“NIMITZ GRAY BOOK”
Volume 2 of 8

War Plans and Files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Running Estimate and Summary maintained by
Captain James M. Steele, USN, CINCPAC staff at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
covering the period 1 September 1942–31 December 1942.

The following series of images is the first step in the American Naval Records Society’s project to produce a scholarly on-line edition of this important, declassified, primary source.

At this early stage, ANRS is able to provide images of one of the copies of the “Gray Book” that are located in Papers of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at the Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington D.C.

This copy consists of loose pages that could be readily scanned. Sections of some of the typed pages in this copy are blurry and difficult to read, and, in addition, this copy does not show the color-coding that is present in the tightly-bound original.

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SECRET

WAR PLANS

CINCPAC FILES

SECRET

SUBJECT: Captain Steele's "RUNNING ESTIMATE and SUMMARY", covering the period

FILE: 1 September, 1942, to 31 December, 1942.
SECRET
9 APR 44 (CTR)

01 0305 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH CTF 61 61 62 COMDUMPAC.

Most Secret. Fully concern with Commaropen 310402. CACTUS not only a base of major value to nation holding but is first foot of ground taken from an enemy who has some cause to consider his armies invincible. The strength of his forces in and enroute to the area and additional available forces indicated as being prepared to move in and the relatively short line of communications leave no doubt of an all out offensive. Repeated and sometimes successful attempts to land infiltration or advance troops clearly indicate CACTUS as a major preliminary objective. It is my considered opinion that at this time the retention of CACTUS is more vital to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific than any other commitment. CACTUS cannot be held unless strong air forces of types of planes requested in reference and in other dispatches of like import plus inshore patrol forces previously requested be promptly supplied. Comgensopac and Comtaskfor 62 have by hand.

01 1315 COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOPAC.

Handle with the greatest secrecy. At this distance it is difficult to understand how enemy operations such as are reported in Comgen 1st MarDiv 310200 and the destroyer bombardment in his 250955 can approach and proceed relatively unmolested.

01 1256 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC CTFs 11,16,17,18 info LEARY etc.

Operations September 1st. Handle as most secret. Enemy force estimated at least 2 cruisers 2 DD located by SBD-2 miles West TAIWO Point GUADALCANAL 0050-11 31st. 1 cruiser JINTSU class. Planes attacked 1 near miss on cruiser. 10 SBDs took off but lost contact when ships dispersed. 3 F4 planes failed to return from patrol went in response air raid alarm GUADALCANAL 31st. Fletcher states SARATOGA able to make 14 knots but damage makes it necessary return her PEARL. Leaving large part of her planes here for carrier replacement. 3 YFs arrived GUADALCANAL.
01 1237 OTF 62 to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOPOAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Comamphorsopac fully supports the opinions expressed by Comairsoopac in his 310402 and recommend that the air sup-
he desires be provided. Para. While always in favor of
the move to TULAGI it may be remembered that I warned that
such a move to be permanently successful would entail con-
tinuous support by strong Naval and air forces. Para. Here
in the SOLOMONS now have an unsinkable aircraft carrier
which I believe may finally be multiplied into an invincible
fleet adequate for a decisive move, but this will require
patience, and the determined support by forces of a strength
and character which you do not now have under your control.
Para. The enemy is now hampered by his adventures in the
ALEUTIANS and Eastern NEW GUINEA. I believe that the im-
mediate consolidation and extension of our CACTUS position
is now possible and advisable, and is a golden military
opportunity that ought not be missed.

01 2331 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPOAC, CINCPAC, OTF 61 COMP.

Comairsoopac 310402 Comsopac 010305 all aircraft that can be
served from ENTERPRISE SARATOGA being transferred Comsopac
for use present campaign. Employment carrier aircraft and
pilots from shore bases necessary because of lack suitable
Army type planes for GUADALCANAL fighting but such use car-
rrier pilots most uneconomic from military viewpoint and our
present shortage trained carrier air groups. To ensure suc-
cess present campaign steady flow to 5oPac of suitable Army
aircraft with trained pilots must be instituted at once.
Consider P-38 A-24 B-25 3-26 suitable present types. My
252241 and my serial 0164W of July 17, '42. Let's give
CACTUS the wherewithall to live up to its name. Something
for the Japs to remember forever.

02 0300 COMSOPAC to MacARTHUR, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC CASOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Cominco 271320 (in 3 parts) refers
me to you for emergency assistance my air effort. Situation
CACTUS is most difficult and becoming critical due heavy and
frequent air attacks to meet which do not have fighters in
sufficient numbers or adequate performance. Army P-400 seat
CACTUS from FPOF exhausted. Replacements enroute cannot
be made available CACTUS prior late September and will be
P-39 type. Can you send me small force of P-38 fighters with
pilots and few key mechanical personnel. I can provide trans-
portation.
Your 271320 in 3 parts. In so far as I can determine I have no information as to types of aircraft embarked in vessels enroute SUMAC. Nor have I been able to interpret the instructions to Harmon such as to give me authority to divert aircraft in ships for use this area. What I have urged and Harmon has likewise urged is that I be reinforced with aircraft (particularly fighters) of suitable types for effective use in present operations. I am asking MacArthur for such P-38’s as he can spare from his present operations. I again urge that my requests and requests of Harmon be given favorable and prompt consideration for the reasons previously given that other types of fighters not effective as evidenced that out of 14 P-400’s sent to CACTUS only 2 remained effective yesterday. In present operation we must have planes suitable to effectively combat the enemy and P-39 series is not effective against his high altitude operations. Authority for diversion of SUMAC bombers in transit by air is fully understood and has been and will continue to be applied with the most careful consideration requirements Sopac and Sowesopic.

01 2313 C.G. CACTUS to CTF 62. Info CONSOPAC.

To CTF 62 Info Consopac from CACTUS. My 202013 and Consopac 201132. Appears enemy is building up striking force by continuous small lendings during darkness. Due to difficult terrain areas are beyond range of land operations except at expense of weakening defense of airfield. We do not have a balanced force and it is imperative that following measures be taken: Alfa. Base planes here capable of searching beyond steaming range during darkness. Baker. Provide surface craft DD’s or motor torpedo boats for night patrolling. Cast. Provide striking force for active defense by transferring 7th Marines to CACTUS. If not prevented by surface craft enemy can continue night landings beyond our range of action and build up large force.

03 1231 CONSOPAC to CTF 11.16.16.17. COMINCH. CINCPAC. COMDOWSPAC.

Handle as most secret. Operations 3rd. B 17 on patrol made 1 500 pound bomb hit on AB or AV at 7-16 South Long 150-3 East 1100 2nd. Ship stopped. Fire forward. Large oil slick. PEY on patrol got near miss on DD possibly escorting SS at 2-40 South 160-18 East 1100 L (-11) At 0900 L (-11) 2nd several hostile planes bombed GUADALCANAL. 1 killed 1 wounded. No material damage. At 1140 L (-11) 2nd 18 twin engined bombers dropped bombs GUADALCANAL. 1 killed 5 wounded. 1 B-24 destroyed also some Avgas and ammunition. Our planes brought down 1 bombers 1 zero. AA shot down 1 bomber. All our planes returned. Latey pass to MacArthur. Afternoon 3rd TF 16 arrived noumena. WILLIAM WARD BERMOWS unloaded and floated off SYLWIA reef after being aground for 3 days.
03 0736 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 Info CTF 11.16.61.62. CINCPAC.

While Taskforce 16 is engaged in replenishment and pending reorganization on carrier task forces the directive assigned carrier task forces in Mydis 271026 of August is modified as follows: Task force 17 operate generally south of latitude 12 degrees. Avoid remaining in same locality to prevent concentration of enemy submarines against you. Destroy promising targets whenever located. Your freedom of movement as may be required by the presence of enemy submarines or other is not limited by any general restrictions herein given.

04 1116 COMSOPAC. to CTF 16.17.18.62.63.11. CINCPAC. COMFTHE SPACFOR.

Operations 4th. At 0200 L (-11) 3rd 3 hostile SS shelled GUADALCANAL. No damage. No casualties. Our planes 3rd strafed several boats and barges on and near beaches southeast TAIYU Point. HURROWS departed GUADALCANAL 1645 L (-11) 4th.

04 0300 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Your 032013 for your information I plan to put the 7th Marines into GUADALCANAL probably Southeast TAIYU Point as soon as plans and arrangements can be made. Desire but small force on TRIVANTON Island possibly from a battalion of Army troops to permit preliminary work on air field that station and as deterrent to enemy action against AVP operating planes from GRACIOSA Bay SANTA CRUZ. Comsopac to Cinopac.
Ultra secret from Comgenforsopac those not addressed stop decoding. Beginning about 13 September under my command your unit plus embarked troops plus raider battalion in APDs plus approximately one third of 5th Defense Battalion will hold 2 battle rehearsals of landing on beach GREEN against opposition for establishment of strong supporting position. Troops will be commanded by a general officer to be named later. Para. Prepare detailed troop and material landing and tactical plans suitable for rehearsals generally similar to CACTUS landing. My OpPlan Affirm 3 Annex Dog except assume beachhead will be established by Raider Battalion during darkness. Propose withdraw surface vessels at one of 14 hours therefore plan must be carefully drawn to ensure landing only essential personnel and material and rapid unloading at beach. Para. Following points are emphasized: Affirm country is jungle with many streams. Motor vehicles must be few. Amphibian tractors and rubber boats will be required. Baker Engineering equipment largely hand operated. As many machetes shovels axes brush hooks intrenching tools as possible plus wire and stakes. Sandbags in bundles of 100. Camouflage nets. Large supply radio batteries all types. Paulins and flies for protecting stores. Nix tents except shelter hanes and few hospitals. Water filtration plants but nil distilling apparatus. Cast. Carefully balanced stores for 30 days. Rations 30 days class baker 10 days cast or king and 5 days dog. Gasoline kerosene in tins McCawley will land fuel in drums. Dog, 3 units of fire but maximum amounts grenades canister demolitions charges and land mines. Para. You will be able to land some excess vehicles prior to rehearsal to clear access to cargo. Para. You are aware of errors we made at CACTUS and RINGBOLT. Avoid them in this operation.

Handle as most secret. Operations 5th. 13 boats southeast coast ISABEL Island and 30 landing craft southwest coast CAY JORGE Island were discovered by GUADALCANAL air patrol 3rd., were bombed strafed, most were left sunk or burning. At 0200 L (-11) 5th 5 hostile DD's shelled GUADALCANAL, sank LITTLE and GREGORY. Casualties not yet known believed heavy.
CINCPAC to CONTASKFOR J INFO COMMON

Utmost secrecy. In the event of threatened enemy landing in Hawaiian Sea Frontier Task Force I, 6th marine available screen will probably be ordered to sail immediately to repel the attack. Maximum available cover by land based aircraft will be furnished. Current plans for your operations and training must be based on this contingency.

CONTASKFOR II to COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC CTF-18 COMSUBPAC

Arrived BLEACHER. Following ships to accompany SARATOGA Pearl: NEW ORLEANS, ATLANTA, PHILPS, DONKEY, WILSON, CUMMINGS, WILSON, Commander Cruisers Task Force II on MINNEAPOLIS. That ship with MACDONOUGH PARSONS HOBSON GRAYSON being provisioned to capacity and awaiting your orders. No fuel available. Ships remaining in area have enough fuel to reach WHITE POPPY. Necessary this force fuel prior departure or enroute to Pearl. Transferring remainder aviation material BLEACHER. SARATOGA still has six officers including flight surgeon and 50 men to transfer to her squadron at ROSES and BURNET. As forwarding via airmail report as requested your 050800. Temporary repairs being effected. Will advise later when ready depart probably 3 or 4 days. Expect to make 15 knots enroute Pearl. No deaths and only few slight injuries as result of torpedoing.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, CONTUS, COMSOPAC CTF 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23

Handle as most secret. Operations 6th. Two B-17's bombed three enemy 15s 5th position 04-20 south Long 150-25 east results negative. 12 officers 226 enlisted from CUMBERLAND and LITTLE reported rescued. Enemy force which sank them now reported at least one cruiser, two DD. Morning patrol from GUADALCANAL fifth sighted 12 large Jap landing boats each carrying about 75 men approaching northwest GUADALCANAL. Strafed boats three sink. P-40's attacked with bombs and light machine guns. Approached to cause many personnel casualties. Bombs sink one boat. Strafed boats on beach. Believed to have destroyed one 15. 12 45 L(48) 5th BS twin engine bombers covered by 16 screen approached our position GUADALCANAL. Only few our aircraft intercepted and provides alert. These can be considered to have sunk two miles eastward LUNGA POINT. BOMBERS CFT 11-25 shot down, the P40 lost during boat strafing operation, Sherman tanks. Enemy pass to MacArthur. CFT 15 11-20 three damaged, one pilot wounded. Lieutenant R.C. Blean on patrol in FTQ at 05-20 5th shot down one Hawaiian two four engine lander boat at 05-30 South Long 180-20 east. Confirmed by second plane which saw this plane burning in water.
SECRET

06 1720 COMINCH to Cinopac, CTF 8, and other commands concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are addressing. Greenslade pass to Dewitt and furnish him copy of CTF 8 042027. Most secret. The occupation of PRIILLOFF approved subject to provision last sentence Comtaskfor 8 042027. Modification of occupation of TANAGA as set forth in CTF 8 052130 also approved.

06 1950 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

Most Secret. My 042027. Am in receipt of message from Buckner stating he has orders from Dewitt to occupy PRIILLOFF and will advise me when to supply escorts and length of time they will be required. My present orders oblige all my surface forces in FIREPLACE operations as stated in reference. Dewitt has never asked me whether or not local naval forces are prepared to support PRIILLOFF move. When PRIILLOFF fighter strip is installed Dewitt apparently expects fighting planes stationed there without again consulting me although I command Alaskan air forces. I am in effect being ordered by Dewitt to take certain action although in no way subject to his command. Shall take no action nor reply to Buckner until I have your directive in premises.

07 0452 Cinopac to NOISE, MacDONOUGH, and various others.

Handle as most secret. A screening and attack force designated Task Force 64 is hereby established composed initially as follows: Rear Admiral Wright in MINNEAPOLIS Task Force Commander with NOISE HUNZE LEANDER DESDIV 22 PARRAGUT and MacDONOUGH. Task Force 64 assigned temporarily to Comtaskfor 62 for operational control, units now at BEECHER to act as escort for transport movement from BEECHER to PUTTEN as directed by Comtaskfor 62. NOISE and LEANDER will join Task Force 64 at PUTTEN. Comtaskforces 62 and LEANDER have for action Comtaskfor 16 for info.

07 1150 Cinopac to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMPOWERPAC, MacArthur.

CTF 62 11 17 63 16.

Operations 7th. Handle as most secret. On 6th 2 PBYs attacked serial 43 lat 05 south long 162-50 east getting hits but no visible damage. B-17 attacked serial 43 on 6th at latitude 07-30 south long 157-40 east. Many hits but Jap escaped in rain squall. 11 SBDs escorted by 6 fighters bombed installations and buildings south side HIZO harbor 6th. Serious damage caused. No ships or planes seen. No AA. Reconnaissance shows 36 Jap landing boats were sunk. SAN JORGE Island and CAPE ESPERANCE in attacks previously reported. During 6th and 7th Task Force 17 attacked 3 enemy SS's. Results twice promising one negative.

868
Most Secret. For Admiral Nimitz only. During 6th and 7th TF 17 attacked 3 enemy subs vicinity 13-20 south 162-40 east results 2 promising 1 negative. 11 SBD with 6 VF attacked installations and buildings GIZO causing serious damage 2 SBD lost in storm failed to return. No ships or planes seen and no AA. 36 Jap landing boats destroyed NW coast GUADALCANAL in previously reported attack. Para. TF 64 Rear Admiral Wright MINNEAPOLIS BOISE LEANDER Desdiv 22 FARRAGUT MacDONOUGH established as screening and attack force under Turner. Para. Ghormley requests establishment advance supply base WHITE POPPY. Has moved Bowman and staff to POPPY and requests additional personnel for AUCKLAND. SOUTH DAKOTA hit uncharted 35 foot pinnacle off entrance LAH channel 5.5 miles bearing 321 from KALINGA light. Damage to fuel oil and reserve feed tanks estimated time in dry dock for repairs 2 weeks. Because of possible speed reduction to 20 knots Ghormley recommends her coming to PEARL which have approved. Para. 450 prisoners enroute LONG RAY in ZEILIN. CO CACTUS reports 600 casualties to date requests early replacement program. Para. Cub reconnaissance results NAURU positively occupied by Japs land plane there. OCEAN negative. No shipping either place. Para. Theobald is unloading 1200 tons daily at FIREPLACE completion first phase about September 13th. Urges CG ALASKA push fighter field project ATKA now for completion both same time.

handle as most secret. Operations 8th. In attack on GIZO 6th 2 SBD'S lost in storm on return trip. B-17 which attacked serial 43 6th had 1 engine and upper turret put out of action but continued search on 3 engines and strafed Jap landing boats south end ISAREL Island. Enemy S3 was attacked by patrol plane 7th lat 07-12 south long 165-14 East with bombs and mg. Did not dive but returned with AA. No damage. In view probable attack tonight 8th by 1 Jap CL 10 DDs, fuller and Bellatrix directed stop unloading GUADALCANAL proceed to eastward through Lengo Channel.
SECRET

SEPT. OCT.

06 2210 CINCPAC to COMALSECo COMALSECo bid on to COMINCH, JINCOPAC

Although I have received the following message from CG WDC I begin receiving messages from OTF 6 outlining his objections to garrisoning Pribilof which Admiral Nimitz concurred in. If you (Buckner) agree with the CINCPAC movement to Pribilofs will be cancelled MOSES POINT garrison going to ATKA as previously planned end paraphrase. I replied to Dewitt saying would not occupy Pribilofs at this time but would send MOSES POINT garrison to ATKA. At later date contemplate sending garrison St. Paul.

06 1736 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC INFO COMSOSWESPA, JINCOPAC-COMINCH ADMIN

Make ready to turn over to MacArthur one regiment of 3 combat teams of experienced amphibious troops plus quota of auxiliary troops and 1 division of combat loaded transports with attached AK. Leave pass to MacArthur. This at direction of Cominich who is with me. Cominich headquarters pass to Army Chief of Staff.

06 2237 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC INFO COMSOSWESPA

Handle with utmost secrecy. Following from War Department is forwarded for information: War Department records show Army planes in central and south pacific under Nimitz control as of September 2nd as follows: heavy bombers on hand 75, enroute or being prepared 44 of which 8 are enroute for SWESPA. Medium bombers on hand 24, enroute or being prepared 11. Light bombers 7 on hand. Fighters on hand 270, enroute or being prepared 202 of which 30 are being transferred from Australia. Para 2.

Replacements set up for October are 12 heavy bombers, 15 medium, 44 fighters. Para 3.

War Department considers that it is not possible to move short range aircraft from United States to Guadalcanal in time to meet present requirements there. Para 4.

The P-40 type is considered by War Dept. as apparently suitable for use against Japanese types. Para 5.

Above information subsequent to and supersedes Parts 2 and 3 Cominich 271320.
Operations 9th. Handle as most secret. 

Convoys (-11) 9th TULAGI shelled by 1 hostile surface craft. No damage.

Convoys (-11) 9th TULAGI bombed 1900. 9th and again 1140 (-11) 9th by 86 bombers which apparently also dropped bombs TASONBOKO. Near misses but no damage our ships. Our raiders and paratroops landed TAIHU POINT, GUADALCANAL daybreak 8th striking enemy position. After some skirmishing Japs withdrew to Southwest leaving large amounts food, ammunition, 4 75mm guns, 1 37mm gun, considerable radio equipment at least 27 dead Japanese. Village of TASONBOKO was burned. Marine casualties 2 dead, 4 wounded. Planes supported operation throughout by bombing and strafing enemy positions. Our troops withdrew before dark. Estimate that enemy had a reinforced Battalion of not less than 1000 in area. Documentary evidence captured not yet examined.
September (GCT)

09 1016 COMSOPAC to TF 18.17.62.64.11.63 & Info units concerned.

Handle as most secret. This is part 1 of 2 part dispatch. OpPlan 3-12. Task Organization of (A) Task Force 61, SoPac striking force, Rear Admiral Noyes consists of Task Force 17 and Task Force 18 (B) Task Force 62, SoPac Amphibious Force plus 5 IMS's. Repeat of Winron 1 Rear Admiral Turner (C) Task Force 63, Air Scouting and attack force Rear Admiral McCain consists of SoPac area aircraft and tenders (D) Task Force 64, screening and attack force Rear Admiral Wright as initially constituted in my 070452. Para 1. Enemy action and changes in the situation since August 27 have necessitated regrouping of certain Task Forces and a modification in the general concept expressed in my msg 271026 of August. Since our seizure of CACTUS - RINGBOLT the enemy has attacked regularly by air and conducted night raids by surface forces. On two occasions approaches by hostile transports have been turned back. A hostile landing attack in force has not developed but remains a strong possibility. Para 2. This force, by a combination of our shore based aircraft, carrier aircraft, surface vessels and defending troops, will (A) Defend and strengthen the CACTUS-RINGBOLT position and existing bases and (B) Destroy promising enemy targets when they appear while remaining in readiness to prevent a landing in force. Comgenseopac has by hand. Leary pass to MacArthur.

09 1018 This is part 2 of above.

This is part 2 of my 091016. Most Secret. Para 3. Affirm. SoPac striking force operate generally south of latitude 12. Destroy promising targets wherever located in order of priority carriers transports battleships cruisers destroyers shipping. Freedom of movement this force as may be required by presence of enemy submarines and other vessels not limited by general instructions herein given. Baker. Amphibious Force defend and strengthen CACTUS-RINGBOLT positions and expedite development of airfield CACTUS mop up adjacent enemy outposts, prepare to occupy APRICOT on further directive, maintain the flow of supplies. Cast. Air Scouting and Attack Force continue search designed for timely location of the approach of enemy in force, gain control of the air over CACTUS-RINGBOLT destroy enemy ships located. Dog. Screening and attack force operate in support of other task forces as directed but initially under operational control of CTF 62. Para XX. Task groups will be assigned to various forces for the accomplishment of special operations as the need occurs. In carrying out this plan which leaves much to the initiative of Task Force Commanders keep in mind that there is no quicker means to ultimate victory than the sinking of enemy ships. Para 5. Communications according Pac 70 and other special arrangements. All Task Forces CACTUS

(Continued on next page)
and other newly established land forces initially on Task-Forces’ frequency. This plan cancels the directives con-tained in my dis 271026 of August and my dis 030736 of September and is effective on signal.

10 0255 COMSOPAC to CTF 64, 61, 63, 62, 17, 18. Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGENSOPAC.

Enemy information additional that given para 1 my Op Plan 3-42 follows: Indications of strong landing force sailing from TRUK on 9th for CACTUS via NUKA. Can arrive CACTUS area by 12th. Ultra, 1 CV and several DDs only naval units thus far associated this move. 7 XCV’s and CV’s excluding one damaged strongly indicated as in or close to TRUK, some possibly further south. Believe A available for task forces. Other 3 ferrying. REKATA Bay believed either in use as seaplane base or detachment there to service planes which may arrive during pending operations. Comairsopac passes to Jam- gen CACTUS verbally by pilot first opportunity. Comairsopac has by hand.

10 1156 COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMGENSOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Your 08237. Situation SOLOMONS not viewed as transitory. Anticipate intensive air action for months to come and movement of fighters from United States to this area should be continuous. Suitability is relative. Unquestionably the high altitude performance of P-38’s and P-47’s make the more suitable than any of the P-39 or P-40 series. Will make maximum possible use Army fighters of whatever type available this area. Of P-40 series the P-40L with V1650-1 engine considered best. Although War Dept states that the P-40 type is considered as apparently suitable for use against Jap types there are no P-40’s this area or enroute except a few P-40 E-1 at BIRACHER. Refer Harmon despatch to Marshall of Sept 8 Comairsopac 310402 and my 270226 Aug and 020400 Sept.
SECRET
September (GCT)

11 0516 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

Handle as most secret. Situation as I view it today extremely critical. Ultra information indicates enemy Naval Military forces in superior strength in TRUK SOLOMONS PLAU area. Same source indicates powerful effort against CACTUS area. Rain has reduced efficiency CACTUS field to point where several planes crashed in take off. We hope hostile attack will find us with dry field. Marston mats being moved to CACTUS slowly. Even with mats it may be necessary, judging from experience other fields, to rebuild field laying a firm base although information lacking this respect. Turner en-route CACTUS today for first hand information. Food situation CACTUS not good. Our transportation problem increases steadily as Japs perfect their blockade methods. Becoming increasingly apparent that ships can remain in area only during daylight and then unloading frequently interrupted by air raids. Sooner or later we are bound to lose some of our valuable AK's on this duty. Due to operational and combat losses our effective air strength CACTUS yesterday was 11 F4F4's 22 SBD's 3 P400's. Arrival plane reinforcements this area as we see it: 58 single engine Army fighters in TILHART and WHIPPLE 20 pilot replacements, 12 Navy PBY5A's from central pacific if replaced from US but positive information lacking, 19 Marine F4F4's and 19 Marine SBD3's in HAMMONDSPORT, 21 Marine F4F4's and 12 Marine SBD3's in COPAHIE. Difficulty landing planes from ship to field but expect to find a way. Due reduction in our carrier strength their relative effectiveness as a striking force has been greatly reduced. Great freedom of action must be allowed Task Force Commanders in order to get better than an even exchange of losses. Due to this lack of effective striking force, threat of hostile attack in great strength, and Jap infiltrations in unknown strength am planning to employ 7th Marines to augment strength CACTUS, however this can be done in time only if hostile attack delayed beyond date now anticipated. Referring Cincpac 081736 relative having experienced amphibious troops ready to turn over to MacARTHUR, it appears at present time that only regiment is 8th Marines which will be ready about 1 October.

11 1320 CONSOPAC to COMINCH, CTF 61,62,63,64, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, MacA.

Operations 11th. Handle as most secret. PBY on patrol 10th lat 05-30 south Long 162-52 east attacked serial 43. Some hits but no apparent damage. At 0015 and again at 0130 L (-11) 10th hostile DD shelled TULACI harbor. Hit and destroyed YP previously damaged. Our SBD's bombed sceened village vicinity VISALE GUADALCANAL believed occupied by Japs. At 1225 L (-11) 10th 27 twin engin bombers dropped bombs on position GUADALCANAL 11 killed 14 wounded. Attacked by F4F4's. 4 bombers shot down. Our losses 1 fighter missing 1 badly damaged. 24 F4F4 to fly SANTO to GUADALCANAL today 11th patrol plane 1053 L (-11) 11th after reporting 1 DD and 1 AK lat 02-05 south long.

(Continued on next page) 874
long 160-40 east in vicinity was attacked by enemy plane type unknown and was apparently shot down. Presence enemy carrier that vicinity a possibility.

09 2300 COMAMPHFORSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO CINC PAC COMINCH

Treat as ultra secret to be decoded only by aces. The only experienced amphibious troops in Sopac are those in Cactus and it is impracticable to withdraw them para 7th regiment left the east coast in March and has since engaged in establishing a garrison defense in straw. The last time it received, amphibious training, was in August 1941 and presumably it has received little field training in straw. Therefore it is not ready for amphibious combat. It can be made ready for a comparatively simple landing such as Taivu Point in 1 week, and can probably be placed in a reasonable state of effectiveness to face real opposition in about 1 month's uninterrupted amphibious and field training. The 7th regiment has no amphibious tractors and no antiaircraft elements para Crescent City Hayes Adams Jackson Aichaba now carrying this regiment probably require considerable reloading of cargo to meet combat conditions. Aichaba should have services of Whitney to repair generator for about 1 week. Otherwise vessels are available para while not required by your 082140 I respectfully invite attention to the present insecure position of Cactus and Ringbolt. Adequate air and naval strength have not been made available to ensure their security, and in the absence of these forces much greater dependence must be placed on troop defense. Vandergrift consistently has urged he be reinforced at once by at least 1 more regiment as essential to clearing enemy out of north Guadalcanal and I concur. In addition it is essential that we occupy Ndeni as soon as possible and establish numerous outposts in other positions if we are to have a reasonable expectation of bringing the southeast Solomons under a firm control which is the prerequisite for any successful offensive against the enemy in the Rabaul-Bougainville region either from here or Australia. This will require more troops that we have or have in prospect.

11 2130 CTF-8 TO CINC PAC

Most secret. Comtaskfor 8 reports progress of Fireplace, 3 transports 1 cargo vessel and 15 barges unloaded. 2 more cargo vessels will be unloaded in about 2 days. This will complete phase 1 and task 1 of project. 4th transport departing Kodiak for Fireplace about 12 September. 2nd convoy barges left Chernofski on 10th. Next ship convoy leaves Chernofski 17th for fireplace with 1 transport scheduled for cavern. Army has constructed flying field by draining Sweeper Creek reports 9000 feet long and average width 500
11 2130 (Continued)

hard sand. First place B 13 pilot Colonel Lareckson landed yesterday 10th reports field best in Alaska. P 38s being sent fire place today to base and operate from there. Believe movement still not known to enemy.

12 0215 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC

In view of Shorneys 110516 I consider his plan to use 26th Marines if necessary to reinforce EacArthur in best that can be done under the circumstances.

12 0530 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC CO 81, 82, 83 CINCPAC CINCPAC

Ultra secret. From Commphorsocapac. Personal reconnaissance and a careful review of situation with Comgen 1st Kardiv confirms opinion expressed my 092300 that at least 1 more regiment is essential to defense Cactus now. VanierPremt and I agree that control of north coastal plain requires dispersed strong points with troops and coastal antiaircraft artillery and additional airfields, but shabby immediate threat shown your 100235 air confirmation by Ompav are of opinion Kukum should be reinforced at once para urgently recommend approval my departure from Buxton for Cactus morning of 14th local with McCawley transdiv 2 7th Marines Task Force 64 covered and supported by Task Force 61 and 63. 7th Marines will disembark to east of Tenaru River. CJW front will be OMNI para later deployment will depend on developments.

12 1241 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC CINCPAC CINCPAC CINCPAC CINCPAC etc.

Operations 12th. Handle as most secret. 1240 L (-11) 11th 25 bombers covered by zeros bombed Guadalcanal. 6 killed 32 wounded. 1 P-400 burned 1 P-40 badly damaged. 6 bombers 1 zero shot down. 1 F4F lost pilot rec yellow. B-17 on photo mission over Guadalcanal 1300 L (-11) 11th shot down 6 zero. 1230 L (-12) 11th SBD's attacked size with 8 500 pound bombs. Buildings destroyed. Strafiled and sank small best near size on return trip. At 1500 L (-11) 11th 17 SBD's sent to attack ormer 2 J2s bearing 500 from Guadalcanal. Contact made but no hits due low ceiling. At 0217 L (-12) 12th hitnn in Guadalcanal Bay. Guadalcanal Island was shelled by zero 53. 8 shots no damage. Shorneys sends. Expander pass to ChinaArt.
SECRET
September (CST)

13 0540 COMSOPAC to CTF 61, 62, 63, 64, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Most Secret. Execute reinforcement CACTUS proposed by Comamphibsopac 120350 subject to following directives.
Close air coverage of CACTUS area by CACTUS based planes.
Task force 61 support operation by destroying threatening hostile vessels with special attention hostile carriers.
Task Force 63 intensify search operations with due regard to physical and material limitations. Task Force 64 under operational control of Task Force 62. Comsopac Opplan 3-42 remains in effect.

14 0133 CTF 63 to CTF 61 Info COMSOPAC.

Ref your msg to me via patrol plane requesting info
Turners plan. Turner departed 0600 L (-11) today Monday to arrive 0500 L (-11) 16th off Tenau Point CACTUS. Route via east and north HUTTON south and west on CACTUS east and north CACTUS. Task Force 64 operates within 100 miles to westward transports until rendezvous let 11-20 long 161-50 at 1600 L (-11) 15th. His force will land 7th Marines between TENAU and block 4 rivers CACTUS completing operation by 2000 L (-11) 16th. Aove from his Oplan A15-42 of 13 September. Aircraft on CACTUS will provide close coverage this force and at moment are sufficient this purpose. You and I to support operation as indicated Comsopac 130540.

12 0544 COMSOPAC to COMINCH INFO CINCPAC CTF 61 CTF 17 LUAF.

Following is encipherment Comcen Cactus teletypegram 030600. Action Comsopac info Comairsopac and Contaskfor 62.
"Your 300259 since installation 90mm anti aircraft Jap bombing operations conducted from 24 to 27,000 feet. P-400's service ceiling precludes their use for interception at these altitudes. In fighter contact at lower altitudes they cannot turn with zeros due heavy wind loading. P47s's able flight or intercept altitudes up to 30,000 feet. In combat with zeros here they have proven equally manueverable and superior in fire power. Zeros arrive here with heavy gas load and avoid full throttle maneuvers. This factor increases apparent superior performance of P47s"
Operations 14th. Handle on most secret. 8 Japanese 15th B-17 on patrol: attacked 4 serial 33's on water; 1 burned, 1 damaged. Same plane attacked by 2 serial 33's in air believe 1 shot down. Some space for 22 reports. Enemy sank 1 off Savo Island. During night of 12th-13th and during 13th Guadalcanal under continuous attack including night bombardment by at least 1 cruiser and 4 DDs. Both TULAGI and GUADALCANAL, probably landings west of Tulagi Point and active patrolling in or near our positions. Some casualties and light damage from naval gunfire. Fire returned of our 3 inch. 1 enemy ship believed hit. Enemy maintained continuous air patrol over area until dawn. OB 10-1 (221) 13th plane formation reported approaching Guadalcanal from northwest. Our planes took off but enemy turned back. 1036 L 13th 26 zero's over Guadalcanal engaged by 22 Grumman's. 1335 L 26 twin engine bombers covered by zero's intercepted by 20 Grumman's caused bombers to jettison bombs 16 miles away. 1300 L 13th 2 single float planes shot down 1 B6. Enemy air losses 4 zeros 4 bombers. 2 Grumman's crashed 2 missing. On ground our losses 4 killed 12 wounded. Jap losses exceeded 40. Enemy forces consisting 3 DDs, 4 cruisers, 4 DDs, 1 AP sighted 1030 L 14th 1st 7-40 3 long 103-50 east-course 140. Was attacked at 1518 L by 8 B-17s. First report states 3 hits 4 near misses. Another hostile force 1 CV, 3 cruisers, 4 DDs reported 1st 06-30 south long 104-14 east at 1140 L 14th course 160. Throughout day Guadalcanal attacked by enemy ground forces in all sectors. Last report states situation satisfactory. 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines shifted from Tulagi to Guadalcanal. Usual daily bombing raid 14th was by 26 twin engine bombers. At 0930 L 4 zero's on floats approached field and were destroyed by VF 6 pilots. 26 land zeros 3 Fedewaff bombers over field at 1340 L zero 1 B6 shot down. 12 single engine land planes delivered bombing attack at 1530 L 14th. Todays attack believed to indicate heavy bombers being saved for special mission.

CTF-6 TO CINCPAC

Long view with bomber and fighter field is key to further Aleutian operation but it stands alone 900 miles from Kiska. Lack of nearest supporting position of strength, generally held for a 15 springboard of our future offensive and assurance against further enemy advance. No less would it once give energy needed land field so far that at Icy Strait whose capture would inevitably follow next of Kiska. This would create
immediate enduring threat to Norfolk and Whitley. Recognize defense of Norfolk is close job but is matter of serious concern to Navy so all concentrations in this area must be joint. In long period of low visibility so frequent here and if our necessarily weak offensive air forces should be neutralized, mobile ground defense must be strong enough to support to U.S. security at this base. Reinforcement of an enemy attack if launched would be extremely difficult if not impossible. Consider full strength triangular division plus specialized units with strong tank support in addition and decide early reinforcement of Army Algelen offensive air forces is essential. Present plans we now know to be provided by end of October mobile ground troops of approximately one third this infantry and artillery strength and no tanks. An of opinion that even these forces are arriving at Longview at a rate which is endangering operation as planned by neglecting consideration of time factor so essential to success despite the favorable start which apparent lack of enemy observation and consequent enterprise has permitted to date. The last troop echelons arrive the end of October.

15 0929

CTF-17 TO CONSECRATING OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION ETC.,

Handle with utmost secrecy. At 1240 Wasp torpedoes lost 12-32 long 164-16inoening. quarter. Believe casualties heavy. From TE 9 intercepted partisan report from Dunhe that Captain and Admiral were on bridge of Wasp when bridge blew up. T-13 remaining with Wasp. North Carolina opened one torpedo hit-frame number 50. Port at 1450. In with the and can make 25 knots. Midshipman received one torpedo hitdamage local 136 can make 15 knots. Ordered to Styx. At 1400 in lat 13-43 100-060 course CCB expect advance to. TCB to continue present course until OTCC local course 140 T. As evening 15 SBD to return to base with war recovery. Wasp aircraft. From CTF-17 passed by PS.
Operations 16th. Handle as most secret. 15th 2 B-17's bombed enemy base RUKATA Bay started fires. Light AA at 1000 Love (-11) 16th 13 SBD's and 5 TBF's attacked 3 enemy hit on CL. 1 bomb hit 2 near misses on 2nd 3. 37 enemy land planes approached to within 100 miles GUADALCANAL bearing 290 but turned back at 1200 love (-11) 16th. Chormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

Operations 17th. Handle as most secret. 16th 2 B-17's bombed dock area CIZO. No ships present. 3 B-17 strafed shore installations RUKATA Bay 1 enemy plane on beach. On GUADALCANAL 16th active patrolling continued by Marines. Only 1 light contact. Enemy troops there appear as awaiting reinforcements. 14 SBD's bombed 1 CA believed KAKO class and 3 DD's at 1750 (-11) 16th Long 505 08-07 south Long 150 east. No hits. Several near misses. Ships continued on course 120.

Operations 18th. Handle as most secret. 17th B-17 bombd ships CIZO at 0455 Love (-11). 3 hits. Another B-17 bombd shore installations CIZO at 1110. No ships present. 3 B-17 bombd shore installations RUKATA Bay. Results undetermined. From GUADALCANAL four planes made ineffective attack on two enemy CA's lat 07-50 south long 157-30 east at 1210 love 17th. Active patrolling continued by Marines at GUADALCANAL. Several contacts with enemy patrols to south of position. Chormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Task force 65 began landing 7th marines reinforced at 0600 love 18th at GUADALCANAL. No hostile activity air or around up to 1835 love 18th.

Operations 19th. Handle as most secret. Brief summary GO W/T prelinary report. While covering movements TF 65 enroute CACTUS WSP had just finished launching 200 mile afternoon search and was turning to base course when at about 1444 love (12) 19th 3 torpedoes sighted close aboard 3 points forward starboard beam 4th torpedo passed ahead. Two hits well below water line between bow and bridge. Third torpedo broached then submerged and hit close to surface 50 to 75 feet forward bridge. All hits vicinity gasoline tanks and magazines, 45 planes lost with ship. Bad fires below decks and in hangars. Starting immediately with torpedo hit continuous explosion ready ammunition particularly noted. About 1505 M severe internal explosions followed shortly by severe explosion in hangar. Severe fire throughout ship. WSP finally destroyed by torpedoes. Comsopac sends.
18 2200 COMINCH to CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC COMSOWESPAC MACARTHUR

Threat as ultra secret. MacArthurs C508 to Marshall quote in case the enemy launches a sea air and land attack at New Guinea what assistance may I expect from the Pacific Fleet. The naval forces at my disposal are minor in strength, practically half were lost or seriously damaged in the Solomons operations, and my air and ground troops are entirely inadequate to meet a balanced attack from the enemy comprising large sea elements. In my C367 August 23 I suggested that the naval force under Admiral Ghormley include in its mission the covering of the southeastern tip of New Guinea but this was disapproved both by him and by Admiral Nimitz. It is absolutely essential that I be informed as to what the Navy contemplates in case of a seaborne attack on New Guinea so that I can plan accordingly. I regard the potential situation with the greatest concern unquote. Comment. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

20 1240 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64, etc.

Operations 20th. Handle as most secret. Estimated 4 DD's bombed GUADALCANAL from 2400 to 0100 L (-11) 19th. 2 killed 2 wounded. Jap ground patrol was wiped out in only contact 19th. 19th B-17 bombed AOGO area GIZO. B-17 bombed another strafed REKATA Bay. 7 enemy killed in mopping up operations FLOREDA Island 20th. P-400's bombed and strafed near ESPERANCE. Indications there that considerable enemy stores destroyed in strafing of 17th. 6 SBD 6 Grumman attacked shore installations REKATA Bay 20th. No affirm no ships no planes. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

20 1542 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Utmost secrecy. Desire early detailed report of tactical situations existing at the times of recent successful Japanese submarine attacks. It is obvious that protracted operations of our task forces on a strategically static bases in submarine infested waters is proving increasingly hazardous. The determination of escort requirements as demonstrated by tactical experience, particularly for carrier operations, has an important bearing on other operations in prospect and on the destruction of destroyers.
20 0145 CINCPAC to COMINCH. Info to CO'SOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, MacARTHUR.

Your 182200. Retention our present holdings in SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA vital to success future offensive operations. If enemy uses transports under naval escort or covering force to make attack from seaward against MORESBY consider this should afford Ghormley opportunity to attack enemy expedition. Success of such attack would depend upon timeliness and accuracy of information of enemy obtained by SOWESPAC air reconnaissance over relative strength of enemy naval forces involved and losses inflicted by SOWESPAC air attacks. Until direction of enemy movement has been definitely determined to be against MORESBY with no concurrent attempt on GUADALCANAL consider present conditions make first duty of Sopac Naval Forces protection of GUADALCANAL and its communications from attack while it is being consolidated. Later best employment would probably be to cover our expansion along SOLOMONS when it is undertaken. If we can maintain sufficient pressure in SOLOMONS I believe this will prevent landing attack in force against MORESBY particularly if allied aircraft based in NEW GUINEA remain active.

20 1322 CO'SOPAC to CTF 17 Info CINCPAC, CTF 18, 62, 63, 64, COMSOWESPAC, COMINTLV 6.

Handle as most secret. Mission to support withdrawal task force 65 completed. Pending arrangements for task force reorganization the carrier task force with attached units will operate in the retired area defined below prepared for offensive action against suitable enemy targets located within striking distance. Operate in general area bounded by latitude parallel 13 and 20 degrees south meridians 165 and 177 east. Avoid direct routes POPPY - HUTTON and POPPY - FANTAN insofar as practicable. Rendezvous for task force units now at WHITE POPPY and Task Force 64 units from HUTTON to join you will be designated later in order effect reorganization of task forces in accordance with instructions to be issued.
CTF-8 to CG ALASKAN DEP INFO COMINCH CINCPAC

I gathered from our conference yesterday that Alaska Army Air Forces should be somewhat increased especially the B-25 for use as torpedo planes with eventual number of latter type set at 3 squadrons or 48 planes in full operation. Butler now reports that your Chief of Staff told him air force strength would remain unchanged until completion Fireplac operations. Thereafter Alaska air forces would be reduced as follows: Fighters from 6 squadrons to 4, loss 50 planes. Medium bombers from 3 squadrons to 2 and 13 operating planes per squadron, 26 crews total. This would give 26 operating medium bombers and 5 spare planes. Heavy bombers cut from 3 to 2 squadrons loss 8 planes. Also losing the medium bombers used for coastal patrol on eastern Gulf of Alaska. My 150039 stated that Fireplac required permanent increase Alaska air forces. Consider minimum requirements of planes in full operations for Alaskan air forces are following: Heavies 32 and mediums 40, fighters 150 with 13 old mediums for coastal patrol with adequate spare planes of each type to permit overhaul and repair.

CONSOPAC TO COMINCH

Your 201322. Desire consideration be given anchoring carrier task and other covering and striking forces at White Poppy or other protected anchorages except when employed for specific tasks. This will decrease hazard from subs conserve fuel save wear and tear and give air groups better chance to train. Request reports required by Cominch 201542 be obtained from Task Force Commanders remaining your area. Also your comments.

CONSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

To be handled most secretly. Your confidential letter 32CL-42. Am I authorized retain Murray as carrier task force commander with Lee in Washington part of that force.

CONSOPAC INFO COMINCH CINCPAC CTF 17, 62, 63, 64, 65

Operations for 21st. Handle as most secret. On Guadacanal 20th during day only 1 contact along Lunga River where ground patrol killed 19 with loss 2 wounded Marines. At 2100 L(-11) 20th enemy launched nuisance raid against forward southern strong point. Contacts continued throughout night. Our losses 2 killed 7 wounded. Many Jap dead left in wire. 2 SED's on evening search bombed Gizo. At 1735 L 20th 10 SED's attacked enemy cruiser 150 miles northwest Guadalcanal, 4 near misses. Believe some damage. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.
Operations 22nd. Handle as most secret. On GUADALCANAL continued patrolling but no hostile contact during day 21st. 2345 (-11) 21st 3 SBD's bombed and strafed & DDs landing boats vicinity GAFF WOPPERANCE. No hits on DDs which left on Northwest course. 21st installations REKATA Bay bombed and strafed 3 times by single B-17's. Dock area GI70 bombed by B-17. Near misses on buildings. Plane sighting enemy CA near FAIISI proceeding slowly with long oil slick to Southeast indicates may have been damaged in DD attack of evening 20th.

Refer Cinopac 220035. Propose following plan for occupation (a) about 4 155 guns, 4 90 mm guns, 10 50 caliber AA, 3 tanks with personnel and administrative units from 5th Defense Battalion to embark WHITE POPPY. (b) 2 company infantry from 3rd Marines SAMOA. (c) Tender and 6 patrol planes from OAHU as none can be spared here. Tender also bring from OAHU for use 5th Defense Battalion 4 twin mount 20 mm guns with 10 units fire. (d) Escort of about 2 cruisers and 4 to 6 destroyers from SoPac. Units rendezvous near HOORN ISLANDS. (e) Occupation about 2 October some M(-12). (f) Command logistic and construction responsibility then pass to ComGen STRAW. An AOORN too large for purpose. Construction personnel to part from STRAW to be replaced. Infantry from SAMOA to be replaced from States. Need immediate INFNC. Above proposals subject minor changes as details are worked out.

Have reason to believe enemy may move into KILLION ISLANDS about October first with weekly escorted forces similar to his GILBERT Operations. Ultra. Consider PURABUTI should be denied immediately by Marine Force from SAMOA. Suggest about 900 men four 155 mm guns 6 heavy AA one platoon tanks and one half special weapons group of defense battalion one infantry company one SCR dash 270. For subsequent development of defenses and airfield a defense battalion and an AOORN now allocated to you could be employed. Comment.
SECRET
September (OCT)

26 0826

COMSOPAC TO CTF 63, CG STRAW, CTO 62.6 INFO CTF 68 CINCPAC

Handle as most secret. Comsopac sends action Comtaskfor 63 CG STRAW Comtaskgroup 62.6 info Comtaskfor 68 Cominch Cinopac only addresses decode beyond this. Comtaskfor 63 cover Petlock operation. On dog minus three and dog minus two day by B-17 and Hudson search from Pantan and PBY search from Button. On dog minus one day discontinue Hudson search and transfer PBY's to Petlock basing on destroyer tender searching enroute. On dog day commet B-17 search from Pantan, PBY search from Button and Petlock plus local search by SOC with B-17s from Pantan furnishing local fighter support. On dog plus two day withdraw PBY and tender from Petlock maintaining striking group of B-17s on call at Button and Pantan. Commander task group 62.6 transfer 4 scout planes with beaching gear and small stock supplies for local patrol at Petlock. CG STRAW provide flight crews and small service detachment. Comtaskfor 63 provide moorings, bombs, ammunition and netting for ramp. Modifications in above as necessitated by circumstances authorized.

26 1156

COMSOPAC TO CTF 63, CG STRAW INFO CINCPAC etc.

Most secret. Comsopac sends action CTF 63 CG STRAW CTF 62.6 info CTF 62 Cominch Cinopac addresses only decode further. Change that part of mydes 260826 regarding transfer of cruiser planes to Petlock as follows. CG STRAW furnish 4 scout seaplanes, necessary crews and material. Crescent City available for embarkation material and ground personnel on not to delay basis. Planes to be flown to Petlock ready for operation on dog plus one day.
Handle as most secret. Comgensopac has by hand. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Other than addressees decode no further. Task Force 62 occupy FETLOCK about 2 October with about 4 155-mm, 4 90mm, 5 40mm, 10 50 cal AA guns, 5 tanks and appropriate service and administration units of Amphib-force SoPac, and 2 infantry companies of 3rd Marines. Com- gen STRAW direct 2 infantry companies of 3rd Marines re- port at once to Comamphibforsopac for FETLOCK operation. See my 231120. Details of air support later. After de- barkation and withdrawal of ships of Task Force 62 command and logistic responsibility for FETLOCK pass to Comgen STRAW. Comtaskfor 17 and 64 informed for info by another dispatch.

24 1630 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, Info NAS DUTCH HARBOR.

Handle this with the greatest secrecy. Cincpac 222327 concur your understanding that transfer Marine combat teams dependent on developments. Assume that you plan use 8th Marine regiment to garrison NDEMNI. Confirm. Para 2. Subsequent to the arrival of the Army 43rd division in Sopac area desire further consideration be given to transfer of combat teams. Inform me your plans for the employment this division. Para 3. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

25 1124 COMSOPAC TO CG FANTAN AND STRAW info CINCPAC

This is most secret. Comsopac sends. Actions Comgens Fantan and Straw. Info Cincpac. Communication plan for Fetlock occupation is contained my serial 0055E to Com- amphibforsopac with copy fifth defense battalion and Comgens Straw and Fantan. Requires radio silence except for special use of coast watcher radio channel to Suva where Comgen Fantan reenciphers in Santa. Will be for- warded next air to Suva and Samao. Fetlock will use Pepek only until silence lifted then joins Straw circuit. Temporary call ZEF.

25 1228 COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO RADM WRIGHT

Ultra secret from Comairsopac. Agree Cincpac 242207. Believe 4 SOC planes sufficient. Recommend they come from Minneapolis Chester less crews. 4 sets beaching gear and small stock spare parts from same source. CG Straw provide flight crews small service detachment servicing equipment. Ballard will provide moorings, bombs, ammunition and Summerfeld matting for beaching ramp. Have conferred RADM Wright who has this by hand. Comairsopac does the sending.
Handle with utmost secrecy. Comsopac sends. Enemy information contained in Daily Bulletins and additional dispatches addressed to task force commanders. Task Force 17 proceed to fly off position south of SHUN-FAISI and at sunrise dog dag attack enemy shipping that area with air striking force. Priority of targets carriers, transports, other combatant types, oilers, cargo ships. Recover aircraft and retire to White Poppy at best speed consistent with fuel limitations. Comtask force 63 will provide B-17s to act as fighter cover from about 8 to 12 hours love (-11) on dog day. Comsopespac has been requested to provide maximum reconnaissance dog minus two and minus one days and to hit Kieta and Buka sunrise dog day with air striking force. Depart White Poppy fueled to capacity. Comsopac will send fleet oiler to rendezvous with task force enroute to White Poppy during retirement. Fuel available at Button. Dog day five October unless otherwise ordered. Car- pender pass to MacArthur.
SECRET
OCTOBER (GCT)

02 0050 COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO COMSWPAC CTF-17

Most Secret. Action Comsoupc. Others cease decoding. To obtain full benefit B-17's operating accordance your O11427 and in creating diversion and neutralization enemy aircraft at source suggest following modification of plan. Your O11302: Afirm Sowespac air striking force hit both aerodromes at Rabaul instead Buka Kiet. Baker Sopac B-17's hit Buka Kiet. Sunrise dog day thence proceed vicinity carrier to arrive about 0800 love (-11) and provide air support according to plan until 12 hours love (-11). Attention invited to fact that while B-17's have excellent defensive qualities neither in speed, maneuverability, diving characteristics nor positioning of armament does it possess capability successfully intercepting and carrying its gunpower offensively to attacking enemy aircraft. CTF-17 should thoroughly understand this in forming his plan of action.

03 0244 COMAIRSOPAC to CTF-17 INFO COMSOPAC

Action Comtaskfor 17 info Comsoupc. Originator Comairsopac assumes that you will launch at 0500 L (minus 11) GCT 5th in position 120 miles bearing 180 true from Buin and that thereafter point option moves at 20 knots along 135 true until 0800 L (-11). B-17 air support after daylight attack Buka will attempt rendezvous at about 0800 L (-11) on basis foregoing assumptions with IFF operating. B-17 call of leader 0V40 will use call quote Blue Base unquote for carrier. Voice frequency 6970 kcs. Key 4435 kcs. Will maintain radio silence unless called. If foregoing assumptions and arrangements incorrect or unsatisfactory advise by whatever means practical.

04 0330 CTG 62.6 to COMSOPAC, CTF 62, CG STRAW, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.

FMTLOCK occupation completed. Handle as ultra secret. Taskgroup less landing unit withdrawing at 18 hours mike (-12) third. Pass through following points all south and east. 10 and 179-30. 15 and 178-30. 23 and 168. Will refuel destroyers to permit all vessels arrive NOUMEA with 20 percent fuel. Expect dissolve task group organization at about 14 hours mike fifth. Expect arrive NOUMEA cruisers and 5 destroyers afternoon 7th. Radio NOUMEA pass to Comsopac and Comtaskforce 62 for action. Radio SAMCA pass to Comgen STRAW. Comairsopac has this and will pass to Comtaskforce 64. No evidence enemy discovery prior to departure.
02 2110 GMT 62 to GMT 64.6 Late GMT 63 17 64. CINCPAC. COMINCH. COMSOFA.

Troops of 1st MarDiv will be transported by CACTUS boats from KUKUM to KOKUMOKA for landing and attack about daylight October 5th. From GMT 62. Task Group 64.6 GRAYSON GWIN arrive off boat landing KUKUM at A hour L (-11) October 5th and embark officers from 1st MarDiv who will deliver attack plan. Para. Provide gunfire support for landing during 5th and 6th as requested by ComDTS CACTUS. Consistent with supporting mission exploit any favorable opportunity to destroy enemy surface or submarine forces in CACTUS area. Giving due consideration to information concerning location and strength enemy surface forces you are authorized at your discretion to retire to RIMU- BOLT or to eastward through LEMCO CHANNEL during night October 5th-6th. Para. When action commences October 5th break radio silence and inform originator your fuel situation. Para. On completion assigned task and not later than 2000 L (-11) October 6th return to BUTTON advising by radio prior departure CACTUS ETA BUTTON. Gen CACTUS has in another system.
SECRET
October (GCT)

05 1202 CONSPAC to GTF 61 Info CINC PAC. GTF 62. GTF 63.

Handle as most secret. Following tasks are in prospect for Task Force 61 during period 7-27 October. (a) Provide escort for COPAC to fly off point and return. This movement under operational control of Commander Task Force 63 by 050502. (b) Beginning soon as practicable have striking force operate in position of readiness to attack enemy vessels landing reinforcements at Cactus generally in accord idea proposed your dispatch 040900 returning BUTTON for fuel as necessary. (c) Provide escort consisting of 2 CA and 4 DD AFRI1001 occupation force departing WHITE POPPY about 17 October. The forces available to you during this period will be Task Force 64 as organized by 221002 September plus Fletcher O’Harran. Additional details covering these operations will be furnished later. Consopac originator.

06 2000 CONINCH TO CINC PAC INFO CONSPAC.

This to be handled with greatest secrecy. Question has been raised as to whether fighter squadrons at Hiroh and Blachet are essential and would better be employed elsewhere. Also whether fighter squadron at Holly should not be replaced by light or medium bombers. Further whether medium bombers in Cactus would not be helpful in knocking out enemy ships which are landing enemy troops and bombarding our positions there. Comment.

07 0306 CONSPAC TO CG ARMY SOPAC INFO CONINCH CINC PAC etc.

Handle as most secret. Request you dispatch earliest practicable 1 army infantry regiment to Cactus consult Comamphibforsopac relative details including transportation to be furnished by him. Regiment will report to Comamphibforsopac for duty under principle unity of command. Replacement reviews a naval responsibility. Also request your recommendations relative early reinforcement Button garrison to total infantry strength of 1 infantry regiment reinforced.
Most secret. In view use BLEACHER as advanced Fleet Base consider air production essential Cominch 062000. My plan contemplates movement forward from BLEACHER all personal American fighter command and replacement by NZAF which will take over American equipment. This then to be considered as one of the 10 NEW ZEALAND Squadrons to be equipped in accordance approved plan. Medium bombers will be definitely helpful CACTUS area. Have 2 squadrons B-26s now available and 1 flight B-25s reported as available near future. Propose employment these from CACTUS earliest opportunity but cannot do so until improvement and expansion runways and airdrome facilities now under way is accomplished. Comopac sender: Harmon has by hand.

Cominch 062000 most secret consider fighter squadron BLEACHER could be better employed forward areas but should be replaced by 6 light or dive bombers. For CACTUS medium bombers would be most useful for both attack and search missions. Do you agree.

Com taskforce 8 sends. Station addressed deliver to Cinopac for action. Cominch and Comd Westseafron for info. Most secret. My earlier estimates, particularly with respect consolidation LONVIEW (my 292340 of August) revised in light of effect of enemy commitments in Westpac upon his intentions North Pacific as set forth your 130139. After increment competent troops arrives LONVIEW about October 23rd bringing strength there to 9000 troops, Army now plans to move 4000 troops to ALWST before further strengthening LONVIEW (My 122234) static situation of main middle ALUTANIAN gaps will thus be reached with unloading of FILLMORE about 1 November. Revised estimate is thus this situation can be maintained with Seafrontier forces augmented by cruiser escorts specially assigned for important troop movements plus certain additions enumerated below. Therefore recommend Task Force 8 be withdrawn from North Pacific about 1 November and Naval effort in task of holding enemy to present positions, opposing his efforts to further consolidate those positions, while strengthening own position be assigned Sea Frontier Forces as contemplated by Comnowwestseafron Op Order 2-42 dated September 10. In addition returning LOUISVILLE about October 17 relieved

(Continued on next page)
14 0230 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, INFO COMINCH, etc. (Continued)
specifically as follows. Afirm. Withdrawal surface units on following approximate dates. October 23 INDIANA CLIS October 28 Canadian Naval Units, November 1 SAINT LOUIS, NASHVILLE, BANCROFT, WILTY, "CG-29", Minesweepers on completion LONGVIEW mining project. Baker. Withdrawal Fleet submarines end of present patrols. Captain Colcioush about November first submarines, HSC's, Patwing 4, old destroyers be assigned to Nowastaf or End operation control of these forces pass to the Connestaf. Withdrawal of Task Force 8 be considered complete as of that date. Contaskforce 8 answering. Pending decision have had no discussion with local Army authorities. Request early information of contemplated action in order to provide Army with as much advance notice as possible of changes in Naval dispositions this area.

15 1025 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, COMINCH.
Most Secret. Addres only decode. Contaskforce 8 reply to COMINCH 141325. Bombardment practically as follows. A. From Eastward using direct fire against North and South Heads and Submarine Base and new installations Southwest side of harbor and indirect fire against main camp and shipping both of latter screened by high land on and near North Head. B. From Southward using indirect fire. Damage from air action or gunfire should be negligible. Some menace possible in Eastern attack but improbable in Southward in view recent operations our submarines along South Coast but consider fast mine sweepers desirable in either case. Consider submarines constitute main enemy threat against repetition of bombardment and recommend strong anti submarine screens. Unless BROOKLYN class cruiser is in close support for counter battery fire recommend against employment of additional destroyers for bombardment due to proximity of destroyer firing lanes to possible shore batteries. Suggest use dive bombers and torpedo planes from AVG against shipping immediately following bombardment. Lessened chance of for at this time of year increases possibility of air attack which will need fighter protection. Planes should include coordinated land base bombing and fighter support but should recognize uncertainty of accomplishment due weather conditions.
SECRET

OCTOBER (G3T)

16 0455 SINCAPAC to COMINCH, Info CTF 8, COMMUNICATIONS

Most Secret. Operation your 141325 considered practically and its morale and training value for the GB's and psychologic effect on country are recognized. However do not recommend it for following reasons. Afirm. Consider air attacks are already making KISKA untenable to enemy therefore even small risk to GBs from subs mines and aircraft hardly justified. Baker. Bombardment of important section of KISKA must be by indirect fire and air spot for this usually impossible due to low ceiling. Jast. While enemy attack against WIDAW is not considered probable the GBs in this area are, due to our concentration to southward, our main reliance against such an attack. Para. If operation is directed NEW MEZING and NIXONPHI would be only units available as there are no 16-inch high capacity shells available. Amount 14-inch this type would permit 30 rounds per gun. Rebagging powder and shifting ammunition would require about 8 days. Believe air coverage should be furnished by shore aircraft especially P-38's from bases within range. ACV cannot be counted upon as combatant carrier as it is slow in handling aircraft and cannot conduct flight operations unless there is at least a 10 knot wind. First ACV to train with own aircraft is NASSAU which has just commenced training. Para. Request early advice.
SECRET
October (GCT)

16 0937 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral King only. Ultra from Cinopac. Halsey his Chief of Staff and Intelligence Officer will be with Ghormley sixteenth our date. In view Ghormley's 160440 and other indications including some noted during my visit I have under consideration his relief by Halsey at earliest practicable time. Request your comment. If Halsey becomes Comsopao would expect him utilize Ghormley as long as needed.

16 0245 COMINCH to CINCPAC

For Admiral Nimitz only personal and secret. Most secret. Your 160937 approved.

Copy CINCPAC 160440 fully here.
SECRET

October (GCT)

18 1350 COMSOPAC to ALL TF CONS, SOPAC, ALL COMGEN SOPAC AREA, etc.

Handle as most secret. Action all Taskforces on SOPAC all Comgens SOPAC area. Contact for 16 and 17 from Jomsopac. Most Secret. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey has this date relieved Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley as Commander South Pacific Force and South Pacific area. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Comsopac pass to Comms GENRO, CACTUS and ROSES by mail. Comsopac Admin pass to New Zealand Chiefs of Staff and to USS CLARK for delivery by her to Comgen BLEACHER via President JACKSON and to Comgen ROEBOT on arrival.

19 1954 COMINCH to COMSOPAC, CINC PAC, COMSWPAC

Handle with greatest secrecy. In order that urgently needed submarine support may be furnished to and coordinated with forces now operating in the SOLOMONS the joint Chiefs of Staff direct that TF 42 be placed temporarily under the operational control of Jomsopac during the continuance of Task 1 and that TF 42 be built up to 12 fleet submarines in transfer from Western AUSTRALIA as soon as possible. This force may base and/or operate in either SOPAC or SWPAC area in accordance with para 7 and 10B of the basic directives to Cino Pacific Ocean Areas and Supreme Commander SWPAC Area as amplified by Cominich and Army Cof 112150 of last May. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Deployment of submarines should be so adjusted that sufficient number can be readily moved to oppose possible Japanese concentrations against NEW GUINEA. This from Chief of Staff Army and Cominich.

20 1540 COMINCH to CINC PAC

Treat as very secret. Cominich 191954 consider greater concentration of Pacific Fleet submarines in SOLICMON ISLANDS Area than indicated in your 180245 should be made. Comment and advise me of action taken.
Most secret Cominch 201540. Will sail PacFleet subs to Sopac as follows all to proceed as indicated from present locations toward BUTTON passing your operational control on crossing equator: (a) SKIPJACK and SILVERSIDES now TRUK at once remaining endurance 10 and 13 Nov respectively. (b) POLLACK and PLUNGER now 5 days out from MIDWAY to JAPAN at once endurance 22 and 26 November. (c) GRAYLING sailed PEARL 19 for Sopac as permanent transfer. (d) TARPON departed PEARL today for TRUK will now divert to Sopac. (e) To depart PEARL for Sopac CROWLER 22nd, FLYING FISH 23rd, STINGRAY 26th, GATO and WAHOO about 30th. (f) ALBACORE and GROPER from MIDWAY for Sopac about 30th. (g) AMBERJACK already in area under Comsopac. Para. BUTTON to SOPAC as soon as possible. Captain Roper on board for employment advisor or command as you desire.

Most secret. Your 201540. Unless otherwise directed will reinforce Sopac submarines as indicated my 202215. This and Comsowespac 200635 will total 24 subs under Halsey. Leaves 10 Pacfins subs for Western Pacific patrols, 9 of which are now on or near station. Of these WHALE has mines. Remainder mining program will be deferred.

Ultra secret. Say to General DeGaulle that it is necessary that Comsopac establish Headquarters ashore at NOUMEA immediately and that due to overcrowded conditions there I have authorized him and staff General Vogel and Staff and the Army on basis of urgent military necessity to occupy certain buildings left vacant by departure of Dargentlieu and his mission. Para. I urge that DeGaulle delegate full authority to local governor Montchamp to negotiate with Comsopac concerning additional matters that may arise. This authority should be independent of movements of Dargentlieu.

Pass to Admiralty for action. Highest secrecy. Following from Cinpoc quote Present Japanese concentrations of all services in SOLOMONS area with consequent deduction to minimum in other areas offers golden opportunity for positive action against enemy by Allied or British action in BAY of BENGAL or along MALAY BARRIER. In my opinion our situation in SOLOMONS urgently requires easing of pressure which would result from such action unquote. I concur. Cinpoc informed.
21 1631 COMINCH to GINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.


27 0251 GINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC.

Most secret. Halsey has requested reenforcement by 1 or more carriers of the British Eastern Fleet. In view urgent and immediate need for every possible increase particularly of carriers I recommend that this idea be explored to utmost.

26 0814 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info GINCPAC. 02MAINSOPAC. GINGETOPAC.

Comsopac to Cominich info Cinopac Comairsopac. Handle as most secret. Following plan employment Army fighters and medium bombers, CACTUS dash UTTON area. Your 241520. Maintain CACTUS one single engine and one "-38 fighter squadron dash total 50 airplanes. Maintain CACTUS dash UTTON area two medium bomb squadrons dash 26 or -25. To be maintained from reserves PHTY which should be 50 percent for fighters and 25 percent for medium bombers. Attrition at rate of 20 percent per month for medium bombers and 50 percent per month for fighters. Above in no way reduces total requirement fighters and medium bombers Sopac area which has been previously reported at 7 squadrons fighters and 4 squadrons medium bombers. Comgentsopac has by hand.

28 0215 CTF 8 to GINCPAC.

This is part 1 of 2 parts from CTF 8. My 150039 September, LONGVIEW, securely held, guarantees our northern flank and its loss to the enemy could cause irretrievable harm. While enemy commitments elsewhere give us complete freedom of action

(Continued on next page)
in the ALLEUTIANS assure the impracticality of LONGVIEW should be our primary aim. If the enemy commitments elsewhere are not sufficiently it is inconceivable that the enemy will endure constant air attacks upon LONGVIEW without counter action. The expansion of our position in the middle ALLEUTIANS by the occupation of ALLEUT and the creation of air fields there must be a further invitation to early enemy reaction to these new middle ALLEUTIANS happenings. By 150039 September recommended full strength triangular division. Due to non availability of troops the conference with DeWitt and Buckner produced a compromise accepting 2 combat teams instead of 3 which were my original and still preferred figure. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered 11,000 adequate. Army will now have 9200 at LONGVIEW on October 30 of which 3100 are infantry, 1297 field artillery, or one combat team plus additional artillery. After that date the occupation of ALLEUT by 4200 troops has priority in local Army plans. Part 2 follows.

This is part 2 of my 280215. This situation does not meet the local Army-Navy compromise agreement does not meet number troops approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff, is one third the number of combat teams originally recommended, and one half the number of combat teams mentioned as basis of agreement in DeWitt-Theobald conference. Eventually LONGVIEW garrison is to be reinforced by additional infantry regiment. Firmly believe that primary position of LONGVIEW in ALLEUTIANS situation should be recognized by bringing the defense force at that place to acceptable strength before initiating ALLEUT operation. Adequate ground troops at LONGVIEW far more vital to LONGVIEW defense than a second or dispersal air field 55 miles away which is all that ALLEUT means to LONGVIEW in a military sense. Two. Due to reduced numbers of planes in Army squadrons, the Alaskan Air Force, instead of being reinforced as recommended in my 202100 September, is actually reduced in combatant strength. Reiterate my opinion that with less than the minimum ground strength of two combat teams at LONGVIEW we can lose that vital position of the middle ALLEUTIANS at any time during these next months whenever either neutralization of Army-air forces or period of low visibility would permit the enemy to effect the landing there. Combat forces 8 send to CINCPAC.

COMINCH to CINCPAC. Info COMSOPAC.

Very secret. Increasing use of enemy submarines for scouting and general information purposes is indicated. We do not appear to be making enough similar use of own submarines.
SECRET
October 30th.

31 0206 COMSOPAC to COMGENSOPEC. Info COMAIRFOPAC. CTF 61. CTF 64. etc.

Handle as most secret. Request you dispatch earliest practicable one Army Infantry Regiment reinforced less one battalion infantry to CACTUS. Consult Comamphibcorpsaeo relative details including transportation to be furnished by him. Regiment will report to Comamphibcorpsaeo for duty under principle unity of command. Replacement rations a Naval responsibility. Comagomac has for action all others are info.

01 1312 COMSOPAC to COMINCH. Info CINCPAC.

Most secret. CTF 17 reports as follows quote HORNET completely immobilized about 1010 COT 26 by two torpedoes starboard side at forward engine room plus bomb hits forward and aft resulting complete loss power, light, water. Thereafter unable reestablish. Towing operations attempted by NORTHAMPTON throughout day unsuccessful. First wire parted. Second cast off due repeated enemy attacks. By late afternoon damage to complete from these torpedo hits five bomb hits two crashed enemy planes all possibilities towing and salvage operations exhausted. In 1st 09-41. Long 167-35 two DD's fired 16 torpedoes at HORNET 9 hits followed by 300 rounds 5 inch shells to sink her. At 2030 6 DD's withdrew from area with HORNET still afloat burning fiercely for full length. Subsequent air search indicated no trace. Unquote. At 1730 CTF 17 had reported his proposed action to destroy with which I concur and which I had anticipated.

01 1050 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

This is most secret. From best information now available re your 010501. Halsey talking. Enemy planes shot down 115 certain. 46 probable total 161. Own losses from all causes VF 27. VS 24. VT 13 total 64. Personnel losses from two airronds 24. Preliminary but more detailed information with KoPAll now enroute by air to PEARL.

02 1618 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Handle with greatest secrecy. Your 012115 Office of War Information states that Associated Press dispatch from NONUEA dated October 28th passed by Censor there contained news of loss of ship. News released here with approval of highest quarters. Loss anticipated but not positively known here until receipt of Halsey 011312 in reply to my 311800.
04 0235 CTF 16 to CONSOPAC, CINCPAC.

This is ultra secret. From CTF 16 to Cinopac. Consopac has by hand. Captured enemy code and notebook and decoded messages give following information relative to action 26 October. (a) An aviator's notebook reveals he left KURE on board ZUNYO 25 Sept. He went aboard ZUIMI 1 Oct. His route was KURE to SAIPAN to TRUK. Whether by ship or plane unknown. (b) Senior officer probably Comcardiv 1 was in SHOKAKU. (c) Comcardiv 2 present in HAYATAKA. (d) Carriers present SHOKAKU, ZUIMI, ZUKHO, HAYATAKA. (e) According to notebook planes from 3 carriers were composed as follows: CV1, 17 torpedo, 21 bombers, 25 fighters. CV2, 19 torpedo, 21 bombers, 24 fighters. End of part 1 of 2 parts.

04 0252 CTF 16 to CINCPAC.

This is second part from Com task for CTF 16. Ultra Secret. CV3, 18 torpedo, nil bombers, 7 fighters. (f) Planes from REKATA BAY took part in action probably search planes and horizontal bombers. (g) One of surface ships present was HAGI. (h) After launching enemy carrier believed SHOKAKU kept planes informed his position about every half hour. (i) Presence our carrier search planes reported to enemy cruiser. (j) Planes reported weather our vicinity. (k) Enemy air group commander in our area appeared to direct attacks by each wave as it arrived and also reported wind frequently. (l) After dark enemy surface vessels searched for HORNET assisted by flares from more than one plane. (m) Partly decoded message included what may be words "Operation postponed". (n) Captured documents forwarded you by air mail. End of second part.
SECRET
November (GCT)

05 1524 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC.

I am becoming disturbed about multiplication of special
commands such as Commander Bases Sopac Area when work
done is inextricably linked with that of Subcomserforpac,
This is HiCom. Para 2. It seems to me that Comserforpac
should have appropriate number of deputies one of whom
should do much of work Comserfor is now doing thus en-
abling him to exercise more overall supervision. In case
of Sopac should include all logistic matters including
bases. Para three. Be prepared to discuss these matters
when we meet.

06 1345 COMSOPAC to CINC PAC Info COMINCH.

Planning and development bases this area is a major prob-
lem. Functions of logistic supply and battle repair and
maintenance provide full load for Seronsopac. Under these
circumstances considered essential relieve Comseron of
base development and command. Conditions here such that
promot action was and is necessary to prevent spread of
chaotic conditions particularly WHITE POPPY. Your 060217.

08 1505 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. After consultation with
Admiral Boyd regarding employment of ILLUSTRIOUS in
Pacific Fleet submit recommendation as to immediate emplo-
yment in Sopac (Afirm) with present complement (Baker)
necessity of proceeding to PEARL or other U.S. Base for
modifications and outfitting of torpedo squadron with
TF99's. View held here based on Halsey's despatch that
services of carrier urgently required now and consequently
immediate problem is employment of ILLUSTRIOUS if and
when she is made available.

08 2145 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

After consultation with Boyd and Towers. Most secret.
Relieve period of about four weeks at PEARL for equipping
with TFT's indoctrination and training is essential to
meet the Japs. Do you consider your present situation
will permit this. Cominch 081505.

09 2107 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, COMAIRFORPAC, ALL TF COM SOPAC, COMSAP.

Excellent. Ultra. Indications that major operation as-
sisted by carrier striking force slated to support movement
Army transports to GUADALCANAL. Jinc Third (Carrier
Striking) now proceeding fueling rendezvous near one north
one fifty seven east. Jinc Eleventh Air Fleet to operate

(Continued on next page)
against CACTUS from Zed minus three days. Eight fleet
_to_ escort Army convoy. Large movement enemy planes to
KAHILI base near Buin. Striking force to hit CACTUS Zed
_minus one day. Army AA Unit to embark eleven November
proceed land CACTUS. Jap sub to attack BLUE plane tender
VANIKORO and NDENI. Zed day not known but research con-
tinues. Air attacks on CACTUS to be augmented by Army
Air on Zed Day. All aircraft under command of striking
force probably on Zed minus one day. Estimate available
combat carriers ZUHO, HAYATAKA, transport carriers HOSHO,
OTAKA, UNYO, but last two have not had combat air groups
assigned in past. While this looks like a big punch I
am confident that you with your forces will take their
measure.

12 0031 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC.

Further conference with Boyd and Towers on Comsopac
110954. Most secret. Assuming ILLUSTRIOUS reports
direct from Eastern Fleet with complement 36 fighters
15 Swordfish or Albacore. Proposals your 081505. Af-
firm. Require replacement of British planes with Grum-
man TBF, Baker, U.S. squadron acceptable but British
pilots with TBF preferred. Cast. Only in view urgent
need indicated by Halsey consider carrier could be
equipped and personnel indoctrinated at Sopac base pro-
viding necessary planes available there. Para. Should
point out small offensive power this carrier with approx-
imate complement 36 VF 15 VTB. Alternate may include 6
SBD as deck park at cost about 9 VF. Para. In lessened
urgency or if British Atlantic carrier furnished it should
definitely equip and indoctrinate at Pearl or U.S. Base.
This would be much more efficient considering minor but
essential modifications necessary in ship and in British
planes. Para. Boyd comments that if INDOMITABLE has large
elevator capable taking SBD planes this ship would be in-
valuable in Pacific operations.

12 2037 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Our forces in action with enemy off SAVO ISLAND about
0230 L (-11) this morning. Most details lacking but ap-
parently ATLANTA and JUNEAU damaged and PORTLAND steer-
ing inoperative from torpedo hit. At least one enemy
unit sunk and several burning. ULTRA. Enemy relief be-
ing sent from Buin and his Zed day postponed. Para.
SEAWOLF unable to catch carrier off PALAU.
COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC CINCLANT OPNAV.

Utmost secret. Begin. CINCLANT direct WICHITA CLEVELAND SUWANNEE SANGAMON JENKINS MURPHY RADFORD WALLER CONWAY proceed Panama preferably but not necessarily in one group as soon as they can be made ready. Also CHENANGO when other destroyers assigned Pacific are available for escort. Upon arrival Panama report Cincpac for duty. Advise expected departure dates. Para. Cincpac send BOOGIE and CARD to Lentlfit as early as practicable. Present intention assign BOISE to Lentlfit and keep Lent modern cruiser strength up to 6 including those shaking down by holding MONTPELIER until BOISE ready. Opnav informed.

CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

Most Secret. Your despatch 220120 indicates plan for relief 1st Marine Division. KIWI "C" will soon be in POPPY. Your despatch 210436 indicates command relations CACTUS not yet settled. In order that I may have information required for own planning and as basis for representation to higher authority request early advice your plans for following based on forces now available to you. A. Relief of Marines at CACTUS. B. Final command organization CACTUS indicated your despatch 210436. C. Commander CACTUS after relief 1st Marine Division. D. Commander CACTUS after relief all Marines. E. Command organization and Base Commander POPPY after arrival KIWI "C" and departure American Division. Also request your plans under A. to E. above based on 25th Division Army being made available to you with first Echelon of 1 regimental combat team ETD PEARL November 25 followed by 3 other increments ETD PEARL December 6, 15, and 31.

COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC COMSOWESPAC MACARTHUR.

Treat as ultra secret. Chief of Staff Army has by hand for info. Army has received urgent despatch from MacArthur "Is it possible to give me some Naval support for the North coast of NEW GUINEA. My submarines on east coast are no longer available, operational control having passed to South Pacific. PT boats would be invaluable in existing situation. If nothing can be done please let me know at once as the increasing enemy Naval pressure may force me to revise my plan of campaign". Para. 2. Return 6 submarines to operational control of Comsowespac area. Para. 3. Place at least 6 preferably 8 PT boats at disposal of Comsowespac area for NEW GUINEA operations pending arrival of boats assigned to Sowespacfor which depart Canal Zone about mid December. Para. 4. Carpendrer pass to MacArthur with the suggestion that time could be saved by taking up coordinating arrangement such as this directly with Halsey.
SECRET  Nov

24 0330 COMINCH to CINCPAC

This is a reenrichment of Comsowestpac 231113 referred in our ZMT2 (NPM 5351/23) Which you had to ZPIL1 correction ZML1 begins . . Handle this as super secret. Prior receipt cominch 230032 L had no knowledge MacArthur's despatch.

At 0600 Love (-11) 23rd 3 submarines stationed directly assist defense northeast coast New Guinea namely off Cape Ward Hunt. 1 off GASMAHA and 1 north TROBRIAND enroute VITIAX. MacArthur was informed of this on 19 November.

From Comsowespeafor action Cominch. In addition 3 subs south NEW IRELAND and 3 west and south BOUGAINVELLE directly assist in defense NEW GUINEA. Consider continuance present method operational control submarines under Sopac increases flexibility and permits more adequate defense NEW GUINEA than would be accomplished by assignment of 6 submarines this area. Prior to start of BUNA campaign L explained to MacArthur that because most authentic navigational in formation shows that draft in excess 12 feet cannot proceed beyond Cape NELSON toward BUNA and because of inaccurate charts destroyors cannot be sent via this passage beyond Cape NELSON from MILNE BAY. L further explained that surface forces could not be sent into this general area north of the TROBRIANDS unless adequate air cover was available. L concur that PT boats are required at earliest date .

25:2330 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Handle with utmost secrecy. Contemplate taking up with Army practicability relief by Army of Marine Corps ground and air units now on garrison or defense duty in SAMOAN and HAWAIIAN AREAS. If such relief were effected following would result: APIRM. 2 reinforced infantry regiments would be available for assignment to First MarapmhCor as elements of a new division. BAKER. Release defense Battalions in these areas would permit their assignment to advanced zones of action. CAST. This relief of defense Battalions would obviate necessity for organization of new defense and airdrome battalions in United States as now scheduled. DOD. Personnel thus saved would be diverted to new division and advance its availability to summer 1943. EASY. Release of defense air groups would permit their assignment to offensive operations in other areas. Para. Request your comment and recommendations. MarCorps informed.
25 2030  CTF 8 to CINCPAC

CTF 8 replying to Cincpac 242319. Estimated total of 7500 to 10000 mixed troops consisting of engineers, construction, infantry and artillery on BOODLE. 1 Battalion 82nd Infantry of from 500 to 1000 on JACKBOOT. Possible coast watcher force of about 10 on western end FORMULA. Same number (10) may be on ALI ID in SEMICHI. No other forces believed on any other islands. Ultra.

26 0155  CTF 8 to CINCPAC info COMINCH

your 252227. Am despatching surface striking force 2 cruiser; 4 modern destroyers at best sustained speed accordance my 260014. 1 cruiser 3 destroyers sent forward from KODIAK yesterday at best speed to fuel LONGVIEW where other cruiser and destroyer join. When your ultra secrets received yesterday they were departing KODIAK with delayed convoy and were immediately detached from this escort duty. Have intensified air search to westward and have alerted air force for strongest possible air attacks to supplement surface attacks. Have alerted air and Navy at western bases against possible enemy diverse action advising Buckner of this. Only submarine in ATTU area alerted against enemy approach. Ultra. CTF 8 sends to Cincpac and for info to Cominich.

26 2305  CINCPAC to COMINCH

Utmost secrecy. Agree in principle with relief Marine ground and air units Urdis 252330 to provide amphibious troops aircraft and defense battalions for further offensive moves. In HAWAIIAN area consider such relief should not be made until assured organization of Army units permit present scale and effectiveness of defenses with approximately same number of troops (about the maximum that can be supported on these islands). In SAMOAN area including FETLOCK agree that relief be effected as soon as Army can make available troops of equivalent training and experience to marines now there. It is recommended Army units for that area also be especially organized for the various tasks to avoid increase in personnel with attendant logistic demands. Para. In line with basic proposal the assignment 25th Division to Sopac for use CACTUS would make available almost immediately one Marine Amphibious Division for further offensive action.
This from Joint Chiefs of staff to Cincpac, Comsopac, Comsowespac area. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Nimitz pass to Emmons. Halsey pass to Harmon. Para 1. 25th Army Division is assigned to Sopac area and will proceed to WHITE POPPY. Para 2. 1st Marine Division is to be relieved without delay, as assigned to Sowespac area and will proceed to AUSTRALIA for rehabilitation and employment. The purpose of this transfer is to provide an Amphibious Division for the future formation of an Amphibious Force to carry out amphibious operations under the commander Sowestspac area. Para 3. Halsey arrange with MacArthur details of transfer 1st Marine Division. Chief of staff Army and Comdt Marine Corps informed.

Comtaskforce 67 reports opened fire on four ships believed transports at CAPE ESPERANCE. Hit and fires were seen. Six minutes later three and perhaps four heavy cruisers struck by torpedoes believed fired by destroyers and submarines. Since then have been unable communicate with other ships. NORTHAMPTON burns total loss. Believe PENSACOLA same NEW ORLEANS proceeding to TULAGI 5 knots MINNEAPOLIS same with bow blown off three firerooms flooded believe HONOLULU all right. No information of destroyers.

At TULAGI are following: PENSACOLA torpedo hit and severe fire damage aft. NEW ORLEANS bow blown off back to number 2 turret. PERKINS, MAURY assisting above ships undamaged. MINNEAPOLIS as previously reported. LARDNER and LAWSON are with Tisdale and undamaged. No further word of NORTHAMPTON, FLETCHER and DRAYTON reported separately by FLETCHER. 1 Jap cruiser seen to blow up and it is known additional Jap ships were destroyed as well as others damaged. Am collecting data. Last BPM number received was 604. Am unable decode messages in crypto channels 7 and 19. Can guard Task Force Commanders circuit only.
To be decoded by Nimitz and Halsey only. Ultra High Command.
Para 1. Final decision cancelling AOLA BAY project in CTF 62 260458 brings to climax my uneasiness of several weeks
duration lest we continue to use up our fighting strength in
virtual "Frontal" operations such as are involved in expulsion
of enemy from CACTUS which if followed in principle throughout
CACTUS-RABAUL area will keep us busy for years. Para 2.
It seems to me that there are now -- see my 291906 -- adequate
Army troops in Sopac to garrison CACTUS and secure airfield
there and "contain" enemy forces which should enable us not
only to withdraw First but also Second Marine Division latter
for use in seizure of enemy position further northwest in
SOLOMONS preferably one where enemy has airfield. Para 3.
Conception sketched in preceding para looks to "Flanking
operation" relative to CACTUS by seizure of enemy base used
for operations in support of CACTUS whereby latter be made
untenable for enemy and what is more important enables us to
get on with the job of clearing enemy from SOLOMONS-RABAUL.
Para 4. Request your comment on premise that next step will
be done by Afirm Consopac Baker Comcowespac.
CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

01 O931
(3m)

For Admiral Halsey only from Cincpac. Utmost secrecy enjoined.
I contemplate making following reply to Cominch 301915. Quote.
I am in complete accord as to necessity for readying our amphib-
ious troops preparatory to pushing along the SUSAN area. I
asked for the 25th Division so that it could relieve the
Second Marine Division. Halsey is relieving 1st Marine Division
with American Division from POPPY. I had not contemplated
that the 1st Marine Division would join Sowestpac for I esti-
mate that provided we have the necessary Naval and Air superi-
ority we will require at least 2 Divisions to capture BUIN
(The nearest enemy base with an airfield unless he builds one
at NUNDA or RIKATA). Para. As the 1st Marine Division can
hardly be ready until 1 Mar. there will continue to be a phase
in which CACTUS remains an area of strong contention. All
indications point to continued enemy moves to land reinfor-
cements there and I believe these will include at least one
more major effort. Also during this period we must develop
CACTUS-RINGBOLT as a secure Naval and Air base from which to
launch our offensive. The foregoing plus the ALEUTIAN situation
stresses necessity for much stronger land sea and air forces
than are in sight for the Pacific. I urge immediate action
to obtain them. Para. I strongly recommend that Task 2 in
the SOLOMONS SEA area be revised to provide that Consopac
continue to command the forces which will extend control up
the SOLOMON CHAIN. I estimate that the bulk of the Pacific
Fleet will continue to be required and I consider that a
change of command of these forces which Halsey has welded into
a working organization would be most unwise. Para. Unquote.
Request early comment.
SECRET
September (GCT)

03 1141 COMOPAC to COMOCECPAC, MacArthur, Info CINCAC, COMINCH.

