

“NIMITZ GRAY BOOK”

Volume 7 of 8

War Plans and Files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Running Estimate and Summary covering the period 1 July 1945–31 August 1945.

The following series of images is the first step in the American Naval Records Society's project to produce a scholarly on-line edition of this important, declassified, primary source.

At this early stage, ANRS is able to provide images of one of the copies of the “Gray Book” that are located in Papers of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz at the Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, Washington D.C.

This copy consists of loose pages that could be readily scanned. Sections of some of the typed pages in this copy are blurry and difficult to read, and, in addition, this copy does not show the color-coding that is present in the tightly-bound original.

This copy was produced through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation, Newport, Rhode Island, with donations received from the Naval Order of the United States and several individual Foundation members.

Scanned at the Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island
and electronically published by
American Naval Records Society
Bolton Landing, New York
2010

AS A DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENT OF THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
THIS PUBLICATION IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

(2) VII

BOOK #7

GRAYBOOK SUMMARY

1 JULY 1945 - 31 August 1945

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

1 July (Quam date)

CABLAN (SS 252) tracked properly illuminated hospital ship approximately 300 miles southeast of TOKYO, suspected to be enroute to MARCOS or WAKE.

For the third successive day there have been almost no plane sightings of ships among south KOREAN Islands.

Two more submarine contacts are reported; one by a merchantman southeast of the MARIANAS near yesterday's PC contact, the other near PARCE VELA by a PC escorting a convoy.

TF 31 dissolved this date and all local defense functions assumed by Commander RYUKYUS. TF 32 remains in the area as covering force. Composition 3 OBB, CA/CI and escorting destroyers. CTF 32 has overall command of other 3rdFlt forces in the area, including TF 39 (Mine Flotilla), TG 30.5 (Search and Rescue Group - PAT 1), and unit of 30.9 (Logistics Support Group). TF 38 departed LYTE today for exercises preparatory to extended operations.

573 B-29s were over the Empire last night on bombing and mining missions. 159 aircraft struck KUMAMOTO, 136 aircraft hit SHIMONOSEKI, 100 aircraft were over UBE and 154 bombed KURE. One plane was lost enroute to the target, 6 of the crew have been reported rescued. 24 B-29s mined the east entrance to the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS; the NANA0 and FUSHIKI areas were also mined.

142 Mustangs attempted to strike the NAGOYA airfields. HAMAMATSU was the only field hit due to bad weather conditions over the other targets. 12 aircraft from the same group hit HAMASHIMA seaplane base destroying 1 hangar, 1 SCL, 4 SD; other light vessels were damaged. 2 planes were lost, 1 pilot rescued.

In the RYUKYUS on the 1st 21 B-25s bombed CHIRAN airfield in southern KYUSHU. P-47s on continuous CAP over KYUSHU destroyed 4 seaplanes and flamed 1 Betty. Neutralization raids were carried out against other islands in the RYUKYU chain.

7 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer left 1 DD and 1 medium freighter burning in HANGCHOW BAY. 2 3000-ton freighters were damaged off the SH coast of KYUSHU.

FAW 1 planes sank 2 small ships and damaged 1 in the YELLOW SEA.

During June search planes of the 7thFlt destroyed 161 ships totalling 30,320 tons and damaged 209 totalling 25,485 tons. In addition 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March (18 Mar. - 30 June, Incl) total 4,941. 5 enemy planes destroyed by TG 99.2 since 1 July.

COMPHIBSPAC 271435 (pink) outlines tentative agreement with FFAF and 9th AF for employment of Marine Air Warning Squadrons in OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 010151 (pink) outlines action to be taken to alleviate critical backlog of shipping at OKINAWA.

COMNAVSEAFRON 010500 (pink) recommends category of defense of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS be reduced to Category of Defense A with modifications.

CINCPAC ADV 010842 directs that CTF 93 continue to have responsibility for neutralization of Jap islands in the Central Pacific.

TOP SECRET

2 July (Guam date)

Commanding Officer of SPROSTON (DD 577) definitely claims sinking a midget submarine on 28 June.

MURRAY (DD 576) is enroute to intercept and board Japanese hospital ship believed to be TAKASAGO MARU. This vessel may be heading for WAKE. Special air search has also been initiated.

TF 38 is conducting exercises in PHILIPPINE SEA enroute to fueling rendezvous.

TIGRONE arrived at GUAM with 23 survivors transferred to her from three other boats. Added to the record total of 28 survivors which she earlier picked up and disembarked at IWO, this makes a total rescue of 51 fliers brought in by one boat on one patrol.

493 B-29s hit Empire industrial targets on 1 July. Fighter opposition was nil to weak at all targets. At UBE fires were visible to 125 miles on withdrawal.

A 24 plane CAP maintained continuously over southern KYUSHU during daylight on the 2nd shot down 4 Zekes and 4 Tonys.

FAV 1 planes off western KYUSHU probably sank 1 SAS and 3 SD on the 1st; on the 2nd 1 SC was destroyed off KUNSAN and 1 SD damaged. In attacks near CHUSAN ISLAND 7 P-47s escorted by a PB4Y-2 destroyed 1 SA, left 1 FTC burning and damaged 1 enemy aircraft on the ground. From 25 June to 1 July inclusive planes of FAV 1 sank 15,230 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 9,510 tons. The cumulative totals are 137,875 tons sunk, 138,400 tons damaged, with 37 enemy aircraft destroyed and 26 enemy aircraft damaged. During the week 3 PB4Y-2s with crews were lost.

TAF planes, in addition to KYUSHU and CHINA Coast attacks, continued hitting ISHIGAKI and KIKAI airfields. MAC-31 is now at CHIMU Field and MAC-14 is at ANASE Field, both on OKINAWA.

CINCPAC 301407 recommends to JCS continuation of existing Area Petroleum Officers to control theater petroleum requirements.

RICHARDSON 012010 announces that effective 1 July ComGenPOA-ComGen Hawaiian Department assumes the title ComGenAFMidPac.

CINCPAC ADV 020021 directs MURRAY (DD 576) to intercept and board hospital ship suspected enroute to WAKE.

CINCPAC ADV 020255 (pink) recommends ComPhibsPac and ComGen 6th Army be charged jointly with embarkation of OLYMPIC land forces.

CINCPAC ADV 020908 (pink) expresses no objection to designation of 7th and 27th Divisions in OKINAWA as GHQ reserve for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 020913 (pink) requests CINCPAC's concurrence in proposal for providing Port Director Units at all ports in KYUSHU.

TOP SECRET

3 July (Guam date)

LAPON (SS 260) sighted a hospital ship headed for CHICHI JIMA on 2 July.

The evening of 2 July approximately 275 miles NW of WAKE a party from USS MURRAY boarded the Jap AH TAKASAGO MARU enroute to WAKE and finding no reason to detain her directed her to continue her voyage.


The night of 3 July 484 B-29s hit TOKUSHIMA, KOCHI, TAKAMATSU and HIMEJI. Photographs taken on the 2nd show the following percentage destruction of built up areas which were attacked on the 29th with incendiaries: MOJI 28.8%, MOBEKA 36%, SASEBO 17.9% and SHIMONOSEKI 36%. In the 4 targets here assessed, total destruction reported is 1.755 square miles, which is 28% of the total built-up areas in the targets. The assessment is not complete because of smoke.

On 2 July 56 P-47s protected 5 photo PB4Is over KYUSHU, driving off 18 Oscars after they had damaged 1 Liberator and wounded 2 crewmen. The 24 plane P4U CAP was over KYUSHU for 2 hours prior to noon, apparently, and not during all of daylight as planned. On 3 July 26 P-47s hit the Kanoya airfield control tower, strafing barracks and administration buildings, and firing 6 single-engine aircraft.

Off TSUSHIMA ISLAND a PAV 1 Privateer destroyed 1 SD by bombing and strafing on the 2nd. On the 3rd 1 SD was sunk NE of SAISHU TO, and PAV 18 planes probably sank 1 and damaged 1 SD off HACHIJO JIMA.

In attacks on the 2nd against SAKISHIMA 1 TEM was shot down by MIYAKO AA. A Dumbo picked up all members of the crew. On the 3rd 32 P4Us hit ISHIGAKI, exploding 1 single-engine enemy aircraft on the ground, and scoring a direct hit on a gun position.

MURRAY (DD 576) 031310 reports boarding the Jap AH TAKASAGO MARU and after examination directing her to proceed on her voyage.

Cur 

4 July (Guam date)

TF 38 is enroute to its first rendezvous, with task groups exercising independently. Units of TG 30.8 departed MARIANAS enroute to rendezvous. TF 39 starts sweep of area "JUNEAU" tomorrow. TF 32 and CVE of TG 32.1 are in support. British oilers are enroute to their fueling rendezvous.

On the 4th, approximately 820 planes were over the Empire on attack, escort, mining and reconnaissance missions. This total includes about 900 B-29s at TAKAMATSU KOCHI, TOKUSHIMA and HIMEJI, 30 B-29s mining, 132 P-51s over TOKYO airfields, 32 P-47s to KYUSHU, 48 P-51s scheduled for KYUSHU, and 104 fighters scheduled to escort photo planes over KYUSHU (confirmation of last 2 missions have not been received).

Enemy aircraft opposition to the P-51 strike was slight and only 1 Jap plane was shot down. On the ground 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 20 damaged.

On the 3rd 26 B-25s and 32 P4Us attacked CHIRAN drone and dispersal areas. 48 P-51s of the 5th AF swept the western coast of KYUSHU, losing 1 plane.

North of the YANGTZE RIVER mouth a convoy of 2 large DD, 1 small DD, 2 PC, 1 FTC, 1 TB was attacked on the 4th by 8 P-47s, 6 PFM and 2 Privateers. Rocket hits fired the small DD and strafing fired 1 PC and damaged 1 DD and the TB. PFMs fired 6 torpedoes from 4-5,000 yards at altitude of 100-150 feet, getting good runs, but no hits.

- Continued -

3252

TOP SECRET

4 July (Guam date) (Cont'd)

COM FEAF 040540 recommends that all air-sea rescue services from OKINAWA be operated by FEAF.

COMINCH & CNO 041350 (pink) requests review of requirements for artificial harbors for CORONET.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz returned to GUAM from the West Coast.

5 July (Guam date)

TAKASAGO MARU departed WAKE at 1600/5th and was intercepted 2½ hours later and boarded by MURRAY (DD 576). MURRAY reported that the ship had 974 patients, all bona fide. 490 were Navy, 484 Army. 15% were tuberculosis, 14 men were wounded, and the rest were suffering from serious malnutrition. Estimated 15% would not survive the voyage. 25% might be restored to duty in 60 days. Most certain no stores were landed. Destination believed YOKOSUKA. No allied personnel aboard. The ship was directed to continue her voyage.

On the 4th 48 P-51s of the 5th AF swept KYUSHU, meeting no interception but some AA. 96 P-47s escorted 4 photo PB4Ys over KYUSHU through 8-10/10 clouds. There was no interception. On the 5th 32 P-51s of the 5th AF were over KYUSHU from 1200-1410, from 10,000 feet to the deck. 6 Georges intercepted, 4 of which were shot down, with the remaining 2 probably destroyed. There were no P-51 losses.

26 B-29s laid 228 mines in the western entrance to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, in MATZURU and in FUNAKAWA HARBOR (NW HONSHU).

103 P-51s struck TOKYO airfields on the 5th. On the ground 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 10 damaged. Hangars and installations were fired at SHIMODATE, and small and medium shipping targets were damaged south of TOKYO BAY. There was no enemy air opposition. 2 P-51s were damaged by AA.

3 pairs of Privateers roamed over southern and central KOREA, destroying or damaging 5 bridges, blocking 4 tunnels, destroyed 2 and damaged 4 locomotives, damaged a power house, a radio station and 2 lighthouses. An FTD was sunk south of SAISHU TO. FAW 1 PTMs sank 1 300-ton AK off the YAKYUZE and damaged a lighthouse and barracks with bombs. Off GOTO RETTO (western KYUSHU) 1 SD was sunk and 1 damaged.

30 F4Us hit OKINO-SENJUN and 24 F4Us plus 13 TBMs hit Wan Airfield at KIKAI.

6 July (Guam date)

TAKASAKA MARU now believed headed for YOKOSUKA rather than HOKKAIDO. However she started out on course 330, speed 15, and this course and speed was confirmed by a plane sighting at noon yesterday.

TF 39, the Mine Flotilla in area JUNEAU, has been maintaining radio silence, and has apparently not been discovered. TF 32 has deployed in a covering position to the westward of OKINAWA. TF 38 will pass south of IWO tomorrow towards its fueling rendezvous on the 8th with TG 30.8.

Sub sweep starts at 1900 tomorrow prior to run-in.

- Continued -

3253

TOP SECRET

6 July (Guam date)(Cont'd)

577 B-29s were over 5 Empire targets between 0018 and 0342 on the 7th. Fighter opposition was nil to slight at all targets and AA was generally nil to moderate.

On the 6th 112 P-51s attacked TOKYO airfields for the 2nd day in succession. Again airborne opposition was light with claims 1 - 0 - 6. On the ground P-51s claim 6 - 1 - 9. 1 P-51 was lost and 7 damaged.

FAW 18 planes destroyed 1 SD off SURUGA WAN, and left a second SD burning. FAW 1 planes sank 1 FTC and 1 FTD off SAICHU TO, exploded a gas dump on shore and shot down 1 Val.

From OKINAWA 6 photo PB4Ys and 5 P-5s escorted by 136 F4Us and P-47s were weathered out of KYUSHU at 1300. The fighters then attacked a possible FTB, with possible damage and destroyed several small boats in the NAMI Area. At 1730 35 P-47s hit TOKUNO damaging the runways, dispersal areas, and gun positions.

COM3RDFLT 030515 (pink) expresses intention to carry out 10 July operation solely against aircraft but to strike NAGATO on 16-17 July.

CINCPAC 031353 (pink) requests transfer of 7th AF effective 6 July, including 3 Long Range Fighter Groups.

CGUSFCT 051200 (pink) comments to CINCPAC concerning NAIPKO operation for obtaining intelligence in KOREA.

CINCPAC ADV 060553 (pink) requests ComGenAAFPAC's comments on disposition of 20th AF fighters in the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADV 060554 (pink) concurs in transfer of 7th AF units not later than 15 July.

CINCPAC ADV 060617 requests that 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be released to operational control of Com7thFlt immediately.

CINCPAC ADV 060626 directs that all 7th AF units in OKINAWA report to CTG 99.2 pending assignment to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 060822 (pink) concurs in use of destroyers for FORT BAYARD project until about 15 September.

CINCPAC ADV 060829 recommends to Cominch facilities at MANUS to be made available to the British Pacific Fleet.

TOP SECRET

7 July (Guam date)

GABILAN (SS 252) reports attacking an RO sub off TOKYO.

Com3rdFlt has detached a destroyer, *MADEIRA* (DD 677), with ComDesDiv 108 embarked to search for and intercept the *TAKASAGO MARU*. She has orders to board, seal her radio, and escort her clear of our forces. CTF 94 has despatched planes to assist in the search. They have been directed to fly along an arc which represents line of position of ship at 15 knots from her last reported position.

TF 39 has completed sweep of the first 12 miles of area JUNEAU without encountering any mines. TF 32 remains in a covering position. TF 38 is at fueling rendezvous with TG 30.8.

31 P-51s of the 5th AF, forced by weather to stay in the KAGOSHIMA BAY Area of KYUSHU, attacked locomotives and railroad cars. 6 photo PB4Ys, escorted by 128 fighters, found KYUSHU overcast and got no pictures.

PAW 1 planes damaged 5 SD south of SHANTUNG PENINSULA. Just west of SASHBO a Privateer, attacked by fighters, shot down 1 and then itself was shot down. Subsequent search failed to locate survivors, and the SEA ROBIN, lifeguard in the area, believes the enemy has them.

PBJs on the nights of 5/6th and 6/7th scored rocket hits on 4 300-foot unidentified vessels and 1 150-foot ship, all south and southeast of HONSHU.

PAW 18 planes during June sank 16,300 tons of enemy shipping and damaged or probably sank 11,150 tons more. They destroyed 8 enemy aircraft and probably destroyed or damaged 13.

12 F4Us in attacks on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 6th burned 3 planes on the ground. TAF planes burned four at TOKUNO on the 7th out of 12 possibly operational planes seen.

COMINCH & CNO 071310 (pink) outlines RAF airfield construction forces and requests CINCPAC to designate destination for 1st echelon, known as Shield Force, and time for movement of 2nd echelon, known as Vacuum Force.

8 July (Guam date)

TAKASAGO MARU was picked up by a search plane at 1005 8th at 32-10 N 157 E. Destroyer is on intercepting course. No report of her investigation received.

Minesweepers of TF 39 are progressing in area JUNEAU about as scheduled. On the 7th 19 moored mines were swept and 5 floaters destroyed. All were found along the general line indicated by captured charts.

166 TAF planes attacked OMURA airfield and installations. The 47 B-24s, 25 B-25s and 94 P-47s hit AA positions, barracks, shops and dispersal areas with fragmentation bombs and incendiaries. Many fires were started. 1 B-25 and 9 B-24s were holed by AA but all returned safely.

In attacks on MIYAKO on the 7th 12 F4Us and 18 TBM destroyed 2 twin-engine planes in a revetment. Other F4Us at AMAMI burned 4 of 11 SD and probably damaged the other 7. 3 float planes were strafed and 2 exploded.

- Continued -

3255

TOP SECRET

8 July (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADV 080301 (pink) contains proposed reorganization of PhilSeaFron and Com7thFlt in order to free the latter for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 080540 (pink) requests ComGenPOA and ComNavSeaFron recommendations for reductions in the category of defense.

CINCPAC ADV 080802 (pink) requests early determination by CINCPAC of location of Naval Air Base in the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC 081059 (pink) concurs with CINCPAC 020913 concerning provision of Port Directors for OLYMPIC.

9 July (Guam date)

Minesweeping operations in EAST CHINA SEA continue. TF 38 strikes TOKYO tomorrow.

On the 9th 549 effective B-29s were over SENDAI, Gifu, YOKKAICHI, SAKAI and WAKAYAMA, bombing with incendiaries. On the same date 30 B-29s mined the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

43 B-24s attacked OMURA airfield with P-47 escort. The P-47s shot down 10 biplane trainers over western KYUSHU. 61 B-25s with 48 P-47 escorts, weathered out of CHIRAN, attacked TOKUNO airfield and OKINO-KIRAJU with 43 tons of frag clusters. 48 other P-47s, weathered out of KYUSHU, attacked KIKAI, AMAMI and TOKUNO.

On the 8th 114 P-51s attacked airfields in the TOKYO area meeting aggressive enemy fighter opposition. P-51s shot down 5 and destroyed 28 on the ground. 7 P-51s were lost, but 3 pilots rescued.

2 Privateers of FAW 1 broadcasting a description of their trip over CMB, sank 2 SCS and 2 luggers, and damaged 1 SD and 2 more luggers off SW KOREA. West of SASEBO 8 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer, sank 1 FTC and damaged a 2nd and fired a 150-foot ship. The explosion of the FTC knocked down 1 P-47. The remaining P-47s were attacked by 8 Tojos and Georges and 1 P-47 was shot down. 1 Tojo was also shot down.

FAW 1 seaplanes on the 9th sank 1 SD south of SHANTUNG PENINSULA, and damaged a small FT. Fire from the latter vessel holed 1 search plane and wounded 5 members of the crew.

COM7THFLT 080200 concurs in CINCPAC 060829 concerning recommended facilities for BPF at MANUS.

CINCPAC ADV 080614 warns Com34dFlt that TAKASAGO MARU has a short coal supply and that she should not be brought into a U.S. port.

CINCPAC 090057 (pink) objects to phrases in CINCPAC Joint Staff Study concerning transfer of command from Commander Amphibious Forces to ComGen Expeditionary Troops.

CINCPAC 090900 (pink) directs Com7thFlt to provide 2 LSTs for CINCPAC headquarters ships.

CINCPAC 090901 (pink) outlines naval organization ashore for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 090907 (pink) recommends relocation of NOB KYUSHU from TAKASU to the western side of KAGOSHIMA.

325

TOP SECRET

10 July (Guam date)

ComDesDiv 108 reported that he had taken the TAKASAGO MARU under escort and was proceeding on a general southwesterly course clear of TF 38's operating area. He was directed to release her sometime between 1800 today and 1800 tomorrow, to proceed to YOKOSUKA.

TF 39 is proceeding with their mine clearance without incident. 37 more mines swept and about one-third of the area covered. Force was snooped on the 5th and 6th; 1 plane was shot down.

ComServDiv 104 is shifting all facilities from KERAMA to BUCKNER BAY.

Forces from CHINA are landing on 5 islands off the CHINA Coast in the north part of FORMOSA STRAITS; landings will continue through to the end of July.

Com3rdFlt reports preliminary results of the 1st 3 of 7 strikes against TOKYO airfields on the 10th. Only 9 aircraft were seen airborne in the target area. Photos show 693 aircraft on 17 fields, with pilot reports adding 175 more on 7 additional fields, for a total of 868 on 24 fields. So far 72 enemy aircraft have been destroyed on the ground and 80 damaged. The VT fuses were highly effective. The force was snooped about noon and 2 recon planes were splashed by our CAP. Our losses so far are 1 F4U and 4 TBM. TF 38 will retire tonight to refuel and rendezvous with TF 37 tomorrow.

109 P-51s hit airfields in the NAQOYA-OSAKA area on the 9th meeting 36 unaggressive enemy fighters over OSAKA. The P-51s scored 12-4-10 in the air, and 4-0-1 on the ground. 1 P-51 was lost and 5 damaged. On the 10th 102 P-51s hit airfields in the KOBE-OSAKA Area shooting down 1 airborne enemy aircraft and scoring 13-0-4 on the ground. 3 P-51s were lost.

On the 9th 43 B-24s with 6 P-47 escorts attacked OMURA airfield starting 3 fires. On the 10th 41 P-51s attempted to sweep KYUSHU, but weather prevented. 1 P-51 was lost.

On the 9th Privateers in TSUSHIMA STRAIT sank 2 SD and left a 3rd burning, beached 1 lugger and sank 1. In SW KOREA 2 phosphate plants were bombed. FAW 18 Liberators slightly damaged 1 125-ft picket boat and seriously damaged 1 FTB E of HOKUSHU at 36-18 N. FAW 1 planes, from 2 - 8 July inclusive, sank 6,780 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 1,040 tons, destroyed 4 enemy planes and damaged 3. Since arrival in the area FAW 1 planes have sunk 159 seagoing ships for 145,650 tons, damaged 194 for 138,980 tons, destroyed 41 enemy aircraft and damaged 29.

COMGENAFAPOA 090847 concurs in transfer of Hdqtrs. 7th AF to FEAF with detailed recommendations to follow.

CINCPAC ADV 100055 directs transfer of operational of 7th AF and temporarily of 20th AF units in KYUKYUS to FEAF.

CINCPAC ADV 100218 (pink) comments on CINCPAC 090215 concerning coordination of air forces.

CINCPAC ADV 100238 (pink) provides tentative deployment of Privateer squadrons following OLYMPIC.

USAFAPAC 100417 (pink) requests 14th AF intelligence information for purposes of coordination of operations between FEAF and 14th AF.

CINCPAC 100601 directs ComGenAFMidPac to review requirements for service troops in rear areas with a view to their reduction.

CINCPAC ADV 100748 (pink) requests that ComGen CHINA provide CTF 33 with officers familiar with CHINA situation.

Cur EV 3257

TOP SECRET

11 July (Quan date)

ComDesDiv 108 reported releasing TAKASAGO MARU at 24-57N 150-05E at 1000/1 on the 10th with orders to proceed to YOKOSUKA. After release she was tracked at 14 knots, but subsequent sightings indicate a speed of advance of only 9 knots.

TF 38 is scheduled to fuel on the 12th. At 1400 it will depart from fueling rendezvous for the run-in to northern HONSHU. CTG 94.1 has extended sectors from IWO which run east of HONSHU to a maximum distance of 1120 miles and is running a barrier patrol between the force and JAPAN.

43 B-24s weathered out of KYUSHU on the 10th hit KAKI. 59 escorting P-47s ran into accurate AA which killed 2 pilots and forced 3 others to ditch. 62 B-25s bombed RONCHI. 1 B-25 was lost as a result of a mid-air collision. 48 escorting F4Us strafed KIKAI and knocked out 5 AA positions. Accurate AA killed 1 pilot, forced a 2nd to ditch and a 3rd to belly land at base.

On the 11th bad weather over KOKUBU and MIYAKONOJO caused 150 F4Us and 9 TBMs to hit MIYAZAKI Airfield, starting large fires. 54 F4Us and 9 TBMs weathered out of KANOYA EAST hit INUJO Airfield in the TANEGASHIMA SHIMA.

On the 10th FAW 18 planes left 1 of 2 1000-ton FTD dead in the water. FAW 18 planes on the 11th damaged 2 picket boats at 39-00 N, 141-55E; FAW 1 planes sank 1 SC and fired 1 SD in TSUSHIMA STRAIT.

29 B-29s laid 260 mines on the 9th. 1 B-29 was lost, believed shot down by AA in the target area.

Photos taken on the 11th show the Maruzen Oil Refinery at YAKAYAMA to have been 95% destroyed by the attack of the 6th-7th.

CINCPAC EARL 030335 (pink) requests CINCPAC and COMGEN CHINA to comment on NAPKO project.

CINCPAC ADV 060825 constitutes Comdt. NOB OKINAWA as administrative senior for all naval activities in the OKINAWA Group.

CINCPAC ADV 110146 (pink) is OpPlan 4-45 for TF 95 for interruption of enemy shipping on CHINA Coast and in the EAST CHINA SEA.

CINCPAC ADV 110153 (pink) forms TF 95 composed of CruDivs 12 and 16.

CINCPAC ADV 110628 requests reply from CINCPAC concerning NAPKO.

CINCPAC ADV 110653 (pink) concerns destinations of units made available to CINCPAC from POA.

COMNAVGROUP CHINA 110752 (pink) proposes to provide CTF 95 with Chinese interpreters.

CINCPAC ADV 110827 (pink) cancels OpPlan 2-45 for defense of West Coast against Japanese carrier task force.

CINCPAC ADV 110828 lists ports and installations in the SEA OF JAPAN where heavy shipping traffic may be expected.

CINCPAC ADV 110832 (pink) requests ComGenFMFPac to prepare and keep up to date plans for the capture of WAKE.

from JV 3252

TOP SECRET

12 July (Guam date)

Task Force 38 will be in position to strike northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO on the morning of the 13th.

Mine Flotilla continues sweeping in area JUNEAU. Almost half of the field has been covered. A total of 152 moored mines have been swept and 21 floaters sighted.

526 B-29s attacked Empire targets on the night of 12/13 July. 42 B-29s of a group of 58 attacked Kanoya drome on the 12th through the clouds with 16 hitting other targets. 64 F4Us flew over. 47 B-24s found TSUKI closed in and hit MAN airfield on KIKAI with 1451 frags. Results were unobserved. 61 P-47 escorts hit TANEGA and KIKAI. VF(11) in the KYUKYU splashed 1 Sally at 0420.

From 2345-0415 on the night of 11/12th 1 PBM of FAW 1 made 4 runs over SHANGHAI at 600 feet and dropped 9 100-lb. bombs and 3 fire bombs at 6 TB and FT tied up at the docks. No hits observed. The city was dimmed out.

Privateers of FAW 1 on the east coast of KYUSHU on the 12th destroyed 1 factory, heavily damaged a second when the boiler blew up, knocked out 1 span of a railroad bridge, burned 1 passenger train and 2 locomotives. AA holed both planes. 1 SD was destroyed north of SHANGHAI.

CINCPAC 090215 (pink) outlines differences between CINCPAC and CINCPAC relative to air coordination and other matters.

CINCPAC 111425 (pink) explains how elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing came to be assigned to Royal Australian Air Force in the northern SOLOMONS.

COM FEA 112140 (pink) directs ComGenFEA immediately on transfer of 7th AF to undertake neutralization and destruction of all enemy air forces west of 135 E.

COMINCH & CMC 112159 (pink) contains Cominch's modified proposal for division of control of OKINAWA between the Army and Navy.

CINCPAC ADV 112336 (pink) requests CINCPAC to undertake appropriate strikes on SHANGHAI air bases in support of TF 95.

CINCPAC ADV 120217 (pink) consents to movement of SHIELD and VACUUM forces to OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 120446 (pink) recommends the establishment of certain communication facilities between Headquarters Soviet Far East Command with GUAM.

CINCPAC ADV 120535 directs that the IsCom OKINAWA proceed with construction of ATC facilities at Naha.

CINCPAC ADV 120726 proposes that 1st MAF arrangements stand until MANILA conference on 20 July.

CINCPAC ADV 120728 (pink) concurs in minutes of 21 June conference on radio intelligence plan subject to specified qualifications.

CINCPAC ADV 120814 requests DepCom 20 and ComGenPOA to inform CINCPAC in detail concerning Army units required in support of 20th Air Force.

- Continued -

3253

TOP SECRET

12 July (Ann date) (Cont'd)

CG USFOT 121000 (pink) stipulates that all attacks on targets in CHINA must be cleared with CG CHINA Theater and that only precision bombing of urban targets be undertaken.

CG USFOT 121015 (pink) requests comment concerning FORT HANCOCK project.

CINCPAC AG 121159 (pink) invites CINC AG and DoCom 20th AF to attend conference at MANILA 17 July with CHINA Theater representatives concerning deception plan.

13 July (Ann date)

ComdFt reported that TF 36 on the morning of the 14th was attacking northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, having effected complete surprise.

The Mine Flotilla on the 13th swept 43 more mines and departed the operating area for BUCKNER BAY for logistics. Sweeping will be resumed on the 19th, and is now two days ahead of schedule.

32 P-51s swept KYUSHU on the 12th meeting no interception. They strafed and damaged 1 SC, several small boats, and several airfields.

The Tactical Air Force, KYUKYU, was dissolved as of 140001. (OTG 99.2 130000). 7th AF units (B-24, B-25, A-26 and F-5) temporarily assigned to the TAF now report to ComFtAF for operational control, as do 20th AF units (P-47) temporarily assigned to TAF. All Marine units report to the 2nd Marine Air Wing for operational control. The 2nd MAF now assumes the designation of TG 99.2.

Heavy aircraft destroyed in the FOA since 16 March: 16 March - 30 June inclusive - 4,941; 1 July - 13 July: TF 36 74, TF 37 0, TF 93 79, TG 30.5 4, 20th AAF 0, TF 94 0, TG 99.2 30; total 167.

COMUSMACV & CNO 112135 (pink) directs CINCPAC to submit by dispatch proposals for reorganization of naval forces in the southwest Pacific.

MACASHEAR 130731 (pink) directs Combined Air Forces, subject to concurrence of Comd CHINA, to strike targets in SHANSHAI area in support of TF 93.

GENSTOA ADV 130744 requests ComFtFt to submit a list of projects not yet completed but which are necessary for development of naval aviation in the PHILIPPINES during the war.

CINCPAC ADV 130749 (pink) comments on JCS 1406/2 which concerns the transfer of command of the KYUKYU to CINCPAC.

COMUSMACV ADV 130751 (pink) in reply to COMUSMACV 112135 recommends reorganization of naval forces in the Southwest Pacific.

CINCPAC 130831 (pink) concurs in relocation of Naval Base from TAIWAN to west coast of HAKODENMAI HAN north of YAMAGUCHI KO.

CINCPAC ADV 130901 (pink) submits recommendations to COMUSMACV covering carrier air group complements during early 1944.

- Continued -

3260

REL. SUMMARY

13 July (Comm date)(Cont'd)

RICHARDSON 131073 (pink) recommends against reduction or modification of category of defense in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

GINDAFFAC 131309 (pink) recommends postponement of HONOLULU meeting to 1 August in order that General Spauls may be present.

GINDAFFAC 131311 (pink) concurs in **GINDAFFAC 130726** concerning operational control of the 1st Marine Air Wing.

HUNTER 131320 (pink) reports results of mine reconnaissance off the SE Coast of KURE.

14 July (Comm date)

Attacks on northern HONOLULU and HONOLULU were carried out on the 14th by planes of TF 30. Extensive damage to shipping and docks.

At noon, bombardment Group ANGLE (TU 34.8.1) bombarded KAWAIAHOU for 2 hours. The steel mill there was demolished. Other areas were hit and burning furiously. The entire area was covered with dense smoke rising thousands of feet above the city, making detailed assessment of damage difficult. 1 plane crashed in the harbor.

In the afternoon, ComB-7 Fleet detached Cruiser 16 (RADM. Jones in PASADENA, SPRINGFIELD, ASTORIA, WILKES-BARRE) and 6 DD of Division 25 for a night speed anti-shipping sweep along the coast between 39N and 40N.

Part of Bombardment Group BAKER (TU 34.8.2), consisting of BDO, WISCONSIN and MISSOURI, plus 7 DD of Division 24, was detached early this morning to bombard HONOLULU. Primary target assigned is the steel and iron mills. Secondary target is the coal liquefaction plant.

Weather hampered plane strikes - the only field not completely closed in was Oahu. Partial flash reports show 24 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and 62 damaged, mostly at Matsushima, Matsuda and Misawa fields in northern Honshu. 1 snooper was shot down 85 miles from the force.

In attacks on shipping the following resulted:

Destroyed
2 U.S. ferries at sea
10 small AK
1 OGD
2 night boats
Total - 15

Damage
1 train ferry
4 medium tankers
1 medium AP
5 medium AK
8 small AK
2 DE
1 FC
1 tug
1 LASH
Total - 24

- Continued -

TOP SECRET

14 July (Gann date)(Cont'd)

Dock facilities at Mahedate, and railroad yards and rolling stock in southern Hokkaido were heavily damaged, with 27 locomotives destroyed.

Final reports of TF 38 strikes on the Tokyo Plains area on the 10th show 109 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and 231 damaged.

Photographs taken on the 10th of 65 airfields in the TOKYO area show 1791 operational planes (1478 single-engine, 313 twin-engine). The planes were extensively camouflaged and dispersed as much as 5 miles from runways, with existing roads used for taxiways.

On the 10th 1160 combat sorties expended 454 tons of bombs and 1442 rockets.

Our losses were 17 planes, 10 in combat and 7 operationally, with 7 pilots and 6 aircrewmembers lost.

In the KYUKUS one Betty was shot down at 21,000 feet, 30 miles northwest of OKINAWA.

The TAF, now dissolved, destroyed 625 airborne enemy aircraft from 7 April to 13 July, 496 by two Marine Air Wing planes, and 129 by ANF 301st Fighter Wing Planes. 29 were probably destroyed, 9 ships were destroyed and 37 damaged.

ComGenAir 091442 (pink) requests comments of ComGen FMAF concerning absorbing the 7th Air Force by 5th and 13th Air Forces.

100450 (pink)

ComGenAFPOA/suspends any presentation of the "numbered Air Force proposal to Admiral Nimitz."

Com7thFleet 122014 (pink) comments to CINCPAC concerning reorganization of the 7th Fleet prior to OLYMPIC.

WAROCS 122019 (pink) requests that MANILA conference be deferred in order that General Spots may attend.

ComGenFMAF 122215 (pink) recommends that 7th Fighter Wing take over administration of Air Force units in Hawaii and that 7th Air Force be retained in existence under ComGen FMAF.

Com3rdFleet 132105 (pink) constitutes annex A-1 Op-Plan 9-45 movement and attack schedule 21 July through 8 August.

Com3rdFleet 132122 summarizes 3rd Fleet operations off TOKYO on 10 July.

Com3rdFleet 132145 (pink) outlines coordination required in support of operations from 21 July through 8 August.

Cinopac Advance 140255 (pink) proposes conference at Gann about 20 July concerning occupation of JAPAN.

Cinopac Advance 140256 (pink) concurs in postponement of Manila conference to 1 August and inquires whether conference will be on staff level or between commands themselves.

- continued -

3282

TOP SECRET

14 July (Comm date)(cont'd)

Com3rd Fleet 140425 constitutes Op-Order for shipping sweep by TG 36.3 consisting of CruDiv 17 and Destroyer 25 plus three destroyers.

Cincomop Advance 140901 (pink) requests CincPac SupCom 20 and CTF 93 to provide coordination required by Com3rd Fleet.

15 July (Comm date)

TF 36 completed second day's strike on northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, and is retired to southeast to rendezvous with oilers and TF 37. (See air summary for results of air strikes.)

No report of the shipping sweep by CruDiv 17.

Bombardment of HONSHU met no airborne or surface opposition. At the KURE Steel Plant there were terrific explosions and fires. At the YAMAGUCHI Iron Works many buildings were demolished or on fire.

On the 14th, in addition to bombardment support, TF 36 flew over 600 strikes on Honshu. Airfields and shipping were the principle targets, ranging from SENDAI to KURE. Only 2 airborne enemy aircraft were seen, both badly, and 1 was shot down, the other damaged. Most of the destruction was on northern HONSHU fields, especially MATSUSHIMA, MASUDA, and HACHINOE. Airfields in western HOKKAIDO were totally closed in.

In attacks on shipping 23 ships and 25 barges were sunk (for 41,000 tons) including 5 of 7 railroad ferries.

Ships damaged totalled 24, plus 3 loggers for 43,000 tons.

On the ground 30 locomotives were destroyed and 16 damaged, and heavy damage was inflicted on 6 trains, numerous warehouses, wharves, bunkers, hangars, barracks, railroad yards, and bridges. A large part of KURE was burned out.

Our combat losses were 9 planes, 3 crewmen, and no pilots.

On the 15th the 1st 3 strikes, all that are so far reported, were carried out again in weather that closed all but a few fields. There was no airborne opposition. 4 Jap planes were destroyed on the ground and 1 was damaged.

9 ships and 6 small craft totalling 12,000 tons were sunk.

9 ships and 30 small craft for 12,000 tons were damaged.

105 P-51s attacked KAGUYA airfield on the 15th meeting a few unaggressive Jap airborne planes. Score in the air was 4 planes destroyed, and on the ground 9 destroyed. AA destroyed 3 P-51s.

15 Privateers of F5U-1, in attacks around the coasts of HONSHU sank 1 SS and 3 SD, and damaged 3 SS, 4 SD, and 1 tug. 3 locomotives were exploded, a railroad bridge was destroyed and 1 damaged, and a tunnel was closed, and damage was done to 4 railroad stations, 1 power plant, 1 roundhouse, 2 locomotives and 30 cars.

- continued -

320

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ (Comm date)(Cont'd)

6 Privateers of F4U-1, scheduled to attack SHANSHAI shipping the night of the 15th, from fragmentary inflight reports apparently met a refinery and several ships afire, and returned with 4 of the planes seriously damaged.

COMNAV FMFPAC 142133 (pink) outlines troop requirements considered necessary for capture of WAKE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150728 (pink) directs CTF 36 Op-Plan 2-45 be modified to comply with Cinpac directives making enemy combatant vessels at TOKYO BAY primary targets.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150549 to CINC BPF agrees to facilities at MANUS to be made available to British Pacific Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150722 directs ComSubPac to make 4 submarines available for lifeguard duty in the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150725 passes CINCPAC 111425, 131311 and CINCPAC 150726 concerning 1 August conference and operational control of First Marine Air Wing.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150727 directs Com2ndCafTF serial 00211 of 26 June be modified to assign shipping as primary objective of 3rd Fleet.

~~16 July~~ (Comm date)

At 0747 yesterday a plane of TG 30.6 saw and attacked a submarine at 34N 151E, scoring one hit before the sub submerged. Reports from the group were ordered to the scene. Planes tracked until LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR (H435) gained contact at 1130. The DE fired a full hedgehog pattern, making several hits followed by 2 violent explosions. Much debris recovered. This is a definite sinking.

TF 95 also sorties on the 16th for sweep along the East China Coast.

All 9th AF missions at OKINAWA except 1 were cancelled because of weather. 8 P-51's provided cover for a lifeguard sub and then swept Southern KYUSHU, shooting down 1 George caught taking off from KUMAKOTO.

100 P-51's were over NAGOYA airfields on the 16th where they met 74 enemy aircraft. 1 P-51 was lost over the target, and 1 operationally. The VP encounters were 15,000 feet to the deck, from KUMOTU to YOKKAICHI and west to the mountains.

Inflight reports from F4U-18 planes on the 16th indicate the sinking of 1 coastal patrol boat off KII SUIDO and the destruction of 2 SD south of KINSHU.

TOP SECRET
JOINT (GOF)

16 July (Comm date)

COMUSFOT 121145 (pink) outlines estimated requirements for construction troops, port companies for **FORT BAYARD** operation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160141 (pink) concurs in **Richardson 150946** concerning designation of an air force for operation under **ComGenFOA**.

CINCPAC 160247 (pink) indicates that garrison beach parties are required at all beaches on **KIUSU**.

COMUSFOT 160727 (pink) indicates strategic air force requirements for construction troops in **MARIANAS** and **KIUKYUS** and numbers that can be released for other operations.

COMUSFOT AF 20 160830 (pink) comments on **Com3rd Fleet 132145** in expressing intention to continue attacks on primary targets.

COMUSFOT 163013 (pink) acknowledges **CINCPAC 150728** directing modification **CTF 38 Op-Order** to include enemy warships as primary targets.

RICHARDSON 150150 outlines requirements for construction troops for support of **20th Air Force**.

USASTAF 1511401 announces establishment of Headquarters **USASTAF** effective **160001 July**.

RICHARDSON 160001 constitutes general order number 7 establishing **Army Air Force Middle Pacific** commanded by Major General **James E. Parker**.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160138 requests that **RICHARDSON 150150** be brought to the personal attention of **Admiral King**.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160149 requests that **ComGen USASTAF** handle informally such matters as require action pending the designation of a headquarters under **ComGenFOA** for **Army Air Force**.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160155 informs **CominCh** that agreements with **Air Marshall Lloyd** contemplated use of **British engineers** for development of **KORR**.

CINCPAC 160249 outlines proposed air operations by **FEAF** in support of **3rd Fleet**.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160853 passes to **ISCOM OKINAWA CINCPAC 071329** concerning the accreditation of **War Correspondents**.

CINCPAC 161121 expresses intention to retain operational control of **7th Fleet**.

TOP SECRET
SECRET

17 July (Oman date)

Summary of 3rd Fleet operations 14th-15th:

966 combat sorties flown
140 ships of 71,000 tons sunk
235 ships of 88,000 tons damaged
37 aircraft destroyed on ground
45 aircraft damaged on ground
24 planes, 10 pilots & crewmen lost in combat
18 planes lost operationally
84 locomotives destroyed; 45 damaged
No airborne opposition
Coastal industrial targets extensively destroyed or damaged.

Bombardment Group "B" plus a British Task Unit consisting of the KING GEORGE V and escorts, bombarded the HITACHI area. Due to low overcast, there was no air spot and results were unobserved.

Hunting for better weather on the 16th TF 38 launching point has been shifted to the south.

TF 32, TF 39, and probably TF 95, are operating to the eastward of OKINAWA in an attempt to avoid the hurricane.

These forces have been removed from operational control of Com 3rd Fleet and are directly under CINCPac.

About 380 planes from the 5th and 7th Air Forces and from the 2nd MAW attacked KYUSHU targets on the 16th damaging several locomotives, bridges and small craft.

From these attacks 1 F4U is reported missing and 1 P-47 was ditched.

F4U-1 planes on the 17th sank 1 trawler and damaged 5 SD, 1 SCL, and 1 tug, and F4U-18 planes sank fishing boat at NANA JIMA.

Single FBV's scored 2 rocket hits in a 200 foot repair vessel at the north end of KAGOSHIMA BAY, and 2 more in a 170 foot vessel in SBO NABA.

F4U-1 planes, during the week of 9 through 16 July, sank 1640 tons and damaged 2940 tons of enemy shipping.

F4U-18 planes from 1 through 17 July sank 27 ships, all under 150 feet, and probably sank or damaged 45 for 11,000 tons.

28 B-29s laid 252 mines at RASHIN, CHENSAN, KIMAN and FUSAN.

TOP SECRET
July (1945)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170523 (pink) requests comment from CINCPAC proposal to have ComGENTEN report to CINCPAC now for planning COMCHENT and to be released from operational control about 1 December.

CINCPAC 170717 (pink) indicates August 1 conference was to be on staff level.

COM FLEAF 171725 (pink) directs FLEAF ADVON to continue operations in support of 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170031 relieves Com3rdFleet of operational control of TF 32, 39 and 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE outlines to COMINCH proposal of accreditation of correspondents to CINCPAC, 20th AIR FORCE and CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170342 proposes to transfer to CINCPAC AAF FOA units with exception of those committed to defense of the KYUKYUS and JOG OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170524 indicates KIRAMA HETTO will be used as an emergency anchorage and that Military control be maintained.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170539 directs TF 94 to assume responsibility of neutralization of central CANOLINES, MARCUS and MONINS.

18 July (Comm Date)

All assigned targets of TF 38 in the TOKYO area were weathered in on the 17th. Few targets of opportunity were attacked and minor damage was inflicted on shipping and ground installations. TF 37 aircraft operated to the north in somewhat better weather and destroyed 13 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged installations at NIIGATA, MASUDA and MATSU SHIMA. On the morning of the 18th TF 38 reconnoitered the TOKYO AREA and by afternoon launched heavy strikes against warships at YOKOSUKA. In the face of the most intense flak yet seen the targets were well hit but smoke and fires prevented damage assessment. At noon on the 18th Com3rdFleet formed TG 35.4 with CruDiv 18 less 2 ships and Destroyer 62 less 1 ship. This force proceeded at high speed to MOJIMA SAKI and conducted minor bombardment retiring to the east to rejoin TF 38. Poor visibility obscured results and no shipping was found.

From OKINAWA 40 F4Us of second Marine Air Wing attacked MIYAKONOJO. On the 18th from OKINAWA P 51s damaged boats and docks at MIYAZAKI on KYUSHU and scored 12 direct hits on a 10,000 ton AK at ASAMI leaving it down by the stern, afire and probably aground.

27 B-29s conducted mining operations at SEIKWAN and FUSHIKI-SANAO. FAW 1 probably sank an FTC in TSUSHIMA STRAITS and sank 2 jagers south of SHANTUNG.

TOP SECRET
REF ID: A66666

18 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CTF 99 VIA JCC OKINAWA 120918 amends his 120042 concerning aircraft of 2nd Marine Air Wing to be made available to COMNAV FMSF.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 180822 requests that CNO, COMNAV ASF and CINCPAC hereafter furnish timely notice of ships destined for OKINAWA in order that back log of cargo now afloat with discharge at OKINAWA may be controlled.

COMNAVFLT 171356 (pink) reports operations of TF 38 and TF 37 of 17 July off TOKYO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 180651 (pink) designates to CINCPAC elements to comprise the First Marine Air Wing for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 180703 (pink) requests recommendations of COMNAVFLT and COMNAVSPAC concerning petroleum logistics to be provided by COMNAVFLT at MANILA.

COMNAVFLT 180912 reports additional results of operations of TF's 38 and 37 on 17 July.

COMNAVFLT 181033 reports operations of 18 July off TOKYO.

JCS 181200 (pink) requests CINCPAC comments on proposal to provide an artificial harbor for protection of small craft in lieu of artificial harbor for ocean-going vessels.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 181255 comments on JCS 150417 concerning joint communication board for coordination of communication matters in POA.

CTG 35.4 181545 reports results of bombardment of MOJIMA SAKI the night of 18 July.

19 July (Guam Date)

Ships in BUCKNER BAY were ordered to leave port yesterday evening and operate to the south of OKINAWA. TF 39 and TF 32 are still at sea. TF 39 will return to BUCKNER BAY after storm passes, fuel and resupply sweeping, probably the 24th. TF 95 is south of OKINAWA but will commence their EAST CHINA SEA operations tomorrow.

561 effective B-29s attacked 5 RAMPAGE targets the night of 19 July. 96 P-51s attacked NAGOYA area airfields on the 19th, meeting only slight enemy fighter opposition. There were only 11 VF encounters and enemy pilots attempted to evade. P-51s claim 9 enemy aircraft shot down. Few planes were observed on NAGOYA airfields - several were apparently empty. 2 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground. 77 P-51s attacked southern KYUSHU targets, damaging several locomotives and box cars, and scoring 2 hits on a large AK in NAZE HARBOR. FAN-1 sank 7 SD off west central KOREA, and damaged 2 others. 3 Jap VF attacked without success. Off SAKI a sub-chaser was damaged and an SD was damaged in BUNGO SUICID.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~JULY (1947)~~

19 July (Guam date)(Continued)

FAN-18 planes left 1 SD sinking off SHIONO-MISAKI (HONSHU). PBJs hit a 400 foot AK and 175 foot patrol vessel in the south entrance to the INLAND SEA. The night of the 18th there were 6 raids on the OKINAWA area, with an estimated 9 aircraft. No attacks have been reported on land targets. 2 MAN VP(N) shot down 2 JILLS to the north of OKINAWA, and later got 1 ZONE, making 34 kills for VMP(N) 533, and 500 kills for the 2nd MAN since 7 April. WASP "Paddle Operation" was conducted against WAKE on the 18th without incident.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 182252 (pink) requests information from CINCPAC concerning the latest plan for action of Air Warning units on outlying positions.

CINCPAC 190455 (pink) requests concurrence in proposal to change "Objective Area" with a radius of 120 miles centered on SATA MISAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190513 (pink) attaches CVE ASW groups from 3rd Fleet and assigns them operational control CTF 94.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190647 (pink) releases to CINCPAC all coast artillery units in FOA except units at PELELIU and OKINAWA.

CINCPAC 190611 (pink) requests comment on proposal to move certain elements of 2 Armored Divisions from West Coast in amphibious lift.

CINCPAC 191117 (pink) proposes to take no further action on CINCPAC 170523 concerning release of ComGenTen for CORONET.

CINCPAC 191423 (pink) reiterates request to JCS for artificial harbor capable of sheltering ocean going vessels.

CINCPAC 190533 (pink) expresses opinion that transfer of 7th Fleet and Mares may be accomplished subject to necessary arrangements with JCS concerning AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH interests.

20 July (Guam Date)

TF 37 and TF 38 complete their replenishment on 21 July and depart that night for their next strike. Com3rdFleet ordered DesDiv 61 detached for a shipping sweep of SAGAMI WAN to take place the night of 22/23 July. DesDiv 113 also ordered detached for shipping sweep in the BOKINS the same night. TF 95 enters the EAST CHINA SEA on 21 July and starts a sweep along the CHINA COAST.

10 B-29s of the 509th Group bombed various HUPINE targets on the 20th. Only 2 B-29s were lost in the 600 plane attacks on the night of the 19-20th. FAN-18 planes attacked 3 x 2000 ton FTCs on the eastern HONSHU COAST (37-40N), damaging 1 by strafing. Off southeastern KYUSHU a PBJ caused an explosion in a 200 foot coaster. On OKINAWA on the 19th 3-4 bogys were detected, but none closed. During alerts in the evening 2 enemy aircraft crashed on OKINAWA and 1 apparent suicider hit near the CHAS. J. BADGER (DD 657) in BUCKNER BAY. Three men were slightly injured by one of the land crashes, but no material damage was inflicted.

TOP SECRET
JULY (C&F)

20 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COMPHIBSPAC 170550 (pink) requests overall approval of revised training schedule of amphibious troops for OLYMPIC.

COMSDFLEET 201337 (pink) expresses intention to throw light force sweeps along EMPIRE COASTS at every opportunity.

COMINCH AND CNO 201819 (pink) approves proposals and CINCPACs 130751 for reorganization of 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC 191119 (pink) agrees to receive British Corps Commander and accompanying officers to arrive if practicable by 1 August.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 192327 (pink) concurs with CINCPAC 191119 concerning British Corps Commanders and accompanying officers.

COMCHINCHINA 200710 (pink) recommends holding conference at GUAM on or about 30 July concerning resources and requirements of CHINA THEATER.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201100 (pink) approves construction of an artificial harbor for CORONET, project to be a responsibility of Navy.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201108 (pink) defines directive of VICTORY 73 for division of responsibility at OKINAWA as applying only to the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190655 directs ComGen 10 to transfer Marine Aviation units on ASW search to Com Fair Wing 1.

COM7THFLEET 190702 lists air fields, control of which have been retained by Commander Allied Air Forces under CINCSWPA in accordance with Army directive similar to COMINCH AND CNO number 7.

CINCPAC ADV 200114 expresses nonconcurrence in the establishment of a naval NATS unit on MACTAN ISLAND.

21 July (Guam Date)

TF 37 and 38 are headed west for strikes on KURE KURE AREA. Fueling groups are following fast carriers to new fueling rendezvous south of HONSHU. TF 95 starts sweep north along coast of EAST CHINA on the 22nd. TF 32 has left BUCKNER BAY for a covering position north of area JUNEAU where minesweeping will soon be resumed by TF 39.

On the 20th 90 P-51's attacked airfields in the NAGOYA-OSAKA AREA, finding only 1 airborne enemy aircraft. 2 P-51's were lost to AA and 1 operationally. 27 B-29's laid 214 mines in KOBE-OSAKA waters, in SHIMANOSHIMA STRAITS, and in the OHSAN AREA.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GDP)

21 July (Guam date)(Cont'd)

WARCOS 202208 (pink) outlines logistic arrangements for provision of LCMs and naval escort craft in FORT BAYARD project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210229 (pink) estimates from September 20 to October 9 CV, 5 CVL will base ENIWETOK 6 CV, 2 CVL at LEYTE. After 10 October proportions will be approximately reversed placing British Pacific Fleet units at ENIWETOK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210645 (pink) approves ComSubPac plan for minefield investigation.

WARCOS 202209 (pink) proposes to place Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillam command 13 Corps in charge of amphibious training of divisions for COMUSMINT.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 211808 (pink) requests Com7thFleet to implement COMINCH directive 201819 concerning re-organization of the 7th Fleet.

22 July (Guam Date)

Search planes from OKINAWA sighted a submarine surfaced southeast of AMAMI, at 0750 on the 23rd and attempted to exchange recognition signals. At 1315 the same sub was sighted again and positively identified as enemy. A strike plane then attacked the sub which went down stern first leaving a persistent oil slick. Photos indicate the sub was similar to the German 1600 ton minelaying type. Destroyer 61 encountered a four ship convoy 5 miles south of MAJIMA SAKI at midnight, sank one medium and 1 small cargo ship and damaged the escort. The Fast Carriers pass north of the BONINS this morning of the 23rd and start their run-in to their launching point for strikes on the KOBE-KURE Area. ComGen 10 reports that an unidentified plane over BUCKNER BAY early yesterday morning dropped a bomb or torpedo which hit the MARATHON (APA 200). Damage is under control.

BB NAGATO - Superstructure badly damaged, unable to determine if she is on the bottom.

1 DD, next to NAGATO, blown in half and sunk.

1 ODD heavily damaged.

1 Cable-Layer destroyed.

3 small AK destroyed.

7 MTB destroyed.

DD converted to flak ship - stern blown off.

4 luggers and 2 small craft damaged.

TAKASAGA MARU, anchored about 700 yards from NAGATO near 2 small combatant ships may possibly have been damaged. Our losses were 14 aircraft.

Planes of TF 37 flew 51 combat sorties with no personnel losses against airfields in the north TOKYO area. They destroyed 13 enemy aircraft and damaged 25, all on the ground. On the 22nd P-51s hit OSAKA airfields, sighting 4 airborne enemy aircraft, 1 was shot down. 1 B-24 was destroyed on the water. Hangars, buildings and factories were damaged. AA destroyed 1 P-51, the pilot was rescued. On the 23rd 77 effective B-29s attacked the UBE COAL LIQUEFACTION plant by radar. F4U-18 planes in SAGAMI BAY destroyed 1 SD and 6 barges, and probably destroyed 2 SD. 1 PB4Y was reported having ditched.

TOP SECRET
JULY (CST)

22 July (Comm Date)(Cont'd)

COMINCH AND CNO 201303 (pink) (VICTORY 135) proposes to establish special TG for construction of artificial harbor for OLYMPIC.

COMINCH 212043 directs proposed Joint Communications Center Pacific, indicating the board will be advisory or not as may be determined by commanders concerned.

COMCHEN USASTAF 212250 (pink) announces that all USASTAF fighters will be withdrawn from escort mission and given primary counter air force operations as required by Com3rdFleet in support of his Op-Plan 9-45.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220410 (pink) directs that Commodore Hartley as ComServ- Div 103 commands units of ServDiv 10 at the objective during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220719 (pink) requests to CINCPAC that COMCHEN FEAF refrain from issuing orders which directly or by implication attempt to control operations of the fleet and to make area assignments in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220726 directs that joint cargo handling continue until each service can assume individual responsibility at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220729 directs CTG 99.1 to reduce present force drastically to eliminate requests for barracks and garrison ships.

COMFEAF 220731/1 (pink) requests that he be informed in advance of changes in operations of TF 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220742 (pink) approves procedure ComServFor 7th Fleet to provide petroleum logistics for OLYMPIC forces in MANILA AREA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220839 (pink) amends OLYMPIC Warning Order by changing site of NOB to TARA-MISAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220842 congratulates ComGen 10 and others concerned on high average rate of unloading cargo at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220843 requests COMCHENFOA to secure CINCPAC concurrence rather than CINCPAC for units destined for OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221040 (pink) concurs in COMCHEN USASTAF 220715 outlining latter support of 3rd Fleet operations.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221149 (pink) announces modification of Op-Plan 4-45 adding TF 95 in command of V.Adm. Oldendorf.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221150 (pink) directs that effective 230200 OUT TF 95 will comprise TFs 32, 39, 95, TG 99.1, 30.5, TU 30.9.4.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221244 directs that COM MARIANAS transfer 147th Infantry to OKINAWA at the earliest and transfer of 206th AAA BN battalion to IWO JIMA

~~TOP SECRET~~
JULY (GUT)

- continued -

22 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

COMUSFLEET 211300 constitutes action report covering operations off TOKYO 18 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221620 warns All Pac concerning encounters with friendly submarines at night.

23 July (Guam Date)

TF 95 reports first sweep conducted as planned. Force was unscaped the evening of 21st on their approach, but no air attacks developed. Only contacts were small craft and junks. The junks turned out to be CHINESE and were not attacked. The force is due to arrive BUCKNER BAY this morning. TF 39 resumed minesweeping, and reports their buoys remained in position despite the storm with a few flags lost the only damage. 18 mines were swept. TF 92 completed their shipping sweep inside the KURILES, without results. The force left somewhat earlier than planned due to being intensively unscaped. On the evening of the 22nd the force bombarded the southeast coast of PARAMUSHIRO with undetermined results. BARE (SS 220) reports 4 frigates patrolling off LA PEROUSE and its approaches. On the 18th she fired 1 torpedo and sank one of the four. Early yesterday a demolition party was landed and placed a 55 pound charge under the railroad which runs along the coast of KARAFUTO. BARE states "while boats were returning at 0147K train arrived on schedule and blew sky high."

Planes of TF 38 attacked KURE at dawn on the 24th, achieving surprise. Targets are combatant naval strength at KURE. 645 B-29's were airborne for strikes against OSAKA - NAGOYA targets. 258 planes of the FEAF (37 B-25's, 81 P-51's, 140 P-47's) attacked shipping in the SHANGHAI AREA on the 22nd sinking two ships and damaging 11. In addition to the 2 ships destroyed and 11 damaged, numerous small craft were destroyed or damaged. There was no AA and no interception. A coastwatcher near AMOY reports that 7th Fleet search planes on 12-14 July killed at least 120 Jap troops. The estimate of kills beyond this figure is unknown because of Japs burning the bodies and burying the bones. There were no CHINESE casualties.

General Chamberlain G-3 Headquarters CINCPAC, Brigadier General Damas G-3 Headquarters COMGEN TEN and others attended conference at Advance Headquarters Commander In Chief, Pacific Fleet, GUAM, from 20th to 24th July 1945.

ADMIRALTY 202253 announces CCS decision that from 1 June Admiralty replaces COMINCH as effective agent for dealing with FRENCH NAVY.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210825 authorizes jointly accredited correspondents in FOA to transmit over any facilities available to the press on material which has been cleared by cognisant censors.

JCS 211338 announces approval petroleum supply procedure outlined by CINCPAC CX 22431 of 30 June, concurred in CINCPAC 032041 of July.

COMINCH AND CNO 221915 (pink) outlines JAVAMAN project in support of OLYMPIC and indicates that certain Naval support will be required.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

- continued -

23 July (Quan Date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH AND CNU 221921 (pink) describes JAVAMAN project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230903 (pink) directs CominPac to continue sweeping area JUNEAU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 231226 (pink) requests comment from CINCPAC on CB requirements for construction of Marine Fields on KYUSHU.

24 July (Quan Date)

On the 24th planes of TF 38 struck the EMPIRE from northern KYUSHU through the INLAND SEA to NAGOYA, with combatant shipping at KURE as the primary target. An incomplete report from the first 3 of 7 strikes for TF 38 shows the following results:

8 enemy aircraft shot down
11 destroyed on ground

Ship damage at KURE:

CA TONE) - hit with many bombs and left

CL OYODO) - burning badly

ISE CLASS BB CV at north tip KURASHI hit twice.

ISE CLASS BB CV

CA AOKA) - hit with unknown results.

Large CV at south end MITSUKO hit with 3 x 1000 pounders.

BB HARUNA as yet unlocated.

ComDiv 17 and 7 destroyers of Destroyer 53 conducted a sweep across the mouth of KII SUIDO. On their way in they made contact with and sank a small vessel, probably a picket. No other contacts were made, but the force bombarded the KUSHIMOTO seaplane base, the SHIONOMI SAKI landing field, and the radio station at UNANO HANTO.

Partial reports of B-29 strikes on 7 targets indicate that 625 planes were airborne, and that 1 B-29 was lost over OSAKA. In addition the above, 10 B-29s of the 509th Wing attacked targets in SUMITOMO, KORE and YOKKAICHI. From OKINAWA 2 groups of B-24s escorted by 32 P-51s strike TSUIKI, and 48 P-51s sweep KYUSHU. On the 23d FAW-1 Privateers shot down 1 Topay and 1 Tojo, sank 1 SD, set fire to 2 SCs, and damaged 3 SD, and on the 24th damaged 1 SC and 1 SD. FAW-18 planes destroyed 1 SD off HAMAMATSU, and 2 x 135 foot Diesel sea trucks in the ISE BAY, south of NAGOYA.

Commander of a task unit consisting of 7 LST's escorted by UNDERHILL (DE 682), 4 PC, 3 SC and 1 PCE reported UNDERHILL was probably completely destroyed by a submarine at 19-20N 126-42E. ComPhilSeaFron estimates there are three submarines in the vicinity and has dispatched numerous ASW ships to the neighborhood.

Com3rdFleet reports that during the last replenishment period TF 38 received from the logistic support group:

6369 tons of ammunition

379,157 barrels of fuel oil

1635 tons stores and provisions.

TF 39 continued sweeping in JUNEAU. 29 mines destroyed yesterday.

99 replacement aircraft

412 replacement personnel

- continued -

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~JULY (1945)~~

- continued -

24 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

COMCHENCHINA 231321 (pink) announces plan to arrive at OAHU 6 August for conference.

CNO 232105 (pink) announces approval of JIC 159/20 which approved records of OAHU mapping conference 25-29 May.

COMPHIBSPAC 240140 (pink) requests COM5THFLEET to submit to CINCPAC for approval assembly dates for PHIBSPAC forces for OLYMPIC with emphasis on early assembly for indoctrination and training.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240317 (pink) approves memorandum for record 23 July concerning partitioning of OKINAWA and agrees, on receipt of CINCPAC, to direct COMCHEN TEN to report to CINCPAC 1200 31 July.

COMBATRON-1 240325 (pink) announces organization of Task Force 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240636 (pink) requests from COMCHEN copy of JCS 659/3 and information as to JCS decision placing Air Sea Rescue responsibility on area Commanders.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240844 (pink) modifies OLYMPIC Warning Order by directing that MANOSE RIVER CUB will remain in support of 5th Phib Corps.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240850 (pink) directs Rear Admiral Low to conduct shipping sweep EAST CHINA SEA.

CINCPAC 241349 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC 220742 concerning procedure for provision of petroleum logistics by SERVON 7 in MANILA AREA.

25 July (Guam Date)

After meeting poor weather over priority targets in the INLAND SEA on the 25th TF 38 and 37 departed to the southward to replenish.

TF 38 heavy strikes on the primary targets on 25 July were weathered out. Fragmentary reports on targets of opportunity show 18 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 20 damaged, mostly at MIHO and YONAGO. 1 Myrt was shot down over the force. Several small vessels were attacked. The ISE, reported moderately damaged on the 24th, was hit again and a violent explosion followed. Final report for TF 38's attacks on the 24th show the following damage inflicted:

18 enemy aircraft shot down (3 over force, 15 over target).
21 destroyed on ground, 53 damaged.

Kure warships were damaged as follows:

Heavily damaged
BB x CV HYUGA
CA TOME
CV OF KUMA CLASS
CV AMAGI

Moderately Damaged
CL OYODO
CV KASURAGI
BB x CV ISE
CA AOKA
AG SETTSU

Slightly Damaged
BB YAMATO
CVL HOSHO
CV ASO
OCA ?

- continued -

3275

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~JULY (60)~~

- continued -

25 July (Comm Date)(Cont'd)

Outside of KURE waters 3 DD were damaged, 1 midget sub was strafed, and the CVE KIYO was hit by 2 rockets.

Merchant Shipping

<u>Sunk</u>		<u>Damaged</u>
1 medium AK*	1 medium AO	3 medium AK*
3 small AK	1 tug	7 small AK
5 luggers		Many luggers

* 1 sank, 2 damaged by night hecklers.

