Battle On Hill 65
(Operation HUMP 5 to 9 November 1965)
by: Lowell D.
Bittrich
This paper was prepared in May 1966
following my turning over of command
of Company B, lst Battalion 503D Infantry and preparing to return to the United States and Fort
Benning, Georgia. While studying the history of our Nations Civil
War I was often struck by how quickly
memories of key participants in battles fade or become distorted over time.
Rather than meeting the same fate I've prepared this paper knowing that it may still suffer errors caused
by recounting experience solely from my perspective. At Fort Benning I was
invited to prepare a monograph on the battle. I declined. This paper would
have more than met that request. However.,
I had three serious reservations in providing it to anyone: First, at several points I am critical of someone or some
unit. I see no good purpose in making that a matter of record. Secondly, I
found myself using "I'' all too often.
Put differently, many owed
credit for their bravery are not recognized
because I fail to recall their names or the particulars. And third, with
all the anxiety amongst Americans on
the merits of this War (a situation I attribute solely to our lack of political leadership) I don't wish
to provide anyone, any basis to
question the valor of our soldiers or their leadership. The 173D Airborne Brigade enjoyed the finest
leaders our Army had to offer. our
paratroopers were the best our government has ever put on any battlefield.
Early
on Friday, November 5, 1965 the 173D Airborne Brigade (Separate) entered War
Zone "D" in the Republic of Vietnam to conduct Operation HUMP (OPORD
28-65). Somewhat auspiciously the name
of the operation signified the halfway point of our year in Vietnam. The search operation began with the 1/RAR
(Royal Australian Regiment) deployed south of the Dong Nai River and
paratroopers of the lst Battalion (Airborne), 503D Infantry being lifted by
helicopters from the "snake pit" around noon to conduct a helicopter
assault on a LZ northwest of the Dong Nai and Song Be Rivers. Leaving my rear detachment under the control
of my Executive Officer, First Lieutenant Charles E. Johnson, Jr., B Company
deployed with five officers, 195 enlisted men and one ARVN interpreter.
1
The
scene of the battle for hill 65 is best captured by SP4 Joseph M. Kenny, the B
Company, lst Battalion 503D Infantry artillery team radio operator (RTO) from Battery
C, 3D Battalion, 319th Artillery, 173D Airborne Brigade in his poem I'D
Zone":
D ZONE
Beneath
the canopy of green,
Flitting
shadows make their way,
In
silent files they furtively steal,
Looking,
searching for their prey,
Muffled
footfalls barely heard above
other
muted sounds,
Of an armed band moving, through the
heart
of "Cong's" home grounds.
Back
again in the D Zone and it's been
said
and heard,
"Charlie"
shares exclusive rights with
the
One-Seventy-Third.
Of
course it's hotly contested,
And
real estate's on a rising cost,
With
payment made on either side,
In
blood and sweat long lost.
But
now it's push on and on,
Through
swamp and tough terrain,
With
salty sweat searing your eyes,
And
a roaring in your brain,
A
burning feeling in your chest,
And
each breath a gasp of air.
But
it's move and push and drive,
Until
you've found "Charlies" lair.
Maybe
soon they'll call a halt,,
And
you'll slip to the mucky ground,
Grateful
to pick the leeches off,
And
pass the smokes around.
But
now it's bamboo thicket,
And
lurking, snagging vine,
While
up ahead the point man,
Searching
for some sign
Of elusive, wily "Charlie,"
The
guy we're looking for.
And
back in line some joker quips,
"Hell
of a way to fight a war."
A rifle shot cracks out.
Like
the rap of a conductor's baton
That
start's an overture,
And
willing or not it's on.
2
Fire
is answered with fire,
A
crescendo quickly reached,
And
"Charlie" breaks and runs,
As
his line of defense is breached.
The
ensuing silence is unearthly,
Still
there's ringing in your ears,
And
guys are tending the wounded,
Soothing
their unspoken fears.
Here
and there's a still, still shape,
Who'll
never walk D Zone again.
Their
names to be struck from the rolls,
With
one stroke of a shaking pen.
The
call comes down to saddle up,
We'll
soon be on our way,
For
we've a goodly stretch to cover,
Before
the end of day.
The
guys no longer look tired,
They've
a determined look of eye
As
they scan the shrouded flanks
And
treetops that hide the sky.
Now
as I write I feel pride,
Proud
that I have served
With
the "Sky Soldiers" of Company B,
First
of the Five-0-Third.
