“NIMITZ GRAY BOOK”
Volume 6 of 8

War Plans and Files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Running Estimate and Summary
covering the period 1 January 1945–1 July 1945.

The following series of images is the first step in the American Naval Records Society's project to produce a scholarly on-line edition of this important, declassified, primary source.

At this early stage, ANRS is able to provide images of one of the copies of the “Gray Book” that are located in Papers of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at the Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington D.C.

This copy consists of loose pages that could be readily scanned. Sections of some of the typed pages in this copy are blurry and difficult to read, and, in addition, this copy does not show the color-coding that is present in the tightly-bound original.

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Book # 6

GRAYBACK SUMMARY

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1 January 1945 - 1 July 1945
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<td>CTF 58 (McCain) relieved by CTF 58 (Hutches)</td>
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<td>2-4 Feb.</td>
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<td>CINCPAC flew GUAM to ULITHI, broke flag in INDIANAPOLIS.</td>
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<td>8 Feb.</td>
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<td>Staging Facilities in MARIANAS for reserve Carrier Air Groups.</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>Summary</td>
<td>Admiral Nimitz &amp; Admiral Sherman departed for Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance and Sweeping of CASSIUSAS SOUND completed.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Summarizes results of conference relative petroleum requirements of BFP.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Harmon search negative.</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>24 Mar.</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Mar.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Mar.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td></td>
<td>All islands of KERAMA RETTO secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr.</td>
<td>COMINCH CNO 011327 (pink)</td>
<td>Landings on OKINAWA, Yontan and Kadena Airfields secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Apr.</td>
<td>CINCPAC 050230 (pink)</td>
<td>Requests info acceptable months for invasion KYUSHU and/or HONSHU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>REFERENCE(S)</td>
<td>SUBJECT - RE: TASKS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(QUEENFISH 020090 (CINC PAC 030818 (COMINCH CNO 071945 (pink) (CINCPOA 090126)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Policy on Visitors to the forward area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Apr.</td>
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<td>20th AF Planning Staff to CINCPOA to aid in planning invasion of JAPAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Apr.</td>
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<td>Outlines to FCA terms of JCS command directive.</td>
</tr>
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<td>CINC POA 100223 (pink)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Warning Order Phase III-C INTECN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Apr.</td>
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<td>ComGenPOA reports CINCAF/AAC with Army forces and resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td>IE SHIMA secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Apr.</td>
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<td>Mounting areas for divisions in assault phase OLYMPIC.</td>
</tr>
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<td>REFERENCE(S)</td>
<td>SUBJECT - R / A / A / S</td>
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</tr>
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<td>APRIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Announces Dissolution of COMAIRPAC.</td>
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<td>CINCPOA ADV 060833</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>CGAAPPAC 072314</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Barry M. Giles assumes command AAPPAC; also designated DepCom 26th AF.</td>
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<td>8 May</td>
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<td>10 May</td>
<td>JCS 10184 (pink)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Com7thFlt 120822 (pink)</td>
<td>Recommendations for Naval establishment ashore at KYUSHU for OLYMPIC.</td>
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<td>CINCPOA ADV 141341 (pink)</td>
<td>Procedure for Release of Army units to CINCPAC.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CINCPOA ADV 170842 (pink)</td>
<td>Admiral Nimitz and RAdm Sherman attended conference at MANILA.</td>
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<td>17 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>Summarizes MANILA Conference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>VAdm Hill relieved VAdm Turner as CTF 97. ComGen 10 assumed control ashore at OKINAWA.</td>
</tr>
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<td>REFERENCE(S)</td>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MAY</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>CINCPOA 181210 (pink)</td>
<td>Release of Hq &amp; Hq Co. SoPacRadsCom for transfer to MANILA.</td>
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<td>19 May</td>
<td>SCONAV 191600</td>
<td>Adm. Hewitt designated to further investigate PEARL HARBOR attack.</td>
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<td>22 May</td>
<td>MARSHALL 222315 CINCPOA 241259</td>
<td>RAAdm Price relieved RAAdm Kiland as COMA KERAMA SETTO. RAAdm McCormick relieved RAAdm Smith as CTF 54.</td>
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<td>23 May</td>
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<td>JCS 250128 (pink)</td>
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<td>Proposal for assumption of control of CTF by British.</td>
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<td>COMINC &amp; CNO 291605 (pink) CINCPOA 110627 (July)</td>
<td>Com3rdFlt (Adm. Halsey) relieved Com5thFlt (Adm. Spruance).</td>
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<td>4 June</td>
<td>CINCPOC 041231 (pink)</td>
<td>Cancels FIREBREAK Operation.</td>
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<td>4 June</td>
<td>CINCPOA 041231 (pink)</td>
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<td>5 June</td>
<td>CINCPOC 050642 (pink)</td>
<td>Concern RAF Engineers and 10 R. Lancasters.</td>
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<td>6 June</td>
<td>CINCPOA ADV 060742 (pink)</td>
<td>Summarizes results of conference at GUAM with CINCAPPAC Representatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>CINCPOA 081229</td>
<td>Directive for provision of facilities at EMINOK for support of fast carriers.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerns Cover and Deception conference at MANILA.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Establishes NOB's KIYAJALIN and EMINOK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RAAD Cobb relieved RAAD Hall as CINCPAC.

VAAD Oldendorf relieved RAAD eCornick as CTF 32.

Capture of Intermediate fort on CHINA Coast.

Division of ServRon Ten into Service Divisions.

Procedure for Repatriation of Allied KIIs.


Admiral Sherman departed for Washington.

Assigns General Stilwell as ConGen TEN.

Concerns ConGenPOA Responsibility for Houting Army Air and Ground Units for OLYMPIC.

Organized resistance ceased on OKINAWA.

Fleet Admiral Mitsui departed HAW for West Coast and Conference with ConGen.

Concerns ConvoLantments and Organization of Air Support Control Units, like no.

Unopposed landing on OKINAWA.

Requests ConGenPOA to initiate base development at TENTAC for handling 150 single engine Army Aircraft per month.

Tentative agreement FSAF and 5th AP concerning Marine Air Station O.S. for OLYMPIC.

Directs ConGen 10 to assume full responsibility for defense of OKINAWA on 1 July.

Directs CTF 94 assume responsibility for escorting of all shipping between OKINAWA and RTUKUTS beginning 1 July.

Authorizes ConSoFac to discontinue all air, sea and ground defense missions.

Procedure for establishing 'Monthly Priority List for Pacific Theater.'
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<th>SUBJECT - REMARKS</th>
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<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>CINCPACNAV 300304</td>
<td>Proposes assigning all air-sea rescue services in HURICO to single agency under PAN - 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>CINCPACNAV 300601</td>
<td>Warning Order for Operation OLYMPIC.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
31 December (Oahu Date) (Continued)

There still appears to have been no landings at the time of the bombardment on the 26th, and very little else was done to the beachhead. Statements by I.J.N. personnel that another DD, the MABARI MARU, may have been sunk in the vicinity of the 26th, and another I.J.N. states that the UGUKEI sank FT off E. coast of I.T.O. on the 12th.

I.N.C. to 3 LT 30th (green) request further steering representatives to I.J.N. to investigate the above statements.

CICUSCA 010738 (green) outlines to I.C. steer port for names for main actions between Japanese ships and Allied forces on 25 October.

CICUSCA 312399 (green) confirms by communication authorization to various commands to expedite unloading of cargo in various areas.

CJTC 94.9 010349 (green) outlines strike as I.J.N. to be executed for January.

1 January (Oahu date)

TF 38 is scheduled to hit FORCJA on 1 January.

Crudiv 5 plus 6 DD's together with units of the Strategic Airforce are scheduled to hit I.C. JIMA on the 9th (1).

I.C. JIMA was hit on the 31st and 1st by a number of B-24's. On 31st and 10 B-24's snoop bombed the airfields by radar every 45 minutes. Again on 1 January 19 B-24's bombDD the airfields with 36 tons.

One bomb was dropped on LFETY FIELD at RIA 1 on the 2nd at 0245 (K - 10). A short time later at 0410 on the 2nd another bogey closed to 60 miles but retired from that point to the Northeast.

ComGenAFFCA 010215 (pink) covers the subject of direct communication between 7th Air Force and 5th Air Force.

COMINC 011754 (pink) requests that ComEVPY KUKU disseminate certain intelligence data.

COMAIRPAJ 012128 (pink) covers the question of aviation logistic support of the carrier task forces and of the St. Fleet.
TCP SECRET

1 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

COMGENAPAC 020205 (pink) covers deployment of certain Engineer Aviation Battalion from ADAC to ROK.

CINC FAST INMIL 300941 (pink) states that ". . . " is the code word for contemplated strike in the ROK.

CTF 77 011102 outlines the result of international FOI regarding strength of major units of Japanese fleet.

COMSHO 122019 covers a protest by the Japanese in connection with sinking of certain Japanese ship by ad. carrier Enterprise in the western Carolines area on 3 July 1944.

COMSHO 021110 states that the Australian 1st Victoria has expressed concern over U.S. plans for reutilization of canteen industry on ROK.

2 January (Oahu date)

Incomplete reports of the first day's strike on ... indicate that the approach of the Task Force was undetected. The first strike reached targets both at 1700 and at 1800. . . . The weather became increasingly bad and cancelled future operations as of 1400 3 January (I) and the force retired to the southeast. No attacks were made on our ships during this period.

TF 38 targets for 3-5 (January 4th) will be either 150,000 again or northern Luzon, depending upon the weather.

Com7thFleet gives his estimate of the operational enemy warships as follows: Empire area: 4 BB, 3 CB, 2 CT, 2 SS, 12 DD. Indo China and Indo Pacific area: 2 CV, 1 FB, 2 CA, 12 DD, 18 DD.

A delayed report from the CINC (32-247) reports a 18-m. a medium AF and possibly damaging another off Phu My on 28 December.

Another of our submarines report sighting a periscope north of FRENCH FRIGATE JACOBS. There has also been a report of the sighting of a periscope in this same general vicinity yesterday.

Com AF-5 estimated Jap air strength in the Philipines area as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/E VF</th>
<th>T/E VF</th>
<th>S/E VF</th>
<th>T/E VF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visayas</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TOP SECRET

2 January (Oahu date) Continued

On the 3rd 97 B-29's of the 21st Bomber Task force were air-borne for an attack on the NAGoya Urban area (KAI KAI). In
16 Returned early, 49 bombed the primary target visually, 9
bombed targets of opportunity, and reports of 28 planes were not
available. Bombing took place from 1445 to 1525. The total load
was 1 - 500 pound fragmentary bomb and the remainder incendiary
clusters. One B-29 is believed to have been lost over the target.

CINCPACFOA 030625 (pink) outlines to CTF 97 that certain
targets of opportunity warrant a variation of plan:et equipment
to take advantage of such situations without specific directive
from CINCPAC.

CINCPAC 020321 references the complement of large carriers
namely 73 VF, 15 VFP, 15 VTF.

2 January (Oahu date)

For the 2nd day strikes and search for the B-29's were
recalled due to bad weather at the target and at the bases.
All planes were recalled at noon. The Task Force's continued
again to the fueling rendezvous. No reports of the strike
carried out in the early morning have been received.

LTG - 1st and 2nd. 5th Air Force planes to 1st AW, 50
attacked shipping along the west coast of Japan, sortiing
north, sinking 21 ships and damaging 25-26 more. Total load
included: 1 AV, 1 large NA, 2 large SB, and 12500
. The attacks were off KOKIN, INE, ISHI (north
of KYOTO BAY), and JIMIZU BAY (just west of KYOTO). Attacking
planes included 50 A-20's plus F-47's, 1-52A's, and 51's. One
A-20 was shot down over the target, 1 crashed on Okinawa and 1
was missing.

At KIRISHI on the night of 1st and 2nd heavy Japanese air
attacks inflicted damage on 2 Liberty Ships, one of these ships
was so badly damaged that it was necessary to leave it in order
to prevent sinking. AA Shot down 5 planes during these raids.

10 Japanese planes bombed the TACILOM strip prior to dawn
the 3rd destroying 10 Blue planes and damaging 5 others.

The strike on K.M JULIA by TF 93 plus TF 91-9 (Cruiser 5 plus
6 DD's) is to be carried out on the 5th.

Surface bombardment of KURIYU area (south in JAPAN) is
to be carried out by TF 92 (Cruiser 1 plus escorting destroyers)
on 6 January.

CINCPAC's 031151 (pink) sets forth the warning order for
Phase 2 of ICEBERG.
3 January (Cahu date) (Continued)

COMMDT's 040130 (pink) notifies HINCH that NAVY intends to strike LUZON across the dividing line (10 north) 6 January (s-3).

4 January (Cahu date)

No further reports have been received regarding results of the strike on FORMOSA by Task Force 78 on the 5th. A strike is planned for LUZON today.

CTG 77.3 (RAdm. Derkey) reports that a mid-ship submarine attacked the formation south of AFC island on the 5th. Two torpedoes were reported to have passed through the formation, missing all ships. The TAYLOR (DD-683) rammed and kept charged the submarine, probably sinking it.

CTF 77 (VAdm. Kincaid) reports that the CV 11, which was proceeding with the Bombardment Group thru the mid sea, was attacked by planes at 1720(I)/4th. The GUADALCANAL (CV-7) was seriously hit, resulting in fires which got out of control. This CV 3 was subsequently sunk by torpedoes from one of our destroyers. Survivors reported to date are 74 men and 35 officers.

CTG 73.7 (Comdr. J.C. Renard) reports another air attack on ships off HINCHOCO on the evening of the 4th. An air attack ship (name unknown) was hit by a suicide dive bomber and blew up. LEMORECOCO (CL 9) and PCC 69 (AG 26) were damaged; all except two ships left the HINCHOCO anchorage and put to sea.

The night of January 1-2 85 paratroops were landed by LCI's at NASURAU BAY Northwest HINCHOCO. No casualties resulted from this landing.

On the night of January 2-3 (one reinforced company) from LINDORO at NASURAU (Southwest HINCHOCO) without incident.

On the 4th PALAU based 1-24s dropped 100-pounders on Clark Field destroying an estimated 30 planes which were in revetments. We suffered no losses on this raid.

Night of January 3-4 LINDORO positions were raided by an undetermined number of enemy planes. 3 A-20s were destroyed. We shot down 4 planes during these raids.
TOP SECRET

4 January (Cahu date) (continued)

CTF 77 (Vadm. Kincaid) estimates the Jap air strength in the Southwest Pacific Area as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VT &amp; VM</th>
<th>V.A.</th>
<th>FI &amp; FJ</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon &amp; Visayas</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borneo &amp; Celebes</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 300 of the 455 in Luzon-Visayas area are believed to be in the Clark Field Area.

During the period 2 January to 4 January a total of 6-24s attacked the airfield areas at I.A. and their bases from 10,000 - 19,000 feet, with results being unimpressive to the raid.

At 2445 on the 2nd 44 1-24s of the 3rd squadron dropped 176 tons on that target. Fighter opposition was light and weak.

ARKLD's 042244 (pink) requests a further special reconnaissance on the HINCHINA-LINC area to determine the possible whereabouts of the enemy naval force which sailed CAGA LAIT 7-12 IE on 31 December.

JINSAWA's 041417 (pink) requests immediate location and manuevers of the Jap airfields by Task Force 95. He further states that land based planes will not attack the island area on 3-3. Shore based planes to hit before 9th and after 1500. Shore based planes between those two hours.

LKNAY's 051046 (pink) advises JINSAW that he will arrive at CAGA at 061034 CDT.

ARKLD 042253 (pink) advises MacArthur that the 5th Bomber Command has been instructed to perform a special reconnaissance of the JINSAWA-LINC area.

CTF 77 05054 (pink) states that early information of the present location of the enemy force which departed CAGA I.A. area on 30 December is critically important and further states that the primary mission of the submarines in the SWPA is to prevent the undetected approach of this force into the PHILIPPINE area.
TOP SECRET

5 January (Cahnu date)

FC 103A 3rd-4th: In attacks on 3rd and 4th by TF 38 on the 3rd and 4th extremely adverse weather was encountered. Enemy air opposition was feeble. Further comments, "Kips unwilling or unable to meet challenge." Force was snooped but no attempt was made to attack TF 38.

The following results are reported:

- Enemy planes destroyed: 111
  - (10 airborne, 91 on ground)
  - Enemy planes damaged

- Our plane losses: 14
  - (17 combat, 17 operationally)
  - Our personnel missing: 1

- Enemy ships sunk: 10
  - (1 large, 12 M, 1 medium, 1 small)
  - Enemy small craft sunk

- Enemy ships damaged: 47
  - (1 large, 1 M, 6 P, 1 large, 2 M, 1 medium, 34 small)
  - Enemy small craft damaged

Ground destruction included 11 locomotives, 90 tank cars, several freight cars and gas trucks, 1 railway car, 38, 423 warehouses, docks, ammunition dumps, fuel dumps, etc, rockets, and strafing damaged hangars and other installations, factories, fuel and ammunition dumps, and roll-in stock.

Con3rdFlt estimates that there were 750 planes of all types on POMOSA before the strike on the 3rd. He reports the locations of 519 planes (including trainers) photographed on the 3rd. 50 were seen on OKINAWA and LEGEND (125 miles east of POMOSA).

TG 94.9 (Cruisiv 5 plus 6 DD's) bombarded the KMM and I.J.A on the 5th. The force approached from the S, turned closed in weather. A 260 foot M was intercepted and sunk 40 miles west of TAKA JIMA. Visibility was poor hence the 4 hour bombardment was conducted by radar. Flaming (30-34) received the small caliber hit near waterline. B-47 TWAIR (54-551) was also hit probably by a mine flooding some forward compartments.

In the second phase, the bombardment of LEGEND began at 1500 K. Targets were chiefly coast defenses and 27 batteries. The G's fired for 1/2 hour on the air strips; many fires were reported as being observed and no damage to our ships in this phase was reported. Upon completion of the bombardment the force was scheduled to retire to OKINAWA.
TOP SECRET

5 January (Cahu date) (Continued)

Forces of the "Forward Area" landed on 1.1. on the northern of 1 January. No evidence of its use as a base by enemy submarines or warships was discovered. Only a few were on the Island.

The movements to the ILHON area are being conducted on schedule, however, there has been considerable air opposition. CTF 77.2 (Vadm Oldendorf) reports 12 ships being hit by suicide bombers between the hours of 1500 (1/5) and 1600 (1/6) at which time one unidentified ship was sunk and 9 seriously damaged. Specific damage was reported as follows:

R.S. ABADAC (PB-40) - hit on bridge; all casualties 20 hit.
M.K. (DD-723) - plane crashed into after part of turbine.
A.H. WILLIAM (DD-692) - hit aft, and after 2 minutes sank.
R.P. LEARY (DD-664) hit forward.

I.C.G. (DE-12) and BUCKS (APD-16) - both hit, the extent of damage unknown.

On the 6th TF 38 planes maintained a continuous target raid over the ILHON fields from prior to down to after sunset. The procedure will be carried out again on the 7th.

CTG 77.2 060614 outlines in some detail the damage inflicted by suicide attacks on the force proceeding to ILHON.

CTF 77 060934 (pink) requests 3rd Filt to request strikes and continuous CAP over ILHON fields on 7 January (1-2).

CONF PLTLT's 052203 (pink) States that request appearing above will be carried out.

5TH FIGHTER CDO 044609 (pink) states that 3rd Convoy cannot be covered from LANTO the 31st Bomb. Inc. and 42nd Fighter Command will cover forces from 1600.

CCMAAPJPA 051605 (pink) advises interested stations that 3rd Fleet will be operating 10-30 N on January 5th. PKO states that Allied air force plans will not cross the FE11 - BAGABAG - CFS 3rd ILEHON line except in an emergency.

TF 92 completed bombardment of JURU on the 5th. Air was observed and no damage reported inflicted on warships. This TF (CruDiv 1 plus escorting destroyers) is retiring to W.T.
TOP SECRET

6 January (Cahul date)

TF 38 is refueling on 8 January (I) after having hit \textit{LPH} for 2 days in a row.

CTG 77.2 (Vadm Oldendorf) reports 9 additional ships hit on the evening of the 6th.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Lincolnia} (50-44)
  \item \textit{Sulphur} (1A) hit twice
  \item \textit{Louisville} (3A-23) hit twice
  \item \textit{Baltimore} (3L-50) hit twice
  \item \textit{Lowry} (BB-72)
  \item \textit{Casablanca} (BC-7)
  \item \textit{Korea} (CVE-49)
\end{itemize}

CTU 77.2 (Vadm Stump) reports that the \textit{Lima} was damaged by 2 suicide bombers at 1745 on the 6th. \textit{Bullfrog} was also hit by a suicide bomber wrecking all her radar but no damage to personnel. Casualty reports on the \textit{Lima} to date are 5 killed, 5 missing, 25 seriously wounded and 53 minor wounds.

The \textit{New Mexico} (CB-40) was hit on the morning of the 6th on the port navigating bridge by a plane believed to be a Lily. Reports indicate that 4 officers were killed and 29 enlisted men killed and 130 injured.

CTF 77.2 (Vadm Oldendorf) reports that operations of the 7th were carried out on schedule with slight enemy air opposition.

Sin) east Indies states that a landing was made at \textit{Kim}, as planned on the evening of 3 January. No opposition was encountered and the occupation of the island was completed that evening.

Results of the raids by TF 38 planes on the 6th indicate the following:

- 8 of 13 airbornе enemy planes were shot down.
- 19 destroyed on the ground.
- 14 damaged on the ground.

Com 3rd Fleet comments that many operational aircraft were present but were difficult to find because of the large number of ships, bad weather, and careful dispersal. Photographs taken by the \textit{Joe 6th showed 237 apparently operational planes on 14 January, 1/2 of which 123, more than half, were at Clark. Another 13 were at Clark on the South, and 32 and the other 83 at \textit{Kim}. Visual coverage of the other fields indicated very few planes present.

CTF 77 (Vadm Link) 061824 requests 3rd Fleet to cover as many airfields as possible in the LPH area and further requests giving consideration to moving 3rd Fleet east to the PHILIPPINES.
6 January (cont'd)

6. INFA 031212 sets forth composition of arrival through 7.

7. CP 77-2 6000 (pink) outlines results of losses incurred on our forces on the 7th.

8. CP 77 072912 (pink) covers employment of 21st Fleet in CP 77-1.

9. CP 77 072932 (pink) outlines possibility that major portions of 21st Fleet is at sea to westward of 140°E. We will arrive in USS will the morning of the 8th or possibly the night of 7 - 8th.

10. CP 77 073007 (pink) requests major decisions on the date to for 21st Fleet to be diverted to strike airfields on 140°E instead of 135°E.

11. CP 77 073014 (pink) outlines his estimate of the situation prior to the 8th.

12. CP 77 073107 (pink) outlines his estimate of the situation and covers contemplated installation of shore based air subsequent to capture of HINNOY air.

13. CP 77 072914 (pink) states that 20th Bomber Command will attack HINNOY airfields instead of HINNOY airfield as requested by AAF and that strikes will probably take place on 9 Jan instead of on the 8th as originally scheduled.

14. CP 77 072914 (pink) states that subsequent to 9 January both 20th and 21st Bomber Commands will be prepared to perform photographic reconnaissance upon request.
TOP SECRET

7 January (Oahu date)

The landings in LINGAYEN GULF area are scheduled for the morning of 9 January (I).

Additional information has been received relative to suicide tactics on our forces:

SOUTHARD (DMS-10) hit.
BRICK (APD-10) reported hit yesterday was taken under tow and is now in hands of salvage party.
APACHE (ATF-67) minor damage.
MINNEAPOLIS (CA-36) superficially damaged.
HELM (BB-35) superficially damaged.
STAFFORD (DE-411) heavily damaged before arrival LINGAYEN.
AUSTRALIA (CA) hit twice more.
CALIFORNIA (BB-44) reported hit yesterday received her hit on the mainmast tower knocking out her after sky control station, secondary radars, 5" mount, #4 out of action as result of hit from one of our own ships.

Reconnaissance was made by underwater demolition teams and no underwater defenses or mines were found in the landing area. All approaches are reported as being equally good. There is a moderate surf.

In the LUZON area on the 6th heavy attacks were carried out. 54 B-24's attacked field targets in the area; an undetermined number of P-38's, A-20's and F4U's made the attacks (probably 100 planes).

On the 7th CVE planes operating in the LINGAYEN area flew 65 VF and 66 VT sorties expending 49 tons of bombs and 178 rockets. 1 TBF was lost.

LEMA 070719 (pink). The 20th Bomber Command mission against SHINCHIKU has been delayed to 9 January.

CINCPAC 072207 (pink) expresses concurrence in both 3rd Fleet and CinCSWP's estimate of the situation which was requested by him.

CINCPAC 072241 (pink) states that CombatDiv 7 (RAdm Badger) in the INDIANA, will arrive SAIPAN 20 January and carry out surface bombardment on IWO JIMA shortly thereafter. Upon completion INDIANA proceeds ULIHTI.

CINCPAC 072326 (pink) concurs in Arnold's recommendation to strike SHINCHIKU instead of KEELUNG HARBOR.

COMFWDAREA 072351 (pink) suggests continuous mining of CHICH JIMA and HAHA JIMA, since most mines already laid have been swept.
TOP SECRET

7 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

COMNAVGRP CHINA 080440 (pink) states that shipping is following close inshore on the Asiatic Coast and recommends that submarines take over blind bombing zones in which they can effectively operate as the 14th Airforce is not considered a serious threat in this area.

CTG 77.2 072046 (Adm Oldendorf) (pink) covers sweep up of bombardment group for operations on the 7th.

8 January (Oahu date)

Strikes by planes of TF 38 were carried out against YOKOSUKA 9 January. No air opposition was reported to have been encountered. The northern searches and strikes on CHICHOW and KAIFENG were cancelled due to unfavorable weather conditions. Only one snooper reached the force and he was not bombed by the combat air patrol. Out of 100 planes dropped on 22 bombs definitely destroyed and 17 damaged. In addition 11 small ships and luggers were sunk and 19 additional items (from TF 38) were damaged.

IVRON - 6th and 7th: TF 38 planes dropped 111 bombs:

Destroyed
- 13 airborne planes
- 93 on ground

Damaged
- 117 plus other possibilities

Ground targets: RR, trucks, barracks, fuel trucks.

Our losses:
- 15 planes combat
- 30 planes operationally
- 25 pilots missing
- 6 aircrewmen missing

CVE planes used 98 tons of bombs and 114 rockets in attacks on ground objectives in the area of LUSHIKE. All, 10 planes were lost, and 2 enemy planes were destroyed. Heavy fire was done to ammunition, fuel, and supply dumps, to vehicles and gun emplacements, to barracks and other buildings, and to trench systems. Recce flights on the 6th from IVRON. No sign to detect enemy troop movements gave negative results. Total sorties were about 500.
TOP SECRET

8 January (Cahus date) (Continued).

During bombardment operations in LINE (0-18) on 7 Jan.,
fighter direction assisted in the shooting down of 15 planes,
at least 9 by visual fighter direction.

On the 7th Clark Field was attacked by 46 I-180's on 7 Jan.,
destroying or badly damaging at least 60 planes. It is reported
the target, plus 2 A-20's missing and 1 A-20 shot down.

On the 9th TOKYO area was bombed by 72 B-29's of the 31st
Bomber Command. 14 of these planes, however, returned early;
results are not yet known but reports indicate that 1 plane
out of the 72 failed to return from this strike.

Operations on the 9th continued according to plan in TOKYO
area. The CALLOUXY (AFA-15) was hit by a suicide plane resulting
in 16 casualties (6 dead and 10 critically injured). 1 I-180
was hit by another suicide plane with minor damage inflicted.
(4 dead and 4 injured).

COMNCPIT's 090004 (pink) states that 1st Marine ETO
placed in effect. (Operations in FJETTY CUIKINASA).

COMNCPIT's 090014 (pink) directs TF 7100 to assist 31st
Group to proceed through UMICHE MACHINE on the night of 9-1.
January for about 5 days operations in the EJETTY area.

MACARTHUR'S 091101 (pink) requests 20th AAF to attack
targets in the KOJOJ area 3 day through 7 plane within
limits of their capability.

CENTAF's 071842 summarizes possible reaction to the
suicide bomber attacks.

CENTAF AAF 090401 requests strategic air recce to
conduct early photo recce of TOK and to prepare to conduct
fighter bomber strikes against air facilities with particular
attention to TOK airfield.
9 January (Oahu date)

The landings in the Lingayen area appear to have been made on schedule with casualties reported exceptionally light.

Com7thFleet reports additional damage to 3 ships which were hit on the 8th and 9th (1). KITKUN BAY (CVE-71) was hit by a suicide bomber and holed below the water line resulting in the loss of power. This CVE is now enroute to LINGAYEN under tow.

COLORADO (BB-45) was hit by a 15" projectile (special fuze) dropped by a plane off her port quarter. 6 officers and 12 men are reported killed and many others wounded. Most of her AA control equipment is reported out of commission.

COLUMBIA (CL-56) was hit for the 2nd time.

CTF 77 (VAdm Kinkaid) reports the formation of the LINGAYEN DEFENSE FORCE. This force consists of bombardment group, TG 77.2, (VAdm Oldendorf), close covering group TG 77.3 (RAdm Berkey) and the CVE Group TG 77.4 (RAdm Jurgen), all under the command of VAdm Oldendorf. This force is assigned the task of protecting in, approaching and departing from, LINGAYEN GULF from attack by enemy surface force.

Com3rdFlt is observing radio silence but is believed to be carrying out Plan GRATITUDE and approaching the SOUTH CHINA SEA on schedule.

Photo recco on the 8th Cape ST JACQUES showed 70,000 tons of merchant shipping. 14th Airforce reconnaissance of this port on the 9th, however, showed only 5 ships in the anchorage.

On 11 January (KLD) CruDiv 5 and 4 DD's are scheduled to depart ULITHI and proceed to a point some 350 miles east of LUZON to act as a covering force for the slow oilers operating in that vicinity.

PUFFER (SS-268) reports sinking 5 ships out of a 10 ship convoy northeast of FORMOSA on the morning of the 10th. 1 of these 5 ships was a large DD.

PIRANNA (SS-389) reports scoring 2 hits in each of 2 unidentified ships south of KYUSHU on the night of 9-10th.

CAVALIA (SS-244) sank 2 small ships off western HOKAGO on the night of the 5th.

BELUGO (SS-321) sank a large loaded tanker on the 6th off the eastern coast of MALAY.

CINCPAC's 100825 (pink) requests clarification of ComPhibsPac 092220 and 100825 relative to the responsibilities to be assumed by ComFwdArea in protection of ships of Joint Expeditionary Force.
9 January (Oahu date)

COMINCH & CNO 082055 requests report be made on employment of Civilian Internes on S.I.PAC.

CTF 77 090852 outlines the organization of the LINGAYEN Defense Force.

CINCPOA 091109 directs ComAirPac to submit specific reasons for the relief of Carrier Captains.

CINCPOA 092131 concurs in the establishment of Western Pacific Base Command.

MEWSTAF 5TH AF 100849-1 summarizes the estimate of the tropical storm currently centered east of L.Y.T.Z.

CTF 77 091218 outlines results of the S Bay landings.

CINCPOA 092306 (pink) addressed to MacArthur indicates concern relative to readiness of 24th Corps for the ICBMAG Operation.

CINCUSPA 081321 (pink) outlines readiness date of certain units.

10 January (Oahu date)

The 3rd Fleet was maintaining radio silence but planes from TF 38 are scheduled to strike shipping in the LINGAYEN BAY area the morning of the 12th (I).

Com7thFlt reports satisfactory operations in the LINGAYEN area on the 10th, landing operations proceeding on schedule. The surf conditions have been somewhat poor, which has resulted in the slowing down of unloading.

Additional damage to our ships has been reported:

DUPAGX (APA 41) hit by suicide plane resulting in minor damage.

KADASHAN BAY (CVE 76) cause and extent of damage not known.

WAR HAWK (AP 168) moderate damage from an underwater explosion.

LST 925 and 1025 - minor damage

ROBINSON (DD 562) superficial damage.
10 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

There was little enemy air opposition, but ships in the anchorage area were attacked by 6 small boats, 3 of which were sunk. Several swimmers with pistols or grenades were captured or killed.

The first echelon departed the LINGAYEN area on the night of the 9th and consisted of one damaged CVE, 3 damaged cruisers, 40 transports of various types and escorts. A typhoon is centered this morning (12th M/L) at 9-30 north 17-30 east moving on course 290 at 11 knots.

QUEENFISH (SS 393) reports 7 ships out of an 8 ship THIRDS bound convoy were sunk in a coordinated attack with the BRIDE (SS 220) and PICUDA (SS 382) west of FORMOSA during the night of 8-9 January.

In the LUZON area on the 9th 180 medium, attack, and fighter bombers from MINDORO and LEYTE attacked various targets in the central LUZON plain area causing extensive damage to sundry mobile units, bridges, etc. On the 10th in the LUZON area 24 B-24's dropped a number of tons of bombs scoring 50 hits on the GRACE PARK air field north of MANILA.

CTF 77 reports that damaged carrier planes have been landing on the LINGAYEN strip and that enemy air opposition was negligible on that day.

At FORMOSA on the 9th 39 B-29's from the 20th Bomber Command hit KEELUNG Harbor (Northwestern tip of FORMOSA). There were no plane losses and no personnel casualties resulting from this attack.

DEFCOMAF 20th AF 100215 states that BomCom 21 will strike principle air installations of OKINAWA between the 12th and 14th.

MACARTHUR's 101447 states that BomCom 26 has been directed to neutralize air installations on FORMOSA during period 10 through 17 January.

CHUNGKING's 110504 requests clearance from CInCPac to lay mines in the CAMBODIA BAY area. This to be carried out by 14th AF.

CinCPAC's 110216 discusses release of Pacific Fleet units subsequent to M-1 operation.
TOP SECRET

11 January (Oahu date)

Com3rdFleet reports that poor weather prevented great damage to shipping in his PULKA strike on the 9th, but that the enemy air had been smothered. TF 38 and TG 30.8 entered the CHINA SEA undetected. 3 Jap transport planes enroute 1100 to FORMOSA were shot down by night fighters. Two oilers collided while transiting BALINTANG STRAIT, but the fueling rendezvous was effected on time and fueling was completed the morning of the 11th. One task group augmented by fast BB was advanced toward CAMARANH BAY at high speed, covered by CA. From other groups. At 1630, J JAKES were shot down near this force, apparently before the reported it. Searches were launched at 2000/112. Apparently the force was still undetected, for a later report originated at 1131/12 states that planes were attacking the INDO-CHINA coast from SAIGON to CAPE SAHOI; that complete surprise was effected, and that air opposition was negligible. ISE and HYUGA were not located.

In a message sent at 2000/12 Com3rdFleet reported attacks still in progress. Several convoys plus scattered shipping were subjected to persistent and devastating attacks at SAIGON, CAMARANH BAY, and along the INDO-CHINA coast. 25 ships including a CL and several DD and DE were sunk, 13 others were seriously damaged. Air opposition was light; 39 planes were destroyed. The CL was the largest combatant unit sighted.

The task force is due to fuel today. CINCPac directed Com3rdFleet to cover the LINGAYEN-MINDORO area.

Com7thFleet reports the arrival of the reinforcement group and the landing of 158th RCT and 125th Inf. Div. on the 11th. Returning echelons are apparently departing on schedule, i.e. on S, S plus 1 and S plus 2 days both slow and fast groups have departed. Destroyers from TG 77.7 sank or damaged 20 to 25 barges and a freighter unloading at San FERNANDO.

SOPA ULITHI reports that MAZAM (AE9) while at anchor in ULITHI at 0700K/12 was torpedoed in the bow. There was no fire or explosion, and, while the ship is flooded forward, she is in no danger. Local escorts are searching, and there are so far indications of 1 midget sub in the anchorage.

On the 12th, planes from TF 38 attacked targets on the FRENCH INDO-CHINA coast from SAIGON to CAPE SAHOI. Complete surprise was achieved. Preliminary report indicates that 25 ships were sunk including 1 MATORI class CL and several DD-DE. 13 other ships were seriously damaged. Report states that no ships larger than CL referred to above were seen. 45 planes were
11 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

destroyed, which includes 3 transport planes and 3 float planes shot down enroute to the target. There were 18 airborne planes over SAIGON (the only air opposition) and 10 of these airborne planes were shot down. 50 planes were sent on the ground at TAN SON NHUT Air Field near SAIGON and 8 of these were destroyed. 20 seaplanes and flying boats were destroyed at CAMRANH, QUI NHON and CATSLAI seaplane bases. No damage was inflicted on our surface forces.

47 B-29's carried out a raid on the SINGAPORE area on the 11th. Raids were carried out by the 20th BomCom. 22 bombed the SINGAPORE docks and 14 bombed other targets in the MALAY area. 20 to 30 interceptors appeared, resulting in the loss of 4 enemy planes and 11 damaged. 2 B-29's are missing and 4 others were believed to have landed at other friendly bases.

ComGenPOA's 110548 requests information relative to availability of certain units for employment in the iceber operation.

CTG 77.2 111031 sets forth ComBattion 1's Op'lon 1-45.

CTG 77.2 111657 sets forth Annex B of Battle Plan B (night battle plan).

CominCh 121241 suggests that arrangements be made to employ the 3rd Fleet in a position west of LUZON STRAIGHT.

Com3rdFlt's 112239 sets forth the alternate 3rd fleet exit plan from the CHINA SEA.

Com3rdFlt's 112241 outlines results of the strikes on FORMOSA on the 9th.

MARSHALL'S 112206 states that joint combined staff decision requires 97th and 86th Infantry Divisions to be diverted to another theater.

CinCPOA's 121607 requests CinCSWPA and DepCom 20th AF to extend searches so as to cover Cape St JACQUES to SINGAPORE.

CinCPOA's 121606 requests 3rd Fleet to operate west of LUZON.

Com3rdFlt's 121941 pink outlines his employment of the task force in the CHINA SEA and states that he will be able to remain there (CHINA SEA) until 23 January.

CTG 77.2 111611 sets forth Annex A of Battle Plan A.
TOP SECRET

12 January (Oahu date)

Reports from Com3rdFleet indicate that bad weather slowed fueling of the task force on the 13th and also prevented complete searches. Fueling and searches are reported as continuing today in the vicinity of 18 North 114 East.

Additional damage from suicide planes in the Lingayen area covering the night 11-12 follows:

- Bicknap (APD 34) - heavily damaged.
- Gilligan (DE 508) - superficial damage.
- R. W. Sukesens (DE 342) - superficial damage.

A relief oiler group consisting of 7 AOs and 2 CVEs that have been operating east of the PHILIPPINES has been ordered into the SOUTH CHINA SEA. They will arrive off Leyte afternoon of the 14th, pick up 2 3rd Fleet oilers already stationed there, transit Surigao Strait and arrive off Mindoro morning of the 16th where they will join the oilers of TG 30.8 which have refueled TF 38. The empty oilers will then return to Ulithi via Surigao Strait.

Balao (SS 285) reports sinking a large tanker with 7 hits. She also sank a small sailing vessel.

Continued air attacks on ground objectives by the shore based air force are being carried out in the Luzon area. Cumulative figures since the Lingayen operation commenced show the following destruction inflicted on mobile units:

- 26 locomotives.
- 309 railway cars.
- 390 trucks.
- 8 tanks.
- 11 armed cars.

Approximately 30 B-24's have been hitting Iwo Jima every day for the past few days. Each plane appears to carry approximately a two-ton bomb load.

Photographs taken on the 12th indicate that all runways on both Iwo Jima air fields continued to be operative, with a maximum of 10 operational aircraft present.

Final results of the strike on Iwo Jima by planes of TF 38 follows:
TOP SECRET

12 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

Enemy planes destroyed..........................42
Enemy planes damaged...........................61
Enemy ships sunk......................................15
   (2 DD or DE, 1 large AO, 1 large AK,
    2 medium AK, 9 small ships)
Enemy small craft sunk..............................18
Enemy ships damaged...............................62
   (3 AO, 5 large AK, 3 medium AK, 1 DD,
    5 DE, 45 small ships)
Enemy small craft damaged..........................42

Our losses in this strike were 10 planes, with 5 pilots and
8 aircrews missing.

The first strike on FORMUSA was carried out the night of
January 11-12 by B-24's based at LETTE. 40 planes made the
attack on the HATO airfield. There was no opposition,
either fighter or AA.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 062231 covers request to S-2, REY to
photograph coverage of certain areas of the CHINA coast.

AAFPAC's 102302 covers the effort being made by S-2, REY to
support the 20th BomCom during period 10 January to 17
January.

MacARTHUR's 121252 relative to employment of 3rd fleet
in the protection of the LINGAYEN beachhead.

Com7thFlt 121415 covers OpPlan for M-6.

MacARTHUR's 301431 covers requirements for M-1 reinforce-
ment convoys and conduct of the M-3 operation.

CINCPOA's 130850 answers MacARTHUR's dispatch relative
to employment of 3rd Fleet units to cover the LINGAYEN beach-
head and discusses release of 3rd Fleet units at an early date.

MacARTHUR's 130215 requests Com Allied Air Forces to
extend searches to include the CAPE SAINT JAMES-SAIGON area
in an effort to locate the 2nd Diversion Attack Force.

CINCSWPA 131511 requests Com Allied Air Forces to extend
search sectors along the northwest coast of BORNEO-PALAWAN
with view of possibly locating the 2nd Diversion Attack Force.

DepComAF 20 132144 states that BomCom 20 will comply
with CINCPEAC's request to search the INDO-CHINA coast in an
effort to locate the 2nd Diversion Attack Force.
TOP SECRET

13 January (Oahu date)

Task Force 38 is operating east of MA'ANAN, scheduled to carry out missions against that target. No reports have been received regarding this strike.

Suicide attacks in the LINGAYEN area on the 12th resulted in damage to four ships. The SALAMANDER (YK 96) was hit by a plane which penetrated her flight deck. The after engine room was reported flooded but indications are that she can travel at 5 knots under her own power. 1 AAA and 2 liberty ships were also hit on this day.

Photographs of 8 FORMOSA air fields b. planes of the 20th BomCom showed 259 planes on the 13th.

The 20th and 21st BomComs were active on the 14th. 82 B-29's of the 20th BomCom were airborne for an attack on SHINCHIKU (northwestern FORMOSA). Preliminary reports indicate that instead of hitting the primary target the majority of planes dumped their bombs on the MGI air field, which was a secondary target. Cloud cover was 10/10, hence results were unobserved.

On the 14th 73 B-29's of the 21st BomCom took off for an attack on the MITSUBISHI Aircraft Factory. Preliminary reports indicate that 41 planes bombed the primary target, 6 visually and 35 by radar. No report of results has as yet been received.

CinCPUSA's 122013 requests ComGen U.S. Army Forces CHINA to support ICEBERG operations in accordance with Fivesome Agreement and to continue mining operations in the HONG KONG Harbor.

ComAirPac's 131938 discusses employment of certain carriers and suggests revision of current ASDIV organization.

[Signature]
14 January (Oahu date)

The 3rd Fleet reports that Task Force 38 was attacked on the afternoon of the 14th while fueling. Strike on FORMOSA, plus fighter sweeps on ANGYI, JAYAK, and HONG KONG, were scheduled for the 15th (1). Com3rdFleet reports bad weather, which probably prevented extensive damage to shipping concentrations which have been reported in the target area the past few days. A strike is scheduled by Task Force 38 on HONG KONG on the 16th and also a strike of HAINAN is likewise scheduled the same day. The force is scheduled to fuel on the 17th.

FRENCH INDO-CHINA - 12th (amplification): Com3rdFleet reports final results of the strikes and sweeps of 17-18 planes on the 12th:

- Enemy ships sunk..........................41 ships, 17,000 tons
- Enemy ships damaged........................28 ships, 79,000 tons
- Examples: An 11-ship convoy of 1 AC, 4 med. AL, 2 DE, 4 PC, total 17,000 tons, completely destroyed.
  A 19-ship convoy had 11 ships sunk and 8 others beached and damaged - typhoon balt. 50 per cent of ship destruction was substantiated by extensive photos.
- Enemy planes destroyed in air................16
- Enemy planes destroyed on ground...........77
- Enemy planes destroyed on water............26
- Total enemy planes destroyed................119

- Enemy planes damaged on ground.............50
  (Included in planes destroyed were 1. 41 of 23 reinforcing Bettyas and 25-30 T0jas and Oscars which arrived in time to be destroyed by the dusk target CAP. Many others from 45 twin-engine -- mostly transports -- and 29 single-engine seen at TAM SON NHUT.)
- Our combat plane losses....................16
- Our operational plane losses...............7
- Our pilots missing.........................14
- Our aircrews missing........................11

Ground damage included a long dock at SAIGON destroyed by torpedoes; 5 of 9 shell tanks at SAIGON; oil storage, buildings and warehouses, a seaplane hangar, and heavy damage to Texas and Standard Vacuum plants.

There was no damage to our surface forces and their withdrawal was not snooped.
TOP SECRET

14 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

Further reports on the strike against FUKUK by the 20th BomCom on the 14th indicate that 54 B-29's attacked the Iwai airdrome. Seven planes were destroyed on the ground and six were damaged. 69 planes were observed on the ground plus 57 dummy planes. Another strike on FORNOSA is scheduled by the 20th BomCom for the 16th.

TRUK was hit on the 14th by 42 B-24's. Direct hits were scored on the runways and dispersal areas of the north and south MOLEN airfields. Three enemy fighters were airborne but failed to attack. Shortly after the B-24's hit this target 10 P-38's carried out a fighter sweep in the TRUK area destroying two enemy fighters. One P-38 is reported missing from this strike.


DepComAF 20 142125 outlines to ANA/LO the present plans for development of air fields and facilities for the VMF's in the MARIANAS.

CinCPAO's 150021 (pink) requests clarification regarding assembly for staging of the 24th Corps.

CinCPAO's 150649 (top secret) requests CinCPACWesPac to allow Com5thFlt to send ships to CABIGUAN Bay after TAE JIMA operation to determine suitability for advanced anchorage during OKINAWA operation.

CTF 77 120730 (top secret) covers release of ships to the Pacific Fleet subsequent to M1 operation.

Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia Command 140030 (top secret) states that he has no objection to the 20th BomCom bombing and mining FORNOSA on 22 and 23 January.
TOP SECRET

15 January (Oahu date)

Com3rdFleet reports successful strikes on the South CHINA Coast on 15 and 16 January. The force was located on the 15th but on the 16th there were no snipers and no enemy attacks were made on the force. Incomplete results of the strikes on these two days indicate that 10 planes were shot down 18 destroyed on the ground and 16 were damaged.

Com7thFleet reports that unloading continues in the LINGAYEN GULF with little air opposition encountered.

CTF 94 (Vice Admiral HOOVER) reports that the PALACAO (DE 32), which made contact on a submarine between ENIWETOK and GUAM, probably succeeded in sinking it on the 14th. Reports state that oil is continuing to rise 30 hours after the attack.

63 B-24s, based both at PALAU and in the PHILIPPINES, attacked LUZON targets on the 13th and 14th. Considerable damage was reported as being inflicted. At BORACAYA attacks were continued on the 15th by B-24s. 14 planes made hits on the No. 1 air field and fires were reported as being observed.

CinCPAO's 130237 (pink) outlines approval for future employment of certain VLR wings in the NATURAL SHORE area and further authorizes another VLR wing to be employed on GUAM subject to availability of shipping and supporting service troops.

Com7thFlt's 121415 and Com7thFlt's 151018 (pink) outline changes to OpPlan 18-44.

Com3rdFlt's 160211 (pink) recommends to CinCPac that after fueling on the 17th he desires to move east of the FORMOSA-LUZON LINE in view of the fact that further offensive operations by Task Force 38 are not considered commensurate with the effort and risk involved.

CinCPac's 161836 (pink) proposes to direct McLANN to move eastward of LUZON STRAIT and strike enemy air force in FORMOSA and OKINAWA and requests concurrence of CominCH.

CominCH 162220 (pink) concurs in CinCPac's recommendation to direct Com3rdFlt to operate east of the LUZON-PALAU LINE.

ComGenAAFPPOA's 150102 refers to service troops to support VLR wings scheduled for Pacific operations.

CinCPAO's 151817 approves ComGenAAFPPOA's appearing directly above with certain attendant provisions.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for AIR, together with Vice Admiral FITCH and party, arrived PEARL HARBOR this date.
16 January (Oahu date)

Task Force 38 continues to fuel on the 17th and if undetected by the enemy will transit ILLOC STRAITS on the night of 17-18 January and will conduct strikes against FO.O.SA. on the 19th and will strike OKINAWA on the 21st or 22nd. Fueling operations will be carried out on the 20th.

ComNavgroup CHINA reports 3 large enemy convoys, one of 9 transports and another of 15 auxiliaries, along the CHINA COAST north of JAPAN and another transport group in the CHOSUN STRAITS headed northeast.

B-29 reports indicate that sightings were made in the KOBE HARBOR of 20 large ocean going vessels and similar reports of shipping in the OSAKA HARBOR indicate 45 large vessels (at least 10 of which appear to be large warships plus 1 CV).

Amplified reports from the 21st BomCom relative to the strike on the MITSUBISHI plant at NAGOYA on the 16th reveal that 40 B-29s attacked the primary target, dropping 94 tons thereon. 20 B-29s attacked the urban area. Airborne interceptors made aggressive attacks. 20 aircraft are reported as being destroyed, 14 probably destroyed and 31 additional damaged. Our losses were 34 personnel; damage to our planes not stated.

Two JIMA was attacked again on the 16th by 16 B-29s together with a P-38 escort. The P-38 escort was hampered by unfavorable weather and only two reached the target, one of which was ditched upon returning (25 miles northwest of SAIYAN).

CinC BPF 152201 (pink) covers the reporting for duty to CinCPac by Commander in Chief, British Pacific Fleet, in accordance with the Octagon decisions.

CinCPoa's 161837 (pink) recommends inclusion of LIDO ROADS in the mining plans for 25 January (20th BomCom).

CinC BPF 151234 (pink) outlines the organization of the British Pacific Fleet regarding nomenclature of units and authorities forming the task force.

CinCPoa's 170133 (pink) concerns information received regarding supply of petroleum requirements for the British Pacific Fleet.

CinCPoa's 162359 (pink) requests 3um3rdFleet to acknowledge his dispatch relative to immediate employment of 3rd Fleet.
TOP SECRET

16 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

Com3rdflt's 170243 (pink) schedules movements of Task Force 38 from 18 January to 22 January inclusive.

CinCBPAC's 160327 (pink) refers to supply of bulk petroleum products to British units operating in the Pacific and sets forth estimates of contemplated requirements for the month of April.

CinCSWPA's 150110 (pink) covers transfer of certain units in the SoWestPac area to the 24th Corps.

CinCIN 130939, 130956, 131024 and 131040 (pink) cover operations to be carried out against the PALM EANG refinery on 22 January and further cover dates on which British Pacific Fleet units will arrive Fremantle.

CTf 77 (Vice admiral KINCAID) 170432 (pink) outlines requirements for certain Pacific Ocean Area ships for employment in the M7 operation scheduled for 29 January and further requests retention in the SoWestPac area of certain fleet units.

CinCPac's 170305 (pink) covers requirements for combat employment of Marine aviation during the next six months.

17 January (Oahu date)

Due to heavy weather CTF 38 was unable to complete fueling on the 18th and plans to carry out operation plan "EXIT" which contemplates transit of JURIGAOG STRAIT instead of LUZON STRAIT as previously planned.

Allied Air Forces assumed responsibility for direct support of ground operations and protection of naval forces on the 17th. This releases 8 CVEs and escorts which left LINGAYEN the night of the 17th for ULISNI.

Troop and resupply echelons for Eastern LUSON and Western MARINDUQUE completed missions without enemy contact on 16, 17 and 18 January.

The results of air action in the PHILIPPINES are reported as follows:

LUZON (14th - delayed reports):
21 B-25s with P-51 cover striking MARAI destroyed 20 planes on the ground and shot down 2.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

17 January (Cont'd)

LUZON (Cont'd)

19 A-20s with P-47 cover hit TUGUIGARAO, south of A.A.M.I., destroying 3 planes and shooting down 1.
36 A-20s destroyed 35-40 planes on the ground in a low-level attack on Clark Field.
Palaau-based B-24s attacked CABANITAN Airfield, destroying buildings and causing many fires.
10 B-25s hit BATAAN Area, knocking out 30-40 trucks and 3 tanks.
23 Mindoro-based P-40s attacked railroad installations at Tarlac.

LUZON (15th):
Palaau B-24s hit Clark Field, causing fires.
P-40s attacked MANILA area, strafing 60-70 trucks and 6-8 tanks.
All types of aircraft continued attacking communications and transportation in the Bataan-ilioc area.

BUERTO PRINCESA, PALAWAN (15th):
25 A-20s bombed airfield, results unobserved.

BURNEO (15th):
33 B-24s bomb JERSEYTON Field.
9 B-24s bomb railroad yards.

ComNavGroup CHINA 170631 (pink) states that 11th Air Force will conduct maximum operations practicable during the SHIBO Operation and will continue the mining of HONGKONG Harbor.

MacArthur 171229 (pink) urges retention of six old battleships until the situation has clarified in the Luzon area.

MacArthur 171400 (pink) concerns present utilization of the 24th Corps at Leyte.

CinCSWPA 171535 (Pink) discusses the dates for return of CV's and escorts from Southwest Pacific Area to P0A.

CinCSWPA 180141 (pink) concurs in Vice Admiral Kinkaid's dispatch relative to returning certain fleet units in the Southwest Pacific Area.

Cinopac 180358 (pink) sets forth schedule for the release and retention of certain fleet units in Southwest Pacific Area.

Com3rdFleet 180947 (pink) states that 19 January will be the day for executing Plan "EXIT" (transit of Surigao Strait).

Com3rdFleet 181001 (pink) that refueling was hampered by severe weather and states that he expects to refuel on the 19th west of Luzon and will transit Surigao Strait shortly thereafter.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

17 January (Cont'd)

Cinopac 18187 (pink) suggests giving consideration to the
transit of LUZON STRAIT instead of SUHIGAO STRAIT.

Cominich 182120 (pink) concurs in Cinopac's recommendation
appearing directly above.

ComAFSWPA 162210 (pink) states that 5th Air Force FORMO
strikes have been cancelled for 16 January and will be positioned
indefinitely during establishment of Air Force in HINGAYEN Area.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 170349 (pink) covers the three phases
of ICEBERG operation and that pending further preparations for the
SUBLIKE Coast operation should be deferred but preparations should
continue for an operation in the CHUBAN-NINGPO Area.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 162254 (pink) covers redeployment of 16th
Bomber Command from CHINA bases to the MARIANAS and deployment of
the 7th Heavy Bombardment Squadron from INDIA to the 14th Air Force in
CHINA upon evacuation of the CHINGTU bases by the 26th Bomber
Command.

Cominich 301328 (pink) covers employment of tankers in the
Pacific Area.

18 January (Oahu date)

CTF 38 has cancelled plans to transit STRAIT and now intends
to transit LUZON STRAIT (BAINTAG Channel) on the night 20-21 Janu-
ary. Attacks are scheduled against FORMO on the 13th and 17th on the
23rd or 24th.

Revised figures have been received relative to the strikes on
HONGKONG and HAINAN:

Destroyed: 3 AK and 3 small AK
Damaged: 2 AK
1 large AP
4 AO (tor. edoes & bombs-AMOI)
9 small AK
1 DD, 5 JE
Plus many small craft

Intense, accurate AA - HONGKONG. High seas, and overcast.

B-29s from the 20th Bomber Command hit CHINCHI on the 16th.
78 planes bombed the target with a total of 505 tons.

In the PHILIPPINES unfavorable weather appears to have restricted
air operations to some extent. Enemy air attacks on our MINDANAO
and MINDORO positions were reported to have declined materially. The
LINGAYEN strip was being used by our fighters and transports commencing the 16th.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

18 January (Con'd)

CominCh 171916 (pink) authorizes Cinopac to establish a new flag officer command, subordinate command of Air Force, Pacific Fleet, in the forward area to be known as AirPac/Comford.

Com3rdFdt 181022 (pink) advises CinCSWA that unfavorable weather has caused 3rd Fleet operating schedule to be unrealiable and suggests that he continue his strikes dependent upon his capabilities alone.

CinCSWA 181231 (pink) grants authority for Com3rdFdt to investigate CASIGLUN Bay (16 N, 122 E - E. coast Russ). 

Com3rdFdt 190438 (pink) covers operating schedule from 19 January to 24 January.

Com3rdFdt 190910 (pink) sets forth his estimate of the general situation.

19 January (Oahu date)

TF 38 was scheduled to transit LUZON STRAIT the night of 19-20 and will operate in the near future eastward of the 100 W-LUZON line.

CTF 77.2 (V. Adm. Oldendorf), whose forces consist of 5 CB, 3 CA, 12 DD, covering SINAYEN GULF have been ordered to remain inside the Gulf prepared to sortie on short notice. Light covering forces continue to operate west of MINASAR.

On the 19th, 64 B-29s from the 21st Bomber Command bombed the Kawasaki Aircraft Engine Plant at AKA HII. Bombing was conducted from 26,000 feet and 640 500-lb. general purpose bombs were drop ed on the target. Huge fires and explosions were reported in the target area. Five enemy intercepting planes were shot down, 3 probably shot down and 3 damaged. No mention is made of any losses to blue planes.

MacArthur 191252 (pink) is in reply to a request by Halsey on relative to the withdrawal of Third Fleet units.

Cinopac 191729 (pink) concurs in Halsey's estimate of the general situation.

ComGenAPOA 200435 (pink) covers VLR Wing facilities at TINIAN and GUAM.

Cinopac 172233 (pink) points out that operations against enemy held positions in the ECHMALLS should be reviewed to making certain that expenditure of personnel, fuel and explosive are justified by the results to be obtained.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

19 January (Oahu date - Cont'd)

CinCPac 190158 (pink) authorizes release of the 49th Cont. Group from allocation to the Pacific Ocean Areas.

CinCPac 190308 (pink) covers CinCPac responsibilities for providing bulk petroleum requirements for the British Pacific Fleet.

CFI 77 200034 (pink) covers change No. 4 to OPLAN 12-44.

CinCSWPA 200535 (pink) outlines to CinCPac that the 24th Corps will be ready for OKINAWA to meet its scheduled date of 1 April.

20 January (Oahu date)

Task Force 38 made strikes on FORMOJA and SAKASHIMA GUNTO on the 21st. No reports have been received as to damage inflicted.

Incomplete reports indicate that the TIGOKARAKOSHI was damaged, however she is proceeding to ULITHI under her own power. All available tugs at ULITHI have been ordered to the fueling area, 20-30 N, 125 E.

A destroyer and cruiser sweep around SAKASHIMA GUNTO originally scheduled for 21 January was cancelled.

A report from the ZHULIN (APA 3) indicates that she was hit on 13 January by a suicide plane.

A strike is scheduled for 22 January by units of the British Fleet against PALAU BANG oil refineries.

Com3rdFlt reports numerous Japanese planes observed ferrying between FORMOJA and LUZON, majority of which were southbound. Ten of these planes being ferried were shot down.

Air activity continued on the 19th against IGO JIMA and CHICHI JIMA. 9 B-24s hit the former target and 7 B-24s bombed the latter target.

There was no enemy air activity over the LINGAYEN area for a period of 48 hours (17th to 19th). Air attacks by our forces continued in the LUZON Area. A number of planes were destroyed in sweeps over LAOAG, LIPA, LEGASPI and JARI CARGALING fields.

CinCPac 201817 answers CinCSWPA despatch relative to release of 2 damaged battleships for overhaul.

CinCPac 210156 (pink) answers CinCSWPA despatch relative to release of the 24th Corps for the OKINAWA Operation.
21 January (Oahu date)

On 21 January (HST) Task Force 38 attacked the enemy air force, shipping and installations in Formosa. Forty-three Japanese aircraft were destroyed in aerial combat, 97 were destroyed on the ground, and approximately 100 more were damaged in attacks on the airfields at Keito, Cheoshu, MAISONA, Hiko, Kofushu, Gitaru, Koshun and Takao. Intense antiaircraft fire was encountered at Takao. At Takao, two large ships and the docks and industrial area were left burning furiously. Considerable damage was inflicted on shipping at Keito, Tosihun and Han Wan in Formosa, at Makin in the Pescadores and in the Sakehima Islands.

During this operation the TICONDEROGA (CV-14), LANGLEY (CVL-27) and MADDOX (DD-731) were damaged.

Eleventh Army Air Force planes attacked Katakia Wan on the island of Result in the northernmost Kuriles.

Docks and buildings on Yap were bombed and small craft at Babelthuap were destroyed by aircraft of Fleet Air Wing ONE.

The Fourth Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft continued neutralization of islands in the Marshalls.

22 January (Oahu date)

Vice Admiral Oldendorf with CALIFORNIA (BB-44) and NEW MEXICO (BB-40) has left the Lingayen area for Ulithi. Rear Admirals Wayler and Sowell are remaining in MISSISSIPPI (BB-41), PENNSYLVANIA, (BB-38), WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48) and COLORADO (BB-45).

ComfDrFleet's 221010 advises completion of photographic strike on Okinawa and withdrawal toward Ulithi.

ComfDrFleet's 221545 reports damage to HANCOCK (CV-19) by deck explosion of a bomb on own airplane and advises 10 days required to repair HANCOCK (CV-19) and LANGLEY (CVL-27).

CinCPac's 222059 (pink) covers status Rear Admiral Hall at Wift.

MacArthur's 211541 covers modification of FILBAS Agreement concerning individual Army personnel.
TOP SECRET

29 - 26 January 1945 (Guam dates)

Preliminary report of 3rd Fleet strikes against FORMOSA on 21 January follows:

A3 planes shot down in the air.
97 - on the ground.
Substantial shipping damage at TOSHIEN, KEELUNG, AMOY, and SAKA-
SHIMA.
At TAIAN the docks and industrial areas were left burning furiously.
70,000 tons of shipping were estimated sunk.

On the 22nd strikes were again carried out on FORMOSA, resulting in the
colllowing damage:

27 planes destroyed on the ground and 41 others damaged.
1 medium AK exploded and 31 small vessels were sunk, plus 27 others
damaged.
Excessive damage was inflicted on buildings on IE SHIMA, and other
installations in the area were also damaged.

TIANGUANGSHA (CV 14) was hit by 2 suicide bombers on the 21st and 22nd. The
HANCOCK (CV 19) was damaged by an explosion of a bomb in one of her own planes.
Repairs are estimated to be completed in 10 days. The LANIGEY (CVL 27) also was
hit by a bomb and estimated time for completion of repairs is 10 days. The
MADDOX (DD 731) was hit by a suicide bomber.

Com7thFlt (VAdm Eismaid) announces the organization of a new heavy covering
group (TF 77.2) consisting of:

PENNSYLVANIA (RAdm Wayler, CTO)
MISSISSIPPI
WEST VIRGINIA (RAdm Sowell)
COLORADO
SHREWSBURY
PORTLAND
MINNEAPOLIS
and 12 DD

This group is charged with the defense of shipping in LEYTE GULF from surface
attack.

A coordinated attack (TF 23, 21st Bomber Command, and TG 94.9) against IWO
JIMA took place on the 24th. Spotting reports indicate that the ship bombardment
was successful. 3 small AX's were sunk, 1 plane was destroyed and 3 damaged. A
heavy weather front forced the bombardment group to break off after expenditure
of only 60 percent of allotted ammunition.

A hunter-killer group made a definite kill of an enemy submarine on the 22nd
west of ULITHI.

BARE (SS 220) reports 6 hits in a convoy anchored on the CHINA COAST north
of the STRAITS OF FORMOSA. 3 ships are claimed to have been sunk in this attack.
ComSubPac reports that GUARDFISH (SS 217) sank one of our own ships, the USS EXTRACTOR (ARS 15) at 232127 GCT at 15-44N, 135-29 E. (between GUAM and LUZON). Commanding Officer and 72 personnel were rescued; 0 are reported missing. The sequence of events leading up to this sinking is as follows: At 2117/23rd, GUARDFISH reported a radar contact on a small ship at 15-11N, 137-01E, and stated that she was tracking and requested information on possibility of its being a friendly submarine. At 0001/24th she gave her position, the course and speed of the target, further stating that she would maintain contact and attack "when positive of enemy character." At 0235 OTF 77 listed the friendly submarines in the vicinity and told the GUARDFISH that if she was in a Joint Zone, the contact, if a surface ship, was probably friendly. The sinking took place at 0627. ComFedArea has ordered a board of inquiry.

Strikes were carried out against IWO JIMA from the 20th to the 23rd by 80 B-24's attacking airfield installations. Enemy planes attempted to intercept on three occasions, with a total of 10 to 12 Zekes.

On the 21st an unreported number of B-29's escorted by 10 P-38's attacked TRUK meeting no enemy opposition.

On the 23rd an unreported number of B-29's bombed the MITSUBISHI Aircraft Engine Plant at NAGOSA. No details have as yet been received.

Com3rdFlt transferred command to Com4thFlt at 1400 GCT 26 January, and OTF 58 (VAdm Mitscher) relieved OTF 38 (VAdm McCain) at the same time.

ComGen BomCom 20 251115 (pink) outlines tentative schedule of 20th Bomber Command operations during the month of February.

Cominch & CNO 231341 (pink) proposes transfer of vessels under lend-lease to USSR in DUTCH HARBOR, or other base in that area, and requests ComNorPac's comment on feasibility.

MacArthur 240235 (pink) concurs in Cinopac 222059, designating RAdm James L. Hall as Senior Officer of the Pacific Fleet Present and Cinopac's representative on LAVLF.

JCS 251348 (pink) states that CHINA Theater support for IEEKEM will be as arranged directly between Admiral Nimitz and General Wedemeyer and authorises direct communication and exchange of liaison officers as necessary.

Cinopac and Cinopac departed for GUAM 26 January 1945.
TOP SECRET

27 January 1945 (Guam Date)

A report has been received regarding the damage incurred by the HAMCOCK (CV 19) on the 21st. Upon return from a combat mission a TEN was taxiing up the deck when a 500 pound general purpose bomb fell to the flight deck and exploded. An area in the flight deck some 70 feet by 50 feet received severe structural damage. 7 officers and 43 men were killed and approximately 80 others wounded.

PARCHE (SS 384) reports several hits in a large Tanker west of KYUSHU on the 19th.

SILVERSIDES (SS 230) reports two hits in an AI NW of OKINAWA.

On the 24th more than 120 British Carrier Planes attacked the Petroleum center at PALIMBANG (SUMATRA). No details of this strike have been received as yet.

On the 25th IWO JIMA was hit by 14 B-24's loaded with 100 pound bombs. Bombing was conducted at 18000 feet. Clouds prevented observation of results.

CominCh 261459 (secret) outlines proposal to assign Navy Air Groups to the flagship and Relief flagship and Marine Air Groups to the other 4 ships of the first 4 Divisions of COMINCHECK BAY (CVE 105) class carriers.

CinCSWPA 271407 (secret) covers coordination of operations of the 14th Air Force and the Allied Air Force during current operations.

MacArthur 253104 (pink) refers to return of APD's for duty in 5th Fleet.

Com5thFleet 253201 (pink) makes available certain surface ships to ComPhibPac for DETACHMENT Operation.

CinC BFP 260649 and 260737 (pinks) outlines readiness date of certain units of British Pacific Fleet (15 March 1945).

GO 10th Army 262113 (pink) outlines readiness date of 77th Division, 7th Division and 96th Division and further states that the 21 Corps will not be available for relief until arrival of American Divisions.

CTF 77 270156 (pink) outlines certain surface units to be returned to Cinopac for duty.

Cinopac and Cinopac arrived GUAM 27 January 1945.
TOP SECRET

26 January 1945 (Gum Date)

21st Bomber Command reports that 100 merchant vessels were sighted East of TOKYO on a course 90° (in several large V formations).

The Headquarters of the 5th Air Force, the 5th Bomber Command, and the 5th Fighter Command moved from LENTO to MINORO on the 27th.

CTF 93 (Lt. Gen. Harmon) reports that (26 January marked the 50th consecutive day IWO JIMA has been bombarded by the 7th Air Force Liberators, averaging 28 planes per day. Marine Mitchells on the same date completed 52 consecutive night searches of the BONINS-BATAAN area, averaging 3 planes per night.

80 B-29's from the 21st Bomber Command attacked MUSASHINO aircraft plant at TOKYO on the 28th. Reports indicate the destruction or damage of 75 enemy interceptors. 3 B-29's are reported missing. No further details have been received.

CNO to NAVOP/OL 231323 (secret) outlines the functions to be carried out by the Advance and Pearl Headquarters.

Cinopac 280040 (secret) states commencing 0000 OCT 29 January action will be taken by Advance Headquarters on all dispatches.

Com3rdFleet 280031 (pink) (Admiral Spruance) states that he will provide coverage of MARCUS, WOKAI, LAMOTHE and TRUX and further states that neutralization of these bases will be carried out by TF 93 as per his OP Order.

29 January (Gum date)

A landing was scheduled to be carried out on the 29th near the SAN ANTONIO Area in LUZON. No reports have been received as yet. Purpose of this landing is to endeavor to hinder any retreat that the Japanese might make on the BATAAN PENINSULA.

A diversionary attack is scheduled to be made in the UNISAN Area of southwest LUZON on the night of the 30th. 24 PT's and 24 LCI's will participate. After dark on the 30th they will move to the target area and conduct simulated landings at midnight on the 31st employing rocket shore bombardment and radio deception measures.

FIGUDA (SS 262) reports an attack on a 5-ship convoy on the 28th in the EAST CHINA SEA resulting in the sinking of a medium AK and damaging 2 others, either AP's or AK's. The BAAI (SS 270) at the same time attacked a northbound convoy in the same area obtaining 2 hits in an AK.

On the 28th 3 Marine PT's attacked a total of 4 DD's and 7 AK's in three groups north and south of CHIKI JIMA. 1 DD was hit twice on the stern and 2 explosions were observed. It appeared to be stopped and dead in the water. A second DD was hit twice, emitting fire and smoke and a third DD was slightly damaged. A medium AK was hit underwater. Search PT's were ordered to search for any cripples from these attacks.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

29 January (Guam date) (Cont'd)

On the 27th at SAIKON 22 B-29s from the 20th Bomber Command bombed the naval yards and arsenal dropping 66 tons thereon. No losses were reported of our planes and no enemy planes destroyed.

A British carrier force (composition not stated) struck the PALAMANG oil refineries on the 26th. Extensive damage was inflicted on the power houses, distilleries and distillation plants in the target area and further damage was inflicted on enemy intercepting planes. 13 enemy fighters were shot down in the air and 34 planes destroyed on the ground. British losses numbered 9 planes.

74 B-29s from the 21st Bomber Command were airborne for an attack on the Nusashiho Aircraft Plant at TOKYO on the 27th. Of this total 65 planes dropped 173 tons on the secondary target which was in the TOKYO harbor area. Enemy fighter opposition was heavy. Reports indicate that approximately 1,050 attacks were made by various types of intercepting fighters. 21st Bomber Command reports that 37 enemy planes were destroyed, 21 probably destroyed and 41 damaged. Our losses were 5 B-29s lost to enemy action and 2 others missing. One B-29 crash-landed at base due to damage from the enemy fighters.

CinCPOA 290831 (pink) covers arrangements for support of ICEBERG by the CHINA Theater.

AAFPOA 290535 (pink) refers to assignment of five Army Fighter Groups to the 20th Air Force.

Wedemeyer 270725 (pink) covers pending conference between Commanding General, CHINA Theater and CinCPOA.

30 January (Guam date)

There is only one report of the results of the landings in the SAN ANTONIO Area, which states that SUBIC BAY has been substantially cleared of mines, and that mine-sweeping operations will be finished today.

ComFleSat reports that CAVALIER (APA 37) was torpedoed off SUBIC BAY. The hit was aft on the port side; the ship is unable to proceed under her own power and is being toved to LEYTE. A preliminary investigation indicates 4 weeks at a Navy Yard are required for repairs.

21 B-24s hit IWO JIMA on the 29th with 425 tons from 18,000 feet. AA did minor damage to 5 B-24s and seriously wounded one airman. In addition, 33 B-29s were airborne from TINIAN for attacks on IWO JIMA. Of the 33 planes, 30 actually bombed the airstrip one and two resulting in heavy explosions. All planes returned safely, though one was damaged by AA fire. 3 FBNs report damaging 1 medium AK and 1 large AK from 2 convoys of 8 & 9 ships each, and possibly damaging a DE in the vicinity of the BONINS.

BOARDISH (SS 327) reports sighting 2 CL, 4 escorts and 2 escorting planes at 1700/30 off QUINHE on a southerly course, speed 20.

Joint Staff Planners 292045 (pink) states that alternate plans for the defeat of JAPAN under various dates for redeployment from EUROPE are now under examination. Also that Joint Logistics Committee is re-examining subject of availability of forces and resources after ICEBERG.

- Continued -
20 January (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CinCSWPA 300023 outlines modifications in composition of 24th Corps.

Cinopac 300613 (pink) requests confirmation of tentative plans for employment of the British Pacific Fleet in the ICEBERG Operation.

Wedemeyer 301331 requests concurrence in contemplated B-29 aerial mining of mouth of YAMOTZE RIVER west of 122 East Meridian.

21 January (Guam date)

Report from CTF 77 (V. Adm. Kinkaid) states that the M-7 landing was carried out successfully on the 29th without opposition. The scheduled bombardment of the beachhead was not carried out due to the fact that no opposition was encountered. Direct air support was provided by the CVE group, but no reports of air opposition have been received. Unloading was delayed somewhat due to the fact that there were no suitable beaches in the landing area.

The diversionary operation at UNISAN was completed the night of the 30th in accordance with the plan.

ComNavGroup CHINA reports that on the 30th 3 cruisers, 1 DD and 2 troop transports were sighted off Quinotoa headed north and 4 cruisers and 1 destroyer sighted headed south.

CTF 71 reports that PAROO (SS 264) scored a hit on a DD or CL with 3 escorts at 1700 I/31st.

HESUO (SS 321) reports results of wolfpack operations in the SOUTH CHINA SEA, BLACKFIN (SS 322) sank a SHIMO class DD and damaged a large tanker on the 24th. HESUO hit a medium tanker.

BARE (SS 316) submits a further report. Dispatched a boarding party who recovered charts and books of doubtful value, but did obtain Jap radio receiver and transmitter.

BERGALL (SS 320) off BRUNAI BAY sank two PEs unaided and obtained two prisoners. Two reluctant petrol vessels still in port.

28 B-29s in strike and snooper missions attacked IWO JIMA airfields on the 30th with 100 and 500-pound bombs. One of 3 intercepting Zekes was damaged. 5 of our planes sustained AA damage.

76 B-29s, carrying 6 to 8 mines each, were scheduled to mine the waters around SINGAPORE, SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, and CAMARINH BAY on the 25th. Secondary targets were PENAHO, MERCUI, BANGKOK, and TAVOY HARBOR.

ComFifthFleet 300840 (pink) directs that coverage of MARCUS, WOLEAI, LAMOTRAX and TRUK be conducted at irregular intervals, averaging approximately once weekly.

Cinopac 310212 (pink) requests estimated date of release of four battleships retained by CTF 77 (V. Adm. Kinkaid).
TOP SECRET

31 JANUARY (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cinsea 310724 (pink) concern efforts to be made to improve the runway at DWO JIMA as soon as possible for the operation of Navy search Liberators after provision of minimum requirements for fighter defense.

Cinsea 312305 (pink) concerns the assigning of NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON for bombardment of DWO JIMA and also authorizes an increase of the interval between the carrier strike on the Empire and the assault on DWO JIMA.

CominCh 311825 (pink) concerns allocation of British Pacific Fleet units to Pacific Ocean Areas control.

1 FEBRUARY (Guam date)

A landing was made on NASUCU in the BATAYAS PROVINCE on the 31st. No opposition was encountered at the beachhead and reports indicate that our forces are continuing inland.

SPEARS (AS 97), while at anchor at LUNGA POINT (GUADALCANAL), exploded on the 31st and sank immediately. Reports state that there are ten survivors from the ship. A submarine contact was made at the time of the explosion and indications point to the fact that the explosion may have been caused by a torpedo.

Reports from MacArthur indicate that our advance patrols are 28 miles from MANILA. Casualty reports have been received stating that on LEYTE as of 29 January 71,624 Japanese have been killed with 631 POW. Our casualties during the LEYTE Campaign are announced as: killed, 3,135; wounded, 9,865; missing, 160.

On the 31st, 20 B-24s hit DWO JIMA. Interception by 4 aggressive Zekes inflicted no damage. Photographs taken on this date showed 11 probably operational planes on airfield number 2. On the day preceding, 14 aircraft were photographed on the same field.

Two Marine PB4s made strikes on a BB 10 miles north of HAHJIMA on the night of the 31st.

CINCPAC 010309 recommends release date of 5 February for the 4 BBs assigned to SWPAC.

CINCGAPA 011243 requests information regarding Cinsea's proposal for the protection of the JIMA Area, and states that the release of the 4 old BBs should not be made until heavy bomber strength is installed in the CLARK FIELD Area, which time is estimated to be the end of February.

2 FEBRUARY (Guam date)

French sources report that 3 cruisers were sighted off the coast of QUINMON on a southerly course at 1600, 1 February.

SILVERSIDES (SS 234) reports sinking a large AK on the 25th west of KYUSHU.

THREADFIN (SS 410) reports sinking a small AK on the 20th near IJIE SAKI.

CINCPAC has formed a Wolfpack of 5 submarines to be stationed between FORMOSA and LUZON to intercept reinforcements or withdrawals from the LUZON Area.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

2 Febrary (Quar date) (Cont'd)

Reports have been received from the GHINA Theater indicating that the airstream at SUGENIA has been taken by the Japanese. The majority of 14th Air Force airfields in that area have been destroyed by our forces preparatory to withdrawal.

At DWO JIMA on the night of the 31st-1st 9 snooper B-24's bombed the dispersal areas from 10 to 15,000 feet. On the evening of the 31st and on the 1st 21 additional B-24's bombed the same areas starting fires visible for a number of miles.

At SAVAN on the 2nd a Kyt (carrier based reconnaissance plane) was intercepted and shot down by the Combat Air Patrol at 1025. This enemy plane was on course 340 when intercepted.

On the 31st at PALAU a total of 76 fighters and torpedo planes hit targets in that area on the 3 days - 31st, 1st and 2nd.

The British Carrier Task Force again attack oil installations in the PALAMBAN Area on the 29th, 100 sorties were flown against the targets and 24 fighters swept enemy airfields in the vicinity. Photographs show hits on a large cracking plant and extensive fires were reported to be spreading on withdrawal of the planes from the target area. 8 enemy fighters were shot down and British losses were 15 planes. However, 8 crews were reported to have been picked up.

CinCSWPA 010626 (pink) outlines the search plan and operations to be carried out in support of ICEBERG Operation by CinCSWPA.

MacArthur 010628 (pink) requests direct communication between Commander Allied Air Forces, SWPA and Commanding General, 20th Bomber Command during air operations supporting ICEBERG.

CinCSWPA 012240 (pink) concerns the substitution of the 5th PhibCorps for the 3rd PhibCorps for Phase 3 of the ICEBERG Operation. CinCSWPA flow from GUAM to Milwaukee broke his flag in the INDIANAPOLIS.

3 February (Quar date)

Seven submarine contacts have been reported in the last 36 hours. Contacts were made in the KINANAO SEA, between MANUS and LETTUS, south and west of ENIWETOK, and off NWALEIN.

CunthFleet reports that an attack was made on the SAM ANTONIO beachhead on the 31st by a group of enemy power boats. PC 1129 was sunk as a result of this action. No further losses were sustained. The enemy craft were either all sunk or driven off.

On the 2nd at DWO JIMA 20 B-24's dropped 45 tons of incendiaries on the area east of the number 2 airstrip. One of these airborne Zekes was damaged and 6 B-24's sustained slight damage due to AA and enemy interception. On the 3rd at DWO JIMA 12 P-38s and 3 P-51s covered DWO from low level, photographing in good weather. Automatic weapon fire was intense and accurate. 1 P-38 was lost, cause unknown, and 1 P-5l (photographic version of P-38) burst into flames over the target and was lost. 5 enemy planes were airborne but did not press their attack. Again on the 3rd at DWO JIMA 6 P-51s photographed the island in clear weather. 7 single engine enemy fighters intercepted, 3 of them were possibly damaged.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

3 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

At HANKOW on the 30th, 25 B-24s bombed the docks. 32 escorting fighters met no opposition. Amplifying report on the attack by B-24s of the 20th BomCom on SINGAPORE indicates that 110 B-24s took part this attack. 200 tons of bombs were dropped on the SINGAPORE area and 21 planes dropped 90 tons on GEORGETOWN (west portion of MALAY PENINSULA). 15 to 25 enemy fighters intercepted; 2 claimed destroyed, 6 probably destroyed and 8 damaged.

ConfIFP 260739 (pink) sets forth present composition of the British Pacific Fleet.

MacArthur 020094 concern requests for personnel relative to Filbas Agreement and authorises ComCom USAFFE to communicate directly with ComComPOA in certain specific cases regarding personnel.

DepCom 20th AF 030921 (pink) covers the schedule to be carried out by 21st BomCom in support of DEPLOYMENT Operation.

4 February (Guam date)

B-29s report heavy concentration of shipping in FUTAMI KO CHICHI (28-30 ships) and 50 ships, 10 of which were heavy, at 33-19 N 135-42 E (50 of OSAKA).

There is additional submarine activity reported in the vicinity of ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN. A merchant ship reported sighting and firing on a periscope at 10-19 N 164-17 E, and a submarine was reported by a transient plane in the same vicinity approximately an hour later. A plane observed an oil slick and made a definite contact with a submarine at 12-23 N, 155-33 E at 1630 MIEK time on the 4th.

Heavy strikes were carried out in the PALAU Area on the 30th, 75 planes attacking BABELTHUAP.

Fighters are evidently hitting FORMOSA from the PHILIPPINES as reports indicate that 9 enemy fighters were shot down on the 29th and 10 additional on the 30th.

Cinpac Adv. Eq. 040430 (pink) authorises WASP and ESSEX to sail with excess fighters for the next operation, but thereafter the excess fighter strength will be reduced in accordance with prior directives.

Cinacop returned to GUAM from ULITHI.

5 February (Guam date)

Reports have been received indicating that elements of the 1st Cavalry entered MANILA on the night of 3 February with little opposition encountered within the town itself. Our forces liberated about 800 military and about 550 civilian prisoners as well as many internes. Reports received indicate that up until 5 February, 1945 18,000 Japanese have been killed in the LUZON Area,

A photographic plane from the 20th Bomber Command reports having sighted 1 BB and a small CV in the SINGAPORE Area.

On the 4th and 5th at DRO JIMA 23 B-24s hit the airfield and surrounding installations. Bombing was carried out from 16 to 18,000 feet. 9 operational enemy aircraft were observed on the field. On the 5th, HAHA JIMA was bombed by 10 B-24s with results unobserved.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

5 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

On the 4th, 110 B-29s were airborne for an attack on KORE. 267 tons of bombs were dropped on the primary target (KORE) by 71 planes, and 26 other planes dropped 104 tons of bombs on last resort targets (other cities in the KORE Area). Enemy aircraft opposition was slight. No B-29s were lost over the target. 1 plane ditched on the way home due to fuel shortage. 10 of the 11 crew members were rescued. 3 enemy interceptors were claimed as having been destroyed.

On the night of 4-5 Feb. 3 B-29s bombed KORE visually. Results were undetermined due to the fact that large fires were reported as already burning.

ComGen BomCom 21 050712 (pink) outlines anti-nickel boat searches prior to the DETACHMENT Operation.

Cinopac 050746 (pink) concerns arrangement for facilities for 3 Marine Divisions in the PHILIPPINES Area and states dates at which time these divisions will move from the objective area to the PHILIPPINES.

Cominch 051255 (pink) applies to operational allocation of units of the British Pacific Fleet and further states that arrangements in connection with bases, anchorages, fuel, communications and intelligence will be handled by Cinopac in accordance with understandings previously reached.

Cinopac 061307 requests CinCSWPA to conduct reconnaissance of SINGAPORE SOUND to determine presence of enemy forces or installations and feasibility of use as a fleet anchorage.

6 February (Guam date)

A report from 20th Bomber Command states that photographs of the SINGAPORE area reveal a damaged NACHI Class CA in drydock at SINGAPORE, a damaged ATAGO Class CA in JOHORE STRAITS and many merchantmen and small craft.

SPADEFISH (SS 441) reports sinking 3 AK's and 1 PC in the YELLOW SEA on the 4th.

Six PB's struck FONAPE on the 6th dropping 16 500-lb bombs on the No. 2 airfield with 9 direct hits. Buildings and field installations were strafed.

On the 31st 24 B-24s, escorted by P-38s, struck FORMOSA resulting in the destruction of 25-30 enemy aircraft on the ground at HUTO airfield. On the same day, 12 other B-24s sank a DD, left another seriously burning, and damaged a third - all heading south for FORMOSA. Five Jap fighters covering this convoy were shot down, 24 B-24s hit FORMOSA again on the 1st causing fires and explosions at the TAINAN airfield and heavy damage at the TAINAN seaplane base. 16 to 20 planes were destroyed on the ground at OKAYAMA in another B-24 strike on the 2nd.

A single PB1 from LINGAYEN reports sinking a 1000-ton AK off ISHIGAKI ISLAND (E. of FORMOSA) on the night of the 5th-6th with 2 100-lb. hits and a straddle with 2 500-lb. bombs.

Cinopac 012254 (pink) requests concurrence in the proposal that certain arrangements involved in the NK-1 Agreement be made by Cominch rather than Cinopac. Also requests allocation of units of the British Pacific Fleet to operational control of Cinopac for ICEBERG Operation.

Wedemeyer 050720 (pink) sets forth the strategic and tactical phases of the current situation in CHINA and outlines projected operations by China Theater Forces.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET
6 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CinCEN 06075B (pink) requests CinCSWPA to return by 16 February the 4 battleships temporarily loaned to 7th Fleet in order to effect necessary repairs prior to employment in ICEBERG Operation.

CinCEN 060801 (pink) concerns policy of rotational changes in aviation flag commands.

7 February (Guam date)

Sightings reported by unknown originator include 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 1 tanker and 3 AK's at TAKAO, and a convoy of 2 large AP's, 2 cruisers and 3 DD's off QUINNOW headed south.

On the night of 6th/7th, TSUKESHI (SS 383) scored two hits in a large AK of a northbound convoy in the SOUTH CHINA SEA.

BARBEL (SS 316) failed to make rendezvous with two other patrolling submarines off PALAWAN, and has not been heard from.

On the 6th, CHICHI JIMA was bombed with incendiaries from 15,000 feet by 10 B-24s. A single enemy fighter took off from SUSAKI airfield, but failed to attach.

At INO JIMA on the 6th a strike by 14 P-38s, escorted navigationally by 3 B-24s, was turned back 100 miles short of the target by weather. 20 B-24s are scheduled to hit INO JIMA again on the 8th.

6 PB4s on the night of the 6th/7th attacked 2 convoys north of INO JIMA. The first convoy, consisting of 6 ships, course 205, speed 8, was attacked with rockets. A hit was obtained in 1 large vessel, other results were unobserved. The second convoy of 5 ships was attacked 250 miles north of INO JIMA, course 350, speed 10. 8 rockets were fired causing an explosion and smoke in a large vessel.

33 B-29s are slated to strike TRUK at 1030 K(-10) on the 8th with 165 tons of 500-1lb GP bombs from 28,000 feet.

In the North Pacific on the 6th, 6 B-24s, bombing by radar, attacked the KATAOKA naval base (SHIMUSHU) with 150 100-1lb bombs with unobserved results. There was no opposition and all planes returned safely.

B-29s of the 20th Bomber Command mined SINGAPORE waters on the 25th from altitudes of 2000-5000 feet, encountering only meager and inaccurate AA fire.

On the night of the 5th/6th 3 B-29s dropped 9 tons of fragmentation clusters on KOBE resulting in several large explosions and fires. On the following night, 3 B-29s bombing by radar dropped 42 GP bombs causing fires. No airborne opposition was encountered in either of these strikes.

CinC Eastern Fleet 050453 requests U.S. type helmets, telephones and oxygen masks be furnished British Pacific Fleet for use in conjunction with possible emergency employment of U.S. fighters aboard British carriers.

CinCSWPA 061815 outlines plan for initiation of Search Plan "J".

CinCSWPA 070403 (pink) covers schedule of operations by SoWesPac air forces in support of DETACHEMENT Operation.

CinCEN 070455 (pink) informs 5th Fleet of 21st Bomber Command strike schedule on TOKYO and NAGOYA areas during DETACHEMENT.
TOP SECRET
8 February
(Onu a r e)

13th Bomber Command reports having sighted an unescorted enemy aircraft carrier headed south in MAKASSAR STRAIT at 0150(I) on the 8th. Carrier was seen to be launching aircraft.

A preliminary evaluation summary of recent submarine contacts reported in the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS area includes 5 positive contacts, 1 probable and 1 questionable. Of the 5 positive contacts, 1 submarine is believed to have been sunk by surface craft with evidence of damage to three others.

PAMANEMO (SS 383) reports sinking large AK (previously reported as hit), and blowing up another ship loaded with ammunition or gasoline in the SOUTH CHINA SEA on the night of 5th/6th. From this same convoy, GUAVINA (SS 362) sank an AK.

17 B-24s struck IWO JIMA on the 7th bombing radio and radar installations and dispersion areas resulting in numerous fires and explosions.

6 tons of bombs were dropped on the airfields at PONAPE on the 8th by 17 F4Us and 1 B-25 scoring 10 hits on the new field and 16 on the old, both of which appeared inoperational. Buildings were strafed and 3 small boats were sunk.

At PALAU on the 7th and 8th 24 F6Fs and F4Us destroyed bridges, damaged a pier and started a number of fires.

3 B-29s dropped 10.5 tons of GP bombs on KOREE on the night of the 7th/8th with unobserved results.

CINCPAC 070308 (pink) requests Con7thFlt's concurrence in proposed conference for discussing use of LEYTE GULF facilities by British Pacific Fleet Service Force.

CINCPAC 070617 (pink) sets forth CINCPAC's appraisal of enemy naval capabilities in SoWesPac area.

Con7thFleet 080121 (pink) requests clarification of Con7thFilt responsibility and authority with respect to provision of naval shore facilities in SoWesPac for British Pacific Fleet and nature and extent of new construction to be undertaken for or by British Pacific Fleet.

CINCPAC 080314 (pink) directs Con7thFilt to return to MANUO by 16 February the 4 battleships temporarily loaned to 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC 080713 (pink) requests CINCPAC British Pacific Fleet to advise him of any desired arrangements for use of anchorages, shore facilities, fuel, etc. in order that such arrangements may be made in accordance with NF-1.

CINCPAC 072020 (pink) states that British Task Force will not be available for first phase of IJsselber Operation.
TOP SECRET

9 February (Guam date)

COOK INLET (AVP 36) reports attacking an enemy submarine on the morning of the 9th while enroute from PEARL to ENEWETOK. Results have not been reported.

HONOLULU (SS 396) reports sinking a large tanker near the BOMINS on the night of the 7th/8th.

On the 8th at WOJULIMA, 20 B-24s, bombing in two formations from 14,16,000 feet, dropped 38 tons on installations and dispersal areas, knocking out 1 AA gun position and scoring 100% hits in the dispersal areas. One B-24 was lost when it was rammed by an intercepting Zeke; both planes exploded. 3 other B-24s sustained minor damage. 10 additional B-24s snooped dropped 19.5 tons in dispersal areas and on airfield No. 2.

B-29s of the 21st Bomber Command attacked WOJULIMA Airfield in THUK Atoll on the 9th with 194 tons of 500-lb. bombs. No airborne opposition was encountered and all planes returned safely.

ATC, WASH., D.C. 081350 directs the establishment of overall policies and procedures with regard to operation and expansion of Oceanic Air Traffic Control Centers in the Pacific Area.

CINCINPHPA 090300 clarifies responsibility and authority of Commander Allied Naval Forces and CINCPAC in providing facilities and allocation of land areas for British Pacific Fleet.

CINCPAC 090525 (pinky) requests recommendations for assignment of carriers to night group and training duty during ICEBERG Operation.

CINCPAC 090706 covers movement of naval forces from LAYTE to ULIHITI and MANUS.

CINCPAC 090624 (pinky) reports results of informal investigation of alleged bombing of MACAO in neutral Portuguese territory.

10 February (Guam date)

Recent reports indicate increased transport movements in a southerly direction along the INDO CHINA Coast.

The 4 OBB remaining with 7th Fleet have departed LINGATEN for LAYTE from whence PENNSYLVANIA and 2 DDs will sail for MANUS; MISSISSIPPI, WORTH VIRGINIA, COLORADO and 4 DDs are ordered to ULIHITI — all to report to CINCPAC on arrival.

PARCHE (SS 384) reports sinking a small AK near AMAMI O SHIMA on the 7th.

BATFISH (SS 310) reports being attacked with torpedoes by BLUE planes in LUZON STRAIT. On the 4th, she attacked a Jap LCI 70 miles south of FORMOSA, and sank an LCI class submarine just north of LUZON on the 10th.

ComNavGroup CHINA states that Chinese near SHANTUNG PENINSULA report excellent results of submarine activity off the CHINA Coast, and further that the ports of KANKO and GENSAN seem gaining in importance as main shipping points to JAPAN, replacing PORT ARTHUR and Dairen.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

10 February (Guam date (Cont'd))

14 B-24s dropped 28 tons of fragmentation clusters on radio and radar installations northeast of the airfield at ENO JIMA on the 9th. 8 additional B-24s dropped 16 tons on defense installations and bivouacs north of SURIBACHI YAMA. 10 smoober B-24s dropped 21 tons on air installations at airfield No. 2 and on AA defenses. On the 10th fighters destroyed 4 Bettys and 3 Zeke's and strafed a DD. Low altitude photo coverage of two JIMA was completed. 1 P-38 was lost with pilot probably lost.

On the 9th, 4 rocket carrying F7s, meeting no fighter opposition, scored hits on radio installations and a lighthouse at KOKUTAN ZAKI (northern SHIMUSHU).

At FORMOSA on the 7th 5 pre-dawn B-24s caused many fires and explosions at TAKAO. Other B-24s struck HEITO airdrome, demolishing barracks and underground supplies and causing fires and explosions. 15 enemy planes were airborne but failed to attack. Escorting P-38s shot down 1 plane, destroyed many railcars and trucks, sank a coastal vessel and a barge.

DepCom 20th AF reports that B-24s on a shipping strike over south FORMOSA on the 7th shot down an enemy reconnaissance plane, sank a submarine, fired a sea-truck and destroyed an unspecified number of trucks.

Cominch & CNO 092141 (pink) informs CINC British Pacific Fleet that all logistic and administrative arrangements should be made with Cincpaci in accordance with NF-1 Agreement.

Cominch & CNO 092141 (pink) refers to Cincpaci for action 09217Fleet's 090121 requesting clarification of responsibility and authority for provision of facilities in SoWesPac for British Pacific Fleet.

CincSWPA 100850 (pink) concerns allocation of personnel and facilities in SoWesPac for use by British Pacific Fleet.

11 February (Guam date)

Numerous sightings, all in the general area between 140 and 142 E from 29 to 30 N, resulted from the picket-boat sweep conducted by 21st BomCom on the 11th. Reports included the following: 3 picket boats (course 300, speed 5); 3 small freighter-transport, 1 medium transport, 1 freighter, 4 escorts (course 290, speed 10); 2 small freighter-transport, 1 medium transport, 2 escorts (course 100, speed 10); 2 medium freighter-transport, unspecified number of cargo ships, 4 escorts (course 90, speed 12); 1 freighter, 2 escorts (course 300, speed 10).

BATFISH (SS 310) which previously reported sinking an I Class enemy submarine on the 10th, now reports sinking another on the night of the 11th north of LUZON.

6 Marine F7B's attacked a medium tanker at 25-30 N, 141-00 E on the night of 10th/11th causing 2 or 3 explosions. 8 explosions resulted from an attack on a stationary AR at 26-28 W, 140-50 E on the same night.

At NAHA JIMA on the 10th 10 B-24s dropped 10 tons of incendiary clusters on building areas in OKINURA TOWN with unobserved results. 1 B-24 was lost due to AA and 2 others slightly damaged. 1 survivor was picked up.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

11 February (Oama date) (Cont'd)

20 B-24s, escorted by 10 P-38s, struck IWO JIMA on the 10th. Except for destruction of 7 planes by fighters (previously reported) results of this strike have not been received.

On the night of the 9th/10th 2 B-29s bombmed the OSAKA Gas Company with 6 tons of bombs while a 3rd plane dropped 3 tons on the MITUBISHI Aircraft Factory at TOKYO. 2 B-29s bombmed the NAKAJIMA Aircraft Plant at OTA and the TOKYO Industrial area with 9 tons of bombs on the night of the 10th/11th. Bombs were seen to strike 1,000 feet to the right of the aircraft plant and fires were reported in the TOKYO area.

BEIJING STRAIT (AVP 34) reports rescuing 23 survivors of 2 ditched B-29s, and ROBERT H. SMITH (DNS 23) reports having rescued a part of the crew of a third plane returning from OTA on the 10th.

13 P-51s attacking TSINOTAO on the 10th report destroying 46 and damaging 52 planes on the ground. No AA and no air opposition were encountered.

CINCPAC 110043 requests CINC British Pacific Fleet to submit detailed requirements for berths and shore facilities at MAUS, and further informs him that arrangements for anchorages forward of MAUS are to be deferred until operational allocations of units of British Pacific Fleet are announced by COMINCH.

CINCPAC 110045 presents to CINCSWPA the proposed program of furnishing anchorage and aircraft facilities at MAUS for British Pacific Fleet.

COMINCH 110151 (pink) outlines procedure for assigning tasks ComNavGroup CHINA in participation of deception plan in such form that purpose is not disclosed to him.

12 February (Oama date)

Air Base Commander at KWAJALEIN has requested lost plane procedure of the Air Base Commander at JOHNSTON for a C-54 due at JOHNSTON at 1035 K(10) on the 12th. No further details are available.

At IWO JIMA on the 11th 21 B-24s dropped 47 1/2 tons of bombs on airfield No. 2 and on radio and radar installations NE of airfield No. 3. 4 B-24s were damaged by AA and one aircrewman was slightly injured. On the night of the 11th/12th 10 B-24 sweepers put 20 tons of fragmentation clusters on airfield No. 2, and on AA defenses. 3 enemy planes were airborne but did not attack. 21 B-29s struck IWO JIMA again on the 12th dropping 40 tons visually and 44 tons by radar. Results were not reported in detail, but were described as "good". All planes returned safely.

NAGOYA was struck on the night of the 11th/12th by 3 B-29s dropping 9 tons by radar from 30,000 feet with unobserved results and without opposition.

Amplifying report of the strike on OTA on the 10th states that 84 B-29s dropped 192 tons of GP bombs and 45.5 tons of incendiaries on the Nakajima Aircraft Factory from 27,000 feet. 14 other B-29s dropped 39 tons on 8 other targets of opportunity. Bombing results were good to excellent. 110 intercepting planes were reported with a total of 305 attacks. 18 enemy planes are claimed destroyed, 15 probably destroyed, and 26 damaged. Our casualties were 12 wounded, 93 missing. 11 B-29s were lost: 2 collided over the target, 1 shot down by fighters, 6 ditched and 2 unknown.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

12 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Marshall 0619556 (pink) directs ComGen INDIA-BURMA Theater to prepare for movement of the 58th Bombardment Wing to the MARIANAHS.

Wedemeyer 110921 (pink) requests information on availability of Jap equipment to be furnished Chinese troops and guerrilla forces in the area of the Jap held corridor HANKOW-HONGKONG.

CINCBPFO 120251 (pink) requests advice as to status and command relationships of British Pacific Fleet.

13 February (Guam date)

A Japanese force of 2 BB's, 1 CA and 3 DD's, contacted on the 12th off the INDO CHINA Coast, passed the first line of submarines without damage. Southwest Pacific planes picked up the force on the night of the 12th/13th and tracked throughout the day. At 1400 1/13th BLOWER (SS 325) fired 6 torpedoes at the force obtaining one timed hit in a BB and another in a cruiser. Two distinct oil slicks were observed. BERGALL (SS 320) reports firing at 2120 1/13th 6 torpedoes, scoring a probable hit in one of the BBs. Tracking planes reported the force still proceeding that night at sustained speed.

BATCH (SS 310) reports sinking a 3rd Jap submarine at 0550 1/13th north of LUZON.

HOLLANDIA (CVE 97) reports 3 unidentified radar contacts on the 11th along the shipping lane between EARL and INIWETOK north of JOHNSTON.

A sweep along projected track of TF 58 by 5 submarines was completed without contact. 21 BomCom VLR planes will sweep the same area on the 14th.

19 B-24s and 10 SB-24s bombed DIO JIMA on the 12th without opposition. Spotting plane reports hits on air installations and AA defenses.

Successful minelaying operations in FUTAMI KO (CHICHIJIMA) were completed on the 12th. 30 B-24s participated in the operation. 1 plane carrying 2 mines and crew were lost.

ComairPac 110144 and ComFirstCarTaskForPac 110836 (pink) submit requested recommendations concerning assignment of carriers to night group and training duty during ICEBERG Operation.

CINCPAC 130416 (pink) cancels Phase III-a of the ICEBERG Operation, which provided for seizure of an island in the DAITO SHIMA as a site for a Loran station.

CINCPAC 130620 outlines plan for providing staging facilities for reserve carrier air groups in the MARIANAHS and establishment of Naval Air Bases KAGAVI and KOHLER.
TOP SECRET

14 February 1945 (Guam date)

Southwest Pacific planes continued tracking the Japanese task force contacted on the 12th. A report at 1030 1/14 placed the force about 70 miles SW of HONGKONG on course 030.

Bombardment of MANILA BAY was begun on the 13th by a force of CLs and DDs, closing to 8,000 and 5,000 yards of CORREGIDOR respectively without suffering return fire. Operation is proceeding according to plan.

Task Force 58 will begin final approach to TOKYO on the 15th, with Support Force enroute IWO JIMA and Attack Force departing SAIPAN.

On the 13th at IWO JIMA 25 B-24s dropped 145 tons on radar, AA defenses, and air installations. Results were not reported.

A single PBAY on the 11th probably sank a 2000-ton AK in the SOUTH CHINA SEA with a 500-lb. direct hit. Intense and accurate AA damaged the plane and wounded 3 men, causing a crash landing on return to MINDORO.

Cominch & CNO 131945 (pink) directs Cinopac to proceed by Court of Inquiry with investigation of alleged bombing of MACAO.

Cinopac 140110 (pink) clarifies situation with respect to communications with ComGen USAF CHINA concerning operations of 14th Air Force in support of ICEBERG Operation.

Cinopac 140112 (pink) directs that all units of all services stationed at IWO JIMA will be under military command of the Island Commander. Tactical units staging through IWO JIMA will remain under administrative and operational control of organizations to which assigned.

Cinopac 140236 (pink) reports sighting of enemy force of 2 BBs, 1 CA and 3 DDs; estimated advance through FORMOSA STRAITS hugging CHINA Coast, probably refueling between AMOY and GOOCHOW, continuing on to Homeland.

Cinopac 140739 (pink) cancels Phase III-b of ICEBERG Operation which provided for the capture of KUNE IJIMA.

15 February (Guam date)

The enemy BB force in the SOUTH CHINA SEA was last contacted at 1100 1/15th by search planes of TF 73 at 24-40 N, 119-00 E (in FORMOSA STRAIT). Composition reported twice on the 15th as 2 BB, 1 CA and 7 DDs. Force proceeding at indicated speed of about 17 knots. ComSubPac has disposed 11 submarines in the EAST CHINA SEA in intercepting positions.

Bombardment of CORREGIDOR and minesweeping of MANILA BAY continued with minor interference from shore batteries. 7 enemy and 22 blue mines have been swept.

A B-24 on escort mission reports observing a torpedo hit in an escort of the Mine Group enroute IWO JIMA at 0320 (CST) on the 19th in position 22-00 N, 142-10 E. No confirmation has been received.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

15 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

5 B-24's dropped 100-1lb. bombs on Susaki airfield at CHICHI JIMA on the 13th from 12-14,000 feet. 2 strings landed on and near the field; others were unobserved. On the 15th, a search plane left an AK burning and listing 100 miles northwest of CHICHI JIMA.

At NIO JIMA on the 14th, 17 B-24's dropped 34 tons of 100 pounders on AA defenses, radio, radar and air installations. 1 of 3 intercepting Zeke's was damaged. 5 B-24's sustained minor damage from AA. On the 15th, an unspecified number of B-24's escorted by 8 P-38's struck NIO JIMA while 5 P-38's conducted a fighter sweep over the same target. 3 enemy fighters intercepted and 1 was damaged. Fire and smoke were reported between airfields 1 and 2 following the bombing run. P-38's observed no planes, shipping or other enemy activity in the vicinity of the island.

117 B-29's participated in an attack on NASOYA on the 15th bombing the primary target, secondary and last resort targets visually and by radar and dead reckoning with results ranging from unobserved to good. 21 planes hit the Mitsubishi Aircraft Factory (primary target) visually. 9 planes returned early and 1 ditched between the northern MARINAS and the VOLCANOES.

CINCPAC 142220 (pink) to Cominch clarifies CINCPAC's 110043 requesting CINCPAC to submit detailed requirements for berths and shore facilities at KANOKI.

ComGen 6th Army 151550 outlines plan for reconnaissance of CAMORAN BOUND and further states that no US garrison is located at BALER BAY and that patrols have found no enemy activity in that area.

16 February (Guam date)

No further report has been received on the Jap force last contacted at 1100 (I)/15th off AMOY.

Minesweeping operations in MANILA BAY have been delayed by accurate shore battery fire; preliminary naval bombardment having failed to eliminate all gun positions in caves on CORREGIDOR. RADFORD (DD 446) and LAVALETTI (DD 443) both struck mines, causing damage and flooding, and have retired to SUBIC BAY. FLETCHER (DD 447) was hit by a 6 inch shell, killing 3 men and causing considerable damage. HOPESWELL (DD 681) received 4 hits; 1 officer and 6 men were killed and 8 wounded; extensive damage was inflicted. YMS 48 was set a fire by a shell hit, and later sunk by our forces; 3 men are missing.

No reports have been received from either Com5thFleet or JTF 58. Cloud cover prevented extensive observation by a B-29 on station as observer. Minesweeping was carried out as scheduled at NIO JIMA with no results except for 1 old mine found adrift. Only part of scheduled gunfire was carried out, no photographs were obtained.

Three submarine contacts have been reported in the area north and west of SAIPAN; 1 reported by a plane about 300 miles north of SAIPAN, 1 just west of SAIPAN and 1 northwest of SAIPAN on track of one of the Tractor Groups.

- Continued -
16 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

At IWO JIMA on the 16th support planes from CVE's left two 500-ton luggers burning and sinking. A spotting plane shot down 1 Zekes, and probably destroyed 3 Bettys on the ground. Air strikes were limited by weather. Jap heavy AA was light, disorganized, and ineffective; light AA was intense but generally inaccurate. Sporadic enemy fire at surface ships was quickly silenced; ships and planes reported a considerable number of enemy installations destroyed or damaged, but accurate evaluation will depend on photos to be taken.

36 F4Us, P6F-Ns and TBFs using rockets, bombs and Napalm bombs attacked RABELTHUAP in the PALAUS on the 16th causing fires and explosions. YAP was struck by 8 other F4Us.

P-47s on a fighter sweep over FORMOSA on the 11th shot down 10 Jap planes and probably destroyed 2 others. B-24s in a pre-dawn strike on Hilo airstrip burned an unspecified number of enemy planes, and later in the day 14 B-25s and 34 P-47s destroyed an unstated amount of motor transport and rolling stock in south FORMOSA. P-47s destroyed a bomber west of the island.

CNO 160219 announces possibility of Soviet transports deviating from established routes and being carried into the Pacific Ocean through straits of the KURILE CHAIN as a result of drifting ice in the OKHOTSK SEA.

Cinopos 160419 (pink) to CINCSWPA requests approval of availability of facilities at MANUS for use by British Pacific Fleet.

Cinopac 160427 (pink) outlines plan for rehabilitation of 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions following DETACHMENT Operation.

ComGenAARPOA 160530 states that insufficient personnel prevents establishing staffs for Air Base Commands in areas where a senior air echelon is stationed and recommends that Island or Area Commanders exercise responsibilities for Army Air Bases through the commander of the senior air echelon who will accomplish administration and operation of air bases by utilizing forces and staffs assigned.

Cinopac 160846 (pink) modifies assignment of rehabilitation areas following DETACHMENT and ICEBERG Operations.

Cinopac 160919 (pink) requests CINCSWPA to release PORTLAND (CA 33) and MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36) in time to report to Cinopac at ULETHI by 5 March.

ComGenAARPOA 161112 (pink) clarifies status of 347th and 348th Air Service Groups by outlining policy regarding assignment, responsibilities and command relationships of these units.

Cinopac 161145 (pink) directs ComServRon 10 to order WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48), plus two destroyer escorts, to proceed immediately to WORKMAN.
TOP SECRET

17 February (Guam date)

A LINGAYEN search plane sighted the force of 2 BB in FORM, A STRAIT at 12011/16th, course 040, speed 15.

The landings on the 15th and 16th in the BATAAN-CORREGIDOR area were carried out by TG 78.3 under Rear Adm. STRUBL; and consisted of 5 A/D, 6 LCI(L), 5 LST, 6 LCT and 20 LSM.

Troops involved were transported from CUBIC BAY to the objective after bombardment by cruisers and destroyers on D-2, D-1 and D plus 1 days.

More than 272 Japanese mines were swept and the presence of controlled mines is suspected. In addition to damage to 4 DD and 1 JMS already reported, LSM 169 struck a mine and had to be beached, and 4 LCS were destroyed or damaged by enemy suicide craft.

UDT reconnaissance of DNO JIMA on the 17th found no underwater obstacles and the east beach suitable for all types of landing craft. A sand terrace on the northern half of the beach may block LVTs. Western beaches were also good, though there are sand bars covered by 1 fathom 75 yards offshore. Surf is 2 feet on eastern beaches, 7 to 4 feet on western beaches.

LCI(Gs) supporting the UDTs received heavy fire from north and south flanks when about 1000 yards offshore. 8 of 12 are known to have been hit. Reports of casualties from 7 total 31 dead, 83 wounded and 1 missing; 11 shock cases. 1 LCI(G) capsized; several are out of action.

On the west beaches there was little shore fire. Minesweepers, who were also inshore off the east beaches, drew only sporadic fire, and completed most of scheduled sweeps.

PENSACOLA (CA-24) was hit off the northeast coast and suffered many casualties, including her executive officer killed.

Scheduled fire support was delivered and support air struck many targets. Yet majority of known installations apparently remain intact. Heavy fire and air strikes will be delivered today against east beaches and their flanks.

On the 15th B-24s snooped both CHICHI and DNO. At DNO on the 16th 42 B-24s encountered 10/10 overcast and returned without bombing. On the 17th 43 B-24s bombed the target through intense, fairly accurate heavy AA. 3-29s and 41 B-24s are scheduled to repeat on the 18th. During bombing runs, naval bombardment of AA positions will be conducted.

On the 17th CVE aircraft strafed 5 planes and 13 small craft at CHICHI and 16 vessels at HAHAN. AA was intense at both targets. 2 jap planes were shot down by destroyer.

THIUK was bombed by B-29s on the 17th. The attack will be repeated on the 18th.
TOP SECRET

17 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

In the SOUTH CHINA SEA on the 16th PB4Ys sank 2 AKs and damaged 2 ocean going tugs. That night a PB4 left a 1700 ton AP dead in the water off FORMOSA with one bomb hit.

Cinpoa 170557 requests survey to determine feasibility of improving infantry combat training facilities for Marine Division at SAIPAN, which will remain a Marine rehabilitation area indefinitely.

Cinpoa 170608 directs that copies of operation plans and orders and corresponding operational reports be furnished the Secretary of the Admiralty and the CinCBFP for specific operations involving units of the British Pacific Fleet.

Cinpoa 170648 approves project for limited training of Army replacements in the forward area.

Cinpoa 171220 covers reassignment of Commodore WOGAN (ComMTBFac) and further directs Com7thFleet to clear with Cinpoa any recommendations concerning redialou of Cinpoa personnel and ships temporarily assigned to his command.

18 February (Guam date)

Hydrographic conditions at I.O JI'A are reported as excellent; no wrecks or hazards have been found, and there is little surf. Minesweeping operations have been completed except for two small areas close inshore; no mines were found. Bombardment was concentrated on eastern beaches and flanks with 4.7's and 13's closing to between 1800 and 3000 yards offshore. LSUTZE (DD 481) received a hit from a 3 or 4-inch shell which detonated in her stack causing some topside damage. Of 13 121's, 4 participated in fire support on the 17th, only 1 remains fully operative.

COT 52 reported at 2200 on the 18th that although weather had prevented complete expenditure of ammunition allowance and that more bombardment might be found and destroyed with 1 more day of bombardment, it was believed the landed could be made as scheduled (H-hour designated 0900 K(10) 19th).

On the 17th, 42 B-24s struck IWO JIMA defense installations and bivouac area on north side of Suribachi Yama scoring 90% hits in the target area with fragmentation clusters. 10 damaged planes were seen on the airfield, and 2 large and 3 small fires were observed. AA damaged 4 B-24s.

4 B-24s and 2 PB4Ys bombed and photographed MOEN, ET2E and ABUM airstrips in TRUK Atoll on the 17th. 4 operational planes were observed. A fighter sweep over TRUK is scheduled for the 21St.

B-29s of the 21St Bomber Command will make a D-day (19th) strike on TOKYO.

Two reports received from ComNavGroup CHINA state that: (1) (rated C-3) Japs have flown 1500 planes from JAPAN to FORMOSA recently; and, (2) (rated B-3) High Command has ordered all Army and Navy air forces remaining in the PHILIPPINES to withdraw to FORMOSA.

ComGenPOA 140541 replies to War Department proposal to equip forces to be deployed from other theaters and from the United States from stockpiles of equipment and supplies at forward bases in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

16 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CNO 161500 requests information relative to rebuilding and rehabilitating GUAM with view to using achievements as basis for extending naval administration to other islands.

Cincpac 180624 outlines procedure for informing Cincpac Advance Headquarters in cases where aircraft under flight control of ComGenPacDiv ATC are missing, overdue or lost.

Cincpac 180736 (pink) modifies availability of rehabilitation and staging facilities in the PHILIPPINES for FOA forces.

CTF 52 181220 recommends that landing at IWO JIMA be carried out on schedule despite incomplete expenditure of bombardment ammunition allowance.

Com5thFleet 182215 summarizes results of two-day carrier strike on TOKYO.

19 February (Guam date)

CTF 77 reports that opening of MANILA BAY is proceeding satisfactorily with minesweepers operating both north and south of GUARDIAN. Additional troops have been landed on GUARDIAN with slight opposition.

Com5thFleet has reported excellent results of strike by Task Force 58 on TOKYO on the 16th and 17th. Approach was executed completely undetected. Weather resulted in extremely difficult flying conditions over the task force, and much of the target area was closed in. Jap planes avoided our fighters and were not aggressive. Results are compiled as follows:

- 322 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air
- 177 destroyed on the ground
- Many probably destroyed (including 150 1st day)
- Numerous air installations destroyed
- Aircraft factories bombed
- Sunk: 1 CVE, 9 coastal vessels, many pickets
- Damaged: 1 DD, 2 DE, 1 AK, 22 coastal vessels

Our air losses:
- Combat: 49 aircraft, 40 pilots, 6 crewmen
- Operational: 21 aircraft, 5 pilots, 4 crewmen

Increasingly bad weather resulted in cancellation of strike on 18th. The force retired without having been attacked. All Jap planes that followed returning strikes were destroyed by CAP over destroyer picket line between surface force and target. 2 DD (BARTON and INGRAHAM) were damaged in collision, a 3rd (DERTH) by gunfire from a picket boat, and a 4th (WALDRON) by ramming the same picket boat.

Landing at IWO JIMA were carried out as scheduled following intense naval gunfire and air bombardment. 8 battalions supported by tanks were landed by 1020 H(10) 19th, encountering little initial opposition, though some fire was directed at IWO's and boats. Mortar and artillery fire developed on all beaches, particularly beaches BLUE and YELLOW. 6 tanks and elements of the 27th Marines had reached the southern edge of the airfield by 1030. Personnel casualties were moderate and the situation was considered favorable. Regimental reserves are being landed. CAMPEL (DM 15) and BLESSMAN (APD 48) both sustained damage and heavy casualties from bomb hits and are ordered towed to SAIPAN.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

19 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

150 B-29s of the 21st Bomber Command were airborne for an attack against the Musashino Aircraft Plant at TOKYO on the 19th. Heavy overcast prevented bombing the primary target, but 110 planes bombed the harbor and dock installations at TOKYO as secondary target. Enemy air opposition was moderate. 11 planes were claimed destroyed, 20 probably destroyed and 25 damaged.

14 B-24s, the first of 3 squadrons, attacked defense installations on IWO JIMA on the 19th placing 90% of bombs in the target area with others unobserved. The 2nd squadron was directed by surface control to return to base with bombs; the 3rd squadron arrived at the target late due to faulty navigation and did not bomb.

A FBXH search plane on the 19th attacked an enemy submarine 225 miles NE of PAGAN at 1315 K (-10). 4 depth charges were dropped from 50-75 feet while the submarine was diving with conning tower still visible. An oil slick with 5X5 foot radius was observed following the attack.

ComSthFleet 182351 (pink) outlines employment of Task Force 58 following DETACHMENT landing support.

ComSthFleet 190129 (pink) presents OpPlan for strikes on TOKYO, KAGAYA, KYUSHU and OKINAWA by Task Force 58. Operation designated JANNAK.

CTF 51 190150 covers the landings and current situation at IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC 190531 concerns arrangements for anchorages to be used by British Pacific Fleet.

CINCPAC 190539 covers arrangements for loading dredges to COMSthFleet on the basis replacements are made available to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC 190701 outlines prospective movements of British Pacific Fleet and requests assignment of British Pacific Fleet to CINCPAC prior to CEFNAWOR Operation.

CINCPAC 190823 presents CINCPAC's congratulations to the forces involved in the strike on TOKYO and the landings on IWO JIMA.

CTF 93 191129 covers B-24 strike on IWO JIMA on the 19th.

CINCPAC 191143 concerns proposed changes in routing of convoys through the Central Pacific to the PHILIPPINES.

CINCPAC 191144 requests recommendations from CINCSWA in regard to foregoing proposal.

CINCPAC 192306 (pink) requests information as to prospective operations and clarification of status of British Pacific Fleet.

10/24
Landing operations at IWO ISLAND continued throughout the 19th with 4 RCT's, 2 Infantry Battalions, 2 Tank and 4 Artillery Battalions ashore by 0800. The 5th MarDiv met light to moderate opposition, secured the south half of airfield No. 1 and swung left flank toward SURIBACHI. The 4th MarDiv met intense mortar and machine gun fire from the right flank. Unloading operations were shifted from YELLOW Beach to RED and GREEN Beaches.

At 0230 on the 20th a counter attack by an estimated 1,000 Japs was repulsed by the 27th RCT after heavy fighting. Enemy mortar and artillery fire continued. During the night 2 cruisers and 11 DD's supported our landing forces with illumination and harassing fire. After heavy naval and air bombardment our attack was launched at 0845 K(-10) 20th (D plus 1) against strong opposition and continuing heavy mortar and artillery fire. The 5th MarDiv moved forward to the slopes of SURIBACHI and pushed to the north securing all of the airfield in its zone of action. The 4th MarDiv swung to the north its assigned sector. By 1200 the entire airfield was in our hands. YELLOW and BLUE Beaches remained closed by enemy gunfire, soft sand and wrecked vehicles. Traffic on the GREEN and RED Beaches continued. The general situation was somewhat improved. At 1800 enemy mortar and artillery fire on our position continued, rockets being fired on our right flank. Front lines remained substantially unchanged from 1200.

Comprehensive casualty reports are not yet available. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers and LCI's all continued to provide fire support. 4 LSM's were damaged.

SOLACE (AH 5) and FRENCHY (APH 2) have been called forward early. Garrison Group O has also been called forward.

All groups of TF 58 are available at the target.

HAWKILL (SS 366) sank 1 large and 1 medium AK in the SOUTH CHINA SEA early on the 20th.

QUAFINA (SS 362) sunk 1 large AO off CAPE PADARAN. After the attack, she bottomed in 190 feet and took 98 depth charges, but suffered only minor damage.

Operations in the MANILA BAY entrance area are proceeding satisfactorily.

At IWO JIMA on the night of the 19th-20th 3 or 4 enemy air raids of 2-4 planes each approached within 10-20 miles of the island but all retired on the approach of our night fighters. Scheduled air strikes on the 20th were increased by 45 planes from the fast carriers, but poor visibility hampered the afternoon strikes. 2 TBM's were ditched, with all crew members rescued; 2 other TBM's collided, but were able to return to the BERMINGHAM and landed safely, and the 1 aircrewman who bailed out was picked up; a 5th TBM on ASP from the SARGENT BAY failed to return.

CTF 56 has informed Cmso/5thFlt that he can furnish 4 carrier task group strikes on the 21st, weather permitting, each strike of about 100 planes (27 VB, 30 VJ, 40 VP). CTF 51 has requested all 4, with the first over the target at 0730 K(-10). Ammunition would be 300 pounders, rockets and 100's. CTF 58 adds that our Napalm runs 50% dead. In addition to these 4 strikes, TG 58.2 will furnish CAP and call strikes.

Amplified report of 21st BomCom strike on TOKYO on the 17th indicates a total of 138 B-29's bombed the harbor and dock area and other targets. 4 B-29's were lost.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

20 February (Osuw date)(Cont'd)

Cem7thFleet estimates Jap air strength on 19 February at 531 aircraft in
the MANDAI SHOTO, FORMOSA, the PHILIPPINES, BORNEO, CELEBES and the eastern
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Of this total 415 are in FORMOSA and the MANDAI SHOTO.
Most of the Empire offensive air strength is reported to be concentrated in southern
KYUSHU.

CinC/PAC 180619 (pink) outlines RFY communication requirements.

CinCBFP 190743 (pink) indicates that MONAB was being sent to MANUS in
belief HP-1 constituted approval and that unless the MONAB was unloaded at MANUS
in late February or early March as planned, considerable delay in its establishment
would be experienced.

CTF 51 191320 (pink) is Summary No. 2 covering DWO situation 1800/19 (D-Day).

CinC/PAC 192308 (pink) questions schedule of 5thFleet OpPlan 4-45 (JAMBOREE)
in providing only 7 days at anchor for carriers before ICEBERG.

Cem5thFleet 200349 (pink) asks whether 24th Corps can meet ICEBERG date.

CTF 51 200600 (pink) is Summary No. 3 covering DWO situation to 1200/20
(D plus 1).

CinC/PAC 200728 acknowledges congratulations from House of Representatives.

Cem5thFleet 200874 (pink) revises JAMBOREE to include only OVERHEAD (TOKYO)
and LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) with 2 task groups returning to ULITHI by 2 March and 2
more by 5 March.

CG LanPer 200925 summarizes situation at DWO from 1800/19 (D-day) to
1800/20 (D plus 1).

CTG 50.5 201013 (pink) outlines special search in support of JAMBOREE.

Cem 51 201210 (pink) is Summary No. 4 covering DWO situation 1800/20 (D+1).

Cem5thFleet 201314 (pink) modifies his OpPlan 4-45.

CinC/PAC 201421 directs that ships now enroute PHILIPPINES will no longer
be held for forward call and announces SWPA escort for shipping from KOSOLO to
LEYTE.

21 February (Osuw date)

During the night of 20-21 February, operations on DWO were marked by minor
ground activity and unsuccessful attempts at infiltration. A Jap counter attack
supported by tanks and artillery, launched at 2015 K (-10), against our left
flank, was repulsed by RCT 27. 2 cruisers, 11 destroyers and 2 gunboat support
units again provided harassing and illuminating fire during the night. The attack
was resumed by our forces at 0330 K/21st (D plus 2) with airfield No. 2, the 0-2
line, and Mt. SURIBACHI the main objectives. By 1145 K the 5th MarDiv had advanced
1,000 yards reaching the west of airfield No. 2. The 4th MarDiv approached to
within 200 yards of the southern tip of the airfield - a gain of approximately

- Continued -
21 February (Omn date)(Cont'd)

500 yards. RCT 28 reached the lower slopes of Mt. SURIBACHI, employing flame throwers and tanks against intense opposition. RCT 21 from 3rd MarDiv Corps Reserve was landed by 1800. Another RCT has been ordered to be off the beach by 0730 K/22nd (D plus 3).

Beaches were congested by vehicles wrecked by enemy fire or bogged down by volcanic soil and steep beach slopes. Three mat roads have been laid inland and some Marston matting is being laid on the beaches. Pontoon causeways are being assembled to assist in unloading of supplies. By 1200 K/21st only 30% of transports had been unloaded. Due to beach conditions it appeared inevitable that unloading of garrison echelon would be considerably delayed.

As of D-Day, there were an estimated 20,000 enemy troops on the island. First estimates of casualties have been received. As of 1800 on the 21st (D plus 2) 862 enemy dead had been counted and 1 POW had been taken. Our casualties were estimated as 3,650 (150 officers, 3,500 enlisted men); 3,063 wounded have been placed on board ship. Number killed in action and missing are unknown at this time.

At 1640 K/21st, TF 51 was attacked by an unknown number of Jap suicide planes resulting in damage to several ships. SARATOGA (CV 3) was hit by 4 planes causing a 20-foot hole in starboard side near waterline and fires topside. At 2300 she reported situation under control and was proceeding toward ENIWETOK at 23 knots. BISMARCK SEA (CVE 93) was also hit by suicide plane at 1850 K. She burned furiously, turned over, and is believed sunk. LUNGAI POINT (CVE 94) reports damage under control, extent unknown. SAGINAW BAY (CVE 82) was attacked but no details of damage have been received. CTG 52.2 reports at least 4 of attacking planes shot down; SARATOGA reports 3 shot down close aboard.

SAMARITAN (AH 10) was hit by a 5-inch ricochet from one of our ships, but no explosion resulted, and she later departed from the objective with no mention of damage or casualties from this hit.

LOCAN (APA 196) suffered minor damage to her bow when she rammed NAPA (APA 218) as result of steering casualty. NAPA has effected temporary repairs and can make 10 knots.

ATULE (SS 403) reports sinking a medium AK off SHANTUNG on the 24th.

8 snooper B-24s bombed Susaki airfield on CHICHI JIMA on the 19th with 100-1lb. bombs by radar. Results were unobserved except for 1 large fire seen through the clouds.

PAGAN was bombed on the 21st by 24 P-47s. Napalm bombs were dropped along the west coast and northwest side of the island. No enemy activity was reported and the runway and taxiways appeared inoperational.

A PBJ search plane from LITTLE sank a coastal AK and 3 seaplanes, damaged 2 additional seaplanes (1 loaded with troops), shot down 1 Zeke and 1 Kate over Naha airfield on OKINAWA JIMA on the 20th. 24 operational planes were reported on the field.

ComOmnPOA 202209 (pink) states that no information has been received to indicate that the 24th Corps will not be able to meet mounting date for ICEBERG.

Cinopac 202305 outlines plan for providing night fighters and carrier training during first phase of ICEBERG.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

21 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

DepCom 20th AF 210004 (pink) revises schedule of operations by 21st
BomCom in support of DETACHMENT.

CINCPAC 210223 (pink) requests reply from CINCSWPAC regarding availability
of facilities at MANUS for use by British Pacific Fleet.

CINCPAC 210225 (pink) advises CINC BPF to permit arrangements for move-
ment of his MONAB to stand firm.

CINCPAC 210306 concerns issuing by War Department of instructions affect-
ing employment of shipping within the local theater of operations.

CINCPAC 210429 (pink) approves revised schedule of operations for 21st
Bomber Command.

CTF 51 210500 is Summary No. 5 covering DWO situation as of 1200/21
(D plus 2).

CINCPAC 210514 (pink) informs Com5thFleet that ICEBERG date is not expected
to be delayed.

Com5thFleet 210550 discusses problem of quickly locating concealed enemy
batteries firing on our troops during amphibious landings. Also reports successful
re-arming operations by TF 58.

CTF 51 211210 is Summary No. 6 covering DWO situation as of 1900/21
(D plus 2).

CTG 52.2 211238 (pink) submits preliminary report of air attack by suicide
planes on TG 52.2.

22 February (Guam date)

On IWO JIMA during the night of 21-22 February the enemy attempted infil-
tration along the entire front with a strong counter attack launched against the
left flank of RCT 27. An unconfirmed landing on the west coast in the zone of the
5th MarDiv was also reported. All lines held firm. Our forces resumed the attack
at 0835 on the 22nd (D plus 3). The 21st RCT from 3rd MarDiv relieved the 23rd RCT
in the 4th MarDiv zone of action. 28th RCT began the assault of enemy positions
on the face of MT SURIBACHI. Strong opposition was met on all fronts, and by 1130
there were no appreciable changes in front lines. During the afternoon, both the
4th and 5th MarDivs made small gains. RCT 28 continued the attack on SURIBACHI
supported by tanks, artillery, demolitions and flame throwers. Japs dropped hand
grenades and demolition charges on our advancing troops. By 1400 the base of the
mountain had been encircled. A counter attack developed on the left of the Corps
front, but was repulsed at 1810. Another counterattack on the right flank was taken
under fire by naval gunfire and artillery; results unknown. Combat efficiency of
our troops was considered to be 70%.

Beaches were still congested but demolition teams are working to clear
passages through the wreckage. Our casualties as of 1200/21st (D plus 2) were:
Landing Force (less RCT 25) - KIA 644, WIA 4,168, MIA 560. RCT 25 - 1,072. Total
casualties 6,644. Enemy casualties totaled 1,222 dead, 2 POWs.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

22 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Naval gunfire support at IWO JIMA has been hampered by poor visibility; however, expenditure of ammunition has been extremely high, and CTF 51 has ordered night gunfire reduced to counter battery fire and that necessary to break up counter attacks and disperse assemblies.

One and possibly two TBMs were shot down by our forces when 4 TBMs from the ENTERPRISE appeared through the clouds over TF 51 after warning had been sent to all planes to keep clear of surface forces while in Condition RED. Pilot and crew of 1 TBM have been rescued.

TRUK Atoll was photographed on the 21st by PBYs. On the same day, 10 P-38s and 4 PBYs hit Woen airfield strafing parked planes and starting 1 fire.

In the North Pacific on the 20th 4 B-24s bombed KURAGU ZAKI (SE OKINAWA) with 118 100-lb. GP bombs. 4 of 5 intercepting enemy fighters were damaged. 1 B-24 was slightly damaged, but all planes returned safely. On the 21st, 4 PVS attacked MINAMI ZAKI (SE SHIMUSHU) with rockets. Heavy AA was encountered. 3 PVS returned; pilot of the 4th reported intention of bailing out over CAPE LAFAYETTE.

Summary of mapping up operations in the forward area for the period 11 February - 17 February shows the following results:

SAIPAN - 48 Japs killed, 7 POWs. Our casualties - 1 wounded in action. An area in the central part of the island was shelled and patrolled on the 15, 16 and 17 resulting in killing or capture of 131 Japs, not as yet classified.

TINIAN - 9 Japs killed, 2 POWs. Our casualties - 2 killed in action.

GUAM - 33 Japs killed, 6 POWs. Our casualties - 5 killed in action, 2 wounded in action.

PELELIU - 4 Japs killed.

Com7thFleet 150433 present OpOrd covering investigation of CAUBAN POINT to determine presence of enemy forces or installations and suitability as fleet anchorage.

Cominch & CNO 201651 (pink) requests Cinopas's views and recommendations on proposed modification of present concept for KURILES operation to keep open a sea route to the Maritime Provinces.

CTF 58 210358 (pink) proposes modification to Com5thFleet's plan for JAMBOREE operation.

CINCPAC 211730 approves use of MANUS by British Pacific Fleet, including augmentation of U.S. naval carrier aircraft pools and personnel.

Com5thFleet 212317 (pink) replies to modification recommended by CTF 58 for JAMBOREE.

CinCEFP 210619 (pink) concerns establishment of bases forward of MANUS.

- Continued -

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CINCWPAC 211328 allocates certain facilities to Cinsea for use by British Pacific Fleet effective 14 March.

Cominch 211653 (pink) clarifies status of British Pacific Fleet.

Cominch 211650 (pink) states that commitment of units of RBF is dependent upon decisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff which are expected to be reached about 15 March.

Cinsea 220115 (pink) modifies operations of 21st Pacific in support of Task Force 58 strikes on the Empire.

Cinsea 220116 (pink) designates 2nd MarDiv as Area Reserve for DETACHMENT; Division to be prepared for loading on 48 hours notice.

Cinsea 220234 expresses concurrence in ComGenPOA serial 0091 of 10 Feb. 1945 concerning FIBAS Agreement and overhead allotment of SoPaCom.

CTF 51 220410 concerns ammunition supply situation at TwC JIMA and establishes new quotas in the interest of ammunition conservation.

Com5thFleet 220647 (pink) further modifies his plan for JAMBOREE operation.

Com5thFleet 220831 (pink) suggests possibility that TwC must be left without adequate fleet support unless a delay in ICEBERG is accepted.

Cinsea 220913 states that coordination of inter-theater communication should be effected by JCS or by arrangements between Theater Commanders.

CTF 51 221240 is Summary No. 8 covering TwC situation as of 1800 (10) on the 22nd (D plus 3).

23 February (Guam date)

During the night of the 22nd-23rd Jap infiltration tactics were again employed but were repulsed along the entire front. A group of enemy swimmers came in on the west coast in the rear of RCT 26, but were wiped out. Our attack on the 23rd supported by artillery jumped off about 0800(K). Enemy fire was again intense. Both divisions were held to very short local gains. At 1200(K) their lines were approximately the same as when the attack began in the morning. RCT 28 attacking SURIBACHI made the most significant advances and at 1035(K) the ensign was raised on the rim of the crater. The regiment held a line on the northeast and south rim of the crater. The attack was continued from the same positions but by 1630(K) the only sizable gain was in the zone of the 4th MarDiv on the right flank. The lines here were pushed ahead 300 yards. In the center, 21st RCT captured the southern tip of Airfield No. 2. Front lines otherwise remained static. RCT 28 began moving up operations on SURIBACHI. Block houses and pillboxes were reported to be within the crater. 717 enemy dead had been counted in this area. KANGOKU ROCK, off the NW shore of D60, was taken under fire by DDs and the mortar emplacements and landing craft located there eliminated. As of 1630(K) 23 Feb. the 4th and 5th MarDivs plus the 21st RCT (3rd MarDiv) and most of Corps Artillery had been landed. In the front lines were (from left to right) 27th RCT (5th MarDiv), 26th RCT (5th MarDiv), 21st RCT (3rd MarDiv) and 24th RCT (4th MarDiv). The 23rd RCT (4th MarDiv) and the 25th RCT (4th MarDiv) had been pulled back from the front lines into Corps Reserve along with two battalions of the 27th RCT. The 9th RCT (3rd MarDiv) was scheduled to land 24 February.
TOP SECRET

23 February (Guan date)(Cont'd)

Beach conditions at INO were somewhat improved. Roads or satisfactory exits for tracked vehicles extended inland from all beaches except from Beach B. Although YELLOW and BLUE Beaches were still subjected to intermittent mortar and artillery fire, the most satisfactory vehicles so far found for negotiation of the beaches are amphib trailers (trailers attacked on airstrips) and tankettes (tracked cargo). Six foot breakers pounded the eastern beaches throughout the day. Use of门诊 causeways has been temporarily abandoned as the surf conditions cause them to break. Investigation of the western beaches indicates that they are suitable only under ideal conditions.

No material change in the disposition of our forces. Naval support gunfire continues. Replenishment has been slow due to weather. 3 LST, 1 LCN, 1 LST, and 2 patrol craft have sustained damage but are still operating under their own power.

347 of the 836 on board the BISMARCK SEA (CVE-95) are missing.

CommNavGroup CHINA reports 5 convoys off the INDO-CHINA Coast, one consisting of a large AP and escort, and another of four ships last seen headed north. The 3rd, 5 AOs with 2 escorts, returned to CAMRANH with dead and wounded after attack by a plane. The 4th, 2 AOs and 2 escorts, was attacked by a submarine at 1200 1/22 northeast of Cape Padaran. 1 AQ was sunk. The 5th, 2 AOs and 2 escorts, passed CAMRANH BAY going north on the 22nd. This convoy was tracked by planes all night, vectoring submarine to the scene.

The 73rd DeWalt reports sighting in the INLAND SEA 2 CV, 1 CVL, 1 BB, 1 DD or CA, 4 CT and 18 DD.

FLUNDER (SS 251), which was operating off the INDO-CHINA Coast reports having been rammed while submerged by another submerged sub "believed friendly." Substructure was damaged and radar carried away. Hull is sound. Sub is proceeding to SUBIC BAY.

The suicide attacks on our surface forces on the 21st came from an estimated 50 Jap planes, both Betty's and Zeke's (also Jills, apparently), that attacked from 1640 to 2000. The planes attacked in small groups, 11 planes were shot down. At 1501 on the 22nd a group of 4 Jap planes attacked unsuccessfully to attack the CAMRANH BAY. At the same time 2 enemy groups of about 4 planes each were picked up by radar but did not close. During this Red Alert 2 FM 2M088 TMs were shot down by our surface forces. Although bad weather hampered air support, more than 400 combat missions were flown on the 22nd between daylight and 1430, when strikes were cancelled. Scheduled air strikes on the 23rd were carried out with emphasis on the destruction of pinpoint targets under the direction of the air coordinator and air liaison parties. During the morning a strike on CHICHI Jima destroyed 3 and damaged 3 of 10 planes seen on the ground; 2 TMs were damaged by AA, but both returned safely. Spotting planes reported Jap AA launched 3 foot parachutes at 5000 feet, each supporting a 4 foot cable from which dangled a plane spouting object 2 feet long.

Beary will bomb TOKYO (or NAGoya) on the 25th rather than the 26th.

A search plane attacked 4 DD and 1 AO in CAMRANH BAY leaving the AO afire and 1 DD damaged.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

23 February (Guam date)

Com 20th AF 192302 (pink) covers directive outlining primary and secondary missions of 20th and 21st Bomber Commands.

Com7thPkt 220247 concerns construction of shore facilities at ANGII, support of fleet operations at LINGAYEN, SUBIC and MANILA and supply stocks in SWesPac Area.

Cinopoa 221303 informs CINCPAC of approval of his use of WMAUS as fleet anchorage, requesting him to make detailed arrangements with ComNavSase "WMAUS."  

Cinopoa 222343 pertains to SWPA shipping through POA.

Cinopoa 230145 (pink) requests CINCPAC to authorize 3DLY photographic planes to operate from LUCHAN in conducting photographic reconnaissance of OKINAWA.

CTF 31 230500 is Summary No. 9 covering IMC situation as of 1Z00 (10) on the 23rd (D plus 4).

ComGenStrAirPOA 230606 states that all units of TF 3/4 are available to assist CTF 31 with bombing strikes.

Cinopoa 230637 outlines arrangements relative to visit of General Maxwell and party to Cinopoa headquarters.

Cinopoa 230640 (pink) disapproves proposal of ComGen Str AirPOA regarding construction for civilian population of OKINAWA.

CTF 31 231150 is Summary No. 10 covering LNO situation as of 1Z00 (10) on the 23rd (D plus 4).

24 February (Guam date)

After a comparatively quiet night, our forces on LNO continued the attack on 24 February (D plus 5) supported by artillery, tanks and naval gunfire, encountering stiff enemy resistance throughout the day. Advances were made along the entire front, the most notable being made in the vicinity of Airfield #2, half of which was captured, and along the extreme right flank where the lines were pushed forward 300 to 400 yards. At 0955 (K), the Commanding General, Landing Force (MajGen. Schmidt) assumed command ashore. By 1800 all troops except 3rd RCT (3rd MarDiv) had been or were being disembarked. Construction battalions and engineer battalions had been ordered ashore and one strip of Airfield #1 cleared of mines. Reports indicate that all Jap defenses were expertly planned and fanatically defended. All emplacements, including block houses, pillboxes and caves were mutually supporting and built of concrete, in some instances four feet thick. Minesfields were numerous with many torpedoes heads being used for explosive charge. A new type of incendiary grenade about the size of an orange was found. It was also discovered that the Japs were using approximately 1,000 pound rockets which were probably the cause of much of the damage on D Day and D plus 1 previously attributed to mortars. Some Japs were found wearing Marine uniforms. Beach conditions have continued to improve and supplies and equipment are now moving more rapidly than at any time during the operation. The hydrographic group has completed its survey and work on nets and mooring buoys has been initiated. Our casualties as of 1900 23 Feb. (D plus 4); KIA 706; WIA 5,125; KIA 531. Enemy casualties as of the close of D plus 5 were: 2,799 killed, 6 POWs.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

24 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

The air attack on our forces at ETO on the 23rd was made by several small groups of enemy planes. There were no fighter interceptions. Mapes dropped a window, but apparently made no attacks. TF 51 employed extensive radar jamming and smoke. CTF 51 reported that the night air attack may have come via WANGOO. Our air support strikes on the 24th were reduced owing to carrier refueling and search operations. 1 TBW spotting plane with Marine Corps observer crashed in flames; no survivors. Fire support was furnished throughout the day by 2 CBH, 3 CA and 10 DD.

210 B-29s from the 21st BomCom are scheduled to strike the TOKYO dock and urban area on the 25th with 564 tons of incendiaries. The attack will occur between 1430 and 1630 in conjunction with carrier plane attack.

Beginning 25 February, CTF 93 has ordered daily attacks on Susaki airfield at CHICHI JIMA by 1 squadron of B-24s during daylight and 7 B-24s at night. Carrier sweeps will be discontinued.

Com7thFli announces plans for aerial mining of waters around NAPO, SHATON, HONGKONG, HAINAN STRAIT, YULINAN BAY, WAKO (ESCATOROS), TAIW and TAINAN (FORMOSA) during March and April.

ALUSNA MOCCO 211430 (pink) covers arrangements for turning over certain types of U.S. mine, petrol and landing craft to Soviet crews at GUAM BAY, ALASK.

ComGen20thBomCom 212105 (pink) requests clarification of orders regarding transfer of 58th Wing from INDIA to the MARIANAS.

CTF 51 232315 requests CTF 93 to make day and night strikes on CHICHI JIMA, HAIN JIMA and MIMA JIMA.

CTF 51 240700 is Summary No. 11 covering IWO situation as of 1300 (K) 24 February (D plus 5).

CTF 51 241310 is Summary No. 12 covering IWO situation as of 1300 (K) 24 February (D plus 5).

25 February (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA the old BBs together with CBs and DDs continued to furnish close gunfire support for troops ashore. During the night of 24-25 February minor infiltrations were attempted against the central portion of our lines; all were repulsed. On the 25th, ground activity continued with only limited gains being made. The most number of gains being made in the central and western portions of the line. It is believed that our troops are now attacking the principal enemy offensive positions on the island. The latest casualties as of 1130 on the 25th were as follows: KIA 834; WIA 5,428; MIA 404. 2,827 enemy dead have been counted and 7 POWs have been taken.

CTF 58 is still maintaining radio silence; however, VLR reports indicate that weather over TOKYO is unfavorable and therefore the carrier planes may have difficulty in reaching their targets.

During the air raid at IWO JIMA on the evening of the 24th the KEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD 665) and the BRYANT (DD 665) collided causing extensive damage to the EDWARDS.

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TOP SECRET

25 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Planes from the CVEs supporting the IWO JIMA operation will renew dawn and dusk sweeps against CHICHI JIMA and HAHN JIMA since TF 93 has reported that he can only carry out night intruder attacks at those targets. B-24s have been assigned artillery, blockhouse and gun emplacement targets for their scheduled 1500 attacks.

On the 24th MARCUS was attacked by B-24s. The runways appeared in good operational condition prior to attack. The attack was made with delayed fuse bombs from an altitude of 10,000 feet.

On the 25th, 229 B-29s were airborne for an incendiary attack on the TOKYO urban area. 22 of these planes returned early and 2 were lost when they collided at the assembly point some 60 miles west of CHICHI JIMA. No survivors were located by a plane which circled the area for approximately 2 hours. 14 of these planes bombed TOKYO by radar through 10/10 undercast. 40 other B-29s bombed Empire targets including YOKOHAMA, SIZUOKA, HAMAMATSU and NAGYIA. All results were unobserved and all planes returned safely except the 2 which collided. There was no fighter interception and flak was meager to moderate and generally inaccurate.

CINCPAC 250430 (pink) outlines searches and strikes to be carried out in conjunction with the fast carrier strike on the NAGYIA AIRCRAFT.

CTF 51 250515 is Summary No. 13 covering JBC situation as of 1100 (B).
25 February (D plus 6).

ComGenAPFOA 250740 concerns movement data of 315th Bomb Wing as the first two groups of the 56th Bomb Wing.

26 February (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA on the night of 25-26 February the enemy attempted only minor infiltrations and no major counterattacks were reported. It was the quietest night since the beginning of the operation. On the 26th at 0700 (E), the front line divisions commenced their assault. Stubborn resistance was encountered from the entire day, but by late afternoon noticeable gains had been made in the center of the line where the entire No. 2 airfield had been seized. At the present time our troops occupy the most important terrain, from a tactical standpoint, but excepting the troops now being on high ground and from the front line positions can observe the entire northern half of the island.

Two of our observation planes landed at strip No. 1 on the morning of the 26th. The strip has been cleared to 1,500 feet. All weapons have been brought ashore to aid in protection of the troops and planes expected to be operated from the airfield very shortly. Information from prisoners of war indicate that the only source of drinking water now available to the Japanese is rainwater which is being collected in barrels. Our own supply is adequate, 15 distillers units being in operation on shore. The morale of the Marine Divisions deployed in the operation is reported to be excellent and the reserves adequate to complete the mission of capturing IWO JIMA.

CVE based planes flew support missions on the morning of the 26th but all air operations were cancelled early in the afternoon because of unfavorable weather.

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TOP SECRET

26 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

On the 26th planes from the ENTERPRISE made a dawn sweep against CHAADU, destroying 1 airplane, 1 small AK, and 2 medium AKs. 15 search planes were observed on the field and 3 small vessels were observed in the harbor.

4 submarines have been reported in the vicinity of IWO (A) A plane from the ANZIO (AV-17 CVE 57) made visual contact with a large submarine at 21/26N (14-12N, 140-15E) dropped a SONO-BOMB and attacked. An explosion was heard and the sub is believed to be damaged. (B) Four hours earlier at 20/26N an un-named ship from TF 54 made a radar contact with a probable submarine (16-28S, 140-28E), NO CON (DD 586), DENNION (DD 662) and CAPE Hatteras (DD 906) attacked; all heard heavy underwater explosion at the same time, then no sub chasers were being dropped. There is no report of debris. (C) At 0045/26N TF 54, NAT (DE 707), escorting returning transports from IWO, had an underwater sound contact (20-12N, 141-29E). Attacks brought debris and weed with Japanese characters on it to the surface. (D) Another contact was made 5 hours later about 50 miles to the south. The TULAGI (CVE 72) ASW group is conducting hunter-killer operations there but no results have been reported.

Com7thFleet reports that preliminary minesweeping of the north portion of MANILA BAY has been completed with negative results.

A Task Unit of 1 DD, 1 DE, 2 AM and 2 LCI left LEXINGTON on the 26th to proceed to CAGAYAN SOUND to land scouts for reconnaissance and to sweep the bay for mines.

It now appears that TF 58 did not attack KAGAYA on the 26th. The KAGAYA attack was broken off after one day and they are now scheduled to arrive at a fueling rendezvous today.

CTF 51 260525 is Summary No. 15 covering IWO situation as of 1900 (K) on the 26th (D plus 7).

DepCom20thARF 260650 (pink) requests ComGen 1st USMC to continue efforts to photograph OKINAWA until such time as photographic results are obtained other means.

Cincom 260725 (pink) concerns employment of MILLET (DE 647) in the PHILIPPINE area to provide for emergency electric facilities.

Cincopep Adv. Hq. 260855 requests Com5thFleet to station a guard ship NE of IWO JIMA on days of VLR major strikes. This request extends only for a period during which 5th Fleet ships remain in the IWO JIMA area.

CTF 51 261315 is Summary No. 16 covering IWO situation as of 1900 (K) on the 26th (D plus 7).
TOP SECRET

27 February (Guam date)

At DIV JIMA on the 27th limited gains were made during the day, with the east side of the line which were made along the center of the line and along the right flank where the 4th MarDiv made an advance of approximately 400 yards along the coast. Garrison forces have been ordered to commence landing on 1 March.

LST 884 was hit by a medium caliber shell putting 1 crew out of commission, and an un-named AKA was hit with minor damage resulting. 11 and 120mm guns and 4 LSM's were damaged from beaching. CAHOUN (DD 301) collided with a trailer from an APA while getting underway. Slight damage resulted.

28 February was the scheduled date for an operation in which troops will be landed in the Puerto Princesa area on the Island of Mindoro. The 9th Inf. (Reinforced) from the 41st Infantry Division of the 7th Army was scheduled to take the landing. Combat troops for this operation number 3,792; service troops number 2,266. The initial objective will be the two airstrips in the Puerto Princesa area; the final phase of the operation will consist of the development of air, naval and logistic facilities, and eventually the control of the entire island of Palawan.

ComSFG reports results of the OYKU strike by TF 78 on the 11th as follows:

**Enemy Losses:**
- 158 planes destroyed of which 47 were hit down.
- 2 trains, 1 radar station and hangars destroyed.
- OTA Plant 75% destroyed.
- KOKU Plant hit heavily.
- 5 coastal vessels, 2 small craft probably sunk.
- 9 coastal vessels, 2 small craft damaged.

**Own Losses:**
- 9 VF planes and 4 VF pilots in combat.
- 3 VF, 1 VT and no personnel operational.
- No damage to surface forces except minor damage to PORTERFIELD and PASADENA.

Approach to the target was through bad weather, which required landing drops several times to prevent damage to destroyers. 4 DDs suffered structural storm damage. The weather was bad on the 25th, and a strike on NAICKA (where better weather was predicted) was cancelled on the morning of the 26th due to weather. During sunset of the 25/26 the force sank 5 small enemy vessels including 1 J battery boat which caused minor damage, 1 officer killed and 13 men wounded on U S NAVY (DD 263) and minor damage and 2 men wounded in PASADENA (CL 65).

The force fueled on the 27th. Then TG 58.4 was detached to return to ULITHI. The other 3 groups are headed for OKINAWA when they will conduct their strike on 1 March, a day early, and possibly strike also on the 2nd.

LENNY (SS 324) reports destroying 1 and possibly 2 tankers from a 3 tanker northbound convoy off CAULUAN BAY on an unstated date, probably the 25th.

CINC SWPA 25059 refers to SePacCom personnel to be transferred to CINCPAC.

CINC SWPA 261515 (pink) refers to staging and rehabilitation of USA divisions as contemplated in the FILLAS Agreement. MacArthur states that they will be unable to stage and rehabilitate the divisions as planned in the FILLAS Agreement.

Continued
TOP SECRET

27 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Com5thFleet 262107 outlines TOKTC strike on the 25th. See TKTC.

Cinopac PEARL 270300 covers report concerning Lt. Gen. Harmon was called to CAHU from IOWA.

CTF 51 270535 in Summary No. 17 covering TK situation as of 0000 on the 27th (D plus 3).

Cinopac Adv. Hq. 270304 refers to proposal to achieve a clear combat area between ENY JETM and the MARIANA'S and WESTERN CAROLINAS.

Cinopac 270324 (pink) authorizes the establishment of a 3rd Marine Fleet HQ/AB at POHANG ISLAND.

CTF 51 271130 in Summary No. 18 covering TK situation as of 0600 on 27 February (D plus 3).

Cinopac 271415 (pink) requests information from ComCESA relative to certain service troops assigned to ComCESA.

Cinopac 271416 requests ComCESA to strike enemy aircraft in the MARSHALLS without delay.

28 February (Guam date)

On the 28th advances were made at ENY JETM to the extent of about half a mile all along the line. Our casualties as of 1300 K 27 February were 153 KIA, 1570 WIA, 7656, MIA 552. Total casualties 9778. Enemy casualties were 2419 on the 26th, 4734 killed, 10 TCW's.

Task Force 58 was scheduled to strike OKINAWA on 1 March.

PRESIDENT ADAMS (ADV 19) received structural damage to CASA 365 during unloading operations on the 28th.

The search for General Harmon's plane has been negative so far. The night of the 26th. At least 70 planes have been searching for the plane.

CinCESAF 240215 outlines short titles of various British traffic flow commands.

MARSHALL 280026 (pink) fixes the departure date for the 2d water column of the 58th Wing at 15 April at the earliest.

Cinopac Adv Hq 280047 (pink) informs CinCESAF that 5 TBMs of VMF-314 will arrive SAWR evening of 28 February for photographing OKINAWA targets in coordination with the Fast Carrier strike thereon on 1 and 2 March. These TBMs will stay in the SAW area until about 1 April.

Cinopac Adv Hq 280129 (pink) gives CinCESAF information relative to Fast Carrier strike on OKINAWA on 1 March and possibly on 2 March.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

28 February ( Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 51 23051D is Summary No. 19 covering L.O. situation as of 1 March 23 February (D plus 9).

Cincopac Adv Hq 230529 (pink) sets forth the Warning order for late 1100-c of ICEBERG Operation with target date noted as "A-Day".

CTF 51 231035 is Summary No. 20 covering L.O. situation as of 0001 (1) 23 February (D plus 9).

1 March ( Guam date)

At Iwo Jima during the night 28 Feb.-1 March enemy artillery fire blanked out the ammunition dump of the 5th MarDiv. During the day of D plus 1, mines were placed along the entire front; however, the 3rd MarDiv was able to seize a portion of Airfield #3. Airfield #4 is now reported operational for emergency landings of fighter aircraft, 1 carrier plane having landed on the field already.

Minor damage was inflicted on our shipping at Iwo Jima. During the night Iwo Jima (D plus 1) received a mediums caliber hit from enemy artillery fire flooding the forward engine room; 9 men were killed, 16 wounded. CALHOUN (DD 801) was hit, 1 of which resulted in 1 killed and 7 wounded.

TF 58 completed its mission of a strike against Okinawa and is now loaded for ULITHI.

CinNavGroup CHINA reports the arrival of the transport USS AUBREY BROWN on 23 February. This ship which was granted safe conduct passage in order to transport supplies for POWs was reported to have unloaded 600 tons of munitions and 20 crated planes.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Rear Admiral Sherman departed for Washington, D.C. with ultimate destination WASHINGTON, D.C.

ComGenPOA 23155 (pink) refers to transfer of Solacbacon overhead allotment to POA.

ComGen Solacbacon 010042 (pink) sets forth units transferred from Solacbacon to various operating areas.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 010135 (pink) lists tentative assignment of ships to CTF 58 for ICEBERG Operation.

CTF 51 010600 is Summary No. 21 covering L.O. situation as of 0001 (1) 1 March (D plus 10).

CTF 51 011130 is Summary No. 22 covering L.O. situation as of 1900 (1) 1 March (D plus 10).
TOP SECRET

2 March (Ganam date)

At 00 JIMA on the 2nd advances up to 700 yards were made by 11th Cav Div in the central portion of the island. The other two divisions, the 6th on the right and 5th on the left, made exceptionally small gains throughout the day. Airfield #3 has now been secured and 4,000 feet of airfield #1 has been rehabilitated. Our casualties as of 1700 (K) 1 March were: 592 officers, 10,663 EM. Total casualties are now 11,255 of which 1,774 are listed as KIA. Enemy casualties as follows: Killed, 7,177; Wounded, 15 Japa, 17 Koreane.

The occupation of PUERTO PRINCESA is proceeding without opposition. The support units and minesweeping units were released on 11-1111. MARAUDER A/S has now been cleared of mines throughout with the exception of a portion along the breakwater. The reconnaissance of CALIGURAN BAY is proceeding satisfactorily. The anchorage appears to be good, no mines have been found and no enemy activity was reported in the vicinity close to the beach.

Task Force 58 is now enroute to ULMU. DD's from this force picked up 7 or 8 aviators (VLR) who were down south of HISS VLR.

Again on the 2nd all searches for Lt. Gen. Halsey were negative.

Beginning on the evening of the 3rd, about 5 to 7 E/A's will fly reconnaissance search missions to the NAGOYA area for the purpose of checking radar scope photographs.

Marshall 241305 delineates the boundaries of the MARAUDER A/S fleet theater.

Com5thFlt 020359 (pink) states that he considers it advisable to strike KURISHI first in the next operation, leaving ULMU 1 day early if necessary, and requests Admiral Nimitz to make an alternate plan covering this strike on ULMU.

CTF 51 020515 is Summary No. 23 covering E/A situation as of 194F (K) on the 2nd (D plus 11).

DepCom20thAF 020554 (pink) outlines employment of 2 VLR wings at JUMP JIMA.

CTU 73-9-2 021058 outlines the results of the shore reconnaissance of CALIGURAN BAY.

CTF 51 021120 is Summary No. 24 covering E/A situation as of 194F (K) 2 March (D plus 11).
2 March (Guan date)

At 1800 JIWA on 3 March steady though not extensive advances were made on both the left flank and center of the Corps front lines throughout the day. The operation was extremely stubborn throughout the day. Heavy mortar fire was encountered by all 3 divisions. Airfield 42 is scheduled to be ready for general fighters on 6 March. However, transport planes are now landing on this field. Bombing is continuing, however due to unfavorable weather and poor beach conditions all operations carried out under extreme difficulties.

Casualties as of 1300 (K) 2 March are as follows: 60 officers, 1,170 enlisted. Total casualties 12,276 of which 1,977 are listed as killed in action. The dead as of 1300 (K) 2 March totaled 1,392. This is 30 Japs, 45 Koreans.

Task Force 58 is due to arrive at ULITHI in the afternoon of 4 March.

In the Southwest Pacific Area sweeping of a large area continues. In the PHILIPPINES is continuing and reports indicate that progress is satisfactory. The VESSELS VANCE is clear and no mines have been found in TIKAO Pass. In addition have been made on LUBANG ISLAND and VESSELS ISLAND.

SALTIER (AMC95) struck a contact mine in JALAN VAI on the 2nd. Due to fuel in the flooding of engine rooms and causing severe structural damage, 11 of her crew were killed and 13 wounded.

2 Task Groups of Task Force 58 obtained majority of JIWA and other islands of the VESSELS VANCE Group on March 2. Unfortunately conditions existed on that day and the prediction of more constant weather and caused the abandonment of plans for a second day at the objective. No air opposition was encountered and only 6 enemy planes (all twin engine fighters) were shot down. 37 additional planes were destroyed on the ground (7 twin engine and 12 single engine). 36 were reporting missing. All of these were Yak and 5 pilots plus 3 aircrews were reported missing.

In attacks on shipping: 13 vessels were sunk (including 1 17,000 ton JAPA), 13 were probably sunk (including 1 medium AK), and 26 were damaged (including 1 DF, 1 medium AK and 4 medium AK).

On the ground, many buildings, including barracks, administration buildings, sugar mills, a lumber yard, warehouses, radio and radar installations, and airfield installations were destroyed or damaged on JALAN, TIKAO, VESSELS, LUBANG, \( \ldots \), VESSELS, and JALAN.

During its retirement, the task group conducted a night on bombardment of JALAN and JALAN, large fires.

191 B-29s were airborne for an attack on TOKYO at 0300 J on the 3rd. Primary target was the Musashino Aircraft Plant near TOKYO.

Air evacuation of the wounded by landplanes began at 1st JUT on the 3rd.

Richardson 200546 (pink) concerns certain Army facilities to be transferred to naval jurisdiction on a temporary loan basis.

COWESCARFOR 020943 (pink) recommends increasing, prior to next operation, the VNP pilot complement on CVE's due to the arduous schedule resulting in excessive pilot fatigue.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

2 March (Gum date) (Cont'd)

CTF 58 031247 outlines photographic coverage obtained by CTF 58 of the initial CINCPACO area on 1 March.

CHQ S/PA 02912 (pink) refers to proposal in the Visit Agreement to stage 9 POP divisions in the PHILIPPINES.

CINCPAC Adv. HQ. 022329 (pink) states that for CINCPAC's information there is no change in current situation relative to employment of RF.

Cons 5d 023297 outlines departure of certain units from 1st AB in order to make ready for next operation.

CTF 51 030110 is Summary No. 26 covering INL situation as of 20th at 1300 on the 3rd (D plus 12).

CINCPAC Adv. HQ. 030219 (pink) states that he desires INL situation to be returned from CINCPAC to operational control of CINCPAC not later than 21 April.

CTF 51 030609 is Summary No. 25 covering INL situation as of 20th at 1300 on 3 March (D plus 12).

Richardson 031022 refers to officer and enlisted shortages in the 26th Corps.

4 March (Gum date)

The front lines at IWO JIMA remained practically unchanged throughout the entire day of 4 March. Casualties as of 1700 (K) 3 March are as follows: 646 officers, 12,656 enlisted men; total, 13,302 of which 2,175 are listed as KIA. Enemy casualties as of 1800 (K) 3rd are: 12,300 dead, 36 Jan. 20th, 48 JNY. 20th.

Reconnaissance and sweeping of CINCPAC area has been completed. No mines were found nor were any enemy installations discovered on shore. No mines were seen in DALEY BAY.

2 destroyers, YAMASHI (DD 541) and RISDJELD (DE 500), both assigned to TF 27 on route to ULTRA, collided, considerable damage being caused to both ships. No personnel casualties are reported by the RISDJELD but 1 man was killed and 6 wounded aboard the YAMASHI. Both ships will require extensive repairs.

TRENDJ (SS 412) sank an AK on the morning of the 3rd off IWO JIMA.

Results of the raid by B-29s on the TOKYO area are as follows: 1 primary target, Musashino Aircraft Plant, was hit with 27 tons from 5 B-29s, resulting in radar area 25-30,000 feet through 10/10ths cloud. 154 other planes dropped 420 tons (14 CP, 148 TB) on the TOKYO urban area by radar area 25-29,000 feet. There was no fighter opposition but heavy AA was effective and accurate and inaccurate. 11 planes bailed 5 other targets with 56 tons. Results were undocumented because of weather. 1 B-29 ditched on return, 9 survivors were rescued by a Navy Dumbo. 1 other B-29 was forced to land at IWO JIMA because of fuel shortage. The plane was recovered, took off and landed safely at TINTIN. All other planes returned safely.

Coxinich & CNO 022020 concerns the category of defense of the JANAPA sector.

Photron 5 Adv. 031136 (pink) states that Clark Field is the only field in LUZON suitable for Liberator operations and that no 5th AF personnel were prior to 20 March and states that 5th AF is scheduled to fly B-52's into IWO JIMA.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

4 March (Guam date) (C 4th)

CTF 58 032346 (pink) states that he proposes to sortie for operation INLAND (LID) for the next operation.

Chairman's 040447 (pink) refers to weather reconnaissance report in support of IOCMEDG OPERATION.

CINCPOA Adv. Hq. 040343 (pink) requests DoPCom to add 3 days to the duration of HICKSON STRIPS in order to determine route used by NVA troops in the area.

CTF 51 040444 is Summary No. 27 covering TIC situation at 0330, 4 March (D plus 12).

CINCPOA Adv. Hq. 040336 (pink) comments on withdrawal of 21st Marines assigned to FOC for conversion to Long Range Groups.

CTF 51 041040 is Summary No. 28 covering TIC situation at 0330, 4 March (D plus 13).

5 March (Guam date)

No change in the ground situation resulting from action on the 3rd. The reason for this was that all the further divisions were reorganizing and reserves of ammunition were being built up and personnel were being retrained. Fighting in the rear areas continued. Casualties as of 1700 (K) on 4 March were 163 casualties. At least 2,419 had been killed in action.

MANILA HARBOR minesweeping operation has been substantially completed. The harbor has been opened and naval ships of all types are now well advanced in the harbor. Minesweeping in BAL RAY and in SAB CARRERO STRIPS continues. Troops were landed on MANILA ISLAND on the 3rd.

C5th Fleets in the HINDAUNOULIS departed LAG 1600 (K) on the 4th for TIC and Covehna briefing is scheduled to leave on the 6th also for TIC.

C5th Fleets 040333 directs CTF 58 to maintain the equivalent of 1 task force of Task Force 58 in readiness for sortie on 18 hours notice.

CINCPAC 040429 states that the new Advanced Echelon Group will be sent within 1200 I (-9) on 5 March.

CINCPAC 040811 (pink) outlines to CINCPAC the current plan to be put into effect for the IOCMEDG Operation.

C5th Fleets 040850 (pink) approves CTF 58 OpLan for 12/21/66 with the exception of minor changes in composition of task groups.

CINCPAC 041759 states that operation of 5 State Liberators of 7-5 from Clark Field about 10 March is approved.

CINCPAC 050313 (pink) states that 49th Bomb Group can be returned to CINCPAC operational control prior to 15 April.

CINCPAC 050434 states that ComGenPOA may send a control group to assist in mounting out 24th Corps Garrison Echelons.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

5 March (Guan date) (Cont'd)

CTF 51 050435 is Summary No. 29 covering JIC situation as of 0500 Z, 5 March (D plus 14).

COMCONNAVPA 050450 (pink) refers to staff setup for INTRAMAR, (CINCNA), and MORELAND (NCO JIC).

DEPCOM20thAF 050452 (pink) recommends that request of CINCNA for the 1st Bomber Command to conduct reconnaissance of TSUKUBA STRAITS be approved provided it does not seriously interfere with the prime mission of the 20th AF.

COMAIRPAC 050615 (pink) recommends that the CACT, together with the Carrier Air Group (29), be returned for Navy Yard availability prior to 15 March. COMAIRPAC states that this Air Group is not fit for further combat.

CTF 51 051015 is Summary No. 30 covering JIC situation as of 0500 Z, 5 March (D plus 14).

CINCPAC Adv. No. 051246 terminates the designation of 2ND DIV as an Area Reserve for JIC JIC Operation.

CINCPAC Adv. No. 051410 (pink) recommends to CINCSEA that CACT be retained plus its Air Group (29), for participation in the next operation (at least in the initial stages).

6 March (Guan date)

JNO JIMA - reorganization of the 5th Place Corps was completed on the morning of 6 March, no changes being made in the disposition of the front line divisions. Intense artillery preparation was laid down before jumping off. However, exceptionally slight gains were made along the entire front lines throughout the day.

SAN MIGUEL STRAITS has been swept with no mines being found. CANGUINAN SOUND and RAY are reported ready for immediate use. The airfield site at this locality was reported to be satisfactory.

3 OSS are scheduled to leave JNO JIMA on the afternoon of the 7th. This will leave 2 OT and 1 DO Squadron for fire support of the objective.

SEYMOUR (JX 473) reports a hole in her plating and a flooded compartment from an unknown cause. The damage inflicted could possibly be due to a 2nd bomb or torpedo dropped by a Betty which this destroyer shot down on 1 March. No personnel casualties were suffered, but docking will be required.

British Pacific Fleet arrived at KINU on the 7th and is reported to be ready for immediate duty.

COMNAVFOA (Adm) 051335 (pink) discusses assignment of certain Air Force units in the JINNO Operation.

COMNAVFOA 040258 outlines assignment of Army facilities to KINU.

COMNAVFOA 040329 (pink) continues to CINCSEA that it is essential that there be no reduction in bombardment strength assigned to FOA.

COMNAVFOA Adv. No. 051410 (pink) replies to COMNAVFOA (Adm. Ingalls) relative to possibility of assault on Fat West Coast.

- CONTINUED -
6 March (Same date)(0-14,4)

GTF 51 060200 is Summary No. 31 covering JNA situation as of 1200 (K)
6 March (0 plus 15).

GTF 51 061200 is Summary No. 32 covering JNA situation as of 1800 (K)
6 March (0 plus 15).

7 March (Same date)

At JNA JIMA on the 7th little progress was made by any of the divisions.
Limited gains up to 300 yards were made by the 9th MarDiv on the extreme left flank
and approximately 200 yards in the center and on the right flank. No advances were
made by 3rd or 4th MarDivs. Casualties as of 1700 (K) 7 March: 685 officers, 15,600
enlisted men of which 2,600 are listed as killed in action.

The JNA JIMA Expeditionary Force is to be reorganized effective 9 March.
The naval forces pass to the control of Admiral Hill and the ground forces will be
under the direct control of Maj. General Schmidt, USA. The Island Command assumes
the designation 23 10,16 until control is passed to Commonwealth.

300 B-47s are scheduled to take off at 2000 K(-10) on the 9th to bomb TOKYO
at 0330 (K) on the 10th. This strike is the largest scheduled up to the present time.

GTF 58 260690 (pink) sets forth his suggested Task Force 58 organization
for ICBERSO.

GTF 58 050917 (pink) outlines sortie date from ULITHI and strikes dates for
the ICBERSO Operation.

Ginesas Pearl 060524 (pink) authorizes 1st MarDiv to use KAUAI facilities
for rehabilitation and staging following the ICBERSO Operation.

Ginesas 061140 (pink) states that the 4th and 9th Submarine Fleets are reporting for duty and requests confirmation of continued assignment to NPOA Forces.

Arnold 061319 (pink) discusses requirements for 2 additional very heavy
bomb wings for employment in KITAKO JIMA.

GTF 51 070520 is Summary No. 33 covering JNA situation as of 1200 (K)
7 March (0 plus 15).

GTF 51 071220 is Summary No. 34 covering JNA situation as of 1800 (K)
7 March (0 plus 15).

GTF 51 071233 (pink) discusses evacuation of 4th and 9th MarDivs and departure
of OIFs and recommends retaining ENTERPRISE at JNA JIMA until night of 15 March.

Ginesas at Washington 071319 (pink) directs that fuel estimates for RRF be
bases on training and passage between ports but no combat operation during Phase I
of ICBERSO.

ComMCHNA 071245 (pink) announces GTF 51's dispatch relative to evacuation of
4th and 9th MarDivs subject to conditions above, but desires earlier release of
ENTERPRISE Group if night fighter squadron is ready to take over at JNA JIMA.
6 March (Guns date)

Small but steady gains were made at IWO JIMA on the 6th. In the center of the line our troops are now within between 400 and 500 yards of the coast.

P-51s on the 6th flew their first strafing mission at IWO JIMA in support of the ground troops. 2 squadrons of P-51s and 1 VMB squadron have arrived.

13th Bomber Command reports that a Liberator attacked an enemy CVE at 2235 Z on the 6th at 117-43N 166-29E, (off E. coast of BOHIBO in MAKASSAR STRAIT). 3 hits were scored resulting in an explosion. The vessel was identified visually to have been on course 260 at 20 knots and was dead in the water when last observed. 6 enemy fighters were airborne in the vicinity but failed to close.

6 squadrons of B-24s and 3 squadrons of P-38s were scheduled to attack ZAMBOANGA targets in preparation for the amphibious assault scheduled for 10 March.

14th AF planes attacked TOUANE (FRENCH INDO CHINA) on the 5th causing considerable damage to planes and airfield facilities. 32 operational planes were still observed on the airfield, 6 other planes being destroyed.

STREEL (AS 392) reports sinking a large tanker off TOKYO the night of the 5th and a medium AK east of MIYAKI on the night of the 1st.

ComSecFWPac 01C01I (pink) discusses arrival of replacements for Marine Divisions to be employed in Phase XIII of IOR/NEGO Operation.

OTF 5 060000 (pink) answers Cinpac's dispatch relative to return of the CAROT and her Air Group for availability and reformation.

Cinmac 071945 (pink) discusses availability of G8s for overseas employment during 1945 and first part of 1946.

ComSecFWPac 080011 (pink) makes further reference to replacement troops for employment in IOR/NEGO.

DupCom20thAF 080200 (pink) requests authority from Cinpac to lay acoustic and magnetic mines without sterilizers in the forthcoming operation at SHIMOKOSHI STRAITS.

Cinpac Adv, Eq. 080230 (pink) states that he will defer action on the return of the CAROT for availability until receipt of Cin5thFleet's recommendation.

OTF 51 060500 is Summary No. 35 covering IWO JIMA situation as of 1200 (L) on the 6th (9 plus 17).

XXI BomCom 060730 (pink) outlines the operations to be conducted by the XXI Bomber Command in support of the IOR/NEGO Operation.

Cinpac Adv, Eq. 060753 answers Cinmac dispatch relative to installation of quad 50 caliber guns on certain G8s.

Cinpac Adv, Eq. 060930 (pink) informs Cin5thFleet that 21st BomCom is prepared to conduct pilot test sweep in conjunction with strikes in IOR/NEGO if desired.

OTF 51 061000 is Summary No. 36 covering IWO JIMA situation as of 1300 (L) on the 6th (9 plus 17).

Cinpac Adv, Eq. 061030 (pink) requests information from Cin5thFleet as to what missions he wishes BomCom 21 to carry out in connection with IOR/NEGO carrier operations.

2574
2 March (Gum date)

The landing at ZAMBOKA on by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area is scheduled for tomorrow, 10 March.

323 B-29s took off from Guam, Tinian, and Saipan at approximately 1500 (K) on the 9th for an attack on Tokyo. Bombing commenced at 0040 (K) on the 10th. Preliminary reports indicate that results achieved were excellent.

OTF 51 090133 (pink) discusses assignment of ships assigned to his command in the forthcoming operations and makes recommendations for provision of additional escorts.

Gnispen Pearl 060325 censors in Ominsh modification of Category of Defense in the UNALASKA Sector.

CG 1 Adv MANILA 060435 summarizes results of conference at 7th Fleet Headquarters on 26 February relative to BPF petroleum requirements at Manus and Leyte.

OTF 51 080920 (pink) recommends that 9th Fleet direct ENTERPRISE to remain at INO JIMA to support troops and cover ships present instead of immediate return to ULITHI.

Marines 061942 (pink) outlines battle replacements to be assigned 9th Corps.

ConfluentNaval & ComNav WNO 090015 refers to possible fast carrier raid on West Coast prior to pending conference in San Francisco.

Com5thFlt 090147 answers OTF 51 recommendation that ENTERPRISE remain at INO JIMA and states that due to demands of overall situation ENTERPRISE should be sailed to arrive ULITHI morning of 12 March.

Com5thFlt 090229 recommends that SHANGRI LA be sailed from Pearl to join Task Force 56 at earliest practicable date.

DepCom20hAP 090555 (pink) approves BmnCom XXX scheduled participation in support of the KIRK Operation.

Cnopea Adv Eq 090748 (pink) recommends to Ominsh that the 4th and 6th British Submarine Flotillas be assigned to 7th Fleet as of 1 April.

10 March (Gum date)

Most notable advances made on INO JIMA on the 10th were carried out by the 4th Marine in the north and central portions of their zone of action. They are now within 800 to 200 yards of the coast in their sector. The 3rd and 9th Marine made very little headway.

Troops of the 11th Div Div landed on ZAMBOKA on the morning of the 10th. Rear Admiral Hoyal landed the troops in this operation. The operation was carried out with very little opposition being encountered. Only slight return machine gun fire was reported.

- Continued -
10 March (Cont'd)

CNSFREP ORIMA reports the presence of a great number of miscellaneous barges, one carrier and small freighters in the vicinity of southern KOREA. Extensive rail, dock and warehouse facilities in this area indicate extensive use of these ports for shipping from MANGYONGAL and KOREA.

KMTZ (25560) reports sinking 3 medium freighters on the night of the 10th in the KYOTO Area.

The southern airfield at IRO JIMA is now reported graded for 5000 feet, with airfield No. 2 scheduled to be in operation around the 14th of March, provided the combat situation permits.

TOKYO was hit on the night of 9-10 March by 205 B-29s from an altitude of from 5000 to 9000 feet. Bombing was done both visually and by radar through 7/10 clouds. 2,777 tons of incendiaries were dropped on the TOKYO urban area resulting in the destruction of 13 square miles completely burned out. Air opposition was slight and ineffective and AA varied from moderate to intense. An estimated 75 to 100 searchlights were reported as being observed from landfall to the target. 5 B-29s landed at IRO JIMA on the morning of the 10th, 1 of them going off the end of the runway and the other 4 making successful landings. These 4 took off for the MARIANAIs that afternoon.

CTC 32.2 201026 (pmsk) recommends that as many CVEs as practicable should be made available as rotating reliefs for the CVEs now assigned for the ICHIBAN Operation; reference is made specifically to CVEs scheduled to be EFS in the near future on the West Coast. (CTC 32.2 - R.Adm. Dungan).

ComPhibPac 091120 (pmsk) censures in Admiral Dungan's recommendation appearing above and requests that certain CVEs be made available for Phase II of ICHIBAN.

ComFltFle 080216 (pmsk) further censures in recommendations outlined in the two foregoing despatches.

Joint Security Central 082317 (pmsk) refers to deception program to be carried out during movement of 20th Bomber Command to the MARIANAIs.

CTF 51 091013 is Summary No. 37 covering IRO situation as of 1800 on the 9th (D plus 19).

Cinseap (Wash) 091377 (pmsk) outlines to CHINSWPA the future scheduled employment of Marine Air Wing ONE in the Pacific Ocean Areas subsequent to 1 July.

ComFltFle 092399 (pmsk) outlines the planned track of TF 58 and requests ComPhibPac to make an anti-plant search sweep in advance of the proposed passage of the Task Force.

CTF 51 100421 is Summary No. 36 covering IRO situation as of 1200 on the 10th (D plus 29).

Cinseap Adm. Eq. 100935 (pmsk) requests photographic coverage by CTF 50 of KERAMID NITTO and KUSUK SEIMA about I Shima 9.

CTF 51 100950 is Summary No. 39 covering IRO situation as of 1800 on the 10th (D plus 19).
11 March (0630 hours)

Progress was good on D plus 20 (11 March) at IWO JIMA. We are now in control of the entire coastline along the eastern coast in the zone of action of the 4th MarDiv and along the northern coast in the 9th MarDiv zone. It is estimated that there are 1,000 Japs located in this extreme northern end of the island plus scattered elements yet to be eliminated by the 4th MarDiv. Our total casualties as of 1800 (N) 11 March are listed as: 17,443 of which 3,443 have been killed in action.

The RANDOLPH (CVL-15) was hit by a Jap suicide plane while at anchor at ULYNO at about 0600 the night of the 11th starting fires which were reported under control two hours later. Known casualties are reported as 1 dead and 25 injured. A second suicide plane crashed on SOKLED ISLAND at the same time, damaging certain buildings. Amplifying report will follow later.

P-51s are apparently operating successfully from IWO JIMA. They have been flying close support missions and have been hitting IWO JIMA with reported excellent results.

On the night of 11-12 March, 307 B-25s were airbombed for an inescapable attack on MACHIA. 29% of these planes actually reached the target. The majority of the planes bombed visually and reports of damage inflicted were from good to excellent. Moderate air opposition was encountered and AA indicated as moderate to intense.

CTF 51 0630 recommends that Com5thFlt issue a directive to ComFwdArea to assume responsibility for defense and development of IWO JIMA upon completion of the capture and occupation phase which he estimates will be about 28 March.

ComAirPac Adm 0630 (pink) refers to summaries of Marine Air Groups and servicing facilities from OKINAWA to OKINAWA ARCHIPELAGO and establishment of an aircraft pool thereon.

Com5thFlt 101400 (pink) outlines certain changes in his OpPlan L-45 (ICBQH).

Com5thFlt 102330 GIVES BCT 51.21 (IraDAN, Hill) and CTF 94 (V. Adm. Hoover) to determine data mutually agreeable for transfer of responsibility for defense and development of IWO JIMA.

CTF 51.21 111000 is Summary No. 41 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 11th (D plus 20).

Com5thFlt 111216 summarizes suicide crash on RANDOLPH at ULYNO.

12 March (0630 hours)

On D plus 21 (12 March) majority of enemy resistance was centered at the extreme northern portion of the island in the zone of the 9th MarDiv, organized resistance having ceased in the 3rd and 4th MarDiv zones. Evacuation of the 4th MarDiv will commence 14 March.

At IWO JIMA both airfields have been captured and most of the defensive installations have been evacuated, the Japanese apparently having withdrawn to the hills.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

12 March (exact date)(uncat'd)

An amplifying report concerning the MADURA strike on the night of the 11-12th indicates that 2/3 B-29s dropped a total of 1480 tons of incendiaries on the urban area from an altitude of from 5 to 8000 feet. Majority of the bombing was carried out visually through 0/10 to 3/10 cloud cover. Photographs taken on the 21st reveal 786 acres of the MADURA urban area to be destroyed. Only 1 plane was lost on this mission.

ComGenAFPA 110209 and 110199 (pink) concern battle replacements for the 13th Corps and also discusses rotation policy to be carried out.

ComGenAFPA 110400 outlines urgent need for additional CVEs for current and future operations.

CinCpeac Adv. Eq. 121302 passes the above despatch to ComAirPac for comment.

ComGenAFPA 112347 (pink) informs CinCSNPA that British carrier participation is cancelled for the time being and outlines schedule of operations to be carried out during the 1st phase of ICEBERG.

ComGenAFPA 120031 (pink) recommends to CinCpeac that release of 494th Bomb Group from CinCSNPA control be given as 15 April.

CFO 51-421 120215 is Summary No. 42 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 12th (B plan 21).

CinCSNPA 120345 (pink) outlines his strike schedule in support of ICEBERG for period L minus 16 through L minus 7.

ComGenAFPA 120410 refers to employment of CAROT in first phases of ICEBERG to be later released when RANDOLPH rejoins the Task Force.

CinCpeac Adv. Eq. 120426 (pink) outlines certain changes to be made by BomCom 21 in support of ICEBERG Operation.

CinCpeac Adv. Eq. 120743 advises ComGenAFPA that SHANGRI LA will not currently be assigned to TF 54.

CinCpeac Adv. Eq. 120732 (pink) outlines plan for covering movement of the 4th and 6th MarDivs from IWO Jima to the HAWAIIAN Area.

CFO 51-21 120805 is Summary No. 43 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 12th (B plan 21).

ComGenAFPA 120950 (pink) covers report on the suicide attacks made by 2 twin engine enemy planes at ULTRI.

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TOP SECRET

23 March (C230 date)

Off 93 is scheduled to sortie from ULRATH tomorrow, 14 March.

No appreciable change is reported in the situation on DNO JIMA on D plus 22 (13 March). Our forces landed on KASHI, BOKU and KASHIO JIMA on 13 March (W of DNO). No enemy forces were found but there were signs of previous occupation. Our total casualties as of 12 March — 19,282 of which 3,759 are listed as KIA; 20,000 enemy are reported to have been either buried or sealed up in caves as of this date.

The American Flag is scheduled to be officially raised at DNO JIMA at 0930 14 March.

The officer in charge of the survey of KAGURAN BAY reports raising the American Flag in KAGURAN TOWN on the 13th. All Japanese who were previously reported in KAGURAN had cleared the area.

RANDOLPH 130510 summarizes damage caused by KAMEJAKI crash.

ComAIlieAForces SWPA 130502 (pink) outlines schedule of fast carrier strikes to CFAF 5; CFAF 19 and ComAIlieAFForFlt and outlines operations to be carried out in conjunction therewith in support of ICHEBO Operation.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 130050 authorizes ComAIlieAFForFlt to make such adjustments of CABOT and RANDOLPH Air Groups as he sees fit.

OTG 31.121 130235 is Summary No. 44 covering DNO situation as of 1200 on the 13th (D plus 22).

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 130547 (pink) requests OTF 58 to obtain certain photo reconnaissance of THE KINUFO Area.

OTG 51.121 (D. Adm. Hill) 130920 is Summary No. 45 covering DNO situation as of 1600 on the 13th (D plus 22).

CFAF 13 (LETTER) 1313900 (pink) states that he will support ICHEBO Operation and furnishing convoy cover from LETTER to OKINAWA by March.

CFAF 21 131315 (pink) outlines his plan for operations in support of

The enemy appears to have been broken as a result of the action (D plus 23) at DNO JIMA. Scattered pockets exist throughout the northern portion of the island. Many attempts were made through the island where all of these were killed in action.

to the landing rendezvous. Five submarines are now conducting a sweep along the projected track of the force. 2 DNO

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

14 March (Gen date)(Cont'd)

OGT 51-21 estimates that INO defense and development will be turned over to OEP 94 (VAdm. Hoover) on the 21st.

No further positive results have been reported in the searches for Lt Com. M.F. Harmon.

On the night of 13-14 March 279 B-39's dropped 2,045 tons of incendiaries on the OKAI area urban area. Bombing was received at an altitude from 5,000 to 10,000 feet. Many large fires were observed. Enemy opposition was slight and reported as ineffective. All intensity was varied. No B-39's were lost in this mission. This is the first mission of any considerable size that BomCom 511 has experienced no loss in planes or personnel.

AAFFOA ADMIN 120325 (pink) discusses completion date of northwest VLR fields on Guam.

COMNAVFLIT 130514 requests information from OEP 51 (VAdm. Turner) regarding who will act as COFA during the next operation until Vice Admiral Turner's arrival.

CO 20th BomCom 131204 (pink) outlines searches to be carried out by that command prior to ICBEDO.

CINCPAC Adv. Eq. 131621 (pink) outlines his understanding of operations to be carried out by CinCOSWA in support of ICBEDO and requests confirmation of his understanding regarding this program.

CinCOPAC PEARL 132030 (pink) advises CominCh that he has no information regarding arrangements for any British base in the PHILIPPINES.

CinCOPAC 132051 states that SHANGRI LA will continue training replacement groups in PEARL until further orders are issued.

ComCENPAC 132107 (pink) concerns battle replacements originally scheduled for Guam to be diverted to PEARL.

CINCPAC Adv. Eq. 132234 advises ComMFLIT that SHANGRI LA will continue training at PEARL.

CINCPAC 132333 (pink) discusses possible employment of Mosquitoes (twin-engine light bombers) for an attack in the future.

CinCOPAC Adv. Eq. 140015 (pink) advises CinCOSWA that a firm date of 15 April has been given as release of the 494th Bomb Group to FOA control.

CinCOPAC PEARL 140047 (pink) refers to the Army FOA conference to be held by ComCEN and outlines the assumptions and plans covering this meeting.

OGT 51-22 140230 is Summary No. 46 covering INO situation as of 1200 on the 14th (D plus 23).

BomCom 21 140434 (pink) states concurrence in certain changes requested by CinCOPAC covering air support in ICBEDO Operation.

- Continued -

2572
14 March (Gen date)(Cont'd)

Cinespea Adv. Hq. 140748 (pink) advised DepCom 20th AF regarding target priorities for scheduled 21st BomCom strike on KYUSHU.

Cinespea Adv. Hq. 140750 (pink) outlines to Com9THFlt the scheduled operations of BomCom 21 in support of ICERSHO.

Cinespea Adv. Hq. 140752 (pink) informs various commands that British Task Force 113 will shortly be available for participation in ICERSHO and will be subject to withdrawal on 7 days notice.

BomCom 21 140800 (pink) requests information from Cinespea as to priority targets on KYUSHU.

COMAFF 141205 (pink) directs OTF 113 (V. Adm. H.B. Rawlins, R.N.) to direct TF 113 and TF 112 to report to Cinespea for duty in connection with operations ICERSHO.

15 March (Gen date)

Mopping up continues on IWO JIMA. The northern portion of the island still holds out as well as certain isolated pockets on the northeastern portion of the island.

TF 58 is approaching the fueling rendezvous.

250-300 B-29s from the 21st BomCom will take off at 1800H(-10) on the 16th for a scheduled night attack on ICERSHO. All planes will be loaded with incendiarics.

Becker ComCom 10 140403 refers to establishment of a Far Western Pacific Base Command in the BUNKHOUSE (HYOKUS) area as soon as that area is declared secured.

OTG 51.21 150225 is Summary No. 48 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 15th (D plus 24).

ComGenIAFFOA Admn 150305 (pink) refers to fighter groups being assigned to 20th AF.

OTF 113 150611 (pink) states that TF 113 and TF 112 are reporting to Cinespea for duty and states that they will be ready to sail from MANUS by 1200 H 17 March.

Cinespea 150656 (pink) requests use of LEYTE anchorage for British carrier task force and Fleet Train while participating in the ICERSHO Operation.

Cinespea Adv. Hq. 150656 (pink) directs TF 113 to proceed to ULITHI to top off from U.S. tankers prior to participation in ICERSHO.

Cinespea Adv. Hq. 150656 (pink) advises Com9THFlt that unless he hears to the contrary he will direct TF 113 to maintain neutralization of airfields in the BAMSA-SHIMA GENTO in accordance with operation 9THFlt's Operation 1-45. Also states that TF 113 will assume the designation of TF 27 upon departure from ULITHI.

Cinespea Adv. Hq. 150740 advises ComGenFOA that he does not consent in the further assignment of responsibilities for any Base Command administration to officers serving as island Commanders and assure unified command over all services involved.

- Continued -
15 March (Oscar date) (Last of)

CINCPAC ADV. No. 151295 advises CINCPAC that TF's 112 and 113 be prepared to function without shore facilities when they arrive at LEYTE and that British reserve carrier aircraft on shore will be authorized and established when Pacific Fleet carrier aircraft pool is activated.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Rear Admiral Sherman returned from Washington conference with Fleet Admiral King.

16 March (Oscar date)

Organised resistance on NJO JIMA was announced as overcome at 1800 X (-10) 16 March (5 plus 25). It is estimated that the island will be officially turned over to the Island Commander about 22 March. Total casualties are reported as 19,938 of which 4,189 are listed as killed in action.

On the night of 16-17 March 321 B-29s made an incendiary attack on KOSRA. Complete reports have not been received but preliminary reports indicate that substantial damage was caused. Fighter opposition was reported as being exceptionally meager and AId described as light. Majority of the squadrons bombed by radar.

CINCPAC ADV. No. 160604 (plank) advises CommodAIFPOA that he does not concur in the assignment of fighters to the 20th AF.

CINCPAC ADV. No. 160714 suggests reduction of 15% of personnel in Marine detachments in Pacific Fleet combatant ships in order to alleviate the critical Marine Corps personnel situation.

CINCPAC ADV. No. 160916 directs CTF 58 and CTF 93 to brief pilots not to attack the Emperor's Palace until further orders are issued.

CTF 51, 21, 160920 is Summary No. 51 covering NIO situation as of 1800 on the 16th (5 plus 25).

CINCPAC 161611 (plank) advises CINCPAC that LEYTE anchorage will be available for British Carrier Task Force while participating in ICHEBU.

17 March (Oscar date)

Mapping up operations continue on NJO JIMA. The 4th MarDiv is now reembarking, the 3rd MarDiv is to assume the responsibility for the 4th MarDiv's zone of action. 5th MarDiv is scheduled to commence re-embarking tomorrow.

No reports from TF 50. Picket boat sweep was completed with negative results.

TF 92 (RAdm.NeGren) reports bombing Matsuwa on the afternoon of the 16th. Heavy fires were observed. Light gunfire was returned but no damage was incurred by our ships.

SEAGAT (88 399) reports sinking a small AK 50 of KOSRA.

SPOT (88 413) reports sinking a medium AK and damaging another in FORMOSA STRAITS.

Amplifying report: gives results of the KOSRA Incendiary attack on the night of the 16th-17th as follows: 321 B-29s dropped approximately 2,000 tons of incendiary bombs both visually and by radar from 5000 to 10,000 feet. The weather was reported.

- continued -

2574
TOP SECRET

17 March (Osmn date) (...at'd)

as ranging from CAVU to 10/10 clouds. Numerous fires were reported as being observed. 3 B-29s are missing for unknown reasons.

21st Bomber 170945 (pink) advises CinCPac that between 27 March and 1 April 1500 mines will be laid in the SHIMOMOSEKI STRAIGHTS.

18 March (Osmn date)

TF 78 attacked KYUSHU targets today. No reports have been received as to damage inflicted as yet.

On the morning of 18 March elements of the 40th Inf. Div. landed on the southern shores of PANAY in the ILIGAN area. No opposition was encountered until the time of the report which was 1800L. Approximately 14,500 SPH troops are involved in this operation. Subsequent landings in this area are scheduled for GUIMARAS and NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.

Submarine activity was brisk. SPRINGER (SS 43A) reports sinking a DD just west of OCTOMA at 0400 on the morning of the 18th. THUNDER (SS 237) sank an AK and damaged another west of MANILA. POMPEII (SS 39) made an attack on a Jap submarine off BOKDO which failed to score a hit. Report indicates that she is doing an "end around" and hopes to make another attack on the same target. SFOY (SS 413) sunk a large AK, another unknown type of ship and made attacks on several other AKs and IJN with negative results. In addition, she engaged an AS with gunfire reporting some damage incurred by making hits with 5-inch and several 40mm. Return fire inflicted damage on the SFOY to the extent that both radars and #2 periscope were hit.

On the night of the 18th-19th 294 B-29s bombed MAKOTA with incendiaries. Preliminary reports indicate that results were good. Majority of squadrons report a general conflagration in the area. VF opposition was reported as being slight and AI light to moderate. No report on losses has as yet been received.

Okinan 171543 (pink) directs CinCPac to formulate a plan for detection and interception of a possible Japanese carrier raid on the west coast of the United States.

CinCPac Adv. Hq. 141502 (pink) informs certain commanders that the LEYTE-SAMAR Naval Base is expected to replace ULITHI as an advanced base prior to the advent of the typhoon season at ULITHI and requests concurrence of CINCPAC to utilize anchorages and facilities in that area.

CinCPac Adv. Hq. 141502 (pink) outlines the scheduled operations to be carried out by the British Pacific Fleet during the DAINAN Operation and sets forth the units which will participate therein.
10th March (Same date)

ConsularFleet reports that the FRANKLIN (CV 13) was hit on the morning of the 19th by a suicide plane carrying a bomb. Intactlore reports indicate that bad fires were started. The FRANKLIN is now in tow by the KITTEDO (CA 72) on a southerly course. Evidently this carrier was hit while south of NIMONI. ConsularFleet has requested fleet tug to take the FRANKLIN in tow.

No reports have been received on the KITTEDO strikes other than that the results were "good."

In the Southwest Pacific Area reports indicate that all unloading has been completed at RAMAT and that re-supply vessels are underway. Landings on GUAMARAS ISLANDS are planned for the night of the 19th.

A report has been received from GINSEGAEMA stating that on the 17th Allied planes damaged a large Japanese naval air transport plane forcing it to crash land near NAKES. Report indicates that an admiral and 32 other passengers were aboard the plane. 6 passengers were shot, 4 captured and 21 burned.

Ginepac Adv. No. 191285 states that TF.98 attacked KITTEDO on the 18th and KORE-KORE on the 19th and further states that FRANKLIN (CV 13) had been hit.

Ginepac 191330 (pink) sets forth the estimated ultimate requirements of VTB squadrons for anti-submarine warfare tasks in the forward area.

Ginepac Adv. No. 191332 concerns employment of search aircraft staging through INO JIMA.

20 March (Same date)

ConsularFleet submitted preliminary report on strike results for 18-19 March. Despatch was sent to a search plane and relayed to Ginepac by base. Report follows:

Enemy aircraft destroyed - 200 (in the air, 275 on the ground); probably damaged or destroyed - 100 first day, large number second day. Large number of hangars, shops and other installations destroyed at many airfields. Oil storage tanks were hit at KRONOT and KOMAI Air Depots and at KORE Naval Base. Ships damaged: 5 small freighters sunk, 7 damaged, 18 seaplane vessels damaged, including: 1 AV, 1 or 2 B, 2 or 3 CV, 7 OT, 2 GVB, 2 GVR, 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 DD, 2 SS, 2 DE. Casualties: 9 aircraft losses; FRANKLIN damaged but now making 15 knots; 4 other CV damaged, but none seriously - all are fully operational.

Intelligence report states one ATAGO Class and one NAGISO Class cruiser left SINGAPORE at noon of the 18th, followed four hours later by a destroyer.

RAKAO (SS 285) sank two transports and a possible escort at SHI 1220 on the 19th, and destroyed a junk a later in the day.

REYKJAVIK (SS 292) was bombed by Zako and can submerge only to 30 feet. 2100000 position 25-50 N, 157-30 E proceeding at 15 knots with FRAY air cover via GULLER and GUNSMACK to KAPIT.

Total casualties in ETO operation reported as 20.454, broken down as follows:

KIA - 6,435; WIA - 15,468; MIA - 268. Total estimated enemy dead - 21,184; 202 FINS of which 154 are Japs and 48 Russians. This report as of 1900(K) 20 March.

--- Continued ---
19 March (Oman date)(Cont’d)

On the night of the 18-19th 289 B-25s dropped 1,633 tons on the NAGOYA urban area from 4,000-6,000 feet. Photos taken on the 19th, partially smoke obscured, show .65 square miles destroyed, making a total of 2.4 square miles of NAGOYA destroyed. 30 enemy aircraft were sighted and 14 made attacks. AA was more intense than in previous missions. 1 B-25 ditched 60 miles NW of INFO JIMA. 10 survivors were rescued by the CATTING (DO 671).

CINCPAC CNO 192007 authorize CINCPAC to issue a directive to reduce Marine detachments in combatant ships by 10%.

CINCPAC 200740 (pink) outlines his position in regard to BPF base in the forward area.

CINCPAC Adv. No. 200847 (pink) sets forth the search plan to be placed in effect 1 April to provide air search and anti-submarine patrols along shipping lanes between ENIWETOK, the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES.

CINCPAC Adv. No. 200851 (pink) modifies the garrison air force to be employed in MIYAKO JIMA (Marine units to be employed instead of Army).

CINCPAC Adv. No. 202140 (pink) advises ComAirPac that fast carriers such as SHANGRI-LA and RANGER are to be ready for emergency combat employment.

OTV 50,5,3 200750 relays the message from ComCINCPAC relative to results of strike on Empire target by TF 58 on March 18th and 19th.

23 March (Oman date)

In a second air attack on the late afternoon of the 20th the ENTERPRISE (CV6), which had been hit earlier in attacks on the 19th, was again hit. She and the WASP (CV 18) have been ordered to ULJEJ for repairs.

Also ordered to ULJEJ for onward routing to PEARL are the FRANKLIN (CV 13) and SANTA FE. HALSEY FORREST (DD 682) was also hit and allowed to 10 knots due to steering gear damage. The Japs launched a torpedo plane attack the night of the 20th, but no damage was reported. Several planes were shot down by AA fire and night fighters.

CINCPAC 20 193042 outlines bombing policy of the 20th AF with specific regard to bombing the Emperor’s Palace.

CINCPAC Adv. No. 200250 advises ComCINCPAC that ComCINCPAC can carry out such training as is desired by him but that the troop division must be ready for departure on 7 days notice.

CINCPAC PWR1 202123 (pink) outlines the urgency for increased hospital facilities in the MARIANAS for Army forces in future operations and suggests that establishment of a 5,000 bed hospital at TINIAN is the most desirable arrangement.

CINCPAC Adv. No. 202212 (pink) advises MacArthur that in order to properly plan developments for 1945 it is necessary that facilities will be available in the MARIANAS for full ground forces and that if complete cancellation of the support by MARPAC is contemplated, advises that MARPAC service troops must be returned to support FOM forces.

- Continued -
22 March (Gazan date) (c. 8 a.m.)

21st BomCom 222359 (pink) advises that no additional reconnaissance of TOSIMA STRAITS has been accomplished as requested by Cinsepa, pointing out that any reconnaissance of TOSIMA STRAITS will detract from 21st BomCom's primary attacks against HYOSHU and the mining of MIKHANOKI STRAITS.

Cinsepa Adv. No. 211998 (pink) summarizes preliminary damage to surface ships during the period 16 thru 20 March:

Cinsepa Adv. No. 211998 (pink) states that he does not desire to detract from either the mining program or the attacks against HYOSHU in order to accomplish reconnaissance of TOSIMA STRAITS.


22 March (Gazan date)

TF 50 has now been reorganized. Of the 3 damaged carriers, the INTREPID and the YORKTOWN are to remain with the force and the other CVs, FRANKLIN, ENTERPRISE and WASP are organized as TF 50.2 and will proceed to ULITHI along with the SANTA FE and Decisive 52. On arrival at ULITHI the FRANKLIN and SANTA FE are scheduled to return to FRANKLIN, ENTERPRISE and WASP to be repaired at ULITHI, possibly one at GUAM, and to return to TF 50 when they are again fit for service.

TF 50, which now comprises 3 groups, is scheduled to strike OKINAWA tomorrow.

6 PBM-5s hit WAKE on the 20th with 14 tons of bombs. Returning pilots reported that runways at WAKE are criss-crossed with dragon's teeth.

FORMOSA was hit by 40 B-26s of the 5th AF on the 20th. No interception by enemy fighters was encountered, although a reported 25 aircraft were observed airborne in 3 different localities, they made no aggressive move whatsoever.

SEALION (SS 315) sank an unescorted tanker off the MALAY COAST on the 17th.

BALAO (SS 285) reports 2 possible hits in unidentified ships of a YELLOW SEA convoy.

The British task force (TF 115) is scheduled to sortie from ULITHI tomorrow morning. After sortie, this task force will assume the designation Task Force 57.

GTF 56 220905 sets forth the reorganized composition of Task Force 50 effective 21 March:

Cinsepa Adv. No. 220899 directs CinMarGls to cease striking enemy airfields in the MARSHALL.

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DepCom 20th AF 222316 (pink) requests 20th AF to obtain photographs of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA.

DepCom 20th AF 222316 (pink) quotes message received from CinCom 20th AF relative to exchange of fighter groups for employment as VFAs asserts.

Cinsepa Adv. No. 222001 (pink) recommends to CinMarGls that the cruiser be assigned the load of 4 British CVs from April until 1 July in view of current urgent requirements for these ships.
**OP SNAKE**

23 March (Omn date)

An amplifying report from ComSaFlit gives final scores on enemy aircraft destroyed 18-21 March (3-day attack on Hiyoshi and the 2 subsequent days):

- **Destroyed in the Air**
  - Over the target: 160
  - By CAP: 64
  - By AA fire: 23
  - Total destroyed in the air: 247

- **Destroyed on Ground**
  - 373

- **Total destroyed**
  - 620

- **Probably destroyed or damaged**
  - 423

Grand Total Destroyed or Damaged: 1,273

This represents an increase of 61 planes shot down and 75 planes probably destroyed or damaged over the earlier report.

OP 59 reports that photographic evidence reveals the following damage to air installations during the KYUSHU attacks:

- **K-picture**
  - Hagi-shima: 3/4 to totally destroyed
  - Miyazaki
  - Kama - 1/2 destroyed
  - Onna
  - Oita: 1/3 destroyed

- **Seabed** - some damage by strafing and rocketing.

WASP (OV 15) reports damage received on the morning of 19 March. A Judy dove on her out of the overcast from ahead and released a bomb which struck amidships and detonated while passing through the second deck, causing extensive damage on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th decks. Number 4 fire room, galley, laundry, berthing facilities for 400 men, fireman's equipment, and number 5 elevator are all out of commission. 102 men were killed and 200 injured. Fires were extinguished rapidly and flooding controlled. Normal flight operations were resumed within an hour.

In the early morning of 23 March, the HAGARD (ID 555) resumed and sank a Japanese submarine at 22°37’N 132°19’E. The ship sustained considerable damage to her stern from ramming and to her electrical and electronic equipment from underwater explosions when the submarine sank. HAGARD is now escorting ULETHI with UHLMANN (ID 6077).

At INO JIMA unloading and re-embarkation of troops has been slowed by bad weather. ZUMI (ATF 95) broached while attempting to salvage the LST 727.

Extensive ice flows encountered forced DesRon 57 to abandon bombardment of YUBODO.

Ginupac Adv. Hq. 230536 (pink) advises ComSaFlit that the battleships of TF 97 may bombard ISHIKARI as an alternative to MITAKO on 27 or 28 March.

Ginupac Adv. Hq. 230530 (pink) concerns efforts to secure the probable reduction in Army Service Units due to the fact that Marine squadrons will be employed in MITAKO instead of the original employment of Army units.

- Continued -

2579
TOP SECRET

23 March (Guam date) (cont'd)

MacArthur 230900 states his concurrence in making anchorages and facilities available at LATTE for POA forces.

Cinpoa Adv, Hq, 231201 (pink) advises Cinpoa that he still adheres to his views previously expressed relative to operational control of fighters by 20th AF.

Cinpoa Adv, Hq, 231952 advises Cinpoa that its intention to terminate logistic support of the North SOLOMONS on 30 April unless otherwise requested.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz is scheduled to visit JIMA tomorrow.

24 March (Guam date)

Bad weather hampered operations of TF 56 on the 23rd. Towns, airfields and installations in KERIMA HATO and on OKINAWA, AMAMI and KINAMI were bombed, rocketed and strafed with a loss of 2 of our VF. 3 Jap planes were destroyed. TF 56.1 on a shipping strike damaged 2 small cargo ships and 2 escorts west of OKINAWA, sank a cargo ship, 1 small craft and damaged 1 large, 1 small cargo ship, 1 DE and many small craft.

Detailed damage reports to CVs: YORKTOWN was hit on signal bridge by a 600 pound bomb which detonated outside the ship at second deck level, tore a 15 foot square hole in the side, and generally perforated the ship's side from flight deck to water line. 4 dead, 18 injured. Operating ability not impaired. ENTERPRISE had only minor damage when a twin-engine plane was shot down close aboard. 1 killed, 13 injured. WASP damage reported yesterday. ENTERPRISE first hit on morning of 18th by a plane (probably Judy) with a 600 pound bomb on her forward elevator. Low order detonation caused minor damage and some casualties (number not stated). Second hit put out her main radio, voice circuits, sky forward, main CIC, and primary flight control station. There were many fires on deck. Cause of damage and casualties not stated. FRANKLIN's report is quoted in full:

"AT 0708/19 MARCH FRANKLIN HIT BY AT LEAST 2 PROBABLY 3 BOMBS. WHILE LAUNCHING DECK ATTACK LOAD BOMBS AND TIT LOADED PLANES X 36 VF 9 VB AIRCOURSES INCLUDING AIR GROUP COMDR X NEAR MISS PORT QUARTER AT 1500/19 X PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATE FLIGHT DECK AND GALLERY DECK COMPLETELY WRECKED AND TORN APART BY EXPLOSIONS AND GUARDED BY FIRE X ALL ELEVATORS WRECKED X HANGAR DECK COMPLETELY GUTTED WARDED AND LARGE HOLE FRAME 170 DOWN TO 4TH DECK X DAMAGE REPORT X 2ND DECK AFT OF FRAME 18 BURNED OUT X 3RD DECK AFT OF FRAME 20 DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIONS BY FIRE AND FLOODING X AFTER TWIN 5 INCH MOUNT X READY MAGAZINES EXPLODED X ALL MAGAZINES PROBABLY FLOODED AND EXTENSIVE FIRE DAMAGE IN ISLAND X COLLATERAL WIRE AND EXPLOSIONS DAMAGE THROUGHT SHIP X TOP MAST DOWN X ABOUT 1500 PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED OR PICKED UP BY OTHER SHIPS X ABOUT 250 MEN 5 OFFICERS ON BOARD X ESTIMATE 1200 KILLED MISSING OR UNACCOUNTED FOR X CAPTAIN A J ISBELL USN PASSENGER KILLED X FIRES OUT STEERING CONTROL REGAINED X LIST UNDER CONTROL X STEAMING AT 13 KNOTS WITH 4 BOILERS AND ON 2 ENGINES X DOWN BY THE TAIL BUT CHINS UP"

On the 24th a total of 260 planes took part in attacks throughout the PHILIPPINES (north and central LUZON areas) dropping approximately 100 tons of bombs on various targets.

Photographs of DE SHIMA taken on the 22nd show that all runways and taxiways on the island were trenched and blasted to prevent use.

- Continued -
24 March (Guam date) (N.D.)

Photographs taken by 21st Bomber Command of NAFOYA on the 24th show an additional unreported burned out section in this area which makes a total of roughly 6 square miles of NAFOYA completely destroyed.

On the night 24th-25th 230 effective B-29s made a strike on the Mitsubishi Engine Works at NAFOYA. The attack was carried out at between 6,000 and 8,000 feet and results were reported as being generally excellent. Majority of planes bombed the target by radar.

Cominco 211442 refers to release of British CVEs currently on loan to FOA.

ANPB 231304 outlines the world-wide tanker shortage and further states that everything possible is being done to augment deliveries presently programmed to FOA.

Cincpac Adv. Rq. 241636 concurs in 20th Bomber Command's plan to mine the SAIGON, SHANGHAI, CAPE ST JACQUES, SINGAPORE and CAMBANH BAY areas prior to 1 April.

Cominco & GNO 211802 (pink) directs that the subject of the return of the British CVEs be held in abeyance until further instructions.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Vice Admiral W.S. McMorris, together with staff members visited IWO JIMA.

25 March (Guam date)

In the ICEBERG Operation conditions are reported favorable for initial landings in the KERAMA RETTO by the 77th InfDiv, scheduled to commence on 26 March (1-6). Hydrographic missions have been completed and surf conditions on all beaches in the island chain are reported as good and expected to remain favorable throughout L-6; highest surf noted was two feet, UDT reconnaissance indicates some beaches not suitable for LVTs, but LVTs will be able to go over or through all offshore reefs. Scheduled mineweeping completed with negative results, except for 5 drifters sunk. Aerial reconnaissance and photo interpretation indicates no increase over estimated opposition (1,500-2,000 enemy in KERAMA RETTO); heaviest opposition being anticipated on TOKUSHIMA SHIMA. Fire support missions, encountering only light opposition from beaches, effected substantial destruction of villages behind landing beaches.

Some units of TF 52 (R.Adm. Blandy) were detected during the approach to the objective on the night of the 24th/25th and were attacked by enemy planes. Only damage reported was to ADAMS (DE27) which resulted from premature burst of 5-inch mortar aft; 2 killed and 5 wounded.

On the 24th, planes from TG 58.1 destroyed an enemy convoy of 3 large AKs, 2 DDs and 3 other escorts 150 miles NW of OKINAWA with a loss of 3 VTB.

Capture and occupation phase has been completed at IWO and command transferred to CTF 94. Composed organisation at IWO is as follows: ICom, Maj. Gen.checksum, USMC; Air Defense Commander, Brig. Gen. Moore, AC, USA; SOPA (until departure about 28 March), R.Adm. Hillel (CTG 51.2). In the Southwest Pacific, the Americal Division (less 1 RCT) is scheduled to begin landing on CEBU ISLAND on the 26th. The operation will be conducted in 3 phases: (1) Seizure and occupation of CEBU CITY-MACTAN LS; (2) Seizure of facilities and town of TAGUILLARAN on BOROL LS; and (3) Seizure of town and airfield of DUMAGUETE on NEGROS ORIENTAL. 14,512 troops are involved in this operation with 2 RCT in reserve.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

25 March (Guam date) (...at'd)

An amplifying report of the B-29 strike on NAJOTA on the night of 24/25 March states that 222 B-29s dropped 1635 tons on the Mitsubishi Engine Factory from 5,800 to 9,800 feet. Air opposition was all to moderate and ineffective; AA accurate, varying in caliber and intensity. 5 B-29s are missing, 3 believed lost over the target and the reason for loss of the others unknown. Total burned out area is 5.0 sq. mi., which represents about 11.6% of the total city area.

Cinopac Pearl 202156 covers critical shortage of construction troops for deployment in PFA and suggests that all using agencies contribute labor from general service troops and other personnel available.

Cominch & CGO 231302 (pink) directs Com7thFlt not to make commitments for British submarine bases in the PHILIPPINES.

Cinopac Pearl 242263 makes recommendations to Com7thFlt relative to establishment of aviation facilities and aircraft pools at SAMAR and CEBU.

Cinopac Adv.Nq. 250331 recommends to Cominch that aircraft and personnel of PacFlt Flag Transport Unit be made a separate squadron in NatePac under administrative control of ComNatePac and operational control of Cinopac.

Cinopac Adv.Nq. 250329 states that employment of Privateer Squadron, temporarily deployed in NAGSHI, should be such as to maintain its combat readiness for forward movement, and that it should be used primarily for search rather than attack on enemy shore positions.

Cinopac Adv.Nq. 250608 (pink) requests ComSemPOA to advise what portion of the 98th Indiv can be made available for designation as Area Reserve for ICEBERG.

Cinopac 250730 (pink) concerns availability of shipping for movement of advance base components from rear to forward bases.

26 March (Guam date)

The initial step in the ICEBERG Operation appears to be proceeding satisfactorily. Air attacks and naval gunfire bombardment were carried out prior to the landings on YAKARI, AKA, GERUMO, HOKAJI and SAMANT SHIMA in the KERAMA RETTO. Opposition was reported as being either nil or light and HOKAJI and GERUMO were reported as being secured by noon of the 26th. During these operations 71 Japs were reported killed plus 5 POWs plus 200 civilians also taken prisoner. The schedule for tomorrow includes landings on IZUMA, AMUKI and TAKASHIKI.

Minesweeping continues as scheduled resulting in 18 mines being swept, most of them off western OKINAWA beaches.

TGs 56.3 (RAdm F.C. Sherman) and 58.4 (RAdm A.W. Radford) are scheduled to hit objective area today and tomorrow while TG 52.1 (RAdm Clark) effects fueling.

In the OKINAWA area an air attack was carried out by the Japs resulting in a hit by a suicide plane on KMIMNASS (DD 521). Considerable structural damage was inflicted, 3 were killed on the ship and 30 wounded. Second suicide plane hit the OIMAR (APD 21) causing only superficial damage resulting in 1 killed and 2 wounded. 2 other suicide crashes missed their targets. In addition 2 planes were shot down by AA and 1 by CAP.

Continued
TOP SECRET

26 March (Gum date) ([...]):

HALICAN (DD 584) reports that she was torpedoed and badly damaged. Further reports have not been received as to extent of damage or loss of personnel.

WICHITA (CA 65) and TERROR (CM 5) report submarine attacks off the western beaches.

Reports from TWO JIMA indicate that on 26 March a banzai attack was carried out by an unstated number of Japanese resulting in 100 enemy being killed. On the night of the 25th 8 bogies approached TWO from the north and were met by our VP. Approximately 40 miles out, 2 Betty's were shot down plus 1 other possible being shot down. None of the planes approached closer than 40 miles.

Two Wings of the 21st BomCom (73rd and 314th) are scheduled to take off tomorrow for attacks on KUSUHU in support of ICEBERG. Approximately 200 aircraft are scheduled to participate.

Also tomorrow, 105 aircraft of the 313th Wing are scheduled to commence mining operations in the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS. This Wing is scheduled to be engaged in full-time mining missions from the 27th of March through 1 May.

Comnoch & CNO 231300 (Mimits only)(pink) covers facilities to be installed by British PacFlt at MANUS and possibly BRUNEI BAY.

Com7thFlt 240305 reports that U.S. Naval Bases at MANILA and SUBIC BAY have been established as of 23 March.

Comnoch & CNO 241655 (KING to Mimits)(Pink) requests feasibility of establishing line of sea communications to the SEA OF JAPAN through TOSUSHIMA STRAIT.

CNO 241840 outlines availability of CBMS to Com7thFlt.

War Dept (Somervell) 250117 concerns shipping allocations to the SWPA during the month of April.

Cinopao Pearl 250345 (pink) advises CinCSWPA that certain materials listed for rehabilitation camps in the PHILIPPINES are not now available for shipment to 3 OwensPac.

Com7thFlt 250756 outlines location and proposed employment of CB units in SWPA.

Cinopao Adv.Hq. 251050 requests Comnoch approval of the withdrawal of U.S. Army garrison force presently stationed on PANWING ISLAND.

CTF 52 251347 (pink) outlines operations at OKINAWA on the 24th.

CTF 58 252155 outlines to CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) his proposed plan for protection of TP 51.

Cinopao Pearl 252314 states that a survey of the construction program in the WAKI-

ANAS is to be carried out and names the officers to be engaged in this survey.

Cinopao Pearl 260145 discusses evacuation requirements at Guam and the forward area.

Cinopao Adv. Hq. 260514 advises CinCSWPA that it is unfeasible to reclassify certain area as a blind bombing zone.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

26 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cinseopac Adv. Hq. 260625 announces to Com7thFlt present acute need for destroyers and requests advice as to when RADFORD (DD 446) will be ready to proceed to navy yard.

CTF 52 (R. Adm. Blandy) 261402 summarizes activities on 26 March.

27 March (Guam date)

On the morning of 27 March successful landings were made on TOKASHIKI, KUBA and AMURO in the KERAMA RETTO. KUBA and AMURO were reported as being secured by 1800, making a total of 3 islands now completely secured by the 77th InfDiv. Our troops were subjected to mortar fire and counter attacks on ZUMAMI and ANA.

No report has been received from either TF 58 or TF 57. TF 58 is scheduled to be at the objective on the 28th while TF 58, 3 and 58, 4 carry out fueling. TF 57 is scheduled to bombard other OKINAWA JIMA or ISHIGAKI JIMA tomorrow.

CTF 52 reports air attack on the night of 26/27th by about 15 planes, of which 12 were destroyed, 3 by AA, 2 by CAP, 1 by FM group, 6 suicides. Damage to our forces is summarized as follows:

- NEVADA (BB 36) - Turret #3 out and planes destroyed.
- BLOW (CL 80)
- FORSTERFIELD (DD 682)
- DORSET (DMS 1)
- FOREMAN (DE 633)
- SKIRLISH (AM 303)
- OBERON (DD 725) - Extensive superstructure damage but operable.

Casualties - 10 KIA, 3 MIA, 98 WIA.

HALLIGAN (DD 58a), which was reported torpedoed yesterday, is now believed to have blown up as a result of a mine, with 75 enlisted survivors of which 14 were injured.

Minesweeping continuing; many mines found off demonstration and preferred beaches. Slow progress here has postponed UDT operations. Bombardment proceeding as scheduled except off NAHA, where mines prevent close approach of fire support ships.

4 or 5 submarine pens claimed destroyed and two midgets damaged. CALLAGHAN (DD 792) sank one midget.

Several suicide boats were captured in the KERAMA RETTO. Boats reported as 20 feet long, 8 feet wide, containing mine or bomb and 1 man crew.

B-29's from the 21st BomCom are scheduled to strike targets in KYUSHU today. Targets selected are TACHIBANAI, OITA and OMURA. In addition planes from the 21st BomCom are scheduled to mine SHIMOKOSEKI STRAITS on the night of the 27th/28th.

Cinseopac Adv. Hq. 270449 (pink) outlines concurrence in complement of VMF and VMFB shore based squadrons and sets forth forward deployment of Marine squadrons.

Cinseopac Adv. Hq. 271105 covers results of 21st BomCom strike on KYUSHU.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

27 March (Guam date)

CINCPAC (p) outlines to CTF 58 his desire to create the impression that a carrier attack is being carried out against KYUSHU and outlines a plan of action to effect this.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 271208 advises various units that IsCom DMO has been incorporated into the forward area as of today.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 271213 (p) requests CINCPAC Pearl Hq. to make a logistic study of an operation to capture TAKUSHI (JIMA).

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 271214 (p) advises COMWESFRON of provision in CINCPAC's OpPlan 2-45 which calls for the assignment of all fast carriers to the Mid-Pacific Striking Force.


CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 271220 recommends to Cominco that there be established a new Fleet Air Wing in the Pacific Fleet as of 1 June. CINCPAC proposes to assign squadrons to Fleet Air Wing ONE which will operate in the KURUKUS and to the westward thereof, and to assign to the new wing the appropriate units operating in the MARIANA'S, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

28 March (Guam date)

In the KERAMA RETTO the island of TOKASHIKA was reported secured on the morning of 27 March. Sporadic fighting continued on AKA and ZAMAMI. Reconnaissance units landed on AWARE ISLAND found it uninhabited.

During the night of 28/29 March a reconnaissance battalion is scheduled to land on MAE SHIMA and KURO SHIMA.

The seaplane base in the KERAMA RETTO area is announced as having been established.

Minesweeping operations are still being carried out. SKYLARK (AM 63) struck a mine and sank off western OKINAWA beaches. 11 officers and 90 men are reported as being survivors.

TOLMAN (DM 28) on patrol off NAGO W (AN) engaged 8 enemy MTBs on the night of 27-28 March. 2 were definitely sunk and 4 possibly sunk with no damage having been suffered by the TOLMAN.

In an air attack on the night of 27-28 March H.A. WILEY (DM 29) and ADAMS (DM 27) each shot down 2 planes. The ADAMS suffered slight damage from this attack.

THRESHER (SS 200) bombarded docks on BATAN ISLAND in LUZON STRAIT and PHILIPPINE (SS 389) bombarded FRATAS REEF.

In the NANKAI SHOTO from 25 to 27 March TOS 58.1, 58.2 and 58.4, in attacks from TAKEDA SHIMA to MIYAKO SHIMA, shot down 13 planes, destroyed 13 on the ground, and inflicted the following damage on shipping: 1 midget submarine destroyed, 1 midget sub heavily damaged, 3 DD or DE damaged by rockets and strafing (attacks continuing), 1 AK beached and burning, 4 AK damaged, 8-10 luggers burned; others beached and strafed with good results. Many small craft damaged or wrecked.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

28 March (Owam date of st'd)

Our plane losses were 6 VP. At least 1 pilot was rescued. On the morning of the 27th, the MURRAY (DD 576) was slightly damaged by enemy air attack, with 3 guns out. In this attack 7 Jap planes were shot down, 5 by CAP and 2 by ships gunfire (included in above total).

On the ground attacks were controlled by CSA on most of the islands in the chain: sub pens and installations at UNTEN HARBOR were heavily hit; barracks, warehouses, and factories were burned, gun positions, trucks, camouflaged tanks, and landing barges were attacked.

On 26/27 March TF 57 flew 574 sorties against MITAKO and ISHIGAKI JDMAS, with all airfields thoroughly bombed and strafed, and 26 plus planes "shot up", some perhaps previously damaged. Only 1 Jap plane was airborne, and this was shot up.

Several coastal AKs were hit and 1 blew up. Buildings and 1 town were fired.

Losses were 6 aircraft to AA, and 11 to other causes. Killed and missing from all causes were 3 pilots and 4 aircrswmen.

TF 57 was sighted during the forenoon of the 26th and again by night (26/27), but was not attacked.

Amplification report of mining in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS states that on the night of 27/28th 102 B-29s were airborne with 888 mines; 97 planes dropped 817 mines in the assigned areas, and 6(?) planes jettisoned their mines. 70 enemy planes were sighted, but only 7 unaggressive attacks were made; 1 enemy plane was destroyed. 3 B-29s are missing from unknown causes. "It is estimated as a result of this mining that minefield in western approaches of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS will close straits to traffic of all major ships for a period of 2 weeks or longer."

Cinopac Adv. Hq. 280107 authorizes British Pacific Fleet Air Transport Service to operate to the TACLOBAN area through PELELIU.

CINCWP A 280109 states that in forthcoming operations initial assault in small type landing craft is advisable in view of beach conditions at objectives. He requests assignment of 1 AGC, 3 APA and 2 AKX to 7th Flt until about 1 August.

CTF 58 280307 outlines his plan to locate and strike the Japanese Fleet reported departing from INLAND SEA.

CTF 57 280503 outlines operations carried out against MITAKO and ISHIGAKI on 26 and 27 March.

Cinopac Adv. Hq. 280649 requests authority from Cinch to assign 2 F4U squadrons on a temporary basis to 7th Flt as relief for 2 FW squadrons currently employed thereat.

Cinopac Adv. Hq. 280904 concerns release of certain ships to Com7thFlt.

Cinopac Adv. Hq. 280905 directs ComSoPac to maintain token occupation of NAUSORI Airfield.

CTF 52 281512 outlines summary of operations as of evening of 28 March.

Cinopac Adv. Hq. 282310 directs ComAir INO to report to CTF 93 for additional duty in connection with offensive operations and directs ComAir INO to assign fighters to operational control of CTF 93 or DepCom20thAF. Also directs transfer of VMB 112 from TF 93 to TF 94.
TOP SECRET

29 March (Guam date).

No reports from TF 58 have been received but it is believed that the force is retiring from Empire waters for replenishment prior to L-Day strikes.

The shore-to-shore movements in the PHILIPPINES Area are being carried out. From PANAY a landing has been made on AGEROS and from CEBU a landing was made on MACTAN ISLAND.

A B-29 from the 21st Bomber Command reports 1 BB, 4 CA and 6 DD in the western portion of the INLAND SEA.

TENCH (SS 417) reports sinking two tugs by gunfire on the 28th east of KYUSHU.

TIRANTE (SS 420) reports sinking 2 small AX's, 1 each on the 25th and 28th west of KYUSHU.

SEADOG (SS 401) reports a hit in 1 of a group of DE off east coast of HONSHU.

BLUERILL (SS 242) reports a hit in a large AP off CATS VARELJA on the 28th.

Two JIMA based P-51s are attacking HABA JIMA and CHICHI JIMA daily.

B-24s based in the PHILIPPINES have been carrying out concerted strikes against FORMOSA targets. Enemy air opposition has not been aggressive although on almost every mission airborne fighters are reported.

ComFwdArea 260520 dissolves Air Defense Command, MARIANAS and outlines the formation of the local Air Defense Command to be placed in effect.

GHQ SWPA 281614 states that requirements are being submitted to the Chief of Staff which include a request for 150 LSTs and 150 LCTs. With the provision of this equipment he states that an endeavor will be made to accent FOA divisions for staging in accordance with the JITLAS Agreement.

Cinopac Adv, Hq. 290619 (pink) outlines to Cominch his views on occupation and development of QUELJAS PORTLAND.

Cinopacs Adv, Hq. 290718 (pink) directs Pearl Headquarters to make a detailed logistic study of Phase III(d) ICEBERG.

30 March (Guam date)

All islands of the KERAMA Retto were reported to have been secured by 1800 I 29 March. At that time all troops of the 77th InfDiv had reloaded, except 1 BN patrolling TOKASHIKI and the garrison forces on ZAMAMI. A report as of 1800 I 30 March indicates that these latter units had captured considerable quantity of stores on both TOKASHIKI and ZAMAMI.

Enemy casualties as of 1800 I on the 30th were: 231 KIA, 100 POWs. Our casualties as of the same time: 29 KIA, 78 WIA, 1 MIA.

General summary of beach reconnaissance on OKINAWA indicates that all beaches are suitable for landing. Wooden posts, varying from 4 to 6 inches in diameter and from 4 to 6 feet high have been found off all beaches. These are now being cleared by NUDTs. Naval gunfire has breached the sea wall in many places.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

20 March (Guam date) ,cont'd

Evidence at this time is that the Japanese gun positions and defensive installations on OKINAWA are well sighted for defense of all beaches both by frontal and enfilade fire.

Several bogies in area but only one attack reported. ADAMS (DM 27) shot down one plane. Decrease in air activity due to night interdiction by CVE planes and more effective gunfire on fields by Fire Support ships which can now get in closer.

Two groups of MTB's made a torpedo attack on our ships on patrol off the western beaches and were beaten off. One positively sunk and one probably sunk without damage to our ships.

Minesweeping is proceeding well. A few floating mines still encountered. Over 2500 square miles swept thus far.

UDT reconnaissance and demolition proceeded with only small arms fire from beaches due to excellent support by ships and planes. No ship damage; only 1 wounded. Close range bombardment followed on defenses disclosed. Seawalls all breached.

Support aircraft attacked airfields, gun positions, midget sub pen at UITEN KO, and special bridges demolished by the 10th Army. 4 sub pens burned and two MTB's destroyed. Our losses 1 VF by AA, 1 VF in collision with another VF which returned safely. 310 suicide boats now destroyed; all survey work completed; 3 underwater contacts today.

BULLHEAD (SS 332) spent some time investigating TAKAO HARBOR. 3 night planes caused some trouble, but there was no air or surface patrol during daylight. No shipping in TAKAO and no patrol off entrance.

From the 28th through the 30th, planes of the 5th AF made several attacks on a heavily escorted northbound convoy in the SOUTH CHINA SEA with the following results:- Sunk: 1 AO (28th, 11,000 tons); 1 (S 2-stack) whaler (10-15,000 tons)(29th); 1 AO (6,000 tons); 2 6600-ton AKs; 1 800-AX; 2 DD; 2 DE; 1 patrol craft. Probably sunk: 1 patrol craft. Total tonnage sunk at least 35,000 tons NV, and at least 6,000 tons escorting warships. P-38 escorts shot down 14 Jap VF plus 2 probable and 1 damaged. Our losses were 1 P-38 in combat and 1 PBM shot down over the convoy at 2316 I 29th.

At 1040 I on the 30th tracker planes sighted 2 DD, 6 DE, 1 SA, 3 SC, 1 VT anchored YULIN BAY (HAIDAN), and 3 DD in SAHAI BAY (HAIDAN), covered by 2 Oscars. B-25s were called in and attacked, the results not yet reported. 1 MINDORO search plane crash-landed after 1 engine was shot out, with all the crew rescued.

14 B-29s attacked the Mitsubishi Engine Works at NAGOTA on the night of 30/31 from 7-8,000 feet with 500 pound GP's and flares.

95 B-29s were airborne on the night of 30/31 for the second mining operation in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, of 4 early returns, 1 crashed and burned, with 2 survivors. No report of results is yet available.

149 B-29s were airborne for attacks on TACHICAI and OHURA on KYUSHU on the 31st. TOT was planned for 1035 I with bombing altitude 15-16000 feet.

- Continued -
29 March (Osum date) (Cont'd)

Gensac Pearl 260208 states that the increasing requirements for bombs and
ammunitions to support the VLB programs are placing an excessively heavy load on
shipping and requests OCMNFPA to make a re-survey of current projects not
immediately essential in order to alleviate critical shipping situation.

GTP 52 291600 summarizes activities as of 1800 29 March.

OCMNFPA 292045 (pink) requests for additional troops for Phase
III(a) IGSMBD.

Gensac Adv. Hq. 300243 (pink) advises OCMNWP of employment and rehabilita-
tion of the 6 Marine and 6 Army divisions assigned to FOA and answers his request
for LSTs and LSTs.

OCMNFPA 300540 (pink) concerns designation of the 99th Division as Area
Reserve for IGSMBD.

Gensac Adv. Hq. 300650 summarizes recommendations to CNO regarding VFP
program.

31 March (Osum date)

All three groups of TF 58 are scheduled to support landings on "L" Day. From 2 April through 6 April, groups rotate so that each group supports the shore
forces for two days and then replenishes.

Seaplanes based at KERIMA HITTO are now carrying out search missions along
the JUSJUS SHIYAI to the north.

MTFs report that they removed 2700 of 2900 stakes from the water in the
vicinity of the landing beaches. Surf conditions are reported by them to be fair
on the Demonstration Beaches and excellent in the area scheduled for the landing.

Landings were made on KEISE SHIMA without opposition and the island was
secured by 3013 on the 31st.

INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) was hit on the morning of the 31st by an Oscar carry-
ing a bomb. There was considerable structural damage and flooding; however, all
ammunition is reported as being unusable except possibly #3 turret. Casualties are
reported as 2 KIA, 14 WIA and 5 MIA. All casualties appeared to have been enlisted
men. Admiral Spruance was aboard this cruiser.

TF 57 struck the SAKUSHIMA Area again yesterday.

197 B-29s made an attack on targets in the KYUSHU Area on the 31st. 106 of
these dropped 450 tons of bombs on the TACHIBANA Machine Works with excellent re-
results being reported. 51 other B-29s dropped 75 tons on the CMURA Airfield, also
reporting excellent results. Fighter opposition was ineffective. 1 B-29 was re-
ported missing.

On the 29th and 30th, TF 58 destroyed 45 enemy planes (29 airborne), and
probably destroyed or damaged 42 more; sank 2 DE, 1 medium and 10 small AS, and 4
kagers; probably sank 3 medium and 11 small AS. Our losses were 12 planes, 12
pilots and 8 aircrews. 5 of the pilots and 3 aircrews were lost in combat. Operational personnel losses included 2 pilots in a mid-air collision on the 20th, 2 pilots shot down by friendly AA when they chased a Judy into TG 58.4 on the 29th, and 3 pilots and 5 aircrews lost as a result of a 5 plane mid-air collision.

On the night of the 27/28th CruDivs 16 and 17 with DDs bombarded MINAMICHI causing fires and explosions, and on the 28th TG 58.3 hit MINAMICHI with a large strike destroying gun positions, 3 warehouses, a radio station, an ammo dump, and several small buildings.

TG 58.1 in addition to Okinawa missions for CAS flew a search and attack group along EAST KYUSHU as far north as SASAKI WAG. On this sweep 1 DE and several AKs were sunk along east KYUSHU, No minesweepers were seen. Ground targets were hit at TOKUNO, AMAMI, YAKU and at KANOYA.

On the 29th TF 58 searched east and west coasts of KYUSHU, sighting 1 CA, 1 CL and 9 DDs 10 miles south of KURE, and much shipping at SASEBO, including several DD or DE and a possible cruiser. Most of the shipping was sunk on these attacks. Weather prevented heavy strikes on several fields at KYUSHU, but six fields were hit, as well as a chemical plant and a railroad depot.

CTF 93 290858 (pink) requests the assignment of VMB 612 to his command.
Cinopac Adv Hq 300756 concerns requirements for DMs and DMSs.
Cinopac Adv Hq 300805 (pink) deals with the redeployment of destroyers for 7th Fleet.
Cinopac Adv Hq 310047 (pink) assigns responsibility for neutralization of enemy held positions in the BONINS to CTF 94 and authorizes CTF 94 to request assistance from CTF 93 when required.
Com3rdFlt 310259 (pink) outlines his OpPlan for the FIREBREAK Operation.
Com7thFlt 310318 (pink) concerns employment of British submarines in SWPA.
CTF 52 (RAdm. Blandy) 310643 states that OKINAWA landings will be carried out in accordance with the "Preferred Plan".
Cinopac Adv Hq 310759 (pink) requests information from ComGenPHFPac as to when the 5th Amphibious Corps will again be ready for combat.
Cinopac Adv Hq 310800 advises CinCSWPA that in order to assist in meeting urgent requirement of the Pacific Fleet for use of Naval Base facilities at SAMAR, he can make available certain ships for this purpose.
Cinopac Adv Hq 310804 sets forth his views as to the need for assignment of additional aviators to TG Commanders for the purpose of coordinating air attacks.
Cinopac Adv Hq 310832 advises ComAirPac that he assumes CV groups will not operate more than 73 fighters.
Cinopac Adv Hq 310833 recommends that allocation of Corsairs to RMZAF be reduced in order to meet the requirements of the Pacific Fleet.
TOP SECRET

31 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC Adv Hq 310835 requests DepCom20thAF to make daily photo reconnaissance mission of KURE in order to locate the fleet reported to be in that harbor.

CTF 93 31123 directs TG 93.2 (Bomber Command - Col. L. J. Carr) to discontinue strikes against the BONIN ISLANDS as of 1 April and to be prepared to strike this area when directed.

ComCom 77th Div (Maj. Gen. Bruce) 311231 (pink) states that registration of Corps Artillery on KEISE SHIMA has been completed and that 16 guns are in position to bombard OKINAWA on the morning of L-Day.

1 April (Guam date)

At 0630 I 1 April landings were made on schedule on the western beaches of OKINAWA. All beaches were rapidly secured and the advance inland commenced against light opposition. By 1100 I our troops had seized the airfields TONTAN and KADENA and considerable numbers of tanks and artillery together with regimental reserves were being landed. Opposition throughout the day was light and by 1800 I we had penetrated to a depth of approximately 5,000 yards from the initial landing point. By 1800 the beachhead was secured from small arms fire and 50,000 troops had been landed. Throughout the day 155mm guns previously set up on KEISE SHIMA were used in support of the OKINAWA landing.

Fire support was furnished by 10 OBB, 8 CA, 3 CL, 23 DD and 177 support landing craft. Direct air support was furnished both by CVEs and fast carriers.

Casualties: WEST VIRGINIA - some structural damage; 2 40mm guns out; ship fully operable; 3 KIA, 1 MIA, 9 WIA. LST 824 - extensively damaged by suicide plane. LST 822 - light damage from suicide plane, near miss. LCT(M) 807 - gunnery casualty from hangfire. ADAMS (DM 27) struck aft by 2 suicide planes during a suicide attack, suffered some structural damage but no personnel casualties and downed 1 Tojo.

A report from CTF 51 (V. Adm. Turner) warns forces at the objective area that there are some 650 Jap suicide boats remaining on OKINAWA.

TF 57 attacked ISHIGAKI and MIYAKO ISLANDS throughout 31 March with no air opposition, and continued attacks on the 1st. Morning of the 1st the fleet was attacked by 10 aircraft. One suicide hit INDEFatIGABLE at the base of the island, but the carrier is still operable. ULSTER (DD) was damaged by a bomb and is being towed to LETTE. 4 aircraft were shot down by fighters. In the afternoon aircraft began to stage into the airfields of both islands. 14 of these were destroyed on the ground and 6 damaged. 4 aircraft attacked the force but caused no damage. TF 57 will continue the attack on the 2nd.

OOGS BAY (AVP 25) enroute ENIWETOK to ULITHI collided with the WSA TAATAORDA which in turn was enroute GUAM to ENIWETOK. OOGS BAY is now under tow to ENIWETOK.

Amplifying reports of the B-29 strike on KYUSHU carried out on the 31st indicate that considerable damage was inflicted. Photographs show that the OMURA naval air station received 27 bomb hits.

A landing was made on LEBASPI on the morning of 1 April. Troops employed in this landing were the 156th RCT of the 6th Army. Fragmentary reports indicate that heavy enemy battery fire was encountered.

- Continued -
1 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CominCh & CNO 311248 directs withdrawal from the East Coast and Panama Sea Frontier for transfer to the West Coast certain patrol squadrons to operate for the duration of the San Francisco Conference.

ComNavSeaFron 010225 (pink) outlines Hawaiian Sea Frontier OpPlan 2-45 (FIREBREAK).

Cinopac Adv Hq 010641 (pink) designates 98th InfDiv as Area Reserve for ICEBERG with availability date of 1 May.

Cinopac Adv Hq 010836 (pink) (Mimits to King) discusses feasibility of occupying a position in the CHINHAE-PUSAN area of the KOREAN Coast.

CTF 51 011300 is Summary No. 2 of the OKINAWA operation as of 1800 the 1st.

CominCh & CNO 011327 (pink) (King to Mimits) requests information from Cinopac as to the acceptable months for invasion of KYUSHU and/or HONSHU.