An incomplete account of ground damage shows 9 locomotives destroyed and 5 damaged; HAMAMATSU had 3 warehouses and a power plant burned, and a small factory plus 2 radio stations destroyed. Shop buildings, oil stores, and factories were destroyed or damaged at TOYOHASHI (West of HAMAMATSU), KUSHIMOTO (southwest tip of HONSHU), ITAMI, TANABE, YOHATE, KISATO (all OSAKA), YOMAGO (MIHO), and OKAYAMA. Our losses will be reported later. Final report shows that TF 37 planes destroyed 21 enemy aircraft and damaged 57 on the ground, and inflicted the following damage to shipping.

<u>Sunk</u>	<u>Probably Sunk</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
1 medium AK	1 ROBE type CVE	1 ODD
4 small AK	1 SCS	1 train ferry
5 junks	1 junk	2 large AK
		3 medium AK
		4 small AK
		40 small craft
		2 ships on shipways.

In attacks on ground targets in north and east SHIKOKU and in the OKAYAMA-FUKUYAMA area of southern HONSHU hangars and airfield installations were destroyed or damaged, and damage was inflicted on flak positions, factories, radio and radar stations. TF 37 lost 8 aircraft to AA and 11 operationally. 9 pilots and 3 crewmen were lost. On the 24th 81-P51s hit NAGOYA airfields in 2 groups. Strafing and rocketing destroyed 1 locomotive and 1 wooden building; damaged 12-15 railroad cars, a railroad bridge, a radar station, a radio tower, a small factory and 7 or 8 buildings. 2-3 SD left burning in SURUGA WAN. 2 P-51s were damaged by flak. From OKINAWA 120 B-24s attacked KIANOWAN drone at SHANGHAI on the 24th. 54 P-47s and 32 P-51s attacked shipping in the YANGTZE RIVER, hitting 1 PG with a 500 pound bomb, damaged 3 FTD, and burning 1 S division ship

JCS 241824 (pink) (V-273) proposes plan for coordination of U.S. Navy and Air operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN.

COMINCH AND CNO 241722 (pink) cancels previous directive requiring that definite number of Cruisers, Destroyers and Submarines be maintained in 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250425 (pink) outlines proposed Seaplane operations during OLYMPIC.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
JULY (66)

- continued -

25 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250904 (pink) comments on COMINCH 241824 concerning division of operating areas with RUSSIAN Forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250907 (pink) outlines plan function for COMSERVDIV 103 in objective area during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC 251009 (pink) concurs in JCS V-273 concerning division of operating areas with RUSSIAN Forces.

CINCPAC 251011 (pink) approves memorandum for record of 23 July with one change.

CINCPAC 251431 (pink) requests CINCPAC concurrence in JAVAMAN project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250726 explains proposed coordination of VLR strikes with operations of Fast Carriers.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250908 outlines views on location of major NATS base in the PHILIPPINES.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250905 (pink) directs that CRDIV 5 be prepared immediately for service in NORPAC.

26 July (Guam Date)

Only sighting near scene of torpedoing of UNDERHILL was a sonar contact by BARTON (DD 722) which dropped a full pattern on a good sonar contact at 15-33 N 127-21E at 261628/1, causing a slight oil slick. Marship ADELPHI VICTORY reported this morning that two torpedoes were fired at her and missed, 200 miles east of ENINOTOK. TF 37 and TF 38 complete their replenishment at noon on 27 July and head north for their launching position on the 28th. TG 95.2 is proceeding north for a sweep off SHANGHAI. TG 95.3 is providing cover for the minesweeping group in area JUNEAU. CVE planes are providing cover for TG 95.2.

On the 25th 76 B-29s hit the HAYAMA and MITSUBISHI oil refineries at KAWASUKA. 1 B-29 is missing. 352 effective B-29s attacked MATSUYAMA, TOKUYAMA and OMVA on the 27th. 2 Privateers of FAW 1 (VPB 124) are missing from a patrol up the west coast of KOREA. Ramming tactics by Jap fighters are suspected. This squadron since its arrival at OKINAWA on 16 June (40 days) has lost 9 planes and 6 complete crews. FAW 1 planes sank 1 SCS in TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 25th and on the 26th sank 1 SD in the same area. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD in SAGAMI WAN, and damaged 6 fishing vessels at 33-43, 136-00. PBJs scored 2 rocket hits on each of 2 small vessels off the HONSHU Coast.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 261514 (pink) outlines plans for implementation of PASTEL.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261225 (pink) requests comment from COMSOPAC and CINCPAC PEARL concerning concerning method of exercising control of OSS office in NORPAC.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

26 July (Comm Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC of 22 July COMINCH 251652 PASSED TO CINCPAC ADVANCE (pink) reiterates recommendation against establishment of Joint Communication Board in the Pacific Theater.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 26151 announces transfer of all U.S. Army forces in the RYUKYUS, except USASTAF forces, to CINCPAC 1200 31 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260145 congratulates COMCHEN TEN and COMCHEN 24th Corps for their successful accomplishments of their missions under CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260249 recommends to COMINCH that office of Deputy of COM7THFLEET be abolished.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260722 directs COMCAR DIVS 23 and 26 proceed immediately to ENIWETOK and report to CINCPAC for duty.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260827 directs COMAIRPAC to have thorough physical examination of Read Admirals GUNTHER and A.C. Davis.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260824 recommends that work on Cruisers 1 to 10 be limited to essential repairs.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261228 announces the establishment of Air Sea Rescue JUNKS along EAST CHINA COAST and directs that action be taken to prevent their being attacked by our forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261244 delegates responsibility for Air Sea Rescue to COMNAVSEAFRON, COMARGILS, COM MARIANAS and to COMFAIRWING 1 in their respective areas of operation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261434 suggests that CHINESE be warned of danger of operating vessels of any kind in EAST CHINA coastal waters.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260723 directs the formation of TF 49 and its preparations for duty in NORPAC.

WAROCS 1223367 (pink) outlines proposal for movement of AIC ATLANTIC facilities to PACIFIC with planned augmentation of PACIFIC facilities.

COMINCH AND CNO 252104 (pink) quotes JCS 659/1 concerning theater responsibility for Air Sea Rescue.

COMCHEN USASTAF 252256 (pink) concurs with JCS V-273 and recommends that targets lying along air boundaries be assigned to either RUSSIA or United States.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260149 (pink) directs COMCHEN 10 to report to CINCPAC with all U.S. Army forces under his command effective 1200 31 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260150 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC 250847 concerning modification of memorandum for record of 23 July.

SECRET

27 July (Comm Date)

Planes on ASW patrol made possible contact with a submarine 200 miles NE of HONGKONG, near where Merchant ADMIRAL VICTORY reported yesterday that torpedoes were fired at her. TF 38 scheduled to repeat strikes against INLAND SHAN-KONG. TG 95.2 swept up to 32-30 N east of SHANGHAI last night, and this morning are scheduled to be east of HONGKONG on a southerly course. No contacts yet reported. A/C cover for this group and for the minesweepers being provided by TG 95.3. On the 26th TG 95.4 completed sweeping the last few miles of the JUMBAI mine line. Clearance sweeps about 12 miles further SW, and check sweeps still further south are scheduled for today. Tomorrow a check sweep along the axis of the field will be started. 330 mines have been swept and 50 floaters sighted to date.

TFs 37 and 38, in the KUNE-KONE-HAGUYA areas on the 26th and 27th report destruction of 196 enemy aircraft and damage to 212. Of these TF 38 destroyed 132 and damaged 148, TF 37 destroyed 24 and damaged 64. In addition TF 38 damaged 22 warships for 258,000 tons, sank 62 vessels for 25,000 tons, damaged 120 other vessels for 60,000 tons, sank 1 medium and 6 small AK, a tug and 12 small craft, while TF 37 probably sank 1 CVE and 2 small AK and damaged 1 CGO, 1 train ferry, 24 AEs a small tanker and 12 Corvettes. On the ground TF 38 destroyed 25 locomotives and damaged 11, and burned 40 hangars. During the 2 days TF 38 lost 64 aircraft, 30 pilots, 17 airmen. Of these, 40 aircraft plus 25 pilots and 15 airmen were combat losses. TF 37 lost 24 aircraft, plus 9 pilots and 3 airmen. 10 of the aircraft were combat losses. Revision of TF 38 report for the 26th shows 2 moderately damaged cruisers now classed as heavily damaged; addition of 1 unnamed CV to the heavily damaged column, addition to the slightly damaged column of 2 Bz, 2 SS and the CVE KAIYO. 2 groups each consisting of 4 VT were intercepted and driven off by HAPCAP and night fighters. TF 37 planes shot down 3 and TF 38 planes got one of these attackers. On the 27th a dumbie flew across HONGKONG to rescue 2 pilots down off MING. On his return he skillfully landed in the fleet formation out of gas. The personnel were taken aboard and the PBM ship. FAW-1 Privateers sank 10 miscellaneous small craft, damaged one and shot down two enemy fighter planes. All FAW-1 planes returned safely. FAW 18 search planes destroyed 1 x 100 ft, pilot boat sank 2 and damaged 4 fishing boats, left 1 x 850 ton TPD burning and sinking east of HONGKONG at 37-28 N.

COMINCH AND CNO 272111 (pink) outlines priority and method of providing communications and aerological teams for RUSSIANS.

COMENAIR (POTSDAM) 261559 (pink) instructs USASTAF to prepare for re-arrangement of B-29 deployment in connection with planning in event of Japanese capitulation.

CNO 261451 (pink) instructs COMUSSEAFRON to expedite lend-lease transfer vessels under MILEPOST

COMINCH 262020 (pink) instructs CINCPAC ADVANCE expedite delivery vessels for transfer under MILEPOST.

CINCPAC PEARL 270019 (pink) recommends disapproval of proposed ONI station at ATTU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270250 (pink) requests early complete information on JAVANAK.

- continued -

327

TOP SECRET
EX-100

- continued -

27 July (Comm Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270253 (pink) recommends category of defense in the Hawaiian Group be reduced to category A.

COMCHINCHINA 270800 (pink) proposes occupation of WAKIDOW ISLAND as preliminary to FORT BAYARD operation.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 280108 (pink) instructs COMAIPAC, COMSENFIL, COMSOPAC and COMSENPAC be prepared initiate operations outlined in CINCOPAC 0009067 of May on short notice.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 271317 sets forth changes in Task Organization and operational control of Navy units in OKINAWA.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270310 deals with shipping control in the Hawaiian Area contemplates disbanding JOSCO in October.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270312 instructs COM MARIANAS to transfer part of 206th AAA BN BN from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA.

CINCAFPAC 261601 implements memorandum for record of CINCPAC-CINCAFPAC conference on transfer of control of U.S. held areas in the KYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270505 advises COMAIPAC proposed transfer of 2 VPB squadrons to NORPAC must be expedited.

CINCAFPAC 280457 (pink) requests COMCHINAFMIDPAC to comment to Chief of Staff CINCAFPAC on CINCPAC proposals regarding Hawaiian Defense matters.

COMPHIBSPAC 250740 (pink) assigns task of capturing islands for air warning and fighter director to South and Southwest of KYUSHU to 40th Infantry, 150th BCT assigned task of securing northern TANEGA SHIMA if ordered.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 280812 (pink) replies to COMCHINCHINA proposal concerning WAKIDOW project.

CINCAFPAC 280849 (pink) proposes abolition of theater area boundaries.

COMPHIBSPAC 280835 (pink) outlines agreement between CINCAFPAC, COMCHIN 6TH ARMY on responsibility for landing OLYMPIC forces.

28 July (Comm Date)

After successful attacks in INLAND SEA the THIRD FLEET retired to south coast. Tonight a bombardment Group consisting of 3 BB's, 2 CA's, 10 DD's plus British Units will bombard the HAMAMATSU Area. Carriers are scheduled to strike in the TOKYO Plains Area tomorrow. TG 95.2 completed its sweep off SHANSHAI, apparently undetected. Its only contact was one small craft sunk by a destroyer of DivDiv 47. Submarines and Dumboes continued their splendid work. Four Subs picked up a total of seven pilots in the immediate vicinity of the HUPINE. Meanwhile, one Dumbo, having first picked up 2 carrier pilots off the HUPINE coast, landed in the INLAND SEA to rescue 5 survivors from a B-29 while the second picked up the pilots of 1 VP, 2 VT, 2 VB and the entire crew of a third Dumbo - 17 in all.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~JULY (60)~~

- continued -

28 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

A flash report of the last 3 of 7 strikes by TF 38 planes on the KURE-KOBE area on the 28th shows 19 airborne enemy aircraft destroyed and 75 enemy aircraft destroyed on ground. Left burning and heavily damaged were the BB HARUNA, BBKCV ISE, CL OTODO, CA AOBA, and CA TONE. Strike photographs showed the BBKCV HYUGA resting on the bottom from the 24th attacks, with the topside well smashed and the deck amidships under water. The CVE KAITO was again damaged. Also damaged were 12 miscellaneous light craft including 4 DD and 2 DE. 562 effective B-29's attacked 7 BPFIE targets shortly after midnight, in fulfillment of the promise given the resident of 11 Japanese cities by radio and by leaflets in the previous 24 hours. 7 B-24's from NOHPAC put 15 tons of 500 lb. incendiary clusters on KATACKA NAVAL BASE. All planes returned safely.

Admiral Sherman and party departed GUAM for MANILA conference, on 29th.

29 July (Guam Date)

Within the past two days every major unit of the Japanese Fleet except MAGATO has been sighted by aircraft - most of them sunk or immobilized. In addition to units attacked by THIRD FLEET carrier planes in the INLAND SEA, 2 carriers were seen at SASEBO, and the 2 CA were seen in SINGAPORE. A force consisting of 3 BB, 2 CA and 10 DD from TF 38, and a British Unit including King George V and DD of TF 37 bombarded HAMAMATSU starting at 2320/I last night. Only damage sustained was minor operational damage to two British Destroyers. TF 95 sweeping in the JUNEAU area. Exploratory sweep of suspected field to the north was negative. In suicide attacks early on the 29th, CALLAGHAN (DD 792) was sunk and PRITCHETT (DD 561) was damaged. Attacking planes were described as biplanes with non-retractible landing gear flimsily constructed of wood and fabric - probably obsolete or trainer planes - expertly piloted. A submarine rescued 7 men from a B-29 100 miles south of SHIKOKU, and a Dumbo from OKINAWA returned to the same place in INLAND SEA from which 5 B-29 aviators had been rescued the day before and rescued an additional officer.

Amplifying reports from TF 38 increase the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground in the KURE-KOBE area by 36 planes to make a total of 111 and of aircraft damaged by 63 planes to a total of 114. Photos show the CL OTODO on UCA lying on their sides, 3 subs sunk, the BB HARUNA beached and burning and the BBKCV HYUGA sunk. In addition CA AOBA battered and burning with guns silenced and stern on the bottom, the BBKCV ISE burning and apparently on the bottom, the CA TONE badly damaged (but she continued firing all day). Of the two CVEs present, the AMAGI and the KATSURAGI, one suffered tremendous explosion with debris to 1,000 feet, while the other hit on prior attacks, appeared gutted. Final damage assessment awaits full photo coverage. Also damaged were one CVK, 6 DD/DE and 9 minor craft. TG 38.3 failed to reach KURE in the last strike but along the northern shore of the SUU NADA sank 23 miscellaneous smallcraft. One AN was attacked by mistake; 4 near misses left her down by the stern. On the ground 13 locomotives and 4 oil cars were destroyed. Planes of TF 37 in attacks on SHIKOKU and central KUNSHU, destroyed 8 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged 26, sank 1 DD and 29 other vessels of which 17 were junks, damaged 3 DD, 2 DE, 2 SS, 7 good sized warships and about 100 small craft.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

29 July (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

Principal accomplishments of FFAF were the reported scoring of 5 or 6 hits (including 3 or 4 1000-pounders) by 10 B-24s of the 5th AF on the CVE KATSURAGI, while 42 B-24s of the 7th AF claim 4 direct 1000-2000 lb hits and several near misses on the BB HARUNA. In addition KANOKA and KAGOSHIMA airdromes, KAGOSHIMA railway yards, and other miscellaneous targets in KYUSHU were attacked by B-24s A-26s, P-47s and TOKYO airfields were hit by 134 P-51s.

COMPHIBSPAC 280930 (pink) sets forth plan assembly for COMPHIBSPAC forces for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 280917 (pink) advises COMINCH that CINCPAC considers establishment OSB/OWI broadcasting station in ALEUTIANS undesirable.

CINCPBF 290209 (pink) lists subjects which CINC BPF proposes to discuss at GUAM.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290525 (pink) instructs COMSHEVPAC, COMCOMFAC and COM - MARIANAS take appropriate action in accordance with COMINCH AND CNO 272111 in order to provide communications and aerological teams for MISSIONS.

30 July (Guam Date)

A preliminary report for the 1st 4 of 6 scheduled attacks on I. HONSHU airfields states that few planes were seen over the target area and no airborne enemy opposition was encountered. 58 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 68 aircraft were damaged. Hests of 3 large subs and many midgets were discovered along the western coast of SAGAMI WAN, at ATAMI, TAGA, and SHIMODA. 2 midgets were destroyed by rockets and 1 large SS, 6 midgets, 1 AS, and 1 PG were strafed. A special late afternoon strike was being sent against the sub hests. Other attacks on shipping at MAIZURU, KOZE, and SAGAMI WAN resulted in sinking of 4 smaller craft and damage to CVE, 4 DE, 7 good sized merchant ships and 11 minor craft. The 1st 2 strikes of TF 37 were weathered out. On the 3rd attack 2 airborne enemy aircraft were destroyed while on the ground 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 5 damaged. In attacks on shipping 1 lugger was sunk, several small craft were probably sunk, 3 DD, 4 DE and 6 small craft were damaged. A minimum of 6 enemy aircraft approached the HYUGYUS in 5 raids, during which the CALLAGHAN (DD 792) was hit by a possible Kamikaze and sunk. A P-61 shot down 1 Betty, F6F's of the 2nd MAW shot down 2 and probably destroyed a 3rd Betty, and AA claimed shooting down 2.

Carriers completed strikes on shipping and air installations in the TOKYO Area and retired to the southward where they will start fueling today. On the night of 30-31 July ComDesRon 25 with 6 destroyers swept up into the head of SAGAMI WAN and bombarded SHIMIZU town. Supplementary report of the previous night's bombardment by 34.8.1 (Bombardment Group Able) lists serious damage to Imperial IR workshop and the aircraft propeller plant of Japan Naval Instr. Co. Prop. Plant and hits on the TEMRYU RIVER BRIDGE and the railroad and roundhouse. No opposition was encountered. The JUNEAU Minesweeping Group has completed its sweep a day ahead of schedule and is retiring to BUCKNER BAY. A total of 343 mines were swept and 61 floating mines destroyed.

TOP SECRET
JULY (G)

30 July (Open Date) (Cont'd)

ANDAMAN SEA FORCE operated off PHUKET, clearing minefields off PHUKET conducting air strikes over the MALAY PENINSULA. One British minesweeper was sunk by a mine, another was hit and so damaged by a suicide plane that she had to be sunk by her own forces. British submarine sank several small craft in MALACCA STRAIT. A fighter pilot went down in mouth of SUNGAI WAN. A Dumbo went after him and cracked up on landing. This left 9 in the water. Then a B-17 went in and dropped a bomb. The survivor sailed out and were picked up by PETO (SS 265) There is no change in the reported status of major task fleet units. The CVs AMAGI and KATSINAGI are apparently still afloat although large portions of their flight decks are missing.

31 July (Open Date)

The Third Fleet is fueling today. Heavy ships of TF 95 replenished yesterday and are due to depart soon for shipping blockade off SHANGHAI. PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38), CABOT (CVL 28) and escorting DD are scheduled to conduct training strikes on WAKE today. Convoys enroute OKINAWA are splitting up and maneuvering to avoid the typhoon. ARD 21 has broken loose from her tug, but was reported riding well. Other tugs have been ordered to assist.

Final report for TF 38 shows that 114 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the 30th and 101 were damaged. The afternoon strikes were chiefly on fields in the NAGUYA area, as TOKYO was closed in. In addition to previously reported shipping damage, one DD and one merchant ship are reported sunk, and an old type CL, another DD and 4 miscellaneous merchant ships damaged. One strike was carried out on 10 subs in SHIMODA KO, but results have not yet been reported. On the ground 8 locomotives were destroyed and 4 damaged, bomb hits were scored and large fires were started at the KANTO Special Steel Co and the JAPAN International Aircraft Co both at MIRATSUYA. Strafed and rocketed were 2 radar station, 4 hangars, 17 factories and railroad cars and turntables. No report on our losses, nor on TF 37 results, is yet available. 130 P-51s (excluding 12 lifeguard escort) attacked KOBE airfields. They saw only 7 enemy aircraft airborne, all too far away to attack. Only 14 enemy aircraft were observed on KOBE airfields. Low level strafing and rocketing destroyed 2 locomotives and caused considerable damage to ground installations and harbor craft. In addition OMURA airfield was hit and fires started and 83, P-47s set the whole of SENDAI (KYUSHU) afire with napalm. Inflight reports from 6 Privateers of TG 95.9 ordered to destroy the SEIKEN RIVER bridge in northwest KOBE indicated that they destroyed the main bridge and 1 small bridge, destroyed 2 locomotives, strafed equipment on a new airfield there and coal mine buildings and damaged 8 loggers. FAW-1 planes sank 6 small craft and most in TSUSHIMA STRAITS. FAW-18 planes sank a merchant ship and damaged 3 fishing boats. No reports from B-29s.

COM7THFLEET 300237 (pink) initial report on 30 July conference at MANILA. States MacArthur reaction to probable landing of Marines and advises possible need for 3 Marine Divisions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 381306 (pink) replies to initial report of 30 July conference. States nonconcurrence in deferring landing of Marines, naval officer on spot must have free hand to act. Limits availability of Marines to 3 divisions. Requests saving clause in event of further JCS directive.

- continued -

3281

TOP SECRET
JULY - AUGUST (RG7)

COMGENCHINA 310900 (pink) advises CINCPAC difficulties FORT BAYARD no more serious than initially envisaged. Will not require equipment jeopardizing OLYMPIC. WEICHOW ISLAND an alternate not an additional operation.

COMINCH AND CNO 302029 (pink) advises that aerological plans outlined CINCPAC 120446 approved by SOVIETS and action initiated.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 310810 (pink) refers to COMINCH AND CNO 302029 and instructs COMSERVPAC comply.

1 AUGUST (Oasm Date)

Both TF 37 and 38 with their logistics support groups retired to the southward in search of better weather. They will fuel today and then depart for KYUSHU strikes on the third, a delay of one day. TF 95 also was inactive. Local KYUKYUS naval forces executed modified typhoon plan X, avoiding the storm to the south. Convoys in the Philippines Sea are finding better weather. AND 21 which broke loose from its tug, has been riding well, and her tug expects to be able to make up tow this morning. PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38) and CABOT (CVL-28) completed their training strike on WAKR. Preliminary reports are 9 guns put out of action; 6 others damaged; distillation and power plants damaged; 1 camp burned. Light AA fire, moderate shore battery fire inside 10,000 yards. No personnel casualties. Two planes lost operationally. Gun director on PENNSYLVANIA hit. Report from HMS STYGIAN indicates that a small British submarine penetrated into SINGAPORE and exploded one of the heavy cruisers there. The mother submarine, which was waiting off HOVERBOROUGH, commented: "Spectacle great. Consider cruiser was well-distributed over countryside."

662 combat sorties were flown over the ESPINE on the 31st by units of the 5th and 7th Air Forces. Attacked NAGASAKI and KAGOSHIMA. Other planes sank 5 small craft and damaged 13. 61 medium bombers dropped 72 tons of bombs on MIYAZAKI drome, and 64 mediums dropped 76 tons on KANOYA. All August 2 strikes by FEAF against airdromes and installations in KYUSHU have been cancelled because of weather. The 6 Privateers of FAW 1 amplifying their previous report advise they made direct hits with half-ton bombs on the SKISEN RIVER bridge destroying 1 span completely and causing it to fall into the river. 1 pier was slightly damaged. 774 effective B-29's attacked HACHIAJI, TOYAMA, NAGAOKA, MITO and the KAWASAKI PETROLEUM COMPLEX while 44 more (total 818) mined. Results are reported to have been good. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, and AA generally meager.

CINCPAC 311509 (pink) requests instructions concerning operational control Headquarters 2nd Marine Air Wing.

COMINCH AND CNO 011310 (pink) outlines proposed new boundary between United States, British areas and SWPA.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET (CCT)~~

2 August (Guam Date)

At about 1100/K yesterday a search plane from FLEETU sighted 30 survivors in the water at 11-30, 133-00, dropped a transmitter and emergency lifeboat. Later other survivors were seen in lifeboats. Dumbo planes were sent out with emergency equipment, ships were diverted to the scene, and other ships were sent out from ULITHI. By midnight several ships were at the scene, and reported that the survivors were from INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35), sunk on the night of the 29th. The SALAMAU AEW Group made a sonar contact about 200 miles to the west. The contact was not retained, but the search is continuing. Carriers and oilers are operating in the vicinity of 25-00 136-45, today, waiting for the weather to clear. 3rd Fleet strike on KYUSHU is tentatively planned for 5 August. Final reports of TF 38 for the strikes of 30 July in the TOKYO AREA: 1224 offensive sorties - 115 aircraft destroyed and 142 damaged, all on the ground; 20 vessels, totaling 20,000 tons sunk and 56, totaling 73,000 tons damaged. In addition considerable damage was inflicted on ground targets as previously reported. Our losses were 11 planes, 8 pilots, and 3 aircrewmembers, all in combat. Meanwhile TF 37 planes flew 188 offensive sorties; shot down 2 enemy planes, destroyed 7 and damaged 12 on the ground, sank one DD, damaged 5 DD and 5 DE at a cost of 3 VF and 3 pilots in combat and 10 planes were lost operationally.

On the 1st 37 P-51s and P-47s hit the KOBE-MAGUYA area meeting no airborne enemy aircraft, and observing few on the ground. They destroyed 1 locomotive and damaged barracks and hangars at OKAZAKI, administration buildings at ITAMI, hangars at MAGUYA east. We lost 1 P-47 and 3 P-51s; 1 pilot was observed to bail out; the other 3 are missing. FEAFF planes flew 525 combat sorties on the 1st. In attacks on shipping 1 mission of 24 B-25s (5th AF) destroyed 8 vessels and 2 laggards and damaged all northwest KYUSHU. In other attacks on shipping 1 small merchant ship was destroyed, and 1 large AK plus 2 small AK were damaged. 4 P-51s (5th AF) on a VF sweep off KYUSHU, intercepted 16 Franks over TAKE SHIMA that were attacking B-24s. The P-51s shot down 4 Franks with no losses to themselves. 23 B-24s (7th AF) dropped 51 tons on AMAMI and KAKKROMA, and were attacked by 12-20 Jap VF, of which, 2 were destroyed and 1 damaged. 2 B-24s were damaged, 2 men were killed, and 6 wounded.

02 1500

CECIL J. DOYLE (DE 368)/contains information concerning sinking of INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020126 outlines CINCPAC views concerning proposal to establish Pacific Joint Communications Board.

CINCPAC 020311 (pink) authenticates Sherman - Chamberlin - Lindsey 1 August agreement for coordination of air operations.

COM7THFLEET 020547 (pink) places Commander Submarine advance base and recuperation both Navy 3002 to report to COMPHILSEAFRON for matters pertaining to defense, maintenance and construction.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020710 (pink) redesignates former ICHING reserve as MARIANAS OLYMPIC reserve, directs addressees to implement and contains detailed instructions therefor.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
ADVANCE (Oct)

2 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 021036 (pink) advises a special operation by 509th Bomb Group, instructs addressees no ships or aircraft of Pacific Fleet to approach within 50 miles NAGASAKI, KOKURA or HIROSHIMA immediately before, during and after time of strike (to be announced later).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 021429 (pink) requests confirmation of assumption that all combat units British Pacific Fleet will be at CINCPAC disposal and of assumption that COMINCH will not object to practice raids against THUK, WAKE and POMAPE.

3 August (Guam Date)

Third Fleet is remaining in fueling area. OKINAWA based craft of TF 95 returned from typhoon plan sortie. No reports from TG 95.2 and TG 95.3 blockading SHANGHAI. About 400 survivors of the INDIANAPOLIS have been recovered and search for others continues. Commanding Officer, one of survivors, says that he believes the ship was hit forward by two torpedoes or a mine at about 0045/K 30 July. This was followed by a magazine explosion and the ship sank in 15 minutes. Survivor of Japanese MTB sunk on the first by the CUMMINGS (DD 365) said his mission was to evacuate navy personnel from KITA IWO JIMA; stated 40 to 50 MTB's based at CHICHI JIMA. ASPRO (SS 309) rescued an Army pilot in SAGAMI WAN at 35-11 N, 139-21 E. This position is 25 miles inside the bay, and 8 miles from the shore at the head of the bay. Two search Privateers sighted the survivor in a B-17 lifeboat, and coached the submarine in. The planes and submarine were attacked by five "Georges" enemy VF and five VO. Although all strafed and 4 bombs were dropped ASPRO escaped undamaged and our aircraft shot down 2 VO and damaged the VF. Boarding party left aboard a junk when COD was forced to dive was recovered by other submarines.

139 USASTAF P-51's attacked the NAGOYA-KOBE area sighting only 1 airborne aircraft and observing very few on the ground. Other ground damage included 14 locomotives destroyed, and damage to 2 hangars (KOMAKI), factories at (KAKOGAWA), stations, power lines and natural gas tanks. 14 small vessels 50-150 feet were damaged or fired. Photographs of B-29 strikes against TOYAMA show more than 90% of the city enveloped in flames. At NAGAOKA photos of poor quality show a considerable number of large fires. Usual sorties were flown in CINCPAC. From SWPA, CTG 73.4 passes on a report from a coast watcher at AMOY that FAN-17 planes have killed 750 to 1,000 Jap troops attempting evacuation AMOY to STATOW.

COMINCH AND CNO 301733/14 defines condition for approach of recognition signals in non-combat areas.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 311355 sets forth operational control FMF ground forces on OKINAWA.

010900

PENNSYLVANIA (BB)/describes 1 August FUDDLE on WAKE.

COM7THFLEET 020018 describes NATS proposed Flight Wing; suggests MACTAN ISLAND for headquarters.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030207 states necessity for disbanding TF 93.

- continued -

328

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030208/643 officially dissolves TF 93 and 93.4, directs 93.4 report to COMCEN USASTAF for duty.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030227 approves completion air facilities under construction SAMAR and completion of seaplane ramp JINAMOC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030247 recommends authorized complement of Photoflans 1 and 3 be increased from 6 to 9 PB4Y-1P that crew replacements based in forward area for these squadrons be similar to other multi-engine squadrons.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030225 withdraws recommendation for major NATS base at SAMAR and recommends MACTAN instead.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030742 advises FMF PAC marine personnel required for local defense and internal security OKINAWA and directs use of at least 2 infantry companies or equivalent under command COM NOB OKINAWA pending arrival requested MP battalions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030912 operational control Headquarters and Headquarters squadron 2nd MAF passed to FEAF, appropriate change being made in memorandum for record GUAM conference 23 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030913 changes CINCPAC 271317. Makes COM NOB OKINAWA CTF 99, directs 99.3.12 report to CTF 99, COMCEN2NDMAF, TU 99.2.1, TU 99.2.2 and Headquarters and Headquarters squadron report FEAF for operational control, TU 99.2.3 report to COMFAIRWING 1 for operational control.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030915 advises addressees AITUTAKI and FENRISON considered to have sufficient Post War Significance to justify token garrisons. Requests instructions if Navy and Coast Guard personnel will be required.

CTU 95.9.2 011355 requests that communication facilities (CTU 95.9.2) 311301 July be expedited.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 311338 (pink) requests operational direction 64th and 30th Engineers be returned to CINCPAC on or about 31 July.

COM7THFLEET 310756 (pink) establishes new command; U.S. Naval Forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA. COM7THFLEET directs COMSEV7THFLT, COMAEN7THFLEET to direct commanders all U.S. Naval Shore. Air and Seaplane facilities for new command for duty. Sets forth responsibilities of new command.

COMCEN AIR 311349 (pink) recommends AMCHITKA most suitable location for basing VLR Squadron in NORPAC and describes facilities.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 311351 (pink) advises FMFPAC units should be prepared for occupation duty on basis of 5th Phib now, 4th M. rDiv in September, 3rd Phib (less 4th M. rDiv) in October.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 301523 (pink) advises reducing SS 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons and of plan to further reduce to 1 Sq after British Command area is formed and provided enemy CAs SINGAPORE are immobilized.

- continued -

3287

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

RICHARDSON 302320Z (pink) dissents at length the proposal for change in category of defense for the Hawaiian Group.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030211 (pink) requests continuance of aggressive air attacks for neutralization of FORMOSA.

CINCPAC 030429 (pink) suggests paragraph 3 Sherman-Chamberlin-Lindsay memorandum be amended making 5th Fleet primarily responsible for air defense and omitting provision now in the memo concerning offensive responsibilities.

4 August (Guam Date)

FAW-1 PBMs sank 1 SD in HAICHOW WAN, damaged a dredge and shore installations while FAW-18 Liberators shot down 2 enemy aircraft and damaged 2 more off SAGAMI WAN and off CHOSI POINT. No reports received of USASTAF strikes. All missions FFAF on the 3rd were weathered. No reports for 4 August. CAP shot down 1 twin-engine snoopers at 30,000 feet, 25 miles west of the island. 15 sorties were flown from PALAU, attacking and sinking 1 SD. 6 NORPAC B-24s dropped 9 tons on KATAOKA NAVAL BASE and KOKUTAN CAPE, both on SHIMUSHU, with unobserved results.

There was little naval activity yesterday. Early morning of the 4th enemy SS made two unsuccessful torpedo attacks on an OKINAWA to LAYTE convoy. An escort, EARL V. JOHNSON (DE 702) made 4 depth charge attacks, the last of which resulted in a severe delayed underwater explosion. Oilers and carrier forces of the THIRD FLEET are moving East from the PHILIPPINES SEA to a position about 450 miles ESE of TOKYO, where they will replenish on the 6th prior to further strikes. Two destroyers from the 7th Fleet boarded a Japanese hospital ship in the JAVA SEA, found her with munitions on board, and are taking her into MOROTAI.

WARCOS 021745 (pink) advises of necessity for early installation early warning radar and fighter director installations for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030154 (pink) authenticates Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreement of 1 August concerning air coordination.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040024 (pink) demurs to CINCPAC 030429 on grounds that proposed change would affect respective responsibilities of FFAF and 5th Fleet within objective area.

CINCPAC 040109 (pink) sets forth proposed early warning and fighter director radar installations for OLYMPIC in response to WARCOS 021745.

COMJEN USASTAF 040353 (pink) authenticates Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreement of 1 August concerning air coordination.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040747 (pink) directs 3rd Fleet to concentrate next effort against enemy air in northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040841 (pink) requests that agreements concerning long lines as well as internal wire installations already made for OLYMPIC also apply to CORONET.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ARMED (C)~~

- continued -

4 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

COM3RDFLEET 041011 (pink) acknowledges CINCPAC 040747 and advises strike plan for 8 August.

COMAAF SWPA 302140 states COM AF 13 responsibility for operations in SWPA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 032345 requests COM7THFLT to furnish complete data on existing operational command areas affecting units of AIR 7THFLT.

5 August (Guam Date)

Carrier Task Forces are proceeding towards their rendezvous tomorrow morning with their oiler groups at 38N 149E. Reserve group of oilers is standing by further to the south where they will be joined by the ANZIO ASW Group. BRISTOL (DD 857), an oiler escort, damaged her bow while alongside ASHTABULA (AO 51) and is returning to GUAM for repairs. Adm. Low's fast striking force and the heavy covering force under Adm. Oldendorf leave their SHANGHAI patrol stations this afternoon for BUCKNER BAY. RAZORBACK (SS 394) reports destroying 6 sea trucks and damaging 2 small craft by gunfire in the southern KURILES on the 2nd.

588 effective B-29s attacked 5 targets last night. 96 hit MAEBASHI (50 mi. NW TOKYO). 256 hit NISHINOMIYA (NW OSAKA), 12 groups by radar, 4 visually. 65 hit IMABARI (NW SHIKOKU) by radar. 64 hit SAGA (E. of SASEBO), 2 by radar and 2 visually. 107 hit UBE coal liquefaction Co by radar. VF opposition was nil at IMABARI and SAGA, nil to slight at UBE and NISHINOMIYA, and nil to moderate at MAEBASHI. AA was about the same. No planes have so far been reported lost. All 7th AF missions and all but one 5th AF missions were weathered out. In the latter, 25 B-25s put 14.5 tons on an unidentified industrial area in east central KYUSHU, damaging a railroad bridge and railroad yards. FAW 1 PFM's sank 2 small warships and damaged a PC and several small ships. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD off KUMANO NADA, were attacked by 8 Zekes, shot down 2 and damaged 2 others. A search plane over TRUK sank a 40-ft. launch loaded with oil drums. 4 Privateers of FAW 4 carried out an anti-shipping sweep off PARAMUSHIRU, bombing TORISHIMA RETTO and damaging 1 SD and 10 landing craft with strafing.

CINCPAC 041451 (pink) collaborates on reasons for change in Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreements contained in CX 30410. States proposed change not intended to lessen FEAF effort but to obtain assurance that primary responsibility for air defense in CAP rests with Fifth Fleet.

COMGEN AIR 041943 (pink) contains technical data and information on JAVAMAN PROJECT.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050100 (pink) instructs COM MARIANAS to inaugurate air search and provide ships to intercept enemy units MARCUS bound.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 042320 (pink) replies to CINCPAC 041451. Recommends original draft Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreement stand. Future details be subject future agreements between FEAF, COMPHIBSPAC and USASTAF.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

5 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050751 (pink) special requests to FEAF and USASTAF unnecessary in view of planned routine operations.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050754 (pink) makes TACLOBAN available COM5THFLEET to copy communications of interest to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050755 (pink) confirms need of 500 aircraft pool at OKINAWA for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC 050845 (pink) contains further information relative to JAVAMAN PROJECT.

6 August (Guam Date)

Third Fleet fuels this morning prior to strike tomorrow. TF 95 encountered no surface activity. INTREPID (CV11) completed her training strike on WAKE yesterday. Buildings and gun positions were destroyed and others damaged. Light AA holed one plane. There were no casualties. The lifeguard submarine SEAROBIN (SS409) bombarded the island with 135 rounds of 5" after the strike. Shortly before midnight the Merchant Ship ETHIOPIAN VICTORY at 16-55N, 169-48E sent out SOS signals and said she was on fire and abandoning ship. Nearby merchant ships are providing assistance. Cause of fire not known.

President Truman has announced that HIROSHIMA was bombed on the 6th (ELD) by an atomic bomb with explosive power equal to 20,000 tons of TNT. The bomb was described as having more than 2,000 times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" and 11 ton bomb. The bomb was dropped by planes of the 20th AF. Of the 500 effective B-29s attacking on the night of 5th-6th, none was lost to enemy action. 1 ditched north of SAIPAN, and 12 were rescued from it. 6 P-51s are reported down from the TOKYO fighter strike scheduled for the 6th. The SCARBARDFISH has picked up 3 pilots, 2 others went down over land and 1 in TOKYO BAY. Results of the strike have not yet been received. TARUMIZU in southern KYUSHU was attacked by more than 275 FEAF planes on the 5th, using high explosive incendiary bombs. Returning pilots describe the entire city as being aflame. 1 Privateer of FAW 1 was shot down by ships AA off FUSAN and burned with no visible survivors. In TSUSHIMA straits other FAW - planes sank 1 SC and left another sinking. In addition a lugger was sunk and an SD was damaged.

CINCPAC 060719 (pink) acknowledges and states that action is being taken on request for continuing neutralization of FORMOSA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 060819 (pink) states that units of 1st MarAirWing now at EMIRAU to be concentrated in southern PHILIPPINES as soon as possible, following which island is to be taken over by the British.

TOP SECRET
ALPHA (OCT)

ENTIMEDOR (SS 340) sighted a small Japanese Hospital ship headed into MARCUS. Ship sighted by search plane at about the same time. Ship departed yesterday evening unharmed after bombing raid in the afternoon. CASSIN (DD 372), on station north of IWO, was ordered to intercept, board and investigate. Later last night a destroyer from one of the 3rd Fleet fuelling groups intercepted a lighted hospital ship at 31-33N 150-00E and reported she was tracking her. Third Fleet is scheduled to strike northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO this morning. TG 95.2 and 95.3 report maintaining barrier for 4 days. Night sweeps were conducted by TG 95.2 between latitudes 32 and 33 as far west as 122-30W. On the last two nights, night search planes assisted. TG 95.3 operated a little further to the south, and provided day CAP for TG 95.2 and searches. Both forces were snooped, but neither was attacked. Four planes were shot down by the CAP, and one driven off by gunfire. Neither force had any enemy surface contacts. TG 95.3 conducted a fighter strike on TINGHAI on the 6th.

114 effective B-29s with 96 P-51 escorts attacked TOYOKANA NAVAL ARSENAL (SE NAGOYA). 97 P-51s attacked TOKYO airfields, meeting no airborne enemy aircraft and scoring 1 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 21 damaged on the ground. Ground installations were damaged and 2 x 200 foot ships were damaged. 4 P-51s were lost to AA, and 2 to other causes. 3 pilots were rescued and 3 are missing. Approximately 450 F4F planes were over KYUSHU and TSUSHIMA STRAITS waters on the 6th. Of these 168 attacked KAGOSHIMA starting a number of large fires in the railroad yards in factory areas. 154 planes attacked MIYAKONOJO using mostly Napalm bombs, starting 20-30 fires in the city. 49 B-25s attacked shipping in TSUSHIMA STRAITS and nearby land targets, sinking 6 ships and damaging 3 others. On the ground 2 radar stations, buildings and docks were damaged. AA shot down 2 B-25s and holed 11 others. FAW-1 planes sank 6 vessels on the seventh, left 1 SK sinking, and damaged 2 small tankers, all in TSUSHIMA STRAITS while FAW 18 planes sank 1 SC in SURGUA WAN.

CINCPAC 040403 (pink) suggests 3rd Fleet strike concentrations enemy aircraft in Northeast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO. Mentions strong indications of airborne attack against OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070331 (pink) recommends CONCORD and RICHMOND remain in present area until about 1 October.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070330 (pink) reports to COMCHINCHINA on progress of conference concerning FORT BAYARD project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553 (pink) advises COMINCH of proposed naval participation FORT BAYARD Project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070717 (pink) reports to COMCHINCHINA on further progress of FORT BAYARD project and naval proposals for participation therein.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070824 (pink) disapproves request for floating storage at OLYMPIC.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

7 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070833(pink) states that Navy can furnish assistance and materials in Ell component for JAVAMAN peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM from OKINAWA. Recommends all materials be obtained from COMGEN TEN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070902 requests comments on policy concerning attacks on Junks, states CINCPAC inclination to interdict all traffic north of YANOTZE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070819 requests that JCS 100345 of December 1944 be modified to eliminate CINCPAC responsibility for shipping for Army controlled ports in RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070020 prescribes use of standard AAF air defense grid for use by CINCPAC forces in air warning and fighter direction and radar telling circuits.

8 August (Guam Date)

CASSIN reports that she intercepted and boarded the KIKU MARU at 1830 K, 8 August in Lat. 26-46N Long. 150-29E. No violations of any kind were found. Patients on board were 84 wounded, 42 nutritional deficiency and 4 tubercular, a total of 130. The ship was directed to proceed. Ship had papers indicating she was boarded and satisfactorily inspected on 4 August by a Sub-Lieutenant of the Royal Navy. Carrier planes of the 3rd Fleet are attacking north HONSHU this morning. 3 BB, 2 CA, 10 DD, and a British unit of cruisers and destroyers are scheduled to bombard KAMAISHI this morning. Meriship ETHIOPIAN VICTORY, earlier reported on fire, is now reported proceeding to ENIWETOK under her own power. TU 12.5.6 (NEW JERSEY, BILOXI and DD's) report completion of their training bombardment on WAKE. 11 buildings, 2 ammunition dumps and 1 AA Gun were destroyed. Damaged were 5 guns, and RDF station, distillation plant, bridge and power plant. Light to moderate coast defense and AA fire was encountered. Our forces sustained no damage and no casualties.

242 effective B-29s attacked YAWATA, accompanied by about 140 F4F P-47s. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, and AA varied. Most of the bombing was by radar and 2/3 of the planes reported results unobserved. 3 lost two operational, one combat, 2 crewman rescued from one, survivors of a second sighted in raft. 38 (of 64 effective) bombed the NAKAJIMA Aircraft Co visually at TOKYO. 6 others hit the TOKYO ARSENAL. Results are described as good to excellent. 1 B-29 was hit by AA and exploded over the target. 1 chute was seen. There was no fighter opposition. 92 attacked FUKUYAMA, half by radar and half visually. General conflagration. No losses have been reported. The Atomic bomb destroyed 4.1 square miles of the built-up area of 6.9 square miles of HIROSHIMA, 60% of the city. Amplification of previous reports indicate 65.5% of the built-up area of NAGASAKI was destroyed, and less than half a city block of TOYAMA'S 1.88 square miles of built-up area was left. 3 B-29s of the 509th Group are scheduled to attack NAKASAKI URBAN area. In the North Pacific 5 B-24s attacked KATAOKA NAVAL BASE and 4 Privateers attacked TORISHIMA RETTO and ONEKOTAN ZAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 081955 announces declaration of War by Russia on Japan.

- continued -

3292

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

8 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CG USFCT 080500 (pink) concurs in plan FORT BAYARD operation. Requests Navy Department action to obtain JCS approval.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 080522 (pink) approves COM3RD FLEET plan for 9 August Strikes on HONSHU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 081540 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC amendments to agreement on logistics responsibility for RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 082227 (pink) recommends to COMNORPAC that CTF 49 bombard selected objectives in KURILES.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 071505 (pink) outlines Red Navy desires for communications set up.

9 August (Guam Date)

Two enemy submarines were reported on the LEXTE-OKINAWA route. Two of our lifeguard submarines report definite periscope sighting, one at 29-55 131-53 and one at 30-15 142-06. SALAMAUASW Group reports a successful encounter with midget submarines on the OKINAWA-LEXTE convoy route, with one midget reported sunk and a second probably sunk, both at 20-26N 126-54E. After a rather successful strike yesterday TF 38 and TF 37 are scheduled to renew their attacks against the northern EMPIRE today from a launching position somewhat further to the south. Fighter sweeps over TOKYO Plains fields are also scheduled. The force encountered more air opposition than usual. BORIE (DD 704) was hit by a suicide plane on her signal bridge, but is able to return under her own power. A bombardment unit consisting of BatDiv 8, CruDiv 10, 2 British light cruisers and screening destroyers bombarded KAMAISHI. Ships used own planes to spot. Hits were scored in coke oven, transfer tables, rolling mill, storage plant and new industrial area beyond steel plant. No casualties to our own forces.

Incomplete reports of the first TF 38 strikes on N. Honshu targets indicate that TF 38 planes destroyed 124 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged 57, mostly at MATSUSHIMA, JIDMACHI, MISAWA, and HACHINOE dromes. The planes apparently were fueled and burned. There was no air opposition over the target, but 11 enemy aircraft were splashed by ships guns and TOMCAT CAP. The BORIE (DD 704) was hit by a suicider but splashed 2 others. The WASP shot down a suicider close aboard. In attacks on shipping TF 38 planes sank 1 DE, 1 PF, 1 PTD, and 7 luggers. Planes from TF 37 also attacking N. Honshu targets destroyed 22 enemy aircraft and damaged 19 on the ground, and destroyed 24 gliders at MATSUSHIMA. They sank 1 DD and damaged 2 DE and 1 net layer. 100 effective B-29s attacked the NIPPON OIL REFINERY CO. at AMAGASAKI from 0019-0307 K, bombing by radar. In flight reports show results. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, AA meager to intense. No losses have yet been reported. 151 F4F P-47s escorting B-29s shot down 12 enemy aircraft probably destroyed 1, losing 5 P-47s at YAWATA. 78 B-29s took off from 0245-0327 K to attack the MAKAJIMA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, OGIKUBO PLANT at TOKYO. In heavy attacks on 8 targets not previously reported concentrated principally on KYUSHU and the TSUSHIMA STRAITS area, planes of the F4F sank 8 small AK and damaged 1 DE or PF, 0 PF, 1 SCL, and 2 SD. In air combat P-51s shot down 6 enemy fighters. 18 B-24 attacking USA, destroyed 8 enemy aircraft on the ground and 24 B-25s destroyed a bridge near TAKANABE.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

9 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

FAW-1 planes destroyed 3 small AK and damaged 1 small FT, 1 tug, and 2 luggers. One Privateer was lost in the explosion of the ship it attacked. PBJ's damaged 2 small FT with rockets on the night of 8/9.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 082028 (pink) assigns North Pacific Force Creadiv 5 Cardivs 23, 26 and DesRon 45 establish and maintain control of communications from the ALEUTIANS across the SEA OF OKHOTSK. Neutralize Japanese bases in the area and protect convoys between ALEUTIANS and escort Turnaround points in the SEA OF OKHOTSK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090027 advises addressees of operational boundary established for operations U.S. and SOVIET forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090050 (pink) requests action to ensure that U.S. submarines in the SEA OF JAPAN north of SOVIET, U.S. boundary be protected pending reallocation. Requests use of TARTARY STRAIT for entry and exit. States that Pacific Fleet Submarines will be kept outside neutral zones pending establishment of liaison.

COM3RDFLT 090129 (pink) advises of intent to continue present attacks on 10, 12th and 13th.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090216 (pink) requests that requests for action by Pacific Fleet Units in support of USFCT be addressed to CINCPAC via COMUSFCT.

CINCAFPAC 090503 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553 which outlines proposed naval participation in FORT BAYARD project with minor reservation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090816 (pink) detaches CRUDIV 16 from CTF 95 and directs it to report 3RD FLEET.

CINCENPA 091403 (pink) states boundary line delimiting air and naval separating areas for US and USSR and states that CINCENPA air forces not operate north of boundary line at SEA OF OKHOTSK except on specific authorization.

10 August (Guam Date)

Although somewhat hampered by the weather, TF 37 and TF 38 continued strikes against air, shipping and communications targets in northern HONSHU. Today both forces are scheduled to fuel. Units of the Mine Flotilla left BUCKNER BAY to start sweeping in area SKAGWAY today. In the North Pacific TF 92 (20 Cl and 5 DD) is scheduled to rendezvous with 7 DD of DesRon 54 at 47-00 154-45 preparatory to an anti-shipping sweep and bombardment along the KURILE CHAIN. Submarines rescued 4 pilots from TF 37 and 38 yesterday. JALLAO reports sinking a large ship believed to be the TARAYASU, with 3 hits, and PAROO reports getting 6 hits in an escorted convoy on the 8th, both in the INLAND SEA. POMFRET sank a junk by gunfire off west coast of KYUSHU, DEVILFISH shelled radio and radar installations on TORI SHIMA and MUSKALLUNGE after failing to score hits with torpedoes in 7 northbound sea trucks in the KURILES, surfaced - damaged 2 in a gun action, receiving a hit in her periscope, with 1 man killed and 2 wounded.

- continued -

3294

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~AUGUST (CCT)~~

- continued -

In 2 days of attacks against HOKKAIDO and northern HONSHU TF 38 and 37 destroyed 318 and damaged 326 enemy aircraft. Revised report on shipping indicates that TF 37 sank 1 ODD, TF 38 sank 1 DE, and both forces together sank 2 DE, 1 FTD, 3 SD, and 6 luggers, damaging 2 DE and 1 FTU, all on the 9th. On the 10th in the first 4 strikes TF 38 planes damaged 1 Kaibokan and 7 merchant vessels. Results of TF 37 shipping attacks on the 10th will be reported later. On the ground TF 38 (on the 9th) destroyed 10 hangars and damaged 16, and destroyed 3 locomotives. On the 10th, despite bad weather, TF 38 planes destroyed 11 locomotives, 4 freight cars, 4 tank cars, and damaged hangars, barracks, railroad facilities, bridges, factories, and other industrial buildings. TF 37 in strikes on the 10th destroyed 3 locomotives, 3 freight cars, 3 tank cars, plus cranes, factories, docks and air installations. No report on our losses has yet been received. 72 B-29s hit the TOKYO ARSENAL, (it was the secondary target), half bombing by radar and half visually. Results were unobserved. No B-29 losses have so far been reported. On the 9th 2nd MAW damaged 27 F4Us, 6 SD and 8 motor launches in attacks off south KYUSHU.

COMFAIRWING ONE 080700 reports refusal of FEAF to provide air cover for rescue submarines.

ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK 080940 reports official Soviet statement that Soviet shipping no longer using IA HEROUSE, reports preparations for beginning convoy of merchant ships.

COMINCH AND CNO 092200 instructs CINCPAC to deal directly with ALUSNA MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK where desired.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100012 directs COMSOPAC to exercise administrative and operational control NABS, Air Fields and aviation matters in SOPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100812 directs COMNORPAC continue planned operations TF 92.

COMGENCHINA 101210 concurs in interdiction of sea traffic north of YANWTSE.

COMINCH AND CNO 101605 approves NATS establishment at MACTAN with installations held to a minimum.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957 (pink) contains detailed description of Soviet convoy plan.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 091540 (pink) requests that Soviets be advised when all American submarines have left their zone.

COM3RDFLEET 092115 (pink) advises of intention to shift attacks after 11 August to TOKYO AREA if northern targets inaccessible or no longer profitable.

COMINCH AND CNO 092202 (pink) requests comments on Red Navy convoy Plan

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100811 (pink) comments to COMINCH at length on Red Navy convoy plan.

- continued -

3235

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

10 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 101609 (pink) quotes text of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS relating to occupation of an operational airfield at each principal anchorage.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 101614 (pink) warns against relaxation of vigilance against Japanese attacks as a result of Japanese peace proposals.

11 August (Guam Date)

On completion of fueling yesterday, the Carrier Task Forces and their fueling groups remained in the same general area awaiting improved weather and political developments. Contained reports are received from submarines active both in rescue and offensive capacities. PLAICE recovered five airmen from a B-25 off KYUSHU on the 11th and BALAO recovered a RANDOLPH bomber pilot and his radioman off north HONSHU on the 10th. In addition to previously reported FOX results from her JAPAN SEA patrol sank a medium tanker and damaged a large tanker. ARGONAUT bombarded a radio station on SHICHIHATSU and on the 7th BUMPER sank a tug, a barge and a lugger off BANKA ISLAND on the 5th.

Final reports on 3rdFlt attacks on the 10th indicate that planes from TF 37 and TF 38 during 2 days attacks destroyed 398 enemy aircraft (13 airborne) and damaged 314. The aircraft types ran more to trainers than they had previously. Very few operational twins were found. Two previously untouched stock pile fields at MAMUROGAWA and at OBANAZAWA provided most of the planes for the destruction on the 10th. In attacks on shipping in addition to damage previously reported planes of TF 38 sank 5 merchant ships and 4 luggers and damaged 11 merchant ships, 2 passenger ferries and 4 luggers. CTF 38 states "enormous damage was inflicted upon airfield installations, oil storage, transportation facilities, docks, shipyards, and industrial buildings." TF 37 in attacks on shipping on the 10th sank 6 merchant vessels and 8 small craft; probably sank 1 DE, 1 merchant ship and 2 luggers and damaged 1 DE and 8 merchant vessels. On the ground considerable damage was inflicted on locomotives and railroad equipment, barracks, hangars, and a power station. 5th and 7th AF planes flew about 600 combat sorties over KYUSHU and near by sea areas on the 10th. Heaviest attacks were on KUMAMOTO with high explosive and Napalm. The city was left flaming and smoke obscured. Other attacks included 22 B-24s on CITA, 36 B-25s on AMAMI, 39 B-25s on shipping in the JAPAN SEA, and 48 P-47s on CVE's in SASEBO Harbor. In the latter attack 11x1000 pounders were described as near misses, with apparently no damage inflicted on the ships. Oil storage tanks were hit, however. In attacks on shipping in the JAPAN SEA and elsewhere 1 DE or DD, 5 merchant vessels and 3 small craft were sunk and 1 DE or DD and 3 small craft were damaged.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

11 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020912 (pink) requests sterilization by 1 December 1945 of mines layed in Central, South and Eastern HONSHU ports and INLAND SEA areas except SHIMONSEKI STRAIT approach etc.

CINCAFPAC 101407 (pink) requests that amphibious force representatives designated to work with 6th, 8th and 10th Armies contact respective Army commanders for detailed planning.

CINCAFPAC 105507 (pink) requests comments on proposal to authorize direct liaison between representatives of 5th PhibCor and 13th AAF, latter assigned mission of supporting 5th Phib during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102314 (pink) concurs in foregoing despatch but points out that 1st Marine Air Wing is component of FIF forces, suggests Marine ground forces be supported where practicable by Marine Aviation.

COMINCH AND CNO 102000 (pink) quotes at length War Department policy for public relations and censorship concerning military use ATOMIC BOMB.


CINCPAC ADVANCE 102315 (pink) states that although CINCPAC does not favor NAIPKO project at this time he is prepared to furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102317 (pink) states provision of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS for coordination with CINCAFPAC and controlled by COMHIBPAC of amphibious movement and debarkation. Instructs amphibious force commanders to establish liaison with appropriate Army commanders.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110217 (pink) states that CINCPAC intends to continue headquarters at GUAM in event of Jap capitulation, but moving between GUAM and SOUTH DAKOTA when necessary.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110829 (pink) advises that presence of pressure mines makes it impracticable to operate in KOBE-OSAKA area until February 1946.

COMGENCHINA 111215 (pink) requests that FORT BAYARD project be continued even though Japanese capitulation



TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

12 August (Guam Date)

OAK HILL, LSD 7 at 21-15N, 131-02 E reported at 2236 KING last night that she was followed by a piloted torpedo for 20 minutes, that the speed of the torpedo was 10 knots and that the torpedo exploded 2000 yards astern. She was south bound and escorted at the time. Com3rdFlt reported at 0620 KING this morning that the TOKYO area was under attack, and that a snooper had been shot down. 30.8 the fueling group, is proceeding to the southward. TG 38.5 has been formed from the following ships of TF 37: KING GEORGE V, 1 CV, 2 CL's and accompanying DD's. The remainder of TF 37 is proceeding to MANUS. At 2045 ITSM last night the PENNSYLVANIA was hit aft by an aerial torpedo while anchored in BUCKNER BAY. The dispatch states that the weather was clear, plane approached low on water and attacked undetected. Damage and casualties undetermined. V. Adm. Oldendorf and staff uninjured. He had shifted Flag to the PENNSYLVANIA and now is returning Flag to TENNESSEE. 2 OCL's (RICHMOND, CONCORD) and 12 DD's of TF 92 in an anti-shipping sweep of north KURILE chain yesterday destroyed a total of 10 trawlers and one small merhip. A simultaneous bombardment was conducted by TF 92 against MATSURA, KURABU ZAKI and SURIBACHI starting many fires. Considerable return fire was received from KURABU ZAKI with no damage suffered by our forces, except machine gun hits (no casualties on DD MC DERMOT). TF 92 is now returning to ATTU.

On the 12th PFM's of FAW-1 fired a lighthouse in HANGCHOW WAN and destroyed a lighthouse-weather station at the tip of SHANTUNG PENINSULA. FEAF planes attacked KYUSHU and nearby shipping targets on the 11th with about 575 aircraft. Attacks on shipping sank 8 AK plus 4 small craft and damaged 1 submarine, 2 transports, 1 lightship and 1 barge. Most of the shipping was sunk in the INLAND SEA. Other attacks were made on KURUME with 159 tons of incendiaries, on TOSU railroad yards near KURUME, east KYUSHU bridges (6 were hit and damaged), YAMAKAWA and IBUSUKI on the south tip of KYUSHU. Cover was furnished by 82 P-51s, 1 Zeke was downed and 2 P51s lost. 8 F4Us damaged a bridge and a lighthouse on YAKU SHIMA, and strafed TOKUNO airfield

At 0900 Admiral Sherman and party departed for conference at MANILA.

13 August (Guam Date)

TF 38 retired to the southward during the night and commenced fueling at 0600 this morning at 32N, 142E. TF 37(less 38.5) enroute to MANUS. Sweeping operations by 95.4 are underway in the SKAGWAY AREA. MinRon 20, fast minesweepers are proceeding toward TOKYO from BUCKNER BAY. CinCEN reports that 4 carriers and 4 destroyers are now cruising in BAY OF BENGAL awaiting developments. Reports has been received from the PENNSYLVANIA stating that she has a large hole 30 feet long and 20 feet wide in bottom of ship, aft, that both starboard propeller shafts are broken and the inboard port shaft and rudder are damaged, that flooding was believed to be under control. BORIE (DD 704) with TF 38 was hit by suicide plane on 9 August 1945, reports the following casualties to ships company: killed in action: 1 officer, 34 enlisted men; 13 enlisted men missing; 2 officer, 32 enlisted men wounded.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

13 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

An incomplete flash report of the 1st 4 3rd Fleet strikes against the TOKYO area indicates that planes of TF 38 shot down 21 enemy aircraft (12 believed to be snoopers and 9 Kamikazes), and destroyed 46 enemy aircraft on the ground plus 71 damaged. Bad weather in the morning improved as the day wore on. No enemy planes reached the force. A report on damage to ground targets, including electronic plants and airfields installations, is scheduled to follow. PEARL planes flew 675 - 700 strikes over KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and sea areas on the 12th. The heaviest attacks were at MATSUYAMA (SHIKOKU). In attacks on shipping 12 small and medium AKs were sunk, and 1 claimed CA (in TSUSHIMA STRAITS), 1 AS, 6 small AV, and 3 luggers were damaged. 137 P-47s and P-38s attacked KYUSHU bridges, destroying 2 and damaging 2. KANOKA and CHIRAN drones were heavily attacked. 3 enemy aircraft were shot down. In one encounter 10 P-51s saw 30-40 Franks and shot down 1. All but 4 Franks fled. 26 P-47s hit MATSUYAMA drone in northern FUKUKA, flying more than 500 nautical miles to the target in their first FUKUKA attack. They used 167 rockets and strafed. 1 enemy aircraft was exploded on the ground and others were probably damaged. Some factory and building targets were also strafed.

Admiral Sherman and party returned from conference at PANAMA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110858 (pink) warns COMGENF/PAC to alert 1 RCT from 6th Marine Division for immediate occupation duty if required.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 111344 (pink) advises that entry and exit of U.S. subs into TARTARY STRAIT depends on exchanges of liaison groups and development of system of recognition signals.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120111 (pink) requests early action on FORT HAYARD proposal.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120112 (pink) requests complete data on status of 3 PCE (R) reported to have been converted into communication ships.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120244 (pink) states that commanders of Fast Carrier Task Forces should take all practicable measures to insure that VF pilots on dual CAP are capable of night landings.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120405 requests that pilots of OKINAWA based planes be briefed that friendly submarines are operating in JAPAN SEA, south of KOREA and in the vicinity of KYUSHU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120807 (pink) advises of and describes modifications of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS with respect to areas of responsibility of COM5THFLT and COM7THFLT.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

14 August (Guam Date)

Report from Com3rdFleet at 0620 this morning states the THIRD Fleet is attacking the TOKYO Area. At 0730 KING time Com3rdFleet acknowledged receipt of orders from Fleet Headquarters to suspend attack operations. TF 37 (less 38.5, British Carrier Group) is proceeding to MAUS. 30.8 remaining in fuelling area southeast of TOKYO. 95.4 is continuing sweeping of SKAGWAY area. Additional vessels en route from BUCHTER BAY ETA SKAGWAY area daylight 16 August. Com3rdFleet has directed MinRon 20 (fast mine sweepers) to join TG 30.8 (oiler group). ITY Dumbo plane rescue reported yesterday as being in TOKYO BAY has been confirmed. This Dumbo rescued three survivors of a torpedo plane from the TICONDEROGA. Of four IWO-based fighters lost yesterday attacking the EMPIRE, three were rescued, one by the sub TIGRONE just west of SURUGA WAN. The TIGRONE also reports that an otherwise dull day was relieved by bombardment of MIKOROTO ISLAND resulting in five hits in radio station 6 on light tower. SPIKEFISH reports sinking 1 class submarine at 29N-124E after tracking it for 11 hours with 2 torpedo hits out of 6. One prisoner rescued from wreckage.

On the 14th 725 effective B-29s attacked 6 targets. 161 aircraft hit HIKARI ARSENAL, 148 hit OSAKA ARMY ARSENAL and 110 hit MARUFU RAILROAD YARDS (INAKUNI, SW HONSHU). No losses have been reported for any of these last day missions. There was no fighter opposition, and AA was nil to moderate. 135 aircraft hit NIPPON OIL REFINERY CO. at AKITA, 89 hit ISEZAKI URBAN (NW TOKYO) and 82 hit KUMAGAYA URBAN (NW TOKYO), all by radar. Again there was no fighter opposition, and no losses have been reported. AA was nil to meager at all 3 targets. Reports of FEAF activities on the 13th show 263 sorties flown. Shipping attacks by B-24s and B-25s in TSUSHIMA STRAITS resulted in sinking 8 AKs and damaging 1 FTD. 48 P-47s on a sweep off KOREA report destroying 1 enemy aircraft over KILJO, with 2 probably destroyed. 1 P-47 is missing. In a separate dispatch ComAF 5 reports that the CVE KAIYO, attacked in BEPPU WAN (NE KYUSHU) by the 38th Bomb Group on the 9th, is now lying on her side. On the 13th 2nd NAV F4Us burned 1 x 75 and 1 x 100 ft. boats in the W. RYUKYUS, and 1 operational Betty on WAN airfield, KIKAI JIMA. FAW 1 planes damaged 1 SB and 1 SA in TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 14th. In the North Pacific 7 B-24s put 10.5 tons on KATAKA and KURIBACHI airfields, and 2 Privateers hit KURABU with 24 x 100 pounders.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 120246 sets forth responsibility for execution of Federal Foreign Propaganda program.