Having
been the battalion S2 prior to taking command of B Company, I had studied the
area and was well aware of reports of an enemy build-up in the area. While there were signs of activity in and
around the LZ on which we landed, the first three days of the operation turned
out to be relatively uneventful with the exception of an enemy contact in the
Australian sector. Late in the day on
Sunday, November 7, 1965 the battalion had established a base camp. With some time left before dark Lieutenant
Colonel John Tyler (Battalion Commander, lst Battalion 503D Infantry) ordered
each of us to search forward of our company positions. Again we found nothing. However, our C Company Commander, Captain
Henry B. Tucker (just "Tuck" or "Big Tuck" to most of us)
reported hearing chickens cackling to his north. I chuckled, having never seen a chicken in the jungles, and didn't
pay much attention to the report. On
day four of the search (Monday, November 8, 1965) Colonel Tyler, ordered his
rifle companies to continue the search of the area some 35 miles northeast of
Saigon and about 15 miles north of our Bien Hoa base camp. C Company was to conduct its search
northwest of the battalion base in the direction of hill 65. B Company was to
3
move
approximately two kilometers north northeast, fan-out its three platoons and search
an additional one-thousand meters in a northerly direction.
At
approximately 0610 hours on the morning of November 8, 1965 B Company left the
battalion base, which was located at approximate grid coordinates 111303. The company had recently been issued the PRC
25 radio and had insufficient radios to operate below the company level, thus
all platoons were on the company frequency.
The third platoon was in the lead followed by my headquarters and a
small element of the weapons platoon, the first platoon and then the second
platoon. Our plan was to move
approximately two kilometers north northeast, establish a company base, and to
fan-out the three rifle platoons an additional kilometer with the intent to
look at hill 78 in the vicinity of -122323 and the road/trail in the vicinity
of -115329 and -110328.
As
the battalion had secured and spent the night of November 7 together I
cautioned my third platoon leader, 2nd Lieutenant Clair H. Thurston Jr., to
move cautiously out of the battalion perimeter and to take his time searching
forward. The movement to the planned
company base was uneventful with no sign of activity in the area. The company closed on the new company base
at approximately 0715 hours. Having
reported the establishment of our base at approximately _117319, I ordered
Clair to begin moving in the direction of the trail in the vicinity of
_110328. Approximately twenty minutes
later the first platoon moved in the direction of the trail at 115329 and
following their move, ten minutes later, the second platoon headed in the
direction of a hill marked on my map as hill 78.
At
approximately 0750 hours, alerted by sporadic small arms and automatic weapons
fire coming from the southwest of our position, we listened intently to the
battalion command net. Subsequently we
learned that C Company had deployed its second platoon, led by First Lieutenant
Ben Waller, north of the battalion base in direction of hill 65 and was in
contact with an enemy force of about platoon size. Moments later the report was updated with information that
contact was lost with their lead platoon.
Then we began to hear artillery fire.
I alerted all three platoons of the situation and cautioned them to move
slowly as planned. About five minutes
later C Company deployed a second platoon and shortly thereafter reported it
was in contact with an enemy force considerably larger than a platoon. The firing had noticeably increased and was
no longer sporadic.
4
Shortly
after 0815 hours I took three actions; first, ordering all platoons to halt
their movements and to hold their current positions; second, to get prepared to
move in the direction of the firing; and third, notified the battalion we had
stopped our search pending any instructions to continue, return to the
battalion base or to move in the general direction of hill 65. The battalion
RTO acknowledged my call and ordered me to "wait-out." On the company
net I informed my platoon leaders that I anticipated we would be moving shortly
and if so ordered we would reorganize on the march rather than returning to the
company base. My instructions were to
the effect that the third platoon would move on the most direct route toward
hill 65 or the battalion base as the lead platoon, my headquarters element
would intercept the first platoon as it moved to catch the third platoon and
the second platoon would follow and secure the companies rear.
No
sooner had I issued those instructions when Colonel Tyler, on the battalion command
net, asked how long it would take to reassemble my unit. I responded that we were prepared to move
now and felt we could reorganize safely on the move rather than having my
platoons close on my position. Colonel
Tyler acknowledged my response and ordered me to "wait out. 11 Having
learned that Captain Tucker had joined and committed his remaining platoon to
the fight, I told my platoon leaders we would most likely be going directly to
the assistance of C Company and if that were the case we must be prepared to
move on a moments notice. Colonel Tyler
ordered me to move and assist C Company at approximately 0845 hours. He further informed me that the situation
was not clear on hill 65, and that while speed was of the essence, I was not to
take any undo risks. I informed Colonel
Tyler that we were up to it, we had a plan and we were ready to execute.
On
order my third and first platoons moved quickly! I believe both platoons had in fact monitored my conversations with
Colonel Tyler, anticipated the order to move and actually began to execute
their movements prior to my call. My
final instructions were to move to the sound of the firing in the general
direction of hill 65. Unless we made
enemy contact earlier, the third platoon was to hold up just short of the creek
at approximately grid coordinate- 108309, a creek bed just east of hill 65, at
which time I intended for both the third and first platoons to go on line with
the first platoon moving to the left of the third platoon and the second
platoon following the third platoon onto hill 65.