Cinopac Adv Hq 010639 advises ComShPhIt that IF SHIMA may be evacuated and that if so, early rehabilitation of this place is most desirable.

CTF 51 010255 covers Summary No. 1 as of 1100 on the 1st.

2 April (Guam date)

Troops of the 10th Army on OKINAWA are reported to have spent a relatively quiet night. Sporadic sniper, machine gun and mortar fire was directed on our forces. Enemy forces are reported to have withdrawn to the SE of NANA Airfield. Many civilians are reported as taking advantage of surrender terms in response to the propaganda leaflets which have been dropped from our planes. There was little call for supporting gunfire from our ships during the day. Following is a list of damage inflicted on our surface forces due to various attacks: ACHERNAR (AKA 53) extensive structural damage; TTHOLL (AKA 60) light damage; LCI 586. These ships suffered damage as result of suicide attacks. Other damage included: PORTERFIELD (DD 682) strafed, SHERMAN (AM 303) minor damage from near miss, WADDEN (DE 644) starboard shaft damaged from depth charge, LCI 580 and 662 aground, DICKERSON (APD21) and HENRICO (APA 45) reported damaged from unknown causes.

TF 58 is covering both SAKISHIMA and OKINAWA areas during absence of TF 57 for replenishment. 58.1 is at SAKISHIMA today, 58.3 is at OKINAWA, 58.4 is fueling. Thereafter the groups will rotate, with one always fueling.

KADENA Airfield is reported to be available for emergency landings by all types of planes including long range search planes. 2 Marine Air Groups have been ordered to arrive at TOWAN Airfield and KADENA Airfield about 5 April. Present planes call for about 170 aircraft to be installed by 5 April. A total of 19 OT planes are now operating from these 2 airfields.

On the evening of the 2nd an estimated 12-15 enemy planes approached OKINAWA from the north. About 5 of these planes are reported destroyed both by night fighter and by ships gunfire.

SEA DEVIL (SS 400) reports firing 15 torpedoes at a convoy in a 4-hour radar surface attack during a heavy fog. 10 of the torpedoes hit resulting in 3 unidentified merchantmen and 3 escorts being sunk. 3 survivors were rescued.
TOP SECRET

2 April (Guam date)(Cont’d)

A report from CTF 73 (R.Adm. Wagner) indicates that during the month of March his task force sank or damaged 140 ships totalling 93,000 tons. In addition he claims to have damaged 146 ships totalling 112,000 tons. Enemy planes destroyed reported as 39.

On the night of 1st–2nd 6 B-29s laid 48 mines in the KURE Harbor in the vicinity of the fleet anchorage. 112 other B-29s dropped 1,000 tons on the Musashino Aircraft Factory. Bombing was carried out at an altitude of 6–8,000 feet. Results were generally unobserved but the few crews reporting indicate excellent results. 6 B-29s are reported lost on this mission.

Troops of the SYP forces today made successful landings on the SW tip of the island of TAFI TAFI. No resistance was reported. Landings in the LOGAS PT Area are reported as proceeding satisfactorily.

Cinopac Adv Hq 012322 recommends an increase in complement of VC squadrons attached to Kaiser CVEs to a total of 20 VF and 12 VB. Formerly the complement of these squadrons was 16 VF and 12 VB.

QUEENFISH 020030 summarizes sinking of the ANA MARU.

Cinopac Adv Hq 020152 (pink) advises ComSthFlt that it may become advisable to execute Phase III–d prior to Phase III–c and requests designation of an amphibious force commander to expedite detailed preparations for III–d.

CTF 51 020548 and 021225 cover operations as of 1200 and 1800 respectively on the 2nd.

Cominch 021511 (pink) concerns communication facilities relative to Russian vessels.

Cominch 021550 (pink) states that it is desirable to send Russian radio operators to west coast ports for familiarization and testing of radio equipment.

Cinopac Adv Hq 022120 requests information from ComGenPhFao regarding instructions issued by him to Marine personnel relative to rotation of personnel.

3 April (Guam date)

The lines on the evening of L plus 2 had been extended in general to that scheduled for L plus 10 in the assigned area of the 24th Corps where all restrictions concerning the L plus 10 line had been lifted and this Corps is to make a drive to the south.

Unloading of supplies is proceeding satisfactorily and roads and ramps are being constructed along the beach and over the reefs. By 1800 on L plus 2 all division artillery had been landed.

Our casualties for the operation so far are reported as being extremely light.

Military Government officers report in excess of 1400 civilians under their control by L plus 1. Majority of these are old men, women and children as reports indicate that other civilians moved to the hills prior to our landing.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

3 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Air attacks continued throughout the OKINAWA Area. The following ships were damaged by air attacks on 2 April: DICKERSON (APD 21) seriously damaged and afire; HENRICO (APA 45) extensive damage and flooding; GOODLINE (APA 107) hit on stern; TELFAIR (APA 230) minor damage; CHILTON (APA 39) grazed in mast. Damaged by bombs: PRITCHETT (DD 561) near miss holed below water line. LST 599 set afire, ship inoperative, cargo ruined in raid early morning 3 April. WAIMAN (DE 644) now reported damaged by booby trap of floating planks carrying 300 pound depth charge. WAKE ISLAND (CVE 85) damaged; cause and extent not reported. LST 724, not 824, damaged at KERAMA RETTO.

Poor weather prevented TG 58.4 (RAdm. Radford) from fueling yesterday; therefore replenishment will continue today. TF 57 is reported to have replenished.

On the 30th and 31st TF 58 continued attacking aircraft, shipping and enemy installations in the OKINAWA and AMAMI GUNTOs. 22 enemy planes were destroyed (17 airborne), and 19 were probably destroyed or damaged. TF 58 aircraft losses, if any, are not reported. Sunk were 3 MTB, 7 suicide boats, 2 small AK, and 2 small craft. 1 coastal AK and 4 small craft were probably sunk and 1 MTB, 4 small AK and 15 small craft were damaged.

6 submarine pens were destroyed and a 7th heavily damaged at UNTEN, and buildings, docks, mills, barracks, bridges, covered revetments, pillboxes, gun positions, and radio station were destroyed or damaged on OKINAWA. TOKUNO, AMAMI, KINAI and MINAMI were also hit.

During a red alert from 0000 to 0700 on the 3rd 11 raids of 60 planes approached from the north and southwest. Ship's gunfire shot down 6 sure and 1 probable, and no damage to our units was reported. Our transports under smoke were approached, but not attacked.

On the 3rd 6 groups of enemy planes attacked from 1730 to 1830 from the north, and 1 group from the southwest. 4 were shot down by ship's gunfire, 7 by carrier VF.

1 Oscar landed YONTAN on the night of 1 April. Pilot made normal approach and landing. Taxied plane to line, and was shot by a Marine when leaving the plane.

CTF 51 reports that on the 3rd a rocket propelled, single-seater suicide monoplane with 12 foot wingspread, 14 feet long, and a 1,000 pound warhead has been examined on OKINAWA. It had no radar or homing devices. It is believed capable of 200-450 miles an hour, as pilot has special breathing gear. Estimate launchers still operational OKINAWA. "Look out for large numbers."

On the night of the 2nd/3rd 10 B-29s laid 78 mines in the immediate vicinity of KURE. No enemy aircraft attacked and AA was reported as meager. Again on the night of the 3rd/4th 9 B-29s laid 54 tons of mines in the KURE-KIJOCHIDA HARBOR Area.

On the night of 3/4 April an attack was carried out by 228 B-29s on the aircraft plants at KOIZUMI, TACHIKAWA and SHIZOKA. Bomb tonnage dropped was in excess of 1700 tons.

CINCSWPA 240534 covers request for assignment of 10 troop ships to the SWPA.

CINCBFP 0230104 (pink) states that he can probably continue to operate for a period of 2 months before returning to an intermediate base for replenishment.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

3 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Cominch & CNO 021350 (pink) states that he considers Captain of QUEENFISH should be relieved of command and brought to trial by General Court Martial so that the record may be kept clear.

CNO 021940 requests 10 troop ships from POA be made available to SWPA.

Cinacp Acv Hqs 030818 (pink) summarizes sinking of AMA NARU.

Cinacp Acv Hqs 030819 places Photo Group TWO under operational control of Cinacpa as of 8 April.

Cominch & CNO 031300 concerns substitution of TB4Y and PV squadrons to be assigned to Com7thFlt.

OTP 51 031310 summarizes results of operations in the OKINAWA Area as of 1600 1(-9) 3 April.

4 April (Guam date)

At OKINAWA advances on L plus 3 continued at pace with those of previous days, against continued light resistance. By 1800 (L) the entire eastern shore in the AA of both Corps had been secured. In the north our forces were along the road which crosses the isthmus from south of YAKADA to YAKA. In the south the left flank of the XXIV Corps was at KUBA SAKI with the front lines stretching to the west to the town of UCHIOMARI.

Conflicting reports continued as to the location of enemy concentrations. The latest report indicates that many troops are located around SHURI. There have been taken under fire by naval gunfire and air bombardment.

Our casualties as of 2400 3 April total 705, of which 196 were listed as KIA.

T.G. 58.3 (RAdm Sherman) shot down 45 enemy planes on the 3rd. 23 of these were Jap fighter planes encountered over KIKAI SHIMA and 16 were miscellaneous types which were shot down over TOKUNO by returning search planes. The other 6 were shot down by CAP over the Task Group.

On the evening of the 4th one of our submarines and 1 of the British submarines reported the presence of a Jap cruiser together with 4 escorts proceeding south from the JAVA SEA via SAIFI STRAITS. An attack was made by the British sub SPARK against this unit.

On the night of 3-4 9 B-29s laid 83 mines in the KURE Area. On the same night, the B-29 bombing effort in the TOKYO Area was distributed as follows: 48 aircraft with 195 tons on the SHINUKA Plant, 48 aircraft with 270 tons on the KOKUSD Plant, 20 aircraft with 139 tons on the TOKYO urban area, 60 aircraft with 550 tons on the TACHIKAWA plant, 47 aircraft with 425 tons on the Kawasaki industrial area. In summary, 223 B-29s dropped 1579 tons against negligible enemy air opposition and varying AA. 1 B-29 is missing.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

4 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Following is summary of mopping up operations in the forward area 25-31 March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japs Killed</th>
<th>POWs</th>
<th>Our Casualties</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWO JIMA</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIPAN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TINIAN</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PELELIU</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total casualties for the IWO JIMA operation through 31 March are as follows: Japs KIA 22,093; POWs 306. Our casualties KIA 4,594; WIA 15,955; TIA 301.

JCS 032140 (pink) outlines the directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff covering the command relationships in the Pacific Theater.

JCS 032141 (pink) directs CinCPAC and CinCSWPA to carry out certain plans and preparations for future operations.

CinCBBF 020115, 030521 and 030526 (pinks) concern British Pacific Fleet operations in the Pacific Theater.

CTF 51 040205 outlines his operations to be carried out in the near future.

CTF 51 040730 (VAdm Turner) covers his summary of OKINAWA operation as of 1200 on the 4th.

CinCops Adv Hq 040849 (pink) requests photographic reconnaissance of portions of KOREA STRAIT in order to determine possible submarine route into the JAPAN SEA.

CinCps Adm Hq 041212 (pink) requests Com3rdFlt to cancel his despatch requesting ComServPac to supply 2 oilers to be held in readiness to carry out the FIREBREAK Operation.

CTF 51 041230 outlines his summary of OKINAWA situation as of 1900 on the 4th.

Com3rdFlt 050006 states that intermittent availability of oilers may adversely affect the FIREBREAK Operation.

5 April (Guam date)

Advances on OKINAWA continued to be satisfactory. The 6th MarDiv throughout I plus 4 pushed its front lines forward 6000-8000 yards and patrols were operating in the vicinity of CHUTEA and KOCHIMA.

In the south the XXIV Corps advanced 3000-5000 yards meeting, for the first time, organised defensive areas. Air reconnaissance indicates that there are numerous installations and troop concentrations in front of our lines in the south.

The 1st MarDiv patrolled the occupied portion of the island, and units from this division landed on YUBUCHI SHIKA.

- Continued -
5 April (Cont'd)

Reconnaissance of the eastern islands by a Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion was in progress throughout the day.

Total casualties as of 2400(I) 4 April numbered 984, with 175 KIA, 798 WIA and 11 MIA.

Military government authorities have reported that by 1 plus 3,000 civilians were under control. Many of these had been injured and were being cared for by our medical units. The civilians are described as being "shocked and nervous, but docile and cooperative".

No damage from air attacks has been reported, except for the following delayed reports: STROSTON (DD 577) had considerable damage from a bomb near miss; HAMBLETON (DSM 20) suffered minor damage when she shot down a suicide plane aboard; ALPINE (APA 92) reports considerable structural damage from a suicide plane hit on the list; NVSADA (BB 36) was hit 3 times by shore batteries but continues in action.

Logistics situation continues satisfactory except for difficulties encountered in unloading yesterday due to increased surf. The following landing craft suffered damage from broaching or collision with other landing craft: LCM 16, LCT 675, 570, 756, 689, 736.

Despite these casualties unloading conditions have improved due to improvement of beaches by UDTs. 29 unloaded APA, 2 LSV have departed.

THORNTON (AVB 11) was badly damaged in a collision with ANTIPLA (AK 51). This is the first collision reported in this operation.

The plan for future employment of TF 58 contemplates its reorganization into four groups of approximately equal size. Unless the tactical situation changes, two groups will provide support and two groups will fuel — alternating every two days.

TF 58 is back at SAKISHIMA to remain today and tomorrow. Summary of TF 57 previous operations: ULSTER was damaged by bomb near miss and her engine room flooded, INDOMITABLE strafed — 6 casualties. INDEPATICABLE crashed by suicide with some damage to island and radio installations, REMAINS operational. VICTORIOUS had suicide plane attack avoided by radical manuvers — wing tip touched ship and plane crashed alongside without damage to the ship. Total enemy losses from 31 March: In air — 5, suicides — 2, 15 destroyed on ground, 9 damaged on the ground. Own losses: 16 planes and 3 pilots lost.

Airstrips remain operational in SAKISHIMA COINTO.

TF 58 planes on April 1st sank more than 40 small boats and damaged 30-40 others; shot down 2 Vals near the target; and in large supporting strikes destroyed bridges, buildings, warehouses, trucks, 1 ammunition and 1 fuel dump. They bombed, rocketed, strafed and napalmed gun positions and entrances to caves and tunnels.

CTF 51 reports that from L Day to 1800 L plus 4 the total confirmed enemy planes destroyed is: 28 by ship gunfire, 21 by TF 51 controlled VP and 16 suicides (who made 15 hits and 1 miss on 14 ships) for a total of 65.

ComSecSeaFron O50020 (pink) sets forth his OpPlan 2-45 for the FIRSTBREAK operation.

— Continued —
TOP SECRET

5 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cinpeac Adv Hq 050028 requests CinCSWP to perform a maximum attack on air bases in north FORMOSA.

Cinpeac Adv Hq 050110 advises CinCSWP that Marine Air Groups 24 and 32, including their Headquarters Squadrions, are available for his use until 1 July.

Cinpeac 050153 states that Construction Battalions will not be returned to the mainland for reorganisation. Re-equipment will be accomplished at Pacific bases and rehabilitation of personnel will be accomplished by individual replacements.

Cinpeac 050223 (pink) states that he does not desire CinCSWP to employ IX craft in the Pacific at the present time.

ComfifthFlt 050527 states that Admiral Spruance (ComfifthFlt) has shifted his flag from the INDIANAPOLIS to the NEW MEXICO.

ComfifthFlt 050709 directs Air Defense Commander IIO JDNA to employ VM 612 in sight ASP at IWO, and attack shipping in the harbors of the Japanese Empire.

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) 050730 is Summary No. 9 of OKINAWA operation as of 1200 on the 5th.

Cinpeac Adv Hq 050837 (pink) advises various interested commands that it may become possible to accomplish subsequent phases of the ICEBERG Operation sooner than originally planned and so warns them to keep their plans and preparations therefor as flexible as possible.

Cinpeac Adv Hq 050840 concerns policy to be carried out with regard to visits of officers to the Forward Area.

CTF 51 051325 covers his Summary No. 10 as of 1800 on the 5th.

6 April (Guam date)

Increased enemy resistance is being met by the 24th Corps in its drive to the south on OKINAWA. In the north units of the 3rd PhilCorps are meeting only scattered resistance.

During the afternoon, apparently very heavy enemy air attacks took place. CTF 56 reported that in the afternoon, aircraft from TG's 58.1 and 58.3 had splash about 150 planes, exclusive of any shot down by the CAP at OKINAWA. Complete report has not been received as to the damage inflicted on us.

A Japanese task force was located in the INLAND SEA. A 734 plane reported a force of one large ship and 6 DD underway to the west of Kure at 0930/1. This force apparently proceeded south through BUNGO STRAIT, for, at 1010 a force was picked up by THREDSDEN (SS 410) on patrol there. HUCKLEBACK (SS 295) picked up the force 20 minutes later. Apparently neither submarine was within attack range, but both trailed, and reported the force - which radar indicated to consist of two large warships and 6 escorts. The speed of the force was high 22 - 26 knots, so the submarines finally lost contact at 2345/1.

- Continued -
6 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

TOP SECRET

To meet this threat our forces have been disposed as follows: Search sectors have been intensified in the direction of the threat. TF 56, while continuing fire support missions, will be deployed to the west of OKINAWA. Submarines have been posted along possible routes of the force. TF 58 is concentrating to the east of OKINAWA in a position to cover the transport convoy routes.

Approximately 150 B-29s are scheduled to bomb TOKYO tomorrow and will be escorted by 70-90 P-51s based at IWO JIMA. This is the first instance of a strike of heavy bombers being escorted by fighters based at IWO JIMA. In addition, a strike is scheduled for tomorrow for 165 B-29s to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant at NAGOYA. These planes will be unescorted.

Cinopac Adv Hq 050220 (pink) outlines the preferable months for invasion of KYUSU and/or HONSHU.

Cinopac Adv Hq 050820 (pink) states his views relative to the possibility of initiating Phase III of ICEBERG earlier than previously planned and requests reply from Com5thFlt as to his views.

Arnold to MacArthur and Nimitz 052341 (pink) states that 20th Air Force is prepared to furnish a planning staff to Cinpaca to aid in planning for the invasion of JAPAN and further states that he contemplates sending the Chief of Staff, 20th AF to this headquarters about the middle of May.

ComGenFMFPac 060125 (pink) outlines his recommendations relative to employment of 3rd PhibCorps vice 5th PhibCorps in 3rd phase ICEBERG operations.

CTF 51 060240 outlines his plan in the event of enemy surface attack off OKINAWA.

Com5thFlt to Cinopac 060701 (pink) sets forth his comments regarding Phase III of ICEBERG.

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) 060715 covers Summary No. 11 as of 1200 on the 6th.

21st BomCom 060815 (pink) summarises mining operations carried out by the 21st BomCom in the SHIMOMOKEKI STRAITS Area.

CTF 58 060847 summarises results of operations of TGs 58.1 and 58.3 on the 6th.

CTF 51 061645 summarises operations at OKINAWA as of 1800 on the 6th.

CTF 51 070035 informs TGs 51.5 (transport screen) and 51.6 (service and salvage group) of possible impending enemy surface engagement and requests them to expedite logistics for ships and support craft that can participate in this possible action.

CTF 51 062025 summarises special report on the enemy air attack afternoon and early evening of 6 April.
TOP SECRET

7 April (Quan date)

Substantial gains were made by both corps throughout L plus 6 on OKINAWA. In the north the 6th MarDiv continued to advance against little opposition and by 1800 the front lines extended from NAGA southeast towards ICAMA TAKA, with patrols as far north as NAROSHI and to the west near the river, between the towns of UOMA and YAHU. Elements of the division landed on the beaches of YOKA in the morning in order to reconnoiter the MotoBu Peninsula. During the day other elements of the division reconnoitered the inshore sides of IHE, TAKA and TAKU REESE. No enemy activity was reported. The 1st MarDiv continued mop up in its 2A.

In the south the XXIV Corps advanced over rough and clifflike terrain finding the enemy in deliberate defensive positions consisting of blockhouses, pillboxes, and in extensive trench systems protected by double arch barbed wire. The town of UCHI TOMARI and DONIKU were captured and on the left flank the front lines were within 400 yards of OUKI. Only slight gains were made on the right flank. Artillery of the XXIV Corps and of the 3rdPhibCorps was assisting the advance. The 96th InfDiv states that it is possible that the entire 4th MarDiv is in front of its lines.

Total casualties as of this time are 1,523 of which 274 are listed as KIA.

Following is a chronology of the contacts and engagement with the 4th task force on 7 April:

2345 - Contact lost by submarine THREADFIN off east coast YUKON.
Force headed SW.

0825 - 1 BB, 2 CL, 10 DD picked up by ESSEX plane at 10-4AM 129-103, course 300.

1030 - FairWing 1 plane reported force 1 BB, 1 CA 9 DD at 31W 129-55E.

1015 - TF 58 launched 380 plane strike against force reported in 41-00N
129-00 E.

1130 - 1145 - ComFairWing 1 issued orders for day and night tracking of force.

1345 - Search plane reported force attacked by VF, VB and VT with considerable damage.

1448 - ComSubPac issued orders to submarines to knock off cripples and search for aviators.

1520 - Search plane reported landing to pick up a survivor at 30-47N
128-05E, and reported 1 CL and 1 DD burning, 4 other DD headed NE, speed 0. ComFairWing 1 ordered planes to search north for the BB and its escorts.

1620 - Search plane sent in a report (garbled) that the BB had not been sighted, but that there was considerable wreckage and enemy survivors in the water.

1705 - Search plane base reported "Survivor states vessel burning not underway to be battleship." Our estimate of others 1 cruiser light, 4 DD sunk, 4 DD undamaged, 1 DD burning, 1 BB burning.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

7 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

1701 - CTF 58 reported: "PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE LACKING EFFECTS AND TOTAL FORCES ATTACKED 1 YAMATO BB 1 AGano CL 1 CL 2 DD 7 OR 8 DD, SANK 1 BB 1 AGano CL 1 CL 1 DD 2. DD BURNING BADLY 3 DD APPEARING DAMAGED X 1 CL DD FUELED OR ROCKETED X BB TOOK MINIMUM 8 TORPEDOES AND 1 1,700 TT BOMB HITS X NO AIR OPPOSITION OVER TARGET BUT "HEAVY AIR DENSITY SO OUR LOSSES ABOUT 7 PLANES" (Later reported 7 planes down in target area, and 4 fighters from ESSEX down in launching area).

0515/8 Plane 927464 reported 4 DD, 1 CL course N, speed 2 at 01-12 120-10.

Submarines have been ordered to knock off cripples and pick up survivors.

From 1440 to 1843 on the 6th, 182 planes attacked 22 groups, 55 shot down by planes, 35 shot down by ships, 22 suicides, 2 near misses. Total 166. The following ships were damaged as indicated during these attacks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Heavily damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUSH</td>
<td>HYMAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLHOUN</td>
<td>MULLANY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMONS</td>
<td>NEWCOMB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MORRIS 6 DD, 1 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LEUTZE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HOWORTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROMAN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minor damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUTCHINS - 1 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECRUIT - 2 AM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further air attacks morning of 7th (0325 to 1015) 20 planes approached in small groups and 6 dropped bombs. Of these 20 planes, 6 were shot down by fighters, 6 shot down by ships, and 2 suicides hit (BENNETT (DD 473) and WILLIAM (DE 141)). Total ships sunk or damaged during these actions: 10 DD, 2 BMS, 3 DE, 1 ABD, 3 AM, 2 APE, 1 LST - 22 Ships.

CTF 57 reports as follows: "On 6 April bombed and strafed airfields at ISHIGAKI and MIYAKO. 1 plane shot down in air. Previous craters on MIYAKO filled in. Force detected by sniper in early morning and attacked by 4 suicides. No damage to ships, the one plane close-missed ILLUSTRIUS after her wing tip grazed island. The other 3 planes were shot down 1 by ships gunfire and 2 by planes." On 7 April both islands were again attacked. All MIYAKO runways left unserviceable. Some 20 a/c were seen of which 3 were destroyed on ground. Total enemy losses aircraft - airborne 5, on ground 3. Own losses 2 planes in combat, 12 operational. Force retired 7th for two days replenishment and will return to combat area 10th.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

7 April (Guam date)(cont'd)

From 27 March to 6 April 205 B-29s from 21st BomCom in 6 missions laid
1690 mines in the approaches to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and in the KURE-KADOMATA
areas. Mining was by radar from 5-8000 feet, except for 48 mines dropped among
major fleet units in KURE HARBOR which was from 25,000 feet. 21st BomCom esti-
mated that 90% of the mines were effectively laid. 3 B-29s were lost in the pro-
cess, probably to enemy action, and 1 crashed while landing injuring 2 and killing
9.

Cominch & CNO 062116 (pink) states that units of the 7th Fleet will pass
to the command of Cinpoa on a schedule to be agreed upon by General MacArthur
and Admiral Nimitz, or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CTF 58 062337 outlines first report by carrier plane of enemy force which
sortied from RURING SUIDO.

Com5thFlt 070105 (pink) orders CTF 58 and CTF 51 to carry out strikes on
enemy task force.

Plane 160, Flight 464 070130 sets forth first sighting of enemy force by
search plane from ComAirWing CNS.

CTF 58 070304 advises that strike has been launched against enemy surface
force.

Cinpoa Adv Hq 070646 advises ComGenPOA that visits to the POMPOA. by
certain personnel will be restricted to those only who are concerned in carrying
out operations in that area.

CTF 51 070755 covers his summary as of 1200 on the 7th.

Cinpoa Adv Hq 070825 requests CinCSWPA to authorize direct communications
between ComAir/7thFlt and ComAirPac regarding exchange of naval patrol squadrons.

CTF 54 070832 (pink) outlines his op-plan for possible engagement with
Japanese surface force.

CTF 51 070925 comments on progress of current state of affairs in MIPSA
area.

CTF 57 071204 outlines operations of that task force on 5 April.

Cinpoa Adv Hq 071214 concerns search operations being carried out by sea-
planes in the OKINAWA area.

CTF 51 071830 covers summary of operations as of 1800 on the 7th.
8 April (Gum date)

OKINAWA. In the north, light opposition is being encountered; however, to the south limited gains were made only after exceptionally difficult fighting. Airfields were encountered together with fire from all types and calibers of weapons. Front lines are of 1800 are within 2500 yards of MACHINAHY airfield on the left flank and within 1500 yards of YONABARU airfield on the left flank.

By L plus 6, 30,000 civilians were under the care of the Military Government authorities on OKINAWA. A general report from the Military Government indicates that the situation is generally satisfactory. Total casualties as of 9 AM on 7 April numbered 1,690, 301 of which are reported as KIA.

Search for remnants of the Jap task force attacked on the 7th were negative. Planes from PAV 1 searched all day but poor visibility was encountered throughout the area and no reports were received indicating that sightings had been made. CTF 54 launched a 32 plane fighter-bomber strike in the general area of the encounter and the planes returned reporting no sightings. CTF 54 estimated that the remnants of this Jap force consist of 5 DDs.

Ship casualties: Air raid on 6th - MARYLAND hit by bomb which failed to penetrate turret #3. H. F. BAUER (DD 26) hit by aerial torpedo, forward, being locally repaired. YMS 321 hit by suicide plane knocking out her three inch gun and causing topside damage. On the 8th - YMS 467 hit by coast defense gun but remaining operational. HUGOY hit by suicide plane; engine room flooded but under control. TF 58 ship casualties: CHAS. S. SPERRY (DD 697) lost port bilge keel. TORSN (DD 573) 2 guns out due to suicide near miss. TAHQUIT (DD 746) electrical fires out due to two near bomb misses. SAN JACINTO (CVL 30) numerous shrapnel holes due to bomb near miss. KENCROCK (CV 19) being returned to ULTRA for repairs escorted by WINTHORP (DD 700) who took a suicide on her bridge and KLINE (DD 644) with a fuel oil leak.

TG 51.3 (TransRon 16 lifting 27th Div) ordered to objective. Two divisions (2 RCT) will proceed to HAGURI beaches for unloading. The other TransDiv (RCT) will go to KERAMA RETTO to prepare for landings on the eastern islands. TG 51.1 (77th Div) and TG 51.2 (2nd MarDiv) remain in waiting areas. TG 51.3 replenishes today. Others remain at objective. Units of TG 52.1 repeat strikes on 5/17. TG 50.3 continues replenishment. Leaves today for combat area.

First report from CTU 944.1 has come in. Unit consists of TALOS (DD 700) and LSM 331.

A survey of FARECE VELA was completed and foundations installed for hydrographer shack. Reef is reported to be very steep and no anchorages are available.

Enemy continuing to shell CEBU docks. Liberty ship furnished counter battery fire. PTs active in landing guerrillas support, barge hunts, and store bombardment. They fired an ammunition dump on CABANAC ISLAND (N of PANYI).

BSSUGO (SS 321) on the 5th attacked a northbound CL in dark at 1 AM but missed. Then scored a hit in one of her escorts, which sank leaving any troops in the water.

On the same date GABILAN (SS 252) scored a hit in the cruiser and slowed her down. This permitted the third submarine, GIANT (SS 329), to score three solid hits. The cruiser was heard sinking and breaking up.

- Continued -

2. 03
TOP SECRET

8 April (Gum date)(Cont'd)

SINGAPORE (SS 407) sank two troop loaded sea trucks bound forichi yest
terday, and recovered the only 3 survivors from 200 troops. These also contained of hundredsof oil drums.

TIRANTE (SS 420) sank an AK in the YELLOW SEA, and SIREN (SS 411) sank a junk.

COBRA rescued 7 13th AF aviators from ditched B-24s off CHINA, all in good shape.

SEADEVIL (SS 400) picked up 3 fighter pilots from B-24.

Delayed reports from TF 58 for the first 5 days of April indicate that to
total of 77 enemy planes was destroyed during that period (59 airborne), with 29 others probably destroyed or damaged. This represents a gain of 30 destroyed and 51 probably destroyed or damaged over earlier reports.

Of 194 B-29s airborne for the attack against the Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant, 137 dropped 574 tons of GPs on the plant primary target visually from 16,500-21,000 feet, and 23 B-29s dropped 107 tons of GPs on targets of opportunity. 127 Jap planes were sighted, and 71 attacks were counted. 34 Jap planes were destroyed, 7 probably destroyed, and 7 damaged. These enemy losses, added to those inflicted by the B-51s and the 73rd Wing B-29s over TOKYO, total 85 Jap aircraft destroyed, 77 probably de
stroyed, and 51 damaged, a grand total of 173 aircraft.

3 B-29s were lost over the target. 1 was rammed and seen to crash. No parachutes were observed. 1 crashed after a wing blew up over the target. 1 was hit in the right wing over the target, spun in and crashed and burned. No parachutes were seen.

Photographs taken of both aircraft plants on the 3rd show a number of hits on plant buildings at NAGOYA, with fires still burning in the engine test cells, and 42 hits in nearby residential and commercial districts. The east half of the TEXT plant was obscured by smoke. Damage was observed in half of the TEXT plant, but again smoke made accurate damage assessment impossible.

At KYUSHU on the 6th 10 B-29s dropped 50 tons on the KYUSHU east airfield and 38 others hit KYOSHIMA CITY and airfield with 152 tons by radar from 19-19000 feet. No enemy opposition was experienced. Results were unobserved.

20 B-29s are scheduled to take off at 1800 tomorrow to continue the mining of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

JCS 072051 discusses shortage of shipping and states that it is necessary to direct rear area shipping to be employed in forward movement and requests information as to what can be done to further this program.

Com5thFlt 080340 outlines his policy on the return of damaged ships to rear areas.

CTF 51 080755 outlines his summary as of 1200 on the 8th.

Cinopac Adv Hq 080816 advises Com5thFlt as to proposal for employment of CVEs and requests recommendation from him for redistribution of CVEs now under his command.

CTF 51 081325 outlines his summary as of 1800 on the 8th.
TOP SECRET

2 April (Okinawa date)

On OKINAWA the front lines in the drive to the south remained virtually static throughout the day. Only small gains in isolated sections were reported. Present plan of the 24th Corps is to capture the high ground on both flanks. 10 Artillery Battalions are now available for the support of the drive to the south. During the day 2 RCTs of the 27th InfDiv landed on MABUII beaches and have been assigned to the 24th Corps. Remaining RCT will land on MABUII late morning of the 10th.

CTF 51 reports enemy reaction to OKINAWA occupation evidenced by daily and nightly air attacks, attempts at surface activity by suicide boats and swimmers and an increased resistance in south. A small group of suicide boats attacked ships in the southern transport area. C.J. BADGER (DD 657) hit and holed amidships putting both engines out. STARR (AKA 67) hit with minor damage, apparently because boat hit LSM alongside. At least 4 boats were destroyed and 8 men killed. At least two swimmers reported. Only one air attack reported on 9th. ETT 567 hit and lost propulsion. Extensive fire support furnished in southern area. \( \text{0-253} \) apparently good results.

Summary of TF 51 ships damaged by enemy action thru the 8th: 12 sunk - 9 by suicide planes, 2 by mines, 1 by suicide boats, 56 damaged - 43 by suicide planes, 6 by bombs, 3 by mines, 1 by aerial torpedo, 1 by gunfire, 1 by suicide boat.

TF 57 is due to strike FUKUOKA on the 11th and 12th of April with 2 CVS from TG 52.1 (RAdm. Durgin) will maintain neutralization of SAWAI until 7/11.

During the afternoon of the 8th 96 F4Us and 16 F4F(IV) of VCF 73 arrived at the Kadena Airfield.

CTF 58 estimates 529 enemy planes destroyed by that force from 2 March thru 7 April inclusive. This total figure breaks down as follows:

- 428 Shot down
  - 176 by OKINAWA target CAP
  - 21 by night, dawn and dusk CAP
  - 60 near TF 58
  - 6 by VF(N)
  - 19 by shoa gunfire
  - 7 appeared definite suicide attempts
  - 2 suicides
  - 99 destroyed on ground

- 529 TOTAL

CTF 51 estimates 234 Jap planes destroyed in the same period, including those destroyed by planes of TF 58 when controlled by TF 51. If the 176 planes destroyed by TF 58 OKINAWA CAP are subtracted, the grand total is 609.

ComMinPac 030321 discusses the necessity and value of assignment of 2200-ton DMs to each mineweeding unit.

ComGenAAFPOA Admin 060535 (pink) discusses base development plans at ISU SHIMA and OKINAWA.

Cominch 071945 (pink) requests CINCPAC to ascertain how SHIMA established identity of ANA KARU.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

9 April (Gum date)(Cont'd)

Cinpeo Pearl 072145 (pink) requests comment from Cinpeo Sec as to Cinpeo AAFICA Admin despatch relative to employment of 316 Wing at S I II.

Com5thFlt 080256 requests TF 57 to strike northern airfields on 11th and 12th.

QUEENFISH 081515 states that the identity of the NZ ADL was established by statement of the prisoner alone and no other confirmation was made.

Cinpeo Adv Hq 090125 advises that in order to ensure ready 1st week future counter offensives it will be advisable to return the TF 57 to port for replenishment, upkeep and rest on a rotating basis.

Cinpeo Adv Hq 090126 advises Cominch that TF 57 is deployed relative to sinking of AKI IVI and answers information requested by Cominch.

Com5thFlt 090225 requests that Cinpeo arrange with US to correct air strikes against southern PHIL and PHOICCA at the same time as TF 57 is striking the northern fields.

CTF 51 & CTF 56 090235 states that 2nd FarDiv will possibly not be required in Phases I or II and suggests that the 2nd FarDiv be returned to CTF 51 as the decision for employment of this unit in Phase III.

Cinpeo Adv Hq 090255 outlines to all Pacific forces areas within terms of the recent directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff involving changes in command organization in the Pacific.

Cinpeo Adv Hq 090625 reclassifies an area north of 53 as a blind bombing zone.

Cinpeo Adv Hq 090642 requests CinGICA to strike southern NH airfields on 11 and 12 April.

CTF 51 090745 covers Summary 17 as of 1200 on the 9th.

ComGen 10 090910 (pink) answers Cinpeo Pearl request for information regarding establishment of VMA sites on TF S I II and CECA.

Cinpeo Adv Hq 091157 (pink) authorizes Com5thFlt to return 2nd FarDiv to CAIPE with the proviso that the Division will remain alerted for employment in either Phase I, II, or III of ICEBERG.

CTF 51 091240 covers Summary 18 as of 1800 on the 9th.

ViceAdm 091617 directs Allied Air Forces to conduct heavy air strikes on southern PHIL and PHOICCA airfields on the 11th and 12th of April in accordance with Cinpeo request.
10 April (Guan date)

Lines of the 24th Corps were consolidated on ORINASU, but two days' fire and only limited local advances were attained. The 3rd Mill珊瑚 encountered stiffening resistance on KORAN KORANA and was subjected to extensive counterattacks on both flanks. Bad weather hampered all operations throughout the day.

During the morning 1 NCT of the 27th INF Div landed on CEBU I. Considerable resistance was reported. Jap casualties as of midday 12, 000 reported, 5,000 KIA and 222 POW's. Military Government authorities report that as of today 73,000 civilians are under their control. All captured males between the age of 15 and 45 are being used as laborers. There are about 1500 in this category.

Delayed reports of ship damage: LCS 16 in air attack on 25. 1914-S 1254 receive 6 hits by shore batteries. After machinery spaces were flooded to a point, but can make 18 knots.

Fire support continued. 2 Cpd, 2 Cln, 1 Cl and 9 TF114 supported operations of TG 51,19 engaged in the capture of TANJUM I.

TF 57 proceeded to position for strike on KORAN KORANA. Two TFs on northern FOCU.S. scheduled for tomorrow. TG 51,14 and 51,2 increasing their support for two days are now due to replenish, with TG 51,3 and 51,4 in the funnel area. TG 51,2 (lifting 2nd InfDiv) starting back to CEBU I.

Our plane losses at ORINASU include 6 EMs missing since the morning of the 9th when they became lost (1 pilot was rescued by TCG 347), 1 pilot rescued, and 1 lost. The pilot and airmen of the TCG 347, after being lost over the territory are now safe, having filtered through the enemy lines.

A report from TCG 51,15 (RAdm Kiland) on Jap submarines follows: A basis of intelligence interpretations of personnel and examination of blueprints and documents aboard 8 DDs and other escort types hit by submarines and general observation of 3 attacks on shipping in immediate vicinity of ORINASU. The following information obtained: (A) Planes generally approach at very low altitude, in some instances 10 to 20 feet off the water. When possible, approach from the inside. Witnesses. (B) Suicide planes will often select isolated vessels, crewed ships or ships with relatively weak fire power as targets. This is not true regardless of the presence of American or high priority targets. (C) Very few planes employed in these attacks but no new models identified. Examination of manufacturers plates from portions of 1 suicide, probably late indicates plane built in 1938 or 1939 and some parts manufactured as far back as 1937. (D) Three or four-divisional planes approach from another direction. (E) Coordinated attacks reported 4 instances with planes coming from several angles simultaneously. (F) Planes making their approach absorb great punishment without being destroyed or thrown off course, indicating possibility these planes are specially armored. Cases of 1/4 inch armor recovered.

This morning elements of the 41st INF Div landed on the northern coast of JOLI ISLAND meeting very little resistance. A landing was also made this morning on BUSANGIA ISLAND southwest of HENDOON.

STARK, a British submarine, reports seeing the cruiser Torpedoes by the CHARK (SS 328). This submarine reports that the cruiser sank after a spectacular explosion. This sinking occurred on the 6th NE of BALI.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

10 April (Cont'd)

On the night of the 9th-10th, 16 R-29s laid 105 mines in minefields in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS (west entrance to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS) through 6/10 to 17/10 Clouds from 5-6,900 feet. There was no enemy air opposition, and no R-29s were lost. "It is estimated that this mission will maintain the blockage of the west entrance of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS for an additional 5-7 days."

ComGen 3rdMarCorps 082357 recommends to ComGenMAC that 3rdMarCorps be rehabilitate at CHINON instead of in the MARIAS or the MARIANAS AREA.

CTF 54.3 (RAdm Beary) 092358 discusses failure to return escorts from ULITHI to the operating area.

ComFlt 080512 (pink) suggests that CTF 50 make a strike on LTU on 17/10.

CTF 50 100005 (pink) advises ComFlt that a strike on LTU will be dependent upon when his TF will be released from support of amphibious forces.

CinCofS Adm 100004 (pink) requests information from ComFlt regarding suitability of OKINAWA Area for the development of certain airfields and facilities.

CinCofS Adm 100003 covers desire of CinCofS that major actions concerning future operations should not be referred to commanders without in advance. He suggests that any such information will be supplied by the advance signal staffs.

ComFlt 100125 states that mining strikes are currently planned and recommends release of mines to the VLF program.

CinCofS Pearl 100146 recommends to CinCofS that material handling facilities for LST'S-SWAB be sent to LIP.

CinCofS Pearl 100223 (pink) covers directive that priority be given to establishment of aviation facilities on SAJAN.

CTF 51 100215 covers Admiral Turner's OpPlan for the capture of SAJAN.

CTF 51 100705 covers Summary No. 19 of operations on 15th as of 1200/10th.

ComFlt 100716 (pink) states that strike on KYUSHU by CTF 50 will have to be postponed until shore-based air is activated at CHINON. He suggests that long-range fighter sweeps on KYUSHU fields may pay big dividends.

CinCSWPA 101145 states that he will carry out heavy strikes on southern PHILIPPINE airfields on the same days that the British carrier force strikes the northern fields.

CinCofS Adm 101159 authorizes ComFlt 100705 to proceed with rotation of personnel of the 3rd MarDiv as originally planned.

CTF 51 101300 is Summary No. 20 covering CHINON operations as of 101900.
TOP SECRET

11 April (Gum date)

Little progress was made in both the north and west areas. West of the day, 24th Corps in the south continued to consolidate its positions prior to launching the scheduled all out attack. Our casualties as of 1800 on 11th were 2,695 of which 432 were KIA.

CVE planes furnished direct air support, and were often from 20 of the active on CAP. 4 Jap planes were shot down and 8th scored a near suicide dive on the HUNLOV (DE 36), killing 1 and wounding 1. We lost 1 PB 403, 2 PB's crashed on take off, burning 1 ranked plane and 1 C-47 engaged in CAP running off and landed at FORTAN Field, demolishing the plane, killing 1 and injuring 7.

KADEN Airfield is inoperable because of heavy rains, but YUFUKI is in excellent condition.

Between 1000-1040 5 enemy aircraft approached from the north at 30,000 feet to within 15 miles, but were not sighted and retired without attacking. At 1620 2 raids approached from the S to within 10 miles of YUFUKI, but turned back when the CAP attacked them.

Weather prevented TF 57 from carrying out its scheduled strike against FORMOSA. The force now plans to attack the same targets on the 12th and 13th.

SAFEGUARD (ARS 23) picked up a B-29 crew 40 miles W of IWO JIMA.

QUEENFISH (SS 393) returning to SINGAPORE picked up all survivors of a seaplane which was down NW of IWO JIMA. These men had been in the water for 7 hours.

Two separate B-29 strikes are scheduled for the 12th. 44 B-29s will take off to attack the Musashino plant of the Nakajima Aircraft Co. at Tokyo and 17 additional B-29s will attack targets in the KUROSHIO area.

JCS 102237 (pink) outlines to CinCPAC the priority of operations in NORTHERN JAPAN, and that seizure of IWO JIMA will not be carried out unless he can do so without prejudice to operations against JAPAN.

Com5thFlt 110247 concerns rotation of units of TF 57 to re-prepare for replenishment and rehabilitation.

CTF 51 110730 outlines his OKINAWA summary of operations as of 1200 on the 11th.

Com5thFlt 110909 directs TF 58 to discontinue replenishment and have all groups in readiness for an expected air attack.

CTF 51 112940 states that there is a possibility of strong enemy air attack being carried out from JAPAN and FORMOSA on the 12th.

CTF 51 111340 covers Summary No. 22 as of 1800 on the 11th.
TOP SECRET

12 April (Guam date)

The front lines on CHIMANA remained relatively stable throughout the week. Troops of the 27th InfDiv which made landings on TUMON 11/4 will have been on Guam and will land on the MAGUSHI beaches.

At this time G-2 estimates indicate that 65,000 Japanese troops were believed to be present on CHIMANA and FB SHIMA. Of this number 45,000 are expected to be combat troops. 62,500 of these are estimated to be on the TUMON line.

Our casualties as of 2400 on 10 April were reported as 1,114 of which 914 are listed as KIA.

On the 12th enemy air raids against shipping and our positions on CHIMANA were heavy. About 25 Jap planes attacked during the night and early morning. An estimated 175 enemy planes attacked between early afternoon and evening. Reports indicate that there were 17 separate raids in the afternoon. Considerable damage was inflicted on our forces as follows:

- 3 sink - SHIRU (DD 478), 2 damaged - PEREGRINE (DD 777), MENDI (DD 259), PARKER (DD 304), CHESLEY (DD 665), 3 others - KIYOKI, MIZU, NAGASAKI

- 3 fuel tanks ruptured and forward gyro out from near beam hit; one aircraft was a suicide bomber; 2 others were captured by Japanese

- 4 fuel tanks ruptured and 2 planes geysered out; 1 plane savaged by suicide bomber; 2 others were captured by Japanese

- 3 others - HADOKA (DD 697), BLACK (DD 666), HIBARI (DD 556), OKUSHI (DD 777), 1 others - KIYOKI, MIZU, CHESLEY (DD 665)

3 groups are scheduled to be at objective on the 14th.

Incomplete reports indicate that in the neighborhood of 2,000 Japs were destroyed by TF 58 and TF 51 during the day. Complete reports will follow. our aircraft losses were relatively light.

TF 57 struck SINDIAN and KIYAMU airfields on CHIMANA. 17 planes are reported to have been destroyed plus 5 additional damaged.

4 enemy submarines have been contacted; 2 by planes and 2 by ships. 1 of the contacts was developed by HAMMANN (DD 778) in cooperation with the MAC (270) with excellent results. Debris and oil was observed and HAMMANN (DD 778), CLARK (DA 32), BLACK (DD 666), 1 others - KIORI, MIZU, MIZU, CHESLEY (DD 665)

On the 12th 96 B-29s bombed the Kusuashio Aircraft Base at Tumon. They were escorted by 78 P-51s. Fighter opposition was reported heavier than estimated 50 enemy aircraft intercepting. 5 P-51 claims were of enemy aircraft destroyed and 16 probably destroyed, 93 B-29s claimed 3 destroyed and 4 probably destroyed. 56 B-29s were lost; however, 4 P-51s are reported missing. Results are described as being unobserved in the main due to poor weather conditions.

141 unescorted B-29s destroyed the Hodogaya and Koriyama electrical plants at KORJIAMA. 3 B-29s are missing from this mission.

Con/StaffPac 260100 concerns UDT teams and rotation of TDC units.

- Continued -
12 April (Gruam date) (Cont'd)

CinCPac Adv Hq 106342 (pink) requests information from CinCPac regarding the possibility of staging photographic Liberators through FPO-PO for the purpose of carrying out certain photographic coverage.

CinCPac Adv Hq 101141 refers to instances of attacks by friendly aircraft on friendly submarines and surface craft and requests assistance in investigating attacks of this nature.

CinCPac Adv Hq 101145 (pink) advises CinCPac that a new location date of 1 September is satisfactory for all mining jobs.

CinCPac Adv Hq 101161 refers to rotation of CR personnel.

CinCPac Adv Hq 101164 removes CinCPac on 30 April of logistic support of all SWPA forces in the Northern Solomons.

ComAfrRes Group 13 110353 (pink) refers to accommodations for British aircraft, officers and men at SAMAR Base.

CFF 51 110545 refers to suggestions pertaining to air cover for AS in the area.

CinCPac Adv Hq 110706 (pink) advises CinCPac that it is not going to carry out attacks against WAKA prior to the 19th of April in view of friendly submarines not to be carried out in that area.

CinCPac Adv Hq 110839 advises CinCPac that all air bases are being re-equipped to the fullest extent to move personnel and cargo from rear areas to combat areas.

CinCPac Adv Hq 11021 (pink) refers to the withdrawal of the 500th ANG personnel to SAMAR for maintenance at the United Kingdom for refit and further states that this will begin sometime in May, TENTATIVELY, about 13 April.

ComTopFlt 111235 advises TF 51 regarding disbursement of tact groups for maneuver in defense against air attack.

ComNinch & CinCPAC 111303 advises that in view of the shortage of F6
troduction of these aircraft to FPO-PO for May and June cannot be made.

CFF 51 112135 concerns special resort of enemy air attacks during the night and early morning of 12 April.

ComTopFlt 120112 requests information from CinCPac as to the future estimate of planes and pilots available to TF 58.

CinCPac Adv Hq 120526 requests CinCPac to continue studies on permanent FPO-PO air installations subsequent to retirement of TF 57 on the 1st.

MacArthur 121113 answers JCS request for information concerning utilization of shipping in the Pacific theater.

CFF 51 121315 is Summary No. 24 of CKNUSA operations as of 1200 on the 13th.

CinCPac's Chief of Staff and other staff members are scheduled to arrive today for conference with CinCPac-CinCPac.
TOP SECRET

13 April (Cuan date)

Little progress was made on CIEIMA on the 13th. Things were not good.
In the south, the 24th Corps is preparing for a strong offensive soon, is newly
scheduled for the 19th.

Air attacks were reported as being much lighter. No damage is being done to
our naval units during the past 24 hours. 3 additional casualties were
reported as results of heavy air attacks on the 12th. 15 was damaged, 1 suicide
plane and sunk. LCA 57 was hit by 3 suicide planes and suffered extensive damage.
In return, however, this ship caused destruction of 4 enemy planes, after which she
returned to CIEIMA R/W under her own power.

VACHT6 (3I334) on patrol off the E coast of CIEIMA reported on the morning
of the 13th 5 days to include the sinking of 1 DD, 2 small AF, 1 large AF, and for
carrier and station picket.

Entitled reports from CTF 58 (Adm Witscher) state that 75, 429 planes were
shot down 153 Jap planes; 62 by the CIEIMA CAP and the balance by planes from
AF and NAM. 5 additional planes were destroyed on the ground. CTF 58 reports observing
only 1 airborne plane which was shot down. 1 Jap AF was reported on the ground at
CIEIMA and numerous small craft and shore gun emplacements were reported.
CTF 58 reports that from 18 March to 12 April inclusive 1,750 Jap planes, 11 enemy
airplanes, broken down as follows:

- 914 airborne planes
- 73 by ships' gunfire
- 841 by our planes
- 363 on the ground
- 56 by air

CTF 51 (Adm Turner) reports that the total number of 1,750 planes reported
by aircraft under his control to be 128.

On the night of 13-14th 335 P-40s attacked 7176 Jap transports. The air
raid carried out by radar and reports indicate that a general conflagration was
noted, and aircraft opposition was generally slight.

Following is a recapitulation of aircraft destroyed in the 12th and 13th.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th</td>
<td>TF 58</td>
<td>1294</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TF 51</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>TF 57</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>TF 93</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>TG 50,5</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>1294</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

CTF 58 111108 covers report of attack by enemy aircraft having taken place
noon of the 11th.

CTF 57 121237 covers operations of the British carrier and is not reported
on the 12th.

CTF 58 121458 summarizes results of operations 12th. April.

---Continued---
TOP SECRET

13 April (Guam date) (Continued)

Cinopac Adm Hq 122938 withdraws censorship regulations regarding suicide attacks by enemy air force.

Cinopac Adm Hq 122310 (pink) covers Warning Order for Phase III(o) of ICESBERG (MIYAKO JIMA).

Cinopac Adm Hq 122312 (pink) outlines areas at which units now carrying out operations on OKINAWA will rehabilitate and prepare for next operation.

Cinopac Adm Hq 122314 concerns certain proposals for changes in the air base development program in the OKINAWA area.

Com5thFlt 130141 requests CTF 58 to make a strike on the KYUSHU airfields when practicable.

Cinopac Adm Hq 130229 suggests to Com5thFlt that he do everything possible to expedite arrival of personnel and equipment to service air groups and improve airfields in the OKINAWA area.

CTF 51 130825 is summary of OKINAWA operations as of 1200 on the 13th.

CTF 51 130840 summarizes an attack by probable pilot-controlled buzz bomb.

Cinopac Adm Hq 130935 requests strongest practicable strikes to be carried out by CinCSWPA against FORMOSA airfields and installations.

CTF 58 131114 covers summary of operations of TF 58 during the 13th.

CTF 51 131400 covers operations at OKINAWA as of 1800 on the 13th.

Cinopac Adm 131415 (pink) covers Army units to be employed in Phase III(o) of ICESBERG.

Certain CinCAPPAC Staff Officers arrived GUAM for conference with CinSPAC.

14 April (Guam date)

No major ground action was reported during the 14th at OKINAWA.

Preparations continued for the landings on IE SHIMA.

NEW YORK (BB 34) suffered considerable damage when a suicide plane crashed amidships.

SIGSBEE (DD 302), while operating with TF 58, was hit by a suicide plane which resulted in leaving only 1 engine operable and her steering gear out. The DD is in tow and a fleet tug has been detached to assist.

TF 57 on the 13th bombed and strafed northern FORMOSA airfields meeting no opposition. The force was under attack by enemy aircraft 3 times during the day but no damage was suffered. During the 12th and 13th TF 57 destroyed 20 enemy aircraft and losses were reported as being light.

On the night of 13-14th 303 B-29s dropped 2130 tons on the TOKYO arsenal area. Photographs on the 14th show the area largely obscured; however, 360 acres of damaged area are visible. 7 B-29s are missing from this mission.

2613
TOP SECRET

14 April (Oamar date) (Cont'd)

Commeh & CNB 131641 and 131644 (pink) concern date for the seizure of
BRUNEI RAY by CinCSWPA, and states that units of the British Pacific Fleet will
probably be allocated for employment in this operation.

CTF 51 132200 states that ComGen 24th Corps has been made responsible for
attack of ground units by artillery, naval gunfire and air south of Corps boundary.

ComGenPAC 140058 (pink) recommends effective date the 99th Division be
deferred to 1 June.

Cinopac Adv Hq 140232 concerns ships to be assigned and withdrawn from
CinMinPac units.

CTF 51 140655 covers Summary 27 as of 1200 on the 14th.

Cinopac Adv Hq 140826 (from General Kenney) directs Army air engineer to
proceed immediately to OKINAWA to confer with Captain Painter relative to construc-
tion of air strips thereon.

Cinopac Adv Hq 140829 (pink) concerns the mission assigned TARAWA.

Cinopac Adv Hq 140833 concerns employment of XE craft against targets in the
SINGAPORE area.

Cinopac Adv Hq 141210 (pink) advises of desire for expansion and acceleration
of Naval Base, OKINAWA.

CTF 51 141240 covers Summary No. 26 as of 1800 on the 14th.

15 April (Oamar date)

The landing on XE SATTA is scheduled for tomorrow by 2 ADTs on the southern
and southwestern beaches of the island.

No major ground action was reported on OKINAWA on the 15th. In the south
the 24th Corps is continuing its preparation for a drive with emphasis being on
the stockage of ammunition. Enemy casualties as of 1200 on the 15th are as follows:
9,106 KIA, 391 POWs.

On the night of 13-14th B-29s burned out an additional 10.7 square miles
of the TOKYO urban area. Photographs taken on the 14th show that a total of approxi-
mately 28 square miles are now burned out in this area. On the night of 13-14th 112
B-29s made an incendiary attack on the KINASHI and TOKYO urban areas. Early reports
indicate that a general conflagration existed in the target areas.

TF 58 made fighter sweeps against southern KYUSHU airfields on the afternoon
of the 15th. No report of the results of this sweep have been received. TF 58 has
been reorganized eliminating TG 37.2.

CommMarPac 030100 (pink) outlines his OpPlan for the KYUSHU Operation.

CTF 51 131040 summarizes the existing situation insofar as shortage of
escort vessels is concerned.

(Continued)
15 April (Guan date) (cont'd)

Cinopac Adv Hq 142230 advises Com5thFlt that he is considering a request on the 20th AF to make an attack on OKINAWA in front of the 7th Division and requests his comment on practicability of such an attack.

Cinopac Adv Hq 150040 advises Cominoh regarding his stand on the question of Naval personnel accepting private employment while on liberty.

Cinopac Adv Hq 150056 requests 20th AF to provide photographic coverage of southern KYUSHU airfields during the critical period of the ICEBERG Operation.

Cinopac Adv Hq 150040 concerns control of Air Support Units.

Com5thFlt 150100 requests TF 58 to strike southern KYUSHU airfields on the 15th or 16th.

Com5thFlt 150120 requests fighters from TF 53 to make strikes against southern KYUSHU airfields.

Cinopac Adv Hq 150130 requests 20th AF to make strike against southern KYUSHU airfields on the 16th.

CTF 93 150620 (pink) directs CTO 93.4 to carry out P-51 strike on KYUSHU airfields.

CTF 51 150700 covers Summary No. 29 as of 1200 on the 15th.

Cinopac Adv Hq 150806 recommends certain B2s be sailed to the Pacific from the Atlantic in view of the severe attrition of the destroyer force during the OKINAWA Operation.

Cinopac Adv Hq 150813 concerns preparation of KAPAI Camp for elements of the rear echelons of the 1st MarDiv.

CTF 92.4 (Brig.Gen. Moore) outlines his plan to sweep KYUSHU airfields with P-51s based at IWO JIMA.

CTF 51 151310 covers Summary No. 30 as of 1800 on the 15th.

Com5thFlt 151418 advises Cinopac that it is not advisable to stage P-51s from IWO JIMA to KYUSHU and thence stage through OKINAWA in view of the large numbers of Marine fighters already based at OKINAWA.

CTF 58 152027 summarises results of operations from 12 April through 14 April.

Com5thFlt 152357 states that he does not desire at this time an attack by 20th AF on targets at OKINAWA.

CTF 51 160015 states that landing was made on 13 SEIMI at 0800 against light opposition.

CTF 51 160205 is flash summary of results of enemy air attacks on the landing of the 16th.

Cinopac Adv Hq 160251 authorises release of the 1st Division to the operational control of CINPACAP.
16 April (Guam date)

A landing was made on the southern and southwestern beaches of Ie Shima at 0800 I(-9) on the 16th. 2 BATs from the 77th Div made the landing. Enemy reaction was light and the airfields were captured as of 1800.

No appreciable change was reported in the 26th Corps southern line on the 16th. The strong offensive is scheduled to commence on the 19th.

A military government report as of 13 April states that 85,000 civilians were under our care at that time. 10,000 of these are in a civilian camp and the remainder in 13 native villages. No large amount of communicable disease has been noted. 10,200 civilians have been treated by military government medical facilities.

In heavy air attack on the morning of the 16th the following ship damage was incurred from suicide planes: FRIEND (DD 477) sunk. LAFAY (DD 724) on radar picket station was under air attack for 2 hours continuously, shot down 6 planes, took 2 bomb hits and at least one suicide hit, and was able to retire to KERAMA under her own power. She finally had to accept a tow due to steering casualty. HUNSON (DD 461) damage not stated, but can proceed under own power. BREVARD (DD 665) hit in radar room but operable. BOXER (DE 677) had considerable fire damage, but can proceed under own power. HARDING (DE 23) had much damage forward, machine flooded, can proceed under own power. LCS 51 holed and cannot back. She is reported to have shot down 6 planes and was being towed to KERAMA with a plane sticking out of her at the waterline. LCS 116 badly damaged. LCI 407 damage not stated. TALOSA (AO 62) hit without serious damage.

TF 58 in addition to conducting fighter sweeps over southern KYUSHU, maintained CAP over OIJINWA and AMAMI, and conducted air support missions. The force was under air attack during the day. INTREPID (CV 11) took a suicide on the flight deck causing extensive fires and holes in both flight and hangar decks. Returns to fueling area with TG 58.1 to see if she can be made capable of sustained operations.

MODERN (DD 977) was hit by a 5 inch shell which put forward firewall out of action; she is ordered to ULITHI.

TF 57 struck SAKISHIMA fields as scheduled, observing little enemy activity. All airfields were bombed and left unserviceable. Continued strikes scheduled for today at SAKISHIMA and possibly northern FORMOSA. Retires to new fueling rendezvous tomorrow.

TF 58 from 12-14 April supported OKINAWA operations, strafed, resisted and burned hangars and buildings on TANEGA SHIMA and at KIKAI. During the two days 77 airborne enemy aircraft were destroyed, including 1 suicide in the MUSSEI (DD 502). At KYUSHU on the 15th 29 enemy planes were shot down, 58 destroyed on the ground, and 60 damaged on the ground with 2 destroyed and 1 damaged at AMAMI. On the 16th maintained a 24 plane CAP over OKINAWA all day, a 12 plane CAP over AMAMI after 0730, sent 28 planes VF sweep to KYUSHU, flew air support, and swept KIKAI. In the day's operations so far reported 216 enemy aircraft were destroyed:

166 were shot down
62 by OKINAWA CAP
27 by KYUSHU sweep
3 by Dambo CAP
15 by ships gunfire
64, by the force, most near AMAMI and KIKAI
1 suicide (INTREPID)

42 destroyed on the ground

216 - TOTAL

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

16 April ( Guam date; Cont'd)

16th - 72 P-51s were over KANOKA, KANOYA, and KIHIKIA fields from 1345 to 1405 immediately after TF 56 planes, and found the pickings slim. They sighted only 15 airborne enemy aircraft, with very few on the fields. No enemy planes were reported shot down, but 1 was observed burning on the ground. 3 P-51s were lost, with 1 pilot reported being picked up by a sub, 1 missing, and 1 believed killed when his chute failed to open.

Box score on enemy aircraft destroyed in the FOA since 18 March, as displayed on the Conference Board:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 56</td>
<td>1663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 51</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 57</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 93</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG 50.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th AF</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>-2428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 17 April elements of the 8th US Army are scheduled to land on MINDANAO in the vicinity of MALABANG. Troops involved in the operation consist of the 10th US Corps (Rein) which includes the 24th and 31st InfDivs. Total 8th Army troops for the operation are 49,209.

ComPhilPac 151040 concerns recommendation that urgent repairs should be carried out by a separate unit to be entitled "Amphibious Salvage and Repair Squadron" to be assigned to the operational command of the joint expeditionary forces during amphibious attacks.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 160250 (pink) outlines proposal concerning action to be taken to implement the JCS directive concerning command in the Pacific and to expedite planning and preparation for the invasion of JAPAN.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 160252 advises ComCPOA that for the present Army forces now under the control of CinCPAC will remain under his operational control except as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CTF 51 160800 covers Summary No. 31 as of 1200 on the 16th.

CinCPAC 160834 summarises opinions after an inspection made by him on OKINAWA on the 14th.

CinCPAC 160847 recommends all but attacks on southern KINSHU in order to cut down the effectiveness of the enemy mass suicide attacks.

CTF 51 160945 covers a mandatory dispatch relative to ships which have been on radar picket duty.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 165245 states that he assumes the Marine Air Groups established ashore in the KINSHU have all the replacement pilots and aircraft that can be advantageously employed with aircraft facilities presently available.

CinCPAC Adv Hq 161247 requests CinCPAC to neutralize all KINSHU fields subsequent to retirement of TF 57 on the 17th.

ComPhilPac 161250 concerns special recommendations regarding provisions for radar picket ships.

- Continued -
16 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

ComGen 10 161410 states that 10th Army Headquarters moves ashore at OKINAWA at 1200 on the 16th.

CTF 51 161415 covers Summary No. 32 as of 1800 on the 16th.

ComAFSNA 162148 warns various units under his command relative to improper recognition procedures being carried out in the SHP

Cinsepa Adv Hq 162251 assigns 7th Fighter Command units to the operational control of CTF 93.

17 April (Guam date)

The landing on IE SHIMA was accomplished and action on the 17th consisted of continuing scattered resistance. Our front line as of the afternoon of the 17th was approximately 2,000 yards east of the airfield.

No change in the front lines of the 24th Corps on OKINAWA.

During the day of 17 April no damage was inflicted on our forces by air attacks except for HENSMAN (DD 796) which is operating with TF 58. A suicide plane crashed causing a near miss and inflicting some damage on this destroyer.

On the 17th TF 58 destroyed 51 airborn enemy planes, majority of which were shot down over AMAMI OUNTO.

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) has submitted a revised total of enemy planes destroyed during the heavy air attack on the morning of the 16th. His total now has been raised from 97 to 131, broken down as follows: 55 by CAP, 62 by ship guns and 14 suicide crashes.

B-29s numbering about 130 made attacks on southern KYUSHU airfields on the 17th. Very few enemy planes were observed on the fields and a moderate number of airborn enemy planes failed to intercept this force.

Box aviso on enemy aircraft destroyed in the POM since 18 March: TF 58 - 1716, TF 51 - 620, TF 57 - 84, TF 93 - 32, TG 30.3 - 5, 20 AF - 94; total - 2521.

ComGen POM 162355 reports to CINCPAC with Army forces and resources under his control as of this date and states that he expects to report in person in KOREA about 20 April.

CinCBP 160755 concerns IE craft operations in the SINGAPORE Area.

ComAirPacSubComFord 170104 sets forth FAs to be ferried to OKINAWA on 15 and 19 April.

DepCom20thAF 170265 (pink) states that 5,000 members of the 50th Wing arrived GUAM from INDIA without certain facilities and requests that effort be made to expedite movement of cargo vessels on which equipment is being shipped.

CTF 51 170520 issues order stating that in view of possibility of enemy ships arriving OKINAWA, ships of TF 58 should deploy to the north and northwest as to be in position to intercepts.
TOP SECRET

17 April (Guan date)(Cont'd)

Cinopoa Adv Hq 170529 concerned ABSD to be installed at OKINAWA.

Cinopoa Adv Hq 170532 states that he consurs in the diversion of fleet support facilities from SAMAR to the KYUSHU and MARIANAS.

Cinopoa Adv Hq 170557 (pink) summarizes status of air units either enroute to OKINAWA or scheduled for OKINAWA in the near future.

CinCBPFF 170647 & 170653 (pink) concern employment of that force in the IIernei BAY Operation.

DepCom20thAF 170654 (pink) requests authority from Cinopoa to base the 499th very heavy bombardment group and the 39th service group special on North Field TINIAN about 1 July.

ComGenAirMFPac 170725 (pink) advises that certain Marine Fighter Squadrons and Bomber Squadrons from MW 1 report for duty to ComGenTEN. Readiness date at mounting point in the PHILIPPINES to be 1 June.

DepCom20thAF 170725 advises Cinopac that beginning 18 April the 21st BomCom will attack KYUSHU airfields with approximately 100 B-29s daily, weather permitting, and will continue as long as Cinopoa considers present emergency exists.

Cinopoa Adv 171155 (pink) outlines to CinCSNPA information relative to current use of enemy air bases by Japanese forces in FORMOSA.

DepCom20thAF 171251 states that daily photo coverage will be carried out of southern KYUSHU airfields until released by Cinopoa.

Cinopoa Adv Hq 171310 (pink) requests comment from ComFedArea relative to basing certain VLR wings plus FAW 18 at TINIAN.

MacArthur 171505 advises Cinopoa that 81st Division will be assigned to the 8th Army and requests Cinopoa to issue instructions to direct this Division to report at LETTE.

2619
TOP SECRET

18 April (Gazz date)

Preparations continue for the attack scheduled for 0640 I on the 19th. The line-up for the attack from west to east is as follows:

27th InfDiv - 105th and 109th Regts in assault
26th InfDiv - 361st and 362nd Regts in assault
7th InfDiv - 134th and 32nd Regts in assault

Elements of the 307th ROY from the 77th InfDiv will make a diversionary feint on the southeastern beaches at 0800.

TF 58.7 (VADM Lee) consisting of 3 BB and 5 DD were detailed for bombardment in support of the effort to be carried out on the 19th. 2 TOs operated in support of OKINAWA operations today and all 3 groups will support the operations tomorrow. TF 57 is replenishing this date.

On the 17th a few enemy aircraft approached the OKINAWA area, 1 or 2 being shot down some distance from the target. On the 19th 3 raids approached from the west at about 1000 resulting in 2 twin engine enemy aircraft being shot down by night fighters about 50 miles west of the operating area.

SEAGULL (SS 403) sank a large L-Class submarine off WAKE ISLAND and possibly destroyed a sampan operating in the vicinity at the same time.

The scheduled strike to be carried out by B-29's on the southern KURUS airfields on the 17th was cancelled due to unfavorable weather report.

A revised estimate of enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March is set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TF</th>
<th>1779</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 51</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 57</td>
<td>84</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF 32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO 30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th AF</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CINCPAC ADV Hq 171247 directs certain addresses to expedite repairs on all escort vessels as expeditiously as possible in order to make them available for combat assignment.

CINCPAC ADV Hq 171512 concerns substitution of Army garrison units in the MARSHALLS by Naval and Marine units.

ComGen 21 BamCom 18000 (pink) concerns the employment of the 116th Wing in the MARIANAS.

CINCPAC ADV Hq 180220 requests information from CINCPAC regarding the unauthorizd visit of General Smith (3rd Fighter Command) to OKINAWA.

ComServPac 180321 (pink) states that if target date of 20 August for 100000 is to be met firm orders for shipments must be submitted not later than 1 May.

- Continued -

2620
18 April (Oman date) (Cont'd)

CTF 51 180643 covers summary 35 as of 1200 on the 16th.

8th FL 180647 concerns schedule of rotation for fast carrier task group for East and replenishment during current operations.

Cinopoa Adv Hq 180653 (pink) concerns assembly of special equipment for LONGOM and OLYMPIC operations.

CTF 93 180718 concerns VLR escort of F-5Is based at IWO JIMA.

ComGenMAAFPOA 180720 (pink) advises Cinopoa that he has been directed to transfer certain fighter groups from the 7th AF to the 20th AF and requests concurrence.

ComGen 21st BomCom 180800 (pink) covers his proposal to base certain VLR units on North Field TINIAN.

GHQ SHFA 181010 (pink) summarizes the proposal of his representatives at a conference at Cinopoa Adv Hq and concurs in the proposal agreed to by them.

CTF 51 181156 covers summary 36 as of 1800 on the 16th.

Cominch & GHO 181432 (pink) outlines directive to ComNavGroup CHINA relative to future activities in the CHINA Theater.

CTG 99.2 (MajGen Maloney) 181516 (pink) concerns employment of shore based air force in the OKINAWA Area.

Cinopoa Adv Hq 181624 expresses appreciation to MacArthur for continued neutralization of FORMOSA airfields.

CTF 58 182039 states that he does not desire to rotate TUs until such time as the shore based air force is ready to take over and TF 38 is relieved from direct support of the OKINAWA Operation.

Cinopoa Adv Hq 182554 (pink) advises ComGenMAAFPOA that it is his understanding that all Army fighter groups deployed in the FGA will be under the operational control of Cinopoa unless otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ComGen 21st BomCom 190025 states that daily bombing of KYUSHU will be continued, weather permitting, until cancellation is requested by Cinopoa.
19 April (Guam date)

Report has been received that the troops jumped off in the 24th Corps sector early on the morning of the 19th. However, final results of the day's action have not as yet been received. Intensive fire support was supplied in the area ahead of the 24th Corps by the following ships: 2 OB, 2 CA, 3 DD on the east; 4 OB, 3 CA, 5 DD on the west; 2 OB, 2 CA, 3 DD supporting diversion; 3 SB, 3 DD (AK only) on east. Diversionary feint landing was carried out satisfactorily.

For the third successive 24-hour period no damage has been reported as a result of air attacks. There were, however, two operational casualties: MARINE (CL 63) suffered an explosion in the center gun, Torpedo No. 2; TOLIAR (DM 29) was reported grounded.

SERNST (SS 403) reports scoring a hit in a 7,000-ton AK and another hit in an escort in the same locality - off KII SHIDO.

SUNFISH (SS 231) on patrol off the east coast of HOKSHU reports that she sank 1 large Maka, 1 gundboat and 1 large escort vessel.

94 P-51s based at DNO hit Atsugi airfield on the 19th. Reports indicate that about 50 enemy interceptors were observed, all being particularly unaggressive. 21 airborne enemy planes were claimed destroyed; on the ground, 26 enemy planes were either destroyed or probably destroyed, and an additional 32 damaged. Our losses were 2 P-51s. Pilots from this sweep reported observing a large cargo vessel sinking. It had previously been burning.

A strike on KYUSHU scheduled to have been carried out by B-29s on the 20th was cancelled. However, an attack on airfields in the northern KYUSHU area and on SHIKOKU is scheduled for the 21st.

Coninc 3 Kund 132020 (pink) states that it is his intention to allocate units of the British Pacific Fleet to CINCPACPA for the BRINDLE BAY Operation and he requests information as to the units required and the dates of assignment.

ConMCP 3 Kund 130030 (pink) concerns ConMCP request for provision of increased repair and supply facilities in CENTRAL JAPAN.

Cinopac Adv Hq 190222 (pink) concerns the proposed meteorological conference and concurs that it should be held in Washington rather than in Manila.

ConMCP 3 Kund 190245 directs that rotation of carrier groups will not be placed in effect until the situation at OKINAWA relative to land based air force has improved.

Cinopac Pearl 190359 (pink) advises action addresses to initiate procurement and assembly of construction and other special equipment for the LONEHT Operation based on a target date of 20 August.

CTF 51 190625 covers Summary No. 37 as of 1200 on the 19th.

CinCPRF 190699 (pink) advises certain British units of tentative employment of the BPF in the near future.

Cinopac Adv Hq 190641 (pink) requests the co-operation of the JMS relative to assembly of supplies concerned to both OKINAWA and JAPAN regardless of the fact that either or both operations may be a problem.
TOP SECRET

19 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Cinacopac Adv Hq 190832 (pink) concurs in cancellation of strike but requests continuation thereof as soon as weather permits.

CommAPSNAV 191033 directs 5th AF to intensify attacks on FORMOSA airfields for maximum possible neutralization.

10th Army 191132 covers summary of operations on OKINAWA as of 1200 on the 19th.

CTF 51 191200 covers summary No. 38 as of 1200 on the 19th.

Cominch & CNO 191617 (pink) concerns control of 7th Fleet elements required for the defense of the SAMP.

20 April (Guam date)

The scheduled attack on the morning of the 19th was carried out as per schedule and the front line as of the morning of the 20th had been advanced approximately 1,000 yards on the right flank, no gain in the center and a gain of approximately 1,000 yards on the left flank. A portion of the YOKABAHU airfield had been seized. 26 of our tanks were destroyed during the 24-hour period. Stubborn resistance continues to be encountered on IS SHIMA. It is estimated that about 1,000 Japs remain on the island. No more changes are reported in the front lines.

For the 4th consecutive 24-hour period air attacks have been light and no damage is reported to have been inflicted on our ships. There were, however, 9 small raids on the evening of the 19th. Most of the bogies made no attacks.

250 B-29s are scheduled to make attacks on KYUSHU airfields tomorrow.

On the 19th 63 B-24s bombed SHINDIYU airfield with results generally unobserved. 23 additional B-24s bombed TAINAN airfield on the same day.

10th Army 191300 covers the summary of ground operations on OKINAWA during the 19th.

Com7thFlt 200003 states that he reports to Cinacopac for purposes of "Navy administration."

Cinacopac Adv 200344 (pink) informs CinCNAV that it is not his intention to assume direct control of naval forces involved in the amphibious phases of the operations directed and to be conducted by CinCNAV and outlines his reasons therefor.

CTF 51 200590 covers Summary No. 39 as of 1200 on the 20th.

Cinacopac Adv 200635 (pink) covers recent instance of a Task Unit Commander requesting permission to divert a Jap hospital ship to a port to examine some and states it is highly irregular procedure.

Wedemeyer 200920 (pink) concerns additional information received from French Army and Navy relative to cargo carried by "ATHAN.

ComGen 10 201045 covers OKINAWA ground situation as of 1000 on the 20th.

CTF 51 201210 covers Summary No. 40 as of 1200 on the 20th.

2623
24 April (Gum date)

During the night 20-21 April front lines on OKINAWA remained relatively quiet though several strong attempts at infiltration were carried out against positions in the area of the 7th Div. Gains of from 400 to 800 yards were made in the 24th Corps drive to the south. On HOTO TO PENINSULA last enemy pocket has been wiped out and organized resistance has ceased.

The island of IWO JIMA was secured on 21 April except for IWO JIMA YAMA. Casualities are reported as follows: 24th Corps, as of 20 April, 4,488 of which 713 are KIA; 3rd PhibCorps, as of 19 April, 1,395 of which 266 KIA.

TF 57 (British force) is retiring to LATEM with an ETA of 23 April.

116 B-29s bombed airfields and installations on KYUSHU on the 21st. Enemy aircraft opposition varied from none to slight. Photographs taken on the afternoon of the 21st show that 3 major fields in southern KYUSHU are inactive. The 13 airfields photographed contained 635 single engine and 215 twin engine aircraft. KANOYA showed in excess of 200 planes.

96 P-51s are scheduled to carry out an attack on Sasebo Airfield in the KAGOSA area on the 22nd.

CominCh CNO 191257 sets forth his ideas relative to the reorganization of CardDiv 7.

DepCom20thAF 208157 (pink) states that the directives received by his to transfer certain fighter groups to the operational control of 20thAF was initiated by ComGen20thAF and not by the War Department.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 202252 covers request for Admiral Kinkaid to proceed to Guam for conference.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 202253 (pink) requests ComGenAFOA to clarify the proposal to transfer fighter units to the operational control of AAFPOA.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 202255 sets forth recommendations relative to a proposed draft covering terms of surrender to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 210213 (pink) requests information from CinCPOA regarding mounting areas for divisions in the assault phase for the OLINDO Operation.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 210214 advises CominCh that he desires JIPOA to remain under the operational control of CinCPOA.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 210227 (pink) requests ComGenAFOA to comment on JCS paper regarding disposition of additional B-29 groups to be employed in the Pacific Area.

ComGen 77th Div. 210445 announces capture of IWO JIMA on the 21st.

ComGenAFOA 210700 (pink) advises CinCPOA of his stand relative to conversion of B-24 groups.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 210740 states his concurrence in proposal for 7thAF to assume responsibility for area south of 23-00 N and west of 122-00 E at a date to be determined by ComSubPac and ComSubSWA.

ComGen 211000 & 211630 cover operations summaries as of 1600 and 1800 respectively on the 21st.
TOP SECRET

22 April (Guam date)

Activity on OKINAWA during the day 22 April was devoted in the main to readjustment of the Corps front lines. Enemy resistance continues to be extremely heavy and little progress has been made.

An air attack was reported on the OKINAWA Axis commencing at 1740 and ending at 1950. An estimated 80 enemy aircraft attacked 11 different raids; the 1st coming from the north and the latter ones coming from the west. 49 enemy aircraft were reported as being destroyed, 35 by the CAP, 10 by ships gunfire and 4 suicide.

CTF 51 reports that reconnaissance of the harbor near TAKUSHI on MOTOBU PENINSULA has been carried out and he plans to set up a boat pool there.

TF 58 carried out strikes on AMAMI OUNTO, MINAMI and KIKAI during the period 18 April to 22 April. From the 20th thru the 22nd planes from TF 58 destroyed 15 enemy aircraft in the air and 10 on the ground, 6 of these by VP(N) and 6 by the CAP on the afternoon of the 22nd.

94 P-51s attacked SUZUKA Airdrome SW of NAGOYA on the 22nd. It was reported that about 30 extremely unaggressive planes intercepted, 9 of which were shot down, SUZUKA and AKINOHARA Airstrips were strafed resulting in 18 planes on the ground destroyed and 19 additional damaged. In the same sweep 4 ships were sunk by strafing 1 of which was a 6,000-ton vessel which exploded. Our losses were 2 P-51s.

The scheduled strike by B-29s on the KYUSHU airfields for the 23rd has been cancelled due to unfavorable weather forecast.

Adm. E. J. King 141235 disapproves recommendation to increase the aircraft complement to be attached to Kaiser CVEs.

ComAirPac 182154 discusses availability of CVEs for lift of Navy, Marine and Army aircraft.

CinCpoa Adv Hq 190223 advises DepCom20thAF that use of OKINAWA fields by B-29s should be limited to only emergency landings.

ComAirPac 212110 discusses CVE program and recommends that CV HORN HOMER AICHARD relieve ENTERPRISE as the CV(N).

CinCpoa Adv Hq 202250, ComFairWing 1 212233 and CTF 94 220531 relate to control of search squadrons and tenders in the forward area.

CTF 51 220530 covers Summary 43 as of 1200 on the 22nd.

ComGen 10 221239 covers Operations Summary 61 as of 1200 on the 22nd.

CTF 51 221315 covers Summary 44 as of 1800 on the 22nd.

ComGen 10 221709 covers Operations Summary 62 as of 1700 on the 22nd.

Fleet Admiral Halsey and members of his staff departed Guam for OKINAWA.
TOP SECRET

23 April (Guam date)

There were no reported changes in the front line positions held by the 26th Corps on 23 April.

Hopping up on KURSU PENINSULA continued. Further details are reported on results of the air raid carried out on the evening of the 22nd. 1835K (DD 516) after near miss from suicide plane is fully operational. COXILL (DD 547) hit in jacket of suicide plane which crashed alongside causing no damage. ECONOC (DE 31) had near miss with man overboard, recovered and no damage. 1 MIL (J 55) and 1 KNOT (DI 11) suffered no damage from near bomb misses. HUDSON (DD 475) hit by suicide Xa which glanced off forecastle and caused no damage, only casualty: 1 AIA; 1 KNOOD - 27 TIA, 25 JIA and 16 MIL; 1 WULLA - 9 AIA, 2 TIA, 2 JIA, 15 - 17 TIA. No damage was reported to have been inflicted on our ships during the 23rd.

BUNO (SS 321) sank a German sub in the JAYA LHA, recovering 1 survivor.

On the 22nd 94 B-29s carried out a strike against the southern KUSHU airfields. 60 enemy aircraft were reported airborne, however attacks by enemy planes were unaggressive. 2 airborne enemy planes were probably destroyed and 3 damaged. Bombing results were good to excellent, a number of runways and other buildings being destroyed and runways thoroughly cratered. Photographs revealed a number of aircraft destroyed and/or damaged on the ground.

Photographs of Atsugi Airfield on the 22nd showed 326 operational enemy aircraft plus 43 additional planes destroyed or damaged.

A B-29 strike was scheduled to be carried out on the KUSHU fields again on the 24th but was cancelled due to unfavorable weather forecast. Weather permitting, B-29s will hit the KUSHU fields on the 25th.

CTF 51 230750 covers Summary No. 45 as of 1000 on the 23rd.

ConGenPOA 230747 (pink) covers supply requirements for the JYUKUS Operation.

CTF 51 231125 covers Summary No. 46 as of 1300 on the 23rd.

Cincpac via Com5thFlt 231221 states that it is expected that ConvoYing ONE will request CTF 94 to provide squadrons or tenders needed for operations in the JYUKUS.

Cincpac via Com5thFlt 231240 corrects Base Development Plan for JYUKUS concerning; squadrons scheduled for No. 8 Field.

Com5thFlt 231322 (pink) advises Cincpac that the B-25 JAY operation is feasible without support of British Pacific Fleet Units.

ConGen 10 231800 covers Summary No. 64 as of 1300 on the 23rd.
TOP SECRET

24 April (Ghana date)

Little progress was made yesterday on the front line... There was...

Up to 1200 on the 24th no enemy air attacks were carried out in this area.

105 B-29s bombed the Hitachi Aircraft Plant on the 23rd. 48 tons were dropped from an altitude of 12-15,000 feet. Bombing results were described as excellent. About 70 to 80 enemy aircraft intercepted and evaded 230 heavily aggressive attacks. 8 B-29s claimed having destroyed 13 enemy aircraft destroying 13 additional. 5 B-29s were lost or are missing. From this list 12 are lost to enemy action over the target. 2 planes ditched and 1 crewman killed attempting a landing.

The tentative B-29 strikes on KYUSHU fields scheduled for tomorrow have been cancelled because of weather.

Cincpac Adv Hq 232303 (pink) advises Cominch of a further 200 direct hit's ready to be split by Cincrepac relative to employment of units of the ECP on the 25th in the DAY Operation.

CnCncpac 240223 (pink) advises Cincapa that bulk petroleum delivered to FCA in May and June will be considerably below requirements and will result in critically low inventories during the latter part of June.

CnCncpac 240600 (pink) outlines his proposal relative to release to CinCncpac of the operational control of Headquarters Army Forces, FCA effective May.

GHQ JTA 240605 states his views regarding employment of FCA in the 25th in the DAY Operation.

GTY 240630 covers Summary No. 67 as of 1200 on the 24th.

Cincpac Adv Hq 240833 (pink) advises Cominch of the survey of airfield sites on OKINAWA and makes recommendation to cancel phase III-c and erect facilities originally set up for that operation to the OKINAWA Area.

Comth Pit 241210 directs that his rotation program for May be revised in effect commencing 27 April.

Cincpac Adv Hq 241319 (pink) directs Comth Pit to further direct 3rd PhibFor to initiate detailed planning for the ambitious phases of operation in May and states that he assumes troops will consist of a Field Army including the 3rd PhibFor.

Cincpac Adv Hq 241316 recommends that Rear Adm. Green be ordered to report as ComflaPac 18.

Cincpac Adv Hq 241340 outlines to CTF 93 (Cnrt Gen. Tada) that offensive operation for EAC based fighter aircraft be used as escorts for B-29 strikes as independent strikes on KYUSHU airfields.

Cominch & CG 241501 (pink) states that the anticipated attack by enemy cruisers is to return the SIMCA-US Army to the Empire Bay area. It is practical to utilize the BPF in operations against this possible eventuality.

ComGen 10 241615 advises ComGen 3rd PhibCorps to designate a division from his Corps for 10th Army Reserve. - Continued -
TOP SECRET

24 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and party returned from OAHU-A on the 24th.

25 April (Guam date)

Limited gains were made by the 21st Corps throughout the day. The enemy retreated. Some high ground was captured and TULAM was taken. Reconnaissance of TULAM was completed on the 23rd. 51 Japanese were killed and 30 civilians were captured and are being moved to OAHU-A.

The 1st MarDiv has been assigned to Army reserve as of 1200 I on the 24th. With 1,000 troops available on 12 hours notice, enemy casualties are estimated as of 1600 I on the 25th: 21,267 killed, 399 taken, 115,000 civilians and 500 military Government control.

From 1200 I on the 24th until 1600 on the 25th there were no air or land attacks. Heavy rains made the Koror Airfield inoperative for 24 to 25 hours.

A-29 strike and also a F-51 fighter sweep are scheduled for the area on the 25th.

ComCruDiv ON 174101 (pink) sets forth his opinion for the Command.

Marshall 241613 refers to civil censorship report for the Command concerning transferring of certain primary responsibilities from CINCPAC to COMINCH.

CominCh 242226 concerns monthly troop movement from the 22nd to the 31st. States that the 35,000 troops will be moved monthly, 30,000 to 30,000, to 30,000 troops per month for a period of about 4 months.

ComStrPac 250029 requests CTF 49 to inform CTF 94 if a strike by the former is contemplated.

ComMarPac Area 250319 concerns petition of Marshallese residents to be placed in protectorate of the United States.

CTF 57 250437 (pink) states that unless otherwise ordered, not to proceed from ADAC on 1 May with TF 57 and continue strikes on line of POMONA commencing 4 May.

MacArthur 250538 (pink) covers the conclusion of operations and is contemplated for the CINCPAC Operation.

MacArthur 250818 (pink) concerns staging of 6th Division for MILIPAC.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 251339 (pink) sets forth plans regarding exploitation of 24th Corps and 1st MarDiv at OAHU-A and the 8th MarDiv Either at OAHU-A or GUAM.
TOP SECRET

26 April (gum date)

Slight advances were made on the 26th and elements of the 76th Div. were reported to have reached the north end of Makinato Airfield.

TG 52.1 is scheduled to depart tomorrow for a ten day break or at least.

Up to midnight on the 26th there were no enemy air attacks. Gensko several enemy planes approached the transport area early on the morning of the 26th.

212 B-29s escorted by 31 P-51s hit targets in the YW area of 405. Weather was very poor and the P-51s had difficulty reaching the target. No P-51s plus the pilots are missing. No B-29s are missing from this list.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in the FOA since 18 March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 58</td>
<td>1210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 51</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
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<td>TF 57</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG 53</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG 50,5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th AD</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ComSoPac 132345 outlines the escort policy to be carried on in the base area.

ComAirPac 220015 concerns long range planning for formation of air groups and squadrons.

ComSoPac 242321 states that effective 26 April the 26th Div. Base Command was activated.

Section 10 260230 (pink) summarizes results of reconnaissance in the Feet crater regarding construction of airfields at FNMMA.

CincPOA Adv Hq 256652 states that shipping strikes and reduction of CTF 50s are not desired at this time until shore based Fliers can be established. It is proposed to permit reduction of demands on fast carriers and use replacement carriers.

Cominr 23 CHO 251031 (pink) sets forth concurrence by J.R. in detaching the YWAIYAKO operation and in recommend to divert the recommended frequency of tank to FNMMA.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 260115 (pink) advises all commands the 36th Ill. has been deferred.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 260229 (pink) answers MacArthur's despatch relative to assignment of ComSoPac to his operational control and discusses basic logistical plan for command areas involving Joint Army and Navy Operations.

CTF 51 260400 covers Summary 49 as of 2400 on the 26th.

Cincpoa Adv 260508 (pink) outlines rehabilitation program for the Midway area.

Cincpoa Adv 260742 (pink) concerns current requirements of 2200 for heavy bombers.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

26 April (Gum date) (Cont'd)

CinC pac Adv HQ 260334 sets forth review of status of Japanese fleet as evidenced by photographic coverage.

CinC pac Adv HQ 260340 concerns replacement aircraft to be supplied to NAS 31 and NAS 33 at CHINHNA.

Cominch 261340 (pink) concerns shipping requirements for evacuation to the Atlantic subsequent to VE-Day.

CinC pac Adv HQ 261345 (pink) advises Cominch that Admiral Halsey of the Con7thFlt (Adm. Kinkaid) he believes that 3,000 IJN carriers can be destroyed without the assistance of the BPF but that British carriers must be destroyed simultaneously in striking airfields on southern BONINs.

CINCPAC 261442 (pink) clarifies the "follow-up" forces contributed for the OLYMPIC Operations.

27 April (Gum date)

No gains of any particular significance were reported during the 27th. The advance was slow and resistance from scattered strong points was reported as being exceptionally heavy.

The administrative and tactical command of the I's was turned over to the Island Commander (Brig. Gen. Thomas) on the 26th.

HUTCHINS (DD 476) was hit by a suicide boat during the early morning of the 27th. She is, however, able to proceed under her own power.

STEARNS (DD 390) was hit aft by 2 suicide planes. She has proceeded to PEARL for docking. RAMMELL (AD 25) was also hit by a suicide. Damage was repaired as best we could. The VICTORY (AM) anchored off CHINHNA hit by a suicide. She was sunk later in the day. The damage reported above was the result of about 6 suicide raids in which probably 25 enemy aircraft participated. At least 3 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

On the 27th 110 B-29's hit 6 southern IJN airfields. The results described as excellent. 2 B-29's were lost on this mission.

Box score of enemy aircraft destroyed in the I's since March: TF 103 - 1810, TF 51 - 637, TF 57 - 19, TF 93 - 80, TF 50 - 5 - 9, and 27 - 25; total 2,799.

ComGen 10 260313 (pink) states that he is assembling the 6th Div on CHINHNA after which the 96th Div will be released to proceed to a rear area for rest. He further states that he will remove the 27th Div to the north and employ the 3rd Phib Corps on the right of the 24th Corps.

CTF 56 261120 outlines the enemy estimated strength on IWO and discusses the troops required to effect a landing thereon.

Cominch 261423 sets forth the CardDiv reorganization effective 1 May.

ComGen 10 261700 covers operations summary 47 a.m. to 1000 on the 29th.

Cominch 261752 approves the program for ComCoast to assume the duties heretofore performed by ComAirSoPac.

- Continued -
27 April (Gum date) (cont'd)

Command & Ctrl 262227 (pink) states that TF will not partcipate in the BOM I operation and will continue under CINCPAC control.

CINCPAC Adv 270014 (pink) approves the deployment of CINCPAC Reconnaissance Squadron in the forward area.

ComFlt 270129 approves the tentative schedule of employment of XXVII.

CINCPAC Adv 270233 (pink) concerns require a further review of operation as outlined by ComPAC.

CINCPAC Adv 270423 (pink) advises ComFlt that the fast carriers and escort carriers will be released as soon as word of a definite evacuation is received.

CINCPAC Adv 270433 (pink) advises units in the forward area that it is possible an impending air attack on bases in the BOM I area may develop originating from TRUK or HOKUS.

ComGen 10 270539 covers operations summary area 2 of the manned I.

CINCPAC Adv 271135 advises CINCPAC of certain ship movements, an alert of personnel and material forward from rear areas.

CINCPAC Adv 271253 outlines areas of responsibility in rear area operations.

ComFlt 271252 delineates the division between the Formosa-Burma and Philippine Sea Frontier.

28 April (Gum date)

On the night 27–28th the BOM I area was hit by 215 Japanese warplanes with an estimated 50 enemy aircraft overhead.佛陀 at 8:50 by any of our AA. About 10 enemy aircraft were shot down near shore AA. In the afternoon on the 6th plane hit a Japanese warship offshore over BOM I and likewise the 6th operation. These ships were equipped with fighters planes.

CTF 53 reports losses from 13 March to 27 April. Two Aircrews, 14 Aircrews in combat, 27 pilots, 17 technicians, 24 enlisted men, 105 to information on wounded. On ships, 2 officers, 2 enlisted men.

Kadena airfield, though muddy, is now in good condition.

CINCPAC (All 6) reported at 2000/28 that he had a good landing. At 2100 she reported her position as 127–39 3 23–30 I, and she had seen a scout with her. She had been attacked by 25 fighters from a carrier at 1830, and had made a low pass over the ship, and dropped torpedoes and bombs. At 2200 she reported she was proceeding under escort and will report damage later. Five minutes later CTF 43 directed up to report landed while under escort, and told 2 ITRs to return to previous ship. At 0130 by 0200, the strike was intercepted from 2850 I. The CTF 43 reported to CINCPAC, escorted by T. L. FRASER (El 24).

At midnight 23–24th a single Jap plane attacked the drydocks at 200, inflicting a certain amount of damage on an ABSD. Ships in the dock were not hurt and there were no personnel casualties.
28 April (Coss date)(Cont'd)

On the 28th, at 1120 an enemy reconnaissance plane (Cloth) flew over the FLGs at 29,000 feet near UJIMI. The plane had been detected and the FLGs were vectored into position and shot the plane at 1123. At 1120 on the 28th 12 F-22s hit Haina Island, taking 1 afterburner. 4 or 500 100-pounders in the target area and an additional 1 F-22 was lost near the designated point of impact. 4 single engine F-105s took off from a Japanese seaplane base and headed north, and the 4 single engine F-105s were shot down in the harbor craft were around Ujibon.

KUSUM fields were bombed by 20 B-29s on the 28th.

ConGenAIFPC 205013 (pink) covers current redeployment of VJ 5 nights in the HAINA and at KUSUM.

CinCopea Adv 280712 advises DepCom20thAF that an attack of 48 bombers each of 6 airfields will constitute an appropriate effort against the target.

MacArthur 281040 states that he will assure any casualties on any portion of operating zones in the area south of 23° and west of 120° effective by 15 March.

MacArthur 281045 (pink) requests information regarding the vulnerability of freight supply vessels.

CinCopea Adv 281445 requests CINCUSA to take action to insure that F-51s will not operate northeast of KUSUM without prior authorization from CINCUSA.

CinCopea Adv 281447 advises CPO 93 (Lak.Sen. Hale) that it is probable to strike TOKYO with F-51s on 30 April.

CinCopea Adv 281446 advises DepCom20thAF and ConGenAIFPC that the operations of TF 93 are used to escort VLR flights, operational control of TF 93 would be passed to the 20th AF for the duration of the operations.

29 April (Coss date)

No ground activity of any particular significance was reported on the 29th.

Naval forces and troops in the KUSUM area were subjected to heavy enemy air attacks on the 28-29th from early afternoon until early morning of the 29th. Approximately 200 enemy aircraft attacked in an estimated 14 raids. The daylight CAP made successful interceptions of the majority of the attacks before they reached the radar plates. So enemy aircraft remained in the transport area until after dark. 60 enemy planes were reported shot down during the daylight hours. After 1900 there were numerous torpedo, bomb, and anti-aircraft attacks which cut against all types of ships throughout the area. 39 enemy aircraft were shot down and 5 planes crashed making a total of 44 subsequent to 1900 of a grand total of 178 for the day. The results of damage to our shipping from mid-afternoon on the 29th to early morning of the 29th continues to inflict damage. Aitken (BB 21) hit by outsider starting fires, General antiaircraft and smoke room flooded. 20 patients killed. WARD-BURROW (DD 516) slightly damaged. WARD (DD 518) slightly damaged. DAILY (DD 519)
29 April (0000 date) (Cont'd)

Extensive topside damage. TWIPOE (DD 521) - Extensive topside damage. LCI 580.
Slight damage. CONFORT (AU 2), hit during these attacks reports all compartments
above main deck amidships from frame 66 to 110 demolished. Interior control out.
Casualties: 29 dead (including 6 patients), 1 missing, 33 seriously injured. WICHITA
(CL 45) has small underwater damage from 5 inch shell. LOS 37 received minor damage
in sinking suicide boat reported previously.

19 additional suicide boats were reported destroyed.

HAGGARD (DD 535) and HAZELWOOD (DD 531), operating with TG 50.4 (RAdm Radford)
were hit by suicide boats on the evening of the 29th. Both are under tow to KERAMA RETTO.

B-24s carried out heavy strikes on TRUK on the 28th and 29th. In addition 2
PB4Y's on a special mission severely damaged a 400-foot floating drydock in the TRUK
LAGOON.

B-24s also bombed MARCUS on the 29th. Results were not reported.

On the 29th 106 B-29s attacked the southern KYUSHU airfields with excellent
results. 2 B-29s were lost on this mission.

OTF 51 280220 summarises heavy air attacks on the OKINAWA area on the 28-29th.

COMDRPAC 281000 recommends that the 223rd Field Artillery Bn be moved with
the 81st Division to the PHILIPPINES area.

CINCPAC ADV 290203 advises COM7thFLT of the revision of areas of responsibility
for search and reconnaissance.

CINCPAC ADV 290619 outlines procedure to be carried out by hospital ships in
the combat areas and during retirement therefrom and embarkation thereof.

CINCPAC ADV 290630 (ptd) answers CominCh dispatch relative to redeployment
of APs to the Atlantic Theater subsequent to VE-Day.

CINCPAC ADV 290835 concurs in deferment of reconnaissance of KORE until situa-
tion at OKINAWA is clarified.

GER WP 290922 concurs in the exchange of VTB 106 for VTB 109.

CINCPAC ADV 291225 (ptd) requests CINCPAC Pearl to prepare a revised Base
Development Plan for IX SHIMA and OKINAWA.

OTF 51 290400 covers Summary No. 52 as of 0400 on the 29th.
20 April (Guam date)

Fragmentary report was received from forces at OKINAWA stating that the Naha base airfield had been destroyed.

TF 58 carried out strikes on AMAMI GUNTO on the 29th. 33 enemy planes were destroyed.

Slight additional damage to ships has been reported as result of raids on the 28th and 29th, BUTLER (DM 29), SHANNON (DM 29) and the merchant ship HALL YOUNG were all hit by suicide planes and all suffered minor damage.

TF 57 consisting of 4 CVs, 2 BBs, 5 Cruisers and 14 DDs departed LSTP for the fueling area.

On the 30th 65 B-29s carried out strikes on KUSUE airfields. Strike scheduled for tomorrow on KYUSHU fields by B-29s has been cancelled.

CinCPOA Pearl 29215A advises CinCPAC that power barge "ELECTRA" is not available for transfer to MANILA.

CinCPOA Adv 300208 (pink) enumerates certain garrison forces which were formerly to be employed in MIYAZAKI but now will be deployed to OKINAWA.

GUF 51 300390 covers summary 29 as of 2400 on the 29th.

ComFwdArea 300541 directs Island Commander IWO JIMA to take immediate steps to safeguard present temporary ammunition storage.

CinCPOA Adv 300549 concerns former missions of bases in the Central Pacific.

CinCPOA Adv 300613 states that he prefers the ENTERPRISE to be employed in the combat area during May and return to Navy Yard for overhaul about 1 June.

CinCPOA Adv 300614 states that he has not authorized the establishment of any regular passenger service by NATS or ATC between the MARIANAS and the KIUSUKS.

CinCPOA Adv 300615 directs ComFwdArea to transfer VFB 106 to ComFwdFlt in exchange for VFB 109.

CinCPOA Adv 300655 directs ComAirPac to transfer VFB 129 to ComFwdArea and to transfer VFB 116 to ComFwdFlt.

CinCPOA Adv 300659 concerns recommendations made by CinCPOA relative to an explosion on the Island of IWO JIMA.

MacArthur 301221 covers new search to be flown by SNF search planes.

CinCPOA Adv 301322 (pink) advises ComNavAAFPOA that the 1st stripes for VFA in the KIUSUKS are estimated to be ready 15 August and 15 September.

CinCPOA Adv 301325 (pink) covers recommendation to initiate a deception plan to cover activities and movements of all Army and Marine Divisions rehabilitating in the Pacific Theater.

CinCPOA Adv 301328 (pink) concerns liaison between CinCPOA and 20th AF relative to mapping photography.

USNAC 301414 requests maximum utilization of LSTs, LSMs and LCMs in order to handle the unloading problems in the forward areas.
1 May (Guam date)

On the 30th the 77th InfDiv took over the responsibility of the area formerly held by the 96th InfDiv and the 1st MarDiv is now in the process of taking over the section held by the 27th InfDiv.

Military government officials report that at the end of April 110,000 civilians were under their care.

Enemy aircraft attacks in the OKINAWA area were light on the 30th.

A landing on TARAKAN off the northeastern coast of BORNEO was affected 1 May. Only slight opposition was reported and operations and unloading are proceeding satisfactorily.

A landing was made on AGRIHAN on the 1st in an effort to locate possible survivors of a B-29 crash. No survivors were found. However, about 70 natives including 4 Japs were located on the island.

93 P-51s (IWO JIMA based) were over TOKYO on the 30th about noon. Only 7 airborne enemy aircraft were sighted. Weather was poor and little damage was done to aircraft installations. None of our planes were reported lost.

ComCMAPOA 3001A5 (pink) concerns request to the War Department relative to service units for HIPOCHIE (JAPAN).

Wedemeyer 301150 (pink) requests air assistance from MacArthur stating that the Japanese have been advancing westward in the YELLOW RIVER VALLEY.

Cinepao Adv 302235 (pink) advises that 2 VLR groups can be received in the OKINAWA area by 15 August and 2 by 1 September. Further states that it is not feasible to deploy additional group at TARAKAN without interference with support of other activities.

ComFedarea 010135 covers ammunition and explosive storage facilities in the forward area.

Cinepao Adv 010346 (pink) states that four strips for VLR are estimated to be ready in the OKINAWA Area on 15 August, 1 September, 15 September and 15 October.

Cinepao Adv 010226 (pink) advises ComCMAPOA of cancellation of certain letters and assumes CINCPAC and ComCMAPOA will submit requests for space needed in the MARIANAS for support of Army units.

Cinepao Adv 010207 advises OTP 31 that a destroyer within 1 mile of a hospital ship might be construed by the enemy as being an escort and states his desire that normally covering destroyer should be approximately 3 miles astern.

Cinepao Adv 010133 requests information from ComCMAPAO as to his long range plans for movement of replacement Army aircraft to the forward area.

LtrCom INFO 010728 answers ComFedarea request for information relative to the ammunition dump explosion night of 25-26 April.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

1 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC Adv O10759 censures in retention by CINCPAC SWPA of a Marine Air Group headquarters and 1 squadron of MAG 25 further stating that the other squadron of MAG 25 may be needed in June or July on short notice but is available for use in SWPA until further notice.

Marshall 010600 (pink) refers to directive issued concerning control of Army forces and resources in the Pacific.

2 May (Guam date)

During the early morning of 2 May elements of the 7th InfDiv carried out a night attack reporting gains up to 1400 yards. Early on the morning of 2 May the 1st MarDiv and the 77th InfDiv launched a coordinated attack resulting in an advance of about 300 yards along the front. There were no hostile air attacks reported in the KYUSHU area up until 1500 on the 2nd. Poor weather hampered air support missions throughout the day.

Emergency landing strip at IE SHIMA is now operational. It is reported to be 75 feet by 1400 feet long.

On the 1st and 2nd strikes were carried out on both MARCUS and TRUK by about 10 to 15 planes each day.

Com3rdFlt 292121 (pink) requests assignment of MISSOURI as Com3rdFlt's flagship and further that it be available to receive Com3rdFlt and staff at GUAM about 18 May.

GEQ SWPA 291149 (pink) concerns assignment of Army forces in the Pacific Theater to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC Adv O10525 (pink) directs ComFwdArea to move ground echelon of one P-61 night fighter squadron from IWO JIMA to IE SHIMA.

ComGen24thCorps 010630 outlines instances of friendly combat planes bombing and rocketing friendly troops within the lines of the 24th Corps.

GEQ SWPA 011430 requests MajGen. Leaven be made available for assignment as Chief of Staff to LtGen. Styer who will soon assume logistc command of APAC.

CINCPAC Adv 020012 (pink) concerns studies completed by Com3rdFlt relative to future operations.

CINCPAC Adv 020020 advises ComWestFron of certain APA's to be made available to him for lift to SWPA.

CINCPAC Adv 020213 (pink) concerns proposed implementation of the BLUEBIRD coverage plan.

CPF 58 O20251 advises Com5thFlt that he does not recommend fighter sweeps against KYUSHU until completely relieved of the responsibility for the defense of OKINAWA.

CINCPAC Adv O20538 advises ComGenPOA of the number of casualties evacuated by Naval Air Evacuation Group from OKINAWA.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

2 May (Gum date)(Cont'd)

ContraFlt 020648 directs CTF 58 not to make fighter sweep against KYUSHU.

CTG 30.5 020803 advises CTF 51 that VFP 109 can be accomodated at Yontan without disruption of maximum fighter operations.

DepCom20thAF 020917 (pink) advises Cincope that decision has been made to deploy the 36th VFR Wing to OKINAWA probably.

ContraSeaFrom 021646 states that he will require all the APA's offered in Cincpo's dispatch of 2 May and that he will advise definitely as to his requirements on 3 May.

3 May (Gum date)

Activities on OKINAWA on the 3rd followed the same pattern as for the past few days. Our attacks were met with severe resistance throughout the front lines.

In air raids yesterday afternoon several suicide attacks scored on ships in the radar picket stations. Beginning at 1820 an estimated 20-25 enemy aircraft approached from the southwest in 4 raids, apparently from FORMOC or CHINA bases. The CAP shot down 4, ships were credited with 4 more and 9 made suicide hits. The following ships were hit by suicidees: AARON WARD (DM 34) after shooting down two planes was hit by 5 suicidees and is in serious danger of sinking; LITTLE (DD 803) was sunk; MADONG (IBS 23) hit, damage not reported; LSM 25 hit, damage not reported; LSM 195 sunk.

CTF 51 has changed his radar picket stations to positions closer to land cover in order to attempt to obtain protection from land shadow.

CTF 57 resumes attacks on SAKISHIMA today.

Reports from submarines are as follows: FLOUNDA (SS 382) reports attacking a convoy on the 27th in the YELLOW SEA without results except for a possible hit on an escort. TREPANG (SS 412) reports sinking a destroyer early the morning of the 4th in the YELLOW SEA. BATH (SS 270) sank a 6000 ton gas loaded tanker also in the YELLOW SEA. SPRINGER (SS 414) sunk a DD on the 2nd and a DE on the 3rd in the YELLOW SEA.

On the 3rd 66 B-29s bombed KYUSHU airfields and airfields were reported as good. Also on the 3rd, 6 FBAs attacked the KANOKA Airfield from 100 feet altitude. 3 twin engine aircraft were reported destroyed. Crews observed very little evidence of a concentration of enemy aircraft in the KANOKA Airfield area, many revetments being reported as empty.

On the night of 3rd-4th 67 B-29s mined the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, KOREA Area.

Box score of enemy aircraft destroyed in the FIA since 15 March is as follows: TF 28 - 1,895; TF 51 - 769; TF 37 - 89; TF 73 - 623; TF 50.5 - 11; 20th AAF - 402; TF 94 - 1. (Note: 20th AAF total has been increased by about 170 thru late reports from photographs of enemy aircraft destroyed in KYUSHU attacks since 17 March). Total of figures shown above - 3,247 enemy aircraft destroyed.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

2 May (Gum date) (Cont'd)

Commend & CHQ 022110 approves the release of of atrocity stories in the FOA.

Cinseap ADF 020119 (pink) considers assignment of Com2ndCarTaskForce (VADM. McCain). He is to assume command of fast carrier task force shortly after ComCarFlt takes over from ComJbFlt.

Cinseap ADF 020121 (pink) advises Com3rdFlt that Japanese aircraft are possibly being moved northward and requests him to study a possible carrier attack against installations in the HOKKAIDO, OKINAWA and Northern HONSHU areas for purposes of destroying enemy air force and shipping.

Richardson 020332 (pink) concerns build up of reserves for HYPOCRITIC in the MARIANAS.

Cinseap ADF 020600 sets forth operation "FURDIE" (hit and run carrier strike on rear bases).

Cinseap ADF 020601 concerns operating procedure to be carried out relative to hospital ships.

Cinseap ADF 020222 (pink) requests clarification from Com. JAMMEN as to whether dispatch regarding "Marine stocks this base" was originated in his capacity as IsCom SAIPAN or as ComComNPSO.

IsCom SAIPAN 030615 (pink) states that action was taken as IsCom SAIPAN and not as Commanding General, Western Pacific Base Command.

Cinseap ADF 020843 (pink) advises Com3rdFlt that certain patrol squadrons may be trained with submarines in the MARIANA AREA provided it will not affect their readiness date to move forward when required.

4 May 1945 (Gum date)

During the night 3-4 May a total of 600 Japs made three carrier landings behind our lines on the west coast of OKINAWA and one landing on the east coast. The landing on the east coast was repulsed and during 4 May the lst MarDiv was busy mopping up the remnants of those Japs who had succeeded in getting ashore on the west. 2 POWs stated that the expedition had embarked at YOWABASHI with the mission of destroying our artillery positions behind our front lines. Little change was reported in our front lines as of 1600 on the 4th.

Casualties as of 2400 3 May: KIA 2,337; WIA 11,432; MIA 514; total 14,283.

On the 4th air raids were carried out from 0130 to 0445 and again from 0745 to 0925. During the early morning raids about 60 enemy aircraft in 24 raids approached from the north and west. No damage was reported to our forces. 12 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 8 by ships gunfire and 4 by TF 58 CAP. Many bombs were dropped on the shore with 30 or 40 in the Xemem area with 4 scoring direct hits on Marine Evacuation Hospital killing 12 personnel. Later in the morning about 70 enemy aircraft in approximately 14 raids came in and scored 12 suicide hits. Ships shot down 12 enemy aircraft and CAP shot down at least 29. There is a possibility of duplication, but reports indicate that 167 enemy aircraft were destroyed

- Continued -
during the 4th by our forces. The suicide planes made hits on the following ships: Ships sunk included LUGU (DD 522) = 1 hit, 1 near miss; MORISON (DD 560) = 3 hits; LSM 194. Damaged by suicide hits: KIRKLAND (CL 62), JORABAH (DD 694), SHOA (BNS 390), HOPKINS (BB 13) and LSM 190. An intercepted message from CTF 31 indicates that the SANGAMON (CVE 26) was sunk on the night of the 4th.

Com5thFlt reports that the first squadron of the 318th Fighter Group (P-47s) can be accommodated on IE SHIMA on 12 May with additional squadrons on succeeding days.

5th AF strike plan and strike plans against FORMOSA from 1 through 5 May are as follows: 1st = 87 B26s plus 43 other sorties attacked FORMOSA. 2nd = 2 B26s attacked, 1 B25 reconnaited FORMOSA. 3rd = Intent: 1 B24 to hit KILUIM (50 hit SAIGON), 4th = Intent: 2 B24s to hit KILUIM shipping, 5th = Intent: 2 B24s hit SHANGHAI Drums 0100-0300; 2 B24s hit SHANGHAI Drums with 3 P51 escorts; 1 B25 reconn FORMOSA; 16 P51s hit TAIHUAN Drums; 6 P51s hit rolling stock. 8 P51s will also hit rolling stock on the 4th in addition to intent above.

ComSubPac 0312192 answers 5th AF relative to employment of rescue submarines.

ComCenFIFTH 031355 (pink) concerns report of inspection of IE SHIMA airfield activities by members of the Tactical Air Force.

ComWesSeaPac 032106 advises Cinopac Pearl that he can utilize all APAs that Cinopac can make available.

Com7thFlt 032315 advises Cinopac that SoWesPac air forces have made very few strikes on FORMOSA fields.

Cinopac 040204 passes the dispatch appearing above to SoWesPac with the request that his effort against the FORMOSA fields be carried out to the maximum extent possible.

Cinopac Adv 040213 delineates search and reconnaissance areas and responsibilities therefor.

Cinopac Adv 040214 (pink) advises Com7thFlt to establish planning liaison with CINCPAFFO regarding naval facilities required on shore at OLYMPIC objectives for support of fleet forces.

DepCom20thAF 040735 requests BuInv XXI to make strike on the arsenal manufacturing 50mm bomb propellant.

Com6Com 10 040902 covers OpsSum 75 as of 1500 on the 4th.

Cinopac Adv 040950 (pink) outlines to Cominie Cinopac's latest estimate of the air base capacity for OCHIKAWA and IE SHIMA.

CTF 58 041114 covers his operational summary for the past three days.

ComGen 10 041200 considers possibility of occupying KIME and states that he recommends employing the 2nd MarDiv in this operation.

Cinopac Adv 041208 requests DepCom20thAF to bomb KYUSHU airbases daily until fighter fields at IE SHIMA are activated.

- Continued -
1 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

MacArthur 041232 directs CmAF to carry out maximum practicable effort on FORMOSA airfields in order to assure continued neutralisation of the enemy airfields.

Dep CmAF 041710 requests BomCom XXXI to comply relative to daily bombing of KYUSHU Airfields.

Cinseap 042124 directs 7th Flt administrative commanders to report with forces under their command to commanders of Pacific Fleet for purposes of type administration.

CmAF 043026 directs CTF 50.5 to carry out provisions of the search plan placed in effect.

5 May (Guam date)

Reports indicate that over 3,000 Japs were killed during the night of 3-4th and the day of the 4th. During the morning of the 5th 24th Corps attacked aggressively making slight gains, the chief gain being made on the right flank by the 1st MarDiv which advanced about 500 yards.

Known enemy casualties as of 0800 on the 5th: Killed - 33,462; POW's - 914 (Military POW's - 493; Labor - 277; Doubtful civilians - 214).

Amplifying reports have been received regarding air attacks the night of 3-4 May. Most of these ships have been mentioned heretofore as having been damaged.

AARON WARD (DM 34) - Sustained 5 suicide hits but did not sink. Had severe fires, lost all communication, had engineering spaces flooded, but was towed safely to KERAMA.

INGRAHAM (DD 694) - Had her CIC demolished and will have to return for repairs.

SHEA (DM 30) - Had hit forward by Baka bomb causing fires and considerable flooding.

BIRMINGHAM (CL 62) - Was hit forward at the waterline and will have to return for docking.

LSM 190 - Previously reported damaged, was sunk.

SANGAMON (CVE 26) - Took suicide on flight deck causing a terrific explosion and fires which destroyed all her planes and completely wrecked the flight deck. All ship's control forward is out but ship's stability and engineering plant is unimpaired. Many men were blown overboard or forced over by the heat of the fire, but casualties were not high, due to prompt action of nearby ships in picking up survivors and assistance in fighting fires. 10 known dead, 6 missing reported. At least 35 WIA.

HUDSON (DD 475) - Received moderate topside damage while assisting in fire fighting.

BACHE (DD 470) - Had suicide hit but apparently remains fully operational.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

3 May (Gum date) (Cont'd)

LOWRY (DD 770) - Had superficial damage when suicider exploded in mid-air.

OWINN (DM 33) - Had suicide hit but remains operational.

LCS 31, LCS 77 and TMS 331 received minor damage and remain operational.

Yesterday from about 0200 to 0400 20 enemy aircraft in 9 individual raids attacked with no damage reported. 1 enemy shot down by VF(N).

On the 5th 20 B-29s bombed southern KUSUMU airfields with excellent results. No attack is scheduled for the 6th, but one will be carried out on the 7th if weather permits.

On the night of 5-6th 93 B-29s carried out mining missions in the INLAND SEA, TOKYO BAY and NAOKI Y BAY Areas. Also on the 5th, 166 B-29s attacked the Hero Naval Aircraft Factory at KURE. Enemy aircraft opposition was nil. However, 2 B-29s are known to be lost and 4 are reported missing. Strike photos of this mission show that the factory is out - 80% destroyed.

SecNav 041637 concerns provision of items to Allied forces operating as part of the Seventh Fleet.

CinC-op 050305 (pink) requests information from Com5thFlt as to his prospective needs for the 2nd MarDiv.

CINCPAC 051116 (pink) concerns operations to be conducted by the Allied Air forces in support of Wedemeyer's operations in CHINA.

CinC-op Adv 051205 authorizes Com7thFlt to make requests direct to Com-ledArea regarding air evacuation services.

CinC-op Adv 051247 concerns a "Warning Order" to various commands relative to safety of feminine members in the forward area.

CinC-op Adv 051290 (pink) directs Com5thFlt to form a task force under ComMinPac to clear minefields in the EAST CHINA SEA preparatory to CLINCHIC and LORITOM.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and certain members of his staff made an inspection of PEIPELIU and returned to Guam on the 5th.
At OKINAWA on the 6th an estimated 15 enemy aircraft carried out raids from 0200 to 0630. ST GEORGE (AV 16) and PATHFINDER (AGS 1) received hits with only minor damage being inflicted.

TG 56.3 and TG 56.4 are in the operating area and TG 58.1 is at ULITHI replenishing. TF 57, enroute to FORMOSA on May 4, was subjected to an enemy air attack by 4 groups of approximately 20 aircraft. 1 suicide plane made a near miss on the INDOMITABLE and another hit the FORMIDABLE causing a small hole in her flight deck. Approximately 8 aircraft were shot down in this attack.

41 B-29s carried out a bombing raid on southern KYUSHU airfields.

On the night of 5-6th 98 B-29s laid approximately 700 mines in the INLAND SEA waters and in the waters around TOKYO and HAGOSHA.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in POA since 18 March: 18 March to 30 April - 3227. Since 1 May: TF 58 99, TF 51 - 132, TF 57 - 18, TG 50.5 - 9, 20th AAF - 1, TF 94 - 1. Total since 1 May - 265.

OTF 51-051815 concerns repair facilities for damaged shipping in the forward area.

ComAF 20 052009 (pink) outlines program to deploy 316th Wing to OKINAWA and discusses readiness dates of additional VFR units.

Com5thFlt 060126 (pink) recommends continuation of increased effort by B-29s on KYUSHU Airfields.

CINCPAC Adv 060814 concerns message to Maj Gen, Jaramen relative to his prospective change in command (ComGen WPBC).

CINCPAC Adv 060819 sets forth the composition of the Naval Operating Base, SAIPAN.

CINCPAC Adv 060816 concerns redeployment of the 24th Inf Regt now assigned to the garrison at SAIPAN.

CINCPAC Adv 060820 sets forth the responsibilities of the Commandant, NCB, SAIPAN, (Adm F.E.M. Whiting).

CINCPAC Adv 060821 (pink) is the Warning Order for Phase III-D ICLBERG (KINAI JIMA) with a target date of 15 July.

CINCPAC Adv 060823 states that effective 1 June the present Forward Area, Central Pacific is redesignated the "Marianas Area".

Com5thFlt 060920 states that Section 10 facilities will move from ULITHI to LESTE commencing 7 May and that that unit will be available for the 3rd rotational group of TF 58 in that port when it is ready for replenishment.

CINCPAC Adv 061127 concurs in XXI BomCom program to reduce the scale of attacks on KYUSHU fields provided attacks will average 4 squadrons per day.

ComCinch 061120 (pink) advises that HOMS TROMP can be attached temporarily to 7th Flt for participation in the BORNEO Operations.
TOP SECRET

7 May (censor date)

Lt. Gen. Buckner (ComGen 10th Army) has assumed direct command of the southern front and ComGen 3rd PhibCorps has assumed command of the 1st MarDiv zone of action.

Estimated casualties as of 0800 on the 7th: KIA - 76,535; POW - 823 (Military 267; Laborers - 342; Questionable civilians - 214).

ComPacWing 1 reports that up to 1600 on the 6th PAV 1 planes had inflicted the following damage on the enemy: Ships sunk - 52,600 tons; damaged - 23,700 tons (does not include tugs, fishing vessels and small craft). Enemy aircraft: shot down - 10; destroyed on ground - 5; damaged - 9.

On the 7th 29 B-29s report bombing KYUSHU aircraft factories visually from 12-14,000 feet with poor results at OITA and excellent results at KANOTA, IBUSUKI, and USA. Enemy aircraft were many and aggressive at OITA and USA. There were 19 attacks at IBUSUKI and KANOTA. 2 B-29s were lost over the target and 1 ditched. 10 of the latter crew were rescued.

GHQ SWPA 031120 (pink) concerns employment of SWPA RAAF Squadrons in the OKINAWA Area.

CTF 51 060605 (pink) states that as soon as OKINAWA is captured, sufficient minesweepers can be released to commence minesweeping operations in the E. CHINA SEA.

Cinopac Adv 060846 requests release from SWPA of DesRon 23 and assignment to Cinopac operational control.

Cinopac Pearl 062209 concerns the airfield construction program in OKINAWA.

Cinopac Adv 070606 (pink) authorizes ComGen 10 to make such changes in priority of base development as are necessary to meet tactical requirements.

Com5thFlt 070528 (pink) concerns his recommendations regarding minesweeping requirements in the EAST CHINA SEA.

ComGen 10 070622 outlines to Com5thFlt steps being taken to activate the airfields in the OKINAWA Area.

Cinopac Adv 070639 (pink) advises CINCAFPAC that photography of KYUSHU is considered priority No. 1.

Cinopac Adv 070640 concerns withdrawal of 24th InfRegt from SAIPAN.

IsCom OKINAWA 071115 advises CTF 56 (Lt. Gen. Buckner) regarding development of fighter airfields on both OKINAWA and IE SHIMA.

CTF 51 & 56 071225 (pink) concerns desirability of capturing certain islands in the OKINAWA area to establish radar thereon. Dispatch further states that no earlier than 30 days after the capture of OKINAWA recommends the employment of 1 division now in OKINAWA to capture KUME SHIMA.
Small gains were made along the front lines on 8 May. However, rain and mud slowed down activities all along the lines.

96th Div relieved the 7th InfDiv on the left flank as of 8 May. Enemy casualties as of 2400 7 May were: 37,466 KIA, 276 Military POW, 345 Labor Troop POW, 214 Questionable Civilian POW (total 835 POWs). Our own casualties as of the same date totalled 16,423 of which 2,684 KIA.

Fire support forces have been organised into two groups; 1 under CTG 51.19 (RAdm Fischler) who delivers fire on call of the 24th Corps, and the other under CTG 51.22 (RAdm Hall) who delivers fire on call of the 3rd Corps.

TG 58.1 (RAdm J.J. Clark) departed ULITHI for the KIYKNUS Area. Present schedule calls for TG 58.4 to leave the operating area on the 11th for replenishment at ULITHI. TG 58.3 will replenish later.

Planes from the TAF have reported destroying 209 enemy aircraft as of the 7th.

The JALLAO (SS 363) at 1630 (E) reported that six large unidentified aircraft landed at MARCUS. This submarine was stationed off MARCUS on a patrol mission. A PBY4 strike scheduled for dawn tomorrow has been postponed until dusk.

On the 8th 96 P-51s based at DWO JIMA attacked KISARAJU Airfield and TOMOTAMA Naval Air Station. No enemy airbase opposition was reported. Reports indicate that about 7 planes were destroyed on this mission. 2 P-51s are missing presumably over the target.

Com7thFlt 071145 advises that Com7thFlt (RAdm Kinkaid) has turned over command of 7thFlt to VAdm Barboy as of 0600I Tuesday 8 May. This is occasioned by Admiral Kinkaid's proposed conference in Washington.

CTP 51 & 56 071230 (pink) concerns employment of 2nd MarDiv for Phase 3(D).

ComGen 10 071507 (pink) concerns ComGen Ten's recommendation relative to employment of a division for Phase 3(D).

ComGen AAFPOA 072314 announces that Lt Gen Barney M. Giles assumes command of Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas effective 4 May 1945. He is also designated DepCom20thAF.

Cinopac Adv 080139 requests information from CINSWPA relative to advance information on air intents against FORMOSA so that Com7thFlt can be advised if no strike is contemplated.

Cinopac Adv 080233 (pink) concerns assault troops for Phase 3(D) and states that the capture of KUNE is not approved if a full division is required for this task.

Cinopac Adv 080234 advises of detachment of Maj Gen Meavey for service with Lt Gen Styer.

Cinopac Adv 080236 concerns policy of return of CB's to mainland stating that construction troops are rotated currently as individuals but not as complete units.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

8 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cinopac Adv 080518 concerns ammunition loading of cruisers and battleships leaving the West Coast.

Cinopac Adv 080819 concerns a 4-plane VMF(N) detachment for night fighter defense of the MariDive Area.

Cinopac Adv 080901 (pink) advises ComGen USAF CHINA that it is his understanding that the 14th AF is discontinuing mining operations in the SHANGHAI area as of the end of April and requests his concurrence to continue this program by Naval air forces from OKINAWA.

Cominew 081345 (pink) concerns transfer of troopships from the Pacific Theater to the Atlantic Theater.

Cinopac Adv 080902 (pink) concerns reply to CINCPWPA relative to desirability of continuing the mining of the SHANGHAI Area.

9 May (Guam date)

The 6th MariDiv is now moving into the front lines and will occupy the right flank in the drive scheduled for 11 May.

On the 9th TF 57 resumed attacks on SAKISHIMA JUNTO. In the late afternoon a group of enemy planes attacked. VICTORIOUS was hit twice holing her flight deck and putting her forward elevator and 10% of her armament out of action. She can still operate a few planes at reduced handling speed. FORTUNATELY was hit on her flight deck aft. Some planes burned but the carrier remains operational. The force has retired to repair damage and replenish and is scheduled to return for further strikes on the 12th and 13th.

TG 58.3 fuels today; TG 58.4 remains in operating area, but departs for ULIWTHI tomorrow. TG 58.1 is enroute operating area.

8 PB4Ys attacked MARCUS at low level, destroying 4 Bettys and 1 Myrt and damaging other enemy aircraft. 2 PB4Ys were shot down and all others badly holed. 5 survivors from 1 plane were rescued by JALLAO (SS368) after successful drop of lifeboat from B17 Dumbo.

33 B24s and 1 Squadron of P47s attacked PARAM and MO-EN; no enemy aircraft were observed in any of the attacks.

Poor visibility and bad weather limited close air support in the RTUKUS on the 8th, although night harassing, propaganda dropping, and observation missions were flown; and kept the PB4Y-2's on the ground on the 9th - their sectors were flown by PB4Ys. There were no hostile air attacks for the second successive day.

63 effective B29s (313th Wing) were off at 0002-0100 to attack Matsuyama (22), Uga (22), Miyazaki (11), and Kanoya (11). They are scheduled to attack at 0825-0916.

ComairFlt 060129 states that early maximum use of fighters in OKINAWA is being hindered by lack of avgas and too strict adherence to base development plan schedule.

Cominew 082014 requests information concerning movement of Jap aircraft via MARCUS to TRUK.

- Continued -
2 May (Quan date) (Comm’d)

ComGen NPBG 090028 advises that MP Co. at SAIPAN will be needed there for security of increased depot and reserve dumps.

Com5thFlt 090113 approves CTF 51 & 56 proposal to seize DORI SHIMA about 12 May.

CTF 51 090330 (pink) requests assignment of 1 RCT from 3rd MarDiv for capture of AGUNI and IHEYI.

Cinepos Adv 090434 (pink) requests views of ComGen CHINA with reference to attacking ANMY targets.

Cinepos Adv 090547 lists APAs and other assault craft made available and to be made available to Com7thFlt for temporary duty.

Cinepos Adv 090604 Maj. Gen. Hale will continue as CTF 93 until Lt. Gen. Giles is ready to relieve him. (pink)

Cinepos 090622 states 3rd MarDiv not available, elements 2nd MarDiv to be used for capture of AGUNI and IHEYI.

Cinepos 090628 (pink) outlines operations against MARCUS and TRUK to prevent enemy from staging aircraft.

Cinepos 090617 (pink) suggests consideration of 26th InfRegt for FRICHTON garrison.

VanHorn 091526 (pink) requests that all matters dealing with troop units except units of the 20th AF and units for ICEBERG be submitted to CINCPAC for approval.

10 May (Quan date)

On 10 May ASA GANA was crossed by troops of the 6th MarDiv and the Division established its front lines on the south bank. The 1st MarDiv engaging in hand to hand combat averaged gains of approximately 200 yards. The front lines of the 77th and 96th InfDivs were for the most part unchanged. 38,857 enemy had been killed through 9 May.

On 30 April Military Government responsibility passed from tactical units to IsCom in central portion of island. On 4 May IsCom responsibility was enlarged to include all northern portion of island. On 8 May 135,000 civilians were under military government care.

Usual fire support, minesweeping and anti-boat missions were carried out at OKINAWA. During air raids early evening of the 9th, OBERREIDER (DE 344) and ENGLAND (DE 635) were hit by suicide planes.

TG 58.3 remains at the objective. TG 58.4 departs today for ULITHI. TG 58.1 enroute OKINAWA, will fuel today, and then rendezvous with TG 58.2. If weather permits these two groups will hit KTUSHU on the 13th and 14th.

BOWFIN (SS 287) reports sinking a medium tanker and probably damaging a small freighter off the NE coast of HONSHU early on the 8th.

- Continued -
Early on the 10th 12 B24s attacked MARCUS from 10,500 feet to 12,500 feet. 2 enemy aircraft were seen. Photos taken at 1355 showed the aircraft factory operational, but no operational aircraft. The fighter strike was weathered out.

On the 10th TRUK was attacked by 19 B24s. Photos taken on the 10th showed the ETEN, 2 MOEN and DUBLON bases operational. Ten operational and six inoperative aircraft were reported.

On the 9th a B25 weather reconnaissance and 1 B24 got through unflyable weather to FORMOSA.

In the KYUKUS from 1830 to 2200 on the 9th about 8 enemy aircraft in 7 raids attacked, generally from the southwest, with a few from the north. 2 suicide hits were scored. Five were shot down by TAF and 3 by AA.

From 0015 to 0100, and 0220 to 0440 on the 10th about 20 enemy aircraft in 11 raids came in low from the north. One plane was shot down by a night fighter.

TG 58.3 attacked MINAMI DAITO on the 9th and reported destroying 4 enemy aircraft on the ground.

67 B29s hit KYUSHU airfields. 412 B-29s hit HONSHU industrial targets during the day and night of the 10th. One medium AK was sunk and a possible torpedo hit scored on a large AK by search planes.

Cominch 081238 provides instructions for the surrender of German submarines.

Com5thFlt 081322 (pink) outlines his views on use of 2nd MarDiv in Phase III-D recommending against the operation as a whole.

Cinopac Adv 090612 describes degree of operational control to be exercised by ComPwdares over VRE 1.

Wedemeyer 090830 (pink) suggests that a Cinopac representative be sent to MANILA conference 13 May for coordination of air operations between Sampa and CHINA Theater.

MacArthur 090925 (pink) indicates that 40 FS boats will be available for LONGPOM if OLYMPIC is not undertaken.

CTF 57 091151 describes attack on 9 May on FORMIDABLE and VICTORIOUS in which both ships were damaged.

MacArthur 091430 (pink) lists OLYMPIC assault divisions and their mounting points and directs ComGenPOA to investigate practicability of moving 9th Corps HQ to LEYTE.

Cinopac Adv 100114 (pink) informs ComGenCHINA that representatives at MANILA conference can not arrive before 15 May.

Cinopac Adv 100117 directs assignment of Navy and Marine personnel on 1stCom SAIPAN staff to staff of Rear Admiral Whiting.

Cinopac Adv 100121 (pink) recommends that CinCBP be authorized to deal directly with Australian authorities concerning local matters.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

10 May (Guam date)

Cinopac Adv 100147 (pink) offers to reclassify submarine zones to permit full employment of SWOD Liberator squadrons.

CTF 51 100205 constitutes Summary 63 as of 092400 (–7).

Cinopac Adv 100412 (pink) warns of possible air attack on ULITHI and directs CTF 58 to attack MINAMI DATTO.

Cinopac Adv 100437 requests information concerning readiness to receive VJ squadrons at LETTE.

Cinopac Adv 100706 (pink) cancels Cinopac serial 30663 concerning base development and construction standards at OKINAWA.

Cinopac Adv 100708 (pink) outlines damage to ships in OKINAWA operation from 18 March to 10 May.

Cinopac Adv 100709 states that fourteen PhilGroups will be adequate for the Pacific.

Cinopac Adv 100717 (pink) outlines planning assumptions with respect to Phases III–D and E of ICEBERG, LONGSHOTS, and OLYMPIC.

DepCom20thAF 100752 protests against the curtailment of VME airfields to 7500 feet in the Ryuutus.

11 May (Guam date)

On the morning of 11 May the 10th Army, with the 3rd PhilCorps (6th & 1st MarDivs) on the right and the XXIV Corps (77th & 96th InfDivs) on the left, launched a coordinated attack supported by air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire. During the day the 6th MarDiv pushed ahead on the right flank with its deepest penetration being approximately 300 yards reaching the outskirts of AMIKO. Tanks crossed the bridge over ASA GAMA and supported the attack. The 1st MarDiv occupied DAKESHU. The 77th InfDiv in the rugged terrain in the central portion of the island made small gains against bitter resistance including hand to hand fighting. The 76th InfDiv on the left flank penetrated into the hills of the NISHIBARA–KURI Area. Both Corps are now on high ground overlooking the town of SHURI.

Enemy casualties as of 102400 were 39,469 killed and 614 PoWs.

On the morning of the 11th, HADLEY, EVANS (DD522) and an unknown merchant vessel were hit by suicides with damage not yet reported. LCS 88 had her stern blown off.

TF 58 was apparently under air attack as BUNKER HILL (CV 17) has been ordered to rendezvous with TG 50.8 for routing to ULITHI for repairs. Admiral Halsey has transferred his flag to ENTERPRISE (CV 6). TG 58.3 is NE of OKINAWA. TG 58.1, after fueling, joins for run-in to target for two days strikes on KYUSHU air forces and air installations. TF 57 scheduled to be back at SAKISHIMA on the 12th.

From 0800 to 0930 about 75 enemy aircraft in 15 raids attacked from the north. The attacks were continuing when the dispatch was filed. Up to that time 40 enemy aircraft had been destroyed. The CAP got 30, ships' AA 5, shore AA 2, and there were 3 suicide hits.

- Continued -

2540
TOP SECRET

11 May (Guss date) (Cont'd)

B-24s bombed TRUK and MARCUS on the 11th.

In the KYUKUS on the 10th enemy planes attacked from 1930 to 2000 from the north and west, scoring one hit with a dud torpedo that did no damage. 1 enemy aircraft was shot down by ships' AA. From 0300 to 0510 on the 11th 35 enemy aircraft came in high from the south, north and southwest in 24 raids. No damage was done and IE SHIMA AA shot down 1.

TG 58.4 on the 11th flew 239 sorties at OKINAWA and TOEINDO. 1 FAW was lost in combat and 3 planes plus 1 pilot operationally. The TG shot down 35 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 5, and damaged 4. (Probably some duplication in CTF 51 report).

Search planes of FAW 1 sank 1 medium AK and damaged a second off the southern tip of KOREA. FAW 18 planes left 2 SC and 1 SD sinking south of CHIBU PENINSULA, and shot down 1 Hel, and probably sank a small AK, east of SHIONO CAFE.

65 B-29s were over KYUSHU airfields on the 11th bombing by radar. 91 B-29s hit the Kawanishi aircraft plant at KOBE visually and by radar from 17-18,000 feet.

Arnold 101243 (pink) outlines proposed deployment of 20th AF consisting of 40 groups of 4 squadrons each.

JCS 101844 (pink) outlines combat qualities of F-47 fighter bombers and offers additional groups for deployment in POA.

CTF 58 102331 (pink) contains CTF 58's operation racket, air strikes on KYUSHU on 13 and 14 May.

Cinpoa Adv 110040 requests that 20th AF sightings of enemy naval vessels remain secret.

Cinpoa Adv 110042 confirms airfield construction policy for VLF at 7500 feet until further extension is permitted by tactical situation.

ComGen 21st BomCom 110245 (pink) announces intention of discontinuing strikes against KYUSHU.

CINCAPAC 110252 concurs in assignment of 24th InfRegt as garrison for NUC-

Cinpoa Adv 110815 (pink) concurs in discontinuance of 20th AF strikes on KYUSHU to permit incendiary strike against KAMISHA, Nagoya.

ComGen 10 111001 contains Operations Summary 82 as of 111500.

ComGen 10 111028 directs continuance of maximum pressure on entire Army front at OKINAWA.

Cinpoac Adv 111252 establishes escort shipping policy in POA.
TOP SECRET

23 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CinCPac Adv 230216 recommends that ComGen AFPAK give consideration to having a
more permanent depot for fighter aircraft.

CinCPac Adv 230559 (pink) directs ComGen 10 to submit to LOC IAC a request
for relocation of Headquarters, XX BomCom and 7th AF.

CinCPac Adv 230649 (pink) directs ComGen concerning need for U.S. in N. Pa.

CinCPac Adv 230633 (pink) submits to CinCPAC AS for consideration a proposed
communication plan for CLIMATIC.

24 May (Guam date)

Mud continued to limit advance along most of the front lines. However, the
7th InfDiv, against light opposition, pushed farther into the OBAOKI-OKA TANI
area and seized high ground 500 yards south of TAINA and 600 yards west of TAIA. The
96th InfDiv beat off an enemy counterattack against its right flank. The 77th InfDiv
seized high ground 500 yards south of TAINA and 600 yards west of TAIA. The
96th InfDiv beat off an enemy counterattack against its right flank. The 77th InfDiv
mopped up isolated enemy strong points. The 1st MarDiv engaged in active artillery
attacks behind its lines. The 6th MarDiv completed 2 bridges across Asato river.
Marines have crossed the river in strength and entered Asato town, but the lack of self-
propelled guns and tanks, mired in the mud, is slowing down reduction of enemy
strong points.

Casualties as of 2400 23 May: Enemy - 56,835. Own - (Loss 27th InfDiv) -
26,575.

SPA search planes from PALAWAN extended their sectors to NIKAI-NIKAI and
saw a thorough reconnaissance of the YUKIYUKI Area. A Nachi Class cruiser was seen
at the Naval Base with another Nachi or Itago Class nearby. Both groups of CV-05
remain northeast of KUJIRAI. Airplane calls for fighter patrols over the northern
KUJIRAI, with dawn and dusk CAs' at ATUMI and KIRAI. T-58A departed yesterday from
NIJOMI to relieve T-58B. T-57 is scheduled to complete its last strike for the
time being at SAKUSHIMA tomorrow.

24 B-24s bombed YUKIYUKI on the 25th.

There were 5 raids during the early morning of the 23rd. More in the early
evening, and several more from 2350-0230. All concentrated in the ISHII Area. 6
planes were shot down by the NAVAL ID (DD 545).

Bad weather limited air support from TG 52.1 and 99.1 to 4 sorties (3 tons, 521 rockets, 26 Navals).

At 2030 35 F4Us from MAG-22 arrived on a ferry flight from Nal.

At 2355 CTF 51 reported persistent air attacks beginning at 1900. There were
19 raids with an estimated 30 enemy aircraft involved up to the time of the dispatch.
15 enemy aircraft had been shot down with no report of damage to surface craft. The
attacks were continuing, apparently concentrating on airfields. 1 NAVAL was hit
in the vicinity of the naval base. 1 enemy aircraft landed wheels up on Yontan strip,
letting out several Japs who were attacking parked planes with hand grenades. Con-
siderable damage was reported.

F4Us 1 planes shot down 2 floatplanes and destroyed 3 SC west of NAVAL.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

24 May (Guan date) (Cont'd)

FAM 18 planes shot down 1 Nick, sank 1 DD and 3 fishing boats off IBA; left 1 FTD dead in the water off NAICA, and seriously damaged 1 FTD, destroyed 4 destroyers off IBA.

104 TOKYO bound B-31s aborted 2 hours from IJA because of bad weather.

Marshall 222315 outlines policy under consideration by JIC, and proposes that the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee for handling Allied captured and now held prisoners of war by the Japanese.

Cominch 222316 requests consent on Marshall 2.22315.

Cincapa 240255 (pink) assigns CTY 93 responsibility of neutralizing and occupying bases in the NAICA as well as responsibility for implementation of OCP 4-45.

Cincapa 240255 (pink) advises that NYUNI is to disrupt enemy attacks now forming.

Cincapa 240513 (pink) reports that the study of joint staff, joint CTY 93 reveals a number of basic differences in interpretation of recent Japanese directives.

Cincapa 240540 advises CTY 93 that the situation in NAICA will be assessed by 31st October and NYUNI is a matter left to the judgment of CTY 93.

Cincapa 240553 (pink) indicates that the arrival of 3rd InfDiv and 7th InfDiv must take place by 15 October.

Cincapa 240660 proposes uniform procedure for release of prisoners to CINCAPAC.

Cincapa 241257 (pink) requests that specific information and details of CINCAPAC concerning differences in interpretation and procedure early conference.

Cincapa 241259 comments on proposed method of handling liberated Allied prisoners of war now held by the Japanese.

25 May (Guan date)

In spite of continued rain and mud on NAICA both FAMs made advances during the day. On the right the 6th InfDiv pushed south of the AWA and expanded its bridgehead into IBA. Many streets in the town are reported in ruins. Tanks have crossed into the city but find strong support and prevented a final artillery assault on the bridges across the AWA. The 1st InfDiv limited its activities to aggressive patrolling. The 77th InfDiv cleaned out the town immediately north of SHURI. The position of the 96th InfDiv remained unchanged. On the left flank, the 7th InfDiv repulsed a Jap counter attack.

Casualties as of 24 May: Enemy; 57,407 killed; 608 - Military, 605 Laborers, 409. Own: KIA 73, WIA 336, MIA 61, total - 470.

At CINCAPAC air raids continued during morning of the 25th. 2 DD, 2 AH, 1 DB, 3 AJB, 1 M2, 1 XAK, 1 LSM were damaged by suicide planes.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

25 May (Guns date) (Cont'd)

During the raids earlier in the evening, ships on radar alert action 15 (north of BOL) attacked several small fast surface targets believed to be small boats. All were believed destroyed; none made any surface attack on our ships.

TF 57 fuel today and then departs for UMB and OMB neutralization mission taken over by CVE Group.

TF 58 during the period 19 thru 23 May attacked airfields, supply bases and ground installations on ROKU, TAHIR, ROKU, and REI. At ROKU 1 submarine killed; 4 destroyed on ground; 3 small craft sunk; 8 damaged. At the 4th, during mine view over TAHIR 12 planes were destroyed and an unstated number of vessels sunk. There were shot down over TAHIR.

Naval casualties to 22 May: FIA and MA 4/278, 1/114, 1/133, 2/114. (Increase since 17 May of 300 and 200 respectively). This does not include all casualties from TF 57. 1 DD and 2 DE, nor casualties from recent air raids. TF 57 casualties.

No strikes were scheduled on FUKUSA on the 26th.

Enemy air attacks which began at 0730 on the 26th continued intermittently until 0430 on the 27th, and began again at 0600. Between 1940/26th and 1800/26th CTF 51 estimates 275 enemy aircraft attacked. Of these, an estimated 117 have been reported destroyed so far, and the final score may be higher. The bulk of the night CAP 6, including 3Betty's; ships sunk during the night destruction; 1 AIAS, 1 AAA (reported by ConCon 10) destroyed 16 of 23 overhead; Yontan Field lost 5 planes by AAA and crash landings, plus 5 others by AAA; the day CAP on the morning of the 25th destroyed 23. There were 3 suicide hits and 1 near miss on 3 planes from 0330 to 0630, and 7 suicide hits plus 1 near miss on 7 ships from 0630 to 1530.

About 2250 6 Sallies attempted to land on Yontan; AAA got 5, and 65th crashed, wheels up. An estimated 22 Japs from the Sallies attacked, armed planes with incendiary grenades and demolition charges, destroying 4 transports, 1 fighter, 2 bombers, with 2 transports damaged. ConCon 10 reports 25 aircraft dived on Yontan, a 70,000 gallon gaseous bomb was burned. The II-3 and 3-7 runways were inoperative until 0800 because of debris from exploding planes. On Yontan we had 1 killed in action and 9 wounded; ConCon 10 reports 12 Japs killed. Tanks and foot patrols were code red for the area. One bomb hit a Naval dispensary on out on 1100 with an estimated 25 KIA and 35 WIA.

The TAF sent 28 F-7's to strike ROKU on the afternoon of the 26th. They bombed and rocketed ROKU, TAHIR, and KURIS, shot down 1 plane, and shot down 1 George on the return to base.

1 small AK was damaged south of ROKU by 411 aircraft on the 26th.

Including tonight's mining mission, there will have been 32 missions engaged in mining; in 3 missions on 2 successive nights. The 32 MISSIONS continue as a prime target.

69 P-51s escorted by B-29s hit TOYO, KURIS, and TAHIR destroyed 1500000 tons of KURIS 1230-1245. They shot down 5 enemy aircraft, 1 damaged and scored 10-3-36 on the ground.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

25 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Photos taken on the 25th through haze and smoke show that additional 1.2-inch of TOKYO destroyed. Considerable additional damage is probable. More photographs can be taken.

JCS 242237 (pink) fixes responsibility for civil casualties in GULF and JACINTH on CINCPAC.

CINCPAC Adv 250507 (pink) requests that concurrence of our Central Staff in telephone conversation with Admiral Cooke concerning operational control of artillery support be held in abeyance.

26 May (Guam date)

Rains have reduced 10th Army zone of action to a jumble. During the night 25-26 May the 6th ARMDIV repulsed a counterattack. The 26th was spent chiefly in organizing front line positions. Foot bridges across the LAMA YUKE have been washed out. However, one Bailey bridge remains intact. On the right flank 1 Co. from the 114th INFATG attacked to the south in order to strengthen our east hill position. One hill 1,200 yards east of YUKABASHI was captured. During the past two days about 1,000 mines have been cleared in the areas south and west of YUKABASHI. Artillery and planes are taking action against what may be large scale troop movements south of YUKABASHI.

Additional data on damage from raids on 24/25th: LCM 149, previously reported beached, has been abandoned; BARNEY (AVD 29), badly damaged, beached off KUSOH; BATES (AVD 47), hit by two submarines, capsized during salvage operations.

On 24-25 May TF 57 dropped eighty tons of bombs on installations at CHIN ChICO and left all fields unserviceable on departure. No aircraft encountered.

All three groups of TF 53 have rendezvoused and are fueling on a northerly course today.

Amplifying reports from I-47 pilots who attacked TOKYO airfields at low altitude on the 23rd indicate that only three planes were really operational, but that two of these were shot up and probably destroyed. The living, reported several times from photographs, was observed to be on jacks, although it had been recently hauled.

There were no additional enemy air attacks after 1000 on the 24th. It is now estimated that over 200 enemy aircraft took part. The final score of enemy aircraft destroyed, as reported by CTF 51 for the period 1000/24 to 1000/30, stands at 195, a jump of 55 over yesterday, distributed as follows: CA, 94; ships, 90; more AA, 27; suicides (hits and misses), 15. Included in the above totals were 4 enemy aircraft shot down by F-47s of the 32d Group who encountered the enemy force on the morning of the 25th during an aborted strike at 0745. No lost planes in air combat in these encounters.

CG, TAF reported that on 26 May 455 aircraft of that force were present on OKINAWA and IE SHIMA fields.

On the 25th and 26th 439 B-29s bombed TOKYO with 2700 tons of incendiaries in what Gen Commander says was the most successful mission yet. 498-29s are known lost and 19 others are missing, and presumed lost over the target.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

26 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

GH: SFAA 251102 (pink) discusses differences between MAC and MAC of TA in command relationships for CINCPAC.

JCS 252158 (pink) constitutes directive for CINCPAC Oeprations. It outlines responsibilities of CINCPAC and CINCPAC AG.

Con3rdFlt 252217 (pink) outlines considerations favoring CINCPAC to Fleet anchorage in support of NF,T Blocks and other operations to the north.

Cinacap Adv 252315 (pink) concurs in the assignment of the Argonaut Force demand at 220 JDA to 20th Air Force.

Con3rdFlt & Con3rdFlt 260231 (pink) jointly recommend Cinacap C-121s can be placed in effect 2400 (4/27) 27 May.

Cinacap Adv 260342 (pink) requests early comment on feasibility of occupying CINCPAC Areas using only Marines.

Cinacap Adv 260343 outlines requirements for combat C-121s. Two are set at 30 for combat purposes and 40 for transports.

Cinacap Adv 260930 (pink) recommends establishment of a new commercial airline from the West Coast to Australia and New Zealand west ultimately to TA and Australia.

27 May (Guam date)

Report from ConSen 10 was not received.

In addition to the normal fire support on the 26th, U.S. YG (20s), VINCENNES (CL 64) and USS CHILMARK (CA 32) fired on troop concentrations north of an enemy country south of CHUR, killing an estimated 500. A U.S. B-26 (24s) destroyed 2 native boats filled with troops armed with explosive charges on the nightside of the SHIBANUKI MAN. TC 1603 was hit by two suicide planes and damaged.

At midnight last night Con3rdFlt relieved Con3rdFlt in control of naval forces in the combat area.

16 B-25s attacked Taui at low level on the 26th. 14 attacked carb on 7200-3000 feet on the 26th.

49 B-25s attacked fuel plants, railroad yards, and troops in a country on F01001 on the 26th.

The only new air attack reported at CHINA was a small one of 10/20th, during which 2 suicide boats were scored on 7C-1003. The G Is, equipped with 1-5 aircraft during this attack, plus 3 others in the morning. Delayed reports indicate that ships guns shot down 4 more enemy aircraft during the heavy attacks at the 24th-25th.

The TAF gave diminished close support on the 26th because of bad weather. Planes of this force have now shot down 37 of enemy aircraft, 14 with 1 missing during the attacks of the 24th-25th. 1 pilot is missing from the 25th.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

27 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 53 reports 5 enemy aircraft shot down on the 25th, 4 of them near the force.

Attacks on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO continued on the 26th by TU 261.4.

FAW 13 planes sank 1 PTC and 3 fishing boats, probably sank 1 75-foot motor trawler, and damaged 2 SD on the 27th. 1 search plane failed to return from patrol.

One plane of FAV 1 sank 5 small ships and damaged 4 more.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in FOA 13 March to 26 April include:

From 1 May to date: TP 51 - 330, TF 51 - 516, TF 57 - 49, KP 57 - 6, 29th AAF - 129, TP 94 - 10; total - 1,066.

JCS 250123 (pink) describes proposal made by Vice Chief of Staff to British concerning assumption by the British of control of Kiska.

MacArthur 261624 concurs in CINCPAC 2140600 outlining procedure for releasing Army units in CINCPAC.

CINCPAC Adv 262315 (pink) announces assumption by COMAF by General of Commander RYUKYUS forces and forces heretofore in the 5th Fleet.

CINCPAC Adv 270117 (pink) announces that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed Operation CINCPAC.

CINCPAC Pearl 270117 requests ComSen Ten to report unloading rate at SHIMA which is now twenty-one days behind schedule.

CINCPAC Adv 270540 directs ComAirPac to designate two VBP(III) squadrons for NorPac.

CINCPAC Adv 270541 requests concurrence of CINCPAC in reduction of Fleet VPB(III) Squadrons from six to four.

CINCPAC Adv 270633 directs ComSen Ten to accelerate airfield construction on IJ SHIMA.

CINCPAC Adv 270725 provides that clearance for all visitors to CINCPAC must be made through CINCPAC.
28 May (Gum date)

During the 27th and 28th advances were again made on both flanks of the center of the Army lines, north of Mauna, practically static. On the right the 1st MarDiv launched an attack before dawn on the 28th pushing south against flak and MG fire occupying all of that portion of Kailua West of the canal which runs north and south through the center of the city. The 1st MarDiv making little headway at first captured the town of Kailua. On its left flank the 2nd Division received the crest of a hill 1000 yards west of Kailua twice only to be driven back by heavy counter fire. Elements of the division are still attacking in this sector. The front line of the 7th and 9th InfDivs remained static throughout the day, attacks mounting in front of our lines received heavy fire indicating that there is no possibility of resistance by the Japs in the Kailua positions. The 7th InfDiv pushed the lines farther south into Capan Hills and presses, against virtually no opposition, reaching the front lines being reported in the vicinity of Kailua, Kailua on the 27th.


In persistent Jap air attacks on Capan, a total of 13 ships were hit, one sunk, three remained operable.

53 CAP P-25s used about 50 tons in striking at factories, railroads, and towns on the southern part of Kailua. 11 P-25s destroyed, 3 located and 2 others. 75.25s destroyed, and 600 0.50s destroyed.

During the 25 hours from 0730 on the 27th to 0730 on the 28th, the total area of enemy aircraft attacked the Capan area in 50 miles of 500,000 by 200,000. Figures indicate that 79 were destroyed including: 7 ships, 7 ships, 1 ship, 1 ship, 1 ship, 3 carrier airplanes, 6 other small ships took the brunt of the attack. From 1230-1530 on the 27th, an estimated 21 enemy aircraft attacked from the N and NE in area of savannah, 32 were destroyed (CAPs, ships' guns, 3, 5 suicides). From 0700 attacks continued all night in bright moonlight until 0730 on the 28th. During the night up to 20 destroyed 7, ships' guns got 13, and 6 were suicides. Total - 28. After daylight CAPs shot down 15 and the CAP got 20. Final breakdown: 50 ships, 50 ships, 6 ships, 11 suicides 15, for a total of 79.

Direct air support on the 27th was hampered by bad weather. 65 sorties were flown.

FAC: 1 Privateers on the 27th sank 1 PT or 30 (described as abandoned in water, minus bow), 1 DD (described as dazed), and 2 LCTs (described as destroyed) for a total of 7 ships sunk and 5 damaged, south of Kailua. On the 28th, privateers last down 1 rate in foul weather. 2 privateers were left on the ground near a tank of gassing facilities.

Of 13 planes probably sank 1 SC and 1 PTD south of Kailua on the 27th.

On the 28th 46 P-51s attacked KAWAIVO Airfield, 39 miles NE of NMR, claiming 1 airborne enemy aircraft destroyed, 5 destroyed on the ground, and 35 damaged on the ground. 1 P-51 was lost over the target.

Photographs taken on the 28th showed that the 2 heavy 22 bomb ton (d) I.A.A. boundary attacks of 23-24 and 25-26 May destroyed 13,000 sq. mi. of Kailua. A total of 51,000 sq. mi. or 65% of the city of TOYO has now been destroyed.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

28 May (Gum date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC Adv 220059 (pink) informed CINCPAC concerning a forward move of
YAMATO by 3rd Flt.

CINCPAC Adv 220059 (pink) requests that all matters on which similar
coastal forces in ICA be referred by CominCh to CINCPAC rather than others
of like commanders.

CINCPAC Adv 220124 (pink) approves visit of General Deyo to scenes and exact
date of General Chamberlains proposed visit.

29 May (Gum date)

During the 28th patrols from the 6th HarDiv crossed over to KURUKA ISLAND
KUHA HARBOR. During the night 28-29th engineers constructed three bridges
the canal in KUB and by the 29th all of RNA north of the harbor and lower canal,
with the exception of scattered pockets of resistance, making to north the 77th
made gains of approximately 900 yards. In the left HarDiv the "A" Flt, Creasy, 10
Marines captured Shuri Castle. Japs were found masquerading in the castle. Shuri,
after, has been used as the headquarters of the 32nd Jan Army and was part of the
YU defensive position. To the north the left flank of the 77th HarDiv remained
front lines of the 77th HarDiv remained static. During the night 28-29th, the
77th HarDiv repulsed a Jap counter attack, preceded by a Jabberco air strike,
concentration. The 77th HarDiv repulsed a counter attack on the left flank, the 77th
marines attaining to land behind the division lines. A reconnaissance unit had
skirted the coast from YUBUHAN to the southern tip of the Island without a
opportunity with no retaliatory fire being received.

Casualties as of 2100 28 May. Enrty: EMA - 89,337 (or) 46,030. 1st Military
722, Laborers - 610. Om: (Cumulative) EMA - 1,057, 4,57,145, JMA - 25, total
241,356.

In raids at OKINAWA on evening of 28th, EMA - (or) 505, was set on fire and
was tow to KURUKU HARBOR.

2 groups of FF 59 remain to east of OKINAWA. 7TH Flt. dropped supplies
area for LMTD to arrive forenoon of 1 June, except for 584 R56Gineer Ctr, to
disembark V.C.S. Mitchel.

Vice Admiral McCain has assumed command of TF 38.

At FCHSA on the 28th 39 B-25s bombed fuel and water division and
2-5’s destroyed 1 locomotive and damaged 15 boxcars.

120 B-24s with 5-51 escort are scheduled to hit TBMK installations on the
30th.

On the 28th the TFN splashed 17 more enemy aircraft for 2-day total of 40;
late reports credit ships W with 18 more kills, and 17 more sightings in report.
The 2-day total of enemy aircraft destroyed now stands at 116. 27 Flt reports
that suicides continued to cause the greatest damage, but an increase in the frequency
of torpedo attacks was noted. Only 1 Baka was noted, on a petty craft near by the
JAP.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

22 May (Comm date) (Cont'd)

TAF intruders were over NYUSHI during the night and early morning of 21ST. 1 T-33A continued to attack the SAKISHI area, and reports indicate 2 T-33As were down on the 27TH. 3 fishing boats were sunk north of NYUSHI.

On the 28th there were 111 close support sorties flown from TAF. 1 medium AK was sunk. TAF sank 2 small AK and probably sunk 1 A-6.

Com-PATL-1 reports that from 21-27 May inclusive, 5713 runs were made, 3,150 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 3,200 tons of enemy shipping. 2 enemy vessels were destroyed.

510 B-29s were airborne against TAIPEI on 21ST. 6 were destroyed, leaving 475 effective. 7 B-29s were lost, 97 escorting SB-2s of the 475 were sunk. The 475 strikes destroyed 355 P-40s were lost.

Com-3rdPhib 232856 (pink) estimates that reduction of 15,000 men was accomplished without occupation of TAIWAN.

CinCPOA Adv 290214 directs that all fuel requests for carriers, transport, material and utilization of PCA's be submitted to the CINC.

CinCPOA Adv 290216 (pink) requests continued use of NUCAPPA for the deployment of all non-WIL aviation units for defense of TAIPEI - KYUKYU.

CinCPOA Adv 290311 (pink) confirms movement of 4000 men to MABEU scheduled for development of carrier pool.

CinCPOA Adv 290519 (pink) replies to Com-PATL-1 report 121 effective runs to CinCPOA 051250 (pink).

CinCPOA Adv 290659 (pink) requests all reports from the SAKISHI area by 1000 hrs to be referred to CinCPOA.

CinCPOA Adv 290712 (pink) requests complete list of landing sites and availability of Naval vessels to support fast carrier groups.

CinCPOA Adv 290830 (pink) announces plan for entry of submarines to JAPAN and requests continued mining blockade of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

Com-3rdPhib 291605 (pink) indicates training operation at 0000 hrs will be conducted.
TOP SECRET

20 May (Oman date)

The 6th MarDiv pushed forward slowly after being held up by an enemy pocket on the eastern edge of NAJA. Elements of the 1st MarDiv which penetrated into the ruins of Shuri Castle repelled enemy infiltration attempts during the night and raised the American flag on the highest point of the island, the Shuri tank. The 6th MarDiv dispersed a night counterattack with artillery. 7th MarDiv occupied a high ground 300 yards east of SHURI. At dark the division was held in heavy fighting attempting to make a junction with the 1st MarDiv to the south. The 9th MarDiv against opposition which was generally light captured four small groups of mutually supporting hills northeast of NAJA which the enemy had held stubbornly for 19 days. The 7th InfDiv made advances in the north near the small villages. Patrols from the division have reached the vicinity of TINAKA and 340 SPEC JURA.

Casualties as of 2400 29 May: Enemy - 1114; USA 166; USA 1141, Laborers, Capts. USA 99, USA 236, USA 8; total - 302.

Fast carriers augmented local air support and went in to a new Ryukus, CVEs struck SAKUSHIMA. Naval fire support.

16 P-47s strafed 4 airfields at Tinak on the 30th. Only 2 aircraft, and only 2 on the ground.

10 B-24s bombed NAJA from 10,000 - 13,000 feet.

On the 29th bad weather and rain allowed only one plane, of which came from the 37 for the last time in several days. Enemy aircraft were destroyed during the day. 1 twin-engine enemy aircraft during the evening destroyed the CAP by superior speed. CVE planes continued attacks on the Tinak area, and TF 38 planes attacked NAJA. Close support by TF 30, TF 95.2 and TF 95.1 totaled 140 sorties (45 tons, 469 rockets).

COMINCH CINCPAC reports that from 1-29 May inclusive, 442 carrier planes landed at Tinak for refueling, resupplying, minor battle damage repairs and because of being weathered out of the carriers. On the heaviest day 54 planes landed.

Naval casualties to date total 1,076 killed, 2,343 wounded, 950 missing. From 17-29 May inclusive 382 enemy aircraft including carriers were destroyed by CAP, ship and shore guns, and interceptors.

FAW 1 planes on the 30th damaged 1 CD and destroyed a F4U. A F6F shot down a Topex off SHIKOKU MISAKI and damaged a radio tower on NAJA.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in NAJA 18 March to 30 April - 477. From May to date: TF 38 - 345, TF 31 - 626, TF 27 - 29, TF 25 - 54, TF 26 - 1, TF 30 - 150, TF 94 - 10; total - 1,228.

CINCPAC ADV 290301 magazine storage for torpedoes available on carriers and the elimination of torpedoes from escort carriers.

CINCPAC ADV 290302 cancels previous directives for removal of fifth bomb group and authorizes establishment of both 41st Bomb Group and 3-54 at Haden temporarily.

- Continued -

25:7.
TOP SECRET

20 May (Xuan date) (Cont'd)

Cominch 292207 announces transfer of 4 Atlantic CVEs to Transoac and further that 3 British CVEs now assigned to Transoac must be returned to British.

Cinopac Adv 300525 (pink) suggests that Japanese electronics industry be accorded first priority in carrier strikes against the Empire.

Cinopac Adv 300526 (pink) outlines principal categories for employment of TF.

Cinopac Adv 300632 (pink) assigns first priority to low oblique close missions of southern KYUSHU.

Cinopac Adv 300826 (pink) constitutes directive covering ammunition stocks in KYUSHU.

Cinopac Adv 300829 (pink) recommends strongest possible representations be made to British for retention by Pacific of 3 transport CVEs.

Cinopac Adv 301225 (pink) outlines projected employment of TF for the anchorage to be used by BFF.

CFI 31 301300 (pink) suggests employment of LCI's in lieu of warships for air-sea rescue purposes at OKINAWA.

31 May (Xuan date)

The 6th MarDiv advanced about 1,000 yards securing the entire shoreline of MUKA HARBOUR and overrunning HAGAITA town and hill, in the area of the town, from which Japs had directed fire against the division during the past two days. The immediate objective of the division is the north bank of the HAGAITA WYT. The 11th MarDiv closed on the Jap pocket in north SHURI and the HAGAITA hill country aided by air strikes. Patrols from the division were in visual contact with units of the 24th Corps. In conjunction with the 1st MarDiv the 77th InfDiv closed on the Jap pocket on the NE against little resistance and brought its lines up to the south side of the town. The 96th InfDiv attacking west towards the Corps boundary on the hills south of SHURI. The 7th InfDiv captured hills to the N of the town.

Casualties as of 2400 30 May:
- Enemy: MIA 419, KIA 66, WIA 621, Total 627.
- Own: KIA 50, WIA 275, Total 325.

One group of TF 38 is fueling; one group provides 6CA. Other 6CA.

117 B-24s attacked NBU. 3 others hit the southern tip of the island; 30 P-47's flew escort and attack missions.

TU 32,413 used 22 tons of bombs and 1191 rockets in attacks on the 31st ME in OKINAWA on 29 & 30 May, sinking 3 fishing boats and driving other targets. 8 planes were lost to AA.

FA: 1 planes on the 30th damaged 3 pocket boats, 2 large transports, 1 light ship and a small oiler off the YANGTZE RIVER in the EAST SHIJA area. Intense AA killed 1 man and wounded 2. On the 31st FA: 1 planes damaged a small AL and shot down 1 Zero.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

27 May (Odate) (Cont’d)

PAT 18 planes on the 1st echelon and damaged 2.00, destroyed 2 Potees and damaged 1 Trace. A FAM from 1.0 scored 3 rockets. One 1000 lb bomb hit a 150-foot ship south of KURUJU.

509 B-29s took off at 0300 on the 1st to attack the TAIKA area, 509 with incendiaries. 100% were effective. 105 P-38s were scheduled to escort.

Coverage of KURUJU shows the principal portion of the city is destroyed. New damage totals about 5.0% of the total portion of the city. Total damage to KURUJU is now 11.5%.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in OCA 13 March to 30 April: 1278, F8F - 12; TBD - 1; TF 33 - 65; TF 31 - 62; TF 27 - 29; TF 23 - 56; TF 20 - 1; TF 4 - 2; TF 9 - 10; 3144; total - 1,228.

Soviet (Div 018) 70,110 announces new policy of allowing U.S. vessels on arrival at BOLL or West Coast.

Conf/Oxit 22000 announces GHO11A that ESHA is no longer providing air cover for KURUJU Theater.

CinCPOAC Adv 215676 (pink) concurs in ESHA 22000O announcement of ESHA craft.

Comdep 16 166248 (pink) announces adoption of ESHA 22000O March 10th Army and HATOs Area for exclusive use with no other units allowed in area.

CinCPOAC Adv 215642 requests that 6th Div KAOs carry out plans, schedule.

CinCPOAC Adv 215625 outlines re-aim and alterations of KNOs to be transferred to FAC/POAC.

CinCPOAC Adv 21256 requests Comdep/POAC that 1st Div, 1st Army, 1st Corps to report to Comdep 6th Army by dispatch for purposes of CIN/TAC planning.

1 June (Odate)

In spite of recent rainfall of 11 inches and adverse terrain conditions the Jape SHURI position has been broken up and the 1oth Army is driving and realigning its divisions towards the south end of the island. The 6th MarDiv drove south to the bank of the HOKURA RIVER seizing high ground in the advance. Patrols have crossed the river and are probing to the south. There is considerable Jape activity reported between HAKU airfields and HAKU RD. The 4th MarDiv completed the capture of HAKU mill and began the mopping up of HOKI. The division drove south 300 yards to hills overlooking HAKU-HEIMARU RD. The 24th Corps is now reorganizing and beginning to shift the sum of action of the 94th Div to the south where it will move to the west of the 7th Div. The 7th InfDiv among all its units to the south and drove a wedge further into the OYATO hills. Indications at present are that the Japes are preparing their final line of resistance across the island from HOKINA eastward to HAKUSUKI.

-- Continued --
TOP SECRET

1 June (Cama date) (Cont'd)


In view of prospective enemy air attacks with the advent of better weather, IHNA SHIMA landing was postponed to the 3rd.

Both groups of TF 30 are in the operating area today. TF 30.4 is scheduled to launch a long range fighter sweep over southern KYUSHU fields. TF 30.1 will continue neutralizations at SAKISHIMA.

A red alert at IPO from 0250 to 0415 was caused by 3 or 4 unidentified enemy aircraft attacking from the north with a few incendiaries. 3 were killed and 19 wounded, 5 seriously.

116 B-24s attacked FORMOSA on the 31st with 316 tons. 100 P-51s and P-38s destroyed 14 locomotives and damaged a number of locomotives, railroad cars, trucks, and busses. 26 B-25s achieved good destruction at GIRAN TOWN.

Only 1 air raid closed the OKINAWA area and 3 planes were shot down. TF 32.1.3 attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO with 39 tons and 419 rockets, sinking 4 boats, and losing 1 VT. 2 F4Us and 3 F-47s are missing from the 30th, and 2 F4Us collided on the 31st. Close support included 140 sorties (94 tons, 637 rockets, 4 Napalm). TMs dropped food and water to front bases.

On 31 May 256 day fighters and 26 night fighters of the TAF were in commission (out of 36k and 42 present).

FAW 18 planes sank 1 SC off IPO CAPE, and FAW 1 planes damaged 1 tug and 1 oil barge north of SHANGHAI.

148 P-51s were airborne to escort the B-29 strike on OSAKA on the 1st. 98 aborted because of weather, 23 were over the target from 1120-1230, finding no airborne opposition. 27 P-51s are missing. 421 B-29s bombed OSAKA, 12 hit other targets, 45 have not reported.

CINCPAC Adv 302303 regrets that it is impracticable to authorize withdrawal of troops of HR. Luce and party.

ComEdN 10 311715 summarizes estimated unloading rates at 11k to 14k.


CINCPAC Adv 302303 (mink) concurs in proposals contained in CINCPAC Adv 302303 concerning withdrawal of two divisions from CKINA and cancellation of OPCON.
2 June (Zulu Date)

A reprieve of 48 hours from heavy rains and deg recording activity. The 36th ZadDiv went on Ambious Reconnaissance Coercing in and near the area north of FAM Airfield. No active defenses were found and numerous caves occupied by civilians were located. The ZadDiv pushed approximately 1000 yards and overran small enemy patrol from just south of the FAM-KUARAKI Rd. The 26th Corp received 12 KIA and 1 WIA, and small infiltration attempts during the night. The FAM ZadDiv reached north patrols andıyoruz up in rear areas. The 26th Div, cleared up C1 and reached north coast of FAM. The 26th Div cleared up most of net heavy resistance in hills west of FAM, in level terrain.

If needed as of 2/400 1 June - Troops: XIA 62,724. KIA 923, WIA 1,728, FIA 782 - Total 35,240.

13 2-24s attached FAM on the 2nd. 119 -24s, 100 - 20 P-51s dive down on each target.

Only 1 enemy plane attempted to get into the air, and was shot down. 119ContentType1s attacked in FAM and 22 planes conducted attacks on SAKISHIMA and TAKAO. 135 close support sorties were flown by 76-79 planes. 33 planes put 5 men from 3 ditched planes.

FAM 1 planes sank 1 SD in KAGOSHI FJLAD (1900-74.43). A PBYZ crew rescued a KAGOSHI FJLAD (southern KUARAKI) to rescue a ditched pilot, 34th ZadDiv, 20 minutes later another plane landed in the midst of enemy positions of the first survivor plus the whole PBYZ crew, sinking the FAM 1 planes.

PBYZs damaged a 300-1t. minesweeper south of KAGOSHI, and sank a 300-1t. vessel dead in the water in KAGOSHI FJLAD. Rockets were used.

The FAM fighters swept southern KUARAKI Airfields on 2nd, also shot down 2 planes and destroying 11 with 23 damaged on the ground.

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Co3rdFtl 0115 07 (pink) requests submarine mine sweeping, suggest that mine sweeping in certain areas off the coast of KAGOSHI in order to maintain a mine barrier.

Co3rdFtl requests division of 1000-ton DZ to 400-tonner.

Cinseac Adv 020305 approves the temporary diversion of 300-ton DZs on KAGOSHI to maintenance of coast troop supply line.

Cinseac Adv 020034 (pink) defers these 300-ton DZs indefinitely.

Cinseac Adv 020035 constitutes Op3rd 6-75 for bombardment of the 24th in order to maintain a mine barrier.

ComzadPac 020317 (pink) reports that there are no properly equipped submarines for mine reconnaissance except the 9 about to enter the JAMA DZ.

ComzadPac 020600 (pink) comments on Coztr/mint's proposed amphibious training schedule.

Cinseac Adv 020607 (pink) requests immediate study to determine communication requirements for naval installations amores in OLYMPIC.

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2690
2 June (Order date)(Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv 023050 (pink) outlines procedure for recall of USAFFE Army units when they are no longer required by Section 1.

Cincpac Adv 030122 (pink) requests that 27 FA batteries be knocked out and 2700 be integrated into ship-to-shore lines before they are reloaded.

Cincpac Adv 031321 (pink) denies local fire requests. MFA-78.

3 June (Order date)

The XXV Corps again drove rapidly south, the 7th InfDiv placing troops in the off coastal plain, cutting off OKINAWA FUTOMIWA. The Jap forces are now split and it is believed that the bulk of the remaining Japs are in the southeastern end of the island. The 90th InfDiv gained 500-1000 yards securing TEMA and KAMISHO. On the right flank the 1st InfDiv advanced 800-1500 yards against heavy AO and mortar fire with its 2nd echelon penetration to Hill 67 220 yards north of KAMASHI. We report concerning the 6th InfDiv. SOT 8, from the 2nd InfDiv, landed on KINSA SHIMA unopposed at 0945, 3 June. A 1000 yard beachhead was quickly established and secured. 3 ELTs plus artillery and tanks are ashore and advancing on the 0-1 line. Unloading is being expedited with surf and beach conditions satisfactory.

Progress of troops ashore has permitted initiation of minesweeping and hydrographic work preparatory to establishing unloading facilities at YONAGUNI BAY, BATON R0 and MARA HARBOR.

Today and tomorrow one group of TF 38 fuels each day.

87 B-24s, 45 P-38s and 25 P-51s attacked FORMOSA on the 2nd.

TU 32,1,3 attacked SAKINOMIYA on both the 1st and 2nd shooting down 2 enemy aircraft, strafing several small craft, and bombing and rocketing buildings, runways, and dispersal areas. The Japs continued repairing runways as soon as they were hit.

There were no enemy air raids at OKINAWA up to midnight on the 2nd. During the night on PAN 48 (N), splashed 1 Irving, and on the 3rd PAN planes shot down 25 enemy aircraft at unreported locations. 1 PAN plane was lost. Close air support on the 2nd was furnished by 63 sorties (5 tons, 180 rockets, 46 Napalm).

PAN 18 planes sank 1 ED off KII SUIDO, sank 1 PTQ and damaged a picket boat south of HAMAMATSU, sank 1 small AK and damaged a lager and a petrol craft off SHOKO, and sunk 1 FED SH of TOKYO. PAN 1 planes destroyed 2 float planes south of KINSA.

On the 3rd planes of TU 38,4 found bad weather and strong airborne opposition. Some 20 airborne Japs provided air interception of the highest quality in both pilots and planes, and prevented attacks on KINSA, OKINAWA, KAGOSHIMA and TUYAMURA. 6 enemy aircraft were shot down and 3 destroyed on the ground at KINSA-KOJO and KINSA. We lost 3 PAN for a two day total of 6 combat and 3 operational losses.

Photos on the 3rd showed 220 enemy aircraft on KINSA, KINSA KAIH, and KAGOSHIMA, although pilots sighted few. The force was not molested; the closest bogey turned away at 30 miles.

-Continued-
3 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Ginopac Adm 030244 (pinky) approves the transfer to the PHILIPPINES of 1 flight of 96th Combat Mapping Squadron (Army).

Ginopac Adm 030257 amplifies controlling policy for ATC schedules from Guam to OKINAWA.

Ginopac Adm 030261 (pinky) requests Fleet Air Wing ONE to cover and provide diversion for submarines passing through TSUSHIMA STRAITS by attacking anti-submarine vessels.

Ginopac Adm 030264 (pinky) places Op-Plan 5-45 (Operation INNATE against THIRE) into effect.

Ginopac Adm 031207 passes to CINCAPPAC certain dispatches concerning attachment of Naval Construction Battalions to the 5th Amphibious Corps for OLYMPIC.

A June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv supported by NCF landed on OMAKU PENINSULA. A 1200 yard beachhead was quickly established and the 6th Marines pushed south to capture the northern half of NAHA Airfield by nightfall advancing through heavy rains along flooded runways. Other units of the division captured ONOKAMA ISLAND and a bridge has been constructed across the harbor with the island being used as a connecting link. The 1st MarDiv gained 400-1100 yards during the day capturing Hill 107, the key of the approaches to the town of IWA. The 77th InfDiv has moved south to the vicinity of CHAN in order to cover the right flank of the XXIV Corps. The 96th InfDiv gained 900-1200 yards pushing its right flank to the northern outskirts of IWA, from where its front lines extend to the east along high ground to a point SW of MINATOGA. The assault elements of the division were being supplied by air drop. The 7th InfDiv cleared out GOOD, reached positions on the outskirts of ANAKUSU, advanced SW to MINATOGA and then to OUSHICHEAN and approached MAKEM. Mopping up was progressing satisfactorily on OCHIME PENINSULA with 1000 more civilians coming under Twelfth Army control. IHEYA SHIMA was secured at 1245 4 June.

Casualties as of 2600 3 June: Enemy - 64,600; POWs 465 Military, 644 Laborers.

 OWN: KIA 12, WIA 82, MIA 2 - total 96.

Development of harbors at MAKAKUSU WAN continues with main entrance practically closed off by nets. Most naval activities at OKINAWA were suspended or curtailed in preparation for possible typhoon. TG 38.1 suspended fueling and TG 38.4 left the operating area on southeasterly courses.

13 B-24s attacked MARCUS on the 4th; 75 B-24s hit FORMOSA on the 3rd.

On the 3rd 45 Jap aircraft were destroyed, out of an estimated 75 attacking in 18 raids. The heaviest raids came in the early afternoon. Most were from the north, and most were below 10,000 feet. TAP planes splashed 35, CVE planes 3, and ships splashed 7, including 1 suicide hit. In the largest single attack 25 Zekes came in at 17,000 feet, and 4 PATs shot down 7 without loss to themselves. Some bombs were dropped on IHEYA SHIMA airfields, with damage not reported.

- Continued -
5 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

During the 24 hours ending 032400 TAF planes flew about 400 sorties, including MCAP (5-6 VFM), DADCAP (24-52 VF), Day CAP (about 50 VF), BAPCAP (10 VF at all times from 0501-1610), AMAMI barrier patrol (8 P-47s) direct support for INKZA and southern OKINAWA, supply drops (24 TBM) ASP, observation missions, photo missions. Through 3 June TAF planes have destroyed 495 enemy aircraft. Direct support, hampered by weather, was furnished by 139 sorties (20 tons, 398 rockets, 66 Napalm).

FAN I planes damaged a tanker south of KOREA, FAN 18 planes sank 1 SC and damaged 2 SC and 2 SD south of HONSHU. 1 of 15 attacking fighters was shot down and 2 others were damaged.

FEJs seriously damaged 1 200 ft. ship with rockets off the HOMSHU Coast, and scored hits in a 75 foot picket boat.

On the 5th 496 B-29s (excluding 29 early returns) took off for an incendiary attack on KOREA.

CinCOPPAC 040259 (pink) estimates that TF 37 will be ready to sortie from MANUS on 2 July or from IWO JIMA on 6 July.

ComGen 10 040325 is OpOrd 19-45 for capture and occupation of OKINAWA.

CinCOPPAC Adv 040626 (pink) requests advice from Com7thFIt as to availability for OLYMPIC of forces now assigned to 7th Fleet.

CinCOPPAC Adv 0411223 (pink) approves deployment of the 44th Fighter Group at IWO JIMA.

CinCOPPAC Adv 041231 (pink) summarizes results of conference with representatives of CINCPAC concerning OLYMPIC Operation.

5 June (Guam date)

CG 10th Army daily report not received.

Unloading operations at OKINAWA were secured and ships put to sea or were sent to protected anchorages on the 4th. Early yesterday morning the typhoon alert was lifted and normal conditions resumed.

TG 38.4 reported no storm damage.

TG 38.1 had considerable damage:

HORNET (CV 12 and BENNINGTON (CV 20) each lost 25 feet of flight deck and sustained damage to additional 25 feet.

DULUTH (CL 67) had her bow buckled upward from frame 21.

PITTSBURGH (CA 72) lost her bow to frame 26. Her bow was later found floating in good condition.

- Continued -
5 June  (Guam date) (Cont'd)

JOHN RODGERS (DD 574) has her main generator out.

BLUE (DD 744) steering by hand.

Other ships lost planes, boats and suffered minor damage.

TG 30.3 also took considerable damage:

CONKLIN (DE 439), heavily damaged, but can proceed on 1 engine and one boiler.

LUXEMBOURG VICTORY (AKR) has not been heard from but as of 0600/1 5th was not in trouble.

WATERMAN (DE 740) was also separated, but apparently has rejoined.

SALAMANCA (CVE 96) and WINDHAM BAY (CVE 92) had severe structural damage and are not operable as carriers. Other CVE took considerable damage to planes.

Com3rdFlt has formed TG 30.3 consisting of PITTSBURG (two sections) two ATR, DULUTH, CONKLIN, BLUE and 3 escorts en route GUAM at SOA 6 to 8 knots.

Liberators of FAW-18 joined up with 5 P-51's from IWO to attack an APD or DD north of CHICHI. The P-51's, homed in by the FBAV's, scored 7-8 rocket hits and strafed the ship thoroughly. The FBAV's bombed, scoring a near miss. When last seen the ship was heading 120 under her own power, trailing oil.

There were no air attacks on the OKINAWA area on the 4th. 40 direct support sorties were flown.

TU 32.1.3 attacked SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 3rd. 5 enemy aircraft (including 4 biplanes) were destroyed on the ground at NOBABA (MITAKO), and 7 boats were damaged.

FAW-1 exploded 1 large fleet oiler off SASEBO, and believes it to have sunk; 1 SD was sunk, 1 beached, and 2 were left sinking.

For the week of 26 May to 3 June, inclusive, FAW-1 planes sank 1,785 tons of enemy ships, damaged 6,525 tons, and destroyed 5 enemy aircraft. Cumulative totals since coming to the area are 94,405 tons sunk, 91,205 tons damaged, 28 enemy aircraft destroyed, 16 enemy aircraft damaged.

FAW-18 destroyed 2 SD and 1 small PT, and damaged 1 SD and 1 PC.

Photographs show 3.3 square miles of new damage at OSAKA from the incendiary attack on the 1st. Total OSAKA damage is now 11.53 square miles, 16.7% of the built-up portion of the city.

On the 5th 446 B-29's bombed KOBE.
5 June (Osm date) (Cont'd)

MARSHALL 021909 (pink) requests comment on desirability of immediate acceptance of 15,500 RAF engineers and 10 squadrons Lancasters.

CINCBPFF 040107 (pink) requests provision of additional facilities at MANUS.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 041843 (pink) outlines proposed cover plan for OLYMPIC and requests comment.

CINCPAC ADV 050612 (pink) informs CINCBPFF that sortie from MANUS should be made by TF 37 as early as repairs permit.

CINCPAC ADV 050616 outlines airfield construction standards at OKINAWA to CINCAPPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 050658 (pink) contains recommendations to COMINCH against the deployment of RAF squadrons at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 050842 (pink) constitutes directive for provision of facilities at EMINENT to support fast carriers.

CINCPAO ADV 050845 requests authority from COMINCH to commission naval operating bases at KWAJALEIN and EMINENT.

CINCPAO ADV 051209 (pink) outlines to COMINCH shipping requirements for OLYMPIC.

COMGRDLFT 040330 recommends daily photo coverage of Empire airfields and establishment of interprons at OKINAWA and IWO for interpretation purposes.

COMGRDLFT/05 050600 requests that all 7th Air Force and 7th Bomber Command pilot rehabilitation areas be made available for the same purpose for the 20th Bomber Command.

COMGRDLFT 050743 (pink) constitutes 3rd Fleet Op Plan 5-45 for sweeping a clear approach in the EAST CHINA SEA.

COMGRDLFT 050559 (pink) indicates Task Force 38 will withdraw to LEYTE about 12 June, departing 1 July for extensive operations, and directs that TG 30.8, operating at sea, should be reduced to minimum required for service to TF 31.
6 June (Guam date)

Development of supply lines on the 5th and improved weather conditions on the 6th aided ground movement, air support and artillery fire. On the right flank, the 6th MarDiv secured NAHA Airfield. Patrols reached the town of GUSHI. An armored Amevaco Battalion took a small island of the northwestern tip of ORAKU PENINSULA. Elements of the 1st MarDiv were reducing a by-passed position in the vicinity of TOMUSU throughout the day. The drive south carried to SHINDAWAKU with patrols farther to the south meeting negligible resistance. The 77th InfDiv continued to cover the XXIV Corps right flank. The 96th InfDiv captured INJ on the 5th and on the 6th met moderate resistance in advancing to the northern outskirts of FUNAGUSUKU on its right flank and TOMUI on its left flank. The division is now 1000 yards from the YAEJI-DAKE escarpment from which strong Jap resistance is expected. The 7th InfDiv captured ARAGUSUKU on the 5th and high ground in the vicinity of TOMUI on the 6th. Heavy resistance was being met southeast of GUSHIHEM. Mopping up on CHINEN PENINSULA was continuing satisfactorily.

Military Government reports that 114,000 civilians are now under its care. Casualties as of 2400 5 June: Enemy: 65,677 killed, POWs - 594 military, 659 laborers. Own: WIA 250, KIA 47, KIA 1, total - 298.

In raids on the evening of the 5th, LOUISVILLE (CA 28) was hit by a suicide plane abreast her #1 stack causing considerable topside structural damage. MISSISSIPPI (BB 41) was hit aft of amidships, damaging her hull and blister for about 30 feet.

Fire support ships on the 5th, in addition to gun positions, concentrated on enemy troops. Many claimed killed. Frontline troops on the east are being supplied in part by landing craft shuttle service. Work is proceeding on clearing the ASATO RIVER for supply of 3rd PhilCorps by water.

IsComInd reports SHERRID (AO 24) grounded and sank during the typhoon. LUXEMBOURG VICTORY has joined without damage. A search plane discovered an SC (hull number not stated, but believed to be the missing 1349) and gave her instructions to proceed. No definite word from ANCHOR (ARS 13). Intercept received from CTF 31 directing two LSTs to report their positions.

Weather cancelled heavy, medium and fighter strikes on the 5th at FORMOSA.

Ships shot down 3 planes and 2 others scored suicide hits in raids from the west and southwest between 1930 and 2030 on the 5th. Close support was held down because of weather. SAKISHIMA, hit on the 4th by TU 32-1-2, was weathered out on the 5th. 1 TAF pilot was rescued from a ditching, and 1 FG(W) is missing. 10 tons of supplies were dropped.

Improved weather on the 6th permitted greater air support. TAF planes strafed ahead of ground troops, and FINS flew 64, paratroops.

A FAM 1 Privateer shot down 1 Tony, and 2 FFM4, attacking 6 Jap planes, damaged 4, 75 miles NW of ANAKI. A seaplane landed 330 miles E of the W tip of LUZON to rescue all 12 members of a seaplane crew ditched on the 5th. Homing signals from the survivors had been received 200 miles and 2 hours and 20 minutes away by the rescue plane.

Strike photographs show fires scattered throughout the entire length of the KORE target area. Half of the city is smoke obscured.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

6 June (Oman date) (Cont'd)

441 effective B-29s (excluding 8 early returns) took off on the 7th to attack OSAKA with incendiaries. 25 B-29s take off at 1700 tomorrow to mine the east and west entrances to SHIMONOKI STRAITS.

CINCPOA 052220 (pink) requests CINCAPAC to take action required concerning movement and re-equipment of Army divisions to be released from OKINAWA.

DEPOOM AF 20 060223 requests additional housing to meet urgent requirements for war correspondents.

COMINPAC 060230 (pink) indicates that mining of BUNGO SUIDO by JMs in support of OLYMPIC is risky but possible.

CINCPOA ADV 060512 (pink) informs CMD of plans for installation of mobile Loren station in KYUSHU during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 060513 directs that plans be established by ComAir7thFlt for automatic search during typhoon weather.

COMBREDFLT 060611 (pink) outlines proposed employment of TF 37 with TF 38.

COMIGN TEN 060630 (pink) requests 24th InfRegt be assigned garrison duty at OKINAWA.

COMCENAPPPOA 060724 (pink) requests that the possibility of airfield sites at IHEYA and AOKI be investigated.

CINCPOA ADV 060806 directs that DepCom 20th AF request for additional material for camp site for war correspondents be submitted to CINCPOA through customary channels.

GHQ SWPA 060930 (pink) proposes to the JCS basing RAF units on southeast OKINAWA or deferring their movement until they can move into Army Air Force fields.

CINCPOA ADV 061242 requests COMCENAPPPOA to screen more carefully the requests for visits to OKINAWA.

CINCPOA ADV 061243 (pink) requests early estimate of potential airfield sites on IHEYA and AOKI.

COMBREDFLT 061247 (pink) is 3rdFlt OpPlan 6-45 for sweeping areas in EAST CHINA SEA for mines.

CINCAPAC ADV 062241 (pink) directs Com3rdFlt to submit track of major 3rdFlt units and estimated track of typhoon from 3 - 6 June.

CINCPOA ADV 062242 (pink) authorized 3rdFlt to conduct a second strike on KYUSHU prior to return of 3rdFlt to LEXIT.

CINCPOA ADV 062243 (pink) confirms that 3rdFlt OpPlan 5-45 complies with Task One of CINCPOA 050619 for sweeping channel into EAST CHINA SEA.
TOP SECRET

7 June (Guam date)

Improved weather permitted tank and air support for infantry attacks on strongly fortified YALU-DAEKE escarpment and CHOKU PENINSULA. The left flank of the 6th MarDiv met heavy resistance. The right flank drove along the coast to a point opposite SAREGA-SHIMA. Further inland GUSHI was reached. The 1st MarDiv secured hill 108, 500 yards west of DAKTON against determined opposition. The right flank of the division pushed close to the coast and was reported 900 yards N of ITOMAI TOWN. The 96th InfDiv captured hills 600 yards NE of TUSA. The 7th InfDiv was meeting very heavy resistance in the GUSHI-SHIMA area. The 32nd Inf from the 7th Div landed on G-SHIMA during the day. The island was secured by 1930 with only civilians being encountered.


Several RED alerts from OKINAWA were received last night. No report received from OTP 31. On the evening of the 6th there were more raids, and J.W. DITTER (DM2) was hit by 2 suicide planes.

Further report from IsCom INO concerning storm damage discloses little other damage. 1 LOT was breached with but minor damage; 1 DD lost a man and whaleboat. All merchant ships were escorted to sea and had no damage. SHERPSOT (AO 28) may be salvageable. No damage to shore installations.

COM3rFlt reports details of damage to ships of TG 30.8. ATTU (CVE 102) and BOUQUINVILLE (CVE 100) had miscellaneous damage but still have operational flight decks. A total of 46 planes were destroyed and 70 damaged from these two and SALAMANCA and WINDHAM BAY. MILLICOMA (AO 73), SHERB (AO 87) and CALIFORNIA (AO 53) had some structural damage. SHASTA (AK 6) had major part of her 16" projectiles damaged, when 700 tons of her ammunition shifted. 2 DE had minor damage. PITTSBURGH bow was still under tow last night, with another tug sent to assist. It is proceeding at 3 knots with an ETA at GUAM of the 19th. DULUTH and the rest of PITTSBURGH are apparently having no trouble, and are due at GUAM on the 10th.

TF 38 strikes KYUSHU with a long range fighter sweep over the target at 1130 on the morning of the 8th if the weather is favorable.

Yesterday a P-38 crashed into the flight deck of the RANDOLPH at anchor at LEYTE.

FAN 1 aircraft west of SASEBO on the 7th sank 2 small AK and left a 3rd sinking. North of SHANGHAI 1 SD was destroyed, 2 were burned, and a 4th was left sinking.

349 B-29s are known to have bombed the OSAKA urban area on the 7th. 133 P-51s escorted the B-29s. 2 enemy aircraft were shot down and 1 P-51 was lost.

3,227 enemy aircraft were destroyed in POW from 16 March to 30 April, inclusive. 1,334 have been destroyed from 1 May to date.

COMINCH & CNO 051536 dissolves the 10th Fleet and assumes direct command of all anti-submarine functions of the 10th Fleet.

CINCPOA ADV 060742 (disk) informs CominCh of conference at MANILA for preparation of Joint Cover and Deception Plan for OLIMPIC.

CINCPOA ADV 061244 (disk) approves Com3rdFlt 060829 and directs withdrawal of TF 38 to LEYTE after strikes on KYUSHU 8 June.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

7 June (Oman date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH 062242 (pink) requests comment on CINCPAC 060930 concerning employment of RAF Lancasters at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 070123 (pink) directs that Com3rdFlt arrange suitable radio diversion in combat area.

CINCPAC ADV 070151 describes to ComServon 10 his duties at LEYRA for support of 3rd Flt and EFP.

CINCPAC ADV 070559 (pink) provides that the 9th Marine RCT of the 2nd MarDiv with accompanying replacements will remain under the operational control of ComGen 10 after capture of AGUNI.

CINCPAC ADV 070725 directs that torpedoes be removed from all CVEs.

CINCPAC ADV 070813 (pink) summarizes organization for providing weather service to 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADV 070816 (pink) comments to Comsh on CINCPAC 060930 concerning proposal to base RAF Lancasters at OKINAWA.

COM3RFLIT ADV 072340 (pink) recommends that mines and equipment for laying by DMS be landed at OKINAWA to be available when desired.

8 June (Oman date)

The 7th MarDiv advanced unopposed approximately 1600 yards to the south bringing its front line along the north bank of the MUKUE GAWE. Supplies were being brought by boat at a point 600 yards north of ITOMAN. The 6th MarDiv on OROKU PENINSULA again found heavy resistance from strong, organized defensive positions. Gains for the day were limited. However, the Japs remaining on the peninsula are now virtually surrounded. The lines of the 96th InfDiv remained static in front of the YAKO-DAKE escarpment. The 7th InfDiv averaged gains of about 400 yards during the day reaching the outskirts of HANAGUSUKU against heavy fire.

Casualties as of 2400 7 June: Enemy KIA 66,334; POWs 622 military, 670 laborers. Own: KIA 39, WIA 681, MIA 0; total - 215.

Progress on new unloading locations. ASATO CHANNEL nearly cleared. Mineweeding to MINATOYA completed. YONABARU approaches have been cleared and buoyed. Emergency supplies are now being landed at MAHA, though there is much clearing still to be done before it can be fully utilized. North HAGUSHI beaches are to be abandoned for all unloading except from LSTs.

Further storm damage reported by TG 38.1: HILLEMA WOOD (CVL 24) had a tractor get loose on her hangar deck, which did considerable damage. SAN JACINTO (CVL 30) received structural damage forward. MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59), ALABAMA (BB 60) and INDIANA (BB 62) had minor topside structural damage. BALTIMORE (CA 68) had structural damage to her bow structure. 3 other cruisers and 7 destroyers not previously reported had minor damage.

Com3rdFlt reported results of KYUSHU strike on the 8th as apparently highly successful.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

8 June (Omission)(Cont'd)

Heavy enemy air attacks were made on the 6th at OKINAWA from 1600 to 1730 from the north and from the southwest 1900-2030. 39 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 8 other enemy aircraft were shot down by TAF planes over KYUSHU. On the 7th attacks began at dawn, during which the NATOMA BAY was hit. In the evening, from 1800-2100 11 raids were made. Altogether throughout the day 12 planes were destroyed over OKINAWA. TAF KYUSHU sweeps shot down 14 more on the 7th, and the next day, shot down 11 over KYUSHU. In the KYUSHU attacks the Japs offered aggressive and skillful opposition, but no friendly planes were lost.

On the 7th 1 squadron of MAC 14 arrived at Kadena Field. Dambos rescued 2 TAF pilots and 12 survivors from a special weather plane. 2 planes were missing from the 6th. 2 0520 from the TENNESSEE, floating out of gas about 215 miles SE of KINAMI DAITO, were finally located after extensive search. On the 6th and 7th there were 422 direct support sorties, using 166 tons of bombs, 417 rockets, 90 Napalms.

FAW 1 planes sank 1 medium AK off SHANGHAI, damaged 1 small AK, and shot down 3 planes on the 6th.

26 B-29s successfully laid 240 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and in FUKUOKA HARBOR on the 7th.

CTO 383 071447 reports crash of Army P-38 into RANDOLPH at LETTE.

RANDOLPH 071247 reports Army P-38 crashing on her forward flight deck.

CEQ SWPA 071432 (pink) concurs in the release of 2 Navy Liberator Squadrons from 7thFlt and offers to release 3 PV squadrons in addition.

JCS 071603 requests recommendations on proposal for reorganization of theater Army-Navy petroleum procurement.

Cominch 072107 authorizes establishment of Naval Operating Bases at ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN.

ComGenFP 072319 (pink) expresses desire to use 2nd MarDiv in lieu of 4th MarDiv for OLYMPIC.

Com3rdFlt 080230 (pink) expresses intention to withdraw TF 38 from the KYUKUS on 10 June.

CINC PAC ADV 080519 (pink) paraphrases for CinCBPF Com3rdFlt's plans for service areas and authorized BFP to draw bulk fuel at ENIWETOK.

CINCPOA ADV 080520 withholds approval for movement of RCM squadron to MARIANAS until an Army field can accommodate it.

COM3rdFlt 080615 (pink) reports completion of KANUYA strike.

CINCPOA ADV 081229 established ROB's at KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK.

CINC PAC ADV 081320 (pink) directs Com3rdFlt to include railroad ferries as targets in strikes on HONSHU-KOKKAIDO areas.

CINC PAC ADV 081521 (pink) approves reequipment of 3 APA's as casualty evacuation ships but directs that they be employed during OLYMPIC for carrying amphibious troops in the assault echelon.
A respite of 48 hours from heavy rains was greatly appreciated by all concerned. The 6th Armd Div sent an Airborne Reconnaissance Company to reconnoiter the area north of KIOAI Field. The objective was to locate the numerous caves occupied by civilians who were fleeing. The 6th Armd Div pushed approximately 1,000 yards and overrun a large cave deep in the hills southwest of Ieyama. The 24th Corps received 10 P-51s and 15 light aircraft and small infiltration attempts during the night. The 24th Corps patrolled north and south in patrols and missed-up in rear areas. The 5th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div, and 24th Corps patrolled the hills in the hills east of Itami, and 11th Armd Div patrolled the hills west of Itami.

Casualties as of 2400 1 June - KIA 1,325, WIA 25,070, 504, 312 - Total 29,726.

11 P-51s attached T113 on the 2nd. 111 - 80, 46 - 20 P-51s. 46: Total targets.

Only 1 enemy plane penetrated to the air, but another 1st shot down. 11 - 75s attached M113 and 37s. 118 planes continued to hit SAKISHIMA. 133 close support sorties were flown (9.4 tons, 1,400). 712 sorties (102 sorties) put up 5 men from 3 ditched planes.

PDI 1 planes sank 1 BD in HAKUOYAN Harbor (so-called). A P-51 crashed in KAZUKU HOKAI (southern KURIHAMA) to rescue a ditched pilot, who was killed on the spot. 40 minutes later another P-51 landed in the midst of HAKUOYAN Harbor. One of the first survivors plus the whole P-51 crew, sinking the BD.

PBIs damaged a 200-ft. destroyer north of HAKUOYAN, and 100-ft. vessel dead in the water in KURIHAMA. Rockets were used.

TB P-40 fighters met southern KURIHAMA airfield on 1st, destroyed 2 planes and destroying 11 with 28 damaged on the ground.


ConaddrFlt requests 1 division of 2000-ton DDs for transport.

Cinpepa Adv 020001 approved the temporary diversion of construction crews on CHIBA to maintenance of combat troop supply lines.

Cinpepa Adv 020041 defers Phase 2D on PEBBS indefinitely.

Cinpepa Adv 0200315 constitutes OCPD 6-15 for bombardment of JIMMERI by NODA and escorts.

Consubras 020317 (pink) reports that there are no proper vessels to sail for mine reconnaissance except the 9 ship to enter the JIMMERI.

Consubras 020600 (pink) comments on Consub's proposed embarkation training schedule.

Cinpepa Adv 020607 (pink) requests immediate study to determine communication requirements for naval installations among in OLYMPIC.

---Continued---
2 June (Con't date) (Con't)

Cinacop Adv 020050 (pink) outlines procedure for relief of 6th MARFA. Any units then they are no longer required by District.

Cinacop Adv 020622 (pink) requests that 97th AAF dive bombing be not integrated into shipping sections before they are under observation.

Cinacop Adv 021529 (pink) denies 6th MARFA requests. 

3 June (Con't date)

The XXIV Corps again drove rapidly south, the 7th InfDiv placing troops in the SE coastal plain, cutting off OKINAWA PENINSULA. The Jap forces are now split and it is believed that the bulk of the remaining Japs are in the south-western end of the Island. The 94th InfDiv gained 500-1500 yards securing TERA and KAMUZATO. On the right flank the 1st Marine advanced 500-1000 yards against heavy anti-air and mortar fire with its further penetration to KILL 67 500 yards north of KAMUZATO. No report concerning the 6th Marine. 578th from 2nd Marine, landed on OKINAWA SHIMA unopposed at 0945, 3 June. A 1000 yard beachhead was quickly established and secured. 3 ELITE plus artillery and tanks are ashore and advancing on the 0-1 line. Unloading is being expedited with surf and beach conditions satisfactory.

Progres of troops ashore has permitted initiation of minesweeping and hydrographic work preparatory to establishing unloading facilities at YONABARI VAN, NAKIMBO and NAKA HARBOR.

Today and tomorrow one group of TF 38 fuels each day.

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TU 32-L-3 attacked OKINAWA on both the 1st and 2nd shooting down 2 enemy aircraft, strafing several small craft, and bombing and rocketing buildings, runways, and dispersal areas. The Japs continued repairing runways as soon as they were hit.

There were no enemy air raids at OKINAWA up to midnight on the 2nd. During the night an F6F(N) splashed 1 Irving, and on the 3rd TAF planes shot down 25 enemy aircraft at unreported locations. 1 TAF plane was lost. Close air support on the 2nd was furnished by 63 sorties (5 tons, 208 rockets, 48 Napalas).

FAT 38 planes sank 1 80 off KII SUDO, sunk 1 FTC and damaged a picket boat south of HAMAMATSU, sank 1 small AK and damaged a larger and a patrol craft off OKINAWA, and sunk 1 PTD NE of TOKYO. FAT 1 planes destroyed 2 float planes south of OKINAWA.

On the 3rd planes of TU 38-A found bad weather and strong airborne opposition. Some 20 airishes Japs provided aerial interception of the highest quality in both pilots and planes, and prevented attacks on OKINAWA, CHINAN, KAGOSHIMA and TOMEBA. 6 enemy aircraft were shot down and 3 destroyed on the ground at KITAKAMO TO and KONOHI. We lost 3 F6F for a two day total of 6 combat and 3 operational losses.

Photos on the 3rd showed 220 enemy aircraft on KAMUZATO, KAMUZATO EAST, and KUSHIMA, although pilots sighted few. The force was not selected; the closest bogey turned away at 30 miles.
3 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cinsepa Adv 030214 (pink) approves the transfer to the PHILIPPINES of 1 flight of 66th Combat Mapping Squadron (Army).

Cinsepa Adv 030217 amplifies controlling policy for ATC schedules from Guam to OKINAWA.

ConsSubs 030411 (pink) requests Fleet Air Wing ONE to cover and provide diversion for submarines passing through TSUSHIMA STRAITS by attacking anti-submarine vessels.

Cinsepa Adv 030424 (pink) places Op-Plan 5-45 (Operation INNATE against TRUE) into effect.

Cinsepa Adv 031207 passes to CINCPAC certain dispatches concerning attachment of Naval Construction Battalions to the 5th Amphibious Corps for OLYMPIC.

4 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv supported by NCF landed on ORAKU PENINSULA. A 1200 yard beachhead was quickly established and the 6th Marines pushed south to capture the northern half of NAHA Airfield by nightfall advancing through heavy rains along flooded runways. Other units of the division captured ONOKAMA ISLAND and a bridge has been constructed across the harbor with the island being used as a connecting link. The 1st MarDiv gained 400-1100 yards during the day capturing Hill 107, the key of the approaches to the town of INWA. The 77th InfDiv has moved south to the vicinity of CHAN in order to cover the right flank of the XXXIV Corps. The 96th InfDiv gained 500-1200 yards pushing its right flank to the northern outskirts of INWA. From here its front lines extend to the east along high ground to a point SW of NAHA. The assault elements of the division were being supplied by air drop. The 7th InfDiv cleared out NAHA, reached positions on the outskirts of AMAGUSUKU, advanced SW to MINATOMA and then to COUSICHAN and approached MAKIN. Mopping up was progressing satisfactorily on CHUSEI PENINSULA with 1000 more civilians coming under Twelfth Army control. IHEYA SHIMA was secured at 1245 4 June.

Casualties as of 2400 3 June: Enemy - 66,500; POWs 465 Military, 644 Laborers. Own: KIA 112, WIA 82, MIA 2 - total 96.

Development of harbors at MAKAGUSUKU WAN continues with main entrance practically closed off by nets. Most naval activities at OKINAWA were suspended or curtailed in preparation for possible typhoon. TG 36.1 suspended fueling and TG 38.4 left the operating area on southeasterly courses.

13 B-24s attacked MARCUS on the 4th; 75 B-24s hit FORMOSA on the 3rd.

On the 3rd 45 Jap aircraft were destroyed, out of an estimated 75 attacking in 18 raids. The heaviest raids came in the early afternoon. Most were from the north, and most were below 10,000 feet. TAF planes splashed 35, CVE planes 3, and ships splashed 7, including 1 suicide hit. In the largest single attack 25 Zekes came in at 17,000 feet, and 4 P47s shot down 9 without loss to themselves. Some bombs were dropped on 10 ORMA airfields, with damage not reported.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET
JUNE

4 June (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

During the 24-hour period ending 032400 TAF planes flew about 400 sorties, including NCAQ (3-6 VFH), DADCAQ (28-52 VF), Day CAP (about 50 VF), RAPCAQ (10 VF at all times from 0501-1610), ANAMX barrier patrol (8 P-47's) direct support for INFEA and southern OKINAWA, supply drops (24 TBM) ASP, observation missions, photo missions. Through 3
3 June TAF planes have destroyed 495 enemy aircraft. Direct support, hampered by weather, was furnished by 139 sorties (20 tons, 396 rockets, 66 Napalm).

FAW 1 planes damaged a tanker south of KOREA. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SC and damaged 2 SC and 2 SD south of HOMSHU. 1 of 15 attacking fighters was shot down and 2 others were damaged.

FEJs seriously damaged 1 200 ft. ship with rockets off the HOMSHU Coast, and scored hits in a 75 foot picket boat.

On the 5th 498 B-29s (excluding 29 early returns) took off for an incendiary attack on KOREA.

CINCPAC 040259 (pink) estimates that TF 37 will be ready to sortie from MANUS on 2 July or from WATS on 8 July.

ComGen 10 040325 is OpOrd 13-45 for capture and occupation of OKINAWA.

CINCPAC Adv 040026 (pink) requests advice from Com7thFlt as to availability for OLYMPIC of forces now assigned to 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC Adv 041223 (pink) approves deployment of the 414th Fighter Group at IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC Adv 041231 (pink) summarizes results of conference with representatives of CINCAPAC concerning OLYMPIC Operation.

5 June (Guam Date)

CG 10th Army daily report not received.

Unloading operations at OKINAWA were secured and ships put to sea or were sent to protected anchorages on the 4th. Early yesterday morning the typhoon alert was lifted and normal conditions resumed.

TG 38.4 reported no storm damage.

TG 38.1 had considerable damage:

HORNET (CV 12 and BERNINGTON (CV 20) each lost 25 feet of flight deck and sustained damage to additional 25 feet.

DULUTH (CL 87) had her bow buckled upward from frame 21.

PITTSBURGH (CA 72) lost her bow to frame 26. Her bow was later found floating in good condition.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

5 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

JOHN ROGERS (DD 574) has her main generator out.

BLUE (DD 744) steering by hand.

Other ships lost planes, boats and suffered minor damage.

TG 30.8 also took considerable damage:

CONKLIN (DE 439), heavily damaged, but can proceed on 1 engine and one boiler.

LUXEMBOURG VICTORY (AKK) has not been heard from but as of 0600/1 5th was not in trouble.

WATERMAN (DE 740) was also separated, but apparently has rejoined.

SALAMAU (CVE 95) and WINDHAM BAY (CVE 92) had severe structural damage and are not operable as carriers. Other CVE took considerable damage to planes.

Com3rdFli has formed TG 30.3 consisting of PITTSBURG (two sections) two ATF, DULUTH, CONKLIN, BLUE and 3 escorts en route GUAM at SOA 6 to 8 knots.

Liberators of FAW-18 joined up with 5 P-51's from IWO to attack an APD or DD north of CHICK. The P-51's, homed in by the PB4Y's, scored 7-8 rocket hits and strafed the ship thoroughly. The PB4Y's bombed, scoring a near miss. When last seen the ship was heading 120 under her own power, trailing oil.

There were no air attacks on the OKINAWA area on the 4th. 40 direct support sorties were flown.

TU 32.1,3 attacked SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 3rd. 5 enemy aircraft (including 4 biplanes) were destroyed on the ground at NOBANA (MITYAKO), and 7 boats were damaged.

FAW-1 exploded 1 large fleet oiler off SASSEBO, and believes it to have sunk; 1 SD was sunk, 1 beached, and 2 were left sinking.

For the week of 28 May to 3 June, inclusive, FAW-1 planes sank 1,785 tons of enemy ships, damaged 6,525 tons, and destroyed 5 enemy aircraft. Cumulative totals since coming to the area are 94,405 tons sunk, 91,205 tons damaged, 28 enemy aircraft destroyed, 16 enemy aircraft damaged.

FAW-18 destroyed 2 SD and 1 small PT, and damaged 1 SD and 1 PC.

Photographs show 3.3 square miles of new damage at OSAKA from the incendiary attack on the 1st. Total OSAKA damage is now 11.53 square miles, 16.7% of the built-up portion of the city.

On the 5th 446 B-29's bombed KORE.
MARSHALL 021909 (pink) requests comment on desirability of immediate acceptance of 16,500 RAF engineers and 10 squadrons Lancasters.

CINCPAC 040107 (pink) requests provision of additional facilities at MANUS.

JCS Joint Security Control 041843 (pink) outlines proposed cover plan for OLYMPIC and requests comment.

CINCPAC ADV 050612 (pink) informs CINCPAC that sortie from MANUS should be made by TF 37 as early as repairs permit.

CINCPAC ADV 050616 outlines airfield construction standards at OKINAWA to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 050658 (pink) contains recommendations to COMINCH against the deployment of RAF squadrons at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 050842 (pink) constitutes directive for provision of facilities at EMIWETOK to support fast carriers.

CINCPAC ADV 050845 requests authority from COMINCH to commission naval operating bases at KWAJALEIN and EMIWETOK.

CINCPAC ADV 051209 (pink) outlines to COMINCH shipping requirements for OLYMPIC.

COMGRDFLT 040330 recommends daily photo coverage of Empire airfields and establishment of interprons at OKINAWA and IWO for interpretation purposes.

COMGRDFLT PO 050900 requests that all 7th Air Force and 7th Bomber Command pilot rehabilitation areas be made available for the same purpose for the 20th Bomber Command.

COMGRDFLT 050743 (pink) constitutes 3rd Fleet Op Plan 5-45 for sweeping a clear approach in the EAST CHINA SEA.

COMGRDFLT 050559 (pink) indicates Task Force 38 will withdraw to LATTE about 12 June, departing 1 July for extensive operations, and directs that TO 30-8, operating at sea, should be reduced to minimum required for service to TF 31.
6 June (Guam date)

Development of supply lines on the 5th and improved weather conditions on the 6th aided ground movement, air support and artillery fire. On the right flank the 6th MarDiv secured NAHA Airfield. Patrols reached the town of GUSHI. An armored M36 tank battalion took a small island of the northwestern tip of ORAK: PEMIN-SULA. Elements of the 1st MarDiv were reducing a by-passed position in the vicinity of TOMUSU throughout the day. The drive south carried to SHINDAMURI with patrols farther to the south meeting negligible resistance. The 77th InfDiv continued to cover the XXIV Corps right flank. The 96th InfDiv captured INI on the 4th and on the 6th met moderate resistance in advancing to the northern outskirts of WOONAGUSUKU on its right flank and TOMUI on its left flank. The division is now 1000 yards from YAEJU-DAKE escarpment from which strong Jap resistance is expected. The 7th InfDiv captured ARAUSUKU on the 5th and high ground in the vicinity of TOMUI on the 6th. Heavy resistance was being met southeast of GUSHICHAN. Mopping up on CHINE PENINSULA was continuing satisfactorily.

Military Governor reports that 148,000 civilians are now under its care. Casualties as of 2400 5 June: Enemy: 65,677 killed, POWs - 594 military, 659 laborers. Own: WIA 250, KIA 47, KIA 1, total - 298.

In raids on the evening of the 5th, LOUISVILLE (CA 28) was hit by a suicide plane abreast her #1 stack causing considerable topside structural damage. MISSISSIPPI (BB 41) was hit aft of amidships, damaging her hull and blister for about 30 feet.

Fire support ships on the 5th, in addition to gun positions, concentrated on enemy troops. Many claimed killed, Frontline troops on the east are being supplied in part by landing craft shuttle service. Work is proceeding on clearing the ASATO RIVER for supply of 3rdPhibCorps by water.

IsCom DIO reports SHREWSBURY (AD 26) grounded and sank during the typhoon. LUXEMBOURG VICTORY has joined without damage. A search plane discovered a SC ( hull number not stated, but believed to be the missing 1349) and gave her instructions to proceed. No definite word from ANCHOR (ARS 13). Intercept received from CTF 31 directing two LSTs to report their positions.

Weather cancelled heavy, medium and fighter strikes on the 5th at FORMOSA.

Ships shot down 3 planes and 2 others scored suicide hits in raids from the west and southwest between 1930 and 2030 on the 5th. Close support was held down because of weather. SAGISHIMA, hit on the 4th by TU 32.1.3., was weathered out on the 5th. 1 TAF pilot was rescued from a ditching, and 1 P&F(N) is missing. 10 tons of supplies were dropped. Improved weather on the 6th permitted greater air support. TAF planes strafed ahead of ground troops, and TAFs flew 6x paratroops.

A PAN 1 Privateer shot down 1 Tony, and 2 FHCs, attacking 6 Jap planes, damaged 4, 75 miles NW of AMAGI. A seaplane landed 430 miles E of the N tip of LUCON to rescue all 12 members of a seaplane crew ditched on the 5th. Bouncing signals from the survivors had been received 200 miles and 2 hours and 20 minutes away by the rescue plane.

Strike photographs show fires scattered throughout the entire length of the KORE target area. Half of the city is smoke obscured.
6 June (Omn date) (Comm'd)

All effective B-29s (excluding 6 early returns) took off on the 7th to attack OSAKA with incendiaries. 25 B-29s take off at 1700 tomorrow to mine the east and west entrances to SHIMONOKURI STRAITS.

CINCPOA 052220 (pink) requests CINCAPAC to take action required concerning movement and re-equipment of Army divisions to be released from OKINAWA.

DEP COM AF 20 060223 requests additional housing to meet urgent requirements for war correspondents.

COMINPAC 060230 (pink) indicates that mining of BUNGO SUIDO by DMS in support of OLYMPIC is risky but possible.

CINCPOA ADV 060512 (pink) informs CMD of plans for installation of mobile Loran station in KYUSHU during OLYMPIC.

CINCAPAC ADV 060513 directs that plans be established by ComAir7thFlt for automatic search during typhoon weather.

COM9REDFLT 060611 (pink) outlines proposed employment of TF 37 with TF 38.

COMED TEN 060630 (pink) requests 24th InfRegt be assigned garrison duty at OKINAWA.

COMCHNAAPPOA 060724 (pink) requests that the possibility of airfield sites at IHEYA and AOKUNI be investigated.

CINCPOA ADV 060806 directs that DepCom 20th AF request for additional material for camp site for war correspondents be submitted to CINCPOA through customary channels.

GHQ SWPA 060930 (pink) proposes to the JCS basing RAF units on southeast OKINAWA or deferring their movement until they can move into Army Air Force fields.

CINCPOA ADV 061242 requests COMCHNAAPPOA to screen more carefully the requests for visits to OKINAWA.

CINCPOA ADV 061243 (pink) requests early estimate of potential airfield sites on IHEYA and AOKUNI.

COM9REDFLT 061247 (pink) is 3rdFlt OpPlan 6-45 for sweeping areas in EAST CHINA SEA for mines.

CINCAPAC ADV 062241 (pink) directs Com3rdFlt to submit track of major 3rdFlt units and estimated track of typhoon from 3 – 6 June.

CINCPOA ADV 062242 (pink) authorized 3rdFlt to conduct a second strike on KYUSHU prior to return of 3rdFlt to LEYTE.

CINCPOA ADV 062243 (pink) confirms that 3rdFlt OpPlan 5-45 complies with Task One of CINCPOA 050619 for sweeping channel into EAST CHINA SEA.
TOP SECRET

7 June (Gum date)

Improved weather permitted tank and air support for infantry attacks on strongly fortified YARU-NAKE escarpment and CHINU PENINSULA. The left flank of the 6th MarDiv met heavy resistance. The right flank drove along the coast to a point opposite SERAGA-SHIMA. Further inland CHINU was reached. The 1st MarDiv secured hill 108, 500 yards west of DAKTON against determined opposition. The right flank of the division pushed close to the coast and was reported 900 yards N of ITOMAN TOWN. The 96th InfDiv captured hills 600 yards NE of TUKA. The 7th InfDiv was meeting very heavy resistance in the OKINASHAN Area. The 32nd Inf from the 7th Div landed on O-SHIMA during the day. The island was secured by 1530 with only civilians being encountered.


Several RED alerts from OKINAWA were received last night. No report received from CTF 51. On the evening of the 6th there were more raids, and S.J.W. DITTER (DMG) was hit by 2 suicide planes.

Further report from FOB NO concerning storm damage discloses little other damage. 1 LOT was breached with but minor damage; 1 DD lost a man and whaleboat. All warships were escorted to sea and had no damage. SHERIDAN (AO 20) may be salvageable. No damage to shore installations.

ComStrFlt reports details of damage to ships of TF 30.8. ATTU (CVE 102) and BOUGAINVILLE (CVE 100) had miscellaneous damage but still have operational flight decks. A total of 26 planes were destroyed and 70 damaged from these two and SALAMANDA and WINDHAM BAY. MILLICOMA (AOG 73), SEEBEC (AO 87) and CALIENTE (AO 55) had some structural damage. SWASTIKA (AE 5) had major part of her 16" projectiles damaged, when 700 tons of her ammunition shifted. 2 DE had minor damage. PITTSBURGH bow was still under tow last night, with another tug sent to assist. It is proceeding at 3 knots with an ETA at GUAM of the 19th. DULUTH and the rest of PITTSBURGH are apparently having no trouble, and are due at GUAM on the 10th.

TF 38 strikes KYUSHU with a long range fighter sweep over the target at 1130 on the morning of the 8th if the weather is favorable.

Yesterday a P-38 crashed into the flight deck of the RANDOLPH at anchor at LETTE.

PAN 1 aircraft west of SASEBO on the 7th sank 2 small AK and left a 3rd sinking. North of SHANGHAI 1 SD was destroyed, 2 were burned, and a 4th was left sinking.

349 B-25s are known to have bombed the OSAKA urban area on the 7th. 133 P-51s escorted the B-25s. 2 enemy aircraft were shot down and 1 P-51 was lost.

3,227 enemy aircraft were destroyed in FOA from 18 March to 30 April, inclusive. 1,354 have been destroyed from 1 May to date.

COMINCH & CNO 031538 dissolves the 10th Fleet and assumes direct command of all anti-submarine functions of the 10th Fleet.

CINCPAC ADV 0607/42 (pink) informs Cominch of conference at MANILA for preparation of Joint Cover and Deception Plan for OLIMPIA.

CINCPAC ADV 0612/4 (pink) approves Comstrflt 060829 and directs withdrawal of TF 38 to LETTE after strikes on KYUSHU on 6 June.

--Continued--
TOP SECRET

7 June (Ganar date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADV 070123 (pink) directs that Com3rdFIt arrange suitable radio diversion in combat areas.

CINCPAC ADV 070151 describes to ComSovRem 10 his duties at Leyte for support of 3rdFIt and BF7.

CINCPAC ADV 070559 (pink) provides that the 8th Marine RCT of the 2nd MarDiv with accompanying replacements will remain under the operational control of ComGen 10 after capture of Aomori.

CINCPAC ADV 070725 directs that torpedoes be removed from all CVKs.

CINCPAC ADV 070613 (pink) summarises organisation for providing weather service to 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADV 070616 (pink) comments to Cominch on CINCPAC 060930 concerning proposal to base RAF Lancasters at Okinawa.

COMSTRFLT 072340 (pink) recommends that mines and equipment for laying by RNs be landed at Okinawa to be available when desired.

8 June (Ganar date)

The 7th MarDiv advanced unopposed approximately 1600 yards to the south bringing its front lines along the north bank of the MUKUE GAWA. Supplies were being brought by boat at a point 400 yards north of ITOMAN. The 6th MarDiv on OROKU PENINSULA again found heavy resistance from strong, organised defensive positions. Gains for the day were limited. However, the Japs remaining on the peninsula are now virtually surrounded. The lines of the 96th InfDiv remained static in front of the YAENU-DAKE escarpment. The 7th InfDiv averaged gains of about 400 yards during the day reaching the outskirts of HANAGUSUKI against heavy fire.

Casualties as of 2400 7 June: Enemy KIA 66,834; POWs 622 military, 670 laborers. Own KIA 34, WIA 181, MIA 0; total 215.

Progress on new unloading locations. ASATO CHANNEL nearly cleared. Minesweeping to MINATOCA completed. YONABARU approaches have been cleared and buoyed. Emergency supplies are now being landed at MAHA, though there is much clearing still to be done before it can be fully utilized. North HAGUSHI beaches are to be abandoned for all unloading except from LSTs.

Further storm damage reported by TG 38.1: HELLENAU (CVL 24) had a tractor get loose on her hangar deck, which did considerable damage. SAN JACINTO (CVL 30) received structural damage forward. MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59), ALABAMA (BB 60) and INDIANA (BB 66) had minor topside structural damage. BALTIMORE (CA 68) had structural damage to her bow structure. 3 other cruisers and 7 destroyers not previously reported had minor damage.

Com3rdFIt reported results of KYUSHU strike on the 8th as apparently highly successful.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

8 June (cont'd)

Heavy enemy air attacks were made on the 6th at OKINAWA from 1600 to 1730 from the north and from the southwest 1900-2100; 39 enemy aircraft were destroyed. 8 other enemy aircraft were shot down by TAF planes over KYUSHU. On the 7th attacks began at dawn, during which the HATOMA BAY was hit. In the evening, from 1800-2100 11 raids were made. Altogether throughout the day 12 planes were destroyed over OKINAWA, TAF KYUSHU sweeps shot down 14 more on the 7th, and the next day, shot down 11 over KYUSHU. In the KYUSHU attacks the Japs offered aggressive and skillful opposition, but no friendly planes were lost.

On the 7th 1 squadron of MAO 114 arrived at Kadena Field. Demos rescued 2 TAF pilots and 12 survivors from a special weather plane. 2 planes were missing from the 6th. 20820 from the TENNESSEE, floating out of gas about 215 miles SE of MINAMI DAITO, were finally located after extensive search. On the 6th and 7th there were 422 direct support sorties, using 168 tons of bombs, 417 rockets, 90 Napalm.

FAW 1 planes sunk 1 medium AK off SHANGHAI, damaged 1 small AK, and shot down 3 planes on the 6th.

26 B-29s successfully laid 240 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and in FUKUOKA HARBOR on the 7th.

CGF 36.3071147 reports crash of Army P-38 into RANDOLPH at LEYTE.

RANDOLPH 071247 reports Army P-38 crashing on her forward flight deck.

GHQ SWPA 071432 (pink) concurs in the release of 2 Navy Liberator Squadrons from 7th Flt and offers to release 3 PV squadrons in addition.

JCS 071603 requests recommendations on proposal for reorganization of theater Army-Navy petroleum procurement.

Cominch 072107 authorizes establishment of Naval Operating Bases at ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN.

ComCenFMFPac 072319 (pink) expresses desire to use 2nd Marine in lieu of 4th Marine for OLYMPIC:

Com3rdFlt 080250 (pink) expresses intention to withdraw TF 38 from the KYUKUS on 10 June.

CINCPOA ADV 080319 (pink) paraphrases for CinCPac Com3rdFlt's plans for service areas and authorized BFP to draw bulk fuel at ENIWETOK.

CINCPOA ADV 080520 withholds approval for movement of RCM squadron to MARIANAS until an Army field can accommodate it.

COM3rdFlt 080615 (pink) reports completion of KANoya strike.

CINCPOA ADV 081229 established MOS's at KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK.

CINCPOC ADV 081520 (pink) directs Com3rdFlt to include railroad ferries as targets in strikes on HONSHU-HONKAIIDO areas.

CINCPOC ADV 081521 (pink) approves reequipment of 5 APA's as casualty evacuation ships but directs that they be employed during OLYMPIC for carrying amphibious troops in the assault echelon.
9 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv continued to compress the Japs in the pocket at the base of OROKA PENINSULA. The 1st MarDiv recommenced the approach to KINILASH RIDGE. The XXIV Corps continued its preparations for attack on the YANFU-DAKE escarpment with a heavy pounding by NWP, artillery and air strikes. The 7th InfDiv attacked with its main effort on the left to seize Hill 95, 300 yards south of HAMAGUSHI. Strong patrols penetrated enemy positions on the division right flank and center for maximum gains of 700 yards against heavy MG and mortar fire.

First assault wave landed on AGUNI SHIMA 06121 (1) 9 June. Island secured at 1200 on the same day. No opposition and no casualties reported.

Summary of mopping up operations in the MARIANAS 27 May - 2 June:

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Rear Admiral Cobb relieved Rear Admiral Hall as SOPA KAGUSHI.

Yesterday TF 38 fueled. Battle cruisers bombarded OKINA DAITO. Planes from TF 38 struck KINAMAI DAITO with no air opposition and found airfields there inoperational. Photographic assessment of the June 8th strike on KANOA airfields confirms a minimum of 20 planes destroyed on the ground. The force is scheduled to leave for LEYTE today.

CruDiv ONE and DesDiv 114 in NorPac are scheduled to bombard KATSUWA at 1600 on the 10th. The bombardment will be followed by a sweep inside the northern KURIKE CHAIN.

A heavy cruiser sighted on the 7th leaving BATAVIA has been sunk by TRENNCHANT, British submarine operating under CTF 71.

Weather prevented heavy strikes on FORMOSA on the 8th.

Fwn 1 planes sank a 1,000-ton AK and damaged 1 SC off SHANGHAI, left 1 SD sinking and damaged a 2nd. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD and 1 FTC south of HONSHU.

297 effective B-29s took off to attack 5 aircraft plants and an army air arsenal in the TOKYO Area on the 10th.

CINCPOA ADV 082301 approves Com3rdFlt proposal to withdraw TF 38 from the KUUKUS on 10 June.

CINCPOA ADV 090251 requests ComGenPOA to obtain CINCPAC concurrence in movement of the 24th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 147th Infantry.

CINCPOC ADV 090846 (pink) requests Cominach concurrence in transfer of 2 VPB(ML) squadrons from 7thFlt.

CINCPOA ADV 090856 (pink) requests comments on proposal to capture KUMAK with 8th Marine RCT.

CINCPOAC ADV 090877 (pink) reiterates recommendation that American flag commercial airline to the South Pacific be established.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

2 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADV 091339 agrees to employment of troops of Japanese ancestry in the main HAWAIIAN ISLANDS but recommends against such employment at positions west of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

10 June (Guam date)

On OROKU PENINSULA the 6th MarDiv continued to compress the remaining Jap pocket, reported to be held by Naval Construction troops. The Bailey bridge leading from OROKU ISLAND to the SW shore of the harbor was shelled by enemy artillery with minor damage incurred. The 1st MarDiv attacked towards KINUSHI ridge. Three of 4 major outposts in front of the ridge were captured. The XXIV Corps began its attack to reduce the YAKU-DARE escarpment receiving fire from all types of Jap weapons. The 96th InfDiv gained 800-1000 yards. The 77th InfDiv made slow advances against rifle fire from HANAUSUKU. A message drop from Combat TBM called on the enemy commander to open negotiations by 1800(1) 11 June for the surrender of his forces.


In air raids of the 9th, no damage to our ships is reported. On the 10th, a suicide plane struck the W.D. PORTER (DD 579) in radar picket station 15. The ship sank about 3 hours after she was hit.

Harbor clearance is proceeding well. Preliminary survey of NAHA has been completed; the harbor is clear of mines and is in use by LCTs. Supplies for 24th Corps still being transported by water.

CVEs continue to neutralise SAKISHIMA; TF 38 is now retiring to LETTE.

Weather cancelled all missions against FORMOSA.

60-70 Jap planes attacked OKINAWA on the 9th in 37 raids, with apparently no damage inflicted on our forces. Our CAP shot down 11 and a DD got 1. During the night 9/10, 14 heckler raids were made on the OKINAWA Area. CAP got 2, IE SHIMA AA 2, and a P-47 shot 1 down north of ANAMI. A few bombs hit land, firing fuel dumps at IE SHIMA and YONTAN. Our dusk CAP shot down 1 of our VF(N), and our AA wounded a pilot who was escaping from an F4U.

Air support on the 8th and 9th totalled 376 sorties, using 70 tons of bombs, 1751 rockets, and 26 Napalm bombs.

PBM 38 planes sunk 1 SD; PBM 1 planes probably sunk 1 SD and 1 SC, and damaged 3 SD and 1 SC.

P-47s attacking KIYUSHI on the 10th shot down 17 enemy aircraft. In 1 melee 9 P-47s attacked about 50 enemy aircraft, shooting down 14 with no losses reported. Lt. Robert Stone got 5.

Photos show the KAWANISHI aircraft plant to be almost completely destroyed. 76% of the roof area is destroyed. The KAWASAKI plant showed little damage. 2 AICHI plants show respectively 96% and 52% destruction or damage. The SUMITOMO Light Metal Mfg. Co. at NAGOTA shows 3 large heavily damaged buildings.
TOP SECRET

10 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CENTCOM ADV 090657 directs that PCs and SCs remain the type responsibility of ComServPac since they are not basically amphibious types but will be assigned to operational control of ComPhibsPac for sufficient periods to permit training.

COMINTC & CNO 091847 requests current typhoon counter measures and plans for their improvement.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 091950 (pink) describes overall deception directive to be expected from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CENTCOM ADV 100231 (pink) requests ComGen LO to initiate development of OKINAWA in accordance with Memorandum of Understanding between CENTCOM and CENTCOM.

CENTCOM ADV 100357 (pink) approves recommendations and conclusions of Joint Mapping Conference, 25-29 May, and recommends appropriate revision of JCS 756/2.

11 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv continued to shrink the OROKU pocket against stiff resistance. The 1st MarDiv made its best gains on its left flank moving up to the slopes of Hill 69 which was being assaulted at nightfall. A Bailey bridge is being constructed across the MAKURU RIVER 600 yards west of ZAMA. The left flank of the 96th InfDiv gained the top of YAEJU-DAKE with an advance made in the early morning hours under cover of darkness. The 7th InfDiv supported by tanks occupied the crest of Hill 95. No response was made by the commander of the Jap forces to the leaflet suggestion that he open negotiations for the surrender of his forces.

Enemy casualties as of 2400 10 June: KIA 71,688 (estimated; POWs: 689 Military, 562 Laborers.

On the 10th GENDREAU (DE 639) escorting LST and LCT east of OKINAWA was hit by enemy shore fire. Despite a flooded fireroom she was able to proceed to KERAMA under her own power.

Vice Admiral Oldendorf relieved Rear Admiral McCormick as CTF 32. TF 38 is enroute LEYTE.

In 3 enemy air attacks at OKINAWA on the 10th 1 suicide hit was scored and 2 enemy aircraft were shot down by CAP. On the 11th 5 enemy aircraft were shot down in the OKINAWA area.

GVE planes used 41 tons of bombs and 624 rockets on the SAKUSHIMA GUNTO, damaging 3 boats and 1 main aircraft. A gas or ammunition dump was destroyed. The ISHIGAKI airfield was found lighted at 0455, apparently to welcome home Jap planes.

On the 10th FUs shot down 1 Jap plane over KYUSHU and destroyed 11 on the ground, in the first TAF F/A attack on the Empire to be reported. Earlier in the same day P-47s had shot down 17 over KYUSHU. On the 11th 5 more enemy aircraft were shot down over KYUSHU by TAF planes.

F/A 18 planes sank 1 SC, which exploded and heavily damaged the attacking plane, and also sank 1 sea truck. Damaged were 1 SA, 1 tug, 2 SD and 1 FTD.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

11 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CPAF 1 reports that during the week of 4-10 June FAW 1 planes sank 14,075 tons of enemy shipping, damaged 7345, destroyed 3 enemy aircraft, and damaged 4 enemy aircraft. Damage inflicted since coming to the area totals 108,450 tons sunk, 98,350 damaged, 31 enemy aircraft destroyed. During the last week 1 FAW was lost, with all personnel recovered.

52 P-51s attacked TAKOROGAMA and ATSUGI airfields in the TOKYO Area, shooting down 0 enemy aircraft, and on the ground scoring 15 - 3 - 33. 2 other airfields were strafed. These attacks took place on the 11th. 12 P-51s were lost.

With the 3.4 sq. mi. of damage from the 7th raid, total damage to OSAKA is now 15.65 sq. miles, 24% of the built-up portion of the city. With the 4.3 sq. mi. of damage to KORE from the 5th raid, total damage is now 8 sq. mi., 51% of the built-up portion of the city.

MACARTHUR 101320 (pink) requests review of proposed movement of 24th Infantry to OKINAWA in view of port congestion and presence of 1 MarDiv there.

CG USAFCT 101516 (pink) proposes capture of an intermediate port on the CHINA COAST such as FORT BAYARD in LISCHOW PENINSULA Area.

COMINCH & CAP 101620 (pink) requests comment on CG USAFCT 101516 proposing capture of an intermediate port on the CHINA COAST.

CINCPOA ADV 110204 requests concurrence in the movement of 24th Inf Regt to OKINAWA notwithstanding the presence of 1 MarDiv.

GTF 31 110330 (pink) constitutes GTF 31 OpOrd A205-45 for reconnaissance of KURE.

MACARTHUR 110516 (pink) requests clearance for movement to OKINAWA of Brig. Gen. Hutchinson and air echelon of 14 C-46 transports.

CINCPOA ADV 110800 outlines purposes of conference to be held at PEARL concerning transport of aircraft by CVs.

CINCPOA ADV 110802 summarizes attrition sustained during OKINAWA campaign and damage inflicted on the enemy.

GTF 31 111210 (pink) constitutes Air Plan for strike against southern KYUSHU with purpose of concealing withdrawal of TF 38.

CINCPOA ADV 111300 (pink) concurs in movement of Gen. Hutchinson to OKINAWA and of air echelon subject to timing as determined by ComGen 10.

COMGEN TEN 111430 (pink) directs IsCom OKINAWA to comply with CINCPOA ADV 100231 concerning base development.
TOP SECRET

12 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv continues to close in on the Jap pocket on GRÖKU PENINSULA. An attempted Jap landing on ONOTAMA ISLAND during the night 11-12th was repulsed. The 1st MarDiv, after beating off Japs counterattacking with antehal charges, launched a night attack at 0330. Against surprisingly little opposition the division right flank reached the top of KUNISHI RIDGE after an advance of 1000 yards. At dawn the Japs directed very heavy fire on these troops and Marines on the ridge were forced to dig in. The division left flank consolidated its recently won position on Hill 69. The 96th InfDiv held on to its position on top of YAEJU-DAKE, seized YUZA and high ground 200 yards south of the town. A night attack by the 7th InfDiv gained 500 yards and brought elements of the division to the top of the escarpment on the east. On the division left advances were made in the HANAGUSUKU area supported by flame throwing tanks from Hill 95.

Casualties as of 2400 11 June: Enemy: KIA 72,957; POWs 731 military, 536 laborers. Own: KIA 67, WIA 359, MIA 5; total 431.

Tomorrow, minesweining organized as TG 32.3 will start sweeping mines to the southwest between OKINAWA and MIYAKO.

COMWORPAC reports CruDiv 1 bombardment of installations on MATSUMA was completed without damage to our ships.

Bad weather again prevented attacks on FORMOSA on the 11th.

A Jap bomb dropped by a Jap plane on the 10th striking "PP" hit IE SHIMA and killed 9, wounding 32.

PB4Ys, escorted by P-47s, on photographic mission over KYUSHU on the 10th were intercepted by 75 Jap fighters. 17 Japs were shot down.

In minor air attacks in the OKINAWA Area on the 11th our CAF splashed 5 enemy aircraft, ships AA shot down 4, 1 suicide hit was scored, for a total of 19 enemy aircraft destroyed. Incomplete reports indicate that 4 more were shot down over KYUSHU by TAF planes.

184 sorties were flown in support of ground troops on the 11th. 2 squadrons of MAG 14 arrived at Kadana on the 11th.

FAW 18 planes on the 12th sank 4 SD, 2 off KII GUIDO and 2 west of KUGU SHIMA. At the latter point a large warehouse or fish cannery was destroyed and the entire harbor area was set ablaze.

PBJs scored 4 and 2 rocket hits respectively on a 300-foot ship and a 200-foot coaster east of CHIBU PENINSULA.

20 B-29s laid 182 mines in SHIMONOSERI STRAITS and TSURIKA BAY.

CINCPOA ADV 110904 expresses desire that TAF 10th Army operations not be handicapped by necessity of demonstrating efficiency of Napesa.

CINCPOA ADV 120149 (pink) suggests that 1330 E. Long. be agreed on as the dividing line between areas of primary responsibility during OLYMPIC.