CINCPAC BPF 121202 (pink) advises of plan to move 3 small British groups with air and logistics support to HONG KONG, SHANGHAI and possibly SINGAPORE.

CINCPAC 121527 (pink) sets forth amendments to 3rd edition BLACKLIST plan; 24th Corps to be occupation force KOREA.

COMINCH AND CNO 122148 (pink) approves assembly personnel and material for operation to supply Chinese (FORT BAYARD plan).

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~AUGUST (CCT)~~

- continued -

14 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 140629 (pink) warns action and info addressees to be prepared to execute CAMBUS on short notice, 5th PhibCor to be ordered to report to COMBEN 6TH ARMY, designates Lt. Col. R. J. Truitt, as MarAirBase commander YOKOSUKA, Col. B. L. Smith MarAirBase commander SASEBO-NAGASAKI, instructs COMAIRPAC nominate ComAirBase KURE, Capt G. J. Dufek designated COMNAVAL BASE OMINATO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 140819 (pink) instructs COM7THFLT at earliest possible date pass to COMPHILSEAFRON all remaining functions as senior Naval Commander SEA.

CINC BTF 140829 (pink) deals with logistics necessary in connection with Admiralty plan to send British Naval forces to HONG KONG.

CINCPAC 141455 (pink) advises that vessel loaded with materials and personnel for construction of bulk aviation gas facilities TOKYO is on route from Manila, requests water facilities at OKINAWA and TOKYO be provided.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 142304 orders cessation of offensive operations against Japanese forces, continue searches and patrols, maintain defensive and internal security measures.

15 August (Guam Date)

Swan songs of the submarines: During the last few days of hostilities ARGONAUT, in EAST CHINA SEA destroyed a junk by gunfire SHIME KOSHIMI (this on the 12th) on the 11th, POMFRET in EAST CHINA SEA sank sea truck off FUKUYE SHIMA and on the 13th an empty cargo junk in SAISHU KAIKYO both by gunfire (POW total 23 Japs and 7 KOREANS). LAMPREY in JAVA SEA sank 1 junk, 1 lugger, PAROO in SEA OF JAPAN sank small AK on 11th, CAVALLA was attacked by unidentified dive bomber at noon yesterday in 35-40N, 141-20E; bomb missed 100 yards astern, and no damage, HOGY reported at noon yesterday from 40N-146E that she had successfully exited from the SEA OF JAPAN via LA PEROUSE STRAIT on the surface. APA 124 (LA GRANGE) in BUCKNER BAY was hit in superstructure amidship by suicide plane at 1948 ITES! on evening of 13th. Fire was soon brought under control. Considerable structural damage resulted. TF 38, while retiring southeastward yesterday, was being heckled by numerous bogies. At 1323 ITEM Com3rdFlt reported that he was continuing to splash those approaching the Force, and that so far the count on such was 5 since noon. The force is operating at economical speed in an area southeast of TOKYO, with 30.8 and 112.2 further to the south. CincBPF in DUKE OF YORK and accompanying DD's joined TG 38.5 this morning. Regimental Combat Team of 5th Marines departed GUAM last evening in 5 APA's (12.1.2) escorted by 3 DD's, to report to Com3rdFlt for duty on 18th. OZARK (LSV 2) with Brig. General Clements and Headquarters Task Force A, 6th Marine Division, embarked, accompanied by SHADWELL (LSV 15) and 2 DD's are enroute to report Com3rdFlt for duty, ETA noon on 17th.

Prior to the receipt of CINCPAC'S order to cease offensive operations planes of the THIRD Fleet encountered about 45 Jap fighters over CHOSI, ATSUGI, and SAGAMI WAN, shooting down 26 of them. On the ground at HYAKETIGAHARA 5 unidentified enemy aircraft were destroyed. During the morning and early afternoon the CAP shot down 8 enemy aircraft approaching the force, and a DD shot down 1. Total enemy aircraft shot down was 35 - total destroyed 40.

- continued -

3301

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

15 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

Final figures on the THIRD Fleet attacks on the 13th show 422 enemy aircraft put out of action on that day: 19 shot down, 254 destroyed on ground and 149 damaged on ground. The percentage of flares was very high. Nagano loaded with over 100 trainers, was wiped absolutely clean. 1 M Class sub was destroyed and 1 damaged; 8 luggers were destroyed and 22 damaged. On the ground 14 locomotives were destroyed and 5 damaged; 11 hangars were destroyed and 5 damaged; 13 industrial buildings, 7 airfield shops, and 5 warehouses were damaged. In 1167 offensive and 414 CAP sorties on that day we lost 20 aircraft (12 combat), with 6 pilots and 2 aircrewmembers. On the 14th F4AF planes in 185 sorties sank 8 AK, 1 sloop, and 2 small craft, and damaged 1 PT, 2 flak boats, 7 small AK, and a large number of small craft. We lost 3 B-47s, with 1 pilot recovered. 7 B-29s on 13-14 August dropped 5.5 million leaflets telling the Japanese people the terms of the Jap surrender offer and the reply of Secretary of State Byrnes, plus the terms of the POTSDAM declaration. The populated centers - TOKYO, KOBE, OSAKA, KYOTO, KANSAI got most, but all islands were covered. 2 B-29s on the 15th and 4 on the 16th are scheduled to drop 4 million leaflets on 31 major cities, keeping the Japanese people up to date on negotiations. In the North Pacific on the 14th 2 Privateers attacked PARAMUSHIRU, and 6 B-24s put 13.5 tons of incendiary clusters on KASHI-WABARA staging area, starting a large fire.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 142310 (pink) requests Japanese to send ship to rendezvous with Halsey and lead him into SAGAMI WAN.

CINCPAC & CINCPAC ADVANCE 150218 congratulates General MacArthur on appointment as Supreme Commander.

MARSHALL 142318 (pink) informs addressees to British Chief of Staff have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser for acceptance of Japanese Surrender in HONGKONG and have asked concurrence of U.S. Chiefs of Staff on instructions to Mountbatten which are set forth in full.

COMINCH AND CNO 150000 advises of receipt by State Department of Japanese. Sets forth full text of reply.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150206 (pink) sets forth changes in BLACKLIST Staff Study.

CTF 95 150215 sets forth recommendations for dissolution TC 95.5, abolition title COMNAV RYUKYUS assignment of CTF 99 duties set forth in CTF 95 OpPlan 3-45.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150216 (pink) advises that Halsey acknowledged receipt orders for cessation of air attacks at 142130 August but that initial attack was under way when directive was received by CINCPAC.

CINCPAC 150245 (pink) sets forth priorities on allocation of seaborne troop lift for Phase one of BLACKLIST.

CINCPAC 150305 (pink) warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operations. COM GEN 6th and 8th Armies and 24th Corps directed to expedite arrangements with 5th, 3rd, 7th Amphibious representatives, and all action addressees are instructed to initiate the execution of operations to occupy JAPAN and KOREA.

- continued -

3302

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 150355 instructs Japanese authorities designate radio station in TOKYO for use between headquarters. Station JUM on frequency 13705 KC be used in interim.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150620 requests immediate dispatch to Japanese authorities that any Japanese aircraft approaching our naval disposition must be destroyed for defense purposes.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150846 sets forth in detail naval requirements in addition to those contained in BLACKLIST.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150842 enjoins officers to conduct themselves properly in their treatment of Japanese.

CINCPAC 151333 (pink) advises that accomplishment of occupation mission the U.S. zone of KOREA will require 1 additional Army Division if DARIEN is occupied, states that occupation of SHANGHAI by 2 divisions of 3rd PhibCorps is feasible barring unforeseen developments, recommends that any other occupation on CHINA COAST be U.S. forces be subordinated to primary operations.

COMINCH 151844 warns of intense activities along shores of SAGAMI WAN probably organized prior surrender but possibly indicating contemplated treachery.

SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS 150503 directs cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces notification of effective date and hour of such cessation directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send representative and sets forth means for this representatives to reach MANILA.

16 August (Guam Date)

At 0200 Admiral Sherman and party departed for Manila conference with Japanese Representatives.

SEA SCOUT sank small coastal vessel on 15th in the GULF OF THAILAND. CARBONERA destroyed 4 schooners, 2 junks, 2 sampans off the MALAY COAST prior to 15 August. TIPTOE and TRUMP (British) sank 15 junks and 1 patrol vessel all before 9th in vicinity of south of JAVA. PLAICE exploded 12 mines in last 4 days, vicinity 32-28N, 128-12E. PIPER was forced down, bombed and depth charged by Jap radar plane at 1845 I(-9) yesterday, 16th. TORSAX sank 2 MIKURA Frigates before final bell with torpedoes in the SEA OF JAPAN. ATULE exploded a frigate with 1 hit on morning of 13th and possibly scored 1 or 2 hits on another frigate after 165-mile chase also in JAPAN SEA. BALAO sank one picket and beached another in TONIWAN on 14th. All submarines south of HONSHU except 1 off BUNGO SUIDO and 1 off KII SUIDO for life guard duty are being returned to base. For present submarines are remaining on station in YELLOW SEA, EAST CHINA SEAS, SEA OF JAPAN and in northern KURILES AREA. Apparently some enemy submarines continue their attacks. HEALY (DD 672) reported submarine contact at 75-13N, 144-19E at 0852 (-10) on 16 August. Challenge unanswered, HEALY made 3 attacks, and there are indications of damage to sub. Additional DD's have been sent to the scene. Clearing of SKAGWAY of mines progress despite breakers during the nights of 14th and 15th. TF 38 is operating in vicinity of POINT READY, and replenishment units in vicinity of POINT DRINK.

- continued -

3303

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

16 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC 141101 (pink) states amendment in BLACKLIST plan, substituting 5th Amphibious Corp for 1st Army Corps in BASENO-NAGASAKI area. Removes 27th division from 24th Corps for use in B-60.

MACARTHUR 150529 (pink) announces assumption of command as Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces by General MacArthur. Announces channel of communication with Japanese Imperial Government will through MacArthur Headquarters.

COMJEMIDPAC 150930 recommends that JCS be requested on V-J day to remove restriction imposed on Hawaiian Area by modifying category defense B.

COMINCH AND CNO AND JCS U.S. ARMY 152127 (pink) suggests in view of Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison groups at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok be modified. Suggests provide liaison representatives with Cruiser to deal with Russian command in whatever ASIATIC port appears desirable. Mentions possibility of Dairen but warns that occupation of that port is not to be communicated to Soviets at this time.

JCS 160045 (pink) directs CINCPAC to release to full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160250 (pink) advises that Rear Admiral Sherman will proceed to Manila to represent CINCPAC during meeting with Japanese representatives. States intention to send a Liaison group headed by a Flag Officer to represent CINCPAC at CINCPAC headquarters at TOKYO AREA.

CNS SAMAR 160433 (pink) refers to FORT BAYARD operation. Announces assignment of officers from MABU 13, announces receipt of designation of 7 LSTs. States intention to begin loading on arrival.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160724 (pink) suggests cancellation of exchange of Flag Officers between CINCPAC headquarters and PEARL and Soviets at VLADIVOSTOK in lieu thereof Admiral Settle to be provided with Cruiser and proceed initially to VLADIVOSTOK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160809 (pink) sets forth naval facilities required to be furnished at (A) YOKOSUKA (B) OGINATO (C) HIROSHIMA (D) BASENO.

KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS 161117 advises Soviets that Japanese forces of KWANTUNG Army have ceased all military movements and requests Soviets cease their attacks. Sets forth procedure for maintaining communications.

CINCPAC 161141 (pink) states that CINCPAC has no further need for Military Liaison Group for Khabarovsk, inquires if project shall be continued in these circumstances.

acknowledgment

WARCOS 161608 sets forth agreement by Japanese of receipt of messages from U.S. Government and MacArthur. Sets forth steps which are being taken in response thereto.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

18 August (Guam Date)

War is not yet over for some of our subs. In SEA OF JAPAN reports that the fallen enemy is maintaining day and night air patrol of SEA OF JAPAN and that she has been dunked four times and bombed once since the 16th. This is report of the PIPER. Enemy submarines also are reported. Merchant ship (HOGLINE KNOT) on a westerly course at ten knots sighted submarine at 1430(-10) yesterday at 10-24N, 154-52E. The submarine was sighted 500 yards on ships port quarters, remained partially surfaced for two minutes, then submerged. No indication of hostility. A DE has been ordered to investigate and take offensive action if and as may prove necessary. A plane of Fleet Air Wing ONE at 1430(-9) yesterday sighted an unidentified submarine 28N-128-45E on a southerly course, speed between 6 and 10 knots, running decks awash. CTF 95 has directed Fleet Air Wing ONE to attack the submarine if it proceeds south of 27-20N. TF 38 is replenishing again today. BatDivs 3 and 4 (less MARYLAND) have been assigned to the THIRD Fleet and are being assembled at BUCKNER BAY by August 22 as TG 32.90. TF 31, TOKYO Occupation Force, R.Adm. Badger in ICWA with SAN DIEGO, 6 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LSV, 1 LSD, 6 TMS, 6 APD and DesDiv 106 has been directed to conform to the movements of TF 38 and remain within TBs range until otherwise directed.

JNP (RDO TOKYO) 170212 requests that Allied forces refrain from approaching the home waters of JAPAN proper until sufficient time has elapsed for the cease fire order will have been fully effectuated.


SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 170711 confirms the impression of Japanese GHQ that the tasks of the representatives in Manila does not include signing of surrender agreement. Orders them to act without further delay.

MACARTHUR 171357 quotes messages nos. 5 and 7 from Japanese GHQ, no. 5 advises Soviet forces still on offensive, requests steps be taken to bring this offensive to a halt. No. 7 advises that the parties for CHINA, MANCHURIA and the south left on 17 August.

WARGOS 171907 quotes broadcast from KHABAROVSK to CO KWANTUNG Army suggesting that Japanese cease military action at 1200 20 August, whereupon Soviet troops also will cease.

COMINCH AND CNO CHIEF OF STAFF 161940 (pink) proposes cancellation of Army, Navy liaison groups for KHABAROVSK and VLADIVOSTOK with Russia in view of termination of hostilities. Instructs Military mission MOSCOW contain Soviet concurrence.

COMGEN CHINA 170615 (pink) passes along Chinese request that the term MANCHURIA be defined as including LIAONING, KARIN and HEILONGKIANG but not JEHCI which Chinese consider integral part of CHINA.



TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

18 August (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170906 (pink) instructs COMBARGILLS and COM MARIANAS make plans and preparations to receive surrender of Japanese forces remaining in BONINS, MARIANAS, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS. Refers to CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45. Preliminary plans to be made for activation naval air fields at WAKE and PALAU for use of NATS.

CINCPAC 171045 (pink) advises that JCL BX 5181 has been passed to COMPHIBSPAC who is asked to submit best estimate earliest possible date for movement to CHINA.

COMG-2 USASTAF 180810 (pink) states USASTAF desire to reserve right to review current construction projects in light of post V-J, requirements for WAC and to propose construction which may be required.

19 August (Guam Date)

Merchant ship sighted supposed enemy submarine eastbound on surface at 01-09N, 132-19E. Plane of FAW ONE sighted another submarine yesterday morning in same location as previous day (28N, 128-50E) and also on southerly course, speed 6-10 knots. Search is being conducted by 2 DD's. COD on her 17th war patrol in South CHINA SEA and JAVA SEA ending August 4 sank 23 junks and an oil barge for a total of 2200 tons sunk. Progress of clearing SKAGWAY area continues. THIRD Fleet is continuing to replenish today. TF 38 is being reformed as TF 38, 2nd Carrier Task Force, and TF 39, 1st Carrier Task Force. Aboard the LEVY yesterday, Japanese officers representing the Atoll Commander at KILE tentatively accepted unconditional surrender terms, subject to approval of KILE Commander. The terms were presented by Captain H. B. Grow, acting for Rear Admiral Harrill (ComMars-Gils). Japanese were given 48 hours in which to communicate with Imperial Headquarters for final instructions.

WARCOS 190023 (pink) sets forth President Truman's attitude toward acceptance of surrender of HONGKONG by British Officer.

COM3RDFLEET 190219 (pink) sets forth in detail Com3rdFleet's alternative plans for landing of marines in coordination with 11th AirBorne.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 192113 (pink) contains instructions for MacArthur and Wedemeyer concerning arrangements for surrender of HONGKONG with British Officer.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

20 August (Guam Date)

The Third Fleet is continuing to replenish and reform today. Replenishment will be concluded by dusk. INTERTAN, INTREPID and CABOT escorted by 9 DD's sortied ENIGETOK at dawn today for Point READY to join THIRD FLEET. EAT is down 25 August. Sweeping of the southern half of the SHAWAY area will be finished 25 August. Information concerning the axis, depth and spacing of this minefield was obtained from the Japanese representatives at MANILA. Information concerning enemy submarines also was obtained from these envoys. 6 subs are at sea: 3 near OKINAWA, 3 in the vicinity of the MARIANAS and 2 near TRUK. On the 16th these submarines were ordered to cease hostilities and return to base. This order was repeated on the 18th. However, yesterday morning a plane of PAN 18 reported an enemy submarine at 14-14N, 147-42E, submerged with periscope showing, on a course of 60 degrees. The periscope disappeared after 8 seconds. Also a late dispatch from COMMILSEAFROM reports an attack by DD SMITH on a good sonar contact at 21-45N, 127-33E early morning of 21st. This attack was made after failure of submarine to answer challenge. The Japanese Commander of MILLE ATOLL has displayed a signal indicating he was ready to sign the instrument of unconditional surrender. Arrangements are being made to effect the surrender aboard a DE at noon on the 22nd.

The Japanese envoys departed MANILA for JAPAN at 1300 yesterday.

WARCOS 182313 (pink) advises representatives of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and Netherlands be invited to attend Japanese surrender and that State Department will request CINCPAC make provisions accordingly.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 190909 (pink) contains official text of (1) Proclamation by Emperor of Japan accepting UNCOND terms. (2) Instrument of surrender. (3) General Order Number 1 containing directions from Imperial General Headquarters to all its commanders in Japan and abroad to cease hostilities and surrender to appropriate commanders. Order also covers disarmament, status of Police Force, supplying of information, disposition of ships, minefields etc.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 191047 (pink) requests MACVIA and GOO Australian Military Forces to arrange between themselves areas in which each will receive surrender of Japanese forces.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS 191615 (pink) amends paragraph in General Order Number 1 dealing with surrender of forces on VIETIC mainland, KARAFUTO and KURILE ISLANDS to CINC Soviet Forces.

21 August (Guam Date)

To avoid the typhoon, THIRD Fleet units moved to the southward yesterday, and at dusk return to assigned areas to the north. No reports of surrenders of enemy submarines yet. A merchant ship sighted a periscope yesterday afternoon at 12-39N, 125-30E. A floating mine resembling a barrel was exploded by strafing late yesterday afternoon at 21-21N, 127-50E. This is just 19 miles to the eastward of the sonar contact made by the destroyer SMITH early yesterday. Aviation personnel rescued by submarines since 28 May totaled 227, of these 47 were from carriers, a total of 32 were Navy and 145 were Army.

- continued -

3307

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

21 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

The Japanese Government has been informed that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will accept the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in TOKYO BAY on a United States Battleship on 31 August 1945, on 26 August an advance party will arrive by air at ATSUGI airdrome. U. S. Naval forces (led by a Japanese ship) will arrive in SAGAMI WAN, and U. S. Naval Forces (with Japanese pilots) will advance into TOKYO BAY. On 28 August, the main airborne force will commence landing at ATSUGI airdrome and Naval and Marine forces will land in the vicinity of YOKOSUKA Naval Base. These forces will occupy and establish themselves at once within a specifically designated area pending consummation of the formal surrender. On 29 and 30 August these landings of airborne and naval forces will continue. On 31 August designated later, landing of airborne and naval landing forces will continue; at an hour aboard a U.S. Battleship in TOKYO BAY the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will receive from duly authorized representatives, the proclamation signed by the Emperor and the instrument of surrender to be signed at this ceremony, and immediately following the ceremony of surrender, these two documents together with General Order No. One will be promulgated to the Japanese people.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 202137 (pink) advises that in view of large amount of air seaborne traffic in the JAPAN and KOREA areas and throughout the KURILES weather centrals will be needed. Suggests that liaison to handle details of ship and aircraft movement coordination be handled by liaison group aboard ship.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210818 (pink) advises of concept of operations for landings on CHINA COAST concurred in by representatives of CINCPAC, COM7THFLT, COMSIXTHNA and staff members of CINCPAC and sets forth concept in detail.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 210941 (pink) changes surrender date set forth in SCAP Z 517 from 28 August to 31 August. States instructions received by SCAP concerning acceptance of surrender in NEW-AUSTRALIAN areas by SAC and AUSTRALIANS and requests latter to arrange between themselves division of the area.

22 August (Guam Date)

Units of the Third Fleet have completed replenishment, have reformed for the pending operation, and are operating at economical speed in areas assigned. As of 20 August 460 mines plus 3 floaters have been swept in the SHAGWAY Area. A Check sweep of the southern extremity of the area corroborated the information received from the Japanese envoys at MANILA as to the southern limit of the mine-field. Plane of Fleet Air Wing 18 reported a submarine yesterday morning, submerged, at 15-53N, 153-51E. Destroyer Escorts CROMEN and GILLIGAN made depth charge attacks on separate contact in vicinity of 21-22N, 127-19E. Contacts were challenged prior to attacking. The CROMEN evaluates these contacts as probably non-submarine. Aboard the USS LEVY (DE 162) inside WILC Lagoon, shortly afternoon yesterday, the Imperial Japanese Navy Commander of MILES ATOLL surrendered unconditionally to Captain Grow, acting for Rear Admiral Harrill, Commander, Marshall-Gilberts Area. August 28 has been set for raising American Flag on main island of the Atoll.

CINCPAC 210517 (pink) concurs in putting in effect the General provisions of Com3RDFlt's plan 2 with certain supplementary instructions.

- continued -

3308

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

COMGENCHINA 210755 (pink) states assumption of COMGENCHINA that rescudores will be included in CHINA THEATERS area.

CINCPAC 220915 (pink) replying to COMGENCHINA CRF 5250 (not held) states that CINCPAC has made no estimate for Army service troops to support marine forces available for CHINA COAST operation.

COMGENCHINA 211220 (pink) states in detail understanding of COMCHINA THEATER representatives concerning availability logistics support and personnel lift of occupation forces for CHINA THEATER.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 212230 (pink) states that disarmed Japanese military personnel may be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by naval commanders pending arrangements to return them to their homes in accordance with POTSDAM proclamation.

COM3RDFLEET 212327 (pink) sets forth COM3RDFLT opplan 11-45.

COM3RDFLEET 212329 (pink) sets forth Annex B to COM3RDFLTs opplan 11-45.

COM3RDFLEET 212341 (pink) sets forth Air Plan (Annex D to Com3rdFlt Opplan 11-45).


CINCPAC ADVANCE 220729 (pink) advises that operation MAJESTIC is suspended indefinitely.

COMGEN CHINA 221200 (pink) advises that to the knowledge of the Generalissimo no negotiations had been initiated between CHINA and BRITAIN concerning British operations in HONGKONG area.

COMGENCHINA 221210 (pink) advises MARCOS and COMINCH that necessary military coordination between British and CHINA relative to occupation of HONGKONG by British is not being made.

JCS 221835 (pink) states that adjustments of boundaries of SCSA also changes command responsibility as agreed to at POTSDAM WILL become effective with formal surrender. Commander Allied Naval Forces CHINA will be abolished and all naval forces except U.S. will pass to British control.

COMGENCHINA 171110 (pink) sets forth in detail plans for movement of central government troops into strategic areas in CHINA to cope with the problems of orderly surrender and preservation of law and order.



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET (C)~~

23 August (Comm Date)

Third Fleet is operating at economical speed in an area southeast of YOKO. BOSTON (DD 670) made a submarine contact at 31-57N, 143-18E early yesterday morning. The submarine fired a yellow flare. No attack was made by the BOSTON. COMBINT Fleet has directed OTC 30.8 to conduct an air and surface search of the area, and OTC 30.4 to search the area from scene of contact forward toward HUPIN. If the submarine is located, it will either surrender immediately or be destroyed.

COMBINT 231516 (pink) advises that CINCPAC had been instructed to hold HONOLULU forces at LAYE or other convenient ports pending further orders, and to conform to MacArthur's views on timing Jap surrender.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201934 (pink) states that no further action is desired with respect to HAFED project.

COMBINT AND CNO 201945 sets forth presidential directive to all concerned to take necessary action to prevent release of any information concerning Atomic Bomb.

COMBINT 231431 advises COMUSMACV that 3rd Fleet will execute plan 2. Directs COMUSMACV to arrange with Admiral McDougal for naval gunfire support, suggests that COMUSMACV AIRBORNE DIVISION send air support liaison officer.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230823 sets forth schedule of return of amphibious corps and Marines to U.S. when relieved or released.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230833 advises COMUSMACV he is considered Task Force Commander and instructs him to initiate compliance OpPlan 12-45.

CINCPAC 231127 advises CINCPAC of numbers of officers of Allied Powers correspondents etc, who will be present on MISSOURI for surrender ceremony.

COMBINT AND CNO 230836 sets forth views of CINCPAC on proposal for grounding PENNSYLVANIA on OKINAWA to provide coast defense. Advises that ship will be towed to OSM for drydocking and limited repairs.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230830 concurs to implication to discontinue are cancellations to business to Merchant Marine; influence of Marine war risk insurance; would establish termination date for operations and campaigns in progress. States belief that Armed Guard and armament should remain on Merchant Ships for the time being.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 232217 concurs in use of Hospital ships for evacuation of WAKE and MANUS.

SECRET
SECRET

24 AUGUST (Own Date)

Units of the THIRD Fleet are operating in designated areas to the north of Fukuoka area and east of Point PRINST. TF 38 has proceeded to operating areas in coastal waters north and south of TOKYO. Later in the day, units will be proceeding to Point PRINST, rendezvous point for entrance plan. All force, group, and unit commanders have been given full discretion in taking action to avoid the path of the storm.

TS 34.70 (R. Adm. McConick), with Destroyers 3 and 4, is en route to Point PRINST, SEA 2342(-9), 24 August. MINESOP destroyers are on station between OKINAWA and TOKYO for air-sea rescue duty.

Japanese GHI reports to SCAP that four merchant vessels were attacked and sunk by a submarine, presumably Russian, on 22 August in the coastal waters of northern HONSHU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240811 deals with the establishment of airplane and surface air-sea rescue services within area of responsibility of COMSOPAC.

JCS 230000 (pink) directs Wedemeyer to inform MacArthur when British have coordinated arrangements for surrender of HONKING with him and with the Chinese; advises that British will provide facilities through HONKING area for assistance and support of Chinese and American forces in CHINA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240810 (pink) directs addressees to comply with OpPlan for occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and KOREA as soon as practicable.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240809 deals with implementation, operational control, and logistic support of Marine fighter groups, naval search and transport squadrons.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240812 requests dispatch advice of text of Annex No. 11 of CINCPAC Operations Instructions No. 4.

SCAP 241005 advises that necessary arrangements to accomplish surrender of Japanese forces in HONKING to British are to be made directly between Rear Admiral Harcourt, General Wedemeyer, and Chinese Board of Military Operations. Contains supplemental instructions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240808 expresses CINCPAC desires concerning anchorages occupied major ships in TOKYO BAY.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240816 directs addressees to nominate a ComDiv for temporary duty in 7th Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240815 states CINCPAC intention that ComDiv in Asato be commanded by R. Adm. A. C. Davis, and that ships be those best prepared for extended service.

SECRET

21 August (Comm Date)

The schedule for the entrance and occupation of the TOKYO BAY AREA has been postponed 2 days because of the typhoon over the HUPHIL. Fleet units are in the areas assigned south and east of the TOKYO BAY AREA, operating at discretion to avoid the path of the storm. TG 38.1 and 38.4 are in coastal waters to the north and east of TOKYO, TG 38.3 to the south and west of TOKYO. With 38.3 is the WASP, which sustained damage to the forward end of the flight deck from heavy seas in the typhoon. CTF 32 (V. Adm. Wilkinson) with ComFleet 12 (Rear Adm. 38) with ComFleet 11th Corps 1st Cavalry Division and 112 Cavalry NOT embarked has reported to ComFleet for duty and is enroute from PHILIPPINES to SAGAMI BAY entrance, ETA 0600, 3 September. With approval of SNAF a Japanese relief vessel departed YOKOSUKA for MARCUS 16000 I9-9) 25 August on direct course ETA 0600 I(-9) 28 August. Departs MARCUS 16001(-9) 29 August, ETA TOKYO 0600 I(-9) 1 September. Vessel is destroyer type with explosives removed, guns inoperative. This vessel has been granted safe passage. CTF 111.2 (Rear Adm.) with 2 CV, 2 CL, 4 DD, 1 AS, 9 SS, 1 AA and 8 AMB reports that he intends to sail TO 111.2 to arrive off HONSHU daylight 28 August. He will endeavor to bring Japanese Naval and Military representatives on board on 29 August and to enter HONSHU harbor as soon as arrangements have been made to preserve law and order. Final surrender to take place on 1st September subject to the surrender to the Supreme Commander having been effected.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250139 (pink) asks when ships of 9thFleet will occupy and control coastal waters of JAPAN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250801 (pink) advises of HND 7th InfDiv from OKINAWA and recommends that if Russians seize KILJO, FUSAN be substituted as objective.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250839 (pink) modified OpPlan 12-45 with respect to organization of mobile service forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250853 (pink) requests concurrence proposed date for ComFleet to assume responsibility as senior naval commander SNAF.

COMMUNION AND CNO 241626 (pink) advises that proposed set-up of areas in Pacific for matters U.S. Naval jurisdiction as set forth in COMMUNION 19448 was for planning purposes.

COMMUNION 250725 (pink) asks whether composition of Marine Corps will be adequate for service functions in SHANGHAI AREA.

COMMUNION 250809 (pink) states assumptions of SHANGHAI will be accomplished by Chinese while Marines occupy TAKU and TIENTSIN, further assume Marines will be self-supporting. Advises that entire air support can be furnished by CHINA THEATER, Port of SHANGHAI will be operated with resources intended for FORT BAYARD.

CINCPAC 241511 reiterates guiding concerning in utilization of resources must be 1st priority in occupation of JAPAN, 2nd to HONSHU and reviews at length plans and CINCPAC attitude toward operations in other areas.

- continued -

3312

TOP SECRET
SECRET (R)

- continued -

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 250608 postpones all dates for occupation operations for 48 hours.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250907 recommends that JCS directive 823/5 be revised so that all logistic support for strategic air forces be made army responsibility.

CINCENPAC 251101 concurs in proposal for transfer of responsibilities senior Naval Officer SWPA as indicated in COM7THFLT 180140.

CINCPAC 251505 states CINCPAC attitude toward repatriating and opinion that it is inadvisable to initiate repatriation of Japs on WAKE and MARCUS prior to 3 September.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS 25 1437 advises that SCAP will coordinate evacuations of POW TOKYO AREA, requests 3rd Fleet not to undertake unilateral action.

26 August (Guam Date)

At 0800(-9) at a point 20 miles southeast of O-SHIMA a Japanese ship is scheduled to meet units of the THIRD Fleet, transfer emigrants to the MISSOURI via NICHOLAS, and lead them into SAGAMI WAN in the following order: Task Group 30.1 (Fleet Flagship Group), Task Group 30.2 (British Flagship Group), Task Force 35 (including Task Group 35.90) (Support Force) plus CTG 30.6 in SAN JUAN, Task Force 37 (British Support Force), Task Force 31 (YOKOSUKA Occupation Force). Fighter cover for these units will be provided by CTG 30.4. Rear Adm. Hall (CV 35) with Vice Adm. Wilkinson (Com3rdPhibFor CTF 32) accompanying, TransDiv 14 and TransDiv 65 with Com5thLth Corps, 1st Cavalry Division, and 11th Cavalry NOT embarked en route TOKYO area to arrive 1 September. INTENSEVID, CANOT and four destroyers have been detached from Task Force 38 to proceed to SUKUMBI BAY arriving 30 August and to report to Commander SEVENTH Fleet for duty.

SCAP 260419 (pink) states that indications are that initial movement of light Armed troops of 7th Division can take place departing OKINAWA 4 September arriving KHLJO on the 7th, to be followed with heavier equipment, actual occupation of KHLJO to take place on 11 September.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260127 (pink) advises that Corps Troops are scheduled to land with Marine units in North OKINAWA and that if this plan is followed no similar CINCPAC units will be available to use at SHANSHAI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260908 (pink) advises of plan to activate WAKE as Naval Air Base under COMNAVBAS, instructs COMENVPAC, COMAIRPAC render assistance and COMNAIRPAC to nominate commander HAD WAKE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260907 (pink) same as 260908 except to MARCUS and places island under cognizance of COM MARIANAS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260821 (pink) advises CINCPAC that AAA units required in his 251509 are not available and gives reasons.

- continued -

3313

- continued -

26 AUGUST (Cont'd)

CINCPAC 250210 advises of forces available for taking surrender RABAU, OCEAN and NAURU.

OTG 111.2 250638 advises of intent to sail TG 111.2 to arrive off HONOLULU 28 August and receive Japanese naval and military representatives on 29 August to accept final surrender (subject to surrender to SCAP have been effected) on 1 September.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260901 asks if TACHIBANA can make trip to WAKE or MARCUS returning with full load of Japanese without recapturing.

SCAP 261409 states policy with respect to surrender of sidearms and swords must be turned in and policy is to request Japanese officers to attend surrender ceremony without arms to avoid necessity of tender at ceremony.

SCAP 260111 states desire of SCAP that senior Japanese commanders formally surrender to designated representatives of CINCPAC (subsequent to final surrender) as follows: in PHILIPPINES to COMNAVFORPAC, at Manila; in the KYUKYUS to COMNAVFORPAC; in KOREA to COMNAVFORPAC.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER OHQ AFPAO 260434 advises that representative of CINCPAC would board MISSOURI in TOKYO to install HF radio equipment and message center for CINCPAC.

WARGOS 262006 advises that designation of COMNAVFORPAC to receive surrender in KYUKYUS is contrary to provisions of General Order Number One.

COMNAVFORPAC AND CNO 251555 outlines tentative ultimate postwar disposition of units of Pacific Fleet.

27 AUGUST (Cont'd)

Plane of Fleet Air Wing 18 sighted a periscope early yesterday afternoon at 09-05W, 14-15N (S.E. of YAP). Yesterday morning, carrier planes of 38.1 sighted a submarine flying the Japanese Ensign and a black flag at 30-47 14-12. About 40 minutes later a second Japanese submarine, also flying the national ensign and a black flag was sighted at 37-42 14-52. ID's were dispatched to intercept both subs and board them. At the same time 38.1 was directed to send a prize crew for each submarine to relieve the temporary boarding parties. Subs will then be brought to SAGAMI WAT. A Destroyer and Destroyer Escort are departing GUMK today for TINK to conduct preliminary negotiations for surrender. Negotiations for the surrender of ROTA, PALAU, MARCUS and JALUIT are already underway. RADM. Harcourt, US, OTG 111.2 in INDEMITABLE is to order HONOLULU tomorrow, August 29th to accept the Japanese surrender of HONOLULU on behalf of the United States, subsequent to the general surrender ceremony at TOKYO. ComNavForPac reports that the Army intercepted a plain language message from MATSUURA reporting RUSSIAN landings on the 26th. Japanese Destroyer and the 3rd Fleet off O-SHIMA at 0800 yesterday as scheduled and the transfer of representatives to the MISSOURI was effected without incident. TF 31 commenced

- continued -

SECRET

- continued -

27 August (Gen Date)(Cont'd)

conducting minesweeping yesterday. If sweeping of American aerial mines has been satisfactorily completed, the SAN DIEGO and destroyers will anchor off KOSHISAKA today and the heavy ships will be moved into TOKYO BAY 29 August.

COMSOPAC 262220 outlines COMSOPAC plan to enter OGINATO with TF 92 on 8 August with air cover by TF 49.

COMINTFLT 270711 reports contact with Japanese ED of O-CHINA to pick up Japanese emissaries, pilots and interpreters.

JCS 251944 (pink) confirms British assumption that Japanese commanders will be required to furnish information direct to representatives of the allied commanders.

DEAFIE 261520 (pink) contains certain amendments to instrument of surrender of Japanese required by USSR.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261713 (pink) warning order for initiation of preparations for operation BEELEACHER with target date 30 September 1945.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270209 (pink) outlines for planning purposes only tentative logistics plan for naval and marine forces BEELEACHER (part 4, Annex E, OpPlan 12-45).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270100 (pink) advises flag officers that questions concerning disposition and use of captured or occupied territory are political and that where government policy has not been announced high ranking officers are abstained from expressing their own opinion.

COMINTFLT 270513 (pink) sets forth 7th Fleet Op Order 4-45 for operations in YELLOW SEA.

COMINTFLT 270755 (pink) directs action addresses to assume logistics responsibilities 7th Flt, further directs COMINTFLTON 7 furnish logistics requirements to naval units in SWPA.

COMCHUNKINA 271300 (pink) concurs in inclusion of a reduced strength MAF for Marine Corps operations in TIENTSIN or TIENTAO area of North CHINA.

COMCHUNKINA 271300 (pink) concurs in recommendation that decision of certain landings in north CHINA will be at TAKU and CHINWANGTAO and that henceforth reference will be to TIENTSIN AREA.

CINCPAC 271419 (pink) confirms assumption that any information required of Japanese Commanders shall be delivered direct to representatives of allied commanders.

TOP SECRET
SECRET (U)

28 August (Comm Date)

Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Sherman and party left for TOKYO.

No word has been received on actual location of units in the SAGAMI WAT-TOKYO BAY area. However, TF 31 should be inside TOKYO BAY with the heavy ships moving in today. In addition to the two Japanese submarines which surrendered yesterday and now en route to SAGAMI WAN with prize crews, the SHUNDO (SS 998) captured a third submarine at 39-10N, 144-45E, has put a prize crew aboard, and is enroute to TOKYO. One of the submarines which surrendered yesterday displaced 5000 tons, has two decks and is equipped for catapult plane and schnorchel. Com-PhilSeaFron relieved Com/7thFleet of all duties as Senior Naval Officer in SWPA, except those as Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA. Task designation of PhilSeaFron is now TF 93. Com/7thFleet departed Manila yesterday in MINNEAPOLIS with CruDiv 6, to rendezvous with ComDiv 16 off OKINAWA. Minesweeping group has departed Philippines for sweeping operation at KILJO on west coast of HONSHU. A CVE group will provide air cover. Two Australian cruisers, SHROPSHIRE and HODGETT with two DD's are en route to TOKYO to participate in surrender ceremonies. With planes in the air and DE's firing salutes, R.Adm. Harrill yesterday witnessed U.S. colors hoisted at MILE ATOLL.

COMCHINCHINA 281225 (pink) expresses desirability for TF 93 units to enter SHANGHAI at earliest possible date, request comment on practicability minesweeping and enter by 15 September; states that occupation of SHANGHAI by Chinese troops will proceed on schedule.

COMINCH AND CNO 272312 advises that War Department agrees to maintain token garrisons AITUTAKI and PHERYNN pending completion State Department negotiations.

CINCPAC 280700 proposes that CINCPAC accept responsibility for conveying all allied POWs from HONGKONG to MANILA; that SACSEA arrange for repatriation of all Indian personnel from MANILA to INDIA; that movement begin as soon as CINCPAC is ready to receive POWs.

SCAP 281225 sets forth exact breakdown of responsibility for acceptance of surrender of Japanese Armed Forces between SACSEA and Command Australian Forces.

TOP SECRET
SECRET (CCT)

29 August (Gann Date)

At 1405 I yesterday Admiral Nimitz and members of his staff arrived at TOKYO BAY by seaplane, and 15 minutes later Admiral Nimitz broke his flag in the SOUTH DAKOTA. SEIKUNDO (SS 398) is escorting her captured Jap sub with prize crew aboard to TOKYO. Planes of FAW 18 commenced tracking a submarine at 1800 yesterday at 15-22N, 147-14E, on westerly course. Sonar buoys were dropped, oil slick seen. Today is "L" Day for landings in TOKYO BAY area. At 0600 airborne landings commenced at ATSUGI airfields, and Marine landings of 4th MAF at YOKOSUKA and at FUTATSU SAKI were to be coordinated with the airborne landings. R. Adm. Carney will accept the YOKOSUKA Naval Areas 30 minutes after the Marines land. Japanese men of war will be collected in the YOKOSUKA area. 12 submarines with escorts gathering off SAGAMI WAN to participate in surrender ceremonies. Already in TOKYO BAY are the SOUTH DAKOTA, MISSOURI, DUKE OF YORK, IOWA and TF 31. Other units in SAGAMI WAN.

CINCPAC 281219 (pink) explains designation of COMUSMACV ARMY to receive Japanese surrender in RYUKYUS.

COM7THFLT 290050 (pink) advises of expectation that target date of 7 Sept for KILJO can be met with small advance party by air on 4 Sept. subject approval of SCAP and successful negotiations and reception.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290751 (pink) instructs COM7THFLT comment direct to COM CHINA on proposal for TF 93 to enter SHANGHAI.

NAVYBATTEN SACSEA 291357 (pink) requests permission to ask COMUSMACV USFOT for information concerning American units to enter on schedule NINGBO.

SCAP 281233 sets forth islands and areas to be surrendered to SACSEA and COMUSMACV-AUSTRALIAN military forces respectively.

CINCPAC 281553 sets forth General Order No. 41 General Rpts SWPA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 281823 advises that CINCPAC has concurred in occupation of OCEAN and NANKU by British with understanding that occupations forces are subject to coordination by CINCPAC-POA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290811 requests ComUSMACV to resubmit recommendations for reduction of his forces.

CINCPAC 291431 advises of revised dates occupation KAGOSHIMA AREA; requests that Japanese ship meet U.S. Naval forces West of SAKA-MISAKI with pilots and interpreters to land U.S. ships into KAGOSHIMA WAN.

ADMIRALTY 282353 and 282359 comprise a single dispatch but quotes two messages: First from British Consul to Secretary of State for Colonies advice of Consul's ability to set up civil administration and requests instructions. Second is reply from Secretary of State Colonies instructing Consul to comply with instructions of OTG 111.2 who will establish military government by proclamation.

TOP SECRET
AMEMB (OGT)

30 August (Guam Date)

Admiral Halsey's headquarters were established at YOKOSUKA Naval Base at 1045 I yesterday. Landings of Marines and airborne forces continue. AP 137 GENERAL STURGIS, escorted by 2 DE's arrives off O-SHIMA today with representatives of allied governments to be present at signing of surrender. SHENGO and other submarines scheduled to be present at ceremonies entered SAGAMI WAN today. YOKOSUKA airfield is ready for limited service and Com7thFleet recommends it be used by NATS as early as possible for evacuation of POW's. WASP, damaged in typhoon, is being detached from 38.3 and routed to Pearl via HONOLULU. Remainder of TF 38 is reforming into two Carrier Task Forces of two groups each. Inmate and POW camps in YOKOSUKA have been found to be black hell-holes. Evacuation of POW is well underway. POW (except U.S.N. personnel and Marines) will be evacuated to Manila as directed by SCAP. At PAGAN ISLAND in the north MARIANAS a plane of FAW 18 at 0945 K saw crosses and waving people; second plane saw personnel disembark from a launch and remove crosses at 1020 K, also red flashes believed by crew to be small arms fire. Two other launches offshore did not land. A third plane saw no crosses visible from 50 feet at 1500 K.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 302141 (pink) advises MacArthur that Stilwell may accept surrender of RYUKYUS but will act subject to supervision of Admiral Nimitz.

31 August (Guam Date)

The 4th Marine BCT landed in the YOKOSUKA Area. 38.1 is replenishing today while 38.4 has returned to the area north of TOKYO. In view of the desperate situation in POW camps, Admiral Nimitz has proposed joint action by Army and Navy and that contact teams of 20 be formed and flown to every POW camp in the Empire, to supervise care, administration, evacuation, etc. ComDiv 5 in ANTITAM, INTREPID and CABOT with DD's has reported to Com7thFleet for duty, and as CTF 72 is proceeding to EAST CHINA SEA and YELLOW SEA to support SEVENTH Fleet operations, and to make a show of force over CHINA Coast and KOREA. Com7thFleet in MINNEAPOLIS is already operating in EAST CHINA SEA with CruDiv 6 and 16. Further sweeping of SHANWAI Area has been deferred in favor of ARCADIA Area to the north-west which will be completed by 10 September. Other sweeping assignments include KILJO Area, west coast of KOREA ("E" Day for landings is 7 September for 7th Division and 24th Corps Sweeping starts 4 September). MinDiv 8 from OKINAWA will rendezvous with Com7thFleet 30 miles south of point "ARGOSY" on 6 September, to sweep channel of Eastern TSUGA STRAIT to OMINATO. (Com7thFleet plans to enter OMINATO on 7 September. Sweep unit will arrive off southern KYUSHU on 3 September to sweep path into KAGOSHIMA WAN to the KANOYA Airfield. ("T" Day 4 September). GILMORE with 18 subs departed SUBIC BAY last evening for PEARL. Only submarines now operating are 5 subs in SEA OF JAPAN and one on lifeguard duty off SAKISHIMA GUNTO. 12 submarines at TOKYO will return to U.S. immediately after surrender ceremonies. Yesterday morning Rear Admiral Whiting, representing Commander Mariana Area, accepted the surrender of MARCOS ISLAND on board the destroyer BAGLEY. Surrender negotiations continue throughout the Pacific, with surrender ceremonies being deferred until the TOKYO surrender is accomplished tomorrow. Vice Admiral Murray left GUAM this morning in PORTLAND to accept the surrender of TRUK.

CINCPAC 310137 (pink) reiterates desirability earliest possible entrance SHANGHAI; advises that former TF 93 now designated TF 74.

331P

SECRET
JULY (G2)

GREEN

03 1310 MURRAY (DD 576) TO COMMARGILISAREA, CINCPAC ADV.

After thorough search found no grounds for detaining TAKASAGO MARU and directed her continue voyage. Crew 157 civilians Navy boat crew and communicators. Naval medical 189. Half sand ballasted. Rations on board estimated 1500 men 1 month. General and medical stores very low. Her captain states destination WAKE to evacuate sick and wounded. Expects stay few hours then return MURORAN. Received utmost cooperation. My 030730. My fuel midnight 96000 gallons. Am trailing. Ship reports sighting surfaced US submarine on 28th or 29th and aircraft today. Boarding party gained impression this crew fully aware of ultimate fate of Empire.

04 0540 COMFEAF TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC, COMAF20, COMAF5, CGPOA, COMSUBPAC, COMJEN TEN, COMJEN ADVON FEAF.

AX 74805. Re CINCPAC ADV HED 300304 to CG 5th AF subject Air Sea Rescue services. This HED concurs in the establishment of a single agency to operate air sea rescue service from OKINAWA and current plans contemplate such operation. Since far east air forces will have primary interest in the service, on arrival in OKINAWA of its air sea rescue units FEAF will assume responsibility for all air sea rescue in the RYUKYUS-CHINA SEA-YELLOW SEA-EMPIRE area west of 134-40. The 5th Emergency Rescue Group Hq, 3rd Rescue Sqn, 6th Rescue Sq and 14 Rescue Boat Sq have been ordered into OKINAWA to provide necessary service. Provisions of Allied Air Forces SOP1 number 29 June 24 will govern operations. Request for assistance of naval facilities will be made as necessary to operate the best service possible to facilitate the rescue of airmen of the Army and Navy Air Forces.

06 0617 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSIPA INFO COMJEN, COM7THFLT, CG AIRFEAFAC.

Addendum 2 to Opns Instructions No. 96 issued by Hdqtrs AAF SWPA under date of 27 June places 1st Marine Aircraft Wing under operational control of the Royal Australian Air Force. Request the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be released now to the operational control of Com7thFlt to prepare for future operations.

06 0626 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 93, CTF 99.3 INFO COMJEN TEN, CINCPAC, CG FEAF, COMAFPOA, COMJEN 7TH AF.

1st action addsee direct all 7th AF units established in OKINAWA to report to CTF 99.2 for operational control until command of the 7th AF is passed to CINCPAC.

06 0829 CINCPAC ADV TO COMJEN INFO COM7THFLT, CINCPAC, CNE MANUS, CINCPAC PEARL.

After conference with ComNavBase MANUS it is recommended that at the earliest date the following principles be approved in connection with the use of MANUS by the British Pacific Fleet in order to increase the effectiveness of its support of forth-coming operations.

- (A) CINCPAC be authorized to establish British construction forces and construct on LOS NEGROS ISLAND in the vicinity of Red Beach and DRACON dock (between MOMOTE and MOKERANG airstrips) such facilities as he requires using if desired camps and camp sites as made available by Comd MOB MANUS.
- (B) CINCPAC be authorized to establish a Honab at PITYILU in addition to the one already established at PONAN and be permitted to share also the use of MOMOTE airstrip as necessary to meet requirements of transport operations.

- Continued -

3319

SECRET
JULY (C-7)

SECRET

06 0829 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7THFLT CINCPAC, ETC. (CONTINUED)

(C) Unused housing at the Section Base MANUS be made available temporarily for the use of British personnel who would furnish their own messing arrangements at that base.

(D) A detachment of British officers and men be accommodated and messed at the headquarters of the US Naval Base for purpose of maintaining communications and general administrative coordination.

(E) CNB MANUS be authorized to make available to CINCPAC surplus buildings and equipment subject to their being replaced at a later date as required.

Early concurrence of CINCPAC and COMSERV7THFLT requested.

08 0200 COM7THFLT TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH, CNB MANUS, CINCPAC ADV, COMAIR7THFLT, COMSERV-
SOWESPAC.

Concur in CINCPAC ADV 060829.

08 0614 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT, COMDESOLV 108 INFO CTF 38, CTF 30.8, COMSUBPAC,
MCDESMUT.

Officers who previously boarded TAKASAGO MARU report English speaking Japanese aboard and that her coal supply probably gave little reserve over requirements for round trip from Empire to WAKE. Desire that we be spared necessity for diverting a ship to tow her in or the embarrassment of obtaining coal and looking out for the sick and wounded pending arrival of such coal if the ship is brought into one of our ports for lack of coal.

Ascertain at once if she has sufficient coal to carry out Com3rdFlt 072123. If not escort her to position Lat 37 N Long 148 E then release her before daylight 10 July with orders to proceed by most direct route to TSUGARU STRAITS. Upon release MCDESMUT proceed on easterly course for 4 or more hours then to rendezvous with TG 30.8 during daylight hours. This modifies Com3rdFlt 072123.

09 0847 COMGENAFPOA TO CINCPAC, CINCPAC.
NER 5016.

This headquarters concurs in the transfer of headquarters 7th AF to the FEAF effective this date. Detail recommendations as to the units which are to be transferred to FEAF with the hqtrs of the 7th AF will be forwarded not later than 15 July.

10 0055 CINCPAC ADV TO CG 30 INFO CINCPAC, COMFEAF, CG2nd MARAIRWING, DEFCOM20AF, COMAFPOA,
COMINCH, COM3RDFLT, COMAIRWING 1, COMGENPOA.

Transfer operational control of 7th AF and temporarily of 20th AF units based in RYUKYUS to ComGen FEAF. Retain 2nd MarAirWing under your operational control for the primary purpose of air defense RYUKYUS and also for support of other U.S. forces in the Western Pacific.

Under your direction CG 2nd MarAirWing may make aircraft available to participate in offensive operations of FEAF when agreeable to local commanders concerned.

Advise all concerned when transfer becomes effective.

~~SECRET~~
~~JULY (GCT)~~

SECRET

10 0601 CINCPAC TO COMNAVFORPAC INFO WARCOS. CINCPAC ADV HQ.
EX 20411.

With further operational responsibility practically eliminated except for support of 20th AF the continuing necessity for shipment to AFMIDPAC of large number of service type units from ETO, MTO and the U.S., whether from redeployment or otherwise is not understood here. It is believed desirable that you service force requirements be completely reexamined in the light of changed operational concepts and plans and the critical shipping situation developing as a result of large shipping backlogs in indirectly redeployed units. The utmost economy in requirements is essential in order that available troop lift can be utilized to the greatest advantage, and in order that USE JRCITITICALLY needed in AFPAC to launch operations directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff may not be OVERLOOKED by less essential troop movements. Request conference with your representatives in MANILA on or about 1 August on this subject.

06 0829 CINCPAC ADV TO CG 10 INFO COMNAVAC, CONSERVAC, AFRAC, SUBCOM, FORC, CINCPAC, PEARL,
COMINCH & CNO, ISCOM OKINAWA, ISCOM IE SHIMA, CG CINCPAC 12, CTU 99.3.4, CIG 99.1,
CTU 99.3.3, COMNAIRBases, CTU 99.3.4, 99.3.7, CGFLETPAC, COMHIBSPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMJCNF

Effective upon relief of Commo F. D. Martland USN by RADM J. D. Price USN as CTU 99.3.4 the Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA will be expanded to include all naval and Marine shore facilities including all naval and Marine Air Bases in the OKINAWA Group subject to the following:

- (A) Naval Base IE SHIMA will remain under the operational control of IsCom IE SHIMA but its Comdr will report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA for type and administrative command.
- (B) Naval communication activities in the Joint Communication Center will remain assigned to the operational control of the officer in charge of the JCC but will also report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA for type and administrative command.
- (C) ComNavAirBases OKINAWA will retain units presently assigned to him but will report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA.
- (D) Organization and control of TU 99.3.5 Construction Troops OKINAWA will continue unchanged COMUs remaining assigned as before but all Naval Construction Troops will be under the overall administrative control of Comdt NOB OKINAWA for naval purposes.
- (E) Marine Corps units including Marine Air Wing 2 Prov Marine AA Group 12th Service Bn and units rehabilitating will for purposes of the general administration of the naval service be under the supervision of CTU 99.3.4. Their operational control and Marine Corps administrative channels remaining unchanged. Issue necessary orders to implement the foregoing.

11 0628 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Request early reply to my 030335 (Top Secret).

11 0828 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CTF 38. CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Answering Com3rdFlt 100100. SEA OF JAPAN ports capable of ship repair in order of importance are MAIZURU, FUSAN, OTARU, HIGASHI-IWASE, TSUBOYAMA, NIIGATA and MATSU. Other important ports where heavy shipping traffic may be expected are SEYSHIN, FUSHIKI, GENZAN, BOKUKESHIN, REISUI, SAKATA, YUKI and KONAN. Known facilities for building and repair at HONSHU ports JAPAN SEA follows. MAIZURU has 3 drydocks, 660 feet 260 feet and 750 feet respectively plus 2 building ways 390 feet each and 3 cranes of 10 to 20 tons capacity each. HIGASHI-IWASE is port

- Continued -

3321

JKLH

For TOYATA and has 1 drydock 555 feet plus 2 covered ways 270 feet each. No photographs available to confirm following reported facilities. FUSHIKI site of SAGA Shipbuilding and Iron Works. YONAGO site of ICHIGAKURA Shipbuilding Co. SAKAI site of ICHIBASHI Shipyard. Coordinates of ports follow. All Lat. N Long. E. FUSMI 35-06 129-04, OTARU 43-12 141-00, NIGASHI-IMASE 35-45 137-14. TSURUGA 35-39 136-04, NIIGATA 37-56 139-04, RASHI 42-10 130-15, SEISHIEN 42-46 129-49, FUSHIKI 36-47 137-03, GEMAN 39-10 127-26, BOKURO-CHIN 37-32 129-06, RUISHUI 34-44 127-44 SAKATA 38-56 139-49 YUKI 42-20 130-20 KOKAN 39-30 127-17. MATSURI 35-29 135-22 YONAGO 35-26 135-20 SAKAI 35-22 133-14.

12 0535 CINCPAC ADV to CG 10 INTC ISCOM OKINAWA DEL COM 120 CINCPAC OAS COTTAZ COTTAZ 76 ASD

12 0726 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC. AC.

12 0814 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, CONGEN CA INFO DER COM 2001, AF, CG AAFRA

SECRET

[illegible]

000000

13 2122 CHINPAC ADV TO COMNAVJAG AND JNRO CTF 37. ALL TGS UNDER.

Final report 3rdF74 strikes 10 July. On 1140 combat action against TONHO airfields 454 tons bombs dropped 1648 rockets fired destroying 109 planes on ground and damaging 231. Many other planes believed damaged by VT fused frags but positive proof lacking. No air opposition at target and only planes known to be near force were the 2 sweepers shot down by CAP. On losses combat 4 Corsair 1 Hellcat 5 Avengers 7 pilots 6 crewmen. Operational 1 Corsair 4 Hellcat 2 Avengers. Shipping sunk 1 small freighter 1 cargo 1 launch. Damaged 1 barge 1 motor junk. Ground targets destroyed 1 hangar HONKAI 2 hangars NASIRO 1 hangar TSUKUBA 1 highway bridge HOSIDOMI. Damaged hangars and shops TSUKUBA NYAKUNIGAMARA UTCHONIKYA KAMRASKI ATSUKE YONOSUKE YACHIMATA KAPORR SHIROI TOKOROKAWA KASAMIGAWA ISRA. Several factory buildings KOIZUMI. 10 car freight train UCHI HARA. Power house YATANE.

Surfaces sub sighted by plane 37-15 N 147-20 E at 1415 on 11th being held down by destroyers approximately 18 floating mines sighted 11th between 35-00 N 146-20 E and 37-55 N 149-15 E. 5 floaters reported 12th within 30 mile radius of 40-30 N 149-30 E. Possible sub contact 0316 13th at 40-30 N 144-35E. Request immediate release 10 July strike figures.

14 0425 CHINPAC ADV TO COMNAVJAG 17 JNRO CTF 38. ALL TGS TF 38. OFFICER 6. COMNAVJAG 23. CHINPAC ADV. CHINPAC ADV. CHINPAC.

From Task Group 35.3 RADM Jones in PASADENA with Orediv 17 Bufiles 25 less MURRAY KENNEDY SIGSEAL. At 1600 14 July TG 35.3 depart from TF 38 proceed to point Lat 39-00 N 144-00 E to arrive 1900 14 July. Then proceed due west to approximate position 39-00 N 142-05 E to arrive 2300 14 July. Running outside 100 fathom curve conduct high speed anti shipping sweep to northward destroying any enemy encountered. At 0200 15 July from approximate position 40-00 N 142-17 E set course to rejoin TF 38 at earliest possible time during daylight 15 July. CTF 38 advise ComOrediv 17 date on launching point and point OPTION for 15 July. Furnish night fighters over TG 35.3 during darkness 14-15 July and CAP during daylight 15 July.

Note you will be in joint zone and friendly subs may be encountered.

15 0549 CHINPAC ADV to CHINPAC info COMNAVJAG. CHINPAC FRANK 10.

Following comments are made on the detailed requirements listed in paragraph 3 of your 040107 of June. So also my 060229 and Cominch and CNO 143440:

- (A) Agree with the understanding that the British personnel will eventually be concentrated in the LOS NEGROS Area.
- (B) Agree. LOS NEGROS available.
- (C) Same.
- (D) Agree.
- (E) Agree on a temporary basis.
- (F) LOT'S and LON'S will be made available as practicable considering the requirements of all ships present.
- (G) Agree. It is understood that the housing for British Royal personnel will be supplied directly or replaced as required from British resources.
- (H) Agree but consider that this covered storage should be created at LOS NEGROS.
- (I) Agree.
- (K) Agree and again suggest LOS NEGROS as the eventual site.

SECRET

15 0722 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC. CONTAINING COM info GTU 30.5.2

ComSOPAC allocates 4 submarines for lifeguard duty for HYUNUS based planes when other commitments permit. These are in addition to present stations off SAKISHIMA GUNTO and northwest FORMOSA but include any assigned to station off EAST CHINA COAST. Air sea rescue unit of Fairwing ONE advises initial stations desired and priority for filling stations. HYUNUS based air commands will be advised to make request for lifeguard service, to supply strike and distress information and to arrange ASR details direct with GTU 30.5.2

15 0725 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC.

Your 131940 see CINCPAC 111425 and 131311 and CINCPAC 120726 passed separately.

15 0727 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC info GTU 30.

Com2ndCofTaskFor serial 00211 of 26 June 1945, in subparagraph 3C is in conflict with my Op-Plan 4-45 which assigns shipping as a primary attack objective for the 3rd Fleet. Take appropriate action.

15 0150 RICHARDSON to CINCPAC info CINCPAC ADV HQ. WARCOS.

RJ 65728.

In answer to your CX 24411 of 100601 OCT July.

Para. At present this headquarters is charged by CINCPAC with responsibility not only for support of 20th Air Force but also for other Army units in FOA and for support of air transport operations and air operations other than 20th Air Force. These missions are in addition to those assigned by CINCPAC.

Para. Troops available to discharge my responsibilities are not only inadequate now but have been ever since I assumed command. In order to meet my directives and fulfill the requirements for the ICHING operation and in the forward areas, it was necessary to strip the rear areas of many units essential to effect the proper maintenance, care and repair on supplies and equipment at the authorized levels. At the present writing I am forced on the one hand to use tactical troops for service functions while directed by the War Department to train the units in question for their primary combat mission. The units furnished for ICHING and the forward areas must be replaced if this base is to function efficiently. Even the forward movement of the units referred to has been inadequate to meet completely the operational needs of the forward areas.

Para. The unit priority list expresses, in order of importance, minimum troop requirements remaining unfilled. When units have been offered to FOA the assignments are balanced against the unit priorities list. Only a portion of the total FOA requirements have been met. The priority list totals 49442 in ground units. Of this 13997 has been made available from all sources, leaving an unfilled balance of 36445. The unfilled balance is allocated 2367 to forward areas and 11018 to MARSHALL ISLANDS and HAWAIIAN area. This does not include shortages of 16460 AFPOA and 33095 20th AF.

Para. Troop requirements are under continuous review with the primary purpose of providing adequate support with maximum economy.

Para. Request that instances of apparent overestimation by this headquarters of types of troop units be cited in order that custody of these instances may be made.

Para. Representatives will be sent to conference MANILA about 1 August. Can AGOUSA for this conference be mailed to this headquarters? Considering that estimates of troop needs made by this headquarters are based for the most part upon responsibilities assigned by CINCPAC, and release of units is performed by him, it is recommended that CINCPAC be invited to send representatives to the proposed conference.

~~15 1401 HRASTAY & PACHYRETC. WAROS. CINCAPPAC. CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE.~~
~~CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE. CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE.~~
~~CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE. CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE.~~
~~CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE. CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE.~~
~~CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE. CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE.~~
~~CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE. CINCPAC BORN NO. CO WREST. CO MUNE.~~

Pursuant authority from Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in message WASH 29978 dated 11 July of higher classification not to all or needed, establishment of headquarters United States Army Strategic Air Forces (Short Title USASTAF) is announced effective 160001 Z (GCT) July. Functions, duties and responsibilities of USASTAF include all those previously charged to 20th Air Force and additional functions outlined in letter AG 322 dated 11 July subject "Redesignation, relief, assignment and disbandment of Air Force units". To implement this action, Hq AAFPOA and DEFOCOMAF 20 FOA at Guam are redesignated Hq USASTAF, also Hqs AAFPOA Admin and DEFOCOMAF 20 PA Admin at Hickam field OAHU are redesignated administrative headquarters United States Army Strategic Air Forces (short title USASTAF ADMIN) having all those administrative and supply functions assigned to USASTAF. COMUSMIDPAC is announcing by separate action formation of additional Air Force Hq to assume functions of AAFPOA other than those now assigned to USASTAF.

Para. Mailing address of USASTAF will be APO 234, of USASTAF AHNEN will be APO 933. Radio traffic to USASTAF at Guam will be sent to addressees call sign NHIA radioteletype call NHK, both formerly assigned HEPOM 20 FOA. Pending assignment addressees call sign to USASTAF AHNEN, radio traffic to Hqs at CANU will be sent to addressees call sign NHNO radioteletype YAF both formerly assigned AAFFOA AHNEN and HEPOMAF 20 FOA AHNEN. Addressees call sign KHYG presently assigned AAFFOA Guam is discontinued.

16 0230 CINCOPAC ADV to COMUSMACV

Request Richardsons BJ-65728 DTG 150150 be brought to the personal attention of Fleet Admiral King since it states succinctly the Army troop situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

~~16 0149 CINCROA ADV to COMNAV HASTAF 122 CINCAPPAC. COMCROA. CINCHIN. CINCROA
PRAW.~~

Your NR 0207 DTG 151401. Request that your headquarters handle in-

SECRET
JULY (C)

- Continued -

16 0149 CINCPAC AFM to COMUSMACV info CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV PEARL (Cont'd)

formally such matters as may require action pending the designation of a headquarters pursuant to the direction of paragraph 5 of UCS MARK 29978 DTG 110101

16 0155 CINCPAC AFM to COMUSMACV info COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV PEARL, COMUSMACV PEARL, COMUSMACV PEARL

The agreements recently reached with Air Marshall Lloyd contemplate the use of the British Engineers to develop at KUNE additional airfields primarily for the use of the Army Strategic Air Force or associated British units.

16 0853 CINCPAC AFM to 1300M OKINAWA info COMUSMACV, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL

My 070407 not to all is hereby cancelled. GHSWPA 071329 signed MacArthur is quoted herewith in part for your information and guidance "Appreciate your offer of assistance. Believe it advantageous however that War Correspondents accredited to this command report its activities in same manner as they have in the past. They will be assigned to AFPA operational units, using signal corps channels provided by those units for relay through MANILA. Censors from this command will be stationed at transmission points of this command".

CINCPAC correspondents will not be given release on matter dealing with AFPA operations. Instruct CINCPAC press censors accordingly and report when this has been done.