5
My
headquarters element quickly made contact with the first platoon and discovered
that we were paralleling the line of march of the third platoon. I ordered the first platoon leader, First
Lieutenant Michael P. DeFrancisco, to move his platoon even further to the left
or south of the third platoon in order to have two platoons abreast and ready
to rapidly move on line once we reached the objective. The second platoon quickly closed-up on us
and secured the company rear. While on
the move we vainly attempted to establish radio contact with Company C. After
numerous attempts to make radio contact, I became concerned we might have
problems running into C Companies fires.
I alerted my platoons that if they suspected they were receiving
friendly fires they were to hold their position until I could work it out. At this point there was artillery fire north
of hill 65. My artillery team was
monitoring that situation to preclude our walking into fires.
Moving
rapidly, at approximately 0925 hours, Lt. Thurston reported enemy movement
forward of the third platoon on the far side of the creek just short of hill
65. Clair further reported that he
believed the enemy was not aware of his presence; however, he suspected he was
beginning to take fire from C Company.
With one more attempt I raised C Company on the radio. I learned that C Company did not have radio
contact with all of its forward elements but that they would make every attempt
to cease its fires. We agreed that they
only needed to halt the fires on the east side of hill 65 as we would be
attacking from the east side of the creek to get to them. While I attempted to get further information
as to their situation they were having great difficulty even talking to
me. I would learn why latter.
We
deployed the company as planned, began to move to the creek, totally surprising
the enemy force to our front. As we
began to move we opened up, firing everything we had in our third and first
platoons. We had no difficulty crossing
the creek and began to climb the hill having stacked enemy bodies as we
went. We had caught the enemy from the
rear. I believe that C Company had
successfully pushed the enemy off the hill and generally to the north of the
hill. Our contact appeared to have closed on the enemies left flank and with
the element of surprise we were virtually unopposed in getting on the hill.
Moving
initially with the first platoon my headquarters element crossed the creek and
began climbing hill 65. As we climbed
the hill we spotted a series of well dug in and covered enemy positions. None of the positions were occupied and a
number
6
of
the enemy lay dead close to the positions.
In a rush to reach C Company, I moved my headquarters element-quickly to
the left and ahead of the first platoon.
Halfway up the hill one of my radio operators appeared to fall. With the sound of firing coming from many
directions, my initial reaction was that he was hit. I grabbed his harness and continued my climb. Finally I heard him yelling to let go. He had slipped and not been hit. The hill was shaped like an egg, running
generally north and south. Across its
northern crest it is approximately four hundred meters wide and from north to
south some 600 meters deep. From the
creek to the crest of the hill is about 300 meters. The hill was heavily vegetated with teakwood trees and what is
generally referred to as triple canopy jungle.
With the sun not penetrating the treetops, the jungle floor was
generally clear. There were well
traveled trails leading off the north and south sides of the hill.
Upon
reaching the top of the hill I spotted Tucker.
Bullets were flying. He was in a
well dug enemy position with a RTO and his second platoon leader. - As I
approached them they all yelled for me to get down. My immediate concern was for what I saw just forward of their
position. Less than one hundred feet in
front of them was a M60 machine gun being dragged backwards. The weapon was pointed to the north and I
was anxious to get it moving back that direction. once we got the machine gun
forward on the crest of the hill I returned to Tucker's position. On a closer look I found Lt. Waller had been
hit in one shoulder and his opposite hand.
A radio operator was holding the company radio and keying the hand mike
for him. Trying to determine the
situation, the best I could get from them was that they had approximately
twenty-one effective soldiers left on the hill. They weren't sure about the rest of the company. My stomach hurt, there had to be more.
My
early assessment was that we had a mess on our hands and must initially try to
secure a position on the hill. Until I had
a better feel for the C Company situation I would be defending. The firing was intense from the north; and I
had no idea what was between us and the firing. If we could find the remainder of C Company we could consolidate
the position and hold under almost any condition. I ordered the third platoon to attempt to make contact with any C
Company personnel by extending their position to the north of the hill while
continuing to maintain their tie with the first platoon on their right. The second platoon, led by First Lieutenant
Robert A. Frakes, would extend to the right of the first platoon further
winding around the hill.
7
Shortly
following that order the first platoon reported the enemy had moved behind them
and they were taking fire from the east.
I received a similar report from my third platoon. Occupying an abandoned enemy position, I
began to wonder if the enemy had deliberately let us in and was in the process
of closing off all escape routes. Lt.
Thurston reported he was taking fifty caliber fire from two directions. Listening, I could make out the distinct
sound of three fifty caliber machine guns.
They were pounding from three very different directions. I reported to the battalion that I had a very
confusing situation on my hands, that while I was on the hill and had contact
with a small element of C Company, it was difficult to determine exactly where
all elements of the company were located.
I then estimated that we could be up against as many as three Viet Cong
battalions. It was my belief that at
this time in the war one would only find enemy fifty caliber machine guns at
the regimental level. The fact that we
were getting fire from those guns from three distinct and well dispersed
directions caused me to believe we were in contact with a much larger enemy
force then previously reported. A
second alternative was that we were fighting a main line PAVN unit. I am not sure which alternative I reported
to Colonel Tyler. Finally, I reported
that I believe C Company had taken severe casualties, maybe as high as a third
of the company. There was a long pause
before the conversation was acknowledged and terminated.