CTF 61, L2. 61.

During operations of allied forces in the CAUTIC-ROSSLIEB area on 8 August a warning originated by the coast watch on KUGAINVILLE informed our forces of an impending Jap air attack. The timeliness and completeness of the warning was of inestimable benefit and enabled our vessels to take proper defensive positions in the repeat in advance of the attack. Please express to the Coastwatcher my deep appreciation and that of the officers and men engaged in the subject operation. Well done.

02 1958 COMINCH to COMOPAC, Info 3MAINSOPAC, COMZCPAC, CINCAC.

Your 020400 information my 271320 as to fighter planes which are part of cargo of certain ships was given to show status and location of replacements command to let you know about when and by what transportation those planes are due to arrive in ports indicated. Para 2. Breakdown of cargoes reported my 271320 as follows: ELLER has 9 P38's, 24 others. GOODHUE 9 P38's, Lee 9 P38's, WINGATE 2 P38's, STEELE 6 P38's, 1 other. LANE 9 P38's, 8 others. ASHT 6 P38's, 8 others. YALE 8 P38's 28 others. Para four. Leary pass to MacArthur. Para 30. Your basic recommendations are fully understood by me and are under consideration of the War Department.

03 1313 COMINCH to CINCAC and Info commands concerned.

Prospects for organization of additional raider battalions, your 010390, for present appear limited to: (A) Organization of 3rd raider battalion at STRAW from CALIF. or 2 officers and 25 men each transferred from 1st and 2nd raider battalions with remainder of personnel recruited from units of defense force STRAW without replacements. (B) Establishment of raider replacement training detachment on West Coast in October, personnel about 200. War corps advised. Your comment requested.

02 0337 CTF 16 to CINCAC Info CTF 62, 17, 18. COMOPAC, COMINCH, CTF.

The present of a fast battleship in task force 16 during past several weeks and particularly during action on 24 August was a distinct asset because of her demonstrated fire power against attacking aircraft and her inherent strength against possible surface contacts. From Comtaskfor 16 action Cinacopac. Because of slight deficiency in speed and acceleration and slight inherent slowers in starting a turn the station of the NORTH CAROLINA in cruising disposition and particularly in tight screening disposition during air attacks should be down wind from carrier as was the case on 24 Aug with thoroughly satisfactory results.
SECRET
September (GCT)

04 2027 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

PRINLOFF move by Japs would be totally contrary to their technique of advance to date and contrary to sound strategy. Such an outlying base for them flanked from HUHAN and subject to repeated bombing attacks from GOLD RAY UNNAK and NAKAN supported as necessary by P-38's using belly tanks for approach flights would always be difficult if not impossible to support logistically and could quickly be rendered untenable to enemy. PRINLOFF airfield of little use to ALUTIAN air operations while NAKAN staging field will be of greatest aid as it provides additional field in direct line of operations possibly free in an area of constantly shifting local visibility conditions. NAKAN should be given highest possible priority consistent with earliest possible consolidation of PRINLOFF. At present stage of FIREPLACE move can not spare cruiser escort for PRINLOFF operation which is to mean withdrawal of some cruisers from FIREPLACE operation. Covering FIREPLACE and NAKAN & single operation. At least 4 destroyers antishupmarine screen desirable in close support of discharging cruisers at PRINLOFFS anchored in open sea for days. 2 destroyers ample at NAKAN. Weather may seriously hamper and lengthen period of discharge at PRINLOFFS. If PRINLOFF move decided upon recommend that priority be given FIREPLACE which has inadequate surface naval support at present against any move in force by enemy and that risk of PRINLOFF move be accepted with 2 destroyer antishupmarine screen and no cruiser escort.
SECRET

SEPT 3CT

05 1050 CHIEF CACTUS to GCS OPCAC into CTF-62, YAMAMCO PAC

Told to GCS OPCAC by YAMAMCO PAC

Commend CACTUS to GCS OPCAC. My 041510, 042001. Twelve officers and 226 enlisted crews LITTLE JELLYFISH reported rescued. Enemy force consisted of at least one cruiser and two PTs. Morning patrol sighted 16 large landing boats each carrying about 75 men approaching northwest coast CACTUS. Strafed boats sank three. P-40s attacked them with bombs and light machine guns. Appeared to cause many personnel casualties. 322 strafed 200-boat beach, believed to have destroyed several of them. One boat was destroyed by bombing. 36 twin engine bombers covered by 20 Zeros approached position at 1245. This was second alert and only several fighters reached proper altitude. Three intercepted planes dropped bombs 10 miles westward LUNA Point. Two bombers one zero shot down. One P40 missing three damaged. One pilot wounded. One additional P40 and pilot lost during boat strafing operations.

05 2130 COMTASSFOR to JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

After consideration General Buckner and I jointly recommend against ADAC occupation TANAJA for purposes of possible diversion reference para 3 comm 21130 of August. When FIREPLACE position consolidated with bombers and fighter planes operating therefrom this establishment of force at TANOJA and creation bomber airfield would be highly desirable and next logical move in ALASIA campaign. With troops and equipment for TANAJA assembled at FIREPLACE and continual observation sea conditions in TANAJA Bay can occupy this place by infiltration using period of favorable weather and sea to effect short haul from FIREPLACE. Move would be covered at all times by close air support from FIREPLACE supplemented by required naval screening forces. With such an operation in contemplation it appears highly undesirable to evidence interest in TANAJA in advance thereof.
SECRET

September (CCT)

05 0626 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC & info Commands Concerned.

Refer Cominch 031313 and Cincpac 042210 nature of operation and enemy infiltration tactics make additional raider battalions necessary. Strength of defense force STRAW should not be diminished. Urgently need 2 divisions APD's whose value for island warfare has been proven. What is status of APR'S. Info radio deliver Comgen STRAW.

06 2246 CTG 2.9 to COMSOPAC Info COMINCY, CINCPAC.

SOUTH DAKOTA struck uncharted 35 foot pinnacle bearing 321 true from MALINOA light distant 5.5 miles. This an extension to lead in AMPEXLANI passage. Extensive contamination with salt water of fuel and feed water bottom tanks. Divers report numerous dents and several holes. Largest 2 square feet in outer skin between frames 32 and 90 starboard side. Now serious leakage several inner bottoms principally due displacement sea connections. No apparent derangement propulsive machinery except clogging 1 condenser. Anticipate no difficulty maintaining 20 knots. No vibration observed. To accomplish estimate about 2 weeks in dock. Ready for sea morning local 8th. Recommend proceed PEARL that date. DD escort recommended during daylight local 8th and DD escort last 24 hours prior arrival PEARL.

07 1020 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 Info COMAIRSOPAC, CTF 18, CINCPAC.

Your 070212 and 070834. Your attention is called to my 030736 NPM number 573 which gives you entire freedom of movement. In order that I may be sure you have reference I have had it repeated for you. My suggestion is that you move east of APRICOT LONDON line at good speed.

07 0217 CTF 17 to COMSOPAC, Info COMAIRSOPAC, CTF 18.

My 070212. Analysis of DF contacts this area and HORNET contacts past 24 hours warrant following conclusions. Afirm presence of large task force in geographical area 10 to 15 degrees south 164 to 165 degrees east known to enemy. Baker approximately 9 enemy subs this area. Para. In absence of important targets consider current directive unduly restrictive and unnecessary hazard. To heavy ships unprotected by adequate number DDs as screen. Para. Foregoing situation will be accentuated upon return Task Force 18 this area. Para. Recommend Afirm task forces operate within 300 miles radius CACTUS south lat 8 and east long 160 east and in southeast direction as necessary to guard CACTUS LONDON APRICOT LONDON lines. Baker. Provide two DDs per heavy ship as soon as practicable. Cast. Provide large number anti submarine type vessel to hunt subs this vital area.

912
SECRET
September (GCT)

06 2040 CTF 8 to CONVOY ALASKA FT ALASKA, and INFO con/nds concern

Based on discharging rate at FIREPLACE of 1200 tons daily present vessels there should be discharged by September 1 completing first phase. Assuming vessels could arrive at FIREPLACE as soon as their discharge can commence increments of second phase could be discharged by following dates based on your carrying estimates for each colon 1st Sept 21, 2nd Sept 30, 3rd Oct 8, 4th and final October 17. Our LL AD: Ft. Richardson 052378 improves previous time schedule but bottleneck now appears to be transports and loading times at points of departure. Desire to help, if possible, in there anything further that can be done to assist in saving time so vital to success of whole operation. Radio stations deliver.

00 2210 OTHER ALASKA DTD DEPARTURES

Since sending my 000000 received following 0100 T he have received message from JCP 10 outlining an opposition to transferring Palillos which a trial exhibit considered. If you (Yackarra) agree with Theobald and Mearse report to Palillos will be cancelled from Point armament to Alaska as previously planned and paraphrased. I replied to Forrest saying would not transfer Palillos at this time but would send three Point armament to area, at later date contemplate sending another at Point.

7 22.00 COMSPOC TO CTF 8, CTF 120, CTF 115, COMSPOC, etc.

Comsopac pass this to CTF 8, CTF 120, CTF 115 and COMSPOC who is to acknowledge. CTF 13 has all the above are not addressed, CTF 10 and all other addresses are from Comsopac. Plan for employment: Sub 1 and 13, 16 and 17th 4th Constructions Battalion follows: Snag generally Sub 3, 4 and 5th Construction Battalion at Casco Kingbolt, Comsopac report to CCF, all construction officers advanced naval base CCF 1,2,3,4, Units of Sub 1 and 3rd Constructions Battalion as required latter place. Hospital unit 801 establish at D WTF. Baker generally Sub 13, 4th Constructions Battalion as required latter place. Hospital unit 802 establish at WHITE CORPS. Forward material and personnel to D WTF only as required latter place. Consult staff Comsopac in this respect. After establishment storage and camp at WHITE CORPS Comsopac report to CTF 8 and report 13 WTF, under principal of unity of command, as commanding officer advanced naval base WTF. Hospital unit 802 establish WHITE CORPS until further orders. Last for exclusion this general principal is established that field headquarters at each establishment
SECRET
September (1944)

07 1000 (CONFOPAC Continued)

cannot be maintained. Personnel and material must be
where most needed. Consult Confopac staff freely;-ins-
ract and consult commanding relative needs and
personnel and material conservation. Facilities, etc. When initiated, construction activities
will be under control. See (Conf)a and (Conf) supplied
outlines above. Keep current with (Conf)b and (Conf)c.

08 1100

ECHELON TO CONFOPAC INFO CONFOPAC, etc.

Until 070030 assembling 5 officers 200 enlisted AAF for
transfer Confopac via San Diego after 20 Sept. Also, officers
and 1200 enlisted available San Diego about 30 Oct.
Parachutist for 1st Div available initial rate 30 per
week beginning 1 Oct. Further replacement will be sent
as available and required. Comptrol requested on current
program of withdrawal of FMF officers excess in rank to
meet urgent needs U.S.

09 1330

CONFOPAC TO CONFOPAC INFO CONFOPAC Admin. CHLAC Admin. GPO401

Make ready to turn over to Commander 3rd
combat teams or experienced amphibious troops plus quota
of auxiliary troops and 1 Division of combat loaded trans-
ports with attached AA. Landings to be confin to
at direction of Comnbadr who is with me. Comnbadr head-
quarters pass to army Chief of Staff.

09 1330

CONFOPAC TO CONFOPAC INFO CONFOPAC

This part 1 of 2 part request. Part 1 is being transmitted
as OCP1004 and 0CP240 and part 2 is being transmitted as
OCP200. With reference Scnnav secret letter April 20 1444,
suppose United Nations operations in Pacific theater,
Confopac has approved deletion paragraph 10 of directive
to CINCPac to Pacific ocean areas and is recommending substitution
of following: "Quote 10 C (1) in the exercise of command over armed
forces which the New Zealand government has
assumed, or may assume, for the local defense of New
Zealand, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be the means
through which such local command is exercised. New Zealand
is informed in exercise of command, the principles of command as set forth in paragraph 14 of 0CPc are applicable. "Quote (5) with regard to the possible
movement of New Zealand forces out of New Zealand territory, the following by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the
president is self explanatory."
of 2240

Note proposals of the US Chiefs of Staff (for operations in the Pacific Ocean areas) made to the President as US Commander in Chief are subject to review by him from the standpoint of higher political considerations and to reference by him to the Pacific War Council in Washington when necessary. The interests of the nations whose forces or whose land possessions may be involved in these military operations are further safeguarded by the power each nation retains to refuse the use of its forces for any project which it considers unwise. In this respect the New Zealand government has accepted an offer from the latter to join reference to United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose concurrence is expected, and Part 1. Refer to this as Document No. 914.

Part 2 of 2 part message. New Zealand government in accepting notification pointed out that the following reservations must be borne in mind: (1) New Zealand army equipment is of British type. (2) New Zealand has no ships capable of carrying British forces. (3) New Zealand has only the force requirements for (a) training purposes in Canada, (b) New Zealand squadron in the United States. (c) Consultation with the Prime Minister in New Zealand is required for future movements. Any approval by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff change to directive to 335 Pacific Ocean areas will be issued. Refer to this as Document No. 915.
SECRET

September (Oct)

09 1215 COMAIRPAC to COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC.

Concur ONE from CACTUS recommends CINCPAC A&A proceed there soon as possible and unload. Concur CACTUS 080251. In that ship is 700 bundles merston and 1200 rolls Somerset, rate, 3000 drums axes, both gas and water tankage, power shovel. All urgently required. Concur ONE executive has verified locally. Estimated 4 days required to unload working 24 hours. He will put on board some miscellaneous equipment recently requested. Foregoing seems good solution if unloading time acceptable and I concur. Proceed my 080706 become alternatives. 9 planes crashed yesterday attempting to use CACTUS field which today Wednesday is practically inoperative. Situation serious and quick action necessary.

08 0935 CINCPAC ltr HARRIV, to JTF 62, Info COMAIRPAC.

Urpts 070348. Japas landed vicinity 90038 (not Cinacap G-1d). 3 miles west of BANGKOK AIR, Jap force thought possibly 1000. Information of strength and exact location being gathered by Jap scout. Area distant 3 days. Movement by trail not feasible for forces with necessary arms. Intend to attack as soon as JAP's or other suitable water transportation made available to this division. Raiders and para troops made attack at TALI today. Full report on their return. In view this move no further action being taken your 031657 pending conference your arrival.

08 2030 COMAIRPAC to JTF 62, Info COMAIRPAC, JTF 62, and COMAIRPAC.

Cinacap 062015 Marcorps directed to comply my 031313. Replacements for personnel assigned raid battle from units in STAN will be made at time transfer is effected about 1 December if situation warrants. Latest estimates on completion dates for APR's (referred to in Cominach serial 01500 of July 23 1942 as APR's) are as follows: September dash 23 October dash 20 November dash 7 total number involved 50. Estimate 3 months from date completion for arrival on station Cinacap.

10 0202 COMAIRPAC to COMAIRPAC info COMINCH.

Conwestseainfron originates. RSO Mono area to Cinacap for action. RSO Wain pass to Cominach for Info. From General De'titt. Following is paraphrase of personal report from Commanding General Alaska Defense Command on FULACE Operation: August 26th one Army reconnaissance force landed from submarine in KULAY Bay ADAX Island. August 27th one Army

(Continued on next page)
reconnaissance force landed from submarine at GWAAB Bay. Reconnaissance force on DARD observed one enemy single motor float plane on August 27th. Plane passed from Northeast to Southwest and return but apparently did not observe our reconnaissance force. No other reports of enemy observation or units. Initialarrison transported on FELL. SAN KIMI and BRANCH arrived KILUK Bay August 30th. All troops landed on that day. 'Loading of transports completed September 6th. Troops this increment consist of one infantry regiment less one battalion, one antiaircraft gun battery, three antiaircraft automatic weapons batteries, one antiaircraft searchlight battery, one battery coast artillery 105 millimeter gun, one battery field artillery 105 millimeter howitzer, one battery field artillery 75 millimeter pack. Force headquarters. Aircraft warning platoons, and Station complement. One battalion aviation engineers less one company and two platoons quartermaster corps company. Arrived via barge August 31st. Totalarrison now ashore consists of 114 officers and 4372 enlisted men. Four thousand foot landing strip expected to be ready for operation September 10th. End paraphrased.

10 0725

JCLAMPHCRSOPAC to GOLSOPAC

Tid by Comsopac to CINCPAC

The situation forecast in your 10 0725 and nightly bombardment CACTUS-RINGBOLT indicates urgent need for several PacPlt submarines tied area. If these are lost recommend SowesPac submarines operate on line NEW GEORGIA ISLAND - HAINING STRAIT.

10 1152

GOLSOPAC to CINCPAC

This is for Admiral Nimitz from Comsopac. Assume your 091944 refers only to combatant naval forces which are organized as of 11 September as follows units designated as indicated in PacPlt Con notice 183C-42 dated Aug 8. Task Force 17 Rear Admiral Murray in HORNET, NORTH CAROLINA Cruisers Rear Admiral Good in NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA SAN DIEGO and Desron 2 plus DALE. HUGHES and WILKE at present absent on escort assignments will be ordered join TaskFor 17 as soon as practicable. Task Force 18 Rear Admiral Hoyes in WASP Cruisers Rear Admiral Scott in SAN FRANCISCO, SALT LAKE CITY, HELINA, JUNEAU and Desron 12 less WOODWORTH and MCGALLA plus CLARK last named temporarily absent escorting. (continued on next page)
Task Forces 17 and 18 together comprise Task Force 61 under Admiral Noyes. Task Force 62 near Admiral Turner Transdiv 2 and 10. Transdiv 12 less CALIFORNIA LITTLE. Transdiv 2 less ALMAACK HARRIS. Transdiv 4 less ENCOUNTER and ALCOYONE plus ALCHIRA. Following units of Minron 2: Cominrom 2 in SPOKANE, SANGREVER, SOUTHERN, ROVEY. Transdivs of Task Force 62 are organized into CINDIV in accord with approved dispatch 17 August. Task Force 63 near Admiral McCain FURNIS, LOCIFAC, FALCON, BALLARD with attached aircraft.

Task Force 64 near Admiral Wright in MINNEAPOLIS, HOSE, HENDERSON Transdiv 22 plus PERMUT FASCICYCLE. Combatant units available in BoPac area not assigned to Task Forces ATLANTA, HULL, AYDIN, FRESNO Transdiv 10 less WM 3 of which currently or prospectively on escort assignments but later intended in part to augment task forces. Also MACLAREN, SNARE, OSCARA currently employed in interbase and aircraft tender Escort assignments. Not included are Task Force 11 as constituted for return to Pearl and Task Group 2.12 which I intend as soon as assigned to Task Force 13 as soon as available, with Combatdiv 6 in WASHINGTON. ACHILLES made available 2 months refit ETJOKUT currently mid September. EOKOMAI utilized for special missions of short duration.

At 0500 L (-11) tomorrow Saturday 28 July task BLIND DEVIL depart APRILGT retiring to south. All female planes take off daylight. Those on search proceeding on mission. Remain as a group operate in general area to south and within 50 miles APRILGT. If no threatening enemy contact received from search planes by 0830 L (-11) Task Group 63.5 less search planes return APRILGT. As replacement am sending one plane from ETJOKUT forenoon tomorrow call 45V35. A second plane call 45V35 will arrive after completing search sector 5. Return any 2 your plane crews via WILMAL.
11 002 08 DEC 1943 083013 UTC to CINCPAC, CINCPAC Info CINCPAC 0924 19430830

It will be possible to embark 1 Army command element 2nd year of 43rd infantry division by deactivation using the LCI in such a manner as to permit direct routing to White Feather or diversion by you execute. Include this requirement during early October. Advise if this modification is desired in loading army units specified in my 201240 August 1943. Inform.

13 0933 Comairsopac to CINCPAC Info CINCPAC, HULAC

When I left at 0645 L (-11) today material situation created of 0600 except for gas shortage and no Barston mat. Personnel very tired - no rest at night account bombardment by surface craft or by heavy account air alerts. TIDTON normal. Turner and McCall at TIDTON.

14 1004 11 DEC 1943 083013 UTC to CINCPAC, HULAC

Enemy attacked throughout night striking at both flanks and rear of position. Attack at rear was in strength and regular only after severe artillery. Contact and summary up operations continued throughout day. Casualties approximately 30 dead 140 wounded. Enemy dead exceeded 500. At 0100 cruiser and destroyer in the area little damage no casualties. Enemy area over at 0700 0800 and 1745. 3 shot down. 19 losses 1 P4. Pilot saved. All times L (-11).

14 0726 15 DEC 1943 083013 UTC to CINCPAC, CTF 62

Your 1410120. My 141045. Enemy struck in three areas. Captured operation area indicated attack sent of as planned. Success of either threat would have given him temporary possession of area field. Threat at rear was main effort. Difficult to determine numbers in night attack but forces on right flank and rear probably exceeded 2000. Suspect destruction of 0600 by aircraft at SAM JONG Island and CAFE TOPEKAN as cause. At 1200 love (-11) today although numerous snipers in position patrols to flank and rear had only one contact. Main effort made along narrow ridge was stopped by 400 raiders and paratroops under Edson supported by intense artillery fire only after 10 hours hand to hand fighting during which our troops suffered over fifty per cent casualties. We have lost three tanks. Casualties to date are 363 some of which are only slightly wounded.
For MacArthur from Nimitz. Plan to place one tender and six modern submarines under operational control Shirley. For best employment these and in view disposal of U-boat made by Johnson 131830 request that all U-boats withdraw you make available for Pacific sub operations that portion your area bounded as follows. On south by lat 23°, on west by long 155°E to lat 11° and thence along a line to East Cape on southeast coast to longitude 147°E. Thence north along New Guinea coast to longitude 147°E. Thence north to equator.

By information indicates possible black-nights enemy effort against CACTUS for next day or two while reinforcing troops ashore for combined repeated attempts. Consider safest time entrance CACTUS next 2 days. At your discretion and provided sufficient fuel vessels transit 2 to make trip in and then out to rendezvous, proceed CACTUS reporting via DD your intention and ETA CACTUS. Am dispatching tanker day light 17th grid posot 64370 (Long 160°-45°E lat 20°00′S) to arrive 10 hours L (11°) 18th thence to grid Posot 64390 (Long 160°-45°E lat 15°00′S) arriving day light next morning. Will issue further orders to tanker based on your intended movements.

In view of questionable value ATOMIC as a mine-laying submarine in enemy waters due to great noise of mine gear and vulnerability of mine tube doors and recognized future need for commodification submarine raider unit and cargo carrier propose converting to an AV by removing mine rolling equipment welding tube door plates and installing bunking facilities to provide for approximately 176 raiders with equipment. Submarine now at yard due to fuel tank leaks. Immediate approval desired to effect work without delay in Navy Yard. No further extensive alterations or Navy Yard work than removal mine racks welding mine tube doors and rebalancing intended for present.
SECRET

September (237)

15 1905 TF 9 to TF 9 Info ONION, FREMONT, FREMONT...

12 B-24's 14 B-39's and 14 P-39's conducted coordinated low altitude bombing and strafing attack on installations Bora Harbor and on ships in harbor and vicinity. Results:
2 mine sweepers at submarine net sunk, direct hits and near misses on 3 large cargo vessels, hits on several small vessels and barcos, large fires in own area on base 4 float zero fighters and 1 enemy biplane shot down in flames.
1 Jap 4 curved patrol plane burned on water, 3 submarines strafed by P-39's with 37 millimeter guns, stores near dock strafed and exploded, all installations around harbor repeatedly strafed, total enemy casualties estimated at about 500, 1 enemy zero and 1 biplane possibly escaped. Own casualties: 2 P-39's collided in midair and crashed while attacking zero fighter, both pilots missing. Com task force eight sends. Connich, Hinch, Freeman and Greenlade all for info. Latter please inform Dewitt.

15 1235 TF 17 to COMTOBAC

This supplements my last report. 3155 escorted by LALS and ADREN'TH ordered to VIET TRIT at 2150 (-10). Damage not serious. About 12 fuel tanks contamined 12,000 gallons unusable. Leave heavy oil slick. None killed 2 injured 3 unaccounted FOR. CORKEN ordered VIETTAC.

921
SECRET
SEPTEMBER (GCT)

19 0225 CTP & to CINCPAC INFO COMNOWESTSEAFRON.

Contaskfor & answers CINCPAC 190215 with Comnowwestseafron info adae. TALBOT now at yard ROCKS arriving shortly. Suggest conversion of these 2 ships begin at once. Will release BENTFORD and VINTERS to proceed designated West Coast yard about October first or as soon as possible after arrival LONG SHIPLOCK IN BOSTON. Am sending "ELIOT" with HONOLULU departing about September 20th as this HOC in urgent need of structural repairs to be returned this force on completion overhaul. Must also return LAWRENCE to Comwestseafron by October 15th. Am having conference DeWitt FISHER tomorrow subject unknown to me. Completion present phase VITTLEACK operations about end October should reduce cruiser commitment but will content more fully after conference. For normal operations consider four modern destroyers adequate screen for four cruisers or "GUNTER and "FISHER" can frequently be made available for escort duty unless further joint commitments develops for fall and winter. Copy by hand to Comaltaec.

922
SECRET
September (GCT)

20 1949 CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

Troops cargo debarking AUOM SKP transports at climate screened by 2 DD since forenoon 19th. Troops cargo debarked cavern completing occupation. No report yet as to status of work of construction of fighter field. Buckner and I agreed task one of Fireplace project "Seizure and occupation" in accordance Joint Chief Staff directive contained in Cominch 050003 completed. Project now in phase of Task 2. Army forces at Longview have terminated statoidus task group under my command and assumed statoidus unit of ADC. Force now at strength approximately 5,000. My supporting operations air and surface continue unchanged.

21 0030 CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

CTF-8 sends to Cinopac Cominch. Intend repeated low altitude bombing attacks of Kiska but weather has prevented repetition since September 14th attack. Kiska harbor now netted on line from north head to south head prevents for present contemplated NF boat attack on shipping there.
The following reorganization of Taskforces 17 and 64 is effective upon joining of Task Group 66.4 with Task Force 17 and attached units by 2012. Tactical distribution of units VMEC new taskforces will be effected when practicable as directed by senior task force commander. Affirm. Task Force 17 striking force Rear Admiral Murray in HORNET, WASHINGTON, NORTHAMPTON, PENNSYLVANIA, ATLANTA, SAN DIEGO, JUPITER, Desron 7 less INDIAN plus QUINALT, KINTON and LEAF. Baker. Task Force 64 screening and attack force Rear Admiral Scott SAN FRANCISCO, KANSAS CITY, SALT LAKE CITY, CLEVELAND, Desron 12 less GOODWORTH plus MICHIGAN. Absent units will be directed join Taskforces soon as practicable.

Amphibious combined with jungle warfare in South Pacific shows following. Commanchepac sends. Need for rapid means to cut trails clear fields of fire and construct field fortifications in dense undergrowth. Japanese are making major attacks at night by mule infiltration and direct assault. Japanese control is excellent due to effective use of small portable radio transmitters and receivers which are much superior to our own. Our yellow painted munitions are easily spotted by enemy. Aviation bombs are hard to conceal. Japanese see our brightly painted grenades either day or night and throw them back. Need for reducing volume of construction materials to be transported. Para. In view of foregoing recommend following. Affirm. Provide following tools each company three double pritned axes, nine heavy duty pack mattocks, nine heavy duty short handled shovels, six heavy duty long handled shovels, two post hole diggers, two cross cut saws, two dash men. Baker. Double present allowance brush hooks. Cast. Provide two commercial machetes with broad heavy blade for each squad. Dem. Increase allowance nails assorted by one ton per division. Easy. Provide trip flares of at least one minute duration and long burning illuminating projectiles for use in 60 and 41 millimeter mortars. Fox. Replace present portable radio transmitters and receivers with efficient waterproof lightweight type. George. Increase allowance of these radios no platoon leaders have them. Hvp. Provide efficient portable receivers for squad leaders. Inter. Eliminate yellow, red and other bright colors. Paint bombs, grenades, fuel drums, and vehicles with nonreflecting paint. Army combat vehicles paint suitable except color should be mattel green. Jix. Provide one small portable sawmill with power unit per regiment. Fins. Double present allowance hand carts. Mike. Three utility
21 2207 COMAIRTHFORPAC (Continued)

part for second Nerdiv recommended as follows. Leave scout car company and one fifty-five millimeter howitzer battalion in United States. Mikes, Groups three and five, equipment and personnel passage particular, neutral clothing be reduced to minimum. New battles, vehicles be only those suitable for rough terrain no sedans nor station wagons. Option plan for five units of fire fifty-five days rations accompany troops in landings plan for equal amounts as reserve with second base depict LONGVIEW.

20 2130 JTF 3 to CONTINGENCY, COMBAC, TG 8, PRUSSIT, TG 9, YAM.

This is JTF 3 Op Order 11-42. Organization. Task Group 8.12, Mike Division 1, PRUSSIT TG 8, YAM, TG 9, PRUSSIT TG 8, YAM. Information. Own Army Forces have occupied ADAK and ATKA Islands and are garrisoning and constructing landing fields thereon. Considerable movement of friendly shipping including transports cargo and submarines vicinity of KURIL Chain. Japanese have seized Kiska and ATKA Islands, enemy base on Kiska Harbor. Enemy forces in vicinity may include combatant ships all types plus land and seaplanes plus several types auxiliaries. Code name LONGVIEW is ADAK, and CAVERN is ATKA. Plan, Mine designated approaches to LONGVIEW and provide antisubmarine screens and escorts as directed. Task, Mine Division 1 lay mines in approaches to Kulaun Bay in accordance with instructions which will be received upon arrival LONGVIEW. Provide antisubmarine defense and escorts as directed. Proceed LONGVIEW via AMURTA PACT, thence through point 20 miles north of KURIL BAY, ATKA ISLAND, thence through point 20 miles north of FLATTEN HEAD on GREAT KURIL ISLAND, and thence to Kulaun. Enter Kulaun Bay only through northern entrance and during daylight. Report arrival LONGVIEW via first airplane returning to KULIK BAY or ATKA. Communications. accordance Pac 70 except guard ENO Fox instead of BZK Fox. Maintain strict radio silence. Obtain standard communication plan LONGVIEW and comply.
SECRET

September (COT)

23 1326 COMSOPAC to COMSUB 1 and 11, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.

The following policy is established relative to the employment of CUB ACORNS and Naval Construction Battalions in the WHITE POPPY BUTTON CACTUS RINGGOLT areas: (a) All materials and personnel of CUBS 1 and 13 and construction battalions 6 and 7 now in BUTTON CACTUS RINGGOLT are available for any one of those bases. ACORN ONE loss its construction battalion will be landed at BUTTON and will be available for some bases. Decision as to priorities of needs between those bases as affects aviation construction, facilities and operations is a function of Comairsopac. (c) Option ACORN ONE on arrival report to CO BUTTON under principle unity of command as CO Naval Advanced Base BUTTON. (b) CO CUB 13 designated as CO Base Construction Depot WHITE POPPY which includes materials and personnel of CUBS 1 and THIRTEEN now at WHITE POPPY and the construction battalion accompanying ACORN ONE. This depot will be employed for construction of WHITE POPPY base. (c) In general additional construction material and personnel sent this area will be received by the Base Construction Depot WHITE POPPY and will be available for movement forward by increments as needed, however present and future needs of personnel and material and extent of unloading facilities and congestion of port will be factors in deciding the port of debarkation of future ships. Advanced areas will advise Comosopac as to requirements not available at BUTTON or in ACORN ONE. My 072206 modified to accord with above. Action COMSUBONE, COMAIRSOPAC, COMCEN CACTUS, COMCEN BUTTON, COMSUB 13 has by hand for action. Anderson pass to COM ACORN ONE for action. Action addrees acknowledge by air-mailgram. Following have by hand for info COMCERONEOPAC, COMGENSOPAC, COMAMPHISOPAC.

23 1251 COMSOPAC to VINCOPNAV, CINCAP. Info COM 12 COMSHIGOPAC.

WHITE POPPY has of necessity become extremely active and congested port. Unloading handling storing and housing facilities totally inadequate or non existent. Urgent requirement of extreme importance to present operations is equipment to get large quantities of cargo from ship to shore. Request earliest possible shipment of following items robbing all available LION CUB ACORN or other stocks with immediate shipment of available items. Twenty self propelled barges of each of three sizes 50 ton, 100 ton and 250 ton. After cargo congestion of this port has been relieved some of these barges will be moved forward. All barges desired self propelled type. 20 wharf units five by

(Continued on next page)
23 1251 COMSOPAC (Continued)
twelve standard. 20 bridge units. 12 five ton truck
spares. 12 five ton crawler cranes. 6 fifteen ton
crawler cranes. 20 five ton dump trucks. 40 ten wheel
trucks ten pickup trucks. 20 jeeps quarter ton. Five
5 ton HYSTER trucks. Two automotive repair shops. Two
floating pile drivers complete. Piles lumber and hardware
for foray by 500 foot pier with 60 foot piles. All above
items to be complete with auxiliary equipment tools spare
parts with two sets of general hand tools. Of above items
pontoon and weight handling equipment will be of greatest
immediate usefulness.

23 2249 CINCPAC to COMINCH. COMDT MARCORPS. Info COMSOPAC. OPNAV. etc.
Concur recommendations Comamphi forcomsopac 212207 except
leaving 155 mm howitzer battalion in U.S. Although im-
mediate operations do not require this artillery because
enemy had not yet consolidated his positions future opera-
tions against defended places will beyond doubt require
powerful artillery. 155 mm should be in area when needed.
24 2311 CONSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.

Goromely sends. Operations 24th. 4 enemy DDs attacked by 6 SBDs 150 miles northwest GUADALCANAL. No damage. 1215 L (-11) 24th bombed enemy transports SHORTLAND Island and TOMOLIN Harbor with R17s. 22 enemy vessels including CL there. Ceiling 15,000 feet. Three hits 6 near hits. 20 enemy fighting planes defended. 1 sure 3 possibly shot down. On GUADALCANAL 23rd extended ground patrols indicate no enemy vicinity position except stragglers. 1 Jap killed 1 prisoner. Continued air strafing TASSAFROMA to SAFUNA. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 23rd 1 of 3 single engines single float planes at Manning Strait attacked R17 and was shot down. Bombed REKATA with incendiaries and 100 pound bombs.

25 1456 CONSOPAC to COMINCH COMSWPAC FOR CTF 69-17-63-64 CINCPAC

Operations 25th. On Guadalcanal 24th 1 battalion on extended patrol made contact 4 miles to south of position at sunset. Fighting continued into night when enemy withdrew. Our losses 7 dead 25 wounded. Enemy losses not yet reported. 4 enemy DDs towing landing boats were attacked by 2 SBDs 2100 L (-11) 24th. Despite repeated attacks by other SBDs and TBFs enemy ships continued toward Guadalcanal until 0130 when within 8 miles Cape Esperance were turned away. Damage unknown. Rekata Bay 24th B-17 encountered 3 float aeroes one type 95 single float seaplane. Larter shot down. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

25 1950 CTF-8 to TF-8 into CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

Reconnaissance Chichakoof Harbor and Holtz Bay by B-24 on 22 and 23 September drew no gun fire from either place planes flying as low as 200 feet. No vessels in harbor no sign of life ashore. Pilot reports installations between Chichakoof and Holtz have been abandoned. No guns observed in emplacements. Photographs verified this observation and in addition show dock in Chichakoof Harbor has been removed. Original houses of village remain. These observations indicate that the Japanese have abandoned Attu. The presence of light mine layers recently at Attu indicate the possibility that harbors have been mined. Action of enemy probably influenced by the vulnerability of small outlying garrisons. Have issued orders to destroy the remaining buildings and installations on Attu. This from CTF-8. NPM pass to Cinopac and NSS pass to Cominich both for info.
CONSPAC TO CG POPPY INFO CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

For action CG Poppy info CG Sopac CG White Poppy
Conspac and Captain Dudley have by hand.
Conspac sends. Captain Roy Dudley is hereby temporarily designated as Commanding Officer US Naval
Advanced Base White Poppy will report to CG Poppy for
this duty under principle of unity of command and
will proceed with the organization and development
of the base which is to include the following naval
shore activities in the port area port director's office,
Base construction depot, Receiving Station, Naval
supply depot, Naval aviation supply depot, naval
ammunition depot, Mobile hospital section base, Naval
radio station, Radio material office, Public Works
Office, Fleet post office, Naval dispensary and other
naval activities that may be assigned.

CTF-6 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

CTF-6 sends. Considerable increased activity at Kiska
many large ships in the harbor one large ship probably
submarine tender observed south of the island. Cause
this increased activity not yet apparent. An intensifying
offensive air and submarine operation and lengthen-
ning coverage Fire place while increasing scouting
observation until enemy intentions are determined.
SECRET
SEPTEMBER (08T)

26 1256 COMBOPAC to CINCPAC. COMONESPAC. O77 17 62 63 64. COMINCH.

Operations 26th. KOKATA BAY 25th H17 strafed beach silencing 2 machine gun emplacements damaging 1 single engine float bi-plane on water. Same day TONOLEI HARBOR 2 H17's bombed ships. Believe 1 500 pound bomb hit stern CA. In harbor 15 miles Southeast HUKA PASSAGE 1 H17 bombed 3 ships. Believe 1 500 pound hit stern XV. TONOLEI HARBOR 25th H17 saw 12 single engine float biplanes and float seaplane. Shot down 3 in flames. Another probably. GUADANANAL 25th extensive air and ground patrolling continued. Area from KOLI POINT to MATAIKOU RIVER free of enemy forces. All approaches and entire coastline covered by air search from 1500 to 0130 L (-1) 26th but no contact. VEDEGE area bombed. Gherley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

26 1259 COMBOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH. VICE OPHAY.

Recommend decision as to location of South Pacific advanced base depot be deferred as situation is changing too rapidly. SUVA not favored as administration would be difficult. An emergency advanced base depot is being set up at WHITE POPPY for OUB materials which could not be delivered at forward bases. Vice Opsave 261936 is the despatch on which this is comment.

26 1302 COMINCH to CINCPAC. Info COM 12. COMONESPAC SAMOA GROUP.

Consider that Army and Marine units which may be moved up to forward positions should receive amphibious training. Anticipate establishing limited number of amphibious training groups (as equipment and personnel become available) in key locations in central and South Pacific areas, each to consist of 1 standard landing craft unit organized as directed Cominco serial 00611 of August 16 1942. Should you concur, suggest you locate your groups as follows STRAW, PANTAN or WHITE POPPY, SPOOKER, and COPPER. Training groups in South Pacific Area under general control of Com-amphics. War Department concurs in above plan and suggested locations. Advise Comapac pass to C of 8 US Army (Sopac Theater) for info.

26 2020 CTF 540 TF 8. Info COMONESPAC. COMINCH. CINCPAC. etc.

Combined for 6 sends. 15 bombers and 26 pursuit attacked KISKA September 25. Preliminary results as reported by PBY: 1 AK left burning, 1 seaplane fighter shot down and 6 out of 10 seaplane fighters destroyed on water. Photo KISKA HARBOR show 2 AK's or AP's, 2 minelayers, 2 smaller craft and many motor launches. Amplify report will be made when full particulars are known here.
SHORT
SPT. WER (OCT)

26 2330 CTF 8 to TF 6. Info COMINCH. CINCPAC. COM 12. END.

Conttaskforce 8 262020 amplified. 9 B-24's took part in attack with 11 P-39's and 17 P-40's, 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 photo ships. Report hits on 1 transport 2 submarines strafed, 1 float plane shot down and from 5 to 8 float planes out of 20 caught on surface. Shore installations strafed. Enemy casualties estimated 150. Only minor damage to our planes. 2nd attack attempted in afternoon forced to turn back due to weather. 3 B-24's bombed shore installations on previous day. Extent of damage to enemy unknown. Stations addressed deliver locally for info to Cominch, CINCPAC, Admirals Greenlade and Freeman and SanFran also to General DeWitt.

27 1436 CONSOPAC to COMINCH. CINCPAC. CONSWPAC CTF 64 63 62 17.

Operations 27th. 26th 8 B-17's struck shipping Faisi. Shortland. 1 large AP hit heavily left burning probably sunk. 1 CA hit on stern left afire. 3 float zeros and 3 float bipoles shot down. B-17 on patrol at Faisi attacked by 4 float zeros. 1 damaged forced land in water. B-17 on patrol Pakata Bay strafed single engine float bipoles on beach. 26th small enemy force was contacted west Matanikau river. Was being encircled morning 27th. Patrols on Florida killed 9 captured 3. Bormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 27th at Guadalcanal 1355 Love (-11) 18 Jap bombers escorted by 13 fighters were engaged by our fighters. Enemy losses 4 bombers 5 fighters. All our planes returned. 1 SBD on ground destroyed.

28 1326 CONSOPAC to COMINCH. CINCPAC. CONSWPAC. CTF 62 63 64 17.

29 1226 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCOPAC, CONWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.


30 0030 CTF S to TF 3, COMINCH, CINCOPAC, COMJENN WDC, COMWESTSHAFRON, etc.

Attack on KISKA Sept 27th by 6 B 24's: Dropped 48 500 pound bombs from altitude of 1 to 3000 feet on ships in harbor and shore installations, shot down 1 float zero, no further damaged Reports as yet. no losses, most AA fire received from ships in harbor. Also 27th Sept 3 bombers attacked enemy transport and destroyer 100 miles north KINICHI, near misses in stern causing transport to stop. Night attack on KISKA 28 September by 8 B24's supported by 17 fighters: 4 float zeros shot down, 1 submarine reported sunk with 500 pound bomb, hits and near misses by 8 500 pound bombs on 1 transport considered badly damaged and sinking, all bombing at 5000 feet, 64 500 pound bombs dropped on ships and shore installations, AA opposition stronger than on previous attack. Our losses one P 39 down at sea 5 miles southeast LITTLE KISKA pilot believed lost, one B-24 hydraulic system damaged by gun fire and racked up on landing 1 of crew slightly wounded, 3 destroyers left KISKA harbor during attack. 2nd attack launched 1055 W (plus 10) no reports as yet. Catalina dropped 2 charges 26th alongside small enemy freighter 50 miles north of BULDIR with possible damage to freighter. Also 28th September bombers burned and photographed ATTU village no opposition however weather plane reported being fired on from ATTU, no amplifying report but possible indication presence of lookout station.
SECRET

SEPTEMBER (COT)

30 2335

CIF-9 TO TF-9 INFO GINOPAC COMNavComNav COM-14 eta.

Com taskfor 3 amplified report of operations 22 Sept.
3 B-24s destroyed with thermite bombs all buildings
Attu village except church, heavy explosions among
houses during fire, bombers then dropped 4 thermite
bombs astride freighter north of Baidir Island also
strafed ship silencing AA guns. 3 B-24s supported by
16 fighters in afternoon attack on Kiska bombed shipping
at 9000 feet, near misses, no interception, no battle
damage. 3 B-24s bombed a freighter north of Srawan Point
at 1 to 4000 feet, near misses. Observation editors of
Kiska reports tents, stores, excavation, auxiliary
vessels and boat in Gertrude Cove, encountered 37mm fire.
No morning mission 20th due to weather. Deliver locally
to Cominoh Ginopac Freeman and Greenslade all for info.
Letter to inform Dewitt. Buckner has by hand.

30 1022

COMAFFPHORSPAC TO ENSHIPS COMHIV INFO GINOPAC COMNav et al

This is part 1 of Comaffphorspac 201650. Following
despatches not to all addreses are referenced. Comaffphor-
groupspac 2293350 August. ENShips 023231. ADM Washington
Incident to operations August September following land-
craft have been left at bases Cactus Kingbolt Sutton
Petlock and are necessary to their operation maintenance
and support: Tank lighters 96 tare toger 55 tare 74.
Due weather and enemy action others have been damaged
beyond repair. Replacement boats actually received
form negligible proportion of above total. In addition
to actual existing deficiency of approximately 150 boats
(33 percent) in 18 ships of transgroups boat engines
and spare parts are being depleted at an alarming rate.
This due to continuous necessity utilise large number
boats in loading unloading and shifting cargo without
dock or adequate water transport and lack boat repair
and maintenance facilities at forward bases.

30 1030

Part two. Some boats not operable due lack of neces-
sary engine parts. This force as a whole therefore
not now ready for large scale task by reason boat
deficiencies. None of references indicate any
replacement tank lighters enroute this area and this
type is essential. None previous request have been to
small and have failed to envision past present and pros-
tpective needs. None in addition to replacement existing
deficiency of 150 landing craft, replacement plans should
provide starter stock 50 percent spare boats latter to
be increased to 100 percent within next 6 months plus
additional numbers for training goals. Corresponding
increase in repair and maintenance facilities sought and
at bases this area also required. Part second this is
threatened as urgent requisition and that movement boats
and parts to this force be expedited. End.
01 0454  COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC OPNAV

Request acorns 3 and 4 be shipped to White Poppy. Cominach 172240. Recommend plans be held in abeyance for shipment to Sotac area of remaining 4 acorns. Request 1 complete Yards and Docks component of Cub including 1 construction battalion be sent to White Poppy. Lion components depend on approval of projects for spooner but the current importance of bases in spooner has decreased and White Poppy development is of the greatest urgency in view of extremely limited shore facilities. Critical items are equipment for unloading and weight handling, water transportation, tugs, and spare parts for all such equipment. Following additional recommendations are also in answer to Vice Opnav 241725 regarding escort vessels. For major maintenance base Auckland directive for which has been issued by Opnav recommend surface ship repair component of Lion including also 1 floating drydock ARD 2 type. For voyage repairs Borabora Samoa Tongatapu and Noumea recommend repair facilities equivalent to an AD plus an ART 2 dock at Tongatapu. Vice Opnav letter 020803 August 17 not received.
30 1300 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, COMINCH, MacARTHUR, TO 62.6. etc.

Operations 30th. On GUADALCANAL during 28th and 29th continued patrol activity but no contact. Enemy remains in occupation MITANIKAU line. FLORIDA petrol killed five Japs at HAHOWO. No casualties our patrol. 29th at 1400 lost 11-11 about 20 zeros followed by small group bombers approached from northwest. One squadron our fighters intercepted zeros. Bombers jettisoned northwest SAVO and fled. Two zeros probably four shot down. Our loss one plane one pilot. 30th ALHENA reports being torpedoed while returning from CACTUS Lat 10-47 south long 161-16 east. Shaft sprung. NAVAJO enroute to tow her. Ghormley sends Carpenter pass to MacARTHUR.

01 1716 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.

Fires started Jap gasoline storage REKATA BAY 30th by 9 quarter ton bombs. Operations first. 29th GUADALCANAL patrol activity only. No ground contact. Search planes destroyed 2 float biplanes bombed AA installations REKATA BAY. 4 enemy boats landing supplies VISALE attacked by our search planes later by P-400's and SBP's. P-400's bombed strafed enemy trucks and troops near KOKUMBONA. Yesterday's report air action GUADALCANAL should read 4 shot down probably 6. GHORMLEY sends Carpenter pass to MacARTHUR. GUADALCANAL 30th usual patrols. SBP's attacked REKATA BAY bombing 2 float planes and burning dump. SBP's and P-400's attacked supply dump KOKUMBONA and TENARU. No plane losses.

01 2100 CTF-8 TO TF-8 INFO COMINCH CINCPAC COMVES & NORVES SEAPRON

Attack on Kiska September 30th made by 9 B-24s at altitude of 15000 ft. Photographs show one possible two direct hits one near miss on transport left burning. Three fires started in camp area. AA fire heavy but inaccurate. One bomber attacked by two pursuits. No damage to own planes. September 29th photo ship dropped bombs at low level and strafed deck of small cargo ship which was bombed 28th north of Attu. No opposition or sign of life. Possibly abandoned. Photos taken. Comatasfor B sends. NSP pass to Cominch. NPM to Cincpac. NPC to Comcowwestseafron and DFO to Comcowseafron.

01 0812 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC.

Comsopac replying to Cominch 181236. Carrier task force have now used White Poppy as replenishment anchorage on two occasions. Carrier anchored Great Road just inside anti torpedo net cruisers generally berthed Durnea Bay due necessity use Great Road berths to facilitate unloading cargo ships with limited dock and barge facilities. Only one berth inside Great Road feasible for carrier or battleship. Durnea Bay affords number EFF ships berths satisfactory except no underwater protection. Material on hand for 2 individual anti torpedo nets not yet prepared for use due employment net detail in...
stalling Great Road and Little Entrance nets. B note on hand expected ready within 2 weeks. Following underwater defense equipment requires to make safe anchorage for single carrier task force. A material for 3 additional individual anti torpedo nets. B. Sound equipped gate barges to detect sub attempting entry behind ship. C. Small craft sound equipped to patrol in vicinity of loop. Simultaneous use of White Poppy as replenishment anchorage by 2 carrier task groups not considered advisable.

C OF S ARMY TO CG NAVDEPT INFO CINCPAC:

397/29th - To provide amphibious training for units your command in preparation for possible assumption offensive action in Pacific, Cominoh contemplates dispatching your area one standard landing craft unit capable of transporting reinforced infantry battalion (Cominoh dispatch 261302 NOR 9532). Your comments desired on the following plan for establishment of amphibious training center: 1. Initial location on Island of Hawaii with a view to giving training to units of 37th division without unnecessarily interfering with accomplishment of assigned mission. 2. Movement of training center or combat units so as to provide rotational training of all divisions your command for Hawaiian Department (signed Marshall). 3. Amphibiously trained units echeloned forward as needed for offensive action. 4. Forces echeloned forward to be replaced by mainland units which will in turn be trained in amphibious and jungle warfare. Complexity of defensive organization on island of Cahu fully appreciated by war department. However, deemed necessary to train 24th and 25th divisions with view toward their possible utilization elsewhere on offensive missions and assumption their present functions by less well trained division. Priority radio reply desired to include requirements in Army boat and shore units necessary to augment navy landing craft unit to provide training on scale you feel essential. Marshall.
SECRET
OCTOBER (GCT)

02 1436
COMSOPAC TO CTF 17, 62, 63, 64 CINC PAC COMINCH COMPO CINCPAC

Sopac operations. October 1st 5 ADEs 6 TEPs from GUADALCANAAL attacked 4 Jap DDs 1st 09-08 E1, Long 166-06 E, at 1900 L (+11). 1 DS damaged left dead in water. 3 TEPs failed return. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

02 2025
CTF-9 to TF 8 info CINC PAC COMINCH etc.

7 B-24s from 15,000 feet bombed seaplane base and other installations Kiska Harbor and main camp with incendiary and demolition bombs during morning October one. Fires observed. Photos taken. Enemy shipping evidently now being routed well north of Kiska and close to track of Russian ships. From CTF-9, Stations addressed deliver locally to Cominchi CINCPAC West and Northwest Sea Frontier Comdr and Comgen West Def Command.

02 2120
COMINCH TO CINC PAC INFO CTF 9 COMINCH & NORWEST SEAFRON

If you are not an addressee do not decode further. Dewitt and Theobald have agreed on the following garrisons: (A) Adak about 11,000 including 2 regimental combat teams 1 regimental AA artillery 18 light tanks 6 15mm guns and 6 105mm or 75mm field guns. (B) Tangan about 4,000 including 1 battalion infantry reinforced 2 batteries auto weapons AA 4 155mm CA guns and 4 105mm or 75mm field guns. Para 2 War department considers it impracticable at this time to increase present commitments to liith air force which are 30 heavy bombers 40 medium bombers and 165 fighters. Para 3 the chief of Staff Army and I consider that under present circumstances the aforementioned forces are adequate for area in question.

03 1356
COMSOPAC to CINC PAC, COMINCH, COMPO CINCPAC CTF 62, 63, 64, 17

Daily dope. Sopac operations. GUADALCANAAL 1st October only one ground contact. One prisoner. P-400's and artillery straffed small hostile groups from EKUN NUNA to VIVALI. Hostile plane over GUADALCANAAL 2130 Love (+11). 3 more at 0405 love 2nd. Dropped few bombs igniting gas dump. 60 feet boat with antena and radio equipment straffed out on fire by B-27's reconnaissance at CRUZEN WICH ISLAND. Reconnaissance planes BAAFA MAY 2nd dropped ten 100 pounders. Large explosion in palm grove. October 2nd usual ground patrols. No contact. One prisoner. 30 zeros followed by small group bombers ran same at 1310 no bombs dropped four zeros shot down. Our losses 6 fighters four pilots. One SHD landed in water. Cramer
SECRET  
OCTOBER (OCT)  

03 1356 CONSOPAC (Continued).

rescued pilot killed. Two TBD's failed to return search. Single hostile plane over area at 2100 and 0430. Japs attacked by P-400 at NARABO, TENARO, KOKUM and POINT CRUZ. Crews of three TBD's lost on first reported rescued. Morn- ing search disclosed large group enemy landing boats well camouflaged inside VIRA; repeat VIRA HARBOR south coast NEW GEORGIA. On afternoon third 9 enemy DD one CA sighted northwest of CACTUS. 7 TBD and THF attacked cruiser and 2 DD lat 06-32 south long 156-15 east at 1715 lave with no apparent damage. Ships observed to continue on course 120 speed 30 until 1800. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacARTHUR.

03 2010 11 B-24's and 6 P-39's attacked KIMKA HARBOR and installations morning of October 2nd. 25 1,000 demolition bombs dropped from 10,000 feet on 2 cargo ships, no direct hits observed. 71 500 pound demolition bombs dropped in camp area, hits throughout area, direct hit on hangar at sea plane ramp. 1 Jap biplane destroyed by B-24, 1 zero fleet fighters shot down by P-39's. Our losses 2 killed in head on attack, AA fire heavier and more accurate than usual particularly from north HEAD. Shore stations deliver info copies. NES to Cominoch NFM to Cinope NPG to Comnewseafon. NPG to Comwesafon and Comgen WDC.

05 0211 COMOWESPACFOR to COMINCH Info CINPAC. COMWOWESPAC.

Plans now developed advance base EXMOUTH GULF with further plans move bases northward soon as possible. Part 2 from Comwesapac action Cominoch Info Cinope Comsubowespac. 2 vessels Subdiv 201 have reported Cinopeo and last 2 ves- sels this division depart SUMAC about 19th October. Recom- mend as follows (A) Complete transfer to Southwest Pacific Force of Subron 6 and 8 total 24 submarines as proposed in Cinopac Serial 0192 of 26 August. (B) Transfer Subdiv 21, 22 and 202 in exchange accordance schedule proposed some reference. (C) Retain 3 tenders (PHELIA, HOLLAND and GRIFFIN) in Southwest Pacific area. HOLLAND to be trans- ferred Cinopac in exchange for FULTON at date to be determined later. (D) In addition retain Subdiv 33 (6 S type sube) until additional division fleet submarines arrives to relieve them. (E) Complete assignment at least 30 fleet submarines this area at earliest date. This number to be increased to 36 soon thereafter as possible.
SECRET

OCTOBER (OCT)

05 0150 COMSUBSPACFOR to COMINCH Info CINOPAC, COMSUBSPACFOR.

Cominich Serial 00928 of 6 September 1942. Minimum 30 fleet subs plus 3 tenders required this area to comply with the provisions above reference as applied Southwest Pacific Area. 20 Fleet submarines plus 2 tenders inadequate. Minimum 12 subs plus 1 tender required adobe to support offensive operations in the Solomon area where major Jap forces and effort now concentrated. Reference ComSUBPacFor 160419 of Sept in which Cominich concurs by his 161345. This action Cominich info CINOPAC ComSUBSPACFOR from ComSUBSPACFOR. Consider Griffin plus docking facilities adobe capable cope with all logistic and repair problems except major overhaul and modernization. Minimum 16 subs plus 2 tenders required cover major supply routes Indo China Philippines plus strategic shipment routes by blockade runners to and from Europe. Completion marine railway Pinafore where lst sub just docked gives equal facilities that port as Adobe. Part 2 follows.

03 2201 COMGEN let MARDIV to COMSUBPAC Info COMAIRSPAC. CTF 62.

No ground contact. 15 landing boats attacked at Vunakanur. All destroyed or damaged. 30 zeros overhead at 1300. 7 Grumman made contact shooting down 9 certain 1 probable. AA shot down 2 certain 1 probable when 3 zeros attempted strafe field. Our losses 1 Grumman pilot rescued. Jap bombers following zeros turned back 85 miles Cactus. 9 DDs 1 CA sighted 1500 by evening search Lat 08-30 South Long 156-20 East. Force protected by over 20 zero land planes. Striking force attacking 1715 opposed only by fleet biplanes. No hits. Ships attacked during night. 1 hit on CA near Savo. 3 DDs at Marovo. 3 at Vunakanur 3 at Truk 10 at Truk: FOGA believed unloading troops and supplies. All were attacked with damage unknown. 1 SBD failed to return. Scattered bombing during night by single Jap planes. Hostile group totaling 7 DD 1 CA heading Northwest picked up by morning search 120 miles Cactus. Speed 20. CA smoking at stern. Our planes now on strike.

05 2030 CTF 8 to TF 8. CT ALASKA DEF. RDM BREMERTON. SAN FRAN. etc.

Comtaskfor 8 summary action Oct. 3rd. Six B-24's supported by 4 P-39's in attack on Kiska. 5 bombers concentrated on hangar and camp area dropped eighty 100 pound incendiaries and 12 500 pound demolition bombs from 10 to 11000 feet observed hits on target. One bomber dropped 5 1000 pound bombs on cargo ship beached near TROUT LAGOON. Results unobserved. Our fighters shot down six twin float Jap fighters 5 at 16000 feet and one which attacked bombers. AA fire light and inaccurate. All our planes returned without damage. Shipping observed Kiska one medium AK beached one mile West South Head. One large AK beached near TROUT LAGOON. One medium AK West of

(Continued on next page)
05 2030 CTF 6 (Continued)

North Head. Two small DDs patrolling entrance. One AK second cove West TWIN ROCKS. One AK off REWARD cove. Enemy planes dropped 39 bombs on LONGVIEW at 0400 W (plus 10) no damage. Info radio stations pass to following local commands for info COMINCH, Cinopac, Comnorwesedron, Comgen WLC and Comwesseafron.

05 1226 CONSOPAC TO COMINCH CINCPAC CONSWPAC CTF 17, 62, 63, 64 info/

MacARTHUR

Sopac operations. Guadalcanal 3rd no ground contact. 15 Jap landing barges at Viru harbor New Georgia attacked by our planes. All destroyed or damaged. 30 zeros overhead 1300 (-11) 3rd. 7 Grumman’s contacted shot down 9 certain 1 probable. AA shot down 2 certain 1 probable when zeros attempted strafe field. Our losses 1 plane pilot saved. Jap bombers followed zeros turned back 85 miles from Guadalcanal. Jap ships consisting 1 CA 9 Dds landed reinforce-ments during night 3rd - 4th. Our planes attacked throughout night. Reported 1 hit CA near Savo. 1 SBD failed return. Enemy ships found by morning search 120 miles north-west Guadalcanal. Consisted 1 CA smoking at stern 7 Dds. Chormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Striking force after then secured 2 torpedo hits on CA. During 4th October 2 small ground contacts along Matanikau. Jap losses 2 killed 3 wounded 1 prisoner. No marine casualties. SBDs and F-400s attacked Jap installations West Cape Tagura Point.

06 2114 CTF-17 TO CONSOPAC INFO CTF 62, 63, 64 COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Results of attack Buin Faisi Tonolei area 5 October. Originator CTF 17. 16 fighters 18 dive bombers 15 torpedo planes participating. Dropped 8 1000 pound bombs 32 500 pound bombs. Extremely unfavorable weather prevented re-mainder attacking. Hits as follows. 1000 pounders 1 heavy cruiser 1 transport. 500 pounders 10,000 ton cargo 1 sea-plane tender 1 cargo. Near misses 1 1000 pound and 3 500 pound on heavy cruiser. Remainder unobserved. In addition put 3 1000 pound bombs on runway and buildings Kieta field. Shot down 1 zero seaplane and 1 float type seaplane in target area. Strafed 10 4 engine seaplanes on water at Faisi believe 3 sunk. Strafed 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer in Shortland harbor. During TF retirement fighter combat patrol destroyed 2 twin engine type 97 Mitsubishi bombers. All aircraft recovered. No damage no losses this force.
06 1410 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 17.62.61.66. MacArt

Sopac operations. B-17s on strike morning 5th turned back by weather. One plane penetrated to HUKA bombing parking area. Twenty 100 lb bombs. Planes on ground reported damaged. Eighty eight 100 pound bombs dropped on Gizo. No observed results. REKATA RAY attacked by eight planes from GUADALCANAL morning fifth. One small plane and motor launch destroyed in water. Two of six enemy planes shot down. Beach bombed and strafed. Ghormley sends Carpenades pass to MacArthur. One SBD forced down SANTA ISABEL. Prep four hundreds attacked boats and installations TASSAFARONGA and MAROVOYO during day fifth. Enemy force five dog dogs approaching from north west were attacked throughout night fifth - sixth. One DD sunk and one reported damaged first attack. Two TBF failed return from night search. Usual ground patrols GUADALCANAL. Several small contacts in MATANIKAU RIVER area. Our casualties one killed six wounded. Jap losses exceed 10 killed.

07 2025 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMNWSEAFRON, etc.

Oct 6th attack on Kiska by 8 B-24s supported by 10 P-39s and 8 P-38s. Bombing from 10 to 12,000 feet with 500 lb demolition bombs, 28 on hangar area, 13 on GERTRUDE COVE camp area, 8 on large AK in harbor, 12 on large AK and corvette in GERTRUDE COVE. Pursuit strafing harbor area set fire to one of 5 zero float planes on water damaged another also damaged radio station, reported ship in harbor on fire and sinking also fire in camp area as result of bombing. All planes returned with minor damage to 1 B-24s and 1 P-39. Reconnaissance ATTU and AGATTU showed no signs of any enemy occupation. This is from CTF 8. WSS pass to Cominchr NWP pass to Cinopac. NPC pass to Comnorwestseafron NPG pass to Comwestseafron and CGADC repeat CGADC.

09 0125 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Details of additional information urdis 071630 on existing situation between Military and Naval Governor SAMOA not available nor even brought to attention Cinopac. On basis first hand information obtained from officer temporarily at PEAUL from SAMOA believe existing situation requires no change in recommendations made my serial 02020 of Sept 6. Only known basis of unsatisfactory situation is that present Naval Governor does not have unrestricted prestige and authority of his predecessors. As in HAWAII this condition follows logically from present military situation and unavoidable during emergency. Believe it undesirable to add civil administrative duties to military governor who is also in command of combatant troops and should be free to move to another area at a moments notice. My recommendations to specific changes proposed are negative to Airm Baker and Cast. If my recommendations are approved will issue instructions to both governors with view to clarifying situation.
Sopac operations. Morning 5th in extremely unfavorable weather Task Force 17 struck KUNI-FAIKI-TONOKE area with 16 fighters 18 dive bombers 15 torpedo planes dropping 8 1000 pound bombs 32 500 pound bombs. Hits reported: 1000 pounder each on CA and AP. 500 pounders on 10000 ton cargo ship, seaplane tender, cargo ship. Near misses with 1000 pounder and 3 500 pounder on CA. Remainder unobserved. Also dropped 3 1000 pounders on runways and buildings KIITA. Shot down 1 zero seaplane 1 float type seaplane in target area. Straffed 10 4 engine seaplanes. Later believed 4 sunk. Straffed 1 cruiser 1 DD SHOTLAND HARBOR. During Taskforce retirement fighter patrol shot down 2 twin engine type Mitsubishi bombers. No losses no damage our forces. Ghormley sends. Carvender pass to MacArthur. Jap SBD was attacked by our patrol plane with 4 depth bombs at 0530 love (-11) 6th Lat 11-22 south long 162-20 east. Oil and bubbles appeared. On GUADALCANAL 6th active patrolling continued. No contacts on ground. P-400's bombed, strafed probable enemy positions vicinity KOKUMBONO. Air striking force located 3 returning hostile DD's 225 miles northwest GUADALCANAL morning 6th. Did not attack due heavy enemy fighter coverages.

10 0150 CTF 6 to TF 6 Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, COM embed EMBALDEF, etc.

Comtaskforce 8 sends summary offensive air operations against KISKA Oct 6th. 6 B-24's, 2 B-17's supported by 12 P-38's at altitude of 3400 feet dropped 12 500 lb demolition bombs and 57 incendiary bombs on camp area starting at least 3 fires. Also dropped at 3800 feet 12 500 lb demolition bombs on cargo ship in GERTRUDE COVE. 4 P-38's strafed AA installations and hanger also a freighter end a corvette. Another mission 3-324's dropped 10 1000 lb demolition bombs at 4000 feet on same ship in GERTRUDE COVE, photos taken damage still unreported. Own casualties minor injury by machine gun bullet to waist gunner, 1 B-24 damaged on landing, minor damage from AA fire to 3 P-38's. All planes returned. No enemy aircraft encountered. Shore stations deliver for info. Bremerton to Commorwestseafron. San Fran to Comwestseafron and CO NDC. Honolulu to Cincpac and Annapolis to Cominch.
SECRET
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11 1006

COMSOPAC to CINCOPAC info COMINCH COMNEAC TO FORSCOM

COMINCH 261302 Sept CINCPAC 272039. Comsopac to Cinopac. Turner at sea and am unable discuss subject with him. A most important and difficult part of Amphibious Training is the training of officers in the intricate planning necessary. This cannot be accomplished in a few months. Of equal importance is training in the coordinated employment of troops boats groups transport divisions naval gunfire support and air support. There must be training in the special communications technique involved. Officers must have a knowledge of transport loading and close acquaintance with supply problems prior during and after landing. Specialized equipment is necessary. The formation of amphibious training groups in Sopac area as in para 4 Cominich serial 001006 would be but a minor step in a difficult problem. Officers of the experience necessary for conducting the required training cannot be spared as they are already too thinly spread through the Marine Divisions. Plans now on hand for the training of Marine Divisions Sopac area will actively employ all available transports. There will be plenty of active combat employment in this area other operations than effecting landings against opposition for all army troops made available. It is believed that the training suggested might convert well trained army divisions into half trained amphibious divisions. If amphibious training is necessary for army troops sent to the Sopac area it is recommended that it be thorough and be done in the United States where personnel and facilities perhaps are available.

11 1930

CTF-8 to TASKFORCE 9 info CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

Six attack missions flew to Kiska 9 October. Total planes for six flights: 10 B-24, 8 B-17, 4 P-38 and 8 P-36. Bombs dropped from low altitude, numbers and observed results as follows: 88 500 pound demolition on AK in Gertrude Cove no hits, 25 500 pounders on two small AKs in Kiska harbor possible hit, 40 bombs of 100 pounds on north head also 20 of 100 pounds and 16 of 500 pounds in hangar camp area some hits observed. 4 P-39s strafed freighter and two gun emplacements. No enemy aircraft observed. Own damage: 4 bombers minor damage, 2 fighters damaged by AA fire, all returned to base. Preliminary report for 10 October 3 B-17s and 4 P-39 attacked camp hangar area from 100 feet dropping 45 magnesium fire bombs report large fires started, damage will be verified by photos taken. Three enemy planes observed on water. No change in enemy shipping over previous reports. From CTF 8. Info stations pass to following local adams, Cinopac Cominich Comneacseafcon, Comwestseafcon and Comgen WOD.
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09 1316 CONSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC. CTF 62, 63, 76, etc.

Sopac operations. H17 on search SHORTLAND ISLAND 1225L (-11) 8th was attacked sustained minor damage shot down 1 zero. From GUADALCANAL 8th 7 SB2As & TF's escorted by 11 GrummanS attacked CA KINUGASA Class 5 DD's at 1800 L (-11) 08-45 South, Long 158-30 East. 1 sure torpedo hit 1 probable bomb hit & near misses on CA reported. 3 of 10 float biplanes shot down. 1 other probable. 1 SB2A 1 Grumman failed return. 2 search planes which made original contact shot down 1 float biplane one probable. Both our pilots wounded but returned to base. At 1315 L (-11) 9th search plane reports 1 Jap BB on fire approaching HUIN HARBOR with 4 DD escort. Chormley sends. Car- pender pass to MacArthur. 20 GrummanS from COPANOE ar- rived GUADALCANAL 1510 (-11) 9th.

11 1314 CONSOPAC to CONSOPAC (Admin). Info CINCPAC.

Your 102324. Flexible situation necessitates employment troops where and when available and precludes formulation fixed future policy.

10 1946 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC COMINCH COMSWPAC CTF 17, 62, 63, 64.

Sopac operations. Two enemy CL 4 DD 1st 07-50 South long 157-40 E attacked by Guadalcanal air striking force at 0640 L (-11) ninth. One hit on CL several near misses. Ship left down by bow. Probable hit reported on second CL but damage unknown. 3 of 15 escorting float planes shot down also on 9th search planes from Guadalcanal strafed 5 bplanes bombed AA installations Rekata Bay. Results unknown. Guadalcanal ground forces supported by P 400s concluded on 10th a 2 day attack to west Matanikau river. Completely mopped up area Matanikau village - Point Cruz. Our troops have withdrawn to main positions except for strong force holding east bank Matanikau River. Early reports states our casualties less than 100 Jap casualties heavy. During night 8-9th single Jap planes over Guadalcanal in relays from 2200 to 0215. 2 Jap DD attacked by 9 SB2As escort by 12 GrummanS 1st 07-55 S, 157-50 E at 1120 L (-11) 10th. No hits. Chormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

12 0329 CINCPAC to CONSOPAC, COMINCH.

While in agreement with Consopac 111006 consider proposal Cominch 261302 is a step in right direction to provide basic training without diverting AP's from combat tasks and will expedite ultimate readiness of amphibious troops for active combat. Concur STRAW, SPOONER and COPPER should each have group. Consopac advise which of FANTAN and WHITE POFFY

(Continued on next page)
12 0329 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, COMINCH. (Continued from preceding page).

should have group. Attention Cominoh invited that boats are now required to fill authorized complements of combat AP and AK in Sopac area. Recommend those complements be filled prior assignment boats to amphibious training groups in order have AP and AK ready further offensive operations.

12 2010 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMORWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Info stations pass to following local addess Cominoh Cinopac Comorwestseafron Comwestseafron and CG WDC. CTF 8 sende.

Amplifying attack on KISKA 10 October by 5 B17's and 4 P38's. In addition to 45 incendiaries which started large fires camp area dropped 15 demolitions 100 pound bombs in camp area and 6 same type on ship East of TROUT LAGOON. Fighters strafed AA installations. Jap planes on water reported wrecked, 2 ships in harbor beached. 2 medium AK's South of NORTH HEAD 1 small camouflaged ship in GERTRUDE COVE. Report for 11 October 6 B24's from 8 to 10 thousand feet bombed shipping and shore installations KISKA. 40 - 500 pounders on ship East of TROUT LAGOON and ship West of SOUTH HEAD no hits. 27 same type bombs on camp area damage unknown. Only above 2 previously damaged ships still in harbor also 1 still in GERTRUDE COVE. Catalina on search mission South of KISKA contacted small enemy AK and attacked with 2 500 pound bombs and machine guns bombs missed received an AA hole in wing. Another Catalina on search North of KISKA contacted enemy small AK. 4 heavy bombers dropped 24 500 pounders from 1,000 feet no hits. Catalina dropped 1 bomb which also missed then strafed decks with machine guns. HALLIBUT on patrol in this area then made contact and attacked on surface with torpedoes at 1600 yards. Torpedoes did not detonate. Enemy vessel was Queen ship equipped with 3 guns forward and submerged torpedo tubes. Torpedo missed HALLIBUT 10 yards to port. HALLIBUT retired undamaged.

12 2234 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Comtaskforce 8 reply to your 112155. Garrison strength LONGVIEW now 7500. Will be approximately 9000 about October 23rd at which time original FIREPLACE project will be approximately completed. CLIMATE and CAVERN 750 each of which is ultimate. ANULT 0. When garrison at LONGVIEW reaches approximately 11000 about 15 November plan is to start garrison at ANULT by movement of troops from LONGVIEW. Additional troops from ALASKAN sector will eventually bring total to 11000 troops at LONGVIEW and 4000 at ANULT. Estimate fighter strip at CAVERN will be completed about November 10. Work continuing on additional strip at LONGVIEW. Landing area 3300 by 100 feet will be finished by October 18 at CLIMATE.
13 0139 CINC PAC to CTF 8 to COMINCH. COMINCH to EAFront.

In view of changing situation in Pacific Ocean Area, adjustment of forces must be made. Believe enemy deeply committed in Sopac and not prepared to carry out more than minor raids chiefly by submarines in Northern area. We must continue pressure and replace losses in Sopac and this requires all forces that can be assembled. The above factors and impending bad weather point reduction in Northern Force. Para. Propose following for your comment. A. On completion present patrol reduce surface forces to those actually needed for escort. Do not consider cruisers will be needed except as escorts supplied by Cinopac for important troop movements. B. In view more S boats shortly will be added to squadron 45 retire large submarines after present patrols completed. Would also return Captain Colclough to Pearl if you consider duties can be performed by Comdr. Gray. C. Return F4F's for employment carriers or Sopac.

12 1316 COMSOPAC to COMINCH. CINC PAC. COMINTYPAC. CTF 17 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. GUADALCANAL 11th had no ground contacts. Patrol found abandoned Jap 75 MM 2 sun battery East of own position. 2 hour air alert beginning 1240 L (-11) 11th. Enemy planes in waves. 16 <i>Ø</i>'s then 18 bombers and 4 <i>Ø</i>'s then 8 bombers 4 <i>Ø</i>'s. Bombs dropped on KOLI POINT. Shot down 8 Jap bombers 4 <i>Ø</i>'s. We lost 1 P-39 1 Grumman. Grumman pilot rescued. Our Task Force intercepted enemy surface vessels near SAVO ISLAND about midnight 11th. Preliminary and inconclusive reports indicate enemy suffered considerable damage but details not yet confirmed. Air attack on 2 Jap cruisers at 1020 L (-11) 12th. 6 South 157-15 E east resulted 1 torpedo hit several near bomb misses on 1 CA left dead in water burning. Gormley sends. Cerenday send to MacArthur. 60 hundred pound and 2 1000 bombs dropped JNA air dome by B-17 striking force. 5 of 15 <i>Ø</i>'s on run way destroyed. Many fires started.

14 1410 COMSOPAC to CINC PAC Info COMINCH.

Situation midnight 14-15 local. Estimate that 6 enemy AP heavily supported by surface ships will land large number of troops on CACTUS tonight. Enemy carriers and a force of cruisers were reported today about 250 miles north of WAILITA. Our carrier group is refueling north west of FPOEY. And Task Force 64 is at JUTTIN after recent action. Intend to employ the carrier group and available surface forces to prevent further large scale landings feeling that the situation is critical and enemy reinforcements must be stopped if our position in CACTUS is to be held. Estimate our carrier group can be in position to strike late afternoon 15th and Task group 17-8 can join Task Force 64 and reach the CACTUS area afternoon of the 16th.
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13000 COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COFS ARMY.

Your 070041 movement 12 B-17's cleared earlier today. Para. This MTQR must be considered special case incident to certain general allocations of Army aircraft. Para. Whole situation as to Army aircraft in Pacific theater is approaching settlement which when promulgated should enable you to make effective dispositions but without expecting each allocation to involve replacement from here. Chief of Staff Army has by hand.

150212 COMSOPAC TO CTF 17.6, CTF 64, INFO CINCPAC, CTU 62.4.5, etc.

CTF 64 and CTF 17.6 join forces vicinity Cinopac grid point G 6295 (Long 165-30 N; Lat 13-45 S) about 5 hours GMT 15 Oct. Rear Admiral Lee assume tactical command combined force designated TF 64. Send TG 17 destroyers to WITTON for fuel when considered advisable. Combined TF proceed to operate general area to south and west of SOLOMONS chain in position to intercept enemy forces approaching CACTUS area from westerly direction with apparent intent land forces or attack our position during night. Available enemy info is broadcast addressed all ships and bases. This changes my 141442. Detach units to proceed to WITTON for fuel as necessary. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

150246 COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH, ALL SHIPS COFAC.

Urgently need this area 1 additional Army Infantry Division. Present forces including 43rd Division reinforced insufficent to garrison present bases and therefore obviously inadequate support offensive operations. Have neither on hand nor in sight sufficient force to render CACTUS secure against present infiltration tactics. Essential that CACTUS be garrisoned with a force sufficient to provide protection dispersed air fields and to take a sustained and decisive offensive against hostile forces on the island. Although full division with all components is required urgency of need is such that division should be sent out by regimental combat teams as ready. Plans being prepared for use NEW ZEALAND troop to garrison AZTEC and CHEERER and to reinforce POPPY. Comgassopac in complete accord. Copy by hand to him.

141325 COMINCH TO CINCPAC, CTF 8, INFO COMO WESTSNAFRON.

Addresses only decode. Highest quarters interested in practicability of making attack on BOODLE using 2 or 3 OBH for bombardment with an AVG and some DD's in support and with land based air coordinated in attack. Comment by hand to Admiral Leahy.
16 0035 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62.

Morning air searches negative enemy land concentrations along coast between KOKWNOMA and CAPE ESPERANCE. Air is striking at them. Request 2 destroyers be made available at once for shore bombardment that area during daylight hours. Profitable targets exist and psychological effect on personnel here would be excellent.

15 2125 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Assume your 110214 refers to evacuation transports designated as APH's. These ships are convoy loaded AP's intended transport troops from United States and evacuate wounded from base hospitals on return. They do not enjoy the immunity of the Geneva Convention and therefore should not be used as hospital ships in advanced areas except emergency and with escort. Normal troop capacity 112 officers 1200 troops and evacuation capacity 166 serious cases remainder troop space for minor cases. No regular hospital ships available. Sopasfor authorized retain TRON APH 1 for essential purposes and to be returned to United States earliest practicable date. TRON now under HTS departing West Coast in PHALANX 19 October. Suggest consideration demilitarizing STRATFORD for operation under Geneva Convention. Advise.

15 1744 COM 12 to VICE OPNAV Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, WPNS, etc.

In view of urgency move large number Navy personnel construction battalions replacement personnel to Pearl Harbor South Pacific Bases and to Comsowestpac imperative to start program of converting EC2's to carry 50 officers 1000 troops. All transports not necessarily employed in named movements. Recommend 1 EC2 be allocated by War Shipping Administration immediately followed by additional allocations every 3 weeks until situation relieved. To relieve immediate situation recommend MOUNT VERNON be employed for shuttle trip to PEARL before assignment to designated movement. Fleet personnel officer reports at least 5000 enlisted personnel to move. Cinopac pass Sarforpac.

Info

15 2050 CTF 8 to TF 8, CG ADC, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPAC, etc.

9 B-24's supported by 5 P-38's attacked Kiska 14 October. Dropped 180 incendiaries in camp area, made large fires throughout camp. P-38's destroyed 3 enemy float planes on water, no other enemy planes seen. 1 B-17 took photos and bombed submarine area with 6 500 pound bombs. Ships in harbor reported as follows: 2 beached vessels previously

(Continued on next page)
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15 0921 COMAIRSCOPAC to COMSOPAC.

Comaincopsac sends. KERNODLE brings this message from VANDERGRIFT. That Jap has moved in and placed artillery of longer range than his which is shelling him positions and airfield at will. That enemy surface craft move at will in surrounding waters and shell his positions destructively both day and night and that he will be unable indefinitely to hold these positions if this continues. Geiger states that he can use no more aircraft until avgas situation improves and until destructive enemy fire on airfield from both land and sea is halted. So long as enemy ships patrol the sea area off U'nga day and night I cannot see how McFARLAND or PAB barge can be brought in with reasonable chance of success and until this is changed the avgas situation cannot be improved to any extent. Offensive air operations limited now to strikes from BARTON.

16 0005 COMGEN 1ST MAR DIV to COMSOPAC INFO CTF 62. COMAIRSCOPAC.

At daylight 15 Oct 5 enemy AP's sighted unloading along coast from KUKUMONONA Westward. Escorted by 11 combatant vessels with constant fighters over. Our air made repeated attacks. Set fire to 3 AP's one of these now sunk other still burning. Remaining 2 FPA but stood out with escort. F17's also attacked and were observed to hit at least 1 AP and 1 large combat ship. Air raid at 1130 AA shot down 3 bombers. Some damage to planes and runways. 3 zero ships shot down in air fighting. Our combat losses 3 F4's 3 SBD's 1 P-39. 4 engaged seaplane bombed position twice during night. Naval gunfire 0030 to 0130. 3 ships firing. Damage to runways planes and dumps. Casualties 12th and 13th 81 dead 15 injured. Planes available approximately 9 F4's 11 SBD's 7 P-400's and P-39's.

16 0025 COMGEN 1ST MAR DIV to COMSOPAC INFO CTF 62; 64. CINCPAC.

Despite destruction of 4 hostile transports and departure of remaining 2 estimate enemy landed about 10,000 troops yesterday on CACTUS with considerable equipment and supplies bringing total force ashore to at least 15,000. Our force exceeds that number but more than half of it is in no condition to undertake a protracted land campaign due to incessant hostile operations and labor connected with development of this base over period of 10 weeks. The situation demands two urgent and immediate steps; Afirm. Take and maintain control of sea areas adjacent to CACTUS to prevent further enemy landings and enemy bombardment such as this force has taken for the last 3 nights. Baker. Reinforcement of ground forces by at least 1 division in order that offensive operations may be initiated to destroy hostile force now on CACTUS.
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16 0812 CONSOPAC to CTF 64. Info CINCPAC. CTF 17 62 63.

Consopac sends. Your 160330. No contemplated air operations CACTUS Area by Task Force 17 Saturday. See my 160032. Consopac and Comgen CACTUS will inform you their air operations as practicable. No shore bombardment by your force contemplated at present except as directed in my 160722. In view of one and possibly more enemy carriers operate generally South of Latitude 11-45 until air search information from CACTUS or planes of Task Force 63 indicates approach of suitable target.

16 0722 CONSOPAC to CTF 64 Info TF 64 CINCPAC. CTF 17 62 63.

Send 2 destroyers designing them Task Unit 64.5.1 to proceed CACTUS arriving via LENGO CHANNEL daylight 17th. Direct Task Commander contact Comgen CACTUS on arrival LANGA roads to receive info bombardment targets then bombarrd enemy positions as directed by Comgen CACTUS. Upon completion bombardment same day Task Unit withdraw by most expeditious route to South end East of RENNEL ISLAND awaiting further instructions. Caution enemy mines may be laid close inshore LENGO CHANNEL and in mineable waters CAPE ESPERANCE-SAVO. MacFARLAND MEREDITH and VINEO with PAS barge in tow may be in CACTUS area or retiring via LENGO CHANNEL during night.

16 0032 CONSOPAC to CTF 17 Info CINCPAC. CTF's 62. 63. 64. 16. CTF17.8.

Sighting of one enemy carrier group and information of possible presence of second group on North flank off BUTTON CACTUS supply line indicates enemy effort sever that line. Task Force 17 operate in general area to Eastward of BUTTON proceeding thence by route South of ROSES to avoid detection by enemy carrier scouts. Strike enemy carriers when favorable opportunity affords. When practicable inform me by plane your fuel situation. This modifies my 150402.

16 0440 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

From Consopac. RDO CANBERRA 160233 and 160145 also 1 CV to westward of NDENI. This appears to be all out enemy effort against CACTUS possibly other positions also. My forces totally inadequate meet situation. Urgently request all aviation reinforcement possible.
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OCTOBER (CCT)

15 2050 CTF 8 (Continued)

reported, the one reported west of SOUTH HEAD now reported stripped of removable gear, 2 sunken ships in harbor 1 of which has been previously reported. 3 B-26's made 2 torpedo attacks on ships in GERTRUDE COVE, 1 erratic run observed others probably hit bottom due to shallow water at launching point. Our losses 1 P-38 and pilot. Comtaskforce 8 sends. Radio stations addressed deliver locally to info addees as follows Cominch, Cinopac, Comwest and Norwestera-frontiers Com Generals Western Defence Command CG ADG.