16 0801 AFM to CINCPAC info WACOS, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV PEARL, COMUSMACV PEARL, COMUSMACV PEARL, COMUSMACV PEARL

RJ 65790.

General order number 7 this headquarters dated 16 July 1945 establishes effective 160001Z (GST) July 1945 provisional Hq and Hq 3Q Army Air Forces MIDPAC. Same order establishes Army Air Forces Middle Pacific Short Title AIRFORSMIDPAC which will consist initially of all AAF units currently assigned to AAFPA. Major General James M. Parker USA is announced as Commanding General Army Air Forces Middle Pacific. This refers to USASTAF radio 0307 DTG 151401 July and RJ 65765 DTG 190946 both not to all or needed. Prov Hq AIRFORSMIDPAC will assume those functions of the Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Area for which Hq AAFPA was previously responsible to AFMIDPAC, by letter of instructions this headquarters dated 13 December 1944 as amended.

16 1121 CINCPAC to CINCPAC BOTH HQ info COMUSMACV

C 23993

CINCPAC 080901 refers. Although immediately after receipt of the directive contained in JCS 1259/41 suggested the transfer to your command and control of 7th Fleet I now prefer, in view of later developments, to keep the fleet, whose commander is also commander allied naval forces, under my operational control.

SECRET
JMA (02)

17 0031 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 32, CTF 39, CTF 95 info COMNAVFLT, CTF 92, COMSOPAC, COMNAV, CTF 30.5, COMINCH, COMNAVJ 104.

Cinsepac hereby relieves Com3rdFleet of operational control of forces under action addressees. Predicted location of typhoon center 180000(I) (-9) Lat. 25-00 N Long. 122-00 E. 181800(I)(-9) Lat 27-30 N Long 122-30 E. Movement northerly speed 15 knots. Suspend operations all action addressees immediately. Forces retire to eastward of OKINAWA until typhoon is clear. Currently expect winds 35 knots in OKINAWA anchorages.

17 0227 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH, SECNAV info CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Current directives give area commanders control of communications and censorship with respect to the operations of forces under their command. The latter is an unquestionable military necessity. In the MARIANAS by mutually satisfactory arrangements correspondents accredited to CINCPAC have covered activities of 20th Air Force and their material has been transmitted by CINCPAC facilities after censorship by 20th Air Force censors. The presence on OKINAWA of forces under control of CINCPAC has created desire on the part of correspondents to cover local operations of forces of both CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

Para. My 040826 my 070407 CHQSWPA 071329 LSCOM OKINAWA 151337 and my 160853 show development of situation at OKINAWA. I am agreeable to simultaneous dual or triple accreditation and a joint censorship or some similar arrangement as indicated in my 160852 in order to furnish prompt clearance for press material concerning operations under different commanders conducted in same general vicinity. In absence of such an arrangement which could be prescribed only by higher authority I will continue to impose on CINCPAC correspondents restrictions such as those in my 160853.

17 0342 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC info USASTAF, COMINCH, COMSOPAC.

The units listed in ComGenAAFPAC 150746 passed to you separately are proposed for transfer to FFAF except that it is considered necessary that these units committed for the defense of KYUKYUS, wire construction on OKINAWA and for air division JOC OKINAWA continue under the operational control of CINCPAC.

17 0524 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH 10 info CTF 92.1, CTF 92.3

Your 160927. Anticipate KIRAMA BEITO will be used as emergency anchorage only. Desire military control that area maintained but censor in movement AAA gun to OKINAWA at your discretion.

17 0539 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 94 info COMNAVFLT, CTF 93.

Effective immediately Task Force 94 will assume the responsibility for the neutralization of central CAROLINES, MARSHS and BORNES. In this connection see my 010842. Direct communication is authorized with ComGen USASTAF with regard to any assistance that may be practicable as indicated in AAFPAC letter 24 June.

SECRET
JULY (GOT)

17 1336 CONCORDANT to CINCPAC BOM HQ info 210000Z. COMAIRPAC. COMAIR 100.
COMAIR 100. CTF 93. CTF 99.2. COMFEAF. COMAF 5. CTF 37. ALL THE 100715.

All assigned targets TF 36 weathered in shortly after sunrise 17 July and the only 2 sweeps launched aborted. Flash reports show few meager targets of opportunity including 10 float planes in river vicinity SHIOYA SAKI of which 4 burned and 5 damaged. Hangar and dock 2756 IKISU demolished. Oil dump KUJI fired.

Para. TF 37 with slightly better luck in weather destroyed 13 planes on ground at NIIGATA MATSUSHIMA and MISUDA. 3 planes combat losses but pilots recovered. Installations including hangar MUSEDO destroyed. Hangars and barracks at NIIGATA airfield and railroad station KAJIMORI damaged. 3 locomotives exploded.

18 0822 CINCPOA ADV to CNO. COMNAV ADV. CINCPAC info COMNAVSTATION. COM NAVYING
FORCES. CINCPOA PEARL HQ. COMNAF. COMNAV.

An excess backlog of approximately 900,000 measurement tons of cargo now is afloat for discharge OKINAWA AREA. This is largely due to the following causes:

- A Diversion of shipping from deferred operations to OKINAWA.
- B Redeployment of Army forces from ETO and MTO to OKINAWA without sufficient advance notice for CINCPAC to integrate into shipping schedules in accordance with discharge capabilities.

Further difficulties are being encountered by requests from CINCPAC to ComGen SF PE for shipping to OKINAWA without prior request to CINCPAC for tonnage allocation.

An additional complication arises from the sailing of the shield and vacuum convoys to OKINAWA without previous reference to CINCPAC.

A condition has thus arisen where CINCPAC is unable to comply with the provisions of JCS despatch 100345 of December 1944 due to conditions beyond his control. If JCS 100345 of December 1944 is to be an effective instrument all agencies requiring shipping allocations to POA ports must clear with CINCPAC sufficiently in advance to allow for sound planning of shipping schedules.

It is requested that action agencies endeavor to furnish timely notice in order prevent further aggravation or recurrence of present conditions. CINCPAC ADV 290659 of May also refers.

18 0912 CONCORDANT to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CTF 36. CTF 37.

Add to my 171336. TF 36 planes sank 1 picket boat 2 small craft damaged 7 luggers 3 small craft. Destroyed 2 locomotives 1 hangar. Damaged 1 train 3 locomotives 3 factory buildings 2 radio stations 2 light-houses 2 warehouses 1 hangar. All ground targets MITO AREA. 1 VF lost in combat 2 VF with pilots lost operationally.

Para. TF 37 also damaged 3 planes on ground. Sank 1 JUNK and damaged 1 SB 1 SC 1 BOON defense vessel 1 Junk 6 fishing smacks 1 barge. Additional ground targets damaged hangars MATSUSHIMA trains SAKAMACHI area radar KINKASAN.

Para. Bombardment HITACHI completed as scheduled. Spotters weathered out. No damage assessment possible. No damage our ships.

Para. Clearing weather permitted 2 sweeps 1 strike TOKYO area afternoon 18th. No reports yet.

GREEN

SECRET
JULY (GCT)

18 1033 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADV info CTF 38, CTF 37.

Reconnoitered TOKYO during forenoon watching weather. In afternoon launched heavy coordinated attack on combatant shipping YOKOSUKA. Coordinated reports attack carried out as planned in face of most intense Flak ever seen. Targets well hit but too much smoke from burning targets and other fires to accurately assess results. Suggest CINCPAC arrange photo recco. Will fly final report days operations to IWO 22 July.

18 1545 CTG 35.4 info COM3RDFLEET, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

At 2350 I (-9) cruisers this Task Group at range 8 miles commenced minor bombardment radar and radio installations and possible coast defense guns on POINT NOJIMA SAKI. Fired about 240 rounds. Poor visibility prevented observing results. Although 1 large explosion resulted no lasting fires observed. 2 mark 11 radars frequency 91 and 97 Megacycles which had been tracking us for several hours during approach were silenced. No counter battery. Still shelling no results yet.

12 0918 CTF 99 VIA JCC OKINAWA to DEPCOMAF 20 AF, COMGENFEAF, CTG 99.2, COMGENFEAF ADVANCED, info CINCPAC ADV, COMGENAFAFPOA, COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC COMGENAFMIDPAC, COMFAIRWING 1.

Next to the last sentence my dispatch 120042 GCT is changed to read as follows: "When not required for air defenses this area as 2nd Marine Wing may make available aircraft to participate in offensive operations of FEAF when agreeable to local commander of FEAF and to 2nd Marine Wing all addressees both action and info requested to inform all holders of copy of my 120042 GCT to modify accordingly.

18 1255 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH AND CNO.

Comment on JCS 150417 GCT (WARX 32627) proposal to establish a Joint Communication board for coordination of communication matters pacific area. It is not indicated to whom the board would be responsible. Assuming that function of board would be strictly advisory to the principal commanders.

- Para. (A) Following additional assumptions made as to composition and operation of proposed board
- (1) Members to be the senior staff communication officers of 3 service commanders pacific plus representatives from ComPhibsPac. This would equalize Army and Navy representation
 - (2) Working committees from same staff sources to assist board.
 - (3) Continuing coordination by board and committees normally to be conducted by dispatch with meetings only when needed to be held at headquarters service commanders.
 - (4) Required Groups of officer specialists to be established as working committees to effect continuous coordination essential particularly in frequency matters.
- Para. (b) Under above listed assumptions CINCPAC acquiesces in establishment of a pacific joint communications board. In effect it would formalize conference procedure currently utilized
- Para. (c) Concur fully in the guiding principles.
- Para. (d) If above concept of proposed board is at variance with JCS concept request more information upon which to base recommendation.

3329

SECRET
NOV (09)

19 0655 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info COMPAWING 1. COMINCH/MAINTENANCE. COMINCH/NOB OKINAWA.

As soon as practicable pass to Com Fair Wing 1 responsibility for local anti submarine air patrol and operational control of VNF 254, VNF 612, VNF 232 and VNF 242. On arrival of MAG 25 it will be assigned to the operational control of Comdt NOB OKINAWA through ComGen 2nd Marine Air Wing.

19 0702 COMINCH/LET to CNO info COMSOPAC/STAFF/OPS. COMSOPAC. CINCPAC. CINCPAC/COMSOPAC BOTH HQ. COMAIR/7THFLT(100). COMSOPAC. COMAIR/7THFLT. COM 72 AIRCRAFT. 1ST GRP 71. COMAIR/7THFLT.

Your 121624. CINCSWPA has overall control of all air facilities in Southwest Pacific Area. Control of following fields has been retained by Commander Allied Air Forces operating under CINCSWPA: OTTUM and LAGOON fields GREEN ISLAND. PIVA north and south and TOKOKINA fields BOUGAINVILLE. Treasury. MURDA and MIRAU. Under direction from War Department identical in TFWOR with COMINCH CNO number 7 CINCSWPA will clear with War Department the abandonment or release of control of any U. S. Air Fields under control of Commander Allied Air Forces. Naval air and air support units have been ordered forward from above named fields from time to time and allied air force units have occasionally been ordered to operate from Navy built air bases since 15 June 1944 but BUCENILA PEARL retains control for United States. CINCSWPA concurs with foregoing. ComAir/7th clears roll ups of seaplane bases with you after obtaining concurrence CINCSWPA, COMINCH/LET and COMAIRPAC.

20 0114 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH info COM NATS. CINCPAC PEARL HQ. COMAIRPAC.

While I agree that additional service may be required by NATS in the PHILIPPINES and that the proposed organization is sound and necessary I do not concur in the establishment of what appears to be a major NATS unit at the naval air base MACTAN ISLAND. The logistic and construction implications are such as to leave considerable doubt that activation of MACTAN ISLAND could be accomplished in time to assist in the present war. This answers your 181351.

20 1303 COMINCH AND CNO COMINCH HQ info CINCPAC BOTH - COMINCH PASSED TO CINCPAC.

VICTORY 135.

CINCPAC CKB-24957 and JCS 201146 refer. I desire a TO Charged with the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project to be set up in the immediate future, initially directly under COMINCH AND CNO, later to pass to CINCPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Rear Admiral or a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations by my headquarters are desired. The staff, which initially need not be large, should include civil engineers and 1 or 2 officers.

21 2043 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Your 181255 your assumption that the proposed JCB pacific would be responsible to the principal commanders of the pacific namely CINCPAC CINCPAC and COMGENUSSTAF is correct. Whether or not this board would

- continued -

SECRET
JULY (GCT)

- continued -

21 2043 COMCINCH TO CINCPAC ADV HQ (Continued)

be only an advisory agency is for the above commanders to decide. Membership of proposed board would be that agreed to by the 3 PACIFIC commanders. Terms of reference of proposed board wholly a matter of local agreement. Consider essential that full time working committee be formed to coordinate and assign frequencies within Pacific Theatre.

22 0726 CINCPAC ADV to COMCIN TEN info COMDT NOB OKINAWA.

Your 180806.

In view pending command reorganization desire joint cargo handling continue under COMDT NOB OKINAWA as heretofore until such time as each service can assume responsibility for handling own cargo.

22 0729 CINCPAC ADV to CTG 99.1 info CTF 99, COMPHIBSPAC, COMBATRON 1.

Your 151551 not understood. Your requirements for 2 APB and 1 APA flagship indicate either that large numbers of personnel who are assigned to shore bases are being improperly quartered on board ship rather than ashore or that evacuation of personnel who are not supposed to remain in the area is not being carried out with transportation which is available daily.

Para. Neither is your request for additional escort types understood. You now have 18 DD 6 DE 8 APD in addition to numerous smaller craft which should be ample for the local defense and support of the area.

Para. It will be necessary to reduce your present force drastically in the near future in preparation for future offensive operations. It is therefore directed that you immediately reduce your requirements for barracks or garrison ships and that you so organize your escort and patrol assignments that your essential tasks can be performed with reduced forces.

Para. Specifically (A) crescent City will be detached about 25 August (B) No APA flagship will be provided (C) no additional garrison LST will be provided but the 20 LST now present will probably be reduced to 10 LST on 1 September. No additional escort or patrol craft will be provided but the present allocation will be reduced by 1 September to not more than 17 DD. N11 DE. N11 APD. 48 LCS/LCI. 18 PC/SC. N11 APB.

22 0842 CINCPAC ADV to COMCIN TEN, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMDT NOB OKINAWA info COMCINCH AND CNO.

CINCPAC notes with gratification that during the first 17 days of July the average rate of unloading cargo at OKINAWA was approximately 35,000 measurement tons per day as compared with 20,000 in June and 17,000 in May. Please extend to the officers and men responsible a "Well Done".

22 0843 CINCPAC ADV to COMCINPOA, info CINCPAC, COMCIN TEN, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Concur your 210049. In view pending transfer of responsibility for HYUKUS to CINCPAC request hereafter you secure his concurrence rather than mine for acceptance of units for that area.

SECRET
JULY 1945

22 1244 CINCPOA ADV to COM MARIANAS info COMCENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL, COMCEN TEN, COMCEN WPC, ISCOM IWO JIMA, ISCOM SAIPAN, ISCOM JIJIAN.

Garrison needs in RYUKYUS require that you transfer 147th infantry regiment to OKINAWA at earliest. Upon arrival destination operational control of unit passes to COMCEN TEN.

Para. To augment garrison strength IWO JIMA and to provide opportunity for training as a unit transfer 206th AAA AN Bn (less Btries C and D) from SAIPAN to IWO JIAM.

21 1300 COM3RD FLEET to CINCOPAC ADV HQ info COMCEN 21 BOMCOM, CTF 93, COMAIR IWO, ALL TCG 3RD FLEET, CTF 37, CINCPAC, CINCOPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMA 4, COMCEN PEARL, COMCEN TEN, PEARL ADVON, CTO 99.2.

During afternoon 18th July TF 38 flew 592 sorties against TOKYO AREA. On the ground 30 planes destroyed including 15 BETTYS KUMAGAYA 3 BETTYS JODAMA and 42 were damaged at HYAKURIGAHARA KSPORI YARARE. Our plane losses: in combat 6 VD, 3 VT, 3VB all to flak, operational 1 VF jettisoned and 1 VB. Personnel lost in combat were pilots of 6 VF, 3 VB, 3 VT plus crews of 4 VB, 3 VT. Shipping. YOKISURA photos show: NAGATO superstructure badly damaged but unable determine whether she is on the bottom, 1 DD by dock next to NAGATO blown in half and sunk 1 ODD at 3rd Dock heavily damaged with cable layer alongside, disintegrated 3 small cargo vessels and 7 MTB near NAGATO destroyed by several shorts stern blown off, fleet DD converted to flak ship. Also ATOMAHAVI and CHIRJA respectively 4 luggers and 2 small craft were damaged. Ground. Flak positions at YOKOSUKA well covered by VT fuse bombs and pilots report definite diminishing intensity subsequent to release. At IMVA 3 locomotives destroyed, 1 damaged with 3 more damaged YUNOTO. 4 hangars were destroyed and 12 damaged at 7 fields. Power plant transformed destroyed and 4 electric cars derailed by rockets at KUMAGAYA. Ammo dump exploded HTAKUIGAHARA oil tank burned YOKOSUKA RR yards at mito, airfield facilities HYAKURIGAHARA RR cars and turntables in KIKYU KUMAGAYA, UMOTO area and many other barracks shops and small industrial buildings damaged by rockets and strafing. Photos show TAKASAGA MARU anchored YOKOJUKOKO ABOUT 700 yards from NAGATO near 2 small combatant ships and may possibly have been damaged. Also on afternoon of 18th TF 37 flew 51 combat sorties without any personnel losses against airfields north TOKYO area 13 planes were destroyed on the ground at KONOIKE KITAUURA KATORI MARUTO MOBARA and 25 were damaged at same fields plus MIYAKIWA. 2 VF planes were lost in combat and 2 operationally. 24 Junks were damaged near GOSI. Hangars plus installations at KONOIKE, MIYAKIWA, JOBARA, KATORI, MARUTO with railways freight cars at KATORI were well strafed and rocketed.

Para. Photos of HITACHI bombardment covering all targets except R-581 show HITACHI engineering works 21-00 and HITACHI arms factory R-458 severely damaged. HITACHI copper refinery 812 damaged.

Para. New subject. Free Balloon shown ONI WEEKLY NR 927 sighted at 33-42 north 146-12 east at 1300 July 19 at 19000 feet ascending 300 feet per minute. Shot down by CAP sunk before recovery possible.

22 1620 CINCPOA ADV to ALPAC.

In night anti-shipping sweep recently U.S. Destroyers fired on a friendly submarine in a joint zone. Fortunately no damage resulted

SECRET
JULY (COT)

- continued -

22 1620 CINCPAC ADV to ALPAC (Continued)

incident apparently caused by large error in navigation and by mistaken belief that radar contact at 27000 yards could not be a submarine.

Para. SOP-1 prohibits attacks in a joint zone on submarines outside torpedo range of heavy ships unless identified as enemy beyond possibility of doubt. Single radar contacts may be submarines or surface ships and must not be attacked until positively identified as the latter. Near boundaries of Joint Zones commanding officers must also be alert to possible errors in navigation and be governed accordingly. Tactical situation will rarely justify firing on a single unidentified target when any possibility exists that it may be a friendly submarine.

20 2253 ADMIRALTY to CINCPAC, FOGNAF, CINCSA, BAD, CINCL NA PARIS, COMINCH, COMINTCH info FOGNA, FOLNA, VA MALTA - COMINCH PASSED TO COMINTCH, COMNAVY, ALUSNA PARIS, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COM7TH FLT.

CCS have decided that from 1st June ADMIRALTY replaces COMINCH as executive agent for dealing with FRENCH NAVY under CCS 358 (Revise)(Para 3) ADMIRALTY letter MD54025/43 of 18/10/43 not to all refers.

Para. Following will be normal procedure under new arrangements:

- A. Requests by the FRENCH NAVY for supplies will continue to be processed through established channels.
- B. Proposals initiated by FRENCH requiring formal reference to CCS will be communicated by Admiral Fenard to BAD, to expedite decision Marine PARIS should inform ADMIRALTY at the same time as they instruct Admiral Fenard.
- C. Proposals initiated by FRENCH not requiring formal CCS decision will be made either through Admiral Fenard to BAD or direct to ADMIRALTY in latter case, ADMIRALTY will be responsible for informing COMINCH and obtaining his consent when necessary.
- D. Proposals initiated by ADMIRALTY or COMINCH and requiring ANCHLO-US agreement will be cleared through BAD reference being made to CCS when necessary. The ADMIRALTY will be responsible for ARRANGING clearance with FRENCH.
- E. Proposals from subordinate FRENCH authorities not made through Marine PARIS or Admiral Fenard should be made to the British Commander in Chief concerned who will forward them to the ADMIRALTY info BAD and NA PARIS. This procedure is designed to ensure single channel of approach. Admiralty will be responsible for clearing such proposals with CCS, COMINCH and FRENCH as may be necessary.

Para. Executive action to implement decisions will be taken by ADMIRALTY with Marine PARIS. BAD will also communicate all formal decisions of CCS to Admiral Fenard and keep the latter informed of such other decisions as they may deem appropriate.

Para. BAD and NA PARIS are requested to inform Admiral Fenard and Marine PARIS respectively of the above and to emphasize the great importance of using 1 channel only at a time for making proposals.

21 0825 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ISCOM OKINAWA, info COMINCH, SECNAV, COMSECON 10, CINCPAC.

Jointly accredited war correspondents operating in POA may transmit or broadcast over any facilities available to the press and radio all news

- continued -

SECRET
NOFORN

- continued -

21 0825 CINCPAC ADVANCE to 1800M OKINAWA. info COMINCH. SECNAV. COMSEVEN 10
CINCPAC. (Cont'd)

material which has been cleared by cognizant censors. CINCPAC will continue to honor as jointly accredited those Navy correspondents who are temporarily in SCWESPAC. Army Correspondents desiring joint accreditation status should apply through SECNAV for Navy accreditation. Temporary Navy accreditation may be secured from CINCPAC in emergency cases where application has been made to SECNAV.

21 1338 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC. COMJUSASTAF. CINCPAC - WAR DEPT
PASSED TO CINCPAC. DEFCOMAP 20.

WARX 35909 in JCS 1362/2, copies of which will be forwarded to your headquarters by officer courier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved petroleum supply procedure for the Pacific as outlined in CINCPAC message CX 22431 of 30 June 1945 and concurred in by CINCPAC in naval message 032041 July CINCPAC PEARL to ANPB and memorandum 11 July acting Chief of Staff, 20th Air Force, to ANPB.

24 0850 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON-1 info COMCRUDIV 16. COMINCH.

CTF 95 230415. When HFS direct R. Adm LOW with the same force as in preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of Long 125-00E between Lat. 30-00 N and 32-30N. Avoid mine restricted area in SHANGHAI-CHUSAN AREA. Keep COM3RDFLEET, COMSEVENCHINA and CTF 99 informed of movements this force.

25 0908 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH-CNO info CINCPAC PEARL. COM7THFLT. COMNATS.
COMNATSPAC. COMAIRPAC.

After conference with COMNATSPAC and representatives of COMAIRPACSUB-COMFORD adhere to opinion expressed in my 200114 and consider that major NATS base in the PHILIPPINES for support of Pacific Fleet operations in this war should be located at SAMAR with turnaround facilities at MANILA.

Para. However will submit firm recommendation after conference between my Deputy Chief of Staff and Com7thFleet in MANILA about 1 August.

Para. Assume COMINCH-CNO serial 001487 of 10 June applies.

25 0726 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT info CTF 37. CTF 38. COMJUSASTAF.

Situation your 240543 appreciated. Concurred in VLR 24 July strikes only after careful consideration of difficulties involved in routing required for attacks on targets adjacent to yours. Weather precluded VLR strikes on targets further east. You will continue to be info on all VLR intents to include precise routes to and from targets when they are known to be near your force. Army Strategic Air Force advises that all aircraft will show IFF from lands and hereafter. Believe it impracticable to eliminate problem especially since VLR effort will soon be greatly augmented. For each individual operation where your effort and that of Strategic Air Force are against same enemy area everything possible will be done to effect coordination that will avoid Army Strategic Air Force units passing over or near your forces.

SECRET
JULY (CST)

25 1652 CINCPAC to WARCOS - COMCINCH PASSED TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C 27447.

Reference JCS WX 32627 reiterating a proposal contained in W 14399 for a local joint communications board to coordinate, control and integrate signal communications in the Pacific. Our radio C 19319 of 16 June did not concur in this proposal. Stating as follows: "Cooperation and coordination between services in the Pacific has already been laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with primary responsibilities in some cases. Pre establishment of a formal board with a limited membership to handle one these only is therefore believed to be unnecessary and undesirable. CINCPAC-CINCSWPA has used most effectively a local committee organization which includes not only the members proposed in W 14399 but also representatives of all interested elements. To coordinate frequencies. To designate call signs. And to insure the efficient utilization of equipment. Such committees are now operating to insure the effective coordination of these matters in prospective operations. CINCPAC and 20th Air Force, among other, are represented. This arrangement has proven so effective it is considered inadvisable and undesirable to change it" CINCPAC and USAF have had and will have membership on all committees affecting their interests and the findings of such committees have been and will be formalized and coordinated in the respective headquarters formal operations instructions. Communications annexes and signal operations instructions and standing signal instructions of the forces concerned. Since under the provisions of JCS 1250/4 and 1331/3 CINCPAC is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of operations I must reiterate now concurrence in the establishment of an agency (in which AFPAC would have the minority membership) for the control of such a vital element to successful operations as signal communications. Since both the Navy and the Strategic Air Forces are supporting forces in the projected operations it does not seem appropriate that an agency should be constituted that would enable such forces to control the signal communications of the commander carrying primary responsibility. The primary consideration in the coordination of communications in this theater has been to guarantee all of the contributing forces all the signal communications they require to insure success in combat. Any disagreements in committees having to do with these matters would be brought to the attention of commanders. The existing system has operated with complete success and harmony. It is considered that a joint communications board would be less effective than the procedure which has been followed with complete satisfaction during the entire period of our operations. The Joint Board could accomplish no more and might be less efficient or give rise to friction which has so far been non-existent. Changes of this nature should not be considered just when the decisive campaign in the Pacific is about to be accomplished even if having some theoretical long range object they would add an element of uncertainty by providing a new and unproven agency to replace 1 which has operated with complete success and satisfaction in the past. We are already committed to the operations and it is too late to consider basic changes in such a vital matter.

26 0151 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALPOA.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July control of U.S. held areas in the RYUKYUS and U.S. Army Forces therein passes to the control of CINCPAC except for units of the Army Strategic Air Force which remain under USAF. Control of the naval operating base OKINAWA and all U.S. Naval forces including Marines in the RYUKYUS remains under CINCPAC.

26 0145 LINCPOA ADVANCE to COMGEN TEN. COMGEN 24TH CORPS into LINCAPPAC. COMGENFOA. COMINCH AND CNO. COMGEN 7, 21, 96, 77 and 1ST DIVISIONS.

~~26 0249 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO info COMZTHLT, COMSHTLT, COM3DZLT.~~

~~26 0722 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info CTG 95.8, COMAIRMAC, COMCARDIV 23, CTF 96,
CINCPAC PEARL.~~

Direct COMCARDIV 23 in HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75) proceed immediately to ENIWETOK where upon arrival COMCARDIV 23 report by despatch to CINCPAC for duty. Direct COMCARDIV 26 in FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70) proceed immediately, where upon arrival report to COMCARDIV 23 for duty. To ENIWETOK

~~26 0827 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC PEARL HO.~~

Rear Admiral E.L. Gunther and Rear Admiral A.C. Davis now on leave in mainland. On Expiration leave of these officers and prior their departure from mainland desire that both these officers have thorough physical check to determine their fitness for duty at sea. COMAIRPAC take necessary action.

26 0824 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO.

Your 241910. Recommend that work on Cruisers one to ten be limited to essential repairs in order that they may render maximum service before being decommissioned.

~~26 1228 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSUBPAC, CTF 95, ALL TO COMUS 7F 95, CTF 99, CTO 99.2
Info COMCOMFLEET, COM7THFLEET, COMJCVCHINA, COMCRUSASIAF, COMS7THFLEET.~~

COMCHENCHINA reports that rescue agency known as AQAS has started operating picket junks off and paralleling EAST CHINA COAST AMOY to FOOSHOW. Picket junks will be utilized to pick up downed airmen. Following markings will be used. Red Sail with white patch on center. Red Cloth with white patch spread over the cabin. White area running length of Gunwales boxed in by 3 inch Red Strips. Operational base these picket junks MEIHUA (25-50N 119-49E). Intended that these junks will operate over considerable period of time. Take appropriate action to prevent attacks on these junks by our forces.

~~SECRET~~
~~JULY (C)~~

26 1244 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBARIANAS, COM MAREELS, CONTAINING 1 in. CINCPAC
PEARL, CINCPAC, CG USASTAF, CG FRAP, COMSOFIL, COMSOFIL, COMSOFIL,
COMAIRPAC, COMSOPAC, COMNORPAC, COMHANSSEAFRON.

The current JCS directive pertaining to the operational control of the Sea Air rescue is contained in paragraph 3 of JCS 659/1 which states "Operational control of air sea rescue activities and facilities is a responsibility of theater or area commanders".

Para. Within the Pacific Ocean Areas this responsibility is delegated to COMNAWSKAPRON, COMMARGILS, COMMARINAS and COMFAMWING 1 for Hawaiian Sea Frontier MARSHALL GILBERTS SUB AREA the MARIANAS SUB AREA and the combat areas to the westward of 135-00 degrees east longitude respectively.

~~26 1414 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCEN US FORCES CHINA THEATER info COMNAVGROUP CHINA.~~

U. S. Navy surface forces are operating in various parts of EAST CHINA SEA including waters close along CHINA coast and will continue to do so in order to exercise control of those waters. Suggest CHINESE be warned of danger of operating vessels of any kind in such coastal areas.

26 0723 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCARDIV 23 Info COMCORPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, CTF 96, COMCARDIV 26, COMDESRON 45, KITKUN BAY (CVE 71), HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75), NINESTA BAY (CVE 74), FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70), VANILLA BAY (CVE 61), SAVO ISLAND (CVE 78), FULLAN (DD 474), GUEST (DD 472), HUDSON (DD 473), HALFORD (DD 480), STANLEY (DD 478), WAINWRIGHT (DD 419), BERNICK (DD 642), KILLEN (DD 593), GRANT (DD 649).

Upon your reporting to CINCPAC for duty read my 260722 form Task Force 49 composed of info ships and prepare them for duty in NorPac.

~~27 0310 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMCINPOA info CONSERVPAC, COM 14, CINCPOA PEARL.~~

Reference CINCPAC serial 3769 of 18 March subject shipping control Hawaiian Area. The interchange of comments both formal and informal in connection therewith and proposed changes in that directive have been noted and given consideration. Meantime JOSO has apparently been functioning effectively. In view of prospective marked decrease in shipping activities involving both services jointly in FOA it is contemplated that JOSO will be disbanded about October. At which time Com 14 will be required to assume responsibilities for CINCPAC shipping in Hawaiian Area which are now charged to JOSO. COMCINCPAC will be called upon to designate an agency with which Com 14 can coordinate such joint shipping activities in the Hawaiian Area as would previously been handled by JOSO.

27 0312 CINCROA ADVANCE to COM MARIANAS info COMCENROA. COMCENROA PACBACOM.
ISCOM IWO JIMA. ISCOM SAIPAN. CINCROA PEARL.

COMJENPOA dis 250332. In order not to reduce the AAA defense of IWO JIMA at this time and to assemble elements of the 206th AAA AW Bn for training transfer the 206th AAA AW Bn (less Btrics C and D) from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA as soon as practicable.

26 1401 CINCINNATI TO COMMEMORATIVEAC, CINCINNATI TO COMMEMORATIVEAC, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI
TO COMMEMORATIVEAC, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI
TO COMMEMORATIVEAC, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI
TO COMMEMORATIVEAC, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI, CINCINNATI, MISSOURI

Para. 1. Reference (forwarded to action addresses on 25 July 1945) is memorandum for record of staff conference by representatives of CINCPAC-CINCPAC at GUAM 21/23 July 1945, subject: Transfer of Control of United States Held Areas in the MARIANAS from CINCPAC to CINCPAC.

Para. 3. At the same date and hour:

SubPara A. The 10th Army including assigned and attached units will become a tactical and administrative command reporting directly to CINCPAC. COMUSMACV will publish the necessary orders passing administrative control directly at AFPAC of 10th Army this constituted

SubPara B. The Island Commands OKINAWA and IJ SHIMA, including all United States Army units assigned and attached thereto, are redesignated Army Service Command 1, short ASCOM 1. ASCOM 1 thus constituted is assigned to COMGENAFWESPAC. ASCOM 1, less United States Army anti-aircraft units, passes to the operational control of COMUSMACV 10th Army. Anti-aircraft units, ASCOM 1, pass to the operational control of COMUSMACV MACV.

SubPara C. COMNAVFLMIDPAC will issue the necessary orders to constitute ASCOM 1 and assign ASCOM 1 and included units to AFNWSWPC.

SubPara D. COMENAFMIDPAC will include in his orders all units now enroute or scheduled for movement to the RIUKYUS under AFMIDPAC orders and redeployed units already assigned to AFMIDPAC by AFPAC orders. (FMST order is letter order this headquarters subject, assignment of units (44) dated 17 July).

Para. 4.

SubPara. A. At the same date and hour COMNAV 10TH ARMY WILL:

(1) In conjunction with the local naval and air forces, assume control and defense of the U.S. held areas of KYUKYUS. (2) Conduct such minor offensive operations from time to time as may be necessary to protect and consolidate U.S. positions in the KYUKYUS or as hereafter directed by this headquarters. (3) Contact military government in the KYUKYUS.

SubPara. B. COMBINFLEAF, reinforced Marine Air Defense Units and U.S. Army antiaircraft units (see paragraph 3 B above) will support the 10th Army and conduct the air defense of the RYUKYUS.

SubPara XRAY. (1) COMKEM 10th Army, COMKEM FRAAF and COMMANDANT NAVAL OPERATING BASE, OKINAWA, will make local arrangements for coordination of defense of the U.S. held positions in the RYUKYUS, forming such boards, committees or information centers as may be required. (2) COMKEM 15th Army will exercise overall coordination of internal security in the RYUKYUS. The commander of each force will provide his own internal security. (3) COMKEM FRAAF will exercise local air control in the RYUKYUS as arranged with local air commanders concerned. Para 5. Logistics (at the same date and hour).

SECRET
JULY (GOT)

- continued -

26 1601 CINCPAC to COMGENAFMIDPAC, COMGEN 10, COMGENAFWESPAC, COMGEN FFAF, COMGEN ISCOM OKINAWA info COMGEN ISCOM IE SHIMA, WARCOS, WARTAG, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY (Cont'd).

SubPara A. Supply. (1) COMGEN 10 charge with responsibility for logistic support of U.S. Army forces within the RYUKYUS (including FFAF and USASTAF) except for air force technical and air force ammunition supply. (2) COMMA-MANDING GENERAL AFMIDPAC will continue existing logistic support of all U.S. Army Forces (except FFAF air corps technical and ammunition supply which remain as currently arranged) in the RYUKYUS. Responsibility for delivery terminates at the waterline. (3) Logistic support of all naval and marine forces will remain the responsibility of CINCPAC.

SubPara B. Evacuation of casualties. (1) CINCPAC retains responsibility for hospitalization of naval and marine corps patients and for surface evacuation of patients of all services. (2) COMGEN 10 will assume responsibility for hospitalization of army patients, including USASTAF, and in emergencies navy and marine corps casualties in excess of hospital capacities under control of CINCPAC in the RYUKYUS.

SubPara C. Transportation. (1) COMGEN 10 will be charged with the responsibility for: (A) call forward from the regulating points the destination of all ammunition shipping and other shipping for the support of army forces in the RYUKYUS. (B) the unloading of all army cargoes, including USASTAF cargoes and ammunition for navy and marine corps units, and the integration of arrivals of such additional shipping as may be directed by this Hdqtrs.

SubPara D. Construction. (1) CINCPAC continues to perform all dredging and harbor salvage operations. (2) COMGEN 10 will be responsible for the initiation and prosecution of construction of all Army and Military Government facilities and for the Army portion of Joint Facilities. (3) Existing supervision headquarters will temporarily be retained within headquarters 10th Army.

SubPara E. A Sub-Area petroleum officer will be assigned by the responsible to this headquarters for requisitioning, call forward, delivery, storage and issue of all petroleum products (Bulk and Packaged) in the RYUKYUS except for those fleet units normally supplied by naval service squadrons or divisions.

Para. 6. Direct radio communication between CINCPAC and COMGEN 10 will take place so as to become effective at 1200 I, 31 July 1945. Call signs and frequencies to be assigned by separate radiogram the AFPAC station of this circuit will be temporarily provided by AFWESPAC.

Para. 7. For further details, see provisions of memorandum for Record of staff conference by representatives of CINCPAC-CINCPAC ag GUAM 21/23 July 1945, all provisions of which are hereby placed in full effect. Detailed orders will publish later.

27 0505 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info COMFAIRWESTCOAST, COMFAIRSEATTLE, COMNORP

COMFAIRWESTCOAST 250802. Not satisfactory see my 270540 May. Expedite movement of VPB 122 as practicable.

SECRET
JULY (GOT)

27 1317 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTG 99.2. CTUs 99.2.1. 99.2.3. 99.3.4. 99.3.12 info COM7THFLT. COM3RDFLT. COM5THFLT. COMINCH. CINCPAC PEARL. COMGEN TEN. ALL TF AND TG COMDRS PAC FLEET.

Following changes in Task Organization and operational control effective 311200 (1) July.

Commandant NOB OKINAWA assume designation CTF 99 and report by dispatch to CINCPAC. Present TU 99.3.12 report to CTF 99. COMGEN 2ND MARINE AIR WING with headquarters pass to operational control COMGEN-AIR FMF PAC. Present TU 99.2.1 pass to operational control COMGEN PEARL. Present TU 99.2.3 report to CTG 96.9 (COMFAIRWING 1).

02 0126 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Para. A. CINCPAC ADVANCE 181255 still presents CINCPAC'S views. COMGENUSASTAFS concurrence in Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to establish Pacific Joint Communication Board noted in COMGEN USASTAF 162325. The Navy Communication interest in Pacific is naturally considered equal to that of Army and no general dominance of Pacific Communications by Any 1 of 3 services would be acceptable.

Para. B. In POA Joint Communications have been utilized fully. In SWPA separate army and navy communications have been utilized and there is obviously no desire by CINCAFPAC to change. It is therefore not expected that CINCAFPAC will be agreeable to any coordination and integration of service communications which might affect the degree of control he now has.

Para. C. If board were established in accordance CINCPAC 181255 and was advisory only it is probable that coordination but not integration could be improved. CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC have coordinated communication matters by conferences and dispatches. This can be continued and is reasonably satisfactory.

Para. D. Referring to your 212043 the creation of a full time working committee to coordinate frequencies within Pacific may become necessary in connection with large scale operations when frequency representatives for 3 services should be together to adjust frequency difficulties as they occur.

Para. E. No comment on command responsibilities expressed and implied in CINCAFPAC C 27447 will be made herein as COMINCH is already fully informed.

Para. F. In view of CINCAFPAC'S expressed opposition to the formation of a Pacific JCB and a method of coordination is working at present recommend against any further effort at this time in this connection.

02 1500 CECIL J DOYLE (DE 368) to COMWESCARBAREA info CTF 94 (INTERCEPT).

Have arrived area. Am picking up survivors from USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) torpedoed and sunk last Sunday night.

~~SECRET~~
~~AMST (CET)~~

Following effective 1 August.

Para. 2. Non combat areas are defined as follows. (A) S.A. North Atlantic including Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico. Arctic Ocean. Baltice and North Sea. Mediterranean. Black and Red Seas. South Atlantic Ocean east of 74-00 West to longitude of Cape Town. North and South Pacific East of 82-00 west but see paragraph 3 below. (B) Land Areas. United Kingdom. European theater. West Africa (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French West and Equitorial Africa, and Belgian Congo). Countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea (Except Spain and Spanish Morocco) and the Mideast west of 45-00 East.

Para 4. All other areas including the ports of Capetown and Aden are combat areas and full British/United States recognition procedures will continue to be used.

~~CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMUSMACV PAC Info CINCPAC, COMNAVFORCOPES,
JTF MACV OKINA, CORN ID, COZDEBOWMAR AAA GROUP, COLTHU AVUE EL
ISOM OKINA~~

(a) 3rd PhibCorps units rehabilitating OKINAWA will be under COMCOMINTMPAC.

~~PENNSYLVANIA to CINCPAC PEARL HQ Info CINCPAC ADV HQ~~

3341

SECRET
AUGUST (OCT)

02 0018

COM/THFLT to CINCPAC/CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMNAVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMNAVS

Have conferred with your Deputy Chief of Staff regarding NATC major base in PHILIPPINES in accordance your 250908. Information given him is now submitted to you for consideration in submitting your firm recommendation. NATS proposed flight wing will consist initially of 2 R4D squadrons Numbers 6 and 13 and 1 Meron Number 10. These squadrons will serve the Asiatic area only. MACTAN suggested as location headquarters service maintenance facilities for wing. MACTAN ISLAND considered logical site for repair and maintenance NATS equipment service PHILIPPINES and adjacent areas with twin engine airplanes for the reasons that: A. It is centrally located with respect areas served by the wing. B. Local weather conditions best this area. C. Will make common use of station aircraft supply transportation and repair facilities of Naval Air Base MACTAN. Facilities for initial use by NATS to extent of 6 R4D wing 300 NATS personnel will be available MACTAN 1 September. Suggest present facilities MANUS and SAMAR continue to be utilized by NATS as necessary AKINOHAT NATS move to MACTAN be progressive as facilities MACTAN become available. Suggest trans-Pacific NATS PHILIPPINE terminal be LIPITE to turn around and Ron facilities only. It being understood that major repair and maintenance will be provided in MARIANAS and HAWAII. NATS trans-Pacific seaplane terminal facilities now being constructed SANGLEY and will allow progressive expansion of NATS seaplane service. SAMAR which is now PHILIPPINE terminal of NATS trans-Pacific landplane service is suggested as temporary terminal to be used only until Neilson Field MANILA facilities now under construction are completed. Neilson facilities to be supplemented by use of strip at SANGLEY which will be available prior to completion Neilson.

03 0207

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 93 Info COMAIR DNO, COM7TH AIR FORCE, COMAR-
TANAS, COMCENPOA

The reorganization of air forces in the Pacific Ocean Area has made it necessary to disband Task Force 93. The mission of your force has been accomplished under difficult conditions in an efficient manner for which I am most appreciative and congratulate you on a job well done.

03 0208

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 93 Info ALPOA

The Strategic Air Force Pacific Ocean Area with designation of TP-93 and TG-93.4 are dissolved. CTF-93.4 report with the forces under his command to ComGen USASTAF for duty. See my 242315 May concerning fighter defense IWO JIMA.

03 0227

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM/THFLT Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMAIRPAC, COM-
SERVPAC, COMAIR/THFLT, COMINCE CNO

Your 141155 is hereby approved insofar as CINCPAC is concerned.

~~03 0347 CINGPAC ADVANCE to COMINTCH AND CNO info DCNO(ATR), BUWARP, CINGPAC FRANK,
COMNAVFORC, COMNAVPACSUBCOMFORD, COMPATPHOTOOP 1, COMPALINKO 1.2, 3
COMTANESRCAST.~~

- (A) That the authorized complement of Photoflans 1 and 3 be increased from 6 to 9 PB4Y-LP as soon as practicable.
- (B) That these 2 squadrons be supported forward on a crew replacement basis in a manner similar to other multi-engine squadrons.
- (C) If required in order to implement the above or to provide compensating personnel complements recommend Photoflans 4 and 5 be decommissioned.

03 0742 CINGPAC ADVANCE to COMCONINFMPAC info COMINTCH. MARCORPS. CINGPAC PEARL.
CIC 99. FMPPACREP HYDRIUS. FMPPACREP MARIANAS. COMCON 3RD PHIL COMD.

~~03 0912 CINCPOA ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMUSMACV REAP ADVON. COMUSMACV REAP.~~

~~03 0913 CINCIPAC ADVANCE TO CTU 99-2, CTU 99-2.1, CTU 99-2.3, CTU 99-3.4, CTU 99-3~~

3342

SECRET
AUGUST 1945

03 0915 CINCOPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO info CINCPOA PEARL.

Your 311607. Consider that there is sufficient possibility that AITUTAKI and PENRHYN may have post was significance to justify continuance of present token garrisons. Navy and Coast Guard personnel will be substituted for Army garrisons if you so direct or if it is the only means by which garrisons can be maintained.

01 1355 CTU 95.9.2 to CINCOPAC ADVANCE info COMGENUSASTAF, COMGEN 20TH AF, CTG 94.11, COMGEN PEARL, COMGEN PEARL ADV HQ, CTG 95.9.

Your 301539 it is desired to continue rescue inland sea all pilots. Conference representatives COMGEN PEARL advise that they will continue their splendid and cooperative fighter cover for all rescue missions and searches necessary. Communication facilities recommended by 311301 not all or needed should be expedited for optimum rescue operations.

30 2140 COMAAF SWPA to COMAF 13, COMGEN 85 FIGHTER WING (ADC), COMAIR 7TH FLEET, CINCOPAC info COMNAV PACIFIC AT GUAM, COM AF 5, COMPHILSAF (SECRET)

AX-79283.

Further to myrad AX-78080, 21 July (not to all). ComAF 13 combat responsibility includes entire 5th Air Force area of responsibility in SWPA, as outlined in inclosure 1 to operations instructions number 96. This combat responsibility includes strike and rescue air-sea rescue and operational control of all shore and tender-based aircraft of ComAir 7th Flt, as outlined in para 3E(1), operations instructions number 96, except units specifically placed under control air defense command for airways, air-sea rescue operations.

Para. 85 fighter wing will assume responsibility for (A) air-sea rescue airways coverage in PHILIPPINES at 00011(-9), 5 August 45, and FIRST the operations of VFB 71 bases SAMAR and 1-half VFB 20 based LINGAYEN to accomplish this mission. (B) area, strike and rescue air-sea coverage on or about 15 September 1945 for all craft operations within and from the PHILIPPINES, at which time 1 Army air-sea rescue squadron will be assigned in addition to Navy squadrons. Letter directive follows to ADC.

03 2345 CINCOPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET info COMINCH.

COMAAF SWPA 302140/I(-9). Request letter report giving complete data on existing operational command arrangements as they affect all units of air 7th Fleet.

SECRET
SECRET (C)

07 0020 CINCPOA ADVANCE HQ to ALFOA info CINCAFPAC.

The standard army air force air defense grid which is now employed by the forces under CINCAFPAC is hereby prescribed for use by forces under CINCPOA in cases when a grid is employed in exchanging air warning and fighter direction information on radar reporting and radar telling circuits. Effective date 1 September 1945. This grid is not to be confused with the AMS world Polyconic grid which is used for gunfire and air support. It is not intended to replace the polar coordinate system used by fleet elements at sea or the polar coordinate system of local reporting from a fixed reference point at the scene of an operation. The air defense grid supersedes the Jangrid the use of which in the POA is accordingly discontinued. Information on the air defense grid will be disseminated separately.

07 0819 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMINCH Info CNO, CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HC

JCS 181409 and the resulting agreement between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC Memorandum for Record of 23 July 1945 subpar 3, 4 and 5 of para 8E regarding division of responsibility for shipping in the RYUKYUS imposes a condition for the present wherein the overall responsibility for procurement and sailing of shipping remains with CINCPOA but responsibility for unloading and turn around at OKINAWA is divided between CINCPOA and CINCAFPAC.

Subpar 8E5 specifically provides that CINCAFPAC may introduce additional shipping at OKINAWA without reference to CINCPAC. Under such circumstances CINCPOA does not have the authority to exercise the overall control over shipping in the RYUKYUS which JCS require of him under JCS 100345 of December 1944. Request JCS 100345 of December 1944 be modified to eliminate CINCPOA responsibility for shipping in Army controlled ports of RYUKYUS.

07 0902 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN CHINA Info CTF 95

Reference C.F.A.W. 1 022330 separately passed. Would appreciate your comments as to attack on junk traffic. I consider visit and search will normally be impracticable and that visual identification as to friendly character will usually be unreliable. My inclination is to interdict all traffic north of the YANGTZE. Early reply requested.

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

GREEN

08 1955 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to ALPOA.

The Soviet Union has announced that a state of war exists between that country and JAPAN.

09 0027 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDEFLT. ALL TF AND TG COMDRS PAC FLT. COMSUBPAC, COMNORPAC, COM5THFLT info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CG FEAF & ADVON, CG US1STAF.

Following operational boundaries established for operations US and Soviet Forces.

Para. In sea of JAPAN the boundary will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTIN (41-50N 129-43E) to point 40-00N 135-00E to point 45-45N 140-00 E thence along parallel 45-45N to line connecting CAPE CRILLON (NISHI NOTORO MISAKI on southern tip of southern SAKHALIN) with SOYA MISAKI (on northern tip of HOKKAIDO). U.S. forces air and naval (including Submarines) will operate to the south and east of this boundary.

Para. In the north Pacific, SEA OF OKHOTSK and BERING SEA. Boundary will be established along the line from CAPE DEZHNEV to DIOMERE ISLAND thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and UNITED STATES to the parallel 51-30N thence to point 50-35N 157-00 E thence to point 49-50N 156-20E thence along parallel 49-50N to the ONEKOTAN STRAIT thence southwest along the KURILE ISLANDS CHAIN. The area to the south and east of this boundary is a zone of United States operation, to the north and west a zone of mutual operations. The zone of mutual operations the operations of the USSR and UNITED STATES naval and air forces will be coordinated.

Para. In the SEA OF JAPAN operations of the U.S. forces north and west of the boundary will be subject to coordination with the USSR.

Para. The boundary line between operational zones of the UNITED STATES and SOVIET air forces in KOREA AND MANCHURIA shall be as follows: CAPE BOLTIN, CHANGCHUN, SINGKING, LIAOXUAN, KAILU, CHIHFENG, PEKING, TATUNG, and thence along the southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA.

Para. United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated. When necessary for United States aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north of the boundary line coordination will be effected by local liaison. Further information regarding identification and recognition signals later including liaison arrangements.

S E C R E T
AUGUST (C)

08 0700 COMAIRWING ONE to CINCPAC ADVANCE H. info GTU 95.9.2. COMSUBPAC.

Shipping strike by FEAF AD ECH August 7 TSU SHIMA STRAITS did not provide cover submarine at lat 32-45 long 128-00. Dumbo was assigned and fighter escort requested this sub for maximum rescue coverage. Fighter escort was refused although request was relayed to COMKEM FEAF AD ECH by landwire and CW. After refusal message was delivered also by hand for determining policy fighter escort future strikes to insure maximum rescue coverage and protection submarine lifeguards stationed for primary duty to cover FEAF strikes. Explanation refusal or policy future requests not answered. FEAF AD ECH establishing own rescue facilities limit their equipment and exercising operational control on other than distress frequencies this includes crash boats. Duplication and resulting confusion hampering efficient rescue and unnecessarily jeopardizing lifeguards. This change in cooperation is recent but applies to practically all air sea rescue operations.

08 0940 ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK to COMINCH AND CNO info MOSCOW - CNO PASSES TO COMNORPAC COMSUBPAC, CINCPAC BOTH HQS.

Convoy officer today officially states Soviet shipping no longer using LA PEROUSE. Would not divulge exact date stopped altho local rumors indicate several days. My 010030. They also preparing to start conveying by planes and warships warships to and from VLADIVOSTOK via TARTARY and INOKHOTSK. Describes LA PEROUSE as dangerous for their use because of Jap subs as well as American warships. Also expresses fear 1st KURILE STRAIT might soon be closed because of military operations.

09 2200 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV info COMNORPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW, ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK.

Deal directly with ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK on such matters as you require. New Subject. Tentative plans for a suitable ship for communication purposes at PETROPAVLOVSK should be made. Interpreters are available COLD BAY connection HULA project. Suggest this ship be communication link to Soviet Naval Command pending establishment GUAM-VLADIVOSTOK circuit.

10 0012 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSUBPAC.

COMSOPAC is directed to exercise administrative and operational control of Naval Air Bases and airfields and aviation matters in SOPAC utilizing the services of a naval aviator whom COMAIRPAC is hereby directed to order to the staff of COMSOPAC. COMAIRPAC shall exercise type command functions including aviation logistic support and aviation personnel matters. This answers COMSOPAC 310223 July.

10 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info COMINCH, GTU 90.91.92, ALUSNA MOSCOW, ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK.

Your 100030. Continue operations of Task Force 92 as planned. Aerial bombing of KURILE chain authorized. In order that Russians may be notified announce your intents to me and to ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK.

AUGUST

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

10 1210 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 95, CINCPAC.

Glance at UrDis 070902 and CFAW 1 022330 concur with interdiction of all sea traffic north of YANGTZE RIVER. Action being taken by this headquarters to notify Chinese of then policy on shipping strikes. Recommend this unrestricted warfare not start until 25 August, so Chinese KG H sufficient time to get notice out.

10 1605 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIBPAC, COM7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT, COMNATS.

Temporary establishment headquarters NATS ASIATIC WING with service and maintenance facilities at MACTAN approved. Ur 030225 and my secret speedletter serial 001911 of 1 August refer. Hold installations to a minimum as MACTAN is not to be a post war base.

12 0405 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMGENFEAF, COMGENFEAF ADVON, CTF 95.

Request pilots of OKINAWA-based planes be briefed that friendly submarines are operating in JAPAN SEA. Others are south of KOREA and in addition to lifeguards there will be submarines on special missions in vicinity of KYUSHU. Recent bombing of submarine lifeguard BATFISH indicates pilots are not being properly briefed as to boundaries and bombing restrictions in submarine patrol zones. SOP-2B requires that no submarine shall be attacked in a submarine patrol zone. Therefore pilots must refrain from bombing unidentified targets during daylight and should not attack single targets during darkness or low visibility.

12 0246 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to EISENHOWER, CHARNEY, MACARTHUR, EDWITS, MOORE, MOYER, WHEELER AND GILES.

WARX 48488.

Propaganda directives originated by the Office of War Information have been reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as causing some confusion in certain theaters as regards their authenticity and status. Clarify this situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to recall that under executive order No. 9312, the OWI is responsible for planning, development and execution of the federal foreign propaganda program subject to approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where areas of actual or projected military operations are concerned and subject to control of program execution by theater commanders. Army and Navy liaison officers designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate in preparing the OWI directives which are reviewed by the OWI overseas planning board on which the state, War and Navy Departments are also represented.

Para. Since propaganda directives must be kept abreast of developments it is desirable to hold administrative processing to a minimum, hence they are normally communicated by OWI to its representatives in the field.

Para. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that these directives be accepted in accord with executive order No. 9312 as reflecting the approved national propaganda policy for execution under your control insofar as military considerations permit. Whenever exceptions are made to any particular directive for circumstances peculiar to any theater, the nature of the exceptions and the reasons therefore will be communicated for the information of the appropriate agency of the War or Navy Department.

AUGUST (GCT)

DECLASSIFIED

AUGUST (GCT)

14 2304 CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS to ALPOA info COMINCH.

Cease offensive operations against Japanese forces. Continue searches and patrols. Maintain defensive and internal security measures at highest level and beware of treachery or last moment attacks by enemy forces or individuals.

14 2310 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC info COMINCH. COM3RDEFLT.

As essential preliminary to further naval operations TOKYO BAY AREA request Japanese authorities be directed to send Japanese ship to meet Halsey 20 miles bearing 135 from O SHIMA to lead his forces into SATAMI WAN and advise time of arrival at rendezvous.

15 0000 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM3RDEFLT.

For your information the State Department has received official Japanese acceptance of surrender demands and is replying through the intermediary power to the Japanese as follows:

1. Direct prompt cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.
2. Send Emisaries at once to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying force to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

For the purpose of receiving such surrender and carrying it into effect, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and he will notify the Japanese Government of the time, place and other details of the formal surrender.

15 0218 CINCPAC AND CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

Please accept my hearty congratulations on your appointment as Supreme Commander for the occupation of JAPAN and my assurance of full support by the forces and resources available to me.

15 0620 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COM3RDEFLT. COMINCH.

Request immediate despatch to Japanese authorities that our own measures for defense require our naval forces to destroy any Japanese aircraft approaching our dispositions. See COM3RDFleet 150423.

AUGUST (GCT)

PLAIN

15 0503 ~~SUPREMACY OVER ALLIED POWERS TO THE JAPANESE EMPEROR. THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL~~
~~GOVERNMENT, THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS, THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS~~
~~HEREBY DIRECTS THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES BY JAPANESE FORCES. THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS IS TO BE NOTIFIED AT ONCE OF~~
~~THE EFFECTIVE DATE AND HOUR OF SUCH CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, WHEREUPON ALLIED FORCES WILL BE DIRECTED TO CEASE HOSTILITIES.~~
~~MISSION BOMBING, SOVIET AUTHORITIES, COMBAT IS, COMBAT.~~

Pursuant to the acceptance of the terms of surrender of the Allied Powers by the EMPEROR OF JAPAN, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers hereby directs the immediate cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is to be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such cessation of hostilities, whereupon Allied forces will be directed to cease hostilities.

Para. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers further directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send to his headquarters at Manila, Philippine Islands, a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the EMPEROR OF JAPAN, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender. The above representative will present to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon his arrival a document authenticated by the EMPEROR OF JAPAN, empowering him to receive the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Para. The representative will be accompanied by competent advisors representing the Japanese Army, the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Air Forces. The latter advisor will be thoroughly familiar with airborne facilities in the TOKYO AREA.

Para. Procedure for the transport of the above party under safe conduct is prescribed as follows: Party will travel in a Japanese airplane to an airdrome on the island of IE SHIMA from which point they will be transported to MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. In a United States Airplane. They will be returned to Japan in the same manner. Party will employ an unarmed airplane, type Zero Model 22, L2, D3. Such airplane will be painted all white and will bear upon the sides of the fuselage and top and bottom of each wing green crosses easily recognizable at 500 yards. The airplane will be capable of inflight voice communications in English, on a frequency of 6970 kilocycles. Airplane will proceed to an airdrome on the island of IE SHIMA, identified by 2 white crosses prominently displayed in the center of the runway. The exact date and hour this airplane will depart from SATA MISAKI, on the southern tip of KYUSHU, the route and altitude of flight and estimated time of arrival in IE SHIMA, will be broadcast 6 hours in advance, in English, from TOKYO on a frequency of 14135 kilocycles. Acknowledgement by radio from this headquarters of the receipt of such broadcast is required prior to take-off of the airplane. Weather permitting, the airplane will depart from SATA MISAKI between the hours of 0800 and 1100 TOKYO time on the 17th Day of August 1945. In communications regarding this flight, the code designation "BATHAN" will be employed.

Para. The airplane will approach IE SHIMA on a course of 180 degrees and circle landing field at 1000 feet or below the cloud layer until joined by escort of United States Army P-38s which will lead it to a landing. Such escort may join the airplane prior to arrival at IE SHIMA.

AUGUST (OCT)

Not Top Secret - PLAIN

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 0355 **SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to THE JAPANESE EMPIRE. THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT. THE JAPANESE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 1516 WARCOS. CINCPAC.**

I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (The United States, The Republic of China, The United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and empowered to arrange directly with the Japanese authorities for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date.

Para. It is desired that a radio station in the TOKYO area be officially designated for continuous use in handling radio communications between this headquarters and your headquarters. Your reply to this message should give the call signs, frequencies and station designation. It is desired that the radio communication with my headquarters in MANILA be handled in English text. Pending designation by you of a station in the TOKYO AREA for use as above indicated, station JUM on frequency 13705 kilocycles will be used for this purpose, and WTA MANILA will reply on 15965 kilocycles. Upon receipt of this message, acknowledge. MacArthur.

15 0215 **CTF 95 to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 99.**

Originator and CTF 99 jointly recommend as follows. Your 110456 refers.

A. To meet situation as it exists now. Effective 1 September CTF 95 dissolve Task Group 95.5 CINCPAC abolish title commander Naval Forces RYUKYUS and assign to CTF 99 duties my OpPlan 3-45 paragraph 3E. Items 1 to 6 inclusive. Remainder duties under this paragraph will be assumed by units of TF 95.

B. To meet developments during and after OLYMPIC or occupation of JAPAN. When control of shipping is passed by COMPHIBSPAC establish Task Organization JAPAN similar to that proposed IP VENTURE. Each organization to take over control of CHOP line to be established by CINCPAC. Consider duties in A above will not be affected except in magnitude of shipping with corresponding increase in escorts required. If approved CTF 95 will transfer personnel and vessels now assigned TO 95.5 to permit accomplishment assigned responsibilities. CTF 95.6 will be assigned duties as SOPA at BUCKNER BAY and will carry out plans prepared by Naval Base Commander for clearing harbor in emergency. He will be responsible for military functions afloat including such as control of BOOKE AA fire etc.

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 0842 CINCIPAC ADVANCE HQ to ALPAC.

With the termination of hostilities against JAPAN it is incumbent on all officers to conduct themselves with dignity and decorum in their treatment of the Japanese and their public utterances in connection with the Japanese. The Japanese are still the same nation which initiated the War by a treacherous attack on the Pacific Fleet and which has subjected our brothers in arms who became prisoners to torture, starvation and murder. However the use of insulting epithets in connection with the Japanese as a race or as individuals does not now become the officers of the United States Navy. Officers of the Pacific Fleet will take steps to require of all personnel under their command a high standard of conduct in this matter. Neither familiarity and open forgiveness nor abuse and vituperation should be permitted.

15 0846 CINCIPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

Refer appendix C to my serial 0005103. It is requested that naval requirements as stated in reference plus the following be presented to Japanese Emissary at MANILA.

1. That the Japanese Imperial High Command will promptly direct all Japanese and Japanese controlled ships, warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft to comply with the following instructions:

A. Ships in harbors to remain in harbor pending further directions from CINCIPAC; ships at sea report their positions in plain language immediately to the nearest U.S., British or Soviet Radio Station on 500KC/S(600 meters) and to the call sign NQO on 1 of the following high frequencies: 4235, 8470 12705, or 16940 KC/S. Proceed to nearest allied port or such port as CINCIPAC may direct pending further orders. Ships will burn navigational lights at night and display searchlights with beams held vertically.

B. Submarines will remain on surface fly a black flag or pennant and show lights at night. Report their positions in accordance with (A) and proceed on surface to nearest of following ports. AGANA GUAM, MIDWAY ISLAND, SUBIC BAY PHILIPPINES. Upon arrival at point 10 miles from entrance to port communicate with port and lie to until boarded by allied naval forces.

C. All warships and merchant ships whether in port or at sea will immediately train all weapons fore and aft. Torpedo tubes will be unloaded and all breech blocks will be removed from all guns.

D. All minesweeping vessels will carry out prescribed measures of disarmament, fuel as necessary and be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the direction of CINCIPAC.

2. The Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that Japanese naval aircraft are not to leave the ground or water or ship pending directions from CINCIPAC.

3. The Japanese High Command will forthwith direct that any neutral merchant ships in JAPAN or Japanese controlled ports are to be detained pending instructions from CINCIPAC.

4. The Japanese High Command will forthwith issue categorical directions that:

A. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times; where possible they are to be removed.

- continued -

SECRET
RESTRICTED

- continued -

15 0846 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSAPAC info COMSOPFLT. COMSOPFLT. COMSOPFLT. COMSOPFLT (Sect 4)

B. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbors are to be disconnected and rendered ineffective.

C. All demolition charges in all ports and harbor works are to be removed or rendered ineffective and their presence indicated.

D. The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliancy.

E. All pilotage services are to continue to operate and all pilots are to be held at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with charts.

F. Japanese Naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports are to remain at their stations and continue to carry out their normal duties.

5. The Japanese Imperial High Command will be prepared to deliver forthwith to CINCPAC representative in TOKYO BAY AREA:

A. Corrected copies of charts showing all minefields laid by Japanese or Japanese controlled vessels or aircraft and all other underwater obstructions.

B. Details of all Japanese coastal convoy routes, searched channels and of all buoys lights and other navigational aids.

C. Exact information with regard to disposition of Japanese naval units.

D. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace diesel gasoline and coal.

6. The Japanese Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that except as may be required for the purpose of giving effect to the above special orders all personnel in Japanese warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft are to remain on board their ships pending further directions from CINCPAC or his representatives.

7. The Japanese Imperial High Command will issue instructions forthwith that:

A. The YOKOSHIKA, HIROSHIMA, OMURA and KASUYAMA airfields be prepared immediately for occupation by U.S. Marine and Naval Air Units.

B. The YOKOSHIKA Naval Base be prepared immediately for occupation and possible operation by U.S. Naval Service Units.

C. All troops and personnel other than those required for normal care taking functions be removed from the foregoing areas prior to the arrival of U.S. Forces.

SECRET

15 1844 COMMUN TO CINCPAC BOTH HEADQUARTERS.

Reports from Soviets yesterday given high evaluation by them indicate following: Intense activity reported along shores SAGAMI WAN on 13 and 14th August Jap dates. Many troops naval personnel and civilian volunteers concentrating that area and digging fox holes and gun positions. Beaches contain many anti-landing devices and entire shore this bay reported heavily fortified. If this report true activity probably organized prior surrender orders but possibility of treachery connection BLUE landings must be considered.

15 0930 COMMUNIDPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL. CINCPAC. COMMUNIDPAC-NAKON.

RJ 68266.

Recommend Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to remove, effective V-J Day, restriction now imposed by modified category of defense B under which this area now operating ordered reduce present alert status of ground and air forces in Hawaiian Group after formal declaration V-J Day.

16 1117 KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS to SUPREME HEADQUARTERS SOVIET RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE FAR EAST.