My
next, and last, conversation with Lt. Thurston had the makings of a
disaster. He reported that he had
spotted an enemy machine gun and was going to take it. Little did I know ' he had decided to do it
on his own. I knew I should have
stopped him, we weren't ready to move to the attack. He moved well forward of his platoon and was killed. When I received that report my heart sank,
and even worse I learned, he was so far forward that we could not get to
him. In a brief conversation with
Platoon Sergeant Walter G. Power I learned the facts and assured myself that he
had the situation back under control.
Once I accepted .the reality and reported to Colonel Tyler, my
headquarters and I became very angry.
Up to this point in the fight we were not able to put a name to any of
the dead. Now this wasn't just a fight
to help C Company, we lost one of our best and they were going to pay. It was time to take calculated risks. Without really understanding the entire
Situation on the ground I began calling for as much artillery as I could
get. My excellent artillery team, from
the 319 Artillery Battalion, brought a curtain of steel forward of us. They initially placed their fires well
forward of the north and northeast base of the hill
8
and
began to walk them in. The fires were devastating
but the enemy would soon tactically adjust to lower their effect.
The
artillery fire temporarily turned the tide by buying us much needed time to
locate all elements of C Company with the exception of seventeen
paratroopers. We would not locate those
remaining seventeen until the following day.
We now had formed a crescent around the hill that extended from the
southeast to the northwest. The south
side of the hill was not covered and so I ordered my second platoon to extend
as far to the south as possible without jeopardizing their current
position. At that time I made an
estimate of C Companies casualties.
While they were severe, we had found many more than twenty-one effective
paratroopers at the top of the hill with which to make a fight. While the firing continued, we quickly began
the task of consolidating the position and recovering the dead and wounded. our
medics were pushed to their limits but accomplished the seemingly impossible. I ordered everyone to "dig in," we
were going to hold this position. The
worst was yet to come.
The
adjustment the enemy made, as a result of our effective artillery, was to move
closer to us in order to avoid the devastating fires. Their reaction clearly demonstrated that we were up against a highly
trained and disciplined force. I
reported to Colonel Tyler that I believed we were surrounded and, while we
would hold the position, we were going to need help. Colonel Tyler provided encouragement and said he was working on
it. Then, out of seemingly nowhere, came the sounds of three bugles. My operations sergeant, Staff Sergeant
Ernest J. Sundborg, turned to me and asked if I had heard them. I said I didn't, but I had. My mind just didn't want to accept it. After
what seemed a lifetime, I realized we had to move fast to overcome a major
assault. I called for more artillery
and again reported that we needed help if we were to hold. My platoons reacted quickly, almost without
direction, repositioning machine guns and troopers to meet the blunt of the
attack. Leaders seemed to appear
everywhere knowing what was about to happen.
I tried to be everywhere. We
were ready for the worst. The enemy
came at us shoulder-to-shoulder. It was
unreal, like something out of films from the civil war. They made it about halfway up the hill when
we finally broke them and they backed down off the hill slowly. They made a second attempt, seemingly more
desperate than the first, but it met with the same fate. This time they were in retreat, but it
wasn't over yet.
Prior
to the first assault, in an effort to collect, treat,
9
and
protect the wounded, I had begun to established a position for them on the
south side of hill 65. - I thought this to be the safest place on the
battlefield. I was wrong and would
learn it shortly. To protect them I
ordered the second platoon to assign two squads (eighteen paratroopers) to
secure the area. The position was no
sooner establish then it was hit by yet another terrible assault. The remainder of the second platoon
attempted to come to their rescue.
However, the position was cut off from the rest of the company and they
were fighting hand-to-hand. Over a
short fifteen minute period, three desperate reports came from three different
non-commissioned officers over the company net. Each of them died shortly following their request for help. Finally, Specialist 4th Class Jerry W.
Langston took over the radio, making one more effort to report. We only had his name when all radio contact
was lost. When the second platoon was
unable to get to them, I ordered the first platoon to move to that area. Some hours later, after reporting they had
busted their way through a wall of the enemy, the first platoon reported they
had retaken the position, found fifteen dead, two severely wounded paratroopers
and Langston, unconscious with a large hole in his helmet, but still
alive. While we exacted a heavy toll on
the enemy, we paid a terrible price for not adequately covering our rear.
During
a lull in the fighting I began to move among the wounded, meeting for the first
time our Protestant Chaplain James "Jim" M. Hutchens. He was new to the battalion and had moved
with C Company on this operation. He
had been hit in one leg attempting to get to some of our wounded. He was in pain but he smiled. Somehow that smile made me feel better (that
smile was a gift he shared with our battalion throughout the rest of our tour). I watched as Specialist 5th Class Lawrence
Joel, a medic from C Company, hit several times in one leg, treated several of
our wounded. Some of those wounded he
had dragged out of the firing. He was
in great pain but kept on helping. My
eyes began to blur, we had paid a dear price.