CINCPOA ADV 120444 (pink) proposes to provide assault air warning units for OLYMPIC and suggests discussion between ComPhibPac and ComGen 6th Army.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

12 June (Guam date) (Continued)

CINCPOA ADV 120501 (pink) requests that all units from the MTO and ETO available for redeployment be reported to CINCPAC who will schedule into OKINAWA and OLYMPIC.

CHQ MACARTHUR 120651 concurs in movement of 24th InfRegt from SAIJAN to OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 121831 (pink) passes to CINCSWPA concurrence of ComGen 10 in movement of Brig. Gen. Hutchinson's party and flight echelon to OKINAWA.

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13 June (Guam date)

Organised Jap resistance on OROKU PENINSULA has been destroyed and the 6th MarDiv is now engaged in mopping up small enemy groups in caves. During the 9 days of operations on the peninsula over 3,500 Japs were killed, including 150 found dead in a Jap sick bay overrun by the Marines. The 1st MarDiv continued to consolidate its positions along KUNITSHI RIDGE. The right flank of the 96th Div gained 4-500 yards to the northern outskirts of OZATO. Gains of approximately 400 yards were made in the division center while the left flank was held up by MG and 47mm fire. The 7th InfDiv pushed its right flank 250-500 yards along the escarpment and reached the northern edge of a small town 400 yards west of HANAGUSUKU. A Jap counterattack by an estimated two companies against Hill 95 was repulsed and artillery later broke up a concentration of enemy forming to attack the hill.

Casualties as of 2400 12th: Enemy: KIA 74,783, WIA 816, Military, 570 laborers, Own: KIA 6,225, WIA 26,901, WIA 226; total - 33,352.

The 12th at OKINAWA was quiet with little naval activity. No air raids and no damage to ships reported. Fire support activity on a reduced scale. Close support was furnished by 98 sorties (24 tons, 330 rockets), and the SAKISHIMA GUNTO was attacked by TU 321.13 (55 tons, 52 rockets), which destroyed 2 planes on the ground.

2 PBY4 photo planes, escorted by 20 P-47s tried to photograph KYUSHU but clouds interfered. The P-47s met no enemy aircraft. 32 P-47s bombed and rocketed KANGTA airfield despite 8/10 clouds at 2,000 feet and a few strafed KUSHIRA. 1 P-47 pilot bailed out near OKINAWA but was dead when picked up.

CTP31 121240 (pink) submits to Com3rdFlt recommended composition of fleet and amphibious units to remain at OKINAWA as TF 31.

CINCPAC ADV 130228 (pink) comments to Cominchr on proposal of ComGen USFCT to open FORT BAYARD or equivalent intermediate port on CHINA Coast.

CINCPAC ADV 130229 (pink) outlines LST availability for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 130231 proposes to Cominchr dividing ServRon 10 into Service Divs.

CINCPAC ADV 130331 requests instructions from Cominchr concerning maintenance of a token force at JUA AMOTU Airfield on TONGATAPU.

CINCPAC ADV 130849 directs ComServPac to resubmit tentative organization of Service Force, Pacific Fleet separating Staff organization from Force organization.

COMAAFSWPA 131110 reports circumstances surrounding crash of P-38 into RANDOLPH.

CINCPAC ADV 131621 comments on CTO 111,2 proposal to bombard TUNK.

CINCPAC ADV 131629 directs transfer of 24th InfRegt to OKINAWA and of 1 Bn of 147th InfRegt from DIO to TINIAN.
TOP SECRET

14 June (Guan date)

The 6th MarDiv in its final mopping up on OROKU PENINSULA on the 13th captured 102 Japs. There were numerous surrenders, individual and group suicides, and shooting of Japs trying to surrender by their own comrades. In the south the Japs are now confined to an area 3 miles by 5 miles. The 1st MarDiv continued to consolidate its right flank on KUNISHI RIDGE. The southern edge of KUNISHI TOWN was reached after a bitter fire fight. On the division left flank 600-800 yards were made bringing the lines up on the ridge to the east of KUNISHI TOWN. The 6th InfDiv reached the southeast edge of OZATO TOWN. The 7th InfDiv made gains of 300-700 yards against moderate to heavy resistance, reaching the center of NAKAZA. The 6th Marine Recon Co. landed unopposed on SENAGA SHIMA, 600 yards off SW coast of OROKU PENINSULA, at 0500 14 June. The reconnaissance of KUMA SHIMA was completed without casualty during the night 13-14 June. Preliminary information indicates approximately 90 Japs on the island.

Casualties:- Enemy: KIA 76, 542; POWs 906 military, 574 laborers. Own: KIA 8, WIA 374, MIA 12; total - 434.

Total naval casualties of TF 31 to 13 June are 1102 KIA, 1403 WIA and 3592 MIA; total 6,097. (Increase of 900 since 23rd)

Minesweeping between MIYAKO and OKINAWA proceeding according to schedule, with negative results for the first day's operations.

TG 111.2 continues 2nd day training strike on TRUK. In addition to air strikes originally scheduled, cruisers may bombard DUBLON ISLAND. TG 32.1 in operating area. TG 30.6 patrolling north of convoy routes.

During the 13th there were no air raids for the 2nd day. 1-47s of the TAF strafed small craft and a factory in southern KYUSHU, losing 1, and TU 32.1.3 attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO with 42 tons and 476 rockets, probably destroying 1 Dinah. Close inspection of runways showed 3 3000 foot and 1 2600 foot strips operational and the rest inoperational. CVEs and TAF planes furnished 93 close support sorties, using 12 tons and 544 rockets. A strike by 65 P4Us using 19,220 gallons of Napalm and 465 rockets was also made on a probable Jap headquarters area near RABUNI TOWN on the S. coast of OKINAWA. The area was left a mass of flames, smoke and dust. 1 P4U crash landed, killing the pilot.

FAW 1 seaplanes on the 14th off SW KOREA left 1 SD afire and settling, sank 3 SD off KUNSAN, KOREA and left 3 others burning and listing. Privateers dropped 4 2000 pound mines in a channel off SW KOREA.

A FBJ claimed serious damage on an unidentified vessel south of TOKYO BAY.

29 B-29s laid 311 mines in SHIMONSEKI STRAITS and NIIGATA HARBOR.

487 B-29s (excluding 25 early returns) took off to attack OSAKA-AMAGASAKI urban area with incendiaries. P-51 escorts were scheduled.

OTP 38 100612 (pink) comments on relative performance of P4U-1 and Jap fighters Frank, George and Jack.

OTP 38 120245 (pink) recommends strongly for retention of the maximum number of VF in CVEs.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

14 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADV 131623 directs that all type commanders screen and reduce all requirements in the MARIANAS in order to alleviate strain on critically burdened port facilities.

JCS 132158 outlines procedure for repatriation of Allied prisoners of war.

COMPHIBSPAC 140030 (pink) estimates ICT requirements for OLYMPIC.

15 June (Guam date)

The 1st MarDiv made little changes in its front lines. The 96th InfDiv completed the seizure of OZATO and was pressing forward to the south. The 7th InfDiv pressed its attacks towards Hill 153 reaching a point 1/2 mile from the hill, after fighting through Jap defensive positions located in jutting coral formations.

Casualties as of 2400 14 June: Enemy: KIA 77,719; POWs 95,210; Casualties: 1,601.

Sights indicate that Jap merchant shipping is still backed up in Korean ports. 21 R手册 reconnaissance and photographs indicate that only the smallest ships are now using the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

TG 111.2 completed TRUK training strike without opposition.

For the 3rd consecutive day there were no enemy air raids. Close support continued with 112 sorties using 69 tons and 486 rockets. TU 32,1, 3 continued attacking the SAKISHIMA GUNTO with 70 tons and 773 rockets, sinking 6 small boats and exploding 1 small armored gunboat off ISHIGAKI, and damaging 11 small boats off 140125Z. Off IEMETSU 2 60-foot boats were damaged. Runways and other installations were attacked. 5 new biplanes and 1 fighter on ISHIGAKI appeared operational.

The TAF maintained a 72-plane CAP from dawn to dusk, when other CASS took over. The TAF KYUSHU strike was weathered and hit ASAMI instead, 1 F4U and 1 F4U ditched near the KIKAI shore, and both were Dumboed under enemy fire with our fighters strafing enemy gun positions.

FAM 1 planes damaged 2 SD and 1 SC SE of SHIKOKU, and probably sank 1 8000-ton PT. FAM 12 planes destroyed 1 SD off KII SUIDO, and on the E shore of KAGOSHIMA destroyed 6 SD on a ramp, damaging 3 SD and 4 fishing boats.

CONAIR TEN 141350 (pink) estimates that 3 airstrips can be constructed on AGUMI and 1 on IBUKA.

CINCPAC ADV 141718 summarizes existing arrangements for locating and tracking typhoons.

CINCPAC ADV 150812 (pink) requests from COM3rdFlt amplification of request by Capt. Brown to operate TF 37 as a group of TF 36.

CINCPAC ADV 150816 (pink) designates 2nd MarDiv in lieu of 4th MarDiv for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 150835 (pink) requests CINCPAC's concurrence in substitution of 1 Marine Scout Bombing Group for 1 of the 4 Marine Fighter Groups to be employed in OLYMPIC.
TOP SECRET

16 June (Guam date)

In the center, the 96th InfDiv reached the crest of Hill 197. By nightfall the division was fighting down the SW slopes of the hill with the Japa offering stiff resistance. The division left flank advanced approximately 600 yards across the plateau. The 7th InfDiv advanced towards Hill 153 supported by tanks and flame-throwers. Latest reports state that the hill was finally taken shortly before nightfall. Tanks in support were hindered by dense, high grass, heavy tree growths, and coral pinnacles. On the division left 500 yards were gained along the coast and Hill 115 secured. The 1st MarDiv continued reorganization and consolidation on KUNISHI RIDGE. Patrols were working through KUNISHI TOWN and towards MEZADO (MAGAR). During the past week infiltration has increased with 1161 Jap infiltrators being killed during this period.


84 B-24s (including 44 previously reported) bombed FÚKUSHIMA on the 15th. TAICHU drome was bombed starting fires and explosions, and destroying or damaging fuel, warehouses, etc. 25 B-25s hit OKAJI drome destroying 5 - 7 buildings plus locomotives and airfield installations. Photos taken on the 15th of FÚKUSHIMA airfields (plus earlier photos of 4 fields) showed 63 VF and 26 VB operational.

At OKINAWA from 2000-2200 on the 15th a small number of Jap planes raided the area doing little damage and losing 2 planes to our VF(A). 3 bombs hit LI SHIMA and 5 hit near Kadoma. AA shot down 1 Nick.

Direct support was furnished by 90 sorties with 67 tons and 228 rockets. TU 32, 1, 3 hit SAKISHIMA GUNTO, sinking a harbor lighter and a fishing boat, and damaging 1 SD, 1 barge and l enemy aircraft. We lost 2 VF to AA with no rescues. Other losses during the day included 1 OSU, over enemy territory, and 1 TAF VF. 38 P-47s and 32 FAUs of the TAF were weathered out of KYUSHU on the 16th and hit KIKAI and TAKUNO instead. The CVE planes with 30 TAF FAU escorts were also weathered out of KYUSHU and hit the northern RYUKUS instead. CVE planes hit KIOIYA seaplane base (AMAMI) and NAKES (AMURI). 1 CVE VF and 1 T77 FAU were shot down, the latter pilot bailing out over TANIBABA, and the former awaiting rescue.

FAU 1 aircraft on the 16th probably sank 2 SD and damaged 4. 2 luggers were also sunk. FAW 18 shot down 2 Zeke east of CHIBU, and probably sank 1 SD, 1 trawler, and damaged 1 150-ft. sea truck. FAWs east of CHIBU left 1 ship dead in the water.

30 B-29s laid 319 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, FUKUSHI, SHIMOA and KARATSU.

COMGRDLT 160007 (pink) outlines plans for operation of TF 37 with TF 38.

CINCPOA ADV 160548 directs ComGen IO to occupy KURE SHIMA as soon as practicable.

CINCPOA ADV 160902 proposes to exchange CruDiv 6 for CruDiv 12.

CINCPAC ADV 161445 proposes to withdraw TG 32, 1 from OKINAWA not later than 1 July.

CINCPAC ADV 161451 requests 3 7th Flt Liberators be made available for weather reconnaissance.
TOP SECRET

17 June (Okian date)

The 22nd Marines from the 6th MarDiv relieved the 7th Marines in a pre-dawn passage of lines. At 0730 the 22nd attacked, pushed through OKINAWA and brought its left flank 200 yards south of the town. The right flank was held up by a Japanese point on the nose of a ridge NW of OKINAWA. The 1st MarDiv supported by artillery advanced its front SE and S of OKINAWA. The 1st MarDiv left flank was held up by heavy flanking fire from the escarpment. In the 96th InfDiv some 115 Japs were killed during the night 16-17 June attempting infiltration and in hand grenade duels. The division right flank advanced 100-200 yards SE OKINAWA. The 7th InfDiv mopped up concealed enemy positions on Hills 153 and 115. 300 civilians were persuaded to surrender by loud speakers mounted on tanks. Admiral Ota, Commander of the Naval Base Force on OKINAWA, committed suicide in his cave headquarters on OROKU PENINSULA.

Casualties as of 2400 16 June: Enemy KIA 30,459; WIA 1,070 Military, 642 Laborers. Own: KIA 35, WIA 210, MIA 3; total = 251.

T/SIGGS (DD 591) was hit by a torpedo off OKINAWA in air attacks on the evening of the 16th and sank about 3/4 hour later. Bombs straddled LINDENHOUT (T. O. 6) but caused no damage to the ship.

Minesweeping of NE half of area "Z" NE of MIYAKO has been completed, with negative results, and TG 32.1 has been ordered to complete sweeping the area.

On the 16th 81 B-24s attacked KURIUM warehouses and harbor installations, starting heavy explosions and fires and destroying or damaging many small boats. 18 B-24s were holed and 3 men were wounded by AA. 24 other B-24s bombed TAKO, destroying or damaging 12-14 warehouses, 3 B-32s bombed TAKO. TOKU with 30 tons from 19,000 feet. Photos on the 16th showed only 38 VF and 25 VS at PC-9001A (as compared to 61 VF and 26 VS on the 15th).

There were 4 early morning raids on the 16th at OKINAWA and 1 raid undetected in the evening. At 2045 the T/SIGGS (DD 591) was sunk by a torpedo from a low-flying plane, and probably hit by the plane itself. Incomplete reports list 118 survivors.

In the "SOCKET" Operation 84 aircraft of TG 32.1.3 were involved. Results were reported yesterday.

70 air support sorties on southern OKINAWA used 10 tons, 248 rockets and 30 Napalm bombs.

2 FAN 1 FBMs at SUSAKI on the southern coast of SHIKOKU destroyed or probably destroyed 5 SD (including 2 under construction), sunk 1 lugger, damaged 12 SD by strafing, completely burned a 3 acre shipyard, burned a 100 foot pier, and badly damaged a 120 foot 2-deck ferry boat which beached. 2 FAN 18 FBMs preparing to attack a large tanker type ship 5 miles E of GHOST POINT (E of CHIBU) were attacked by 12 aggressive Zekes and Oscars. 3 fighters were shot down and 5 badly damaged in a running fight to 120 miles off shore. There was no damage to the FBMs. A FBM scored 2 hits in a patrol craft south of HONSHU.

CINCPAC FO 160614 (pink) constitutes resume of plans for utilization of RAF units at OKINAWA.

COMINTCH & CNZ 161904; authorizes establishment in ServRon 10 of ServDiv 101 thru 104.

CINCPAC ADV 170715 (pint) disapproves Com3rdFt proposal for operating TF 57 with TF 38.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

17 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC 171109 (pink) announces that additional V1R 24018 will not be moved to the MARIANAS and that RAF units will be deployed at OKINAWA when Army Air Forces units move forward.

COMMGEN 171407 (pink) indicates that reconnaissance of KURE cannot be made until the island is secured about 1 July.

18 June (Guam date)

ComGen 10 in a dispatch dated 180935 stated, "Enemy resistance in OKINAWA broken today." The Japs are reported fleeing south and west on the southern tip of the island and are being brought under our artillery fire. During the day the 5th Marines (1st MarDiv), 8th Marines (2nd MarDiv), and 22nd Marines (6th MarDiv) broke through the Jap defense lines and by nightfall had pushed on to the MAKABE HAIKAI Highway. Elements of these regiments had reached the outskirts of MAKABE TOWN and MAKABE TOWN. The 96th InDiv advanced to southwest gaining 200-1000 yards, bringing portions of its front lines along the southwest edge of the escarpment from which the troops can overlook MAKABE and the ocean 3000 yards to the south. The 7th InDiv advanced 300-700 yards against heavy small arms and MG fire from hollowed out coral heads with enemy resistance centering around Hill 110, 1000 yards north MAKABE.

Casualties as of 2400 17 June: Enemy: KIA 81,901; WIA 1,096 military, 730 laborers. Own: KIA 47, WIA 354, MIA 10; total - 441.

On the 19th 7 squadrons of B-24s hit KIRUN, 3 squadrons of B-25s attack KITA railroad bridge, and 3 B-32s also attack bridges.

There were 3 small air raids at OKINAWA in the early morning on the 17th and 1 in the evening with no damage reported. The CVE strikes on the SHANTUNG PENINSULA continued as did TAF strikes on the northern RYUKUS. 2 TAF pilots were rescued off KIRUN beaches. South of ATAMI, on the northern coast of KYUSHU, 7 heavily camouflaged SB were sighted. 78 support sorties were flown using 49 tons, 469 rockets and 24 Napalm bombs.

FAW 1 planes laid 8 2000-lb. mines off SHANGHAI. A FFM of FAW 1 ditched off of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA and 3 officers and 3 men were rescued by another FAW. FAW 18 planes sank a 70 foot fishing boat and damaged 1 70-foot larger.

25 B-29s laid 250 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and KOREA HARBOR.

Strike photographs the night of 17/18th at OMAHA, HANAMATSU, YOKKAICHI and KAGOSHIMA showed many fires burning and pilots and crews reported extensive fires. 13 B-29s are missing, 1 of which was seen to explode over the target.

CINCPOA ADV 180144 (pink) requests explanation of proposal to delay occupation of KURE until 1 July.
TOP SECRET

19 June (Guam date)

The collapse of Jap defenses across the entire line was increasingly evident. On the right flank the 22nd Marines sopped up in the KUVANGA-KAGISHU area and protected the Army right flank. The 4th Marines pushed to the south against measurer resistance reaching the northern slopes of MABUNI-MURA. The 8th Marines plus one battalion from the 5th Marines by 1700 had reached the SE Coast 700 yards south of KO- MESU. The 96th Div advanced 500 yards bringing its lines just north of AYAWAGI. Its left flank was reported meeting stubborn resistance at the base of the escarpment, though one report states that our advance in this sector is impeded less by the character of enemy resistance than by the great number of Japs that are just in the way and have to be killed. The 7th InfDiv averaged 300 yards against stubborn resistance of small enemy groups in caves and other fortified positions. Numerous enemy are reported jumping off the cliffs along the SE shore.

Casualties as of 2400 18th: Enemy: KIA 83,492; WIA 61, 1547, 151; total = 519.

Only 1 small air raid took place at OKINAWA in the early morning of the 18th and it caused no damage. The TAP KYUSHU strike was again diverted to AMAMI because of weather. TU 32,1,3 continued the neutralization of the SAKISHIMA group. 71 sorties were flown in air support, using 42 tons, 756 rockets and 43 Napalm. On the night of the 18/19th our VP(N) shot down 3 Betty's. On the 19th the entire crew of a search plane down 82 miles 078 degrees from POINT BOLO was rescued.

FAW 18 planes on the 19th damaged 1 SD off SHIFUN NOBUK and shot down 1 Oscar. 2 crewmen were wounded. Off KOZA SHIMA 1 SU and 5 fishing boats were sunk. FAW 1 planes destroyed 1 and damaged 2 SD off SW KOREA, left 1 small stack-at AF in SUSHIMA STRAITS, and damaged 2 luggers north of SHANGHAI. A FW scored 2 hits on an unidentified ship near 0 SHIMA.

Photos taken on the 18th covering 25% of the area attacked showed .57 w/nd, or 16% of the YOKKAI area destroyed or damaged from the incendiary raid on the early morning of the 18th. Several fires were still burning on the waterfront. 7 numbered targets show damage, including 2 oil refineries. YOKKAI is the site of the second largest naval fuel depot in the Empire.

On the night of 19/20th 439 effective B-29s attacked SHIZOKA, SATO and TOYOHASHI around midnight.

COMSERNV 131,524 (pink) estimates cargo to be handled through destinations in POA during August from ETO and MTO.

COMSRDFLT 140,903 (pink) outlines estimated destroyer requirements for TF 38.

CTF 31 180555 (pink) recommends ships for TF 32 for cover and support during JUNEAU Operation.

CINCFF 180636 (pink) estimates sortie date from MANUS as 6 July.

COMMARILS 181326 estimates that 1 CVG in full operating status can be accommodated at RCI.


COMSRDFLT 190115 estimates that TG 38.4 will arrive ENIWETOK about 1 August.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

19 June (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAO ADV 190834 (pink) releases the 2nd MarDiv, less the 3rd Marines, from Area Reserve for ICEBERG.

COMGEN TEN 190936 (pink) estimates 200 enemy troops on KUNI and expresses intention of landing on 25 June.

MACARTHUR 191213 (pink) concurs in exchange of CruDiv 12 and 6 subsequent to 7 July.

CINCPAO ADV 191335 (pink) requests recommendations for the modification of the category of defense for HAWAII.

CINCPAC ADV 191737 (pink) proposes to CINCPAC that CINCPAC assume responsibility for bulk petroleum supply of all forces and activities at CINCPAC.

CINCPAC 200213 assigns General Stillwell to command the Tenth Army.

CINCPAC 200349 (pink) requests concurrence in designation of ComGenPOA as agency responsible for mounting all Army Ground and Air Units from ICA for CINCPAC.

20 June (Guam date)

The Japs on OKINAWA are now confined to three pockets on the southern end of the island. Elements of the 6th MarDiv drove to the south on the Army right flank reaching the coast and SE slopes of MABUNI MURA, confining the Japs in a pocket on ARA-SAKI about 1000 yards square. Masses of civilians are coming to our lines to surrender and some Jap soldiers are reported coming in with these civilians. The 1st MarDiv continues to attack HILL 81 against heavy enemy fire and other elements of the regiment are working through and mopping up MIKAE where 170 Japs were killed during the day. The 96th InfDiv is meeting heavy resistance just north of ARAGACHI and along its left flank from ARAGACHI to MADERANA. The 77th InfDiv made 1000-1/400 yards to the south and southwest. The advance was impeded by heavy fire from HILL 82, 400 yards NE UDA. Mopping up on this hill is now in progress. The division left flank made 300-500 yards capturing a hill (Hill 89) 200 yards south of MABUNI.

Casualties as of 2400 19 June: Enemy: KIA 87, 342 POWs 1,503 military, 1,069 laborers. Own: KIA 6,740, WIA 29,592, WIA 250; total = 86,588.

CALVIN VICTORY (XAK) was torpedoed early on the morning of the 1st 300 miles west of EMINENTOK. SENYMON (ARL 9) sighted a torpedo at 0633K at 12-70N, 156-22W while enroute SAIPAN to PEALI.

During the night of 18/19th DUNLAF (DD 354) on anti-shipping patrol off CHICHI JIMA destroyed 2 small craft each reportedly of 30 tons, and 1 small 100 ton ANNE of CHICHI. Prisoners were taken who stated that the mission of these vessels was to evacuate non-combatants to the homeland from CHICHI JIMA with as much gasoline as possible.

TU 321,3 used 24 tons and 811 rockets to hit the SAKISHIMA JIMA on the 18th. 2 small boats were sunk and 9 were damaged. 1 CVE pilot ditched and was rescued. The TAP hit ANAKI again after finding KUSHI closed in. There were 35 support sorties, using 10 tons, 250 rockets, and 2) Napalm. The shore based ADOC (Air Defense Control Center) was placed in operation on TF SHIMA at 1800.

- Continued -

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TOP SECRET

20 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

FAW 1 planes on the 20th in NISHI SUIDO sank 1 SC, 1 SD, and 1 coastal passenger steamer, and off the YAMOTZE RIVER damaged an 800 ton coastal AK. South of MAICHOW WAM 1 PT was sunk. 1 Tojo was probably destroyed and 1 damaged. FAW 18 planes off HAMAMATSU shot down 1 Zeke and damaged 2 others. All FAW 18 planes at IWO were ordered escorted to TINIAN on the evening of the 20th because of the impending typhoon.

CINCPOA PEARL 200205 (pink) outlines current petroleum supply and tanker situation to ComServRon 10.

CINCPOA ADV 200228 recommends to Cominch against adoption of changes in current petroleum supply functions and suggests augmentation of area petroleum offices instead.

COMNAVU 14th AF 200235 requests information of damaged ships and tankers in.YELLOW SEA for attack by 14th AF aircraft staging through North CHINA fields.

Dep't 200hAF 200443 (pink) requests concurrence in movement of 509th Fighter Group from OAHU to IWO JIMA.

COMGRDLTF 200819 (pink) requests that decision be deferred on ComServRon 10 170217 until arrival of Capt. Cross with study of July requirements for fleet oilers.

CTF 31 201340 (pink) constitutes Com5thWibFor OpOrd A-207-45 for seizure and occupation of KUMI SHIMA.

21 June (Guam date)

Lt. Gen. Geiger has announced that organized resistance on KEINAJA ceased on 21 June (1 plus 81) and that mopping up is continuing to eliminate two remaining pockets. During the day the 6th WarDiv announced that organized resistance in its zone ceased at 1027(I). The 1st WarPlt repulsed a Banzai charge by an estimated 250 Japs during the night 21-22 June. In fighting today, the 5th Marines secured Hill 81. The XXIV Corps has been impeded in its attack by large numbers of civilians, plus military personnel, who are coming through to our lines. In the 96th InfDiv zone, resistance centers around HAJRIGA and Hills 82, 79, 600 and 700 yards S of HAJRIGA respectively. These positions are now under attack by the division. Along the southern coast many Japs are walking into the water and drowning themselves. A large cave, believed to be the headquarters of Lt. Geiger. Ushijima, is under attack by elements of the 7th InfDiv. Many Japs are coming out of the many exits to the cave and surrendering. More than 1700 military prisoners were taken during the day, 754 of these by the 7th Div. 3 Majors, 2 Captains, and 5 Lts. plus other officers not yet identified were made prisoners. In several cases Jap officers led their men into our lines to surrender.

Casualties as of 2400 20 June: Enemy KIA 99, WIA (estimated); 1200 military, 1,273 laborers. Own: KIA 99, WIA 468, MIA 4; total - 471.

A raid occurred during the evening attack of the 20th at KEINAJA in which a single Betty made an unsuccessful torpedo attack.

TU 321.3 continued coverage of SAKASHIMA GUNTO. Z1 minesweeping operation will be resumed on the 23rd, and expected completed 24th. Only 2 M12 sweepers 13-19th have bothered this operation so far. Due to high wind and swell all LSTs at HAGUSHI beaches were withdrawn. All cargo discharge to I5 SHIMA suspended for the same reason.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

21 June (Guan date) (Cont'd)

CommarGils and AtCom ENIWETOK hunter-killer group formed. ACA 193 dispatched to ENSKIN. Shipping departing ENIWETOK hold up. Sinking enroute to southwest of ENIWETOK diverted south. Exact number of torpedos still undetermined, but another ship, SS PORT WASHINGTON (US tanker), also reported a torpedo strike, 3 miles from ENSKIN's position, but it may be that it was a relay of ENIWETOK report.

34 OKINAWA P-47s hit the CHIRRA aircraft plant with undetermined results. 195 enemy aircraft were photographed on the airfield. Other F4U-7s and F6F-5s hit ATUC and NAKIZUMA, firing 4 small ships. 29 F4Us hit CHIRRA drone, with results unreported. 1 TAF pilot is missing.

TU 32,4,2 covered the SAKISHIMA GUNTO again. A CVE VF pilot ditched and the ASP seaplane which landed to rescue him could not take off. A Dumbo landed and picked up all 15 safely. 1 TAF pilot who bailed out was picked up by a DE, severely injured.

All P3V L8 empire searches on the 21st were weathered out. PATL planes off the YAMATO sank 1 800-ton PT and severely damaged 1 200-ton tug. Off KURE 1 small PT and 1 large coastal AK were damaged. In NISHI SUNDO 3 of 7 SD were damaged.

Photographs of the 17th and 19th show the following damage to recent B-29 industrial targets in percent of built-up area destroyed. OKLA 36%, YAMAMOTO 40%, YOKKAICHU 59%, FUKUOKA 66%.

CINCPAC ADV 210312 approves British carrier replacement pool at MITYANLU.

CICNJPAC ADV 210342 expresses reference TOC in SoPac to be continued until roll-up completed.

CTF 99 210405 announces termination of organized resistance on OKINAWA.

COM MARIANAS 210451 indicates development for 4th Fighter Group at IN under way and accommodations for 5th Fighter Group under construction.

CCUSFCT 210645 (pink) summarizes to JCS possibilities of capitalizing on Japanese withdrawals in CHINA.

CINCPAC ADV 210903 (pink) outlines schedule of withdrawal of elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing from SWPA.

COMGEN TEN 211116 (pink) constitutes 10th Army OpOrd 16-45 for seizure and occupation of KURE SHIMA.

MACARTHUR 211237 (pink) requests 3 CVEs for CBOE TWO Operation.

COMGEN TEN 211405 (pink) announces that Air Defense Command is ready to assume full responsibility for air defense on 1 July.

CTF 38 211415 (pink) summarizes intentions for carrier operations during July.
22 June (Guam date)

U.S. forces were formally raised on the island of JAPA at 1000(1) June. On the SW tip of the island the 29th Marines have surrounded an unstated number of Japs. About 160 of these were observed committing suicide with grenades during the day. A small sector is held by Japs in the vicinity of AUSA-a-AUSA. In the town of MADEIRA a group of enemy officers and NCOs resisting to the end and 3 00s are reported as operative. Gen. Ushijima is believed to have been killed in his headquarters on 21 June by our artillery or mortar fire. A considerable number of Japs are believed to be hiding out in the bush in the rugged terrain of the extreme north of the island.

Casualties as of 2100 21 June: Enemy: KIA 94, 719; IIA 3, 576 military, 1, 770 laborers. Own: KIA 66, MIA 382, MIA 2; total - 450.

Three hunter-killer groups are now operating between JAPA and MADEIRA, and it appears that there may be two submarines, one in the general vicinity of 12-40N 156-00E, and the other at 10-30N 146E. ASI planes have had recurring and disappearing radar contacts and have conducted holding down operations for the last 36 hours.

During a red alert before dawn on the 22nd at 0500 single plane bogeys were detected approaching from the north. 3 F-61s were scrambled. None of the 3 approaching planes got closer than 18 miles.

Heavy strikes against FORMOSA were weathered out, and only 13 1-51s attacked island communications, damaging a railroad tunnel, locomotives and railroad cars, a roundhouse, and an electric plant. On the 23rd 18 B-24s attack the KCHI butanol plant.

For the first time in 10 days a sizeable group of enemy aircraft raided the OKINAWA area on the 21st and 22nd. Raids began at dusk on the 21st, when a small group of enemy aircraft showing IFF code 6 attacked the KORAMA TPTK, with suicides hitting the CURTIS and LSM 213, sinking the ex-BAT and LSM 59, near-missing the KENNETH WHITING. A strafing did some damage to a DE which splashed the enemy plane 76 feet away, PC 469 splashed 2 with no damage to herself. From 0000-1130 there were 30 raids, the heaviest being 0800 and 0900. Good work by the GAP and south pickets prevented all but a few stragglers from getting through, and these were knocked down by AA with only insignificant damage reported to 1 IJN and 1 DE in the east anchorage. During this period 1 P-47, 2 TBM and 2 FM were lost with the crews of the last 3 planes rescued.

TU 3211 flew 200 sorties using 48 tons and 1052 rockets in neutralizing the SAKISHIMA GUNTO. 3 planes and 1 pilot were operational losses.

Off west KOREA FAN 1 planes sank 1 very large sailing vessel. In S1W SUIC Privet attack damaged 3 SD, and in HAGASHI SUIC heeled 2 DEs. No other picket boats were seen.

27 B-29s laid 176 mines in N HONSHU harbors. 403 B-29s are reported bombing Empire targets on the 22nd.

CINCBBF 210654 (pink) requests permission to dock KING HOLEY for a few days at MANUS.

CINCENROA 220342 (pink) recommends that 1 full strength fighter group be retained in the Hawaiian Area for air defense.

CINCZAC ADV 220630 outlines to Cominch proposed organization of Trench Companies as a task force commander afloat.

- Continued -
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22 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CCF 38 220832 requests with Com3rdFlt concurrence that the complement of all CVLs be changed to include only fighters in time for the next operation.

CINCPAC ADV 220955 (plink) directs the formation of a task group consisting of 3 CVEs and 5 DBs to report to Com7thFlt for OBE-2.

CINCPAC ADV 230106 (plink) concurs with CINCAP AC with limitations in proposal that ComCemPOA be responsible for mounting all Army air and ground units in the CPOA for OLYMPIC.

23 June (Guam date)

Systematic mopping up is now being conducted in each Corpo zone of action. Small enemy groups are being killed or captured. Japanese soldiers remaining appear non-aggressive but are trying to escape through our lines to the north. The town of KOBUSA has been cleared out, but many Japs are reported to be holed up in caves along the coast south of YAMAM.

Casualties as of 2400 22 June: Enemy: KIA 95, 569; WIA's 4, 493; military 37, 663. Laborers, Own: KIA 7, 283; WIA 32, 916; MIA 233. Total - 10, 477.

"2" Sweep concluded. Enrado area now considered safe to a maximum depth of 90 feet. During the day's operation 23 mines were swept. Total for entire operation 101 since sweeping begun. Covering force of TU S-1-1 will retire to KIN.

34 B-24s attacking TOCHIEN fuel storage on ADACRO bombed an oil refinery, AA positions, silenced 3 of the latter and scored direct hits on oil tanks and a cracking plant. A tremendous explosion in the oil installations sent a sheet of flame to 2000 feet, with black smoke billowing to 10,000. 9 B-24s were holed by AA.

During the evening of the 22nd a few small enemy raids continued at OKINAWA. 1 torpedo attack on screening vessels was ineffective. During the 23 hours prior to midnight on the 22nd our forces destroyed 57 enemy planes over OKINAWA (including 4 over AWATU), with 2 more shot down over KYUSHU. Of this total (59) ships, 39 AAF and 21 were fighters (including 4 over AWATU), and 32 FMs over KYUSHU got 2. We lost 5 planes, with 4 pilots missing. Enemy pilots were reported as aggressive and skillful, using coordinated air combat tactics seen only infrequently in recent months. One TAF pilot after expending all his ammunition shooting down a Betty is reported to have rammed a Jap near a picket ship and then bailed out. 2 Bettys were sighted carrying Bakas, and 1 or 2 Bakas were seen in free flight. During the heaviest raids between OKIN and NAF on the 22nd, the TAF CAP numbered 121 fighters.

CVE planes on the 22nd continued attacking the OKINAWA TYPE. TAF P-47s found OMAHA closed at 0800 so attacked ITAWA Airfield near RERIWA, with results unobserved. Intense AA from the harbor prevented strafing the airfield. Since 7 April TAF planes have now destroyed 5969 enemy aircraft. In TAIWANA TYPE. Privates blew the stern off a 2-masted sailing vessel and damaged 2 DDs.

90 P-51s on the 23rd attacked airfields in the TOKU Area. They shot down 19, probably destroyed 2 airborne and damaged 13 airborne enemy aircraft. In the ground they destroyed 13, probably destroyed 12 and damaged 10. We lost 3 P-51s, but 2 pilots were picked up by a sub.

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TOP SECRET

23 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Photos show total damage of 2,04 sq. mi. to KAWASHIMA - 43% of the built-up portion of the city. Strike Photos show that a majority of the naval arsenal buildings got 1 or more direct hits, causing structural damage. The ASAO (KORI Class) had 2 near misses and 1 probable direct hit on the stern, with some damage to the stern reported.


CINCPAC ADV 230546 emphasizes critical unloading situation at FIJI A and requests CINCPAC to review all shipping requirements and reduce them to absolute minimum.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz departed GUAM by air for conference with Continental West Coast.

24 June (Guam date)

Mopping up continues on OKINAWA and the screen of troops across the island from NAHA to YONABARU has been placed in position to catch Japs attempting infiltration to the north. Recent contacts with Japs have been limited to small groups of 2 to 10 men.

Casualties as of 2400 on the 23rd: Enemy: KIA 101, WIA 362; TOS 5,212 military, 2,689 laborers. Own: KIA 24, WIA 138, MIA 2; total 214.

Four submarine contacts are reported as of the 24th: One east of J IJ 1000 by a transport plane, a second west of the MARU IS 1000 attacked unsuccessfully by surface craft, a third 300 miles NW of ULITHI attacked for 3 hours with 1 hydroplane hit claimed and a fourth in the same general area as the 3rd attacked unsuccessfully with search continuing.

Landing on KURE SHIMA has been postponed until tomorrow.

15 B-24s bombed the KORI alcohol refinery on FUTABA on the 23rd scoring direct hits.

On the 23rd there were 2 single-engine enemy raids at OKINAWA about 2100 but no attacks were made. At 0340 on the 24th 4-6 Jap bombs holed the southern end of IS SHIMA E runway and scored a direct hit on a 90mm gun position, killing 15 and wounding 13.

17 TBMs and 36 FWs in 1 raid and 32 P-47s in another attacked the KAWASHIMA GUNITO on the 23rd. On the 24th MIRARA FIELD on IYAKO was bombed and rocketed by 37 FWs and 18 TBMs with the airfield, dispersal areas and AA positions as targets. A 100-foot AK was damaged.

1 SD was exploded off the SW tip of KOREA on the night of the 23/24th by PAN 1 aircraft. 2 DBs scored rocket hits on 2 small AKs, 1 of CHIN and 1 of RURU AKSUDO. In TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 24th 2 3D and 1 medium PT were set afire, and 6 3D and 2 tugs were left smoking.

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24 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH & CNO 171550 requests information on ship repairs undertaken in the forward area by reason of anticipated delays in west coast shipyards.

CINCPOA 212003 outlines proposed relationship of Commander 12 W.T.N., at ENTRUPOK with ComMarGils and NOB ENTRUPOK and their respective responsibilities for fleet support.

COMINCH 232046 requests early estimates of 1946 requirements for all types of shipborne landing craft.

COMAIRPAC 252208 recommends strongly against approval of CTF 38 2120832 proposal to install all VP CVs on CVs.

COMWESSEXFORPN 232220 outlines program of return of AIA's and AIA's to main land for troop and cargo lift.

CNO HANUS 201016 (pink) indicates KING GEORGE V can be docked early in August in reply to CINCPOA 230555.

COMGENEF PROCN 240299 (pink) recommends strongly against proposed movement of headquarters 5th Mar Corps from NAUI to SAIPEAN.

CINCAPAC 240849 (pink) requests early availability of maps of KYUSHU indicating area and acreage required for naval shore establishment.

CINCPOA ADV 240913 (pink) directs transfer of 8th Regt. to 2nd Mar Div at SAIPEAN as soon as no longer required for KURE operation.

CONSESTCRON 10 241051 outlines plans for establishment of Service Div 111 through 105.

MACARTHUR 241305 (pink) requests clarification of APAC responsibility for 20th AF units and assignment of fighter groups to 20th Air Force.

25 June (Guam date)

No damage to ships at OKINAWA in air raids of the 24th. Landing on KURE SHIMA is scheduled for tomorrow. Task Group 31.25 consists of a DD, landing craft and miscellaneous small craft.

SPADEFISH (SS 411), the first submarine to report after exit from the JAPAN SEA, gives her patrol results as 1 large freighter, 5 medium freighters sunk by torpedoes and 3 trawlers and 1 sampan sunk by gunfire.

There were no strikes on FORMOSA on the 24th.

Night fighters at OKINAWA shot down 2 twin-engine bombers on the 24th. TAF P-47s and P-47s attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO, concentrating on IJNOHARI, on the 24th and again on the 25th, with a total of about 150 planes. There was no airborne opposition, although 12-15 apparently operational planes were on the airfields. 1 150-ft. AK was damaged by strafing. 1 P-47 ditched, with the pilot rescued. IJNOHARI and MIYAMA fields were believed inoperational after the attack on the 25th.

The crew of a downed PBM was rescued on the 24th by the ILA HILTON (PC 30).

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25 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

FAW 1 planes on the 25th sank 1 merchant vessel S of FUKAS (25 KOREA), and destroyed 1 PT off SW KOREA. FBMIs shot down 1 Oscar and damaged a 2nd. FAW 1 planes at HACHINO SHIMA destroyed 1 SD and 1 SC. FAW 1 planes from 18 to 26 June, inclusive, sank 4,070 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 12,400 tons. They shot down 1 enemy aircraft and planted 58 2000-lb. mines. Cumulative totals since arrival in the area are 122,645 tons of shipping destroyed, and 128,890 tons damaged, with 36 enemy aircraft destroyed and 24 damaged.

511 B-29s will be over the Empire tomorrow for bombing attacks on 9 targets, principally the NAGoya Area, plus a mining mission. 148 B-51s are scheduled to escort.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in POA since 18 March: 18 March - 40 April (Incl.) 3,227. 1 May to date: TF 38 401, TF 31 409, TF 37 31, TF 93 130, TG 240.9 22, CORDIAF 229, TF 94 12, TG 99 2 456; total 1,691.

COMGEN TEN 240230 (pink) announces that he will be prepared to assume responsibility for air defense in the RTKUKUS on 1 July.

CTF 99 240646 (pink) recommends deferring all but construction troops, air units and cargo handling troops until current critical unloading situation is alleviated.

COM XARRANAS 250623 (pink) reports that without unacceptable reduction in dispersal, 5 fighter groups cannot be accommodated on 10 JUHA.

CINCPOAC ADV 250645 approves tentative plans for docking FMs 63 2107 at UUMA.

COMINCH & CHIO 251316 approves in general Marine and Navy aspects of RTKUKUS serial 006068 concerning complements and organization of Air Support Control Units, PhibsPac.

26 June (Guam date)

Landing on HIRE SHIMA, approximately 52 miles west of OKINAWA, was unopposed. All waves were ashore by 0700 with the initial beachhead secured by 0915. Unloading of supplies and the Garrison Force had commenced and was proceeding satisfactorily. Hopping up and interception of Japs attempting to infiltrate to the north continues on OKINAWA.

Casualties as of 2400 25 June: Enemy: KIA 105, 225; POWs 6,477 military, 3,019 laborers. Own: KIA 6,313; WIA 29,467; MIA 105; total 34,385.

Submarine contacted between ULITHI and OKINAWA on the 23rd was believed sunk by CHAMPION (AM 314) and FIIIUCAN (DE 508).

Eight of the nine submarines operating in the JAPAN SEA have now successfully retired through LA PEROUSE STRAITS. The ninth, BONFISH, has not been heard from since the 18th when she requested permission to enter TOKAMA BAY. Five boats report sinking 26 vessels consisting of 1 large AO, 1 large AK, 14 medium AK, 4 small AK and 6 miscellaneous craft.

516 B-29s and 111 P-51s attacked Central HONSHU on the 27th. 2 B-29s were lost and 2 others at last report were unreported from since take off. The P-51s sighted 48 enemy aircraft at NAGOYA and 4 at OSAKA. They claim 2 destroyed and 6 damaged. 1 P-51 was lost but the pilot was rescued by a lifeguard sub.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

26 June (Guan date) (Cont'd)

26 B-29s laid 153 mines on the 25th in YONOSHO STRAITS, NORTHEAST CHINA.

2 PBY-5s were missing from an anti-shipping sweep between SHUAI AL and
25-00 north. South of KOREA 1 TC and 1 FTC were left burning. PBY-5s planes will
intensify their shipping attacks along the southern KOREAN coast and will extend
their search along the eastern KOREAN coast to 300 miles.

Between 2230/25th and 0210/26th there were 16 enemy raids at SHUAI AL, prin-
cipally by float planes. There was no damage to shipping, although one of the
AUBURN (AGC-10) were wounded by fragments from a near suicide miss. 15 enemy
aircraft were destroyed.

41 TBMs and FWJs attacked MIYAKO at 1710 with bombs, rockets and strafing.
2 planes were slightly damaged.

COMNAVYFO ADMN 250227 recommends reconsideration of CINCPAC serial 0-5579
of 14 August 1944 concerning storage of toxic gas in the forward area.

CINCPAC ADV 251516 outlines influence of heavy work loads on continental
shipyards in performance of repairs in the forward areas.

COMINCH & CIO 251520 approves continuance of six existing Marine Ambitious
Truck Companies and authorizes activation of two battalions.

CINCPAC PEARL 260327 requests ConMaries to initiate base development at
TINIAN for handling 150 single-engine Army aircraft per month.

CINCPAC PEARL 260351 (pink) disapproves movement of 506th Fighter Group from
CAHU to TNO.

CINCPAC ADV 260352 denies CTF 58's request for all VP complements in CINCPAC.
CINCPAC ADV 260435 (pink) approves retention of 9th Hibberson Headquarters
at NAUI.

COMINCRF 261245 (pink) constitutes proposed interdictive plan for operations
early in July.

27 June (Guan date)

On NUKI our forces continue to sweep across the island against no opposition.
30 civilians have been taken into custody. They report that most of the civilians
fled to the hills at our landing and that approximately 40 Jap sailors are on the
island.

On OKINAWA the bodies of Gen. Ushijima and Gen. Cho, who had committed hari-
Kari, have been found.

Casualties as of 2400 26 June: Enemy: Carried. Own: KIA 17, WIA 62, MIA 1;
total = 80.

The submarine sighted and attacked on the 26th was again picked up by a plane
from the MARIANAS. The sub was attacked as it submerged. Photographs show a slick

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TOP SECRET
27 June (Omnulaire) (Cont'd)

with 2 torpedoes or midget submarines. A few pieces of splintered wood were seen in the slick and the torpedoes or midgets sank. This submarine was believed to be damaged. Another contact was reported by a DE, but contact was lost to the AE at 1340 17/6. Extensive anti-submarine operations are continuing. A CTI and 11 AK's Group is in the vicinity. Other DEs are patrolling. Barrier search continues, and other planes are covering the shipping lanes.

On the night of 25/26th 2 CCL and 4 DD of TF 92 on sweep inside the HUNG SHAH encountered an enemy convoy southeast of HAIHU. 1 AV and sunk 1 AK (2000-ton), 1 SC and 1 large tug. One smaller vessel was probably sunk and another small vessel damaged.

FAT 1 planes, off western KYUSHU, probably sank 1 SC, and damaged 2 smaller ships on the 26th; on the 27th 1 2300-ton AK was probably sunk off W. KOREA, and 1 SC was sunk. 1 Privateer was shot down by AA from a DD off S. KOREA. This is the 3rd Privateer lost in 2 days. Search for the other 2 N of SHANGHAI found some debris but no positive information about the missing planes. A SHU in SHANGHAI on the 27th scored 2 rocket hits on a 350 foot ship, with damage undetermined. FAT 18 planes E of CHIUSA sank 1 200-ton trawler and damaged 1 SC. Since 23 April, when CTF 92 took control of HARIANAS, based search planes, they have destroyed about 36,000 tons of enemy shipping and 17 enemy aircraft.

TAP P-4U 2s, TBM 4s and 7s continued attacking MIYAKO and HOKKAIDO. CAF was flown all day over OKINAWA and over KURE. 1 pilot bailed out and was rescued. On ISHIKARI the 27th 1 operational Betty was destroyed in a revetment, and 5 boats were exploded. At KASHIRO 31 VFP burned 1 SB, fired 1 SE, damaged 2 SC and damaged 1 barge.

CONFIDENTIAL 261225 (pink) constitutes OpPlan 9-45 for attack on Japanese forces in the Empire.

CINCPAC ADV 262310 (pink) outlines troop requirements for JAPANESE units, including redeployed units which have been accepted for these bases.

CONFEN TGN 270428 recommends reduction of ammunition storage at JERA A to 20-day level.

CINCPAC ADV 270436 in reply to CONFEN TGN 250227 reaffirms existing policy on storage of chemical ordnance.

CONFIDENTIAL 270751 (pink) recommends withdrawal of CTF 91 from JERA and assumption of full responsibility for defense by CTF 10 on 1 July.
28 June (Guam Date)

On the 28th, ANTARES (AKS 3) was attacked by possibly two submarines. SPROSTON (DD 577) proceeded to the scene and made several attacks on sonar and sight contacts. 2 periscopes were seen, 1 of a fleet sub, the other of a midget. Midget sub was attacked by gunfire and disapeared. Several large oil slicks were seen, but again no debris. Night of the 28th, shortly before midnight, a merchant vessel reported seeing a submarine, 5 hours later another merchant ship reported a submarine but gives no details. These contacts considered insufficient to justify starting ASW operations. Another contact was made 300 miles east of LADY B.

SKATE (SS 305) reports seeing 2 ships early on the 13th in the LAKE HUBBLE STRAITS. One was approached within 1100 yards; no lights were seen, and she was torpoded and sunk. The other, seen shortly thereafter on a southwesterly course was recognized from 8,000 yards as a Soviet vessel. One of these may have been the Soviet ship TRANSBAITL which was sunk on the 13th near the position of these sightings.

TUNHEX (SS 282) reports that the LODSTON (SS 223) when last contacted on 18 June, had sunk to that date 1 large transport and 1 medium AK. She was then given permission to enter TOYAMA BAY, and has not since been heard from.

SKATE (SS 305) reports her results for the patrol as 1 Y-Class submarine sunk, 1 medium and 3 small ships sunk, and 1 medium ship damaged.

494 B-29s made incendiary attacks on the 28/29th against SHIZUOKA, AKITA, TOYAMA, and NOBEOKA.

1 Pete was shot down by night CAP at OKINAWA in the only action reported on the 27/28th. MIYAKO intruders hit the KITARA area and started one large fire in the revetment area. ISHIKARI airfield was hit by Avengers and Corsairs. Han airfield, KIKAI, was hit by fighter bombers leaving several fires.

In attacks against enemy shipping, Thunderbolts from CHICHIBU sank 2 luggers off ISHIKARI and hit other small ships around AKITA, destroying 1 SC. Attacks were made against 10 ships on the NE shore of OCEANIA, and 1 SD was reported as exploding. 2 other SD were damaged.

FAN1 planes sank 1 SD, 1 stack-fleet and 2 small tankers, and disabled 4 other small ships. FAN1 planes also laid several mines off SH tip of KOREA. On the 28th FAN1 planes bombed and strafed 1 SD which had been beached on the west coast of KOREA. 1 plane sank 2 luggers, 1 unidentified ship, 1 small fishing vessel 15' of KYUSHU. 3 hits exploded a 4-masted schooner off the W coast of KOREA.

CINCPAC ADV 281347 (pink) requests Con3rdFlt to designate a commander to exercise control of TF 32, TF 39, TG 30.5 and TG 30.9.5 during periods when Con3rdFlt is in radio silence.

CINCPAC ADV 281348 (pink) directs ConGen 10 to assume full responsibility for defense of OKINAWA on 1 July.

CINCPAC 281355 (pink) outlines War Department proposal to load 3 Liberty ships for delivery at FORT BATARD about 15 August, and 2 additional ships 30 days later and further requests comment on possibility of providing US cover presumably by CVE.
TOP SECRET

29 June (Guam date)

Submarine contact between Guam and SHIMA was confirmed by plane observers of an oil slick which appeared to be moving slowly. AAF unit is still on the scene. Last night about midnight, the same merchant ship that had reported sighting a submarine 250 miles west, reported a torpedo wake passing her at 1230 P.M. A SB reported a sound contact 50 miles N of ULINAI, and ASL operations were instituted here. North of OKINAWA a submarine was sighted on the surface by a DD. The sub submerged and subsequent searches were negative.

Much small activity is reported north of OKINAWA. Sub also sighted. Marine Air Warning outpost illuminated 3 objects on surface closing point, which disappeared when taken under fire. Investigation of this activity continues.

Two more submarines from the JAPAN SEA Group have reported. Total score to date: 30 ships and 16 miscellaneous craft sunk.

25 B-29s in three groups laid mines in west SHIMA, ULINAI, and SAKATA on the 27th. 34 B-29s struck an oil refinery at KURUMA, reporting fair to excellent results.

On the 29th the tactical air force carried out raids on KUKI, TAHARI, and other islands in the KURIYUKI Chain. Six Corsairs were lost during the day. 1 pilot was recovered. In a raid against NOBURA airfield on 29th 10 Corsairs were armed with VT fused bombs. Three planes were lost due to the explosion of their own bombs and a fourth was lost from the explosion of his weapon's bombs.

FAT 18 sank 1 SD along the coast of JAPAN, and had 1 plane shot down in KATJURA HARBOR. No survivors were observed. FAT 1 sank 1 fishing boat. 1 Aircraft was reported overdue from daily searches.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290138 directs that CTF 94 assume responsibility for escort of all shipping between the MARIANAS and the KURIYUKI beginning 1 July.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290242 recommends that facilities for 1 replacement CTF be established at ROK.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290331 grants ComSoPac authority to discontinue all air, sea and ground defense missions.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290505 requests statement from CONAIRPAC concerning feasibility of moving ATC from Naha to Yonebaru.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290725 (pink) recommends early conference concerning ammunition and bomb supply storage on OKINAWA.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290754 (pink) comments on feasibility of convoying ships to BAYARD.

CONAIRPAC ADV 290836 (pink) outlines to CominCh proposal for CTF services for OLYMPIC.
TOP SECRET

20 June ( Guam date) 

This morning a plane on an anti-shipping sweep on the CHINA Coast reported 1 CA, 1 DD and 5 merchantmen anchored in HANCHOW. At noon, another plane reported 1 DD, 2 smaller escorts and 6 merchantmen including 3 tankers. Attacks were launched from OGINAYA.

CHINA reports a large concentration of junks at TAOY in connection with the Jap Army evacuation.

3 merchantmen report sighting submarines or periscopes - 1 west of OGINAYA, 1 between MANUS and OLUUTH, and 1 SE of the MARIANAS. An AE reports a possible periscope E of ENSETOK. A transport pilot made a doubtful sighting of a submarine between OKUS and ENSETOK. 1 of TG 96.9 also reported a contact at 12-30 E 157-55 S, but this was lost. TG is now sweeping back and forth along the shipping lanes. At 0600 the morning of the 1st a barrier patrol plane reported a periscope at 15 S 110 E.

3 small enemy air raids on OGINAYA were reported between 0600 and 0900. No damage was inflicted, and 1 F6F was splashed by night VP. The Tactical Air Force struck AYUTI and SAKISHIMA. TAF splashed 1 Jake on the 20th for its 600th kill, the group of Thunderbolts strafed, bombed and rocketed NUKUTA and KODYA in south KYUSHU.

5 small surface ships were sunk by F6F planes in the YOKOHAMA and 1 on the 30th by TAF off the west coast of KYUSHU. 6 other small vessels were damaged by F6F.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in IJA since 14 March - 18 March to 30 April - 126. 1 May to date: TF 38 410, TF 31 419, TF 27 31, TF 93 190, TF 30 5 23, 11th AAF 80, TF 94 12, TG 99 2 468; Total = 1,714.

COMINCH 29211G outlines procedure for establishing monthly priority list for personnel movement to the Pacific Theater.

CINCPAC ADV 300304 proposes to CINCPAC to assign all air sea rescue services in the KYUSHU to a single agency under Fleet Air Wing 04.

CINCPAC ADV 300513 (pink) designates Control of the single agency responsible for coordination of ammunition supply for all forces in the RTF Area.

CINCPAC ADV 300601 (pink) constitutes Warning Order for Operation CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 300608 informs CINCPAC of submersion of all naval aviation requirements at Yonabaru preclude ATC operations there.

CINCPAC ADV 300617 (pink) directs that HQtrs 5th Air Force remain at KUR.

CINCPAC ADV 300618 outlines proposed procedure for visit of important civilians.

CINCPAC ADV 300732 informs CINCBF that only limited air stores can be made available to meet BPF requirements.

CINCBP 300735 (pink) proposes possible missions for British Force of 1 CV, 3 CV's and appropriate escorting units.

CINCPAC ADV 300817 (pink) summarizes CINCPAC Orders 3-45, 6-45 and 9-45 for CINCPAC.
Early this afternoon, front lines of the 4th Marines were advancing and the W&N BN following mopping up rear areas. 29th Marines are attacking NW to seize the high ground and prevent enemy further withdrawal in that direction. Para. Little enemy activity reported. 16 Japs killed this morning on MOTURI. llth BN, 26th Corps: Progress of attack by Corps reported as satisfactory. Enemy artillery classified as moderate. Lines pinned down at points along the front by 50mm and mortar fire from well concealed, covered strong points. Para. Enemy fired 6 and 41st mortar rounds in 36th Inf area. Vicious closed in fighting reported in 18th Inf area. Para. Japs delivered counterattack against area 36th Inf area, undetermined size. Para. Shortly after noon 27th Inf supported by tanks were in the village of KARAK. Para. Large fires in YAMA BARU, few buildings western part of town still standing. Para. Town of IMA has many fires racing. Para. Director unit NAU is setting up on KODO MISAKI with 2 search stations operating. Para. EST SINDA no reports. Para. 10th Army CP opened ashore. Para. 181200-180097 closed ELDORADO 181159.

Summary No. 39 as of 201200. Ships gunfire continued to support ground troops. During the night 19-20 3 CA 1 CL 5 DD assigned 3rd Phil Corps and 77th DD while 1 OB 2 DD fired in support of 26th Corps from 1 3 CA 1 DD fired from the West. Fire missions conducted during the night were illumination harassing fire missions and interdiction types. 5119 from NAKAGUSUKU NAU as of 1800 19th that eastern beaches and shorelines were well neutralized as result of yesterday's bombardment. 5 heavy ships and 3 DD operated in TONABARU NAU West of Long 127°50 as far as navigation permitted and drew no enemy fire. LST 764 destroyed 3 mines on reef near CHITONE POINT and destroyed 3 beached boats. From 51215 at KERAMA RETTO comes word that repairs on southern net handicapped by weather and that unloading of ammunition ships proceeded very slowly yesterday due adverse weather conditions. 51215 at KS SINDA as of 1800 19th reported unloading was resumed at daylight and beach conditions continued to improve throughout the day. Removal of cargo from beach and drop areas hampered by rifle fire and mine roads. 3 LST and 2 LSM were beached within LADON A 1300 14. Intend to install pontoons causeways at end of harbor as pier for small craft and to increase landing for total 4 LST and 6 LSM. At 1416 an LST not identified was taken under enemy artillery fire appearing to come from SISURO TA 942. No damage. TUSCALOOSA neutralized suspected area. First attempt to tow off TOLUHU previously reported grounded at high tide yesterday was unsuccessful. Attempting again today. All double bottom tanks forward of machinery spaces are punctured and flooded. Blowing flooded tanks. Revised MOBEL casualty figures are 5 KIA 17 WIA. Routine minesweeping was conducted in area 21 channel and transport area with negative results. GREGORY STREET HULL departed for rear areas 19th. During day. raid this morning at 0429 1 small bomb dropped 150 yards off starboard quarter of BAUER. No damage or casualties. BREEZE southern patrol KERAMA reports torpedo fired at her evening 15th. REVENGE on station P18 18 miles east of BCHO opened fire visually at 0235 on 3 low flying twin engine bombers apparently Irving which passed over her bow. Repeated 2 crashed in water. No flames or explosion observed. Para. Naval air arm engaged in direct support troops. Strike missions furnished by fast carriers of TF 56 and CVEs of TG 52.4. STEPHEN RAY CAP planes on return to base strafed KODO SINDA at 1030. Fires
were started. No enemy aircraft sighted. Search flights were made by FBMAs. At 0255 2 D8s were sighted 31-25N 123-20W. Routine ASP was flown by FBMAs. On 19th an oil slick with continuous bubbling fresh oil 2 miles long 150 yards wide sighted 27-07N 127-01W. Sonar buoy pattern negative. DITTER sent to aid investigation. 2 FBMAs were damaged in takeoff KERAMA RENAI 19th due to smell. Enemy air was active from 0425 to 0610 when small group of planes approached from the north and returned to north. There were no interceptions and no damage to our forces. End of summary.

20 1045 CTF 51 to CTF 51 Info CHINA BOTH, CONFIDENT.

Ops Sum 57 as of 20/1000. 3rd Pacific Corps continues operations to eliminate remaining enemy force north of OKINAWA and PROMOTION. 1st MarDiv recce up north coast OKINAWA near late yesterday and today TA 10-32 completing coverage north of island. Corps losses period 180001 to 182600 KIA 1 WIA 0 KIA 0 WIA 0 WIA 6 NV same period 2 no report enemy dead. 26th Corps sector quiet last night received scattered artillery fire. Result of yesterday attack lines advanced southern front generally 1000 yards and secured. Penetration of 1000 yards on left flank. Lines reported this morning 77720 77770 77560 80748 81762 81762 99764 98764 54757 98774 96739. Casualties period 180001 to 182600 KIA 4 WIA 80 KIA 2 NV 9 WIA. Enemy dead not reported. 26 of our tanks were destroyed in yesterdays action. 77th Div continues drive today to seize south and eastern section of islands and capture, 77th DIV YAMA. Yesterday Div encountered stubborn resistance from isolated positions. Enemy strength on 77 DIV estimated 900 to 1100 exclusive of present casualties. One 25th Division of 6th Special Inf En TAMA 16650. Plan to unload 77th Div over NAUGHT beaches upon completion of 77th DIV operation. Enemy casualties period 171600 to 191600 KIA 207 NV 4 total period ending 181900 KIA 736. 77th Div casualties period ending 171600 KIA 21 WIA 1 NV 1 WIA 0 NV 15. Para. Supply situation 10th Army satisfactory strong N winds and heavy rain yesterday slowed down discharging of cargo. Weather clear today.

20 1220 CTF 51 to CTF 51 CHINA BOTH, HASS TRUST.

Summary No. 40 as of 20/1000. Naval gunfire support was furnished throughout the day by 1 CA and 4 DD in zones of the 3rd Pacific Corps and 77th Div on T3 SHIA. 6 OBS 1 CA 2 CL 4 DD worked for the 24th Corps from the west and 1 OBS 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD reinforced from the east. 1 OBS 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD replenished ammunition. HUTCHINS in direct support of the 22nd Inf obtained many hits in numerous caves and destroyed gun position during runs this morning. COLORADO had a fire aboard with handling rooms 1 and 2 at 1030 by an explosion of 16 inch powder charge while loading ammunition KERAMA. 8 main battery magazines were flooded. Loading continued aft and preparations made to remove powder forward. Ship sustained no damage to installations or equipment beyond capacity of ships force to repair. Late report from TF 315 as of 1715 indicates ship still fast and pounding badly. Departures for the day included CombatDiv 3 in IDAHO ConvibCorps 1 in ESTES HART WILSON WILSON JIGARILLA departed 1300 for OWAH and 1120 BACKLAND EKSTROM STANLEY CRISWELL TISDALE departed for ULTIME. Para. Naval air activities consisted of strikes in support of troops by fast carriers of TF 38 and CVEs of TF 52A. Search flights were made by FBMAs with sighting of 1 ES 1335 on course 270 speed 15 33-30N 135-30S. Routine ASP was flown by FBMAs. Enemy air activity was limited to 1 high flying plane approaching to within 80 miles of OKINAWA.
20 1210 CTF 57 SUMMARY NO. 40 - CONTINUED

from the west at 1330. No interception and no damage. Tonight 9 small raids approached. Torpedoes dropped at pickets apparently without result. Para.
Weather light scattered to broken clouds. Wind northerly 20 to 25 knots.
Visibility 5 to 10 miles. 77th Div not employed at D-Day. Landing MACOMHI.
End of Summary.
Operations summary number 59 situation as of 21. SEP 44 1000Z. 111 Phib Corps. 4th RCT and 5th RCT of the 6th Mar Div yesterday reduced the enemy pocket previously reported and advanced to the northern shore of MOTUO PENINSULA. Light infiltration on 6th Mar Div rear areas during night. Plan for today mopping up. Marine amph lib patrols returned from reconnaissance of SESOKO SHIMA (94423) and YAGACHI SHIMA (10026) during early hours today. Preliminary report islands lightly held. 24th Corps. Reported quiet last night only sporadic artillery and mortar with minor endeavors to infiltrate except in 7th Div same where infiltration was heavy and being mopped up today. Corps continued attack this morning at 0630. 77th Div. Enemy continued to offer strong resistance from PINNACLE and town at TA 87326 has secured island except PINNACLE and town which is being worked over today. Airfields Kadena 5 and Yontan 6 were subjected to air attacks during night. AAA reports 2 enemy planes probably destroyed. 1 AAA S/L was damaged. At 2020 unknown number of enemy bombs fell in the TAF area. Drake field was strafed damaging 2 helicopters, 1 off EM KIA 4 OFF 12 EM WIA. Between 210930 and 210950 enemy shelled Ruby field with 15 rounds destroyed 1 Corsair and damaged another. Drake field was also shelled during same hour with 11-15 shells. No reported damage. Minna Shima was shelled at 200755 with 20 to 40 rounds HE and WA. KIA 1 EM WIA damaged 1 howitzer and 3 vehicles. Source of fire is being investigated.

Operations summary number 60 situation as of 21/1600 10/4). 77th Inf Div. At 1025 today the American Flag was raised on INDUSABO YAMA, the pinnacle which has been the center of resistance on IK SHIMA. It was estimated that 200 to 300 Japs remained in caves on this pinnacle at that time, some of the caves 3 stories deep. The 77th Div expected to have all resistance cleared out today. 77th Div described the fighting as the bitterest he has ever witnessed. 9th Div APO Geo 45, has been directed to commence Base Development 3rd Phib Corps. All organised resistance on MOTUO PENINSULA has ceased. No major changes in position since previous report. 29th and 4th RCTs of 6th MarDiv remain on northern shore of MOTUO (0928 to 9631) which position was reached last night. Latest report active patrolling today has produced no enemy contacts. Total 3rd Phib Corps casualties to 2400 19 April KIA 266 WIA 1125, MIA 4, NBC 1043, total 2836. Enemy KIA 259, POW 246, Civilians in area 67935. 26th Corps. Bitter fighting continued with only small gains reported. Hill 178 in front of 7th Div continues to be a major obstacle, crags and small hills blocking the approach to hill 178 have changed hands several times. At 1700 a 2nd enemy counterattack was repulsed in some of 3rd RCT 2301, 86th Div, 150 Japs were killed. It is estimated Corps now has 2500 99/F and with present unloading rate should be able to maintain this level.
22 0530 CTF 51 to CONSTFLET Info CINCPAC BOTH SHIPS.

Summary 43 as of 221200. Fire support throughout the night was furnished 21thC by 1 CA 2 CL 4 DD from the H and from the N by 5 OBB 1 CA 3 DD. Of these ships 2 DD & OBB and 1 CA were in general support in addition to direct support assignment. 1 DD was in support of 3rdPhibCorps. Night fire missions consisted mainly of harassing and illumination. 1 OBB 1 CL 3 DD are replenishing ammunition. CHUTTER reports Rate or Jull attacked 211212 with torpedo in screening station A33. Torpedo missed. Plane hit possibly splashed. During air raid last night N W SUSANS in screening station A33 reported hostile plane dropping bombs about 2042. 2047 torpedo was dropped 500 yards on port beam from altitude of 25 feet. SUSANS maneuvered radically evading torpedo. Plane was taken under fire and reported hit in fuselage. CHUTTER in station A33 was under air attack at 2300 on 2nd run plane dropped torpedo at 800 yards which missed, plane taken under fire and hit probably destroyed. HALLORAN in area 27-31 F of EKINAX SETO took bogey under fire about 2230. Torpedo dropped but missed. EXON in SPA SADSWORTH in RF 10 and CONEL in RP 1 were under hostile attack by single planes about same time and FUTAM by 3 planes. FUTAM splashed 1 and EXON and FUTAM 1 between them. No damage to ships. LOS 31 splashed 1 YF 2255. TOLUAN previously reported aground is still afoot on reef flooded down hard (prent pounding. Salvage operations continue expect to attempt to re-float on 24th. Minesweeping of channel and transport areas and area 31 around TA 9583 and 9279 were completed. LOS 34 reports sinking floating object possible mine on RP 10 at 1900 21st. Casualties to LOS 51 damaged 16th now reported as 2 VIA. UDT 16 has completed reconnaissance of TA 9725 KATORU area finding excellent well protected harbor for small craft. Small channel approach capable of docking 2 1/2 at a time. It is planned to establish boat pool in this harbor. Repairs to MH net in KINRATA now completed.

FORREST yesterday recovered body from sea identified by clothing marks as C.W. PHILLIPS but ship unknown. Buried at sea 26-36 N 127-31 E. Par. Planes from CVEs of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TP 58 and shore based air of TG 99.2 gave direct support to ground troops. VAF SHIDA was strafed by 4 fighters at 1130. No activity noted. Search flights were made by FIBS from KINRATA at 0135 2 DD were sighted at 31-32N 124-07 3 course 000 speed 15, ASP was conducted by TIBS, TOLUAX on antisub sweep of shipping lanes to SE. No contacts. Destroyed 2 mines 23-38 and 130-17. Hostile air attacks occurred between 1840 and 2050 from 0040 to 0250 with planes approaching from N and W in numerous small groups. Results above plus F6F night fighter shot down 1 unidentified plane 90 miles from KINRATA. Plane losses occurred at 0710 when 1 PM from MARCUS ISLAND collided with PM from SARGENT BAT. Both planes crashed burned. Pilots presumed lost. Rescue of pilot reported down near SAKIHUMA previous summary was made by sub prior to arrival of Dumbo. MAN Sqdn now established on N tip of KINRATA are controlling part of CAP. Entire shore based radar reporting unit is now tied by a force flagship CIC. Strip for observation aircraft now established on SB SHIDA in TA 8340. End of Summary.

221239 REQUEST TO CTF 51 Info CINCPAC BOTH SHIPS.

Operations summary 61 as of 221200. 3rdPhibCorps (aft night) 6thMarDiv reconnoitered SISOKO SHIDA 9423 no enemy encountered. Marines moved 1 En by motor to ASA 0119 embarked 23 April for attack on SISOKO. Remainder 29th moved to TOUGUCHI 9725. 6thMarDiv today reconnoitered YAGACHI SHIDA. Some enemy sniper during night units near base of MUNOZ PENINSULA no further.

--- Continued ---
SSERET
APRIL (G51)

22 1239 CG TAN SUMMARY NO 61 — CONTINUED.
details. Patrols eliminating remnants of 150 enemy UDO force 0918-1015,
Switchboard in 88000 attacked last night strength unknown our casualties
KIA 3 WIA 1 in land by 0130. Bomb dropped near 6thMarDiv CP during night
no casualties. Elements 1stMarDiv today occupied TAKE BANARE from which
base patrols HANAI-HANAI-TAI CHINA. 24th Corps front lines as of 200700
7 Div 83760W 8375SE 83753W 83760E 83763W 83763E 83760E 83763E 83765W 83768W 27 Div 7776 AMY 9 78765E
82765W 27 Div 7776 AMY 9 78765E 82765W. Enemy defensive position consists of
mutually supporting concrete and earthen pillboxes and dugouts inter-
laced trenches. Japs throw grenades and entrench charges when our troops at-
tack. DD fire house XHIPAN June Bug 02. Intermittent arty fire during night
most sectors 106-105 CPs extensive shelling between 2200-2400. At 2318 187th
Inf repelled counterattack Corps continues attack today capture high ground
adjust lines 27th Div cleans up KAMAKU and vicinity. At 2319 165th received
counterattack supported by FAP arty 27th Div arty attack under fire. Wires
cut to all REEFS radio radios out no further info. Both pontoons and bales
bridges in 7978 destroyed by Jap fire during night. Enemy counterattacked
105th at 0615 today no further report. 24th Corps casualties varied 192200
202400 KIA 97 WIA 745 MIA 92 NBC 123 Corps casualties to date KIA 817 WIA
4483 MIA 217 NBC 254 total casualties to 202400 5527. Strength of command
202400 7th Div 13857 96th Div 12540 27th Div 14240 Corps Totals 16573. Jap
casualties 24th Corps KIA 11732 FM 27 civilian 29342. Iscon dumps now con-
tain approximately 10 days rations for units ashore. All routes in area
being widened and surfaced provide 2 WEATHER all weather roads progressing
satisfactory. DRAKE Field hit by 3 Boms at 212005 1 plane damaged 1
officer 3 enlisted men slightly wounded again hit 212045 no damage reported.
At 0930 1 AC fighter reported splash 1 Betty N of CHINA.

22 1315 CTF 51 to CONSTRUCTION INFO CINCPAC BOTH. SINGLE.
Summary 44 as of 221500. Surface activities for the day included naval gun-
fire support to 3rdPhilCorps by 1 DD 24th Corps from the E by 1 CA 2 CL 4 DD
and from the W by 2 CA 3 DD. ST LOUIS rests good effect on caves trenches
and emplacements with 9 inch artillery. RALSTON reports that for the past 2
nights bogies have dropped 2000 flares N of XINHAI. The following types
departed for SANTAI today: 5 APA 1 AK 5 APA 2 XAP 3 XAP 2 DD 2 DD 2 APD.
Para. Naval air activity consisted of direct air support to troops by fast
carriers of TF 50 and CVEs of TG 52.1. TG 52.1 again struck SANTAI GUNTO
today. Results of strike on CHIANGKI by TG 52.1.3 on 21 April show runways
disposal areas buildings and gun emplacements hit. Night fighters sighted
Zekes airborne. Later burned 1 on ground. Routine search flights and AP
was flown by T'S. 21 TMS of YMB 232 landed at Kadena Field 1430 and 1600
4 F5 planes landed at YUTAI Field landing to TG 29.2. Car plane losses were:
1 YUKON hit by cr, crash landed in water off western OCEANA at 1220.
Enemy air attacks from 1740 to 1950 22 April. Estimate 30 raids in 11 raids
approached OCEANA. Early raids came from W latter ones from N. 35 planes
estimated shot down by CAP 10 by ships crediting SANTAI 2 JASON 1
DETECT jointly 2 BOM 1 INDIAN 1 VAL HUGO 1 FLY 1 JUNGLE 2 SEDDON 1
Betsy. Shells hit by survivors: INDIAN cod in screen had fire and extinguished it.
1 depth charge exploded. 20 M. Proceeded under own power to SANTAI.
SANTAI capsized and sinking. LCS in FBS 14 unreported damage. ROGERS 15 mi.
2 JASON 1 INDIAN beaches reported bomb misses her area and SANTAI near miss.
CAP reported 3 Valo jetisoned fixed landing gear then attacked by our fighters.
Total enemy destroyed 49. No further details at this time. Para. Weather
early cloudy with visibility 10 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. X
Wind NE to ES 10 knots. Slight sea.
22 1709 CTF 51 to GTF 51 info CINCPAC both. 21STFLY.

Ops Sum 62 as of 221700. Japs opposing 24th Corps are resisting with deadly tenacity assaults of the corps. Enemy positions protected every conceivable approach deeply entrenched with numerous pillboxes and caves. Activity today mainly devoted to combat patrolling with attempts to probe pillboxes snapping up rear areas from infiltrations last night and early this morning together with readjusting Div lines. Para. In the 7th Div ZA early this afternoon an assault of ROCKY - EAK by a double envelopment of 2 companies was repulsed by terrific enemy fire of all types. Arty fire by heavy tanks ineffective. Troops were reorganized and a concerted effort launched utilizing Inf., 2 Platoons medium tanks and flame throwers supported by 155 mm Howitzers from positions only 800 yards to the rear. Resistance continues heavy and determined. No further report of progress this phase available. Para. Cav. In 7th Div zone has been explored of contain bodies of many Japs. 1 cave contained 100 another 200 another 50. Apparently majority were killed by arty fire and placed in caves instead of burrying. Para. Troops cleaning up KIRAN area reported advancing slowly early this afternoon against rifle mortar fire. KURUK RIDGE which has had been fought over bitterly for 2 weeks still occupied by number of dug in Japs. 7th Div is working on this. Japan occupation of ridge gives small salient and observation into our lines. Para. 3rd PHIB Corps at 1420 6thInfDiv reported 1st Bn 2nd Mar Div had killed 6 Japs and sighted main body of enemy force estimated 150 vicinity 117 enemy withdrawing W 1st Bn in pursuit. Para. Landing operations against ROCKY-SHIMA commenced at 1200 with landing of 2nd Bn 2ndInfDiv and 1st Bn 315TH INF. At 1340 our forces were half way across the island. 6th Mar Div plans landing operation on KURI-SHIMA on 236000. Para. CTF 51 has requested permanent port organization assume control all unloading at OKINAWA except those on KAGASHI beaches and SHIMA KAGAI areas. Para. Fair weather and good unloading conditions expected until 21 April with winds slowly shifting to NE. Para. Assault shipping 77th Div is 22% unloaded. Para. IS SHIMA was declared secure at 211025 with only mop up to do and completing Phase 2.

23 0750 CTF 51 to CINCPAC both. 21STFLY.

Summary 45 as of 231200. Demands for naval gunfire support have decreased since completion of Phase 2 operation. CG 3rd PHIB Corps states no further need for naval gunfire support and expressed appreciation for excellent work of fire support ships. Fire support to 24th Corps yesterday was furnished by cruisers and destroyers only. From the E direct support was had by 1 CA 2 CL 3 DD and from the N by 3 CA 1 CL 4 DD with 1 CA 1 DD harassing and illuminating southern OKINAWA airfields and boat areas. Results of yesterday's gunfire indicate direct hits on AA emplacements various dumps trenches blockhouses and caves effectively covered by fire. To prepare against probable air attacks in force yesterday evening no covering force was deployed. All OBOs were anchored in smoke cover and covering force screen assigned to inner screen transport area. Amplifying information on last nights air raid shows the following: ISHIKAWA previously reported as hit by suicide now reports that after engine room machine shop port shaft aley flooded. Ship proceeded to KERAMA under own power; HALLION and DARTS rescued 4 survivors. Preliminary casualty report 30 KIA 25 WIA 13 MIA. LCS previously reported hit by suicide now identified as LCS 15 and sank in 3 minutes. LCS 37 did excellent job rescuing 25 by line and ladder including 5 badly wounded. After first aid transferred 6 officers 50 WI including 6 seriously wounded survivors to VAN VALKANBURG and LSS 195. Report is that 18 HITA PO B GUYET 5 sector MCLAA performed.

- Continued -

2722
excellent rescue job of 105 survivors of sunken SHALLOW including captain and 7 officers, only 1 reported KKIA. Casualties and survivors transferred to ENDEAVOUR and MATRONIA with CVE 855 rendering excellent assistance. TADSOUTH reports hit but near miss by splashed plane which fell 15 feet on starboard beam causing 6 small holes above waterline. Ship fully operational. 1 WIA, GUNNER on Sta 438 at 2048 reported a bomb dropped 300 yards off port quarter by hostile plane. No damage. COVELL in RF 1 hit in jackstaff by suicide Val which missed ship and crashed. No damage. HUDSON enroute to transport area from RF 12 hit by suicide Val which glanced off forecastle and crashed with no damage to ship. 1 WIA. SIEGELSTROM had suicide crash close aboard. No damage. 1 man overboard recovered at 1929. SHIMSA in screen station E24 at 1936 received superficial damage from an explosion of bomb or torpedo from hostile plane crashing 25 feet off port beam. 2 WIA, details at SHIMSA had torpedo miss with no damage at 1800. At 2323 LCI 803 daylight raft in TA 9232 E of ISGEMA went alongside and took 6 enemy privates 1 1/2 miles 3 of NOGAMI. 2nd LCI 1132 at 097222 April, mine disposal officer detached and cleared mine at 2100. 51.19 reports lower entrance ISJIMI AAIJ 412 cleared and large sections of bay also checked by sweeps. BROWN beaches and approach from ISJIMI AAIJ TA 9738 sounded and swept with negative results. Channels and transport area swept. Entrance at TA 9603 in area G1 clear. All negative. No change in ISJIMI previously reported grounded. SHIMSA previously damaged has now been repaired and has reported to CTF 51 and been assigned to duty in screen. Naval casualties reported by 105 ships are: 585 KIA 1755 WIA 523 MIA total 2780. Para. Naval air operations included direct support by CVEs of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 58. Strafing attack on KADE SHIMA hit 1 camouflaged Oscar burning it. Exploded mines on beach. TG 52.1 attacking ISHIMI GUNTO on 22nd dusk strike found 21 planes turning up for take off on NOBABA field. Bombs rockets and strafing destroyed 15 plus many personnel. 5 airborne Oscars shot down over NOBABA and 4 more Oscars shot down over ISHIGAKI. Search were made by TBDs. Between 2200 and 0100 sighted several enemy freighters with escort in general area 32-00 N 133-00E. Special search by Dumbo PBM around radar picker station 14 for survivors was negative. At 1030 PBM Dumbo landed at Anomada NOBABA 10 miles 5 of north tip OKINAWA to bring off badly wounded Marine for hospitalization. Routine ASP was flown by F6F. Additional information on enemy air attack evening 22nd reveals fighter total now 32 by TG 99.2 and 5 by fast carriers. Ships which shot down planes not previously reported: COVELL, LUCE, DALI, Grand total 54.

23 1125 CTF 51 to CONSTITUT Info CTF 51 PACIFIC BOTH STRIKE

Summary as of 231800. Gunfire support was furnished to 24th Corps throughout the day by 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD firing from the W and 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD from the E. General support was provided by 2 OBB 1 CA 1 CL. Ammunition situation is excellent with replenishment continuing satisfactorily. DAILY reported possible periscope vicinity of FP2 at 0100. Planes in sector 4 is investigating in collaboration with DAILY. Correct ISHIMI AAIJ casualty report now shows 27 KIA 25 WIA 16 MIA and SHALLOW: now reporting 9 WIA 2 MIA. Para. Air activity for the period comprised direct support missions by CVEs of TG 52.1 and fast carriers of TF 58. KADE SHIMA was again investigated this afternoon by 4 flights of fighters. No air

- Continued -
activity was noted but 2 camouflaged planes in addition to those previously reported and 1 boat were destroyed. Search flights and ASW were made by PBMs covering all sectors. TBFs are providing air cover to damage sub MARYKAYE proceeding from 59-30 N 133-33 E to UMAI. 6 PBYs privateers of TG 50.5 have arrived Yontan Field for duty. At 0700 an F4U of TG 79.2 shot down 1 Val 50 miles NE of BOLAO. Our plane losses for the day are: 1 F4U from TG 99.2 damaged was abandoned. Pilot parachuted 12 miles bearing 225 from UMAI at 1359. Rescued by HAM, and on board within 11 minutes. Pilot of TG 52.1 made water landing; 2 of ICHIGAKI too late to be rescued by Dumbo today. Dumbo will attempt rescue daylight tomorrow. Bulk aviation gas delivery from YOKOS to tanks ashore by pipeline commenced today. There were no hostile air attacks this afternoon. Bars weather overcast. Visibility 6 miles. Wind 2 to 3 knots. Temperature average 75 degrees. Sea calm. Negligible swell. End of Summary.

OEC 10 to CTF 51 Info CINCINPAC.

Ops Summ 64 of 231600. 3rd PhiB Corps. Reconnaissance completed HINAGA SHIMA 231259 and KOURI SHIMA 231206. No enemy found. Reconnaissance HINAGA SHIMA in progress. 1st BN 22nd Marines continued topping up remnants UDO Force TA 1126. Other units no change. Casualties 22001 to 222600: 1st MarDiv KTA 1 KIA 6; TKA 0; NBC 17 total 24. 6th MarDiv KTA 1 KTA 14; TKA 0; NBC 43 total 58. 3rd PhiB Corps trop 93; TKA 6; TKA 1; NBC 1 total 11. Corse: Reconnaissance of TUGGEI SHIMA begun 0930 no report results. No change corps front except capture cag 8474. Plane drop unguided Naval bombs INAGU today followed by concentration fire. 16 Div reports naval gunfire very effective stopping Jap counterattacks. 383 Inf no advance. 327/349. 7th Div 1701 took cag 8474A at 1215. Casualties 220001 to 222600 Corps troops KTA 0; TKA 3; TKA 0; NBC 14 total 17. 7th Div KTA 25; TKA 131; TKA 1; NBC 1 total 268. 27th Div KTA 38; TKA 218; TKA 99; NBC 51 total 396. 96th Div KTA 19; TKA 71; TKA 9; NBC 21 total 114. Corps ammo 201600 in GP/UP, small arms 201551; 2,95; 155 gun 2,05; 113; 3,650. Casualties enemy up to 310604. TOTAL KIA 13043; W2 215; WA 122. Total casualties 1465. KIA 331; MC 222600 KTA 1; TKA 31; TKA 0; NBC 81 total 113.

CTF 51 to CINCINPAC BMD 51 INFO CINCINPAC BOTH. 0630 CINCINPAC.

Summary No. 47 of 241200. Direct support was furnished 24th Corps during the night from 1 by 1 OBB 2 CA 1 DD from the W by 3 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 1 CA and 2 DD were assigned duty in Naha area. Excellent reports on effectiveness of naval gunfire included ST LOUIS closed 14 caves HALL destroyed gun emplacement with direct hits; MONTVERDEY destroyed underground storage and radio station SALT LAKE. CIC closed several caves and made many hits on blockhouses pillboxes and trenches BIRMENHAM damaged camouflaged gun position. Replacement continues satisfactorily. Ammunition situation good. Routine sweeps of channel and transport areas were made and entrances to area 11 checked. All results negative. GLADIATOR reported bombed in station B-11 at 230050 no damage. TOLLIAN material condition unchanged. Tugs took all at high tide but unable to unfloat apparently must wait for spring tide. LCI 373 grounded night 22-23 on reef SW SHIMA while investig-
SECRET

240630 CTF 51 SUMMARY NO. 47 - CONTINUED.

 rating suspicious objects, TAHANAWI towed her clear on high tide afternoon 23rd. No damage. At 0400 HLT made possible submarine sound contact bearing 322 degrees 25 miles from PCNO. Attacks were made at 0430 and 0445 with negative results. Search continues. Search on submarine contact made by AMERICAN WARD was abandoned with negative results. D 7

TENTH sank floating mine by rifle fire at 0830 bearing 190 27 miles from PCNO. Mine was spherical with 4 homes and in good condition. JIFFIES destroyed 1 mine at 2219/44 position 23-47 N 126-46 E. Loading and unloading operations progressing smoothly on Lt SHIMA. All assault shipping has been discharged and 50% of GroPac units ashore. 5000 feet south not completed and 7 boardings failed at KERAMA. Revised casualties on INAKO 36 KIA 30 MIA 14, 5 KIA. Casualties reported to date by 110 ships of TF 51 KIA 580 IIA 1594 MIA 627. Total 2801. Para. Direct air support of troops not furnished today due to bad weather. CAF was maintained but search flights and anti submarine patrols flown by TBM. No in flight contacts were reported. 1 TK is assisting search surface by IVFAT for possible submarine bearing 322 degrees 25 miles from PCNO. TU 521,3 is continuing strikes on SAKISHITA GUNTO. No enemy air contacts since last report. Tactical air observers commenced operations on YOUTUN field in TB's of TC 33A relieving TB's of TU 521,4. Pilot TU 521,3 reported in water last night 33 of LAHIWA too late for Dumbo rescue was recovered Dumbo NW at 0700 today. Para. Weather overcast with clouds breaking in afternoon. Scattered showers. Visibility 6 miles. Wind 15 Knots from 300 to 000x Slight sea. Temperature average 75 degrees.

262400 CTF20 COMASLT info COMDEN 10, CINCPOC BOTH NO. 5TH FLT.

Summary Number 49 as of 2524001 (-9). Naval operations for the period consisted of reinforcing fire missions in support of 24th Corps during afternoon 25 April by 2 OBB. 1 CL 4 DD operating on east shore and by 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 3 DD working west shore. During the night 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 4 DD gave direct support to 24th Corps from the east and 2 CA 22 CL 3 DD from the west. All fire was under corps control and consisted mainly of call fire missions and illuminating fires. Further report on gunfire support of 24 April indicates NEW YORK destroyed hostile gun and 8 artillery emplacements in TA 7974L. WICHITA destroyed 1 2-gun emplacement and 1 3-gun battery in TA 8073L. On 24 April COLORADO reports demolition of 10 buildings 3 guns and enemy personnel covered effectively.

TEXAS closed 6 caves and CALLACHAN destroyed 1 hostile gun. OPLAISKY had sound contact at 0230 on 25 April bearing 130 true 32 miles from POINT REUNION. Unable to maintain contact and rejoined screen at 0435 because of reduced screen for flight operations. Evaluation possible submarine. RALPH TALBOT reports sound contact at LAT 21-50 North 131-21 East at 18.0 on 24 April. Hunter killer operations in effect. Reports so far undetermined. RASS had sonar contact at 1720 25 (10 groups missing) 9-34 East. Made 2 attacks with negative results. Contact evaluated as probable sub. PUTUM sink 1 JH Type mine in position 26-11 North 128-06 East at 1450. SPHIA destroyed 1 horned mine in position 26-17 North 128-43 East at 0711. AMICO Group destroyed 1 mine in position 25-59 North 131-59 East. Outgoing convoy reported sighting mine in position 25-60 North 128-26 East at 2200. Hydrographic survey US IN IS SHIMA completed 24 April. Minesweeping for the period included channel.

2725
in E-5 Transport Area and QL entrance and selected areas rechecked. Negative results. Ships by type departed for SAIPAN 25 April as follows: APD, 3 AN, 1 PCE, 1 PC, 3 SC, 1 LCPF, 5 LST, 18 LSM. Para. Naval air missions conducted CV2's of Task Group 52.1 Fast Carriers of Task Force 58 and shore based air of Task Group 99.2 in direct support of troops. During the night a night air mission was flown by a TBM of Task Group 99.2 over southern OKINAWA. Task Unit 52.1.3 continued neutralization of SAKUSHIMA GUNTO. Search flights were made by PBM's from KEAWA BASH and PELAY'S from TONTAN. At 1100 2 DB were sighted 30-38 North 128-57 East. At 110 and again at 1330 KUSIFAKI radio station was strafed and at 1515 radio station at GAGA SHIMA was bombed and strafed with minor damage. AAF patrol was flown by PBM's. TULACI Group covered area around 28-30 North 134-30 East. ANZIO Group made 4000 contact on possible sub 22-08 North 131-28 East and are still working on it. ANZIO plane sighted submarine on surface 28-43 North 131-26 East at 1852/1. Made special attack with results unreported. Commenced hunter killer. 1 Dumbo PBM was maintained on station near SAKUSHIMA GUNTO for Task Unit 52.1.3 but no rescues were required.

There were no hostile air attacks during period but from 0230 to 0445 several enemy planes approached transport area at low altitude. TENNESSEE fired at 1 without results. At 0347 LCS 56 shot down 1 SALLY off northeast coast OKINAWA. PARA. Weather mostly cloudy. Wind variable 5 to 6 knots. Temperature average 75 degrees. Visibility 10 to 15 miles. Smooth Sea. No appreciable swell of surf. End of Summary.

Ops Sun 67 as of 261800. During the period 251200-261200 no enemy aircraft were reported in OKINAWA area. Para. Between 252030-260100 the enemy launched 3 counter attacks in groups 20 to 30 men each in 24th Corps zone. All attacks repulsed. Small enemy groups armed with satchel charges and other explosives continued infiltration attacks all along 24th Corps sector. Advances of 800 to 2000 yards were made all along 24th Corps front. 165 Inf of 27th Div reached the northern end of the airfields in TA 7670E at 1340. 105 Inf of 27th Div reached its initial objective in TA 7775 at 1200. Main opposition 27th Div front centered around bypassed SAKUSHIMA. Captured map indicates the enemy 24th and 25th Bns of the 2nd Inf Brig oppose the 27th Div. Para. During the night division killed 4 and captured 1 of an infiltrating party and identified the 24th Div RCN Regt. Mission of enemy patrol was to locate CPs and kill high ranking officers of the 7th Div RCN TROOPERS of TAKAHAMA by 0700. Patrols all along the Div front continued to encounter and engage small enemy groups. Other Bns of the Div continued mopping up and sealing caves in areas previously bypassed. Para. 96th Div at 1200 meeting relatively heavy mortar and MG fire. Advance continued slowly. Enemy documents indicate that Div opposed by elements 24th Jap Div 2. Para. Front lines 24th Corps at 261800. 27th Div TA 7777 EL 77776 X0 7875 BM 7775 96th Div TA 807777200 807775 507770 507770 52777A 807775 281740 in 7th Div TA 8174 WM 8274KPV 8274KLY 8374 RX 8473 ASGK 8574 FLKX 8572 1D. 3rdPhilCorps During the night mortar fire fell on NAGO. No casualties damage reported. 6th MarDiv killed 23 enemy 25 April 1 HarDiv continued patrolling and reported no enemy activity during night 25-26. Para. Kadena airfield now operational except during rains. 24 plane down and dusk CAP maintained on schedule.

- Continued -

2726
A 2-plane CA above each of 5 ship groups north of Okinawa during the day. 2 Marine Avengers maintained night CA over 24th Corps zone dropping 150 boxes on enemy airfields located by flashes. 4 plane night CA reported no enemy contacts. Casualties period 250001 to 252600, 24th Corps at 0128, 77th Inf Div 19 IA, 110 MIA, 27th Inf Div 16 IA, 23 MIA, 47th Inf Div 96th Inf Div 3 IA, 22 MIA, 23rd Philippines 50 OIA 2 MIA 0 OIA 47th Inf Div 3 IA 3 MIA O 6th Inf Div 4 MIA 22 MIA 23 MIA 367.

27 08-19 CONTINUED TO CTF 51 HOP CINCPAC CINCPAC AUSTRIA.

Ops Sum 08 as of 27/1700, 24th Corps: Generally quiet during night. 77th Div received small amount 780 at 2000. Jap activities at 3rd Innik to area A 3273 early today broken by artillery fire. Several scattered reports Jap artillery fell in 24th Corps area during night. No known reported. 27th Div received 200 rounds light and medium with some white phosporus telling. This is 2nd report latter type. Air strike yesterday employing 2000 and 1000 pound bombs on conical hill 2771 excellent results. Today's advance proeced slowly meeting resistance from scattered strong points. 3rd Act patrols reached town at 3000 KL about noon, 91st Div attacked 0730. AA had advanced to 3741 be continued against light opposition. 91st Div attacked 0730 at 1355 engaged hand to hand combat thru pillboxes. Initial moving forward slowly enemy opposition from pillboxes. Front lines as of 1500 27th Div 1867, 2761 R 7371 M to 7975 K to 7975 M to 1970 K to 3673 R 7367. 73rd Philippines quiet night continued moving up prepared for future employment. Casualties period 250001-262400 24th Corps Troops KIA 1 TIA 1 MIA 1 NBC 7, 77th Div KIA 3 MIA 1 NBC 26, 27th Div KIA 9 OIA 1 MIA 1 NBC 23, 77th Div not previously reported KIA 1 MIA 1 MIA 1 NBC 9 77th Div 71 OIA 9 MIA 3, 3rd Philippines NBC 6, 1st HarDiv NBC 5, 5th HarDiv 9 MIA 32, 10th MIA 2 MIA 3, 10th MIA 9 MIA 1 NBC 5, 59th AAF, 1st Brigade 32, 1. 1. 2 NBC 1, Total KIA 51 MIA 91 MIA 8 NBC 130, 1st Brigade 55 as of CTF Corsair ready. 10 of 14 MIA of aircraft. 180 39 39 as of 261 Pula and 10 of 14 Pula reports 24. Avengers 24 were set with night lights 44 mortar 74 rays. General night and day violation with night raids throughout night. No contacts. VTB flow heavy sorties. 1 Avenger hit by AA down in friendly territory. Crew reported walking away no further info. 4 ground support missions by Corsair yesterday.

29 04-000 CONTINUED INTO CONTINUING OPERATIONS BERS. CONTINUE THE STORY.

Summary No. 52 as of 284000. Naval operations for the period comprised gunfire support to 24th Corps by naval vessels in close and fast action, Cruisers, DD's and small craft engaged in night attacks along both coasts. Other fire support ships were organized for defense against air attacks. Results of gunfire support during the period show KIA MIA 14 killed and injured in battle stations and several killed on radio stations in 157000 and various times and movements with several killed on radio stations in 157000. Troop concentrations well covered with air support. 101ST and 102ND reported destructive effect on various areas. ST LOUIS and HAIL engaged in small boat antisubmarine plan covering all of enemy held west coast. Reports by ST LOUIS show 9 small boats destroyed with HAIL destroying 1 and CALLAHAN 3 assault boats along KIA HEAD. - Continued -

2727
LCI(G) 347 destroyed 1 suicide boat night 27-28 April. LCA 64 reports tactics employed by suicide craft is to lie still until closed by patrol craft then to make run past at high speed. OWIN in station B10 at 0130 28th reports near miss by bomb or torpedo. RALPH TALBOT now reports 5 KIA and 10 WIA. THOMAS E FRASER in station 154 was under attack at 2205 15 by Betty which dropped dumb bomb or aerial torpedo nearby with no damage to ship. SAGITTARIUS shot down 1 enemy plane in transport area at 0300 28th. LCA 63 in area 130 destroyed 1 small craft at 0413 28 April. CANADA VICTORY tentative casualty report shows merchant marine personnel 14 WIA 7 MIA Navy Guard 1 KIA 13 WIA 3 MIA Army 1 MIA. LCT 803 in TA 9232 at 0330 28th had near bomb miss with no casualties or damage. ENGLAND in position 34-07 14 miles from Bolo had near miss by suicide at 2205 28 April. GROUNDER at station KELLER 4 11 miles N of Bolo reports several bogies during night 27-28, showed white signals similar to emergency IPP and showed running lights. Showing of white IPP by 2 planes last night shot down by BUTLER without loss of any friends. LCA 37 reports damage to steering shaft and stern plate from depth charge in action with suicide boat previously reported destroyed 0240 28th. PINKLEY which was station ship at KERIA hit amidsips by low flying suicide plane at 1928. Severe fire started burning from bridge aft was soon under control but entire midships gutted. Engine room flooded, tag alongside pumping out. Last report indicates ship is able to provide for her own casualties but others being transferred to hospital ship. Captain wounded now aboard MT MCKINLEY. Estimate 25 patients killed by explosion and fire. WICHITA suffered underwater damage at 2331 27th while at NAKAGUSUKU WSN. Inspection by divers reveals small caliber shell penetrated skin of ship and exploded in fuel oil tank. Hole about 5 inches in diameter 5 feet underwater port side. Probably came from shore AA. CGT 51.21 reports 23 midget sub discovered in TA 0825 to TA 0827. Contained 6 wrecked subs and 18 inch torpedoes without warhead plus maintenance equipment. Minesweeping for 28th consisted of routine channel and transport area sweeps. Area in KL E2 E4 east of OGUN MISAKI REP completed. Area H16 between 100 and 100 fathoms cleared, 3 floating mines sunk in TA 3962 and 1 sink in TA 5134. Additional sweep in area GI was negative. ELLISON sank drifting hump prin 06-14 N 128-23 E at 1645 28th. To date 7 ships have reported total of 12 WIA from friendly AA fire during action night 27-28. Indiscriminate firing by ships. AA is a difficult problem to solve. Para, Our air activity for the period consisted of direct support to troops by T7 58 TG 52.1 and T7 99.2. Large YUAP was maintained over OKINAWA throughout the day and did a grand job. TG 52.1 continues to strike SAKISHIMA GUNTO. The strike of 27 April hits runways hit at NOBARA ISHIKI MIYAMA where large fires were started. 1 lugger fired 5 luggers strafed IKEMA JIMA. Continuous patrol maintained over target area from 0100 to 2100. No activity noted on fields. KURO SHIMA was again strafed with no enemy activity noted. Search flights were made by PFMs from KERIMA BASE and PFMs from Yontan who went through TSUSHIMA STRAIT with many sightings. Several small ships strafed. At 2242 27th 6 PFMs in masthead attack of hostile convoy 33-05 N 122-35, made 4 hits with 500 pound bombs at 111405. 1 DE was sighted 33-52 N 128-16. At 1155 1 SB 1 SA 1 FG sighted 34-34M 128-00E. At 1220 convoy of many small ships sighted 34-43M 124-28E course 000. Special flight sent to track and strike. Night of 28-29 10 PFMs with bombs and torpedoes attacked shipping in SHIMONOSEKI STRAIT. ASP flown by PFMs in OKINAWA area with no contacts reported. Emergency landing WIPPP now available on TE SHIMA and is the north 3,000 feet of the east strip surfaced in eastern half basin.

- Continued -
29 0400 CTF 51, SUMMARY NUMBER 52 - CONTINUED

0455-2235, Enemy air attacks few the period covered by special report. Additional information since that report increases enemy planes destroyed by CAP totals 74 for a grand total of 104. Para. Weather scattered clouds with 2/10 cumulus few alto cumulus and cirrus clouds. Wind easterly 8 knots. Visibility 15 miles. Temperature average 73 degrees. Slight sea no swell.

30 0330 CTF 51 to COMTFILT INFO CINC PAC BOTH 5THFLT CONGEN TAN

Summary No. 53 as of 092400. Naval surface operations consisted of gunfire support by battleships, cruisers and destroyers. 24th Corps operating in both east and west sectors. Destroyers and cruisers continued flycatcher operations on both coasts. The remaining fire support ships were assigned for defense against air attack in transport area. Reports of naval gunfire show suicide boats pens in NAHA area hit 7 small boats destroyed and 6 damaged fires started in various areas large explosions followed hit on cave in TA 7673 K and NAHA Airfield interdicted at dusk and dawn. Transport area was smoked for 4 hours and 35 minutes during the night. There has been heavy expenditure for oil during past 3 days equal to 10 days normal operating expenditure. Ammunition situation is good with satisfactory replenishment. Amplifying reports from TWIGGS show attack pressed home by 2 groups of 5 to 6 hostile planes, Initial detection at 32000 yards and taken under fire at 12000 yards. Suicide all under heavy fire as they commenced to dive from 2000 to 3000 feet. Damage to ship caused by near miss. Ship maneuvered at high speed. At 2150 28th PAKANA in position 3537 10,5 miles from BOLO was under torpedo attack by low flying plane whose attack was not detected until release of torpedo close aboard. Plane strafed coming in 1 3-inch salvo exploded near plane without result. Torpedo missed. LCI(R) 770 on station south channel entrance to KERAMA RETTO was attacked by low flying Val at 0051 28th. Bomb hit deck ricocheted and exploded 50 yards off port beam with superficial damage to LCI and no casualties. BUTLER during air action night 28th received damage to hull pierced above waterline near stern and minesweeping gear winches and magnetic tail rail damaged by near miss of suicide, 6 WIA. However the BUTLER splashed 5 planes. Ships damaged during air attack of last night additional to previous reports were SHANNON slightly damaged when bogey splashed close aboard. Fire control radar out. BENJON in RP 1 with minor damage when bogey dove through rigging. SS HALL YOUNG off IE SHIMA at 0401 hit in #5 hatch by suicide. Fire started but was reported under control. Minesweeping included transport and channel sweeps. Areas H1 and G2 completed. All with negative results. Units 14 and 18 remained in transport area during the night as emergency units. LSM 109 in RP 4 at 0245 28th, sank 1 mine in 26-26N 128-37 E and 1 in 26-41 N 128-40 E at 0647. PAUL G BAKER sank 1 floating mine at 0740 29th in TA 6644. CroPac 12 from IE SHIMA reports that good progress is being made developing beach and harbor installations with unloading steadily accelerating. Pontoon causeways have been installed NAGE WAB and approaches. Para. Air operations consisted of direct support to troops by TF 58 TG 99,2 and TG 52.1. Continuous CAP was maintained both day and night. In addition to close support missions enemy small boats and fuel dumps and truck were specific targets. TU 52,1,3 struck SAKISHIMA GUNTO. Report as of 29th indicates TU 52,1,1 HENK I bombed rocketed and strafed runways and dispersal

- Continued -
areas. Fuel dumps were set on fire AA gun emplacements buildings and radio facilities were hit ACIJOB. Hangars and buildings attacked. 2 Zekes and 1 Oscar shot down by CVE CAP. Search flights were conducted by TBMs and PB4ys from KERAMA and PB4ys from Fontan RC TB4ys made dusk sweep TSUSHIMA STRAIT sighting 1 freighter transp 1 PT 3 39 KRAFFERT 3 2 stack at 1105 N 34-15 N 129-40 E. At 1130 attacked 1 SD. Left burning and in sinking condition at 21 00 122-35 E. A/F was flown by TBMs around OKINAWA area with 1 TBK from TG 52 1 over CHE Flicker. These TBKs planes are effective and are doing an excellent piece of work. TBKU group operated in shipping lanes to southeast. TBMs engaged in hunter killer 80 miles bearing 270 from COTO. Enemy air attacks at 0610 LOS 87 in RP 2 shot down 1 hostile plane. From 1700 to 1745 planes approached from east in 3 raids possibly part of a group which had attacked Chancers. BOWERS shot down 3 GOVILE 1 and 1 by CAP from RANDOLPH. From 2200 to 2300 some 15 planes in 5 raids approaching from the north. There was no damage to our forces and no enemy shot down. From 2330 to 0130 and again from 0210 to 0350 approximately 30 planes in 10 raids were over the area. Night fighters shot down 1 plane. Ships gunfire accounted for others as follows: BENJAMIN 2 GREATER STANLEY TATNWALL SHANNON LOS 18 1 each. Shore based AA brought down 1. Total 10 enemy destroyed. Later reports of air action for night 27-28 April shows AARON WARD shot down 2 this brings total 29 destroyed including suicide planes. Planes shot down on night of 28-29 and not previously reported are: WADDINGTON 2 2050 3 DAILY 4 ST GEORGE 2 LOS 21 1 LOS 31 1. Revised CAP scores are TF 58 13 TG 99 2 36 TC 52 1 9 for a total of 56 by CAP. Grand total including suicide planes 100. Our plane losses were: 1 FAU from Kadena field shot down by AA over OKINAWA. Pilot made water landing and rescued by LOS 63. Other losses were 1 fighter pilot from BUNKER HILL rescued by LOS 11 at 1700 28th and 1 aircrew from SHANGRI LA who parachuted into burning plane and was rescued by Dumbo at 1225 5 miles south KIRAI. Dumbo then raced 4 miles to rescue 2 airmen of SHANGRI LA SBE2C. These planes had been lost due to enemy AA. Dumbo was under fire during rescue. Special photo mission flown by P5 planes over BANGCO and NANA for purpose of locating suicide boat hideouts. Para. Weather partly cloudy with scattered clouds. Easterly winds 8 to 12 knots. Good visibility 20 miles. Temperature average 75 degrees. Calm rippled sea. Negligible swell and surf.

04 O092 OCMEN TEN TO CTF 51 CINCPAC BOTH INFO CONSTHEFT. CONSENT TEN.

Summary 63 as of 092400. All times Item. Surface craft consisting of DD, cruisers and BB continued their support to 10th Army from sectors covering both E. and W. sides of island. Reports coming in show effective results.

NEW MEXICO placed 3 direct hits on coastal gun in TA 7 and destroyed barracks. BEALE shot up artillery emplacements and machine gun positions.

ROCKETS reports many enemy personnel casualties while firing in support of 7th Div. ST LOUIS accounted for 17 enemy trucks destroyed. C.T. GIBBS reported 10 hits on concentrated defense installations in TA 74/75. Boat launching ways previously reported are now definitely located in TA 74/75. LAUNCHING WAYS 10/28/32-10/1943.

Launching ways serving W caves have been counted. No boats observed. Routine fly catcher and illumination missions were carried out with no small boat activity indicated. During hostil air raid of early evening 6 DD's were hit by suicide planes as follows: At 1900 OBERON in screen station 277-13 miles from BOLO was hit vicinity forward fire and engine room causing fire in forward fuel tank which was brought under control. All power and communications went out. PEARLHORSE stood by and 1024 195 rendered emergency medical assistance and received casualties.

Arrived KERAMA RYU 10/28/32-10/1943. Screen station 81 hit. Damage and casualties unreported. Taken in tow by VIGILANCE. Arrived KERAMA RYU early this morning.

Mine sweeping consisted of routine channel and area sweeps. Screen units 17 and 1d remained in transport area during the night. 8DD's 1 353 was sunk by a horde type floater mine at 1745 in position 23-06 11-40-00 N. Metcalf-06 was sunk by a horde type mine at 1444 in position 24-08 11-40-40 N.

Mine the naval casualties and 6th Air loss as of 9 May reported by 152 ships of TF 51 lists 791 KIA 2377 WIA 1025 WIA total 4413. Para. Air operations consisted of direct support to troops and CAP furnished by TF 38 TC 27-140.

Inclusive support missions consisted of striking on troop concentrations and landing zones and launching ways 07/12 and 07/24 from KERAMA RYU carried out screen flight missions. At 1146 2 DD were sighted 34-33N 124-19E 2 DD 1 CL were observed 34-14N 125-08E course 035 speed 15 at 1215 2 CL 3 DD were observed course 34-14N 125-08E speed 15 at 1215 2 CL 3 DD were observed course 34-14N 125-08E at 1345. A medium freighter was strafed at 34-50N 126-14W at 1355 abandoned and resting on bottom. At 1140 1 FMM was attacked 34-30N 126-09E and believed to have been hit. At 1900 1 FMM 1 was attacked 34-18N 126-09E with slight damage to CL. At 1940 1 CL 2 DD 1 FMM 2 escorts were attacked 34-30N 125-37E 2 FMMs were sighted 34-20N 125-37E at 2255. Routine ASP was carried out by TRX with 1 TUG over transport area and TUG/1C covering shipping lanes to 03. Enemy air attacks occurred from 1320 to 2200 with planes approaching generally from the E. with several from the N. 2 raids prior to dark were suicide attacks later raids were hecklers. Tonton field received 1 bomb hit 2154. CAP shot down 1 turret shot down 1 friendly fighter missing. At 0900 a twin engine plane possible Betty crashed 2 miles from NAKAJIMA in NAKAJIMA. Yu following shallow dive and without being fired upon. From 0015 to 0200 from 0200 to 0400 about 20 planes in 11 raids approached generally low from the E. There was no damage to our forces and no enemy shot down. During early morning 10th 2 searches of aircraft kept out of KERAMA area because of smoke and air raid landed at sea. 1 made successful landing other crashed at 0000 with 1 survivors rescued by GANADO. Search is being made for the others. In summary 10th as on previous mornings after enemy air attacks simple high flight enemy twin engine fighter tried engine planes either click or buzz and several passes over transport and land areas leaving vapor trails. 0204 visual contact several times but soon lost contact, as enemy in very fast and formers were unable to close. Radar gave no early indication and few shots were had when sighted. Finally our CAP caught the intruder and shot down 5 0 miles N of KERAMA at 0930. Para. Weather scattered clouds, visibility 15 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. Wind N 15 Knots. Wave height no swell.
Army front last night received intermittent air and mortar fire and counter attacks and attacks by small infiltration groups. Our artillery and mortars maintained counterbattery and harassing fire throughout night. 1st Div. Army launched counterattack support by air strikes and artillery fire this morning. Gains of 500-600 yds made along front, in the I area of 77th Inf. Div. and major portion of Jap salient which had resisted all efforts for last week. Both Corps seized high ground affordng observation over enemy. Southern edge 21st Div. gained and advanced up slopes of Hill 112 to left front begun.

Para. 3rd Div. Corps: Enemy activity during night remained no change. Fall of 1121 Bridge.

Para. 6th Div. Corps: Taking main effort in center gained average 250 yds. Continuous mortar and artillery fire with 77th Inf. Div. in support. Bridge over 1121 LNR remained under heavy fire and was heavily bombarded.


Para. 26th Corps: Yesterday 204th of 26th Inf. moved out early in area where Japs had 1121 new corps 1121. Taps were destroyed. Japs killed. Corps attacked 0700 preceded by heavy concentration on both flanks and with equipment to 400 yds on Corps right and 600-800 yds on left. Enemy resistance was heavy to 1121 across entire corps front.

Para. 77th Div. From midnight to dawn estimated 1000 Japs were killed on Div. front. 32 Japs killed. Mortar and artillery fire against flank. This gained 500 yds. in center. 7th Div. was not successful in effect against tactical resistance. 15-500 yds press. and 8-500 yds press. on direct fire for attacking 26th Inf. Corps and arty. Momentum would not permit effective use.


Para. 77th Div. 2 Japs single plane raids over CND 124-145, 2 Japs destroyed 1 plane. No damage from enemy. Air raids total 9 planes over. 1121 during darkness this morning. 2 Japs destroyed 1 Jap plane 2 possibilities.

Para. 10th Army TAF splashed 1 Tony by night fighters at 1320. 4 splashed 2 Tona 2 Ivas 1 Pits 1 Pits 3 Ivas 3 Tona. 1 Tony went down. 1121. 1121. 144-145. 2 Japs. 2 Japs

Para. Estimated enemy casualties 102,400 KIA 9,469 WIA 77th Inf. Div. 46, 96th Inf. Div.

Para. Estimated enemy casualties 102,400 KIA 9,469 WIA 77th Inf. Div. 46, 96th Inf. Div. 46, 9, 144-145.
01 0949 CTF 94.9 to CTF 94 INFO CTF 93, CINCPOA.

CINCPOA 10731. Not getting underway with Graviv 5 and 5 or 6 destroyers at 2100 K(-10) 1 January. Will execute CTF 94 Operation Order 6-44 on January 4th instead of January 5th unless directed otherwise. Para. Could arrive CHICHI JIMA time 0700 K(-10) 1 January 3rd but no chance undetected approach with resultant escape of enemy ships. Para. Request early advise if not practicable CTF 93 to rearrange to 4th Flt 4 January.

01 1657 CTF 94 to CINCPOA INFO COM3rdFLT, JTG 94.9, JTG 17.7.

By OpOrder 6-44 operation SKULLDUGGERY calls for Task Group 94.9 strike CHICH at 050700 K(-10) and LIO at 051500 K. Coordinated air strikes as in CTF 93 despatch 010631 and 010627 not to all.

01 1639 COLENDAR to CTF 94 MILE, CTF 93 INFO CINCPOA.

As a Joint Operation my OpOrder 6-44 requires relative timing air and surface forces be as specified. CTF 93 previously reported the 5th to be earliest practicable date.

01 0652 CINCPOA to CINCPOA.

I am concerned that lack of experience of U.S. Meteorological methods may hinder the operations of ships of British Pacific Fleet. If acceptable to you I would like to arrange the appointment of a British Naval Meteorological Liaison Officer to work at a suitable Weather Central.

27 2019 COMINC & CNO to CINCPOA.

Japanese have lodged strong protest connection sinking M/V TATEI MARU between YAP and PALAU on 3 July 1944 by American submarine alleging shooting of survivors of gun attack who were in water. Protest states 7 survivors rescued by Japanese. Remainder civilian refugees and 1 crew member allegedly killed by submarine crew. Investigation establishes attack made by CLBACORE on 9th War Patrol. 5 Survivors recovered placed in custody Provost Marshal First Cavalry Hq LOS NEGROS on 8 July. Desire Air Mail report of interrogation survivors in custody regarding incident as basis reply to Japanese Govt. Ex Commanding Officer CLBACORE now NEW LONDON has been directed submit amplifying.
SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

01 1102

CTF 77 to ALL TFCS 7TH FLT, CTF 38, CTF 34, TG CONS
OF TF 38, Info COMINCH, 3INC3MPA, CINCPOA, COM7THFLT,
COM3RDFLT.

Further interrogation results my 280556. Evaluated
Baker 2 with much confirmation from other sources.
Major units Japanese Fleet comprise 7 CV 1 OR 2 CV3
2 CVL 2 CV-EE 4 BE 7 CA 5 CL. Para. CV HAYATAKA
and AMAGI completely operational. KATSURAGI and
8 NRYY class cruisers completed and training.
Available for battle operations probably February
or March. AMAGI and KATSURAGI built on YAMATO
type battlecruisers hulls and have displacement 45000
tons. Total of 6 UNRYU class carriers bearing names
UNRYU, HIRYU, SORYU, YAMAGI, KAGA plus one unknown
(25000 tons with prominent bridge on starboard
side forward of amidships. 2 Stacks on port side
bent downward and to rear. Deck extends to tip
of bow and is high off hull) constructed during last
year but UNRYU sunk December 19th and 1 unidentified
ship sunk November 29 by submarine. Expect carrier
KAIYO and possibly OTA planned operational. CVL Ryuhou
and Hosho operational. CV-EE ISE and HYUGA operational
and last known at SAINT JACQUES. Battle ships YAMATO
NAGATO KONGI HARUNA have just completed repairs in
Empire. Heavy Cruisers IZUKI KAGEN 8000 toner
(TONE ASHIGARA completely operational HOGURO completing
minor repairs at SINGAPORE TAKAO (with 8 boilers out)
docking SINGAPORE for temporary repairs prior return
Empire KITOKI heavily damaged probably still at
BANGKOK where was towed after submarine attack early
in December. Aoba heavily damaged (in Empire) CL
OYODO YAMAGI operational MINANO and her sister ship
(Presumably SAKAWA) believed operational YUGU
heavily damaged and now at SURABAAL repairing. In
Addition to other destroyers a total of 27 Matsuz Class
Destroyers (bearing names of trees, flowers and GRABLES)
known completed during past year. Para. YAMAGI was
scheduled depart Empire December 24th and arrive
MCRAN 30th or 31st. YAMATO NAGATO TONE to leave
Empire about same time or shortly after enroute
OUTERBOARD to MCRAN SAIGON, or LINGGA anchorage. Common
assumption aboard prisoners ship this force being
brought down to CELAX counter anticipated Blue landings
MANILA area near future. Para. Prisoner had heard
4 sister 10000 ton heavy cruisers planned. Named
KAGASGI and also plus 2 unidentified (presumably
IKOMATA and KURAGI). KAGASGI and A30 known under
construction as of May 1944. None near completion
and doubted to be converted to carriers.

01 2110

COMINCH to CINCPOA.

Australian Government have expressed concern to Std
Department over report reaching them of plans
originated by U.S. Navy for rehabilitation Phosphate
Industry on NAURU duplication their own efforts. Plans on file do not include NAURU Phosphates request your comment as further basis for reply.

The established complement of large carriers is 73 VF, 15 VSB, 15 VTB. Any departure from this complement for a particular operation or because of a deficiency in pilots or airplanes of a particular type is of a temporary nature only. Para: All training and logistic preparation shall be based on meeting the requirements of the established complement.

AAFPOA 0419. Conduct early photo recon air facilities TRUK, JOLEAI and MARUG with particular attention to Nosn Airfield TRUK. Prepare to conduct fighter bomber strikes against these objectives in order of priority as listed as soon as results of photo recon obtained. Commarcom 21 has been requested to confer with you on preparation Plan for coordination your strikes with practice missions 313 Minc scheduled to start about 16 January. Expedite submission thereof.

Article on SAIPIAN in Newsweek Magazine 28 August issue states all able bodied men registered for labor and work 8 hour Day on airfields New Construction etc. Japanese protest points out Forced Labor contrary to agreement with United States and further that employment Civilian internees on construction Military Airfields is unlawful even if voluntary. Desire investigation and report.

Commencing night of 10 January TF 77.2 less damaged ships directed to be returned to LYTTE by separate despatch will proceed to sea and join TG 77.4 escort carriers augmented by TG 77.4 and TG 77.3 close covering group 3 combined Groups under CTG 77.2 will comprise the LINGAYEN Defense Force. CTG 77.4 and CTG 77.3 will report to CTG 77.2 for duty. While continuing present missions assigned these various Groups by my OpPlan 17-44 the LINGAYEN Defense Force
SECRET

JANUARY (GCT) 1

09 0952 CTG 77 to ALL TCG & TFG's.

INFORMATION.

CINCPAC, CINCPAC, JCG FJ.

under VAdm Oldendorf will assume the mission of protecting our forces in and approaching LINGAYEN GULF from attack by enemy surface Forces. CTF 77.2 is free to exchange ships between the various Groups as deemed necessary, for best accomplishment of assigned Tasks and to provide for replenishment. A maximum of 3 CVE's will be assigned CTF 77.3 while close covering Group to engage in Slope covering echelons to and from L.P.O.P.. UTILIZING Carrier Planes as available conduct searches as necessary to insure against surprise attack by enemy surface forces.

09 1109 CINCPAC to CINCPAC.

Your 0900 14. It is not the policy of CINCPAC to recommend relief of carrier captains without specific reason in each case. Normally these reasons are requirement for services elsewhere, Professional unfitness, physical unfitness or Fatigue after a long period. I look to DCMONAC for recommendations for long range planning in connection with aviation personnel but desire such recommendations by letter with specific reasons for each change proposed.

09 2131 CINCPAC to COMCSNCPA.

Your serial 0003 of 6 January. Establishment of Western Pacific Base Command with understanding personnel in headquarters will be kept at the lowest practicable number.

10 0849-1 WEATHER 5TH AF to COMAF 13. 494 Bomber Group.

INFORMATION.

J-0126T Tropical Storm centered 150 miles east of southern Leyte at 0800 I (-9) /10. Winds above 30 knots in storm area with intermittent rain but slight turbulence. Forecasted movement west Northwest at 12 knots. Leyte terminal expected closed after 1200 I (-9) 10 January.

2738
09 1/18 Prior dawn today 9 January transports and supply ships of assault echelon entered LING TAU Gulf and proceeded to unloading areas. Preliminary bombardment of beachheads by fire support groups and rocket F/1 followed by strafing from support aircraft proceeded in accordance with plan. First wave landed on schedule at 0927. By 0-40 Assault waves ashore on all beaches without opposition except for slight amount mortar fire on eastern LAMPAI Beach. Troops moved quickly inland against minor and sporadic opposition. Approximately 65,500 troops ashore by dusk. Unloading progressed rapidly at all beaches. By late afternoon Commanding Generals 5th, 38th, 40th and 43rd Divisions had reported assembling command ashore. Enemy air opposition during the day was comparatively light but attacks by suicide planes were effective in damaging BBK116, NUSAU1, and COK06400 which were hit, COK1055 for second time and IMM32 AUSTRALIA for 4th time during present operation. Damage to above ships extensive but not critical. Evening 8th during approach KITUKUN BAY hit by suicide diver north below water line lost power and now enroute HHAS1 under tow. 1 engine expected to be operational near future. Delayed report. HATA HMAI Class destroyer intercepted by escorting DD of TF 75 enroute objective area evening 7th and sunk.

12 1607 CINCPOA to CINC6PA, BLOCOM 20th AF Info. RCC 1501, COM3RF, COMAFFO, CHINA.

To locate 2nd diversion attack force (I. I. HYU1A) as soon as possible request maximum extension BPA searches to south of Cape JACUDES and coverage at JACUDES to SINGAPORE by 20th Air Force including eastern portion of Gulf of SLOAN.

13 0215 MACARTHUR to ALLIED AIR FORCES (GW MAR) Info. CINCPAC, BLOCOM, CHINA, JOINT, COM3RF, etc.

Effective immediately and continue until further instructions from this headquarters sectors southwest Pacific search planes will be extended to include the CAPE SAINT JACUDES-SAIGON area maximum coverage within capabilities of CINCPAC BPA. BPA JACUDES-SAI0GN area will be maintained to locate MAIFU. 2nd diversion Attack Force (I. I. HYU1A) 20th Air Force has been requested to maintain maximum coverage of CAPE SAINT JACUDES-SINGAPORE area including Gulf of CALMARI.

13 2144Z DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA Info. CINC6PA, COMINCH, COMINCH, etc.

AIPPOA 0716 BomCom 20 has been directed to comply with your 121607 subject to requirements of primary mission.
SECRET

13 1938 COMINPOAC to COMINPAC.

Refer urbus 290331 December. Experience has proven value of night carrier in offensive action against enemy. CVL carrier has been reported unsatisfactory in night operations due to narrow deck and excessive motion in seaway. Sahara48 currently required Hawaiian area for training replacement CVG's in group operations. Assignment of CVG to training not considered best employment for this class. Para. Propose following action to effect return of Carlin to Pauahi for training, and assignment of day air groups to Atsah and Maili.

-(A) Transfer CVG (N) 39 from Carlin to TI. O. D. ROCG at ULIHAI about 1 March and return CVG 80 for rearming. (B) Assign CVG-23 to Carlin, ROCG, about 25 January as relief for CVG(N)-41. CVG-41 will be moved from Pauahi to embark at Okinawa or ULIHAI. (C) Sails BATAAN from Pauahi in February with CVG-47 embarked. (D) Redesignate CVG-36, 38 and 50 now training west coast as CVL's with standard CVG complement and readiness dates of 1 April, 15 April and 1 March respectively. This makes total 18 CVG available for 8 CVL carriers. Required one forward area relief and reserve for early relief of operating groups. (E) Revisit Carlin organization set forth CominCh 031237 January as follows: Carlin-7 ENTERPRISE (F) CMA TICONDEROGA, Carlin-6 ENTERPRISE (F), SHANGHAI, LANGLEY and BATAAN, Carlin-5 ENTERPRISE, BATAAN, HIBBING, ROYAL INDIAN and SAN JACINTO.

14 0050 COMINPAC to COMINCH INFO. COMINPAC INFO.

There is an increasing need for a subordinate command of AirPac in the forward area to coordinate and supervise the activities for which CominCh is responsible including logistics, training and administration of replacement carrier air groups and replacement pools of aircraft and pilots. These duties are now being superimposed on those of ComNavAirbases and with arrangement is not satisfactory. Accordingly, recommend establishment of geographical subcommand of AirPac SubComNav. Title "Commander Fleet Air" considered and rejected because Commander will not in fact exercise command of other fleet aircraft operating from bases in the area. Para. Recommend designation for flag officer to command contained in my 102048 to BuPers.
SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

15 0102Z COMGENRAFPOA to CINCPAC Info, PHILIPPINES

Radio date time group 122324 January 1945. We state that the availability of service troops as given in VAM 84316 dated 30 December 1944 is not to KELLOGG, INFO, MACA TNW and will be accepted as an interim measure for the support of units with personnel coming to this area. Theatre command that to the extent that numbers and types of ground service troops on hand in and committed to theater may be uncommitted for complete support, a greatly increased effect it will result with the arrival of this date.

15 1817 CINCPAC to COMGENRAFPOA Info, PHILIPPINES

Your 150102 approved subject to the understanding that the service and support of the Yuka Line will be below normal standards and that the tactical units may have to improvise measures to become partially self sustaining until additional service troops become available.

21 1541 MACARTHUR to CINCPAC Info COMGENPOA, C/S US ARMED FORCES FAR EAST

Concatenated in is your proposal to modify the terms of MILBAS Agreement so that concurrences of CINCSWPA and CINCPAC must both be obtained on requests for units only and not for individuals or small groups of individuals. MIL an integral part of a larger unit. To accomplish this change suggest the final sentence of paragraph 7A MILBAS Agreement be amended to read: "The Exemption of Specific Army Units from this General Policy Covering Army Service Units will be made only by Mutual Agreement between CINCSWPA and CINCPAC."

22 1930 COMINCH & GO TO CINCPAC Info COMNORPAC, CANADA

Your 162045 ComNorPac 162218 authorized. Arrangements should be concluded locally between ComNorPac COAD and appropriate Canadian authorities that area. State and War Departments Concur.
SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

26 1459
CINCPAC to COMPHCSC HQS 26TH MAR DIV

Propose assign Navy Air Groups to flagship and relief Flag and Marine Groups to other 4 ships of 1st 4 Divisions COM-
MENAGEMENT BAY (CVE 105) class carriers except CarDiv 27.
Navy Group in Flagship to have night fighter element of 8
VF(N). Marine Groups will be assigned CarDiv 27 according
CinCCH and CNO 052109 November 1944. with Navy Groups
initially in SULA GULF and SIBARAF of this Division. Comment.

27 14072
CINCWPAC to COM ALLIED AIR FORCES ADVANCED ECHELON info COMSOUTH
FLT. HQ USAF CHINA THIR ADLV ECH APO 579, HQ USAF CHINA THIR REAR
ECH APO 629, CO 14TH AIR FORCE ADV HQ COMDR, ALLIED NAVAL
FORCES (WASATCH) COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA), CINCPOA

CX 57087. Allied Air Forces are authorized to strike water targets
along the CHINA and INDO CHINA coasts in coordination with operations
of 14th Air Force. Coordinate with and notify 14th Air
Force direct of projected operations as nearly as practicable
24 hours in advance. Strikes on land targets along the CHINA
and INDO CHINA coasts will be made only at the request of
Commanding General CHINA Theater or by prior arrangement be-
tween Commanding General CHINA Theater and this headquarters.
Allied Air Forces authorized to strike the decks and shipping
area in SAMA BAY (16-15 north 109-30 east) as practicable.
Strikes will be coordinated with 14th Air Forces. Commanding
General CHINA Theater APO 879 and this headquarters will
be included as information agencies in all messages coordinating
air operations with 14th air force.

CNO to NAVOP/01

24 1323
CinCNPAC/CINCPAC Advanced Headquarters have been established.
The Staff functions of Plans and Operations will be conducted by
that command. Functions of Logistics. Military Government,
Administration and routine fleet movements East of Hawaii will
be conducted by CinCNPAC/CinCPAC Headquarters Pearl. To effect
distribution dispatch traffic the following categories and group-
ing of subjects have been established by CinCPAC. Category A:
Strategic planning. Operational Planning. Allocation of forces.
Aerological. Frequency coordination. Category B: Radar. IFP.
Counter measures. Administrative matters. Routine Logistical
administration. Electronic material. Category C: action reports,
Operation Plans. Logistic Planning. Intelligence. Area op-
erational matters (all services). Combat Readiness. Fleet
training and organization. Personnel. Public Relations. Convoy
and routing operational matters and operational communications.
Dispatches pertaining to items in category A are to be addressed
CinCNPAC/CinCPAC Advanced Headquarters. Category B to CinCNPAC/
CinCPAC Headquarters Pearl. Category C to CinCNPAC Headquarters
Pearl and Advanced Headquarters.
SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

28 0040 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC PEARL.

Refer Cincpac Pearl 221802. Commencing at 0000 GCT 29 January action will be taken by Advanced Headquarters on all matters contemplated by my 122322. No action will be taken here on despatches with date time groups of the 28th or earlier unless you refer them to Advanced Headquarters by procedure signal for action. Suggest you so refer all such despatches except those which require action without delay.

30 0023 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info CONGENPOA, CONGENTHARNY, COMGHQ PAC, PT SHATTER.

This is a partial report. Composition of 24 Corps as defined in Cincpoa serial 00010 60 has been accepted (CX 57234). All organizations defined in this serial under the 24 Corps will be attached immediately to 24 Corps for administrative control with the following modifications: AAA organization to remain in position until relieved at an early date, but not later than 22 February. All port companies, ammo companies, quartermaster service companies will continue on present duties in support of rehabilitation and loading of 24 Corps. 3722, 728 and 748 Signal Air Warning Companies will remain on present duties pending arrival of replacements. This is necessary in view of the integration of these organizations in the Central PHILIPPINES air warning nct. Constructions are now in preparation by GHQ SWPA to give effort to above. Para. General Engenbert and I confer and consider our mission in this regard fully accomplished. I plan to leave for PEARL as soon as above orders and instructions are published. All other matters satisfactorily concluded. From General Feldman.

30 1331 WEDEMEYER to CINCPOA–PEARL Info CHENNAULT, CHENNAULT to CINCPOA ADV.

Chennault was info Cincpoa got action on Wedemeyer 300823 GCT and now reencrypts action Cincpoa Adv. Hqtrs. "Contemplate B29 aerial mining ops of anch of TANGUZ RIVER west of 122 East Meridian. Request your concurrence."

16 2021 COMINC & CNO to CINC BR PAC FLT Info CINCPAC, CINCSONWSPAC, COMHTFLT ADMIRALTY, COMHYTE.

Welcome to service in the Pacific. Your 150136. Allocations to meet operational requirements of CinCSWPA and CINCPOA will continue to be made by me in consonance with arrangements made at HNPAC and in the same manner as is now done in my capacity as executive agent of the US Chiefs of Staff with respect to the US Fleet. Early information your 151241 on composition of units, dates of arrival of "Units and Authorities" in Pacific and of operational readiness requested.
01 0308 CTF 77 TO CINC SWPA TLMLAC Info CINCSWP A LETTE. CINCPAC ADV Hq.

In his 310122 to CTF 77 info CINCSWP A and others for planning purposes estimate as to release of 4 BBs. CINCSWP A 161236 concurred in by Cominoh 162220 contemplated retention in 7th Fleet of 4 BBs for "about 3 weeks". CINCSWP A 191252 indicated criterion for release date was "the installation of our air force on PHIL". Recommend release date of 3 February which coincides with inauguration of search plan J. Request instructions for reply.

CINCSWP A to CTF 77 Info GHO SWP A (LETT E). CINCPAC ADV Hq.

01 1243 Reference your 010308. Release of 4 old battleships now protecting the Lingayen Base can not safely be contemplated until heavy bomber strength which is installed in Clark Field. This is now proposed to be the end of February depending upon laying of gas line from SUBIC or MANILA BAY. But no exact fixed date can be given until dictated by the event. We will not have heavy bombers on JU. UN until then. What will be the naval dispositions you propose for the protection of this base if these 4 battleships are released under possible conditions of unfavorable weather fronts for air defense and the possibility of undetected night attack due to potential proximity of enemy fleet query this harbor holds approximately 400,000 tons of merchant shipping which figure will not materially change in the proximate future until our base is shifted to MANILA or SUBIC BAY.

02 2004 MACARTHUR to CG USAFPE Info CINCPAC ADV Hq. COMGENPOA.

CX 57472. Attention is invited to our CX 56786 and CINCPAC's 162133 to CINCWP A and CINCPAC's 290237 to COMGENPOA. In order to facilitate and expedite action on the numerous requests from COMGENPOA to COMUSAFPE for exemption of individuals from the general policy of the PIBAS Agreement, you are hereby authorized to communicate (communicate?) directly with COMGENPOA in all such cases involving individuals as differentiated from units or groups of individuals who are an integral part of a unit set up for transfer to SWF. In the case of requests for exemption of units from the general policy covering Army service units. Such exemption can be made only by mutual agreement between CINCSWP A and CINCPAC.

03 0453 CINC EASTERN FL T TO CINC US PAC FL T ADV. CINC US PAC FL T ADV. Info COMSTHFLT

FOC AIRCRAFT CARRIERS EASTERN FL T. FLAG OFFICER NAVAL ATTACHÉ CANADA. FLAG OFFICER FL T TRAIN BR PAC FL T.

In order to give operational flexibility it may be necessary as temporary measures to relinquish British CV at short notice with aircraft from US source. In an emergency US Helicot and Avenger could be operated by British carriers if air crews were equipped with US type helmets, telephones and oxygen masks. Corsair cannot be made interchangeable since folded height US Corsair is too great to be accommodated in British carrier. (3) It is therefore requested that 200 sets US helmets complete ear phone microphone and oxygen masks be supplied British Fl T at MANUS by 6th March in order set may be distributed to each CV. (4) It is not known whether reciprocal arrangements would also prove practicable.

06 1907 CINCPAC ADV Hq. to CINCSWP A Info COMSTHFLT.

Reference by request for COMSTHFLT to visit CASIGURAN SOUND and your concurrence. Request that as early as practicable you have made reconnaissance of that general area and advise me as to presence of enemy forces or installations including mines in the vicinity and as to the feasibility of its use as a fleet anchorage.

2744
06 1815 G Including CG CHINA THEATER ASC 879, CG CHINA THEATER (CHINA-ALIEN) CFB 67F, CG IATH AF, COMTHELF LANDOPS, 1ST AAF, GARR, CHINA 6TH US ARMY, GARR, 6TH US ARMY, COLOR ANP (JASONS-TOKICA-HOLLANDIA), CTF 73, GARR, ALLIED AF ADV ECH, CG 20TH BOMCCOM, CG 21ST BOMCCOM ADV ECH CH.

CX 57746. Reference our CX 57595 too 041534 OCT. Conditions airfields on Luzon due to heavy rains caused following changes in initiation of search Plan J; sectors from MOROTAI, MINDOLO, BORRIN and sectors J, K and L from LEYTE will be initiated on 7 February. LEYTE sectors OP and 1 will be flown beginning 10 February. Sectors 1 through 9 of search plan H will be flown from LEYTE until LINGAYEN fields are operational. You will be notified at an early date when entire search plan J is in effect. MacArthur.

08 0314 CINCSWPAC (ADV ECH GHO) to CINCPOA, COMTHELF Info CH, SWA, CINCFLUT.

CX 50326. In view of Para 2 of your 060758 providing strategic naval cover of LINGAYEN Base I have directed 7th Fleet to comply with request of Para 8. All these ships and all others which have participated in the operations have performed splendidly and fully maintained the highest traditions of the Navy. I am very proud and grateful to have had their invaluable assistance in this vital campaign.

08 1350 ARMY TRANSPORT COR, WASH DC (KELSEY AND AKEEN) to ATC HIGHWAY FIELD Info CINCSWPAC BOMB HQ.

Oceanic Air Traffic Control Plan as outlined in your letter dated 6 Jan 1945 has been approved by Gen. Arnold and by memo Admiral King has been so advised. Your AOEA directed to report to CINCPAC for temporary duty assuming the responsibility to establish overall policies and procedures with regard to the operation and extension of oceanic air traffic control centers in the Pacific. You subordinate officials in charge of each center will report to the respective area or sub area command with regard to air traffic control problems which are peculiar to the respective area. Problems of the area or sub area commands which may affect the overall policies and procedures will be referred to you for appropriate action. In case of tactical emergency your subordinate will report to the area command concerned. Advise if this clarifies the oceanic air traffic control situation in the Pacific area.

09 0900 CINCSWPAC to COMTHELF Info NAVMARS AT MANUS, COMMANDY LSG, CINCFLUT, COM SOG MANUS CH, SWA.

When operating as part of the United States Pacific Fleet the British Pacific Fleet will use facilities at MANUS on same basis as United States ships and logistics support being as arranged by CINCPAC. Para. Commander-Allied Naval Forces or COMTHELF will not provide personnel or material for construction or for other facilities nor allocate land areas unless specifically authorised by this headquarters. Service involving British Pacific Fleet as an independent entity in its relationship with the Southwest Pacific Area should deal directly with the Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area in all matters of policy such as those presented in your 080121. None of the matters to which you refer has been submitted to this headquarters and the Commander in Chief has no previous knowledge of them. The only information possessed by this headquarters was conveyed in verbal statement by CINCPAC to effect that British Pacific Fleet when operating as a part of the United States Pacific Fleet would use itself of anchorage facilities at MANUS with all logistic support being provided by BPF Train and that same facilities would be provided at ESPIRITU SANTO.
SECRET

FEBRUARY (COT)

090706 COMTHPIT to CTG 77.2 info CINCPAC TARAC & LTEE, CINCPAC ADV Hq, 100045 CINCPAC, CINCSWPAC, ALL TF AND TG COMS THPIT, COMTHPIT, CINCPAC TARAC, CINCPAC CINCSWPAC CINCPAC 5 & 13, COM 309 & 309 COMING.

TG 77.2 R. Adm. Weyer in PENNSYLVANIA, MISSISSIPPI. COMCICLIV 4 In 17. VIRGINIA, COLORADO. COMDESON 6 In VAURY. GUIDLY, GOOD, CAVL, TANAN.

DASHILII. Depart LINGAYEN GULF 10 February proceed via standard route CLEMANT and CARIBOU to LEYTE. ESA 15 knots. Upon arrival fuel all TFs. You are authorized to retain 1 DD at LINGAYEN to receive mail for ships your Task Group arriving accordance ComSerFor/7thFleet 071151 not to ALL. DO TO REJOIN TASK GROUP at earliest practicable time. Para. R. Adm. Weyer authorized to shift flag to MISSISSIPPI at discretion. Para. At LEYTE form TG 77.2 PENNSYLVANIA. STEWART, DASHILII. From LEYTE TG 77.2 proceed via approximate direct route to ULITHI. TG 77.2 proceed via route BUFFALO to MANUS. Upon arrival destination TG 77.2 and TG 77.2 dissolved. All ships report CINCPAC for duty. Para. Upon departure above ships from LINGAYEN remaining ships of present TG 772 redesignated as 77.3 East orders by separate despatch.

110043 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CINC BFP Info CINCPAC, CINCSWPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Until operational allocations units British Pacific Fleet are annouced by Cominch desire defer arrangements for anchorages forward of MANUS but to proceed with those for MANUS as expeditiously as practicable an assumption they will be necessary under cover of 100045 to CINCPAC. Request by despatch your detailed requirements for berths and shore facilities at MANUS including approximate date each project and estimate of officers men and construction required.

110045 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CINCSWPAC (ADV Hq) Info CINCH, CINCPAC, 100045 CINCPAC.

Para 1. Your 100050 see Cominch 092241. The provisions of NP-1 all f which were read by LtCol. Gen. Sutherland at LEYTE on 17 December include the following "Arrangements will be made by CINCPAC for the use of 'NP-1 by the British Pacific Fleet for anchorage and carrier aircraft as rapidly as circumstances permit. The "anchorage" requirements will be covered by separate despatch. Para 2. The initial arrangements needed for carrier aircraft are envisioned as similar to those planned at advanced anchorages in the Central Pacific; namely, "augmenting the American pools and their personnel with British aircraft and personnel. Later however it will be necessary that the British Fleet have shore facilities for refresher training of carrier pilots, for staging replacement air groups and for aircraft maintenance and repair. The date at which any existing air strip can be released at MANUS for these purposes should be determined by CINCPAC. Early advice on this point is requested. Para 3. Request your concurrence in general concept of foregoing after which I will submit to you such headquarters as you may designate a more detailed program covering aviation facilities for British Fleet at MANUS.
SECRET
FEBRUARY (OCT)

11 0144 COMAIRPAC ADMIN to CINC PAC ADV INFO COMSTC/ACT/POOL, 4TH FEB 1944 AF
PEARL, CONCORDIV.

Recommend: (A) CV SARATOGA resume training duties. A large carrier capable of exercising CVE’s in group operations at ‘SAIL’ prior combat assignment is an urgent requirement. This phase of training is impractical with CVEs now in CarTrainRonPac. Unless a CV is available replacement groups cannot be made fully ready for combat. (B) Night group composed of CV ENTERPRISE plus 1 CV (ESSEX) as designated by ComStC/ActPac for preferably Wasp, Essex, Yorktown or Hancock due imminent relief of assigned air groups. Assign to selected CV night group now in SAIL area. (C) All CVE and CVL require return for yard availability due to poor material condition and CVL MONTEREY will be unavailable due to recent damage. CVE JAMES require about 3 weeks availability and BATAN 10 days prior further assignment.

13 0620 CINC PAC ADV HS to COMAIRPAC, COMGENNAF-AREA, CINC D.A. BEACONSBCH, ADV INFO COMAIRPAC/STAFF, COMGENNAF/ADMIN, COMGENNAF-AREA, 13TH FEB 1944, 13TH FEB 1944

In order to provide as soon as possible staging facilities for 2 reserve carrier air groups in the HAWAIIAN and to maintain their combat efficiency, confirming conference agreement between CinCNAF and ComFwDArea the following plan will be implemented. 1. The 38th Bomb Group will be returned to the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS prior to 1 March 1945 leaving space for 1 carrier air group at KOBBER FIELD. ComAirPac will furnish acorn and CASU (F) to support this group and operate field to arrive as soon as possible after March 1st. Housekeeping facilities of 38th Bomb Group will remain as may be arranged between ComGenNAF and ComAirPac. 2. In order to make room for 2 reserve carrier groups at KAGAN POINT the 6th Night fighter squadron will be moved to KOBBER FIELD when the 38th Fighter Group moves forward about 4 May 1945 and the 38th component of the 38th Group will be retired. ComAirPac will provide acorn and double CASU (F) to support these 2 carrier groups and operate field. Additional housing and facilities will be necessary at KAGAN POINT. 3. Carrier groups will be required to furnish fighters for air defense of KAGAN-TINIAN area similar to provisions of aircraft operating policy and doctrine, Hawaiian Area, CinCNAF/CinCNE/A serial 06295 dated 7 Nov 1943. 4. KAGAN POINT FIELD and KOBLER FIELD will at dates to be announced later become Naval Air Bases under the type command responsibility of ComAirPac. 5. Previous plans for KAGAN POINT remain firm. 6. KAGAN FIELD will not be used for carrier aircraft aft 1 March and 11th Bomb Group will remain at Depot Field until staged forward.
151630 COMGHQ 6TH ARMY to COMAIRFLEET Info CINCPOA, 21JUL59

Cite WL 2447. Reference recce CASIGURAN shows your 13248 WTP no US garrison at present located DALER BAY. However our patrols have watched DALER and found no enemy activity. Lt. Chandlee with HMC Scout Team of 9 men and several guerrillas familiar with CASIGURAN area will be ready to come aboard at town of DALER beginning 14JUL and accompany task unit to CASIGURAN area and conduct reconnaissance. No info available from guerrilla sources on enemy strength or defenses CASIGURAN area. Map garrison in that area if any not believed in excess 15 to 16.

160219 ALASKA ROCKET to CINC INDIA PASS TO CHN PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS TO JAP PASS TO JPN PASS TO AK PASS. (141420)

Following received from Soviet Naval Staff: "Winter conditions of navigation in the KURILE area are often bound up with drifting on the ice and for that reason the possibility that Soviet transports may deviate from the established route and be carried together with the ice into the Pacific Ocean through 1 of the straits of the KURIL Chain, therefore please take these circumstances into account when issuing instructions to the Commanding Officers of the American warships and aircraft operating in these regions with the view of avoiding the consequences of continuously identifying Soviet vessels with those of another nation only on account of their deviation from the established route or their being involuntarily in Japanese territorial waters off the island of HOKKAIDO, as is the case of the KURILE Chain and the Gulf of ACH. In particular at the present time the Soviet vesselslikth PRIM and NAVITK are under threat of being carried into the Pacific Ocean together with the ice through the southern straits of the KURILE Chain. In case these vessels are carried out into the Pacific Ocean they were ordered to return to the KURILE area through the BERING STRAIT."
SECRET

FEVERARY (CCT)

17 0557 CINCPOA to CONFIDENTIAL Info COHNAIFT AG LIND, & 8000222111, GYFR ADY ISSAM SANGAN.

Request survey to determine feasibility improving infantry combat training facilities for Marine Division at SAI. Continue and Cardvic L00347. Use "SAINTAN as rehabilitation area for 1 Marine Division will continue indefinitely.

17 0608 CINCPOA ADV Hq to ALFAG Info COMINCH, SANGAN.

This is Cincpoc number 5. Whenever units of the British Pacific Fleet are involved include the secretary of the admiralty Whitehall London and the Cinc British Pacific in the distribution of copies of important plans and orders for the specific operations and corresponding operational reports.

17 0648 JINICOA ADV Hq to CONFIDENTIAL Info CONFIDENTIAL. CINCPOA, 8000222111, GYFR.

Para 1. Your 150527. Project approved in principle with the understanding that as much as possible of the training of Army replacements will be accomplished before they arrive in the forward area and that training in the forward area will be that which is essential to their readiness for operations definitely in prospect. Para 2. At earliest convenience request you submit to me by letter complete description requested by my 110449 and also copy of policy referred to in your 150527.

17 1220 CINCPOA ADV Hq to CONFIDENTIAL Info CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 150449 proposes to Cominch reassessment of Comondore 1944. The by my records is assigned to Pacific Fleet and is type commander for Motor Torpedo Boats, Pacific. That fact was taken into account in my papers to temporarily send MTBS from FLEET to CINCPOA. You may also recommended permanent assignment Moran to 7th Fleet but Cominch 150449 May stated he was there on temporary or indefinite basis. Please clear through me any recommendations concerning redist of Moran personnel and ships that may be temporarily under your command.

14 0544 CINCPAC to 8000222111 Info JINICOA, 8000222111, GYFR. PASSED ADY.

AD 51521-13TH. Basic plan as outlined in our previous information. In's land group 2000222 February 1945 is subject. Based in the Fleet are already taxed to the maximum in handling the units, ships, etc., in Army and marine troops presently being staged in that area for eventual return there. Establishment of bases in the Pacific islands is not yet due to handle a large volume of relieved troops in the immediate future. It is considered that redeployment of forces from our external areas the United States will be well under way by the time you are to be taken in the immediate future by naval ocean areas. Forces are secured and have been developed to the extent necessary to relieve, redeployed troops and force them issued equipment. Than any Air Corps unit presently committed to the Pacific Ocean Areas are already taking our facilities on Italian bases in the United States and those Army Air Force units presently arrive are a part of the total air units whose deployment is planned for Italian base. The islands of the MAJAN group are the only bases in the islands, except areas that are sufficiently organized and establish them to enable them to do
Continuation—

An appreciable number of redeployed troops in the Hawaiian area, by you, it is not considered desirable or practical to expect to redeploy troops through the Hawaiian Group base, moreover, it is essential that adequate service troops be sent to area in sufficient time to re-open facilities that have been placed in standby or near standby condition due to the fact that service troops previously assigned these facilities installations have been displaced forward to the area in operations currently under way or planned for the immediate future. The service troops must be brought to the Hawaiian Area sufficiently far in advance of other troops to have completed all necessary preparations for receipt of supplies and equipment. If these conditions can be met in the Hawaiian Group, it may be possible to receive a limited number of redeployed units in the Hawaiian Area, but it must be emphasized that service troops will arrive prior to other troops, and that equipment for standby-type organizations must be pre-shipped in its entirety in sufficient time to be available for redeployed troops upon their arrival, as depot stocks in the Pacific ocean Areas are insufficient to make complete issues of 7/8, including NSN items to units arriving without such equipment, and normal measures for supply of NSN items do not operate fast enough to insure pre-supply. War Department plan as proposed is not believed to be practicable for general application in the Pacific Ocean Areas and frequent changes in operational destinations of Army, Marine and Naval units which in the past have proven to be normal, make the adoption of such a plan exceedingly dangerous from the supply standpoint. It must also be pointed out that the adoption of War Department plan will require large stockpiles of equipment and supplies on each island base in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Redeployed troops will be used in operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas either in the actual assault on enemy held territory or will be part of the early garrison shibments for newly captured islands or land masses. It is not believed feasible to issue equipment and supplies as proposed by War Department under these conditions. Therefore, adequate facilities must be provided on the Mainland to permit a substantial portion of redeployed troops to be mounted (with prescribed equipment and supplies including ammunition) and combat or convoy loaded in the United States to go directly to the target. In the particular case of the South Pacific Area where units are moving direct to the Southwest Pacific Area, an agreement has been reached between the 2 theaters concerned, that units so destined for movement will move with full 7/8 as shipping space permits. Any change of this procedure to agree with part 4 of the referenced radio at this late date is considered undesirable. War Department plan under no circumstances can be placed in effect immediately in this theater and, insofar as it affects general purpose vehicles, it is believed that the proper stockage point for these vehicles is the west coast of the United States and not within the theater. In view of the statements made above, this headquarters can not concur in Plan A or B in Part 3 of your radio at this time.
16 1500 GAO to CINCPAC ADV HQ

House Appropriations Committee considering rebuilding and re-occupying Guam with view to using achievements there as model for extension of civil administration to other islands. It is requested that you furnish by 1 March the practicable information concerning character and extent of your projects and their effect on Civil Affairs in Guam during periods of military operations and Post-war activities including following subjects:
(1) Removal of war damage debris.
(2) Relocation of civil population.
(3) Restoration of dwellings and other buildings public and private.
(4) Building of roads expansion and relocation of government structures and public works for both military activities and island government.
(5) Acquisition of and compensation for land required for above.
(6) Re-establishment of former economic and cultural institutions.

13 0624 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC GACDIV-ATC (CINC JAEPC AC) INFO REHEARMWDL

In order that CINCPAC Advance Headquarters be kept informed of cases were aircraft under your flight control are missing, overdue, beyond fuel endurance, land request CATC furnish following information by dispatch:
(A) Report point of departure and time, ETA and destination.
(B) If overdue and presumed lost give pertinent details.
(C) When search is initiated inform CINCPAC when plane is located or presumed lost. Forward airmail gram list of passengers in cases where aircraft is declared lost.

18 1220 CTF 52 to CTF 41 INFO CINCPAC ADV HQ

Though weather has not permitted complete expenditure of entire ammunition allowance and more installations can be found and destroyed still more days of bombardment I believe landing can be accomplished tomorrow as scheduled if necessary. I recommend however special attention before and during landing to flanks and east coast of island with neutralizing fire and white phosphorus projectiles immediately available if required. Simplifying report follows immediately.

18 2215 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC ADV HQ INFO ALL TG COMMANDER

1st report of TOKYO strike. Task Force approach completely undetected and target area was not alerted until strikes neared targets. Weather condition both days low clouds and squalls over Task Force making extremely difficult flying conditions. Had to unsatisfactorily over target with much of target area completely closed in. Results of 2 days strike: 332 enemy aircraft shot down; 177 destroyed on ground; many others destroyed or damaged including at least 150 lst day. KUREAS, ships and installations destroyed at many airfields and air depots. Ota Airfield Plant effectively hit by 1 small strike. Mushashino Tama and Tashikawa engine plants each well hit by 1 Task Group strike. Bombing apparently excellent. 16 Feb., 7 coastal vessels sunk 1 DD 2 DE 1 AK. 20 coastal vessels damaged. TOKYO Area closed in most of Time preventing large percentage of strikes reaching assigned airfield targets, 17 February 1 CTF or CVE at YOKOHAMA hit with 6 quarter ton bombs set afire down and rolled over on side apparently resting on bottom. 2 coastal vessels damaged. Increasingly bad weather 17th and forecast of same for 18th dictated cancellation of plans for continuation of strike and retirement was started after recovery of early afternoon sweeps.
13 2215 **CONFIDENTIAL** TO CINCPAC ADV Hq. Info ALL TO ADV'S. Cf. 0720.

17th. Total air losses both days--Combat 49 aircraft 40 pilots 3 crewmen.
Operational--21 aircraft 5 pilots 4 crewmen. No report on recoveries.
No attacks reached our surface forces and no damage to our surface ships from enemy action. Special combat air patrol stationed over our rear
picket line between our force and TOKYO destroyed the few Japanese planes
that followed our returning strikes. 3x C.S. (0747) and 26x A.S. (1012)
in collision causing extensive damage to B.A. Not losing speed to 25
knots. Minor damage to B.A. H.M.S. 'UNION' (2222) forced to stay in
bay in racing enemy picket boat night 17th. Taking near vicinity
range too close for firing with picket boat and 2 men killed by USN
of task group. L.T.U. (3970) previously damaged 17th night, twice
by gunfire from same picket boat. H.M.S. LAI, 0025, fired independently,
SAIPAN 0025 SEAWAY 14 no. 13, night, attacking boats destroyed during night retirement 17th-18th. Boats attacked
of our pilots under hazardous flying conditions, suffering several
losses. We are aggressive and avoided our fighter planes about 0046
among our own vessels in TOKYO area. No shortage planes but possible shortage 1p.3p. gasoline.

To ridicule Jap superstition that weather is their immortal friend, present
publicity to effect that weather operated against them and allowed us to approach and 2 days attack by our forces without damage to us in near vicinity
TOKYO. I have sent following despatch to TF 556. Command and
all hands on a co-operatively well led job. Only damage from intelligent
teammwork by every member of task force 556 which resulted in historic results in spite of opposition by some enemy. I feel confident that our future operations will hurt the enemy even more. Maintain
5th Fleet and TF 55 desire express appreciation for excellent cooperation.

556 Command and TF 55 desiring to express appreciation for excellent cooperation.

59.3. Today's operations: Topping 10 nuts and 2000 hit last night
sweeps. Deck load strike by 2 Task Groups in beach of 13.

19 0150 CTF 51 TO CONFIDENTIAL TO CINCPAC BOTH Hq. TF 32nd & 33rd Fleet.

This is summary number 1. Following intense naval gunfire and air
bombardment, 5th Marine Corps landed as scheduled. B-25s en supported
by tanks landed by 0130. Little opposition was met initially, due to
mortar and artillery fire at 0600 on the beach. Mortar and artillery fire
developed on all beaches particularly on 0800 and 1100. Several 105s
on tanks and 120mm and 105s hit. 6 tanks and elements of the 27th Marines
reached southern edge of airfield by 1030. Front lines 1130 T.C. 1 in from
0700-1130. 7th Marine by 0700-1130. Several were hit. 105s on tanks and
120 mm and 105s hit last night by bombs. Casualties heavy. Will tow to TF 51.

19 0506 CINCPAC ADV Hq. TO CINCPAC, CINCBP, CTF 51, INFO 2, MILITARY.

Comdivs' concern, 17/02, concerns arrangements for 8th Official Area by British
Pacific Fleet. By 120047 states my desire to defer arrangements for
anchorage forward of 8th Official Area are announced by Cominch whose 0921h4 indicates his assumption that such arrangements
will be made by us.
SECRET
FEBRUARY (GCT)

190539 CINCIO ADV H. to CNO Info CINCIO BAG H. 250119N 163350E

Ref UR 071938. Although some undesirable delay will follow in starting program at GUAM as well as some decrease in dredging capacity due to limited operations as agreeable in interests of overall war effort to leasing dredges NH & GOLK and KB1 51/2X to CINCPAC it is expected you procure replacement dredges of similar equipment. An estimated date of arrival this theatre, dredges, will be available. Dredges of similar types and capacities considered satisfactory replacements. If you excur I can order both dredges immediately and attend the plant including first 2 days at time of arrival from PHIL to CINCPAC. Before any such orders are placed it is very important that definite arrangements be made for replacement of two of three return of dredges NORFOLK and BAY 5000 as I have already received very possible losses in operating them the operations scheduled late this year. It is in line with order to follow suggestion of your 071938 to integrate dredging requirements of both as I am without authority in that area and as such, directly informed as to their requirements. In view of foregoing request you make arrangements for replacements mentioned above and prescribe date for return of dredges to CINCPAC.

190823 CINCIO ADV H. to ALLIGA Info CINCPAC

The officers and men of the First Carrier Task Force of the Pacific Fleet have dealt the enemy a crushing blow which will long be remembered. The same courage, skill and teamwork which enabled our carriers to destroy the enemy in bad weather over CINCPAC are now in effect. The forces which are taking WAK in only 240 miles of CINCPAC. They will also bring success when our troops land in Japan itself covered and supported by the ever increasing power of our air arm and the fleet of the Fleet, Japan. To those brave officers and men whose names are in combat and also to those whose support and assistance rear areas are essential to their success "Well Done".

191129 CTF 93 to CINCIO ADV H. IN INFO CINCIO BAG H. 250119N 163350E

CTF 93 to CINCIO ADV H. INF CINCIO BAG H. 250119N 163350E

G605 7th BomberCom 7th Air Force CINCPAC 250119N 163350E

In 14 hour flight over Iwo Jima 6,5000 foot were made. Libs used to cause over local station 8,000 pound bombs dropped at target area. 3rd ground target was made. 3rd squadron arrived target late due to 3500 pound bombs. 1 day a 2000 pound bomb dropped and landing. 7 Libs dropped 1800 pound at 181000 west 110000 to 182300 UTC. 36 bombs had 6 hour delay 36 more had 5 hour delay. 36 bombs next 5 to 304000 west 110000 to 114000 UTC.
SECRET

February (ct)

19 1144 CINC PAC ADV, to CINCPAC Info Hq, as follows: SUBJ: CINC PAC, CINCPAC, PEARL HARBOR:

CONFIDENTIAL. RE: SHIPMENT TO KUALI'I:

The routing of HULL to KUALI'I, despite injury to W представляется целесообразным. The routing of HULL to KUALI'I is causing unnecessary delays, the reasons for which are (A) The scarcity of available U.S. escort vessels and (B) the inability to use a U.S. escort vessel at KUALI'I, with the existing call-up of SEABEE's to anchor in a bay directly under a mountain, 12 miles from Pearl Harbor. A shipping to the west coast of the United States is not practicable. A vessel proceeding to or from KUALI'I should be able to proceed through the HULL Limited of the United States, and it will be the view of (A) The probable receipt in time of the escort vessels by the time of the receipt of the vessels, and in the meantime, the time from a somewhat shorter distance to the anchorage is less. To effect the departure of the vessels in a timely manner, every other day by this plan it is expected that the escort vessels will be brought into the area, and as a result, using the escorts for each convoy, the escort vessels will be able to cover the area and provide for the escorts required for the various vessels. It is not possible to preclude that a U.S. Navy escort vessel will not make the voyage. Each escort vessel for temporary operational control to the parent area is established and to be replaced on a ship for the basis of 150,000.

Until 180347 not to all. Agreements reached at the meeting of 15 September 1944, and restated in your letter of 10th, to the effect that CINC PAC shipping to KUALI'I would be moved forward on call from CINC PAC. Your 240225 of Nov and 2534 of Dec, and your letter of 15 Oct of Nov 120106 of Dec established that a reporting office at KUALI'I would be responsible for calling forward of shipping at KUALI'I, and to report to the nearest possible dispatch. In this connection see my despatch of 180347 of 15 Oct 150715 should ensure to institute call forward to meet logistic requirements in KUALI'I. The logistics situation has been such as to procedure for expediting movement of ships.
20 0728 CINCPAC ADV Hq to RDO WASHINGTON Info COMINCH, NAVY.

The Honorable Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: My heartfelt thanks for the message of congratulations just received from the House of Representatives to the officers and men of the United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. We are enormously proud to have the confidence and encouragement of the House. There exists with us a keen awareness that our achievements can be traced back to those who were instrumental in providing us with the means to outshoot, outfight and overpower the enemy. The victories we are winning in Japanese home waters had their genesis on Main Street and in the Halls of Congress. We are profoundly grateful for this continued generous and enthusiastic support. Your heartening message was transmitted at once to everyone under my command. Signed C.W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

20 1421 CINCPAC ADV Hq to COMAFDBEA, COMNORTHSEA Info 7 DEEP Kop, L. U. S., ROSSO, SCAPA, CINCPAC PEARL Hq, CINCSOA.

In every convoy to the westward include all Southwest Pacific shipping now in port or enroute which is destined for LSTs. Such shipping will no longer be held awaiting call forward unless specifically directed by CINCPAC. Convoys routed direct from ENIWETOK or ULITHI to LSTs shall include SWAC shipping to destination. CINCPAC will escort own shipping departing ROSSO for LSTs. Expedite movement all possible.

20 0925 CG LANFORD to CTF 56 Info CTU 56.2, CTF 56.2, CTG 56.3, RCT 21, MDC 3RD MARDIV.

This is part 1 of 200925. This is my dio summary from 0000 Feb 19 to 1000 Feb 20. During night of D-Day 11 DD's 2 CA's and 2 16L mortar units supported the Corps. A total of 143,000 rounds of 4.2 mortar was fired. Night activity characterized by intermittent mortar and mortar fire falling on both dives. At 2315 enemy attempted to infiltrate our lines on west coast by landing barge in zone of 28 Feb, but were repulsed. At about 0345 1 battalion enemy counter attacked across airfield No. 1 but were repulsed by RCT 27. Dives commenced a coordinated attack at 0930 preceded by air, artillery, and AMP preparation and b. 1300 had advanced about 500 yards to the north while RCT 28 had made gains of about 200 yards against CHAM Mountain to the south. Intermittent mortar, artillery and rocket fire fell on troops during the morning, especially on beaches GREEN, RED, and BLUE 1. During the early afternoon 4th MARDIV beaches received very heavy concentrated mortar fire. Our artillery situation had improved by noon and 4 complete Bns and halves of 2 other Bns were ashore and firing in support of the attack. Slight gains were made during the afternoon against increasing resistance. Fighting against heavy resistance the total advance of the day was approximately 800 yards in 5th MARDIV's zone of action and from 200 to 800 yards in the 4th MARDIV's zone of action. 11 DDs, 4 CA's and 3 BBS supported the attack throughout the day.

2755
20 2305 CINCPAC ADV H. to COMSOUTHFLT, CO'AIRPAC Info CTF 51, CTF 59, PACIFIC, CHINA, PEARL, CONCORD, CONCORD IV.

Part 1. Following plan will be followed to provide for night fighters and also accelerated carrier training during 1st phase of next operation. (A) SARTOGA will be returned to ComCarTrainRon immediately upon completion of operations. (B) INDEPENDENCE and BATAAN will arrive U.S. with standard groups not later than 13 March. (C) ComAirPac will equip temporarily the 2nd Essex Class carrier, practical for sending forward from PEARL with night group, using units now in SARTOGA at discretion. Para 2. ComAirPac nominate carrier for purpose in Sub-para 1(c) above and advise probable date of joining Task Force 58.

21 0306 CINCPAC PEARL H. to CNO (DNST) Info CINCPAC ADV, CIGNICAO.

The practice indicated in WARX 31659-3rd of the War Dept issuing instructions to subordinate commands in this theater which affect employment of shipping within the theater is considered to be at variance with policy set forth in JCS 100345 Dec. The 1st reference did not include CINCPAC as an adder and its implementation without CINCPAC's knowledge has caused the embarrassing situation indicated ComCinDrPAACoGON 090456 and CINCPAC 11010. Concur in the objective sought by the 1st reference but does not concur in the method of implementation established therein. Request this be brought to attention Chief of Transportation ADV.

21 0500 CTF 51 to COMSOUTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH H., ALL TFs PEPHILEFT.

Summary No. 5 211200. Para. Landing Force resumed attack 0910 objective capture of airfield No. 2 the 0-2 line and slopes of MT. LUMICHLI. The advance is being met with heavy machine gun, sniper and mortar fire. Para. During the night 20-21 only minor ground activity was reported. Numerous attempts at infiltration made along entire front but were unsuccessful. A local counter attack supported by several tanks and artillery was made against the Corps left flank at 2200 but repulsed by CT 27. Small arms mortar artillery fire and sporadic rocket fire continued against our front. Numerous enemy defense installations require taking by individual troop action. Para. Our lines as of 1146 K (-10) reported as follows: From TA 132 R to 131 E thence along west coast to 117 W thence 139 UX south edge. 138 E 135 W to 126 D. Para. 1st estimate of casualties as of 21 0800 K (-10) approximately 150 officers 350 enlisted men of which 300 are wounded and on board ship. Total of 20 LVT's destroyed 20 under repair 320 serviceable. 13 LVT's (A) have been destroyed with 1 under repair and 78 serviceable. 12 tanks destroyed leaving 10 serviceable 10 under repair 16 unserviceable 7 bogged down. II MARINES destroyed 19 trucks 3 cranes 3 bulldozers 1 tractor knocked out. Ammunition dump on RED Beach 2 B 02 UF during night, 1 supply dump on beach BLUE 2 destroyed this morning. 4th BN 1st Marines lost 7/105 1x Howitzers in DUCKS which sink due to rough water. Para. Naval gunfire positioned illuminating harassing and interdicting missions throughout the night with 2 cruisers, 11 destroyers and 2 gunboat support units. Naval gunfire has continued throughout the morning with scheduled fire and call missions. Total scheduled air strikes have been augmented by 4 special large strikes from fast carriers making total of more than 800 airplanes on direct support missions today. Para. SHANGI and AT's CHICAGO and BATTLE arrived fueling and ammunition replenishment area in progress. LEXAN (AV 196) (2 groups garbled) retirement suffered steering casualty and rammed U. S. NAPA (APA 218) causing considerable damage on port side abreast number 4. Hold latter ship but in no immediate danger. LEXAN has minor damage.

---Continued---
SARATOGA received hit by 5 inch ricochet from friendly firing vessel but projectile did not explode. STRAND while rendering close in fire support hit submerged object on reef damaging port propeller. PHOENIX hit by mortar fire with slight damage. No casualties. LVT's and DUCKS continued unloading ammunition and rations throughout night. Demolition units started at daybreak to clear wrecks from Y/20 and BLUE Beaches. Causeways are being placed on beaches this morning.

21 0550 COMSTAGT to CINCPEAC BOTH Hq. Serious problem in amphibious landings on strongly defended objectives in present inability quickly locate concealed enemy mortar batteries and artillery firing on our troops. Any plan already developed or which can be developed by scientific research will be of great value in future operations. New subject. CV and CVL task force 53 successfully arrived at sea by SHASTA and WASHINGTON. Transfer rate initially .6 tons per hour improving to 30 tons. SHASTA recommends issue load of 400 tons by 290053 January. Results substantiate previous conclusions. With experience increased transfer rate possible.

21 1210 COMSTAGT to COMPEAC BOTH Hq. ALL TPC FIFTHFLEET

Summary No. 6 211800 K(-10). Ground attack continued this afternoon against heavy opposition consisting of intense small arms heavy weapons and artillery fire. Bombs and minesfields covered by enemy mortar and artillery fire slowed the advance. Resistance was best organized and most severe in center of the Corps zone just south of airfield number. . 1ST 28th attack against MT JUNINACHI has been against very strong defence. By 1500 they reported reaching the base of MT JUNINACHI and were using flame throwers on defensive installations. 4 tanks supporting this attack were casualties due to mines. Demolition equipment and personnel from 5th Engineer BN are with 1ST 28 to assist in their advance. 1ST 28 reported counter attack in the area east of MT JUNINACHI at 1200 which was repulsed. Numerous booby traps and terracotta mines have been encountered. 1ST 21 in Corps Reserve completed landing at 1600. Coordinated attack will be resumed tomorrow morning for the capture of O-line. Para. Latest estimate indicates 962 enemy dead counted since D-day. Only 1 prisoner of war captured to date. Estimate received from Landing Force Commander that there are 1000 additional naval troops above the original estimate on LÉ JIMA. His estimate indicates a total 20,000 enemy on D+8 JIMA on D+8. Troops were ordered to fire in at 1700 on most suitable terrain in their forward areas prepared to meet possible counter attack tonight. Some variation occurred in the lines during the day. At 1700 we held the general line from TA 202 W to 131 JN (where along west coast to 197 Y thence 198 V south edge 192 N. 129 W. 133 RMY 166 E. Para. LCM 43 sustained considerable structural damage due to rough sea while unloading transports. Temporary repairs to APA will permit speed of 10 knots but requires docking. LOGAN damage requires repair ship. Para. NAPA reports 3 men missing. During the day BB and heavy cruisers supported attack by deep supporting fires. This was in addition to normal close support. Para. Air attacks separate with summary tomorrow. Para. Special report on beach conditions. Breakers not heavy but are a handicap due to steep slopes. Soil on all beaches of volcanic ash extends from 20 to airfield No. 1, very loose and will not permit passage of any type of wheeled vehicle. Almost entire beach

- Continued -
21 1210 CTF 51 to COMFLEFlT Info CINC PAC BOTH H., ETC. (CONT'D)

Frontage now congested with wrecked LCP's, LVT's, vehicles, and tanks. Supplies being furnished to troops inland only by LVT's. Demolition teams now clearing beach wreckage. Marston beach matting being laid but much will be needed. 3 mat roads completed to top of ridge. Mortar fire on beaches diminishing in intensity since 1000 but still a serious problem. Only satisfactory landing craft are LVT, LCT, CT and LVT. Trying to get portion causeways rigged will try unloading by personnel barges. Net result is that while about 12 LVT's are unloaded transports average only about 30 percent. This means considerable delays in unloading garrison echelons. Beaches west coast under investigation but not believed suitable.

25 0433 COMFLEFlT to COMTHFLS Info LINC LAX 4TH H. COMDR, AX 566-435, 0433.

Desp. OpPlan 2-40. MOUNT 25 current operations permit form Task Unit designated CASSIVAY SOUND. This unit composed of 2 DD or DE 24 AR, equipped for sweeping 1 LC AL, 1200, 1 PT. Enemy occupied in a line of strength points along east coast of LUCON. Enemy air on KURUM is not now present. Scattered enemy mines are operating in企業 NORTH waters. There are no known enemy mine fields coast defense installations are in use in the CASSIVAY SOUND and Bay section of Eastern LUCON. Although NAKA BAY and DUGALEH BAY are reported to be mined. Elements of the 6th CTH have occupied NAKA and DUGALEH BAYS. Friendly submarine are operating in Eastern LUCON waters. Para 2. This force will investigate CASSIVAY SOUND and BAY SOUND for the purpose of determining the presence or absence of enemy forces or installations and suitability as a fleet anchorage. Para 3. Assemble Task Unit at LEPTE earliest practicable date. Then 18, proceed BAY BAY contact local 6th Army Commander and arrange for local embark scouts. Proceed CASSIVAY SOUND land scouts as previously arranged with 6th Army to determine presence or absence of enemy forces or installations CASSIVAY SOUND Area including near enemy landing field on west side of sound. Take exploratory gates in CASSIVAY SOUND and BAY. Inform COMFLEFlT by despatch, progress of operations and results of mission. Without interfering with primary mission destroy any enemy forces encountered. Return to destination arranged with 6th Army upon completion debarkation return LCT. BAY unit dissolves on arrival. Arrange air cover with Allied Air Forces. In order avoid accidental engagement keep all interested commanders informed on movements. Logistics at LEPTE. Communication in accordance CABP MTN Plan 5-44. Comm7thFlt at TOLOHA. Para Comm7thFlt and all interested the names and radio calls of vessels in Task Unit as soon as assignments are made.

21 1328 CINC PAC to CINCPOA ADV. COMFLEFlT Info COMTHFLS, CINCPOA WACs, CMY AIR, COMMAIRED AIR FORCES, ADV ECH CHI.

CZW 10744. There follows answer to Cincpoa's 110045 and Comm7thFlt's 160443.

POWAD island field with facilities thereat allocated Cincpoa for use of British Pacific Flt effective 14 Mar 1945. Comm7thFlt is authorized to complete all arrangements by direct correspondence with Cincpoa. Cincpoa accepts no obligation for additional construction except from forces locally available which are not required for other projects in Southwest Pacific Area.
21 1730 CINCPA to CINCPA ADV, COMTHFLT, Info COMINCH. CINC PAC AIR, 11th AAF, COMM. COMMTN, AIR FORCES, ADV SCH ORG.


22 0234 CINCPA ADV to COMINCOA Info CINCPA PBUL.

I concur in the comment of your serial 0091 of 10 February 1945 and do not consider that PILSAS Agreement is applicable to overhead allotment of SoPacBCom. Request you initiate request direct to Chief of Staff US Army to implement sub paragraph 5(b) of your serial 0091.

22 0410 CTF 51 to TF 54, CTF 53, CTG 56.1, CTF 56 Info TG 51.1.

Ammo expenditures have been enormous and at present rate exhaustion of effective gunfire support will occur in 2 days despite constant replenishment. Up to present night firing has been very wasteful and much of it unnecessary. It must be reduced both for AA common and star shell. It will hereafter be limited to firing for counter battery, to break up counter attacks and disperse assemblies. Continuous star shell illumination can not be maintained. Ammo quota each night hereby established at 300 AA common and 50 stars per ship for 2 to 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers. The amount of ammo expenditure during the day must also be reduced (it is essential that Division and Regimental Commanders exercise a more rigid control of Battalion calls with a view to better and more efficient coordination).

22 0818 CINCPAC ADV HJ to COMGENNAAF/COA Info COMINCH.

Your 220131. Do not desire participation in proposed conference by officers assigned to the Pacific Ocean Areas. Coordination of intertheater communications should be effected by JCS or by arrangements between the Theater Commanders.

22 1240 CTF 51 to COMTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HJ, ALL TF COU/TS STEH.

This is Summary No. 8 221800 H. Our troops continued attack this afternoon against stubborn resistance. RCT 21 on the left flank of the 4th Division was pinned down by heavy rifle and mortar fire and made only slight gains to the north against airfield center (number) 2. The 5th Division on the left flank advanced about 200 yards north of the 0-1 line but were unable to advance further ahead of RCT on their right. RCT 48 supported by tanks artillery demolitions and flame throwers continued attack on MT SURIBACHI. Strong reconnaissance patrols were sent up the cliffs and existing trails and were met by enemy troops dropping hand grenades and demolition charges. At 1400 it was reported that the base of the crater was entire circled and that the elimination of enemy defenses was progressing. In the attack today the 5th MarDiv was supported by 3 Bns of the 13th Field Artillery and 1 Battery of 360M Artillery.

- Continued -
22 1240 CINCPAC ADV to CHINICAC. CINCPAC: CINCPAC/CHINICAC: CHINICAC. CHINICAC.

5 Bns of Field Artillery were in support of the 4th Div. Strong enemy counterattack was reported organizing on the right flank of the Corps at 1100 and was taken under fire by naval gunfire and BCT artillery. Report of 1600 indicated the counterattack materialized but details not available. BCT 26 reports a strong enemy counter attack at 1700 along their front on the left of the Corps front. The attack was reported repulsed at 1810. At 1650 troops were ordered to link and prepare to resist counterattack and infiltration tonight. The attack will be continued at 0730. Arranged in boundaries objectives and zones of action. Front lines as of 1600 are as follows: PH in the north, 132 UV-LKF 131 TH thence along west coast to south of PH. 1278 NCT 174 14th BCT thence along west coast to south. 13th BCT reports as of 1300 21 February: Landing Force 1 at BCT 13 1231, 1311 TLK 1460; MIA 560. Total for RCT 15 1072. Total of ground forces 2454. Enemy counted dead reported as of 1230 2 February total 1311. Prisoners of war 24. Naval gunfire support has been hampered by unfavorable weather conditions with heavy rain and low visibility.

22 0247 CINCPAC ADV to CHINICAC. CINCPAC: CINCPAC/CHINICAC: CHINICAC.

7th Fleet has commenced facilities on shore 30. With all other equipment to the limit of its resources while simultaneously meeting requirements to support active fleet operation at TODAY. Numerous minor operations are to follow in rapid succession. It may become necessary to withdraw some of this manpower to get essential work elsewhere in the area. For at least 4 months after arrival of the first landing naval forces at LCTs must in general be supported by only a limited provis довольные силы. Also there will be an almost complete lack of harbor craft small boats, small oars, water barges and other essential ships. I have taken steps to ensure that at least one ship on shore can be built up. Requested 2000 to be authorized correspond directly with COMSOUTH in order to arrive at an understanding as to levels and responsibility for maintenance.

22 1303 CINCPAC ADV to CHINICAC. CINCPAC/CHINICAC: CINCPAC: CINCPAC/CHINICAC: CHINICAC. CHINICAC.

According CINCPAC 21 1730 use of "AIUs as a fleet anchorage as a temporary, carrier pool and arrival of liaison officers are urgent is required. Requested you make detailed arrangements direct with COMNAV FAST. I will advise you concerning use of airfield and establish a pick-up as soon as I can.

22 2343 CINCPAC/CINCPAC ADV to CHINICAC. CINCPAC: CINCPAC/CHINICAC: CHINICAC. CINCPAC/CHINICAC: CHINICAC.

Your 201608. Delays of more than a few days in routing of 2nd A slipping through FPA have in the past resulted from the fact that shipping was not called forward by the SNSA regulating officer in FPA. By 191603 and 201603 were issued with the idea of alleviating this condition. If all limitations requiring the calling of ships forward are removed if a ship should reach the westermmost staging point (either TUS or ENA, whatever you select) ex found, then after which their onward sailing will be entirely within your own control.
This is my Summary Number 9 231200 K(-10). Both fronts were relatively quiet during the night 24-25 Feb. Casualty infiltration tactics were attempted but without results. Group of enemy infantry crossed our front line in rear of lines of CTF 26 which required counter attacks by heavy mortar and artillery fire, 3/26 was held up on the right with 2/27, 3/26 (from left to right in line); 4th Platoon on the right with 2/21, 1/21, 2/24, 3/24, 1/24 (from left to right in line). CTF 26 reported 1555 1500, 2750, 4000 casualties. Resistance continued heavy but reports indicate that the advance is continuing. CTF 38 on the south continued to take over the town T. Suribachi and at 0735 reached the rim of the crater on the north, finding up operations proceeding a few thousand feet. The 13 and 14 Marine artillery is in direct support of the attack. Intend landing headquarter and 3rd Platoon of 1st Battalion in February, 11th, Front lines as of 1600. JAPAN area north coast no change. North front lines are from 17177-17173. 183-185, 185-183 PANGONG. Para. Night illumination and interdiction air strike was delivered during the night by 3 cruisers 11 DD's 1 motor support unit. Scheduled and call fire continued throughout the morning and 1st Platoon is embarking casualties. Rough water has interfered with operations of boats. Para. Scheduled air strikes are being carried out with emphasis on destruction of pin point targets south of the air control unit. Strike this 221200 servicing 3 damaged of 10 planes on ground. 14 small craft seen. 2 TBD's were damaged by enemy anti-aircraft fire but both returned. Air artillery spotting plane reports enemy AA fire launched white light parachute at 2000 feet. Each parachute was suspended by a 4 foot cable to an object 2 feet long which started streamers of fire. It has now been determined that 2 TBD planes from ENTERPRISE which were searching for JAPAN AA were shot down about 1530 22 February instead of 1 plane as reported in my Summary No. 8. A search for survivors from this plane and for crews of 2 missing SARATOGA is continuing. Para. Beach conditions are as fast improved. BLUE 1 and YELLOW 2 were subjected to some mortar fire early this morning and several snipers killed near beaches. 3 roads now exist for vehicles from YELLOW beaches to airfield. Beach 1 remains 1 exit for tracked vehicles and 1 for wheeled vehicles. Beach 2 has 3 for tracked vehicles and 1 for wheeled vehicles. Beach 3 has 1 for tracked vehicles. BLUE 1 has 1 road for tracked vehicles. BLUE 3 has 1 constant road when free of enemy machine gun fire. Weather pretty cloudy, visibility good JUL 20-25 knots. 6 foot breakers on eastern beaches and choppy enough off shore to impede unloading and replenishment of ammunition.

23 0606 CONSTRATARIPOA to CTF 51 Info CINCAC, COM AF 7, CTF 92.

0413. All units of CTF 92 are standing by and available to assist you in any manner you desire. If and when you call for strikes please specify targets, time, and type of bombs desired. Liberators are prepared to bomb from 4,000 to 6,000 feet.
Ref: Marshall signed Maxwell 221906Z. Cincoha will be glad to facilitate the purposes of visit of General Maxwell and his party. In matters which are not strictly Army but do concern Pacific (sea areas I request be confer with by Deuty Vice Admiral Towers instead of directly with any subordinate member of my staff as indicated in reference. Admiral Towers will arrange for such conferences as may be found necessary with other officers under my command.

2) 1550 OFF 51 to CINCPAC HQ:

This is my Summary Number 10 231000 K(-10). Stubbren resistance from concrete pillboxes, caves and entrenchments continued to limit the advance of our ground forces. Limited gains were made in the zone of action of the 4th Carivy on the Corps right with a maximum advance of 200 yards in the area of the 24th RCT. The 4th Carivy on the left held position along the C-1 line. RCT 21 in the center has encountered the stubborn defense of airfield No. 2. RCT 28 in the CHIBHI area continues to make progress. Blockhouses and pillboxes have been reported within the crater. "10" enemy dead counted in the RCT 28 area. Enemy landing craft and support fire reported from KUNOBU ROCK were elminated by DD curfew. Battery A, 1/20th Corps Artillery landed in general support. Recommand that the Corps Artillery be ordered to land during the day. Front lines of 10/11 are: JUTWACH area no change. North from TA 177 to TA 178 to TA 182 to GANA 18 to IROHO 184 to TA 167 to Para. Naval gunfire continues to support the ground troops. Ammunition replenishment was carried out throughout the day by RSNAGSA from transports, DOS from 24th RCT. LCIs from LSTs. Replenishment is slow because of rough wind and sea. The following operational casualties are reported: LST 207, LST 107 while retreating from beach. Extensive damage forward including 5 foot hole starboard bow doors and machinery decked in starboard anchor was lost. Emergency repairs will be made prior to retirement to rear area. LST 716 lost ramos. Emergency repairs to weld steel bulwarks and steel ramp are underway. DB 361 has leak in hull but ship is still operational. DC 1027 snapped starboard shaft. In operational and can use 13 knots. DC 877 has damaged starboard propeller but operational and can use 13 knots. COCSE burned out anchor engine with 30 fathoms of chain out. Repairs by ship's force in progress. LSM 92 fouled by wire in position. Efforts to remove it are underway. Para. Air struck in support of ground troops continued through the day. Correction by Arm Aggs. Fire on TMBs from ANTIKIAE was from unit with GUERRA but not from that vessel. 1 TMB from VIVIDIA BAY has been missing since 2000 22 February after reporting a contamitated water landing 21 days bearing 356 from OK. Immediate surface search was made and 2 searches on 23 Feb resulted in no results. At 1350 23 Feb an OS2U plane from NAVADA crashed inside our Lines on F.O. Pilot Lt. Hugh Shibley, USS K-114; Cts. John and Friday USMC passenger seriously injured. All plane documents retrieved and burned. Latest check on survivors from BOSAK BAY indicates 10 officers 54 enlisted men survived out of 124 officers and 366 enlisted men on board. Figures include squadron V C-36 and passengers. Large personnel loss considered due to initial explosion and fire amplified by later explosion of torpedoes. Para. Sweep of CHIBHI JUFA was made during afternoon of 23 Feb by planes from fast carriers O PAULS and V CONN. One plane from SAUAI TDW was reported down 10 miles from target. Airsea rescue operations underway. Para. AIRPRO & NAFO beach considerably improved. Supplies continue to be landed by LSTs, LSTs and LSTs. Troops report other trailer highly successful in moving supplies over heavy sand. - Continued -
are effective in carrying supplies to front lines. Supply dumps are being set up and this will relieve congestion. Beaches CVL 11 and NAVY are continuing to receive anti-aircraft or artillery fire which impedes work considerably. Seventeen barges and causeways not being used due to steep beach and heavy surf causing breaches.

23 2315 CTF 51 to CTF 92 Info CTF 92 to CTF 51. ALL TRAFFIC IN THE AREA.

Appreciate your training. Request you make day and night strikes on CVL 11, JNA and MBD 7A Fording. JNA, and MBD 7A for neutralization of airfield and destruction of aircraft and ships. For insertion and resupply of personnel and equipment by carrier planes will be continued except in emergency.

24 0700 CTF 51 to CTF 92. Info CTF 92 to CTF 51. ALL TRAFFIC IN THE AREA.

January 11. 21. 1000 K-10. Ground forces had relatively quiet night. Minor attempts at infiltration sporadic mortar and artillery fire. CVL 11 resumed attack with the objective the general line 1ST 2010 1315 northeast road junction 304A 2001 2201 134A 2201 2006. Heavy air effort on its line 1ST 2010 1315 northeast road junction 304A 2001 2201 134A 2201 2006. Heavily supported by heavy air and naval artillery bombardment. In general areas 199 and 200. Tanks supported the attack. No commences had been gained in the center along southeast edge of the division. Unsuccessful against stiff enemy resistance. CTF 91 continued supporting a small area. Patrols have entered the crater. (recent news as 0310) CTF 122 132 140 141 131 134 2010. All Corps artillery in area. 23 LioFor assumed command where 0755. CTF 91 and LioFor commander continued hard hitting at 0200 on beach 1512 1000 and 1010. Tanks and anti-aircraft have been introduced to assembly area last night. Casualty reports as follows: as of 231000 KIA 706, WIA 525, WIA 971, 4 casualties by anti-aircraft fire during air raid. 2 casualties by unknown fire. 114 casualties continue to support the ground forces. Heavy voice tape launched from shore this morning in support of the attack. Casualty situation as follows: LST 47 had near miss by bomb. No mentionable damage. 114 casualties. 114 46 hit by enemy artillery fire from 200 yards west of landing. 2nd hit port structure dock starting small fire and damage in ship's office. 2 dead 9 wounded. 114 464 hit by enemy artillery fire 200 yards east of water line after passing cargo compartment. 114 464 hit port superstructure dock starting small fire and damage in ship's office. 2 dead 9 wounded. 114 464 hit by small arms fire. 114 464 hit by small arms fire. 254 324 hit by small arms fire. 254 324 hit by small arms fire. 254 324 hit by small arms fire.

- Continued -

27E
Summary No. 12 241800 K(10). Enemy resistance remained strong throughout the afternoon. Artillery and heavy weapons fire increased as the attack progressed. Intermittent heavy artillery fire fell in area north of HOTA IV airfield. Many enemy anti-aircraft guns were destroyed since landing by mines. 21st CT and 5th MarDiv ashore were ordered ashore by 4th MarDiv. 2nd Engineers, 4th Engineer BN and Engineer Combat BN ordered ashore by 4th MarDiv. 24th Div ashore under 3701. HOSPITALS 15000 1 stripe airfield No. 1 cleared since landing. South end beach west 2 co-located with south end beach Y-2. 15000 included. Caused to control 3rd MarDiv 1600. Jar defended 3rd MarDiv 1505. {}
casualties tomorrow. SC 1027 breakdown in port facilities. SC 202 extensive damage - port facilities. 5, 9, 11, 16, 20, 21 extensive hull damage. SC 202 extensive hull damage. SC 1027 extensive damage. Other ships while unloading 250 hits. SC 118 damaged by ICI 365 receiving 12 inch hits. SWP receiving 15 inch hits. Missions flown. Number strikes retake control of many operations. Drop made on CTF area. beaches status. miscellaneous notes. occasional artillery and mortar engagement. occasional B-26 missions.

25 0515 CTF 51 to CTF 51

Summary No. 13 252000 K (-10). No new contact. Our areas subjected to small counter attack areas. 50/75 mm fire and 155 mm fires to 850 yards. 155 mm field artillery on 1st Division's front. 4th Marine in center, 5th Marine on 2nd. 2nd Marine on 3rd in center zone. (Objective 0-1 line.) No 155-mm. Casualties reported. 1130 indicates only active. 25 0515 K. 5420, 5420, 5420, 5420. 25 0515 shows 36 wounded both legs, condition good. 5420, 5420, 5420, 5420. 25 0515 dead count 25 077. 20 0515 shows 3 wounded. 25 0515 gunfire support was furnished during night. 25 0515 beach a port unit and 111 patrol support unit. 1130 indicated enemy cave positions SURNAGACHI area by search light. Kortar support during heavy enemy fire during night. 1130 casualties. 25 0515 10 DDs furnished schotted and did not fire. 25 0515 ICI 335 (DD 665) collides last 25 0515. 25 0515 EAMDS use 10 TFX against fire. Only energy aircraft is small. 25 0515 About 30 bombs dropped from 10 000 feet over 50 000 yard. No damage to 25 0515. 25 0515 No land mines or booby traps were 25 0515. 25 0515 JTF night 24 February. 25 0515. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile. 25 0515 5 10 at 10000 feet. Visibility 1/4 mile.
26 0525 OTP 51 to CONCERED: Info is expected from [SC] on [SN].

25 0740 OCM-11 PAK to CINCPAC: 1300 JAP. CINCPAC CONF. MAPO 12 MARCH 1940.

AIRCRAFTO 0495. The following Telecom from 9th AF. No. 10 (20th FG) have left your info. This does not alter the orders covering the mission of the 9th AF to 44th FG to conduct an air attack on the airbase at Truk. The 44th FG will make an air attack on the airfield at Truk. The 20th FG will conduct an air attack on Truk. The following current position of the aircraft is as follows:

- 20th FG: Over Truk, air attack on airfield
- 44th FG: Over Truk, air attack on airfield

The current position of the aircraft is as follows:

- 20th FG: Over Truk, air attack on airfield
- 44th FG: Over Truk, air attack on airfield

The 9th AF is subject to all orders of the 44th FG. The 44th FG is subject to all orders of the 9th AF. The 20th FG is subject to all orders of the 9th AF. The 44th FG is subject to all orders of the 9th AF. The 20th FG is subject to all orders of the 9th AF. The 44th FG is subject to all orders of the 9th AF.
26 0525 CTF 51 to COMSTAFF, Info ALL TFG REMAIN 31ST JTH

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CTF 51 to COMSTAFF, Info ALL TFG REMAIN 31ST JTH
for night 1700 with limited local attacks otherwise no other for 1700. attacks. Attack to resume later 1900. Unchanged. Night 1700 attacks. Little enemy fire has fallen on 13th Field Battery and no casualties. 1 Battalion of 2 units of 16 and a 16-84130001 has been on fire. 1 Battalion plus 2 batteries 120mm 744 artillery battery reporting in action. RCT 1/24 reports 500 enemy dead in area north of HMM. 1 Battery of 114th Field Gun Battery No. 8034, 39th Division, is moving to depth under new command. 1 Battery of 114th Field Gun Battery No. 8034, 39th Division, is moving to depth under new command. PTO staff estimated enemy's only source of water supply stored in the area. Blood bank established in area. (a) (b)
that this 1977 indicated in the war report out the attack could not be as soon as practicable. In view of the very small target force hit service forces with targets originally set up but by the year were by the FOKUS attacks. It is expected that all targets except one of the 3962 will weapon hitting all units of the service set up for transfer to Japan.

25 2107 COMPLIMENT to RICARDO H.

Struck TOEY area 15th. Because of unfavorable weather conditions, it was decided to strike FOKUS area 18th but prevented by heavy cloud cover, further advance was made. The TOYK target area was attacked but due to poor weather conditions and ceiling, only two low for hitting the target. At night in day could not get through to any target. All except 2.5 in open deck plate reports give 17 of 19 total hits destroyed. 17 aircraft still on ground. Approximately 75 damaged on ground. Check FOKUS area by 12th. 75 percent buildings destroyed and 12 percent damaged. Important building: 18TH pltn heavily hit by 1 bomb. 7 ships 5 coastal vessels 7 U.S. Navy craft heavily hit by 1 bomb. 1 ship, 5 small craft damaged. Our combat loads 5 TF 4 WT 5 TF and 5 TF, no personnel, no damage to any other vessels except minor damage by pickup boat described with seamen. 5 TF and 1 refrigerator ship 25-26 Feb sunk 5 all enemy vessels including 1 which had been with minor damage 1 U.S. Navy 15 tons forced in and minor damage 2 ton on board. In TAKA following weather: 18TH sound damage destroyed but later repaired and under 1 month in commission. Check and with U. S. Navy 128 and 128 all in the joint number 1 caved in MIKATANI in 128. No consider the structural forecastle damaged. 128, weather was Favor 128 above the sky and necessitated lowering 128, 128 25 Feb and 46-48 and 128, 128 damage, particularly 200 ton clamp. Combination of bad weather in TAKA area with impossibility of better than approximate prediction makes timing of strikes extremely difficult. Particularly tight schedules permit little or no flexibility. Until arrival off TAKA predicted weather was Favor 128 and 128, Favor 128. FOKUS attack was made because weather was Favor 128 and 128. Favor 128 and 128 was too widespread and severe however and because of seas position for strike could not have been reached until too late in afternoon for launching. TAKA weather at present are definitely passive. We could have found us with search planes during daylight 24th but there was no indications of search. Search planes taking off passed the formation close aboard 24th on other side, FAS launching began off TAKA 25th but apparently no one reported us. Thereafter there was no apparent attempt to locate or to attack us. Only about 100 air and aircraft were seen and most of them sought to avoid combat. 21 but 3 of 22 aircraft shot down were fighters. Full coverage and estimate of number and type of enemy aircraft in TAKA area prevented by weather, apparently lower aircraft than before on major combat fields but about same number present as before on other fields. Enemy combat types at these fields appear to be reserve aircraft without pilots.
SECRET

FEBR NUARY (GCT)

27 0300 CINCPAC Pearce to Chief, CONUSTFLT, INFO ALL TFGS HOSPITALITY, U.S. NAVY, makaha, OAHU, TFG-5, ADMN.

C 87 plane Lt. John l. Harmon on Board. Call sign CMY. 1:05 meter FM. Departed MAKAWAU 260028 GCT on direct flight to JAP. Due OAHU 262243 GCT. Reported overdue 220100 CST. Last contact with him Jan 26/1050 GCT give position 11-05 N 174-15 S. Institute coordinated search in respective areas.

27 05:00 CTF 51 to CONUSTFLT Info ALL TFG 5THFLT, 270000Z.

Part I of 3 parts. Summary No. 17 271000 (K). Activity during night limited to small scale infiltration and anti-infiltration efforts including mortars and artillery fire. Enemy activity on 3rd MarDiv front included troop and aircraft in our rear areas attacked our lines and repercussion communications. Rocket boats also reported starting fire in vicinity of CURIBACH. HINDBERG and MARKO anchored near CURIBACH reported shells landing close aboard. JOW hit last night. Support unit on night ambush received two 40mm. and two 88mm. The fire was kept up from shore from 6:00 p.m. support unit and under fire the night. Resistance near 3rd MarDiv zone 25 percent. 5th MarDiv support unit also under fire. 3rd MarDiv zone 25 percent of 6th and 5th MarDiv. 1 M1A1 fired from K-hour preparation. 9 DD gunboat support unit on first missions today. Resistance continues heavy defense well placed and camouflaged. New positions being reported hourly and taken under fire. 5th MarDiv reported enemy use of white phosphorous hand grenades at 0200 K-10). Part II of 3 parts. The 5th MarDiv on the flank of Curaçao zone advanced about 300 yards this morning and the right flank of the 4th MarDiv moved up the east coast approximately 600 yards. Some advance was made on the night of 3rd MarDiv other lines remaining the same. Lines at 1200 generally along: TA 215, 198 EX 197 MEDC 200 REX 197 REX 197 REX 167 E. Para. 506 44 Bn now in position with 2nd and 3rd fire control, MGF control established ashore. 11 tanks 1st platoon to enemy artillery and mortar fire and 3 reported today. 5 DD gunboats firing on beach and rear areas today. (continued)
27 0935 CTF 21 to CONFLICTANT SHO (CONV): 

Concurrent starboard screen damage. Left all 7 110mm A.A. guns and 2 twin 40mm. 2 man crew. Damage control eliminates possible extensive fire schedule. Conical search. CTF 21 area 4 ZP 6206 A100 pilot donated at 0730Z, 16/1. 

Estimate west unloading of transports 15 to 16 March, west unloading 16 March. 

27 0005 CTF 21 to CONFLICTANT SHO (CONV): 

Travocel 23 area 5 ZP 6206 A100 pilot donated at 0200Z, 16/1. 

Cove unloading 15 March, 2400Z. 

27 1130 CTF 21 to CONFLICTANT Info CTF 21 2400Z 16/1 CHURCH WTH HX Waliki - Continued -
SECRET

FEBRUARY (CTR)

27 1130 CTF 51 to CHEM 155, TMG (CONT'D)

Clearing: Felled anchor while getting underway. LSTs no damage. MK X
minor. CHEM 3 starboard side forecastle saved in frame 29-32. Hit reported
on LST (AIA 60) apparently from about 2000 which exploded 19th helied
from direction of land. Para. CVE planes reinforced ground troops with
close support strikes. 9 B-24s strategic airforce made strike prearranged
against target AIA 1445. 1 CVE plane successfully launched from CVE 776
plane lost pilot saved. 3 CVE's arrived southwest base. Routine day sweep
CHEM 155, 3rd air search for CHEM 155 pilots unsuccessful. Para.
Surt conditions restricted unloading to LSTs 155's 156's this afternoon.

27 1416 CTF 51 to CHEM 155 ALCB 155 INFO CHEM 155 TMG JOHNSTON, CHIEF

Strike enemy airfields in MALAYA as heavily as practical without
delay. Take reconnaissance other stolls to detect any enemy activity.
New subject: Provide armed escort between WHAJAL and JOHNSTON for 2
MTF 554's which will leave GUMM in company at 272200 COT with important
passengers.

24 0215 CTF 51 to CHEM 155. CTF 51 ADV Hq. REAR ADMIRAL BRIT ADMIRALTY DEL. WASH.

CHIEF. CHIEF.

By 15124 as extended by any 09025. (A) Vice Admiral Second in Command short title is now TFS or CTF. (B) Flag Officer Fleet Train Brit Pacific Fleet operating title is CTF 112. (C) FST, aircraft carriers Brit Pacific Fleet operating title is now ACL. Carrier squadrons now organized into car-
rier squadrons short title RA. Consisting of Fleet Carriers short title is ACL. Carrier squadrons consisting of ferrying VS inclusion carriers short title is AS, short title of senior officer AG 20.

28 0510 CTF 51 to CHEM 155 INFO CHEM 155 TMG ALL TMS TMG:

Summary No. 19 501200. Night 27-28 attack LC inactive. Usual infiltra-
tion by small enemy groups attempted without success. Rear areas received
some artillery fire with scattered small arms artillery mortar fire along
time front. Our artillery executed counter battery harassing inter-
distinctive fire throughout night. 5th PhilCorps rescued a tanker 0645
preceeded by 45 minute preparation by artillery with Corps reinforced by
naval gunfire air strikes. Objective 0-3 line TA 230 233, 234
F1 235 FPG 219 AGW 202 CHATTY 166. Troop dispositions 5th Mardiv on
left in 3rd Assault Bns 3rd Mardiv in center with 2 assault Bns 4th Div
right with 5 assault Bns. 20th RCT less 1 Bn still mopping up SURABAXI
in Corps Reserve. Boundaries extended 5th Mardiv-3rd Mardiv 216YT, 217
W 218 B235XT 3rd Mardiv-4th Mardiv 200 MO 201 BM 202A 218. Attack
began on time progress generally slow against continuing heavy resistance.
Part 2. Noon reports show the following progress made: 200-400 yards
center 5th Mardiv 100-200 yards center 3rd Mardiv 200 yards center 4th
Mardiv. Front lines follow: TA 197 E 198 AD 215 XT 216 FPG 200 ART
201 UT 84/85 167 D. 506 AA Em in position ready to fire both air and
ground missions. Revised statistics of our casualties 1800 27 February
records: KIA 1570 WIA 5935 WIA 55 more 8178. Unit classification fol-
low: Corps troops KIA 1 Officer 3 EM WIA 3 officers 58 EM MIA 2 EM
total 67. Corps Artillery KIA 3 EM WIA 1 officer 15 EM MIA 1 officer 2 EM
total 22. 3rd Division KIA 15 officers 230 EM, WIA 5 officers 888 EM
WIA 6 EM total 1326. 4th Div KIA 55 officers 701 EM WIA 205 officers
3940 EM MIA 2 officers 334 EM total 5237. 5th Div KIA 32 officers 530 EM.

Continued -

2772
5410 2310 05/15/45

23 0510 CTF 51 to CINCPAC 19NO 0648 19NO 0700 (CUTUP)

MA 134 officers 2360 MIA 2 officers 163 M. Total 3226. Corrected figures enemy dead 1800 26 Feb 47/46. 10 PM. 70% information indicates enemy group HQ located caves TA 216 26. Rocket launchers mounted on trucks fired 250 kg bombs. Towed rocket motor added. Previously reported as 350 kg bomb size now confirmed by discovery dead. Enemy water supply low. Small local counter attacks in effort to secure our water. Friction reported between any Navy personnel. Enemy artillery displaced to MA 235 236 216. Para. 1 338 1 CA reinforced ground artillery in preparation for incoming attacks. Call fires delivered throughout morning by 9 DDs. 1ST 42 hit by mortar fire 2219 27 Feb causing fire in gasoline drums quickly extinguished no other damage. GREGORY in radar picket station 118 degrees true 144 miles W 115000002300 had submarine contact 0230. Dropped full pattern depth charges. Evaluated 50% possible submarine. INDIA/US arrived 271300. SMARTY 29 1000 arrived 0900 for casualty evacuation. Para. CVE aircraft reinforced artillery preparation for attack with strafing bombing rocket missions selected pre-arranged critical areas 1 mission with naval bombs. Call strikes throughout morning. 2 FEM seaplanes carried out seaplane search out 500 miles. 3 FAMAN land planes made air delivery supplies by parachute. All OY planes from CVE based ashore. Para. Unloading LCAs during night discontinued due surf conditions. Beach traffic facilities improving. Field No. 1 not yet operation for emergency landing carrier aircraft. Weather east wind 10 knots 3/10 low cloud base 2000 feet. Visibility good temperature 70 surf east-northeast 5 foot swells.

23 1035 CTF 51 to CINCPAC 19NO 0713 19NO 1000 ALL TDC FIFTHFLEET

Summary No. 20 231300. Led by tanks in the 5th MarDiv zone of action using flame throwers infantry advanced front line generally 400-500 yards along the front of the 3rd and 5th MarDivs. Progress made by the 3rd Div through center of enemy main line of resistance advanced beyond village of HIRYOJIMA. Small gains of several hundred yards were made opposite the right flank and center of the 4th MarDiv zone. Local counter attack of 9th MarDiv front broken up by artillery 1625. Lines were consolidated for the night at 1700. Our front as of 1710 TA 2156C 216KLY 20413C 217 MXY 2005F 201PV 134NMX 1679D. SHIELD rounds mortar fire hit JMS beach. Resumption attack 0930 tomorrow. Para. Naval gunfire assisted the advance with call fire missions. President Adams operational casualty received considerable damage to side plating port side during unloading operations. Requires emergency repairs upon return HMAS. R H SMITH exploded horned moored type enemy mine latitude 25-29 N Long 10-04 W. Para. 2 TBM aircraft from 100 feet sprayed with TBD area occupied by our troops. VCG-1 flew HMAS ISLAND furnished effective spotting naval gunfire. Desk strikes CUTCHI JF 27 Feb caused explosion seaplane base FUT-J KO. FISHERDI unidentified vessels off seaplane base. Hit enemy observed aircraft. REGARD NOB arrived this afternoon HYAMA submogen tonight after a slow unloading day.
SECRET

01 0600 OFF 51 to CONSTATE

Info CHINMAC BOTH R. Info ALL FLT STAFF.

Summary No. 21 01L200 (K), Hostile artillery fire concentrated on rear area during night exploding 5th MarDiv ammunition dump with resulting several types of ammunition. No hostile counterattacks. 600 troops and 2 tanks attack. RE2 28 less 1 Bn reverted to 5th Div control at 0400. After RE2 27 with mission seizing high ground along boundary between 5th MarDiv and 3rd MarDiv. 3rd MarDiv main effort on right; 5th MarDiv to maintain center and right end as much as advance of 3rd MarDiv.

Attack proceeded by 45 minute artillery preparation. 5th Div continues. 5th Div pushed forward thru minefield and mortar fire as reports indicate troops approaching TA 2171, 3rd Div front moving rapidly. BLT 3/21 by 0545 reported 1 Bn at TA 2171.

Elements of BLT 2/21 reported across SOTUKA airfield by 0600. TA 2171 at 1130. No reports available on 4th Div as of 1200. Airsoft terrain in zone of action 4th Div prohibited use mechanized equipment and field artillery fire relatively ineffective. Hostile artillery fire was received all morning from along northeast coast in TA 2171-2172 area.

Minor BNJFAL charge in zone 3/25 reported. Result of morning operations reveals good progress made in Corps center zone of action but front lines cannot be accurately reported. Ground force casualties are:

KIA 1635, WIA 820, MIA 606. Total 1046. Casualty evacuation by direct from beaches to hospital ships and to transports by Navy.

Combat efficiency remarks: reported excellent. Fire 3/21 gunboat and 1 mortar support unit provided night illumination and fires throughout night. Naval gunfire operations for 3rd Div. Fire support by counter battery and reinforcing fire missions by 100 20mm 13-9 and 1 ICM with 5 VP planes spotting fires. Fire 2/21 at TA 2171, 59 at 0420 held flooding engine room and without water for over 4 hours while retracting from beach. T/N in screening stations 2/21 received 1 medium caliber hit enemy artillery fire at 0701 p.m. on starboard side main deck and hull near frame 100 filling forward on flight corridor line.

9 KIA 18 WIA. 3/21 in screen straddled by heavy fire 2/21. CASIK at 1008 on fire support mission hit by 1 calibar 17.5 hit in after torpedo mount no. 3, 2111 and 308. 51 hit 2/21. COLUMBIA VICTORY at 1046 straddled by medium caliber 20mm fire, 10 planes over beaches with damage superstructure 12/21. Direct fire support missions reinforced ground troops with control assigned landing force ashore. Night intruder over CHINMAC 13 February fired rockets at small ships in harbor results unobserved. No enemy aircraft observed. AA usage inaccurate. No serviceable enemy aircraft observed. 5th Div operating 200 seablue base morning 1 March covered 2 sections, 300 miles. 17 CT spotting planes operating from airfields.

Kield LC area 0220-0430 by estimated 4 planes possibly 12/21.

BENNEDT radar picket station 2 shot down 1 Betty, planes 12/21.

Night fighters airborne with 1 contact no kills. All air attacks below with no planes over areas or island, 1 plane down 200 yards from radar picket. Tail delivered troops by canoe to 1350 plane. 3 TEM LUNDA POINT 0702 with 3rd MarDiv observed 1 Bettys, believed within our lines burned with no survivors. 1 Batalion of fighter in formation. Emergency landing emergency landing airfield 1400 casualties taken North-south runway. Field No. 1 now available emergency landing emergency landing carrier planes. Permanent cemetery now established ashore, earlier 2/1 scattered low Cumulus clouds at 2000 feet wind east-northeast. Visibility 65-70 Light northeast swell visibility high beach conditions.
Part 1 of 2 parts. Summary No. 26. 011200 H(4), 3 MAR 43. Information available this afternoon concerning fighting in 5th and 9th Div. lines. Early afternoon 5th Div. headed by tanks progressed to vicinity 23 25 5, GHS, but later withdrew to line 216 7 47 23 26 6 39. Mortar fire was heavy mortar fire from area NORTI. In 3rd Div. zone south of area 227 3 covered gap between 3rd and 5th Divs. 23rd Cav. PIR brought up 3/26 between the right of the 9th Div. advance and 3rd Div. made in right boundary 5th Div. to east to line 216 9 2 6 5 39. 2/21 3rd Div. was pinned down by fire from hull down tanks advancing beyond its position generally along south edge of airfield and caused retreat to line 214 2 39. Part 2. 6 MAR 3/24 passed through 3rd Div. area to enemy gap existing between 3rd and 4th Divs and assisted 4th Div. to clear 3rd and 5th Div. boundary line. 4th Div. front line was static except 1 sector occupied by BCT 3/25 on the division right flank which gained a foothold on terrain, front line of 1700. In 216 8 22 6 21 5 39 134 ADAMS 1679. Para. Occasional artillery fire of 150 mm. Each. No casualties or damage reported. 22d Div. took 17. 0000 and was transferred to 4th Div. shore party. Para. 15 heavy antitank guns reported destroyed by anti-tank fire from 6 25 3 25 21. 22d Div. and 1st AD's hunter-patrol operations and negative results. Direct air support this afternoon used napalm fire bombs.

(FEB) 24 1300 MARSHALL to ALL THEATERS & BASE COMMANDS. Info H (4) 3/25.
25 0855 MICHAUD passed to FUSCO ADVANCE.

WAR 42880. Middle East Theater effective 1 March 43 is redefined as the AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST THEATER with boundaries to include the entire continent of AFRICA, PALESTINE, IRAQ, JORDAN, the island of CYPRUS, and the entire SAHARA-ARIKA CHINCHURA, except IRAK and the 390. The boundaries of the MEDITERRANEAN THE THEATER of operations effective 1 March 1943 are the Mediterranean Sea (except the Island of CYPRUS) and the Turkei Islands adjacent to the Turkish mainland) TURK, HUN, ALB, YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, BULGARIA, and CRETE. Para. No V. and the boundaries in the FUSCO THEATER of operations are expanded to include SPAIN, PORTUGAL, and the AZORES. North Atlantic Div. AOC retains administrative control of the AZORES except in the event of tactical operations. Para. Command: No change in personnel. Para. 13 MAR 42 Command: No change.

02 0515 CTF 51 to COMSTHELTH Info CUSCOG 23TH H, ALL THEATER.

Results of shore reconnaissance indicate that 7000 foot airstrips can easily be constructed axis bearing 030 degrees on old rail on pogy plain about 1500 yards inland from shore 2 all west of 1400. 2 construction battalions 7th light are on the job. Supply and fuel dock is feasible in the landing vicinity. 4 areas within CASIGURAN SOUND & BAY north of line nearly inaccessible. 1 Jews. 427, 428 are accurate except for uncharted 4 and 5. 10 knots is about 1500 yards from shore. 426 is about 1100 yards offshore. 742 was not observed off shore. No enemy activity was observed by 100 n.m. from Concentration Area by dark. 2nd day in use reduced by 270 miles. Results negative, complete mission CASIGURAN AREA by dark 2 Par. Bobs.
Summary No. 24, 021800. 5th PhibCorps with 15 Bns in assault from left to right as follows 5th MarDiv BLTS 3/28 3/28 3/28 3/26 3/26 3rd MarDiv BLTS 3/9 2/21 2/21 2/9 1/9 4th MarDiv BLTs 3/24, 2/24 1/24, 1/25 2/25 3/23 continued to expand its salient NW. During morning 3rd MarDiv in clear advance about 700 yards along Div boundary to seize Hill 362 TA 235 U. The center and left flank of 3rd MarDiv advanced 200 yards against small arms automatic weapons mortars fire, At 1530 this Div jumped off in renewal of attack with main effort on Div right with Hill 362 TA 219U as objective. 20 minute artillery preparation preceded attack. At same time BLT 2/21 attacked N to fill gap between BLT 3/9 BLT 1/21 with BLT 3/9 attacking SE. 5th MarDiv had limited gains both flanks. RCT 28 gained 200 yards on Corps left along coast. BLT 3/26 advanced generally abreast of BLT 3/9 of 3rd Div right causing gap between BLT 3/26 and RCT 28. Gap was filled by BLT 2/26. 1530 RCT 28 repelled local counterattack estimated 150 enemy killed. 5th Div advanced slowly against heavy mortar, artillery and sniper fire in its 2A. 200 yards gained by 21st REG SE MOTOKAMA 1500. Limited gains made on extreme E flank by 25th RCT. Troops consolidated at 1700 with lines along TA 216 ABCHMK. 217 KOREHKE 234Y 235 UV 216PUNPSY 217 KOREHKE 184 BEOHYE 167E. Cave system on island complex. 1 found in TA 183L has 9 entrances main passageway extended 800 yards came out MINAMI VILLAGE. Searched but documents and equipment previously destroyed, Mary Jap dead found. Former CP. Prisoners indicate most caves in northern island are small filled with wounded food water low. Korean POW says 15000 enemy on island of D Day, believes 5000 to 6000 remain. Past 24 hours has been good counterbattery work by Marine artillery definitely taking out numerous medium caliber field pieces isolated cave positions. Engineers destroyed many caves pilboxes containing stores ammunition. Para. IOT 1029 struck underwater object at 0310. Hull phased engine room flooded ship broached on beach. 175 tons ammunition successfully unloaded. Heavy surf prevents present salvage. HERCULES (AKL-1) grounded on pinnacle shoal NE BLUE beach 1/21 towed SS HER no visible damage. SILENCER departed 1700 with casualties for GUAM. IOT 224 struck port side by LCS 52 as she came alongside inflicting following structural damage considerable. 0945 LST 634 struck same ship starboard quarter in retraction while on beach inflicting tear in hull plating between frames 39 40 other minor damage. Summary naval battle casualties cumulative to 2 March beach parties KIA 44 WIA 49 MIA 12 ship personnel KIA 145 MIA 473 MIA 440 total 1063. Para. CVEs continued direct air support. Seadrome conditions prevented sealeane searches today. Last instant identifications 2235 1 March saved 1 E-24 from gun attack by ENTERPRISE. Plane showed very weak IIF and flew directly over TG 52.2 5. BENINGTON sighted visually 1 snooper Zeke 1805 1 March taken under fire not hit. ENTERPRISE fighters chased plane northward without result. CHICHI JIMA sweep by ENTERPRISE planes 1830 1 March dropped bombs shot rockets causing explosions and fires, 2 TBM's sprayed DDT 1715 today. Previous coverage and toxic effect reported excellent. Para. Approximately 4000 feet NE-SW runway airfield rehabiliated. Subject sporadic artillery fire transport planes can land now and have been requested. Limited resurfacing facilities available tomorrow. Tomorrow should clear field of artillery fire, permit use by fighter squadrons which have been alerted. Para. Long swell from ESE make eastern beach condition bad. Expect use of western beach on 3rd.
Based on pilots' reports required photo coverage ended 1 March with following exceptions: (A) Verticals view SHOA and Convoys. (B) Verticals west shore OKINAWA south of 26-18 North (C) Verticals Tokyo area OKINAWA north of 26-18. Verticals to HAOH area OKINAWA from SAHA WAKAI to 26-18 N. 90% complete at 5000. Missing 10% is that farthest from beaches. 1 batch ran out of film at 1 to 5000. All above due weather except (A) out of range. Materially, generally poor due low lying haze. More low clouds forecast for today. No air opposition. Shot down 2 Bettys 1 Sally 1 Dianas, destroying deck gun. 9 twin engine and 23 single engine aircraft. teased destroyed or damaged about 50 planes on 8. Many other non operational seen used as decoys. About 1200 B-24s, 275 SB4s 57 1FGs 27 TB4s 17 TF 6 fighters. Damaged 12 BSs or TFs 1 TB4 1 TF 1 TB4 3 TFs 1 BS No fighters. Bank or damaged several small craft. Many buildings including barracks, administration buildings, sugar mills, rubber yard, warehouses, radio and radar stations and airfield installations destroyed or damaged on the SHOA. Tokyo area MURAGUMI, IVASAKI and TAKAHAMA. Suggest that SHOA, along 10 WP 3 VT pilots 4 TF 1 VT crewmen 5 VTs operational late today but would have personnel. Looked for but could not find ship. Suggest field off KINETA by search plane. On retirement conducted all operations. At OKINAWA starting big fires. Pilots report additional material in northeast side YOKAI SHIMA.

03 1110 CTF 51 to CONSTRUCTION Info ALL TFG 8TH, 14TH, 21ST...
03 1022 RICHARDSON to CG HUBBELL, CHINESE RCT. Info 24TH CORPS, COM cmd, CHINA.

RU-841111. Look at 24th Corps radio TCF 168 dated 2310024 OCT Feb 45 not to all or needed of which you were for add. This theater will cover officer shortages by co bat appointments which will leave 24th Corps a bon of 3000 enlisted personnel short for mounting. This shortage due to delays in return of casuals as well as large numbers of non battle losses evacuated from BATA. The closest precludes furnishing above shortage from this theater prior to mounting. Request SFPAD furnish 3000 replacements to 24th Corps prior to mounting. This personnel will be replaced to SFPAD as follows: All casuals returned to 24th Corps at BATA between 10 March and 10 April 45 we will be assigned to SFPAD. On later date an inventory will be made of such personnel and the difference between that number and the total furnished to 24th Corps by SFPAD will be shipped from FOA to arrive at designated stations in SJA about 1 May. Your agreement to above plan urgently requested by CGCHINA.

02 2357 COMSHEL to CHINESE ADV RCT. Info CTF 51, CTF 52.

By 220801. Situation ashore much better and success assured. Assume you concur departure TF 56 this general area as planned on completion fueling today. Have in mind retention here small ENTERPRISE Task Group until air capabilities ashore are adequate, accepting arrival Task Group components late for next operation if necessary. Will submit plan in more detail later when situation is clarified. Think build up on air ashore and commencement of next operation will relieve pressure on TIO JIMA.

03 0605 CTF 51 to COMSHEL Info ALL TCG FIFTHFLT, CHINESE BCT HQ.

Sumary No. 25 031200 (K). Night 2-3 March generally quiet on front. 3rd Div received some small arms mortar fire and reported explosion Jap ammunition dump TA 199J. Minor infiltration attempt and shelling rear areas. 4th Div sector very quiet. 5th marDiv reported 65 Japs emerged from caves ZA BLT 1/26. 64 killed 1 prisoner. 5th PhilCorps resumed attack 0745. 4th Div attacked at K minus 75. 3rd and 5th marDivs attack at K hour. Boundaries unchanged. Front line Bns assault from left to right were: 5th marDiv BLT 2/28 2/26 1/26 3/26 2/26 3rd marDiv BLT 1/23 2/21 2/19 1/9 4th marDiv BLT 1/24 1/24 1/23 2/25 3/25. Corps artillery support attack with preparation in 4th marDiv ZA from K minus 90 to K minus 75 and 3rd marDiv-5th marDiv ZA K minus 90 to K hour (0745). 4th marDiv making slow progress over difficult terrain on its front. 5th marDiv attack ridge running east NISHI encountering many caves reinforced emplacements. 300 yard gain made along center 5th marDiv. Enemy pocket continues exist in 4th marDiv ZA west MINAMI. Gap in line reported between TA 2186 ZA 3rd marDiv. Front lines as of 1330 are: TA 2156 216AB CHIJ 217 AB along boundary line between TA 217 234 to 235UV 2188 gap 218DMIN 218DINQU 189AFK 189RIGSO 189UIMN 177K. Part 2. Personnel casualties as of 1700 2 March: 3rd marDiv KIA 22 Off 313 EM WIA 680 Off 1350 EM MIA 1 Off 67 EM total 3rd Div 91 Off 1750 EM. 4th marDiv KIA 64 Off 815 EM WIA 235 Off 4793 EM MIA 1 Off 287 EM total 4th Div 300 Off 5895 EM. 5th Div KIA 43 Off 726 EM WIA 158 Off 3020 EM MIA 1 Off 174 EM total 5th Div 202 Off 3920 EM. Corps troops KIA 1 Off 7 EM WIA 5 Off 86 EM MIA 0 Off 2 EM. Total Corps Troops 6 Off 97 EM. Corps artillery KIA 1 Off 5 EM WIA 1 Off 18 EM MIA 1 Off 1 EM total Corps artillery 2 Off 24 EM. AA KIA 0 WIA 1 Off 7 EM MIA 0 total AA 1 Off 7 EM. Garrison force assault shipping KIA 1 EM. Total

- Continued -
03 0605 CTF 51 to CSW 120, ALL TPO SIE N HIL, CINCPAC DOC No 53 (cont'd)

Land Force 602 off 11674 KIA. Grand total 12,276 of which 1997 KIA. Combat efficiency very good to excellent. Enemy dead as of 1800 2 March 19329. Total PC's 30 Japs 43 Koreans. Of this total 5 Japs died since capture, Para. There was no naval gunfire preparation this morning due to limited area remaining on RVNCS front. Call fire executed. Night of 2-3 March day 3 March 3 CL 7 DD 2 TOSLS in direct support. VMF(N) (AF 62) during unloading incurred considerable structural damage. Seaweeding qualities unimpaired. Fueling conducted support carrier units. Part 3, VMF's furnishing support missions with control by land force CINCUS. VM aircraft provided searches to north and west. 8 B-24 airplanes dropped parachute supplies Field No 1. 1st transport plane landed Field #1 1100 followed by a. 1 additional Dunk strike CINCUS 1030 2 March bombs rockets damage unobserved. 1 TBM holed enemy AA returned to base. VMF(N)333 planes completed 174 hours continuous day flight 2200 2 March. 3 VF and 8 VT made dawn attack on merchant shipping CINCUS previously reported. Result rockets hit 1 1200 ton freighter other results unobserved. Total 11 freighters. Intense AA all tyers. AA holed 1 TBM which made water landing. AVBS rescued crew. Another strike same also returned 1100 results unreported. 1 fighter shot down over target area no survivors. VMF(N) 211 fighter shot down 1 Jan. Francis 1125 position bearing 250 degrees 70 miles EFC 1204 T. VMF(N) Estimate Field #1 and servicing facilities ready to receive 2 VT squadrons garrison air force 6 March. Unloading VMF(N) 46 due to heavy weather 29 March now in progress. Unloading continues very difficult due weather conditions. General supply situation E D with ammunition supply arriving. Roads conditions fair. Considerable rolling stock destroyed to date enemy action. Report follows: IVTS operational 250 under repair 31 destroyed 162. DUKWs operational 112 under repair 22 destroyed 116. Vessels operational 92 under repair 3 destroyed 7. Tanks operational 22 under repair 3 destroyed 23. Weather clear wind SSE varying to SSW 10-15 knots. Besty shore surf 4 to 6 feet. Temperature 72-74. Visibility excellent.

02 2020 CSW 120 to CSW 120, ALL TPO SIE N HIL, CINCPAC DOC No 12

03 0930 CINCPAC PEARL to CSW 120, ALL TPO SIE N HIL

Present approved modified Category of Defense A in UFIL/HLAX Sector requires planning of harbor defenses. Dept proposes eliminating this requirement for most installations in this sector stating that requirement cannot be met due to withdrawal of certain units and personnel from Alaskan sector as a result of CINCPAC order. Harbor defenses at PEARL MARINE are now in caretaker status. CINCPAC prepares to concur but desires your consent before taking action. Refer JCS 1020/2 forward CINCPAC and info another byavy serial 003139 of 21 October 1944.

04 0440 CTF 51 to CSW 120, ALL TPO SIE N HIL, CINCPAC DOC No 53


- Continued -

2780
040440 OFF 51 to CONFLICT ALL TPG STAFFT, CTRG-AC BOTH HG (CONT'D)

terrain. BLT 2/27 engaged sealing caves SURIBACHI. 5th MarDiv reports hand to hand fighting along its front reports enemy defensive positions lack reinforced concrete features positions previously encountered but nature defensive strength of terrain make going slow. Sulary casualties 1700 3 March; 3rd MarDiv KIA 23 Off 330 EM 129, 75 Off 1714 EM KIA 0 Off 66 EM Total 3rd Div 96 Off 1410 EM. 4th MarDiv KIA 65 Off 924 EM KIA 240 Off 5090 EM KIA 2 Off 279 EM Total 4th MarDiv 307 Off 6523 EM. 5th MarDiv KIA 17 Off 773 EM KIA 175 Off 3370 EM KIA 1 Off 1275 EM Total 5th MarDiv 222 Off 4330 EM. Corps Troops KIA 1 Off 7 EM KIA 5 Off 93 EM KIA 0 Off 2 EM Total Corps Troops 6 Off 102 EM. Corps Artillery KIA 0 Off 5 EM KIA 1 Off 7 EM KIA 1 Off 1 EM total Corps Artillery 2 Off 23 EM AA Artillery KIA 0 Off 7 EM KIA 0 total AA Artillery 1 Off 7 EM. Garrison Force in assault shipping KIA 1 EM total casualties Lanz For 636 Off 12,656 EM. Grand total 13,292 of which 2175 KIA. CAS cas air evacuation unit now operating ashore. Corps Artillery reports 5 additional enemy field pieces destroyed. Intelligence reports indicate Rear Admiral Ichihara Commanding naval forces JCG. Enemy rocket launcher captured intact. Para. 2 DD 7 DD 2 LCSL gunboats provided support fires during night and available call fire missions throughout day. 36 inch horned mine sunk 24-30 N 140-32 E Para. Air support missions CAP and ASP cancelled due weather conditions. ENTERPRISE duck strike CHICHE dropped 2600 rockets results unobserved due weather. 4 seaplanes engaged search missions this morning. Para. Weather wind 15 kts light rain 8/10 low stratus at 700 feet temperature 69-73 sea light to moderate surf 4 feet visibility low.

041040 OFF 51 to CONFLICT ALL TPG STAFFT, CTRG-AC BOTH HG

Summary No. 28 041300 (K). Stiffening enemy opposition held troops to small local gains during period. BLT 3/21 passed through BLT 1/21 pinned down by small arms fire after advancing average 50 yards. Front line remains static since last report. Local counter attack ZA 40T 28 several hundred Japs 1340 realized many killed. Enemy land mines found along west runway airfield #2. Land Force records 12,566 enemy dead with POW's 45 Koreans 36 Japs total 61 as of 1300 3 March. Several rounds enemy artillery fire hit airfield #1 1339 with no damage reported. Large water distillation unit estimated 300,000 gallons per day capacity and large tanks discovered cove TA 152 R. Para. Gunfire missions provided by 7 DD 2 LCSL this afternoon. Hydrographic survey unit in SURIBER (AGS5) with TP 42 arrived. CoxeDeSoto 50 in Desido 99 arrived. Para. Unfavorable weather prevented afternoon air support operations. 1 B-29 returning Empire strike made successful emergency landing I/O 1457 refueled departed TINIAN 1720, 2 TBS NAKIN ISLAND sprayed DDT occupied area. Para. Surf conditions eastern beaches improved but loading restricted to LCS LS2. Western beaches taking ICTs LCS with excellent development potential. Road net shows improvement.

0400313 CONFLICT to OFF 51 Info ALL TPG STAFFT, CTRG-AC BOTH HG.

During current upkeep and replenishment period at UMMTHI maintain as practicable equivalent of 2 Task Groups of Task Force 58 ready for sortie on 18 hours notice. Desire this precautionary measure not interfere with scheduled upkeep and replenishment.
04-0420

04-1759

05-0435

Summary No. 29 051200 (E). Front line reports indicate night 3-5 March enemy infiltration attempts broken up by artillery fire. Considerable small arms and mortar fire received. Bombing activities marked by reorganization divisions in preparation for concerted corps attack eastward 6 March. Total troop casualties to 1700 6 March: 3rd division 252 7th division 508, 3rd infantry 245 7th division 228 6th division 219 7th division 227 8th division 527 6th division 303 5th division 246 6th division 179 7th division 219 8th division 230 4729 7th division 230 8th division 246 6th division 219. Corps troops 051200 total 1204 8th division 611 7th division 54. Artillery, 1st division 5 2nd division 17 7th division 10. Total manpower 671 7th division 13 671 6th division 179 8th division 246 6th division 219 7th division 230 5th division 246 7th division 219 8th division 230 4729 7th division 230 8th division 246 6th division 219. Troops on the move 2419 8th division 9 7th division 3 6th division 305 2419 8th division 9 7th division 3 6th division 305. Provided night illumination and call for fire with 105 122 65 and 6 DDs available throughout day. 7-8 search sectors flown by 8th PPG medics. 1 TIB search plane investigating and sending report of ditch on St. 25-45 E 473 Furnished direct air support call missions throughout morning. Para. Unloading progresses over both western and eastern beaches. Weather overcast scattered low clouds, light winds, northerly 5 knots, visibility poor, low swell with 4 foot surf.
05 1015
CTF 21 to OCEANA Info CVE-49 with us. All TF's still at
HMS Yarmouth (L). 4th Haridy and 5th Haridy completed
reorganization with 3rd Haridy reported progressing satisfactorily. Receive
arrangements with respect to recirculation of personnel accomplished. Topping up rear
areas in progress. Details plan of attack to be available at this
time. Task Force Halsey sank all enemy vessel 30-30 X 124-90 EX.
Continued from 1015 3 March by 1110 3 March. Halsey arrived SAWAII BAY
previously reported. TINIAN search BAY's stage thru LCE on return trip
congest 1 March and landings, will replace smoke. Expect to
continue smoke attack by 4th. Enemy AF hit 2 CRP at TANUS ISLAND 1230-1220.
Task landed safely LCE field. 1 crew member still. Previous report possible
claim attacked June 30-29 X 111-45 EX not identified as 4-29 which made TF's
base. More work conditions favored unloading this afternoon.

05 1246
CTC CG W. J. to OCEANA, CTF 21, CORDOVAN (L) Info CVE-49
LOCAL AIR, TF 36, TF 56, TF 31, TF 2 BATTALLION.

Designation of 2nd Haridy as area reserve for BEMTAF Operation terminat-
ted hitherto.

04 0558
CONSORTIA to CINCPOA End of Info TF 36 CAP - 27/04

W-5425 J. Army facilities (L) listed TF's and 200040 Feb included in
serial 0817/50 to 10. CINCPAC - 28/35 and 11/32 Feb with understanding
that in case it becomes necessary to send additional Army troops to BEMTAF
as a result of present status of BEMTAF Agreement or redeployment this
support to 'given out of necessity be curtailed accordingly.

06 0700
CTF 21 to OCEANA Info CVE-49 with us. All TF's still at
06 0500 CTF 51 to COMINCH INFO SHAO KEI H., ALL TFC STAFF (CONT'D)

Available throughout day. YANGJY (AKA 93) has accumulated extensive structural damage during unloading operations since D Day still operational. Para. Sea Drome desanitzed with 36th PM seaplanes returning. 0500. FBMY search planes now refuel L.E on return flight to TAINIAN. 23 May P51 landed 1200 with 12 Aru P51 planes due arrive afternoon.

CTF's furnished direct air support. 1 TBM 3118/21 DAY hit by gunfire. 0530 made wheels-up landing. L.E Field with 1 crew member KIA. Unloading conditions both beaches good. Weather clear high scattered clouds, visibility excellent. Wind 355 8 knots. Temperature 75. Surf 2 feet low easterly swell.

06 1010 CTF 51 to COMINCH INFO SHAO KEI H., ALL TFC STAFF

Summary No. 32. 061800 (K). In spite of heavy prolonged artillery fire reinforced by strong naval gunfire and air strikes troops pinned down by hostile shell fire and mortar fire throughout day. Small salient was extended to depth 300 yards vicinity of L.E at TA 2358 along Division boundary 25th MarDiv 3rd MarDiv. Small gain opposite center 3rd MarDiv extending to 331 in TA 2182. Otherwise no change front lines which at 1730 K were 0630 2358 09 2350 09 0630 2182 0630 2182. 19th Div.

TransDiv 31 32 with casualties departed 1300 GUNI. DFRI (AIV) straddled by light caliber artillery projectiles. 1 hour forward boss putting it out of ordnance. No casualties. Not known whether fire friendly or enemy. 2 P51s flown over with air strikes but no targets identified. 1 BOM. P51 night fighters Aru garrison arrived 1300. 2 P51s 0630 liaison to air attack seaplane base CHIANG JIA 0630 results not observed.

07 0510 CTF 51 to COMINCH INFO SHAO KEI H., ALL TFC STAFF

Summary No. 33. 071200 (E). Following relatively quiet night V PhibCorps resumed attack this morning 15 assault lines in line boundaries and objective unchanged. 4th MarDiv with main effort on its left jumped off at 0800. 3rd MarDiv with main effort capture Hill 362 TA 2194 attacked at 0500. 5th MarDiv with main effort on its right to take high ground to NE their 2A attacked at 0730. By 1030 3rd MarDiv reports WEIXING 362 Hill 362 and by hand to hand fighting had advanced approximately 500 yards but advance than checked. 1100 report indicates 100-200 yards advance left center 4th MarDiv. No report 5th MarDiv. CP HT 2/23 received direct hit 0645 causing staff casualties.


Division non-effectives 6 Off 3678 EM MIA 5 Off 272 EM total 5th MarDiv battle casualties 238 Off 4907 EM. Division non-effectives 9 Off 361 EM. Corps troops KIA 1 Off 7 EM WIA 5 Off 85 EM MIA 0 Off 3 EM total Corps Troops battle casualties 6 Off 95 EM. Corps troops non-effectives 1 Off 20 EM. Corps Artillery KIA 0 Off 5 MIA 0 Off 11 EM MIA 1 Off 1 EM total Corps Artillery battle casualties 1 Off 17 EM. Corps Artillery non-effectives 1 Off 8 EM.

-Continued-
AA artillery KIA 0 Off 3 BN WIA 1 Off 9 BN KIA 0 total AA artillery battle casualties 1 Off 12 EM AA artillery anti-effectives 0 Off 2 EM Total Land Force battle casualties 2 EM Off 13608 EM Grand total 14,293 of which 2641 KIA Total anti-effectives 0 Off 2 EM 2 OBS 7 DD 2 LC9L carried out night illumination and harassing missions with 9 DD on call throughout day.

AMERICAN (NEO) arrived 0649 for security evacuation. Para. ENTERPRISE planes on dusk strike OTRXK and KAMA 6 March encountered solid overcast. Bombs released near targets. ENTERPRISE plans on special intruder mission over OTRXK from 0400 till dawn 7 March. OTRXK supported ENTERPRISE dawn sweep struck OTRXK 1 ARMY TM on dawn over target KIA survived. 1 AMERICAN BAT TM landed ISO FIELD 0500 port wing, above based Army P40s took over local OTRXK 7 March. OTRXK returned morning direct air support. Para. Sea conditions yesterday best experienced to date but were LC9Ls on sea eastern beaches still not practicable without heavy losses. On west beach LC5 17 LC9 DUKES in use with water too shallow for LC5. Unloading conditions afloat and ashore about optimum with available water transportation. Short tons unloaded 24 hours making 061200 were successful assault transports 7

07 1100 OTF-51 to CONTINUE Info CINCPAC BASE NO. ALL THE STEPS

Summary No. 34. 072000 (E). Continued heavy resistance mainly small arms and machine gun fire held ground troops to limited gains throughout afternoon. 7th MarDiv estimates Japs withdrawing from areas vicinity TA 22845P. Japs blew up ammunition dump TA 233. 3rd tank BN status Jap suicide group charged tanks and were moved down. Positions ordered consolidated at 1700 with attacks after that hour authorized to seize limited objectives. Gains of 500 yards made left flank of 7th MarDiv narrowing to 200 yards center and right. Continually 5 relieved ComDivRep 11 as OTF 34. All OBs departed for ULTIX 1800. GAF SEAPLANE propeller damaged by LC9L. Para. Thick weather cancelled support missions by OTF planes 1500. GAF by garrison P-24s secured 1350 due weather. Special search for ARMY TM pilot lost over OTRXK JIMA with negative results. Para. Favorable conditions for unloading.

08 0530 OTF-51 to CONTINUE Info CINCPAC BASE NO. ALL THE STEPS

Summary No. 35. 081200 (E). Night 7-8 March uneventful. Corps continued attack in echelon to capture remainder of island. 4th MarDiv attacked OTRXK with main effort on left. 3rd MarDiv attacked at 0720 with main effort both dive on right. Zones of action boundaries unchanged except boundary between 3rd and 4th MarDiv extended to TA 2265P. 4th MarDiv reports enemy withdrawing from areas on its front. Fragmentary reports indicate stubborn resistance continues. Little advance on all fronts. 0235 report shows 500 yard gains right flank 3rd MarDiv center and left flank with 300 yard salient extended to TA 2300 opposite left flank 3rd MarDiv and 200 yard salient advanced to TA 2286W opposite left flank 4th MarDiv. Translation captured undated document reveals order issued by Commander Defense Force to poison — Continued —
with hydrofluoric acid all work not removed to rear. Land Air cumulative casualties 1760, 7 Mar. 720 Officers 1450 enlisted men. Grand total 1450 of which 1290 KIA. Total Land Air non-effectives including sick and injured non-battle 47 OFF 2355 enlisted men. 1200 Para. Right fire support by 1 CA 7 DD 2 LDG with 2 CA 7 DD available throughout day. SOLACE arrived 0930 for casualty evacuation. Seaplane base group SAINTJAY (AVJ5) and CHIRICOYENNE (AVJ9) departed SAINTJAY 0930. Seaplane base discontinued. SAINTJAY (AVJ5) hit by small caliber enemy shell with 1 enlisted man KIA. 2 enlisted WIA. Ship undamaged. Para. Direct air support continued by USN planes. REDATED BAY fighter pilot shot down over JOY 0950 making crash landing in water. Pilot rescued by PB 470 with 1600 position 77°25' N 143°28' E rescued 8 of 12 survivors of B-29 46 sector 609 which made water landing. 6 of 12 survivors injured. 3 fatalities arriving JOY 1335 7 March took over Dumbo. Dust strikes CHIRICO JIMA 7 March cancelled due weather. Rito 27-29 Feb troops reported paratroopers dropped close to front lines. Now confirmed as Jap planes attempting resupply JOY troops. At time first noted bogey report received but evaluated an ASP. Believe new plane was a low flyer not seen visually and only fragmentary sighting by radar. ENTERPRISE beam swept CHIRICO 8 March strafed restricted field area naval base results unobserved. Para. Unloading and evacuation from western beaches shifted to eastern beaches due surf conditions. First echelon survivors shipping arrived commenced unloading 1450 tons unloaded all beaches past 24 hours. Weather wind NW 16 knots, temperature 64. A/19 cumulus 2000 feet. Visibility good. Low small NW 3 feet surf eastern beaches with 6 feet surf western beaches.