15 1346 COMOPAC to COMINCH, CINOPAC, COMWEST, CTF 17 62 63 64

Coppac operations. 1040 L (-11) 14th search plane machine gunned 9 biplanes on beach 2NZATA. Believed all damaged. During night 13th-14th GUADALCANAL shelled for 1 hour 20 minutes by B3 cruisers and DD's. Shells identified as 14, 12 and 8 inch. Our 5 inch scored direct hits on 3 DD's. Cruiser planes overhead all night. Occasionally land battery shelled position during night. Morning search showed 2 large oil slicks debris and boats where CA and DD where attacked on 12th. Shelling damaged runways bomber fields bomber fields destroyed 1 B-17, 5000 fuel gas. 2 39mm's 1 bomber shot down. At 1600 L (-11) and again at 1820 L (-11) 14th enemy landing force attacked by 3 DD's. Near misses only on AP's. 1 Grumman missing. GUADALCANAL shelled again night 14th - 15th. Shelling ceased at 0315 L (-11) 15th. No detailed report. At 0300 L (-11) 15th enemy force 4 cruisers 7 or 8 DD attacked by 4 PT3's vicinity SANDFLY passage. L probable hit on cruiser. At 0624 L (-11) 15th GUADALCANAL reported enemy landing force in 5 AP's 1 AP or AK supported by 1 BB 2 CL's 4 DD's 15 miles northwest SAVO. Shortly after enemy began landing troops to westward KOKUMBONA. Air strick of 5 B-17's contacted at 1145 L (-11) 15th. Reported 3 direct hits on transports. 2 transports burning. BB crippled. Shot down 1 9. At 1145 L (-11) 15th 5 B-17's out for strike against enemy CV reported Lt 09 3 Long 165 E at 1351. No report yet. At 1533 L (-11) 15th Task Unit 62,4,5 attacked by 9 dive bombers 11-18. South Long 163 East. No damage. Chormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. At 1430 L (-11) 15th GUADALCANAL reports 3 transports beached and burning fiercely. Near SAVO Island 1 BB or CA which was hit by B-17 bomb, 1 CL and 5 DD's

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16 1326 CONSTOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 62 63 64 17.

Sopac operations, Jomgen GUADALCANAL estimated about 10,000 Jap troops landed GUADALCANAL during morning 15th. Morning air searches 16th from GUADALCANAL negative, enemy land concentrations observed along coast from ESPERANZA to KOKUMBONA. Gorman sends, Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 0200 L(-11) 16th VP's on search for enemy CV reported attack on enemy cruiser Lat 09-50 South Long 164-55 East. Believe hits scored on cruiser bow. During afternoon 16th McFarland delivered 32,500 gallons avras to GUADALCANAL. McFarland bombed 1745 Love 16th. Stern damaged proceeding RINGHOLT. Two Jap AP's seven DD Lat 08-50 South Long 156-10 East attacked by F3D's. One AP hit left burning. Other AP near misses. Continued course toward GUADALCANAL.

16 2138 COMAIRSOPAC to CINCPAC Info CONSTOPAC, COMINCH, PIASER.

Comair sopac sends, Strongly recommend earliest formation of Navy shore based air striking group for long range offensive operations this area. Group to consist essentially 2 squadrons each B-24's. Fighters and torpedo dive bombers. Last 2 equipped with latest types now beginning production. In meantime consider highly desirable assignment to CACTUS as replacement for carrier squadrons now in process being withdrawn 1 each fighter, Dive bomber and torpedo squadron. These to be drawn from carrier replacement of sufficient operation basic training. Actual carrier experience not essential. To be assigned operationally as a group under air commander CACTUS. Combat experience thus gained in shore based status will be invaluable information future air striking groups which definitely necessary to successful war this area.

16 0106 CONSTOPAC to CO 4th DF BTN, JOMGEN ROSES, CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Jomgen ROSES pass to CO 4th Defense Battalion action. Upon arrival ROSES 9th Defense Battalion report Jomgen ROSES under principle unity of command. Relieve 4th defense battalion which embarks same vessels. 5 and 3 inch batteries with ammunition and present installations remain intact at ROSES. 155 and 90 mm batteries complete with ammunition remain aboard ship. Battalions authorized exchange serviceable tentage at discretion. Rations will be exchanged. All other equipment including vehicles and tanks remain with own organization.

17 0800 CONSWESPAC to CINCPAC Info CONSTOPAC, COMINCH.

Cinopac 170123. All 6 fleet submarines now based AMODE are in northeast area as follows: South NEW IRELAND between RASANIL and KAYINGO, SAINT GEORGE CHANNEL, PAISET, SOUTH NEW GEORGIA, between NEW GEORGIA and CHOCOEIL ISLAND, one proceeding southeast along north coast of FOLMONS to round
SECRET

October (Oct)

17 0800 COMPACPLAN (Continued)

east and ISAAC ISLAND enroute to base. Four of these
directly supporting SoPac operations in CHOICUEUL SHORTLAND
area. No additional fleet sub can be moved to this area
within reasonable time although two more enroute from PINA-
FORE. My 300818 Sept and 140640 October. 2 7 class sub-
marines with 12 torpedoes each can be sent patrol CACTUS
area ETA 27 October 12 days on station thence return AODE
for overhaul prior transfer your command accordance first
reference. Alternative see Cinpac 092205 October and my
11651. 3 subs of Subdiv 53 can depart AODE 20 October with
12 torpedoes each ETA CACTUS 28 October remaining on station
12 days thence proceed GUANA and join CHIPPIN plus other three
submarines that division. After overhaul there tender and 6
subs proceed PANAMA. Must know immediately if either plan
desired in order permit modification torpedo loadings. Mac-
Arthur has this.

16 2221 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH, COMMONWEALTH.

Propose to reduce your cruisers to 2. Advise when present
commitments permit and name 6 inch cruiser to go. Due to
overwhelming need for strength in SoPac comment on relief of
remaining 2 by RALEIGH and DETROIT.

17 1536 COMPACPLAN to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 16,17,62,63,64, COMPOXYSPAC.

SoPac operations. Later report FLY attack 0245 Love (-11)
16th states 1 torpedo hit bow of 1 cruiser of 10 cruisers
and DDs at 09-50 South, Long 16-55 East. MacFARLAND was
attacked at 1745 Love (-11) 16th by 8 type 99 2 place dive
bombers. Stern was blown off aft of after deck house. Now
anchored TULAGI. 4 zeros shot down. 7 B-17's at 1750 Love
(-11) 16th dropped 44 500 round bombs on enemy supplies
KOKUSIMA. Seven fires started. 5 zero attacked
1 B-17. 1 zero shot down. All our planes returned. B-17
on search 08-55 South, Long 160-46 East shot down serial
43. No ground activity GUADALCANAL 16th. Our air struck
troop concentrations supplies and battery positions incess-
antly throughout 16th. 14 Aichi type dive bombers and 6
zeros over GUADALCANAL at 0745 Love (-11) 17th. 8 bombers
2 zeros down by planes. Unknown number others shot down
by AA. Our loss 1 plane missing. No other damage. Chormale
sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 15 twin engine bombers
accompanied by many zeros bombed position at 1315 Love (-11)
17th. Our planes unable gain altitude in time intercept.
1 bomber probably shot down. Our losses none.
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1st 1426 COMSOPAC to Com 12, COMINCH, CINCPAC, JUNIO PATAC, et al. et al.

Scope operations. CTF 17 reports shot down 1 Kawasaki type 97 twin tail & enzime flying boat Lat 1 -20 South Long 162-47 at 1255 L (-11) 15th. Also 1 Mitsubishi type 97 twin engine land bomber at 0845 L (-11) 16th. In Jap attack 0745 L (-11) 17th reported yesterday 1707 volts 6 bombers. Morning 17th 2 our DD bombarded enemy positions west of KURTAN. 2000 rounds fired. At least 2 ammunition dumps set off. Many other fires started. Afternoon 17th GUADALKANAL search planes NKATA BAY attacked by 6 float biplanes 1 float zero 1 enemy plane shot down. One SBD missing. GUADALKANAL planes made 4 attacks against Jap positions. GUADALKANAL reported shelled by 1 single cruiser or DD night 17th-18th. Fire ceased 0010 L (-11). Again reported heavy fire 0013 L (-11). 1250 L (-11) 18th GUADALKANAL attacked by about 20 bombers 20 zeros. 8 bombers 11 zeros shot down. 2 Grumman's missing. Halsey sends Carpeny par to MacArthur. Delayed report TF 17 states in daylong operations 16th strafed burned 12 float planes NKATA, destroyed fuel dump as positions. At GUADALKANAL made 1 direct hits on beached transports set fires supply dumps strafed silenced AA fired landing parties KURTAN to TERENANCE. No damage to casualties own force.

1st 2355 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH, JUNIO, 1st MarDiv.

Suggest earnest consideration sending 9th Defense Battalion direct to CACTUS instead relieving 14th Defense Battalion at ROSPS. This move will give Vandegrift double number 155 MM guns he requested which are badly needed. Will double antiaircraft protection for fields, supplies, and installations by both heavy and automatic weapons which in secondary role will tremendously increase ground defense against tanks and troops. Unit also has powerful ground defense power in thirty caliber machine guns. Personnel involved much less than if units of equal fire power but organized for mobile offensive operations were sent in. Unit in ships ready for immediate movement and personnel already acclimated to tropics. Relief 14th Defense would be postponed but move considered impelled by critical situation and am sure personnel of 14th will gladly contribute their part to ensure success CACTUS.
SECRET

October (GCT)

19 1256 CONTOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNWPAC, CTF 16 17 62 63 64.


20 1321 CONTOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNWPAC, CTF 62 63 64 16 17.

Sopac operations. 1810 Love (-11) 19th 3 DD's with 10 float biplane escort northwest SAVC bombed by SBD's. One DD appeared damaged but continued on course. One enemy plane destroyed. All our planes returned. Due to bad weather only two of 6 PHY's reached target 2 CA's 2 DD's one mile West POINT CRUZ at midnight 19th. From 2000 feet one plane got direct hit on cruiser. Two heavy explosions heard. Other PHY's bombed beach POINT CRUZ to TASSAFARONGA. All our planes returned. On GUADALCANAL little ground activity 19th. 15 zeros over position 1330 L (-11). 2 shot down. One Grumman lost. 0100 (-11) 20th bombed enemy DD off KOKUMOKE. HALSEY sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 30 zeros over airfield at 1045 (-11) 20th followed by 16 bombers at 1145. 7 zeros 1 probably plus 2 bombers shot down. 2 our pilots missing.

20 0407 COMMARWIN 1 to COMAIRWINPAC, Info CONTOPAC, CINCPAC, etc.

Essential that reserve aircraft be maintained "TRIM" area for replacements at CACTUS. Past experiences have required 50% replacements SBD's and F4F's every 10 days. Should Jap pressure continue CACTUS will require 18 F4F and 18 SBD with 100% flight crews every 10 days. Pass to COMMARWINPAC.
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October (GCT)
21 1630
21 1523 COMINCH to CINC PAC Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC.
Part 1 of 3 my 211630. Hicom, Your 172359. Concerning aircraft. Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved following forces by 1 January. 1943. For NEW CAL-PUKI-EPAT-KONMI-
GUADALCANAL area: 2 groups Army heavy bombers total 70 planes. 2 groups Army fighters total 150. 1 group Army medium bombers total 52. 5 squadrons VTF total 60. Four 18 plane squadrons VMF. Four 18 plane squadrons VMF. 1 squadrons VTB, 50 VOS planes. 13 Army and 36 Navy transport planes. 3 squadrons RNZAF Hudsons and RNZAF Vincents and Singanores now at SUNA.

21 1723 Part 2 of above. Para 2. JIG East Sol directive also provides for flow of replacements personnel and material to meet actualities of expenditures and attrition. Para 3. Navy part of these increases in air strength is under control of Cincpac. Copy of JCS directive forwarded by mail. To meet these and other requirements. PacFleet pool during October will receive following approximate totals: 80 VF, 85 VB3, 50 VT3, 20 VPA, 7 VR and inshore patrol VOS.

21 1630 Here is part of three my 211630. Hicom, During November: 125 VF, 75 VB3, 50 VT3, 75 VPA and 10 inshore patrol VOS. Forgoing includes VOS planes for new squadrons VS7D 14 and VS8D 14. Para four. Information as to availability of planes and personnel now in area and now enroute is known to you. Information as to dates of Army reinforcements and flow of Army replacements other than that you have not now available but will be forwarded when received. Para five. Concerning other craft in separate despatch. Para six Halsey pass to Harmon.

21 0517 COMSOPAC to VICE OPNAV. Info CINC PAC. Com 12. PIDOCKS.
Recent developments have intensified the need for immediate shipment of all items in Vice Opnav 131255. The unloading situation has been decidedly improved and there are now only 6 ships in the harbor for unloading. Com 12 152320 to Vice Opnav states that LONGFELLOW, ALDRICH and COLT will be used for shipment of construction materials. Additional cargo ships on West Coast must be made available immediately for further shipment of materials including the complete Yards and Docks component of a SUB requested in my 010454. The large number of personnel afloat and ashore and the ships to be supplied from this base require that a major supply depot be established here instead of the Advanced Base Supply Depot originally contemplated. The total covered storage required for naval supplies is now estimated at one million square feet instead of the two

(Continued on next page)
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21 0517 COMOPAC (Continued).

hundred thousand square feet first recommended. Paymaster
General concurs in this estimate. Request 200 more store
houses 40 by 100 feet be furnished for this purpose, and
10 more refrigerator storehouses. Request complete lumber
and hardware for 160 by 600 foot pier, and 3 complete sets
of battalion hand tools for WHITE POPEY, WITTGEN and CACTUS.
Large number of developments planned at WHITE POPEY re-
quires construction of all types of shore facilities for a
complete Naval base including facilities for over 20,000
men. The maximum possible urgency must be assigned to the
development of this base. To plan and direct the activities
of the 19th, 20 and 24th Construction Battalions which will
be temporarily used in this area and to be Public Works Of-
ficer of the Naval Base at WHITE POPEY request that a Captain
or Commander in the Civil Engineer Corps be immediately as-
signed for this duty.

21 2300 COMAIRCOPAC to COMFAIRWESTCOAST, Info MAEL, CINCOPAC, etc.

Here goes account critical shortage fighters South Pacific
consideration being given to proposal load ALTANAJA with
aircraft to proceed direct from San Diego. It may be nec-
essary to: (a) Reduce A/C units to one third allowance.
(b) Reduce VF 11 to half allowance. (c) Take some F4F’s
from Marine fighter Squadrons. Based on foregoing request
recommendation as to date of readiness and approximate
composition of cargo for ALTANAJA aircraft to be in fly
off condition. Recommendation also requested concerning
equipping one Marine Fighter Squadron with F4 units and best
pilots available for early service in Sopac. Originator
Comairpac for action Comfairwestcoast. SFG pass. MAG give
to Ruaer for info. Cinopac has.
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**CONCOPAC to COMINCH, Info CINC PAC, CTF 16 17 62 63 64 A2**

22 2246

Sopac operations. At GUADALCANAL 21st 7 bombers 15 to 20 zeros over field 1115 L(-11). 6 zeros shot down by Grumans. 1 bomber by AA. 2 bombers left smoking. 2 Grumans missing. 4 others damaged by enemy fire. 9 killed 44 wounded. GUADALCANAL ground forces 21st small contact MATANIKAU. Japs used some 9 ton tanks. These withdrew under artillery fire. Our planes continued harassing missions against enemy ground forces. Occupied village on HUSETT ISLAND bombed strafed by 3 SBs. 22nd several groups enemy planes over GUADALCANAL 13 to 1400 L(11). Made contact with only 5 due to weather. These were fixed landing gear dive bombers. All 5 shot down. Airfield HUTCHIN shelled by enemy sub 0730 L(-11) 23rd. Halsey sends. Carpenter passes to MacArthur.

21 0956 **COMAMPHIBFORSPAC to CINC PAC, Info COMINCH, CONCOPAC, CTF 16 17 62 63 64 A2**

Following additional information obtained from prisoners and diaries. Force engaged off SAVO ISLAND night October 11/12 was proceeding CACTUS to bombard airfield. Officer prisoner states FURUTAKA was second cruiser in column and not third. Rear Admiral Zonji Goto Ojjaska commanded force. Some indication from prisoners statements that AORI FURUTAKA FURUTAKA and accompanying 3 DDs were joined by 2 light cruisers and other DDs. Ensign from FURUTAKA states he saw another cruiser sinking while his ship was going down. FURUTAKA sank stern first. Discrepancies in statement of prisoners claiming to be from S.ARAKABA indicate possibility that they may be from different 3 DDs. Comsopac sends. Comsopac has this.

21 0942 **COMAMPHIBFORSPAC to CINC PAC, Info CONCOPAC, COMHINCPAC, etc.**

From prisoners statements and diaries learned that CHOUKAI KAKO AOBA KINUTAKA FURUTAKA TATSUTA TENGU and 1 of 2 DDs took part in attack on our forces night August 8-9 off SAVO ISLAND. This force came around west side SAVO ISLAND and veered continually left till it retired. Firing was initially to starboard. No Japanese ships sunk or hit by torpedo. AOBA had damage to forward turret. KAKO damaged. Statement made that force came from KAWASAKI or KABAUL. Routes of approach and retirement not known. 1 prisoner says that no land was visible during daytime considered probable that at least part of force came south of Island chain which area not air scouted on 8th. Para. KAKO received 3 torpedo hits and sank about 0700 L(-11) on August 10. Diary says 651 men rescued before KAKO sunk. Diary states AP KINUTAKA AOBA and DD KINUTAKA were sunk on August 25. Comamphibforspac sends. Comsopac has.

22 2129 **CINC PAC to COMINCH.**

Request approval exchange DET. CIT and RAILEIGH for cruisers in TM 8 in view Theocald's 172343 and critical need for maximum strength in Sopac.
Comaircopac sends. Results B-17 strikes today. All planes armed with four five hundreds. 5 planes sent to intercept enemy long range at lat 08-05 long 164-30 failed to intercept. 2nd flight 6 planes nought 12 enemy ships 1430 love (-11) lat 07-50 long 163-40 course 000 speed 25 dropped at 1510 from 15500 feet on 33 miles hits. Other ships this force not identified but no cv. Opposed by land plane VF and AA. Third strike 6 planes altitude 13500 at 1710 hit force of 2 CA and 4 DD in lat 0817 long 160 2 hits certain on undamaged CA. Ship reported left dead in water burning heavily. 4 explosions noted after attack. Leader reports his attack was preceded at 1700 by Dauntless attack which also obtained one hit on other cruiser. All planes returned. Please pass to Consensopac.

Comopac operations. 3 Catalines made night torpedo attacks on Jap ships sh c iand T by i area at 0245 L (-11) 23rd. Two torpedoes at CL anchored off KONA WIGHT one hit certain. One hit probable. Also 500 pound bomb hit on another CL or DD. Third plane attacked probable FF one torpedo vicinity of ENNEBA ISLAND results unobserved due to AA and searchlights. All planes returned. Night 23rd search plane contacted two groups enemy Naval force. 2027 L 23rd one group lat 06-55 South long 164-52 East CV CL DD. One group CA 2L and 2 DD, CV described as flat top no island about 600 feet long. One Catalina with torpedo made contact with CA 2L and 3 DD's at 0110 L 24th lat 06-09 South long 164-14 East. Torpedo dropped at 400 yards on CA described as KOGAMI class. Force opened with AA after attack. Large explosion which may have been torpedo hit noted during retirement. On WADAJOI beginning 1800 L 23rd Japs laid heavy barrage on our front lines along MATANIKAU RIVER. All calibers including six inch. When barrage lifted Japs attempted river crossing in force with tanks and massed infantry. Four attacks thrown back with five large enemy tanks destroyed. Our air and artillery took under fire Jap force observed early morning 24th attempting outflank left MATANIKAU RIVER line. One TR shot down by Jap AA. Pilot runner rescued passenger missing. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.
Copac operations. GUADALCANAL reports 16 Jap bombers about 20 zeros over airfield 1120L (-11) 23rd. 20 zeros 1 bomber destroyed, 3 bombers left smoking. All our pilots safe.

Halsey sends message to MacArthur. 1315 L 23rd our search plane at INDISPENSIBLE STRAIT shot down Jap 4 engine flying boat. Small groups enemy planes over GUADALCANAL 1300 L 23rd. Group of 5 dive bombers sighted shot down. 1 SBD crashed take off pilot gunner killed. On ground only activity artillery fire. Our artillery and air concentrated on enemy 155 mm position which relieved damaged.

26 0440 CTF 61 to CONSONPAC.

By 260200, Damage ENTERPRISE more extensive. 2 bomb hits. Number 1 elevator out of commission. Can operate reduced number planes. More details later. SOUTH DAKOTA bomb hit on turret 1. PORTLAND steering gear unreliable. CAN JUAN 2 small compartments flooded. PORTER sunk. Other DD's damaged. Request tanker lat 14 south, 170 east soon as practicable. From Comtaskfor 61 to Sonopac.

26 0210 CTF 61 to CONSONPAC.

1 carrier of SHOBUAU Class hit by 3 1000 lb. Other carrier of same class hit by 2 500 lb bombs. That carrier smoking and being attacked by B-17's in position latitude 07-05 South Longitude 161-56. MOCANLI CA hit by 2 1000 lb bombs. 1 hit and 2 near misses on BB. ENTERPRISE landing HORNET planes. This report will be amplified. ENTERPRISE attacked 4 times. No serious damage. From Comtaskfor 61 to Sonopac. Flight deck immobilized due to portion of HORNET group. Will endeavor to send extra planes to BUTTON. Comtaskgroup 17, 2 252340 gives information on HORNET.

26 0210 CONSONPAC to CONSONPAC, CTF 62 64 61 63 64 SICOPAC, COMINCH.

Copac operations. During 25th Jap naval forces approached GUADALCANAL from southwest north west and north. Others operating to northeast GUADALCANAL. Few reports yet received from our striking forces. 1115 Love (-11) 25th at 07-50 south, long 160-28 east our search plane shot down Jap flying boat. 1052 love 25th GUADALCANAL reported receiving naval gunfire from 2 cruisers 1 DD. 1300 love 4 SBD's from GUADALCANAL scored 1 hit 1000 pound bomb on forecastle of enemy CA also damaging hit or near miss on CL. CA dead in water. Enemy force consisted 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 2nd SBD strike scored hit on CA and near miss on CL same force at 1700 love. B-17 strike of 6 planes also hit this Jap force at 1710 love. 2 500 pound bomb hits certain on CL. Left dead in water burn-
26 0210 CINCPAC to COMSNPAC, etc. (Continued)

ing heavily. 4 explosions noted after attack. At HOKATA BAY
2 small AK's with deck load vehicles and boxes strafed by
search plane. Plane attacked by 2 float biplanes. 1 bi-
plane shot down. On ground 24th little action along MATAN-
KIAU where our position intact. Beginning midnight continu-
ing through early morning 25th Japs attacked toward airfield
from south. Army battalion reinforced Marines and position
held during night. Halsey sends, Carpender pass to Mac-
Arthur. Japs still attacking this area morning 25th. In
air over GUADALCANAL 25th enemy fighters throughout day at
irregular intervals. 17 Jap fighters shot down. 16 Jap
heavy bombers over at 1435 love 25th. 5 bombers shot down.
9 dive bombers Aichi type attacked position at 1500 love.
Only minor damage by bombs. 2 our fighter pilots jumped and
rescued.

27 0426 CINCPAC to CinCPAC, Cominch, CTF 61 62 63 64 42, etc.

CinCPAC operations. B-17 on search 1020 L(-11) 25th was at-
tacked by 6 Nagoya landplane zeros with belly tanks. 1 zero
down in flame. Bomberidier killed. Our plane returned.
Taskforce 64 made offensive sweep through area west GUADAL-
CANAL evening 25th. No surface contact with enemy. Pre-
liminary reports from Task Force 61 indicate that force got
3 1000-pound bomb hits on 1 enemy CV. 2 500-pound bomb hits
on another CV. Both CV's SHOKARU class. 2 1000-pound bombs
on CA NAGATO class. 1 hit 2 near misses on Jap BB. Halsey
sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. PBY reported at 0215
L 27th had torpedoed Jap carrier result not seen. Jap force
1 CA 1 CL 4 DD which was reported under attack 25th by JRB
twice and B-17 strike once was again attacked by JRB's and
P-39's at 0700 L 26th. P-39 got 1 500-pound bomb hit on
CA. Very near miss on CL by JRB. Both cruisers proceeding
slowly leaving large oil slicks. Jap DD which shelled
SEMINOLE morning 25th were strafed by 4 Grumman's. 1 DD also
hit by 3 5-inch shells from L'NGA battery. At GUADALCANAL
Japs attacked in force during night 25th-26th. Main attack
down L'NGA River from south. 1 attack this sector by Jap
29th infantry penetrated lines south of airfield. Our lines
here restored by strong counterattack of 1 64th infantry.
Along NATANKAUS River 7th Marines drove Japs to south. During
25th our AA shot down 1 bomber 3 zeros. Ground troops got
1 zero.
Amplifying report 51 P 6 261540. At 0055 enemy force 2 CV 1 BB 2 CA 2 CL 1 DD lat 00-51 long 165-06 course 030 speed 20. 1 CV very large with small island other CV smaller with flush deck. No planes on deck either carrier. Fish dropped at 500 yards at largest carrier. Results unobserved due heavy AA. Other Catalina missed with 4 contact 500's made steep glide bombing attack on CA at 0105 L (-11) lat 04-25 long 160-35 course 080 speed 30. 2 bombs under stern threw water over ship and into tunnel hatch. 2 direct bomb hits fell aft stack hit up ship permitting identification. After retirement 2 large explosions seen at same location. Attack opposed by heavy AA until after both hits. Plane damaged but returned safely. No other ships in area. 3rd Catalina no contact.

27 0045 CTF 61 to CINCPAC.

My (Comtaskfor 61's) 260440. This action to Jomsopac. Damage now determined requires following ships proceed to port for further examination and temporary repairs. ENTERPRISE PORTLAND SAN JUAN SMITH VAULT. TAIL with survivors of PORTLAND not damaged. Commanding Officer SOUTH DAKOTA seriously wounded. Guns of turret 2 nicked by fragments but may be serviceable. Following undamaged ENTERPRISE PHILIP PEARL HARBURGH. Also JUNEAU now with me. Additional damage ENTERPRISE. Forward gyro out. 4 feet down by the head. Fragment holes in sides. Number 3 and 3 bomb elevators out. Also 5 inch ammunition hoists to groups 1 and 2. Forward 50 feet hanger deck bulged. 3 radio transmitters out. 1 DP room shot away. Decreasing cables out. Personnel casualties ENTERPRISE 30 dead 60 wounded. PORTLAND 1 steering unit out other unreliable. Vessels task force 17 are about to join me.

26 0814 JOMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, COMINCH, ENSA.

Jomsopac to Cominch Info Jomspac Comairsopac. (See Pinks)

27 0437 JOMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info Cnap, Comaerforpac, Cominch, Papers.

A base command separate from Jomsopac is essential this area for planning construction and administration. Your 210275 and my 230837. Long known need for base construction on large scale now emphasized by damage to ships and lack of facilities for adequate support of land based air and amphibious operations. If approved I plan to assign Captain W R Carter now in this area as Commander Naval Base South Pacific Area. Request following additional personnel report by air: 1 Capt for aviation planning, 1 Colonel Marine Corps for planning land and AA defenses 1 Captain

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27 0437 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, etc. (Continued)

CEC for advanced base planning and construction and 1 Commander or Lt Comdr Specialist in each of the following: Aircraft maintenance, Aircraft supplies, Aerology, Ship maintenance, Radio Material, Radar degaussing loops and sono buoys, mines, nets and booms, torpedoes, ordnance plus appropriate officer personnel for operation of South Pacific Advanced Base Depot. Ref Opnav 241938. Additional assistants to the Commander "aval Bases will be furnished from this area or requested by despatch if recommended organization is approved. Early action requested. Opnav deliver Cominchi Hupers and Budocks for info.

28 0311 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral King only. While not having complete picture believe WASP announcement somewhat premature unless certain that Japs had full knowledge of it. Also immediate release of PORTER's name was hard on morale of dependents therefore on our personnel. Recommend previous policy of withholding name of ship until it can be announced that next of kin have been informed.

23 0326 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 61, COMSOWESPAC, etc.

Further report. Sopac operations. PBY attacks early morning 27th states enemy force consisted 2 CV, 1 BB, 2 CA, 2 CL, 1 DD late 06-41 south long 165-06 east, 1 CV very large small island. Other CV smaller with flush flight deck. No planes on deck either carrier. Torpedo was-dropped 500 yards at larger carrier. Heavy AA. Another PBY with 4 contact 500 pound bombs made steep glide on CA at 0105 love (-11) 27th lat 05-25 south long 161-35 east. 2 bombs under stem throwing water over ship, 2 direct hits aft stack. After retirement of plane, 2 large explosions seen. Heavy AA until after bomb hits. Plane damaged but returned safely. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. On GUADALCANAL during night 26th-27th numerous small attacks by Jap land forces. All repulsed outside our wire. Last 5 days our casualties 86 dead, 109 wounded. Jap losses 9 tanks (14-18 tons), one regimental battery, many heavy and light machine guns. At least 2000 Japs killed. TREVOR, ZANE report being attacked by 3 new Jap DD while returning from GUADALCANAL 25th. Scored at least four hits on DD's. They report at least 2 of these Jap ships sunk by GUADALCANAL bombers.

28 0351 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH

Am concerned over each of defenses of BUTTON and desire to assist you in every way to improve them. As there

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28 0351 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH

was no basic joint plan for its establishment suggest you have one drawn up for its defenses and I will submit it to Cominch for approval and implementation. Enroute to you is copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff Aircraft Plan which sets BUTTONS aircraft complement by January 1st at 13 Army medium bombers, 25 Army fighters, 18 VSB, 6 VO3, and 18 VP.

28 0921 COMNAVUNIT BUTTON to COMSOPAC INFO COMAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC

COOLIDGE struck two mines 0930. Sank SECOND CHANNEL 1050 local October 25 in about 20 fathoms. Vessel and cargo total loss. Army personnel on board 4604. Known loss 1 officer, 5 men. 27 additional missing but reported seen ashore. Navy personnel on board 2 officers, 50 enlisted; all saved. Crew ship reported 200. Only lost 1 fireman. Survivors being temporarily based ashore. Channel open to normal traffic. Ship entered Channel through mined entrance. Master states was not notified of existence mine field. Picket boat with pilot stationed proper entrance could not attract attention of ship or overtake. Signal station ashore warned ship but ship could not keep headway before hitting mine. Beached turned over to port and slid off coral ledge into deep water one hour twenty minutes after hitting mine. Letter report follows. Comairsopac has by hand for information. And passes. Commavunit BUTTON originates.

28 1001 MACARTHUR to COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC

Can utilize to advantage from airdromes this area any available B-24's. Re Comsopac 272330. Assume planes belong 90th Group. Squadron just arrived here from that group grounded about four days for replacement nose wheel collars. Due to lack protection underneath where interception is normally expected consider this type should be used in night missions. Otherwise operational losses and damage will soon reduce weight of attack below that which can be regularly sustained in night operations. Pilots of squadron just arrived here not yet competent for night operations under adverse weather conditions encountered here, but expect to have them ready in ten days. Every effort being made and will be made to hasten training period for pilots here on arriving. Above facts given in order you may have complete picture of situation. Let me know your decision. From Macarthur to Halsey. Info Nimitz.
SECRET
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28 2225 CINCPAC to CINCOPAC Info COMINCH.

Ground situation at CACTUS can be turned in our favor only by offensive action. Our present forces have performed magnificently but their present strength appears to have restricted them to the defensive which may be fatal if enemy succeeds in building up sufficient superiority on island. Japs have favored dark of moon for reinforcing their troops. Lull after intense activity appears to give us opportunity now for placing strong reinforcements on CACTUS that will permit offensive operations. Comment.

29 0130 CINCOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH.

In complete agreement your 282225. Supplies now enroute. From CINCPAC to CINCPAC info Cominich. Force consisting 2 raider companies, Army infantry battalion, small AA unit and ACORN 2 shortly at Adra Bay CACTUS to develop supporting airfield there. Above to be increased in strength as field develops. 8th Marines land noon at "W", landing coordinated with offensive launched by present garrison if then feasible. Marine aviation engineer battalion and 2 batteries 155 guns now enroute "W". Marine replacements 1 Army regiment American Division moves to CACTUS as transportation available. Opening phase above operations begins morning 30th L (11) with ships gunfire on hostile installations. CACTUS will not crack.

29 0106 CINCPAC to COMINCH. CTF 61 62 63 64. CINCPAC, etc.

WASHINGTON subjected 2 submarine attacks early morning 26th. SOPac operations. Several torpedoes seen each attack. All missed. Torpedoes apparently set to explode at end of run. On GUADALCANAL Japs attacked 3 points on perimeter at nightfall 27th. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. One attack penetrated but position restored by counter attack. Other attacks stopped outside wire. GUADALCANAL air forces attacked Jap 8 gun AA battery at KELPONA with 300mm and P400's. Battery silenced and ammunition dump and stores destroyed. Continued attacks on suspected field gun positions. No fire from these 26th. GUADALCANAL air dropped 11100 pound and 3300 pound bombs on Jap Shivouac area KESATA BAY 0920 L (11) 27th. Fuel or ammunition dump set afire. 7 float planes strafed on water. Four of these burned. One our pilots parachuted northwest tip YKI EL ISLAND.

28 0330 CTF 16 to CINC PAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 17.

Your 262351 following from Comtaskforce 17 Quote NE! 803 Oct 18. Action addressed incorrectly decoded as Comtaskforce 17 resulted in dispatching ships of this task force.

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28 0330 CTF 16 to CINCPAC (Continued).

Mission unsuccessful. Letter and MORRIS action report forwarded when practicable. Unquote. Comdeason 2 in MORRIS raided patrol line about four hours the minutes prior to 
Comdediv 9 in LAMSON with NAHAN. This originated by Comtaskforce 16. NPP deliver to Cinopac for action and NSS for info Joninch. Also pass to Comsopac. By visual to

28 2240 CTF 8 to TASKFORCE 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMWESTSEAFLON, etc.

Comtaskforce 8 reports reconnaissance October 27, gukina: Northeast coast negative, one shack on west slope which was in ruins. carelo: Grey shack observed. No traces enemy occupation either island nor on Attu also scouting. Damaged ships VICKA HARBOR and GENTLE GIVE as previously reported. Afternoon mission of 6 B-24's found VICKA closed in and returned with bombs. Info stations deliver to usual local adees Cominich Cinopac Comwestseafcon Comdren VDF and Comnor-westseafcon.

29 0251 CONSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, Info CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC, etc.

Your 240221 concur necessity establishment subordinate com-
mand. Eventually propose Comfair each important base in
Sopac area. At present WHITE POPPY only such activity in
being. Until separate C.O. provided necessary Compawing
1 continue functioning as Comfair WHITE POPPY. This by
mailgram with copy of reference for all info adees.
Ref: Comairsopac 240221: The rapidly increasing importance
and employment of Naval Aviation in the South Pacific Area
makes it essential that a shore based aircraft subordinate
command be established as soon as practicable. It would
seem logical that this command be a part of Aircraft Pacific
Fleet, that organization being the source of aircraft supply
in this area. Para. The duties of Commander Aircraft South
Pacific are such that it is impracticable for that officer
to carry out properly the administrative functions of a sub-
ordinate command. Compatwing CNE for the present is function-
ing as such for petrol aircraft within the limitations of
his organization which is in process of establishment.
October (GJT)

30 0150 CONVOY to GOAHTU, GOAIRPAC, ZION, AKA 73. MST 47 62 63 64.


30 0602 CONVOY to GOAIRPAC, ZION, 1st MARCH, CENTAIRPAC, etc.

Task Force 65 (3 cruisers 10 destroyers 3 transports) will land 8th Marines reinforced at SACTU on 3 November to reinforce garrison. By 291007. Details in CTF 65 Current as which Goairs and units of TF 65 have. In war to other addresses. CTF 65 provide all practicability support by air scouting and striking opposing enemy forces. Coms CACTUS provide air coverage for TF during approach, landing and while in CACTUS area. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Request Cowspecs air support by continued strikes against enemy forces northwest CACTUS area. Priority of targets carriers, battelfields, other combatant units. Action addeas acknowledge.

30 1419 GOAIRPAC to CTF 8 Info GOAIRPAC, ZION.

Due to experience to date with defensives mines not repeat not conclusive to extension such measures. Take every practicable step to ensure that your defensive minefields are less dangerous to own ships than to enemy.
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31 0534 COMTOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMCGWCPAC, JTF 42, etc.

Searchplane reports. Sopac operations. Attack on Sub lat 13-10 south long 163-44 east. Results negative. On GUADALCANAL 29th no important ground contacts. We continued mopping up operations. Small patrol captured and damaged 2 Jap 75 mm guns west MATANIKAU. Our planes continued attack missions on Jap positions. 2235 L (-11) 29th SSD on patrol sighted 2 Jap DDs vicinity TASSAFARONGA and dropped bombs. No damage but DDs proceeded toward RUSSELLS. 0015 L 30th 3 SSD's bombed DDs west RUSSELLS. No contact thereafter. 1 SSD missing. 0510 L 30th 7 Grummans attacked RUPATA BAY. Destroyed 3 biplanes on water 3 zero float planes 2 biplanes in air. Set fire to and strafed main building and fuel dump. Strafed camp results unknown. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 0030 to 0845 L 30th 1 cruiser and 4 DDs bombarded Jap positions GUADALCANAL. Destroyed artillery boats buildings.

31 0355 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMTOPAC, COMCGWCPAC

Your 281735 believe our situation different from enemy in that area as his operations against CACTUS is quite thoroughly scouted by our aircraft while he has difficulty in projecting aircraft to southward and southeastward of CACTUS. Aircraft are so much more efficient as scouts and submarine offensive role is so much the most effective employment that I consider it correct to keep the majority of submarines in focal areas and make information mission secondary to attack. However, due to repetitious enemy deployment during his advances I believe that employment suggested by Halsey's 300416 offers excellent possibilities.

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31 0946 CTF 62 to STURGIS, CARNEY, MCKEAN. Info CINCPAC, etc.

Mission AOLA BAY occupation group is to construct fighter strip soon as possible to be followed by bomber strip and to deny AOLA BAY to enemy. CTF 62 sends for delivery to STURGIS and CARNEY. Command passes to Gen GEN CACTUS on completion of debarkation. Para. Plan to reinforce with following units: Afirm - Remainder ACORN ONE. Baker - One five five millimeter guns as soon as available. Cast - Additional infantry to bring total of one regiment less one battalion. Dog - One battalion field artillery.

31 2126 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Recommend following reorganization Sopac Force. Afirm. Detach first Marine Corps from Amphibious Force. Baker. Establish Corps Commander on same echelon of command as Commander Amphibious Force. Cast. Joint planning between two commanders under control Comsopac. Dog. Comsopac assign units of First Corps to Amphibious Force as necessary for operations or training. On conclusion of training exercises such units revert to Corps. When deemed advisable after conclusion of landing phase of operation a task organization for the shore phase of the operation will be established, or the Corps units will revert to the Corps, when and as directed by Comsopac.
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November (OCT)

01 2359 CONSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC etc.

Sopac operations. 0530 L (-11) 1st 7 Grumman at
NEKATA BAY destroyed all 5 Jap planes on beach.
Many wrecked planes about. Strafed all buildings,
started fire in coconut grove. AA very heavy and
accurate. Our planes damaged but returned. 5th
Marines crossed MATANIKAU at daybreak 1st. Attacked
to west. Supported by B-17's. Continuous attacks by
P-400's and SBD's throughout day silenced Jap artillery.
Enemy withdrawing slowly. We have advanced about 2
miles with relatively light casualties. Halsey sends
Carpender pass to MacArthur.

01 0515 CONPLAN 1st MARDIV to CONSOPAC info CTF 62 etc.

5th Marines crossed MATANIKAU at daylight this morn-
ing and attacked to the west. Attack supported by
B-17 bombardments. Constant attacks by P-400's and
SBD's throughout the day silenced Jap artillery.
Enemy withdrawing slowly taking advantage of rough
terrain to reduce effect of air and artillery attack.
We have pushed forward approximately 2 miles with re-
latively light casualties. Attack followed up by
large reserve force for use in event enemy makes de-
termined stand this side POHA river.

01 0501 COMMARDIV 1 to CONSOPAC info COMAIRSOPAC etc.

Bomber field graded 5400 feet. Take off end 1700
feet being crowned to receive mat. Mat laid last
3500 feet. Fighter field one rolled grass surface
4600 feet long completed. Fighter number 2 graded
3250 feet. Soil stabilisation in progress prior to
laying somerfield mesh.

01 2115 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Unless there is evidence not at hand here that the
enemy actually saw the HORNET sink, I feel very strong-
ly that yesterday's announcement was of considerable
assistance to the enemy and correspondingly harmful
to us in a very critical situation.
SECRET
November (GCT)

03 0130 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, CONSOWESPACFOR, etc.

Sopac operations. Patrol returning from AOLA on GUADALCANAL reported only contact with small groups Japs to eastward our position. No ground activity during night first-second. 37D's harrassed Jap positions during night. Our destroyers assisted attack west MATANIKAU RIVER morning 2nd by bombardment. Later report of damage to Jap naval forces by TF 61 26th states: Add 6 1000-pounders on 2nd TONE Class CA. Change 1000 pounder on unidentified BB to 500 pounder on CL. Add 1 additional torpedo hit port side same NACHI Class CA. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

04 0146 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMOWESPACFOR, etc.

On GUADALCANAL. Sopac operations. Our attack continued with slow progress during second. One 75, 6 37 mm and many machine guns captured. All units advancing morning third. Two fighters lost due operational crashes but pilots safe. 72D's and P-39's completed numerous missions supporting ground troops. One enemy gun and three trucks destroyed by bombing. 3 39D's off 1730 L (-11) second to attack hostile force & 21 17 DD. None returned. 1 37D reported enemy DD vicinity KORUNA at 2130 L (-11) second. Plane failed return. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

04 0725 Retiring CASTUS transpots for night to South INDISPENSABLE STRAIT to return tomorrow entering SHARK CHANNEL at 0430 November 5th. Require 6 more hours. AOLA BAY group will continue unloading tonight estimate complete late tomorrow. 4 cruisers 6 destroyers remain south 09-12 in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT ready to strike favorable targets tonight. This from Callaghan.

04 0235 CTF 62 to CTO 65,5 Info CTF 65 61. COMSOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS.

Comsopac has directed Carlson and two companies second raiders remain AOLA BAY for present and be reinforced with two additional companies. Pars. Direct McKean, Manley on completion debarkation raiders proceed at best speed to arrive BUTTON during daylight refuel embark two companies second raiders. Orders as to logistics and further movements will be issued later. Inform STURGIS and Carlson. Pass to McKean and Manley by hand. Comgen CACTUS informed in another system. CTF 62 originator.
SECRET

03 0015 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

For Admiral King only. Believe Army should retain defense HOLLY and increase effectiveness thereof in accordance with recommendations being sent you separately. We need for amphibious purposes all the Marines that can be made available. I note from enclosure your ser 00935 of 7 September that Army troops are only used for amphibious work due to lack of Marines.

05 0524 COMO PAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 42, 61, 62, 63.

Friendly SS reports. Sopac operations. 2 torpedo hits in NATORI Class cruiser INDOMITABLE STRAIT 0415 love (-11) 3rd. On GUADALCANAL our attack west MATANIKAU continued successfully. 350 Japs killed one position west POINT CRUZ. 3 field pieces twelve 37 mm, 30 machine guns captured. Jap positions KOKUMABA shelled by our naval forces. Night third - fourth Japs landed force 7000 yards east KOLI POINT. Attacked at dawn by battalion 7th Marines. Attack driven back by superior forces with artillery. Our ground troops concentrating afternoon fourth to destroy this hostile force. Beginning 1630 love 4th three planes bombed strafed area east KOLI POINT. Halsey sends Carpender pass to MacArthur.
On GUADALCANAL, Seabees operations. Marines holding captured positions west HATCHERY. Enemy made strong counterattack this area night 4th-5th, repulsed with heavy Jap losses. On east sector Marines holding vicinity HILL POINT while 2 battalions Army move to envelop enemy left flank from south. Fighting this sector during 4th limited to patrol actions. Our air maintained continuous patrols over enemy positions, strafed known hostile positions including mobile gun with ammunition trailer on road east KIAI. Halsey sends, Carpeneder pass to MacArthur. 8th Marines landed reinforced GUADALCANAL position 4th-5th. AGILA BAY detachment now ashore. Convoy last week Corps and ConvenPac have.

During October, Seabees operations. Seabees destroyed 369 hostile aircraft, 90 probable or damaged included. At 35000 feet (-11) third USS TAN Sighted periscope close aboard submerging lat. 13050 south long 16120 east. Attacked with depth charges, and underwater explosions after depth charges exploded. Sub possibly sunk. On GUADALCANAL morning 6th, 16th Infantry had completed passage VALIKA river and advancing to north to envelop hostile south flank. No large contacts this area. In west our position second Marines repulsed light attacks west of HILL 364 during night 5th-6th. TAN TAN completed successful operation against Jan outpost KIAI. 30000 feet, 19 enemy killed, one captured. All radio equipment documents arms and ammunition captured intact, only 2 unarmored janes escaped to beach. No marine casualties. 1130 love 5th 27 bombers and zeros over GUADALCANAL positions. Our fighters made no contact due cloud conditions. Seabees dropped near defense lines killing one, wounding five. Our air continuously over Jan positions. Five attacks by 2-4s, one by 3EBs on enemy positions. Halsey sends, Carpeneder pass to MacArthur.

Following planned (A) Call MOUNT WASHING for WHITE papers from 3EB (EBD) about 24 November with personnel for voyage repair facilities equivalent 1 AB, 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, Seabees, Mobile Hospital Number 7 and casualties plus barge tageage and galleys for all embarked personnel. Call MINUTE from EWHS about 19 November with essential Seabees material and medical supplies and equipment followed by another ship with remainder Seabee cargo and equivalent ad cargo. Ship Mobile Hospital Number 7 cargo later when will not interfere with vital military supplies
November (COT)

06 2139 VERNAY to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, etc. (Cont'd)

and equipment. Etc. MOUNT VERNON 6 December. WINTER 5 December. (B) Sail coal lining as scheduled. (C) Sail AOE's 3 and 4 when co-struction equipment diverted to AD's is replaced requiring 30 days, and transports are available estimated middle December. Do you approve? Request immediate reply in order start loading. KIL pass to Mobile Hospital 7 for info.

07 2358 COMA PHOSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, etc.

Documents captured CACTUS indicate presence our naval forces has prevented landing that part 38th Div. embarked on transports and general attack planned for Nov. 3rd therefore not possible. Sickness and shortage of food and ammunition in enemy forces noted in diaries. Our naval gun fire and air attacks appear very effective and decline in morale noted Indications continue of presence 17th Army Headquarters on CACTUS. Enemy tank unit identified as 1st Independent Tank Company.

08 0101 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 16,12,62,63,64,65.

No activity, Sopac operations, on west flank GUADALCANAL 6th. On east flank we advanced to KETEPOA RIVER, 4 miles east KOLI POINT. No contact enemy forces. Advance to east continuing morning 7th. P-40's made 7 attacks on jap positions. Destroyed large ammunition dump and boat with gas drums. Continuous SBD patrol over jap positions. PT boats reported 2 Jap DD off LUNGI POINT 0200 L(-11) 7th. Claim 1 DD sunk. Our air reported later large oil slack boxes liferafts and debris vicinity NUGU ISLAND SKYLARK CHANNEL. MAJAFA while unloading supplies to GUADALCANAL struck amidships by one torpedo 2 miles east LUNGI 0930 L 7th. Halsey sends Carpenber pass to MacArthur. At 1730 L 7th air strike consisting 7 SBD 3 TBF 8 P-39 22 F4 attacked 1 CL 10 DD at Lat. 07-10S Long. 159-40East. 2 torpedo hits 1 1000 pound bomb hit 1 near miss on CL 1 torpedo hit on DD. P-39's shot down 5 float biplanes. F4's shot down 5 float Zeros 2 float biplanes. 4 F4's failed return. One pilot rescued. Enemy headed east 1800. Planes saw explosion after ships no longer visible.
GUADACANAL morning search strafed bombed 3 beached float biplanes REKATA BAY. Destroyed 3 landing boats south CAPE ESPERANCE. Destroyed 3 landing boats west TASSAFARONGA. Evening 8th. Sopac operations. Sighted bombad strafed destroyed a 2 man Jap SS CAPE ESPERANCE. GRAYLING reports 2 torpedo hits in OHYODA type aircraft tender. 1500 L (-11) 7th LANDOWNE bombarded suspected Jap positions east KOLI POINT. On GUADALCANAL 7th no activity in west. Our forces moving east from METAPONA RIVER but no contact. In attack on GL and 10 DD reported yesterday OHMAKAS scored additional 2 hits 2 near misses with 100 pound bombs on Jap DD. P-400's executed 5 attacks missions Jap ground installations. Halsey sends Carpender pass to MacArther. Combos Sopac and Combopac have by hand.

For operations against Jap light forces submit necessity for guns larger than 5 inch. Jap strength in torpedoes necessitates early effective hits which can only be made by larger guns. Effectiveness of 5 inch AA for sinking DD is doubtful. ATLANTA carries only about 10 percent common mark 32. In order make best use of our doubtfull torpedoes DD's with 2 or more mounts should be assigned striking groups. Para. For night November 2nd I would necessarily have called off my operation due PT boats western and SEALARK and at KOLI POINT. Was ready to enter SEALARK and proceed vicinity KOLI POINT when info received that PT boats were stationed at both positions. Originator Scott in ATLANTA

Comsopac answers your Cominor 061500. Can now make full power operate 30 fighters 27 SBD's, 9 VBFs on 24 hours notice. Expect complete number 1 elevator and hanger deck November 21st. Thereafter vessel capable operate full power complete air group operations indefinitely. Cognizance should be taken longitudinal slit starboard shell below side armor frames 123 aft to 134. 3 fuel ballast tanks open to sea. After pedestal number 2 hype prep turbine stronger then before break. Similar strengthening being done all other pedestals. Info Cinopac.
SECRET
November (GCT)

10 0316 COMSOPAC to COMSWESTPAC. CINCPAC. COMINCH. CTF 42.61.62.etc.
At 2150 L(-11) 8th PT's got hit on 1 of 2 Jap DDs off ESPERANCE. Sopac operations. 1 PT slightly damaged by gunfire. On GUADALCANAL no activity in west. On eastern flank contact with enemy 3000 yards east METAPONA RIVER. Action continuing. Morning search bombad straffed Ujikata Bay. Results unknown. 1 plane failed to return. Additional Jap landing boats filled with supplies sunk vicinity ESPERANCE. Evening search 8th sighted bombad straffed 2 man SS reached at ESPERANCE. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Additional enemy air losses 7th not previously included Sopac summary 3 zero float planes, 1 float biplane.

09 2359 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC. Info CTF 62. COMAIRCOPAC. CG 3520
On east flank a Jap force of undetermined size has been surrounded near TETERW. On west flank advance toward KOKUMA resumed at daylight this morning with 2 regiments attacking in column. Morning search yesterday found 2 CL and 3 DD bearing 300 distance 180 course 300 speed 20. ZANTA ISABEL search located 2 masted schooner radio equipped and camouflaged. 4 attack missions by P-52s in support of ground troops. Evening searches negative. Planes available P-54 24, SB1 20, P-400 2, TBF 13, F4F 7 1, P-39 13. Reencipher my 092245.

09 2045 CTF 8 to CINCPAC. Info COMSOFOR5U. COMSOFORPAC. etc.
CTF 8 sends. Mining project LONGBAY completed. My 110437 Sept. Except magnetic mines in KABALACKA STRAIT and UMACK PASS in which fields mines exploded prematurely. Do not propose to remove these fields at this time. N/PW pass to Cincpac for action and Comsafors for info. NPG pass to Comsaforsub for info. NSS pass to Vice OpNav and Cominch for info.

11 0251 COMSOPAC to CTF 17.42.63.67. COMINCH. CINCPAC. COMSOPAC. etc
On GUADALCANAL. Sopac operations. East flank a Jap force of undetermined size has been surrounded near TETERW. On west flank resumed advance toward KOKUMA at daylight 10th. 4 attack missions during 9th by P52's. SOUTHARD reports sighted attacked 55 1st 10-13 south, long 161-09 at 0230 love (-11) 10th. At 1110 love 10th 2 Germans dived through formation of 15 manus at 27,000 feet. Shot down one. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Comsopac has.
10 2102 CONSOPAC to CTF 16 into GINOPAC. CONSOPAC. CTF 63. 67.

Task Force 16 sortie with all units present when ready about 23 hours and 10 November. Order of sortie and zero hour as directed by Task Force Commander. Local minesweepers will sweep channel to one hundred fathoms curve prior sortie. Task force provide own air coverage and surface antiship protection. After sortie fly on air group. Proceed via route to west of POPPY toward CACTUS arriving vicinity Guncpac grid posit 0469 (Lat. 14-00 S, Long. 161-30 W) about 21 hours and 12 November. Be prepared strike enemy targets CACTUS Area.

10 2156 G0 FIRST MARDIV to CONSOPAC into CTF 62. COMAIRCPAC. NOORDA.

On West flank advance continued slowly in face of increasing enemy resistance. On East flank our troops engaged in mopping up Yap position near TETEKE. Raider battalion has reached HINIU and is patrolling between BALISUNA and METAPOHA rivers. Morning search negative. Enemy planes approached at 1015. Fighters intercepted. One shot down. Evening search sighted five DD's 210 miles CACTUS. Striking force of 17 fighters and 8 SB's scored three near misses on each of two destroyers at 1815. One plane lost after takeoff. Pilot and gunner rescued. One pilot lost last week also recovered.

11 0956 CONSOPAC to GINOPAC into COMINC.

Consider situation here such that reinforcements required earliest possible time. Highly desirable use own aircraft, bombs, torpedoes, and ammunition along with our landing signal officers, key deck personnel, maintenance crews and torpedomen. If above is done believe 2 weeks training will suffice. Augmentation by Bome Squadron will be dependent upon timely arrival of additional such this area.

10 2030 CTF 8 to TF 8. Late COMINC. CINOPAC. OWD. etc.

Four P-38's escorted by B-17 strafed and destroyed 7 float severs in HULIS BAY around 9 November. Two exploded all burning. Ten or 12 men observed on beach. No opposition no damage to own planes. Two B-26's made low level attack on AK in GINOPAC COVER resulting in near misses. Two P-38's strafed cargo ship in KUSKA harbor and beach area. Heavy AA fire from cargo ship shooting out one engine in P-38. All planes returned. No damage to enemy shipping at KUSKA. CTF 8 sound. Info stations pass to following local offices Guncpac Command from OWD and COMWIN.

977
09 0334 FANTAN to CINAESPAC Into CINCPAC.

Field report on NAKDI NAKWA field follows. No runway construction in progress. New dispersal area is 70% completed. Five heavy bomber hardstandings and three dispersal roads totaling 4000 feet have been completed. Three roads totaling 3000 feet are being stabilized. The last 2000 feet of road is being cleared. Report on DRASA follows. The number two runway is 30% completed. Allow seven weeks to complete. Cut and fill work is being done on the last 2000 feet. Gravel is being placed on the first 2000 feet. Gravel stabilisation is 15% completed. Report on NAUBORT aerodrome follows. The one four runway is completed to 5000 feet. The tile drain is 47% completed. The open drains are 90% completed. The 48 inch culvert has been completed. Stabilisation is 17% completed.

12 0635 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Into COMINT, COMAFHPOWERPAC, etc.

Amphibforpac at SAN DIEGO faced with necessity of rapidly training for amphibious warfare third Marine division and possibly one Army division. Only combat loaders now available to Amphibforpacs are two transpots one freighter. Training cannot be carried forward at reasonable rate now progress beyond elementary stage without sufficient combat loaders for at least a reinforced regiment preferably for a division. Spearhead for next Scape advance cannot be sharpened without this training. Believe completion troop movements now in hand in your area and delivery of two liberty class freighters to you of which first is now enroute will materially ease your shipping situation. Therefore I desire that the combat loading transports and freighters which are permanently assigned Amphibforpacs but doing temporary duty at present in Amphibforpacs be returned to SAN DIEGO as soon as this can be done without serious prejudice to your current operations. First two transports and first freighter should arrive SAN DIEGO by 20 December if practicable. It will be satisfactory for ships returning to leave in Amphibforpacs all serviceable landing craft and boat crews for them these shortages to be made good after arrival in SAN DIEGO. Advise.

12 0059 COMSOPAC to COMINT, CINCPAC, CONAFHPOWERPAC, GTY 42 16 17 63.

Referring SOUTHARD attack on Jap SS. Scape operations. Later reports states attack blew sub astern out of water. Sub surfaced 1 minute later than cited under 2:30 after 1 1/2 hit in after control room. Search made afterward by NOVBY and PIAH. Result negative. Halsey sends.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET
November (Oct)

12 0059 CONSOPAC (Continued)

Carpenber pass to MacArthur. Comengeope and Comenge-SIMAC have. On GUADALCANAL 10th our advance continued on west flank. Enemy resistance there increasing. On east flank our troops engaged in mopping up Jap positions near TETERE. Evening search 10th sighted 5 DDs 210 miles from GUADALCANAL. Striking force of 17 fighters 8 SB's get 3 near misses on each of 2 DDs. 1 plane lost after take-off. Pilot and gunner rescued. At 0930 L (-11) 10 Aichi Type 97 dive bombers and 12 zeros attacked ships GUADALCANAL. ZELIN damaged by 3 near misses. No other damage. Our planes shot down 5 zeros 1 dive bomber. 2 zukos 1 dive bomber additional probable. At 1135 L (-11) 11th 5 zeros and 25 twin engine bombers attacked GUADALCANAL. Our planes shot down 6 bombers. 11 AA downed 1 bomber. Our losses 7 Grumman. 2 pilots saved. Also 5 Grumman damaged. No other damage.

12 2322 PORTLAND to CONSOPAC into CTF 67, 67A. CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Damage night action 12-13 November off GUADALCANAL. PORTLAND. Torpedo hit aft frame 137 starboard blew large hole in side destroying stern. No means of steering. Minor damage caused by 5-inch shell hit starboard hangar no fire. Can use 2 outboard engines. Rudder appears jammed hard right. Following garbled account from ATLANTA damage as result of night action, 6 turrets out of commission. Both fire rooms and forward engine rooms flooded. After engine room gradually flooding. Have only diesel auxiliary power. Steering gear operating. Foremost gone. Ship received many 8-inch hits and 1 torpedo hit. Latter in number 1 engine room port. Bridge struck. Have requested assistance from CACTUS. Intend to send WORREN and others NEUVIS to garble garble in case available for garble garble. If not available conditions of ship warrants sinking. Request instructions regarding. Following observed. CURSING large fire visible under forecast from waterline. 2 other friendly destroyers near TULAGI damage unknown.

13 0115 CTF 67 to CONSOPAC, CINCPAC, ALL TF COMDRS PACIFIC, etc.

Following essential for your information includes originator CTF 67 120522 refused 10 times by circuit Monitor. Para. Task Force 67 on arrival KUKUM 12th received fire from enemy shore battery. This is part one of CTF 67 130200. Our cruisers and destroyers heavily shelled enemy positions silencing battery causing many large fires and explosions. As TASSPARANGA found 75 landing boats some previously damaged. Our ships gunfire destroyed 30 large damaged others. Fire stopped due to enemy air attacks.
This is part 2 of CTF 67 130200. At 1444 12th ships this force plus BETHELHUSEN LIBRA SOUTHARD HOVEY while underway in close disposition were attacked by about 21 Mitsubishi 97 torpedo bombers which approached low over FLORIDA during high dive bombing attack on CAUTUS. 9 enemy planes seen shot down by ships and boat gunfire others by fighters only 1 enemy plane seen to escape. SAN FRANCISCO was side swiped stern to bow by heavily burning plane battle 2 after control and radar destroyed causing 30 casualties. BUCHANAN struck by one 5-inch shell some material damage 6 casualties. A few casualties other ships from own fire. No other damage to our ships. Para. All troops debarked from convoy McCANLEY JACKSON completely unloaded. ADAM 50%, CRESCENT CITY 50%, BETHELHUSEN 40%, LIBRA 20%.

This is part 3 master reference 130200. At 1830 force withdrew to east. Turner with transports and AK's SHAW, McCALLA, BUCHANAN, SOUTHARD, HOVEY for BUTTON, Callaghan with Task Group 67.4 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, intending strike force reported in CTF 67 120030. If enemy was found in Straits Callaghan expected reenter SAVO SOUND through SEALARK between 2300 and 0100. We were aware of enemy forces reported NHM 200 and CACTUS 120623. Para. After arrival BUTTON SHAW McCALLA, BUCHANAN available to you after fueling latter requires some repairs. Comsopac pass to Comgensopac.

First intelligible picture this cockpit. At 1200 love (-11) KONOC Class BB with 7 torpedo hits and 1-1000 pound bomb after part of ship burning fiercely 10 miles north SAVO ISLAND. 5 enemy DD's attempting assist her. 1 ship believed hostile DD beached and smoking north coast OLEVUGA ISLAND. 2 vessels possibly DD's steaming circles trailing oil just east NUGU ISLAND identity unknown. Large vessel INDESPENSABLE STRAIT type and identity unknown. CUSHING burning 5 miles southeast SAVO ISLAND. MONSSEN dead in water near CUSHING both abandoned. ATLANTA and PORTLAND badly damaged 10 miles southeast SAVO ISLAND proceeding slowly eastward. ATLANTA in tow by TOPOLINK. LAFFET was sunk. 700 survivors picked up 25 percent of which wounded. Much oil and debris and some survivors in water south of SAVO ISLAND. Some enemy survivors taken being questioned to determine name of vessel.
SECRET

NOVEMBER (OCT)

13 1730 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info ALL TF COMM SOPAC, CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC.

Proceed northwesterly remaining about 100 miles from SOLOMON ISLAND CHAIN. Your objective transports expected moving from PAISI area toward CACTUS. See NAV FOX Number 349 TOR 130110. Intention send fees to you near Island Chain. Supplement MUSTIN and CACTUS searches by your own as necessary to locate and destroy AP'S. CACTUS has essentials. CARPENDAR pass.

14 1020 COMSOPAC to GUADALCANAL Info CINCPAC.

Task for 16 VF shot down 4 engine seaplane at 1030. Scouts reported 10 enemy planes approaching us out no attack developed. Sent attack group hit enemy near NEW GEORGIA to land CACTUS. Retiring south to fuel DD's tomorrow. If there is an air group available CACTUS can return to pick it up but not advisable. No information regarding number that arrived from Kinkaid. Number 1 elevator out of commission. Has trouble with number 3. MUSTIN separated due change orders proceeding nearest port for fuel. 16 VF remaining on board. No (last three groups garbled). This is COMtask for 140122 passed to you in another system by Comsopac.

14 0716 COM NAV UNIT CACTUS to RDO TULAGI. Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC.

My 140122 air strike from CACTUS have seriously damaged many transports but force may proceed in reduced numbers. Task Force 64 may be in area this evening. Info PT's.

14 1058 SAN FRANCISCO to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, CTF 17. Info COMAIRSOPAC.


(Continued on next page)
14 1058 SAN FRANCISCO to CINCPAC. (Continued)

got 18 main battery hits on KONGO Class battleship at 2000 yards. 5 inch battery sank a DD. SAN FRANCISCO parent night boat to TULAGI originates. Comairsopac and HELENA have.

14 1115 SAN FRANCISCO to COMSOPAC. CTF 17. CINCPAC. Info COMAIRSOPAC.

Originated by SAN FRANCISCO. During air attack afternoon Nov 12 following casualties. Dead 1 officer 10 enlisted. Wounded 5 officers 22 enlisted. Missing 5 enlisted of whom 1 picked up by LAFFEY and on her during subsequent night action. All wounded transferred to transports except Comdr Grouter who later died of additional wounds received in night action. Torpedo plane flew into control after putting that station after FC Radar and after machine gun platform out of action and damaging battle 2. GO HELENA and Comairsopac have this.

14 1406 HELENA to COMSOPAC. Info CINCPAC. CTF 67. COMAIRSOPAC.

Your 140925. JUNEAU torpedoed and sunk by submarine at 1109 love (-11) 14th posit 10-32 south 162-02 east. HELENA originating this. This information transmitted visually to S-17 patrol plane with instructions to forward to Comsopac at 1121 love. Buchanan joined this group from Turners force at 1215 love.

13 2233 CG 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC. Info CTF 52. COMAIRSOPAC. etc.

Ground action confined to east flank where raiders continued to attack Jap groups southwest of TETERE. At least eighty Japs killed in three contacts. 0730 fighters shot down eight of group 10 zeros near SAVO with losses one fighter. KONGO Class BB attacked 7 times by TBF's and 5 times by SBD's. Seven torpedo hits and two 1,000 pound bomb hits. At 1850 BB still aloft although burning and smoking very little way with five DD escorting. Fighters straffed DD at zero nine thirty and twelve thirty. 2 reconnaissance flights for reported enemy CV's negative. 1745 near miss by SBD on probable Cast Love circling damaged BB. Other SBD's failed make contact due zero weather 1 SBD's lost 1900 Dog Cast 3 crashed off KUKUM. Crew lost zero one thirty dash zero two forty enemy surface craft bombered airfield. Two hits on fighter strip. One SBD two F4F destroyed. 17 F4F damaged but majority repairable today. Personnel casualties light. Pase to Comgen First MarAmphCorps for Info.
SECRET
November (CCT)

15 0355 CTF 64 to COMSOPAC. Info CINC PAC. COMAIRSOPAC.

Enemy damage considerable but data incomplete. WALKE, PRESTON lost south SAVO. HENHAM, GWIN seriously damaged proceeding slow speed west and south GUADALCANAL toward BUTTON at 0245 (-11) 15th. Present status not known. SOUTH DAKOTA by gunfire hits 30 dead 60 wounded. Serious damage battery. Fire Control. Radar. Catapult and planes. 5 tanks ruptured but 37 capable 27 knots. Navy yard repairs required to make effective. WASHINGTON undamaged except washed out kingfishers by own gun blast. Now in company SOUTH DAKOTA proceeding to meet DD’s your 142358. Unless otherwise directed will send SOUTH DAKOTA to WHITE POPPY escorted by 2 DD’s. Request air coverage HENHAM and GWIN and search for survivors south and west of SAVO. Air attack reported my 142344 planes withdrew before attack developed.

15 0355 COMSOPAC to CINC PAC. Info COMINCH. COMSONESPAC.

At 1030 L 14th a convoy of 26 ships comprising 12 AP, and the rest escort 115 miles northwest CACTUS course southeast. At 1600 L (-11) 14th CACTUS reported 6 AP seriously damaged several DD milling around 60 miles northwest of SAVO ISLAND. At 060 L 15th, 3 AP are reported burning and abandoned in position of first contact. The same hour 4 AP unloading at TASKAFARANGA and CAPE ESPERANCE. At 1600 L 14th a large enemy force of cruisers and DD’s reported at 6-52 south 160 east course 165 speed 17 verified by submarine. At 200 L 15th this force identified as 1 CL 4 CA 10 DD. At 080 L 15th 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD 150 miles north course 4 speed 12. 3 CA and 8 DD missing at 1030 L 15th. Task 64 in 11-00 south 160-45 east. My 122314 ATLANTA MONSHEIN and LAFayette sunk GUSHING and SARTON missing. 1400 survivors at CACTUS. Aircraft losses 1 fighter 2 P4F 3 SBD 1 DC J. Enemy lost 8 of 10 easters. JUNEAU torpedoed and sunk by BS 1109 L 14th at 10-32 south 161-02 east. Enemy appears to have suffered the following damage 1 DD sunk 1 cruiser blew up 1 BB KONGO or MUSO Class heavily damaged and unreported since afternoon 13th. Another BB damaged. 3 cruisers heavily damaged possibly sunk. 3 DD damaged 1 unaccounted for. This does not include damage to convoy and its escort nor large force cruisers and DD’s. Reported at 1600 L 14th in 06-52 south 160-00 east. Comsopac originator. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Com- pensopac Comrenemphib-orsopac info by hand.
SECRET
November [GCT]

15 1310 COMSOPAC to CINCOPAC Info COMINCH, COMPOWSAC, MacARTHUR, COMGUARD.

In addition to my 150355 regarding 12 AP. Five sunk three burning dead in water northwest of SAVO. Four reported unloading at GUADALCANAL are beached and burning there. Comsopac sends. Lee reports much damage to enemy but no specific information. Carpenber passes to MacArthur. SOUTH DAKOTA requires Navy yard repairs but still capable of 27 knots. Comsopac has by hand for info. WASHINGTON unharmed. WALKER and PRESTON sunk. BENHAM and OWIN seriously damaged. PORTLAND sank 1 SHIURI type DD night action early morning 13th.

14 1926 VOPNAV to COMSOPAC. Info CINCOPAC.

Delivery of aircraft and aviation material to NEW ZEALAND air force has been limited by combined agreements to 10 combat squadrons for period ending April 1943. Now under consideration is question of allocation of aircraft production to various United Nations for period ending April 1943. NEW ZEALAND considers herself capable of training air and ground personnel up to 30 squadrons for service in SoPac and would prefer to employ them in that area rather than continue to send them overseas to EUROPEAN and AFRICAN theaters. Present outlook indicates feasibility of increasing all allocations above present levels. NEW ZEALAND's share of increase would be on the order of 50 percent which would give a grand total of 15 squadrons by April 1943. Any disproportionate increase in allocation of material to NEW ZEALAND must be set by corresponding decrease in allocations to other services now in South Pacific. Your views on this matter are desired at an early date in view of studies now being made. In particular desire your estimate of attrition based on the 15 squadrons strength having in mind your plans for their employment. NEW ZEALAND air force is being queried on the subject by their representatives in Washington.

15 1012 CTF 62 to COMSOPAC. Info TF COMRDS SOPAC etc.

Preliminary report by HELENA of night action 13th by Task Group 67.4 now in airmail. From CTF 62. As result conference today with commanding officers ships of this group present BUTTON. My preliminary evaluation enemy strength and losses and certain other details follows. A enemy in 3 groups totalling 2 KONGO battleships, 2 CA, 4 CL, about 10 destroyers. Our force passed between right and center groups. Most of the firing was at ranges of 1500 to 4000 yards. B 1 battleship was struck with 2 torpedoes seen to detonate also heavily hit set afire by 6 inch. This probably ship found and attacked near SAVO during next day. Am (not clear what finally became of this vessel.
15 1012 CTF 62 to COMSOPAC (continued)
5 destroyers seen about noon assisting believed not to have been in this action. Other battleship hit with 2 torpedoes and gun fire. This probably ship seen at dawn with 3 destroyers 40 miles distant.

15 1015 Part two of master reference 151012 from CTF 62.
C 2 CA seen to blow up and sink from torpedoes and gunfire. D 1 NATORI seen to sink, 2 additional TENFU or NATORI heavily hit and afire; possibly these were the vessels seen later near NUGU ISLAND. F 1 SOKUJI, 2 or 3 other destroyers blew up, several set on fire, probably one of these later seen beached on OLEVUOA ISLAND. F Center and left enemy groups apparently engaged each other, then all remaining ceased fire and withdrew. C believe all enemy vessels that escaped were hit. H. Action started at 0145 LAFFNEY seen to sink from gunfire at 0153. RANSON seen to blow up from gunfire and torpedo hit. At 0156 T Calleighan and most of staff killed within 10 minutes of start of action. This fact not known to other ships until action was over.

Neither Fletcher nor Obannon were hit but latter damaged by underwater explosion possibly depth charge from LAFFNEY.

16 1124 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC,
Summary of enemy damage. Evaluated by Comsonac. From November 8th to 16th inclusive, Carpenter hand to McArthur. Sunk or destroyed 1 BB, 3 CA, 2 CL, 8 DD, 10 AP, 3 AK, 2 SS. Damaged 1 BB, 6 DD. Comsonac and Comgen amphibiousac have for info by hand. Comsonac sends SOLOMON, NEW BRITAIN area from all sources so far reported. Neither less score nor possible bag by our subs included. CACTUS reports raider patrol captured large quantity ammunition and supplies including personal effects Major General Kawaguchi. 15th November bombers with 8 zeros; over 6 zeros shot down, 2 others probable bombers turned back. Our air losses nil. Heavy losses of enemy personnel suffered from beached transports. Their operations unsuccessful. Our continuous bombings started series of fires still burning at dawn November 16th.

15 2246 COMDESN 1ST MARDIV to COMSOPAC. Info CTF 62 etc.
Daily dope part one. Raider patrol destroyed nip MARAUDER BASE VOUTEA 5 miles southwest of HIHUU killing five and capturing large quantities of ammunition supplies and documents. Material recently captured near TENERE included personal effects Major General Kawaguchi. Morning
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15 2246 COMDOENIST MARDIV to COMSOPAC (continued)

search reported enemy force 4 CL and DDs bearing 350,
course 330, distance 60. 0630 3 enemy AK and 1 AP be-
tween POHA RIVER and CAPE ESPERANCE. All destroyed by
noon, 1 sunk, 3 completely ablaze. 1530 8 zeros and
10-12 dive bombers intercepted by fighters. 6 zeros cer-
tain and 2 probable shot down. Bombers turned back.
No fighters lost.

14 1921 COMINCH to CINCPAC. Info COMSOPAC

From COPS Army and Comincoh. Addressees will deliver this
despatch to army and navy commanders as necessary.

Army and navy air organizations assigned to the Central
and South Pacific areas and navy air organizations as-
signed North Pacific are subject to deployment and re-
distribution by Cinpsac at his discretion. Jig, cast,
sail confidential despatch 041829 of May is modified
accordingly.

The purpose of authorizing Cinpsac to dispose all navy
and army air organizations in the Central and South Pac-
ific areas at his discretion is to allow the commander on
the spot entire freedom in the disposition of available
forces for the defense of positions for which he is re-
 sponsible. Redistributions under this authority are
limited to the forces allotted by the War and Navy De-
partments and therefore will not be ordered on the basis
of creating requirements for additional units.

14 1928 Part two of 141928.

Necessary delegation to Comsopac of your mentioned au-
 thority is authorized.

Any redistribution of air organizations made or planned
should be reported to the War or Navy Department as ap-
propriate for information and logistic purposes.

War and Navy Departments will keep Cinpsac informed of
planned replacements and allocations of aircraft and per-
sonnel when in all respects ready for delivery can be
loaded or flown to destination desired by Cinpsac. A
similar procedure will be followed in regard to air
organizations made available by War or Navy Department.
16 0830 PORTLAND to CTF 64, etc. (Continued)

open fire. Rolled over and sank in 30 seconds. WALKE hit by heavy calibre shells forward and in waist and possible torpedo, sank in about 5 minutes. MEADE, SIBO-LINK and YP recovered about 24 officers and about 220 men. By hand to Comnavoct SOLOMON ISLANDS.

15 0145 MEADE to COMTOPAC, CTF 62. Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, etc.

Bombarded 3 enemy transports beached on GUADALCANAL morning of 15th [MEADE SENDS]. 600 rounds expended no opposition believed personnel landed prior to bombardment. Left transports burning fiercely. Recovered following survivors from waters off SAVO ISLAND from WALKE Executive and 5 officers 129 men, from PRESTON 10 officers 121 men, from YENHAM one man, landed all at RINGHOLT. Straffed by Zero 3 my crew minor wounds. Senior naval officer GUADALCANAL has in another system.

16 1144 COMSOPAC to All COMENS SOPAC, etc.

Following effective this date. Afirm. Marine units detached from Amphibious Force. Baker. For coordination of operations joint planning will be conducted by Comgen First Marine Amphibious Corps and Comamphibfor Sopac under control Comsopac, Cast. All Marine Corps organizations Sopac Area except Marine aviation regular ships detachments and units in STRAW area and FETLOCK assigned First Marine Amphibious Corps. Dog. Transportation of reinforcements replacements relief units and supplies and equipment to CACTUS RINGHOLT remains responsibility Comamphibforsopac.

14 0358 RDO CACTUS to COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, Info CINCPAC, etc.

Captain Jenkins senior survivor CACTUS sends. Results action TF 67.4 off SAVO 0200 13th. Believe BARTON and LAFFREY sank early in action ATLANTA sank 2015 love (-11) fair search 14th failed to locate MONSEN and CUSHING latter seen fast burning southeast of SAVO dark 13th. Rear Admiral Scott and entire staff killed in action except Lt. Murdock badly wounded. Lt. Thomas Ranr also killed. Commanding officers ATLANTA, CUSHING, MONSEN and Comadesdiv 10 among survivors here. Approximate percentage survivors officers and crews above vessels ATLANTA 60, CUSHING 70, LAFFREY MONSEN 30, BARTON 10. About 25 percent survivors wounded many seriously. Known Jap losses two destroyers sunk, one badly damaged and beached. One BB badly damaged and later information indicates sunk by aircraft.

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Whatever the enemy plans with regard to major offensive measures it is clear that he now will do what he has heretofore neglected to do: Concentrate on damage to our supply lines to CACTUS by the use of submarines, minor surface vessels and aircraft. Para. As the maintenance and building up of our CACTUS position is the cardinal feature of the Pacific campaign, it is recommended that every effort be exerted to obtain protection of our communications in the features and forces which we now lack. These are: About 20 subchasers based in RINGBOLT for direct protection and to operate as hunting groups in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT, 12 VOS sea-lanes in RINGBOLT and 12 in MARMASIKE STRAIT for the same purpose, minefields off RINGBOLT and in LEHMOO CHANNEL, 1 alternate carrier air group at ATL BAY as soon as the field is ready, and reinforcements of destroyers withdrawn from regions of less imminent importance. Para. It is unnecessary to mention to you the requirement of carriers long range aircraft cruisers battleships and troops and their transport which Cincoap has recommended for offensive employment and for broadening our base of operations. Such forces have been indicated as available but so far have not been sent. Para. It is my belief that the Navy has now the forces which we require for our job, and I hope that the Navy will be able to send us these forces, here when they are needed in the South Pacific, to forward our final victory.

17 0400 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Part two. Action and info same except word not info this part. Still from PORTLAND. After action positively identified one NACHT Class burning until gutted and sunk about 0330 L (-11) 13th. Tentative identification one TENNY Class did same. After action there were nine burning ships lying to of which only three could have been friendly. At daylight saw one Jap DD off SAWO previously reported sunk my 142100 and one HARUNA and unidentified Jap cruiser on horizon. During action in addition to sinking one HIYOKI Class DD PORTLAND hit 33 many times with 4 salvos about 4000 yards and several hits 2 salvos one unidentified cruiser. Action report follows air mail. (Note: Part 2 received 1st, part 1 not yet received).

16 0830 PORTLAND to CTF 64. Info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMHAT ACT COLONOL.

Action Comtaskfor 64 info Comsopac and Cinpoc from the PORTLAND. Senior uninjured survivor PRESTON Lt. (Jg) Gibson states most of action night 14 - 15th neither PRESTON nor WALKE saw target when BBs opened. Both opened fire on believed cruiser targets about 3 minutes after BBs PRESTON hit by 8 inch salvo plus possible torpedo 3 minutes after

(Continued on next page)
17 0804 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC BUORD.

Here comes part one of two parts. Action Comsopac info Cinopac with word info first part only. PORTLAND sends. Examination two fourteen inch hits PORTLAND AMENDED AARON WARD clearly indicates Japanese battleships were loaded with bombardment shells instantaneous fused. Practically no penetration and little damage. Half of one fourteen inch projectile base ring recovered stamped 3687520 with 22 under last two digits. Also 112 with inverted 4 over center digit QQ that's all part one.

18 0655 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMGENSOFAC, etc.

Action Cinopac info Cominch and Comsowespac from Comsopac. From incomplete reports ENTERPRISE planes made repeated attacks on enemy ships between November 13 and 15 inclusive inflicting following damage. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 8 torpedo hits on BB. 3 torpedo hits on a CL. 4 torpedo hits 3 bomb hits 2 near misses on transport. Comsopac forwards. On troops and equipment 2 500 pound bombs and 25 incendiary bombs. By hand to Comgensopac and First Maraphecos for info.

17 2205 COMSOPAC 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info CTP 62 RADIO NOUMEA, etc.

No important ground activity with ref enemy landing near TETERE two November now estimated fifteen hundred troops landed. Eight hundred now been killed. Remainder dispersed into groups working back into jungle. Force no longer considered to be effective due disorganization pursuant to loss of supplies and repeated attacks air and ground. Morning searches negative except large fires northern tip of NEW GEORGIA. P-38's and B-25's attacked mission station northern NEW GEORGIA near ROWIARA ISLE reported occupied by Japs. Bombs dropped but no activity noted. Evening searches negative. RDO WHITE FLOPPY pass to Comgen First Maraphecorp.
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18 2131 CINCPAC to CONSOPAC Info CONSUBPAC.

In view of: A. Effectiveness of past patrols in Empire waters. B. Very low present strength these patrols. C. Lull in enemy activity and improved situation CACTUS area. Propose return to Empire patrol Subron 10 sub now based PEARL and withdraw SILVERSIDES, FLYING FISH, WAHOO from Sopac for far western patrol on completion present patrols and refill by SPERRY at BRISBANE. Would then return SPERRY to PEARL. On assumption twelve Consopac submarines continue base northeast AUSTRALIA you will have available that number for patrol: SOLOMONS SEA. Consopacpacific to retain a number of submarines from Squadron 2 to keep at 80 the total based AUSTRALIA pending arrival remainder Subrons 6 and 8. I also plan send you ARGONAUT on 23rd. English will send you her new characteristics as APS. Comment.

19 0659 CTF 64 to CONSOPAC Info ALL TF CONER SOPAC AREA, CINOPAC, etc.

Summary by Comtaskfor 64 of data available from WASHING- TON, SOUTH DAKOTA concerning night action SAVO ISLAND 14-15 November indicates following enemy sunk: 1 heavy cruiser or battleship, 3 large cruisers probably heavy. 1 destroyer. Additional enemy ships damaged. 1 14-inch gun battleship hit repeatedly by 16-inch and some 5-inch. One cruiser and 1 destroyer burning. Observed rapid and accurate gunfire from own destroyers which contributed to sinking of 1 enemy BD and damage to other as reported above.

18 2338 CONDEN 1ST MARDIV to CONSOPAC FOR Info COMAIRSOPACFOR, etc.

Bomber field graded 5400 feet mat laid 3900 feet. Grown- ing complete to additional hundred feet. Mat construction to terminate at 400 feet for time being. 5 revetments complete and sixth under construction. Drainage system under construction. Fighter field 2 graded four thousand feet. Approaches 90% cleared. Four revetments (probably revetments) under construction. Runways being graded and four hundred feet matted. Road system at bomber field and fighter field 2 being graded. One bomb resistant command post and two personnel bomb resistant shelters completed at bomber field. Weekly report.
20 1135 COMSOPAC to GINGPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOUTPAC, etc.

Jap patrols were active and aggressive during the 16th. Our forces pushing strong outposts preceded by patrols across the MATANIKAU RIVER to positions west of POINT CRUZ preparatory to general attack. Comsopac relays P-38's from CACTUS escorted B-17 and B-26's on raid to TONOLILI morning 16th. Former shot down 3 aces in addition to damage of enemy reported yesterday. Carpen- der pass to McArthur. Ground action GUADALCANAL 19th limited to patrol activity covering advancement of out- post line. About 35 Japs killed; own casualties light. Burned out enemy cargo ship not previously recorded, sank close in shore CAPE ASTORIA, MALAYA after an explosion time 0336 OCT/19. Comsensopac and Comgen IMAC have by hand for info.

20 0021 COMSOUTPAC to COMSOPAC Info GINGPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTY A2, etc.

ARGONAUT departs PEARL for Sopac November 23rd. Has following characteristics. In addition to crew can carry 164 fully equipped enlisted and 6 officer troops. Aviation gas capacity 22,000 gallons. Armament 2 6 inch 53 caliber, 3 20MM, 4 submerged and 4 deck firing tubes, 4 deck stowage tubes, 8 interior torpedo stowage racks. Ammunition 200 rounds 6 inch bombardment, 200 rounds com- mon, 15,000 rounds 20MM, 20 torpedoes. If only 6 torpedoes are carried, approximately 100 tons bulk cargo can be car- ried in cargo space of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. Cargo must be able to pass through circular hatch 26 inch diameter. 9000 miles radius at maximum surface speed 13.5 knots. Stowage for 24 marine rubber landing boats. 30 days subsistence when carrying troops. Particularly suit- ed as raider transport with six inch gun landing support, advance base seaplane tender, fueling seaplanes at sea, cargo carrier, bombardment of enemy positions and general submarine duties against bombardment of own forces. Cinopac has for info.

20 0923 GINGPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC, COMUNH/DEPT.

Status bases OSTLER and LINO#UT not entirely clear. Understand garrisons have arrived or about to. Rec- ommend commanding officers report to Comsopac and assume status of other Sopac bases. Will forward in a few days my recommendations concerning ultimate defenses. Com- mending Officer AZTEC should also report to Comsopac if he has not already done so.
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21 0600 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOWESPAC, COMINCH, etc.