Reaching for the radio, I readied for my toughest report. When Colonel Tyler came on the net it took
everything I had to report I estimated our two companies had more than forty
dead, approximately seventy wounded, and were missing up to another
twenty. For the second time I
experienced a long pause on the radio followed by a pained “out”.
By
now we had received over 900 artillery rounds in support of our fight on the
hill. Fighting continued throughout the
day with some indications that the enemy was trying to disengage. By
10
now
the battalion had added air power to the fray hitting targets well out from our
position and along the-trail we had planned to take a look at prior to this
fight. Approximately thirty five air
strikes supported this effort. I
reported that we were loosing contact and felt that the enemy was trying to
escape. My estimate up the point of the
three major enemy attacks was that they had well over 110 killed with no idea
of the number of their wounded. With
the action just completed my new estimate was twice that previously reported.
I
then learned that the battalion headquarters had been hit earlier by a mortar
round. That came as a surprise as we
had not experienced any mortar fire on the hill. It also caused me to wonder as to their situation. With triple canopy jungle we were
experiencing difficulty firing grenade launchers and thus had ruled out the use
of mortars early in the fight. Earlier
I became aware that A Company was tasked to attempt to get to us. As their lead platoon left the battalion base
it was hit hard by an enemy force. In
that contact A Company lost a platoon leader, Second Lieutenant David L.
Ugland, a classmate of Lt. Thurston.
Their effort to get to us was called off. Subsequently I received a report that my second platoon had spotted
an element of A Company and may have taken fire from that element. Trying to confirm that report I became
convinced it was highly improbable because the A Company enemy contact occurred
within about two hundred and fifty meters of the battalion base. At about the same time I received two
disturbing reports, one from my second platoon and one from Captain Tucker, of
the enemy in differing types of uniforms and some wearing helmets. The same report came from the only survivor
of the seventeen missing from C Company on the following day.
Having
learned of the details of the failed A Company effort and the mortar attack on
the battalion, a third even greater disappointment was yet to come. The lst Infantry Division had been requested
to deploy a battalion in support of the battle and the reported response was
"We are still training and not ready to fight!" Upon receiving that
message I made a number of crude comments and even thought worse. I doubted that I would ever forget that message. That historic division deserved better! Fortunately, they were to get a new and
great Division Commander shortly after this battle and many of those commanders
who believed they had come to Vietnam to train lost their commands.
Ever
so gradually fires were falling off. At
around 1600 hours, one of my rifle squad leaders, Staff Sergeant Billie R.
11
Wear,
from the third platoon approached me and asked if we would make an attempt to
recover Lt. Thurston from the battlefield.
I told him we had to get him but I would need help. SSgt Wear said he knew where Lt. Thurston
had fallen and he was willing to lead a recovery effort. I approved the effort but stated I was going
with him. After some brief exchange we
moved out and at approximately 1625 hours an improvised squad of the third
platoon, made up mostly of non-commissioned officers, lead by SSgt Wear,
recovered the remains of their fallen leader.
While not probably the wisest decision on my part, I felt compelled to
follow the squad in this recovery and I understood the unusual composition of
that squad. Later, some would claim I
lead the effort. That was not the case. I had become a rifleman because we had lost
one of my lieutenants and I wanted him back under any circumstance. With the recovery of Lt. Thurston, we had
accounted for all members of my command.
We had yet to find seventeen missing from C Company. We all knew we would not leave this
battlefield without them.
With
contact apparently broken, I set about the task of trying to get our critically
wounded out, get more ammunition in, and to prepare to secure the position for
the night. We continued our attempt to
clear an area to get 'helicopters in to carry our wounded out. It didn't take us much longer to realize we
couldn't get it done prior to dark with what we had to work with. With a lot of effort from the battalion, the
Air Force came to our rescue. From the
Bien Hoa Air Base they sent a fire-fighting helicopter to hover above us while
lowering a basket. Five times, over
five trips we put a critically wounded paratrooper in a basket they lowered
through the canopy, and five times the Air Force wenched our troopers through
that triple canopy jungle in an attempt to save each of them. They succeeded and were willing to continue
to try and save more as it began to get dark.
It was a painful decision but I called them off. It was getting dark and not only could we
not hear the battlefield with the aircraft hovering above us, we now could not
see to our front. The risk was becoming
too great to go on with it. I knew we
would lose more wounded through the night.
Because of their efforts all five survived. In between the Air Force flights, we were resupplied by an Army
helicopter dropping their bundles through the jungle canopy with but one
mishap. In coding a resupply message I
mistakenly called for one hundred trip flares when I had intended to order one
hundred claymore mines. Nonetheless, we
made good use of the trip flares and fortunately none of them went off during
the night.