Your 061340. 40mm or larger projectiles considered necessary for certain and early destruction suicide bombers penetrating fighter patrols. Positive steps to reduce difficulties in identification and fighter direction which enable 5 inch to open fire earlier being taken. Most cases of attacks which hit are results of surprise with little or no firing time. Straight dive attacks generally occur only with low ceiling of near land with many attacks being sudden turns into ship after low run from ahead or astern. Letter offer very short no deflection firing period. Proposed quiz 50 cal with MP 8 sight believed at best of little more use than 26mm which has been of minor importance in stopping suicide attacks. However, in view of Oomine's 122227 Campbel/PFA 061340 Obtained 181123 and Oomine's 2 241000 all Feb 1942 and implied approval and desire in your 061340 advance papers and visit of present access to proposal to install ASP turrets on carriers as available in yards and in quantities designated by Oomine. Early evaluation by BuOrd desired to include maintenance, gun life, and stopping power.
08 1043 GAF 23 to CINCPOA ADV HO INTEC CICPOA PEARL, COMINPOE ADV HO INTEC CICPOA PEARL, BOX 3074

Summary No. 36. 0G1600 (2). Results of ground action for the day showed slow and steady progress being made against enemy defending desperately every inch of ground. Early morning attack appeared to confuse enemy and they reorganized quickly and slowed down our progress. Light heavy machine guns were silenced. Our tanks tested out many pillboxes moving over difficult terrain. Japs busy trapped Marine dead during night with pressure released FUZ aerial charges. Front line troops again report snipers wearing Marine uniforms. As day ended troops were in position along line: TA 22533 E3AP00 233AP00 229A00 230Q00 16AQ40Y 169EST 167E prepared to resume the attack at dawn. Para. OYERON (AFRAS) destroyed horned mine 17157 March 21-22 160-170 160-170. LOT 1029 breached and heavily damaged eastern beach. Salvage and repair impossible. Craft towing 12325 sunk 153 fathoms. SAMARITAN departed GUAN 1800 with casualties. Para. OYR based plans continued direct support missions. 1 strafing mission flown by shore based F-51a when coming off QATAMNIK. 1 BUSTER BAY TMN hit crash landed IWO Field with slight injury 1 crewman. 2 additional Army F-51 squadrons and 1 Marine TMN squadron arrived after noon IWO Field. Further information down sweep ONICHI indicates field cleared of JAPAN and operational.

08 0435 ADV OYR MARITA to CICPOA ADV HO INTEC CICPOA PEARL, COMINPOE ADV HO INTEC CICPOA PEARL, BOX 3074

As a result of conferences at 7th Flt Edisto LEXIs on 26 Feb attended by your representative Capt. House to discuss BFP petroleum requirements at MANUS and LEXIs, the following is forwarded for your consideration: Para 1. Navy special fuel oil. It will be the responsibility of CinPac to supply and transport to the SNSA all BFP requirements. Sub Para A. These quantities, scheduled through MANUS will come under the control of ComServ 7 upon arrival at MANUS. An equivalent amount will be issued to the BFP at MANUS by ComServ 7 or if required at LEXIs through ComSelco 10. Sub Para B. These quantities transported directly to LEXIs by CinPac will come under control and be inventoried issued to the BFP by ComSelco 10. Para 2. Aviation fuel oil will be provided from SNSA stocks, as requested by CinPac. Sub Para A. At MANUS ComServ 7 will be responsible for providing all of these products. Sub Para B. At LEXIs on request of ComSelco 10 aviation fuel oil stocks will be provided by ComServ 7 and CinPac will be responsible for providing aviation fuel oil stocks to CinPac. Para 3. Details in regard to the submission of requirements, reports on consumption and movements of tonnage as outlined at SIDNEY conference are satisfactory. It is important that full information as to BFP requirements be furnished SNSA aviation fuel oil officer and ComServ 7 together with times and places of delivery.

09 0013 COMINPOJAC, COMINPOJAC INTEC INTE 0002 01 USA, COMINPOC, INFO CICPOA ADV COMINPOC

Commander Western Sea Frontier and CinCen Western Defense Command consider pending conference CinPac offers attractive opportunity to JAPAN for fast carrier raid as precautions and offensive answer to "here is fleet" in view of overwhelming inability his carriers to exist in home waters. This can be applied with carriers now available behind cold front on a non-recoverable basis and undetectable by air search. This suggests desirability of early attacks on enemy carriers. Meanwhile Army & Navy air forces except aircraft on coast are generally adequate in numbers but all are in training. Effective defense will require much earlier warning than provided by coastal radar. Screen of radar equipped surface vessels plus carrier screening
and striking force essential to adequate detection. Recommend
necessary
authority to establish condition 2 of flight regulations and modify
training schedules as necessary to establish adequate defenses. Immediate
basis decision requested. Detailed plans and requirements of Army and Navy
being forwarded.

09 0247 CONTINUE to OTO 52-22. Info CINCPAC ADV. OTO 56. OTO 51.

OTO 51 received, Overall situation demands availability ENTERPRISE group for
most operation in preference to lesser usefulness as now employed. Call
ENTERPRISE group so as to arrive KULIK by 0900. Report OTO 56, Employ shore based aircraft fullest extent to meet air
requirements XV and PRIME Area.

09 0229 CONTINUE to CINCPAC ADV NO Info OTO 56, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC.

An approving OTO 58 0900L7 as basic for planning. FORMOSA strike can be
added later if developing situation makes this advisable. Details regarding
coordination with other forces by separate dispatches. Have ordered ENTER-
PRISE group return KULIK by 0900L7. Recommend SHANGH AI be called on as
so to join OTO 56 earliest practical date. Importance and magnitude coming
operations justify her combat availability at expense some interference with
training until situation allows resumption of CV at PEARL. Concur with
Kitchener that CAGRT retention without fresh air group is unadvisable.

06 0325 CINCPAC PEARL NO to COMAIR Info CINCPAC ADV NO. COM 17. COMAIRPAC.

Conneutral and OTO 022948 (022930) concur.

09 1015 OTO 51 to CONTINUE. Info CINCPAC BOTH NO. ALL NW SHIPS.

Summary No. 37. 041000 (E). During night of 8 March 3rd MarDiv front
generally quiet, 3rd MarDiv received sniper and rocket fire, 4th MarDiv re-
ported heavy rocket and mortar fire and infiltration attempt in strength,
344 enemy destroyed in attempts. 1 CA and 7 ED provided illumination and
harassment fire. Attack resumed at 0700 with 2 Divisions abreast. No
change in sense of action. Encouraging progress was made by troops today
against continuing shift resistance. At 1315 patrols of BCT 21 reached the
beach at TA 2364. Rocket fire reported from KAMSA or KAMSHO AERO Corps
Arm continues to provide general support. NWP provided during day by 1
CA and 4 ED. OTO groups continued close support missions. F-31s gave
additional support with excellent results. 1 F-31 crashed on landing and
damaged 2 parked planes. At 1421 1 E2Y made successful forced landing on
carfield NO. 1. Casualties as of 1700 9 March. Battle casualties 750 Off
Unloading and evacuation continues on eastern beaches. 9 survivor forces
completed unloading this morning. Total tonnage last 24 hours 7810. Be-
tween OTO and OSHA estimate 3 beaches closed without attacking as described
OTO 51 dispatch 0900L7. Unloading conditions eastern beaches good western
beaches unsatisfactory. Front lines as of 1700 (E). 230V 234 BEINOT 235
KIMSTY 234FWV 219D25 25022AUPJLQ 2012 185DODMISFY 167EF.
Following is 101200 (K) situation summary (No. 38). Night fairly quiet with minor attempts at infiltration. 4th MarDiv reported at 1130 (K) that initial morning advance only light fire. BRT 2A reported held up by sniper fire and BRT 25 moving uphill from rear. have encountered no large groups of enemy. Resistance generally spotty. 3rd MarDiv reported at 1130 (K) little activity in BRT 21 sector. BRT 1/21 has patrols on beach in TA 236W and 2196. BRT 9 on beach moving southeast 1130(K). BRT 2/21 estimates few enemy on its front. BRT 3/21 moving slowly against caves and pillboxes. 5th MarDiv reported 1130(K) BRT 26 being held up on flanks. BRT 26 having trouble with blockhouse or pillbox in TA 235A.

Summary No. 39 101800(K). Troops continued to make steady progress. Substantial gains made on right flank against resistance turned as generally spotty and disorganized. At 1500 patrol reached beach in TA 166A. Close air support furnished entirely by P-47s except for VIF planes which strafed and dropped napalm bombs. Air support confined to extreme northern end of island in TA 290 and 291. During daylight 1 CA and 3 DD gave close support. Last night 1 ASP plane from OTU TULAH (CVR72) emergency wheels up landing field 1. No injuries. During morning 5 B29s landed 1 plane run off end of runway. Others landed safely. During afternoon 4 B29s took off at 1530(K) shore based VIFB assigned ASP relieving OTUs. 2 rusted spherical contact mines believed to have broken loose from fields in BOXING were sunk bearing 035 50 miles from BRT ROCKS. Unloading continues on eastern beaches under favorable conditions. Heavy surf still prevents use of western beaches. B-LAOG (268) departed with 546 patients. Estimated enemy casualties 21,000. Front lines consolidated at 1700 as follows: 2350Y 2340X 2330X 2320Y 2310X 2300X 1850X 1840X 1830X 1820X 1810X. 1800X 1750X 1740X 1730X 1720X 1710X 1700X 1650X. Plan to continue the attack at 0530 tomorrow.

Date of completion capture and occupation Phase Para 57 your OpPlan 13-44 may be difficult to determine exactly and may occur while you are in radio silence. Estimate that 2K 5th Corps and 4th and 5th MarDivs will be evacuated and INF moved over to 1500 by 15 March. In view withdrawal fleet units by that date recommend reassignment for defense and development BNO JIMA be transferred to Comfwdarea about 16 March exact date to be determined by later arrangement between this officer and GTU 51.21. Recommend directive to that effect be issued by you not later than 10 March. Para. Request designation of SOPA BNO JIMA FOR BNO GTU 51.21 may transfer responsibility.

Anticipate that Com5thFit will be in radio silence when capture and occupation phase BNO JIMA is completed. Desire action on this so far as possible to the stage mutually agreeable for transfer of responsibility for defense and development. GTU 51.21 recommends postponement of completion capture and occupation phase 19 March for transfer to JIMA ABDON Maj Gen James O. G. Seay USA GTU 10.16, and transfer of SOPA functions to command designated by GTU 9.4. When command transferred GTU 9.4 assumes responsibility BNO JIMA conforming to Comfwdarea directives.
11 1000 CTC 51.21 to CONSIGNEE Into GUNPAC BOTH NO. ALL TEC-SUELT.

Summary No. 43 111800(K). Organized resistance was overcome on 3rd and 6th MarDiv sectors except for northeast corner of 3rd MarDiv sector and small pocket of resistance in 4th MarDiv sector. 5th MarDiv made small gains against heavy resistance from northern tip of island. 5th MarDiv estimates 1000 Japs still inside in 5th MarDiv zone of action. Front lines as of 1700 peaks in 4th MarDiv zone TA 182820 1640. In 5th Div zone TA 2210 2340 2350W. TA 2210 2340W. Landers reports general supply situation satisfactory. Total Landers battle casualties to 111800(K) 217,009 1666. Total 17,463 of which 3449 KIA. Total non-effectives 3,794. Combat efficiency very good. PI3 executed 2 support missions during afternoon in TA 220 and 225. At 1440 all P33s which attacked ONISHI JIMA returned safely. Pilots report 22 hits on SAMESHI FIELD on runway and among planes, 1 transport 1 damagedKate 1 undamaged planes 1 direct hit 2 probable 5 near misses. On estimated 16 to 18 small ships in harbor. Strafed SAMESHI Field and KITAMURAB JIMA TOWN and OKIMURA TOWN on HIBA. Set fire to radio weather station at OKIMURA. At 1017(K) CTO 12.6.1 reported 1 horned type mine had been exploded by gunfire in area CELLAR. Unloading now being controlled by Port Director DNO. Plan to continue the attack at 0800.

11 1216 CTC 51.21 to CONSIGNEE Into GUNPAC ADV NO. ALL TEC-SUELT.


12 0905 CTC 51.21 to CONSIGNEE Into GUNPAC BOTH NO. ALL TEC-SUELT.

Summary No. 43 121800(K). 16 P33s struck OKIMURA TOWN with bombs and strafing. Intense AA fire, 1 plane hit but all returned safely. At 1145 K submarine sighted bearing 125 distance 40 miles from HOKURUS by ASP plane. Sub dived. Depth bomber killer operations continuing. At 1440 damaged P33A7 search plane landed. Mopping up continues in 3rd and 4th Div zones. At 1240 3rd MarDiv reports all organized resistance ceased their zone of action, to boundary TA 2240. Resistance in 4th MarDiv area now confined to small pocket about 200 yards square TA 1952. 5th MarDiv meeting continued stiff resistance. Front lines as of 1730 K to A 2200 west center to 2340 southwest to CR 231 to JR in 235 K to K center leeward PHIL east a southeast along div boundary to coast at 250. Situation shows more improvement than is reflected in space gain. Most important enemy defensive installations have been destroyed including 23 pillboxes in TA 2340 W and the strong enemy position in TA 2350W has been taken. No enemy artillery reported. lst Garrison came in 73 percent unloading.

12 0950 CTC 51.21 to CONSIGNEE Into GUNPAC PEAC. CONSIGNEE CVTB/ESP RANDOLPH. CTO 51.21.

My 111216 not to all. Suicide attacks were made by 2 twin engine planes both carrying bombs. 1 plane hit SORLEN ISLAND boat repair base and other hit RANDOLPH starboard quarter at flight deck level. Some material damage SORLEN ISLAND 2 dead 6 injured. RANDOLPH after 60 feet starboard side flight deck has hole 40 feet wide. Sections underneath wrecked. Estimate can be repaired Service 10 in 3 to 4 weeks see my 1208Z-5. 11 RANDOLPH planes destroyed 6 seriously damaged, 16 dead 47 injured 22 of whom transferred to RELAY.

- Continued -
12 0950 CONTACT to GINCPAC ADV NO. 30G. (CONT'D)

Planes loss and casualty data subject to later revision by RANDOLPH. Examination of Jap planes with notes and maps found therein indicates planes came from KADOTA via OSHIMA or MINAMITAI. See memoranda sent you today by officer messenger. 3rd plane discovered this morning wrecked in shallow water near TAP. TAP airstrips remain nonoperational but are being covered by daylight strikes and dusk GAP to eliminate possibility of staging. Additional precautions being taken. Recommend withholding release regarding attack unless announced by Japs in which case restrict release to destruction 2 planes.

11 0800 CONTACT to GINCPAC BOTH NO INFO. GINCPAC. COMAIRPAC. COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFORD.

OVE situation. Losses of escort carriers in combat have not been replaced. These losses can be expected to increase. (B) Missions assigned CVE and their value at objectives have greatly increased. (C) Assignment for next operation of only 4 transport OVE to support 36th Flt is inadequate. Lack of sufficient transport OVE makes it necessary to assign all these available to support TF 58. This leaves 18 OVE engaged in close support at objective without provision for aircraft replacement except by withdrawal of 1 or more of them from already inadequate number. (D) This serious situation requires remedial action. Para. Recommend assignment of additional transport OVE now from ComTrans. Believe this can be handled by more intensive employment of remainder and accepting reasonable reduction of number replacement aircraft now in pipeline and at bases to rear of MARIANAS and ULLENS. Para. Recommend additional and longer range action to expedite availability of more OVE from new construction and sources outside FOA.

12 1502 START 1034 NO INFO. GINCPAC NO. 278. GINCPAC NO. 278.

12 0215 CONTACT to GINCPAC ADV NO. 278. GINCPAC NO. 278.

Summary No. 44. 121300(K), Quiet night on all fronts. Minor infiltration attempts and mortar fire in 4th and 9th MarDiv Sectors. PCW estimates 500 Japs remain in pocket of resistance TA 189 PCW. K hour advanced to 0700. 3rd and 4th MarDiv continue mopping up. Japs remaining in caves are being sealed in. Some Japs killed have been reported to be in Marine uniforms.

9th MarDiv reports general movement along front and advances of 75 to 100 yards. NAF support provided by 1 OA 2 DD 2 101(0). F-51a continue to give support in TA 250 and 251. Last night 2 and this morning 7 B-29s made emergency landings. 3 B-29s have already departed. No. 1 airfield NE-SW runway now operational 3800 feet. Airfield No. 2 will be operational about 14 March with NE-SW runway 2200 feet long and E-W runway 1200 feet long. Begin evacuation of 4th MarDiv morning 14 March. NO 107 JIMA teletype installed and ready to test. HOUNFIPU arrived and is loading casualties. Not laying operations commenced.

12 0420 CONTACT to GINCPAC ADV NO. 278. GINCPAC ADV NO. 278.

GYF 58 125136 passed to you for action recommending approval. Expect CABOT will be assigned local patrol duties and released when RANDOLPH rejoins.
12 0743 GINCPAC ADV HQ to CONAIRPAC Info OPI 58, GINCPAC PEARL HQ. CONAIRPAC.

Training important and requirements are such that assignment SHANKS PB to TP P3 is considered infeasible. Consider your recommendation as to CABOT but prior issuance movement orders suggest consideration be given adjusting RANDOLPH Group for employment in CABOT for forthcoming operation and re-turning CABOT's Group in RANDOLPH.

13 0225 OPI 51-21 to CONAIRPAC Info GINCPAC BOTH HQ. ALL WDC STAFF.

Summary No. 44 131200 K, Quiet night all along front. Minor infiltration attempts, sporadic mortar fire. Total of 166 Japs killed during night. Illumination and harassing fire provided by 3 DD. Attack resumed at 0700 by 5th MarDiv with 2 RT in assault. 3rd and 4th MarDiv continues systematic mopping up. Yesterday 1 RT reported scaling up 113 caves. NWP support provided by 3 DD. After reconnaissance late yesterday 1 Company landed on KAMA ROCK this morning. No enemy present. During morning 1 NAA and 1 PBY made emergency landings on airfield No. 1. 1 OT crashed in 235R. Details not available. Hunter killed enemy on sub last contacted yesterday afternoon continues without results. Total casualties to 121800 LeMPER battle 840 off 17,364 enlisted. Total 19,204 of which 3,659 KIA. Garrison force battle casualties 11 off 28 off 204 enlisted of which 44 KIA. American Flag will be officially raised on DWO JIMA at 0930 14 March.

13 0050 GINCPAC ADV HQ to CONAIRPAC Info OPI 58, GINCPAC PEARL, CONAIRPAC.

Although OPI 58 130136 not received, your 130420 is approved and you are authorized to make such adjustments of CABOT and RANDOLPH air groups as you see fit. Request be informed prior your departure ULITHI as to final action taken.

13 0920 OPI 51-21 to OPI 55 Info GINCPAC BOTH HQ. ALL WDC STAFF.

Summary No. 45 131800 K, Many small arms NCI and heavy mortar fire from pillboxes and bunkers many of which resisted our artillery fire have limited advance to small gains of 9th MarDiv, 4th MarDiv continued to reduce enemy pocket in 165 K. Mopping up proceeds. Landing on KABOKU ROCKS. No enemy present but signs of previous occupation. No close support missions flown today. Japs maintaining close contact with our lines to reduce effect of our artillery. No enemy artillery. 11 P-40s with bombs to GINCPAC. All returned safely. Direct hit on radar station SE of Sasebo Airfield and hits in wharf and dock area with unobserved results. Light AA intense and accurate. TU 12,6,3 plus PRESIDENT PEARL and CHINA VICTORY commence reembarkation of 4th MarDiv tomorrow. Figures submitted by Divos show 19,995 enemy buried by LeMPER and by Japanese or sealed in caves. Unknown number smoking burial. Have requested clarification. Total POWs to 131800 12I. Total LeMPER battle casualties 850 off 19,736 enlisted. Total 16,506 of which 3,756 KIA. No appreciable change in front lines.
12 0530 RANDOLPH to COMFLTLT Info CTF 48, CTF 48.3 (Passed by SHTFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC)

At 2009Z 11 March RANDOLPH was hit by KAMEHARI at starboard edge of flight deck frame 209. Enemy aircraft was Frances carrying bomb of undetermined size. Bomb and starboard engine went under flight deck where bomb exploded in aviation engine shop and after hangar space. Fire and bomb explosion caused following damage, 27 dead or missing of which 21 bodies recovered, 52 injured still under treatment. Hole in starboard half of flight deck frame 197 to frame 209. Extensive damage by fire to flight deck shaft frame 197. Arresting gear unit from 190 badly damaged. All shops store complexes gas and equipment between flight deck and hangar deck shaft frame 194 badly damaged, Vertical flight deck support frame 203 starboard bent and twisted. Roller curtains damaged both sides shaft frame 145. Some damage to hangar and fantail and 2nd and 3rd deck resulting in flooding of 5 compartments 2nd and 3rd deck. Several holes in hull port quarter above water line caused by assisting craft. 14 aircraft destroyed plus 12 damaged beyond capacity this ship. 3 Japanese bodies recovered. 1 chart showing pencil course 143 degrees from DALTO SHIMA. Estimates to affect temporary repairs vary from 14 to 30 days without replacement of arresting gear unit controlling arresting wires 1 and 3.

13 0201 COMFLTLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CTF 59, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC.

Your 1207A3. In view planned light units for CABOT and prospective availability RANDOLPH within 6 or 4 weeks disruption her Air Group by partial use in CABOT not justified. My 090229 non-availability RANDOLPH now makes need for SHANGRI LA greater. Request reconsideration decision to use her for training rather than combat during part of forthcoming operations.

13 0544 COMFLTLT to CTF 51 Info CTF 52.

In view of change in CTF 54 will CTF 51 act as SOPA RVN XNS during next operation until your arrival. Subject modification 3rd sentence Para 3 E in your OpPlan to clarify situation.

13 2051 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ. COMFLTLT. CTF 58. COMAIRPAC.

ComShtFlt 130201 SHANGRI LA will continue training replacement groups and personnel until further orders. Hints.

13 2234 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMFLTLT Info COMAIRPAC. CTF 58. CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 130201. After long and very careful reconsideration and full appreciation your operational needs adheres to previous decision to continue SHANGRI LA training air groups. Without such action timely replacement of Air Groups suitably trained cannot be achieved and the efficiency and tempo of combat operations would be unacceptably reduced.
14 0250 CTF 51-21 to CONDUCT INTO COCHICO BOTH HX. ALL TFC STRAFED.

Summary No. 46 - 141200. During night 3rd MarDiv and 4th MarDiv some quiet except for knee mortars and grenading from enemy attempting to escape from isolated pockets. Activity in the 5th MarDiv some consisted numerous attempts to infiltrate. Attack resumed at 0630Hr. 3rd and 4th MarDiv continuing to mop up their areas. 5th MarDiv attacking against stiff resistance from prepared positions and spider trap foxholes. WIP support by 2 DD, P-51s made 1 Kapaia strike. LanFor gives best appreciation of enemy dead as 20,000 reports combat conditions make accurate count impossible. At 131900 Hunter killer operations ended at. During morning 9 E297s made emergency landings on INO, 8 have since taken off. American flag officially raised on INO 0930, 4th MarDiv commenced reembarkation. 2nd garrison echelon commenced unloading.

14 0403 BUCKER CONDUCT REAR TAKES TO COCHICO ADV HQ.

TA 1517. ComCenPOA preparing establish Far Western Pacific Base Command in BUNKHOUSE (KTUITS) Area soon after that area declared secure. Function this command will be "To facilitate execution Army administrative and logistical support of area." Planned to activate by augmentation of ComCen LEGUMINOUS. This Base Command will be under ComCenPOA for command, with operational control and coordination on Army administrative and logistical matters by ComCen 10. COMCENPHIL directed submit material for inclusion in ComCenPOA letter of instructions to Far Western Pacific Base Command. Further to inform you, establishment western Pacific Base Command with Headquarters TEARAWAY (SAIPAN) imposes. Western boundary this letter command meridian 130-00 W from equator to parallel 20-00 N latitude, 135-00 W from parallel 20-00 N to parallel 30-00 N lat. Have you comments on plan for Far Western Pacific Base Command? Please forward by dispatch or airmail as appropriate.

15 0225 CTF 51-21 to CONDUCT Into ALL POSTS, COCHICO BOTH HX.

Summary No. 48 151200. Last night LanFor reported it appeared that the backbone of the enemy defense in the 5th MarDiv sector has been broken. Night generally quiet except for small arms fire and infiltration attempts. Attack resumed at 0730Hr. 3rd and 4th MarDiv continues mopping up. Plane throwing tanks engaging enemy vicinity southern boundary TA 251N 9th MarDiv zone. WIP support by DD. Casualties to 141500K: LanFor battle 661 Off 18,121 E, Total: 18,982 of which 3,644 KIA.

15 1235 CTF 51-21 to CONDUCT INTO BOTH, COCHICO, OTT & MTA, COMPO, COM- PHIL, COMCUW. ADVANCE ADVANCE.

Your 141315, Desire TF 112 & 113 be prepared function without shore facilities when they arrive LANTER. Advance officers may be sent to consult with Sr. Officer Peafly at LANTER now RAdm. Davis who controls all Peafly facilities presently. He or his successor will assist as practicable with facilities at his disposal and in making local arrangements. Establishment British reserve carrier aircraft on shore will be authorized when Pacific Fleet carrier aircraft pool is activated.
15 0740 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CONINIC. CINCPOA INTO CINCPOA PEARL NO.

ComOcn 10 Rear Babalina Tp 1317 (140403). In view possible changes in overall command organization do not confer in further assignment of responsibilities for Army Base Command administration to officers serving as Island Commanders and exercising unified command over all services involved.

16 0746 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CONINIC Info MARCORPS, CONVESTL. CINCPOA PEARL NO.

In order to assist in alleviating critical Marine Corps personnel situation temporary reduction of 10 per cent of personnel in Marine detachments of Pacific Fleet combatant ships without change of complement is acceptable to CINCPAC.

16 0916 CINCPOA ADV HQ to OTV 46, OTV 93 Info CONVESTL. COMINIC, MAGICOM 20TH AF, COMOCS 24 NOV 20.

Since the Emperor of Japan is not at present a liability and may later become an asset his palace at Tokyo will not be attacked until further orders. Brief pilots accordingly.

16 0920 OTV 51 21 to CONVESTL Info ALL FTC STHL. CINCPOA BOTH NO.

Summary No. 31 161800. All organized resistance in IWO overcome at 1800K after continued advances by 3rd and 5th MarDiv. Small pockets and some mopping up remains. Estimated island can be turned over to 1stCom about 22 March. IWO Airfield No. 2 operational. 16 F-5s bombed and strafed CHICHI. No flak. On return observed 2 small cargo vessels at KITAMURA. Not attacked due to shortage of ammunition. Hunter-killer operations continuing. Casualties to 1800 15 March: 1stFor battle 616K officers 18,736 enlisted - total 19,619 of which 4,043 KIA. 4th MarDiv continuing re-embarkation.

16 OTV CINCPAC ADV HQ to CONINIC. CINCPAC. COMINIC. COMVESTL. CONVESTL. INFO MAGICOM 20TH AF. COMOCS 24 NOV 20.

Pursuant to FIBIAS Agreement augmentation and completion of naval facilities in LATER area has highest priority of projects for support FOA forces and the LATER SAMAR Naval Base is expected to be ready to replace ULYTHI prior to the advent of the typhoon season at ULYTHI. Present plans for supporting Pacific Fleet in Western Pacific includes: (a) Retain principal advanced base and major portion of Sakan 10 at ULYTHI until May and then transfer to LATER SAMAR. (b) Limit use of GANDERS to anchorage with no facilities or shore except recreation facilities established by Sakan 10. (c) Movement of troop vessels to GANDERS will be limited to tenders, oilers, ammunition and supply ships called forward by COMINIC for a specific purpose and for a specific period. All ships called forward shall be able to withdraw rapidly under their own power. (b) Retention at ULYTHI of facilities ashore and naval-age for support of merchant shipping consort and occasional combatant units. The occurrence of CINCPAC is requested in connection with the contemplated use of FOA anchorage and facilities.
19 1233 CINCPAC ADV NO to ALL COMS INTERESTED IN COMBAT REPORTS Info COMUDC, CINCPAC, COMCINC.  CINCPAC, COMCINC.

Flash report from ComPhibPac, TF 98 attacked KYUSHU 16th and KONIN area 19th. Strike resulted good. FRANKLIN (CV 13) hit morning 19th now retiring in tow of STONEWALL (CA 72) covered by TF 98.

19 1332 CINCPAC ADV NO to COMOP 1, COMAIRPAC, COMFEDAREA Info COMAIRPAC SUBCOMOOD.

Confirnig conference with ComPalwing 1 Ventures may be substituted for Liberators in seaplane aircraft staging through ENO total of both not to exceed 18 allowed by L/102 not to all. ComairPac augment CAG 52 as necessary to support foreseen plans 3 air sea rescue F6T4s. F6Ts spare and a few Ventura mechanics are already at ENO. ComairPac also augment ground echelon of VMF 612 as required by ComFedArea for support not to exceed 6 TUs of VMF 262 staging at ENO, total aircraft of both VMF 612 and 262 at ENO not to exceed 18. Base Development Plans will be modified accordingly. ComFedArea coordinate direct with ComairPac and answer his 142058.

19 2017 COMAIR 1 ORD to CINCPAC ADV NO, MARCORPS Info CINCPAC, PEARL COMEN.

As emergency measure make temporary reduction of 10 percent in Marine detachments in combatant ships Pacific Fleet. CINCPAC issue directive to execute. MarCorps report when situation permits regular authorized strength to be resumed.

20 1730 OTH 20.9.3 to CINCPAC.

Following relay received by V402 planes. From VIKING to LONE STAR. Preliminary and incomplete report follows: Aircraft destroyed both days in air 200 or ground 275. Probably destroyed or damaged at least 100 last day large number 2nd day. Own aircraft losses 5. Very large number hangars shops and other installations destroyed or damaged at many airfields. Also at Hako and KURU air depots and at KURE naval arsenal oil storage tanks, 7 freighters damaged. About 16 combatant vessels damaged including 1 BAOY or 2 BE 2 or 3 CT 2 CYL or CVE 2 CVE 1 CA 1 CB A 9 DD 1 85 plus 1 DE. Own ship damage XIXIX now making 15 knots. 4 other carrier damaged some seriously. All fully operational. Enemy countered with large number individual plane attacks believed mostly suicide which were aided by low broken clouds. No attack since mid-afternoon yesterday. Complete summary tomorrow. This is VIKING 20052.

19 2042 COMAIR 20 to COMAIRPAC 21 Info DEFCON 20 for CINCPAC.

Bombing of Emperor's palace. Bombing policy of 20th. Air Force remains in force; i.e. to attack specific assigned targets. Emperor's palace has not been assigned as a target and will not be intentional objective of attack unless so designated. It is, however, subject to same hazards as any other building or installation in TOKYO.

20 0230 CINCPAC ADV to COMOPAC Info COMAIRPAC, COMFEDAREA, COMOPAC, CONSOPAC, GONCOM 9 INFO 1, INFORM.  MAR NO.

When Transition II is NPS arrange direct for such amphibious refresher training as desired by ComPac Fleet Div and as is feasible with consideration for the fact that Transition and troop Division must at all times be ready for departure for combat on 7 days notice from CINCPAC. Keep ComPhibPac and me informed.
21 0630 CONTINENTAL IN CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMORETH. 10, OITZ-58.
21 0128

My 2045Z, 4 other damaged carriers are ENTERPRISE, ENTERPRISE, ESSEX, ESSEX, ENTERPRISE, ESSEX. ENTERPRISE minor damage from near miss. ENTERPRISE damage not serious. ENTERPRISE and ESSEX require repairs. Have ordered FRANKLIN, ENTERPRISE, ESSEX, ESSEX to escort by DesRon 52 to SANTO. Orsini. FRANKLIN for repairs and 2nd round to PEARL with SANTA FE, SANTA FE, ESSEX, ENTERPRISE, ESSEX for repair if practicable. In attacks late afternoon 20th ENTERPRISE hit 2nd time 1st being on 10th. Also ESSEX, POWELL with steering gear damage which allowed her to 10 knots and has required protection from TF 56 less TO 58.2. Repairs her steering gear expected shortly when she will speed up to 25. No damage reported aircraft torpedoes attacks last night. Several planes shot down by anti-aircraft and night fighters. My 0600 14-9) position 27.25N 134-50 E heading toward KEMBU. ESSEX, POWELL astern with THE SULLIVANS and FRANKLIN group ahead. New subject. Your 201729 see my 20615.

20 2055 OITZ-58 to CINCPAC 58.1, 58.2, 58.3, 58.4, 58.5 INFO CONSTATL, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.
20 0130 OITZ-58 to CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

At 1000 X (-9) 21 March Task Force 58 reorganised as follows. TF 58.1 R Adm Clark, ENTERPRISE, ENTERPRISE, RELAY, ENTERPRISE, RELAY, RELAY, ENTERPRISE, RELAY. TF 58.2 R Adm Devison, WASP, ENTERPRISE, FRANKLIN, SANTA FE, DesRon 52 less THE SULLIVANS. TF 58.2 R Adm Sherman, ESSEX, BUNKER HILL, HAMMOND, BATAAN, BATANGA, DesDiv 6, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

22 0850 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMORETH.

Compliance my 271416 February completed. Resume compliance with my 172233 January.

23 1952 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC ADV HQ, CINCPAC ADV HQ, CINCPAC ADV HQ, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

On 26 Jan 1945 in para 6 of CinCPAC serial 00153 it was assumed that logistic support furnished by CinCPAC for north Solomons axis would cease about the middle of February 1945 upon the relief of the American Division by Australian forces and CinCPAC was requested to advise on that assumption to date no reply has been received. Operations planned by CinCPAC and the necessity for rollup of South Pacific Area make impractical continuation of above support beyond 30 April 1945. It is intended to terminate logistic support of Normandy by CinCPAC on that date unless otherwise requested.

23 0900 NAVYPORT 10 CONTAINER. CINCPAC ADV HQ. CINCPAC ADV HQ, CINCPAC ADV HQ. NAVYPORT NAVYPORT.

OAK-51168. Consider within limitations of CinCPAC radio 220247 Feb not to all addresses in making SWPA anchorage and all possible facilities available as outlined in CinCPAC Adv. HQ. radio 180610 March.
23 1304 AMPA to COMREPAC(ARP) Info COMPOA BOTH NO. COMMPAREXION.

Reference your 201843. Due critical world wide tanker shortage and lengthening of Pacific supply lines our ability supply your requirements petroleum products with tanker tonnage presently available is being taxed to utmost. Our weekly aide is fairly accurate indication of maximum deliveries possible with present tonnage. Everything possible being done here to augment deliveries presently programmed to FPA by expediting repairs and deferring drydocking of tankers. However it is extremely doubtful that even with benefits to be derived from this action that increased fuel oil requirements for April and May can be fully met. Any substantial increases which can be affected over and above deliveries presently scheduled will be passed to you by dispatch.

24 1136 COMPOA ADV HQ to COMREP 2D BATTLE INFO COMREP(4), COMACCFRP CHINA, COMPOA.

ComGen 20th BnCom 231.000. Censor. (B: aerial mining SAIGON, SHANGHAI, CAPE ST JACQUES, SINGAPORE and CAMBRAI BAY areas before 1 April).

21 1142 COMPOA ADV to COMPOA ADV HQ INFO CUNIPAC FEBR. ADMAITY COMCARTOEPAC, COMANT. COMPOA, COMACF, COMCARTOEPAC.

Admiralty advises that British CTVs PATRULLER, REAPER and HAWK are required at an early date for fitting out as replenishment carriers for BFP. Release 2 of these CTVs as early in April as practicable. 3rd CTV may be retained until end of April. When released sail them to UK. Inform Admiralty of approximate sailing dates and place of departure as soon as reasonable firm. Admiralty 021930 1 January before.

24 2243 COMPOA FEBR. to COMREPAC Info COMREPAC COMPOA ADV, COMAIRPC, COMACF.

ComThnFlt 160225. In view situation to which ABOU-2 has been unlaunched, recommend its retention SAMAR. If decision is made for establishment at CESU recommend:
(A) Carrier pool at SAMAR be limited to 500 aircraft. (B) ABU GUADAL be established at CESU and augmented by engine overhaul and associated facilities and pilot camp from SAMAR as shipping becomes available. Air establishment at CESU should comprise initially ABU GUADAL, ASA plus necessary facilities to support local aircraft and 500 plane pool. Additional space should be reserved at CESU for eventual location of above engine overhaul facilities or ABU-2, pilot camp and major portion of supply facilities initially at SAMAR plus 500 plane pool initially at SAMAR. Thus CESU will eventually have total 1,000 planes pool. Para. Realize that final evaluation of location and details of establishment must be made locally.

25 0231 COMPOA ADV to COMTEAMS(3N) Info COMHATS, COMCARTOEPAC, COMAIRPC, COMACF.

Recommend that the aircraft and personnel of the PacFlt Flag Transport Unit be constituted as a separate squadron in Hapac. The unit should include all 4 engine flag transports in the ComFlt. ComHats should control and be responsible for administration, maintenance and operating procedures and efficiency. Cunipa will exercise direct operational control (allocation of aircraft to flights or special services) as at present and the unit ComFlt should report to Cunipa for additional duty for this purpose. It is intended that the headquarters of the squadron for the present be at NAS HONOLULU with a detachment at NAS AGANA.
25 0429 CINCPAC ADW HG to COMAIRLUS Info CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPM KG

Privateer Squadron in Marshall is deployed there temporarily, in readines
for forward movement when and if required. Its employment should be such as
to maintain its combat readiness and should normally be for primary mission
of search rather than attack on enemy shore positions.

20 2156 CINCPAC PEARL to CONRINUS, CONAIRFLAG, JCSOM, SATPAM, TITIHAM, CHAM, INC,

Due to the insufficiency of total number of construction troops to effect
the desired deployment in the POA the provision of many necessary facilities
may be impossible of accomplishment. In the very near future the requirements
for planned operations make inevitable a greater reduction in the number of
these troops in the rear areas, including the MARIANAS, than is consonant with
the expected reduction in the work load. Accordingly it is believed that
many essential projects may be left unfinished and others unstarted
unless special methods are instituted to increase labor available for con-
struction work and to eliminate unessential projects and portions of projects.
It is suggested therefore that respective using agencies be required to con-
tribute labor from general service troops and other personnel available to
them to augment such supervisory, engineering, and skilled personnel as may
be available for work on the project desired by the particular using agency.
It is again directed that all construction be of the simplest utilitarian
type and without embellishment.

24 0905 COMAIRPAC to TITIHAM Info COMINCH CNO, SGNAY, CNRB SUBIC BAY, NAVAL BASE MANTALI

US Naval Base MANTALI and US Naval Base SUBIC BAY both LUZON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
established 23 March 1945. Request info above disseminate as appropriate.

24 1840 CNO to CONRINUS Info CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC, DURBACKS PEARL, COMAIRPM CONRINUS, TITIHAM, CHAM, INC

Your 220413 and 220427, Para 2 my 0039230 requested Cinpos to advise the
number OHEU's available from area and also requested BuPac to advise number
which could be supplied. Cinpos 250111 Feb and 122104 March authorized contin-
uation temporary assignment 5 OHEU's in SOSOSL for ULOD and requested transfer
OHEU 502 to SHAE. CUNSM & CNO 071945 advised overall limitation SeaBee
and assigned area ceiling quotes citing inability to bring currently author-
ized units to full strength and directed adjustment magnitude and rates of
construction work to suit allocations or to accomplish work with Army or lo-
cal civilian labor. There are approximately 47,000 SeaBees now in SeaBee and
will all unit now assigned or to be loaned would be over 66,000. This
exceeds Cunsm ceiling quote of 60,000 for SeaBee. It will therefore be
impractical to make more OHEU's available for the US for ULOD or for additional
locations and operations listed.
Data requested your 202103. Read info after each numbered unit in columns this order. Present location, present employment, proposed transfer date, proposed location, proposed employment. Latter column omitted for some units engaged in miscellaneous construction at locations indicated and where future plans not sufficiently crystallized to permit definite assignment units after completion present projects:

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</tbody>
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Proposed use of CEMUs 553, 568, 569, 582, and 586 subject CWO approval my dis 22O413. Foregoing does not include units ordered to SAMAR from US and ComPac which are not yet in SWPA. No units presently assigned SWPA except as indicated above will be available for reassignment outside area before 1 Sept. Following are base companies by location and number now assigned SWPA: MANUS - 2, 6, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, MIKE - 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, NOENDI - 17, HOLLANDIA - 5, 20, 44, 47, 49, 50. Present plans do not contemplate transfer of any Base Company prior Sept 1.

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25 1050 CINCPAC ADJ HQ to COMINCH INFO CINCPAC FLEET, CINCPAC:

Due to acute troop shortage FPA request approval withdrawal US Army Garrison Force of 2 officers 46 enlisted men now stationed at Fanning Island. US troops were stationed Fanning to replace New Zealand troops in April 1942. Should British Government desire regarrison this station with Australian or New Zealand troops before withdrawal of US forces request earliest date our troops can be withdrawn.

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25 2155 OTP 58 to OTP 11 INFO COMINCH OTP 52. (Intercept)

From photos whole island of CINCPAC appears to be honeycombed with caves, tunnels and gun positions particularly along roads. Tanks and armored cars seen entering caves. It will probably be tougher SW and NW quadrants cannot be covered by my radars since I must remain E of island. Timely warning from you will assist. Will furnish all air protection possible day and night with my reduced facilities. Will attempt interception from east and northeast. As searching island chain twice daily between bearing 330 deg to 040 deg for aero as OSUMI GUNTO. Believe most of raids will be during moonlight period.
A survey of the construction program currently authorized for the MARIANAS is being initiated with a view to elimination of all projects and parts of projects that do not contribute directly and materially to the support of combat operations. Action aforesaid will assist CinCPac staff officers engaged in this survey as may be necessary. Group is headed by Capt. W. L. Faillier CEC, USNR. Pasa. No new projects will be submitted to CinCPac by info aforesaid that do not contribute directly and materially to the support of combat operations and all projects submitted will be covered by statement of responsible commander to the above effect. Pasa. The authority of all action aforesaid to approve projects under existing CinCPac policies and directives is hereby suspended except for projects of such emergency nature that time will not permit their submission to CinCPac for action.

ComGenPOA 240949. In view (1) Shortage of beds in forward area resulting in increased casualty reception requirements OAHU and (2) Period necessary to clear required bed capacity in OAHU consider any course other than that directed in CinCPac 072327 unwise. Provisions of that directive remain unchanged. As soon as circumstances indicate safety and practicability return to 128 day evacuation policy will be authorized. Request this situation be presented to War Dept with urgent recommendation that personal replacement flow from mainland be increased to offset the loss of replacements resulting from curtailment of evacuation period which is regarded as an operational necessity.

Regret that plans for future operation of POA submarines, aircraft and surface ships in area described in your 240901 serial CX 12836 make unfeasible its reclassification as a blind bombing zone.

My 190857 assigned DD STEVENS and YOUNG as relief for RADFORD and LAVALLE. RADFORD 200705 indicates no action being taken to make RADFORD sufficiently seaworthy for her to proceed for repairs and that deterioration of material and personnel is progressive. This is a matter of much concern to me as destroyers are badly needed and if RADFORD's report is correct a valuable fleet unit is not being readied for future useful employment. Request advice as to when she can be made ready to proceed to navy yard.

During morning twilight 26 March about 8 enemy planes attacked ships near KERAMA RETTO. 1 splashed by CAP 2 by ships gunfire. 2 suicides missed ships and crashed. 1 hit KIMBERLY causing considerable structural damage with 2 5-inch guns 1 40mm mount beyond repair otherwise ship operable. Successful landings preceded by effective gunfire and air support made on AKA OKUMA ZAMAMI HOKAJI YAKARI. Opposition light. By noon HOKAJI OKUMA reported secured. Incomplete reports indicate Jap KIA 71 POW 5 civilians taken 200. Landings on KUBA AMINO YOKAIKI scheduled tomorrow. Minesweeping approximately on schedule 3 scored mines swept in southern SS5 and 15 in 56. B 3 other areas negative. Ships gunfire accomplished as scheduled. Careful air

25 2314 CinCPac PEARL to COMCPAC INFO ITMO OKIN. LSG 190621 LSG 240949 LSG 240936 CinCPac INFO PEARL

26 0514 CinCPac ADV HO to CinCPac INFO COMAIRNS FPAC COMSUBPAC

26 0625 CinCPac ADV HO to COMAIRNS INFO COMAIRNS

26 1402 CTF 52 to COMSHUTT CTF 51 INFO CinCPac ADV HO TF 51

Continued -
26 1402 CTF 52 to CONSFUTL. CTF 41. Info CINC PAC ADV NO. TF 51. (Cont'd)

observation disclosed no important defensive installations TOMAGU. No enemy fire during bombardment or at minesweepers passing close aboard. Support aircraft in addition to supporting landings attacked many installations OKINAWA including probable midget sub base UNTEN KO. 3 small luggers beached and destroyed. 1 TONY splashed by CAP of CVE, 1 of own planes reported shot down not confirmed WICHITA and TERROR while off area HUMO beached reported submarine attacks and torpedoes passing close aboard, large oil slick after attack on 1 enemy sub. ConvTaskGroup 52.2 at 1913(1) (-9) reported HALLIGAN DD 586 torpedoed and badly damaged. CTO 52.22 with several ships standing by. No further details. Casualties in morning air attacks GILMER KIA 1 WIA 2 KIMBERLY KIA 3 WIA 30.

27 1105 CINC PAC ADV HQ to CONSFUTL. CTF 58 Info ZTL. CINC BF. CINC PAC PEARL. BOMCML 21. DEPON AF 20.

Flash report on KYUSHU from BomCML 21 planes in flight. All planes carried 1/4 ton GP bombs and dropped from 15,000 feet, 78 dropped 268 tons on TACHARAI with results 4 excellent 19 good 11 fair, 35 dropped 122 tons on OITA with results 20 excellent 15 good, 40 found KANGAR weathered in and dropped 180 tons on OKURA with good results. All aircraft accounted for.

27 1141 CONSFUTL to CTF 58 Info CINC PAC ADV. CTF 41. CTF 52. CTO 50.5.

Desire to create impression carrier attack on KYUSHU is impending by sinking picket boats on a line estimated extending from about 29-00 N 135-50 E to 29-00 N 138-00 E just before sunset on March 29 by coordinated destroyer and CV aircraft attacks. Following general plan is suggested for your consideration. Use units from TCGs 58.3 or 58.4 on 29 March, 1 DesDiv which has sailed 28th begin sweep from western end of line about 1545. Aircraft begin sweep from eastern end of line about 1630. Destroyers discontinue sweep after sinking last picket boats and not later than 1800 proceed to rendezvous with you. Aircraft sink others, Supply 2 sqn fighters and 1 sqn bombers be launched from about 25-20 N 133-20 E at approximately 1500 form scouting line centered at approximately 29-00 N 138-00 E about 1640. Estimate destroyers will be met about 1730 at which time both planes and DDs depart area.

27 1208 CINCPOA ADV to CONSFUTL. COMMANDA PEARL CTF 51. CTF 51. 21. Info ISCOM 1IO. COMAIR 1IO. CINCPOA PEARL. COMMANDA PEARL. CINCPOA COMAIR 1IO. COMAIR 1IO.

The Island Command 1IO is hereby incorporated into the forward area and its garrison into TF 94. The senior officer present afloat at 1IO is assigned additional duty under CTF 94 for purposes of the development and defense of the island and all forces present.

27 1220 CINC PAC ADV to COMINCH & CIO. Info CINC PAC PEARL. COMAIR 1IO.

Recommend establishment in PEARL of a new Fleet Air Wing as of 1 June. Thereafter it is proposed to assign to Fleet Air Wing 1 the appropriate squadrons operating in the MARIANAS and to the westward and to assign to the new wing the appropriate units operating in the MARIANAS CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.
SECRET

28 0107 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCPOC Info CINCPAC, COMCHTL, COMPODARMA, ISCOM FEJELIU, CINCPAC PEARL.

Authority granted to extend British Pacific Fleet Air Transport Service to TACLOBAN staging through FEJELIU subject to conditions contained in CINCPAC 260556.

28 0109 CINCPAC to COMPOC WAR DEPT Info COMINCH, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMCHTL.

CX 13072. Beach conditions at objectives forthcoming operations indicate advisibility of landing initial assault in small type landing craft from transports. It is therefore requested that a transport division consisting of 1 AGO, 3 APA and 2 AKA be assigned temporary duty with 7th Fleet until about 1 August. This TransDiv should be available at MOROTAI not later than 15 April.

28 0307 OTP 58 to OTP 58, 58, 3 and 58, 4 Info COMCHTL, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CONSUBPAC ALL PER 58WD.

Task Group 58.1 join TF 58 in position 29-15 131-15 at 0530 March 29 in order to locate and sink Japanese Fleet reported rounding southern KYUSHU during night 28-29 March. At 0520 TG 58.3 launch reinforced day search and attack plan Y distance 250 miles between bearings 330 to 020. When search planes report contact with enemy fleet linking communication planes will inform strikes from all TGs and obtain acknowledgments as well as informing TG Comdes. At 0545 each TG launch full VB-VT deck load strikes plus VFUs as practicable to proceed to position near YAKU SHIMA then skirt west coast KYUSHU to distance of not more than 200 miles from launching point. If enemy fleet not reported by then TG 58.1 air groups strike KOKUSHI airfield. TG 58.3 air group strike KANOKA airfield and TG 58.4 and 58.4 air groups strike KUSHIRA and KANOKA east airfields. If airfields are attacked VFUs loaded with torpedoes strike any shipping target or if none jetisons. Ships may be in KAOOSHIMA BAY. Aiming Plan A Alternate modified so that not more than 1/2 VFUs per TG for CAP. Request ComSubPac furnish rescue submarines INSTALLATION 2 and 4 if practicable and advise.

28 0649 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMINCH Info COMATPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMCHTL.

Request authority assign 2 PBAY squadrons temporarily to 7thFlt as relief for 2 PBY squadrons with the understanding that they will be available for return to PBFIt when needed.

28 0905 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CONSOPAC Info COMINCH.

Your 170057 and 270351, Maintain token occupation of NAUSORI airfield as of post-war significance. US installations at LAUTHALIA seaplane base which was developed primarily by NEW ZEALAND may be dismantled or abandoned.
SECRET

NARA (G6)

28 0904 CINCPAC ADV to COMTFUL Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, EAPL, COMINCH, JCS.

Cominco 26204A. Ships can be released to you as follows. LAVACA (APA 189) is now unloading at SAMAR and is immediately available. DAWSON (APA 79) and BOTSFORD (APA 136) are loading on west coast for ESPRITU SANTO with arrival dates of 15 April and 23 April respectively. LST 172 can be released in S000L by 1 May. Desire LAVACA returned GUAM upon completion 1 lift as indicated in ref. Depatch. Orders will be issued to ships when you advise locations desired.

28 0903 CTF 57 to COMTFUL Info CINCPAC ADV NO. CINCPAC.

Daylight air operations comprising 774 sorties were carried out against MITAKO and ISHIGAKI on 26 and 27 March. Para 9. All airfields were thoroughly bombed and strafed. Installations, facilities, and barracks continuously attacked. Para 3. 20 plus aircraft were shot up on ground. Some of these are believed to have been previously damaged. Para 4. Only 1 aircraft airborne. This shot down at HIHARA. Para 5. Several coasters hit, 1 blew up. Other administrative buildings fired and OHAMA TOWN left burning. Para 6. Photographic results poor owing to cloud. Para 7. No air opposition flak moderate to heavy. Para 8. Loses due to flak 6 aircraft. Other losses 11 aircraft. Para 9. Killed and missing all cause 5 pilots and 4 aircrew. Para 10. This force was sighted during forenoon 26th and again by night 26/27, but was not attacked.

28 1512 CTF 52 to COMTFUL, CTF 51, Info CINCPAC ADV, TF 51, (ECM HOLDERS).

Summary as of 281600(1). During night 27/28 MORRISON and SHEA off eastern OKINAWA made good attacks on sub contest. TOLMAN while on patrol off NAGO WAN engaged 8 Jap MTB's having estimated speed 32 knots which sighted therefrom and made torpedo attack on her. 2 MTB's definitely sunk possible 4 others. No damage to TOLMAN. H H WILEY and ADAMS on night patrol at objective splashed 2 planes which attacked them. No damage to WILEY slight damage to ADAMS who reported part of list plane and most of pilot landed aboard. After part HALLIGAN is grounded eastern shore TAKASHIKI, CTO 51,1 investigating. Further details including disposition classified documents and ECM equipment when known. TAKASHIKI secured morning of 27. Only snipers remain in AKA. Sporadic fighting still continued HAMAMATSU this morning. AWAKE uninhabited. Incomplete reports own total casualties KIA 21, WIA 65 enemy KIA 292 POW 49 including 1 officer. More suicide attack boats captured same with dummy traps. 12 women found strangled and 1 baby alive in cave. TO 51,30 arrived and established ashore base. Planes will arrive commencing tomorrow morning. Northern not installed and southern not installation nearing completion. TO 50,15,34 arrived. Taskers commence fueling operations and reconditioning scheduled to commence tomorrow. Mineweeping expected to permit UDT reconnaissance on preferred and demonstration beaches tomorrow. UDT reconnaissance COMINCH TO EKISE during mineweeping operations SKYFIRE (AM-53) struck mine and sank in Le 26-20,5 H Long 127-41, FF TEMPEST L. TOLMAN reports recovering 11 officers 90 men of whom 5 and 20 WIA respectively. Evidence that enemy is launching floating mines off western OKINAWA possibly floating down BASHIJIMA. Increasing night patrol off beaches tonight. Naval gunfire proceeded on schedule but at ranges 6 to 11,000 yards because of unswept water. Expect to get in to close range tomorrow. Support aircraft very active on OKINAWA 2 MTB's destroyed and probable base at TOSUCHI heavily hit. 5 landing barges strafed 3 set afire. Many gun positions attacked. Several planes on TONTAN Field strafed about 4 apparently still serviceable.

- Continued -
28 1512 CTF 52 to COMPLPAC, CTF 51 Info CINCPOA ADV, TF 51 (CONT'D)

there. YORKTOWN pilot who had spent 3 days in cave OKINAWA rescued off MACHINATO TOWN by combined efforts HELJOSIN and VOI from SAN FRANCISCO. Pilot states Japs fire own guns from caves into ground to confuse our spotters. 2 of own planes collided over objective no survivors seen. During air attacks yesterday morning 1 own VF and 1 VT crashed probably hit by own AA no survivors. 2 VF had water landing pilots recovered. Weather good for all types operations today and same weather forecast tomorrow.

28 2310 CINCPOA ADV to CTF 93, 94 Info ISCON INFO, COMAIR INFO, DEPPOCOTHAF.

Para. My serial 0095000 of 7 January CTF 93 280704. Take following action. (A) Direct Comair INFO report CTF 93 for additional duty connection offensive operations. (B) Direct Comair INFO assign fighters to operational control CTF 93 or DepCom 20th AF by allocations from his command on request from those 2 commanders. (C) Transfer VMS 612 from TF 93 to 94.

28 1614 CINC SWPA S-04 MACARTHUR to CINCPOA Info COMIFOR, COPS WD, COMGEN-CSA, ADTHER-13132. Your 213042 relative to facilities support of FOA divisions request of resources for the development of PHILIPPINE bases in progress. Statement is being made to Chief Staff of our requirements to fulfill the provisions of FILBAS Agreement. The great destruction of facilities which were in part depended on to provide adequate discharge rates, and inability to construct others rapidly impose a problem beyond the resources of this theater. These conditions are correctable quickly only by provision of considerable amount of long range self-becoming equipment to assist in bringing in service units, materials and equipment from rear areas, and ship-side floating equipment to unload heavy ships. Our requirements being submitted to the Chief of Staff will include 150 LSTs and 150 LGTs the former to be employed a minimum of 4 months. With early provision of this equipment and a moderate increase in engineer battalions and heavy shipping, an endeavor will be made to accept FOA divisions for staging in accord with the timing indicated your 180736 February. The plan will provide staging for 1 Corps each LETTE, CEBU, MINDOLO. Port facilities, port and depot service, and hospitalization, access roads, water and construction materials, will be provided. Engineer units of divisions so staging will be expected to arrive early and extend program of internal camp development. Final preparation by HUUSP can you assist in provision of above specified self-becoming equipment.

28 0520 COMIFOR to ISCON SAIKAI, GUAM, ADTHER-CSA MARINAS Info ISCON TANTAN, OMAHA-3, CINCPOA-ADV, CINCPOA-ADV, COMIFOR, COMAIR-ADV, COMIFOR-ADV, COMIFOR-ADV, OMAHA-3, CINCPOA-ADV, COMIFOR-ADV, COMIFOR-ADV, COMIFOR-ADV.

Dissolve ADC MARINAS (TU 944.1) and in lieu thereof form the following local air defense commands: (A) Air Defense Command SAIKAI-TANTAN (COL. SEXTON, USA) under ISCON SAIKAI. (B) Air Defense Command GUAM (Lt. Col. South, USMC) under ISCON GUAM. Aircraft deployment as follows. For day defense retain VMF 225 at GUAM. At SAIKAI ComAirPacSubComFord thru the senior air group commander will assign minimum of 10 VF and pilots from CV training groups for exclusive use of ISCON SAIKAI during daylight hours with remaining Navy fighters present as a ready reserve available for air defense in emergencies. Administrative control CV planes and pilots remains with ComAirPacSubComFord. For night defense retain VMF(H) 534 at GUAM with a 6 plane detachment at SAIKAI under

- Continued -
IsCom SAIPAN rotating as necessary. 6th Night Fighter Squadron available for other assignment when this deployment accomplished. For anti-submarine patrol WM131 (until relieved by VPB 152) based at GUAM with detachment at TINIAN under ADC SAIPAN-TINIAN. Control and coordination of aerial target practice areas presently under ADC MARIANAS remains with ADC SAIPAN-TINIAN. Para. AD Cndr reduce personnel in presence ADC MARIANAS making surplus available for other assignment after requirements are met. Reorganisation effective about 1 April. Notify originator when accomplished. When reorganisation complete Brig Gen Gushman, USMC, will be made available for reassignment.

29 1600 CTF 52 to CTF 51 Info CINCPOAC ADV HQ. TF 51.

Summary as of 0000Z(-9). Last night enemy planes were reported landing and taking off from fields on OKINAWA by ships on patrol whose interdiction fire at long range due to smokefields was ineffective. Estimate 20 to 30 planes made uncoordinated attacks on ships on patrol stations and in retirement areas. About 16 planes destroyed by AA and crash attacks. Of these at least 4 succumbed. In these attacks LSM(R) 139 had serious damage beyond capability of repair in this area and is now in KERAMA anchorage. Other ships had little or no damage. WYANDOT (AKA 92) in night retirement sustained underwater damage forward near bomb miss. At last report flooding under control and ship entering KERAMA. HA WILEY observed SARGENT BAY VP shot down by AA at 0615Z(-9) and rescued pilot apparently uninjured. 4 engagements between ships on night patrol and Jap boats. 4 boats destroyed plus 1 possible. Of these 3 were attempting to reach MAS SHIMA from TOKASHIKI and blew up when hit. 1 survivor of a sunken boat was taken prisoner. LCI(0) 558 was shaken by depth charge attacks by Jap boats and 2 engines placed out of commission. LSM(R) casualties reported 11 KIA 3 WIA 57 WIA. Other casualties in all above actions reported as 5 WIA none serious of whom 3 injured by own fire. HALLICAN survivors now total 1 officer 150 enlisted of whom 1 officer 20 men WIA. Dispatch to all ships present to report survivors on board fail to disclose more. KERAMA BERTO had several air attacks last night. 1 bomb dropped on ZAMANI. Islands all secured. Troops lose 1 battalion patrolling TOKASHIKI and garrison ZAMANI reloaded. Army casualties total 24 KIA 61 WIA none MIA. Enemy 306 KIA 99 POW. Estimated 140 sealed in caves. LCI(0) 462 580 nonoperational due to combat damage and required docking for repairs. Fueling and ammunitioning schedule underway at KERAMA BERTO. Planes from seaplane base now executing ASP operations. Enemy in ship and installation light on OKINAWA completed. 290 suicide attack boats destroyed in KERAMA BERTO 2 retained for intelligence. Documents giving table of organisation total number these boats this area and plan for use in defense OKINAWA captured. Possible 700 more in OKINAWA mostly on OKINAWA. Jap 2nd Lieutenant specialist in these boats also captured. Boats appear identical to description JICPA weekly intelligence bulletin Vol. 1 No 96 23G6 of Feb. 45. Mineweeping now substantially on schedule. Mines reported being swept in area W. Approximate total 123 swept and demagnetised. Lost found in area C. UDT reconnaissance successfully completed all preferred beaches demonstration beaches and KISSE SHIMA. Negligible enemy reaction on preferred beaches. Detailed reports not yet received but no casualties to ships or personnel have been reported. Demolition on preferred beaches scheduled tomorrow. Support aircraft supported UDT operations and strafed and bombed NAHA KADEH and YAUTAN Fields as well as gun positions. GAP splashed a Vol. 2 enemy planes/shot down over airfields.

-Continued-
15 destroyed on ground and others strafed. Underground hangars discovered
at YONAM. 2 boats and several guns destroyed. Unsuccessful search for ANTIC
planes which failed to return from night ASP. Planes report complete lack
of observable activity on IR SHIMA. Airfield still trench and barricaded.
Fire support ships successfully covered UDT operations. Reports and photos
show ships beginning to locate and hit defenses with increasing effectiveness.
Arrivals objective BOWDITCH SHELDRAKE. Weather partly cloudy slight sea no
swell off western OKINAWA. Wind NNE 8 knots.

28 0208 CINCPAC PEARL to CONGENOA CONGENAAPPPOA, DEPCOMOTHAF Info CINCPAC ADV, CHC
CONAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC.

The rapidly increasing requirements for bombs and other aerial munition
to support the VLR program are placing an increasingly heavy load on the
limited available shipping which can only be met through a sharp curtailment
in movement of redundant or other materials. Critical examination of all cur-
rently authorized construction and development projects in the MARIANAS is
being made with a view to elimination of all possible projects and parts
of projects. Request you review your projects and proposed projects with
a view to further elimination or curtailment, with consequent reduction
in shipments of materials pertaining thereto. Current projects not immediately
essential to the prosecution or support of combat operations will be elimi-
nated, deferred or reduced. Proposed future projects both in MARIANAS and
elsewhere will be reviewed and reduced, eliminated or deferred on same basis.
Reduction in allocations of ship tonnage for maintenance supplies and materi-
als of all types will be made by Cinpoca as necessary to provide essential
munitions for VLR support up to the maximum practicable limit and all adroc
will be prepared for such reductions. Last 2 info addes take action to make
similar surveys of projects under their cognizance and be prepared to cur-
tail material shipments as directed by Cinpoca.

30 0418 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH, CHC Info BUER, COMAIRPAC CINCPAC PEARL.

Para 1. My plans for operations to be conducted during the remainder of 1945
require the active operation of a minimum of 17 shore based Marine Fighter
or fighter bomber squadrons. 5 groups (15 squadrons) will be engaged in
active combat at bases north and west of the MARIANAS and these squadrons
will continue to be Corsair equipped. 1 squadron in the MARSHALLS and 1 at
PELELIU could use other types if necessary. Para 2. Information supplied
by ComAirPac indicates that the supply of Corsairs will be short as to
necessary operating with inadequate pools of aircraft for support of Core-
sair squadrons in area and aers and that complements of an increased number
of reforming CVGs must be all Helocats. ComAirPac estimates Corsair deficits
of 200 in May and 250 in December. Para 3. Request that any action prac-
tical be taken to increase Corsair deliveries to Pacific Fleet.

30 0650 CINCPAC ADV to CHC Info COMAIRPAC, COMPACWESTCOAST, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC,
COMAIRPAC, BUER.

Refer CHC secret serial 0017531. Recommend approval of the division by types
of the 60 VFP Squads provided for in para 3 of reference. Para. Recommend de-
commissioning VFP squad 33, 34, 52, 54 and 216 now. Para. Recommend no V8 Squads
be decommissioned at this time. Para. Recommend that all PacFlt VFP Squads be
ultimately supported by crew replacement program and that every effort be ex-
erted by the training establishment to maintain the squadrons on a sound
 CONTINUED
rotation basis. Para. Until PacLift VPB crew replacement program is firm or until tempo of operations in NorPac warrants deploying all NorPac squadrons forward continuously in that area to rotate them between ALASKA and West Coast. Para. This summarizes recommendations contained in speedletter correspondence being forwarded air mail.

30 0750 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH & CNO Info FIFTHFIPS, CONSEVFPAC, COMINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, AUTONPAC, COMHSPAC.

A review of the DM and DMS situation indicates a current requirement of 12 of the former and 24 of the latter for employment in PacLift operations. It is anticipated that the last of the above DMS now undergoing conversion from DDB will be ready for service in the Pacific in June. Para. It is not contemplated that these numbers will be increased nor that those which may be lost due to battle casualties will necessarily be replaced. The hazardous nature of their duty however may result in casualties to such a degree that prompt replacement would become an urgent necessity. Such replacement could not be readily effected under present circumstances because (a) Conversion of additional DD is slow due to the material required much of which has to be manufactured (b) Old DM and DMS have reached an age and a material condition which renders them unfit for duty in combat areas. Para. In connection with old DM and DMS 5 of these ships now have availability on west coast and several more will be made available shortly. The expenditure in manpower and critical materials to make these ships satisfactory for combat operations is considered to be out of all proportion to their value to the fleet. Para. In view of the foregoing the following recommendations are made: (a) In order to enable quick conversion of 1630 ton DD to DMS provide 6 spare sets of conversion material to be held in readiness on west coast. Each set consisting of material not ordinarily available in navy yards, to convert 1 ship. (b) For the same purpose but in connection with DM provide 2 spare sets of conversion material as above to convert 2200 ton DD to DM. (c) Limit the overhaul and accomplishment of alterations on all 1200 ton DM and DMS now assigned Pacific to a minimum in the interest of conserving critical materials and labor. Refit these ships to enable them to provide training services to the fleet, or to be employed as escorts in the rear area. Reclassify as ODD's.

31 0800 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.COMHLTF. COMASSAIFRON. CINCPAC PEARL, COMHSPAC GROUP 12.

In order to assist in meeting urgent requirement of PacLift for use of naval base facilities SAMAR as early as practicable I can make available the ARA (AYC 136) CRATER (AYC 70) and 2 small APAs for 1 lift or 3rd Echelon Assembly 15 departing west coast early May. Request you advise if this is desired and if material can be received at the time noted without unacceptable congestion SAMAR.

31 0832 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCPAC Info CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 292204 concour. Assume also that CV groups will not be permitted in future to operate more than seventy three fighters.

31 0833 CINCPAC ADV to DFPOM 20TH Info COM 21 ROMCOM.

If practicable request that daily FBM be made of KURE paying particular attention to naval anchorage area and presence of major naval units.
SECRET
MARCH (GCT)

31 0643 CTF 52 to COMSTHF LT. CTF 51 Info TV 51

Consider preparations and prospective weather will permit successful landing on OKINAWA tomorrow in accordance with preferred plan. KEISE secured this morning and landing of artillery commenced. Further details in my 1800 I(-9) summary.

31 0634 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH, CNO Info COMAIRPAC, CTF 58, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSTHF LT.

Concerning ComAirPac 240544 following extract from CTF 58 serial 0045 of 13 March is conveyed in by Cinopac and ComstFlt: "Recent comments have proposed additional aviators to TG Comdra for the purpose of coordinating air attacks. It is the opinion of CTF 58 that this additional overhead of pilots and aircraft is not warranted or necessary. Each TG contains 3 or more air group commanders whose primary duty has been and will be to control and coordinate as necessary the operations of TG sweeps and strikes. These air group commanders are considered fully qualified and authorized to represent their TG commander in the air in this capacity."

31 0633 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH, CNO Info COMAIRPAC, CTF 55, CINCPAC PEARL, COMKESSEAFRON LT.

Your 282021 to ComAirPac, ComAirPac 300730. See my 300418. Strongly recommend allocation Corsairs to RNZAF be reduced in order maintain supply to FAF at a more satisfactory level. Cinopac has no need for RNZAF fighters in the present strategic situation.

31 1248 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCLANT Info COMAIRPAC, COASTSEAFRON, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMASA, CO ASPER DEPARTMENT, COMKESSEAFRON, COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIR ALAMEDA, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMAIRPAC.

Withdraw VPB 32 and VPB 64 from EastSeafRon and remaining 3 aircraft VPB 64 from FaseaFron. Transfer these squadrons to West Coast port designated by ComWestSeafRon for temporary duty ready to operate commencing 20 April for duration San Francisco Conference, Para. As replacement for above squadrons transfer 1 PBM squadron from each of CaribSeafRon and FaseaFron for duty in EastSeafRon.

01100 CTF 52 to COMSTHF LT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TPC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 2 011000. Landings on all beaches continued with good progress inland against light opposition. Beachhead has been secured from small area fires. Approximately 50,000 troops have landed over beaches including 8 RCT with FA Bns 2 Bns medium artillery and approximately 15,000 service troops. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire received on beaches early morning. AA fire ceased. 420th FA Group with 2 Bns 155 guns in position KIKE SHIMA and firing in support ground troops. This BN received heavy artillery fire early hours morning with no damage. Liaison plane strike KEISE SHIMA now in operation. Front lines as follows: 3rd PhilCorps: TA 7895 KO 7995 KOE 8096 UT 8125 AIRY 8299U 8300U 8304 ARBHB 8394 PF 8393 COTY 8392 ET 8491 AU 8490 A 8500 JB 24th Corps: TA 8589 LOW 8588 CI 8687 DX 8686 DX 8686 BU 8686 WT 8685 BN 8684 COTY 8683 ET 8682 A 8382 JT 8381 CF, 1 HANOOG SP24 made water landing 110 degrees 16 miles ZMPA at 0900 with 2 crew members rescued by CAIROM. 1 PM SAGINAW BAY crashed in flames inland 0925 no survivors. 9 PAV INTREPID used 114/44 rockets on support missions. 1 CABOT TBM crash landed NAKAGUSUKU WAK 1109. Crew rescued by Dumbo PBM. 1 PBM engaged

- Continued -
WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT SECTOR 140 degrees to 160 degrees from BOLO 500 miles distant. 1 enemy aircraft shot down 0900 reported carrying robot bomb similar to German HENSCHEN type 293. Small raid bogies approached from north at 1900 passed over transport area. Night fighter splashed 1 Zero, 1 suicide hit WEST VIRGINIA 1945. Fire was started but immediately controlled no other details. Para. Unloading supplies over HAGUSHI beaches commenced using LVTs DUKWS LSMs and LST s, AM 8 unloaded on NAGANNU, Para. Direct fire support all day by 100 BBR BCL 23 DD and 177 ECG, LCM support type. ARKANSAS attack north of NAHA air strip was fired upon by coast defense gun with no hits received. LST 884 hit by suicide plane with extensive damage by fire. Towed to KERAMA RETTO, LST 824 received light damage by near miss of suicide plane, LCI(N) 807 suffered mortar explosion while checking misfire, 1 KIA 1 WIA, 12 overboard with injuries unknown rescued by small boats, ADAMS hit at stern port side during suicide attack by 2 planes with substantial damage to port side deck rudder and rams. Depth charge rack damaged. Ship badly shaken. No personnel casualties. Shot 1 Torpedo MADISON destroyed floating mine believed mark 6 at 24-12-30N 128-46 E 31 March, High order detonation, Transport Group E sighted 5 mines area 20-22 N 130-13-2 during movement LETTE to OKINAWA, BARTON probably destroyed 1 submarine 1555 31 March, After 2nd attack submarine was seen to come to surface and go down immediately. Retrack made by BARTON. Heavy oil slick with diesel odor observed. Further search unproductive. Logistic replenishment all types carried on at KERAMA RETTO, Para. Direct air support furnished by CVEs and fast carriers. Search flights to north made by PBM planes from KERAMA RETTO, PBM planes from KERAMA RETTO covered 5 sectors ASP, Propaganda bombs were dropped, CHENANGO ASP plane ditched 75 miles south ZAMPA at 2105, Search by DD negative. 1 TBM ESS.JX shot down by AA fire near ZAMPA with 2 crew members rescued by MUSTIN.

01 0255 CST 51 to COMSFFUL IT CINCPAC BOTH HQ ALL TFC STEFLT.

Flash summary No. 1 as of 011000. Proceeded by intense naval and air bombardment troops of 10th Army began landing HAGUSHI beaches at 0830 I. Troops landed on all beaches against very light opposition. Practically no fire against boats none against ships. Considerable number tanks and artillery landed regimental reserves now landing. Troops are advancing inland standing up. All of TONTAN and KADENA airfields are in our possession. Troops of 3rd PhibCorps along approximate line 7895 to 8292K to 8292L to 8191I to 8290K with advanced patrols. 24th Corps have elements in 8389 8486 8793 8486 8484 8389. Para. HINDSDALE (APA 121) hit by mine or torpedo engine room flooded troops transferring other craft. Towing to KERAMA, ADAMS (DM 27) hit by suicide plane, 7 enemy aircraft shot down by CAP and AA fire. Para. Have sent for 4 transport carriers with garrison aircraft.

01 0639 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSFFUL IT CTF 51 COMTENTH CINCPAC PEARL HG.

CTF 52 311640 last 2 sentences indicate IE SHIMA may be evacuated. Assume that this condition if it exists will be exploited. Early rehabilitation IE SHIMA will simplify many problems both now and in the future.
Secret

01 2322

CINC PAC ADV HQ to COMONUS & CINCPAC INFO CONAIRPAC CINC PAC PEARL.

Cumulative evidence contained in combat reports of KAIJSFR Class CVE indicates practicability of operating 20 VF/FW-2 and 12 VTBS. Recommend increasing complement of VT squadrons attached to Kaiser CVEs from 16 to 20 VF and 12 VTBS to 20 VF and 12 VTBS. If approved this program would be implemented as rapidly as planes and pilots become available after CVE 105 class and present operating requirements of CVU and CVL0 have been met. New subject. Also indicated is the need for a VT squadron in each Kaiser Class CVE Division that is trained in observation and spotting of shore bombardment. Recommend that presently designated VT squadrons be re-designated as VT squadrons and that 1 VT squadron per division be trained in the observation and spotting of gunfire for shore bombardment.

02 0030

QUEENFISH (SS 393) to CINSUBPAC.

QUEENFISH 2nd. Day, Deeply regret sinking AWA MARU at 013000Z (OCT) posit 25-25 Long 120-07. Surface attack in fog with firing range 1200 yards. 4 torpedo explosions seen but lights on ship not visible. Ship exploded and sank immediately with few survivors or debris. Picked up 1 who identifies ship as 12,000 ton MTX Liner 2 years old. He stated definitely that cargo consisted of rubber, tin, lead. 2000 Nips on board but no troops, wounded or FOW. Decision to attack based on single ship speed 17 with initial range only 17,000 yards. Believed ship to be destroyer or DE and used 3 foot depth setting. Location of attack 11 miles from posit SEAFOX attacked 7 ship convoy 10 hours earlier getting 1 hit.

02 0550

CIF 51 to CONRAFT/P into CINC PAC BOTH HQ. ALL TP5 TYESL.

Summary No. 3 as of 021200. Both Corps reported quiet night with some sniper, machine gun and mortar fire. Enemy has withdrawn his major forces to southern part of island. Attack resumed 0830. Being pushed vigorously so as to take full advantage of light resistance. Patrols from reserves mopping up pockets rear areas. Fragmentary reports indicate our troops have reached major portion L-3 line and continuing advance against minor opposition. Naval gunfire heavy air strikes support the attack with schedule and call fires. 6 piloted bombs or rockets having wing spread 15 feet cigar shaped body 15 feet long captured and held for JICPA Intelligence Team. Kadena airfield reported serviceable for emergency landings. Some construction work necessary to make fully operative. OT planes landed YONAN airfield today, Prospera bombers dropped 0830. Reports indicate civilian populace considerable numbers taking advantage of surrender terms of leaflets. Tentative identifications enemy units reported all sources include: 32nd Army Hq, 62nd Div, 22nd InfReg, 24th Eng, Reg of 24th InfDiv. Miscellaneous units including 11th Shipping Group. No enemy ground activity KERAMA RETTO during past 24 hours. Para. Gunfire support furnished throughout night by 3 OBB 8 CL L 60 DD gunboats. ABEHEWAR on night retirement hit by suicide plane. Fire quickly extinguished. Ship maintained position in formation. Extensive structural damage including 3 holds inoperative, deck winches damaged radar out, no electric power forward, light flood forward. 5 KIA, 40 WIA. TYESL hit by suicide plane with slight damage. 1 WIA. Skirmish received bomb hits from 2 attacks mast height. 1 12mm gun knocked out, 1 JIA. VAMEN damaged starboard shaft resulting from accidental dropping 300 pound depth charge due striking floating plank. Preliminary damage reports WES STRONGHIT hit by suicide plane 1913 1st April shows frame 69 port side 20 deck, galley, laundry, engineers compartment damaged. 250 Kg had bomb...
shattered on second deck. 2 20mm guns wrecked. 5 inch range finder damaged.
3 KIA 9 WIA. 1 MLA. Ship fully operational. LCI 500 aground KERAMA RETTO. Both
shafts and propellers damaged. KCT 462 also aground KERAMA RETTO. Port
shaft screw damaged. Fire aboard LST 884 hit by suicide plane 1st April
caused loss of individual organic equipment 1 Inf. Company, detachment amphibious tractor. Corrected casualties reported by INDIANAPOLIS 9 KIA 18 WIA.
Demonstration group conducted 2nd demonstration off southeast beaches
0630. COPA established KERAMA RETTO. Logistics replenishment continuing
satisfactorily. 1 AO being brought HAGUSHI beach to expedite refueling.
Sweep unit 2 on station P16 tracked several small surface targets from
northwest corner TURON ISLAND at 30,000 yards passing within 2,500 yards at
30 to 45 knots but not sighted. Para. Direct air support furnished troops
by CVEs and fast carriers with other attack missions byollopping CAI
which strafed 30 boats various sizes along western beaches north of "ZAMPA",
Search flights flew PBM covering 5 sectors. ASR patrol flown by WIA KERAMA
ETTO seaplane base. Enemy air attacks from 1800 to 1930 1st April and 2300
1st to 0700 2nd with approaches from north and south in 11 raids and many
single attacks, 6 enemy destroyed by gunfire, 5 by VF during period LUPICA
POINT and SAGINAW BAY shot down 10 0356. 1 BENNINGTON VF made water landing
208 degrees 48 miles from ZAMPA at 1000 with rescue by MDCS. Para. Reach
conditions good with general unloading started. Weather low scattered cumulus
clouds 1/10 at 1500 feet. Visibility good. Wind NNE 10 to 20 knots. Tempera-
ture 74 degrees. No appreciable smell of surf.

02 1225 CTF 51 to COMSHLFLT into CINOCPAC BOTH H. ALL TP & TCG SHLFLT.

Summary No.041800 (No. 4 031800)(?) Ground forces made good progress this
afternoon. Reports indicate advance 3rd PhilCorps reached L-5 line 1A
6th MarDiv with 1st MarDiv approaching 5-3 line. 24th Corps advanced
rapidly east in 2A 7th InfDiv south and east 2A 96th InfDivs. 1 120 50 2nd
battalion 17th Inf reached east coast vicinity TOBANO TA 9085. On the corps
right 96th Div advanced into rugged terrain to east encountering stiffening
resistance. The division right pushed through to vicinity PUSEMA TOWN with
advance elements penetrating ISA TA 9360. All division CFS in operation
scocher. Air observers reported enemy activity including troop concentration
area southeast NAHA airfield. Enemy opposition mostly by small scattered
units engaging in sporadic mortar small arms fire. Due rapid advance front
lines are fragmentary: 3rd PhilCorps TA 81975 82966Y 83958Y 84961Y 85948Y
85941LQV 8592BCHW 859140YV 86904YV 8698BCHW 24th Corps: 91867 8278
9087X 9086DCHL 8986YVR 908656 88886 TXX 978565X 8888600 888829X 98830
8493 LX 8482DX 8482IE 8431AHGTVU 8481LU 8481XU, Para. Gunfire support furni-
nished by 8 B 9 cruisers 21 DD and gunboats. Few calls firing during day
necessary due weak resistance. ANZID conducted hunter-killer operation on
ASP plane radar contact in 25-15W 128-222. No report. PORTERFIELD strafed
by Jap fighter 0021. No damage to ship 1 KIA. Reaching all types continues
satisfactorily. LCI 568 reported hit by plane 1857. No other details. Para.
Direct air support furnished by CVEs and fast carriers. CAP coming off sta-
tion destroyed 12 barges, 2 50 foot boats, 3 small boats in MAKAGESUKU WAN
and MINOPE PENINSULA. Support aircraft north discovered 12 mines 100 yards
offshore in area NE NAGAHAMA TA 6197. A exploded by strafing with destruction
continuing by aircraft. Search flights were made by PBM and ASP planes
KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. 0X planes ashore from CVEs brodied LCT.
Total 19 CFS at YONAN and KADERA airfields. SAN JACINTO TBM crashed near NAHA 1805.
No survivors. MARCUS ISLAND FN plane made water landing 65 miles bearing 050
ZAMPA at 1230. COLMOUN rescued pilot. 1st carrier plane landed KADERA Field
Continued
when CHENANGO P6F made emergency landing 1617 due AA fire. 1 crew member WIA, 2 TMs smashed, DDT occupied area OKINAWA 1630. Additional propaganda bombs dropped. Flash RED 1857 estimated 12 to 15 enemy planes approached from north southwest. HORNET night fighters definitely shot down 2 Jills, 1 probable. BENNION probably splashed 1. WICKES reports 2 planes shot down by gunfire near her 50 miles bearing 210 from ZAMPA. General unloading continues satisfactory.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN NWPAC Info CTF 43 MARDIV, CO FWD CHFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HAB, COMMANDO CORPS.

Advising existing instructions issued by you for rotation of personnel 3rd MarDiv or any other MarDiv. Desire in the future any plans for rotation of personnel in MarDivs which have a major effect on the combat readiness of those units be referred to CINCPAC for approval. Further desire existing instructions for mass rotation of personnel 3rd MarDiv or any other Div be held in abeyance pending action by CINCPAC.

CNO SWPA to COMGEN ARMY SERVICE FORCES Info CNO.

CX 12888. Subject: rotation of troop ships to SWPA. Reference is made to CNO signal 032000 (GCT) of June 14 which assigned 10 troop ships to this theater as result of a request made by Major General Marshall when on a visit to Washington at about that time. In view of the greatly increased lines of communications within this theater and the greater number of troops deployed it is being clearly demonstrated that the troop ships assigned to the theater are inadequate to meet requirements. Owing to the inefficiency of moving troops in cargo ships and the extensive requirements that exist within the theater for moving cargo (supplies from AUSTRALIA and rolling up rear bases) the use of Liberty ships other than cargo movements is most undesirable. It is requested that 10 additional troop ships be assigned to this theater for employment until our deployment of troops into the PHILIPPINES is completed. And average capacity of 2000 troops with 2000 measurement tons of cargo and a capability of moving in 14 knot convoys is desirable.

CNO to CINCPAC PEARL INFO CINCPAC ADV, CINCPAC PEARL INFO, COMMANDSEAPRON, COMMANDFH.

Refer GEM SWPA CX 12886 being passed to you by CNO 021930. Allocation of 10 troop ships to CINCSEAP for 60 day retention to meet requirements approved. JMTG proposes assignment of following vessels to CINCSEAP: SEA SCAMP, CAPE COD, EXCHANGE, LPA MARLIN, CAPE CLEAR, JOHN LYKES, CAPE HENLOOPEN, GEN PATRICK (AP 150), GEN MCGREGOR (AP 149), GEN MURCHFORD (AP 153). Request those vessels now in your area be made available to SWPA unless some or all are obligated for return loadings to US in which case request comparable substitutions which may be made available in CINCSEAP at approximately same dates.

CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 02 03 51 41 COMMANDSEAP COMPHOT, CINCPAC PEARL HAB, COMAIRFOR OCEAN, CINCPAC PEARL HAB, COMAIRFOR OCEAN, CINCPAC PEARL HAB, COMAIRFOR OCEAN.

Photo Group 2 assigned to direct operational control CINCPAC effective 0000 (GCT) 8 April. This change in assignment will in no way change services now being rendered to all commands concerned.
03 1300  COMINCH & GNO to CINCPAC ADV Info COMAIRPAC-CINCPAC PLAN. CONTINHT.

Provided such action is satisfactory to CINCPAC your 280649 approved because of shortage of Venturas. If the 2 PVT squadrons are withdrawn they should be replaced with equivalent of 2 PV squadrons which they are relieving.

03 1310  CTF 57 to COMINCH Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TF & TOC STLHT.

Summary No. 6 of 031800. Both Corps advanced rapidly in their respective ZA with negligible resistance. 3rd Phibcorps: Reconnaissance elements 1st MarDiv extended operations along north coastal road to L plus 15 line reporting they would continue operations southeast along road from MAKADOMARI TA 8798 to ISHIKAWA TA 9097. This division made steady progress in rugged terrain confronting them and have reached L plus 10 line in left of their ZA and division right flank is within 800 yards L plus 10 line. 1st MarDiv drove its left flank to the vicinity SUNAN TA 8995 SE to point 200 yards E of INUBI TA 9193 thence S to corps boundary along L plus 10 line to KATSUREN BAY. From this point line extended across KATCHIN PENINSULA isolating same. KATCHIN PENINSULA reconnoitered. No enemy or installations found. Reconnaissance in progress north along roads from 1STUKAI TA 9589 to HITACHINNA TA 9095. Plan to land 2nd MarDiv 5 April on YELLOW beaches. 24th Corps: Area from Corps boundary S to AWASHI PENINSULA seized and latest reports indicate 7th Div line as KUBA TA 8990 to UNJO TA 8781 thence SE to Div boundary. 96th Div advanced south along west coast to CHITAGAMA TA 8380 and FUTAN BAY. Rapid movement troops precluded showing fixed lines. Division reports attacked by 5 men and 11 women dressed in soldiers uniforms. Women committed suicide when attack failed. 12th Ind Inf Rn identified. (Part 2). Para. Fire support provided 24th Corps by 1 OBS 3 CA-CL 10 DD. 3rd Corps by 3 OBS 3 CA-CL 8 DD. General support eastern bombardment 1 OBS 1 CA 6 DD. Special Army support 1 OBS 1 DD. COLORADO reports good fire effect tank park and troop assembly. TA 7909. Minesweeping off eastern island covered by 2 CA 2 DD. OTO RO R W SURSEI lasped 1 TONY KERAMA RETTTO not previously reported. FOREMAN hit by bomb starboard side 0120 with major engineering damage 4 WIA. LST 599 set aflame during air raid early morning. Ship inoperable. Cargo ruined. BUNCH slight damage starboard side while alongside DICKERSON fighting fire. Repaired by ships force, Para. Direct air support furnished troops by CVEs and fast carriers. TG 58.1 covers SAKISHIMO GUNTO while TG 57 fueling. Search flights and ASP by PBYs from KERAMA RETTTO. Flash RED 1720 to 1830 with planes approaching from North in 6 groups. From SN 1 group, Enemy destroyed by gunfire 1 by unknown DD at 1757, 1 by ABELE 1810, 1 by BENNON 1824 another by BENNON 1829, Destroyed by VF 1 Zake TULACI FM 1722, 3 Judies HANCOCK PTFs 1747, 2 by HANCOCK 1743, 1 by HANCOCK 1753. (Part 3). Own plane losses. 1 TBM TULACI made crash landing TOWAN Field 1608, 1 Oscar landed TOWAN night 1 April. Pilot made normal approach and landing. Taxied plane to line. Shot by Marine when leaving plane. Para. Brief summary beach conditions follow: at 1730 53 LSTs and LSMs were being unloaded over the reef. At 0600 the 24th Corps shore party commander assumed command of the 7th & 96th Div beaches. BROWN beaches closed. Not needed due availability other beaches. New road being built in 1st MarDiv area. Lateral beach roads poor to fair. 24th Corps shore party building lane highway parallel to beach. 24th Corps has built 4 or 5 sand ramps over reef. 3rd Phibcorps will build ramps when equipment lands. Unloading conditions generally satisfactory. Weather generally clear. NE and E winds 6 to 10 knots. Temperature average 79 degrees. Visibility 10 miles. Slight sea no swell.
04 0205

Information indicates eastern islands OKINAWA lightly held except for TSUGEN SHIMA. Minefield entrance NAKAGUSUKU WANN. Sweeping vicinity islands in progress. To avoid if possible committing 27th Div to assault. Eastern islands OKI 52.14.19 will execute reconnaissance in force of IWE SHIMA TATRAI, HANAKO SHIMA, HAYASHIKA SHIMA, TSUGEN SHIMA. KURUMA ISLAND with ambitious reconnaissance battalion embarked in KINZER and SCRIBNER and UDTs 7 and 11 embarked in HOPPING and KLINE with UDT 21 as standby in BUNCH (ENLAC). Gunfire, air and minesweeping support as requested. Concen operations soon as possible not later than 6 April. Comdecon 10 concurs including detail of recon battalion.

04 0730

Summary No. 7 (041200). Both Corps continued to make rapid advances against no effective opposition. No enemy ground activity was reported during night. 1st MarDiv seized HINERIWA TA 9920 after dark 1st night. No resistance. 1st MarDiv resumed advance at 0800 to seize L plus 20 line, 1200 reports indicated troops advancing rapidly on line PUTSU TA 8800 to TAWA TA 9907. Full MarDiv pushed to east coast. Unconfirmed reports of 1135 indicated 3rd/3d Corps troops had reached east coast line in its 2A including TAWA PENINSULA. 24th Corps advancing to L plus 20 line pushed south to the general line TAWA TA 8790 NODAKE TA 8790 KURI SAKE TA 8980. Previous report indicating SHIMO and KURUMA being possible concentration points main enemy strength not confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. Para 3 0BB 5 CA-118 DD provided naval gunfire support. DD resting in composure. WAKE ISLAND in area U8F-7 had 2 near misses from enemy plane 1750 3 April. Shell plate has 10 foot hole frame 25 below water line. Many shrapnel holes. LCT 82 in anti small craft screen operating outside NAKAGUSUKU WANN was sunk in action against enemy WTB also destroyed. LCT 367 has 41 survivors 4 WIA aboard, TRACY has 9 survivors 5 WIA aboard. Afternoon 3 April LCT 305 559 on patrol north TSUGEN picked up 8 men 1 woman civilians from small boat flying white flag. 0610 BENNETT took body under fire 260 degrees 70 miles from BOLTO. Bogyet retired northwest. 0500 SPRESTON reported near A-76 in area OI00 degrees 45 miles from BOLTO. 0240 ELLISON and HAMBRO attacked attack by 2 to 3 enemy aircraft which used window and brilliant flares. ELLISON BANNON WOODMAN attacked 3 times by single enemy aircraft from 0200 to 0610. No ships damaged. No planes shot down. 1500 3rd April WILLIAMS and BOWERS relieved HUBBARD to continue search on contact QD at 1721 by ASP plane morning 3 April. WILLIAMS made 4 attacks 1600 with negative results. During A/S patrol 1721 2nd April northwest TSUGEN RODMAN attacked on good sound contact in Lat 26-57 N Long 127-21 E. Contact lost after 1st run. MACNABB and plane assisted until 0400 when search abandoned. LCT 366 at 1130 3rd April destroyed floating mine TA 6770. Para. Direct air support by CVEs and fast carriers. Extensive reconnaissance and photographic flights over entire target area has failed to locate any sizable enemy concentrations but RDF reported numerous previously unreported targets which have been subjected to air and naval bombardment. Strafing attack made by fighters on 50 foot deep near MOTOBO PENINSULA and on boats and seaplanes near ISHI SHIMA. Search flights made by PBRs from KERAMA BERTO seaplane base, ASP furnished by TMIs from CVEs in inner sectors and PBRs from seaplane base in outer sector. 1 PBR hit reef northwest corner KERAMA BERTO while taxiing night 2 April and sank all personnel recovered. Enemy air attacks occurred intermittently during night from 0200 to 0750. Planes approached.

Continued.
from north in small groups. Enemy planes destroyed by VF were 1 Betty by CAP at 0227, 1 Sonda by CAP 0434, 2 Zekes by HANCOCK F6Fs at 0747. No damage incurred from these attacks. 1615 3 April CABOT F6F was downed in position 28-15N 129-45 E, 1124 BUNKER HILL F6F made emergency landing YONTAN Field. 1155 SANTÉE F6F made emergency landing YONTAN Field. 1 TM Dumbo with 4 ESSEX fighters as cover at 0815 proceeded to rescue CABOT and BATAAN pilot downed between AMAMI and KIKA SHIMA and 1 CABOT crewman rescued. Air delivery supplies made to units 1st MarDiv 0925 and 1130 by TBMs from PANSHAW BAY NATOMA BAY. TBMs MAXIN ISLAND sprayed DDT over friendly areas. SAKURAT BAY TM dropped propaganda leaflets 1030. Floating mines sighted by air observer 0900 between IE SHIMA and OKINAWA. 1 exploded by strafing.

04 1230 CTF 51 to OCMHSTF Info CINCPAC BOTH H2, ALL TFG & TOG 57HT.

Summary No. 8 (041000). Reports this morning indicated our troops continued the advance against scattered resistance, 1 enemy group ambushed Company L 7th Marines in TA 9098 with 40 enemy killed. No report on our casualties. Elements 1st MarDiv are along line TA 9000 to TA 92038 blocking off north exits to isthmus. Entire east coast line from TA 92038 south to KUBASAKI TA 8980 now in our hands. 24th Corps advancing south reached the line YOKI TO- MARI TA 8078 KAMITAMA TA 8378 to north edge of NAKAJUMI TA 8874. Air observers reported many enemy troops in TA 7970 and 8070 and vehicles in TA 7865 were taken under fire by naval gunfire and air bombardment. Advance CP 24th corps now ashore. Cumulative casualties to 032400 follow: 6th MarDiv 29 KIA 88 WIA 0 MIA. Battle total 117 NBC 50. 1st MarDiv 13 KIA 60 WIA 0 MIA. Battle total 53 NBC 35. 7th InfdDiv 32 KIA 155 WIA 3 MIA. Battle total 190 NBC 54. 96th InfdDiv 20 KIA 115 WIA 5 MIA. Battle total 140 NBC 14. 77th InfdDiv 43 KIA 161 WIA 0 MIA. Battle total 204 NBC 49. 24th Corps non divisional units 1 WIA NBC 4. Grand total: Battle 705 NBC 205. 3rd Phil Corps non divisional units and Army not reported. Fara. Fire support provided 3rd and 24th Corps by 2 OBB 6 CHI-CL 1A DD. General support eastern bombardment 2 OBB 4 DDs. Army support 3 OBB 1 DD. Ammunition replenishment exceeds current expenditures. Command of TA SL transferred to CTF 31 to 171900 2 April. FENSACOLA starboard propeller damaged by 1.5 during running 31 March. 3 tips bent forward 2 to 6 inches. WILMAST and BOWERS completed search on contact developed yesterday at 292 degrees 70 miles from BOLO. Results negative. SOLACE sailed for GUAM. Many unloaded transports departing tomorrow morning. Minesweeping being conducted around IE SHIMA and sections east of OKINAWA. Fara. TF 58 attacked KIRAI and TOKENA Fields. This attack based on information from rescued pilot who spent last night in a boat off KIRAI SHIMA and who stated 10 enemy fighters landed there during night. Intensive air search north OKINAWA revealed few significant installations. Mines destroyed by aircraft east of IE SHIMA. Enemy air approached 1700 to 1745 from SW and retired to west after closing 60 miles from OKINAWA. Chased by CAP without making contact. At 1425 F6F SIIANEE crashed behind enemy lines. At 1700 TBMs took off from take off from YONTAN Field. No casualties. 2 TBMs RUDYARD BAY sprayed DDT 1435. Air drop missions and water to 1st MarDiv at 1600. Friendly aircraft over IE SHIMA 0830 received light flak attack fire from base of tower easterm tip of TA 81348N. 12 small boats destroyed this afternoon by BORONSHIMA by roving air patrol. No other pay targets this island visible. Fara. Beach conditions follow: 24th Corps completed construction of roads in beach area. All barges and causeways in the OKINAWA Beach areas have been launched with the exception of 2 causeway sets. 23 barges
04 1230 CTF 51 Summary No. 8 (Cont'd)

have mounted cranes and are in use as transfer stations. Several causeway
piers are in use on various beaches. 22 barges are handling general cargo,
9 hauling fuel or ammunition, and 5 operation as Bowser fueling stations.
Weather clear this morning with overcast this afternoon. Visibility good.
Winds north to northwest 8 to 10 knots increasing to 20 this evening.
Temperature average 74 degrees. Surf slight increasing to 4 to 6 feet by
nightfall.

050006 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL.

Your O44712 understood and complied with. Logistic support Mid Pacific
Striking Force will now depend on intermittent availability of oilers
in transit. Therefore the prompt initiation and aggressive execution of
your OpPlan 2-45 and mine of same number may be adversely affected. This
for information connect your planning.

05 0028 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COM7THFLT, COM4THFLT, CTF 58, CTF 57, CTF 51
COMM РФ PEARL.

Cincpac PEARL O411932 to Com7thFlt. Request maximum attack on air bases
northern FORMOSA.

05 0110 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COMATPAC, COM7THFLT, COMGNAIMAL, PEARL
& COM, COMMARPSFAP, COM MANAJDING ONE.

My O511379. Your CX 13451 DTD O511443 not to all. Marine Air Group 24 and 32
including their RedRons are available to you until 7 July.

(March) (05 1711) CINCPAC to CINCPOA BOTH HQ Info BUDOCKS, DERPA, DOCKS, SANFRAN & PEARL

CINCPAC PEARL Info COMPOPA, CTF 24.

Construction Battalions will not be returned to the mainland for rehabilita-
tion and reorganization. Reequipment will be accomplished at Pacific
bases. Rehabilitation of personnel will be accomplished by individual
replacements.

05 0537 COM5THFLT to STHFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Com5thFlt shifted flag and administration to NEW MEXICO. Request Cincpac
inform others who need to know.

05 0709 COMPOPA to ADC TWO JIMA Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMSUBPAC, VMB 612.

Until blind bombing zone approved by Cincpoa direct VMB 612 perform night
ASP at TWO JIMA and attack shipping in harbors of Jap Empire. Will advise
you immediately when other areas become available.

05 0730 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC & TOC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 9 as of O51200. Minor enemy troop activity reported during
night. 24th Corps reported high velocity or large caliber artillery fire
1,000 yards west of FUTEMA TA 2A51 at 042004 from suspected positions north
NAHA BAY. Counter battery fire on that target resulted in explosions and
fires. 6th MarDiv continued attack north of L plus 20 line on ISHIIKAWA

- Continued -
05 0730 CTF 54 SUBJ 9 (CONT'D)

PENINSULA. Patrols have been reported as far north as OOSH TA 7906 KOCHUDIA TA 0805 and CHUDA TA 0511. 1st MarDiv patrolling the occupied zone and consolidating positions. 1st MarDiv reported landing of troops on TUBUCHI EHKA TA 008, off KATSUREN PENINSULA at 0900. No further reports were received. 24th Corps were ordered to continue attack to the south with no reports received on progress. 26th InfDiv reported 2 tanks lost to land mines and 1 lost when dropped into camouflaged tank trap. ComOTM 3rd Phil-Corps assumed command ashore 1500 4 April. Towns encountered so far not fortified. Captured enemy pilot states entire crew his plane had no prior combat experience. Ordered from training school to pick up plane at KISARAI Naval Air Base. Flew to KINOTO and proceeded to attack mission. (Part 2). Para. Call fire illumination and harassing fires furnished both Corps by 6 CA-CL 9 DD. 1 OBB, 1 CA 5 DD to eastern group, 1 OTR 1 DD on general support special missions. Accelerated unloading yesterday as result excellent UTI work preparing reef for LTs on north beaches. LTs now able beach simultaneously. Unloading stopped all beaches last night due heavy surf with some damage to boats and landing craft shipping. Incomplete reports show LSM 12 broached on WHITE 1 beach NV 0035 in bad condition with seams split. Holes in sides caused by LSM 76 broaching and landing against LST 570. Engines and generators out. 3 feet water forward compartments engine room after steering. LSM 766 badly broached. LST 756 reported 2300 that reef punctured holes in ballast tanks and engine room. All power lost. Water coming in fast. PARKAN standing by. LSM 669 broached on WHITE beach 3. LST 736 beached on WHITE 2 with engine room flooding. These craft unable retract due stage of tide and heavy loading. (Part 3). Many towing missions by tugs and some LCTs because barges and small craft drift in anchorage. Further report from SPAGTON and HAUBLETON. SPAGTON received near miss from enemy bomb. Sonar gear and gyro disabled. Main battery computer jarred out of position. No personnel casualties. HAUBLETON suicide crashed close aboard after being shot down. Minor damage. Some underwater damage possible as vibration more prominent. No casualties, Sweeping in progress of minefield entrance NAKAGUSUKU WAN. Gunboat destroyed mine 2 miles NW southern tip OIKAMA 0000. LCS 115 at 0230 definitely sighted submarine at 1400 yards which submerged on approach to location 3 miles 366 degrees 68 miles from BOO. HUDSON in adjoining radar picket station despatched to area. 17433 1 PM assigned for hunter-killer. HUDSON at 1000 reported making 2 firing runs and 3 dry runs on contact practically dead in water at 600 fathoms. Oil slick rising from contact. 4 other firing runs made earlier resulted in light oil slick hunter relieved by GENDREAU and BOXER with 174461 now assisting. (Part 4). Replenishing and rearming at KERAMA RETTO continues satisfactory. Hulk of DICKERSON sunk. 29 Unloaded APA 2 LSV 21 escorts departed for GUAM and SAIKAN. Para. Early morning air strikes were made but weather caused cancellation of missions after 0630. Direct air support furnished by CVEs and fast carriers. Special air search being made for mines in NAKAGUSUKU WAN. Search flights by PBM from KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. ASP during daylight flown by TBMs from CVEs in inner sectors and by PBM from KERAMA RETTO seaplane base in outer sectors. During night all sectors covered by PBM. 7 PBM arrived from SAIKAN. 1 returned SAIKAN for repairs. No enemy air attacks during period. 4 men in lifeboat reported by aircraft in position 6 miles S of MIZAKO at 1005. Dumbo with VJ cover proceeding to make rescue. 2 twin-engine planes destroyed on NAHA Field by PBM from RENSHAY BAY at 0900.
05 0810 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC PEARL COGEMA AFPO ALL TLP CG DIS Chicflite COGEMA, COMINT into SERNAY.

Past experience has shown that after a new position is taken from the enemy many requests are soon received for permission to visit such localities for a wide variety of reasons. In many instances the date or information sought could be obtained from reports or by letter without serious detriment to the prosecution of the war. Where visits have seemed essential the size of parties has often been larger than necessary. These visitors require valuable transportation and accommodations enroute but far more serious is the fact that their presence and the assistance they require in forward areas takes up time of busy officers and retards in greater or lesser degree the work that must be accomplished there. Addressed are requested to screen all applications for visits to forward areas particularly the Ryukyus. Unless they consider that prosecution of the war might suffer if the visit were not made it is requested that they disapprove applications without forwarding them to Cinepoa except where there are special reasons that merit consideration. Coopers are requested to furnish copy of this message to chief of staff of the Army for such action as he finds appropriate within the war department.

05 1325 CTF 51 to COMSHF plank CINCPAC BOD H2, ALL TFG & TG 5THFIL.

Summary No. 10 as of 05:30Z. Fragmentary reports indicate the 3rd Phib Corps engaged in a veering to the north up the IJNINJIMA with no opposition. 22nd Marines now astride the general line TA 9906 to 0198R with patrols at CHUDA TA 0511 and KOCHIMA TA 0805. 10th Corps advancing south met persistent resistance in organized defensive area along their front. Advancing up to 3000 to 5000 yards were made and at 1900 lines held as: TA 87777 84766 82767 80768 to TA 80779. Air reconnaissance reveals numerous enemy installations and troop concentrations along the front. Reconnaissance of eastern islands preparatory to landings of 27th Army Div in progress. Total personnel casualties to 0420: 6th Corps troops 2 KIA 0 WIA 0 MIA, 7th Div 32 KIA 94 WIA 0 MIA, Total battle 126 NBC 80, 10th Corps troops 57 KIA, 119 WIA 0 MIA, Total battle 156 NBC 68, 24th Corps non divisional units: 0 KIA 1 WIA NBC 0, 7th InfDiv 35 KIA 172 WIA 5 MIA, Total battle 207 NBC 40, 77th InfDiv 79 KIA, 161 WIA, 0 MIA, Total battle 204 NBC 42, 96th InfDiv 27 KIA 251 WIA 6 MIA, Total battle 278 NBC 19, Grand total 175 KIA 778 WIA 11 MIA NBC 296. Para: Fire support furnished both corps included 3 OBB 6 CA CL 14 DD, 3 OBB 3 CA CL 7 DD supported minesweeping NAKAGUSUKU WAP. Special interdiction and harassing fires in southwest sector by 1 OBB and 2 DD, 1 cruiser and 1 DD supported minesweepers off western OKINAWA, DDs and gunboats searched along coast for enemy PT and suicide boats, LCS 12 and LCI 1027 reported 1240 sighting midget submarine bearing 225 degrees 3000 yards from BOLO. CatRon berth 670 about 237 degrees 1700 yards from BOLO reported periscope 300 yards and torpedo wake passing close aboard, at 1243. Hunter killer operations with results negative so far. About 1750 NIVADA hit 3 times by shore battery TA 7169 or 7269. No details but ship continues in action. Para: Logistic situation satisfactory. Para, CVs and fast carrier furnished direct air support. Expect increased air support will be required tomorrow on the southern front. Beach reconnaissance of eastern islands made by FANSHAW BAY TBM at 1420. Reconnaissance of NAKAGUSUKU WAP for mines STEAMER BAY TBM at 1230. Search flights made by PBMs KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. ASP carried out, 1 enemy Val attacked at 1800 splashed by SANGAMON PFG at 1825. Dumbo PBM at 1330 rescued 4 airmen from lifesaving 6 miles south of MIYAKO previously reported in progress. COHOUN 1610 rescued.

Continued.
SECRET
APRIL (CCT)

05 1325 CTF 51 Summary No. 10 (Continued).

pilot of BENNINGTON P6F 87 miles bearing 097 from ZAMPA. Dumbo FBN rescued
pilot of HORNET P6F 160 miles bearing 047 from ZAMPA at 1308. At 1440 pilot
from TG 58.4 sank while friendly fighters orbited and Dumbo was enroute.
2 YORKTOWN aviators reported downed close to southern ICHIGAI at 1620.
Dumbo could not effect rescue today but will try early tomorrow. From L
day to 1900 L plus 4 Day total confirmed enemy planes destroyed is as fol-
lows: 28 by ships gunfire, 21 by fighters controlled by TF 51 plus 16 sul-
ciders who made 15 hits and 1 miss on 14 ships. Ships which have shot
down planes but have not been previously mentioned by name in summaries are:
Bennett, Wiley, Adams, Frazier, LCI 1078, ELLISON, Goodreau, LCS 64,
SUESMIDE, Bush, DOT sprayed but 2 HUDYARD BAY 1245 by 2 SANGAMON
TM 1140. Para. Beaches well organized with well regulated dumps located
inland. Unloading has been retarded seriously last night and today due to
severe weather conditions. Probably there will be a delay from this cause
in activating airfields. Weather overcast with intermittent light rain.
Winds averaging 25 to 30 knots from the north decreasing to 20-25 knots at
end of period. Temperature 66 degrees. Visibility 5 to 7 miles, Moderate
sea and swell from northwest.

06 0540 CTF 51 to CTF 58. COMBATRON 2 into CTF 53, CTF 55, CTF 51, CTG 51.1, CTG 51.2
CTG 51.3, 51.5, 51.15, 52.1, 50.1, 50.5.

To provide for indicated possibility of enemy surface attack to eastward
or westward of OKINAWA early morning of 7th 8th 9th TF 51 will be directed
to execute following: (A) TGs 51.1 and 51.2 including tractors groups will
be moved 100 to 150 miles to SE of present positions generally near regu-
lar routes. (B) TG 51.3 will proceed to arrive KERAMA RETTO on 9th as sched-
uled unless otherwise directed. (C) TG 51.17 will continue reconnaissances
of eastern islands and gunfire support except early morning 8th will move
to 5 miles south of OKINAWA R.A. (D) KERAMA RETTO and HAGUSHI beach oper-
tions will continue as scheduled except transport screen will be KERMAU
to assign additional DDs to TF 54. (E) TF 54 will deploy between DELTA
RETTO and AGUNI SHIMA nightly with 7 or 8 OBB 6 cruisers 15 to 20 DD, (F)
Night ASP as scheduled. To 52.1 will send daily 2 flights of air scouts 250
miles up the NANSEI SHOTO CHAIN as directed by ComFlot TF 58 will
provide troop support aircraft during day to re-place this effort. Para.
Request action deems comment and advise as to other measures if desired.

06 0847 CTF 58 to ComFlot.

06 1250 ComFlot 19:1 CTF 51, CINCACAP.

Aircraft of WGS 58.1 and 58.3 splashed about 150 planes today exclusive of
any shot down by OKINAWA target CAP. Our losses high. Some ships damaged
all operational.

06 2025 CTF 51 to ComFlot CTF 58, CINCACAP. ATO CINCAP. ATO CINCAP.

Special report enemy air attack afternoon early evening 6 April. Includes
TF 51 ships and planes controlled by TF 51. From 1440 to 1843 total 182
enemy airplanes attacked in about 22 groups. 55 shot down by our planes
35 shot by following ships. BUSH, ST LOUIS, LCI 909, TUSCALOSA, LST 693,
GREGORY, ESTES, MORRIS, COLHOUN 2, STARNET, HPAN, ROCKS, ST LUCIA,
TAMAHOU, BENNETT 2, WICKS. All ships in transport area jointly. Unknown ships 11.
Continued
06 2025 CTF 51 to COMSOUTH, Info CINC PAC, ALL TFG & TGC 3 9TH 7, (CONT'D)

Plane score includes 1 by PB4 and 1 by TBD. Total of 22 suicide hits made, 2 suicide misses. Total enemy planes destroyed 116. 2 friendly planes shot down by our AA. Para. Following ships hit by suicides: BUSH sunk, OCEAN sunken alongside BUSH affecting rescue hit 3 times sunk 4 hours later. HOBAN heavily damaged. BOMBS sunk. ROYALN heavily damaged. MULLANY, NELLIE, VERS hit twice. MORRIS, LEUTZ sinking condition. DEVASTATOR, FISHERLING minor damage. RECRUIT, HONOR, DEFIANCE, MORRIS, HUTCHINS, HOBBS VICTORY (AEE) in KIRAMA REAGA on fire, towed clear, all damaged ships being assisted. Para. BUSH, COYOUN radar installation. BOMBS, ROYALN, MULLANY, NELLIE, VERS, DEVASTATOR, FISHERLING, HUTCHINS transport screen vessels. Other naval vessels hit were fire support vessels or minkcraft.

07 0035 CTF 51 to CTF 51.5, CTF 51.15 Info CTF 51.5, 52.2, CTF 54, TFG 3 9TH 7

Information received indicates enemy surface force headed toward KIRAMA ETA tomorrow morning 8. CTF 51.6 expedite repairs on destroyers types that can be made ready to fight or screen CTF 51.15 sail when ready any destroyers or destroyers types at KIRAMA that can be made ready for action or screening to report to CTF 51.5 advising readiness condition. Para. CTF 51.15 expedite logistics for ships and support craft that can be made ready today.

06 0715 CTF 51 to COMSOUTH, Info CINC PAC, ALL TFG & TGC 3 9TH 7.

Summary No. 11 as of 061200. Reports indicate 3rd MarDiv is in advancing north against scattered small enemy groups while 7th corps is meeting increasing opposition in the south. In the north sector the 6th MarDiv is engaged in the organization and defense in its A.A. With the 7th Marines less 1 Hn in Corps reserve ordered to move to the vicinity of KANIKU. 6th MarDiv advancing to the north to secure the corps objective line CTF TA 0511. KIRAMA WAT T A 1007 and ROYALN 29 patrolling well in advance to the north. Air observer reports all roads and trails both side KIRAMA LITTORAL front of enemy troop movements. 1200 report 27 from air observer placed in 3rd MarDiv troop on line TA 0512 H(-6) to TA 0507 0715. 1st MarDiv patrols completed reconnaissance YAMOURI ISLAND TA 0649. No resistance or installations. Other patrols blasted 52 enemy lines in division 2A. During night 1 enemy plane made zigzag strafing run on YAMOURI airfield. No report of damage received. Progress 24th Corps this morning unreported. Additional reports of 5 April indicate that increasing resistance can be expected from that area. 96th Division reports that afternoon 5th April artillery fire was received and a counter attack. An estimated company supported by 2 tanks resulted in vicinity KANIKU TA 8277. 1 enemy tank destroyed. Enemy position estimated by strength with numerous machine guns mortars reinforced by artillery was developed northwest GINOL TA 8278. 77th Div states 5 Japs arid with demolition charges killed attempting to infiltrate our position at 1700 0109. Night 5 April. Enemy killed to date KIRAMA area total 5399. 160 Tone. Comden 24th Corps assumed command ashore 061 XCP NAGARI. Reconnaissance of TUCHEI KIA KUHARUAGUSU 377 by PM amphibious reconnaissance bn night 5-6 April indicates garrison force 75-100 troops with machine guns mortars registered on beach. Military government operations satisfactory. As of 6 April approximately 9000 civilians interned with some 300 injured being adequately cared for. No contagious diseases reported. Civilians appear good health doctorate cooperative. Food and water sufficient. Underground houses serve as temporary shelter. 2 camps and 2 0-6 hospitals NMPF installed.

-Continued-
permanent location OKINAWA. ERAHA RETTO civilians our care number 122.
Adequately cared for locally. Civilian casualties evacuate from other
islands to ZAMANI and cared for by C-10 unit. Civilians ROKA, KIIC, other
islands are self-supporting. Para. Night illumination and harassing fires
provided 3rd Corps by 1 OBB 3 CA-CL 5 DD. 21st Corps by 3 CA-CL 5 DD. 10th
Army support by 1 OBB 1 DD. General support covering eastern OKINAWA from
ARAZAKI to KANAZAKI and eastern islands provided by 1 OBB 1 CA 6 DD. "line-
sweeping progress made possible fire support eastern side ICHIGAKI ISLAND.
Para. Further details relative NEVADA. 1 hit aft frame 101 port side main
deck demolished 20mm mount, 2nd hit penetrated frame 73 starboard 3 feet
above 2nd deck. Pierced 5 WT bulkheads exploding frame 73 port side 2nd
deck crew's compartment. Degaussing coil damaged, 3rd hit must between 1st
and 4th turrets starboard. Struck deck port side frame 108 4 feet from side
of ship and roccocheted clear. After 20 radar damaged, ammunition lost.
2 KIA IONIJA. Ship otherwise operational. THREAT badly damaged in
collision with ASHTABULA 24-24 N 128-58 W. MURRAY STONINGTON, GUID. Ta
standing by. ASHTABULA damage not serious. ICI 55% damaged during storm
previously reported. Extent not known. ICI 1059 damaged above waterline
night 4-5 April as result of drifting down on her. ALT 781 severe struc
ultural damage. Starboard shaft innenive. No other details. Torpedo fired
at HUMAN 728 passed close under stern. BAYAN made attack 3 miles west host
BOLO. Local 8SP restored and hunter killer commenced. CUMIN YUPO in WT
station reported 3 bombs dropped nearby 0300. No damage. NAKAHIC departed.
Today for rear areas 10 APA 2 AKA 2 DD and 4 DE. HATA ISLAND departed 0000
for GUAM. Para. Search flights made by PBW, NAJIMA base. ASH flown during
daylight by TBMs from CVEs inner sector by PBW from OKINAWA outer sectors.
During night all sectors flown by PBW. This morning an additional ASH from
CVEs flown ASP over inner transport area. Direct air support furnished by
CVEs and fast carriers. V0C 1 in WAKE ISLAND exchanged with VC 87 in MAC
ISLAND. V0C 1 remains OKINAWA. VC 87 returns GUAM. Enemy air
attacks by about 35 planes occurred intermittently during latter part of
night 5-6 April. Planes approached from N and NE. Enemy destroyed by gun-
fire: 1 by ZELLARS 0129, 1 by LCS 119 at 0310. MACOR 1 at 0455. CUB 1
at 0430, 2 by unknown ships at 0628, 1 by STARLING at 0659. OEOUR 1 in MAC
reports bandit exploded off port bow. 0826 ST LOUIS reported being under
attack 10 miles north BOLO. No other details. Enemy destroyed by VPE: 1
by RUDERD BAY FU at 0755. Own damage none reported. Dumbo 1B rescued 2
crewmens from WORKTOWN TB. Close to southern ICHIGAKI 1900 5 April. 2 other
crew members reported lost in crash. DD averted propaganda leaflets dropped
photographic flights made.

06 2337 CTF 58 to AFGOSTHELF Info CINCPAC ADV, CINCPAC.

ESSEX search plane 1st report. 1 battleship 2 light cruisers 10 destroyers
30-44 N 129-10 E on course 300 speed 12 at 070825 (--)9.

07 0130 PLANES 160 FLIGHT 164 to CONFIRMING 1 OBH FLIGHT 162.

This is my 1st report 1 battleship 1 cruiser heavy 9 destroyers north 31-00
Lat east 128-55 Long course 000 speed 17 knots 105 and 60V track.
070304 CTF 58 to CONSPHTLF Info ALL TFC/SPH TF, CINC PAC ADV, SUBMARINES & DLMs

At 071015 launched 380 plane strike against enemy surface force in Lat 31-00 N Long 129-00 E course 200 speed 17 knots. Launching position Lat 27-00 N Long 129-45 E. Am maintaining target CAP over OCTANA. No enemy attacks on this force today - yet. Request area be thoroughly swept by Dumbos and submarines for downed pilots.

070755 CTF 51 to CONSPHTLF Info CINC PAC BOTH, ALL TFC & TSG SHHHT

Summary No. 13 071200. During the past 24 hours we have been hit badly by enemy aircraft but thanks to our great support from TF 58 and TF 52.1 we can sustain our losses and if this is the best the enemy can throw against us then we can move further forward. Para. Ground force action during the night was marked by a lack of enemy activity to the north in the ZA of the 3rd PhilCorps while in the south the 24th Corps received receiving intermittent artillery mortar and machine gun fire and some infiltration attempted. Both corps resumed the attack this morning. In the 3rd PhilCorps the 6th MarDiv was advancing to the north with the objective of securing the line TA 0716 to TA 1313. On securing this objective the advance was to continue to the line TA 0718 to TA 0919. The 1st MarDiv continued mopping up in their ZA. Elements of the 6th MarDiv were landed on NAGO beaches at 0800 with the mission of recceing OCTURA SOUTH. Other elements 6th Marines recceing inshore side of IWE HABAR AND HABAR yesterday and reported no enemy activity. Noon reports show the 6th MarDiv on the line TA 0919H TA 0718 TA 1312H. The 24th Corps confronted by exceedingly rough cliff like terrain with enemy defenses consisting of blockhouses pillboxes extensive trench system double arpon barbed wire. These defenses appear to be of low standing rather than of new construction. 96th Div reported that it is possible entire 62nd Jap division is disposed across their front. 1st MarDiv reports the capture of a large coastal gun in TA 949E. 6th MarDiv captured a suicide boat armed with 300 pound rocket mounted in bow. Para. Fire support missions during night were furnishing 3rd Corps by 2 CA's and 2 DD's. 26th Corps by 2 OBH 2 CA 5 DD. General support eastern bombardment group by 1 OBH 1 CA 6 DD. TF 56 covering force consisted of 6 OBH 2 CA 4 CL and 15 DD. Ammunition situation is good in PS ships but loss of 2 ammunition vessels LOGAN VICTORY and HOBS VICTORY due enemy action limits the reserves on hand. 3 more ships in addition my special report namely LOGAN VICTORY, HOBS VICTORY, 1ST 347 are probably a total loss. 2 additional ships the 7 LEON and BENNET damaged through action this morning. INDIANAPOLIS 8 A's and 1 AKA 1 DM battle damaged 2 DDs 1 of which battle damaged 2 APDs departed for Guam 0900. Para. The area was again under air attack during morning 7 April 0925 to 1015. Bombs were dropped in transport area by about 6 planes. Total of about 20 enemy planes approached in small groups of which 12 were shot down. 6 by fighters and 6 by ships crediting BENNETT GERONIMO TACKER JEFFERSON WITH 1 each. Suicide hit WESSON and BENNETT. Direct air support of ground forces was flown by CVE planes only today. Search flights were made by PBM's KERAMA base. TF 58 conducted search for Jap fleet with KERAMA plane reporting contact 30 miles west of YUKI SHIMA. Routine ASW was flown by PBM's. The search for midget sub south of MOTOMI reported negative. Special searches by Dumbo planes were made for survivors of ships sunk during night 6 to 7 April and for an aviator reported downed 25 miles bearing 070 from ZAMPA but results were negative. Add to list of ships shooting down planes during 7 April air attack: 1 each by GRIFFIN DEFENSE GLADIATOR TPS 5H. These planes previously listed under those shot down by unknown ships and do not raise total shot down. GRIFFIN reports 2 bomb misses by TPS 5H. For plane losses in fighting attack bay 1 additional friendly plane shot down by GRIFFIN. Not KERAMA.
07 0925 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC.

I MAY BE CRAZY BUT I THINK THE JAPS HAVE QUIT THE WAR AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

07 1214 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSEA Info COMSTHFLT, COMAIRFAC, ADV HC, VFA-1, 12TH FLOYD WING ONE, COMSTHFLT, COMAIRFAC.

Refer your CX 133977 timed 29107 not to all. Seaplane facilities not yet fully established at OKINAWA. Planned searches are shown on appendixes 2, 2A and 2B of ConAir7thFli. Additional copies airmailed to you yesterday. Searches currently flown have south limit bearing 280 from KERAMA RETTO. Request you search sectors 5 thru 10 be continued as now flown for the present except radius should be reduced to 650 miles. ConAir7thFli's search will remain clear of these sectors.

07 1204 CTF 57 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, CINCSEA, CTF 112.

6 April. Bombed and strafed airfields ISHIGAKI and MYAKO. Found previous craters. MYAKO filled in. Splashed 1 Francis. Fleet detected 0850 by spotted and attacked 1700 by about 44 suicide aircraft. Heavy attacks and bombing by plane frequencies preceded attack. Fighters splashed 1 Judy 1 Zekes. Fighters and ships guns 21 hits 1 suicide near missed ILLUSION crashed in sea after wing tip hit 1, 1100 hit island. No damage. No casualties. 7th Airfield ICHIGAKI runways bombed. At MIYAKO about 20 aircraft seen at OKINAWA some believed damaged. Low cloud prevented decisive strafing. Destroyed 3 on ground. All Myako runways heavily bombed and believed unserviceable. Own losses 2 by flak 1 ditched pilot recovered. Heavy 

07 0646 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSEAPAC Info CINCPAC FRAUL.

While active operations are in progress visits or temporary duty to RTUKUS will be limited to those considered necessary to facilitate those operations. Your 010052 is disapproved for the present. Should you find it desirable to do so request may be renewed in early May and will be given further consideration.

07 0825 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSEA Info COMSTHFLT, COMAIRFAC, COMAIRFAC.

Request ConAir7thFli be authorized communicate direct with ConAirFAC concerning exchange of naval air squadrons your 060865.

07 1330 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TAC & TAC STRFMT.

Summary No. 14 as of 071300. 10th Army made substantial gains in operations today. 24th Army Corps drove south against stubborn resistance over broken terrain containing numerous pillboxes and blockhouses. 7th Div penetrating enemy defenses reached a point on its left flank to within 400 yards of COKI TAI 8974. Slight gains were made on the right flank of the 7th Div. The 98th Div advanced along its entire front and captured...
UCHIYUARI TA 8078 and DONKU TA 6276-6. Divisional artillery is now reinforced by 24th Corps and Marine artillery. 24th Corps front on study site: TA 79780 82765K 8475D 8575U 8675C. 3rd PhibCorps moved north and only minor resistance reported its lines from KHOO TA 04016 extended diagonally SE towards IGARA YAMA TA 13130 with strong patrols as far north as YABAKYU TA 12212K and to the west near the river between the towns of OUSA TA 04175B and YAHU TA 04180. Cumulative ground force casualties to 002400 are: 3rd PhibCorps non divisional units 10 KIA 13 WIA 2 MIA. Total battle 22 NBC 48, 1st MarDiv 54 KIA 172 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 226 NBC 11, 4th MarDiv non divisional units 0 KIA 2 WIA 4 MIA. Total battle 6 NBC 84, 77th Div 49 KIA 172 1A 0 MIA. Total battle 222 NBC 48, 7th Div 44 KIA 244 WIA 5 MIA. Total battle 297 NBC 98, 96th Div 85 KIA 474 WIA 9 MIA. Total battle 268 NBC 106. Grand total battle 1523 NBC 602. Fara. Fire support was provided by 3rd PhibCorps by 2 OBUs 3 CA-CL 5 DD by the 24th Corps by 2 OBUs 2 CC 5 DD. Support for 5119 on eastern side of island was provided by 1 OBUs 4 CA-CL 6 DD. These ships also engaged in general support missions to both corps from that side of the island. Ammunition situation is excellent, some damage and casualties were caused by our own AA fire during attack. YABRAI was hit by AA or bridge structure with 6 WIA, WAKAD reported she had casualties. PGS 1390 control gear out and 1 KIA 5 WIA. MAFIT 1 KIA. MAFIT had forward rigging severed and boom shot away 5 WIA. COUNTERFIRE at 0400 felt heavy explosion throwing out all engine room pumps. Believed depth charge or torpedo close aboard. Otherwise no damage. 1 mine destroyed by SHIBERU 3402 degrees 12 miles from 9000. 16 mines swept off eastern side and 8 floating destroyed 6 April. Fara. Small craft made away rescues from damaged ships. LCS 63 picked up 70 to 80 BUSH survivors including commanding officer. LCS 37 recovered 7 bodies and 2 survivors from BUSH. US DNY rescued 80 from MULLAN. PGS 855 has 17 survivors from MULLAN. YOKAM airfield received its 1st land based fighters this afternoon when 22 Marine Fools and 7 P5Ns of VIP 224 311 441 UR 2N arrived. Routine search flights and ASP were flown. 2 enemy planes entered the general area this afternoon. YORKTOWN CAP destroyed 1 July at 1547 and GREGORY shot down the other at 1745. 2 ESSEX fighters had mid-air collision. Both planes crash landed, 1 pilot killed, 1 rescued by GREGORY. A VANGUARD CVF crash landed south of KADEN Field 1230. 1 pilot survived. 2 Dunhors covered the TF58 strike and a search plane rescued 1 pilot of TF 58 near KUMUN. CAYUSEaley fighter while escorting photo plane saw 2 Valo and splashed 1 Val in suicide dive 28 March and 1 Tojo on 2 April both at EKURI and not previously reported. Fara. Unloading over the beaches progressing well due to better weather. Overcast, wind NE to 14 knots. Temperature average 71 degrees. Slight sea and swell. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Surf 3 to 4 feet.
1. Shortage of shipping has immobilized large quantities of supplies and considerable numbers of service troops necessary for the care and handling of these supplies both in the South Pacific and in rear areas of the Southwest Pacific. Expeditions' movement forward of these resources is required in order that we may continue to apply full weight of our means against the enemy and to permit timely preparation of the shipbuilding and other forward positions as bases for the forces required for decisive operations. 

Every available means must be exploited to this end. 

2. 

3. Addresses carefully examine their requirements for assault shipping in the light of current operational directives to the end that such as can be spared without prejudice to current and projected operations will be made available to assist in redeploying troops across the Pacific and in moving forward troops and supplies from the South Pacific and the rear areas of the Southwest Pacific. 

4. Report what can be done.

General policy regarding return of damaged ships to rear areas. Ships with minor damage which are fully or nearly fully operational and whose continued services in objective area are desirable shall be temporarily repaired by ships force or local repair facilities afloat and retained. Ships with minor damage which can be spared from combat area and ships with major damage shall receive only voyage repairs in combat area and be returned to rear area as promptly as practicable. Larger ships which require docking and ships requiring Navy yard availability shall be routed to Guam. 

Latter ships for voyage repairs and onward routing. Larger ships not requiring docking and all ships not requiring special yard repairs shall be routed UTLH. ComSeRon 10 may divert these to NAVU or NAU depending upon relative availability of facilities.

Please be assured that CinPac and ComAirPac are making the most effective allocation of escort carriers to meet conflicting requirements. The general proposal of your 080325 and previous messages on the same subject namely to increase your allocations at the expense of others is not feasible and would defeat your own purposes in a short time. I will be pleased to receive from you recommendations for redistribution of CV's now under your command so as to best serve your needs.

Summary No. 15 as of 081200. 10th Army continued the assault this morning with the 3rd PhibCorps making rapid advances to the north in the 2A of the 6th MarDiv and by 1000 had established a line generally across the neck of KOROPU PENINSULA from TA 0617P to TA 0717J along the road to TA 1121C with patrols working to the objective line TA 9720M 0324C 0626S 0825B. By 1200 these elements had reached TA 0421C CHUUSUKU TA 0922 and WAHTA TA 1322. This division encountered some mines and undefended road blocks in their 2A. The 1st MarDiv is engaged in patrolling their area sealing caves and...
improving roads. In the area of the 24th Corps both the 7th and 9th Divs received considerable enemy artillery fire during the night and numerous attempts at infiltration of our lines were made. The attack this morning was against stubborn resistance. Enemy defenses are reported as skillfully emplaced with approaches covered by anti-tank guns and heavy caliber weapons. Numerous anti-tank ditches and minefields were encountered. 47th Div tanks were knocked out yesterday by 500 pound bombs buried in minefields. By noon only slight advance had been made along the corps front with front lines substantially the same as reported last night. Intelligence reports indicate that main Jap artillery positions are in the vicinity of WAMU 7.9.3. 3rd 94th Div is now passing through the 1st enemy defensive position. CA tactical air force AYASHI Army established as bases 001000, 3 squadrons day fighters and 1 squadron night fighter macOS 2d 4A 14 are operating from YANTAN airfield have 90 F4U and 100F6F. Reconnaissance of eastern islands was completed by FM1 reconnaissance BN. No Jap patrols except TSUCEN lightly held and KITAPA no details. There is no ground action reported in KERAMA RETTO. KLESE SHIMA was subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire at 071905 on area of the AS 52nd FA group resulting in damage to 1 gun and 1 KIA. Very low altitude reconnaissance of I HTPA revealed enemy installations all unoccupied. No AA fire was received or other enemy activity noted. Para. TG 52243 OPERATE arrive 9th will land all but 1 at 1000 on western beaches and use 1000 at capture eastern islands. Para. 2/1 3rd Corps by 1000 1 CA 1301 DP 24th Corps by 2300 1 CA 1 DD. General support by 1 OBB 1 C 6 DD which also covered reconnaissance on the eastern islands and provided harassing fire in 24th Corps and Army zones on south OKINAWA. JT IOKAS in high area silenced guns which had shelled artillery position in KERAMA. All fire support DDs west side of island were relieved 070 last night by DD224 from TG 52242 so as to provide large screen for TAS SAMA in event of surface action. These DDs returned to Ph duty this morning. JT IOKAS now reports hit during air action 0000 April by bomb on 03 turret top badly dished turret but no penetration some damage to supports sprinklers and radar reflector XTA 15 XTA 6 KIA not identified. XTA IOKA received near miss 1830 6 April. Minor damage all repaired. No casualties. TG 511 likewise hit on 064 April by suicide plane with 3 inch gun demolished after touch 03 deck. Minor topside damage. No report of casualties. About 0700 7 April while in the SW part of NAGASAKU WBN 0427 was hit by SD gun with 3 KIA 1 KIA. KIYUTA silenced M15 battery. XTA remains operational. XTA 3 mine disposal vessel and XTA 103 struck mines in NAGASAKU WBN at about 0800 sinking quickly. No report on survivors. XTA 3K sank horned mine in 860700 7 April. BOXERS destroyed 6 horned mines 240 degrees 127 7 miles from BCP. Sweeping of CHINU WBN completed with negative results. Sweeping of NAGASAKU completed except small area which is now in process of completion. 12 drifters were sunk. At 0200 an LCM sighted sub 5 miles north of BCP. XTA 27K and HENDRUEU engaged hunter-killer but failed to establish contact. Search discontinued at 0615. 1 torpedo was fired at STARBUCK at 0700 and which bears 297 degrees 25 miles from BOLD. XTA 27K and HENDRUEU conducting hunter-killer. Following ships departed OKINAWA 0900 for LTPP 1 LCPF 16 LST 1 DE 2 PC 2 PCS 1 SG. Para. AQ support missions were flown by C79N and fast carriers. A special strike by CVE planes was made on YOKASA and ISHINAKO. No reports received. Routine search flights anger were flown by PB4 from KERAMA RETTO base. We were subjected to hostile air attack from 2030 to 2440 night 7 April 4 planes approached from the SW of which 1 was shot down by gunfire over KERAMA the others suspected of landing at KIWA. At 0610 to
080755 CTF 51 Summary No. 15 - CONTINUED.

0623. 2 planes approached from the SN over ISLAND. Both were shot down by gunfire by MAKIN ISLAND fighters. Air support of the 24th Corps has been turned over to land support force 600-1 PAVIFF from BOSTON on ferry flight to YOWON field shot down 1 pilot during afternoon 7 April. Our planes losses for the period as of 1100, 1 PAVIFF from BOSTON on propaganda leaflet mission was hit by AA. This plane landed YOWON field, pilot unharmed but gunner VIT, 2 survivors sighted in NAGASHIMA. 1155, CHINACO COPO dumbo dispatched to THEATER. 3 dumbo FMs from SGH/TU base are operating with TF 58 and 1 with TF 52L. 2 more searching for missing 2 EX pilots.

Enemy planes which strafed YOWON field during night 4 April destroyed previously captured transport planes of MAT service arrived from SGH this morning. 2 R5D's returned to SGH shortly after.

081325 CTF 51 to COMSOUTH INFO CINCPAC BOTH H.Q.'S ALL TF'S 21 K.T. EAST

Summary No. 16 as of 081800. Action of the ground troops is characterized by open warfare tactics in the OA of the 3rd PHIBCORPS while in the south the fight is settled down to assault of strong defensive positions in depth. 6th MarDiv continued its progress up the "TAMING" front and by night had reached a general line from TA 0218 to TA 0421, 7 to TA 0922. The 24th Corps is meeting continuing stiff resistance as the drive proceeds south. The right of the 96th Div is within 500 yards of "CHINIC" airfield. 7th Div on the left is within 1500 yards of the uncompleted "CHINIC" airfield with patrols reported near the airfield. This is being made only after difficult fighting with heavy fire of all calibers and weapons falling along its front. At 1800 the Corps had 19,000 casualties reported by the same last reported showing gains of about 400 yards in the 96th division to average of 400 yards 2A of the 7th Div. Corps front line generally along the line TA 6075, 975, 975, 975, 976, 977, 977, 978, 978.

Naval gunfire observers and air liaison parties have located many new targets which have been subjected to bombardment. Several reports described a torpedo launching battery or a similar subord. base in TA 6079. This target has been under fire by aerial bombardment with results reported as good. 24th Corps reported 4 rounds from large caliber weapon fell in their area last night detonating with terrific concussions and making craters 30 to 40 feet in diameter. Believed possibly 500 lb. bomb or rocket. Map found on the body of a dead Jap pilot indicates the starting point for enemy planes as northern KYUSHU and possibly TF 58. Casualty report as of 072400 follow: 3rd PHIBCORPS non-divisional units: 106, 107, 108, 109, 110. Total battle 25 MRC 90, 1st MarDiv 2 MIA, 27, 0 MTA. Total battle 104. NBC 162. 24th Corps non-divisional units. 5 MIA, 23, 47, 97. Total battle 42 NBC 96. 6th MarDiv 53 KIA, 182 MIA, 0 MTA. Total battle 965 NBC 126. InMarDiv 58 KIA, 133, 0 MTA. Total battle 601 NBC 146, 247 InMarDiv 7, 747. Total battle 338 NBC 97, 156. Total battle 566 NBC 106. Brand battle 169 NBC 67. Para. Fire support missions throughout day were provided 3rd PHIBCORPS by 1 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 3 DB, 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 CA 3 TB. General support by TG 51, 19 by 1 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 9 DB. CTF 52 in TG 51 area by 1 CL 1 DB, 2 MIA covered mine sweeps in LG sector. CHINACO hit by AA fire from friendly ships evening 6 April. Minor damage. TG 92 operating in "CHINIC" area struck mine. Still afloat. No other details. Reconnaissance by TG's on eastern beaches commenced today. Small sub sighted bearing 190 degrees 6 miles from TSGENN ISLAND at 1400. INUGAN cod and all plane conducted hunter-killer but unable to gain contact. GREGG hit forward by suicide during
08 1325 CTF 51 Summery No. 16 - CONTINUED.

air raid this evening. Engine room flooded but under control and proceeding in company with ALGONI to transport area. 200 TBM reports considerable structural damage received on 6 April while alongside TBU. Starting fire. Para. Air activities for the day consisted of direct air support of troops by CVEs of TSG 54 with search flights and ASW patrols. Our plane losses were one TBM from CHENANGO hit by AA fire at 1755, landed on TBU field with 1 WIA. At 1250 OSSU from CUNOCA 9s 8s 6s and 1 OSSU from HELIUS CITY each rescued 1 aviator from LANCA POINT TBM in KATAMA ISLAND. Drone ASW search at 1510 for a number of UDT lost on KATAMA ISLAND was negative. drone FLW retrieved body of dead pilot near KATAMA ISLAND at 1425. Dustoff FLW rescued BURRER HILL pilot 30 miles south of KUROSHI at 1555. Air raid took place from 1000 to 1900, 2 Nips shot down by fighters 2 by YAMUS before being hit by 3rd by an unknown LCI 3 by unknown LCI. Visibility today's favorable weather unloading generally satisfactory. Very broken cloud this morning changing to low broken clouds this evening. Visibility hazy limited to 6 miles. Wind NE changing to E 2-5 knots. Temperatures average 75 degrees. Surf negligible. Slight swell.

08 1515 USS QUEENFISH to CONCUBPAK Info CINCPAC ADV.

QUEENFISH 6th. Identity of ship established by statement of prisoner with no other confirmation. Identification therefore not positive but believe prisoners statement is reliable based on his knowledge of itinerary and description of AWA MARI. Could not determine if lights and special markings were lighted at any time. Ship was never sighted in visibility of 200 yards and sank in 3 minutes aetegan 2200 on 1200 on.

09 0126 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH AND CIN.

QUEENFISH 081515 contains information required by your 071945 (Top Secret).

03 0321 COMINCPAC to CINCPAC 10TH. COMSTHFL, CONCUBPAK, COCINCPAC, JCOMM, COMAIRSEACFG, 2

ADCO/1NCPAC.

The OKINAWA operation has proven the necessity and ineptitude of the 2200 ton DMS assigned to each sweep unit. Their close in gunfire and strong antiaircraft support have been the means of saving many light battery mine sweepers from damage or destruction by enemy bombers suicide planes and shore batteries. These DMS manned by personnel familiar with the task furnish communication navigation and command assistance as well as provide the sweepers with confidence during a hazardous operation. In all future operations it is recommended that their numbers be maintained and that the above described use of modern DMS under this command be continued subordinating the diversionary demands of other commands to this end.

08 0256 COMSTFL to CTF 57, CTF 51 Info CTF 52, CINCPAC ADV.

TGF 52 continue neutralization SAKISHIMA 10 April. TGF 57 cancel its scheduled SAKISHIMA strike that day. If at 0900255 approved by CTF76 desire CTF 57 strike SHINGIHIKO and YASUMIKA airfield 300CA 11-12 April while TGF 52 5D maintains neutralization SAKISHIMA. CTF 57 advise if not within his capabilities.
09 0125 CINCPOA ADV H.Q to CONSFHTL Info CTF 51, CTF 52.

As fighter groups become established on shore in sufficient strength and in view of the heavy pilot losses inflicted on the enemy it will be advisable to return TGs of TF 51 to port for replenishment under and rest on a rotating basis in order to ensure readiness to meet future counter offensives and to exploit opportunities to destroy remaining enemy fleet units. Likewise the escort carrier which have borne a heavy load during the fighting so far need to be returned to advance bases as soon as shore based aircraft can take over. Request your intentions in these matters.

09 0225 CONSFHTL to CINCPOA ADV Info CONSFHTL, CTF 57, CTF 51, CTF 52.

Urdis 050227 not needed by info adess. Propose TF 57 strike SHINGHUKU and MATSUYAMA Airfields PORTUGA 11-12 April. If satisfactory request you arrange S & S as in southern PORTUGA fields same time. TF 52.1 will maintain neutralization SHINGHUKU GUTT. ConSuric requested assign lifeguards to stations 9, 10, and if practicable 11 on 12-14 April days.

09 0255 CINCPOA ADV to ALPOA Info COMINCH, CINCPOA.

Recent directives from Joint Chiefs of Staff issued with the approval of the President involve changes in the command organization in the area which have been indicated generally in the public press. Included in the directives which in their entirety are not needed by the lower echelons of command is a provision that the area under the command of CinPac in the Army forces allocated to him will remain under his command until assigned to CINCPOA by mutual agreement or by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The units concerned will be informed specifically as such agreements are reached or directives are received. The existing orders and arrangements for unified command within the Pacific Ocean Areas remain in effect until changed.

09 0625 CINCPOA ADV to ALPOA. Info COMINCH, CINCPOA, CONSFHTL, CTF 57, CTF 52.

CinPac zone notice A-3. Effective 0000 GCT 10 April the area enclosed by a circle of 30 miles radius centered at 26-52 N 122-10 E is reclassified as a blind bombing zone.

09 0642 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPOA Info CTFs 57, 58, CONSFHTL, CONSFHTL, CTF 51-42.

British carriers will strike SHINGHUKU and MATSUYAMA airfields northern PORTUGA 11-12 April. Request Allied Air Force S & S strike southern PORTUGA fields same time. Escort carriers will maintain neutralization S & S, HIMA Group.
09 0235 CTF 51 & CTF 56 to CINCPAC ADV Info 3RD PHIBCORPS, 24TH VINCE, CINCPAC, PHIBSC, NUTT.

Now appears probable 2nd MarDiv not required Phase 1 or 2. Possibility exists 77 Div may be needed only to limited extent. With view to relieving shipping congestion and avoiding interference with logistics of base development following recommendations made re these 2 divisions: (A) 2nd MarDiv be returned 8ATPAN at once for discharge personnel and minimum galley and housekeeping gear pending decision employment Phase II LG. The shipments 2nd MarDiv rear echelon be delayed. (B) That landing detachment employment 77 Div shipments to rear echelon be delayed.

09 0745 CTF 51 to CINCPAC THPTN Info CINCPAC 1ST, ALL TSC & NUTT.

Summary No. 17 as of 091200. Enemy reaction to the occupation of MINOA is being evidenced by daily and nightly air attacks attempts at surface activity by suicide boats and swimmers and an increased resistance to our advance to the south. 3rd PhibCorps reported little enemy activity during the night. The front of the 6th MarDiv has been reorganized with RE 20 assigned to KOTOBU PENINSULA and RE 4 on the right and RE 22 on the left of the main part of the island to move north. Other 3rd PhibCorps units continue to patrol and improve their areas and to reconnoiter east coast beaches. At 1000 patrols of the 22nd Marines were reported in the vicinity TA 1623 and 9025. No other reports have been received. 24th Corps front is being subjected to considerable volume of mortar and artillery fire which is both constant and effective causing only during counter-battery fire. Small arms machine gun fire continues with increased volume. Numerous infiltration attempts have been made. Plans for the 24th Corps call for the capture of hill masses on both flanks. The 7th Div is to continue with its main effort on its right. The 96th Div is to push its 39TH combat team to the ridge at TA 8707 3XY preceded by a 45 minute artillery preparation by corps and divisional artillery and scheduled air strikes in the zone of the 7th Div and by pre-arranged air strikes and artillery fire in the zone of the 96th Div the corps resumed the attack at 0700. No reports have been received as to progress made. 24th Corps now has a total of 20 PA Bns in support. Small boat loaded with Japs armed with smoke charges attacked gravel pit at IZUMI TA 1913. These were repulsed. An initial reconnaissance Bn 39TH has been relieved from detachment TA 5119 and is now attached to the 77th Div. This Bn was landed on 24TH DAY for rest. Large caliber projectile reported previously as possible 500 lb Rocket bomb has been identified as 240mm mortar. UDT teams are reconnoitering the eastern beaches in the area now under our control. Similar operations were carried out yesterday on beaches in TA 0211 0311 0910 0310. All were found suitable for landing LCs. 2 AKAs have discharged cargo through these channels using LSMs LCs in support of the 6th MarDiv advance. Further work is continuing on the NAGO beaches. At 0900 island commander 331 VC HQ at TA 8290A began the progressive assumption of logistical and administrative functions. Effective this time Island Commander assumes 10th Army responsibility for all shore party operations with the exception of those at the beaches north of TA 8598. These latter remain under control of 3rd PhibCorps. There are now 30,000 Okinawan civilians under military control. Military government operations are proceeding satisfactorily. Undamaged native houses are being fully utilized. Civilians are being fed from local food supplies salvaged by military government and from local garden products. Medical cases not many but are taxing present military government facilities to capacity. Some 3rd PhibCorps medical units have been loaned to military government. A suicide attack on KOROA BETTO.

- Continued -
resulted in approximately 20 civilians deaths. 60 wounded suffered from throat wounds. Para. Gunfire support was furnished during the night in the 3rd FilibCops by 1 CA 3 DDs, 1 OBB 1 CA 5 DD to 24th Corps. 1 CAN 2 CA 1 CL 8 DD provided support to 7th Div from the east and covered NATs and reconnaissance parties. 1 OBB 1 DD served in Naha area. Connection to summary 15 as of 081200 which states WMS 103 sunk. WMS 103 has been beached and may be salvageable. WMS 103 now reports 4, KIA 11, KIA. 19 reported yesterday as hit by mine share 46 survivors and 15 KIA. All of area DL as shown on MS chart No. 2 has been swept. Area FI 18 and area east of CI has been completed. Sweeping in I continues negative results. The sighting of a SPV reported yesterday by JCS 5 miles north of the 3rd FilibCops was evaluated doubtful. LCI 465 at KORAKA shot 1 smasher at 0310 7 Jul. NO MORE details at 1645 for OKINAWA. Para. CVs of TG 52.1 continue to furnish direct air support to troops. Attacks were made on possible radar station on north tip of OKINAWA at 0925. Attacks were also made on suspected torpedo station at south end of NAGASAKI SHAN at 0840. A TF at 1106 destroyed 1 boat and attacked underground boat house north coast of YONEZAWA. A TF fired 2 landing craft on the southern tip of OKINAWA at 1125. Search flights and ASP were flown in all sectors by TFs from OKINAWA. No plane losses include 1 FM from SHIBUSHI BAY colliding with unknown plane over enemy territory at 0720. Descending parachutes were fired upon by JAs. Survivors doubtful, 1 O22U from TUSCALOOSA crashed behind enemy lines at 0330. Special searches were conducted by 1 Dumbo FM in YONEXA, OKINAWA area for reported life rafts. Result was negative. 2 Dumbo TBs are working with TF 58. 1 Dumbo FM is on station SANTITAMAN. Transport planes are now on a daily schedule from YONEXA. There has been no air attack this area since last report.

Summary No. 18 as of 091800, 3rd FilibCops by continued rapid advance has now secured approximately 1/2 of the ISHIBASHI PENINSULA. The 3rd FilibCops in this area hold the line TA 7720X 0220X 0325X 0525X 0620X 0725X 0825X 0925X 1025X 1125X 1225X 1325X. 1st FilibCops operates well to the north of the island. No further reports have been received from the 24th and 22nd Marines operating in the north. In the zone of the 24th Corps only small local gains were made against Japan organized positions. Recent front lines remain virtually unchanged. 10th Army reports the line as: TA 967X 0757X 0757X 0757X 0814X 0847X 0847X 0847X 0847X 0847X 0847X 0847X 0847X. 27th Div less 1 RCT which is to land on the eastern islands tomorrow. Landing over HAUSHI beach today and was assigned to 24th Corps at 0900. Para General fire support ships thoroughly covered southern OKINAWA today. Various enemy installations barracks templates and caves were reported destroyed. KINCHAKURI destroyed gun emplacement in TA 7196 destroyed numerous small boats in TA 7360. KINCHAKURI damaged coastal defense gun in TA 7759 and rocket emplacement in TA 7797. ISWIC destroyed numerous small boats in NAHA HARBOR automatic weapons guns in TA 7797. Throughout the day 1 CA and 3 DD provided close support missions for the 3rd FilibCops. 1 OBB 2 CA 7 DD for the 24th Corps. General support missions were fired by 3 OBB 3 CA 2 CL 9 DD. Report at 1720 from PENSACOLA operating off eastern beaches was that PENSACOLA had been fired upon and hit by shore battery which PENSACOLA took under fire. No other details. 37mm in station A72 reported sonar contact about 1900. GARLAND and TUSCALOOSA are assisting. Following ships departed 9 April for JAPAN: 1 LCSF 29 LCTs 1 LCT 2 AM

- Continued -
09 1240 CTF 51 Summary No. 16 - CONT I'U.

1 FUE 2 PC 1 YMS 8 ATA 9 AKA 1 DD 3 V.C. 120800 on 12 April. CTF 51 reports casualties as 22 KIA, 71 WIA, 39 WIA/T. Para. 96 WIA and 10 WIA/T of AA 33 from CVEs HOWELDA and NETTLE arrived at BATA. Airfield this afternoon. CVEs furnished direct air support to troops and down strike against JAPANISHIDA and KAKISHIMA GUNTON. Routine search flights and AA were flown by CVEs. 2 SNOBBY BAY TBM were hit by AA at 1415 with slight damage. 1 plane landed YONAN field 1415. The other plane proceeded to its carrier. All Dumbo missions for the day were negative. Observation and strike missions were flown this afternoon on JAPANISHIDA, KAKISHIMA GUNTON, HARA and SHIBA. Under air attack tonight commence 1419. About 10 planes approached from north in 3 raids. STEVENS shot down 1 YAK then was hit by mines. Propulsion lost. Tug enroute. TECX damaged by torpedo fired from bomber. ENTERPRISE night fighter shot down 1 plane. PICKING shot down 1 plane. 1 plane attacked TF 54 without results. Yara. There was marked improvement in beach road net and well regulated dump established inland. Unloading has been favored by good weather. Weather high broken clouds this morning becoming high scattered this afternoon with low rain cloud at night. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Temperature average 74 degrees. Wind 15 to 20 knots, fresh sea. Surf western beaches low eastern beaches 5 to 7 feet.

09 1617 MACARTHUR to ALLIED AF INFO CINCPAC, ADP (FOGDA), CINCPAC, CINCPAC, FAAC, CINCPAC.

CX 13788. Refer CINCPAC Adv Ho 090642 which states British carriers will strike SHINCHI and YATSUYA airfields northern JAPAN 11 and 12 April. Para. Desire Allied Air Forces conduct heavy strikes southern FORCOSA airfields on 11 and 12 April.

09 2358 CTF 50.6 to COMSERA 10 INFO CINCPAC, ULITHI, FILIPINAS.

Your 090633. You have again returned a shuttle unit to us with only 2 tasks under my operational control. When this unit called you had 12 of my escorts in port 8 of which had been there at least 3 days. Your continued failure to send escorts back to me at normal rate they are being returned to ULITHI is hindering my operations and jeopardizing the safety of the other groups at sea. Call 5 of my escort with new shuttle unit leaving ULITHI and at least 3 with each succeeding unit.

10 0048 CINCPAC ADV Ho to CINCPAC ADV Ho, INFO CINCPAC ADV Ho, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

ComGenArmy 060535 and CINCPAC Adv Ho 0545. In order to avoid excess dispatch traffic at cross purposes desire that prior questions concerning future operations target dates for deployment of forces on positions yet to be captured and overall concept of air base development in the combat area be not referred to commanders engaged in combat except by these headquarters.

10 0128 COMSTAFF to CINCPAC ADV Ho ADO CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

Your 090616. No carrier mining strikes currently planned. Recommend release of mines to VIAR program. Advance notice of future mining plans will be given.
SECRET
APRIL (GTO)

10016 CINCPAC TF 10 to CINCPAC ADV.

Recommence following dispatch be sent CNO to CINCPAC, CINCPAC, and CINC-NEPSeAFron 'Ur 29 Mar by 1700. All forces in requirements facilities for LEYTE-SAMAR possible at this time. Desist in re-arranging supplies and hospital facilities be completed as soon as possible consistent with ability LEYTE-SAMAR to receive supplies. In view of deviation of transfer of floating repair facilities to LEYTE-SAMAR delay in completion of shore base facilities to be recommended to CNO or made in forward areas if later developments dictate.

10145 COMAF SUDA to COMAF 5 Info CINCSEA, CINCPAC ADV.

AX 74,050.

In support of British carrier strikes on 11th and 12th April you will conduct a no-strikes on southern FORNOA airfields on same dates. On 11th April, simultaneously escorting carriers of TG 52.1 will maintain neutralisation of SAGAM. CUNTO. Acknowledge.

100705 CTF 51 to COMPTAC Info CINCPAC BOTH ALL TAC 1429 STREET.

Summary No. 19 as of 100000. In yesterday's fighting in the Northern Corps area RTC 29 of the 6th Div advanced against enemy 200th art. was subjected to enemy counter-attack on its left flank at 1700 with enemy being repulsed after severe GPPUS fighting. Another counter-attack on the right flank at 1815 was repulsed at dawn of this day. During the night there were attempted infiltrations on right and center of 29th Division. On center receiving sporadic mortar and machine gun fire. Several small infiltration attempts were made in the area of 29th Division on 11th and 12th April. All other areas quiet. 1100 dispatch indicates elements of 29th Division on TA 09992, RESY and TA 10284TX. No reports on location Main Body. Further reports of yesterday's fighting in the 24th Corps zone indicate that 33rd RTC of 96th Div had a rough day yesterday suffering severe casualties from artillery and several counter-attacks after capturing a hill on right flank from which they were later driven off. The 7th and 9th Divs jumped off at 0700 with objective of reducing resistance on both flanks and to gain high ground along both coasts. No further reports. 1 RCT of the 27th Div under CTG 51.19 moved to eastern island and supported by naval gunfire and air landed E 1 on south beaches of TUSCULI. NEFAL at 0800 to clear the island of enemy troops and air installations. 96th Div artillery concentrated on 24th Corps 51.19 to maintain heavy fire on HACHINOKO airfield south to minimize artillery activity. 2 RCT 2 CA 1 CL 9 DD were in support of CTG 51.19 maintaining patrols in HAGASOKU WAN and around eastern eastern islands and provided support to 7th Div from eastern side. STERMIT which was hit by suicide vehicle 9 April proceeded under own power to KERAMA escorted by JEPPESS. Previously unreported was LCS 36 hit at same time proceeded under own power to KERAMA. Damage is loss of mast antennas 50 ft. JEPPESS at 0734 in FS station reports 1 Oscar crashed close aboard. No casualties or damage 4 submarine contacts southeast of OKINAWA located at E 604 while screening HOLLANDIA and WHITE PLAINS made sound contact at 0638 4 April in 26-53.128 49 E. Attacked with depth charges with negative results. BROWN escort with 51.19 made good sonar at 21-50N 132-21 4. At 0147 on 9 April, Dropped embarrassing pattern and marker. No reports of attack but traces - Continued - 235'
10 0705 CTF 51 Summary No. 19 — CONTINUED.

Poor and no dawn. At 1836 B.E.T. observed 4 distinct tones: 25 to 50 yards apart and 7000 to 10000 yards at 2000-0300 hours. Contact area searches continued. Sweeping is continuing in areas 12 to 20. Casualty report, C.S.S. as of 9 April lists 1417. 171 30. Following types departed 0900 for 0700: A.A. 312, 365.1, 917, 1, 157, 72.0. Air and aircraft reconnaissance included an attack on SUGEN JETTA by TU 52.1, R with results unreported. A.S.P. by P-40's in all sectors and with possible sub-marine contact 30 miles east of north tip OKINAWA at 1020. Air raids continued. Tone search aids were employed. Route search flights were made by 2400. Special direct support was furnished troops by G-47 of FG 114. Special support to S.U. in support of EASTER ISLAND landings. After G-47 support. Flights were suspended due to bad weather. Special searchers were made by 1. Dumbos with TU 52.1 12 to SAFETY 9, TOYO and C1 to Dumbos with 9. If weather improves other Dumbos will make search for missing TF111. Ours planess a result of 1 damage of B-17 which landed on island. Aircrafts on runway YOKOHAMA ground burned with no personnel injured. 0600. During early morning 1 P-47 51 operating from JAPAN was seen to crash and explode near CABG in water. No survivors. During evening of 9 April 6 P-47's and 3050 were lost. All planes are missing. 1 P-47 recovered by TF 200. On 8 April 2400 JASD and SAFETY B auxiliary TF111 were relieved by TF 200 and SAFETY JETTA in TG 52.1. There were no enemy air attacks and no fighting. Weather thick high winds from KUR. Heavy rain in open areas and beaches.

10 1159 CTF 51 to CINCPAC Area Info CTF 51 AREA REPORTS.
provided 10th Army by 1 CCB and 1 CA 2 DD covering assigned areas south of NV. NEVADA fired her main batteries at OCP artillery emplacements in TA 9742 with good results. Col. Maj. reports various dugouts and emplacements destroyed or neutralized. 1 probable radar station destroyed in TA 7757 and artillery vehicles moving in roads near 9771 TA 7779 were taken under fire with good results. Poor visibility hindered effective observation throughout the day. Ammunition situation remains good but heavy seas today interfered with replenishment ships. 3 ships involved in hunter-killer at 25-44 "E" 129-27 8 recalled at sunset because of bad weather. 1 ship departed for GUM evacuating casualties. Harbor is safe for 6 times by 4 97 gunfire from T904, 110, 120, 75mm, and 40mm gunboats. Numerous electrical and aerial casualties. Control of 2 meter control maximum speed 18 knots. 1200: 1 killed in response. Casualties reported 2 killed, 11 wounded attached to ships of TF 51 is 225.7. 1121: 1 killed 1996: 111 10 killed 101 hits were made by SBDs from 9771 but direct fire support of troops was cancelled because of bad weather. Ship 1200 due to bad weather. GUM tactics on sub contacts this morning were effective. 5 FLMF shot down 1 B-25 at 0625 and was missed by radar at 1200. 1 ship from 3rd Nib Corps has been missing since 1600. Special photo recon was negative. TAF's ACOSU pilot and crewman who bailed out over enemy territory 9 April are now safe having filtered through enemy lines. 1355: a BATS RSP approached within 3 miles of Yuma Field and turned back to 1210 because of weather. Control of direct air support of 3rd Corps was taken up by landing force air control unit today. A follow-up beach survey by UNNA. Yuma. It is learned that PAGUERA COME beaches in TA 9829 9684 and Bono B4 are suitable for small landing craft. 47 suitable for LCT in high water. Bono B2 B3 and B5 are suitable for LCT only. 325 suitable exits lead from any of these beaches. The continued work on 1900 beaches reporting MACK CHANNEL cleared now suitable for 374. No to beach at 1100, UDT 112 removed items of intelligence value from sunken enemy gunboat consisting of various charts documents signal devices suggestive of equipment. Heavy rains have slowed supply lines to forward echelons over roads. Unloading has been retarded today because of adverse weather with stopping of unloading PAGUERA beaches. Weather 1110 to moderate rain. Visibility variable from 0 in heavier rain to 6 miles. Temperature average 74 degrees. Wind south to northwest 22 knots average. 5-6 to 6 feet rough sea.

08 2357 03 3RD INFRCNS to COMPTAC INTO CMIAC AVL, CEBH in CTW.

Strongly recommend 3rd Nib Corps consist of 3 major, CcA Artsy, Corps troops rehabilitate at CMIACs. Following factors are all three superior to 2nd Corps and 8th and 3rd Tank Divisions: (a) Training areas with ample artillery and small arms ranges. (b) Concentration of Corps in one area. (c) Experience in shipping and time in connection troops movements. (d) Combat in area's USN and PFC. (e) Climate.
10 0315 CTW 51 to TF 51 Info CTW 51 with CONSTHELF 51 0315 51

This is CTW 51 (Contra Bac) OpOrd AB-45 effective on receipt. Important: All measures surrounding its EMNIA have been cleared of mines. The nature and character of fortifications and in absence of control indicate that area of Jap garrison is EMNIA probably consists 2 TK's, 144 small LCI's and 2,500 troops totaling 2,500. Area 2. This force with continuous actions required by CTW 51 OpPlan AL-45 and ConPlan 10 OpPlan L+45 has already entered and defend EMNIA and establish thereon air base facilities. Area 3, 24th and organized as at present less detachments continue present operations, and
TG 51.21 HAdm Reif Schneider (who also retains title and status of 7-11) 51, 51.1 less detachments including TG 56.4 less detachments of AlK Evangelos R. embarked in KEIZER and SCHNEDER, plus assigned VMF units, air support units, plus TG's numbers 4 and 21 embarked in LCT and BMC support activity. Area 4 and defend EMNIA, establish air facilities. Execute AL-51 OpPlan 10 OpPlan L+45 landing on beaches in accordance CTW 46. Attack thin Jap garrison and reembark assault troops in accordance with later instructions. Execute necessary gunfire and aircraft support beach reconnaissance and demolitions beginning 7 day minus 5. Mark channels to establish first essential aids improve beach approaches unload resupply andarrison storage. Comm 1 7 day is 16 April 1945 S hour as set by CTW 1.21. Comm 2 7 day prior submit attack plan with requirements for supporting troops, the essential detachments of TG 51.1 as separately directed by CTW 41 to land at northern HOKUSHI beaches 16 April and report to TG 11.1. Those elements of and communications in accordance CTW 51 OpPlan AL-45, area TF-46.
Summary No. 21 as of 111200. The 6th Marine Division continues its advance northward with the 29th Marines objective to secure the anchorage of the MUTSUO-GUNSHIMA, 22nd and 4th Marines are at CHERILLO. OKINAWA encountering only small enemy groups. The 22nd Marines moved 7 km up to the vicinity of TA 22251 and 1 Company to TA 22254. 1 Company 4th Marines dispatched to ABURARU in TA 22257. The 1st Battalion controlled its assigned areas capturing 9 suicide boats in the area of the 3rd Marines. 24th Corps continued to improve its positions with the 37th Div making local attacks on KAWAMURA RIDGE TA 22257. Army concentration of heavy artillery and naval gunfire are being placed on enemy defense. 14th Corps reports enemy defenses comprise concentric positions on both the forward and reverse slopes with the center of defense around the village. The Japanese has been described as more highly organized than anything previously encountered. TSUGU SHIDA in the EASTERN ISLAND sector was completely overrun as of 101805 by 3rd BN of 24TH INF 115TH Div previously reported. Enemy troops landed against light opposition initially and advanced rapidly inland. After landing intermittent light mortar fire developed on the beach but soon ceased. STiff resistance was encountered from a strong point in the vicinity of TA 0726. This strong point was knocked out by 112200th heavy fire support of LVT(A). With the mopping up of TSUHI'S, 3rd BN of 24TH INF INTSUHI was killed 10 Japs yesterday morning. T entries are still suffering during the night were provided 3rd BN of 115TH Div by 1st BN of 115TH BN and 4th Corps by 1 OBP 5 CL 3 DD plus 2 DD of 151.19 assisting. 1st BN of 115TH Div provided support for the 115TH Div operations off eastern islands was provided by 2 OBP 1 CL 4 DD 1st BN of 24TH INF, providing suicide boat activity for night of 8-9 April. Report the last 24TH INF boats were sighted and at least 6 destroyed, 15 men were obtained from smoke grenades were killed, 1 boat with 6 Japs in it committed suicide with high explosives. Suspected suicide boat was engaged and burned along main route east coast area being neutralized by naval gunfire and illumination. 24TH INF reports 4 patrol. 1st BN of 24TH INF 24TH Div operations was 8th BN of 115TH Div ordered to 115TH Div and inland before silenced by gunfire. CHIBA's operations. 3rd BN 115TH Div, mineweeping completed in C1 east of 127-90 except for 000 miles north bearing 268 degrees T from TSUGU SHIDA. Not confirmed as mine swept. Other small areas near shools same. No mines encountered, other mineweeping continues in areas J1 J2. Routine transport and channel sweeps completed. CHERILLO and YO 96 collided. 0600 10 April near area 7848. No damage to TSUGU SHIDA, YO 96 towed to 125 of 14. 21:00 it flooded. CTU 51.21,12 convoy unroute C1 115TH Div reported contact 1070, 10 April in Lat 23-27 Long 122-00 000 miles north. 1st BN of 115TH Div reported, R-110 at 1000 reported sound contact in area, 10 member ofresults of search. Faro. Direct air support of troops were indication of losses by CTVs of TU 52.1.1 and 52.1.2. Lanes of TU 52.1.1 attacked by CHIBA on 9 April with unreported results and 1 cabin shot. On this morning, search flight from base in northern Fukuoka with 1st 52.1.3 and 1st Dumbo for missing F8U pilots. CTV plane loses 1 F8U this morning. July 5, 500 the plane was hit by enemy AA at 0845. At 0700 an F8U taking off from Fukuoka Field.

- Continued -
11 0730 CTF 51 to COMSILFLO, JPN (SUBJ CTX 51 - 31 MAR 45)

Crashed into 3 damaged planes burning 1 plane. Torpedoed another.

KADIMA Field is inoperational due to heavy rain and electrical failures. No aircraft on the field. Procopa and photo flights were welcomed by AA and 30-mm. Between 1000 and 1100 Hostile aircraft in 2 formations, altitude 20,000 approached within 15 miles of CTF. No fire from the planes; were sighted and no attacks were made by enemy. Three planes arrived after radar pickets. End of summary.

11 0940 COMSILFLO to CTF 58, 51 Info JPN (SUBJ CTX CTF 58, 20 APR 45)

TU 52 AL 3 return OKINAWA area to augment CTF. During next day, we expect air attack tomorrow 12th. T58 discloses ready to attack aircraft 12th and will have all groups available to meet attack.

11 0940 CTF 51 to CTF 58, Info COMSILFLO, CTF 58, 20 APR 45

Indications are that 12 April will be good weather and the enemy will attack very strongly from 1100 and 1400. To proceed with 12th hit and return.

11 1340 CTF 51 to COMSILFLO Info CTF 58, CTF 58, 20 APR 45

Summary No. 22 as of 111800. There was little change in the ground situation today. 21st Corps continues to consolidate its lines to include degenerating terrain preparatory to resuming the attack. 90th Div continues receiving more extensive mortar and artillery fire than usual. NGC support has been effective. 7th Div has been conducting sieging throughout its front and has cleared minefields to its N. 857th Artillery encountered sharp opposition, Hill 178 TA 29774 on the Div's right front, an extremely strong enemy position is the immediate key position obstructing their advance. The 2nd Other situation in the area of the 21st Corps continues the 3rd Div in the general area TA 0324 is being held up by organized resistance. Attacks are being directed at isolating enemy forces. Troops in TA 0324 passed to command if IsCom OKINAWA at 121000. Ground forces casualties to include 092400. 3rd Phil Corps 2 nondivisional units: 111300. Total battle 22 NBC 18, 1st Hard Div 90 KIA 1 WIA, 241 NBC 19. Total battle 224 NBC 192, 24th Div A nondivisional units: 2 KIA 48 WIA 9 KIA, Total battle 24 NBC 123, 7th Div 139 KIA 3 WIA, Total battle 18 NBC 124, 7th Div 90 KIA 576 WIA 18, Total battle 675 NBC 216, 96th Div 133 KIA 913 WIA 35, Total battle 1233 NBC 253, Grand total of battle 2695 NBC 1036, 930. Fire support missions throughout the day in support of 3rd Phil Corps were 12, 1 CL 30. 24th Corps west of OKINAWA 2 CMB 1 CA 2 CL 5 DD on the east side of OKINAWA by 2 CMB 2 CA 6 DD. General support by 1 CMB 2 CA 2 DD. In the Army zone, north of NAHA 1 OBB 1 CA 2 DD. 2 DD supported mineweeping operations off the northern coast. Protective measures have been established for WAKA. A support ashore, 570 L/67 hung up on reef in grid 0686 damaging both sectors. A possible midget sub was reported by CTF 51.19 on 0930 hearing 165 degrees 13 miles from BOLO. NGC15000 was sent to this location. A special ACP plane was sent to aid in hunter-killer. No further report. T58 in position 030 degrees 10 miles from BOLO took under fire an enemy ship which approached from the north at 1017. Plane retired to the northward.

- Continued -
Last night ESTES and 4 LCTs anchored near Okinawa for the day consisted of direct air support to troops airdropped from CVEs of TG 52.2. Search flights and AS were flown by P-47s from ESTES. Strike was made on an amphibious tanks and a concentrated attack on a point near south tip of Okinawa at 1700 with results unknown. Aerial torpedoes launched by Dumbo PTs were all reported negative. Two plane lost on this afternoon were 1 C4Y employed for DDT flying which crashed and burned at 1500 at 1530 demorasing the plane with 1 KIA and 7 WIA. Heavy activity occurred at 1600 when BUNKER HILL F6F was shot down and 1 KIA. Today, 8 planes registered 17 KIA and 1 WIA, probably inflicted on 1 C4Y by eightly (80) planes. This evening beginning 1830 several carrier planes in machine guns approached from S2 within 10 miles south of ESTES, 1 KIA reported and turning back. Possibly for 2 landed after dark. In 1931 flown in position 40 miles bearing 140 degrees from ESTES and parallel. ENTERPRISE plane shot down 1 Tori at 1947 position of miles bearing 000 degrees from ZANGA. Mharih in position 30 miles bearing 140 degrees from ZANGA had near miss by suicide plane at 1938, 11 miles. 1100 from ENTERPRISE shot down 2 engines at 40 miles bearing 050 degrees from ZANGA and 1 KIA, 7 WIA from BUNKER HILL and 1 KIA from ESTES. Weather present. Visibility 3 to 10 miles. Temperature average 35 degrees. Wind NWY to north 25 to 30 knots. Moderate sea and swell with 12 foot surf. (MARCH 26 0100)

SOUTH PACIFIC to CENTAC ADV. Info COMDTSHIPSAC to ADV. 26 0100

Your 240629. Cannot agree that UDT duty is not hazardous. Low casualties to date attributed to excellent personnel, organization, training, safety precautions and safe shipbuilding. UDTs have high morale. A few casualties in this Theater have been high. Future casualties in Pacific may be high and should be provided for. Teams are now required to live aboard LCPs for very long periods. Use of volunteers highly desirable but not absolutely essential now that UDTs are firmly established. However, UDTs operations can hardly be compared with assault boat operations in regard to personnel characteristics and capabilities. 20 active teams assigned before the war should be sufficient for prospective operations, 30 all now in Operating, rehabilitating and on leave. Provided at present does not greatly exceed 20000 experience. The reduced program used by ComdtSHIPSAC is required. Replacement by individuals from other satisfactory UDT experience shows very few volunteers. Also, they must be specially selected to obtain man with desired physical and mental capabilities. New fleet should be assigned to teams on active list in field but must always be first through the 6 weeks course at CFP or at ESTES. This points to selection on West Coast by HBTRAC for experienced officers and men at receiving stations waiting 3 months. To prevent losses it may be necessary to request increase in personnel.

11 0114

CENTAC, CINCPAC to COMDT SHIPSAC, ADV. 26 0100

CX 13830. Effective 20 April 45 ComShipsAC is relieved of logistic support of all CINCPAC forces in NORTHERN SOLOMONS area. Effective 20 April 45 Commander Allied Naval Forces will assume logistical support of all naval elements in

- Continued -
in Norsols. Other than Marine air units not assigned to CINCPAC, all other US naval forces in Norsols will be evacuated in the future excepting a detachment of approximately 200 ships组成 detachment and transfer of other US naval forces from Norsols and all 'time to be mutually agreed upon by Com Allied NavForces and ComNorsols operating a detachment operating boat lighterage task at Norsols will be assumed by Commander Allied Land Forces.

11 0545 CTF 51 to COMDIV/4 Info #51.

Your suggestion relative to evening twilight air cover for radar pickets are agreed to. The force commander recognizes the requirement of your vessels and advices their gallant performance of a hazardous but extremely necessary duty. Air cover at dusk has been limited because carrier deck must land before dark and carrier night fighters are not numerous enough to cover the entire area. Shore based fighters which are now ready for operation will provide a 24-plane dusk CTF with additional planes on ground alert. They have operated for several days and will later be increased.

11 0839 CINCPAC ADV TO COMDIV INFO CINCPAC DEAR.

JCS 07/2051. Assault ships and craft are not being utilized to the fullest extent possible for movement of personnel and cargo from rear to areas, virtually all being transported in SS. Large numbers LST and LCM being utilized to expedite movement of defense battalions and equipment into areas in order to capitalize on the rapid advances made by assault troops. Ships from SoPac being utilized to transport bombs to Norsols for use of LCM and to transport personnel and equipment moving toward island to roll up. Other ships and craft allocated temporarily to assist in forward movement 7th Fit Forces as indicated my 280904 and my 290724 of higher classification. As soon as operations are in progress and those in immediate future have become clarified it is possible that additional ships can be utilized for logistic purposes. No firm estimate of numbers or dates can be made at this time.

11 1235 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 51 Info CTF 53, 54, 55 CTF 51, 19.

Consider all battleships, cruisers, destroyers above minimum needed for fire support and screens tomorrow should be kept together in suitable dispositions for maneuvering in defense against air attack.

11 1830 COMDIV & CHG TO CINCPAC CINCPAC BATT LNK 2559.01, CTF 51, 19. COMDIV COMAIRTHEM, SHIP COLLECTION.

Due to increased tempo carrier and Marine fighter squadron to operations with resulting high losses and short supply of Coralie, requested allocations these aircraft to RNZAF for May and June cannot be met. Only Hell divers are available to RNZAF if desired.
11 2155 CTF 51 to CINCPAC ADV, CONFLICT, TF 51, SL JAP SCP S-795.

Special report enemy air attacks night early morning 12 April, 0600, 25 enemy planes in 10 groups approached from north. 45 TF(N) shot down 2 Betty 1 Jack, 2 Betty 1 Jack shot down. 2 Betty 1 Jack, Shore based patrol shot down 2 Betty 1 Jack.阴影 off HAGSHEI beach, 1 Betty 2 Bobs. Several ships hit, SA 30.5 hit. No report as to damage.

12 0526 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INFO, CINCPAC INFO, CONFLICT CO, SL JAP SCP S-795.

Request continued neutralization strikes on southern JSANSA installations including TACSHI with added strikes on HAGSHEI and JAPAN SCPs subsequent to TF 57 retirement on 13th.

10 1114 CINCPAC ADV to CONFLICT, CT 10, CT 18 JUPAN INFO, CINCPAC INFO, CINCPAC INFO, CINCPAC INFO.

There are reported instances of friendly submarine and surface craft being attacked by friendly aircraft. This indicates careless briefing, improper identification and inattentiveness to reconnaim procedure. In addition, the offensive approach frequently employed by aircraft and particularly by ACK fighter cover leaves the submarine no choice but to surrender or shoot. These dangerous practices must stop! Action, orders are directed to initiate absolute action which is sufficient to prevent the fighter from acting in an improper manner.

10 1615 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INFO, CINCPAC INFO.

CINCPAC INFO order to issue CINCPAC INFO 525000 each of which may have been issued without due consideration of effect on planned operations. My concept that replacements should arrive prior to effecting transfers. Desire no withdrawals of CB men or marked reduction their strength when operations will be directly affected. Noted officers from TAC JAPAN embarked. Please arrange to bring 39 CB to strength promptly. As a guiding principle, desire that prior approval be obtained before any plan or directive is issued that calls for large re-routings in strength of any important units afloat or ashore.

12 1118 MACARTHUR TO JCS INFO CINCPAC/CINCPAC, CONFLICT.

CINCPAC INFO 525000. Ref JCS 072051 (CT). Continuous move ahead to utilize all available floating equipment, including amphibious craft. In the movement of forward flying and other resources from Saipan and other bases, 20 lots have for some time past been working as a separate to disconnect forward heavy equipment and troops. This will increase in size as additional LSTs and LSMs are released from operations. Not committed to operations are utilized for movement of personnel having little or no equipment, such as replacements. LSTs except those required in rear ports for loading and unloading are being placed forward to perform STE war duties in "HILITE" ports.
SECRET
APRIL (GTO)

12135

COC 51 to CINCPAC BAND, ALL TCG & TCG 5THFLT.

Summary No. 26 as of 121300. No change today in the situation of the 24th Corps. Corps reports having received artillery fire and mortar fire of 240mm caliber. Fighting in the MOTOBU PENINSULA has developed into combat by separate groups along the general line TA 9725 0928. The 6th Recon Co has reached TA 9630. A Bn of the 22nd Marines is moving up the PENINSULA to TA 2635, and last reports indicate that this Bn had reached TA 2530. A Co of 4th Marines is en route to TA 2622F. FM Recon Bn in TO 51.117 is to proceed after dark this evening and land on MENA SHIMA TA 2934. Captured 32d Army order dated at SHURI 21st March 1945 corroborates other evidence indicating the presence of the 24th Div and the 4th Inf on OKINAWA. This document further indicates that all air shipping, air and service units are to prepare for ground combat. Casualty reports to include 10000 list to 3rd Phil Corps non divisional units: 1 KIA 20 WIA 1 MIA. BATTLE 22 NBC 21, 1st MarDiv 42 KIA 162 WIA 6 MIA. Total battle 204 NBC 203. 6th MarDiv 64 KIA 260 WIA 2 MIA. Total battle 316 NBC 320. 24th Corps non divisional units: 9 KIA 48 WIA 9 MIA. Total battle 66 NBC 130. 7th Division 120 KIA 696 MIA 13 MIA. Total battle 629 NBC 300. 77th Div 49 KIA 173 WIA 3 MIA. Total battle 225 NBC 48. 96th Div 193 KIA 1108 WIA 232 MIA. Total battle 1533 NBC 287. Grand total battle 3195 NBC 1192. Para, Naval gunfire support for the day consists of 2 DD reinforce 3rd Corps 1 CA 1 CL supporting 24th Corps plus 2 CA and 2 DD of TO 51.19 supporting the 7th Div on the east side. TO 51.19 was allocated 2 CA 1 DD for general support. There was no deep support provided in army zone. All firing extent of eastern group was controlled by SAGCS or air sort in Corps 1. Other naval action included sinking of 2 canoes by 11I(II) 472 carrying 60 natives or Japanese near KARAKI SHIMA. FPN reported BA target being torpedoes body which on patrol station 0725. HMT 16 is further developing beaching in TA 0616 and investigating TA 7925. Yama Flandry passed command of Eastern FG group to COASTDIV 4. Para, our activities for the period consisted of routine search flights by TCS from KERIA NAS with direct air support of troops by CVs or TT 52.1 which were cancelled during air raids. 135 was flown by TTs with 5000 group continuing hunter killer operations on submarine reported in 1200 summary. Our plane losses reported as: 1 FJU crashed and burned on 11 KOBUSA at 1650. 1 fighter crash landed 6 miles bearing 050 from KOBUSA at 1528 with rescue by COASTBC. 1ST WTU. Fighter crashed landed 12 miles bearing 320 1540 at 1540 with rescue by unknown ship. STS 13 rescued WIZARD FJX pilot at 1518 position not given. 1 fighter crashed on southern CONUSA in enemy territory at 1523. No confirming details. Special searches were made by Durko TIF which was sent to rescue KOBUSA and 1 BENSEST. Pilot landed near 1522 but pilots rescued previously by other means. 1 search TIF rescued survivors last 29-20 long 130.5 at 1930. Durko TIF leading DD to rescue aviator reported found 17 miles bearing 055 from KOBUSA. Pilot rescued turned out to be enemy pilot who had straggled from plane. Para. Good weather favored unloading over beaches throughout period. Weather clear, visibility 10 Miles. Temperature 68 to 70 degrees. Northerly wind 15 to 20 knots. 111th sea and swell from 2 to 4 foot surf. End of summary.

12137

CT 57 to CINCPAC BAND, ALL TCG 52.1, CH 150, CH 150. CINCPAC CT 112.

2844

Carried out 4 drop on each of SUGUSHI and HIANDI, latter because 10/10 cloud on 14. X.F. Aircraft observed on either side. Collected 16 armed types over dropped 5. 1 TIF destroyed "FLYING" results CINCPAC unobserved due low clouds. Today's situation shows significant traffic between OKINAWA and KERIA, both ways. If weather permits effective strait intentions dealing with OKINAWA and traffic. In view present situation
12 1401 CTF 57 to CONTESTENT XX. (TOP SECRET)

...and your 1100h7 expect to be available further operations 16, 17 April is now direct.

12 1458 CTF 58 TO CONTESTENT INFO CTF 51.

Flash report 12 April. Shot down 13 aircraft of which 6 by CTF 58. A target CTF 10 group force including 3 by gunfire. Balance shot down by CTF over FUKUJU and DD run attacks near IJNT. Destroyed 3 planes on ground at FUKUJU and IJNT and damaged 9 more. Struck runways both fields. Fired fuel dump and warehouses. Last night heeded TOSUGO and KIKAI with TFN and VF5 starting fires both places. Ongoing tonight with TFN. Last night VF5 damaged total of 7 including 3 by OTUNI target TFN. VF5 heeded 1 more. Tonight VF5 damaged 1 Betty TFN, taking photo coverage. NAVY completed negatives excellent. Pilotsreport TOSUGO coverage also completed.

11 1108 CTF 52 TO CONTESTENT.

Under attack most of afternoon and still going now. During day 12 planes splashed by gunfire and about 20 to 25 more by our aircraft. Torpedo attack by suicide with about 20 killed and 60 wounded including captain. Severe damage to ship. MISSOURI hit by suicide with light damage. INDUS considerable damage from near miss suicide and 2 bomb near misses. 4 men missing, 10 wounded 2 of them seriously, NARK slight damage 2 killed 1 missing from near miss suicide. So far night fighters have splashed 3 Bettys plus 1 probable. Gunfire shot down 2 more.

12 2308 CINCPAC ADV HU to CONTEST.

Because suicide attacks are now the rule rather than the exception and in fact amount to mass suicide by the Japanese Air Force I consider it necessary gradually to divulge the situation to the American people. My previous requests for secrecy are withdrawn.

12 2314 CINCPAC ADV to CGS INFO CONTESTENT CTF 99,2 CP 99,3, CINCPAC, CINCPOA ADV to CGS INFO CONTESTENT CTF 99,2, CP 99,3, CINCPAC, CINCPOA.

Your O90910. My 10004h and 10004h. Confirming conference 11 April I will await your proposals for changes in air base development program which will be welcomed either as overall or as partial recommendations. Following agreed principles are stated for information addresses. (A) OKINAWA and LE SHIMA will be developed for at least same total air forces as planned. (B) VFR may be based on OKINAWA and other Army aircraft on LE SHIMA to simplify logistics. (C) 1 field developed initially for a Marine fighter group will be expanded to include carrier replacements and will be accessible for unloading reserved aircraft from ships. (D) The naval air base originally planned for No. B field will be adequate for at least 4 land based squadrons plus a photogroup, NATS, and 2 more patrol squadrons. (E) The governing principle will be extra early development of OKINAWA as a base for attack on JAPAN consistent with immediate urgent requirements for tactical purposes incident to capture and defense of the island.
SECRET

APRIL (GCP)

13 014.1 CINCPAC TO CTF 58 INFO CINC-PAC, CTF 51.

Believe enemy is depending strongly on southern IJN fields not for staging only but for ability to assemble and launch heavy attacks such as yesterday and 6 April. See Cincpac Adv 120159 in confirmation. Desire you exploit possibilities whenever you feel situation is right to hit these fields. Turner is directed herewith to keep you advised regarding his own defense requirements.

13 0229 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INFO CTFs 51, 56, CINCs 29.1, 29.2, 29.3.

Because of the importance to the naval and air situation of establishing on share at OKINAWA as many tactical aircraft as possible as soon as possible desire that you make certain that nothing is left undone which can be done to expedite availability of personnel and equipment to service air groups and improve fields on a full out basis.

13 0825 CTF 51 TO CINCPAC INFO CINC-PAC, BOTH, ALL I.E.M.HOLD PRIORITY.

Summary No. 25 as of 1/1200. No material change in ground action situation. 24th Corps still engaged in consolidating its position and perfecting its plans for initiation for a strong offensive to the south probably about 15th. The enemy plan of defense in this area appears to be 1 of defense in place of the death of all arms of a heavily fortified complex area which includes supply areas with sliding steel doors against which flamethrowers are ineffectual. This defensive system in depth extends across the island along the coral front throughout the southern end of the island.

Hostile artillery fire heavy mortar fire increasing in accuracy and volume to the rear of the corps front lines with strong evidence that artillery fires are observed and that counter battery is assisted by flash and sound ranging units. Various attempts at infiltration were made in the area of the 7th Div during the night. The enemy armed with rifles, spade and demolitions, around 85 Japs were killed and 8 light machine guns captured. The 1st BN 363rd Inf. recalled a counterattack of some 900 enemy at 0630. 3rd Allied Corps reported a quiet night. Latest reports from the area of the 29th Marines on OKINAWA indicate that 3rd BN was heavily engaged yesterday in the area TA 9324. At 1400 they indicated urgent need for fire support due to counterattack on all sides. Counterattack was repulsed with the assistance of effective naval gunfire from HYUGA. Soon reports show 1 En 26th Marines has reached HYUGA TA 9235. The 6th Recon Co. has captured NUKITA 9421. In other areas of the 3rd Allied Corps, situation continues with minor contacts with the enemy. Recon by PFC Beazley 28th IN of HYUGA reported TA 8524 was completed last night no enemy troops found. During the night 12-13 April 8 enemy suicide boats were captured in TA 9900 in operating condition.

Naval operations for the period consist of support to 3d Corps by 1 CL, 2 DD and to 24th Corps by 4 CB's 1 CA 1 CL, 3 DD plus 3 DD of 51.9 cooperating from east. General support to TC 51.9 was furnished by 1 CB, 2 CL, 1 DD and 5 DD. Anti boat patrol and coastal illumination was conducted by CL and DD. FIFTH'S largest night airfield interdicted between 0500 and 0600. Amplification of flash report of hostile air action against our ships follows: JEFFREY'S in SP station AD 12 at 1345 damaged by near miss from suicide Val and Baka bomb released from twin engine bomber at 1,000 yards. JEFFREY'S with assistance LTC 189 rescued 250 crew 22 officers including wounded from 21220 199 and 190, 152189 strafed and bombed in RC station 14 at 1502, 1 plane dived into con carrying, 2 men blown off ship severely injured. Several I.J.A's are stationed near radar picket line

- Continued -
18 0825 G5 51 Enemy No. 25 CONT.

For rescue salvage and towing purposes, all damage was repaired except for a 1500 pound bomb released at 5800 feet. The bomb was recovered. 

18 0945 C5 51 Sve 51 Info NTh 51 Ch 11

CEA 41 Alaska No. 25: 1545 1945 CST. A 1500 pound bomb dropped at 15,000 feet. The bomb was recovered. 

18 1400 C5 51 to TP 51 Info UTC 10.5 Th 15

JEFFES (D/57) reports that on the afternoon of 15 April 11, 32, and 31 attacked by 23 enemy aircraft. The 31 was not hit. The 32 was hit by 3000 rounds of ammunition. 

18 1940 C5 51 to C5 51 Info UTC 10.5 Th 15

CEA 41 Alaska No. 25: Provisionally allocates only 910 Oil to TP 51. 

Our forces ashore and afloat continue under serious enemy air attack from 1000 to 1600 hours. Intelligence reports indicate continuity of extensive use of 1000 Oil for attacks on our forces ashore and afloat. 

284
13 1/00 GMT SCIFF 51 to COMANDANT NAZ. 2313 14 APR.

Summary No. 26 of 15/3/01, 23rd Corps reports no change in front lines. Operations of the 7th Div confined to improving existing lines, reconnaissance firing of artillery fire on selected targets, and artillery firing to probe hostile positions. Artillery observers and small arms engaged in excellent results in bringing artillery fire on points. 7th Div continued consolidation and strengthening of its front lines. On the enemy well delivered air strikes rockets bombs and strafing resulted in some results on a large enemy column west of FFI 7367. Further report of enemy counter-attack of early morning against 69th Div is not yet confirmed. Artillery and mortars fire caused considerable confusion, enemy is tending wires in this area. No report as to 21st and 21st Fire control and movements scheduled for the day. 1 Bn 22nd Marines reports 1 CCA at 1150. 29th Marines had numerous contacts with enemy forces estimated at approximately 1000 mixed Army and Navy troops mostly scattered men with a concentration of about 500 in TA 0025, 0022 and 0020. 8th Marines also made contact with an estimated 100 enemy in the vicinity of TA 0005. 4/100. Positive identification of the 23rd Bn of the 6th Div was made by enemy. TAF. 4th Marine AJM has established a defense for the beach area in 1500 NAZ. PM. Post fire support given to 6th Div by 1 CA 2 DD 27th Corps 3 073 1 CL 3 DD in the west and in TA 0033 1 OB 2 CA 2 DD from 0032 JAPAN. Support was provided by 1 F 0024 10 51. Bomberd in 0036 with 1 073 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD in support of TAF. Here is 1 for the bombs, 105 57 hit by 3 suicide planes while in flight. In 01 afternoon 12 April 1 hole 8 feet beneath water line, after bombing and gyro room flooded. Steering by hand only. Fresh water system out, Pluming system and valley out. Living quarters in not habitable. Extensive damage to ordnance. 2 FIA 6 N 16A. Ship shot down 1 plane. In addition to 2 suicides and returned to KURE under own power. 1200 GMT sighted submarine on periscope 27-13 W 126-04 Z bearing 315 68 miles from NW. AJM vectored to area made attack on possible sonar buoy contact with unobserved results.

Continued
CONNOLLY and BOXERS sent to assist ASP plane made 2nd attack on sonar buoy at 1630. Results not known. THIVERTON not previously reported was hit by suicide plane at 121555. 12th had 8 KIA 56 VIA 10 MIA. REMF sighted floating contact type mine in position 18-5N 138-10 E. Attempt to destroy unsuccessful. Para. CVEs of TU 52.1.1 and 52.1.2 furnished direct support to troops. Results of strikes made by planes of these units for 12 April include destruction of trucks, artillery gun positions, various small boats and buildings strafing of troop concentrations and firing of ammunition and fuel storage areas. An attack mission was carried out by TU 52.1.1 on SAINTHER GUNTO during the afternoon with unreported results. Several small strikes were made on IKEYIMA. Search flights were made by PBMAs from KERAMA seaplane base. ASP patrols were flown. ANZIO ASP group completed 24-hour air search for sub previously reported. Area was under air attack from 1720 to 1800 by 9 planes approaching from the north and then from west in 2 groups. "SUHAN" P6F destroyed 4 Vals at 1740 50 miles bearing 300 from ZAKPA. "SHERMAN" P6F shot down 3 Vals at 1746 40 miles bearing 290 from ZUKPA. 1 Downed by STEWART DAY FM. 1 suicider missed an unidentified LCS. There was no damage to our unit. Only 1 enemy plane got away. Again at 1910 to 2010 an estimated 4 planes came in from the north. "DEIMOS" shot down 1 Betty at 1930 40 miles bearing 000 from ZUKPA and downed 1 Betty and 1 Frances at 2000. Para. Weather clear, visibility 8 miles. Temperatureaverage 72 degrees. Wind north 7 to 8 knots. Smooth sea and no swell.

13 2300 CTF 51 to CTF 55, CGC 51,10 Info ConGen 10, CONGEN, 24TH CORPS

Effective 0100Z (-9) ConGen 24th Corps has been made responsible for attack of ground targets by artillery, naval gunfire and air all south of Corps boundary including island immediately adjacent to OKINAWA.

14 0232 CINCAC ADV TO CINCAC INFO CONCENT, CG31, CHEF, COMFIC, CINCAC, AMC

Your 110435, TRACY (DM 19) DRESS 2 (DR 14) NORTH (DR 15) will not be withdrawn from combat area for time being. DORSEY (DR 1) will be returned to combat area after minor battle damage repairs. All other old DM and DRS will be converted to DM and employed for training and rear area escorts. Decision as to further conversion of DM and DRS to maintain strength of 19 and 24 respectively, will be deferred until conversion kits are available at which time overall situation will again be reviewed. Your 110515 was clarified by my 130627 and 130628. These plus new construction will constitute an operational force at the objective by 15 June of 33-220 ft N, 32-130 ft N, 11 new DM, 11 new DR, 2 old DM, 2 old DR. Total all types 99 minus those receiving further battle damage. These are totals which can be made available.
SECRET
APRIL (GCT)

14 1240 CTF 51 to COMTHPT INFO CINC PAC BOTH HC, ALL ECOM HOLDERS FIFTHFLT.

Summary No. 28 as of 141600. Information concerning ground force activity has been lacking this afternoon. Summary as of 1400 from 24th Corps reports no enemy activity on Corps front. Late afternoon report relates another counter-attack was received on the 96th Div right at 0315 in which 107 of the enemy were killed. 24th Corps artillery reports 9 enemy guns destroyed yesterday. Only report from 3rdPhibCorps this afternoon relates that elements of the 6th MarDiv have occupied the ridge 9724R 9723Q on the MOTOBU PENINSULA against light resistance. Enemy estimated as 1 platoon with machine gun and mortars. KADEWA airfield received scattered mortar fire at 1600. No other details. Para. Navy units consisting of 1 OB 1 CA 1 CL 7 DD bombarded IE SHIMA today. Other support missions were furnished 3rd Corps by 1 OB 1 DD 24th Corps by 2 OB 2 CA 1 CL 2 DD from the west and by 2 OB 1 CA 3 DD from east. General support was furnished by TG 51.1 with 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD. Support was given minesweepers off NW coast of OKINAWA by 1 DD. Excellent fire support was furnished UDTs in reconnoitering IE SHIMA beaches. BBs are now able to render fire support from inside NAGACHISUKE WAN. Excellent results have been obtained against targets in this area including camouflaged troop installations gun emplacements trenches and caves and against suspected torpedo launchers. All gunfire on OKINAWA is now controlled by CTF 55 in the south and by CTF 53 in the north. At 1930 NEW YORK east of island reported hit by hostile plane which crashed into catapult demolishing 1 plane and cutting transmitting antenna. 2 WIA. Ammunition status satisfactory. About 0400 LORRY had sonar contact at 25-05 N 127-49 E. Made 1st attack 0408 with uncer carbon results. Made 2nd attack 0424 with negative results. Search abandoned because of necessity to rejoin carrier screen. Plane continued observant operations over contact. LCS 13 destroyed mine vicinity of RP 12. CONNELLY on hunter killer assignment reported sighting liferaft with 2 enemy in it. Believed they were working radio. CONNELLY investigated and took 1 prisoner. Results of hunter killer negative. CONNELLY returned to transport area. Design investigated contact reported in 1200 summary. Dropped pattern of charges with negative results. Our CVEs of TG 52.1 continued direct air support of troops throughout the period. Attack missions by TU 52.1.2 on ISHIYAKI and MIYAKO as of 13 April now report enemy aircraft destroyed on ground 1 Zeke 2 Bettys 1 twin engine 3 single engine. Probably destroyed 1 Sally. Damaged 25 planes. All believed non-operational. Our losses: 1 VF and pilot. Strike by TU 52.1.3 on NOBARA and ISHIYAKI on 13 April report various fires started one Betty burned. Search flights were made by PBMs from KERAMA and at 1015 missed 2 small ships with bombs in Lat 30-25 Long 130-25. ASP patrol was flown by PBMs. Several mines were disposed of during the day, 1 by ASP plane in bearing 336 130 miles from BOLO. Another reported by PBM rescue plane at 1422 at 25-30 N 126-27 E. Marked location with dye marker. ASP plane dispatched to destroy. PBM Dumbo made rescue of RANDOLPH pilot south of AMAMI SHIMA at 1225 and PBM ASW plane made rescue of pilot from TU 52.1.2 who made water landing 2 miles SW ISHIYAKI at 1630. Commencing 14 April a 2 plane CAP is being maintained over each of radar picket stations 1, 2 and 3 from 0530 to 1200 by planes from TAF controlled by vicket for its own protection. This is in addition to regular CAP. Enemy aircraft approached from north at 1630. BENNINGHAM P6Fs on CAP destroyed 4 Zekes, 1 Vap and 2 unidentified about 76 miles due N of ZHAPA. BRIELEAU F6Fs on CAP destroyed 3 Zekes 50 miles bearing 320 from ZAMPA about 1720 at 1905 JUDEF splashed 1 Kate and BROWN in radar picket station reported being under attack by 2 planes 1 of which dropped torpedo and missed. CONNELLY shot down 1 Val at 1736 13 April not previously reported. Para. Weather clear. Visibility 12 miles. Temperature average 75 degrees. Wing ENE changing to WSW 10 knots. Sea calm with no surf or swell.
Summary No. 27 as of 141200. The situation remains unchanged on the 24th Corps front. Around Hill 178 in the zone of the 7th Div the enemy is observed to be very active preparing communication lines carrying in supplies and improving gun positions. Several large concentrations of enemy in the front of the 7th Div were observed by patrols. Following enemy counterattack early yesterday morning on KAKAXU RIDGE in the ZA of the 96th Div the remainder of the day was fairly quiet until 2000 when estimated enemy company attacked this ridge again. This attack was repulsed. The enemy is reported well armed and equipped. In repulsing yesterday's strong counterattack our forces captured 9 IMES several knee mortars 125 rifles and 1 radio. Hostile artillery fire was heavy during the night. The 3rd PhibCorps zone continues to be relatively quiet except the area of the 29th Marines on MOTOBU PENINSULA. 29th Marines have been engaged in sporadic combat throughout the area. The greater part of the area has been covered by patrols and today attacks are being made on enemy positions in 3 directions from TA 9923 and 0022. The 4th and 22nd Marines continue their advance up northern OKINAWA. The 2nd Bn 22nd Marines has captured HEDO SAKI TA 9751, and other units of the 4th and 22nd reported moving north over the east and west roads in TA 2535 and 3725. 7th Marines continue operations to destroy enemy group in TA 9903. Other 3rdPhibCorps elements continue to patrol their areas. Predawn take off accident at Kadena field resulted in destruction of 5 Corsairs and damaging of 3 with casualties of 3 KIA 1 WIA. Plane taking off swerved into parked ready planes which exploded and burned. Afternoon 13 April Corsairs of 2nd VoughtA-4F engaged in 1st supporting missions ground troops. Planes attacked enemy artillery positions with excellent results reported. Enemy has shelled Kadena field sporadically for past 2 days with slight damage. Para. Naval gunfire support was furnished the 3rdPhibCorps by 3 DD 24th Corps by 7 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD. General support to CTG 51.19 by 2 OBB 2 CA and 7 DD. SED reports having been attacked at least 8 times by hostile aircraft in afternoon 12 April. No damage to ship reported. STANLEY amplifies previous report hit by 2 suicide planes below waterline with extensive damage including 5 foot hole through bow with deck above buckled. Fuel tanks ruptured. Extensive damage to ordnance WYANDOTT underway hit stern of LSM 312 while in anchor off HAGUSHI beaches. LSM 312 lost anchor 120 fathoms cable. Mine sweeps 14 April include exploratory sweep in area L9 and L8. Sweeping on eastern half of area G2 and approaches to vicinity of TA 3548 and 3549 to provide for landing radar equipment. Sweep units 11 and 13 are making channel and transport area sweeps. UCT 651 in northern edge transports area received near hits by friendly AA this morning with fragmentation damage and 6 WIA. UDT reconnaissance of beaches GREEN T1 RED T1 RED T2 indicate no manmade obstacles or mines found. PATTERSON exploded ORANGE colored homed mine at 0800 13 April in position 25-15 N 127-44E. 5 floating mines discovered off KIJEY UHMA morning 13 April. Mines being rendered safe today. HORSEN sank floating mine 27-35N 126-05 E afternoon 13 April. CONNELLY and BOWERS continued hunterkiller operation with no further results. Evaluation probable. At 0900 midget submarine was sighted in TA 7280. Hunterkiller operations by EXECUTIVE and DESERT were initiated. Total naval casualties reported to date from 69 ships plus TG 52.1 343 KIA 1038 WIA 507 MIA. Following devoted this morning for MURRAYS: Fast convoy 2 OBB 1 CA 12 APA 1 AP 2 AKA 1 DD. Battle damaged 3 DE 3 APD. Slow convoy 2 APA 1 AKA 14 LST 1 LSM(R) 3 ABD 3 SC 1 PCC 1 AP. Para. Air summary for the period includes direct air support of troops by CVEs of TU 52.1.1 and 52.1.3 and by TAF based on OKINAWA. TU 52.1.2 engaged in strike SARATHICA GUNTO this morning.

- Continued -
14 0826 CINCPOA to COMTHAP Info CTF51, CASCO, JCSCOM, OKINAWA, COMENJO, COMGEN TACTICAL, AIR FORCE/JOTHANKY.

For General Whitehead and signed Kenny with concurrence of CINCPOA and CINCSWPA message follows send by air immediately your air engineer to OKINAWA to report to ComGen 10th Army for temporary duty to work with Captain Painter USN purpose surveying airdrome possibilities to get maximum deployment of air forces on OKINAWA and LE JIMA end of message. Following instructions for air approach to OKINAWA area and landing on YONTAN air strip. Check in point diamond lat 25-50N Long 127-29E which point bears 224 degrees true distant 17 miles from SW tip of OKINAWA, at 1500 feet altitude. At point DIAMOND report to ComAir Support Control Units voice call BLACON on 140.55 megacycles. From point DIAMOND proceed on course north for 27 miles arriving at point GRAPHITE. Do not proceed beyond point GRAPHITE without checking IFF with ComAir Support Control Units. From point GRAPHITE proceed direct to YONTAN strip. Call DRAKE tower on 140.58 Mc for landing instructions. Additional useful information comes now. BLACON has two alternate frequencies which are 6005 Kcs and 4775 Kcs. Best strip YONTAN is 350-170 degrees magnetic and has 5000 useable feet. Beware all other strips. Field elevation 300 feet and field has emergency night lighting. If approach to area made at night turn on running lights when passing point DIAMOND. YONTAN is first strip south of point BOLD. For verification of approach procedure see tactical air force 10th Army OpPlan 1-45 Appendix ONE.

14 0833 CINCPAC to CINMBTF info COMINCH.

Following from ELO ref RAMEY 122059. If you consider targets suitable suggest you might desire to propose to SACSEA the use of E2A/VENTURE KG craft against them. It is very doubtful if suitable targets will become available in area further to the northward.
13 1040 CTF 51 to CINCPAC (5THFLT 142350 passed message to CINCPAC ADV for Info).

14 2350 CINCPAC ADV 030518. Since current operation commenced 6 escort vessels have been sunk due to enemy action. 22 have been so severely damaged that their return to duty in the near future is highly problematic. The 16 damaged to the extent that they require overhaul in forward area. Many of the ships used for escort and sweeping duties are minesweepers and the loss of the above ships has curtailed all but the more vital sweeping operations during the operations for the capture of IE SHIMA in order to provide necessary screen and fire support. My 020135 of March requested additional escort vessels over and above those already assigned TF 51 as it was believed that an insufficient number had been assigned. The losses incurred to date have made this situation even more critical. Para. It is therefore recommended that CINCPAC be requested to reconsider and that DESRON 2 remain with this force until replacements can be provided in this area, and that other steps be taken to provide an adequate number of screen and escort vessels for Phases 1, 2, and 3 of the ICEBERG Operation.

14 2230 CINCPAC ADV TO COMFPHTLF, CTF 51, CTF 56.

I am considering a request on the 20th AF to make a full out attack with 1 ton bombs on the area in front of the 7th Div or other targets designated by you. Addressees comment as soon as possible and include desired time if attack concurred in.

15 0020 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMFOUTH.

Request Under Secretary be informed relative to his 121600 that there exists a shortage of naval manpower afloat and in the forward areas and that ComL4 has been ordered to make available for transfer all Naval personnel that can be spared. Under these circumstances it is not feasible to grant to Naval personnel liberty or leave of absence from their naval duties for the purpose of accepting employment with public transportation companies. Moreover, as a matter of policy the Navy should not be maneuvered into the position of having manpower available to drive civilian buses while drafting additional manpower for naval purposes.

15 0036 CINCPAC ADV Hq to DEPOCOM20THAF INFO 210COM.

Request you provide daily photo coverage of southern KYUSHU airfields. Plane counts on fields are of prime importance during this critical period to naval and Army forces engaged in OKINAWA Operation.

15 0040 CINCPAC ADV to COMHIBSPAC, COMGENMFPAC INFO COMGENAIRFMFPAC COMAIRFPA.

The attention of addressees is invited to Cominch secret 3rd Endorsement serial 00666 of 16 March 1945. All personnel of air support control units including "Landung Force Air Support Control Units" will be assigned to CASCO HibSPac. ComGenAirFMFPac report when para 3 of Cominch serial 00666 has been complied with. This is also my action on ComGenAirFMFPac 00851 of 29 March 1945.

15 0100 COMFPHTLF TO CTF51, 58 INFO CINCPAC ADV Hq.

My 100716 and 130114. Consider it highly important in view General situation that southern KYUSHU fields be hit at least by long range fighter sweep from TF 58 either today or early tomorrow. CTF 51 reduce requirements from TF 58 to minimum for period involved so that he may have more freedom of action. CTF 58 take action at his discretion with due consideration for situation on fleet.
150120 COMSTHFLT to CINCPAC ADV Info CTF 58, CTF 51.

My 130141. Believe concentration enemy planes southern KYUSHU fields is very heavy. Mitscher may be able to hit them see my 150100. However it may not be practical or advisable for him to take action. Request in any case all available fighters TF 93 hit these fields earliest possible tomorrow, 16th. Their crowded condition and lack of usual warning from carrier strikes should produce valuable results. Appreciate TF 93 is committed to important mission today but believe situation justifies exceptional effort. If practicable Marine PBJS and 7th AF B-24s should also be used but not to delay action by fighters of TF 93 LACRIMOSE.

150410 CINCPAC ADV TO DEPCOM20AF CTF93 Info COMINCH, COM20AF, COMSTHFL, COMFWDAREA COMAIR TWO, CTF 51, CTF 58.

As an emergency measure request strongest possible attack on enemy air concentrations on southern KYUSHU fields on 16 April using forces you consider will be most effective. VMB 612 available to you. Advise your plans soon as practicable.

150700 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL ECM HOLDERS 5THFLT.

Summary No. 29 as of 151200. The ground force situation on the south front remains as previously reported. 24th Corps continues its preparation for a sustained drive with emphasis on ammunition stockage. Late reports of yesterday’s activities tell of 39 enemy killed in mopping up operations on the 7th Div front and an additional 17 enemy destroyed by raiding patrols sent forward to seal caves. During the night some infiltration occurred in the 7th Div 1 particularly the CP of 3-184th Inf where several jeeps were destroyed booby traps and mines laid in the area. In the 3A 96th Div our artillery broke up 3 counter attacks in front of 2-381st Inf at 1930-2330 and 0430. 169th Inf 27th Div relieved the 383rd Inf. 96th Div now in Corps Reserve as of 0940. Our artillery has been active in counter-battery neutralizing and destructive fires. Hostile artillery fire of various calibers was placed on the Corps front during the night with no damage reported. No other action has been reported from this Corps this morning. Very favorable reports are being received from front line units on promptness and effectiveness of naval gunfire support used extensively in repulsing night counter-attacks. Activity in the 3rd PhibCorps is described as follows: Elements of the 429th and 22nd Marines of the 6th MarDiv are increasing their pressure on enemy group previously reported in TA 9922 9923 0022 meeting stiff resistance. No further report on this engagement. The 1st MarDiv this morning directed 1 Inf Bn Rein by 1 Plt of tanks to vicinity of KANAWA TA 2722 to be attached to the 6th MarDiv. Other elements of the 1st MarDiv continue vigorous patrolling within Div area. Previous report of enemy small boats observed along northeastern coast of OKINAWA TA 4337 were hit by air strike with destruction of 6 boats. They were found to be fishing boats and canoes. 3 Bns of FA 77th Div are being landed on NAHA SHIMA this morning for support of EB SHIMA operation schedule for 16 April. KURU SHIMA TA 6175B has been occupied by our troops. There is some indication that enemy counter attacks are being timed with our flash RED alerts. Para. Naval operations consisted of gunfire support 3rd PhibCorps by 1 OBB 3 DD 24th Corps by 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL and 3 DD firing from west shore and 3 DD firing of 51.19 reinforcing from the east. General support ships of TG 51.19 included 2 OBB 2 CA 2 CL 4 DD. In addition 2 DD harrassed EB SHIMA during the night in connection with activities of TG 51.21. NAGO WAN

- Continued -
15 0700 CTF 51 SUMMARY NO. 29 - CONTINUED.

anchorage was subjected to artillery fire around 1935 last night requiring ships unloading to retire temporarily. No casualties reported ship casualty list includes WABASH rammed by unknown ship during smoke operation night of 12 April resulting in hole through plating starboard quarter 1 foot diameter 8 feet above waterline. HAZARD was attacked by hostile plane at 1930 14 April which dropped torpedo to stern exploding at end of run.

JEFFERS previously damaged by near miss again ready for duty. LCI(6) 81 at 0800 ran aground on reef TA 6769 and was hauled clear by LCI 122 covered by SALT LAKE CITY LUCE and aircraft of CASU south. Minesweepers cleared area in G2 E of 128-11 to line 297 degrees tangent of NW corner of island. Areas L3 and L9 swept with negative results. Routine channel and transport sweeps made. Requisite at 0932 sank object appearing to be floater type 3 mine in western edge transport area. CONNOLLY reports destroying 1 mine while on hunterkiller mission yesterday. Position not reported. J W DITTER IN RP 1 destroyed 1 floater. FGS(H) 1388 1396 1404 are engaged in hydrographic survey in NAGASUZUKI WAN. An LCI(M) of division 6 patrolling area between DE SHIMA and MOTOBU PENINSULA sighted 8 small boats in TA 9133 at 0245. Boats came out from shore 500 yards and retired under attack. Not at south entrance. BETTO dragged 1 mile out of position. Estimate 50% protection afforded. Para. Air operations. Planes from CVEs of TG 52.1 and shore based aircraft of TG 99.2 and fast carriers of TF 58 are furnishing direct air support to troops. TU 52.1.2 is striking SAKISHIMA GUNTO. Search flights in progress by DFS from KERAMA. At 0410 search plane made definite radar contact on sub in latitude 28-40 Long 129-45. During 1r April search flights observed many small merchant vessels vicinity YAKA SHIMA. Strafed 1 and left burning. 5 DD sighted off CHIMA coast at 1330 14 April in Lat 29-51 Long 123-02 and 2 more DD at 1525 in Lat 31-50 Long 126-16. Latter covered by 2 Betties. Routine ASF flown by DFS from KERAMA. TG 99.2 furnished part of night CAP for 1st time night 14-15 April. At 1905 14 April 2 F4Us on radar picket CAP shot down 1 Judy 20 miles E URAN SHIMA. At 1930 14 April Oscar which was reported in suicide attack on NEW YORK previously dropped bomb near HUTCHINS. ST LOUIS at 1834 on 13th shot down 1 Val not previously reported. TAF on 13th lost 2 planes and 1 pilot killed operationally. This morning a Dumbo PBM rescued pilot from TU 52.1.2 who went down 2 miles south of TSUGAKI afternoon 14th. Plane remained on station for further call during TU 52.1.2 strikes in that area. YONTAN field now conforms to left base air traffic pattern.

15 1310 CTF 51 to COMSTRIPFIT Info CINCPAC BOTH, BCM HOLDT'S 5THPFT.

Summary No. 30 as of 151800. 10th Army reports no changes 24th Corps front lines today. 27th InfDiv assumed responsibility as of 0900 today of that part of front occupied by 2nd and 3rd Bns 106th Inf from TA 2871k to west coast. At 0900 tomorrow 105th Inf will relieve 381st Inf to take over their zone. 27th InfDiv had little activity today. 7th Div reports no enemy artillery activity in its zone since early morning. Patrols from 184th Inf penetrated hostile territory for about 200 yards killing 26 enemy in 3 caves. Small enemy groups have been observed throughout the day along the Div front. Within the 96th Div ZA several hostile attempts were made to drive in forward elements and infiltrate but these were repulsed. Some artillery fell in 381st Inf area this afternoon. Little reports as to activities of 3rd Field Corps. Fragmentary reports from 4th Marines on MOTOBU PENINSULA indicate attack against enemy strong point previously reported centered in TA 9922 9923 and 9924 was progressing satisfactorily against heavy resistance. 77th Div reports artillery moving on to ENIMA SHIMA received no - Continued -
hostile fire from any source 10th Army intelligence reports list 9108
enemy dead as of 132400 with 391 FNGs 153 of whom are questionable
civilians and 30 labor troops. Para. Naval operations consisted of gunfire support
by 1 OBB 4 DD to 3rdPhilCorps of which 2 DD supported 51.21 in its bombard-
ment of IE SHIMA. Fire support missions were fired by 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD
for 24th Corps plus additional support from 2 OBB 1 CL 2 DD from 51.19.
General support by 51.19 in addition to the above listed ships included 1 CA
1 CL 5 DD, 1 DD covered minesweepers in area G2. TEXAS reports 14 direct
hits destroying 5 caves during yesterday's bombardment of IE SHIMA. 3 ammo
dumos exploded in TA 3883LY and destroyed entire area which included active
AAA small caliber guns. UDTs completed reconnaissance IE SHIMA beaches
without enemy opposition, CROSBY with UDT 17 conducted reconnaissance in TA
3548 3549 3651 and GREEN 2 BROWN 3. At 1343 GUAM sighted periscope close
to formation 26–32N 130–35E 150 miles E of BOLO. Destroyer failed to make
contact and search was abandoned because of air attack. Air coverage of area
was maintained until sunset. Results negative. MORRISON sank 1 enemy mine
position 26–12 N 126–25 E. Estimate 10 days required to replace south net
KERAMA RETTO. LCS 87 was hit by enemy small arms fire off south OKINAWA
this morning. Details not known but ship is operating. Para. Direct air support
of troops was furnished throughout the day by CVEs of TG 52.1 fast carrier
of TF 58 and shore based aircraft of TG 99.2. Reconnaissance strike 14 April
by 52.1 show KERAMA TOWN burned by napalm. On 14 April TU 52.1.2 hit
SHIGOAKI and MIYAKO. Reports destroying planes on field bombed runways revetments
and AAA positions. Enemy airfields still operational. This TU is again striking
SARAHMA today with no reports yet received. A special strike by CAP
was made by YORAM SHIMA at 1500 with results unreported. Routine ASP was
flown by PBM s throughout day. Rescue were made by PBM Dumbo who rescued
1 pilot from MACASSAR STRAIT at 0620 with a 2nd rescue of pilot from PETROFF
BAY at 0920 15 miles N of TARAMA SHIMA. Another PETROFF BAY pilot rescued
during afternoon by relief Dumbo PBM of TU 52.1.2. Another Dumbo PBM on
station off KYUSHU with TF 58 rescued pilot late this afternoon. DET was
sprayed by carrier planes on 14 and 15 April. We have been under air attack
since 1830. At 1840 6 planes approached from north over XXXI LACCE and at-
tacked airfield damaging several planes wounding a few RVPYEDIL EKVM shot
down by F4U. 2 Oscars by ships in transport area. 1 by shore AAA. At 1900
1 Val shot down by CAP 60 miles bearing 070 from ZAMPA. 1902 1 Val by WICKES
60 miles bearing 070 from ZAMPA. 1936 1 by EDWARDS 35 miles bearing 050
from ZAMPA. At 2 JHXX BB FVE HOBSON in radar picket station 14 reported being
average 69 degrees. Smooth sea. No swell or surf. Wind easterly 10 to 14
knots.

15 0806 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCLANT, CINCPAC PEARL.

Battle damage has so far diminished destroyer force by more than 40 ships
during current operation. Ships assigned PacFilt by Urdis 222312.Dec may re-
quire extensive availability as in case of 6 weeks granted SHUBRICK (DD 639).
In view of above recommend SATTERLEE (DD 626) and HERNDON (DD 638) be sailed
to Pacific without awaiting relief. If approved MCCALL (DD 400) and MAURY
(DD 401) will be sailed when SATTERLEE and HERNDON arrive PEARL.

15 0813 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Rear Ech 1st MarDiv should be disembarked KAPAI CAMP. Preparation of camp
other than that necessary for Rear Ech should be discontinued. Urdis 140305.
Rear Ech 1st MarDiv should be planned to be echeloned into ADJUTANT compan-
ing not sooner than 3rd Ech.
SECRET
APRIL (CGT)

15 1418 CGSTHFLT to CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF52, CTF93, CTF62, CTF54, CTF51.

CTF 93.4 1509Z7. Regret landing large number of fighters OKINAWA tomorrow afternoon undesirable due to crowded conditions of fields, probable fallout operations during afternoon of Marine fighters based there in inaccessibility during expected enemy air attacks of bringing in large number unfamiliar planes in safety from AA in immediate vicinity afloat and ashore.

15 2027 CTF 58 to CGSTHFLT Info CINCPAC ADV.

From sunset 12 April thru early evening 14th destroyed total 71 airborne enemy aircraft including suicider that crashed SIGOSTEE (DD 502). Above total includes 1 Myrt previously reported and 3 planes reported in CTF 58 dispatch 141454. In addition to air support OKINAWA and damage previously reported strafed rocketed and set fire to hangar and buildings at TANGA SHIMA and to buildings at both airfields and in villages on KIKAI. On 15 April OKINAWA support missions burned track and destroyed buildings and carried out attacks on caves and gun positions as directed. Sweep to KIKAI and TOKUNO found no operational planes but started 2 large fires with apparent explosions from gasoline or ammunition in woods adjoining KIKAI airfield. Flash reports of fighter sweep to KANOTAKANPSA EAST and KUSHIRA show 31 planes shot down and many destroyed and damaged on the ground strafed rocketed and bombed hangars and buildings at all 3 fields starting fires.

16 0015 CTF 51 to CGSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL CTF & CTF STREET.


15 2357 CGSTHFLT to CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51, CTF 56.

Your 142230. Negative at this time. Recommend entire effort 20th AP be used in obliteration attacks on major KYUSHU fields until present situation is brought under reasonable control. When this is accomplished delivery of 1 ton bombs at OKINAWA will be in order.

16 0205 CTF 51 to CGSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TCF & TCF STREET.

Flash summary enemy air attacks morning 16th. Estimated 100 planes in 10 raids all approached from north. 1st attack 0742 last attack 1027. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Planes shot down 37 by CAP including 1 Betty which approached to within 3 miles of transport area. 15 by ships, 10 suicide hits. Total enemy destroyed 62. Ship hit by suiciders. STINGLE sunk. LAFFEEY HOBSON BRYANT BOWERS HARDING LCS 407 LCS 51 LCS 11. Possibly sunk. Condition LAFFEEY not known. Para. Foregoing based on fragmentary report.

16 0251 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC C OF S USArmy Col. Generica CINCPAC CTF52

The 81st Div now at NEW CALEDONIA in area reserve for OKINAWA operation can be released immediately to your complete control. Assault shipping is present adequate to move it unit loaded to the PHILIPPINES if you so desire and so doing would expedite release of other resources in SoPac. If you so request, you designated destination.

2857
In order to provide for continuing and progressive policy, methods and equipment for salvage and urgent repair during amphibious operations it is recommended that there be established under the administrative command of ComServPac a new squadron entitled "Amphibious Salvage and Repair Squadron" for assignment in whole or part to the operational command of commanders of Joint Expeditionary Forces during amphibious attacks. This squadron would have permanently assigned to it vessels especially equipped for amphibious salvage and repair such as ABE, ABE, ATP, ATR, electronic and radio repair ships, salvage and fire fighting LCTs, Salvage LSTs carrying salvage LCTs and warping tugs, at least 2 ABEs carrying warping tugs, PCB(R), and other vessels not especially equipped such as at least 1 AT or AD. To these would be added for particular operations additional vessels and boats from ServPac and PhibsPac. Also proposed is a command by a Commodore embarked in a small AOG. This commander should have an adequate operational, salvage, maintenance and administrative staff. Assigned also to the command would be at least 3 salvage unit commanders embarked in LC(FF) with small operating and salvage boats to permit supervision of salvage operations in several areas or subareas. Salvage and repair squadron facilities would be available as practicable for towing and salvage work for other fleet forces in combat area, and for assistance in salvage of boats beyond capabilities of beach party salvage units. Recommended for command of this squadron is Captain Curtis.

Para 1. Pursuant to the directive of JCS 032140 with the Army forces and resources under your command report by dispatch to CinCPac for purposes of Army administration, Para 2. For the present the Army forces now under the operational control of CinCPAC will remain under his operational control except as may have been or may in the future be directed by the JCS. It is requested that you furnish as soon as possible a list of the units which you consider necessary for the functioning and defense of the Hawaiian Department, including as a list of the units now in the Hawaiian Department, which are not so needed and lists of the Army units now in the Marshalls, Marianas, Carolines, and the South Pacific with the dates when they can be released to the operational control of CinCPAC as no longer essential to the functioning or defense of those subareas. Para 3. You are authorized to proceed and report in person to CinCPAC and it is requested that you ascertain his desires in this regard.

Summary No. 31 as of 161500. Elements of the 77th Div under CTC 31-22 supported by naval gunfire and air bombardment landed on the beach with 2 M4s abreast on BLACK 31 and RED 31 and 2 tanks at 0800 with RED 21. Light enemy reaction reported. The landing is being supported by 77th Div artillery previously emplaced on KAMEA SHOA and by Carrier air and BPF. By 0900 troops had landed on all beaches and moved 300 yards inland. At 1030 BEF 305 on the right reported meeting opposition in its front from SE direction of GUSUHA TA 6753, by 1340 troops of BEF 305 had reached the North-South strip of the airfield and CTC 305 had reached the line TA 6632 at 6632Y. Both BEFs are attacking to the east. 34th Corps continues maintaining its preparation for strong offensive tentatively scheduled 19 April.
Coordinated with it will be a landing demonstration SE OKINAWA. There was little enemy activity on OKINAWA 3/27-3/29 period. Enemy appears to be waiting for our intended attack. Enemy artillery and mortar positions were heavily hit by our naval gunfire air strikes and artillery throughout the day of 3/31. 24th Corps plans for the day called for extensive reconnaissance of enemy positions to the front of the 7th Div while the 27th Div completes relief of 381st Inf of the 94th Div and assumes responsibility for new ZA on Corps right (west flank) 96th Div is regrouping within its new ZA abreast and to the east of the 27th Div. 3rd PhibCorps reports that the 4th and 29th Marines continued their attack on NAGASU "TENSHI"A which has slowed down by necessity searching out enemy in many ravines and caves. 22nd Marines are consolidating their positions and retreating the northern end of the island. TAF ashore completed 5 missions totaling 73 planes in support of the 24th Corps yesterday. Numerous targets were damaged or destroyed including 2 locomotives fired. Enemy AA reported light meager and inaccurate. Both TONTAN and KADEN fields were bombèd and strafed during night alert 15 April. There was no damage to KADEN field but 4 VF's were damaged and 1 VF shot down by own AAA. On TONTAN field 2 night fighters and 10 Corsairs were damaged by our AAA ashore and 10 to 12 bombs dropped SE corner of field damaging 4 aircraft three WIA. At 0315 this morning enemy artillery shelled KADEN field resulting in 3 aircraft destroyed others damaged but repairable. Small arms ammunition dump was hit 1 KIA 3 WIA. 22nd FA emplaced on KIJI "SHIMA" was again the target of hostile artillery fire on 15 April, No damage sustained. Para. Naval gunfire support was provided 3rd PhibCorps by 1 OBB 2 DD 24th Corps was reinforced by the fires of 1 CL 2 DD of 51.19 firing from the east and 3 OBB 1 CA 3 DD of TF 54 from the west. 2 OBB 4 Cruisers 7 DD provided AWP support for IE SHIMA landing. 1 DD engaged in illumination and harassing fires along southwest coast to prevent suicide boat activity. 1 CA and 1 DD operating off Naha last night were credited with silencing battery that shelled KIJI "SHIMA" during the day good effect was secured on mechanized equipment troop concentrations gun emplacements and fuel dumps in the CTF 55 area. 3rd PhibCorps reports deep support missions fired by ships under CTF 53 were effective. CTF 51.19 reports that shins gunfire under his direction destroyed boat retransmits several blockhouses and pillboxes camouflaged buildings and motor vehicles. Suicide boats were active in areas 103 and 105 during the night. LCICM 659 reported destroying 1 boat 8 miles off shore in area 103 at 2340. At 0215 DDS 331 opened fire on suicide boat which dropped charge astern. DDS suffered steaming casualty. Continued search but boat escaped. At 0240 LCICM 659 contacted another suicide boat which retired at high speed. BARTON in station 105 took suicide boat under fire but failed to destroy. Minesweeping has been completed in NAGASUKU WANN insofar as possible with DDS Area G2 east of 129-11 and 2000 yards of northern end of HL swept on 15 April. Routine channel and transport area sweeps were made. CRESCENT CITY and PINKFISH have proved more convenient for evacuation from shore than hospital ships and are being retained here for this use for the time being. CRESCENT CITY off HAMAGUI beaches. SINNENY at KERAMA LSH 15 which breached in reef is now considered to be a total operational loss. Days attack evening 15 April 9 18 CHIFFIN in position 250 degrees 9 MILES FROM HULL reports enemy plane dropped bomb exploding 100 yards astern. No damage to ship. Ships devating today for ULLITHI area: 1 LCS (FP) 26 LCT's 2 PC and the following damaged 1 DD 1 DE 1 DM 3 AL's to SAIPAN: 6 APA 1 AP 7 AKRA 2 LST 2 DE A ABD. Para.
16 0800 CTF 51 SUMMARY NUMBER 31 - CONTINUED.

Here is another page for the book in which we pay tribute to gallant ships. This morning many enemy planes concentrated against the LAFAYE in radar station L-1. The enemy was attacked by all the VF we could get there and suffered heavy loss from the CAP but for 2 hours the LAFAYE was under continuous attack. She shot down 6 Vals, was struck by 2 bombs. Seven of the 4 suicide planes, and is now on the way to KERAMA RETTO at 25 knots speed. Para. Naval air arm carried out direct support to troops with planes of CVES of TQ 52.1 and fast carrier of TF 58. Diehl's were supporting the landing. HARRA RETURNED STUNTSOS OF JACINDAN 170 BABY rockets and Nagasaki. Search flights were made by PBM's from KERAMA and reported at 0500 that many enemy planes headed south were sighted in Lat 27-18 Long 129-05. At 0830 they reported sighting 2 Val XIV/JACINDAN 228-01 120-25. At 0930 small patrol vessel was sighted Lat 32-15 Long 128-10. Ship JAKANAD damaged. ASP JACINDAN flown by PBM's from KERAMA. TULAGI relieved 4 CTC in special ASH patrols in shipping lanes to southeast of OKINAWA. Hostile air attack occurred from 1600 to 2200 15 April with planes attacking from north in several raids. Planes destroyed in addition to those mentioned in previous summary: 4 Tony, 1 Zeke by CAP from TQ 09.2. At 0830 2 Val IV/JACINDAN SHoot down 1 Hamburger 2 Oscars 1 Zeke 1 Helen. This morning from 0742 to 1027 area was again under attack by estimated 100 planes which approached from north in 10 groups, 37 shot down by CAP, 15 by AA, 13 suicide hits. Ships hit by suicide; PRINCE (SUNK) LAFAYE HOBSON EYRIE ROCKETS HARDING LCS 116 LCT 407 LCS 51. More later when all reports are in. The following rescues were made: 1 Dumbo PBM landed at 1925 15 April near NAKES 58 miles bearing 070 from ZAMPA due to engine trouble. This plane had previously rescued 2 survivors from BENEDICTON 1 from BELLEAU WOODS during day. At 0600 plane took off returned safely to base. ROCKLAND rescued BUNKER HILL PBM pilot 28 miles bearing 030 from ZAMPA at 1016 PBM Dumbo is with TF 58 near KUSUSHI. Enemy planes reported on NAHA Field by TIC 360 were taken under fire by SHANNON at 1815 15 April. 1 Betty and 1 fighter wrecked. LCI 407 reported planes took off from plateau of NAHA BAHAR during night.

16 0834 CONFLICT TO CINC PAC ADV INFO CTF 51.

Your 130229. Made inspection ashore on 14th and discussed situation with responsible officers. YONAN Field is in fair shape for all weather operation and being improved rapidly. KADEN requires blanket of coral for wet weather operation and coral pits are 4 miles away. Construction personnel on fields was to have been increased yesterday. Commodore Bisell states NOYU for airfield No. 1 available SF of base development plan location. Also additional site for fighter field exist on NW corner KURUSHI. Some increase in numbers of planes operating from YONAN will probably be possible in near future. Major increase OKINAWA will not come until IX SHIMA fields are activated. Development ashore has been handicapped by rough seas slowing unloading and by rains making roads bad for moving cargo to storage dump. Improvement of roads throughout island will depend upon availability of suitable coral which is not found everywhere as in KARIANAS. Construction of new airfields will probably be slower than hitherto because rolling character of terrain and need to haul coral considerable distance. Unable to locate Painter while ashore.
SECRET  
APRIL (GCT)

16 0347 CONSTFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51, CTF 56.

Scale and effectiveness of enemy mass suicide air attacks and rate of ship loss and damage are such that we must use all available means to prevent further attacks. Recommend maximum and continued use of IWO and HARRAAN based planes, latter staging through IWO as necessary to prevent enemy’s use of KYUSHU fields. Also to hit assembly fields feeding attack units into KYUSHU. This recommendation means all types of bombers and long range fighters, Para. Local air situation will not improve greatly until we have rebuilt and activated fields on IWO SHIMA. All of our carriers have been carrying a heavy load and must continue to do so, then 24th Corps takes offensive on 19th demands on carrier air will probably increase. Retirement to LEYTE after tomorrow of TF 57 will further increase their load. Continued and heavier strikes by SoWesPac air on FORMOSA fields are also required. Para. We have a firm grip on a most valuable Japanese possession and must expect continuance of strongest enemy reaction until as a result of fighting ashore loss of OKINAWA can no longer be questioned. I wish to do everything possible to insure that preventable losses and damage to fleet units do not slow tempo of our future operations.

16 0945 CTF 51 TO TF 51 INFO ALL TFG & TCG STUFTL, CINCPAC BOTH III.

This dispatch is for the purpose of giving special honor to the ships who are and have been on radar picket duty. DD types DEs LCSs and LCCs are all on this distant guard whose work is doing so much to help our troops make this operation a success. We are very proud of the magnificent courage and effectiveness with which these vessels have discharged their difficult and hazardous tasks. Para. Pass this on to captains whose ships have been sunk in this service. Para. Lt. Gen. Buckner joins Admiral Turner in this tribute.

16 1245 CINCPAC ADV TO CONSTFLT INFO OKINAWA TACTICAL AIR FORCE, 10TH ARM. CTF 51 CONTEMPL. HARRAAN, CONTEMPTPAC, COMOFTPAC.

Unless otherwise advised CINCPAC will assume that Marine Air Groups established on shore in ROYKUS have all the replacement pilots and aircraft that can be advantageously employed with airfield facilities presently available.

16 1247 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO 9 HSOEPFAP CONSTFLT, CTF 51, CTF 56.

After TF 57 strikes northern FORMOSA on 17th request FIF to neutralize all of FORMOSA as effectively as practicable.

16 1410 CONTEMPL CTF 50, CTF 51 INFO CTF 56, 3, CTF 52, CTF 53, CTF 54, TUNGEOD (PEACO), CONTEMPTPAC, CINCPAC BOTH, COMOFTPAC, CONTEMPL, CTF 50, CTF 51, CTF 52, CTF 53, CTF 54, CTF 56, OKINAWA, 66 TAF, CASCU, 6CG SINTDIV, CTF 50, 90, 3, ComDEFCORPS.

10th Army closes USS-KALAMATH 181200 L-(9) and opens OKINAWA at target grid 8667 W same time.
Summary No. 32 as of 161800. The airfield on IE SHIMA has been captured. By 1730 our troops had secured most of the island west of grid 987. After initial landings the advance eastward was met by scattered light resistance. Machine gun fire and sniper fire was received from caves in TA 635224 which temporarily delayed advance but was quickly silenced. An enemy AA gun was later captured in this same area. Mines were encountered on entire GREEN T1 beach. A concentration of mines was discovered around the airfield. It is reported that the enemy has withdrawn for a final stand to pinacle in TA 6713 where numerous caves and defensive installations exist. Fire from this area this afternoon knocked out 3 of our tanks. Support aircraft made numerous strikes with bombs and rockets on this area together with concentrations by field artillery on IE SHIMA. Results of these strikes are unreported. Our casualties light. Nothing to report from 24th Corps front. Little activity has been reported by the 3rdPhilCorps, RCT 4 and RCT 29 were indicated to have attacked as scheduled this morning. RCT 22 moved to TA 6111 under 6th MarDiv control and attacked north on the line TA 0022P to 0122B. 1 En of the 29th Marines is attacking from the west against the center of resistance in TA 9923. Heavy resistance was reported by RCT 4 which is attacking eastward against this same strong point. Report as of 1730 shows the 4th Marines on the general line TA 9823-9925 9924-9824T 9823V 9922V 9720P. The 3rdPhilCorps is establishing an AFS fighter director station at the northern tip of OKINAWA. RCT. Naval activities for the day include gunfire support to landing on IE SHIMA by 2 OOB 2CA 2 CL and 7 DD. Call fires were furnished the 3rdPhilCorps by 1 OOB 2 DD and to 24th Corps by 1 OOB 2 CA 3 DD. In addition 2 OOB 1 CA 2 DD TG 8L19 furnished support from the eastern side. General support was given by 1 CL and 4 DD from 8L19. TALTGA was hit by suicide plane at 0645 this morning 6 miles S AFARE SAKT but proceeded in convoy. 3 WTA 1 MIX. MORRISON enroute RP 10 took fire from many single bogies enroute OKINAWA or returning FORMOSA. MORRISON also reports destruction of 2nd enemy mine position 26-13 N 126-23 E. MASSEY and FULLMAN exploded 1 floating mine each at 0650 today position 25-09 N 127-35 E. Also sighted German LCT 15 April position 25-03N 128-38 E. YANCEY sank horned mine on 13 April in position 25-03N 128-51 E. STRATEG at 1230 had possible sonar contact bearing 276 7.5 miles from BOLD. MAD hedgehog attack 1235. Negative results. Further details on action of morning 15 April. HOBSON in RP 14 hit by suicide plane about 0923. Returned to transport area under own power about 1830 maneuvering with difficulty. J W DITTER escorted HOBSON. HOBSON has 1 SD survivors from PRINCE. PRINCE was sunk after hit by suicide plane about 0943. Captain 8 officers 77 men aboard LCS 3 hit BRYANT in RP 2 at 0923 while proceeding to aid LAFAYETE. HORSE EX participated. HORSE EX was hit by suicide plane in high speed with casualties. FJUR(R) 851 sent to aid BRYANT. BOWERS at 0935 was hit by suicide plane while in station D42 bearing 390 20 miles from BOLD. Was able to proceed transport area. SNEAKER after assisting BOWERS extinguished fire took 95 wounded from BOWERS assisted by CONVOY his transferring them to HOBES about 1400. SHANNOC continued further search of area for survivors with negative results. LCT 407 reported hit by suicide plane at 1502 in station 13N entrance NAKAGUSUKU WAB. 4 feet holes above waterline. Forward 10mm gun out. No casualties. Remained on station. LCS 31 in RP 1 hit by suicide plane about 0945. Suffered engine casualty and ceased back. HOLE in port side above waterline proceeded to transport area. Has some casualties aboard LAFAYETE. LCS 116 in RP 1 hit by suicide plane and badly damaged. LCS 32 took her in tow. Later assistance was required and LSN sent to aid...
1515. Proceeded to transport area. HARDING hit by suicide plane about 1030 while enroute station WP 14. Plane hit near No 1 stack. Much damage forward with magazines flooded. Bulkheads shored. Reported at 1307 she was able to make 5 knots. BUTLER standing by and TEXAS sent to aid. HARDING arrived KERAMA REEFS 1630. SHEA in position 220 19 miles from BOLC was under attack by many planes at 0950. Within 10 minutes she shot down 5 planes with 1 additional jointly with HARDING. Reports she did not see any planes getting away. Para. Air support for the day was furnished by planes from TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 56 and shore based air of TG 99.2. Reports of strike on ISHIGAKI on 15 April by TG 52.1 now show 3 hostile planes shot down and airfields strafed bomed and rocketed. Search flights made by FBM's from KERAMA base and at 1130 1 of our FBM's in 33 40 N 128 07 E shot down 1 Jake, Routine ASF was flown by FBM's. Ships which shot down planes in air attack this morning and not yet reported: TEXAS 1 Jake at 0946, SHEA 1 Kate 4 Oscars 1 Kate at 0905. CHIC and HARDING jointly 1 Kate, LAPPY 6 plus 4 suicides, LCS 51 4 Vals 1 Zeke, HALL 1 Zeke, BEAM 2 Vals and 1 suicide miss. This raises total enemy planes shot down by ships to 36. Suicide hits to 12, Grand total 67. Our plane losses consisted of 1 JZ SC 1 canceled while being recovered and sunk. Rescue was made by MCCLURGAN of 1 BUNKER HILL F4U pilots who was shot down by friendly 16 during morning attack. MAGUMB rescued 1 TO 99.2 pilot and an unknown LG5 rescued 1 during the morning. DUNAL FBM rescued pilot from TF 56 from north of KAGI SHIMA BAY, in south KYUSHU. On way back this plane rescued 3 survivors of a B 2515 miles south of KIKAI SHIMA. Aerial observation of TAKABAI SHIMA during afternoon failed to reveal an airfield or any military activity in spite of earlier surface report of planes taking off from there. There were no air raids in this area this afternoon. Para. Weather has been clear. Temperature average 75 degrees. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Wind northerly 7 knots. Smooth sea. No swell or surf. End of summary.