21 0643 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMTU PAC, CTF 42, COMSOWESPAC

Your 182131. NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS areas are most fertile hunting grounds so long as RABaul - FAISI - KAVEING remain in enemy hands and enemy forces on GUADALCANAL. Recommend no reduction in Sopac subs at present. If reduction is made strongly urge 14 subs minimum for patrols in SOLOMONS area divided 7 on patrol and 7 enroute or refitting A30DR. Comsopac sends.

20 0925 CINCPAC to VICE OINPAC, Info COMSERFORSU.COM, COMSERONSOAPAC, etc.

Subject following comments concern fully objectives suggested your 171939. Slow tankers to numbers required best fitted for COPPER run where convoys still in effect. Intermediate fast and remaining slow ships are in ALASKA on coastal and Sopac services. Five or six fast Fleet tankers have been kept available in Sopac area for task forces. Incident of ESSEX RICHMOND regrettable but was primarily due to lack of any shore storage in forward area. We are now employing J. C. DONELLS as mobile storage for black oil Sopac area and contemplate same use for KANAWHA when current repairs completed. Hulk ERKINE PHELPS will also help that regard.

Principal relief will be afforded by shore tanks under construction at WHITE POPPY ROSES and BUTTON. Unless transportation of PT boats of immediate concern do not need any more tankers for present other than those now in prospect. Namely, WHITE PLAINS KAISER (AO) and PATUXENT when ready.

Situation may change by February as per CINCPAC secret ltr serial 0246 of 13 November to VUPnav. In addition foregoing and in furtherance your suggestions Comseroncopac hereby requested consider. Adopt and report on such of following measures as are practicable. Retain clean tanker PHAUK G DRUM now in area as mobile storage. Do same for such black oil slop commercial tankers as may be required. Do not use fleet tankers for mobile storages unless absolutely necessary and reduce those held for task forces to reasonable number. Employ fleet tankers so released for freighting. As implied by VUPnav the guiding principle should always be to employ the faster ships on the long hauls.
Part 1 from Combatdiv 6. Tremendous value and some limitations radar demonstrated night of 14-15 November. BB's obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spot plus optical bearings. Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quicker and more accurate solutions and spots than on target practice. Opening range 1st phase 16 and 18000 yards illuminated by setting moon both ships hitting selected targets on 2nd salvo. Opening 2nd phase 6000 to 9000 yards we used some star shells which functioned properly but did not add to accuracy of fire. No indication enemy used radar. When deprived artificial illumination he apparently ranged inaccurately on sun flashes. Hits on S 57 obtained when that ship illuminated by enemy searchlights at about 6000 yards.

Part 2. Second and final part Combatdiv 6. Accuracy own fire definitely better than Japs and superiority increased rapidly with range. SQ radar invaluable in finding surface targets and coaching fire control radars on. As currently installed Batdiv 6 SQ has wide blind arc astern. Single instrument found insufficient to meet fire control needs and supply adequate ship control and tactical information. Most urgent and most important need for improvement night fighting efficiency BB's is provision additional SQ to permit visual access to plan position indicator by flag and conning officer. Elimination blind spots also urgent and important. SQ type radar of little value in enclosed waters as targets are lost in asparagus patch of land signals. Neither SQ SQ nor fire control radars could discriminate Jap DD known to be lying in against SAVO ISLANDS.

22 0120 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC. Info COMINCH. Your 120635 if ships detached from Sopac in accordance with reference there would remain 7 AP 4 AK of which HELMATRIX temporarily out due to battle damage LIBRA slightly damaged and needs docking FULLER temporarily out due to collision. McCAWLEY urgently requires docking. Present shortage requires sending chartered ship to CACTUS. Am sending remainder American Division plus 5th Marines to CACTUS and withdrawing 1st Marine Division. Plan storing material CACTUS in preparation for next offensive move. 1st Marine Division upon withdrawal must go into amphibious training. Desirable Army and New Zealand troops this area also receive some amphibious training. Even provided no further losses received ships now this area totally inadequate for present and planned operations. Liberty freighters will materially ease cargo shipping situation but are not transports or equipped for amphibious operations. Cannot transfer now or in future any combat loading transports or freighters without prejudice to operations. Comsopac Comgen FMAC and Comamphibioropac have by hand for info from Comsopac.
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21 0052 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

Request all practicable efforts speed delivery PC’s and other listening equipped craft for base patrol and local escort duties Sopac. Comsopac (originator) refers Cominch 151657 of September (Action CINCPAC and Info COMINCH) need for these units to combat submarine menace in CACTUS area and vicinity established bases increasingly acute.

21 1800 COMINCH to CINCPAC. Info COMSOPAC. COMAIRSOPAC. COMAIPAC.

Cinopac 180159. Indicate proposed relationship of subordinate command to ComairSopac and responsibilities toward Marine aviation in Sopac. Would additional personnel be required. If proposed command is established a more distinctive title will be required.

22 1037 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMENSOPAC. COMINCH. etc.

In face of the stubborn resistance. Comsopac sends MacArthur via Carpender. Our advance is continuing slowly on west flank. No activity on other sectors. Action CINCPAC. Comensopac. Comensopac have for info. Enemy positions west of MATANIKAU RIVER under continuous attacking missions by P-59’s, TBF’s and SBD’s. 1 near miss was made on an AK in vicinity of DUNAI, NEW GEORGIA.

22 1541 COMINCH to CINCLANT Info CINCPAC. COMSOPAC.

Transfer to Pac Fit for duty soon as practicable 4 combat loaded APs, one of them suitable for division flagship, plus 2 combat loaded AKs. Advise expected date ready to depart and names of vessels.

22 2125 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC. COMOSWESPAC. COMSUBPAC.

Shift of submarines to Sopac in recent emergency required practical abandonment of our patrol of Jap waters which was very effective. As of this date none of these patrol stations is filled and no sub is yet enroute to them. Consider the most critical period for CACTUS has passed. Unless otherwise directed I will distribute Subs Pac Fit as follows. ARGONAUT plus one to bring to fourteen the number of subs available operations SOLOMONS SEA. Subron forty-five of 13 S boats for ALASKA and Sound School. Remainder Subrons FOUR and TEN for Empire and TRUK patrols comprising about 17 submarines not under navy yard overhaul.

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22 2357 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, VOPNAV, COMSERFORPAC, etc.

Comsopac sends to Cinopac info Cominch, Vopnav, Comserforpac, Comdespac. SUSTAINED 11 shell hits port side including 1 major caliber bombardment all above waterline. Number 3 handling room, gun shelter and Number 4 handling room holed. Resultant fires with ready service powder explosions caused extensive damage. Both after guns out necessary replace. Also both torpedo mounts out due direct hits require renewal. Recommend PEARL. Repairs made seaworthy completed. Vessel capable full power. BUCHANAN being repaired WHITE POPPY completion December 6. Repairs O'BANNON minor damage completed. Commeronsepac by hand. Cinopac please deliver to Comdespac.

23 0612 COMSOPAC to ALL TF COMMANDS SOPAC CTF 16.11.68.69.84. Info etc.

Task Forces under operational control of originator Comsopac are reorganised as follows: Task Force 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey in SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, COMDESRON 6 in BALE, GRIDLEY MCCALL GRAVEN DUNLAP FANNING. Task Force 16 Rear Admiral Sherman in ENTERPRISE, SANDHOO, Desron 2 NORRIS, ANDERSON HUGHES MUSTIN RUSSELL HUNT CLARK. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee in WASHINGTON, بطيخ 6 plus screening units as assigned. Task Force 65 Rear Admiral Hill in MARYLAND, COLORADO, NASSAU, ALTAMARE, PARRAGUT, DALE AYLWIN, HULL, MACDONOUGH, MCMAGHAN. Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Kinkaid (Rear Admiral Tisdale second in command) NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, NEW ORLEANS, HONOLULU, HELENA, LAMSON, NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, FLETCHER, GRAYSON, MAURY. The following units are assigned Task Force 68 (Escorts): LAKEWOOD, WOODWORTH, LANDNER, MCCALLA, MEADE, SHAW, STACK, BUCHANAN. Units not now in company will be directed to join Task Force Commanders by originator Comsopac as soon as practicable. Units assigned Task Forces 62 and 63 remain unchanged. Additional assignments to Task Forces will be made from units now enroute. Combatant units in Sopac area not assigned to Task Forces will operate under orders of Comsopac. The organisation herein prescribed is effective zero hours 24 November.
24 0145 CONSPAC to CINCPAC info CONMENCPAC.

Your 222241. Comspac sends for action Cinopac. Based on forces now available, garrison CACTUS after relief now planned will consist of American Division and 2nd Mar Div (6th, 7th, 8th Marines) plus attached units. Command to senior troop commander under principal unity of command. Command organisation be separate despatch. Base Commander POPPY Major General Lincoln, USA commands all defense forces including KINZI CAMP under principal unity of command. If 25th Division made available plan send CACTUS relieve 2nd Marine Division in preparation further offensive action. Comgen Sopac concurs and has for info.

24 0525 An enemy encampment . Reports GUADALCANAL . On the north slope Mangaotu was contacted by patrol of 30 men First Marines. ComSoPac Forwards. Orange lost 5 machine guns plus 70 killed. Our casualties 2 wounded. While regrouping have temporarily halted operations on west flank. On 23rd SBD and F4F4 strike at MUNDA; NEW GEORGIA scored 1 Strike on warehouse at LAMETEI. Sighted no shipping. Air reports indicate Nips unloading at LIU LIU CHIUSKOL on 21st. Also 1 AK unloading near MUNDA 20th and 21st. Weather prevented planes from reaching MUNDA. ComGenSoPac ComGen 1MAC and CTF 62 have by hand for info.

25 1215 CONSPAC TO CINCPAC info Cominuch, CTF62, ComGowes pac, Comspac

Comspac relays from GUADALCANAL. At three hours late (-11) one enemy plane dropped bombs to the south of the field killing and wounding several. No ground activity of importance past twenty four hours. Shore positions of enemy harassed by nine individual F-39 missions. Four bomb hits on buildings LAMETEI not LOMBEI as previously reported yesterday despatch NEW GEORGIA on 24th. Ten Zeroes attacked bombers without damage our planes. ComGenSoPac and ComGen1MAC have by hand.

232222 COMINCH TO CINCPAC info CONSPAC

Your 200923 Garrison OSTER, LINEOUT each total 45 officers and 827 men and consist Headquarters Detachment, 1 Coast Artillery Battery automatic weapons antiaircraft with searchlight platoon, 1 engineer company aviation, 1 airways detachment, 1 signal antiaircraft warning company plus miscellaneous service units. Both SS KOTA AGEHONG arrived OSTER November 8 Thence to LINEOUT. Report ComGenSoPac by dispatch. New Zealand joint staff mission assumes commanding officer Astee already reported Comspac. Comspac confirms. Cinopac give to ComGen Raw Dept for info. CO Army has by hand.
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26 1300 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMSOWESPAC, etc.

Front lines area GUADALCANAL witnessed only ground activity for the day. Our patrols engaged in cleaning out isolated groups offering resistance. Daily Comsopac info. 4 B-17s dropped 8 500-pound bombs enemy convoy 2 DDs and 2 AKs 1 AO vicinity PILOPILO GANONOGA. No hits observed. Our bombers intercepted by 4 enemy zeros no damage resulting. At 0410 L (-11) 26th 2 enemy bombers over CACTUS dropped bombs without resultant damage. Our 33D continued nightly patrol over enemy lines. Comsopac and Comgencmac have by hand. Action Cinopac Info Cominoh.

26 0458 CTF 62 to COMTRANSPORT DIV 8. Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, etc.

Abandonment AOLA project approved. Form Task Unit 62.4.6 Captain Ashe in NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, PRES. HAYES, FORMALHAUT, Comdeav 24 in LANSDOWNE, GRAYSON, SHAW, NICHOLAS. From CTF 62. Task unit depart BUTTON earliest daylight Nov 27th proceed CACTUS via east and north of SAN CRISTOBAL and LENO CHANNEL to arrive 0530L (-11) 29th. Unload on beach extending 3000 yards east of TOGAMA POINT. Embarked personnel establish base at VOLINAVUA as directed by Comgen CACTUS. On completion unloading NEVILLE, HAYES, HEYWOOD return to BUTTON via same route escorted by 2 DD's. When FORMALHAUT unloaded at TOGAMA direct her proceed AOLA BAY accompanied by remaining 2 DD's and load about 75,000 cubic feet heavy cargo for transfer to TOGAMA POINT and RINGOLFI as designated by Comgen CACTUS. FORMALHAUT and escort return to BUTTON on completion. Op Plan Affirm 24 covering this movement being forwarded Comandnavbase by air for delivery to you on arrival.

25 0609 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, COMINCH, COMAIRPAC.

Cinopac 180159 Cominoh 211800. In order clarify situation urge following action. Affirm Fitch's title to be only Commander Task Force 63. Baker. Establish Comairsopac at WHITE POPPY in order discharge functions outlined para 5 of Pafit letter 33 L-42 in Sopac area. Comsopac the sender. Cast. Order aviation Rear Admiral to command same. The Commander of the Task Force comprising the combatant elements of land based aviation is a full time job and must be filled by the most experienced Naval aviator available in this area.
26 0247 CINCPAC to COMINCH. Info COMSOPAC. COMAIRSOPAC. COMAIRPAC.

Commander Fleet Aircraft NOUMEA short title Comfair NOUMEA considered most distinctive title new command. My 180159 Cominch 211800. See Comairsopac 240221 Comsopec 290251 October now passed to you which basis original recommendation. Also Cimairsopac 242311 Comsopec 250609 which comment your 211800. Propose duties Comair NOUMEA within Sopac area to parallel and extend those now assigned Comairpac for entire Pacific Ocean Area would concern all Naval air units and air base facilities and would for Marine aviation include supply of aircraft and aviation material plus other administrative assistance as directed by Comsopec. Agree Halsey proposal that Fitch as Comtaskfor 63 exercise operational control over such Army Navy and Marine aircraft as assigned by area commander but consider present inopportune time to reassign title Comairsopac. Additional flag officer and staff necessary to free Fitch of widespread administrative responsibilities.

26 0632 COMSOPAC to VICE OPMAY Info COMNAV. CINCPAC.

Prior receipt of Vice Omnav Ser 123739 of Oct 13 and Omsopec serial 4235 of Nov 16 Comsopec originator directed by his serial 5356 of November 10th all commanding generals at established island bases to designate a U.S. Naval officer as Port Director where no Port Director has been regularly assigned. Port Director's have also been instructed to act as routing and reporting officers for merchant shipping British route and Vese arrival signals are prescribed with NZNB as reporting center responsible to pass them to regular US and British Aees. Authority hereby requested for Port Directors so designated to draw publications listed in paragraph 3 subparagraphs A through P of Vice Omnav Serial 0127320 of May 2nd. Mobile issuing office USS ARGONNE and issuing office NOS WILKIN are to be directed to make issues subject your approval. Names of Port Directors designated will be communicated to the Director Naval Transportation Service. Action Vice Omnav Information Cominch C and R Omsopec.

25 1659 COMINCH to CINCPAC. COMSOPAC. COMAIRSOPAC. COMAIRPACFOR. etc.

Refer to this as Admiralty 1726A/24. Your 1350 21st not to all addressees. Engadine should not complete patrol systems 2 she is to proceed to NOUMEA via AUSTRALIA as soon as she is ready for sea. She is not required to embark Martlets from KILPIN. 3 ATHENE is also to be sailed for same destination as soon as ready. 4 Other ships are to come under operational control of Cinopac on arrival in South Pacific Area.
SECRET

November (OCT)

25 1415 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info CONSOPAC QUINTUS OPMAY BUPTER etc.

Opmay Bupers Marcorps informed. 4 APs and 2 AKs escorted by 6 PacFit destroyers expected depart Base III mid December for canal zone where report Cincpac for duty. BBS now planning load ALLEN with 3rd Marine Replacement Battalion and 2nd Garrison Replacement Battalion for STRAW and cargo for WHITE POFFY. GEORGE GLYMER, JOHN PENN, TITANIA, ALOMAR, with SeeBees 25 and 37 Pontoon Assembly Depot other personnel and urgent cargo for WHITE POFFY. THOMAS JEFFERSON with personnel for canal zone thence West Coast or Army personnel to Sopac as desired by you. Comment. Advise also desired division assignments APs and AKs unless you wish retain in new Transdiv 18. This movement direct to Sopac should be considered in connection return APs and AKs to Amphcorpac.

26 2230 NAVAL ATTACHÉ WELLINGTON to CINCPAC

Afirm 416-26 November. From Goddard. Just returned from visit to Halsey and Pitch. Neither had been able to consider RNZAF development but hope now to have time to complete my directive and formulate future requirements for RNZAF. Para 2. Was informed Vice Opmay has stated intention to expand RNZAF from ten squadrons to fifteen by April 1944. This is no expansion since we already have sixteen squadrons. Under this arrangement mostly all our future output trained personnel will continue to be sent to England contrary to your wishes. Para 3. Vice Opmay further suggested that if intended allotment of aircraft to South Pacific are exceeded the surplus should go exclusively to American Squadrons. This would effectively prevent employing New Zealand personnel resources. Para 4. Please regard this as advance information only as sending letter by airmail. Please accept congratulations on great successes and regrets at loss of Callaghan. 06452/26.

27 1254 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC

50 Japs killed number of machine guns captured in local operations west of POINT CRUZ. There were no other ground activities Consenopac Comgen IMAC info by hand. At 2400 26th 7 B-17's struck aerodrome at KAHLI no opposition encountered. Large fires resulted at dispersal area plus 16 hits on runway. During the night Consopac forwards daily summary from GUADALCANAL area. 2 enemy bombers dropped missiles near mouth of LONGA RIVER no damage. On the 23rd and the 24th CAUTUS bombing of KOKORO mission NEW GEOROGA destroyed all houses that area. Wipe reported hiding in bush during raids. Enemy explorations toward the eastern side of NEW GEOROGA are continued. On the 21st barge with 50 Japs was reported in BALFOUR CHANNEL near RENDOVA. Good native report states 3000 ORANGE at RENATA BAY.

999
SECRET

November (c.o.t.)

140000

TO 67.4 engaged apparently 2 enemy forces containing DDs and cruisers plus DDs to DD of SAVO about 0328. We approached in long columns 4 DDs, 1 CL, 1 CA, 2 GAs, 1 CL. 1 CLA, 4 DDs via LEMCO CHANNEL on 280 along north coast alos in. Changed course to about 310. True then 000 then 315 at 0137, then S70 closing to about 3000 yards of enemy. Enemy force believed coming in to south of SAVO from NE in 2 or 3 groups. Bearings and distance of groups by sail George radar from USNUSA. 3 ships 250. True range 4200 course 190 speed 90. 4 ships 315 True range 7000, 4 large ships 290 True range 10000. At 0143 DDs instructed to launch torpedoes attack. At 0145 ordered to stop by to fire. At range of about 3000 yards to group on port bow while turning to course S70 commenced firing at 0148. Enemy turned on searchlights and commenced firing at short range just prior to our opening fire. 0100 changed course to 000 on signal and speed 28 knots. ATLAS fell out to left and believed on fire at 0149. SAN FRANCISCO hit heavily especially bridge area and Rear Admiral Caglania and all staff but one killed. JUNEAU hit by torpedo forward engine room time unknown. PORTLAND believed hit by torpedo and lost steering control prior to 0216. No one resulted in which events uncertain but destroyers both sides very active. Numerous ships afloat including one large ship capsized and one large BB or CA stopped and completely enveloped in flames and passed both close aboard. At 0200 gave course 090 True speed 16 Form 18 to ships able to comply. At 0240 contacted SAN FRANCISCO on port bow and ordered up. SALTLAKE reported in SALT LAKE CHANNEL. SALT LAKE and O'BANNON in LEMCO CHANNEL. At 0310 reported condition PORTLAND to radio FUTA and requested tow and air coverage. After transiting SALT LAKE destroyers formed screen. At daylight picked up JUNEAU in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT near MALAYA Island. Instructed to join up. Took course to southwest and speed 10 knots until SAN FRANCISCO made temporary repairs. Transferred medical assistance to SAN FRANCISCO and sent O'BANNON to position to transmit report on force position and intentions. O'BANNON rejoined at 1552. At 0810 course 190 speed 15 knots zigzag No. 8 at 08 all speed JUNEAU could make. At 1101 torpedoes fired from about 260 relative running on or near surface passed astern of INDIAN and ahead SAN FRANCISCO and hit JUNEAU (then down 4 feet by head) on port side of fantail (location of hit debatable but aft) as she was zigzagging 15 deg. to the right. JUNEAU was third ship in formation about 800 yards on quarter of SAN FRANCISCO due to steering difficulty using one screw and as requested by commanding officer. There was a single enormous explosion filling the area with debris and large cloud of yellow black and brown smoke. Waves fell to such an extent and volume as to cause belief of high level bombing attack. Remaining ships increased to maximum speed and radical course changes. As only Fletcher and squadron screening and ships crippled continued on course and reported events by visual for further transmission to Command.
14 0001 (Continued) B-17 sighted at 1131. Within minute after explosion JUNEAU had completely disappeared. Debris fell and smoke remained for about 9 minutes. No sight or sound contact on submarine. SAN FRANCISCO worst material and personnel casualties including Captain Young. Lt. Comdr. Schonland now commanding. STERRETT extensive personnel and material casualties. Material and personnel damage various extent remaining ships. SAN FRANCISCO and probably STERRETT will require navy yard overhaul. HELENA and O'BANNON tender availability. All times mentioned are minus 11.

28 0309 CTF 62 to CTU 62.4.7. CTU 62.4.6. CTU 62.4.8 Info CINCPAC etc.

MAJARA and ALCIBIA have been torpedoed vicinity LUNGA POINT. From CTF 62. Indications that Jap subs are also operating in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT. Possibility that subs enter SAVO SOUND at night and lie on shelf near beach at CACTUS awaiting early morning return of ships to anchorage. Suggest part of screen make sweep close in CACTUS beach prior daily arrival APs and AKs in unloading area. On retirement to eastward recommend units of screen made sweep INDISPENSABLE STRAIT ahead of transports. If retire to RINGBOLT desirable that units of screen patrol SAVO SOUND during night with view intercepting subs on surface.

28 0145 CONWOPAC to MACARTHUR VIA CONBOWESPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

This despatch to General MacArthur from Admiral Halsey. Your 270035 and 271136. Our common objective is RABaul. Until Jap air in NEW BRITAIN and northern SOLOMONS has been reduced, risk of valuable naval units in middle and western reaches SOLOMON SEA can only be justified by major enemy seaborne movement against south coast NEW GUINEA or AUSTRALIA itself. Seaborne supply of bases we take on north- ern coast of NEW GUINEA not feasible until we control SOLO- MON SEA, in other words RABaul. Pursuant foregoing and with history past months in view, consider RABaul assault cam- paign must be amphibious along the SOLOMONS with NEW GUINEA land position basically a supporting one only. I am cur- rently reinforcing CACTUS position and expediting means of operating heavy air from there. It is my belief that the sound procedure at this time is to maintain as strong a land and air pressure against the Japanese HINA position as your lines of communication permit, and continue to extract a constant toll of Japanese shipping, an attrition which if con- tinued at the present rate he can not long sustain. I be- lieve that my greatest contribution to our common effort would be to strengthen my position and resume the advance up the SOLOMONS as soon as possible, while continuing to maintain a naval force in being on the flank of any possible Japanese large scale advance against AUSTRALIA or Southern NEW GUINEA coast. Carpender pass.
November (CCT)

29 1050 CONSPAC to CINCPAC

This is MacArthur's 271136 you asked for in your 290709. "MacArthur sending to Conspac. Ultra. In connection with my radio of this morning it is reported from our naval sources that the enemy will attempt landing at Gona 5 AK's on the night of November 29 and 6 AK's on November 30 and repeating on the nights of December 3rd and December 4th. The escorting naval force is reported as one cruiser and 4 destroyers. Can you help me by a diversionary move to threaten his flank query? Admiral Carpenter, please pass."

29 1100 MACARTHUR VIA CONSPAC to CINCPAC

MacArthur's 270233 follows. Reference your 290709. Conspac passing. This dispatch is for Admiral Halsey from General MacArthur. In my operations in New Guinea my ground forces have driven the enemy back to a shallow beach head in the Buna Gona area. The air force has provided close support, has transported large numbers of troops and has supplied the entire operation. Pending the establishment of seaborne line of communications, the number of troops I can employ is definitely restricted by limited capacity of air transport. The enemy is making every effort to reinforce and supply the garrison by sea and despite losses from air attack, has recently succeeded to an extent sufficient to prevent my destroying his beach head. He is evidently increasing his efforts and is in position to make a move of considerable magnitude against NEW GUINEA. The Chief of Staff of the Army after discussion with the Navy in Washington has suggested that I take up with you the detailed naval requirements for the support of my immediate operations in order to reach an agreement as to the practicable measures to be taken with the naval forces now available in our respective areas. I would appreciate an expression of your views. Carpenter please pass.

28 1235 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info CONAIRPAC, CONSPAC, COMAIRPAC, etc.

Cinopac 260247 approved. Cinopac hereby authorized to establish new flag officer command in South Pacific "Fleet Air Command NOUMEA". Short title Fairannoumea will be a subordinate command of Comairpacific and Comairpacific. Will report for duty to Cinopac. Bureau and officers of Navy take necessary action.

29 0035 CTF 3 to CINCPAC, CONAIRPAC, COMNORWSEAFRON, NYMS, CPHAV, etc.

Radio HONOLULU, pass to Cinopac - refer Cominah 272156. Following status of CTF 3 destroyers. 15 at present operating with TF VIZ four modern, 11 others including sweepers.
SECRET
November (GCT)

29 0035 (continued)

Essential duties. 3 old on permanent escort duty between OCEAN BLUE and WHIRLAWAY. 2 old anti-submarine patrol LONGVIEW. 3 to 4 will be assigned ANTLET MOVE. Two for anti-submarine patrol. 1 to 2 screening moves between LONGVIEW and ANTLET. Minimum 3 required for screening OCEAN BLUE to LONGVIEW for transports and important cargo ships. Movement of important cargo ships will continue indefinitely. At infrequent intervals and periods lasting month must maintain anti-submarine patrol at CAVERN to protect discharging ships. Four modern destroyers now in striking force with cruisers. Operational breakdowns old destroyers frequent. Present status king at BERMERTON urgent repairs. KAUH must follow for same when king returns. WAMBUT, PENNY operating with cracked reduction gears which should be repaired when ships can be spared. LAMBERTON has boiler completely burnt out. Destroyers have been operating practically continuously without opportunity for upkeep. Margin with respect to prospective demands now zero. Recent net reduction in escort vessels to the force including Canadian is nine. Request retention TALBOT with this taskforce until reliefs can be provided or at least until one January. CTF 8 sends. Radio BERMERTON pass to Commessafron and NWS X RDO SanFran pass to Commessafron and NM I X RDO Annapolis pass to Opnav and Cominch.

28 1708 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC COMAIRSOPAC COM 12:

Comairsopac 240567 from Comnavbassopac. Do you approve development of BUTTON into LION Base as recommended? If so does this base supplement or replace development heretofore stressed for WHITE POPPY? See your 210617 October next to last sentence. If BUTTON development is in addition you must balance large shipping requirements against other shipping needs Sopac. Little additional shipping in prospect. If not approved as recommended specify location of approved components. What is to be division of base functions between BUTTON and WHITE POPPY? RDO NOUMEA pass to Comnavbassopac.
29 1755 COMINCH to CINCPAC CINCINNATI COMUSNAVFORTKNOX, COMUSWESPAC, etc.
Addressees promulgate following to extend commands need to know. Para. In event usage gas by enemy is suspected, Affirm. Make immediate dispatch report addressed for action to entire chain of command. Baker. Conduct immediate investigation on spot by qualified personnel. Cast. Make amplifying report confirmed or not confirmed. Dog. No not retaliate with gas until authorized by Cominch and Cast Nagat option. Use of toxic gas will not be initiated by any units sail commander. Undertake instruction and training to ensure that retaliation if authorized will be effective. In precaution against initiating use of gas under stress offensive materials are to be kept in ready reserve but not issued to combatant units. Buord will keep addresses advised regarding availability of materials. VCNQ has for action Comitch Marocs, Buord, Buara informed.

29 1811 COMSAPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSAPAC, WESPAC.
Answering Cominch 261230. Unless sterilizers more reliable than indicated by statements Doctor Michels, use of aircraft mines offensively this area subject same tactical drawbacks as mustard inland warfare. From Comspac, Action Cominch, Info CINCPAC, COMSAPAC. Basically propose use aircraft mines offensively first in passages much used by enemy traffic and in which later resulting menace to our forces is acceptable; second, as anvil to interdict enemy passage incident to specific attack. First of above dependent upon continuing adequate reconnaissance enemy traffic at his bases, which lack of aerial photo reconnaissance equipment this area has so far prevented. No suitable opening for second use has presented itself up to now. Unable get more specific until campaign features more clearly defined.

30 0841 COMSAPAC to CINCPAC. Info COMAMPHIBRCPAC, COMINCH, etc.
Urdis 270145. Comspac sends. Torpedoing of ALCUBA leaves Spac area with 4 AK's, 1 of which is under repair. Necessity for moving large quantities construction equipment and material to CACTUS and resulting from interruptions and damage by enemy action, results CACTUS food and ammunition supply critical. Even with temporary addition noncombat cargo vessels, several essential cargoes would still await transportation. No AK's can be spared without endangering CACTUS position. Further losses must be expected. All operable AP's except McCANLEY (SPOONER drydocking) are engaged transporting troops. McCANLEY essential as force flagship due adequacy radio installations. Following is schedule for emphibforspac ships. Affirm. JACKSON, ADAMS, CRESCENT CITY, (Continued)
loaded troops for CACTUS return trip evacuate troops first mardiv. If 6th Marines to CACTUS these ships occupied until January 25. Baker. NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BARNETT occupied transporting Americal Division and 9th Defense Battalion to CACTUS until December 20. Cast, FULLER under repair collision estimated ready December 25. Dog. ZEILLIN departs for West Coast about 1 December time of repair estimated 3 weeks. Easy. HUNTER LIGGETT enroute CACTUS with troops returning BUTTON about 10 December. AMERICAN LEGION to load 18th Construction Battalion for CACTUS to return BUTTON about December 15. Fox. MOGANLEY due WHITE POPPY about December 20. Additional movements anticipated are relief remainder First Mardiv, movement Army troops from WHITE POPPY and BLEACHER to CACTUS, movement Third Raiders from STRAW to BUTTON, training Sopac troops for amphibious operations. Providing movements mentioned in preceding sentence are postponed, estimate that transports can arrive SAN DIEGO on following dates. HUNTER LIGGETT on December 26. AMERICAN LEGION on January 1. NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BARNETT on January 8. FULLER and MOGANLEY on January 12. Four ships of Transdiv 2 on February 10.

01 0335 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, COMAMPHIBFOR SORPAC, etc.

Urals 00841. NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BARNETT designated for return Amphib-sorpac. Since KENMORE made available for trip to CACTUS assume this takes care of 9th Defense Battalion your item Baker. Therefore sail one of the 3 designated ships for SAN DIEGO now and the other two upon completion Item Baker to arrive about 8 January. Appreciate situation as regards freighters. When 2nd LIBERTY Class freighter arrives Sopac area transfer 1 combat loader to SAN DIEGO and when 3rd arrives send 2nd combat loader. In addition I will direct retention ZEILLIN en West Coast on completion repairs. Advise division organization desired by you. Ships which will remain Sopac including 3 enroute from ANACAPA and 10 liberties. Direct ships ordered SAN DIEGO leave all landing craft in Sopac area.

01 1321 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, OFF 62

Yesterday's activities comprised numerous patrols First Marines captured 6 machine guns on MAHULU killing 15. Patrol 164th Infantry killed 11 captured 70 mm gun. Marine Raiders on upper LUNA killed 25 captured 1 75 mm gun and 1 30 mm. Sopac reiterates 4 attack missions carried out by P-39's against ORANGE positions. 3 airplanes and 2 flying boats sighted KINATA BAY by morning search planes drew AA fire. 3 ships fire near KINATA 10 AK or AP 5 DD and possible CV FROM TURKISH evening 30th. Friendly tank force engaged with enemy near HAVO beginning 2300 love (11) 30th. Unidentified planes overhead CACTUS at 2300 love 30th and again CACTUS love 2 December. Comsopac Cemson Int Nav OFF 62 all info by noon.
01 0645 CINCPAC to COMINCH. Info CONSOPAC. CONWEPAC. CITY 2.

Lacking suitable target areas within reach there are no plans in immediate prospect for use of aircraft mines in central Pacific. This in reply your 261230. For all other areas including Sowesac am strongly of opinion that this weapon should be used without too much stress on probable failures of sterilizing features hampering our future actions. This view based on definite experience of British with favorable damage ratio of mines versus bombs even under admittedly different circumstances. We should harass the enemy with every conceivable means. Further of note is certainty that as Japs are driven from any locations now held by them we will encounter more mine opposition. Sweeping measures undertaken concurrently with offensives will therefore give some degree of protection against own mines previously laid.

30 0255 SAV GUADALCANAL to CONSOPAC Info CONMATSOPAC. CINCPAC. etc.

Construction of 1000 lineal feet more coral. 15,600 lineal feet taxiway 8000 lineal feet road. 37 plane revetments. Command post shelter. Ready room shelter. 87,200 lineal feet drainage ditch. Preparation of campsites. Installation gasoline tanks necessary to complete fighter 2 field. Construction of 4000 lineal feet of Marston mat. 29,350 lineal feet taxiway. 36 plane revetments 8000 lineal feet roads. Command post shelter. Ready room shelter. 67,000 lineal feet drainage ditch preparation of camp site. Installation gasoline tanks necessary to complete fighter 1 field. Reconstruction of 500 lineal feet Marston mat. Construction of 23,100 lineal feet taxiway. 41 plane revetments. Command post shelter. 50,200 lineal feet drainage ditch. 10,000 lineal feet road improvement. Air base office. Repair shop installation gasoline tanks. Necessary to complete bomber field. All of foregoing must be completed before prolonged rains estimated middle December if fields are to operate. No work started fighter 3 or KOLLINAVIA fields.

29 0110 CITY 2 to COMINCH. Info CINCPAC. TOFIVAY.

Taskforce commander has 25 each Mark XII Mod 1 and Mark XII minal mines at DUTCH HARNESS. No others enroute. Plan use Mark XII's against enemy shipping concentrations CHICHAGOF HARBOR, OXKRIFF BAY and Pass between SOUTH HEAD and LITTLE KIESKA, Mark XII-1's some purpose OLEZ BAY, MCDONALD COVE, Pass SOUTH HEAD to NORTH HEAD KIESKA and possible anchorages in SEMICHIS if more accurate charts received. Strong anti-aircraft installations KIESKA HARBOR prevent mining mission that area until these installations reduced by bombing or other means. The lack of shipping in KIESKA at present time also militates against use mines that location. Palloso mark XII's recent mine plants KAGALASKA STRAIT and OXAK PAPPS attributed strong ocean currents and 600 feet spacing. Believe sus-

(Continued)
29 0110 CTF 6 to COMINCH. Info CINCPAC, VJPNAV. (Continued)

rents reduced magnitude in areas planned for future use and revised directive for 1000 spacing will insure more successful performance by aerial mines. Pass Vice Opnav for info. Com-taskforce 8 originator. Cominich for action. Cincpac info added.
SECRET

September 1.

The damaged SARATOGA is enroute TONJATARI with two cruisers and seven destroyers, and will arrive there the 6th. Her power plant is uncertain and she can only make 10 knots. To enter the harbor she will probably need the HAYAJO and SEMINOLE, both of which are available to her. All her surviving planes except 6 VF, 9 VP, and 4 VT have been flown to the ROSES-BUTTON area for distribution. It seems probable that the sub which torpedoed the SARATOGA was sunk by the KONSBEN before it could get off a report of hitting.

With the ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA out of action for some time to come the Wasp and HORNET groups will have to remain in the ISLANDS-NEW CALEDONIA area indefinitely. The addition of the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA will greatly add to our strength in that area. Nevertheless, the Japs are capable of placing superior forces in the area.

Three Jap DDs landed troops and supplies about 20 miles east of our position on the north side of GUADALCANAL. It has not yet been learned how such operations can take place without satisfactory counter action on our part.

CTF-62 011237 pink joins other commanders there in a plea for more air in the GUADALCANAL area. Thus every major commander in the South Pacific and the Under Secretary of the Navy have urged that the flow of planes in adequate numbers be increased to that area. CinCPac 012331 urges specific types of Army planes and pilots to fly them.

In a letter to CominCh today CinCPac disapproves the use of carriers to support landings when they are vulnerable to enemy shore based air and when the job can be more properly done by our shore based air. The letter is designed to prevent the use of our carriers to cover landings in Task Two and Three.

ComCPac 020230 pink requests MacArthur to supply P-38s to the TULagi area. And his 020430 makes a further plea for aircraft reinforcements, particularly fighters.

C.G. CACTUS 012313 explains his fear of the enemy building up a large striking force by repeated small landings during darkness and recommends adequate search by aircraft and LSTs or MTBs and the 7th Marines as a striking force.

Submarines continue active in the South Pacific. One was seen off TULagi today.

In the ALEUTIANS CTF-0 reports that the HEID sank the RRo ãl and took prisoners from her.
The Jap forces thought northeast of the SULMONDS have not been sighted for several days. It seems possible that the IJNJO has returned to the Empire and that one J is enroute south to replace her. The recent occupation of CNEF and SAWI now seems a fait accompli. Apamana in the HELMETS was probably occupied today. Carlin Two is still indicated in some waters.

Jinjapac continued to keep the army here fully informed of the current developments.
SECRET

September 2.

ConsOpac 031434 gives a summary of operations for the day. The bombings on Cactus took place the day before. Evidently the HURCOWS went around a second time off TULAM and was hauled off by the SAMs. His C30-30 sink gives the employment of TF-17 while TF-15 is at Noumea for fuel and supplies. TF-17 arrives at Noumea tomorrow.

ConsOpac estimates that on August 24th local an enemy CV received a torpedo hit. Damage to other units is not clear.

ConsOpac 031141 justly praises the fine work of the Bougainville coast watcher in giving timely warning of an approaching air raid.

Cominch 031056 indicates that 60 P-38s in addition to other planes are enroute Pacific bases.

The JDN in Midway from patrol off Truk and Kavieng reports poor hunting both places.

Air reconnaissance of the Gilberts by the Japs continued today.

The J.D. at Fanning Island reports serious labor trouble and requests that the trouble makers be deported.

The Army reports 6 APs at Kiska, 2 of which are over 26,000 tons. This report by Alaskan G-3 stirred up the Commander Western Defense. CTF-9 doubts this report as does CinCPac. Steps are being taken by the Army to garrison the Pribilofs.

There is nothing significant about enemy moves.

September 3.

ConsOpac 041116 gives a summary for the day in his area. His 040300 indicates his plan to put the 7th Marines in GUAMALANAL and to put a battalion of Army troops on TREVANION Island (Santa Cruz).

Cominch 031213 does not give much encouragement for large development of raider battalions.

CTF 16 020337 comments favorably on the employment of the new RBS in the carrier task forces. The best place seems to have them down wind from the carrier.
SECRET

September 3. (Continued)

The TAYBOR reports sinking 22000 tons off TRUK.

There is further confirmation of the enemy occupation of OCEAN and MAURU Islands. This being the case, Jincpac will not attempt to send food to OCEAN Island.

As the Japs appear to be occupying TAHAWA Island in the GILBERTS, the ALBACORE, which was close by, was diverted to that place to take any appropriate action possible.

The first three transports have unloaded undetected at ADAK Island. At MAJAN Bay the CASCO is still aground and a salvage tug is enroute to assist. There is complete disagreement between the Army and the Navy concerning the activity at WAPA. An Army report of 270000 ton APs in that harbor is not believed by CTF 8.

Cardiv 2 is still indicated in home waters. All signs continue to point to an all out enemy attempt to recapture TULAGI and GUADALCANAL.

June 4.

Admiral Ghormley's 051156 summarizes the South Pacific situation.

The SOUTH DAKOTA will join Task Force 18 on the 8th.

So far in their operations in the South Pacific the combat and operational losses of PTs run 28% a month.

There is some fear by CTF 62 that the enemy will raid SAMOA tonight or tomorrow.

Jomsowestpaco requires replacements of ships lost in the TULAGI operation. This involves 1 CA and 3 DD. In addition he wants one destroyer division. These ships are requested to keep the lines open to NEW GUINEA.

To rectify landing mistakes made in the initial TULAGI landing, Comamphibious Forces 040610 plans an extensive rehearsal of a landing on September 13th.

CTF 8 042027 objects to the Army proposal to garrison the PRIBILOF Islands.

The Jap submarines continue to be active in the South Pacific. One was reported off TULAGI yesterday and one off BLAIBERK today.

A major move of Japanese units from the Empire to the South Pacific in the next few days is indicated. Cardiv 2 seems involved in the move.

1011
September 5, 1942.

CoSopac 06114C (pink) gives the summary of his operations for that day.

The 50TH SAILCCA group which included the JUTTLA and 3 DD were ordered to leave PLEASIBER today to rendezvous with Task Force 10 on the 8th. Then clearing the harbor the 50TH SAILCCA hit a pinnacle rock and will probably require drydocking.

The SAILCCA group arrived at PLEASIBER (CSP-11 CSP2016). Then necessary repairs are made and certain stores and stores are unloaded to be left there that ship will proceed to Pearl with 1 DD 1 CI and 5 DD as escort. CoSopac plans to send Vice Admiral Fletcher north with the SAILCCA and make Rear Admiral Hoyes CornAuf 01.

The WASHINGTON and 3 DDs will arrive at PLEASIBER Sept. 13. It now appears that each Task Force 17 and 18 will have a new DD with them by around the 17th of September.

Regarding General SAILCCA 70TH reports another small unit. It is probable that these will continue.

The flurry caused by a report of 77's off SAILCCA yesterday was found to be the result of an error.

CinCPAC 052005 reminds CornAuf 01 that the 77's are now at Pearl to break up any attempted enemy landing in the Hawaiian area. It is now probable that Task Force 1 will remain at Pearl during September.

The FLYING FISH on patrol off TAIK was damaged by depth charges and is returning to Pearl. She reports hitting a 31 and setting it on fire.

CornAuf 01 052130 advises against the occupation of TAIK at the same time that the move is being made to TAIK, he suggests that when air support is available from FAA the TAIK occupation will be much simplified. Insofar as escort is concerned, CinCPAC concurs with CornAuf 01 that the Ft. Stiloffs should not be garrisoned at this time.

There is indication that at least five Jap carriers are in range to the F באק area. This, together with the continued evidence of large reinforcements to the area point to a major effort to recapture positions in the F באק area. Activity in the F באק area continues. It now seems probable that most of that group are now or will be occupied by the 7th. CornAuf 01 suspects mining in the F באק area. No mines have been encountered there.
SECRET

September 6th.

Comopac 050626 expresses his desire for more Marine Raiders. The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion left PEARL today for the South Pacific.

Cominch 061720 pink approves the project to garrison the Pribilofs and to delay the occupation of Tulagi.

CTF 8 feels that he has been given orders by General DeWitt to provide escort to the Pribilofs and register a protest to Cominco. He had not yet received the directive above from Cominco. Thus, a few hours delay on the part of TEF 8 would have cleared up the matter and made his protest unnecessary. Army - Navy command relations in the North Pacific are not good.

Admiral Mitscher left PEARL for San Francisco to confer with Admiral King. Developments in all areas since his departure are summarized in CinPac 07236 pink.

There are no new enemy developments.

September 7th.

The day was generally very quiet. Comopac 051140 pink summarizes operations that area. The transports were ordered to return to Tube Canal at daylight.

450 Jap prisoners from the GLCBOSS will arrive in NZE Zealand on the 11th. That Government will accept and be responsible for any prisoners we deliver to them during the current offensive.

Comopac 072200 gives plans for the employment of units 1 and 13.

The SOUTH DAKOTA will come to Pearl with the 3AAROs, HKT 413 and 3 destroyers.

3rd Alaska 062210 states that he will defer the garrison of the Pribilofs. Admiral Theobald strenuously objects to the plan as he considers it strategically unsound.

Fairly good information states that the Japs plan to attack India at the end of the present monsoon season and that the MILNE BAY occupation is the first step in the attack on Australia.

The Japs are now concentrating nearly all of their sea-going forces for the expected attempt to recapture their positions in the Tulagi area.

1013
CONFERENCE NOTES

September 9, 1945

1. Recapitulation of forces at the disposal of ComSoPac made. Verification requested of ComSoPac.

2. Comments on employment of forces by ComSoPac:
   (a) Calculated risks.
   (b) Operations not closely knit.
   (c) Refueling accomplished at inopportune times.
   (d) Delay in setting up TF 66.
   (e) Surprise attack should not have been possible.
   (f) Distribution of Flag Officers.
   (g) Disadvantages of mixed forces.

3. Discussion of the use of New Zealand troops, etc., also replacement of squadrons under MacArthur and his refusal to permit. Effect of Lend-Lease arrangements to be felt shortly. The goal is to have all American equipment in Australia and New Zealand. CominCh related his efforts to get Venturas and explained the situation regarding air craft service units, namely that New Zealand has surplus units and Australia has none. Plan is to make surplus units available to Chormley. Australia is short of air fields and facilities. The saturation point must be maintained.

4. Comment on use of Capehoo to supply planes.
5. Comments on Andini force -- 7th Regiment.

6. CinCPac to prepare Press Release covering Brown's 60-day cruise and Fletcher's 101-day cruise. Fuelling arrangements to be soft-pedalled.

7. Discussion of material condition of ships and their overhaul. CominCh expressed the view that routine overhaul should be abolished as it is a peace time practice. Overhauls during War should be made only when necessary.

8. NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON permanently in the Pacific Fleet. SOUTH DAKOTA is in a different status. Discussion of employment of new BB's -- one more to go to Pacific Fleet as soon as available.


10. CominCh spoke of the DE building program and discussed the characteristics of DE's. (F-2 to submit memo to Admiral on the question of whether or not the Army 90/39 gun can be adapted to ship board use.


- 2 -
11. Capabilities of cruisers. Relative advantages of large versus small cruisers.

12. Change of membership of General Board and affect thereof.

FOLLOWING POINTS BROUGHT UP BY REAR ADMIRAL JACOBS:

13. CinCPac to check on salvage personnel.

14. Survivors of ships should not be sent to shore bases. Instead they should go to new construction. (This is being done).

15. Aviation under new organisation "ComAirPac" - orders to aeronautical organisation. (P-05 to check on title "Commander U.S. Naval Air Forces".


17. Relief for Anderson. Are four Admirals necessary in TF 1?

CinCPac says "No".

18. Fitness reports to be more descriptive of the duties performed by officers reported upon.

19. Is ComDesPac freezing his personnel? Answer: Temporarily only; matter is now in hand.


21. Cut down passengers going to Pearl Harbor by Clipper.

Space needed for mail.
23. Recuperation Center for Flag Officers in Hawaii.

24. Employment of negro personnel — will do well in Africa.

(Here Admiral Jacobas has no more items.)

25. As a matter of policy, Flag Officers are not to take their staffs with them when transferred.

26. Repairs to California: Electrical material delayed. Predicted date of completion October 1st. WEST VIRGINIA had seven torpedo hits. Completion depends on repairs to rudder post, about January 1st. Will not require further docking until that time. Oglala goes to coast to be refitted as a mine layer. OKLAHOMA will be righted in November, followed by the UTAH. Guns and powder being removed from ARIZONA.

27. (Admiral Halsey now present.) Discussion of aircraft, Fleet air wings, groups, etc.

28. Establishment of new air fields and facilities. Why not use Army fields where arrangements can be made? Discussion of training program for 37000 planes — all hands need not be trained simultaneously.

29. Priority of repair work at Seattle. Should it be given to AVO's in preference to NB's?
CONFERENCE NOTES

SECRET  September 8, 1942

1. Dispatch sent to Ghormley telling him to get ready one regiment of Marines (three combat teams) and stand by to transfer them to MacArthur along with one Division of combat loaded transports and attached

AK. Admiral King remarked that Task 2 and 3 go out the window.

2. General DeWitt to be told that Army troops used in occupying various islands in the Aleutians must be under Navy control.

3. Vice Admiral Fletcher, now en route to Pearl, is to come to Washington, reporting to CominCh for temporary duty for about one month. Halsey to take over ENTERPRISE group.

4. The Fleet Air Command at Seattle was discussed. CinCPac stated that the job was important chiefly because of the reported delays in the manning, commissioning, and fitting out of AVG's. (This question solved temporarily by issuing orders to Captain Ginder to report to Com 15 for additional duty in this connection.) Admiral Freeman notified by telephone.

5. In connection with the Seattle Command, the status of Naval Air Centers and Naval Air Training Centers was discussed with particular reference to whether or not they should be commanded by Flag Officers.

Incident to the Seattle situation, CominCh announced that aviators must be qualified for advancement in these cases and that they were to be promoted to fill billets only. Methods of determining who should be promoted were also explained.

- 1 -
6. Personnel items:
(a) CominCh inquired as to whether or not Hoover could be usefully employed in the Pacific Fleet. CinCPac replied "No billet at present". CominCh said he brought up the matter at this time merely for possible accomplishment at an undetermined date.
(b) Assignment of Fletcher. Probability of various jobs in Washington for him was discussed.
(c) Bernhard or McWhorter could relieve Hoover, and Buckmaster could be used to fill in where needed.
(d) Status of Mason, Ramsey, Hogan, and Wagner touched upon; also rotation of Flag Officers in general.

7. CominCh related his efforts to reorganize the Navy Department and explained the present situation in that respect.

8. To be taken up upon return to Washington:
Should the supervision of the making ready of AVG's be exercised at CominCh Headquarters?

9. CinCPac dwelt on the method of providing escorts in the Pacific Fleet, also whether or not Leary's request for more ships should be acted upon at this time. Decision made to do nothing about the despatch request but instead, Charley to lend them as a cover, forces...

See para 1 above.
10. CominCh discussed prospective additions to the Fleet and stated his opposition to overhauls in Australia. He also spoke of the effect of Second Front operations and the small boat building program. In connection therewith, CominCh spoke of the functions of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, their position with respect to priorities, and how they work. CominCh also explained Mr. Nelson's position as compared to General Sommerville's. Expansion of the Army has resulted in surpluses in non-critical materials. These surpluses ought to be used. (Also, Army fighters planes located in various parts of the Country).

11. The formation of Task Force 64 was reviewed. Admiral King remarked that it was about one month late.

12. Consideration given to the possibility of Vice Admiral Ghormley being unable to stand up physically. Possible reliefs for him were mentioned. CinCPac stated that he preferred Turner. (Subsequently, CinCPac stated that he would check up on Vice Admiral Ghormley's physical examination and notify CominCh of the results.)

13. Tulagi operations - Criticisms of:

(a) Day dispositions all right; night dispositions look bad. Was the best use made of the forces available, particularly Flag Officers; that is, why were they absent from both groups? And why was not consideration given to the question of fatigue?
(b) When Turner retired to Ghormley, Vandergriff left to hold out by himself.

(c) Was the surprise attack a result of inefficiency, and why were not means taken to prevent Jap forces from getting in?

(d) Tactical dispositions discussed by CinCPac. Captain McCormick stated that the delayed despatch made no difference, that is, it was received in time to be acted upon.

(e) Over-all responsibility was Ghormley's; immediate responsibility was Turner's; final judgment to be left until receipt of completed reports. (At this point Major General Upshur called, followed by General DeWitt).

16. (Vice Admirals Halsey and Greenslade present.) Vice Admirals Halsey and Greenslade explained the situation at the Supply Depot at Oakland. Despatch sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to send a personal representative to clear the log jam there. CominCh agreed that this would not solve the problem permanently.

18. Vice Admiral Halsey spoke of the situation with respect to AVG's in Seattle. (This point previously covered.)
16. Vice Admiral Halsey suggested that the Commander of the Fleet Air Detachment at Alameda be given quarters. This proposal met with an emphatic negative. Short discussion relative to status of Fleet Air Detachments.

17. Additional comment with respect to the Supply situation, with reference to the possible establishment of more subordinate commands. Decision made that Commander Service Force could have representatives at Seattle, San Diego, Washington, and perhaps elsewhere, but that these representatives could not build up an organization.

18. Should material be assembled at Auckland or Blenhein? CinCPac remarked that this question is academic at this time because material is being sent to the place where it is used as fast as is possible. McCain's proposal touched upon. Captain McCormick read letter from Rear Admiral Turner to Rear Admiral Spruance.

19. Should submarine type Commanders and their staffs draw submarine pay? CominCh read memo on this subject. Decision made to recommend yes, if the new law leaves it up to the Secretary of the Navy, otherwise this question to be answered in the negative. In other words, if the new law merely increases the figure and says nothing about any other change in the prior law, the same personnel now drawing this pay, and no others, will draw it.

20. CominCh remarked on the necessity of freezing certain people
in their jobs for the duration of the war, such as Intelligence, Aviation, Submarine, and Communication jobs. As food for thought, CominCh mentioned the possibility of establishing "Services", the idea being to detail officers in and out of these "Services". CominCh went on to explain the uses of radio intelligence and stated that it is essentially a communications matter and not a proper function of ONI. Copy of the treatise prepared by the Ensign in Redman's office to be given CinCPac and CinCLant.

21. Upon return to Washington take up with the Army, in connection with their route to the Southwest Pacific, what do if Canton Island is knocked out?

FOLLOWING ITEMS BROUGHT UP BY CINCPAC:

22. MacArthur's discussion of Tulagi's operations.

23. Rear Admiral Byrd's letter regarding Ghormley and MacArthur and Task 2 and 5.

24. MacArthur's release of news. It is obvious that the information he releases is obtained only from Secret despatches.

25. Assignment of submarines in the Pacific. (Covered yesterday and now fully understood by CinCPac).

26. Pitch to be ComAirPac; Halsey to be TF Commander. (Also covered yesterday.)

27. Releases of war news. CinCPac states that he is bedeviled by reporters. Wishes Elmer Davis to know that he assumes release of war news to the Press means release to the enemy. CominCh replied that he fought that battle at least once a day.
28. Should there be a Civil Engineer on CinCPac's Staff?
Answer: No need for one now, but possibly later. Thomas already given additional duty as such at request of Moreell.

29. Fraser wants a Liaison officer with New Zealand forces and Ghormley. New Zealand man is a Lieutenant General. CominCh replied that the matter is up to Ghormley. Short discussion as to wartime functions of Liaison officer.

30. Army reinforcements to SoPac and SoMPac. Fourteen Squadrons earmarked. (Note: General DeWitt says assignment of 37 medium bombers to Western Defense Command has been cancelled.)

31. Upon return to Washington: Take up with the Army the proposition of putting at the disposal of CinCPac another Army Division for amphibian training to replace the Third. This division would go to the Amphibious Force Pacific. CinCPac has no more items.

32. CominCh discussed raider battalions, also the situation in the Marine Corps in general and disposition and distribution.

33. Land based planes are to go to CinCPac. CinCPac notified that there are no more restrictions on the type of plane considered necessary. B-17's are all right.

34. Should mining operations be undertaken in the Aleutians?
Theobald has proposed, CinCPac is opposed, but is investigating. Should the mining be done by submarine? Answer: Supply of torpedoes is a factor.
35. CinCPac has been requested by Ghormley and others to set up an Airplane replacement program. As all available planes will be sent, there is nothing to plan at this time.

36. The question of whether or not Fulorum should be major airplane repair base was brought up. Not feasible at this time.

37. Brief discussion of the characteristics of P-400's and the best way to employ them.

38. Prospective battle damage repairs to be effected. CinCPac gave approximate dates.

39. Upon return to Washington: P-1 follow up day by day the forwarding of material to repair the ENTERPRISE.

40. Kaneohe projects: CinCPac furnished a letter. F-33 comment to P-0.

41. Ways and means to get the Army to bomb from lower altitude. Upon return to Washington request Army Air Force Headquarters to furnish a digest of High Level Bombing Instructions. When received, send copy to CinCPac and circulate to all other forces with Army units and cooperation.

42. Forwarding of casualty lists - classification thereof to be Secret. (Also other routine lists).

43. CinCPac to furnish Cominoh tomorrow with complete list of forces at the disposal of ComSoPac.
44. CominCh remarked that in effecting battle damage repairs, bringing ships to the West Coast, thereby permitting contact with families, is a factor. Puget Sound now filled up. The question of where to overhaul the PENNSYLVANIA recently arose. The Pearl Harbor gang is excellent.

45. CominCh told CinCPac that loss of cruisers is off-set by one extra BR. Short discussion followed in regard to other BR's, the WICHITA TUSCALOOSA, and TUSCALOOSA, also as to how many cruisers Theobald should have. Decision made to make no changes until the weather gets bad. CominCh assured CinCPac that he would have more tools as soon as they became available.

46. CominCh inquired as to how Dunn's organisation is working. CinCPac replied that it is working all right but that he has too many people, namely, 15 officers and 28 men. Can Navy Yards be trusted to look out for the interests of the sea going forces? Answer: No. Similar situation existing between Fleet Maintenance in OpNav and BuShips illustrates that the technical people and the sea going people do not talk the same language.
SECRET

September 7, 1942.

1. Shift of Aviation Flight Commands discussed. Decision made that Towers should be relieved by McCain, the former to become ComAirPac with rank of Vice Admiral. Fitch to relieve McCain. Halsey to be Task Force Commander, retaining his rank of Vice Admiral but to be subordinate to Ghormley.

2. Command relations in the Aleutians were discussed. Incidents included Theobald's report against Buckner and the reliefs of both Buckner and Butler. In this connection, Admiral King read a letter from Vice Admiral Freeman who recently made a tour of inspection. The gist of the letter is that bad feeling exists because of bombing limitations placed on Army aviators, which has resulted in the lack of effective Army air support. Vice Admiral Freeman recommends complete support of Theobald. Despatch, originated by CinoPac, sent to Theobald to the effect that the J.C.S. directive is interpreted by him and CominCh to give him the authority he desires with respect to the Pribolofs.

3. Admiral Nimitz discussed the Alutian situation in general and some points of it in particular, namely the occupation of Kiska and what should be done about it, also the Adak move. Admiral Nimitz does not feel that the occupation of the Pribolofs by the Japs would be profitable, hence does not believe they will undertake it.

4. Admiral King read a letter covering reassignment of submarines in the Pacific Fleet. This covered the transfer of SubDiv 53 to

SECRET
CinOLant. Various Second Front operations discussed. SubDiv 201 can go to ComSoPac.

5. Admiral Nimitz stated that the docking situation at Pearl has improved tremendously - special credit due Salvage Party.

6. Personnel items:
   (a) Monroe to relieve Anderson (not decided).
   (b) Should Anderson relieve Holmes?
   (c) Who should relieve Newton? Hewitt a possibility.
   (d) Should Anderson become Com Eleven?
   (e) Discussion regarding casualties following 58 year old physical examination.

7. Authority for ComSoPac to make awards on the spot.

8. It was agreed that it would be desirable to change the boundary line between ComSoPac and ComSOWPac to give Ghormley more freedom, but the decision was made not to do it because of possible complications arising from certain protests from General MacArthur.

9. Admiral King discussed the Commands in the SOWPac Force. Also explained the duties to be performed by Vice Admiral Willson.

10. Admiral King explained Admiral Leahy's duties as Chief of Staff to the President.

11. Admiral Nimitz brought up the question of employment of battleships of Task Force 1. Gave Admiral King a copy of his despatch to ComTask Force 1 on this subject.
12. Admiral Nimitz announced that the development of Midway field has progressed satisfactorily. He also stated that B-17's are now operating from Johnson Island. Be sure to tell Admiral Bloch.

13. Admiral King brought up the subject of Canton Island in connection with the possibility of using it as a development of an alternate route - Morea - Tongatabu.

14. The details of the Makin raid were related by Admiral Nimitz. The captured sword (with blood still on it) goes to the Naval Academy Museum. The captured machine gun to the Marine Corps Museum. In this connection Admiral King stated that a Third Raider Battalion will be formed in the South Pacific, the nucleus to be men taken from the first and second Raider Battalions. Admiral Nimitz stated that he had recently given orders to round up the Marines in the 16th District who were not doing a man's work to form such a nucleus. Admiral King questioned their suitability to which Admiral Nimitz replied that they could be used to replace those who were suitable. Admiral King said there would be a fourth after a while.

15. The Under Secretary having made some comment about the supply situation, and having intimated that it might be desirable to have another agency in Washington, it was decided that Admiral Calhoun should have a representative in the Navy Department to act in the same capacity that Captain Bacon does for the Atlantic Fleet. Admiral King remarked that the supply situation in general is a matter for the
Paymaster General, who, although not formally designated as such, acts in the capacity of Fleet Supply Officer.

16. Complications in the Command relations under General MacArthur together with his compliance with the directive he received; Items under the foregoing were the failure of General Brett to get along, and speculation as to what Kenny will be able to do in that capacity. In this connection, the employment of New Zealand ships and troops and a question of who was responsible for the local defense of New Zealand was touched upon. Also, what information is due the New Zealand Government and to what official should it be given.

17. Captain McCormick read a letter from CimoPac to CominCh dated September 2nd on the subject of prospective employment of carriers. Copy of the letter delivered to CominCh.

18. Revision of Tasks 2 and 3 Tulagi operations to be made. Admiral King explained how these tasks were originally decided upon and what the various considerations were, including the part played by the J.C.S.

19. Distinction drawn between communiques and press releases. Admiral Nimitz is to issue communiques but if he feels a press release is desirable it should be submitted to Admiral King.

20. General UpShur has appointment at 10:45 followed by General Dewitt at 11:00.
September 2.

General GHQ 081254 gives the plan for employment of New Zealand forces in the war.

General GHQ 081254 pink summarizes the Army airplanes in and presently on route to the Pacific Ocean Areas. He states that all these planes are under control of Admiral Halsey.

Singapore 081250 directs Seapac to move ready to turn over rear of expected amphibious troops and 1 division of AIs to MacArthur.

General GHQ 081254 believes that MacArthur has a squadron of P-40s which are not being used for combat and suggests Seapac get them.

Investigation shows that the entrance to Bleacher is safe for the WASHINGTON. The 5 fathom coral head which the SOUTH PAPUA hit has been buoyed. The SPICE is not needed now to clear out the entrance.

Consorsac 091014C summarizes the operations for the day in his area.

The SULACON can now go ahead on 4 shafts and back on 3.

Headquarters Marines 081005C is planning a replacement program for the South Pacific.

Task forces 17 and 19 will join under Admiral Hayes on September 11th just east of the New Hebrides.

The PONPARK returning from off Japan reports sinking 1 AK, 1 DD, 1 PY.

In the north a submarine was reported at SIHIA and another off DIXON. General DeWitt stated that his report concerning the capture of the Pribilofs was not a directive to Admiral Theobald. The incident could and should have been avoided. A submarine on patrol sighted two destroyers at ATU.

The Japanese continue to build up forces in the South Pacific. There are indications that the 17th army left Truk yesterday for Balicalan. The APs are escorted by 35s only. If this be true that army can attack Balicalan as early as September 13th.
SECRET

September 9th.

Commsopac 091016 and 091016 plus 100255 all pink give the new operating plan for the South Pacific Forces. It will be put in effect by despatch, presumably on the eleventh.

There were no contacts in the South Pacific area yesterday and all forces are busily engaged in strengthening positions. The landing field at CAPTUS is inoperative today (Comamsopac 091215).

At least 1000 Japs are estimated to have landed on NW GUADALCANAL (C.G. 1st Marine Division 079935). Thus about 2000 have been landed on that island recently. The second group is in the vicinity of TAIYO.

Jominch 082030 says that the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion will be formed at SANGA.

The ENTERPRISE will arrive at PEARL for repairs tomorrow. The SARAOGA group, which includes the SOUTH DAKOTA, will fuel at BLESHER tomorrow and depart immediately thereafter for PEARL. That carrier believes she can make an engine speed of 15 knots for the trip.

TPI continues training at PEARL. The force is constantly ready to break up any attempted enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN area.

Soomowestseafron 100262 gives the progress of the FIREPLACE operation. The ALEUTIANS are otherwise quiet.

September 10th

The operations for the day in the South Pacific are summarized in his 111320 (pink).

Because of the serious situation which now confronts Admiral Ghormley and because he needs the 7th Marines now at GUADALCANAL, he plans to make the 7th Marines available to General MacArthur when ordered to do so by CinCPac. That regiment will not be ready until October 1st (Commsopac 110410 (pink)).

Admiral Ghormley's 10115C (pink) stresses the need for more VPs. And his 101152 gives the organization of the South Pacific Force as of September 11th.

(continued on next page)
S L I C H E T

September 10th (continued):

Admiral Turner (100722) suggests that Pacific Fleet submarines not be employed off the eastern NEW GUINEA coast. In this connection, the only submarine now immediately available was offered to General MacArthur for patrol off NEW GUINEA Island. The offer was not accepted as General Turner is employing all our submarines in the westward of the SOLOMONS.

There was no news from the ARCTIC'S.

The ENTERPRISE group arrived at Pearl. The SARATOGA group should depart ENTERPRISE today.

Task Force 1 departs tomorrow for four days training off Culebra.

There is some evidence that the forces for the counter attack on IOWA JALUL are now approaching that area. If our information is correct, they can be expected to arrive there in great strength. There is no indication of prospective air effort in any place except the South and Southwest Pacific.

September 11.

CinCPac 120315 (pink) states that sending the 4th Marines to reinforce General MacArthur is the best that can be done under the circumstances.

HALIFAX 120530 (pink). Admiral Turner agrees with General Vandegrift that HALIFAX must have at least one more regiment for defense. Admiral Turner proposes to send the 7th Marines to that place from ESPIRITU SAINTO on the 14th, reverting the move with all task forces. This 120300 (pink) gives status of the 7th Marines and stresses need for troops to bring the Southeast ASIATICS under firm control.

ComSanpac 121241 summarizes the operations for the day. The enemy carrier and one enemy cruiser were sighted by our patrol plane during the afternoon in lat 7°30'S, long 165°33'E. This group was probably seen further South later in the afternoon. A flight of 10 T-1s were ordered to attack, but have not yet reported results. During the night at least one cruiser and four destroyers shelled the Marines on HALIFAX.

Admiral Hinte returned from his conference with Admiral King in San Francisco. It seems very difficult to interest the Army in the war in the Pacific. Cominch 118002 gives the status of one Army regiment of the 43rd Division. It can be expected to be ready to leave the West Coast early next month.

1033
SECRET

September 11th (Continued)

The NAFO ship reports sinking of 5,000 tons of enemy subs after their departure.

In his 170100 (pink), Commander reports progress in the airfield operation. The navy reports a short way to take an airfield by Graham's Siver Creek. The field is 8,000 feet long and 500 feet wide. A B-24 landed there to-day. It was reported that the construction of this field would take months. In his 170100 he gave his escort plan for thearrison in of the 32nd Corps.

CinCPac has a proved a plan for quite extensive defensive mining at ARAK.

The enemy continues to assemble his forces for air attack on SALAI. There are indications that paratroops will be employed in an effort to capture the airfield. There is no new evidence of changes in the Jap deployments.

September 12th.

There continues to be considerable enemy surface and air activity in the central and southern SOLRON. During the afternoon a patrol plane sighted a good sized group of enemy cruisers and destroyers about 200 miles northeast of SALAI. SALAI was shelled again last night by at least one cruiser and two destroyers. The situation at that place is shown in your admiral Turner's 170100. A major attack on SALAI is to be expected in the near future.

The plan to land the 7th Marines on SALAI, dawn Sept. 16th, has been approved by Cominch and CinCPac. (Cominch 170100 (pink) gives the general directive).

The first 425TH is now enroute the South Pacific and the second should leave the West Coast September 17th.

The ALLIANCE were generally quiet.

Further enemy activity in the PUSKATA is noted.

Radio intelligence indicates that Carlin 2 is still in home waters. The SIEGRAF and ONAUKO are still unheard. It is still uncertain as to whether or not the HYUG was badly damaged and possibly sunk on August 24th. CinC Combined Fleet continues to show much interest in the SOLRON situation.
September 13,

During the late morning our search planes discovered two enemy forces in the area to the eastward of the Solomons. One force was composed of three ships, four cruisers, four AA, one transport heading southeast. When last seen, the force was on a northerly course. 14 S-18s attacked and claimed hits. The second force was located about 120 miles north of the first group, and contained 1 CV, cruisers, and DDs.

For the past two days the Japs have been attacking the Marines on HOKUALOA from the rear and flank. The attacks were repulsed, enemy dead over 100 to our 1. It is believed that the enemy will attempt to surround the Marines and try to capture the airfield. An enemy landing craft was repulsed.

Due to approaching hostile forces our transports and tenders were withdrawn to the south.

Rear Admiral Turner's plan to land the 7th Marines (CTP-63 140133 pink) may be delayed because of the enemy ships sighted during the day.

Consopac 120544 again comments on the fact that P-40s are of little use to him. Consopac desires about 12 F4U's from Hawaii at this time. These will be sent. Eventually, when they can be handled in the south, about 15 more will be sent from Hawaii.

Twenty fleet subs and two tenders will be maintained at present in the Southwest Pacific. The S-boats now there will be withdrawn.

In the ALEUTIANS a sub was reported off Kiska Island. The CASCO has been refloated and will be towed to Dutch Harbor.

The enemy continues to assemble large forces of all kinds for attack in the South Pacific. At least five CVs and four AA may now be in the HOKUALOA-SOLOMON area. The Japs seem to be concentrating almost everything they have except their battleships in that area. A small force is now landing in the Gilberts. TARAWA may be the first landing point. It is probably the best place in that island group.
SEPTEMBER 14TH.

TF 61 composed of the WASP and HORNET groups under Rear Admiral Noyes was proceeding to the westward, speed 17, to rendezvous with TF 64 and 65 (7th Marines in APs and escort under Rear Admiral Turner). The carrier groups had been ordered to cover the landing of the 7th Marines to reinforce our position on GUAM. At 1440 local 15th the WASP was torpedoed. Twelve minutes later the NORTH CAROLINA received one torpedo hit. Rear Admiral Scott 141755 sent and "TF 17 150929" sank described the action and gave future moves. The torpedoing was certainly done by one or more submarines and the subs are indicated as having reported results by radio.

Commsacs 141350 sink summarizes the operations for the 14th. Much of this has been recorded before.

C.G. Marines 1st Div 141045 gives the details of fighting on the 13th and 14th. Wasp 150225 amplifies the first report and goes on to say that after severe fighting his position continues to be satisfactory. If the disaster to TF 61 does not change our plans, the 7th Marines will be landed tomorrow in the vicinity of the UPHSA river. A group of 7 enemy subs was heading toward GUAM in the afternoon and it seems probable that they will land reinforcements there tonight. It must be recorded that our surface forces in the South Pacific have done nothing the past 30 days to prevent or intercept these night landings and shellings of Marine positions.

Commsacs 142247. It is planned to send one tender and six fleet submarines to operate under Vice Admiral Halsey. The message also requests part of General MacArthur's area for submarine operations.

The WASHINGTON group leaves LUSUMA today for the active area.

TF 1 returned to Pearl from a training cruise south of CAULI.

There was a possible submarine sighting off the FORALLS.

Rear Admiral Wright will relieve Rear Admiral Noyes as Comairsonac. Vice Admiral Leary will relieve Vice Admiral Oue as CTF 1. He may also relieve Rear Admiral Anderson as Combatant.

The GROWLER returning from patrol reports sinking 20,000 tons and damaging 6000 tons.
September 14 (Continued)

In the ALLIANCE photo reconnaissance shows 4 SS, 3 AK at EMBA and 1 SS, 1 DD and BS at KMSI. JMT 1-30-29 gives his views concerning the strategic location of airfields and the need for Army troops in the South Pacific.

At least 12 enemy submarines are operating in the GULF area as advance screen and attacking ships for the enemy surface forces thought to be in the GULF area. While enemy strength in that general area cannot be stated accurately, it is possible that major units include as many as 5 CV's and 3 BS. The STARK may be in the GULF area.

September 15th.

Comsopac 161220R pink summarizes operations for the day. The need for 4 ships at GUADALCANAAL is acute and the TELLITAX will be sent there tomorrow to supply this need. Comsopac 160900 gives his estimate that the next two days are favorable for unloading stores, etc., in the GUADALCANAAL - TULAGI area. Because of the threatening situation Rear Adm. Eder did not bring in the 7th Marines for the planned reinforcement of the 9th Marines.

TF 17 and units of TF 18 were combined to rendezvous September 17 (local) and will operate to westward of the longitude of TF 17 and within 200 miles of that base awaiting further developments. Cruisers and DDs of TF 18 arrived at NORMANDY SANTO where they will land hospital cases, then proceed to NORMANDY.

General MacArthur sees many difficulties in Pacific fleet subs operating in his area. If any go there he would desire operational control. The plan to send one tender and 6 SS to Comsopac is thus held in abeyance for further study. The AKILAAX has been moved from patrol of KAVIENG to the north and east of the KUGAIVILLE STRAIT area.

Our submarine on patrol in lat 24-25 N, long 139-01 E sighted an enemy CV escorted by 2 DD.

Comsubpac proposes and Cinopac approves the conversion of the ARGONAUT to a troop carrying submarine (Comsubpac 150144).

The TURFLEPHER in the CHINA SEA reports sinking a 10,000 ton passenger freighter and a 19,000 ton tanker.

In the ALBANIAN the Army air made a very successful air raid on HICKA (CTF 8 151905). Thus the new airfield at ARAY has started to pay dividends.

It now appears that Cardiv 2 (NITAKA and HAYATAKA included) have left home waters for the South Pacific. There are no other important enemy moves.
Convoque L7120 #1 sunk summarizes the day in the South Pacific. The 7TH MAZUWA is not seriously damaged. "WASHINGTON' (BB-58) will arrive at "OAHU" the 19th, local date, when temporary repairs are completed she will sail for Pearl.

The 5TH MAZUWA are expected to arrive at "OAHU" later tonight. Reports of large numbers of enemy vessels, mostly destroyers and auxiliaries, continue to be received in a reconnaissance zone over the central and north 320000\%

There is continued minor enemy activity in the ill-defined because of this concentration, will be able to establish a landing field in the IWO JIMA islands.

The "U.S.S. CRYSTAL" grounded at "OAHU" when steering north in the lagoon.

TF-1 continues training in the CAN area and remains ready to assume an enemy landing in the Kaneohe area.

A PHY on patrol from "KALIKI" was attacked by a "TBD" with two twin engine planes 440 miles south of "OAHU." No damage was done to either plane.

Johnson proposed to convert TF-1 for TF-7. If TF-7 does not go, replacements would come from the Pacific Fleet.

There is nothing new concerning enemy bases. Interest of the enemy continues to be centered in the South Pacific. As long as this continues there seems little chance of an attack on the "KALIKI" area.

General Homma was yesterday to Hawaii to report on current situation at a conference held by General MacArthur.

General Homma just returned from a visit in the South and Southwest Pacific. He had a long talk with General MacArthur the gist of which was that (1) our "KALIKI" can be taken by the Japs any time they are ready, (2) he thinks our positions in the Hawaiian area are very precarious, and (3) as soon as the Japs clear us out of the "OAHU" they will attack "KALIKI."
SECRET

September 17th.

Comopac 181231 pink summarizes operations in his area for the day. The 3-17 attacks and the 3W attacks were particularly ineffective. The NORTH CAROLINA is not badly damaged, as noted before. She was examined at BLENHEIM and the captain reports her ready for further active service but with speed reduced to 24 knots. The O'BRIEN was examined at ESPIRITO SANTO and is badly damaged. She will be escorted to NOUMEA. The loss of the SAP is briefly described in Comopac 181140 pink.

The enemy radio at GUADALCANAL reported the arrival of Ty 64 and 65. About midnight surface forces arrived and bombarded the marine position. Presumably our surface forces had departed shortly after dark. The unloading of fuel, food, and other needed material in this area is severely handicapped by enemy activity. At present the only solution seems to keep our ships away during darkness and to get them underway when day air attacks are reported coming in. And until a better solution is found our situation will continue unsatisfactory.

The HADDON returning from patrol in the East China Sea reports sinking 26,000 tons of freighters.

The landing mat on SAM ISLAND, KELSFORD, is now ready for emergency use.

The Central and North Pacific areas are generally quiet.

The ESPERANZA left SAMIL today with fighter and dive bomber replacements for Comac. She is also transporting personnel for Patwing GCO. Vice Admiral Chormley will be given authority to retain her there as a carrier, otherwise to return her to SAMIL.

No changes in Jan deployment are noted. The inability to "read the mail" leaves us in the dark. We can guess, but are never sure.
September 12th.

The Pacific Ocean areas are receiving quite a bit of the landings of the 158th Division at Port Moresby 7000 troops there. The only problem is that the 158th Division area now is to build up the airport, so that supplies can move out alright.

The arrival Army control in New Guinea is another fascinating bit of the situation here. The Japanese seem to have little enthusiasm for building up even in New Guinea who can probably somewhere at the southeast airfield.

The 30TH DIV. is now reported able to make up to 65 knots and has been ordered to the E.I.

Seminak 120,000/library gives General Larrabee's present estimate and wants to know what the Pacific Fleet will do to prevent a seaborne invasion in this area. There are over 20,000 troops in the 16th 200,000 area and around 10,000 in the 14th 200 area.

Since the start of the war our submarines in the Pacific Ocean have sunk approximately 3,000,000 tons of Jap ships.

The Hawaiian Sea Frontier will take over the direction of the daily Hawaiian search on September 21st. Up to now it has been run by the Patrol Wms under Douglas's General direction.

The A.M.T.A.S. are quiet.

The locations of Jap carriers continue indefinite. It is assumed that at least four are in the area south of BIS.

There is no good indication of the objective of the Japs next move except that it will be in the Southwestern Pacific.
SECRET

September 19.

Comsopac 201240 pink summarizes the day in his area. TF-17 will be reorganized in the near future. Meanwhile it will operate in the general area bounded by 15 and 20 degrees south, 165 and 177 east prepared to take offensive action against suitable enemy targets within reach. In his 201542 pink Cominnoch questions the employment of striking forces on a strategically static basis in submarine infested waters.

The question raised by General MacArthur regarding the employment of the Pacific Fleet to repel Jap landings in NEW GUINEA was answered by CinCPac 200145 pink.

Minor enemy surface and plane movements continue to be observed by our search planes in the Central SOLOMONS and in the general area to the east of the SOLOMONS. Major units were not observed within the limits of our search.

A drydock at AUCKLAND capable of taking a damaged BB is under consideration.

Vice Admiral Leary will relieve Vice Admiral Fye as CTF-1 and also assume Combatships on September 20th.

CTF-3 summarizes his need for destroyers in connection with the withdrawal of ODs for conversion to APDs (his 190225). The first phase of FIREPLACE will be regarded as completed tomorrow.

There is no new information of enemy deployments. The carrier locations are very much in doubt. There is some possibility that the enemy may make a raid similar to our MAKin raid on our staging route to the South Pacific.

September 20.

Only minor enemy activity is noted in Comsopac daily summary (211221 pink).

CTF-3 210030 states that bad weather has prevented further attacks on Kiska. His 201949 reports the landing of an Army garrison at ST PAUL in the PRIBILOFS, and of an Army landing at ATKA. His 202100 objects to reported reduction of Army planes in the Alaskan Sector and gives his estimate of current army plane requirements.

CinCPac 202147 pink suggests that our striking forces anchor at NOUMEA except when employed on specific attacks.

APAIANA and TARAWA in the GILBERTS report continued enemy activity. This indicates that those atolls are not yet completely occupied. CinCPac is now considering occupying FUNAPUTI in the ELlice Islands where the Japs are indicated as going around the first of October.

No change in enemy deployment was noted during the day.
SECRET

September 21

The reorganized task forces under Vice Admiral Ghormley are as shown in his 221002, Rear Admiral Murray retains command of TF 17 in spite of the fact that Rear Admiral Lee in the WASHINGTON is senior.

Operations in the South Pacific are as shown in

CINCPAC 221756 pink.

Admiral Nimitz expects to arrive in WASHINGTON September 20 for a conference with Admiral Ghormley. He will also inspect various South Pacific activities.

Rear Admiral Turner 217702 tells of Japanese methods of fighting ashore and lists some of our shortcomings and makes recommendations to correct deficiencies.

The 2nd Raider Battalion will initially disembark at

PORTO BAY.

CINCPAC 202139 gives the mining plan for BALI.

The SOUTH PACIFIC and 201701A group arrived at BUP for repairs. The NORTH PAC PLUNA is due at BUP for repairs September 30th.

There is no new information on location of major bar-

units. Carrier deployment is most uncertain. There continues to be strong evidence of a large scale attack to recapture the Southern Solomons.

CINCPAC 220035 is a proposal for the occupation of FUNAFUTI.

September 22

There were no important contacts or developments in the

South Pacific during the day.

General MacArthur seems to expect one Marine regiment about

October 1st. On September 8 Cinopac ordered a regiment made ready for duty in the SWPac but it is not yet certain that the Marines will be sent. All available troops in the SPac are urgently needed by Admiral Ghormley at present.

Admiral Nimitz invited General MacArthur to a conference in NOUMEA next week and General MacArthur invited Admiral Nimitz to extend his trip South to Brisbane. Neither of these officers feel that they can be away from their commands long enough to cross the Coral Sea.

The 3rd Marine Raider Battalion was formed at SAMOA on

September 20th.

(Continued on next page)

1042
SECRET

September 22 (Continued)

The first of 12 B-17s from OAHU to SoPac are now enroute and 12 more are being prepared for early despatch.

Comsopac 221226 pink gives his plan for the occupation of FUNAFUTI.

The AMBERJACK on patrol off SOUGAINVILLE STRAIT reports sinking one 5000 ton freighter. While there she grounded and suffered damage to her sound gear.

The ALEUTIANS continued quiet.

There is continued doubt regarding present deployment of Jap major units. A large number of subs are in the South Pacific and a good number of cruisers and destroyers are sighted in the SOLOMONS - NEW BRITAIN area. All evidence continues to point to a large attack in the near future to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS.

September 23

Comsopac 240206 pink orders the occupation of FUNAFUTI about October 2nd. Under Rear Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral Wright will command the expedition.

Comsopac 231326 gives the general plan for the employment of CUBS, ACORNS, and construction battalions.

Comsopac 231251 states that the harbor of NOUMEA is very congested and requests weight handling and other equipment. As operations progress in the present offensive it becomes more and more apparent that facilities and equipment needed to support the operation were not made available initially. Cinopac 232249 generally concurs with Rear Admiral Turners recommendations to perfect our amphibious efforts.

There is some indication that GIZO and FAISI are mined. While the day was quiet in the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI area, all our moves were promptly reported by Jap radio on GUADALCANAL.

There were possible submarine sightings by Army planes today - one off FANNING ISLAND and one 240 miles SW of CANTON ISLAND.

The ALEUTIANS continue quiet.

Indications continue of Jap plans to recapture the southern SOLOMONS and eastern NEW GUINEA. There is some evidence that this operation may be delayed.
SECRET

September 24.

Cominco 241630 pink concurs that a Marine regiment experienced in amphibious warfare to General MacArthur will depend on developments. The message also requests plans for the employment of the Army 43rd Division.

The South Pacific is generally quiet. This may be the lull before the storm as all indications continue to point to major Jap operations there in the very near future. TF 17 is about to enter NOUMEA while the WASHINGTON group is approaching TONGATAPU. The unloading at GUADALCANAL has greatly improved in the past few days and critical shortages in the area have been supplied.

The ALEUTIANS continue quiet.

There are no changes in Jap major deployments. Apparently small garrisons are being left on the atolls in the GILBERTS and allied coast watchers are being captured.

September 25.

Arrangements for the occupation of FUNAFUTI regarding air coverage are shown in Comsopac 260826 and 261156 and Comair-sopac 251228.

Comsopac 251456 gives operations for the 24th in his area. There were no major developments or contacts. The performance of the SBs from CACTUS against approaching enemy DDs was not good.

Admiral Nimitz and party were delayed at PALMYRA due to engine trouble in his plane.

Plans are going forward to establish an advanced base at NOUMEA along the lines described in Comsopac 260434.

CTF 8 251930 and 260645 indicate that the Japs have abandoned ATTU. Increased activity at Kiska might possibly indicate an abandonment there also. It is hard to see where the Japs have profited in their ALEUTIANS adventure.

Indications of preparation for a major Japanese offensive in the South Pacific continue. Best guess is that they plan to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS, PORT MORESBY and attack AUSTRALIA. They are thought to be making a major effort to assemble the means for this in the RABUAL area. This being the case, no move on the OAHU-MIDWAY line is expected. Nor will they be able to launch a major attack toward INDIA.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Amphibious Training of Army Troops for Operations in Kiska Area.

1. Weather conditions in the Western Aleutians since the occupation by the Japanese of Kiska and Attu have been such that neither aircraft bombing or surface ship bombardment of Kiska nor submarine operations off that port have been able to prevent the enemy from consolidating and strengthening his hold in that area.

2. There is no indication that weather conditions will be such as to ensure the ejection of the Japanese from Kiska as a result of aerial bombing to be conducted from Adak.

3. The current stalemate has caused the neutralization of the considerable naval strength now assigned to Task Force EIGHT without a corresponding holding or reduction of Japanese naval forces.