12
Early
in the evening I had many of the dead and wounded moved to the rear of my
position on top of the hill. It was
crowded and their suffering at times made it noisy. I felt we could better protect them from this position rather
than place them at any further risk from another onslaught from the bottom of
the hill. Through the night we lost one
of our wounded. That they were able to
hold that number to one was a tribute to the extraordinary efforts of our
medics. Later, several days following
the operation, I was indirectly criticized by medical personnel (none of which
were with us on hill 65) in a battalion staff meeting not for my decision to
call off the rescue helicopter but for having placed the dead and wounded so
close to each other and so close to my command post. They gave me a lecture on "morale in combat." Frankly,
I wasn't impressed and I told them so.
In fact, they had a point.
However, giving their timing and the alternatives we faced, I wasn't
inclined to acknowledge their well reasoned arguments as I was troubled in my
decision to call off the Air Force rescue helicopter. Colonel Tyler kindly intervened in the heated discussion and
brought it to a halt.
Early
that evening we received a torrential rain, the last of the rainy season. Thankfully it didn't last long. We needed to be able to hear what might be
going on around us. Throughout the
night I paced the area, tried several times to rest on an enemy crafted log
table, and listened, and listened.
Above it all I wanted to hear the sound of the battlefield. It was deadly quiet even with the suffering
of our wounded. My mind now centered on
how we were going to get our remaining wounded and dead out of this place. We couldn't walk and carry them out except
at great risk to them. Some of the
wounded just couldn't make that trip. I
had no idea as to the situation at the battalion base. I realized we weren't going to get any
outside help, no one was coming to us.
The Air Force had done a great job penetrating the jungle with their
basket but we had too many wounded to count on that again. We hadn't made much progress on a landing
zone. We had to do better and we were
going to have to do it on our own.
How? I talked with Captain
Tucker and we came up with a plan. We
would call for chain saws and explosives.
We would open a hole in this jungle and get helicopters on the ground to
get them out. By first light we were
ready.
As
light broke through the jungle on Tuesday, November 9, 1965 all our leaders
knew what to do and were moving.
Medical evacuation helicopters, gun ships, and Brigadier General Ellis
W. Williamson, Commander 173D Airborne Brigade, in his command
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helicopter
were above us. I cautioned them to keep
the helicopters clear of us so we could hear . Just having them near was a help
to us. We had three tasks -to
accomplish: First, we had to probe forward of the perimeter and determine if
the enemy was there. Second, we had to
find the missing soldiers from c Company.
And third, we had to create ia hole in the jungle. How the first task played out would
determine how difficult this day would be.
The answer to the first task came quickly. The enemy had fled leaving many of their dead (some reportedly
stripped of their uniforms). The second
task was left to C Company and they soon found their missing in a number of
locations. Amongst the last of the
seventeen missing they found one alive.
He had spent a day on the battlefield playing dead surrounded by the
enemy. Cutting a hole in the jungle,
our third task, turned out to be a lot tougher than we had imagined. The Air Force dropped us the saws but they
were impossible against teakwood trees.
Dynamite did the job but created a hell of a mess that had to be
cleared. Everyone helped, some to the
point of exhaustion. When we thought we
had finally got the job done we called for a medical evacuation helicopter
(Dust Off). From the air our cutout in
the jungle must have looked like a pin hole.
They needed an opening twice as large if they were to get on the
ground. We went back to work, blew out
more trees. Still not good enough; they
began dropping smoke grenades trying to mark areas that had to be taken
out. The troops kept at it taking turns
working on a landing zone and guarding the perimeter. It was still not good enough.
Finally,
General Williamson radioed he was coming in.
He stripped his aircraft and started the decent. Some of us knew his pilot, WO Charles Smith,
and believed if there ever was someone to take on this task he was the
guy. It was slow, we could feel the
helicopter vibrate, we watched WO Smith thread the needle, descending some 200
to 250 feet with little room to clear the blades, he put the helicopter on the
ground. General Williamson 3umped out
of the aircraft and told me to load it up.
The General spotted our dead, all covered in ponchos, stopped, looked at
them, and seemingly paused to say a prayer.
I moved away. We put as many wounded
on the aircraft as we could and WO Smith started his vertical climb out of the
jungle. We held our breath. This was even slower than when he came in. He cleared the trees and we began to breathe
again. Now we knew the "Dust
Off" would be coming in. They came
and left as fast as we could load them.
On each decent and as each lifted off we prayed. I marveled at those pilots. In about two hours all the wounded were on
their way to the Third Surgical Hospital and our dead were beginning their long
journey home to their loved ones. We
14
would
say our last goodbye at a memorial service on November 15.
I
expected one more helicopter to come in and get the General out. He said no, he was walking out with us. I hadn't anticipated this and quickly became
concerned as did the troops around me.