16 1250 CNO/TH/SPAC to CNO/PAC ADV INFO CNO/PAC.PEARL.CONSECR/PAC.COMUSSPAC ADCOM/TH/SPAC.COMO/TH/SPAC.COMO/TH/SPAC.CNO/PAC.COMUSPAC.CNO/PAC.CNO/PAC R-86958

Radar pickets and fighter director ships plus large CAP have so far prevented serious losses in large ships and troops OKINAWA Area. Losses in destroyer types have been heavy since they have taken the full weight of suicide air attacks. Additional radar pickets will be needed for Phase 3 and future operations. Recommend highest priority action to provide (A) 20 special fighter director ships using AM LBS or LG5 hulls mounting air and surface search radars with good GIC and powerful communications and maximum 50mm director controlled AA plus 20mm AA. (B) These plans for future landings include placing well trained efficient combat loaded search radar and fighter director teams and equipment with AA batteries and protective troops on outlying islands before or immediately after main assault in order reduce number and exposure of picket ships.

16 2448 CNO/AFS/H/TA to CNO/SPAC. CNO/PAC. CPO/SPAC. TG 73. WOC BLAX COMMAND INFO CNO/PAC.CNO/PAC

AX 73415, Many recent reports have reached this Red of continued attacks by U.S. aircraft on friendly lifeguard subs. Some planes have made hostile passes and offensive approaches, leaving submarines no alternative but to evade or fire on approaching plane. These instances indicate careless handling improper identification and inattention to recognition procedures. Direct that positive action be taken in all echelons of command to impress pilots with the seriousness of this problem and to prevent the possibility that future instances might occur involving aircraft within your commands. 2883
162251 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC/WPOA, COMMANDER, I6CCN, P.O. COAIR MAC, COMAIR MAC, CINCPAC...

The following repositioning of air forces will take place effective 212400 II-9. (A) In view of increased offensive and decreased defensive requirements at I6CCN Brlg, Gen. Moore with 7th Fighter Command Headquarters and 21st 15th and 506th Fighter Groups pass to operational control of CTF 93 but will report to IsCom IWO for additional duty as ComAir IWO and for defensive employment. (B) Units of Firing 1 engaged in search operations from the HAWAIAN CAROLINES and IWO pass to the operational control of CTF 94. (C) VMF 612 and VMFB 242 remain under CTF 94.

160755 CINCPOA to BRITISH LIAISON OFF VIA CINCPAC ADV INFO COMNCS:

Your 140633 such an operation would have to be carried out by British Pacific Fleet submarines operating under CTF 71 from Pacific base since approach from westward is not feasible and SACSEA will have no suitable submarines for towing. Para 2. Present targets are not considered to be sufficiently worth while as targets in naval base area are inaccessible.

162355 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC/WPOA, COMMANDER, I6CCN, P.O. COAIR MAC, COMAIR MAC, CINCPAC...

RJ 59883. Pursuant to the directive contained in Cinopac Adv Hq dis 160252 April 1945, I, with the Army forces and resources under my command, report CINCPAC for purposes of Army administration pursuant to your desires I will report to you at MANILA in person or about 20 April 1945 your date.

170104 CINCPAC/WPOA TO COAIRNORTHAMPTON, INFO CINCPAC ADV, COMMANDER, CTF 51, COMAIR MAC, COMMANDER, I6CCN, P.O. COAIR MAC, COMAIR MAC, CINCPAC...

Rflr 130513, 160610. Ferry flights to you as follows. 19 April 5 P40s, 6 P40s, 19 April 1 P40-10, 2 P40-10, 2 P61-5 and 2 P40-10. Propose to maintain squadrons at authorized complement plus pool of 10 Corsairs in area for immediate replacements. Request you advise additional aircraft required on this basis.

170520 CTF 51 to CTF 54, INFO TF 51, CTO 51, CTO 51...

Possibility of enemy TF of unknown composition arriving OKINAWA area during night of 17-18 April. See CinfSubPac 162222, CTF 54 in TENNESSEE with WEST MEXICO, WEST VIRGINIA, SALT LAKE CITY, SAN FRANCISCO, BIRMINGHAM, ST LOUIS, HALL, HUTCHINS, EDDY, LONGSHAW, PORTERFIELD, BARTON, EDWARDS, P HAMILTON, LAWS, PRESTON, ROOKS deploy to north-northwest so as to be in position to accomplish primary task and at same time to accomplish the secondary task of protecting radar pickets. Radar pickets under surface attack should join you.

170529 CINCPAC ADV TO CONSERVATPAC INFO CINCPAC & CTO, CINCPAC/WPOA, PEARL HARBOR, COMAIR MAC...

Facilities and components except ABSD offered in ComPac fit 130930 recommended for diversion to HOKUS and MARIANAS. Further action on ABSD will be taken by separate communication. ConServePac initiate study immediately to determine which diverted facilities should be installed in OKINAWA or MARIANAS or other areas and arrange shipment.
17 0532 CINCPOA ADV TO COMUNCH. CINC INFO CINCSEPA, CINCPOA PEARL, CINCPAC, COMCINCPAC.

Your O72006. Concur in diversion fleet support facilities from SWAR area to RTUKUS and MARIANAS as offered in COMCHUT 130530, units which cannot be advantageously employed in RTUKUS can be so employed in MARIANAS. Detailed studies being initiated to determine optimum allocations.

17 0725 DEPOCAF 20 TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COMCHUT 130530, CTP 53, CTP 58, 21 BOMCOM.

Beginning 18 April 21 BomCom will attack KYUSHU airfields with approximately 100 B-29s daily weather permitting. Attacks will continue as long as Cincposc considers present emergency to exist.

17 1251 DEPOCAF 20 TO CINCPOA ADV INFO BOMCOM.

Your 150036. Weather permitting 21 BomCom will provide daily photo coverage until released by Cincposc or Cincposc states that emergency no longer exists.

17 1505 MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA ADV. GC 8TH ARMY INFO OOPS XH COMGPOAC, CINCPOA, COMPOAC, GC USASOS, GC 8TH ARMY, GC USAFFE.

CX 11240. Your 160251, releasing the 81 Div now MAOSEA to CINCAFAC for duty is concurred in. Destination desired is LETTE. Upon arrival at LETTE 81 Div is assigned to 8th Army. The GC 8th Army will provide for embarkation and quartering, arranging necessary details with GC USASOS. GC 8th Army is authorized direct communication with the GC 8 Div. Request Cincposc issue necessary instructions to direct unit report 8th Army upon arrival LETTE and to send forward by air to LETTE at the earliest practicable date an advanced detachment to report to the GC 8th Army, consisting of GC 8 Div or 2nd in command, G3, G4, and Div engineer or their representatives, and representatives of Inf Regiments and artillery Bns and divisional troops. Further request that this headquarters be advised concerning landing arrangements and ETA LETTE of various elements of the Division. Desire that troops be accompanied by 60 days of supply classes 1, 2, 3 (oil only) and 4, and 5 units of fire.

16 0310 CTP 51 TO COMUNCH. PASSED BY STAFF TO CINCPOA ADV FOR INFO.

Damage to ships heavy today though number of enemy aircraft committed seems much smaller than on 12th. Consider this due to 2 causes. (a) Attacks today were better massed and coordinated. (b) Decrease of TF 28 reduced depth of fighter cover. Para. Recommend largest possible number shore based long range filters be assigned to filter sweeps KYUSHU and KYUSHU at frequent intervals using not only planes based at NO but also staged thru NO in order provide mass effect.

17 1247 CINCPOA ADV TO COMUNCH. CINCPOA ADV WITH GC 8TH ARMY INFO OOPS XH COMGPOAC, CINCPOA, COMPOAC, GC USASOS, GC 8TH ARMY, GC USAFFE.

In view of heavy losses which have been experienced in escort types during current operation action agree take the following action. Cincposc, CINCPAC, ComServPac, ComSeaborn XH, ComSeaborn CMA engine repair on BB, BB, BB, BMS, APD all possible without radical disruption of other work schedules. CINCPAC and ComServPac overtail training period these types all possible and report their readiness to Cincposc for essential assignment. Cincposc detach 2 Div of OTC 57 and route to PEARL for award raising to the western Pacific. CTP 56 detach OTC 56 and direct them report to CTP 94. CTP 56, detach OTC 12 and direct them report to CTP 51 for duty 9th Fleet. 2885
SECREn
APRIL (GCT)

17 1512 CONTIN & CHO to CINCPOA ADV.

Desire that execution subparagraph F UrDis 160250 not operate to reduce the availability of Marine and Naval combat units for offensive employment.

18 0250 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC INFO OTTO COMDS ACROSS PACIFIC 22 FEB 52. WITH ATTN.

ComGen 5th AP 172120. Request by return dispatch information concerning unauthorized visit of General Smith of 5th Fighter Command to KIA by 140826 authorized visit of only "Air Engineer" to survey airbase possibilities.

180645 CTF 51 to CINCPOA INFO CINCPOA BOUTH ALL SHIPS INFO POC.

Summary No. 35 as of 181200. Roundup of information concerning enemy's ground force activity coming in during the night indicates that enemy activity along 26th Corps front was negligible as Corps entered its final preparations for attack 19 April. Artillery naval gunfire and aircraft continued to soften up enemy positions with reported excellent results. 7th Div was subjected to some hostile artillery fire forward areas. Active patrolling throughout the day with no enemy contact reported by patrols operating to immediate front of 26th Corps. On Div lost patrols of 12 supported by light tanks reached points on ridge in 817600 1200 yards east of Hill 178. Enemy mortar and machine gun fire received at tank fired on caves along ridge. Enemy activity in 14th ZA was negligible and no patrols to Div front reported unusual enemy activity. Reconnaissance by patrols for 7th Div throughout the day with no enemy contact reported 100% unloading. 95th Div units completed movement into position for continuation of attack. Enemy activity in Div 2A was negligible with very little mortar and artillery fire received. Air and naval gunfire observers directed fire on enemy positions and replacements to front of 1277151, throughout the day with good results. Fortified enemy 371 at 107251 blasted by IGF resulting in considerable damage. 373 383 patrols operated in 13th Corps service area investigated over 500 caves during period. 27th Div civilians picked up in this area and turned over to 10th Div for counterbattery and normal harassing missions were continued throughout the period. Destruction of 6 150mm guns located at 1775600 was completed. Enemy trench locations caves hillboxes and gun positions were taken under fire by naval units during the day with unreported results. 3 air strikes were made on SH 1 CASTLE with estimated 50% destruction. Hillboxes on ridge at 177672 were hit with extensive damage reported. A pipeline believed to furnish water to 1277151 was cut by 27th Div engineers. For a plan for the day calls for all units to make final preparations for coordinated attack tomorrow. Elements of 27th Div to secure by 1800 Hill 178 to 26th Corps overlooking town of MACHINATU and seize corner of KIWA at TA 177730. 95th Div is to consolidate positions along Div boundaries and move 1 on 383rd NCT to assembly area at 87478 in Div reserve. The 3rd InfDiv zone 6th MarDiv continued operations to eliminate enemy on TUTU PENINSULA with effort being made to prevent enemy organization on high ground to 12. Attack being made by 4th and 29th Marines. The 1st BN 22nd Marines is making up the rear. 22nd Marines less 1 BN continues patrolling K IWA and has established a defensive line facing south from 375000 364000 to 375000 to prevent interference with radar and fighter director station being established on northern tip of peninsula. The 1st MarDiv continued patrolling assigned areas and is to send a reconnaissance group to patrol islands guarding approach to CHINU WAN. 77th Div on 13 SH 2 reports that during - Continued -
the night 17-18 April small groups of enemy supported by mortar fire and small arms attempted infiltration 366 Inf sector, 6 enemy officers and 13 enlisted were killed in this action. The division reports advances have been steady with substantial gains made against determined enemy resistance from high ground vicinity TA 9733 with some machine gun and small arms fire coming from IS TOWN and mutually supporting pillboxes with automatic weapons encountered in TA 97330. Soon report indicates the 306th Inf on the north to have extended its lines to: TA 8356, 3830, 7, 34. No report on RCT 305 on the south. Enemy casualties reported total 338 and 1 PSW with our own casualties of 15 KIA 73 WIA 5 MIA. 4 of our tanks were destroyed by mines. Coastal patrols around the islands in the ROK-AF retto group killed 5 enemy and destroyed another derringer cause north shore ZAMPAS HISAKI. Planes of MAG 91 and 123 flew 24 planes CO at dawn and dusk, and provided 2 planes CAP over each of the 5 landing boats from dawn to dusk yesterday. 4 ground support missions of 31 Corsairs struck enemy troops and ground installations in 3rdPhibCorps area with results reported excellent. GF 10th Army opened ashore in TA 90877 as of 144000. Also, naval elements conducted harassing and night illumination in the zone of 366th Corps using 2 ORB 1 CA 5 DD firing from the 3 and 4 at 1400. 1 CA 1 DD operating from the 344th firing missions were conducted in this area. Support to the 3rdPhibCorps and 77th Div was allocated to 1 CO 1 CA 8 DD. 3119 reports that LEXINGTON CT 1400 IS. TUSCALOOSA and JUSTIN engaged in illumination against suicide boats N sector. and bombarded NAHA and ITOMAI airfields. Com ISCG 67 with 9 57s 6 LS to 6 LSs anchored for unloading in ISCHI WAI. IS 1 DAA buoys 4 shoal spots and is reproducing anchorage charts of CINC. S. BARRACK also engaged in planking buoys. Miningweeping has been effected in area 92 E of Long 128-11 and Area 14 A of target area 49. Routine channel and transport area sweeps were made. In 1 YORKSIER AV has been cleared to 2500 yards of land to 5%. This will permit fire support ships to move in closer and to place endeavor fire up valleys as well as direct fire to head of NAH. POE(R) 351 to ore out stanchions supporting number 2 gun tab while getting away from alongside LAFAYETTE 10 April. Z21 will run around 1A SHD 14 April will require drydocking to repair propellers due shaft alignment. ISH 193 grounded in ISCHI WAI 17th. Has 6 foot rig on center line frames 21-22. Requires docking. BANDON overhauled last night with TF 54 to the N at 2028 reported hostiles plane flying low over formation. Shortly after described felt violent underwater explosion. BANDON 5,000 yards away reported explosion astern of her at 2031. No damage to any ship of TF 54. HARVEY now reports casualties as 14 KIA 10 WIA 3 MIA. 1 naval air air furnished direct support to troops by fast carriers of TF 58 and CVAs of TG 52.1. Other attacks missions included fighter sweep of ISCHI SHD 1 at 1000. Results not reported. Routine search flights and 22 were flown by FBM's from KERAMA BASE. Enemy air activity occurred from 0000 to 2200 night 17th. A few hecklers approached from west and southwest. No report of damage to our forces. 1 Sally shot down by night fighter. Our plane losses consist of 1 F6F9 of TG 99.2 who shot down hostile plane close over water off shore from NAHA at 2145 hitting his propeller on water making this attack forcing a crash landing. Pilot rescued 0125 by LC 754 on anti bomb patrol. Rescue was made by FBM Dumbo at 0815 of NACUS ISLAND fighter plane who was shot down by AA 1 mile off shore ISCHI DATTI. Dumbo was under fire while making rescue. These Dumbo planes are doing a magnificent piece of work in support of our attack planes. Planes of TG 52.1 made air delivery of supplies to 3rdPhibCorps on ISCHI PENINSULA. Lt 5-29 to land at ISCHI WAI case in on 2 engines 0730. This plane had been sent out to strike POE(R).
Intend initiating program of rotation your task force in accordance to ULTRA for 10 day rest and replenishment periods with 11 group starting as early as practicable possibly after last support in station so relieved will be accomplished on station in operating area. We must our recommendations as to (1) Whether TF 92 should be relieved during 10 day in 3 TGs or 4. (2) Schedule of rotation to ULTRA.

Upon reporting to this command for operational control effective 1000 040127 and 050624 not all squadrons operational. 4th: 7th fighter command 15th and 11th fighter groups all based on St. M4 and with 206th fighter group also based. TF TLH reports TF 94 the pilots Ernest Moore continues as TG. Mission is the escort of offensive fighter operations as directed by TF 93 exclusive of operations directed by TF 94. TF 93 will conserve aircraft for this mission and will employ for air defense only the number which in my opinion fills minimum requirements for adequate protection.

Summary No 36 as of 181300. CG 10th Army established headquarters here. 10th Army set all out attack southern GSPs on 19 Apr 1. 21st Corps line for attack from west to east is as follows: 7th Div 105th Inf 105th Inf assault 96th Div 31st Inf 23rd Inf assaults 184th Inf and 32nd Inf assault. The 307th NCT of the 77th Div under TF 91.23 Raider Blandy is to conduct the diversionary feint landing Chich Oshawa in support of the attack. The 3rd Division continues its operations in NOVO ORIO LA CONDE and northern GSPs with full force. 77th Div is making progress against determined enemy on line defending from hillboxes and dug in positions. The plan of the 77th Div is to completely isolate LORO JABO the main enemy defense. Information reports locate troops along the line running generally 992 1000 7 32 20 832 832. Regret troop casualties not available tonight. Furthermore, Naval support was furnished 3rd Corps by 1 CL 2 DD 24th Corps from west. An cavalry support was furnished 3rd Corps by 1 CA 2 CA 1 CL 2 DD. On eastern side of GSPs by 1 CA 1 CL 1 DD 32. Ammunition replenishment was completed in preparation for tomorrow's attack. 3 CB 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD replenished at Eniwetok Jap 101 and 125 in RP 14 each report 1 horned mine destroyed. Attacked on 210 planes on 2 Heinkels believed to be low flying Betty's. No hits. 21 500 now report casualties as 24 KIA 56 WIA including Captain and executive officer. 10 KIA. Naval casualties to date reported by 96 ships 1522 1350 1350 584 584. Total 25.25 K. Para. Direct air support of troops continued throughout the period by CVEs of TG 521 fast carriers of TC 400 shore based air of TG 99.2. TG 521 made attack on KIA JAP 1500 with results unreported. Search flights and A-6 were flown by TF from GSPs. TULAGI special ASV group was ordered to conduct a counter air mission in sub contact in the area of 26-29 Long 130-43 developed by TG 51.4. Attacker destroyed prior to arrival this group probably sank two. Two flights of 6 F4Us replacement planes for TG 99.2 arrived by air from Eniwetok via TF 6-29 which made emergency landing at YOONI. This evening departed 1600 for Eniwetok. There were no air attacks on this area this afternoon. This evening commencing 1840 enemy planes approached from west in 3 raids. 2 twin - Continued -
181156 CTF 51 SUPPLY NO 36 - CONTINUED.

Engine planes shot down by P6F and fighter planes near 70 miles due west of CAMPA, 1 at 1235, 1 at 1244, 1 at 1224. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cloudy. Visibility 8 miles. Temperature aver 7° degrees. Wind SE 14 to 22 knots smooth sea, no swell.

181824 CINCAS ADV TO CINCASPA.

NOTICE TO MACARTHUR. I add my own appreciation to the following message from Spruance "Appreciate strong action being taken in TF 51 to keep FORMOSA enemy air neutralized. Continuation of our flank security and our carrier forces available for troop support are as for stopping attacks from Japan."

182039 CTF 53 TO CONSFITLT INFO CTF 51. CTF 51 to CTF 53. IFC 51.

Your 180647. Do not desire to rotate "TF. Reduction of force in operating area will cause concentration of enemy on remaining TF and consequent probability of increased losses. Also reduction reduces number of available fighters. Prefer to retain entire TF in operating area until shore based air is ready to take over where we are relieved of direct support missions. (a) Sufficient carriers and destroyers are available for only 3 TGs. (b) TG 58.1 plus about 4 carriers and destroyers, 2-3 planes, 2-3 TGS, and 1."...

190025 CEBRONộc to CEBRON Orc1. CEBRON Orc1 to G1F 93.4. CINCAS ADV H. OC DET A 3 23 96 W.J.

STNKF-19. Subject daily bombing. For your information, it is believed that KYUSHU will be initiated and continued, weather permitting, until further notice. You will be advised each day of proposed schedule for following day including targets, force, bomb load, and assembly areas.

190245 CONSFITLT TO CTF 51 INFO CTF 51. ALL TCG OF TP 59.2. 2 TCG ADV.

Your 180239. Rotation will not be placed in effect until present situation has improved. Activation of USNAA fields will probably require about 2 weeks. This will be 1st possibility of any large increase in local TF. Success of 24th Corps attack also affects situation.

190625 CTF 51 TO CONSFITLT INFO CINCAS BOTH. ALL TCG 1 TGC AVAILABLE.

Summary 37 as of 191300. Surface units supported both day and night during the night 13-19 April with harrassing and night illumination fires by 1 L. 2 DD in support of 3rd Flieging and operations in J, 

180517 CINCAS ADV TO CINCASPA.

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SE coast OKINAWA. Results of this morning's unloading activities north off TAC 727. Details coming in on MINES sunk 16 April reveal she was attacked by 10 to 15 planes. At 0920 she was hit a number of times, including a suicide bomb, she broke in two and sank in 6 minutes. Data, however, and TA 9529 night of 17th previously reported both a bomb and a torpedo exploding at end of run.subset continued. We continued to receive quotable up north at north channel entrance KIJUAI, but continued with unloading on south not continuing. "Asmiev2" 11 April continued without serious damage and unloading for South Korean troops ceased on 10th. A usual small load arrived today. TF 3 continued to unloading vessels departed today for USTU: 20 04 9, 20 04 10, 20 04 11, 20 04 13. DD 1 2-13. "Palm" naval air operations continued of direct support of troops by CVS of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TG 52.1. On 17th over 300 airplanes from fast carriers were engaged in several air strikes. Reports coming in this morning indicate loss of 12 planes killed and L-5s, have been hit by B-29s. Many buildings and other structures in area. Town of TSUSHIMA thoroughly covered with smoke and burned. Town of SAKAMI heavily hit by B-29s and burning. Planes laid smoke screen to cover troops in amphibious assault. Other attack carried out by TF 52.1. Results of previous strike 11 April indicate 11 targets. JAPAN air search flights and B-29s from TF 3 continued to maintain coverage of shipping lanes to the 4000. JAPAN exercises ended at 1015. During evening April 18 several hecklers of JAPAN transported to damage to our units. 2 B-29s destroyed as previously reported. All but one of our plane losses consist of L-5s. One of the 12 injured personnel is 0110. No casualties. Dubro picked up 1 TUG 12 April at 1500. Photo mission at 1500. B-29s dropped 4 bombs on southern OKINAWA. B-29 which was reported taking off at 0900 18 April still at YONAM Field. End of Summary.

Your 190625 concur but request that southern JAPAN fields be attacked as soon as weather permits.
191033 CINCPAC SIA TO CINCPAC SIA CINCPAC SIA 01 SEP 44

A 7569 H Intensity attacks on KOWA airfields for radical neutralisation. Every possible source of suicide attack on fleet at KOWA must be attacked.

191132 G3 10TH AEC TO CINCPAC SIA CINCPAC SIA 01 SEP 44

Operations summary 55. Situation as of 191200 13th Apr at 0100 hrs during last night in the 3rd/11/50 area, northern front remained quiet. Some attacks to infiltrate and probe in 0800. 10th Army were quiet.

10th Army

By 10th Army last night, the 7th and 9th Divs were prepared for a large-scale assault on the fortified enemy position covering the 10th Army zone of advance to the south. Vicious counterattacks attempted an advance and enemy position, strong lines and concentration of artillery, and a considerable number of tanks were knocked out on 1075. 10th Army tanks concentrated to 974 and 1804. Enemy counterattack was reported to have been repelled.

7th Div jumped off at 0600 against Hill 1804. 9th Div jumped off at 0600 against Hill 1075. The 9th Div was subjected to a concentrated enemy counterattack with 200 planes to support a 9000-man counterattack against the enemy left flank at 0900. The 7th Div, was subjected to a severe artillery barrage with 300 rounds of caliber 155 mm. 120 Inf was subjected to a severe artillery barrage with 300 rounds of caliber 105 mm. Casualties incurred by the 7th Div were landing against the enemy left flank.

121000. Over 300 rounds of caliber 155 mm. were received in the regimental area. Casualties incurred by the 7th Div were landing against the enemy left flank.

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Summary of the day's operations.

Naval gunfire support was provided by ships listed in the report except for 3 ships. Gunfire and air support of the attack on 24th Corps today was rendered the largest ever given in similar periods to ambuscaded troops by the enemy.

All fire missions were coordinated with air and artillery to achieve maximum effect. Divergence of fire at landing was completed with no fire censorship.

Some minor fire was received from beach mortars, ships were damaged, although expenditures were large or ships were relatively less; in combination there remains sufficient for normal fire requests. Report coming in today's bombardment was 1224 and destroyed 3 5-inch guns, 21 hits, 347 steamer off Jima and destroyed 3 5-inch guns. T SUR, lights, etc.

Several explosions destroyed AT-201 neutralized 3 on battery. GOC I JAC 5 scored direct hit on command post, and placed direct hit on position. MODEL while engaged in firing mission in area A, 2343 LT explosion of center gun of 6-inch turret No. 8. Enemy investigation indicates explosion occurred while shelling. To render inoperable, 4 KIA 2 WIA. LST 929 while proceeding to harbor, transport area at 0331 struck LST 267 at anchor. LST 929 port had been nearly disabled between frames 27 and 29. Side saved in above waterline.

13th destroyed horned mine in position 24 12 19 16 32. North of a 16 18 22 19 and 21 12 19 18 19 20, 2 tugs and 2 LST have been sent to assist unloading, 100 damage sustained from forward superstructure to transfer and oil transferred from forward to aft tanks. GUNNERY at station A22 was attacked by a near explosion at 14 19 20. Splashed 1 which crashed 500 feet from port bow, 2 bombs were in plane. 2nd plane made bomb run 2 minutes later, 2 bombs 200 feet astern, slight damage, no casualties.

A attack carrier was attacked by low-flying plane at 1911 LT. Heavy fire drove off hostile plane. GUNNERY 20000. Air support of troops continues to be furnished by fast carriers. 530 and GUN 121 until 1500 when missions were cancelled due to bad weather. TU 521 LT made on attack on 24th Corps.

No reports of results received as yet. Routine searched 2 landings were 

1.000 by TUGS. 99,2 received 1 FALs and 1 P-51L, 2 machines and landing from GUAM via HBG escorted by RN and BS 1730. 1 Brnke was on station with TU 521 LT off EAU TAUSHT. Search for missing plane was negative. At 1330 air observer of TG 51.21 located a Marine command in a small native craft north of KOKUMERTUK and directed survivor vessel to rescue. There were no enemy air attacks this afternoon. Weather cloudy, visibility 10 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. Airmes 16.00 to 

20 0103 CONTJTH PT reports to CINCPAC for purposes of naval administration in accordance with CINCPAC 191230.
20 2252 CINCPAC ADV to COMTHFLT info CINCSWPA, COMINCH

Desire conference with you at Ooam at a time when minimum interference with your duties in SWPA will be involved and which is agreeable to you and to CINCSWPA. Your 200103.

20 2255 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH

My remarks and recommendations on JCS 1275 required by secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff memo of 26 March forwarded by CominCh secret serial 00786 of 30 March are as follows. A. The documents attached should be prepared for the signature of the officer receiving the surrender using the military title assigned to him by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. B. The documents should provide for the Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas taking control immediately of all forces personnel equipment and installations of the Japanese Navy.

21 0214 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info CINCSWPA, COMCSFPA, CINCPOA PEARL HG

Warn 70172. The continued functioning of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas under the operational control of Cincpoa is essential. Request the War Department be informed that I desire to retain my Joint Staff complete in all respects and that JICPOA is an activity essential to the effective functioning of my headquarters if reductions in my requirements occur I will release individuals who are no longer required.

21 0740 CINCPAC ADV to CINCSWPA info COMSUBPAC, COMTHFLT, CTF 71, CINCPAC PEARL HG

Your CX 14454 timed 201400. Concur.

19 1257 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV info COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HG

In view recommendation CTF 58 contained in para 47 of his ser 0045 13 March and Ur 310526 March reorganization Cardiv 7 is indicated. This refers ComAirPac ser 00632 of 27 March and Ur 1st and ser 009031 of 7 April. The need for 1 CV(N) with the Fast Carrier Task Force has been recognised by you and it will take at least 2 CV(N) to support 1 in the combat area. Assuming Enterprise to be one of those, make recommendation 1 additional CV to be assigned Cardiv 7 and insure necessary state of night readiness in that Carrier. It is recognized that circumstances may require temporary employment of either 1 or both as day Carrier. Present program of 6 CVG(N) will not be reduced at this time in view development in fighter direction and electronic field. The program can be cut back with MOD facility that it can be reinitiated. Make recommendation for standardised CVG(N) compliant and for reassignment INDEPENDENCE and BATAAN to day divisions.
CINCPAC TO CINCSEA ADV INFO CINCSEA BAG 18 02 30 1942 JAPAN

Consistent with saving lives desire such action as is practicable to prevent use of Yontan and Kadena airfields by B-29 aircraft. This action necessary because of critical tactical situation at IWOJIMA.

21 0445 COMGEN 77TH DIV (BRUCE) TO CINCPAC ADV INS UTD ARMY INFO

The 77th infantry division after a bitter pill box to pill box, house to house, cave to cave fight planted our American Flag on the highest point of the strongly defended mountain pinnacle on IWOJIMA. Men from Texas planted a Texas Flag on bloody ridge at the base of the pinnacle fortress in honor of those gallant Texans who gathered together at Corregidor to remember San Jacinto Day on 21 April 1942

14 12 55 ADV JI KING TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCSEA BAG 18 02 30 1942 JAPAN

Your recommendation that compliment of VC squadrons in each SB division can be increased from 16 VP and 12 VTB to 20 VP and 20 VTB is also received. Cannot at this time foresee availability of shares and doubt any reduction in the number of combat CVEs or reduction in the ratio of VC squadrons per ship. Which is not desired. Action GRAF Vertical take wing. Your recommendation that present design VC squadrons be reclassified as VC squadrons and that 1 VC squadron per division be trained in the observation and spotting of gunfire for shore bombardment is approved. Take recommendation as to complement these VC squadrons.

18 21 54 CINCPAC TO CINCSEA ADV INFO CINCSEA BAG 18 02 30 1942 JAPAN

P-51 replacements CONCAPAFO 14 03 47 can be lifted only by elimination of lift of Navy aircraft. Previously scheduled lifts Navy planes and Army aircraft exceed capacity of TransitionPac ships. Implications of this request are that required aircraft lift for Army will in future be or imposed in increasing numbers on already inadequate lift in available to meet my basic commitments. Provided aircraft are ready 1 day can utilize available space on combatant carriers proceeding forward as it becomes available after that date. Subject to above remarks 57 can be diverted to requested Army lift if you so direct. In concerned over indicated lack of other plans to move Army aircraft and increasing demands on transport CVEs in excess of availability.

19 02 23 CINCPAC ADV TO DEFCOMOAF ADV INFO CINCSEA 18 02 30 1942 JAPAN

Consistent with saving lives desire such action as is practicable to prevent use of Yontan and Kadena airfields by B-29 aircraft. This action necessary because of critical tactical situation at IWOJIMA.

21 21 10 CINCPAC TO CINCSEA ADV INFO CINCSEA BAG 18 02 30 1942 JAPAN

Cominch 19 12 27. UDTO 20 00 1 15. Recommend: (A) Embark CTF(H) 91 in RICHARD About 1 June at which time return ENTERPRISE for yard availability and CTF (H) 90 for rehabilitation and refueling. (B) Complete yard availability ENTERPRISE late August retain her Hawaiian area in ready standing status with CTF(H) 52. ENTERPRISE assist in Hawaiian night training program unless or until needed in combat. (C) Utilizing pilots and aircraft CTF(H) 53 form CTF(H) 70 and 71 in continental US now with compliment 12 VP(N) and 12 VT(N) for embarkation in SADOR and SANGALION about 1 September. Restart

-Continued-

23 1221 CINC PAC VIA SLEET TO CINC PAC, CINC PAC AND CINC PAC
CONTRAPAC

By 162251 and 202250, it is expected that Conair is to be directed to
initiative or as directed by Constitution and authorized by Con
squadrons or squadrons needed for operations in the area which require
normal or high priority over those of other aircraft. Action is to be
with the exception of those which extend north of the 49th.

23 1240 CINC VA VIA SLEET TO CINC VA, CINC VA AND CINC VA
NAVAL
BASE CANADA, CINC VA, AND CINC VA
ARCTIC.

Y 12230, correct subpara D to read "The Naval Air Arm contains the
required for No. 3 field. It will be adequate for at least four medium
squadrons, 2 medium land-based search squadrons, 1 fighter
airport. The 2 MFB squadrons now scheduled for US Navy aircraft to
be attached to Marine Fighter Group (5) dedicated by 32D except for
air 30 (CGT 994)."

24 0505 CINC SFA TO CINC AVG AND CINC AV.

CINC 14703, Kinkaid will arrive in the area as soon as practicable. At
the discretion of CINC, he may either send 1 TG as now constituted or one
upgraded to the addition of ships of each type available from 3 TFS
squadrons. If this is not desirable, he will send from 1/4 to 1/3 of the total
of each type available to you. Full details requests for support aircraft
from the 3 TFS to maintain 12 to 15 to be deemed necessary to meet the
aircraft needs. In case of emergency, he cannot be met by forces under his
command.

24 1210 CINC PAC ADV TO CINC PAC AND CINC VA.

Place rotation program outlined by 100647 in effect commencing mid
April or as soon thereafter as practicable. At your discretion, you may
either send 1 TG as now constituted or one upgraded to the addition of
ships of each type available from 3 TFS squadrons. If this is not desirable,
he will send from 1/4 to 1/3 of the total of each type available to you. Full
details requests for support aircraft from the 3 TFS to maintain 12 to 15 to be
deemed necessary to meet the needs. In case of emergency, he cannot be met
by forces under his command.

24 1351 CINC PAC ADV TO CINC PAC AND CINC VA.

In order to economize personnel and reduce transportation, the
immediate officer of adequate rank and experience to continue
flights on 13 it is recommended that (A) ConAir assume responsibility
for the period of the mission performed by ConAir. (B) CINC VA select
report ConAir for duty as senior aviation officer on 13 for 13. ConAir
Admiral W. F. Greer be ordered immediately to ConAir and be
assigned to duty as ConAir. (C) On reporting of ConAir to ConAir
be commissioned in MARINA. (E) Rear Admiral take off ConAir and
be divided between Wing 18 and ConAir as directed by CINC VA.

24 1341 CINC PAC ADV TO CINC PAC.

Your 230111, desire that offensive operations, fighter aircraft based at
LOG be either as escorts to VII th or as independent strikes on
KUPRI fields unless other operation of these aircraft has been
prior approval.
SECRET
APRIL (CGR)

24 1515  CINC N 10TH ARMY TO CINC GIBRALTAR AREA 1 APR 60
CP 51 CHICAGO AREA

Designate 1 Div your Corps 10th Army Reserve Div and continue your present
location and continue recent activities with exception that you are
informed assembled 12 hours notice in area designated by
TA Grid Line 94. Designated Division remain under your command
employment. Notify this Hq of designated Division in writing.

24 1715  MARSHALL TO CINCAP AC CINC DEF, CINCAPAC (SEASON) PASSED TO CANCERBA

JAG 72252 has been repeated to all addresses to which it was
originally sent 8/3/60 as affected by JAG NO. 1259/5 dated 5 April 60.
6/714 (Navy Dept number 032141) dated 7 April 65 lines up with
original directive of civil censorship program for CINCPAC with view toward
removal of problems in problem of integration with other commands as civil
censor. Has been ordered for Army Reserve VAC. A to be extended to each
unit chief civil censor or other representative to carry out temporary duty
with JAG representatives in Washington and serving as a complete civil
censor for any affected areas. This order would be clearer with unit
Chief Civil Censor, this problem and submitting this to the Army
Reserve VAC. A for approval. Recommended line of meeting is for EUC
CINCAPAC passes this message to CINCPAC for cable concurrence on action
and that CINCAPAC also cable views.

25 2035  CINCAPAC TO CINC PAC 1 APR 60 (PACIFIC 1 APR 60)

Ur 241351, Latest information is in daily dispatches as follows: 230/71 and 240/42
which indicate a change in status for CINCPAC. 60th set 21 May 65. The
note resemblance Tony's and Tony's.

25 0319  CINCAPAC TO CHINCH TO CINC PAC 1 APR 60

Following information from AtCin 7/60 forwarded with administrative
and political significance of possible value to your command. All
Marshallese residents on Marshall and Bikini Atolls are still to be
protected by United States. 1/3 of Marshallese residents on Bikini Atoll
be on protectorate of United States. The United States is approximately
2700 natives or 1/3 of Marshallese population and are expected
be spontaneous and voluntary act. A petition and further reports will
be forwarded when obtained.

24 2220  CHINCH TO CINCAPAC 1 APR 60 (PACIFIC 1 APR 60)

After cessation hostilities JAG Army proposes move (JAG) of
unit troops monthly from ANG to HILL. 241 via JAG for your
information. Transports may be 15 to 15 knots or over 15. Cincac 210/40
acts as your escort and routing policy single ships and convoys. No constant
change to HILL A and/or PACNAV.
18 2345  CONSPAN to ALL SHIPS AND BASES SOPAC Info ALL TU COMMANDERS
SOPAC, COHC, CINCPAC BOTH HS, COMMANDER, FJAX

Cancel my 010645 October 1944. The following escort policy is effective in the South Pacific Area. Para 1. While known or anticipated presence of enemy submarines may require a temporary modification of these instructions by routing authorities, under normal conditions all cargo ships and troop ships proceeding within the South Pacific Area will be sailed independently regardless of speed and number of passengers. Para 2. When escorts are available they shall be provided for major combatant ships and transport CVK's. However, when escorts are not available the sailing of such ships within the South Pacific Area is authorized under the following conditions: (A) Speed of advance is 15 knots or greater (B) Ships armament is not seriously damaged (C) When it is believed enemy submarines are not operating in area to be traversed. In such circumstances speeds up to 20 knots are prescribed where practicable. Para 3. When vessels with a speed of advance of less than 15 knots, carrying 500 or more passengers, are sailed to the Central Pacific, the appropriate authority in the Forward Area shall be advised promptly in order that escort may be provided for that portion of the voyage north of the Equator. Para 4. In the Southwest Pacific Sea Frontier escorts are not required east of the longitude of BISAK and south of the Equator. Para 5. All ships whether sailing escorted or independent will proceed via established routes only. The carrying of passengers shall be in accordance with CINCO (1944 Article 1423). Para 6. Island commanders will provide all practicable air coverage on the approaches to ports and other focal points of shipping, using assigned base craft for local surface patrols. In addition to local patrol craft there will be maintained at RUSSELLS, ESPIRITU SANTO, NOUMEA and FUNAFUTI 1 PC or equivalent in a ready duty status available to the island commander for JASA or rescue work.

23 0015  CONAIR to GHO Info CINCPAC BOTH HS, COMAIRLANT, COMFAIR WEST COAST

Long range planning for the formation and movement of air groups and squadrons from continental training centers to combat theaters is premised on following factors. (A) Normal predicted requirements (B) Full pipeline (C) Adequate reserves. Para. However, planned flow inevitably will be affected by battle damage to carriers and length of time required for repair. Both factors are unpredictable. The direct result is dislocation of the planned flow of air groups necessitating deceleration of stocking of combat ready groups. Para. This must be recognized and since Hawaiian and Forward Areas are saturated provision must be made for facilities in continental U.S. to support temporary excesses. Para. Recommend that action be instituted to alleviate condition exemplified by Comairlant L51622 renumbered by Cominch 191300 which inevitably will arise from time to time.
24 2931

CONTRACT WEPSG MACON to OCMAND AGF THO, CONBON AGF TUNISIA, CO AGF

MOROCCO, CONBON AGF GULF Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMPTDAREA, COMGENAF, etc.

Effective 0921 25 April the WPSG was activated. Pending the receipt
of LOI from this Hq the AGF Commanders will continue to operate under
the provisions of their respective LOI from Hq USAFPOA. All communi-
cation will be forwarded thru this Hq except those pertaining to
supply and logistics which will be handled as they have been in the
past until instructions are issued from this Hq.

25 0653

CINCPOA ADV HQ to CONSTRUCTION CTU 50.5 Info CTF 96

The shipping strikes contemplated by CTU 50.5 250203 are not desired
at this time. Until there are sufficient fighters & grps established
on shore in the KUROIUS to permit reduction of demands on fast and
escort carriers and reduction of ships in the combat area desire
available field capacity used to increase fighter strength and conduct
necessary search and transport services. Strikes on shipping while
greatly desired must not prejudice above basic requirements.

26 0838

CINCPOA ADV HQ to CTU's 73, 93, 96, CINCPACP FP.COM 20TH AF, ALL TF

& to COMINS 141 TF, COMPEAKIR, COMPEAK, ACCOPLAN, H-WUSAG
2, ALL CAR.ASGD, SHIPPF, 2 SHAPCO, COMAAR, COMNAV, CINCPOA Info CINCPOA FSNW

Review of current Japanese Fleet status from photographic coverage is
OpIntel 58. Battleships, MAGATO at TOKOSUKA 17 April in same place
where she was observed 18 February, HABUNA at KURE 13 April with repair
or construction work in progress on after section. ISSE and HYOGEN both
at KURE 13 April in same mooring where they have been since 26 March.
Carriers. 2 UNKYO Class (probably AMACI and KATURAGI) at KURE (MITSUKO
JIMA) 13 April. UNKYO Class (probably KASAGI) at SASABE 21 April. 2
UNKYO Class hulls on which construction appears to have been suspended
located 13 April at KURE and IKEDA WPN (34-27 North 134-16 East)
respectively (probably ASD and TAIKO respectively). HAYAKO at SASABE
21 April covered with camouflage netting. CVL at SASABE 21 April
believed to be HUSO. Elevators removed and not camouflaging beginning.
CVL at KURE 13 April estimated as HOSHO. CVL KAITO at MIYAZAKI SHIMA
(34-11 North 132-12 East) 13 April covered with camouflage. CVE KOBE
type at SHIMO WPN (34-21 North 134-12 East) 13 April. Another KOBE
type last observed at KORE 25 March outfitting and repairing. Estimated
still there. Unidentified flat top possible MAC Ship at BEPPU WPN
(33-16 North 131-32 East) 21 April. Do not consider YOKOHAMA and HANU
ships, of which BEPPU WPN ship may be one, have sufficient flight deck
to be large enough for CVL. Cruisers. TONE Class at ETA SHIMA 13
April. ABOA Class at KURE 13 April. Light cruiser OKAMO at KURE 13
April. AGANO Class light cruiser last seen at KURE 26 March but not
there on 12 April. Present whereabouts unknown. SINGAPORE Area 15 April
were 2 MACHI Class and 1 ATAGO Class, 1 of each class severely damaged.
SECRET
April 1945

26 0838 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF's 73, 93, 94, CINCPACF, DESCOM 20TH AF, ALL TF & JO COMDES 5TH FLT, COMMARAF, AREA, COMPHIBSPAC, ACOMEFP, PHOTOGR.
2, ALL CARRIERS 5TH FLT, 21 BOMCOM, COMAASFSP, CINCSWPA (Cont'd)

Believe another NACHI Class present in this area making 4 heavies total. On 16 and 22 April respectively a DUTCH Sub contacted a NACHI heavy cruiser near BATAVIA, JAVA. 1 torpedo hit was claimed in the 22 April contact. Destroyers. At KURE 28 March were 27 destroyers broken down into following classes: 4 TERUTSUKI 1 HIBIKI 1 AMAGI 1 ASASHIO 1 TAKANAMI 1 HATSUHARU 2 MUTSU-1 MINEKAZE-KAMIKAZE 13 Matsu. To this total can be added about 10 destroyers which were in other areas as of that date. Photos taken after BANGAI engagement off KYUSHU 7 April reveal following count: 7 at KURE 13 April 14 at SASEBO 16 April 2 at YOKOSUKA 17 April. Total 14. Other units not exceeding 6 to 8 probably located at other harbors not covered by photographs. Rough check of photographs from EMPIRE FORMOSA CHINA COAST and MALAYA Areas indicates existence of about 20 MATSU Class units. Incomplete coverage of EMPIRE shipbuilding yards tends to confirm presently estimated rate of construction. 5 units seen building or outfitting in yards covered.

26 0840 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC Info COMAIRPACSUBCOMFWD, COMGEN TAF 10TH ARMY, COMTFPLST, CTF 51

Your 230322 does not comply with intent my 161245. It is desired that the number of aircraft operated by MAG 31 and MAG 33 from now until about 10 May be the maximum that the fields will support and replacements must for the time being be supplied on that basis.

26 1120 CTF 56 to CTF 51 Passed to CINCPAC ADV FOR INFO.

See your 23010, Estimated enemy strength of 1500 on KURE will require assignment of 1 RCT plus recon units, AmTracs, and less artillery for JGS MUSUY N X. An additional RCT to be placed on 12 hours notice on OKINAWA. Propose landing over KU RED beaches at SEDA K0 and make simultaneous survey of both possible airfield sites. Will require close in naval fire support to neutralize enemy opposition during recon. Believe RED beach most favorable landing area to accomplish this with minimum UTF and minesweeping. Actual ground recon necessary to determine airfield possibilities. Air photography and visual inspection from air of slight value. Character and strength of enemy defenses to be determined by recon YA landing force. Strongly recommend that this recon in force be delayed until operations on OKINAWA have successfully passed their new critical stage in order to preclude assignment of sizeable force to this mission which force may be needed to complete present operation. Refer my 260313 higher class.

26 1752 COMINCH AND CGN TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, BUFERS, COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC FRANL.

Your 241316. Approved notify CGN by mailgram when office ComAirSoPac disestablished.
General schedule of embarkment 27/11/2504/5, satisfactory to us. Recommend approval this plan.

Ready to your 21/14/59 has been delayed until decisions were reached as to landing operations. I am now in position to make available to you until 1 July for loading personnel and material forward from rear areas the following ships of Division III on completion: Discharge of 1st Div in Leyte. 2nd X (A 44), 2nd Y (A 46), 2nd Z (A 46), 3rd X (A 16), 3rd Y (A 16), 3rd Z (A 16), 1st X (A 29), Bataan (A 39). 1st Y (A 90), 1st Z (A 90), 2nd X (A 201), 2nd Y (A 201), 2nd Z (A 201), 3rd X (A 201), 3rd Y (A 201), 3rd Z (A 201), 4th X (A 201), 4th Y (A 201), 4th Z (A 201), 5th X (A 201), 5th Y (A 201), 5th Z (A 201). The period of availability may later be extended if conditions permit. Additional XA may also become available. Request you advise us as to number you can employ. Regret that LST can not be provided as all this type in USA will be required to supply accelerated reserves ARA where unloading docks will not become available for many months.

27 1239 CH CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC.

Effective 29 April propose that you assume responsibility for classification of areas relative to 38 operations south of 23°00′ N and west of 122°00′ E while XA forces exclusively are operating therein.

27 1329 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC CH IWO JIMA, CABRILLO, CHIGSIPAs, CINCPAC BSA

Effective 1 May dividing line between Southwest Pacific Sea Frontier and Philippine Sea Frontier moved as follows within S.I.P.A. From western boundary S.I.P.A. The equator to the west coast of 15°00′ the equator thence in a northeasterly direction to the coast of Borneo at Lat 04°00′ north thence east to Lat 04°00′ north Long 130°00′ East and within FOA for purposes of control of shipping by S.I.P.A. agencies, CinCPac Iwo Jima, Cabrillo September. From Lat 04°00′ north Long 130°00′ E to Lat 04°00′ N to 135°20′ E.

26 1423 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL, OKINAWA, CINCPAC, CINCPAC

Following Cardiv reorganization effective 1 May. Your 250223. Cardiv 1. CV5 ASSIS (F), CV15 BONHOMME, CVL 22 INDEPENDENCE, CVL 25 CONFIDENCE, Cardiv 6. CV45 TICONDEROGA (F), CV20 BENNINGTON, CVL 27 LANGLEY, CVL 29 BATAAN. Cardiv 7. CV40 ENTERPRISE (F), CV31 BONHOMME, RICHARD. Bases and offices Navy Dept notified.

27 1300 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL, IWO JIMA, BONHOMME, CINCPAC, BONHOMME.

Following normal action added for use in preparation material on air/fields CHINA, MANCHURIA and KOREA. A-CHINA 400-500, B- MANCHURIA 500-600, C-KOREA 251-300, CHI 052109 not to all or needed refer. In accordance with agreement my 311231 March. Request you notify interested commands including CINCPAC.
SECRET

28 0712 CINCPOA ADV TO DEFPOOHTAF INFO CINCPOA 21 BEACON, CINCPAC.

For the present it is considered that an attack on the scale of approximately 1 squadron to each of 6 airfields will constitute an appropriate effort against enemy airfields on KYUSHU.

28 1040 MACAO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA 21, ALLIED AIR FORCE.

CK 1500L. Your 271283. Effective 29 April CINCPOA will assume responsibility for classification of operating zones in the area south of 25-00 North and east of 122-00 East.

28 1415 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA INFO CINCPOA 21, ALLIED AIR FORCE, CINCPAC CONSTRUCT.

Constrat 2300017 and 221305. Request positive action be taken to ensure that except in emergency operations of the Allied Air Forces S.F.A. will not be extended northeast of KYUSHU without prior authorization by CINCPOA. Po prior notification or arrangements have been made with my headquarters concerning operations reported by 5th AF 2300047 or those announced only to Constrat 221305. The danger inherent in unexpected penetration of air forces through the combat area in the vicinity of the KYUSHU and KYUSHU must be obvious.

28 1417 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA.

Your 200533 affirmative. (Request authority strike KYUK area 30 April).

28 1424 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA.

Your 271400L. Then fighters of TF 93 are used to escort VSTOL flights the fighters should be passed to the operational control of the 20th AF for the duration of the operation.

28 0746 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA.

Propose revise inter area boundary for search and reconnaissance as follows: 130 East parallel of Longitude to 20 north thanes to 23 North 123 East thence to 26-30 North 123 East thence West along 26-30 North to CHINA Coast. Request concurrence.

28 0020 CTF 51 to CINCPAC INFO CINCPOA CINCPOA BOTH, CTF 51, 5THFLT, CONGEN TEN.

Special air attack summary. All times I(-9). About 200 enemy planes in 44 raids attacked U.S. forces at OKINAWA area from 281436 to 290215. During daylight CAP made successful interceptions majority of raids before reaching radar pickets and no enemy planes reached transport area until after dark. CAP which includes TF 58 planes as well as TG 52.1 and TG 99.2 shot down 68 planes before dark. None after dark. Prior 1900 following ships shot down planes; BUTLER 2 LCS in RP 12.1. Suicide attacks on DAILY TWIGGS BENNING. Total enemy destroyed prior to 1900 74. Para. After 1900 numerous torpedo, bombings and suicide attempts against all types throughout area and air bases. Following are credited with splashes. BROWN 2, BENNING 3, LSM 190 1. Unknown ships at KERAMA RESTO 2, WADSWORTH 2, LCS 119 1.

- Continued -

2882
SECRET

28 0020 OFF 51 TO COMDTWAR JAP (CONT.)

LO8 61 L, ST LOUIS 1, BUTLER 2 giving 4 for day. Shore AA 3. And 1 by unidentified ship in EP 10 area. Total by AA 19. Para. Following hit by submarines after 1900 WADSWORTH 1, LIT 990 1, BRONX 1 - total 3. Suicide misses BRONX, BUTLER. Total enemy planes destroyed after 1900 2A, Grand total 98. Probably more later. Para. Following fragmentary reports ships hit by suicide planes. At 1746 EIDOS hit by near wide from hit. At 1749 DAE with EIDOS hit near wardrobe. Both ships returned transport area at 25 knots. Doctor in EIDOS killed many casualties reported. Para. At 1803 EIDOS radar picket 1 damaged slightly. Para. At 1905 PHILIPPE (AAA 2) at KYOTO KIITO hit by aileron but fire soon brought under control. WADSWORTH radar picket 12 hit near bridge chief damage destruction of Captain's g.q. At 2123 LIT 180 not severe but has several wounded. Para. 2230 several bomb hits Yontan Field with minor damage.

28 1000 RICHAUD RECOMMENDS FOA TO CINCPAC ADV INTO CINCPAC PEARL, CC SOPAC, CC BOMAR, OFF 51.

BY 6014L. Recommend concurrence CINCPAC be obtained for movement to PHILIPPINES of this unit with the 81st Division in that shipping now available at NEW CALEDONIA to 223rd Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun), for which there is at present no planned employment in FOA.

29 0203 CINCPAC ADV TO CONDTWAR INTO COMMTWAR OFF 51 OFF 52.

Revision of areas of responsibility is now being made which will assign search and reconnaissance areas to SWPA, FairWing 1 and FairWing 10. Upon promulgation this revision Cang 98 is requested to review and submit recommendations similar to those contained in his serial 00097 dated 10 April.

29 0819 CINCPAC ADV TO OFF 51 TO CINCPAC, CC BOMAR, CC RICHAUD, CINCPAC.

Present circumstances require special procedures for safeguarding hospital ships. These in combat areas may be attacked deliberately or accidentally by enemy or accidentally by friendly forces. Insofar as practicable the following arrangements should govern when such ships are in or near combat areas. (A) At night dare not ship and when possible remain at anchorage to benefit from smoke and protection from other ships. (B) When loaded at sea be covered but not escorted by suitable combat vessels in general vicinity to render prompt assistance if required. (C) When sailing from loading area do so by noon when possible and if loading not completed before mid-afternoon defer sailing until following day. Para. When well clear of combat area follow full hospital ship procedure. Para. Forgoing principles are for general guide and may be modified to meet special circumstances.

29 0835 CINCPAC ADV TO CONDTWAR INTO OFF 51 OFF 52.

OFF 52 261120. I express in deferment of reconnaissance in force at KURE until southern OKINAWA is well in hand.
29 0952 SGR FPO TO CHINAPAC AVN. COMAIRFORCES INFO ALLIED AIR FORCES MANILA.

C15106. Reference CINCPAC's 250706. Censor in exchange of VFB 106 for VFB 109. ComAir7thFlt authorized direct communication with CINCPAC to arrange details of exchange with information copies of radio to Allied Air Forces and this Headquarters.

30 0615 SGR FPO TO CHINAPAC AVN. COMAIRFORCES INFO ALLIED AIR FORCES MANILA.

Transfer VFB-106 to ComAirFleet for duty in exchange for VFB 109. ComFedArea authorized direct communication with ComAir7thFlt to arrange details of exchange. Inform ComAir7thFlt when VFB 109 ready for duty INFANTUS.

30 0653 SGR FPO TO CHINAPAC AVN. COMAIRFORCES INFO ALLIED AIR FORCES MANILA.

When ready in May transfer VFB 123 to ComFedArea for duty and eventual assignment to ComAir7thFlt for duty in PaliWing L. Upon reporting VFB 123 ComFedArea transfer VFB 116 to 7thFlt as relief for VFB 137. When relieved by VFB 116 ComAir7thFlt return VFB 137 to US for rehabilitation.

300659 SGR FPO TO CHINAPAC AVN. TSCOM TDY. TSCOM TAIWAN. CINCPAC AVN. COMAIRFORCES INFO ALLIED AIR FORCES MANILA.

It has come to my attention that there recently occurred on D+0 a second serious explosion that destroyed large quantities of material required for development of the island and for prosecution of operations, and that jeopardized life. You will at once require the island commander to furnish you with a report of the circumstances and of action taken to effectively prevent recurrence. Advise me in the premises including your comments and recommendations. For your guidance it is directed that you establish suitable arrangements for keeping yourself promptly informed within your command of important matters of whatever nature that directly or indirectly affect operations in order that you may initiate suitable action. When the circumstances require inform me in connection therewith.

30 1221 SGR FPO TO CHINAPAC AVN. COMAIRFORCES INFO ALLIED AIR FORCES 8TH AIRVEFl FORCES MANILA.

C15210. This radio will be considered as operations instructions 101/1 and will become effective 1 May 1945. Operations instructions 101 this headquarters dated 15 April 1945 is amended as follows: Delete that portion of search sectors 21, 22, 23 and 24 lying to the north and east of a line from 25-15 N, 129-00 E to 29-00 N 129-00 E to 21-30 N 127-30 E.

30 1454 SGR FPO TO CHINAPAC AVN. CINCPAC INFO COMAIRFORCES.

This has to do with unloading heavy equipment in SVP A and refers to CINCPAC 271139 April and 300839 March and CINCPAC AVN 201309. In order to handle unloading problem into forward bases suggest maximum utilization of LVT's LLMs and LLUs. Figures available here indicate 103 LLMs and 301 LVT's new in SVP A. In order that additional requirements for LMT's or SVP A can be met desire CINCPAC take positive action as practicable including moving up LMT's under your proper transporting our LMT's and possible testing. CINCPAC report action being taken.
SECRET

29 2134

CINCPAC ADV. TO CINCPACINFO CINCPAC ADV. CONSIDER. 12.

Regret that power barge ELECTRA is not available for transfer to MANILA. ELECTRA is supplying power to the Army dredge POINT LOMA which is also under operational control of CINCPAC. ELECTRA and POINT LOMA are now employed in inner APRA HARBOR, GUAM and scheduled to remain there indefinitely. ELECTRA is the only power barge in P0A. Recent transfer of USS WISEMAN (DE 667) to MANILA for power supply has already decreased ability to use electric dredges for forward area work in P0A to absolute minimum. CINCPAC 251617 and ComGenPOA 280604 not to all refer.

30 0541

CONFIDENTIAL. TO USCOM INFO CINCPAC BOTH.

In view of recent serious accidents and pending completion permanent ammunition dumps in accordance with development plan construction work upon which should be expedited and priority raised accordingly take immediate steps to rectify and safeguard present temporary ammunition storage by

(A) Complete isolation of all dangerous salvage material awaiting examination and final disposal from other types explosives. (B) Separation of ammunition in temporary revetments in accordance with War Department TM 9-1900 to fullest extent practicable. Provisions of TM 9-1900 Article 116 B I do not in my opinion at this late stage Island development warrant conditions of unsafe storage now existing. Deeper revetments with baffles and covering against stray shots most necessary.

30 0549

CINCPAC ADV. TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV. CONSIDER.

Para one. The missions of bases assigned by my serial 0005035 of 15 April 1945 are modified as follows. Approximate reductions involved will be effected by 1 July 1945. (A) At KWAJALEIN ATOLL ENOWE ISLAND will continue as a Naval Air Base to provide headquarters for the Atoll Comdr and ComMarGIs with facilities only for emergency staging of seaplanes. (B) The mission of KWAJALEIN ISLAND is changed to read "A Naval and Air Base to support operations of Fleet units, of the Air Transport Services of the Army and Navy and of Marine aircraft assigned to the MARSHALL GILBERT Area". Under this mission facilities will be retained for 4 Marine squadrons. (C) At EMERSON Atoll the mission of KWAJALEIN ISLAND is cancelled. All its aviation personnel will be retained at ANDROMEDA ISLAND except for a very small Airway and ENOWE ISLAND except for a very small complement. All aviation personnel for maintenance.

30 0613

Two. In view change in primary mission of KWAJALEN ISLAND, decreased defensive requirements, expressed by Naval Atoll Commander and predominance of naval and Marine personnel desire relief of all Army units except those required for operation and support of ATU including AAC. CINCPAC Pearl harbor advised in cooperation with info address by 1 July to replace Army combat units and service troops with corresponding Naval and Marine units. All troops should be replaced by small detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion from EMERSON. Desire Naval Aviator as Island Commander.
SECRET

I have not authorized establishment of any regular passenger service by MATS or ATC between MARIANAS and HAINAN. Service of AirTrac Group 1 under OTF 94 plus ATC aircraft available for air evacuation and combat transport fill current needs and use services available at OKINAWA. Request you correct your 1 May schedule accordingly and direct CommTracPac cancel his serial 00152 of 23 April which does not adequately recognize operational control AirTracGroup 1 by OTF 94. Authorization for regular services will await recommendation OTF 99.

(MAY)

01 0135

COMMTRAC TO COMMTRAC, YEAR: 21ST COMMTRAC ADV.CONTRAFORCES. COMMTRAC, 21ST COMMTRAC ADV. HAINAN, OKINAWA, 15000 SALIPAN.

Your 1500000 21ST BommCom for 5 VLR wings totaling expenditure of 10,000 MT tons per wing per month. At this rate 60 day reserve each incendiary and high explosive bomb totals 200,000 MT tons. Remaining 30,000 tons may 152130 required for storage miscellaneous types for special missions. 60 day reserve each incendiary and high explosive bomb was considered necessary by 21ST BommCom to accomplish without restrictions whatever operational directives may be assigned including accelerated sustained operations requiring exclusive use of either incendiary or high explosive bomb. Plans for storage contemplate continuation of standard safety factors and standard hardstand construction. In view of limited space on TINIAN as further reduced by 5 general hospitals authorized your serial 001542 it will be necessary to use about 50% of present FGA agricultural storage for additional bomb storage. Upon reconnoitering my 152130 it is opinion this command that 60 day reserve is not required and total storage figures listed therein may be reduced 1/3 on assumption that uniform flow of replacement ammunition ordered from rear areas will be accomplished. The necessary increase in storage would then be GUAM 28,000 TINIAN 2,000 SALIPAN 0.

01 0907

COMMTRAC ADV TO CTF 51 INFO COMMTRAC, CONTRAFORCES, COMMTRAC, COMMTRAC.

Your 301055 destroyer within 1 mile of a hospital ship might be taken by enemy as escort. Desire that normally the covering destroyer be approximately 3 miles astern. Note that hospital ships should darken at sea as well as in port except when well clear of combat areas.

01 0533

COMMTOA ADV TO COMMTOA (ROTH) INFO COMMTRAC, COMMTOA PEARL. COMMTRAC

Desires information as to your long range plans for movement of replacement Army aircraft to forward areas. Assume that the capabilities of some aircraft to move by air or as deck loads on miscellaneous cargo shipping will be fully exploited in your planning.

01 0759

COMMTOA ADV TO COMMTOA INFO COMMAND, COMMAND FORCES SWPA, COMMAND, COMMAND

Your 300916. Command in your retention of group headquarters and one squadron of MarineGroup 25 until last combatant MarineGroup is withdrawn pursuant to your serial 00304 and serial 230107. The other squadron may be needed in June or July on short notice but is available for use in SWPA until further notice is given.
SECRET

01 0736 JASON TO JIMA TO CONFIDENTIAL. (Intecept)

Ammunition dump explosion night 25–26 April, see my report of SAKI to you in daily airmailgram reports of 26 and 27th. Report of board of officers forwarded you earliest possible date. Investigation of same directed and started at daylight after fire. Present information indicates fire started in a revolted slot containing undersea demolition tubes left by amphibious force and quickly spread to adjoining lots of same material, then to miscellaneous ammunition being sorted, and finally to lot of 3250 lb. depth bombs which caused severe explosion. Cause of fire flue released by enemy action or boulder from seaside Mt SURIBACHI. Injuries to personnel were 2 moderate and 1 moderate shock. In addition to destruction of ammunition some organisational equipment of 23rd CB En was burned and damaged in a nearby dump. About 150 drums of motor gas burned, 3 QMnosti were damaged, and about 200 tents suffered same damage, practically all shut and were repairable. Plans were already underway for moving part of this ammunition to extreme northern end of island. Central part of island already had dumps of explosives and is largely taken up with airfields, personnel and installations. Planned ammunition dumps had to be abandoned due to recent modifications made to airfields, changes in location of airstrips and marina, and resulting necessary shifting in operating personnel. A second board of five experienced officers headed by Commodore Johnson appointed 29 April to locate storage areas and best method of storage in each of ammunition, explosives and stored gasoline on this island. When approved, it will be forwarded to your headquarters for information or action. The explosion of dynamite on April 2nd caused by a shot at night killed one and slightly injured 14 to 17. Property damaged other than the dynamite was negligible. In view of CINCPAC ADV 300599 indicating large material damage due to dynamite explosion, it is requested that this information be passed thereto. The entire northern half of this island has been the scene of continuous patrolling and clearing up operations day and night. Since March 25, 175 Japs have been killed to 775 captured they are still aggressive and ammunition has to be safeguarded.

01 0840 COMMD/JROPS TO OCMER ID INFOTHCNAL AND ARM/COMP/DEP/SERVICES/CCXX/CR/CR

O C T L 1 3 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7

Cite 14 TP 000. Since L Day there have been repeated instances of friendly combat planes bombing rocketing and strafing troops within the lines of 24 Corps at times other than on called or permitted missions. So far as known no offending pilots have been identified or punished although reports have been made. It is expected that some of these are sightseers or returning CAP planes. Many casualties have occurred from these actions as well as lowered confidence of troops in our splendid close air support. Most recent incidents are:

(A) At about 2245/30 2 Corsairs strafed from TA 3573A NW to TA 8475E,
circled and strafed from TA 8474E to TA 8474E. 1 man wounded, 1 plane bore number 350.

(B) 3027/30 6 planes identified as Corsairs strafed and bombed or rocketed
a truck approximately 3000 yards inside lines of 7th Div. Truck had large
white star on hood and other easily identified vehicles such as jeeps and
3 quarter tons in the general vicinity. 7 men killed and 17 wounded.
Front lines were clearly marked by large colored panels. 1 of the six planes
involved was reported to carry the number 20. This plane was reported
to have made the last pass but did not fire.

- Continued -
01 0310 CONGRELEOPORS TO CONCRETE (CONT'D)

Unless these incidents are caused by enemy planes, I do not believe they can happen if all pilots are properly instructed and obey orders. I make urgent request that investigation be made and that if pilots are identified disciplinary action appropriate to punishment for manslaughter be applied. I further request that all hands make every effort to brief all pilots operating in the area to make no attacks at any time on southern OKINAWA except by request or permission of this headquarters on well identified and clearly located enemy targets.

01 1439 GEN SWPA (MACARTHUR) TO GINOPOA ADV INTO AGWAR, GENERAL STAFF.

CX 15276. Lt. Gen. Althea will soon assume command of reorganized logistic command of APPAG. He makes an urgent request for the assignment of Major General E. M. Leavenworth as his Chief of Staff. While it is appreciated that this officer now fills a position of importance it is felt that his special knowledge and wide experience give him the highest qualifications for the proposed position of even greater importance. It would be appreciated if this officer could be made available.

02 0020 GINOPOA ADV TO COMSTAFFPMOM INTO GINOPOA PEARL. GINOPOA. COMAFFT, GINOPOA MULT.

Your 282218. 10 APA will be sailed from PEARL to West Coast arriving by 10 May for 1 lift to SWPA. 10 additional APA can be sailed to arrive West Coast for same purpose by 25 May. 15 additional APA can be made available during June provided other requirements do not interfere. Will advise later. Para. The 13 APA now under voyage repairs West Coast are already allocated for FOA lifts.

02 0251 CTF 58 to COMSTAFFPOM INTO CTF 51. GINOPOA ADV.

Your 012326. Do not recommend fighter sweeps against KYUSHU with 2 TOs unless completely relieved of any responsibility for defense of OKINAWA. Believe such a sweep not profitable on widely dispersed aircraft which are staged into the area camouflaged and take off as soon as refueled. In order to produce results on fighter sweeps fighters must remain in the area for considerable time in order to find target and have advantage of weather to insure visibility. If the Baka plane is the Betty type it has a demonstrated cruising and attack range of 600 miles with torpedo.

02 0536 GINOPOA ADV TO COMSTAFFPMOM INTO GINOPOA PEARL. COMAFFT. COMAFFT, GINOPOA. CAPACITY ARG.

Your 302224 is concurred in and my 270020 is modified accordingly. The facts are that the naval air evacuation group operating between OKINAWA and the MARIANAS evacuated 1,585 Army 77 Navy and 59 Marines during the period 6-30 April and aircraft of the same group evacuated 232 Army 316 Navy 115 Marines from GUAM to the eastward. Para. Under the provisions of my OpPlan 14-44 as now amended there will be a capacity of 600 patients a week from the MARIANAS to the eastward via ATC and 300 via NAFS.

02 0648 CONCRETE TO CTF 58 INTE CTF 51. GINOPOA ADV RG.

Your 020251. Do not make fighter sweeps.
02 0803 COM 20.4 to Com 51 INFO CONSOLIT. COM 51 INFO WAR YONTAN. COM 51 INFO CINCPAC ADV

W/0 010231 not to nor needed by all. Cognizant units at Yontan agree VBF 109 can be accommodated that field now without disruption of maximum fighter operations. On this basis request authority to deploy VBF 109 Yontan when ready estimated about 9 May. Present Privates will be withdrawn upon arrival VBF 109.

02 1846 CONNSSENAVN TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL. ADCOMPHIBSPAC, CNO, COMPHIBSPAC

W/0 222222 to Cinepoa Pearl and 012322 to you. Due to new developments will probably now require all APA's offered W/0 020000. Will advise definitely 3 May.

02 2110 CONSIG CSO ND, A3 to CINCPAC/CINCPAC BOTH

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the following policy on the release of atrocity stories. Theater Commanders may clear atrocity stories submitted for censorship within existing security requirements. They may make such official releases on atrocities as they deem desirable. In those cases where it is intended to request that an official protest be made by the United States Government protest must be made prior to that official release concerning the atrocity.

03 0600 CINCPAC ADV TO COMARPBAC INFO CONSHIT. COMARPBAC INFO AIRPACSUBCOM. CINCPAC PEARL. COMARPBAC INFO

Consour with proposals contained in your serial C0847 dated 18 April. In the future movement orders for units containing aircraft carriers in an operational status will contain authority to execute operation "FUDDE" followed by the target designation. Operation "FUDDE" will be a hit and run carrier strike on the designated target with the combined objective of keeping bypassed enemy bases in the rear area operational and under surveillance while at the same time providing final training for carrier air groups in all phases of combat operations. Operation "FUDDE" shall be limited to those attacks that can be made in a 12 hour period. Forward movement of units involved will not be delayed more than 24 hours in order to execute this operation. Target designation will in each instance be obtained from COMARPBAC and the approximate date of attack will be included in the orders. All concerned must be informed in advance.

03 0601 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CONSHIT.

Approve your proposal to send out loaded hospital ships with trailing ships not later than 1000 1(-9) with hospital ships proceeding under full hospital ship procedure upon departure and throughout voyage unless otherwise specifically directed. Do not approve hospital ships proceeding darkened executing signal and being actually escorted as alternatively suggested. Desire empty AH as well as loaded AH be provided with rescue vessel.
03 1242 CINCPAC TO 5TH AIR FORCE RESERVE INFO CINCPAC ADV HO.

Replying to your 030642. No further action taken in view my orders from Cinapa which are based on compliance his 281A13 to CINCPAC which 5th AF received for information.

03 2106 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC ADV, APOCPHIBSPAC.

Until 290055 in immediate future can utilize such additional APA's for cargo loadings to FOA destinations as you can make available. Forecasting also applies APA's. Advise names STD PEARL destinations and dates required free of charge.

03 2215 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC ADV, APOCPHIBSPAC.

ComAF 4 040159 indicates practically no strikes by SoWee Pac on FORMOSA fields today. Weather there appears favorable for strikes. We suffered considerable losses to screening vessels in sundown attacks yesterday made by Formesan planes.

04 0204 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC ADV, APOCPHIBSPAC.

Com5thFlt 022315 passed to you with the request that effort against Formesan airfields continue at maximum practicable effectiveness.

04 1200 COMGEX TEN TO HAKO INFO COMAF, COMAF, CINCPAC ADV, CG 2ND MARDIV.

Urgency occupying KIHEI, ANDI, and INEYA thoroughly appreciated. To relieve picket burden in most expeditious and efficient manner recommend obtaining 2nd MarDiv. If approved will take action to fly 2nd Div planners here to complete details. Personnel of Div to start loading immediately ready for hurried call-up. After securing islands Marines to be relieved by garrison troops from OKINAWA soon as practicable. Current tactical situation and depleted status 27th Div dictate against use combat troops now present in area. Am taking action to expedite arrival AWS 11 for KIHEI. Exploring availability other AWS units which might arrive earlier.

04 1252 MAGNARTUR TO COMAF INFO CINCPAC ADV, CINCPAC ADV.

CX 15477. R adio from Com5thFlt and Cinapoa Adv Ho state that their forces in the OKINAWA area suffered considerable losses from sundown attacks yesterday made by Formesan planes and request that effort against Formesan airfields continue at maximum practicable effectiveness. Desire maximum practicable concentration of effort on FORMOSA Airfields from which hostile strikes can be made against OKINAWA forces in order to insure a continued neutralization of enemy air forces.
SECRET

04 0213 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPEL, COMSUBPAC, CTF 96 Info COMPAREWING J. COMPAREWING

In CINCPAC.

Subject is area boundaries for search and reconnaissance responsibilities. Boundary between FOA and SWPA is 130 degrees E parallel of Long to 20 degrees N 123 degrees E thence N to 26-30 N 123 degrees E thence E along 25-30 N to CHINA Coast. Within FOA boundary between task fleet (FairWing 1) and TF 94 (FairWing 16) from 20 degrees N 130 degrees E to 25 degrees N 135 degrees E thence E along 135 degrees E to coast of JAPAN. Upon request of TF Comdr the areas N and W of line 30 degrees N 130 degrees E to 32-30 N 140 degrees E thence N along 140 degrees E to coast of JAPAN will be assigned to FairWing 1. These areas of responsibility will be the basis for assignment of Fleet Air Forces. This assignment becomes effective at 0000 II(-9) 5 May.

04 1114 CTF 96 to COMPEL, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

On 2 May 1 Tony splashed by VFN, KIKAI and TOKUNO Airfields attacked. On 3 May OKINAWA target CAP shot down 1 Dinar. On ground destroyed 1 plane and damaged 19 at Tokuno, KIKAI and TAKUMA SHIMA Airfields. Cratered WNW airfield and started fires barrack's revetment and wooded areas near field. Damaged motor boat. On 4 May splashed 96 planes as follows by VFN rear forces 21 by UMAI and KIKAI CAP 67 by OKINAWA CAP and 4 by Division force CAP viced into males NE of N tip of OKINAWA. Bombad WNW airfield. 1 of our Heloats was diving on a Val today when an unidentified Corsair dove on him and started firing. Heloat broke off to avoid Corsaire and Val made a perfect hit on a destroyer in pickup station L. Pilots returning later reported sighting suspicious acting single Corsair over DDs at approach point 2 at 1305J. Corsair took evasive action to prevent close investigation but pilots noticed shiny waxed appearance with vulture marking on starboard wing. Star on wing and no tail markings. Cumulative casualties through 2 May. MIA during flight operations; combat 116 pilots 60 aircrews. Operational 34 pilots 17 aircrews 1 combat photographer. On board ships 530 killed in action, 162 missing in action. 1121 MIA. Above incomplete for FRANKLIN and HAGGARD as explained my 280514 and includes estimate of 80 MiD on HAZARDOUS in addition known 13 dead and 30 wounded.

04 0735 DECOMAP 20 to BONCOM 21 Info CINCPAC ADV.

CNO 022324 and Cincom 040246 request you comply with latter.

04 1236 CINCPAC ADV TO DECOM XX AF INFO CG XXI BONCOM, COMPEL.

Your STREP-19-1 DTG 190025, My 280712 request daily bombing KYUSHU aircrews continue until fighter fields in SHIMA are activated.

04 1710 DECOMAP 20 to 21 BONCOM Info CINCPAC ADV, COMPEL.

See Cincom Adv Hq 041236. Request you comply.

04 2124 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPEL INFO COMTEAPAC, COMDESPAC, COMSOUTH, COMSOUTHCOM, CINCPAC, COMUSPAC, COMUSPAC.

Direct appropriate senior 7thFlt administrative commanders in each type to report with forces under their command by letter to appropriate type commanders Pacific Fleet for purposes of type administration.
05 0036 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV.

Institute searches to cover area previously covered from IRO JIMA and TINIAN and now assigned to TF (Fighting 1) by CINCPAC ADV 040213 and advise search coordinates and sector calls. No coverage to eastward of 135-00W will be required of you for the present.

05 1203 CINCPAC ADV GQ TO CINCPAC INFO COMFARAREA, COMMSA, COMNAVSAPAC.

Your 040051 Air Evac Group 1 is under operational control ComFARarea. Make requests direct to latter. He is hereby authorized make air evacuation aircraft available to evacuate stretcher cases from TACLOBAN subject to meeting requirements at OKINAWA which for the present have higher priority.

05 1241 CINCPAC ADV GQ TO CINCPAC, COMFARAREA, COMMARCHEL, COMNAVMED INFO CINCPAC JEARL, COMSAPAC.

Women are now present and connected with various activities in areas where many of the restraining influences of normal life in a well established and orderly community are greatly weakened. The arrangements for safeguarding life and persons that exist in such communities are frequently lacking or exist only to a limited degree. Some of the areas are sparsely settled and primitive conditions exist. In many places members of enemy combatant forces are still at large. You are directed to take adequate measures for protection of our womankind whether they are in the Armed Services or otherwise present in the area under your command. Such action should include any necessary restrictions on hours and movements of women etc.

05 1815 CTF 51 to CINCPAC INFO CONSERVPAC, CINCPAC ADV, CTG51.15, COMFRONOMO (REP EKAMIA.RENO), COMSPEWAC.

In view of large number of damaged ships and urgent need of drydocking time now estimated at well over 100 days and increasing daily repeat recommendations made by 222155 April. A minimum of 4 and preferably 6 ARDs should be provided also sufficient manpower to permit continuous use these facilities at maximum capacity. Recommendation based on:

(A) Necessity of returning units fully repaired to operating status at early date to maintain protection this area.

(B) Need for returning ships damaged beyond capacity local forces for complete restoration to rear areas to prevent loss or further damage.

(C) Certainty of continued air attack with continued percentage of damage rates. This matter becomes more urgent every day. There is berthing and operating room for 6 ARDs.
SECRET

06 0126 CONTELM TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 58, CTF 51

Due to the scale of enemy air effort justifies reduction in B29 commitment to KYUSHU Airfield attacks. Recommend commitment be increased rather than reduced with special heavy effort just prior to resumption of each enemy periodic full out attack.

06 0814 CINCPOA ADV TO ISCOM SAIPAN INFO CINCPAC, COMPOA, COMFORDAREA

For Major General Jarman. Incident to your prospective change in status I wish to express my personal appreciation of the loyal cooperation and efficient service you have given during the past year to congratulate you on your achievements in the development of SAIPAN and to express my hope that our close association in the war against JAPAN will continue until our job is done. Thanks.

06 0816 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMFORDAREA, COMPOA, COMFORDAREA, ISCOM, SAIPAN, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC, WPDG

The 24th Inf Regiment now assigned to the garrison of SAIPAN will be available on 15 May for such other assignment as may be desired and will be released to your operational control on departure. It is intended to have their present duties which are decreasing in importance performed initially by available elements of the Fleet Marine Force and later by Marine Military Police and Guard Battalions formed for that purpose.

06 0819 CINCPOA ADV TO ALPDA INFO CINCPAC

Effective 15 May there is hereby established the Naval Operating Base, SAIPAN which will comprise all naval shore activities at the Island of SAIPAN in the MARIANAS including the following principal components: NAB, KORLER; NAB, TANAPAG; NAB, MARPI POINT; NAB, KACIAN POINT; NSD, SAIPAN; NAVAL MAGAZINE, SAIPAN; Naval Repair Base, TANAPAG; Marine Corps activities, SAIPAN.

06 0820 CINCPOA ADV TO COMPAC, ISCOM SAIPAN, COMDT NOB SAIPAN INFO COMPOA, CINCPAC, CONAIRPOA, COMAIRPAC, WPDG, CONAIRPOA, WPDG

Effective on reporting BGen F.P.M. Whiting USN as Comdt NOB SAIPAN about 15 May he will also relieve Maj.Gen. Jarman as IsCom SAIPAN and report to COMPOA for that duty. This action is taken in view of the assignment of General Jarman, US Army, as ComGen Western Pacific Base Command with responsibilities direct to higher authority in the Army for activities outside the island of SAIPAN, to permit the Navy to meet more directly the responsibilities assigned by JCS 250/5 and JCS 819/5 and to release Army personnel to Army control pursuant to JCS 1259/4. It is expected that MajGen Jarman will retain his present headquarters for use in his capacity as ComGen WPDG.

06 0833 CINCPOA ADV TO ALPDA INFO CINCPAC, COMPOA, COMAIRPOA, WPDG, CONAIRPOA

Effective 1 June the present Forward Area Central Pacific is redesignated the "Marianas Area". No change in limits, mission or organization are involved. The long and short titles of the Area Commander will be "Commander MARIANAS" and "ComMARIANAS" respectively.
06 0920 **CONFIDENTIAL TO CTF 51. CTF 58 Info 5A4520. Commander. CINCPAC Both. Commander. CTF 58.

Movement of ServRon 10 facilities from ULITHI to LETTE commences 7 May. Complete replenishment and repair facilities will be available ULITHI for TG of TF 58 scheduled arrive there about 16 May. 3rd rotational group of TF 58 should proceed LETTE when due for upkeep and replenishment. TF 51 ships which can arrive by 19 May proceed ULITHI later arrivals proceed LETTE. Commencing 24 May complete replenishment and repair facilities available LETTE for TF 51 ships as well as for 1 group of TF 58. Subsequent 19 May my 060340 April continues in effect except that large ships not requiring docking and all ships not requiring Navy Yard repairs shall be routed LETTE instead of ULITHI. ConServRon 10 advise originator and action akses if change in above becomes necessary.

06 1127 **CINCPOA ADV HQ TO DESRON 20TH AF INFO CINCPAC. CTF 58.

The proposal of 21 BomCom 050450 is concurred in with the understanding that the scale of harassing attack on KUSHU will average 4 squadrons a day. I will request heavier attacks when I consider the situation requires them.

06 0846 **CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH. CTF 58. CINCPAC PEARL. COMDESPAC.

In amplification of last paragraph my 200344 (not to all akses) and in view of Con7thFlt's 050659 request release of DesRon 23 to my operational control.

07 0622 **CONFIDENTIAL TO CTF 51. INFO CINCPAC ADV. CTF 51. ISCOM IE SHIMA. ISCOM OKINAWA. CINCPAC.

Following steps taken Con7thFlt 060129 and 061204. 1 additional Engr. Bn. being applied immediately Kadona Airfield construction and 1 additional NBC En Yontan making total 4 Bns Kadona and 2 Bns Yontan while continuing OKINAWA and AWASE Airfields. At IE SHIMA 2 Engr Bns being applied to airfield construction with priority of features to permit earliest possible operation 2 groups fighters. Consultation with TAF indicates present plan widening Kadona strip and provision more taxiways and hardstand will accomodate maximum number VF ConTAF can operate in near future. Have determined this method provides most rapid practicable fighter field construction sequence with means available for earliest maximum employment of fighters. After consultation Con7thFlt ISCOM OKINAWA immediately deferred efforts toward heavy bomber priorities and has concentrated efforts on fighter facilities. Being unloaded now are 17 1000 barrel Avgas tanks which will be installed rapidly as possible. These tanks together with 3 additional tanks on hand and pipe fittings and pumps being unloaded will provide total of 8-1000 barrel tanks at Yontan and 14-1000 barrel tanks at Kadona. Additional Avgas bulk tank materials arrive May 10 and May 18. Preliminary work will be accomplished to permit rapid installation this additional tank storage OKINAWA. Temporary bulk tanks and ready tanks IE SHIMA will be completed by May 12. Drum Avgas OKINAWA now 2800. 15000 additional drums within week and 30000 additional drums by 17th. IE SHIMA drum Avgas 15000 being discharged now. This constitutes confirmation to ISCOM OKINAWA.

289
07 0640 CINCPAC ADV TO CCOM HIRAB. CINCPAC INFO CINCPACAC, JCCOM SAILPAN.

Whenever 1ST Bn of 24TH Inf Regt leaves TINIAN, May 16, 060016, request the MP Co now at SAILPAN or an equivalent unit be made available to JCCOM TINIAN. Patrols, guard and other duties now being performed by the Inf Bn will then be assigned to MP Co and other forces locally available.

07 1115 JCCOM OKINAWA TO CTF 56 INFO COMIF. COMARS OKINAWA, CTF 51, JCCOM LE.

Reference Com5thFlt's 060129 instructions in full accord with expressed desires of Com5thFlt regarding maximum and most rapid development of fighter airfields on both OKINAWA and II SHIMA were issued by me on 5 May these projects are being pushed to the fullest with all available facilities base development construction program has been deferred where it interferes in the least with the completion of fighter fields at earliest possible date.

06 2209 CINCPAC PEARL TO AAFPOA ADMIN INFO CINCPACAC, XXI BOICOM, CG TEN, CINCPAC ADV.

Your 032132, It is not contemplated that the airfield construction program in OKINAWA utilizing forces available can progress beyond the essential operational stages. Engineering necessity dictates that the broadened specifications be adopted. It is not anticipated that long continuous grades will exceed 1 percent on VLR fields as the country is gently undulating however if such an increase is dictated due to field conditions then Cincpac will accept recommendations that the particular field receive special consideration either decreasing the grade to 1 percent or increasing the length depending on engineering considerations. Your 050235t the approaches on II SHIMA are 0. Fields for very long range fighters will be specified initially at 6000 ft with extensions to 7500 ft when labor is available.

07 1115 COM5THFLT TO COM5THFLT CINCSWPA INFO ALL TFC 7THFLT AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH NAVAL BOARD, CINCPAC BOTH, COMINC, CAN.

Admiral Kinkaid departs for conference in Washington and turns over command of Seventh Fleet to Vice Admiral Barbey as of 0600 I Tuesday 8 May.

07 2314 CINCPAC INFO CINCPACAC, XXI BOICOM, CG TEN, CINCPAC ADV, CINCPAC INFO CINCPACAC, XXI BOICOM, CG TEN, CINCPAC ADV. 7TH FIGHTER WING, AD GUAM, COMAIRSFU 6, HAD, AFR.

236411 LtGen. Barney W. Giles assumes command of Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Areas per general order 62 this Bq, 4 May 1945, and pursuant to General Order 10 Bq, 20th AF office of the DepCom 4 May 1945 is announced as DepCom20thAF POA.

08 0159 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COM5THFLT, COMAIR SWPA.

No air intent received from ComAF 5 for 7 May. No strikes against FORMOSA included in ComAF 5 MG72AF air intent for 8 May. If practicable request positive advance information when FORMOSA is not to be included for any reason in order that Com5thFlt may be advised of possible increased enemy activity from that area.
08 0234 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPOA PEARL, CINCAPPAC.

Your 061801, I am agreeable to releasing Major General Leavay for service with Lieutenant General Styer as proposed. However in order that he may not be embarrassed by responsibilities to both of us and in order to clarify his status I am detaching him and directing him to report to ComGenPOA as of 10 May. Request Chief of Staff, U.S. Army be so informed.

08 0236 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPOA PEARL HG.

The policy set by my 051711 concerning return of Construction Battalions to the mainland was decided upon after careful consideration of all the factors concerned and will be adhered to unless exceptions are directed by higher authority, CNO 071920. My 051711 took into account also the equally long overseas service of the combat troops who are equally desirous of returning to the mainland. Under present instructions both combat and construction troops are rotated as individuals but not as complete units.

08 0518 CINCPOAC ADV TO COMBATRONS 162, A01CPAC, COMDESPOAC, CINCPLANT INFO CTG 58.1, 58.2, 58.3, COMINCPAC, CINCPOAC, COMSCHRON, NAD POHA SOUND, NAD MARE ISLAND, COMINCPAC, COMSCHRON, CINCPOAC, CINCPLANT, CTG 58.4, 58.5.

In view changed situation as regards probability of major surface action desire cruisers and battleships leaving West Coast or transiting Canal be loaded as follows:

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<th>Caliber</th>
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<tr>
<td>15&quot;</td>
<td>40 rounds per gun AP, then HC to capacity</td>
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<td>8&quot;</td>
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Each AP projectile should be matched with a service charge, and each HC with a reduced charge (except 6"). Excess powder capacity over projectile capacity should be used for additional service charges. Desire that ships now in forward area with preponderantly AP loads approach this loading gradually be replacing AP expenditures with HC.

08 0819 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC, COMPOAC, COMSCHRON, CTG 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79.

Upon transfer of VMF(N) 533 from MCAS Macon to OAHU desire maintain a four plane VMF(N) detachment for night fighter defense of MaCAB Area. Request you take necessary action to implement.
06 0129 CONSTHFLT TO CTF 56 Info CINCPAC.CINCPAC.ONFIKINAWA.JCCOM OKINAWA.CTF 51.JCCOM IN SHOPI.CINCPAC ADV.

Earliest maximum employment of fighters from fields OKINAWA Area in accordance with Cinopac and my instructions is being hampered by lack of adequate bulk storage ashore for avgas. and by too strict adherence to schedules in base development plans which subordinates early construction of fields to permit their use by largest possible number of fighters to their ultimate development for heavy and VLR bombers. Request you give necessary orders to IsCom OKINAWA:

A. To increase bulk avgas storage for Yontan, Kadena as soon as possible using all facilities now available in this area including additional pumps and pipelines if needed.
B. Construct additional taxi ways and hardstands at Kadena to accommodate maximum number VF Com TAF can operate from present strip.
C. Continue construction program for VLR operation at Yontan Kadena which will interfere with development VF provision in B or with VF operation there until other fields are available to which to move fighter squadrons which are or may be operating from these fields.

Request you give necessary orders to IsCom IE SHDIA to take similar steps to insure earliest development of fighter strips and adequate avgas bulk storage.

09 0028 CONGENWESPACECOM TO COMFWDAREA, COMGENFOA INFO CINCFOA ADV.

Reference Cinopac Adv Hq 070640. Consider WP Company now at SAI MEM will be badly needed for security of ever increasing AQE Depot and reserve dumps under control WPBC and for which no other security is available.

09 0113 CONSTHFLT TO CTF 51.CTF 56 Info CINCPAC ADV.

Step D your 071225 approved. (Ref. Top Sec)

09 0547 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCWPA.COMSTHFLT, CINCPAC PEARL

Your 0014,54. My 250730 March made available 3 APA and 1 LST to SWPA for lift from rear to forward bases and 2 AK for lift from West Coast. My 271350 made available 8 APA and 6 AKA to SWPA until 1 July. My 020020 made available 35 APA for 1 SWPA lift from West Coast. Com7thFlt 020227 indicates no assistance required in movement of 7th Flt LCT from rear bases. 24 POA LCT now in LEYTE are being offered to 7th Flt this date to augment SWPA facilities for a period of 60 days. All POA LST & LSM currently engaged in accelerated development OKINAWA. It is found that any of these types will not be required in this employment they will be made available to Com7thFlt for temporary use.

09 0604 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 93.CINCPAC ONFIKINAWA.CINCPAC INFO CINCFOA PEARL.COMAF 7

COMGENAFAPOA 072316. Maj.Gen. Willis Hale will continue to exercise operational control of TF 93 (Strategic Air Force PoA) until Lt.Gen. Gille reports to Cinopac his readiness to assume that responsibility at which time he will be designated as CTF 93.
08 1238 COMINCH TO RAMSEY (BR). (Intercept)

The German High Command has been directed to give the following surrender orders to U/Boats:

To remain on the surface, fly a large black or blue flag by day and burning navigation lights at night.

To report their positions in plain language on 500 Kcs every 8 hours and to make for specified points under allied control.

UBoats apparently complying with these instructions are not to be attacked but should be given a wide berth. W/T reports of such sightings are to be made in plain language in the following form:

A. Number of U-Boats.
B. Position.
C. Estimated course.
D. Estimated speed.

If however, U-Boats commit a hostile act or otherwise disregard these orders reports are to be made by normal distress procedure and all appropriate defense measures taken.

09 0612 CINCPAC ADV TO COMFINDAREA. COMNATS INFO COMNATS PAC. COMAIRDEVACGRP 1. CINCPAC PNL. CTF 92.2.

Comincoh 171755 of March directed ComNATS to establish Air-Evacuation Group 1 as a unit of NATSPac. Operational control of Air-EvacGrp 1 was delegated to ComFindAir with respect to the number of planes to be operated, the times at which they are to operate, and the points between which they are to be operated. All other phases of control and administrative control remains with ComNATS. Including flight procedures and technical operating procedures.

09 1151 CTF 57 to COMFINDA. CTF 52.1. INFO CINCPAC BOTH. UMG BHY. CTF 112. CTF 73.

9th May. MIYAKO and ISHIGAKI well bombed. Destroyed 2 fresh aircraft on ground 1 being blown up through entrance to beach cave shelter. At 1501 group aircraft very low detected 25 miles. Enemy then climbed 5000 feet and split. Fighters intercepted splashed 1. Enemy next seen diving in succession. 1st steep dived VICTORIOUS hit flight deck forward. 2nd shallow dived VICTORIOUS clanged deck and fell in sea. Both enemy hard hit by gunfire. 3rd shallow dived HOWE but splashed close by gunfire. 4th struck FORMIDABLE flight deck setting aftr air park alight. Damage: VICTORIOUS hole in flight deck. Forward lift, elevator slow and 10% armament out of action. Can operate slow aircraft at reduced handling speed. Casualties 3 killed 1 seriously injured 15 wounded. FORMIDABLE: 2 pamps out of action ship remains operational. Casualties 1 killed few slightly injured. Withdrawing to COOTIE to square things up and replenish 10th-11th May. Will probably be able to resume striking 12-13 May.

10 0117 CINCPAC ADV TO JSCOM SAIPAN INFO COMFINDAREA.

Rear Admiral Whiting will arrive SAIPAN about 11 May preparatory to compliance my 06019 and 06020. Request naval and Marine personnel of Island Commander's Staff be transferred to his effective 15 May. Also request temporary assignment such Army personnel as appears appropriate after conference COMCNWPAC and RAD. Whiting together with joint recommendation to me and appropriate higher authority in the Army.
10 0537 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCWPAC INFO COMSOPAC. COMTHEAT.

Anti aircraft and training service to Pacific Fleet at 1 1/2F require
availability of additional VJ Squadrons at SAMAR May 060216 and 141222 of
Arpil refers movement VJ Squadrons 8 and 13 from SoPac Area should start
about 15 May. Request reply.

10 0709 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. CNIC INFO CINCPAC PEARL. COMSUBPAC.

Your 301307. 11 PibGroups in Pacific considered adequate. Recommend re-
maininng 2 groups not be activated.

10 0752 DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPA PEARL INFO CINCPA ADV. COMAF 20. DEPCOMAF 20. ADMIN.

CONGEN BOCOM XII. CONGENBOCOM XX. CONGEN XIX.

Adoption of restricted very long range airfield construction program
at OKINAWA as contemplated in your 062209 May 45 will appreciably curtail
the very long range capabilities of OKINAWA E-29 aircraft. Such curtailment
is not in concensus with the operational concept for which the airplane
was designed and should obtain only for the briefest interval as a temporary
emergency situation which cannot be avoided. Para.

Operational experience has firmly established 8500 ft as the minimum
runway length to assure full utilization of very long range aircraft per-
formance capabilities. Previously estimated very long range runway lengths
have thereby been refuted and must be disregarded.

Very long range runway lengths at OKINAWA should not be reduced below
8500 feet because of acquisition of bases closer to the Japanese Empire nor
should currently apparent shorter range objectives influence the 8500 ft
minimum very long range runway requirement at OKINAWA.

It is considered essential therefore that the very long range airfield
construction program at OKINAWA must provide for extensibility of 7500 ft
runways to 8500 ft runways at the earliest possible time.

11 0252 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPA ADV INFO CONGENPOA.

CX 15940. Your 060816 and 090817 May. Concur in assigning 24th Inf Regt
as garrison for FRICITION.

11 0040 CINCPA ADV HQ TO DEPCOMAF. CG XXI BOCOM INFO CINCPA PEARL.

It is requested that information as to enemy naval forces and shipping
which may be sighted by units of the 20th AF be held in a secret status
and transmitted only to military and naval commanders concerned.

11 0042 CINCPA ADV TO DEPCOMAF INFO CONGEN TEN. CINCPA PEARL. CONGEN BOCOM XX

CONGEN BOCOM XX. CONGEN V AF.

The comments of your 100752 are appreciated. However at the present time
at OKINAWA the requirements of tactical aircraft take precedence over
those of the 20th AF. The extension of VIR runways from 7500 to 8500 feet
will be included in base development plans but with a priority determined
after consideration of the requirements of all forces involved in attaining
the overall strategic objective in the war against JAPAN.
11 1028 CONGEN TEN TO CONGEN 3RD HTHR CORPS, CONGEN 2A CORPS INFO CTF 51, CTF 51-22, ISCOM OKINAWA, CONCMCIFC, CINCPAC ADV.
Army
On 12 May continue maximum pressure on entire/front and push envelopment SHURI position. Insure close coordination effort and timing of attacks by adjacent units. Time of attack 0730.


Pass to all routing officers.

(A) My 140240 March established area in which unescorted shipping may be routed under certain conditions. This dispatch amplified by 061446 and 210539 April.

(B) Effective 15 May extend this area under same conditions westward to 130-00 E to include all remaining area under POA shipping control south of Latitude 11-30 N.

(C) ComPhilSeaFron is expected to authorize similar conditions in SANA areas which will enable through routing of majority shipping unescorted between rear ports POA and LYTE.

(D) Also effective 15 May KOSSEL remains open only as emergency anchorage.

(E) Escorts when required from ULITHI to LYTE will be provided by the area commander to whom the shipping is assigned. Independent shipping will proceed along standard routes to position just north ULITHI thence along route LUKE.

12 0626 ISCOM SAFAPAN TO CINCPAC ADV, COMCIFCC, INFO CINCPAC.
Ref CINCPAC Adv 101117. Deputy Commd SAFAPAN Brig. Gen. Colladay and Rear Admiral Whiting conferred today. The staff of the present IsCom SAFAPAN is a unit functioning as the staff of the WestPacReadCom, IsCom, and garrison forces. There is no separate Army Garrison Force Headquarters organised. Total personnel of staff 137 officers and 416 men. This does not include JCC personnel.

Para. Without committing Maj.Gen. Jarman, who will return about 17 May, Gen. Colladay has agreed to integrate incoming naval staff officers with present Island Staff until former are familiar with problems when split off will take place and present Island staff released to whole time WPBC functions. This to be expediated maximum. Para.

It was further agreed that certain Army units will be turned over to new IsCom for operational purposes, administration to remain with Army. This includes garrison forces for Island functions. Prospective IsCom estimates he will require about 70 officers and 150 men exclusive of JCC personnel for his staff.
SECRET

12 0730 CINCFOA ADV TO CONCENPAC, COM HARRANAS, COM-AGUS LSX 2 MARCH. THIS AS
PEACE, COMHRAF, CINCFOA, CONCENPAC, COMESA-FSUJAP.

The term "Token Garrison" as used with respect to FOA bases will be defined
to mean a self-sustaining unit of the minimum practicable strength.
the primary mission of which will be to maintain U.S. possession of the base
involved. This unit should comprise personnel and material capable of pro-
viding such minimum weather communications or similar services as may be
desirable for support of our operations elsewhere. The unit may in each
case be increased as necessary to provide for its own security or to pro-
vide these services including emergency land or seaplane operations if they
are essential or facilitate logistic support of the unit itself. Hereafter
when a base or island is to be reduced to a token garrison the area
commander concerned will submit to Cincfoa the recommendation of
the token garrison required with copies to interested senior type or service
commanders.

12 0918 CONCEN TEN TO CG3RDPHIB, CG2ACORS INFO JSCOM 331 CTC 51.19 51.22 CTF 51.
CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Captured enemy map believed very recent date indicates 44th IB occupies
position north of NAHA opposing 6th MarDiv. Possibility enemy committing
major reserves, 10th Army at 130730 I continues maximum effort ACROSS
front. 3rdPHIB Corps exert strong pressure to envelop SHURI position and
destroy forces in immediate front. 24th Corps capture conical hill and
continue attack to envelop SHURI position. Close coordination of effort
and timing of attack by adjacent units required.

12 1450 MACARTHUR TO CONCENF OA INFO CINCPOA BTH, CONCENPAC AGUS, CG. ASCACEN, CG USAFVE

CX 16076. Desire that instructions be issued directing General Gilbreath
and his headquarters as a complete unit be transferred to NAHA and report
for duty to CINCPAC. Request that General Gilbreath, accompanied by
small party, proceed immediately by air transportation. Remainder of person-
nel proceed by air as they may be relieved from duty and excess baggage
and equipment proceed by water transport. All transportation arranged by
this headquarters please instruct General Gilbreath to advise at earliest
practicable date air and water transport requirements, logistics and approxi-
mate dates of readiness.

13 0145 CTF 51 TO TF 51 INFO CINCPAC BTH, GCSTHEL.

Following letter received from ComGen 10th Army quoted in abbreviated form
"Desire express my deep appreciation for splendid support ground operation
by support ships. Power and accuracy of these ships contributed materially
to land success and subsequent advance with minimum loss of life XV-ATI
MGWSS CO ships to close shore though faced with foul water and enemy
guns permitted more accurate close support and effective E/A support
EUProject work of crews under trying conditions of long hours at general
quarters and constant threat of enemy air is especially praiseworthy.
If I may borrow a Navy term I would like to say well done, Buckner."
This message is greatly appreciated and should encourage us to make our
support of the troops even more effective.
SECRET

MAY (909)

13 0604 CONGEN WESTPACFOC TO CONGENPFOA INFO CGAAMFOA CGNFOA DX/CH LOSSON JUAN,
YOK HOMOK, JSCOM TAIWAN, CS 73RD WING, CGAAMFOA ADMIN.

Ref AAFPOA Admin 081349 and your 092349.

A. GUAM: JSCOM GUAM states urgent need exists at Depot Field for all 3 aviation squadrons. Need exists for 1 st Service Co. to assume duties presently being performed by 457th Aviation Sqdn.

B. TINIAN: 180 men of 457th Sqdn now being used to assist ordnance troops in handling VLR ammo and to provide security and assistance to staging fighters. Additional personnel to handle VLR ammo needs will be required when 58 Wing begins full scale operations. Unit is contributing directly to air operations.

C. SAIPAN: 435th Sqdn was released to control of 73 Wing upon arrival for duty in connection with operation FA Isely Field. No troops are available either within the Wing or on the Island to replace this unit. 73 Wing concurs. Sqdns entire activity has been in direct and undiverted support of air operations.

D. Shortage of Army service troops for both air and ground operations on all these islands is severe. It is recommended that squadrons on SAIPAN and TINIAN not be moved, that a 21 Service Co be immediately sent to GUAM and that 2 additional aviation squadrons from sources outside this command be procured for Depot Field at earliest possible. It is desired to emphasize that neither 457th nor 435th Squadrons can be spared from their functions which are immediately concerned with air force responsibilities.

13 0631 CGNPOA ADV TO CONGEN 10 INFO CONSTATEL CTG 51, CGT 200, 23, 29, 36, CGAAMFOA, CGAAMFOA PEARL, CONGENAAAMFOA (ADMIN).

Your 081327 not to all, Amplifying my 110822 Cinpoa plans have been and are to establish aircraft ashore on OKINAWA in the following types and priorities: Priority 1 - Sufficient fighters to assure control of the air and provide adequate close air support. Priority 2 - Long range fighters and medium bombers for close support and or neutralization of enemy airfields in order relieve other forces of these responsibilities.

Without utilizing any additional Fighter Group at KADENA as you propose you will have available about 22 May 3 Marine Fighter Groups and 2 long range Army fighter groups totaling about 483 fighters. These aircraft are capable of coping with the present tactical situation as certain to fighters. Desire adherence to plans by establishing the 41st Medium Bomb Group at KADENA. This medium group is presently on OAHU and its movement forward will be expedited by GenAAAMFOA.

My 110822 directed ground echelon MAC 14 be moved OKINAWA earliest possible. Upon its arrival it must be so used as to delay basing 41st BnB Grp at KADENA as planned my serial 0005045 28 April 1945.

13 1518 CGNPOA ADV TO CONGENAAAMFOA INFO CG XX AP CGNPOA PEARL, CONGENAAAMFOA (ADMIN).

The schedule of your 120845 is in accord with my serial 0005045 of 28 April. It is concurred in for planning purposes with the understanding that construction progress will be influenced by tactical requirements until capture of the island is completed. Delays in capture of southern airfields and requirements for extension of runways to 8500 feet will make it more difficult to meet planning dates.
In accordance ComSoPac 3004/1 April not to or needed by all, as of 1 May 1945 ComAirSoPac is dissolved and ComSoPac assumes duties previously performed by ComAirSoPac and CG 11/3. For purposes administration and correspondence ComAirSoPac will be deleted and the address "ComSoPac (Air Admin)" will be used. This unit with senior aviation officer ComSoPac staff as officer in charge will remain at GUADALCANAL until a later announced date and function administratively in same manner as heretofore by ComAirSoPac.

Both Army and Navy are apprehensive as to adequacy of existing and planned facilities in forward areas to meet operational requirements for bulk petroleum products. Since facilities planned and installed in PACAREA and KYUK KYUS have been undertaken under the cognizance of CINCPAC and in view of urgency of this matter the Army Navy Petroleum Board with the approval of Cominch, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces has designated a Joint Service Committee with instructions to proceed to PEARL HARBOR and to Headquarters CINCPAC and Headquarters CINCPAC to discuss existing and planned facilities and to inspect the installations or locations in forward areas designed for this purpose. The committee is being directed to submit any recommended changes and additions for these locations direct to CINCPAC who will make dispatch recommendations to CNO. As a second part of its responsibilities the committee is being directed to give consideration to the question of adequacy of petroleum product storage and handling facilities to meet all service requirements as proposed by ANP 61/1 copy of which is being mailed to addresses. The latter consideration will involve matters under the cognizance of ComSoPac and CINCPAC. To the extent necessary to assure complete information it is requested that representatives of your command familiar with the problems accompany and assist the committee in the expeditious completion of its missions. Names of committee members follow: Col. H. W. Howe, AAF, steering member; Comdr H. H. Bagley, USNR; Comdr G. F. Lindley, USNR; Lt. Col. A. B. Small, USN; Lt. Comdr. B. D. Davis, USN; Mr. A. J. Yonkers, AUS; and Lieut. E. R. Specht, USNR. In addition either R. Adm. W. H. Smith, CG, USN, Chief Planning Officer of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Dept., or R. Adm. A. F. Carter, USN, will accompany the committee for conferences with CINCPAC and CINCPAC staffs and to such other forward points as developments may make advisable. Request clearance for committee be expedited.

ComGenFMFPac 131504 passed to you separately is not recommended for approval because:

(A) The Naval Construction Battalions prospectively available are needed for heavy construction projects and they are not now constituted equipped or trained for combat engineering duties as units of a field army.

(B) The Fleet Marine Force should continue to be constituted for amphibious operations wherein its elements are supported by the Fleet.

...continued
SECRET

14 0722 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPAC HQ

(c) When an amphibious corps or other unit of the Fleet Marine Force operates inland away from the beachhead as a unit of a field army it should be given support by the service organization of the field army in the same manner that such support is given to Army Corps including all services required to make the Marine tactical units effective in such operations beyond the distance at which they are normally supported by the Fleet.

14 0809 CINCPAC ADV HQ TO CTF 93, CINCPAC, COMMANDER IN CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC


14 1442 COMINCH FOR JCS TO CINCPAC UDT A

To coordinate the Air Transport services of the Army and Navy in the Pacific both with regard to requirements for air lift of the Theater Commanders and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of air transport services and facilities, you are directed to appoint appropriate representatives from your command to confer with newly constituted NATS Sub Committee on Pacific Air Transport programs. Your representatives and such conference will consider and coordinate the following:

(A) Standards for determining air lift requirements.
(B) Estimated requirements for air route air lift in the Pacific through 1946.
(C) Limitations on route capacities.
(D) Joint use of ground facilities and services, and
(E) Tightening priority procedures to assure that the movement of personnel and cargoes carried is of such urgency in the prosecution of the war as to require transport by air.

Senior members of NATS Sub Committee are Commodore Pacific Division and CompDir NATS. You should communicate names of your representatives to the NATS officers who will take all necessary steps to facilitate early meeting and action on this subject. The Joint互通 11000 10 of foregoing.

16 0959 COMINCH TO COMGEN 10, CTF 51 INFO COMINCH UDT A.

At 0900 I (-9) 17 May coincident with relief of Vice Admiral Turner by Vice Admiral Hill accordance my 130406 command of all forces on shore in OKINAWA Area shall pass to ComGen 10. He shall then assume responsibility to me for defense and development of captured positions conforming to directives issued by CinCPAC. Vice Admiral Hill as CTF 51 will continue to control air defense of OKINAWA and of naval forces present and shall report to ComGen 10 for this purpose. Support of 10th Army by 5th Fleet will continue.
SECRET

S218

17 1344 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, COGON TEn INFO CINCPAC, HIKL, CINCPAC HIKL.

Ref my 130531. COMSOUTH 150306 and 150411. COGON TEn 151130. Refs not for all. Reiterate that 41st Medium Bomb Group will be activated on FAMEN with priority ahead of 5th Fighter Group. Adhere to all control outlined in COGON TEn 151130 which is considered to be best solution under the circumstances.

17 1425 CINCPAC ADV TO COGON TEn INFO CINCPAC, CTG 99.2, COMSOUTH HIKL, PEARL, COMSOUTH HIKL.

Request CTG 99.2 submit priority dispatch reports each Saturday list for each Air Group, Fleet Air Wing or other major component the total aircraft on hand, total aircrews on hand and the air strength available for operations. Distribution same as this dispatch.

17 0007 CINCPAC ADV TO COGON TEn INFO CINCPAC, HIKL, CTG 99.2, COMSOUTH HIKL, PEARL.

In accordance with COMSOUTH 160959 report for duty in control of air defense of CINCPAC and of naval forces present.

18 1208 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, PEARL, HIKL, CINCPAC.

Your 172854 Agreement was reached at HAILA on 16 May between Rear Admiral Chamberlain and Capt. Adm, Sherman to the effect that U.S. Forces would assume primary responsibility for topographical surveys of J & K for needs of ground forces that CINCPAC would retain primary responsibility for hydrographic surveys and mapping of beaches for needs of amphibious forces and that each CINCPAC would prepare such maps as are needed for its own air forces. The principles of this agreement have the approval of CINCPAC.

18 1035 COMAND CARTASKFOR TO CINCPAC, BOTH COGON, COMSOUTH HIKL, CTG 99.2, COGON HIKL, ALL FTF AND TG, COGON HIKL.

Commander 2nd Carrier Tank Force Pacific, VAdm. McCain, this day hoisted flag in SHANGRI LA.

18 2005 COMAND & COG TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC, PEARL, CINCPAC, HIKL, PEARL.

The request for permanent assignment of SeaBee's to Marine Amphibious Corp contained in CG RIMPAC's 131504 not approved for reasons given in your 140722.

19 0054 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSOUTH HIKL INFO CINCPAC, COMSOUTH HIKL, CINCPAC, HIKL, COMSOUTH HIKL.

Para 1. My 140247 and your 150625 not to all ades. Then practicable send ComPhibGroup 12 in his flagship to MANILA to report to ComSOUTH for temporary duty in connection with amphibious training of Army troops in the PHILIPPINES. While employed on this duty he will have the status of a TF Condr or TG Condr in the 7th Fit as may be directed by ComSOUTH. The detailed naval procedures in amphibious training will conform to directives issued by Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet as the cognizant type commander.

Para 2. Transition will be sent to report to ComSOUTH for duty with PhibGroup 12.
19 1600 SGNCO TO CINCPOAC BOTH INFO COMINT OCN NAVFUNCH NAU TASS.

Have designated Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to conduct further investigation of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR. Lieut. John Ford Trenchard has been detailed to assist Admiral Hewitt will arrive PEARL HARBOR about 01 May to conduct preliminary examination of certain records and files prior to arrival of Adm. Hewitt. Fullest cooperation in this investigation should be given.

19 0431 COMGEN TEN TO ComINT, INFO CTF 51, CINCPOAC.

In order not to unduly subject AFs to unnecessary risk at target recommend consideration be given to use LCTs and LKA's for mounting garrison and resupplying shipping for 3rd D. Recommend all garrison oceaneering and resupply ships where feasible be staged through YAMASHITA. These ships to be discharged there and reloaded into smaller craft such as LCTs and LKAs. Transfer of cargo to small craft; OKINAWA impractical due additional load on port facilities as result divers on 3rd C shipping here. After transfer can go. Vessels to sail OKINAWA as control point and be forwarded target in daily increments as unloading situation warrants. This plan will place resupply and garrison and shipping at control point from which some can be sent target on short notice and as required. This will insure minimum vessels at target for minimum time. Request your comment to originator and both CINCPOAC and Adv.

19 0942 GH. SHF A TRD TO COM AAF HANYA INFO CUSAIF CHINA, CHINA-GAOF, SHHH, CHA.

CX 16547. Allied Air Force operations in support of CHINA Theater is subject.

Air forces are authorized to strike target in INDO CHINA and JC CHINA south and east of JAPAN. Inclusive. JAPAN is the far point and road, water and rail lines of communication from HANKOU through KAIJO-HASAN, HAIHAI and HANKING to HANG. 14th AF keeps AAF informed of hostile situation and areas occupied by friendly forces in JAPAN and other pertinent matters. Para.

Subject to weather and availability of aircraft and profitable targets Allied Air Forces will make strikes as follows:

1. Against enemy INDO CHINA coastal lines of communications from HANG to SAIGON.
2. Against enemy river, railroad and oil lines of communication extending east north and west from CANTON.
3. Against other enemy lines of communication within range as arranged with 14th AF.
4. Heavy bomber sorties (H2X) nightly against the SHANGHAI-NANKING areas and the HONGKONG-CANTON Area.

5. Against shipping in the harbors and coastal areas of INDO CHINA and INDO CHINA except that north of POCHENG strikes against shipping outside of harbors are prohibited. Allied Air Forces prior to initiating strikes which require aircraft to fly over water areas NORTH PACIFIC Ocean Area will obtain clearance therefor from CINC OA, Para.

For continuing missions such as nightly sorties against CHINA areas clearance for the operations as A UHRN will be requested. Allied Air Forces will arrange for attack of targets in CHINA with 14th AF and will notify latter of missions prior to their dispatch and results thereof upon completion.

CommA&d Air Forces is authorized direct communication with CINC OA and with 14th AF for the coordination of operations covered by this radial Para.

CommCEN USAF CHINA and this Hqtrs will be made info addescs of all communications relating to above operations.
SECRET

19 2355 CGAF/PAC TO CGAF 10TH ARMY COMARATIONAL 2 INFO FICU 93-261, CGAF 10TH ARMY COMARATIONAL 22, 33, 31, CGAF/OA BOTH CGAF/OA MARCORP 22, 33, 31, COGENAFALIEST.

Ref: DMAL 130126. 48 pilots furnished for reliefs and build up Hakair on 31 and 33 on their allowance of 313. Remaining reliefs will be furnished as called for by you. Complete relief pilots at 2 months impractical due to transportation involved and lack of pilots in MarCorp 2. 2 month rotation requires billeting and pool facilities in rear areas not now available. Present planning calls for 10 months combat tour and 2,2 pilots per assigned slot seat to permit reasonable employment and periodic rest in combat area. If this is inadequate request substantiation by sufficient data and recommendation for increase in procurement and training program will be submitted to MarCorp 2. Until revision of allowances approved and additional pilots provided by MarCorp present program will remain in effect. Recom and fullest exploitation rest provisions L/GENUS.


Ref: Para 3 of your Sec Ltr Ser. 00282-9 not to all and TAF 10th Army OpPlan 1-45 desire following coordination and assignment of responsibility for photographic and photographic activities at OKINAWA:

(A) VD-3, VD-254, Ger. Inter-Ron 1 and any other naval or Marine aerial photographic and intelligence units present will be assigned for operational control to ComPhotoGp 1 under ComFA/AFing 1.

(B) ComPhotoGp 1 will have the following responsibilities for the units under his command:

1. Assign and direct flights for all photographic missions.
2. Assign priorities consistent with orders from higher echelons.
3. Coordinate and direct movement of photographic aircraft, supplies and personnel by reference to their support organizations.
4. Coordinate and establish a naval and Marine Central Photo Interpretation and Intelligence Unit with Inter-Ron 1 as the nucleus.
5. Assign priorities to interpretation unit for production of photographic intelligence.

(C) TAF 10th Army will for the present retain operational and administrative control of the 25th Photo Recon Sqdn, Fara. As soon as ComPhotoGp 1 is prepared to operate, CGAF will issue basic directives for systematic reconnaissance and mapping photography of selected areas of the Empire and Asian mainland required for naval exercises, Fara. PhotoGroup 2 will remain under direct operational control of TAF AFW for staging aircraft throughovable and OKINAWA as necessary.

20 0830 COMPHIBPAC TO COMPHIBSTRAPAC ADD COMPHIBPAC INFO COMPHIBSTRAPAC 10th COMARTAC RCAF COMPHIBSTRAPAC 12, COMARTAC 10th.

Soon as possible each action asea submit by airmail to originator in ELCRADO draft of type basic amphibious ship to shore training program for Army troops in accord with ComPhibPac previous training policies as modified by recent practice. Course should involve training first of HMC's second MCTs third reinforced Army Division, including training of complete division shore parties and also training of Corps Hqtrs and Troops. Entire course for all elements of 1 Div of troops should last 12 training days not including loading times and should include ship to shore movements both in boats and LVTs with subsidiary use of DUKWs. Para. 2399. - Continued -
SECRET

200830 COMHIBPAC TO COMPHIBTRAFCO CHINA SEA, 1st MAR

Expect that control vessels LSTs, gemboats and aircraft will anticipate. Essential that ship to shore movement of Division, artillery, tracked and wheeled vehicles, other equipment and supplies in considerable quantities be included in plan. Organization and tests of communications should be included in plan. Para.

After coordination with ComPhibPac final plans will be issued by ComPhibCorps L2 in consultation with COMPac and ComTheFIt area.

As a separate matter each action area directed within a day can and field training schedule for Army JACCS in addition to those employed in landing with troops, and each be prepared to send to PHILIPPINES L 1 for training teams. Scope of JACCS training should be similar to practical field training now conducted by ComPhibTroops on coast and by ComTheFIt, ComConPhibPac and AdComPhibPac in operation at PHIL.

201734 COMHAF S.IPA TO COMINCWFC BOTH INFO CO USEAF CHINA SEA, 1st MAR ATO ATO A

AX 90353. Request clearance for continuing missions of aircraft flying over water areas of the Pacific Ocean Area as follows:
(1) Nightly sorties against SHANGHAI Area.
(2) All strikes and missions on FUKUOKA and on CHINA Coast as far north as PUCHOW.

A clearance will be requested prior to each mission on all other flights over Pacific Ocean Area not mentioned above. COMINCWFC and ComTheFIt will be made info aids on all air intents when aircraft will fly over ICA. Thus clearance requested in accordance with directive issued by COMAF (Ref CIC 16947) as result of recent intertheater conference.

210850 COMINCWFC ADV TO CHINA, CHO INFO CHINA SEA, 1st MAR ATO ATO A

Refer Cominch & CIC 161524. Trained A2H hunter-killer crew not desired but do desire maximum number escort carriers for transport duty. Anticipating increased requirements for moving aircraft and for training recommend endeavoring to obtain as many CVEs from British as possible x Command and recommendations on redistribution FACs CVE between combat, training and transport will be submitted soon.

(This message delivered by hand by Maj. Penney 22 Mar)

140938 COMPHIBPAC TO COMPHIBTRAFCO

Your 120839. Release of 3-plane squadrons as proposed by L2C20 (75) will permit release of tenders for overhaul and later redeployment in PTA as follows. CA60 about 1 June. SAN CARLOS about 15 June. TANGIER about 1 July. TANGIER now scheduled for overhaul in U.S. leaving CICW about 15 July. CA60 now scheduled for BANGKOK overhaul about 15 June but overhaul in U.S. would be preferable if practicable. SAN CARLOS due for overhaul in August. Above release dates are dependent on actual departure of 1 F21 and 1 F6T-5A squadron from this area. If departure of squadron is delayed release of tenders will be delayed for an equivalent period.
23 0216 CINCPAC ADV TO CINC AC ADV, PEARL, JAVA, S. COMOKINHWA, COMACAPAC.

Your 210635 not to all. Recommend you give consideration to development of WANA Airports as a do at which short notice can be made and loaded from aircraft transp. and elastic available for air or other flight. It is obvious that such a facility will be needed for NMAC to be the best site respectively available. Your L.O. also refers.

22 2315 MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR: COMING TO CINC AC ADV, RABU.

JCS are now considering policies with respect to United Nations prisoners of war held by JAPAN. Policies have been proposed by State for Navy Coordinating Committee and by British Chiefs of Staff which are substantially the same except S. NC policy is primarily for our nationals. JCS proposes repatriation of United Nations prisoners of war be given priority second only to military operations and maintenance of occupation forces and places responsibility on the "Supreme Allied Commander" to coordinate policies for prisoners of war from confinement assume control. In this plan it is assumed that they are accorded proper care and maintenance by the Japanese Imperial High Command. The Supreme Allied Commander "will accord liaison on prisoners of war matters to duly accredited representatives of the other United Nations and arrange for such representatives to have access to their prisoners of war and will not government to conduct relief of transfer and repatriation. It is proposed that 189,000 Japanese held prisoners of war, 124,000 are from British Commonwealth 30,000 Dutch and 35,000 American. They exclude Chinese in their proposal. They propose that priority be given to the repatriation of sick and wounded but that no differentiation be made between nationalities services and between officers and other ranks. They are one to charge "Supreme Commanders" with making adequate provision for the care of prisoners of war in terms of any armistice provision of necessary food clothing comforts medical attention and protection for recovered prisoners of war control of prisoner of war camps collection and protection of enemy records and apprehension and imprisonment of any personnel charged with serious maltreatment of prisoners of war. They also propose that each Supreme Commander include on his staff personnel of each Allied Nation to assist in evaluation of their own nationals. Comments on these proposals are requested.

22 2316 COMING TO CINC PAC ADV.

WAR 85478 of 21 May 1945 being passed to you for information and your comment as you may wish to make.

24 0540 CINC PAC ADV TO CTF 93 INFO CTF 94, CINC KORAFICA (CHIC).

Your 230342. The task of neutralizing enemy air bases at KHH and YLL is assigned to CTF 93. The manner in which this task is accomplished and the means used is left to the judgment of the CTF. Assistance can be obtained from CTF 94 as practicable. Of the 2 Heavy Bomb Groups scheduled for the current combat area desire that the 494th Grp at WABA be the 1st to move forward and that not to exceed 2 Sqns of the 50th Bomb Bg. nor in any case to the KIWINARS in time to relieve the 414th Bomb Grp of its present task of neutralizing enemy air bases.

2910
24 0600 CINCPAC ADV TO CHINCAPAC DFC COMGENOA CINCPAC

ComGenPOA dis 2205/46, UrDis 2310/46. In order to establish the terms of procedure for the release of Army units to you and the movement of Army units within the FCA the following proposal is made:

(A) Army units to be released to you will be named according to SAs L41.34.

(B) Decisions as to movements of Army units will be made on an ad hoc basis. Matters concerning Army units expatriated in NCOs and CNAs will be cleared with ComGenPOA. I will assure that ComGenPOA is consulted with you before making such decision. All in accordance with policy. Request your concurrence.

24 1259 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH DFC CINCPAC

Although proposals summarized in JST 9473 passed by ComINCH are not set forth in sufficient detail to permit full action, following points appear worth consideration.

(A) As any Chinese prisoners will probably prove to be more political than military and will be likely to present unique problems it appears desirable to accept British proposal to exclude them.

(B) SECNAV wording regarding prisoner of war liaison with the more Allied Commander" appears to place such liaison on basis of need rather than right, and therefore seems preferable to the approach as this subject which refers to "staff".

Para. Insofar as CINCPAC is concerned no need in terms of representation of other United Nations at his headquarters and such representation is not desired until need is definitely established. This is particularly true of Dutch and Chinese.

26 0843 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CINCPAC DFC COMGENOA CINCPAC

Present and future requirements for combat CVEs are set at 30 i.e., provides for escort, direct air support missions, AAC and for logistic support groups. Do not feel this number can be reduced. The requirement will not be met until CarDiv 28 is activated during the first quarter of 1946 and precludes any diversion of Pacific CVEs for transport or training until that time.

Para. Best present estimate approximately 15 CVEs for transport only. More CVEs required for training. I now and I in Oshawa. These requirements can only be met by additional CVEs from ATLANTIC and British.

Para. In view above comments recommend no change in previous distribution. Pacific CVEs. Recommend assignment additional CVEs made available from ATLANTIC as follows:

(A) First 4 CVEs to ComCarTransRons Inc.

(B) Next 2 CVEs to ComAirFac (CarDivs 11 & 12) for training.

(C) Remaining plus any received from British to ComCarTransRons Inc.

This answers Cominch and GNO 181524 and Cominch 20061 as well as 260370 also refers. References not to nor needed by all.

29
SECRET

HANC, NEW YORK

270141

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS TO CONDAFF INFO CHICAGO ADV.

At present unloading of garrison and maintenance units is so slow behind schedule. In order that base development may proceed according to plan and that unjustified pile up of ships in port shall not continue, it is imperative that following questions be answered:

1. Do you consider that unloading rate will improve sufficiently to catch up with schedule?

2. If answer to 1 is negative what unloading rate can you maintain? Your reply will be a basis for adjustments to ship in advance.

270510

CHICAGO ADV. TO CONDAFF INFO CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, TO GEN. STUART, WASHINGTON, D.C.

300630 CHICAGO ADV. TO NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL, ILLINOIS, TO COMGHQ, I.T. C.

Your 231830 not to all. Designate and initiate 'train' as early as possible. Sigs and required service units now on West Coast for transfer to Moriac as soon after 1 July as practicable. Also designate and initiate 'train' for transfer to PAT I in December or January from this date. Place on call CH 131329. In order to insure that Comaff requirements are met, CH 131329 will be requested by separate dispatch to initiate a P.O. return train on call. Movement forward of V.B(I) Lms, 1/4 and 1/4 units must be planned.

270633

CHICAGO ADV. TO UNITED SERVICE LINES, ILLINOIS, TO POLISH AIR FORCE, I.T.

I.ADD 280630 refers. Estimated date for completion of 3rd Fighter Group is disturbingly late. Construction is being speeded to provide facilities to operate units here on time. Morafac set forth in Enclosure 3 my serial 300630. Advice of any information to correct this situation and to accelerate entire work. I reiterate that additional assistance you require.

270734

CHICAGO ADV. TO CONDAFF INFO CHICAGO ADV. TO GANT.

CH 17129. Refer your 240630 May. Concur procedure suggested on release of Army units. It is assumed that ComaffCA will effect transfers of Army units from F.B(I) Lms. 1/4. No specific action is intended. I reiterate that units released by F.B(I) Lms. 1/4 aren't indicated.

270941

CHICAGO ADV. TO CONDAFF INFO CHICAGO ADV. TO GANT.

Strength of Air7thFlt by sqdns pursuant to my 210630 is now scheduled to be 8 V.B(I) Lms., 6 V.B(IS), 4 V.B(I), 22 V. Ml. and 11 B. (MS) Sqdns. I order to meet Morafac requirements outlined in my 210630 and revised by Cominc & CH 300130 of Sept 1944 it will be necessary to transfer 7th Flt W.B(I) Lms. for designation to other &/or units, 1/31 July 1944. As applied to specific squadrons this would result in retention of V. (MS) 137 to west coast as already scheduled and in retention here of V. (MS) 147, 2nd V.B(I) Lm. Sq designated by you to be transferred in order to meet your concurrence.

Para. To what extent will this alter your CH 16 xx 14 thaw 1345?
27 0725 CINCPAC ADV TO JOINT CHIEF INFO CINCPAC, JOINT CHIEF, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CORD, JOINT FORC, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CORD, CINCPAC, COMDAC, COMNAVAC, ADV.

Conditions on OKINAWA continue such as to necessitate restriction of visits there to those whose presence is necessary for the protection of the war and whose visit cannot be deferred without detriment to the war effort. Transportation and accommodations are too much in demand to be afforded to others and officers on duty there are too much occupied to have time to attend to visits and needs of entertainers, tourists, or visitors in the case of officers on temporary duty for special technical purposes unless the latter is immediately required. Clearance for visits will be by CINCPAC Advance Headquarters. These also furnish transportation and are charged with seeing that transportation is not furnished to anyone not properly cleared. All concerned are requested to discourage requests for visits to ATOMIC until they are subjected unless the case is considered particularly meritorious in which case it may be presented to CINCPAC for consideration.

29 0244 CINCPAC ADV TO JOINT CHIEF INFO CINCPAC, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CORD, JOINT FORC, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CORD, CINCPAC, COMDAC, COMNAVAC, ADV.

Desire the following action taken in connection with the above:

(a) In every case requests for additional personnel to be added to CINCPAC for approval.

(b) Request contained in 290152 A is subject to the condition of the clearance if available. Copies of this should be sent promptly to CINCPAC for approval.

(c) No ATOMIC or civilian internee will be returned to enemy territory overseas for clandestine use unless approved by CINCPAC in each case. Requests for use of such persons must be accompanied by current reports on the individual's and plans for their utilization including transportation and communications.

(d) Further desire that necessity for approval in 290152 B be reexamined and if necessary request be sent to CINCPAC.

29 0659 CINCPAC ADV TO JOINT CHIEF INFO CINCPAC, JOINT FORC, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CORD, JOINT FORC, JOINT STAFF, JOINT CORD, CINCPAC, COMDAC, COMNAVAC, ADV.

JCS 1002/45 of Dec 1944 and JCS 762/10 are considered to be in force for the control of shipping in the Pacific Ocean Areas unless specifically cancelled by the JCS.

Para. In order that the criteria may be complied with, drawing for the War or Navy Departments desire to divert from the 762/10 the bulk ports for discharge in ports of the JCS should be referred in advance of applying to CINCPAC for inclusion in his shipping schedule on the basis of the capacity of the ports of destination to receive such cargo for discharge.

Para. Any shipping in the foregoing categories which is contrary to knowledge that the cargoes are in excess of the capacity of the port in discharge or which is diverted to the JCS without reference to CINCPAC can be accepted only with the understanding that the responsibility for all arrived in the discharge and turn around of such vessels rests with the diverting agency.

Para. CINCPAC 1231 of January and CINCPAC 04011 of Feb not to have been approved by all also refer.

Request War Department be informed as appropriate.
SECRET
NAT (GOT)

29 0250 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH AND CNO.

Cominach CNO 27JUL42. Guarantee of safe conduct for aircraft crossing through ICA operating area will be difficult if not impossible unless there is precise agreement as to time and route. Operations of two I-400s may make it inexpedient to give such guarantee at some particular times. Cincpac's approval of any understanding reached or any change or modification thereof should be obtained before final agreement is made in order that suitable notifications and arrangements can be made. Subject to foregoing concurs.

29 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO CNO INFO COMINCH AC 25 29662 NEAR AC 29656 REMARK.

Ur 241929 current and prospective enemy tactics dictate that a cease practice of keeping warheads in ready service condition in carriers or elevator pits. Accordingly consider it essential that a scheme adequate for warheads be provided in carriers.

Para. However in the case of carriers engaged in "escort and support operations" which is taken to mean CVEs, the possibility of finding suitable torpedo targets does not justify the danger and displacement of heavier armament which are involved in the carrying of torpedoes on board. Accordingly concurs in proposal to remove torpedoes from these ships.

29 0903 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CNO 29666 INFORM CNO RAIT 2THRA INTRA.

CINCPAC NEAR PACIFIC

Since it now appears that the present forward movement of the ground echelon of IWM 14 from SWA will result in readiness of this group to operate considerably in advance of 41st Bomb Group of which movement has been delayed the previous directives of 190621 and 191224 are cancelled and replaced by the following:

A. Ground echelon of both groups will be established sooner, if expediently as possible.
B. Squadrons of both groups will be called forward at discretion as Comm 10.
C. Movement of IWM 612 to SWA will be deferred in separate directive.

Para. Advise action taken.

29 2207 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC NEAR PACIFIC.

Recommendation your 206084 refer.

A. 4 LantFlt CVEs ordered redeployed and assigned to CTFN 232130.
B. Remaining CVEs in Lant required here for training and will not be redeployed.
C. In response to representations made according to 232247 not to all Admiralty states no additional British CVEs can be made available and now necessary to ask for the return of Athlone, Arun and Taku in order to support British PacFlt. No change in present distribution of PacFlt CVEs will be made.
SECRET

May (GCT)

30 2100 SHCHV (DIR. U.S. NIL) TO CINC-AC ADV INFO CINC-AC FG.

By 2910254, new policy provides that damage to certain vessels will be released upon safe arrival at HALL HARBOR or continental ports. Others after return to service. To control release of information, only will initially release battle-damage information concerning ships, battleships cruisers submarines and Nukluss force ships to appropriate U.S. or any other vessel if initial availability is more than ten days. District Public relations officers may initially release all damage upon damage to vessels if initial availability is more than ten days. Last date they will be released, damage, including all vessels and data, will be released. Final damage photographs and description released, only after receipt of photographs or specific description from a Central Service.

31 0020 CENTRAL TO CINC-AC FOR CINC-AC ADV.

Subject agreements reached at conference 54 to 54, including WPA and DODFAC support of CINC-AC Theater. CINC-AC decisions must be reviewed as agreements concern him.

31 0343 CINC-AC ADV TO FGDIV ATG INFO ATG CINCPAC CINC-AC NAPOG CINC-AC HONOLULU CINC-AC CINC-AC

Consider tactical situation CINC-AC is still in the enemy area. Your transport schedules for June indicate regular transport flights between CINC-AC and CINC-AC will lead to unannounced movements concerning travel to CINC-AC that may contravene the purpose of 291025. All air travel from or via CINCPAC to CINC-AC is subject to mittigent control by CINC-AC. Request you modify your June schedules accordingly.

31 0489 CINC-AC ADV TO CINCPAC CINCPAC ATG ADV CINC-AC HONOLULU CINC-AC CINC-AC CINC-AC

In view urgent need transport CVEs desired only those repairs required to insure reliable operating condition. If a condition can be accomplished during the yard period required for above repairs, priority should be given to those which affect the carrier capability of the vessel. These alterations are AGY 179 increase living accommodation. AGY 196 install additional dry-bunk in galley. AGY 176 install additional and closed wardroom galley. Move forward wardroom bulkhead at Prov 2.1 and instal additional wardroom mess table. These alterations only as required on an emergency basis. Removal of 2nd catapult not desired. It is assumed, however, not to nor needed by all.

30 2305 CINC-AC ADV TO CINC-AC ADV INFO CINC-AC

Regret that conditions at CINC-AC are such as to deny in the little to authorize visit to CINC-AC at this time by the above personnel. See by 270725, will reconsider if conditions warrant before leaves the Pacific.
01 2303 CHILD'S ADV IN 2 ENS. T.C.

Your 313525 approved. The advances of the past few days are not satisfying. I believe you have destroyed the enemy armor in a fairly new position for long.

02 0035 CHILD'S ADV TO COMMANDER, CHILD'S ADVANCE FORCE, O'BRIEN, OFFICER, CTF 21, OCTOBER 1.

This is my OpOrd 6-45.

Task organization as prescribed by CTG 21. Forces are under the control of CTF 96.1 as designated by CTF 96.1. NAVADA has one of the most important roles in the task of naval reconquest of the Islands.

1. Information from native sources indicates a native constructed command post on ENIDU ISLAND, JAJOJ AIRL is visible to the naked eye and used by Army and Navy commanders and command personnel during air attacks.

2. Forces assigned this operation will do not NAVADA command and control personnel by coordinated air and surface attack on 16th. In order to reduce Japanese ability and will to resist able and move on to newer training.

3. CTF 96 provide supplementary intelligence and base necessary detailed plan for air strikes, bombardment, execute direct and indirect fires during surface firing and coordination of operations. CHILD'S ADV route NAVADA and escorts to arrive at objectives with a specified CTF 96 assistance to NAVADA, 16 June 1402 designated 9-day.

4. Ammunition replenishment for NAVADA and escorts 1402.

5. Communications PAC 700 and PAC 71. NAVADA and escorts report to operational control of CHILD'S on departure from objective. CTF 96 at 1600.

291
Your ORO120s. Believe my 310243 is sufficiently clear on urgent activities. However, following answers are due to your ORO120.

A. 2nd sentence. Negative.

B. 3rd sentence. Movement of cargo and ammunition for delivery to OKINAWA will be regulated as necessary so as to meet the requirements of Commander XXI DFD. (Sec. 10, para. 2) The tactical situation has been determined by F/X to warrant normal scheduled operations, by 270125 to remain 15 minutes (15 min) F/X are concerned. It reads in part "clearance for 5W10 to be given only by CinCPac Advance Headquarters".

Para. suggest you review logistic plan for 1st Bn 155th Engineer BN to my Op律 11-44 of 31 December 1944. In case you need further clarification suggest you or your designated representative contact the above officer in my Advance Headquarters.

03 1207 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPEAC, OOR OOR, 2G CP, 2G, CP, 2G, CP, 2G OOR.

Am passing to you separately ConGenF.Tac. 115204 by 0321Z. and Control 132000 to clarify status 21st Naval Construction Battalions assigned to 21st Naval Corps.

04 0325 CONLOR 10 to 21 CORPS. WFDHDCORPS. INFO CINC PAC ADV CTY21 CTY22 CTY52 11 CORPS.

This is Opord No. 13-45.

10th Army will continue attack to pursue and destroy enemy in southern OKINAWA. Effective 0412Z 11/15 June boundary between Corps as follows:

Present boundary to crossroads in IMA 7561X southeast along road through SHIBAMAKI 7563X junction 7562X through west edge IMA 7661X west edge OZATO 7561X south along road to crossroad 7561X to 21st Corps. 3rd Philb Corps will continue on present mission. In addition will drive rapidly south in Corps zone of action to prevent the enemy from organizing new defensive position. 21st Corps will continue present mission and in addition will attack SW capture hill mass 7625-7760-7859 and prevent enemy from organizing new defensive position. Maintain contact with 3rd Philb Corps. Both Corps will take full advantage of enemy disorganization. Destroy the manpower met, and will prevent him from reorganizing his forces. By mutual consent troops of each Corps may cross Corps boundary for maneuver. Be prepared for further advance. Other details no change.
SECRET

050616 CINFPOC ADV TO CINCPAC.

1. In order to expedite construction and take advantage of natural terrain in OKINAWA-IV SHIMA the usual standard airfield specifications have been liberalized with the concurrence of AAFPOA.

   (A) The sight distance at any point 10 feet above the runway to any other point 10 feet above the runway was reduced from 7000 ft to 6000 ft.
   (B) Longitudinal grades have been increased to 1 and one quarter percent.
   (C) Lengths of fighter fields determined in the field with a minimum of 6000 ft for F47Ns.
   (D) Medium bombers 6000 ft long.
   (E) Other bombers except VLR 6500 ft. Glide angle for fighters 1 to 40 bombers 1 to 40.

2. It was informally understood in the early conferences that FEA specifications were more liberal than CINCPOC’s however a close analysis indicates a more rigid type than those in the original CINCPOC specifications except for widths of runways which are specified at 100 ft.

3. It is recommended that where FEA specifications are in excess of those adopted by CINCPOC as outlined in para 1 above that CINCPOC specifications govern except that lengths of fields as outlined in General Casey’s memorandum for the various fields may be generally met with glide angles of 1 to 50.

050845 CINCPOC ADV TO COMAIRS & GRO INFO CINFPOC PEARL, Commandolls, Enfers.

Request authority to establish the Naval Operating Base ENIWETOK and the Naval Operating Base KWAJALEIN to consist of all the naval shore facilities including Naval Air Bases at ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN ATOLL respectively. If this authority is granted recommend ReFers order Rear Admiral W. R. Harrill as Comdt., NOB KWAJALEIN and Atoll Commander KWAJALEIN and Capt. R. B. Tuggle as Comdt., NOB ENIWETOK and Atoll Commander ENIWETOK. Rear Admiral Harrill’s orders as Commdolls should remain in effect. The purpose of the foregoing is to strengthen and regularize naval administration at these important naval bases.

040330 COMAIRS ADV to CINCPAC ADV NO Info GTW 38, CINFPOC PEARL NO. COMAIRPAC.

Proposal contained your 030626 strongly concurred in. Also with future operations in mind it is deemed of the utmost importance that daily photo coverage of Empire airfields be undertaken by planes based at OKINAWA and IWO at the earliest possible moment. Coincident therewith it is requested that intercepts be set up at both places with personnel specially trained in this type of interpretation. These units in conjunction with proposed distribution offices to be charged with the responsibility through the appropriate command for keeping the fleet and other interested commands informed by dispatch and supplied with material resulting from raid missions. Delivery by parachute drop considered feasible where distances too great for carrier planes.

050800 COMAIRPAC ADV TO COMAIRS ADV Info CINFPOC.

AAFPOA 34303. To date no combat crew rest camp facilities have been provided in the MARIANAS. This situation has reached a critical state as
there will be 1975 combat crew due for rest and rehabilitation on July 1. During June the 7th Air Force and 7th Bomber Command areas on BAP will be progressively vacated. These areas alight not desirable nor acceptable for permanent rest camp offer the only opportunity to provide facilities to meet this need. It is recommended that these 2 areas in their entirety including both club buildings and the general officers' quarters presently occupied by General Douglass be allocated for this purpose. Some additional shower and latrine facilities will be necessary to make full use of the tents and office quarters available. None equipment, roosters and generator plants being removed by the vacating units must be replaced. Request immediate reply.

05 2230 CINCPAC ADV TO CONVAFFC INFO CONGFOA. COMMISSIONER, CHIEF. CINCPAC PEARL.

Request you take such action as is required concerning ComGenPOA 050046 and ComGen 10 050034 since they relate to movement and reequipment of Army Infantry divisions after they are released to your operational control.

06 0223 DISCOMAP 20 TO JDCOM GUAM INFO CINCPAC ADV. COM MARIANAS. DISCOM 20 ADMIN.

3465. Existing in AAFPOA area immediately and urgent requirement for housing facilities to accommodate transient officers, press correspondents and other visiting officials. At present time some of these personnel must be housed in CINCPAC area. This arrangement objectionable to both CINCPAC and AAFPOA. Admiral Nimitz has approved in principle immediate construction in AAFPOA area for this purpose. Request 1 each 81 EQ complete with all plumbing etc., be made available from local stocks and constructed immediately. Site available in AAFPOA area cleared and readily accessible for water and sewer connections.

06 0806 CINCPAC ADV TO DISCOM 20 AP INFO CONGFOA. JDCOM GUAM. DISCOM 20 AP ADMIN.

Your 060223 is in error. Fleet Admiral Nimitz has not received and has not approved your request for construction. Desire it be submitted in normal manner including statement as to availability of materials and priority which you recommend relative to other Army projects on Guam.

Para. All press correspondents housed in CINCPAC area are accredited to the Pacific Fleet and arrangement is not objectionable. Nimitz.

06 0533 CINCPAC ADV TO NAVY WEATHER CENTRAL MARIANA INFO COMTFI.

For Capt. Davis at weather conference, Proposed plan of 7th Flt to search for typhoons brought me results this week until request for search was made by CINCPAC. Explicit arrangements should be made by which ComAir 7th Flt will initiate weather flights immediately upon formation of storm condition and send reports direct to CINCPAC without requiring request in each instance. For urgent use here please ascertain exactly what weather flights were made and what weather information was transmitted to CINCPAC in PHILIPPINE SEA.

06 1245 CINCPAC ADV TO OCOAFFPOA INFO OCOAFFPOA (ADMIN), CINCPAC PEARL, COMMEN TN.

Your 050685 and 060601, Request thorough screening of requests to visit OKINAWA in compliance by 27079. Request of your 060601 granted.
SECRET

JUNE (GCT)

05 1538 COMINCH & CNO TO US Fleet Info COMNAVFL, ALL NAVYDS, COMDT COAST GUARD,
ALNAVNAV, CNO US Army, ALL SENIOR & OFFICE NAVY DEPT. USNO OFFICE.

As of 0000/3 (GCT) 12 June 10th Fleet hereby dissolved. Directive establishing
10th Fleet Cominich & CNO serial 02561 of 29 July 1943 is cancelled. At
that time ATLANTIC SEA FRONTIERS revert to status prescribed General Order
No. 213. All anti-submarine functions heretofore performed by 10th Flt and
Assistant Chief of Staff (Anti-Submarine) will henceforth be performed by
Cominich. Com10thFlt CMDR becomes COMINCH CMDR with no change in call
signs. This is Cominich & CNO number 44.

07 0151 CINCPAC ADV TO COMANDER 13 INFO CINCPAC 13 COMANDER CINCPAC PEARL
Islands, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COAT IJN, CINCPAC.

Your 060247. The special duties assigned ComPhibGroup 13 are considered
terminated. Your duties are those normally assigned plus such duties as
administrative SOFA connection 3rdFlt and British Pacific Fleet as may be
assigned by Com3rdFleet.

07 0725 CINCPAC ADV TO COMANDER INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAFLMEST,
COMTAC, COMTRAC, COMAST, COMAF, COMAFA, COMUPPER, COMUPPER, COMUPPER.

CNO 051430. Proceed with removal of torpedoes from all CVE type carriers.

07 1603 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, ISMETZ, ARNOLD.

WARF-13084.

1. In view of the complex petroleum programming problem and the projected
tight products and tanker situation, it is necessary to adopt an agreed
petroleum supply procedure for the handling of Pacific Theater petroleum
requirements. Conferences here have resulted in working out the following
recommendations which are presented for your consideration:

A. There shall be 2 area petroleum officers in the Pacific Theater:
   One an Army Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCPAC, one a Navy
   Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCPAC.

B. By mutual agreement between COMMARPAC and CINCPAC a sub-area
   petroleum officer will be designated for each locality where the petroleum
   products requirements are sufficient in the opinion of the Petroleum
   Officers to warrant such action. The sub-area Petroleum Officer in each
   area shall combine the total requirements for all services in that area
   and forward them to the appropriate Army or Navy area Petroleum Officer.

C. As its representative in the Pacific Theater the Joint Chiefs of
   Staff (Army-Navy Petroleum Board) will designate an officer to serve as
   Pacific Petroleum Coordinator. The Office of the Petroleum Co-
   ordinator will be located at some forward base to be agreed. He shall
   be responsible for the consolidation of the requirements forwarded by the 2
   Petroleum Officers for the Pacific. He shall forward the combined re-
   quirements to the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, giving complete details of
   required cargoes and destinations, the latter to be set forth in broad
   area or distribution points in keeping with presently accepted practices.

D. Except as may otherwise be agreed by addressers, the area petroleum
   officers for the respective service organizations shall determine their
   requirements separately and furnish them to the Pacific Petroleum Co-
   ordinator for consolidation and forwarding to the Army-Navy Petroleum Bd.

E. Upon receipt of consolidated Pacific Theater requirements from the
   Pacific Petroleum Coordinator, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall set up
   an overall supply program and, in line with current practice, will

- Continued -
07 1603 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, bran, ADAM, F. (CONTINUED)

continue to forward to the agencies interested in Pac Theater logistics a weekly slate outlining the projected movement of all petroleum products to all Pacific Theater forces.

F. The Area Petroleum Officer for each service shall designate a liaison officer to work with the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator.

G. The Pacific Petroleum Coordinator in conjunction with the Area Petroleum Officers or their liaison officers shall arrange the distributing of all cargoes to ports and bases. No diversion of products on cargoes scheduled for the Pacific Theater by the Army-Navy Petroleum Board to meet the requirements of any service shall be made without obtaining prior consent of the service affected.

H. Consistent with the principles of efficient tanker operations and product requirements the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator shall arrange with the cognizant authorities for all tanker diversions.

I. Until otherwise directed the foreggoing provisions will apply only to those areas and bases presently included in the responsibilities of the Area Petroleum Officer, POA, Area Petroleum Officer, SNPA.

2. Your early consideration of the procedure is desired. Upon agreement by all addresses to the adoption of the procedure as outlined, the JCS (Army-Navy Petroleum Board) will nominate an officer to serve as Pacific Petroleum Coordinator.

07 2107 CONTINUE to CINCPAC ADV Info CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRFLTS. SUPERS.

Your 050645 approved. (Ref: Request authority to establish MOB EMITTER)
and KWALIKEIN

07 1147 CAF 38-3 to COMPRECONFPO AF Info COMCINCPAC ADV TO 38-3. CAF 38. 1 earble

At 071544 I(-9) Army P-38 crashed and burned on forward flight deck of RANDOLPH resulting in structural damage, serious fire, 10 planes destroyed, 4 known dead, 14 seriously injured, P-38s for missing not completed. P-38 made low MANE run past bow close aboard, pulled up to 4,000 feet and made straight shallow dive to crash. Propeller hub number 1002857 recovered with 2 blades. No evidence of bomb. Fire fed largely by gasoline from P-38 as RANDOLPH's planes not fueled. This is 1 of numerous instances of P-38s which have been playing around and diving on ships this TO FM. Request Army authorities be requested to take immediate correcting action and inform P-38 units operating this vicinity that unless otherwise instructed by first info adde hereafter P-38 planes diving on ships this TO will be fired on. Fire was withheld on subject plane on account its friendly identification Pilot apparently did not survive.

07 1217 RANDOLPH (GT 15) to CONTINUE. COMPRECONFPO AF Info CINCPAC ADV TO 38-3. CAF 38. COMCINCPAC ADV TO 38-3. CAF 38. 1 earble

Army P-38 of unknown number and home base while flat hatting crashed and burned on RANDOLPH forward flight deck 071544 LEYTE HARBOR. Propeller hub number 1002857 with 2 blades only identifiable object recovered. Casualties RANDOLPH 4 dead 14 seriously injured check for missing not completed. Material damage not extensive 1002857. Expect ready for sea 12 June ANCAP destroyed.

08 0520 COMSPO ADV TO COMMANDING OFFICER COMSPO ADV

Your 050647 conclusion withheld until it becomes feasible to deploy the unit concerned on an Army Air Field.
08 1229 CINCPAC ADV TO ALPOA INFO COMINC AND CNO.

Effective 10 June there are hereby established the Naval Operating Base KWAJALEIN which will comprise all naval shore activities in the KWAJALEIN Atoll and the Naval Operating Base ENIWETOK which will comprise all naval shore activities in the ENIWETOK Atoll. The Atoll Commanders at KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK will assume duties as Commandants of their respective Naval Operating Bases.

08 2301 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINC.

/Top-Sec.

Your 080230 affirmative. (Ref: Withdrawal TP 38 from OKINAWA 10 June)

09 0251 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINC INFO CINCPAC, COMMARIANAS, COMGENDO, ISCOMS OKINAWA, SAWAN, TINIAN, IPO JIMA.

Under the procedure established by my 240600 and CINCPAC 261634 request you obtain concurrence for me in
A. Movement 24th Infantry Regiment to OKINAWA.
B. Movement 1 BN 147th InfRegt from IPO JIMA to TINIAN.

09 1339 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINC.

Your 091630, CINCPAC has great sympathy for the position in which citizens of Japanese Ancestry who are in the armed services find themselves. He recognizes however that the situation in active areas of the Pacific is far different from that in EUROPE where all Japanese were friendly. It is undesirable and inexpedient to have troops of Japanese Ancestry deployed in an active area where their physical characteristics might cause them to be regarded as enemy or where circumstances might arise which would put their loyalty to an undue strain. It is agreeable to CINCPAC that troops of Japanese Ancestry be employed in the main islands of the HAWAIAN Group. He recommends against their employment in the POA to the westward thereof as the danger and difficulties involved would outweigh any gain in connection therewith.

09 0657 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPHIBSPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

The assignment of ships to Type Commanders for administrative control is based on their designed normal employment over prolonged periods of time which embrace extended intervals of relatively reduced activity as well as intervals of active combat operations. It is recognized that during periods of actual combat and during the preliminary training period PCE, PGS, PC PC(R) and SC are required by Amphibious Force Commander for training indoctrination and employment. For this reason it is intended that they will be assigned to the operational control of ComPhibPac in sufficient numbers and for sufficient periods of time for this purpose. Since they are not basically amphibious types however it is considered desirable that they continue under ComServPac for administrative purposes. Your 0930110 refers.
SECRET

09 1847 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Inability of TF 38 to avoid typhoon of 5 June is cause for concern particularly in connection future operations. Report in detail what measures are currently in effect to locate and track such storms and whether any were not made use of or failed in the recent case. Advise your plans for further strengthening weather service. Is any additional action required of Department to assist you with material or personnel.

11 0800 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL.

My 2902A3 contemplated conference primarily for naval purposes "to explore all problems connection with carrier transport". It is expected that information will be obtained as to the extent of Army problems in connection with their fighters and to determine to what extent the fleet may be able to assist with CVE lift after meeting its own requirements. However desire no commitment made. It should be made clear that the Army must rely primarily on its own resources and on normal methods of overseas shipment of Army aircraft and also that except in special cases fleet requirements must be met before CVE lift is made available to the Army.

11 0248 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC.

Your 101230. The considerations with respect to ports and ships mentioned in your 101230 were all taken into account before CINCPAC requested concurrence in the movement of the 24th Infantry from SAIPAN to OKINAWA.

The planned employment of MarDivs is such that it will be highly desirable and possibly necessary to have in OKINAWA 1 Regiment which will not have to prepare for a future operation or be recently returned from a previous operation. Unless you have other needs for the 24th Inf request your concurrence in its movement.

11 0802 CINCPAC ADV TO SECKNAV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC.

Your 021935. The following figures cover the OKINAWA Campaign from 18 March to 9 June inclusive and are based on dispatch information.

A. Our plane losses total 965 including 312 destroyed on board carriers as a result of damage by enemy and storm.

B. Fast carriers during strike sank 14 ships and 14 small craft. During other operations sank 43 ships and 152 small craft. CVEs sank 4 ships and 26 small craft. VBF type planes sank 107 ships and 50 small craft. Total sank 168 ships and 242 small craft.

C. Fast carriers on strike sank damaged 139 ships and 73 small craft. On other operations damaged 100 ships and 597 small craft. CVEs damaged 30 small craft. VBF typeplanes damaged 138 ships and 35 small craft. Total damaged 377 ships and 735 small craft. Vessels 100 tons or greater are here classified as ships.

D. Fast carriers on strike destroyed 920 enemy aircraft. On other operations destroyed 1410. CVEs destroyed 273, Marine planes of TAF destroyed 457. VBF planes destroyed 38. Ships AA destroyed 450. Suicide hits or misses destroyed 216. Total enemy planes destroyed by fleet units 3776.

E. At one time or another the campaign involved 13 CVEs 7 CVLS 22 combat CVEs 3 MADE, 10 VBF squadrons with total complements of 2582 aircraft. Replacement carrier aircraft supplied by Comairpac during the period totaled 12120. Total navy planes involved in the campaign adds up to an estimated 3775.

292
11 0804 CINCPAC ADV TO COMZINC TEL INTO CTG 99.2, GTF 31.

After consideration of CTG 99.2 100345 originated by Lmt. Col. Fix it appears to be necessary to comment that the operations of the air units available to support the 10th Army are expected to be those which will contribute most to the task in hand. It is not desired to sacrifice tactical efficiency for the purpose of demonstrating any particular weapon or technique.

12 0651 CHQ MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV CINCENPOA.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMZINC INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERFPAC.

Expanding fleet requirements for floating repair and service facilities in widely separated places in western Pacific necessitate assignment ServRon 10 units accordingly. Importance of general supervision under 1 head continues but definite strengthening of the organisation is immediately required. Propose divide squadron into service divisions 101 and 102 and 103 and 104 initially located at LESTE RUKYUS MARIANAS and ENIWETOK. Plan all ships now assigned ServRon 10 so continue but to further reallocate them from time to time among specific divisions giving squadron commander freedom of action to shift a unit from 1 division to another to meet varying requirements.


As foregoing considered of great importance urge approval of the organisation and assignment of commanders at early date.

13 0335 CINCPAC ADV TO COMZINC INFO CONSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 22O2X2 and SeiNav serial 000,081 of 22 May to Asst Secy State regarding maintenance of token force at JUA AMOTU airfield on island of TONIATABU. No U.S. personnel has been stationed there for many months. Field originally build by NEW ZEALAND forces and operated by them. Reorganisation sooPac proposes in CONSPAC 00035 of 6 March Enclosure A Page 1 and approved by CINCPAC CINCPAC 0005033 of 8 April provided for only NEW ZEALAND personnel at TONIATABU. Current information however indicates about 2 officers and 28 enlisted men remain at NOB. CNO 181945 of April 1944 approved CONSPAC 0100460 which proposed retention at TONGA personnel for tank farm only. In view foregoing circumstances is it desired now to establish a garrison force at JUA AMOTU airfield.

13 0849 CINCPAC ADV TO CONSERVPAC.

It is a fundamental principle of naval command that officers on the staff of a flag officer afloat do not themselves exercise command. The authority of a Chief of Staff is authority delegated by the commander concerned. Other staff officers have no authority in their own right and may not issue orders except in the name of the commander and then only when directed by the commander.

The tentative organisation of Service Forces Pacific Fleet submitted by your comd serial 02938 of 4 June 1945 and also the organisation of ServRon 10 - Continued -
13 0849 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC (CONT'D)

as proposed by your serial 02924 of 4 June 1945 are faulty in that staff
officers appear in the chain of command. They are therefore not approved.

Please resubmit both organizations in such form that the chain of command
and the internal organization of the staff do not appear on the same sheet
of paper. Desire if practicable ComServPac bring with him tentative drafts
and be prepared to discuss when he comes to GUAM.

13 1110 COMAFSPPA TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC BOTH, COMAFPAC, TOLOSA, COMAF 5, COMAF 13.

AF 70361. ReURad CX 18131 of 9 June. Investigation reveals that P38 which
grased carrier RANDOLPH in LEYTE HARBOR was from 6 Photo Recon Sqn DULAG
LETE. This airplane was being ferried from Clark Field to DULAG on routine
nontactical flight. In performing dangerous maneuvers which ended in fatal
orash pilot was disregarding previously issued regulations and letter of
structions of MFAP and was violating principles of flying safety which all
airsmen have been trained to observe. Slightly regret that carelessness of
2 pilot has cost other lives, injuries, and damage. The contents of MyRad
AF 70034 is being brought to the attention of all pilots of this command
and should prevent recurrence of such incidents.

13 1621 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC.

If proposal of CTG 110.2 had been made from 1 of my own commanders it
would have been disapproved as the risk appears greater than any prospective
sion. If for purposes of morale or training you would like it done I will
authorize it. Please advise.

13 1629 CINCPAC ADV TO COM MARIANAS INFO I&COM TDG JIMA, CINCAPAC, CINCPAC PEARL

COMAFSPPA, COMET TEL. I&COM OKINAWA, I&COM TINIAN, I&COM TINIAN.

When relieved by Marine MP Bn transfer 24th InfRegt to OKINAWA for
arrison duty. Unit released to CTF 99 operational control upon arrival.
conjunction with above transfer 1 Bn of 1/7th InfRegt from TDG JIMA
to relieve elements of 24th InfRegt at TINIAN. Make shipping arrangements
CINCPAC PEARL.

13 1623 CINCPAC ADV TO COMAFSPPA CINCPAC, COFA, CONSERVPAC, COMAFSPPA INFO COM MARIANAS

I&COM GUAM, CTF.

Refer CINCPAC PEARL 302205. The critical situation outlined therein has
become aggravated to the extent that there is now an unacceptable accumulation
of ships in the MARIANAS and MARIANAS awaiting discharge in the MARIANAS.
Action addresses are directed to screen carefully all operational projects
involving movement of cargo in or out of the MARIANAS and to reduce or defer
shipments wholly or in part until the accumulation of ships awaiting discharge
and loading is cleared away. Advise CINCPAC PEARL info CINCPAC ADV without
delay reductions in tonnage allocations or deferments that can be affected.
Report required from action aces.
SECRET
JUNE (87)

13 2158 103 TO MACARTHUR, EISENHOWER, SULZEN, HENDERSON INTO CINCPAC PEARL.

WX 16434 Book Message.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following directive for
the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war in the Far East. Similar instruc-
tions being passed by the British Chiefs of Staff to SACEAC.

1. All Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody including merchant
seamen, will be repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with mili-
tary operations. The approximate numbers held in JAPAN and Japanese-occu-
pied territory are as follows:

- British Commonwealth: 123,500
- American: 15,000
- Dutch: 30,000

Members of Chinese forces present a so (2 grope missing) problem
outside of the scope of this directive.

2. Since the problem is basically of a military nature, all plans for the
evacuation and repatriation of prisoners of war must be approved by the
War Office or War Department of each government concerned.

3. Repatriation will conform to the necessities of current military operations.

4. Priority will be given to the repatriation of the sick and wounded.

5. Except as stated in para 4 above, no difference will be made in repatria-
tion priorities; OPEC NSCLOSUR begin

A. Between Allied prisoners of war of various nationalities;
B. Between different services (including merchant navies);
C. Between officers and other ranks (enlisted men).

6. The United States Theatre Commanders concerned and Supreme Commander,
Southeast Asia (in conjunction where necessary with C-in-C INDIA) will:

A. Ensure that adequate provision is made for the care of prisoners of
war in any armistice agreement with the enemy;
B. Make the necessary preparations to ensure that all prisoners of war
are repatriated also including provision of staff comprising personnel
of each Allied nation whose activity will in general be limited to the
problems of registration, financial relief, transfer and repatriation
of their own nationals;
C. Make the necessary preparations to ensure that all recovered prisoners
of war within their respective zones area provided with necessary food
clothing comfort and medical attention;
D. Take control of any prisoners of war camps within their respective zones;
E. Take all necessary measures to protect Allied prisoners of war;
F. Collect and preserve all records kept by the enemy pertaining to
prisoners of war, including those who have died in captivity, have
escaped or have been transferred or released, pending instructions
from the governments concerned for their disposal;
G. Ensure that any enemy personnel denounced as war criminals and charged
with serious maltreatment of prisoners of war are apprehended and
taken into custody.

END OF DIRECTIVE.
Ref 091847. Current measures to locate and track typhoons are:

(A) Reconnaissance by search aircraft from PAN 1 and PAN 1B.
(B) By request reconnaissance by Army 655th Weather Squadron 20th AF.
(C) By request reconnaissance by planes under CINCSWPA and Com7thFlt.
(D) Reports from station weather ships.
(E) Reports from ships at sea.
(F) Current network of reports from islands, submarines and air rescue ships also post-flight search reports.

All means available used. During critical period weather reconnaissance flights in PHILIPPINE and GUAM areas by both Army and Navy were incomplete in that specified sectors were not entirely covered at times required due to aircraft operational failures incomplete briefing and communication failures which are the subject of investigation and corrective action.

Typhoon warnings are issued every 6 hours in scheduled weather broadcast and every 12 hours on VOX in both GCM and strip cipher plus messages on BAMS. Once daily in 35 C channel. Plain language dispatch of typhoon warnings were sent to hospital ships note CINCPAC 040521 and 040626 directing them to disregard routing instructions and avoid danger area.

Plans for further strengthening weather service include following:

(A) Provide additional weather ship stations earliest practicable date upon arrival PC2 type vessels.
(B) Installation of new weather station on PARESSE VELA with estimated completion date about 1 September.
(C) Installation of an automatic weather station on GAPERUT ISLAND estimated completion date 1 September.
(D) Immediate relaxation of weather security plus simplication and elimination of several weather ciphers.

(E) As an immediate measure to ensure positive results Navy aircraft weather reconnaissance will be initiated by assigning 3 operational planes PHAYTs to each of the following points: OKINAWA, INC, GUAM, PLEELIU and KERIVIOX to be held in readiness for weather searches. Request being made to CINCSWPA to provide 6 PHAYTs to CINCPAC for similar use 3 based in LINGATE GOLF and 3 at SANAR. Aerological officers will be assigned as weather observers. These planes to be under operational control CINCPAC.

(F) Establishment of a typhoon tracking center.

(G) Duties of coordinator Navy Weather Centrals FOA and Fleet Aerologist to be separated and experienced officers of appropriate rank assigned to respective duties.

Request Department take action on following:

(A) Expedite delivery of automatic weather stations.
(B) Require 4 additional aerologists 1 of rank of Comdr and 4 aerographer mates in order to expand weather service at CINCPAC Headquarters.
SECRET

June (GMT)

16 0548 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COMDRPFLT. CTF 31.

Your 150952. As soon as practicable occupy KURE and DTMU establish radar and conduct airfield site reconnaissance on the ground and make recommendations. New subject. I will take no action on ComGen ADC 151015.

16 0902 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSCWPAC INFO COM7THFLT. COMINC. COMDRPFLT. CINCPAC PEARL.

In order to secure most effective employment of forces in prospective operations propose to exchange CruDiv 6 and CruDiv 12 between 3rdFlt and 7th Fleet prior to 1 July. MINNEAPOLIS (CA-36) will not return from overhaul until about 7 August. Request your concurrence.

16 1445 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COMDRPFLT. CTF 31. CTG 32.1.

I propose to withdraw TG 32.1 from operations not later than 1 July. I consider that at that date adequate shore based aircraft will be established and operating. Request your comments.

16 1451 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSCWPAC INFO COM7THFLT. COMAIR7THFLT. CAAFSUPA. COMINC & CNO.

Accurate and timely ocean weather information is required by ships of the Pacific Fleet and bases in Western Pacific. Steps are now underway to provide this information require weather reconnaissance flights by long range naval aircraft based in the PHILIPPINES. Request 3 7thFlt Liberator aircraft at SAMAR and LUZON be immediately available on call for weather reconnaissance missions when required by CINCPAC Weather Central. Desire direct communication with ComAir7thFlt in assigning these missions. Early reply requested.

16 1904 COMINC & CNO to CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL. COMSERVFLON. COMSERVON.

Effective when directed by you ServDivs 101 through 104 established as Divisions of ServRon 10 to be composed of fleet units assigned by you and ComServRon 10 according to your operational requirements. Your 1/231 refers. Orders being issued NADM A.E. Smith as ComServRon 10 vice Commo Carter and your nominees as ComServDivs 101 through 104 respectively. Nominations being submitted commodore rank for above DivComs.
SECRET

JUNE (GCT)

18 1326 COMAIRPLS AREA TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPAC PEAC, COGAAEF, USARVAR, VAC, CMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC, SUBCOMFORD, CASU P.

Can base 1 replacement CGV at ROI in full operating status. This includes considerations your 160235 plus VNR squadron. Will require CCF component, 6-250 Gal stills and 3 75 KW generators. This and other increased activity necessitates fill station and CBM complement about 200 personnel and 250 tents or 26 double deck Quonsets. This and some additional detailed equipment will be requisitioned when advised your plan firm.

18 1431 CINCPOA ADV TO CG TEN, COM3RD PHIB CORPS INFO CINCPAC, JCAU, JNAF, CINCS, MARSOC, CINCPAC, CONGENPOA, GYX 31, COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC.


19 0115 COMAIRDELT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO AFIAC, CASUBCOMFORD, CINCPAC, GYX 31, CASUBCOMFORD, COMAIRPAC, CONGENPOA.

TG 364 with composition as stated in my 170017 will arrive PHIBTOK about 1 August. This answers CINCPAC ADV 130908 and COMAirPac Adv 190100 neither to all. Aides will be advised of later changed in TG composition.

20 0213 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV.

C-20050. Your 181436. By authority of 10th Army have assigned Gen. Stillwell to command 10th Army and have directed him to report to you at CULN without delay. He is now in HONOLULU.

20 0228 CINCPAC ADV TO COLNCH INFO CINCPAC, CGAEP, CINCPAC, PEARL, CONSERVAPAC, AMER.

Recommendations presented JCS 071603 leading to material changes in current petroleum supply functions in presently constituted Pacific Command Areas and creation of new office of Pacific Petroleum Coordinator do not appear advisable at this time. Effectiveness of present methods of supply have been satisfactorily demonstrated. The establishment of sub area petroleum offices in existing base areas and in new sub areas as they are established is considered desirable. Suggest that desired coordination within the Pacific area may be attained by augmenting as necessary the functions of area petroleum offices now established and creation of an even closer operational liaison between the 2 area petroleum offices.

20 0235 COMNAVUS 14TH AF to CINCPAC ADV INFO CONSUBPAC, CMAIRPAC.

14th Air Force now has gasoline in staging fields in North CHINA which will permit B25s with 1000 pound bombs and P47s to make daylight, low level attacks on worthy targets in YELLOW SEA. Area includes DAIRIEN and LAC YAO. Can be over target within 12 hours after we get word. Suggest targets of damaged ships tankers and large vessels be passed.
20 1312 CINCPOAC ADV TO CHAB MANUS INFO CINCPOAC, COMTHFLT, OCEANAFLT.

Your 190636. Establishment of British Carrier Replacement Pool at FITTYU MANUS is approved subject to provision by CINCPOAC of general service ratings as required by you.

21 0342 CINCPOAC ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO CINCPOAC, COMGEN-CA.

Your 160637. In view of ComSoPac 190109 prefer that no reduction of ATC activities in SoPac Area be effected until roll up of other SoPac activities has progressed further. ComSoPac is directed to advise when in his opinion roll up will permit ATC activities in SoPac to be dispersed with.

21 0405 CTF 99 TO CINCPOAC ADV INFO CTF 99,1, CTF 99,2, CTF 99,3, CTF 31, OCEANAFLT, COMGEN 24TH CORPS, COMGEN 3RD PHBR.

Organised resistance has ceased on OKINAWA. 2 small pockets on southern portion island are being mopped up. Geiger.

21 0451 COM MARIANAS TO CINCPOAC ADV INFO DEFCOMAF 20POA, ISDOF INC.

DepCom 20 POA 200443. Development of space for the 4th VF Group being worked on now at TAO. Expect to get a solution with considerable crowding. The 5th Group proposal required additional time for study and will be considered reply. Will be prepared in 3 or 4 days.

22 0630 CINCPOAC ADV TO COULTINCH.

Your 202114. Details of organization were discussed by representative this staff with HAdm Delaney and Capt Chandler. TrainCom pacific to be set up as TF Cmdr afloat and to be present, normally, at the main fleet base. He would have chief assistants as follows:

(A) TrainCom West,
(B) TrainCom PEARL,
(C) TrainCom MARSHAL,
(D) TrainCom MARIANAS,
(E) TrainCom PHILIPPINES,
(F) TrainCom RYUKYUS.

Such assistants will report to appropriate commands for logistic support in a similar manner as OCTCPac reports to naval districts and Com estafpron. (A) TrainCom West to perform all the functions in connection with shake down and refresher training that are now performed by OCTCPac.

(B) TrainCom PEARL to be the officer in charge of the Pacific Fleet Training Center which will comprise all activities now grouped under Pacific Fleet Schools.

(C) All subordinate TrainComs to be assigned the operational control of all training activities in their respective areas including Wtfoms, AATC's, ASW facilities, etc. as listed in letter which follows. Amplifying paragraph 3 of message 06102 dated 1 June all training Coms would constitute a single agency in each area to which incoming ships or unit comds could address their wishes in regard to training or to whom such unit comds could direct individual ships to report for specific training in case they themselves were not in a position to assume the details of conduct of the exercises. They would also be empowered to arrange arrival and departure services in all areas as at present done at PEARL. Institution of this program would largely be a reorganization of personnel now engaged in training. Few additional personnel contemplated.
SECRET
JUNE (OCT)

22 0832 CTF 38 to COMAIRPAC INFO COM3RDFLT. COMAIRPAC PASSED TO COMAIRGULF INFO ADV
AIRPACSUBCOM, FPOD, CNO.

Request CVLs be equipped with all VP complement prior next operation.
If program cannot support this change in all CVLs urge BUMPING AS many
as possible and modifying program forthwith to accommodate complete changes.
Com3rdFlt concurs.

23 0058 COMAIRNAV TO CTG 00.1, 0024thCorps, CTG-99, 2, 003rdInfCorps, CTG-99, 3 INFO CHIEF
COMGRIPAC, CINCAPAC, CTF 31.

Pursuant orders CINCPAC General Joseph W. Stilwell US Army assumes com-
mmand TF 99 (KURUSAK Area) and Expeditionary troops and pursuant orders CINCAP-
FAC General Joseph W. Stilwell US Army assumes command of 10th U.S. Army all
effective this date 23 June 1945.

23 0546 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAPAC INFO CINCAPAC NAV.

Your 140011, 210309 and 220859. The unloading situation at OKINAVA is
critical and gives every prospect of remaining so for some time to come.
Accordingly desire to avoid commitments to accept ships' beyond reasonable
expectation of capacity to unload. Request you review above referenced dis-
patches with view to:
(A) Reducing shipments to bare requirements for operation.
(B) Shipment of as much as possible in LSTs which can be handled at OKINAVA.
IsCom OKINAVA has been requested advise when he can accept the A41A referred
to. You will be advised later. Request advise on date you will assume re-
spnsibility for supply of aviation tech supplies and ammo in accordance with
Para 4A2 of MySer 0005071.

17 1550 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

To assist efforts being made to increase workmen continental repair yards
desire report via airmailgram of all vessels giving numbers and types on
which your decision to make battle damage repairs in forward areas, and ad-
vanced bases, has been influenced by heavy continental repair loads and prob-
able delays in completion incident to labor shortages. In this connection
attention invited to fact that east coast facilities have been made available
for repairs to Pacific ships. Can you give any information on comparative
completion times between advanced base and continental yards. Has the re-
pair situation in continental yards influenced not returning combatant ships
for routine overhauls considering task requirements.

(240237) 21 0030 CINCPAC EARL TO COMGULF AREA, COMSPEAC INFO CINCPEAC 10, LUKAS PASSED
TO CINCPAC ADV. CONSULT COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT.

ComSerVPA 190103 and ComMarCils 161116. In order insure maximum coordi-
nation of effort in support forces afloat and at same time facilitate mo-
Bility ServCon 10 for possible future movements propose following plan to be
effective as long as task forces or task groups are basing ENIETOK.
(A) ComSerVPA 10 responsible for support of task forces or task groups
basing ENIETOK and in addition temporarily responsible for furnishing
aflot support at ENIETOK necessary for vessels and craft indicated para
2 my Ser 001424.
(B) ComMarCils assign such personnel and storage fed repair facilities afloat
at ENIETOK now under his control to temporary control of ComSerVPA 10 as
may be considered necessary by mutual agreement.

Continued —
SECRET
JUNE (OCT)

21 2003 CINCPOA PEARL TO COJHARLSEA, CONSERV, ETC. (CONTINUED)

(C) The above personnel and facilities to revert to control of CojHarlsea when this plan no longer effective.

(D) Hyser 001424 of 17 April 1945 to be considered as modified accordingly for period during which this plan effective. No west CojHarlsea, Conserv and Conservac 10 submit comments regarding this plan.

23 2046 COMINCH TO CINCPAC BOTH INFO ADOCPAC JAP, CHINMAC, CONSERV, ETC., CINCPAC, ETC., CONSERV, ITU, ETC.

For production planning purposes desire early estimates totals and most likely lifts from west coast for all types shipborne landing craft requirements Pacific including Seacovac for calendar year 1946. Breakdown to include:

(A) Replacements shipborne craft.
(B) New garrison boat pools and replacement boat pools.
(C) Fleet services at advanced bases.
(D) Replacements for Army Special Engineer Brigade Seacovac.

23 2208 CONAIRPAC ADV TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA, EARL.

Desirability of all VFP on CVL carriers is recognized and has been recommended. Refer Hydis 110414. Cominach 091414 proposed orderly change over of CV and CVLs for all groups embarking after 1 January 1946 and this procedure is strongly recommended.

By this date Bearcat will have had combat evaluation and its introduction into combat should be on a firm basis. Any increase in fighters prior to this date will decrease reserve of fighter aircraft to a point where a major delay or restriction on Bearcat although not expected will adversely affect fleet fighter availability. Changing complements prior to 1st operation will disturb combat readiness of groups now in advanced stages of training. Unless you consider additional VF a tactical necessity for next operation recommend disapproval of CTF 38 dis 220832.

23 2220 CONVESSEAFRON TO CINCPOA BOTH INFO ADOCPAC, ETC.

Subject is return of APAs and AKAs to mainland for troop and cargo lift. Troop lift currently and in immediate future required in any type vessels made available with sufficient troop lift to warrant transpacific voyages. Cinc 221330 pertains. Current cargo situation precludes guarantee full utilization APAs and small AKAs for cargo lift. Recent increased presentation APAs and AKAs has greatly reduced amount FRAY cargo on hand. So this points to cancellation FINK, HONK and ARTU has reduced overall requirements cargo ships see no 110628 not to all requesting downward revision June for allocated vessels. Summary and restatement Convesseafiron position follows. APAs and AKAs required in fullest number for troop lift with understanding not fully required for supplementary cargo liftings. Large AKAs and AKAs usable for cargo liftings. Supplencing WSA Navy allocated vessels in garrison and maintenance employment with understanding utilization definitely supplemental to APA allocated vessels view latter generally more suitable due better cargo carrying characteristics and fixed presentation dates. Small AKAs not required recommend inter or intra theater employment. Return of any foregoing vessels to mainland for liberty recreation or training of ships company general practice within limitations aforementioned when vessels are APA. Return of vessels to mainland for repairs or annual overhauls or inspections should be within overall limitations Hydis 212241.
SECRET
JUNE 1051
CONSERVON 10 TO CONSERVAPAC INFO CONSERVON 10 REPS A, B, C, D, E, PHIBSPAC INFO

Refer CINC PAC ADV 230616. Plan to establish service divisions as follows.
ConservDiv 101 at LYTE in CCELT. ConservDiv 102 at PHIBSAC in ANCHOR
(formerly Rep A). ConservDiv 103 at SAIJN in LUCON (formerly Rep C). Con-
ServDiv 104 at KOMBUH in HAIN (formerly Rep B). Recommend Conserv-
Div Rep D be established temporarily as ConservDiv 105 at LUCON in LUCON. If
this organization confirmed by you, request you notify all interested commands,
particularly Fleet Post Offices. Further request Fleet Post Offices be notified
that individual ServDivs will continue to receive mail addressed to service
representatives which they have superseded. Recommend replacement of these
letters be given wide publicity in fleet. Unless advised to contrary representa-
tives less Rep D commence using appropriate ConservDiv designation as
return address in both personal and official mail commencing 1 July, until
further notice send mail for Conservon 10 to LUCON.

CINC PAC ADV TO CINC PAC INFO PHIBSAC MANUS, CONTINUE.

Your 210654 WIR MANUS 240106. Tentative plan for docking LIPEN GEORGE Y
approved. Advise CINC PAC and CINC US NAVY of date desired so much in advance
of arrival as practicable. While improbable it is possible that other
Fleet representatives may be released earlier.

CINC PAC ADV TO CONING & CHO TO CINC PAC BOTH INFO CONINGPHIBSPAC INFO

Organization ASCU PhibsPac your serial 009003 approved in general interest
Navy and Marine Corps concerned. Concurrency C/S US Army will be requested. Additional
fighter director program will be handled separately. Following concerns
ASCU PhibsPac serial 007. Propose authorize 15 ship based units and current
staff ASCU (Enclosure A) to form additional unit. Clarification following
point required. Enclosure B. Necessity fighter director and night fighter
director personnel since each ASCU has full CIC team. If required in complement
of ship based unit can equivalent reduction C/D personnel be accepted.
Although recommended components substantially approved neither Navy nor Marine
Corps will be able to fill billets ranked for rank at present.

CONING PHIBSAC ADV TO CINC PAC & CHOFOR, NAVY, CINC PAC, NAVY, CINC PAC,
PASSED TO ADV H. BY CINC PAC NAVY 260212.

Attention invite to WARX 21057 DTO 220213 June and 7/4. Itr. Chief General
Staff, operations division CINCPAC 385 (14 Dec 44), subject: Coordination of
implementing a decision to initiate retaliatory chemical warfare against the
Japanese. In view of changing opinions concerning the use of toxic chemicals
in warfare it is recommended that reconsideration be given to your serial
00249 11 Aug 44 subject: Storage of toxic gas in forward areas, and that
headquarters be advised of the decision on this subject.

CINC PAC ADV TO CONING & CHO.

Ur 171550. Heavy work loads in continental yards were the determining
factor in deciding
(A) To defer indefinitely permanent battle damage repairs and alterations
on battery in MISSISSIPPI.
(B) To repair IDAHO billets in GUAM.
(C) To perform extensive repair of hull damage WWII FIT at NAU.

Continued
25 1516 CINCPAC ADV TO COLUMB & CNO (CONTINUED)

(D) To repair ruptured bow structure DULUTH in GUAM.
(E) To repair battle damage to LOUISVILLE and BIRMINGHAM at PEARL HARBOR, and
(F) To postpone overhaul of SAN JACINTO for overhaul.

These were all extensive jobs which required prolonged periods in forward bases where facilities are not equal to those on the continent. A large number of lesser jobs which would normally have been returned to the continent have been performed at forward bases. In general repair facilities in forward areas are being loaded to the limit of their capacity over and above maintenance requirements of the fleet in order to ease the work load in continental yards. Estimate that roughly 50% of ships now under repair and overhaul on west coast will be delayed beyond assigned ETD dates. 32 Pacific Fleet ships have been made available to East Coast yards or such availability has been requested. Advance base repairs are usually more expedite than continental yards but not so polished.

25 1520 COLUMB & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMDT NAVY CORPS GEF CINCPAC

Continuance 6 existing Amphibious Truck Companies and activation 2 Amphibious Truck Battalions of 3 companies each requested your serial 006048 of 3 June approved.

26 0327 CINCPAC PEARL TO COM mARTINAS INFO ISCOM TINIAN CINCPAC CHAPLAIN GSIC GCO, COMGEN AAFPOA ADMIN, CINCPAC ADV H.

Request base development plan TINIAN be modified to authorize facilities for receiving from tankers and ZEC vessels 150 single engine Army aircraft per month and preparing these planes for flight at west field no 4. Unloading facilities, asphalt parking areas and modifications to runways to transport these planes from port to West Field must be provided as necessary. Tent camps and galleys for personnel and necessary temporary working facilities will be required. ComGenPOA is requested to furnish unloading personnel, construction troops, material and equipment as required. ComGenAAPPFOA is requested to furnish the necessary AAF operating personnel. Request immediate local implementation in order to receive aircraft as soon as possible.

26 0352 CINCPAC ADV TO COM SPFEKT INFO CTF 38, COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COLUMB, CNO, CINCPAC ADV. SCINCORPAC, CNO.

CTF 38 dis 220832 negative. After consultation with ComAirPac infeasible change carrier air group complements at this time.

27 0436 CINCPAC ADV TO GLOPPAOA INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIR, GSIC, CINCPAC AC, COM mARTINAS.

Your 250227. Situation described in your 002149 of 14 Aug 44 still obtains and in an intensified degree. The policy set forth therein is accordingly reaffirmed.

27 0428 CG 10 to CINCPAC PEARL, INFO CINCPAC ADV, COMAIR, GSIC, CINCPAC AC, ADMIN.

Refer ComAirPac ser 001390. In view cargo discharge situation outlined our 181417 not to all reduction projected ammo tonnage considered essential. Recommend establishment 20 day stock level and integration requirements for 20 AF PEARF and Navy. Request reference be revised accordingly. Overall review tonnage situation with Gen Heldman now in process.

2934
SECRET
JUNE (C)

27 2122 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA RED, CINCNAK.

In addition to maintaining Bauer Field keep token garrison north of
nearing your 240910 pending clearance with War and State Departments.

28 1306 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA RED, CINCNAK, COMSAPAC

CINCPAC, COMTHPT, CONSOLANT, COMORSEAPAC,

Provisions of Cominich and CNO #7 of Dec 1943 amended to include abandon-
ment seaplane bases.

28 1309 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMSAPAC

Pending further instructions do not establish token garrison force JWA
at KTSU Airfield your 130335 but retain token forces at tank farm.

29 0138 CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 94 INFO COMTHPT (CTF 31). COM 99, JNNSH, PEARL, COMTHPT.

Effective O000 OCT 1 July CTF 94 will assume responsibility of escorting
all shipping between the MARIANAS Area and the ROK-YAK.
Refer my 170700 which directed that units be redeployed from 3rdFlt to
augment escort forces of TF 94 for this purpose.

29 0242 COMSAPAC TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COMAIR. ID. AIR REFUGEE TED CINCPOA PEARL

COMAIR. COMAIR

Hawaiian and Marianas areas will be taxed to limit to handle expanding
training requirements for CV groups. Extremely desirable base CVG at RCI
per 160235 to lighten load on other areas. When not so used facilities
would be available to air groups of TF 38 for refresher training. In view his
181326 recommend authorize ComairGils develop adequate facilities at RCI
ready to receive operating CVG by 15 August.

29 0505 COMGENAFPOA TO CINCPOA ADV.

NR 4574.1
1. Recent joint planning conferences regarding CINCPOA airfield develop-
ment have broached the subject of combined ATC and NATS operations at a single
terminal such as Yonabaru Airfield.
2. Planning review here indicates likelihood that implications will outweigh
feasibility of such a move.
3. Request statement of your opinion regarding possibility of moving ATC
from NAHA Depot Airfield to Yonabaru Airfield for combined operations with
NATS at OKINAWA.

29 0331 CINCPOA ADV TO COMSAPAC INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMINCH & CNO, CINCPOA PEARL

COMAIR, COMPOA, COMAIR, CINCNAK.

Your serial O0571 of 18 June not to all. Authority granted to discontinue
all air, sea & ground defense missions in SoPac except internal security and
air sea rescue.
Subject is procedure for establishing monthly joint priority list of personnel movements. Ref Cominch 192115 April and CINCPAC 211111 011511.
Request your comment on proposed modifications incorporated in A and B below.
War Dept will request CINCPAC comment by separate message.
A. About the 20th of each month Cominch will send for action CINCPAC and CINCPAC info those directly concerned a dispatch containing all Navy movements available for surface lift to Pacific during 2nd following month listing separately movements scheduled for operational control each Commander in Chief. War Dept OPD will send corresponding message for action CINCPAC and CINCPAC CINCPAC info those directly concerned containing all Army movements (except direct redeployment) separated with respect to Commander in Chief of operational control.
B. On basis above dispatches and collateral information CINCPAC CINCPAC will forward to COMINCH info to CINCPAC and others concerned a single priority list containing as previously all Army and Navy movements assigned his operational control desired shipped. CINCPAC will forward to War Dept info to CINCPAC CINCPAC and others concerned a corresponding single priority list of Army and Navy movements assigned his operational control.
C. COMINCH and WAR DEPT OPD will integrate priority lists submitted by CINCPAC CINCPAC and CINCPAC by procedure presently employed.

30 0304 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC COMSUBPAC CG 5TH AF GTF 31 5TH AF RESCUE CG 10 450 20.5.

It is the intention that all air sea rescue services in the RYUKYU-EAST CHINA SEA-YELLOW SEA and Empire areas west of Long 15500E be operated by a single agency. This agency is an air sea rescue task group to be established by ComFairWing 1 and will be based afloat until such time as suitable facilities are available on shore at OKINAWA. This agency will provide air sea rescue services to all aircraft operating in its area regardless of base of origin or branch of service of aircraft involved. It will coordinate the operations of all air sea rescue facilities such as surface vessels, submarine lifeguards rescue boats, seaplanes, landplanes that can be made available.
To this end it is requested that the 5th Emergency Rescue Group and any other air sea rescue facilities now available to you and destined for service in the aforementioned areas be made available to ComFairWing 1 for duty in connection with air sea rescue. Request your concurrence. 450 20.5 and ComSubPac 201411 not to nor needed by all refers.

30 0608 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGENAFAPOA.

Minimum essential requirements naval aviation in RYUKYU preclude any possibility utilization of YONABARU by ATC.

30 0618 CINCPAC ADV TO SECMNAV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COM 12.

Un 273925. Such trips can be accommodated. Recommend they be coordinated by you so that:
(A) Trips depart from W Coast at intervals at least 2 weeks apart.
(B) Each trip consists of individuals with similar interests. Do not send publishers and industrial leaders in same trip.
(C) Trips require about 16 days from coast and return to coast.
(D) Arrangements to enter SoFaPac Area if desired be arranged before departure by SeCMNav direct with War Dept. Such trips to SF will increase length of tour 6 days.

-Continued-
Referring your WX 13084, June 7th in view of the long experience and satisfactory result of the 2 existing area Petroleum organizations in the Pacific, it is considered neither necessary nor advisable to establish a Pacific Petroleum Coordinator as outlined para 1 C. It is therefore suggested that a directive be issued by JCS substantially as follows:

1. In view of the complex petroleum programming problem, the protected tight products and tanker situation and other considerations, it is necessary to adopt the following petroleum supply procedure for the handling of Pacific Theater petroleum requirements:

A. There shall be 2 area petroleum officers in the Pacific Theater; 1 an Army Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCPAC, 1 a Navy Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCPAC.

B. By mutual agreement between CINCPAC and CINCPAC the respective Area Petroleum Officers will arrange for:

1. Continuing to supply petroleum products to existing bases and installations in the Pacific area.
2. The supply of petroleum products for future operations.
3. The assignment of sub area petroleum officers to those areas where the consumption of petroleum products or the volume of transshipments requires coordination by special representatives. A sub area petroleum officer in a given area will normally be assigned the responsibility for the supply of petroleum products to both CINCPAC and CINCPAC in that area.

2. The petroleum requirements of CINCPAC and CINCPAC will be determined by the respective Area Petroleum Officers and requisitions and/or states will be submitted to the Army Navy Petroleum Board in form acceptable to that body, except that:

A. Certain requirements of CINCPAC may be included in CINCPAC requisitions and, conversely, certain CINCPAC requirements may be included in CINCPAC requisitions as mutually agreed by the Area Petroleum Officers. Copies of CINCPAC requisitions will be given to the CINCPAC Area Petroleum Officer, and copies of CINCPAC requisitions will be given to the CINCPAC Petroleum Officer. In each case the destination and time of delivery will be made known to the Army Navy Petroleum Board at the time that the requisitions are submitted.

3. The Army Navy Petroleum Board will arrange for delivery of petroleum products as required by CINCPAC and CINCPAC and tanker will proceed to destination as scheduled, except that:

A. By mutual agreement between the Army and Navy Area Petroleum Officers, such diversions may be made as are deemed necessary and advisable to meet unforeseen requirements.

B. Diversions may be made by mutual agreement between the 2 Area Petroleum Officers in order to expedite tanker turnaround.

4. The operating control of all petroleum tankers, except the small Army Y-Type tankers, is under Navy. Its understood, however, that tankers will be dispatched to destinations as required by the Area Petroleum Officers and that Area Petroleum Officers or their representatives will be responsible for the expeditious discharge and turnaround of such tankers.

5. Each Area Petroleum Officer will designate a liaison officer to coordinate the activities of the CINCPAC and CINCPAC Area Petroleum Officers.
SECRET
JUNE (OCT)

30 0618 CINCPAC ADV TO SECONAV INFO CINCPAC PEARL COF 12 (CONTINUED)

(E) Each trip should be classified as to whether or not considered as personal guests of Seconav.
(F) Total number in party does not exceed 4 unless special plane is provided by you.

30 0732 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCIFP INFO CINCPAC PEARL COF 12 MAJ 4, COMPTF, CINCPAC, ASIA, PACIF, VA.

Imperative British forces be self sustaining your 2704/1 blanket authority for issue cannot be given. Determination as to each item will be made on basis of (A) priority of requirements, (B) Availability of item for immediate needs US forces, (C) feasibility of procurement of particular items by US issuing officer for replacement of items thus issued. Items are:

Issuing officers directed by copy of this dispatch to observe 3 conditions listed prior making issue in each instance. Also to keep CINCPAC promptly advised.

(JULY) 01 0842 CINCPAC ADV TO CO 050582 of 18 June AAFPOA ltr of 21 June. Notwithstanding contemplated movement of 2 Sqs 30th Bomb Group to MARANAIS will not take place at present neutralization of Central CAROLINES, MARSH AND BONIN will continue to be a responsibility of CTF 93 will be assisted by Dep Com 20th AF and CO MARANAS such assistance as may be required for performance of this task.

01 2010 RICHARDSON (VTG FSHATER) TO SEATTLE POE. SANFRAN LAX MILK ACAPULCO. VIC. HON CHOLNO TINTANT. DEPOT AP 14 INFO CO AAFPOA CO AAFPOA FT RAPPALL. CO LORAY A LA

Effective this date this Headquarters re-designated U.S. Army Forces Middle Pacific. All correspondence should be addressed accordingly. Hq U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas and Hq Hawaiian Dept are retained and amalgamated with Hq. U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific.

02 0021 CINCPAC ADV TO MURRAY (PO 576) (URGENT) INFO CO.AFFIC CINCPAC 247, CICM 12, 8, COMASSAF, CO SESAFL, ASCOM KAJAC (CH)

Japanese hospital ship believed to be TAKASAKI loco in position lat 33-47N long 25-22E at 300910Z (GCT). Believed to be proceeding to HIKE ISLAND. Description 2 stacks 2 masts length 466 feet 93.7 tons displacement. Speed estimated 12.5 to 15 K.

Para. Proceed at best practicable speed to intercept. Board ship, inspect for violation of existing conventions which are listed in War Dept Technical Manual 72-251 forwarded to you by officer messenger and are briefly specified in PacFlt Conf ltr 2601-44 of 26 July. In the event violations are discovered place prime crew aboard seal communication facilities and take ship to ENJAMAJK in company with MURRAY for further investigation as directed by CINCPAC. You are authorised to exercise such force as the situation requires. Maintain search operations until contact is made or until otherwise directed by CINCPAC. If no violations of international law are discovered permit ship to proceed after making suitable entry in her log. Keep contact with her and again board and conduct examination after her departure from port.

Search planes from ENJAMAJK will be directed by CINCPAC to assist in search. Lt. Huggins and Lt. Brown have reported to you to serve as interpreters. Maintain communication with search planes on 140.38 WMC primary & 309.01 sec.

Secondary. Keep CINCPAC informed as to developments. Keep radio silence as necessary.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

01 2215 COMINCAPPOA to CTF 93 into JTF 94, CINCPPOA, CONGRUPY 3.

TOP SECRET. AAFPOA 0071 strike shipping targets in BOKIN with all available aircraft as soon as practicable. Reference CINCPPOA 010731 and your dispatch 011159. Use optimum bombing altitudes.

01 0627 CTF 93 to CTF 93-1, CTF 93-1, CTF 93-1 into JTF 94, CINCPPOA, CONGRUPY 3.

TOP SECRET. This is part 1 my OpOrder 1-45 called SPYFLIGHT. CTO 94.9 with 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers attacks shipping CHICHI JIMA 050700 to 050800 then bombards IWO JIMA 051500 to 051630. TF 93 attacks IWO JIMA in coordination surface forces. CTFG 93.9 provide spotting aircraft as required by CTO 94.9. With MarRonion 612 make routine search BOKIN and VOLCANOES night of 4th reporting contacts on 7455 PCS with no additional aces. CTO 94.9 will intercept. CTO 93.3 photo CHICHI JIMA HATA JIMA then after 051630 photo IWO JIMA. No lifeguards. TF 94.9 available air sea rescue along their track to be furnished pilots who need to know CTO 94.9 guards 7455, 7590, 4475 PCS and 140.58 VOC. All times X(-10). All aces see my Dis 01063187 for part 2 to ComGen 21 BomCom.

01 0215 COMINCAPPOA to COMAFF 7 Info CINCPPOA.

TOP SECRET. Direct communication between your headquarters and headquarters 5 AirForce as requested your DTG 260808 CTO has been granted by CINCPPOA. This authority is for the purpose specified and for no other and must be over existing communications facilities. Desire point out that 4 officers and 4 enlisted men will arrive approximately 5 January and will be available for training until approximately 10 March at which time they will go into FUKEDAI. From 15 March to 15 May an equal number will be trained for ICEBERG. Request your arrangements with 5th Air Force take into consideration these training requirements for forthcoming operations.

01 1754 COMINCH GNO to JOINAVGROUP 21HNA, Info CINCPPOA, CONGRUPY 3.

TOP SECRET. Cominch and GNO 011754, Information previously received from source RAN 2100 appreciated. Desire continued emphasis upon spot report concerning all movements new combatant vessels and movement of specific information concerning major cargo loadings and also important but proper should be upon operational intelligence.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

01 2128  COMAIRPAC (ADMIN) to CINCPAC.

TOP SECRET. In view of adverse meteorological conditions in LST-1 area of PHILIPPINES, concentration of all carrier replacement aircraft and related supporting facilities in quantities required for aviation logistic support of 7th Fleet and Carrier Task Forces considered hazardous and inadvisable in that locality. Para. Request clarification whether CominCh 261935 was intended to preclude the establishment of SATELLITE facilities of this nature in any other area in the PHILIPPINES. Report of LST-1 board refers. Para. Recommend for LST-1 area a maximum of 500 replacement carrier types plus related activities and a similar depot with limited facilities in the LUSON area.

02 0205  COMGENA/FP OA to CINCPAC Info COMGENA/FP OA.

TOP SECRET. Progress by December indicates parking facilities on airfield at GUAM being provided far in excess of authorized Base Development Plan. Estimate there is now space on hard stands and extensive parking aprons for 120 B-24's or equivalent. In order to provide facilities at GUAM for an additional wing it is necessary to add 3ng Avn Avn Battalion strength. The 1st and most readily available is considered to be the 1887th at ANAUR. It is recommended it be redeployed from ANAUR to GUAM immediately. Recommend shipping be made available earliest date possible.

03 0941  CINC EAST INDIES to COMAIRPAC. COMAIRPAC/FRON.

TOP SECRET. Meridian is codeword for operation in my 271230 and Para 1 of my 300935 neither to all addresses.

03 0625  COMGENA/FP OA to CINCPAC Info CINCPAC.

TOP SECRET. AAFPOA 0098. Approved is your 020905. Target of opportunity such as indicated in 1V223 dispatch 010220 warrant your variation of planned employment to take advantage of such situations without specific directive from here. In case in point my 012215 predicated on belief that target sufficiently important to warrant ap lication greater proportion your forces than 1 squadron.

2940
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

03 1151

CINCINMAR to CONCMAR, KOREAFOR, SOUTHCOM, PACOM, CJCS, NINE ONE INFO SECNAV, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, CONCMAR & NINE ONE INFO SECNAV, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, COMNAV, USAFRICA, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, STAFF USAFRICA, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, NAVFOR, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, CONCMAR, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, CONCMAR, JAN 72.

CONFIDENTIAL, WRG 92 INFO NINE ONE, JAN 72.

TOP SECRET. Warning order. Initiate preparations for Phase 2 Inchon with target date (2-day) for INCAPACANCI on L plus 30 in accordance with Joint Staff Study CINCINMAR Serial 500776 Dec 71. Operation will be continuation of Phase 1 under same higher commanders. Assault troops required for operation will be selected from those already available to Commander Joint Expeditionary Forces in Phase 1. Garrison Troops will consist of 1 Army HCT from Assault Forces and following major units in addition to those in Phase 1: 1 Army Artillery Gun 35 plus 2 batteries. 1 Army Air Arm plus 2 batteries. 1 3/L Ptry plus 1 Platoon. 2 VFM Groups. 2 VTF Groups (Army). Island Commander will be Army and Commandos will provide necessary supplemental Garrison Forces. Commanders concerned submit by 10 January or as they become available specific destinations of additional units to be employed phase 2 including defense, aviation, construction and service units. In designating units the mounting point should be indicated. Copies of designations should be provided ComSth Fleet Com 5th PhibFor and ComGen 10th N WA. All units will be furnished initial supplies & materials in area from which mounted. Para. Commandos nominates of the earliest prior Gen Army Air Forces for duty as Island Commander and Army all Phase Commander with permission ConSanForce nominate Commander Naval Facilities.

04 0130

CINCINMAR to CONCMAR, INFO JTF 72, JTF 77, JUSEPO.

CONFIDENTIAL, ALL INFO IN JTF 72.

TOP SECRET. Reference Annex C my OpPlan 29-41 & Tour 210323. Notification hereby given that TF 33 intends strike LUNC6 across dividing line on S minus 3 as measure added protection of own forces. Will strike worthwhile targets evident but will not strike shipping south of 17 degrees north latitude uncertain LUNC6 LUNC6 unless definitely identified as enemy. Pilots will be briefed that ConSanPac Army and Navy planes may be encountered over LUNC6.

04 0640

CINCINMAR to CONCMAR

TOP SECRET. Surface bombardment SURIJU Area by Task Force 92 is planned for 6 January.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

04 2244 ARNOLD to LEMAY Info HBAR, HITT, HAGERTY.

TOP SECRET. We have received information from MACARTHUR that enemy Naval Force departed SINGAPORE JACQUES 30 December possibly for SINGAPORE. We request special reconnaissance SINGAPORE-LINKOGA Area to determine whereabouts of this force in view possible influence current operations in theatre. Desire you conduct necessary search and report findings direct in manner now in use.

04 1417 CINCPOA to 30 BRITISH Info SINGAPORE, COMMANDER ALLIED NAVAL AIR GROUP (NAVJOE), COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES (AIRPAX)

This is a recipherment of my 030345 plq cancel and file. Weight of land based air neutralization effectiveness not as much as expected. Request you include CINCPOA and G-117-X fields in your missions S minus 3. Land based planes will also work in area on S minus 3. For coordination, ALL AIR FORCES will deliver attacks between 1200 and 1500 Hours Zone 1 (—9) time, 3rd Flt before and after those hours. Each Airforce except in emergency to keep planes off of the area during periods allotted the other. 3rd Flt please advise this headquarters and ALL Air Forces earliest convenience action this request. CINCPOA.

05 1046 LEMAY to SINGAPORE.

TOP SECRET O398D AT 061034 GCT General LEMAY will pilot 15-29 from HBAR-115-3 MIMA to GUAH ISLAND. Flight plans as follows from MACARTHUR AIRFIELD at 05-26 12-3-56 to BATAN ISLAND at 05-28 12-2-00 at 1600 GCT to DEPOT Field 15-30 14-4-6 Landing GUAH at 001500 GCT. Request all Naval Units concerned be advised. Also advise approach procedure. IFF Channel, Radios Frequency and any other particulars desired to be used.

04 2253 ARNOLD to MACARTHUR Info HARKEN, HARRIS.

TOP SECRET. WARX 86772 The Commanding General 20th Bomber Command has been instructed to perform special reconnaissance SINGAPORE-LINKOGA Area for purpose requested in your CX 55835. Findings will be reported direct.

05 0651 GTF 77 to CTF 71 Info SINGAPORE, CINCPOA, Job WR 14 PTF 72, 30 BRITISH, 30 THAILAND, CTF 88, JOINT BACAN, CINCPOA.

This is top secret. Enemy Force which departed BATAN ISLAND JACQUES 30 December remains 294.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

05 0671 CTF 77 to CTF 71 Info CINCSWPAC CTF 77, CTF 71

unlocated & early information of present location highly important. Primary mission submarines is to prevent undetected approach of this force into Philippine area. 2ndary mission determine present position of enemy force if within submarine operating areas Japa. Modify submarine dispositions as necessary and until enemy force located.

06 0614 CTF 77 to COMFLEET ALL INTERESTED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS SWESPAC Info 7TH FLEET. CTF 77, ALL TFG'S & FGC'S.

DUCKS AND SEAGULLS this for UNRECONNAISSANCE VULN.
damage from suicide attacks as follows: (A) New Mexico (BB 40) bridge destroyed. All communications are out. CombatDiv 4 in WEST VIRGINIA in charge San Fabian Task Groups. No info Admiral Weyler. (B) WAKES (DD 723) plane crashed in after part of bridge into CTC. 10 killed 25 burned. All guns in local control. Captain critically injured. (C) A M SUMNER (DD 692) hit abt. After magazine flooded. 2 killed 3 injured. (D) IOWA (BB 12) hit by suicide plane. (E) ENGLISH (ASPD 16) hit by suicide plane. Latter 2 no amplifying requests received no yet as still under attack. (F) E P JANET (DD 664) hit by plane on both forward gans damage slight. 1 man superficially injured. Now subject: Minesweepers report no mines found as yet in entrance mine fields location but several floating mines. Now subject: Suicide dive bomber attacks made in determined fashion. Pilots seem to be of high quality and difficult to stop. Group fighter director officer states no radar contacts this forenoon all interception being done by visual lookouts with fighter director. Now subject: We require considerably more air support. What we have does not seem adequate at all. We have had 12 ships hit by suicide bombers since 1630 yesterday of which 1 sank and 9 were damaged severely.

06 0934 CTF 77 to COM3RDFLT info CINCSWPAC. CTF 77, CTF 71

COMBAT AF 32 BOMBING, ALL TFG AND TFG 3RD AND 7TH TFG

COMBAT.

Damage by enemy planes to bombardment and minesweeping groups described in CTF 77, 06 0614, and previous report indicates urgency of neutralizing Jap airfields in LUSON. Request 3rd Flt repeat today's strikes and BOMB caps over LUSON fields TOVC XED 7 minus 2 Day.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

05 2203

COM3RD/FLT to CINCSOWESPAC Info CTF 38, CINCPAC, COMEAP, CTF 77, COMA 5,

Reference your CX 5586 of 041417 GCT. In accordance
URDIS 040130 I (-9) will maintain continuous target
CAP over LUZON fields from prior dawn to after
sunset 8 minus 3 in the interest of protecting both
my force and your echelons. Experience has shown
that only by such procedure can enemy air activity
be held down. Pilots will be thoroughly briefed
regarding your strikes between 0900 and 1500 as
stated in the reference.

04 1609

5th FIGHTER COMMAND to 310 BOMBWING, 42 FIGHTER
CONTROL GEN. 40 FIGHTER CONTROL CTF 77,
ALL SOURCES INT CURRENT OP's SOPAC Info A7, A8 and
8 FIGHTER GRPS: 418, 547 NIGHT FIGHTER SQUAD: 11TH
LIFE FORCE, 35 FIGHTER GRP, COMMANDER GPF Z, CO VFP
241, COM 5TH AIRFORCE.

J 221 E Whenever it is anticipated that M-1 convoys
cannot be covered from LEYTE, the following
arrangements have been coordinated with 310 Bomb
Wing and 42 FIGHTER CONTROL to have convoys covered from
MINDORO. Code Word BLACKBIRD followed by name of
convoy position and fighter director call word will
indicate inability to cover said convoy from LEYTE.
Reverse BLACKBIRD followed by name of convoy and
position and fighter director callword will indicate
cover can be furnished from LEYTE. Acknowledge.

05 1625

COMAASPAC to COMAF 5, COMAF 13, COMAIR7TH,
ECO 310 BOMBWING, CTF 94.5 FOR 22 AND A9A GROUPE
INFO CINCSOWESPAC, COM3RD/FLT, CTF 38.

AX-30376 3RD FLEET will be operating in LUZON area
south of 16-30 North Latitude on January 6. All
Allied Air Force pilots will be briefed that Navy
Carrier type airplanes may be encountered over
LUZON. Allied Air Force airplanes will not cross
the SANTA CRUZ - BAGABAG - CPE SAN ILDEFonso line
January 6 except in an emergency.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

06 1824

CTFO 77 to CINCPAC Info ALL TOG's A TO A MARCH 7TH FLT. CTOS ALL TR, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COLUMBIA.
COF 5, COMAIRPAC, EACH.

COFO 77.2 despatch 061210 reports additional damage by crash divers which is growing to serious proportions. Probable that Japa are using small air fields as well as large. Request you cover air fields as possible in LINGAYEN Area. Further request you give direct Air Support objective area which will be especially required during period headed TRAF that area. This would facilitate initiation gratuation operation necessity for which may develop without much warning due to weather fronts CHINA SEA area.

03 1237

COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC Info COMAIRPAC, CINCLANT, COMAIRLANT.

1. Carrier Divisions, Air Force Pacific Fleet constituted as follows:

CARDIV 1
CV 9 ESSEX (F)
CV 15 RANDOLPH
CV 31 BON HOMME RICHARD
CVL 25 COWPENS

CARDIV 2
CV 13 FRANKLIN (F)
CV 19 HANCOCK
CV 38 SHEL.LORI.LA
CVL 30 SAN JACINTO

CARDIV 3
CV 10 TOWNTOWN (F)
CV 16 LEXINGTON
CV 36 ANTIETAM
CVL 24 BEALEAU WOOD

CARDIV 4
CV 17 BOMBER HILL (F)
CV 11 INDEPENDENT
CV 39 LAKE CHAMPLAIN
CVL 28 CUBOT

CARDIV 5
CV 16 WAFF (F)
CV 12 HORNET
CV 21 BOXER
CVL 26 MONTEREY

CARDIV 6
CV 14 TICONDEROGA (F)
CV 20 DENINGTON
CVL 27 LANDOLY

CARDIV 7
CV 8 ENTERPRISE (F)
CVL 22 INDEPENDENCE
CVL 29 BATAAN

TOP SECRET

JANUARY (20)

06 1210

CTO 77-2 to CINCPOA: CINCPOA, CONWES PAC, CTF 77, JCOMS, COMAIR 5, and CTF 77.2.

This afternoon following ships hit by suicide bombers, CALIFORNIA (BB-44), AUSTRALIA, LOUISVILLE (CA 28), LOWRY (DD-770), O'BRIEN (DD-725), ORCA (AVP-49). This makes 12 ships hit today and a total of 17 since 1630 yesterday afternoon. LOUISVILLE and AUSTRALIA have now been hit twice. Rear Admiral painfully and seriously burned. Command CruDiv 4 now temporarily in PORTLAND. RAdm WYLER safe. Consider need of additional air power urgent and vital. Our CVE's entirely inadequate providing air cover. Japanese Suicide Dive Bombers seem able attack without much interference owing radar difficulties affecting all ships in LYNGAYEN GULF area. Airborne radar rarely makes contact with planes. Believe in addition that all fields small as well as large near LYNGAYEN area must be continuously bombed and maintained neutralized. Enemy attacks heaviest morning and evening especially around 1700. Additional damage may seriously and adversely affect this as well as important subsequent operations. More damage may invite action with the Japanese Fleet with which this command is becoming progressively less prepared. Should suicide bombers attack transport results might be disastrous. Recommend 5th Air Force be informed seriousness situation and need more air support. Recommend 3rd Fleet be ordered this area immediately provide additional air and surface cover urgently needed. Consider this matter of such serious import as to warrant immediate reconsideration present plans.

07 0200

CINCPOA, CONWES PAC, CTF 77, JCOMS, COMAIR 5, and CTF 77.2.

TOP SECRET. 8 January Task Force 38 refuels and will not be available for strikes or cover. Unless recommendation received from MacArthur or Kinkaid Com3raf10 will decide whether strike FORMOSA or LOZON 9 January covering interested commands.

07 0312

CINCPOA to JCOMS, CONWES PAC, CINCPOA, CTF 77.

TOP SECRET. Suggest limit operation 3rdFleet in SOUTH CHINA SEA 96 period necessary for accomplishment covering Task accomplish my 281406 and use their aircraft for offensive strikes in Strategic Support. However request your comment on CTF 77 061824 and estimate as to present ability shore based air forces and escort carriers accomplish essential protection expeditionary forces and direct air support at the objective in accordance previous concepts. When time
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

07 0312 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, COMFLLT, CTF 77.
(Continued)

permits prefer that requests for major changes in employment of Fast Carrier Task Forces incident to changes in overall coordination of land and carrier based air forces be received from your headquarters.

07 0342 CTF 77 to COMFLLT, CINCPAC, CINCSOWSPAC AREA, COMAIRPAC, TWEF, COMINCH, COMINPAC.

ROPK Via COMNAVGROUP CHINA 061419 OSINT JUGS possibility that major portion Jap Fleet hitherto SINGAPORE is at sea to westward of KYUSHU. At SOA 16 knots force could arrive BAKO 1100 I-(-9) 8. Allowing 1 Day fuel time Force could arrive LINGAYEN morning 10th. If fueling time reduced or SOA increased force could arrive LINGAYEN night 9-10.

07 0342 CTF 77 to COMFLLT/CINCPAC/CINCSOWSPAC/COMFLLT/COMINCH.

TOP SECRET. COMNAVGROUP CHINA 061419 indicates possibility that major portion Jap Fleet hitherto in EMPIRE is at sea to westward of KYUSHU. At SOA 16 knots force could arrive BAKO 1100 I (-9) 8. Allowing 1 Day fuel time Force could arrive LINGAYEN morning 10th. If fueling time reduced or SOA increased force could arrive LINGAYEN night 9-10.

07 0307 MACARTHUR to COMFLLT ARMY AIR FORCES Info COMINCH 20TH.

BOMCOM, JUNIPER 20TH ARMY AIR FORCE, CINCPAC, 07/77,

COORDINATE, DEPLOYED AIR FORCES.

Situation developing in M-1 Operation indicates possibility that suicide bombers are coming from FORMOSA and requires maximum concentrated effort by all means on neutralization of Japanese Air. Request that bomber missions 20th BombCom scheduled for KEELING HARBOR on S-1 be Diverted to Hostile air field FORMOSA.

07 1044 COMFLLT to CINCPAC.

TOP SECRET. Based on available intelligence, Your 07/0921. Coordinated attack by enemy northern and southern forces does not appear possible before KYUSHU. Force alone could possibly attack LINGAYEN 9th or could attempt contain TaskFor 11 at basis near OKINAWA 9th. My air estimate puts threat to MacArthur in FORMOSA. Actually movements are initially restricted by weather.
07 1044 COMBSRFLIT to CINCPAC.

Fueling tomorrow 8th after which I consider best move is to attack FORMOSA as planned on the 9th from which position operation GRAPPLE OR AGITATOR can be initiated quickly. I do not recommend transmitting LUZON STRAIT without first attacking FORMOSA (9th at earliest possible). Defensive covering of MacArthur from CHINA SEA as compared to present operating area is (A) more restrictive (B) entails more risk to Task Force 38 and Task Group 30.8 from suicide and weather and (C) involves the ultimate additional risks of the retirement.

07 1207 CX 56037 CINCSWPA to CINCPAC Info COMBSRFLIT, CINCSWPA, TFG 77 (TFG CIRCUIT).

Refere NCINCPOA 070312, it is probable that the bulk of enemy air attacking forces are coming from FORMOSA. Southwest Pacific Air Forces are at present available for cover at the landing and for the approach and retirement of the various Task Groups. Comprise 16 escort carriers, 3 Fighter Groups, 1 Strafer Group, and 3 Tactical Escort Squadrons (2 Fighter, 1 Strafer) at MINDORO. 3 Fighter Groups, 2 Strafer Groups. Search and miscellaneous elements at LAYTE. In addition to the above there are 4 Heavy Bombardment Groups from PALAU and MOROTAI being used with light bomb loads. 3 Only can be employed per day and employment of all is subject to weather through tropical storm. It is anticipated that this air power will be augmented to 5 a total of 4 Fighter Groups at LAYTE and 4 Fighter Groups at MINDORO about 15 January. Appropriate reciprocal show to MacArthur. One half of one of the heavy bombardment Groups will be displaced to SAMAR by 20 January and 1 additional medium Bomber Group will be established in MINDORO by 21 January. It is also anticipated that 1 Group of Fighters can be installed at LINDAYEN by 15. Plus 6 Para Therecan be NL CARKPVK neutralisation of the many fields on LUZON. Itinerant and essential planes will, for some time, be able to launch from these fields and strike in the LINDAYEN Area. It is believed, however, that our increasing air power should progressively minimise the air force menace over the M-1 Landing Area and along the shipping lanes thereto insofar as hostile aircraft being launched from fields in the PHILIPPINES ARCHIPELAGO are concerned. It is further believed that defensive air cover can never positively prevent suicide bombing attacks. The FORMOSA Fields are within easy flying distance of the M-1 LANDING.
TOP SECRET

SHEPP (C.T.)

07 1207
for suicide bombers. If these airfields are left
undisturbed, it is certain that shipping will con-
tinue to be menaced and will be subject to considerable
loss. It is believed that the 3rd Fleet should
be employed on 1 day against FORMOSA fields as planned
while remaining prepared to strike JAPAN: JAPAN
previous effective action in SOUTH. Concur in
principle in use of Fleet Air Forces against targets
beyond our reach but in case of emergency will call
for direct support.

07 1708
ALDO to MACARTHUR, WHITIN, LINCOLN, NIKUN.

The request received in your 156001 is approved.
20th Bomber will attack KALUTA airfield in place
of PEMING JAPAN. Recent information indicates that
this mission will be delayed on account of weather
and will take place on 9-1 day.

07 2128
ARNOLD to CINCPOA, L. R. Y. GIBBELL Info NIKUN.

TOP SECRET (CARL 68365) You are authorized effective
January 9th to release photo planes held on call for
J-1 Operation reconnaissance of KALUTA by 21st Bomber
Command will terminate January 9th both 20th and 21st
Bomber Commands will remain prepared to perform upon
request from this headquarters special reconnaissance.

07 219
LEWIS to ARNOLD, DEERING 20, HORN, BLANCHARD, HARVEY,
ANDERSON, EDMUNDS, BAKER, ORY, MUNRO, RANDY,
Info JAPAN, KOREA JAPAN. CINCPOA near CINCPOA.

TOP SECRET. Mission PITIYANG (KIMIKU) will be de-
layed 24 hours because of weather conditions. New D
Day will be 9 January 1945. (NOTE: Attention is in-
vited to MacArthur's request that this raid be divert-
from PEARL to FORMOSA (070107).

07 2207
CINCPOA to COM3RDULT. Info JAPAN. CINCPOA, CONTPL
CTF 38, TO COM3RDULT 38.

Top Secret. I concur in your 071044 and in the general
comments of CINCPOA CI 56037 (071207) both of which
are substantially in accord our previous concepts and
agreements. Assume you will operate in accordance the
with and will take any favorable opportunity to destro-
emy heavy ships.

07 2241
CINCPOA to OTH, CTF 94. Info COMATOY 5, COMATOY
COM3RDULT. COM3RDULT.

CombatDiv 7 will depart PEARL in INDIANA 10 January and
arrive SAIJAN 20 January. Prepare plans and make prelimi-
inary arrangements air attack and surface bombardment.

(Continued)
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (CST),

07 2241  SINGPOA to CTF 91, CTF 94, etc. (Cont'd)

ICE JIMA as soon thereafter as practicable using
INDIANA CruDiv 5 and screen. ComBatDiv 7 OTC surface
force. On completion INDIANA proceeds WTW.

07 2326  SINGPOA to COMMD 20TH PACIFIC. Info COMBUDPLT. CTF 3.

Top Secret. Your 071050 see Arnold's 071708 in which
I concur.

07 2351  COMMD 20TH PACIFIC to COMMD 20TH PACIFIC. Info COMBUDPLT. COMSTRAT.

Top Secret. Suggest continued mining CHICK JIMA and
near JIMA with particular attention FUTAMI FO. Relieve
most mines already laid have been swept and that con-
tinuous mining only way to maintain threat to shipping.
No action Cominfac 043000 pending reply.

08 0440  COMBUDPLT CTF to COMBDAG. Info COMBUDAG.

Top Secret. Answering 080312. Enemy shipping
definitely following close inshore Atlantic Coast when-
ever possible even being inside islands off JIMA. Coast
between YAMOTO and 14th AFB JIMA. 14th Air Force is
not a serious threat to this shipping and has wealth of
targets in harbors and on land that it cannot bomb due
to limitations supply. Therefore it is strongly recom-
mended that submarines take over any or all of blind bombing
zone in which they can effectively operate.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY 10:45

07 2046

CTG 77.2 to COMPTAH. ALL XLMS UNDER COMAIR KOSOL INTO YP 77. ALL XLMS ARE WAVING ALL XLMS ARE HAVING

SECRET. CONTACT BONIFACIO AND ROHR. CONTACT BONIFACIO

NO DETACH. CONTACT ROHR.

Conducted bombardment of landing areas this afternoon, continued mine sweeping, made inspection of beach approach areas with underwater teams and continued air strikes with carrier based aircraft. No air opposition was encountered until about late afternoon when FALMER (DN=5) was sunk. Slight enemy opposition to blue bombardment was noted, slight opposition was encountered by underwater teams this opposition being mostly from snipers. Direct air support furnished smoothly without opposition. Report follows: (A) Bombardment. As a general thing, suitable targets were conspicuous by their absence. Enemy guns were engaged on ridge in 1173, and in areas 1416, 1366. AA fire was noted from vicinity church in 9731 P. Direct hits noted on road in area 1416, several buildings damaged or burned. Also destroyed medium calibre guns in area 0641 N, damaged AA battery in 1249 N near ridge, a single howitzer or mortar not definitely located but believed northeast of RAJUA opened fire. Shortage of spotting planes from AUSTRALIA and WOOLSEY prevented completion scheduled FOR HU. Above is brief summary of firing ships reports which indicate very few important targets have as yet been located. (B) Minesweeping area ESQUITA, BOULEVARD, PEDROIT, ANCHOR, SHACKLE, TURBINE (may be THURSLEY) and FIG were completed. All others well ahead of schedule and will be completed early tomorrow morning (8 Jan.). MULE only 2 mines reported. No controlled mines of any type discovered anywhere. (C) Direct air support. Tag hit by 4 rockets and strafed, 120 MM 3 AS 6 heavy guns in target areas 0820 OCEANS certain results. 20 trucks destroyed in vicinity target area 0900; nil AA in SAN FERNANDO; ammo dumps and gun emplacements in target area 0000 hit with excellent results; ammo truck destroyed target area 2563; 4 hits on barracks in SAN PIRUOS; 2 direct hits on boat in target area 6783; fires started in buildings in target area 0675 P and 0975 P and rocket and bomb hits on railroad in same areas; fired several buildings in target area 2075 W. Enemy troop movements southward vicinity ROSEIG. Boats in vicinity of damaged submarine hit JUNKO first started. Totals for day planes used 61 VT, 66 VT. 20 in direct support and 4 special missions. 19 tons 100 pound bombs 30 tons 500 pound bombs 178 rockets expended. Lost 1 VT. Results today much better than yesterday. (D) Underwater team reports forwarded by separate despatches. New subject. Rear Admiral Theodore E. Chandler ComCruDiv 4 passed away at 1750/1 7 January as a result of injuries and burns suffered during suicide bomber attack preceding day.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

07 0837

CTG 77.2 to CENTCOM: Info CTG 77 ALL TF & TG COMMANDERS:
3RD ANTHEM TF-10 CHICLAY, BIRDS-5 WEST AND
FEROLRS-5, 10 DEC 76.

SUBJECT: GULF FORCES.

Report of operations for LINGAYEN GULF Groups for
6 January follows: Bombardments of SANTIAGO I. L. I. AND
_FORO POINT_ completed. During afternoon Task Group
penetrated distance of 20 miles into Gulf to support
minesweepers under attack and to conduct any bomb-
ardsment feasible. A bombardment of about 1/2 hours
duration of _ARINGAY-BAPANG_ area was effected. During
bombardment and upon retirement from the Gulf the
Group was subjected to an intense and prolonged
suicide bombing attack in which CALIFORNIA, AUSTRALIA,
LOUISVILLE, COLEBRA were heavily damaged as reported
my 061210. Para. Specific discussion of each operation
follows: (A) SANTIAGO I. L. I. Few important or
worthwhile targets were observed in this area. Firing
was therefore limited to those targets only and to
a considerable amount of small shipping in passage
between SANTIAGO I. L. I. and Mainland (B) FORO POINT.
All targets were well covered. Some counter battery
fire necessary and enemy ceased firing. Heavily
damaged storage, Heavy A/C A/S, and reported 155MM
gun positions. (C) _ARINGAY-BAPANG_ Area. Fire in this
area was directed largely at enemy forces which were
moving east on road in areas 0783, 0883, and 0463
towards the mountains. Troops were also noted moving
north in areas 0781 and 0782. These troops included
many vehicles and horse drawn heavy field pieces. The
heavy suicide attacks made on our ships coincided with
this movement. Results achieved indicate MOSSY WILLY
JOHESKE COMMUNITY. (D) Minesweeping conducted in
all areas. All results negative to date except 1
mine found in area. Several floating mines were
discovered. Operations_CENTCOM TRAVELER, B.J. N.
HOVEY (DDG-11), LONG (DDG-12), SOUTHARD (DDG-10)
and BROOKS (DDG-10) were hit by suicide bombers.
HOVEY and _LONG_ have since sunk. (E) Support
aircraft. Expended 45 tons bombs, 492 rockets with no
losses. Results: Fired or damaged several P.S.
LINGAYEN BAY Railroad bridge knocked out for 36
hours. Destroyed 1 railway locomotive this area
Destroy 1 aircraft on ground, 1 in air. Destroyed
ammo dump 8624 B.4 buildings probably barrack in
9239 and 9240. Extensive reconnaissance failed reveal
any targets, as provided by advance intelligence.
No coastal guns located. (F) Fighter direction.
Destroyed 1 enemy aircraft airborne at least 9 of
which were in visual fighter direction. Para. New
Subject: Correction 060614. Last paragraph changed
ORIGIN. WHICHWY had 11 ships hit by suicide bombers
since 1630 yesterday, of which 9 were damaged severely. Para. Correct my 060537. 1st Paragraph, 4 sentence change to read "Minesweeping group X/P about dawn destroyed 1 plane". Para. New Subject: weather conditions 1200/1 wind 120 degrees true 8 knots, barometer 29.86 falling slowly, barometer change 6 hours 1/10 inch. ALTO stratus clouds 8/10 base 9000 feet. New smooth moderate 13 morning at noon.

07 1842 CINCPAC to AJIAD.

THIS IS TOP SECRET. Execute plan GRATITUDE. My 282130. C Day 8 January. Estimate Fast Oil Group will arrive route point A at 23001 9 January being approximately 4 hours behind schedule. ComTaskGroup 30.8 expedite arrival point A all possible. ComTaskForce 38 provide air cover for Task Group 30.8 on 9 and 10 January remaining in vicinity latitude 19-20 North Longitude 119-3 on 10 January until rendezvous with Task Group 30.8 can be made then proceed according Plan.
05 2306  CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH.

TOP SECRET.  RE: 24th Corps.  I am becoming concerned over the prospects for success of the 24th Corps for the ICEBERG Operation with a target date of 1 April.  As what date can this Corps be relieved from Combat Operations.

08 1321  CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info COMINCH.

TOP SECRET.  Progressive movement 77th and 70-7th Divisions into staging areas LEYTE GULF commences in about 1 week.  All units these Divisions except 1 combat team expected close in staging areas on or before 7th February.  Expected unit which must await arrival advance element American Division will close before 15th February.  96 Division now out of combat and assembling LEYTE GULF Area. Above schedule will be expedited as consistent with the demands for facilities of area connection success M-1 assault.

10 0215  DEP COMAF 20 to CINCPOA Info COMINCH OTC 9a.

TOP SECRET.  Section 21 has been directed to carry out major effort at earliest practicable date against principle air installations OKINAWA.  Probable date between 12th and 14th.  Detailed plan will follow.

10 1447  MACARTHUR to COMAF, CINCPAC, COM SHOF LT, COMAAF, ADV ECH, ADVANCED ECH CIRQ, COMAF, WASATCH, CTF 77, CIAF BOISE.

TOP SECRET.  Section 20 has been directed to neutralize within capabilities air installations on FORMOSA during period 10 through 17 January.  Refer CIC 5640, T.O.O, 091301 OTC.  WASHINGTON designated targets embracing primary air installations on FORMOSA including SHINCHIU, DEITTO and KAGI.

11 0659  COMAF to MINITZ, MACARTHUR Info CINCMNCH.

TOP SECRET.  Clearance is requested for 14th Air Force to lay mines in CAL RANG BAY.
09 2220

COMPHIBPAC TO COMFORWARDAREA Info COMTHFLE, CINCPAC.

THIS IS TOP SECRET. Joint expeditionary Force will conduct rehearsals in SAIPAN, TINIAN Area 12 and 13 February. CAP and ASP will be provided by Joint Expeditionary Force only for the purpose of rehearsing planes and control units. It will be assumed the responsibility for protection of ships from air surface and submarine attack to remain with ComFwdArea unless otherwise notified. In case of emergency planes will be made available air Defense Commander on his request. Carriers operating to the Eastward at distance from Islands will provide own CAP and ASP.

10 0825

CINCPAC TO COMTHFLE Info COMFWDAREA, COMNH.

TOP SECRET. Consider ComPhibPac 09220 requires clarification particularly with respect to area within which ComFwdArea is desired to assume responsibility for protection of ships of Joint Expeditionary Force from Air Surface and Submarine attack respectively.

11 0846

CINCPAC TO COMFWDAREA Info COMTHFLE, COMINCH, COMBRETTON L/C DRASCOR.

TOP SECRET. The fivesome agreement of 5 November provided that after M 1 fire support ships will be released to arrive ULTIMI by sail pm 10 to meet target date for detachment if the situation warranted. My serial #21164 of 24 December may have reached December gave desired movement of Pacific Fleet units returning from your operational control area P 1. ComTHFLE was informed by me on 25 December that retention of these ships subsequent to M 1 would not be agreed to. Commodore Naval Forces Op Plan 18-44 of 30 December no received comments about use of Pacific Fleet units including battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and escort carriers not only thru M 1 but also to participate in M 2, M 3 or M 4 assaults and to carry out operations on K Day (29 January) "and subsequent thereto". It is essential that the fivesome agreement be adhered to in order that the detachment operation may take place as ordered by the joint chiefs of staff and as soon as possible after M 1. Request Com Allied Naval Forces Op Plan 18-44 be modified to delete all Pacific Fleet units not allocated to him for the operation concerned.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (CCT)

11 0548 CINCPPOA to CINCPPOA

Top Secret. Exchange of units between Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas is subject. In view of CINCPPOA dispatch CX56038 (D/T 071226 Jan) is the exchange direct in CINCPPOA, serial 0001060 plus the return to Pacific Ocean Areas of the 36th and 179th Coast Artillery battalions and designation of detachment 1, 36th Signal Company, aviation, the final action to be expected reference message form this headquarters serial 00086, dated 24 Dec. Early information on availability of these units in planning for iceberg is imperative. Based on reply to this message, final action may be initiated requesting War Department to re-assign units to be transferred.

11 1031 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3, TG 77.4 Info. All TFC & TOC 3rd & 7th, CTF 77, CTF 78, CTF 79, etc.

Top Secret. This is CombatRon 1 OpPlan 1-45. Para 1: It is believed that the enemy is preparing to resist our occupation of LINGAYEN by surface forces. 1 of the strongest which might be encountered is expected to approach from FORMOSA and could have the following units: 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 2 CA, 3 CL and upward of 15 DD. Our force will be supported by 3rd Fleet Air and surface forces and land based air and additional units made available by CTF 77. Para 2: This force will cover own forces in and approaching and retiring from LINGAYEN Gulf Area in order protect them from enemy surface forces. Para 3: TG 77.2 and TG 77.4 take covering position off LINGAYEN GULF, the general area bearing 315 degrees 25 miles from Point CAW and operate in spaniel, airdale or collie as directed. During daylight, when directed, a combined cruising disposition similar to RO will generally be taken. During darkness and low visibility, when directed, TG 77.2 and TG 77.4 will generally take separate dispositions similar in case of TG 77.2 to 5201. When latter dispositions are taken TG 77.4 will take station about 10 miles distant from TG 77.2 on the reverse of the probable enemy bearing line and will be prepared to retire LINGAYEN GULF in an emergency. TG 77.3, whenever practicable maintain a position which will facilitate joining TG 77.2 vicinity LINGAYEN GULF if ordered. Subpara HAVI continue present tasks assigned CINCPPOA OpPlan 17-44 and continue air support Para 5 Appendix 5 to APPEND 2 CTF 77.4 OpPlan 3-44. Should fleet action eventuate use Battle Plan A or as applicable. Fuel & Fuel will be available in others when requested in urgent cases fuel destroyer from heavy class. Para 1 Use CINCPPOA Communication.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

11 1031 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3, TG 77.4 Info. All TFG &
TGC 3rd & 7th, CTF 77, CTF 78, CTF 79, etc. (Continued).

17-44 and Annex S and Annex E, my OpPlan 3-44. Use
zone minus 9 time. Commander LINGAYEN Defense Force
in BB 44 with TG 77.2.

11 1657 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3, TG 77.4 Info. CTF 77,
CTF 78, CTF 79, CTF 38, etc.

Top Secret. This is Annex B, Battle Plan B, (night
battle plan) to Combatron 1, 4 and 5 as in Annex A,
Battle Plan A, to Operations plan. Paragraph 2: This
force will destroy enemy battle line, engaging it in
normal action at moderate ranges, using destroyer
torpedo attacks and air attacks by carrier based planes
plus maneuver to hold the sun range so obtained in order
to protect blue forces in, and approaching and retiring
from LINGAYEN GULF. Paragraph 3 As in Annex H Night
action CTG 77.2 OpPlan 3-44.

12 1241 CominCH & CNO to CinCPac Info. CinCSWPA, Com3rdFlt,
Chiefs of Staff Army and Joint Chief of Staff.

Top Secret. Suggest for immediate consideration if not
already arranged that 3rd Fleet maintain position in
area, perhaps westward of LUZON Strait, such that it can
surely protect area MINDORO STRAIT to LINGAYEN against
enemy surface attack from SOUTH CHINA SEA or via FORMOSA
STRAIT or LUZON STRAIT.

11 2239 Com3rdFlt to 3rdFlt Info. CinCPac, CinCSWPA, Com7thFlt,
ComFEAF, Com4thAF, Com3rdAF, All TF and TG Comind 7thFlt.

Top Secret. This is alternate 3rd Fleet exit plan from
CHINA SEA, short title exit. Plan is effective if and
when directed. Refer ComTaskForce 77 Op Plan 17-44,
Annex C, Appendix 2, Chart 2, which TG Commanders hold.
Para. TF 38 will transit SUNAGA STRAIT commencing with
arrival fleet TG at point kin at 18 hours 1 Xray day in
accordance following schedule. Para. TG 38.1 arrive
point kin 18 hours Xray day then proceed at 20 knots 80;
through point pad then south arriving east of CAGAYAN
prior dawn Xray plus 1. While operating this vicinity
provide air cover for all task groups during Xray plus 1
day. Depart this area in time pass through point poi
about 2200 1 Xray plus 1 SOA 16 knots WPTICA. To 38.2
arrive point kin 21 hours TG 38.3 arrive safe point 24
hours Xray day. Both groups proceed from point kin via

2958
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

11 2239 COM3RDFLT to 3RD FLT Info. CINCPAC, CINCSWP, COM7THFLT,
COMPEAF, etc. (Continued).

Route CARIBOO at speed of advance LEXE, 16 knots. Para.
On Xray plus 2 day all groups provide own air cover
while proceeding at 30A 16 knots. During transit all
groups be prepared catapult night fighters for own pro-
tection such to proceed LATE or MINDOBO fields only if
carrier recover not possible. Para. Upon arrival
position HOMONHON ISLAND Xray plus two day task groups
proceed independently to southwest corner area Mick
where rendezous with oiler groups 0800 1 Xray plus 3
and fuel all ships. Para. ComTaskForce 77 requested
to notify all concerned this movement if plan is
placed in effect.

11 2241 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC, CINCSWP, CTF 77, COMINCH Info.
CTF 38.

Top Secret. Weather prevented shipping slaughter
FORMOSA 9TH but enemy air was smothered and own force
unlocated. Results by separate dispatch. Two oilers
collided BALINTANG STRAIT but AEF made rendezvous as
usual. TF 38 and TG 30.8 entered CHINA SEA undetected.
3 unobserved nip nats planes enroute LUZON to FORMOSA
shot down by night fighters. Refueled forenoon 11th.
Advanced TG 38.2 and TG 34.5 (augmented) toward CARIBOO
at high speed covered by cap from other groups. At
1630 3 planes chasing SWPA search mariner stumbled cap
force and were splashed apparently without reporting at
0300 item 12th still undetected (one for RIPLF) lau 8 oued
searches. To be continued.

11 2206 MARSHALL to RICHARDSON Info. CINCPAC

Top Secret. War 90417 By JCS decision the 9th and 46
Infantry Divisions have been diverted to another theater.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

12 1606 CINCPOA to COM3RDWFLT Info. COMINCH, CINCWPA, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Para 1: After fueling your 120220
operate to northward disposed to cover the LINGAYEN
MINIDRO area against approach from LUZON STRAIT, FORMO,
ST. LUIS or from the south and continue efforts locate
enemy heavy ships. If more important targets do not
appear strike HONG KONG at discretion. Para 2: When
practicable advise me length of time you can remain
in SOUTH CHINA SEA with regard to logistic support
respectively available including fuel and ammunition.
Assume you will use your 2 tankers previous spotted
at LEYTE as well as others under your control. Advise
if commercial tanker deliveries desired at LEYTE.

12 1941 COM3RDWFLT to CINCPOA Info. CINCWPAESPAC, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Your 121606. Estimate oilers sailed
according my 121935 can reach position west of
MINIDRO by 17 January. I plan to join 2 oilers now
at LEYTE with this group enroute. With fuel avail-
able today plus oil in these replacements will then
be able remain in CHINA SEA at least until 23 January
if required. Estimate ammunition remaining in ships
will permit 4 additional full strike days. No com-
mmercial tanker deliveries will be required LEYTE
unless necessary for 7th Fleet reserve.

11 1611 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, 77.3, 77.4 Info. CTF 77.78, 79.
38/20378, COMINCH, COMAF 5 & 13, CINCWPA, etc.