1st. Japanese 1st line forces have ceased all military movements at their present positions. It is hoped that the Soviet Forces will also cease their attacks. Especially in the vicinity of MUTANKIANG, the Soviet attacks should be speedily stopped.

2nd. Hereafter, the intentions of the Japanese side will be notified every hour for 10 minutes on frequencies of 6035 kilocycles and 15330 kilocycles. The same will be transmitted via wireless on frequencies of 13530 kilocycles and 5815 kilocycles and 7490 kilocycles at the same hour. The Soviet side is requested to carry out similar communications via the KHABAROVSK radio and the tass news agency. Wireless communication should be established between the supreme field headquarters of both the Japanese and Soviet Armies. Specify the wave length on which your communication will be transmitted.

16 1608 WABOS to MACARTHUR info DEANE. KIMBERLY. NIKOLAI. ADAMS. KIMITE.

Urgent NR 1497 following is text of English language broadcast from TOKYO dated 16 August furnished for your information. We are in receipt of the message of the U.S. Government transmitted to us through the SHES Government, and of a message from General MacArthur received by the TOKYO radiotelegraph office, and desire to make the following communication:

Para 1. His Majesty the Emperor issued an Imperial order at 4 PM on August 16 to the entire Armed Forces, to cease hostilities immediately.

Para 2. It is presumed that the said Imperial order will reach the front line and produce full effect after the following lapse of time.

A. In JAPAN proper, 48 hours;

B. In CHINA, MANCHURIA, KOREA, southern regions - except BOUGAINVILLE - NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES, 6 days.

SECRET (CONT)

- continued -

3354

SECRET

- continued -

16 1608 WARGOS to MACARTHUR info DEANE, KUDOVER, KUDOVER, SPATE, KUDOVER. (Cont'd)

C. In BOUGAINVILLE, 8 days.

D. In NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES, in the case of various local headquarters, 12 days. But whether and when the order will be received by the 1st line units, is difficult to foresee.

Para 3. With a view to making the August wish of his majesty, regarding the termination of the war, and the above - mentioned Imperial order thoroughly known to all concerned, members of the Imperial Family will be dispatched as personal representatives of his majesty to the headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army, the expeditionary forces in CHINA and the forces in the southern regions respectively. The itinerary, type of airplane, marking, etc will be communicated later. It is accordingly requested that safe conduct for the above be granted.

Para 4. As regards to the request to dispatch a competent representative accompanied by service advisers, to the Headquarters of General MacArthur in MANILA, leaving SADA MISAKI in KYUSHU on August 17, we feel greatly embarrassed, as it is impossible for us to arrange for the dispatch of your representative on August 17 due to the scarcity of time allowed. We will, however, proceed at once with the necessary preparations and notify General MacArthur as to the date of the flight of such a representative which will take place as soon as possible.

Para 5. It is proposed to MAS if communications with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the following manner:

A. Sender and receiver on the Japanese side, the General ~~XXXXXX~~ or the government.

B. ~~RSUDDOARONS~~ on the Japanese side, TOKYO station, call sign JNP, frequency 1 ~~XXXXXX~~, 740 kilocycles.

C. Means of communications, radiograph.

D. Language, English.

Para. Communication received from General MacArthur. We request therefore, that the message be repeated, bearing upon the type fully and clearly.

Para 7. In order to make sure that we have received without fail all the communications sent by General MacArthur, we beg him to repeat them once again through the route of communication specified under heading single quote 5 ~~WUDCOVER~~ and single quote of the ~~FRES~~ communication end of quote.



17 0212 JNP (RDO TOKYO)

INTERCEPT MESSAGE.

As stated in our radiogram No. 1 it takes some time for the said order to reach the front line and produce full effect. It is earnestly requested that the allied forces will refrain from approaching the home waters of JAPAN PROPER until the order will have been fully effectuated.

17 0711 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to JAPANESE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Reference your radiogram number 4 August 16th. Your assumption that the signing of surrender terms is not among the tasks of the Japanese representatives to MANILA is correct. The directive from this headquarters is clear and explicit and is to be complied with without further delay. MacArthur.

17 1357 MACARTHUR to US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW. GURZAC AKAHARA. GURZAC 12. HAS

Following messages have been received from the Japanese General Headquarters (Z 507) quote message number 5 while on our side the Imperial Order has already been given to cease hostilities, the Soviet Forces are still positively carrying on the offensive and their spearhead is reaching near a point west to MUKDEN early this morning. As the result, the Japanese Forces in MANCHUKUO are meeting great difficulties in carrying out the Imperial Order. It is urgently requested that the Supreme Commander would take proper steps to bring about immediate cessation of the Soviet offensive. Message number 7. Re our radiogram number 2:

Para 1. The parties for CHINA and MANCHURIA left TOKYO today at 9:30AM.

Para 2. The party for the south, reported in our previous message to leave on the 18th, left TOKYO also today at 9:30 AM. In order to avoid possible delay due to bad weather.

Para 3. The type and markings of the planes and their routes are as communicated before. Unquote addressees southwest Pacific area take necessary action to provide safe transit Japanese parties for CHINA, MANCHURIA and the south. See also my Z 503. Following message received from the Japanese Government (quote message number 6 please correct the sender of our radiogram number 4 from (Japanese GNY) to the (Japanese Government). MacArthur.

17 1907 WAROOS to MACARTHUR info DEANE, WHEDECKER, WHEELER, SPARTZ, KIMBLE.

1532.

Following is text of broadcast from KHABAROVSK in Russian to the USSR on 17 August furnished for your information. "To the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army:

Para. The Staff of the Japanese KWANTUNG Army addressed over the radio the Staff of the Soviet Troops on KHABAROVSK suggesting that they cease military operations, whereas not a word has been said about the capitulation of the Japanese Armed Forces in MANCHURIA.

Para. At the same time the Japanese went on with the counter-offensive in number of sectors of the Soviet-Japanese Front.

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

17 1907 MARCOS to MACARTHUR info DEANE, MEDEYER, WHEELER, SPAATE, RIVITT.

Para. I suggest to the Commander KWANTUNG Army troops that he cease all military operations against the Soviet Troops along the entire front, lay down arms and surrender, at 12 O'Clock on August 20.

Para. The time mentioned above is given in order that the staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY could issue the order to cease resistance and surrender to all its troops. As soon as the Japanese begin laying down their arms, the Soviet troops will cease military operations.

Para. Commander in Chief of the Soviet Troops in the Far East Marshal VASSILEVUKYI COMVU August 17, 1945, 6:00AM.

Para. Following is text of English language broadcast from TOKYO dated 17 August furnished for your information. "Jap TOKYO to WTA MACARTHUR headquarters in English at 12-41 PM. (Text) to the supreme Allied Commander radiogram number 7, August 17-our representative to Manila is selected. Due to necessary internal procedures, he is scheduled to leave TOKYO on August 19. Further details will follow." J2 HULL OFF.

20 1945 SECRET AND CND to MACOR.

The President on 15 August 1945 issued the following directives: Appropriate departments of the government the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design and production of the Atomic Bomb, or in regard to its employment in Military or Naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the President in each instance.

21 1431 SECRET AND CND to MACOR info CNDL 11th Airborne Div 129.78 MC.

Your 210517 (OK 35347) will execute my plan 2 including occupation of forte vicinity FUTSU SANE which I will arrange to have vacated when I am met by emissary off OKINAWA. Desire you arrange direct with Nain McCornick now in IDAMO at OKINAWA (departing 24th) for naval gunfire support desired by Army forces. McCornick will advise me in the premises when his group joins me. I will make all necessary arrangements for gunfire support for Marine Landing Force. I suggest that G2 11th Airborne Div MAAC send air support liaison officers and any desired JASCO elements with McCornick to report to me. My plans call for carrier plane CAP to cover airborne landings with air coordinator constantly over objective. I intend using frequencies as follows. Air coordinator and direct support aircraft for 11th Airborne division 129.78 MC. SACCHI WAF combat air patrol 124.02.

SECRET (GCT)

22 0823 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNAVJAG, COMNAVJAG, MARINES, COMNAVJAG.

Para 1. Based on the assumption that arrangements can be made for the 5th Amphibious Corps including 3 MarDivs to be released in December-January from occupation duty JAPAN (either being relieved by Army Units or being released without relief) the following schedule of return of amphibious corps and Marine Divisions to U.S. is recommended for planning purposes: October 4th MarDiv, December 3rd MarDiv, January 9th Phib Corps and 9th Mar Divs. May 3rd Phib Corps and 6th Mar Div. Units returning will include personnel longer in area. Above is dependent on strategic situation however your approval is requested for planning purposes. In May anticipate 1st MarDiv will be in CHINA and 2nd MarDiv in MARIANAS-MARSHALLS-WESTERN CAROLINES.

Para 2. Recommend that 2 AAA Group Headquarters and 5 AAA Bns be disbanded and the personnel used for rotation and to augment the service command. Remaining 2 AAA Bns will be required Marianas for present.

Para 3. ComNAVJAG concurs in the above. In addition he will submit recommendations for disbandment and readjustment of other units as the tactical situation permits.

Para 4. 6th Defense Bn at MIDWAY and Marine Defense Force JOINTLY will be reduced to minimum.

Para 5. 52nd Defense Bn can be released from assigned duties now and returned U.S. 51st Defense Bn will be required Marshalls for the present.

Para 6. The disbandment of units the processing of equipment and supplies the closing out of camps etc., will require a temporary augmentation of the service command involving an estimated additional 600 commissioned and warrant and 10,000 enlisted. ComNAVJAG will submit above requirements to MARCORPS by separate correspondence.

23 0833 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNAVJAG.

Your 202222 just received. Commander North Pacific Force has been considered to be a Task Force Commander of the Pacific Fleet and has been included in the Task Organization of all major operation plans issued by CINCPAC. Initiate compliance by OpPlan 12-45 of which pertinent extracts have been furnished you. Keep me and ComNAVJAG informed of your plans and the intended position and movements of your forces. Do not enter OKINAWA until after 31 August. Acknowledge.

23 1127 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

O 34029.

For the surrender ceremony there will be 30 senior officers of this headquarters and other major army headquarters. These are in addition to 30 Allied officers who will attend representing the Allied Forces. Correspondents, newsmen etc AFMAG 135, CHINA 13, USAGM 14, total 162. Request that the arrangements on the HONOLULU be made on the foregoing basis reference Commander 3rd Fleet 220513 OCT.



23 0836 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMUSMACV AND CDR info CINCPAC HONOLULU.

Item 171545. No suitable site for grounding PENNSYLVANIA without extensive preparation at OKINAWA. Because no protected anchorage exists in typhoon weather consider moving ship in present damaged condition unwise. Unless directed to contrary will tow PENNSYLVANIA to Guam earliest practicable for drydocking and limited repairs to facilitate further tow to Pearl Harbor or west coast pending final decision as to disposition.

Para. Do not recommend use of CDB for coast defense Pacific Island Bases for following reasons.

- A. If grounded extensive repairs, RIP RAP construction necessary to prevent failure ships girder as seas wash out support of bow and stern.
- B. Vulnerability of target.
- C. Difficulty of rearming.
- D. Unknown changes in gunnery planes and clearances to be expected from changes in support due to sea action.

Para. Extent to which this was has shown sea coast batteries to be an obsolete form of defense.

23 0838 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMUSMACV info CINCPAC. ACTIVITY.

Comur UrDis 191945 on assumption that implications involved in discontinuing combat areas are following:

- 1. Cancellation payment of bonuses to Merchant Crews.
- 2. Influence on Marine war risk insurance rates.
- 3. Would establish termination date for operations and campaigns not yet officially terminated. Attention invited to CINCPAC 150520, 150907 and serial 07052 of 18 August defining Merchant ship control procedure in FOA following formal surrender which is similar to COMUSMACV serial 083611 of 15 December.

Para. Until there is more definite assurance that there are no isolated independent groups of Japanese unwilling to comply with surrender consider that Armed Guard and Armament should be maintained on Merchant Ships and troops in Western Pacific until occupation of Japan has been accomplished.

23 2027 CINCPAC ADV to COMUSMACV UNDER ALLIED FORMER info COMUSMACV. SIGNATURE. [illegible]

As indicated in discussions between Rear Admiral Sherman and Rear Admiral Yokoyama at Manila CINCPAC-CINCPAC is entirely in accord with use of Japanese Hospital Ships to relieve the situation in the Pacific Islands and requests that the evacuation of WAKE and MANUS be handled as a matter of urgency in that order. Request this action be initiated in your reply to Imperial Japanese Headquarters message number 21 quoted in your 230521. CINCPAC will supervise by detailing Destroyer to escort each Hospital ship.

AMMER (SIX)

24. CDR1

Para. My 190119 assigns CW frequencies for distress and rescue control.

24 0812 ~~GENERAL AGO NO 10 SUP COMER ALLIED FURNISHING INC. COMMER. GEN. SUP. FURN.~~
~~ON THE FURN. CONTRACT~~

24 1505 ~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.~~
~~FROM: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.~~
~~SUBJECT: [REDACTED]~~

Q 619

By radio 282148Z (not teall) CINCPACFLT advises that British Chiefs of Staff desire that HONGKONG surrender to Rear Admiral Harewood conforming to timing required by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Further requests information by urgent dispatch as to earliest date HONGKONG surrender should be effected.

Para. In CMB-9493, 23rd, (not to all) COMUSCHINA informs Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has agreed to delegate his authority for acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces in HONG KONG to a British Commander. Also that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek will designate a Chinese and an American officer to participate in surrender acceptance. Further advises that Generalissimo has requested British to effect military coordination on operational matters connected with HONG KONG surrender with General Wadswayer and the Chinese Board of Military Operations. Requests Supreme Commander for Allied Powers to make appropriate arrangements.

Para. Decide that necessary arrangements to accomplish surrender of Jap forces in HONG KONG to Rear Admiral Harcourt be made directly between Admiral Harcourt, General Wadsworth and the Chinese Board of Military Operations. The surrender date can be fixed for any day following that on which the instrument of surrender is accomplished, now scheduled for 21 August. Further request that this office be kept informed and advised of date and hour of acceptance of surrender. Para. This office will direct the Japanese to surrender the Japanese forces in HONG KONG to Rear Admiral Harcourt.

SECRET
(S)

24 0120 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNAVFLT

Your 211415 desire anchorages be assigned to ships concerned as follows unless there are compelling reasons to contrary. P 68 KING GEORGE VII P 69 DUKE OF YORK P 70 SOUTH DAKOTA P 71 MISSOURI P 72 IWO P 85 ANCON P 86 TONG. Other ships in anchorage P as desired avoiding assignment in battleship column to any types except battleships. Advice.

24 0156 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNAVPAC, COMNAVFLT Info COMINCH, CTF 38, CTF 39, CTF 37

Nominate a carrier division consisting of 2 CV and 1 CVL for temporary duty in 7th Fleet.

25 0245 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNAVPAC, COMNAVFLT Info COMINCH, CTF 38, CTF 39, CTF 37

My 240156. Since Basic Post War Plan contemplates maintenance 1 carrier division in Asiatic waters, duty may be of considerable duration. It is my present intention that division be commanded by Rear Admiral A C Davis ComCarDiv 5 with ships best prepared for extended service.

24 1511 CINCPAC to WARCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMCHINA.

OX 24421.

COMCHINA OFEX 5404 dated 21, CINCPAC 210818 to COMINCH and my OX 33890 dated 19th are references. This radiogram answer WX 90 and 91, 19th and WX 59744, 24th.

Para. The guiding consideration in the utilization of resources, particularly of amphibious shipping, for occupation operations along the CHINA COAST must be that 1st priority is given to the occupation of JAPAN to the fullest extent of the resources required. HUNDA has 2nd priority. It is possible that after the occupation starts a delay may be possible after the 1st Phase movements, however, the present time planning should be firm on sending the 2nd phase division, with the possible exception of 1 division in HUNDA, which would give a total of 16 divisions in JAPAN and 2 in HUNDA with a possible availability of 1 division for another location as indicated in my OX 33890. CINCPAC representatives indicated that the heavy availability of amphibious shipping by the 30th of September would practically eliminate any problem of priority since at that time there would be a 14 division lift available. On this basis and within the limitation indicated in the 1st paragraph the concern of CINCPAC in his 210818 is generally concurred in.

Para. Since conference with representatives of CINCPAC and COMCHINA information has been received that DAKIN is now occupied by Russians. It therefore appears that the marine contingent specified in CINCPAC 210818 would be a sufficient participation of U.S. troops along the CHINA COAST. CINCPAC agrees to the relief of 1 Div of the 5thPhilCorps from JAPAN about October 1. It will be replaced by 1 on the Philippine divisions if practicable or by 1 being redeployed.

Para. The agreement indicated in para 1 of OFEX 5404 is believed to interrupt the deployment into JAPAN to give priority to a movement into CHINA until 15 phase 1 Divisions have been placed in JAPAN.

- continued -

24 1511 CUBANOS to HARRY 1st, CUBAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY (C-151).

25 0608 [REDACTED] THE ALLIED STATES OF AMERICA AND COMMERCE
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Refer my Z529 too 210343, Z 531 too 210401, Z 532 too 210405 and OK 3965 too 220645 stating requirements Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for accepting surrender of JAPAN. Due to typhonic conditions all dates specified herein for operations on the 26 August and thereafter are postponed 48 hours. New Schedule: Movements of advance party by air and preliminary naval movements on 28th; air movements in force and initial landings on 30th; Surrender ceremony on 2nd September; advance party landing KANOKA 3rd September; landing in force KANOKA 4th September.

~~25 0907 GUNPAK ADV TO COMNAV 1400 GUNPAK. GUNPAK FRAG. COMNAV. GUNPAK-
ADV.~~

25 1101 CUBANA to CUBAPAC AM 1200 HARDS. CONTINUED.

Consent in proposal for the transfer of responsibilities under naval officer Southwest Pacific Area contained in COMINTFLT 180140. Our Allied Naval Forces will terminate when Southern command area is transferred to British now scheduled for 2 September 45. This answers your 230703.

25 1985 CUBANAS to CUBERAS/BOA AIRLINE.

The rate and timing of repatriating Japanese from any area must of necessity be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (2 572) since determination will be governed by conditions existing in JAPAN after occupation thereof the urgency of Japanese repatriation from WAKI and MANJUS as indicated year 232217Z (OCT) must be governed accordingly. In any case it is deemed inadvisable to initiate repatriation action prior to 3 September.

344.

25 0020 [REDACTED]

Para. Effective immediately, TG 111.5 composed of GLOCK, CAPTAIN A.W. BUZZARD CTG, and 2 aloops selected from HART, HANE, BLACK SWAN, SEVENTH.

~~25 0628 CTR 111.2 to CINCENT 1st; CTR 112, CTR 111, SACSEA, CTR EL, CINCENAS, CTR
JAN SUP, CTR JALD D 1973, CTR 111, CTR 111, CTR 111, CTR 111,
CTR 111.~~

- 26 0902 CENSUS ANSWERS to QUESTION 1

26 1459 8242 to CONFAC ASSURANCE CO.
CHICAGO, ILL.

ADVICE (907)

[illegible]

In carrying out the provisions of paragraph 1, subpara (E), "General Order Number 1, Military and Naval", advance copy of which was handed your representative in MANILA 20 August 1945, it is desired that senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in certain areas formally surrender to designated representatives of the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, subsequent to General surrender of Japanese Armed Forces at TOKYO, as follows:

A. In the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Western Pacific, whose headquarters are at MANILA, at a time and place designated by him. (u-505).

B. In the NIUKYUS, to the Commanding General, Tenth United States Army, whose headquarters are at OKINAWA, at a time and place designated by him.

C. In KOREA, south of 38-00 north latitude, to the Commanding General United States Army Forces in KOREA (Commanding General 24th United States Corps), whose headquarters are at OKINAWA, soon move to KOREA, at a time and place designated by him.

It is desired that the senior Japanese Commander in each of the above areas make contact with the above designated commander concerned by the most expeditious means for preliminary instructions providing for accomplishment of such surrenders on or immediately after 2 September 1945.

~~26 0424 CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER GND ARPAC to CINCPAC ADV ATTC OASD/OPS/STAFF.~~

June 994.
Representative of GENAFMAC (Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Schenck) will board USS MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY to install and operate VHF radio telephones and telegraph equipment and message center for GENAFMAC. Request name of officer aboard MISSOURI that Colonel Schenck should contact.

26 0000 000003 to CUNRAPPAC info USASTAF, CUNRPAE ANWARRD IN.

WABX 55342.

Designation of COSUMN 10TH ARMY to act for CINCPAC in receipt of surrender in KYUKYUS per your CX 36036 is not understood here in view of the provisions of paragraph 1 D, General Order Number 1, transmitted to you in WARK 49961 of 15 August and quoted in your 2515 which direct Japanese in KYUKYUS to surrender to CINCPAC. Advice.

SECRET (S)

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

25 1555 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COM 12 & 13, CINCPAC PEARL H., COMCRUPAC, COMDESPAC, CINCLANT, COMNESSEAFRON, COMAIRLANT, COMAIRPAC, COMBATRON 1 & 2, COMCRULANT, COMDESLANT, COM 11.

In connection with selection of ships for early return to tentative ultimate post-war disposition of following units under your command is furnished for planning purposes. Ships under construction or repair and ships in Lant are not included. Refer MyDis 122358 for establishment reserve Fleets. Schedule of build up of reserve Fleets now in mail to you.

1. Battleships Pacific Fleet.

A. Active. INDIANA (BB 58). MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59). ALABAMA (BB 60) IWOA (BB 61). NEW JERSEY BB 62. MISSOURI (BB 63). Reserve Fleet. COLORADO (BB45). MARYLAND (BB 46). WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48).

C. Decommission Pac West Coast. PENNSYLVANIA (BB38).

2. Battleships Atlantic Fleet.

A. Active. NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55). WASHINGTON (BB 56). SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57). WISCONSIN (BB 64).

B. Reserve Fleet. NEW MEXICO (BB 40). IDAHO (BB 42). TENNESSEE (BB 43). CALIFORNIA (BB 44).

C. Decommission in Lant. ARKANSAS (BB 33). NEW YORK (BB 34). TEXAS (BB 35). NEVADA (BB 36). MISSISSIPPI (BB 41).

3. Carriers PacFt.

A. Active. BOXER (CV 21). ANTIETAM (CV 36). SHANGRI LA (CV 38).

B. Reserve Fleet. ESSEX (CV 9). YORKTOWN (CV 10). INTREPID (CV 11) HILL (CV 17). BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31). INDEPENDENCE (CVL 22). BELLEAU WOOD (CVL 24). COMPENS (CVL 25). SAN JACINTO (CVL 30).

C. Decommission Pac West Coast. SARATOGA (CV 3).

4. Carriers Lant Flt.

B. Reserve Fleet. FRANKLIN (CV 13). RANDOLPH (CV 15). WASP (CV 18) HANCOCK (CV 19). BENNINGTON (CV 20) MONTREY (CVL 26). LANGLEY (CVL 27) CABOT (CVL 28). BATTAN (CVL 29).

C. Decommission in Lant. RANGER (CV 4). ENTERPRISE (CV 6).

5. Cruisers PacFt.

A. Active. BALTIMORE (CA 68). BOSTON (CA 69). QUINCY (CA 71). SAINT PAUL (CA 73). CHICAGO (CA 136). PASADENA (CL 65). SPRINGFIELD (CL 66) TOPEKA (CL 67). VICKSBURG (CL 86). DULUTH (CL 87). MIAMI (CL 89) ASTORIA (CL 90). OKLAHOMA CITY (CL 91). TUSCON (CL 98) AMSTERDAM (CL 101) WILKES BARRE (CL 103). ATLANTA (CL 104). DAYTON (CL 105).

B. Reserve Fleet. PITTSBURGH (CA 72). SAN DIEGO (CL 53). SAN JUAN (CL 54). SANTA FE (CL 60) BIRMINGHAM (CL 62). MOBILE (CL 63). VINCENNES (CL 64) BILOXI (CL 80) OAKLAND (CL 95). FLINT (CL 97).

6. Cruisers LantFt.

A. Active. ALASKA (CB 1). GUAM (CB 2). COLUMBIA (CL 56) CLEVELAND (CL 55) MONTPELIER (CL 57) DENVER (CL 58).

B. RESERVE FLEET. CHESTER (CA 27). NEW ORLEANS (CA 32) PORTLAND (CA 33) MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36) TUSCALOOSA (CA 37) SAN FRANCISCO (CA 38). WECHITA (CA 45). NASHVILLE (CL 43). PHONIX (CL 46). BOISE (CL 47). ST LOUIS (CL 49) LOUISVILLE (CA 28).

AUGUST (GCT)

1065

C. Decommission in East. DETROIT (CL 8). RICHMOND (CL 9). OGDON (CL 10). TRENTON (CL 11). PENSACOLA (CA 24). SALT LAKE CITY (CA 25).
 7. Destroyers PacFlt.
 A. Active. Destroyers 10, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65.
 B. Reserve Fleet. Destroyers 21, 45, 46 less DD 592. 47 less DD 593.
 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 less DD 586 and 481 plus DD 578, 595, 596.
 C. Decommission in PacWest Coast. DD's 514, 552, 481, 586, 639, 714.
 8. Destroyers East Flt.
 A. Active. Destroyers 50, 57, 66 less DD 714.
 B. Reserve Fleet. Destroyers 7, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 22, 23 less DD 514,
 24, 25.
 C. Decommission East. Destroyers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 31 DD 595.

Plan depart 30 and 31 August with forces present this area as indicated by oporder 9-45 in mail today. Route through MAMITKA pass via lat 49-11 N long 17 3-00 E and point BUEE rendezvousing with minesweepers 30 miles south point ARGOSY 0900Z(GOT) 6th September. Will FJL 6th and 7th conduct minesweeping operations to clear channel eastern TONGAN STRAIT to OMINATO anchorage 7th, and if completed enter OMINATO with Task Force 92 on 8th with air cover provided by Task Force 49 operating vicinity route point CAMUTE.

Contacted Japanese Destroyer HATUZAKURA off O-SHIMA 0800 this date carrying naval emissaries, pilots, and interpreters.

Para. Took staff Captains Y. Takasaki of YOKOSUKA and I. Otsu from naval headquarters TOKYO plus 2 interpreters on board MISOGUNI. Received satisfactory preliminary information from naval emissaries and informed them of the time schedule and requirements of the occupation operations. Preliminary arrangements satisfactory and no untoward incidents. Mine-sweeping by elements of Task Force 31 commencing this date.

Para. Intend SAN DIEGO and Destroyers anchor off YOKOSUKA 28 August
if sweeping operations for American Aerial Mines satisfactory completed.
OTW 31 obtains further complete information from Japanese naval authorities
tomorrow.

Para. Further intend moving heavy ships into TOKYO BAY 29 August if minesweeping has progressed satisfactorily. H-Hour set for 1000 I(-0) & Day 30 August.

Para. Will establish liaison with Army advance party by air from COMUSMACV to ARVN after advance party arrives.

3365

SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

27 2312 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSOPAC.

War Department agrees maintain token garrisons your 240205 AITUTAKI and PENRYHN pending completion State Department negotiations.

28 0700 CINCPBF to CINCPAC info ADMIRALTY, CTF 111, SACSEA, CTF 37, VA(Q), CINCET, CINCPAC ADV, RAFT, CTG 111.2, CTG 111.3.

After consultation with Major General Harrison of staff of SACSEA understand that your intention is that allied POW and internees CHINA, FORMOSA and JAPAN will in the first place be taken by USN transportation to PHILIPPINES for rehabilitation prior to repatriation, and that CINC AFPAC accepts responsibility for receiving them there.

Para. Propose that (A) CINC BRIT PAC FLT accepts responsibility for conveying all allied POW internees from HONGKONG to MANILA. (RM ER) SACSEA arrange in conjunction with the INDIA government for the repatriation of all INDIAN personnel from MANILA to INDIA.

Para. If para 2 (A) is agreed intend to start this movement as soon as you can inform that POW and internees can be received at MANILA.

28 1225 SCAP to SACSEA(MOUNTBATTEN) CINCPAC(BLAMEY) info COMALF(MELBOURNE), WARCOS (JCS) CINCPAC ADVANCE.

CX 10428.

The Japanese Imperial government has been informed that: "The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16-00 north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLAND INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, south EAST ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces as later designated".

Para. Exact breakdown of responsibility with the areas listed for the acceptance of surrender of Japanese Armed Forces located therein, was to have been arranged between Mountbatten and the Australians. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has charged with preparation of the details of execution based on the agreement made.

Para. Since only a partial agreement has been reached covering but a portion of the areas listed and because timely preliminary arrangements must be made for and within the entire area, the Japanese Imperial Government is being informed that paragraph 1(c) of General Order Number 1 has been amended to read as follows: "(1). The Senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 16-00 north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, LESSER SUNDAS (including BALI, LOMBOK and TIMOR), BOERCE, CERAM, AMBON, KAI, AROE, TANIBAR and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, MALMAHERA and DUTCH NEW GUINEA shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, south east ASIA command." "(2). The Senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, the BISMARCKS and the SOLOMONS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, Australian Military Force".

[illegible]

SubPara 1. "The senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ADAMANS, NIOGBARS, HUNDIA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA LESSER SUNDAS (including BALI, LOMBOK, AND TIMOR), HONKOE, CHINA, HAINAN, KAI, ANKE, TANTHAR, and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, MALANANAS, and BUTON NEW GUINEA, all surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, ASIA command".

SubPara 2. "The Senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within BOHIO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, THE NEIGANOKS and SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, AUSTRALIAN Military Forces". Para 2 from SubPara D part 1 delete "MYUKUS". Para 3 in SubPara E part 1 insert "MYUKUS" preceding the phrase "and the Philippines". Para 4 in SubPara a of part 2 insert "Naval and" following the word "Land". Para 5 in part 12 delete the 14th word "Forces" and substitute thereto "Power".

~~20 1553 CINDRAPAG, P. JOHN MINISTER AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, HONGKONG, GUINER, THE
AUSTRALIAN ISLAND GROUPS, SINGAPORE, MALAYSIAN, BRITISH, AMERICAN,
AFRICAN, AND OTHER ISLAND GROUPS, A.C.O.P.~~

Following General Order Number 41, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area dated 28 August 1945 is quoted for information and guidance:

A. The portion of the Southwest Pacific Area south of the following described boundary, except as noted below, is transferred to British Empire control: beginning on the coast of INDU-CHINA at 16-00 north; thence to intersect at 07-40 north 116-00 east the boundary between the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to 03-00 north 127-00 east; thence east to 05-00 north 130-00 east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence to 02-00 north 146-00 east; thence east to 02-20 north 159-00 east; thence south.

2. The following commands stated in general orders 1, 12 April 1942, are abolished: (1) Allied Land Forces, SWPA. (2) Allied Naval Forces, (SWPA. (3) Allied Air Forces, SWPA.

C. All Australian, Netherlands east Indies and New Zealand land, sea and air forces now under the control of the Commander in Chief SVP, except as hereinafter indicated, will pass to British Empire control.

Para. Pending availability of transportation to Okinawa, of other action to dispose of, and in order to facilitate communications; bases, airfields and other installations now occupied, with personnel and supplies therein pertaining to the U.S., will remain under control of the Commander in Chief, United States Armed Forces, Pacific, for any installations, supplies and personnel, and the commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for

SECRET

(cont'd)

naval installations, supplies and personnel. The 2 last named commanders will negotiate directly with appropriate Australian and Netherlands East Indies agencies for the expeditious evacuation of areas so occupied.

Para. Present coordinating control over logistic arrangements and present shipping services rendered by agencies of the SWPA will be passed progressively to agencies designated by the British Empire by direct negotiation and in such a manner as to facilitate continuity of operational procedure where required and in the interest of good administration.

Para. Elements of forces and personnel of the Allied Forces indicated in para 1 C above who are serving with U.S. forces or allied Headquarters north of the boundary described in para 1 A will remain temporarily on duty therein until orderly relief may be made without detriment to good operational procedure and administration.

28 1823 CINCOPAC ADV to SCAP info COMINCH. COMSOPAC. CINCPCT.

Your 281411. I have concurred in the occupation of OCHS and HAHN by British Commonwealth forces under the direction of CINCPCT. It should be understood that such forces are subject to coordination by CINCOPAC-CINCPOA since these islands are within the Pacific Ocean Area.

28 2353 ADMIRALTY to CTG 111.2 info CINCPCT. CINC EAST INDIES. (DEFERRED)

Part 1 my 282359 REF an 130032 Aug an 130042 Aug 131957 Aug not to CTG 111.2. 1. Following message from Gimson for Secretary of State for Colonies carried by messenger to MACAO and transmitted by telegraph from H. H. Consul. "Most immediate. Have sufficient staff and complete ~~ADMINISTRATION~~ available to set up Civil Administration immediately except patrol of new territories. For a short period without outside ~~ASSISTANCE~~ ~~ADMINISTRATION~~ ~~ADMINISTRATION~~ as officer administering the government. Request immediate advice consultation at present quite. In NS QITAL for incoming Allied commander to meet me immediately on arrival. Suggest landing at or near Stanley Camp". 2. Following reply sent by Secretary of State for Colonies. "Your message has been repeated to Rear Admiral Carcourt who has been empowered immediately on his arrival in HONGKONG to establish military administration by proclamation.

28 2359 ADMIRALTY to CTG 111.2 info CINCPCT. CINC EAST INDIES (DEFERRED).

Part 2 final Admiralty 282359 pres part 2353. You should then at once comply fully with his instructions. In the meantime warmly approve your initiative and plans you have made". 3. You should convey Secretary of States message to Gimson in case he has not received reply via MACAO. 4. Both above messages have been repeated to Ambassador CHURCHILL.

29 0811 CINCOPAC ADV to COMNAVSTAC info CINCOPAC PACFL.

In view of the changed status of the War with JAPAN it is desired that you resubmit recommendations for the reduction of forces within the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. This to supersede your serial 0003 of 29 July giving consideration to recent directives affecting this subject.

SECRET (CCT)



29 1431 ~~CHANGING to WAR DEPT. JO MILITARY MESSING MESSING. CHANGING AREA. FROM~~
~~CHANGING AREA. FROM CHANGING AREA. FROM CHANGING AREA. FROM CHANGING AREA.~~
~~CHANGING AREA.~~

From the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers subject is occupation of the KANTO AREA. (Z 645) revised dates for these operations are as follows: Advance party will land 3 September and main forces will land 4 Sept. 1945. Desire that Japanese ship beginning not later than 0600 hours, 3 September 1945, take station to meet U.S. Naval forces at 20 miles, bearing 270 degrees, from SAGA-MISAKI, southern KYUSHU, and land these forces into KAGOSHIMA-WAN. 8 pilots with interpreters will be available on Japanese ship. These instructions supersede those contained in para 9 of document 4 of "Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers presented to the Japanese representatives at Manila, Philippine Islands, 20 August 1945". Acknowledge.

01 0616 ACNB to SENIOR OFFICER, H.M.A. SQUADRON, ALL N.O.'S I/C, HMA, EI, CESP, SHIPS (MAJOR WAR VESSELS, 641B info CINC BPF VA (Q), CINC EI, CINCPAC, NZNB.

Effective 0300 GCT 2nd September that portion of the SWPA south of the following line Indo China coast at 16-00N 116-00E thence along ANOTHER international treaty limits of Philippine Archipelago to 05-00N 127-00E thence 05-00N 130-00E Equator 130-00E Equator 140-00E 02-20S 146-00E and 02-20S 159-00E reverts to British and Australian control. 2. ACNB assumes naval responsibility for eastern portion of this area to SEAC for THEL western portion. 3. The boundary between SEAC and the Australian area is yet to be decided but for guidance the initial Australian responsibility will be for Borneo and to the eastwards, and the lesser areas to the eastwards of Jymbok. It is unlikely however that the Australian army will engage in any operations in Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera or Celebes (except Pinrane). 4. Until the control of Shihsang is relaxed the present boundaries and ship lines established for the control of shipping in the SWPA and adjacent commands remain effective. Chop line between areas referred to in para 2 above will be promulgated as required. FKVBCAD all HMA ships under the control of CINC SWPA revert to the control of ACNB but are to continue their present assignments until directed otherwise by this authority. 6. Communication plan as in my 371 and 471.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOV 4 1960~~

PINK

01 0151 ~~CINCPAC ADV TO COMSEMPAC, COMGENPOA, COMAIRPAC, COMSARPAC, INFO COMNAV, CG~~
~~100231 JUNE 1945, OKINAWA, 1400 01 SHINA, CGO 100231 JUNE 1945~~

In order to aid in the alleviation of a critical backlog of shipping now awaiting discharge at OKINAWA the following action will be taken immediately:

- (A) ComGenPOA ComGenFMFPac and Navy Type Commanders will postpone shipment of all materials not required to establish the facilities prescribed in CINCPAC PEARL dispatch 162139 May (as augmented by CINCPAC ADV 100231 June to arrive OKINAWA after 1 November 1945, or in the case of airfields becoming operable after 1 November, materials will be shipped at a rate to correspond with operational dates.
- (B) ComGenPOA will postpone shipment until after 1 Nov. 1945 of all materials not required to make Army installations (other than airfields) essentially operable by 1 November 1945. For airfields see (A).
- (C) Hut and prefab housing for all NCBS Army Engineer Aviation General Service and Construction Battalions and Regiments will be cancelled. Such troops will continue to use camp facilities initially unprovided.

Recommended changes to current OKINAWA echelon schedules to implement this directive will be submitted by action address by 7 July.

01 0500 ~~COMNAVSEAFRON TO CINCPAC ADV.~~

ReUrDis 191335 June recommend category defense reduction HAWAIIAN ISLANDS from Fleet Opposed to Non Invasion and from Category Defense B to Category Defense A modified as follows: FTP 155 Chapter 5 Section 3 Para 31 A eliminate general measure number 5 and number 6 A B and C.

02 0255 ~~CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMTHANPAC, COMNAV, COMSARPAC, COMSEMPAC, CGPOA, CG TEN, COMNAV, COMSARPAC, COMSEMPAC.~~

ComPhibsPac 190310 not to all or needed. Para.

Following clarification of responsibility proposed. Para.

ComPhibsPac and CG 6th Army to be jointly charged with responsibility for planning embarkation of all OLYMPIC land based forces equipment and initial supplies whether loaded in assault or later echelons and whether to be under control of CINCPAC or CINCPAC at the objective.

Representatives of appropriate subordinate commanders can be made available to them when requested to assist in planning.

In accordance with existing FOA policy ComPhibsPac to have overall responsibility for loading the ships of the assault echelon conforming insofar as possible to the desires of CG 6th Army.

ComPhibsPac and CG 6th Army will include in their overall loading plans recommendations to CINCPAC and CINCPAC as to responsibility for loading all shipping exclusive of the assault echelon.

Your concurrence or comment requested.

02 0908 ~~CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CG TEN, COMNAV, COMSARPAC, COMSEMPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.~~

Your CX 2256 (DTG 010945). No objection to designation of 7th and 27th Divs in OKINAWA as GHQ reserve for OLYMPIC provided that in the event both the 7th and 27th are committed in OLYMPIC another division arrives OKINAWA not later than 1 January 1946 to support garrison forces in emergency.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET (C)~~

PINA

02 0913 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL. COMPHIBPAC. COMINTFLT.

CINCPAC is equipping Port Director Units for OLYMPIC to be established as follows. 1 unit of 25 officers in vicinity of mouth of MANOSE RIVER. 1 unit of 10 officers at YAMAKAWA at Western Entrance of KAGOSHIMA WAN. 1 unit of 40 officers in vicinity of TAKUSA for naval base on eastern shore of KAGOSHIMA WAN. 1 unit of 25 officers in ARIAKE WAN at SHIBUSHI of FUKUSHIMA GAWA (alternate location UCHINOURA WAN). 1 special unit of 20 officers for Army port at KAGOSHIMA CITY to perform such strictly naval functions as piloting, assembly, routing, sailing and reporting of shipping and distribution of charts and hydrographic information.

5 specially equipped LCI will house these units until provision established for them ashore. These units include infra harbor voice and visual signalling equipment. Of these LCI 2 are being equipped at PEARL and 3 are presently at OKINAWA.

Port Director personnel will be assembled at PEARL. Commanding officers these units on or before 1 August will be ordered report to ComPhibPac for planning purposes. Other port director personnel will join their respective LCI in time to mount to objective with major forces.

Complete Port Director Units will report to ComPhibPac when required in time to accompany assault echelons and will later report to CG 6th Army along with other units of PhibPac as outlined in CINCPAC operations instructions No. 1.

Request your comments or concurrence.

04 1350 COMINTCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC.

Ref WAR 25859 detailed information mentioned consists of JPS 703/1 a study of problem bearing no approval but which is being forwarded to you for information. In view of experimental nature these installations. Their doubtful effectiveness. The over-riding priorities necessary to their timely construction with consequent impact on other essential preparations for CORONET. And the difficulties of delivery, I am of the opinion that plans for this operation should not depend on the provisions of artificial harbors unless they are an essential requisite for success. Request you consult with CINCPAC on the matter and submit your views.

03 0515 COMINTFLT TO CINCPAC BOTH INFO CTF 38.

Your 020152 intend carry out 10 July operation solely against enemy aircraft and air installations in accordance with carefully laid plans and elaborate briefing. On 16-17 July strikes will undertake destruction enemy men of war TOKYO BAY Area with emphasis on NASATO and destroyers. Now tentatively planning destroy enemy men of war KURE-KOBE Area subsequent to 20 July replenishment.

03 1353 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC PASSED BY CINCPAC PEARL TO CINCPAC ADV.

Ref CINCPAC-CINCPAC agreement general principles of coordination of forces dated 16 May 1945 request 7th Air Force be transferred to command AFPA effective 6 July. Info here indicates following units now HYOKU: 44th Heavy Bomb Grp, 41 Medium Bomb Grp, 28 Photo Recon Sq. with 319 Light Bomb Grp now displacing and 11 Heavy Bomb Grp loaded and ready to displace. In addition to above, 318, 413 and 507 Fighter Groups attached to 7th AF now installed.

TOP SECRET
JULY 1950

PINA

05 1200 CONCEPT TO CINCPOA VIA RDO GUAM.
CFB 243.

Comments as requested in radio 030335 concerning 643 project in KOREA follow. It is highly desirable that intelligence be obtained concerning Japanese activities in KOREA. This theater is undertaking a project to obtain intelligence and has started to train agents for overland penetration of KOREA from CHINA. Due to the inaccessibility of the target area it is estimated that the agents cannot be in position in KOREA for at least 2 months. In view of this delay, CHINA Theater looks with favor on the subject project which, it is assumed, can be initiated immediately.

Since the base area and the 2 radio listening stations will be outside this theater it is not considered desirable for China Theater to sponsor the project. However, any intelligence which is obtained from this project will be of value to this headquarters.

06 0553 CINCPOA ADV TO COMNAVAPFOA. DEPCOM 20TH AF INFO CINCAFPAC. COMCINCPAC. CTF 92.
CTF 92.2.

CINCAFPAC 031353 request your comment and recommendation with particular reference to units of 20th AF now in RYUKYUS. Assume 0000 I(-9) 15 July as time of transfer.

06 0554 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFO CINCPOA PEARL.

Your 031353 first obtained from my PEARL HQ. Concur in transfer not later than 15 July. Will advise further after consultation with DepCom20thAF concerning units that command.

06 0622 CINCAC PAC ADV TO COMCINCH INFO CINCAFPAC. COMZTHELT.

CINCAFPAC 051221. Concur in use of destroyers for FORT BAYARD project until about 15 September when they must be withdrawn for OLYMPIC.

07 1310 COMCINCH AND CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA PEARL. CINCAFPAC.

The British Chiefs of Staff have arranged for the dispatch of 2 assemblies of RAF airfield construction personnel and equipment to the Pacific for eventual preparation of VLR facilities in RYUKYUS. It is my understanding that this construction force will be pooled with our own and employed wherever needed until required for RAF needs late in 1945.

The 1st convoy known as SHIELD FORCE consists of 8 ships (SAMJACK, SAMAFRIC, SAMSETTE, SAMUTA, SAMFEUGH, SAMKEY, SAMLAMU, SAMERE) containing 15,000 tons construction equipment and 1000 vehicles. The movement is underway and ships will arrive canal zone in order named between 7 and 19 July. EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA containing 3100 construction and administrative personnel arrives Canal Zone about 19 July. The 2nd convoy known as VACUUM FORCE composed of similar ships cargo and personnel is scheduled to sail from United Kingdom between 14 July and 1 August.

Air Marshal Lloyd who is familiar with all details of these assemblies is enroute GUAM for consultation. Following consultation with him request you:

- (A) Designate destination for SHIELD FORCE arrange routing and provide such escorts as may be required.
- (B) Submit recommendation as to movement of VACUUM FORCE which can if necessary be held in United Kingdom.
- (C) Advise contemplated employment these forces.

3373

SECRET

PINK

08 0301 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, COM7THFLT INFO COMPHILSEAFRON, COMNAVSEAFRON, COMNAVSEAFRON, COMNAVSEAFRON, COMNAVSEAFRON.

The following measures of reorganization of units now in the 7thFLT are proposed to be made at the times indicated in order to improve the support of OLYMPIC and subsequent operations and facilitate Pacific Fleet administration. Your comment or concurrence is requested. Turner and Burby have concurred.

- A. About 1 October Com7thFLT relieved from duties in SNPA and report to CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
- B. About 1 October ComPhilSeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a Fleet Task Force Commander under the operational control of CINCPAC in command of naval forces assigned for duty in Philippine Sea Frontier.
- C. On 15 August ComServFor 7th Flt change title to ComServFor 7. ServFor 7 becomes unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com7thFLT until 1 October and thereafter to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron to render service to all Fleet units in PHILIPPINES as required.
- D. Effective 15 August all naval shore facilities including naval air bases in PHILIPPINES pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron.
- E. Effective 15 August Com7thPhibFor and staff detached 7thFLT report to ComPhibPac and assume status parallel to Com3rdPhibFor and Com5thPhibFor.
- F. Effective 15 August all units now in 7thPhibFor pass to command of ComPhibPac combatant units to be reallocated to meet current requirements including those of PhilSeaFron and other units to form a subordinate command of the administrative command PhibPac (with an organizational status parallel to that of the SubCom at GUAM) for the purpose of rendering service to all PhibPac units in the PHILIPPINES.
- G. About 1 October ComAir7thFLT change title to ComAirPhilSeaFron.
- H. About 1 October FairWings 10 and 17 pass to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron through ComAirPhilSeaFron.

08 0340 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCINCPAC, COMNAVSEAFRON INFO COMCINCPAC.

Submit by letter your detailed recommendations as to reductions in defense measures to conserve personnel and resources on the assumption that category of defense of Hawaiian Area remains as at present but degree of implementation becomes discretionary with CINCPAC.

08 0802 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, COM7THFLT INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMNAVSEAFRON, COMNAVSEAFRON.

CINCPAC 060319. Determination of organization of naval shore based units OLYMPIC and naval base development planning are being handicapped by discrepancies between CINCPAC Operations Instruction No. 1 and the staff studies with regard to the location of the naval air base. CINCPAC and CINCPAC staff studies both showed development of existing Japanese naval air base KAGOSIMA re U.S. Naval Air Base. This arrangement had the advantage of proximity to Naval Base at TAKASU which will be the center of major naval activities and naval cargo discharge.

If Naval Base at KAGOSIMA and Marine Divisions operating areas are all to be west of KAGOSIMA BAY it may be advisable to consider relocating Naval Base at KAGOSIMA CITY and Army port facilities at TAKASU thus shortening overland supply lines for both services.

Your early comment requested.

08 1959 SINGAPORE TO CINCIPAC ADV INFO 621 AMK. COMANT. CINCIPAC. CINCIPAC.

1. That in addition to Port Director Units listed in reference consideration be given to establishing units at MIYAZAKI, ISHAGAKI and KUSHIKINO to aid in the control and routing of shipping.
2. That a representative from Port Director's staff for SHIBUKUNI, and for any of the localities requested above at which you agree to establish Port Director Units, confer with representatives of 6th Army and AFMESPAC earliest practicable date at headquarters 6th Army for coordination of operating procedures.
3. Designations and strengths of all Port Director Units which will pass to 6th Army control be furnished this headquarters in order that they may be included in the troop list for the operation.

As many LSTs as possible are being allocated for OLYMPIC Operation. Any assigned especially for communications or other special purposes must necessarily cause a corresponding reduction in assault lift. In view of need expressed by you¹ for LST COM7THFLT is directed by this letter to make immediately available to you for use as CHQ communication ships 2 LST from those now ~~assigned~~ assigned to his command and is further authorized to increase the number to 3 if you so require. He is also directed to send such assistance as is needed for structural alterations and installation of your signal communication equipment. LSTs will continue as units of Pacific Fleet.

The following refers to Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC, U.S. Pacific Fleet and FOA, 18 June 1945: The statement bottom of page 16 "When the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops (ComGen 6th Army) assumes command of the ground forces established ashore he will report to CINCPAC who then assumes command and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN" is not concurred in. The responsibilities of CINCPAC are set forth in JCS 1331/3, particularly para 1B(1) "is charged with the primary responsibility of the conduct of the operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commanders". I will assume the troops and will exercise at all times the command responsibility directed as quoted above, by the JCS.

MYDIs 300601. A rear admiral will be designated by CINCPAC ADV as Commandant Naval Operating Base. The Naval Operating Base will embrace all naval and Marine activities on KYUSHU as indicated in the following sub paras:

- (A) Lion 9 will be utilized to establish the Naval Operating Base facilities at TAKASU.
- (B) The 2 Cubs to be designated should be ordered to report to CG 6th Army for further assignment.
 - (1) L to 5thPhibCorps for employment during the amphibious phase in the vicinity of the mouth of the MANOSE RIVER.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

PINK

09 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO COMNAVFOR, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20

- (2) The other to XI Corps for employment during the amphibious phase in ARIAKE WAN. Both cubs will pass to control of the Commandant upon completion of the amphibious phase.
 - (C) The shore based facilities of the PT operating base at YAMAGAWA KO will be under the Commandant NOB. The tenders and boats will be under operational control of Com7thFlt.
 - (D) The Naval Air Base will be commanded by a naval aviator who in turn will be under the Comdt NOB. ComAirPac requested to nominate the prospective commander KANOYA Naval Air Base.
 - (E) The Marine Air Bases at CHIRAN TOJIMAYA and MISUMAYA will be commanded by Marine aviators. During the complete assault phase while supporting V PhibCorps the Marine Air Base commanders will be under the Marine Tactical Air Commander at each field. Upon completion of the combat operations of V PhibCorps the Marine Air Bases will pass to control of the Comdt NOB. ComAirPac requested to nominate 3 Marine aviators for command of 3 Marine Airfields.
 - (F) (1) The naval construction troops assigned to construct Marine airfields initially will be under the control of CG 6th Army. They will pass to the control of Comdt NOB upon completion of airfield construction.
(2) The 4 NOBs with V PhibCorps will remain under the control of the V PhibCorps until withdrawal from KYUSHU at which time they will be assigned to Comdt NOB.
(3) All naval construction troops other than those mentioned in (1) and (2) above will be under the continuous control of the Comdt NOB.
 - (H) The Marine AAA Groups will be under control CG 6th Army. For purposes of general administration of the naval service they will be under administrative control of the Comdt NOB. However Marine ~~administrative~~ administrative matters will remain under normal MarCorps channels.
 - (I) The various naval communication activities will be assigned to the operational control of the respective officers in charge but will be under Comdt NOB for type and administrative control.
- Geographical locations listed above are subject to changes which may arise from further studies.

09 0907 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC COM7THFLT INFO COMSERVPAC CINCPAC PEARL.

ComServPac recommends that the location of the NOB be changed from vicinity TAKASU as proposed by CINCPAC serial 0005081 18 June to a location on a level plain of the western side of KAGOSHIMA WAN just north of YAMAGAWA KO. The following advantages will be gained by a change of location:

- (A) Construction time on waterfront facilities will be materially reduced since only 4,000 waterfront feet of sheet steel ~~pila~~ will be involved in lieu of 25,400 ft.
- (B) Dredging operations will be reduced from 2,327,000 cu.yds. to approximately 1,000,000 cu.yds. and the base can begin to function independent of dredging operations.
- (C) Pontoon requirements will be materially reduced.
- (D) Considerable road construction and improvement will be eliminated due to flat area at the new location.
- (E) Certain waterfront development is existing and can be utilized in lieu of complete new construction.
- (F) New location is adjacent to PT operating base and in the same general land area as all other naval activities except those at ARIAKE WAN with resultant possible consolidation of administrative control.
- (G) Anchorage and waterfront facilities will be in a more protected location.
- (H) Naval airfields can be constructed as conveniently and rapidly as the existing fields at KANOYA can be lengthened and brought to proper grade.

- Continued -

3376

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EX-1000~~

PINK

09 0907 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCARPAC COMZTH AF, INFO COMSERVPAC, CINCIPAC, HANAI. (CONT'D)

(I) Ample flat and usable area exists at the new location so that crowded conditions need not be the consideration for the establishment of both naval operating base and naval air facilities as might have proved existent at the former location.

(J) Since the construction time is limited to 120 days maximum, a new location which requires less construction effort appears to be more practicable and feasible from the standpoint of reduced shipping space required, possible reduction in forces involved and the consolidation of all naval activities in 1 general land area.

The advantages to be gained in relocating the Naval Base and Naval Air facilities as recommended by ComServPac from a base development point of view are such that this plan appears desirable. Acceptance of this plan will alleviate discrepancies given in CINCIPAC ADVANCE 060802. Request your views.

10 0218 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCARPAC INFO DEPCOMZOTH AF, COMINCH.

Your CX 24152 (090215) is welcome because it opens the way to an early solution of the problems concerned. The definite information now available as to the future organization of the Army Air Forces will facilitate this solution. I am in complete agreement that the system of coordination must facilitate placing the full force of all air power on any objective with minimum restriction as to targets. I believe that this can best be achieved along functional lines with little use of restrictive boundaries. My conferences with Gen. Giles indicate that he shares this belief. The coordination of the operations of the 20th AF and of the aircraft under my command has been achieved effectively by full exchange of information with maximum freedom of action as to targets.

It will undoubtedly become necessary in the future for fleet units including carriers to attack targets in the INLAND SEA and to operate not only in the PHILIPPINE SEA west of the 135th Meridian but also in the EAST CHINA SEA later in the SEA OF JAPAN and possibly also in the YELLOW SEA. I must retain complete freedom of action in such matters subject to the realities of the strategic and tactical situations as they develop.

With reference to sub paragraphs A and C of your message you may be assured that the inferences which concern you are mistaken. I am opposed to any restrictions which delay or impede using any available weapons to damage the enemy. The text concerned is part of a general concept and refers only briefly to the salient features of the operations planned. It does not cover the full use of forces against targets of opportunity and may require amplification in that respect.

Gen. Giles has agreed to send Major General Kuter and I will send Rear Admiral Sherman to meet with your representative to clarify these matters at MANILA at any time convenient on or after 15 July. I consider representation from the headquarters Army Air Forces inadvisable because it would in turn necessitate representation from the headquarters of Cominch. I believe that these 3 officers can very quickly evolve solutions which will be mutually agreeable to you to Spaatz and to me.

10 0236 CINCPOA ADV TO COMARPAC INFO FAM 1, FAM 16, ~~ADMINISTRATIVE~~

Requirements for 4 Privateer squadrons for OLYMPIC approximately 9 plus 45 to 60 should be met by reductions elsewhere in accordance with following tentative deployment on 1 January 1946 by squadrons, 4 BATESMAN 3 CHESNA 3 INO and MARIANAS including ASR squadron 3 PhilSeaFron. Weather aircraft are included. Designation of specific squadrons can be deferred until late November.

TOP SECRET
NOV 1967

PINA

10 0417 USARPAC TO COMCHIN CHINA INFO CINCPAC ADV COMNAF COMNAVFOR 14.
CR 24399.

Reference is your CFEH 430. Concurrence in NORTH CHINA and KOREA operations of RYUKYUS based FFAF aircraft. Operations will begin on or after 15 July. Request 14th AF keep FFAF and Advon FFAF informed of hostile situation and areas occupied by friendly forces in subject area and any other pertinent matters. PEIPING will be excluded from bombing attacks except in case of military necessity as determined by this headquarters. FFAF will arrange for attack of targets in proposed area with 14th AF and will notify latter of missions prior to their dispatch and results thereof on completion of missions. FFAF will be authorized direct communication with 14th AF for the coordination of operations in KOREA and NORTH CHINA, with your headquarters and this headquarters as information addressees. Your comments or concurrence requested.

10 0748 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCHIN CHINA INFO COM7THFLT. CTF 33. COMNAVFOR CHINA.

A cruiser and destroyer task force has been formed whose tasks will include operations along the CHINA Coast. Request that you arrange to have 1 of Miles officers familiar with CHINA situation with particular emphasis on coastal shipping and as many Chinese speaking interpreters as possible up to 9 report to senior naval officer at SAMAR for further transfer to Jeda Rear Admiral Low in U. S. ship GUAM.

03 0335 CINCPAC PEARL TO CINCPAC. COMCHIN CHINA INFO CINCPAC ADV.

Request your comment and recommendations concerning NAPKO project of the Office of Strategic Services transmitted to you by JCS memo of 18 June.

11 0146 CINCPAC ADV HQ TO COMCRUDIV 16 CTF 99 COM3RDFLT INFO COMINCH CINCPAC PEARL.
CINCPAC CTF 32 CTF 39 CR 30.5 CR 32.1.2.30.9.1 NORTH CHINA.

My OpPlan 4-45 modified as follows:

(1) Add to task organization: (N) Cruiser Task Force (TF 95) Rear Admiral Low in GUAM (CBL), CruDivs 12 and 16. Desron 24, less BACHE (DD 470) MULLANY (DD 526) plus WILLARD KEITH (DD 775) J.C. OWENS (DD 776) MASSEY (DD 778).

(2) Add in subpara 3(a) to tasks of 3rdFlt: Provide air cover for cruiser task force as practicable from units in the RYUKYUS area on request of CTF 95.

(3) Add in subpara 3(b) to tasks of RYUKYUS forces: Provide air cover for cruiser task force as practicable on request of CTF 95.

(4) Add new subpara 3(N): Cruiser task force exercise control of the EAST CHINA SEA, interrupt enemy shipping along the CHINA Coast, mislead the enemy as to our next assault objective by conducting repeated sweeps in the EAST CHINA SEA. Make initial sweep from the vicinity of TUN YUNG TAO (26-22N 120-30 E) northward to about Lat 28-40 N. Be prepared to conduct further sweeps when ordered. CTF 95 request air cover as required direct from CTF 99 and from naval air commanders concerned. Keep CINCPAC COM3RDFLT and all interested air and naval commands in RYUKYUS Area informed of movements. Base at OKINAWA.

(5) Add to para 4: Logistic support at OKINAWA available from ComServDiv 104 in HANUL.

11 0159 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCRUDIV 16 Info CINCPAC PEARL COMCHIN COMNAVFOR CHINA.
CR 30.5 CR 32.1.2.30.9.1 NORTH CHINA.

Form TF 95 Rear Admiral Low in GUAM composed of CR 32.1.2.30.9.1 Desron 24, less BACHE (DD 470) MULLANY (DD 526) plus WILLARD KEITH (DD 775) J.C. OWENS (DD 776) MASSEY (DD 778). When RFS about 13 July TF 95 proceed from LINTAS to RYUKYUS Area. Upon completion fueling proceed to execute initial task assigned my 110146. Upon completion return to vicinity of OKINAWA.

Arrange directly with ComServDiv 104 for logistic support.

3378

1234

Destinations recommended your 090443 July acceptable except following. You show engineer power plant maintenance detachment for SAIPAN in November whereas no such unit listed in CX 21538 and must mean engineer refrigeration maintenance detachment due in November for which no destination given. Of 4 Engineer Dump Truck Companies listed in CX 21538 already accepted 2921 company for OKINAWA per your 142348 June leaving 1 each for OKINAWA, CANU and SAIPAN altho you list 2 for SAIPAN. Likewise acceptable are destinations contained in your 100340 assuming 130 Engineer General Service Regiment to be the 1302 for TINIAN and the 72 Finance Disbursing Section to be the 272 for TINIAN.

Ur 100748. Will selected Chinese personnel fill your interpreter requirements. We have no Americans with qualifications. Desire to set up direct radio contact between Task Forces and Hdqtrs ComNavGrp CHINA Eastern Command. Short title COMNAVCHIEF. Radio call JT 89. ComNavCHECK is located at KIENYANG EAST CHINA Lat 27-23 Long 118-08 and has direct operational control of coastal intelligence nets from SHANGHAI to SWATOW. Also operational control of 18000 U.S. Navy trained guerrillas. I am now temporarily at KIENYANG in wide swing along coast available anywhere for conference. When do you want personnel. Suggest CHANGTING 25-45 116-23 as pick up field.

* Cancel my OpPlan 2-45. CINCAC 271215 March refers. (FIMBREAK Operation).

Request CG FMF Pac prepare and keep up to date plans for capture of WAKE ISLAND by Marines supported by fast carrier task force. Assume enemy garrison now 2700 but deteriorating due to repeated attacks and lack of supplies. Keep CINCPAC advised your estimate troops required and units tentatively earmarked. Initial report desired as to earliest date considered feasible and troops contemplated for employment.

The following refers to Joint Staff Study, U. S. PacFlt and FGA, 18 June 1945. There are a number of differences in concepts between certain sections of the above document and the Staff Study and Instructions of CINCPAC relating to the employment and coordination of air forces. Some of these have been subjects of conferences and correspondence between our staff officers, but definite conclusions have not been reached. On the last exchange, your representative indicated disagreement with certain features of air coordination suggested by this headquarters and indicated that an alternate scheme would be submitted. This scheme has not yet been received. My general concept is that a simple system of coordination which will permit the full force of all air power to bear on any objective with minimum restriction as to targets is the correct system. Experience in the PHILIPPINES Campaign indicated that 2 air forces could operate in the same area without interference providing each was informed that the other would be present. The system that my representatives have proposed follows this general line of thought.

3379

TOP SECRET
CICG

PINA

09 0215 CINCAPPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO WABCO. CO AIR. (CONTINUED)

A. Specifically, on page 7 of the document referred to above, there is a strong implication that you desire to impose restrictions on Army Air Force operations against shipping. I consider that this restriction is unnecessary and undesirable. In the scheme of air coordination proposed by this headquarters, the primary target for Army Air Forces in the RYUKYUS was indicated as the land areas, and of the Navy Air Force in the RYUKYUS the sea areas, each being free by coordination with each other to operate in the primary areas of the other. I do not agree that Army Air Forces can not operate against shipping.

B. On this same page, you indicate that the Army Air Forces operating from the RYUKYUS would be subject to such measures of coordination as you find necessary for safety or operating effectiveness. There is a need for a closer understanding on this subject. I have already agreed that the assignment of areas of air, surface and submarine activities is your responsibility. It is expected, however, that this be coordinated with my headquarters as has been the practice during the last year. As to the matter of traffic control, it is probable that this control can be handled locally between air force commanders in the RYUKYUS without imposing undue restrictions. Eventually the FFAF will be the predominating air force and the commander should have a voice in the coordination provisions prescribed. This matter should be clarified.

C. On page 8, the action of the Army Strategic Air Force is confined to the island of HONSHU. This is not believed to be in accordance with intentions. Conferences with representatives of the Strategic Air Force have already indicated the intent of placing its full weight in the objective area for 10 days previous to the OLYMPIC assault. Moreover, there are targets along the MANKURIAN mainland and selected targets in northern KYUSHU and SHIKOKU which are included within the anticipated objectives for the Strategic Air Force. These targets are prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but early decisions as to coordinating provisions are necessary.

D. On pages 17, 34, and 27 a plan is indicated to turn over a part of the Marine air forces operating in the objective area to the 7th Flt for the purpose of escort and protection of shipping to and from the objective area. This plan diverges somewhat from our agreement that Marine air operating in the objective area would be under the control of CINCAPPAC. Generally, it is believed that this plan is meritorious. However, since it has not previously been explored in conference, it is believed that it should be further examined in its relationship to the general coordination of air in the objective area.

E. Annexes 2 and 3 to Appendix B diverge from similar concepts of the employment of air which has been favored by this headquarters. These matters should be adjusted at the earliest practicable date.

Para. Since the above points have many ramifications, it is not believed that they can be settled satisfactorily by radio. Moreover, the Strategic Air Force has an important interest in the general air coordination. A conference at the earliest practicable date is suggested. MANILA is preferred because detailed planning is now going on here, but if you prefer otherwise, we will conform. If this is agreeable to you, I will arrange to have the Army Air Forces, Washington, or the Army Strategic Air Force, send representatives in order that final conclusions on these matters can be reached. For purposes of planning, I suggest that the conference be held about 20 July.

11 2140 COMNAVFORAF INFO CINCAPPAC CINCPAC COMNAVPAC COMNAVFORAF 5. COMNAV 7. AX 75775.

1. Effective immediately upon transfer to FFAF of operational control of the 7th AF and 20 AF units in the RYUKYUS you will direct the operations of these units to extend the air offensive from bases within the RYUKYUS against KYUSHU, SHIKOKU and HONSHU west of 135-00 E to:

- Continued -

3380

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOV 1950~~

PINK

11 2140 COMFEAF TO CG ADVON FEAF, DUEO CINCPAC, CINCPOA, ETC. (CONT'D)

- (A) Neutralize and destroy hostile air forces wherever they may be found.
 - (B) Destroy air installations, ground forces and defenses ~~WLSJND~~ industrial and harbor installations.
 - (C) Disrupt water lines of communication and close critical points on land lines of communication.
2. Upon establishment of the 7th AF Hq in the RIUKYUS the ComGen 7th AF will take over operational control of the 301 Fighter Wing.
 3. CG Advon FEAF will immediately institute photographic missions per instructions given him by ComFEAF on 7 July and report to this headquarters when he is ready to strike.