4. Information received from Commander Task Force EIGHT states that he has arranged with General DeWitt for Army garrisons of 15,000 men for Adak and 5,000 men for Tanaga.

5. It is believed that a satisfactory solution for the Aleutian situation can be reached only through the ejection of the Japanese from Kiska and Attu. Such ejection can be effected only by a landing of amphibious troops.

6. It is therefore recommended that the Army at once begin the amphibious training of a suitable contingent of troops now in the Alaskan Area (including Adak and Tanaga) with a view to retaking Kiska and then Attu when suitable ships are available for this operation.

Copy to: Comtaskfor S
Comnorwesseafron

C. W. H :IMITZ

1045
SECRET

September 26.

Operations for the 26th in the South Pacific are summarized in ComSoPac 261256. Air offensive operations, particularly against enemy shipping in the SHORTLANDS and RABAUL areas, have been stepped up by both ComSoPac and ComSWPac. Our Task Forces there, except those in the FUNAFUTI operation, are in port.

Vice Chief of Naval Operations suggests SUVA as an advance base depot for storage of Cub and Acorn material. ComSoPac 261259 requests that the decision on this be deferred.

The mail situation has, and continues to be bad in the South Pacific. Officers and men go for months without mail. The job has been sadly bungled.

Cominch 261302 suggests that troops to be moved to forward positions be given amphibious training in the Central and South Pacific. He suggests training centers at OAHU, WELLINGTON, SAMOA, and NOUMEA or FIJI.

ARD-2 will be towed at once from OAHU to NOUMEA.

CTF-3 262020 and 262330 describes another successful air raid on Kiska. The ADAK field is paying good dividends.

General MacArthur wants the marines to clean out the northeast coast of New Guinea. He has about 15,000 troops in that area now and seems to think 5,000 marines to be necessary in addition. As previously noted, the despatch of amphibious troops to the Southwest Pacific from the South Pacific will depend on developments. No present developments indicate that such a plan is suitable. See his 270300 pink.

C.G. SAMOA urges prompt action in furnishing 2500 marines to bring his garrison up to strength and ComSoPac concurs.

There are no major changes in Jap deployments.

September 27.

The general situation in the South Pacific is improving. Admiral McCain, who has just been relieved as ComairsoPac, told the morning conference that GUADALCANAL can be held if sufficient fighter planes and pilots can be brought in to maintain present levels. The Japs are afraid of our F4F and will not attack them consistently. Unfortunately, the requisite number of VF and trained pilots are not yet in sight. Admiral Ghormley's 271436 summarizes the day except that during the day 25 enemy VB covered by 6 fighters approached GUADALCANAL and were intercepted by our fighters who shot down 23 VB and several 6's with no loss to themselves. A magnificent performance.
SECRET

September 27 (Continued)

TP-17 is in port at WHITE POPPY. The WASHINGTON group is at TONGATAPU. The ENTERPRISE group may be able to leave Pearl for the south about October third.

TP-1 continues to conduct minor training exercises in the OAHU area.

TP-3 continues comparatively inactive as they are hampered by lack of AF's for training. In a recent letter Vice Admiral Greenslade reported that our landing boat personnel are definitely inferior to the Army. This is another manifestation of naval growing pains.

TP-9 was quiet.

While there are indications that the Japs will make an all out effort in the Southern SCLOMONS and possibly NEW GUINEA, there are also many signs which point to troubles that he is having. It seems reasonable to suppose that we have now destroyed the cream of his naval air pilots. Also, our attrition attacks on his ships and planes must be causing them extreme difficulties. Our submarines are causing increasing shipping shortages.

Admiral Nimitz and party arrived during the afternoon at NOUMEA.

September 29.

Operations on the 28th in the South Pacific are summarized in Comsopac 291326. Admiral Nimitz apparently completed his conference with Vice Admiral Ghormley and with General MacArthur's Chief of Staff and with his Air Force General and went on to ESPIRITO SANTO. Among the things discussed was the employment of the 8th Marines which are earmarked for the NDENTI garrison and the 43rd Army division for the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area (see Comsopac 290256 pink).

The ALHENA completed unloading at GUADALCANAL. The unloading follows the same pattern each day: the AK with a DD escort unloads during daylight and departs each evening via the LENGO channel, returning that way in the early morning. The Japs have observed and reported this procedure.

The COPAHEE is having some troubles in shaking down.

There are labor troubles at WELLINGTON. Waterfront workers refuse to work overtime and unloading is being unduly delayed.
The TROUT reports hitting a large CV off TRUK with two torpedoes. This may be the ZUIKAKU. Another Jap carrier reports being attacked by a submarine. As this latter is thought to have occurred off NEW IRELAND and as the TROUT was definitely off TRUK, it seems probable that two Jap carriers are in trouble.

The Central and North Pacific areas are quiet. There is nothing to confirm the suspicion that the Japs plan to evacuate KISKA.

A good RDF cut places the CinC with Air Fleet in the vicinity of the GREENWICH Islands. While some CVs seem to be leaving the South for the homeland there is no major change in Jap intentions noted.

SoPac 291226 summarizes operations on the 29th in his area. The ALHEMA was torpedoed leaving GUADALCANAL but not sunk. She will be towed to BUTTON. Our AKs are continually exposed to this submarine menace. TF-17 continues in port waiting for suitable targets.

Minor activity continues in the GILBERTS. All islands there can be considered visited by the Japs and small garrisons have been placed on the principal atolls. Planes were reported over the ELIICE Islands.

The Central Pacific is generally quiet. Good progress is being made at PEARL in repair of damaged CVs and the SOUTH DAKOTA.

The Army bombed KISKA again on the 27th and 28th. GTF-8 30030 summarizes known results. It seems confirmed that the Japs have abandoned ATTU and AGOATT. Withdrawal of some ships of TF-8 from the area may be possible soon.

The Japs are suffering attrition losses of planes and ships in the SOLOMONS. They continue to land troops on GUADALCANAL. And they continue to bring in planes and ships to the general RABAUL area. KAVIENG is becoming an important airplane center.
SECRET

September 30.

There were no important contacts in the South Pacific during the day. Comsopac plans to employ TF-17 to strike the shipping in the SHORTLANDS Area on October 5th (local). His 011302 pink.

Comamphibiousforsopsac 301022 and 301030 gives the need of landing boats for his operations. At present there is such a shortage that further major operations can not be undertaken.

Comsopac 010454 gives the disposition of Acorns 3 and 4. He outlines the needs of equipment and repair facilities to support his operations.

The 8th Marines are now assembled at TUTUILA and are being trained in amphibious warfare.

Admiral Nimitz plans to arrive at NOUMEA tomorrow and at SUVA the day after.

CTF-0 302355 amplifies the report of army bombing at KISKA. As an enemy plane dropped 1 - 1000# bomb at ATKA yesterday it must be assumed that the FIREPLACE operations has been discovered.

The enemy has changed his communication systems completely. Thus, for some time now we can expect very little information from radio intelligence.

October 1.

Comsopac 301300 and 011716 give operations in his area for the past three days. There were no unusual happenings recorded. Other sources report that an enemy DD was hit by our bombs and damaged north of the NEW GEORGIA group and an enemy cruiser is aground on a reef in TONOZEI harbor. During the past weeks our aircraft and submarines have inflicted quite satisfactory damage on enemy ships in the South and Southwest Pacific. During the day enemy fighters and bombers appeared over GUADALCANAL. Our fighters intercepted but lost 6 VF to the enemy's 4 Zeros. Comairsopsac 020050 pink suggests that B-17s from GUADALCANAL bomb in the SOLOMONS when the HORNET group attacks the BUIN area and that MacArthur hit the RABaul area. He also notes that B-17s are not entirely suitable to give a CV fighter coverage. Comsopac concurs if the airfield at GUADALCANAL can take B-17s.

Admiral Ghormley 010812 describes the use of NOUMEA as a carrier replacement harbor and gives needs.
SECRET

October 1 (continued)

Kiska was again attacked by Army air yesterday. Results were not impressive and are shown in CTF-8 012100.

General Marshall 0042Z/30 directs amphibious training for army units be commenced in the Hawaiian area.

The ZUKAKA is probably now in Japan. Traffic analysis indicates that only three CVs are in the TRUK-RABaul area. There are no indications as to when the enemy expects to launch a major attack on the Southern Solomons. Change in all his call signs makes it impossible for R.I. to analyse current Jap moves.

October 2.

Comsopac 021436 gives operation summary for his area on the 1st. Nothing extraordinary happened.

Comairsopac 030244 pink gives his plan of cooperation with TF 17 for the 5th.

CTF 62 022110 pink gives plans to attack Jap positions from seaward on the 5th.

Cominoh 022120 pink gives troops and planes agreed to for the FIREPLACE operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No mention is made of the ATKA garrison.

CTF 8 022025 reports Army bombing of Kiska with minor results. He also reports that ADAK was bombed by an enemy plane. No damage resulted but the airfield project there was definitely discovered.

No changes are noted in Jap deployment.

Admiral Nimitz arrived at SUVA.

October 3.

Comso Pac 031356 gives operations in that area for the 1st. The usual shipping was noted in the SHORTISLANDS AREA. FUNAFUTI was occupied as described in TF 62.6 - 040330. The planned landing of marines to the westward of the GUADALCANAL position was postponed at the request of CG 1st Marines. GREENWICH was observed by plane. Only one small non-combatant ship was seen in the lagoon and no air field was discovered. Thus the belief that this place is being used as a fleet anchorage or as a plane staging point is shown incorrect.

CTF 8 - 032010 reports another Army bombing of Kiska on the 2nd.
SECRET

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

28 September 1942.

1. The following estimate of location of Orange strength in the Pacific is submitted. Locations are of 27 September 1942.

ALUTANES

Six submarines. NAGUI and CruDiv 28 are in the northern area but probably not in vicinity of Alutians. About one DesDiv is operating between Alutians and Empire. Attu has probably been abandoned. No definite estimate of troop strength is possible, but troop movement out of Kiska area is indicated. Not more than twenty planes of all types.

EMPIRE

HITAKA and NAYATAKA remain in the Empire.

SOLOMONS

CruDiv 6, DesRon 3, part of DesRon 4, 2 minelayers, 11th Seaplane Tender Division, a considerable number of submarines and light craft. There are twelve submarines in the eighth fleet area. Sasebo 16 Landing Force is in transports in the Shortlands area.

NEW GUINEA

CruDiv 18 and a few destroyers. Air strength about 50 planes. Troop strength 3,000-6,000.

NEW BRITAIN AREA

OTAKA arriving in this area. HOKAI and ZUKATU are probably to the south of Truk. One battleship indicated in New Britain area and two or possibly three more are at least as far south as Truk. CruDiv 4 is in the Truk Rabaul area. CruDiv 8 is unlocated but probably still in the southern area with CruDiv 16. CruDiv 16 is in the Rabaul area. The air strength is estimated at 142 planes in the whole New Britain-Solomon area. Troop strength 1,000-4,000 in New Britain.

EAST INDIAN

Quiet.

MARSHALLS

Estimate air strength 150-140 planes. Three submarines in the area.

-1-
SECRET

ESTIMATE OF FUTURE OPERATIONS

No change since last report.
**Yaco Gima Combined**

YAMOTO

**Battleships**

Battleship 1

KAGAKO

MITSU

YAMASHIRO

Battleship 2

HYOGA

FUBO

KOSANSHI

Battleship 3

KONGO

KIRISHIMA

Hiei

HANUMA

GimC Combined in Truk area.
Part of Staff in SENDAI in Solomons.
No recent information. Truk area 9/16.

No information.
Indicated in Ambaul area by associations.
No information.

No information. Indicated Truk area 9/16.
No information.
No information.
Empire.

Truk area - or south.
No late information.
No late information.
No late information. Indicated Truk 9/19.
SECRET

CARRIERS

Task areas.
At least as far south as Truk.
Route Truk to Empire.

Empire.
Empire.
Probably sunk.

May be same ship as OTAKA.
Vicinity of Navioe.
No information.
May be same ship as UNYOU.
Route Kure to Truk via Chichijima and Saipan.
GrubDiv 4
ATAGO
TAKAO
MAYA

GrubDiv 5
HAUGURO
MYOKO

GrubDiv 6
AOMA
KINGUASA
FURUTAKA
KAKO

GrubDiv 7
KOHARU
SUZUYA
MOAMIK

GrubDiv 8
TOWA
OKIKUMA

GrubDiv 9
ATTAMAYO
OJI

GrubDiv 10
HAGARA

GrubDiv 11
AGANO

GrubDiv 16
HATORI
ISUZU
KINU

GrubDiv 18
TARUTA
TERAYU
KASHIMA

Truk area or south.
Truk - Rabaul area.
Probably arriving Empire from Truk.

None indication GrubDiv 9 in Rabaul area.
No information.
No information.

No information.
No information.
Solomon.
Possibly sunk.

Probably damaged.
No information.
Under repair in Empire.

Still in Truk area or south.
Probably still in southern area.

No information.
No information.

No late information.

No information. 3rd of June

Empire.
Rabaul area.
Rabaul area.

Involved in New Guinea campaign.
Rabaul area.
Rabaul area.
Flag of 4th fleet.
DIVISION 12 (Minelayers)
TOKIWA
TSUJANU
OKINOSHIMA

Grand 22
YAMA
KISO

Unassigned CA
ASHIGARA
CHOKAI
MACHI

Unassigned CL
KUSA
TUBA
KATORI
KASHII

Truk area 9/19, no late information.
Truk area 9/19, no late information.
Definitely sunk.

Northern area.
No late information. Ominato area, 9/19.

No information.
Northern area.

Indies area.
No late information. Truk area 9/19.
Truk area.
Kosrae.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division 1</th>
<th>Division 2</th>
<th>Division 3</th>
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<th>Division 5</th>
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<td><strong>LIMA</strong></td>
<td><strong>YAMAX</strong></td>
<td><strong>OSTRA</strong></td>
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**DESTROYED**

- No late information. Northern area 9/15.
- May be enroute Empire to Truk.
- Northern area.
- New Britain area.
- YUGURE in Truk area. OHIRAT SUTU in Palaue.
- SHIGURE in Truk area. AKIARI damaged.

**Nabaul area.**
- No information.
- No late information.
- One unit in Nabaul area.
- 2 units with CardDiv 8. One in Saipan area, one northern area.

**Corregidor in Solomons.**
- Shortland - Gizo area.
- No late information. Probably Solomons.
- Shortlands.
- No late information. Probably Solomons.

**Corregidor 5 in Shortlands area.**
- No definite information.
- Truk area.
- South of Truk.
- One unit Truk. One Yakima. One unlocated.
- One unit Penang. Two unlocated.

**Ambon area, possibly escorting toward Truk.**
- No late information. Probably East Indies.
- Solomons. One unit Marshalls.

**No late information.**
- No information.
- Two units return to Saipan.
- Two units New Guinea.

**In Nabaul area with Otsuka.**
- Associated with CardDiv One.
- Nabaul area.
SECRET

UNASSIGNED

DESTROYERS (Continued)

DesDiv 1
DesDiv 11
DesDiv 13
DesDiv 32
DesDiv -

Northern area.
Truk zone.
Formosa area.
Saigon area.
One unit Aikujima, two units Yokosuka.
SECRET

ANNEXURE

SubDiv 1
SubDiv 19
SubDiv 2
SubDiv 3
SubDiv 4
SubDiv 7
SubDiv 6
SubDiv 11
SubDiv 12
SubDiv 14
SubDiv 19
SubDiv 30
SubDiv 13
SubDiv 7
SubDiv 11
SubDiv 26
SubDiv 33
SubDiv 8
SubDiv 1
SubDiv 3
SubDiv 14

Two units Truk. One Saigon.
Two units 6th fleet, one unit
Truk, one Jaluit.
Unlocated.

Two units 6th fleet, one unit
Aleutians.
One unit Jaluit. Two Empire.

Two units 6th fleet area, three
units Truk.
One unit 6th fleet area, three
units Empire.

One unit 6th fleet, 2 units
unplaced.
Two units Saigon

Three units 6th fleet area.

Two units TRUK.
Two units Aleutians, one Empire.
Three units Aleutians.

Three units Empire.
One unit Jaluit, Two Empire.
Three units enroute Saigon to Envo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6th Fleet area</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truk</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaluit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern area</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Enroute</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SECRET

AIKOKU MARU
AKITSASHIMA
ORITORE
CHITODA
FUJIKAWA MARU
GOBE MARU
5 HIRO MARU
KAMIKAWA MARU
KAMITSU MARU
KAMO
KANTO MARU
KATSUJO MARU
KYOIMAN MARU
LYONS MARU
NAGISON MARU
NARUTO MARU
NIHON MARU
NISHIMARU
NISHIN MARU
NITOKO MARU
OKITU MARU
SASHIKO MARU
SANTSU MARU
*5 SEIJI MARU
SOUTAI MARU
SHINSU MARU
TOKI MARU
*2 TOWAN MARU

AIR TENDERS

No late information. Believed Rabaul area.
No late information. Believed New Britain area.
Shortlands.
Empire.
No information.
Empire.
No late information.
Seipen area.
No information.
Truk area.
No information.
No information.
Marshalls.
No late information. 8th fleet area 9/19.
No information.
No late information, Truk-Palau 9/17.
Solomons
Rabaul area.
Kavieng area.
New Britain.
No information.
Rabaul area.
In-Truk area.
Shortlands area.
No information.
Rabaul.
No information.
No late information. Solomons 9/16.
No definite information.
SECRET

AIR

AREA DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE AIR FORCE

ALCUTIANS

While very little information is available, it is possible to make a fair guess from the absence of Orange air activity that the Japanese do not have more than 25 planes in the Aleutians. The 5th Air Group still appears at Kiska. Attu Island, which with Kiska was rated as a seaplane base, now appears to have been abandoned. The land based VEB reported over Adak in August have not appeared since. A liberal guess of Japanese air strength in this area by plane types is:

2 - Kawanishi 97 four engine flying boats.
5 - Float type reconnaissance planes.
10-15 - Float type VEB.
Total - 17-22 planes.

MALAY AREA

There is not sufficient information available to estimate the Japanese air strength in this area. The 40th Air Group appears in this area and possibly also the 32nd Air Group and 35th Air Group, which are either in Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. There is some slight indication that these groups may also move east. No other information on this area is available.

DUTCH EAST INDIES AREA

No recent information exists on the 23rd Air Flot which has been in this area except that from association it may operate in the Solomons. The commander of Taino Air Group was still at Kosadari 9/22 with a detachment of the group at Truk 9/22. 3rd Air Group has not been heard from since believed enroute New Britain about 9/12. The first attacks on Darwin since August 30th (27 VEB and 27 VEB) took place September 25th (2 planes) and September 26th (3 VEB). The absence of Japanese air attacks in this area and the previously reported movement of planes to New Britain make it probable that the former strength of about 45 VEB and 45 VEB has been greatly reduced. Reconnaissance of Kupang on September 23rd revealed 2 VEB and of Dili on September 24th and 25th revealed 1 VEB and 4 VEB respectively.
SECRET

NEW GUinea AREA

New Guinea must be considered with New Britain because Japanese VBF bombing Port Moresby and other Allied bases in this area as a general rule operate from Rabaul airfields. Only VF and reconnaissance planes have been permanently based in New Guinea. The 25th Air Fleet still appears to be in command of New Guinea air operations, but the 23rd Air Fleet may also be operating some planes there. There is no recent information on 4th, 5th and Yokohama Air Groups of the 23rd Air Division except that Yokohama seems to be arranging for flying boat replacements from the Empire. The Japanese air strength in this area probably does not exceed:

10 - Type 97F usually based at Lae or Buna.
10 - 12 - Reconnaissance seaplanes.
2 - Kawasaki 97 flying boats.
27 - Mitsubishi types 96, 97, or 1 VBF operating from Rabaul.

Total 49-51.

Remark: Probably one full fighter group of 45 type 97F is enroute New Guinea to replace the heavy losses inflicted during August.

NEW IRALAND - NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS

New Ireland is principally a supply, repair, and assembly base for planes coming from the Empire or damaged in operations. The 21st Air Fleet N.A. is presently at Ering, and the 11th Air Fleet is associated with both the Solomons and New Guinea. The 26th Air Fleet still appears to be the command of air operations in the Solomons, while the 11th Seaplane Command is in that area. The 12th Seaplane Command is also in the Solomons. The 11th Air Fleet Commander appears to be in this area. The commander and a detachment of 6th Air Group (probably 77) is in the Solomons, while additional planes of this Group are being or are seen to be ferried from Kiaratan to the south by the Yokosuka Navy and the Zaino. The 23rd Air Group and Kanaya Air Group appear to be receiving planes (probably 77) from Eaveo via the Solomons. Yama Air Group (79) is at Ralotland Island. 100th Air Group is at Rabaul. Other groups that may be in this area have not been heard during the past week. The Japanese air strength in New Ireland, exclusive of planes being assembled, repaired and forwarded to New Britain and the Solomons, by planes and types probably does not exceed:

13-16 - Seaplanes - reconnaissance and fleet type 79.
2 - Four engined 79.
Total 14-20.
SECRET

Japanese planes by number and types in New Britain and the Solomons probably do not exceed:

45 - land type S77.
24 - float type S77.
24 - Reconnaissance seaplanes.
12 - Kawasaki 97 four engine VFP.
27 - Mitsubishi types 96, 97, or 1 VMB (exclusive of the 27 VMB based at Rabaul and used to bomb Port Moresby).

Total - 192.

Enroute: Probably 45 type S77.
96 - Mitsubishi type 1 VMB.
a scattering of other types.

MARSHALLS AND GILBERTS

The 24th Air Flot and its Groups, 1st, 14th, and Chitose, were this week placed on the alert for a U.S. offensive in this area. There is no specific recent information on these air commands, but they are shown still to be in the Marshalls. 19th Air Group is still in the Marshalls and concerned with the Gilberts infiltrations. The total air strength in this area probably does not exceed:

9-12 - Kawasaki 97 four engine VFP.
18-24 - Reconnaissance seaplanes with some possibly VFP.
96 - Mitsubishi types 96 and 1 VMB.
50 - (approx.) type S77 assigned to defense of airfields.

Total: 131-140.

Enroute: Probably none.
SECRET

AIR FLOTILLAS AND AIR GROUPS

NOTE: Air divisions are now termed Air Flotillas. The 21st - 26th Air Divisions appear in this report as the 21st - 26th Air Flottilas. The 11th and 12th Air Divisions, because they are non-plane tender units, are called the 11th and 12th Seaplane Div.

The number of planes shown in any group is the largest number of planes known to have operated in that group at any time.

11th Air Fleet - CmDr. is very active in the Solomons, particularly in connection with Guadalcanal. CmDr. may have been at Tulagi 9/23.

11th Seaplane Div - Important command in Solomons. H.Q. appears to be at Shortlands.

12th Seaplane Div - Also appears to be in Solomons.

21st Air Flot - H.Q. now at Kavieng. Is receiving planes from Philippines and may already have operated some planes over New Guinea. Associated with both New Guinea and Solomons.

Kanoya Air Group

Tokyo Air Group

22nd Air Flot - No recent information.

Vibore Air Group

Gemma Air Group

23rd Air Flot - From association is to operate in the Solomons.

3rd Air Group

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SECRET

Takao Air Group 45VMB

Comdr. at Kandahari 9/25.
Detachment at Truk 9/22.

24th Air Flot - Marshalls.

1st Air Group 27VMB

Still in Marshalls.

14th Air Group 12V7 flying boats; 3V3

transports.

Chitose Air Group 27VMB

Still in Marshalls.

25th Air Flot - Continues to be actively associated with New
Guinea and bases and commands there.

4th Air Group 27VMB Traffic routed by Tokyo

to Truk for delivery 9/23.
Unit probably south of
Truk near Rabaul.

Taihara Air Group 45V7, 6V0


Yokohama Air Group 12V7 flying arranging for V7 to be

boats, 6 fleet flown from Empire,
type V7

26th Air Flot - Remains very active in Solomons and in command of
air operations there.

6th Air Group V7 and V8

Comdr. and detachment in
New Britain or Solomons.
Other planes of the group
about to leave Kinsatsu,
probably on Bismarck
Islands.

Mitsawa Air Group 27VMB

South of Truk. May receive
reinforcements from Bismarck
Air Group.

Kisarazu Air Group 27VMB

No recent information.

2nd Air Group V7

Associated with Kansawa
Air Group and Okinawa, and
may also be receiving
planes from that source.

5th Air Group Scaplances

Still at Kinsatsu.

17th Air Group Scaplances

No recent information.

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SECRET

19th Air Group  Seaplanes       Marshalls - Active in Gilberts infiltration.

21st Air Group  Seaplanes?      At Truk. Active with ferrying of planes to Rabaul area.

33rd Air Group  ?               Indicating possible shift to Rabaul. Not clear whether this unit in Empire, Malay, or DMZ.

35th Air Group  ?               Probably in Malay or DMZ. Possible that shift to Rabaul is scheduled.

40th Air Group  ?               In Malay. Possible that shift to Rabaul is scheduled.

108th Air Group Seaplanes (?)   At Rabaul.

252nd Air Group  ?               Appeared for first time, on 9/27 at Kismarou Air Station.

Sasaki Air Group  ?               In Empire probably supplying local air cover for southbound convoys.

Sasobe Air Group  ?               Detachment may have moved south and appears in association with Rabaul and Shortlands.

Shinhocharu Air Group Training Unit of VMF               Tokyo has routed traffic to both Truk and Rabaul for delivery.

Suzuka Air Group  ?               No recent information.

Yokosuka Air Group  13 Seaplanes    May be aboard Shitos in vicinity of Shortlands.

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JAPANESE AIR PLANE LOSSES
(Sept. 19-26th incl.)

SOLOMONS - Destroyed - Float Type VF - 7 (also 3 probable.
Recco. Floatplanes - 4.
Damaged - Recco. Floatplanes - 3.

NEW GUINEA - Destroyed - Land type VF - 1.

TIMOR - Destroyed - Land type VF - 2 (probable).

ALRUTIANS - Destroyed - Float Type VF - 7.

Total - Destroyed - Float Type VF - 24 (3 probable)
Land type VF - 1 (2 probable)
Recco. Floatplanes - 4.

Damaged - Recco. Floatplanes - 3.
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE LAND FORCES AS OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1942

ALASKA -

Attu and Kiska. Radio traffic has indicated that something abnormal is in progress here, and it has been interpreted to be that the enemy forces are withdrawing. Aerial visual reconnaissance of Attu by Task Force Hight revealed no signs of enemy and all works abandoned. Traffic has connected the Maizuru No. 3 Special Landing Force, which was part of the occupation force, with the Rabaul area. Presence in the Solomons and the isolated position of the Attu - Kiska forces may account for this withdrawal.

OCEANIA -

Islands occupied by the No. 2 Combined Landing Force, the Yokosuka No. 3 Special Landing Force and Yokosuka No. 6 Special Landing Force, plus additional antiaircraft troops, guard units, etc.

Baru - Raided on 26th and probably occupied.
Maina - Occupied.
Tarawa - Occupied.

UK BRITAIN -

Radio traffic indicates a steady influx of reinforcements for the Solomons area. Information is insufficient to make a new estimate to replace last week's figure of troop strength, but it is probable that more troops have arrived there.

The following units are at, or are connected with, Rabaul:

17th Army Division (part here, part at Buna and part in Guadalcanal).

D'Arcy 1st Landing Force (Army) is sending amphibious troops to Rabaul.

8th Base Force is main identified Naval garrison of Rabaul and adjacent areas.

Rabaul -- 30,000 to 35,000
Pomio-Ullassou
Cassinia-Willowmen
Peninsula -- 3,000 (old estimate)
NEW GUINEA -

Buna-Suma-Kohada-Efogi area - Occupied by Sasebo No. 3 Special Landing Force, Yokosuka No. 3 Special Landing Force, and units of the 17th Army Division (cavalry and probably infantry) - Total troops - - - - - - - - - 5,000 to 6,000.

Lae-Markham Valley area - - - - - - - - - - - 2,000 to 3,000.

Salamaua - Buna River area - - - - - - - - - - 2,000.

Kubo (cavalry patrols) - - - - - - - - - - - - - 900.

Milne Bay - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (Remnants of Kure No. 3 Special Landing Force).

NEW IRELAND -

This area is under the 8th Base Force.

Kavieng - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 800.

Remainder of island and nearby islands are guarded by patrols and small detachments therefrom.

SOLOMONS -

Reinforcements are bound for this area. The main units headed there are the Maizuru No. 6 Special Landing Force (probably destined to go there) and the Sasebo No. 6 Landing Force, which is in transports in the Shortlands area.

Bougainville - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1,600.

Buin-Paisi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 200.

Gizo Island - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 300.

Guadalcanal (Taiva Point) - - - - - - - - - - 1,400.
(Cape Esperance) - - - - - - - - - - - 1,200.

Traffic has indicated considerable activity at Kainakoe Bay (not shown on H.O. Chart Oceana No. 1697, but it is a bay between Pearl Shoals and Fish Reef and is about 3 miles west of Cape Esperance). This bay is the main landing place for reinforcements and supplies for the Cape Esperance Force. At present this force is requesting supplies of food as their staples are sufficient for five days.

The Taiva Point Force apparently consists of Navy troops under the command of Lieutenant Kawaguchi.
SOLOMONS (Contd.) -

The Cape Esperance Force is made up of Navy troops, one battalion (ABA Unit) of Army and a pioneer unit. Lieutenant Kawamoto is in charge of the navy there.

- Malaita - Small detachment total - - - - - - 100
- Santa Isabel
  (Mafu Point) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100
  (Vik'sara Point) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100
  (Rekate Bay) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100
- Total Troops - - - - - - - - - - 48,850 to 55,850

LOCATION OF SPECIFIC UNITS

Naval Special Landing Forces (each about 1200 men)

- /2 Combined - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gilberto.
- Kure No. 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Parts at Gundalcanal and
  Milne Bay.
- Kure No. 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gundalcanal.
- Maisuru No. 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No information.
- Maisuru No. 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No information.
- Maisuru No. 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Wager at Kieta now may be
  bound for Rabaul.
- Maisuru No. 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - May be bound for Gundal-
  canal.
- Sanekoh No. 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No information.
- Sanokoh No. 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No information.
- Sanokoh No. 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No information.
- Sanokoh No. 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - At Dam.
- Sanokoh No. 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - In transport to Short-
  likes area.
- Sanokoh No. 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - May be in Shanghai.
- Yokosuka No. 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gilberto area.
- Yokosuka No. 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - In Taken (Permuta) on 23rd.
- Yokosuka No. 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Buna.
- Yokosuka No. 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gilberto.

ARMY UNITS

16th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - No new information but was
  connected with Abeam and
  Falesa.
17th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Parts at - Gundalcanal-Buna-
  Nebbe-Rabaul.
Devos Special Landing Force - - - - - - - - - - Sending amphibious troops to
  Rabaul.

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SECRET

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

October 1, 1942.

1. Preliminary.

Much of the Estimate of Enemy Capabilities for the month of August continues to remain valid and is not repeated.

2. Brief of Events during September, 1942.

SOUTH PACIFIC.

The SARATOGA was torpedoed on August 30 and proceeded to PEARL for repair. On September 5 the SOUTH DAKOTA hit a pinnacle rock at BLEACHER and also came to PEARL for repair. On the 16th the WASP was hit and sunk by Submarine torpedoes and the NORTH CAROLINA received one torpedo hit and proceeded to PEARL for repair.

In the Southern SOLOMONS our position has been strengthened by landing the 7th Marines on GUADALCANAL. Plane strength there is now nearly at a satisfactory level. The maintenance of logistic supply to the TULAGI area continued to be difficult. On September 29th the ALHENA was torpedoed leaving GUADALCANAL. We have been unable to prevent the Japs from bombarding our positions and from landing troops on either flank of the Marine GUADALCANAL position. Jap bombing of the position has been almost completely prevented.

The enemy mopped up the GILBERTS Islands and landed small garrisons on the main islands.

On September 13th enemy major forces made their only appearance in reach of our search to the east and north of the SOLOMONS. The enemy turned back before our land-based air could attack with satisfactory results and before our striking forces could reach them.

Large enemy reinforcements to the RABAUL area continued throughout the month. Except in NEW GUINEA and the landings on GUADALCANAL, they remain in the general RABAUL area. Indications continued that they were assembling forces for an all out effort in the South Pacific.

During the month it has become almost certain that RYUJO was sunk on August 24th. On September 28th one of our submarines probably badly damaged one carrier. Planes have reported hitting cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries but the amount of damage done is uncertain.
SECURE

The enemy used the FAISI-BUIN area as an assembly point for cruisers, destroyers, transports and other auxiliaries. This area was the jump off point for troop carrying destroyers bound for GUADALCANAL. Airfields at KAVIENG, BUKA, and KIETA were being improved.

The Japs advanced over the OWEN STANLEY mountain range in Eastern NEW GUINEA to within about 15 miles of the PORT MORESBY airfields. At that point allied resistance stiffened, and by the end of the month the enemy was retreating. At MILNE BAY the enemy landed in some force but were unable to capture the airfield, and later withdrew.

CENTRAL PACIFIC.

The area was generally quiet during the month. Good progress was made in strengthening defenses at MIDWAY. Those defenses will serve as a model for JOHNSTON, PALMYRA and CANTON.

Our submarines have been very successful in destroying enemy shipping but the numbers on patrol in enemy home waters continues small.

NORTH PACIFIC.

The airfield on ADAK was first used on the 11th, and the first phase of the FIREPLACE operation was completed on September 20th. The Army has placed a garrison on ST. PAUL Island and plans to garrison TANA Island. Each time weather has permitted, Kiska has been successfully bombed and strafed from the new field at ADAK. The Japs have evacuated ATU and AGGATU.

3. The Situation.

(a) Enemy. For the past six or seven weeks the Japs have been assembling planes, troops and ships in the general RABAUL area. There are no indications whatever of a move in any other direction.

While the Japs may wish to start such an effort in the near future, there is evidence that they are having their troubles. Our planes and submarines are taking increasing toll of their forces. On GUADALCANAL our Marines invariably have thrown back attackers with heavy enemy losses. The Japs may have lost the services of 3 CV, 1 BB, several cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries during the month. Their aircraft losses have been heavy in August and September. All this has definitely slowed up their preparations.
SECRET.

An estimate of Japanese strength in the Pacific as of September 28, 1942 is appended.

The enemy is copying our communication methods with good success. As a result, we continue to be unable to read his mail to any great extent.

(b) Own. We retain TF-1 at PEARL for the purpose of breaking up any enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN SEA FRONTIER. As of October 1st the ENTERPRISE, SARATOGA, SOUTH DAKOTA, and NORTH CAROLINA are under repair at PEARL. With them are cruiser and destroyer escorts. The ENTERPRISE group can reach the SOLOMONS area by about the middle of October. In the South Pacific TF-17 waits in port for a suitable target.

While we think that our OAHU-MIDWAY line is vulnerable to raids, there seems little probability of a major landing. The battleships at PEARL probably could prevent a landing in the area. This situation will improve when more air striking forces, properly trained and indoctrinated, are stationed in the Hawaiian Islands.

The situation in the ALEUTIANS is obscure. It has always been hard to understand how Japan could profit much in the occupation of Kiska and Attu. Complete evacuation there would be no surprise. Meanwhile TF-8 will continue to cover Army seaborne movements while remaining ready to strike any enemy within reach.

While the situation in the South Pacific has improved considerably in the past month, it is far from satisfactory. We are strengthening our positions in the Southern SOLOMONS but the logistic and personnel replacement programs remain to be put on a satisfactory basis. It is hoped that the Army 43rd Division can relieve the Marines in the TULAGI area soon, but probably not during October. No additional marines will arrive in the area until after the end of the month. The harbors at NOUMEA and ESPIRITU SANTO are overcrowded and unloading facilities are most primitive. Measures to improve this condition will hardly be effective in October. Unloading facilities in the TULAGI area are meagre, and to date we have been unable to provide adequate protection for our AKs during the unloading period. There are no planes in sight to take care of combat and operational losses in the area beyond about October 30th. The airfield at GUADALCANAL with necessary facilities such as underground gas storage, dispersal areas, repair facilities, etc., will not be complete during October. It is, however, now in good use.

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Our submarine offensive against the Jap trade in her own waters continues at a low ebb because of the shortage of Pacific Fleet Submarines, which is aggravated by necessary diversions of boats to ALASKA and the MANDATES. In October we hope to commence laying mines in focal points of Jap trade.

4. Threats to Japan.

The UNITED STATES continues to be the only real threat to Japan. The start of our offensive in the South Pacific evidently has caused serious repercussions, and probably caused the enemy to abandon plans in any other theatre until that threat is removed. There is good reason to believe that our own offensive nipped in the bud the Jap plan to cut our lines of communications to AUSTRALIA. As our greatest threat to Japanese interests now is via the South Pacific, it seems most unlikely that they will move toward INDIA or SIBERIA or toward any other place in the Pacific until their South Pacific flank is secured.

HAWAII is always a threat to Japan in that it is an advanced base for supplies and operations. They will always desire to damage our MIDWAY-OAHU-SAMOA line in order to decrease our overall Pacific capabilities.

It does not seem probable that Japan takes the threat from the UNITED STATES via the ALEUTIANS very seriously.

Whether Japan knows it or not, they need have no fear from AUSTRALIA at the moment. The Australians do not even feel sure of being able to hold NEW GUINEA now. However, Japan knows that eventually large forces can get underway from AUSTRALIA and threaten seriously all of their gains inside the MALAY BARRIER.

GREAT BRITAIN, at present, is unable to threaten Japan's Indian Ocean Front. That front only can become dangerous when GREAT BRITAIN is free of her commitments in EUROPE and the Near East.

Today RUSSIA is entirely too occupied with GERMANY to permit her to open the SIBERIAN front. But should the GERMAN situation change radically in favor of the RUSSIANS, there would be a chance of a threat by opening SIBERIAN air bases to the Allies. It is significant that RUSSIA has opened a radio channel with us and has finally begun an exchange of information.

Because of the many uncertainties throughout the world today it is hard to speculate very far into the future. Suffice to say that for October Japan considers our activities in the SOLOMONS her major threat while still remaining very sensitive to possible moves for bombing the Empire.
5. Broad Courses of Action.

There is overwhelming evidence that the enemy's intention is to try to cut us off from AUSTRALIA and then capture or neutralize that continent.

Other broad courses of action within enemy capabilities remain the same as for September, and include:

(a) An attempt to capture MIDWAY.
(b) An extension in the ALEUTIANS.
(c) An attack on Western AUSTRALIA.
(d) Raids on our positions from MIDWAY to NOUMEA.
(e) An offensive toward INDIA.
(f) An attack on RUSSIA.


The enemy's most probable next moves are the recapture of the Southern SOLOMONS, and the extension of control in NEW GUINEA.

It now seems that the effort in the SOLOMONS and in NEW GUINEA will be in the nature of a gradual infiltration followed by a major assault. Whether the final effort in the SOLOMONS will be concurrent with that in NEW GUINEA is not known.

Before any grand assault we can expect the following to continue:

(a) Submarine reconnaissance in the SOLOMONS AREA and along our lines of communications to the South.

While the submarines may now have the primary duty of reconnaissance, it has been shown that they can and will attack important targets. During October the enemy is estimated to be capable of maintaining no less than twenty submarines in the area for this purpose. It is indicated a total of 32 submarines could be made available for this duty.

(b) Air attacks on our positions and shipping using shore based air.

Our recent successes in repelling bombing attacks on GUADALCANAL has reduced the enemy capacity to continue this form of attack, but has not eliminated the danger.
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As of October 1st the following shore based air is indicated as in or enroute to the NEW BRITAIN-SOLOMONS area and could be made available for this duty:

108 - VHB
90 - VF

To these it is possible to add, from the MARSHALLS and GILBERTS, about:

54 - VHB
50 - VF

It is difficult to estimate the ability of the enemy to maintain such levels in the area as that ability depends on rate of losses and other circumstances. If losses are excessive they would have great difficulty.

(c) Occasionally shall our shore positions in the SOLOMONS.

This has been possible in the past and will undoubtedly continue. The shelling usually takes place at night and may be incidental to landing of small numbers of infiltration troops.

As many as 16 cruisers could be made available for this duty but only if the usual striking force escort were to be employed. The same situation applies to eighteen Devisa estimated in the TRUK-RABUAL area on October 1st. While no such numbers are believed possible, the main thing is that there are ample cruisers and destroyers for this job. Submarines may be employed likewise also.

If we are able to cause sufficient losses to the enemy cruisers and destroyers at their jump off points, and enroute, it seems probable that operations of this type will cease to be profitable.

(d) Attacks in the general area from ESPIRITU SANTO, north, on our transports, freighters and escorts, both day and night; especially while unloading, or at anchor.

These attacks are always to be expected from submarines. It is quite possible that the enemy will employ cruisers, destroyers, and motor torpedo boats, if he thinks circumstances warrant. Should he detect a large enough target within reach of a CV or BB striking force he may attempt a
raiders. However, it does not seem likely that he will risk any major striking force within reach of our effective shore based air. The most likely attempt would be to make a high speed attack with cruisers or destroyers based on advance information of our movements.

During the all out attack we should expect carrier raids on our advance positions such as ESPIRITU SANTO and ROSES to break up our line of supply. The all out attack most probably would include a determined effort to neutralize the GUADALCANAL airfield.

As matters now stand, it does not seem necessary for ORANGE to employ carriers to cover the landing of troops on the east coast of NEW GUINEA. The Japs have the capacity to make a large landing on eastern NEW GUINEA, and at the same time make an assault on the Southern SOLOMONS. If they continue to land sizeable forces at night on GUADALCANAL they will build up a force which can assist in an assault by attacking on all sides of our position there at the same time. If this were a night attack they would hardly employ carriers to cover the landing at GUADALCANAL.

When and if an all out attack occurs it seems most probable that:

(1) The landing will be at night, the transports, barges, etc., escorted by cruisers and destroyers.

(2) CV striking forces covered by BB groups and preceded by submarine scouts will attack our airfields, shipping, and installations at BUTTON and possibly ROSES.

(3) SANTA CRUZ Islands will be occupied if we are not already there, - in which case the enemy would be expected to attack that position.

There are many varieties of such an operation and it would only be a guess to set down details.

7. In spite of the fact that enemy intentions appear clear it is desirable to list other operations within the capacity of the enemy during October.

Our estimate of enemy locations shows that it is possible to concentrate sizeable forces almost any place in the Pacific Ocean Areas during October. We know that the great part of his Navy is serviceable and that logistic and other considerations make it possible for him to do much harm in widely separated places. While the following are not considered probable they are discussed briefly.
(a) A raid on PEARL HARBOR.

At the moment fine targets are presented at PEARL. Our defenses have improved but there is no assurance that a well timed raid could not get in. We might well suppose that the cost to the enemy would not be acceptable. On the other hand, if he could hit our ships in dry dock and our tank farms he might be willing to accept anything our Army air could give him. We have not, on October 1st, a force adequate to repel a strong carrier raid. Nor will we be able to meet 4 enemy CV groups in the HAWAIIAN area on equal terms during the month.

But to make such a raid the Japs would have to give up or postpone any powerful attack in the 3CLOWONS. They could do this; and because of the RI situation we would hardly find out what was up until too late.

Although this is again stated as not probable, the mere possibility indicates stiffening the search and alertness conditions, at least until the enemy further commits himself. It must be remembered that major forces have not been located for some time.

(b) A raid on MIDWAY or JOHNSTON.

Such an operation would be in the nature of a diversion, but unless made in strength which he can hardly afford at this time, there would be little profit in the adventure.

(c) At attempt to capture MIDWAY.

This has been a Jap objective and still must figure in their plans. While he must know that we have improved our defenses there, he may think that his moves in the South Pacific have diverted sufficient forces to permit success on the second attempt.

(d) Light raids on our staging points south of OAHU.

These are always within enemy capabilities. In fact they are easily possible as a diversion now.
SECRET

October 3rd Cont'd.

The central pacific was quiet. The BBs of TF 1 are at sea off OAHU for training and will return to FEA71 tomorrow.

No changes of enemy deployments were noted.

October 4th.

So far as is known TF 17 did not attack shipping in the BUIN area today as planned. Bad weather may be the reason. The COPAHHE will fly in reinforcements of VF's to GUADALCANAL during the coming week. The enemy continues to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL during the night from destroyers. It is not known here why our surface forces have been unable to break this up.

In his 2 part 050211 General MacArthur explains his need for a minimum of 30 fleet submarines in his area. These cannot be supplied by Cincpac without severe reduction of patrols off JAPAN.

The occupation of the PRISILOPS was completed. Midget subs on a marine railway were seen at Kiska.

As the old BBs of TF 1 urgently require modernization, Cincpac will recommend a program to start in the near future. Among other things, the removal of the 5"/51 battery, conning tower, and boat cranes is to be accomplished.

There are no changes noted in enemy deployments.

October 5th.

Admiral Nimitz returned from his inspection trip in the South Pacific. In general he feels that the situation is favorable. He desires continual pressure on the Japs to prevent them from thinking of adventures in other areas and to prevent them from getting set to re-capture the Southern SOLOMONS. There are quite a few rough spots in the South Pacific set up. The expeditious handling of supplies is the greatest need at the present. Communications are poor, - the Japs have not yet been prevented from landing troops on GUADALCANAL. This later fault may be corrected by Admiral Scott when he arrives in the area (see Comsopac 051202 pink for operations of CTF 64)

No word has been received regarding the planned attack on the shipping in the BUIN-FAISI area by TF 17. The weather may have prevented air operations. Reports of that area indicate that all ships left the area yesterday but returned in greater numbers to-day.

Com Gein 1st Marines 032201 gives a summary of his activities on the 3rd.
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October 5th (Cont't)

It seems probable that our occupation of FUNAFUTI has been discovered by the enemy as one of his 4 engine patrol planes was sighted from there.

CTF-8 052030 gives the results of an Army bombing of KISKA on the 3rd. In the ALEUTIANS the CALDWELL was damaged in a collision with the SPICA and will have to be docked.

There is no new of Jap deployments.

October 6th.

At his regular morning conference, which was attended by General Emmons and Vice Admirals Halsey, Leary and Calhoun, Admiral Nimitz recounted his visit to the South Pacific in considerable detail. The gist of the remarks was to the effect that the general situation is not bad and the many difficulties are being overcome gradually.

Comopac 070306 pink requests one army regiment for use at GUADALCANAL. He also expresses his desire to increase the army garrison at ESPIRITU SANTO to strength of one infantry regiment.

Cominch 062000 questions the employment of VF at CHRISTMAS, TONGATABU and CANTON. Cincpac believes that plenty of VFs should be in advanced areas.

Comopac 051226 gives the summary for the 4th and CTF-17 062114 gives results of the bombing of the BUIN area. At that place results were modest, probably because of adverse weather.

Task Force 17 has been ordered by Comopac to operate generally between NEW ZEALAND and AUSTRALIA. Thus that force is a running sub target and is too far south to be used offensively. The Cincpac would be pleased to see that force at anchor in ESPIRITU SANTO until needed for further offensive operations.

Task Force 64 has been ordered by Comopac to operate to the south and east of GUADALCANAL. As it has the job of breaking up the enemy landings at GUADALCANAL, it looks like it is poorly placed. A better initial position would be generally to the westward of GUADALCANAL.

The ALHENA arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO where an examination of her damage is being made. This again demonstrates the need of salvage vessels in the active areas.

CTF-8 reports an unsuccessful attack on a freighter north of KISKA by three B-24s.

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October 6th (Cont'd)

Continued lack of information regarding enemy moves because of call sign changes makes it difficult to make good predictions regarding the timing of enemy moves. However, there is nothing to indicate that he has abandoned the idea of recapturing the Southern SOLOMONS as soon as possible.

October 7.

The day was generally quiet. In the South Pacific the usual movements of cruisers and destroyers were sighted by our search planes in the Central and North SOLOMONS Area. Admiral Ghormley's 061410 summarizes the 5th and 6th of October.

The query concerning the use of fighters in rear positions which was made by Cominch is partially answered by Comspac 061229 pink and Cinopac 080333 pink.

CTF-17 does not believe his ships were sighted on his recent trip to bomb the BUN IN area.

An examination of the ALHENA shows that she will require docking.

TF-8 072025 gives the results of bombing KISKA on the 6th. Results were minor.

Call sign recoveries still do not permit traffic analysis. This condition may improve during the next month. As long as this condition continues we will not expect much from RI.
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October 8,

Comsopac 001326 gives the summary in his area for the 7th. The daily arrival of troop carrying destroyers at GUADALCANAL continues in spite of our air attacks. During the afternoon of the 7th one CA was reported hit by one bomb and one torpedo. The repeated movement of enemy light vessels into range of our shore based air despite recent damage is an indication of the determination of the enemy to land troops and supplies on GUADALCANAL. Large numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries in the SHORTLANDS area show that place as the advanced jump off point. TF-64 is not yet in position to intercept these approaching ships.

Rear Admiral Turner will command an expedition to land an Army regiment at GUADALCANAL and is scheduled to arrive there the 13th. TF-61, 63 and 64 will cover the move. On the 15th the VIERO, JAMESTOWN, a MTB division will arrive and be stationed in the TULAGI area.

TF-1 continues at PEARL, conducting training off OAHU and prepared to repel landings in the HAWAIIAN area. TF-16 is preparing to sail for the South Pacific on about the 16th.

TF-8 is quiet. It has been suggested to Cominch that the LOUISVILLE of that force be sent to the Southwest Pacific to replace the CHICAGO.

Traffic analysis of the enemy is still not possible. However, sightings in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS Area shows the presence of a good number of cruisers, destroyers, transports, freighters and miscellaneous smaller types. The major units are not located by any means, but 4 BB and 3 CVs with screening vessels are believed in the TRUK - HABAUl general area.

October 9

Comsopac 071246 gives a summary of operations. These are now two days late, but intercepts here keep us well informed. The pressure by air attacks on the enemy shipping in the central SOLOMONS continues with gratifying results. However, the inability of our surface groups to intercept the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL is disappointing. It is hoped that MTBs arriving in the area the 12th or 13th will be able to get in some attacks.

The CHICAGO will be replaced by a CA from the Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, Marine Corps, will send 20 officers and 1000 recruits monthly to SAMOA to provide replacements in the South Pacific.
MEMORANDUM FOR WAR PLANES:

Subject: Suggested Changes in Air Strength -- Alaska.

1. The Army (ELEVENTH Air Force) now have in Alaska:

   146 Fighters
   50 Medium bombers (including 22 attached from R.C.A.F.)
   28 Heavy bombers
   224 Total

As components of the ELEVENTH Air Force these aircraft are not within the jurisdiction of CinCPac. Aside from this fact, however, the present strength can certainly not be called a generous provision to resist sudden attack or to maintain present scale of effort against the enemy.

2. The area of Alaska is provided with a fairly adequate airways system permitting the ready transfer of all types of aircraft throughout the area. This has the effect of reducing the over-all total required to maintain an adequate defense. Unless and until some important change occurs in the strategic situation, it is recommended that the present Army air strength be maintained.

3. The Navy now has in Alaska a total of:

   12 VAF-4 Fighters (ex-COPAKE)
   25 PBY-5 and PBY-5A Patrol Planes (PatWing 4)

These latter comprise 4 squadrons of which it is the indicated intention of ComPatWing 4 to return one squadron to the West Coast during the bad winter weather period beginning about 1 November.

4. Again considering the importance of the area, it is considered decidedly wise to reduce the patrol plane strength available there. In the event of a threat from the westward the Defense Forces would undoubtedly rely completely on Navy VP planes for search operations. Dependence could not be properly placed on aircraft of this type, if available, being flown up from the West Coast after the threat had developed.
Subject: Suggested Changes in Air Strength — Alaska.

3. On the other hand, the basing of carrier type fighters in the Alaskan Area is not justified except to meet some immediate urgency. That situation has long since ceased to exist and the Navy fighters should accordingly be returned to their normal employment in the carrier force at the earliest possible date.

R. A. OPSTE
PROPOSED REDUCTION OF NORTHERN FORCE

October 11, 1942.

1. The Northern Force, Task Force RIGHT, was formed by direction of Cominco to oppose an expected enemy major attack against Dutch Harbor and possibly Alaska. The composition and force commander are as assigned by Cinopac who was governed largely by the restriction of employing forces which had not been sent to the Coral Sea.

2. Though the enemy occupied three Western Alaskans, no major enemy threat developed. In fact he soon reduced his surface forces to a very weak nucleus and has never been able to maintain aircraft of suitable types and numbers to constitute much of a threat. He has now abandoned ATTU and AGATTU and is beaten down regularly at Kiska by strong air attacks. He is deeply involved in the South Pacific and we have every hope of keeping him so.

3. Therefore there is little likelihood of a strong enemy effort in the Northern area for some time to come. Feasible operations of the enemy appear to be:

(a) Air operations from Kiska employing seaplane types, and, if he is able to complete a landing field, land planes. (The feasibility of completing a field suitable for heavy bombers is very doubtful.)

(b) Submarine patrols off our bases and on our line of communications.

(c) Cruiser raids for bombardment and against our communications. (Destroyers might be used if fueled at Kiska.)

(d) Mining off our bases and/or to deny unoccupied base sites.

(e) Commando raids.

4. Our air base at Adak may be considered to be well established and is held by a strong garrison (11,000). A strongly held outpost (4,000) is being placed on Tanaga and another (about 2,000) on the Pribilofs. There may be a garrison and fighter strip on Atka. These and the Army aircraft appear ample to handle the minor activities the enemy may undertake, with the exception of submarine and surface raider attacks on communications. We should also keep some pressure with our submarines on the enemy's communications. Now that there is
SECRET

PROPOSED REDUCTION OF NORTHERN FORCE

only one terminal for enemy shipping the number of submarines which can be profitably employed in this way has been decreased. Also any defensive deployment of submarines would have little chance of encountering targets.

5. A factor not yet mentioned is the weather. This will have a tendency to decrease all operations, and will shortly prevent operation of seaplanes.

6. This all leads to the conviction that the Northern Force should be reduced and perhaps abolished as such. Enemy submarine action is regarded as certain. Therefore A/S escorts must be provided.

(a) It is considered that Rear Admiral Theobald's estimate on the number required must be obtained and given full consideration.

(b) The threat of surface raiders is so small that there is doubt whether any cruisers should be left in the area. If, say two, were based at PEARL they could act as effectively against raiders as they could from KODIAK. 8" cruisers would be preferred. We need the 6" for our night work against Japanese light forces in the GUADALCANAL area.

(c) Navy aircraft should be reduced. 95 is studying this. Comptuing FOUR has recently made proposals for a rotation of squadrons.

(d) Comsubpac will make recommendations as to submarines. The S-boats offer quite a problem. There are nine of them being rotated between SAN DIEGO and DUTCH HARBOR. They have been very ineffective but they may have been "pepped up" some and have not been able to demonstrate it because of lack of targets. In any case, if we remove all large submarines we would be decreasing our submarine strength there much more than mere numbers would show. There is only one good submarine "beat" and that is the vicinity of KISKA. The S-boats ought to be able to handle it, but perhaps we should keep one certainly effective unit on station in the ALSEUTIANS. With such a reduction it must be determined whether Captain Gololough will continue to be needed.

(e) Should the Northern Force be abolished and Rear Admiral Theobald be withdrawn? I believe the regular sea frontier command set-up can handle the reduced forces. If "fleet opposed invasion" status is continued it should be made consistent with other sea frontiers - Navy control Army bombers and scouts; Army control the fighters.
SECRET

October 9 (Continued)

Ten LC2 type ships will be sent to the South Pacific at the rate of three per month, starting October.

Kiska was bombed again on the 8th as shown in JTF 8 100150.

No changes in enemy plans or intentions are noted today. Jap interest continues to center in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS area.

October 10.

Shortly before midnight TF-64.2 intercepted an enemy force thought to contain 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers west of SAVO Island. Results are not in yet. During the day the Japs made strong but harmless bombing attacks on GUADALCANAL. Their plane losses were roughly the ratio 4 to 1 of ours. Our Marines now have their battle position on the west of the MATANIKAU river.

The operations for the 8th and 9th are summarized by ComSoPac in his 091316. His 111314 states that the situation will not permit him to give a fixed policy in the assignment of troops. He also has a shortage of communication personnel in his area and requests CinCPac to supply deficiencies.

Acorn One has been assigned to HEN I and Acorn Two to ESPIRITU SANTO.

The AMBERJACK sank the No. 3 TONAU MARU (whale factory ship) in KAVIENG Harbor. As a result of DI the AMBERJACK was also ordered to intercept an AK enroute PONAPE. The AK was sunk.

The ZUIKAKU, escorted by one cruiser and one destroyer, was sighted by one of our submarines to the northwest of TRUK and heading toward that place.

In the SW Pacific the Japs are trying to evacuate remaining troops at MILNE in submarines. Also, there is reported a serious lack of torpedoes in that area and the submarines are now being sent on mining missions.

C.S. SAMOA has inspected FUNAFUTI and finds that the defenses are coming along fine and that preparations are going ahead to construct a landing strip.

The North Pacific was quiet. Admiral Theobald complains that air bombs supplied to him are poor. He reports that three hits on ships at Kiska last month were duds.
October 10 (Continued).

The Japs continue to suffer losses and damage from our air attacks in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS Area, but in spite of that indications continue of preparations for an assault on GUADALCANAL in the near future. The sighting of the ZUIKAKU confirms the belief that she made a trip home.

October 11.

The results of the engagement between Task Force 64.2 off SAVO Island yesterday are not known completely today. It appears that the DUNCAN was sunk, the BOISE severely damaged, the other cruisers slightly damaged. The enemy may have lost four DD and one CA damaged. During the following daylight period our air from GUADALCANAL may have sunk one cruiser, and damaged two destroyers. TF-64.2 is retiring to ESPIRITU SANTO.

Comsopac 101946 summarizes the activities of his area for the 9th and 10th. There were no important developments reported.

Comsopac 111006 and Cincpac 120329 comment on amphibious training in the South Pacific.

As the situation has now changed materially in the Pacific Ocean Areas, and especially in the North Pacific, consideration is being given to a reduction of TF-8. Attached is the whole story. CTF-8 111930 amplifies the report of the bombing of Kiska on the 9th. Army bombing was very poor in spite of favorable circumstances. The HALIBUT ran into what he reports as a decoy (a maru type, guns, 2000 tons) 50 miles north of ADEN Island. His torpedo attack was not successful.

The CALIFORNIA left PEARL for BREMERTON yesterday. The WEST VIRGINIA will follow in about a month. The NYP5 thinks they can put these ships in service after 5½ months overhaul.

There are some indications that the Japs have underestimated our strength in the SOLOMONS, and are now gathering considerably more army strength from the PHILIPPINES and the NEI. In this case they would not attempt an all out attack for some time. Meanwhile our attrition successes are bound to affect seriously any plans they may have. In any event we feel quite sure that JAPAN is so deeply committed in the SOUTH PACIFIC that they cannot undertake any major adventures in any other area.
SECRET

October 12.

Fragmentary reports do not permit accurate assessment of the damage inflicted on the enemy intercepted by Rear Admiral Scott's Force in the 2nd battle of SANG ISLAND. The estimate today is one cruiser sunk, one cruiser damaged, four destroyers sunk or damaged, small transport probably sunk. Our damage was DUNGAN sunk; HOIIE badly damaged; HELENA, SALT LAKE CITY, and FAREWELL slightly damaged.

Rear Admiral Turner brought one Army regiment to GUADALCANAL in the early morning and was able to unload the transports and depart in the evening. He was interrupted by two air raids, and shelling from enemy shore positions on his ships and our shore positions. No damage was done to ships but the GUADALCANAL airfield was damaged by bombs to the extent that heavy bombers could use it only in emergency. Toward midnight enemy ships commenced a bombardment of the Marine position.

Consopac 121316 gives the summary for his area.

TF 17 was evidently sighted West of RENNEI ISLAND and reported by the enemy. The WASHINGTON group Northwest of SAN CRISTOBAL was sighted and reported also.

Cominoh has not yet replied to Cinopac request for clarification of his status resulting from General Marshall's order to C.G. Hawaii to stop the move of the second group of B-17s from HAWAII to the South Pacific. A follow up was sent.

KISKA was bombed on both the 10th and 11th as reported in CTF 8 122010. The new Army garrisons in the ALBINTANS and PRIVILOPS are shown in CTF 8 122234. We now find that the Army plans an airfield on St. PAUL ISLAND. Cinopac 130139 crystallizes views here on a reduction of TF 8.

A large concentration of enemy ships is reported in the WIN-FAISI area. There continues to be no doubt in the mind of Cinopac that the enemy is proceeding along the lines shown in the Estimate of Enemy Capabilities dated October 1, 1942.

October 13.

On the 11th (local date) a marine battalion from TULAGI landed to the eastward of our main position on GUADALCANAL and successfully attacked small enemy outposts. Also on that day our CACTUS planes (1) bombed S DD badly damaging one, (2) attacked a CA getting one torpedo hit, (3) again attacked the same CA and 2 screening DDs causing the CA to be abandoned and badly damaging one DD.
October 13th (Continued)

On the 12th local B-17s bombed BUKA causing minor damage. Again on the 13th (local) B-17s bombed the BUKA airfield and attacked shipping in the BUNI harbor. Of the 36 vessels reported in that vicinity one AK was damaged. All of these vessels were seen still there the next morning by a coastwatcher and included 2 CA, 3 CL, 10 DD, 1 AV.

The heavy gunfire on GUADALCANAL noted yesterday continued for 70 minutes during the night 13-14th local causing very heavy damage to planes on the field. During the middle of the day there were two bombing attacks on the airfield causing additional damage, but the field was in service for all but the biggest planes.

TC C2.4 was enroute GUADALCANAL with supplies including avgas. Due to approaching enemy the AKs were turned back and the VIREO towing FAB barges loaded with avgas and escorted by the MEREDITH was ordered to continue to GUADALCANAL. The McFAHLAN was also ordered to bring in a deck load of avgas.

During the morning search planes discovered three enemy forces. One consisting of 6 AP, 1 CL, 7 DD and covered by 1 PH, 3 CL, 4 DD was tracked along the east coast of SANTA ISABEL ISLAND and heading for GUADALCANAL. Six B-17s attacked this force in the late afternoon. The second force about 400 miles N.N.W. of GUADALCANAL, and on southeasterly courses consisted of carriers escorted by BBs, CAs, and DDs. That force was not sighted again during the day. A third force consisting of cruisers and DDs apparently scouting in advance of the carrier group was sighted during the morning about 225 miles northeast of GUADALCANAL.

As a result of these sightings Comsopac ordered: TF-64 (SAN FRANCISCO, CHESTER, HELENA, LANSDOWNE, LARDNER, McCALLA, BUCHANAN, AARON WARD, LAPPEY) to proceed toward GUADALCANAL (got underway daybreak 15th local); TF-17 to proceed toward GUADALCANAL as soon as fuel permits; TF-17.8 proceed ESPiritu SANTOS for fuel and report readiness to depart.

The above indicates that the enemy has commenced his major offensive. Because our surface forces need fuel, our lack of adequate avgas at GUADALCANAL (to be flown in), and recent heavy loss of planes, our position is not favorable to prevent a major enemy landing. Planes left are 7 3BD, 4 P-400, 2 P-39; 10 SBDs were flown in during the afternoon.

The position of our forces in the area has been discovered by the enemy.

The TROUT reports that she got two hits on the OTAKA on September 28th in the TRUK area.

The ACHILLES and LEANDER are to go to ENGLAND for a 4½ months refit.
SECRET

October 13th (Continued)

Coninch 132030 indicates that there will soon be an agreement on the use of Army airplanes in the Pacific Ocean areas.

TF-1G is at sea off OAHU training and will probably depart for the South Pacific on the 16th. TF-1 continues training and readiness for PHANL.

CTF-C 140230 pink recommends withdrawal of TF-6 from the North Pacific about November 1st and turning over the job to Commodore Heflin.

October 14th

After midnight an enemy force commenced shelling our position on GUADALCANAL heavily. Damage done was not reported. During night the six enemy transports started landing to the westward of our position. The landing was covered by 3rd group west of GAVO and screened by cruisers and destroyers. During the morning search the CV striking force seen yesterday was located Northeast of SAN CRISTOBAL ISLAND.

During the morning a group of B-17s attacked the transports and ships at GUADALCANAL setting three on fire so badly that they were beached, and hitting a B3.

As the day ended all enemy forces in the GUADALCANAL area were retreating. The CV group moves are not clear and may be moving on ESPIRITU SANTO.

TF 17 was probably fueling during the day and may be in a position to strike tomorrow. TF 17.8 fueled at ESPIRITU SANTO and departed at 3 p.m. (local) to rendezvous with TF 64, where the forces will merge as TF 64 under Rear Admiral Lee. Consonac 150212. This force cannot get to the GUADALCANAL area before day after tomorrow. Because of a possible enemy raid, all shipping at ESPIRITU SANTO got underway toward the South.

The gasoline situation at GUADALCANAL continues critical. The VIRSO towing a PAB barge, and screened by the MEREDITH, can arrive there tomorrow morning.

Motor torpedo boats attacked the DDs protecting the enemy APs at GUADALCANAL. Results were not observed. One LT cruiser damaged.

A submarine shelled ESPIRITU SANTO last night.

Our AKs which were turned back from the Tulagi area yesterday were bombed but not damaged.
SECRET

October 14th (Continued)

Consopac 15074/6 feels that he needs another Army division for present operations. Cinopac concurs.

Our cruiser action in the GILBERTS (PORTLAND and TAN YUAN) caused the Japs some uneasy moments. Results have not been reported.

Highest quarters would be pleased to have IVA shelled by our old BBs. (Cominouch 141325). CTF 8 151025, in answer to a query on the operation from Cinopac, states that it is feasible.

The Japanese may be expected to reorganize their forces during the next few days. There is no indication that they have abandoned their efforts to recapture the Southern TARUMA, or that they are planning anything in other areas.

October 15th

The days reports indicate that the enemy now has two major forces in the South Pacific. In the central and northern Solomons, forces are:

Off NE BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND:  
1 BB, 2 CA, 2 DD, 1 AV.

At FUKA:  
2 CA, 2 CL, 8 DD, 3 AV, 10 auxiliaries

At WIN - FAISI:  
3 BB, 2 CV, 3 CA, 5 JL, 10 DD, 14 auxiliaries

Along the 165th meridian (east) as far south as 11-00 3:  
2 BB, 1 CV, 17 cruisers and destroyers.

In view of the above enemy deployment TF 54 was ordered to operate generally South of Lat 11-45 S. Consopac 160812. He is also sending two DDs to bombard enemy at TULUULU (his 160722). Consopac has asked that the vessels in the WIN-FAISI area be attacked by SWPac air, which General MacArthur promises to do. Consopac 160032 orders TF 17 to operate eastward of ESPIRITU SANTO. Consopac 160440 considers his present forces inadequate for his tasks.

There is some indication that the LUNGA area may have been mined by the enemy on the 12th (local).

The MOOREY reports capturing 4 officers and 70 men, survivors of the 2nd Battle of SAVO. Preliminary statements of these prisoners are not creditable.
SECRET

October 16th (Continued)

Comairsoap 150921 gives the critical situation at GUADAalanai. Conen 1st Nodiv 160005 describes action on yesterday; and his 160035 tells of enemy land concentrations. Also his 160028 tells of needs to relieve his present situation. He requests 1 battery of 155 mm guns be sent to him as soon as possible.

Air strength at GUADAalanai was increased today by 3 SBD and four R4D1. The shortage of planes and gasoline there now will almost preclude offensive action.

It now appears that we are unable to control the sea area in the GUADAalanai area. Thus our supply of the positions will only be done at great expense to us. The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.

The McFARLAND did a splendid piece of work in delivering gasoline and ammunition to GUADAalanai today. As she was about to leave she received a bomb hit on her stern which knocked out her steering gear. It now seems probable that the MEREDITH was lost and the VIREO towing avgas to GUADAalanai was damaged by enemy air.

Cominch 152125 describes APAs. They are not hospital ships under the Geneva Conventions. Com 12 151744 tells of sending EG2 ships to Sopac.

CTF 3 152050 describes a bombing attack on Kiska the 14th. Results were minor.

Cincpac 100455 pink does not recommend use of F-4's to shell Kiska.

There is no doubt now that Japs are making an all out effort in the SOLOMONS, employing the greater part of their Navy.

October 16th

Just as the McFARLAND was ready to leave GUADAalanai in the evening she was hit by a bomb on the stern. 350 drums of avgas in a barge alongside was also exploded. About 20000 gals. reached the shore. While enroute GUADAalanai towing a barge with 2000 drums avgas the VIREO was damaged by an air attack and unable to continue the tow. The MEREDITH, escorting, is unreported and suspected missing. The the acute avgas shortage continues. The HOFFSTADT and SOUTHERN are scheduled to arrive with deck loads of avgas on the 19th local. There is also a critical shortage of bombs - which may have to be flown in. The AMBERJACK is now enroute ESPIRITU SANTO to be fitted to carry gas.

During the night the Marines at GUADAalanai were shelled by a cruiser or a destroyer. The results of our bombardment of enemy
SECRET

October 16th (Continued)

positions by 2 DDs is not yet known.

Copac 151346 gives his summary for the 14th and 15th, and his 161326 summarizes the situation to the 16th local.

Comairsopac 162136 describes air needs for his command and Comsopac 171230 gives what he considers necessary to reinforce his position.

The New Zealand Army has agreed to garrison BLENHEIM and will have a reinforced BGuI ready about November 7th.

The HELLETRIX arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO and reports some damage from an air attack two days ago, which also forced her to cast a PAS barge adrift.

Comsopac 160106 deals with the relief of the 4th defense battalion with the 9th at EFATE.

It has been decided to send about 50 Army fighters from the Central Pacific area to the South Pacific in the immediate future.

Comsopac 170800 is a proposal for the employment of submarines to support Copac current operations. Two Pacific Fleet ships will be sent to General MacArthur to assist his coverage of the SHALANDA-FAIKI area.

Cincopac 162221 proposes a reduction of TF 8 forces in ALASKA. Cominch approves an immediate reduction of the cruisers to two. This will permit reinforcement to Copac. TF 8 reports that 3 B-24's got hits on a ship in GERTRUDE COVE, VIA. Also that Army bombers probably sank one DD and damaged another just north of VIA.

The deployment of the Jap forces in the South Pacific is uncertain. Some forces have left the BUN area and the CV striking force thought north of MAEBI is unreported.
SECRET

October 17th.

The Admiral's conference this morning was attended by General Emmons and Rear Admiral Barley. These officers were brought up to date on the situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

The day in the South Pacific is summarized in Comsopac 171556.

Our DDs, previously mentioned, report having fired 1000 rounds per ship into the Jap positions at GUADALCANAL.
Also, during that day TF17 planes attacked the same positions incessantly. REKATA was also attacked by TF17 planes. Admiral Nimitz will urge Comsopac to repeat the bombardment daily when feasible.

The Japs launched what must be to them a very disappointing air attack on GUADALCANAL today. Of the 14 bombers attacking, 8 were shot down by our fighters and 6 were shot down by AA.

A total of 50 Army fighters will be sent to the Sopac from the Central Pacific. 25 were ordered sent by General Marshall and 25 will be sent by C'nopac.

The VIREO will be towed to port and her harve will be towed to GUADALCANAL by the JEMINCOLE arriving the 19th local.

Comsopac is flying emergency war ammunition to GUADALCANAL.

It seems most probable that TF64 was seen by the enemy today.

The SAN JUAN reports sinking two small Jap patrol boats when retiring from their raid on the GILBERTS and the patrol lines to the South. Two officers and 14 men were captured. They will continue to raid that line with our ships enroute to and from the Sopac.

The SWPac bombers are having much better success in bombing enemy ships in the SOLOMONS and NEW BRITAIN.

TF16 is enroute to the South Pacific via a point to the westward of FUNAFUTI where it will fuel.

Two fleet subs from PEARL may be sent to operate under General McArthur in the near future in order to provide denser coverage of the SHORTLAND - FAISI area.

The position of the main enemy forces in the South Pacific is obscure. It is not thought, however, that they have withdrawn from the general area.
SECRET

October 18th

Commodore 181350 wmk, Vice Admiral Halsey relieved Vice Admiral Ghormley as Commander South Pacific Force and South Pacific Area. On the evening of the 15th Admiral Nimitz conferred with members of his staff concerning relieving Admiral Ghormley. It was felt that Admiral Ghormley has not been successful for several reasons and that the critical situation there requires a more aggressive Commander. The following morning, after having received authority from Admiral King to make the change, a decision was made to effect the change upon the arrival of Admiral Halsey who was enroute by air. Rear Admiral Finkle will thus retain command of TF 16. (See. Compre 181657 and 181441 Wmk)

The J. J. Hawaiian Department has been directed by General Marshall (October 16th) to select one infantry division from his command for movement to the South or SW Pacific and to report earliest date of readiness of the first regimental combat team. Also General Marshall prefers General Collins as division commander as General Fennel is too old. Early replacement this division will not be possible.

The Sopea situation to the 18th was summarized in Sopea 181426. Generally the day (19th local) was quiet. There were no contacts ashore on GUADALCANAL reported. While 40 vessels were sighted in the SHORTLANDS area, the location of major enemy units was in doubt. 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers were reported enroute to attack GUADALCANAL and JTF 64 was ordered to intercept. However, he was fueling west of SOEHADAN and was unable to comply. The SOUTHARD delivered almost 10,000 gallons aviation gas to GUADALCANAL. The SPHINX towed the VIROQ barque with 2000 drums of aviation gas into the area but went to TULAGI because of the approaching enemy. No bombardment was reported last night, but some troops and supplies may have been landed. Apparently the VIROQ was abandoned by her crew because of fear of an air attack. The crew embarked on the MERRYDITH which was sunk by aerial torpedoes and bombs shortly thereafter. The abandoning of the VIROQ is not understood. It looks like a disgraceful procedure. TF 64 continues to be trailed by enemy planes. REVEL and RANK INCLINED had been occupied by small enemy garrisons.

The SW Pacific air sent 22 B-17's to bomb the enemy in the SHORTLANDS area. Results were minor. The CUMFAX reported sinking two tankers on the 18th.

JTF 64 estimates that in the second battle of OSAK he sank 3 CA, 4 DD, and possibly 1 CL and one more DD. These figures seem high because of the number of cruisers and destroyers seen and attacked by planes the following day.

The PORTLAND reports engaging two DDs and two marus in her raid of the GILBERTS. No sinkings were reported. The attacks
SECRET

October 18th (Continued)

were not pressed home because of fear of air attack.

The Army in Washington has approved Admiral Nimitz's orders to send 25 P-38's from CHRISTMAS to the South Pacific.

TF 1 has been ordered to prepare a plan to bomb Wakayama at an early date - the date dependent upon availability of 1 CL(2) and 1 CL(3) to be added to the bombardment group.

Cincpac 182159 urges that the 9th defense battalion be sent directly to GUANALANAL instead of relieving the 4th at ESTATE.

JTF 8 gives the minor results of a bombing of IJNAF on the 17th. Cominich has approved the immediate reduction to two of TF 8 cruisers but reserves decision on withdrawal of other forces and of Rear Admiral Theobald. The Army plans to increase the garrisons at ADAM and TANAGA to 15000 and 5000 respectively.

There are no changes noted in enemy deployments.

October 19th

Copac operations to the 20th are summarized in his 191956.

About 9 p.m., local the JAPAN was torpedoed south of JAN CRISTOBAL. The reports being without power and a tug and 20 escorts were provided.

JTF 64 sent part of his force to SPIRIT COAST to fuel, and the remainder will fuel there in the next few days. TF 17 is operating to the East of SPIRIT COAST. TF 16 is on route South.

In his 191956, Cominich directed Commodore Copac to place and maintain 12 fleet subs under operational control of Commodore. Also in his 201540 he desires Cincpac to reinforce Copac submarines.

There were two air raids on SPIRIT COAST. Of the 30 zeros and 16 bombers involved 7 zeros and 2 bombers were shot down. We lost two pilots.

The SPIRIT broke in two and sank today while enroute PEARL for repairs, after being torpedoed last month.

While the supply of aces and bombs to SPIRIT COAST is still critical, enough is being sent in to permit operations to continue. The NEMACK will arrive with a small cargo of gas on the 25th.

The 12 3-17's for the Sopac have left CAFI. This brings the total transferred recently up to 24. Also from CAFI was the
SECRET

October 19th (Continued)

First of the 19th bombardment group (P-47's) going to AUSTRALIA.

In the BATAAN area yesterday were at least 1 CV, 1 CA, 8 cruisers, 8 DD, 8 AK's. At SARBAL were 24 large vessels and 22 of medium size. In that group was 1 CV and 1 CA. Thus we now have the position of most strength in the area except it is probable that 3 carriers, 2 CV, with usual flotilla are somewhere in the general TAIWAN area.

October 20th

Copac operations for the 20th are summarized in his 201021.

The CHESTER is making 6 knots under own steam and at that rate should arrive at ESQUIMALT jetty day after tomorrow.

Sounder 00407 indicates the shortage of planes at GUADALCANAL. The rate of attrition there is extremely high. Much damage to planes was caused by recent enemy shelling.

Yesterday the Marines repulsed a minor attempt to cross the KATAMIKAU RIVER.

Cinacopac 202215 and 202309 describe a plan to send 12 Pac Fleet subs to the Copac. This is an emergency move to provide dense coverage in the active area, and complies with Cominch desire noted yesterday.

KURUWEL ISLAND is not occupied by the Japs.

The Fighting French High Commissioner has left VICTA for good, in the opinion of someone.

The GROUNDY returning from patrol in the BAY WATERS area reports sinking 17,000 tons of mersis (2 ships).

The very large concentration of Jap ships at ESQUIMALT apparently continues. Photos do not show a CV there as reported yesterday. There is very good indication that the Japs are having to slow up their plans for an attack in force on TAIWAN because of large attrition losses.

Cinacopac pointed out to Cominch that now is a golden opportunity for the British Eastern Fleet to take action on the Jap west flank.
SECRET

October 21st

Vice Admiral Halsey will move ashore at HONOLULU occupying certain buildings vacated by the Fighting French High Commissioner. Jominich approves taking over this French property as a military necessity. (His 211900 Dink)

Jominich concurs in Cinacap proposal for British action (Jominich 211400 Dink) and passed the measure along to the Admiralty.

In a 3 part (211630) Jominich gives the present plans for Army and Navy air support to the Cinacopac operations.

TF 16 and TF 17 will join an TF 61 under Rear Admiral Finkell at 0300 GCT October 24th and make a sweep around north east of the Bismark, thence south-westerly east of the Bismark, thence south-westerly east of the Bismarck to the Coral Sea area in position to intercept enemy forces approaching our positions in the Southern Pacific.

The HMAS, HMAS, HMAS, and HMAS have been ordered to the Pacific Fleet and will depart Atlantic ports for the Coral Sea area no later than November 10th.

Jominich 211631 Dink summarizes the situation in the Pacific.

Cinacopac 210517 tells of need of a major supply base at NGATTA. Cinacopac 212300 tells of need of 73 planes in the forward areas.

There is a shortage of Marines in the STAK area and at WUAMATI.

The 25th Army Division at GATTO has been ordered to move to the South of GATTO starting November 15th.

The GORTER sighted an enemy merchant type vessel of about 5,000 tons, apparently armed with several guns, 4" or larger, near the GILBERT ISLAND. An engagement which followed the GORTER fired about 1800 rounds without sinking the vessel. No damage was done to the GORTER.

Jominich has approved the withdrawal of the COHAGES YF squadron from ALATCA and cancelled the directive to maintain one fighter division in ALATCA.
Jonsopac22246 summarizes operations in his area. The use of tanks and small artillery by the enemy on GUADALCANAL indicates the ability of the Japs to land good sized weights. There have been indications of towing lighters to GUADALCANAL by destroyers.

Japs attacked shipping in the S.M.T.A. area early in the morning. Although one plane reported a torpedo hit, it indicates no damage.

A search plane reported sighting an enemy tank force about 350 miles NE of KUL Oltena 10 in the morning (local). This was indicated to be a 7Y striking force on southerly course. The search kept the force fairly well under observation during the day. During the following night a search plane reported making radar contact in that general vicinity. One hour later the same plane reported 8 ships, of which one was believed to be a 7Y, and that he dropped his torpedo but failed to get a hit. When last observed the force was reported on course 290 speed 20 - which would permit it to be in a fly off position for GUADALCANAL next daylight. This is the first time in several days that we have been able to get much light on Jap deployments. The RABAL and TURTLE areas continued to be well filled with Jap ships, most of which were auxiliaries. The Combined total in those areas was 93 vessels. From all indications the enemy seems about ready to start his low expected all out attack on GUADALCANAL. The next three or four days are critical.

GUADALCANAL reported three flights of planes coming in from the northwest during the middle of the day but no report of bombing was received.

Jonsopac welcomes the Army T-Os but points out that if they are not the "NEW" series they are no good as fighters but excellent for ground strafing. While the flow of planes to the area cannot be considered satisfactory, it is improving. In the GUADALCANAL area there is enough ammos (over 100,000 sacks) to keep General Geiger's planes filled, there is not enough to operate B-17's; nor is there any immediate prospect of so doing. Ammos and ammunition still arrives there in driblets.

A crew was put on the VINC. That ship, with TAO #5 in tow, is now enroute ESPERRIT SAINTOU.

TF 61 will hardly be in a position to intercept enemy forces in the "ZUK" before late afternoon of the 25th local. TF 64 could be off GUADALCANAL on the 25th. Thus, should the enemy strike tomorrow air and submarines will be the only opposition.

Jonsaphibforsopac 210956 gives information from prisoners on the 2nd Battle of IWO. General DeGaulle has fully agreed to the assignment of necessary buildings at HATA to Jonsopac. Governor Bonchamps was authorized to negotiate any other matters with Jonsopac. In a very cordial conversation with Jomspeva he emphasized his desire for full cooperation with the R. About time.
SECRET

October 22nd. (Continued)

It is possible that the poor shooting reported yesterday and attributed to the 17TH was done by Condorson T.J. in the 16TH.

TF 1 continues at PHILLand engaged in training and upkeep while being prepared to repel landing attempts in the Hawaiian Area.

In the KOKARANG, enemy submarines were active, one fired torpedoes at the TURITI which missed. The F-22 reports hitting 2 AKs with torpedoes in the vicinity of KOKARANG and claims one probably sunk and one damaged. The cruisers of TF 8 completed a 10 day sweep as far west as ATU. Results were negative. Hincopac 277129 requests Somisoh approval to exchange the UTICA and RALEIGH for cruisers of TF 8.

We are still without definite news of the major units of the enemy which are thought to be in the general Solomons area. If our guess is correct they can throw more ships, planes, and troops into the vital area than we can. And this situation will continue for the next few weeks. Having inferior forces we must count heavily on attrition, but losing no chance to come up with the enemy under the principle of calculated risk.

October 23rd.

Operations in the South Pacific are summarized in Hincopac 277141. The very fine work of our Marine pilots in shooting down the enemy planes is most encouraging. Again during the day, the airfield unsuitable for heavy planes. There is much work to be done to provide all-weather fields in the area and several other locations are under consideration.

General MacArthur reports good success in air raids in the civilian area. Among other targets claimed hit he reports setting a tanker on fire. If this is verified it is bound to slow up the enemy somewhat.

The submarine concentration in the active area is beginning to shape up with the arrival of two Pacific Fleet units from TRUK. Ten more are to follow from PHILAND, leaving before the end of this month.

Both TF 61 and TF 64 will be in position to strike the enemy in the Southern Solomons by late tomorrow.

The logistic support of our positions in the southern Solomons is proceeding, but the difficulties of unloading and the great risk to ships involved continues.

The CHESTER probably arrived at EXHIBIT units for emergency repairs today.

Cam (Continued on next page)
SECRET

October 23rd (Continued)

Our search plane from OAHU reported sighting a submarine
about 500 miles southwest of that place. If this can be verified
it may be the forerunner of projected enemy operations in the
Hawaiian Sea Frontier. H. I. also gives indication of some sort
of a raid. A raid in the near future, probably at HAINAN, is con-
sidered a possibility. All signs continue to point to the commence-
ment of major operations in the South Pacific within the next two
or three days. If these signs are right, a raid in the MAHAI area or alone our exposed positions to the South will be a minor
hit and run affair.

The exchange of the FAND and KALITA for TF 8 cruisers
has been approved by Sommers and will be effected as soon as possi-
able.

October 24th,

Reports of enemy contacts from search planes in the South
Pacific during the morning were confusing. One force composed of
BBs, CBs, and DDs was reported 140 miles NE of the GUADALCANAL air-
field. 130 miles to the eastward of that group a second force was
reported. This was reported to be 2 TB, 2 NY, 2 CA, 7 CL, and at
least 4 DD. A third force stated to be composed of nine ships was
reported 210 miles NE GUADALCANAL. Off the east coast of HATH
TARARON ISLAND a force composed of 1 BB, 3 CL, and 2 DD was reported.
Off the west coast of KALITA a force of two cruisers and three
destroyers was reported. While the picture is not clear, enough
was reported to show a typical major enemy move toward the south.
TF 61 was too far afield to attack. TF 64 was ordered to strike any
forces encountered in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL. That force made
a sweep of the GUADALCANAL area but failed to make contact with the
enemy and withdrew. B-17's were ordered to strike the forces nearest
GUADALCANAL, probably because they were the immediate threat.
Results are shown in Somairosocap 251450. During the morning our posi-
tion on GUADALCANAL was shelled by two cruisers and one destroyer.
As that group was retiring to the northward Marine TD's attacked
and reported one cruiser obviously damaged. As enemy night attack
landings, General Vandegrift ordered motor torpedo boats
from TF 61 to strike the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL after dark.
During the afternoon enemy planes were reported heading toward
GUADALCANAL.