Top Secret. This is Annex A Battle Plan A (Red action).
OYNECO Battle Plan 1 0 8 1 85. Para 1: General sit-
situation. Expected that Japanese will react strongly
with both Naval and Air Forces against blue naval
and enemy task group of 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 2 CA,
3 CL and 15 DD's may be used for this purpose. Our
forces will be supported by land based air, by addi-
tional forces from TP 77 and by TG 77.3. Para 2: This
force will destroy enemy battle line initially by
reducing battle line speed by attack by carrier based
planes, secondly by engaging enemy battle line in
normal action at moderate ranges passing quickly through
unfavorable long range bands and finally by any attacks
coordinated with gunfire in order to protect blue
forces in, and approaching and retiring from LINGAYEN
GULF. Para 3: Battle line: CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA,
WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI
destroy enemy battle line by opening fire at about
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

11 1611 CTF 77.2 to TG 77.2, 77.3, 77.4, Info, CTF 77.76, 77.38/20378, COLONIA, COLNA 3 & l, etc. (Continued)

26000 yards and by closing rapidly to moderate range of about 19000 yards and by then maneuvering to confine action with the enemy battle line to moderate range. Right flank force, Captain NICHOLS, RN, SHADWICK, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS. DesRon 56 (temporary), DesRon 6c (temporary), attack enemy battle line; defend own battle line. Left flank force, Rear Admiral HARRIS, PHILIPPI, YUEN S R, KENPEI, DesRon 21 less H WORTH, JENKINS and LA VALETTE, attack enemy battle line, defend own battle line. Escort carrier group gain and maintain control of air. Reduce enemy battle line speed when directed by O T C. Coordinate activities with land based planes. Para. (X) as in paragraph 3 Xray Day action plan, Annex H, CTF 77.2 OpPlan 3-44. Para four S & one. Para 5. Communications in accordance with Annex E my OpPlan 3-44 with battle frequencies as shown in Article 2212 para (B). Special organization voice and C W calls as set forth in CINCPAC Communication Plan 5-44. Use zone minus 9 time. Commander LINGAYEN Defense Force in BB44 with battle line.

06 2231 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WEDEMeyer Info. NIMITZ, MILLS, CHINNIAU, MILLS, CHINNIAU.

Top Secret. Photograph projects in CHINA rear CPBX 27108 is subject. Para 1: Cancel existing request my MILLS for areas defined in CPB 18083 dated October 27 and substitute request in paragraph 2 below which is based on statement by CinCPAC to Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16th December. Para 2: Minimum immediate requirements for CinCPAC (Reference map series AAS 1581): Subpara A: For mapping to complete 6-inch vertical cover of all land within area bounded by 121 degrees 45 minutes east, 122 degrees 30 minutes east, 29 degrees 30 minutes north, and 30 degrees 30 minutes north. Wanted by 1 April. Subpara B: Reconnaissance photography as follows: Subparagraph 1: 1st priority: South coast of CHOU SHAN to depth 4 miles inland, south and north coasts of NINGPO PENINSULA to depth 3 miles inland from 121-50 east longitude and HENG PU to eastern tip of peninsula. Include MEI SHAN and channel, also CHI-TING SHAN and channel. Desired by 1 February, approximate scale 1 to 10,000 instead of 1 to 5,000 requested by CinCPAC which is not considered practicable at this time. Subparagraph 2: 2nd priority
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JANUARY (GCT)

06 2231 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WEDEMEYER INFO. HANSELIU, MILLE, CHENNAULT (Continued).

Complete cover islands TAO-HUA-TAO and LIU-HENG-TAO desired by 1 February, approximate scale 1 to 10,000.
Subparagraph 3: 3rd priority: Entire island TAI-SHAN by 1 March, approximate scale 1 to 10,000.
Para 3: Minimum immediate requirements stated by Joint Chiefs of Staff are completion of 6" vertical mapping photography of these areas: remainder of NANKING SOUND and CHU-SAN ARCHIPELAGO, YOUCHEW, SAMSA INLET, WENCHOW, ANCY, CHATOW, CHENCHAL, BIAG BAY, HONG KONG-CANTON. Photography desired in order listed as soon as possible under present conditions. Technical specifications as in JCS 756/2. Photo cover of bays named should extend inland about 20 miles from shore. Around named towns photo cover should extend about 20 miles farther if necessary to include adjacent coast and close in islands or important terrain or cultural features. Additional details on location each area being air mailed by WDGBI. Para 4: Longer range AMEES can be met by supplementing above requirements by trimetrogon photography as planned under JCS 756/2 as your capability permit. Completion date October 1945 given your CPX-5 28237 acceptable but earlier date desirable. Priorities and various details of JCS 756/2 now being revised and will be mailed you soon as completed. Para 5: Please advise if you can accept request of para 2. Para 6: Security of requirement para 2 is paramount. Request photo missions over lower priority areas be flown concurrently and photos shipped to provide maximum deception.

10 2302 WAR TO MACARTHUR, HARMON INFO. WEDEMEYER, CHENNAULT, LEMAY, HANSELIU. JAF POA passed to CINCPAC.

Top Secret. Every effort is being made by WEDEMEYER to support 20th Bomber Command during period January 10th to 17th regardless of sacrifices entailed. It is estimated that the logistical support he is giving will permit 2 attacks by 20th Bomber Command of approximately 50 to 60 aircraft each with 8 to 10 ton bomb loads on air installations in FORMO. Strikes will take place as soon as supply situation and weather permit. Estimate now is that these attacks will occur on or about 13/14 January. Meanwhile 20th
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JANUARY (OCT)

10 2302 WAR to MACARTHUR, HAGANNA INFO. WADDEY, CHIAYAULT, LIMAY, HANGELL. AAF 760A passed to CINCPOA (Cont'd).

Bomber Command is attacking on 11 January floating dry docks, repair facilities at JINGAWA with approximately 48 aircraft. 21st Bomber Command is to attack air installations at JINGAWA near future with major force. Estimated date or about 12 to 14 January. This message has purpose informing all concerned. Strike and operational reports will be sent by book message to all concerned.

12 1252 BULGE for MACARTHUR to CINCPOA INFO. COMINC, COMBATANT 1, COMTHTHT, COMCARFOR and CHONGSHA.

Top Secret. Reference UA 110216. Operation plans to which you refer are merely sorties to cover possible contingencies. I share your desire to carry out your plans on target dates announced and will do everything within my power to accomplish this purpose. Your message brings up very definitely the general question which I have previously discussed with you as to necessary measures to protect the LINGAYEN beachhead from surface ship attack. The extremely limited strength of the Seventh Flt unless augmented is entirely inadequate for such purpose and is barely sufficient for escort duty to and from the beachhead. To withdraw the 3rd Flt and the elements which have temporarily augmented the 7th Flt will completely expose LINGAYEN to naval surface attack and would plainly invite disaster. Under these circumstances what is your suggested solution to comply with the naval mission of the basic directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the LUZON operation.

12 1415 COMTHTHT ADV HQ to CTF 78 INFO. CTF 77, CTF 79, CINCPOA, CG 8TH ARMY, COMINC, CINCPOA, COMTHTHT CTF 78.

Top Secret. Following additional operations to be used as AN are directed by these additions (Change Number 1) to CINC OpPlan 14-44. Add to para one following list of operations instructions new subpara quote (7) 86 dated 11 January 1945 unquote. Add to end of para 2 the following quote (7) Will transport, protect, lend and support minor elements of Eighth U S Army in the BATAAN GAS and/or TAYABAS PROVINCES of southern LUZON uncite. Add to end of para 3 (A) Quo' Transport, protect, lend by 2 successive amphibious
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JANUARY (CST)

12 1415 CONT:HELT ADV HC to CTF 78 info. CTF 77, CTF 79, CINCWPAC, CG 8th ARMY, CINCPAC, CINCPOA, CINCPAC

CTF 78, J (Continued).

landings and support minor elements of 8th US Army in the coastal sector. MAUGHH-PACBIRAON (TAYATIS).

Provide transportation for and support additional supplementary minor operations as requested by Commanding General 8th US Army and as permitted by available means. Designation attack group or unit commander for these operations unquote. Para 3 (5) (8) Insert new subpara quote C.M-6 assault successive operations using 11th Airborne Div (Reinf) mounting from LYTE target date of landing at initial objective S plus 21 (exact dates are determined by the requirements of the M1 operations and will be designated by GHQ unquote). Rerurnber old para 3 (X) (8) C to D and add the following quote The landing locations of the M6 operations will be later designated by GHQ unquote. New subject: Take following correction: CAF SWPA Op Plan 18-44 as change number 2, annex B, Page 2, Para 12 (Item 2) (B) Correct 9 LST under TransDiv 21 to read 3 LSI. Para Item 2 (C) Delete 4 liberty ships. Substitute 11 LSTs as assigned. Interchange ALLEN and ABBOTT. Page 5, para 3-1 Correct 25 January to read 24 January. Page 6: Strike out para 3-1(3). Para 3-2(1) Add AFORD WARREN quote: AQUARIUS, MERCURY, ELECTRA, RICKY unquote. Strike out entire paras 3-2(3) and (4). Para 3-4(1) at end of sentence insert quote plus RICKY, STARLIGHT, STORM KING, ELECTRA, AQUARIUS, MERCURY unquote. Page 3-4(5) Correct 15 LSM to 30. Strike out para 3-4(6). Para 3-5 Strike out last "lines. Para 3-SIXTUSO After combatant ships quote and APDS unquote. Para 4 Insert following as new subpara (1) and number succeeding subparas quote If required route ships O.S.VBD.P., 41 and FYUUKO (Para 1-2(B) of Annex Baker) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to MOROTAIIDOM to load. After return from M3, and if necessary and practicable, these divisions will pick up boats at HOLLANDIA or MANUS. If required, route ships of TransDivs 11 and 12 (Para 1-2(C) of Annex B) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to BIAK to load unquote.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)


Top Secret. Your 160342 October and my CX 54629 10th December Para (CX 55686) based on estimates of requirements for escort of M-1 reinforcement convoys and conduct of the M-3 assault with target date 27 January. It will be necessary to retain 100 adequate escort elements, including CVE groups RN as follows: (A) 9 CVE, 8 DD and 6 DE scheduled for release horror 30 December, delay to 29 January. (B) 12 DD scheduled for release stevedore 4 January. Omit to cover battle losses sustained to date. (C) 6 DD scheduled for release stevedore 11 January, delay to 9 February. (D) 8 DD, 3 PC and 5 PCs scheduled for release mainyard 20 January, delay to 9 February. (E) 9 DD scheduled for release mainyard 20 January, delay to 18 February. (F) 4 DDs and remaining small craft scheduled for release accumulation 25 January, delay to 9 February. (G) 9 DD scheduled for release accumulation 25 January, delay to 18 February. (H) 9 CVE, 12 DD and 12 PC scheduled for release horizon 1 February, delay to 9 February Para. The question of the old battleships and associated elements will be taken up later, based on the situation. Para. As also amphibious equipment. The release dates indicated above are necessarily computed on the situation we assume will exist. They will of necessity have to be varied with actual conditions. Continuous effort will be made to release this equipment to combat the earliest dates which are found practicable.

13 0850 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA info. COMINCH. COM3dFLT. COM7thFLT.

Top Secret. The LINGAYEN beachhead is now being covered by all the available major units of the Pacific Fleet. It is clear that the requirements for cover by heavy ships will continue until either the principal enemy units which threaten it are destroyed or our shore based air forces become capable of protecting the beachhead with the assistance of light naval forces. The 3rd Fleet will continue to attempt to locate and destroy the principal enemy units now operational. The early accomplishment of this purpose will best solve the local problem and will permit early application of the striking power of the fleet in the carrier attacks on HONSU which comprise the last phase of deterrence. These attacks will most effectively contain the
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

13 0850 CINCPAC to CINCSEPA info. COMINCH, COM3RDFLT, COM7thFLT (Continued).

enemy fleet units remaining in the empire and will provide effective strategic support for your position in the Philippines. Para. I am glad to have your assurance that you will do everything in your power to permit carrying out my plans on the target dates established and could ask no more. My 110216 was intended to ensure that Pacific Fleet units are not definitely planned to be retained to establish a new beach head at VIGAN or so located elsewhere as to create new problems. Para. It is my hope that the 3rd Fleet will be able soon to terminate the threat of strong enemy surface attack. Meanwhile its destruction of enemy shipping will further cripple the enemy capacity to make war effectively.

13 1511Z CINCSWPA to COM ALLIED AIR FORCES info. COM3RDFLT, COM ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, CTF 73, etc.

Top Secret. Possibility that Jap 2nd Diversion Attack Force is moving northeast along line: Northwest coast of BORNEO-PALAOAN favored by weather. Extend Sectors L, K, and J of search plan H to maximum practicable distance. Initiate special long range searches along northwest coast BORNEO to maximum practicable distance. Maintain above searches until further notice. This radio confirms instructions by telephone this date, MACARTHUR.

12 2013 CINCPAC to COMGEN US ARMY FORCES CHINA info. COMNAV GROUP CHINA, COM11thAF, COM5thFLT, CINCSWPA.

Top Secret. Subject is supporting operations for ICEBERG. Request you maintain search of area indicated on inclusions to Fivecome Agreement. Continue mining of HONG KONG Harbor. During period L-14 to L-12 inclusive strike HONG KONG. Request your concurrence or comment. L Day will be confirmed by later dispatch.
Top Secret. G-20 2125

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFO. COMINCH, CINCPOA, COMCINCPAC.

Top Secret. AAF 0695 Plans for MARIANAS. Development includes provision of field facilities for five wings as follows: eight groups on GUAM, eight groups on TINIAN, and four groups on SAIPAN. Implementation of development of fields for the additional eight groups still is dependent on provision by War Department of required Army Service Forces. As soon as they are made available, CINCPOA will schedule 316 and 315 wings into TINIAN and GUAM respectively. Tentative plans for development leguminous will provide field facilities for one VLR wing of four groups by W Day. W Day is 30 days of Operation for seizure of Indispensable. This offers excellent possibility for redeployment BomCom 20. Recommend that this unit, together with appropriate air and ground service troops including mobile transport squadrons be made available for redeployment to P0A for stations in leguminous. If approved request detailed information as to units available. Plan for provision of necessary surface and air transport. In view existing shortages in ground service troops CINCPOA urges that maximum ground service troops now supporting BomCom 20 accompany that unit.

15 0021

CINCPOA to CINC SWPA INFO. CINCSWPA (ADJ 047 94), COPMARNOAFFL, CORPSCOM 10TH ARM, COMGEN XXIV CORPS, CINCPOA.

Top Secret. Prior correspondence has not clarified completely the staging of all units of 21st Corps. Request immediate advice if all units comprising XXIV Corps in accordance with MYSE 0001060 of 2 Dec not to all are being assembled for staging with divisions per UR 081321 not to all Para. COMGENPOA requested to take necessary action with War Department to effect transfer of units required by MYSE 0001060.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

15 0649 CINCPOA to CINCOWESPAC info. COMTHFLT, COMTHFLT.

Top Secret. Request authority for Com 5th Fleet to send appropriate ships to CAJIGURAN Bay during or after the detachment operation to determine suitability its use as an advanced anchorage during ICEBERG.

12 0730Z CTF 77 to CINCWPAC info. CINCPOA, CO.INCH, COMEDCARPOA, COMUSPACFOR, COMUSPACON 1.

Top Secret. CINCPOA 110216. My Op-Plan 16-44 is in effect and addendum to 17-44 covering M2. It provides for the reinforcement of the initial assault and the conduct of such continent operations as may be ordered. It included the task organization and assignment of forces all combatant units operating under my command at the initiation of the M2 operation. It was clearly understood by me that the forces assigned were subject to modification from time to time during the scheduled 32 day reinforcement period as units were returned to the Pacific Fleet in accordance with agreements reached between CINCPOA and CINCWPAC. It was prepared prior to the receipt of CINCPOA letter serial 0001164 of 24 December which lists names of vessels and dates for return to POA. It was further understood that the release of ORB and associated elements of fire support group has to be effects on scheduled dates if the situation permitted. CINCWPAC 301431, reply to which by CINCPOA has not been received by CTF 77. Adjustments for battle losses such as 3 CVE scheduled remain in SWPA were also to be made subsequently.

14 0930 SUPREME ALLIED COMDR SOKAST ASIA COMAND to COM ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (MACARTHUR) info. COMTHFLT, CINCPOA.

Top Secret. Your 210 13 January. Have no objection or restriction to 20th Tumer Command bombing and mining SAIGON 22 and 23 January. Request information addresses advise action addresses direct if dates satisfactory. Our CK 56055 concurred with request your 204 of 4 January. Signed MACARTHUR.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

13 0237 CINCPPOA to COMGENPOA info. COMNAAPPOA, COMMDNAPOA, ISCON, GUAM.

Top Secret. Re: 10002 of 3 January which is 1st Ind. on 30. CINCPPOA letter of 31 December, subject: Revisions to Base Development Plan - GUAM, see mydia 050601. Desires to defer shipment of any materials or units of 2nd GUAM VLR Wing until necessary service troops are available for support. Required shipping and service troops have not yet been made available. Shipment of construction material and supporting service troops is & when available will precede shipment of VLR units. Base development plan will be revised to indicate the additional facilities only for purposes of planning base layout and allocation of area. To provide sufficient time for procurement required materials and equipment in case 2nd Wing is accepted, the procurement of necessary materials and equipment and stocking same on west coast is approved. One VLR Wing is authorized for indispensable and knowledge. Second VLR Wing on GUAM approved subject to availability of shipping and supporting service troops.

16 1052 CINCPAC to COM 3rd FLT info. COMINCH.

Top Secret. Your 16021l received. Desire results your operations 15th and 16th before making decision which I will make about 162330 GCT.

12 1415 COMMTHLF ADN NO to CTF 78 info. CTF 77, CTF 79, CINCPAC, CG 8th ARMY, COMINCH, CINCPPOA, COMMTHLF, CTO 78.1.

Top Secret. Following additional operations to be used as No are directed by these additions (change number 1) to CAMP op plan 18-44. Add to para 01 list of operations instructions new subpara quote (P) 36 dated 11 January 1945 unquote. Add to end of para 2 the following subpara (W) Transport, protect, land and support minor elements of Eighth US Army in the BATANGAS and/or TAYABAS Provinces of Southern LUZON unquote. Add to end of para 3 (A) Quote Transport, protect, land by 2 successive amphibious landings and support minor elements of Eighth US Army in the coastal sector. アサヒ, PACELAON (TAYABAS). Provide transportation for and support additional supplementary minor operations.
as requested by Commanding General 8th US Army and as permitted by available means. Designation target or unit commander for these operations unquote. Para 3 (X) (8) Insert new subpara C.4.b.4 assault from LST. Target date of landing at initial objective is plus 21 (exact dates are determined by the requirements of the M1 operations and will be designated by GHQ unquote). Number old para 3 (X) (8) C to D and add the following quote. The landing locations of the M6 operations will be later designated by GHQ unquote. New subject. Make following corrections CANSWPA Op Plan 18-44 as change number 2. Annex B, page 2. Para 12, Item 2 (B) Correct 3 LST under TransDiv 21 to read 3 LST. Para Item 2(O) Delete 4 liberty ships. Substitute 11 LSTs as assigned. Interchange ALLEN and ABOTTOM. Page 5 para 3-1 correct 25 January to read 24 January. Page 6. Strike out para 3-1(3). Para 3-2(1) add AFTER WARREN quote. AQUARIUS, MERCURY, ELECTRA, NICEY unquote. Strike out entire paras 3-2 (3) and STORM KING, LUSTRA, AQUARIUS, MERCURY unquote. Page 3-4(5) correct 15 LCM to 30. Strike out para 3-4(6). Para 3-5 Strike out last 4 lines. Para 3-six TAIJUD after combatant ships quote and APDS unquote. Para 4 insert following as new subpara (1) and number succeeding subparas: Quote if required route ships QRBUDINS 41 and FYUBeko (Para 1-2(B) of Annex B) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to EUROTOP/FK to load. After return from K3, and if necessary and practicable, these divisions will pick up boats at HOLLANDIA or KANUS. If required, route ships of TransDiv 11 and 12 (Para 1-2(C) of Annex B) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to BIAK to load unquote.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

15 1018 COM7THFLT to CTF 78, CTG 78.3 info. COM7THFLT, CINCPAC
CINCPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMNCH 77THFLT (Continued).

Make same correction then insert new sentences
"Clear and open SUBIC BAY for shipping. Initiate
MTB operations at earliest practicable date."
Para 3 (X) (6) (B) add "11th US Corps to assault
and indicate GHQ reserve to 41st US Inf Div". Delete
X-Day and substitute B-Day. Para 3 (X) (B) (D)
for third line substitute "The objective area
for the M7 assault is the SAN ANTONIO-CASTILLETOS-
SAN FELIPE Area". Wherever occurring correct K-Day
to B-Day. M3 assault to M7 assault. Objective
area from AYOAN to SAN ANTONIO-PELPE. Annex B
Para Roman 2 arabic 1 Delete entire para and
substitute therefore tasks assigned GHQ Op instruc-
tions 87 copies of which mailed action adees.
Changes 1, 2 and 3 to include corrected tasks
Annex B will be distributed in printed form to
all holders op plan.

16 0211 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC.

Top Secret. Upon completion HONG KONG HAINAN
strikes today consider immediate future dividends
from further offensive operations by this force
in CHIN. SE, not commensurate with forces and
effort involved. As defensive cover Task Force 38
is being contained. Finally CHINA focus of
operations so restrictive as to invite air attack.
Recommend Task Force 38 move east of FORMOSA LUZON
line after fueling 17th. From that position can
move to meet any reported enemy fleet detachments
approaching LINGAYEN and can photo strike OKINAWA
as opportunity offers. Persistent weather front
has been lying over OKINAWA and may necessitate
considerable waiting before desired photos can be
obtained. Para Based on logistic considerations
alone Task Force 38 situation as follows: (A) Fuel
immediately available for CHINA SEA operations
permits 5 more days. If proper notification re-
ceived this can be extended by bringing in addi-
tional oilers. (B) Provisions for more than 30
days. (C) Ammunition for at least 3 more strike
days exclusive of AP and fish always reserved for
fleet action.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

16 1836 CINCPAC to COMINCH info. CINCSWA, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. para 1. By 130850 to CINCSWA. Com 3rdFlt 160211. All available intelligence indicates that KONGO HIRUKA NAOTO YAMATA Force is still in empire while ISE HYUGA Force in vicinity LINGOA SINGAPORE. Meanwhile enemy air strength in FORMOSA and OKINAWA is increasing to an extent which makes it primary target for carrier attack. 3rd Fleet operations in South JIMA SIA in a more or less fixed position are obtaining diminishing returns with increasing risk. Para 2. Propose direct HALSEY on completing today's fueling move to eastward of LUZON STRAIT and strike enemy air force FORMOSA and OKINAWA. He will still be in position to intercept heavy ships coming from empire. Para three. To cover LINGAYEN dash MINOH against LINGOA dash SINGAPORE force propose for about three weeks augment KINKALU eight American cruisers and fifty destroyers with four battle ships in best condition and will plan to conduct detachment bombardment with BatDivFive plus NEVADA, TENNESSEE and IDAHO augmented by fast battleships as necessary. By this means safety LINGAYEN will be ensured and contingent on readiness fast carrier force TOKYO strike and capture of FYO JIMA will take place close to scheduled date with the effective strategic support of PHILIPPIs. Campaign. Para four. Request concurrence as early as practicable.

16 2220 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC info. CINCSWA, COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Concur in your 161836.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

15 2201 CINC BPF to COMINCH info. ADMIRALTY, CINCPAC.

Top Secret. Following is a repetition of my 150136. I hereby report for duty in accordance with the octagon decisions. (2) The British Fleet will look forward to fighting along side the United States Navy in whatever area you may assign us.

16 1837 CINCPDA to COMDDENTOCOMNAVCOM info. MARCOM2OTH AF, CINCPA, COMTHFLT.

Top Secret. Recommend if practicable you include KINGA roads in your mining plans for 25 January.

15 12342 CINC BPF to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMTHFLT, COMTHFLT info. ADMIRALTY BAY WASHINGTON.

Top Secret. This is part 1 my 151241 organization of British Pacific Fleet. Task Force 110 for use by CInc BPF Task Force 117 fleet train Task Force 118 fast carrier force. Remainder unassigned. (2) It is intended to use task force call signs and frequencies for Task Force 57 for instructional purposes unless otherwise ordered. (3) British nomenclature of units and authorities forming the task force are: Read in 3 columns: 1 unit or authority. 2 Short title of unit. 3 Short title of senior officer. British Pacific Fleet BPF CinCBPFP, Vice Admiral second in command British Pacific Fleet NLT VA BPF, Naval Air Stations NLT FONAS, Vice Admiral Administration British Pacific Fleet NLT VA, fleet train NLT RAFF, carrier squadrons NLT RMA BPF.

17 0133 CINCPAC to COMINCH, CNO.

Top Secret. Area Petroleum Officer (Captain LOHMANN) has personal letter from Rear Admiral CARTER ANPB presented by Captain MONTGOMERY RNVR which contains following: "As you know Royal Navy petroleum requirements for those units serving in Pacific Ocean areas are to be included in the figures which you send us". Request official information as to source of petroleum products for British Pacific Fleet as soon as practicable to avoid embarrassment in relations with that fleet. See my 290513 to which no reply received.
16 2359 CINCPAC to COM3RDFLT info. CINCESPAC, COMOTHFLT, COMTHFLT, COMINCH.

Top Secret. Comply intent my 161836. Acknowledge at first suitable opportunity.

17 0243 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC info. CTF 38, CINCOWESPAC, COMOTHFLT, CTF 77, COMAY.

Top Secret. Your 162359 acknowledged. Fueling will continue into 18th due to weather. If enemy still unaware our location will transit LUZON STRAIT night 18-19 January otherwise will force passage in manner best suited to situation. Silence will signify arrival east of Straits on 19th. Plans strike FORMOSA from east on 19th fuel 20th strike OKINAWA 21st or 22nd.

16 0327 CINC BPF to CINCPAC info. COMSEVENTHFLT BAD WASHINGTON.

Top Secret. (1). I have been informed by the British Admiralty Delegation WASHINGTON which has been in consultation with CDK that the ANPFB will be responsible for the supply of bulk petroleum products to all British units operating in the Pacific (2) I have been asked to forward you my requirements which are as follows (3) Initial bulk supplies will be required as follows by 20th February at MANUS (A) furnace oil 70,000 (70,000) tons (B) diesel oil 2500 (2500) tons (C) aviation spirit 1,000 (1,000) tons by 5 March at advanced anchorage (D) furnace oil 140,000 tons (E) diesel oil 2500 tons (F) aviation part one my 160345.

16 0345 CINC BPF to CINCPAC info. COM7THFLT BAD WASHINGTON.

Top Secret. Part 2 final of CINC BPF 160345 spirit 2000 tons (4) It is estimated that requirements for April will be approximately (A) furnace oil 130000 tons (B) diesel oil 4000 tons (C) aviation spirit 2500 tons at present it is not possible to give the distribution of that between MANUS and the advanced anchorage (5) Confirmation is requested that these requirements can be met.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

15 0110 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA info., GFO SWPA

Top Secret. Listing of units constituting Army garrison forces APO 246 in CinCPoA serial 0001191 differs extremely from the present constitution of that unit as to indicate a fundamental change in the Pilibus agreement. It was agreed that the units now assigned to Army garrison force APO 246 which were organized to establish the YAP Base were transferred to the Southwest Pacific area to perform the same function there. A study of CinCPoA's letter 0001191 indicates that CinCPoA now contemplates the transfer of the 24th Corps of many of these units. Units of the following general categories were not and still are not available in the Southwest Pacific to implement the present accelerated campaign and it was to meet this requirement that APO 246 was made available in the basic agreement. Most important units by type are: Signal construction, air WLR wing and service units, anti-aircraft units, port battalions, amphibious truck companies, engineer Lt Det, general service and maintenance units, ordnance ammunition and heavy maintenance companies, quartermaster service companies. Our radio CX 55633 of 30 December to which no answer has been received was intended to clear possible minor variations in the composition of Army garrison force APO 246. It is requested that CinCPoA's serial 0001191 be reviewed in connection with our CX 55633 to bring the former in harmony with the latter and with the obvious requirement of the PHILIPPINEAs to perform the function required by Pilibas agreement.

13 0939 CINGB to ADMIRALTY, SACEAC, AOR, HQCPA, CONTINENTAL CONTR. CTF 71, US CORPACFPAC, CBRP 255, CTF 71, KANDI, HQLO, DELHI CINCBP info. RA AFP, VAP, A.

Top Secret. Operation will be carried out by Force SI 3 consisting of indomitable (RAAFP) victorious illustrious indefatigable King George 5thAuxilary and 10 destroyers and Force SI 9 consisting of 1 destroyer (Part 1 my 131022A), CINCBP 031147 December para 3.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (CCT)

13 0956 CINCEI to CINCPAC.

Top Secret. Part 2 CINCEI 131024. Escorting
4 oilers (1 to rendezvous from Fremantle). 2. Ob-
ject air strike oil refineries BAUMANG. 3. Out-
line program WE D minus 9 Force SI 9 sails Trin-
comalee D minus SI Force SI 3 sails Trincomalee D
minus 2 1st refueling D day to D plus 2 1st strike
period D plus 4 and 5 2nd refueling D plus 7 to 9
2nd strike period.

13 1024 CINCEI to CINCPAC.

Top Secret. D plus 11 3rd refueling D plus 17
Force SI 3 arrives Fremantle D plus 13 Force SI 9
(Less BPF oilers) arrive Trincomalee D plus 20 BPF
oilers arrive Fremantle. 4. Programme after D
plus 4 dependent on results obtained in first strike
period.

13 1046 CINCEI to ADMIRALTY, GSNSF, SACSEB, SOKW, KANDY,
ACME BURO JELHI, HCSWPA, CINCPAC, CTF 71, CONTRIBUT,
US COMDRPACFLT info, HAPF, KANDY, VAI.


170432 CTF 77 to CINCSWPA, LYTIE and LINGAYEN info, CINCPAC,
CONTRIBUT, CONINCH, CONTRIBALT, COMSOUTH, 7THFLT RD
LYTIE.

Top Secret. Right as augmented. CINCPac 161836.
Adequate for defense MINDORO-LINGAYEN against enemy
heavy surface forces. Assuming retention PORTLAND
and MINNESOTA total of US cruisers would be 6 as
Phoenix Boise Denver Montpelier only cruisers now
with 7th FLT although Cleveland is enroute to arrive
LYTIE about 30 January. I have one Australian CA
the SHORKIRK. However this combined total is con-
sidered to be adequate at present. Para. The total
of 50 destroyers crippled during the reinforcement
and contingent operations there presents a difficult
problem. Adequate destroyer screens are required
for the 4 OBBs 7 cruisers and 6 CVEs. A total of
19 large ships. 22 destroyers (augmented by anti
submarine ES) is considered a minimum with the
prevaleant type of Jap air tactics. This would leave
a total of 28 for harbor defense and anti submarine
screens for large volume of merchant type shipping
and fleet auxiliaries at LINGAYEN MINDORO and LYTIE.
17 0432 CTF 77 to CINCSEA, LYE and LANGAYEN info. CINCPAC
CONTINUED, COMINCH, COMINFOR, COMAIRPAC, LYE (Continued).

and GHRTIN escort of transports and amphibious type-
lifting, 5 reinforced divisions plus streamlined air-
borne division and regimental combat team from point
between New Guinea and Leyte Island at Lingayen and
coastal points in ZA, BALE, AND BAUANGAS Provinces
for M-1 reinforcement and contingent NSOAK by com-
bining transport types with LSTs where practicable;
accepting delays caused by consequent 8 knot convoy
speeds. By reducing destroyers escorting transp
proceeding separately to not more than 6, and by using
only DDs and smaller craft with convoys of merchant
and miscellaneous shipping the destroyer requirement
for these purposes can be reduced to a minimum of
36, all of which would be at sea on the same day at
certain times. The total minimum requirement would
thus be 58 DDs until 29 January at TRESFOR Shore.
With 30 US and 2 Australian DDs now assigned the 7th
Fleet this would require the retention of a minimum
of 26 POA destroyers until the completion of the
contingent assault now scheduled for 29 January.
No allowance is made for losses due to battle or
other causes nor for at anchor keep. Para.
Our files of communications exchanged between CINCPA
and CINCSWPA indicates agreement on the retention
of a total of 21 POA DDs until 18 February (7 of
DesRon 2, 9 of DesRon 49, 4 of DesDiv 102, plus
the ABBOTT). It is recommended that agreement be
reached on the retention of 5 additional DDs until
5 February at ULMTH. Suggest that ships assigned
be those of DesRon 62 of which only 5 EUGIN this
are (BAFAYN, LAFFLY, KOALH, INGRAM, KOWLEY with min
battle damage).

17 0305 CINCPAC to COMINCH, COMO info. COMAIRPAC.

Top Secret, Para 1. The principal requirements
for combat employment of Marine Corps aviation
during the next 6 months in order of importance are:
A. Shore based operations during ICBACO in which
severe attrition will be experienced in the 3 flight
groups involved. B. Operations from escort carriers
and carriers. C. GARRISON, MIDWAY, MARSHALLS,
CAROLINES. D. Operations of Marine Air Wing 1 in
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

17 0305 CINCPIAC to COMINCH, CHQ info. COMAIRPAC, (Continued).

Southwest Pacific Area. Para 2. After discussion with Vice Admiral Fitch I am not certain as to whether or not your 151632 contemplates meeting ICEBERG commitments and continuing loan of Marine Wing 1 to Allied Air Force, SWPA. Opinion here is that manning 16 escort carriers will certainly require withdrawal of Marine Air Wing 1 from the Southwest Pacific and probably not completely feasible if ICEBERG requirements are met and if Marine Corps aviation is not to be expanded. Para 3. If Marine Air Wing 1 is withdrawn to support the carrier program recommend it be accomplished by tactically balanced increments namely a light bomber group and fighter group together in each of 2 increments. Medium bombers as a separate increment. Para 4. Concur in long range plan to man 16 escort carriers with Marines providing other commitments are met without expansion Marine Corps aviation.

17 0900 COMGEN20THBOMCOM to CINCPAC info. DEPCOM 20th AIR FORCE, CINCSWPA, COMTHIPT.

Top Secret. LINGGAI anchorage will receive priority consideration for another operation possibly within month. Request confirmation here on exact enemy anchorage location. Desire your available data for definition our mine field placements. Urge 161437 impracticable include LINGGAI ROADS in forthcoming operation.

17 1443 MACARTHUR to COM3RDFLT info. CINCPAC, ADV ECH GHQ.

Top Secret. Allied Air Forces attack FORMOSA scheduled 18 January has been called off due to possible interference with 3rd Fleet operations directed in CINCPAC 162359. Request 3rd Fleet advise when practicable as to his schedule in order that 5th Air Force strikes may be instituted in FORMOSA.

17 1420 COMNAVGROUP CHINA to CO. 3RD FLT info. CINCPAC.

Top Secret. 14th Air Force hitting HONG KONG about 0530 GCT 18th and 19th. B-24s and P-51s involved.

2978
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

30 1328 COMING & CHD to CINCPOA INFO CONFIDENTIAL

Your 290513. To effect the most efficient employment of tankers in Pacific areas and utilize world wide sources of petroleum, supply essential that providing these products be the responsibility of a single agency through existing area petroleum organizations. Agreement in CNIC serial 0365312 confirmed. Your future requirements submitted via area petroleum office should include increased quantities necessary for Royal Navy units. HMB will be responsible for delivery these requirements by commercial tankers into areas where Royal Navy will furnish sufficient oilers to service Royal Navy units.

16 2210 COMAFF SWPA to CINCPOA, COMAFFAC SWPA CINCPOA, COMAFFLTL, COMAFF STG 77.

Top Secret. 5th Air Force FORMOSA strikes cancelled 16 January due weather and will be postponed indefinitely during establishment of air force in LINGAYEN Area. Appreciate action by ComSubPac on our request for sub lifeguard service. Will make similar request at later date giving at least 48 hours notice.

16 2254 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MADDOYER Info D'NAY, MACARTHUR, KENNY, HARKIN, CINCPOA, CHICHESTER, HASTBATTEN.

Reconsideration has been given to basing 20 Bomber Command outside of CHINA in view of your CINC 31091 of 12 January. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the course of action outlined herein subject to availability of the necessary shipping, the provision of which is now under study: (A) The 20 Bomber Command to vacate bases in CHINA at once. (B) The 20 Bomber Command to prepare to arrive in the MARIANAS, 2 groups by 1 April and 2 groups by 15 April, thereby delaying the scheduled move of the 31st Wing of B-29s to that area. (C) The 20 Bomber Command to conduct limited operations from INDIA bases against strategic targets from SINGAPORE north to the limit of their range employing both bombs and mines, to conduct reconnaissance and also to perform such missions as requested by SOUTHEAST ASL Command as might otherwise have been performed by the 7th Heavy Bomber Command Group. (D) To move the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group and appropriate service units at your discretion from the 10th Air Force in INDIA to the 14th Air Force in CHINA concurrently with the vacating of the CHINGTU bases by the 20 Bomber Command. (E) The 2 fighter groups deployed to CHINA for the protection of the 20th Air Force units at CHINGTU will remain temporarily assigned to the 14th Air Force. They will, however, be retained available for movement to 20th Air Force bases in the Pacific at a later date. (F) You will provide the required support by the 14th Air Force for operation ICEBERG. In this connection you will be expected to deliver approximately the same effort in the SHANGHAI area as would have been possible if the 20 Bomber Command had remained in CHINGTU. - Continued -
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

16 2254

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WINSTEDT Info LIMA. SET BOCNA.

(G) The 315th Wing to be retained in training in the U.S. for an additional month making its readiness date 1 May instead of 1 April. The 315th Wing then to take over the base establishment originally planned for the 316th Wing. Since the 315th Wing is a special instrument precision unit, the additional training time is considered most desirable.

(H) The 316th Wing to be similarly retained in the training establishment for 1 additional month making its readiness date for its lst 2 groups in July instead of June and that it then be deployed to the RYUKUS in place of the 20 Bomber Command as currently planned. (I) On arrival in the MARIANA the 20 Bomber Command to retain its present organization but to operate as a wing under the 21 Bomber Command. During this period to reconstitute the 56th Wing so that the 20 Bomber Command may ultimately be released to be deployed in the PHILIPPINE-RYUKUS area to control the reconstituted groups to be ultimately based therein.

2. The foregoing courses of action permit you to take the steps you desire, namely: (I) To bring into CHINA the medium bombardment squadron belonging to the 14th Air Force which is still in INDIA and also to bring an additional heavy bombardment group and such supporting units as you elect into CHINA. You are aware of the fact that there are no additional air units available to you in INDIA or CHINA except parts of the 10th Air Force. Your plans to move additional air service units into CHINA will have to be expressed in detail and considered separately.

17 0349

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ Info MACARTHUR, WINDOM.

Top Secret. Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the general concept of the 3 phases of ICEBERG comprises a necessary course of action to insure security and adequate support for further advances, and in view of the prospective limitation in forces and resources, expansion in the BUNKHOUSE following the seizure of LEGUMINOUS is the best course within our capabilities, as we now see them, to broaden the base of operations for fulfillment of the first phase of the over-all objective in the war against JAPAN. Decision as to an operation on the SUEZIAN COAST will be deferred for the present Para 2. It is, therefore, directed:

(A) That plans and preparations for expansion in the BUNKHOUSE following the seizure of LEGUMINOUS along the general lines of ICEBERG be continued. This operation is within your current directive. Para. (B) That pending further decision, preparations for a SUEZIAN COAST operation should be deferred, but planning should continue for an operation in the CHUAN-NINGPO Area.
JANUARY (CCT)

17 0631 COMMIRNRour CHINA to CINCPPOA. Info COMGEN USY CHINA THEAT.

Commenting on urdis 122013. Concur in suggested supporting operations for IJN. ISTRK will probably be limited due to weather but will conduct to max of my capabilities (aimed Chennault).

17 1229 MACARTHUR to CINCPPOA Info CINCPPOA, CINCPPOA.

I am concerned at your 161836 suggesting the immediate withdrawal from Kinkaid's local covering force of two old battleships to be returned for repairs. His fleet would then be a central position between two echelons of the enemy's naval forces. He will be more clearly superior to the one to the south but will be in doubtful superiority to the one to the north and in unquestionable inferiority if the two enemy afgn units attack in concert. It is not improbable that the enemy will strike in strength when the Third Fleet is drawn away. I do not believe that the strategic position of the Third Fleet in the empire or in the ERIAN, will necessarily prevent his movement to the south for a quick attack against Kinkaid's forces. The Seventh Fleet augmented by only 4 old battleships opposed to the enemy force of 60, possibly 6 battleships might well be unable to cover BANGAN which might result in disaster to our PHILIPINE operations. I strongly urge the retention of his present strength of 6 old battleships until the situation has clarified. If two old battleships are to be returned for repair they should be replaced by others which are just out of overhaul.

17 1400 CINCPPOA to CINCPPOA Info HQ DD.

Reference said radiogram 092135, all combat troops Southern Pacific Area at present in the LEYTA area are expected to be loaded out for operations on LUZON before the end of January. The 21th Corps will be the only combatant unit present, pending the arrival of the Americal Division, which should close in this area about 22 February. Until then, the 24th Corps will have to perform part of the combat mission and will also have to assist in the operation of the port, including working its new equipment and supplies ashore. It will be assembled in accordance with my radiogram CX309 and rehabilitation and reequipment will be pushed with the greatest vigor. In view of the above, it is believed the operational control of this unit should remain in this area until the unit departs. I could suggest that the preferred system would be to permit free correspondence between the 10th Army and 24th Corps on all matters relating to rehabilitation, reequipment, and launching of this unit. It is hoped that Cinohe will feel free to send officers of his command to visit this unit and to oversee its preparation without further request on this headquarters.
17 1535 CINC SWPA to CINCPAC Info COMSEVANHTFLT, GHQ SWPA.

Top Secret. Delayed dates for return of CVEs and escorts were discussed with Admiral Sherman during visit to Leyte and at Borneo was tentatively understood these dates general would be satisfactory. A confirming radiogram CX 55668 DIG 021431 was dispatched from this headquarters under the DIG (5 gr marble) was received to this radiogram and in order to proceed, the assumption was made that the delayed dates would be satisfactory. These dates cannot be changed without compromising the success of the Luzon campaign, since the escorts are required to protect convoys carrying reinforcing units. A continuing effort will be made to meet the dates which you desire as nearly as the tactical situation will permit. Analysis of your serial 0001164 indicates that the amphibious equipment listed therein will be returned to the places indicated on the dates required with the exception of certain ships which had originally been agreed to be returned to Leyte and those were changed to more distant locations. It will be impracticable to change plans to effect return of vessels of the excepted category to the more distant location on same schedule as they were to be returned to Leyte.

18 0141 CINC SWPA to CINCPAC Info GHQ SWPA, CINCUSFLY, COMSEVANTHTFLT.

Subject to comments in my (top secret) CX 50030 (too 171229) with regard to battleships concur in Com7thFleet dispatch 170342.

18 0358 CINCPAC to CTF 77 Info COMSEVANHTFLT, CINC SWPA, COM7THFLT.

This refers your 170432 not to all in regard to destroyers. Of those DD scheduled to return HORROR 24 January you are authorized to retain RIDLEY, LARRY, and MCCALL of DesRon 6, STEVENSON and DASHIELL of DesRon 25, TIZARD of DesRon 56. Para. 57 DD under your operational control through February will then be as follows. 7 of DesRon 2, 5 of DesRon 3, 3 of DesRon 6, 3 of DesRon 14, 8 of DesRon 21, 9 of DesRon 22, 5 of DesRon 23, 2 of DesRon 25, 1 of DesRon 42, 9 of DesRon 49, 4 of DesRon 51, 1 of DesRon 56, Total 57 DD. Para. Of the DD listed above the following are expected to be returned to FOX by 18 February. 7 of DesRon 2 and 4 of DesRon 51 at HAUNARD. 9 of DesRon 49 at ACCUMULATION. The following will have reported to you by 18 February. E. MCINTYRE and BAILEY of DesRon 14, DYNON and MATCHER of DesRon 23 and an additional DD to be designated. It is requested that you then release the remaining 3 DD of DesRon 6, 2 DD DesRon 25, 1 DD DesRon 56. Para. Following these exchanges a total of 36 DD will continue under your operational control as follows. DesRon 5 less LARKIN, DesRon 14 less GARRICK, CALDWELL, COCHRAN, DesRon 21 less ROSS, DesRon 22. DesRon 23 less ALLICK plus ABERT (DD 629) and 1 DD to be designated. Desire ABERT be returned.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (CST)

18 0358 CINCPAC to CTF, etc. (Cont'd).

to POA when relieved by MULICK (DD 569) about 2 March. This also answers your 160442. My serial 0001164 of 24 Dec as previously modified is changed accordingly.

18 0947 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC, CINC SWPA, Info COM3RDFLT, COMAIRCOM, COM15TH, ALL TCG's & TCG's 3RD & 7TH FLKS.

In executing PLAN EXIT see my 112239. With a Day 19 January.

18 1001 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC, ADV CH, CH, J01, LYTTE, CINC SWPA, Info CINCPAC AC, CTF 77.

Inability to refuel in southern area plus vulnerability to attack and storm damage in LU ON SN WIT during prevailing heavy weather makes eastward passage via that route uncertain and undesirable. Expect refuel 19th under 1601 of LYTTE and unless otherwise directed will then transit via JURIGAO. Strategic awkwardness recognized but weather and tactical considerations dictate this compromise.

18 1033 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC.

Halsey to Nimitz only. Your 142233 do not believe proposal can be carried out in practice. Next objectives require full strength of all groups. Best solution would be to (A) Send 1 group back when force still has about 50% bombs. (B) Limit operations of groups remaining at sea to those absolutely necessary to success of the Pacific Ocean Area-Southwest Pacific Area Campaign as a whole. (C) If all of TF 38 can not be withdrawn send single groups back for replenishment in as quick succession as possible. Para. This discussion is for planning purposes only and will not be put into effect without further word from you.

18 1812 CINCPAC to CINC SWPA Info COMAIRCOM, COM3RDFLT, COM15TH.

Your 171229, CTF 77 170432 in which I concur generally. CTF 77 180526. I do not share your opinion as to the ability of the enemy to concentrate a force of 6 battleships for a quick attack on Kinkaid's forces nor do I consider the Japanese Fleet capable of inflicting disaster to our Philippine operations if our fleet is employed offensively. Acceptance of the view that the PHILIPPINES must have in addition to your air force a local naval defense force continuously on station capable of meeting all the heavy ships left in the Japanese Fleet would effectively prevent further major offensive operations in the Pacific for an indefinite period. The best naval protection for the PHILIPPINES as well as for the exposed island positions elsewhere in the Pacific is to proceed with offensive operations against JAPAN. Para. I therefore repeat my request for the immediate return of the two damaged battleships most in need of repairs in order that their fighting efficiency may be...
restored and their return to profitable service expedited. Para. The temporary retention of PCOGS RD, MINNESOTA I, and five additional destroyers requested by Kimball’s 170432 is approved. Please acknowledge receipt.

18 1814 CINCPOA to CINCPAC Info OKINAG, CINCPAC CINCPAC COMM 10.

For General MacArthur personally. Para one. Preparations of the XXIV Corps for employment in the TBGAG Operation have been hampered by certain conditions in the LEXTE-SAMAR area to a degree which unless corrected will jeopardize the success of TBGAG. Immediate corrective action is requested as follows: (a) Acceptance of FO 327 HQs USARPAC 20 October as modified by FO 333 HQs USARPAC and my serial 0001080 of 2 December as defining the composition of the XXIV Corps and FO 248 for the purpose of par 70 of the FILBAG AGREEMENT of 4 November. Inability to replace units essential to readiness of the XXIV Corps for TBGAG compels adherence to these legitimate orders which were in effect when FILBAG AGREEMENT was approved. (b) Relief of all units of the XXIV Corps including all service and supporting units from all operations and duties not connected with rehabilitation. (c) Transfer of all units of the XXIV Corps, including AAA troops, to control of the Corps Commander and assembly of the Corps in areas suitable for rehabilitation and for the reception, sorting, maintenance, and issuing of equipment and supplies. (d) Transfer of operational control of the XXIV Corps to CINCPAC 10th Army in accordance with my dis 09.133 January and under the principles established by JCS 012144 of May 1944 (WAR R 3044). "Transfer of administrative control of the XXIV Corps and attached units to CINCPAC concurrent with transfer of operational control to 10th Army. It is understood that members of the XXIV Corps or its attached units who returned to duty from hospitals in the Southwest Pacific prior to departure of the XXIV Corps will remain in their units. This in no way will lessen responsibility for logistical support by SWPA as prescribed by the FILBAG AGREEMENT. (e) Replacement of any critical items of equipment and supplies which the XXIV Corps was required to furnish to other units for MUSKETEER Operations and avoidance of future requirements of this nature. (f) SWPA provide lightage needed by the XXIV Corps in the LEXTE Area. My records indicate large numbers useful landing craft in 7th Fleet at bases in NEW GINNIA or to the EASTWARD. (g) Subordinate SWPA agreed in the LEXTE Area be informed of the provisions of the FILBAG AGREEMENT which affect the XXIV Corps and directed to carry them out. Para. Para 2. In accordance with Comd: A 162220 January (passed to you) desire to send to your headquarters a liaison group from CINCPAC’s staff of A office headed by Brigadier General Francis E. Nagelhardt.

- Continued -

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I also desire to send to your headquarters for a brief period as my own representative for discussion of matters covered by this dispatch Brigadier General Herman Feldman of my staff. Your concurrence in these visits is requested. Para 3. The intent of the various agreements which I have approved in connection with the XIX Corps was to make available to you for LAYTE the same well equipped combat unit which General Richardson had prepared for YAP and then to have it available for ICHELNG in the same strength and with the same composition. General Richardson's Field Orders are the only documents which define its composition authoritatively. Para 4. The foregoing 3 paragraphs were drafted yesterday after conference with Generals Richardson, Buckner and Hodges and their Chiefs of Staff together with the General officers of my Joint Staff and has their concurrence. Your 171100 just received is my last formal advice of your intention to continue the active employment of the SSI Corps too long to permit its readiness for the ICEBERG Operation as now scheduled a procedure which must have the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Please acknowledge receipt. Nimitz.

Your 181001. Although I expect you to make the final decision on the spot my views are as follows. In withdrawing your fleet from the SOUTH CHINA Sea the governing consideration is maintenance of optimum strategic and tactical position against possible enemy naval threat to our LUZON position from the north. Passage of your whole fleet through SUBRAO will give enemy definite information of your relinquishment of such a position. Exit via LUZON STRAIT under conditions which will avoid storm damage and concurrently permit offensive use of carrier aircraft is preferred even if your stay in SOUTH CHINA Sea is prolonged several days. Para 2. There is no objection to sending oilers damaged ships and light units through SUBRAO. Para 3. My weather information although meager is that reinforced monsoon winds blowing normally abates after a few days. Para 4. I am proud of your recent successes and have confidence in your judgment.

Concur your 181837.

Cancel my 180947. Task Force 38 will fuel on 19 January in vicinity Lat 14-26 N Long 117-24E. Remaining west of LUZON. Further intentions later.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (CST)

14 0200 CINCPAC to CINCSEWPAC Info COM7THFLT, COMAG6TH ARMY, COLGEX 8TH AAF.

This answers your 301431 December received today by lettered paragraphs as indicated. (A) Affirmative. (B) These specific DD's cannot be omitted from redeployment as proposed. However it will be noted in my serial 000166 of 24 December that a total of 50 DD's are planned to continue to operate with the 7th Fleet until 18 February at which time the number will be reduced to permanent strength presented by Cominch now 30. (C) 6 DD and 1 JX required HORROR 6 February. (D) 5 YK, 6 PC and 4 SC, not required MAIN Yard until 16 Feb. (E) Affirmative. (F) 2 DD, 1 JX at ACCUMUL. 1N and MAIN Yard. (G) Affirmative. Arrival HORROR 41 February preferable. (H) Aside from the units specifically mentioned herein it is desired that redeployment be conducted as indicated in my serial 000166. This also acknowledges your 111207.

17 1916 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC Info CU JADPAC.

Your 140050 approved. You are authorized to establish a new flag officer command in the Pacific Ocean Area as subordinate command of Air Force Pacific Fleet in the forward area to be known as Commander, Air Force Subordinate Command Forward Area short title Airac-SubComford. Bureaus and offices of Navy Dept. take necessary action. When he is available the assignment of Rear Admiral Gunther to this command is satisfactory. This is Cominch and CNO number 40.

18 1022 COMARDFLT to CINCSWESPAC Info CINCPAC, GFM, ADV ECH, COMAF, CTF 18.

Reference your 171443. Unfavorable weather has caused Third Fleet schedule to be unpredictable. Suggest you continue your strikes dependent on your capabilities alone. Meanwhile will keep you advised our plans. Foresee no difficulty of simultaneous strikes by both forces in future provided pilots each force briefed they may encounter aircraft of the other.

18 1231 CINCSWPAC to CINCPAC Info COM6THFLT, COMAG 11TH NAVAL FORCES (WASTECH), ADV ECH CHG, CTF 77.

Concur your 150649 relative investigation CASIGURUN BAY.
TOP SECRET
JANUARY (GCT)

19 0438

COM3RFILT to CINCPAC, CINCPAC-VIC, JTF 77, COMP.
INFO OFF 35 CTF 34.

On completion fueling 19th will head for BALINTANG
with intent to transit undetected night 20-21 January.
Attack mid-21st fuel 22nd strike OKINAWA 23rd or
24th. Schedule subject to modification by weather,
tactical situation or availability of important targets.

19 0910

COM3RFILT to CINCPAC,

Estimate of general situation. Air strength negligible
Southeast CHINA Coast and INDO CHINA. Collapsed in
LUZON and currently not aggressive FORMOSA. Naval
threat to MacArthur from south negligible due loss of
MICHIKI and damage to KUROI. Reported damaged condition
of 1 BB-XCV 2 CA (air photo) and shaken confidence re-
sulting from 3rd Fleet operations. Empire naval forces
incapable of more than hit and run attack on LINGAYEN;
such attack would face early detection. Stiff resistance
and harried retreat and could not inflict sufficient
damage to secure control of the sea nor fatally affect
the PHILIPPINES Campaign. Japs know they are licked
in the PHILIPPINES and will not attempt serious rein-
forcement in face of our air surface and ground superi-
ority. Para. Abnormal shipping concentrations north
of Lat 22-00 indicate large projects and/or shortage of
fuel. Escorts or harbor facilities from estimate of
enemy impotency south of Lat 22-00 plus evidence of
feverish activity to the north I incline to the belief
that enemy may be evacuating vulnerable facilities from
FUKOJIMA but digging in inside perimeter of the EAST
CHINA SEA and strengthening local defenses FORMOSA
IKIGAKI MIYAKO CHIBA OKINAWA. If that estimate is
correct he has written off the PHILIPPINES and will not
indulge in any dubious counter attacks that risk further
losses to dwindling defense forces and could not perma-
nently stop our PHILIPPINES Campaign. Para. In view
of foregoing it seems important not to delay DETACHMENT
and ICEBERG for the same aggressive reason that dictated
adherence to MINDORO and LINGAYEN dates. 3rd Fleet's
best immediate contribution is vigorous attack on ship-
ning along FORMOSA OKINAWA line with concurrent another-
ing of enemy air and early return ULITHI in preparation
for DETACHMENT.
TOP SECRET

January (COT)

20 0435 CONGMAAFPOA to CINCPOA info COMG-MFAFPOA.

Top Secret. Directives by Cinpoa are necessary to provide VLR wing facilities at Tinian West Field and Guam North and Northwest Fields. References as follows:
A. Cinpoa top secret ltr serial 00057 of 12 Jan 45.
B. ComGen.AAFPOA radio to Cinpoa NR 0274 of 5 Jan 45.
C. WarDept radio WARX 21782, Jan 45.

If radio directives are issued at once to provide VLR wing facilities as indicated in references above and in addition to include facilities at the Guam depot for 2 additional VLR units can be accommodated as follows:
   2 groups of BomCom 20 on Tinian West Field by 1 April,
   2 groups of 315 Wing on Northwest Field Guam by 1 June,
   2 groups of 315 Wing on Northwest Field Guam by 1 July.

New Subject. The deployment of the 316 Wing on INDISPENSABLE will require that 5 aviation engineer battalions be echeloned as to arrive on 1 INDISPENSABLE between W-Day and W plus 40. The 1924, 807, 1908, 1909, and 1632 Aviation Engineer Battalions are available for employment in INDISPENSABLE. If practicable to meet the above echeloning of aviation engineer battalions, 2 groups of the 316 Wing can be deployed on INDISPENSABLE by 1 August 45 (W plus 90) and remaining 2 groups by 1 Sept 45 (W plus 120). Recommend that your decision as to availability of facilities be transmitted to Comaf 20 in order that unit readiness dates may be established.

19 1252 MACARTHUR to CINCPOA info COMINCH COM3RDFLT COMTHFLT OMGSEA.

Top Secret. Your 181812. The temporary retention of the two old battleships in question can not materially affect the accomplishment of future offensive operations against Japan. Nor did my message mean the indefinite retention of a naval force here continuously capable of meeting all heavy units of the Japanese Fleet. It dealt with the relatively short and critical period between your withdrawal of the Third Fleet and the installation of our air force on Luzon which is at present limited to a few fighter squadrons. During that time when the potential of our land based aviation is so low I do not believe adequate protection of the LINGAYEN base against enemy surface craft will be provided if the major naval strength is reduced to 4 old battleships. I shall interpose no further comment however and request that you inform me of the date which you desire these ships withdrawn.

19 1729 CINCPAC to Com3rdFLT info COMINCH CINCSWPA COMTHFLT COMVFLT COMAF.

This is top secret. Your 190910 completely concurred in.
I consider also that shipping is banking up to north because of fear of your activities to southward.
The neutralization of enemy-held positions in the 1sk HALL has progressed to a point where each operation against them must be reviewed to make certain that the expenditure of personnel, fuel, explosives and stores is necessary and justified by the results to be obtained.

Recommendations your letter subject "Disposition of Forces" dated 15 Jan 1945 are approved. You are authorized to initiate action to release the 489th Bomb Group from allocation to POA. It is understood that the 494th and 30th Groups will be designated for 1MO/2MO and that the 11th Group less 2 squadrons will be returned to 0AO.

CinCPoA will be responsible for providing bulk petroleum requirements of British Pacific Fleet while basing at LANIC and while operating in POA. BritFlt tentatively scheduled to arrive LANIC 20 February and requirements until departure will be met by CinCPoA. By 31 LIMI 5 March, Conserva-PAC will schedule additional deliveries to meet operational requirements of BritFlt thereafter. Cargo of arriving tankers are not earmarked expressly for BritFlt, whose requirements will be provided from the total available products in all storage and carrying vessels. Accounting procedures later. ComdRm 10 will include in routine fuel reports as separate items data on amounts on hand in British AO and issues to BritFlt units.

Change 4 to my OpPlan 18-44. Task Organization. (A) TF 78 reduce DB's assigned to 34. (B) TC 77.3 correct to read 4 CL, 6 DD. (C) TC 77.4 correct to read 6 CVE, 7 DD, 4 DE. RIO Stump delete para (F). Para 3a 3rd sentence delete all after "over water movement". Air cover will be provided by shore-based air. Delete 6th sentence. Fire support will be provided by vessels of M. Attack group. Additional fire support if required and limited air support and cover to be obtained by direct request to commanders close covering and escort carrier groups. Para 3b delete 1st sentence. Close covering group operate as directed by separate dispatch. Delete 6th sentence and substitute "Provide fire support for landings as arranged with CTF 78 and attack group commanders". Para 3c delete 1st sentence.

-Continued-

2989
Operate as directed by separate despatch. Correct 3rd sentence to read "Within limit of capabilities and in coordination with shore based air of Allied Air Forces provide MX Attack Group during landing with CAP and direct support in accordance with Air Plan of Commander MX Attack Group and all coordinated and requested by later through his commander support aircraft."

200034

CINCPAC to CINCPAC, Info COLNCH, COMGH, CINCPAC, 27THFLT, CTF 77.

Your cooperative reply, your 191252, greatly appreciated. I expect a stiff fight for the beaches in ICEBERG and every bombardment unit available will save the lives of many soldiers and marines. Accordingly request immediate release 2 damaged battleships and return for necessary repairs.

CINCPAC to CINCPAC, Info COLNCH, COMGH, CINCPAC, 10.

Am very pleased to have the assurance of your 200535. For your information my present plans involve commencement landing and sailing from LYIT in order to be ready for principal assault on 1 April. 77th Div commence loading 25 February rehearse 9-16 March sail 19 March. 24th Corps less 77th Division commence loading 2 March rehearse 14-21 sail 27 March.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY 1945 (GCT)

25 1115 CONCEM B NCC 20 to CINCPAC Info CONSUBPAC, CTF 71

TOP SECRET. February tentative schedule. Begins with 112 sorties on SINGAPORE Naval Base on 1 February. Similar maximum effort on Rangoon area SINGAPORE for 7 Feb. 60 sorties on RANGOON on 11 Feb. Similar medium effort strikes on SINGAPORE floating drydock on 15 Feb. SAIGON on 19 Feb. SINGAPORE on 23 Feb and 27 Feb. Possibility of LEMANARMA operation during next 400 period. Also substitute mission of 60 sorties being held in 24 hour readiness status for opportunity strike on enemy shipping within our INDIA base range. This schedule subject to tactical changes but presented to assist in lifeguard service planning.

23 1341 CINLINC & CNO to CONNOR PAC Info CINCPAC

TOP SECRET: It is proposed to effect transfers under lend lease following listed vessels in increments to Soviets in DUTCH HARBOR or other base that area: 30 FR 2 XCM 24 AM 36 YMS 56 SC 48 PT 4 YR 6 pontoon barges 30 LCI(L) 30 LCT 5 Army T tankers. Proposed schedule deliveries extends April to December 1945. Desire comment on feasibility with facilities available for housing mess and shakedown and technical training. Submit data on facilities available this purpose in DUTCH HARBOR and any other ports considered on premise that during no month will personnel requirements exceed about 2500 and that turn over time will not exceed 2 weeks.

24 0259 MACARTHUR to CINCPAC Info CH-27A

TOP SECRET. Concur in your 22205y. Reference Rear Admiral James L Hall as your representative at LEYTE.

25 1348 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WEDEMEYER, NIMITZ

TOP SECRET. Support for operation ICEBERG to be furnished by CHINA Theater will be as arranged directly between WEDEMEYER and NIMITZ. Direct communication and exchange of liaison officers should be carried out as necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be kept informed. This answers CPW-31575 from WEDEMEYER, not to NIMITZ.

25 1304 MACARTHUR to CINCPAC Info CTF 77 CINCPAC

TOP SECRET. Comply with CINCPAC radio gram 210305 GCT regarding return of APD's. MACARTHUR.
22 2059  CINC PAC to CINC SWPA, COM 3RD FLT. COM 4TH FLT. COM 8TH FLT. COM 8TH FLEET-PAC. COM PHIB GROUP 12, COM PHIB OCEAN. COMinating. COMPHIBPAC. COMENORTH PAC. COM ENORTH PAC.

TOP SECRET. Rear Admiral James L. Mall ComPhibGroup 12 (LCTG 13.12) will proceed LEYTE via air in advance of his flagship. After arrival about 26 January in addition to such duties as may be assigned by ComPhibPac he will act as the Senior Officer of the Pacific Fleet Present and will represent CINCPac-CINCPac in coordinating arrangements for preparing and mounting Pacific Ocean Areas Forces for DETACHMENT and ICEDOWN. Concurrency of CINCSWPA requested.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

25 2041

ConStEmt to COMPHIBPAC info COMPHIBGROUP 1, COMPHIBAC - CINCPOA ADV.
HLYRS AND PEARL Cty 58.

TOP SECRET. Your 260910. Plan to make NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON,
SANTA FE, BILOXI and 1 DesDiv all of TG 58.4 available to assist
your bombardment D Day and D + I Day and longer if necessary.
Carriers of TG 58.4 will be available for air support same days.
Availability of other task groups of TF 58 for support as tentatively
agreed to by you and Mitscher will be dependent upon length of
initial EMPIRE strike which I WISH to continue for 3rd Day if situation
permits. CVEs available to you are WAKE ISLAND. SAGINAW BAY. LUNGA
POINT. BISMARCK SEA. SARGENT BAY. HOUYERU BAY. MAKIN ISLAND plus
ANZIO ASTW group.

26 0649

CINC BFF to COMINCH AND CGO info CINCPOAC PEARL AND ADV HGS, CINCSEP.
CON 7TH FOOTVOCINCPOAC BRERELL/CEбу

TOP SECRET. Your 162021. A Carrier Task Force designated TF 118 will
be ready for operations in any advanced anchorage on 15 March (2) TF
118 will consist of 2 BB, 4 CV, 2 CL, 3 CL(AA), 16 DD's (3) To support
the above the following Escorts and units of the Fleet Train designated
TF 117 will be available: 8 DE, 16 PCE, 4 CVE, 1 ARB, 1 ARV, 4 AF, 2
AN, 4 ATA, 8 AO, 3 AKS, 1 AD, 1 AW, 1 ARH, 1 AN, 13 AE part 1 my 260737.

26 0737

CINC BFF to COMINCH AND CGO info CINCPOAC PEARL AND ADV HGS, CINCSEP.
CON 7TH FOOTVOCINCPOAC BRERELL/CEбу

TOP SECRET. Part 2 final is 260737 FPTOC 260659. (4) Names of ships
are being forwarded by airmailgram (5) Additional forces are expected
which will be communicated as they become available for operations
(6) authorities as in my 151244 not to all (7) Admiralty pass to Comnavu.

26 2113

COMGEN 10TH ARMY to CINCPOA info COMGENPOA, COMGEN 24TH CORPS.

TOP SECRET. Cincpac reenrypts ComGen 10th Army 260650. Reported by
Gen Hodge dispatch received 25 Jan 8th Army advises 77th Div 5 Feb, 7th
Div 15 Feb, 96th Div 2 Feb, Corps Troops 1 to 15 Feb, 6200 men from
all Divs en SD under CinCNPAC by 22 Feb, all contingents en arrival of
American Div as dates for relief of troops 24th Corps and concentration
in staging areas. Above dates do not provide desirable minimum for
rehabilitation personal and reequipment of 24th Corps. Reference
Cincpac 161814 OCT, CinCNPAC 200140 OCT and per 7C mem 03 24th Corps
to Adar Limits 16 Feb 45. Such delay will require request for additional
postpennement ICEBERG.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

27 0156

TOP SECRET. Following for planning purposes. DD's now on temporary duty to be returned to CINCPOA as follows. 4 DD's of DesDiv 102 Escort CVE's when released to ULITHI thence proceed GUADALCANAL. MAURY (DD 409) GRIDLEY (DD 386) MCCALL (DD 400) of DesDiv 11 plus STEVENS (DD 479) DASHIELL (DD 659) of DesRon 25 and 12ARD (DD 589) of DesRon 56 Escort CVE's when released to ULITHI. DesRon 2 less HUGHES (DD 419) ANDERSON (DD 411) to arrive GUADALCANAL by 18 February. DesRon 49 to be released CINCPOA control at ULITHI by 18 February. Para. 36 DD assigned 7th Fleet will DECOD DesRon 5 less LAMSON (DD 307). DesRon 14 less O'ASHEVOORT (DD 608) CAINWELL (DD 605) COOHLAN (DD 606). DesRon 21 less ROSS (DD 563). DesRon 22. DesRon 23 less AULICK (DD 569). ABBOTT (DD 629) until received by AULICK about 2 March. 1 DD to be designated by Cincpos.

28 0001

CON 5TH FLEET to CINCPOA info COMFLEBWAY 1, CTF 93, COMINPOA.

TOP SECRET. Will provide coverage MARCUS, WOLMAI, LAMOTTH, TAHU by search planes of Task Group 50.5 as requested your 200049. Assume neutralization these bases if required will continue as function of Strategic Air Force as per his current OP Orders.

27 0725

WEDEMAYER to HUNZIK.

Top Secret to Limited. New location POA Headquarters noted. It would be helpful if we could hold conference as you suggested. Such conference probably should follow closely after the conference about to be held involving 3 big boys. Decisions pertaining to global strategy will be firmer. I should like to bring few planners to confer with you and your staff and proceed to Washington accompanied by your able planning chief Admiral Sherman where we could discuss plans and resources with U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and planners for not to exceed 1 week returning via Pacific to finalize plans with you.

29 0931

CINCPOA ADV HNOTS to COMINCH Info COMARCH CHINA THEATER.

JCS 251349. Preliminary arrangements for support of IJNPOK by China Theater made by my 122013 answered by ComNavGroup China's 170631. Further arrangements including exchange of liaison officers will be made direct with General Wedemayer keeping JCS informed through Comarch.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

29 0515 AAPFOA (HARMON) to COMAP (ARNOLD) Info CINCPAC ADV HNOFRS.

Top Secret. CINCPAC reference 280215 OCT January and present telecon number H-23-2 from COMAP 20 to DepComAP 20. Dispatch 280215 OCT received from CINCPAC this date is as follows: "From your daily assignment and movement report number 20 dated 21 January it appears that the 413, 414, 506, 507 and 508th Army Fighter Groups are assigned to the 20th Air Force pursuant to a War Department letter of 9 January which I do not hold instead of being assigned to Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Areas as expected. Request authoritative information as to the status of these 5 fighter groups as soon as practicable since my plans for DETACHMENT, ICEBERG and The Defense of the HAWAIIAN Area have been developed on the assumption that the 5 fighter groups would be under my operational control and no plans have been made to base 20th Air Force fighters in the Pacific Ocean Areas." The 5 fighter groups were accepted by CINCPAC with the understanding that these units would be operated in a dual capacity with their eventual primary mission being to escort VLA. By War Department letter 25 December the 508th Fighter Group was assigned to AAPFOA for administration and operations. To satisfy the command requirements and to insure these fighter groups will be accepted in this theater, it will be necessary that they be definitely placed under my operational control. It is recommended that the 413, 414, 506 and 507th in addition to the 508th Army Fighter Group be attached to AAPFOA for operational control. Identical recommendation is contained in my 2a-0. This matter was discussed at length with Norstad and Vicellino recently with explanation as to need for assignment as recommended and has been repeatedly recommended by me ever since the availability of these units became probable. Please note CINCPAC's request in quoted message for authoritative information as to the status of these groups. Letter from War Department supersedes defining their status and referred to in Norstad's H-25-1 has not been received.

29 2045 JOINT STAFF PLANNERS WASHINGTON to PLANNING STAFF CINCPAC Info FLWPG CINCPAC ADV HNOFRS.

WARL-28061. Top Secret. Since our WARL-74766. This is a planning message. You are advised following is being done here. Para A. Our studies listed below have been dispatched to you: Para JWPC 28h/1, SJP 28h/1, JWP 28h/1, JWPC 28h/1. Para B. New subjects under examination. Para L. Alternate campaign plans for the Defeat of JAPAN under various assumed dates in 1945 for beginning of redeployment from EUROPE. Para. Optimum forward deployment of air forces in the Pacific through the time that bases seized in HUMBERSONE become available and assuming no redeployment from EUROPE. Para C. Joint Logistics Committee is re-examining subject of availability of forces and resources after ICEBERG.

30 0613 CINCPAC ADV HN to COMAP (ARNOLD) Info CINCPAC ADV HNOFRS.

It is highly desirable that tentative plans for employment British Pacific Fleet units in ICEBERG be made firm and that CINCPAC proceed with arrangements outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 WP-1. Action is being deferred until CINCPAC Brit Pac Flt reports to CINCPAC and it is understood that he awaits directive from COMINCH. Request early information since CINCPAC Brit Pac Flts Aest Chief of Staff has completed conferences with ComStaf/Flt and is at GUAM and Chief of Staff 5th Fleet will arrive tomorrow.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (OCT)

30 0840 COMPSTHFLIT to CTG 50-5 Info CTF 93, CINCPOA & CONGMAAPCA

In complying with 280001 conduct reconnaissance at irregular intervals averaging approximately once weekly.

31 0212 CINCPOA ADV HDQTRS, to CTF 77 Info CINCPOA PBHL, CINCPWPA, COMSTHFLIT, CONSERVPAC

My 161836 concurred in by Cominch 162220 contemplated retention of 6 battleships for about 3 weeks unquote. To facilitate planning request your estimate as to date they will be released.

31 0734 CINCPOA ADV HDQTRS to COMSTHFLIT, COMNAVPAC, CONSERVPAC, COMAIRPOA, CONGMAAPCA Info COMNAVAREA, COMPHIBPAC, CTF 51, CONSERVPAC, CTF 56, CTF 10,16, CTU 10,16,1, CTG 50-5, CINCPOA PBHL

Para 1. Sub-paragraph 242,31 Base Development Plan for WORKMAN modified by insertion new 3rd sentence "Every effort will be made to improve a runway sufficiently to permit the operation of Navy search Liberators as soon as possible after the provision of minimum requirements for fighter defense". Sub-paragraph 240,21 of same plan add note as follows "The requirement for operations of PBHL by D plus 50 refers to full load operation with completed facilities see para 242,31. Limited staging operation of Navy search Liberators at light load shall be provided for as soon as possible". The decision as to actual date of operation of Liberators to WORKMAN and priority between this operation and the increases of the fighter defense will be made by the officer conducting the operation (ComSTHFLIT). Para 2. Modify supporting plans as necessary to implement the foregoing.

31 2305 CINCPOA ADV HDQTRS to COMSTHFLIT Info COMPHIBPAC

ComPHIBPAC 301220 has been discussed with Rear Admiral Davis who knows my views. No commitment or decision has been made by me and the assignment of NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON is a matter for decision by ComSTH who may also increase the interval between carrier strike and island assault if desired. Davis will arrive U.S. today about noon local today.

31 1825 COMINCH AND ADM to CINCPOA ADV Hq.

See my 162021 to CinCFF upon which basis I await your request for allocation to you of British Pacific Fleet units required by you for a specific operation to include your reasons why you need such units. I now confirm my intention to keep operational allocation of British Pacific Fleet units in my own hands.

010626 CINCPWPA to CINCPOA Info COMCURSAFP(ADV EBK), CONSTHFLIT, COMAIR, COMNORTHMAF Forces, CTF 73, BOMBCOM 20(ADV ABD)

Body is made to CinCPa top secret letter "Operations in Support of Paragraph D Southwest Pacific Area" Serial 000007 dated 14 January. Subpara 1: Search Plan J 0160. This headquarters incorporates search requested in appendix two DBSUB reference: Search Plan J was forwarded to Commanding General, US Army Air Forces, CinCPa, Commander 5th AF, BOMBCom 20, 21, 14th Air Force and China Theater on 27 January.

- Continued -
(010626) CINCSEPA to CINCPAC Info COMGENUSAAF (ADV ECH), ETC. (CONT'D)

(CX7253) effective date in early February will be announced by later dispatch. Subpara 2: Attacks on enemy air bases and shipping in FORMOSA have already begun and will be progressively increased as WINNERS-TUNDOE facilities are developed. B24 and B25 airplanes with P38, H-7 and P51 fighter escort will be used on these missions. Subpara 3: Offensive FBAY screens will be provided if requested but limited number of FBAY necessities that planes of Search Plan J provide this offensive screen within limits of prescribed W ARDC areas or in recommended adjacent areas is lieu if search sectors requested. Request this headquarters be furnished charts indicating exact routes and time schedule of movement of friendly naval forces in order to provide more effective screen. Searches from LEITE as indicated in Search Plan J will provide the screen for movement of groups from the LEITE Area. Subpara 4: Night diversion strikes on FORMOSA and air installations at SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the nights of 12/11 through L minus 9/6 will be made weather permitting. Subpara 5: Strikes on FORMOSA air installations will be made on L minus 16 or 1 minus 15 or 1 both days subject to coordination with 20th Bomber Command. Strike will be made on L minus 16 and L minus 13 if practicable notifying Commander 1st Carrier Task Force and Commander Central Pacific Task Force of times. Place: Strength of strikes including type of planes. Subpara 6: Continuous strikes on FORMOSA will be made as practicable subsequent to L minus 13 in coordination with 20th Bomber Command to cover ICEBERG operation. Subpara 7: Search Plan J covers search plans including sector calls. Strike schedules are dependent on coordination with 20th Bomber Command and will be forwarded by dispatch later.

010628 MACARTHUR to COMGEN 5th ARMY AIR FORCES, WASH., Info CINCSEPA, CINCPAC, COMDR ALLIED AIR FORCES (ADV ECH), COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (MACV), COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA).

Southwest Pacific air forces have initiated strikes against the FORMOSA Area. These strikes will increase in intensity as air installations are developed in MINDORO and LUZON. Cincpao in his top secret letter serial 0005007 plans for both 20th BomCom and SWPA air forces strikes in the FORMOSA SAKISHIMA GUNTO Area in support of ICEBERG Operation. In order to obtain maximum neutralization of the FORMOSA Area commencing at the earliest practicable date. Your concurrence or comments are requested relative to authorizing direct communication for this purpose between Commander Allied Air Forces SWPA and Commanding General 20th BomCom to facilitate and effect maximum coordination.

012240 CINCSEPA to COMGEN USFPPAC Info COMGENUSAAF, COMGENUTH, COMCINCUSPAC: Your 202047 not to all. Joint Staff Study for Phase 3 of ICEBERG will be reviewed and revised where necessary as rapidly as availability of intelligence concerning terrain and enemy dispositions permits. It may be assumed for logistic planning purposes that 5th Philippines Corps will be used in Phase 3 in lieu of 3rd Philippine Corps. Employment of an Army Rept Combat Team for Phase 3(A) is also under consideration.
TOP SECRET

26 0739 CINC BPF to COMINCH, CNO/ (Cont'd)

Divided between Advanced Anchorage and Intermediate Bases.

Armament store issuing (AE) CORINDA, PRINCE DE LIERCE, DARVEL.
ship
PRINCESS MARIA PIA, HERMMELIN, ROBERT
MAERSK, HERON, THYRO S. KLEPTI, PACHECO

On passage between Advanced and Rear Bases.

Ferry Carriers (CVE) STRIKER, FENCER

Armament Store Carriers (AE) QUADRAN MARSK KISTA KOLA

Naval Store Carrier (AKS) BOSPHORUS

03 0921 DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COMSTHFLT, CTF 58, JUNKN 23, CINCINAPA.

Following operations will be conducted by 21 BomCom in support DETACHMENT Operation: A. On D-8, search area between longitude 135 and 148 east, wild latitude as determined on D-10. On D-5 search area 60 miles on each side carrier force track to operating area for D-3 as outlined in OpOrd 1-43. Search to begin 800 miles from base and extend as far north as possible. B. Attacks on TOKYO Area during nights of D-6-3, D-3-2 and D-2-1 will be made by 3 aircraft each night operating individually and using ECM. Attacks on NAGOYA Area during nights of D plus 3-4, D plus 4-5 and D plus 5-6 will be made by 3 aircraft each night operating individually and using ECM. C. Weather permitting maximum effort strikes will be made against a primary target in TOKYO Area on D-4, a primary target in NAGOYA Area on D and a primary target in NAGOYA Area as alternate for TOKYO Area and NAGOYA Area as alternate for NAGOYA Area. In the event visual bombing is not possible in either area on either of the alternate days radar bombing will be conducted in TOKYO Area on D-3 and D plus 1 and NAGOYA Area on D plus 5. D. Divergent strike will be conducted on D-2 against NAGOYA Area using ECM.

02 1722 CTF 77 to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCSWPA (TARLAC AND LETTE).

Reply to your 310212 contained in CINCSWPA 011243 of which Cinnco is afo addressees.

04 0430 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC (PRIORITY), CTF 58, COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC PEARL H.

COM NAB GUAM.

CTF 58 290505, ComAirPac 022056. In view necessity maximum fighter strength for initial strikes next operation WASP and ESSEX may sail with excess fighter strength as planned by CTF 58. Thereafter CNO 262132 will be observed and excess fighter strength reduced by adjustment of replacements. Disposition Buccaneer 4 and 81 as directed by ComAirPac.
26 0739 CINC B.P.F. to COMINCH. CNO Info CINC PAC BTH Hq. BAD WASHINGTON, CALIFORNIA (HOLLANDIA), COMM/THULEST, ADMIRALTY, CAMHIAED.

In continuation of my signal DTG 260737 the following is a nominal list of the British Pacific Fleet:

T.F. 118

**Battleships** - KING GEORGE V, HOVE 2 BB

**Fleet Carriers** - ILLUSTRIUS, VICTORIOUS, INDOMITABLE, INDOMITABLE 4 CV

**Cruisers** - SWIFTSURE, GAMBIA, BLACK PRINCE, AQUITAN 2 CL

**EURALYUS** 3 CL(AA)

**Destroyers**

4th D.F. - QUICKMARCH, QUIBERON, QUALITY, QUEENBOROUGH

25th D.F. - GRENVILLE, URSA, ULSTER, URANTA, UNDINE, UNDAUNTED

27th D.F. - KENTONFELT, WELSEX, WAGNER, WILDFIRE, WINDMILLS, WAKEFUL 16 DD

**Support Forces**

1. **Escorts**

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**Fleet Train - T.F. 118**

**Advanced Anchorage**

Replenishment carriers (CVE) SLAGN, SPEAKER
Aircraft Repair Ship (ARV) UNICORN
Repair Ships (ARB) RESOURCE
Victualling store issuing ship (AF) PORT EDMONTON
Hospital Ship (AH) OXFORDSHIRE
Tugs (ATA) 2
Oilers (AO and AOG) BROWN, RANGER DINGLEDALE, SAN ANTONIO
Naval Store ship (AKS) BACCHUS
Destroyer Depot Ship (AD) TIMB

**Intermediate Base**

Air Store Ship (AKS) PORT COLVILLE
Victualling store ship (AF) DENBIGHSHIRE, CITY OF DURBLS, PORT ALABAMA
Hospital Ship (AH) TJITJALENO
Tugs (ATA) 2
Distilling ship (AW) SAGPOOL
Repair ship (ARH) ARETE
Net Layer (AW) GUARDIAN

- Continued -
X-05-2 Following are briefs of Field Orders 25 and 26 covering anti-submarine boat searches given Decomp AF 20s 030921 to Cinccpac AdvHQ. Both orders specify 10 a/c from 313th BN taking off at 0645K and flying parallel search at 3000 feet with a/c 12 miles apart. Naval observers will accompany both flights. A/C will make contact reports to 313th Wing ground station for transmission to 25K. A/C will make identical transmission on 4475 KC. A/C will stand by on channel C VHF for possible voice communication with naval units. Pilots will be familiar with shackles authentication on this channel. No bombs will be carried. FO25: On D minus 8 search area from 1358 to 1632 60 miles on either side of latitude to be determined on D minus 10. FO 26: On D minus 5 search within the following coordinates: 28-02N 145-58E, 28-03N 147-59E, 32-04N 146-10E, 34-02N 144-55E, 31-15N 144-45E.

05 0746 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPAC info COMINCH, CHQ, COM7THFLT, COMCNPAC, CINCPAC \[null\]

My 212003. Availability of facilities for a Corps of 3 Marine Divisions in the PHILIPPINES now planned with timing as follows. Depot rear echelons etc., move from HAWAIIAN AREA to PHILIPPINES about 1 August. Combat elements of Corps move from objective area to PHILIPPINES commencing about 15 Sept and as released thereafter. Para. Request PACIFIC representatives in CINCSWPAC. Headquarters continue search for suitable site with view to readiness when required.

05 1255 COMINCH & CHQ to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

My dispatches referred to in 1st portion of your 012234M GMT applied only to the matter of operational allocation of units of the British Pacific Fleet. Arrangements in connection with bases, anchorages, fuel, communications and intelligence should be handled by you in accordance with the provisions of the memorandum of understanding dated 20 December previously approved by me. Your request for operational allocation for later phases of PHILIPPINES now under consideration.

06 0756 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPAC Info COMINCH, COM7THFLT.

Para 1. The remaining 4 of the 6 battleships which I sent to the 7th Fleet for temporary duty to provide fire support for the LSTTE and LINDAYEN assault are required for the same purpose in operations to be conducted in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Under the terms of our agreement (Firescape) they were to arrive ULI THI by 19th January but were made available to the 7th Fleet for about 3 weeks by my 161836. Para 2. On 16 February the Pacific Fleet will attack HONSHU and IWO JIMA and will thereby make fully effective its naval strategic support of the PHILIPPINES position. Para 3. Vice Admiral Oldendorf's report shows that PENNSYLVANIA must be docked and MISSISSIPPI and COLORADO must have extensive battle damage repaired prior to sailing for ICEBERG, All 4 ships are badly in need of upkeep. Para 4. Request you direct 7thFleet to return MISSISSIPPI, COLORADO and WASHINGTON to ULI THI and PENNSYLVANIA to MANUS all to arrive 16 February.
TOP SECRET
FEBRUARY (GCT)

06 0801 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, DEPUTY CNO AIR. Info CINCPAC PEARL, COMCHINPAC.

My acquiescence for long range planning purposes in Picket's slate for prospective change in aviation flag commands assumed a rotation rate that would not be injurious to the Fleet and contemplated changes only when the present carrier division commanders who are all highly satisfactory to me show need of rest or their services are definitely required on shore. The average interval between detachments of CarDiv comds should be a minimum of 2 months. Montgomery is just being relieved as ComCarDiv 3. The timing on the planning slate dated 30 Jan as drawn up by Murray and Picket contemplated relief of 5 of the remaining 6 CarDiv Comds by August. That is too rapid and unacceptable. Although Davidson's experience and work are valuable to the Fleet I will not oppose his relief after DETACHMENT if his services are required ashore. Slate should be so amended that other CarDiv commanders will not be moved at intervals of less than 2 months and then only in accordance with the principles mentioned in the 1st sentence.

01 2254 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH. I.

Top Secret handle as limited only. Para 1. Memorandum record of understandings reached in conference 17-19 December (NP-1) and approved by Cominot serial 0014 of 2 January was based on directive of Cominot 131255 December which is now understood to be superseded by Cominot 162021 and 31823 Jan. The provisions of that memorandum included arrangements in connection with bases, anchorages, fuel, communications and intelligence which should be implemented without delay. It now appears preferable that such of these arrangements as involve the Southwest Pacific Area be made by Cominot rather than Cinapac. If you concur as prepared to submit specific recommendations immediately. Para 2. Request allocation of available carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the British Pacific Fleet together British Fleet Train to operational control of Cinapac for ICEBERG Operation. Contemplated employment is attack on enemy forces and positions south of OKINAWA and other operations as may be required. Augmentation of US Pacific Fleet by British Carrier Task Force is not absolutely necessary but will expedite campaign and by more complete neutralization of enemy air force will reduce our losses.

05 0730 WEDMORE to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, RICHARDSON Info MARSHALL, KNOX.

CFE6 32476. Para 1. In response to message from Chief of Staff (WAX 27118 dated 26 January refers) regarding report on CHINA situation following is submitted for your information. Part 1- Strategic. Para 2. Inevitability of defeat is realized by Japan, However before calling halt they hope to induce Allies to ameliorate present stringent terms of surrender and purported drastic post war measures against them. This they would accomplish by causing Allies to become war weary as result of prohibitive losses in lives and material and unacceptable duration of war. Para 3. Speed of American advance in Pacific last 8 months undoubtedly has upset enemy time schedule and overall plans. Japanese no longer possess strategic initiative and their future dispositions and preparations will be determined by defensive considerations. This would not preclude isolated or small scale offensive actions. Para 4. The complete neutralization of Japanese Archipelago, the dynamo of enemy war effort, must continue to be principal objective of American strategy for next several months. Air, naval and amphibious operations should be...
conducted with a view to acquiring bases for the effective employment of strong air and naval forces against the Japanese homeland preparatory to invasion of possibly KYUSHU and or HONSHU. Subsidiary operations should be conducted with a view to cutting enemy main lines of communication leading to and within areas under their control in order to prevent and restrict redisposition of their troops and movement of vital war materials.

Para 5. Large scale land operations on the Asiatic continent by United States forces should not be undertaken during the next several months, if ever. Difficult terrain and inadequate communications make large scale use of modern land armies impractical in interior of CHINA. In undertaking such operations we would play into enemy hands, as Americans would be opposed by strong Japanese ground forces under conditions favorable to them.

However, during that period maximum effort must be made by Chinese supported by United States China Theater forces, essentially air. These forces should contribute most effectively by cutting enemy communication lines, destroying important installations and diverting and containing the greatest possible number of Jap air and ground units. At the same time, United States units in the Pacific could establish naval and air bases in KYUSHU, BONINS, HOKKAIDO, SHANTUNG PENINSULA or FORMOSA. Situation may require the seizure of intermediate objectives along CHINA Coast, south of WENCHOW, in CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO, in KURI KES, and in FORMOSA if the enemy considerably weakens forces in that area. Situation may develop in such manner as to require extensive ground operations on continent before Japs are compelled to surrender however operations suggested for next 6 to 8 months might suffice. If Jap elects to fight it out on mainland of ASIA, favorable conditions particularly with reference to JGS communications and air cooperation will have been created for American all out land-air battles in CHINA.

Para 6. Based on limited information of Soviet capabilities, best estimate in event they enter war against Nippon is that they have about 30 trained and equipped divisions in Far East. Effective operations from eastern SIBERIA based on present enemy dispositions and strength would require additional forces (about 30 divisions). This force would take approximately 4 months to move. On assumption that GERMANY capitulates by early spring of this year, Russian reinforcements would not arrive in Far East until late Autumn. Severe winter weather might prohibit and would certainly restrict operations until following year.

Soviets disclaim interest in CHINA. However, their local representatives are carefully analysing all developments particularly regarding the KUUMINTAUG, Provincial War Lords and Chinese Communists. In MONGOLIA, Soviet influence is today very great. Chinese Communist movement overshadows other political issues in Northern CHINA, allowing infiltration of Soviet doctrines. This condition will facilitate actual penetration by Russians later.

Part II - Tactical, Para 7. Japanese activities in CHINA are essentially as presented to JCS in November and December of last year. They still have almost complete freedom of action. In November the Japs could have taken KUNMING or CHUNGKING. More than adequate resources were available to them and the Chinese-American effort could only have delayed their drive. There were no effective Chinese ground forces immediately available to interpose between KUNMING and enemy advance. Now, on 1 February the Japs still have strong offensive capabilities with about 12 divisions disposed south of CHUNGSHA and along the communication lines to CANTON and INDO-CHINA.

Para 8. The enemy can also attack KUNMING by way of HANOI - SON-PAY - KUNMING; MANNING-POEHS-KUNMING, or POEHS-CHIKIANG-WENYANG.
Present indications do not indicate that the Japanese Supreme Commander in CHINA is committed to any of these courses of action or that Japan has moved 2 American trained, fed and equipped Chinese Divisions from HURMA to CHINA. They know further that these 2 divisions can and will fight. MacArthur's successes in Philippines cause enemy increased concern about CHINA Coast. For these reasons, the enemy is not expected to attempt large scale advance westward for example against KUNMING. The latter however remains a capability and we must be alert and prepared for such enemy action. Para 9. The enemy will probably concentrate in coastal areas and in the CHANGSHA-HANKOW-Peking-MANCHEI area. These dispositions would release Japanese forces for use against possible Allied operations along Chinese Coast; against Soviet attacks in MUNCHI or for rapid movement to Japanese Archipelago. Para 10. Offensive action by Chinese forces can be taken in July or August with weather favoring the operations. A Chinese force for offensive operations, 15-25 divisions, is expected to be available for combat by that time. Staff studies have been made concerning their most effective employment. We have considered an attack from YANGTZE eastward to acquire air bases and to cut enemy communication lines in area YANGTZE-LILUNG. This would be feasible only if enemy materially reduces forces south of YANGTZE. An air and ground outline plan is being prepared for drive on LIUCHOW-MANNING area thence east against CANTON-HONGKONG. All planned operations will be accompanied by coordinated action by strong guerrilla, commando and clandestine forces designed to disrupt enemy lines of communication and installations. Part II. B-Combat Forces. Para 12. Total combat forces available in China Theatre for offensive operations, as of 1 July 1945 are: Sub-usa. A: Entire 14th Air Force; and in addition, 2 fighter groups and 2 heavy bombardment groups. Sub-usa. Ground: 3 divisions, 1 tank group, 3 battalions 75mm field howitzers, 7 battalions 105mm guns; 3 battalions 155mm Howitzers (all from Chinese forces previously in INDIA and provided with US training and equipment). 20 Chinese divisions from Chinese armies in CHINA (middle in training, equipment and leadership). Para B. Schedule of operations. Para 13. Following schedule of operations within and from China Theatre is included for your information. Para 12. Period from present to 1 March. Air - Cooperation with Pacific advances and operations versus Japanese supplies and communications lines. Ground Clandestine and guerrilla activities. Organization, training and equipping of Chinese divisions. Objective of all forces - Insuring security of KUNMING-CHUNGKING area while concurrently preparing for offensive. Para 13. Period 1 March to 1 May. Air - Cooperation with Pacific advances and operations versus Japanese forces and installations particularly communication lines and supplies. Ground Clandestine and guerrilla activities. Organization, equipping and training of Chinese divisions and movement of forces to forward areas. Objective of all forces - Insuring security of KUNMING-CHUNGKING area while concurrently preparing for offensive. Para 14. Period 1 May to 1 July. Air - Operations against Japanese forces and installations particularly communication lines and supplies. Ground Clandestine and guerrilla activities. Continued training of Chinese divisions, concentration of divisions in selected areas in preparation for commencement of offensive. Objective of all forces - Insuring security of KUNMING-CHUNGKING area, concurrently preparing for offensive. Para 15. Period 1 July to 1 September. Air - Strategic and tactical participation and cooperation in CHINA, based with Pacific operations. Ground - Offensive operations by Chinese armies strongly supported by intensified guerrilla and clandestine operations. - Continued -
Para 16. Above presents current situation in CHINA and projected operations by China Theater forces. Operations by Pacific Ocean Area or ENPA forces against the CHINA Coast would contribute strongly to success of CHINA operations. CHINA Theater cannot materially aid Pacific operations during the next 4 months except by air strikes. After appropriate ground forces are available (estimated date 1 July 1945) combined and effective operations should be possible at such time and place as would support or assist operations in Pacific against island objectives or CHINA Coast. Para 17. It will probably be the first of July at the earliest before effective ground operations can be undertaken. CHINA Theater is striving to undertake co-ordinated ground and air operations against the Japanese from the west in time to disrupt their planned redeployment to meet possible U.S. advances from the Pacific and to prevent the withdrawal of forces from ASIA into JAPAN proper. It is believed that if our operations can be initiated in July they will catch the Japanese off-balance and probably preclude planned redistribution of their forces. In the event they are preparing to withdraw bulk of forces to the north of the YAMASHTE these operations will probably hasten that withdrawal. In any event, our operations, if successful, would give the Chinese army much needed combat experience and confidence and could result in opening of KANTUN-HONGKONG. When sea communications are re-established, it will be possible to dispense with the prodigious effort required to supply CHINA via INDIA. Further, the increased flow of supplies in conjunction with victorious battle experience may inspire confidence and create conditions that will enable the Chinese forces to destroy the Japaneese on the Asiatic mainland without large scale American ground participation.

07 0403 CINC SWPA to COM ALLIED AIR FORCES ADV GCH. Info CINC VA, COMSTAF, COMALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA), ADV GCH GHQ.

CI 57760. In support of DETACHMENT Operation with target date 19 February, Commander Allied Air Forces will extend long range searches sectors 5 through 9 of search plan B and when effective sectors 5 through 10 of search plan J to maximum practicable distance during the period D-10 to D plus 10. Continue strikes on FORMOSA airfields during this period with increasing intensity as practicable. On D plus 9 and D plus 10 strike FORMOSA airfields to cover fast carrier strikes on and retirement from the NAGOSHI SHOTO. Commander 5th Fleet's Op Plan 13-44. Action addresses acknowledge. MacArthur.

07 0455 CINCPA ADV GCH to COMSTAF GCH. Info DESMORETHAF, CTF 58, ALL TO COMMAND TF 58.

Your 050432. In the event that the 21st Bomber Command does not strike on D-4 it will strike on D-3 using 1 of the following alternatives. A. If clear weather is predicted at TOKYO proceed to TOKYO and strike target 193 if visual bombing possible. If radar bombing then becomes necessary bomb radar area bounded by Lat 35 degrees 33 minutes - 35 degrees 45 minutes and Long 139 degrees 43 minutes - 139 degrees 52 minutes between 1430 and 1630Z. B. If clear weather is predicted at NAGOYA and not at TOKYO strike target 193 NAGOYA. C. If overcast is predicted at both places strike radar area as in A. Para. For NAGOYA area in event 21 BomCom does not strike D plus 4 it will strike D plus 5 target 193 if visual bombing possible. In event radar bombing becomes necessary bomb radar area in the city of NAGOYA bounded by Lat 35 degrees 44 minutes - 35 degrees 45 minutes and Long 139 degrees 50 minutes - 139 degrees 59 minutes between 1430 and 1630Z. Should TOKYO be open on D plus 4 a primary target that area will be attacked. No deferment to
above plans will be made unless weather conditions at home base necessitate. You will be notified of any change not later than 0730 K on D-3 for TONTU area and 0730 K on D+4 for NAMYA area. The foregoing decisions were reached after thorough consideration of your 050822 also of desirability concentrating attack effort and unsuitability air frame plant 1544 as a radar target.

07 0306 CINC BFP to COMTHFLT Info CINCPAC ADV H. CINCPAC REAR. COM NOB STIEFF. RAFT.

Plans for forthcoming operation include use of LEYTE GULF by British Pacific Fleet service force, though this is dependent on BFP being assigned to CINCPAC by Cominch. On the assumption that this assignment will in fact be made, I would like to send a small party of officers to RAFT at an early date to discuss use of anchorage with ComNob STIEFF and his staff. Please advise if you concur and convenient date for visit.

07 0617 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCPAC Adv CO. CINCPAC Adv CO. COMINCH. COMTHFLT. COMINCH.

My 060758. My appraisal of enemy naval capabilities in Southwest Pacific Area follows. Ultra discloses Jap Southern Army plans for evacuation of 46th Division (HINA) plus elements of 5th (TOKAL) and 48th (DILL) Divisions to SUMARAYA with naval cooperation and subsequent movement to MALAYA indicated. Believe above transportation commencing soon and extending until possibly April. On 21 January Cinc Combined Fleet assigned #2 Diversion Attack Force (ISE, HYUGA, ASHIGARA, HAGURO, KYOHO plus about 5 destroyers) to Cinc Southwest Area Fleet and the next day latter commander assigned the #2 Diversion Attack Force to the Western Force. On February 4 Cinc Combined Fleet deleted the #2 Diversion Attack Force suggesting its abolishment as a combined fleet tactical unit and assigned the Western Force and North of AUSTRALIA Force to the tactical command of Commander Southern Army Field Marshal Count TERAUCHI. These assignments stripped Cinc Southwest Area Fleet of practically all his commands except minor naval forces afloat and ashore in the PHILIPPINE. Previously the high naval air commands of the PHILIPPINES had withdrawn their headquarters to FORMOSA. Evacuation of air crews and ground personnel from LUZON by air and submarine is in progress. The Jap Army's failure to prevent U.S. landings in PHILIPPINES is well established. A naval shakeup in command is reflected by the assignment of a new Cinc 2nd Southern Expeditionary Force and the indicated detachment of the ComDR #2 Diversion Attack Force plus the suspicion that Cinc Southwest Area Fleet may have been relieved of his post. The overwater movement of large numbers of troops in small craft under the reduced Jap air strength available in face of Allied submarine menace and the acknowledged threat of British Task Force raids against JAVA and SUMATRA will probably result in utilization of naval units for escort and cover and possibly to augment available transportation. Japanese Army and Naval air units and naval anti-submarine escort units are engaged in intensified anti-submarine measures covering vital convoys along the HINA Coast from SINGAPORE to the Empire. An unidentified command on 5 February made inquiry as to amounts of aviation gasoline in drums and tonnage, also numbers of personnel, that could be carried aboard ISE, HYUGA and ASHIGARA, also amount of aviation gasoline in drums that could be carried by destroyers KAME, AKIBFURO and KAKUSHIRO. It is estimated therefore that the enemy naval commander will be incapable of utilizing naval surface forces under his command to attempt to interfere with our supply line to LUZON. Signed NDMTZ.
TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY (OCT)

08 0121 CINCPACFLT to CINCPA LEYTE & LUZON INFO COMINCH, CINCPOA.

An increasing volume of requests are being received direct by Com7thFleet and ComdAllied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific Area and by his subordinates, particularly CINCPACFLT, from CINC British Fleet for facilities and services. Among these requests for provision of ANU, ships of the CinCBP, and others, are for airfields and facilities and the allocation of ground areas for the construction and installation of accommodations for 14,000 men, supplies and fuel depots, barracks, docks, etc. It is requested I be informed earliest practically of status of BFP with respect to CANS and Com7thFleet. Proper communications and correspondence channels and extent of my responsibility and authority with respect especially to provision of naval shore facilities in SWPA. Para. The present load on ANU for support of SWPA naval and naval air activities requires early decision with respect to whether and extent of transfer to BFP of existing facilities or of new construction to be undertaken for or by BFP.

08 0713 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINC BFP INFO COMINCH, CINCPOA, COMTHFLT.

My 080710. As soon as your next operations are decided upon please advise me of your arrangements desired for use of anchorages, shore facilities, fuel, etc., in order that I may make them accordance to which has been approved by Cominich.

07 2020 COMINCH (ADM) to CINCPOA ADV HQ. 07 1602 COMINCH TO COMINCH (ADM).

British Task Force not available your 070626 for ICEBERG first phase.

08 0314 CINCPOA to CINCPAC, COMTHFLT, Info SH, CINCPOA, COMINCH.

CAX-50326. In view of Para 2 of your 060753 providing strategic naval cover of LINGAYEN base I have directed 7th Fleet to comply with request of Para 4 all ships and all others which have participated in the operations have performed splendidly and fully maintained the highest traditions of the Navy. I am very proud and grateful to have had their invaluable assistance in this vital campaign.

09 0525 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, COMSTCARD, TASKFORCE INFO COMTHFLT, CINCPOA REAS.

COMAIRPAC 131938, January. Request recommendations of addresses covering assignment of carriers to night group and training duty during ICEBERG. Also, of info addresses will be welcomed.

09 0824 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMINCH & CNAG Info COM3RDFLT, COMBATRON 2.

Your 0622k2. Following a report of informal investigation conducted by VADM Lee as directed by CINCPAC. On 16 Jan 1945 (E. Long. date) TF 38 struck shipping, aircraft installations and islands from HONGKONG to NEW YORK Fighter aircraft from USS HANCOCK attacked seaplane hangar and base installations in Portuguese territory in MACAO. This target was assigned to TF 38, 2 and specifically to HANCOCK for observation and "blanketing". On 13 Jan 1945, CTG 38, 2 with concurrence Com3rdflt and CTF 38 sent dispatch to HANCOCK as

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FEBRUARY (OCT)

09 0824 CINCPAC ADV Hq to COMINCH & CNO, INFO COMINF, CONTRABN 2. (CONT')

follows: "Since MACAO is owned by neutral CITIGAL brief all pilots that no attacks are to be made on MACAO or shipping within 2 miles thereof unless Japanese aircraft or shipping are on MACAO or in those waters in which case attacks will be limited to those aircraft and ships. Pilots will inspect MACAO for aircraft but will not fly over it." The intention of CTG 38.2 was to prohibit attacks against seaplane base at MACAO unless enemy air activity observed thereon. Because of incomplete briefing of pilots on the HANCOCK as to the intended meaning of despatch quoted above their understanding was not to fly over or attack MACAO, its harbor facilities or shipping therein but to observe from a distance and that the seaplane base about 22 miles from MACAO had been definitely and unconditionally assigned for attack. On day of attack no enemy activity was observed on or near seaplane base MACAO. Details of attacks all by FlightRon 7 are as follows all 16 Jan 1945. 0900 5 fighters strafed seaplane hangar. 0930 7 fighters strafed and fired seaplane hangar; strafed revetments. 0940 5 fighters strafed seaplane hangar. 1530 4 fighters strafed burnt out hangar and apparent gasoline stations. The gun camera film record of above attacks are reported to have been destroyed by bomb explosion on HANCOCK 22 Jan 1945.

09 2141 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPEF INFO CINCPAC ADV Hq. CONT'FLT, CINCPAC

Information from Commander 7th Fleet indicates that various officers of the Royal Navy are seeking to make major logistic arrangements with him direct. I assume that in accord with NP-1 you will deal with administrative arrangements with, by or through Cincpoa.

09 2141 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV Hq.

ContFlt 080121 referred to you for such action as may be necessary and appropriate.

10 0850 AW CHA SWPA to CINCPAC INFO COMINCH, CNO, CG, PEAF, CINCPEF, CH LSTY.

CAX 50405. Subject is British Pacific Fleet's operations and use of SWPA facilities and personnel as requested in CINCPEF 030223 OCT of 5 February to copy not to you paraphrased "Approval expected shortly for facilities including air strip to establish a naval air base at MANUK including tented camp site for 1500 men for which will require construction and maintenance personnel. Request confirmation of release of RAAF works squadrons or Australian engineer personnel who have been approached and confer in this request being passed to you required to establish base by 6 March" end of paraphrase. Also CINCPEF 310537 of 3 February to me copy not to you paraphrased "Approval is requested for CinCPa to communicate directly with Command General PEAF regarding the following problems: (A) Providing protection from the air of the bases and lines of communications of the BF, (B) air formation training of the fleet in company with air, (C) use of facilities of air transport service for the BF. End of paraphrase. Concur in Commander 7th Fleet 060121 of 8 February 45. Facilities and personnel SWPA allocated to fullest extent in support of present and future operations. In consonance with serial 000169 letter of 19-20 December 1944 and Commander in Chief and CNO 162021 OCT to CinCPa, believe requests for use of facilities and direct communication should follow the defined chain of command.

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TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY (CST)

11 0151 COMINCH to CINCPOA ADV Hq Info CINCPOA PEARL Hq. COMSUBPAC. COMPOEUL.

Consider it advisable that so far as possible participation of ComNavGroup CHINA matters of nature your 10531 be handled by assignment of straight-forward tasks in such form that purpose is not disclosed to him. To avoid revealing purpose in pertinent future messages to ComNavGroup CHINA substitute cominches for Joint Security Control in addesses. Cominches will deliver such messages to Joint Security Control who have this by hand. By 301993 Jan not to nor needed by all also refers.

06 1956 MARSHALL to SULTAN, RICHARDSON, WEDDELLER Info HANLON, LEMAY, BAINES passed to 1SCOMS CHINA, SATPAN, TINIAN Info Hq CHINA BOUTH A

WARX 33285, Now the War Department directs that the Commanding General, United States Army Forces INDIA-BURMA take the necessary action to prepare for movement and to move the 58 Bombardment Wing (VH) and component units as hereinafter indicated from INDIA-BURMA Theater to Pacific Ocean Areas in accordance with the following: Para. 1. References: (A) War Department letter AG 270.5 (25 June 43) OB-W-3088T-E-W, 30 June 43, Subject: Assignment of weapon numbers to overseas commanders, Para. (B) War Department letter AG 270.5 (23 June 43) OB-W-3088E-W, 30 June 43, subject: Procedure concerning movement of Troops Overseas, Para. Part 2. Personnel: (A) 1st Water echelon: (1) 2275 personnel of the 58 Wing will be prepared for departure CALCUTTA on or about 22 February destination TINIAN. (Total personel in this echelon plus additional maintenance and staff personnel carried in unit aircraft should be comparable by SSN to the retained air and ground echelons of the 315 Wing remaining in the United States to support unit aircraft. (Complete breakdown of SSN being forwarded under separate cover), Para. (2) 2864 personnel will be prepared for departure from CALCUTTA on or about 22 February destination GUAM consisting by units as follows: Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 58 Wing 3 officers, 10 enlisted men; ground echelons 2 headquarters and headquarters squadrons Bomb Group each 2 officers, 16 enlisted men; ground echelons 6 Bomb Squadrons each 6 officers, 197 enlisted men; 2 photo labs Bomb Group each 1 officer, 20 enlisted men; 2 Air Service Groups each 44 officers, 3 warrant officers, 667 enlisted men; 338 Signal Company Wing 8 officers, 119 enlisted men, Para. (3) 2nd Water Echelon: 3070 personnel consisting by units as follows will be prepared for departure to GUAM with readiness date 4 April: Hqtrs & Hqtrs Sqdns Bomb Group each 2 officers, 16 enlisted men; Ground Echelons 6 Bomb Sqdns each 6 officers, 197 enlisted men; 2 Photo Labs Bomb Group each 1 officer, 20 enlisted men; 2 Air Service Groups each 44 officers, 3 warrant officers, 667 enlisted men; 2nd AAF Combat Camera Unit 9 officers, 23 enlisted men; 1903 Ordinance Ammunition Co, 6 officers, 173 enlisted men; Ground Echelons Flt C 1st Reconnaissance Squadron 10 officers, 85 enlisted men; Link Trainer operators 40 enlisted men; total 3070 personnel; 155 officers, 6 warrant officers, 2099 enlisted men. Para (C). The 1st Air and Flight Echelon (90 B-29s, 2 B-24s and 5 F33s) of the 58 Wing consisting of: (A) Hqtrs Hqtrs 40 officers, 2 warrant officers, 66 enlisted men; Flight C, 1st Reconnaissance Sqn 30 officers, 60 enlisted men; 2 Ground Hqtrs each 20 officers, 1 warrant officer, 19 enlisted men; 6 Bomb Squadrons each consisting of 100 officers, 140 enlisted men; total 710 officers, 4 warrant officers and 1015 enlisted men will arrive at 315 Wing bases at TINIAN beginning 1 April. Unit aircraft to be loaded with combat crew and 9 maintenance or staff personnel. Regulation of the flow of aircraft in accordance with the completion dates of airfields on.
TINIAN will be accomplished by direct communication between the 21 Bomber Command, the 20 Bomber Command. Para (D), The 2nd Flight and Air Schemal (90 Bk's) of the 5th Wing consisting of Bombing Hqtrs personnel, 20 officers, 20 enlisted men; 2 Group Hqtrs, each 20 officers; 1 warrant officer, 19 enlisted men; 6 Bomb Squadrons, each 100 officers, 150 enlisted men; total 560 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 958 enlisted men, will arrive at TINIAN beginning 1 May subject to the regulation established in the preceding paragraph. Para (E). The totals of personnel for each unit indicated within echelons are considered only as a guide to indicate totals of personnel that can be moved within the means indicated. Any adjustment between units and within echelons (air or ground) is authorized consistent with the mission of the personnel and the condition of the bases upon arrival. Para (F). The headquarters 20 Bomber Command and the balance of its assigned units composing the 3rd echelon will be the subject of a separate directive. 1 June 45 is established as a readiness date. Para Part 3. Equipment: (A) Personnel of each echelon moving by water will be accompanied by heavy tentage and minimum essential equipment as outlined in FM including such authorized hand tools as transportation facilities will permit. Para (B). Complete tables of equipment, tables of basic allowances and special lists of equipment irrespective of qualifying remarks indicated in applicable equipment tables will be processed and sacked for overseas shipment. Tentative deadline at port for organizational equipment of the 1st echelon is 1 March and for the 2nd echelon is 1 April ending receipt of unloading schedule from Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas requested in 4-3 below. The Commanding General INDIA—BOMBA will establish final equipment readiness dates. Para (C). Commanding General INDIA—BOMBA will authorize the 5th Wing to ship on vessels nominated for the movement of cargo of each echelon of the 5th Wing, such extra items of equipment accumulated in excess of tables of equipment and tables of Basic Allowances from special projects (except theater projects), special issues and such critical spare parts as deemed advisable using space available remaining after loading cargo specified in the preceding paragraph. Para (D). Based on appropriate tables of equipment and tables of basic allowances, it is estimated that the 1st Water Echelon will have 3700 long tons and 23300 measurement tons (garble) including 1083 vehicles. The 2nd Water Echelon will have 3700 long tons and 27300 measurement tons including 1089 vehicles. These estimates are based on provisions of paragraph 3 B above. Para (E) A radio report will be rendered by the Commanding General INDIA—BOMBA Theater to the War Department by 20 February with a copy to Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas giving theater estimate for each echelon to include (group missing); (1) Total weight in long tons and measurement tons. (2) Number of vehicles by type and model. Para Part 4. Transportation: (A) The Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, will: (1) Furnish transportation (group missing) to accomplish the above movement and take the necessary steps to coordinate the movement with overseas theaters. Para (B). Designate personnel shipping by radio immediately for the 1st Water Echelon. Para (3). Nominate cargo shipping upon receipt of information required by 3 E above and 4 B below. Para (B). The Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas will upon receipt of information in 3 E above advise the War Department with copy to the Commanding General United States Army Forces INDIA—BOMBA Theater of the unloading echelon during which the cargo for the 1st Water Echelon and of the 2nd Water Echelon may be accepted at GUAN. For planning purposes this date has been accepted
as approximately 1

Para (B). The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces INDIA-theater will provide such assistance as is required for the ships: as outlined in 2C and 2D through bases in CHINA. Para (C), Operational. Vaccination against bubonic plague will be effected prior to this movement or enroute. Para (D). Direct communication between theater commanders is authorized. Para. Part 6. Report: (A) In addition to reports called for above and in references Part 1, the Commanding General U.S. Army Forces INDIA-BURMA theater will report by radio to the War Department, the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area and the Intermediate Theater Commander (if the vessel will call at an intermediate port) not later than 1200-00 hours after NO AB ARRIVE all ships the following information: (1)Ship serial number and letters of the units. Para (2), Total number of officers and enlisted personnel by unit (any female or negro officers and enlisted personnel will (group missing) indicated, Para (3). Date of departure. Para (4). Port serial number designated to the vessel, Para (5). Estimated time of arrival at an intermediate port (if any) and at destination area. (B) Cargo information will be in accordance with section 3 of War Department Technical Manual 33-12721 March 44, subject: Standardized supply and transportation information from ports of embarkation to overseas theaters.

Serial CPX 32812. Both east and west of the Jap-held corridor NANKONG-KONGCHIN are large number of Chinese troops and or guerrillas from whom supplies are not now contemplated in the approved U.S. programs. Para. Potentially they can be of great value in resisting further Jap advances, protecting remaining air field, disrupting lines of communications and aiding in possible future operations. Any equipment would aid them and Jap equipment would be particularly appropriate. Para. Logistically, air delivery from LUNON is feasible and fast with the further advantage that it will not create a drain on our hump lift already stretched to sustain the approved Chinese divisions. Para. The question is, what air transportable captured Japanese equipment is available, how much and where. All small arms, mortars, light machine guns, ammunition therefor and hand grenades are of principle interest to us. Para. Will you help us out by speeding the answer. If availability of equipment warrants, we will consider other details of the plan and discuss them with you.
TOP SECRET

ELENAU (GCT)

12 0237 CINC BPF to CINCPAC.

(PART 1)

FRASER to NILTZ. I find it now a little difficult to understand what is happening. 2. As directed by you we are trying to plan for ICHEX 3 but (A) We apparently have not been assigned to any command. (B) I am informed that the British Task Force is not available for early stages of ICHEX. (C) Cominc 92241 Feb 1945 inform that should have no communication with Com7thFgt 3. With regard to (C).

(PART 2)

the only communication I have had are (1) A personal visit on General MacArthur's invitation followed by a proposal to attach liaison officers. (2) A request to Cinc Soewap Area for the release of some Australian work personnel to assist on airstrip at UGAKI. (3) A request to Cinc Soewap Area to deal direct with Commanding General Far Eastern Air Forces over local air matters. (4) Other local questions in AUSTRALIA.

12 0245 Same as above.

12 0251 CINC BPF to CINCPAC ADV.

(PART 3)

Part 5 final my L20251. Such as accommodation in SYDNEY. 4. My only object is to try and bring the BPF into action on the dates you desired, but am beginning to feel a little frustrated. Time is getting short, the fleet is in SYDNEY, and I have as yet no air strip allocations at UGAKI. 5. Can you help and advise me if we are doing wrong. It hardly seems to me to be practicable to be based in the command of CinCPA Area without having communication on local matters.

11 0236 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC ADV HQ into CINCPAC AREA.

(PART 4)

SCOTT to TASKG. Due to time involved required retention SABATOGA (CV 3) for ICHEX and assign BATTEN (CVL 69) and ENTERPRISE (CVL 22) for training or retain only ENTERPRISE (CV 6) as night carrier for this operation. CVLs are not suitable for night carrier work and doubt if TICONDEROGA (CV 1A) could be trained or carry her weight as only a night carrier. All CVs available will be necessary as day carriers during this operation.

13 0210 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CINCPAC ADV Hq into CINCPAC AREA. CINCPAC ADV.

The seizure of an island in the DAIX SHIRE as a site for a Loran station will be eliminated as a feature of current planning. No forces will be earmarked for that purpose at this time except for the Loran equipment and its operating personnel which will be held in reserve for use at such time as its installation at a suitable site may be accomplished without use of important combat units. This cancels Phase III-a of ICHEX.
TOP SECRET
FEBRUARY (GCT)

13 1945 COMCHN & CNO to CINC PAC ADV Hq Info COMTHIRDFLT, COBRA AIR

In view circumstances reported your 090824 proceed with investigation
by Court of Inquiry when convenient.

14 0110 CINCPOA ADV Hq to CINCPAC Info COMTHIRDFLT, CINCPOA,
COMNAVCHINA.

To clarify situation in connection your 121A39. No copies of my top
secret serial 0005007 were sent to any agency in CHINA and it is un-
likely that ComNavGroup CHINA has knowledge of its contents. It was
paralleled by my 122013 January addressed to you and ComNavGroup's
170631 signed CHINA/CHINA understood to be your reply, Para 2. You
may be assured that my communications concerning forces under your
command will be addressed direct to you. Para. Reference to serial
0005007 in my G414 was improper and it is obvious that loss of
forward bases makes 14th Air Force unable perform tasks which FIVESOME
Agreement outlined for 20th Bomber Command.

14 0112 CINCPOA ADV Hq to CINCPAC Info COMBARDARA, LOCAL Hq CHINA.

Your 102205. All units of all services stationed at NORRMAN (INC JIMA)
must be under the military control of the Island Commander. Tactical
units staging through NORRMAN will remain under the administrative and
operational control of the organization to which assigned. The
Island Commander NORRMAN will be responsible for efficient operation
of all units of his military control. Mission assigned of units
mentioned your 102205 to such as to conform to foregoing.

14 0456 CINCPOA ADV Hq to CINCPAC, COMCHN, CHINA, THEATER FOB JIMA, CINC POA

ORANGE Task Force of 2 I3-10, 2 I3-2, or 2 M-24, or 2 I3-15 Class CA and 3
DD sighted and attacked with undetermined results by CIFA subs and
planes. Composite of sightings indicates speed about 15 knots. Last
reported 17/40 N 112-00 W, course 042, at 0430 (1)-9 February 14.
Estimate this force will continue advance through FORMOSA STRAITS
hugging CHINA Coast. Speed of advance suggests necessity reselecting
probable between JOM and GOGROH. Believe they will continue on to
homeland after fueling.

14 0759 CINCPOA ADV Hq to COMTHIRDFLT, CINCPAC, COMCHN JIMA, CINCPOA

Info COMTHIRDFLT, CINCPOA, COBRA AIR, COMTHIRDFLT.

In view of favorable possibilities of development at INDOMINAMBLE (INC
CHINA) and unfavorable terrain shown by recent reconnaissance of
KNOWLEDGE (INC JIMA) the latter will be eliminated from current plan-
ning and Phase III-b of FIVESOME is cancelled.
TOP SECRET
FEBRUARY (GCT)

14 2220 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMINCH & COMO:

Your 132020. The purpose of my 110043 to CINC BPF is to ascertain what requests he actually intends to make. See his 030223 quoted in CINCWPAC 100850 and para 3(2) of his 120251 which indicate an intention to undertake some construction with Australian personnel.

16 0419 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCWPAC INFO COMINCH, CINCINFE, COMDTHT, CINCINFE PAC, COMCINPOA

Para 1. CINC BPF 141300x Request approval now of the use of MANUS by the British Pacific Fleet as an anchorage for the augmentation of United States Naval carrier aircraft pools and personnel at MANUS by up to 50 British carrier aircraft with 4 officers and 131 men. Para 2. I will withhold any request for establishment of a British Mobile Naval Air Base (MMA/NAB) until receipt of your action on Para 2 of my 110045 and approval by the Commander in Chief United States Fleet of the establishment of the MMA/NAB concerned. Para 3. If facilities can be made available request also your approval of arrival British Liaison Officer and party proposed by para 2 of CINC BPF 141300.

16 0427 CINCPOAC ADV HQ to COMINTIFPAC INFO COMHITAC, CONGIRACFAC, CINCPOAC, CNO 10/17, CFP 53, LHA AND AREA COMMANDER 10TH, CFP 54, CFP 56, ADVANCED

Schedule of operations following Phase I of ICEBERG require rehabilitation of 4th and 5th Marine Divisions in Hawaiian Area rather than in MARIANAS following DETACHMENT. Assault Transoms now committed to DETACHMENT will therefore be employed as follows: (A) 1 Transom evacuate 3rd MarDiv to GUAM after which it will be routed to scheduled mounting point for ICEBERG as previously planned. (B) Other 2 Transoms may be used to evacuate casualties to MARIANAS or SOPOAC and will then be routed to scheduled mounting points for ICEBERG without being required to evacuate troops. Shipping for the evacuation of 4th and 5th MarDivs will be provided from (A) APA's and AKA's from 7th Fleet which were scheduled to return PEARL for overhaul, (B) APA's and AK's from 7th Fleet which were scheduled to return PEARL for garrison shipping, (C) AK's and AK's in garrison shipments number 0 and 1, (D) Additional spare APA's and AKA's from PEARL which will be sailed to forward areas immediately. Para. All of these ships except those in (C) above will be concentrated in UPLI and EMRATOK to be routed to WORKMAN as directed by you. Actual names of ships and arrangement for escorts will be provided later. Assume that landing craft which you leave at WORKMAN for unloading garrison shipments will be adequate for the reembarkation of these divisions. Decision as to which Marine RCT will be last at objective prior to the arrival of the 1/7 Inf Regt is left to your judgment but this alteration in plan indicates the desirability of selecting 1 RCT from the 3rd MarDiv which is committed and provided no other factors are presented.

16 0946 CINCPOAC ADV HQ to COMINTIFPAC INFO COMINCH, MARCORPS, COMMINTERPAC, COMINTIFPAC, COMINTAFPAC, COMINTAFPA, COMINTAC, CONGIFPAC, CC PUB BOLI EPFIFPAC, CC SOPOAC BOLI EPIFPAC, CC SOPOAC EPFRAC, CFP 54, CFP 56, ADVANCED

Rehabilitation areas as per 200006 modified as follows: (A) Following DETACHMENT 4th AmphibCorps 4th and 5th MarDivs return to Hawaiian area 3rd MarDiv return to GUAM (B) Following Phase II ICEBERG 3rd AmphibCorps 6th MarDiv to GUAM 1st MarDiv to Hawaiian area and 2nd MarDiv to SAIPAN. (C) Following Phase III to ICEBERG 5th AmphibCorps with 30th 4th and 5th MarDivs to PHILIPPINE if facilities are ready otherwise return to previous rehabilitation areas.
TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY (CET)

16 0919 CINCPAC ADV. to COMNAVAIRFOR, CTF. 77, COMFLT, 34TH FLEET, COMFLT, 24TH FLEET, CTF. 53, CTF. 23, COMAIRPAC.

Request WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48) and KITTHA CTF. (CA-36) be released in the report CinBac at WICHT and Robert on March 16.

16 1116 CINCPAC ADV. to CINCPAC ADV. CTF. 77, COMFLT, 34TH FLEET, 24TH FLEET, 53RD FLEET, 23RD FLEET.

Your 160069. Direct WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48) proceed immediately to WICHT as routed by WICHT at best speed of advance. Select 2 destroyers in best operating condition from 24TH, 34TH, 53RD, 24TH to report to WEST VIRGINIA as escorts. Advise WICHT if necessary and advise CTF. 53RD if necessary ETA WEST VIRGINIA on arrival report. Advise CTF. 34TH for duty in 24TH. Select retain escorts until further orders, since COMNAVAC 160135 passed separately to WICHT.

16 1112 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV. HG.J.

AARPA 0237. Reference is made to our CINCPAC dated 10 February, and your 1401112 February. In order to clarify status of units in question, recommends CINCPAC inform interested agencies as follows: (A) That the primary mission of the 34TH and 34TH Air Service Groups is to support 21st Bomber Command operations through activities in WICHT. (B) That the most effective accomplishment of mission of these units ComGenAIRCPOA will issue orders to 21st Bomber Command for administration and operation. (C) As set forth in (B) above, does not affect the overall responsibility and authority of ComGenAIRCPOA in regard to the command, general administration and discipline, and his authority in emergencies to take any action which he considers necessary in keeping with his responsibilities. (D) That control of these units will be vested in an officer designated by ComGen Bomber Command 21. (E) That in the interest of economy of effort, Commander Task Force 10/131 will deal directly with the Commander of combined service troops (in Bomber Command 21 Commander at WICHT as covered in (D) above) in utilizing means in excess of Bomber Command resources requirements to meet overall requirements at WICHT. (F) That ComGenAIRCPOA will assume responsibility to affect detailed implementation of the above.

18 0736 CINCPAC ADV. to CINCPAC INF. CTF. 77, CORPTAC, 13TH FLEET, 34TH FLEET, 24TH FLEET.

Due to revision of operational plans it is now considered desirable that rehabilitation and staging facilities in the PHILIPPINES for FPA forces in accordance with AILAC Agreement be made available for units as indicated below: (A) For Army: One corps of 3 Divs with elements arriving as follows: Corps troops and 2 Divs about 1 June, 1 Div by 15 June. Additional Corps of 3 Divs with elements arriving as follows: 1 Div about 30 June, 1 Div by 1 July. Corps troops by 15 July, 1 Div by 15 Sept. (B) For Marine Corps: One additional Corps of 3 Divs with elements arriving as follows: Depots and remaining units about 1 July. Combat elements during Aug. AILAC 050746 modified above briefly.

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19 0721 CINCSPAC AD H. Into CINCSPAC ADV H. COMNAVBASE.

18 0613 CINCSPAC ADV H. Into CINCSPAC ADV H. COMNAVBASE.

Part 1 of my 180619. Communications requirements at MANUS. References 1 my 141300 Feb. and 2 my 070347 Feb. During the period before the fleet moves forward from MANUS to operations W.T. THIAN will act as W.T. base ship establishing a fixed service with BILDCORP W.T as in reference 2. Then the fleet moves forward from MANUS the LOFTIAN will also leave. Fixed service will be discontinued and there will be no British W.T. base ship at this period facilities are required (A) For the Liaison officer (short title CINCO) to establish (Part 2) and 3 receivers to operate a British short wave and to copy BILDCORP W.T. radio sets will be provided. (B) For passing British traffic on existing fixed circuits maintained by radio MANUS. Existing US visual shore stations to install a small telephone exchange for the use of the BINC. Equipment for this will be provided but assisted with installation and provision of the lines to US exchanges is requested. (C) To assist in implementing the above British communication personnel will be lent where necessary to COMNAVBASE and the numbers in Para 8 reference 1 should be increased by 1 officer and 20 ratings. 51 additional seamen will be required to accommodate radio sets, telephone exchange and communication.
190743 CINCPAC to CINCPAC NW II. Info CINCPAC, COMPTL, CINCPAC NW II, GO AIR CO, FLEET.

This is part 1 of my 190741. For information with regard to para 2 of your 190741, (2) Mobile Naval Air Base #22 was designated to FON in the belief that the CINCPAC's acceptance of NF-2 carried with it an acceptance in principle of Para 2 of NF-1. (b) The present position of this NF-2 is as follows: (4) It's departure in mid-Nov in FON is on its way via NF-2 and is due at MANUS on March 15th. (5) All personnel are due sailed by 15th February and are planned to take passage in SHK to arrive MANUS by 11th March. Part 2 final. (6) If the NF-2 equipment cannot be landed in MANUS it will be necessary to divert this ship to NUKUSAN where her other cargo must be off loaded. (7) This will entail a considerable delay in the final establishment of the AF/AC. (8) It is believed that the early establishment of air facilities in NUKUSAN will considerably increase the operational effectiveness of the British fleet in whatever area the latter may eventually be assigned.

190803 CTF 51 to CINCPAC. Info CINCPAC NW II, ALL TECH, FLEET.

Summary number 2 190800 K. BCT 26, 25, 27, 28, and 2 Tank battalions completed landing by 1500. BCT 26, 27, 28, and 2 Tank battalions landed by 1500. A battalion artillery ashore by that time. Para. Initial contact was met with heavy enemy air and artillery fire. It was observed that the enemy had taken up positions on the beaches and boat lines with more fire in the area of airfield No. 1. Enemy fire was particularly severe on SHK and YANK beaches and developed greatly in intensity during the day. Fire was principal from the high ground on right flank although heavy opposition from hilltops in the vicinity of airfield No. 1 was encountered. Some land mines were reported inshore of several of the beaches. Para. At least 100 enemy tanks and tanks were destroyed by enemy fire. Para. The 5th MarDiv advanced rapidly across the island without a problem. No. 1 against light opposition. Gun crews left open the left side but were held up by strong positions. Fire along the eastern edge of SHK and YANK. Marines of the 5th MarDiv were light to moderate. Para. The advance of the 4th MarDiv across the open slopes to airfield No. 1 was severe and heavy casualties were incurred from mortar and machine gun fire. Para. Overall, about 30 percent casualties. YELLO 2 Beach party suffered 60 percent casualties. Para. Both divisions dug in for the night beginning about 1600. At 1700 our lines generally ran from TA 112 1 to 197 1 hence along west coast to 133 hence through 134 10 100 165 10 165 10 160 10 100 160 10. Our tanks are deployed in the vicinity of the airfield and TA 165 10 10. Para. 6CVNCHSC lines along airfield and north flank were considered insecure. Para. Intelligence information indicates enemy concentrating for counter attack during darkness. Para. Expect to resume advance at 0700 K-(16) on 20th. Para. Propaganda were dropped by B-24. Beach conditions in YELLO 34 were unfavorable for movement of vehicles. Beaches GYFF and BE were organized and receiving equipment and supplies during afternoon. Several boats broached and lost during AF. Para. Reports of troop casualties not yet received. By 1700 2130 wounded had been passed through hospital. Para. Very heavy naval gunfire and air cover were continued throughout the day in effort to destroy well concealed enemy field artillery and mortar, and machine guns as well as others. Para. Very heavy anti aircraft batteries and nearly all coast defense guns were apparently destroyed prior to H Hour. Strong illumination harassing and counter battery fire are planned for tonight. Para. Heavy enemy anti aircraft fire appeared only a few times during the day but modus and light was intense but insignificant.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY 20

19 1320 CTF 51 (SUMMARY NO. 2 - CTF 51)

2 planes were shot down 1 a TBM with 5th wave, observer from "KODAC" hit and 1 O2U from "THUNDER" no survivors. At 1635 BUNKER HILL TBM reported making a forced landing off the north coast but search failed to find it. Press TVM of VMF 26 in landing at 1645 seriously damaged its tail surfaces which require repair. Tapa: HAPLAN ill arrive 20th. Delayed report shows VICKERMAN (AVP L2) bombed by enemy planes 10.115. At 1100 feet altitude hit possible by 2 bombs all power lost, ship company 16 dead 3 missing 6 wounded. UDT 15 17 dead 22 wounded. On same night about 130 GUNLITE (AM) hit by bomb on same both fire rooms out leakage under control crew removed excess smoke. All tow these vessels to LST 74, 211 and 323 were hit by enemy mortar fire and suffered minor damage. No reports on personnel casualties. All tow to SAPIAN. Tapa summary shows of the 12 (13) in action against enemy on 16th, 10 were hit by gunfire while covering UDT operations 1641 474 sunk and 438, 441, 449, 450, 457, 466, 49, 471 badly damaged, Tapa, CIAKT, and STITES in collision at 190000 K. HICKEY W OTTO DIRECWUFAX holed but repaired ship operational. CUSTER badly damaged starboard boiler. Tail shaft possibly broken. Being sent to SAPIAN to Convoy 10 for repairs.

* 19 0025 CTF 58 to CINCIND AIO Info CO, CINCIND, CINCPAC, CINCIND. SERIAL OF TF 288.

CinCIndFleet: "JAMBOREE" enemy order 1046 Index J. Lifeboat subs requested as follows all dates inclusive. Stations listed in order of priority. TFVC F to F plus 1, SAPIAN 1, 2, new station designated A bearing 360 distance 30 miles from reference point. Odd days bearing 010 distance 30 miles from B-5, 3, 6. KOKAI subs A plus 2 to F plus 4. Stations 5, 6, 7, 8. KYUSHU subs F plus 4 to F plus 6. Stations 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16. KIRISHIMA F plus 5 to F plus 8. Stations 17, 18, 19, 12, 13. Changed in above requirements will be anticipated whenever possible. Recommended changes in zone classification: Baseline air surface F plus 2 through F plus 4. Baseline air surface F minus 2 through F minus 6. Furnace east of Longitude 139-00 Joint F thru F plus 2. Furnace west of Longitude 139-00 Joint F plus 2 thru F plus 5. Cargo air surface F plus 1 thru F plus 9. Store Joint F plus 2 thru F plus 5. Test and air surface F plus 2 thru F plus 11. Rooster Joint F plus 4 thru F plus 8. East Abandon East Abate East Abduct Joint F plus 4 thru F plus 9. Closet air surface F plus 3 thru F plus 10. Cupboard air surface F plus 5 thru F plus 10. Choco yard air surface F plus 4 AFT CO F plus 9. Corridor and entrance remain Joint Zones and Stable remains air surface.

19 2308 CINCIND ADV H.T. to CINCPAC.

Reviewing your OpPlan 4-45 in connection movement schedule your OpPlan 4-45 shows that carrier force will have only 7 days at anchor if both are carried. Do you consider 7 days adequate or do you contemplate eliminating or shortening of some strikes now planned for period L minus 14 to 1 day? It is agreeable to us to leave those questions unanswered until JAMBOREE is underway but consider that they must be answered sooner or later. I do not desire to delay ICEBERG.
TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY 27

2012 GMT

CONFIDENTIAL

GEN. CICERO, US NAVY

INFO CTF 51, CTF 58.

Turner advises considerable uncertainty existed latter part of January
as to whether 24th Corps could meet GC HANCO date. Request date Corps
can definitely meet. Any delay affects current plans of CTF 51 and 58
for DETACHMENT.

2006 GMT

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO CTF 51 to CONFIDENTIAL INFO CTF 51 CTF 58.

Summary number 3 201100 K (-10). Occasional accurate bursts of enemy
artillery and mortar fire on beaches during night. About 20000 K enemy
numbering 100000 on beaches. 3 shelled airfield A against right wing of
the 5th MarDiv but attack broken up by Rocket 75 at 200014. 3 K. Some supplies landed
during night. 2 cruisers 1000 delivered illumination bombarding and destruc-
tive fires during night. Tara. After strong naval and air bombardment our
attack commenced about 0945 K against very strong enemy opposition includ-
ing heavy artillery and mortar fire. At 1200 K our lines from air appear
to be from TA 132W to 132F thence along coast to 18 C thence through 1820
1635 1800 1635 L. 1635 K. Tara. Many wrecked boats LVT's VUKA's and engineer
equipments along beaches YELLOW and RED. Due to gunfire and smoke
YELLOW and RED were closed and traffic concentrated on GREEN and RED.
In spite of this the critical supply situation ashore is somewhat improved.
Tara. SAVANNAH arrived for evacuation severe casualties. HAMMINS CHINO-
TAUGE and certain vessels by TG 51.4 arrived others phase TG 51.1 are
in waiting area. Tara. TG 54 met transports some landing craft
retired during night returned daybreak. Tara. Because of very heavy expen-
diture TF 58 will provide 4 additional cruisers during 21st and 22nd.
Tara. 3 or 4 enemy air raids 2 to 4 planes each approached to 10 to 20
miles last night but all retired on approach of our fighter. Red
alert from 1921 to 2050 K. At 0900 K THM from HUDYER BAY landed in water
10 miles to eastward all 4 occupants rescued by ASHLAND.

2008 GMT

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO CTF 58 to CONFIDENTIAL INFO CTF 58.

My OpPlan 4-45 too ambitious unless ICEBERG should be delayed for other
reasons. Your 102000. To insure readiness for ICEBERG consider it desirable
TF 58 have more time at ULITHI. Will do only DECEASED and DEVIATION part
of plan subject to DETACHMENT support requirements and enemy reaction. 2
base groups should arrive ULITHI 2 March and 2 about 5th.

2010 GMT

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO CTF 50.5 to CTF 50.5.3 INFO CTF 50.5 & 58. ALL TF 4 & TF 50.5.

As soon as staging facilities at JAO JIMA become available commence furnishing
2 plane Liberator offensive screen during daylight. Search for and
destroy enemy的小boat and planes in advance of TF 58 on F minus 2 to
F plus 3 inclusive. Track of TF 58 follows. F minus 2 start trip to
TOKYO via east of NAPOLOI. F day plus 1 strike TOKYO from vicinity
34-00 N 140-20 E. Retire night of F plus 1 to rendezvous with oilers at
1000 K (-10) F plus 2 pos. 28-30 N 110-30 E. Arrive dawn F plus 3
pos. 32-30 N 137-30 E for NAPOLOI strike F plus 3 F plus 4. Rendezvous with
oilers at 1000 K (-10) F plus 5 pos. 26-30 N 140-00 E. F plus 6 plus 7
and pos. 0700 K each day 30-40 N 133-40 E c. 325 K. 5 knots.
Communications VHF channel C 140.55 YO and normal search freq. Action ade-
notify info adequate plane calls.
Summary 4. 201300 K(610), Para. Troops continued attack throughout the afternoon meeting continuous mortar and artillery fire. Some rocket fire received on right flank. The 28th ATC attacking Mt. Thurston met stiff opposition. The 4th and 5th MarDiv ordered to consolidate and prepare for the defense of their front line positions at 1630. 7 battalions of division artillery and 1 battery of corps artillery are in position ashore and prepared to support troops. Attack will continue at 0900 K 21st.

Enemy units identified to date: 165th Inf. Reg., 310th Independent Inf. Bn., 311th Independent Inf. Bn., 312th Independent Inf. Bn., 313th Independent Inf. Bn., 2nd Artillery Bn. of 2nd Independent mixed Brigade, 1st Detachment ROK UDMA naval guard force, 2nd special Naval Landing Force, 123rd AA unit (a part of land unit of naval guard force), VNE UTUAI (a AA unit). Para. Front lines as of 1800 K were TA 132 M to 132 M thatence along coast TA 180 Y 181 Y 182 Y 183 Y 184 Y 185 Y to 186. Para. No reliable casualty reports obtained as yet. Para. Gunfire support continued by 1 BS cruiser D D 1 TBM 1 CI(US) using VOF planes for spotting. Rain, low clouds, and poor visibility afternoon hindered observation. Gunboats fired throughout day in the cliff area north of beach PUS 1 which contains many well camouflaged caves and is source of hostile artillery and mortar fire. Ammunition was replenished by 4 destroyers and 6 destroyers. Ammunition expenditure to date approximately 8500 tons. LST 216 damaged in superstructure by enemy shell which destroyed all radio and gyre. Vessel will be used to tow crimpls to rear. LST 59 and LG 354 each have 1 engine inoperative due operational causes. Scheduled and on call gunfire will continue throughout night. Para. Scheduled air strikes were increased by 45 additional planes from fast carriers. Afternoon strikes hampered by poor visibility. 1 observation plane to SC over target during night. 2 TBMs from SARGENT BAY (CV 33) on 203 failed to return to carrier. 2 TBMs from BOWINGTON (CV 29) collided in mid-air at 1015 with slight damage planes able to return to carrier. 1 crew member bailed out and was rescued by LEARY (DD 879). 1 TBM from BOWINT (CV 29) crash-landed 10 miles north of DIO. All crew members rescued by COTTER (DD 667). 1 PBM landed V15 and departed 1840 with press material and passengers. Para. BLISS and WHITCOMB beaches continued to be subjected to heavy mortar and artillery fire. Action is being taken to clear these beaches which are badly blocked by wrecked landing craft. The status of supply ashore is generally satisfactory. DUKWs and LVTs are unloading supplies on RED and GREEN beaches.

20 1314 COMARRIAL to CTF 58. CTF 58, 50, & 50, B. GORDON ADV H., Info ALL TF 4 TO CTF 58, 50, & 50, B. CROMBIE 13, DUCKIVS.

F day for JAMESBUR is 25 February my OPLAN 4-45 as modified below effective 0000 K(10) 23 February. Ships of TF 58 temporarily operating with TF 51. Less SARCOTTA (CV 3) DesDiv 103 VESPER 2 (CL 26) plus TUNI XAARLIS (CA 35) when released by CTF 51 about sunset 22 February proceed as TSG 58.1 CCR DIV 13 OTC to rendezvous with TF 58 and TG 50.8 at 0800 K 23 Feb. in Latitude 25-00 North Longitude 145-00 East. Special fueling unit remain in assigned TG 50.8 fueling areas departing in time to rendezvous with TF 58 at 0800 K plus 3 in Lat. 23-30 N Long 140-00 W. Upon completion fueling CTF 58 direct TG 58.2 and TG 58.4 proceed UNPRESS to arrive afternoon F plus 5 day. With TG 58.2 and 58.3 conduct UNPRESS strike and photo mission F plus 5 day. CTF 50.8 direct special fueling unit after F plus 3 fueling operate areas VALcour ROLLIN ENGINES BATT FY and rendezvous with TG 58.1 and 58.3 at 0800 K plus 7 in Lat 17-00 N 130-00 W. Upon completion fueling TM 58.1

-Continued-
20 1314 CONFIDENTIAL STG (C/11)

and 58.3 proceed to arrive ULIATHI afternoon F plus 9. Special fueling unit proceed arrive ULIATHI O700 K F plus 9. Para. CTF 59 modify his 19025 to conform to foregoing schedule. CTF 58.9 make arrival date ULIATHI to Port Director ULIATHI.

20 2209 CONFIDENTIAL Info GUMANA. 21004990109.

RJ 52505. While the assumptions stated in G2 GUMANA serial 00069 dated 9 Dec 44 to CINCPOA not to all adders or by all needed were not fulfilled in that 24 Corps has not closed up on KURUSHI until a week later than assumed, no information has been presented to CINCPOA by Compln 24 Corps or Compln 10th Army to indicate that the 24 Corps can be meet its presently prescribed mounting date for ICNRC reference oral inquiry Colonel Western China Staff.

21 0004 DESCOM AF 20 to CINCPOA ADV Info GUMANA 20. BACN 21. CTF 41. CTF 48. CTF 72. CTF 94.

21 0514
CINC PAC ADV II to CINC TH, Info CTG 52.2, SPA.

Your 200349. ICEBERG target date not expected to be delayed. Refer my 192308. Recent reports from 14th Force now reassuring.

21 1238
CTG 52.2 to CINC TH, INFO CINC SW, CINC NA, CINCPAC.

Preliminary report Task Group 52.2 left the Unit 52.2.1 under air attack from 1700 to 2000. SIRATOA hit about 1745 by 4 suicide and is now proceeding south 23 knots with situation under control. RENMARK (CVE 95) hit about 1850 on fantail by suicide, burned furiously with many explosions, and finally turned over in believed sink. Captain Pratt of RENMARK now in charge at scene picking up survivors. Escorts have been ordered return this Task Group after survivors delivered to beach. LYNX POINT (CVE 194) reduced situation under control. Effect on air operation unknown at present. 4 enemy planes shot down by ships' pursuit escort carrier group. SIRATOA and CAP score unknown.

22 0115
CINC PAC ADV II to CINC TH, Info CINC NA, CINCPAC.

Your 210636. Rocket boat sweep will not be made by 2-29 either in advance of TF 58 or as diversion west of longitude 125. 7-8 weather strike missions and major strikes will be conducted as outlined for TF 56.3 at 2000.4, later changed to date the group 0100.

21 0619
CINCPAC to CINC NA, ADV, INFO CINC SW, CINCPAC.

Part I of 210000. Complete report 1700 thru 1900 has not been received. Your 190051 to see only refers. Part II. Except for your 090000 February concerning a reconnaissance which was reported to you, no separate action has been taken with CINC TH, subject to the establishment of bases forward of 1000, as it is assumed that you will take such arrangements when required. Part II. In response to your 110045, D3, detailed requirements for TF 56.3 were forwarded in my 140000.

20 1651
COMINCH & CINC to CINC NA, (NIMITZ ONLY).

In view of the answers to questions 67 and 8 of enclosure (c) to my serial 00646 of 16 February to you only the question arises as to whether we should now modify our present concept for a HULAC operation to keep open a sea route to the Maritime Provinces possibly by considering the seizure of an island or islands in the north or central Pacific. This is being examined here and your planners should examine it likewise. It now appears in view of the Russian requirement that none supplies continue to move via the Pacific following Russian entry into the war that it will be essential to keep a sea route to the Maritime Provinces open. I desire your views and recommendations on this matter on the assumption that the Russians will not be able to control the BERING STRAIT subsequent to seizure and occupation of lower COURIN.

22 1635
COMINCH to CINC NA, Info CINC NA, (NIMITZ ONLY).

I am at a loss to understand why there should be confusion as to status of British Pacific Fleet. All arrangements for basing Brit. Pac. Fleets are in the hands of CinC NA including CINC PAC concurrence where appropriate and always bearing in mind that said fleet is to be self supporting. Further allocation of units of British Pacific fleet for operations remains in my hands. Part I of 211650.
21 1650 COMMING to CINCPAC (KING TO NUTT) Info 180112 180004

Past 2 my 211650, Part 1 was 211635. I cannot commit units of British Pacific Fleet to ICEBERG (involving 2 to 3 months) or any other operation until Joint Chiefs of Staff decide what operations are to be carried out other than those already approved. Requests now are that such decision will be reached by middle of March.

22 0116 CINCPAC ADV h to CTF 51, 221112 to INFO, 224151

2nd VarDiv is designated as Area Reserve for operation DETACHMENT under direct operational control of CINCPAC and should be prepared to load on 48 hours notice. Designation as Area Reserve DETACHMENT not to interfere with 2nd VarDiv prevarication for ICEBERG including scheduled reharsels unless otherwise directed by CINCPAC.

21 0358 CTF 58 to CINCPAC, STEHIT (180446) passed to 180414 38 0f 180004 for Info.

Your 192034. In view increased enemy air strength on KYUSHU and necessary early return Task Force 58 to HOKAI in lieu your modified 27340K suggest HOBART strike be carried out with K Day to 18 February unless Pky Command. Fuel area W 18 1300 22 February and of Lt 18 20 20 Long 136 00 00 at 0700 1 March arriving KYUSHU afternoon 1 March or morning 2 March. This keeps Task Force concentrated and will permit maximum effect on objectives in time available.

21 2917 CINCPAC to CTF 58: Passed to CINCPAC ADV by STEHIT 180446.

Appreciate advice and points made in your 192034 but consider it best to adhere to present plan of 192034. Destruction of enemy plants in the area remains our basic important objective if enemy air strength is to be checked at source. Events such as those that area late last night can be eliminated only by attack on source as well as on forces already in operation. I have in mind codification of ICEBERG 1st to cover ICEBERG (KYUSHU) first. I hope you will continue to make comments and suggestions freely.

22 0647 CINCPAC ADV, CTF 58 Info CINCPAC, info 180112 180414

Modify my 192034. After fueling P plus 1 day CTF 58 proceed with Task Groups 58.2, 58.3 and P 13 to carry out CTF 58 (58.4) strike and photo mission. Task Groups 58.4 proceed with CTF 58. Completes intends to return in LSP 18 1813 (28 35) to CTF 58 (STEHIT) about 28 February.

22 0801 CINCPAC ADV h to CTF 58, 221112 Inform CTFs 58, 59.

Strength of enemy resistance plus blemish in landing and distributing cargo, cause of which you know, may be expected to delay date when airfield will be activated and LST IV can be safely left without direct fleet support. This opinion is based on CTF 51 daily reports and on info of conditions ashore just brought back to me by Col. Jones and Kelly of staff. This situation is brought to your attention now as decision may be involved later as to whether LST IV will be left without adequate fleet support or a possible delay in readiness for ICEBERG accepted.
TOP SECRET

23 0145 CINCADA ADV H. to CINCADA Info GTF 73, CTG 93-3, COMPHLEF, DEPCOMAF, CG INTELSAT.

17 of 19 recent attempts by 20th Air Force to obtain photographs for ICBIERG have been abortive due to weather. Carrier reconnaissance cannot fill all requirements. Now a necessary expedient is, if it can be arranged to maintain temporarily a section of 4 to 6 PBY photographic planes of VDB at Clark or other advanced field for purposes of making photographic missions of ICBIERG (ICBIERG) area as demands arise. Liberator escort of 2 for each photo plane on a mission is considered to be minimum for reasonable safety over this area. To avoid overloading your facilities with my escort planes request you provide those essential to assist in carrying out these missions vital to the plan.

23 0640 CINCADA ADV H. to CINCADA BASE Info GTF 73, CTG 93-3, COMPHLEF.

Proposal ComGen 10 11 15 to provide 1,255,500 board feet of lumber and 3,600,000 square feet of corrugated metal for housing of 180,000 enemy civilians is approved. A drastic revision of concepts is indicated with full recognition of fact that enemy civilian population will thereby suffer. Hope and expect that at least in early stages of campaign the civilian population will be forced to continue as a change on the Japanese army rather than contrarywise.

19 2:02 COMAF 20 to BOMPAC 20 & 21, DEP COMAF 20 Passed by DEP COMAF 20 to CINCADA

(Telecon msg No. C-41-10 and H-19-3), "Subject: Target Directive. 1. The following directive is issued for your information and guidance and supersedes previous directives. This directive is issued to the 21 Bomber Command concerning the incendiary attack on ICBIERG. 2. The destruction of Japanese aircraft engine plants as part of the overall Japanese air power continues to be the primary mission of the 20th Air Force. 3. The 21 Bomber Command will continue the attacks on the principal Japanese aircraft engine plants. 3-A. The 21 Bomber Command's priority targets, until destroyed, are: (1) MATSUYA, HOKKAIDO (TOKYO), (2) HATASHI, HOKKAIDO, NAGoya. (3) ACHI ENGINE PLANT, NAGoya. (4) CHIBUSA Engine Plant 3-B. For secondary visual attack or for diversionary reasons, attacks may be directed against the following targets: (1) Selected urban areas for test incendiary attack as directed. (2) Principal aircraft assembly plants. 3-C. Primary targets for radar condition are: Target clusters centered on 90/20 - 194 NAGoya, 90/20 - 194 NAGoya, 90/20 - 244. OSACA, 90/17 - 32. 4. The secondary mission of the 20th Air Force is the support of planned Pacific operations. 5. The 20 Bomber Command, having ceased operations from CHINA bases except for photographic reconnaissance, will conduct limited operations from INDIA bases against strategic targets from SINGAPORE north to the limit of their range, employing both bombs and mines. They will also perform such missions as requested by the Southeast Asia Command as might otherwise have been performed by the 7th Heavy Bomber Command. 6. The 21 Bomber Command will make preparations to move to the YAMNAMAS by 1 April and 2 groups to move by 1 May."
"Following are answers to questions your 14/03. (A) Soviets estimate requiring 45 days after training on H-10, H-11, H-16, LCI and F3 types and about 30 days on other types. This time adjustable to local circumstances and adaptability of individual crews. (B) 1st group will arrive at 01/12 late March. Plan loading about 600 men on each returning Soviet Liberty ship. At present plan includes use of 5 Liberties all to arrive late March or early April. Names, departure dates, total personnel will be given as soon as plan completed. (C) Soviet Staff and Interpreter will arrive on 1st ship in March. Permanent staff for entire turnover program will consist of 23 officers probably headed by Rear Admiral. In addition there will be 9 substaffs of from 8 to 14 officers and 3 to 4 petty officers on each staff for turnover of particular types of ships. 3 of these substaffs will arrive with 1st group, 1 each for LCI, LC and all other types. (D) Turnover program will be completed. 2 other substaffs arrive later, 1 for landing craft, 1 for Frigates. Each substaff will return to Russia as soon as turnover of its particular type is completed. From 45 to 50 interpreters will arrive with 1st group. This maximum total staff will be about 105 persons including interpreters. Regarding visa procedure informed LINTERVY that group visa would be used similar to past procedure for subcommands but that due large numbers involved and fact that all personnel was from U.S. area. Soviet Navy at VO should submit lists direct to AECO Consult VO for approval. Will inform Rabansky here plus consul and AECO NAVO of requirements. If any change in the required advice, subject moving 3,000 men from VARIANAS via U.S., discuss and Soviets agree to drop it and send all via Pacific route. Question regarding 'Ts.' Request all 'Ts' be taken on deck cargo on Soviet Liberty at West Coast ports. ALAFIVOV arranges for foreign trade for this. Consequently no crews will be sent to CPO FOB for 'Ts.' Advice if this can't be satisfactorily arranged. Question on LCI's. Are LCI's now sufficiently to go to 'WYVANNAS' under own power? Should they be towed by LCI's? If neither practicable what type of transport available? Please give rank of U.S. officer in charge of station and advise to our pilots without question to avoid unpleasantness. Have requested LAFIVOV that he instruct Soviet Administrative staff that they can not take LCI's in charge of station and accede to our orders without question to avoid unpleasantness at other stations. He understood and agreed. "

Ref your Telecon K-20-2. In order to clarify our plan for staging the 56th Wing air echelon enroute to VARIANAS the following is a resume of the action taken by this command. (A) Arrangements with the Commanding General, CINC Theater have been completed and are still in effect for the staging of 58th with B-29s through WULIANG direct to the VARIANAS according to the following schedule: (1) 75 B-29s and 2 FJ1s from the 1st through the 6th April. (2) 5 B-29s from the 1st through the 6th of May. In addition approval has been secured for the staging of 4 B-24s through WULIANG and the PHILIPPINES about 1 March. (B) On 15 February radio TAR 37603 from Arnold was received which
stated that Cincpea recommended that move be staged through PHILIPPINES, preferred otherwise through CHINA. Considering this to be a directive of the President to stage through the PHILIPPINES if possible, this headquarters
sent CINCPAC O342-1 to CHINA with MAINTENANCE and CINCPAC was instructed which we stated
that we had planned to stage 4-27s only through the PHILIPPINES but that we were agreeable to staging 4-27s also through the PHILIPPINES if the Air
Bomber could supply and initial stock of 20 engines and 2 tons of replacement parts and maintenance equipment. Staging area we also stated our gasoline
requirements in the PHILIPPINES would be 150,000 gallons. CINCPEA. It is in
favorable to this headquarters whether to stage in CHINA or the PHILIPPINES except that arrangements with CHINA are already completed. If we stage the
PHILIPPINES there will be a saving in the gasoline that the CINC would
take the PHILIPPINES will have to supply for our stage. Requirements. We have been approached
on this point verbally by Air Service Command. The difference in tonnage is
D-27s however will result because the limiting factor of the amount we can
carry is space rather than weight. CINCPEA. In view of Cincpea's recommended
action forwarded by Arnold we are somewhat in a quandary as to what action
you desire, CINCPEA. Request that we be notified immediately as to your
desires in this matter.

25 0130 CINCPEA to CHRON, MAJ. AL. and MAJ. H. L. ADY II. CENTRE.
CINCPAC

30 0550 DETROIT to 35466811 INFO CHOSUN MAJ. ADY II. CENTRE.

26 0650 DETROIT to CHRON, MAJ. ADY II. CENTRE.

26 0725 CINCPEA ADY II. to CHRON, INFO CINCPEA. ADY II.
CINCPAC 501515 advises as soon as practicable by dispatch, total number
Army Service troops actually available for 23DA pursuant to JCS agree-
ment, number ordered to be transferred and number not yet ordered trans-
furred. Further request breakdown of units in these 3 categories be
available at 23DA Headquarters noon 1 March.

CINCPAC 50587. Reference CINCPAC 50696. At the time of the conference
which resulted in the 50696, a request for retention for rotational retention of
ships in the Southwest Pacific area for landing purposes was in excess of
200. By successive releases since then that number has been reduced to 129.
Concurrently transfers from other areas have been curtailing the
shipping that was available by the Southwest Pacific area can not
do more than strive to support its essential operations. It will
not therefore be possible to undertake the training and rehabilitation of
Pacific Command units or their support. It will therefore be desirable to
live within the limits previously established for allocation of adequate
land areas. If this were done the preparation of the areas, the
allocation of all supporting aviation, the providing of necessary
means for loading and unloading, the provision of troops and materials
for construction of any kind, and the responsibility for construction of any
type, would have to be undertaken by CINCPAC. Thus it is re-
quired that the allocation of the areas previously available in the
Southwest Pacific area be reduced by 200. All plans were based incremen-
tally so the necessity for the curtailing the assistance that was contemplated,

CINCPAC ADV H. 2610

TOP SECRET. KINO TO NSC. Concur action Ud74 2208013 in declining
particular proposal conference. Inter theater communications and the
allocation of radio frequencies Ud74 2208016 are primarily problems for
consistent arrangements by theater commanders concerned with the JCS settling
non-agreements which if of operational significance may require conference
in Washington.
TOP SECRET

CINCPAC  (CINCPAC)  (OCT 31  1944)

CMNTY (OTR)  28 0126  V.A. 1.2.1.  APPEAL  (JSTL)  18 75

SUBJECT:

I have requested that you make the following

1. Current Analysis  

Operational plans indicate the necessity of continuing the development of the 5th Field Force, which will be required at the earliest. In light of this CS, it is expected that the development will be completed by the end of the month.  

2. Information  

All headquarters personnel are to be informed of the importance of continued support of air operation by P-38s and P-47s.  

Information is being provided to all the various units to ensure that all units are aware of the importance of continued support.  

3. Distribution  

Distribution of information is being expanded to include all headquarters personnel.  

FIN CINCPAC  (OCT 31  1944)
27 2155 CONCERNING TO MARSHALL INFO CHINACO FROM H.

HJ53510. Transfer of South Pacific Base Command OVER-DYCS allotment to Pacific Area Areas in subject: References are: (A) JCS 036/5 (B) FIELD Agreement Chino-CoCINPAC dated 8 Nov 42, (C) CHINACO radio CX 10963, USG 920559 Feb. 1102); there are 3 problems involved in meeting constant recurring operational requirements for overheard: 1. Difficulty being experienced by War Dept in furnishing necessary troop basis vacuum because of ceiling limitations and requirements to meet operations in hundreds of higher priority. 2. Critical shortage of headquarters type personnel in IJA because of increase in headquarters which have been recently formed and augmented to meet requirements for approved operations. 3. Necessity for organization of headquarters in sufficient time to initiate efficient operational planning for directed operations and operations approved for planning, purpose. Para. 2. Solution is key to above problem until planed redeployment to positions and personnel current authorized. Operation overheard are made available to Pacific Area after the South Pacific Area is rolled up. No references (A) (B) (C) do not specifically provide for transfer of grades and personnel of South Pacific bulk allotment to IJA. However CONSIDER ABORT about 1400 grades and personnel created surplus have been approved by H. For transfer to CO marines, it would appear that in no oral or written of overheard as mentioned in reference (C) has already been furnished. Para. The operational requirements for overheard grades and personnel in IJA cannot be overemphasized. In view of the particular problems and augmentations current before the War Dept. COINCPAC conclusion are the unannounced requirements for COINCPAC as indicated the 920559/9 and all of them necessitate initiation of detailed planning immediately. Para. Request that the remaining portion of the Chino-CoCINPAC bulk allotment be executed from the terms of reference (A). Chino-CoCINPAC does not consider FIELD Agreement applicable to Chino-CoCINPAC allotment. In accordance this concurrence Chino-CoCINPAC has directed CONSCIN to initiate a request for Chief of Staff of Army to secure approval JCS to executing subject bulk allotment from provisions of reference (A) in light of conditions now existing in IJA.
01 0044  CONSELNO ADVISE to CTIF 33 Info: to 719th RSR 82 on 23 Feb

As of 5:45 PM, submitted is report in compliance with your radio RQ 53399 of 25 Feb and Chicago A.D.Radio 719/450 set. This report is divided into 3 categories. 1st category is Army Service Troops actually called to CONSELNO. No units have actually been called to CONSELNO on authority of FILBAS Agreement. However, the following groups of troops are listed for your information since it is considered these units may be related to FILBAS Agreement. 1st group is entitled to MILA as listed in your radio RQ 49516 of 23 Jan and radio RQ 35429 of 15 Jan. These units total 719th Army Service Troops. The Hq and Hq Det 301, 211, and 441, Watson 497, 3rd Laundry. To included in this group were earlier assigned to CONSELNO by NA S 46638 of 30 Oct 44, with specific designation given in our top-secret file to you file 370,5 dated 14 Nov. 2nd group is Army postal units moved to CONSELNO in accordance with NAAS 4604 of 17 Jan and Hq Dept 4th file 278,5 dated 16 Jan 45. Postal units called in this group total only 27 Army Service Troops since 11 Base Post Office has not yet been lifted.

The remaining groups of troops ordered to be transferred to CONSELNO pursuant to FILBAS Agreement. 2nd Category is troops not yet transferred. Total of 32743 Army Service Troops have not yet been transferred to CONSELNO pursuant to FILBAS Agreement. Units assigned by Hq Dept to CONSELNO by NA S 46638 of 30 Oct 44 and earlier arms are not included in above figures since it is considered that transfer of such units is not pursuant to FILBAS Agreement.

01 0135  CONSELNO ADVISE to CTIF 38 Info CONTACT:

Following is tentative assignment of units to CTF 38 for CONTACT. Carriers: CarDiv 1 less COMARS, COM CTF 38, CarDiv 3 less COMENT, ANDEVF. CarDiv 4 less Land COMAND. CarDiv 5 less COMAIR, COMCAT. CarDiv 6 less COMAIR, COMCAT. CarDiv 7, Total 11 CVL. Battleships: Battleship 1, 2, 3 less Land COMAND. Total 8 BB. CruDiv 10, 1, 2 GL Cruisers COMCAT, HICKORY, PITTSBURGH, SAN FRANCISCO. 2 CA. CruDiv 11 less COMAIR, COMCAT, WINEY. CruDiv 14 less HUNTINGTON plus 2 CTF 38, CruDiv 15, 6 GL Destroyers: DesRon 25 less ITALY, DesRon 47 less ROY, DesRon 52, 53, 54 less LAND, DesRon 50, 51, 53, 55 less HUNTINGTON, DesRon 60 less DesRon 61, DesRon 62, Total 73 DD.

02 0335  CONTACT TO CTF 5 Info CTF 5 0500ike 00.

Consider it may be advisable strike MILA 9th LST in next operation leaving ULTRA 1 day early if necessary. Request you prepare alternate plan on this basis including later strikes in order CTF 54 55 56 57 ORB 35 36 37. Discussion, the yfs present strategy seems to be to conserve forces by deploying on ground and await favorable opportunity all out blow. My principal concern is to achieve surprise in order to prevent withdrawal to fields to north thus permitting destruction high percentage of grounded planes.

3030
0622. Subject is 2 wings of VLR for NMVY NA (U) (NMVY NA). Para 1.
Cincpaa's serial 000534, dated 23 Feb 1945, subject: Establishment of
WIAH, Directives for Base Development Plan, indicates 2 airfields, 2
strips each; for 11 squadrons of VLR each airfield, or a total of 2 VLR
wings for the Island. This is over and above the requirement of 1 wing
for NID (NID), Para 1. AC/NA is tentatively scheduled
for 1 July 1945. It will require at least 30 days for completion of the
airfield. This will require a readiness date in the States of approxi-
mately 15 August for ground echelons of 1st 2 groups. Air and flight
echelons of the 2 VLR wings should be available to reach target area during
period 1 October thru 1 January. Ground echelons should have readiness
dates to insure their arrival in CONUS at least 30 days prior to arrive
of air echelons, Para 3. Cincpaa dispatch 200529 to this headquarters
calls for first constituent units, and designation if possible, by 10
March. If VLR units are to receive order priority on plans being formulated
for the Island, full information must be made available prior to 10
March as to tactical units and service forces to be committed for this local

28 0546 & 070917 TICO HS FIFTH TDH 10 19 MAR 1944, CINCPAC RAd MARRINAS,
APAC later passed 1607-7, ADVC.

UL 5558. Cincpaa Advon dispatch 1396203 XET of Feb 11 and APAC AWM
dispatch 169 of 2 Feb 45. Request your concurrence in the following
plan. A. Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas designated in "AALAN" is hereby designated to handle all details of subjects transfers.
In carrying out this responsibility the following principles will govern.
Sub para 1. All utilities, including water purification and storage sys-
tems, electric generators, and power distribution, which formerly were
operated by either 36 Bomb or 71 Service Group, will be turned over to
the Navy on a temporary loan basis. Sub para 2. Quarters will be
turned over on loan basis. Tent cities will be returned to NAV, unless
same can be reutilized by the Navy when subject units return to CONUS. No repla-
cement of tentage will be made by Army at CONUS. Sub para 3. Railways and
messing gear will be transferred on a temporary loan basis except all
organic messing gear and range which will accompany units on return.
Sub para 4. All aviation gas storage and distribution facilities will be
resubmitted to NAV on temporary loan basis. Sub para 5. All rolling
cargo trailers, motorcycles. These vehicles which are not retained by 36
Bomb and 71 Service Groups will be turned over to InCoa "AALAN" to be use
in meeting operational requirements or other Army requirements, Authori-
ty is given to interchange vehicles with deactivating units if vehicles ob-
tained from deactivating units by such transfers are in adequate condition
be shipped with serviceable vehicles. No vehicles will be returned here
which are not serviceable. All tank type vehicles will be disposed of
in accordance with existing regulations. This authority will be very
carefully exercised so as not to reduce vehicles can be made from this except for
those vehicles previously listed. Sub para 6. Floating and maintenance
facilities will not be transferred to the Navy, but will remain assigned
to the Navy Air Force. All floating depot repairshops and floating main-
tenance units at "AALAN" will be assigned to Air Depot" WAC for storage.

- Continued -
WTH. Commanding Officer Air Depot MM will make necessary arrangements with CinCne (Naval) for services needed from these floating units.

Subpara 7. Gunners, generators, and airproof caissons units, and other ships facilities which may be turned over to Navy are rendered serviceable by installation of central water pumps, island wide water distribution system, and central oil storage tanks they will be returned to Army ships as they can in earliest practicable rate. Subpara 1. The Navy will assume responsibility for all installation, maintenance, and repair of pipe and fuel distribution facilities to them. Subpara 12. All ASC and Army fuel storage facilities and equipment will be retained by the organizations concerned. However, all equipment and ordnance stored therein will be returned to the Army concerned. Subpara 12. Transfer of facilities and supplies to the Navy will be accomplished by the transfer of responsibility for operations. ASC will maintain until the establishment of earliest possible date by Com-Gen CTN representative in NAVALN. The transfer of facilities above action is necessary as reassignment cannot be made from BATU available at CBSC. Early concurrence is required. Upon receipt of concurrence, ASC will be guided accordingly.

02 0943 CONSIDERATION TO COMBATIRON INFO CINCIR (NAV) OPERATIONS CBSC

Recent prolonged operations under air attacks has led flying conditions have demonstrated the urgent necessity of increasing the allotment of RF: 31945. These flyable allotted an major share of support work accounting well over 90% of operations for 3 and 4 week periods with short rest interval before starting again. Alleged fact not definitely indicates increase from 34 to 37 RF: is necessary. Request this be accepted forth prior to next operation.

02 1912 THE STHN TO AMTRAC CINCIR (NAV) INFO COMBATRON ADV CINCPAC ADV

CINC 21 8407. Reference 211, 1912, 207. In negotiating F/T agreement this agreement was based on the proposal to stage 3 F/F divisions in the CINCPAC area. The fact that the 4th Corps would be supported from CBSC for TFMI II, had considered to be extraneous to the general proposals and as such was specifically treated in para 11 of TFMI II. Para. 11 refused and inadequate were not projected for early establishment in CINCPAC B-905 to enable CBSC to accept an in-flow of casualties of 3rd Corps during engagement in CINCPAC. Any key casualties only will be accepted at CBSC by air or water to be hospitalized threat or evacuated to CBSC CINCPAC hospitals as necessary to relieve presently over-worked CINCPAC hospitals.

02 2329 CINCIR ADV TO CINCIR

Following from 2112, ADV Eq., Reference employment of CBSC there is no change in situation. However, a conference on taking place at this in which employment CBSC is included for discussion. Before departure of Capt. Chief Staff for conference I emphasized to him that in possible event of original plan taking place CBSC was and would be ready in every way to assist in the case of CINCPAC not yet been asked for by CinCne but requirements appreciated at this headquarters.

3032
03 0219 CINC. ADV. To CINC. 4th to CINC. ANI. Info CINCPACAF. DRESS A. MILITARY. CONFIDENTIAL.

Desire 494 Bk. OI to be returned to our control. Cinc. will control later than 15 April 1944.

03 0316 CINC. ADV. To CINCPAC ADV. CINC. JAPAN CINCPACAF. CINCPACAF CINCPACAF.

No photo flights of note at this time. Arranged and completed with EUC for 5th AF to fly P5 photo planes over Kiyotaka and nearby islands in addition to our coverage your CINCPACAF. Flights will be staggered to insure best chances on weather. Clark Field only field still suitable for Liberator operations and no avgas will be available prior to 10 March. If that will be available for Liberator operations in our future we recommend flying there instead of optical because of shorter flight distance.

03 1319 CINC. ADV. To CINC. JAPAN CINCPACAF. CINCPACAF CINCPACAF.

Central 020539, Cinc. Pearl 021920. Propose sortie 301121 or March. East Long. Date. Request FAA to liaison. Will be advanced if practicable.

04 0417 CINC. ADV. To CINC. JAPAN CINCPACAF. CINCPACAF CINCPACAF.

CINC-4262, Ellsworth can give immediate coverage and cover target on 26 Feb. of area within 700 mi. of Koya for weather report toward Korea as directed. Will you forward date you desire to begin these operations. Reference further note to recon mission to CINCPACAF SEA and western approaches to Koya. JAP. as directed by Arnold. by reference of CINCPACAF in Top Secret radio. YAMA for commence from Arnold dated 20 Feb. In order to conserve time it is highly recommended that these missions be combined to reach JAPs to accomplish both projects during period minus 10 to 1 plus 10. If you concur we will provide weather observations without fail.

04 0430 CINC. ADV. To CINC. JAPAN CINCPACAF. CINCPACAF CINCPACAF.

Neutral shipping has reported that Japanese ships encountered in the STRAIT of KOROMO are aligned. Exact location of ships is not known. This has resulted in access by submarines to profitable shipping. In the JAP. Request you conduct repeated reconnaissance of STRAIT OF KOROMO as early as practicable and continuing for sufficient period in order to determine precise routes used by Japanese shipping through these straits.

04 0836 CINC. ADV. To CINC. JAPAN CINCPACAF. CINCPACAF.

Your OIM. Current and future plans based on JCS directives issued and in prospect as well as defensive plans of positions already under our control including the 21STAF AIRPLANE are being reviewed. In this latter the base of operations currently assigned to 21STAF is to be reappraised in their withdrawal for operation to VIAR area. In view of the employment of such groups in important operations about to be undertaken he desires these to be no reduction in their efficiency.
11536. 5th Fleet conducts ICESTORM operation in accord with 5th Fleet Op Plan 1-45. All addressed areas apply. Forces 34th in support this operation. 25th. The Commander Allied Air Forces while conducting present missions will: 1) continue until further notice sectors 5 to 10 inclusive search plan J to minimum practical distance effective 144. 2) furnish support indicated in Commander 5th Fleet Op Plan 1-45 annex B para 2(c)(4,5,6). 2) Destroy hostile shipping and naval forces along the INDO CHINA—WTH Coast and deny their movement toward Empire waters within limit of capabilities and without detracting from requested specific support as set forth above. 3) Direct communications as required is authorized between the Commander Allied Air Forces and Constiflit and designated Task Force Commanders. 5th Fleet for initiating and coordinating offensive screen to be provided and coordinated and execution of strikes in the CHINA Area. 4) The Commander Allied Air Forces will: 1) report to this headquarters by 07 March tentative strike schedule during the period 1-16 thru 1-27 to include estimated strength of forces and type of planes employed. 2) Effective 1-28 report to Constiflit and all Task Forces 5th Fleet strike intents in the CHINA Area including targets, number and types of planes involved giving 24 hours notice as practicable. 5) Since 20th Bomber cannot perform missions indicated in Op Plan 1-45 Annex 3 Commander Allied Air Forces will assume responsibility for such assigned with Bomber in the CHINA Area as indicated in para 20 (5) and 31 of Annex V to Op Plan 1-45.

04 0950 CONSTIFLIT to CTF 58 Info ALL TPS 01.4-5.

Task organization your 260630 approved with following modifications. TG 58.1 delete LITTLE; TG 58.2 substitute ENTERPRISE for SHREVE. Add CRAGGS, Split relieved by CAGGS. TG 53.3 delete STURDY. FLIGHT jobs: LITTLE, delete HUNTS, TG 58.4 delete ENTERPRISE, ATLANTIC, BIRTH, BADGER, NORTH, TWIN, CRAGGS, ENTERPRISE, ALASKA, DESDIV 107. Probably not present during period 1-27, trim and ENTERPRISE, LITTLE, FLIGHT. DESDIV 107 may not leave TICO JASS until about 15 March and will require time for upkeep replenishment at TICO before joining. You are authorized to shift cruisers and destroyers per JT as considered advisable to equalize strength of groups. Assigns to ENTERPRISE, LITTLE 2 above subject to your concurrence. New subject: In connection your planning. By 02/25.

Note that in basic plan Appendix C 5th Fleet 1-45 insufficient time is allowed between departure USN and arrival 1st launching position.

05 0313 CINCINAPA to CINCINAPA ADV 1, Info ALL TACP 50 FORCES (FOLLEA) ADV 1.

11532. Refer your 030197 CG 49th Base Group can be returned to your operational control prior to 15 April. Request an early advance notice as possible of date of return designated by your headquarters.

05 0450 CINCINAPA to CINCINAPA ADV 1, Info ALL TACP 50 FORCES (FOLLEA) ADV 1.

CINCINAPA 0683. Reference Cincos Adv By L>The SUT tab quoted below: "To CINCINAPA ADV Info TACOM WORFLI, TACOM BOMBERS, CINCINAPA, ENTERPRISE, CONSTIFLIT. Your 160530, your proposal is understood to be (1) that an Inland Commander exercise his responsibilities for air bases thru the - Continues -
TC: SECRET
CASS (607)

05 0650

SHERMAN C. M., 2ND LIEUTENANT AIR (EC)

(Cont’d).

Junior Army Air echelon Commander present who will have on his staff an
officer acting as executive assistant for air bases. This arrangement
would avoid setting up an additional air base commanders staff. (2) That
each individual air field for which the Army is responsible would be Com-
manded by the senior officer stationed at the field. Para 3. Since the War
Dep't. does not desire to provide personnel for the staff of Air Base
Commanders at LEMAN Jan is reminded of the command procedure outlined
above will obtain at NAMUR and at "DENMARK" air bases for which the Army
is responsible. (Para 4. To initially exercise Army command responsibilities
as approved in these messages until arrival of a service air echelon.

AARMA 0689. For your information the following message was sent to Comb. 20
reference (Ref) MACAP 07726. As a result of a request from CINCPAC
forwarded to you, note, for protection of troops from Japanese attack, location of airfields is
not known. This has received additional attention to profitable air traffic
in the Japanese air attack. An initial request for contact and with reconnaissance of TAIWAN
is being carried on as early as practicable and continuing for a sufficient
period in order to determine fixed roads used by JAP. shipment thru the
strategic CINCPAC. Reconnaissance report is approved and HBG 21 be
directed to contact the necessary reconnaissance until desired information
is obtained or this reconnaissance no longer interferes with prime mission of US Air Force. Do Not.

05 1400

SHERMAN C. M., 2ND LIEUTENANT AIR (EC)

Although have great confidence in CAPT J. A. Comdranc and CIN 57 as en-
trely reluctant to accept views expressed former's 06615 and as very
hesitant to acquiesce in recommendation made. Necessity for efficiency at
Early is particularly appreciated but importance of operations about to be
undertaken in the prosecution of the war in such that employment of a
Carrier Air Group that may have been used in our battle-worn role of
will afford to reduce our striking power in a campaign of such moment. It
Please give further consideration to our letter and present foregoing
views to responsible commanders concerned. Unless capabilities of group
mentioned are reduced below that which reasonably be expected after 3 months
of operations (even though they have been strenuous months) desire CAG
to participate in coming campaign at least in the initial stages. Carrier A
Groups have repeatedly shown not only courage and capabilities of the
highest order but they have also displayed great stamina when their serv-
ces were needed. Consider that CAG's group should be able to make val-
uable contributions in the attacks on the enemy during the next few weeks
and desire that it be so employed unless definitely unfit.
CONFIDENTIAL. This memorandum presents a request of Conson 10 in his capacity as Director of Plans to SCAP for action to be taken in the consideration of the matter of operational control and administration of all Army Air Forces Units under his command. The memorandum is addressed to Conson 10 and is considered to be of a confidential nature as the subject matter is classified under the heading of "Operational Control and Administration of Army Air Forces Units." The memorandum is dated March 15, 1946.

The memorandum requests that Conson 10 be authorized to take action in the matter of operational control and administration of Army Air Forces Units under his command. It is requested that he be authorized to take action to ensure that all Army Air Forces Units are operated in accordance with his instructions and directives. The memorandum also requests that Conson 10 be authorized to take action to ensure that all Army Air Forces Units are operated in accordance with the policies and procedures established by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).

The memorandum is signed by the Director of Plans and dated March 15, 1946.
question "Where is the Imperial Navy". Similarly no open their inner fortresses and homeland is under attack. In the vast ocean areas that are frequently traveled and where vessels are deficient to stop possible an undetected r-2o, Intelligence is not sufficient to give advance warnings. Pacific Fleet will begin offensive operations that are more likely to keep enemy forces from the homeland. An air attack on CAP, PHANGAI 30 could be made. It is highly improbable.

26 0630 GTF 68 to CAPTAIN

Suggested TF 68 organization Sep. 30th 30, TO 52.1 - ANTRIM (F), WICHITA, BELLEAU WOOD, MASSACHUSETTS, INDIANA, FRANKLIN, KANSAS CITY, SANTA CRUZ, SAN JUAN, SEATTLE 61 and 25, TO 52.2 - FRANKLIN (F), ST. ALBANS, INDIANAPOLIS, OAKLAND, TO 52.3 - Bunker Hill (B), RANSOM, BATAAN, CAGOT, NEW JERSEY, SOUTH DAKOTA, PASADENA, SPHERING, ASTORIA, WASHINGTON, INDIANAPOLIS (if present), FLINT, COMO 62 and 60, TO 52.4 - TERRIER, OGA (F), TERRITORIAL, ENTERPRISE, INDEPENDENCE, LAMBERT, WISCONSIN, MISSOURI, ALASKA, GUAM, ATLANTIC, DULUTH, SAN DIEGO, Seattle 56 and 47. If one Section must be given up suggest Seattle 60. CAGOT scheduled to go back for overhaul. Does this include all ships assigned TF 68.

05 0617 GTF 68 to CAPTAIN Info COMO 62 to GTF 68 52.4" CERTAIN. GTF 68 training schedule to include all TF 70.

Your GTF 68 not to all new needed. Proposed exercise U.S.K. 25 March, Final dates 19-27 March, Fleet 3000 29-30 March, April, May 16-20 March, replacemt 0700 March 16, 30 new. 30 March 15, 20 new. On 24-26 March northern portion city on 25 H-120 R. On 25 March 56.1 and 56.4 routes starting from position 51.3. CHINA 30.6. Route 52.2 and 52.4 replace SA new areas HUMBE, beginning 25 March 2 groups strike HUMBE CHINA daily from 0600-2200 March 15-20, 0600-2200 March 21 and 22, 0000-0600 March 23. Strike 2 day period while SA is replaced. Route 52.1 and 52.4 replace first 2 day period while SA is replaced. Route 52.1 and 52.4 replace first 2 day period, beginning 0200 March 25 new to area HUMBE. Thereupon 2 day replacement period beginning 0600 March 26, 1100-2200 March 27, 1100-2200 March 28, 1100-2200 March 29, 1100-2200 March 30, 1100-2200 March 31. This period is subject to future consideration depending upon status of U.S.K. Agreement and requirements. Cagot FOA following U.S.K. rearrangement, Direct communication between Cagot FOA and Cagot FOA in making final arrangements authorized. References not to all or needed.

ComFOA-30-30 takes facilities available KAMAI requested your U.S.K. Feb. Your 312291 Jan and Charmes Adv 312296 Feb refer, Let Cagot authorized to use KAMAI facilities. Reh. 312296 Feb refer. U.S.K. Beyond this period is subject to future consideration depending upon status of U.S.K. Agreement and requirements. FOA following U.S.K. rearrangement, Direct communication between Cagot FOA and Cagot FOA in making final arrangements authorized. References not to all or needed.
06 1140 GROUND TO GROUND ADV HO. PARA 6, GROUND, FIFTH, HOMER, GUY, WRIGHT, WRIGHT, MILITARY.

This is part 1 of my 061140. Formerly 061140. Para 1. Para 2. 4th Submarine Flotilla (MAIDSTONE) comes under my orders on 1st April and is hereby reported for duty. Request confirmation of continued assignment to Southwest Pacific Forces. Para 3. 4th Submarine Flotilla (MAIDSTONE) comes under my orders on 1st April and is also hereby reported for duty. Request you take propose assignment of this Flotilla to Southwest Pacific Forces.

06 1145 GROUND TO GROUND ADV HO. (SAME AS ABOVE).

This is part 2 final of my 061140. Previous part 061140. Para 4. Para 5. 4th Submarine Flotilla consists of duty ship MAIDSTONE and submarines MAIDSTONE, JAMAICA, JAMAICA, ZWARODNIK, SINDAR, SEDIN, SEDIN, STURM, STURM, STURM, STURM, STURM, STURM, STURM, STURM. Para 5. 4th Sub Flotilla consists of duty ship MAIDSTONE and submarines TERRAPIN THROUGH THEKYNO SUPREME THULE THURSDAY. ROQUE WA SPOUT RETIRE TAYTY TIPBO TIPTOE PARADY.

06 1149 ADVISE to RICHARDSON, IGNO HINTZ, LIND, HAMIE, SMITH, IROKO WING (RAAF).

(WAIT 1429). Requirements for 2 additional Very Heavy Bomb Wings for MAIDSTONE in your 0642 dated 2 March 1945 have been considered. (A) Assumed here that 316 Wing will be deployed in HARROWING (ARIZONA) and 3 groups converted from 316 to Very Heavy Bomb; 1 group retained in HARROWING (ARIZONA). (B) Further action now being taken to secure approval for assignment of 2 B-38 to the Very Heavy Bomb Group to 31 AF and deployment to WWA. Assume that this group will also be deployed to HARROWING. (C) Next step in increasing number of Very Heavy Bomb Groups in Pacific Theaters called for reassignment of 8 heavy groups from Europe for conversion to Very Heavy Bomb Groups in the United States and further deployment to the Pacific Theaters. Holders take plan firm enough to permit you to operate base development plans immediately. Assignment of 2 additional very heavy bomb groups for MAIDSTONE. (D) Readiness of converting groups reported to in 5 above present following readiness dates for both air and ground echelons in the order: 1 on October, 1 in November, and 1 in December. Partiality of those 3 groups from Europe dependent on JCS and CINCPAC approval. (E) Supporting Army Air Forces Service elements can be provided. Due to critical shortage of Army Service Forces Support Services, difficulties may be encountered in providing complete Army Service Forces support, however, every effort will be made to meet requirements based on the readiness dates of combat elements in D above. (F) To increase efficiency of very heavy bomb groups, each group to be augmented by 6 US Aircraft plus 3 reserve and 1.7 crews after each unit has been operational for 6 months. This augmentation to commence in August of this year.
071235

CHAPMAN

0721235 to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC AND HQ, GAY, CINCPAC

My OIKI 50 possibly optimistic as to time of evacuation 5th Group and 5th and 5th Marine units towards ground. This is the result of recent small advances. Consider this should stay home. We need to save. Not until evacuation. These troops accomplished. Paracel will be able to reach. 5 OVE at present as once of troops support must be given training as first to supplement and then replace 503 aircraft after 11 March. At that time 51 P51s and 10 VMI will be here. Recommend retaining ENTERPRISE here until night of 11th if possible. Paracel will be on AGS until organized resistance ceases. Paracel. Believe stopping up will require considerable time.

073139

CINCPAC AT HAWAII to CINCPAC BOTH HQ INFO CINCPAC

Until further instructions are received base fuel estimates for British Pacific Fleet on training and passage between ports. No contact operations during Phase 1 next operation.

0730

ENTERPRISE VIA CINCPAC AND HQ to CINCPAC

Your 071235 approved subject to developments a general toward carrier release of ENTERPRISE group if night fighter opposition is ready to take over.

081330

ENTERPRISE to ENTERPRISE HQ to SOUTH A (ADM, GENERAL MEMO)

Bats 2713300, Plan request for 3rd Phase INDIAN 2500 arrive 1 Mar 45 for 5th 4th Marine unit. 2500 arrive 1 May 45 for 6th Marine unit. 2500 arrive 30 May 45 for 7th Marine unit. 2500 arrive 1 July 45 Translant Center and 8th Marine unit. Translant Center request to be confirmed 2500 arrive 10 July 45 for 2nd Marine unit SAIKAN 2500 arrive 20 July 45 for 8th Marine unit. 2500 arrive 1 July 45 for 1st Marine unit NAVAL. 5000 arrive 15 August 45 Translant Center and 8th Marine unit.

0800

CINCPAC HQ to CINCPAC AND HQ INFO CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR

Your OIKI 50. Appreciate your confidence in my judgment and I believe that I have as great an appreciation of the importance of future operations as that expressed in your OIKI 50 and fully agree that we can ill afford to reduce our striking power, however, I cannot agree that the substitution of a new unit Carrier Group can in any way compensate for the first Air Group of the ENTERPRISE and SHANGRI LA. Your attention further invited to the fact that ENTERPRISE has only night planes equipped and trained for night combat which in the past has proven to be the most necessary asset for the night carrier operations. Although my opinion has not been altered I agree that we can ill afford to reduce our striking power in a campaign of such moment and importance.
07 1945

All members in this message are thousands of enlisted Seabees. Current ceiling of 272 cannot be raised and authorized induction rate precludes lifting of Seabees before April 1946. Totals available for overseas employment worldwide will not exceed the following. For March this year 152, April 154, May 196, June 198, July 200, Aug 202, Sept 204, Oct 206, Nov 208, Dec 210, Jan next year 212, Feb 214, March 216, April and thereafter 218. Minimum of 7 is required for ATLANTIC and EUROPE. For June 1945 will be about 60 in Seaweed including those on loan and about 131 in FOA including坆need for Seaweed. Totals available to Seaweed will reduce those available to Atlantic to 60 by April 1946. Therefore total available for all FOA operations will be approximately:

July 123, Aug 125, Sept 127, Oct 129, Nov 131, Dec 133, Jan 135, Feb 137, Mar 139, Apr 141.

FOA 1945 includes all CB CB Specials CMB miscellaneous detachments and headquarters units available for work overseas which appear necessary to cover all present and subsequent Naval and Marine operations enroute to and for final defeat of JAPAN. For the duration of COB units now on station in the Pacific aggregate 197 which exceeds total available and accordingly many units are under strength. Additional units requested by addresses and now formed as said transportation from the U.S. aggregate 32 making total 229 of which only 191 will exist by June and only 198 will exist by following April and thereafter. No indication here that any under this para are for operations beyond INDIAN 2. For this reason it will be necessary to adjust magnitude and rates of construction work and projects to suit foregoing allocations or to accomplish work with any of local civilian labor. Note your proposed CB deployment and relief schedules on basis of foregoing also its effect on approved commitments.

08 0001

Current total casualties and probable delay in returning same from occupied areas the 4th and 5th 1946 require minimum total of 250 efficiency and Seaweed enlisted arrive at FRAY earliest practicable date for June 1945. Similar to be composed similar to battle replacement drafts. This request is in addition to my 070151 Z/S to Seaweed that you sent and my 242239 to Seaweed, advise BTX West Coast.

08 0600

Dispatch 070102 OGT 21. Bases not held by you recommended that until sterilizers with times of 4 months or longer are available authority be granted to lay mines 25, 25M6, 26 Med 1, 26 Med 112, 36, 36B2 without sterilizers. Present short time sterilizers make frequent re-laying of minefields necessary. Sterilizers not required in 5 months. All magnetic mines capable of being swept by own forces. All mines with A-2 and A-6 mechanism will be laid with present short time sterilizers, 5-month sterilizing mines will become available in near future and will be used for sterilizing all mines of time requested by Theater Commander. Request authority to lay in all magnetic mines without sterilizers in forthcoming operation at STRAIGHTS. Further request information as to future sterilizing dates that may be required for any mining target grids. Refer to later Seaweed top secret letter of 28 February 1945 subject: Target Grids for Operation STRAIGHTS.
08 0530 JUNIPER ADV HQ to CONSTEL.  

My 0530 and CTF 58 060010 will defer action until receipt your recommendation.

08 0730 23 BONCOM to DEFCOM 20AF Info JUNIPER ADV HQ.

III 04/2. Subject: VLF operation in support of KORUS. In accordance with discussion between representatives of Ginomco, DepCom 20AF, and 23 Bonsen on 7 March 45 the following operations by this command are proposed. 1. L-62 to L-10; Maximum operations against KORUS. 2. L-60 and L-10: Photo reconnaissance of KORUS SHOTO, with particular attention to KORUS KOREL, if requested by Ginomco. 3. When requested: Reconnaissance for enemy pickup boats in specific areas desired by Ginomco. 4. L-10 be L-3: (a) L-30 or L-9 (depending upon weather); attack against KORUS for installations, as selected by Ginomco, if visual bombing is possible. Under radar bombing condition attack will be made against NAGASAKI or OMURA. (b) L-6 or L-9: repeat reconnaissance above plan of attack. 5. 10:10 to L-5: Mining of SENNOSAKI STRAITS with 1500 mines which is estimated will effect complete closure for 4 weeks. 6. After L-5: Full scale operations against KORUS will be resumed.

08 0903 JUNIPER ADV HQ to CONSTEL. Info CTF 58.

21st BonCom is prepared to conduct picket boat sweep in conjunction with carrier strikes in KORUS. If these operations desired in lieu of possible similar sweep by TG 50.5 request recommendation detail timing and location.

08 1445 JUNIPER ADV HQ to CONSTEL.

Refer BonCom 21 080730, DepCom 20th AF will be advised that Item 2 is not required. Advice if Item 3 is desired and if affirmative specify area to be covered. Comment on Item 4. Early reply is requested in order to permit firm arrangements with BonCom 21.

02 0135 CTF 51 to CONSTEL. Passed to JUNIPER ADV HQ.

According to present information TP 51 will be assigned for forthcoming operations ships requiring escort: 8 CBB 12 cruisers In OVE KOS transport types (not including area reserve) 163 LST 112 LSM plus several miscellaneous types. For this number of ships I consider the minimum proportion of escorts is as follows: 2 escorts for each OVE or a total of 32 escorts. Considering initial fire support requirements 1 and 1/4 DDs are required for each CBB or cruiser for each transport type or a total of 94 escorts. For each LST LSM LCT Group the minimum is 1 DD and 1 DD type or a total of 10 DD and 10 DD type plus all assigned 16 10 type plus reserve minesweeping units. Para. Based on this ratio total escorts required are 171 DD type whereas your 221,159 assigns 128 DD type, Para. There are 27 groups for movement in TP 51. Groups been consolidated for movement even to the extent of moving units to objective before actually required, Para. Due to early movement and initial screening requirements it is considered essential that the western landing attack group have a strong escort thus further increasing the need for an adequate assignment of escorts, Para. Due to the extensive and early minesweeping required 25
is not practicable to consider minesweeping as available, except for reserve units, for escort or screening duty until some time after 1 day except at night. Furthermore, APD's assigned for troops or UDT's when available for screening are required early at the objective and initially are not available for area screening, Para. In view of the foregoing it is requested that additional escorts be assigned, Para. It is proposed with your concurrence that the 4 DE new assigned to the Northern Garrison Group be assigned to the Southern Attack Force and be returned from the objective unless provision can be made for assignment of escorts from new construction or escorts returning from overhaul, Para. It is requested the following additional APD be assigned TP 51: HORSE DIAMONDO CHASE CREED EATEN, KINGNESS SIMS STRONGHOLM and such of following whose material condition permits participation GEO E BADGER CLEMSON SANS GOLDSBOROUGH DICKERSON HERBERT RUMPHREYS GYTON CROSBY KILLY MANLEY OCHST and TALENT, Para. With the assignment of these ships there will still be a deficiency of 16 escorts assuming that escorts for Northern and Southern Garrison Forces are provided from escorts returned from the objective or from other sources. It is requested that efforts be made to provide TP 51 with the 16 additional escorts from TP 58 and rear areas.

080920 CTG 51 to CONSTRUCT Info CTG 51.

Your 072050, Shore night fighters have taken over at objective but can not do so in carrier area. Recommend ENTERPRISE remain for that purpose, end. CHICK CHorns supporting troops and cover for ships present. Request your reply go for action to 0705 51+41.

081942 MANDATORY to GF PNPAC Info CINCPAC BOTH NO. COMMON & GEO.

Explain request UrDis O60011L 15,000 battle replacements furnished each Corps prior to DETACHMENT. Latest casualty figures 5th Corps approx 16,000. 7900 battle replacements ready 1 April for 9th Corps, 9000 replacements planned for arrival Transient Center Niihau 01/41. 1 July, 5th Corps returnable wounded of 5th Corps be transferred to 3rd Corps at Guam to allow diversion of 39th, 40th, 45th and 46th replacement drafts to Hawaiian Area and cancellation of request UrDis O60011L.

090355 URDIS APPROVED to CONCOM 21 Date CINCPAC ADV HQ.

(NMR 07732). Your 090730Z (OUT) approved.

090748 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CONCOM.

CINCPAC 061140 passed separately. Recommend assignment of 6th and 8th Submarine Flotillas to 7th Fleet as of 1 April as agreed in NO-1 page 2 para 6.
TOP SECRET

OCR TEXT:

26 1036 CGT 52 2 to CGT 51 Info CGT 52 COMAIRPAC.

CONTAINMENT PHASES FOLLOW:

03 0613 CGT 53 to CGT 48 Info COMCIGS.

ContainFit 260 036. ComAirPac 130 036 states NPS dates of COM's west coast area:

All dates April: HOOGATTAY BAY 2, MANILA BAY 3, KENNEDY BAY 6, KITMAN BAY and SALAMANCA both 17. Also expect the BLOCK ISLAND and possible the GIBRALTAR ISLAND should be NPS during this period. Due to the protruded nature of the "TERRITORIAL Operation consider that as many of these CVEs as practicable should be made available as rotating reliefs for the CVEs now assigned and
to bring forward if found necessary replenishment pilots aircraft and aircr

05 0120 CONTAINFIT to CGT 48 Info COMAIRPAC.

Advised present for action to CINCPAC both HQ Info COMCIGS.

Concur with CGT 52 2 030613 particularly as to feasibility of making 1st 3 CVE's available during Phase II with additional CVEs for Phase III. Recommen
dement plans be made for early employment of new construction and overhauled CVEs to replace losses from battle damage and operations and to provide reliefs.

08 0945 CONTAINFIT to CINCPAC both HQ Info COMAIRPAC, COMCIGS.

CGT 52 2 03 0613 and COMPHIBSPAC 05 0120 passed to you. Concur in recom

08 2317 JOINT SECURITY CONTROL Info near HHB HUAMONG KANGI "C" CECCOM. CINCPAC

AID 02 03 CO, ROYAL 25 FEBRUARY 20 AP, ANGRAHAN COORDINATE 0301 1940 for Info.

WAR A 49 090. Para 1. In view of forthcoming transfer of 20 Bomsen from

INDIA SAGSHA has requested approval of: (A) Exceptional, indicating that 20

Bomsen will remain in SEAC until 15 June 1945 as follows: (a) That strictest security

precautions be imposed to prevent arrival in FARMA JUS. Para 2. Subsequent

changes of cables between commands and agencies concerned has resulted in

unnecessary cabling: (A) SAGSHA request that 20 Bomsen remain stationed in

SEAC until 15 June 1945 and (B) Security measures of air movements as follows:

(1) VARIED FLIGHT BY SINGLE AIRCRAFT. (2) Radio silence to be maint

ained by aircraft except in distress. (3) Departure and arrival airmail

transmitted over high level channels preferably Telexco. (4) Radio traffic

level between BomCom 20 and all stations to be maintained at present level

until 15 June 1945. Para 3. All concerned please cooperate in all possible

execution these measures which must necessarily be controlled by BomCom 20 in collaboration with SAGSHA and CO USF INT. Information except

all communications with respect to this subject should be furnished to Joint Security Control. Para 4. SAGSHA please keep JSC currently informed

of all implementation measures taken (5 code word covering above features

will follow).

09 1337 CINCPAC (AW) to CGS FAP Info CG FAP. CONTAINMENT PHASES FOLLO

CONTAIN, CINCPAC.
09 1337 CINCFOA (NASH) TO CINCFOA INFO CONTPLAN, CONTPLAN, NASH (CONT'D)

northward about 1 Sept. The dates on which the other groups will be needed will be furnished as soon as practicable.

09 2999 CONTPLAN to CINCFOA Info CINCFOA ADV, CGT 50.6, CTF 52, ALL THE TP 68.

Planned TP 68 track from 0600 I(-9) L minus 25 position Lat 28-50 N Long 135-50 E to 0945 I(-9) L minus 14 Lat 30-00 N Long 133-50 E. Request airstrip be swept of maximum practicable width not to exceed 40 miles each side of track. Desire sweep to be undetected if possible and to be completed at latest practicable time but not less than 200 miles in advance of passage of Task Force. Request your proposal.

10 0939 CINCFOA ADV NO to CTF 52 Info CONTPLAN, CTG 31, CGT 51, CINCFOA ADV NO.

Ref Orkla top secret 0940/17. Request photographic reconnaissance KIHEIKI NITTO and KEINE SHIMA on or about LOVE minus 9. Make photo interpretation to determine accurate location of new military installations and report findings by dispatch to CTG 51.1 prior to LOVE minus 7.

08 0211 CONTPLAN ADMN to CINCFOA PEARL NO Info CINCFOA ADV NO.

Read Sherman top secret memo of 25 Feb. concerning movement of Marine Air Groups from LEXINGTON to IMPROMPTU and subsequent allocation Field 1 for carrier aircraft. In order to provide ready available replacement aircraft for carriers in LONGWIND operation required provision advance echelon of ACORN to arrive LEXINGTON (OKINAWA) concurrently with assembly and loading of materials for forward movement by MAV-31 at Field 1. Acora equipped to take over field operation upon landing of ground personnel and equipment of MAV-31 and to assist in maintenance Marine aircraft remaining on field during interim prior their departure. Thereafter to receive and issue only ready carrier aircraft at rate of 300 per month, maintaining a pool of at least 200 such aircraft to ensure availability at all times. Acora to be augmented and CASU added at later date as appropriate to support carrier groups. Assuming new housing and facilities furnished MAV-31 will remain on field until initial increment Acora estimated to involve 1020 personnel and 9235 HT equipment from West Coast to TESI north. Shipment later completion and CASU estimated to involve 596 personnel and 930 HT.

10 1400 CONTPLAN to CINCFOA ADV, CTG 52, Info CONTPLAN, CINCFOA, CONTPLAN, ALL THE TP 58, 68, 52, NO.

This is change 2 to my OpPlan 1-45. Change 1 not to all. Make following changes in Annex E, Cancel Tab 1 to Appendix 1 and substitute the following schedule:

TP 58 sortie from ULIUH I minus 15. Commence fueling 19-2000-22-000 at 0700 L minus 16 course 345 speed 20. Strike KYUSHU air installations L minus 14 and L minus 13 from approximate location on line between 20-000 135-500E and 25-000 133-300E to southwest corner area KYUSHU passing thru 27-000 129-100E at 0700 L minus 12. Refuel and return commenced L minus 12. At 1300 L minus 10 commence run into 25-000 128-000E PW strikes at OKINAWA JUKASIMA, JUKA Groups and KIHIMA DJITO. Present plan is for full TP strike L minus 9 and L minus 8 and thereafter alternately 2 TP strikes daily while remaining 2 refuel and return. Refueling and returning in area ENKITEI thru L minus 5 thereafter in area GLOWWORM until L day. If strike on FORMOSA or KYUSHU should be

- Continued -
necessary between L minus 9 and L day information will be promulgated by
dispatch. Para. 10, 5 furnish offensive screen to cover fast carriers
L minus 16 and L minus 15 and during retirement on L minus 12 and fueling
in area BLYCIA L minus 11 and L minus 10. Other missions remain as specified
Para 2 (B)(2) and substitute following only. 21 Remarks: (A) Attack HINELS
on L minus 5 or L minus 1 and on L minus 1 or L day instead of days as pro-
mised Item 4 in 1st BOMCOM 00/730 not to all. (B) Time SHERMAN STRAIT L
Minus 5 to L day. Para. Softwase: Delete last sentence in 2C(2), General
2C(2)3A, 2C(2)3C, 2C(2)4A, 2C(2)4C. In lieu of cancelled requirements
request PAK screen (interdiction) for carriers fueling and remaining general
area BEETLE from L minus 7 thru L minus 5 and area GROWLER L minus 4 thru
L day maximum implementation CINCPAC 01/0626 of Feb not to all will fulfill
balance of requirements. Para. Request for lifeguard submarine services
be separate dispatch. TF Commanders pass to subordinate commanders who re-
quire.

110205 CINCPAC to MCDONPAC MCDONPAC MCDONPAC
This is Part 2 & final. Part 1 was 111023. Application of 1Pr of Easyer No.
762 will result in unknown number of evacuates. Best estimate available 2880
replacements on 080011 required to rehabilitate 4th and 9th Divisions over
and above returnable casualties. 2500 battle replacements mounted out each
Division already absorbed on target. Para. Intention to change as required destination and employment of replacements other than those sched-
uled direct to Divisions on 010151. Para. Consider retention present phase
2 year rotation 3rd MarDiv and other 5th PhibCorps units only alternate
if you cannot comply on 080011. Para. For your information our figures indi-
cate 897 officers 1484 enlisted now attached 3rdPhibCorps will have complete
24 months overseas by 30 June and will require replacements in addition to
battle casualties upon withdrawal Phase II and II ICERSON to conform rotation
policy. Force troops not attached either Corps and supply service date
not included in above figures.

111033 CINCPAC to MCDONPAC MCDONPAC MCDONPAC
This is Part 1 of 111033. 30000 replacements available your 011032 dis-
tributed as follows: 2500 to each 7th 6 Divisions and mounted with them
6250 diverted 2nd MP BN 1st MarDiv 2nd MarDiv 6th MarDiv and Pearl to bring
organizations to 7/0 plus approximately 45 prior mounting and accomplish
rotation. 3750 new JUNO as operational reserve DEPACT 2500 in MARFIN
3940 45 and 46 to Guam operational reserves Phases I and II ICERSON to
accomplish rotation 3rd MarDiv 3750 now JUNO plus returnable casualties and
2500 presently attached that division required. To complete rotation 3rd
PhibCorps units other than divisions will require additional 1500 over and
above all current requirements. Destination Pearl. Consider this dispatch a
firm request for battle replacements mounted out with 5th PhibCorps 3rd Phase
ICERSON and is confirmed by your 011032. Para. Necessary evacuate missions
from MARTANAS provide space ICERSON casualties. Have requested Champan 4th
Eq expedite evacuation mission number 4th and 9th Division returnable
casualties to Pearl for return to those Divisions.
Cite AX-70016 which is your 101620 1(-9). British carrier participation cancelled. If later scheduled you will be informed. See to 101400 Info CINCPAC BOTH NO. COMPA S. CHINA.

120011 CONGENAAPFOA to CINCPAC ADV Hq.

AAPFOA 0827. Reference AAPFOA 020452 OOT March relative to release of 494 Bomb Group Heavy from operational control, and MacArthur's OOT313 OOT March which asks as much advance notice of possible date of return desired by Cincpac. Recommend PEARF be given firm date of termination of operational control of 15 April 1945.

120345 CINCSTPA Info CINCPAC ADV, COMALLIED AF, ADV ECH CHQ SSHA.

G1 12042, Reference is made to 5thPlt operation Plan L-45, para 2(C)(1) of Annex E. Following is strike schedule in support of OTOOK for period L minus 16 thru L minus 7: During nights of L minus 12 thru and including L minus 9/8 2 special radar Liberator will be over FORMOSA and L will be over SAKISHIMA GUNTO. On L minus 16 and L minus 15 the daylight strike on FORMOSA will be made by 3 groups of heavies, 2 groups MCHI and 3 groups of fighters. From L minus 14 thru L minus 7 strikes will be continued using 2 heavy groups, 1 medium group and 2 fighter groups MCHI for L minus 14 and L minus 13 strikes time over target will be from 1200 to 1400 3/(-9). FORMOSA strike intent is to be forwarded 24 hours in advance. All strikes will be made in accordance with latest intelligence on Japanese air force disposition.

120426 CINCPAC ADV HQ to ROCON 21 Info ROCON 20 AF. CONTINUE.

Refer your 0445 timed 0807/30. Items 2 and 3 will not be required. Desist timing your Item 4 be changed to L minus 5 or L minus 4 and as L minus 1 or L Day and timing your Item 5 be changed to L minus 5 to L Day. Your Item 6 change timing to read after L Day. Comment.

120752 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC PEARL Hq. Info CONGENAAPFOA.

Reference URTD 082222. Plan for covering movement 4th & 5th MarDiv from IWO to HAWAIIAN Area and indicating their continued presence in this area should conform to following pattern. Assuming divisions are withdrawn from IWO about 18 Mar. movement to Hawaiian Area will be made under complete radio silence. This radio silence must be continued until about 26 April. Under no circumstances will divisional units be operated on radio silence and all traffic to and from the divisions will be handled thru PEARF with use of call signs of the 2 Divs. In order to give plausibility to this pattern both Divs should send to the MARIANAS enough of their signal personnel and equipment to maintain a minimum of routine intra-divisional traffic in that area, IWO traffic to and from the divisions simulated as being in the MARIANAS will be handled by the personnel located. Divisional call signs for this traffic will be used. About 15 Apr Divs will be placed on radio silence to indicate movement of these units from the MARIANAS. About 2 weeks later the Divs in the HAWAIIAN Area can break radio silence thus indicating the completion of the move from the MARIANAS. It is not practicable to indicate by means of...

-Continued-
radio traffic of the 4th and 5th March to the presence of 2 new divisions in the HAWAIIAN Area. Comment,

13 0022 CONAIR-SHPA to CONAIR 5, CONAIR 13, CONAIR-WESTPAC, CONAIR-SHPA, CONAIR-WASH, CONAIR-CHINA, CONAIR-ALLIED NAVAL FORCES. A kill order.

AX 70278. This radio in 7 parts. Part 1. CTF 58 has changed OpPlan 1-45. Fast carriers will not strike FORMOSA unless required. Here is revised schedule: CTF 58 depart UJITHI 14 March, refuel 16 March Lat 18-30 N Long 137-40 E. Strike KYUSHU southern Japan 16/17 March. Proceed to SW corner REDHOG where refuel 21 March. On 23 March strike OKINAWA, SAKISHIMA and ANAMIT GROUPS from position Lat 25-00 N Long 129-00 E. Beginning 25 March 2 TCG continues strikes from position E of OKINAWA while 2 TCG replenish SW CORNER BEETLE until 27 March when replenishing will be done in area GLOWORM alternating groups on strike. All groups 1-11 April strike OKINAWA. 9th Flt will notify if they intend to strike FORMOSA after 23 March, Part 2. CTF 58 attack 7th Flt while continuing present missions will furnish FBA missions against enemy search planes and patrol vessels to cover fast carrier movements stated above within capability, will give cover for convoy escort LANTA to LEGIONAIS (OKINAWA) from 20 March through 31 March, will continue as directed by 5th and 13th AF extending sector coverage of search planes J and will give FBA screen interception for area RIBERLE on 25-27 March and area GLOWORM 28 March through 1 May. Part 3. CTF 58 while continuing present mission will make daily strikes against FORMOSA and will provide diversionary strikes on FORMOSA and SAKISHIMA GUNTO as determined in 9th AF radio R5853E. Part 4. Within capabilities and without detracting from above missions all forces will destroy aircraft shipping and naval forces along CHINA and INDO CHINA Coast and deep their movement toward empire waters. Part 5. CONAIR 5, CONAIR 13, and CONAIR-WASH are authorized direct communication with TF 58 for coordination of missions. Include all IJNMSO support missions in daily intents and daily reports with information to military headquarters. Beginning 1 April include CONAIR-58 and CTF 58 as address to receive intents and reports. Desire 24 hour missions strike if practicable. Part 6. 20 Bomber will not perform missions assigned in Annex C paragraphs 2c(5) and (6) of R5602 OpPlan 1-45. Part 7. These instructions cancel all previous directives this TBD for support IJNMSO Operation. Desire earliest recommission of revised plans each force incorporating changes. Acknowledge and pass to subordinate commands who require. / these

13 0547 CONAIR-ALLIED NAVAL FORCES 24 to CTF 58 Date CONFIDENT.

Ref: OpOrd 2-45 see 00029 4 March 1945. If you strike WINGPO Area request you secure photo reconnaissance of areas 306 and 307 as outlined in Chinese top secret letter 31 Jan 1945 serial 000187.

13 1200 CONAIR 13 (LETTE) to CONAIR-ALLIED NAVAL FORCES. CONFIDENT. CONAIR-CHINA, CONAIR-ALLIED NAVAL FORCES. ADV ORD SHPA, CONAIR, CONAIR-WASH.

Cite R5602. Be Allied Air Force die AX 70278. 13 AF will support IJNMSO operations by continuing search plan J and by furnishing cover from LANTA to LEGIONAIS (OKINAWA) within our area of responsibility commencing 25 March.
13 1215 COMCOMM to CINCWPAC, DECEMBA 20.

X-13-10. Reference your Telecon message H—9—3, the following is our plan for operations in support of ICEBERG. If L minus 22 to L minus 10: Maximum operations against HONSHU. 2. L minus 5 or L minus 4 (depending upon weather): Attack against KYUSHU air installations, as selected by CINCPOA if visual bombing is possible. Under radar bombing conditions attack will be made against NAGASAKI or OKINAWA. 3. L minus 1 or L DAYS: Repeat Item 2. 4. L minus 5 to L DAY: Mining of SHIMOKOSHII STRAITS with 1000 mines, which it is estimated will effect complete closure for 4 weeks. 5. After L DAY: Full scale operations against HONSHU will be resumed.

13 1204 COMCOMM to CINCPAC ADV. CONTINENT. CTF 72. COMAFAPOA CHINA.

07/1/62. Prelude to ICEBERG. Beginning 21 March until 5 April single plane daily search of EAST CHINA SEA area from Point A at 30—40 120-90 ranging over sea area and returning over point N at 50—90 120-50; average altitude 1500 feet. Estimated time over water from 2307 CDT until 0518 OCT. Using CINCPAC ASR SB-1A section K-6. Frequencies 4475 kHz and 140,000 kHz. Per CINCPAC's recent instructions received PTXZ in another system no in flight sighting reports will be broadcast, at time of original sightings. Upon interrogation at home base urgent dispatch will be sent to NWP via CHUCKING Navy. Please acknowledge concurrence.

13 1621 CINCPAC ADV. HQ to CINCPAC Info COMAFAPOA. CONTINENT. CTF 58.

Subject SWPA support for ICEBERG. Your CX 23735, timed 020626 February your 11926 timed 040311 and CX 12042 timed 120465 all refer. See also ComAFA APAX AX 39833 timed 062315 I and Com5thFt 1031600. In interest of mutual understanding recapitulation of prospective SWPA operations is desirable. 5thFt plans are firm and further notifications not expected except for possible pre-LOVE Day strike on FORMOSA if required. Per 16 February 1962, May 5thFt42 may proceed changes about L Day, (2) Offensive PTXZ screen against enemy search planes and patrol vessels to cover (A) Advance of cruiser groups from LETTE to LEUMINHOS (OKINAWA) from L minus 12 thru L minus 7 thru L minus 5 and in area GLOWGTH from L minus 4 thru L DAY. (2) Flight diversion monitors against FORMOSA and air installations at JAPANNAI CHIBO on the nights of L minus 12/11 thru L minus 9/6. (4) Neutralization of enemy air strength on FORMOSA by daylight attacks on air installations from L minus 16 until LEUMINHOS is captured. (5) Destruction of hostile shipping and naval forces along the INDO CHINA Coast and denial of their movement toward Empire waters as practicable without disconnecting other supporting missions. Confirmation or correction is requested.

13 2050 CINCPAC PEAL to COMAIR into CINCPAC ADV. HQ. CINCPWA.

Recognising desirability facilities concerned to make BFM self-supporting request Comair set on CINCPIF 120713 and 120748 passed separately. CINCPAC has no information of plans for and has made no arrangements for any British base in the PHILIPPINES.
13 2107 CONSC/MPAC to CINCPAC BOLW MG. Info MARCORPS COMMAND.

My 060011 and 120013, Request battle replacement drafts 39, 40, 45 have destination changed from GUAM to PEARL. These drafts needed immediately for 4th and 5th MarDiv. Intention to send minimum 3750 personnel requested my 060011 to GUAM to form operational reserve Phases I and II ICESCAP.

13 2053 CINCPAC to ETOFO ADV HQ, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Your 120004. Though still anxious to carry out Mosquito attack at a suitable opportunity occurs I do not wish you to raise the question at this moment unless Cinpace himself brings it up. As I expect an early decision concerning the operation of the fleet. AS G for your information it would take approximately 1 month to mount the operation at MANUS. This notice cannot be materially improved without holding the Mosquitoes in readiness at MANUS which I do not wish to do at present unless there is a good chance of their being employed. J. Please come and see me whenever you consider it advisable.

14 0015 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCWPAC Info CONGENAAPPNO, CONVINCANDAIRAREA, LCSN AIRNCO.

Your 090913 March. Firm date 15 April 1945.

12 0925 (A725) AAPPNO, Aircom to CINCPAC PEARL. Info CONGENAAPPNO, BOMCOM 21.
14 0512 Passed by CINCPAC PEARL to COMPOFAREA, CINCPAC ADV HQ for Juko.

A725. Present indications are that completion of mission operational facilities at Northwest Field GUAM on June 1 and July 1 for 58 Wing is doubtful and this is causing serious concern. Reference is made to CompoFarea 090901 UTC Feb. 1945. Request confirmation these dates so that 20th AF can be assured the flow schedule for 58 Wing to GUAM and simultaneously the 315th Wing to TINIAN will not be disrupted.

14 0414 BOMCOM 21 to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info DEPOCM 21.

X-14-3. Message: 1 Reference is made to your 120426. 2 The changes in schedule will be made. 3 This confirms information sent to CompoAF 20 in msg 131215 and to DepoAF 20 in msg 131212 copies which were sent to your Hq for information.

14 0714 CINCPAC ADV HQ to DEPOCM 21.

BomCom 21 131212. Purpose of KYUNI strikes by BomCom 21 in support of ICEBERG is to harass Japanese air operations against 5th Fleet. Measure of carrying out this mission will be left to your discretion. Your preliminary planning, arrangements have been made to supply you with all available intelligence relating to KYUNI air installation. Any information received from TF 58 strikes will be passed to you immediately. Designation of target priority will be furnished you prior to strikes. Please advise deadlines.
14 0750 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC, CONCERT. CONCERT. CTF 48, CINCPAC FWD.

BomCat 21 operations supporting ICEBERG follow: (1) Attacks on KYUSHU continue through L minus 10. (2) On L minus 5 or L minus 4 and on L minus 1 or L day attacks against KYUSHU air installations if visual bombing possible otherwise against NAGASAKI or OKURA. (3) Mines SHIKOKUSHI STRAITS from L minus 5 to L Day. (4) After L Day resume attacks on KYUSHU, Para. If radio silence conditions permit desire early and detailed reports of TF 38 KYUSHU strikes giving breakdown by airfields of planes destroyed and installations destroyed in order to assist in planning and target selection for BomCat 21 KYUSHU strikes. Nominate specific targets if you desire.

14 0752 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC, CONCERT. CONCERT. CTF 48, CINCPAC FWD.

Now appears British TF 113 will shortly be available for participation ICEBERG but will be subject to withdrawal on 7 days notice. More later.

14 0800 BOMCAT XX (IWMX GO) to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

AIR1 0852. Target designation priority and target material is subject. Reference our dis 131212 GO. In addition to specification of installation on KYUSHU information is desired as to priority of these installations and further request that all presently available target information including photographs be immediately dispatched to this headquarters attention A-2. Further request that this command be furnished on L Minus 12 day information as to any change in priority of targets designated plus information as to damage as result of fleet attack plus report on enemy aircraft and antiaircraft opposition for each target. Further desire copies of photography obtained during fleet strike which should be available on L=9 to be of use on the list of our projected attacks.

14 1205 CINCPAC to CTF 113 Info CTF 112 FMAS(A) VA(G), CINCPAC ADV HQ. ADMIRALTY

In accordance with instructions received from Admiralty you are to report TASK FORCE 113 together with TASK FORCE 112 to CINCPAC forthwith for duty in operations connected with ICEBERG.
14 0047 CONSPAC PEARL to CONSPAC ADV HQ. CONSPAC INTO CONSPAC ADV HQ. CONSPAC ADV HQ.

ConsPac 100428 not to all passed Richardson's R 55092 to Calloway to originator. Request that Army POA conference being called by ConsPac be governed by assumptions and plans set forth herein. Para. Assumptions:
(A) That PHILIPPINES will not be available for POA divisions until an indefinite future date. (B) That Army divisions redeployed to POA from STO and for which space is not available in HAWAII, PHILIPPINES or on objectives, will be held on West Coast for direct shipment to targets. (c) That deployment of divisions in POA will be in accordance with alternate plan chart No 2 of CinCPOA serial 0003026 of 26 Feb. Para. Chart No. 2
CinCPOA serial 0003026 considered firm relative future use SoPac rehabilitation facilities and movement of divisions thereafter will be approximately as follows: (D) 27th Div mounts for ICEBERG (See NAMD 261930 Dec) 28 March rear echelon to mount for ICEBERG as soon thereafter as transportation and loading echelons permit. (E) 41st Div to remain in NWW CAM as area reserve ICEBERG (See NAMD 032304 Dec) until needed therefor to terminate moves to HAWAII Area but not before 5 May. If 41st Div required in ICEBERG rear echelon to mount as soon thereafter as shipping permit for ICEBERG or HAWAII to be determined at that time. (F) If preparations for operations in North Pacific should be directed it would be necessary to send 98th and 61st Divs to ALASKANS for escalation. (G) 3rd Phil Corps troops and let and 6th War Divs mount for ICEBERG 32 March rear echelons to GUAM and HAWAII according NAMD 062646 Feb as soon as transportation is available but prior to 1 May. Para. There will be no further requirement for staging troops in SoPac bases following departure of ships in foregoing para and desired that roll-up of base facilities as directed in NAMD 0001023 (2 of which is modified by foregoing) be expedited.

15 0503 CONSPAC ADV HQ to CONSPAC ADV HQ. CONSPAC Into CONSPAC ADV HQ.

4435. 559th Fighter Group is now at OAHU, while 555th Air Service Group designated as supporting unit is now loading west coast for movement to OAHU. By War Dept action these units are assigned 20th AF and attached AAPFOA for administrative and operational control. Request your concurrence or comments on proposal to recommend to War Dept that these units be relieved from present 20th AF assignment and assigned outright to theater. Consequently, the 318th fighter group and 364th Air Service Group supporting, now at SAIPAN and projected for movement to LURAYDOS (SAMAMI), be relieved from assignment to theater by War Dept, assigned to 20th AF and attached AAPFOA for administrative and operational control in same manner as 525th Fighter Group and 555th Service Group are not attached. The objective in the proposed action is to simplify command relationships in theater as result could be to have the 3 Army Fighter Groups at LURAYDOS and INDESPERABLE (IE SHIMA) assigned 20th AF, while AREN Fighter Group held at OAHU to meet defensive requirements would be attached to theater.

15 0611 TF 112 to CONSPAC BOTH TO INFO CRT 112.7A(C) PHIN(A). PHIN(A). ADMIN.

I hereby report TF 112 and TF 113 for duty in accordance with orders received from CinCBBP. I have recalled ships from use exercises and expect merging 5th and 8th air squadrons from shore training. Anticipate TF 113 with supporting units of TF 112 will be ready by 1200K(10) 27 March to sail from SIBOW as you may direct. I would add that it is with a feeling of great pride and pleasure that the BF- joins the US Naval forces under your command.
15 0654 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC Info COMSUBPAC, COMCHL, CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL CONVALESCENCE.

Request use of Leyte anchorage for British Carrier Task Force and Fleet Train while participating in ICEBERO. No shore facilities required for the present.

16 0656 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 112, CTF 113 Info CINCPAC, CINCPAC COMSUBPAC COMREL.

TF 113 proceed to ULITHI to top off from US tankers in preparation for participation in ICEBERG. Advise by despatch prospective date departure. ULITHI. Necessary units of TF 112 may proceed as required to fuel rendezvous selected by you. Capt. E.C. Dower, US Naval Liaison Officer assigned TF 112 now enroute from PEARL to MANUS. If practicable please send a representative to GUAM by air immediately. Para. Arrangements for use of Leyte anchorage by TP 112 and 113 will be made separately.

15 0658 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSUBPAC Info CTF 113, CTF 56, CINCPAC COMSUBPAC Command CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Unless you request otherwise I will direct TF 113 to maintain the neutralization of airfields in the SAKASIMA GUNTO accordance concept your OpPlan 1-45 until otherwise directed by you. Suggest you detach destroyers to break radio silence and transmit further orders. Upon departure ULITHI TF 113 will assume designation TP 57.

16 0604 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCHL Info COMCHL ADV HQ, CONVALESCENCE.

Your 150505. Cebuexa does not confer in the assignment to the 26th AF of any fighters to be based within the FOA and requests that the War Department be so informed. It is essential that fighters be completely available for any type of mission required by the strategic and tactical situation as estimated locally without reference to headquarters outside the Pacific Theater.

16 12346 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSUBPAC (ULOSA), COMCHL CINCPAC PEARL, CONVALESCENCE. CINCPAC ADV HQ.

CX 12346. Leyte anchorage will be available for British Carrier Task Force and Fleet again while participating in ICEBERG as requested your 150654.

17 0945 XXX BomCom to CINCPAC Info COMSUBPAC, DEFORMAP 2.

ADMK 1079. Mining operations 21st BomCom is subject. This command will blockade SHIMOYOSHI STRAITS by laying 1500 mines between 27 March and 1 April 1945. These mines will be variously distributed throughout all the grids in minefields L and M. Refer to my top secret letter dated 26 Feb 45 subject is target grids for operation STARVATION.
17 1343 COMDIV A CINDO to CINCPAC BOTH HC INFO COMMSAFRON, COMSUBPAC, COMAIRVICU, COMMEL.

Relative to matter presented Commsafron and ComSubPac assent OP 084# the following is directed: (A) Cinopac Formulate Plan for detection and interception possible Jap carrier forces. (B) Commsafron is task force Allied Pacific Fleet for this. (C) Plan should include the establishment of a Mid-Pacific patrol between the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutian Islands under surface and air forces available in the Hawaiian and Mid-Pac areas. (D) Plan to be effective until directed by Comdiv and CINDO. It is not expected such instruction will be issued unless intelligence indicates such action or major units of Jap fleet are located under suspicious circumstances. Para. Commsafron furnish Cinopac by air courier copies Joint Weasafron-WPS-4th Air Force Plan promulgated Commsafron serial 00469 of 10 March. This plan has been approved by War or Navy Department but indicates planning regarding this matter which has already been done.

18 1322 CINCPAC ADV HC to COMSUBPAC, COMDIV, COMAIRVICU, GPF 73, COMAIRCLY, GPF 1/2, GPF 11, GPF 2/2, COMAIRICA, GPF 11, COMAIRQA.

Task Force 97 which will participate in ICEBERG comprises the following ships of the British Pacific Fleet: 4 CV (INDOMITABLE Class), 2 BS (HMS ORION V Class), 2 CL (FTJH Class), 3 CLAA (2 DIDO and 1 SPARTON), 11 BC. Para. Unless otherwise directed by ComSubPac scheduled movements will be as follows: Depart UMLIYI morning 23rd. Arrive point AIP to 390 off morning 25th. Lend-air strikes against SAKISHIMA GUNTO from 24th morning 26th continuing several days of 27th and 28th with retirement each night to 36 during darkness. 36 may bombard MIYAKO JIMA afternoon 28th prior departure for area MIHON for replacement 29th 30th. Resume air strikes on SAKISHIMA GUNTO 30th, 1st and 2nd. Thereafter fueling and strikes as required or directed by ComSubPac.

19 1330 COMAIRVICU to COMAIRPAC Info COMAIRPAC SUBCOMPOD, COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2. COMAIRVINC1.2, COMAIRVINC1.2.

Units 140126 not to all or needed. The estimated ultimate requirement of FVP squadrons for ASW tasks is as follows: (A) 6 FVP squadrons deployed as scheduled in ComAirvicu 1 OpPlan 2-45. These squadrons are VFP 27, 208, 26, 205, 32 and 19. (B) 6 FVP squadrons to be trained and equipped for ASW tasks deployed as follows: VFP 152 to GUAM May; VFP 142 and 153 to TONKIN May; VFP 144 to MARSHALL area June; VFP 148 to PELELIU July; and 146 available forward in December. Para. Delay in reporting dates of FVP squadrons is accepted in preference to cancellation MIDWAY requirements. Para. No change in present summer training syllabus desired since squadrons will undoubtedly serve in multiple-task assignments.
20 0740 CONREP to COMPHICOM 1000 Info VAC, BBPLO.

The position with regard to the BBP base in the forward area is that
Admiralty VAUE/VAUE bulk loaded, and is in the process of sending
KATHEUS for a base of the following proportions: (A) Ammunition and welfare
facilities for 5000 liberty men daily. (B) Transit camp for 500 officers
and men. (C) 200 bed hospital. (D) Covered storage to store 1 victory
store 1 naval issue SBD. (E) Making unit and torpedo repair shop. (F) Minor
W/T station. (G) Total complement including NE company (maintenance and
500 Asiatic personnel) would be 3000). Para 2. The material stores and boats
for the above base are being shipped in 4 freight ships due HAVUS at monthly
intervals from early May. Para 3. 2 Construction Battalions (approximate
total of 500 REMES) are being sent to build the base. The 1st contingent
of 500 REMES is due SYDNEY 10 April. Remaining 3 battalions each of 700
REMES are due SYDNEY May, June, August respectively. Para 4. With this con-
struction party it is expected that some facilities would be available
after 5 months but that the base would not be fully operative for 9 months.
Para 5. It is not thought that a base of this scale would meet the full
requirements of the BBP and consequently base facilities on a larger scale
have been asked for from the Admiralty, but the prospect of getting anythin-
greater depends mainly on our ability to obtain the facilities locally in
AUSTRALIA. Para 6. From paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above it will be seen that
an early decision on the location of this base is becoming urgent. Request
you will report how the matter now stands.

20 0847 CONREP 1000 to COMPHICOM 1000 Comp to COMPHICOM 1000 Info VAC, BBPLO.

REMEMBER: 1 April modify searches ComFHICOM OpPlan 1-49 and
CG 50.5 OpPlan 2-41 to provide air search and anti-submarine patrols along
the shipping lanes between ENIWETOK, the MIKAKI and EASTERN GUARDIAN
as follows: (A) By ComFHICOM area originating ENIWETOK sector 255
degrees clockwise to 310 degrees for a distance of 300 miles. (B) By Pairing 1 (1)
Rotate search V366 to Median line 100 degrees for a distance of 300 miles.
(2) Replace search V4005 by sector originating SAIPAN 225 degrees clockwise
to 270 degrees for a distance of 300 miles. (3) Originating ULTHI add new
sector 055 degrees clockwise to 090 degrees for a distance of 300 miles. (4)
Originating ULTHI add new sector 235 degrees clockwise to 285 degrees for
a distance of 300 miles. Para. Give following priorities to employment of
search aircraft: (A) Primary missions forward. (B) Coverage to battle
cripples when appropriate. (C) Anti-submarine operations and patrols.

20 0951 CONREP AA HQ to COMPHICOM. COMPHICOM Info COMFHICOM (FR) COMPHICOM COMFHICOM COMFHICOM COMFHICOM COMFHICOM COMFHICOM COMFHICOM.

My 280529, Operation ICHBORG 3, (B) Garriss air force ADJUTANT (HIYAKO) will
be modified as follows: 2 fighter groups and 1 night fighter will be
Marines instead of Army. My 090854, ComFHICOM designate air
defense commander, VLA(N) squadron in the MARSHALLS may be deployed if new
squadron not available. Base development directive will be modified accord-
ingly.
TOP SECRET - MARCH(GCT)
20 1340 CINCPAC ADV Hq O COMAIRPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV Hq 

Fast carriers in training squadron such as SHANGRI-LA and RAMBER are to be ready for emergency combat employment. This necessitates that there be a continuously revised and up to date plan for equipping them with an air group on short notice.

20 2153 CINCPAC PEARL to CINCPOA Info CINCPAC ADV Hq

Increased hospital facilities MARIANAS for support of Army forces future operations considered urgent. Consider establishment of 5000 beds under canvas TINIAN most desirable arrangement subject to confirmation of availability suitable sites that location. Since installation these facilities required in immediate future in order to support ICEBERG III-e and III-d as well as ensuing operations their installation should have precedence over and be additional to the fixed bed hospital requirements of those operations.

20 2325 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CINCWPAC Info COMCHC C OF S US ARMY CINCPAC

Your CAX 50687 (Feb 261515) and 021912 March indicate a de-enlistment or cancellation of PHILIPPINES facilities for support of POA divisions as contemplated by the PILBAR Agreement. In order that I may properly plan deployment of POA divisions and installation or retention of facilities for their support in POA request you indicate approximate dates and scope of PHILIPPINES facilities for support of POA ground forces which may be provided by you under the PILBAR Agreement. If complete cancellation of such support is now contemplated request that I be so informed. In connection SAPAC service troops and overhead personnel are required for the support of POA forces and must be retained in POA if POA forces are not to receive the expected support in the PHILIPPINES Area. Reply to your 250539 February withhold pending receipt of above information.

20 2332 21ST BOMCOM to CINCPAC ADV Hq Info DEPCOM 20TH AF CINCPAC

IABY-20-14. Due to all out incendiary effort against HOKSHU an additional reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS as requested your 040430 has been accomplished subsequent to that reported our 110300; from 25 March to 1 April our entire effort is committed to attacks against air installations in KYUSHU and mining of SHIDONGKI STRAITS in support of ICEBERG operation and any reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS will constitute a distraction from this effort. If you place sufficiently high priority on this reconnaissance we will, however, devote during this period whatever forces you designate to its accomplishment.

21 1958 CINCPAC ADV Hq to DEPCOM AF20 Info BOMCOM 21, CINCPAC

Refer BomCom 21 202332. Do not desire any distraction from either mining program or attacks against KYUSHU in order to accomplish reconnaissance requested by MYDIS 040430.
My OpPlan 14-44 for Operation ICEBERG is modified as indicated. In para 1 delete all paragraphs under heading "Own Forces" and substitute the following:

Sub para A Air forces of the SWP are supporting this operation by (1) Reconnaissance in accordance with Search Plan E with sectors 3 to 10 inclusive extended to maximum practicable distance. (2) Offensive BAY screens against enemy search planes and patrol vessels to cover (a) Advance of Tractor and Transport Groups from 20 thru 21 March, (b) Fueling of TF 60 on 21, 22 and 23 March, (c) Night air strikes against FORMOSA and air installations at SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the nights of 20/21 thru 23/24 March. (3) Night air strikes against FORMOSA by daylight attacks on air installations until LEGACIOUS (OKINAWA) is captured. (4) Neutralization of enemy air strength on FORMOSA by exploitation of all attacks on air installations until LEGACIOUS (OKINAWA) is captured. (5) Neutralization of hostile shipping and naval forces along the CHINA and INDO CYMBA Coast and denial of their movement toward Empire waters as practicable without detracting from other supporting missions. Sub para B. Bomber 20 is supporting this operation by weather reconnaissance flights with 1 flight every 24 hours over the EAST CHINA SEA between 30 and 35 degrees N. Sub para C. Bomber 21 is supporting this operation by (1) Maximum operations against FORMOSA from 10 thru 20 March. (2) Attacks against KIRISHI air installations if visual bombing is possible, otherwise against NAGASAKI or OKINAWA on 27 or 28 March and on 31 March or 1 April. (3) Closure of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS for a period of about 4 weeks by mining operations from 27 March to 1 April. Sub para D. This operation will be conducted in 3 phases. This plan covers Phase 1 and 2. Para. In sub para 3(e) change last sentence to read: Air sea rescue procedure is prescribed CINCPAC SOP-2A and addendum 2 to SOP-2A. Para. Change sub para 5(e) to read: CINCPAC at GUAM.

22 0853 CINCPAC ADV HQ to DEFCOMAP 20 Info CINCPAC COMDR.

For purposes of planning future operations reconnaissance photography is required of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA as far west as 119-00 E and south to 34-15 N. This area is beyond the range limits of any reconnaissance aircraft under my command. Carrier task forces cannot yet penetrate into the EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS. Would appreciate your placing the above area as high on your present commitments. Request film positives or dape negatives of photography obtained be forwarded direct to this headquarters.

22 2316 DEFCOMAP 20 to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

1067. The following message was received from CINCPAC 20 and I quote it for your information, "I refer to several messages transmitted between commands in the Pacific Ocean Areas on the subject of the exchange of the 508th Fighter Group and 556th Air Service Group for the 318th Fighter Group and the 318th Air Service Group. CINCPAC, DEFP letter 31 Jan, subject: VLR fighters for FIA, to CINCPAC which was agreed to by Admiral Edwards for the Navy, clearly establishes the status of the 5 VLR Groups and insures that FIA command has necessary operational control to carry out its functions. The transfer cited thereafter appears here to be purely an administrative one insofar as it affects CMEPOA operations. Suggest this be clarified to appropriate CMEPOA agencies." If the JCS direct that the control of the 5 fighter groups be transferred to the 20th AF the exchange of the combat groups and their service groups can be affected at that time.
Admiralty secret 021330 of January approved loan of 4 CVEs until April. In view large requirements for transport CVEs in forthcoming operations plus possibility transport CVEs may be required for combat and reported unavailability sufficient British carrier pilots to keep their CVEs fully manned in sustained operations strongly recommend that immediate representatives be made to extend loan of CVEs until 1 July 1945.

Modify N02 181322. BB of TF 57 may bombard ISHIGAKI as an alternative to MIYAKO on 27 or 28 March depending on results of air strikes.

In clarification N02 000299 of 4 March and CINCPAC Pearl 10041A (not to or required by all) escorts for support shipping for LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) will be provided as follows, by CTF 96 between ENIWETOK and ULITHI and between ENIWETOK and the MARIANAS as required by N02 160240. By CTF 51 between ULITHI and LEGUMINOUS between the MARIANAS and LEGUMINOUS and between ULITHI and LEGUMINOUS. In implementing this plan it is desired that CTF 51 provide escorts at ULITHI the MARIANAS and LEYTE at intervals as necessary for use by CTF 94 and ComPibGroup 13 respectively. The latter two commanders are responsible for assembling support shipping into appropriate convoys and routing them to the objective. Para. Shipping will continue to be routed via ENIWETOK and will be called forward from there by SCOPA as required. In general it is desired that support shipping from ENIWETOK stage thru ULITHI rather than the MARIANAS. It is not expected that any significant amount of support shipping will assemble in LEYTE except shipping now at that port or assault shipping which has been discharged and has returned from the objective for reloading. Convoy will be called forward from ULITHI and from LEYTE when called for by CTF 51 and when escorted by CTF 51. At a later date (when CTF 51 and his representatives have left the objective) the function of calling shipping forward will pass to CINCPAC. At that time the responsibility for providing escorts to the objective will pass to CTF 94 or CTF 99.1 as will be determined by Cinopac. A redeployment of escorts by Cinopac will be made accordingly prior to that time.

UrSer 000109 dated 10 March. Concurs subject to modifications that will be required in view of N02 200651 not to all. The estimated reduction in Army service units resulting from reference dispatch aggregates about 7000 personnel as follows: 2 HQ and Base Serv Sgs, 2 Engr Sqs, 2 Materiel Sqs, 1 depst repair S, 2 Depot Supply Sqs, 2 Bn Comp Sqs, 2 Avn Sqs, 4 Engr Avn Bns, 1 HQ and HQ Co, 2 Sig Sq Co, 4 Engr Dump Trk Co, 2 Avn MP Cos. Para. troop list showing revised requirements will be published shortly. In view of reduced requirements for Army Service Units as indicated above desire such service units now located forward area not be designated for employment this operation except where necessary.

DepCom20thAF 222318 passed to you separately. I adhere to views expressed in my top sec serial 005020 of 20 Feb and my 160604 to ComGenAAPO.
TOP SECRET

MARCH(GCT)

21 1442 COMINCH & CNO to CINC PAC ADV HQ Info CINC PAC PEARL. ADMIRALTY, CONANDTAC-RONPAC, CONAM PAC, CONAM PAC, COMF/J/ST/CST, COMM SEA FORC & CINC PAC.

Admiralty advises that British CVRNs, PATROLLEUR, BRAVE and RANGER are required at an early date for fitting out as replenishment carriers for British PacFlt. Release of these CVRNs as early as April is conceivable. 3rd CVRN may be retained until end of April. When released sail them to US. Inform Admiralty of approximate sailing dates and place departure as soon as reasonable firm. Admiralty 021130 A January refer.

24 1802 COMINCH & CNO to CINC PAC ADV HQ Info CINC PAC PEARL. COMAIRPAC, CONANDTAC-RONPAC, CONAM PAC, CONAM PAC, COMF/J/ST/CST, COMM SEA FORC & CINC PAC.

In view your 222331 hold in abeyance any 211442 pending further instructions.