11 1425 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAFA.
CX 2404.

Ur 060617. Relating to placing 1st MarAirWing under operational control of 7thFlt to prepare for future operations is reference. Addendum 2 Allied Air Force Opns Instructions 96 refers only to those 1st MarAirWing units based in SOLOMONS. July 15th date for assumption of control of 1st MarAirWing units in SOLOMONS by RAAF command was agreed to by ComGen 1st MarAirWing in conference with air officer commanding RAAF command and ComAllied Air Forces. August 15 tentative date for release of units of 1st MarAirWing from operations was recommended by ComGenMAN based on directives to his headquarters for preparation for OLYMPIC, and consideration of tactical missions in the SOLOMONS. Reminder of 1st MarAirWing is operating under 13th AF in direct support of operations in MINDANAO and covering Fleet units in LUTE GULF. In view of above do you still desire the FMAN released immediately to the operational control of Com7thFlt to prepare for future operations.

11 2336 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMGENFEAF, CTF 95, COMGEN CHINA.

My 110146. To support initial sweep of TF 95 request heavy strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets in SHANGHAI Area and FUJING on date of sweep. CTF 95 advise predicted date and confirm or correct when definite.

12 0217 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPAC PEARL HQ, JEPCOM 20AF.

Ur 071310 and 111737. Ships of SHIELD and VACUUM forces may be sailed as scheduled. Upon arrival PANAMA propose they be sailed independently and unescorted to ENIWETOK where they will remain until called forward to RIUKYUS in regular echelon convoys as required. There is at present a very heavy backlog of shipping at OKINAWA that will be gradually reduced. Selective unloading is now in effect and will be for some time. It is expected but can not be assured that personnel with their equipment will be discharged safely promptly. No special priority can be granted the British ships. They will be integrated into the immediate requirements of the RIUKYUS as a whole. Representatives of CINCPOA British Admiralty and 20th AF are at present conferring on OKINAWA as to the most effective manner for handling such integration. Will advise you of developments. Also see my 110834.

12 0446 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Reference mission of Capt Frankel CINCPAC approves of aerological plans submitted by Capt Orville and makes the following recommendations. (A) Establish a duplex ~~radio~~ teletype circuit between GUAM and a station to be located at KHABAROVSK or ~~hqdtr~~ Soviet Far East Command with tentative transmission frequencies from GUAM 7500 Kcs 10445 Kcs 17930 Kcs and transmission frequencies from KHABAROVSK 7350 Kcs 10200 Kcs 18030 Kcs. (B) Establish a simplex ~~radio~~

TOP SECRET
JULY (C-7)

PINK

12 0446 CINCPCG ADV TO COMCINCH (CONT'D)

circuit connecting a station to be located at PETROAVLOVSK with the station at Khabarovsk with frequencies to be designated by the Soviets. (C) Assemble the communication and aerological material and personnel in the U. S. (D) In the event negotiations completed prior assembly material contained in recommendation (A) initial establishment of simplex manual circuit connecting GUAM and Khabarovsk recommended using GUAM transmitting frequencies.

12 0728 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CGRCA, CGFAF, COMAF20, CGTNAF, CINCPAC PEARL.

Minutes of 21 June conference on signal (radio) intelligence plan are concurred in subject to following comments.

- A. Movement and establishment of radio intelligence units except where already provided for in troop movement schedules and base development plans are contingent upon:
 1. Availability of necessary shipping space.
 2. Ability of those responsible for base development in each area concerned to provide the sites facilities and services required for operation and maintenance of these units.
- B. Circuit referred to in subpara 13 B(1) as Army multiplex circuit is the Strategic Air Force GUAM OKINAWA multiplex teletype circuit (using Navy supplied multiplex) 1 channel of which has been allocated by Stratair for RI use.
- C. Paras 10 & 11. Do not concur in plan for 2 AF direction finder stations on already crowded IWO JIMA. 1 such station now operated there by 6th radio sqdn mobile. Consider it could be made to serve both FFAF and 20th AF. As alternative consider FFAF and 20th AF could arrange for similar dual use of Stratair FOA station on GUAM.

12 1000 COMUSARPAC TO COMUSARPAC, COMUSARPAC, CGFAF, INFO CINCPAC ADV, COMAF20, COMCINCH PEARL, CFBX 693.

This Headquarters concurs in priority of targets recommended in TopSec CAXX 15388 ref MANILA secret rdo 23484, please confirm last city named in 23484 as it was garbled in transit. Ref your top sec CX 24399 in view of status of PEIPING as a Chinese National ~~Shanghai~~ we must insist that any contemplated bombing attacks on this city be cleared thru China Theater. Further we desire to reemphasize the necessity for precision bombing of targets in any Chinese city. Area bombings of crowded Chinese cities in occupied areas of CHINA would result in more deaths and hardship among friendly Chinese than among Japs.

11 2159 COMCINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

Army has not agreed to my proposal that the existing arrangement at OKINAWA should be continued in effect. My modified proposal is contained in paragraphs 2 to 6 and enclosure of JCS 1406/2 which are quoted herewith for your information and comment.

*Para 2. As stated in JCS 1406/1, CINCPAC and the Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) have made a Joint Logistic Plan for the OKINAWA Operation in which have been integrated carefully the matters of priorities of base development, allocation of projects and the movement of supplies into the area, and have set up service forces for their implementation. CINCPAC has been charged with the responsibility for base development on OKINAWA. This responsibility has caused him to allot much of the Naval Construction budget to Army developments. Undoubtedly when and if control of these developments is passed to the Army he will continue to allot as may be practicable units

CP - 100 -

3382

TOP SECRET
JULY 1967

PINK

11 2159 COMINCH & CINCPAC TO GINGPOA ADV. (CONTINUED)

of these construction battalions to the meeting of Army requirements. If this control of development of Army facilities is to be transferred as recommended it is my understanding that the control of the development of Army fields both for the Army Strategic Air Force and the Far Eastern Air Force will be included in the transfer.

"Para 3. Both during OLYMPIC and in the continuing future OKINAWA will be a primary naval base in control of a vital sea area and an air base. During OLYMPIC and perhaps for a short period thereafter important facilities and developments are required for use by the Army forces of invasion.

"Para 4. As stated in JCS 1406/1 I am doubtful as to the wisdom of disturbing this agreed organization which is now at work and progressing well. However if the Chief of Staff US Army has strong convictions that more effective progress in the prosecution of OLYMPIC will be effected by the transfer to CINCPAC of the responsibility for the development of facilities considered essential for his operations and full control thereof including the logistics involved I acquiesce. This transfer of control to CINCPAC to include full responsibility for and control of development of all Army installations and projects in the RYUKYUS (including those for the Army Strategic Air Force) movement of Army supplies into the area and such harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to by the 2 commanders concerned.

"Para 5. In view of the fact that the defense of the RYUKYUS is primarily integrated to the general naval defense of the sea areas of the Pacific Ocean Areas that the defense is primarily air and naval in nature and according to agreed plan is being implemented by preponderantly naval air and naval surface forces responsibility for the defense of the RYUKYUS should remain with the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC) as is the case with every other position in the POA. Such Army forces as may be required in the defense of the RYUKYUS from time to time should be assigned by CINCPAC to the operational control of CINCPAC.

"Para 6. Accordingly I propose dispatching the attached message (Enclosure follows. Message to the CinC US Army Forces Pacific and CinC of Pacific Fleet.

Para 1. CINCPAC in consultation with CINCPAC will arrange to transfer to the latter at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August responsibility for and control of all Army and Army Air Force (including Army Strategic Air Force) installations and development projects in the RYUKYUS the movement of Army troops and supplies into the area and such harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all US Army forces located in the RYUKYUS including the 10th Army will pass to CINCPAC except as indicated in the last paragraph below.

Para 2. Similarly CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of all naval and naval air installations and development projects in the RYUKYUS. The movement of naval forces and supplies into the area, and harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all US naval forces in the RYUKYUS will be vested in CINCPAC.

Para 3. The defense of the RYUKYUS Area and its military government will remain a responsibility of CINCPAC in accordance with existing directives. For this purpose CINCPAC will assign to the operational control of CINCPAC such US Army Forces as may be required from time to time. End of Enclosure)."

12 1015 COMINCH & CINCPAC TO GINGPOA ADV. (CONTINUED)

OPIN 689. Preparation for FOR DAYAD is subject to the following recommendations are requested on the following:

A-CHINA Theater's responsibilities in convey operation.

- Continued -

3383

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

PINK

12 1015 COMUSFOT TO CINCPAC CINCAFPAC INFO CGSOSCT, CGREUSFOT, CGIAAF, WARGOS (CONT'D)

→ 130228 JUNE
B-Naval harbor facilities required at FORT BAYARD and availability thereof to CINCAFPAC reference 941300ZS including movement to FORT BAYARD.
C-Nature and extent of command and liaison required between forces of CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC and CHINA Theater involved in FORT BAYARD operation. If a conference is believed necessary on the above, let us know.

12 1159 CINCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV DEPOOMAF 20.

OX 24942. JCS radiogram WX 29914 dated 10th approves plan PASTEL as amended. CINCAFPAC's detailed implementation plan requires final coordination prior to completion. Invitation extended deception representative your headquarters to conference here 17th July with CHINA Theater and CINCAFPAC representatives for that purpose. Advise.

11 2135 COMINCH AND GNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COM7THFLT.

Submit by dispatch your coherent proposals for reorganization of naval forces SWP subject to following considerations.

- (A) Reorganization of Service Force 7thFlt should be accomplished earliest practicable and is not contingent upon departure of Com7thFlt for JAPAN.
- (B) Naval bases in the PHILIPPINES will pass to jurisdiction of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.
- (C) Upon the reorganization of Service Force 7thFlt and establishment of Service Squadron 7, Commander US naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA will be established. This command will function under Com7thFlt until CINCSWPA relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time Comdr naval facilities will report to CINCPOA direct.
- (D) Concurrently with change in area responsibility or sooner if you so desire the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS should pass to CINCPOA jurisdiction and representations will be made to the JCS dependent upon your comments.
- (E) Maintain in PHILIPPINE Area naval force sufficient to contain Japanese force remaining in SINGAPORE Area.

13 0731 MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA ADV. CG CHINA. COMAAF INFO CTF 95.
OX 25198.

CINCPOA ADV HQ 110153 giving composition of TF 95 and initial movements, 110146 giving initial mission TF 95 and 112336 requesting strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets are references.

Comdr Allied Air Forces will:

- (1) Subject to concurrence ComGen CHINA Theater strike airfields and other appropriate targets with heaviest strikes within capabilities in the SHANGHAI area and FORMOSA on date of initial sweep of TF 95.
- (2) Inform CINCPOA ADV HQ and CTF 95 of strike intent earliest possible. Para. CINCPOA ADV HQ requested to notify this Hdqtrs with info to AAF and ADV HQ FFAF OKINAWA date of initial sweep.

Request concurrence CG CHINA Theater on strikes SHANGHAI area with info to above addressees.

13 0749 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Your 112159. I am concerned at the degree to which the processes of reorganization and changes involved in any new command arrangements for OKINAWA will absorb effort and create confusion during the critical 3 and one half months remaining before the OLYMPIC assault. During this all too brief period a stupendous base development task is to be accomplished. The latest reports show that this task is well in hand. Construction is accelerating and during the 1st 10 days of July approximately 350,000 tons of cargo

Cont'd

13 0749 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (CONTINUED)

were unloaded.

Commenting on the specific proposals of JCS 1406/2 I wish to point out that:

- (A) The assurance of paragraph 2 "He will continue to allot as may be practicable units of these construction battalions to the meeting of Army requirements" is undesirable. Actually, although 4 and 1/4 construction Bns are now working on Army airfields in order to get them activated promptly for tactical reasons, current plans call for gradually transferring these battalions to naval and to general island development. The excess of naval engineering effort over naval requirements will approximate requirements of and should be used on projects of common necessity and defense which will be naval responsibilities under JCS 1406/2. It would be better if no commitment were made on the JCS level concerning use of NCBs on Army projects.
- (B) As of 7 July 27 and 1/2 NCBs were present of which 15 and 3/4 (including 5 and 1/2 regular Bns, 6 Stevedore Bns, 2 Pontoon Bns and 1 Truck Bn) were on general island development, 3 on naval base construction, 4 and 1/2 on naval and Marine airfields and 4 and 1/4 on Army airfields. Of 32 Army Engineer Bns present 13 were assigned to general island development and 19 to Army airfields. The category of "general island development" which includes work on roads, waterfront, water supply, fuel systems, cargo discharge and supply dumps and which now absorbs 28 and 3/4 out of 59 and 1/2 Bns will decrease in relative priority. Many of the common projects can be allocated to either Army or Navy. However to avoid impeding the whole effort present engineering plans must remain virtually unchanged and the separation of service responsibilities must take place slowly and carefully. It will probably be necessary to continue supervision of common projects by ComGen 10 for a considerable period. Recommendation addition to paragraph 3 of the directive of a sentence approximately as follows. "The Commanding General 10th Army and his Headquarters and also the present Island Commander OKINAWA will continue to act for CINCPAC as at present in connection with defense and developments of common necessity until released under arrangements mutually agreeable to CINCPAC and CINCPAC".
- (C) I am in hearty agreement with paragraphs 3 and 5 of JCS 1406/2 as drafted by you. It is my intention to use OKINAWA as a base not only for OLYMPIC and CORONET but also for extending control by the Pacific Fleet initially over the EAST CHINA SEA and as rapidly as possible over the YELLOW SEA and the SEA OF JAPAN. The Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of OLYMPIC.

13 0751 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7THFLT, CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL COMSERVPAC.

Your 112135 not to all addressees. Following recommendations are submitted. See my 080301 and Com7thFlt 120014.

- (A) On 15 August ComServFor7thFlt change title to ComServRon 7. ServRon 7 become unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com7thFlt to render service to all fleet units in PHILIPPINES.
- (B) Effective 15 August establish Commander U S Naval Forces AUSTRALIA NEW GUINEA to function under Com7thFlt until CINCSWPA relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time Comdr US Naval Forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA report to CINCPAC direct.
- (C) Effective 15 August pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron all naval shore facilities including Naval Air Bases in the PHILIPPINES and to ComNavFor AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA all US naval and naval air facilities in SWPA outside PHILIPPINES except MANUS.

- Continued -

3385

13 0751 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COM7THFLT, CINCAFPAC, COMPHILSEAFRON, ETC. (CONT'D)

- (D) Effective on or before establishment of NEW BRITISH command area transfer ADMIRALTY ISLANDS to the Pacific Ocean Areas.
- (E) Effective 15 August Com7thPhibFor with flagship and staff detached 7thFt report to ComPhibsPac. Other units now in 7thPhibFor pass to command of ComPhibsPac combatant units to be reallocated to meet current operational requirements and other units to form a subordinate command of AdComPhibsPac to render service to all PhibsPac units in the PHILIPPINES.
- (F) When new British command area is formed all British naval forces remaining in Pacific Theater pass to command of CINC BPF.
- (G) On 1 October Com7thFt pass to ComPhilSeaFron operational control of all units then under his command except those otherwise assigned by CINCPAC to meet OLYMPIC requirements. At this time Air7thFt change name to Air PhilSeaFron and pass to operational control ComPhilSeaFron.
- (H) On 1 October ComPhilSeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a fleet task force commander under the operational control of CINCSWPA in command of naval forces assigned by CINCPAC for duty within PHILIPPINE Sea Frontier. These forces to be sufficient to contain Japanese naval forces in SINGAPORE Area.

13 0851 CINCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM7THFLT, CG AFWESPAC, CG6THARMY, COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

CX 25216. Cite your 090907. Location of Naval Base north of YAMAGAWA KO instead of at TAKASU concurred in. Army plans no facilities in this area. This also answers your 0808022.

13 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO COMAIRFAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT CTF 38, DCNO.

Concur in principle with your 091314 except consider 1 February and 1 November 1946 to be more appropriate dates. To assist in planning the changeover in carrier air group complements the following recommendations are submitted:

- (A) Changeover to 36 VB CVLG's be made as soon as practicable. CVLG's for CVL-48 Class be 24 VF and 24 VBF.
- (B) No model distinction between VF and VBF and all single-seaters on any 1 carrier to be same model. VF and VBF in CVBG's and CVG's to be about half and half.
- (C) Increase VF(P) in CVG's from 2 to 4.
- (D) No change in night groups or units.
- (E) CVEG's and MCVG's 18 VBF and 12 VSB.
- (F) Standard and spotting Comprons 20 VF and 9 VSB as soon as practicable. ASW Comprons 12 VF and 15 VSB.

Strongly recommend careful analysis VF requirements contained in above comments before cutting back VF production.

13 1033 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV, CG CPBC.
RJ 65600.

Inasmuch as any downward revision of category of defense would release, for other use, Army personnel in limited numbers only, disproportionate to the resulting loss of efficiency and security, it is recommended that no change be made in the present modification of category of defense B. This answers your radios 191335 June TQPLSETO DKE 2359 July also.

13 1309 CINCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV. CG US ARMY STRAT AF (WASH) INFO WARCOS, CGFEAF, CG AAF 20, DEPCOM AAF 20, CX 25301.

In view of WARCOS 30889 of 12th, not to all, conference proposed for this headquarters 20 July in our CX 24785 for coordination of air operations is now suggested for 1 August in order that General Spaatz ComGen U.S. Army Strategic Air Force can be present. Action addressees please concur or comment with info to all.

13 1311 CINCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAAF, CX 25302.

Concur in your 120726 reference maintaining existing arrangements on operational control of FMAW and discussion of FMAW preparation for future operations at MANILA Conference.

131320 RUNNER TO COMSUBPAC (PASSED TO CINCPAC ADV FOR INFO).

RUNNER 3rd. More info area between 39-11 and 39-20. Made zig zag search up coast passing within 1 mile of 1 SAKE, 0 SAKI, SANGAN SHIMA and OHAKO SAKI. Also east west searches on Lat lines 39-10, 14 and 18. Tanker and escorts seen hugging beach. Anti submarine vessels traversed area freely. Gear working perfectly. Consider this survey shows definite absence of defensive minefields offshore this area. 10 days practice has made evaluation of contacts less difficult. Resurveyed vicinity of 36-37 140-50 today approaching from direction of shore. This revealed that the vicinity is definitely clear. Complete report on southern ARWESLQQQJNDW. WX 08001, 65775, 2 AUG 23 IVPP OKTRA 36-40N 141-20E.

09 1442 COMGEN AIR TO CG FEAF INFO CGAAFPAC (BOTH HQ), WAXX 29026.

Administration of Air Force units in HAWAIIAN AREA is subject. Do not think the creation of another numbered Air Force for this purpose is desirable at this time ReURad CX 23168 dated 4 July 1945. 1 possibility is by the 5th and 13th AF absorbing the combat units and service elements of the 7th AF and using the Hdqtrs 7th AF to administer the Army air units not in FEAF and proposed USASTAF in the HAWAIIAN AREA. This plan is now within the capabilities of the theater and appears to be the simplest solution. Your plans and comments desired.

10 0450 CG AAFFOA TO CG FEAF INFO CG AIR, 5058.

In furtherance of the proposal which I discussed with you and General MacArthur in MANILA regarding the establishment of a numbered air force in HAWAII I have dispatched a message to Gen Richardson with info copies to you and General Arnold (see my 101027 July). This message contained the proposal on which I intended to request Admiral Nimitz concurrence of July 11th and on which Gen. Richardson might comment. In view of the info contained in WAXX 29026, date time group 091442 July, addressed to you, I feel that I must now suspend any presentation of the numbered Air Force proposal to Admiral Nimitz. The 7th AF is now yours. General Arnold's message appears to concur in the basic idea of establishing a numbered Air Force in HAWAII. Difficulty arises only in the designation of a numbered Air Force Hdqtrs to do the job. I will be very much interested in receiving a copy of your reply to General Arnold.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

12 2019 WARCOS TO CINCPAC INFO CG USAFMIDPAC, DEPCOMAF20 (PASSED TO CINCPAC ADV).

ALSO PASSED BY COMINCH 131941

WARX 30889.

Conference proposes for 20 July in Manila, reference your CX 24152 and CX 24785, at which United States Strategic Air Force in Pacific should be represented, is subject.

Para. In view of the importance of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces to be established as in WARX 30438, ComGenAir is very desirous of having General Spaatz represent him personally at the conference in Manila.

Para. Since General Spaatz can not be present in Manila until 1 August would it materially interfere with your planning to postpone the conference from 20 July to 1 August.

12 2215 COMGENFEAF SCD KENNEY to COMGENAFAFPOA.

A 75933.

Reference your Top Secret message 5053 10th: Following is message sent General Arnold under date of 11th July:

"Reference your WX 29026 9th recommend administration of Air Force units in Hawaii by the 7th Fighter Wing now there, this wing slightly augmented is capable of handling the Army Air part of the defense for that Area. This augmentation can be taken from 1 of the fighter wings now set up on the redeployment schedule. 7th Air Force, augmented by redeployed units, plays an essential part in the plans for both OLYMPIC and CORONET. If this headquarters is abolished or detached it will be necessary to create another headquarters of similar size to handle the air units assigned to the successive areas and missions now set up for the 7th Air Force."

12 0014 COM7THFLEET to CINCPAC info ADCOMPHIBSPAC, CTF 72, CTF 76, CINCPAC ADV HQ, COMPHIBSPAC.

The following comments on CinCPac ADV 080301 are based upon certain assumptions which have not been discussed in the proposed reorganization of units now in the 7th Fleet. Prior to separation from SWPA provision should be made regarding the duties of Com7thFleet as CANF.

2. Provision should be made for control of naval bases in MANUS, NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIA and a command designated to be responsible for their roll up.

3. Provision should be made for the operational control of submarines SWPA. Subject to the above. Concur with A B C E F G and H. Also concur in principle with D except that date of transfer should be not before 1 September and preferable later. New subject. It is suggested that unnecessary reorganization can be avoided, with the last possibility of confusion during the critical period of mounting our forces for the OLYMPIC operation, if the transfer of naval shore facilities from control of ComServ 7th Fleet to Com PSF is delayed until after 1 October. Exact date to be determined later. On that date Com 7th Fleet reports to CinCPac for duties in OLYMPIC and CPSF will have control of naval shore facilities through ComSeron 7.

13 1941 WARCOS to CINCPAC info CGUSAFMIDPAC, DEPCOMAF 20. COMINCH PASSED TO CINCPAC ADV.

3388

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

13 2105 COM3RDFLT to CTF 37, CTF 38, COMBATRON 2, COMBATDIV 7 info COMINCH, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMSUBPAC, ALL FLAG OFFICERS 3RD FLT, CTF 93, COMFEAF, COM MARIANAS, COMFAIRWING 18, COMGEN 21ST BOMBOM.

This is annex A-1 to my Op-Plan 9-45. Movement and attack schedule subsequent to 21 July. See my 261227 June.

Para. Completion replenishment at 1600 21 July Task Force 38 proceed via direct route to point click to arrive 1200 23 July. Thence proceed to launching position vicinity lat. 31-30 Long 135-00 to arrive 0430 24 July. Conduct sustained strikes against combatant naval strength KURE, sweep MIHO, strike air and air installations KURE-KOBE area. At dusk commence diversion retirement toward OKINAWA then proceed to launching position vicinity lat. 32-00 Long 136-10 to arrive 0430 25 July. Make sustained strikes against naval combatant strength KURE-KOBE area, sweep MAIZURU, strike air and air installations KOBE-NAGOYA area. At dusk proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat 28-00 Long 138-00 to arrive 0700 26 July.

Para. Fuel and replenish until 1200 July when proceed to launching position vicinity Lat 33-00 Long 138-30 to arrive 0400 28 July strike air and air installations in TOKYO-NAGOYA area. At dusk retire to southward until time to arrive launching position vicinity Lat 33-30 Long 138-30 at 0400 30 July. Continue strikes as for 28 July.

P Para. Task Unit 34.8.1 be prepared bombard HAMAMATSU area of HONSHU at about 2300 28 July or about 1200 30 July as specifically directed later rejoining Task Force 38 on completion. Ammo allowance 30 rounds 8 and 16 inch HC per gun. CTF 38 provide night fighters or CAP for Task Unit 34.8.1 as required.

Para. Completion strikes 30 July Task Force 38 proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat. 28-00 Long 138-00 to arrive 1200 31 July.

Para. Comfuel 1200 1 August Task Force 38 proceed to launching position vicinity Lat. 31-40 133-30 to arrive 0430 2 August. Conduct sustained strikes against shipping SASEBO, sweep FUSAN shipping, strike air and air installations northern KYUSHU-KURE area. At dusk proceed via Lat. 27-55 Long 137-40 and Lat. 28-35 Long. 142-45 to fueling rendezvous Lat. 33-30 Long 147-00 to arrive 0500 5 August.

Para. Comfuel 5 August proceed via point CHARM to launching point vicinity point LIFE or via points CHARM and SCIENCE to launching point vicinity point GAZETTE as later directed accordance later instructions launch air strikes against air and air installations in TOKYO PLAINS area vicinity LIFE or against same targets north HONSHU-HOKKAIDO from vicinity GAZETTE commencing dawn 7 August. Retire east at dusk and return at dawn to continue strikes from same position on 8 August.

Para. Task Unit 34.8.2 be prepared bombard HONSHU or HOKKAIDO targets on 7 or 8 August as later directed. CTF 38 furnish CAP for Task Unit 34.8.2 as required.

Para. Task Force 37 be prepared operate in conjunction with Task Force 38 in accordance this schedule as practicable. Also be prepared for separate operations on north HONSHU-HOKKAIDO targets during this period. Movement and attack schedule for Task Force 37 by separate annex later.

Para. Present intention return Task Forces to bases upon completion of strikes 8 August.

Para. All of above schedule subject to change due to weather and tactical developments.

Para. All positions north and east and times I (-9).

3389

13 2145 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CG21BOMCOM, COMMARIANAS, CTG99.2, CG10, COMAIR IWO, COMFEAF, CTF93, CTF38, CTF37, ALL TGC TF 38.

Request you institute following coordination plan connection Annex A1 my OpPlan 9-45. My 132105. Throughout period concerned continuation maximum practicable effort of air forces against the Empire. Specifically request following: By OKINAWA Air. On 24 & 25 July maximum effort KYUSHU fields striking fields northern KYUSHU all possible. 28 July strike northern KYUSHU and sweep KURE area fields. Repeat on 30 July major concentration on KURE area. 1 August maximum effort northern KYUSHU fields. 2 August southern KYUSHU fields.

By Task Force 93: On 24 & 25 July maximum effort NAGOYA area airfields. 28 and 30 July maximum effort KOBE Area airfields. 1 August and 2 August maximum effort KOBE-NAGOYA airfields.

21 BomCom: Continuation basic strategic plan best request following exceptions if at variance with such plan. 24-25 July attack air facilities TOKYO PLAINS area. 1 or 2 August TOKYO-NAGOYA area air facilities.

In setting up coordination request strikes on the areas assigned to OKINAWA and IWO air be by groups staggered throughout the days in question to keep enemy air constantly occupied and thus reduce air retaliation potential.

Unforeseen delays may preclude adhering exactly to schedule in which case CINCPAC is requested if practicable to adjust coordination accordingly to accomplish the effect herein outlined.

14 0255 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC.

My planning staff have been giving considerable attention to compliance JCS WARX 17064 (142307 June). It would be extremely helpful if 1 or more of your planners could visit GUAM about 20 July for a brief conference concerning occupation plans and incidentally orient my planners connection your CORONET concepts as they now stand.

14 0256 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFOCOMINCH, CG USASTAF, DEPCOM USASTAF.

Your 131309. Delay until 1 August of conference concerning air coordination OLYMPIC first requested by your dispatch CX 24152 of 9 July is agreeable to me. Request information as to whether you now propose a conference on the staff level between planning representatives of CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC and COMGEN USASTAF or a conference between the Commanders themselves.

14 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC, DEPCOM20, CTF93 Info CGFEAF, CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT CTF 38, CTF 37.

132145. Will appreciate your cooperation in coordinated air strikes at places and times desired by Com3rdFlt 132145 insofar as practicable. ~~Request~~ Request you inform this Hq and info addressees of your intent and firm plans.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

14 2133 COMGENFMFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM 3RD FLEET, COM 5TH PHIBFOR, COMGEN SERVCMD FMFPAC, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS, COMGEN 4TH MARDIV.

Consider 1 MarDiv (reinf) less 1 inf regt as ground force required to accomplish your 110832. 4th MarDiv nominated. Earliest date to commence mounting from MAUI 15 September with target date pending on rehearsal requirements naval forces to be employed. Reinforcing units nominated and present location as follows: 5th and 10th Amtracs bns. MAUI. 1 Co 1st Armd Amph Bn. SAIPAN. 4th Amph Trk Co and 1 Prov Amph Trk Co. MAUI. 1 bomb disposal plat. GUAM. VMO-4. MAUI. 1st rocket det. MAUI. 1 Prov heavy mortar Co. MAUI. 43rd NCB. MAUI. This will require following substitutions be made for units now scheduled for employment with VAC. 4th and 9th Amtrac Bns at GUAM substituted for 5th and 10th Amtrac Bns. 1 NCB to be assigned to 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN to be substituted for 43rd NCB. Early approval desired above tentative troop list in order that changes indicated in unit assignments to VAC may be effected at earliest practicable date. Contemplated that no garrison forces are provided from above assault force.

15 0728 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEET info CTF 38.

Insure that CTF 38 Op-Order 2-45 modified to conform with objectives your 030515 and my 112335 to the end that enemy combatant vessels remaining TOKYO BAY are destroyed.

15 0720 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING.

It is not quite 2 months since our conference in MANILA at which we discussed the subjects covered by your CX 25423 DTG 140723 and as I thought arrived at understandings which, although they represented concessions on both sides, were to serve as the basis for our preparations for OLYMPIC in the limited time available. Pursuant to those understandings I have released to you all the major combat elements of the Army then under my control except the headquarters 10th Army, headquarters 24th Corps, the 7th and the 27th Infantry Divisions and various attached units all of which are still engaged in mopping up operations on OKINAWA but all of which are by agreement or by accepted plans available to you for OLYMPIC or CORONET as you desire.

Para. It is true that relatively few service troops have been released to you but that is because as was well known there existed in the Pacific Ocean Areas a shortage of Army Service Troops for Army purposes which has been partly but only partly alleviated by the use of naval personnel to fill Army deficiencies.

Para. My 080301 July asked your comment or concurrence on matters which pertained to the internal organization of the 7th Fleet and specially left under your operational control the naval forces assigned to your area. Similar reorganizations have been made within the Army forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas without reference to me.

Para. I will be glad to confer with you again in connection with these problems at any time that you can arrange to be my guest at Guam for that purpose. Current operations will require my presence here for a considerable period.

3391

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

12 1145 CGUSFCT to WARCOS info CGREUSFCT, CGSOSCT, CGUSFIET, CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC,
COMGENAFAFPOA.

FBX 717.

1. Utilization of FORT BAYARD is subject. Reference Urad WARX 22283, WARX 25857 and WARX 2772 (last 2 radios were not sent to all and are not required to understand this radio). China theater has completed the study of materiel and personnel resources required by CHINA theater for this project and available to CHINA theater and INDIA BURMA theater.
2. The results of this study are as follows: A. FORT BAYARD will be used by CHINA theater as an auxiliary temporary supply base with an air and auxiliary ground line of communication forward to support CARBONADO modified. Target date for 2nd report area is 15 August 1945. B. The capacity of the port area is to be 5 liberty ships or their equivalent per month. C. Type cargo delivered forward initially will be primarily drummed oil. D. Personnel requirements in FORT BAYARD area estimated as 4300 of which CHINA theater can supply 506, INDIA BURMA theater can supply the equivalent of 3147. The shortage is 647 made up of 1 military police company to and E 15-37 less 1 traffic platoon, strength 124; Quartermaster petroleum supply company to and E 10-377 less 1 operating platoon, strength 108; Ordnance man company to and E 9-127, strength 116; 1 Quartermaster based depot company to and E 10-367, strength 76 and 1 port company to and E 50-177, and 1 Headquarters and Headquarters detachment port battalion to and E 55-116. CHINA theater is prepared to accept the cost of transporting personnel plus certain equipment from INDIA BURMA theater to CHINA theater and to improvise initially to cover the above shortages. However, CHINA theater must request that the most expeditious action be taken to meet the 647 shortage listed above. E. The material loading on the 1st 5 ships is satisfactory to CHINA theater as specified in WARX 25506 with the addition of T/E equipment for 1 port company and 30 days B rations for 5,000 men. The loading schedule for the follow up shipping will be forwarded to you as soon as possible. In general it will cover maintenance requirements of U.S. forces in port area including AV Gas for transports and fighter squadrons and cargo to be forwarded which we will now examine in closer detail. F. The initial destination of the 1st 5 ships should be determined by CINCAFPAC CHINA theater recommends MANILA.
3. At this time WEICHOW TAO is a questionable venture and will require diversion from FORT BAYARD. The information of this area and FORT BAYARD REQUESTED has been forwarded by separate radio.
4. Concur that LUZON air route appears inadvisable at this time if facilities now allocated to CHINA theater must be used. A detailed study of this will be continued here. CHINA theater has just seen WARX 29972 answers required will be sent later.

16 0141 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENAIR info COMGENUSASTF,
CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Cincpac concurs in Richardson's RJ 65765 DTG 150946.

16 0247 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CG 6TH ARMY, COM5THPHIB, COMSERVPAC.

CX 25864

Refers to your 090610 not to all. Your assumption that functions performed by naval garrison beach parties will be performed by similar

- continued -

3392

CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CG 6TH ARMY, COM5THPHIB, COMSERVPAC (Cont'd)

Army units for KOSHIKI RETTO, southeast KYUSHU and east KYUSHU landings is not correct. In addition to 4 naval garrison beach parties desired by 5th amphibious Corps, 6th Army desires 1 each naval garrison beach party for operational attachment to each of 8 engineer shore battalions scheduled for employment. Further desire 3 battalion headquarters attached to Supervise these beach parties.

16 0727 COMGEN USASTAF to CINCAFPAC info COMGEN AFMIDPAC, CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMGEN AIR, COMGEN USASTF ADMIN.

0261 look at CINCPAC ADV 120814 GCT July. Requirement given below is based on following assumptions: A. This headquarters responsible all USASTF construction in MARIANAS and RYUKYUS; B. withdrawal of all construction assistance on USASTF airfields such as naval construction battalions; C. Withdrawal of all USASTAF units from construction other than VLR and allied functions; D. USASTAF can obtain support from a theater for engineer units other than those supplied by Army Air Forces, ie, spare parts companies, heavy shop companies, dump trucks companies and ordnance medium maintenance companies. E. The following engineer aviation troops now in this theater or committed clan 4 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 34 battalions, 2 depot companies, 4 maintenance companies, 3 topographical companies, 1 air force Hq company and 3 utilities companies will be retained by USASTAF as long as required. F. Maintenance will be performed in areas to rear of MARIANAS by undesignated air force. 5 utilities companies and 1 separate company now assigned in such areas. Presuming above assumptions correct, USASTAF will require 1 engineer command, aviation, 6 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 36 battalions, 2 Depot companies, 6 Maintenance companies, 3 topographical companies, 1 air force Hq company, 1 topographical battalion and 3 utilities companies in addition to units referred to in D above from a theater. This creates a shortage of 1 engineer command aviation, 2 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 2 maintenance companies, and 1 topographicak battalion between units required and units on hand or committed USASTAF. It is understood if the strategic situation remains stabilized as far as VLR requirements are concerned that as construction is completed a progressive release of aviation engineer units will be made to a number required for maintenance purposes only.

16 0249 CINCAFPAC to COMGENFEAF info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, DEPCOMAF 20, COM3RDFLEET, CTF 93, CTF 38, CTF 37.

CX 25865

In support of operations 3rd Fleet as outlined in his Annex 1A operations Plan 9-45 (3rd Fleet Radio 132105 with info FEAF) desire comGenFEAF in coordination with other RYUKYUS based air forces support operations to the maximum extent practicable with strikes in the KYUSHU-KURE area on schedule as indicated in Commander 3RD Fleets 132145 (info to FEAF). Schedule of strikes to be flexible and to be adjusted to conform to any change in plans of Commander 3rd Fleet due to unforeseen delays. Desire you submit earliest your scheduled plan for support including estimated striking force and targets with information to adees in CINCPOA ADV 140901.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

16 0830 COMGENAF 20 TO USASTAF GUAM info CINCPAC ADV, COM3RDFLEET, COMGENAIR.

AIDCO 1304.

Subject operations in coordination 3rd Fleet. Comments on Com3rdFleets 132145Z (GCT) follows as requested by your 150045Z. Presume air facilities means airdrome installations. Attack against such installations at variance with basic strategic plan. Many VLR primary targets principally aircraft production installations are located TOKYO-NAGOYA area. Intentions are to strike our primary targets during the period 24 July - 2 August when weather forecast indicates reasonable chance visual bombing. Otherwise incendiary destruction of urban industrial areas will be continued.

16 2013 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CTF 38.

Your 150728 acknowledged. CTF 38 will comply.

17 0523 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH.

Having in mind the desirability of continued supervision of development of OKINAWA by ComGenTEN for our mutual advantage and of having at OKINAWA during the OLYMPIC assault and army officer of STILLWELLS standing and in view also of your CORONET plans for the 10th Army and use of divisions as OLYMPIC reserves I request your comment or concurrence on the following proposals in connection with the release to you of the army units concerned.

- A The Headquarters 10th Army to report to you now for CORONET planning and to be released from my operational control about 1 December.
- B The Headquarters 24th Corps to be released to you now.
- C The 7th and 27th Divisions to be released to you about 1 October.

17 0717 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV info WARCOS, CG USASTAF, DEPCOM USASTAF.

CX 26167

Your 140256Z, August 1 conference coordination of Air. Staff conference was intended, however Army Air Forces wish ComUSASTAF to attend. No objection attendance commanders. Final decisions will of course remain with CINCPAC, CINCAFPAC and COMUSASTAF.

17 1725 COMFEAF to CG ADVON FEAF info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMSTRATAIR, COM3RDFLEET, CTF 38, CTF 37.

AX 77476

CINCAFPAC CX 25865 orders that Far East Air Forces, in support of Com3rdFleet operations outlined in his radio 132105 and in coordination with other RYUKYUS based air forces, conduct air attacks to maximum extent practicable in the KYUSHU-KURE area. Schedule of these air attacks will be as outlined in Com3rdFleet 132145 and will be flexible to conform to any change in plans of Com3rdFleet due to unforeseen delays.

Para. Advon FEAF missions currently ordered comply with this directive. Advon FEAF will announce his air intent daily with information to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC ADV, COMSTRATAIR, COM3RDFLEET, CTF 38 and CTF 37.

Para. CINCPAC ADV is requested herewith to direct that radios containing information on fleet operations plans and fleet movements include CG ADVON FEAF as info adee. Copies of references above being forwarded CG ADVON FEAF by special safehand courier July 18.

3394

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

18 0651 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC info 5THAIRFORCE, FEAF, COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMSERV7THFLT, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMGENAIRFMPAC, COMGEN1STMAW, COMGEN2NDMARATWING.

Following Marine Air Units will comprise the 1st Marine Air Wing for OLYMPIC. Wing Hedron-1, Wing Seron - 1, Marine Air Groups 12, 14, 33, 61 as presently organized. Marine Air Group 32 consisting of Hedron 32, Seron 32, VMSB-244, VMSB-343, VMTB-134. Marine Air Group-24 consisting of Hedron-24, Seron-24, VMF(N)-541, VMF(N)-533. Hedron-62 with air Warning Squadrons, 3,4,9,12 and GCI units 1 through 5 inclusive attached. AWS 3 and AWS 4 are light weight units. VMD-254. Colonel Roberts USMC on staff ComGenAirFMPac arrives MANILA on 19th with detailed logistic information.

18 0703 CINCPAC ADV to COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC info COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERV7THFLEET, COMSERVRON 10.

CINCAFPAC 162111. Paragraph 8 reads "petroleum logistics required by 7th Attack Force afloat that assemble in the MANILA area for the OLYMPIC operation will be provided by ComServ7thFleet and will be slated by CINCPAC."

Para. CominCh 112135 not to all confirms decision to reorganize service force 7th Fleet and establish servron 7. It appears to CINCPAC that ServRon 7's responsibilities with respect to petroleum logistics in the MANILA area will be identical insofar as 3rd and 7th attack force are concerned. See also my 130751 not to all.

Para. Request your joint recommendations as to changes in CINCAFPAC's 162111 necessary in light of COMINCH 112135 and my 130751 which Com7th-Flt furnish to ComPhibsPac.

18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC info ACWAR, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Victory 65 BG 142. The provision of a harbor of refuge for the protection of Lighterage and small craft constructed of block ships which would satisfy your primary concern as outlined in CX-24937 is within our means and can be provided on time.

Para. Expansion of the project to include Caissons for the protection of ocean-going vessels requires overriding priority over other major war programs with possibility that this might interfere with other programs more essential to the success of the operation.

Para. Navy Department has advised that its towing facilities are being augmented by 10 ATA's and 45 Liberty ship towing installations. Therefore believe towing of steel caissons and block ships can be undertaken without serious detriment to CINCAFPAC'S and CINCPAC'S towing programs from west and gulf coasts to forward areas. Navy Department will select towing units with regard to suitability for ready ships which latter may be largely non self propelled.

Para. Navy Department states that given priority caissons can be constructed and delivered to theater on time. Ability to assemble at site must be considered.

Para. In view of the impact on other programs and requirements and the necessity of having reasonably firm assurance that if the caissons are constructed they will be used CINCAFPAC'S recommendation is requested

18 1200 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info AGWAR, NAVY DEPART. (Cont'd)

as a matter of urgency as to whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide only a harbor of refuge for small craft constructed wholly of block ships or whether they shall proceed with the construction and delivery of the artificial harbor as defined in CINCPAC'S CX-24937 which includes the provision of Caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping, on the understanding that addressees are willing to accept possible impact on towing and other programs. Further request CINCPAC'S comments on naval phases of project both towing and siting.

18 2252 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC info COMPHIBSPAC, COM5THFLEET, CINCPAC PEARL.

In the ICEBERG operation unexpected delays occurred in the early establishment of adequate air warning facilities in the outlying positions which necessitated reliance for air warning on vulnerable surface craft with resultant loss in men and ships. It is of mutual and paramount importance that air warning units that are to go into outlying positions for OLYMPIC be so loaded and echeloned that their efficient functioning is assured at the earliest possible time at the outset of the operation to give the maximum protection to the amphibious effort. Information as to your plans for the early activation of air warning units on outlying positions will be appreciated.

19 0455 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CG 6TH ARMY, CG FEAF, COMPHIBSPAC.

CX 26663.

Objective area designated in para 3x(4) AFPAC operations instructions number 1 dated 20 June is subject. AFPAC, FEAF and COMPHIBSPAC are in agreement in changing delineation of objective area to that area south of 32-30N which is enclosed by arc of circle having radius of 120 nautical miles with center at SAKA MISAKI (31-00 N 130-40 E). Purpose to allow more water area for forces of COMPHIBSPAC. Request comments or concurrence.

19 0513 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 94, CTG 30.8, CTG 32.1 info COM3RDFLEET, CTF 32, CTU 30.9.15, CTU 32.1.2, COMCORTDIV 70, COSS (DE 444), COMSERVDIV 10, SALAMAU (CVE 96), ULVERT M. MOORE (DE 442), K.C. CAMPBELL (DE 443), WM. SEIVERLING (DE 441).

Info ships hereby detached 3rd Fleet and assigned to CTF 94 for temporary operational control for employment as ASW Task Group.

Para. CTG 32.1 detach SALAMAU, CTG 30.8 DETACH DE'S and sail to rendezvous as directed by CTF 94.

19 0647 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC info COMGENFOA, CINCPAC PEARL.

CINCPAC coast artillery unit requirements are now 1 Bn at PELELIU and 1 Grp Hq and 3 Bns at OKINAWA. All other coast artillery units COMGENFOA Dispatch 160213 are available now for release to you. Advise disposition desired. Upon departure these units present stations operational control passes to you.

Para. By 1 August the coast artillery units at OKINAWA will pass to your operational control therefore no action will be taken by CINCPAC on request for conversion of 1 CA Bn at OKINAWA to FA contained COMGENFOA 160213.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

19 0611 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, CINCPAC, info COMPHIBSPAC, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY.

CX 26685.

Armored divisions for employment in CORONET will not be available for dispatch from the United States until November or December. If staged through PHILIPPINES, arriving in December or January, respectively, only very limited period can be allowed for shakedown and mounting out on or about 20 January. War Department has agreed to shipment direct to objective area in sea-trains or other means provided armored divisions can be handled at destination as required (W 16507, 13 June).

Para. The following reinforcing units should accompany armored divisions in assault shipping; 2 battalions 155 Gun (SP), 2 engineer combat battalions, 2 Treadway Bridge companies, 2 Ordnance Bn companies (Tank), 2 Ordnance Ammunition companies, 2 Quartermaster Gas Supply companies, 2 Quartermaster truck companies (Aug), 1 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile), 1 Quartermaster Truck company, petroleum (Equipped under Column 2 B). L Corps headquarters should be alerted to accompany this shipment in the event that a definite requirement is established therefor.

Para. Preliminary investigation here indicates feasibility of releasing from OLYMPIC 90 LST PARV at XRAY plus 35 and 12 APA, and 6 AKA at XRAY plus 50 for dispatch to west coast to lift 2 armored divisions, reinforced, direct to CORONET objective area to arrive not later than Y Plus 5.

Para. Request CINCPAC concurrence in utilization of assault shipping as proposed herein with information copy direct to War Department.

Para. Request War Department confirmation of availability of units listed above and approval of assault loading and proposed movement of 2 armored divisions, reinforced, as indicated, from west coast direct to objective area.

Para. Movement of these units by amphibious lift as priority would:

A Insure ample time for preparation prior to entry into combat.

B Relieve congestion in staging area and ports, and

C Effect appreciable reduction in Back-Log of shipping.

Para. Early reply appreciated.

19 1117 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS.

CX 26793.

No further action being taken, reference your 170523 (GCT) relative to tactical units on OKINAWA, in view of recent directive of the Joint Chief of Staff.

19 1423 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CINCPAC ADVANCE, info BPNL PEARL, BPNL CINCPAC.

CX 26866.

This replies to radio Joint Chiefs of Staff 181200. The recommended artificial harbor will be used for the operation as planned and the possible impact of its provision on towing and other programs has been fully considered and is accepted. It is recommended that Joint Chief of Staff authorize construction and delivery artificial harbor as defined in CX 24937 which includes caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping.

124

CX 26648.

[illegible]

A. Philippines 12 LSTS 10 LSM and Transfon 16 now being employed on continuous bases. Approved by your 190122 of May and 220815 of June.

B. An additional Transdiv is required in PHILIPPINE area for period of 1 month commencing 25 July for training additional NOTS not included in original tentative training schedule. Requested by CINCPAC. Action not known.

D. GUAM 3RD MARITIME TransDiv 37, 10 LST, 10 LSM available 21 August.
Approved by your 280724.

E. SAIPAN 2ND MARDIV 4 APAs including a division flagship of Transcon
12, 10 LST and 10 LSM available 8 September. Requested by Com5thFib
140021.

F. OAHU 5TH MANDIV 4 APAS including a division flagship of Transition St, 6 LST and 12 LSM available 26 August. Requested by Comphib 14021.

G. CANV 96TH DIVISION CenterStation 22 in WESTMORELAND, KANSAS. BOTTENBAU, BOWIE, KINGSBURY, ALABANCE, SAPPHO. 10 LST and 10 LSN available 1 August. Approved by your 092316.

It is my intent to tighten blockade and keep pressure on the enemy by throwing light force sweeps against EMPIRE coast and outlying islands at every opportunity. Objectives denial of coastal sea lanes to enemy destruction shipping and bombardment of shore targets. These raids will usually be ordered suddenly.

Para. Keep currently familiar with locations within operational range with emphasis on enemy coastal shipping refuges. Heavy mine fields. And coastal targets such as harbor facilities, railroad bridges, yards and tunnels. Radar and radio stations, shore batteries, factories, towns.

TOP SECRET
JULY (007)

20 1819 COMUSMACV AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMUSMACV.

Your 130751. Items A B C E G and H are approved. Item D is under consideration. Item F and future of CHAF are under advisement and dependent on action by JCS on proposal to reorganize SWPAC area. Make nomination to me for Rear Admiral to command U. S. Naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA. What are your plans for Task Force 71.

19 1119 CINCPAC to WARCOS, (FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF), CINCPAC ADV HQ.

CX 26794.

Will be glad to welcome British Corps Commander and accompanying officers. Suggest their arrival earliest date and if practicable by 1 August. Reference Joint Chiefs of Staff V 66 BG 145, 18th. CINCPAC requested to comment or concur directly to Joint Chiefs of Staff, information to CINCPAC.

19 2327 CINCPAC ADV to COMUSMACV info CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

I concur in CINCPAC 191119 to WARCOS concerning arrival British Corps Commander and accompanying officers.

20 0710 COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info WARCOS, COMUSMACV 10, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACV.

CFEX 1169.

Agree that meeting between representatives from Headquarters CHINA THEATER, Headquarters CINCPAC and Headquarters CINCPAC at GUAM as suggested in radio 140304 is highly desirable.

Para. A study and assessment of resources and requirements of CHINA THEATER is being made now. This study will be completed about the end of July. If you agree it is recommended that conference be held on or about 31 July. Composition of CHINA THEATER party will be furnished later. Present plans are to leave on or about 30 July. Suggest that CHINA THEATER officers return via MANILA to insure coordination of operations.

Para. Captain Painter has arrived and is providing very valuable assistance in both our future and operational planning.

Para. For MacArthur's request clearance for 1 C 54 aircraft through your area on or about 31 July. If you feel that a meeting between CHINA THEATER officers returning from GUAM and your people would be beneficial they will return via MANILA for a brief conference.

20 1100 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to AGWAR (ACTION) PASS TO NAVY FOR ACTION info CINCPAC FOR MACARTHUR, CINCPAC FOR MACARTHUR, VICTORY 12 13 14.

Construction and provision of an artificial harbor to meet the strategic requirements set forth in CINCPAC CX 24937 of 12 July is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The construction and establishment of this artificial harbor is charged to the Navy. The Navy will proceed with this project with priority above all Military and Naval progress except manhattan project and will be assisted by appropriate agencies of the War Department as necessary. Appropriate action by the Joint Logistical Committee and Joint Military Transportation committee is directed.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

20 1108 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC FOR MACARTHUR info CINCPAC FOR HENRY
AGWAR, NAVY, NAVY DEPARTMENT VIA AGWAR VICTORY 129 21 195.

With regard to your C 26799, directed in Victory 73 pertained only to the STUKIUS. This does not preclude the transfer of responsibilities pertaining to USSTAF units elsewhere in the Pacific by mutual agreement as provided in WAR 62773 of 3 April.

20 2208 WARCOS to CINCPAC, COMEN USCT info CINCPAC ADV HQ.

WARX 35530.

For operation and maintenance of LCM's for PORT BAYARD PROJECT CINCPAC is requested to (see Navy Rad 192133) arrange landing and onward shipping of personnel with equipment to destination. Possible use of naval escort craft for this should be examined. For information 4th and 5th ships depart NEW ORLEANS POB 16th and 21st July respectively.

Para. New subject. CHINA THEATER should arrange to furnish tanks fuel and necessary logistic support to these navy personnel on arrival. Believe it proper that navy personnel used in port operations not be charged against existing navy troop ceiling.

Para. New subject. To facilitate detailed arrangements for these operations, it appears desirable for CHINA HQ to establish liaison in CINCPAC headquarters. CHINA'S CFBX 669 July 12 refers. WD has not received info copies of inter theater cables (CFBX 669) which announce decisions reference split of responsibilities for the operation. It is requested that War be included as info addressee on all inter theater cables reference decisions for implementation of this operation.

21 0229 CINCPAC ADV to COMAIRPAC SUBCOMINT info COMAIRPAC, COMINTFLEET, CVF 32.

From Sept 20 to Oct 10 3 U.S. Groups containing 9 CV, 5 CVL, 5 BB, 19 Cruisers will base ENIWETOK. 2 U. S. Groups containing 6 CV, 2 CVL, 4 BB 12 Cruisers will base LEYTE. After October 10 for indefinite period proportions will be approximately reversed. In addition 5 British CV and 3 CVL will base ENIWETOK.

Para. These estimates are for planning purposes only. They may change radically at any time before or during forthcoming operations. Composition of Groups as to identity of specific ships can not be provided at this time.

21 0645 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSUBPAC info ADCOMCINPAC, COMCINPAC, COMTHIRSPAC,
COMINTFLEET, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, JICPOA.

Plans for minefield investigation proposed in your LMAA5 are approved subject to following qualification of last sentence. Mine detection subs will in emergency be considered available for offensive missions, air sea rescue duties or reconnaissance if necessity arises. ComPac arrange direct with ComSubPac for conference if desired.

21 1808 COMCINPAC ADV HQ to COMINTFLEET info CINCPAC.

My 130751 COMINCH 201219. Request implementation items approved obtaining concurrence of CINCPAC where appropriate.

Para. Request your comment on future submarine requirements SUPA.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~July (GWR)~~

20 2209 WARCOS to AFPAC info MIDPAC, CINCPAC - CG AFMIDPAC PASSED TO CINCPAC BOTH Hqs

WARX 35531.

Repeated to all addressees. Reference 26665 of 19 July 1945. It is suggested here to place Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillen who now commands the 19th Corps Headquarters in charge of this force upon completion of the scheduled amphibious training of the units you have indicated you desire. This is proposed in order to carry out what is considered are your desires. It is assumed that other reinforcing units for this corps headquarters will be furnished there by you if you intend to use this corps in the role of an Armored Corps. Gillen's Corps is an infantry corps but he happens to be 1 of our best Armored Commanders also. Furnishing reinforcing units requires minor changes to present redeployment schedule in order to meet target date as follows:

- A. 1 field artillery battalion (155 Millimeter Gun) (self propelled) will be indirectly redeployed instead of directly redeployed in 9th month.
- B. 2 Engineer combat battalions will be indirectly redeployed instead of directly redeployed in 10th month.
- C. Indirect shipment remainder reinforcing units will be delayed in order to marry up with this force.

Para. Upon receipt CINCPAC concurrence concerning assault shipping and your comment or concurrence to the above proposal, the necessary implementation here will be accomplished. An early reply would be helpful.

21 2250 COMUSASTAF to CINCPAC ADV HQ info WARCOS, COMNAIR, CINCPAC FEAF, COMAF 20, CTF 58, COM3rdFLT, CTF 37, COM3rdFLEET, COMNAVJAG, COMJAG, COMJAG 1.

0549

Request USASTAF message no 0313 dated 171643 OOT sent to your headquarters be withdrawn and destroyed and the following substitute therefore: All fighters assigned to USASTAF will be withdrawn from their primary mission of escort and given the mission of counter air force operations of destroying the Japanese air force both in the air and on the ground, attacking airfields and airfield installations, on the dates and at the places requested by Com3rdFleet during the execution OpPlan 9-45. The WLR forces will be employed against major air targets such as aircraft engine plants, propeller plants, and other major industrial areas in the general area and on the same dates requested by Com3rdFleet. Your headquarters will be currently informed as to the names of the places and dates of attack.

220731 COMNAIR to CINCPAC info CINCPAC ADV, CTF 95, COMNAVJAG, COMJAG, COMJAG 1, CTF 32.

AX 77920

Reference is used CX 25196 which directed FEAF to conduct strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets, to assist TF 95. Also reference CINCPAC ADV 110153, 110146 and 112336 and CTF 95 radio 120222. 19 July 45 this had received info copy of CTF 95 radio 122218/Z which first info that CTF 95 sweep intent for 18 July was not conducted as scheduled. Assistance requested in CINCPAC ADV 112336 and directed by used CX 25196 was conducted as outlined in Myrad AX 77215 to provide direct assistance for TF 95 sweep scheduled daylight 18 July. Current operational plans, including assistance for 3rd Fleet (See my rad AX 77476, 17 July) precludes furnishing any further direct assistance in general target area for TF 95 (This is RIFODE; cancel and file 211050 CR 269 and cancel 211827 CR 59)

22

VICTORY 135.

~~22 0410 GINCPAC ADV to COMSTHULET, COMHULESPAC, COMSERVPAC 1-6 COMSTHULON 10.~~

22 0719 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC InCo COMINCH. COMBODIENT. COMBODIENT.

Para. It is requested that the Commanding General Allied Air Forces SWPA be directed to refrain from issuing orders which directly or by implication attempt to control the operations of the United States Pacific Fleet or to make area assignments within the Pacific Ocean Area.

Refer paragraph 8 CINCPAC 162111 and my 200709. CINCPAC approves procedure COMSERVFOR 7TH FLEET (SERVFOR 7) provide petroleum logistics for OLYMPIC amphibious forces assembling in the MANILA AREA. These requirements to be slated by CINCPAC. In addition SERVFOR 7 should similarly provide for all other naval forces in the MANILA AREA. Accordingly request deletion of "7th attack Force AFLEAT" and substitution "Pacific Fleet Units."

Mydis 090901 modified as follows:

3492

- continued -

1. The site presently selected for the NOB is at TARA-MISAKI in KAGOSHIMA BAY.
2. The site presently selected for the Naval Air Base is at MINATO.
3. Insert as paragraph (G): The naval hospitals and naval ammunition Depot will be under the Commandant NOB.

Concur your 220715. (Ref: 3rd Fleet Coordination.)

My OpPlan 4-45 will be modified as follows:

- (1) Add to Task organization: (N) (TF 95) V.Adm. Oldendorf. With forces assigned.
- (2) Change Tasks of 3rd Fleet to read: Attack Japanese naval and air forces; shipping, shipyards, and coastal objectives. Protect sea and air communications along the central Pacific axis.
- (3) Modify SubPara 3(N) to read: Maintain control of the EAST CHINA SEA and its western approaches. Interdict to limit of capabilities the movement of hostile naval forces and shipping in the YELLOW SEA, TSUSHIMA STRAITS and the southern part of the SEA OF JAPAN. Protect friendly shipping. Cover and defend our positions in the RYUKYUS. Provide air-sea rescue services. Support operations of other forces. Conduct minesweeping as directed by CINCPAC.
- (4) Add to SubPara 3(X)6: CTF 95 area of military responsibility is that part of the combat area west of the 135th meridian except that the 3rd Fleet will enter therein in execution of its assigned tasks upon giving prior notification to forces concerned.
- (5) Add new SubPara 3(X)8: For purposes of coordination direct communications between CTF 95 or his subordinate commanders and the commanders of other forces is authorized as at present.
- (6) This dispatch is effective 250200 at which time my dispatch 110146 is cancelled.

Effective 250200 UCT forces assigned to operational control Com3rdFlt will comprise those units now assigned to TF-37, TF-38, TG-30.6, TG-30.8, TG-30.9 less TU-30.9. Forces assigned to operational control CTF 95 (V Adm Oldendorf) will comprise those units now assigned to TF-32, TF-39 TF-95, TG-99.1, TG 30.5, TU 30.9.4 plus such other combatant ships now

PINK

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

- continued -

22 1150 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLEET, COMBATRON 1, CTF 95, CTF 39, CTG 99.1, CTG 30.5, CTG 30.9 info COMINCH, CTF 99, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMWESCARFOR, CINCAFPAC, COMGENFEAF, COMGENFEAF ADVON, COMSERVRON 10. (Cont'd)

in LEYTE which were formerly assigned to Com3rdFlt and which are not included in the forces listed.

Para. For the information of both commanders the KASAAN BAY and SALAMAMU ASW groups are assigned to CTF 94.

Para. Rotation of CVE to TG-30.8 or to TU-32.1.2 may be arranged directly by CTG-32.1.

Para. This reassignment does not affect assignments to Com3rdFlt contained in my 220259 and 220612. Assignment of additional ships or transfers between 3rd Fleet and TF 95 will be controlled by CINCPAC. Com3rdFlt make recommendations when and as necessary.

22 1915 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, CINCAFPAC, CG AAF, COFS ARMY.

Refer WARY 33621 to COMGEN FEAF held by 20 AF GUAM and OAHU. For JAVAMAN project in support of OLYMPIC COMGEN AAF has requested assistance from Navy. It is indicated that your approval will be sought on basis project will be under command FEAF and CINCAFPAC and be self supporting at BUNKHOUSE and all support operated by OSS personnel to be shipped via MANILA. If you approve operation it appears wasteful to ship special facilities for single operation if available at BUNKHOUSE for temporary use. This applies particularly to LCM, automotive equipment, shops and housing.

Para. Operation is set out in separate message. Facilities requested are 1 LCM(3) and following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3, 1 D-12, 1 E-11, 1 G-8, 1 F12A.

Para. Extensive work on boats required in secluded place for security reasons. Advise whether you can provide all or part of facilities on temporary basis.

22 1921 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, CG AAF, COFS ARMY.

Project my 221915 is to destroy SHIMONOSEKI TUNNELS with 6 drone 85 foot aircraft rescue boats and involves installing JAP SEA truck and lugger disguise which is prefabricated ready to ship. OSS expects to request ISCOM to assign midget Sub-Base on MOTOBU PENINSULA. If Jap Marine railway at base can be used, estimated installation time with facilities requested in 1 week per boat. 6 Spare boats and disguise kits being provided.

23 0903 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMIN PAC info COMPHIBSPAC, COM3RDFLEET, COMBATRON 1, ADCOMINPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Upon completion sweeping area JUNEAU continue minesweeping operations in EAST CHINA SEA using those minesweepers which have arrived most recently in combat area. By use of rotational plan of overhaul and rehabilitation it is expected that sweeping will continue indefinitely. Minefield north of area JUNEAU and field in vicinity of SHANGHAI-CHOSEN are desired swept as early as practicable and prior to OLYMPIC. Your 220837 refers.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

24 0317 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ. COMGEN 10. COMDT MOB OKINAWA. COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Memorandum for record dated 23 July signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman approved by CINCPAC. On receipt CINCPAC concurrence I will direct ComGen 10 with U S Army Forces in the KYUKYUS report to CINCPAC effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July which was earliest date acceptable to your representative and other Army conferees.

23 1321 COMCHINA to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC. COMUSMACV. COMNAV. COMNAV 10. COMSOSCHINA. COMNAV CCC CHINA. COMNAVACT. WARCOS

TOP SECRET. CFBX 1480

Due to staff conference at Manila 1 August conference at GUAM has been postponed until after 4 August. Message GUAM 202351Z (GCT) refers. Presently plan to leave CHUNGKING 4 August will arrive GUAM late 5 August or early 6 August. Party expected to number about 15 officers and men (including General Simpsons party) Request information as to whether this will be satisfactory. Names of persons composing party will be forwarded later. New Subject: (For WARCOS) Eminently satisfactory is Colonel L. J. Lincoln's presence at this conference He can return with CHINA Theater party.

23 2105 CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ

TOP SECRET. Mapping and photography of JAPAN JCS 756/2 revised by JIC 153/12 is subject your 181208 of May. JIC 153/20 has been approved and is being forwarded you by air mail. Recommendations of OAHU mapping conference 25-29 May were approved and reassignment of responsibilities for mapping photography of Japanese areas to CINCPAC and CINCPAC mutually with assistance of USASTAF are to be accomplished in accordance with conference agreements.

24 01 40 COMPHIBSPAC to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC/POA ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. In preparation for OLYMPIC it is considered most important that ships assemble early for indoctrination and training. The large numbers involved and the complex organization plus fact that present duties of PhibPac does not permit tactical training require this receive special attention. It is recommended that main elements of the advance and amphibious forces my serial 000279 of 18 July assemble by 10 September as follows: At LEYTE 5th Air Force and Covering Force, Escort Carrier Force, Western Attack Force, South Attack Force, 3rd Attack Force. At MANILA 7th Attack Force. In MARIANAS and HAWAII 5th Attack Force. At LEYTE and in HAWAII Reserve Force.

Para. Assembly date of 10 September is approximately 10 days in advance of dates set forth in Joint Staff Study. Submit that complexities of training, loading, rehearsals, movements to loading, rehearsal, and objective areas, to gather with necessary upkeep and logistics require a longer period than at present allowed. If you concur in proposed plan request you submit to CINCPAC for approval.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

24 0636 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMLUNCH

TOP SECRET. Request by air mail copy JCS 659/3 of 24 March 1944 and by dispatch information as to any JCS decision which places on area commander responsibility over and authority to coordinate sea air rescue within his area.

24 0844 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM3DFLT, COM7THFLT, COMAIRPAC, COM5THFLT, COMPHIBPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMCOMINTOPAC info COMLUNCH & CMO, MANOSES, CINCPAC, COMNAVFOR, CTF 95, CTF 99, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGENTPAC, COM3DDEFLT, COMCOMINTOPAC, COMNAVFOR, COM7THFLT, COMGENAIR FOR MID PAC, COMCOMINTOPAC, COMSERVPAC

TOP SECRET. Para (B) bydis 090001 modified to extend that the CUB at MANOSE RIVE (or such other place on the West Coast as may be selected) will remain in support of V Phib Corps as long as needed by the Corps. On or before withdrawal of the V Phib Corps from KYUSHU this CUB will pass to control of Commandant NOB.

24 1349 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBPAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COMSERON 10, COMSERV7THFLT

CX 28065 TOP SECRET. Concur in change outlined your 220742Z (GCT) July in reply to our 162111. Servon 7 will provide for all naval forces that assemble in the MANILA area. Request Servon 7 be advised of substation additional requirements for inclusion in AFPAC slates.