We didn't know the situation between our position and the battalion
base. He had done enough getting our
dead and wounded out. We needed him,
but others need him more. How in the
hell were we going to protect him, why take the chance? I called Colonel Tyler and asked him to
intervene. He had never failed me
before but this time he would. The
General stood firm. Colonel Tyler
ordered me to take it very slow and get him back to his location. I got the message. We weren't going to lose this guy.
The
General, knowing of my concern, simply smiled at me and with confidence said
"Let me know when your ready." With that I said that B Company would take
the lead, left him with Captain Tucker, and began to organize the march to the
battalion base. I made sure everyone
knew we had the General with us, we would move slowly and we would not be
taking any chances. The troops shared
my concern and seemed to get a very determined look in their eyes. They knew they had another job to do and
they were ready. Once organized, I
asked General Williamson to follow my command element. With that I grabbed the radio and ordered
the company to "move out." While very tired, the troops were superb,
and just as in the poem by SP4 Kenny:
"The
guys no longer look tired,
They've
a determined look of eye
As they scan the
shrouded flanks
And
treetops that hide the sky."
We
moved slowly, well spread out, followed by C Company. Within an hour we closed on the battalion base. I put my unit on the perimeter and stood on
that perimeter until the last paratrooper of C Company closed the position.
That last man straightened up and said, "All the Way, Sir." I
responded proudly, "Airborne." B Company had done its job, we had C
Company back; we were dirty, tired and proud!
From
the battalion base, C Company was the first to liftoff for the return flight to our base camp at Bien Hoa. C Company was followed by the extraction of
A Company, and then my company.
Generally I would lift out with my headquarters following my
company. In this case we stayed on the
ground until the battalion headquarters flew out. Just prior to the liftoff of
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the
headquarters we heard small arms fire coming from the jungle. Gunships were returning fire as we
extracted.
Upon
closing at our Bien Hoa base camp I reported all my personnel and weapons accounted
for and headed for the hospital. Having
a bit of a phobia on being in a hospital, usually getting sick to my stomach if
there more than about fifteen minutes, it became my habit to get there as
quickly as possible to avoid any excuses.
More importantly, I wanted our wounded to know they were uppermost in
our minds and we wanted them back as quickly as possible. This time I had a change of heart. While on the chopper returning to Bien Hoa I
recalled the number of my soldiers wounded and killed on this operation that
had been wounded on prior operations.
While their'-'were more, three stuck in my mind and two of those were
dead. The dead were Lt. Thurston and
Specialist 4th Class Wayne W. Humphries.
Both had been wounded in action in early October near Ben Cat as we
penetrated the "Iron Triangle." The third was seriously wounded and I
wondered if he would even live. In the
past we allowed our wounded to choose if they would return to the unit or go
home. I could not recall a case where
they chose to go home. It was time to
say "enough" even to one tough paratrooper.
When
I found my third man at the hospital I said "Your going home."
Angered he put on quit a scene. I had
to chase away some medical personnel that wanted to restrain him. He pleaded to return to the unit. I held fast. Finally, telling him I would be back to see him, went outside to
get some air. He was hurt too much to
return anyway, they had to evacuate him.
With that feisty spirit I knew he would make it. I saw him again in a military hospital on my
way to Fort Benning. He was still
recovering in a ward with one of our great leaders, Platoon Sergeant Adam A.
Bernosky of the first platoon. Bernosky
was seriously wounded on March 16, 1966 during an operation near Phuoc Vinh
where B Company was the lead company of the First Battalion 503D Infantry going
to the aid of another unit, this time the Second Battalion 503D Infantry.
I
then visited the other wounded. Here my
notes on the wounded are mixed with wounded from another fight. On New Years
Day 1966, during Operation Marauder on the "Plain of Reeds" west of
the Oriental River near Kien Tuong, B Company again had to go to the aid of C
Company. My recall of those wounded on
hill 65 may include some wounded from the New Years Day fight. In any case, from the second platoon I
talked with PFC John C. "Dutch" Holland, PFC Larry Anderson, PFC
Ronald G. Apodaca, Specialist
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4th
Class Wallace S. Tao and Sgt. Theodore Shamblin. Sgt. Shamblin was hurt so badly that he would be evacuated and
subsequently die on November llth.
From-the first and third platoons I talked with several of my soldiers
recalling only PFC Manual Garza, SSG Wallace A. Warden and Sgt. Hector
Membreno. This group was doing very
well; but were anxious to find out more on the fight. I could not see several soldiers as they were still being worked
on or were in recovery. I spoke briefly
with Chaplain Hutchens, he still had that rare smile, looked good and was
collecting visitors to the point that some wanted us out of there. General William C. Westmoreland visited our
wounded the following morning, November 10th.
Late in the day I got called away from the hospital with an urgent
message to return to my unit. General
Westmoreland would also be visiting my company.