23 1902 COMINCH & CNO to COMTHPAC Info CTF 71, CINC PAC ADV HQ.

In any conversations which you have had or may have with representatives of submarine flotillas Brit PacFlt assume you have not and will not make any commitments for British submarine bases in the PHILIPPINEs. This is not intended to curtail present operational commitments for services and replenishment on occasion by tenders in presently established advance bases furnishin similar services to US submarines in TF 71.

25 0606 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMPOA Info COMPOA, COMPOA, COMPOA, COMPOA, COMPOA, COMPOA, COMPOA.

Undue 222011. Additional area reserve KyDis 172232 would land over established beaches and be supported by Corps of Army troops. Substitution for some minor articles of T/O and E equipment satisfactory. Additional equipment normally furnished to units engaged in an amphibious assault not essential. Consider forces including 2 MarDivs remaining after departure of 98th Div sufficient for defense of Hawaiian Area. Do not desire to use reinforcement personnel set up for ICEBERG or to interfere with support being given in the form of labor for mounting of units to ICEBERG. The only major reinforcing unit desired for 98th Div if used would be 1 Tank Bn. Based on the above advice what portion of the 98th InfDiv could be available for designation as area reserve.

25 0730 CINC PAC to COMINCH & CNO Info CINC PAC PEARL.

Your 191940. Following ships can be made available for temporary assignment to ComThPac. 4/2 PAC BATA (APA 140) now discharging SAMAR for 1 lift rear to forward bases then to be returned CincPac at GUAM by 15 May. DAWSON (APA 79) and BOTETOURT (APA 136) available SoPac last half April for 1 lift. LST 172 available SoPac 1 May for 1 lift. Remaining POA shipping on extremely tight schedule to meet operational requirements. Para. Reference CNO 202015. If necessary to expedite readiness SAMAR Base as willing to accept resultant adverse effect on other projects and make following ships available for 1 lift to assist in movement 3rd echelon assembly 15 from West Coast to SAMAR, ARA (AK 136) and CRATER (AK 70) completing overhaul WNYC 22 April and 2 May respectively plus 2 small APA's from new construction NFS late April. In view possibility of congestion SAMAR foregoing should have consignment CINCWPA. This echelon includes 5 million feet lumber. By previous dispatch authorization has been requested from CNO to divert to SAMAR 4 million feet now afloat at PEARL and excess of 40000 feet. Para. The movement of GSE and equipment from PEARL is proceeding on schedule requested by CINCWPA. Last phase of movement will 6 one less equipment trains to arrive SAMAR approx 15 May to coincide with arrival of equipment for these battalions from the mainland.
24 1655 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV Hq.

KING TO MACDOWELL. Wish you would explore question of establishing line of sea communications to sea of JAPAN thru TSUSHIMA STRAIT. Include in exploration the seizure of the 2 airfields reported to be on QUALITY ISLAND I. Preliminary estimate of requirements for this operation here is 3 Divisions, Assume the completion of ICEBERG and probably that of LONGTOM. Param. Command setup and directive for future operations in Pacific still under discussion with Army with little progress. Your comment on line of communications through TSUSHIMA will be helpful in connection with decisions to be made here.

25 0345 CINCPAC PEARL to CINCSOEWAPAC Info COMCINCUSAC Info CINCPAC ADV Hq.

Refer Unit AG 600,12 of 23 Dec 44. MarCor materials were declared available. Wiser 000156 of 28 Jan 45 based on original proposed readiness date of rehabilitation camps for 1 Marine Amphibious Corps, Corps Troops, 3 Marine and Marine Depot following Phase I ICEBERG. In view of the continued presence of foregoing troops in POA as result of dis 210203 Jan and Urdis 261515 Feb materials listed are not available at this time. Availability of MarCor material will be of subject of survey when readiness date of rehabilitation camps for Fleet Marine Force units is more definite.

25 1347 CTF 52 to TF 51 Info CINCPAC ADV, COMSOUTH.

During approach to OINATA on nite 24 Mar several enemy planes made contact with various units of TF 52. ADAMS (CB 27) while engaging 4 planes had casualties 2 KIA 5 WIA caused by premature burst from after 5 inch mount. Low flying plane approached ESTES and small splash about 40 yards astern may have been depth bomb. Minesweeping for 24 and 25 March completed substantially on schedule, I moored mine sweep in VI, 6 drifters sunk. Otherwise results of minesweeping negative. Sweep of southern third of A9 did not develop minefield previously reported. Scheduled UDT operations completed in KERING BETTO. Preliminary reports indicate no mines or man made beach obstacles. Opera ions well supported by destroyers LCI(9)s and excellent work by support aircraft. Light return fire from Beach PURPLE 21 caused 1 KIA in LCI(9) 475. No other casualties to ships or personnel reported. Aircraft besides attacking KERING BETTO destroyed 1 AA gun at NAHA airfield strafed planes on YONAH airfield and attacked amphibious tank vessemts target areas 8370 Y 8700 8696 2 amphibious tanks 8497 8507 reported destroyed. No air-drome enemy planes sighted. Extensive hunt for boats and barges disclosed few. Photo and hydro observer missions accomplished on schedule. Shore bombardments executed on FSU one TONACHI PSU and KERING BETTO PSU. Weather and surf conditions favorable today and good weather forecast tomorrow.

26 0152 CTF 51.1 to CTF 52, CTF 51, Info COMSOUTH, CINCPAC ADV Hq.

SITREP 261100 I9-9) battalion landings made on AKA GERUSA I9-9 HOKAJI beaches by 0930. Opposition encountered nil or light. Preferred plan landing on KUBA and YAKAJI delayed due necessity as found by UDT reconnaissance of using LVTA. Landings will be made when LVTA are available. Now planned YAKAJI afternoon 26th, KUBA, TONASHIKI and SHIRO 27th. GILMER hit by suicide plane damage rigging 1 KIA 2 WIA. Also KIMBERLY 2 5-inch 1 40mm gun 5 5 guns out 3 KIA 30 WIA. Both operational.
TOP SECRET
MARCH (CCT)

23 1300  COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV H.

Limits only, Ur 202310z (CCT). In view of the magnitude of the project
and the time involved MANUS will be too far from the combat areas when the
facilities become available. My view is that minimum temporary facilities
should be installed at MANUS but for the main base consideration should
be given to a location farther forward such as BRUNEI BAY. Final decision
in this matter depends on the future operations to be conducted in the
Pacific Theater which matter is now under consideration by the JCS, Com-
cinewa to shore facilities in the PHILIPPINES.

27 0450  CINCPAC ADV to COMAIRPAC Info CINCPAC PLAN.

Your 252058, Cominch serial 00130 of 15 Jan approved Marine shore based pro-
gress of a total of 24 VMF and VMFP squadrons. Equipment of VMFP squadrons
with Hell divers has not been approved by Cinpec. My ICEBERG plans require
forward deployment of only 17 squadrons of which 5 groups will be commited
in action in combat area (3 in LOOSERIGUS(OKINAWA) and 2 in ADJUTANT(MIYAKO)
MAG 12 and 14 must be equipped with full Corsair allowance and customary
spares. If necessary Corsair equipped squadrons now in Hawaiian Area, New
CAROLINES, MARSHALLS and MIDWAY in excess of minimums authorized by my ser-
000521 of 24 Feb should be reduced in aircraft strength pursuant to intent of
sub para 3E of Cominch serial 00130. Request your further comments on this
basis.

27 1213  CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC PEARL.

As an alternate to ADJUTANT(MIYAKO) or FRICIION(KIKAI) desire immediate log-
icst study of operation to capture ADJUTANT(TOKUMO JIWA). Forces same as
FRICITION except infantry garrison reduced to 1 RT and fighter groups and
airfields each reduced from 4 to 3. Also desire immediate restudy of FRICTI
on same basis.

27 1214  CINCPAC ADV to COMHSSAFRON Info COMINCH & CNO.

Your joint WSP-WDC-4AF Plan received. See my 210001. Note assignment of all
fast carriers available to Mid-Pacific striking force by my OpPlan 2-45 which
affects para 5 Annex A to your Joint Plan.

27 1215  CINCPAC ADV H2 to COMINORPAC, COMHSSAFRON, COMHSSAFRON, CINCPAC, CONSTRPAC, CINCPAC, COMHSSAFRON, CNO, COMINCH & CNO, PEARL, CINCPAC.

This is my OpPlan 2-45. Task organization: (A) North Pacific Force (TF 90-92)
Vadm Fletcher, Forces presently assigned less CruDiv 1 and escorts. (B) Sea
frontier Forces (TF 97) Vadm Bagby, Forces presently assigned.
(C) Western Sea Frontier Force (TF 06) Adms Ingersoll. All naval forces on
west coast less units assigned Mid-Pacific striking force. (B) Mid-Pacific
striking force (TF 30) Adm Halsey. BONHOMME RICHARD, RANGER, CruDiv 1, Decr
57 less 1 Decr 57. All major surface units available in Hawaiian Type and on
West Coast. (E) Western Striking Force (TF 95) commanded by Senior Officer
arked. 2 fast carrier groups and logistics support ships designated by Com-
flot. Para 1. Assumption: That a Japanese carrier task force has been orga-
ized for diversionary operations in the Eastern Pacific Area and is unlocated.
2. Mission: This fleet will detect, intercept and destroy enemy raiding force
in order to prevent carrier air attack on West Coast of the U.S. Para 3.
Tasks: (A) NormPar cruising undetected approach of enemy forces to West Coa-
of United States through North Pacific Area, by maintaining aircraft barri-
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Continued -
CINCPAC ADV to COMORPAC, COHANSEAFRON, COMWESSEAFRON, etc (CONT'D)

Patrol along 160th meridian southward from ADAX to latitude 42 N. Augment barrier patrol by sectors searches if required. Destroy enemy forces located to limit of capabilities. Sail CruDiv 1 and DesRon 97. ruins 1 DesDiv to rendezvous designated by Comsd Mid-Pacific Striking Force. (B) NewSeaFronFor prevent undetected approach of enemy forces to West Coast of US thru Hawaiian Sea Frontier, by maintaining aircraft barrier patrol along 160th meridian northward from MIDWAY to lat 42 degrees North. Augment barrier patrol by sector search if required. Destroy enemy forces located to limit of capabilities. (C) WeeSeaFronFor maintain search over sea approaches to principal cities and installations on the West Coast of the US. To limit of capabilities destroy enemy forces located, coordinating attacks with ComGen WestDefCommand and ComGen 4th AF. Sail with appropriate escort to rendezvous designated by Com Mid-Pacific Striking Force all major combatant units on the west coast (fast carriers, including RANGER, battleships and cruisers) which are available for combat service. (D) Mid-Pacific Striking Force intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces. Designate rendezvous for concentration of forces. (B) Western Striking Force intercept and destroy retiring enemy raiding force (XRAY). This operation is designated FT OF BAY. This plan will become effective only when directed by Cincpac. Para 4. NorPacFor, NewSeaFronFor and WeeSeaFronFor provide own logistic support. Commander Mid-Pacific Striking Force arrange logistic support required with ComServc direct. ComInfPt assign necessary logistic replenishment ships for support of Western Striking Force. Para 5. Communications CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Use zone Z(Oct) time, Cinpca at GUIAL.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINT.

If the enemy fleet and air force can be rendered incapable of effective interference a line of sea communications into the Sea of JAPAN via the KOREA or TSUSHIMA STRAIT can be made secure. The enemy fleet has been greatly reduced and current operations may virtually eliminate its heavy units. The enemy air force has suffered severe losses and is apparently somewhat demoralized. Affected it may be sufficiently weak to permit us to occupy and develop air bases as close to JAPAN as QUELPAIR ISLAND if the enemy air force is so weak as to permit the occupation of such bases the desired line of communications can be made secure. Para 2. I will initiate action to obtain adequate reconnaissance of QUELPAIR. Although understood to be weakly defended it is not well adapted to development. It is well located. Its large population would necessitate quite a large garrison. As soon as my search and reconnaissance from OKINAWA is effective QUELPAIR'S possibilities can be evaluated. Para 3. It now appears that capture of QUELPAIR will be more feasible and probable than capture of a position in the KURILS as soon as the enemy force sufficiently reduced. This will probably occur before the Spring of 1946 if not by the Fall of 1945. Operations in the KOREA STRAIT REGION will contribute directly to accomplishment of the overall objective by US forces as well as by the preparation of RUSSIA to assist.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC PEARL.

Desire detailed logistic planning Phase III(d) ICES 26 proceed on basis your 29O217 subject to provision that completion dates will be advanced if further information warrants. FRICHTON (NIKAI JDA) Base Development directive and Phase III Staff Study will be developed accordingly by Advance Echelon.
Following Army units requested in addition to present assigned 5th PhilCorps - Phase III(c) ICEBERG (A) 1 InfDiv available employment by a TM (B) 1 Amphibian Tractor Bns (C) 2 8-inch Howitzer Bns. Due to enemy strength estimated at 27,000 additional units considered essential. Amplified in letter that follows.

Your CX 13132 (281614). Paral. Since receipt of your 261515 Feb and in view also of the deferment of the probable dates of arrival of divisions from EUROPE plans for the employment and rehabilitation of the 6 Marine and 6 Army divisions available in PHA have been reconst and logistic preparations have been readjusted accordingly. Under these plans the earliest use which could be made of Marines of rehabilitation areas in the PHILIPPINEs would be about 1 October and then only if the divisions concerned were relieved by 3 Army divisions from EUROPE or 2 of the garrison ADUNANT (IYAKO JDA) and two to garrison IMPROVITI (CHUNUK BARROW, CHINA). The earliest use which could be made of SAVA facilities by Army divisions now in PHA would be approximately as indicated in my 180736 Feb but only in case divisions from the SAVA or from EUROPE are made available to relieve them as garrisons 2 in LEXIKOVITZ (CHINA) in early June 1 in JUTONJU (NAGASAKI, JAPAN) at the end of August and 3 in LINCETRE (NAGASAKI, JAPAN) in September and October. See enclosures B to my serial 0008026 of 23 Feb 1943.

Para 2. The need for facilities in the PHILIPPINEs for staging Army troops from the PHA at the time contemplated by the FJPA Agreement of 4 November 1943 was predicated on the redeployment of forces from EUROPE at an earlier date than is now possible. Para 3. The construction and service troops and the shipping included in SAVA requirements for development of facilities external to camp sites cannot be spared from the resources in the PHA which are now barely adequate as to shipping and are deficient as to construction and service troops. The 150 LCTs and 150 LCTs likewise cannot be spared because all assault shipping of this character will be needed in operation in immediate prospect. The LCT problem in the Pacific is primarily one of forward movement of those available in rear areas. My estimates shortages in forward areas have recently been materially alleviated by forward movement under their own power from PEARL to ULMUTH including the 1270 mile passage from JOHNSTON to MAURITIUS. Para 4. I appreciate the difficulty of your situation and your desire to work out a solution of the troop staging and mounting problem for eventual operations. However, my current plans provide for using all the resources available to the PHA in the seizure of positions in the approaches to JAPAN for the purpose of establishing a sea and air blockade and intensive air bombardment of JAPAN. The establishment of adequate troop staging and mounting areas and facilities in the PHILIPPINEs is essential to preparation for the use of large forces and resources from EUROPE in the invasion of JAPAN but should not divert and absorb resources essential to maintaining the momentum of the Central Pacific Campaign now in progress.

RJ 58110. Designation of 98th Division as area reserve ICEBERG is subject. Reference to your dispatch 250608 March and 172232 March and to my dispatch 222011 March. The entire 98th InDiv with an attached Tank Bn can be made available for such designation. T/O strength can be met except for 96 office warrant officers and 1048 enlisted men. Only available Tank Bn not located on LEMS ISLAND assigned to 10th Army but not earmarked for ICEBERG Operation.
Lift must be made from LSTs by CinCPac. Para. 98th Div will not be relieved of present duty until order designating this unit is received here. If to be used request early designation in order to undertake necessary training and preparation for movement. Not recommended is the designation of less than a division.

This deals with the redeployment of destroyers for 7th Flt. Following DD are now assigned: 5 of DesRon 5; 1 of DesRon 12; 6 of DesRon 14; 5 of DesRon 21; 8 of DesRon 22; 7 of DesRon 23; 1 of DesRon 46; 1 of DesRon 49; 1 of DesRon 58. Total 35 DD plus RADFORD, LAVALEON and RENSHAW which have sustained battle damage and are to return for permanent repairs. Para. AULICK and CALDWELL now enroute to report to you. Upon reporting you are requested to detach COCHRAN for return to overhaul. A & GRANT and KILLER of DesRon 56 will be ordered to report to you about 1 Nov at which time you are requested to detach STINGRAY and PHELPS for return to overhaul. CONSFIT will be directed to detach SART and WYCKOFF of DesRon 58 as soon as practicable to report to you as relief for ABLOT and YOUNG. Para. As soon as operations permit the following deployment will be carried out. DesRon 22 will be interchanged with DesRon 56 now in 5th Flt. DesRon 23 will be interchanged with DesRon 45 now in 3rd Flt. 4 ships of DesRon 31 will be relieved by DesDiv 10. 6 ships of DesRon 12 will be replaced by HAHN and DesDiv 101 now in overhaul. SHIELDS and Wray of DesRon 58 will be directed to report to you on completion of overhaul. Para. Ultimate assignment to 7th Flee: DesRon 14, 43, 51, 56, 58 - total 39 DD less 3 in overhaul and repairs. Total 36 DD. Until total of 36 from above squadrions is reached 5 ships of DesDiv 9 will remain with 7th Flt but will be relieved ship for ship as total exceeds 36 DD.

My OpPlan 14-44 modified in that CTF 94 is assigned responsibility for the neutralization and isolation of the enemy held positions in the BOWINS. CTF 94 request assistance from CTF 93 when and if required.

Here is Com3rdFlt (CTF 30) OpPlan 2-45. As TF 30 Mid-Pacific Striking Forces Admiral Halsey, Sub Area A1. TF 30,1 surface striking group rear admiral McCrea CruDiv 1 DesRon 57 less 1 DD; CruDiv 1, additional units less carriers as assigned by dispatch. Sub area A2. Air Striking Group Rear Admiral Jennis Henry BON HOMME RICHARD RANGER plus additional carriers and escorts as later assigned. B. TF 30,9. Service Group senior officer embarked fleet carriers and CVE as escorts assigned by dispatch. Para. This plan stems from CinCPac C Plan 2-45. Assumption: That enemy carrier task force is proceeding for diversionary operations in Eastern Pacific Area and is unlocated. NorPac forces and West SeaPron forces have been directed maintain air barrier patrol along 180th meridian from ADAK to MIDWAY. West SeaPron has been directed to maintain air search over sea approaches to principal cities and installation on west coast U.S. 5th Flt supports by striking retiring enemy raiding force. Assumption: All ships will maintain maximum readiness for extended operation, if at sea consistent with current employment and are prepared for towing or to

-Continued-
be towed. Para. This force will intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces in order prevent carrier air attack on west coast of US. Para. TF 30 intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces. TG 30.1 Support Air Striking Group. Be prepared launch day or night gun and torpedo attack against enemy units when directed. TG 30.5 conduct air search for enemy units as directed. Attack enemy units within range with all available aircraft. TG 30.9 provide replenishment services for TF 30. As separately directed. This operation designated FIREBREAK. This plan will become effective only when specifically directed at which time rendezvous at sea for units proceeding from Pearl and West Coast will be specified. Cruising instructions and battle plan will be distributed by sea mail at rendezvous,Para. Fuel ammunition and supplies at Pearl and West Coast ports. Fuel at sea with TG 30.9 Communications CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Use zone O'CT time, CTF 30 at Pearl until shift to DON HOMAS RICHARD or alternate flagship is announced.

31 0318 COMPTHEL to COMUNCH Info CINCPAC ADV H... CTF 71.

It is intended to operate British submarines from British tenders stationed only at those advanced bases from which submarines of TF 71 are operating. Your 231302. No commitments have been or will be made for British submarine bases in the PHILIPPINES. Present plan for operations of British submarines under CTF 71 is for tender MAIDSTONE and accommodation ship arrange to arrive about 22 May at SUBIC BAY where 2 US submarine tenders are now stationed. Submarine Base BOLDENS is being rolled up and will be reestablished at Subic. Approximately 14 British submarines depart PREMIANTE for patrol JAVA SEA en route SUBIC to begin arriving about 27 May. Remaining British submarines at PREMIANTE based on HAGA DANCE. When submarine base PREMIANTE ready for roll up and movement to advanced base (possibly TOTO BAY) DANCE and accompany submarines plus drydocks from ENGLAND to be moved forward for operations from advanced base. Estimate only shore based facilities required by British submarines will be possibly ready and ammunition storage.

31 1223 CTF 93 to CTG 93.2 Info CINCPAC ADV, COMPTHEL, CTF 95, CTG 94.1, CTU 94.1.

Cinepaz Adv 310047 of higher classification not to all. Discontinue strike BONIN ISLANDS 1 April. Be prepared strike this area when directed.

31 1231 CTG 51.1 SBD BURL. CG 77TH DIV to CTF 52, CTF 41, 34th Corps, 10th Army.

Registration of Corps artillery on KEISHI SHIMA completed 311940. 16 guns in position. Estimate all guns in position ready to fire at daylight tomorrow.
CINCPAC to CONGEPRICAP Info COMINCH, HAGGUS.

MARCH (27)

29 0858 CTF 93 to CINCPAC ADV Hq, Info CTF 24, CTU 74, 124, CTG 94.

CINCOA 282310Z assigns WGB 612 to CTF 94. In view of long range offensive nature this squadron request it be retained by CTF 93 who will exercise operational control through CTG 93.4 as organized by my 280704Z.

31 0759 CINCPAC to CONGEPRICAP Info COMINCH, HAGGUS.

NIMITZ TO HOLLAND SMITH, INFO KING AND VANDEGRIFT. After the troops concerned have reached their rehabilitation areas and accurate appraisal of problems concerned is possible I desire your opinion based on consultation with the Corps and Division Commanders as to the date when each Division of the Fifth Amphibious Corps will again be ready for combat. Please make this decision as soon as possible.

APRIL (27)

01 0725 COUSHEAIFRON to NOH MIDWAY Info COMINCH, HAGGUS, CONGEPRICAP, CONERCAP, CONREDCAP.

Following is HawSeaFron OpPlan 2-45. TF 97 HawSeaFron forces Vice Admiral Baglay, (A) TO 971 Naval Operating Base MIDWAY Commodore Morgan, Air force currently assigned plus additional aircraft later assigned, (B) Task Group 97.9 Air Forces HawSeaFron, Air Officer HawSeaFron, OAHU based search aircraft currently assigned plus additional strike aircraft later assigned under emergency conditions. This plan is based on CINCPAC Adv Hq OpPlan 2-45.

Assumption: That an unlocated enemy carrier task force is enroute from Japan to the Eastern Pacific for invasionary operations. Picture map maintenance of aircraft barrier patrol along 180th meridian from ADAK to 4200 N, MicPac, Striking Force under Con3rdFlit intercepts and destroys enemy raiding forces. Western Striking Force ships designated by Con5thFlit intercepts and destroys enemy forces. TF 97 locate and destroy enemy forces to limit of capabilities.

01 0641 CINCPAC ADV to CONINCPAC Info CINCPAC, KING, VANDERGRIFT, CONVEPCAP, CONGEPRICAP, CONCONFPOC, CONGER, HAGGUS.

98th InfDiv (at reduced strength UrdIs 300548) reinforced with 1 Tank Bn is hereby designated as Area Reserve Div for I Corps, with availability date of 1 May. Para. It is assumed from UrdIs 300554 that the assignment of 98th DI to Area Reserve will not interfere with tank support required in the form of laf for mounting of units for I Corps and will not affect the schedule of personnel replacements established for I Corps. Para. Advance designation Tank Bn Urdls 300548. If employed Tank Bn will mount WWII Para. Referred dispatch is not needed by info adees.
TOP SECRET
APRIL (0C)

01 0836 CINCPOAC ADV H. to COMINCH (Nimitz to King)

Further consideration of operations in the KOREA STRAIT brings out the possibility that once established in UPMUT (CAIHSHU) it would be feasible to occupy a position in the CHINHAE-MULAN portion of the KOREAN Coast and thereby obtain an anchorage as well as additional air facilities from which to control the STRAIT and cut JAPAN off from the ASIATIC Mainland. The concept of close co-operation by occupation of positions in the WASHI GROUP during the last phase of ICEBERG followed by occupation of CAIHSHU and the southern tip of KOREA is dependent as to sequence and timing on further developments and is contingent on the early collapse of the enemy air force.

01 1327 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPOAC ADV H.

KING TO NIMITZ. From viewpoint of weather and balancing requirements of amphibious air and ground operations what do you consider as acceptable months of the year for invasion of KYUSHU and/or KERISHU 1st case as entirely independent operations 2nd case as connected operations with perhaps a 3 months interval.

02 0152 CINCPOAC ADV H. to CONSFLEET Info COMINCH, CINCPACSPAC, CONORDEN TEN, CINCPAC-PEA

In order to maintain momentum of campaign and also afford more time for recuperation of 5th PhibCorps it may become advisable execute Phase III-d ahead of III-e. For this reason desire firm designation of amphibious force or senior group commander to expedite detailed preparations for III-d. If desirable can arrange temporary accommodations at GWAN for him.

02 1511 COMINCH to CONMORPAC Info CG ALASKA, CINCPOAC BTH H.'S COMMISSIONS/FRONTR.

All messages concerning HULA from and to HULA 2-4 areas will be transmitted by Army wire instead of by radio. Originators will so indicate. All HULA vessels arriving in Alaskan Sea Frontier waters for HULA 2-4 transfers will maintain radio silence in HULA 2-4 areas. JCS have requested ENSOUTH to direct that Commodores and COs of Russian HULA vessels sailing westward from HULA 2-4 maintain strict radio silence while in Alaskan Sea Frontier waters. Remove all US communication allowances and rob from all US HULA vessels upon their arrival at HULA 4-2.

02 1550 COMINCH to CONMORPAC Info CG ALASKA, CINCPOAC BTH H.'S COMMISSIONS/FRONTR.

As radio silence must be maintained by HULA vessels in the HULA 2-4 area desirable send Russian radio operators for such vessels to US west coast ports designated by CommoSeafRON for necessary familiarization and testing of radio equipment. Make necessary arrangements with local Soviet Commander.
1. JCS 62773. Following General Directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is issued for the guidance of commands in the Pacific Theater.

2. The over-all objective in the war against JAPP, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is

   To force the unconditional surrender of JAPP by:

   (a) Laying Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

   (b) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

3. (a) The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, is hereby also designated Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCPAC) and, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 below, all United States Army resources in the Pacific Theater (less Southwest Pacific Area and resources under control of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department) are placed under his command. CINCPAC will be responsible for the provision of Army resources to meet requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   (b) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 below, all U.S. Naval resources in the Pacific Theater (less Southwest Pacific Area) are placed under the command of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas in his capacity as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Cinpaci will be responsible for the provision of Naval resources to meet requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

   (c) The 20th Air Force for the present will continue operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided in JCS 742/3.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will exercise strategic jurisdiction over the Pacific Theater. They will issue operational directives to the Commanders in Chief assigning missions and fixing command responsibility for a variety of operations and campaigns. The Commander in Chief of the service who is not invested with the command responsibility for an operation will render every possible assistance to the Commander in Chief of the service to whom it is invested with such primary responsibility, coordinating each
with the other, in order to accomplish the over-all objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will normally approve SICOPAC with the responsibility for conducting joint campaigns and SINCOPAC with conducting sea campaigns. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, will act as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters pertaining to U. S. Army forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, will act as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters pertaining to U. S. Naval Forces.

5. The transition from the present organization to that prescribed in this directive will be accomplished as expeditiously as possible, subject to agreements reached under provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 below, all resources of each at their own service.

6. Until reassigned to other command by mutual agreement or by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the localities under command of SICOPAC and the Naval forces allocated to him will remain under his command and similarly, the areas under command of SINCOPAC and the Army forces allocated to him will remain under his command. Changes in command of forces or localities and changes made in existing joint control procedures will be effected by progressive arrangements made by mutual agreement, or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. SICOPAC and SINCOPAC are each authorized to establish joint forces or designate commanders to exercise unified control for the conduct of operations for which they have been made responsible, and may also do so by mutual agreement. They will also determine by mutual agreement when forces or localities revert or pass to the appropriate commander following operations.

8. Any release required by the foregoing directive will be made from Washington.

*Conflicting provisions of existing directives

** as possible with

*** and arrangements made
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, will:

(1) Complete the selection and development of positions in the
JUSF as required by his current directive.

(2) Continue such operations for securing and maintaining
control of the sea communications to and in the eastern Pacific as
are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

(3) Continue planning for seizing positions in the
U.S. Army in the BACAO and the eastern portion of the
BACAO. Plans should include the possibility and desirability of
confining objectives to the BACAO. Assembly of necessary
special equipment will be undertaken in a priority which will
not detract from timely preparations for the invasion of JAWN.

(4) Make plans for landing on a sea route to JUSF, and
include, if feasible, an operation considered essential.

(5) Provide forces and support for the operations directed in
A(1) below.

(6) Make plans for the operations for the naval and amphibious
phases of the invasion of JAWN. Co-ordinate with PBSCC in the
plans and preparations for the invasion in JAWN.

The Commander in Chief, Southeast Pacific Area and U.S.
Army Forces, Pacific, will:

(1) Complete the occupation of HII and conduct such additional
operations in the HII as required for the accomplishment of
the over-all objective in the war against JAWN. Further to the
foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing
the liberation of the HII as can be mounted without prejudice to
the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying KIWI, including KIWI BAY,
using Australian combat and service troops and make pre-
parations at such time as resources can be made available without detracting to
the accomplishment of the over-all objective. Units of the British
Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support for the operations directed in
A(1) above.
(4) Make plans and preparations for the campaign in JACo.
Cooperate with CG CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the
naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JACo.

C. The Commander-in-Chief, 20th Air Force, will cooperate with
CINCPAC and CINCAC in the preparation of plans connected with the inver-
ions of JACo.

D. The operations, as specifically directed hereinafter, will consti-
tuate a test of the resources available to the Pacific Theater
under the provisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff current directive contained
in OP 67775 DT 0521404.
02 0104 CINCOPAC (Via)
03 0626 300 STORMY to CINCOPAC ADV Info CINCOPAC PEACE COMSTHLT GTF 37.

Part 1 of 020115. In my memorandum BFP 043 dated 25 January 1945 I estimated that the British Task Force (A) Could operate in the combat area for 3 weeks (B) Would then require replenishment at an advanced anchorage lasting about 1 week (C) Could probably continue operating thus for 2 months before returning to an intermediate base for major replenishment.

03 1350 COMINCH & CNO to CINCOPAC ADV Hq Info COMSUBPAC.

News in ComSubPac 020653 of such import that I consider you should relieve Captain of QUEENFISH from command and bring him to trial by General Court Martial in order that the record may be clear. Advise immediately position and time of sinking.

04 0115 CINCOPAC ADV Hq to COMINCH.

Your 021350. Position of sinking 25-25 Long 120-07 time 011500. Corrected information indicates ship was only about 2 hours ahead of schedule instead of 120 miles as estimated in my 020840 Limits to King only message. Your 021350 will be complied with but in interest of war effort I shall continue QUEENFISH on present patrol for about 10 days longer unless you direct otherwise. About 8 additional days will be required for return voyage. Your message referred to ComSubPac 011300. No record such a message

04 0349 CINCPOA ADV Hq to COMSTHLT. Info CTG 50-5. COMINCH COMSUBPAC.

Minefields reported in KOREA STRAITS have prevented access by submarines to profitable shipping traffic lanes in the JAPAN SEA. Determination of routes used by shipping through KOREA STRAIT (between KOREA and TSUKUBA ISLANDS) is desired in order to develop a safe route for the passage of submarines. Request visual, photographic or radarscope photographic reconnaissance of this portion of KOREA STRAIT by planes of Patrol 1 and Baseset 21 as practicable. Location and course of any mine layers observed is especially important. This modifies request of my 040400 Feb not held or needed by 5thFlt addressees.

04 1212 CINCOPAC ADV Hq to CINCPAC PEACE Info CINCOPAC PEACE COMSTHLT.

Request you cancel your 040235. Until directed to be placed in effect I do not wish my OPLAN 2-45 to interfere with efficient employment of forces concerned.

02 0115 CINCOPAC to CINCOPAC ADV Hq Info CINCOPAC PEACE COMSTHLT GTF 37.

This is part 2 of 020115. Previous part 020104. Para 2. Based on this estimate I expect TF 57 to return to LETTIE about 16 April. As soon after their return as possible I will (A) Confirm or amend the estimate in para 1 above (B) Estimate the length of time required for the major replenishment referred to in Para 1(C) above and estimate the date on which TF 57 will be ready to continue operations. Para 3. My Chief of Staff who will be discussing these questions with TF 57 on return of latter to LETTIE could if you agree then proceed to COMINCH to report the result of these discussions to you.
TOP SECRET

03 0521 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC WELM, CONEIN, BAD, ADMN, CINCPAC.
CONTHLFT CTF 71, CE MARINES 24, 34, CINCPAC.

Part 1: 
My 030526. My 260737 Jan Part 5 SECVENTU RN carrying 6 X craft is now in the Pacific and is hereby reported for duty. Subject to your concurrence I intend to keep her ready in reserve until it is apparent that an opportunity will occur for using her X craft operationally. I propose her future employment should be reviewed at monthly intervals but I do not think it is practicable.

03 0526 Part 2: Final my 030526 too PP 0521 from CINCPAC. To keep her inactive for too long a period.

05 0020 CONWESMARFOR to CONSOCALSEC. CONWESMARFOR, CONNORTHCOM, CONTFORCOAST, CONWESMARFOR, CONWESMARFOR. CONWESMARFOR, CONTFORCOAST, CONSOCALSEC, COPAC, COPAC, CINCPAC, CONWESMARFOR. CONWESMARFOR.

This is ConWestSeaFron OpPlan 2-45. Task organization (TF 06): (A) SoCalSea (TG 06.1) Capt. Lassing - forces presently assigned plus fleet air units. (B) NorCalSea (TG 06.2) Capt. Blackburn - forces presently assigned plus fleet air units, NorCalSec. (C) NorWestSec (TG 05.3) Capt. Kerick forces presently assigned plus fleet air units, NorWestSec. (D) Army aircraft units (TG 06.6) Bombardment 5th AF organized and turned over to ConWestSeaFron by CG 50562. This plan supports CINCPAC OpPlan 2-45. Assumption that Japanese carrier task force has become located and that diversification operations West Coast are contemplated.as propaganda warfare during United Nations Conference, own protective aircraft barrier patroil has been established in Mid Pacific along 180th meridian from ADAM to MIDWAY by NorPanFor and HAWSEAFORE and Mid Pacific Striking Force directed to intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces. No major fleet units (carriers, BES, EA5, etc.

This is corrected portion of plan.

will be available to ConWestSeaFron, Mission: This force will maintain air search over sea approaches to principal cities and installations on West Coast of United States, detect, intern, and to limit of capabilities destroy enemy forces located. Tasks: TG 06.1, 06.2, 06.3 effect and maintain air patrol and search to extend possible over sea approaches to principal cities and installations in own sector of the West Coast of the U.S. (Including Mexican and Canadian onshore approaches as appropriate). Augment patrol by sector search if required. Training operations temporarily suspended. Use all fleet air personnel and air units available. To limit of capabilities (balance of message will not break and is being serviced) destroy enemy forces located. Coordinate attacks with Western Defense Command and 4th AF I accordance with existing agreements, OpPlan 33F-5. TG 06.6 report numbers, availability, readiness of Army bombardment units for combat operations over water. Move attack units to rendezvous designated by ConWestSeaFron, ConWestSeaFron, designated PIENOFF. This plan will become effective only when specifically directed by ConWestSeaFron, at which time all major combatant units on west coast (fast carriers including RANGER, battleships and cruisers) available for combat service will be ordered PIENOFF for rendezvous specified by Comdr Mid-Pac Swimming Force (TF 30). Sector commanders provide for logistic support at normal bases. Logistic support of Army bombardment units at Army bases. COMMUNICATIONS in accordance with existing plans of participating units. Use OCT time. Sector commands at sector JODS JUN 11, 1945, TUBES, ILUM and SEATTLE, ConWestSeaFron at JOC SAN FRANCISCO.

3072
05 0223 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CINCPAC INFO COMINCH.

Your O30521. My views concerning HOKUSAI and her IX. craft are the same as expressed previously. I see no need for them and do not desire to intrust effective use of other forces in the attempt to create such a need.

05 0837 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CINCPAC, CINCPAC COMCLASS, CINCPAC COMMES, COMLOG CINCPAC, CINCPAC MAIL INFO COMINCH, CGEN 10, CINCPAC, COMCLASS CTF 21.

The initial successes and light ground opposition experienced thus far at OKINAWA indicate that it may become possible to accomplish subsequent phases of ICEBERG operations sooner than planned. It is intended to exploit fully any opportunity to expedite the occupation of the positions involved in Phases II and III even if all the forces and resources needed for expeditious development are not fully ready. All commanders concerned are directed to keep their plans and preparations as flexible as possible and to be ready to support an accelerated campaign. Rolling up and drastic reduction in rear areas and MARIANAS as necessary would be expected and required.

05 2341 ARNOLD to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

WARL 63941. Joint Chiefs of Staff message number TAR 62774 and Navy number 03214 of 3 April are references. 20th Air Force is prepared to furnish planning staff to meet the requirement of paragraph 3 of cited message on receipt of advice from you that your planning for the invasion of Japan has progressed to a point where participation of the 20th Air Force is desirable. I contemplate sending the Chief of Staff 20th Air Force, Brigadier General Norstad, to discuss this subject with your headquarters about the middle of May.

05 0230 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

NIMITZ to KMCO. Acceptable months for invasion KYUSHU are May to November with September to November preferable. Acceptable months for HOKUSAI are May to September with May and June preferable. Believe more than 3 months interval desirable if both operations take place in order develop full effect of forces established in KYUSHU. If 3 months interval adhered to the date of the HOKUSAI operation should govern.

05 0838 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INFO CTF 51, CTF 56.

NIMITZ to SRAVANCE INFO TURNER AND BUCKNER. Para 1. If the tactical situation on OKINAWA continues favorable it may become possible to initiate Phase 3 earlier than planned. In such case the principal difficulty will be in finding assault divisions for ADJUTANT. Although I have not yet received full reports it is unlikely that the 4th and 5th MarDiv will be ready even for a target date of 1 July. The 3rd MarDiv can probably be ready for an operation in July. Para 2. When opportunity occurs desire that you obtain the views of Turner, Buckner and Geiger as to the employment of the 6 Army and 6 Marine Divisions available in FPO to finish HOKUSAI and initiate LONGSTOM late August possibly confining objectives to CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO only. Consideration should be given to rehabilitating at OKINAWA such divisions as are required to augment uncommitted reserves for the occupation of ADJUTANT. Para 3. You will appreciate that this message is purely exploratory and that reply will not be a commitment.
06 0701 COMSHAEF to CINCPAC ADV Info CTF 51, CTF 56

SPRUANCE TO NMFTZ INFO TURNER A.M. BUCHNER. After conference with Turner and Buchner, your O2000 not to info aces and O50838 (Geiger ashore and not available on account of weather on beaches) submit the following comment: We recommend against taking further positions to northward immediately following ICEBERG 1 and 2 because of difficulties of landing on and supporting any of islands in question and because we believe value of position to us after capture is not commensurate with damage we are likely to incur from continuing enemy air attacks particularly suicide for which we have as yet no good solution. We recommend proceeding with MIYAKO operation as soon as capture of OKINAWA and IWO JIMA as availability of assault and service troops will permit using assault troops now committed to ICEBERG. This may involve somewhat retarded base development in MIYAKO unless availability of service troops can be advanced over present plans. Consider that number of assault troops available in CinPac should be adequate for ICEBERG including capture of OKINAWA PENINSULA which is recommended as well as reduction in number of islands to be occupied in CHUAN ARCHIPELAGO. Availability of service troops not known to us, Para, Believe naval forces will be adequate although mineswept and escorts should be increased at additional m-pair vessels floating docks and certain special types already requested should be provided. Para, In view of foregoing, recommend (A) Target date of Phase 30 be 1 June, (B) Phase 20 15 August. Para, Prior to moving ashore Geiger expressed himself as in favor of using available troops of 3rdPhilCorps for MIYAKO.

06 0125 COMINCHFLPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Recommend 3rd PhilCorps reorganize and reequip at target and be employed Phase 30 ICEBERG in lieu of 5th PhilCorps. This refers your O50037 April and 280520 Feb. In view light casualties and limited opposition believe adequate replacements and material replenishments available GUAM and reequippments. This should permit advancement tentative target date Phase 30. Further recommend 5th PhilCorps be employed LOCHTON in place of 3rd previously recommended.

06 0615 21ST BOMCOM to COMOUTHAF Info BOMCOUTHAF CINCPAC ADV 73RD BOMBING 31STMAR

03/47, Subject: Summary of Minelaying Operations: B-29s of 21st BomCom have laid a total of 1690 mines using 205 sorties in initiation of complete strategic mine blockade of Japanese home waters. Minelaying missions of STARVATION 1 to 6 were designed to obtain closure of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and HIROSHIMA-KURE area in order to terminate all merchant traffic through SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and prevent free use Jap fleet against our operation ICEBERG. Attempt was made to contain major Jap fleet units, in particular battleships and carriers, since reconnaissance indicated those forces were gathering in preparation for a sortie. This sortie could be through either the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS or BUNGO STRAIGHTS. Total of 612 mines dropped in field MIKE of which 588 were estimated effective. Total of 694 mines were dropped in field L in which 640 mines were estimated effective. Total of 78 mines dropped in field J of which 70 were believed effective. Total 12 mines dropped in field H in which 320 mines were estimated effective. Total of 34 mines of which 40 believed effective were dropped in approaches of SASEBO HARBOR. All above mines dropped from altitudes of 5000 to 8000 feet. Total of 45 mines dropped directly in KURE HARBOR among fleet units at anchor of which it is estimated 40 are probably effective. These mines dropped from 25,000 feet. 20 additional sorties scheduled for 3 and 4 April, 10 on each.

-Continued -
night to ensure complete blockade of these fleet units by reinforcing Field 1. We suffered loss of 3 aircraft, probably due to enemy action and 1 aircraft crashed while landing. Total number personnel reported killed 19; total number missing 33; total number injured 2. Mine types used were approximately 90% acoustic and 10% magnetic. 1000 pound mines were used at depths from 3 to 15 fathoms; 2000 pound mines from 15 to 20 fathoms. Acoustic mines were set on medium sensitivity without arming delays or ship counts since basic plan assumed this mine could not be swept by enemy and because it was known that enemy was prepared to employ grazing methods to clear channels and shallow waters. Arming delays uniformly spaced were used on 2000 pound magnetic and ship counts were distributed between 3 and 10, 1000 pound magnetic mines were used. Dead periods usually divided between 8 and 10,5 seconds without arming delays or with 30% of the mines on ship counts of 2. This preparation was made after careful study of effectiveness of Japanese 9k3 sweep against this type mine with long dead periods. It was possible to prepare and use a small number of magnetic mines designed to select larger ships. In view of extreme difficulty the Japanese would encounter in sweeping these mines with long dead periods, combined with acoustic mines, it was believed that it would be disadvantageous to use long arming delays and ship counts in view of the shallowness of the water permitting easier use of grazing methods which would be discouraging if heavy loss of sweepers resulted. It is intention to modify this type preparation as soon as evidence is available in regard to the effectiveness of enemy in sweeping mines with these particular arming periods. The relatively high effectiveness of 90% in this mine operation is ascribed to care taken in preliminary training in radar detection techniques which were of simplest possible nature. Estimates that JIHOCHOSHI STRAITS will remain closed to all traffic from JAPAN area until at least 7 April and possibly longer. Believe western entrance to STRAITS may be opened by enemy during next week in April but it is probable he will encounter appreciable losses after opening, caused due to mines with delayed arming. Believe minefields in the JAPAN area will offer definite 96% deterrent to shipping attempting approach to western entrance of JIHOCHOSHI STRAITS and to naval ships attempting to fuel at TOKUYAMA. Enemy forces consisting of 1 battleship and 12 cruisers and destroyers were observed prior to minefield at TOKUYAMA. These were later observed on 29 March near minefield between HIMA SHUKI and KAGA SHUKI and have subsequently been observed on 1 April in SAM-RO sector. It is from these sightings that this force may have avoided passage through minefield and turned back after suffering losses. There is as yet no indication that major Japanese force observed in KURE consisting of 6 battleships, carriers and escorts has been able to sortie forth since mine laying of 30 March. Estimate this force will be contained within KURE area for at least 1 week, that is, until 7 April and that they may suffer losses in attempting to clear mine field out of harbor area. Conclude that mining operations were able to completely disrupt any plans that may have been made by Japanese Navy to sortie out and attack our forces engaged in landing on OKINAWA. Mining of SAM-RO was designed to trap and interfere with any naval units based there which had been observed by reconnaissance and to prevent use of this base against our OKINAWA assault forces. Opinion of this command is that accuracy achieved by crews in these operations was exceptional. All results will be confirmed by radar scope photos taken at point of release. The fact that radar laying techniques were used by all crews and much high success achieved even though visual methods in laying were feasible indicates high effectiveness of training in radar methods in obtaining high accuracy. Believe 90% of mine airborne can be effectively mined by P-40 aircraft mining at altitudes of 5000 to 8000 feet using radar methods in any type of weather encountered.
07 0105 CONSTELLATION TO CTF 58, CTF 52, Info CTF 54, CTF 52.3, CTF 50.5, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, NAV. This:
My 0615Z. During afternoon when overall situation and distance warrant attack with aircraft force reported Contact Force 58 0623Z. Keep each other and me advised as practicable.

07 0832 CTF 54 to CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CATF 54, Info CTF 51, CTF 52.5, CTF 53.5, CTF 51.10, CINCPAC

Info ORANGE force consisting of a minimum the YAMATO 2 light cruisers or heavy cruiser and possibly 10 destroyers as heading for this area and at 0825 this date was in position 30° 44' N, 129° 10' E. They can arrive this area after dark. Force believed to be on fast striking group of BANGAL type with objective of destroying ROKC shipping and combat ships in objective area. Probably their threat will be accompanied by suicide and torpedoes attacks. Para. Gen plan this force will interpose between orange forces attempting to interfere with ROKC operations in western OKINAWA and destroy them by battlejine action at moderate ranges, by light force gun and torpedoes action, and air torpedo and bombing attacks when visible on the horizon. In order to protect OKINAWA area, Para. TG 54.4 battle line Kadm McCormick BatDiv 3 INOC NEW MEXICO TEMPESTUE BatDiv 4 destroy enemy battle line by closing to a moderate range of from 17,000 to 22,000 yards. Pic then by maneuvering continue the action until the enemy battle line at moderate ranges. TG 54.6 right flank force Kadm Rodgers CruDiv 11 less SANTA FE, DDs BATSON, LITTLE, WINDSPRING, CAN.建, DEAN, HALL, TURNER, HUTCHINS, ADDISON to TG 54.7 left flank force Kadm Joy CruDiv 6 less DEERDING plus DDs, destroyers HUMPHREY, HEALEY, RUSSELL, WOODS, SMOOD, RODMAN, TURNER, WEAVER, DEWEY prevent enemy from working around our flanks and keep interposed between him and the transport area. Sink his light forces and prevent torpedo attacks upon own battle line. Forcdo enemy heavy ships when opportunity offers or when directed but keep interposed between enemy and his objective. Destroyers will generally conform to actions of cruisers. Keep TF 54 informed position enemy shipping, also condition and changes speed. Keep clear of islands except for cover. Insure enemy not using islands for cover. Attack enemy, defend own battle line. Para. Good effective on radar. General principle night battle plan Annex 1 Combatant 1 OpPlan 1-45 apply. Should TF 54 be divided into 2 CTFs BatDiv 3 plus right flank forces will be TF 54.6 commanded by Combatant 3 and BatDiv 4 plus left flank forces will be TF 54.6 commanded by Combatant 4. Para. Use zone time C-1-45, use communications Annex 3 Combatant 1 OpPlan 1-45 but use force frequency 75.7 NCS for TF 54. CTF 54 in BR 43 with TG 54.5. Opord Combatant 1 No. 1-45.

06 2116 CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, to CTF 54

Under the provisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 3 April which has been passed to you for information units of the 7th Fleet will pass to the command of CinCPac on a schedule to be agreed on by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
TO: CO 1945 FROM :

VERIFIED - 04/05/54

U. S. Army Area Commander

TO: Commanding General, 10th Air Force

SUBJECT: VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION AND RECOGNITION

The prompt, efficient, and careful identification of vehicles will be an important factor in the successful prosecution of operations. Therefore, commanders are directed to take immediate steps to ensure that all vehicles are identified and that each vehicle is marked with distinctive identifying insignia. The marking of all vehicles with identification numbers will be mandatory. The use of such markings will facilitate the rapid and accurate identification of vehicles. Commanders are directed to ensure that all vehicles are properly marked and that the marking is clearly visible from all angles.

The marking of vehicles with identification numbers will be as follows:

1. The identification number will consist of a combination of letters and numbers.
2. The identification number will be painted in a contrasting color to the vehicle.
3. The identification number will be located on the front of the vehicle, on the side, and on the rear.
4. The identification number will be painted in a prominent location on the vehicle.
5. The identification number will be painted in a small, inconspicuous location on the vehicle.

Commanders are directed to ensure that all vehicles are properly marked and that the marking is clearly visible from all angles.

The identification of vehicles will be as follows:

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2. The identification of vehicles will be as follows:
3. The identification of vehicles will be as follows:
4. The identification of vehicles will be as follows:
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Commanders are directed to ensure that all vehicles are properly marked and that the marking is clearly visible from all angles.
Ample space for taxiway hardstands and facilities. Good base good drainage coral fill. Reconnaissance in southern sector may disclose additional Vl sites. Recommend consideration be given to development these fields for Vl eliminating 2 or more Vl fields PO BANTU, T.T. This has advantage of concentration effort immediate application of present construction forces to task and elimination of difficult logistic problems at PIONER. Estimate desired dates can be met at recommended sites if early decision reached. Additional number of Vl can assist in expedite completion project. Vl fields PO BANTU can later be developed for fighter fields if desired with less logistic problems or Vl PO BANTU can later be developed for Vl fields in which case consideration should be given to elimination Vl program 30. This has advantage of concentration of effort nearer profitable targets reduction logistic difficulties and reduction of forces required. Corollary subject to airfield No. 1. The site is in navigable deep mud for foundation difficult to reach and poor drainage and no suitable building materials within reasonable distance. 4 new sites being investigated. Limited reconnaissance discloses airfield No. 8 may be impracticable. Further report when data available.

CINCPAC ADV 1157

CINCPAC ADV 1157

CINCPAC ADV 1157

CINCPAC ADV 1157

NEATZ TO Halsey: Halsey is now ordered in planning operations of eastern forces during 4/4-5/4 and operations to include line of communication into BAC of JAPAN via either K关 or KUSAipe AREA JAPAN, see my serial 000050% 31 March. It is my view that in CINCPAC the country will be best served if JAPAN is offensively covered or operations both of which must be coordinated by forces in CINCPAC. Thus each will be employed in the field in which he is best qualified.

CINCPAC ADV 0028

CINCPAC ADV 0028

CINCPAC ADV 0028

CINCPAC ADV 0028

WRIGHT TO MACARTHUR: I would be happy to have you and such staff as you choose to bring be my guests at CINCPAC to discuss the matters involved in our latest directives.

CINCPAC ADV 00526

CINCPAC ADV 00526

CINCPAC ADV 00526

CINCPAC ADV 00526

CA 51/64. Your cordial invitation to visit you is appreciated but the daily developments of campaign here are such that it is impossible for me to absent myself at this time. When convenient to you I will send Sutherland with Assistant Chiefs of Staff G3 and G4. The signal officer and one air officer for conference. The 13th is suggested. Delay to that date has been occasioned by the displacement of CO from BATA to MANILA which is in progress.
09 1155 ZINC 40 AUV to CINCPAC.

Your 090526. Will be glad to see Sutherland and the others on the thirteenth. WTP.

09 1921 CONTINUE to CINCPAC.

ASSIST TO HYDRA. In answer to your 090526 I note your 090220 consider November is latest month in the year for 001. 001 is essential that your overall command setup for naval and amphibious phases of invasion be established in early future for coordination with MacArthur's plans for land campaign. I agree with your view that this command should be placed on team of Scurrell and Turner. This will take them unavailable for HVONIC. They should therefore be disregarded from NERR as soon as practicable. To this end I suggest Halsey take the overall command about one May and the Turner pass over the amphibious command about 30 or 30 not later than one May. Para Two. Assume you will include consideration of Kinkaid dash Barrey "team" so among those who will participate in planning and operation possibly those mounted in 411. Para Three. Admiral could thus remain for making amphibious plans for 0010 and or other amphibious operations preliminary to invasion. Para Four. Assume that you will arrange MacArthur in early future as to period, time and place for coordination of invasion planning and operations directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff.

08 0512 CONTINUE to CINCPAC Info CINCPAC, JCS, FEAF, NCSA.

With view to standing on next date, desire you make 1 day 120-H strike. Factors in timing are shore-based shipping 080445 available for Turner, status your air groups and indications enemy reactions. With respect to latter, I believe the sooner the better. Turner comment on local support requirements.

10 0025 CINCPAC 58 to CONTINUE.

Your 080512. Striking date 120-H dependent upon when TF released from support amphibious forces. Will require 1 day to fuel TF from 16 oilers center area NRT and then wait for favorable weather.

10 0044 CINC OA ADV to CONTINUE Info CINC 51-56, CINC 99.4, 99.2, CINCPOA, IJNAF.

I of the principle purposes of the occupation of the Ryukyus is to establish air bases for attack on JUNS and its sea approaches. The seizure of position and subsequent to CINCPAC and LTRN will be dependent to a degree on the extent to which suitable airfields can be developed on OKINAWA. The tentative sites of 4 of the 6 fields planned for OKINAWA, namely 1 3 7 and 6 are now in our hands. 2 4 5 and 8 are still held by the enemy but our forces in the area should be able to dislodge our suitably for development. Para, request as soon as practicable the best local estimates to (1) feasibility of constructing the 6 fields planned with the capacity now projected, (2) feasibility of constructing additional fields and proposed sites, (3) feasibility of increasing capacity of 6 fields now planned while maintaining satisfactory dispersal. Para. In case either number 1 field or No. 8 field cannot be developed as planned it will be necessary either to find adequate sites elsewhere or use 1 and possibly 7 existing fields for the essential needs of search aircraft and eventually of carrier aircraft. Bureaucratic contemplated for 8 and 1 respectively. The future requirement of the accelerated can sign against
JAPAN make it imperative that there be 2 naval airfields capable of expansion. Para. Desire information as to feasibility of establishing airfields on OKINAWA north of ISHIKAWA ISESHIMA. Para. The proposal of ComGen 10 O70210 to develop airfields No. 5 and 6 for VLA is not concurred in unless adequate sites can be found elsewhere for the groups now planned for those fields. Decrease in the planned strength of the tactical air forces to be deployed in the KURUS is not acceptable. Para. These questions are of the greatest urgency since they affect decisions concerning the seizure of additional objectives to get the needed airbase capacity. Para. Can send Captain Painter to you if you desire his services.

It is urgently necessary that completion of essential operational and supporting facilities in the MARANAS for carrier aviation be accelerated. It is directed that on SAIPAN the completion of such facilities be given a priority next after essential hospitals. CinCPac Pearl issue necessary directives to implement and delete 51st NOB from troops for Phase III ICEBERG. This will leave 39th and 51st NOB available at SAIPAN until operations subsequent to ICEBERG are directed to be undertaken.

CTF 51 100440 comply. In addition to conditions he mentions I believe another heavy attack is nearly due. Para. Until shorebased air is reported by Turner to be sufficiently effective major strike contemplated your 100425 in response my 080512 must be postponed. When strike is made expect maximum oilers available will be 12 to 16 instead of 16 requested by you. Para. In interim believe long range fighter sweeps or sweeps on KYUSHU fields at critical times may pay big dividends. Desire you do this if at all practicable while meeting Turner's CAF requirements.

WAR 66096. In connection with your CAX 51420 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the operation of 1st priority in BORNEO is BRUNSWICK BAY and this area will be seized at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of providing an advance base for the British Fleet. TARAKAN will be seized prior to BRUNSWICK BAY only if essential to the success of the BRUNSWICK BAY operation. You are reminded that the British Pacific Fleet can be made available for these operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer that you do not commit forces for the seizure of BALIKPAPAN unless you can do so without prejudice to the operations against JAPAN and/or without involvement of US ground troops and the diversion of amphibious craft and equipment.
10.0442 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEACE, COMPHOTOCRIO 2, CG10, CTF51, CTG52.1, CTF52.2.

Re MyDis Top#Secret 040622. Account immediate needs for medium altitude mapping and reconnaissance coverage of southern KOREA. TSUSHIMA and SAMSHU-TO it is desired that arrangements be made for staging 2 or 3 Liberators of Photo Group 2 through OKINAWA as soon as feasible. Maximum number officers 14 enlisted 7,000 gallons AVGAS will be required per mission. Oxygen required. Para. Request you inform Cincpac expected date Photo Liberators can stage through OKINAWA fields. (*Ref - secret)

10.1145 CINCPAC ADV to COMTHFILT Info CINCPAC PEACE.

Sterilization date of 1 Sept for all mining targets your 090835 is satisfactory. Mining POCHOW and WENCHOW approved with same sterilization date.

11.0353 COMPHIBGRP13 via COMTHFILT TO RAFT INFO COMTHFILT, CINCPAC ADV, PACFLT CARRIER AIRCRAFT POOL SAMAR.

Reference to your letter FT No 2018/432 dated 6 April 1945 not to all. Arrangements have been made and authorization is hereby given for accommodating 25 British aircraft and 4 officers and 55 ratings at SAMAR. Pacific carrier aircraft pool beginning 15 April. ComThFilt has agreed to provide necessary tentage for personnel. It is requested that no increase in numbers stated in this despatch of British planes and personnel based ashore at SAMAR be made without additional request to ComPhibGroup 13 and receipt of authorization by addressee.

11.0706 CINCPAC ADV to COMHARGILSAREA INFO COMSUBPAC.

Your 100634 Desire you do not depart from regular routine searches until 19 April. Unless special circumstances arise do not send air strikes against WAKE prior to this date. Complete absence of air during this period will greatly enhance probability of successful accomplishment of submarine mission.

11.1021 CINCPAC to CINCPAC BOTH Info COMUNCH, BAD WASH, COMTHFILT, ADMIRALTY.

My 260739 January not to ComThFilt. It has been found necessary to withdraw ILLUSTRIOUS to UK for refit. 2. ILLUSTRIOUS will be relieved by FORMIDABLE in TF 57 after present series of strikes on approximately April 13th.

12.0112 (PROBABLY COMTHFILT) TO CINCPAC ADV, CTF51, 58, CTG 52.1, 50.3 Info COMAIRPAC SUBCONFID, COMANTPAC, CINCPAC PEACE.

Cincpac Adv 080846. To keep abreast situation with minimum LAG request Cincpac Adv direct ComAirPacSubConfFord keep CTF 51 advised current and anticipated need for services additional CVEs for aircraft transportation to combat area basing his estimations on his knowledge planes and pilots in pools and on direct information from CTF 58 CTG 52.1 and CTG 50.3 who are directed to keep him informed. CTF 51 directed meet requirements by assignment of combatant CVEs from CTG 52.1.
WARNING ORDER.  HyDis 280529 Feb modified as follows. In order to be ready to exploit successes in Phases I and II and to prepare to deploy in the Ryukyus a maximum air force at the earliest possible dates initiate preparations for Phase III (c) ICEBERG with target date (A-Day) for ADJUTANT (MIYAKO JIMA) on L plus 76. Operation will be conducted by same higher troop commanders as Phases I and II. Assault troops for operation will consist of 3rd Amphibious Corps with Corps Troops 1st 2nd and 6th MarDivs reinforced or equivalent units designated by ComGen 10th Army from forces under his operational control. Necessary DUKW COs and NCOs as designated by ComGen 10 attached. 334th and 720th Amph Tractor Ens mounting point.

Oahu, 726th Amph Tractor En mounting point SAIPAN. 750th 8 inch How Bn Hq Det 28th Smoke Gen Bn 67th and 68th Smoke Gen Cos mounting point. Oahu, 1 Army CML Mortar Bn when available. Para. Garrison troops will consist of following:

(A) To be provided from troops locally available to ComGen 10. 1st MarDiv reinforced which will remain on target until relieved by Army garrison unit.

2 Firing Batteries AAA Auto Mpsn, 1 En AAA guns (90mm), Btry C (Less 1 Plt) 294th S/L Bn. Hq and Hq Btry 230th S/L Bn. (B) To be mounted HAWAIIAN AREA. Hq and Hq Btry and Btry A 867th AAA AV Bn. 143rd Hq and Hq Btry CA Grp.

(C) To be mounted KWAJALEIN. Btry D 867th AAA AV Bn. (D) To be mounted GUAM. 867th AAA AV Bn. 46th AAA Gun Bn. 771st AAA Gun Bn. 2nd Plt Btry C 294th S/L Bn. 177th CA Bn. (E) To be mounted SAIPAN. Hq and Hq Btry 69th AAA Grp.

206th AAA AV Bn (Less Btrcs C and D). Btry B & C 867th AAA AV Bn. 865th AAA AV Bn. Btry B 230th S/L Bn. Hq and Hq Btry 59th AAA Brig. 33rd CA Bn. (F) Mounting point ANGAU. 45th AAA Grp C. (G) To be mounted FINSCHHAVEN. 1 AAA gun Bn 1 AAA Grp Hq. (H) Operations Det. Para. Garrison air forces: MarAirGrp 14, HedRon 14, Seron 14, MarFtrRon 212, 222, 233 mounting NAVAL. MarAirGrp 12, HedRon 12, Seron 12, MarFtrRon 115, 211 and 218 mounting ZAMBOANGA. HedRon for ATC mounting on west coast. VMF(N) 533 mounting ENGEBI. VMMB 331 mounting MAJURO. MAN 57 mounting OKINAWA. 2 CBMs and 1 NCO to be designated by ServPac. 2 VLR Wing complete with Hq and accompanying service units. Photo Sqdn WH. Photo Lab Bm Grp WH. All to be designated later and all mounting from West Coast. Para. In the following 2 paragraphs the remarks in parentheses shows availability of units as indicated in ComGen POA serial 0001L5 Mar 28. Para. Additional aviation service units:


- Continued -
Trk Co from OAHU, 3072th, 3073rd, 3074th, 3076th Dump Trk Cos and 2 other Cos from west coast. 1 Hwy Shop Co (short). 2 Petrol Dist Cos from West Coast.
1772nd Plt Parts Supply from OAHU, 1 parts supply Plt (short). 2848th Gas Gen Det from SAIPAN, Med. 2 San Cos (short). 1 Field Hosp from PHASE I or II. 317th Gen Hosp and 210th Sta Hosp from west coast. 39th Sta Hosp from ANGAUR. 20th 31st 122nd 382nd Sta Hosps from GUADAL, NEW C., ESPARITU, SANTO and west coast respectively. 3 Malaria control units and 2 Med Survey Units from PHASE I or II. 149th Vet Det (food insp) from west coast. 2 Vet Dets (short). 877th Med Sup Team number 5 from OAHU. MILITARY POLICE. 1 MP Co Corps (short). 1 MP Rn (short). 1 MP Proc Plt from Phase I or 2, 1 Criminal Invest Sec Type 2 (short). 2 Encl Guard Secs Type 3 (short). 1 Mess Team No. 2 (short). 1 MP Co for Military Govt. Miscellaneous. 1 Intell Servy Org and 1 Order of Battle Team from Phase I or II. 77th GIC Det from Phase II. 2 CIC teams from OAHU. 1 Photo Interv Team from Phase I or II. 1 Special Servy Co (short). Ordnance. 1 Hq and Hq Det (short). 302nd and 1 other Hq and Hq Det Bn from OAHU, 247th and 248th Amm Co, from West Coast. 323rd Depot Co from west coast. 3233rd Depot Co from OAHU. 2 Ham Cos from west coast. 584th Hvy Maint Co Trk from west coast. 354th Mast Maint Co AA from west coast. 382nd MAM Co from west coast. 154th MAM Co from OAHU, 406th and 296th MAM Co from west coast. 114th ED SQD from Phase I. 215th 216th 217th 219th ED Sqds from west coast. 3 Quartermaster. 1 Hq and Hq Det 529th Op from OAHU. 4474th Depot Co Supply from OAHU, 150th Oa Trk Co from ANGAUR. 4102nd 4106th 894th 895th 95th Trk Cos from OAHU. 4154th Salv Coll Co Less 1 Plt from west coast (1 Plt short). 5 Driver Aug Teams (short). 1 Gas Supply Co (short). 5 Hq and Hq Det 9M Bn (short). 2 Encl Cos (available 1 Plt ANGAUR 1 Plt WC). 1 Grs Plt from OAHU. 2 Salv Repair Cos (1 Plt available ANGAUR). 2 Ldry Cos (1 Plt available ANGAUR). 4517th 4518th Serv Cos from west coast. 6 other Serv Cos required (1 Plt available ANGAUR). 2 Funig and Bath Cos (short). 2 Sec Hosp Ldry Type B (short). 5 Sec Hosp Ldry Type E (short). Signal. 103rd, 105th, 221st, 250th, 311th radar Mast Units from OAHU. 1 Sig Const Co Hvy (short). 1 Sig Serv Co Opn (short). Transportation. 1 Hq and Hq Co Amph Trk Bn (short). 526th Hq and Hq Det Port Bn from west coast. 364th Hq and Hq Det Port Bn from OAHU, 493rd and 495th Amph Trk Cos from CANDY. 491st and 493rd Amph Trk Cos from HAWAIIAN AREA. 142nd 145th 146th 147th 148th and 137th Port Cos from west coast. Overhead. Hq and Hq Garr Force (83% available). 30 Military conscripts (short). 37 Military Govt Intep (short). 1 Signal. Army units listed in preceding paragraphs which have not been designated should be so designated with mounting point by ComGenPOA by dispatch as they become available. 3 Naval Service Units in accordance with ComServPac Splttr Ser 0001003 dated 10 March. Plus the following units: 1 NCB for waterfront work. 2 NCB Regt Hq. Military Govt Hosps consisting of 4 G-6 and 3 G-10 naval functional components. 4 NIA functional components for Military Govt. ComServPac requested to designate units above by dispatch indicating mounting points. Para. Cincopoa Pearl designate necessary military gvt dets by dispatch. Para. Units listed in this dispatch is a preliminary list of units and is based on revised troops list Phase 3(c) now being formulated. Para. On completion of Phase 3(c) Hq 3rdPhibCorps, Corps troops and 6thMarDiv return to CANDY for rehabilitation and 2nd MarDiv return to SAIPAN for rehabilitation. Para. All combat and garrison units including service, construction, aviation and defense units for ADJUTANT other than those employed in Phase 1 and 2 should be ordered to report at the earliest to ComGen 10 (info OQ 10 rear). Garrison units should report in addition to prospective ISCom of ADJUTANT (BrigGen Edwin B Lyon), CTC 99/4. Those not in the immediate vicinity reporting by dispatch. Para. Col. Benjamin R Wimmer USA is designated as CincMar Corps troops, Col Ford C Rogers USEC is designated as AirDefComd. Both Officers should report to ComGen 10 and CTC 99/4 by dispatch. Para. ComServPac expedite nomination of officer as ComNavActivities Mid 19529 280529 February 1983
2312 CINCPOA to CINCPOA, Pearl, CGPOA, COMNCOG, CICPOFAC, CG, 3rd PHIBCORPS Info COMINCH,
HARCORPS, CINCSPA, TSCO, GUAM, COMINCFAR, TSCO, OKINAWA, JCOM SAI, CTF51,
COMSTAF.

Pursuant to recommendation of ComGen 10th Army rehabilitation and preparation for their next operations subsequent to Phases 1 and 2 of ICEBERG will be accomplished on OKINAWA for 3rd PhibCorps less 2nd MarDiv and for 24th Army Corps including 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Divisions. 2nd MarDiv will be returned SAI, After Phase 3 3rd PhibCorps Hdqtrs and Corps troops and 6th MarDiv will be sent to GUAM and 2nd MarDiv to SAI. 1st MarDiv will remain ADJUTANT until relieved by a non amphibious division.

13145 CINCPOA ADV to CHQ, SITPA MACARTHUR Info COMGENPOA, ADV BCH CHQ, COMINCH, CINCPOA,
PEARL, COMGEN TEN, COMDTEN, COMSUPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COMSTAF.

UrDis 090213. Expect to use for Phase 3 (c) ICEBERG see HyDis 122310 the following AAA units: 1 Gun Br, 1 Grp Btr, 1 Opsn Det from FHFSCHEN. Para. Desire to use immediately 1 S/L Btr for Phase 2 ICEBERG. Para. Request designation of units required for Phase 2 and Phase 3C. 2nd. Plan to use in Phase 3D ICEBERG the battle of units listed UrDis 090213 with the exception of 1 Opsn Det which is not required at this time. Request designations these units. Para. Shipping arrangements to mount units will be coordinated by Cincooa Pearl. Para. Based on the above ComGenPOA is authorized to deal directly with action addes as regards these units. Para. Advise Cincooa as to allocation of shipping desired for mounting these units and mounting dates. Plan to have ComSupac ship equipment referred UrDis 090213 to units concerned as soon as practicable. Please advise destinations desired.

131641 COMINCH & CHQ to CINCPOAC ADV Hq, CINCSPA, CINCPAC.

Part 1 of 131644, An advising British Admiralty delegation that tentative date for seizure BRUNEI BAY by MacArthur is 23 May. That units of British Fleet will probably be allocated to this operation, and that British resources referred to in CINCPOAC 200740 March not to all should be used for establishing fleet base facilities at BRUNEI instead of MANUS. BRUNEI base will parallel FIOBAC, U.S. Pacific Fleet Base in EYEBGE GULF.

13 1644 COMINCH & CHQ to CINCPOAC ADV Hq, CINCSPA, CINCPAC.

Part 2 final of 131644. Part 1 was 131641. Its use designed to provide for employment of British Pacific Fleet either south, west or north in future operations against JAPAN. Operations to northward will require use of advanced anchorages by British Pacific Fleet such as in the PHILIPPINES and in the NEAR EAST.
TOP SECRET
APRIL (0RD)

140038 CONGENFOA to CINCPOA ADV Info CINCPOA PEARL, OG 10TH, SCHOFI ARMY REAR.

PM 59751: In view of information contained in CTF 51 and CTF 56 dispatch 090235 and authorization in your 091157 to ComSthFlt recommend effective date 9th Flty is designated Area Reserve be deferred to 1 June current period preparation of the Div for May 1st alert is well underway but is working a severe hardship upon the facilities of OAHU due to critical shortage of service troops and concurrent support required for other TENGUS forces our radio reply requested.

143029 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC PEARL, CONGENPOA Info CONGENPOA DIV ATC, COMAIRPAC,
CONMAUTCS, CONGENMAPO, CONSERVPAC.

Refer Cincopac secret serial 0096 of 10 October 1944. The mission assigned TARSMA is hereby revised as follows: HAWKINS POINT BAY ISLAND to be maintained as an Air Base to support activities of the ATC until such time as they may be withdrawn. Necessary maintenance and service personnel must be provided. The Atoll and Air Base to be provided by the Army. Reduction to meet the mission will be affected as hereafter indicated: (A) immediately reduce to ATC activities and nucleus Navy garrison adequate to support same. (B) Navy replace entire garrison as soon as practicable and not later than 1 June. (C) Close out activities.

141210 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPOA PEARL.

Request your comment on ComSthFlt’s 130530. It is desired to expand and accelerate the Naval Base OKINAWA in order to support an accelerated campaign against JAPAN.

080140 CONTRAIRCRAFTPAC TO USS RANGER & ASSIGNED ESCORTS, COMAIRPAC, COMRAVEON,
COMMAUTCS, COMINSS, CINCPOA PEARL, COMSUBPAC, COM4TF, COMSEAC, COMFRC, COMCINCPAC,
CONSTATE, COMCOMAFRON, COMHAWAIAFRON, COMORPAC, COMCRDIV 1, COMFLEET 57.

Following is TG 30.5 OpPlan 1-45. Task organization. TG 30.5 air striking group RADM H. Y. Jennings, SubPara A, TT 30.5, 1 carriers RADM Jennings BONAVENTURE RICHARD plus air group designated by ComAirPac RANGER plus air group designated by ComFleetWestCoast additional carriers with air groups later assigned. SubPara B, TT 30.5, 2 escorts later assigned. Para 1. Enemy Forces: Enemy capable forming strong carrier Task Force. Own Forces: SubPara A, TG 30.1 Surface striking Group composed CruDiv 1 DesDiv 57 less 1 DesDiv plus additional units less carriers assigned will join and support this group. NorPac and HAWAII FORCES directed maintain air barrier patrols along 130th meridian ADAM to MIDWAY. WestSeAFRON directed maintain air searches over sea approaches principal cities and installations west coast. 5thFlt will support by striking retiring enemy raiding forces. Assumptions: Unlocated enemy carrier TF proceeding diversionary operations eastern Pacific area and possible raids on west coast. Para 2. This group will conduct air searches directed by CTF 30 and will attack enemy units within range with all available aircraft in order to prevent enemy attack on west coast. Para 3. SubPara. Carriers. (1) Conduct air patrols and searches according doctrine and as directed. (2) Intercept destroy enemy. Primary target carriers. SubPara B, Escorts: Screen carriers of other units according doctrine battle plan and as directed. SubPara. (1) This operation designated FIREBREAK. (2) This plan based ComSrdFlt CTF 30 OpPlan 2-45 and effective only when directed. (3) All units maintain maximum readiness extensive offensive operations consistent present employment. (4) Rendezvous of units proceeding from
PEARL NORPAC and WEST COAST will be specified by CTF 30. (5) Current doctrine tactical orders and instructions effective and will be supplemented as necessary by annexes. (6) Cruising instructions battle plans CTF 30 and annexes this plan will be delivered in rendezvous. (7) Be prepared towing and to be towed. (8) Conduct training exercises as possible enroute and thereafter as directed. Para 4A. Logistics PEARL and WEST COAST ports. (8) Replenishment from TG 30.5. Para 5 A. Communications ComCom 2 Pac 71. Zone time Z (GCT). C. CTF 30.5 in BON HOMME RICHARD or as designated.

15 0620 OT 93 to OT 93 4 Info CINCPAC. BOMCOM 21.

CINCPAC 150410 COT. Change Mustang strike from ATSUGI airfield to airfields in southern KYUSHU for tomorrow the 16th. Also use NAF 612 in full strength. Intelligence data will arrive by B-24 tonight. Submit your plan to include time of attack to me with info CINCPAC, CTF 58, CTF 51, by urgent dispatch immediately, repeat, immediately. Happy hunting.

15 0957 OT 93 4 to OT 93 Info CINCPAC, CTF 58, CTF 51.

Can do KYUSHU this way. Plan A: Sweep south airfields and remain in area for 2 hours proceed to OKINAWA for service and return to base. If approved request you inform OKINAWA bases. Plan B: Strike KANoya airfields remain maximum 40-5 minutes and return to base at TWO. Take off 0900 (-10) over target 1245K.

16 0250 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSSWAPO INFO CINCMCH.COFSPS.USA. COMTHFELT, CONGENPOA,CINCPACHQ.

1. Your dispatch concurrence is requested in the following proposals concerning action to be taken to implement the directive of JCS 032140 and to expedite planning and preparation for the invasion of JAPAN. (A) CINCPAC and CINCPAC assume immediately command of all forces of their respective services for purposes of Army and Navy administration. (B) CINCPAC release to the operational control of CINCPAC as rapidly as possible all Army forces and resources now under his control except those which CINCPAC considers essential to the functioning development or defense of the POA or to the success of operations which the Joint Chief of Staff have directed CINCPAC to conduct. The resources to be released would include depots and supply systems and similar logistic activities. (C) CINCSSWAPO release to the operational control of CINCPAC all naval forces and resources except those which CINCSSWAPO considers essential to the functioning development or defense of the SWPA or to the success of operations which the JCS have directed CINCSSWAPO to conduct. (D) CINCSSWAPO and CINCPAC retain their coordinating authority over logistic matters within their respective areas but each commander assume as rapidly as practicable full logistic responsibility for the forces of his own service. (E) Within the POA the existing Army and Navy responsibilities for joint logistic support of positions in the MARSHALLS CAROLINES MARIANAS and RYUKUS continue in effect until changed by mutual agreement. (F) Army combat units in the garrisons of island positions in the MARSHALLS CAROLINES and MARIANAS to be relieved as soon as practicable by corresponding units of the naval service and released to CINCPAC. (G) CINCPAC will each establish as soon as possible the necessary command organizations for planning and conducting the phases of the invasion of JAPAN for which they are responsible.
170245 DEPCOMAF 20 TO COMWDCAREA Info CINCPOA, DEPCOMAF 20 ADMIN.

1723. Over 5000 members of 58th Wing arrived destination without tentage, other field equipment or transportation, Request every effort be made to expedite movement of cargo vessels CAPE SAUNDERS, CAPE SANDY, CHARLES E SMITH, WILLIAM HAWKINS in this and other theaters.

170557 CINCPOA ADV TO COMSTHFLT, CONFWEAREA, CT51, COMBENTEN, CT099, 2, CONGENAAPPPOA, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPACSUBCORM, DEP, CONGENAATMARRATLING, CINCPOA PEARL, COMMASCMARRESSAAREA INFO CONGENAAPPPOA (ADMIN), COMAIRPAC.

Para 1. (A) Flight echelon MAG 22 less VMF 314 at ENGINEL, VMF 311 enroute GUAM in THESS BAY ETA 25 April. Ground echelon now loading in MARIANAS. (B) 313 Fighter Group (118 F-47N) ready at SAIPAN ground echelon afloat ULITHI in KEMORE (AK 221) and mership S HALL YOUNG. (C) 1 Night Fighter (H-61) Squadron now in MARIANAS available if required. (D) 134th Fighter Group (100 F-47N) ready MARIANAS 1 May. (E) 507th Fighter group (96 F-47N) ready MARIANAS 10 May. (F) Units of MAG 11 now at PELELIU, VMF 111, VMF 155 in MARIANAS. VMF 225 at GUAM can be made available for emergency movement if needed before any of the above become available. Para 2. All addressees to take such action as practicable to expedite and facilitate increase in shore based fighter strength RTKUS including forward movement ground echelons subject to necessary coordination of arrival dates at OKINAWA.

170647 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA Info COMSTHFLT. Part 1 170653, If BIF is to provide anything more than a small force for the operation outlined in Cominch 131644 (not to ComstHFlt) TF 57 will be obliged to withdraw from ICEBERG on conclusion of the present series of strikes. (2) The period at LINTJE between the return of TF 57 and the mounting of the new operation (estimated at about 3 weeks) would be employed in replenishment and in planning and practicing for the new operation. (3) This new operation cuts directly into the period planned for the major replenishment of the fleet (Part 2) as projected in my 050115 April. (4) It will be appreciated that our lack of shore facilities in the forward area makes long distance logistics planning necessary and consequently some reduction in operational availability will inevitably result if such plans are seriously upset.

170654 DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA ADV INFO ISCOM TINIAN, CONFWEAREA, CONGENAATMCOM 9, DEPCOMAF 20 ADMIN.

1732. Para 1. Request authority to base the 489 Very Heavy Bombardment Group and the 369 Service Group Special on North Field TINIAN on or about 1 July. Para 2. Sufficient available parking areas exist to accommodate this group Para 3. Only the minimum necessary housekeeping facilities need to be constructed for these 2 units. Para 4. Unless the above request is approved, existing additional airbase completion schedules will not permit the employment of this very long range group until approximately 15 September. Para 5. Recommend comments of info addees be secured.
TOP SECRET
APRIL (C)<

17 0725 CG AIRMPAC TO CGF 99-4 CTF 99 INFO CINCPAC BOTH CTG 32 2 3RD EIDCORPS COMAIPAC COCENTEN REAR COMTHFIL MARCORPS COMPHIBSPAC COMCPAFFMPAC COMGENS ever AFMPAC COMTHFIL MARAIR, INGL MARATWING 4.

Following units reporting for duty: HedRon 62, HedRon 12, SeRon 12, MarAtRon 115, 211, 218, HedRon 14, SeRon 14, MarAtRon 212, 222, 223, MARVGFRON 533 and MarSoBomRon 331. Reference Cinpoa Adv Hq L22510 not to or needed by all. Readiness date at mounting point in PHILIPPINES 1 June.

17 1155 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COMAIPACSWPA COMGENSUTAHF COMGEN 13THAF.

CINCSWPA serial 14196 date timed 170910. Best info here indicates attacks on our forces OKINAWA area are using SHINCHIKU TAIHOKU GIRAN and KARENKO airfields. Rear bases believed TACHU and SHUKOZAN near TAKAO, SHINCHIKU, believed most prominent. TANZUI probably used for seaplanes shuttling to AMAMI O SHIMA.

17 1310 CINCPAC ADV TO COMFENDAREA.

Request your comments on DepCom 20 AP 170654 with due regard to future requirements Fleet Air Wing 18 and 2 VLR Wings plus 1 extra VLR Group already planned to be based TINIAN.

18 0005 COMGENBOMCOM 21 to COMAF 20 Info DEPCCM AF 20 DEPCCM AF 20ADMN COMCHENPOA CINCSWPA CINCPAC ADV.

AIPIN 1116. REdad NR 1681 from DepComAF 20 DTG 150748 April, which quotes their letter to Cinpoa Adv subj: Requirements for VLR units. In order to employ the largest possible number of VLR aircraft against Japanese Empire at earliest practicable date it is strongly recommended that favorable consideration be given to proposal that 316 Wing be deployed into MARIANAS. In this connection the following comments are offered. Para A. Present echeloning of air depot groups into LEGUMINOUS indicates that, based on experience in MARIANAS and considered probability of enemy action against LEGUMINOUS support of VLR operations by LEGUMINOUS air depot should become available on approximately the following schedule showing percentages of ultimate depot capabilities available by dates indicated: supply 5% and maintenance 9% by 1 August 45, supply 40% and maintenance 0% by 1 September 45, supply 60% and maintenance 5% by 1 October 45. Supply 90% and maintenance 10% by 1 January 46, and supply 100% and maintenance 50% by 1 Feb 46. In this connection it is desired to emphasize that air cargo shipments have been essential to support of XXI BomCom operations. Unknown is planned schedule of air tonnage to be made available for support LEGUMINOUS air depot, but it is obvious that diversions of air tonnage or any other form of logistical support from that presently allocated to MARIANAS would have immediate and serious effect on XXI BomCom operations. Despite its present overload, it appears that Guam Air Depot could support 316 Wing operations effectively much earlier than could LEGUMINOUS Air Depot. Appropriate augmentation of Guam Air Depot of course would be required at earliest practicable date. Para B. Other major problems incident to deploying 316 Wing in MARIANAS appear to be 1st, operating area, 2nd, port capacity, and 3rd, AGF service troop availability. My staff engineer is now at LIRP collaborating with Hale's staff engineer in detailed survey to determine work required to provide minimum operational facilities by 1 Aug 45, for additional VLR wing at North Field LIRP. Anticipate being able to furnish you with additional comments about 21 April.
18 0301 CONSERVPG TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CNO. COMINCH.

Planning for LONGJUN completed in accord CINCPOA ser. 0005023. Cincpoa Pearl informed, If target date of 20 Aug is to be met, firm orders for base units and maintenance shipments must be submitted not later than 7 May. Request instructions. Splan a recommendation for naval base commands follows.

18 0653 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA PEARL.

Request special notice be taken of subparagraph A3 of JCS 032141 of which last sentence authorizes and directs assembly of necessary special equipment. Since LONGJUN and OLYMPIC are alternates, construction and special equipment and other special equipment is of same character, desire procurement be initiated without delay.

18 0720 COMGENAPOA TO CINCPOA ADV.

1765. I have been directed to initiate the following action. A. Transfer the 508th Fighter Group (in HAWAII) from the 20th AF to APOA. B. Transfer the 15th Fighter Group (in WORLDMAN) from the 7th AF to the 20th AF. C. Transfer the 31st Fighter Group (in WORLDMAN) from the 7th AF to the 20th AF. D. Transfer the 7th Fighter Command to the 20th AF as a means of direct control of the fighter groups operating with the 20th AF. This would result in 6 fighter groups now present or scheduled to arrive in this theater and a headquarters fighter command being assigned to the 20th AF. Your concurrence is requested.

18 0830 COMGEN21STBOMG TO DECOM 20th AF INFO COM20thAF CINCPOA ADV COMZWDAREA DECOM/APOA/ADV.

AIPLIN 1116. Proposal to base 489th Bomb Group and 369th Air Serv Group on North Field TINIAN on or about 1 July 45 contained in your TopSec Mag 1732 dated 170654 April to Cincpoa Advon apparently assumes 489th Group will be attached to this command and temporarily conduct combat operations from Tinian pending mounting for movement to forward area about 1 Sept, and further envisions provision of only minimum necessary housekeeping facilities during this period. Unless complete physical facilities and normal logistical support are provided for these units at Tinian I cannot concur. If adequate facilities and support can be provided, I strongly urge permanent assignment of 489th Groups and other elements of 316th Wing to this command as proposed in your Mag 1631 date time group 150748 April to Com20th AF and my Mag to Com 20th AF AIPLIN 1116 date time group 180005 which proposal if approved would assure earliest effective employment of subject units against the enemy.

18 1010 CHO SWPA to CINCPOA ADV INFO C OF S MD. COMINCH COMTHPLT CINCPOA PEARL COMGENA.

CX 14286. The proposals contained in your 160250 based upon the conference between our representatives recently held at your Adv. Hqtr, have my concurrence. It is considered that this agreement is the first step in execution of the JCS directive to place all Army and all Navy resources in the Pacific under their respective commanders. If and when the JCS issue a definitive directive for an attack upon the Japanese homeland it will be necessary for CINCPAC to have greater control of Army resources in the Pacific than is now suggested by you. It is anticipated that this matter will be the subject of continued conference and adjustment and that mutually satisfactory agreements will be reached from time to time as

---Continued---
required for full compliance with the JCS directive. Orders are being issued for the Com/7thFt to report to you for administrative command. At any time you will give your concurrence I am prepared to pass to you full control of the 7th FIt as suggested through my representatives at GUAM.

18 1432 COMINCH & GNO TO COMNAVGROUP CHINA INFO CO-GENUSFORCES CHINA, CINCPOA BOTH, CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY.

Report to ComGen US Forces CHINA Theater for duty. JCS WARR 644.2 of 6 April refers. Missions and tasks assigned by Cominich remain effective under principles of unified command for US joint operations (JCS 263/24) of 20 April 1943 and are reviewed in broad outline as follows: (A) Exploit and exploit and prepare for all means available in the PAR EAST that might be of value to the US Fleet and develop maximum Chinese cooperation of present and future value to US Fleet. (B) Take charge of the American participation in the SACO Agreement (and in accordance with such modifications thereto as may be made) and cooperate with the responsible Chinese authorities in activities directed against the Japanese. (C) Establish and conduct in support of the US Fleet communication intelligence, D/F net, weather net and coastal reconnaissance and intelligence services. (D) Render all possible assistance to US Army ground and air forces, particularly in connection with mining. Photo reconnaissance and air ground aid. Para. Agreement to supplement SACO Agreement being processed for separate message. Para. Beyerly report in person and advise General TAI III, Miles report by dispatch and in person on arrival. Cinopac deliver to Commodore Miles.

18 1516 CGT 99.2 to COMSTHOLT, COMGENTERM, CTF31, INFO COMENDAREA, CONAIRPAC/SUPCOMFOR, CINCPOA BOTH, COGEN/IIIAR/AR/IVING, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRMAPPAC, COMGENIVPOA.

Cinopac Adv 170557 applies. Effective additional fighter strength practicable as follows. (A) Land ground echelons of MAG 22 and 318 Fighter Groups at IE SHIMA without delay. Fly in flight echelons these groups strikestrips IE SHIMA available. (B) Build up MAG 33 and 31 at maximum strength which urgently requires prompt plane and pilot replacements and earliest possible landing remainder personnel and equipment these groups. No additional fighter strength can be effectively based and operated under present construction plans for YONTAN and KADENA Fields. These fields can take increased fighter strength if all construction effort gives way to fighter employment. (C) Night fighter situation will be satisfactory if availability of F6F-5N is kept up by prompt replacement of losses and by earliest landing of remainder squadrons personnel and equipment now at sea. Believe this far preferable and earlier effective than employment (P61) squadron. (D) Believe best employment units MAG 11, WFP 111, WFP 155, WFP 225 as replacements to keep MAG 31, 33, 22 up to strength. (E) Request 200 additional ground echelon personnel for each MAG 31 and 33 with tentege and bedding arrive earliest fairtrans to alleviate manpower shortage until all personnel these groups arrive. (F) No operable fighter strips in sight for employment 431th and 507th Fighter Groups by availability dates.
TOP SECRET
APRIL (OCT)

18 2039 CTF 58 to COMSTFTLT Info CTF 51, ComSERON 10, CTGs of TF 58.

Your 130547. Do not desire to rotate TGs. Reduction of force in operating area will cause concentration of enemy on remaining TGs with consequent probability of increased losses. Also materially reduces number of available fighters. Prefer to retain entire TF in operating area until shore based air is ready to take over and we are relieved of direct support missions. (A) Sufficient carriers and destroyers are available for only 3 TGs. (B) ROMPETON TG 58.1 plus about 6 cripples of other TGs, TG 58.3, TG 58.4.

18 2354 CINCPAO ADV TO COMGENAPPPOA INFO COMINCH, COMGENFOA, COMHWAREA, COMCENTEN, CINCPAO PEARL.

Your compliance with the orders issued by the War Dept as quoted in your 180720 is concurred in as a matter of Army administration with the understanding that all Army Fighter Groups deployed in the FOA will be under the operational control of CINCPAO unless otherwise specifically directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

19 0025 CG FOMCOM EXT 155: OGBOMING 72, OGBOMING 313, OGBOMING 314, Info ComGENBOMING 58, CTF 58, CTF 92, CTG 93.4, CINCPOA ADV, GO DET A BOMCOM XL ING.

STNXF-19-1 Subject daily bombing. For your information daily bombing of KYUSHU will be initiated and continued, weather permitting, until further notice. You will be advised each day of proposed schedule for following day including targets, force, bomb load, assembly areas.
18 2020 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV, CINCSWPAC INFO CINCSEAC, COMYTFI.

It is my intention to allocate units of the British Pacific Fleet to CINCSWPAC for Q6 operation. CINCSWPAC CX 14221 of 17 April 1943 and my 131644 refer. After consultation action addresses are requested to report units required and dates desired.

19 0056 COMYTFI TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CHQ SWPA, COMSEVPAC, CINCPAC BOTH, BASE SHIP CTF 72.

Your 072006. Present plans indicate LUZON will become largest staging mounting area in SWPA. This will entail large concentration of assault and cargo shipping with attendant requirement for supplies and voyage repairs. Base at SUBIC BAY should be expanded to provide increased repair and supply facilities in central LUZON. Components offered my 130530 are at the expense of the SAMAR base and were made available in order to expedite the construction of vitally needed bases in the RYUKYUS. However units not urgently required in the RYUKYUS together with a proportionate number of construction battalions thus released should be diverted to SUBIC to meet requirements in central LUZON. Cincpac 170532 refers.

19 0222 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCSWPAC INFO SAGSEA, CGEN CHINA, COMINCH & CNO.

I concur in the proposal of SAGSEA 160625 that the proposed inter-theater meteorological conference be held in Washington rather than Manila.
TOP SECRET

APRIL (COT)

19 0359 CINCPAC PEARL TO COMSEVPAC, COMGENPOA INFO CINCPAC ADV.

Initiate procurement and assembly construction and other special equipment for LONGOM based on planned target date of 20 Aug 1945 EBD. JCS 032141 not needed by all refers. This is not intended to indicate that LONGOM as an operation has been approved.

19 0641 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMGENPOA, CINCSWA.

Since OLYMPIC and LONGOM are alternates and since it is logical to assume that the latter will be the least effort to be undertaken in the second half of 1945 request the concurrence of the JCS in proceeding immediately to assemble in the FOA all supplies and make all preparations which are common to both operations. Such formal concurrence will facilitate processing and support of requisitions and projects in both War and Navy Deps. The dispatch concurrence of CINCSWA is requested with respect to Army projects and resources.

19 0639 CINCPFT to VAQ, FONAS A, BS 1, AO 1, RAFT.

Alternative employments for the fleet in the immediate future are under consideration as follows: (A) Continuation of ICEBERG as at present planned. (B) Withdrawal from ICEBERG and engagement in a different operation with target date of leaving LEYTE approximately 15 May. Para 2, Plans and action to carry out intermediate replenishment of the fleet now para 1A above are to continue. My 060600 refers. Para 3, At the same time plans are to be made for filling up the fleet as far as possible at LEYTE before 15 May to meet the requirement of 1B above (these plans should not be put into effect unless a signal from CINCPFT is received. Para 4, In the meanwhile any executive action such as sending forward additional TUGS should be put in hand now provided this does not prejudice replenishment required for para 1A above).

19 1317 COMINCH & CHI TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COPS ARMY, CINCSWA, COM/TH/FLT.

My 062116 your 160230 MacArthur's 131010, I am in full agreement that control of those 7th Flt elements required for the defense of SWPA or for participation in operations conducted by MacArthur cannot pass to you, especially as you have been given no responsibility for the conduct of these operations and have not participated in making decisions and plans thereon. Para 2, Further it should be pointed out that naval units in SWPA other than U.S. (except BPF) are passed by the Allied Governments concerned to CINCSWA, and by him to ComAlliedNavForces, SWPA who is also Com/Th/Flt. The command of these allied naval units could not be passed from MacArthur except by the agreement of those concerned.
Para 1. The prompt concurrence of your CX 14239 DAS 131010 is appreciated and I share your belief that mutually satisfactory agreements will be reached as they become necessary. I do not desire to assume direct control and responsibility for naval forces involved in the amphibious phases of the operations directed to be conducted by CINCSEA because: (a) I believe unity of command is essential in amphibious operations and in the development and defense of newly captured positions. (b) There exist the complications that the Australian naval forces are assigned to you and that the British naval forces which may participate must be coordinated by your Condr, Allied Naval Forces S.F.A. Para 2. At such time as any screening vessels of the types in which we are sustaining losses can be spared from your operations for employment in IGEERG. I would appreciate their release.

CINCPAC ADY TO ALL FLAG OFFICERS PACIFIC TFPO COMNCH.

CINCPAC recently noted from a task unit consider a request for permission if opportunity occurred to divert a Japanese hospital ship to Port for visit and search. For guidance of all hands Cincpac policy is to avoid any interference with enemy hospital ships unless there is prima facie evidence of flagrant violation of international convention and then only if time and circumstances are such that directions by dispatch are infeasible. It is to our distinct advantage that no excuse whatever be given the enemy for retaliatory acts against our own hospital ships.

UNDERCVR TO CINCNA ADV.

CFB 36005. Regarding your unnumbered top secret from CINCNA ADV dated 15 April following is repeat and additional information: AIA MARU arrived in SAIGON (no date) flying a white cross flag and had on board 400 wounded and 537 seriously wounded. Following military cargo reported to have been unloaded. 1700 motors in cases, 12 sedan cars, 30 machine guns, 30 tanks, 30 trucks and some medical supplies. AIA MARU left SAIGON February 28. Above report dated 1 March. Following is additional information dated 2 March: Reports say included in 1700 cases of motors were 45 aircraft engines and also 5000 tons of munitions were unloaded which included 300 torpedoes or JUNO bombs. Believed still on board at the time were additional materials however no further information has been reported. All above information was checked and confirmed by informers in service of French Army, Navy and Police. No information available on any cargo loaded.
20 0635Z DEPCOMAF 20 PCA to CINCPAC ADV

TOP SECRET NSR 1812. For clarification my 1765 date time group 18235lZ signed ComGen AAFPOA was not intended to imply directive from War Department as indicated in your 18235lZ. Directive originated from ComAF 20. In view of above does your 18235lZ still apply.

20 2253 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC ADV to COMGEN AAFPOA, DEPCOM 20TH AF Info COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Your 20 0635. The concurrence of my 18235lZ in ComGen AAFPOA 180720 was premised on the assumption that the order quoted were issued by competent authority. If such is not the case the concurrence is withdrawn. If there is any doubt in the matter request ComGen AAFPOA clarify through Army channels and advise me.

21 0213 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC PEARL HQ

TOP SECRET. To facilitate preliminary planning for OLYMPIC request you indicate basis you prefer as to numbers and mounting areas for divisions in assault and follow up. Pending reply will work here except for mounting areas on basis WP8G 235lZ and JIC 190/1 which are in agreement but using data as available in ASP-P-SL-11 of 18 December 1944 which is based on same totals but with 9 divisions in assault and 4 in D plus 15 follow up.

21 0217 CINCPAC ADV to COMGEN AAFPOA

TOP SECRET. Request your comment and recommendations answering JCS 1190/7 of 27 March and WAX 69495 DTG 181434.

21 0700 1852 TOP SECRET. Reference WAX 69495 conversion of B2A groups. Para 2 of the 3 B2A groups and their service organizations assigned to Central Pacific are committed to ICEBERG operation. Without interfering with that operation the following contribution could be made from units and personnel in AAFPOA. Para A. No lead crews available. 2 potential very heavy bomb group commanders. 6 squadron commanders of whom 4 are actual and 2 potential. 4 actual squadron operations officers and 1 actual group operations officer. Para B. The 30th bomb group now stationed in Hawaii could be converted and could supply the enlisted specialists listed for 1 group. Para C. No specialists available from Depot groups. Para D. If the 30th bomb group is selected for conversion its associated 71st service group could supply the enlisted specialists for 1 service group.
23 0147 CONGENPOA TO CINCOPAC PACIFIC.INFO CINCOPAC ADV, CGSFIT, CCGFEC.

RJ 60135. Operational project for LONGCOM is subject/ U/R Ad 190359 April directed initiation of procurement and assembly of equipment to meet 20 August target date. In order for this headquarters to properly meet the supply requirements for such a date project CP-42 and 67 should be approved by War Dept and approved bill of materials and requisitions be at the port by 1 May. Para. All possible preliminary action has been initiated at this Hqtrs. Following additional actions are required if target date is to be met: 1. Early concurrence by Cincpac in projects GP-42 and 67 in order that they may be forwarded to the War Dept. These projects were delivered to Cincpac on 10 April. Para. 2. Early approval of the operation by JCS. The War Dept has consistently refused to approve projects for operations which do not have JCS approval.

23 1322 COM/TH/FIT TO CINCOPAC ADV.

Your 230156. My reply to General MacArthur contained in my 210735 was as was as follows: "Your 2007140 cite C 1/4/42. Consider 06 operation feasible without support of BF. No units that fleet are required. Recommend Cincpac and Cominch be so informed. Cominch CNO 126529."}

23 2303 CINCOPAC ADV TO COMINCF.

On receipt your 12020 I send query to CINCSWPA requesting his views. He in turn directed Com/Th/Fit to answer. My 230156 requested advice from Kinkaid without delay. His answer contained in his 231332 which I am separately passing to you, will CTF 57 continue to be assigned to operations with U.S. Pacific Fleet. Request early advice as they can be used advantageously.

24 0223 CONSERVPAC (APO) TO CINCPOA BOTH INFO COMSHELLEAFRON(PETPOOLPACG), ANFR, CONSOPENPOA, COMTF-DARPA, CO MFNOCOCCOL/21, CONSERVON 10, CONENAFPOA, COMNATSPC CONSRPAC, COMVFPAC, COMNADDCV, CTF 51, COM 12.

ANFR 211752 not to all or needed indicates maximum possible bulk petroleum deliveries to FOA in May and June considerably below requirements. This will result in critically low inventories during latter part of June. On 1 July in entire FOA estimate will have on hand 27 days supply of diesel and 15 days supply each of McGas and AvGas.

24 0600 CINCAPAC TO CINCOPAC ADV INFO C OF S WARDEPT FOR JCS.

CX 1/702. To implement further the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 JCS directive 032140, April 1945, radio dispatch concurrence is requested in the following proposal: Para. That Cincpac release to CINCAPAC operational control of Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, effective 1 May 1945. Para. To meet your requirements for the execution of the mission assigned to you by JCS to defend the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, the Comfit, CenPac Base Command, with the Army forces which you have previously approved as essential to the defense of HAWAII, would report to you for operational control. He will act as Task Force Commander for the execution of your orders governing the defense of HAWAII. Para. This proposed action will not change existing Joint Logistical Procedures in the FOA, nor will it affect Cincpac's operational control of other Army forces at present allocated to him. Para. This action is fundamental and is an essential prerequisite to the execution of JCS 1259/4.
24 0838 CINCPAC TO COMINCH

PARA 1. My 1700/40 and 122310, Ground reconnaissance of IE SHIMA and of all but enemy held portion of OKINAWA has been completed. Sites have been located on OKINAWA and IE SHIMA for the air bases heretofore planned to be constructed on IE SHIMA OKINAWA and MIYAKO. They are in such locations that construction troops, equipment and supplies can be unloaded rapidly. Tentative sites have also been located for about 8 additional strips.

Para 2. Only 4 sites are in enemy hands. Progress on the southern end of OKINAWA is very slow. Strong naval air and gunfire support will be needed until the Japanese defense force is destroyed. The only prospects of speeding up the operation lie in the use of the 3rd Amphibious Corps either to rotate with Army Divisions in the existing lines or to make an additional amphibious assault on the southern beaches. Para 3. With few exceptions all the amphibious forces and assault troops, construction troops and service troops now planned to be used in the capture, development and defense of MIYAKO can now be used more advantageously in speeding up the capture and development of OKINAWA. So doing will give us a larger air base capacity and sooner than would the MIYAKO operation. Para 4. The concurrence of the JCS is requested in the cancellation of the MIYAKO Operation and the use on OKINAWA of all the resources heretofore intended for MIYAKO. Para 5. The operation of KIKAI and possibly TOKUNO (ICEBERG Phases 3D and E) can be deferred until summer. The availability of 1 or more air bases for short range aircraft north of OKINAWA will be necessary during OLYMPIC. Para 6. Because of other matters now pending which are affected by this decision request earliest possible concurrence. All the foregoing has been discussed with Spruance, Turner Buckner and the senior Engineer Officers concerned and all are in concurrence.

24 1319 CINCPAC ADV HQ TO COMPHIBSPAC

Direct Com3rdPhilPFor initiate detailed planning amphibious phases operation LONGJOM and assume troops will consist of a Field Army including the 5th Amphibious Corps.

COMINCH & CHO TO CINCPAC ADV, COM7thFLT

In reaction to O-6 operation I anticipate probable attempt by operational heavy cruisers in SINGAPORE JAVA area to return to Empire. Timely deployment in SOUTH CHINA SEA area should be made to provide for this possibility and to offset destruction before escape of Japanese units to FORESSA Area. This can best be done by utilizing British Pacific Fleet in coordination with 7thFlt and shore based air in the PHILIPPINES and therefore under operational control of Nimitz. Present operations of British Pacific Fleet should be so adjusted as to permit its operational availability either to the westward of 1320W or in BRUNSWIK BAY area by the date of O-6 Operation. Para. 2. In the light of above desire further recommendations from addresses, Com7thFlt 231322 and Cincpac 232303 refers.
17 2101 COC/RDIV 1 to CRU/Div 1, DEs/DIV 113 into CON/THO, CCG/3RD/LT, CCG/5TH/LT, CGC/AC both, CON/WPSAC, CCG/WASPAC, CON/THA, CGC/WASPAC, CON/SEVPAC.

This is ConCruDiv 1 (CGT 30.1) OpPlan 1-45. Task Organization: CGT 30.1 Surface Striking Force RAdm McCrea. SubPara A. CruDiv 1 plus any additional heavy units assigned. SubPara B. DesDiv 113 plus any additional destroyers assigned. Para 1. This plan based on ConCruDiv CGT 30 OpPlan 2-45. Assumption: Enemy carrier TF is proceeding for diversionary operations in EASTERN PACIFIC AREA and is unlocated. Own Forces: NorPac and HaWSeAfron directed maintain barrier patrol along 160 Longitude from ALEUTIANs to MIDWAY. WessAfron directed maintain search over sea approaches principal cities and installations West Coast of U.S. Western Striking Force directed intercept and destroy, retiring enemy raiding forces. CGT 30.5 (Air Striking Group) of Mid-Pacific Striking Force will conduct air search for and attack enemy units. CGT 30.9 will provide replenishment services for TF 30. Para 2. This group will support air striking group and will attack enemy units with gunfire and torpedoes as directed. Para 3. SubPara A. Cruisers: Attack enemy with gunfire. Support destroyer attacks with gunfire. SubPara B. Destroyers: Attack enemy with gunfire and torpedoes as directed. SubPara X: This operation designated FIREBREAK. This plan effective only when directed. Maintain maximum practicable readiness for extended operations pending placing this plan into effect. Rendezvous with units joining from other areas will be specified. CGT 30 cruising instructions and Battle Plan will be distributed at rendezvous. Para 4. Provision ammunition and fuel to capacity prior departing present base. Replacements available FEARL and West Coast ports. Fuel at sea with CGT 30.9. Para 5. Communications CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Zone time GCT. CGT 30.1 in RICHMOND.

25 0538 (C 14766) MACARTHUR TO CINC/POC ADV.

Reference is made to your 210213 GCT of 21 April 45. Planning here for OLYMPIC is based on an assault force of 3 Corps consisting of 9 Divisions plus 1 Airborne Division with a follow up of 1 Corps and 4 Divisions. A Marine Corps of 3 Divisions (presumably the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine) and corps troops to be in the assault. The 9th Corps consisting of the 31st, 96th, 1 Div from BUNKHOUSE and Corps Troops mounted from present locations (ACUMULATION, MAHOLE and BUNKHOUSE) will be in the follow up. The balance of the OLYMPIC Divisions to be mounted from BUNKHOUSE.

26 0818 ADV 120 GCT TO CINC/POC/CGFC/POC BOTH.

CX 14803. Reference to CinCpoa letter serial 0005613 of 13 April 45 subject Naval Installations required for support of 1 Marine Amphibious Corps plus attachments if staged in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. As a result of the recent conference held in Guam between representatives of this headquarters and CinCpoa Headquarters it is understood that only 1 Division from PON will be staged in the PHILIPPINES (1st Div at LATTER). Therefore the information requested by para 3 of referenced letter now appears unnecessary. Confirmation of this understanding is requested.

25 1339 CINCPOA ADV TO CINC/THO.

Your 250818 affirmative. Tentative plans involve reestablishing 26th Corps and 1st Marine at OKINAWA. 6th Marine may possibly be reestablished OKINAWA otherwise at GUAM.
Para 1. Your CX 14/702. Pursuant to the terms of executive order 9489 issued by the President, ComGenPOA is designated as the Military Commander for the Territory of HAWAII and has responsibilities, power and authority which make it necessary that in this capacity ComGenPOA continue in his present relationship with CinCPFA, in view of CinCPFA's responsibilities with respect to the HAWAIIAN AREA. A copy of this Executive Order is being airmailed to you today. Para 2. The directive of the "Basic Logistical Plan for Command Areas Involving Joint Army and Navy Operations" signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by CominCINCPAC and issued to me by the latter on or about 6 March 1943 has been fully complied with. Under that directive CinCPFA was "charged with control of and full responsibility for all logistical services within the area under his command" and it was directed that the logistical organization provide for "wherever possible supplying items or services common to both the Army and Navy by a single agency." The logistical organization within the POA established pursuant to the directive cited cannot be quickly changed without seriously impeding preparations for OLYMPIC and other prescribed operations. Until the organization is changed extensively ComGenPOA will continue to have important logistical responsibilities to CinCPFA. Para 3. It is regretted that for the foregoing reasons I cannot concur in the proposal of your CX 14/702. You are assured however that the continued responsibilities of ComGenPOA to CinCPFA will not be permitted by me to interfere unnecessarily with ComGenPOA's responsibilities to CINCPAC.

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TOP SECRET

APRIL 37

25 OT 37

CTF 57 to COMTHFLT INFO CINC PAC BOTH, CTF 112, CINC BPF, VA (Q), FONAS (A), COMAIRBRITPACFLT.

25 OT 37

COMAIR BRITVFLT, CINC 3 AF.

Unless otherwise ordered intend to proceed from LEYTE on May 1st with TF 57 as required for future duty in operation ICEBERG. Para. 2. Consider TF 57 can undertake a further period of from 3 to 4 weeks operations on cycle of 2 days of strikes and 2 days of replenishment. Unless otherwise ordered I will resume strikes on SAKISHIMA GUNTO starting May 6th after exercising new aircrared and topping off in MOSQUITO BAY 3rd, subsequently replenishing in area COOMAR PA. Para 3. Subsequent operations of TF 57 are conditioned by logistical need at some period to undertake a major replenishment at intermediate and rear bases, and to allow time for intake of pilots to make good wastage. Para 4. Alternatives appear to be: (A) Return to LEYTE for 1 week on conclusion of operating period given in Para 2. Top up and then continue operations for about 3 weeks. Thereafter carry out major replenishment being absent from operating area for a period which may amount to 2 months before all units are ready as new air squadrons will need training. (B) Carry out major replenishment on conclusion of operating period given in Para 2 being away from operating area approximately 5 weeks. Para 5. I much prefer to aim for alternative (A) so as to give you all the assistance we can now in operation ICEBERG. Please advise CINC BPF which you prefer.

25 OT 30

COMGEN 10 TO COMAF 5 INFO CINC SWPA, COMPEAF, AAFOA, CINCPOA BOTH, COMAIR PAC COMSTIFLE.

After reconnaissance of OKINAWA SHIWO with Capt. Painter I concur with radio report airfields from ComGen 10 to Cincpac Adv. dated 18 April, with info Cinc SWPA. A minimum of 22 runways can be constructed with estimated average 75 of our standard hardstands on each. There will be enough engineer troops arrive here on present schedule to develop approximately 60 percent of these airfields for minimum operational use in next 6 months. Construction of airfields will require large part of available effort. Location of many fields have been selected to meet their minimum requirements. This island has all requirements for a major air base. More engineer troops are required for any major expansion program. Am returning with full report.

25 163 1

CMTNC & CNO TO CINC PAC ADV.

Your 240348. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in procedure recommended by the reference whereby forces and resources presently set up for MIYAKO are diverted to OKINAWA. MIYAKO operations should be deferred rather than cancelled as it may be found advantageous to conduct it at a later date.

26 0115

CINC PAC ADV TO CNO, COMTHFLT, CINC STPHIBPO, COMAIR PAC, COMPHIBSPAC, CINC SWPA, CINC BPF, CINC PAC INFO CINCPOA, COMAF ASIA, CTF 93 96, CNO COMCINCH, COMCINCH, MRCORPS, CG 3 3 BIPAC, CINC PAC, COMTHFLT, CG 3 D PFLT CINC PAC, CG 2 4 T CORPS, CG 3 D PHIBCORPS, CINCPOA PEARL, CG 3 3 PHIBCORPS, COMPHIB CORP 2, COMMPHIBFSAC, COMGEN TIP BEAR ECH.

Cancel MyDis 122310, 160745 and 210042. Latter 2 dispatches not to all. Phase III-C ICEBERG will be deferred indefinitely. The JCS have concurred in the diversion of the resources herefore intended for ADJUTANT to establish additional facilities on LEGUMINOUS. Additional instructions including revised Joint Staff Study and base development directive to accomplish above will be issued by CINCPOA. Existing studies and directives concerning these III-D and III-E remain in effect.

3100
26 0742 CINCPAC ADV TO C OF S USNAVY INFO CINCSEPA, CGAFPOA, DEFCOMO, CG21DNCOM, CNO, COMINCH, COMNORTH, AIR FORCES.

Your WARNO 69495 DTG 131435 April. The current requirements of CINCPAC for heavy bombers are (A) 1 B-24 group based in MARIANAS whose mission will be the continued neutralization of bypassed enemy air installations within range. This group may be at half strength. (B) 2 groups of B-24s based on OKINAWA. Since 2 groups are echeloned in to OKINAWA and will be at the peak of their operation during the months of September and October it is not considered feasible to disrupt their operation through conversion nor to withdraw specialists from them as their readiness and combat efficiency must be maintained.

26 1345 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCSEPA, COMTHFLT.

Have conferred with Com7thFlt who states with CINCSEPA's concurrence that the BRUNXI BAY operation can be carried on without the assistance of the BPF but British Carrier Force could be used to advantage in striking airfields in SW BORNEO. Para. With reference to your 241501 it is now indicated that HAGUNO is only enemy cruiser operational in JAVA SINGAPORE region. Submarines and shore based air should be adequate to prevent her escape. Kinkaid concurs in this view. I consider that the greatest contribution of the British Carrier Force to the war against JAPAN in the near future will be in continued participation in ICENBERG at least until additional airfields are activated in KNMI IE SHIMA about 5 May and recommend that TF 57 and TF 112 continue under the operational control of CINCPAC until that time. In view of current situation early advice is requested.

26 1442 GHQ SWPA (MACARTHUR) TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

C 14931. This is top secret. Reference your 251337 of 26 April. Phrase in question might better be expressed as 1 Corps of 3 Divisions plus 1 Divisions in Army Reserve. (INFO)

26 1340 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV AND PEARL/CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY.

Reference JCS 521/13 which is approved for planning to 31 December 1945. Para. Redeployment from EUROPE incident to VE Day will require employment in ATLANIC of approximately 1/2 troop ships now in PACIFIC. Para. It will probably be necessary to assist in the redeployment in PACIFIC by utilizing combatant types as well as APA, AKA and other amphibious craft whenever any can be made available without detriment to operations or the build up for approved operations. Comment on advisability setting up a TF to plan and direct this. Redeployment points particularly to OLYMPIC and CONTINENT but plans must for the present consider that DEGAROM or other encircling operations may take place.
26 0313 COMGEN TFM TO FOR INFO CINCPOA ADV, CONSTATEF, CONGEN, MFFPAC, CTG 99.1, CTG 99.2
CTG 99.3, CTF 51, CONGEN/PHIBCORPS, COMGEN 24TH CORPS.

Assembling 77th Div on Okinawa after which it replaces 96th Div latter to
rear area for rest. Plan following to complete Phase 1 (decision re: Phase
30 will have bearing). Remove 27th Div to Northern areas employ 3rdPhibcorps
on right of 24th Corps using initially 1st MarDiv. Later as 27th Div takes
over responsibilities 6th MarDiv release latter to 3rdPhibcorps. Details
later when announcement re Phase 30 enables firm planning.

26 2227 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPAC, CONSTATEF, CONCONF, RAD.

In view your 261364 BPF will not participate in BRADY operation and will
continue under your operational control until further directive is issued.
Para. With regard to CTF 57 250437 desire information as to localities for
accomplishment of major replenishment referred to.

27 0014 CINCPAC ADV TO CGAAPPGFA INFO CINCPAC PEARL, ISCOM TINIAN, CONFDAERA, ISCOM IHO
POCOM 21.

Your 260644. The employment of the 41 Photo Recon Sqn in the forward area
for staging thru MWO JIMA is approved. An Army air force on TINIAN will be used
as a base instead of depot field GUAM. This does not preclude the employment
this unit in LONGCOM.

27 0334 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN FOR INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

The directive of JCS 032141 of April 1945 confines LONGCOM objectives to
the eastern portion of SINGSHEE (HINOGO PENINSULA) and indicates the
desirability of confining objectives to IMPROMPTU (CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO).
The estimated operational requirements in your serial 000166 of 10 April
are based on a more comprehensive concept and consequently exceed the re-
quirements for the LONGCOM operation as it is being planned. However in
view of the necessity for initiating preparations for OLYMPIC which will
have much greater requirements your serial 00166 is concurred in for proc-
curement planning.

01:23

CINCPAC ADV TO CONSTATEF INFO CTF 94, CTG 50-5.

Your 251507. In the present strategic situation it is necessary that the
fast carriers and following them the escort carriers be released as soon
as possible from their present employment in protecting and covering OKINAWA
in order that they may be returned to port and prepared for further offensive
operations. Accordingly it is desired that the fighter strength
on shore in the Ryukyus be built up as rapidly as possible and that there
be established also a sufficient number of search aircraft of types suitable
for offensive reconnaissances in the vicinity of JAPAN. Subject to the fore-
going and without interference there with it is desired that the aircraft
available to us be used to inflict damage on the enemy and particularly
on his shipping. Any suitable squadrons in TF 94 are available to you on
request which should be made far enough in advance to minimize disruption
of his arrangements.

27 0433 CINCPAC ADV TO CONFDAERA, CONGEN 10 INFO ATGM PALMY, ISCOM S-JAPAN, ISCOM
TINIAN, ISCOM GUAM, CONFDAFA Subarea, ISCOM IHO, ADC IHO, CTF 92.

Indications of impending Jap air attacks on bases in MARIANAS and WESTERN
CAROLINES POSSIBLY FROM TRUK OR MARIAS. TAKS APPROPRIATE PREVENTATIVE
MEASURES. Believe Japs are moving planes from Emprise to TRUK via IWO JIMA.
29 0630 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CHNO INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 261340. Assume that only AF will be employed in the ATLANTIC and that employment of combatant types to move troops in the PACIFIC will be on a "not to interfere with operations or fighting efficiency" bases. Recommend that planning and operational control of assault shipping for redeployment of troops be a function of the Commander Amphibious forces Pacific Fleet since he must in any case coordinate use of same ships for extensive amphibious training, (initial and refresher) and their overhaul requirements as well. The availability of numerous group commanders and staffs will permit him to decentralise as practicable and keep his organization flexible to meet changing requirements. Use of combatant types when practicable can best be controlled by CinCPAC as heretofore.

29 1225 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL.

Desire Pearl Headquarters prepare as a matter of the utmost urgency a revised Base Development Plan for IE SHIMA and OKINAWA. The development should not exceed the total heretofore intended for IE SHIMA, OKINAWA and MIYAKO in any respect except for supplemental airfields for which sites will be reserved as indicated in my serial 0005045. The process of formal directive to and formal recommendations from type commanders will be eliminated. The naval and air base development must be carried on with highest priority since the Naval Base must serve both OLYMPIC and CORONET and air base capacity must reach a maximum by 1 October. Para. This headquarters will furnish within 24 hours a list of garrison forces heretofore intended for MIYAKO and which are now to go to OKINAWA. Para. It is not desired to impose on ComGen Ten any responsibility for decisions concerning naval installations except where interservice coordination may be necessary. Para. As a matter of policy desire no use of Army engineers on naval projects without specific authorization by CinCPAC Adv Hq. Seabees will be used for needs of projects essential to tactical defense naval projects of common interest and to full Army deficiencies in order named. Decisions as to location major projects must be cleared with Cincpac. This answers Pearl Hq Telegrams 2936 and 2944.
TOP SECRET

30 1150 WHISKEY TO MACARTHUR INFO MARSHALL, KIMMEL, CINCPAC, SHAEF.

CINCPAC 36540. Air assistance to CHINA Theater from Pacific is subject. Japanese have been advancing westward in the YELLOW RIVER VALLEY and also from the vicinity of PACHTING toward CHINKAN and IMYUAN. Their object apparently is to broaden their corridor of communications and space in preparation for successful offensive operations by CHINA Theater forces. Request that any communications concerning assistance that you might render in connection with above be sent direct to CHINA Theater Headquarters, CHINACAO. This theater can furnish necessary briefing data.

30 2255 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGENFOA INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMCINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMBHO.

Your WARX DTG 281621. The original program for establishment of 6 VLR groups in the MARIANAS plus 8 additional if practicable has now been expanded to 21 although Army construction and service troops have not yet been furnished to support the 21. It is not feasible to deploy an additional 4 groups at TINIAN without undue interference with the support of other activities. However the 489th Group can be deployed making 22 groups in the MARIANAS. Para. Sites have been located at OKINAWA suitable for support to accommodate 3 VLR wings. 4 of these strips are still under occasional enemy artillery fire and dates are not firm. It is estimated however that 2 groups can be received by 15 August and 2 by 15 September. Para. If OLYMPIC operation is ordered a general reexamination of types of aircraft to be based at OKINAWA may become advisable with increased emphasis on types suitable for attacks on enemy air forces and installations or for support of ground operations.

01 0144 CINCPAC ADV. TO COMGENFOA INFO COMGEN ARMY AIR FORCES.

My 301332 change 3rd sentence to read “The first 6 groups for VLR are estimated to be ready 15 August and 15 September and 15 October”.

01 0226 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGENFOA INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 300145. The requests contained in my serials 000351 of 19 March and 000400 of 5 April are withdrawn and the 2 letters are cancelled. Assume CINCPAC or ComGenFOA will submit request for space and facilities needed in MARIANAS for support of Army units.

01 1600 MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR INFO KIMMEL, RICHARDSON.

WARX 75413. ReURad 15140. This is a list of references: Subpara A - Rad WAR 62773 (Directive). Subpara B - Rad 160252 CinCPAC to ComGenFOA. Subpara C - Rad R59985 ComGenFOA to CinSWPA. Para. In accordance with the references all Army forces and resources previously assigned to the FOA assumed the status of assigned to CINCPAC at the time ComGenFOA reported to CINCPAC for purposes of administration. From that time, CINCPAC has had administrative control of all Army forces and resources in the FOA. Inasmuch this control CINCPAC has command authority over the movement or use of these Army forces and resources except for elements under operational control of CINCPAC and GO 20th AF. All Army forces and resources to be moved to the Pacific henceforward will be assigned to CINCPAC exclusive of 20th AF units and IJBERG exceptions noted in para B of his 15140. Para. Effective at the earliest practicable date, all correspondence pertaining to the above will be directed to CINCPAC, except for such as he may specifically request be directed to one of his subordinate commands.
TOP SECRET

MAC (CGM)

29 2121 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL. COMHUF

As verbally directed request is made for assignment of MISSOURI as ComHuf's flagship. Subject to Cinpac's current orders and approval will proceed in MISSOURI with suitable escort to OKINAWA or port where ComHuf may be and at time mutually agreed upon will relieve Spruance and assume command of designated forces.

29 1149 SHAP TO C OF S WAR DEPT - PASSED BY COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV FOR INFO.

In order to properly carry out the provisions of paragraph 3 JCS directive WX 62773 3 April especially the part which reads as follows "CINCPAC will be responsible for the provisions of Army resources to meet the requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the JCS", it is requested that effective 1 May the following be assigned to CINCPAC as Commander U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific and that all correspondence pertaining thereto be directed to this headquarters. The above requests are exclusive of Southeast Pacific Area and Alaskan Department. (A) All troops projected in the 16th troops list for SHAP and FOA and all troops to be redeployed from U.S., STO and MTO. (B) U.S. Army resources equipment and supplies arriving in the Pacific Theater exclusive of those now approved for ICEBERG and normal maintenance, Para. Upon arrival of the foregone requests instructions will be issued to Richardson.

01 0525 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPODAREA INFO CINCPAC CTG99.2, JSCOM JMO, CMO, CMO, COMGENAFPOA, COMAIR JMO, JSCOM IE SHIMA.

Take necessary action to move ground echelon of 1 F-61 night fighter squadron to be designated by ComGenAFPOA from JMO JIM to IX SHIMA at earliest practicable. Flight echelon to follow when ground echelon established ashore and when called forward by CTG 99.2.

02 0012 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSHAP INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC.

The requirements of subparagraphs 1B and 1D of my serial 00090/3 of 11 March are considered completed. It is understood that a study pursuant to 1C will be submitted shortly which will complete compliance with that subpara. Subpara 1A remains in effect.

02 0213 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH.

Propose implement BLUEBIRD with further communication deception designed to create impression increasing radio linkages between Army and Navy forces in Central Pacific, Southwest Pacific and those in CHINA. If CINCPAC concurs following plan and Joint Security Control approves, propose that appropriate directives be issued to commands concerned and Joint Security Control coordinate activities not under CINCPAC or CINCPAC.

(1) Scrutinize bona fide radio traffic readily susceptible enemy intercept to identify each message linking Army and Navy commands in Central and Southwest Pacific Areas with those in CHINA.

(2) Insure gradual increase in number of such messages and their superior precedence, with normal variations, until 10 days after target date for LONDON or OLYMPIC whichever is later. Thereafter taper off steadily without introducing compliance aircraft changes.

(3) Prevent radical decrease volume or precedence all aircraft involving CHURCHING, KURECHO and INOHA,

-continued-
(4) Maintain high volume LYTE and MANUS forces unless inordinate quantity dummy traffic required.

(5) Fully exploit bona fide traffic contributing to desired picture originating dummy traffic only when necessary. Navy will comply with LYTE 56-45 in preparation of dummies.

(6) For Navy traffic communication security units will arrange details volume precedence crypto systems call signs and methods of transmission, and for communications between units will use CSPS 2961, 22005, 2617, 4084/5/6 accordance Cominch Conf 04216 of 25 December.

(7) Maintain cover major fleet units and assault forces while at staging bases as straight security measure and to disguise departure, plus much short term tactical deception as TF commanders require.

(8) Above proposals made with understanding that plan can be terminated whenever CINCPAC CINCPOA and joint security control decide that it has served its purpose or that it interferes unduly with normal communications. Request CINCPAC advise.

02 0917 DESCOMCALAF TO CINCPAC ADV.

2189, Paraphrase of ComAF20 Telecom message HO1013-CH date time group 011264 May is passed in part for your information. Your top secret radio 2124, DTG 3006/6 April is reference. Decision has been made to deploy 316th Wing at OKINAWA, viewing field availability dates OKINAWA specified in part 1A and readiness dates of 316th Wing units here.

02 0022 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN WIRE INFO COMENDAYA, COMCHIN.

Your 010351 which refers to "Marine stocks this base" not understood unless the dispatch was originated in your capacity as Island Commander SAIPEM. Request clarification.

03 0119 CINCPAC ADV TO COMLSTCALAF, COM2NCALAF INFO COMBRIEF, COMTHBF.

Desire Com2ndCarTaskFor hoist flag in BENNINGTON, SHANGRI LA or other carrier designated by CTF 58 as soon as practicable after 16 May. It is my present intention to direct Com2ndCarTaskFor to assume command of the Fast Carrier Task Forces shortly after Com3rdCar assumes Comthbf. Until so directed Com2ndCarTaskFor is available to CTF 58 as a TO commander but his assignment as such is not required.

03 0121 CINCPAC ADV TO COMBRIEF INFO COMIND.

It appears possible that Japanese aircraft are being moved northward either for storage and or training out of VLR range and clear of carrier strikes or for purposes connected with hostilities with RUSSIA. Prior departure PEARL obtain all available data from JICPAO and give consideration to problems involved in a carrier attack against installations in HOKKAIDO, OKINAWA and Northern HONSHU for the purpose of destroying air forces and shipping, diverting forces from OKINAWA and general strategic deception. Will confer with you connection this operation at our next meeting.

03 0352 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC INFO CG WIRE, WAR DEPT. CINCPAC BOUTH.

In view CINCPAC Guam 010226 May and provisions WARR 75413 May 1 not to all needed, unless otherwise directed by CINCPAC no further action being taken by ComGenPOA to establish with War Dept requirements for troops and supplies necessary to build up HYPOCRITIE reserve in MARIANAS. All info address be guided accordingly. Perp copy of this letter required to establish HYPOCRITIE reserve and submitted War Dept "A" and being forward CINCPAC as courier air for information.
03 0618 FROM SAIPAN INFO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPAC GARDEN ISLAND.

Re: 020022 OCT. Action was taken as Fcout SAIPAN not ComDHQ WPAC.

03 0843 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC GARDEN ISLAND
CONSULTATION CONCERNING COMAIRCFS COMPOC COPIES CINCPAC OCEANA LPACIFICATION OF MPAC.

Com3rd Flt 010201 approved for such training as will not delay readiness to move forward when required. Desire similar training for all squadrons of same type since it is infeasible to earmark particular squadrons for work with submarines.

04 0244 CINCPOA ADV TO COMTHFLT INFO CINCPAC GARDEN ISLAND.

Subject to concurrence of CINCPAC request you establish planning liaison with his staff and give me your summarized recommendations (details not required initially) as to naval facilities required on shore at OLINDTC objectives for support of fleet forces including VMF and Air FMP with particular reference to terminal support facilities for escort forces. In preparing these preliminary estimates reference should be made to Mart Assumptions of Overall Logistic Plan - U. S. Navy of 1 April 1945. Copy being airmailed to you today.

04 0958 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH.

Your 021829, Msg 0005045 of 23 April contains latest estimate air base capacity LEGUMINOUS and INDESPENSABLE. Msgs 0005038 of 14 April and 0005625 of 22 April for ADJOIN and FRICION. Summary follows: LEGUMINOUS and INDESPENSABLE; Army: 3 VP Groups, 2 VBM Groups, 2 VAM Groups, 3 VLA Wings, 1 TC Group less 2 Sqs. 1 Photo Recom Sq. Marines: 1 VMB Opns. 1 VMB(N) Group, 2 VMTB Groups, 1 VMB Sq. Navy: 4 VTB (H) Sq., 2 VTB (KL) Sq., 1 VD Sq. Also following units contingent on assignment of additional construction troops and air force units. Army: 2 VBM Tps., 5 VBM Groups, 2 TC Sq. Marines: 1 VMB Group, 2 VMB Sq. These Marine VMB and VMB will be available if LONCOM is not ordered. ADJOIN. Marines: 2 VMTB Groups, 1 VMB(N) Sq., 1 VMB Group, 1 VMTB Sq. of which 1 VMB Group 1 VMB(N) Sq. and 1 VMTB Sq. will be redeployed from LEGUMINOUS. FRICION; Army: 3 VP Groups, 2 VFB(N) Sq. Marine: 1 VMTB Sq. Which will be redeployed from LEGUMINOUS.

03 1355 CG TF 10th ARM TO CONGEN TEN INFO COMINCH, GTG 51, LEGUMINOUS, LEGUM.

Indispensable - Later passed for info to CINCPAC ADV Eq.

See 280509 from ISCOM INDISPENSABLE TO CGT 51, 21. Believe dates this dispatch need revision and further evaluation as to early augmentation effective fighter strength this area. See Cincpoa Adv 170575. Thorough inspection today of IE SHIMA airfield activities by CGT 99, 21 and representatives of TAF. After consultation these people with ISCOM INDISPENSABLE, 12 May estimated earliest date airfield operable for use for Group with 11 aircraft. Too early yet to determine when additional Group can operate. Attention invited Cincpoa Pearl 290126 to CG 10th Army. This dispatch specifies latency of runway and shoulders which must be attained if we are to operate effectively as follows: (A) From I strip 111 VP of 311 Fighter Group. 15 2 engine night fighter aircraft of P61 squadron, and 22 P-5 of 29th PhotoRecon Squadrons.

- Continued -
(041523) 03 1355 CG TAF TENTH ARMY TO CONGEN TEC, ETC. (CONTINUED)

(B) From 2nd strip 96 VMF of MAG 22, 24 VMTB of 131 Sqdn and 15 VMF(N) of 533 Sqdn. Do not overlook taxiways and hardstands for this number aircraft, situated so that both groups can operate effectively. Looks like more aviation engineer or Seabees strength needed in SHIMA immediately to achieve needed airfields reconstruction and attain necessary road construction. Following dispatches apply: (A) CinCPac Adv to Com5thFlt 270631L. (B) Com5thFlt 271233 and other 5thFlt requests to move in VP and VP(N) ground echelons.

0505 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CTF 51, CTF 52

Request information your prospective needs for 2nd MarDiv reinforce. Shipping now beingheld for entire division. Desire unload and release any elements not needed for Phases 1 and 2 ICBERG including RNR2 if its occupation deemed essential to security OKINAWA.

05116 CINCPAC ADV TO CG USAF CHINA INFO AGHAR, CINCPAC ADV, CG USAF CHINA APO 627(RE), CG YAH AF, COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES JAPAN.

CG 15546. SWPA air forces are prepared to initiate limited operations against enemy lines of communications and installations indicated in your radar CPEX 365/34. Unless CHINA base facilities are available operations can be conducted only with heavy bombers. Intensity and frequency of attacks will depend on weather and range factors, availability or non availability of refueling facilities in CHINA, and forces available considering commitments for planned operations, Para 1. Before initiating attacks, request representative your hqtrs visit this hqtrs to discuss details of missions, friendly and enemy dispositions, pertinent intelligence information, communications, base facilities and friendly fields in CHINA available for SWPA aircraft and problems of coordination.

051250 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO COM3RDFLT, CTF 51, COMINPAC.

As soon as operational requirements permit form TF under Com3RdFlt to clear minefields in EAST CHINA SEA preparatory to OLYMPIC and LONOTOM and with priorities such as to provide sea room first for the fast carrier and escort carrier operations common to both OLYMPIC and LONOTOM.

052009 COMAIR 20 TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COOLPHA CINCPOA PEARL, DEPOMAPPO, CORONADO, COOLPHA, COMINPAC, COMINPAC, COMINPAC, COMINPAC, COMINPAC, COMINPAC.

MARX 77765. References MARX DTE 281627 CinCPOA Adv 302255 and CinCPOA Adv 020021, Para. In view of the field availability dates established in CinCPOA's 302255 as amended by 200021 it is our plan to deploy 316th Wing to OKINAWA 2 groups to meet field availability date 15 August the remaining 2 groups to meet field availability date 1st September providing location of stripes is such as to permit maintaining unit integrity of 316th Wing. Para 2. Our present plan for conversion of units in US will permit the following readiness dates in the theater:

A. The 429th Group can meet readiness date in the Theater of 1 Sept.
B. 1 other converted group to have readiness date in the Theater of 1 October.
C. 2 converted groups readiness in the theater 1 November. This completes the 2nd Wing for OKINAWA.

- Continued -
05 2009 CINCPAC ADV TO COMZHFIT INFO COMINCH, CINCINNA, PEARL, ETC. (CONT'D)

D. 2 groups in the Theater by 1 Dec. and 2 groups in the Theater by 1 January completes the 3rd Wing for COMZHFIT. Your messages indicate field availability dates that will be adequate to permit the above schedule.

Para 3. Army Air Force ultimate deployment of WHS Groups is now set at 60. Tentative deployment schedules after 1 January are as follows: 1 Wing in Theater Feb. 1st and last Wing in Theater March 1st.

05 0821 CINCPAC ADV TO COMZHFIT INFO COMINCH, CINCINNA, PEARL, ETC. (CONT'D)

Warning Order. Initiate preparations for Phase 3(D) ICEBERG with target date (P-Day) for FRICHTON on 15 July. Operation will be commanded by Adm. W.F. Halsey with VAdm. H. W. Hill commanding Joint Expeditionary Forces and Lt.Gen. S.B. Buckner commanding Expeditionary Troops. Assault troops for operation will be 1 Div Rein designated by ComGen Expeditionary Troops from the troops under his command. Garrison ground troops will consist of following Army units: Initially 1 RCT to be designated from assault divs. 745th AAA Gun Bn (BAK), 497th AAA Gun Bn (FINSCHAFEN), 104th AAA AW Bn (HOLLANDIA), 945th AAA AW Bn (FINSCHAFEN), 290th S/L Bn (less 1 Btry) (FINSCHAFEN), 158th Hq & Hq Btry AAA Gp (LETSHE), 33rd Hq & Hq Btry AAA Gp (BAK), 178th CA Bn (GUAM), 1 Wt Co. Garrison air forces.

1 Sqdn Fighter Wing (Army), 3 Groups VF (Army), 2 Sqdns VF(M) (Army), 1 Sqdn VMIF, 1 MAR Sqdn. Supporting troops in accordance CINCPAC revised Staff Study serial 00.053.6 April 14, and 00.056.8 April 22. Type commanders designate by dispatch other garrison troops not designated above (including aviation, engineer, defense and service units) indicating mounting points. Designation of units insofar as known now should be made by dispatch at the earliest. Designation of others should be made by dispatch as soon as known. ComServPac designate naval officer as Commander Naval Activities. In view of deferment indefinitely of Phase 3(C) ComGenPOA requested to renumber Air Corps General Officer for duty as IncGen FRIOTIC. ComGenPOA also nominate Air Corps officer as Air Defense Commander, FRIOTIC.

05 1520 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV, CINCPAC.

Netherlands authorities have requested that HANS TRUMP (now on EAST INDIES station) be attached temporarily to 7thFt for participation in BONDO operations. Admiralty concurs. Please obtain concurrence CINCSWPA and advise him of my desire to approve request.
05 1120

CX 15549. 14th AF has discontinued mining operations in the SHANGHAI Area end of April. Consider desirable that these mining operations continue. SWPA RAAF Squadrons are available to continue mission if tender based facilities can be provided by CINCPAC in the OKINAWA Area. Request your comments. If alternative means of communication CINCPAC to 7th FLA to arrange details.

06 0605

CTF 51 TO COMSTHEP INFO CINCPAC ADV. COMINPAC.

Cinfopac Adv 051250. It is stated that as soon as OKINAWA is captured sufficient minesweepers can be released to commence extensive minesweeping operations. In interim preparation is being made by giving preference to minesweeping types for overhaul repair upkeep and rehabilitation Para...

All escort types in TF 51 except those recently assigned have had extensive grueling service and require upkeep repair and rest. I am trying to accomplish this by decrease in screen locally to minimum safety limit, augmentation of repair facilities, installation of shore based radars, acceleration of development of airfields so carriers may be released and thereby their escorts, rotation of escorts insofar as practicable to rear areas however this concluded to a large degree for DDs because of great need for that type locally for gunfire radar pickets and support... Para. Recommend expediting moving forward for duty in TF 51 all available minesweepers escort of each type and early action on my recommendations for increase in repair facilities to the end of expediting overall readiness for future operations of minesweepers MOLITIO types of escorts. Para...

In order that necessary minesweeping operations may proceed as required CX recommend following measures be taken:

A. Submarines equipped with special mine location device examine prospective routes and areas of operation.

B. Regular search planes EAST CHINA SEA have 1 or 2 experienced minesweeping officers observers embarked.

C. Special search planes with experienced minesweeping observers examine suspected areas and located minefields to determine definitely existence extent and characteristics.

As light and sea conditions have considerable influence on ability to locate fields several examinations or areas should be made. Consider photographs taken downwind in choppy sea with light at operators back might be useful.

07 0528

(PROBABLY COMSTHEP) TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51. COM3DFLT. COMINPAC.

Minesweeping requirements in EAST CHINA SEA for LONGTOM and OLYMPIC appear largely mathematical. Your 051250. Distance between 2 objectives is about 400 miles. Carriers supporting an amphibious objective normally operate in area within 200 miles of it. For LONGTOM plan to sweep mined areas whose approximate centers are given:

A. Lat 25-10 Long 126-00. Comment. This area should be cleared in any case as it will be menace during typhoon season also is needed as support area for B.

B. Lat 27-10 Long 120-00.

C. Lat 30-20 Long 123-45 starting from south end.

In addition check sweeps must be made to insure that channels promised

- Continued -
070528 (NONE - PROBABLY CONFIDENTIAL) TO CINCPAC ADV (CONT'D).  

COFORD, adjacent to these areas are still clear. Air cover must be furnished either from shore bases or carriers during these operations. COFORD-PAC has Op Plan for foregoing. For OLYMPIC approaches except in its immediate proximity are non-mine able. See room for carrier operations is also available in deep water. No mine-sweeping can be done within 200 miles of objective under present conditions of enemy air strength. This would have to follow amphibious operation rather than precede. For OLYMPIC believe present enemy defensive minefields in EAST CHINA SEA should be left intact as Jap sea traffic is channeled and easier prey for our air strikes and submarines. Concur in desirability of forming task force under COFORD-PAC as soon as local situation permits. See Turner's 060605.

070606 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, CTF 51, COMGENINFO CINCPAC JAPAN.

ComGhigh's 060129. ComGen 10 is authorized to make such changes in priorities of base development as are necessary to meet tactical requirements at any time. Such changes are expected if necessary for full compliance my 150029 and 2nd para my 170037.

070639 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC JAPAN. COMGENINFO DEPJCOM 20TH AF.

Requests for photography of DIAMONDS (KYUSHU) made in US Div top sec 050139 will be considered priority 1 and integrated with my mapping and reconnaissance photographic requirements as outlined in my top sec 144445 serial 000127 of 23 Jan 1945 and 000187 of 31 Jan 1945.

071225 CTF 51 & 56 to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV.

CTF 51 Top Secret serial 000201 of 30 April to which originator's agree with slight modifications is now in process of being carried out by CTF 56 for parts not requiring higher approval as follows:

A. AWS and FD stations take BANAKI and adjacent islands on being set up and 1 at SAKAI SAKAI will be set up if further study indicates desirability.

B. KOBE SHIMA being reconnoitered and if conditions found favorable station of ZAMAMI will be moved there. If not favorable station on NAGASAKI will be moved to ZAMAMI to improve coverage.

C. Station IS SHIMA not entirely satisfactory and will be improved. Following steps which require approval of higher authority are recommended:

D. About 12 May dependent on enemy and weather seize DORI SHIMA establish AWS, FD and minor defensive position.

E. As soon as possible probably about 20 May employing 1 RCT of 3rd MarDiv in succession seize AGUNI SHIMA and DERU SHIMA establish warning service FD and defenses consisting reenforced company on AGUNI and reenforced battalion on HOMI temporarily formed from assault forces. Capture would be made by troops embarked in landing craft and supply kept up by same means.

F. No earlier than 30 days after completion capture OKINAWA employs 1 Div now OKINAWA to capture KUROI SHIMA develop it for both defensive and offensive purposes, Para.

We consider this expenditure of effort will prove economical and effective in long run. Para.

Request immediate approval step D and approval E and F when practicable.
07 1230 CTF 51 & 56 to CINCPAC INFO CINCPOA AVR H.

This is CTF 51 & 56 Joint Top Secret Dispatch replying to your 052314, and CINCPAC 050505. Reference is also made to CTF 51 Top Sec Ser 00020I of 30 April to which both originals agree with certain modifications as treated in a separate dispatch. Also reference is CinCPac 060821 Warning Order for Phase 3(D). Para.

Recommendations are:

A. 2nd MarDiv is not required for capture of OKINAWA and if brought forward would complicate problems of supply, training, and space assignment. CTF 56 has designated 2nd MarDiv for Phase 3(D) see ComGen 10 071053. Recommend it be completely disembarked at SAIKAN and shipped in which embarked be released to CinCPAC.

B. This recommendation made on assumption 31st Army Division not available for Phase 3 (D).

C. While occupation KUMO cannot be deemed essential to security of OKINAWA its possession and development would add greatly to OKINAWA security, to success of naval operations in CHINA SEA, and to neutralization of FORMOSA and SAKISHIMA ISLAND. Its capture will require 1 division. The necessary troops can be supplied from 10th Army on OKINAWA after capture of OKINAWA has been completed and this course is recommended not earlier than 30 days after OKINAWA secure. If KUMO must be captured in advance of that time consider 2nd MarDiv only force now available and therefore other troops to be reassigned 10th Army would be required for Phase 3(D).

07 1507 ComGen Ten to CTF 51 Info CINCPOA AVR.

See CINCPAC 060821. Interpret Warning Order requires Army Div as assault troops. Prior to OKINAWA operation Army Div participated in campaigns which resulted their embarking JEREMIE tired and understrength. All will come out of this fight considerably depleted in personnel and equipment. Target date may not permit rehabilitation and retraining proper strength. If future operation permit use 2 MarDiv and 3rd recommend its employment since it is fresh from rest of about year. Shipping available and with minor adjustments unit will be ready promptly to meet target date. Army garrison ARTY to be sent from OKINAWA when FRESH secure.

08 0233 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CTF 51 & 56.

ComGen 10 071507, by 060821. Not intended to require an Army Div as assault troops for 3(D) since 1st 2nd and 6th MarDivs are under operational control ComGen Ten. Am prepared to approve Joint recommendation of CTF 51 & 56 071230 if you concur. The capture of KUMO is not approved if full division is required.

08 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO CG USAF CH NA INFO CINCPOA, CINCINCH, CINCPAC, CONTREFL. FANILA, CINCPAC.

Understand from CHINA SPOA that 14th AF is discontinuing mining operations SHANGHAI Area end of April. Request your concurrence in continuation of this program on approximately same scale by naval air forces from OKINAWA.

08 1345 COINCPAC TO CINCPAC BOTH HS INFO C/S US ARMY.

It now appears that transfer of troopships from the PACIFIC THEATER to the ATLANTIC in connection with redeployment as discussed in JCS 521/3 will be required at an early date and preparations should be made accordingly. War Department is similarly informing CINCPAC.
08 0902 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCHIN CHINA INFO CONSTM1T, CTF 56.

Your CK 15519. Concur as to desirability mining CHINA. It is not desired however to employ units of the RAS in the IJA particularly when us of U. seaplane tenders would be required. If you find the total number of patrol planes available in the NMC is in excess of your requirements would appreciate information as to the number and types of U.S. naval search squadrons which can be released for operations in the Central Pacific. If COMCHIN CHINA concurs am prepared to continue mining SUNDAI Area with U.S. Naval aircraft. See my 090001.

08 2014 COMCHIN & CHN TO CINCPAC ADV.

Advise me about situation regarding movement of Japanese combat air via MARCUS to USU presumably headed for ULITHI and what steps are being taken to control it.

09 0330 CTF 51 to CINCPAC ADV INFO CONSTM1T, CTF 56.

Your 090000. 1 RCT from 3rd MarDiv is desired for capture of AGUNI and INOH. Originally it had been decided to ask for 1 RCT from 2nd MarDiv but the necessity for designating 2nd MarDiv for Phase 3 of mine use of a 2nd MarDiv RCT undependable. Para.

It may be recalled that 1 of the 3rd MarDiv's RCT's was not used at AIO JICA. Para.

Consider the occupation of AGUNI and INOH in near future and before completion capture CHINA is important with relation to protection our operations and reduction losses of rocket vessels. Comch 10 is averse to withdrawing 1 RCT from troops present for capture these 2 islands and CTF 51 concurs.

09 0434 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPG, CHINA INFO CONSTM1T, CTF 51, CTF 56 INFO CPO 2ND MARDIV.

Request your views on general subject Compgroup CHINA 080510 and 081310 with reference to all points on CHNA Coast northeast of Longitude 110 W.

09 0802 CINCPAC ADV TO CONSTM1T, CTF 51, CTF 56 Info CPO 2ND MARDIV.

The 3rd Marine Division is not available for TOPHER. CTF 51 090230.

Elements of the 2nd MarDiv should be used for the capture of AGUNI and INOH.

09 0808 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCHIN & CHN.

Your 080314. Connpda Area SOFA ULITHI and all Island Commanders concerned were informed in my 240133 as follows "Indications of impending Jap air attacks on bases in MARIANAS and Western CAROLINAS possibly from TRUK on V/4. Take appropriate precautionary measures. Believe Japs are moving planes from Empire to TRUK via MARCUS. At 100100 (+9) the JALLAO (83 368) arrives on station off MARCUS as life ship and was directed to advise of any enemy air movements observed. The following sorties have been made against MARCUS: 11th - 1 FBAY 12 B24, 30th - 36 B24, 1st - 16 B24. 1 FBAY, 2nd - 29 B24, 3rd 1 FBAY, 4th - 11 B24, 7th - 11 B24, 8th 12 B24. Para.

No enemy planes sighted until JALLAO despatch 080330 which reported 6 unidentified planes landed MARCUS 080330. This report was broadcast to all interested commands. Strikes on 9th consisted of B24s and FBAYs which have reported destroying 2 Betty and strafing 4 Betty on ground. Attacks still progress. Para (Cont'd).

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

09 0908 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINT 4 & CNO (CONTINUED)

The following sorties have been made against TAIW: 28th - 24 B24, 20 P47
1 FBAY, 30th - 4 FB 24 B24 20 P47, 1st - 21 B24, 2nd 21 B24, 3rd - 19 B24
1 FBAY, 4th - 1 FBAY, 6th - 16 P47, 7th 16 P47, 8th 12 B24 1 FBAY. During
this period 1 Emily has been destroyed. Below approximate 7 operational
planes at TAIW of which estimate 3 or 4 floatplanes 3 or 4 Zekes and 1 or 2
reconnaissance. Para.

Since rotation of fast carrier groups commenced at ULITHI on 30 April
4 radar picket destroyers have been maintained at sea outside Atoll. On
29 April 4 Hyrt was destroyed while approaching ULITHI at 26000 feet by
shorebased Marine Corsairs.

09 0917 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAPAC, COMGENPOA.

My 060816 and 060821, subject consideration be given to assignment 24th
Infantry as garrison for SHI KAM as referable to using an NCT from an
amphibiously trained INF Div.

09 1526 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV, COMGENPOA INFO AKMIR, OGHASOS, CECMHQ, COMINT.

C 15861. It is requested that effective immediately all matters involving
the requisitioning, movement, use or disposal of troop units and resources
now in or destined for the Pacific, exclusive of 20thAF units and units
approved for OCEBERG, whether operational or as a result of V-E Day
redesignate including troop units not set up on the 6 months list, be submitted to this
headquarters for approval prior to the taking of any other action. Insofar
as is consistent with the foregoing it is contemplated that present admin-
istrative procedures will remain undisturbed for the time being except as may
hereafter be directed. Para.

In this connection it is requested that your recommendations for the
priority of movement and destinations of U. S. Army troops heretofore set
up for the Pacific Area and now assigned to CINCAPAC either from the U. S.
or elsewhere in the July and subsequent monthly quota Joint Priority Shipping
Lists for Personnel Movements unquote be forwarded to this headquarters
not later than 33 days prior to the month during which they are desired
shipped in order that such recommendations may be integrated into or coor-
dinated with the similar list prepared by this headquarters.

08 1322 COMINT 4 TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51, CTF 56.

Your 050905 and 080233. If RED IV Phase 3D OBERG is to be executed best
use for 2nd MarDiv appears to be this operation. ComGen 10 071253, CTF
51 CTF 56 071230. I still believe Phase 3D unnecessary and unprofitable
and would prefer to see 2nd MarDiv used to take KUM and other outlying
positions around OKINAWA required for radar defense (CTF 51 CTF 56 071229)
and to assist if necessary in expediting capture of OKINAWA itself.

09 0830 WEATHER TO MEHTZ MACARTHUR CHENNAULT INFO COMINTL. COMINT 4.

CPB 37072. Ref CPB 36140 of 3 April. Observe your message 080901 operations
SHANGHAI Area. Arrangements made for conference of representatives this Eq
with ComGen/SPA at MANILA on 13 May relative to operations of air forces und-
MacArthur's control against targets in Southeast CHINA. Suggest you have rep-
resentative present for coordination of plans including PTA mining or other
air operations against CHINA Theater targets. At present Allied Air Forces
are conducting mining operations in SHANGHAI Area.
091530 CH: JAPA TO CINCPAC ADV CICNCAP ADV, C2 6TH AVF.

CX 15860. For planning purposes for CINCPAC, the following principal units will be utilised: 9th Amphibious Corps (3rd, 4th, 5th MarDivs) to be mounted from present location; 9th Corps (1st, 38th and 1 Div from HUMOUSA to be designated by ComแซวCA) to be mounted from present locations except 9th Corps Hqtrs and Corps troops; 11th and 11th Corps (1st Cavalry, American 25th, 3rd, 40th, 41st, 43rd and the 11th Airborne Divisions) to be mounted from HUMOUSA (115040) or HUMOUSA (115040) as now located, here.

6th Army will be responsible for the equipment and mounting of the 1st and 11th Corps and the 81st and 11th Airborne Divisions. ComแซวCA will be responsible for the equipment and mounting of the 9th Corps less Corps Hqtrs and Corps troops and 11st Div. ComแซวCA advise that oldest practicable date division designated from HUMOUSA. ComแซวCA investigate practicability of immediate movement 9th Corps Hq with such of the Corps troops as are now present HUMOUSA to ACCUMULATION. Hq advise this Hq and Cinncap logistics of movement. Cinncap requested to advise, upon receipt of information, whether 9th Corps Hq and troops can be lifted to ACCUMULATION with shipping under his control with approx data.

100314 CINCPAC ADV TO CCGQNP CHINA INFO CICNCAP ADV C2CH.

Your 090830. Not feasible to have representative at HANTL 13 May but expect to have adequate representation there about 15th. CCGQNP requested arrange representation for me in preliminary conferences.

100324 CINCPAC ADV TO CHINL.

Cinncap O801. Recommend action be taken which will permit CINCPAC to deal direct with Australia authorities concerning local affairs in Australian matters internal to the British Commonwealth. Present procedures in which requests from Cinncap concerning such matters come to me in Guam and must then be cleared with CICNCAP in DC HA seem unnecessarily devolus since I have no authority in the matter and can only lend my good offices in an ineffectual manner.

100417 CINCPAC ADV TO CICNCAP ADV C2CHINA INFO CCGQNP ADV C2CH. CICNCAP.

If it is desired to use VUL 109 and similar squadrons for SHOO strikes outside enemy harbors reclassification of areas in EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS will be required to permit freedom of action for aircraft without endangering own submarines. Following measures can be put into effect immediately if you desire:

(A) TSUSHIMA STRAIT north of line running 135 degrees true through NO SAKI at south tip of TSUSHIMA can be made blind bombing zone. In June when submarines commence operations therein north part of TSUSHIMA STRAIT may revert to sub patrol zone.

(B) Refer addendum 8 to SOP-1. Areas 124, 111, and 112 north of 27 N can be classified as blind bombing zones from 0000 to 0600 each night reverting to submarine patrol zones each day to permit life-guard rescues during daylight. Early comment desired.

100412 CINCPAC ADV TO ATC JAPA CHINA INFO C2CH. CICNCAP ADV C2CHINA INFO CCGQNP ADV C2CH. CICNCAP.

Indications air attack on UJUMP may be imminent. Source of planes may be similar to 12 March attack. CTF-58 attack HUMOUSA if practicable.
TOP SECRET

CINCPOA ADV TO CINC-CA PEARL

10 0706 CINCPOA ADV TO CINC-CA PEARL

Cancel Cincpoa serial 30666. Issue instructions holding in abeyance compliance Cincpoa serial 000490. Hereafter refer to this headquarters all matters of basic policy particularly those which involve inter service relationships.

09 0925 GEO SWPA TO CINCPOA PEARL INFO CINCPAC ADV, GEO

CIN 15815. Your 022118Z. You may assume for planning purposes if OLYMPIC is not executed that 4075 boats will be available for use in LEBOTTU Operation. There is only 1 73 type reefer boat in the allocation to both Army and Navy in SWPA. Therefore the 1/4 reefer included in your request will not be available.

10 0708 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH

Your 081549. Following ships sunk in OKINAWA Operation between 20 March and 10 May: DD: HALLIGAN (DD586) 26 March, BUSH (DD 529) 6 April, COLHOUN (DD 691) 6 April, M.L. ABELE (DD 733) 12 April, FREDERICK (DD 477) 16 April, LITTLE (DD 603) 3 May, JUCE (DD 522) 4 May, BROWNING (DD 560) 4 May, Total 8 DD sunk. No BB, CA, CL, CV, CVL, or CVE sunk to date. Following ships are now non-operational as result of damage received in OKINAWA Operation during period 12 March to 10 May: BB: KANSAS (BB 39) EFS at PEARL 6 June; MARYLAND (BB 46) now at KTP3 for repairs and normal overhaul; IDGIO (BB 42) EFS at GUAM 14 May; TENNESSEE (BB 43) and WEST VIRGINIA (BB 45) have sustained some damage and are being repaired in ULITHI, EFS approximately 20 May. CA: INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) returned west coast for repairs estimated completion 30 June; PENSACOLA (CA 28) sustained slight damage and was returned west coast for scheduled overhaul. CL: HILTON (CL 60) sustained slight damage and returned west coast for normal overhaul; BIRMINGHAM (CL 62) being docked GUAM, may be sent to PEARL for repairs. CV: INTREPID (CV 11); HANCOCK (CV 19) sustained damage and have been returned rear area. CVE: WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65) EFS GUAM 17 May; SANGAMON (CVE 22) will be returned rear area. DD: Following extensively damaged have been returned rear areas: KIMBERLEY (DD 521), ORLEANS (DD 725), MURRAY (DD 576), HAMAN (DD 722), MULLANY (DD 528), HUNTER (DD 592), HAYNES (DD 700), GEORGE (DD 602), BRIGHT (DD 475), STEMER (DD 497), KIDD (DD 661), FRANKS (DD 554), LAFAYETTE (DD 724). Following have sustained extensive battle damage and will be returned to PEARL or West Coast for repairs: NEWCOMB (DD 586), MORRIS (DD 417), LEWIS (DD 451), PERRY (DD 734), ZELLARS (DD 777), SINSHE (DD 502), WANT (DD 665), ISHERWOOD (DD 520), TALBOT (DD 390), HAGGARD (DD 555), HALE (DD 533). Following have sustained some battle damage and will be repaired in forward areas: CASSIN YOUNG (DD 793), HALS (DD 642), HUTCHINS (DD 476), TIDWELL (DD 591), HUNTON (DD 662), INGRAM (DD 694), HUDSON (DD 473), DALY (DD 519), STANLEY (DD 470).

10 0727 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMSHERPAC, COMSOUTH, CINCPOA ADV, COMINCH

For the time being operational and logistic planing should be based on the following assumptions:

As if OLYMPIC is directed to be executed in 1945 Phase 3D of ICEBERG will be executed about 15 July and Phases 3C and F will be deferred indefinitely.

- Continued -
B. If LONEX is ordered to be executed in the late summer or early fall of 1945 all of Phase 3 will be deferred.

C. If neither OLYMPIC or LONEX are executed in 1945 Phase 3 will be executed about 15 July and Phase 3E will be executed about 1 Sept plus such additional minor operations in the RYUKUS as will contribute to the rapidity with which the overall objective can be accomplished.

D. Under assumption A FECTION will be developed for temporary use under minimum standards and will be abandoned except for an emergency airfield as soon after CINCPOA as possible.

10 1243 ARNOLD: LOST AIRMAIL TO MACARTHUR, JUNE 1945, DEPCCOF, CHIEF NR.

ABKD 79979. Current 20th AF VIC program provides for 40 groups of 4 squadrons each with 8 LN-20's to assigned per squadron located 20 groups in the MARINAS and 20 groups in the RYUKUS. No conversion of Pacific air units to B-29 is now contemplated in completing this program. In view of field availability dates as currently established by CINCPOA it is our plan to deploy to OKINAWA the 16 Wing 2 groups 15 August and 2 groups 15 September to convert units in the US to permit the following readiness dates:

- 457 group 1 July
- 2 converted groups 1 August
- 2 converted groups 1 September
- 2 converted groups 1 October
- 2 converted groups 1 November

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This completes the 3rd Wing for OKINAWA; tentative availability 3rd quarter 46 in US as follows: 1 Wing, 1 December; last wing 1 January; request theatre recommendations on reception of the final 2 wings which are planned here to follow forward displacement of your tactical units. The build up of groups to 4 squadrons will be accomplished as follows: 1st 30 groups in program will be augmented in the theater by activating squadrons in theater in accordance with the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Activation</th>
<th>Readiness Dates at Start of</th>
<th>Additional personnel req'd</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 August 45</td>
<td>1 August 45</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>1 October</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 November</td>
<td>1 November</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December</td>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last 10 groups in the program will be shipped as 4 squadron groups.

11 0245 CONGEN BORCLE XXI TO CINCPOA ADV. CINCPOA Info DEPCCOF 26, CINCPOA CT 86-47

X-11-8. Subject: VJ Intention. Pursuant to Cinpoa's oral decision of this date it is planned to discontinue 20 strikes against FUSO airfields effective upon completion of today's operation. All available a/c this command will be used for series of maximum effort incend. strikes against urban industrial areas of NAGoya and TOKYO. Present weather forecast favorable for takeoff on 13 May initial strike of this series. 12 May will be required for essential maintenance on all assigned a/c and final preparations measures.

11 0815 CINCPOA ADV TO DEPCCOF, CC, BOC, XLII, INFO CG20, CINCPLT, CT 41-8

My concurrence in discontinuing 20th AF strikes against KYUSHU as necessary to permit an incend. strike against NAGoya in maximum strength is confirmed. Also in view subsequent developments concur in plan as stated in your 110245. Will request further neutralisation KYUSHU only in event CT situation again so requires.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that your plans for OKINAWA call for the introduction of a P47 fighter bomber group on OKINAWA on or about May 12 with 2 additional groups occupying in OKINAWA shortly thereafter. Para.

Recent reports from ground commanders in OKINAWA particularly stress the great advantage our ground forces have had from the close support of P47 fighter bombers capable of carrying heavy bombs for the destruction of fortifications, artillery and concrete blockhouses holding up our ground forces. This employment, alone, has had a great effect, has saved our ground forces from many casualties. Para.

This experience plus the reported very heavy enemy defenses on OKINAWA lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff to convey to you that the P47 equipped groups can, in view of present developments, be brought into the OKINAWA Area. Para.

1. Additional advantage of the P47 lies in the range which should permit groups so equipped to harass Jap airfields in KYUSHU from which it appears the Japs launch much of their opposition to our ships and forces in the OKINAWA Area. This would release the P29s for return to their attacks on industrial targets and the continued destruction of key cities. Para.

Please note that if we can get any additional fighter bomber groups available to you.

10 2331 CTF 58 to CTG 58.1, CTG 58.2, Info CTG 58.1, TO 58.3, CINCPAC ADV, HICAP 47, JNUSPAC, CONSTHEFT, CTF 51, CTG 50.5, CTF 29.2, CTF 94.

Operation racket. TF 58 will attack KYUSHU with sweeps and strikes on 13 and 14 May. 130500 Launching position about 30-00 N 132-40 E. 130500 in station 1, Axis 030. Radar picket group 1 Desk V from each TG on station 25 miles N of fleet guide. Air plan 13 May. TG 58.1 target area 1. Priority for sweeps, KANOYA, HORIBA, KUMA, KOSHIGA, Striking primary SAKI and KIMURU. TG 58.2 during night 12-13 May maintain VTN hecker over target areas 1 and 2 and VCN down patrol over KANOYA. Priority for sweeps, HIRARAMA, HIRAI, TEZAKA, KURIKI, Striking primary SAKI and KIMURU. Alternates KUMA and ISHIBA. Night 13-14 May VCN hecker over target areas 1, 2 and 3. 14 May, 140500 Launching point 31-40 N 132-00 E. Target areas both TGs later. Rescue sub responsibility. TG 58.1 station 2, 58.3 station 2. Brief all pilots on CINCPAC and JNUSPAC naval bases. Strikes employ amending Plan 6 with 260 pounders from Tone winging TGs. Use selective arming in TGs. Germany. Recommend amending Plan 6 with 260 pounders. Targets priorities and amending plans may be changed by HICAP if later information makes it desirable.

12 0700 CINCPAC ADV TO DET 2907TH AST. CTG 29.7 OFFICIAL MSG, CINCPAC ADV. CONSTHEFT. CTF 51, 58.

By 110815 May. Change word KANOYA to read SAKI.
Construction policy is subject: Cinpoen to serial 000490 is hereby cancelled. Those concerned will be guided by the following serials not to add or order:
A. Cinpoen to serial 000500 subject to existing policy for defense operation.
B. Cinpoen to serial 000503 subject to existing policy for defense operation.
C. Cinpoen to serial 000509 subject to existing policy for defense operation.

In order to provide operational airfields by dates established in Cinpoen to serial 0005045 subject to Airfield Development, FANNAI IsCom is authorized to divert Army construction materials to expedite Army Air Support facilities and similarly to divert Army construction materials to expedite Navy Air Support facilities and to provide operational naval support shore facilities by 1 Nov. Cinpoen general construction standards will continue in the future as they have in the past. New construction policy governing Navy construction now under preparation.

Systematic mapping and reconnaissance photography are needed of KYUKU and TOKYO PLAINS Area on KIAJU for purposes of operational planning. Carrier photo helicopters are not able to perform this photography and airfield facilities do not at this time permit land based photo planes to operate continuously from OKINAWA or IWO, Para.

In view of urgency and in accordance with provisions of JIC 756/2 directive and since only VFA-13 F-14s can accomplish this photography it is recommended that consideration be given to assigning a priority to a mission for F-14s of the 20th AF for systematic vertical mapping photography of Cornwall and Dartmouth areas of KYUKU as outlined in my top secret letter serial 000127 of 23 Jan 1945 and "McArthur's" top secret dis 050423 May.

Preliminary report. Your 040244. After consultation GHQ, I AMF AREA.
CINCPAC concurs. DVI consideration has been given:
(1) Basic assumptions. Overall logistic plan for U.S. Navy
(2) Logistic problem of supporting large Army forces involved.
(3) Empty airfield construction effort.
(4) Timing of the succeeding operation.

Recommend:
(A) Use U.S. Navy facilities for support of escort forces.
(B) No onshore naval facilities at CINCPAC for support use of air PMF.
(C) Minimum onshore naval facilities which are summarized as follows:

- Fuel storage - none.
- Water 2,500,000 gal/day for amphibious craft.
- Armament storage - none.
- Headquarters advanced base with large communication facilities.
- Port director units.
- Harbor protection.
- Loran station.
- ADF stations.
- Coast patrol and landing craft repair units.
12 1213 CINCPEAC ADV TO CONSCRIPT. CYP 51, CYP 5D.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding, please acknowledge my 090802.

12 1709 CONSCRIPT TO CINCPEAC ADV.

Your 090802. (Acknowledgment of receipt).

12 2151 CYP 51 to CINCPOA ADV.

Your 090802 acknowledged.

13 0003 CINCPEAC ADV TO CONSCRIPT. CYP 51, CYP 5D.

The facilities envisaged by your LAPS are inadequate. Desire your base plans officer available in CINCPEAC area to fly your LAPS at which time your tentative draft logistic annex to Joint Staff Study JSS-111 will be furnished you.

13 0034 CINCPEAC ADV TO APPOO-COLD. RAC. ALEJIU MAIN 10, COMMAND 1, CYP 5A.

CINCPOA Subbase. Republic 1900. Time 0015. Cable PoA-Flat Creek.

LOG 1 CYP 51.

In view of possibility attack on WIDE ALEJIU area alert condition should be maintained for next 3 to 4 days. TRUK appears to be most probable source of flights but possibility that point of origin may be Empire using PC MOSA or HWUK out to WIDE ALEJIU as starting base should be considered. Use of radar detection devices may be expected with such flights. Reconnaissance of WIDE and HWUK out to WIDE ALEJIU will probably be made by JAC on 12 May

This is in keeping with usual pattern and past practices. Blue BACON/AB can be reconnoitered or attacked by JAC planes flying between HWUK and TRUK or via TRUK.

13 0111 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPEAC ADV. CYP 51, CYP 5D.

Your 080111. You are authorized to deal direct with Australian authorities concerning local affairs in AUS, as matters internal to the British Commonwealth are handled by General MacArthur and as informed as appropriate. Cominch and War Dept have concurred.

13 0158 CINTERP TO CINCPEAC ADV IN CO-OP CINCPOA.

RJ 61191. Employment of 24th Infantry your dis 090817 may is reference is concurred in. In view of this employment it is recommended that the 296 BCT which was planned for employment in MUCXLI now be employed in JAC. JAC employment anticipated for the 296 will facilitate necessary training here prior to the forward area employment.

13 0213 CINTERP TO CINCPEAC ADV. IN CO-OP CYP 51, CYP 5D, CYP 57.

Your 120218. Thank you so much for your invitation but I am afraid I cannot manage this period due to approaching replenishment of the fleet.

Para 2: Hope to be able to visit you a little later subject to your concurrence.

Para 3: I am asking Rawlings to arrange his visit.

13 0405 CINTERP TO CINCPOA ADV.

Your 090802 received. See my DTG. (120740 ?)
Because of the severe damage being received from enemy aircraft by naval forces in the SWW, under the provisions of para 5 of myCircular CNO 200 of 31 October become effective the senior officer present of the amphibious forces, Pacific Fleet will continue to control the air defense of PHILIPPINES and the naval forces present from a command position afloat and will report to ComGFX 10 for this purpose. When ComGFX 10 is ready to assume the responsibility for the air defense of the forces and ships present without this assistance he will so inform CinCoppa.

WARX 81823. Requirements of Phase III for CINCPAC are considered as being included within the ceiling of the redeployment forecast according to the plan for CINCPAC, not to alter addresses. Application must necessarily be made to CINCPAC to provide the balance of units required for Phase III either from those presently in CINCPAC or from those scheduled for redeployment from amphibious forces.

Take immediate steps to cope with Japanese air reconnaissance at CINCPAC. Such action imminent. Possibility of Japanese attack against amphibious forces should not be overlooked.

Para 1. The 2nd MarDiv (less 1 RCT) is hereby detached from operational control ComGFX 10 and is placed in the command under CinCoppa.

Para 2. 1 RCT will be designated as CINCPAC under operational control ComGFX 10 for employment in the area of AGBUL and HAL. This RCT will be treated immediately as a special task and be prepared to sail as directed by ComGFX.

Para 3. 2nd MarDiv is designated as an assault division for Phase III-D of GOLDBERG and will return SAIPAN when relieved at CHURCHIL by Army garrison units. ComGFX 2nd MarDiv will report to ComGFX Expeditionary Forces by dispatch for planning in connection with Phase III-D.

Para 4. ComGFX and 2nd MarDiv send staff representative immediately to this headquarters to confer connection with volunteers of 2nd MarDiv (less 1 RCT).

The training requirements envisioned by CINCPAC are highly important and will require the servicing of a full transport squadron commencing 1 June. If CINCPAC is directed in 1946 the training shall be continuous and will extend into a period in which ComGFX will have duties. Accordingly, desire your recommendation as to transport squadron and also an amphibious group commander to perform amphibious training in the PHILIPPINES on a continuing basis.

Lt. Gardner of my staff leaves CINCPAC today 15 May 45. I have copies of tentative draft of Joint Staff Study naval amphibious phases CINCPAC for ComGFX. Request early advice any comments you wish to make since final draft will be commenced immediately on return from conference at CINCPAC 15-17 May.
14 1014 CINC AFRICA ADV TO CINCPAC ADV HQ, 10JUN45, PLACED IN CED 16200, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

CX 16175. Re: Rad 3779979 dated 10 May 1945. The date that the last 2 VJ9
ings can be accommodated in the MUEFL will depend on the rate at which
the tactical air forces are displaced forward and the availability of avia-
tion engineers over and above those required for other operational commit-
tments.

14 1341 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV HQ, 14JUN45, PLACED IN CED 20500, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Pursuant to a directive from the JCS, it is desired to release Army units in
SIC to CINCPAC as soon as the services of such units can be spared. To
implement this directive the following procedures are prescribed in the sequence
indicated:

(1) As Army units become available for release from their respective
areas action should be taken to communicate the release of units
and recommend dates of
(2) After receiving operational requirements. CINCPAC is requested
transmit to CINCPAC Adv HQ his recommendations on such units.

(3) Release to CINCPAC will be accomplished by CINCPAC.

14 1602 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV HQ, 14JUN45, PLACED IN CED 20500, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Be my Top Sec 13009 and 14015, not to all. Further evidence exists of near
immediate reconnaissance of AJ-2, 3, 4, and 5 with possible principal objective,
Main priority MIP, take immediate necessary action.

15 0628 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV HQ, 15JUN45, PLACED IN CED 20500, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

All INDIA-2 planes that has recently arrived in PEPF will be available for
operations during the period of the continuation of reinforcement in June.

Para 2. This ship is fully equipped, but requires battle experience in
this theatre and I would like to comply, for 50 or 200 merchant ships
forces on the lines of your operation, whenever convenient to you.

Para 3. I would allocate a special escort of destroyers from among the ships
replenishment at 600.

Para 4. Proposed targets and scale of attack subject to your concurrence
would be 2 days consecutive attack or 4 days 1 or 2.

Para 5. If approved request suitable 10 days advance and target information
may be forwarded to me.

16 0557 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV HQ, 16JUN45, PLACED IN CED 20500, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

The subject is Fleet support for the CINCPAC operation which largely will
come from (A) MIP, (B) MIP, and (C) MIP. The recent
assignments of construction troops in the above areas it appears that all
presently approved naval support facilities in B and C (less those removed for
relocations) will be completed. It is not however considered that more than
the minimum facilities at call as outlined in my Teletype 3677 of 12 May planc
nament at on Iron Mike will be essentially operable by 1 Nov with present
forces. CINCPAC's 21025 of April recommends certain cancelled U.S. fac-
tials for MIP. However due to a diversion or 7, 10, and 12 of the 7 U.S. that
determines it does not appear that the MIP facilities recommended for use
could be in operation for MIP unless, at least unless additional construc-
tions are undertaken.

- Continued -
It is recommended that ConServac be directed to immediately review his overall logistics requirements giving consideration to:

1. HUEP augmentation from LUP.
2. Additional support from BHF.
3. The extent of completion of wire facilities in the Mathura by 1 November.
4. The reallocation of command from LUTF to FUP which will not be completed until December, reconstruction troop deployment.

We should recommend:

1. HUP augmentation by type of facility, if required, giving desired locations.
2. The plan of construction troops, equipment and materials necessary to accomplish augmentation.

These matters are of utmost urgency and must be expedited. ConServac to advise date by which above items will be supplied, Admiral Towers to advise.

CX 15276. Assistance of APA and APAs listed your 171135 is greatly appreciated. Additional APA cannot be profitably employed for troop movement, unless used in conjunction with additional APA or LUPs. However, it is planned to conduct further amphibious operations (for U.S. divisional assault selected for 011016). Completion of this assault will require 2 Mobile Amphibious Training Units operating simultaneously. Inadequate APA is available to Commander 7thFlt for this assault. Therefore, 2 APA are urged to transport a squadron of your combat equipment to 011016 by 1 June for use in amphibious assault. Anticipate these ships will be required for at least a minimum of approximately 100 APA.

14 2255 DECATUR TO CINCPAC ADV. (COPY 3)

2576. Subject: Statement of Military Policy, issued on 28 May 1945, is no longer required for your information in the following manner from CINCPAC.

1. Now that regular supporting operations for LUP/LEP are concluded, it is appropriate to restate our policy over the operations. Current target directives remain in effect until changed or until situation requires. These directives will govern your normal operations. It is anticipated, however, that from time to time you will receive requests for missions in coordination with operations of other forces; such requests will, of course, be considered separately according to policy already established.

2. The primary mission of the Asiatic-Australian forces is to complete the destruction of the major aircraft production, to destroy the principal Japanese urban industrial areas in the shortest possible period of time. It is extremely important, in order to capitalize on the recent critical situation in Japan, that your effort be concentrated on such of these targets which will contribute most to the defeat of Japan.

15 0610 CINCPAC ADV. TO CINCPAC ADV. (COPY 3)

My 21 140242, 2nd Task Force (less Task Force 'Main') authorized to land at OME in support of current U.S. naval operations, would be manned by a team for element.

312
Conclude Flex 8 (Dec 1945) not to all. Do not consent on following that is under consideration:

(A) Retain 3,000 inhabitants for a 6-hour period.

(B) Construct 2,200 feet of 900 feet north and south for each operation. Act on your own, and then construct 1,100 feet north and 900 feet south. The 900 feet north and south for each operation. Act on your own, and then construct 1,100 feet north and 900 feet south.

(C) Construct 2,000 feet of 900 feet north and south for each operation. Act on your own, and then construct 1,100 feet north and 900 feet south.

(D) Construct 1,000 feet north and 1,000 feet south for each operation. Act on your own, and then construct 1,100 feet north and 900 feet south.

(E) Reserve 2,100 feet, for additional carrier runway, at present.

(F) Concurrence with para (4) above cancels (E).

Conclude A/B+D duty for development and for Kumaon based on Joint Staff Study. Consent. No objection to henceforth. Considerable for coordinate development of plans.

1.0515 10th Dec 10 Year Info OMBUSM. 10th Dec 10 Year Info OMBUSM.
Para 1. Cincopa serial 0-5503 of 12 May subject to Cincopa Base Development. Plan CINCACA and E3-11277B as superseded Cincopa serials 01-4221 of 10 February 1945 and 00-0258 of 1 March 1945 and 000451 of 27 March 1945 and will take precedence over the original serial as corrected to date. In case of conflict Cincopa serial 000451 will govern.

Para 2. Definition of Cincopa serial 0-5503 the minimum facilities as listed below should be established in addition to the capacities indicated:

(a) Air installations as established in Cincopa serial 0-5503 of 12 May

(b) Operational ASI

(1) 100% Joint Communications
(2) 300 major and 100% minor over 1/2 mile repair facilities
(3) Naval Service Base to include 1 and 1/2 million square feet

In non-hibernation buildings distributed approximately as follows: 1-2 proper 1,500 sq. ft, 1-20 1,800 sq. ft. ordnance service building, 1-20, Class 10, 2,000 sq. ft. medical stores 1-2,000 sq. ft.

(4) 5500 fleet hospital beds, 9000 Army Hospital beds.

(5) 10,000 bales black and 30,000 bales diesel storage capacity for forces afloat.

(6) Inter post facilities to unload 50,000 P/T of cargo per month.

(7) Water de-fresh water supply of 30,000.

(8) Marine Corps facilities or to exceed the continental construction capacity of 1 and 1/2 million tons.

(9) 100 2550 magazines and 6,000 tons outside storage for fleet and bombs.

(10) Include such necessary facilities that are required for the essential operation of the above such as administration buildings, piers, harbor control, etc.

(C) The location of facilities listed under (a) should be such that any delay in the progress of the war or type of material development as approved in the original plan will not interfere with the necessary work for landing of such facilities.

Para 3. Cope with 10 day relocation period of the necessary installations to suit local conditions not to interfere for early completion.

Para 4. The timing of services that meet the above is approved.

Para 5. Major diversions of material from one service to another should only be done with 29th Aug approval.

Para 6. CINCACA 004245 of 6 May 1945 subject Construction Limitations has been cancelled by CINCACA ADV 110747 and original specifications as set forth in CINCACA's dispatches 004245 of 6 May 1944 and 004203 of 29 May 1944 as modified by CINCACA's 004203 of 2 November 1944, except that the limiting housing policy date shall be extended to 1 October 1945.

17 0152 CINCACA ADV 11 MAY 44
Following are extracts from the Commanders General's Order No. 90, dated 1 April 1943, in connection with the development of air facilities:

"The CINCPAC is to provide facilities for and assist in the development of air bases in the British Pacific and the Far East Air Forces, as directed by CINCPAC and CINCPAC, Far East, in the Pacific area, in connection with the development of air bases. The extent of these bases will be determined by the United States and the United Kingdom. The Command of all forces will be under the Command of CINCPAC and the control of the Far East Air Forces. In case there is a requirement for the facilities provided, the Command of these forces will be under the control of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Command of the forces will be under the control of CINCPAC and the United States and the United Kingdom. The Command of the forces in the United States and the United Kingdom will be under the control of CINCPAC and CINCPAC, Far East, respectively, except:

(a) The 30th AF will operate as directed by the United States and the United Kingdom.
(b) The United States and the United Kingdom will operate with the United States and the United Kingdom.
(c) The United States and the United Kingdom will operate with the United States and the United Kingdom.

Para. Each station in which the air force is or will be under the authority of either CINCPAC or CINCPAC, Far East, depending on whether it is an air or an Army installation.

Para. Control of units in JAC, as used in common, will be placed under the authority of CINCPAC, Far East.

Para. After the Commander, JAC, has established the United States, the naval forces required in the Southwest Pacific Area will be assigned as a Task Force under the command of the Commander, United States and the United Kingdom.

15 1110 DOKUHIA CHI TO CHUNGA JUSHI TEN DE KOUHIN HINOKI...
Para 2. It is now apparent that conditions in June will still call for
an absolute minimum of construction activities. Until June 1, all normal
orders will be suspended to permit the withdrawal of a large exodus to 3rd
the north service area to the detriment of our construction and main-
operation forces. Construction forces will be concentrated at warehouses
and on essential operational installations. All other activities will be
suspended. It is apparent that the troops will be finished to other necessary
construction projects.

For the July 1 date, 101st would have completed the necessary conditions to basing
construction projects above, and operations will be initiated.

Para 3. It is recommended that the construction will be operational
by the resumption of forces, the completion of the 101st in the accelerated
pace of construction, and by the immediate reduction due to the
necessary facilities.

Para 4. Further, it is highly recommended that the 101st be an
in which recommended priority for construction is 1,570 and many projects
previously of higher priority and having less construction force are well
applicable to Northwest Field which have been completed. It is understood
that these priorities are based on final establishment of a number of the 101st.
It is apparent that by application of these priorities additional construction forces on
the 101st will be available for this program.

Para 5. By June 1, 101st will depart for 101st between
and the 101st, are assigned on Northwest Field, in the north,
and are lacking certain minimum essential facilities, and 1
be assigned construction, priority 101st. It is recommended that
in order to reestablish and land for movement, 1 01st, and another 1 01st. 1 01st
on May 20th, 1 June 20th, and another 01st June 20th. The period allowed is any 2
weeks prior to departure date. The 101st battalions are due on 25th
June, 18 June, 26 June, and 27 June. The 101st will require about 2 weeks to unload,
and will be available for immediate movement. As or approximately 101st
construction effort is involved in each case, it is a serious disadvantage that this movement occurs at the
critical time to threaten completion of
minimum facilities.

Para 6. It is strongly recommended that the 101st be not presently
assigned on Northwest Field on a limited objective basis or an equivalent engineering
force be retained, and their use broadened to include construction on both
the south and north sides of the 101st service area and certain essential work
on North Field. It is also recommended that the remaining construction area
of 1 01st or more of these 101st be reorganized as a priority task, and placed
on Northwest Field to speed up construction of essential warehouses, shops
and operational buildings to the limit of materials available or to be made
available from lower priority jobs. In addition, it is recommended that earth moving equipment of 1 additional 01st be based on Northwest Field. This
is considered essential to provide clearing of strip zones and areas needed for
2 01st groups now in place on the north side of the airstrip, the retaining
of foundations for essential buildings, and minimum road net.

180005

It is requested that plans for the withdrawal of troops after 19th and for
provide for the withdrawal of the 3rd corps from FOB CORPS to 19th prior
to or coincident with the commitment of the 3rd corps to 19th. This
procedure is necessary for
(1) Have 1 or 2 groups rehabilitated on 18th for use as
ensure internal security and release troops for duty in the
(2) Have 1 and 2 groups in the 18th for the remaining
for further
and amphibious operations which will be necessary to complete our
in the Western Pacific.
(2) Avoid having 100% of the players in action at one time or create an under utilize in the field. Each or replacement to be used. The players at a time to be replenished to the team whenever possible.

13 1120 CINCPAC ADV TO CHIEF OF STAFF

151000 ZULU 140708 CINCPAC CHIEF OF STAFF 612323. The subject is the extension to the release of the order to the senior staff, following the Base Command for transfer to 1500 Nov 83 1254Z. The senior staff, any officer returned by the joint task force to that the

13 0742 CINCPAC ADV TO CHIEF OF STAFF 67

Your 120702. 67 57 is required for further portions of the joint task force as practicable in July consistent with the time being used. Request that you advise the date when these will be ready to be sent LMTW for future operations. My intentions for the use of 67 will be sent to you in early as possible.

13 0801 CINCPAC ADV TO CHIEF OF STAFF

17 0607 MARSHALL TO CINCPAC BOTH COMGEN TEN BACK FOR JTF

19 0737 COMCINC IN JTF CHIEF ADV EVEN GSR DF CINCPAC 5146

RJ 61283. Movement of Gen. Halsey and his HQAT personnel from Okinawa to CINCPAC was ordered by CINCPAC 12008 of 12000 and ComGen Ten of 130049.

Your 141345 was received, and an order to action initiated above and establishment of standard procedures for release of units from CINCPAC. Recommend it not be permitted to interfere with the movement of Gen. Halsey's personal instruction where the movement will in no way affect the functioning of the Task Force under Gen. Halsey's command. The movement ordered by CINCPAC is largely an administrative transfer of a portion of the task force and not the movement of USMDC, rather than a transfer of units, and the movement is in process of accomplishment.

Request radio concurrence earliest.

19 0837 CHIEF OF STAFF ADV ENG GSR DF CINCPAC

RJ 61269. As a result of action referred to in reference to, it is assumed to advise you that this flight will be unable to logistically support operation LMTW. Based on actual target date of 22 Aug. 67 as a rested. Reference either (A) MT 2351, MT 173097, F 2 61629, or (B) MT 61629 07 14028.
JAP C20/3 estimates, based on available data, that\(\theta\) can support 650 aircraft located on 7 fields. Support this paper be restored in view of above reconnaissance obtained during carrier strafing on 13, 14, and 17 March which reveal this area to be entirely unsuitable for air base development. None of the possible areas suggested are suitable for development except possibly No. 4 (AUS). These sites are located by Landhill (2V 17) at site A of 26 March, and on 17 March and 19 11A and 11C of 26 March. Interception 39/4 report on dated 3 May 43 states complete coverage available.

200704 2135 HA 30 04 11B 1112 2140 04 11H 11C 11D 2143 11D 11F 11G 11H

Inquiry regarding success of fighting troops Phase 3 11/0735 refer
URDIS 1/0709. Deem your representative confer with Gen. Lawson who has
conferred with my staff. This date. Gen. Lawson will next confer with 21 and
26 Division and arrive on 11. 11D about 20 May. After conference with him request your
recommendations be sent to 132. As both try with you to Consol 10.

191808 EXCHANGE 3 11/0735,

Your 11/0327 I have no specific comments on your tentative draft Joint St
study now. I attach four sheets for your 11/0327. In general agreement with it.
provisions and with your views expressed in your 11/0327 and 11/0735. In
particular I agree with your recommendation provisions. However under the
provisions of 11/0327/4 please be advised that proposal for specific categories in
the area would be the normal dispatcher. This does not constitute "pooling".

203400 1103/1100 1104/1104 1105/1105 1106/1106 1107/1107

This is Cont'd:


-Continued-
   Formed only for a specific target direction.

   Units as attached by CINCPAC.

K. Task Force 53 - Task Carrier Task Force.  Task Attacker (VADS, MAI LING
   on order directed by CINCPAC).
   Units as currently assigned.

L. Task Force 78 - The Kii Islands, 1st Marne  
   Units as directed by CINCPAC.

Strategic Aims: Force, blockade, and neutralize, carriers, task forces, various forces
operating under command of general task
forces. Carry on offensive operations of naval forces with support of air forces.
Control occupation of Kii Islands and conduct operations in area to port the
operation by continuous searches. Control and neutralize of airfields in the area.

Assumption: That capture of Kii Islands has been completed or is about to be
completed.

Para. This Fleet will attack Japanese naval and air force, shipping, ship
yards and naval objectives, cover the port forces and protect
and communications along General area A in order to lower
Japanese ability and will to resist.

Para. A. The 4th Marne, 6th Marne, 12th Marne, 13th Marne, 22nd Marne
   is directed by CINCPAC.

B. The 79's, 80's, and 78's are conducted in advance of the main fleet.
   Units as attached by CINCPAC.

C. The 53 is directed by CINCPAC.

D. The 1st Marne is directed by CINCPAC.

E. The 79's, 80's, and 78's are conducted in advance of the main fleet.

F. The 53 is directed by CINCPAC.

G. The 38, 35, and 56 are directed by CINCPAC.

H. The 36, 37, and 57 are directed by CINCPAC.

I. The 38, 39, and 59 are directed by CINCPAC.

J. The 36, 37, and 59 are directed by CINCPAC.

K. The 38, 39, and 59 are directed by CINCPAC.

L. The 36, 37, and 59 are directed by CINCPAC.

1. Maintain and extend continuous air pressure against JAC.
2. Attack enemy shipping and industrial capacity by all possible means.
3. Maintain and extend continuous air pressure against JAC.
4. Release additional forces to support JAC.
5. Release additional forces to support JAC.
6. Release additional forces to support JAC.
Operating Procedure SOP-2A.

4. Public relations will conform to Annex F of CINCPOA OpPlan 14-44 except that assignment of correspondents, photographers, and public relations personnel will be made separately.

5. Boundaries of command areas and command relations are described in Annex A CINCPOA OP PLAN 4-45 not to all. These area boundaries are shown in Part I Con3rdFlt Standard Instructions.

6. This Plan will be made effective by dispatch.

Para. Logistics in accordance with PacFlt Logistic Plan (Annex C amended to CINCPOA OP PLAN 14-44) and Part II 3rdFlt Standard Instructions. Fleet ServPlans for the replenishment at sea by separate dispatch.

Para. Communications in accordance with USF 70A and ComCon 2 until superseded by PAC 70-B. Use zone Z (GCT) time in DTG of all communications except visual signals to or within ground forces. Use I(-9) time at sea and local time in bases unless otherwise directed. Con3rdFlt Standard Instructions to be distributed by mail and effective when this plan is placed in effect. Con3rdFlt in MISSOURI normally with TF 38.

20 0912 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPOA ADV.

CX 16609. Ref your RJ 61604 dated 18 May. Present plan for OLYMPIA is to augment the organic corps artillery of each corps with heavy field artillery group. Tentatively set up to reinforce 38thPhibCorps is 1 Hq & Hq Btry FA GP 2 FA Bns 155 How now in HAWAII plus the 1 FA Bn 8 inch How ReoRd CS 16196 dated 14 May. 9th Corps organic artillery to consist of Hq & Hq, Btry Corps Artillery and Observation Bn now in HAWAII 2 Bns 155 How set up for shipment to ACCUMULATION and 1 Bn 155 Gun now in BUNKHOUSE. Reinforcing artillery for 9th Corps to consist of 1 Hq & Hq FA GP and 1 FA Bn 240 How now in HAWAII 1 FA in 155 Gun and 1 FA Bn 8 inch How destined for ACCUMULATION. This confirms destination MAESTRO for 1 FA Bn 8 inch How being shipped on June priority list.

21 0148 CINCPOA ADV TO COMAIRPAC INFO CIN7FLEET, COMINORPAC.

In view of changing situation in SWPA and NorPac and of current difficulties with Harpoon and Ventura availability am considering recommendation to Cominch for:

A. Transfer of 2 VFP(ML) Sqs now remaining in 7thFlt to PacFlt as necessary to maintain present scheduled availability of VFP(ML) Sqs in CenPac.

B. Transfer as soon as practicable of 2 of 6 VFP(HL) Sqs now in 7thFlt to NorPac to be followed by lot 2 of 6 Sqs referred to in CNO 181339.

Para. From information available here 4 VFP(HL) Sqs 4 VFP(MS) Sqs and 2 VFP(CL) Amphib Sqs should meet permanent requirements PhilSeaPron. Request detailed recommendations covering specific squadrons involved rotation VFP(HL) Sqs in NorPac and deereament of availability of additional VFP(ML) Sqs for equipment with Harpoons.

Para. Info Adees comment at discretion.
CINCPAC 37731. Since dispatch of my CPLX 36605, I may direct arrangements for increased air assistance to CHINA Theater by EFAF, as authorized in WARM 83426, have been completed. Agreement reached by CHINA Theater representatives in consultation with EFAF, GHQ SWPA and CINCPOA at conferences in MANILA 14-16 May sets forth following air cooperation against target areas in CHINA. Agreement follows:

Allied Air Forces are free to strike targets in INDO-CHINA and that part of SE CHINA bounded on north by YANGTZE RIVER VALLEY and on west by enemy lines of communication from HANKOW south thru HENGYANG, KWEILIN and NATING to HANOI (both boundaries inclusive) and parts of this area are occupied by friendly forces, as shown by maps furnished Allied Air Forces and by data supplied from time to time by CHINA Theater through headquarters SWPA.

Para. Matter of restrictions on bombing of HONGKONG-CANTON Area will be clarified by USFOT without delay.

Para. Under present condition Allied Air Forces will conduct operations against CHINA Theater targets generally as follows:

1. Strikes against shipping in harbors and coastal waters TWT SOUTH East CHINA and INDO-CHINA as profitable targets are presented and as AAF capabilities permit. Water targets off the Coast CHINA north of FOOCHOW will not be attacked by AAF. Prior to initiation of operations involving attack of targets in harbors or on land north of FOOCHOW which may require AAF aircraft to fly over the water areas north of FOOCHOW, clearance must be obtained from CINCPOA. Direct communication is authorized between AAF and CINCPOA to obtain such clearance.

2. Strikes against INDO-CHINA coastal lines of communication from HANOI to SAIGON as profitable targets are presented and as AAF capabilities permit.

3. Approximately 2 M2B heavy bomber sorties each night against targets in HONGKONG-CANTON Area and in SHANGHAI-NANKING Area intermittently as permitted by weather, the tactical situation, and by the availability of aircraft not committed to SWPA operations of higher priority.

4. Medium bomber and fighter sweeps along the enemy occupied river, road and rail corridors extending west, north and east respectively from CANTON as permitted by weather and the availability of aircraft not committed to operations of SWPA of higher priority.

5. AAF consider HANKOW Area beyond radius of profitable heavy bomber (or other) operations from PHILIPPINES bases unless staging and refueling are made operationally available in SOUTH EAST CHINA by CHINA Theater. Para. The CHINA Theater will KUSP provide AAF current weather, target intelligence, communications and other pertinent operational data.

Para. Communications relating to weather, target intelligence and coordination of operations are authorized direct between AAF SWPA and I4AF CHINA Theater with information copies to respective Theater Hqtrs. AAF will notify CHINA Theater Air Forces (I4AF) prior to dispatching combat missions against targets in CHINA Theater. Channels for such communications will be as indicated in preceding para.

Para. Reports of results of Allied Air Force operations against targets in CHINA will be announced in messages to CHINA Theater air forces (I4 AF), information copy to Hqtrs CHINA Theater.

Para. Mining operations in eastern YANGTZE RIVER Area, beyond reach of SWPA aircraft. These operations can be undertaken by CINCPOA if PBY or other search squadrons, which can relieve CINCPOA squadrons from other duties, can be made

---Continued---

3133
available to CINCPAC by CINCSWA. Agreement Ends.

Air strikes by FAF against targets along the CHINA and FRENCH INDO CHINA Coast already has been mutually beneficial to SWPA and CHINA Theaters. Further impact against mainland target areas by the combined efforts of Chennault's and Kenney's air forces will deny further freedom of action to Japanese south of MANCHUR RIVER which should eventu- ally seriously reduce their offensive capabilities; thereby affording precious time for CARBONADO operations.

In consonance with agreement reached at MANILA I have lifted all restrictions on targets in CHINA within bombing range of AAF operating from SWPA bases to give Kenney the latitude needed for maximum air effort against SOUTHEAST CHINA.

In view of current preparations for operations against JAPAN explained in War 63426, which virtually eliminates all possibility of a CHINA Coast lodgment by US forces from the Pacific, concept for operation CARBONADO remains unaltered. We will continue to exert our all-out efforts toward securing a port to vitalize the under nourished Chinese military potential and thereby insuring the means for ultimate expulsion of enemy from CHINA.

(This dispatch was delivered by hand by R. Adm. Pennoyer on 22 May 1945)

11 0330 COMAIRTHPTL TO COMTHPTL.

This is top secret. Refer CINCPAC ADV 0303902. Patrol squadrons of aircraft in THPTL can be released to POA as follows:

1 PBX-5A squadron when VPE 53 is relieved in Norsolsy by New Zealand landcats and becomes available for operations in the PHILIPPINE Area. This date indefinite but expected during late May. 1 PBM squadron during June when Blackcat operations from Lingayen along CHINA Coast which are becoming unprofitable can be terminated. 1 Ventura squadron on 1 July after completion of OBOE 6 when there will no longer be any profitable employment for Venturas now based at PUERTO PRINCESSA. The release of the above squadrons is predicated on retention in SWPA of 6 PB4Y squadrons. 3 PBM squadrons. 1 PBX-5A squadron and 1 Ventura squadron. 5 of the PB4Y are now present and the 6th PB4Y squadron is due this month. Squadrons will then be deployed as follows: CLARK 2 PB4Y squadrons. MINDORO 2 PB4Y squadrons. PUERTO PRINCESSA 2 PB4Y squadrons. These squadrons required for regular search coverage.

Mariners 1 squadron for air sea rescue. 1 squadron for operations in BORNEO Area. 1 squadron for ASW duty with PhilSeafon. Landcats 1 squadron for air sea rescue and utility based at PALAWAN and SAMAR. Venturas 1 squadron for ASW with PhilSeafon based at SAMAR. Above deployment based on understanding that no more than one Mariner Squadron will be required for operations in BORNEO-NEI Area. Request your concurrence in order enable me to inform COMAAF and CINCSWA of the above prior to conference regarding operations against CHINA Targets to be held at GHQ 13 May. If you concur recommendations regarding release of tenders will follow.
OX-16766. This radio is in 4 parts.

Part 1: In furtherance of the recent agreement between CINCPAC and CINCPAC relative to the installation of Army PT forces in BUNKHOUSE, arrangements have been made with the War Department to send from redeployment in EUROPE, to arrive about 1 August a considerable number of service units among which are 3 General Service Regiments and 1 Construction Battalion for LEGUMINOUS, 3 General Service Regiments for PRGUTION and 2 General Service Regiments for INDISPENSABLE.

Part 2: In addition to the above there will be dispatched to LEGUMINOUS the 1592 Engineer Aviation Battalion now loading HOLLANDIA and the 1593 Engineer Aviation Battalion now enroute to LEXTE ETA 27 May. These units will move on SWP LST's, ETA LEGUMINOUS will be given later.

Part 3: In addition there is now at LEXTE ready for shipment the 872 and 1906 Engineer Aviation Battalions and Headquarters and Headquarters Company 113 Engineer Construction Group. Query can you furnish transportation for these units.

Part 4: For administrative convenience the units indicated in Parts 2 and 3 will be assigned to Far East Air Forces and will upon arrival LEGUMINOUS pass to your temporary operational control during the period of work at LEGUMINOUS. They will be moved forward to DIABOLICO upon the initiation of that operation.

OX 16657. Joint Staff Study Preliminary Draft of OLYMPIC Naval and Amphibious operations contains some features which appear to require clarification. The following ASE IN are included in this 7 part radiogram.

Part 1: There are a number of differences in the concept of land operations. Your page MLAND. Appendix A. Over the concept which was outlined to you during recent conferences. Without going into detail which I hope to furnish you shortly in the form of a written plan. The following is outlined for your information. Total for the operation; 14 Divisions and 1 Regimental Combat Team, 12 Divisions and 1 Regimental Combat Team to be mounted in assault, 1 Division plus 1 Regimental Combat Team of the above available for preliminary operations. The main landings to be 3 simultaneous Corps landings on the East, Southeast and West coasts. A Corps of 2 Divisions to be in floating reserve and 1 InfDiv and 1 Airborne Div as follow-up, 40th Div from TRAEZEDY and 158th RCT from WHITEWASH constitute the force for preliminary operations, 14th Corps with 25th and 33rd Div from WHITEWASH and 41st Div from FORGERunner assaults East coast, 11th Corps with 1st Cavalry Div and 43rd Div from WHITEWASH and Americal Div from OXYGEN effects SE coast landing. The 5thPhilDiv marches west coast landing. The 9th Corps with the 93rd Div from MANNHEIM and 31st Div from ACCUMULATION is in the reserve afloat. 77th Div from LEGUMINOUS and the 11th Airborne Div from WHITEWASH follow-up echelon.

Part 2: On Page 6 it is indicated that the Army Air Forces operating in the POA would be subject to measures of coordination CINCPAC found necessary including air traffic control. The agency which is to execute his traffic control is not stated. As applied to the CINCPAC air forces in BUNKHOUSE it is believed that at some stage of the build-up it would be advisable to assign this duty to the Army Air Force Commander since his force will probably be the larger and his missions of primary interest. It is suggested however that this factor does not need settlement at this time or definition in advance but probably should be left to commanders, on the spot for local arrangement.

-Continued-
Part 3: On page 6 and again on page 23 there is a strong indication that the mission of attack on hostile shipping is given solely to fleet aircraft based in BUNKHOUSE. The Army Air Forces which are to be displaced to BUNKHOUSE contain types of planes ideally suited to the attack of shipping, especially merchant shipping. Both during daylight hours and at night. The aviators have had careful training and much experience in this type of operation. Attack on shipping with the objective of interrupting hostile efforts to move resources into or out of MONKEY PUZZLE is intimately connected with the land campaign and the Army Air Force mission will include this task. Coordination can be obtained locally in BUNKHOUSE.

Part 4: Page 23 indicates that the 1st MarAir Wing will be attached initially to the 5th Phib Corps. When questioned on this subject Admiral Sherman indicated that this would not restrict CINCPAC reassigning this unit to a centralized air control if he so desired. Request confirmation of this understanding.

Part 5: Page 36 indicates that CINCPAC assumes responsibility for supply of all bulk Class 3 products for all forces in the operation. It is understood that a study of this matter is now in progress in Washington. Therefore, the statement is but noted at this time with the suggestion that discussion be deferred pending determination of the results of the Washington conference.

Part 6: Page 36 indicates that control of the Army Air Forces will pass at a time mutually agreed upon by COMPHIBSPAC and the Army Air Force Commander. It is believed that it would be advisable that this time be arranged directly between CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

Part 7: There are numerous questions, mostly of omission in the plan, relating to the control and coordination of signal communications. These relate to the supply of naval signal communication equipment for shore installations. Responsibility for installation and the assistance to be expected from Army construction agencies, responsibility for installation of radar facilities, etc. Such matters eventually must be agreed upon, but it is assumed that they will be subjects of further detailed staff conferences and therefore are not cited in detail here.
This is ComNorPac OpOrd 4-45, Task Organization:
404th BombSqn - 12 B-24s  
77th BomSqn - 16 B-25s  
15, 54th and 34th FighterSqs - 75 P-38s.  
Fighting 4 - 24 Ventures.  
B. TF 91 - AlSeaFron Forces - RAdm Wood.  
C. TF 92 - Surface Striking Force - Capt. Thompson  
CrudDiv, Design 114, ATR 32.  

1. General Situation: Japanese shipping OKHOTSK SEA will increase as ice fields clear. Enemy forces: Estimated that in the Northern and Central KURILES enemy has only miscellaneous picket boats, escort vessels, merchant shipping and not more than 20 planes all types.  

Own Forces: Friendly submarines are operating North Pacific Area.  

CINCPAC SOP-1 and Addendum 8 thereto effective.  


2. Mission: This force will destroy enemy shipping in the OKHOTSK SEA and North Pacific Ocean Areas to the limit of its capabilities in order to damage the enemy and harass him to the maximum possible.  

3. Tasks:  
A. Air Force: As directed or when enemy shipping is located conduct strikes against enemy shipping in the PARAMUSHIRU-CHISHICHU Area or YATSUKA Area.  
B. AlSeaFron forces provide tanker MASSACRE BAY.  
C. Surface Striking Force when directed intercept and destroy enemy shipping. Utilize services ATR 32 at discretion.  

Para. For Air-Sea rescue operations Para 1 Annex E my OpPlan 1-45 apply.  

This OpOrd effective 12 hours after (July 10) April 30th.  

4. Logistic support available ARTU.  

5. Communications accordance USF 70A (NorPacSupp). Rendezvous MASSACRE BAY. US IV time (July 10). ComNorPac at ADAK.  

221530 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COLONCH, H.A. CORPS, CINCPAC, USPAC, CINCPAC, PAK.  

CX 16612. Your 180005. Agree to removal Marine Corps from DIABOLIC replacing same with the 2 garrison divisions from US now scheduled for CenPac. 1st 2 Marine Divisions to come out prior to CORRECT. (Approximately by X plus 90) and remaining division to be removed in accordance with the then existing situation.  

230213 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COLONCH.  

Your CX 16677 DTD 21O11A. Concerning Part 1 see parenthetical note at top of Page 14 my preliminary draft OLYMPIC. As therein stated my Appendix A in connection ground forces was included for orientation only and on receipt your plan will be amended to conform thereto.  

Para. Concerning Part 2 agree that it is not necessary for me to designate now the officer who will be my representative for coordinating local air traffic control. You may be assured that he will be a competent senior flying officer.  

Concerning Part 3 I expect to employ carrier forces light naval surface forces submarines and shore based aircraft to complete the task of destroying enemy naval forces and shipping. Their basic coordination will be effected - Continued -
from my headquarters with additional coordination by designated commanders in the operating area. There is no objection to the participation of Army Air Forces in operations against naval forces and shipping providing that the necessary coordination is effected but I strongly recommend that the Army Air Forces deployed in the Ryukyus be selected for their suitability for attack on objectives in Japan in direct preparation for the land campaign as envisaged in our earlier discussions of action required to create the conditions most favorable to the success of OLYMPIC. This task is by no means as well in hand as is the destruction of enemy naval forces and shipping which has reached an advanced stage.

Concerning Part 4, the 1st Marine Air Wing is attached to the 5th PhibCorps to assist in providing the direct air support which is requisite in operations of the character of those in prospect. I would expect the Army commander in the exercise of his authority and responsibility to employ the Marine ground and air units in the manner which in my opinion would contribute most to the success of the operation using Marine aircraft to support Marine ground troops in cases where other considerations are not in my opinion more important.

Concerning Part 5,

Concerning Part 6 will propose new draft which will require ComPhibsPac and Army Air Commander to recommend and CINCPAC and CINCPAC to decide time control is to be passed.

Concerning Part 7 the draft of communication annex will be prepared to implement basic concepts on which we have agreed and will be ready for next conference. Detailed discussion follows in separate dispatch.

23 0215 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINC

1. Request reconsideration of your 211315. The ships involved will for the most part be carriers and destroyers which have recently completed overhaul and are badly needed in the combat area or will be escort carriers engaged in training much needed replacements. At this particular time the ships cannot be spared without adverse effect on actual combat operations.

2. An inherent feature of FIREBREAK was the expedited departure of ships preparing for sea. Because of the difficult labor situation I propose to direct that if ordered the exercise shall be conducted without any interference with Navy Yard or supply base schedules or any other effect on the civilian labor situation.

23 0559 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COMGEN AAFPOA, USCOM OKINAWA, CINCPAC PEARL

Submit to me your comment on ComGenAAFPOA 210635.

23 0849 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINC INFO CINCPAC

Reply to JCS WARR 86160 DTG follows: Owing to the character of the war in the FOA which has been primarily naval amphibious and aerial the employment of the agencies of the Office of Strategic Services in the FOA has been very limited. The minor services rendered could have been rendered equally effectively by appropriate agencies of the War & Navy Depts.

Although the OSS has been anxious to assist and cooperate it is my considered opinion that better results would have been obtained and can be obtained in the future if the missions now assigned to the OSS are reassigned to the War and Navy Departments insofar as the FOA are concerned.

I have no adequate basis for comment on the need for the OSS in land campaigns in large land masses.
Preliminary reply to Part 7 Urius 210114 (CX 16657). Submitted for your consideration are following proposals with respect to general allocation of responsibilities for provision of communication facilities and service. The term Communication Plan as used herein embraces both operational and logistical aspects.

Subject amphibious phase communication plan. For amphibious phase of operations an overall amphibious communication plan extending through the landing phase until CINCPAC takes charge on shore. To be prepared under direction of CINCPAC. For this purpose direct communication between certain Army and Navy commanders concerned (especially ComphibsPac and OQG 6th Army) will be essential.

Subject communication plan for land campaign. Propose CINCPAC prepare an overall communication plan including shore based naval forces, Naval and Marine aircraft, Army ground and Army air forces.

Subject responsibility for providing facilities. Consider generally that the using service should supply necessary facilities with certain exceptions especially where one service may more efficiently provide for both services, for example as the outside wire plant and airways facilities by Navy and ship-shore communications by Navy.

A. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for communications facilities required to support naval forces and naval operations except as noted below.

B. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for following communications ashore in addition to facilities normally required for support of Army forces and operations,

1. Airways communications, radio aids to aerial navigation except Loren, airport control communications and procedures, except Navy to furnish facilities for Navy and/or Marine airfield control.

2. Organization of integrated area airwarning and fighter direction system. Note that on Page 84 of Appendix E MySer 0005053 of 13 May 2 Marine Air Warning Squadrons are contemplated. These might be employed as part of radar system with sitting such that fighter direction personnel will control air defense sector in which WAF normally operate.

3. Installation military wire system to be by Army. Reference is para 2(F) of CINCPAO Conf. Ser. 11CF-45. Normally advance base wire installations in FOA have been thus accomplished. Request CINCPAC continue this procedure to avoid duplication in material planning and procurement and in training of personnel. Present policy of Army assuming general responsibility for land line construction and operation of major central offices has been notably successful in FOA.

C. Joint Communications to be employed to that extent which will effectively satisfy the operational needs of the various commands involved in order to affect obvious economies.

Para 5. Subject is responsibility for installation of radar facilities.

A. Surface search radar for harbor defense will be provided by Navy as part of the harbor defense organization.

B. Airwarning and fighter direction radar has been treated above. It will be considered in conference especially to insure adequate shore based radar and fighter director units during early phases of landings.

C. Gun and SL control radar are integral with artillery units and control is a phase of overall command of the defense organization. To facilitate action prefer hereafter to keep separate our messages on radar and those on communications.

- Continued -
6. Request comment on foregoing in order to establish basis for further agreements and planning, Particularly desire your proposals on any other communications subjects considered essential. With agreement on general principles details to be determined in conferences particularly the coordination and continuity required for the communication plans for the amphibious phase and the subsequent land operations.

24 0255 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 93 INFO CTF 93, CONRDFFLTF.

My OpPlan 4-45. CTF 93 assigned responsibility neutralization MARCUS and enemy held bases in DONINS as well as responsibilities assigned in Sub-paragraph 3(e).

24 0258 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSPTFLT INFO COMGEN 10, CTG 99.2.

Assume that TG 99.2 will make maximum effort against enemy air in KYUSHU as best counter to disrupt enemy forces now forming up to attack your forces.

24 0558 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, PEARL INFO CINCPAC, COMGENPOA, CGAAPT, CGFEAF.

Dates given in ComGenPOA RJ 61966 for arrival fighter groups are not in accord concept my 100717 which contemplates that FRICITION will be developed for temporary use under minimum standards to support OLYMPIC. Airfield development must be such as to accommodate 3 Fighter Bomber Groups by 15 October. Revised Base Development Directive in preparation.

24 1257 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH.

I am not aware of the basic differences in connection with responsibilities and command structure referred to in your CX 16573 since they did not become apparent in our recent conference. Request that I be furnished specific information.

I consider that any basic differences should be resolved without delay and before any conferences take place on lower command levels or on staff levels. I therefore urge an early conference and hope that you will find it feasible to visit my headquarters for that purpose.

24 0513 CINCSWA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S WAR DEPT FOR GEN. MARSHALL.

CX 16598. Further to my CX 16657, 20 May, the completed study of CINCPAC OLYMPIC PLAN develops a number of basic differences in interpretation of intent of present planning directives relating to responsibilities and command structure over those held here. These will not be cited in detail now since it is not believed that they can be adequately covered by radio nor advantageously settled until an operational directive has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime, the many other details of planning and coordination may proceed.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV.

WARX 87435. Directive to CINCPAC in WAR 62773 and WAR 62774 both dated 3 April 1945 to make plans and preparations for campaign in JAPAN is reference.

Para 2. Following responsibilities have been fixed by Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. CINCPAC is charged with censorship of civilian communications in JAPAN (including the 4 main islands, about 1,000 offshore islands, and KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLANDS but excluding the outlying islands as defined in JCS 1231).

B. The War Department will make available to CINCPAC all civil censorship plans for JAPAN as defined in 2A above completed or in preparation to date and will continue the preparation of uncompleted plans and will continue to assist CINCPAC in planning, in procurement and training of censorship personnel, and in the procurement of technical censorship equipment to the same extent as heretofore has been done for CINCPOA/CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

FOR VICE ADMIRAL COOK.

During telephone conference this morning Rear Admiral Sherman's concurrence was asked in a proposed agreement concerning operational control of gunfire support ships. Since reception was not reliable request proposed language be transmitted by dispatch and concurrence be considered held in abeyance.

CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S WD, FOR MARSHALL.

CX 17032.

Your 241227. At our recent conference, the 2 conceptions of the OLYMPIC Plan were verbally presented by you and by myself. As I understood, your estimate envisioned the campaign as practically divided into 2: The 1st Part under the Navy, and the 2nd part cooperatively under the Army and the Navy. The Navy part included practically everything up to and including the success of the beachhead landing. This involved Navy control and command of the Army's forces as well as those of the Navy. In the 2nd part, the Army forces were to operate under Army command while Navy forces were to remain under Navy command, cooperating under the principles of joint action. You will recall I disagreed with this concept, believing that the campaign should not be so divided; that the "campaign" as the term is used in Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1259/4 started many weeks before the actual landing, with the preparatory air phases which have very great effect upon land operations subsequent to landing; that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized this fact in their employment of the term "Campaign" and "Naval and Amphibious Phases of the Invasion" thus apparently contemplating an overall responsibility although each service would operate under the orders of its own commanders throughout. In the long amicable discussion which followed, it became evident that these points of difference were fundamental. It was therefore agreed that certain general principles which were mutually believed to be workable should be made of record and the Staff Study OLYMPIC which you had drawn up should be left at my headquarters for review. That review confirmed the policies enunciated verbally by you and clearly set forth your views of responsibility and command structure with which I had expressed disagreement. The 1st part of the campaign was to be under your command with you and your subordinate naval commanders not only controlling the operation but actually
25 1102 GHQ SWPA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S WD FOR MARSHALL (CONT'D)

COMMANDING IT, including the Army troops. All publicity, including Army as well as Navy elements, was to be controlled by you. After the beachhead was secured and the Army Command Post was established ashore, the Army troops were to report to me and their control for the remainder of the campaign was to be in my hands. The naval elements in this 2nd phase were to remain under your command and cooperate with me in support. Our review yielded many other differences flowing from this basic difference, and showed clearly that a directive defining these fundamental points was necessary before further discussions of this feature. Thank you very much for your invitation to come to GUAM. I or my planners if I am unable to come will accept it immediately on receipt of the operational directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

25 2217 COM3RFIT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CONSERVPAC, COMAIRCAP.

Your 190749, and also considering KEBEKLARG. Subject to modification after inspection the following are considered important for consideration.

(A) Airline distance from Empire targets to ENIWETOK and LOTTIE not greatly different but surprise attacks from ENIWETOK would involve less steaming than from LEYTE. ENIWETOK closer to navy yards and closer to repletion sources.

(B) ENIWETOK weather offers less danger and more benefits to men and material.

(C) If ENIWETOK is used generous provision should be made for maintenance, repletion, aircraft pool, service, recreation and water transportation before first visit of combatant forces. Until such full and adequate facilities can be provided at ENIWETOK the fleet would do better at LEYTE.

(D) By restoring about 1/2 of former maximum shore facilities plus appropriate floating facilities ENIWETOK can base and support 3 fast carrier groups and related shipping. Estimated 4 to 6 weeks to prepare ENIWETOK for that load.

25 2315 CINCPAC ADV TO DEFCOM20TH AF INFO COMINCH, CINCAPAC, CGPOA, CINCPAC PEARL, COMWDAREA, ESCOM TWO.

Cincpac concurs in the assignment to the operational and administrative control of the 20th AF of the Army Fighter Command at IWO JIMA with its fighter group service and other units. Cincpac also concurs in the temporary assignment to the operational control of the 7th AF of 20th AF fighter aviation to be deployed at OKINAWA and IE SHIMA. The foregoing concurrence is contingent on the continued responsibility of the fighter commander at IWO JIMA to the Island Commander for the fighter defense of the island.

26 0842 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RFIT FOR INFO COMSTFELT, COMPHIBSPAC.

Request your early comment on feasibility occupying CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO without NINGHO PENINSULA using only Marines (5thPhibCorps plus 2nd MarDiv). Consult with ComGen5thPhibCorps and include his views. Assume neither ICEBERG 3D or OLYMPIC to be done in 1945.
Para 1. The extent to which military and naval requirements for airfields, installations and facilities at PALMERA, SAMOA, FIJI and NOUMEA have decreased make it an appropriate time to establish an American Flag commercial air service from the West Coast to AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND and I recommend that in the national interest such action be taken without delay.

Para 2. I recommend further that consideration be given now to establish an American Flag commercial air service from GUAM to SAN FRANCISCO at some future date. This service should be extended to MANILA if CINCPAC-WPA concurs.

Para 3. The number of civilians now travelling through the Pacific for various reasons would help support such a service and additional support could be given by assigning air mail to use available pay load.

25 2158 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO NIMITZ, ARNOLD, MACARTHUR.

WARX-87938. Pursuant to and in furtherance of directives contained in WAR-62773 and WAR-62774 both dated 3 April 1945, the following directive is issued and is effective on receipt.

Para (A). The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the invasion of KYUSHU (Operation OLYMPIC), target date 1 November 1945, in order to:

1. Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of JAPAN.

2. Contain and destroy major enemy forces.

3. Support further advances for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of JAPAN.

Para (B). CINCPAC-CHINCISWA:

1. Is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander.

2. Will make plans and preparations for the continuation of the campaign in JAPAN and cooperate with CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases thereof.

Para (C). CINCPAC-CINCPAC:

1. Is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious (subject to Para B(1) above) phases of the OLYMPIC Operation, and will correlate his plans with CINCPAC-CHINCISWA.

2. Will cooperate with and assist CINCPAC in his plans and preparations for, and the conduct of, the campaign in JAPAN.

Para (D). The land campaign and requirements therefore are primary in the OLYMPIC Operation. Account of this will be taken in the preparations, coordination and execution of plans.

Para (E). CG CML 20th Air Force, will cooperate in the plans, preparations and execution of Operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 20th Air Force will come under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of Operations directed above.

26 0231 COMSHFILT. & COM3RDRAFT TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Originators jointly recommend your OpPlan 4-45 be made effective 2400(9) 27 May at which time command of all forces then attached 5th Flt except NEW MEXICO and assigned escorts will be passed to Commander 3rd Fleet.
1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have made a general proposal to the British regarding their taking over a part of the present SWPA and in turn the British have asked certain questions regarding U.S. intentions in the area.

2. The following is under consideration here as a basis for reply to the British. Your comment is requested, to include advice as to initial steps in the progressive turnover and the approximate timing.

(A) Question. Is it the intention of the United States Chiefs of Staff to leave all Australian forces in this area when they give it up?

Answer. Yes. In addition it is the intention that all other Allied forces (except U.S.) will remain in the area when the United States give it up.

(B) Question. If so, will they continue to provide for the Australian forces such equipment and logistics as the Australians cannot provide?

Answer. Except for emergency supply, the Australians government provide their own equipment and logistic support from local resources and through normal lend-lease channels. The United States will not be responsible for provision of equipment and logistics for the Australians when the area is given up, except that consideration will be given under normal lend-lease procedures for requests for specific items of equipment which cannot be met from Empire resources.

(C) Question. Will the United States Chiefs of Staff leave the base installations and administrative personnel which are at present being used by the Australian forces?

Answer. At present the Australians are not using U.S. base installations for their support. The U.S. does not intend to remove fixed base installations from the area but will displace forward all required movable installations or parts thereof and movable items of equipment and material including refrigeration, tankage and heavy construction equipment. When all supplies and equipment required by the U.S. are evacuated, bases and any remaining equipment will be disposed of by normal procedures.

Para. No U.S. administrative personnel, except some amphibious engineers presently employed in operations, are furnishing direct support to Australian forces. All U.S. administrative personnel now in the area, including amphibious engineers, required in the forward areas will be removed. If the roll-up of U.S. bases is delayed beyond 1 October, it will be necessary to leave some U.S. administrative personnel as caretakers for supplies to be moved forward at a later date.

(D) Question. Will the U.S. Chiefs of Staff leave an amphibious lift? The British Chiefs of Staff reckon that a self-contained lift for at least 1 division with necessary maintenance facilities will be required.

Answer. No. However, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider that when amphibious operations for the area are approved, allocation of assault shipping should be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the light of the priority and requirements of other areas.

(E) Question. Will the U.S. Chiefs continue to supply the Australian forces with airfield constructional resources?

Answer. No. At present U.S. airfield construction effort is not being furnished in support of Australian forces. Steel mat has been furnished. Airfield construction for Australian forces should be by their own troops and from local resources supported as necessary by resources obtained from Empire production and from lend-lease through normal procedures. - Continued -
(F) Question. Will the U.S. Chiefs of Staff be prepared to support allocations of merchant shipping for the operation and maintenance needs of the area?

Answer. While Australian forces remain under command of CINCUSWA, shipping is made available for their support from U.S. allocations. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are prepared to consider allocations of merchant shipping for the operational and maintenance needs of the area when under British command on the same basis as allocations are made for other areas.

(G) Question. To what extent do the U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose to continue to depend on the civil resources of Australia?

Answer. It is estimated that the SWPA is receiving from AUSTRALIA some 70,000 measurement tons per month of which approximately 35,000 are perishable food and 35,000 dry cargo. The U.S. will continue to depend on Australian resources at the approximate present rate of production based on existing contracts. To do otherwise would disrupt present logistical set up and undoubtedly entail an additional drain on overall shipping. It is probable that U.S. requirements for prefabricated buildings from Australian resources will terminate with the expiration of present contract demands.

2. In addition to the above, the following is under consideration as the dividing line between British and U.S. areas of command: Beginning on the coast of INDO-CHINA at 1500 N, through BALABAC STRAIT along the 1939 boundary line between the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO to 0800 N; thence East to 0500 N 13000 E; thence South to the equator; thence East to 14000 E; thence generally southeast to 02000 11600 E; thence East to 02000 15900 E; thence South. U.S. control of the ADMIRALITY ISLANDS is necessary due to the extensive naval facilities have been assembled at MANUS and its continued use as a primary base west of HAWAII for the support of U.S. naval forces.

3. The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate that once decision is made, the turnover of area and forces be accomplished on a schedule to be arranged between CINCUSWA and the British authorities IRC approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

26 2315 CINCPAO ADV TO ALPAC INFO COMINCH. CINCSWA. COMAFLSWPA. COMTHFIL. CINCBBF. DEPCOM 20 AF.

My Op-Plan 4-45 modified by my 131239 and 240255 becomes effective 271500 MAY. All references not held or needed by all. All forces then in 5thFlt will pass to operational control of Com3rdFlt except:

(A) Commander RYUKYUS Forces (CTF 99) will be under the direct command of CINCPAO.

(B) NEW MEXICO (BB 40) and assigned escorts will remain under operational control of Com5thFlt until otherwise directed.

27 0117 CINCPAO ADV TO COMATPAC. CONSEVPAK. COMGENPOA. CGFFPAC. COMPHIBSPAC. COM3RDFlT. COM5THFlt. CONCOM. CONFIJDATE INFO COMINCH. CINCAPPAC. CINCPAO PEARL. COM3RDFlT FOR. COM5THFlt FOR.

The JCS have directed Operation OLYMPIC with target date of 1 November. Accordingly as indicated in my 100717 Phase 3D ICEBERG will be executed about 15 July and Phases 3C and R and also Operation LONGJAM are indefinitely deferred. Base development at FRICION will be such as to accommodate a maximum fighter bomber strength not later than 15 October and no construction will be undertaken which will not directly support OLYMPIC.
CINCPEAC ADV TO COMINCH-CNO INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

I am considering use ENIWETOK as a carrier task force anchorage primarily because of the shortening of lines of supply which will result for forces operating off HONSHU and secondarily because of the better climatic conditions and better shore facilities. Intend initiate use in late July by 1 task group building up as developments warrant until by OLYMPIC target date 3rdFt could base primarily in ENIWETOK-GUAM-SAIPAN and 5thFt in bases to westward. Plans are not yet firm. Purpose of this dispatch is to inform you of trend of our planning.

CINCPEAC ADV TO COMINCH and CNO INFO COMAIRPAC.

CNO 261832 which crossed my 270540 and 270541 was addressed direct to ComAirPac and requested his comment on proposals for changes in deployment of heavy and medium landplane search squadrons. My 270540 and 270541 are intended to increase and strengthen Fleet Air Wing 4 for strategic reasons in connection KEREBLOCKS 4 and prospective 3rdFt operations. Request all matters of deployment of naval combatant forces within Pacific Ocean Areas be referred to CINCPEAC-CINCPAC.

CINCPOA ADV HQ TO CINCSPWA.

Your 270722 and 271312. Visit of General Casey and party completely convenient and will expect them tomorrow Tuesday.

General Chamberlain's visit will probably be convenient but there is a possibility of conflicting requirements. Suggest you give me exact date when he would arrive and by the time it is received I expect to be able to reply definitely.

General Kenney's conference with General Giles is agreeable and my staff will be available to discuss any subject he desires on an exploratory basis.

CINCPOA ADV INFO COMINCHBEPAC, COM5THFLT, CG5TH, HIBCORPS, CGFMFPAC.

In view your 270117 reply your 260842 is made for possible future reference. On basis resent intelligence seizure islands with Marine Forces allotted deemed feasible even though peninsula in enemy hands. Heavy reinforcement particularly in artillery of peninsula prior assault would hazard success of operation. Temporary occupation of tip of peninsula during initial assault CHUSAN may be desirable for security. Enemy reoccupation of peninsula after withdrawal security force and his practicable reinforcement of peninsula which is in medium artillery range of projected airfields other island installations AND best fleet anchorage would hamper development phase. Possibility continued enemy attempts to effect counter landings and necessity occupying approach islands to westward of CHUSAN would require large permanent garrison estimated as 4 divisions thereby necessitating retention Marines or their replacement by Army divisions. Subsequent seizure peninsula employing additional forces might prove necessary to insure unimpeded development and fruitful employment base facilities. ComGen5thHibCorps consulted and concurs.

CINCPOA ADV TO COMHIGHPPOA INFO CGAAPPPOA ADMIN, CINCAPAC, CGFEAP, CINCPOA PEARL DEFPOC 20th AF.

In view of agreements recorded in myser 000507 of 19 May request that you coordinate with CINCAPAC all proposals for deployment in KYUKUS of Army Air Forces other than VR groups and the units now definitely planned for deployment in Phases 1, 2, 3D of TOSENOK this replies to your 250827 not to all.
29 0331 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCEN TEN INFO COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, CG TAF RYUKUS, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMMAR HEL PRS OKINAWA.

This reply to your 211252 not to all or needed. See also my 152347.
(A) 34 will be retained in 15th echelon.
(B) ATAS construction will be expedited to accommodate MAG 14 and 15.
(C) Initial increment 200 airplanes carrier pool to be established
ATAS October 15 increased to 300 airplanes as practicable after departure MAG 14.
(D) MAG 14 will be displaced forward in November.
(E) Development of airfield TSUGA "shelter" will be deferred. Information regarding augmented airfield development program will be furnished you later after conference with CINCAPAC.

29 0519 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGRDLFT.

Your 230929. See my 051250 concerning minefield clearance.

29 0718 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC AREA INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMRON 10, COMGRDLFT.

Cinpac Adv 260625, ComServRon 10 230227, ComAirFac 260123 and Com3rdFlt 252217 which is passed to you separately. Request immediate comments and recommendations on proposal to base and support fast carrier groups at SHLETOK (1 in July and building up to 3 US and 1 British by October) together with carrier pool of 300 aircraft, 2 carrier air groups staging without aircraft and the tactical aircraft contained in ComAirFac 260123 less 1 VPB(HL) and 1 VMSB squadron plus 1 VF(N) squadron.

29 0358 CINCPAC ADV TO DEPCOMAF 20, COMGRDLFT INFO COMCHINCH, COMSURPAC, COMRON 21, CTF 30-5, CTF 31, CTF 33.

Coordinated attack group of 9 submarines will soon force entrance to JAPAN SEA and commence shipping attacks therein on H-Day (now planned for 9 June) to continue for about 2 weeks. This operation will create new opportunities for the destruction of shipping and intensification of the blockade of JAPAN.

Para. For DepCom AF 20. Request BomCom 21 maintain mine blockade of SHIMONOGAI STRAITS and satellite ports of FUKUOKA and KARASUI during this period and devote remainder of mining effort to attrition and blockade of ports on the north coast of HOKUSUI after H-Day.

Para. For Com3rdFlt. Desire that Fairchild 1 be prepared to intensify shipping strikes on west coast of KYUSHU, off KOREA and in TSUGA STRAIGHTS, employing mines as practicable to drive KOREA Coast-hugging shipping into the open.

Para. Inform only those who need to know that submarines are to enter JAPAN SEA and period of their operations therein.

29 1605 COMCHINCH & CH. TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC HAWAII, COMSUBFAC, CINCPAC JAPAN, COMSREP FROM COMAF 30, CGT 30-5, CTF 30-5, CTF 31, CTF 33, DEPPOC, COMSURPAC, COMRON 21.

In view recommendations UdDev 230215 not to all I do not propose to direct implementation FIREBREAK as an exercise. UdDev 211315 refers.
20 0526 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPNORTHCOM.

There is no time to wait for developments in the electronics industry. The most effective countermeasure is destruction of electronic tube production concentrated in 5 plants named in CINCPAC-CINCPAC priority list Japanese strategic targets 16 May 1945. Suggest these plants be considered primary strategic targets in any strikes against the empire in the TOKYO area. However not recommended unless there is available sufficient force to destroy 3 plants TOKYO Area.

20 0526 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO.

Your 232150. The future activities of the combat forces British Pacific Fleet in the war against JAPAN should fall into 2 principal categories. In the 1st they would base on AUSTRALIA with an advance base at MANUS and operate against JAPAN with the 3rdPlt stating anchorages (but with no British shore installations) at ULITHI and ENIWETOK. In the 2nd category they would operate to reopen the MALACCA STRAIT and liberate the enemy held areas in the British command area, proposed by JUS 250128. For this purpose they would need a base in the SOUTH CHINA SEA from which BUNGEI BAY seems well suited. If it is to be captured it seems fundamental that it should be developed. If it is not to be developed and used its capture seems questionable.

Para. I see no need for a British base in the PHILIPPINES for either category of operations. If it later develops that British ships operate against JAPAN with a line of supply through MALACCA STRAIT ULITHI and ENIWETOK can be used as advanced anchorages.

Para. In the foregiving I do not regard temporary British augmentation of the United States carrier aircraft pools of the carrier as constituting British shore installations.

20 0632 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPNORTHCOM.

Re 20 0632 top sec 29037. Subject photography is not to be undertaken as a priority I task assignment for your forces. Special photographic requested in 20 0632 top sec 110518 and 290526 is to be considered a priority I photo mission consistent with your recce and damage assessment photographic requirements when your carriers are operating against targets in southern DIAMOND.

20 0826 CINCPAC ADV TO DECOM 20 AP INFO COMRDA, COMBAREA, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 130331 which in effect recommended construction of storage for and build up of VLR ammunition stocks in KALAMAS to 324950 tons. After careful consideration all factors including the more urgent requirements imposed by CINCPAC preparations throughout the Pacific decision to limit VLR ammo storage in KALAMAS to total 150,000 Tons as indicated in CINCPAC Pearl 190102 is confirmed. Recommendations of ComBAREA based on agreement between that Hq and ComGen 21 BomCom have been approved for distribution between islands as follows: CALAM 50,000, SALINAN 30,000, TIMANAH 70,000. Due to shortage of chipping and of service troops for construction, handling and transportation of VLR ammo as well as serious backlog of cargo awaiting discharge in KALAMAS and necessity for priority construction of other essential installations it is regretted that additional VLR ammo storage cannot be favorably considered at this time.

Para. See CINCPAC's 230033 concerning troop shortages.

Para. Idemination of 150,000 Tons applies to construction of facilities in accordance with prescribed safety standards. There is no objection to augmentation of stocks in authorized storage space as feasible provided safety factors in regard to storage are acceptable to both COM and COMBAREA considered and provided further that additional stocks are not divided at the expense of other material considered more essential by ComBAREA.
30 0829 CINC PAC ADV TO COMCHIC AND CHC INFO CINC PAC FMWL.

Your 292207. On assumption ATHELING, RAJAH and TRACKER were furnished British under lend-lease recommend strongest possible representations for their continuance in the Pacific with American crews if necessary.

30 1225 CINC PAC ADV TO CINC BF T INFO CTF 37.

From BPFL0. Cincpac Adv 270117 and 280058.

1. As early in July as possible after rest and replenishment at LEYTE, TF 38 will commence strikes on targets in HOKSHU HOKKAIDO and KURILES. Subject to continued availability to Cincpac he plans to include TF 37 in strikes when fleet returns from replenishment and battle damage repairs. Anticipated that offensive operations will continue up to OLYMPIC.

2. Plans for possible use of EMILJETOKAFOR for TF 37 to use this anchorage commencing by October. Meanwhile TF 37 works from LEYTE. Plans contemplate inclusion British aircraft and personnel in carrier pool at EMILJETOK.

3. Length of operations referred to in Para 1 will probably be shorter than in ICEBERG before groups return to forward anchorage but increased distances of targets will make matter of tanker groups crux of problem.

4. Admiral Nimitz approves this dispatch.

30 1300 CTF 31 to CONRDFIT INFO CINC PAC ADV.

Your 290525. Cincpac Adv 201326 provides for shipment to OKINAWA of 6 or 7 MTB's to arrive about 20 June primarily for air sea rescue duties. Necessary retain this area for use in garrison duty and Phase 1 large numbers of LCI types which have proved to be very effective against enemy small craft. Consider remaining enemy boat and large traffic can be successfully countered. In view of this and early advent of typhoon season with facilities for protection small craft against heavy weather already overtaxed recommend that no additional MTB's be moved forward at present. Consideration should be given to their advance in sufficient time for OLYMPIC.

31 0236 CINC PAC ADV TO CINCBF T.

Your 300110. As stated in my 061430 April I cannot see any need for XE craft in PCA and therefore concur in Para 1 your 300110.
31 0334 COMGEN TFM TO FOR INFO OOR-E TFM, CINCPOA 20TH, CG 24TH, CG 36TH, CONSERVPAC CONAIRPAC, CO CINCFFEAPAC, CTP 51, CG 36TH AREA, TSOCH LEGENDINESS, TSOCH FRACTION, CG 24TH Corps, CG 36TH PhilCorps.

Effective 311500 (GCT) MAY this Hqtrs adopts the additional title of Hq 10th Army and RYUKYUS AREA to be used exclusively for correspondence and written orders dealing with RYUKYUS Area affairs. This title is not authorized for radio traffic for which the titles ComGen 10 and CTF 99 remain in effect for all dispatches addressed to this Hq. The adoption of above title does not imply a division of the Hq 10th Army staff which continues to perform triple function of:
1. Administering RYUKYUS Area affairs
2. Administering 10th US Army
3. Conducting 10th Army operations with attached Marine and Navy units.
Separate files established at this Hq for all correspondence orders dispatched to CG 10th Army and RYUKYUS Area or pertaining to administrative or tactical operations of RYUKYUS Area.

31 1251 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCFFEAPAC INFO CINCFFEAPAC, CG 10TH ARMY, CG 36TH, CINCFFEAPAC, CG 36TH, PhilCorps.

Request you direct CG 5th PhilCorps report by dispatch to ComGen 6th Army for purposes OLYMPIC planning.

01 0042 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCFFEAPAC

Following under consideration here:
A. Return 2 Army divisions from OKINAWA to PHILIPPINES to reduce garrison permit entrance our air forces and eliminate large requirements OKINAWA for additional services. After discussion with Eastwood I will answer in affirmative and designating LEYTE and MINDORO as stations unless otherwise advised.
B. Cancel KAIHIN JIMA operation in order conserve shipping, engineer effort and service effort required for placing air on OKINAWA. Believe this will permit concentration effort on OKINAWA and result in heavier concentrating air to cover OLYMPIC although distances will be greater. Spruance, Turner, Hill and CINCPOA planners and also Kenny favor this. Will give affirmative opinion for APAC unless otherwise advised. Please acknowledge.

01 0453 CINCFFEAPAC ADV TO CINCFFEAPAC.

My 010042 originated by Major General Chamberlin.

01 1014 MACARTHUR GHQ SWPA TO CINCPOA ADV

For General Chamberlin. C 17557. Concur proposals contained in your 010042.
01 1157 CON3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CONSUBPAC, COMBATRON 2, CTF 38.

Tentative plans for Empire strikes by TF 38 in July include long range bombardment HOKKAIDO and HONSHU targets from approaches which current intelligence shows to be free of mines. In order verify this information and permit bombardment shorter ranges request submarine mine reconnaissance inside 100 fathom curve be conducted earliest practicable in following areas with order of priority indicated:
1. East Coast HONSHU between 36-20 N and 37-00 N.
2. Due south of KASDORO between 146-10 E and 144-40 E.
3. East of KMAISHI between 39-11 N and 39-20 N.
4. South Coast HONSHU between 137-20 E and 138-00 E.

01 1217 CON3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV, COMBATRON 2 INFO CTF 38.

See my 011157. Request 1 Division 2200-ton DMS be assigned TF 38 by 1 July. Desirable that division be given all training practicable to allow for speed sweeping unit prior to this assignment. If approved intend this division sweep ahead of bombardment groups in approaching Empire targets.

02 0034 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CJUO TH, AMY, CONSUBPAC, COMCPAC, CHAPAC, CHAPAC, COMCPAC INFO COMCINC & CINCPAC, CTF 37, COMCPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSUBPAC.

Cancel my 060321 May. Phase 3D ICEBERG is deferred indefinitely. Resources previously intended for FRICMION will be utilized fullest practicable to expedite and intensify development of LEGUMINOUS and INDISPENSABLE.

02 0317 CONSUBPAC TO CINCPAC INFO CON3RDFLT, CONSUBPAC & COM, ATO, CTF 17, 10.

Con3rdFlt 011157. No FM Sonar equipped submarines now in area except 9 about to enter JAPAN SEA. Recommend no diversion of these ships. New gear now being installed JASO as received from coast. 1 new submarine may be able to investigate requested areas beginning 8 July. Will make preliminary investigation requested areas with REDFIN beginning about 20 June. Her gear has no security hence use depends on absence A/S vessels. Therefore cannot guarantee success but will do what we can.

02 0600 COMPHIBSPAC TO COMTHPAC FOR INFO COMTHPAC 12, 6066TH ARMY, COM 7TH, CINCPAC ADV.

Your serial 00013 of 22 May concerning Amphibious training very helpful and appreciated. Letter to ComPhibCgrp 12 now being issued directs him as TG or TF Cdr of 7thFlt to coordinate detailed training procedures with ComTHPtL and ConCon 6th Army accordance best amphibious practices.