24 0325 COMBATRON-1 to COMESCAR, USS TENNESSEE, COM FAN-1, COMCRUDIV-16, COMINPAC, COMNAVFOR, COMNAVFOR KURYUS info ALL TF, TO COMS PAC, COMNAVFOR, COMNAVFOR, CINCPAC ADV, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCPAC, COMNAVFOR, COMNAVFOR, COMNAVFOR

Organization TF 95. 95.1 TENNESSEE force flagship Captain Hefferman. 95.2 EAST striking Group RAdm Lowe. 95.3 Heavy striking Group V. Adm Oldendorf. 95.4 Mine Group RAdm Sharp. 95.5 Base Covering Group R. Adm Cobbe. 95.6 OKINAWA Logistic Group Comdr Ueliher. 95.7 Philippine Training Group, R. Adm McCormick. 95.8 ESCORTOR R. Adm Durgin. 95.9 Fleet Air Wing 1, R. Adm PERRY. This dispatch effective 250200 GCT.

24 0850 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON 1, info CRUDIVS 16, COMLUNCH. (SECRET DISPATCH) Done on GREEN Radio

CTF 95 230415. When RFS direct R. Adm Low with the same force as in preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of Hong Kong between Lat. 30-00N and 32-30 N. Avoid mine restricted area in SHANGHAI-CHUSAN area. Keep Com3rdFlt, COMGENFLAF, COMGENCHINA and CTF 99 informed of movements this force.

23 1226 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, COMSERVPAC.

Request your comments on COMSERVPAC 210215. CINCPAC considers a total of 4 stripes on 2 or 3 fields required to support 1st Marine Air Wing.

TOP SECRET
JULY (OOT)

24 1722 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINTFLT, CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMSUBPAC.

Referring to item H your 130751 and my 201819 the requirements of my 181305 September 1944 and myer 00107 of 12 January 1944 for maintenance of definite numbers cruisers, destroyers and submarines in 7th Fleet hereby cancelled.

24 1824 NONE GIVEN to CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH USASTAF PAC info none.

V-273.

As a basis of discussion with the Soviet General Staff on the subject of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made the following proposal in connection with U.S. Naval and Air Operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN:

- A. U.S. Naval surface forces may operate without restriction in the seas of JAPAN and OKHOTSK.
 - B. U.S. Submarines may operate without restrictions in the SEAS OF JAPAN and OKHOTSK south and east of a line connecting following points: coast of KOREA at latitude 38 north thence to latitude 40 north longitude 135 east thence to latitude 45-45 north longitude 140 east thence east along that latitude.
 - C. U.S. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east of a line connecting following points: CAPE LOPATKA-west to a point at latitude 51-10 longitude 147 degrees-thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 144-20 thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 139-30 thence to point latitude 41-20 longitude 133-20 - thence westward to SEIKHEN KOREAN-thence north to railroad at KOREAN border-thence westward along railroad to YUNGKI and CHANGCHUN-thence along the river to LIAOYUAN KAILU and CHIHFENG-thence along the railroad through TOLIN, PAOCHANG, WANCHUAN, TOTUNG, FENGCHEN, TSINING to LNEISUL-thence northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA.
 - D. The location of these lines may be changed from time to time by mutual agreement as deemed necessary or desirable.
- Para. U.S. Submarines and air operations north and west of these lines will be coordinated with the RUSSIANS and similarly their submarine and air operations south and east of these lines will be coordinated with U.S.

Para. Your comment is requested to arrive terminal by 260600Z (OOT).

NOTE (On Originator) - call sign JEBG (The station from which this dispatch was received) has been used on dispatches originated by COMINCH AND CNO and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - Location is POTSDAM, GERMANY.

25 0905 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBATRON 1 info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMCRUDIV 5, COMCRUPAC, CHESTER, PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY.

CRUDIV 5 will be assigned north pacific force in near future. Preparation ships for this service is to be initiated immediately.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

25 0425 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMFIBSPAC info COM5THFLEET.

Your 240650 seaplane operations during OLYMPIC will be conducted in KOSHIKI and ARIAKE WAN AREAS as determined by COM5THFLEET. Concur in desirability of establishment of tender based seaplane operating area adjacent to other naval activities. Final determination of site upon recommendations of commanders concerned.

25 0904 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

Your 241824 (V 273). Strongly urge that decision be reached as to areas in which Pacific Fleet will control and be responsible for safety of shipping (including such part of the sea route from the United States to Russia through the SEA of OKHOTSK as may be a U.S. Pacific Fleet responsibility) and that RUSSIAN submarines be excluded from that area. Difficulties of communications, language and unaccustomed recognition procedures make it extremely inadvisable permit RUSSIAN submarines operate in areas where United States ships and aircraft are escorting shipping.

Para. The boundary proposed for United States submarines is satisfactory.

Para. It is recommended that since the ports railroads and rivers listed in paragraph C of V 273 as the Air Force boundary are themselves centers of target concentrations they be assigned definitely to the United States or RUSSIA in all cases.

25 0907 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLEET info COM7THFLEET, COMFIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC APO, COMSERVPAC.

Your 240358 and 222354. It is expected that COMSERVDIV 103, Com. Hartley will be responsible for other logistic activities in the objective area as well as for repairs and salvage as indicated in my 220410. Captain Curtis will be assigned to his staff. He will be assigned the CAMPBELL (CGC-AGC) as flagship and with adequate assistants to permit him to discharge these duties. It is expected that he will remain in the area as COMSERVDIV 103. As such he will be under the operational control of COM7THFLEET after departure of COM5THFLEET. The Army Sub Area petroleum officer may accompany Commodore Hartley or Admiral Turner as arranged by the latter. The assignment of the SPENCER (CGC) and INGHAM (CGC) will be determined later.

25 1009 CINCPAC to WARCOS info CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

GREGO. 28231.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-273 24th.

25 1011 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN 10, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMNAVJDPAC, COMNAVWESPAC.

CX-28232.

Reference memorandum for record, dated 23 July 1945, relating to RYUKYUS, signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman, approved by CINCPAC with the word "Administrative" changed to "Operational" on page 2, para 3A(1)(A)1. CINCPAC ADV in his 240317/s (OCT) has approved memorandum.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

25 1431 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARCOS, USASTAF, CINCPAC PEARL, COMNAV-
AFPOA, AFMIDPAC, COMNAVAF.

CX-28307.

Subject is JAVAMAN project reference WX 33621 and COMINCH 221915/Z (GCT) and 221921/Z. Request your concurrence in proposed operational project now assigned to FEAFF for execution. Target date later to be determined will precede OLYMPIC target date.

12 2336 WARCOS to CINCPAC info COMNAVAFMIDPAC - COMNAVAFMIDPAC PASSED TO
CINCPAC BOTH HEADQUARTERS.

WARX 31108.

A study is now undergoing priority consideration wherein ATC facilities (Aircraft crews and maintenance personnel) of the Atlantic be moved to Pacific beginning in August.

Para. New grand totals 4 engine transport aircraft to be in the Pacific under this study will be: 373 in August, 375 in September, 399 in October, 453 in November, 537 in December, 600 in January, 655 in February, 707 in March.

Para. 2 plans being considered. Plan 1 is to base majority of ATC HAWAII with personnel fed to that point by water transportation. Plan 2 is through movement by air from West Coast. Ultimate destination to be PHILIPPINES, LEYTE or MANILA or both.

Para. Shipping implications and comparison of net Pacific gain against new Atlantic loss will be resolved here.

Para. Needed without delay is estimate of theaters ability to:
Para. A. Receive via air total 7600 personnel in August, 18000 in Sept, 28000 in October, 39000 in November, 46000 in December, 59000 in January, 61000 in February, and 67000 in March.

Para. B. Provide holding area in Hawaiian department to accommodate 12500

Para. C. Provide accommodations for greatly increased permanent personnel at HICKAM. (Assuming plan 1 above is accepted)

Para. D. Provide terminal facilities in PHILIPPINES and assume full responsibility for passengers upon landing, to include necessary ground transportation.

Para. E. Provide storage and disbursing facilities for ATC total POL requirements of 41000 short tons in August building up to 115000 in March.

Para. F. Provide service forces to support such increase.

Para. Directly related and in amplification this problem is radio DTG 111817 of 11 July 45 (dispatched via Navy channels).

Para. For COMNAVAFMIDPAC only. This is ATC augmentation message to be brought to attention of Colonel Hobson, OPD, now TD in Pacific which was subject of earlier communication. Hobson to extend TD to Hawaii and arrange TWX with WD for further details of necessary. Extreme size of backlog on West Coast foreseen between now and March 1946 is causing great concern here.

25 2104 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE NOTES.

Ur 240636. Copies of JCS 659/1 and 659/3 being forwarded airmail. No subsequent JCS action modifies paragraph 3 of 659/1 which states "operational control of Air Sea Rescue activities and facilities is a responsibility of theater or area commanders".

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

25 2256 COMCENUSASTAF to JEMC(POTSDAM, GERMANY) info CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-273, 20-4th. Recommend that targets lying along outlined air boundary be assigned to either RUSSIANS or United States.

26 0149 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCEN TEN info COMINCH AND CNO, CINCPAC, CTF 91, COMNAVAFMIDPAC, COMDT JOE OKINAWA, COMNAVAFESPAC, COMNAVFLT, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMCEN USASTAF, COMSTFLT, COM7THFLT.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July report to CINCPAC with all United States Army Forces under your command. At that time control of United States held positions in the RYUKYUS will be governed by JCS 181409 July and memorandum for record dated 23rd July as approved by CINCPAC 240317 and CINCPAC CX 28232 (DTG 251011).

26 0150 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMCEN TEN, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMNAVAFMIDPAC, COMNAVAFESPAC, HOUSOS SWPA.

Your 250847 concur. Copies of memorandum distributed to naval service will have change incorporated.

26 1225 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMNORPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

TOP SECRET. Cominch & CNO 251750 request your comment and recommendations as suggestions as to how CINCPAC should exercise control. Expedite reply.

26 1514 ELISEL JOINT SECURITY CONTROL (MARSHALL), CINCPAC, Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, COMCEN USCT

TOP SECRET. WARY 38701 Following for your information in implementation planning PASTEL. (A) Chinese underground SHANGHAI presently under United States control. Includes important employers and labor, steamer lines, street railways, harbor activities, public utilities plus 15,000 coastal pirates. (B) ComNavGroup CHINA on 14 July proposed beginning training within 6 weeks 1500 key SHANGHAI personnel for intelligence sabotage Jap installations and protection of port against Jap sabotage. (C) COMINCH concurring directs ComNavGroup CHINA that it be "accomplished at expense of your other obligations unless it has sufficient importance to ComGen USFCT to carry increase in theater ceilings on personnel and freight in order to meet a target date for completion, which date is a matter for his decision" Evaluation follows. (A) Sequence of actions if taken and date set by ComGen USFCT will bear on enemy estimate PASTEL. (B) Assistance provided by CINCPAC or CINCPAC to above projects will accelerate and augment appearance your GIGUAVTS SHANGHAI area in accordance PASTEL. (C) May be possible to relate pirate activities to those of TF 95 in operations EAST CHINA SEA. Radio traffic between GUAM and HONGKONG could support this relation. (D) If attention SHANGHAI area maintained or exaggerated after X-55 per PASTEL special means implementation by Joint Security Control must be coordinated appropriately.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

27 1000 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC (MACARTHUR), CINCPAC (NIMITZ) USSTAF PAC (SPAATZ), AGWAR.

for U. S. aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north of the boundary line coordination would be effected by local liaison and within 24 hours after application. It was further agreed that position of the line would be reconsidered if communications proved too slow to effect prompt coordination.

Para 4th Question- Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945?

Para 4th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with Military Operations of the Soviet Union against JAPAN, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison groups with General MacArthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.

Para. American Liaison Groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the FAR EAST, MARSHALL VASSILIEVSKI, in Khabarovsk, and with the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev in Vladivostok.

Para. The Soviet Command is ready to accept the Radio-Teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.

Para Action- Agreed with the understanding that Liaison would be effected by the commanders in the field without reference to WASHINGTON and MOSCOW.

Para 5th Question- it is assumed that, after D-Day, Soviet or U. S. air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or U. S. ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet Aircraft.

Para 5th Answer- The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above mentioned ships and planes.

Para. For the purpose we can designate:

SubPara (A) Naval ports: in the Japanese SEA, port NAHODKA (American Strati); in the OKHOTSK and BERING SEA REGIONS-NIKOLAEVSK, on the AMUR, and PETROPAVLOVSK, on KAMCHATKA.

SubPara (b) Airfields: in the region of VLADIVOSTOK, in the region of ALEXANDROVSK on SAKHALIN ISLAND and in the region of PETROPAVLOVSK on KAMCHATKA.

Para Action - Agreed with the understanding that the method of identification of damaged aircraft arriving at Soviet fields would be established by the Commanders in the Field.

26 1559 COMGENAIR(POTSDAM) to COMGEN USASTAF info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, AGWAR FOR CASAIR.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GFR)

- continued -

26 1559 COMNAVSTA (POTSDAM) to COMNAV USASTAF info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, ADMAR FOR CASATR.

Victory 343 BG 400

In connection with planning for program in event of a Japanese capitulation it is planned to implement fully the B-29 program as now scheduled, the units to be deployed as early as practicable. You should prepare for rearrangement of the deployment so as to deploy the 40 B-29 groups in OKINAWA, PHILIPPINES, MARIANAS and for 2 groups in the ALEUTIANS.

26 1951 CNO to COMNAVSEAFRON info COMNAV PAC, COM 13, COM 17, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Desire that you expedite lend lease transfer preparation of vessels scheduled for MILEPOST and that you sail them to cold bay as early as practicable maintaining satisfactory standards as regards readiness for transfer. Advise COMINCH and CNO and info addressees of revised estimated date arrival COLD BAY all ships which have not yet departed SEATTLE. Action being taken to advance date of arrival SEATTLE remaining vessels not yet available to you.

26 2020 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCLANT, COM 13, COMNAVSEAFRON, COMNAV PAC, COM NAVDET FT RANDALL, COMNAVSEAFRON.

Expedite movement and delivery vessels scheduled for transfer under MILEPOST anticipating arrival and transfer dates as much as practicable. Advise interested addressee new arrival dates when known.

27 0019 CINCPAC PEARL to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

It is the opinion of communication officers here that northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO are included in the directed beam of OWI SAIPAN station. The proposed station if placed in ATTU would be no closer to the population center of objective area than is OWI SAIPAN. Interrogation of FWS has so far failed to indicate any general knowledge of operation of propaganda stations of OWI. FWS has been unable to detect any difference between the OWI and OSS programs except the pretense of OSS that it comes from a Japanese source. Control of the station could be exercised only by assignment of FWS indoctrinated control officer with freedom of communication with CINCPAC staff. Conclude that station is unessential and recommend that it not be authorized. This refers to your 261225.

27 0250 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH, CNO, CINCPAC.

CINCPAC has no technical data in connection with the JAVAMAN project. However from his general knowledge and based on Pacific Fleet experience with similar projects he is doubtful of the value of the project when measured in terms of the naval support eventually required to place the boats in the desired location. CINCPAC requests as complete information as possible on this project and especially as to naval personnel ships or boats that may be required and how it is proposed to move the boats from OKINAWA to destination.

Para. If it is decided to carry out the project it is recommended that CINCPAC assign a site on OKINAWA and provide the resources required. CINCPAC will provide such material as they Army cannot provide to the extent to which such material is available from naval sources and excess to project of higher priority.

TOP SECRET
JULY (CCL)

27 0253 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMJENPOA, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

In order to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources and in view of the vastly improved strategic situation it is recommended that the category of defense in the main islands of the Hawaiian Group be reduced to category A and that in view of his continuing responsibilities as area commander CINCPAC be authorized to determine the degree of implementation required with respect to fighter protection, anti-aircraft readiness, mobile combat troops and harbor defenses.

Para. It is also pertinent at this time to consider the necessity for retention of the powers conferred on the Military Commander of the Territory of Hawaii by executive order 9489 of 24 October 1944. Lieut. General Richardson COMJENPOA considers that they should be retained. Having overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas, I feel that the state of the war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer justified and according recommend that it be suspended or revoked.

27 0800 COMJENCHINA to CINCPAC info COM7THFLT, CINCPAC, COMJENCHINA, COMJEN-
SOSCHINA, WARCOS.

CPBX 1803.

For planning purposes preliminary to impending visit CHINA THEATER party the following is offered for your consideration and comment.

1. The purpose of the FORT BAYARD operation is to open a sea supply route to a temporary base in CHINA, augmenting hump tonnage, to assist in supporting further operations to the maximum extent possible.
2. The FORT BAYARD area has the functions of furnishing a port for unloading and airstrips for distributing cargo. Intelligence information at hand and a study of aerial photography indicates that these facilities are neither ideal nor immediately available. The airstrip will need matting and possibly rebuilding of subgrade, the beaches in the river are wide mud banks drying at low tide and ship berths appear desirable to handle the required tonnage, the hydrography is far from ideal and pilots may be required for river navigation, present indications appear to dictate a limited draft of ships to 19 feet although the last 3 ships are loaded to 22 feet and must cross the bar at high tide. FORT BAYARD as a port, despite difficulties, is most desirable as a step toward later operations.
3. As an alternate operation, or as a preliminary phase of opening FORT BAYARD, WEIRHOW ISLAND PRN(10906) ~~SCORPION BAYARD~~ ~~PORTABLE~~ ~~UNDERSTANDING~~ considered. This island is now in Chinese hands and the abandoned airstrip appears easy to reconstruct and lengthen. The harbor appears suitable to anchor AKs fully loaded. The sandy beach in the harbor appears useable for all types of landing craft at all tides.
4. Aircover entirely adequate for either operation will be furnished from a field now in our hands at PAKHOI (109-04 21-29). Preliminary plans envisage using 4 P-38 planes giving continuous convoy cover 100 miles west of the 114 meridian. If convoy arrives at 114 meridian at night fall this should provide daylight cover west of the 114.

- continued -

PINK

5. There is reported a considerable number of enemy troops in INDO CHINA and YO HAINAN ISLAND with minor enemy naval installations. In order to interdict the movement of these troops by water and to protect the port area it is believed that a squadron of PT boats would be extremely valuable.
6. The plan involving use of the island could be put into effect almost immediately, after both PAKHOI and WEICHOW are in our control. Enemy resistance may delay occupation of LUICHOW PENINSULA and it is desirable that time be allowed in the FORT BAYARD OPERATION after occupation to survey the river, install navigational aids and unloading facilities before AKS are called up. Our thought is that WEICHOW would be used to accept shipping if LUICHOW is not secured by 20 August and shift thereafter made as soon as possible to FORT BAYARD.
7. For the WEICHOW operation it is assumed that the convoys would proceed south CE HAINAN ISLAND. Intelligence sources do not indicate that there are any minefields in TONKING GULF, however HAINAN STRAIT was once reportedly mined. The mines in this strait are reported to have broken loose and carried into TONKIN GULF. There has been no friendly mining since May 1944 at which time HAIPHONG HARBOR area had 90 day mines laid by the 14th Air Force.
8. Request your consideration to furnishing a naval command to assist in the operation and to be responsible for the following:
 - A. To provide required surface convoy protection and minesweeping.
 - B. Assume the responsibility of channel and harbor surveying, installing navigational aids and piloting to anchorage area.
 - C. The installation and operation of port protection facilities, such as air, anti-aircraft, and harbor landing boats. ^{HARBOR POLICING & OPERATION OF PORT FACILITIES INCLUDING HARBOR POLICING BOAT, BUT EXCLUDING NAUTICAL}
 - D. Furnishing qualified personnel and equipment for functioning of port director in the harbor including maintenance of all landing and other craft.
 - E. Provide the necessary command and auxiliary units including house-keeping with 30 days consumables for naval personnel in the area and shipping to move personnel and equipment supplies by the Navy.
 - F. Functional components as outlined in our CFB 1007 (Top secret not to all) including 1 Stevedore company and 1 water front engineer company. These units plus pontoon cells for 2 ship berths are considered necessary. Naval engineers requested could install docks and erect the other naval facilities outlined.
 - G. CHINA THEATER will assume responsibility for supply of all class 1, 3, and common usage ammunition supplies for naval personnel.
 - H. Material and logistical support required for port operations would be responsibility of the naval command.
9. Requested are your comments on the above prior to the departure of CHINA THEATER representatives for conference at your headquarters. This is a planning message only and is not a request or requisition for assignment of naval resources.

TOP SECRET
JULY (GWT)

27 2111 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Refer CINCPAC/POA serial 000576 of 20 July Para 3. COMINCH approves. Equipment and communication personnel less senior officer of each unit to be assembled Seattle DYMISR report COMINCH temporary duty. Movement designator already assigned KBN will be promulgated in normal manner. Order of priority movement personnel as follows. Radio Technicians. Interpreters. Aerological Technicians. Radiomen. Aerological personnel. Target date all personnel and material 25 August. CNO will assemble RUSSIAN speaking liaison teams Washington prior Target Date. Soviets have agreed in principle establishment facilities and are ready to accept material now. Items still undetermined are frequencies and detailed arrangement as to entry U.S. personnel. Unless otherwise advised assume you will direct COMSERVPAC provide all communication equipment and communication personnel. For info COMSERVPAC all equipment destined for Khabarovsk to have shipping designated "MOKO" for PETROPAVLOVSK "TEAM" for VLADIVOSTOK "KURT".

27 1000 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC (MACARTHUR), CINCPAC (NIMITZ), USSTAFFAC (SPAATZ) AGWAR.

Victory 371 BG 429

At terminal the Joint Chiefs of Staff put to the RUSSIANS 5 questions which are listed below with the RUSSIAN answers and the action of the U.S. and RUSSIAN Chiefs of Staff thereon. The agreements are to become effective upon Soviet entry into the war. Preliminary arrangements in regard to the subject matter of the 5 items may be made now.

Para. 1st Question - has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish U.S. weather liaison groups in PETROPAVLOVSK and Khabarovsk as presented to GENERALISSIMUS STALIN by President Truman on 23 July 1945.

Para. 1st Answer - The Soviet Command agrees to establish in PETROPAVLOVSK and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the Radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.

Para. As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American Radio Stations.

Para. In addition to these 2 stations we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather.

Para action - Agreed as above except that the radio stations to be established in PETROPAVLOVSK and Khabarovsk are to be manned by U. S. Personnel.

Para 2nd Question - U. S. Naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the seas of OKHOTSK and JAPAN. U. S. Submarine forces will operate without restriction in the SEAS OF OKHOTSK and JAPAN, south and east of a line established by connecting and following points: coast of KOREA at 38-00 North, thence to 40-00 north 135-00 east, thence to 45-45 north 140-00 east, thence along the parallel of 45-45 north. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U. S. Submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of Naval operations?

Para 2nd Answer- separate zones of Naval and Air operations are to be

TOP SECRET
JULY (GCD)

- continued -

27 1000 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC (MACARTHUR), CINCPAC (MIDTIZ), USSTAFIAF (SPAATZ), AGWAR.

set up for the U. S. and the USSR in the SEA OF JAPAN. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTINA on the coast of KOREA to point 40-00 north 135-00 east to point 45-45 north 140-00 east; thence along the parallel 45-45 north to the line connecting CAPE CRILLON (KONDO) (on the southern tip of southern SAKHALIN) with CAPE SOYA MISSAKI (SOYASAKI) (on the northern tip of HOKKAIDO).

Para. The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line. U.S. Naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.

Para. Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.

Para. U. S. Naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet Naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.

Para. In the SEA OF OKHOTSK there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the U. S. and the Soviet Union. Operations in the OKHOTSK SEA will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.

Para. In the BERING SEA there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from CAPE DEZHNEV to DIOMEDE ISLAND and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and the U. S. to parallel 51-30 north and thence through 50-35 north 157-00 east; thence to 49-50 north 156-20 east and thence along the parallel 49-50 north to the 4th KURILE STRAIT.

Para. The remainder of the BERING SEA as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the U. S. Fleet.

Para. Action - Agreed with the understanding that operations by U. S. and Soviet Naval and air forces in the SEA OF OKHOTSK and the BERING SEA would be coordinated by mutual understanding and cooperation.

Para 3rd Question - U. S. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: CAPE LOPATKA, west to point at 51-10 north 147-00 east, thence to point at 45-45 north, 144-20 east, thence to point at 45-45 north 139-30 east, thence to point at 41-20 north 133-20 east, thence westward to SEISHIN, KOREA, thence north to railroad at KOREAN BORDER thence westward along railroad to YUNKI and CHANGCHUN, thence along the river to LIAYUAN, KAGLIU and CHINNENG, thence along the railroad through TOLUN, PAOCHANG, WANCHUAN, TATUNG, FENGCHEN, TOUNING to KWEISUI, thence northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U. S. Air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?

Para 3rd Answer - The boundary line between operational zones of the U. S. and Soviet Air Forces in KOREA and MANCHURIA shall be as follows: CAPE BOLTINA, CHANGCHUN, LIAYUAN, KAILU, CHINNENG, PEKING, TATUNG and thence along the southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA.

Para. U. S. aviation will operate south of this line including all the above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. U. S. air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.

Para Action - Agreed with the understanding that when necessary for

28 0108 ~~CHURCHA, ANASTAS 1. COMATRAS, CONTROLE, COMBRAC, COMBRAC, 1-0. CHURCHA~~
~~CHURCHA, ANASTAS 1. COMATRAS, CONTROLE, COMBRAC, COMBRAC, 1-0. CHURCHA~~

~~28 0457 CINEAPPAC to COMNAVHIDRAC info WARCOS. CINEPOA ADVANCE NO.~~

Request that you express direct to the Chief of Staff with information copy here your views regarding Hawaiian Defense matters that were raised in CINCPAC advance dispatch 270253.

~~25 0740 COMINT/PAC to COMINT/LT info CINCPAC, CINCPAC/PAC, CG 6THARCT, COM 2ND, 5TH, 7TH FLEET, COM 11TH, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14.~~

~~28 083.2 GUNPAQ ADVANCE 1. COMBUSTION 1-2. CONTIN. GUNPAFFAC. COMBUST. 1.~~

Para. Although a technical factor which can be adjusted it should be noted that while FORT BAYARD borders on the Pacific Ocean areas WICKIUM ISLAND and the TONG KING GULF are in the southwest pacific area.

CK 29034.

3417

12. 2. 2.

06-035778-1

[illegible]

Para. Ships having prior commitments which will delay them will join their respective forces as soon after assembly dates as practicable.

Para. Initial logistics indoctrination and training should be stressed in early employment of forces.

~~28 0917 CINEPAC ADVANCE to GORINCH AND CNO 1st CINEFOA FRAM. CINEPAC.~~

3412

TOP SECRET
REF ID: A67

29 0209 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

For EPFLO. It is intended to discuss the following subjects at GUAM during visit of Commander in Chief.

Para. 1. The inclusion of CVL'S as a group in tactical cooperation with CV'S.

Para. 2. How British Task Groups will be required to operate in October onwards including the scale of effort.

Para. 3. Long term requirements of British Task Groups.

Para. 4. Facilities at ENHETOK as a result of report from THE CINCPAC ADV HQ 070415 refers.

Para. 5. Routing policy. My 200819 refers.

Para. 6. Relief for late commander GOVERT your 230925 refers.

29 0525 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSEVPAC, COMUSPAC, COM MARIANAS info COMNAVFOR, COMNAV, CINCPAC PAC, COMNAVFLT, COMAIRPAC.

Take appropriate action accordance COMINCH AND CNO 272111 passed you separately keeping CINCPAC advised. COMSEVPAC request from CNO such personnel and material required and not presently available for this utilization. CNO hereby requested advise CINCPAC of all action taken to implement.

30 0237 COMZINFLANT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MC MORRIS ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and very amicable conference with General MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air show of force as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the Joint Chiefs of Staff message but did not consider it a directive and has asked for one.

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 MarDiv available to Army for JAPAN because it appears impossible for Army to move sufficient divisions rapidly without some marines.

Para. The foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement unless unforeseen demands are made. His plans are being made and will be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are concerned.

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMZINFLANT.

MC MORRIS TO SHERMAN ONLY.

Do not censor that landing of marines or occupying airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is to be made as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para. 2nd Para your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and

TOP SECRET
100-100000

- continued -

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMZINFLANT (Cont'd)

MEMORIS TO SHEPHERD (Cont'd)

developments which immediately follow with the time of any such landing if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this interpretation is correct then concour otherwise need amplification.

Para. In view prospective requirements for marine elsewhere it appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be required initially. You are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available for early and rapid movement into JAPAN, if your discussions there indicate advisability of so doing.

Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent directives giving CINCPAC a free hand until CINCPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces any agreements or understanding you make should carry a proviso for revision of any part that might prove to be inconsistent with any later directive issued by JCS.

31 0900 COMZINFLANT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info MARCOS, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMZINFLANT, COMZINFLANTACT, COMZINFLANTACT, COMZINFLANTACT, COMZINFLANTACT.

CPHE 2231

Difficulties in connection with operations against LIUCHOW PENINSULA is subject your 2812022 GUAM refers. Difficulties of FORT BAYARD operations are no more serious than initially envisaged. Our CPHE 1803 was for planning purposes and information only. The operation will be undertaken with resources available or being made available to this theater. This headquarters is fully in sympathy with presently projected strategy and will not expect equipment or resources which would in any way jeopardize OLYMPIC.

Para. WEICHOW ISLAND is an alternate operation. It will only be undertaken if Japs prove unexpectedly stubborn in BAYARD AREA and it becomes apparent that as a result there will be a protracted delay in securing that port. This headquarters sincerely appreciates your interest in theaters operations.

30 2029 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Project as outlined in your 120446 has been approved by Soviets and action initiated. CNO will provide all material and personnel required for the establishment of the SIBIRIAN facilities. Additions to and revisions of this project brought about by CINCPAC/FOA serial 080742 of 20 July and my 272111 have not yet been submitted to Soviets and are to be considered separately. Advise COMSEVPAC to take no further action.

31 0820 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSEVPAC info CINCPAC FRANK HQ.

Comply with directive to COMSEVPAC in last sentence COMINCH 302029 passed you separately. See CINCPAC 120446 passed you.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~JULY - AUGUST~~ (GOT)

31 1909 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMNAV FRAZ ADTON. COMNAV FRAZ.

CX 29846.

Not specifically included in Marine Air Units available operational control CINCPAC (reference memorandum for record QUAM conference 21-23 July) is headquarters 2 Marine Air Wing which normally control an integrated force all RYUKYU Marine Air Defense units. Without above Headquarters these units would operate directly under headquarters 7th Air Force OKINAWA. Your intentions regarding operational control headquarters 2nd Marine Air Wing requested. Pending instructions COMNAV 7 exercises operational control Marine Air Defense units through 2nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters.

01 1310 COMNAV AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed in principle that that part of the southwest Pacific area lying south of the boundary described below shall pass from U.S. to British Command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreements of the Australian, New Zealand and Dutch governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected. "Beginning on the coast of INDIA CHINA at 16 degrees north; thence to intersect at 07-40 north latitude 116-00 east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North BORNEO; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05-00 north longitude 127-00 east; thence east to 05-00 north 130-00 east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence generally southeast to 02-20 south 146-00 east; thence east to 02-20 south 159-00 east; thence south". What are your views concerning the disposition of EMIRAU which lies north of this British area of responsibility.

02 0311 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMNAV FRAZ. WARCOS. COMNAV FRAZ.

CX 30145.

Agreements for coordination of air operations, signed by Sherman, Chamberlin and Lindsay, dated 1 August 1945, approved with following change in sub paragraphs 1 A and B, I Ray minus 7 should be Ray minus 8. Copies for local distribution will be changed.

02 0547 COMNAV to COMNAV 7THFLT. COMNAV SEAFRON info COMNAV AND CNO. CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ. ALL TFC AND TFC 7THFLT.

Effective 15 August 1945 COMNAV 7THFLT will direct Commander Submarine Advance Base: A, Navy 3002. And Navy recuperation Camp, Navy 3002. To report to COMNAV SEAFRON for matters pertaining to defense. Maintenance and construction. The operational and administrative control will remain with Commander Submarine 7th Fleet. The intent of this directive is to establish a command relationship between COMNAV SEAFRON and COMNAV 7THFLT analogous to that outlined in general order number 21.

~~AUGUST~~

TOP SECRET
August (CCT)

02 0710 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMSOPAC, COMCENPOA, COMSOPAC and CINCAPAC,
COMCEN 10TH ARMY, COMSOPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

Cancel CINCPOA PEARL 110149.

Para. 1. Former ICHIBO reserve now redesignated Marianas OLYMPIC reserve. Action addressees will reconstitute this reserve by 15 October with same items and quantities as originally prescribed for ICHIBO and will maintain same at prescribed levels until ordered discontinued by CINCPOA. Effective 15 October and weekly thereafter action addressees will notify CINCPOA info COMSOPAC of any existing deficiencies and estimated date of replenishment. Negative reports are desired.

Para. 2. COMSOPAC or COMCEN 6TH ARMY will forward all requests for supplies from the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve direct to COMSOPAC for release. COMSOPAC will coordinate shipments. Action addres or their designated representatives will make available for shipment those supplies requested which are in the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve.

Para. 3. Emergency supplies for the RYUKYUS or other areas will be filled from regular stocks of normal supply agencies. Marianas OLYMPIC reserve shall not be considered a source of such emergency supply unless replenishment of the reserve can be effected by 15 October. COMCEN POA 200425 not to or needed by all refers.

02 10 36 CINCAC ADVANCE HQ to COMSOPAC, CTF 94, CTF 95, info CTF 38, COMSOPAC,
COMSOPAC 18, COMCEN USASTAF.

A special operation will be conducted by the 509th Bomb Group on 4 or 5 August at a time to be announced later. No ship or aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will come within 50 miles of NAGASAKI, KOKURA, or HIROSHIMA from 4 hours before to 6 hours after the announced time. Acknowledge.

02 1429 CINCAC ADVANCE to COMSOPAC.

CINCAC 290254 and 290209. Am I correct in assuming that all combat units of British Pacific Fleet will be at my disposal during OLYMPIC including preparatory phases. If so assume you will have no objections to proposals of reference. In view early arrival CINCAC in GUAM for discussions various matters request reply your earliest convenience.

31 1338 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMCENPOA info CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

In accordance with para 3 of recommendations made by representatives of CINCAC, COMCEN20THAF and CINCPOA at the inter-theater mapping conference held at Pearl 25-29 May which has subsequently been approved by all commanders of theatres involved and the JCS it is requested that operational direction of the 64th and 30th Engineer Topographic Battalions and attached units be returned to CINCPOA on or about 31 July. Outstanding requisitions from AFPAC will be completed on the terms of present arrangements.

TOP SECRET

JULY - AUGUST (GCT)

31 0756 COM7THFLT to COMSERV7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT info CNO, COMINCH, CINCPAC/POA
BOTH HQ, CINCPAC, COMSERVPAC, ALL TF AND TO COMOPS 7THFLT, & COMUSP.

Effective 15 August 1945 there is hereby established under Commander 7th Fleet the command U. S. Naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA, TF 70. Which will include all U.S. Naval Bases and shore facilities and Naval Air and Seaplane bases in SWPA outside the Philippines except MANUS. The name of the Commander U.S. Navy for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA, CTF 79, and the location of his headquarters will be announced.

Para. COMSERV7THFLT and COMAIR7THFLT respectively will direct the commanders of all U.S. Naval Shore, air and seaplane facilities within the Area delineated to report to Com U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA for operational and administrative control. Units decommissioned but not yet moved forward are to be included.

Para. Com U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA will be responsible for:

- A. Logistic support as practicable for Pac Fleet and allied Naval Forces, units in his area.
- B. Expeditious roll up and staging of U.S. Naval personnel and equipment scheduled for forward movement.
- C. Orderly transfer of excess material and of facilities or equipment duly authorized to be taken over by other allied services.

Para. COMSERV7TH as COMSERON 7 will continue to provide logistic support for U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA and to schedule and provide shipping for roll up. New Subject. COMSERVFOR 7THFLT, COMSERON 7, will retain responsibility for operation. Administration and defense of MANUS pending further decision on Para D of CINCPAC 130751 not to or needed by all.

31 1349 COMGENAIR to CINCPAC ADVANCE, DEPCOM 20TH AF info GHQ SWPA.

WARX 41360.

In connection with terminal VICTORY 343 of 26 July, the following information received from ALASKA DEPARTMENT is submitted for your info: A year round port operation at AMCHITKA practicable and adequate. B. Capacity avgas AMCHITKA 1,510,000 galleon existing. C. Capacity hardstands total 150 very heavy bomber AMCHITKA, length of longest runway 10,000 feet. 2 additional runways 5,000 feet each. D. Available for very heavy bomber deployment is tenthousing. Some prefabricated tent frames and necessary tentage are available. Material for mobilization type construction is available in theatre but additional labor will be required.

Para. In event it becomes necessary to deploy a very heavy bomber force in North Pacific Area, it is believed that AMCHITKA is the most suitable location. COMGEN ALASKAN DEPARTMENT is being advised of the contemplated strength and composition of force for planning purposes.

31 1351 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMENFMFPAC info MARCORPS, CINCPAC PEARL.

UrDis 280119 not to all or needed. Target date for the next major operation for which the 3rd Mib Corps is scheduled is 1 March and readiness date for this operation may be set by FMF PAC accordingly however due to the general world situation with which you are familiar and in order to take advantage of a surrender or collapse of the Japanese Empire FMF units should be prepared for occupation duty which might well include active combat with readiness dates as follows:

- (1) 5th PHIBCORPS units ready now.
- (2) 4th MarDiv reinforced ready by 1 Sept.
- (3) 3d PHIBCORPS units (less 4th MarDiv) by 1 October.

TOP SECRET
JULY - AUGUST (GCT)

30 1523 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN info COMSUBPAC.

Your 201819. Am reducing U.S. Submarines 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons totalling 24 submarines. Plan further reduction to 1 squadron after British Command area is formed provided enemy cruisers SINGAPORE are immobilized at that time. Estimate life guard requirements only after 1 September 1945.

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCPAC - AFMIDPAC PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

RJ 67045.

Here reference is made to CINCPAC radio CX 28945 dated 28 July 1945. to COMGENAFMIDPAC with info to WARCOS and CINCPAC advance. The subject matters under discussion are indicated in CINCPAC dispatch 270253Z (GCT) July 1945 to COMINCH. At this point it is especially desirable to invite attention to the fact that CINCPAC dispatch referred to above treats and relates 2 distinct subjects which actually are unrelated, namely: (1) the category of defense for the Hawaiian Group, which is prescribed by the JCS; and (2) executive order No. 9489 of the 24th of October 1944, prescribe by the President directing the secretary of War to appoint the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas Military commander for the territory of HAWAII.

Para. I will express my views on these 2 subjects in 2 parts in the order listed.

Para. Part 1. Category of defense period under present directives of the JCS HAWAII is under category of defense "B" modified, which provides for fighter protection, consisting of a Group of day fighters of 3 sqs and 2 night fighter flights; 5 battalions of guns (anti-aircraft); 5 battalions of anti-aircraft artillery automatic weapons; 1 battalion and 1/2 of searchlights; complete early-warning radar coverage and integrated air warning service. These defenses in general are located around the critical areas of PEARL HARBOR, HONOLULU, and principal air fields. They have been determined by the best local military opinion to be the minimum necessary to provide adequately against the eventuality of a suicide attack by the Japanese. Compared with the overwhelming resources in aircraft and anti-aircraft at the disposal of the American Army, these defensive forces are small indeed and they represent the minimum insurance that the United States Army charged with the grave responsibility of defending HAWAII should provide to protect the vital installations of HONOLULU and especially PEARL HARBOR. To reduce them in order, as CINCPAC recommends "to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources, etc" is unjustifiable just so long as there is any possibility of a sneak raid and it is particularly unwarranted in view of our ample resources in aircraft and anti-aircraft. Any economy of personnel or resources so effected would be extremely small compared with the over all strength of the Army. The reduction could only be justified if the Army was in dire need of units of the character employed in the defense, which of course is not the case.

Para. It is true that the strategic position of the U.S. forces in the Pacific is much more favorable at this time than at any time since the War began and that the likelihood of the Japanese attacking HAWAII is remote. To date, however, I have received no official communication from CINCPAC-CINCPAC notifying me of the complete destruction of the aircraft carriers and aircraft carrier escorts of the Japanese Navy, which constitute the main potential threat to any attack on these islands, either by aircraft of a single carrier or of a group of carriers, and I therefore can not assume the impossibility of a sneak suicide raid. Furthermore, it is

TOP SECRET
JULY - AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCPAC - AFMIDPAC PASSES TO CINCPAC BOTH H.

pertinent to observe that the American people have invested in this war billions of dollars, several of which are represented by extensive vital installations in HAWAII, notably PEARL HARBOR, and the people would be in no mood to condone a failure to provide adequate defenses should a Japanese suicide attack occur, especially in view of the prodigality of troops and resources provided by congress.

Para. I can not give my consent to the reduction proposed by CINCPAC BOTH for reasons of prudence and caution, and because the onus would be on the U.S. Army and on the local Commanding General should the risk be accepted of having inadequate defense forces in the event of an air suicide attack by the Japanese.

Para. Therefore, I recommend that there be no change in the present category of defense of the Hawaiian Group, namely category "B" as now modified. Paragraph

Para. Part 2. Presidential executive order number 9489, 24 October 1944. The recommendation by CINCPAC in his radio 270253Z (GCT) that the said order be suspended or revoked is based on the following 2 grounds: (A) that its provisions affect his overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas; and (B) that the state of war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer justified. These contentions will be answered seriatim.

Para. (A) CINCPAC'S authority and responsibilities as theater commander stem from directives of the JCS and therefore his responsibilities must be interpreted in the light of these directives. There is an apparent misunderstanding on CINCPAC'S part that his directives in some way impose upon him responsibilities connected with the executive order. I know of no directive from the JCS or from any other authority that relates my responsibilities under the executive order to CINCPAC'S responsibilities as charged to him by extant joint Chiefs of Staff DIRECTIVES.

Para. Executive order 9498 replaced certain security measures that were exercised by me as Military Governor under martial law and which were felt to be necessary for the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. At this point it should be emphasized that Presidential Executive Order is not concerned with military operations against the enemy but deals with the control of civilians in U.S. Territory. It places in the hands of the Military Commander means whereby he may secure these islands against espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage that might be practiced by civilians in our own territory. The authority for the exercise of these powers stems from the President to the Secretary of War, who was directed by the President to delegate this authority to me, the commanding General Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas and to appoint me Military Commander of HAWAII. This authority does not stem from the JCS and therefore must legally be interpreted as a separate authority because where I challenge in the courts by a citizen or alien for any act of mine committed under this authority I could not plead as a defense that I acted under the authority of CINCPAC-CINCPAC exercising unity of command under joint Chiefs of Staff directives. As an illustration of the misunderstanding referred to supra, CINCPAC-CINCPAC invoked this executive order as 1 reason for not releasing my headquarters to the control of CINCPAC in the implementation of JCS directive 1259/4 of April. In his dispatch 260229Z GCT April 1945 he states "Pursuant to the terms of executive order 9489

- continued -

3425

TOP SECRET
JULY - AUGUST (OCT)

- continued -

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCPAC - AFMID PAUSE, TO CINCPAC BOTH RE.

issued by the President, COMGENPOA is designated as the Military Commander for the Territory of HAWAII and has responsibilities, powers, and authority which make it necessary that in this capacity COMGENPOA continue in his present relationship with CINCPAC in view of CINCPAC's responsibilities with respect to the Hawaiian Area" but for reasons stated above I am unable to recognize that CINCPAC legally has jurisdiction over me under this order. Therefore, CINCPAC'S contention that the provisions of the Executive Order affect his overall responsibility for the security and safety of the Territory of HAWAII as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas is untenable insofar as it applies to the executive order.

Para. Turning now to CINCPAC'S 2nd contention, that the state of war is now such that the continuation of the powers vested in military authority by the Executive order is no longer justified, and his further statement that "Lieutenant General Richardson, COMGENPOA, considers that they should be retained" my comments are as follows:

Para. It is true that the present writing I consider that the powers of that order should be retained, although CINCPAC has never invited my recommendations or discussed the subject with me. The reasons for the retention of the executive order are obvious from a study of the security orders issued under its authority.

Para. At the present time there are 6 essential security orders in existence covering the following subjects: They are necessary because of the large alien population in HAWAII.

Para. 1. Conduct of enemy aliens and prohibition against their possessing firearms, short-wave radio, etc; 2. Instructions to civilians covering vehicular traffic, vacating of congested areas and use of lights in the event of air raids, air raid alarms, etc;

Para. 3. Designation of restricted areas requiring identification passes for entry such as harbor areas and certain vital installations and the handling of explosives in these areas;

Para. 4. Travel control of civilians necessitated by the limited amount of joint shipping in Pacific Ocean Areas; priorities are established for necessary surface and air civilian travel;

Para. 5. Mail and cable and radio censorship and control of short wave radio.

Para. 6. The cargo and passenger control which coordinates commercial use of harbors and harbor equipment with the needs of the military.

Para. In addition, executive order 9498 is the only authority for the evacuation of American citizens deemed dangerous to the U.S. Since the effective date of the order, 24 October 1944, 6 citizens of Japanese ancestry have been evacuated from the territory to TULE LAKE segregation center CALIFORNIA. In testimony before a hearing board these persons openly confessed their loyalty to JAPAN expressing a desire that JAPAN win the war. Some of them refused when drafted to serve in the Army of the U.S. Therefore, it is believed, still other Japanese of ITDPELEHUECHSYAK the community.

Para. Minimum use is being made of the authority contained in the said executive order and the security orders which I have issued pursuant to it are reviewed periodically with the view to rescinding any regulation not necessary to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. For example, a month ago I dispensed with the Curfew and presently study is being given to relaxing civilian censorship.

- continued -

342

TOP SECRET
JULY - AUGUST (OCT)

- continued -

PAC

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARCOS info CINCAFPAC-AMID/PASSES to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Para. My policy has been and will continue to be the resission of all restritive security orders just as soon as the need for them disappears.

Para. In view of the above it is recommended that the executive order be kept in effect and, to summarize, that the status of both the category of defense and of the executive order remain for the present undisturbed.

03 0211 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Relaxation of air attacks on FORMOSA airfields and installations gives the enemy opportunity for rehabilitation and restoration of his air strength and supplies threat. There is some evidence that this is now being accomplished. Request you continue neutralization of FORMOSA in order to protect our communication lines to the PHILIPPINES, to safeguard our forces and installations on OKINAWA from air attack by FORMOSA based planes and in order to deny the enemy the use of gasoline and other supplies remaining in FORMOSA.

03 0429 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ, CG USACTAF GUAM

TOP SECRET. CX 20410

To make the phraseology identical in each subparagraph of paragraph 1 B Staff Conference 1 August signed by Sherman-Chamberlin-Lindsay suggest paragraph 3 in parenthesis read "The 5th Fleet will assume primary responsibility for air defense in the objective area but will take such action etc". Request concurrence.

02 1745 WARCOS to CINCAFPAC - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

W/R 42740.

Navy has raised the point of the necessity for the early installation of shore based radar for early warning and fighter direction purposes during OLYMPIC. They emphasize the extreme importance of early establishment of land based air warning and fighter direction facilities in order to minimize losses in an operation where frequent and sustained suicide attacks by the enemy may be expected. The foregoing points were raised in connection with a discussion between war and navy department staff officers and are furnished for your information.

03 0154 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSASTAF, COMCENTAF, WARCOS, COMINCH.

Reference agreements for coordination of air operations dated 1 August 1945, signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay approved after changing XRay minus 7 to XRay minus 8 in subparagraphs 1A and B. Copies in local distribution will be changed.

04 0024 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGEN USASTAF.

It appears to CINCPAC that the change proposed in your 030429 would effect a considerable change in the responsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet within the objective area. As it now reads subpara 1(B)(3) states the employment of 5th Fleet aircraft but recognized the planned volume and

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (OCT)

- continued -

04 0024 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGEN USASTAF.

weight of FEAF air effort within the objective area as worked out between FEAF and COMPHIBPAC. As proposed the change would release FEAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it should share in order to give the troops and ships the maximum cover and support. Accordingly request text stand as now drafted.

04 0109 CINCAFPAC to WARCOS info CG6THARMY, COMGENFEAF, COMPHIBPAC, CINCPAC ADV.

CX 30632.

Refers to your W 42740 not to all MFLJKOING of navy emphasis of importance for early installation of shore based radar for early warning and fighter direction purposes in OLYMPIC. Plans include establishments for such purposes on 6 outlying islands to south and southwest of objective area on Xray minus 3. With no satisfactory outlying Ground Locations to the east and southeast coverage in that direction will be provided by naval ships radar screen until ground installations are established at corps beachheads on XRay plus 2. CINCPAC has been requested to comment on the above by our 280503 of July not to WARCOS.

04 0353 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGENAIR, COMGENFEAF.

1253.

Approve air coordination agreement of 1 August 45 signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay together with changes proposed by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC in their dispatches: CINCPAC 030154, CINCAFPAC 030429 (OCT). Local copies will be changed.

04 0747 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info CINCAFPAC, COMINCH.

Your 040351. In view CINCAFPAC 040403 desire you concentrate your next effort against enemy air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO instead of TOKYO area. All available intelligence data will be furnished in separate despatch.

04 0841 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Request that agreements made for OLYMPIC apply also the CORONET concerning long lines as well as internal wire installations at naval establishments.

04 1011 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CTF 38, CTF 37.

Your 040747 wilco. Planning strike 8 August. (reference strike against enemy air forces in north HONSHU and HOKKAIDO instead TOKYO AREA).

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

04 1451 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMGENUSASTAF.

CX 30858

Reference your 040024Z, in the agreements of 16 May 1945 we agreed that all air forces in the objective area during the amphibious phase would operate under your control. Responsibility for the air missions in that area necessarily goes with control. The agreement also contemplated that FEAF would be employed. The objective area and arrangements therefor are now being coordinated in the detailed planning conference in progress. CX 30410 was not intended to imply a withdrawal or lessening of FEAF air effort in the objective area or to release FEAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it is expected to share in heavy volume, but to obtain assurance that the 5th Fleet would be primarily responsible for the mission of air defense or CAP in that area as FEAF and the 3RD FLEET are in other defined areas. Request that my suggestion in CX 30410 be reconsidered.

04 1943 COMGENAIR to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC.

WARX 44043.

Here is further technical data and information requested on JAVAMAN PROJECT in your 270250. JAVAMAN PROJECT involves the employment of 80-5 foot rescue boats each carrying 50000 pounds of explosives. These boats are carefully disguised as Jap luggers and sea trucks and are remotely controlled by radio, radar and television from aircraft having a control range of 55 to 80 miles. The cruising range of loaded boat is 800 to 1200 miles. For this operation 6 disguised ARB boats will be employed. 4 will be loaded missiles and 2 will be escorts and will proceed from BUNKHOUSE to destination under own power. Skeleton crews leave missiles between 10 and 20 miles from target and will return to BUNKHOUSE by 2 escorting ARB boats. 4 missile ARB boats are then directed to target by radio control and television from B-17 control planes. When disguised missiles enter magnetic field of tunnel, W.A.D. equipment on boat by telemetering records on television screens in B-17 and operator by remote detonation SCUTTLES boat over target. No personnel required from CINCPAC. All personnel, for project already on detached service to CINCPAC. Present plans, because of disguise factor of this CM OHK JNPPD PROTON, do not contemplate use of naval escort ships or naval escort aircraft. 2 disguised ARB boats will serve as surface escorts and plans call for FEAF to provide air cover for control planes and ARB Missiles. State of development of this equipment and technique has, as result of many tests against simulated targets, been determined to be completely operational and practical.

05 0100 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM MARIANAS.

Inaugurate appropriate air search and provide naval surface unit for possible interception enemy MARCUS bound units in connection CINCPAC PEARL 041956.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (OCT)

04 2320 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMGENUSASTAF.

After thorough consideration of your 041451 OCT and all the associated questions believe that the phraseology of the agreement of 1 August 1945 is preferable to the change proposed by your CX 30410. If the language were to be changed it would be necessary to redraft the paragraph considerably to bring out the fact that FEAF and also USASTAF must share in the responsibility for providing in the objective area the full weight of air effort required for air defense and for support of the troops and ships therein. I believe it better to let the draft stand as 1st approved by your 020311 and my 030154 and let the details within objective area be developed in the further planning between FEAF, PHIBSPAC and USASTAF.

05 0751 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info CINCAFPAC, COMGENUSASTAF, COMGENFEAF.

Your 042125. Consider it unnecessary to make special request on FEAF and USASTAF in view nature their routine operations at this time. Their strikes are made as often as practicable and cover wide areas FEAF, USASTAF and TF 38 operations are all mutually supporting as now planned.

05 0754 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC, COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC.

CINCAFPAC has requested that the USS TACLOBAN (EX-TULSA) be made available primarily to copy navy communications of interest to CINCAFPAC and transmit same to CINCAFPAC headquarters on shore in objective area. TACLOBAN is hereby made available for this duty and during the OLYMPIC operation will be assigned to COM5THFLT for operational control. Since TACLOBAN has previously performed same duty for CINCAFPAC no additional installations will be made.

05 0755 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, CAPSCF, COMCOR OKINAWA, COM NABS OKINAWA.

Replacement carrier aircraft must be available at OKINAWA during OLYMPIC to meet needs of the fleet. Existing directives which require the buildup to 500 pool aircraft as rapidly after 1 November as is feasible are confirmed.

05 0845 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADV info MARCOS, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL, AFMIDPAC, USASTAF, COMGENFEAF, DONOVAN OSSP.

CX 30940.

Para. 1. Reference my CX 28307 CINCPAC ADVANCE 270250 GCT and COMINCH 281625 GCT. Proposed to destroy KAMMON TUNNEL in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS. 4 air rescue boats of 85 foot length disguised as enemy craft and loaded with 25 tons high explosive each are sailed into west entrance of STRAITS. Boats are fitted with remote control, radar and television devices and self destructive elements and are controlled from aircraft at a maximum range of 100 miles. Boats are directed to target located by magnetic indicator and scuttled. Main charges are detonated by time delay and counter mining.

Part. 2. All necessary operational equipment and personnel has been assigned FEAF. FEAF will recover personnel after boats are abandoned by their crews. A heavy bombing attack in the area will cover the operation.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

05 0845 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info WARGOS, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL, AFMIDAC
USASTAF, COMGENFEAF, DONOVAN OSSE, (Cont'd)

No navy personnel, ships or aircraft will be required.

Para. Part 3. Reference COMINCH 221915 GCT project will be expedited and shipping conserved if you can furnish for not to exceed 3 months effective 1 September the following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3, 1 G-8, 1 E-11, 1 D-10, 2 N-18, 1 W-12A, 1 C-8. It is desired to establish the project and above facilities in a navy base area if possible.

Para. Part 4. Request your concurrence in the operation and indication of extent above logistics support you can furnish. Separate radio follows with code name for operation.

06 0719 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C 31175.

Action being taken. Reference your 030211 requesting continuation of neutralization of FORMOSA.

06 0819 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH AND CNO.

Your 011310. EMIRAU ISLAND is now in use as a base for Marine Air Group 61. However it was agreed at MANILA conference 30 July - 1 August that all units of 1st Mar Air Wing will be concentrated in southern PHILIPPINES as soon as possible. After this is done recommend EMIRAU be released to British as it will not be needed in the near future by our operating units and may be of use to British in connection with their mopping up of RABAU and KAVIENG. Further recommend retention "Right to Use" if needed at a later time.

04 0403 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE H, info CG FEAF, COM3RDELT.

CX 30653.

Strong indications that Japs intend an airborne operation against OKINAWA area after 9 August. Troop Carriers are being concentrated in northeast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, both beyond operating radius of FEAF at OKINAWA. Suggest if practicable that 3rd Fleet during present operations in EMPIRE waters strike the concentrations in northeast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO.

07 0331 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH & CNO info COMNORPAC, COMCHUPAC, COMSERVPAC,
CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 061648 recommend CONCORD and RICHMOND remain on present duty until ice closes traffic into AMUR RIVER about 1 October then proceed CANAL ZONE.

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

07 0330 CINCPAC ADV to COMGENCHINA CHUNGKING info COMJENFACTCT, CINCCHUNGKING,
COMGENAARCT KUNMING, COMGENSOSET CHUNGKING, COMGENCOCT KUNMING, CINCPAC

FERN 5.

Para. 1. Formal presentation of JEMEDAR made at 1000, 6 August. CINCPAC and key staff attended. Afternoon devoted to discussion of availability of personnel and supplies. Everyone most cooperative and intention solving all difficulties.

Para. 2. Admiral Sherman feels that JCS must issue a directive to establish responsibilities among 3 theaters if operation is to be carried out on time. He feels CHINA should handle land matters and GUAM or MANILA handle the naval responsibilities.

Para. 3. Lincoln says that War Department is also interested in cutting red tape with this operation and to that end S & P produced a draft directive. No action has been taken due to absence of key people at POTSDAM.

Para. 4. All timing is based on securing target area by 15 August. 7th Fleet questions whether channel will be secured from ground attack (coastal or field batteries) in time to set up the initial convoys about 20 August. Conference working on assumption that convoys can safely pass into channel on or about 20 August.

Para. 5. Tentative ETD GUAM night of 7 August.

07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA info COM7THFLEET,
COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HC, COMSERV7THFLT, COMJESCAROLINES, WAROCS.

The representatives of COMGENCHINA now at GUAM inform me that it is confidently expected that the Chinese Army will occupy FORT BAYARD on 15 Augst. Although numerous exploratory dispatches have been exchanged definite action does not appear to have been taken to ensure the operation of the port and the unloading of the supplies available. In my opinion the advantages to be gained by such action and the obvious disadvantages of failing to deliver effectively even token supplies to the Chinese when they first take useful seaport are controlling and justify the minor diversion of naval resources involved.

Para. 2. In view of the short time remaining earliest concurrence in the following is requested.

Para. 3. A. Com7thFlt load in 7 LSTs the following naval advance base personnel and material, prepare them for shipment to FORT BAYARD as soon as possible and advise readiness date. Listed by component designation - number of personnel - measurement tons. A3-43-200. B1-27-100. B2B-29-210. B3-18-200. B4-10-500. B5A-6-50. B5B-28-28. B7-21-102. B10-0-100. C3-10-40. C8-8-23. C9-9-34. H14C-0-153. D10-26-835. D22-6-9. E9-18-225. F7-68-431. J2-4-27. One quarter F1-300-1500. One quarter F1-300-2500. F8-0-1500. F12A-1-30. F12C-1-30. 2H1A-50-940. Total 983 personnel 9767 measurement tons.

B. Rear Admiral E. Buckmaster proceed via air and break flag in SPENCER(CGC) or INGHAM (CGC) as commander South China Naval Force (TF 93) which will consist of 1 CGC-4YNS-1PCS(R)-6P2'-2LCS(L) designated by Com 7thFlt plus 2 CVE-6DE-71ST-1ACG-1ACG designated by CINCPAC. CTF 93 prepare the forces assigned for movement to FORT BAYARD when and as requested

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA info COM7THFLT
COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL H., COMSERVTHFLT, COMDESCROINES, MARCOS.

by COMGENCHINA and develop naval base facilities at FORT BAYARD. The Escort Carriers with 2 destroyer escorts will be released to CINCPAC after arrival of the 1st AK convoy at FORT BAYARD.

C. On arrival in FORT BAYARD CTF 93 and forces under his command will cover and support the forces of the CHINA THEATER.

D. CINCPAC replace as promptly as possible such naval advance base components supplied by the 7th Fleet as need to be replaced.

E. LSTs, to be used only for the initial lift. Other naval craft to be released as required by CINCPAC if necessary to avoid interference with OLYMPIC.

07 0717 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COMGENCHINA, CHUNGKING.

GENERAL CARAWAY SENDS:

CINCPAC is sending despatch today to CNO, CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA concerning JEMEDAR operation. Components listed therein cover naval requirements for operation of port. In addition it establishes small naval surface force to provide protection for port and convoys thereto. This message is FERN 6.

Para. 2. In opinion of CHINA party proposal if approved furnishes minimum requirements for operation in time to meet target dates.

Para. 3. Recommend that CHINA THEATER make request that War Department take necessary action in conjunction with Navy Department to obtain approval and implementation of CINCPAC'S proposed action.

Para. 4. Admiral Sherman and CINCPAC'S staff state that the diversions of components and ships to JEMEDAR will not interfere with MACARTHUR'S logistic support of OKINAWA forces. They further state that personnel and shipping which are necessary to OLYMPIC committed to support of CHINA may be withdrawn for period of that operation, to be replaced or returned CHINA after.

Para. 5. Admiral Sherman indicates naval units operating port installations being placed under Flag Officer because that furnishes most convenient means of administration and control. He indicates that CINCPAC may consider dividing forces into 2 parts, placing port installations under CHINA at later date. It appears that CHINA theater should insist on operational control now of naval shore installations at port with administrative control remaining under Admiral Buckmaster since these installations will be supporting CHINA and not be for support of naval forces.

07 0824 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COMSERVPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, CNO, COMSERON 10.

Refer to your 262225 of July. Due to importance of subject operation consider floating storage too great risk. Request contained your 262225 floating storage OLYMPIC is disapproved.

07 0833 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH, CNO.

Reference your 251431 July and 050845 Aug. Feasibility and desirability of JAVAMAN are believed to be matters for determination by CINCPAC and COMGENFEAF. Navy can furnish from resources available to COMNAV OKINAWA such assistance and materials in E-11 component as are peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM. Suggest that all other materials referred to in COMINCH 221915 be supplies from stocks available to COMGEN10 COMNAV.

✓
Air 041943 Aug
also refers.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

08 0500 CGUSFCT to CINCPAC. WARCOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE H. COM7THFLT.

3010.

Concurrence with plan outlined by Advance Headquarters CINCPAC in Top Secret GUAM 070553 of 7 August is expressed by Commanding General China Theater.

Para. To CINCPAC. Request your concurrence in proposed arrangement.

Para. To WARCOS. Request action in conjunction Wash. Navy Department to obtain JCS approval and urgent implementation of action proposed by CINCPAC to make timely provision for operation of port at JEMADAR and a small naval surface force to protect port and convoys proceeding thereto. Request that directive be issued including provision for continuation of cooperative action essential to continued use of JEMADAR port until sub-unction becomes available, all without detriment to OLYMPIC, and that command arrangement include operational control by Commanding General CHINA THEATER over shore installations, since these will be serving this theater.

Para. Every effort being made to insure occupation of PORT BAYARD by 15 August and security of area including local approaches by 20 August.

08 0522 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COM3RDFLT.

Your 080309 approved. Assume you will take maximum advantage of any improvement in weather to expand coverage over assigned area. With emphasis on destruction KATANA force. Interested commands will be advised.

08 1540 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to CINCPAC info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVIC (APO), GHQ SUB AREA PETROLEUM OFFICER, ASOCHI OKINAWA.

Concur proposed amendments your top secret 040939.

07 1505 ALUSNA MCSOW to COMINCH AND CNO - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Vice Admiral Gavrilov head of Red Navy Communications today presented Navy's desires for communication set up for use of their operational liaison groups 4th question Victory 351 refers. They desire 2 circuits between VLADIVOSTOK and WASHINGTON 1 being the circuit VLADIVOSTOK MOSCOW WASHINGTON as now established. A 2nd to be a direct circuit between VLADIVOSTOK and WASHINGTON. For this circuit they propose to use 1 station at VLADIVOSTOK of about 10 Kilowatt power marginal operation using international code. This station has previously established communication with HONOLULU on 13635 KC between 0300 and 0400 GMT. See my 241410 GCT and related dispatches. They desire the use this frequency and time for 1 schedule but request our recommendation regarding additional frequencies and schedules. They believe 6 periods per day for sending and receiving will be adequate. The call sign GAB is proposed for WASHINGTON and GAL for VLADIVOSTOK. They desire our recommendations and suggestions regarding this circuit before establishing definite program of tests. They desire to establish 1 circuit for our own use between VLADIVOSTOK and GUAM 24 hour service is desired and the following wave lengths and

AUGUST

3434

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

07 1505 ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CNO - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

schedules are proposed between 2100 GMT and 0900 GMT basic wave length 14480 KC standby 16240 KC. Between 0900 GMT and 2100 GMT basic wave length 7990 KC standby 9125 KC. Suggested call signs are VLADIVOSTOK KBN GUAM ZTK. Soviet will use own station at VLADIVOSTOK but desire U.S. furnish facilities at GUAM. They are sending a communication team of 1 officer 4 radio operators and 3 coders to GUAM as part of liaison group. Following is over and above any stations or facilities which United States may desire to establish at VLADIVOSTOK for own use. New Subject. At a meeting with SLAVIN today regarding weather facilities, see my 040820, he stated that questions concerning this project were under study but that no answers were ready at this time.

08 2227 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info CTF 49, COM3RDLT.

Present task force 49 will pass to your operational control upon departure ENI ETOK. Consider it desirable that you arrange coordinated air attack and surface bombardment against an objective in the KURILES as soon as forces can be assembled and also make sweeps against enemy shipping which may appear.

08 2023 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CGUSPCT, ALL TF COMDRS PAC FLT, COM3RDLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

North Pacific Force with forces currently assigned plus CruDiv 5, CarDivs 23, 26 and DesRon 45 as separately reconstituted for this purpose assigned following additional tasks.

Establish and maintain control of a line of communications from the ALUTIANS across the SEA OF OKHOTSK.

Neutralize Japanese bases threatening this line of communications.

Provide protection for convoys against hostile air surface and submarine attacks between the ALUTIANS and escort turn around points in the SEA OF OKHOTSK.

Para. This modifies my OpPlan 4-45.

09 0050 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMSUBPAC.