A Catalina night radar search and torpedo strike was ordered
from TOBAGO to the NW.

One squadron of the 90th bombardment group (P-24's) pre-
viously ordered to AUSTRALIA is to report to General Harman for
temporary duty by orders from General Marshall.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

October 24th. (Continued)

The 8th Marines have been ordered to VOTA and should arrive there October 30th.

Tobar 250216 gives the summary of operations in that area to the 24th.

Admiral Chormley arrived at PEARL today on route to Washington.

A submarine was reported 120 miles west of AM. This may be the same one sighted yesterday about 500 miles off AM.

Two DDs from TF 16 raided the enemy patrol line south of the ILBERT on the 22nd and sank two small patrol vessels. It now appears that a DD of TF 17, also raided the same patrol line on the same day.

The Army planes made a minor air attack on I-ta during the day.

October 25th.

In the early morning TF 61 was about 150 miles southeast of the enemy striking forces noted yesterday in the area to the eastward of the ILBERT. Both forces had good knowledge of the approximate position and composition of each other. Our position and strength seemed quite favorable. Shortly before 7 a.m. local an enemy shore-based patrol plane made an accurate contact report of TF 61. The enemy immediately launched a carrier strike which was able to find TF 61 without further search. Ours was our carrier strike was launched at about the same time. There is some evidence that it had to search before locating the target.

A little after 9 a.m. local the enemy started air attacks on TF 61. The ILBRET was severely damaged by bombs and torpedoes and was taken in tow by the illfated TUN. A preliminary report of damage to other vessels is given in JTF 61 260210. Damage inflicted by our IV planes is shown in JTF 61 260210. B-17's from GRAND TURNO were also ordered to attack but the amount of damage inflicted is not in. After the first attack TF 61 continued retreat to the southeast. During the afternoon the enemy 27 planes attacked the ILBRET again with bombs and torpedoes causing serious damage that TF 17 decided to sink the carrier with own torpedoes. As the day ended the enemy seemed to be retiring to the northwest and all of our task forces were retiring on southerly courses.

(except for one force containing DD's which was attempting to intercept our force during the afternoon.)

Continued on next page)
For the first time in the South Pacific our CV task forces were able to operate under a search umbrella and the enemy strength and disposition was reported frequently. The Japs have always had this advantage in the area. During the past two days there has been a front along the northern part of the search area which has reduced the efficiency of the search.

No report of enemy plane losses has been received but they must have been very heavy. If the percentage of loss approaches that of previous recent engagements (and it should as we have been loading our ships with AA), the three enemy CV’s thought to have been in the battle today will be unable to do much more damage soon.

At daylight TF 64 presumably was retiring from GUADALCANAL. During the morning Comosac ordered all TF to strike the enemy. Later in the day TF 64 was ordered to retire to the southward.

The enemy group which shelled GUADALCANAL on the 24th also sank the SEMINOLE and a YF at TULAGI. The SEMINOLE was fitted for salvage and his loss is serious.

While entering ESPIRITU SANTO the CLAUDINE, with one regimental combat team of the 43rd Army Division embarked, struck one or more mines and sank. While she probably struck our own mine field, there is a possibility that enemy mines are responsible as a Jap sub was in the vicinity recently.

General Harmon is holding usable B-17’s at PANTAN for emergency combat. Those held are enroute from AUSTRALIA to CAHU.

Operations preceding the battle in the South Pacific are summarized in Comosac 260210.

The SARGO returning from patrol off the CHINA coast reports sinking one 7000 ton freighter with torpedos and gunfire. The STURGEON returning from patrol in the FAISI - ST GEORGES channel area reported sinking one loaded 10,000 ton tanker and one 7000 ton freighter. The NAUTILUS clearing patrol area off Eastern HONSHU reports sinking 22000 tons enemy shipping.

The CHESTER will be able to leave ESPIRITU SANTO about October 29th under her own power. Due to extensive damage she will be able to make only seven knots. She will go to SYDNEY for temporary repairs.

There were no important contacts in the Central or North Pacific area. The landing strip on ST PAUL ISLAND is now 100 feet wide by 2300 feet long. The SPERRY and FULTON leave PEARL for the South Pacific tomorrow.

Although the enemy has suffered considerable damage recently in the general SOLOMONS area there is no indication that he has

(Continued on next page)
abandoned his plan to recapture Guadalcanal. The Jap subs are ordered to search for and attack our forces in the area. Due to the strength in the South, no major operations in any other area are considered probable at this time. Small nuisance raids in the Central Pacific area are possible.

October 26th.

The Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander Hawaiian Ocean Frontier, were present at the morning conference when events of the previous day were reviewed. Admiral Wainwright continues to keep his principal subordinate fully informed of developments in the Pacific Ocean areas.

The morning search from CL-48 to two discovered groups of the enemy about 460 miles to the eastward of NUULOO. At least two PT's, 1 W, several cruisers and destroyers were reported. All were on northerly courses at fair high speed. Operations in the area are summarized in Jompspec 270266, which includes a night attack by PT's on an enemy carrier, which is also reported by Commodore in his 270231. TF 41 reports further details of course to his force in his 270646. After delivering 15 and 46 to Makin, the 41 and 46 turned three enemy 1's at dawn and escorred with minor damage to the Australian force of 1's. The pilots joined the battle and are credited with sinking two of the enemy 1's. TF 41 and TF 46 retired during the 1's toward Makin Island.

TF 46.2 (Rear Admiral Scott) in TF 46.4, 46.5 is ordered to pound the enemy positions on TULUWALU Island on the morning of the 26th and 27th (Nelson).

General MacArthur is requested by Admiral Wainwright to make maximum battle effort day and night against value in the TULUWALU-TAF Territory area.

Admiral Wainwright requests carrier reinforcement from the British Eastern Fleet. MacArthur concurs and agrees to explore the idea (Jompspec 270291 plus).

During the afternoon 14 2-17s attacked the area west of the TF 46.4. 811 hits.

Jompspec 260244 gives the plan for the employment of army fighters and medium bomber in the TULUWALU-ESPIRITU SANTO area.

(Continued on next page)
October 20th. (Continued)

Consopac 270437 sets forth his views for setting up a base command separate from Scronopac.

There were no developments of note in the Central and north Pacific areas.

During the day a force composed of battleships and other combatant vessels was reported on our slopes in a position to the eastward of the UTAH. The force was reported to be enemy, but was later identified as part of Task Force 17.

October 27th.

Lieut. General Deacon, Rear Admiral Roselay, and Vice Admiral Towers attended the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.

Consopac 280326 amplifies his report of operations for the previous days. The enemy reported that a unit had received a torpedo hit about the time of the UTAH attack, while the enemy usually reports "no damage" or "minor damage." In such cases, we know from past experience that damage inflicted is often much greater than reported.

T.O. 64.2 (Rear Admiral Scott in ATLANTIC, ATLANTIC, ATLANTIC, LEXINGTON, CUMBERLAND) will be unable to shell the Japs on SANTA ROSA on the 29th as requested and is now ordered to shell on the 28th only.

The McFall LAND will be used to service seaplanes, fuel and gas storage, be an alternate radio station, and other services at T.M.O. It is planned to mount her 4 inch guns on shore for harbor defense. There are indications that she has been discovered by the enemy.

TF 61 is proceeding to SANTA BARBARA fueling enroute. TF 64 less TG 64.2 was enroute to a fueling rendezvous west of T.M.O. At 3:20 a.m. and at 5:30 a.m., 27th local, the SANTA BARBARA was attacked by submarines. Several torpedoes were fired in each attack and all missed. Because of the sunk submarine menace east of T.M.O., T.W.O. Consopac ordered the SANTA BARBARA and T.W.O. to SANTA BARBARA for fuel, and the other vessels in company to SANTA BARBARA for fuel. TF 64.2 will also fuel at SANTA BARBARA on their arrival there November 1st (local).

The inexcusable loss of the SCOTT is described in Combat unit SCOTT 280921. The existence of a mine field at SCOTT CANTON has been made known widely, especially after the loss of the SCOTT in the same locality.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

October 27th. (Continued)

Commoce offered 50% from his area to General I'Arthur to increase bombing of enemy ships in the "CORAL SEA" area. General "MacArthur replied that he could use the planes to advantage with reservations listed in his 221001.

The approved Joint Chiefs of Staff aircraft plan for the active "Solan" area has been received by mail. Message 23301 suggests that Commoce have a plan drawn up for the defense of "CORAL SEA" area. Commoce will submit to Cominco for approval and implementation. The lack of strength there is cause for concern.

The logistic support of our positions in the southern "SOLAN" continues, but the risk and difficulties are great.

The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, inaugurated the auxiliary landing strip at "SOLANDIA" when he landed there in a T735 on October 26th (local).

Cominco has stated that as a general rule exchange of information will be direct between our liaison officer and the 3rd Eastern Fleet.

The TUGGERZ returning from patrol off "P" CHANNEL reports sinking one 10,000 ton AG and one 5,000 ton AY. While our submarines have had few success, there are a few scotty performances. For example, recently off TAF two of our submarines each missed a fine chance to press home attacks on enemy carriers.

STP 320215 and 280255 (pinks) expresses his views on the needed strength and disposition of Army troops in the "SOLAN" area.

Commoce 280311 reminds Cominco of the somewhat premature announcement of the loss of the "MT. ZIN" and of the loss of the "CORAL SEA" before it could be announced that next of kin informed.

Cominco 281735 (pink) deals with the use of our submarines for scouting and general information purposes.

Although the main enemy strength has retired to the north beyond our air search there is no indication that the "MT." have abandoned plans to recapture "TULANERA." It seems probable that damage inflicted and fuel needs have made it necessary to retire for the time being. Further attempts to land troops on "TULANERA" are to be expected.

C/o
October 28th,

Events of the previous day were discussed at Admiral Wilmot's morning conference. Lieut. General Samson and the Commanders now at TAU were present.

Samson 282925 remarks on the present half in the South Pacific area which appears to give us the opportunity for placing strong reinforcements on GUADALCANAL. Samson 282917 is in complete agreement and gives his plans for troop movements starting on the 10th (local).

Samson 282917 is a summary for his area. Land operations on TANANAI during the 20th (local) are described.

The logistic support of southern South Pacific positions is being stepped up. In the 28th (local) there were 4,200 gallons awes at TANANAI and 4,000 gallons awes at TANA.

The TANANAI, returning from patrol in the area between the TANANAI area, reports the probable sinking of 1 - 924 MT, 1 - 100 MT, 3 - large MT, 1 - 4600 MT.

A total of 43 ships including 2 MT, 3 MT, 1 MT, 1 (reported) 30, 2 MT, 2 MT, 1 MT, 1 MT or more were reported in the TANANAI area.

The story of our destroyer visit in the enemy patrol line south of the TANANAI: TAN 282950.

The DETA reported sinking four MT while on patrol off TANANAI.

It appears that the TANANAI on a shake-down trip was attacked by a submarine off the TANANAI coast.

TAN 282940 gives results of reconnaissance in the western area.

Some of the enemy strength in the South Pacific is located in the TANANAI area and the remainder is believed to be retreating and reorganizing to the northwest of our screen. It continues to appear probable that the enemy will continue with plans to recapture GUADALCANAL.
October 29th

As is usual, present at Admiral Nimitz's morning conference were the principal subordinate commanders now at Maj. TF commanders at 307th are thus given a good picture of current operations.

The day was quiet in the South Pacific. Following below summarizes the 29th local.

Plans have been completed to reinforce the MIA division, and to construct an alternate landing strip in the vicinity of WAK. It is planned that the 4th Marine will be landed to reinforce the reinforced November 3rd (local) and that part of the 4th Marine Defense Battalion, 1 147th Infantry, 2 batteries TA, 2 Co's 1st Marine Raiders, and 500 U.S. personnel will be loaded at 12:15 the same day. (See dispatch 3007/05 for reports and cooperation by other forces and forces.

The C.J. LION 31 will proceed to base and assist in formulating recommendations and execution of a coordinated movement of that LION to the South Pacific.

The Central Pacific was quiet. TF 31 continues training in the MIA area, being at 120. TF 31 has been formed under rear Admiral Turner and will be ready to proceed with the near future.

M36-3007/05 deals with defensive mine. Experience to date is not conclusive of extension of this method of warfare.

Three enemy cruisers were destroyed well to the westward of the MIA area and were observed on a westerly course. These cruisers may have made a sweep into the western sea.

Nothing new is reported concerning enemy dispositions or intentions.

[Signature]
SECRET

October 30th.

Following the usual morning conference the question of sending certain old BBs of TF 1 to the South Pacific was discussed. While no decision was reached it was considered feasible to send two BBs to operate either with or without ACVs. If BBs are sent the MARYLAND and COLORADO probably will be the first to go.

The day was extremely quiet in all areas. In the South Pacific our forces were refueling, refitting, and reorganizing. The enemy is presumed to be doing the same. Comsopac gives a summary to the morning of the 30th (local) in his 310534. The SW Pacific air continued attacks on enemy ships in the KURTJAND and RABAUL areas. Two direct hits are claimed on a probable CA in the former place. These attacks are valuable for several reasons. Army pilots are trained in navigation and bombing; reported hits and near misses may inflict important damage; the enemy is not permitted to rest secure in the harbors.

Cincpac 310355 gives views on the employment of submarines in the SELONGEN area.

Comsopac 310206 pink requests Comsopac to dispatch earliest practicable one Army Infantry regiment reinforced, less one battalion, to GUADALCANAL.

Due to shipping, the departure of the first combat team of the 25th Army Division from CANU to the South Pacific is now delayed until November 25th, and the second team should leave early in December.

There is no news of enemy major units in the South Pacific. Five enemy DDs are scheduled to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL November 2nd (local). Cominich points out that enemy actions may well be linked with our national elections due next Tuesday.
SECRET

October 31st

The Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, and TF commanders at PEARL where present at the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.

The story of the loss of the HORNET is told in Comsopac 011312 pink. The poor torpedo shooting by our DDs is not understood. Also, as the two enemy and nine own torpedoes failed to sink the carrier, there is a suggestion that we should push salvage measures in the hope of saving wounded ships. Comsopac 011050 pink gives his estimate of enemy plane losses and a summary of own plane losses in the October 26th engagement. We still are not fully informed of our own damage on that day. For example, it was learned today for the first time that the KAHAN has serious damage forward, and the SAN JUAN requires docking.

Comsopac is now giving his submarines good information of enemy movements. This should be beneficial.

Tomorrow two AKs and one AP will arrive at GUADALCANAL with supplies including 8 - 155 mm guns.

A task group has been sent to intercept 5 enemy DDs expected to arrive at GUADALCANAL tomorrow night.

CTF 62 310946 describes the AGLA BAY project. A fighter, then a bomber strip will be constructed as soon as possible.

Comsopac 312126 recommends a reorganization of this force. This has to do with the Amphibious Force.

The landing strip at FURAPITI is now 3500 feet long. This is a very quick construction job.

The KINGFISH reports sinking 12,000 tons of enemy shipping off HONAN.

A submarine was reported by a plane 120 miles SW of CAHU.

There are no new enemy developments.

Cun
SECRET

November 1st

General Emmons and the TF commanders present at PEARL attended the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. The events of the previous day were reviewed.

Comsopac 012359 is an operations summary. Comgen list MarDiv 010515 reports the crossing of the MATANIKAU RIVER by the 5th Marines. A large force of enemy cruisers and destroyers was sighted by our search planes during the afternoon about 100 miles NE of ISABEL ISLAND. Comsopac estimated that the force intended to make a sweep through INDEPENDENCE STRAIT to attack our surface forces. TF 65 was ordered to attack but was unable to intercept the enemy during the night, and so rejoined the transport group. The transport group had been ordered to retire toward Eq. in the absence of enemy contacts, the landings planned for the 3rd will take place on the 4th (local).

During the night the FULLER and CONTINENTAL were in collision. The destroyer has a flooded fire room and speed reduced to 10 knots. She was directed to seek shelter inshore at PALAILO. The FULLER damage was slight.

Comnavdiv 1 010501 gives the progress of landing strips at GUADALCANAL.

Cinopac notified Comsopac of the probable use of KOKANK BAY in the SWALLOW ISLANDS by the enemy during the last enemy advance. This information was noted in XI and may have been seen by Comsopac.

The SUEKER will complete the survey and have new charts ready November 5th.

Cinopac 012115 gives views on the press announcements regarding the HORNET.

The sighting of enemy forces to the eastward of the SOLOMONS is not good evidence of the resumption of the all out offensive toward the SOLOMONS. As the enemy knew of our moves off GUADALCANAL the day before it seems likely that the force sighted was ordered to make a sweep to the south in order to destroy inferior forces. No CVs or BBs were observed within our search area yesterday.

 văn
The following estimate of location of Japanese strength in the Pacific is submitted by Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District.

GENERAL

Most of the information on location of Japanese surface and air units is now too old to be of any great value. This information should be used with caution and with regard to dates given. Dates set opposite the information indicate date of last location.
**Flag Cinc Combined**

**Yamato**

**BattDiv One**

Mitsiro
Nissho
Yamashiro

**BattDiv Two**

Ise
Kuma
Fuso
Kumachi

**BattDiv Three**

Kakuso
Kumashima
Kumitake
Hanuma

**Cinc Truk area 10/1.**

Truk area 9/29.

**Empire in August.**

South of Truk 9/87.

Empire 9/10.

**Truk area 9/16.**

Empire 9/1.

Empire 9/5.

Empire 9/23. Note - listed with BattDiv Two for convenience only.

**Truk area 9/34.**

Empire 9/13.

Empire 10/9.

Truk area 9/19.
CarryOn

SUKOKU
ZUDIN
KURO

CarryOn 2nd

HAGUMA
HITAKA
RPHM

Assigned Carriems

OJAMA
HOSIO
UMMY
CHUKO

NOTE: Submarine GREENLING hit a CV with two torpedoes at 37-30 N 145-00 W on course 080 T on 10/26.
Carry 2 lost HITAKA made a battle report for action north of Santa Cruz 10/26.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>ComDiv Four</th>
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<td>Akozo</td>
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<td>Takao</td>
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<td>Kaya</td>
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<td>ComDiv Five</td>
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<td>Takabata</td>
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<td>Tsubakura</td>
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<td>Kashiwa</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Current

- **Truk area 9/28**: Possibly damaged.
- **Truk area 9/28**:

### ComDiv Seven

- **Empire 9/28** in Solomons 10/11.
- **Empire 9/28** in Solomons 10/11.

### ComDiv Eight

- **Comrade 6** in Solomons 10/11.
- **Save Island 10/12**.
- **Save Island 10/12**.

### ComDiv Nine

- One of this class reported Santa Cruz area 10/24.
- **Truk area 9/28**: Probably damaged.
- **Nabaul area 9/28**: Probably damaged.
- **Empire 9/24**: Damaged.

### ComDiv Ten

- **Truk area 9/23**.
- **Truk area 9/23**.

### ComDiv Twelve

- **Comrade 9 Flug in Truk 9/29**.
- No information.
- No information.

### New Britain area 9/30

- **Fitting out 9/31**.

### Enroute Solomons from Empire 9/30

- **Truk area 10/30**.
- **Nabau 9/30**.

### ComDiv Twelve in New Guinea area 10/30

- **Comrade 10 in Solomons 10/25**.
- **New Guinea area 10/30**.
- **Truk area 2/11**.
DIVISION ELEVEN (Nine Leagues)

NOMI
NIKIRU

On Gotiy seventeen
YAMA
KIBO

On Gotiy Twenty-Two
YAMA
KIBO

Dispersed CAS
ASHIDAMA
CHOKAI
MACHI

Dispersed CL's
KISIGO
KIOK
KAKCHI
KAJIKI

TIREN CL's REPORTED SIGHTED IN ALLOTMENTS 10/29 PROBABLY TAMA,
KISO, ABUKUSO.
On ice area 0/2.

No information.

Replenishment
Ko-Oh 9/20.
Departing from our saloon 10/2.
With Comdiv Ice 0/23.

Northern area 10/13.
Northern area 10/13.
On ice area 0/24 - damaged.

South area 9/17.
South by NORTH.
Replenishment 0/27.
Replenishment 0/17.

Gualama 10/05.
New Britain 9/14.
Damaged. Gualama 0/7.
Southland area 9/06.
Taile area escorting 10/2.

Replenishment 10/0.

Assigned West Indies Force 0/11.
No information.
No information.
Possibly sunk.

Gilberts 0/1.
Escorting 0/100.
Possibly sunk. Escort area 0/1.
Falkland area 0/6.
Falkland area 0/6.

Replenishment 0/2.
Replenishment 0/1.
Daily damaged. Falkland 7/2.

South area 9/2.
With Comdiv Ice 0/2.
Ko-Oh 9/11.
Northern area 10/8.
With Comdiv Ice 0/8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyers</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Destroyer Three</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>NEWARK</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>YUBUKI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>CHIBAYUKI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>HATSUMI</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer II</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>HANASHIO</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>FUJUZU</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>SEIKOMI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>FUJIKOE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer X</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>KIYU</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>MABASHI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>HISASHI</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer 20</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>ASACHI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>AIKARI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>YUGANE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer 4</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>NOZU</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>YUDACHI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>SANADA</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>MARUSAKI</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer 8</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>KAIYUKI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>MOKUMAI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>TOKIZAKI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>ASAHI</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer 9</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>ASA-SHISO</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>OCHIKI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>MICHISHI</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>MITSUO</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>ASAOKI</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer 11</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>SATSURO</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>MINETSURO</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>ASAOKI</strong></td>
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COMMUNITY S

Seaplane 5 in action area 9/30.
Saloon area 10/1.
Saloon area in August.
Saloon in action area 9/30.

Seaplane in action area 9/27.
Supply 9/30.
Harvest Singapore to supply 9/29.
Sale 9/29.
Saloon 9/29.

Seaplane 9/30.
Seaplane 9/30.
Seaplane 9/30.
Seaplane 9/30.
With South 9/30.
Harare 9/30.

Deserton 6 disbanded 17 July.
Sale 9/30.

Seaplane 9/30.

Seaplane 9/30.

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Seaplan
**Deadly IV**
- SAKAGAMI
- AKIMOTO
- HAYAKAGI
- USAGI

**Damaged Deadly IV**
- IDA

**Deadly III**
-槌長
- 木村
- 吉村
- 木村

**Deadly II**
- KAMATA
- KAMATA
- KAMATA
- KAMATA

**Deadly I**
- Kitagawa
- 田中
- 田中
- 田中

**Deadly 1**
- KUNITAKE
- KUNITAKE
- KUNITAKE
- KUNITAKE

**Deadly 0**
- KUNITAKE
- KUNITAKE
- KUNITAKE
- KUNITAKE

**Nonexistent Deadly Data**
- USUGUMI
- 池上
- 池上
- 池上
- 池上

**Kamikaze 17**
- 多数
- 死亡
- 9/27

**Kamikaze 12**
- 多数
- 死亡
- 9/27

**Kamikaze 32**
- 多数
- 死亡
- 9/27

**Kamikaze 24**
- 多数
- 死亡
- 9/27

**Kamikaze 01**
- 多数
- 死亡
- 9/27

**Kamikaze 14**
- 多数
- 死亡
- 9/27
ALTITUDE

In track area 10/12.

have area 10/4.

Track area 10/4.

Track area 10/4.

Track area 10/4.

Track area 10/4.

Track area 10/4.

At or near salon on 10/10.

New Britain - Salamaua 10/4.

Track 10/4.

Track 10/4.

Salamaua 10/4.

Salamaua 10/4.

New Britain - Salamaua 10/4.

Cassowary's Rabaul area 10/12.

Rabaul 10/4.

Track 10/4.

Track 10/4.

Possibly track - New Britain 10/4.

Possibly track - New Britain 10/4.

Track 10/4.

Track 10/4.

Salamaua 10/4.

Rabaul - Salamaua 10/4.

Rabaul - Salamaua 10/4.

Rabaul - Salamaua 10/4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP NAME</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIKOKU MARU</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKITSUSHIMA MARU</td>
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<td>CIBICOE</td>
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<td>CHIYODA</td>
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<td>FOGUZUKA MARU</td>
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<td>GOGU MARU</td>
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<td>GÔ5 KIIRO MARU</td>
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<td>KAMITSU MARU</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAMUJO MARU</td>
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<td>KIYUKAIWA MARU</td>
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**ALL SHIPS**

- **AIKOKU MARU**
  - Refuel 9/18
  - Seaplane 9/19
  - Seaplane 10/1
  - Part 10/2
  - Seaplane 10/21
  -博客 10/3

- **AKITSUSHIMA MARU**
  - Seaplane 9/18
  - Refuel 10/1
  - Seaplane 10/1

- **CIBICOE**
  - Seaplane 9/18
  - Seaplane 10/1

- **CHIYODA**
  - Seaplane 9/18

- **FOGUZUKA MARU**
  - Seaplane 9/18

- **GOGU MARU**
  - Northern area 9/18

- **GÔ5 KIIRO MARU**
  - Seaplane area 10/27 probably evacuate Japan.

- **KAMIKAWA MARU**
  - Evacuated 9/18

- **KAMITSU MARU**
  - Northern area 9/18

- **KAMIOI**
  - Seaplane area 10/27 probably evacuate Japan.

- **KAMITSU MARU**
  - Evacuated 9/18

- **KAMUJO MARU**
  - Refuel 10/2

- **KANITOS MARU**
  - Part 10/2

- **KINTOS MARU**
  - Seaplane 10/2

- **KOTOKO**
  - Seaplane 10/2

- **KUROSHI**
  - Seaplane 10/2

- **OKITI MARU**
  - Evacuated 9/18

- **SAINTEI MARU**
  - Evacuated 9/18

- **SANTO MARU**
  - Northern area 10/2

- **SHISHITA MARU**
  - Northern area 10/2

- **SHIYUKAIWA MARU**
  - Northern area 10/2

- **SHINSHI MARU**
  - Northern area 10/2

- **SHITENKO MARU**
  - Northern area 10/2

- **Ô2 TOHAN MARU**
  - Northern area 10/2

**To evacuate their ships**

- **Nishin Island in July**
  - To evacuate to Rabaul 11/2 from Shertlandi.
  - Seaplanes in July.
  - Seaplane 10/34 evacuate to Singapore.
AREA DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE NAVAL AIR FORCES

ALBUTANG

Until last observed on October 24, there were still no Japanese planes at Kiama.

MALAY AREA

No information.

DOKAL AREA

Insufficient information for an estimate of Japanese air strength, which however, is not believed to be great. The Command of the 23rd Air Fleet and the Tekoo Air Group appeared to be at Buka 10/30. The 33rd Air Group was still in the Dili-L. 10/7, and 36th Air Group was at Ambon possibly enroute to New Britain 10/7. Darwin was raided October 24th and 25th by only 3 planes and October 25th by 1 plane. During October very few planes have been seen on Timor and Ambon. The largest number seen at any one time was 3 JF at Dili on October 6 and October 19 and 6 JF at Keapang on October 7 and 8.

M.H. GUARDIAN

Insufficient information for an estimate of Japanese air strength in this area. The 6th Air Fleet which formerly had control of operations in this area has moved to the Solomons, and the Air Fleet appears to have taken its place. Up to and including October 22nd, the only Japanese air raids on Port Moresby during October were on October 22nd (3 VMS), October 25th (8 VMS) and October 26th (4 VMS). There was one raid on Milne Bay on October 22nd (8 VMS) by probably the same planes which raided Port Moresby that same day. On October 3rd, there appeared to be as many as 20 JF at Buna and Gona, but since then, 4 have been the largest number seen at any one time. It appears that practically all Japanese planes formerly in New Guinea have moved to the Solomons.

NEW GUINEA - REG. GUARDIAN - SOLOMONS

The 6th Air Fleet appears to have assumed control of operations in the Solomons. The Command of the 6th Air Fleet appeared at Buka 10/30. Nothing has been heard from the 1st Air Fleet during the past week but it is probably still in this area. Since October 22nd, the Japanese air attacks on Gudalcanal appear to have slowed down considerably. This may be due to bad weather or to the destruction of 77 JF over Gudalcanal on October 25th and 26th. The heavy losses suffered by the Japanese appear to have had some effect. At Buna on October 22nd, there were 21 JF and 6 VMS (7 of the 27 reported damaged) opposed with 25 on October 23rd. No air contact was made with the Japanese at Laido on October 24th. On October 25th, there were 11 VMS and intense activity were reported at Kavieng; that base has assumed greater importance as an air base than ever before. For example, there were 3 JF and 12 VMS at Kavieng airfield on October 24th at 9 VMS and 12 VMS on October 24th. It is possible that the Japanese are now flying fast to Kavieng to protect them from the heavy night raids that have been made on Buna.

1125
There is not sufficient information to estimate Japanese air strength in this area but it probably is no greater or not as great as reported last week.

60 type SBF
45 VMF
15 four engine VP
24 float planes
TOTAL 167

Note that this does not include carrier and other ship-based aircraft.

MARIANA AND SOLOMONS

The 16th Air Fleet and the 14th, 14th, 19th and Chitose Air Groups are still very active in this area. The 14th and 19th appear to be conducting extensive search operations for U.S. Fleet units from the Gilberts with the headquarters for this activity at Nauru. Chitose Air Group appears at Milne. The 94th Air Fleet is closely associated with major commands in the Solomons but this is probably due to search operations and not to the movement of planes from this area to the Solomons. There is no indication of any increase or decrease in air strength in this area which for some time has been reported to be:

15 four engine flying boats
24 seaplanes
24 twin engine VMF
20 (appears) VP
TOTAL 84
AIR FLOTILLAS AND AIR GROUPS

A great deal of the information on these air units is too old to be of great value and should be accepted with caution and with regard to the dates given.

The number and type of planes listed in any group is the largest number of planes known to have operated with any group at that time.

11th Air Fleet
Continues to be an active major command in the Solomon with its control station at Rabaul.

11th Scouting
Continues active in the Solomons.

8th Scouting
Solomons 8/30.

21st Air Fleet
Solomons 10/11 at which time it indicated that it had only 16 planes available for attacking Guadalcanal.

Kanoya Air Group
27 VP, 36 VBD

Tokyo Air Group
27 VP flying boats
Command in Eniwetok 9/30. Group operating in the Solomons.

3rd Air Fleet
Appeared to be at Kassung 10/1 but traffic reached to Truk 10/30.

3rd Air Group
45 VP, 6 VD
At Eniwetok Passage 9/30.

Tokyo Air Group
45 VBD
Indicated as being at Truk 10/30.

22nd Air Fleet
Indicated a possible move south from Empire on 10/30.

Bilbao Air Group
27 VBD
Empire area 8/30.

Gemen Air Group
27 VBD
Command at Eniwetok 9/1 but group indicated in Empire 9/27 possibly Truk or south.

25th Air Fleet
Still active in the Marshall and Gilberts but also now closely associated with major command in the Solomons probably in connection of its surplus but possibly moving some units to that area.

1st Air Group
20 VP, 37 VBD
Station in Marshall, group possibly a detachment at W}

---

1127
24th Air Fleet (cont.)

14th Air Group 12 VP flying boats
3 VJ transports

Chitose Air Group 27 VHS

Comms. at Makin 10/29.
Basehead at Wake 10/20.
Operating across the Gilberts.

Comms. at Hille 10/29.

30th Air Fleet
Solomon. Appears to have charge of attacks on Guadalcanal. On 10/18 either Kisanetsu or Hissan
Air Group was transferred from the 30th Air Fleet
to the 25th.

4th Air Group 27 VHS

Tainan Air Group 45 W, C V0

Yokohama Air Corps 12 VP flying boats
6 VP float planes

Nabael area 9/23. On 9/24 it was proposed to return this unit to Saipan for later type planes on completion of the
Morotai Campaign.

Comms. in Nabael area 9/23. Probably still operating in
New Guinea or the Solomons.

Nabael area 9/30. On 9/24 it was proposed to return this unit to the Marsh on for later type planes on completion of the
Morotai Campaign.

Comms. in Nabael area 9/23. Perhaps still operating in
Solomons or the Solomons.

25th Air Fleet
Has probably been replaced by 25th Air Fleet as the
operating head in the Solomons. Comms. at 14th Air

6th Air Group W, V3

Kisanetsu Air Corps 27 VHS

Kisawa Air Group 27 VHS

Still active in Solomons 10/10

Still active in Solomons 10/11

At Nabael 10/10 and on 10/15 either 25th group or Kisawa
Group was transferred to the 30th Air Fleet.

In Nabael area about 10/40, and
on 10/15 either 25th group or
Kisanetsu Group was transferred
back to the 30th Air Fleet.

Additional Groups

2nd Air Group W, V3

5th Air Group Scoopdrums

11th Air Group VP flying boats

At Rabaul Passage 9/29.

Still at KiEpoch of surf, 9/30.

In Napal and possibly expected
by 10/2 to return to Solomons.

1128
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Additional Groups</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th Air Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>17th Air Group</td>
<td>Believed at Palma</td>
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<tr>
<td>19th Air Group</td>
<td>Believed at Truk</td>
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<tr>
<td>19th Air Group</td>
<td>Believed at Saipan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Air Group</td>
<td>Very active in Marshalls and Gilberts. Detachment at Makin 10/29.</td>
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<tr>
<td>31st Air Group</td>
<td>Comdr. at Truk 10/19 and group probably still active in Kossol operations from Empire to Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Air Group</td>
<td>Philippine Unit. Possibility of transfer to New Britain area 9/29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Air Group</td>
<td>Still at D.E.I.; possibly Saipan 10/7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Air Group</td>
<td>D.E.I. unit. Probably still there but observed at Saipan 10/7 and possibly moving to Rabaul.</td>
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<tr>
<td>751st Air Group</td>
<td>Malay area 9/29.</td>
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<tr>
<td>751st Air Group</td>
<td>Comdr. at Kavieng 9/29. May be an air base and not an air group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>752nd Air Group</td>
<td>Comdr. indicated at Rabaul 10/29 but group not there and location doubtful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>753rd Air Group</td>
<td>On 10/29 appeared to be a new group possibly at Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>758th Air Group</td>
<td>On 10/29 appeared to be a new group possibly at Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>831st Air Group</td>
<td>In Empire on convoy duty 9/29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>832nd Air Group</td>
<td>At least a detachment at Rabaul-diamond area 9/29.</td>
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</table>
Additional Groups (cont.)

Shinshiku Air Corp. YIS or a training unit
Possibly Feb 2/22.

Suruga Air Group. No data
8th of Feb 10/2.

Yokosuka Air Corp. Scapluses
Probably at Reheal or in Saipan.
**JAPANESE PLANE F. C. 3 JULY TO OCTOBER**

Based on dispatches received by Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas. Only planes reported as definitely destroyed are included. Late reports for the last few days of the month may not yet have been received. Carrier losses during the sea engagement of October 26th are not included because reports of that encounter have not been received.

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**COMBINED SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER IN JAPANESE PLANE LOSSES**

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*Not identified in the reports but believed to be fleet type VF*
# SUMMARY OF NAVAL AUXILIARIES

**AS OF OCTOBER FIRST 1945**

This summary is made up from data available up to 1940, October 31, 1942 and only concerns vessels of 500 tons or over as far as can be verified and only vessels which are primarily merchantmen (vessels whose names carry the “Maru” suffix), although some of these are naval auxiliaries.

The following sinkings are all verified, either by reliable witnesses, captured documents or translated enemy dispatches. Duplications have been eliminated as far as possible and “probable” sinkings are not listed.

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</table>

1132 TOTAL
MARTHA: MARU MOVEMENTS

MARSHALL - GILBERTS AREA

TOYOHAMA MARU

KATTAKU MARU

MTO MARU

EUPTUS AREA

1 MARU

2 MARU

DAISHIN MARU

TEIKO MARU

HAKUAI MARU

TEIBI MARU

DATAVIA MARU

ARGUS MARU

TOKIE MARU

SHANGHAI MARU

DAIDAI MARU

NEIJI MARU

AFRICA MARU

HAKUBASAN MARU

SAWATI MARU

Aground on reef 360°, 8800 tons. from Ujase Is.
350 tons. Arrives Tasama Oct. 13th
Admiral departs Tasama Oct. 21st 17.00.
Arrives Malaita Nov. 2nd.
FO or FF. Arrived on Is. Oct. 20th
for reconnaissance or patrol (temp.)

Oct. 29th departs Tasama via
Chichijima.
Departed Saipan Oct. 30th arriving
Tasama Nov. 7th.
Departs Rennell for Guadal Oct. 1
with cargo of 7200 tons gold ore.
Departs Rennell for Kobe Oct. 7
with 1060 general cargo, 7600 tons
gold ore.
Departs Rennell for Kobe Oct. 7
with cargo 8000 tons rice.
Departs Rennell for Guadal Oct. 1
with 2700 tons of rice.

(Regular Line - Indo China - Empire route)
Arrives Guadal from Rennell Oct 12th
with 1820 tons rice and general cargo.
Departs ? Empire port for ? Indo China
port (Oct. 20th?).
Departs Rennell for Guadal - Kobe Oct. 7
with 8000 tons of rice.

(Regular Line - Japan to Southeast -
Indo China). Was enroute Saipan to
Hiro from Saipan Oct. 16th with 9700 tons
of rice. Arrives Singapore Nov. 9th
from Saipan via Singapore, Malacca.
Departs New York, March 1st.
Departs Malaita for Tasama.
Departs Saipan into Oct. for Japan.
Departs Saipan into Oct. for Tokyo
with 4400 tons of rice.
Departs Saipan Oct. 27th for Tokyo
with 4200 tons of rice and 1500 tons
general cargo.

Departs Saipan Oct. 7 for Tasama
with 2600 tons rice.
Arrived Tasama vicinity Oct. 20th.
SELECT AREA (Contd.)

DOBE MARU
KAKOYO MARU

TRUK - NEW GUINEA AREA

NIPPON MARU
KOKAMA MARU
SAKUSA MARU
MIMUTOSAI MARU
SUNAGAI MARU

Departed Nagasaki Oct. 20th for Shanghai, Japan - China ferry.
Arrived Tsukudain area Oct. 30th.

Truk vicinity Oct. 20th.
Shantian Oct. 30th.
Nabaul vicinity Oct. 29th.
Expected to arrive Nabaul Oct. 31st.
Due arrive Nabaul from Shantian
Nov. 2nd via 3°07’S - 153°00’E.

BULU HARBOR

Sighted in harbor Oct. 29th 11, 5000 ton class AK
Oct. 30th 2, AO, 2, AS, 2, AP.

MALAY AREA

---German Blockade Steamer

Departed Birmahk Oct. 20th with cargo of rubber, tin, copper, shells and tungsten.
SECRET

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE LAND FORCES AS OF DECEMBER 1, 1942

1. ALASKA

Kiska - no change. Occupation force appears to consist of one infantry regiment, reinforced, one naval landing force (Kussharo J3) and guard units.

Troop strength: 3,000 - 4,000

2. OILFIELDS

Under the 6th Base Force, these islands are occupied by the Kussharo J3 and a small part of the Kussharo J6 Special Landing Forces, and the 62nd, 63rd, 64th and 65th Guard Forces.

Makins:
62nd Guard Force 60
6th Special Landing Force (base station unknown) 200
Total 260

Abemama:
62nd, 63rd, and 64th Guard Forces 278

Kila:
62nd Guard Force 130

3. RISMARCK - SOLOMON AREA

Lack of ground activity by the Japanese on Guadalcanal since the repulse of their attacks on our lines and attempted movement of more reinforcements to Guadalcanal indicate that the Japanese have lost the initiative.

References to the fact that very few new units appeared in radio traffic during the past week and that associations with convoys were rare seems to indicate that the forces to fight the battle in the Solomons are already in this area.

Vague indications of movements of forces via Rolas were seen, but they were so indefinite that no estimation could be drawn.
Captured documents definitely placed the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade in the Kokoda area, and thus eliminated that Brigade as a reinforcement for the Japanese forces in the Solomons.

The Koriil Detachment (1st Battalion 320th Infantry, 33rd Division) which was noted frequently as being on board cruisers seems to be associated more with the Duma-Kokoda area than with Guadalcanal.

More of the 2nd Division has been identified as being on Guadalcanal.

Several landings of reinforcements on Guadalcanal were attempted, and were repulsed and whether or not any fresh troops got ashore is not ascertainable.

Units of the Anatesuki Force, the nature of which is undetermined, still appear at Rabaul and are an unpredictable factor.

(A) Units recently arrived in this area:
None.

(B) Units already in the area and capable of reinforcing the Solomons:

At Rabaul:

17th Army (less units in New Guinea and Guadalcanal) 20,000
2nd Army Division (less units on Guadalcanal and enroute there) 10,000

(Spread in strength due to uncertainty as to whether it is a triangular or a square division)

2 units of the Anatesuki Force (Nos. 2943 and 6157) ?
Classaki Anti-Aircraft Unit (probably a regiment or less) ?
Kure No. 6 Special Landing Force 1,200
No. 1 Yabu Brigade 7,020

1,136
In Diano-Faisi-Shoalands Area:

- Matsuzaki Unit (believed to be engineer regiment of 2nd Division) 800
- Isebo 3rd Special Landing Force 1,000
- Yokosuka No. 3 Special Landing Force 1,200
- Isebo No. 26 (Pacific) Special Landing Force 1,200

Total reinforcements readily available 30,700

(c) Units associated with this area indicating their possible transfer to this area:

- Isebo 1st Landing Force (Army)
- 16th Division (No new information on this unit)

Total possible reinforcements 22,000

(This figure not included in total troop strength of this area.)

(d) Units already on Guadalcanal:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Regiment (Infantry)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Regiment (Infantry)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Field Artillery Regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th (Gna) Regiment (Infantry) of 18th Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Heavy Artillery Regiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th (Gna) Regiment of 7th Division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Miscellaneous Units:

- Asa Battalion
- Issawa Force G1359 (Regiment ?)
- Kameyama Detachment
- Kitamura Detachment
- Kawanabe Detachment
- Saijii Battalion
- Units 66070 and 69713 of Matsumi Force
- Naval Engineer Co.
- Navy Special Landing Forces:
  - Force No. 5
  - Force No. 1
  - Force (Resident)

Less estimated losses

Troop strength

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**B) CARRIERS IN BISMARCK-SOLOMONS AREA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops (approx)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabaul</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarenea</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,100 - 4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kavieng</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remainder of island and nearby islands protected by small patrols and detachments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bougainville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Duna)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sohma)</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kiska)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Duna)</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Georgia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vini Harbor)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rendova Island)</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wilkes Anchorage)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Dinagat)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Gizo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in Solomon Islands</td>
<td>9,100 to 9,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaita (small detachments totalling)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Island</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Isabel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Motu Point)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Vilamara Point)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Aukana Bay)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Carribean Troops</td>
<td>9,100 to 9,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Troops in Solomons area proper (Totals of D and E)</td>
<td>91,100 to 91,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total troops in Solomons - Solomon area (Totals of D, E and F)</td>
<td>92,200 to 92,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**EXTRACT**

4. **NEI-CHINA**

Buna-Cora-Kokoda area. Troops here are the 21st Independent Brigade consisting of two infantry regiments 144th and 41st, one engineer regiment (15th), cavalry, and the one mountain gun artillery regiment (3rd), less losses, and two Navy Special Landing Forces (Sasebo #5 and Yokosuka #5) which are probably in the Buna area. Reinforcements have been moving up to the front here and one battalion (4th Battalion (Marine) of the 287th Inf. 30th Div.) is apparently bound here.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lee - Matanika Valley</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North 6000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamau - Busua River</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferguson Island (Sasebo #3 Salam)</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total troops</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total troops in South</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Reinforcements</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>90,000 to 107,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LOCATIONS OF SPECIFIC UNITS**

Navy Special Landing Forces (about 1600 men each).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bare #5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ineffective due to casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bare #6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bare #7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malewu #3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malewu #4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo #5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo #6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka #5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka #6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka #7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka #8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo #2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo #17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo #18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo #19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Sasebo #20 |                   | Partially in Buna and 

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Army Units:
17th Army
Parts at

Divisions
2nd (Genda or Old)
Headquarters
4th Infantry Regiment
234th Infantry Regiment
2nd Field Artillery Regiment
Takahashi engineer Regiment
Balance
2lst Independent Mixed Brigade
10th
14th
15th
50th
184th (Goka) Infantry Regiment
50th
1st (Kori) Battalion, 230th Infantry Regiment

Detachments (of varying sizes)
Aoba Battalion
Akashi Force

Aikoku Force
Commanding Officer
Unit No. 3940
Unit No. 3942
Unit No. 3943
Unit No. 6107
Unit No. 6128
Unit No. 6171
Unit No. 6173

Iwasa Force
Commanding Officer
Unit No. 1330 (Reg.?)

Kasugai Detachment

Kitaura Force

Daewo First Landing Force

Makgye Engineer Corps

No. 1 Yoko Brigade

Oizumi Anti-Aircraft Unit

Rehealed
Guadalcanal, Buka-Kokoda

Rehealed
Guadalcanal

Rehealed
Guadalcanal

Rehealed
Guadalcanal

Buka-Palai
Rehealed
Rehealed
Rehealed
Phillipines perhaps part at Palau
Rehealed
Rehealed
Rehealed
Guadalcanal
On cruisers in Bismarck area
bound for Guadalcanal

Shattucka area

Rehealed
Guadalcanal
Guadalcanal
Rehealed
Guadalcanal
Rehealed
Rehealed

Abord ship, Bismarck area
SECRET

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Nov 1, 1942

1. Brief of Events during October, 1942.

SOUTH PACIFIC. (All dates Hawaiian Time)

On October 1 it was estimated that 3 enemy CVs and 4-6 BBs plus cruisers and DDs were operating in the TRUK - RABaul area. FUNAFUTI was occupied by us on that day. Admiral Nimitz and certain members of his staff returned to PEARL from an inspection of the South Pacific on the 4th. TF 17 carrier planes raided the BUIN - FAISI area on the 5th. Damage to enemy was only moderate because of extremely bad weather in the target area, but we suffered no losses. On the night of 10-11th TF 64.2 intercepted an enemy force off SAVO ISLAND. Damage inflicted seems to be - 1 cruiser sunk, 3 cruisers badly damaged or sunk, 4 DDs probably sunk. We lost the DORCHESTER, the BOISE was badly damaged; and some other ships involved were slightly damaged. On October 12th one army regiment arrived to reinforce GUADALCANAL garrison. On the 13th large forces were sighted east of the SOLOMONS approaching GUADALCANAL. No striking force engagement resulted, but during the next day six APs landing troops on the NW coast of GUADALCANAL were attacked by our planes setting three on fire so badly that they had to be beached. On the 15th the enemy was estimated to have the following combatant ships in the general RABaul - SOLOMONS area: 6 BB, 3 CV, 7 CA, 7 CL, about 30 DDs. On the 16th the McPHERSON at GUADALCANAL was severely damaged by a bomb hit. The VIREO, towing a PAB barge load of avgas to GUADALCANAL, and escorted

-1-

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by the MEREDITH, was abandoned due to fear of an air attack. The VIREO crew cut the tow adrift and embarked in the MEREDITH. Sometime thereafter, the MEREDITH was lost in an air attack. The VIREO and barge were salvaged. On the 17th the SAN JUAN and PORTLAND raided a Jap patrol line south of the JILBERTS. On the 18th Vice Admiral Halsey relieved Vice Admiral Ghormley as Comsopac. The CHESTER was torpedoed south of SAN CRISTOBAL on the 19th. Also on that day the O'KRIEN, enroute to PEARL for repairs, broke in two and sank. On the 21st three DZ's raided the enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS. TFs 16 and 17 joined up as TF 61 on the 22nd. On the 23rd a major move of the enemy toward the southern SOLOMONS was discovered. The next day the forces were within our search. The SEMINOLE at TULE;I was sunk by gunfire. On the 25th air contact was made between the approaching enemy and TF 61. In the air duel which followed damage inflicted is estimated as: 2 CV, 1 BB, several cruisers and destroyers damaged. (Later reports indicate fair chance of 1 large CV being sunk.) Our damage was: HORNET lost, PORTER lost; SOUTH DAKOTA and ENTERPRISE damaged; several other vessels slightly damaged. The enemy is believed to have lost twice as many planes as we: 130 to 65. After this battle both sides retired to fuel and reorganize.

On October 20th it was decided to send 12 submarines from Submarines Pacific to the South Pacific. These, plus 12 from 3W Pacific, were placed under CTF 42 who in turn was placed under Comsopac for operational control.

During the month the enemy continued to land reinforce-
ments on GUADALCANAL; make air raids on our positions there; shell our airfield; and several times attempted to penetrate our positions. The Marines did a splendid job of repulsing all attacks and keeping the position and airfield intact. Marine pilots and own submarines inflicted severe attrition losses on the enemy in the SOLOMONS area. SW Pacific planes were of assistance in scouting and damaging enemy shipping. Toward the end of the month these activities plus our surface action had greatly reduced the surface activity in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL. But in spite of this the enemy has established, and been able to support in some degree, a strong force on the island. Our difficulties in providing logistic supply to the GUADALCANAL area continued throughout the month. We have been able temporarily to control the sea off GUADALCANAL. Our control of the air there has been temporary. Enemy submarines were extremely active along our supply line to the southern SOLOMONS.

As the month ended there was no indication that the enemy had abandoned plans to recapture GUADALCANAL.

NEW GUINEA.

The Jap offensive over the STANLEY MOUNTAINS toward PT. KORESBY was stopped only when the advance had reached within a few miles of the northernmost PT. KORESBY airfield. During the month this offensive has been beaten back slowly and at the end of the month allied troops had recaptured KOKCDA and were advancing toward BUNA. Some American troops have been transported to the battle area by air.

After repulsing a Jap landing in the MILNE BAY area,
SECRET

the allied forces on the eastern tip of NEW GUINEA and adjacent islands have been engaged in mopping up small enemy detachments.

Several small enemy landings have been made during the month on northeastern NEW GUINEA but at no point have new important positions been established.

CENTRAL PACIFIC.

The area was generally quiet during the month. Our submarine successes on patrol in Japanese home waters continued. During the month 12 fleet submarines were ordered to the South Pacific to operate under Comspac. The Army was ordered to transfer the 25th Division from the Hawaiian area to the South or SW Pacific. The Army Hawaiian Air transferred 24 heavy bombers and 50 fighters to the South Pacific.

NORTH PACIFIC.

In the ALEUTIANS the major activity was bombing of KISKA by Army planes from ADAK. While some success was achieved, the Japs were not forced to abandon KISKA, nor were our submarines able to find many targets. They did, however, abandon ATTU and AGATTU. Some pressure was brought on Cincpac to use BBs to bombard KISKA. Authority to reduce the cruisers in TF 8 to two - the RALEIGH and DETROIT - was approved by Cominch. The garrison at ST. PAUL was established.

At the end of the month the Japs hold KISKA but their position is believed to be almost untenable. Our positions seem reasonably secure with fairly sizeable garrisons.

2. The Situation.

(a) Enemy. Since the middle of August the Japs have
been assembling troops and ships in the general RAMAUL area. During the last days of October they were turned back, temporarily at least, in what appeared to be another start of an all out offensive in the South Pacific.

There is good reason to believe that the enemy will continue the attempt to recapture the Southern SALOMONs, and if successful, will try to extend his control along the island chain to NEW CALEDONIA. Also, he may be expected to attempt to capture the remainder of NEW GUINEA.

Our continued pressure in the SALOMONs area by all forces has caused the enemy losses and delays, but in spite of that he may consider himself in a favorable position. Our pressure also has the effect of forcing him to a maximum effort in the South Pacific and thus prevents him from undertaking any sizeable operations elsewhere.

An estimate of enemy strength as of November 2nd is appended.

(b) Own. TF 1 continues at PEARL for the purpose of opposing attempted enemy landings in the Hawaiian area. TF 11 is at PEARL, and will be ready to depart for the South Pacific about the middle of the month when torpedo damage repairs to the SARATOGA and NORTH CAROLINA are completed. TF 17 has been broken up due to the loss of the HORNET and damage to the SOUTH DAKOTA. TF 16 is not fit for battle as a CV striking force until the battle damage to the ENTERPRISE is repaired. The WASHINGTON, undamaged cruisers and destroyers, and land based air
SECRET

In the South Pacific are available to keep the lines of communications open to the Guadalcanal area, and to intercept the enemy approaching that area. We have 24 submarines available for operations in the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey.

Our air strength in the South Pacific is not adequate to meet completely all demands. We can, however, provide an adequate search and can defend the Guadalcanal air field. We are unable to count on the Army pilots to find and severely damage the enemy. Improvement in the air situation is to be expected as times goes on. When adequate numbers of planes in the area becomes a fact and when the Guadalcanal airfield is ready in all respects for all-weather operations, and when supporting fields are constructed, the situation may permit the resumption of the offensive.

Most of the Marines in the Guadalcanal area are tired and require relief as soon as possible so that they can rest, reorganize, and reequip. The present strength (November 1st) at Guadalcanal will not permit an offensive to wipe out the enemy on the island, but this may be possible after the arrival of replacements and reinforcements of about 14000 troops by about the 10th, making a total of around 35000 on the island. There are several movements of troops toward the South Pacific in the offing, but as troops arriving are needed for offensive, adequate relief for tired troops does not seem probable during November.

The logistic problem in the South Pacific continues to be cause for serious concern. Movements of fuel, food, and equipment to the Guadalcanal area are extremely difficult and are undertaken with considerable risk. Handling facilities at
SECRET

all South Pacific ports and beaches are far short of requirements. Small fast freighters to run supplies to CAGAYA from JUZON do not exist; therefore large and valuable combat loaded freighters have to be employed.

While our situation in the Southern Solomons is far from satisfactory, it is far from hopeless. It is critical, but the determination, efficiency, and morale of our people there is so fine that even the most pessimistic critics must concede that we will win out in the end.

The OAHU - MIDWAY - FIJI line is still vulnerable to raids, but no probability of serious landing attempts is seen.

The ALJUTIAN situation should give but little concern during November.

3. Broad Courses of Action.

Overwhelming evidence continues to point to but one broad course of action at this time, i.e. to cut us off from AUSTRALIA and then capture or neutralize that continent. However, in spite of this belief, it is necessary to list and briefly to discuss other feasible courses.

If the enemy continues present large concentrations in the TAN - RABaul - SOLOMONS area he will be unable to strike in force elsewhere. But the enemy has the capacity to make minor raids elsewhere in the Pacific and still retain superiority in the active area.

Assuming that major forces are moved to another theatre during November, the following courses of action are within
enemy capabilities:

(a) An attempt to capture MIDWAY.
Always a suitable target, but in view of the bitter experience in June, the enemy will be unlikely to make such an attempt unless under more favorable circumstances, i.e., assured absence of, or after defeat of, our striking forces, plus security in the South. It seems most improbable that the enemy can assemble necessary forces and arrive off MIDWAY during November. Nevertheless, major enemy forces are unreported since October 26th. It is thus physically possible for the following to be at MIDWAY on about November seventh — at least 6 BB and 3 CV, with supporting cruisers and destroyers, escorting and covering a major landing force.

(b) An attack on Western AUSTRALIA.
The enemy can shift his strength to the westward and to jump off from the NEI toward NW AUSTRALIA. This might happen if the enemy found losses too great in the SOLOMONS to be acceptable. Such a course seems most improbable.

(c) Raids on our positions from MIDWAY to NUEA.
The advantages which might accrue include: damage to our positions and installations of such magnitude as to disrupt temporarily our lines of supply to the South Pacific; and, to force a diversion which would relieve our pressure on the SOLOMONS and thus delay seriously our offensive.

Raids on points near the active area are quite pos-
sible, but as the distance from HAMAL increases the probability of raids decreases.

(d) An extension in the ALTITANG.

Considered most improbable because (1) coming bad weather; (2) merely holding KIOKA may require all available resources; (3) the enemy is aware of our ADAK position.

(e) An offensive toward INDIA.

No doubt this is an ultimate aim of the Japanese. It cannot take place (with naval support) until the Pacific flank is secure. Therefore, we can dismiss this course for the month of November.

(f) An attack on RUSSIA.

The stiffened Russian defense, especially at STALINGRAD, must have caused repercussions in JAPAN. We do not think that JAPAN will attack RUSSIA until a German victory over RUSSIA in EUROPE is a sure thing. And even then there is no assurance of such an attack.

4. Most Probable Enemy Intention.

For the month of November we conclude that the most probable move continues to be the recapture of the Southern KLOONS, and the extension of control in NEW GUINEA.

It is now definite that the enemy suffered heavy attrition losses during October, and considerable damage to striking forces on October 25th. Thus, they could not continue what seems to have been the start of a grand scale attack on GUADALCANAL. On the 1st of November the striking forces are to the
northward of our search. Some major enemy units will have to retire for repair and will be out of action during the month. Enemy plane losses in October were excessive.

While the enemy may still retain the balance of sea power in the SOLOMONS area, the margin seems too small to risk a grand offensive. It is considered more probable that the enemy will — for November — be content to:

(a) Strengthen positions and continue fighting on shore at GUADALCANAL and NEW GUINEA.

(b) Make air attacks on our positions and shipping in the SOLOMONS, NEW GUINEA, and that part of AUSTRALIA in reach.

(c) Attack our communications to the SOLOMONS with submarines and surface vessels.

(d) Shell our shore positions in the SOLOMONS.

(e) Possibly raid our position at ESPIRITU SANTO.

These operations will be along the lines discussed in last month's estimate, — remembering that the capacity of the enemy to conduct such operations has been reduced by October losses. The remark applies to the operations listed in paragraph 7 of the October Estimate.
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November 2nd.

Lieut. General Holcomb, USMC, was present at the usual morning conference.

Sopac operations are in his 030130. Unloading of our AKs in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area proceeded during the day without serious interruptions. As noted yesterday, the landing of the 8th Marines and the ACCRN group is now planned for the 4th (local). During the night the enemy succeeded in landing a fair number of some troops in the vicinity of KOLI, GUADALCANAL.

The PLUNGER reported two hits on an enemy GL in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT.

The SUMMER has been ordered to survey MINAPITI. At that place four PTs arrived for duty there.

The Central and North Pacific Areas were quiet.

There is no new information regarding enemy deployments or intentions.

Cominch 021518 pink is an explanation of the release of the news of the HORNET sinking.

November 3rd.

Lieut. General Holcomb, USMC, Lieut. General Emmons, USA, Major General Lutes, USA, and TF commanders were present at the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. Captain McFall told of the HORNET engagement on October 25th.

The operations in the Sopac are reported in Comsopac 040146. The transport group arrived at GUADALCANAL without meeting opposition and commenced unloading. (CTF 65 040725 and CTF 62 040235). The Marines were moving troops to deal with the enemy landing made near KOLI yesterday and are holding the line to the west of our position.

CTF 61 040235 pink gives information on the enemy line-up for the battle of October 25th.

The general situation at GUADALCANAL is not unfavorable. We have had no real interruption in providing logistic support and sending in reinforcements. Apparently the enemy knows exactly what we are doing but is unable to do much about it. Flames

(Continued on next page)
November 3rd. (Continued)

reported approaching in the past two days are not reported as having arrived. It is hoped that our escorts arriving with the transports and freighters will shell the enemy positions as often as possible. The situation will not always permit this, but whenever done it helps our Marines.

ARD-2 arrived at NOUMEA.

Both the CHESTER and SAN JUAN are being sent to SYDNEY for repairs.

It now appears that the COOLIDGE cannot be salvaged, but a properly equipped expedition can salvage much of the cargo.

General Marshall has ordered General EMMONS to move immediately to AUSTRALIA for permanent assignment 15 replacement B-24s with 17 combat crews.

Cinopac 030015 pink deals with increase of effectiveness of defense at CANTON.

The WHALE has completed the first Pac Fleet offensive mining mission by making a plant of contact mines in the eastern part of VII TUNDO. That sub also reports five torpedo hits in four freighters.

It seems probable that VP 345 foundered in the vicinity of LAYSAN ISLAND.

There are some indications that the enemy will attempt to resume his all out attack on GUADALCANAL in the near future. We believe that he has superior sea power in the area, but may not know it.
November 4th.

At his morning conference, which was attended by General Holcomb and TF commanders at PEARL, Admiral Nimitz read extracts from a letter written by Admiral Halsey on October 31st. The following were high points: (a) The day before the battle of October 25th, the ENTERPRISE had operational losses which amounted to 12 planes; (b) fighter control during the battle was not too good; (c) heavy damage is believed inflicted on the enemy during the battle - maybe a CV was sunk; (d) the MONTER was lost due to a battle freak - hit by a broaching circling enemy torpedo; (e) an enemy plane landed on the forecastle of the ENLHT causing an enormous fire but the ship kept right on fighting; (f) while enroute MONTER the MAHAN collided with the SOUTH DAKOTA; (g) the SOUTH DAKOTA is not seriously damaged, but may have to return to PEARL because of collision damage; (h) Admiral Halsey will not keep CVs and BBs at sea continuously in submarine infested waters; (i) logistics in the South Pacific is a headache.

The day in the South Pacific was generally quiet. We were engaged in reinforcing our COLONIAL positions and the enemy was thought to be reorganizing for another southward push. Comsopac 050524 is a summary to the evening of the 4th (local). During the night two enemy ships were reported in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANZA. Comsopac has requested the NEW ZEALAND authorities to provide NEW ZEALAND troops for the replacement of one U.S. infantry battalion and regimental headquarters at TONGATAPU. This is in addition to NEW ZEALAND troops previously requested. Transportation could be available at WELINGTON on November 15th.

It seems indicated that the loss of the COCONUT was due to negligence and disobedience of orders on the part of the master of that vessel. Comsopac is investigating.

There was a possible sub contact 10 miles south of KUKU HEAD.

The S-3l reports sinking 1 large JI off PAGAYAN - again demonstrating that S-boats skillfully handled can inflict important damage on the enemy.

A nightly dispersal from the anchorage in the BUIN-FALII area is reported. A photograph shows a CV at RAJAIL on the afternoon of the 5th (local). There are no further indications of major enemy moves.

The following is a summary of damage inflicted by carriers of TF 61 on October 25th, as reported by CTF 61:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHOKAKU Class CV</th>
<th>2nd Do</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 - 500# bomb hits</td>
<td>4 to 6 1000# bomb hits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 4th.  (Continued)

KONGO Class BB - 2 - 1000# bomb hits
Unidentified CL - 1 - 500# bomb hit
ATAGO Class CA - 1 - possible torpedo hit
           - 1 - possible 500# bomb hit
TOHE Class CA - 5 - 500# bomb hits
  2nd Do - 4 - 1000# bomb hits
MACHI Class CA - 3 - torpedo hits

Planes destroyed:

Certain 67; probable 23, total 90.

There is still doubt as to the source of the press release concerning the HORNET.
SECRET

November 5th.

Jomsopac 052358 is a summary of operations in that area to the 5th local. As there is increasing delay in receiving action and battle reports from Admiral Halsey he was requested to pass these along promptly in addition to his daily summary. Communication facilities available to Admiral Halsey are not good but constant effort for improvement is being made.

The day was quiet, so far as is known. A flight of enemy planes reported heading for GUADALCANAL is unreported. A enemy group of 1 cruiser and 16 DDs was sighted heading toward the PORTLAND area during the day by search planes. One KCV, 4 DD, several smaller combatant craft, and 1 war type were reported at RANAVL.

There is urgent need for 3000 men of balanced ratings in the South Pacific Area.

Two enemy ships, thought DDs, were reported about 10 miles north of our position at GUADALCANAL.

Unloading of all APs in the GUADALCANAL area was completed by early morning of the 6th (local). Further movements of troops and supplies to the area are underway.

The CONRADHAN is being patched by the WABAO at MALAITA and should leave for ESPIRITU SANTO in the next day or so.

Cominchk (051524 pink) is disturbed about the multiplication of special commands in the Sopac area and desires Admiral Nimitz to discuss the matter with him at the next meeting.

At the request of Jomsopac the SUMMER will report to him for survey duty - probably at ESPIRITU SANTO.

Jomsopac assumes that the 3rd Raider Battalion will be ready for duty assigned on December 1st.

The Central Pacific and North Pacific areas were quiet. In the ALEUTIANS CTF 8 reports that weather conditions have become so severe that fueling at sea is now rarely possible.

There are no new enemy developments.

*Signature*

1155
November 6th.

General Emmons and the usual Task Force Commanders were present at the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. The general situation in the Pacific Ocean Area was reviewed.

During the late afternoon planes from GUADALCANAL attacked an enemy force of 1 CL and 10 DDs discovered approaching GUADALCANAL about 60 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND and obtained 2 torpedo hits and one 1000# bomb hit on the CL, 1 torpedo hit on a DD, and shot down 12 enemy planes. Our losses were four F4Fs and three pilots. It is indicated that enemy ships had on board a relief force to be landed near TAJJAPARCNGA POINT.

The MAJUFA was torpedoed while discharging cargo in the vicinity of LUNGSA POINT, and was beached. All ammunition had been landed. Eye witnesses believe a midget or very small enemy sub was responsible.

Consopac 070150 gives operations to the morning of the 6th (local).

Consopac 061345 is comment on Cominch message regarding the multiplication of base commands in his area.

During the day Consopac reorganized two major task forces. TF 16 under Rear Admiral Kinkaid is the new CV force and TF 65 under Rear Admiral Callaghan is the new cruiser force.

Vice Opnav 062139 gives the loading of Seabees, etc., in the MT. VERNON and JUPITER for NOUMEA to arrive early in December, and the plans for sailing the OALMNKE movement and ACORS 3 and 4 for Sopac.

The 147th infantry less two battalions is scheduled to arrive at AOLA BAY from TONGATAPU during the last half of November. Then this outfit arrives there will be over 2000 Army troops at AOLA BAY.

A submarine was reported off the North Coast of CALIFORNIA.

Present indications are that the planting of minefields at ADAK will be completed tomorrow. Photographs indicate active enemy activity at ATTU.

The enemy continues to reinforce and supply GUADALCANAL. It may well be that when the number of aircraft is considered sufficient, the enemy will make a coordinated attack on our positions, employing surface ships, air, and troops to the limit of their resources in the general area.
SECRET

November 7th

At 1730 local a force of 4 CL's and 5 DD's was sighted about 125 miles north of GUADALCANAL and apparently headed for that place. Last night and again the night before PT boats off GUADALCANAL report hitting enemy DD's. Comsopac 080101 summarizes operations in his area to the afternoon of the 7th local. A 2-man sub is claimed sunk by a plane off CAPE ESPERANCE. This may be the sub that hit the NAJARA off LUNGA. Rear Admiral Turner will command TF 67 and expects to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL on the 12th local. This move involves one Army regiment, one Marine aviation engineer battalion, and 2000 Marine replacements—a total of about 6000 men. Two companies of Marine 2nd Raider Battalion were landed at AOLA BAY during the day. Good progress is being made on the airfields at GUADALCANAL, and the tank farm there should be unloaded in the near future.

Comanphibsopac 072358 deals with enemy troops at GUADALCANAL as learned from captured documents.

Comsopac 290251 gives plans for air base commands in his area.

There is some evidence of mining off LUNGA and the HOVEY has been ordered to sweep the area on the 10th (local). She will also deliver a deck load of avgas to add to the meagre supply.

In the Central Pacific the only activity above routine is the search for a PEVS5A down off JOHNSTON and a B-24 down enroute OAHU to CANTON.

Seven float Ø VF were sighted at HOLTZ BAY, ATTU, yesterday. This is not taken as a resumption of enemy activity there. Enemy subs continue small activity in the central Aleutians. There are indications of some personnel trouble with merchant vessels in ALASKA which is being investigated.

The GRAYLING reports getting two torpedo hits in a CHIYODA class AV off TRUK.

There is nothing new concerning enemy deployments or intentions. It continues almost certain that main enemy interest is in the Southern SOLOMONS.
SECRET

November 8th

At the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz, and attended today by General Ermol and TF Commanders, Rear Admiral Murray, who was recently JT 17, told of his activities in October - especially on the 5th and 25th. The poor performance of our DD torpedoes was commented on and is a matter of serious concern. Admiral Nimitz congratulated Admiral Murray for the fine work done by TF 17.

The day in the South Pacific was quiet. Jomoped 39 126 is the operations summary. Admiral Scott comments on the present employment of the ATLANTA in his 080020. Also, he points to a disadvantage in the employment of LTs north of Guadalcanal. The EDGAR ALLAN POE is reported to have been torpedoed south of NOI. ENA. ComsoD90247 gives further details on the condition of the ENTERPRISE. Vice Admiral Halsey has closed his administrative office at AUCKLAND and is consolidating his staff at NOI. ENA.

The RALEIGH made a sweep along the reported position of an enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS with negative results.

There is strong indication of a grand scale offensive aimed at Guadalcanal to be undertaken by the enemy in the very near future.

The following is an estimate of the maximum enemy surface combatant forces that can be employed in the Guadalcanal area for the offensive in the next week:

4 BB, 2 CV, 5 CA, 6 CL, 21 DD.

It must be noted that some of these units may have some damage.

Our surface force available to oppose that offensive is:

2 BB (one damaged), 1 CV (damaged), 4 CA, 4 CL, 33 DD (some required for escort).

CominCh 081505 pink and Jomoped 082145 pink deals with the employment of the ILLUSTRIOUS in the Pacific Fleet.

Jomoped 092107 pink gives an estimate of enemy intentions in the SOLOMONS.
SECRET

November 9th.

At the usual morning conference Rear Admiral Mason told of the attack on the HORNET which resulted in her loss.

Consopac 100316 is the operations summary for that area. The Army 70034314 which has been moving eastward the past few days has succeeded in surrounding a Jap force of undetermined size in the vicinity of TETERE. (Comgen 1st Marines 092359). A group of 5 DD's was sighted and attacked by the evening air search just off the northeast coast of NEW GEORGIA and these ships arrived in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANCE at 2230 (local). The ATLANTA group will arrive at GUADALCANAL tomorrow, and Rear Admiral Turner's group of reinforcements are scheduled to arrive the day after. His support group is preceding the AP's and is due to arrive one hour before midnight. The SOUTHAND reports the probable sinking of a Jap sub between SAN CRISTOBAL and GUADALCANAL. The FLETCHER reports a possible sub contact to the east of SAN CRISTOBAL.

General MacArthur will comply with the request of Consopac for maximum air effort against shipping in the BUNI-PAISI-TOKOLEI area during the period 11-14 November (local) inclusive. Today at least 61 ships were reported by a coast watcher in that area including six cruisers and 33 DD's. Another coast watcher report from that area states four probable RB's there.

Consopac has requested that eight P-39's be flown from AUSTRALIA to GUADALCANAL at once.

During the day subs were reported sighted off SAN PEDRO and near DUTCH HARBOR. CTF 8 reports the ADAK mining project completed in his 092045.

It is generally believed that Zed day for the landing of enemy Army troops on GUADALCANAL is November 13th local. This is expected to be a major effort to recapture GUADALCANAL. TF 61 has been put on one hours sailing notice at NOUMEA, but if the attack starts as believed, it will have to get underway at once to intercept.
SECRET

November 10th.

Sopac operations through the 10th local are in Comsopac 110231. Comsopac 102102 ordered TF 16 to sortie at 10 a.m. today from NOUMEA and proceed toward GUADALCANAL. Two air attacks were made by the enemy this morning. The enemy lost a total of 5 zeros and 8 bombers out of 17 zeros and 35 bombers attacking. We lost 7 P4V4 and five pilots. The ZEILIN was damaged by three near misses in the first attack but was able to start for ESPIRITU SANTO. No other damage was reported. Comgen 1st MarDiv 102156 reports ground activities and the air strike on 5 DDs 210 miles north of GUADALCANAL on the evening of the 10th (local). Just before midnight Rear Admiral Callaghan’s force arrived off the Marine position and continued to the westward of GUADALCANAL without making enemy contacts. The APs under Rear Admiral Turner are due at GUADALCANAL at dawn tomorrow. TF 67 approaching GUADALCANAL has been sighted and reported by enemy search planes.

Comsopac has ordered three of his subs to the vicinity of a point 75 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND.

TF 66 has been formed as an escort force. CTF 66 will be the administrative type commander for destroyers, South Pacific.

Comsopac 110954 believes that two weeks training for a British CV will suffice if we use our own aircraft, bombs, key personnel, etc.

The 9th Defense Battalion which arrived at NOUMEA today has been assigned to TF 62 for duty at GUADALCANAL.

One was reported 15 miles east of LUNGA POINT.

Cominch has approved the reorganization of the Sopac Marines as outlined in Comsopac 312126.

The SEAWOLF reported sighting a large CV and 2 DD departing from PALAU for the South during the late afternoon.

CTF 8 reports an air attack on enemy planes at AATTU and a minor air attack at KISKA. There are indications of renewed enemy activity in that area. This may be in the nature of a diversion. AATTU is mentioned and minor activity reported by sub reconnaissance on AMCHITKA.

If our reading of the mail is correct, today is 2 minus 2 day and the striking forces will attack GUADALCANAL tomorrow. There are no indications of raids or other major enemy activities in the Pacific except as noted above in the ALEUTIANS.

As a result of our landing in North Africa on the 7th, Vichy France broke diplomatic relations with us at 1930 on November 8th.

1160
SECRET

November 11th

General Eisenhower and TF commanders at PEARL attended the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.

Consopac 120019 is the operations summary for that area. The good news of the day is that 20 to 25 enemy torpedo bombers escorted by 8 zeros were shot down by our planes and AA when they attacked our shipping off GUADALCANAL. Rear Admiral Turner's force arrived as scheduled and was attacked in the early afternoon. Other flights were reported coming in but it is not reported whether or not they arrived. Rear Admiral Callaghan's force made two sweeps to the westward then took a covering position to the westward of SAVO. The APs and AKs were expected to retire from the area during the night of the 12th (local).

Our search planes reported the following enemy forces during the day: 2 BB or CA, 1 cruiser, 6 DD, 270 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND; 5 DD 110 miles north of ISABEL; 2 CV, 2 DD west of GUADALCANAL. There were several enemy search plane contacts in the SOLOMONS area. An enemy sub was reported north of LUNGA POINT.

Fragmentary reports have begun to arrive indicating a battle near SAVO during the night. The PORTLAND steering engine was disabled and a tow requested, and the ATLANTA said she needed assistance. Other known details are in Consopac 122037 pink.

Consopac 120031 pink is further information on the employment of the ILLUSTRIOUS.

FANTAN 090334 is a report of airfield construction at SUVA.

ComSWFak reports that a small Allied corvette engaged two enemy raiders at 19-50 S, 92-40 E. One raider was reported hit and afire and the corvette was damaged.

The landing field at FUNAFUTI was put in commission by ComGen STRAW on November 8. It is now 250' x 3500', and will be extended to 300' x 6000'.

The 147th Infantry is now loaded in the PRESIDENT HAYES at BLEACHER.

The first section of TF 11 will depart PEARL for the south tomorrow and the second section will leave when the NORTH CAROLINA is ready - about the 17th.

CTF 8 reports a medium tanker and one DD at HOLTZ BAY. There are several indications of renewed enemy activity in the ALEUTIANS, but because of great enemy activity in the SOLOMONS it is believed that no major effort is probable in the north.

Consopac 120635 indicates the need for APs and AKs for training purposes on the West Coast.
SECRET

November 12th

General Emmons and Task Force Commanders at PEARL were present at the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. All present were brought up to date regarding current operations.

The day in the South Pacific was one of great activity. As noted yesterday, a battle was working up in the vicinity of SAVO ISLAND. CTF 67 had completed a good percentage of unloading and departed during the evening. His three part 130115 reports the shelling of enemy positions by cruisers and destroyers at GUADALCANAL during the unloading, and of air attacks, and of percentage of unloading. Rear Admiral Callaghan's cruiser and destroyer group were to intercept the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL. Rear Admiral Scott in the ATLANTA with 4 DD of Decons 12 joined Rear Admiral Callaghan.

At 0310, local, off LUNOA POINT, the PORTLAND requested air coverage and tow, having been hit by a torpedo. At 0700, local, the HELena originated a message, as senior ship, saying that the HELena, SAN FRANCISCO, JUNEAU, O'BANION, FLETCHER and ENTERPRISE were proceeding toward ESTIRITU SAIIO at 15 knots. All these ships are reported damaged. By 10.00 a.m. local, Comsopac had accounted for all his ships except the ATLANTA and 5 DDs. Shortly thereafter Comsopac gave details of the damage to the PORTLAND and ATLANTA in his 122322. By 1100 the AARON WARE reported being towed to TULAGI for examination of damage to engines and boilers. By the afternoon the ATLANTA was sinking and had to be abandoned. Comsopac gave those on the spot authority to use discretion in destroying the ATLANTA. The PORTLAND was being towed to TULAGI at this time. At 1755, local, there were about 1400 survivors of Rear Admiral Callaghan's force ashore at GUADALCANAL. During the evening RIO TULAGI asked whether or not to torpedo the KONUNSEN. The extent of damage to two other DDs is not completely reported. Preliminary information of damage inflicted on the enemy includes the disabling of one HOKO Class BB and one CL by torpedoes and bombs. One enemy ship was reported blown up.

As the results of the morning air searches came in, the following enemy forces were reported:

KONUNSEN Class BB vicinity of SAVO.
1 BB, 3 DD - 40 miles north of GUADALCANAL.
1 CV, 1 BR, 3 DD - 230 miles northeast of GUADALCANAL, with 3 cruisers and at least 4 DDs about 50 miles to the eastward of this CV group.
10 AP, 12 cruisers and destroyers heading toward and about 50 miles from BUIN.
1 BB, 3 DD - 45 miles north of LUNOA with 1 BB, 1 cruiser near that position about 1½ hours later.

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SECRET

November 12th (Cont'd)

2 CA, 1 DD - 330 miles northeast of VAIATI.

In the afternoon there was reported:

1 BB, 1 DD - 150 miles north of and heading toward GUADALCANAL.
1 CV east of VAIATI.
A large ship 60 miles north of GUADALCANAL.

TF 16 had been ordered to support GUADALCANAL and the withdrawal of our damaged units, operating to the south of SOLOMONS. As a result of these sightings TF 64 was formed with 2 BBs and 4 DDs to prevent the bombardment of our GUADALCANAL position during the coming night. The remainder of TF 16 was directed to continue operations to the southwest of GUADALCANAL, striking suitable targets. TF 64 cannot reach an intercepting position before 0800 local tomorrow but the ENTERPRISE group will be in a position to strike in the GUADALCANAL area at daylight tomorrow. The ENTERPRISE flew in some planes to GUADALCANAL, probably because her damage (70% effective estimated) will not permit her to operate all of her planes effectively.

Consair SOPAC stated he would attack enemy cruisers if they approached VAIKORO with SEBs and TBFs from ESPIRITU SANTO.

During the day two strikes of B-17s were launched. The first strike of 8 B-17s failed to get hits on the PP northwest of GUADALCANAL, and the other strike is not reported.

At least five enemy plane strikes were made on GUADALCANAL. None were reported reaching that place.

During the day it became doubtful if there were any enemy CVs in the SOLOMONS area.

Air forces from the SW Pacific attacked shipping in the BUIN area with good results, and Admiral Halsey requested further attacks on the APs. He also requested that 10 B-24s be alerted in the SW Pacific for a flight to ESPIRITU SANTO, or EFATE, or NEW CALEDONIA, as designated later.

During the evening GUADALCANAL directed the sinking of the ATLANTA tomorrow at daylight.

Shortly after midnight GUADALCANAL reported being heavily shelled by naval gunfire. The last shelling there caused serious damage and so this report causes much concern.

The enemy has postponed 2 day until the 14th (Local). Thus tomorrow may be another very exciting day. We continue to

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 12th. (Continued)

be optimistic. Our forces will be in good position to come to
grips with the enemy, and if gunfire did not put HENDERSON field
out of commission, our Marine pilots should make the landing
extremely costly.

The FINBACK reports sinking 27,000 tons enemy shipping
to the east of FORMOSA.

The pilot of the Rickenbacker plane which landed at sea
three weeks ago was rescued today off FUNAFUTI. As other personnel
are thought in rubber boats near the position where the pilot was
rescued, there seems some chance of saving them.

November 13th.

Continuing with the narrative of yesterday Comsopac
130428 describes some results SAVO action. The ATLANTA was
sunk by our forces after damage received from the enemy had
completely wrecked her. It is found from enemy survivors that
our forces may have engaged two enemy groups: - 1st 2 BB, 1 CL,
6 DDs; 2nd 2 BBs, 2 CA. The PORTLAND and AARON WARD arrived
at TULAGI for temporary repairs to permit them to withdraw. The
MONSSEN probably was torpedoed by our own forces.

Morning searches discovered the following enemy forces:

(1) A convoy of 12 AP off the northern coast off the north
coast of NEW GEORGIA headed southeast.

(2) A group of 25 ships southwest of ISABEL ISLAND headed
southeast.

(3) 5 ships (one damaged) 75 miles northeast ISABEL ISLAND
headed northwest.

(4) A "large force" of cruisers and DDs 60 miles northeast
of ISABEL ISLAND headed south.

(5) 2 BB, 1 CL, 11 DD just off the east coast of NEW GEOR-
GIA on southeast heading.

(6) 1 BB, 1 CL, 2 DD 60 miles south of SHORTLAND ISLAND and
heading to that place.

(7) Several enemy patrol planes.

Other minor contacts were made.

(Continued on next page)
Photos yesterday show one direct hit and two near misses by B-17s in first drop on BB of the FUGO class, and a second drop claims three hits.

The orders for TF 16 and TF 64 are shown in Comsopac 131730.

Both the planes from the ENTERPRISE (See Comsopac 14-1020) and from GUADALCANAL attacked enemy forces approaching in the vicinity of the NEW GEORGIA group. As a result of these air attacks Comgen CACTUS reported 11 enemy AP, 6 of which were damaged, and several DDs were milling around 60 miles northwest of SAVO at 1600 local and asked CTF 64 if he could strike. The results of B-17 and PB4Y strikes during the day were not reported. ComNavUnit CACTUS 140716 is his belief of enemy conditions.

As GUADALCANAL planes operated successfully during the day it is assumed that last nights shelling did not seriously damage the airfield.

The FLYING FISH made an unsuccessful attack on the force of cruisers and DDs northeast of ISABEL. CTF 42 readjusted sub positions in the hopes of getting the cripples, or any other prime targets.

At 1903 local CTF 64 stated he would enter east of RUSSEL at 2200. At 2000 a plane reported a naval battle to the westward of RUSSEL ISLAND. This report is not understood. CTF 64 reported being off JUNGA at 2245. At 2322 CTF 64 reported "engaging enemy".

SAN FRANCISCO damage and casualties are reported in his 141058 and 141115. The loss of the JUNEAU by enemy torpedoes is reported in the HELENA's 141406. It is certain that Captain Young of the SAN FRANCISCO was killed, but no report has been made concerning Rear Admiral Callaghan.

Comgen 1st MarDiv 132233 reports activities on the 12-13 local.

The first NEW ZEALAND troops to garrison NOUMEA should arrive there November 16th.

The PRESIDENT HAYES with Army Troops from BLEACHER embarked has been ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO.

For the first time in this campaign P-36s and B-26s are reported at GUADALCANAL.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 13th. (Continued)

The personnel of the Rickenbacker plane, except one man who died at sea, have been saved.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

As the day ends it seems most probable that while we have suffered severe losses in ships and personnel, our gallant shipmates have again thwarted the enemy. If so, this may well be the decisive battle of this campaign.

November 14th.

General Emsens and the usual Task Force Commanders were present at Admiral Nimitz's morning conference.

As previously noted our BB group had been ordered to parallel the SOLOMONS 50 miles to the westward and the ENTERPRISE group to parallel 100 miles to the westward. The subsequent action of our BB group is described in CTF 64 150355. Probably because the ENTERPRISE damage would not permit her planes to operate efficiently, 54 were flown off to GUADALCANAL. At the end of the day the BBs and the ENTERPRISE were returning to NOUMEA and the ENTERPRISE planes will proceed to ESPiritu SANTO as soon as conditions warrant. Gomspec 150355 and 151310 give damage to own and enemy forces. The MEADE and air bombardment are credited with the destruction of all four enemy AKs beached in the vicinity of TASSAPARONGA POINT. While a great many of the details of the events of the day in the general GUADALCANAL area are not yet known, it is certain that TF 67, 64, and 16 inflicted such heavy damage on the enemy that the push was completely broken up and the enemy was forced to retire.

During the retirement of TF 64 the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA were attacked by enemy air.

A summary of our losses and damage is:

Lost: ATLANTA, JUNEAU, MONSSEN, WALKER, LAFAYETTE, PRESTON.

Probably lost: BARTON, CUSHING.

Severely damaged: SOUTH DAKOTA, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND.

Damaged: HELENA, FLETCHER, O'BANNON, STERRETT, HENHAM, GWIN, AARON WARD.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 14th. (Continued)

Personnel loss is not known, but includes Rear Admiral Callaghan and three of his staff, and Captain Young - all of whom were in the SAN FRANCISCO and were killed during the night action of TF 67.