Para. Following comment on the reference:
A. Consider amphibious training group and special schools for officers training will be very useful as that course might be expanded to 2 weeks. Desire to send to you if you agree for training group staff officers from PhibsPac experienced in recent operations for advice and lectures on subjects of naval gunfire support, air support, UDT operations, beach party operations, control line operations, amphibious communications and transport quartermaster duties for ships and troops.
B. With present plan of having ComPhibCgrp 12 in direct charge of training there is doubt as to value of mobile training units as now organized.

- Continued -
Suggest possible reduction numbers of officers in units and that if used these units be ordered report to ComTransRon 16 for duty.

C. In my letter am placing emphasis on desirability of training divisions as a whole in various shore parties and all other units and also desirability of training Corps (1 group missing) FRIGHT TRAINING. Due lack of time and ships this may not be initially possible but am making effort obtain additional ships because training major staffs only during rehearsals is not entirely satisfactory.

Para. Any initial arrangements agreeable to you and ComPhibGrp 12 satisfactory to me with reserve that desirable changes may be agreed on later.

1. Preliminary conference with representatives CINCPAC discloses that CINCPAC has not included provision for wire communication within naval establishments ashore in OLYMPIC. Neither material nor troops on hand or under redeployment has been projected for this purpose.

2. Request immediate study be made jointly to determine material and personnel requirements for installation and operation of wire interior communication facilities for all naval installations ashore in OLYMPIC. ComAirPac requested to advise you of naval and marine air requirements. ComGenPOA requested submit projects for procurement of such personnel and material requirements which are in excess of POA resources now available or planned for other operations now indefinitely deferred. Note paragraph 2F my letter 11CL-45 which applies .

3. Following assumptions and considerations apply:
   (A) Army forces Pacific will install long lines system.
   (B) AEFAC will serve naval activities closely associated physically with Army installations.
   (C) Material procured under central Pacific projects for LONETOM and other bases in the Pacific combat and MARITIMES areas which may not be required therefor, is available for use in OLYMPIC and CORONET.
   (D) Project wire installations on basis of contemplated naval developments ashore as contained in CINCPAC Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC or later estimates which may have been developed in conference with 7thFlt representatives.
   (E) Construction planned should generally be limited to tactical or semi-permanent type which will fulfill requirements and permit most expeditions installation.

Pursuant to a directive from the JCS it is desired to release Army units in the POA to CINCPAC as soon as the services of such units can be spared. My Top Sec 114341 May prescribes procedure for the release of Army units except those under ComGen 10.

Para. As Army units under ComGen 10 become available for release ComGen 10 will furnish designations of units and recommend dates of release to CINCPAC info ComGenPOA. On receipt concurrence of ComGenPOA CINCPAC will accomplish the release.

Para. For the present at least 1 Army and 1 Marine Division will be retained under ComGen 10 in the Ryukyus. In order to permit preparation for future operations Army divisions will be released in the sequence 77th, 7th, 3152.
02 0650 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TFK INFO CINCAPPAC, ETC. - CONTINUED

96th or as requested by CINCAPAC. It has been agreed between CINCAPAC and
CINCPAC that 2 Army Divisions will be withdrawn from OKINAWA to the PHILIPPINES
as soon as the tactical situation permits.

Para. Instructions covering the release of Headquarters 10th Army and
Headquarters 24th Corps will be issued later.

02 0822 CINCPAC ADV TO CHQ INFO COMWEA STRON. CINCAPPAC, GGAFAPOA, CG10, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 201935 informs that 27 NSA cargo vessels will load out INFO starting
Mid-June for discharge BIVE. Request by return dispatch unit designation and
tonnage breakdown for troops involved in order that they may be integrated
into shipping echelons only in the manner which will most effectively support
OLYMPIC preparations.

02 1324 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSDFLTL TO CTF 38, COMBARTION TWO

Your 011217. There are no 2200-ton destroyer mine sweepers. The 1630
ton ships of this type which have been converted and are now in operational
condition are 4 in number and are operating under CTF 39. It is expected
that they will be required to assist in performing the tasks mentioned in my
051250 and 290319 and your 280929 and 020411. The 8 2200-ton destroyer mine-
layers which are operating with CTF 39 are not equipped for sweeping and are
not available as carrier force screens.

03 0244 CINCPAC ADV TO CHQ SWPA, GGAFAPOA, INFO. CINCPAC PEARL, COMGENPAC, COMGEN TFK,
COMGEN TAF 10TH ARMY.

ReUrDis CX 17519. DIG 010412 not to all or needed 1. flight 4 F-7 and 6 com-
bet crews 86 combat mapping squadron will be made available as soon as pos-
sible to report to CINCAPAC for operational control. ComGenAAFAPOA hereby
directed to take requisite action. Direct communication with CINCAPAC and
ComGen FEAF authorized as required to expedite.

03 0411 COMSDFLTL TO CHQ 30-5 INFO COMSDFLTL, CINCPAC ADV.

On 4, 5 and 6 June 1 group of 3 submarines each day will pass through
TSUSHIMA STRAITS for patrol in JAPAN SEA. Passage through the straits will
be made submerged during daylight hours using the channel to the north and
west of TSUSHIMA ISLAND. After entering JAPAN SEA they will remain unde-
tected until all subs have reached their patrol stations. Date for starting
attacks is tentatively scheduled for 9 June. Would appreciate any assistance
your planes can render during this operation such as strafing and heckling
antishubmarine vessels vicinity of TSUSHIMA and along north coast of HONSHU
and east coast of KOREA.

03 0827 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF93, CTF94, CFAA, CTF94 INTO COMUEH, CINCBFP, BS1, ACL, CTF96,
COMGENAAFAPOA, BOMCOM 21, CINCPAC PEARL.

My OpPlan 5-45 hereby placed in effect. T-Day will be confirmed later.
04 0259 CINCPAC ADV INTO CINCPAC PEARL. BY J. AC.J. WATK.

Your 010834.

1. Provided no unforeseen difficulties in making good battle damage become apparent when the Fleet is inspected on arrival at Sydney I expect TF 37 to be ready to sortie from either:
   A. MANUS on the 2nd of July, or
   B. LETTE on the 6th of July.

2. Information would be appreciated on the next combat and servicing areas to be allotted to TF 37 in order that consideration may be given to the best anchorage from which to operate.

3. If these areas are to be in the neighbourhood of HOKKAIDO or Northern HONSHU there would be much to be said for operating from MANUS rather than LETTE. Advantages would be:
   A. The haul from MANUS to LETTE would be saved.
   B. The typhoon area would be avoided.
   C. Some British air facilities are already established at MANUS.
   D. British air facilities would not require to be established at LETTE for the present.

4. The main disadvantage would be the rather longer haul from MANUS to the probable servicing area which would be at present just beyond the capacity of my tanker resources. If the previous rates of striking are to be maintained, this disadvantage however would be offset if some of my tankers could occasionally draw from bulk of supplies at GUAM and SAIPAN.

5. Early advice on para 2 would be appreciated as in the event of operations the Fleet from MANUS it will be necessary to divert to GUAM the aircraft pools at present planned to be established for the next operation at SAMAR.

6. On receipt of your reply I would like to send my assistant Chief of Staff Captain Brown to your headquarters at GUAM to discuss implications of which referred to in para 4 of long range operations to the northward.

04 0826 CINCPAC ADV TO CONSIDERT INTO CINCPAC. CONSIDERT. CONSIDERTSPAC.

In estimating availability naval forces following now in 7th Flt are assumed to be available for assignment to 5th Flt for OLYMPIC. 6 CL, 9 DE, 48 DE, 6 AOC (3 large, 2 small), 60 LST, 26 LSM, 10 LCI(G), 15 LCI(L), 25 LCT. These totals do not include those PFA units assigned PhilGroup 12 for amphibious training or APAs AKAs LSTs assigned for temporary cargo and troop lifts all of which will be required for OLYMPIC. Advise us to whether or not these estimates can be met with ships in all respects ready for combat duty by 15 Sept. Further advise what additional ships or craft might be made available.

04 1229 OTTER ADV TO DEPLOY OOTL AIR FORCE INTO GUAM MARINAS MOON AND JIMA, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your proposal to base the 5th Aircraft Group at MTO JIMA as a unit of the 20th Air Force is approved. Please arrange details with Gen MARINAS Moore.
04 1231 CINCPAC ADV TO COMMANDER INO SOUTHERN PAC.

1. CINCPAC CINCPAC Staff Conferences at GUAM completed and CINCPAC Staff conferences returned MANILA. Conference was highly productive and accomplished a great deal. Copies of memorandum record will be airmailed to you.

2. CINCPAC's Staff Study OLYMPIC was discussed in detail and consumed in general except that it was incomplete as to definition of functions and provision for coordination of various air forces. This matter will be taken up separately with CINCPAC as soon as possible. For your information, assault lift is required for 451,047 troops 72,652 vehicles 687,505 DWT. I will submit my estimate of shipping implications shortly. It was not feasible to deploy at OKINAWA the full FRAF air strength planned and reductions were made as per paragraph 4 below.

3. OLYMPIC arrangements covered by conferences included determination of assault shipping requirements and roll up requirements, naval equipment of OLYMPIC troop list, location of planning staffs, withdrawal Army divisions from OKINAWA, amphibious training withdrawal of Marine divisions from OLYMPIC Area, tentative deception plan, communication responsibilities, responsibilities for procurement movement and control of shipping and skills of emergency supplies, evacuation, mounting and support of Marine troops, allocation of land areas, use of landing craft and harbor clearance and development.

4. Arrangements were completed for construction at OKINAWA of 11 air strips for Far East Air Force 6 for VLR groups a depot field at NAKA for Army Air Forces and 3 fields for Navy and Marines. This program will make available to FRAF tactical fields on which it is planned to deploy 21 groups from the PHILIPPINES. These added to 7 from the 7th AF 12 VLR groups 3 equivalent USMC groups and 2 equivalent Navy groups will make a total of 47 groups.

5. This involves movement from PHILIPPINES of FRAF units including 73,026 FRAF personnel 18,702 vehicles and dead weight tonnage of 164,973. It also involves use of 8 engineer battalions from SWPA and maximum practicable use of Army service and construction troops from other sources including redeployment. Principal controlling limitations will be suitable shipping and ability to unload cargo and clear it from ports and beaches. It represents the maximum practicable effort in the time available before OLYMPIC and can be accomplished only by the most careful handling of engineering and shipping resources. In order to ease the logistic load it has been agreed to withdraw 2 Army divisions to the PHILIPPINES as soon as the tactical situation permits.
WARX 10737. Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the landing of 10 squadrons of approximately 220 XN British aircraft (mainly Lancasters) in the NAZARUS and it is contemplated that these forces will come under US command.

British have informed the US that 3500 British aviation engineers are prepared to sail in British ships from UK in Mid June. 2400 men in Mid July and 2500 in Mid August, to be followed by 1500 miscellaneous Army Engineers, totalling 6650. Personnel will carry full equipment, rations, and 1 month’s rations. Subsequent logistic support is expected to be a British responsibility and not a drain on theater resources. These units are primarily intended for support of the RAF, but it is understood that they may be used for any purpose pending firming of plans for the deployment of British aircraft.

Your comments are requested as to desirability of immediate acceptance of these engineer units prior to the finalization of plans for employment of British air combat units, and on the shipping schedule proposed by the British. If June increment can be accepted, request shipping instructions.

04 0107 CINCSEAP ADV INFO CINCSEAP PEARL CONTINUE THE CAPS END MAINU VA

In view of the forthcoming increase in the British Pacific Fleet I shall be very grateful if you could provide some increase in the facilities at MAINU.

A. To enable larger numbers of the fleet to be serviced there during replenishment periods.
B. To provide a staging point in the line of supply which I believe American and certainly British experience has shown to be an important requirement.

2. These facilities are I believe essential requirements quite apart from the questions now under suspension discussion regarding arrangements forward.

3. The following are the main requirements contemplated:
A. An increase in British naval personnel at MAINU to approximately 50 officers and 750 ratings. This total would include all naval personnel except those at airfields.
B. An increase in the number of British Harbour craft and a site for the setting up of repair facilities for them.
C. A site for setting up small motor transport repair bays.
D. At the earliest date which circumstances permit the establishment of a 2nd NAGA at another airfield besides POMAN this will be manned by 45 officers and 450 ratings and will require accommodation for 90 disembarked aircraft 50 reserve aircraft and about 1600 officers and men.
E. The continued use of the existing recreational facilities on POMAN.
F. The loan of up to 4 LCTs and 10 LCMs while the fleet is at MAINU until British craft can be provided.
G. The extra accommodation for personnel in (A) above will need to include extra huts for additional offices and camp stores.
H. A site for the erection of 60000 sq feet of covered storage.
I. Continued accommodation for handling fleet mail and sick cases awaiting air transport.
J. A possible requirement for setting up minor instructional facilities for the fleet. Equipment would be provided from British sources.
K. A great deal of time would undoubtedly be saved if some existing buildings and possibly some equipment could be lent for requirements A B D G and H. Similar quantities of sectional huts and sheds could be turned over to the army from British supplies now arriving. - Continued -
5. It is understood that minesweeping section base MANUS is likely to be closed down shortly. If this can be turned over to us it would accommodate item B and 200 personnel for item A. This site would also provide room for expansion later if necessary.

6. It is proposed that this camp should be self contained as regards victualing and cooking, etc., but it would be greatly appreciated if remaining officers and men at the main camp could be victualled from US sources as exist personnel now are.

7. Depending on the amount of constructional work required, it may be necessary to use up to 300 British construction corps. These would not all be in addition to the numbers in Item A, some of whom would not arrive until the former had left. If Item 5 above is approved, construction corps could erect their own tented accommodation alongside existing buildings, and would be so contained.

8. Item C could perhaps be erected at the minesweeping section base in continuation of existing sheds, but the dock would probably require to be enlarged.

9. I would like to say how grateful I am for the great assistance that we have always had from ComNavBase and his staff at MANUS. I fully realise that we are asking a great deal, but there is no time to build our own base if U.S. ships are to operate this summer.

10. If you concur in these proposals I would like to send representatives to MANUS to discuss details such as water supply, electric power, telephones, docks, equipment, etc., on the spot.

04 1843 JOINT SECURITY CONTROL TO CINCWPAC, CINCPOA, CINC Pussy, and CINCPAC CHINA THEATER.

WARX 11/44, Overall Pacific deception objective provides cover and deception objectives for OLYMPIC as HOKKAIDO and FORMOSA shifting latter gradually to CHUSAN-SHANGHAI then to TSINOUAO. Those under study for CORONEL are SHIKOKU and TSINOUAO shifting latter gradually to FUSAN and continuing HOKKAIDO as practicable. Special means of Joint Security Control have been used since immediately prior to ICEBERG to tell the following strategic story to explain why we landed OKINAWA instead of FORMOSA-Coast of SOUTH CHINA.

(1) CINCPOA required strong base in RTAYUS to protect right flank for other minimum westward move.

(2) If European war had ended January 1945 OKINAWA would have been about TIME but subsidiary to FORMOSA-SOUTH CHINA landings and made possible by forces from European Theater redeployment.

(3) PHILIPPINES Operation lasted longer than estimated time forces from there not available for westward operation.

(4) Hence OKINAWA only practicable operation in April.

(5) With occupation of OKINAWA high command now believes soon be in position for westward movement. Story ends.

Until receipt of your cover and deception plan for OLYMPIC and in order to a strategic special meansounds proforma for future use JAS FUELTAPHEE continues deception story for present as follows:

(1) Recent movement of Jap strength from SOUTH CHINA to localities farther north have been noted but FORMOSA remains an enemy fortress and air base threat to our westward movement and this threat must be eliminated.

(2) Present plans contemplate an assault against FORMOSA this summer.

(3) Meanwhile investigation proceeding to determine most suitable landing field sites and harbors on CHINA Coast in vicinity of FORMOSA and to the north in order to mount further bombing offensives against enemy and to establish an oceanic supply line to CHINA.

- Continued -
05 0612 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCINCH INFO CINCPAC-PAC, CINCINCH, TORONTO, CINCPAC ADV SEND YOUE SE. 05 0658 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCINCH INFO CINCPAC-PAC, CINCINCH, TORONTO, CINCPAC PEARL.

1. Marshall's WRX 10737 passed to me by Richardson arrived after the completion of conferences between staffs of CINCPAC-PAC, CINCINCH, and CINCPAC-CINCINCH reported by my 06-12-31. At about the same time I received a letter from Giles which requested concurrence in the following recommendations:
   A. That the 316th Wing be redeployed from GUAM to North Field, TINIAN.
   B. That initially 1 Royal AF Wing of approximately 200 Lancaster or Lincoln aircraft be deployed to GUAM for six months.
   C. That a logistical planning program be initiated to determine the feasibility of continued RAF augmentation in the CINCPAC until a full deployment of 40 Lancaster Squadrons is attained.

2. The proposal to base an additional VFA Wing at North Field TINIAN is not a new one. It was examined carefully and as stated in my 30-2-2355 May was found not to be feasible without undue interference with the support of other activities. Pertinent to this situation is the fact that on 11 May Commodore informed me with reference to future flow of Army aircraft through the MARIANAS, "The tactical bases of the 21st Bomber have a maximum a maximum load at this time and cannot take any part of this traffic." It is increasingly evident that normal increases in Army and Navy staging requirements and transport services will saturate the airfield capacity and will absorb the logistic capacity available for that purpose in the MARIANAS. Accordingly I reaffirm that it is not logistically feasible to deploy an additional VFA Wing in the MARIANAS between now and OLYMPIC.

3. Under agreements made with General MacArthur in MANILA on 16 May our engineering representatives have examined sites and consulted with the engineers in the field and as the result of the efforts of the staffs working separately and in conference together there has been evolved a coordinated plan to exploit to a maximum the potentialities of OINAWA and LE SHIMA to support the operations which must take place to prepare for OLYMPIC and to support the OLYMPIC Operations itself. We desired to install a larger air force but found it impossible to do so. As reported in my 04-12-31 it was possible to deploy only the equivalent of 21 groups of the Far Eastern Air Force. Para.

-Continued-
Planned deployment of engineer troops in RTUNUS now includes 37 Naval Construction Battalions, 31 Army Aviation Battalions, 9 Army Construction Battalions, and 20 Army Combat Battalions, totaling 96 battalions plus 8 Army General Service battalions.

As pointed out in CINCPOA CT 17634 DTN 03054A, conditions in the Pacific are not like those in EUROPE. An attempt to increase the air forces to be deployed in an island position involves a precisely coordinated use of shipping, port and beach capacities, land transportation, and advance base overhead. The PEARL has more units than can be deployed in the RTUNUS prior to OLIMPIC, and they are of the types and have the training in the Pacific which makes them well suited for their tasks. The same is true of the naval aviation units involved.

It is not feasible to deploy any of the RAF in the RTUNUS before OLIMPIC without displacing equivalent U.S. units. Displacement of any U.S. air units with consequent disruption of carefully integrated plans will have an extremely adverse effect on our attempt to prepare for OLIMPIC in the short time available. Displacement of U.S. will be least prejudicial to OLIMPIC but is not recommended.

It is recommended that the decision to base British aircraft in the RTUNUS be reconsidered. It is further recommended that no British aircraft or British personnel arrive in the RTUNUS prior to OLIMPIC.

Desire preparations be initiated as outlined below to support 1 fast carrier group at ENIWETOK in July building up immediately to 5 U.S. and 1 British by October and thereafter total of 4 or 5 indefinitely. Due to limited land area facilities ashore must be limited to those for support of garrison, aircraft pool, replacement pool and fleet recreation. Supply for fleet units must be from floating facilities. Following total tactical aircraft squadrons will be based there and other squadrons now present will be transferred to make additional space ashore. 1 FB (ML), 1 VF, 1 VF (N), 1 VJ (TUNNEL), and 1 VJ (DONNE). Any additional search required will be provided by seaplane units to reduce load on fields.

A. Aviation support. Establish aircraft pool of 200 planes at ENIWETOK and 100 at ROY equipped to receive preserved carrier aircraft and issue in combat ready condition. Provide staging without aircraft for 2 CV groups. Augment NAB, CASU, HUBAN and SERON as necessary to support this plan bearing in mind necessity for keeping total personnel ashore to bare minimum. Defer roll up of ASD ROY as necessary to support increased air.

B. Naval base support. Provide following augmentation for boat pool: 12 LCT, 100 LCM, 20 LCVP, 20 LCI or LCT as available. 4 self propelled barges, 100 ton and necessary operating personnel, in increments as required. Provide additional 2-10 component. Add 1 BE telephone and 20 small boat moorings. Provide logistic support companies as necessary to supply forces afloat basing them in APLs. Augment base administration, piloting, postal facilities, port director and shore patrol personnel as necessary.

C. Construction. Fields. Field resurfacing not feasible at this time. Modified form of compacting such as used at MIDWAY authorized as necessary to maintain fields. No additional AvGas storage ashore contemplated. Housing to be in tents to greatest extent possible and where space limitations require bib barracks. These barracks available PEARL and require less space per capita housing than quonsets. Install 1 G-4 unit augmented by dental and optical units in vicinity of present defense battalion facilities. Increase...
facilities as necessary to provide shore recreation for fleet units. August 3 CEMU's at ENIVETO to full strength. Transferring Construction Battalion TINTAN to ENIVETO as soon as possible to start work essential to carry out augmentation of base. Supply additional distillers as necessary to provide water for increase in population.

B. In executing above plan all personnel and facilities possible will be drawn from other bases in Wargils. Aviation personnel and facilities not required at ULIHI also available for this augmentation. Desired floating repair facilities under ComServ 10 Rep ENIVETO augmented as follows with dates indicating dates of arrival ENIVETO:

- BASSILAN AG 68 or BAHAM AD 7 July
- LASERTES AS 20 1 July
- DIONYSAUS AR 21 1 Sept
- DELTA AR 9 1 Sept
- ALCOI AD 31 1 July
- DENEROSA AD 12 1 July
- ALTADOR AD 11 1 Sept
- ARD 29 15 Sept
- ARD 30 15 July
- ARDC 7 1 July
- TAF 61B 1 July
- TAF 730 1 July
- TAF 722 15 July

In event dates can not be met ComServPac will make necessary adjustments to provide equivalent facilities by 1 October. Desire ComServ 10 Rep with adequate staff be on site to establish ENIVETO immediately.

05 1209 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PAC

Following preliminary forecast of shipping requirements for CINCPAC-CINCPAC-PAC developed as result of conference between CINCPAC-CINCPAC-PAC and CINCPAC-PAC at GUAM 1-4 June.

Commencing early in September and continuing through January all APA and AKA APD LST LSM and smaller assault types in POA will be required for mount OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC-CINCPAC-PAC requirements for continued development and support of present bases in the POA including RUKUS. August 23 AP 273 AK Sept 21 AP 270 AK Oct 17 AP 213 AK Nov 16 AP 183 AK Dec 17 AP 183 AK Jan 15 AP 179 AK Feb 16 AP 172 AK. Foregoing in terms of sailings.

Following are CINCPAC shipping requirements for OLYMPIC based on assignment of shipping responsibilities agreed on at GUAM conference and destined to arrive at objectives in months indicated. Nov 8 AP 25 AK Dec 8 AP 45 AK Jan 14 AP 45 AK Feb 2 AP 12 AK. AP estimates based on 1500 troop lift per transport. CINCPAC will submit to appropriate Army agencies his requirements for shipping for which he has responsibility for procurement as mutually agreed at the GUAM conference.

Refer JCS 521/13 Annex D page 110. APA can be made available on West Coast in numbers indicated during July and August but will not be available for remainder of scheduled redeployment. Request estimated dates and embarkation points for ships required for redeployment during July and August.

CINCPAC-CINCPAC-PAC estimates of shipping requirements will be revised monthly for succeeding 3 month periods in accordance current practice.
050559 COM 3RD FLEET to CTF 38 Info CTF 38, CTF 31, CINCPAC B/TH, COMUSVJAC.

TOP SECRET. Presently expect withdraw TF 38 to LETTE about 10-12 June. Task force will depart LETTE about 1 July for extensive operations at sea, necessary details of which will be given to you in conference and by hand. Will require replenishment services at sea during July including special group of about 12 fastest and most reliable oilers for advanced fueling. Servplan details will be furnished later.

Para. Desire you reduce your group operating at sea when Task Force 38 withdraws to minimum required for service to Task Force 31 using direct sailings from ULITHI and LETTE to OKINAWA where possible. Send BOUNTIFUL (AH 9) to LETTE when Task Force 38 retires. Suggest you proceed LETTE in DETROIT as soon as practicable after TF 38 proceeds there.

050743 COM3RD/FLEET to CTF 31, CTF 31 (32), CTF 39 Info COMINCH CINCPAC BTH NO.
ALL TASK FORCE COMS AND ALL TASK GROUP COM 3RD FLEET.

TOP SECRET. Here comes Com3rdFleet OpPla 5-45.

A. Task Force 31 5th Amphibious Force VAdm Hill units as currently assigned.


Para. This force while carrying out the general mission prescribed in my OpPlan 3-45 will sweep a specified area of enemy mines in order to provide a clear approach area into the EAST CHINA SEA.

Para. A. Task Force 31 sweep approximately the north eastern half of area Z completing this sweep by 5 July 1945.

1. Instructions contained in sub paras xl, 3, 4 and 5 my OpPlan 3-45 apply.

2. Area Z is bounded on 5 sides by a line joining following points:

   21 25-17N 126-36E, 22 24-40N 126-00E, 23 25-18N 125-23E, 24 25-40N 125-49E,
   25 25-43N 126-07E.

3. This plan effective on receipt.

Para. Para 5 my OpPlan 3-45 remains in effect.
06 0724 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN, CINCPAC ADV

3480.

1. The deferral of FRICIÓN accords our airdrome requirements to support OLYMPIC Operations.

2. Although INSHA PSTO and ADUNI-SHIMA were captured largely for radar purposes, it is believed it possible to build airdromes, at least fighter airdromes, on these islands.

3. Request all possibilities, including physical reconnaissance, be explored to determine airfield potentialities of these 2 islands. Request earliest advice of investigation results.

06 1243 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN.

At earliest convenience after capture of INSHA and ADUNI are completed please give me your estimate of practicality and desirability undertaking airfield developments thereon having in mind program now projected for OKINAWA.

06 0930 GHQ SWPA to CHIEF OF STAFF WAR DEPT, CINCPAC ADV.

CX 17860. Ref WX 10737 2nd, arrangements have been perfected between CINCPAC and CINCPAC to displace 21 and 3/4 groups of PEAR to the SHIKIN prior to 15 September for the support of OLYMPIC. Generally speaking, this will absorb potential airdrome sites on northern and central OKINAWA and IS SHIMA which are susceptible of development during the rainy season. It is the understanding of CINCPAC that the support of the increased forces will likewise absorb all port and service troop capacity during the next few months. 2 plans would appear to be practicable, based on the studies which have just been completed between CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

Plan 1a. Allocate potential sites in the vicinity of TANAGASHIMA, referred to as X1, and NAKYAMA, referred to as X2, and a possible site in the vicinity of OZATO, all on southern OKINAWA. Allocate the southern portion of YONABARU WAN for development of harbor facilities by the British. The areas indicated are still occupied by the Japanese and detailed surveys have not yet been made. From information at present available, it appears that 1,500 foot and 1,700 foot runways could be obtained in the 2 mentioned areas.

Plan 1b. Retard the entrance of the Lancasters into OKINAWA until after 1 November, at which time it is anticipated that PEAR will displace forward in the OLYMPIC Operation and the facilities thereby vacated will be available for British use.

CINCPAC refrains from comment relative to the desirability of immediate acceptance of the engineer units indicated since the ability of ports to take in this additional equipment is a problem of paramount interest to CINCPAC. CINCPAC is requested to comment on the 2 plans above indicated.
06 0611 CINCPACFLT TO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 050612 and 050613. Commencing by 06.
(1) When they join up I tentatively plan employ British carrier group as tactical unit of TF 38. British Service Group because of speed and technique characteristics will be separate from SHERIDAN 6 but operated in same general vicinity insofar as circumstances permit. British forces can be incorporated into our combat and service operation scheme at any time. The sortie of TF 38 from LSTs and the initiation of TF 38 offensive operations need not be affected by availability of British forces.
(2) Service areas will depend on location and sequence of targets, tempo of attack, and enemy capabilities and will be selected to meet existing conditions and announced as a part of appropriate OpO's. I had understood and tentatively planned KURILES HOKKAIDO NORTH HOKUSHU as initial combat area rather than TOKYO.
(3) No comment other than offering the thought that British carriers might be able to carry out longer sustained operations and more strikes per cruise if TF 112 could replenish at ANCHORJK.
(4) Am looking forward to seeing you and unless otherwise directed will direct Lefane (RN) to make refresher visit to his own command while TF 38 is in LSTs.

060630 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV. INFO CINCPAC BOTH HO I.SOM. 331.

Ref ComGenPOA RJ 62716 DTG 022228 and CINCPAC Adv Hq 020650. Request 24th Inf Regt be assigned garrison LEGIMUMUS for early shipment. Needed for protection installations outlying islands. Size and terrain of LEGIMUMUS requires garrison division organized as complete tactical unit not only for organized hostile units roaming mountains which must be continuously hunted. Presence 24th Inf Regt will release earlier some Army units under 2nd reference SABRE.

06 0230 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV. INFO COR MARIANAS. ADGSG/PAK.COMINRFIL.

Mining of BUNGU SUIDO by DMS may be desirable in support OLYMPIC. Possible though risky to lay extensive fields outside enemy mines under cover carrier aircraft attack. Closure expected 3 to 30 days most effective just prior attack. SANGAT now in MARIANAS has sufficient mines for this operation and for midair closure KII SUIDO which might be desirable about 1 month earlier. In these operations contemplated request SANGAT remain MARIANAS or MARSHALLS available to supply mines to DMS at OKINAWA in August. All other shipments of surface mines to OKINAWA cancelled by my 150731 May not to all.

06 0512 CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC FAREL. CINCPAC MANILA.

Your 022030, Subject Loran. The assumptions concerning an EAST CHINA SEA chain with stations in the KYUSHU are not in agreement with present plans. Phases 3C 3D and 3E of ICEBERG have been deferred indefinitely and as a result there are no Loran locations available in the KYUSHU except in OKINAWA. The next available site would be in KYUKU late this year. Preliminary conference with representatives of CINCPAC reveals that present plans are for FAM to install air transportable equipment in this location. Conference to be held in the near future by representatives of CINCPAC CINCPAC and 20th Air Force to coordinate Loran requirements for coverage of the CHINA SEA and the Empire. On conclusion of this meeting combined requirements for these areas will be submitted to JCS.

Recommend (A) MKNAH continue present schedule. (B) ComMarSeaPac ship chain from the U.S. to PHILIPPINES. (C) This equipment to be installed in both locations as become available and are agreed upon by CINCPAC, CINCPAC &
TOP SECRET
JUNE (CCT)

06 1247 CONGDENFLIT TO CTF31, CTF 32, CTF 39 INFO COMING, JINCAP BOTH, ALL TF 4 & TFG
COMMFLIT, COM3GFLIT.

This will be my OpPlan 6-45.
A. TF 31 5th Amphibious Force - Vada Hill. Units as currently assigned.
   1. TF 32 Unis fire and Covering Force - Vada Oldendorf units as assigned
      by CTF 31.

B. TF 39 - Mine Plottilla - Rada Sharp - Units as assigned by Com3rdFlt.

Para. For information own and enemy forces see my OpPlan 3-45.
3rdFlt forces not specified in this OpPlan support this operation by execution
of missions assigned in Com3rdFlt OpPlan 3-45.

These forces while carrying out the general mission prescribed in my
OpPlan 3-45 will sweep specified areas in the EAST CHINA SEA of mines in order
to provide a clear operating area in this sea for our forces.
A. TF 31 provide necessary air and surface support to TF 39. Provide logis-
support for own forces and TF 39 in NMUKUS.
B. TF 39 clear area JUNEAU of enemy mines completing this sweep by 1 Aug 194.
   1. Instructions contained in sub paras 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 my OpPlan 3-45 appl
   2. Area JUNEAU is bounded by line connecting following points:
      C. Lat 26-04, Long 124-09
      D. Lat 26-15 Long 124-31
      E. Lat 27-38 Long 126-01
      L. Lat 28-20 Long 125-20
      W. Lat 27-00 Long 123-50

3. This plan effective 0000 GCT 5 July unless notified otherwise by
   dispatch.
   Logistics as in OpPlan 3-45. CTF 31 arrange for logistic support in
   NMUKUS as required.
   Para 5 OpPlan 3-45 remains in effect.

06 2241 JINCAP FLIT ADV TO CONGDENFLIT INFO CTF 39, CTF 38, A, CTF 38 A

As soon as practicable submit your estimated track of recent typhoon and
each major Task Group for period 3-5 June inclusive.

06 2242 JINCAP FLIT ADV TO CONGDENFLIT INFO CTF 39 CTF 38 CTF 31 COMGREN TON COMJINCAP CTF 92.

Your 060652 received subsequent my 061219 2nd strike authorised to be
made at your discretion prior to return to LNTE.

06 2243 JINCAP FLIT ADV TO CONGDENFLIT.

Your 061219 affirmative.
TOP SECRET
JUNE 0742 CINCPAC ADV TO C.MUNCH INFO CINCPAC.

For Joint Security Control. Arrangements made for CINCPAC and CINCPAC-PAC deception representatives to meet in MANILA 11 June to prepare Joint Cover and Deception Plan for OLYMPIC. Plan to be presented to JCS immediately following this conference.

Your attention invited to appendix F of Preliminary Draft of CINCPAC Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC which has tentative agreement in principle by CINCPAC planners.

Is your 041843 a firm directive or a proposal.

07 0123 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RD FLT INFO CINCPAC-PEARL.

Unless already provided for Com3rdFlt arrange for suitable diversion ship to remain in combat area transmitting traffic apparently from you. Recommend transfer to diversion ship at least 2 operators who have been recently on your ship shore circuit preferably those with noticeable transmitting characteristics. CINCPAC-PEARL inform Com3rdFlt of any such characteristics recently noted by monitors at NAHAWA. While in port note that forces in your company should continue receive traffic on foxes. Bonafide outgoing traffic should be filed ashore for transmission with codress headings.

07 0559 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RD FLT CTF 31 COMGEN 10 INFO CINCPAC CONRAD YANG, COMPDHPSCO, COMPARAVIAS, MAJORCS, COMGEN PB, LOCAL SALIPAN.

To clarify Para 2 MyDis 140245. 8th Mar RCT remains under operational control of ComGen Ten after capture of AGUNI and is available for employment Phase 1 ICEBERG if desired. This includes accompanying replacements.

06 1244 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RD FLT INFO C.MUNCH, COMGEN 10, CTF 31, CTF 38, CTF 36.

Your 060829 (to me only) approved. Unless otherwise directed by later dispatch withdraw TF 38 to Lette after strike on KYUSHU fields about 8 June.

06 2242 C.MUNCH TO CINCPAC ADV INFO NO ONE. Do you desire to make application further than your 050505.

07 0813 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RD FLT.

This replies to that part of your 050209 regarding weather service information. The 1st indication of a cyclonic circulation with a possible development of a typhoon was on 31 May when an intense wave passed GUAM. Immediate steps were taken to track and cover this disturbance. In addition to the normal coverage the following coverage was requested:

(A) FairWind 18 directed by My 011105 to cover on 2 June the area 500 miles N and 250 miles W of PELELIU. (ed)

(B) On 2 June a B-24 from 65th weather sgn was ordered to area 600 to 500 of GUAM.

(C) FairWind 1 to cover on 4 June area south of NAHA to 20 N between 123-133

(D) CINCPAC-PAC on 4 June to effect weather reconnaissance of tropical storm at 18000 127-00 E.

(E) On 4 June a B-29 WM to TOKYO was diverted to 23000 129-00 E.

(F) For 5 June CINCPAC-PAC to repeat reconnaissance of 4 June.

(G) For 5 June B-29 to circle storm expected in area 20000 127-00 E.

As info aede you were advised of flight plans covering weather reconnaissance - Continued -
07 0813 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCHFDLF (CONTINUED)

Para. On 3 June storm was out of range from FOA bases but within range of 7thFlt aircraft. Information is being obtained as to action taken by 7thFlt.

Regular weather broadcasts at 6 hour intervals gave latest information available. Twice daily broadcasts to "All U.S. Ships" (NAV) at 0600 and 2000 were made. At 1600 daily broadcast on channel 35 C was made.

07 0816 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC-

Following comment made on CINCPAC CX 17800. Plan 1 extremely inadvisable and all of YOKOHAMA NAV required for U.S. Naval Base facilities. Plan 2 is less objectionable but submit that U.S. augmentation of U.S. Army Strategic Air Force will contribute more effectively to the defeat of JAPAN than will deployment of British units and creation of mixed forces within a congested island.

07 2340 COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV-

Desirability of fields proposed by COMINCH 060290 cannot be determined this long ahead of operation. Recommend mines be landed and available for loading in mine layers in OZINASIA so that fields may be laid either just before or during operation if conditions then existing make this desirable.

07 1432 GEO SFA INFO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 73, GO PAFF, BAR DEPT OPDIV, HAT-

CX 17973.

Concur in release of 2 PB4Y squadrons as specified in your 270541 with VPB 116 remaining in FOA and 2nd Sqdn to be designated at a later date for transfer in August. Our CX 16302 May hereby cancelled. The following units may be released to CINCPAC. 3 FVI Sqdns as follows: Return VPB 137 to USN nor. Release VPB 126 upon completion of O operations. Release VSB 119 when VPB 53 from northern SOLOMONS becomes available in the PHILIPPINES. All 4 VPB(M) Mariner Sqdns and both VTB (MC) Amphibious Sqdns will be retained. The tender TANGER can be released in July. No other tenders can be released at this time.

Direct communication authorized with Com/inch to effect details of transfer of squadrons and tender.

07 2319 COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV-

Will 8th Marines and attached units rejoin 2nd WarDiv at SAIPAN in time to permit employment this division with 5th PhibCorps. Your 070559 refers. If available desire utilize 2nd WarDiv in lieu 4th WarDiv for CINCPAC.

08 0519 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC FTR, COMINCH TEN.

My 050612. Com/3rdFlt has made following comments. "Service areas will depend on location and sequence of targets and will be selected to meet existing conditions and announced as part of appropriate OpOreds. Am looking forward to seeing Gen and unless otherwise directed will direct LEPANU to visit CINC while TP 38 in LEITE".

Refer my 050612 Para 3. You will be authorized to draw bulk fuel supply from ENIVITOK if you consider this preferable to ULTIM.
08 0250 COMERFLOT TO CINC PAC ADV INFO CTF 38 CTF 31 CTG 34.2 ComGen 10.

Your 062242 believe earliest return TF 38 to base for upkeep and storm
damage repair will best serve your plans for future operations. 1 Squadron
MAG 14 has arrived OKINAWA others due 9 and 10 June. Unless OKINAWA air de-
sence situation seriously deteriorates intend withdraw TF 38 from this area
10 June arriving IJYME 13 June.

08 0815 COMERFLOT TO CINC PAC ADV INFO CTF 38 CTF 31.

KANOA strike completed with negligible plane losses and no threat as
yet to surface units. Good surprise achieved. Details and damage assess-
ment by later dispatch. Refueling tomorrow.

08 1500 CINC PAC ADV TO COMERFLOT INFO COMINPAC CTF 38.

In connection with your prospective strikes against the northern HOKAI-
Area the HAKODATE-AGOMI railroad ferries should be included in
target assignment. Special intelligence information on this target is being
prepared for distribution.

08 1521 CINC PAC ADV TO COMPHIBSPAC INFO COMSERV PAC CINC PAC FEARL, COMINCH & CNO,
COMERFLOT, COMOCEPAC, NAV HED SUE DEF FEARL.

ComPhibPac 060200 not to all and not needed. The request to fit out
SAMUEL CHASE (APA 26), THOMAS JEFFERSON (APA 30) and J.T. DICKIN (APA 13)
as casualty evacuation ships similar to CRESCENT CITY (APA 21) and GOSPER (APA
170) is approved. These ships will be directed report AdComPhibsPac at FEARL
for necessary work. ComServPac will supply required additional medical
personnel on request. Medical equipment and supplies will be provided by
Naval Medical Supply Depot FEARL. Minor alterations to provide operating
room facilities authorized. My 061330 of March refers.

It has been agreed that all PacFlt APA's which are in operating condition
will be made available for employment in OLYMPIC and it is desired that the
above 5 ships be employed in this operation in their primary mission of car-
rying amphibious troops for the assault and not in the 1st garrison echelon
as suggested. It is further desired that the REMONT (APA 14) designated by
ComPhibPac 060225 as flagship for ComPhibsGrp 13 be employed as an APA in
the assault in addition to her flagship mission.
09 0848 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO DGEN(ALT), QCMAIRPAC CINCPAC GC THTFLT, CINCAMTF. CINCWPAC.

Com 7th Flt and CINCPAC consider 3 VFP(HL) Squadrons & VFP(MS) and 2 VFP(AS) Amphibious Squadrons can meet naval air requirements in SWPA. I counsel these numbers are ample now and consider they may be reduced later as strategic situation decreases requirements. Request your concurrence in deploying in POA squadrons in excess of 7th Flt requirements as stated above.

09 0856 CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 31, COMDRU 10 INFO COMTHFLT CINCTHFLT, COMAIRPAC.

Desire your comments on proposal capture KUNI SHIMA after AGUNI SHIMA using 8th Marine RCT. Unless you have reliable local information as to garrison and defenses operations to obtain intelligence are indicated.

09 0857 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO.

Your 061314. My 260930 contemplated the establishment of an American flag commercial air service to the South Pacific in the interest of the United States as a whole. Consider that it should be on a straight commercial basis not an Army or a Navy contract service and should have modern equipment such as C54's obtained by release of production by Both Army and Navy on a proportionate basis. Consider delay until end of year relatively undesirable but acceptable if other plans and preparations are made in advance.

09 1890 JOINT SECURITY CONTROL TO 482 SWPA, CINCPAC ADV INFO CG USMC.

WARX 14392. Reaching you and info addresses in a few days will be overall deception directive. Reference CINCPAC ADV 060742. CINCPAC GC 17832. Directive does not include COCHIN (SHIKOKU) as objective for OLYMPIC nor DESERTS (SHANGAI) as initial objective. Follows. Fictitious operations are included. Amphibious assault against CULTURES (FORMOSA AREA) in late summer 1945. Advance in MELAYA SEA in winter of 1945-46 to secure bases for air and land operations. Operations against LABORATO (HONI JDO) early Fall 1945 with simulated buildup in ALEUTS. An assault from the PHILIPPINES by CINCPAC coordinated with overland assault by Allied mainland forces against FRENCH Indo-China in Fall of 1945.

10 0231 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO ISL KIRISHIMA, JUSOM JF SHIMA, CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMNPOA, COMHMAF.

Pending issuance of changes to Base Development Plan request you initial development in accordance by Ser 000664 as modified by CINCPAC 071605. Para 2 C and 5 B my serial establish priority of development. Instructions covering procurement of materials referred to in Para 2 C will follow.

10 0507 CINCPAC ADV TO CNO INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGENPOA, DCPNAMF 20.

Recommendations and conclusions of conference Joint Mapping Conference as submitted in letter subject Mapping Conference, OAHU, T.H. 25-29 May 1945 dated 29 May are approved by CINCPAC. Recommend that JCS 756/2 be changed accordingly.
10 1516 CG USPCT TO MARSHALL FOR FULL AND COMPLETE INTE CONCIPAC COMPLD.

CFRJX 38994,

1. Plans are being perfected to take fullest advantage of the Japanese withdrawal as it continues in the Nanning-Liuchow area by stretching available resources to the utmost. Build up of present stock levels is being delayed to permit maximum intra China forward movement. It is planned to augment present intra theater movement by direct air shipment from INDIA BURMA Theater as soon as airfields in the Liuchow-Nanning area will permit. However a demand for additional tonnage in Liuchow-Nanning area to permit rapid follow up of Japanese withdrawal still remains.

2. It is believed that capture of an intermediate port, probably Fort Bayard, in Liuchow peninsula area by approximately 1 August may be a definite possibility without detracting appreciably from the main effort. Investigations are continuing to select the exact area.

3. It is therefore requested as a matter of urgency that War Department advise as of arrangements that can be made and resources particularly shipping, amphibious craft, material, and minor naval harbor defenses which can be provided and the timing thereof to utilize this opportunity of improving China theater's line of communications based on assumptions given below. Upon receipt of this information from War Dept., and after necessary coordination with the INDIA BURMA Theater, I will advise War Dept. of my course of action.

4. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. Material required initially to be shipped through this port are primarily trucks preloaded with armored vehicles, drivers, self-propelled repair equipment, and operators, equipment for naval harbor defense and minor equipment for harbor repairs. A list of material for other than naval harbor defense is being prepared by COMGEN services of supply CHINA Theater and will be forwarded in next 48 hours. I request recommendations of the Navy Dept. as to requirements for a reasonable harbor defense for the assumed.

B. Fort Bayard will be used after 1 August 1945.

C. 1st month capacity 30,000 MT and 60,000 MT per month thereafter.

D. An anchorage should be provided where shipping can stage and be called forward.

E. Shipment will continue over the present line of communications to full capacity after capture and development of Fort Bayard area.

5. There are no personnel available within present CHINA Theater troops basis to provide for port rehabilitation, port operations, including transshipment, if necessary, and harbor defense. COMGEN INDIA BURMA Theater is being furnished by us with a list of personnel required for the first 2 functions to determine availability. Request recommendations of the Navy Dept. as to harbor defense required and availability thereof. Latest information on Fort Bayard area indicates that 1ST is most suitable area for this operation.

6. Capture and development of an intermediate port area would result in the following advantages to CHINA Theater.

A. More adequate support of American and Chinese forces, hence permitting a strengthened assault of HONGKONG-CANTON AREA.

B. Simplification of a very complex line of communications.

C. Provision of vital equipment at the point required.

10 1620 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCIPAC ADY.

Desire your early examination and comment on CFRX 38994. Hereafter, you as Cominch 101516. Wedemeyer proposals offer promise not only as to augmentation of Chinese participation in war, but as to cover for OLIMPIC. On the assumption that sufficient shallow draft shipping can be made available.
10 1320 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV. COMM. INFO COMM. TEN.

Ref J J 63069, 5th, and ComGen 10 090630 June. In view of the intent of CINCPAC to leave 1 Marine Div on OKINAWA indefinitely and the anticipated continuing staging of 2 Army Divisions thereon until COMGEN, it appears to CINCPAC that the movement of the 24th Inf to OKINAWA is of doubtful necessity. Such a move would appear to be particularly undesirable at the present time because it absorbs shipping which is badly needed for the re-supply of troops in rear areas and because it will tend to congest ports needed to support COM operations in support of COMSEC. It is suggested that this matter be reviewed in view of the factors indicated above and that headquarters be further advised as to your conclusions.


CTF 31 (Com5thPhibFor) OpOrd A 20545.

TASK ORGANIZATION

A. TP 31 (5thPhibFor) VAdm Hill as currently organized.
B. TG 31.26 Reconnaissance Group Lt. Comdr. Street in SCRIBNER (AFD 122) with KINZER (AFD 191) and PMFPA Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion Major Jones less Co. A.

1. Information as in current orders and dispatches. By separate directive TF 31 will be directed to cover reembarkation from KUME SHIMA.

2. This force will be continuing until the present operations make re-embarkation of KUME SHIMA in order to obtain information of enemy garrison and to determine suitability of beaches for amphibious landings.

3-A. TF 31 continue present operations.
3-B. TP 31 embark reconnaissance as required in KAKAGI SHIMA on 12 June and complete departure on 1600 same date. At 2000 depart radar picket station to debarkation point and reconnaissanc personnel on north coast KUME SHIMA. Take prisoners as practicable and obtain information of enemy garrison. Determine suitability of beaches for amphibious landing. Complete reembarkation of re-embarkation personnel about 13 June proceed OKINAWA, July 10. Deliver prisoners to CTF 31. After disembarkation troops return command to Gen 10. At that time CG dissolved SCRIBNER and report to CTF 31-4.

4 and 5. Logistics and communications as in CTF 51 Opb/Jan 45.

11 0316 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV. INFO 10th US ARMY.

CIA 18398. Request clearance for following:

A. Brig.Gen. David Hutchinson and party of 3 to proceed LEGUMINOUS on or about 12 June and
B. Air echelon of 14 C-46 transports with 70 officers and enlisted men with equipment on or about 13 June to establish Admon PFAS prior to arrival of units in area.

On or about 15 June to initiate P-25 courier plane service from Clark to LEGUMINOUS on alternate days. All above planes will require servicing at

If above dates not practicable request earliest dates A, B and C above can be cleared. Due to larger number of similar air echelons suggest arrangement for future movements be made by PFAS directly with 10th Army with information to CINCPAC ADV HQ and CINCPAC.
TOP SECRET

JUNE 3, 1945

11 1210 CTF 31 to CTF 32.1 CTF 99.2 CTF 31.20 CTF 30.6 INFO CINCPOA ADV CINCPAC AD

CINCPOA ADV CINCPAC AD

11 1300 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV

Operation SOCKEML. Air Plan. On Y-Day this force will conduct air attack in force against enemy aircraft and aircraft facilities in southern KYUSHU area. Take off time from OKINAWA fields about 1:00. CTF 32.1 provides attack group of 36 FF and 30 TBM staging through OKINAWA fields. TAF escort and otherwise support this operation with approximately 60 long range fighters. CTF 31.20 provides weather service immediately preceding the operation and Dumbo service. CINCPOA will be requested to provide lifeguard submarine 165 degrees 50 miles from K5 of 307. 2A. CTF 99.2 furnishes preliminary target intelligence. Effect local coordination traffic control and arrange logistics. CTF 32.1 furnishes target coordination call SOCKEML. AD. CTF 30.6 requested to take station and conduct radio deception tactics to simulate 307. TUNGER Operation. For planning purposes Y-Day tentatively established 15 June to be confirmed by dispatch.

11 1430 CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV

CINCPOA ADV 100231 not to all is quoted for necessary action. (CINCPOA ADV 100231 is already in the graybook).

12 0149 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC

Comparison of Annex 3 Appendix B CINCPOA Staff Study CINCPOA ADV CINCPAC CYNTHIC with Annex 3B(5)(B)4 CINCPOAC CYNTHIC study shows difference in dividing line between normal operating areas of NTUKYU Air Forces and carrier forces. For uniformity and clarification suggest that 123 degrees S Long be agreed on as the dividing line between areas of primary responsibility. This is also the dividing line between 3rd and 5th Fleet areas. It is understood that overlapping will occur subject to coordination initiated or requested by the unit crossing the line.

New subject. Para 3B(5)(3) and (F) page 19 CINCPOAC CYNTHIC study. Request clarification of first coordinate. It is assumed that the line described is intended to be that shown on Annex 3 Appendix B CINCPOAC CYNTHIC Study.

12 0444 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV

Subject assault air warning and fighter direction units CYNTHIC. It is anticipated that during 1st phase of operation and before adequate heavy facilities are established ashore, air warning and fighter direction and the coordination thereof will be the responsibility of CINCPAC. A system of command ships, radar guard ships and outlying picket ships will be employed for this purpose. In addition effort is being made to obtain effective aerial radar pickets.

To assist in expediting the rapid establishment ashore of early warning and fighter control stations, a number of marine Air Warning squadrons or...
Teams therefrom can be made available if desired. Some of these units especial-
ly those near the CKINAWA area, have had considerable experience with both
Navy and Army elements during the critical early period when forces ashore
and afloat are most vulnerable to air attack. They would be equipped with
special assault control posts mounted in LSTs and with light weight early
warning and night fighter direction equipment. Further discussion of this
feature of assault by CombatPac and Combat Army after CombatPac arrives
MANILA Area.

CINCPAC ADV TO GEN HICKEY, CINCINPAC, CINCPAC INFO, GEN HICK.
CINCPAC ADV TO GEN HICKEY, CINCINPAC, AGF 7TH PRINCE.

Ref Up 052015. See 21, STA 291149 to C of 3 MD. Troops listed your
052015 cannot be identified as troops "have approved for "RETURN".

Some units are scheduled in your 052015 to move to FUNCTION and ADJOIN
capture of which have been indefinitely deferred.

CINCPAC requirements Army troops have been made known to CINCPAC and
arrangements made for movement away of these to objective in LSTs in order
to meet serious unloading problems.

All units listed your 052015 should be reported to CINCPAC in accordance
his 291149 and should be moved only in accordance his instructions. None of
these units should move directly to destinations indicated except in accordance
our agreements with CINCPAC and his instructions based thereon.

CINCPAC ADV TO GEN HICKEY, CINCINPAC, AGF 7TH PRINCE.

Refer your 110518 and my 111309. Combat 10 indicates
A. Affirmative,
B. Affirmative except prefers 7 planes per day instead of 14, on 1 day and
that they not RCN if practicable,
C. Approve to Yontan.

CINCPAC ADV TO GEN HICKEY, CINCINPAC, AGF 7TH PRINCE.

In view prospective close of military operations at CKINAWA the follow-
ing estimate of requirements TF 31 is submitted. General plan of retreatment
provides for:

(A) Departure of ammo vessels, and early transfer of TU 30, 45 to HAKUSHIKU
CHAN except for repair elements which will remain KERAMAHU for present
with TU 30-45.

(B) Elimination guntire support vessels, Oldendorf recommends retention for
present 3 BS 4 CA or CL 9 DD as composition of TF 32 covering force
 pending return TF 38 at which time further recommendations will be sub-
mitted. Hope to reduce picket stations to 3 and possibly to 2 by July
1st dependent upon progress of island radar installations. Have commence-
reduction in LST LSM and LST types to approximate figure shown in Pacific
serial 000908 except recommend total 164 LST Type remain for present.

Delay development NAHA and eastern beaches plus additional unloading re-
quirements to meet expanded development program will necessitate use of
HAGUSHI beaches for indefinite period thereby creating additional require-
ment screening and smoke vessels. Delay in construction naval base
facilities will also necessitate retention receiving ships and floating
storage for present. Based upon general shore based air picture expect
release 1 group CVs after island secure and other group after completion
- Continue -
Your 090335. A total of 556 LTFs are assigned Command for employment in CXNAC. This number includes all LTFs assigned for assault lift whether cargo is ammunition, for oil, vehicles, supplies, and personnel. It is not expected that additional LTFs will be provided.

The above LTFs will be provided from the total number of 779 LTFs which are expected to be available in the Pacific Ocean by 31 August. This number includes 556 LTFs now in CXA and 223 LTFs now in CXNAC and 27 now being redeployed from Atlantic.

Additional requirements for LTFs in CXA during OLYMPIC will be met by the remaining 154 LTFs in the Pacific for other CXNAC. Some will be overhauled.

It is anticipated that 46 of this 154 LTFs will be employed during OLYMPIC as a reserve pool and will be available for subsequent lifts to the objective.

ComAirPac 292035. The early 1942 concept of the carrier striking force continues to have undue influence on front line equipment and concomitant supply planning should recognize instead the actual needs of present and future operations in this war. CVs will never get far from beachhead when the real invasion begins because they are the only source of close CAP and support. For this work VF and VBF are practically the only useful type. Under the control of CASCU and CBF now aboard have been used only for supply missions and strafing where antiaircraft is ineffective. These types are more vulnerable to AA than are VBF when excursions into strategic activity are made properly and intelligently handled can carry greater punishment to the enemy over longer ranges than the AA type. The following is the experience of the last year and emphasizes the immediate need. The compelling advantage of single seat bombers (VF) over multi place bombers (VBF-VTB) in every prospective type of carrier operation are demonstrated in CTF 38 confidential serial 0131 dated 27 May. Even after this war our CV and CTF complements will likely be designed at least for some years for operations against targets against shore based air rather than against navies.

Complements of the CTFs should have the same high proportion of single seaters as is recommended herein and has been recommended previously for CV. The present complement alternate complement and proposals A through D of ComAirPac's 292035 are not recommended as they do not realistically meet the needs of the operations planned for this task force. The single seater will continue to predominate during this war. Production and supply should be altered forthwith to accommodate. Training needs no appreciable change. New and better types of VF are of course welcome. Recommend CTFs and CTF complements to occupy the following proportions of ship capacity: VF (88) when available, 30%, VBF (26) 60%, special (35) 10%.

CINCPAC 070515 CIX 062025 not to all. Technical details follow. Pilot reports performance comparison made between 104-10 and 114 positively identified by gun camera as Tony.

A. Between 15000 and 25000 little difference in climb with slight GILHDX FAU.

B. No direct comparison top speed but comparable.

C. FAU was unable to close distance in dive.

--Continued--
Z minesweeping operation unless further sweeping operations undertaken. Basis of no further operations after completion Z sweeping consider practical reduce initially forces OKINAWA to following forces by July 1 with further reduction as conditions permit. TF 32 as listed above, TF 31 as recommended separately by CTF 39, TF 31 (to be later established as TF 99.1 naval forces USAWM under RAM Cobb on my departure) 24 DD to be reduced as pock stations are eliminated, 3 DD-AM 12-16 or 32 16-30 -13 type, 4 AN 20 L/7, 3 AA-29 104 LCT type 4, 1 4 104 20 mm 4 ATKs as presently assigned TF 30, 9, 5 as recommended separately. The above does not include any escort requirements for shipping between OKINAWA and rear areas. In event EAST CHINA SEA sweeping conducted increase TF 32 by 1 group CVE and escort plus 6 DD (FOR DFC) for close cover of mine force. In event KUO operation undertaken concurrently increase TF 31 by 4 additional DD and 150's required for troop lift.

If above plan approved a recommendation as to bow numbers and detailed breakdown of types will be submitted as soon as practicable.

13 0228 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CGUSFC.

Wedemeyer's CPAM 30994, Your 101620. I am in agreement with General Wedemeyer as to the desirability of establishing at the earliest possible time a more efficient line of supply to the United States forces in CHINA not only to increase the scope of their operations but also to augment Chinese participation in the war against JAPAN. I recognize also that minor operations on the coast of CHINA will help cover OLIMPIA. I have repeatedly advocated establishing sea communications with our forces in CHINA and need not emphasize the advantages of doing so.

However OLIMPIA requirements for shipping particularly for light draft assault shipping in the LST-45 category both for preparatory movements and for assault lift are critical. It is probable that deficiencies in assault lift will exist and must be accepted with consequent cuts in the assault forces. 1 of the principal reasons for deferring Phase 3 of ICHIBAN was to avoid jeopardizing OLIMPIA by absorbing shipping of this type and also other resources.

Any large operation or any appreciable diversion of critical shipping to support CHINA or our forces in CHINA is incompatible with the effort to be ready for OLIMPIA in time. Accordingly as long as the current directive for OLIMPIA stands assistance to CHINA must be sharply limited.

It is estimated that the assumed measured tonnage of 30,000 in August and 60,000 per month thereafter could be lifted by a total of 20 LST each making 2 round trips per month between HARBIN and POINT BAYARD. It seems probable that such a number might be obtained directly or indirectly from sources outside the Pacific Fleet not now obligated for OLIMPIA. Transfer of cargo in the PHILIPPINES would be necessary. It is believed that the very minor harbor defenses required at POINT BAYARD can be supplied. The naval escort and cover for movements of shipping from the PHILIPPINES to CHINA in the quantity indicated can be supplied without serious prejudice to OLIMPIA.

If the project is undertaken it should be with the firm understanding that the very natural tendency to increase its scope and to exploit successes gained must be curbed if we are to be ready for OLIMPIA this year.
TOP SECRET

D: Tony had superior rate of roll at 400 knots indicated. Deduce Tony may be fitted with unoccupied engine. Less definite comparison but same indication George and Frank are arable in top speed and superior in climb.

These comparisons not surprising in view win power loading of 35 or less and power loading about 8 to 10 ascribed to Frank, George and Jack. Attention called to unreliability of performance comparisons made during combat.

Para. In tactical comparison Jap intercepts located were: (A) Aggressive (B) Skillful in technique of flying. (C) Evidently well drilled in teamwork and tactics of mutual support. (D) Poor shots as usual. It was anticipated and should be expected that enemy interceptors are better trained in coordinated aerial combat than the suicide single seater groups. This should cause no grave concern in as much as our average VF squadrons are far superior in gunnery and tactics. The Kamikaze attack against ships remain the real threat against our naval operations.

Substance of this report has been transmitted to forces afloat concerned. See my USO259 intent of which was to assist pilots in realistic appraisal of the enemy. Text of this dispatch was that Jap interceptors can be shot down by adherence to rules already taught in training. Detailed reports by higher commanders were underway through prescribed channels.

LO030

Your LO068 not to all or needed, concur. It is estimated 200 LCTs will be required for OLYMPIC and 400 LCTs for CORAL.

US records indicate 692 LCTs assigned to Okinawa, of this number 40 have not departed east coast and 119 are now water-borne at OKINAWA. 314 LCTs assigned to 7th Flt, of this number 72 understood to be available for OLYMPIC.

Agree that it is entirely feasible for LCTs not immediately required in assault to move from OKINAWA to OLYMPIC under own power. This is also desire from viewpoint that for each LCT carried the LCT's load is decreased about 25% whereas the LCT will be able to carry a load enroute when proceeding under own power.

Believe all LCTs not required in assault should be brought forward to bases as near to future objectives as possible but proper maintenance and supervision must be employed. To keep these LCTs in state of combat readiness due to the difficulties that would be involved in loading LCTs on LCTs in the PHILIPPINES it is suggested that of the 72 LCTs from 7th Flt available for OLYMPIC as many as practicable be moved under their own power to OKINAWA and then on to OLYMPIC.

LCTs at OKINAWA or PHILIPPINES Area to be employed in OLYMPIC should be released from all duty in sufficient time for repairs and upkeep so as to be fully operational.

At OKINAWA careful consideration should be given to plans for disposition of LCTs in event of typhon.
Your 061240 refers. Three airstrips on AGMA and 1 on LBTA are practical. Part 1: AGMA 2 7500 foot strips from TA 26176 to TA 26178 and from TA 26175 to TA 26177 also a 6000 foot strip from TA 26175 to TA 26178. 3 strips parallel and in direction of prevailing wind. Thinner amount cut and fill required. No rock cut. Ample space for 100 hardstands and connection taxiways on each of the 7500 foot strips and 50 hardstands and taxiways on 6000 foot strip. Estimate 5 1/2 months required for each of longer strips including 100 hardstands and connection taxiways and 3 to 4 months required for 6000 foot strip. Coral and gravel for surfacing available with short haul. Fair weather landing beach of limited capacity TA 26175. A US station will be established requiring minimum development and garrison this island whether or not airfields are developed.

Part 2: LBTA, 1 crosswind airstrip with minimum of 50 hardstands practicable 6000 foot strip from TA 04710 to TA 04720 or 7500 foot strip from TA 04710 to 04720. Shorter strip requires 2 and 1/2 to 3 months and the longer strip will involve greater cut and fill. 3 and 1/2 to 4 months to construct. No rock cut anticipated through boulders. Suitable gravel for surfacing readily available. Fair weather landing beach of limited capacity TA 04720. A US station will be established requiring minimum development and garrison this island whether or not airfields are developed.

Part 3: Desirability undertaking airbase development these islands depends upon the need for additional fields in this area and in excess of available sites on LBTA and in SHI. Also on availability of construction and other service troops required. If not too satisfactory landing facilities are acceptable AGMA in particular offers very favorable possibilities for additional airbases.

Part 4: SHI SHI, aerial reconnaissance and study of available maps indicate possibility of 3 airstrips, 1 7500 foot strip from TA 06899 to TA 06909 and other 7000 foot from TA 06896 to 06897. Considerable cut and fill both strips. Ground reconnaissance contemplated.

15 0812 CINCPAC ADV TO COOTHERL.

Your 150220. Request information as to what is contemplated. See paragraphs 3 and 4 of Roiat-Palau Agreement of 10 December 1944.

15 0816 CINCPAC ADV TO COOTHERL. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR REQUEST 2ND MARINE REINFORCED HEREBY DESIGNATED FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH 3RD MAR DIV IN LIEU OF 4TH MAR DIV MOUNTING POINT 2ND MARINE REINFORCED IN JAPAN.

15 0835 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCINAC.

Ref your changes to Staff study CINCINAC. Page 15 shows 4 Marine Fighter Groups. This should be 5 Marine Fighter Groups and 1 Marine Scout Bombing Group. This necessary in order to provide aircraft suitable for both AP and close support ground troops. Plans this headquarters were to assign 1 WFP(1) group less 1 squadron for this operations. If concurred in page 21 your changes should read 6 MAG Hemlocks and 6 MAG sections. Page 15 should read 1 Marine Night Fighter Group less 1 squadron.
16O07 CONFIDENTIAL TO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 150812 and 150838. Contemplate you operate with wide normal intergroup interval from the guide of your Task group. CTF 38 will prescribe plan option and maneuvers for TG 304, and CTF 37 will conform thereby contributing to and sharing the benefits of our force defense. This concept does not infringe on British position guaranteed by United-Fraser Agreement.

Para. Surface tactics present no problem; but in order that British air units air warning and fighter director units may understand TF 38 technique I recommended to Broom that appropriate British representatives visit TF 38 for conferences prior to TF 38 sortie.

170104 CINCPAC ADV TO ONE INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC, HARRIOTT, CINCPAC:

This is partial reply your 131545. Agreements between CINCPAC and CINCPAC referred to my 125510 and your 131545 are summarized in my serials 095660 of 9 June and 105071 of 6 June copies of which furnished Comchad.

Confirmation schedules referred to your 131545 cannot be given at this time as they will require review by CINCPAC on basis of above agreements. See also your 170103 to CINCPAC.

160614 CINCPAC TO ONE INFO (FOUR AND WILD) INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC, (SALEM):

1. There follows a resume of what has occurred in the matter of utilization of Royal Air Force forces in the Pacific from information available to this Headquarters.

A. Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that 10 Syrdes of British Very Long Range aircraft of approximately 200 aircraft will be based in the KURUS for operation under U.S. command. (See JCS 10737 of 9 June 1945) to MacArthur.

B. The British, aware of the JCS decision, have 4 Lancaster Syrdes now at ports in the area ready for movement to the Pacific.

C. 3000 British engineers have been at United Kingdom ports since May 15 and will be followed shortly by 6000 additional engineers. These engineers are available for any job they can perform in support of the combined effort. It is expected that their efforts will be used in support of British VLR units when a decision on RAF participation is established.

D. At General Arnold’s recent conference with Admiral Mitsui it was mutually agreed that nothing definite be done at the present time in the matter of use of the RAF units in the Pacific in view of the fact that we are already crowded in trying to find airbases for all of the U.S. air units planned for the Pacific. General Arnold consented as soon as air units are deployed forward from GRANADA there may be some room available for the British in the KURUS.

E. In compliance with a request from Headquarters RAF for plans whereby RAF units might best be employed by this Headquarters in the Pacific (?) a recommendation was made that the 316 Wing be diverted from OKINAWA to SIHAP to operate out of North Field in addition to the 136 Wing now located there. This was designed to make available space at OKINAWA for the initial movement of RAF units to the Pacific. CINCPAC does not concur in this recommendation.

F. Air Vice Marshal Sharp and Satterly are now here.

2. Recommendation:

A. Based upon reasons of national policy, of which this Headquarters is not completely aware, the RAF units will be employed in operations against the JGS and Area from a separate British base in the NORTHERN HOLLANDS area, perhaps ENSD.

- Continued -
17 0715 SINGAPAC ADV. TO SINGAPAC.

Your 1600C7 is not approved. Operate TF 27 separately from TF 38 in as well as in name under arrangements which assign to Readings tasks to be performed but leave him free to decide upon his own movements and maneuver.

17 1109 SINGAPAC TO COCINLAF INFO SINGAPAC, CO AIR.

CXC 19582.

From Arnold at HINTA ref your 19596, I have discussed with MacArti the matter of employment of the RAP Lancasters. We are in complete agreement that:

A. The present plan for establishment of 12 14-20 groups in the HINTA by year end not changed.

B. The Lancasters be employed in the HINTA after sufficient aircrews are evacuated by forward deployment of RAP units. Estimated date of aircrew availability for the RAP is 1st October.

C. British engineers be accepted and trained in HINTA as early as possible consistent with theaters capability of receiving them. Engineers must have full organizational equipment prior to departure from U.K.

The original agreement with the British which was confirmed at Yalta clearly indicated that the RAP would be employed in the bombing of JAPAN proper. The acquisition by W. forces of another island solely for employment of the RAP is unacceptable. It is the exclusive to change the destiny of the 316 Wing.

17 1407 CG: REPLY TO SINGAPAC ADV.

See my 141350 for information requested your 061243. Airfield reconnaissance D/F cannot be made until island is secured or about 1 July. This answers your 150144.
LIMITS TO EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE: GENERAL, ALL PARTIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNDERSTANDINGS IN VIEW OF AVAILABLE STRENGTHS, ARE TO BE PROMPTLY SECURED TO THE LIMITS OF REALISTIC OPERATIONS.

SUBJECT TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONAL FACTORS:

(a) Each TG should have 1 or more tethered FST in screen.

(b) Linking TFs are needed between groups and also between groups and strike pockets owing to limited range of TFs.

(c) Not less than 2 strike pocket stations must be manned and each such pocket should be composed of 4 or preferably 6 TFs in order to properly defend themselves.

(d) As many as 9 additional single ship radar pickets may have to be posted around the force to ensure adequate air warning.

(e) When TGs are organized into groups, a minimum of 60 TFs is needed and even this will require cutting some elements to provide full number of radar pickets and it does not allow for the formation of a scouting line, such as described in fast carrier task force instructions.

If TFs are organized into groups an absolute minimal destroyer requirement is 75, assuming 10 CV and 1 CTG available by 1 August. A group organization is indicated as of the date of this report, as TFs available may prevent forming 4th group and necessitate reducing group organization in spite of any lack of increase in number of carriers or group.

If released, ATLANTIC TFs can be maneuvered in lieu of the inlay of contemplated TFs. ATLANTIC TFs functions the battle situation for the mobile TFs might be eased.

18 0555 CRT (3) to CAPT-DET, 9TH FLEET: CREW (GROUP) 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

18 0836 WSH (3) to CAPT-DET, 9TH FLEET, CREW (GROUP) 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

My 040529 not to Co-Spain. To ensure satisfactory completion of battle damage repair, date of sortie from 1020 is not expected to be until July.

19 0824 UP-7205 CRT (3) ADV TO COMMANDER, 9TH FLEET, TF 25, CRT (3) ADV TO VICE-ADM, CNNR, 9TH FLEET, CRT (3) ADV TO CAPT-DET, 9TH FLEET; ALL.

Up-7205 may not to all. 2nd TF/GM (less 8th CTG) is released from area reserve bunching and reverts to control Cont-PMF-Pac.

19 1213 DRUDGE TO CRT (3) ADV TF (GROUP) 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18.

CRT (3) ADV 140902 and 220730L 180797 relative exchange CrDiv 12 and are references. CrDiv 12 is committed to 6th CTG as which is now in group. Concur in exchange of CrDiv 12 and 6 subsequent to 7 July as arranged directly with Condr Allied Navforces.
URGENT

19 1335

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC CINCPAC

Request you submit recommendations on to modifications in the size of defense forces for KOREA with view to reduction of defense forces.

19 1737

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC

Following addition received to

URGENT CINCPAC 10057230 serial 0829702 dated 6 June 1955. CINCPAC CO will assume responsibility for supplying bulk petroleum for all fixed based forces and submarine including ship in target area. CINCPAC will be 1000 ton tanker for use to bulk petroleum destined KOREA. All other operations for bulk petroleum destined KOREA will be handled by use of similar submersible tankers and barges. CINCPAC will advise CINCPAC as to number and type of Army petroleum barges to be made available.

URGENT

19 1524

URGENT

Although you have undoubtedly cleared with CINCPAC on redeployment it is also necessary that you have discussed and cleared with CINCPAC the situation with respect to the movement of equipment as outlined in CINCPAC's note PPM 148 dated 1955. Detailed movement plan reflects Army planning figures before specific units and destinations were nominated. Present estimate of cargo to be moved through various destinations in P.O. A to arrive 10-16 August for CINCPAC are:

- POMO 2000 tons, including 250 vehicles
- TANK 1900 tons, including 1150 vehicles
- TANK 6000 tons, including 600 vehicles
- TANK 2000 tons, including 200 vehicles
- Troops are scheduled to arrive from the area to be mentioned above. Detailed loading directives from P.O. A to the above units, schedule should be accepted as above. CINCPAC is reporting to have completed this distribution. Schedule is delayed due to availability of transportation. CINCPAC has completed the detailed breakdown by units. Specific 1300 tons for destinations not available at this time.

19 0936

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC

Based on estimates less than 200 enemy soldiers on KOREA, landing force KOREA Operation of U.S. Army Forces KOREA begins loading 10 June. Your B-26s, not to or needed by all. Plan landing 25 June. Flak, and B-26 survey team accompanies forces.

19 0349

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC

CX 20061. CINCPAC OLYMPIC Plan, Phase 2, contemplated that CINCPAC (U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific) will mount units in the P.O. A for CINCPAC. In the KOREA, some of these units are Army ground and some are Army Air Units. With your concurrence, plan to charge CINCPAC with mounting both ground and air forces and with the preparation of ground forces for the operation. CINCPAC prepares air forces.
20 0205 CINCINNATI FARE TO CONSERVATION AIR INFO CTC 30, 8, CONRAD, JINIC-AC ADV. SUB- SERVICE (ADP), CTF 31, CONSERVATION 10TH, OKINAWA COMMD-AF ARA.

CTF 30, 8, 15230 not needed by all and Ur 170217 of higher classification indicates advisability dissemination factual information current petroleum supply and tanker availability as follows:

(1) Stocks of fuel readily available to facili operations now at lowest point during last year. Pearl stocks on hand equal to approximately 2 weeks OPA requirements. Recent operations have completely exhausted west coast fuel stocks with result that only 1Career scheduled from there from 20 June through 31 July which is extent of current listings. This serious fuel stock position is result of tanker shortages when during recent operations fuel requirements had to be met from short haul Pearl and west coast instead of distant primary sources. CINCINNATI current fuel requirements now scheduled to be met by transporting from NASLEIU, GLF, BONWA, T1, and ... F. Current California production required for bunkers locally.

(2) Supply of all gasolines is adequate, diesel sufficient, and fuel oil short.

(3) Tanker availability indicates possible deficit 94 ships on 1 July increasing to deficit of 297 ships for all 1946.

(4) The assurance of continued supply of sufficient bulk petroleum to maintain planned operations plus rebuilding reserve stocks in OCA demands exploitation of every possibility for shortening the supply line maintained by our allocated commercial tankers which includes maximum use ABC, AGC, and IXEs in on upshuffling service. Determination of commercial tanker terminals to be based solely on maximum utilization these ships as petroleum carriers and cannot be influenced by despatch of personnel, freight, etc.

(5) Concur establishment of ENITOK main tanker turnaround point. Concur MAHANA supply method. Do not approve removal tanker turnaround facilities ULIHI. Your proposed shuttle OKINAWA fuel from LEHTE vice ULIHI would result in unacceptable increase of approximately 1500 miles to commercial tanker turnaround. Petroleum supply situation is such to require constant study of operational procedures to effect maximum results from allocated tankers assigned.

20 0443 DECOMAF 20 to CINCINNATI ADV INFO OCEAN 120 AF 20, CINCINNATI, CONRAD, COMAIRANA.

4174. Air Staff plans provide for 10 fighter groups to be assigned the 20 AF for long range VLR escort. The properly deploy these forces 5 groups are needed in TWC and 5 groups in the KORUKUS area. Desire your concurrence in deploying forward from OAHU to TWC the 508th Fighter Group which is assigned to the 20th AF, on or about 1 August. It is contemplated that the unit can be reequipped with long range fighter aircraft prior to that date. Availability of 2 additional fighter groups for KORUKUS not yet known.

20 0819 CONRAD to CINCINNATI ADV INFO CINCINNATI, CONRAD, KORENIG, JUN, CONSERVATION 10.

Request you make no decision regarding Conservation 10 170217 until arrival Capt Cross. Study of July requirements for fleet oilers indicate following:

(A) 12 oilers required for supply supporting forces OKINAWA not including 2 additional now exclusively for WCA and diesel.

(B) 36 oilers required for direct support TF 38 planned operations.

With total 60 oilers now available to TF 30, 8 it is apparent that either an alternate plan for OKINAWA supply must be employed or TF 38 operations must be scaled down to permit 28 oilers to provide sufficient support. Cross proceeding to GUAM 21 June with complete data.
This is CTF 31 (ComSubPac) Op Ord 1-20-45.

Task Organization:
(A) TF 31 - Wake Island - As currently organized.
(B) TF 31.24 - KURE SHIMA Attack Gun - Capt Buchanan in command (10704).

Both following units organized in his op ord 2-45. FWP Recon, 2 plus reinforced rifle Co, LST 1423 (DD 706) bats.(DD 70) CATT (DD 79), LST (1) 292, RE (2) (4) 292, RE (3) (4) 192, CATT (4) 890, 1 LST 1021, 2 LST 1021, 1 LST 1021, 4 VAP 17 (AV 17), WAP 179 with CNT 11 embarked. Support aircraft as assigned by CTF 31.

1. Information as contained in current orders and dispatches. Undeserving at objective will be accomplished prior assault as directed by CTF 31.

2. This force while continuing present operations will, beginning on K-Day capture and secure KURE SHIMA in order to establish additional air warning and fighter directors stations thereon.

3A. TF 31 continue present operations.

3B. KURE SHIMA Attack Gun move from SHIMA to objective, capture and secure KURE SHIMA. Then infilts are secure troops operate as directed by Op 10.

3X1. KINGDAY 25 June 1945 12 Long Day. Time of landing 3rd assault wave, will be designated by CTF 31.24.

3X2. After KURE SHIMA has been secured and when directed by CTF 31 TF 31.24 dissolved.

3X3. After order effective 0000 1 (-9) 24 June 1945.

21 0903 CTF 31 ADV TO GHPG INFO POLICY GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY OP FOR ASC DEC 44.

Ref is your 200329, latest withdrawal dates lst Marine Aircraft Wing Hq and component units follow. To be withdrawn in order. MAG 32 Hedron and SeRon. MAG 25 see my 01/05/45, May, regarding this group. 7th ARRL.

Tentatively scheduled for employment LST 2045 with mounting dates to meet Marine airfield schedule of activation. MAG 12 with attached squadrons. MAG 61 with attached squadrons. MAG 24 Hedron and SeRon plus WAP 2644. Air Groups planning and 4. For October withdrawal WAP 1. Other squadrons attached to MAG 21 and MAG 21 will be returned to WR or decommissioned as shown in chart 200934 of March.

21 1116 COMMAND TO CTF 31 CG RECON 221, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259.

INFO CTF 31 ADV.

This is AMF Forces and OTH Army Op Ord 16-45.

This command in conjunction with CTF 31 will capture RECON SHIMA for purposes immediate installation air warning and fighter direction facilities. Tentative K-Day 25 June 1945. Naval attack force as designated by CTF 31. KURE landing force commander Maj. James 1 Jones 250B. Consiste of FWP recon and Rein.

As a result of CTF 31 naval attack force with landing force attached will make assault landing SW coast KURE. Capture and secure island. Initiate set up enemy personnel construction landing craft and reconnaissance air warning and airfield sites.

Landing Force will begin landing 22 June in ships designated by CTF 31 from areas designated by 250S 311 and report for duty to CTF 31. Ultimately, passed from naval attack force commander to landing force commander later report.

YTERU HENRY 18TH EXT 104 for duty as 250S KURE until relieved. Effective - Continued -
receipt this dispatch OTAC Recon Bn detached IsCom 331 and designated KNEE landing force. Effective receipt this dispatch units listed are detached command and attached OTAC Recon Bn, from 3rd Bn 7th Marines, Det 13 3rd Bn 22nd Marines (327 WT), Det 3rd Bn Amphib Tank (2 LVT-A), Det 2nd MALS (Shore Fire Control Party), from 26 Corps 6th Port Mobile Base Hospital, from IsCom 334 (Unit designation by JCOM 334) flatbed wagons, flat bed trucks, Det 844 Gun Det, type AN-6 and dispensary type ship to more Comm Det, Det for Corp KM-1 to OKHAMA
TAP will provide air support as requested by CTF 31. Missions initially under op control Naval Attack Force Comdr. In conjunction IsCom 331 establish maintain and operate LAM mine search and fighter control facilities KNEE
IsCom 331 will mount landing force, then landing force Comdr reports for duty IsCom KNEE responsibility garrison defense and base development
2. At earliest practicable date consistent tactical situation IsCom 331 will return following units to OKHAMA, OTAC Recon Bn, Shore fire control party, 20 AmphibTrac and crew, PUR (MT) tanks and crew, on arrival KNEE units revert parent org.
Following reports to CTF 310 fastest practicable means, Time of landing, resistance encountered, daily Orms from closing 1200 hours. Special reports covering Recon air warning site. Unloading facilities, airfield recon at earliest practicable time. Direct communication authorized all agencies concerned.
Logistics IsCom 331 responsible logistics support assault and garrison forces. Construction landing facilities for LAM or larger will be initiated without delay. Request CTF 31 provide 2 LCM and 3 LCM with all crews for KNEE Boat Pool. IsCom 331 replace crews not later than 90 plus 90, Civil population remain on island. Military prisoners to OKHAMA.

21 0645 CUSMET TO JCS VIA JCS 11TH, JINHAI, CHINA.

ÔCPH 39739 Para 1. Possibility of utilizing on Jap military deterrence and withdrawals in OKHAMA is subject. Ref JCS 1581, 13 June.
2. There have been no substantial changes in Jap capabilities since China theater's last bivouc report. The enemy continues to concentrate in key coastal areas from FRENCH INDOS CHINA to MANCHURIA South of YELLOW RIVER it is possible that they are adopting the German strategy of defending the inner ports strongly in order to hamper seriously allied operations.
3. The enemy in now conducting operations in the MUKDONG CHINA
There is no clear indication of any one of these operations. Meanwhile the Japanese are conducting delaying action as they withdraw.
4. At present Chinese forces are in contact with Japanese near CAI HANG and MUKOWA along PIC border and are threatening LUCHUN and KUNILIN towns. Pressure by Chinese forces is being exerted west of KUCHING.
5. The main China Theater forces continue on the active defense, following up Japanese withdrawal with minor ISF, armored forces while preparing for planned operations. Action to accelerate projected operations, taking advantage of enemy withdrawals, has been initiated. New 1st Army (78th and 82nd Divs) will commence arriving at ISF 1904 from OKHAMA via air in near future to secure area and cover build up of additional Combat forces and supply other preliminary measures to be undertaken at once include:
A. Securing and consolidating LUCHUN, YUCHUN and FANCHUN (ULUN) (10-25-19) airfield areas, Airfields will be made operational for minimum air supply and air defense.
B. Accelerating build-up of air and ground forces in preparation for early advance on LUCHUN KUCHING.
C. Maintaining pressure against withdrawing Japanese with forces now engaged.

-Continued-
D. Securing and developing an intermediate port and airfield area at 
PORT BAYARD and/or at other coastal supply points.
6. Mission of projected operations, presented by me in March to JCS, remains 
unchanged. Modified timing and phasing follows: Main Effort;
A. Phase 1 (target date 1 Sept 1945) lst: To advance from NANKING-
LUCHEN-KUANGCHOW base area on final objective via west river and/or
FENGCHU-TUNGCHI area. 2nd: By air and possible sea bom-
bardment to soften up principal enemy strong-points in final objective
area.
B. Phase 2 (target date 1 Nov 1945) to assault and capture CANTON-KWONG
port area. Secondary effort: To advance on final objective along the
coast from vicinity of LUCHEN-AIHUAHUA making maximum use of air-borne
supplies, JUMARS and animal transport; all at no expense to main effort
from LUCHEN-TAIHANG area.
7. Distance of NANKING-TAIHANG of supply from final objective over extremely
difficult terrain and under adverse weather conditions, where adequate land
communications have never existed, is a great hindrance to acceleration of
China Theater operations. Operation of all intermediate port or suitable
coastal landing points along South China would offset these logistical diffi-
culties somewhat and contribute substantially to successful attack on
CANTON-KWONG. This fortified area may be organized on scale similar to
that of German defense of channel ports. If so, task will be formidable, one.
8. Further exploitation of the deteriorating enemy situation in China by
forces outside China Theater may be accomplished in 1 of 2 ways as follows:
A. Assault by ambitious forces outside of the theater to secure
NANKING lodgement along the CHINA coast phased in support of projected CHINA
Theater operations.
B. Provision of shipping, small craft, necessary naval complements,
supplies and equipment for delivery to points along the coast when assured
by "CHINA" Theater forces.
9. If a small scale operation to secure lodgement along CHINA Coast becomes
feasible this year, the area south of KOWLOON extending to EASTERN appears
most desirable. An ambitious assault and tied with Red China would accom-
plish the size expressed in PWB 1541A and materially assist effort in CHINA.
Later during 1946 an optimized Chinese armies advance toward FOCOU, lodge-
ment areas in vicinity of HUNG KO would be desirable.
10. Investigation on the ground of local forces and resources in the area
between KOWLOON and TAIHANG is continuing. Continued Japanese withdrawal
into bastions of HONG KONG and EASTERN makes it improbable that any material ad-
vantage will accrue to SAC forces from unopposed landing in this
area even though it is possible that some effective Chinese forces could be
sucked together. With their equipment supplemented by supplies from the
Pacific these forces might, after period of reorganization and training, be
able to exert additional pressure against the Japanese in the SHANGHAI area
during the remainder of 1945. Experience is proving however, that furnishing
supplies and equipment to units with which there are no substantial U.S.
liason teams is unsound. The leaders of such units tend to hide the additiona
equipment for use in post war struggle for power. The semi autonomous armies
in WESTERN CHINA areas and the complex political situation rapidly developing
there make it doubtful whether result envisaged by JCS will be achieved from
landings in that area without considerable prior preparation. Pending report
of investigating teams it must be assumed that the ports such as FOCOU will
only be usable by shallow draft vessels and landing craft and that the only
feasible way to get the supplies in will be effect Chinese armies will be
SEASON.
11th re: increasing the blockade our information indicates
that there is little Japanese shipping operating south of SHANGHAI.

- Continued -
11. Landings on the coast north of KAOHSIUNG could be militarily advantageous. Politically such landings are unacceptable to the Generalissimo and would result in the flaring of an open civil war between the Central Government and the Communists prior to the ending of the war against JUAN. It is also probable that the Japanese field FUKIYENT landing attempts from ILHAM northward with a determined defense.

12. 2nd method of exploiting the deteriorating enemy situation by forces outside of CHINA is part of problem under current study in this theater. The ILHAIN HAYAI area and perhaps 1 or 2 other intermediate areas between NAG HAYAI and ILHAIN appear to have great possibilities as intermediate supply points for increasing supplies to the armies and enabling the Chinese to extend the area of their attack against CHINA-CHUKO. Preliminary estimates based on the assumption that most supplies would be moved inland from HAYAI by ground force have already been submitted by CHINA Theater to the War Dept. A new study is now underway examining the movement of supplies inland using air lift primarily. Considering the timing of CHINA's operations, it appears that the results of this study will give a more realistic picture and would provide the maximum aid from outside the theater.

13. If there is no landing on the CHINA coast in an area and in phase with CHINA Theater operations, the development of intermediate coastal supply bases to supplement China's existing tenour lines of communication will do the most toward intensifying operations by Chinese armies and lowering current and future logistic difficulties.

21 1237 MACARTHUR X CHAPA ADV HUAC, G2 & I2, C2A, JUN 28.

CX 20429. Adverse weather and terrain conditions have prevented preparation of higher field T-101 in sufficient time to cover 1 operation. Alternate plan of providing air cover from 10 July by long range fighters has become uncertain because of weather. Thrift is recommending that escort carrier be utilized if available to ensure air cover. It is suggested that 1/2 escort carrier division with screen be provided in SHO XII. One for operations during period 30 June to 2 July inclusive.

21 1405 C2G XII TF STF CHI A2 11, XIV 1, CHI A2 10.

ReUDIS L20430 ADC ready to assume full responsibility for all air defense functions CHINA Area 1 July present location. Recommend ADC be assigned immediately, the operation and control of air warning net and fighter direction both day and night. Consider number of shore based fighter aircraft currently available sufficient for defense this area.

21 1415 CTF 38 to ALL FLAG OFFICER PH 28. AL, CYA W, TF 38 INFO JULY 28.

Present intent for planning TF 38 sortie 1 July. Period 1-2 July training under type. TG and TF conditions as follows:

A. 2 days anti-aircraft firing.
B. 4 days air training including squadrons, air group, task group, and task force exercises. Fuel 8 July. Air strike SOUTH fields 10 July target is aircraft. All carrier types will be employed. Principal loading is fuel, 
support and repeat previous day as practicable. Extensive photo coverage including mapping, reconnaissance, damage assessment.

Fuel and rendezvous with TF 37 on 15 July. On 16 July strike TOKYO area similar to plan of 10 July. If and as directed execute bombardment plan A night bombardment coast vicinity lat 36-20 to 37-00 night of 16 July or bombardment plan B midday bombardment same area 17 July. If no bombardment ordered or night bombardment ordered intend air strikes against strategic targets 17 July. If day bombardment is ordered all air effort will be in support against airfields. Retire evening 17 July.

Target assignments as follows. Airfields TOKYO. Each includes major airfields listed plus minor fields adjacent. Area T2801, 2803, 2805, 2807, 2796, 2797, 2754, 2766, 144, 1477, assigned to TG 38.1. Area U2809, 1404, 2790, 2750, 298, 276, 2781, 2787, 1222, 1412 assigned to TG 38.3. Area V, U1, 1465, 1466, 1471, 2754, 2758, 1416, 1406, 2783 assigned to TG 38.4. Area B 2814, 2773, 2887, 2895, 2897, assigned TF 37 when present. Airfield numbers from SecEnT, TaskFor serial 01373 of 20 June distributed by officer messenger mail today. For strategic targets TOKYO all groups to be prepared to handle as later assigned targets F electronics plants numbered 496, 498, 497 or target G aircraft engine plants number 2016 X F-117, F-111, from CinCPac secret serial 005792 of 16 May to ComOrdFit subject Jap Industrial targets. Target assignments HOKKAIDO as follows. Area W 2932, 2920, 2930, 2923 assigned TG 38.1. Area X 2890, 2886, 2886 assigned TG 38.3. Area Y 2925, 2934 assigned TG 38.4. Strategic targets same areas. Intend to make minimum changes area assignments in these and subsequent operations.

Late photo coverage TOKYO expected 28 June. Brief on recognition SEAFIRE, FIREFLY, CLIPPED WING Corsair. British Plane insignia. Operation and training orders will follow.

Night carrier be prepared provide night heckling, intruder in target areas as ordered. Also provide night spotting and illumination for night bombadments if ordered.

21 0654

CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMNAVAE, HAMUS, VMHP, VMUS, US, COMSERVON TEN, BSI, ACL, COMTH/FLT.

It is desired to dock and refit all capital ships of the BTF requiring such work before OLYMPIC. The target is to use 4 BBs, 5 CVs and 4 CVLs for that operation.

2. FLIGHTSHIP ASSIGNMENTS. Owing to underwater repairs necessary the CVs will occupy Capt. Cook dock at SINGAPORE almost continuously.
3. It would be appreciated if it were possible to dock KING GEORGE 5TH for a few days at HAMUS on return from operations at beginning of August. It is realized that it might be necessary to cancel the docking at short notice should a commitment with a higher priority arise.

22 0342

COMSPOA ADV INFO DEP COM 20, DEP COM 20 AF, ADMIN.

RJ 6/04. Plans to deploy total of 10 fighter groups of 20th AF as indicated DEP ComAF 20 0043 June not previously known here. Redeployment forecast provides for total of 34 groups to Pacific, assignment not specified. In accordance WD Radio 05572 / TDC 22280 August 44, JOS radio 72143, DTG 093197 December 44, DEP ComAF 00149 Sept 25, CINCPAC 00127 October 20, and CINCPAC serial 00682 Nov, provision has been made in redeployment plans for the retention of 1 fighter group as part of minimum defenses of the HAWAIIAN GROUP. This requirement now met by 508 fighter group, presently only fighter group HAWAIIAN AREA.

Separate reply is being made to your 191335 June. Incorporated therein will - Continued -
be recommendation that an organized fighter group remain as a minimum requirement on OAHU. Therefore this headquarters does not concur in forward movement of the 508 Fighter Group without replacement. It is requested that before CINCPAC makes a final decision to reduce the presently prescribed Army fight protection, including night fighters, for the HAWAIIAN GROUP, this headquarters be so informed in order that further representation may be made on this subject.

22 0965 CINCPAC ADV TO 3RDFLT INFO CINCPAC 3RD FLT, CTF31, CTG32.1, CINCPAC ADMN AIRPAC.

MacArthur 211237. Form TO 3 CVE and 6 DD or DE with ESARDIVCON as TG. Detach this group from 3rdFlt and direct TG report by dispatch without delay to Com7thFlt for temporary operational control.

23 0106 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC.

Your CX 20061 (DTG 200349). Concur. It is understood that your arrangements for preparation and mounting units involve no change in CINCPAC command authority responsibility including control of harbor and shore facilities and the movement of shipping in the PHILIPPINES.

24 0106 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC.

Affirmative your 230555. (Re: ABSD 2 for docking KING GEORGE IV).

24 0229 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC 210040 also refers. This Hq does not concur with such move if contemplated.

CINCPAC 210335 indicates Hq 5thPAC in CINCPAC also refers. This Hq does not concur with such move if contemplated.

24 0849 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC CTG21, CTF23, CTF24, CTF26, CTF27, CTF28, CTF31, CTG32, CTF33, CX 21015.

Request you furnish as soon as possible maps indicating areas and locations desired with their use for all CINCPAC shore installations in DIA.BLUE (KUHNU) in order to make tentative allocations of sites for Army and Navy establishments ashore. Also in order to facilitate planning you must designate of commanders and agency constructing Marine Force airfields in DIA.BLUE and your concurrence in their direct communication with representatives of General 6th Army, FARP, and CINCPAC as desirable.

24 0918 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC CTG21, CTF23, CTF24, CTF26, CTF27, CTF28, CTF31, CTG32, CTG33, CX 21015.

1. When the tactical situation permits and the 5th PAC can be diverted to the 5th PAC as the 4th separate command to CINCPAC, operational control of above units pass to CINCPAC as directed. 2. The following units of the 5thPAC are scheduled to reinforce the 4th PAC: 1st Marine Division, 2nd Marine Division, 2nd Marine Division (SSR 777) and 3rd Marine Division (7th Marine Regiment). Upon conclusion of the 1st Marine Division's mission the tactical situation to transfer all other units of 3rd Marine Division to U.S. as previously directed by 3rd PAC.
24 0918 GINCHA ADV INFO CTF 21, CTF 31, CGAAPPF, CONSF, 30TF, 39TF, AFPOA, CTF 21 (TOPSECRET)

3. When no longer required for the EF-2 operation transfer F-86 F (in or make other disposition as desired by MJR GC or PAC advice.

4. CTF 31 nominate and direct approx 75 ICS from those now dispensing and concan EF-2 (in) for movement of material and equipment of units listed in preceding paras. LCAs (assigned temporary operational control 7th AF) for aviation purposes. Approximately 200 personnel will be lifted off each LC. Personnel lift required in addition to those on above 75 LCs will be given by separate dispatch. CG3rdPbCavCms indicates to local authorities OICHA priorities desired for return of units.

5. Desires CTF3rdPbCavCms and key staff members (Approx 11) be transferred only when their service can be spared. Class 2 air priority via HAP certifies. 100 lbs. excess baggage authorized while in air travel status. Authorized to travel private plane if desired.

24 1305 MACARTHUR TO NARCOS INFO CGHPA, CGAAPPF, CGAF, CGNPAC, CX 21093.

Subject is radio IX 13836 dated 8 June 1945 which contains proposal that certain 7th AF and 7th Fighter Command units be reassigned to 20th AF. As a result of conference with COMAIR, reassignment of 15 and 21 fighter groups, 347, 348, 363 and 386 Air Service Groups, 318 Fighter Grp and 364 Air Service Groups is concurred in with the understanding that the 301 Fighter Wing at INDISPERSABLES will remain under operational control of PBC unless and until required for VIP escort of LEGENDOUS. Confirmation of this understanding is requested. Hq and Hq 7th Fighter Command, less personnel and equipment, remains assigned to PBC as per agreement with COMGENAIR. Ref remaining units listed in IX 13836 attention is invited to radio COMGENAIR 10 63422 dated 13 June 1945. In view of COMGENAIR comment, request clarification of theater responsibilities with respect to 20th AF and consequently clarification of 20th AF requirement for remaining units IX 13836 requests be reconfirmed.

24 0230 CONDEN 10 CINCPAC ADV INFO CONSIPHTRPFOR, CONSPAC, CTF 99 1, CONSFIPFT, CTF 99 5

See CINCPAC 131239 May Conden 10 will be ready 1 July 45 to assume the responsibility for the air defense of the forces and shipping present in OKINAWA area. Conspfhtrpfor concurs.

24 0640 CTF 99 to CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 99 7

Your 230653. Unloading situation so critical that cargo arriving for next 30 days must be limited to cargo handling troops and equipment, construction troops, air force units, base development material required for original project and necessary maintenance. Recommend shipment from PHILIPPINES of signal construction supplies and air sea rescue equipment be deferred to arrive not earlier than 1 August. Will advise further on 15 July reference ability to receive.

25 0623 COMARRITANAS TO CINCPAC ADV INFO ISCH HAGUJA, CINCPAC PEARL, DEPCOM 20 AFPOA.

Ref DepCom 20 TSP 200443 June COMARRITANAS 210441 June, COMARRITANAS conf. per 019556 1 June 45. Careful study indicates that with current directives on aircraft dispersal a 5th Fighter Grp cannot be accommodated at IWO. If current dispersal of 6 plane hardstands at 300 ft is reduced to 6 planes at 200 ft between groups 5 groups can be stationed IWO. Would also necessitate lengthening of North Field 1000 ft which can be accomplished. Comarritanas opinion this 200 ft dispersal not safe due to damage in hardstand causing progressive damage to adjacent ones.

3188
Your ML044 and ML040. Do not concur in movement forward of 3rd Fighter Group from Oahu to Jap. Your attention is invited to ML044 in Box A, subject to rapid maneuver and 5th Fighter Group cannot be accommodated at Jap without relaxing current dispersal directives which is not advisable at this time. This also applies to ML044.

Your ML035 and ML040. In view of disadvantages pointed out in ML040 and others, it is now extremely desirable that headquarters 5th Air Force remain on Jap rather than shift to Hawaii.

Request you institute following interdiction plan connection in your ML040. During approach of 34 from Okinawa via Iwo Jima on 6-7 July, during fueling in vicinity of Iwo Jima on 8 July and during high speed approach via Iwo Jima on 9 July maintain interdiction patrol in 70th and 14th sectors between force and Empire.

On retirement of force to northeasterly on 11 July and while fueling on 12 July extend sectors 10 and 20 from 10 miles to maximum practical limit outlining necessary to patrol etc. between force and Empire.

While fueling on 15 July and again during period 12-13 July maintain same procedure as outlined for 12 July. Mission of interdiction destruction of enemy search planes which might contact our surface forces. Schedule above is in effect but unforeseen delays will occur in which case request interdiction be planned to cover movements of force in accordance with basic plan outlines. Dependence is on radio silence conditions you and interested commanders will be kept informed of plan changes all practicable.

Insure shore based air commands fully briefed on movements of 70th, 30th, 21st and submarine picket sweeps.

This is CINCPAC OpPlan 9-45.

A. TG 30.2 Radio Deception Group - Capt. Ayraud TCSM.
B. TG 30.7 AN Group B Capt. Perkins - Units as assigned by 1st echelon.
C. TG 30.8 Logistic Support Group - Adm. Reary - Units as assigned by separate echelon.
E. TG 34.8 Bombardment Group - Adm. Shafroth.
1. TU 34.8.1 Bombardment Group A - Adm. Shafroth - BatDiv 9 less ALABAMA, PLUS SOUTH DAKOTA. Uincy Chicago, DesRon 63 less KINO, PLUS NEVADA.
F. TF 37 British Carrier Force - Vadm Rawlings - Units as assigned by CINCPAC.
G. TF 38 Fast Carrier TF - Vadm McCain - Units as assigned in my 170017 modified by my 230635.
26 1225 CONDITION OF PLAN 2-45 (CONTINUED).

Information own and enemy forces as in Op Plan 3-45 and by separate dispatch. 3rd Ffbt forces not specified in this Op Plan support this operation by execution of missions assigned in Cond 3rd Ffbt Op Plan 3-45.

This Fleet while carrying out the general mission prescribed in Op Plan 2-45 will attack Japanese naval and air forces operating ashore and coastal and assigned strategic objectives in order to lower Japanese ability and will to resist.

A. TG 30.2 carry out radio deception in accordance with Annex C this Op Plan. Remain in assigned area of TG 30.2 or when not on detached deception duty.

B. TG 30.7 conduct A/F operations as are directed by Cond 3rd Ffbt.

C. TG 30.8 provide logistic services for TG 31 at sea in accordance with Annex L which is annex in this Op Plan. Analyze TG 30.8 for A/F operations in vicinity of 20°N unless otherwise directed by CTF dispatch.

D. TG 30.9 provide maximum logistic and repair services to all Fleet units at all advance bases. Provide logistic services for Fleet forces in CINCPAC area as required.

E. TG 34.3 operate in assigned area of TG 34.3 except when otherwise directed. Bombing every coastal objective when specifically directed.

F. TG 34.4 conduct air strikes against enemy objectives as specified in movement and attack schedule Annex A this Op Plan or on later directed.

G. TG 34.5 conduct air strikes against enemy objectives as specified in movement and attack schedule Annex B this Op Plan or on later directed. Furnish combat air patrol for TG 34.5 and spotters when directed.

1. CTF area's X1, 2, and 3 of Op Plan 3-45 are intact.

2. This Op Plan effective on receipt.

3. All ships are armed for battle and to be towed.

Logistics and repair facilities available in X1, 2, 3, of CTF area and CINCPAC. Logistics at sea for TG 30.8 in accordance with Annex L. CINCPAC provides logistic services for TG 30.

Communications in accordance with CTF 30A and CTF 30B (effective 1 July). Use zone Z (GCT) time in TG of all communications. Use J (-) time for all operations at sea. Annexes A, B, and C by separate dispatch. Cond 3rd Ffbt in CINCPAC.

26 2310 CINCPAC ADV TO AEF/FLA/EFX. HONG KONG, 1000 HRS.

UrDts 250256 is virtually answered as regards TG 30.2 units by UrDts 250156. Troop requirements CTF 31 and CTF 21 determined by following:

Original plan B1 and current serial 00426, ADDITIONAL diversions by CTF 1 NO 040106 of May. Furlong diversions by CTF 1 NO 040106. June. Furlong troops by CTF 2D CINCPAC NO 005502. Redeployed serial units by CTF 2D of latter serial. Round out and balance troops by CTF 2D serial.

27 0751 CINCPAC ADV TO AEF/FLA/EFX. HONG KONG, 0730 HRS.

CTF 30.2.

Recommended 0000 GCT 1 July as time for withdrawal CTF 31 from CINCPAC Area. If approved following should be placed in effect at that time date:

A. CTF 10 assume responsibility for the defense of CINCPAC including responsibility for the air defense of the forces & shipping present in CINCPAC Area.

- Continued -
Air sea rescue responsibility assumed by 377 F0.1 as prescribed by my 190129.

C3 16 (excluding naval and air forces at his disposal) assume responsibility for all areas within area bounded by circle of 500 statute miles from point 377 F0.1 calling on 377 F0.1 for such additional assistance as may be required.

If this recommendation approved I will direct 377 F0.1 and 377 F0.6 assume responsibility for tasks not assigned to you on 6-45.

Lancaster Commander.

Your 6-45 orders and 6-45 are effective in absence of FM 100, 8-45, 30-9-45, 377 F0.1, 377 F0.6, 377 F0.7, 377 F0.8, 377 F0.9 and 377 F0.10. I believe that in your overall combat organization FM 100, 8-45, 30-9-45, 377 F0.1, 377 F0.6, 377 F0.7, 377 F0.8, 377 F0.9 and 377 F0.10 are without your overall combat organization effective as true FM 100, 8-45, 30-9-45, 377 F0.1, 377 F0.6, 377 F0.7, 377 F0.8, 377 F0.9 and 377 F0.10. I believe that in your overall combat organization effective as true FM 100, 8-45, 30-9-45, 377 F0.1, 377 F0.6, 377 F0.7, 377 F0.8, 377 F0.9 and 377 F0.10.

While I consider it a certainty under conditions of radio silence, all of the orders and messages we consider as FM 100, 8-45, 30-9-45, 377 F0.1, 377 F0.6, 377 F0.7, 377 F0.8, 377 F0.9 and 377 F0.10 will be uncertain as to the accuracy of responsibility for the coordination of these orders and messages.

Be sure that you designate a commander to exercise authority over the activities mentioned during this period that you can lay on task orders over the period mentioned. Since all of the commanders in your various organization and modifications are partially effective, a clarifying order would be helpful.

Request details for your 377 F0.1 sub-area A and B being issued by AMC in separate dispatch.

In separate dispatch.

Pursuant to my order 6-45 effective 30-4-45 July assume full responsibility for defense of captured personnel in the A22. This task includes responsibility for air defense of forces and shipping in the area and responsibility for the operation within limits of task 41. In execution of this task you are authorized to call upon 377 F0.5 for additional air assistance when required and other beyond directed to so assist when possible.

A number of radio-towers have been established along the Pacific between the land end, the China Theater, WPAF 14 and 15 relating to establishing a supply line to the China Coast in the vicinity of X'F by 6-45. The latest land radio-tower, X 22212 dated 25 June, requires the following general orders: Load 2 liberty ships in the U.S. for discharge at X'F about 15 August. This ship is to be followed by a 30th July by additional liberty ships. For details of this matter contact your Medium Command concerning feasibility of protection across CNY 12000 miles during landing. Your immediate orders are requested relative to naval surface protection. For your information, air cover can be furnished from the China Theater to the limit of range available if required. Your orders are being made of China Theater as to what air cover can be furnished from that end.
TOP SECRET

JUNE (CIP)

29 0725 CONSIDER THIS ADV ICEIHC CINCPAC ENL G-4 R-4-2 L-4 CINCPAC COMDIV.

29 0726 CONSIDER THIS ADV ICEIHC CINCPAC ENL G-4 R-4-2 L-4 CINCPAC COMDIV.

Study of aviation and bomb problem in this area reveals necessity for clarification and adjustment of requirements submitted by various agencies. Tomahawks indicated as being prohibited from point of view of storage areas and beach capacity. Aviation and bomb equipment needed require further analyses. Consider essential single agency responsible for coordination and supply problems among F-15, Naval Air and Pac Div. Recommend conference at early date to include all interested agencies, problem route and requires immediate clarification. See also our JUNE.

29 0730 CONSIDER THIS ADV ICEIHC CINCPAC ENL G-4 R-4-2 L-4 CINCPAC COMDIV.

Your JUNE cited 7-8-14. The feasibility of the proposal will naturally depend on the ground and air situation in the area. To obtain maximum protection and security air and sea, facilitate entry it will be necessary to take final run in during darkness to arrive and enter at daylight. The size and draft of ships employed should permit passage over the bar and traversing channel during any stage of the tide. Adequate surface and AS protection can be provided. Escort should not remain in the area during unloading. Would require fighter cover as follows:

1. Down to dusk on approximate direct route from LINC513 between limits of 250 and 120 miles from LINC513.
2. From dusk following day off LINC513.
3. Cover for retreating escort on reverse track until dusk, about 200 miles.
4. From dusk during unloading and until departure.
5. As in 1 above for return trip.

Considering enemy air and suicide boat capabilities in the area (even though LINC513 is captured and reestablished as an Allied airfield) the operation would be hazardous. Further information desired from TRIA Theater:

1. Probable unloading time as per intelligence indicates this operation would be unduly prolonged due absence of adequate escort unloading facilities.
2. Confirmation no enemy or Allied airfields exist in area.

29 0830 CONSIDER THIS ADV ICEIHC CINCPAC ENL G-4 R-4-2 L-4 CINCPAC COMDIV.

This summarizes CINCPAC for 000560 on 21 June, for your guidance consideration:

(a) Essential OI services will involve facilities for CINCPAC capable of transmitting press material from mobile stations in objective area to RN in relay West Coast including facilities for radio-telegraphy radio-photo and voice broadcast. Transmission required from at least 3 units near objective back to RN.

(b) Operational communications facilities in area will be largely air and sea transport. Essential facilities supplied necessary to provide terminal equipment and operating personnel for both voice broadcast and radio-photo transmission in 5 flagship.

(c) Essential personnel at least 1 and preferably 2 or 3 ships with mobile radio press relay. When personnel available, recommend assignment to CINCPAC. (W-11) class be outfitted as described for.

(d) Limiting dates for program 9-21st for press and 9-29th for West Coast and 1st for radio-telegraphy. Voice broadcast and radio-telegraphy material and personnel send of letter.

Comment: General conditions on CINCPAC will probably be such that relay of press material from point of origin is not recommended.
COMMND. CONCERNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

30 0618 Comm. Gen. to G-2 of 6th Corps: 

RAGING ORDER. Initiate preparations for operation OLIMPIA with target date 1 November, 1942, in accordance with the Joint Staff Plans. The initial date of operation will be 1 June 1942. The objectives of the operation will be achieved by the 12th Corps, the 6th Army, and the 7th Division. The commanding General 6th Army commanding all expeditionary troops.

SCORING UNITS TO BE EXPLODED: In operation will be as outlined in Appendix E of reference Joint Staff Plans. The commanders concerned must be notified of the objective to be achieved. Any deviations from these objectives must be cleared with the Joint Staff. The commanders are responsible for the execution of the operation.

30 0618 CINC 6th CORPS: SCORING UNITS TO BE EXPLODED IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS:

SCORING Unit A: 6th Corps, 7th Division, 12th Corps.

CINC 6th CORPS, 20,020, 20,100, 1st Army 5th Corps will remain.

30 0735 CINC 6th CORPS: 

1. It is expected that a force consisting of 600 ASW, 2 CYL, 2 Battalion T or C T or 2 CYL, and 2 GLs will be available at 1942 for operations in the Kopet. 
2. The scale of operations of which this force is capable is being reviewed by:
   a. The air available, it would be necessary for them to return to
   b. The air available in order to be incorporated in the 1942 operations plan for 1942. 
3. Logistic support will be particularly noted for tankers. 
4. Apart from its actual commitment, the considerations referred to in the paragraph above would appear to exclude the use of this force as a group of AR in operations against the Japanese inland at this time.
5. I propose to commit the force to the operation outlined in para 3 above such an operation could not be justified nor its military effect be maintained by its being in these units against an enemy assault on "X-UA."
6. I have not, of course, mentioned it to 1942 but I am sure that any time we are in the position which we are in now, any time we can do there that time would help him. 
7. Other alternatives might be the capture of "X-UA" which might prove useful as a base or of "X-UA" which seem to be important as an offensive force, to 1942 in the operation of an force, to 1942 and 1942. For either operation Australian or New Zealand troops would have to be available and this might not prove practical.
8. If you agree I would like to send a staff officer to your headquarters as soon as convenient to you with any further details that may be helpful to you in deciding the employment of this force.
Here in brief of current operation orders: 6-45, 8-45, and 10-45 of which remain effective during period of current operations.

3rdFlt will attack Japanese naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards, and coastal objectives, cover and support NYXU forces and protect air and sea communications along Central Pacific Area.

TF 36 Fast Carrier and TF 37 British Carrier forces conduct air strikes and bombardment according to following schedule:

(1) TF 36 departs Leyte 1 July proceeds to Midway rendezvous 3 July and on 10 July conducts air strikes and air strikes against enemy air and air installations in "X" area.

(2) Force returns and departs 1 July strikes in northern "Y" area.

(3) 1 July attacks in "X" area and bombards all "Z" area.

(4) Force returns to rendezvous with TF 37. Force attacks in "Y" area. 6 July.

(5) Force attacks in "Y" area and departs 6 July, TF 36 will return to Midway if ordered, as head "X". Escort TF 37 in "Y" area.

(6) Both forces return to base for replenishment at sea, fuel and food and subsequent strikes depend on tactical situation. Force schedule subject to change due to weather and tactical developments.

TF 304, TF 306 and TF 307, 38, and 309 respectively conduct desert missions, conduct air strikes, and provide logistic support.

As TF 304, Fast Carrier conducts search and air strikes in "X" area and TF 306, Fast Carrier and off SC's east of 160°E.

TF 22 conducts air strikes in "X" area bounded as follows: 28-06 W 150-150°E, 15-15°E 120-120°E, 25-25°S 115-115°E, 30-30°N 135-135°W, 37-37°S 120-120°E. Commander scheduled to start 1 July, 3 north of area.

TF 304 will strike at 1710 1 August. Commander to conduct operations for logistics reinforcement is assumed to take place from 1 to 15 July.

TF 22 will provide adequate cover for TF 304 and TF 306, TF 304 is in overall command of 3rdFlt Forces operating in "X" area, namely TF 304, TF 306, TF 307, and units of TF 304.

Tentative agreement among P.L., 9th A.C. and Combined Air Task Groups for 3rdFlt has been reached and is now being recommended in detail to 3rd Flt. This includes following major features: 1 radar and fighter direction units, and 1 control center to go into western Iwo Jima with 40th Division. A radar and fighter direction units, one unit to go to small islands south and southeast of objective, a radar and fighter direction units, another unit to go to with 4th Division.

A control center to cooperate with TF 304 to 307 to potentially form a unified control center similar to the new tactical control center which will be in use. 3rd and 7th Battle Area Forces, details of agreement recommended are being given to all Army which will forward to 9th A.C. in accordance with previous agreements. New 4th Flt Air Task Group and Fighter direction units will be equivalent to approximately 4 standard Marine Air Task Groups with a coordination of 3rd Flt and TF 304. New additional radio direction and aerial experience is given to the essential to successful operation. It is for your consideration on possible advance planning since 3rd Flt has not approved and forwarded similar recommendations as soon as practicable.
CTG 77.2 Dispatches (VAdm. Dendorf)

JANUARY (GCT)

06 0614

CTG 77.2 to CONZTH FLNAT. ALL INTERESTED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS SOMANACAP INTO CTG 77. ALL TAC'S TO MACNA 7TH FLNAT.

During operations this forenoon ships received damage from suicide attacks as follows: (A) New Mexico (BB-40) bridge destroyed all communications are out. ComBatDiv 4 in WEST VINGILNA in charge San Fabian Task Groups. No info Admiral Weyer. (B) WALE (DD-723) plane crashed in after part of bridge into CTC. 10 killed 25 burned. All guns in local control. Captain critically injured. (C) A.M. SUMNER (DD-692) hit aft. After magazine flooded. 2 killed 3 injured. (D) LONG (DD-12) hit by suicide plane. (E) BROOK (DD-10) hit by suicide plane. Latter 2 no amplifying reports received as yet as still under attack. (F) R.P. LEXS (DD-664) hit by plane on both forward guns damage slight. 1 Man superficially injured. New subject: Minesweepers report no mines found as yet in entrance mine fields location but several floating mines. New subject: Suicide Dive Bomber attacks made in determined fashion. Pilots seem to be of high quality and difficult to stop. Group Fighter Director Officer states no radar contacts this forenoon all interception being done by visual lookouts with Fighter Director. New Subject: We require considerably more air support. What we have does not seem adequate at all. We have had 12 ships hit by suicide bombers since 1630 yesterday of which 1 sank and 9 were damaged severely.

06 1210

CTG 77.2 to CONZTH FLNAT Info CTG 77/ALL TV AND TAC'S

This afternoon following ships hit by suicide bombers. CALIFORNIA (BB-44), AUSTRALIA, LOUISVILLE (CA-28), LOWRY (DD-770), O'BRIEN (DD-725), ORCA (AVP-49). This makes 12 ships hit today and a total of 17 since 1630 yesterday afternoon. LOUISVILLE and AUSTRALIA have now been hit twice Rear Admiral Chandler painfully and seriously burned. Command CruDiv 4 now temporarily in PORTLAND. RAdm Weyer safe. Consider need of additional air power urgent and vital. Our CVE's entirely inadequate providing air cover. Japanese suicide dive bombers seem able attack without much interference owing radar difficulties affecting all ships in LYNGAYEN GULF area. Airborne radar rarely makes contact with planes. Believe in addition that all fields small as well as large near LYNGAYEN area must be continuously bombed and maintained neutralized. Enemy
06 1210  **Continued:**

attacks heaviest morning and evening especially around 1700. Additional damage may seriously and adversely affect this as well as important subsequent operations. More damage may invite action with the Japanese Fleet with which this Command is becoming progressively less prepared. Should suicide bombers attack transports results might be disastrous. Recommend 5th Air Force be informed seriousness situation and need more air support. Recommend 3rd Fleet be ordered this area immediately provide additional air and surface cover urgently needed. Consider this matter of such serious import as to warrant immediate reconsideration present plans.

06 1911

CTG 77.2 to COM7THFLT Info CTF 77. ALL TF AND TO COMMANDERS 7TH FLEET. COM7THFLT PASSED TO COM7THFLT.

COMAREAST AIR FORCES (LEYTE).

TOP SECRT. My 061210 add 2 ships not previously reported. (A) COLUMBIA hit twice. 1st plane struck antenna damage negligible. 2nd hit main deck penetrated to sea. Turret 4 out permanently, turret 3 out due PON I TCURTAGAT. ND oil flooding. Steering engine out of commission. Now steering with engines casualties about 20 dead and 20 were critically wounded. (B) NEWCOMB damaged by straffing near miss ZEKK crashed. Mark 4 radar damaged beyond repair. Many minor holes in bridge structure and after deck house. Casualties 1 dead, 1 missing, 10 slightly wounded. New subject: CTF 77.4.1 reports one Lilly DES ORGEBUXD no tail runner and quantity of hits absorbed. DMOCPX self sealing tanks and substantial armor. Believed to be a suicide.

07 1242

CTG 77.2 to COM7THFLT ALL COMTF NOH SOLS Info CTF 77. ALL TF AND TO COMMANDERS 7TH FLEET. COM7THFLT.

CINCPAC. CINCSKFAC. COMLINCH. COMCAL. COMUL. COMFE.

COM7THFLT.

TOP SECRT - Todays operations went off on schedule with very slight air opposition. No attacks were made on this Force until 1840 when PALMER (DMS-5) was bombed and sunk. Reason no attacks obscure but most probably stepped up counter air activity by Blue Forces. Comments on todays operations report in separate dispatch.
Since my last report additional info has been received concerning damage to ships. (A) SOUTHARD (DE-10) hit by suicide bomber. Is operative but requires repairs. (B) BROOKS (APD-10) hit by suicide bomber. Taken under tow and now in hands of salvage party and anchored off SANTA ANITA ISLAND. (C) APACHE (ATF-67) hit by suicide dive bomber and suffered failure of number 4 propulsion armature and some small damage incident thereto. (D) MINNEAPOLIS (CA-36) superficially damaged suicide bomber near miss. 5K radar and some antennae out. (E) PALMER (DMS-5) hit by bomber and sunk today. This brings the total of all ships sunk or damaged since arrival at LINGAYEN to 20 ships. The OMMANKEY BAY (CVE-79) sunk, the MANILA BAY (CVE-61) slightly damaged. The SAVO ISLAND (CVE-78) superficially damaged. The HELL (DJ-386) superficially damaged and the STAFFORD (DE-411) heavily damaged before arrival LINGAYEN GULF. Bring the grand total of 25 ships sunk or damaged in present operations up to 1900 I (-9) January 7th.

Strong evidently suicide planes equipped to stand phenomenonal punishment. In 1 of yesterdays attacks a Frances advanced 2000 yards at 25 foot altitude against a most concentrated and accurate fire from all calibers of AA before crashing. A current practice is for Fast planes to come in flying so low as to leave wake from propeller wash, then, by banking climb to collide with ships superstructure. They generally come on from the sun or from a land background suitable to their camouflage. Few high altitude attacks were noted. New subject: Could these planes which attacked Task Group 77.2 so effectively FS 6 January have been carrier based AIRCRAFT the COLUMBIA reported roughly tracking 1 of these pilots from out latitude 15 degrees longitude 118 degrees.

TOP SECRET. 2 Suicide attacks made on damaged AUSTRALIA about 0720 I (-9) today, 1st Plane shot down close aboard, 2nd A Dinah hit port side. Ship holed near water line, steering from aft, AA Battery now reduced to 1/3. Carring out boardment mission. Attacks were conventional high altitude 45 degree glide.
CONDUCTED BOMBARDMENT OF LANDING AREAS THIS AFTERNOON, CONTINUED MINE SWEEPING, MADE INSPECTION OF BEACH APPROACH AREAS WITH UNDERWATER TEAMS AND CONTINUED AIR STRIKES WITH CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT. NO AIR OPPOSITION WAS ENCOUNTERED UNTIL ABOUT LATE AFTERNOON WHEN JAPAN (2) WAS SUNK. SLIGHT ENEMY OPPOSITION BY UNDERWATER TEAMS AND SNIPERS. DIRECT AIR SUPPORT FURNISHED SMOOTHLY WITHOUT OPPOSITION. REPORT FOLLOWS: (A) BOMBARDMENT. AS A GENERAL THING, SUITABLE TARGETS WERE CONSPICUOUS BY THEIR ABSENCE. ENEMY GUNS WERE ENGAGED ON RIDGE IN 1173, AND IN AREAS 1451, 1666, AND FIRE WAS NOTED FROM VICINITY CHURCH IN 9731. DIRECT HITS ON ROAD IN AREA 1451, SEVERAL BUILDINGS DAMAGED OR BURNED. ALSO DESTROYED MEDIUM CALIBRE GUNS IN AREA 0646, DAMAGED AAA BATTERY IN 1249 NEAR RIDGE, A SINGLE HOWITZER OR Mortar NOT DEFINITELY LOCATED BUT BELIEVED NORTHEAST OF BAY. OPENED FIRE. SHORTER OF SPOTTING PLANES FROM AUSTRALIA AND ENGLISH PREVENTED COMPLETION SCHEDULED. ABOVE IS BRIEF SUMMARY OF Firing SHIPS REPORTS WHICH INDICATE VERY FEW IMPORTANT TARGETS HAVE BEEN LOCATED. (B) MINE SWEEPING: A 1451, 1520, 1525, 1451, 1685, 1715, TURTLE, TURTLE (MAY BE TURTLE) AND ZIG WERE COMPLETED. ALL OTHERS WELL AHEAD OF SCHEDULE AND WILL BE COMPLETED EARLY TOMORROW MORNING (8 JAN). ONLY 2 MINES REPORTED. NO CONTROLLED MINES OF ANY TYPE DISCOVERED ANYWHERE. (C) DIRECT AIR SUPPORT. TUR HIT BY 4 ROCKETS AND STRAFED. 36 BOBS AND 12 HEAVY GUNS IN TARGET AREAS 0810, 1150, CERTAIN RESULTS. 20 TRUCKS DESTROYED IN VICINITY TARGET AREA 0500; ALL AA IN 318 FORT;ги; AA GUNS IN 318 FORT; 18 AA GUNS AND AMMUNITION EMPLACEMENTS IN TARGET AREA 0600 HIT WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS; AMMO TRUCK DESTROYED TARGET AREA 2563; 4 MILITARY BUNKERS IN 0672 HIT; 2 DIRECT HITS ON BUNKER, 1 INTEGRATED, 1 IN TARGET AREA 0783; FIRES STARTED IN BUNKER TARGET AREA 0875 AND 0975, AND ROCKETS AND BOMB HITS ON RAILROAD IN SAME AREAS; FIRED SEVERAL BUILDINGS IN TARGET AREA 2075. ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS SOUTHWARD VICINITY HCO-JRC. BOATS IN VICINITY OF DAMAGED SUBMARINE HIT JUNXIO FIRE STARTED. TOTALS FOR DAY PLANNED 61 VP, 68 VT. 20 IN DIRECT SUPPORT AND 4 SPECIAL MISSIONS. 19 TONS 100 POUND BOMBS 30 TONS 500 POUND BOMBS 175 ROCKETS EXPANDED. LOST 1 VT. RESULTS TODAY MUCH BETTER THAN YESTERDAY. (D) UNDERWATER TEAM REPORTS FORWARDED BY SEPARATE DESPATCHES. NEW SUBJECT. READ ADMIRAL THEODORE EDDISON CHANDLER COMPRUDLY AND PASSED AWAY AT 1750/17 JANUARY AS A RESULT OF INJURIES AND BURNS SUFFERED DURING SUICIDE BOMBER ATTACK PRECEDING DAY.
This is Top Secret. Both planes which made side attacks on AMERICA this morning were Dims. [redacted].

Subject: 071536 statement KHITMA tracked one of these pilots in error. 'He which crashed KHITMA at 1750/06 port side Japanese pencil diagram entitled "Midget or Yoke of Aircraft carrier attack and admitted (or Second Lieutenant) IIA". Plane take off indicated at unknown time and place on course 325, 171 knots taken at 1720. Change course to 15 degrees to 150 knots at target 1805. Course of target course 325, 171 knots. Each carrier launched 1500 type C4A 2 deg after take off. Each carrier borne equipped launch was made forward hours. Took was Yoke diagram type C3A 20 deg after take off. Yoke understood to be strictly toy type. [redacted].

071536

080936

Report of operations for 10 January follows: Bombardments of BINTAIK ISLAND FORC POINT completed, during afternoon Task Group penetrated distance of 20 miles into Gulf to support minesweepers under attack and to conduct any bombardment feasible. A bombardment of about 1/2 hours duration of ARINOAY-ADAM Area was effected. During bombardment and upon retirement from the Gulf the Group was subjected to an intense and prolonged suicide bombing attack in which KOBAYASHI, UKADA, LOULID, SOKUTA were heavily damaged as reported 061210 Para. Specific discussion of each operation follows: (A) KOBAYASHI ISLAND. Few important or worthwhile targets were observed in this area. Firing was therefore limited to those targets only and to a considerable amount of small shipping in passage between BINTAIK ISLAND and Mainland. (B) FORC POINT. All targets were well covered. Some counter battery fire necessary and enemy ceased firing. Heavily damaged storages, heavy Ask Ask, and reported 155 mm gun position. (C) ARINOAY-ADAM Area. Fire in this area was directed largely at enemy forces which were moving east on road in areas 0763, 0863, and 0463 towards the mountains. Troops were also noted moving north in areas 0781 and 0782.
These troops included many vehicles and horses drawn heavy field pieces. The heavy suicide attacks made on our ships coincided with this movement. Results achieved indicate COVERSING OTHER COVERSING (D) Minesweeping conducted in all areas. All results negative to date except 1 mine found in area. Several floating mines were discovered. Operations continue. TRAVELING 1 MT IJN. HOVEY (DMS-11), LONG (DMS-12), SOUTHWARD (DMS-10) and BROOKS (APD-10) were hit by suicide bombers. HOVEY and LONG have since sunk. (E) Support aircraft. Expended 45 tons bombs, 492 rockets with no losses. Results: Fired or damaged several FJT. ALINGAYEN BEY Railroad Bridge knocked out for 36 hours. Destroyed 1 railway locomotive this area. Destroyed 1 aircraft on ground, 1 in air. Destroyed ammo dump 8624B, 4 buildings probably barracks in 9239 and 9240. Extensive reconnaissance failed reveal any targets as provided by advanced intelligence. No coastal guns located. (F) Fighter direction. Destroyed 15 enemy aircraft airborne at least 9 of which were by visual fighter direction. Para. New subject: Correction to 060614. Last paragraph changed ORCH. MACBANE had 11 ships II by suicide bombers since 1630 yesterday, of which 9 were damaged severely. Para. Correct to 060557. 1st paragraph, 4th sentence change to read "Minesweeping Group GAP about dawn destroyed 1 plane". Para. New subject: Weather conditions 1400/1 Wind 120 degrees true 8 knots. Barometer 29.86 falling slowly barometer change 6 hours 1/10 inch. Alto Stratus clouds 4/10 Base 9000 feet. Sea smooth moderate NE MORNINGS ATXNOON.
10 0640 0000 to COMINCH.

NORTH to KINKA. Para One. Immediately upon receipt of 0000 00000 and 0210 I send my 000022 to General MacArthur. Also 00000 passed to you stated his inability to absent himself from his campaign at this time and presumed conference here with General Sutherland and other key staff officers. By 091555, conferences will commence 0915 the strength. The coordination of planning and preparations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be arranged with General MacArthur as expeditiously as possible. Para Two. Desire direct reply to paragraphs your 091555 commenting flag assignments until major concepts have been clarified in the exploratory conference here followed by a personal conference with General MacArthur for which I will proceed to MANILA rather than forego the advantages of a personal conference.

12 1215 CINCPAC to COMINCH INFO CONFIDENTIAL.

RELATE TO KINKA INFO SERIOUS. Sherman has just returned from brief conferences at OKINAWA with Supreme and later with Turner and Busch. The following is his estimate based on his own observation and impressions. Para. There are 62,000 enemy troops in southern OKINAWA and in northern OKINAWA 10,000 in the SHIMA. This does not include the large numbers of enemy civilians who have been drafted as laborers. Troops in south include Japanese 4th Div at practically full strength and about 7,500 due to casualties inflicted by us. Also 44th and 19th Independent Mixed Brigades. Enemy is strong in artillery and his artillery fire is said to be most effective experienced by us in the Pacific. Busch is proceeding methodically and effectively to consolidate and push off the extremely strong and cleverly prepared Japanese defenses and is using all the field artillery, naval gunfire and air support available. Lowest responsible estimates for overrunning the organized resistance is 30 days from now and this is probably optimistic, 77th will capture DI SHIMA this week and then move into OKINAWA to join Hodge. Prior to landing the 27th Div the Japanese had move troops in the line than did the 24th Corps. Para. From 10 April unloading over the HAGUCHI beaches though hampered by bad weather tonnage 575,000 tons plus 206,196 short tons which is the corresponding SHIPAN figure. Some airfield sites are disappointing but the overall development can meet initial plans. Thorough reconnaissances being initiated. Para. Nelson is high and Busch, Hodge and Geiger all wish to rehabilitate troops on OKINAWA. This will be ordered, Turner rates Busch very high and wishes to work with him in the invasion. Para. 2 Marine Air Groups are ashore but NADEMA will be ineffective in wet weather until Harston mast is laid. Air evacuation inaugurated and functioning well. Para. Supreme and Turner both point out need to move into PACIFIC all available destroyers and escort groups because of losses being experienced and expected to continue from submarines who wish the screen and pickets. The feeling is that our ships will sustain last Jap suicides but we will need all the screen we can get in the next few months. Para. We are in a fight which will be hard until the Japanese run out of the means for continuing mass suicide attacks tells there is no doubt that our ships can take it. Our defensive organization and teamwork between ships and aircraft and our anti-aircraft armament is improving. The enemy skill is deteriorating rapidly. Para. There is general agreement that we cannot seize any position northeast of OKINAWA until the supply of suicides is greatly reduced.
110000 CONFER AT 9AM.

STERN TO FDR. Following message received over telegraph circuits endorsed by Major Gen Leary my staff at Guam from Major Gen Leary HQ AAF in Washington. "Gen MacArthur has requested 150 LTFs for use in moving supplies forward from our area to Philippines. LTFs are needed because planes are so damaged that Liberty ships cannot be discharged now and are not available. It is estimated that 150 LTFs under my command are now proceeding North on West Coast United States. General Somervell requests that you personally urge Admiral Nimitz to dispatch 150 LTFs to NTH in as many as now practicable. In addition to LTFs MacArthur has asked for 150 LTFs. End." This question was previously raised in MacArthur's MASSA to which I replied in my 2000A3. Request following reply be addressed to the Dept for Gen MacArthur from Commander. All LTFs and LTFs now assigned to FPO are required for operations which have been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No portion of this number can be made available to MACUSA without curtailting necessary assault lift for these operations or the movement of garrison units and equipment essential for the early implementation of the functions for which these new bases are acquired." Suggest that the Dept agencies be requested to make future requests of this nature to OCMUR or to OCMUSA rather than to members of my staff.

112000 CONTACT to CINCINAQ.

FDR TO STERNimir HITE. I consider it important that you be told that Joint Chiefs or Staff will soon discuss with the President the general strategy for the ultimate defeat of JAPS along following lines: There are two general alternatives first envelopment (shady or隐蔽) of invasion (assault). It is apparent that both alternatives have their merits and demerits. A third method is to proceed with "envelopment" while postponing fully for "invasion" in which case envelopment can be expected to facilitate invasion.
13 2346 CINCPAC ADG TO CINCPAC.

Lieut Gen Sutherland and party including General Hull arrived on 13th and I held an initial conference in the evening with only Sutherland, Chamberlain, Nettleton and Shuman present. Faro. General MacArthur's idea as expressed by Sutherland is as soon as possible to take command (operational control as well as administrative and logistic) of all Army forces throughout the Faros including the garrisons of the shore positions in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Sutherland advanced the view that all our previous command arrangements had been "unsatisfactory" and that unity of command was an unworkable "shibboleth". He further stated that in future (post IJN2085) no Army troops would be allowed to move under an Admiral. He was informed that unity of command in the Pacific Ocean Areas had gotten us through our period of adversity had saved us in the inner approaches of JAPAN and was the only feasible arrangement for operating and defending an area and coordinating area efforts. Para. I expect to relinquish to MacArthur the operational control of the deployable assault troops and other Army units as they become available for operations to be prepared for further operations and it is clear that he will assume administrative and logistic control and responsibility. However, the essential garrisons of all positions in the Pacific Ocean Areas must remain under my operational control as long as I am responsible for those areas. Addition of unity of command in the subareas and outlying islands would produce chaos and would retard the prosecution of the war. I shall not therefore accede now to his assuming operational control of Army forces except for service which are essential to the defense and functioning of the Pacific Ocean Areas. This is in accordance with my understanding of paragraph 1 of JCS 0282A, Para. It appears that MacArthur expects to take over the KHUMUS and KENNY expects to take over air operations in the BOKTUS. Para. Stuart indicated that MacArthur expects to be able to actively support and support an assault on KOTUS in November. The Fleet will of course be ready if the enemy air force is overpowered by that time. Para. The Federation is to keep you personally informed, discussions will continue today at the Chief of Staff level and I will inform you daily of progress made.

14 1659 CINCPAC AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

FIND TO KENNY: I am in complete agreement with your views expressed in your 1545.

14 2142 CINCPAC/CINCPAC ADV RG TO CINCPAC.

KENNY TO KENNY ONLY. By 132346, conferences continued on staff levels. Last night proposals were made by Kenney for moving 5th Air Force into KHUMUS to operate under his direction and by Sutherland for CINCPAC to take command of KOTUS because of his "paramount interest" in the KOTUS as the axis of advance into JAPAN. Our need for naval and air bases and for coordination of naval and air attacks on JAPAN in congested areas during naval and amphibious phases of invasion were stressed. Para. The proposal to make the experienced and effective 5th Air Force available to exploit fully the potential offensive capability of the KOTUS is sound. The question of Army air support is a complex one and I shall make no commitment for the present. I would appreciate your approval of this question as I do not know the manner's intentions as to other regions under the new directive. The tentative plan is for CINCPAC to send over his draft of strategic plan.
OLYMPIC after which my planners will redraft and revise with respect to naval and amphibious matters and then proceed MANILA for next planning conference. There is general agreement as to concept of invasion operations although ideas as to command relationships will need to be resolved. Para. An interesting sidelight is that Sutherland says MacArthur will land in KYUSHU about D+3 stay a short time and then return to MANILA until time for the KYUSHU landing.

151406 CINCSPAC ADV TO COMGHQ.

NOTICE TO KING ONLY.

The S/RPA conferences today prepared and submitted a paper which in effect provided that quote localities be transferred without delay unquote apparently referring to KYUSHU and other shore positions where Army troops predominate, that after CINCPAC and IE CINCPAC have been captured the Army Air Forces in KYUSHU pass to command of CINCSPAC and that CINCPAC assume operational control and responsibility for naval operations in S/WA. Since these ideas were consuming valuable time and delaying constructive planning I authorized Holleis to inform Sutherland in writing as follows quote Para 1. It is highly important that the conferences proceed as soon as possible to arrange the method, time, and place for coordination of the invasion planning and preparations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is necessary in order that the naval command organization for planning and coordinating the naval and amphibious stages may be established and assume to function. Para 2. The following information is furnished concerning the intentions of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, in order that conferences may be expedited. (A) He will not at this time transfer any important shore positions from the Pacific Ocean Areas to the Southwest Pacific Area. (B) He will not at this time relinquish operational control of any Army forces, ground, air or service, now under his control, which he considers essential to the furnishing, development or defense of the Pacific Ocean Areas or to the success of operations which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have or may direct him to conduct. (C) He will exercise operational control over the major forces assigned to operate from shore positions in the Pacific Ocean Areas unless otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (D) He will retain the coordinating authority over logistic matters given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommends by the recommendation of the Chief of Staff, U S Army, dated 26 March 1945 (No 1029). (E) He will not assume direct control of naval forces involved in the offensive phases of operations directed to be conducted by the Army. He will provide naval cover for such operations and will allocate naval forces for direct participation under CINCPAC. Para 3. The position taken in para 1 is in complete accord with the directive of JCS CINCPAC January. Any other further discussion during which it was argued by Generals and Generals that the conferences expedite consideration of map and plans and planning and preparations for invasion I authorized Holleis to write to them as follows quote. "In amplification of paragraph 10 of your letter of 13 April the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, desires to be prepared to recommend that subparagraph 10 of paragraph 1 of your letter of 13 April be interpreted as follows: (A) An amphibious operation is one in which the Theater Commander or Combined Force Commander has overall operational control as distinct from a phase of operations in amphibious warfare when the amphibious commander assumes overall operational control as distinct from a phase of operations in amphibious warfare."

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Name]
and preparations and the NCPA party was apparently not prepared for such discussion.

16 0254 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC COMRAFTLY OCM 917. CINCPAC FAM.

FOR KING NAUGHTS BORDAGE HALEY, KIHONY, AND TURNER, SUBRANCE ENSIGN
HICKERT AND TURNER AS APPOINTMENT. In order to expedite plans and preparations for OCM 417. It is my present intention as soon as the capture of OCM 917. has been completed to have submarine and turner and necessary staff establish planning headquarters at Guam initially and plan for OCM 417. Haley to take over the fleet in the combat area.

17 1504 COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV.—Your 160254 is hereby approved.

16 0734 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

NOTICE TO KING ONLY. After arrival in Pacific General Vandegrift requested my permission to visit OCM 917. His desire as head of the Marine Corps is to display his deep interest in the personnel engaged in active combat and to encourage and cheer them by his presence. He also wished to talk with Geiger on general Marine Corps matters. Had a similar request occurred in the Iwo Jima campaign where the troops engaged were all Marine I should have granted it. In this instance I have considered it advisable to deny it. Vandegrift is of a higher rank than Lt. Gen. Buckner who is commanding the land campaign and the majority of the troops engaged are Army. If Vandegrift is permitted to go to the front during active operations it will be difficult if not impossible to refuse a similar request that is sure to be forthcoming from Richardson and doubtless others. My experience has shown that visits of this character while immediately helpful to the morale of some of the forces involved frequently lead to subsequent criticisms and vindictive comments of the organizations participating in the campaign. The net result has been harmful rather than helpful. This information is furnished you in order that you may be informed if this or similar action may later be brought to your attention. Vandegrift will remain here for several days and if there are considerations which I may not have taken into account that cause you to believe that my decision should be changed please advise.

09 0247 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC.

NOTICE TO MACARTHUR. General Richardson has requested my concurrence in his proceeding to MANILA for a conference requested by you. I consider it preferable that your conferences with the Army commanders now assigned to the Pacific Ocean Areas and my conferences with the naval commanders now assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area be deferred until you and I have conferred as proposed in my 090228 and have discussed the procedures for transfer of command pursuant to Joint Chiefs of Staff O32140 (NAV 62773) and the schedule contemplated by Cominsh 062216.
17 0040 CINCPAC ADV TO C 14TH FIEC CONC MPTII COOSELT CINC OPT NBR.

MITAFO TO KING INFO HALSEY ENHANCE TO LE. The primary purpose of the MITAFO operation is to get more airfield capacity as soon as possible. I am making full preparations to conduct it with target date 16 June. Meanwhile thorough ground reconnaissance of OKINAWA and TAIWAN is being conducted to determine airfield potentialities of these islands. After all data is available as to airfield sites construction forces and combat air forces firm decision can be made between capture of MITAFO and concentration of those islands. All data is available as to airfield sites construction forces and combat air forces firm decision can be made between capture of MITAFO and concentration of those islands. All data is available as to airfield sites construction forces and combat air forces firm decision can be made between capture of MITAFO and concentration of those islands. All data is available as to airfield sites construction forces and combat air forces firm decision can be made between capture of MITAFO and concentration of those islands. All data is available as to airfield sites construction forces and combat air forces firm decision can be made between capture of MITAFO and concentration of those islands.

18 0030 ADMIRAL HALSEY TO Fleet ADM KING INFO FLEET ADM NBR.

Your 162023. (A) I favor reduction of the organizations of the Navy and War Departments streamlined internally as necessary to procure and administer the material and personnel needs peculiar to each service. (B) I recommend a superposed commander of the armed forces of the United States in whom is vested operational control of all armed forces and whose office includes coordinating agencies to effect all possible economies in matters common to services. In view of the fact that Americans have a deeprooted conviction that an enemy must set foot on our shores it must be accepted that the American consent of war involves overseas invasion, therefore the supreme commander of the armed forces should be a naval officer in order to ensure proper conduct of overseas movement leading to deployment of troops in enemy territory. (C) I favor a civilian secretary of the armed forces with under secretaries for Navy, Army and (if necessary) Air Force. (D) I oppose strongly a separate subdepartment having cognizance over all aviation or seek equality with Army and Navy (each with own aviation component) on the cabinet level. (E) I recommend immediate selection and training of appropriate officers to exercise command and staff functions in composite forces comprising all arms. (F) I recommend retention of a Marine Corps within the framework of the Navy. American insatiable appetite to large standing armies and to impartiality will combine to prevent overseas use of Army troops in time of peace whereas Marines may be legally and employed with apparent sanction of public opinion. During peace ambitions skills will also be best maintained by a Marine Corps integrated with the Navy. Para. See my serial 344 of 10 Dec to Admiral Richardson for discussion and supporting arguments of police being成绩ed to both sides. Concept outlined in referenced paper prevents improper domination of the nation's strong peacetime Navy by an Army and Army Air Force which will surely be skeletonized or greatly reduced after hostilities end.
ND T.O. KIN. Your 171512. Intent of subparagraph 7 of 160250 is to pave the way for installing a flag officer of the Navy as LOCM S1AP3 and a captain as LOCM NAVAL RES if such service becomes necessary. On the 1st project it would be necessary to replace a colored Infantry Regiment by a Marine NP and a Marine Guard Battalion. These could not be limited service personnel and Vandergrift says he can do it. Some shifting of AA Battalions would be involved also. It is not yet timely to move in this matter but I have it in mind if the Army insists on using Japanese as MacArthur's administrative representative in this region. Will keep you fully advised and will comply with intent your 171512.

181832 GINCOA ADV TO CINCPAC. CINCPAC TEL. COMPLIES 100.


181951 GRL & CSO TO GINCOA ADV.

ND T.O. KIN. Have sent a memorandum to Marshall requesting his views on air command set-up and status of CINCH your 142212. Will advise you further on receiving his reply. Para 2. As a solution for this very complicated problem I have in mind the following on which I desire your comment: (A) During progress of ICEBERG operations, which will continue for some time, all shore based air in your forward area, except 20th AF, to continue under your command as at present. Between completion of ICEBERG and much other encroachment operations may be directed by JCS and the beginning of amphibious phase of invasion (If undertaken) have 2 shore based air command in the Pacific: (1) The Strategic Air Force under Kenney composed of 20th AF units and additional Air units assigned solely to the objective of bombing JAPAN this force to be under MacArthur. (2) A Tactical Air Force under Dilles composed of all shore based Army (except Strategic Air Force) Marine and Navy air units in GM forward area this force to be under you. (B) With the undertaking of amphibious phase of invasion both Strategic and Tactical Air Commands to be under CINCPAC. (C) With the initiation of the land campaign phase of invasion command of Strategic Air and essential elements of Tactical Air to pass to MacArthur.

190710 SR. USMC. REP TO GINCOA ADV.

CINC EAST INDIES reports as of 14 April that he considers U-boats potential broken on EAST INDIES station.
19 0314  CONFIDENTIAL  CINCPAC ADV.

AFTER TO JIMMY. Referring CINCPAC and FOA top secret serial 000624 of 31 March 1943, Priority of Staff Study of and plans for North Pacific operations has been reduced from 1 to 4 in view of your despatch 160456 April concerning target dates. Para. Separate operations of "Eastern Forces" during LONGRUM may not be advisable but if undertaken can best be determined by the current estimates of enemy strength, disposition, reactions, and the availability of targets. No long range study of these operations appear profitable and any long range plan would only be crystal gazing. Therefore GenOrdFlt will unless otherwise directed defer further study and planning for these operations until a later date when and if execution of LONGRUM is ordered. Para. Preliminary drafts of other Staff Studies now completed and will be forwarded with additional comments and recommendations for future operations not later than 27 April. Para. Though SHANTUNG operation appears to be quite hazardous to shipping estimated benefits from air operations against Japanese industrial installations in southern MANCHURIA and in KOREA may justify certain calculated risks. Destruction of Japanese plants and installations in these areas will to a large extent reduce their efforts to continue the war on the continent. I will continue to work on SHANTUNG plans (priority 2) until and unless operations called off and will assume target date of 30 Nov. Para. KOREA STRAIT operation involving occupation of TENSHA KOULUN SHIDONG KAMCHO is feasible and recommended with target date of 1st Phase, seizure of TENSHA 15 June, modifying or cancelling other plans as necessary. Initiation of these seizure of FYUKU SHIDONG KAMCHO 1 month later unless: initiation of operations in southern KYUSHU take priority for strategic reasons, I will proceed with work on KOREA STRAIT plans priority 1. Para. I am studying problem of early direct assault on KYUSHU following TANGSHA seizure as best answer to overall strategic program and will comment on completion of study. Para. The planning implications for this command involved in your 160254 to Cominch are being studied although positive information is lacking as to meaning of "CLINFIC" and as to its target date.

19 0507  CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

AFTER TO KIN. I have no notes on my conversation with the Richardson Board but assume that their report records my views of which the gist is as follows: (A) Unified command is essential to the efficient conduct of war. (B) The FOA excluding continental land masses such as JAPAN and the PHILIPPINES should be held and controlled for the U.S. under unified command now and in the foreseeable future, since the responsibilities are primarily naval and air the commander should be particularly well qualified in those aspects of war. (C) Other vital outlying strategic areas should likewise be controlled and held for the U.S. under unified command. The experience of this war and the development of new weapons and methods of attack make it necessary that there be increased preparations and increased vigilance in outlying areas in the post war years. (D) For planning and preparation and for coordination of defense of defense and for the conduct of war when war occurs there should be established in Washington a single commander of the Armed Forces of the U.S. He should be responsible only to the President and should have an adequate staff composed of officers from all services who have been relieved of all responsibility in or to their respective services. (E) All officers comprising unified command should have joint staffs. (F) The professional heads of the individual services should have the right to appeal to the President concerning the decisions of the Commander of the Armed Forces and to advise the
LETTER TO KING (CONT'D)

Letter who should, however, be free to make his own decisions without delay and without any more debate and argument than he chooses to bear. (D) The administrative organisation of the departments which administer and support the fighting services is less important than the unified command outlined above. I strongly recommend against the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments because the problems of the two services are different, because consolidation would increase civil control of military preparedness and because decentralisation of administration is less wasteful and more efficient. Separate and even competitive experimentation and development are desirable. Moreover the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments would produce a single department of such large size as to place under one civilian secretary too large a proportion of the administration of our government and would inevitably give his office political power and importance incompatible with our form of government. (E) Naval aviation and the Marine Corps must continue as essential components of the naval service. Likewise the Army should continue to have its own air component. The foregoing views are based on the experience of over 5 years of war in the Pacific during which successes have been achieved, often with extremely slender means, which could not have been achieved without unity of command as well as unity of purpose. They are expressed in general by Halvorsen and Sherman and are I believe representative of those held by many of the senior officers who have been responsible for combat operations in the Pacific. We have developed a single fighting team which should not be disrupted now or in the future.

CONTENTS A GRC TO GINSPEC ADV HS

HINTS FROM KING. In reply to Genspec 170601, Battle policy is to announce loss of each ship by name as soon as security permits provided most of I.C. have been notified. Exceptions may be made in case of major actions or special circumstances when preliminary announcement should be made in general terms such as "moderate loss" or a specific number of major ships or light craft. Avoid mention of specific categories where names of ships are not given. With reference to last sentence your despatch I desire that you announce the sinkings by name.

GINSPEC ADV TO CONTROL.

Para 4, my comments on para 2 your 112951 are as follows: (A) Experience throughout the war has shown that it is necessary to control the Fleet Air Wings (search, patrol and rescue) to fleet and to army area commanders. Fleet Air Wing units in MARSHALLS are now under Naval, those in关岛 are under Spruance. Those in MARIANS are under Spruance but will report to Halsey. The Army in the Pacific has not asked for any control over our Fleet Air Wings and naval control of search is necessary. Accordingly it would be most unfortunate if Fleet Air Wings were brought into the problem of control over shore based and attached air groups. Should any control over Marine medium squadrons be given to Fleet Air Wings? I believe it would be far better for these squadrons to be under the control of the I.A.S. as already established. However, the Army air forces which are engaged in operations in the PAC until control is exercised by the I.A.S. at that time or during control by the I.A.S. when it is not engaged in combat, can be made with General, Marine, and I.A.S. control. As soon as possible the control over Army air forces in the R.A.S. (These squadrons under control of the

- continued -
him) and would during appropriate phases be responsible to MacArthur for
softening up land objectives or to me for supporting my naval amphibious
operations. Kenney and his headquarters are better prepared for this as-
signment and the bulk of the forces will be those he now has. (c) All
B-29's and Army fighters in the MARIANAS ETO Axis are now engaged primarily
in attack on JAPAN. In my opinion it would be better for Giles to command
the Army Air Forces based in the MARIANAS and B-29's at appropriate time
the B-29's in the KURUS. I am prepared to relinquish operational control
of the fighter groups (Army) at ETO headquarters if he is given command of the
B-29's which they escort. (D) In my opinion the detailed remote control
of the 20th AF from Washington is extremely undesirable. The force should
be under CinC Pac but in any case its local commander should have greater
freedom of action. I hope that Giles will have it. In this connection
see ComGenAFFPOA 180720 and my 132234. I have since learned that Halsey
orders were from Norstadt by telecon rather than from a source having
authority over both 7th and 20th AF's, Para 2. My views on unity of command
do not need repetition. I recommend that there be obtained for me as much
control as possible over the air forces in the FOM without which the naval
and amphibious forces cannot be fully effective.
MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR DRA G-00611

Top Secret. War 670901. Para. Within the next few days it may be necessary for me to discuss with the other Chiefs of Staff, the question of our basic strategy in the western Pacific. There is an honest difference of opinion on this problem. Para 1, school of thought is that much more preparation is necessary than is possible with target dates of 1 December and 1 March for the main operations. Hence a campaign of air-sea blockade and bombardment should be adopted which involves a CHUBAN operation, and perhaps others such as a lodgment on SHANTUNG or KOREA or the islands in the Tsushima Strait area. The points made for this scheme include the high casualties incident to landings on JAPAN proper, the necessity for further beating down JAP air power, the cutting off of JAP reinforcements moving from the mainland of ASIA and the possibility of bringing about surrender without a major landing on JAPAN proper. There is a point about the Japanese reaction to a landing on the sacred soil of JAPAN. Also there is the question of our ability to get sufficient forces against JAPAN proper soon enough so that our present pressure will be maintained without let-up. Para. The other school of thought believes in driving straight into JAPAN proper as soon as the forces can be mounted from the PHILIPPINES and land-based air established in the RYUKUS. This school of thought considers that JAP air and sea power will be weakened sufficiently by the end of this year to permit invasion. Para. Our Naval operations, plus air operation from the RYUKUS, plus the limited capabilities of JAP shipping and inland transport, will prevent material reinforcement of JAPAN. RUSSIA's entry into the war would be a prerequisite to a landing in the Japanese homeland in December. The B-29's and carrier strikes will have devastated large areas (A group missing) and the JAP homeland. Para. As to landings operations involving high casualties and experience in the PHILIPPINES and even in CHINA shows that wherever the US has been able to employ all the supporting arms and services on a battlefield, suitable for maneuver either on land or amphibiously, the JAP has been defeated with acceptable losses. On the other hand, a series of island and limited objective operations results in high losses per unit engaged, may result in commitment of large numbers of troops, and does not assure the early termination of the war. Furthermore, there is always the chance of being locked into the commitment of large forces in a non-decisive operation, such as on the coast of CHINA. As to weather, any month is suitable, although weather months are less desirable for sea operations and more desirable for air and ground operations. Para. In summary, let us discuss the various schools of thought and have a series of discussions on the 1st paragraph of the overall objective in Appendix B of COS 778/3 and questions the need for invading JAPAN, whereas the other school of thought concludes that by the end of the year the 1st part of the overall objective will be adequately accomplished and an immediate invasion is the quickest and easiest way to ensure the end of the war. Para. Will you let me have your thoughts on this problem for use within the next few days in possible discussions.
Top Secret.  C 14442.  1. Analysis of strategy in western Pacific indicates that there are three general courses of action open to us:

   Course 1. Encircle JAPAN by further expansion to the westward, destroying masses of air forces preparing attacks on KYUSHU and HONSHU in succession or directly against HONSHU. Course 2. Encircle JAPAN by further expansion to the westward with a view to its complete isolation and endeavor to bomb JAPAN into submission without effecting landings in homelands. Course 3. Attack KYUSHU and install air forces to cover a decisive assault on HONSHU. 2. Course 1 would provide greater air power for final assault and would attain a high degree of neutralization prior to attack; would isolate the Japanese islands from access to outside reinforcement or resources; might permit the bypassing of KYUSHU and a direct attack on HONSHU. It would deploy our resources off the main axis of advance; would not increase short range air coverage of vital areas of the Japanese islands; would require a large part of the available resources in the Pacific; would prevent an attack on the main Japanese islands until after redeployment from EUROPE; would commit the United States to heavy involvement on the mainland of CHINA; unless KYUSHU can be bypassed, might require a postponement of the HONSHU operation until 1947; involves a definite loss of time by inserting comprehensive operations prior to delivery of the main attack; would result in great loss of life. 3. Course 2 if successful would be the minimum cost of life but would prolong the war indefinitely; would fail to utilize our resources for amphibious offensive movements; assumes success of air power alone to conquer a people in spite of its demonstrated failure in EUROPE, where OVERLORD was subjected to more intensive bombardment than can be brought to bear against JAPAN, and where all the available resources in ground troops of the UNITED STATES, the United Kingdom and RUSSIA had to be committed in order to force a decision. 4. Course 3 would attain neutralization by establishing air power at the closest practicable distance from the final objective in the Japanese Islands; would permit application of full power of our combined resources, ground, naval and air, on the decisive objective; would place our forces in the most favorable location for the final assault; would deliver an attack against an area which probably will be more lightly defended this year than next; would continue the offensive methods which have proven so successful in Pacific campaigns; would place maximum pressure on our combined forces upon the enemy, which might well force his surrender earlier anticipated, and would place us in the most favorable position for delivery of the decisive assault early in 1946. Our attack would have to be launched with a lesser degree of neutralization and with a shorter period of time for preparation. 2. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the possible courses of action clearly indicates that course 3 is the preferable plan. It should be
adopted unless: A. It is considered that we have insufficient air power to support the operation, or B. The resources in the Pacific are insufficient or cannot be gathered in time for its launching this year and therefore another course of action should be pursued in the interim in order to maintain unrelenting pressure upon the enemy, accepting the delay incident to the conduct of such operations concurrently with concentration for the main attack. 6. I am of the opinion that the ground, naval, air, and logistic resources in the Pacific are adequate to carry out course 3. The Japanese fleet has been reduced to a line of action which involves uncoordinated, suicidal attacks against our forces, employing all types of planes, including trainers. IG HU (1 G HO CUT) ON is heavy and its power for sustained action is diminishing rapidly. These conditions will be accentuated after the establishment of our air forces in the KYUKUS. With the increase in the tempo of VR attacks the enemy's ability to provide replacement planes will diminish, and the Japanese potentiality will decline at an increasing rate. It is believed that the development of air bases in the KYUKUS will, in conjunction with carrier based planes, give us sufficient air power to support landing on KYUSHU and that the establishment of our air forces there will ensure complete air supremacy over HONSHU. Logistics consideration present the most difficult problem. Provision of necessary service troops to activate and operate bases and at the same time to provide a service garrison for KYUSHU requires prompt supply of transportation for concentration and a ruthless combing out of rear areas. With the exception of the vigorous pooling of Army and Navy resources throughout the Pacific the necessary service troops can be found to perform the minimum required functions by the exception of hospital beds. It is estimated that some 36,000 additional beds not now available in the Pacific will be required; not all of them, however, prior to D Day. Vigorous displacement of land based air into the KYUKUS will be necessary and potential airfield sites are believed to be available. Concentration of engineer effort with the corresponding reduction of projects in rear areas will be essential. By pooling resources of Army and Navy it is believed that engineer effort can be obtained. 7. From the standpoint of weather it appears that November would be the best month to initiate the operation. 8. Initial studies have been based on an attack to be launched on 1st December, but it is believed that this date might be moved forward to 1st November, providing: 1. That every non-essential be eliminated. 2. That this headquarters exercise a high degree of control over Army resources in the Pacific. 3. That the Navy assist materially in moving forward service troops, equipment and supplies from NEW GUINEA and SoPat bases. 4. That the War Department allocate additional shipping immediately to assist in the movement forward of supplies, and provide sufficient shipping for direct resupply to KYUSHU. 9. If this campaign is to be initiated during 1945 and particularly if we are to take advantage of the most favorable weather in November, it is essential that the decision be made promptly in order that logistic plans may be perfected and procurement initiated in the United States.
21 2240  COMPTCH & CHN to CINCOPAC AND HQ.

Top Secret. With reference to my 112045 CINCOPAC C-1445 of 20 April and War Dept. War 67098 of 12 April have been passed to you. Desire your comments and recommendations on matter as presented in General Marshall's message in light of General MacArthur's comment as soon as you can give a considered opinion. Take your reply info to MacArthur.

22 0129  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR info HQMTY

Top Secret. WAR 71546 Limits only. Para 1. Base development in the PHILIPPINE should proceed under the following assumptions and concept which are revisions of those contained in Sections II and III inclusive of base development plan submitted to the War Department by CinCPAC. A copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff study explaining these revisions is being forwarded to CinCPAC and CinCPAC.

Para II. Assumptions: Para 2. Own Troops.

Para A. That it is necessary to give consideration to the probable expansion of base facilities to provide logistic support for the large scale deployment of forces prior to and during the initiation of large scale operations against JAPAN.

Para B. That the bulk of United States Army forces in the Pacific will be concentrated in the PHILIPPINES.

Para C. That the RYUKYU and BONIN ISLANDS will be occupied or neutralized by friendly forces.

Para D. That minimum garrison forces will hold the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA Area; and that except in WAPUS no United States Forces will be used in this area.

Para E. Such operations as are conducted in BORNEO and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES will employ Australian troops, utilizing bases in NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIA.

Para F. That United States Forces will seize, occupy and consolidate the PHILIPPINES.

Para G. That the staging and garrisoning of United States Forces in the Pacific will follow generally a pattern similar to that indicated in the study being forwarded (Appendix "B" of JOS 1836/1).

Para H. That forces conducting operations in the NIPALAN SEA islands will be based on LATER.

Para I. That any BORNEO-NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES operations will be logistically supported as far as practicable from bases other than the PHILIPPINES.

3214
Para J. That the bulk of the United States Air Forces allocated to SWPA will be deployed initially in North Luzon and the Central Luzon Plains.

Para K. That 4 United States Very Heavy Bomber (VHB) Air Groups of the 20th Air Force will be deployed in the Central Luzon Plains area by the end of November 1945, building up to 12 in February 1946.

Para L. That upon the cessation of hostilities in JAPAN some aircraft and combat crews and some ground echelons of redeployed air groups will be staged in the PHILIPPINES.

Para M. That Naval installations for the support of the 7th Fleet, and 1-3rd of the rest of the Pacific Fleet is the initial target for Naval developments in the PHILIPPINES.

Para N. That facilities for the simultaneous mounting of 11 assault divisions of 20-2000 mounting strength by February 1946 will be the maximum demand for future large scale operations.

Para O. That only the minimum civilian utilities and industries essential to the immediate prosecution of the war will be rehabilitated by the military forces.

Para P. That components of the Armed Forces of the PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH will be garrisoned and trained in antisubmarine facilities not initially used by United States Forces, facilities constructed for the United States Forces and subsequently vacated, or constructed in priorities junior to the essential needs of the United States Forces.

Para Q. That the United States bases in the South Pacific Area, AUSTRALIA, SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA, except MAMUS, will be liquidated as soon as the hostile situation, service effort, and shipping means will permit.

Para R. That to provide for necessary possible expansion, facilities will be planned to permit expansion without interference in operations of the initial installations.

Para S. That PHILIPPINE imports will be the minimum required to prevent NUTRITIONAL DEPRIVATION, and those required to exploit fully local resources which will effectively contribute to the war effort. Any additional imports will be in a priority below requirements for the prosecution of the war against JAPAN.

Para T. That the maximum direct shipments from the UNITED STATES to the objective areas of combat operations will be employed in support of operations.
PFA 3. Concepts: Para 1. The concept envisages establishment in the
PHILIPPINES TO:

PFA 4. Shoreside bases and provisions a total of 200 (207) L.O. and
O.0. aircraft plus accompanying bombs and replacements by December 1944. Included oper-ational plans must progress before a final determination can be made of the exact requirement.

PFA 5. Provide facilities for the reception and operation of 240 B-24s
and groups of approximately 140-180. This is estimated to be the group of the 20th AF (strength 70,000).

PFA 6. Provide facilities for the reception and operation of 240 B-24s
and groups of approximately 140-180. This is estimated to be the group of the 20th AF (strength 70,000).

PFA 7. Provide port facilities, transport, and storage capacity with fixed harbor installations and lighters to handle required tonnages.

PFA 8. Provision naval base facilities for the support of the 7th Fleet
and 3,200 of the ships of the Pacific Fleet.

Para 2. The planning basis and forth above is subject to changes which
may be indicated by development of detailed plans for future operations.

SUBJECT: GENERAL PLAN IN SPAIN, THE GENERAL AMERICAN FORCES IN SPAIN.

HEAVY GUN BATTERIES, ARTILLERY, AND FIELD ARMIES.

Para 1. By whom on the subject covered by the G-5 report of 25 April 1944 and
containing 1 field of 20 April 1944, as well as on the subject.

Para 2. Table I is in agreement with the sources of 25 April 1944 and the
product data on the subject. The accuracy of the sources shown are not on the accuracy of

Para 3. Database of the area. This has been thoroughly accomplished by the
examination of the strategic part of the Spanish frontier.

(8) Control of the area. This has been thoroughly accomplished by the
examination of the strategic part of the Spanish frontier.
(3) Combat troops. These troops are primarily on land warfare. In amphibious warfare, Corps of 3 Marine Divisions can be used.

(4) Airpower. This is the most critical weapon. We should not assume that availability of JATO aircraft, adequate reserves of personnel and equipment is the primary strength of the Army. Army equipment must be available for replacement and reserve must be maintained in sufficient numbers. The shipping and transportation available in the Pacific must be increased rapidly. Control should be vested in an agency in the Pacific.

(5) Logistic organisation. Requirements for ammunition and fuel still constitutes major problems. Existing stocks should be used. All means of enabling all possible use of ammunition and equipment and procedures. "Swallow" organisations will assume that which cannot be spared.

(6) Supplies. I assume that the War Department will furnish all the naval supplies needed including winter clothing for soldiers and marines.

(7) Weather. The risk of typhoons has been greatly increased to other extent, particularly in the China Sea. The weather must be kept under control to avoid delays and stoppages due to weather conditions, which is another factor to be considered in planning troop movements. Weather must be the last thing to be considered.

(8) Environmental conditions. As least 3 positions should be taken between China and Japan, with rest (perhaps 2 of 3) in the rear, within the area of Japan by the fleet and shore based air forces and the air and sea blockade should be intensified through these areas.

Para 4. Immediate consideration of developments in the Japanese campaign and the additional help the air forces can make available together with estimated air cover needed to support them. If possible it must be arranged that all the forward and air bases are captured to replace the bases now used by the Flerows which have been destroyed in the developoment of ground and air superiority, and a progressive reduction in the number. This should be made available to Allied forces as needed.

Para 5. I have designated the principal naval commanders for the naval operations in the Pacific area. These commanders have been selected in consultation with the United States and have been directed as to their duties and responsibilities. The commanders are responsible for the protection of the fleet and for the conduct of the war at sea as set forth in their plans.
PAGE 6. In my opinion the feasibility of GOFEDU in 1956 depends on the prompt provision of adequate aircraft and adequate air supplies and equipment. The fleet including the Fleet Marine Forces can be ready.

PAGE 7. If GOFEDU cannot be done this year I recommend operation of the fleet as currently scheduled by operation of one carrier and one battle group without any material reduction in the number of aircraft or personnel. The fleet should be ready and prepared for a major engagement should it come about to the extent of any emergency or situation of sufficient importance to warrant the difference between readiness today and postwar.

PAGE 8. Moreover our best efforts have not yet shown the Japanese Navy on the defensive. In my opinion the situation is such that in order to achieve a satisfactory position in 1956, first and foremost, we must be able to determine with a high degree of accuracy the type of naval forces they will need in the defense of Japan where the enemy line of communication will be short and our carriers more adequate. Moreover I am confident of the ability of our carriers and marines eventually to defeat the Japanese Navy eventually.

PAGE 9. I am concerned over the restriction of aircraft of Kure and its forces into the central area in the JAPAN and in the eastern area of JAPAN. I feel that there should be better plans in which British carrier aircraft can take part in a coordinated anti-attack air operation near JAPAN. The F-20's are designed to meet these problems of this difficulty. These forces, primarily through those in the central area and in the eastern area, can operate against the Japanese carrier forces which are not effective in the central area and are concentrated in the eastern area.

PAGE 10. I am confident of the enemy's use of Kure and JAPAN as the central area for the central operations of JAPAN. The F-20's are designed to meet these problems of this difficulty. These forces, primarily through those in the central area and in the eastern area, can operate against the Japanese carrier forces which are not effective in the central area and are concentrated in the eastern area.
URING DIRECTED AIR OPERATIONS ALONG THE COAST OF CHINA AND FORMOSA INTO CHINA. I am studying possibilities for making airborne aircraft available to China. I have no reason to believe that we cannot reassert the same for the purpose of the attack on Formosa. I am studying the possibility of an amphibious attack on Formosa using Chinese resources. I am studying the possibility of conducting a military operation against Formosa. The Japanese have a number of airfields in Formosa that could be used for such an operation. I am studying the possibility of conducting a military operation against Formosa using Chinese resources. I am studying the possibility of conducting a military operation against Formosa using Chinese resources. I am studying the possibility of conducting a military operation against Formosa using Chinese resources. I am studying the possibility of conducting a military operation against Formosa using Chinese resources. I am studying the possibility of conducting a military operation against Formosa using Chinese resources.
01 ZMAG ORDER TO CINCINNATI AREA TO MAKE NO ZILO COMMUNICATIONS.

Joint Chiefs of Staff desire your views at an early date on the most desirable and practical course of action to assure a northern line of communications by sea to western Kuriles. Desired particularly is comment on practicability of maintaining a convoy route without occupying positions in KAMCHATKA or the KURILES.

Para 2. As there may be a possible requirement for an operation in KAMCHATKA or the KURILES to open and maintain a sea route to western Kuriles in 1945, it is desirable that plans be completed at an early date.

Para 3. The foregoing does not take into account the possibilities of a southern route via TURSUKA STRAITS and the Sea of Japan which will be treated as a separate subject.

02 1708 ORDER TO CONTINUE.

If not already in your hands request you obtain copy of Undersea's OORDS to Marshall for JCS. Also send 00110 to Rebon to Marshall.

04 1922 ORDER TO CINCINNATI AREA.

"Without occupying positions in KAMCHATKA" your 032017 does not bar use of PETROPAVLOVSK as an advanced anchorage.

05 0013 ORDER TO CINCINNATI AREA

Refer your 032117. Believes northern lines of communications by sea to western Kuriles can be maintained with fair degree of security without occupying positions in Kuriles or Kamchatka. Such lines can only be maintained from late June thru November. Assuming Soviets provide port facilities for unloading and make expeditions turn around it is considered the following U S forces will be required to protect convoys:

A. A minimum of 5 CVEs with destroyers for escort.
B. Destroyers in sufficient number to escort convoys. Number CVEs will depend on size and frequency convoy mileage. CVEs not recommended in view of menace.
C. Additional logistic shipping and base facilities such as repair ship and replacement squadrons with CATU must be supplied for forces assigned.
D. Increase TF 90 by 1 group heavy bombers in order to neutralize Kuriles bases. Para.

In view of my lack of information on various important factors bearing on this plan I recommend an officer on staff proceed MARE for conference.
05 1249 CINCPAC ADV TO CONTINUE;

WHITE TO ZEMKE ONLY. Your 041129 in response to my 041024 reveals an unacceptably arbitrary and inadequate compliance by 150229 161225 and 170557. It may indicate an inadequate appreciation by Cushman 10 of the necessity for using construction troops in a manner which will not quickly release for offensive employment the carriers and also the 20th Air Force. If this is the case take corrective action.

05 1250 CINCPAC ADV TO CONTINUE,

FOR PLAN AND NAVAL DATA ONLY. Your 040204. Concur with your proposal. In addition I shall control shore-based Navy or Marine fighter group to provide local fighter cover and to cover carriers. Present plan is to arrive GUAM 1000 Tuesday 8 May convert WASHINGTON. Depart GUAM early Wednesday.

04 0249 CINCPAC ADV TO CONTINUE.

WHITE TO ZEMKE. Connection your conversation as to your part as OLYMPIC and CONVERSE desire your views on proposal that you assume control forces based in JAPAN and naval shore activities landed there. This would in effect combine your present relations with CINCPAC but I would expect you to exercise operational control over naval search and patrol planes based in JAPAN the alternative being to retain them under 3rd or 9th Fleet. In this connection I intend to secure the transfer of control of AIRFIX to you or to Kimmitt if all possible during discussions of giving Army operational control of Army Air Forces in ALASKA. I envisage your status in JAPAN in connection with transports, escort, etc, as being similar to that of H. L. Wilson at Brest in 1918. I would expect Kimmitt to continue in present capacity but with increased scope when you move forward. This has not been discussed with Cushman. Will discuss with you whenever you come to GUAM next but desire your views by dispatch.

03 2012 TOO TO HAMMER-JENSEN-SULTAN-KURTZ.

"Number WZ 76206 (0222117). Stenches as atrocities may be released in theaters in accordance with following policy.

1. Theater may clear severity stories submitted for censorship within existing security requirements.

2. Theater Censors may make such official releases on atrocities as they deem desirable.

3. In those cases where it is intended to request that an official protest be made by the U. S. Government protest must be made prior to an official release concerning the atrocity."

03 0127 CINCPAC ADV TO CONTINUE

WHITE TO ZEMKE. To facilitate progress on additional DELILAH Plan under directive your 032140 request decision as to whether "without occupying positions in KAMCHATKA" have use of PETROPAVLOVSK as an advanced anchorage. KEBELLOKES III practically completed with general concept of occupation of KAMCHATKA and escorting through KURILES.
04 1308 MAGAZINE TO CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFO COMP 20. CINCPAC ADV.

OX 1547%. Reference sub-para 2K of Assumptions, WX 7146, 22nd, in which the basic assumption is "That 4 U.S. very heavy bomber (VHB) Air Groups of the 20th AF will be deployed in the Central Luzon Plains Area by the end of November 1945, building up to 12 in February 1946". Present information available indicates that this plan has not been definitely approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Futility of engineer effort available for the accomplishment of existing missions in the PHILIPPINES makes it highly desirable that available resources be not diverted to preparation of facilities for VHB units until the requirement is definite. Further information relative to the probability of the deployment of 4 Groups by November and 12 Groups by February will be helpful in the rearrangement of the program of use of our engineer resources.

05 0549 MAGAZINE TO ADMIRAL.

Personal for Admiral, Report from General MacArthur. C 15506. In view of your old intimacy with the PHILIPPINES it would probably be of great interest to you to see at first hand their present situation.

It is needless for me to tell you how warm would be your welcome from all ranks here if your operational duties ever permit you to get away.

06 0822 CINCOPAC ADV TO COMINT.

HITORY TO ADMIRAL. CINCPAC has made inquiry as to the possible availability of 2nd airship at MANUS for 2nd HOBFB in connection with expansion of his force to 2 carrier task groups. Before asking COMSFWPA for a 2nd span which would have to be one released by the Army I would like to have your estimate as to future employment of British Fleet forces. If they are to be used to Southwest of BRUNKE BAY the 2nd HOBFB would be better placed at BRUNKE BAY.

06 1125 CONTINUE TO CINCPAC ADV.

SCHUTTLE TO ADMIRAL. Your 051047. Investigation averted yesterday does
*Continued*
06 1125 CONSUMPT TO CINCPAC ADV. (CONT'D)

base development plans should have a forward to the effect that they are a guide made under conditions of inadequate and inaccurate knowledge of terrain and of no knowledge as to how the tactical situation will develop during capture. That they should be modified as necessary best to meet requirements of tactical situation and to attain results indicated in the plans.

06 1142 CONSUMPT TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

SPRUNCE TO NITITZ.

Spent yesterday ashore seeing Buckner Hodge DelValle Bruce Ready Arnold Bullocky Wallace. Your 030219. Buckner and Hodge were much to make any prediction as to when end of organised resistance would come but when pressed said they hoped for it toward end of May. Both DelValle and Bruce emphasized very tough character of fighting in which their divisions are now engaged. I do not believe accurate prediction possible at present. Until end of organised resistance attainment of amphibious phase with its gunfire and air support appears essential. Even after all troop air support can come from local fields protection from Jap air attacks given our ships by CAP must remain function of Amphibious Commander. Believe only end of organised resistance will cause enemy to cease his large scale air attacks including suicide planes which are major threat to our ships. At that time with elimination of gunfire support ships from area and with establishment of outlying radar and fighter director units Area Commander should be able to assume full responsibility under you for defence and development. See Turner's 050525 for arrangements in hand to turn over to Buckner's subordinates certain functions now exercised by Amphibious Force. Our troops ashore have much hard fighting ahead. I feel that our fleet must continue with its support until the job is done.

06 0906 CONSUMPT TO CINCPAC ADV. (SPRUNCE TO NITITZ)

Your 042015. Recommend Buckner be not designated for LONOTOM. Consider ICEBERG is too important and will last too long to warrant his learing here in time to plan LONOTOM. As Troop Commander for latter suggest first Geiger, second Harry Schmidt. This on assumption Holland Smith not available. Have just discussed command for LONOTOM with Wilkening whose ideas coincide with mine. Early designation of Area, Naval Base and other subordinate commanders very desirable. For LONOTOM our Troop Commander must be man who will move rapidly to seize area on mainland within perimeter selected before enemy has time to build up strength against us.

07 05 NITITZ TO MAGNANTZ.

The generous invitation of your G 19903 is greatly appreciated and I will hope to take advantage of it at some future time, Nora.

By about 15 May I will have a tentative draft of my plan for the naval and amphibious phases of CINCPAC and wish to confer with you about it since it must interlock with your plans. I would be delighted to have you visit GIN at that time with such members of your staff as you desire if you are unable to come I can arrange to come to MANILA for that purpose.
08 1119  TWO CPA TO CINCPAC ADY (PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ).

0-15777. Thanks for your cordial invitation. In the absence of President
Camma and due to civil affairs demands am unable to leave here at present.
Would be delighted if you and staff could come here. Will send you by
courier officer toward the end of the week a copy of our plan for employ-
ment of Army forces. Signed MacArthur.

10 0430  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARThUR INFO NIMITZ.

ON WAKX 79823. Para.

Directive to CINCPAC (War 62774 3 April 1945 War 62775 3 April 1945)
to make plans and preparations for campaign in JAPAN is reference. Para.
Following responsibilities have been fixed by Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. CINCPAC ISLANDS ARE JAPAN (including the 4 main islands. About 1,000 offshore islands
and KOMICOTO AND TSUHIMA ISLANDS but excluding the outlying islands
as defined in JCS 1231).

B. Chief of Staff US Army is designated as executive agency for
Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters pertaining to military government
of JAPAN.

C. Procurement and training of personnel for military government
of JAPAN are War Dept responsibilities subject to such administrative
arrangements or operational expediencies as are agreed between the
services or between the services and other agencies of the US Govern-
ment.

D. War Dept is responsible for procurement, shipment and distribution
of supplies necessary to accomplish objectives of the military govern-
ment of JAPAN as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. As basis for planning you will be informed separately in near future
as to current status of JCS plans and preparations for military government
of JAPAN.

08 2347  MARSHALL TO MACARThUR INFO DEFCONAF 20. CINCPAC.

WAKX 79224. Cite your CX 15479, 6 May. Recent incomplete information
from CINCPAC indicates that possible VMB air base sites are more numerous
in ICEBERG Area than originally estimated when assumption 2K was included
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in WAKX 71542. Pending more complete informa-
tion and firm decision of Joint Chiefs of Staff on deployment of remain-
ing scheduled VMB Groups, you are authorised to suspend action on assumption
2K relating to preparations for VMB units in LUXEM and concentrate engineer
effort on other projects of higher priority.
11 0031 MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR, RICHARDSON - RICHARDSON PASSED TO CINCPAC ADV.

WAR 00305. Personal to MacArthur and Richardson from Marshall. Richardson plans move to Midway and send us his omissions.

I wish to send General Stillwell to the Pacific to see if the training of our replacements here and in the redeployment training in EUROPE is what it should be for the particular employment in view, and to check up on the special weapon and technique requirements of Infantry and Artillery in operations against the Japanese. Stillwell commands the army ground forces and as such is in charge of the training of replacements and all combat units, and I wish to send him to EUROPE to bring their training into line. To accomplish this purpose he should spend considerable time with troops actually in combat in the PHILIPPINES and in OKINAWA.

Please let me have your approval. Stillwell would leave here between the 15th and 20th of this month.

11 0745 CINCPAC ADV HC TO CINC BRITISH EAST INDIES FLEET.

Personal for Admiral Sir A. J. Power, Royal Navy from Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

I wish you all success in eliminating the NACHI Class cruiser and destroyer reported as attempting to reach the ANDAMAN ISLANDS on evening of 12 May although I had hoped to have them as targets in this area.

11 0630 WEDDINGTON TO CINCPAC ADV INFO MILORD MACARTHUR, JOHNS ON SPALA, CHEVES (FOR 100)..

1 agent was dispatched last October into FORMOSA. Contacted prisoner of war camps at TAINAN and TO. He has returned. Agent brings back proposals for escape and evasion work. We are sending 2 agents into FORMOSA, 1 to go to KINETO and 1 to TAINAN. We are furnishing ILMAO and a half Chinese money, they will operate junk communications between POCHON, AMOY and TAINAN. These agents claim they are connected with approximately 15,000 active guerrillas and that the group intends to carry out sabotage, intelligence activities and general 5th column work in addition to escape and evasion. We are interested only in escape and evasion. Request your concurrence in our carrying out this work. If you wish to control all activities we will turn over to you the ground work and contacts that we are now establishing. Funds are authorized only for escape and evasion, but feel that once the agents are in FORMOSA we will be unable to prevent these other activities.

11 1610 CONTINCH AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADV. (KING TO NIMITZ)

British Chiefs of Staff have been informed that object of operations against BROMO are primarily to secure a naval base at BRUNX for British Pacific Fleet and secondarily to secure sources of oil. British consider BRUNX undesirable from standpoint of distance from main theater of operations against JAPAN, tardiness of base development and distance from Australian JLN base. Preference was expressed for PHILIPPINE Area base or alternatively the continued use of facilities at MANUS. Para.

British are in process of being informed by JCS that there are no sites available in PHILIPPINES, that MANUS is too far from scene of operations and that they should reconsider BRUNX BAY as a base the cost of which we regard as a desirable operation regardless of its use. Para.

- continued -

3226
Your 060622. The following is a quotation from a draft memo to British:

"The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the main theater of naval operations against JAPAN extends in the Western Pacific from the KURILS to the MALAY BARRIER. Both United States and British naval forces may be employed in any part of this area. There will be naval operations required in the SOUTH CHINA SEA in support of operations in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and the MALAY PENINSULA. It is considered that such operations can best be supported from an advanced base at BRUNSWICK BAY. The establishment of an advanced base at BRUNSWICK BAY is not intended to preclude the employment of the British Pacific Fleet in any part of the theater of operations or to influence necessarily the localities in which it may be employed. The question is rather one of utilizing to the best advantage the base facilities which the British Admiralty is providing for the Pacific." Para.

Do not consider that a 2nd air strip at MANUS should be provided for British Fleet. For your information only assurance in general terms is being given British that airfield constructional resources will be supplied Australian forces to be left in SWPA supported logistically with resources they cannot themselves provide.

12 0220 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC.

FOR JOINT CHEIFS OF STAFF. The offer of JCS 101844 to make additional fighter bomber groups available for use in OKINAWA is greatly appreciated. The 318th Fighter Group (F-47-N) will fly to IE SHIMA 1 squadron a day commencing today. The ground echelons of the 437th and 507th Fighter Groups (both P-47N) can not reach OKINAWA until about 20 May and 10 June respectively. These are the earliest dates which were permitted by their readiness for departure from Mainland. Marine Corsair Groups available in the Pacific Ocean Areas were deployed earlier and have been extremely effective. The effectiveness of fighter bombers in close support of troops has been demonstrated throughout the Central Pacific Campaign and the P-61 in PAU and PA7 have all been so used with a high degree of success. Very intensive use of carrier type aircraft for direct support of troops as well as naval gunfire beyond all precedent has characterized the OKINAWA and preceding Pacific operations. The P-47 was used and proved very effective in the capture of SAIPI, and Tinian.

Para 2. After PA7-N Groups are established in OKINAWA and IE SHIMA it is intended to use them for counter air force action against KYUSHU and to continue the Marine Fighter Groups in local air defense as well as the direct support of troops for which they are outstandingly well qualified.

Para 3. It has been necessary recently to divert all the striking power of the fast task force and also to a limited degree the striking power of the 20th Air Force from offensive operations against strategic targets to operations to cover and support the troops and ships engaged at OKINAWA. However, the 20th Air Force has now been released and the carrier striking forces will likewise be released as soon as possible.

Para 4. The rapid development of OKINAWA for the deployment of an air force of maximum effectiveness will be discussed with CINCPAC within a few days. The pressing need at the present time is for Army construction and service troops to prepare fields and support Army Air Forces.

Para 5. As indicated in Para 4 of my 260235 a decision to execute OLYMPIC this year may make it desirable temporarily to replace some part of the VA2 wings planned for OKINAWA by types better adapted for attack on enemy air forces and air installations and for close support of troops. This will be discussed with CINCPAC.
Para 6. Request information as to dates when additional Army construction troops, service troops and 377th Fighter Groups could be made available for deployment in RYUKYUS to supplement present planned deployment of Army air forces or additionally to replace 11th and 494th heavy bomber groups or to replace any or all of the 1st 3 very heavy bomber groups.

14 0256 CINCPOA ADV TO COULCH.

Top Secret. Limits to Spruance only. Info King only. By 090219.
Prior to or coincident with Turner’s relief arrangements your 130406 desire arrangements paragraph 4 my serial 0001147 of 21 Nov, as modified by my 131239 placed in effect. I do not desire to have Buskirk placed under Hill’s command. Support of 10th Army by 5th Fleet will continue.

16 1355 COULCH AND ONE TO CINCPOA ADV II.

KING TO MEHTZ. Issuance of directive for OLYMPIC has been under discussion for some time. My latest proposal to the Army is as follows “Further to War 62773 and 62774 to CINCPOAC and 032140 April and 032141, April to CINCPOAC Pursuant to Paragraph A(6) and B(4) and C of War 62774 and Navy 032141 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the invasion of KYU HA target date 1 November 1945” CINCPOA ADVANCE forward to Admiral Limits if communication arrangements provide.

17 0941 CINCPOA ADV TO COULCH. (MEHTZ TO KING)

During our conference just completed at WASH we there was general agreement as to tactical and strategic concepts and the preliminary draft of my OLYMPIC plan will require no important changes in that regard. The principal point in which MacArthur’s tactical scheme differs from our assumptions is that he plans to land an Army Corps at KUSHTIK to drive east to secure the city of KAGOSHIMA.

Para. The only plan shown was an incomplete overall campaign plan called "DOWNFALL" which he expected to issue to cover one or both services in both OLYMPIC and CORONET and to which I was to contribute only the sections concerning naval matters. Included therein were certain basic ideas of command to which I could not agree including transferring to him complete control of the RYUKYUS and complete control of all "land based air forces" except those engaged in "naval support" this principle apparently to extend throughout the Pacific. Photostat of promulgating letter for DOWNFALL being forwarded to you.

Para. After considerable very frank discussion it was agreed that I will prepare and issue my plans as directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff clearing with him the parts which affect his forces and that he will do likewise. I have left my draft with him and expect his detailed comments by letter. He will send me his draft when it is ready.

Para. The drafting of an overall campaign plan by MacArthur as outlined above would prove tedious in the extreme and be mechanically difficult to keep up to date. It would further carry with it the implication of unity of command being exercised by the Army for the entire campaign for the defeat of JAPAN. A "Joint Plan" to signed by MacArthur and me would be equally difficult to draft and keep up to date and would involve protracted and contentious conferences. For these reasons I will issue my own plan for the naval

- Continued -
and ambitious operations consulting with MacArthur as necessary on matters which affect his operations. Actually the Joint Chiefs of Staff now exercise overall command and their directives now constitute the campaign plan.

Para. I agreed to the establishment of Kenny's Air Force in the OILC as soon as possible under arrangements approximating those existing for the 20th Air Force with CINCPAC controlling all Army air forces except the 5th. I retain area control and responsibility for development and defense. An important point in this regard is that it was clearly indicated that CINCPAC would like to "pool" Engineer troops" and thereby get control of our Seabees to use on Army projects for which adequate Army resources are not being made available. I retain control of naval aviation except for Marine units with the Army.

Para. To conserve naval construction troops for naval projects essential to fleet support I can not too strongly urge early provision of Army engineers needed to expedite Army construction projects in preparation for CINCPAC.

Para. Text of extracts from Memorandum Record of our agreement follows separately.

See Annex 19 1000 (not a)

15 0411 CONTRACT TO CINCPAC ADV. (ANNEX TO NIMITZ)

My 150309 gives airfield status as obtained ashore yesterday and contains certain recommendations. Believe your 130631 should be modified to permit maximum use of Kaduna for fighters until such time as additional fields are ready for half or all VP which we have planned to operate from Kaduna. CINCPAC 140002 being passed to you gives status of bulk areas storage KENCA and LISHIMA. I do not know how fast additional tanks on OKINAWA will come into use but note that completion date is end of May and there has been no improvement in bulk storage situation since 5th when I emphasized to Gen. Wallace necessity for more bulk storage. Whatever the reasons record of 6,100 barrel tanks available for use on OKINAWA 6 weeks after our landing is not impressive.

17 0133 JCS TO WENDERHURST INFO MACARthur, CINCPAC/CINCPAC ADV.

We are appreciative of the situation confronting you in the China Theater as outlined in your CPB 36005. It now appears that preparations which have been directed for major operations planned to take place late this year, together with the demands on redeployment, will absorb all available means and resources, particularly shipping. Unless it is found impracticable to conduct operations against JAPAN sooner this year, it does not now appear that operations to secure a lodgement on the CHINA Coast will be within our capabilities.

Para. Current operations in BORNEO are on much smaller scale than would be required for operations on the CHINA Coast and are employing Australian forces not available for operations to the North.

Para. Such assistance to your campaign by air operations from adjacent theaters and areas as can be arranged directly with appropriate commanders without prejudice to directed operations is favored.

18 0235 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

In connection with my 180005 to MacArthur note that unless the 5th FieldCor is withdrawn from KYUSHU as I have requested we will be unable to conduct even minor ambitious operations without Army troops and consequently divide ...

—Continued—
18 0235 CINCPOAC ADV TO COMCHIN (CONTINUED)
command. I visualise considerable stepping up and several minor amphibious operations on the Asiatic mainland to secure ports and restore sea communications which can best be accomplished by the Fleet using only the Fleet Marine Force. It was indicated at HUALA that the SWPA planners contemplated leaving the 5thMarCorps in KYUSHU but General MacArthur personally requested that I keep a bbe Div in OKINAWA to release Army Divisions for CORINTH. This can be done just as 2nd MarDiv kept SAIYAN secure while preparing for future operations.

21 0119 CINCPOAC ADV TO COMCHIN INFO COMORPAC COMMAND.

UNITED STATES NAVY

Para 1. By KEELING ISLANDS III and KEELING ISLANDS IV are being completed and will be airmailed within a few days. KEELING IV contemplates:
A. Augmenting North Pacific Force by 3 CA 7 CVE 26 DD or DE and appropriate auxiliaries in Army heavy bomber group and 1 or 2 naval heavy landplane search squadrons.
B. Basing escort forces at ADAK where a carrier aircraft pool will also be installed.
C. Passing convos from ADAK north of ALEUTIANS to vicinity of ATTU thence through the KURILES via OKINOTAN, SHASTOTAN or MIKANINO STRAIT. Russians to assume responsibility west of 170th Meridian or north of 57th Parallel in SEA OF OKHOTSK.
D. Naval air search from ALEUTIANS to be extended to cover convoys while under U.S. escort.
E. Fast carrier strikes on HOKKAIDO and southern KURILES as necessary to support Russian operations in SAKHALIN or to cover convoy movements.

Para 2. The operations required in foregoing concept are considered feasible in the strategic situation anticipated to exist and constitute the only method of accomplishing the desired result without unacceptably adverse effects on OLYMPIC or CORINTH.

Para 3. Whenever the situation at OKINAWA permits I plan to withdraw the entire fast carrier force and after a period of replenishment if then practicable send it to attack northern objectives according to 030121.

21 2313 JCS TO NIMITZ, MACARTHUR AND ARNOLD.

WARX 35707, Book message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Arnold for action. Responsibility for mapping, charting, and photography of JAPAN and approaches incident to invasion and campaign therein is considered integral part of planning and preparations directed in messages Navy 032140 (WAR 62773) April and Navy 032142 (WAR 62774) April. Addressees should therefore confer and mutually agree on necessary action, including recommendations as to changes in JCS 756/2 considered appropriate. Message C 15100 dated 29 April from OC, GHQ, SWPA not to CINCPOAC-CINCPOA nor to ComGen 20th Air Force in reference.
TOP SECRET

23 0315
CINCPAC FARE TO CINCPAC ADV. (TOKYO TO NITTYG Ret)

Refers to your 210118 Re SoPac Navy rollup. ConServPac records show 405,000 MT of all types of excess Navy materials and equipment reverted for movement and estimate that this is approximately 50% of total to be reported. Excess components reverted total 181,000 MT. Of the amounts reported 33,000 MT are now moving and instructions issued to move 110,000 additional MT. June and subsequent maintenance tonnage allocation will provide movement for 185,000 MT of CN and N.D. stocks reducing continental requirements in like amount. This does not include QM movements of Navy tonnages. Included in the unreported 50% is 156,000 MT of impediments of 75% organized activities for which readiness dates are as yet undetermined. Destination of these units is dependent on availability dates. Types of equipment shipping heretofore available have not been suitable for lifting large amounts of Navy construction equipment. Approximately 75% of assault shipping now scheduled for SoPac rollup is moving Navy cargo. Present cargo operation commitments for QM already exceed estimated port capabilities by approximately 20% thru August. Records at this headquarters indicate ability to receive cargo at OKINAWA is averaging 10,000 MT per day compared to 30,000 MT per day already on shipping schedules. In addition to availability of suitable type shipping the factors of trans-shipment FRICTION cargoes from merchant ships to LSTs and LSMs, reception of redeployment shipping from the ATLANTIC and build-up of reserve supplies for LONDON and OLYMPIC must be evaluated and priority established. Repeated acceleration of VIU requirements is an imposing demand on shipping and terminal port reception capacities. ConServPac records of SoPac rollup are current and we are exploiting every opportunity to pull all cargo to move SoPac cargo. A study is being made as to the possibility of bringing a limited amount of SoPac Navy stocks to FJDL in order to make them more readily available for issue and expedite closeout of SPARTUS and NORTINA at an earlier date than could be accomplished by moving the supplies to the MARIANAS.

24 0035
CINCPAC ADV TO COMCPAC INFO CONSTRUCT.

UNITED STATES NAVY

Request you cancel such part of your 230934 as refers to Backner and Muhlenhey. They are both engaged in important combat operations and should not be called on board your flagship. If conference is needed it can take place ashore before you assume command responsibilities.

24 0343
CINCPAC FAREL TO CINCPAC ADV.

TOURS TO NITTYG ONLY.
Para 1. In accordance your instructions have carefully examined existing order No. 9489 and all available documents relating thereto. Have also discussed it with Rauscher and Bagley.

Para 2. Richardson strongly opposed to any consideration towards its cancellation or modification. He states that he does not consider there is any method which is legal suitable and feasible by which matters covered by 9489 can be handled. He states further that cancellation would not relieve him of any responsibilities to you because he does not recognize any responsibility on your part for any of the functions he performs under terms of 9489. I disputed that point. My suggestion that Para 1 of order might be modified to permit some officer other than ConCPAC to be assigned as "Military Commander" was countered by Brig. Gen. Morrison with the statement that-Continued-
Sorier General had insisted that officer (by title) who had exercised authority of Military Governor must exercise authority under Executive Order. Morrison claimed Solicitor General because of certain legal implications would not recede from that position.

Para 3. Bagley is opposed to cancellation because he considers essential the control presently exercised and sees no suitable substitute method unless sufficient authority is vested in you. I am confident such authority does not exist.

Para 4. I recommend against any move at this time towards obtaining cancellation. Austin concurs. Further details will follow by letter.

25 0517 CINCPAC ADV TO CONTINUE.

MILITARY POWER

Para 1. The further experience in fighting against Japanese forces since receipt of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 03214 April and submission of my 280235 April prompt me to point out that:

As it has been further demonstrated that where Japanese troops occupy prepared defenses and have adequate supplies they constitute a competent fighting force against which the best of our troops even with air support and naval gunfire support beyond all precedent as well as strong artillery support can advance only slowly. Japanese forces have not so far surrendered in appreciable numbers and cannot be destroyed without our incurring enormous casualties. It would be unrealistic to expect that such obvious objectives as southern KYUSHU and the TOKYO PLAIN will not be as well defended as OKINAWA. Although our troops for the invasion of JAPAN should be in the best of condition many of the divisions planned to be employed OLYMPIC are still fighting on OKINAWA and in the PHILIPPINES.

2. It is apparent that the enemy air force is prepared to continue its large scale suicide attacks. 235 ships have been sunk or damaged during the ICHIHO Operation. The 27 ships sunk have been destroyers or ships of less valuable characteristics. By belief that we can better afford our ship losses than the enemy can afford his air losses is unshaken but damaged ships must be returned to ships and all ship repair facilities must be kept fully manned with skilled personnel even if such men must be drafted.

Para 2. The 20th Air Force is now operating against JAPAN with great effect. As its operations accelerate and when the fast carrier forces can be separated from their present defensive role in support of troops and become available in July for attack on suitable targets in JAPAN our naval and air forces can in time accomplish the complete destruction of Japanese industry and shipping. Japanese naval and air forces can be virtually destroyed with minimum losses to our casualties but time will be required. The blockade of JAPAN is now being constantly by air forces operating from OKINAWA and submarines will commence operations in the SEA OF JAPAN in early June. JAPAN can in time be reduced to the point where her will to resist will be low but time will be required.

Para 3. In my 280235 I expressed my belief that until we are able to invade JAPAN with assurance of success we should continue to accumulate and isolate by occupying positions which will cut off JAPAN from GINN and HOKKAIDO and from which bombing of JAPAN can be intensified. These weeks can be used on this situation also.

Para 4. Unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less than the best preparation and more than minimum casualties, I believe that the JAPAN INVASION should be deferred until the condition of the forces during 1945 to include JAPAN in the fields of available men and material.
25 0519 CINCPAC ADV TO CHINCH.

NUITZ TO KING ONLY. Para 1. In view of recent exchanges of messages it appears necessary to inform you as a matter of record that:
A. The text of the agreements contained in my serial 0003097 was drafted by the staff of General MacArthur.
B. The text of Sub Para (K) which covers the transfer of command was inserted at the instance of Maj. Gen. Chamberlain.
C. The entire draft was taken by Maj. Gen. Chamberlain to General MacArthur who gave it to me personally in his own house and it was thereafter agreed to by us.
D. I consider that the draft constituted a firm and binding agreement within the meaning of JCS 032140.

Para 2. It was implicit in all our discussions that CINCPAC would control the amphibious phase and Sub Para 101 is a firm agreement which gives CINCPAC control of land based air in the objective area during the amphibious phase.

26 0552 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CHINCH.

NUITZ TO MACARTHUR DUKE KING.

1. I regret that my concept of command relationships in connection with the OLYMPIC Operation has been misunderstood to the extent revealed in your 251102 and will attempt to restate it briefly in terms which I hope remove the misapprehension which apparently prevails.

2. Our operations up to and including the capture, occupation and development of the MARINAS-TARO and RYUKUS have been conducted under the principle of unified command within our respective areas. In addition the forces of the two command areas have supported each other under arrangements made between CINCPAC and CINCPAC. However the command directives of JCS 032140 and 032141 make it clear that for the invasion of JAPAN a new command organization would be employed in which CINCPAC would control the land campaign in JAPAN which will be carried on primarily with Army forces while CINCPAC would control the naval phases and also the amphibious phases in which naval forces embark, transport and land Army forces at the beaches selected by the Army. Concurrently CINCPAC would of course continue to command the overall naval campaign in the Pacific in strategic support of OLYMPIC and other operations ordered by the JCS and for the general purpose of accomplishing the overall strategic objectives of the war.

3. Under present plans and agreements, well in advance of OLYMPIC the Army Air Forces operating against JAPAN from the MARINAS-TARO area will be commanded by General Arnold and the Army Air Forces operating against JAPAN from the RYUKUS will be commanded once by General Arnold and once by CINCPAC. Under the concept of my Joint Staff Study of OLYMPIC and the concepts which I advanced in our conference at MAMILA, the only cases in which Army forces engaged in OLYMPIC would come under naval control would be:
A. Troops would necessarily be under naval control from the time they embarked in naval vessels at points designated by the Army until they are disembarked on beaches designated by the Army. Thereafter as is customary in amphibious operations they would remain under the control of naval amphibious commanders until the appropriate Army Commanders are willing to assume their normal command responsibilities. Any procedure which you can propose to shorten this period will be welcomed. The procedure agreed upon at MAMILA for passing to the Army Command of recently landed troops was drafted by your staff and accepted by me without question.

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B. I likewise agree in MANILA to the arrangement by which the aircraft of both services, while within the amphibious objective area, would be controlled initially by the Amphibious Commander and later by the Army air commander on shore.

As I have no desire to exercise any command or control over Army forces in the OLMATIC Operation except as necessitated by their being embarked in naval vessels or in case of air forces as necessitated by the realities of the tactical situation at the beachhead. In the conference at MANILA it was pointed out on the staff level that the Army was disturbed at the possible implications of the customary naval term "Commander Joint Expeditionary Forces". It was agreed to substitute in revision the administrative title "Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet" and likewise to use the title "Commanding General, 6th Army" in place of a functional title.

5. The character of future operations against JAPAN as exemplified by the fighting now going on in the vicinity of the KYUSHU and elsewhere in the Pacific makes it essential that the operations of large naval forces be coordinated by a naval commander in a well-equipped command position on shore. All our experience in this war has proved this to be necessary. Complete flexibility must exist with respect to the transfer of ships between task forces and naval task forces to meet a constantly changing strategic and tactical situation. Accordingly it is necessary that, except for naval aircraft engaged in direct support of troops, the naval forces engaged in OLMATIC remain under my command. I had understood that you advocated that I command the naval forces just as I advocated that an Army officer be responsible direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of operations ashore in JAPAN.

6. I trust that the foregoing will serve to allay any apprehensions which may exist and to permit the expeditious prosecution of OLMATIC planning on a satisfactory basis in accordance with the current directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the agreements which we made in MANILA.

28 0921 CONFIDENT TO CINCPAC ADV. (HALSEY TO HIDTZ)

Having evaluated the situation at OKINAWA and capabilities of own and enemy forces after discussion with all principal Navy, Army and Marine Commanders my estimate is as follows:

A. Withdrawal of TF 38 will entail increased risks to OKINAWA shipping unless shore based fighter strength is augmented.

B. An additional shore based fighter group would about counterbalance the loss of TF 38 support. (Withdrawal of British carriers and neutralization of SARIGEMA GUMO by TAF or CVEs important factors in this estimate).

C. Immediate offensive potentialities of TF 38 seriously reduced by shortage of carriers, shortage of specially equipped DD, poor material condition which is reported to be general.

D. Further attacks against KYUSHU at this time not profitable due lack of strength in TF 38 and further due to juggling and canceling of planes by Nips, their apparent intent to avoid air combat and virtual imposibility of achieving surprise now.

E. More vigorous prosecution of installation of shore air warning and related communications is necessary for relief of pickets and installation of JOC and the internal communication systems required by shore based activities should be expedited.

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3234
28 0921 CONVOY TO CINCPAC ADV. (CONTINUED)

F. Gunfire support and air support of ground operations by TAF and CVEs may continue into July but CTF 31 rotation plan should insure adequate support for Phase 3D and subsequent operations.

G. Continued use of minesweeping by CTF 31 for screening purposes may adversely affect preparations for future mine-sweeping projects.

H. TF 31 and TAF can cope with any enemy surface threat. I strongly recommend (1) ground and light echelons MAG II be ordered OKINAWA immediately.

J. Ground echelons list Medium Barber Group proceed OKINAWA as scheduled but that planes be withheld pending readiness of MAG II about 1 July.

Para. Pending being informed as to your action on these recommendations I propose:

K. To continue defensive and interdiction support by TF 38.

If recommendations approved I propose:

L. Withdrawing TF 38 to bases when 1st squadron of additional fighter group is activated on latest date that will permit 14 days availability prior departure for next approved operation. If recommendation not approved I then recommend:

M. Acceptance of added risks to OKINAWA forces and withdrawal of TF 38 not later than 15 June to permit 14 days availability prior striking HOKKAIDO area about 1 July.

Para. Plan for support of KOKUSIBUCHUS and Phase 3D by separate despatch.

28 0929 CONVOY TO CINCPAC ADV. (HALSET TO Halsey)

My 280921. I recommend TF 38 strike Northern HOKUSAN-HOKKAIDO-KURILS about 1 July. TOKYO Area about 7 July. HOKUSAN Area prior to and during Phase 3D. Request early CINCPAC minesweeping directive in order adequate ships may be transferred from TF 31 to CTF 39 for preparation training and initiation of projects. Suggest for consideration the team possibilities of coordinating the timing and objectives for VJR, TAF and TF 38. Detailed suggestions will be submitted later.

28 0910 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (Halsey to NDITZ)

The following message is to be delivered at once in a sealed envelope to Lt. Gen. Buckley, marked for his eyes only. "The basic and airfield development at OKINAWA and in PHJANDA must be developed to the maximum extent and with the utmost speed to support the invasion of JAPAN. Official dispatches and reports of several competent observers give me the definite impression that one or more changes may be necessary in the senior officers responsible for base development and airfield construction in particular. The last is disturbingly slow. Request your frankest comments."

29 0829 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NDITZ to Halset)

Your 280921 and 280929. Maintain at least 2 carrier task groups in position to cover and support OKINAWA. Inform me when you consider withdrawal to base advisable.

Plan on 2 full weeks at anchor for Task Force 38 followed by attack on Northern HOKUSAN-HOKKAIDO-southern KURILS using TF 38 and also British carrier task force. When dates are firm CINCPAC will arrange coordinated action by other forces.

Nominate now a U.S. carrier task group to base NEWPORT after mid-July.
The purpose of the capture and development of FRICKER is to establish fighter bombers in a position intermediate between LAMARDO and DINAPO which will facilitate defense and development of LAMARDO and will improve the air support in the OLYMPIC Operation. Occupation of FRICKER will also of course deny use of that position to the enemy.

Para. The advantages of having such a position to support OLYMPIC will be somewhat offset by the reduction in the state of preparation of fleet forces for OLYMPIC and in the diversion of offensive effort to cover the development of the position which will be difficult and protracted.

Para. Request by dispatch direct to me your brief estimate and recommendation as to whether or not Phase 3D ICEBERG should be executed in July to prepare for OLYMPIC on 1 November.

Para. Conclude comment when feasible.

Your 290900. Assuming that no substantial reinforcement or augmentation of defenses of the objective occur and that enemy air capabilities are approximately equal to present, believe Phase 3D ICEBERG is an essential and profitable operational INTERLUDE between fall of LAMARDO and OLYMPIC attack in order to maintain offensive pressure and to bring about reduction in air strength rather than allow respite in which enemy will recuperate. All air power that can be brought to bear for direct neutralization and air defense should be employed in early stages 3D which will minimize reduction fleet readiness for OLYMPIC. Recommend execute.

Reply your 290910 passed Backner by Hill, THIS FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ FOR LAMARDO. Airfield development OKINAWA LEJEME original was an expanded scale compared to greatly increased present plans. Commander construction troops staff and organization geared for the smaller and has not yet expanded to meet enlarged program. Certain directives your Hq. (CINCPAC ADV C63209), (CINCPAC Pearl 17JUL, CINCPAC Pearl 210305 all May) in some instances subject to misinterpretation by local operators creates initial delay. I have intervened (interacted) assuming full responsibility for interpretations. Additional corrective action has been initiated which should remedy faults and permit development to proceed in a manner calculated to meet your desires that is OCT has requested staff augmentation through your amplifying letter following.
CONCEIVED TO OLYMPIC ADV. (HALSET TO NIMITZ)

Your 290900. Consider LEVMINOS development can be accomplished without taking FRICTION and further believe that FRICTION will soon be interdicted by OKINAWA air. FRICTION would not be worth the effort if only its contribution to LEVMINOS development were considered. However its importance to OLYMPIC appears great. Continuous CAP over naval assault forces will be an essential to success and concurrent widespreadblanketing of enemy airfields will be a vital factor in restricting and reducing enemy air offensive. Distance (and weather at times) prohibits continuous use of OKINAWA fighters for either of above tasks thereby forcing sole dependence on carrier aircraft for the job until shore based air is effectively established in DIABOLIC unless nearby shore based air support is available. In view of the foregoing I consider taking FRICTION vitally important to the success of OLYMPIC.

Para. By midsummer enemy air potential should be so reduced that the diversion of effort incident to Phase 3D and the resulting FRICTION combat losses should be a reasonable price to pay for the saving in OLYMPIC life shipping and material resulting from availability of FRICTION air support.

Para. I recommend expediting Phase 3D as planned. Development to be limited to installations needed for maximum fighter air effort with temporary construction wherever practicable but speed of development and plenty of Seabees emphasised.

29 2248 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TED (NIMITZ TO BUCKNER ONLY)

Your 291012 will make no changes unless you so recommend. If additional officers are desired please inform me by dispatch. It is of utmost importance that nothing except urgent tactical requirements be permitted to delay the establishment of air forces.

30 1645 GTF 3L to CINCPAC ADV.

Principal advantages FRICTION operation are as outlined your 290900 plus desirability keeping enemy off balance by constant attack and also providing opportunity for inflicting further serious air losses which are probably becoming irreplaceable. Following principal disadvantages:

A. Lack of suitable harbors or beaches together with advent of typhoon season will render unloading slow and uncertain thereby retarding base development.

B. Experience OKINAWA indicates that own damage particularly in light vessels will be appreciable and may seriously restrict availability full strength for OLYMPIC.

C. Proximity of FRICTION to DIABOLIC renders it specially susceptible to air attack and hit and run surface raids. For its protection naval covering force will be required until activation of OLYMPIC.

D. Proposed schedule coupled with prospects another month fighting at OKINAWA will preclude much needed upkeep and relaxation for many of smaller craft causing resultant in efficiency.

E. FRICTION has no permanent value.

Para. My studies of FRICTION lead me to believe that site suitable landing beaches are non-existent, it can be taken without too much difficulty, as however consider advantages gained as outlined above for another disadvantage.

In view prospective ability to maintain fighter CAP from LEVMINOS over any portion DIABOLIC for support of OLYMPIC do not believe FRICTION is worth the possible losses and consequent affect on OLYMPIC. Recommend cancellation.
While realizing definite advantages during early stages of OLYMPIC of possession of an air base to northward of OKINAWA I believe OLYMPIC as a whole would be furthered more by elimination of Phase 3D ICEBERG. My reasons are as follows:

A. Poor beach conditions will delay development to such extent only barest essentials can be accomplished by OLYMPIC target date and in meantime FRICION will be a military liability on account of exposed position and required naval support.

B. Ships, construction and other service units involved can be used to better advantage in:

1. completing and stock piling MILAN bases
2. South and Southwest Pacific rollup
3. Accelerating OKINAWA development

I recommend Phase 3D be cancelled.

Well developed fighter bomber bases at FRICION prior to OLYMPIC would be worth considerable effort and cost if they could be activated in time and without unduly weakening forces required for OLYMPIC. However, in view of present target dates for Phase 3D and OLYMPIC, combined with losses and base to fleet units already received and probably additional losses prior OLYMPIC, consider probable value of FRICION is offset by following:

A. FRICION will be a difficult campaign, poor beaches, rough terrain and stubborn enemy resistance may retard early activation of FRICION airfields. Target date and development period now scheduled can during time of year when most unfavorable weather is to be expected. Lack of shelter at target and at OKINAWA during the adverse weather may well cause unacceptable operational losses and prolong operations unduly.

B. Forces required for Phase 3D could well be employed to expedite development OKINAWA area and in direct reduction of enemy air strength, productive capacity and shipping, the time factor in continued attrition of the enemy is important if OLYMPIC is to be successful and enemy attrition must be kept greater than our own attrition.

C. Many of the ships to be employed in Phase 3D have already approached limits of endurance of machinery. Unless an interval rested with adequate upkeep and preparation is available it is considered doubtful whether we can develop full strength for OLYMPIC even if future losses can be reduced.

It is therefore recommended that Phase 3D be omitted unless OLYMPIC is to be postponed. In the latter case, it might be possible to execute Phase 3D in October.

Nominate TG 38.4. Your 290839. This group contains largest number heavy ships which will best test facilities and allow GunScrA and 6TP to inspect. This early selection requires element of crystal gazing as later tactical developments may require change.
01 0112 CONCERTED TO CINCSPAC ADV.

Your 250900. Believe value of position in question will not be commensurate with its cost for occupation and development. recommend operation be cancelled.

31 2100 CNO TO CINCSPAC ADV. (FOR FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ)

Colonel 1 Ma P Fisher AC USA will arrive Guam about Sunday 3 June bearing Cominch and CNO top secret serial 00040905 dated 29 May. It is considered appropriate that you discuss contents thereof and previous information on subject with Lieut. Gen. Giles and Major Gen. Lemay to facilitate arrangements for initial delivery of weapon.

01 0223 CONCERTED TO CINCSPAC ADV INFO GTF 38 (HALEY TO NIMITZ)

Your 250959 not to info aede. For planning purposes when may I expect British carrier task force to be ready to sortie from advance base for offensive operations.

01 1201 CINCSPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCAPAC CONCERTED CONCERTED CONCERTED CINCSPAC CONCERTED CINCSPAC CONCERTED

Para 1. The purpose of the capture of ROCHAMBO (Phase 3D ICEBERG) is to establish fighter bombers in a position intermediate between LEXINGTON and DIABLO which would facilitate defense and development of ROCHAMBO and improve air support in OLYMPIC. It would also maintain pressure and tempo of combat.

Para 2. However, it has become increasingly apparent that the beaches and terrain are unfavorable to expeditious capture and development and that with an OLYMPIC target date of 1 Nov., it will not be possible to activate sufficient air forces in ROCHAMBO in time to justify the cost in combat and logistic efforts.

Para 3. The CINCAPAC-CINCCPAC staff planning conferences now in progress at Guam have made it clear that the resources involved will be more productively employed if concentrated in early development of OKINAWA. The shortage of both personnel and cargo lift is an important factor. Of greater importance is placing the carrier task forces for offensive strikes at the sources of the suicide attacks which as long as they continue will be a serious military threat to the success of OLYMPIC.

Para 4. By 250900 Halsey's 301137 Spruance's 031212 Turner's 320455 Hall's 301445 and Towers' 312010 passed separately for information of Cominch only.

Para 5. I am deferring ICEBERG Phase 3D indefinitely and propose until OLYMPIC to concentrate available logistic resources on full development of OKINAWA and to devote fleet effort to offensive naval operations.

01 1353 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH

Mythis 013011. CINCPAC has also concurred in indefinite deferral of Phase 3D ICEBERG.
01 2204 CONGRATULATIONS TO CORAL INFO CINCOPAC ADV. (HALSEY TO HULL INFO HMINTZ)

I view with concern any possibility of failure to take DUNKY at this time. Weather protection and Task Force 38 operations will never be better.

01 2306 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO HMINTZ, MACARTHUR

WARX 10463. Annex "D" to the Appendix to JCS 74/3 is the reference.
The Commanding General, Army Air Forces has procured (to which the JCS have agreed) the transfer of the Headquarters, 20th AF, now operating in Washington to the Pacific as of 1 July 1945, and its establishment initially in Guam. The 20th AF will simultaneously be redesignated the United States Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and will be commanded by General Carl Spaatz. Also on 1 July the XX Bomber Command, scheduled for deployment in the USASTAF, will be redesignated the 8th AF and the XXI Bomber Command, now operating in the MARPAC, will be redesignated the 20th Air Force.

Para. This arrangement will enable the Gen. USASTAF to present to CINCOPAC and CINCINA his requirements so that adjustments necessary to meet changing conditions will whenever possible be made in the Pacific.

Para. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise demanding such action, ComGenUSASTAF upon request will make available for utilization by CINCOPAC or CINCINA USASTAF aircraft which are based within their respective areas for purposes other than their primary strategical mission, immediately informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, of the action taken. Should there be any conflict in requests for such emergency use the issue will be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. All commitments, agreements and directives relating to the 20th Air Force will be applicable to USASTAF.

Para. Your comment is requested.

02 1202 CINCOPAC ADV TO CINCINA INFO CINCOPAC.

The organization agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as noted in the 1st paragraph of WARX 10463 (JCS 012306) is considered in. The location of the Headquarters of the Army Strategic Air Force at Guam will facilitate the prosecution of the war against JAPAN.

02 1203 CINCOPAC ADV TO COMSHOF (BY HAND)

Comshof 020411. Request your early comment.

02 0411 CINCOPAC ADV TO CINCOPAC ADV. (BY HAND) (HALSEY TO HULL)

If Comshof下达 OLYMPIC EAST CHINA SEA carrier operations I feel that areas to be swept in EAST CHINA SEA should be prescribed by CINCOPAC. In order to ensure timely preparation and initiation of any major sweeping project you may approve I intend to issue my dispatch OpPlan 54-45 about 1 June directing completion passage through north half of E by 3 July and completion by 30 October of an operating area (and approaches thereat) in EAST CHINA SEA totalling about 25,000 square miles of exploration and an estimated 15,000 square miles of sweeping.

-Continued-
03 0514 0909 to MAR COR into CHINA F W.

CI 17039. Reference your HW 10463 list. I assume that the only changes in the existing and previously proposed air command structure in the Pacific are:

(1) That the actual command of the VLF bomber organization is transferred from CINAF to General Spaatz with the headquarters at GHQ.

(2) The 20th and 21st Bomber Commands are redesignated the 20th Air Force and the 8th Air Force respectively and these 2 air forces are combined into the Strategic Air Force.

(3) That except for the fighter units now set up to support the Strategic Air Force all other air units to be redeployed from the ETO and the ETO will in general be assigned to FEAF.

Para. Airdrome space now built and possible of construction this year will accommodate the 20th Air Force on the MARSHALL ISLANDS. In the Ryukus there can be based the B-29 groups as recently scheduled for this year with their supporting fighters plus the FEAF and naval land based air units for the defense of the base and search missions for the U.S. fleet. Any further deployment must await the acquisition of airdromes in Japan itself.

Para. Conditions here are radically different from those in Europe. We are limited to the employment of much smaller numbers of planes. We have extremely limited areas in which to deploy them. We have a serious shortage of engineer troops for the preparation of airfields. And we have projected a time schedule that requires most intensive coordination in the establishment of priorities and in the employment of men. Our objective is geographically small and our targets comprise only a small fraction of the area. Under the proposed set up we would have working from restricted areas against concentrated targets the Far East Air Force, the Strategic Air Force, Navy land based air forces and carrier based air forces. It is my firm conviction that coordination of these efforts will be extremely difficult unless the land based air forces are set up to operate under the general coordinating control of a single commander.

Para. The supply and logistics problems involved are extremely difficult of solution under either the existing or proposed arrangement. I believe that there is grave danger that air operations will not only be prejudiced but such confusion may result that at some critical stage of an operation its very success will be endangered unless the supply and logistic organization for the Army Air Forces in the Pacific be placed under a single control.

Signed MacArthur.
02 CALL CONFIDENT TO CINCPAC ADV - PASSED TO COMSOUTHFLIT (HALSEY TO NIMITZ ) (CONT'D)

Permit. I offer for your consideration my own opinion that this project will entail effort and losses probably not justified if OKINAWA shore based air can cover CHINA and KOREA targets which would be normally taken under carrier attack, KYUSHU targets can be effectively struck from deep water SOUTH and Southeast of KYUSHU.

03 1206 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSOUTHFLIT INFO CONCERNING 10, INFO COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY AND BUCKNER ONLY INFO KING. By 230859 to Halsey only. Desire movement of flight echelons MAG 14 to OKINAWA expedited. It is my present intention that Task Force 38 shall strike KYUSHU when last squadron MAG 14 is ready to operate at OKINAWA and then retire to LYTEG for 2 weeks at ancho.

04 6118 CINCPAC ADV TO MAR CORPS INFO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO VAN KIRK SUNG INFO KING ONLY)

Since Halsey has been in combat under strenuous conditions for over 2 months I intend to return him to the Mainland for leave and assign Woods as his relief as Commander Tactical Air Force ROKYUS. Request your concurrence. Woods can be released for other duty in July or August after Tactical Air Force is dissolved and Kennedy takes over Army elements. If Mitchell's return is urgent suggest a more junior relief than Woods since Marine Air Wing 1 will be relatively inactive for some months.

05 0200 COMSOUTHFLIT TO CINCPAC ADV.

Year 031203. In view deferment of LONCHON and predicated on assumption that shore based air will be able neutralize air bases in EAST CHINA and KOREA consider Comsoulfit 0204 that sweeping Northern EAST CHINA SEA areas is neither profitable nor necessary at this time. Sufficient deep water exist for Amphibious Force approach to DIABOLIC from southeast and for fast carrier operations from south to southeast. In view of approaching typhoon season and to afford ample sea room to ships in OKINAWA vicinity in event of typhoon and because of value in connection with cover plans recommend the entire area ZEBRA be swept earliest practicable and in addition area bounded by 24-04 N 124-09 E, 26-15 N 124-31 E, 27-38 N 126-01 E, 29-20 N 125-20 E, 27-00 N 123-50 E.
04 0719 COMMANDER TO COMMANDER ANY. (PERSONAL FROM GILLS TO KEMP)

1. Reference your top secret operational priority note 04069 dated 28th June which directs Rest 2D INGLISH indefinitely. It is desired to acquaint you with the issuance of the positioning of a very long range fighter group and its supporting units.

2. The 411th Fighter Group and 559th Air Service Group were committed for this operation with west coast advancing point. The following are the movements status of these units:
   A. Ground echelons of 411th Fighter Group has a tentative landing date at Guadalcanal on 6 June.
   B. 559th Air Service Group is in staging area at Port Leston preparing to load.
   C. 2 CV's have been allocated, each to pick up 16 F4F-2's aircraft with flight detachment at Aleutian, on 14 and 27 June respectively.

3. It is desired to position the above units for NIB JIMA for the purpose of augmenting the strike and escort capacity of the 3 very long range fighter groups now located at NIB JIMA. I believe the ultimate requirement for NIB based very long range fighter aircraft will be 3 groups and therefore the ready availability of the 411th Fighter Group and its supporting service group is particularly acceptable to my augmentation plan for very long range NIB based fighter aircraft.

4. In view of the short time that exists before these units are to be loaded, recommend this matter be expedited so that instructions may be implemented by administrative headquarters with appropriate theater and mainland agencies.

05 0457 COMMANDER ANY TO COMMANDER. (HITZM TO KEMP)

In view of the events to which GUMBPP 040697 has implications which bear on the subject of paragraph 3 of JCS 261612 and depart from the principle of the British being logistically self supporting request your comments.

New subject. Will the British carrier force be available to me for attacks on Northern HOKKAIDO-SOUTHERN KURILES with JEF 10 in July.

06 0839 COMMANDER ANY TO COMMANDER. (RALSTY TO HITZM)

Your GUESEP 060839, TF 38 ready to strike KANGA fields with 2 groups June 6th as per my GUESEP. ENSIGNUS operable but an essential key to LEITZ after strike for repair to flight deck damaged by storm. ENSIGNUS has storm damage to flight deck but is operable and unless otherwise directed will be retained with TF 38 until normally due to return for overhaul. All forces ready to execute assigned tasks despite damage which is being assessed for early dispatched report.

06 0839 COMMANDER ANY TO COMMANDER. (HITZM TO RALSTY)

Request immediate report of condition of runway TP 38. Have received no report since your GUESEP.

06 1034 COMMANDER ANY TO COMMANDER. (HANDLE AS HITZM ONLY)

Your GUESEP (To me only) approved. Unless otherwise directed by later dispatch withdraw TF 38 to LEITZ after strike on KANGA fields about 6 June.
07 0814 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSUBPAC GHEGA PEARL. 
(NIMETZ TO KING INFO TOWERS ONLY)

I consider it necessary to strengthen the organization of the naval shore facilities at OKINAWA by placing them in a single command. At present the air bases are planned to be under Commander Hillen. The small so-called Operating Base under Commander Kirkland and there are other smaller bases in prospect. Complex relationships with the Army are involved. Request authorization to consolidate all naval shore facilities at OKINAWA into a single Naval Operating Base. Recommend that Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd be ordered to command the Naval Operating Base OKINAWA with Commander Kirkland as his deputy. As such he would report to Major General Wallace, the Island Commander, OKINAWA for local operational control and to me for administrative and general naval matters.

07 0815 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSUBPAC GHEGA PEARL. 
(NIMETZ TO HALSEY INFO KING AND MOCAIN)

Press releases from flagship TF 36 transmitted by IOWA indicate interview in which Captain Thash released information not reported to me and of a nature to give aid and comfort to the enemy. Direct OTT 36 to make full report technical details concerned see CWO 062025. Take steps to prevent further release of such information by units in the combat area. Article by Ensign Hortesheft quoting Captain Thash as advocating use of poison gas against Japanese being censored here and forwarded to Commander.

08 0221 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSUBPAC 
(NIMETZ TO KING ONLY)

At present Commander OTT 36 is responsible to me for the KINSHUS forces. Wallace as CTG 36 is Island Commander and Cobb as CTG 99,3 is to attend to command local naval forces KINSHUS and will eventually function as a permanent administrative SOPA. See Annexes A and F of OpPlan 14-4A.

Within Island Command there are now 2 separate naval shore commands. The former Lam 8 now the Naval Operating Base under Kirkland and the Naval Air Bases under Hillen. Additionally completed are a small nine base and a motor torpedo boat base. Amphibious base facilities will also be necessary also to support OLYMPIC. My proposal is to consolidate all naval shore facilities under 1 rear admiral with the title of Comdt Naval Operating Base OKINAWA and assign Kirkland as his deputy with no other duties. This would parallel action already taken at SAIPAN. The changes recommended are all internal to the Island Command OKINAWA and will not affect Cobb.

So long as we were organized for unity of command the establishment of several separate naval entities under an Atoll Commander or Island Commander confirmed to an effective command developed by experience in the Pacific. The change made at SAIPAN and recommended for OKINAWA KINSHUS and OKINAWA is necessary to ensure effective functioning under the new concept of JCS 032140 of April which contemplate an eventual separation of the services.

08 0521 COMSUBPAC ADV TO OTT 36 INFO CINCPAC ADV. 
(MOCAIN INFO NIMETZ)

CINCPAC 070615. Make required report. Apparently written background material prepared to cover Thash's interview was misinterpreted or Thash verbally went beyond written brief. Take immediate appropriate steps to prevent personnel your command from divulging to press confidential information except as is proper for off the record background briefing. CINCPAC expects IOWA will be separately instructed by originator.

08 0754 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSUBPAC.

ComSubPac 261245. (Msg 10 British subs to BeNeCraPac)
09 2009 COMMAND BY CDR (OPINION) TO COMMANDER INFO (OPINION) CINCPAC AFD.

PERSONNEL FROM ADMIRAL KIN to THE FIRST SEA LORD.

I have carefully reviewed the series of memoranda exchanged between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff relative to establishment of British intermediate base facilities at a point sufficiently far south to be useful to support operations in the main theater against the Japanese. I have also reviewed the despatches which have been exchanged between Admiral Fraser and Admiral Onishi on this subject. It is my opinion that the utilization of the materials provided by the British for the establishment of shore facilities in Western Pacific would contribute best to the overall needs in that theater if they were established in HONGKONG BAY. Such operations as are required by the British Pacific Fleet in areas to the north will be supported by fleet anchorages and shore facilities now established or being established by the United States Navy in the United States and the Far East. Operations in the SOUTH CHINA SEA in support of operations in the COSAMAN can best be supported from the base which I propose in HONGKONG BAY. Objection to the establishment of facilities at HONGKONG has been presented by the British Chiefs of Staff in that they would not be made available until the end of the current calendar year and therefore at a time when SINGAPORE itself might be available. The same considerations would apply to the establishment of similar facilities in the PHILIPPINE area even if sites therefor could be made available. It appears even more objectionable to erect additional facilities at MANUS which will be even farther away from the scene of operations on 1 January 1944 than is the case. If in the light of the foregoing the British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to meet our wishes for the establishment of shore facilities to support a fleet anchorage at HONGKONG BAY I have no further suggestions to offer as to the use and employment of the resources involved.

09 2219 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO KINITZ INFO MAGNUS.

Mark 234A In the indefinite deferral of Phase 2D of the reference year 01230 the joint chiefs of Staff express.

10 0309 CINCPAC AFD TO COMMANDER INFO (KINITZ TO SPENDACE INFO TUNNUR).

ComPacPac 090225 requires clarification. Desire your approval designation 9C029 for OLYMPIC employ 9C029 (At. Adm. Oldendorf) in a suitable command capacity relative to Bat. 1 and other units of the gunfire and regarding forces. Bat. 1 as whole will not be placed under the command of a Rear Admiral.

13 2255 CINCPAC AFD TO COMMANDER INFO KINITZ (KINITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING).

Request your comment on proposal that CruDiv 17 plus 1 Division leave JAPAN as soon as practicable refuel at KERAMA RAFTO proceed at high speed to vicinity Weihai during 1 or 2 daylight sweeps Weihai BAY – CHIAK Coast north toward Huanghau BAY with air cover as practicable from OKINAWA then return via OKINAWA to SAIPAN for replenishment and rejoin TF 38 at sea around July operation. Purpose would include destruction small craft being used by enemy for coastal transportation, cover and deception, diversion and disruption of enemy plans and keeping up the pressure.
14 0616 COMAF TENTY TO WAR G OF S PERSONAL FOR MARSHALL.

(NOTE: This dispatch delivered by hand and is not available in CINCPACO communication files)

Again referring to your WARK 15054 and supplementing my JILL DTC 130140 I discussed in detail with Nimitz the proposed plan of moving the Twentieth Air Force Headquarters to GUAM and activating the Eighth Air Force in the RTURTUS. I also explained to him the necessity of setting up a Strategic Air Force Headquarters to control and operate these two air forces. Further that I propose to set up a Strategic Air Force Headquarters on GUAM with Spaats commanding. To all of this Nimitz fully concurred, stating that he had given his concurrence to this plan as proposed in JCS message and that he had not changed his mind. In accordance with above headquarters 20th AF should be moved to GUAM and redesignated Headquarters USASTAF on one August 1945 and on same date Headquarters XXI BomCom be elevated to AF status and designated 20th AF. Likewise, on 1 August 1945 HQs XX BomCom be redesignated Hqtr 8th AF.

New subject; I discussed with Nimitz the subject of inactivating AAFPOA Hqtrs. Nimitz stated that in his opinion there should be some kind of an organization set up to control and operate the small static group of Army Air Forces airplanes that would remain in HAWAII and the MARIANAS and other islands under his control primarily for defensive purposes. It is therefore recommended that AAFPOA be continued on a greatly reduced scale for the operation of Army Air Forces units which are assigned to Nimitz. Further, that the commander of AAFPOA be named by the ComGen USASTAF and that the ComGen USASTAF outline the policies and directives and operations functions for AAFPOA in conference with Nimitz.

15 0538 CINCPAC ADY TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

General Arnold conferred with me at length on 14 June with Giles, Mahan and Sherman present.

He discussed last the establishment of the Army Strategic Air Forces. I confirmed the concurrence of my 021202 in the organization already agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as announced by JCS 012306. He then discussed in general terms a list of 12 items that Spaats has requested be included in his directive. I commented informally. Today I have been shown an exact statement of these items and have addressed to General Arnold a formal memorandum giving my formal comment. Copy airmail'd to you.

I could not agree to 2 items namely "That USASTAF have organized and control over all the means required for the defense of airbases and USASTAF "Have command of the base areas i.e. command of the islands or other areas on which USASTAF units are the predominant forces".

He told me that British have only 1 Lancaster ready and proposed that "Nothing definite be done for the present".

He read me a dispatch from Marshall informing him that you were now proposing a change from JCS 012306 and expressed strongly his opinion that he should organize his air forces without interference by the Navy. Being undeformed as to this development I made no comment. I did inform him that I continued to believe in unity of command within each area.

During our conference and later by telephone he discussed a proposal that MacArthur establish temporary headquarters here at GUAM prior to OLIMPIA, I told him that while I did not consider it necessary I had no objections, that I had repeatedly invited MacArthur to visit my headquarters and that he had never accepted, that on 1 occasion Col. Knox and I offered to come to his and

- Continued -
15 0558 CINCPOC ADV TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING) (CONT'D).

he discouraged it, that I had been to MacArthur's headquarters on 3 occasions and that I doubted MacArthur's willingness to come to GUAM. What the implications of Arnold's proposals about MacArthur's headquarters are I do not know.

It is logistically infeasible to create extensive additional command facilities for Spatts or MacArthur at any early date. Spatts will have to take Giles and Giles take Lenny's. I could care for MacArthur only on the same basis of "double up and share" as is now used for Spruance.

15 0753 COMINCH TO CINCPOC ADV. (HALSEY TO NIMITZ)

Subject to your approval TF 38 will sortie 1 July launching 1st attack northern area about 10 July. Will you wish to see me at GUAM during this in port period.

12 2202 JOINT CHERI OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WEDENBEYER.

WAR 1581.1. Recent changes in enemy dispositions in EAST CHINA indicate trend of withdrawal to the north and evacuation of certain coastal positions. While it is unlikely that the Japanese will withdraw from positions suitable for our use in direct support of the invasion of JAPAN, under suitable circumstances it may be possible without distraction from the main effort to exploit such withdrawal to accomplish diversion and deception, increased effectiveness of blockade, and possibly the eventual establishment of a limited supply line to support Chinese forces. It may be that the support of the campaign in JAPAN will absorb all available resources, particularly shipping, thus making it impossible to provide major tonnages to aid Chinese forces prior to the completion of planned invasion operations. However, the changing situation in CHINA requires continuing review and reconnaissance with a view to capitalizing at small cost on Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals. Your views and recommendations are desired from time to time as the situation develops.

13 0236 CINCPOC ADV TO COMINCH, CTG 38.7. (FOR HALSEY AND SHERMAN ONLY)

CINCPOC considers the action indicated in COMAAPSWEA 101750 will stop further attacks on ships by SWPA aircraft. Desire CTG 38.7 now withdraw his threat to shoot down our Army aircraft.

13 0635 CINCPOC ADV TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

With the initiation of submarine operations in the SEA OF JAPAN it is possible that 1 or more submarines may be so damaged as to have to return on the surface. Request any information you can obtain as to Russian action in case a damaged submarine

(A) Requires voyage repairs at VLADIVOSTOK or SOVIETSKAYA GAVAN (SOVIET HARBOR)
(B) Requires piloting through TARTARY STRAIT.

Is there any preference between VLADIVOSTOK, SOVIET HARBOR or possible SHANGHAI Bay as a point at which to apply for repairs to make a submarine seaworthy or for internment.

Give to brief submarine commanders as to action to take in case they are not severely damaged to exit through KOREA STRAIT or LA PERouse STRAIT.
Your 130655. Question as to probable Russian reaction and attitude has
been referred to MOSCOW. Pending receipt of guidance from MOSCOW it is con-
sidered that SOVIETSKAYA GAVAN should be preferred to VLADIVOSTOK.

14 2307 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ INFO ARNOLD.

Book message to Macarthur and Nimitz for action, to Arnold for informa-
tion. WARX 17064. Further to WARX 87936 dated 25 May 1945. Although there
is at present no evidence that sudden collapse or surrender of JAPAN is likely
the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that plans be made to take immediate advan-
tage of favorable circumstances, such as a sudden collapse or surrender, to
effect an entry into JAPAN proper for occupational purposes.

14 2330 COMAF 20 to DEFCOMAF 20 (TO GILES FOR ARNOLD FROM ANDERSON).

Note: Not in CINCPOA Communication files.

Telecon 15-5.

President has indicated desire to meet with Joint Chiefs of Staff
afternoon 25 June to discuss details of Campaign against JAPAN. He ex-
pects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and pros-
pects. Information requested by him is:

- Number of Army personnel and Navy vessels necessary to defeat JAPAN.
- Estimate of time required and casualties resulting from invasion of JAPAN proper.
- Estimate of time required and casualties resulting from effort to de-
  feat JAPAN by isolation, blockade and bombardment.

Useful contribution, if any that can be made by other United Nations,
President intends to make decisions on campaign with purpose of econom-
ing to maximum extent possible in loss of American lives. Economy in
time and money is comparatively unimportant.

Joint Staff Planners have been directed to submit draft of suitable
memorandum that can be submitted by Joint Chiefs to President at meeting.

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COMGEN (ARNOLD) TO WARCOS FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (Not in Comm. files)

16 June 1945

3974. Paren for Marshall for JCS from Arnold at Iwo Jima paren. Major
General Curtis Lemay and his intelligence officer Colonel Garcia have pre-
pared able factual and dramatic presentation of the effectiveness of strategic
air to date upon the war making capacity of JAPAN. They have also a reasonably
projection of the further results to be reasonably expected from our continued
air offensive against JAPAN. The expected results of the air offensive
against GERMANY can now be specifically compared with the actual damage to
German systems of objectives thru the data in the hands of the Dolier Group.
Item am of the opinion that the JCS will find it most helpful for these pre-
sentations be presented to the President.

16 ----- COMGEN (ARNOLD) TO WARCOS (PERSONAL FOR MARSHALL FROM ARNOLD AT IWO JIMA)

16 June 1945

Baker personally with Lemay should represent me at the conference to
present the President with factual data available in the Marianas. Lemay is
enroute to Washington now and in view of his intimate knowledge of the local
situation he should personally present the picture of 20th AF capabilities. It
is of utmost importance that USASAF Hqtrs be established at once and that
full support by everyone be given to that Headquarters for administrative,
operations, supply and top priorities in shipping. Even though the President
indicated that economy of time is comparatively unimportant, I am convinced

- Continued -
21 0105 GENTLEWATER TO CINC PAC ADV. (HALFY TO NDITZ)

Will shortly be prepared to present details of proposed operations for your consideration. If agreeable to you I should like to visit you on Sunday 24 June with Chief of Staff and 3 others returning LTB on the following day. If approved request you send plans.

22 0845 CINC PAC ADV. (PERSONAL & PRIVATE FROM FRAJAY TO NDITZ)

I do not think I can effectively support the British Fleet later in the year unless I can now get on with the facilities asked for at MANUS and the use of Eagle Farm BRISBANE.

From the examinations we have made I do not believe that we should in any way be hampering the American war effort by using these places and I am now in the position of endeavoring to carry out your operational requirements whilst at the same time I do not seem to get the necessary support in my logistic arrangements.

I cannot see what action to take next and would be grateful for your advice and assistance as my operational Commander in Chief.

(JULY) 03 0235 GENTLEWATER TO CINC PAC ADV. (PERSONAL FOR GENERAL STAFF FROM GENERAL FOLLER)

Changes in availability of ships necessitates my postponing my visit in DUKE OF YORK until about the beginning of August.

I should like to do this in order to see you and present your decoration on board.

If you desire to see me earlier I can always fly at any time you wish but the postponement might be advantageous until after the forthcoming conferences in EUROPE. Perhaps I could have your views and I will do anything you desire.

03 1300 CINC PAC ADV. TO CINC PAC ADV. (ADMIRAL KING TO ADMIRAL NDITZ)

Your comment is requested on the following aide memoire from Admiral Somerville to me:

"Item 1: In Admiral King's personal message 092000 addressed to the First Sea Lord he states "most operations as are required by the BPF in areas to the north will be supported by fleet anchorages and shore facilities now established or being established by the US Fleet". The First Sea Lord will be glad to be informed of the bases to which Admiral King refers.

"Item 2: Will it be possible for the BPF to use shore bases at the bases referred to in 1. Alternatively can we extend existing resources at these bases with our own constructional personnel. (Note: 3000 are available in AUSTRALIA or on passage to AUSTRALIA who could build stores, houses, roads, etc. They are not equipped to construct airfields but can repair and maintain airstrips)."

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