Upon
my return I found more chaos in my orderly room than I experienced during the
fight. It seemed everyone from the
battalion and brigade staffs wanted to help us get ready for the Generals
visit. Still thinking about my soldiers
in the hospital, being tired and dirty, having not slept, shaved or washed in
two days, I had little patience and sent some folks packing. They got the message and I didn't get any
more help, guidance or visitors until the General arrived the next day. In preparation for his visit I called my
Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants together and issued my instructions. They were simple and prioritized; first, get
a shave and a shower, get some chow, get to sleep, and tomorrow morning we'll
start our "six-hour drill." I saw a wall of smiles, we had a plan and
they liked it.
Our
six-hour drill originated from an earlier experience where we witnessed another
company coming off an operation and a commander allowing his troops to soak up
much-too-much beer. The sad result was
troops feeling sorry for themselves, second guessing each other and even
blaming each other for some of their casualties. The end result was a unit out of control until they
sobered-up. Our drill focused minds and
energy on getting ready for the next operation, highlighted by my conduct of a
"stand by" 100 percent inspection of everyone and everything we
owned, and to whichever platoon fared the worse the honor of pulling all major
details until we moved out on the next operation. General Westmoreland would never know he was the inspector on
this one.
The
visit of General Westmoreland was great.
Accompanying the General was Colonel Tyler and General Williamson. General Westmoreland talked with each of my
soldiers. It was a "standby."
I led him to each soldier in their squad tent.
As he
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entered
each tent our troops were called to attention and then instructed to continue working
on their -equipment as part of the six-hour drill. As I approached their bunk the soldier came to attention, I
stepped aside and the General stood toe-to-toe with each of them. He usually began by asking them if they were
in the fight. He would go on to ask if
they had fired their weapon. All but
one of my soldiers responded they had fired their weapon. When that soldier was asked why he didn't
fire his weapon, he responded, "Sir, I'm a Grenadier, I was so damn busy
firing a M60 Machine Gun, a M16 Rifle and my 45, I never got to my Grenade
Launcher." Then it would get more personnel with questions on where they
came from, how long they has been in the Army, their assignments and the like.
one of my soldiers with a speech defect felt pushed to the point that after
several questions, the last of which was: "How do you know you killed the
enemy?" responded without a stutter, "Because I got his blood all
over me." While they talked I would look at their weapons and equipment.
Later
the troops would tell me how much they appreciated getting the opportunity to
stand toe-to-toe with the General.
Others thanked me for not having the usual formation in the sun with
someone simply talking to them. As I
accompanied General Westmoreland back to his helicopter he stopped, turned
toward me and asked "Captain Bittrich, your- really proud of your soldiers
aren't you?" I was and I told him so.
He asked if we needed anything.
I responded we didn't. Later
some of my troops would say I blew that question. Finally he asked how long it would take us to be ready for
another mission. I told him we were
ready now! He said he always enjoyed
the opportunity to talk with paratroopers and thanked me. We exchanged salutes and I left him with
General Williamson and Colonel Tyler. I
called my leaders together, informed them as to the General's comments, thanked
them and announced a winner (that I can't recall) of the six-hour drill. Then I began the sad process of writing
letters to the parents and loved ones of our dead.
On
Friday, November 12, 1965 Brig.
Gen. Williamson, Capt. Tucker, Sgt. Sylvester Bryant, SSgt. Wear and I briefed the Saigon press,
derisively referred to as the five o'clock follies, on the operation. We got a lot of questions on "being
ambushed" and "fallen into a Viet Cong trap." General Williamson
took those head-on as nonsense. Tucker
reported, "They began charging in human waves with bugles blaring." I
reported, "We killed about 90 Viet Cong as we busted through one of their
encirclements.11 Too another question I responded "When we finally
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fought our way to the top of the hill, we counted 111 Viet Cong bodies lying there." SSgt Wear offered,"I don't know what VC unit was there, but I know the other side knows we were there and won't want to tangle with the 173d again for a long time." The most quotable quote was offered by Sgt. Bryant, "I figure the Viet Cong would have been able to hold roll call the next morning in a telephone booth." I laughed for the first time in days.
For
several days the press continued to report the battle. Reporter Tom Tiede published a detailed
account of Specialist 4th Class Langston and the paratroopers cut off during
the battle. He published a second
article covering PFC Terry Hinson, his role in the fight, and the fact that he
was seventeen years old. That article
caused a reaction in the states that would lead to us sending Terry and all seventeen
year old soldiers home. He published a
third story covering PFC Edward C. Bable and his effort to save his wounded
buddies. Joseph Alsop from Washington
gave an account of the battle. A UPI
headline article appeared in the "Saigon Daily News" on November 9th
and other headline articles appeared in the "Pacific Stars and
Stripes" and "The Saigon Post" on Wednesday, November 10th. Several of their reports carried the line
that the battle for hill 65 had been the biggest battle of the war up to that
time. As we were honoring our dead the
ist Air Cavalry Division would lay claim to that record as they fought North
Vietnam regulars from November 14 to 19 in a battle for the Ia Drang Valley.