The enemy losses are not accurately known. It is safe to assume at least the following:

Sunk: 12 AP(AK), 3 CA, 9 DD.
Severely damaged: 1 BB,
Damaged: 1 BB, several cruisers and DDs.

SW Pac air is expected to strike damaged ships reported entering the SUIN-FAISI area.

We still have to hear of what was accomplished by TF 63, TF 42, GUADALCANAL air, and the PTs.

The INDIANA group arrived at BALBOA and will proceed at once to the South Pacific.

Batdiv 4 has been diverted to NANDI. The SARATOGA group will cross the equator next Monday.

The MANLEY and McKean will land 2 companies of the 2nd Raider Battalion at ACA LA BAY and will also tow 4 PTs to TULAGI.

We are two days behind on reports from General Vandegrift. No major land action is reported.

Vice Opnav 141926 gives plans for NEW ZEALAND air employment and requests Cinc Pac and Comsopac views.

The Central Pacific area was quiet.

In the North Pacific AA fire was encountered by our planes at ATTU and landing barges were sighted. Possible enemy radio activity was reported at AMCHITKA.
November 16th.

General Emmons and the Task Force Commanders at Pearl were present at the usual morning conference.

It is now definite that the enemy offensive was completely stopped. It is probable that damage we inflicted on the enemy is greater than received by us. As striking forces of both sides have retired from the GUADALCANAL area and can hardly be in large scale action in the near future, it appears that now is the time to move in supplies and to relieve the "ired Marine amphibious troops. CTF 52 has already started a movement of supplies to GUADALCANAL.

The ENTERPRISE, SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, and screening DDs are enroute NOUMEA. The NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, and 5 DDs (TF 16.6) are at ESPIRITU SANTO waiting orders where they will be joined by the LEANDER. The PORTLAND and AARON WARD are making temporary repairs at TULAGI. The HENHAM and GWIN are limping toward ESPIRITU SANTO and are being escorted by the SHAW and NICHOLAS.

CTF 52 151012 (2 parts) gives results of recent action after conference with commanding officers engaged. Comsopac 161124 also summarizes results of the battle.

Comgen 1st Marines 152246 reports action on GUADALCANAL, including air activity.

C.O.S. Army & Cominco 141928 (2 parts) gives procedure for distribution, allocation, and replacement of aircraft in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Because of a report of sighting an enemy land plane by our search plane 675 miles NW CAHU, condition ONE was ordered at midnight. The enemy threat did not materialize and normal conditions of alert were resumed about eight hours later.

Except for two reports of enemy submarines the Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.
SECRET

November 16th.

As the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and Task Force Commanders at PEARL are either present in person or represented at the daily morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz, notation will not be made except to note absentees.

There was no action with the enemy in the Pacific Ocean Areas yesterday except minor air and submarine contacts. During this lull in the South Pacific both the enemy and ourselves are commencing to regroup, and to plan for the repair of damaged ships. Major logistic support for the GUADALCANAL area is underway.

Rear Admiral Turner expresses his views regarding the force necessary to protect our lines of communications to advance positions in his CTF 62 161133.

The action of the PORTLAND in the 3rd Battle of SAVO in his 2 part 170400 and 170400. The PORTLAND also sends (160830) the account of the senior survivor of the PRESIDENT. Captain Jenkins, senior survivor on GUADALCANAL describes other losses and personnel casualties (RDO CACTUS 140358). The MASSE LINE 1501L5 reports bombardment of enemy APs (AKs?) and the rescue of survivors.

An enemy AK was reported stopped and smoking just west of SAVO ISLAND.

The Marine reorganization in the South Pacific is made effective by COMSOPAC 161144.

COMSOPAC has delegated to COMSOPAC authority for deployment and redistribution of Army and Navy air organizations in the South Pacific Area.

Two enemy submarines were reported sighted off CAPE HINCHEN'S ROOK, ALASKA.

There is indication that the enemy is again becoming active in the HUNA area. So far the move of forces to that area is of a minor nature. It is believed, however, that if the enemy can find the means, they will plan to capture all of NEW GUINEA.
SECRET

November 17th.

The only enemy action of note in the Pacific during the day is the movement of troops and air to the vicinity of BUNA, NEW GUINEA. It appears that the enemy is reinforcing the position there.

The report of ENTERPRISE plane operations between November 13 and 15 inclusive is in Comsopac 180655.

Comgen MacDive 172205 reports GUADALCANAL operations.

The PORTLAND will require the services of a tug when she leaves TULAGI. That ship recommends repairs be accomplished at SYDNEY.

The delivery of supplies of all kinds to the GUADALCANAL area is now underway on a large scale.

The WICHITA, CLEVELAND, SUWANNEE, SANGAMON, JENKINS, MURPHY, RADFORD, WALLER and CONWAY have been ordered to proceed to the Pacific for duty at an early date. The HOISE will remain in the Atlantic. Cominch 180255 pink.

CTF 8 has been directed to submit a plan as early as practicable for expulsion of Japs from the ALB TIAN. The plan will also include consideration of early occupation of AMCHITKA to deny it to the enemy as an air field site.

Aside from minor enemy moves toward Kiska and BUNA, there is no new information of enemy deployment or intentions.

November 18th.

Again the day was quiet in the South and Southwest Pacific except for minor activity in the BUNA area. Our logistic movements to the SOLOMONS are proceeding satisfactorily according to plan, and when completed and bulk avgas storage installed much greater strength of our positions will result.

In his 190859 CTF 64 reports damage inflicted during the night of 14-15 local. As some of this was predicted and reported by Comsopac, we are not yet ready to estimate enemy losses. It seems quite probable that damage inflicted is considerably greater than the preliminary fragmentary reports indicated. It may even be that our forces in the south have inflicted decisive damage for this phase of the campaign. In any event we can reasonably assume that with the arrival of TF 11 in the near future and the strengthening of GUADALCANAL now in progress that we can expect to control both the sea and air in the Southern SOLOMONS. If the 26th Army Division can be sent in to GUADALCANAL to relieve the 1st Marine Division, the Marines

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 19th. (Continued)

can rest, reequip, and prepare for the next step. As the sit-
tuation now stands there seems to be a good chance to starve
out the Japs on GUADALCANAL.

There were no new developments in the Central or North
Pacific areas.

In Cinopac 182131 is a plan to withdraw Pacific Fleet
submarines from the South Pacific area in order to increase
patrols in Empire waters.

November 19th.

The South Pacific continues quiet. Logistic support
of GUADALCANAL is proceeding according to plan. The present
development of airplane fields at GUADALCANAL is in Comgen lst
Mardiv 182338. Comsopac 2011135 is a summary to the 19th local.
It is now learned that damage inflicted on the enemy on Nov-
ember 14-15 by TF 64 was not included in prior damage reports
made by Admiral Halsey. On this basis a tentative estimate
damage to the enemy November 8-16 is

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* BB or CA
** Type not stated

The remodelled ARGONAUT will leave PEARL about the 23rd
for the South Pacific. Her new capabilities are shown in Com-
subpac 200021.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet. Cinop-
 pac 200923 requests clarification of the status of the bases
OSTLER and LINEOUT.

The center of enemy interest in the South has shifted
from GUADALCANAL to the SUNA area, but there is nothing yet to
indicate anything like a major move toward NEW GUINKA. There
November 19th. (Continued)

is nothing new learned of enemy deployments or intentions, except some activity at MUNDIA, NEW GEORGIA and the indications of further strengthening at EKA.

November 20th.

The day in the South Pacific was quiet. Some enemy submarine and air activity was noted but no main interest continued to be the logistic supply of our SOLOMONS positions and the repair of damaged combatant units. Comsopac 210600 refers to plans for the 21st (local). A flight of enemy planes were reported coming in to CACTUS but no arrival report was received. Comsopac urges that Pacific Fleet submarines remain in his area (his 21064).

The tanker situation in the Sopac area is discussed in Cinopac 200925.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

Rear Admiral Giffen's force will leave the east for the Canal Zone, enroute to the Pacific, on December 5th.

There are no new enemy developments.

November 21

The South Pacific continues quiet, as is also the case in the Central and North Pacific areas. The logistic support of GUADALCANAL is proceeding according to plan without opposition. No report of land operations on GUADALCANAL was received during the day. Minor enemy activity continues in the EUNA area. The enemy is landing some troops and materials at MUNDIA, NEW GUINEA. The Japs are to try to land troops and supplies on GUADALCANAL from submarines.

Combatdiv SIX 211236 (2 parts) discusses the gunnery of his part in the 3rd Battle of Savo and stresses the importance of radio in night action.

Comsopac 220120 comments on need of present APs and AXs in his area.

Comsopac 210052 requests speed in delivery of PCs to his area.

Cominch 211800 desires further information on Cinopac proposal to establish Comairopac system.

Consideration is being given to convert 9 additional ODDs to APDs for use in the South Pacific.

There were no new enemy developments.
SECRET

November 28

The South Pacific continues quiet. Air searches were negative. Complete coverage was not possible due to bad weather.

Comsopac 221037 is a summary of the day at GUADALCANAL. Logistic support is going in, including turkeys for Thanksgiving.

The BENHAM received a torpedo hit during the night of 14-15 November off SAVO. During the following afternoon the ship was thought breaking up and the crew was transferred to the GWYN who sank the BENHAM by gunfire.

There is the possibility that the Japs are using captured Allied planes to trail our forces.

Comsopac 222357 gives progress of repair to STERRETT, BUCHANAN, and O'MONN. The PORTLAND is underway for SYDNEY after temporary repairs at TULAOI.

Comsopac 230512 is the Task Force reorganization of the forces under his command.

Cominch 230032 pink directs the return of 6 subs to Comowespace and that 6 preferably 8 PT boats be placed at the disposal of MacArthur in response to the latter's request.

Cominch 230188 is a proposal for redistribution of Pacific Fleet subs.

Cominch 222241 requests information of troop command relations at GUADALCANAL.

Cominch 221341 directs the transfer of 4 APs and 8 AKs from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet. This will ease the training problem of TF 3.

The enemy continues active in the BUNA and MUNDA area. There is some indication that Jap CVs have returned to JAPAN for reorganizing, refitting and training.

Ow

1173
SECRET

November 23rd.

There were no new developments in any Pacific Ocean Area today. Because of expected enemy submarine operations off GUADALCANAL, Com Gen 1st Marines requests additional forces in additional to the PT's.

The SOUTH DAKOTA will go to NEW YORK for battle damage repair, and the SAN FRANCISCO will go to WAKE ISLAND.

The proposed command set up at GUADALCANAL is shown in ComSoPac's 240145.

The enemy is planning reinforcements to the BUNA, MUNDA, and GUADALCANAL area by destroyers. As previously mentioned, subs have been ordered to bring supplies and troops to GUADALCANAL. It is evident that the enemy is in no position to dispute our command of the sea area in the Southern SOLOMONS at this time.

November 24th.

As has been noted for several days, the enemy interest in the South and Southwest Pacific concerns: (1) THE BUNA relief force, (2) Logistic support of GUADALCANAL by submarines and DDs, (3) strengthening the MUNDA position.

Our logistic support of GUADALCANAL continues in a satisfactory manner. Comsopac 240525 and 251215 summarize activities in the Southern SOLOMONS. At 0320 the 26th (local)enemy planes were reported over GUADALCANAL.

Comsopac believes that the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS occupation should continue to be held in abeyance because of construction difficulties and desirability of avoiding dissipation of effort.

In the SW Pacific the allied troops are pressing the enemy in the BUNA area. Of a reported group of 1 CL and 4 DDs attacked by SWPac air to the southwest of NEW BRITAIN, two DDs are reported hit and burning.

The NORTH CAROLINA has been sent to SUVA to join other BBs there. The MINNEAPOLIS, PERKINS, and DIXON will join TF 67 at ESPIRITU SANTO.

The LOUISVILLE, FRAZER, and GANSEVOORT depart PEARL for the South tomorrow escorting APA loaded with the first combat team of the 25th Infantry Division.

C/m

1174
SECRET

November 24th (Continued)

Comin ch 232222 describes the LITTLE and OSTLER garrisons.

CINCPAC plans for the seizure and occupation of Kiska, and an estimate for the resumption of the Sopo'oa offensive are underway.

November 25th.

There were no major activities in the Pacific today.

COMAOPE 261300 is a summary for his area. The AGLA project has been abandoned. Apparently the new unloading point is 3000 yards east of Togama Point. (CTF 62 260458). COMAOPE 250609 urges that Admiral Fitch's title be CTF 63 only and a rear admiral be ordered as COMAIRAOPE at NOUEEA. Cinopac comments on this in his 260247 to Comin ch. The port director setup in the South Pacific is outlined in COMAOPE 260632.

The master of the COOLIDGE will be brought to trial. Both Army and Navy have jurisdiction.

COMAOPE 240330 (pink) relays SWPAO despatch to COMAOPE showing that Admiral Carpenter was not consulted by General MacArthur prior to his recent request to Washington for Naval forces. It also gives sub distribution in support of NEW GUINEA.

COMAOPE 252330 (pink) suggests possibility of relief of Marines in SAMOA and HAWAII by the Army.

A tanker was attacked off San Francisco Bay today by an enemy submarine.

CTF 8 252030 (pink) gives his estimate of enemy troop strength in the western ARCTIC. The estimate seems a bit high. Comin ch desires a report and recommendations of landing field possibilities on AMCHITKA. The Army recommended against occupation for that purpose in the early fall. CTF 8 will make a survey as soon as possible.

CTF 8 260155 (pink) 2 CLs and 4 DDs to intercept a convoy indicated now enroute Kiska.

COMAOPE 251659 indicates British units may soon report to South Pacific for duty.

The Army Signal Corps seems to think action imminent at RABaul. Here it is believed that no major enemy activity in the South Pacific can take place in the next two or three weeks.
SECRET

November 26

Comsopac 271254 is the daily summary of his area. The report of 3000 Japs at NEKATA is a much larger force than had been estimated there. At 0434/28th local (-11) enemy planes were reported over CACTUS. There is some doubt concerning the combat readiness of the 43rd Division, location of the American Division and 9th Defense Battalion, and the 1st Raider Battalion. Comsopac has been requested to keep Cinopac informed of these and the organization and strength of future troop movements.

Cominoh 251415 is sending 4 APs and 2 AKs to the Pacific, leaving the east coast mid December. As 3 AP and 2 AKs are to be loaded for the South Pacific it seems best to send them as planned. The need for APs and AKs in TF 3 for training is urgent. Until the planned training there is completed no troops will be available to oust the Japs from the Aleutians. Because of this Admiral Halsey has been asked to comment on the immediate release to TF 3 of 3 AP and 2 AK.

NA WELLINGTON 262230 gives Commodore Goddards views on New Zealand air.

The reported submarine sighting off SAN FRANCISCO yesterday now appears quite doubtful.

Cinopac 262305 pink agrees in principle with the relief of Marine ground and air units at SAMOA and HAWAII mentioned yesterday.

In the Aleutians, the enemy convoy believed enroute to SEMICHI has been delayed 2 or 3 days. CTF 8 is attempting to intercept with 2 CL and 4 DD, working with FBY search.

There are no new enemy developments.

November 27

There were no major contacts with enemy units during the day. Various sightings indicate an AK afire to the westward of NEW GEORGIA. This damaged ship is in a small group of DDs and Marus apparently standing toward the SHORTLANDS area. The ALCHIRA was torpedoed off LUNGA today. The ship was beached and when last reported was on fire forward but unloading continued from the after hatches. CTF 62 290309 suggests sweeps to reduce the hazard of unloading.

The INDIANA will join up with other BBs at FIJI and the COLUMBIA will go to ESPIRITU SANTO to join the force under Rear Admiral Wright.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 27 (Continued)

The HELENA 140001 gives additional details regarding the 3rd Battle of Savo, including details of the loss of the JUNEAU.

Ground activity continues in the FUNA area. Neither side is indicated having the upper hand.

In the North Pacific Rear Admiral Smith with 2 CL and 4 DD is making a sweep toward ATTU in the hope of intercepting an enemy convoy which is indicated bringing reinforcements and supplies to the Western ALEUTIANS. B-26's were ordered to attack a small AK reported in HOLTZ BAY. The planes reported 3 hits leaving the AK on fire and sinking. The air search which covered ATTU and SEMICHI reported negative results except for sighting the above AK aground. A possible sub was also reported.

There are no new enemy developments.

November 28th.

The South Pacific was generally quiet during the day. As it is believed that an enemy convoy indicated as eight DDs and 6 APs will attempt to land food at GUADALCANAL tomorrow, CTF 67 was ordered to proceed from ESPIRITU SANTO with available cruisers and DDs to intercept.

Enterprise engine repairs are now completed and the ship can make full power. As battle damage repairs are not yet permanently made, there will be some reduction in the reliability of air operations. No yard overhaul is proposed at this time. The COLUMBIA at NAGASAKI has turbine trouble which reduces her speed to 20 knots. The ship will arrive at NOUEA December 2 (local).

Comsofar 280145, 291050 (passing MacArthur's 271136), and MacArthur's 291100 discuss Naval requirements to support NEW GUINEA operations.

The enemy continues to receive damage from CTF 48 air in attempts to run convoys to the FUNA area. A DD was reported hit west of NEW BRITAIN and the group, of which this was one, turned back.

Cominch 281235 authorizes "Fleet Air Command, Noumea".

CTF 8 290035 outlines destroyer needs for the North Pacific Force. These vessels are now operating at maximum capacity and without a reserve number to permit needed overhauls. A sub was reported southwest of FITKA.

The German auxiliary "RAMSES" enroute KOK to Germany was intercepted by the ADELAIDE. The Germans scuttled their ship.

(Continued)
November 28th. (Continued)

Aside from the Jap attempts to feed and reinforce positions at NEW GUINEA, GUADALCANAL and the ALEUTIANS, there is nothing new known of enemy deployments or intentions.

November 29th

During the night the first reports, came from Rear Admiral Wright (CTP 67). That force had been ordered from ESPIRITU SANTO to intercept an enemy force of eight DDs, plus possible 6 APs, off GUADALCANAL. Action between surface forces commenced about 1330 p.m. local. Of Admiral Wright's force of 4 CA, 1 CL, 6 DD, the first damage reports are: MINNEAPOLIS, 2 torpedo hits; NORTHAMPTON, on fire aft looks like total loss; NEW ORLEANS, torpedoed; PENSACOLA, uncertain; HONOLULU, not reported. As is usually the case we get bad news first; enemy damage is not reported. ComSoPac ordered CTP 11 to proceed at once toward GUADALCANAL (SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, DESRON 6). TF 65 (MARYLAND, COLORADO, NORTH CAROLINA, HULL, MONAGHAM) were placed on 2 hours notice.

The MAC PARLAND, which was badly damaged sometime ago in an air attack off LUNGA, is enroute ESPIRITU SANTO.

The ALCHIBA is still afire forward, and aground off LUNGA. Salvage is being investigated.

COMINCH 291906 (Pink) gives the destination of the 25th DIVISION. It also states that the 1st Marine Division will be sent to AUSTRALIA.

COMSOPAC 291811 gives his plans for aerial mining. He is not ready now for such an offensive campaign.

COMINCH 281708 discusses base developments in South Pacific. ComSoPac is asked whether or not he approves the development of BUTTON into a LION base.

COMINCH 291755 deals with the employment of gas in warfare. Gas warfare is forbidden to be initiated by any U.S. Commander.

The extent of the enemy move to the ALEUTIANS is in doubt. Five convoys are believed to be enroute. Except for this move, and the known activities in the NEW GUINEA area nothing significant is known of enemy plans or developments.
SECRET

November 30th

Comtaskfor 67 301730 and 302350 pink describes what is now known of yesterday's action. Many important details are yet to be reported. Rear Admiral Tisdale will arrive at PUNJAB in the HONG KONG tomorrow and will be able to make further report.

Cominch 30y15 pink is uneasy regarding the South Pacific campaign and requests comment from Cincpac. A tentative answer to Cominch is in Cincpac 01068 to Comasopac, for the latter's comment.

In answer to Cincpac proposal to sail 3 AP and 2 AK to San Diego to meet urgent training requirements, Comasopac sent his 300971. Because of the necessity for CTF 3 to start training on a much larger scale than now underway, Cincpac directed 3 APs to return to San Diego in his 010335.

Comasopac 011321 gives CACTUS activities.

The PORTLAND is making satisfactory progress toward SYDNEY. The NAVAJO, which was accompanying the PORTLAND, has been ordered to CACTUS for salvage.

Cincpac 010645 gives views on aerial offensive mining in the Pacific. It is believed that we should harass the enemy with every conceivable means.

The work remaining to be done on the CACTUS airfields is in GUADALCANAL 300255.

The CARATOGA has turbine trouble which reduces ship speed to 27 knots. Repairs are beyond the capacity of the ship's force. So far as is known today the CARATOGA task force is still proceeding to CACTUS, but other SoPac combatant units have been returned to 12 hours notice.

Returning from patrol off NEW GUINEA the CACTUS reports (1) 18 October - possible hit in CL; (2) 6 November - 1 hit in DD; (3) 9 November - 2 hits in DD. The TROUT fired 5 torpedoes at a SS north of MALAITA on 13 November but all missed.

CTF 8 290110 gives his aerial offensive mining plans.

Some evidence is beginning to come in of another push toward CACTUS. It may be that the enemy will employ JVs when and if it takes place. The enemy continues to be active in the NEW GUINEA area but no large scale move in that direction is noted.

In the ALEUTIANS the enemy moves are not clear. It seems probable that convoys now enroute the Western ALEUTIANS are bringing in reinforcements and replacements. Photos show that the enemy is there to stay until ousted by troops.
03 0521 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral Kinkaid only. Highest secrecy. Had given full consideration to disadvantages raised by your 011605 as to operating Batdiv 3 in Sopac. Logistics can be met. I have had the AA batteries of Batdiv 3 increased in addition of 2 40 MM quads and 40 20 MM guns per ship, making them comparable to those of Batdiv 4. These AA batteries will of course be improved when they receive their remaining 40 MM guns and replace 3"-25s with 5"-38 but their underwater defense will not be satisfactory until third deck centerline compartments are made watertight. It was with all this in mind I decided in view of the military situation these ships should go to Sopac. By 232.4° and Faisley's 250522. It is probable that the enemy will make at least one more powerful move against CACTUS including more of his battleships than he used last time. The need for additional gun power to defeat this move has been accentuated by recent losses in heavy cruiser strength. I consider this situation more acute than those in the past which led to suggestions for use of OBB. Your 052523 of April and 121750 of August, Para. I believe that decision should be made now whether we shall lay up all OBB for lengthy modernization or whether we shall keep available and utilize some in situations where their hitting power may be the deciding factor. Will await your further advice before cancelling transfer of Batdiv 3 one ship at least of which will be required as part of escort for troop convoy departing December 6.

02 2135 CINCPAC to COMINCHDEPT, COMHAWSPAFRON Info ASIP no DSL etc.

While situation at present does not indicate probability any major Jap attack Hawaiian area of first anniversary of Battle of Pearl Harbor, possibility exists of acts of sabotage by misguided local Japanese or of minor shelling by submarines. Desire modified alert effective for 5 dark December to after daylight 7 December with special emphasis on sabotage directed against ships or shore installations. Blackout exceptions made to expedite work on damaged ships and movements important cargoes are not rescinded but excepted activities be particularly alert to blackout promptly if later ordered.

02 3037 To be decoded by Cominch and CINCPAC only. Ultra high command. Your 301215. Concur conception therein. FN at present key ORANGE position in JUSNA. To take this near future requires: A CACTUS, RINGELT development at support planned surface operations. B Neutralize or take UNDA and REATA as may be needed later. C Increased air surface and shipping available. Para. Relative above, enemy
continues efforts to reinforce CACTUS. He has not abandoned
it. Securing all development that position and MURPHOLT con-
tinue absorb available Sopac effort and are progressing
too slowly. Reinforcement and more shipping needed now.
Lack anti-sub craft is grave weakness. Jap activity MUK-
DA, ROKATA, BUK obscure due inadequate reconnaissance
which difficult and slow due lack of means and weather.
Consider MarDiv 1 required for move on EDIN. Para. Army
troops now here plus 25th Division adequate to garrison
back areas and CACTUS provided EDIN offensive is gotten
underway promptly. In this connection it is essential that
next offensive will not be undertaken until ships and troops
are available to exploit immediately initial landing and
follow through otherwise a 2nd CACTUS may result. Para.
Operations involve directly and mainly Sopac forces, bases,
and communications. Command should be located accordingly
regardless of who it is.

03 1740 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Decode only for Admiral Kinko. Ultra Secret. Last para-
graph your 030021 think only sound course is to continue
modernization and rehabilitation of OBEs as underway in
TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA which must be adjusted to Navy
Yard capabilities after consideration new construction and
battle damage repairs. Para. However only acute needs
such as now exist in Sopac should cause us to unduly expose
OBEs which have not been modernized.

04 0253 CINCPAC to COGSOPAC Info COMINCH, CTF 1

Treat with utmost Secrecy. Due to non-water tightness of
centerline compartments of 3rd deck of NEW MEXICO and KISS-
ISSIPPI, I desire that they not be unnecessarily exposed
to underwater damage unless they are required in an urgent
situation. Under present conditions I consider that operating
them west of FANTAN one would result in such exposure.
Their AA battery now consists of 8 5"-59s, 4 1.1 quads,
2 40 MM quads and 46 20 MM guns. Half of their secondary
battery has been removed. Para. Suggest on his arrival
FANTAN you have leary confer with you on BB employment.
SECRET

December 13

02 112 CINCPAC to CINCPAC

Radio HONOLULU; pass to Cincpac from Contaskforce 50.2. Ultra. Ordered late afternoon air attack 2 ships expected ATHC today without awaiting scouting contact. Secondary objective Kiska shipping and land installations in event ATHC attack not made. Weather prevented operation now scheduled early tomorrow. Cruisers fueling LCHOW VIEW tonight. Weather holds. McKerris SNAKE today. Unless enemy info requires different action, will return flagship AKORN tomorrow night to accomplish flak relief.

000502 CINCPAC to ALL US NAVAL SHIPS SOPAC, Info CINCPAC ON slosh

The following reorganization of Sopac task forces is effective immediately for all units in company with Task Force Commanders. Absent units will be directed to join by Cinopac, originator, as soon as practicable. Task Forces 11 and 16, no change from organization in my 230612 November except delete CLARK from Desron 2 and Task Force 16. Task Force 64, Rear Admiral Lee in WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, INDIANA, MAURY, CUMMINGS plus additional destroyers may be assimil. Task Force 65, Rear Admiral Mason in NASSAU, ALTANABA, Combatativ 4 in MARYLAND, CONTROL. Comdesron 12, WOODWORTH, BUCHANAN, LANSDOWNE, LARDNER, ECCALIA, GRAYSON. Task Force 67, Rear Admiral Ainsworth Task Force Commander in LOUISVILLE, Rear Admiral Tisdale second in command in HONOLULU, HELENA, COLUMBIA, Comdesron 5, SHAW, LAMSON, PERKINS, DRAYTON, NICHOLS, FLITNER, OBANNON, DE HAVEN, SAUFLEY. The following units will operate directly under Cinopac PENNSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, HULL, KONAGRAN, FARRAGUT, MEADE, STACK, LANG, PRAZIER, GANSEVOORT. Cinopac will act as Contaskfor 06 using group and unit designations that force for units operating under his direct control. Task Forces 62 and 63 are not affected by this reorganization. Commeronsopac and Comdesopac have by hand for info. Interested Bases Sopac have also for action in another system.

00 0506 CINCPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH

Handle as most secret. Mining plans vicinity CAPE ESPERANCE CACTUS recommended for approval as follows, one standard field of 340 Mark Six mines fitted with five hundred fathoms hoisting wire, floats and mines at standard depths against surface ships as soon as prepared at WEST LCH be loaded on four light minelayers and sent WHITE POPPY soon as practicable. Cinopac sends to Cincpac action, Cominch info. Recommend approximate location of field one mile northeast entrance of TENAMBA RIVER long axis field 040. Foregoing after consultation Captain Hull. This field designed curtail infiltration Jap troops and supplies northwest our position on CACTUS.

1182
SECRET

December 20, 1943

09 2145 CINCPAC to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC, COMGEN 1ST MARSHALL CORPS etc.

Utmost secret. In connection with 190243 October you are authorized to transfer 10th Defense Battalion to Simapac as relief of 4th now in ROKS when transportation can be arranged. If 10th is utilized, Paracors will make available to you SAN DIEGO about 10 January; 12th for transfer to SIMPAC on replacement for 10th. 11th will be retrained to full strength in January. Should you utilize 10th, inform desired date to sail in order to arrange transportation. NPS Delivery action CINCPAC XXI for INF, HMC, COMGEN 1st Marashall Corps. Paracors has by hand or originator CINCPAC.

19 2007 CINCPAC to CINCPAC

Utmost secret. Request coment CINCPAC 092145. Tent. Defense Battalion consists mainly personnel with year or more experience bases Hawaiian area and will be organized as of 1 January. Equipped with 155, 90, 40, and 20 mm. plus machine guns, tanks, and other defense battalion equipment; strength 50 officers, 113 enlisted.

14 0932 CINCPAC to COMGEN JACUS INFO JTF 62 63 IN LEMANAL, etc.

It is important, Ultra. That action reports be promptly made, by preliminary and one or more amplifying dispatches when necessary. Your 122352 was first report on action off MAU of 11th. 26 hours earlier than your time group we had fairly complete report from real sources. Necessary that Red 3 and Class 5 Aden be advised in advance of use of surface forces in GUAMANAL - FLORIDA area. This not to restrict your discretion but to avoid possibility of conflict between forces your command and those of other commanders. Prior to receipt of your 170320 regarding ground reconnaissances at LEMANAL, had received report through TOKYO that a PLAN TBD covered by O' T J Courses area and landed raiders at LEMANAL the morning of 12th. If true originator should have been informed of plan or orders to our force. Pass to Commandant in CINCPAC by hand. Action to Comgen JACUS from COMJAPAN who has given to Comgen CINCPAC and JTF 62 for info.
SECRET

December (3CT)

10 0424 CINCPAC to CINCPAC

Highest secret. Critical shortage destroyers now with outlined. Due limited unloading areas beaches and equipment CACTUS-KIKIOLI movements cannot be loaded in large numbers. Small frequent use in and out of that area make heavy drain of experts. This situation unavailable for some time to re and the movement must continue. Lack of maintenance opportunity increases apparent in material casualties. Further serious consequence of hand to mouth condition is impracticality retaining any semblance of division and squadron organization. CINCPAC suggests leave 20 be ordered here for escort work. If you can do so earnestly recommend this at once. Relief so afforded will result a permanency in destroyer assigned and trained with task forces and will be reflected in marked increase in battle effectiveness of these forces. I know that you are absolutely aware my need for the ships. However, the present may clarify your picture somewhat. At present most of our heavy striking forces are immobilized and remainder suffer greatly reduced battle efficiency due to what I have outlined.

10 0435 CINCPAC to CINCPAC Info 3 CENTER

an sending 190 mines in JAWS-RUDY (most secret) departing 17th. Comdr Div 1 in RAIDY and RUDY having loaded with mines accompany. I do not approve plan proposed your 090500 as it appears to restrict our possible future movements in that area. I will a prove fields fail off every lander beaches which you will not want to use in future yourself and in depths of not over 250 fathoms.

10 1050 CINCPAC to CTX U Info 2 CENTER

Utmost secret. Expect directive from joint chiefs of staff canceling occupation TANAGA and ordering occupation ACHICHTA. Be prepared carry out latter task at earliest practicable date after receipt of orders.

10 1050 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info 2 CENTER

Ultra secret. Advise Cominich as of to strength of all units of all services, less aviation, which are now in CACTUS-KIKIOLI. When various units are relieved inform Cominich as to their Strength and the amount and type of organizational military equipment not withdrawn. This information essential for material and personnel planning. Limited supplies amphibious material available for MArDivs necessitates serviceable equipment and weapons this type should be withdrawn if and when practical. MARCorps informed.
17 0510 CINCPAC to CONSOPAC Info CINCPAC_0337

This from Consopac. Strategic location of WOOLLACK ISLAND as advanced air base for operations Northern SOHAL SEA believed to offer possibilities. Such preliminary information as available here indicates relative ease of establishment field. Subsequent logistic support does not appear to present too great difficulties. Request I be furnished, for information, any recent topographical survey information visual and photographic reconnaissance information also any other useful data available. This is ultra.

17 0337 CINCPAC to CONSOPAC

Your 160424. Have reduced vessels assigned ocean escort to minimum compatible with task. I will continue policy of sending you all I can but regret none in sight except 3D's now under repair.

18 1315 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMWSEAFRON, COMORWSEAFRON, etc.

Treat this as most secret. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that if reconnaissance of AMCHITKA shows that a satisfactory airfield can be constructed there in a reasonable time, the following directive will be executed: Comwseafron pass to DEWITT. Objective: Occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose: Q.E., to render Kiska untenable as an operating base for the enemy. Two, to provide an advanced base for possible operation against Kiska. Tasks: A firm, seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. Baker, train force for assault and occupation of Kiska. The Army assault units as assigned by the War Department can be trained in SAN DIEGO. No Marine amphibious units are available for this operation. General instructions. Cinpac in conjunction with comgen Western Defense Command form plan for occupying AMCHITKA to be executed on earliest date. Cinpac furnish CTF 8 immediately 1 AP combat load for first troops to land in occupation of AMCHITKA. Report target days for AMCHITKA occupation and outline of plans and means required for this operation and for future occupation of Kiska. Code name for AMCHITKA operation is CROWBAR. Occupation of TANAGA suspended in accordance with Cinpac.

18 2321 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH, COMorwseafron, etc.

Utmost secrecy. Cominch 101315. On assumption that TERRAIN at AMCHITKA proves suitable and that directive for its occupation will be issued by Cinpac and comgen Western Defense, I desire you continue detailed plans in conjunction with such Army agency as may be designated by Lieut. General De Witt. Consideration will be given to requests by you for forces in addition to those now at your disposal but beyond the one AP very little is immediately available. De Witt is being addressed separately regarding troops. Greenslade pass to De Witt.
182345 CINCPAC to COMMWEASEA Front Info COMM NOR WEASEA Front, etc.

For General De Witt. Most secret. Referring to Cominch 181315 and my 182321 to Theobald which is being passed to you. After final approval of AMCHITKA project and determination of forces to be employed, I visualize that our joint directive for that project will assign the task and make available the forces decided upon. CTF 8 will be assigned the naval task by me and I presume will command all forces until the amphibious phase is completed. If you concur, please inform him of the agency with whom he will deal in preparing detailed plans. Would also appreciate information as to your plan for the garrison and whether all units are now available to you.

190320 CCM 12 to CINCPAC

Pass to Cinpac for action; treat as most secret. Com 12 sending. Paraphrase of despatch sent by Lieut. General DeWitt to Chief of Staff as follows after conference with Cinpac and staff. Admiral Kinkaid and staff, officers Cominch, recommend adoption following General Plan as basis preparation detailed plan for reduction and occupation BOODLE. Occupy FORMULA at once with garrison formerly destined for AMULET supplemented by additional units from LONGVIEW if necessary. Plan to use 184th Infantry after BOODLE is reduced with units from LONGVIEW, FORMULA and other ADC garrisons as occupational force, BOODLE. 35th Division to be designated task force BOODLE reduction and brought up to full strength. General Corlett and General Landrum to be returned from BRONZE and assigned as division and ass't. division commanders that division, both having served with division in amphibious training. Second part follows four minutes later.

190324 CCM 12 to CINCPAC

Most Secret for action Cinpac; second part my 190320 says Com 12. Both officers familiar with Alaskan conditions and have worked joint exercises with Marine amphibious forces. Present location 35th Division, LOS ANGELES and its early relief from Western Defense Command will facilitate training of specific force for reduction of BOODLE. Training can be initiated immediately under Admiral Rockwell provided given first priority by Cinpac. 154 Infantry now intensive training should be sent OCEAN BLUE immediately for acclimatization and training in preparation occupational task. Recommend approval of above as basis for preparation detailed plan. Request authorization take necessary measures implement plan coordination and collaboration with Kinkaid and Rockwell who have seen this message and concur paraphrase ends. Reference Cominch 181315 War Department directive therein your concurrence requested in working out plans directly with Admirals Kinkaid and Rockwell subject to your approval. DeWitt.

1186
19 0215 CINCPAC to COMVESEAFRON: Info COMINC, COMAMPHIBCPAC

For General DeWitt. Most secret. Studies by my staff and CTF B indicate probable 10,000 enemy at Kiska and that 2 divisions will be required for its capture. Request your comment and that I be kept informed of situation as to availability of troops for the Kiska operation. Rear Admiral Spruance, my Chief of Staff, will confer with you immediately on his arrival S.A.N FRANCISCO tomorrow.

19 2048 DEWITT to CINCPAC

This from Dewitt to CINCPAC. Answering your 182345 concur in designation Comtaskfor B as commander all forces FORMULA project until amphibious phase is completed. Confering with Admiral Kinkaid here today and will inform him detailed plans will be worked out between him and Commanding General Alaska Defense Command. All units are now available to me for occupation FORMULA and are assembled for only except battalion of general service or combat engineers. Initial garrison to consist 1 battalion infantry, 2 AA batteries, 1 battery 105 howitzer, 1 battalion engineers combat or general service, 1 battalion construction engineers aviation, 1 battery 155 mm gun. Engineer battalion general service or combat will be made available in Alaska Defense Command for movement to FORMULA.

22 0557 CINCPAC to COMVESEAFRON

For Lieut. General DeWitt. As indicated in my 212137 I concur your 202504. Following is tentative text of dispatch which I propose that we issue as our joint plan. "Objective, occupation of ArchlTka at earliest date. Purpose, to immediately deny ArchlTka to enemy and utilize it as soon as possible in air operations against enemy forces and Kiska installations. Task, seize and occupy ArchlTka and build airfield thereon. In command, Commander Northern Force (TF B) Pacific Fleet. Forces assigned, Task Force Eight plus Indianapolis, Dewey, Worfun, Kalk, Gillespie, Middle. Army garrison of about blank thousand plus construction and transportation forces as designated by CO Western Defense Command. Para. Target date January blank. Command of Army forces less aircraft will revert to Army when CO FORMULA informs CTF B he is ready to take over. Code name of this operation is CHOWBAR." Request you give me information to substitute for above blanks and also any other suggestions to make the plan acceptable to you. If no appreciable disagreement exists, I suggest you include your approval and I will issue the dispatch as coming from us both.
Buckner and Theobald concur that enemy discovery of SEAMCO operation must be almost immediate. Threat to NOAKL created thereby assures early and continuing maximum enemy reaction. With force herein recommended, shape of island confines our held position within fairly narrow limits near southern end of island. Subject only to our air action enemy thus has opportunity to infiltrated forces at will by barges, submarine and other transportation in low visibility to unoccupied middle and northern sections of island. It is recognized that our supporting naval surface forces will be weak. Our occupation force must therefore be strong enough to assure our control of area within artillery range of contemplated airfields. These considerations dictate that minimum force desirable is 2 full regiments of infantry, 2 batteries of 155's, 4 batteries 75's, 1 regiment anti-aircraft plus construction and service troops. This full strength must be fully available dog day. Commanding General Alaskan Defense Command and Commander Task Force 8 jointly send. Most Secret. Radio HONOLULU deliver to Cincpac for action and Comwesafpron deliver to Commanding General Western Defense Command for action.

191906 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, 1ST MAR A'PHLEIOUS CORPS, etc.
Handle this as super secret. Non addressees do not decode begin Cincpac 170545 and 180151 Comsopac 181056. Disregard my 162115. NTS provide transportation for Twelfth Defense Battalion with its normal equipment and supplies from SAN DIEGO to COPPER and if transportation can not be furnished by Cincpac for Tenth Defense Battalion from COPPER to port in Sopac designated by Cincpac. Twelfth Defense Battalion will load SAN DIEGO 4th January or as soon thereafter as transportation can be made available. Marine Corps issue necessary movement order Twelfth Defense Battalion. Cincpac advise whether transportation is or is not required for Tenth Defense Battalion. Warcorps and Opanv informed.

230016 DeWITT to CINCPAC Info COMWESAFRON.
Concur entirely your 220557 pass this to Cincpac handle as most secret Con 12 sending for Gen DeWitt. Army Garrison strength at FORMULA 6,000 including approximately 500 in engineer aviation construction battalion and same number in air combat and service units expected to be stationed at FORMULA upon completion construction air base. Engineer construction battalion aviation armed organically with rifles machine guns both 30 and 50 caliber and 37 millimeter guns and available for combat if needed. Target date January 5th in which Adm Kinkaid concurs. Comwesafpron has by hand.
SECRET
December (GCT)

25 2030 COMDEN WEST DEF COMMAND to CINCPAC.

C 12095 this answers your 242149. To Admiral Nimitz from
Gen De Witt. C of S from Alaska Defense Command here a few
days ago and brought Buckner’s estimate of minimum force
desirable for FORMULA project which was approximately same
strength and composition as outlined in Theobald dispatch
212238 sent jointly to you and me. Consider minimum garrison
necessary as outlined in my reply to your 182345 and so in-
formed Buckner. This is force of Six thousand strength as
contained in our joint dispatch implementing CROWBAR project.
In discussion with Kinkaid just prior to his departure for
north, which was attended by Admiral Smith who had just re-
turned from ALASKA, various matters connected with CROWBAR
project were discussed including the possibility of prompt retaliation by enemy. It was consensus of all present at
conference that enemy would doubtless attempt to interfere
with CROWBAR operation utilizing all possible means includ-
ing submarines and possible bargeing of troops from KISKA.

No one at any time expressed confidence that movement would
be unopposed or that Navy could prevent anything coming to
either FORMULA or LONGVIEW. Kinkaid stated it was Navy job
to do everything possible to prevent enemy action interfering
with movement and occupation of FORMULA and both he and
Smith considered that effective measures with Naval forces
available could be taken to seriously interfere with possible
enemy bargeing operations from KISKA. It may become necessary
to augment FORMULA force later. This can only be done at
expense of other ALASKAN garrisons and in absence of present
unloading facilities FORMULA reinforcements should not be
scheduled pending change in present estimate of immediate
enemy capabilities.

26 0612 CONSOPAC to CONSOWESPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC.

In regard to Cincpac 250303, Consopac speaks. CACTUS gas
situation will not yet permit repeated heavy long range
strikes from there. Further impracticable give fighter
coverage CACTUS to RABaul hence night strikes only can be
made. Can send you 18 fortresses, 9 B-26 and 8 Lightenings
to operate temporarily from Sowespac against RABaul shipping.
Request your opinion and desires in this regard. Very secret
Comensopac has by hand for info.

27 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Hicom Hicom. Only for addressee. Your repeated and long
continued indication of carrier training activities in
ORANGE waters may repeat may involve rehearsals of operations
directed against HAWAII - MIDWAY line or elsewhere other
than South or Southwest Pacific.
SECRET

COMSNAC to COMDTASKFOR 67 Info CINCPAC CTF 62 CTF 42 919

Addressees only decode. Most secret. Be prepared carry out shore bombardment against MUNDA airfield on NEW JERSEY during night of 4 January with three (3) CL and probably 2 DD. Use own planes for illumination and spoting retiring them to RINGBOLT. GRAYBACK available for navigational or other aid desired CMA information to be provided her through Comtaskfor 42 by January 2. Propose to employ VP coverage from CACTUS. Obtain air photos of target area and sea approaches to firing position from Comtaskfor 63. This operation to support landing of own troops CACTUS. Advise ships designated. Comsopac sends. CTF 42 and GRAYBACK have for info in another system.

31 0341 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSNAC

Handle with utmost secrecy. It is apparent from Halsey's 300250 that the estimated dates of readiness of amphibious troops contained myser 0259Y of 6 December are much too optimistic. Therefore recommend before any directive by Joint Chiefs of Staff be issued that the objective and target date be referred to Cinopac and Comsopac for comment.

31 1815 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSNAC Info CSA VCNO

Very Secret. Only for addressees. Comment on contemplated set-up whereby Deputy Commander Sopac area relieves Comsopac of administrative and local operational matters including bases except advanced so that Comsopac is free to give full attention to enemy especially as SUSAN campaign progresses when command relations with Comsowestpac area will develop importance. Chief of Staff Army, VCNO informed.
Preliminary survey results night action 30 Nov - 1 Dec. from CTF 67 who has not yet consulted Admiral Tiedal and CGs HONOLULU and L DD's. Jap ships sunk 2 AP, 1 AE, 2 IL (N'hami or Cendari Class) 4 DD's, 2 other A's damaged, some indication that CA was present but escaped unscathed. About 5 destroyers escaped. Am convinced no landings were made from any ship. Jap force believed composed of 5 AK or 3 cruisers 9 destroyers. Action commenced 2320 following torpedo attack on transport group by our DD's from 8,000 yards. Gunfire at ranges 7 to 3 thousand yards. No tanders of great benefit. Jap gun fire unimpressive.

Part 1 of 2 parts. Partial preliminary narrative 4th CTF. Tiedale sends. 4 DD's 2 miles ahead cruisers ordered launch torpedo attack followed shortly by gunfire from cruisers at targets already along beach area. Thin at 2323. All time L(-11). HONOLULU commenced fire at 2324 range 5,300 closing rapidly. Order in column MINNESKUL, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHAMPTON, LAMSON, LARDNER. First hit I saw was on NEW ORLEANS, second PENSACOLA, MINNESKUL, NORTHAMPTON hits not noted. At midnight Wright with 2 torpedo hits and rapidly failing was ordered me take charge. Gunfire now desultory or over. PENSACOLA half way SAVO to RINGOLT speed 8, NEW ORLEANS retiring toward RINGOLT speed 5 knots. NORTHAMPTON immobilized and burning advised was abandoning. MINNESKUL making 5 knots toward LUNA POINT. Location DD's unknown. Largo fire alone stretch of beach seemed fully half mile long. Ordered all destroyers to stand by crippled cruisers. HONOLULU at about 0230 cleared area to westward to await daylight due 0530 when returned via SAVO hunting crippled enemy ships south of NITTEL ISLANDS enroute. Done located. LARDNER, LAMSON joined inside SAVO. End of part 1. CTF 67 pass to COMMOPAC by hand. COMMOPAC pass to Conserveropac.

Part 2 of 4th CTF. CTF 67.2.1 originator. "MARY patrolling TULAGI advised PERKINS and all 3 cruisers inside TULAGI HARBOR. Only MINNESKUL visible." Circled off harbor to signal Wright in endeavor arrange convoy to BUTTON but contact broken when MINNESKUL shifted north behind island. MARY then advised no disabled cruisers able make trip. DRAYTON, FLETCHER already departed. My group started for BUTTON. Extent damage to enemy PENSACOLA, NEW ORLEANS, PERKINS, MARY unknown. LAMSON, LARDNER, FLETCHER, DRAYTON,
02 0011 Part TWO of CTF 67,2,1 (TIDDALE) (Continued).

HONOLULU undamaged except HONOLULU maximum speed 28 until granted 24 hours availability repair one engine. All require ammunition. 10 cruiser planes if none lost now at TULAGI 10 others BUTTEN. Fitts in DEPARTMENT advises his ship sunk 0257, 57 officers including Captain, Executive, Navigator, Gunnery, Supply, Medical, 1st Lieut. all seriously injured. Understand more survivors in RINGOLT area. Believe entire enemy attack force destroyers and submarines.

02 0600 CTF 8 to TF 8 info CINCPAC.

This is CTF 8 Operation Order Number 15-42. Information, SEMICHI convoy and KISKI convoy enroute these destinations, one at least scheduled to arrive early evening December 2nd. Escort probably consists 1 TUKA and small number of destroyers. Another force speed 24 arrived in an objective area above time or about 0600W (12) Dec 3rd approaching on course 040.

Assumptions. (1) Task Force is covering escort for SEMICHI convoy. (2) This force is carrier raiding force or surface raiding force objective probably LONGVIEW for early morning air attack or night shelling. Plan. This force will locate enemy approaching LONGVIEW and SEMICHI - ATTU on afternoon 2 December or as early as possible 3 December and will destroy fast enemy force by repeated air attacks in vicinity of LONGVIEW or full scale primary attack by air in SEMICHI area and will utilize surface force attack to complete destruction enemy combatant surface force and SEMICHI convoy in order to prevent establishment of enemy on SEMICHI ISLAND while safeguarding forces and installations at LONGVIEW. Task. Air Group. Air search unit. Locate enemy force approaching SEMICHI and LONGVIEW as late as possible in December 2nd consistent with predark return to bases and as early as possible on December 3rd. Determine type and number enemy combatant units. As consistent with primary task, assist in attacks on enemy combatant forces and SEMICHI convoy. Air striking unit. Destroy as primary target, fast enemy combatant units protecting SEMICHI convoy. If and when search eliminates probability of presence enemy near LONGVIEW on 3 December, be prepared to dispatch force as early as possible against enemy located in ATTU SEMICHI area. Consistent with tasks against enemy combatant forces, assist in destruction of transports and auxiliaries of SEMICHI convoy. With due regard for offensive tasks, while awaiting information of enemy, safeguard air force at Western Bases to maximum possible especially on early 3 December. Surface striking group. Destroy SEMICHI convoy when search intelligence indicates favorable situation or when ordered. Destroy or drive off enemy combatant units interfering with primary task. Consistent with primary task.

(Continued)
02 0600 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info CINCPAC, (Continued)
and as situation warrants complete destruction of enemy combatant units. Xray. If not located until after arrival, SEMICHI convoy may be found dispersed at SEMICHI, in TEMAC MASSACRE SARANA CHICHAGOF or HOLTZ BAYS ATTU or in lee of AGATTU. SEMICHI convoy is primary convoy objective. No action against KISKA convoy must interfere with or delay destruction SEMICHI convoy. Organization of groups and units and commanders thereof are set forth in my OPlan 14-42. Tasks of groups not mentioned herein are covered by my OPlan 14-42. This Op Order effective on receipt. Senovoff LONGVIEW a−sure delivery to BUTLER and LANDRUS.

04 0459 CINCPAC to CINCPAC Info CINCPAC CMAIRSCAPAC

Your 270149. 2 bomber, 2 fighter strips planned for CACTUS. Complement aircraft desired including attack group, 80 VF and pursuit, 40 VSR, 18 VTR, 30 heavy bombardment, 20 medium bombardment, 12 Hudsons, 6 photo and utility. Comsopac sends to Cincpac for action.

03 2127 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC COMSEFORPAC COMSERONSOPAC

272203 X SALVAGE OPERATIONS COOLIDGE WITH VIEW TO RAISING not practicable during war activities on account large force of personnel and equipment diverted from salvage and battle damage repairs to combatant vessels. As bow is 66 feet under water and stern 138 feet under water ultimate salvage considered questionable. Present program is cut holes in sides for removal urgently needed military materials of special value. This program will be continued as fill in, when work on combatant vessels permits. Action Cominch. Info Cincpac, Comserforpac. Comsopac originates. Comseronsopac has by hand.

04 1153 CINCPAC to CINCPAC Info CINCPAC COMGENSOPAC COMGEN 1MAC etc.

West of POINT CRUZ 164th Infantry patrol—killed 5 Japs destroyed machine gun. On upper LUNGA Marine Raider patrol captured 1 mortar some ammunition several machine guns and killed 16 orientals with loss of 4 wounded. Comsopac summary. 3 GAs arrived BUIN from north at 1100. All times Love (-11) December 3rd. Left at 1700. Last seen at 1825 north of CHOSEUL course northeast. 10 DDs left BUIN 1300 course southeast. Probable these ships same as those engaged by CACTUS air at 1830, 150 miles, bearing 300°. Hits: 2 1000 pound hits on 1 vessel, 1 1000 pound hit on 2nd vessel, 2 torpedo hits on DD and 2 possibles on another. By hand to Comgensopac, Comgen 1st MAC, NSS give to Cominch info. Cincpac is action.
SECRET
December (GCT)

04 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COLSOPAC, CTF 9, COMINSCAPRON, etc.

Addresses only decode. It is considered possible even probable that enemy will make definite effort to effect surprise even suicidal attack perhaps of air raid character on some of our positions and/or forces on or about 7th instant. Para. When you pass this despatch along make sure of adequate paraphrase.

04 2153 CTF 9 to TASK FORCE 8 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOUTHCOM.


05 1441 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info CINCLANT, CINCPAC, COMSOUTHCOM, etc.

4 AP's and 2 AK's in addition to those my 051415 November to all ships expected depart base here late December for MRCURY where report CINCPAC for duty. Now planning embark 158 Infantry Combat Team (trained in jungle warfare) at MERCURY for AODE in JOSEPH DICKINSON CHARLES PAUL REED THOMAS JEFFERSON ARMENTH also Army Navy personnel and cargo at base here in WILLIAM RIDDLE OBERON for going on. Comment. Early reply necessary in order arrange loading. Convoy has by hand.

06 0143 Comsopac to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, COMSOUTHCOM, etc.

Night of 4th after remarkable 30 day operation through mountainous jungle 2nd Raiders reached LUNGA. Comsopacs passes. They destroyed 5 Jap bases killed 400 enemy. Suffering only 17 dead their own force. West of NAMUKI 164th Infantry killed 7 nips. On 6 missions P-40's strafed 15 enemy landing barges and rafts vicinity TASSAFARONGA. Jap supplies lashed to drums drifted toward beach. CINCPAC action. Cominach info. Comsopac and Comsen First Maraphorms have by hand for info.
**SECRET**

**December (OCT)**

06 2031 **CINCPAC to COMINCH**.

PENSACOLA scheduled depart RINGBOLT 6th local for BUTTON speed about 8. Consopac ordered following moves yesterday afternoon, TF 15 proceed toward Lat. 15-00 S, 160-00 W, engine speed 22, NORTH CAROLINA with DD escort from PANTAN 1 toward same position, speed 20, CTF 64 in WASHINGTON with INDIANA, COLUMBIA, and DD escort from WHITE POPPY toward same position speed 20. HONOLULU, HELENA available DDs at BUTTON placed on 2 hours notice.

06 1932 **CINCPAC to COMINCH** Info CINCPAC, CONSOPAC, CTF 64.

Your 281708 Nov. The development of BUTTON as an advance operating base of LION dimensions is approved. NOTEA is too far from present and prospective active combat areas to answer all requirements. NOTEA however is desirably situated for supply, Provisions, Hospitalization, Training groups and battle damage repairs in conjunction with drydocking tender and shore facilities equivalent to one destroyer tender. Consopac sends. Cominch action. Consopac info.

29 Nov **CONSOPAC to CINCPAC**

Ürdis 270841. Afirm. At BUTTON; 172nd combat team with 103rd Field Artillery Battalion plus attached medical company and engineer platoon. Enroute SPOOKER to POPPY; one battalion 103rd Infantry, one battery 152nd Field Artillery, one battalion 169th Infantry, detachments of division service troops. Remainder 43rd Division in POPPY, consists of 103rd Infantry, 169th Infantry, 152nd and 169th Field Artillery Battalions, 43rd reconnaissance troop, attached medical quartermaster, ordnance, engineer units. Entire Division reported as ready to combat except BUTTON contingent which is lacking considerable equipment. Baker. At CACTUS; 164th Infantry (3150), 182nd Infantry less one battalion (3075), 245th Field Artillery Battalion (570), 246th Field Artillery Battalion (486). Enroute CACTUS due 3 December; 132nd Infantry less one battalion (2100), 247th Field Artillery Battalion (400). At BUTTON; 3rd Battalion of 102nd Infantry (900). At POPPY; 1st Battalion 132nd Infantry (800), 221st Field Artillery Battalion (500), reconnaissance squadron (196). All service elements at CACTUS or enroute. Cast. 9th Defense Battalion enroute CACTUS last elements arriving 3 December. Dog. 1st Raider Battalion, present strength 16 officers, 67 enlisted; now based WHITE POPPY. Of these 511 enlisted now NEW ZEALAND for recreation, rehabilitation to return about 20 December. Easy. 6-155 MM guns and 4-155 3" howitzers. Enroute with Defense Battalion; 6 additional 155 MM guns. Marauding ONE; headquarters WHITE POPPY, forward echelon CACTUS. Group 11 at CACTUS and BUTTON (moving to CACTUS). Group 14 at CACTUS. Group 25 at TOKTOUTA. VKO 251 at BUTTON. VHF 212 enroute USA.

1195
SECRET

December (GCT)

07 1251 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

As Sopac has first priority your request for shipments are being met and will continue to be met to the full extent that shipping can be made available after denying much needed support to areas of lower priority. In addition to the ships now at NO'MEA and OTON ships enroute and loading for NO'MEA will arrive throughout December at rate exceeding 1 per day. Request you reaffirm that this accumulation shipping your area is wanted.

COMSOPAC to COMGEN 1ST MARDIV, COMGEN FMAC, COMAMPHFORSOPAC, etc.

07 0446 Effective 10 December the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI position will assume a status generally similar to other island bases in South Pacific. The base to be known "CACTUS" will embrace the airfields on GUADALCANAL the seaplane base at TULAGI and the Advanced Naval Bases and Naval Local Defense Forces at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI, and all troops and installations in the general area. ComGen CACTUS will command the base under Comsopac. The principal of unity of command will be observed. The administration and operation of aircraft will be responsibility of Comairsopac is covered in "Organization of aircraft Sopac" promulgated by Comsopac serial 205 of August 4, 1942. Naval Advance Bases and Naval Local Defense Forces under Comnavbase CACTUS. For purposes of planning, administration, and development following responsibilities are established: Airfl. Airfields, seaplane bases, advanced naval bases, and naval local defense forces, Comnavbases Sopac. Baker. Troops Comgen FMAC (Passes to Comgen Sopac when Army forces assume defense responsibilities). Comamphforsopac relieved responsibility defense CACTUS but retains responsibility for transportation of reinforcements replacements relief units supplies and equipment until Comseronsopac is able to assume this responsibility. MTRon 3 plus JAMESTOWN, MTRon 2 assigned to operational control Comsnavbase CACTUS. Comgen FMAC, Comamphforsopac, Comnavbasesopac have for action. Comgensopac, Comseronsopac for info all by hand from Comsopac.

08 1225 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC.

Accumulation shipping, your 071251, considered warranted. With arrivals December, plus installation pontoon dock expect materially improve turn around which is main bottleneck at present. This will be further materials expedited by better loading now apparent in recent arrivals. Comsopac sends to Cominch for action, Cincpac information.
SECRET
December (OCT)

09 0405 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Present garrison ADAK, 16,056; TANAGA garrison 0. Following future arrivals ADAK 12th, 600; 14th, 1264; December 28th, 580 completing troop movement to ADAK. January 5th TANAGA troop movement from ADAK begins. Expected date completion January 15th. Eventual garrison ADAK 14,361. Eventual garrison TANAGA 4,109. Have no knowledge of approved preliminary plan for AMCHITKA occupation. Army survey party proceeds there at early date. CTF 8 answers CINCPAC 071049.

11 2025 CINCPAC to COM 14 Info COMINCH

For Admiral Nimitz. B-17 strike reported was in RUIN area. Photos 9th local show MUNDA airfield 90% completed with taxi-ways revetments bomb blast shelters 4 gun positions. Halsey orders Patch make repeated attacks there. On departure RINGBOLT, MINNEAPOLIS ordered BUTTON; NEW ORLEANS, ACACIA. PT reports sinking Jap sub off KAMITBO night 9th local. Tentative Comsopac plan counter Jap subs CACTUS, PUY locate with radar, cruiser planes illuminate area, PTs or available DDs strike. Vandergrift relieved by Patch, arrives BRISBANE 12th. Halsey advises MacArthur 75% 1st Mardiv have malaria. Time rehabilitation 3, possibly 6 months considers climate of SYDNEY or further south necessary. RADM. Wright ordered U.S. temporary duty by Halsey. Radar and sound by DD last night indicate 2 probable suba 20 miles from NE end WOLEAI. Being hunted today by 2 DD VPB. No word yet of 11 DD TOKYO-EXPRESS expected CACTUS last night.

11 2147 V OPNAV to Comsopac Info CINCPAC COM 12, COMNAVBASESOPAC

To facilitate planning orderly flow of base materials assign relative priority on outstanding and future requests for base materials and organizations using decimal system. Pending receipt of priorities intend ship as follows: A. ACORNS 3 and 4 in December. B. Communication component LION 1 to BUTTON, FADTRANS, CINCPAC 090109. C. Material for development WHITE POPPY and piling requested Comnavbasepac 040421 as space available. D. First echelon LION 1 early January Comnavbasepac 240557, BOAKE assisting. E. Stevedore battalions as requested my 072053. F. Will modify C'N'B 2 to include all material requested your serial 00501030 and send with its organized and trained personnel to CACTUS and RINGBOLT. Progressive assignment of priorities will greatly assist integrating concurrent development of WHITE POPPY, CACTUS, BUTTON and shipment subsequent ACORNS. Pass to Comnavbasepac
SECRET
December (3CT)

10 2220 COMINCH Info CINCPAC, CONSPAC, CINCPAC-SPEC

This is reply, negat Inter Intelligence Bulletin Number 1 resuming former ORANGE Navy summary informative of trends and new developments when noted here. Note: Believe CinC 3rd enroute South and will command striking force of CV's supported by CinC 2nd, with available CA's and some CL's plus DD's. In coordination with indicated strong land-based aircraft forces in RABAUL-SOUTH IS, believe primary objective will be to gain control of sea comm. 2nd. CinC South now considered in subsidiary battle concerned logistics CHULALONGKORN and NAGA with forces limited to DD's, 3's, and small number CL's. Info concerning BB's too fragmentary hazard opinion. CinC continued believed to retain strategic control impending operations. Indication MUNDA further reinforced on 10th.

11 2025 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral Nimitz. B-17 strike reported was in WIN area. Photos 9th local show MUNDA airfield 90% completed with taxways revetments, bomb blast shelters, gun positions. Halsey orders North attack to be repeated. On departure: Ringbolt, MINNEAPOLIS ordered to PEARL, NEW ORLEANS AGACIA. PT reports sinking Jan. 25th off VINPS 9th local. Tentative Comsomac plan counter Jap subs Cactus PHY locate with radar cruises planes illuminate area PTs or available DD's strike. Vandegrift relieved by Patch arrives January 12th. Halsey advises MacArthur 75% land have malaria, 95% malaria, have malaria, 95% can be treated. 2 weeks to 6 months considered climate of SMITH or further south necessary. Rear Admiral Wright ordered to temporary duty by Halsey. Radar and sound by DD last night indicate 2 probable subs 20 miles from 1/3 SMITH. Being hunted today by 2 DD's. No word yet of 11 DD Tokyo Express expected CACTUS last night.

12 1501 CONSPAC to ALL ISLANDS CINCPAC, CTF 42, etc., Info COMINCH

Refer Comsomac (originator) 070445. Heral after following will apply: Comnavbase CACTUS includes Subordinate Command of Comnavbase LAGA and Comnavbase TULAGI. Comsomac and LMAC have. Also Comsenomac and Comnavbase Sopac. Info Cominich and CINCPAC.

12 2112 CACTUS via COM 12 to CTF 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC AFRICA

This from CINCPAC. Followings been sent by Jewett with concurrence of Cominich and CINCPAC. "Suspend all action in connection with occupation of TANAGA pending further instructions from this headquarters. Retain troops destined for TANAGA at ADAK taking all measures possible to contribute to their comfort and use them to maximum to expedite construction of areas harbors and storage facilities ADAK. Further information later.
Plan eventually to return all P3V planes from advanced combat areas, and to replace with squadrons equipped with P3M3 planes. About 14 new P3M3 squadrons should become operative on East Coast by July 1943. Of these half are assigned Cinclant and half Cincpac. Cinclant designates and arranges for transfer to Pacific at least 1 P3M3 squadron per month beginning January. These squadrons as received will replace PBY squadrons now in Pacific. Cincpac designates PBY squadrons to be returned and arrange for their return to Continental U.S. as appropriate. Cincpac is authorized to delay return of these squadrons at discretion. Upon return, P3V squadrons will become available for redistribution by Jomintch. Squadron personnel to be transferred will consist of 1 and 1/2 combat flight crews per aircraft assigned, plus 2 ground officers and 6 enlisted technicians per squadron. Transfer of headquarters squadrons or other ground personnel not involved in this movement. Any readjustment of such ground personnel is to be handled through normal channels. Bauer initiates advance flow of supporting material to operating areas as designated by Cincpac. Bauer has this for action. FSSD and VCPNAV for info.

15 0422 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSWPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC AREA

Catalina bombed and strafed MUNDA for three hours night of 13th from 2000 feet. Fortresses and CACTUS planes continued attacks on 14th reporting that runway appeared well bombed. Scouts report any casualties MUNDA area from bombing of 12th also that Japs have 5 inch AA gun there. Some sources indicate no Japs on CHOISEUL except radio post on northwest tip at MALAVAGA. Two H17's bombed KAHILI RPT KAHILI on 14th meeting no AA or fighter opposition. From Comsopac. Ground forces continued patrols in GUADALCANAL prior to intended occupation. 2 MG positions and crew destroyed. Several ORANGE planes dropped bombs near HENDERSON FIELD fighter strips with damage. Destroyer SAULFLY depth charged sub resulting in oil slick east of GUADALCANAL night of 13th. B-17's reports 3 DC's, 3 tanker s, 4 AK's, 1 passenger liner possibly AK at BUN. 3 destroyers south of BUN; one with stern blown off being towed by another.

10 2147 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMWESPACRON Info WARCORPS, etc.

Para 1. Marine Corps make following units available for loading at SAN DIEGO beginning 10 January, 1943, and transfer as soon thereafter as practicable to 3opac area: (Afirm) Advance echelon headquarters 3rd MAR DIV, 12 officers, 100 enlisted men and 200 measurement tons. (Baker) 9th Marine Regiment reinforced, 243 officers, 5400 enlisted men and
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10 2147 COMINCH to CINCPAC etc. (Continued)

25,000 measurement tons. Para 2. Ultimate destination of units as Cincpac directs. Para 3. NTS provide sea transportation issue necessary instructions regarding loading of vessels, and inform other action addresses of names of vessels involved in movement, date available for loading, and approximate date of departure UNITED STATES ports. Para 4. Warcorps (Affirm) Assist in preparation of loading plans as necessary. (Baker) Provide normal weapons and equipment, 90 days supply, 10 units of fore all units. Para 5. Code name this movement Tiresome. Warcorps and Opmav have to hand. MXZ give to Comgen 1st MAC. Com 11 may to Comgen FPF, TAC DIEGO area. Para 6. Execute this plan on receipt.

15 2350 COLOSOWESPAC to CINCPAC Info CONSOPAC

Information very meager and old concerning DUTCH NEW GUINEA, following best available: positions (Consowespacfor sending, action Cincpac, info Consopac) at SOAONJ BANC and FAK-FAK. Total strength 6-300. Allied ship attacked in eastern APA-PUNA SEA 15th by plane presumed from BUNO in ARCE ISLANDS where garrison estimated 140 in September. 7000 troops Portuguese TIMOR covering north coast thoroughly. 26-4600 Dutch TIMOR mostly KAMPUNG area. TORRES STRAIT open but some passes great barrier reef mined according of dispatches, northeast NEW GUINEA, WENAK and MADANG occupied, no estimate strength, HOLLANDIA not occupied December 4th; native police pro Japanese. LAE SALAMAU unreliable, estimate 4000 including construction workers and aircraft ground crew. CAPE WARD HUNT area 1400. BUNA area 1400. 3000 along SIRPUTA track (leads inland about halfway between BUNA and SOROA)

16 2115 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMGEN FPF AT SAN DIEGO

Reference my 092145. Plan send 12th Marine Defense Battalion to COPPER early January to relieve 10th Defense Battalion which will embark same vessel for ROSES. Plan to exchange 12th and 10th equipment thus avoid unloading copper. Remainder of 12th Battalion equipment unable to load in vessel provided by NTS will be sent from West Coast direct to final destination for assignment 4th Defense Battalion on it's withdrawal from ROSES. Do you concur? Request immediate reply in order to arrange transportation.

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17 0812 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMOWESPAC, All TF COMSOPAC.

CACTUS ground forces extended patrolling on 15th. Comopac puts out the dope. 24 Japs killed. 6 Marines wounded. MUNDA bombed by Catalina night of 15th and twice by B-17's on 16th. In the morning strike 3 of 12 attacking floaters were destroyed and 1 B-17 shot down near TETAPARI, NEW GEORGIA. Crew rescued. At 2240 L (-11) SBD's on a strike against 6 DDs seen approaching MUNDA. 1 SBD hit 1 destroyer with 500 lb. bomb near miss with 200 pounders. 2nd SBD bombed same target but failed to return to base and results unobserved. Other SBD's failed to locate target and bombed runway. Fortress bombed KAHILI runway morning 16th. Dauntless and Wildcat silenced antiaircraft positions bombed and strafed REKATA area evening of 16th. KINGFISHER sank midget sub GUADALCANAL area. Small schooner destroyed in RUSSELL ISLAND by CACTUS air. On 15th MUNDA craters appeared to have been filled. Photos on 16th show BALALKE coral surfaced fighter strip 2000 feet long 75 percent completed. Local sources report 2 subs at REKATA 4 different nights during December. 12 DDs, 6 APs AKs, 2 Tankers, 5 floaters and 7 flying boats reported at BUNI 16th. Damaged tanker still anchored there. 8 of the Destroyers arrived BUNI from north during morning and 6 left for south late in afternoon. HARUNA and KONGO according to captured documents left SOLOMON action October 14th at speed of 29 knots.

18 0151 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC

My objection to arrangement your 162115 is that in spite concurrence my 170645 to tentative destination ROSES for 10th Defense Battalion I think that situation might require Halsey to change employment this battalion to a forward area. It is the only such organization uncommitted and suitable for this use during the next few months. I have therefore contemplated asking Halsey to consider retiring the 4th Defense Battalion without relief or to fill its place with Army personnel. Due to freedom from malaria 10th will be more effective than 4th even after latter has been rehabilitated. Experience shows undesirability of exchanging weapons particularly when differences exist. Also it has been found most desirable where spare parts are immediately available. To summarize the foregoing I think 10th Battalion should leave HAWAII with its own weapons and thus ready to land and fight in a forward area if required. Request action your 162115 be withheld until Halsey's further comment obtained.
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18 1056 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH

Your 180151 to Cominich. Cominich 182115 not received. Until your reference was received have planned: Afirm. 10th Defense Battalion relieve 4th ROSES. Baker, 4th LONGBOW rehabilitation; Cast. 11th (now arriving in area) temporarily to BUTTON pending further probable duty TULAGI-PORT PURVIS; Dog. 3rd now being relieved by Army CACTUS to LONGBOW rehabilitation. Result availability, 11th depending results reconnaissance and developments, 3rd and 4th available about March for employment new areas. Will proceed on above basis unless otherwise instructed. Comopac to Cincpac for info "cominich."

19 2206 SENAV CACTUS to CINMAIR SORPAC Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC etc.

Summary of flights from dawn yesterday until daylight this morning. 12 SBD's escorted by fighters hit MUNDA 1330 L(-11) destroying several buildings and received no opposition from enemy planes or AA. 7 B-17's bombed MUNDA 1715 L starting several fires. Anti-aircraft fire light. Runway has several bomb craters from previous raids. These planes, sent to attack shipping at BUIN were met by at least 20 enemy planes in air over SHORTLAND ISLAND. Some were 9's, some float 9's and other float biplanes. Japs did no damage with phosphorous bombs but 1 B-17 and 5 P-38 received damage from bullets. About 25 float planes and 4 flying boats were in KULITANAI BAY, SHORTLAND ISALND and AA was received from KORORO. Weather bad in vicinity and our striking force turned back and bombed MUNDA. All planes returned. 1 B-17 over KI HilI for 2 hours starting 0045, 1 over MUNDA from midnight until 0400, 1 spent 2 hours over BUINA leaving there at 0300. They dropped 20 hundred pound bombs, several flares, and many empty bottles at irregular intervals from BUINA; 1 large fire was left burning at south west end of runway; 1 DD at northeast end BUINA passage. 3 SBD's, one PBX dropped flares and searched unsuccessfully for transport reported at TASSAFARONGA at 2300 L(-11). No signs of enemy activity seen. Small groups of Japs strafed during day on coast road between TONEGI RIVER and TASSAFARONGA. RDO BUTTON pass to Congen 1st Mar for info.

20 2207 SENNAV GUADALCANAL to COMAIR SORPAC Info CO ARMY FORCES SORPAC, etc.

Condensed version of 24 hours preceding 0600 Love (-11) today. Attack on MUNDA by 4 B-17's with indifferent results at 0700 received little AA. Planes over local Jap territory during entire day saw few signs of activity. Single B-17 on screen at 2350 came to CAPE ESPERANCE and withdrew track 300. 2 B-17's attacked two AKs East of KI HilI airdrome with 500 lb bombs from 0200 until 0345. Direct hit 2 near misses

(Continued)
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202207 SENAVER GUADALCANAL to COMAIRSOPAC, etc. (Continued)

started fire on one ship. 3 near misses on 2nd. Strafed both vessels. Damaged ship settling by stern when last seen. Small calibre AA from ship and airstrip. One Fortress harassed MUNDA for three hours beginning at 0100 dropped 20 100 pounds from 4000 feet. Results unobserved. No sign of Jap activity. One similar type plane spent hour over EUKA dropping 100 lb. bombs. Hit wharf SOHONI TSSAND(?) and north east jetty starting fire latter place. Small calibre anti aircraft ineffective. Another fortress molested KIHILI from 0200 to 0400 with same armament. Dropped two bombs on NADI village and two on landing strip on BALLALE ISLAND. Daily searches all completed. Air observation indicates field on BALLALE ISLAND ready for use. Request photo reconnaissance. Pass to Comgen IMAC for information.

202304 DE WITT to CINCPAC

From General De Witt to Cinopac. Preliminary report FORMULA reconnaissance indicates suitable fighter field strip at the head of CONSTANTINE HARBOR 150 feet wide by 3,000 with metal mat can be constructed in 2 to 3 weeks. Sites exist for fields more than 5,000 feet long suitable as main field and can be constructed in period estimated as from 90 to 120 days and provide some dispersion. I interpret this report as meaning construction of airfield on FORMULA is feasible and as placing Joint Directive in effect. Do you concur?

210215 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

To Cinopac for action. Originator CTF 8 considers additional forces required for escort and covering in CROWBAR operation (your 18232) are three modern cruisers, one of which should be 8 inch and one squadron new DDs. Recognize probable unavailability but state estimated requirements as suggested in reference. Consider early discovery of movement by enemy air and submarines certain threat to Boodle must result in immediate and maximum possible enemy reaction. First and incomplete report from FORMULA survey party establishes that Japs have dug test holes east end of island within past month and are keeping area under close air observation. Am preparing plans on basis of present local naval strength as any reinforcement can be absorbed with very minor alteration.

210830 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH COMWESAFRON, COMWESAFRON

FORMULA Survey Party returned LONGVIEW December 19. Report concerning construction air fields follows. Metal mat fighter strip 150 by 5000 feet head of CONSTANTINE HARBOR feasible by aviation battalion in 2 or 3 weeks after starting construction. Sites exist for main airfield with some dispersion. 90 to 120 days estimated to complete field 5000 by 200 feet by 1 aviation battalion. Tracks and test holes indicate enemy has investigated southern end of island for suitable airfield. Island scouted by enemy air both days but survey party believes they were not sighted. Addeas pass to Cinopac for action.
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21 2307 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, CG ADC

CTF 8 reports. Coordinated air attack shore installations KISKA HARBOR 1345 to 1350 W(-10) December 20 by 5 B-24's, 4 B-26's, 4 B-25's, and 9 P-38's. 52 500 pounders on Sub-base area with hits heavy explosions and flames observed in buildings south of Marine railway. South and north heads strafed and bombed with 48 100 pound demolition. Direct hit on gun emplacement and on building AA battery area. Camp area strafed and bombed with 16 each 100 pound incendiaries magnesium and general purpose. Results not observed except hit on munition sheds with heavy explosion. P-38's strafed camp area south and north head and beached cargo ship. All planes returned. Light battle damage from heavy AA. 1 pilot, 1 crew member minor injuries. For Cincpac action, Cominch info, CG ADC by hand.

23 0407 CINCPAC to CONWESAFRON Info COMINCH

For General DeWitt. Concur your 211820 as basis for initiating training. Request you send me your suggested draft of the joint directive we should issue in carrying out task B of Cominch 181315. Foregoing based on assumptions. Afirm. That troops have been or will be made available to your. Baker. That location of amphibious training is satisfactory to Rockwell. Cast. That necessary transports for the indicated combat loading can be made available for the actual operation against Booble.

23 0016 DeWITT to CINCPAC Info CONWESAFRON

Concur entirely your 220557 pass this to Cincpac handle. (copies in pinks as this despatch is Most Secret).

25 2215 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH CTF 3 CONWESAFRON etc.

Execute the following plan which is issued jointly by Cincpac and CG Western Defense Command. Objective. Occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose. To deny AMCHITKA immediately to enemy and utilize it as soon as possible in air operations against enemy forces and Kiska installations. Task. Seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. In Command. Commander Northern Force (CTF 8) Pacific Fleet. Forces Assigned. Task Force 8 plus INDIANAPOLIS, DEWEY, WORDEN, KALK, GILLESPIE, MIDDLETON. Army Garrison of about 6000 plus transportation forces as designated by ComGen Western Defense Command. Target Date. January PIPHR. Command of Army Forces less aircraft will revert to Army when CG FORKUTA informs CTF 8 he is ready to take over. Code name of this operation is CROW-BAR. Addressees pass for info to interested Army Commands.
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23 2359 CTF 17 to CINCPAC Info CONGEN 7th AIRFORCE.

CTF 17 speaking. Pass to ComGen 7th Air Force. Initial estimates of attack are approximately 90% of projectiles were placed in target area. Every indication attack complete surprise. No AA fire until after passage of 1st Airplane. Many fires started which were visible 75 miles. No injury to personnel, only minor damage to aircraft. Photo airplane departed 0420 Y (Plus 12).

24 0616 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TFC SOPAC COMSOWESTPAC NZNB.

Day long strafing MiP positions GUADALCANAL featured activity there 23rd. SBTs, SEDs and fortresses hit MUNDA noon same day concentrating areas just north and east of field and on coastal gun positions and west end runway. 7 zeros downed by fighter escort. Photos this strike show clearing underway for possible extension eastern end of strip, which appears useable. Single B-17 harassed MUNDA prior dawn today. 1 AK, 8 other ships BUIN yesterday with 20 planes on KAHILI field. At 230535 GCT 1 CL, 1 DD between FAISI and VELLA VELLA on southeast course. From Comsopac. NWX pass to NXN for info.

24 0225 CTF 6 to CINCPAC

Comtaskforce 8 sends. Radio Honolulu pass to Cinpaca for action. DeWitts orders to Buckner establish CROBAR Army force as follows: 1st Echelon total 2952 composed of 1 Battalion infantry, 1 Battery 75's, 1 Battery 155's, 2 Antiaircraft Batteries, plus regiment engineers; 2nd Echelon probably 2 weeks later total 1600 composed of 1 Battalion of infantry, plus engineers. 1000miscellaneous troops not yet assigned to echelons. Total 5560. Buckner's chief of staff reports from personal conference with DeWitt in San Francisco that latter realizes larger garrison more desirable but has decided against increased force for the following reasons: A. Additional freight tonnage involved. B. "The Navy is confident the movement will be unopposed and that they can prevent anything coming either to FORMULA or LONGVIEW."
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December (337)

25 0333 CINCPAC to CINCPAC INFO WESTPACFOR, VICE CINCPAC CHIEF

Present concentration over 100 Jap ships in BATAAN offers best chance of war to date to strike crippling blow at enemy overseas transportation service. Request your ideas and specific comments as to planes and munitions available for all out air strike combining low altitude bomb and torpedo attack on shipping by medium bombers and limiting fighter escort from BUTTON via CACTUS coordinated with maximum effort by heavy bombardment aviation against adjacent air bases and AA installations in BATAAN area. Coordination with Special Forces necessary in order to provide maximum effort. You rest you take up with Mac Arthur. Also believe this enemy concentration warrants greater number of our submarines in BATAAN approaches. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

25 0449 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH COMAIRSFAC CONSOPAC COMGEN CACTUS ETC

Consopac sending. Current night nuisance raids over CACTUS are lowering combat efficiency of our troops through loss of sleep and increased exposure to malaria during hours of darkness spent in fox holes and dudsouts. Recommend that a minimum of 6 night fighting aircraft with homing radars and personnel now undergoing night fighter training plus around equipment be dispatched CACTUS earliest time. Best available altitude determining intercepter radars with night fighter directing personnel should accompany. Advise. Action Cincpac Info Cominch, Consopac, Consen CACTUS, Comairsfac, Consenopsac, Comfair NCCHEA by hand, Consopac, please pass to Comairwing 1.

26 0224 COMAIRSFAC TO CONSOPAC FOR Info CINCPAC, CONSOPAC FOR

Christmas photos BALLEALE ISLAND show landing strip to be surfaced 3500 feet with 500 feet north east end unfinished. Clearing extends complete length island from northeast to southwest beaches. Dispersal lane southwest end much improved. 1 Revetment finished 7 more under construction. Similar dispersal area started to northeast end. No planes observed but strip looks serviceable. Large concentration stores southwest tip of island. Previous dispatch erroneously reported strip to be shorter. Careful check show these measurements more accurate.
30 0350 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Urdia 270841 November. Following planned. A. By 10 Jan. entire Americal and 25th Divisions in CACTUS. 2nd Marine Division in CACTUS. 1st Marine Division in AUSTRALIA.

214th Coast Artillery Regiment embarking WHITE POPPY for CACTUS. 1st Raider Battalion and 2nd Parachute Battalion from SPOONER embarking at POPPY. 6th Construction Battalion enroute CACTUS to FULCRUM for rehabilitation. B. About 25 January 2nd Marine Regiment embark CACTUS for LONGBOW, 27th Construction Battalion embark WHITE POPPY for CACTUS.

C. Debar 3rd Raider Battalion from STRAW at BUTTON. D. 30 January embark 6th Marine Regiment at CACTUS for LONGBOW.

E. 20 February embark 6th Marine Regiment at CACTUS for LONGBOW.

F. About 14 January 11th Defense Battalion unload RINGBOLT for gradual transfer to PORT PURVIS. More detailed info regarding movements by airmail.

30 0627 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC info CONSOWS-SPAC, ALL TF CONS 3CPAC etc.

CACTUS Marines killed 110 Japs 27th and results artillery fire plus minor clashes raise total enemy slain GUICALANA past few days to 155-165. Pair of small AK's at WICKHAM left blazing exploding total wrecked after 2 BLUE air strikes 29th. Early CATS harassed MUNDA 29th and 30th dropping bombs and mortar shells. Consopac daily dope. Rdo AUCKLAND pass to NZNB. Heavy AA 29th from point and shore emplacements toward KOKENGOLO. Further reports much barge activity and unloading southeast KOLOBANJARA. KUNDU POINT west ILAONOGA also may be staging point MUNDA supply. Harves small AK's there 27th and 100 men ashore. Native patrol SANTA ISABEL jumped 24 Japs December 28th only 3 escaped alive. 29th air search REKATA saw construction continuing PAPATURA ISLAND strafed 3 float planes on water.

30 1223 CONSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.


155 mm Battery Corps Artillery 7, 148. Info military equipment not withdrawn follows by airmail.
Dec 31 0836 COMSOPAC to CINC PAC Info COMSWPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC, etc.

Daily dope from Comsopac patrols killed 20 more Japs and single dive bomber demolished heavy gun behind their lines the 30th. 1700 love (-11) same day 3ED's and F4F's raid ed REKATA scoring bomb hits new buildings PAPATIRAGIA ISLAND and other structures SUAVANUA POINT. Only slight AA. Special RECCVE VILA area southeastern KOLOMBANGARA 1140 love 30 negative. WICKHAM HABOR empty oil slicks evidence almost certain destruction AK's bombed there 29th. P-39's and F4F's destroyed 5 small barges another point on south VANUOU 1300 love 30th. CW reports DD close inshore CHOESEUL BAY 30th and DD patrol off nor thern entrance TONO LEI area said daily late afternoon routine. Nips hot breath on North SOLOMONS watchers and 1 in CHOESEUL made forced move yesterday. Shipping still light FAISI-BUIN area but 91 vessels seen RABUL 1000 love 30th. Medium bombers now using MUNDA where PBY's made nuisance raids this morning. At 0600 love 31 search from CACTUS saw 5 submerged possible midget subs in MAROVO LAGOON. Strike despatched. BLUE subs report following successes: ALBACORE got 6,000 ton AK or AP just off MADANG December k8th. GREENLING sank 2 AK's northeast of ADMIRALTY'S and DD north by BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT.

Dec 31 0830 COMAIRWING 2 to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINC PAC, COMSOPAC etc.

6 B-26's protected by 4 Lightnings CKA, 4 Cobras CMA, 4 Wildcats dropped 6 500 and 42 100 pound bombs MUNDA field 1630 L (minus 11) CMA altitude 8000. No enemy planes seen on ground or in air. AA heavy but not effective. 1 P-39 landed in water on way up CMA pilot ashore safely RUSSELL. About 8 large caliber AA guns now at MUNDA, Wildcats had difficulty maintaining speed of bombers. Hand for info to Comgen FMAW.

Dec 31 0459 CINC PAC to COMINCH Info COMGEN HAWDEPT

Presume you have been informed of Emmons 282235 to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. I plan to give maximum employment to bombardment aircraft as suggested by your 261315. This is not only effective action against enemy but excellent training for all concerned. In addition believe important to add to long range search and striking forces here while there is threat to outlying bases this area. Additional bombardment group is most desirable.

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31 1100 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 67 Info COMGEN CACTUS, etc.

31100 part 1 of 3 parts. Comsopac Operation Plan 1-43. Task Group 62.6 Captain Heifnider consisting 6 AP's, 1 AK, 5 DD's depart WHITE POPPY 1800 GCT December 31st to land troop reinforcements and cargo for GUADALCANAL and TULAGI embark personnel and equipment for further transfer in accordance, Comtaskfor 62 Operation Order A25-42. Landings is scheduled to commence LUNDA POINT area by 1830 GCT January 3rd. Estimate withdrawal of 5 AP's with personnel will be completed by local night January 6th. Task organization. Task Force 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore-based air units CACTUS, RINGBOLT, BUTTON. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee Betdv 6: DUNLAP, FANNING, MAURY, LARDNER. Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Ainsworth: LOUISVILLE, HONOLULU, HELENA, NASHVILLE, ST. LOUIS, COLUMBIA, ACHILLES, FLETCHER, DRAYTON, LAWSON, OBANNON, NICHOLAS, GRAYBACK. Task unit 66.1.6 Commander Ryan: PLATTE, LANDSKNE, no general task. This force will cover Task Group 62.6 until safe withdrawal of 5 AP's from CACTUS area as determined by Commander, South Pacific Force. End part 1. Addees who have all 3 parts by hand and otherwise stated in part 3.

31 1112 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 67 Info CTF 42, CINCPAC, etc.

This is part 2 of my Opplan 1-43. Tasks. Task Force 63 provide close air protection for Task Group 62.6 from point Q until safe withdrawal 5 AP's, strike enemy forces and installations repeatedly commencing 3 January as far north as and including KUNA area, provide air protection for approach and withdrawal of Task Force 67 MUNDA bombardment unit period (Comsowespac Plans to strike RAPAUL every morning until and including January 7th). Task Force 64 depart NOUMEA 1800 GCT January 1st arrive point S 0800 GCT January 3rd operating thereafter as practicable in general area point S until otherwise directed. Task Force 67 depart BUTTON 0300 GCT January 2nd contact Task Group 62.6 approximately 60 miles south of Point Q at 2100 GCT January 2nd, proceed independently thereafter to operate 100 miles northeast of point Q, detach unit to bombard MUNDA airfield installation NEW GEORGIA the night of January 4th local date, be prepared to counter enemy threats against landing and withdrawal operations of Task Group 62.6. Task Unit 66.1.6 depart WHITE POPPY 1800 GCT January 2nd proceed to arrive point 0 at 2300 GCT the 4th, operate to eastward passing through point 0 daily at 2000 and 0700 all GCT for fueling rendezvous until further orders. Finish part 2. Addees who have all 3 parts by hand or otherwise listed in part 3.

31 1124 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 64, ALL TF COMSOPAC, GRAYBACK, etc.

Part 2of 311100 started "This is part 2 of my Opplan 1-43". What follows is part 3 of Comsopac 311100. Opplan 1-43 part 3. Logistics fuel in battleships, cruisers, PLATTE, WHITE POPPY, BUTTON. Communications in accordance Pac 70 TF Commanders frequency 4205 KC3 series. In addition Comsopac
31 1124 (Continued)

will guard secondary series as follows: commencing with execution this plan. 4295 KG3 from 0700 to 800 COT. 8590 continuously. 12085 from 1800 to 0700 COT. Employ secondary frequencies as necessitated by volumes of traffic or inter-
ference on a primary circuit. Operation traffic will be paralleled on NFK fox and loted during period of operations. Point 0 latitude 14 South, longitude 164 East; point 4 lat. 12-30 South, long. 162-45 East; point 5 lat. 15 South, long. 159 East. This Operation Plan effective on receipt. Com-
sonasfor at NOUMEA. End Operation Plan. CTF 62, CTO 62 60, and Comersonasopac have by hand for information. CTF 64 action and Comersonasopac info by hand. Comgen CACTUS and Comnavbas-
CACTUS and RigelBolt info. JAYBACK has in another system as an action alee.

01 0514 COMSOPAC to CONNAVBASESOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS, COMGEN 1ST MAC.

PORT PURVIS (FLORIDA ISLAND) development as fleet anchorage and transhipment point approved. Harbor survey and develop-
ment of harbor facilities, underwater defenses, shore storage facilities responsibility Comnavbaseopac. Defense PORT PURVIS responsibility Comgen CACTUS. 11th Defense Battalion assigned as initial defense force. Responsible Commanders proceed with development PORT PURVIS earliest practicable date and make detailed recommendation for ultimate development and defense. Code name FINKONEY assigned PORT PURVIS. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comsopac sends. Comnavbase-
SOPAC has as action alee. Also action Comgen CACTUS, Comgen 1st MAC, Comgen SOPAC, CTF 62, Comersonasopac have by hand all info. Comnavbase CACTUS info.

31 2140 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGEN ADC.

Air action as follows. All times COT. For action Cinopac Info Cominch. From CTF 8. 2130 December 30th 14 F-50's, 3 B-25's found recently arrived AF's or AP's KISKA HARBOR. Also 3 small subs probably midgets. 8 Lightnings proceeding for bombing and strafing attack engaged by 4 float zeros at 2000 feet. Attack broken up. 2 Lightnings shot down 1 zero crashed water. 5 other float zeros seen in air. 1 B-25 shot down (Probably AA fire). Other 2 attacked cargo ships with 4 500 pounders and 3 300's. Results unobserved. 2nd attack at 0147 on 31st. 5 heavies 8 medium dropped 77 quarter ton bombs and 5-300 on cargo ships. Observed results include 3 hits one ship 2 on other with smoke and heavy explosion from 1. During afternoon attack bombers encountered 1 float zero. Catalina off KISKA attacked by 4 zeros evaded in cloud cover. Afternoon photographs show 6 zero (4 twin float 2 single float) on beach also show new ships are approxi-
mately 465 and 300 feet in length. Former still loaded. Army Catalina during morning attack landed vicinity crashed B-25 and took off but not heard from since. All planes after-
noon mission returned, minor damage, 1 tail gunner killed, 2 pilots minor injuries from AA.

12:10
SECRET
January (GCT)

01 1136 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

For Cincpac Cominch only. From Comsopac. Cominch 311405.
2nd Marine Division being withdrawn as rapidly as availability of shipping permits. Plan loading 2nd and 8th Marines CACTUS 25th and 29th. 6th Marines now enroute arrive CACTUS 4th for 6 weeks combat experience. See also last sentence this despatch. Ships which land 6th will load 7th for ADOBE. Copy shipping schedule has been airmailed Cincpac. Last element Army 25th Division due CACTUS 4th. Present plans for cleaning up CACTUS situation: A. Seizure by Army of POINT AUSTIN a Jap held hill mass dominating present position from south. B. Landing reinforced regiment vicinity TASSAFARUNG about 18th to sever Jap communications and pocket Jap main body. C. Subsequent cleaning up operations. For your personal information were it practicable to withdraw them earlier I would feel retention of Second Marine Division CACTUS as outlined above essential until Army combat efficiency has been demonstrated.
January 1st

Further reports of the 4th Battle of CACTUS are contained in TF 67 010658 (via Jomonsac) and Rear Admiral Tidestad's 012252 and 070011. It is believed that our damaged cruisers can be patched up and sent to NAUCHARIA for preliminary repairs, then to U.S. yards. Rear Admiral Tidestad's force has rendered another push of the enemy and inflicted severe losses. He continues to retain command of the sea in the southern Pacific.

Twenty six Jap survivors of a Jap UB landed at NAUCHARIA and stated that their ship was one of 5 Japs attempting to run supplies in to NAUCHARIA.

TF 16 will go to FLEX and TF 11 to YAMO, both training enroute. The AMERICA will join TF 67 at WASHINTON. The BOSTON will go to Iwo Jima instead of NAUCHARIA.

Activity in the WASH area continues, but is not on major proportions.

TF 8 020600 is his operation order to deal with enemy convoys approaching the eastern CAPEHENGE.

The RATES, BAINS, LEAVENWORTH, and VINCENNES are ordered to the Pacific Fleet from the Atlantic.

It is still indicated that a major attempt to recapture CACTUS is making up.

December 2nd.

The Tokyo express, composed of 2 Japs, 3 Japs, and 6 Japs, was intercepted 150 miles northwest of CACTUS during the late afternoon by planes from CACTUS. Our reports give 2 - 1000-pound bomb hits on one cruiser, 1 - 1000-pound bomb hit on second cruiser, 2 torpedo hits on another ship, 2 possible hits on another ship. On the other hand, the Japs report no damage in this attack. It seems extremely difficult to assess damage inflicted by our planes. Damage is believed less than reported.

There was only minor activity by patrols at CACTUS during the day. The fire in the forward holds of the AMERICA continued burning on the 1st (local). All undamaged cargo has been unloaded. Salvage possibilities are being investigated. Other logistic support of CACTUS is proceeding in a satisfactory manner. During the night enemy planes were reported overhead.

Engine repairs to the SARATOGA and CALIFORNIA will be attempted at NOUMEA.

(Continued)
SECRET

December 2nd (Continued)

The Okinawa DD is now reported able to proceed to full
under own power at about 10 knots.

There were several reports of enemy submarines in the
area to the south of the Bismarck yesterday. The reconnaissance
and attacks on prime targets are to be expected.

The First Marine Division at Vella will be relieved as
soon as possible and sent to MLB, reporting to F.R. as

Caspar 020637 sink comments on Domich's proposal for
speeding up the campaign in the Tuallagi.

As Domich expressed doubt concerning operating activity
in SoPac, Cinacop sent his 030521 sink which reviews the need of
DDs for power in certain circumstances, and suggests that decision
should be made now regarding modernization of DDs.

The next section of the 25th Division will move from
New Caledonia to the South Pacific on December 6th, and the final section
is expected to leave the 15th.

To warn against minor Jap efforts at IOWA on December 7th
Cinacop sent his 02155 to Capo Hatton and Pohnpeian.

There are no new major enemy developments.

December 3rd.

There were no major developments in the South Pacific
during the day. Early in the morning 2 DDs and 3 other enemy
ships were seen 100 miles northwest of Cactus. No report of
a strike on these was received, but it is known that the weather
was bad. Ground action at Cactus was limited to minor patrol
actions. ComSoPac's 040459 gives plans for landing strips and
air at Cactus.

The CAVESON returning from patrol in the NEW IRELAND-
SHORTLANDS area reports sinking 3 AKs totalling 22,100 tons.

Prisoners of war recently captured from DDs sunk off LUNGA
indicate the HEYDEL and KIRSCHER were sunk in mid-November, and
that 5 CVs are at TRUK and are damaged.

There is a rather large concentration of shipping in the
TULAGI - QUAPALCANAL area today. Damaged cruisers are still there
and several AKs are unloading.
SECRET

December 3rd (Continued)

The POMPOM movement is in part the transfer of Marine replacements from NORPOLK to the STRAW area.

Minor activity continues in the BUNA area. A large number of SWPac planes attacked enemy DDs retiring south of NEW BRITAIN but failed to get hits.

Cominch 031740 pink answers Cincpac in regards to modernization and present employment of OERs. Cincpac 040253 does not desire to expose unnecessarily the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI to underwater damage and considers that operations west of FIJI under present conditions would result in such exposure. These vessels depart from PEARL for the South on December 6th.

Cominch has ordered four more APs and 2 more AKs from the Atlantic to Pacific Fleet during December.

It is believed that the enemy is now making arrangements for another major effort to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS. Convoys are enroute to the Western ALEUTIANS, but the strength and purpose of this move is not clear. No major threat to the MIDWAY-OAHU line is seen. Minor raids in the Central Pacific continue to be possible.

December 4th.

The day was generally quiet in the Central and South Pacific areas. TF 11 and 16 are at sea training and will go to NOUMEA and NANDI respectively. TF 67 is at ESPERANZA. TF 64 is divided between NOUMEA and NANDI with the NORTH CAROLINA at NANDI and the WASHINGTON at NOUMEA. TF 65 is at NANDI. The NEW MEXICO, with CTF 1 embarked, and the MISSISSIPPI will proceed initially to NANDI. The INDIANA and COLUMBIA are at NOUMEA.

There were no major sightings in the Southern SOLOMONS area. Enemy subs continue active in that general area, including midget subs believed using KAMIMBO as a base.

The logistic supply of CACTUS is being slowed down somewhat because of shortage of boats.

Comsopac 0411153 summarizes his day.

Our damaged cruisers are still at TULAGI. Their condition today is not reported. The salvage possibilities of the ALCIBIA at CACTUS are being investigated.

The KENMORE grounded when leaving TULAGI, but came off about ten hours later with no apparent damage.

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

December 4th. (Continued)

Consopac recommends against an attempt to salvage the COOLIDGE at this time (032127).

An enemy force was reported about 200 miles south of AMCHITKA by a search plane. The report is complete as shown by CTF 8 042153. On return the pilot reported that no positive contact had been made. As we and CTF 8 have good information of enemy convoys approaching the Western ALEUTIANS, the contact was believed authentic. CTF 8 alerted his forces and sent out a search and strike to develop and attack the enemy. His forces resumed operations in accordance with his Op. Order 13-42 when the report was seen to be erroneous. It is not clear here why the report was made.

Cominch 041750 alerts against a Jap move on December 7. No major Jap action on that day is considered likely. The enemy is continuing to gather his forces for another push toward CACTUS but there is no indication that he can move that soon.

December 5th.

Because surface units are expected to attempt to reinforce JUNO ISLAND between the 6th and 12th, Admiral Nimitz ordered moves indicated in JNepac 062031. It must be assumed that the JUNO ISLAND is completing turbine repairs as she was not ordered to rendezvous with other combatant units. The PEARL HARBOR left TULAGI for ESPIRITU SANTO. The KURENOKI and SOTOYASU are not yet ready to leave TULAGI.

The remarkable trip of the 2nd raiders at WOOLSEY ISL. is described in Consopac 060143.

The search of the Western ALEUTIANS today was negative. It indicates that the weather was good - maybe good enough to bomb ESPIRITU SANTO.

Cominch 051441 shows that 4 APs and 2 APA's above those previously mentioned are to be sent to JNepac from the Atlantic. Cominch proposes to replace 1 CML with 1 DL in order to make another CML available for Task Force 58.

Indications of a major push toward the Southern ALEUTIANS continue. The time is uncertain. Because of this push no major activity by the enemy in any other Pacific area is considered possible. The move of troops to the ALEUTIANS continues. A minor raid in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier is possible but not probable.
December 6th

Dear Admiral Nimitz,

Leaves here tomorrow to take command of the North Pacific Force (TF 52). An intensive preliminary study of the problem of seizing IJN has been made here, and

Admiral Nimitz has been made fully acquainted with the present views of Admiral Halsey on that subject.

At 0945 our logistic supply of the Marines is proceeding. At 1845 in the morning the SHOKAN was torpedoed for the second time; this time by a reported submarine. The ship may be a total loss.

The HOKULANI and KAKUKU plus 3 DD have been ordered to join other combatant units of TF 64, mentioned yesterday, on the 8th (local). TF 64 in the WASHINGTON will operate in an area about 200 miles southwest of GUADALCANAL. The NORTH CAROLINA and DD escorts also will join TF 64. TF 16 will fuel starting tomorrow evening about 200 miles southwest of TARAWA Lagoon.

Late in the evening the TANZO EXPRESS was allowed heading toward GUADALCANAL off the east coast of TARAWA. No further word was heard of this group, which was reported as at least 9 DDs.

In the TANZANIA area 7 DD, 5 AS, 1 CV, 1 CL, 5 AA or AK, were reported. At 1200L at least 30 ships were counted.

The 1/6 BATTLE is afloat at ART TAU TAU. A turn is being sent to assist the SHOKAN in hauling off the ship.

Either the BLUE or BUCK will relieve one DD in the cruiser. It is expected that the #2 will be added to TF 6.

Consopac 061929 approves the development of CTF 64 as an advance operating base of LCU dimensions.

The enemy is making large troop movements to the SHOKAN area. Combatant units, including NMs, are believed assembling for another major attempt to recapture the SHOKAN. In the meantime supplies are being brought into WAKABISHI by submarines, and DDs seem earmarked for the same duty. As long as these operations continue, no threat to the BATTLE - SHOKAN line is seen. Of course, minor raids on our advanced positions in the central Pacific are always a possibility.

The ALEUTIAN situation is obscure.

[Signature]

[Stamp] 1215
SECRET

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Dec 7, 1942

I - SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

1. As a result of recent actions in the SOLOMONS area, we are in command of the sea and air in the Southern SOLOMONS and approaches thereto.

2. Our positions at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI are not apt to be recaptured. At GUADALCANAL there still remain the following major items to be accomplished:

   (a) Eliminate the enemy troops thereon.

   (b) Construct alternate landing fields.

   (c) Provide for logistic supply; which includes bulk avgas storage tanks with pipe lines so that bulk carriers can discharge; roads; storage space; weight handling gear; etc.

3. GUADALCANAL is our most advanced position. Its security requires the occupation and development of further advanced positions.

4. The NEW GUINEA situation is not satisfactory but is not dangerous at present. The enemy is attempting to improve positions on the northeast coast, but it is unlikely that control can be extended to the southern coast. This is particularly true if pressure continues in the SOLOMONS.

II - THE PROBLEM

1. WPL-46-PC is the broad directive for the campaign. Task One, which is the seizure and occupation of the SANTA CRUZ Islands, TULAGI, and adjacent positions, has been completed except for the SANTA CRUZ operation which has been deferred.

2. Task Two is the seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMONS ISLANDS, LAE, SALAMUA and the north coast of NEW GUINEA. The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific was assigned to command for this Task. Due to the changing situation it is evident that that Task, and the assignment of the Commander, must be reconsidered.

3. Task Three involves the expulsion of the enemy from the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO. As is the case with Task Two, certain revisions to meet the situation are to be expected.
II - THE PROBLEM

4. The problem is to estimate the how, when, and where of the resumption of the offensive; to restate Task Two; and to suggest command to fit the restated Task.

5. Other tasks assigned to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas are still effective.

III - MEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED.

1. Own. (Under Cincpac)

(a) Surface:

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<th>Nov. 24</th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>CL(AA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Exact No.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LS</td>
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<td>In doubt.</td>
<td>72</td>
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*No estimate of losses included.
SECRET

(b) Air: (as assigned by Joint Plan)

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<tr>
<td><strong>GUADALCANAL</strong></td>
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<td>(Incl. Tulagi)</td>
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<td>VTB</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NZAF</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>VF</td>
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<td><strong>NDENI</strong></td>
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<td>(When ready)</td>
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<td>Ftr</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>Ftr</td>
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<td>VF</td>
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<td>Ftr</td>
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<tr>
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<td>VOS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>VR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIJI</strong></td>
<td>M/B</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ftr</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEW ZEALAND</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TONGATAHU</strong></td>
<td>Ftr</td>
<td>25X</td>
<td>VOS</td>
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<td>Wallis, Tuvalu,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upolu)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SORABORA</strong></td>
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<td>VOS</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CANTON</strong></td>
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<td>VPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M/B or L/B-13, or VSB</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Operating throughout NEW CALEDONIA - GUADALCANAL - NDENI - FIJI Area.
X To be manned by R.N.Z.A.F. personnel.
(b) **Air:** (Continued)

**Explanatory Memorandum on Recommended Employment of Planes.**

GUADALCANAL, NDENI, ESPIRITU SANTO, and EPATE are considered front line positions. The first three are to be kept filled with light and medium planes to operating capacity, reserves to an aggregate of 150% or more in the back areas of flyable planes with pilots. The Army considers the planes in NEW CALEDONIA, FIJI and TONGATABU a part of this flyable reserve.

As the capacity of GUADALCANAL, NDENI, and ESPIRITU SANTO increases, the number of planes assigned thereto must keep step with the capacity, with corresponding increases in reserves. This also applies to new positions seized.

Half the Army fighters assigned to the forward positions should be high altitude fighters. This matter was discussed but not concluded.

(c) **Troops:**

**Appended.**

(d) **Logistics:**

There are no insuperable logistic difficulties. Adequate support of all kinds is available in the area. The usual difficulties, which are met when landing on beaches with no facilities, will have to be overcome.
2. Enemy

**Enemy Surface Strength:** November 23, 1942.

**BB** - 10 (2 were probably sunk; 2 probably damaged)

**CV** - SOKAKU - probably damaged.
SUKAKU - probably damaged.
RUTA - possibly sunk
ZHIHO
HOSHO

**XCV** - HAYATAKA
HITATAKA - damaged.
OTAKA
IYUC
CHIYO

**AV** - CHITOSE - damaged
CHIYODA, NISAN, ATISUSHIKA

**XAV** - 4 - 6.

**DD** - About 105 in Navy. Not thought feasible to employ more than 40 in the South Pacific.

**SS** - About 40 available for use in the South Pacific.

**Enemy Air Strength** - Naval Air.

This does not include ship-based planes. Also, there is insufficient information to estimate Army air strength. It seems probable that Army air is moving into the South Pacific.

**EMPIRE**

- **VF** --- 135
- **VB** --- 30
- **VBF** --- 81
- **VP** --- 24
- Seaplanes 72

Total 348

**MARIANAS and CAROLINES**

- **VF** --- 45
- **VBF** --- 27
- **VP** --- 6
- Seaplanes 60

Total 138

**HAPAUL Area**

- **VF** --- 90
- **VB** --- 18
- **VBF** --- 72
- **VP** --- 18
- Seaplanes 24

Total 202
SECRET

**Enemy Air Strength - Naval Air (Continued)**

**MARSHALLS and GILBERTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHB</td>
<td>54</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 140

Grand total which it is believed physically possible to put in the South Pacific:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
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<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHB</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 608

Note: Details of above in ICPOA estimate attached.

**Enemy Troop Strength - South Pacific**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUADALCANAL</td>
<td>- - - - - - - - - - 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrisons - BISMARCK - SOLOMONS- - - - - 10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops available for assignment - - - - 35,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW GUINEA</td>
<td>- - - - - - - - - - 7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total troops South and Southwest Pacific- - - - 80,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Details of above are in ICPOA estimate attached. It is believed that the above are maximum figures. Troops are continually moving to the area and a large and well trained reservoir of troops is thought to be available to the enemy from outside the area. Of the numbers indicated not all are effectives; that is, some 50% may be considered engineers, laborers, ground personnel for airplanes, etc.
IV - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE.

1. In the advance up the following from GUADALCANAL, decision will be made whether to go all the way to Jap positions, such as in the JUIN area, or whether to establish in intermediate positions. If the latter is decided upon the NEW GEORGIA group, ICABEL, and CHOISEUL Islands offer a mid-position insofar as distance is concerned.

From GUADALCANAL to

North part ICABEL - 150 miles
South part CHOISEUL - 180 miles
Mid NEW GEORGIA - 175 miles
TONCHI - 290 miles

TONCHI to

WUKA - 120 miles
RAAUL - 275 miles

The only places considered are those which seem to offer possibilities which include:

Reasonably safe approach
Good landing beach
Adjacent airfield possibilities

2. NEW GEORGIA

VIRU HARBOR

APs could not be expected to enter the anchorage. Boating in the harbor should be very easy.

The undergrowth appears to extend to the water's edge but landings could be made at piers on both the east and west sides of the harbor.

Level country around the harbor appears suitable for a landing strip, but because of dense undergrowth clearing the site would be difficult. A coconut plantation on the west side may offer possibilities in this respect.

The Japs are reported here in small numbers.

RENDANVA HARBOR

At least equal to VIRU, but here again the APs could hardly expect to enter without a good pilot.
SECRET

There are reasonably good beaches and water supply. Nearby coconut plantations seem to offer landing strip possibilities.

HATHORNE SOUND

A fairly good anchorage which might be used by a division of APs. Beaches are only fair and will present landing difficulties. ARUNDEL ISLAND has landing strip possibilities.

Just around the coast to the west and north is WUNDA POINT. Recently Japs have landed there. Almost nothing is known of the approach to this anchorage. Entrance is reported by way of a tricky passage through shoals.

Because of adjacent nearby flat terrain the following are possible sites listed:

RICE, LEVER, and LINGUTU, all in NEW GEORGIA.

Recently the Japs have used GIZC HARBOR in a small way. It seems suitable for limited seaplane operation only.

In general, all islands of the NEW GEORGIA group are densely forested. The only roads run for short distances around coconut plantations. Native villages are located along the coasts and lagoons. Population of the group is around 2000.

3. CHOISEUL ISLAND

Very little is known of this island. Smiling directions, and other meagre information indicate that no suitable landing sites for our purpose exist in the southern half of the island.

4. ISABEL ISLAND

REKATA BAY

Seems to be a fine seaplane anchorage and could be developed into a major airfield. It is 170 miles southeast of TONOBEI. The landing of a large force seems to present no great navigational or other dangers. As it is now in use by the enemy as a seaplane base, the landing would be opposed.

MARINGE LACOON

It is also suitable for landing and development but is only 85 miles due north of GUADALCANAL.

5. The SHORTLANDS area, which includes HUIN, FAISI, and TONOBEI is adequate for large forces and capable of considerable
SECRET

development. A Jap landing field is under construction. As it is held in some strength and is under the guns of HABUAL and HUKA air, there would be enemy opposition to the landing by both air and shore defenses.

V - ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Enemy's Problem

1. During the period since our occupation of GUADALCANAL the enemy has suffered severe losses in ships and planes. Resultant enemy strength has been noted. Because of these losses the enemy has been unable to carry out planned operations which included the recapture of GUADALCANAL. As the situation now stands the enemy is faced with the immediate problem of maintaining a supply line to her GUADALCANAL troops. As there are insufficient enemy troops there to drive out the Marines, the enemy must (1) be reinforced heavily, (2) surrender, (3) starve. The latter seems probable as long as we retain local command of the sea. Submarines cannot provide adequate logistic support.

2. The situation is somewhat better for the enemy at NEW GUINEA. We do not control the approaches to the LAE-SUNA area but Allied troops are actively opposing the enemy and Allied air has, and can cause considerable damage to shipping and positions. It seems possible for the enemy to land strong forces on the north coast, but to extend control to PORT MORESBY they must go over the mountains or around the eastern tip of NEW GUINEA by water. Determined Australian opposition should prevent the former and Admiral Halsey's force can oppose the latter.

3. There is every indication that the enemy is on the defensive in the Central Pacific. This is not by choice, but because the South Pacific venture does not leave sufficient strength to do anything else. The occupation of the GILBERTS is a minor affair and further extension southward will be opposed from FUNAFUTI. Should the enemy decide to assume defensive in the South Pacific enough naval strength could be withdrawn to attack in the HAWAIIAN area and/or our positions to the south of OAHU.

4. The enemy is in good control of the PHILIPPINES and the MALAY barrier. No immediate threat in that region is seen. Here again, as long as the bulk of strength is committed to the South Pacific the enemy is unable to extend control in the direction of WESTERN AUSTRALIA or INDIA. The latter is a land operation which does not involve large naval strength. The enemy has a strong hold on the PHILIPPINES, NEI, the MALAY peninsula, and INDO CHINA, and the sea routes from those places to JAPAN. To permit Japan to exploit that vast area and to transport the strategic materials to Japan on a large scale would be to prolong the war, and might even make the outcome uncertain.

-9-
5. The defense position of Japan is nowhere seriously threatened at the moment. Although offensive has been stopped on all fronts, capacity for defense is not materially disturbed. It is known that JAPAN wanted to extend control to NEW Caledonia and neutralize AUSTRALIA in order to perfect her position in the South. There are some early indications that the southern defense outer position will be the HINMANARCHIPELAGO. However, it is too early to state this idea with any assurance.

6. In the North Pacific, the enemy is entrenched at Kiska and will stay there until we occupy that area. There is no evidence of the desire or capacity of the enemy to extend control eastward along the ALEUTIANS or to make major attacks on other ALASKAN positions.

7. Off JAPAN the enemy maintains a comprehensive patrol line. The bulk of her battle line is always ready to repel raids on the Empire proper.

**Probable Enemy Course of Action**

8. As stated above, it now appears that the enemy no longer has capacity for further expansion. The broad course of action, therefore, will be to maintain a strong defensive position on all present fronts until exploitation of gains has made her Asiatic position too strong for the Allies to do more than accept a stalemate, and thus give JAPAN her ultimate war aim—complete hegemony in the Far East.

9. Such a broad course of action does not rule out offensive moves in selected sectors to enhance overall defense. These are to be expected, and may include:

   (a) Further attempts to capture or at least neutralize GUADALCANAL.

   (b) Establishment and strengthening of outlying positions in the SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA to provide defense in depth for the HINMANARCHIPELAGO, and to provide bases for attrition attacks on Allied shipping and positions.

   (c) Continued attacks on our lines of communications employing submarines, air and surface forces.

   (d) Raids on our advanced positions from MIDWAY to GUADALCANAL.

   (e) Troop movements toward INDIA.
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(f) Political and 5th Column activities in INDIA.

(g) Raids toward north and west AUSTRALIA.

(h) Raids in the ALTITUANGE.

10. We may continue to expect JAPAN to attempt the stabil-
ization of the CHINA affair by political moves. The same applies to BURMA.

VI - OWN COURSES OF ACTION

1. As it now stands, our broad courses of action are set
forth in current directives. The overall concept appears ac-
ceptable i.e. to defend ALASKA; to hold the MIDWAY-OAHU-CANTON-
FUNAFUTI-FIJI line, and, during the second phase of the war, to
expel the enemy from the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. Our immediate
concern is the accomplishment of Task Two. Task Three will re-
quire readjustments to fit circumstances as the war develops.

2. For many good reasons, of which the appeasement of
public opinion and prestige are of importance, the Japs must
be expelled from the Kiska area by our land forces and the area
occupied. Plans for this project are underway.

3. The MIDWAY-OAHU-FIJI line is secure against permanent
capture. Nowhere is the line secure against raids, nor will it
be so in the foreseeable future.

4. Our lines of communications behind our present posi-
tions are reasonably secure. Convoys must continue as at present
and good air and surface coverage must be provided at focal
points.

VII - THE SOLMONS OFFENSIVE

1. As so little is known of the plans, strength, and in-
tentions of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific, that part
of the Task Two which refers to the NEW GUINEA area is not dis-
cussed.

2. There are the following methods by which the SOLMONS
can be captured and occupied:

(a) Step by step. In this method an intermediate point
about half way from GUADALCANAL to BUNI would be established as
the first step. There are several suitable positions available
None are held in strength by the enemy and none are developed to
any extent. The only immediate value of any are the anchorages
which include advanced seaplane operating positions. All are
vulnerable to enemy air from the RABAUL, SHORTLANDS, and VUKA areas. On the other hand CACTUS air could support our operations to a limited extent.

The great objection to such an intermediate position is the necessity to develop it. We have learned a great deal about how to go about constructing an airfield in the jungles. We have, or soon will have, adequate and competent construction personnel. We can have adequate materials. Nevertheless, this construction must be undertaken under the guns of the enemy. Based on previous experience the enemy will react violently when our moves are discovered. Our auxiliaries, escorts, and covering vessels will be subject to heavy attrition attacks. The situation during the time we are developing the position will be favorable to the enemy, insofar as they will be able to plan and execute attrition almost at leisure. We must expect to pay heavily for such a move.

(b) Modified step by step. This method would involve the capture of the SHORTLANDS area first. The great advantage is that we would capture an airfield which could be used in a very short time. The dangers and difficulties of the capture are increased: (1) because we move nearer enemy air from RABAUL and VUKA; (2) much stronger enemy forces to overcome; (3) the probability of the approaches being mined; (4) and the lack of VF support from GUADALCANAL.

(c) Simultaneous capture of all major enemy positions in the SOLOMONS. This would involve the capture and occupation of the SHORTLANDS area, the VUKA area, KEMATA BAY, and the neutralization of other enemy minor positions such as SINDA, GIZO, KEPITA, and the eventual mopping up of enemy observation positions.

3. Course (a) is feasible. Of the positions investigated earlier, KEMATA BAY seems to offer the maximum advantages. It is 180 miles by air from the nearest enemy airfield at WANGI, and 180 miles by water and 140 miles by air from GUADALCANAL. Approaches permit ample sea room for any sized forces. Radar operation offshore should be efficient. Warning of the approach of the enemy from passes through the SOLOMONS may be possible by submarine and coast watchers, observation. Seaplane operations can commence almost immediately. Probable enemy local troops should be relatively easy to overcome. The choice of KEMATA does not eliminate the VUKA or WATSON BOUND areas. But because radar will be less effective at those places they are less desirable; and they do not seem to offer any advantages not possessed at KEMATA. For the initial landing no more than
SECRET

One amphibious marine regiment would be required. The move would have to be covered by sufficient surface forces to prevent successful enemy surface attack. The size of our covering force would depend on an estimate of enemy surface strength capable of attack at the time of the move. Air coverage seems possible from Guadalcanal. Preliminary surface bombardment of enemy positions is possible but not believed required on a large scale. After the initial landing the garrison troops should relieve the amphibious troops. Air field construction personnel and material would follow at once.

There is considerable doubt regarding the suitability of this move. This is mainly because so little is accomplished until an air field is constructed. The immediate result is to deny a seaplane base to the enemy. Past experience indicates that shore based planes could not operate under a month from the date of the landing.

The cost may be high. It will take at least one day to land the amphibious troops. Three or four days will be required to land the air field construction personnel and material. Up to now we have been unable to prevent enemy use of his air fields by bombing. Unless we improve in this respect the expedition will be under air attack during the landings and during the air field construction period. And until antiaircraft weapons are placed ashore the enemy air activity will find little opposition. Surface raids must be expected at all times. Submarines would attack our line of supply.

4. Course (b) is suitable as it denies a most important base to the enemy and permits the use of an air field almost at once.

It is only feasible when there is available two amphibious marine divisions. Because of this important limitation the operation cannot be scheduled before March 1, 1943. There are advantages in such a delay. Our surface forces available then are estimated to be strong enough to prevent any enemy surface opposition. Garrison troops to move in promptly can be available. The disadvantage in delay lies in the expected strengthening of the enemy defensive positions on the Shortlands during that time.

As the Shortlands area is a relatively strong enemy position the cost will be higher than at Kiska. It is nearer to Kiska and Kiska which would indicate heavier air opposition. We would pay heavily for this fine prize, but it might be worth heavy losses. As at any place in the Shortlands, our losses will be in proportion to the effort of the enemy to oppose our plan. Should a slugging match take place between surface units, such as at
SECRET

Savo, we can expect to inflict at least equal losses. As time goes on our capacity to absorb losses, in relation to enemy capacity, will increase. We must plan to avoid a repetition of the Wasp, BATAAN, and NORTH CAROLINA affairs.

Course (c) is suitable as it accomplishes the major part of our task. The feasibility is open to question. To do this we must land strong amphibious forces in the codeLANDS, and at BUKA, and smaller forces at MATA, GISATA, and possibly MUNDA. Short of six months, the necessary troops do not seem available. We must, therefore, abandon this course for the present. If neither (a) nor (b) can be accepted, and if we are forced to wait until late spring, the details of (c) must be considered in light of developments during the next three or four months.

VIII - Selected Course of Action.

Preliminary.

1. As previously stated, information is lacking regarding the NEW GUINEA part of Task Two. We can only conclude that it will go forward simultaneously with the COLCHONS operation, and that the Commander Southwest Pacific will make requests for naval support.

2. In any move up the COLCHONS, the operation will be a continuation of Task One, and the main forces will be those of the Pacific Fleet. It seems logical that the command for that part of Task Two which involves the COLCHONS be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. After consideration of the various factors involved in the three courses stated for the capture and occupation of the COLCHONS, it is decided to adopt course (b). For purposes of planning the target date is March 15, 1943.

Discussion

4. The various phases of the course adopted are:

   Preparations.
   The capture of the SHORTLANDS area.
   The moopping up of intermediate positions.
   The assault and occupation of PORT VILA.

5. Preparations. The three major items which must be disposed of before the attack on the SHORTLANDS can get under-way are:

   (a) The relief, rest, reorganization, and refitting of amphibious troops now on GUADALCANAL. This is covered in...
the appended discussion of troops.

(b) The improvement of the GUADALCANAL position. Major items are:

(1) Installation of bulk aviation gasoline storage. This is underway at present but will not be on a satisfactory basis until there is at least two million gallons storage.

(2) Building of a wharf, with weight handling devices. This is planned but not started. Materials are in the South Pacific.

(3) Erection of housing for troops, stores, ammunition.

(4) Completion of alternate landing strips.

(5) The ejection or other disposal of enemy troops on the Island.

If we can retain command of the sea approaches for the next month sufficiently to prevent adequate enemy logistic support and the arrival of reinforcements, the enemy must either starve or surrender. There is every reason to expect that the Japs will make at least one more major attempt on GUADALCANAL. If we can repeat the successes of mid-November, there can be little doubt of the ultimate outcome of this phase of the campaign. Enemy success, on the other hand, would reverse completely the situation. With reinforcements now arriving, our situation is favorable - except for carriers.

While it would be desirable to have a landing strip in the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, that position is not considered essential to the capture of the SOLOMONS.

The positions at CANTON and FUNAFUTI are not up to satisfactory strength and must be improved, principally by additional air strength.

Reserve air strength to maintain GUADALCANAL fields saturated must be built up at ESPITALU SANTO, ESPATE, FIFI, and NOUMEA.

6. The Capture of the SHORTLANDS Area.

There are so many unknown factors that it is impossible at this time to present a finished plan. It will suffice to outline the operation.
Forces, 1st wave.  D day.

Carrier striking groups.
BG covering group.
Cruiser and DD support group.
Transport group - two division marine amphibious force.
One defense battalion, plus one Acorn.

Forces, 2nd wave.  D + 14 days.

Carrier striking groups.
BG covering group.
Transport and freighter group - one construction regiment and one defense battalion embarked.

Rehearsal.  On D -10 to D -5 day transport group, 1st wave, rehearse landing at WUTTON or ROSES.

Embarkation points. Amphibious troops jump off from NEW ZEALAND or AUSTRALIA for rehearsal. Defense battalion, and Acorns embark at WUTTON by D -5 day. Construction battalion embark at WUTTON by D -12 day.

Mopping up of intermediate positions.

Raider battalions will be employed in these operations. As no intermediate position is to be developed under this plan, no occupation troops are required. It may develop that HUNDA and RUKATA will be too strong for raiders alone. In this case, amphibious troops may be necessary to assist.

The capture and occupation of the remainder of GUMAVILLE will be completed by an amphibious division. The attack on RUKA will be similar to but on a smaller scale than the attack on the SHORTLANDS. In each of these it will be of first importance to secure the landing field for our own use. RUKA will only be neutralized by a raid or short occupation.

The final step is to garrison the SHORTLANDS and RUKA, and release amphibious troops for the capture of RABAUL. Lessons learned, plus availability of Army and Allied troops, should permit the accomplishment of this in two months from D-Day.

Air support. It is essential that the RABAUL and RUKA air fields be neutralized from D -2 to D +4 day. This can be done only if our pilots are willing to get near enough to hit the air fields. It is well known that hedge hopping technique is effective and not too costly. No attempt is made at this time to detail this operation.
IX

1. It will be seen that as long as the enemy does not capture eastern NEW GUINEA in the next three months, that the present status is acceptable. With the proposed increase in pressure in the SOLOMONS there can be no simultaneous enemy threat to NEW GUINEA.

2. With the SOLOMONS in our hands we will be able to attempt the capture of RABaul. That task is amphibious and is merely a continuation of the same operation. No reason is seen to shift the Supreme Command to the Southwest Pacific. To do so would place the Command in less experienced hands.

3. Task Two is thus restated "Capture and occupy the remainder of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, while holding in NEW GUINEA".

Instructions: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet will execute Task Two except for NEW GUINEA. The South Pacific area is extended to the equator at 145° East, thence to the center of VITIAZ STRAIT, to VOCIOLA ISLAND, to NAUKULA ISLAND, thence South.
SECRET

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

References: (a) CINCPAC Secret Despatch 301915 of Nov., 1942.
(b) Cinseac Secret Despatch 010931 of Dec., 1942.
(c) Joint Plan for Offensive Operations, Southwest Pacific Area, of 2 July, 1942.
(d) WPL-46-PC, 23 April, 1942.

1. Reference (b) is referred, as requested by reference (a), upon certain features of the campaign in the Solomons. This letter is intended to amplify the comment in reference (b).

2. The tenor of reference (a) was that, in exerting our strength against remaining Jap forces on Guadalcanal, we are in effect becoming "begged down" in a "frontal" operation when we might better cut off the Jap Guadalcanal forces by seizing the base from which they are being supported.

3. The necessity for "getting along with the war" is well recognized by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander South Pacific Force, and every possible "short cut" is being investigated. There are, however, certain conditions which delay us at this time, and I desire to describe the situation as I now see it.

4. In general I consider that Task One of reference (a) (the seizure and occupation of the Tulagi area) will not be completed until this area is sufficiently secure, and developed. I also consider that the forces are not in hand for an immediate initiation of Task Two. It must be remembered that Task One was undertaken with the full knowledge of all concerned that the forces for the accomplishment of Task Two and Three were not in sight. Although the Guadalcanal campaign has progressed favorably, I consider that we are now in the period which is,
as was foreseen, one of building up our strength while taking advantage of every favorable opportunity to cut down the enemy's. In regard to the latter, the enemy is apparently going to continue to expose his forces in the Guadalcanal area—a situation over which we should perhaps not be impatient until we have effected the superiority which will make it suitable to similarly expose our forces in operations against his bases.

5. In initiating Task Two, any considerable step forward will require a superiority in sea forces, aircraft and troops, and our supporting bases must be sufficiently developed and reasonably secure. The superiority must not only be local, but there should be sufficient strength to support our new base and its supply lines against the forces the enemy will throw against them. We have learned from Guadalcanal that such efforts by him are liable to be up to the limit of his resources.

6. **Sea Forces.** While we have been successful in exacting disproportionate losses on the enemy in the Guadalcanal campaign, I do not consider that we have yet a superiority in surface forces. Such superiority will be brought about by our new construction and by further losses we cause the enemy, particularly in his further efforts against Guadalcanal. This superiority may be considered to be eventually assured, but an estimate as to its attainment places it in the late spring of 1943.

7. **Aircraft.** In general it is considered that equality in aircraft has been reached and can be quickly increased to superiority by allotting sufficient of our air production. The difficulty is to provide the air bases both ashore and afloat. However, we should capitalize on the ready availability of superior air forces to overcome our weaknesses in other respects.

8. **Own Troops,** particularly those trained for amphibious operations, are considered to constitute a serious bottleneck in our preparations for an offensive. Following is a brief
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomon Sea Area.

Summary of this situation:

1st Marine Division - now being removed from Guadalcanal, and will require until about March 1st to be ready again for active operations. It is being assigned to the Southwest Pacific Force. Whether it will be available for future operations in the Solomons is not known.

2nd Marine Division - two regiments now at Guadalcanal; will probably be relieved by the 25th Army Division; should be ready 1 February. One regiment in New Zealand which is probably ready now.

3rd Marine Division - should be ready as a division on 1 March; one regiment ready 1 January; another on 1 February.

Army Divisions - none in training, or even assigned, therefore none can be ready in less than three months.

If amphibious troops are assigned for operations in the Aleutians, this will, of course, make the bottleneck worse.

9. Enemy Troops. Delays in our advance are made particularly unfavorable by the abundance of troops that the enemy has available to strengthen his positions. He is showing every indication that he will use freely this component of his strength. Thus, the longer we are delayed the greater the strength in troops we will require.

10. Rations. It is believed that Guadalcanal - Tulagi can be made into a suitable base from which to support our attack. It is, as yet, by no means such a base, either in development or security. Some of the items still required are:

(a) Sufficient airfields with full complements of aircraft.
SECRET

Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

(b) Storage and unloading facilities, particularly for aviation gasoline.

(c) Anchorages or berths secure against torpedo attack.

(d) Improved shore batteries, surface and antiaircraft.

II. Other Strengths and Weaknesses. Our contact with the enemy to date makes possible the following general comparisons:

(a) The Jap is our equal in his willingness to fight.

(b) Surface units must be considered of equal ability except that our fire control radar seems to give us a considerable advantage in low visibility, and our AA batteries are superior. We have no evidence for comparisons in day surface action.

(c) Our air forces are definitely superior in quality.

(d) U. S. land forces in the Solomons have proved themselves better armed and more skilful than the Japs, but we could hardly expect a continuation of the disproportionate personnel losses we have been able to inflict, and must realize that we will still require a superiority in numbers at our point of attack.

(e) Our submarines have proved themselves to be more effective units than those of the Japs.

(f) Our great inferiority is in use and performance of torpedoes.
SECRET

Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

12. Objectives.

(a) It is believed that the Japanese position in the New Britain area is a most difficult one to outflank. The bypassing of one or more of the enemy positions, even to the point of making Rabaul the first objective, offers strong temptation. However, the following factors point toward conservatism in this respect:

(1) The system of bases that the Japanese hold outside of New Guinea — i.e., Kavieng, Rabaul,本期, Kieta, Ran, and Gasmata, are mutually supporting and none, even Rabaul, may be considered a keystone, which if captured would cause the rest of the system to collapse.

(2) Even if Northeast New Guinea were in Allied hands, it would not constitute the base of operations which its strategic position would indicate. This is due to its lack of land communications. Its rail communications are flanked by enemy bases.

(3) The real communication line of any base we seized would unavoidably be flanked by the enemy bases we bypassed. Thus it may be said that our advance cannot escape being of a frontal nature.

(4) In order to establish a base successfully with one or more enemy bases in our rear, or to seize two or more positions simultaneously, we would require a preponderance of strength which is certainly not in sight for the near future.

(b) With the forces we estimate will be available I believe our question narrows down to whether our next objective is Guadalcanal, or one or more intervening positions between there and Tulagi. This decision depends on:

(1) Relative strengths at the time we make our move.
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

(2) Activity of the enemy at the aforementioned intervening positions, and our own counter-measures in connection therewith. Recent information shows that he is beginning the construction of an airfield at Munda, New Georgia (160 miles from Guadalcanal). This should be interfered with as much as possible with our present means, and if the field ever reaches the point of being placed into use, we should strike to take it over with the amphibious forces we have at hand. This would delay an attack on Saipan, but would greatly facilitate its success by the increased air support it would render. Three hundred miles is a rather long step to take, particularly before the radii of action of our dive bombers and fighters have been increased.

13. Remarks. Aside from the strength to make this move we should have in sight the forces which will be required for the succeeding move. Otherwise we will have a delay similar to the one we are now experiencing. It appears that the sea forces and air forces will be on hand, but there is no present assurance that amphibious troops will be. As has been pointed out, the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions are the only amphibious troops in the area and the future employment of the 1st Division is in doubt. Time will inevitably be lost if we depend upon the troops which make one assault to be made ready for the next one. Necessity for preparing additional amphibious troops is obvious.

14. Comma. The reaction of the Japanese to our seizure of Guadalcanal has been such that practically the whole of the Pacific Fleet has been required for operations in connection therewith. It is firmly believed that this naval force will be required in the operations in the Solomons visualized for Task Two. The present organization under Commander South Pacific has been built up with great difficulty and is only now approaching its maximum efficiency. It is therefore considered vital that the present command set-up of this organization be maintained for the prospective advance up the Solomons.
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

15. Summary,

(a) Task One will not be completed until Tulagi - Guadalcanal is secure and sufficiently developed as an air and naval base.

(b) Task Two cannot be undertaken until a superiority to the enemy in sea, air and land forces has been attained, and Task One completed as defined above.

(c) One means of attaining superiority is to continue to take advantage of the enemy's exposure of forces in the Guadalcanal area. Another means of overcoming our weakness in other respects is to capitalize on our rapidly mounting aircraft production.

(d) Various considerations require us to adopt a step-by-step advance up the Solomons. Due to the enemy activity in establishing an air base at Bunda, that will probably be our next objective.

(e) Amphibious troops constitute a serious bottleneck. Many more should be placed in training.

(f) The operations for advancing up the Solomons should be under the same command set-up as that for the seizure of Guadalcanal.

Copy to:
Comsopac

C.W. VIMITZ
SECRET

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Review of Aleutian Situation.

References: (a) Cinemaps Secret Despatch 29040 of June 1942.
(b) Cinemaps Secret Serial A16(6) 86788 of 24 September 1942.
(c) Cinemaps Secret Despatch 241841 of Nov. 1942.

1. It is considered that a careful survey of the Aleutian situation is necessary at this time - not only because of its own aspects, but because of its bearing on future operations in the present major Pacific theater - the Solomons Sea area.

2. Shortly after the Japanese occupied Kiska and Attu, I suggested in Reference (a) that the 2nd Raider Battalion and AFD's could be made available for offensive action provided the Army supplied supplementary troops, and then took over the defense of the area including the construction of an airfield on Amchitka.

3. This project was not approved at the time. The views of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet were that:

(a) The Navy would be unable to divert forces from the South Pacific to counter the expected strong reaction of the enemy against the recaptured positions and their supply lines.

(b) The move should not be made before the Army had occupied Atka and Adak, which it was not yet prepared to do.

(c) The raider battalion plus Army troops which could be carried in combatant ships was probably not sufficiently strong to accomplish the task; and in any case it would probably be required in the South Pacific.
SECRET

Subject: Review of Aleutian Situation.

4. The view of the Commander Northern Force (Task Force EIGHT) was that:

(a) The initiation of such an operation would be unwise unless naval forces including carriers were available to cover the operation for a long period.

(b) In any case it should be an operation for demolition and not for occupation because of difficulty of our supplying this area along vulnerable lines of communications.

(c) Without such an operation, it was probable that the Japs could be made to see that continued occupation was too costly.

5. I believe that, at the time, all concerned thought there was a good possibility that Kiska, at least, could be made untenable for the enemy. Later, this appeared even more favorable after the Army occupied Adak and carried out some effective air raids on Kiska.

6. However, even by 24 September, the above-mentioned possibility became so doubtful that I wrote reference (b), recommending that plans be initiated for the preparation by the Army of sufficient amphibious troops to eject the enemy from the Aleutians.

7. Although the Japanese, since then, gave some slight indications of relinquishing their hold in the Aleutians, and undoubtedly did evacuate Attu at one time, this lasted for a very short period. For the last month they have been vigorously prosecuting the establishment of their position in the area. Kiska installations have grown by leaps and bounds, Attu is active again, and indications point to his occupation of Semichi, and possibly Amchitka.
SECRET

Subject: Review of Aleutian Situation.

9. On the assumption that there are favorable sites on Amchitka for airfields, I consider that it is the key to the situation. For that reason I sent reference (c) urging its occupation by the Army. I herewith repeat this as an urgent recommendation. I believe that the troops which the Army has earmarked for Tanaga could much better be moved forward to Amchitka. We would thereby place ourselves within a really punishing distance of Kiska, and could render real support with land-based air when amphibious operations against that place are undertaken.

10. Recently I have had studies made of the present problem of a landing attack against Kiska. Commander Task Force EIGHT estimates that there are now 7500 to 10000 Japs on this island. This is confirmed by photographs now available. In addition, these photographs show the defenses to be well placed and of considerable strength. In fact it appears that a landing attack might be too costly an operation to undertake until our supply of amphibious troops is much greater than that now in sight.

I believe that this problem of our early action in the Aleutians should be thoroughly reviewed in combination with that of making sufficient forces available in the Solomons Sea area. It is already clear that the placing of many more troops in training for amphibious operations is one matter of great urgency.
December 7th

On the first anniversary of the war no unusual activities of the Japs were reported.

There were no major sightings in the Southern Ground activities at TF 64 were routine. In the TF 64 area there was some patrol activity, the nature of which is not clear.

TF 16 and 64 are operating in the Solomons. TF 16 continues at KINSA, where the OUTDOCKS are listing under repair. TF 42 submarines are covering the Solomons area with 16 subs on patrol today. Reports to date indicate that these subs are not very effective. TF 65 is at INDO. The HINDOE will report to Honiara for duty about December 9th.

The 5th Marines will be the first of the 1st Marine Division to be relieved at GUADALCANAL and the relief will be accomplished now. Troop dispositions in the active area are shown in Annex 1 of the November 29 briefing. About 9000 Kiwis are in KINSA awaiting transportation to ARAKA. It seems probable that from 3 to 4 thousand New Zealanders have already returned for duty in ARAKA.

CONIMOR 071251 requests reaffirmation of the shipping concentration in the Solomons area.

UTF 8 020112 gives current operations.

There are no new developments regarding enemy intentions or deployments. The build up for another push to the southern Solomons continues and enemy movements toward the western Solomons seem scheduled at least to mid-January.

December 8th

Admiral KINZIT left for San Francisco by plane to confer with Admiral King. The agenda includes many important subjects among which are our offensive in the Solomons and the expulsion of the Japs from KINSA.

B-17's from BUTTON dropped 320 1000 lb bombs on MIRSA. The landing strip there appears ready for use. A planned B-17 and P-38 strike on shipping at TCHOLEKI from CACTUS has been delayed because rain has temporarily grounded these planes at CACTUS.

TF 16 and the cruisers of TF 64 have been ordered to BUTTON. TF 64 BBs will train in the Coral Sea for two days, then proceed to KOUVEKA. The new Sopac task force set up is shown in Comacpac 090502 pink.

(Continued next page)
SECRET

December 8th (Continued)

Consopac 090506 pink proposes a standard mine field in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANZA. Mines are ready at PEARL now but four DK's requested cannot reach the area before January 9th.

The SAKATOGA, SASSAU, and ALTAMANA air groups are on 4 hours notice to proceed to BUTTON, CACTUS, or ROSES.

The bases "CACTUS" set up in Consopac 070440.

A plane reports sinking a two-gun enemy ship off LUNDA POINT.

Consopac 061225 tells Coninch that the shipping accumulation referred to yesterday is considered warranted.

The GREHO grounded while assisting the THOMAS EDISON at TURTLE ISLAND and may be a total loss. The DEMOCRAT is proceeding there to conduct salvage.

CTF 3 suggests that, as his search has not discovered convoys reported by DI in the Western ALASKANS, the enemy may be using radio deception on a larger scale. While every radio deception is being practiced, this is not believed an example of it.

MUNDA is rapidly developing as an airfield. Planes report the strip almost ready for use. There are no new enemy developments, except that the report of CVs in the TANGAL area was probably in error.

December 9th.

There were no major sightings or contacts in the South Pacific during the day, other areas were quiet.

TF 64 and the cruisers of TF 64 are returning to TF 65. Admiral Lee is training his 33s in the Coral Sea and will leave the training area for MUNDA tomorrow. The logistic supply of MUNDA is proceeding satisfactorily.

The PENDAL LA arrived at MUNDA. It is expected that the damaged UKI (ULAN) and MI'REALI will be able to leave MUNDA in about four more days. Each ship hopes to be able to make 8 knots.

The B-17 and B-38 strike mentioned yesterday was made. Three hits were made on one large ship (reported possible 17, but identity doubted here) and two straddles were made on a tanker.

For the second time this month Consopac reports evidence of landing strip construction at UKI, ANTARIA.
SECRET

December 9th (Continued)

It is reported from CACTUS that our PTs are having "unbelievable success" in that area. Details are not given.

Thought is being given by Cominch to the installation of torpedo baffles for unloading at CACTUS, and for an aerial reconnaissance of TRUK. Both of these projects have been considered by Cincom.

CTF 8090405 describes troops at and enroute ADAK and TALKAD. An Army survey party will look over AMCHITKA soon.

The enemy is expected to run the Tokyo Express to GUADALCANAL tomorrow night. At least eleven SDs will be employed. The major push toward the Southern SOLOMONS is still building up and should take place fairly soon. Because of this, no major threat is seen any other place in the Pacific.

December 10th

Operations for the day are summarized in "incidents:

The salvage of the TAMA 14-14 is doubtful, but the cargo probably can be saved.

The YAMAMOTO touched an uncharted island about 70 miles southwest of MAJURO. Minor underwater damage was sustained.

The Fleet Maintenance Officer estimates that it will take two years and much labor and material to put the TAMA in service. The OLALLA had a successful dock trial on the 7th. The ARIZONA is being scrapped in place. No work is being done on the UTAH.

The North and Central areas are generally quiet.

There is some indication that the move of 11-12 SDs to GUADALCANAL and the bomb run of "NEPTUNE" field scheduled for last night was cancelled. We still believe that the Japs intend to launch a major move to recapture the southern OLIVET FAIRY soon. That being the case, no major threat toward the Hawaiian or Aleutian areas are seen. There have been no sightings of indicated convoys in the western Aleutians.
SECRET

December 11th

The operations in the areas for the day are summarized in Cincpac 112025. It is not clear whether or not any part of the 11 DD Tokyo Express arrived at GUADALCANAL. Present ultra information is that at least one enemy DD was sunk, 2 DDs were sighted by the next morning CACTUS search in the NEW GEORGIA area on 18 courses.

The first increment of the 28th Division which arrived in NUKIO this week will proceed in the same ships to CACTUS arriving there the 17th.

Cominch 092145 authorizes sending the 10th Defense Battalion to Sopac. Cincpac 112007 gives condition and strength of this battalion.

Vice Opnav 112147 gives shipment plans for Sopac base materials.

Cominch 102220 is the first ONI Intelligence Bulletin. The guesses therein are not unreasonable.

December 12th

There were no major sightings in the South Pacific area today. Ground activities at CACTUS were limited to patrols. Shortly after midnight 11-12 local our PTs attacked the Tokyo Express off SAVO. One enemy DD was definitely sunk, a second is believed sunk, and a third was hit. We lost one PT. There were two air strikes on MUNDA from ESPIRITU SANTO during the day, and a similar daily strike is planned.

The MINNEAPOLIS departed TULAGI, making 8.5 knots. The NEW ORLEANS will be able to depart for SYDNEY tomorrow. It now appears that the ALCIIBA can be salvaged, and that she can be floated within two weeks. The FLYING FISH reports sinking 2 DDs in the SOLOMONS area.

Names for the Naval base set up in the GUADALCANAL area are in Comsopac 121501.

The SUMNER has completed the survey of HAVVAHAK harbor.

The 4th Raider Battalion is assigned to Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet effective 1 January.

Cominch 111629. All PBVs will be withdrawn from advanced combat areas and replaced with PBM3C planes.

Cincpac 122112. With the concurrence of the Army, Cominch, and Cincpac all action in connection with the occupation of TANAGA is suspended.

It is believed that the enemy has no intention of giving up attempts to recapture positions in the Southern SOLOMONS. However, the next large scale move, probably scheduled for December 18, is reinforcement of WENAK, NEW GUINEA. There is some indication of a plan to attack or attempt to occupy the KULUK BAY area of ADAK. This may be in the nature of a large scale diversion. No threat to the HAWAIIAN area is seen at this time.
December 17th

In the South Pacific activities were limited to two strikes on COMA. The first was 7 A-17s from 7-17 and 777, arriving in the target area at 10 a.m. The second was an escort by P-38s and P-40s from 7-17, arriving at noon. In the past three days five strikes have been made on COMA, while the landing field is believed ready for LFs, no report of such use has been received.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

Jin! Eastern Fleet will land agents on the China coast by submarine between the 4th and 6th of January.

Rear Admiral Giffen's group expect to arrive in the 4th of January.

The Army plans to bomb COMA with 10 B-24s between December 21 and 24.

Consolac 140932 B-24 with delay in action reports in his area.

From fragmentary "DI it seems that the Japs plan some sort of a raid in the COMA area from submarines. If true they must underestimate our strength there. Our search in the COMA area has failed to locate enemy convoys often reported by DI, but some landings are indicated. The unusual interest in the COMA area, and from there westward to COMA may mean a revival of activity - possibly toward the northwest coast of Australia. No troop move is seen at this time. This does not mean that there is any chance noted in the enemy desire to recapture the southern COMA area, and the Japs may be seen as diversion attempts. Also, in COMA there is the suggestion that an attempt was made to strengthen defense positions in that area, and to facilitate air transport to and from the SBI.

No major threat in the direction of the Hawaiian sea frontier seems probable in the foreseeable future, although minor raids on COMA and our outlying positions are always within enemy capabilities.
December 14, 1942

TP 16 at ESPIRITU SANTO has been placed on 4 hour notice, as have the EAs (TP 64) at NAIFEA. TP 11 is anchored at NAIFEA. TP 67 is at ESPIRITU SANTO. TP 61 is at NAIFEA.

The CACTUS planes attacked the NAIFEA area again today. No AA or enemy plane opposition was encountered. This may indicate successful bombing the last few days.

Enemy planes were reportedly over NAIFEA in the evening.

The unloading of supplies at NAIFEA is progressing under difficulties. There seems to be a shortage of craft to handle stores from the ships to the beach, and on the beach, the facilities are inadequate.

Comsopac 150422 is an operation summary.

Cominco 102147 is the "Tiresome" Marine transport movement from the West Coast to the Pacific.

Crudiv CME composed of the BAKEFIT, DEFICOIT and RESCORCE has been formed under Rear Adm. McKane.

The Plans Section will reexamine "ILINT" for use as a stepping stone to the Jay positions in the Central Pacific.

There is nothing new of enemy deployment or intentions.

December 15th.

TP 11 and 64 departed NAIFEA today and TP 16 and 67 depart NAIFEA later tomorrow. All will operate in the CORAL area for training and to await developments. TP 11 and 16 will continue as TP 61 under Rear Adm. Sherman.

Both ILINT and "Tiresome" are now daily targets for planes from CACTUS and CITED in order to retard development of either place. A report today indicates that the bomb craters we made in the ILINT strip the last few days appear filled up. Territorial minor strikes are being made daily at the NAIFEA airfield.

There is some indication of short attention of CORAL. A small AP was reported unloading there today.

The CRUCIFIX reports two hits in a wood site plane tender on November 6th and sank a small tender on November 10th. Both attacks were made off TPM.

(Continued)
SECRET

December 15th. (Continued)

An O32U reports sinking a midrate sub near the NEW GEORGIA group.

Cinopac 160424 pink outlines his critical BC shortage.

Cinopac 160435 pink does not approve Cinopac plan for mines off GUWAHATI but gives a suggestion which would be approved.

The precise information of WEST NEW Britain and enemy positions west of there is contained in Jomsowesac 152350.

Cinopac 151959 pink orders STF 8 to be prepared to occupy ANMITBA at an early date.

Captain Coman with the W.P. MIDDLE, GEORGE PARKER, THOMAS JEFFERSON, J.T. DICKMAN, HERMITAGE, LONGSTRENGTH, ANTRURK, SOUTI, and escort leave Norfolk about December 27th. On arrival at the Canal Zone the AP's and SOUTI will report to Cinopac for duty.

The enemy is making strenuous efforts to create and improve positions in the central SOLOMONS. As previously noted, positions at MODANG and WENAK are expected to be occupied in moderate strength about the 16th. Moves toward the Western ALEUTIANS, including KULIK BAY are indicated. Some of these indicate a lessening in the enemy desire to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS. It seems probable that large enemy forces are now organizing and training for a major push toward GUWAHATI. It is believed that losses sustained in the past few months have caused the enemy to abandon plans to extend control beyond the SOLOMONS.

December 16th.

Aside from routine air strikes on NUNDA the Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet. 39Ds claim one 500 pound hit on the stern of a DD or CL off NUNDA bar. The only major unit sighted was a CV leaving TRUK on southerly courses by the OCTUK.

The E. J. HINDS grounded in SEALANK CHANNEL. This ship had about 1200 troops of the 25th Division on board.

The INDIANAPOLIS and WILSON conducted firing tests today off OAHU with the new Mk. 32 fuze. Performance indicates great possibilities and battle distribution of the fuze is underway.

Work on the OKLAHOMA will be limited to that necessary to prepare the vessel to be towed to the mainland for scrapping.

(Continued)
SECRET

December 16th. (Continued)

Cominco 151650 pink requests information concerning the strength of our forces in the CACTUS - RINGWALT area.

In reply to Comsopac message concerning the critical DD shortage in the Solomons, Cinopac replied that all that can be done is being done (170327 pink).

Comsopac 170510 pink believes MOOGLAY ISLAND offers possibilities as an advanced air base and requests information on it from Comsowesopac.

DI shows that mines have been laid by the enemy at Kiska. The fields as reported will not hinder us to any great extent. These fields are just one more indication that the Japs are there to stay until thrown out. With the construction of a fighter strip on BALLALE ISLAND (SHORTLANDS area) underway, there is further evidence of the determination to defend GUAM with considerable air strength.

December 17th.

Task Forces in the South Pacific, less TF 66, continue operations in the eastern CORAL SEA. Two B-17 air strikes were made on Munda from Cactus. The HEADS, which grounded two days ago in the SEALARK CHANNEL, was refloated. New Zealand patrol boats are now operating in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area. Comsopac 170812 is an operations summary.

Temporary repairs have been made to the COLUMBIA turbines permitting speeds up to 25 kts.

In answer to Cominco 163115 regarding disposition of defense battalions Cinopac sent his 163016.

The FLYING FISH reports sinking two DDs in the central SOLOMONS while on patrol there since early November.

Orders were issued to the 7th Bomber command to attack WAKE with 24 B-24s during the night of December 22-23. 3 subs and one DD will be stationed between MIDWAY and WAKE to assist the Army and rescue personnel as necessary.

Cominco is waiting on reports from a special survey of AMCHITKA before deciding whether or not to occupy that island.

A report from the ELLIOT in the ALEUTIANs indicates her back broken. The damage probably was caused by heavy seas.

(Continued next page)
SECRET

December 17th. (Continued)

The only enemy activity noted during the day was a landing in the MADANG area. This was predicted. Evidently Sowesepac air was unable to prevent the convoy approach and no sizeable air attack on the convoy was reported. The CV sighted by the SCULPIN off TRUK, noted yesterday, may have returned to TRUK. It has never been clear why the Japs would want to use a CV in the operation to occupy MADANG and WEWAK. There is some evidence of Jap desire for a landing field in the HOLLANDIA area, and on SAMOA ISLAND and MOERAI.

Nothing new is learned of enemy deployments or intentions. A strong push toward GUADALCANAL is still predicted, and no major threat in the HAWAIIAN area is seen.

December 18th.

There were no major sightings in the Northern Solomons area today. Activity was limited to the routine daily strike on the Munda area by 14th Air from AVGRA...

Some task forces, less TF 65, continue operations in the east Solomons.

The BREET will be ready for sea at TF 68 on Dec. 24th, and the BORDUO will be docked there that day.

Sorinac indicates that LUSIMA and perhaps other islands of the TUKA area may be suitable for an advanced air base for operations in the Northern Carol. TA area.

TF 2 reports a "24" strike on "A" area, that a survey party landed on "A" area the 17th.

Sorinac 181715 area is a directive to occupy "A" area if reconnaissance shows that an airfield thereon can be constructed in a reasonable time. Sorinac 181715 area directs TF 2 to continue plans and to recommend forces needed. Sorinac 181715 area says that TF 2 will be assigned the task, and General Hiditt probably will issue a joint directive for the operation.

Com 12 190320 (2 part) area directs General Leidt to keep views on the capture of "A" area. Sorinac 100615 area states that belief here is that 2 divisions will be required. Rear Admiral Price will confer with General Leidt on this tomorrow.

Sorinac 181050 area gives planned employment of Marine defense battalions in his area.

The enemy was successful in landing at MAIUR, CMAK, and MAIUR. With the completion of this operation we can expect stepped up effort towards MAIUR. No other enemy developments are seen.
SECRET

December 19th.

All Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet. A summary of air strikes from CACTUS is in CACTUS 192206.

TF 61 will split up into TF 11 and 16 tomorrow. TF 11 will proceed to NOUMEA and TF 16 to ESPIRITU SANTO. TFs 64 and 67 will continue operations in the CORAL SEA.

While operating off GUADALCANAL the GAMESVOORT damaged one propeller and her speed is limited to 23 knots. The K. J. HINDS is proceeding to ESPIRITU SANTO at eight knots. Her grounding damage is limited to propeller and shafting.

In the Southwest Pacific it is reported that an air attack on a group of 1 CL and 4 DD west of NEW BRITAIN resulted in direct hits and possible sinking of the CL.

General DeWitt's 192048 pink gives further details on the occupation of AMCHITKA.

The S-35 was attacked by two enemy float planes south of ANTIGNAK ISLAND yesterday. These probably came from KISKA.

There are no new enemy developments.

December 20th.

There were no major sightings or contacts in the Pacific Ocean Areas today.

TF 67 has been ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO arriving there tomorrow. TF 64 will arrive at NOUMEA day after tomorrow.

The first increment of the 25th division is still unloading at GUADALCANAL and the second increment of the same division is being held temporarily at SUVA.

Routine bombing and harassing strikes were made on the enemy positions in the central SOLOMONS. GUADALCANAL 202207.

A survey of AMCHITKA indicates the feasibility of constructing a fighter strip within about two weeks of the commencement of the occupation, and of the construction of a bombing strip within about three months (CTF 8 210830). CTF 8 210215 gives naval forces he believes required for the operation. General DeWitt (202304) believes that the survey report will permit the operation to proceed under the directive from Cominch. It now appears that the target date will be about January 5th.

(Continued)
SECRET

December 20th. (Continued)

Our strikes on MUNDA undoubtedly have hindered the enemy, but not caused the airfield project to be abandoned. At BULA, a landing strip is well underway. The Japs continue to make strenuous effort to improve their Central SOLOMONS position. Sixty-two vessels were sighted at RA'UL yesterday. Sigma continues to point to another major drive toward the Southern SOLOMONS within the next two or three weeks. If this estimate is correct, no major threat toward the Hawaiian area is seen.

December 21st.

No surface or ground operations of significance were reported during the day. There was a strike on MUNDA by eleven SB2Cs from GUADALCANAL. These planes were not opposed and were unable to see any ground activity. A few minutes later a B-17 over the runway received AA fire.

CTF 8 reports a strike on KISKA in his 2 12307.

All Sopac striking forces are heading for or in port, as previously noted.

The 25th Division, lst increment, disembarked at GUADALCANAL today. The 2nd increment of this Division is waiting orders at SUVA.

It is expected that the "PENSACOLA" will be ready to leave ESPIRITU SANTO about December 28 and the "MINNEAPOLIS" about January 5th. The "NEW ORLEANS" has arrived at SPOONER. The CHESTER will proceed to Norfolk for complete repair of battle damage.

The Army planes which are scheduled to bomb WAKE the night of December 22-23 have arrived at MIDWAY.

For the CROWBAR operation Cincpace will reinforce TF 8 with the INDIANAPOLIS and 4 DD. This will not give all the anti-submarine forces that could be used profitably, but no others are available. A proposal for a joint directive for this operation is in Cincpace 220557 pink. CTF 8 212238 pink estimates the AMCHITKA troop requirements at about 13,500. This number raises the problem of logistic support and involves the Navy insofar as large escort demands can be expected.

Cominch 191906 pink gives moves for the 10th and 12th defense battalions. Cincpace will require transportation for the 10th, and combat loading is not essential.

(Continued)
December 21st. (Continued)

Admiral Halsey proposes to return the NEW HOLLAND and MISSISSIPPI from the SoPac to conserve escorts and to permit accomplishment of watertight integrity improvements to permit their use in forward areas. CinCpac concurs.

The very large number of vessels seen at RAPAUL yesterday is a fine target for air attack both from CACTUS and KITTY. It seems probable that these vessels are involved in the expected major push toward GUADALCANAL. It would be worth a great deal to break up this shipping concentration. It should be noted that our submarines in the SoPac area seem ineffective. Just why this is the case is not clear. Plotted patrol positions do not provide for maximum concentrations at the two main focal points, i.e. RAPAUL and PUNU.

The enemy today has at least four combatant CVs available. Some are training in Empire waters. While it seems most probable that the next employment of the CVs will be in the South, the possibility of raids in the Hawaiian Area and on our staging points cannot be overlooked. No employment of CVs in the Aleutians or east of the meridian of 00°N is seen.

December 22nd.

12 SBKD, 5 B-17, with VF coverage made strikes on MUKLA shortly after noon local. Specific damage inflicted is not reported, but AA opposition was encountered by the B-17's.

An extremely large concentration of shipping was observed at RAPAUL. Ships of all types, including one or two cruisers and 20 D's, numbered over one hundred. It would be an ideal set up for a BLUE CV strike, particularly while Murochite (Japan) probably could not oppose with more than one CV. The danger in such an operation is, of course, enemy shore based air. Comairacac plans to strike RAPAUL tomorrow with 6 B-17's, and the next day with at least 12 B-17's.

The B-24 strike on WAKE was made on schedule. All planes returned to MIDWAY safely. Damage inflicted is not yet reported.

The CROTHAR operation (occupation of AMCHITKA) is shaping up. CinCpac 230407 requests General DeWitt to send his suggested draft for a joint directive. This despatch was answered in DeWitt's 230016 pink. The joint directive to TFT 8 should be sent along tomorrow.

There are no new enemy developments.
December 22nd (Continued)

The press indicates that the BRITISH have raided Munda with carrier based planes. The BRITISH have also started a land offensive against AKYAR.

December 23rd.

There were two strikes made on MUNDA during the day from CACTUS. It is evident that these almost daily attacks are hampering Jap development. However, it was seen for the first time today that zero fighters are operating from the MUNDA field.

No major sightings were reported in the Pacific Ocean Areas. The large assembly of ships at RABAUL, mentioned yesterday, still remains a most attractive target. The B-17 strike on RABAUL which was scheduled for today is not reported and may have been called off on account of bad weather.

Comsopac 240616 is a summary for his area.

CTF 17 232359 is the report of the successful Army strike on WAKE. The photo reconnaissance which followed the strike also was successful. On the day of this strike the TRITON sank a water barge off WAKE. If bombing destroyed a few distilleries ashore the Japs may have a serious water problem.

Cincpac 232215 is the joint directive for the occupation of AMCHITKA.

CTF 8 240225 gives forces proposed.

There are no new enemy deployments noted, and nothing new is learned of enemy plans.

December 24th.

The Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet except for air strikes in the SECACNCS. Eleven P-17's started to bomb RABAUL. Six reached the target and claim three hits on an AK or AP, and several near misses. Other planes were unable to find the target area. This may be because of bad weather. The large number of ships at RABAUL, plus a possible CV, previously mentioned, was reported by returning pilots. In this connection Cinc Pac sent his 95013 which suceeds a coordinated air strike on this shipping concentration and the redistribution of submarines to cover RABAUL approaches more effectively. Minor contacts made during the day in the SECACNCS area are of no special significance. A CV's with VP cover attacked landing barges and the MUNDA airstrip. It is reported that the landing strip is considerably damaged from the past few days bombing.
December 24th (Cont'd)

All task forces in the South Pacific are in port as follows: TF 63 at WAKINI; TF's 16 and 67 at WUPPY; TF 11 and 54 at WITA POPIY.

No ground action is reported from Guadalcanal. The troops in that area have been quiet for some time.

A Jap DD which was sunk at TULAL is in rather shallow water. It may be possible to recover her charts and other papers of value.

The photo reconnaissance plane sent to WAPA following the recent strike was unable to get pictures because of overcast.

The Allies in the Buna area are making slow but continued progress in cutting off the Jap troops and recapturing two airfields.

The RNTH reports that an attack on a carrier in Dec. 19th off Southern New Guinea resulted in two torpedo hits.

CFF 8 plans to make a sweep to the westward with cruisers and destroyers starting Dec. 28th. The S-35 at Arawe in a serious battery fire yesterday.

There are no new enemy developments.

December 25th

At least two enemy submarines were reported sunk. The first was sunk off ST. GEORGE CHANNEL by the SEADHAGON while on patrol in these waters, and the second was sunk by a SWPac PT in the Buna area.

Two small enemy AKs were sighted off WICKHAM ISLAND, NEW GEORGIA during the day and were attacked by CACTUS air. One of 3000 tons was sunk. Reports from the SWPac indicate good success in air attacks on enemy shipping in the western SOLOMONS SEA. It seems probable that one victim was the ARIAKE (DD). It continues to be of first importance to sink enemy shipping. An efficient way to do this is by low altitude bombing.

At GUADALCANAL current night nuisance raids are lowering our troop's combat efficiency as indicated in Comsopac 250449. The logistic supply of our southern SOLOMONS positions is proceeding satisfactorily.

Admiral Halsey is discussing air strikes on Rabaul with ComSWPac. Comsopac 260612 pink.

(Continued)
SECRET

December 25th (Continued)

The present status of the BALLALE airfield is in Conair-sopac 260224.

The MONTPELIER group will arrive at MOKEA about January 19. TP 65 less Baitdiv 4 is ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO. The ACVs are warned to be prepared for further service.

Further discussion of the AMCHITKA occupation is contained in General De Witt's 252050 pink.

There are no new enemy developments.

December 26th

As has been the case for several days, the Pacific Ocean areas were generally quiet. SBDs with fighters made a routine strike on the MUNDA area. Some zero and AA opposition was encountered.

The WALOO returning from patrol in the Central SOLOMONS area reports sinking one I class sub and one 5600 ton AP in mid December.

There are now 161 planes of various types at GUADALCANAL, but full operation of these is not yet possible because bulk aviation storage is not yet completed. Completion of the tank farm now under construction is promised by January 15th.

The 2nd increment of the 25th Division should arrive at GUADALCANAL about the 29th.

Admiral King says well done to the WAKE bombers, and believes that attacks should be repeated at irregular intervals not only for the effect on WAKE but as prospective cover if and when we may wish to follow the attack with assault. We are giving consideration to other air attacks on enemy Central Pacific positions from JOHNSTON and FUNAFUTI.

Admiral Hepburn will report to Cincpac in a few days to conduct an administrative investigation of the 1st Battle of SAVO.

There are no new enemy developments.
SECRET

December 27th

There were no major sightings in the Pacific Ocean Areas. A Southwest Pacific plane saw at least 51 ships anchored at HAWAII. No large concentration in the BUIN area has been noted for sometime.

It appears probable that four Jap subs have been sunk in the SOLOMONS SEA area in the past week.

The NEW ORLEANS arrived at SYDNEY the 24th local.

While enroute from WAKE to the South Pacific the TRITON sank an AK off KOKIL (CAROLINE ISLANDS).

All Task Forces of the South Pacific Force are in port for upkeep and to await developments.

Army planes over ATTU encountered some AA from that Island. A reconnaissance plane had reported float planes at ATTU, but a strike sent from ADAK to destroy them was unable to find them. This may have been due to radar warning from KISKA.

Cominch 271750 pink suggests enemy CV employment against the HAWAII - MIDWAY line or elsewhere other than the SOLOMONS SEA area. This is, of course, always possible— as was noted herein on December 21st. The most employment seems to be in connection with another major attempt to recapture positions in the Southern SOLOMONS. Because of new airfields in the Central SOLOMONS and in NEW GEORGIA, the next southward push would involve use of considerable enemy shore based air with better fighter coverage than was possible from HAWAII.

December 28th.

During the day air strikes from GUADALCANAL sank two AKs at WICKHAM ANCHORAGE, NEW GEORGIA. The Pacific Ocean Areas were otherwise quiet.

An Army photo reconnaissance plane returning from WAKE landed at sea 200 miles southwest of MIDWAY. Rescue is underway.

The GAMSITH (CNS) broke in two in heavy seas and sank off ADAK ISLAND.

The enemy probably is reorganizing and training for another push toward GUADALCANAL. The carriers are training in EMPIRE waters. The bulk of other surface strength is not located but seems to be in the general area between TRUK and HONSEN.
December 29th

There was very little activity in the Pacific during the day. GUADALCANAL planes made a strike on enemy installations at REKATA. Slight AA was encountered and there were few signs of activity there. Comsopac 300627 is an operation summary for the past few days.

Cominch has directed that 6 to 12 PTs now in Sopac be sent to ComSWPac for temporary duty.

Comsopac 300350 gives the plans for troops in the GUADALCANAL area, and his 301223 reports present troops in the GUADALCANAL-TULAGI area. There seem to be some omissions in the latter despatch. The second increment of the 25th Division has arrived at GUADALCANAL.

Sopac Task Forces are still in port with TF 16 and 67 at ESPIRITU SANTO and 11 and 64 at NOUMEA. TF 65 ACVs and escorts were due at ESPIRITU SANTO at noon today. Batdiv 4 is at NANDI.

Comsopac 300602 pink gives a plan for a cruiser and destroyer bombardment of MUNDA during the night of January 4th (local).

The THOMAS EDISON, which grounded several weeks ago at TURTLE ISLAND, can now be considered a total loss. She broke her back the 19th. Most of the cargo, including 40 torpedoes, has been salvaged. Even better salvage results may be expected with the arrival of the new salvage vessels in the South Pacific. At present ATs with makeshift equipment are employed.

North Pacific cruisers and DD escort under Rear Admiral McMorris will make a sweep to the westward from KODIAK during the next few days. This is preliminary to the SHARPBAR operation now scheduled to begin on January 5th.

There is very little known of present enemy deployment and intentions. It is believed that the next major move will be toward GUADALCANAL, and that the recently noted developments in the NEW GEORGIA Group and the Central SOLOMONS are primarily to provide better shore based air coverage. At MUNDA, for example, it is now known that bombers can operate on the airfield. About half of the enemy carriers are believed around to complete an intensive training operation in the vicinity of KOSIKI. The bulk of combatant surface strength is thought between TRUK and the Empire. Based on this, no major enemy move toward GUADALCANAL would take place before January 7th. But Cardiv ONE has been silent for the past three days. It may be enroute south. In that case a possible enemy target date may be somewhat advanced. Because of lack of definite information, the best that can be done is to predict as follows:

(Continued next page)
December 29th. (Continued)

(a) No major move on GUADALCANAL is to be expected before about January 7th.

(b) A major move on GUADALCANAL is more probable that one toward NEW GUINEA.

(c) It is possible, but not probable, that a raid in strength will be made in the near future on the MIDWAY-HAWAII line or outlying positions in the Central Pacific.

(d) It does not seem probable that much strength will be in the North Pacific to interfere with the CROWBAR operation.

December 30th.

Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet. Comsopac 310836. Our submarines are beginning to show improvement in the SOLOMONS SEA area. Enemy sources indicate that one of our subs sank one ship of a convoy heading from the NEW BRITAIN area toward PALAU and attacked another ship in the convoy about an hour later. (In this latter attack two torpedoes passed under the ship without exploding. This is further evidence of our very poor torpedo performance).

There are no major developments in the SW Pac. Ground forces continued to close in on Japs in the HUMA area. The enemy undoubtedly is improving and building air facilities on the North Coast of NEW GUINEA.

The press reports increased air and ground action in the BURMA theatre. In RUSSIA extravagant reports of success against the Germans appear daily in the press. While the RUSSIAN must be successful in the present offensive, the degree of that success may not be as great as the RUSSIANS report. Little is known of our African Campaign. It seems probable that the advance from the West has been stopped now that stiff enemy resistance is encountered. The advance from the East seems to be slowed down, possibly due to logistic problems.

Comairwing TWO 310830 reports a typical strike on MUNDA.

Our logistic supply and troop replacement program to GUADALCANAL is proceeding well. The second increment of the 25th Division will be landed by January 3rd. Because of Admiral Halsey's 300350, noted yesterday, Cinopac sent his 310341 pink to Comincoh. In this connection it is recorded again that no crops are in sight or even contemplated (as far as is known here) successfully to complete tasks TWO and THREE. We know that, after jungle duty,
SECRET

December 30th. (Continued)

troops are not available again, because of malaria and other causes, for from three to six months. Until we have the requisite numbers of fresh troops to take and keep up the offensive our situation in the SOLOMON SPSA Area will be unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of getting along with the war. Results in 1942 are gratifying considering the fact that we have not had enough tools to work with. While we have managed to stop Jap advances toward AUSTRALIA and the supply lines thereto, we have not impaired Jap capacity to defend gains of 1942. To permit Japan to exploit her present "Far East" holdings would prolong the war to the danger point. All this means only one thing for 1943 - more tools to work with them are now in sight. In addition, we must improve material, such as torpedoes and radio. CINCPAC 310459 is one more plea for more tools.

No new enemy deployments or intentions are noted.

December 31st.

For the first time in several days a cruiser-destroyer group was sighted in the vicinity of the SHORTLANDS. Bad weather in the SOLOMONS area probably was the cause of an ineffective strike today on KURUADA and of only a part of the usual daily search. The large concentration of shipping continues at HABANI. We have 61 merchant type in the NOUMEA-ESPIRITU SANTO-GUADALCANAL area.

Comsopac 311100(C parts) is his Op Plan 1-43 in which he outlines cover for 6 APs and 1 AK in the GUADALCANAL area January 3rd to about January 6th.

Comsopac (010514) plans to develop PORT PURVIS, FLORIDA ISLAND as a fleet anchorage. His O11136 gives his plan to relieve the 2nd Marine Division at GUADALCANAL and to eliminate the enemy there.

Cominch 311815 pink is a proposal to create a Deputy Comsopac to relieve Comsopac of administrative details.

CTP 8 reports an air strike on KISKA in his 312140. Cominch states that the Army is maintaining the ALEUTIAN P-38 squadron at twenty-five airplanes. No additional P-38 squadron is available at present for assignment to the ALASKAN area. This plane is believed the only pursuit which can satisfactorily be employed in that area.

There are no new enemy developments.