There are U.S. submarines in the SEA OF JAPAN north of the boundary established in VICTORY 371. Request action to ensure that they not be attacked. Orders have been issued for them to move south of the boundary line.

Para. In view lack of recognition signals propose to keep Pacific Fleet submarines outside "Mutual" zones until liaison becomes effective except for the SEA OF OKHOTSK south of 47th parallel which must be used by submarines in passage.

Para. Request use of TARTARY STRAIT be obtained for entry and exit of submarines as soon as possible.

09 0129 COM3RDLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 37, CTF 38.

Your 082226 intend continue present attacks on 10th fuel 11th strike 12 and 13th. Will advise later as to Task Force 37 ability to participate after 10th. Details of plans by separate dispatch.

AUGUST.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

09 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNAVGR CHINA info COMGEN CHINA THEATER, COMINCH.

CTG 95.2 080733 passed separately. I request that requests for support of the activities of U. S. forces in CHINA by units of the Pacific Fleet be addressed to CINCPAC whenever time permits and normally through the Comdg General U.S. Forces in CHINA. Departure from proper channels in matters of this nature will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding and will not be conducive to the most efficient use of the resources which can be made available to support the CHINA THEATER.

09 0503 CINCPAC to INTCOM, CG USFCT info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COM7THFLT.

CX 31898.

Reference CX 45950 and CPMX 3010. Concur in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553 (GCT) relating to Naval planning for MONT MAYARD except CFS PCE (R) is not available. All PCE'S in this area have been converted to communications ships and are planned for use in our coming operations.

09 0816 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info COM3RDFLT, CTG 95.2.

Detach CruDiv 16 when RFS and direct ComBrdDiv 16 with his division proceed LEYTE reporting on arrival to COM3RDFLT for duty. CruDiv 16 will be available for inclusion in TF 38 for operations scheduled commence late August.

09 1403 CINCSIMA to COMAA info CINCPAC ADVANCE, CG USASTAF, COMAF.

CX 32046.

Boundary line connecting the following points delimits air and Naval operating areas for U.S. and USSR air and naval forces: point at intersection of 45-45 north latitude and line joining CAP CHILIAN (KORDEX) (southern tip of SAKHALIN) and CAP SOYA MISOKE (SOYAKAZE) (northern tip of HOKKAIDO), west to point at 45-45 north latitude 140-00 east longitude, point at 40-00 north latitude 135-00 east longitude, CAP KUTCHI (MUSU KUTCHI) on KOREAN coast, CHANGCHUN, LIAIYUAN, KAILU, CHIH-PING, PEKING, TIENTSIN, southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA. All points inclusive to US Forces. RUSSIAN naval and air forces will operate north of the boundary line and U.S. naval and air forces will operate south of the boundary line. Air forces of this command will operate north of the boundary line and in the SEA OF OKHOTSK only on specific authority from this headquarters. Reference our CX 26304 designating area of operations for FFAF in north CHINA and KOREA, FFAF will operate north or west of line indicated in reference only on authority of this headquarters. Clearance is being requested of commanding general USCT for operations of FFAF in area included between the line: MUSU KUTCHI, MUKDEN, PEKING and the line: CAP BOLINA (MUSU KUTCHI) CHANGCHUN, LIAIYUAN, KAILU, CHIH-PING, PEKING.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

09 0957 ALUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH AND CMC - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Answering your 011400 Red Navy submits following. They estimate convoys can be initiated within 5 to 10 days after beginning of hostilities and consider that it will be necessary to despatch from 3 to 4 convoys of from 12 to 15 vessels per convoy per month but add that convoys can begin as soon as the U.S. Navy has laid down the necessary operating arrangements in the region around the southern portion of KAMCHATKA and in OKHOTSK SKA. Their plan submitted for your consideration calls for U.S. convoying of Soviet merchant and mail post vessels to PETROPAVLOVSK except they desire such mailpost vessels as are properly equipped and trained to be used as escorts with convoys to PETROPAVLOVSK. Despatch of these convoys to be entirely as decided by U.S. Naval authorities. Convoys for NIKOLAEVSK will be made up at PETROPAVLOVSK. Responsibility for maintaining line of communications between PETROPAVLOVSK and NIKOLAEVSK will be a mutual responsibility of U.S. Navy and Soviet Pacific Fleet but they state they desire U.S. Navy to have control and responsibility of convoys until they arrive at NIKOLAEVSK. The composition of the escort vessels and the convoy commander to be assigned by U.S. Navy. Red Navy will furnish supplementary escort strength but is not able now to state numbers or types. Despatch of convoys to NIKOLAEVSK to be a matter of agreement between their Pacific Fleet and the convoy commander. They assume that the escort arriving at NIKOLAEVSK will pick up return convoy with PETROPAVLOVSK at 1st destination. Despatch of this return convoy to be a matter of agreement between their Pacific Fleet and convoy commander. Likewise despatch of convoys from PETROPAVLOVSK to UNITED STATES to be a matter of agreement between convoy commander and commander PETROPAVLOVSK Naval Base but UNITED STATES to have entire responsibility and control of these convoys. They desire that the same system that was used with convoy movements from the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to northern posts of the USSR be established. They will take the necessary steps to insure that Soviet submarines will be excluded from areas where convoys are operating and an anchorage will be arranged at PETROPAVLOVSK for escorts and attending auxiliaries. Soviet vessels in BERING SEA between 50-53 north and 57-30 north and east of 166-00 east will have been directed to proceed to U.S. Ports. Vessels in allied ports will be instructed as to their future movements by Soviet Convoy Officer. New Subject: They request initial numbers of liaison group for VLADIVOSTOK be held to lowest possible minimum because of lack of accommodations there. They would also like to be informed of number of U.S. submarines operating in SEA OF JAPAN. The naval section of the Soviet liaison group at GUAM will consist of 4 officers and 7 enlisted men. They were advised that this group could probably be flown to GUAM in U.S. planes which brought in U.S. Liaison Group on assumption this group will be flown in. Request confirmation. They are greatly interested in matter of recognition between surface craft and aircraft and between surface and aircraft and will submit their ideas shortly.

09 1540 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCH.

While delivering substance of your 090050 to Red Navy was advised that an American submarine was observed at 1410 on August 8th about 52 miles south of CAPE GAMOV and at 1540 on same date Soviet airplane observed fragments of a Merchantman which had been sunk in the region where the sub had been seen. Presence of U.S. Subs within this area complicates

AUGUST

3437

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

09 1540 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCH (Cont'd).

commencement of their naval activity and they desire to be informed when all submarines have left their zone. They will take such action as they can to assure that submarines are not attacked. With reference to passage of TANTARY STRAIT they promise early reply.

09 2115 COM3RDEFLT to CINCPAC info CTF 38, CTF 37.

For strikes after August 11th fueling intend to be prepared to shift full weight of attack to TOKYO AREA if my assigned primary northern targets are inaccessible or if fields now under attack are no longer good targets.

09 2202 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMNORPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW.

Refer ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957 being passed to you. Comment on convoy and escort control proposals therein. With respect to recognition systems CNO 091415 refers.

10 0811 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMNORPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW.

Your 092202. ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957. Recommend convoy system follow concept my Joint Staff Study KEEBLOCKS 4 of 26 May 1945.

Para. Specifically recommend that (A) Chop line as suggested in study be established within the SEA OF OKHOTSK east of which the UNITED STATES have complete responsibility for air and surface protection of convoys and east of which no Russian Submarines operate. West of the Chop line the reverse situation should exist. (B) Convoys assemble at ADAX and routed direct through the KURILES via OMNEKOTAN, SHASUKOTAN or MUSHIRU STRAITS to Russian ports or direct to PETROPAVLOSK. Minimum traffic between PETROPAVLOSK and ports to westward. (C) Minimum use of PETROPAVLOSK. No U.S. Naval shore establishments in Russian ports except for communications and liaison. (D) Dispatch of westbound convoys to be controlled by COMNORPAC and eastbound convoys by Russian Naval Command. Direct coordination and consultation between COMNORPAC and appropriate Russian naval commander required.

10 1609 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDEFLT info COMINCH, CTF 38, CINCPAC, COMNORPAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT.

The text of my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS dated 9 August insofar as naval landing force operations are concerned now reads as follows. "At each principal anchorage occupied an operational airfield will if practicable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings and for eventual development for naval purposes. The timing of this occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet the requirements of the situation as it develops after the arrival of naval forces in Japanese ports. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the anchorages occupied may be occupied if such action becomes necessary to insure the safety of naval forces".

Para. If time permits desire advance notification of any landing force operations under naval command.

AUGUST

3439

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

10 1614 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALPOA info COMINCH.

The public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against Japanese attacks. Neither the Japanese nor Allied Forces have stopped fighting. Take precautions against treachery even if local or general surrender should be suddenly announced. Maintain all current reconnaissance and patrols. Offensive action shall be continued unless otherwise specifically directed.

02 0912 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENUSASTAF info COMGEN20THAF.

Desire that any mines laid in SASEBO, NAGASAKI, KOBE, OSAKA, NAGOYA, TOKYO, all other southern and eastern HONSHU ports, and all INLAND SEA areas other than eastern approach to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and other than INLAND SEA area between 133-00E and 134-45E be sterilized by 1 December 1945. Also request that the number of mines planted in INLAND SEA area between 133-00E and 134-45E that will not be sterilized by 1 December 1945 be held to a minimum. Sterilizing times for other targets indicated in COMGEN21BOMCCMS 300035 June and COMAF 20's 290740 July as agreed to by my 020256 July.

10 1407 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

C 32375.

Tentative troop lists for BLACKLIST are approaching completion in current conferences with 6th, 8th and 10th Army commanders and with FEAF. Request that representatives of the Amphibious Forces which you intend to designate to work with each Army Commander be instructed to contact Army Commanders for detailed planning. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando, Pampang, Headquarters 8th Army now LENTE; headquarters 10th Army now OKINAWA. Army commanders will be responsible for the loading out of FEAF elements.

10 1507 CINCAFPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC PEARL, CG V MAR AMPHIB CORPS, COMAF 13, COMGEN FEAF.

CX 32403.

FEAF has assigned 13th Air Force mission of support 5th Amphibious Corps during OLYMPIC. Propose authorizing direct liaison between representatives 13th Air Force and 5th Marine Amphibious Corps on matters pertaining operational coordination and utilization aircraft warning control groups in direct support Marine OLYMPIC operations. Involves sending aircraft and liaison personnel to HAWAII required for liaison purposes. Your comments requested.

10 2314 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC info COMGENFEAF, COMAF13, COMGEN5THMARBORPS.

Your 101507 concur subject to the comment that the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is planned to be furnished as a component of the units of the Fleet Marine Force which may participate in OLYMPIC. As far as practicable Marine Ground Forces should be supported by Marine Aviation and Ground Air Liaison with Fleet Marine Force should be carried on by Marines.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

10 2000 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HL, COMEASTRON, COMSSEASTRON, COMGULFSEA-
FROM info SECNAV.

In order to conform with War Department policy for public relations and censorship purposes concerning military use of ATOMIC energy and ATOMIC bomb war Department policy is quoted below for guidance. Doubtful matters should be submitted to Navy Department puginfo for clearance War Department or U.S. Office of Censorship representatives. "1. Censors may pass material dealing with ATOM BOMB and military use of ATOMIC energy within bounds of official releases only. 2. Industries universities, individuals etc may be identified with the overall development in general terms but may not elaborate on their technical contributions. 3. Historical information of non-military nature concerning ATOMIC energy provided technical information on ATOMIC research after January 1940 is not revealed. Censors should stop for security reasons following information. 1. References to specific processes formulae and mechanics of operation. 2. Stocks location of stocks procurement of stocks and stocks consumption. It may be said that uranium is used. 3. Quality and quantity of production of active materials for ATOM bombs. 4. Physics characteristics and future military improvements or developments of ATOMIC energy or ATOMIC BOMB. 5. Descriptions or pictures of bomb and nature of its action other than comparative explosives equivalents such as equal to 20,000 tons of TNT or 2000 times more powerful than any bomb yet used. 6. Techniques of operational use of the bomb. 7. Information as to relative importance of the various methods or plants or of their relative functions or efficiencies. General references may be made to these installations only plants adjacent to OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE and RICHMOND, WASHINGTON and the laboratory near SANTE FE, NEW MEXICO."

10 2315 CINCPAC ADVANCE to JCS info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCAFAC, CG USFCT.

Subject is NAIRKO PROJECT which involves introduction of OSS personnel into KOREA by submarine and establishment of 2 radio listening posts at forward bases to receive information.

Para. Objectives are (A) to organize intelligence network in KOREA; (B) assist in rescue of downed aviators; (C) provide base for further penetration of JAPAN proper by clandestine agents; (D) organize resistance, sabotage and guerrilla activities. Principal value may lie in (D).

Para. Comments on CINCAFAC and CG USFCT on this project are contained in their 151119 July and 051200 July respectively both of which have been passed to JCS for information.

Para. CINCPAC does not favor project at this time but is prepared to furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.

10 2317 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMPHIBPAC, COM3RDPHIBFOR, COM5THPHIBFOR, COM7THPHIBFOR, info COMINCH, CINCAFAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COMGEN6THNAVY, COMGEN 10, COMGEN 8, CINCPAC PEARL H.

My Joint Staff Study CAMPUS provides that the planning and execution of the occupation of JAPAN by U.S. Army Forces will be coordinated with CINCAFAC. COMPHIBPAC will control the amphibious movement and debarkation of the occupation forces through the various amphibious force and group commanders. An amphibious force commander will be designated to operate in close coordination with each Army Commander and to conduct the movement to the objective of the forces assigned each Army. COM3RDPHIBFOR will move

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

10 2317 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMHIBSPAC, COM3RDHIBFOR, COM5THHIBFOR, COM7THHIBFOR, info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COMGEN6THARBY, COMGEN 10 COMGEN 8, CINCPAC PEARL (Cont'd).

the 8th Army, COM5THHIBFOR the 6th Army and COM7THHIBFOR the 10th Army".
Para. Amphibious force commanders concerned establish planning liaison immediately with Army Commanders. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando. Headquarters 8th Army now Leyte. Headquarters 10th Army now Okinawa.

11 0217 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, CINCPAC PEARL H., COMCORPAC, USN SOUTH DAKOTA.

In the event of a Japanese surrender it is my present intention to continue to exercise my command from my headquarters at GUAM except when my presence is required elsewhere for particular purposes. Admiral Halsey will remain in MISSOURI. Admiral Spruance will break his flag in NEW JERSEY. SOUTH DAKOTA will remain in company with Admiral Halsey and will be prepared to serve as my flagship when required. I expect to move between GUAM and SOUTH DAKOTA by seaplane when necessary.

11 0829 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COM5THFLT, COMINCH.

Due to quantities of United States pressure type mines laid in KOBE-OSAKA AREA specifically in the OSAKA HAN it appears impracticable to operate in that area until sterilizers render the mines inoperative in February 1946. KURE appears to be preferable as a base from which to control INLAND SEA. This affects CANBUS and BLACKLIST to a controlling degree.

11 1215 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, COMGENSOSCHINA, COMINCH, WARCOS.

CFBX 4309.

Regardless of Japanese surrender request all material, shipping and personnel designated for FORT BAYARD at GUAM conference be considered as firm agreements. All material, shipping and personnel agreed upon are required by CHINA THEATER whether port is established at BAYARD, KOWLOON or elsewhere.

12 0244 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLT info COM3RDFLT, COMHIBSPAC, COM1STCARTPAC, COM2NDCARTPAC, CASCU PHIBSPAC.

Refer to CASCU top secret serial 00015 dated 11 July and COM5THFLT 2nd endorsement serial 000155 of 7 August thereto subject dusk and dawn fighter patrols.

Para. It is considered infeasible to accomplish the training of fleet pilots on any such scale as visualized. Commanders of fast carrier task forces should take such measures as are practicable to insure that VF pilots flying dusk CAP'S are capable of landing on board parent carriers after dark.

Para. The maintenance of the day CAP after sunset is within the operational control of appropriate commanders and should be so ordered if required.

AUGUST

3441

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

12 0807 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMNORPAC.

For occupation planning am modifying concept my Joint Staff Study with respect to areas of responsibilities of action areas. COM5THFLT will command naval occupation western HONSHU, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU and will control INLAND SEA, southern half of SEA OF JAPAN, and waters east of line from southern tip of KOREA at 127-00 east south to 32-00 north 127-00 east southwest to 26-30 north 123-00 east thence south to 20-00 north. This will give COM7THFLT responsibility for planning and conducting operations from LUICHOW PENINSULA along CHINA COAST, in YANGTSE RIVER, and in YELLOW SEA. It will more nearly conform to boundaries between zones of action of 6th and 10th armies. Request your comment.

11 0858 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM5THFLT info CINCPAC REP MARIANAS, COM3RDFLT, COMNORPAC.

Alert 1 RCT from 6th MarDiv for immediate occupation duty if required. Unit should be completely equipped and ready for active combat operations. 5 units of fire and 30 days supply to accompany. If employed this RCT will be withdrawn later for subsequent employment with parent division. Advise unit designated earliest.

11 1344 ALUSNA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCH AND CNO.

Soviets consider that entry and exit of U.S. submarines through TARTAR STRAIT can be arranged for only after exchange of liaison groups between Soviet and United States Pacific Fleets and after a system of recognition on which they are presently engaged has been worked out. Cinpac 09050 refers.

12 0111 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Request early action on my 070553 since the operations involved will be required to support operations directed by MARK 47513 (JCS 102217) even if Japanese surrender.

12 0112 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT.

CINCPAC 090503 indicates that 3 patrol craft escort (rescue) have been converted into communication ships. It is noted that they were not included in your 121406 or 30821 as available for OLYMPIC. Please furnish me complete data on status these craft including date authority and extent of their conversion, present employment, source and service ownership of additional equipment.

Para. All ships of the Pacific Fleet which participate in CAMIC will be assigned by me to an appropriate Task Organization.

AUGUST

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

12 1202 CINCPAC to CTF 112 info VA(), RA(), CG 1.

Further to my 120226. I have now been instructed by CTF 111 to prepare a plan to move 3 small composite groups with air and logistic support to HONG KONG, MANCHAI and perhaps ENTAPORE.

Para 2. To achieve this all Cruisers and majority of destroyers of TG 37.3 may be required to augment TG 111.2 and these ships will require replenishment as far as possible at MANUS.

Para 3. Further signal will be made when situation has been appreciated and instructions of US Government which are expected have been received.

Para 4. WARRICK (A) requirements of CTF 38.5 should continue to have 1st priority. Some reduction in his JULY requirements may prove possible if situation clears quickly.

(B) Units of Fleet Train and Escorts which are operationally useful should not come south of MANUS.

(C) Movements of CVE's to AUSTRALIA should continue as previously arranged.

12 1527 CINCPAC to COM3RDMIB, CGLSTARV, COM7THMIB, COM5THMIB, MARCOS, COM-
PHIBSPAC, USASTAF, CG 6TH ARMY, FETPAC, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, ASCOM,
CG AFNESPAC, COMCENTAF, AFMIDPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

CX 33017.

BLACKLIST Play, 3rd Edition, dated 8 August, is hereby amended to designate the 20-4th Corps as occupation force, KOREA. the 20-4th Corps will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in KOREA, functioning as a Task Force directly under this headquarters. Responsibilities of the 10th Army in the KYUKYUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain unchanged.

Para. Tentative troop list for BLACKLIST distributed 12 August as inclosure to letter this headquarters file AG 322 (11 August 1945) GC (not to all or needed) is amended as follows: on page 1 substitute the words "Part 1: 24th Corps". for the words "Part 1: 10th U.S. Army". Delete the following units from Part 1: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 10th Army, 519 Military Police Battalion (Army), 85 signal operations battalion to headquarters and Headquarters company ASCOM 10 is designated headquarters and Headquarters company 24.

Para. The 10th Army will reinforce headquarters, 24th Corps with commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other appropriate resources as may be available, to enable the 24th Corps to perform its assigned area command and military government functions.

12 2148 COMINCH AND CMC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMGEN CHINA, CCS USA.

Assembly of personnel and material and arrangements for shipping your 070553 are approved for employment on CHINA COAST in accordance with JCS directive to be issued when destination determined.

AUGUST (GCT)

3442

224

WARNING ORDER. Be prepared to execute operation CAMUS on short notice in accordance CINCPCA Joint Staff study serial 0005103 August 9. Troop list will be in accordance CINCPC 100904, 120623, 120624. 5th InfCor should be ordered to report to CMCG2/6THA25 for planning.

14 0819 CINCAC ADVISE to CINCACAC info COMZTHET. COMZTHETAFR. N. QUICHE.

Para. Suggest CMTF/SECRET and COMINT/COMINT/SECRET convey and advise me and CHICAGOAC earliest practicable date for transfer.

Admiralty have now stated intention of sending British Naval Force to HONGKONG subject to arrangements with U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Para 3. Provision of oilers is essential to this move even at some expense of TG 38.5

Para 5. CTF 112 (A) report intentions to ZINC 2.5 and CTF 38.5 (A) make direct arrangements with ZINC 2.5 ADVANCE and COMNAVFOR 10 regarding UUT41.

33551.

Further to conference of 11 August with your representative (Admiral Sherman) a vessel capable of sustained speed 17 knots is being loaded LAFILA with materials and personnel necessary for construction of bulk aviation gasoline facilities TUNYO to go forward from OKINAWA 1st Navy echelon. Inasmuch as water capacity this vessel is limited it is requested that navy facilities for watering at both OKINAWA and objective area be made available. The name of vessel will be given in a separate radio. Advise if watering facilities for approximately 500 personnel will be available.

3444

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

14 2318 MARSHALL to WEDDEMEYER, MACARTHUR info NIMITZ.

PARY 49578.

For your information with reference to PARY 49042, the British Chiefs of Staff now inform the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that they have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser concerning acceptance of surrender of Japanese at HONGKONG.

Para. In another paper the British asked the concurrence or comment of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on instructions already sent to Mountbatten on which, in view of the time factor, the British are going ahead with all preparations. These instructions in summary are that, after acceptance of Japanese surrender, main tasks will be:

A. Reoccupation of key areas of occupied territory and surrender and disarmament of Japs.

B. Release of British and Allied prisoners of war.

C. Protection of British interests in CHINA.

D. Participation in the occupation of JAPAN.

Para. Assumptions on policy are:

A. Parts of Southwest Pacific will pass to British and Australian command on cease fire.

B. Highly important British accept HONGKONG surrender and show British flag at main Chinese ports.

C. British take part in Japanese occupation with British Commonwealth force in which Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand and probably Canada will each be represented by a Brigade Group supported by an air component.

Para. Mountbatten has been asked to submit plans for operations in order of priority:

A. Complete occupation of BURMA, reopen MALACCA STRAITS, and occupy SINGAPORE and key areas of MALAYA.

B. Reestablish a British garrison in HONGKONG using initially British Pacific Fleet and an Australian force from PACIFIC. These to be released as soon as possible with Brigade and tactical air force from PAC.

C. Small forces for certain Chinese ports.

D. Occupation of JAPAN.

E. Dispatch of force to CHINA. Arrangements being made to ship French forces and civil affairs personnel as a follow up. Mountbatten's forces should not occupy more of CHINA than necessary to assure the control of headquarters of the Japanese southern armies.

F. Dispatch forces to JAVA as soon as possible to accept surrender there. Arrangements are being made to ship Dutch security forces.

G. SUMATRA is in lower priority than JAVA.

Para. Australian forces are being asked to take initial responsibility for BORNEO and enemy occupied territories in the east. At later date Mountbatten must be prepared to provide the Australians a small proportion of force and some merchant shipping.

H. Mountbatten should appreciate that many of these arrangements are subject to agreement of Governments, which the British are now undertaking.

Para. This ends summary of orders issued by British Chiefs of Staff to Mountbatten.

Para. Request Wedemeyer's and MacArthur's expeditious comments on the foregoing.

Para. This message passed to Nimitz at request of Navy Department.

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

At 142130 Halsey acknowledged receipt of orders to suspend air attack operations. The initial attack was already underway when I received your directive to suspend the operations.

15 0305 CINCPAC to CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, CG XXIV CORPS, COMCEN FEAF, CG AFWESPAC, ADMIDPAC, info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMPHIBPAC, COMSHEL, COMSHELT, COMTHFLT, COM3ROPHIBFOR, COMTHPHIBFOR, CG 1ST PAC, CG USASTAF WARCOS, COM5THPHIBFOR, CG 1st ARMY.

CX 33638.

Follows warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation. Action aces will immediately initiate the execution of operations to occupy JAPAN and KOREA as outlined in BLACKLIST. COMCEN 6TH and 8TH Armies and 24th Corps will expedite arrangements respectively with Commanders 9th, 3rd, and 7th Amphibious Forces and air Task Force Commanders. Operations instructions number 4 directing preparations for the occupation of JAPAN and KOREA being issued this date. B Day the effective date of OI number 4 is 15 August 1945. Operation MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely. Warning Orders for execution of B 60 will follow. No actual landing in JAPAN or KOREA will be made prior to a date to be announced later.

15 0245 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, CG XXIV CORPS, AFWESPAC, ADMIDPAC, COMPHIBPAC.

CX 33634.

Priorities for allocation of seaborne troop lift for phase 1 BLACKLIST are as follows: 1st, for 8th Army, 3 and 1/3 reinforced Army Divisions plus headquarters and supporting troops as follows: CH: APPAC, 8th Army, 11 Corps, 14 Corps, destination TOKYO. 2nd, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Division of the 5th Amphibious Corps, plus available elements of 5th Amphibious Corps Headquarters both from MARIANAS, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 3rd, for 6th Army, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 6th Army and 1 Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OSAKA. 4th, for 24 Corps, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 24 Corps Headquarters and corps troops, destination KIEJO. 5th, for 8th Army, 1 reinforced Army Division plus 9th Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OMINATO. 6th, for 6th Army, 1 Marine Division plus remainder of 5th Amphibious Corps Headquarters and supporting troops from HAWAII, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 7th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced Army Division from HAWAII, destination OSAKA. 8th, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Division from Marianas, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 9th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced Army division, destination OSAKA. 10th, for 8th Army, 1 and 1/3 reinforced Army Divisions, destination OMINATO.

Para. Where more than 1 Division is allocated for initial movement to a given objective, the movement may, at the discretion of the Army or Corps Commander concerned, (6th Army, 8th Army or 2 ~~SYLPHIBFOR~~) and as arranged with the corresponding naval task force commander, be conducted by reinforced division rather than by simultaneous movement of the entire allocation.

Para. The following paragraph for CINCPAC only: this message confirms priorities handed Admiral Sherman at Manila 13 August on BLACKLIST priorities and troop lift estimates. The estimate for the troops involved in the initial movement to the TOKYO area should read "personnel, 151 allocation of shipping should be obtained from the Army Commander concerned". 3496

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
ALFUST (GCT)

15 1333 CINCPAC to WARCOS FOR JCS info CINCPAC ADVANCE. COMGEN US FORCES CHINA.

CX 33830 - This radio in 4 parts.

Para 1. Present planned BLACKLIST contemplates employment, JAPAN 19 Divisions, KOREA 3 Divisions, Philippine Garrison 2 Divisions, reference WX 49334. It is considered that forces and shipping allocate for JAPAN proper must remain available pending determination of conditions after initial landings which will be made by 14 Divisions.

Para 2. By confining KOREAN occupation to KESJO AREA and reducing initial entry to the initial division only, a division with shipping can be made available for DARIEN at a relatively early date. Eventual accomplishment of occupation mission in the United States zone of KOREA will require commitment of an additional Army division not now allocated if DARIEN is occupied.

Para 3. Occupation of SHANGHAI by 2 divisions of the 3rd Phib Corps is proposed by CINCPAC in conjunction with COMGEN CHINA when shipping becomes available, this can be accomplished if no unexpected requirements arise in JAPAN proper or KOREA.

Para 4. It is recommended that any occupations on the CHINA COAST by United States forces further to those cited above be placed in a contingent category dependent upon the development of the situation in higher priority areas and availability of resources.

15 0206 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM5THPHIBFOR, COMCORPAC, COMGEN 5THPHIBCORPS info CINCPAC.

Para 1. CINCPAC staff study BLACKLIST mailed today. Following changes made since publication.

A. 24th Corps designated as occupation force, KOREA. 24th Corps will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in KOREA, functioning as a Task Force directly under CINCPAC. 10th Army responsibility in the RYUKYUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain unchanged.

B. In B 2 the 5th Phib Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 98th Division will be employed for B 10 in the OSAKA AREA.

C. 27 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B 60. 27 Division replaces 98 division within the 14 Corps. 38 Division remains in AFPAC reserve.

D. 96 Division is included in 24 Corps replacing 27 Division.

E. Delete all references to occupation of any part of KARAFUTO. Such operations will not be conducted.

Para 2. Foregoing changes also apply to applicable parts of my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

15 2127 COMINCH AND CNO AND CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY to CINCPAC. CINCPAC ADVANCE
info U.S. MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW.

With Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison groups Army and Navy at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok appear to be subject to modification. In this connection it is suggested that a Cruiser or other suitable vessel be provided for the use of Army and Navy liaison representatives to deal with the Russian Command in whatever ASIATIC PORT appears desirable such as Dairen. The sending of a Cruiser for this liaison purpose should be considered in connection with previous directive regarding the occupation of Dairen by United States forces. (For Deane reference to visits to or occupation of Dairen is not to be communicated to the Soviets at this time).

Para 2. Taking foregoing into consideration information desired from MacArthur and Nimitz as to what changes if any they desire as regards present arrangements for liaison groups at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok informing military mission MOSCOW at same time.

Para 3. In connection with above CINCPAC is advised that a group vice for Navy liaison group has not as yet been received but Rear Admiral Settle with 8 additional Naval officers and 6 enlisted men are proceeding by air to GUAM from Washington evening 16 August to report to him for further assignment in connection with this duty.

16 0433 CNS SUMAR to COM7THFLT info CONSERV PAC. CONSERV 7TH. CINCPAC BOTH NO.

My serial 0002 of 13 August Re: FORT BAYARD operation. Have assigned 6 officers from NABU 13 including Commander John Harold Sedis USNR 86937 to this operation. Latter assigned acting Commanding Officer of NABU pending confirmation or designation of another by higher authority. Essential to have an organized NABU to avoid confusion. New Subject. Designation of 7 LST's received this date. Have not yet arrived but are expected tomorrow. Unless otherwise directed will begin loading upon arrival. At moment appears that 3 additional LST's will be required but will advise of additional shipping requirements later. Personnel from GRO PAC PEARL not arrived. Request shipping designation.

16 0724 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO info WABCOS. CINCPAC.

In view of current developments believe it better to cancel exchange of Flag Officers on basis originally planned. Your 152227. The presence of a Russian Liaison Group at my headquarters would have many disadvantages.

Para. In lieu thereof propose that Rear Admiral Settle report to CINCPAC break his flag in a cruiser and proceed initially to Vladivostok and later to such other port as may be desirable.

Para. Propose to use LOUISVILLE escorted by a destroyer if you concur.

16 1141 CINCPAC to COMINCH & CNO WABCOS. info US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW.
CINCPAC. USASTAF.

34087.

ReUrads 152127Z the mission assigned to the U.S. Military Liaison group which has been organized for station in Khabarovsk was to effect operational coordination and liaison with the Red Army in connection with Military operations against JAPAN. So far as this command is concerned direct liaison is no longer necessary query shall the project be continued.

AUGUST (CCT)

3448

Your 141507. CX 33547. My 150846 also refers. Naval facilities required to be furnished in each occupational area as follows:

B. OMINATO. Entire naval base at OMINATO with all present facilities. KABAYAMA airfield with living quarters for 3000 personnel. 50 truck not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger cars. Clearance all highways between port and airfield.

D. SASEBO. Entire naval base at SASEBO with all present facilities. OMURA seaplane base and airfield with all adjacent unloading facilities. Living quarters for 4000. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger vehicles.

F. Airfields to be complete with all existing facilities. Runways taxiways and adjacent areas cleared of debris and ready for operation.

H. Facilities at airfields and bases to include adequate electric power water and sewage disposal.

~~14 1101 CINCPAC to CINCIPAC ADV. JTFPAC. MARCOS. COMCONTHAIEX. COMCONTHAEX.
COMCONTHAEX. ASOM I. CONCONAPESPAC. CONCONAPAC. COMCONAPAC. COMCONSPAC
COMCONSPAC. COMCONUSASTAF.~~

BLACKLIST plan, edition number 3, this headquarters dated 8 August 45 is amended as follows:

B. The 27 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B-60. The 27 division replaces the 98 division within the 14 Corps. The 38 Division remains in AFPAC reserve.

38 Division remains in AFPAF Reserve.
C. The 96 division is included in the 24 Corps replacing the 27 Div.
D. Delete all references to operations for the occupation of any part
of KARAFUTU. Such operations will not be conducted.

3449

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 0529 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV. COMGENCHINA. WARCOS. SACSEA. COMCOMUSASTAF. MIL MISSION MOSCOW.

CX 33657.

Pursuant to directive from the President of the United States and in accordance with agreement among the governments of the United States, Chinese republic, United Kingdom, and Union of Socialist Republics I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the Japanese surrender. I assume command accordingly. The channel of communications with the Japanese Imperial Government and Japanese Imperial Headquarters will be through this headquarters. MacArthur.

16 0045 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC. BRITISH ARMY DELAG.
WARX 50182.

You will release to the full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

16 0250 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH. WARCOS.

Your CX 33831. Will send Rear Admiral Sherman to represent me at Manila during meeting with Japanese representatives 17 August.

Para. The presence of a liaison group to represent me at your headquarters in the TOKYO AREA will be very advantageous and I propose to send a group headed by a Flag Officer with communication and intelligence personnel as required. Will advise shortly as to personality.

15 1442 COMGENCHINA to WARCOS Info COMINCH. CINCPAC. COMCOMUSASTAF.

TOP SECRET. CFBX 4740 In view of final decision that immediate requirements of China Theater for U S troops to occupy key positions cannot be furnished, determined measures must be taken to retain control of the situation here. Refer WAR 49574. First: It is urgently requested that no aircraft be removed from the India-China Wing, ATC, see WAR 49943. The present instructions issued General Turner in personal ATC message from Washington have caused him to take the measure of alerting 50 C-54's the removal of which from the Hump is costing China Theater 12000 tons per month and this loss in the absence of immediate U S occupation forces on the CHINA COAST is jeopardizing the new mission of the China Theater WARX 47593. Chinese troops are being alerted for move to secure the most critical areas however their arrival will be a matter of weeks or months if airlift is not employed. Adequate forces to insure security of these key areas cannot be moved in time unless all presently assigned aircraft are available to lift the troops and to bring fuel into CHINA. 2nd: It is urgently requested that additional assistance be given by making Avigas available at the airfields in vicinity of NANKING and in the TIENTSIN-PEIPING area for the movement of occupational Chinese forces. It is suggested that U S Navy convoy shipment of avigas.

Para. Utilizing vessels set up for JEMEDAR should meet our emergency requirements for the NANKING area, provided we can expect continued shipments, means which can be made available plus personnel and equipment

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 1442

---(continued)---

previously allocated by CINCPAC, CINCPAC and WAR for JEMEDAR should enable us to handle this operation. Request that all resources allocated for JEMEDAR be diverted to NANKING.

Para. In addition request the 7 LST's originally earmarked for naval pre-convoy in JEMEDAR be retained after off loading at NANKING with addition of any others which can be made available for lift of damaged avigas from OKINAWA to TIENTSIN.

Para. 3rd: The allocation of LCI craft for coastal or river movement intra CHINA would material increase our capabilities for the movement of forces into the vital areas. It is recommended that Task Force 93 be augmented by a minimum of 50 LCI for this purpose.

Para. The urgency and importance of the above must not be underestimated. There are reports that fighting is already in progress between Central Government and Communist Troops in the TIENTSIN area and elsewhere, with the Communists attempting to seize all key towns and airfields in northeast CHINA. Each day's delay in placing a major force in the critical areas increases the probability of widespread civil conflict and jeopardizes our 1st task of securing the key areas within CHINA as stated in WAR 49574.

16 1940

COMINCH AND CNO CHIEF OF STAFF to MILMIS MOSCOW - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC. CINCPAC.

My 152127 and MILMIS MOSCOW MX 25322 since arrangements with Soviets for exchanging Army, Navy liaison groups Khabarovsk and Vladivostok and U.S. Headquarters were to effect war operational coordination we now propose to cancel these liaison missions.

Para 2. In order to provide for contact with the Soviet Pacific Naval headquarters we propose to send a Cruiser and 1 or 2 Destroyers initially to VLADIVOSTOK and later to such other ports as may be desirable.

Para 3. Obtain Soviet concurrence on above and advise originators and info addressees. Upon receipt of Soviet concurrence regarding visit to VLADIVOSTOK CINCPAC make detailed arrangements and notification direct through ALUSNA MOSCOW keeping COMINCH advised.

Para 4. If the need should arise for additional liaison in connection with coordination of OSC surrender activities proposals therefor will be furnished at a later date.

17 0615

COMGEN CHINA to MARCOS info CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

CFBX 4870.

Reference paragraph A of 4th document "General Order Number 1 Military and Naval" (WAR 48672 as amended by subsequent messages) request that the term "MANCHURIA" be defined. Chinese authorities state that the term "MANCHURIA" includes only 3 provinces, namely, LIAONING, KAREN and HEILUNGKIANG. However since the Japanese created the puppet government of MANCHUKUO they have included the province of JEHOL which the Chinese government considers to be an integral part of CHINA and not a part of MANCHURIA. The Chinese state that MANCHURIA as a geographical term definitely does not include JEHOL and they feel it to be vitally important that JEHOL be expressly excluded from the term "MANCHURIA" as used in the surrender documents. Request that this matter be clarified and if possible that JEHOL be definitely excluded from MANCHURIA as used in General Order No. 1. Request prompt information as to action taken.

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
SECRET (S)

16 0944 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to KENNEDY AND WEDMAYER info MACARTHUR.

WX 50281.

This message refers to Wedmayer 4352, MacArthur 33449 and W 49334 and Cincpac 128842.

Priority for areas to be occupied as given in WX 47946 and 48804 will not be changed at this time. However, it is desired that every effort be made to expedite the movement of U. S. Forces into key ports on the CHINA COAST. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the attitude of the Japanese administration and armed forces in the Japanese Homeland and the subsequent time and speed of movement of U. S. Forces into the Japanese Homeland remains to be determined. In preparing a reply to 49334, it is requested that consideration be given to proceeding with arrangements on a basis that in addition to KIELSO or another KOREAN port, DAIKIN if not already occupied by the Russians, a CHINA COAST port will be entered prior to commitment of forces for 2nd priority objectives in JAPAN PROPER as set forth in BLACKLIST plan dated 25 July. This suggestion is made with the thought that it may be practicable to set up arrangements so that forces intended for ports around the YELLOW SEA can, up to their actual landing, still be shifted to the Japanese Homeland if the developing situation so indicates.

On the matter of a specific port or ports on the CHINA COAST, this is left for the time being to Commanders concerned. Wedmayer should obtain views of the Generalissimo on the port to be selected, if any can be entered in the near future. For your information, State Department considers the occupation of TSINGTAO or TAKU should take priority over SHANGHAI. In light of the foregoing and in answering 49334, and this message, request that, after consulting Wedmayer, MacArthur and Nimitz furnish their best estimate of time schedule on a port in KOREA, DAIKIN and a CHINA PORT. In your time schedule there should be included alternate ports to be occupied by the forces set up should DAIKIN and/or KIELSO have been previously occupied by the Soviets.

SECRET (S)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (OCT)

17 0906 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMMARIANAS, COMMARGILS info COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM4THPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC.

Make plans and preparations to receive the surrender of all Japanese forces remaining in the BONINS, MARIANAS, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS. For these purposes the command areas shown in Appendix 1 to Annex B of my OpPlan 12-45 are applicable. Advise means required to implement plans.

Para. Plans should include provision for concentrating prisoners in the larger islands or Atolls and for their repatriation when circumstances and shipping permit subject to arrangements between CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

Para. Make preliminary plans for activating naval airfields on WAKE and MARCUS for use of TATS and other transient aircraft.

17 1045 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C-34353.

From Sherman. Have passed JCS WX 50181 to COMPHIBSPAC and asked him to submit to you and CINCPAC his best estimates of timing under the present priorities and possible alternatives to permit earlier movements to CHINA.

Para. Estimates by Wilkinson contemplates arrivals TOKYO as follows: B plus 16, 11th Corps Hdqtrs, 1st Cav Div and 112 RCT. B plus 20 2 American B plus 29 43 inf Div and 14th Corps Hdqtrs. Assuming use of same ships the 9th Corps Hdqtrs and 1 Div would arrive OKINAWA B plus 40. 2nd Div OKINAWA at B plus 47.

Para. 6th Army estimates 1st arrivals as: 5th MarDiv B plus 31, 98th B plus 41. 3rd B plus 47. 27th B plus 57.

Para. CINCPAC has asked COMGEN CHINA to send representative here.

Para. Perhaps Carter can produce a helpful estimate from his own records.

18 0810 COMUSASTAF to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC, COMNAIR, COMAF 20, COMAF 8, COMMARIANAS.

2346.

Further reference CINCPAC ADVANCE Top Sec message date time group 160808Z August and our number 2229 date time group 176131Z, your attention is invited to the fact that prior to the termination of hostilities war department policy prescribed that USASTAF construction be in accordance with minimum war operational requirements. As a result, much of the construction that now exists is not desirable for either permanent or semi-permanent use. In view of either the permanent or semi-permanent nature that many USASTAF installations may have, USASTAF desire to reserve the right to review current construction projects in light of post V-J day requirements and to propose construction that may be either of a permanent or semi-permanent nature as well as projects in categories you list. You are advised of USASTAF AFOS position in this matter inasmuch as your policy makes no provision for future war department approval of post-war projects.

AUGUST (OCT)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (OCT)

19 0023 WARCOS to CINCPAC, CHUNGKING CHINA THEATER HQ info CINCPAC ADVANCE H.
HQ USAF CBI NEW DELHI, DEPCOM 20AF GUAM.

WARX 51481.

In reply to a message from the Prime Minister, the President has answered as follows: "From the U.S. standpoint there is no objection to the surrender of HONGKONG being accepted by a British Officer provided Military coordination is effected beforehand by the British with the Generalissimo on operational matters connected with assistance and support through that area to Chinese and American forces who may still be either engaged against the enemy or involved in securing surrender of Japanese forces in the hinterland. General MacArthur will be instructed to arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to the British Commander whenever the above coordination is effected.

Para. The Secretary of State informed T. V. Soong here this morning of thus contemplated action stating that it did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of HONGKONG.

19 0219 COM3RDEFLT to COMGENSTHAROK info CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADV, CTF 31, COMNAVFOR

HALSEY TO EICHELBERGER.

Predicated on assumption fleet arrives SAGAMI WAN 23rd, airborne landing 11th AB division takes place 25th, and troops will initially occupy only ATSUGI-YOKOSUKA and area to southward I have formulated 2 alternate plans (plan 1) 4th Marines and Fleet Marine landing force under B.G. Clement land at SHINJIKU. 4th Marines spearheaded by tanks make 2 prong simultaneous advance on YOKOSUKA airbase and YOKOSUKA naval base. Fleet Marines protect rear and flanks. Ship fire support in both SAGAMI WAN and TOKYO BAY. Plan 2 forces land at YOKOSUKA air base and envelope YOKOSUKA naval base from rear by land.

Para. Both plans contemplate landings on same day as airborne landings with H hour for naval landings approximately same as time designated for airborne landings or as you may direct. Plan 1 preferred as it avoids exposing transports to treachery in very restricted waters. Both plans permit subsequent isolating and disarming enemy forces on peninsula south of KOKOSUKA-SHINJIKU line after fleet landing forces take over security duty at YOKOSUKA air and naval bases.

Para. Nav. landing forces comprise 4th Marines and 1800 (3 battalions) marines from the fleet under Clement, a reserve force of 1200 (3 battalions) U.S. bluejackets and 1 battalion (400 men) from British Fleet for security duty. An additional reserve of 5 battalions (2000 men) of U.S. bluejackets can be mustered but with inferior equipment.

Para. In order to crystallize details of my plans request following information earliest (A) on what air field or fields will 11th AB division land (B) is my plan 1 agreeable to you (C) what if any support of airborne operation do you require from 3rd fleet air surface or ground forces (D) do you wish to designate H hour for my forces or will you be satisfied with my intent to time it with initial airborne landings (E) are you agreeable to my normal amphibious organization (CTF 31 R Adm Badger Commander attack Force). Brig Gen Clement Commander Landing Force) under which Clement is COMGEN ashore until notified that he is relieved by the officer you designate.

Para. With the answers to the foregoing I can meet any time table with 72 hours notice in advance of earliest scheduled date of airborne landing.

AUGUST (OCT)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GGT)

19 2113 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, WEDMEYER info NIMITZ, WHISLER, SPARTAN
BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION.

WARX 51776.

Concerning WARX 51481, MacArthur will arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to a British Commander as soon as the military coordination with the Generalissimo on operational matters indicated by the President is effected by the British. Wedemeyer will keep MacArthur informed of the progress of these arrangements with the view to expeditious action.

18 2313 WARCOS to CINCPAC Info H. USAFBI, H. USAFCT, CINCPAC ADVANCE.

WARX 51397.

State Department requests you be informed that the President has now decided that, in addition to representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, representatives of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the Netherlands will be invited to be present at the acceptance of the Japanese surrender. Reference is WARX 50043. Communications have gone to those governments asking them to name representatives and to communicate, if possible, directly with you on details, including arrangements for attendance.

Para. State Department requests appropriate instructions be issued to you to provide for the presence of these representatives. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

19 0909 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS to CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMCHIN CHINA
(GENERALISSIMO), CHC AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (GENL BLANCK), CHICP, U.S.
MILITARY MISSION, MOSCOW (CHIC SOVIET FORCES, FAR EAST, CG 25TH CORPS, CG
8TH ARMY, CG 6TH SACSEA info WARCOS (JCS), CG 10TH ARMY, 24TH CORPS, USASTAF
CG AF WESPAC.

X 2515.

Herewith for information are official texts of 3 basic documents governing general surrender of Japanese and Japanese controlled armed forces which are being handed by me to Japanese representatives at my headquarters 20 August 1945 for compliance as indicated. (1) proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN. "Accepting the terms set forth in declaration by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on July 26 1945 at POTSDAM and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on my behalf the instrument of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to issue general orders to the military and naval forces in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. I command all my people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the instrument of surrender and the general orders issued by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder".

B. "Instrument of surrender". We, acting by command of and on behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain 26 July 1945 at POTSDAM, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which 4 powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

3455

- continued -

TOP SECRET
August (CCT)

- continued -

111A

Para. We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese Armed Forces and all Armed Forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

Para. We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircrafts, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

Para. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese Forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

Para. We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper and to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

Para 6. We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commanders for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration.

Para 7. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

Para 8. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Para. Signed at blank at blank on the blank day of blank, 1945. Blank by command in behalf of the Emperor of Japan and the Japanese Government. Blank by command and in behalf of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters.

Para. Accepted at blank at blank on the blank day of blank 1945, for the United States, Republic of China, United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and in the interest of the other United Nations at war with Japan. Blank Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Blank United States representative. Blank Republic of China representative. Blank United Kingdom representative. Blank Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative".

C. General order number 1, military and naval. "The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese Armed forces and Japanese controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, The Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in

- continued -

3456

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (COT)

- continued -

detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out (A) the Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within CHINA, (excluding MANCHURIA), FORMOSA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA north of 16-00 north shall surrender to Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK. (B) The Senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, and auxiliary forces within MANCHURIA, KOREA north of 38-00 north and KARAFUTO shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

Para. (C) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA SOUTH of 16-00 north, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender (to the Supreme Commander South East Asia Command or the commanding general Australian Forces-the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. (D) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands, ~~MARSHALLS~~, BONIN, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Para. (E) To the Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of JAPAN, minor islands adjacent thereto, KOREA south of 38-00 north and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces in the Pacific.

Para. (F) The above indicated commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrender, and all surrenders of Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

Para. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its commanders in JAPAN and abroad to disarm completely all forces of JAPAN or under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied commanders indicated above.

Para. Pending further instructions, the Japanese police force in the main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police force will be prescribed.

Para 2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete information with respect to JAPAN and all areas under Japanese control, as follows:

- A. Lists of all land, air and antiaircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.
- B. Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving complete information as to the number, type, location, and condition of such aircraft.
- C. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.
- D. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 tons (Gross), in and out of commission and under construction, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.
- E. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps showing locations and layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to

- continued -

3457

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

F. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

G. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Para 3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will insure that all Japanese military, naval and civilian aircraft remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

Para 4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

Para 5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will insure that:

A. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.

C. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of above.

Para 6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

A. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in section 4 of this order).

B. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.

C. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defense, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications installations and establishments.

D. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the productions or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by military or part.

Para. Military organization in connection with its operations.

Para 7. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs A, B, and D of section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

Para 8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
ARMIST (OCT)

- continued -

Para 9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

A. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved, to include the administrative and supply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms, and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the Command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoners of war and civilian internees.

C. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities.

D. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their locations LOCATIONS. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

Para 11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instructions from Allied occupation commanders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

Para 12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of other Allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of Allied Military authorities and the Japanese Government.

19 1047 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to SACSEA, OOC AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (DELIVER GENERAL BLANKY IN MANILA) info WARCOSIGMA, CINCIPAC, WARCIL.

Z 517.

It is anticipated that the actual surrender in TOKYO will take place 28 August. Instructions received by this headquarters direct that: "The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, southeast ASIA command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces - the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers".

Para. Action addressees are requested to arrange between them the areas within which they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese forces and advise at earliest.

CLASSIFIED

**A. NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
CINCPAC AND CINCPAC**

INCOMING

PLAIN

ROUTINE

ORDER NUMBER 1, MILITARY AND NAVAL, IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: (2627)
PARAGRAPH 1 DELETE SUBPARAGRAPH C OF PART 1 AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR
THE FOLLOWING 2 SUBPARAGRAPHS; (1ST SUBPARAGRAPH) "THE SENIOR

JAPANESE COMMANDER AND ALL GROUND, SEA, AIR AND AUXILIARY FORCES
WITHIN THE ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SOUTH OF 16-00 NORTH LATITUDE, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, LESHER SUND

(INCLUDING BALI, LOMBOK, CERAM, AMBON, KAI, AROE, TANIMBAR, AND
ISLANDS IN THE ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, HALMAHERAS, AND DUTCH NEW
GUINEA, SHALL SURRENDER TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ASIA

COMMAND " X (2ND SUBPARAGRAPH) "THE SENIOR JAPANESE COMMANDER AND
ALL GROUND, SEA, AIR AND AUXILIARY FORCES WITHIN BORNEO, BRIT NEW
GUINEA, THE BISMARCKS AND SOLOMONS, SHALL SURRENDER TO THE COMMANDER

IN-CHIEF COA AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES" X PARAGRAPH 2 FROM SUB-

DATE 31AUG45/0024 CRYPTO-GROUP PLAIN CBO HALE Cl -Enc No U 3913

ORIGINATOR SCAF 281233 CINCPAC-PCA ADV HED 291856	ACTION JAPANESE IMPERIAL HQ COMGENCHINA (FOR GENERAL SHSILIO) MILITARY FORCES TO GENERAL BLANEY MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW JCS/CG 6TH ARMY PASHED CG 24TH CORPS/USASTAF	INFORMATION CINCPAC ADV/COMGENCHINA/ GOC AUSTRALIAN PASHED CHIEF US MOUNTBATTEN/ WARCOW CG 8TH ARMY/ CG 10TH ARMY/ (SEE NEXT PAGE FOR READ AD)	2291
--	--	--	------

Adm	Dep	CoFS	ACS	FSec	PLt	Oper	Plans	Comm	Avia	Log	SDO	Plot	Anal	Ch	S/S	Int	Read	PBO
A																		
(PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES)																		
3480																		

U. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERV
CINCPAC AND CINCPAC

PARAGRAPH D PART 1 DELETE "RYUKYUS" X PARAGRAPH 3 IN SUBPARAGRAPH
E PART 1 INSERT "RYUKYUS" THE PHRASE "AND THE PHILIPPINES" X
PARAGRAPH 4 IN SUB PARAGRAPH A OF PART 2 INSERT "NAVAL AND RPT,"
FOLLOWING THE WORD "LAND" X PARAGRAPH 5 IN PART 2 DELETE THE 14TH
WORD "FORCES" AND SUBSTITUTE TUREDE "POWERS"

(ADDITIONAL ADDRES FROM READDRESS)

INFO TO: COM7THFLT
COM5THFLT
COMNORPAC
COM3RDFLT

SOAP _ _ _ _ _ 281233 _ _

CINCPAC/POA ADV HED 291856

PLAIN

2 OF 2

(ORIGINATOR)

(DATE TIME GROUP)

(CLASSIFICATION)

(PAGE) 346

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (OCT)

19 1615 SUPREMACY COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to CINCPAC ADV. COMCHINA. USASTAR
CG AFDPAC, JCS. COMNAVY. CGC AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (GENERAL HEADQUARTERS)
CHIEF US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW (CINCPAC FORCES FAR EAST, INTC. CG 2ND
CORPS. CG 6TH ARMY. SACSEA. NARCOS (JCS)

X Z520.

My Z-515, date time group 190909 OCT, (Z 520) paragraph "(C)", General Order number 1 military and naval ", sub-paragraph (B) is hereby amended to read "The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within MANCHURIA, KOREA north of 38-00 north latitude, KARAFUTU and the KURILE ISLANDS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East". Reference Washington Radiogram WX 51396 (not to all nor needed).

20 2137 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to DEANE info NMICITZ. MACARTHUR. SPAATZ.

WARX 52004.

The following with reference to your M 25339 is for your information.

Para. There will be a large number of U. S. aircraft operating over and into JAPAN, particularly in the next months. These include the occupational air forces, transport runs into and from JAPAN and KOREA, and naval air operations. A transport route from the ALEUTIANS probably will be inaugurated. U. S. Naval and merchant vessels will operate throughout the north Pacific and the SEA OF JAPAN. The requirement for the best possible weather service over JAPAN and adjacent areas in the north Pacific will therefore be intensified as a result of the Japanese capitulation and the weather centrals will be needed.

Para. As for the liaison groups, it is recognized that some means of liaison will be necessary to handle the details of post hostilities problems you mention. However, the great bulk of these will concern the coordination of movement of ships and aircraft into a port or areas immediately adjacent to a port. It is considered that this liaison can most expeditiously be handled by a liaison group aboard ship, which will permit the liaison group to be present on the spot required and not be immobilized at a place where it may not be needed. In this connection it is believed that the great bulk of the new problems which will arise as the result of the Japanese capitulation will, on the soviet side, require resolution in MOSCOW rather than by commanders in the field.

Para. Since the Soviets have already been informed of the decision on this matter and the weather personnel and equipment is now en route, it is considered no action should be taken to justify this decision to the Soviet at this time unless they raise the question.

21 0618 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCHINA info CINCPAC. COMCHINA. COMTHFLT.

A conference took place at Manila 19 August between representatives CINCPAC, COM7THFLT and COMCHINA. The following concept of operations was concurred in by COM7THFLT, by COMCHINA'S representative and by the headquarters of CINCPAC on the staff level. It is recommended for approval as the basis for interim operations and for further planning. This constitutes my comment on COMCHINA'S CPEX 4740 CPEX 4906 and JCS 50181.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

21 0818 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMCHINA, COM7THFLT (Cont'd)

Para. It appears that 30 September is the earliest realistic planning date for landing marines on CHINA COAST without undue interference with occupation JAPAN and KOREA.

Para. Concept of operations:

A. Establish north CHINA naval force under COM7THFLT in SHANTUNG-CHINWANGTAO area as soon as possible to consist of 2 battle cruisers, 4 heavy cruisers, 1 CarDiv and accompanying destroyers. This force would control YELLOW SEA and GULF OF CHIHILI and also support occupation of KOREA.

B. Establish YANGTSE patrol under COM7THFLT with 2 light cruisers, destroyers and small types as CHINA THEATER forces reach YANGTSE and status of minesweeping permits.

C. Establish south CHINA patrol under COM7THFLT with gunboats and destroyers escorts as soon as CHINA THEATER forces take a port. Troops available are the 3rd Phib Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, the 1st MarDiv and the 6th MarDiv less 1 regiment. In view of prospect demobilization requirements it is not advisable to commit the 4th MarDiv which would make a total of 6 Marine Divisions in JAPAN and CHINA. CINCPAC representative indicated that a MarDiv from the 5th PhibCorps could be released from JAPAN when relieved in October by the 86th or 87th Inf Div. This MarDiv could reinforce the 3rd PhibCorps.

Para. Information from COMCHINA indicates that unless unfavorable developments occur divisions of the Chinese combat command controlled by American officers will by late September be in control of SHANGHAI, NANKING and CANTON and that no other troops will be needed in SHANGHAI to make naval operations feasible in the YANGTSE RIVER.

D. Operate temporarily in 7th Fleet approximately 72 landing craft infantry for use as coastal and river transport and gunboats.

E. Divert supplies intended previously for FORT BAYARD to such port as COMCHINA may designate. ~~PHIBCORPS FORT BAYARD~~

F. Prepare for occupation CHINWANGTAO and TSINGTAO or, alternately if CENTRAL CHINA situation required, when forces are ready, occupation of SHANGHAI area.

21 0941 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS to SACSEA, SAC AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (BLADEY), info WARCOS (JCS), CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

Z 534.

Reference is made to my 4517 of 19 August. Desire that message be voided and the following substituted therefor: "It is anticipated that the actual surrender in TOKYO will take place 31 August". Instructions received by this headquarters direct that: "The senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDU-CHINA, SOUTH OF 16-00 north, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, And the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, southeast ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces, as later designated".

Action addressees are requested to arrange between themselves the area within which they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese forces and advise this headquarters at earliest.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~AUGUST (CCT)~~

PINK

21 0517 CINCPAC to COM3RDFLT Info CG8TH ARMY. CINCPAC ADV HQ. CG 7TH AF. CG 11TH AIRBORNE

CX 35347. From CG 8th Army to Com3rdFlt. Reference your radio dispatched 190219. In view of the fact that HAYAMA, ZUSHI and KAMAKURA have been selected as the headquarters area of the Supreme Allied Commander, and advice given the Japanese emissaries that the initial landings would be in restricted areas, it is considered advisable to put into effect the general provision of your Plan 2, with not to exceed what is normally considered to be a regimental combat team, of 3 battalions of infantry and 1 battalion of supporting artillery, initially. Additional troops to be landed as required. Landing force as limited above is acceptable. Brigadier General Clement will report by radio upon my assumption of command about 1200 I (-9) 23 August. His force will land in the vicinity of YOKOSUKA and occupy the general area: URAGA-KUBIRI-FUMAKOSHI-YOKOSUKA, all inclusive. Commanding General 11th Airborne Division is charged with coordination of boundaries. Airfield for 11th Airborne and H Hour will be designated by SCAP. Employment of elements of the 3rd Fleet air and naval gunfire support will be arranged directly with Commanding General 11th Airborne Division at OKINAWA. Recommend liaison officers be dispatched by air to Headquarters 11th Airborne Division to coordinate details. Essential personnel to furnish communications to be supplied by AFPAC Jasco unit at OKINAWA. The emissaries were directed to have the area evacuated of Japanese troops but we must be alert to guard against surprise.

21 0755 COMGEN CHINA to SURRENDER COM ANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS Info WARCOS FOR JCS passed by COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ

~~TOP SECRET.~~ CFBX 5409 Your tosec radio 1515 assigning areas of responsibility for accepting surrender Japanese omitted reference to the PESCADEROS ISLANDS. We are assuming that subject area is including in CHINA Theater's area of responsibility in absence of instructions to the contrary.

22 0915 CINCPAC to COMGEN CHINA Info CINCPAC ADV H.

~~TOP SECRET.~~ 35704 Your CFB 5250 dated 20th and CFBX 4906 dated 17th are references. This headquarters has made no estimate of nor received requests for United States Army service troops in support of the Marine forces indicated by CINCPAC as available for CHINA coast operations, other than those previously allocated for the FORT BAYARD operation. Availability can be determined only after complete requirement is known. Generally speaking many types of service units are now short of requirements for occupation JAPAN and KOREA and supporting bases. No understood is requirement for air forces. BELEAGER indicates availability of Marine aircraft wing. Port personnel provided by CINCPAC for FORT BAYARD project are now loading and will proceed in accordance with CINCPAC instructions.

Para. For CINCPAC only, COMGENCHINA CFB 5250 dated 20th is being repeated to you for information in accordance with this dispatch.

21 1220 COMGEN CHINA to WARCOS Info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMCHINA, COMCHINA, COMCHINA, COMCHINA, COMCHINA

~~TOP SECRET.~~ CFBX 5404 REPRESENTATIVES of CHINA Theater, General Gurney

3464

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

PINA

21 1220 (continued)

and Captain Painter, USN proceeded to MANILA, 18 August pursuant to a message requesting conferences among representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPAC, and COMGENCHINA. Message CX 34316 refers. Discussions dealt with availability of occupation forces for CHINA and with problems of logistic support and personnel lift. The following subjects were discussed on a planning level only and agreements reached on that level as indicated below:

Para A. The question of priorities for occupational forces. It was agreed that the 1st priority must remain JAPAN and KOREA. It was tentatively indicated that forces would probably be moved into key points on CHINA coast after 10 divisions had reached JAPAN and 2 divisions had been put ashore in KOREA. 1st 2 divisions therefore could land in CHINA approximately 30 September.

Para B. Naval assistance for CHINA. Preliminary examination and planning are under way covering operations of 7th Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid to support CHINA Theater forces and to control coastal waters. As presently planned 3 naval forces would be established to include: A SOUTH CHINA Naval Force basing general in the CAUTION area; A NORTH CHINA Task Force in TSINGTAO-CHEFOO-CHINWANGTA area, and a YANGTZE patrol for operations in the YANGTZE. The net firm and is subject to approval by CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA and CNO, WASHINGTON.

Para C. United States forces for occupation in key areas on CHINA Coast. As previously agreed between CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMGENCHINA 1st Marine divisions (less 1 regimental team) will be available for occupation of key points on the Chinese coast with a possibility of later getting a 3rd Marine division if it can be replaced by 1 of the US Army divisions presently enroute from United States.

Para D. Furnishing of transportation for movement of Chinese forces to key occupational areas. As previously agreed next for 2 Marine divisions initially allotted to the occupation of CHINA Theater areas can be turned over to CHINA Theater for movement of forces thereafter (about 15 October). In addition, an exploratory examination is being undertaken to determine whether approximately 50 landing craft infantry can be furnished for use in moving the Chinese troops along the West, YANGTZE and HLE Rivers for coastal movement. CINCPAC has stated that this type craft is not suitable for large scale movement of US forces into JAPAN and KOREA.

Para E. Convoy to open port and furnish supplies to CHINA. It was agreed that the convoy of the 1st 5 ships plus the additional equipment and personnel furnished by CINCPAC and CINCPAC would be run into the SHANGHAI NANKING AREA as soon as SHANGHAI and NANKING are secured (estimated about 15 September). It was further agreed that the 1st convoy could go into NANKING if necessary to facilitate distribution of gasoline and other critical supplies. Thereafter the main port would be established at SHANGHAI. The lower YANGTZE must be swept YFC mines prior to the bringing of the convoy into CHINA.

Para F. Evacuation of U.S. and Allied Personnel identified in CHINA. Discussion on staff level in CINCPAC indicates that shipping could possibly be made available by the IOXKPHRE recovered personnel could be assembled

- continued -

3455

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

PINK

and transported to a port area and meanwhile CINCPAC is examining the availability of evacuation and hospital ships and KATS aircraft for rapid movement of recovered personnel to OKINAWA or the MARIANAS for processing and necessary hospitalization prior to their being placed in the normal evacuation pipeline via the Pacific, the United States.

Para G. Japanese disarmed and civilian personnel in CHINA. Preliminary discussions were held with representatives of CINCPAC and CINCPAC on priorities for evacuation of Japanese disarmed personnel from CHINA to the Japanese main islands and it was agreed that early evacuation of all Japanese military and civilian personnel from CHINA was mandatory to prevent serious unrest in CHINA and the possibility of large groups of Japanese becoming established in Chinese Communities.

Para. Information will be furnished CINCPAC when firm request for naval assistance are forwarded through War Department for processing as per instructions in NAUX 51172. That is all.

21 2230 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR info WHITE, WHEELER, SPAATE, CDRAGV.

NAUX 52674. United States Policy Reurad C 34637 follows:

Para. "The 4 Allied Powers are bound by the POTSDAM ultimatum to permit the return of Japanese military forces, after they are completely disarmed, to their homes. Pending such return, which of necessity depends on the availability of transportation, this personnel may be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions and directives as may be prescribed BHPYK national Commanders authorized to receive the surrender. Surrender Japanese soldiers should be considered as disarmed personnel and not necessarily as prisoners of war.

Para. Until the Japanese Armed Forces are secured, discussion and commitments concerning treatment of Japanese disarmed forces during the period between their surrender and their return to their homes should be held to the essential minimum."

Para. Desire you inform Mountbatten of above suggesting that he may wish to adopt a similar policy reference the STL P this personnel.

21 2327 COM3RDFLEET to CTG 30.1, CTG 30.2, CTG 30.9, 30.5, 30.6, 30.8, CTF 31, 35, 37, 38, COMUSCARTASKFOR, COMJENB info COMUSCARTASKFOR, COMAIRPAC, SUBCOMAND, COMSERVPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSTFLT, COMUSMACV, COMNAVFOR, CTG 94.1, CTF 95, CTG 95.9, CTF 99, COMSEAFON 10, SOP SEAFON 10, COMNAV, COMPHIBPAC, 3RDFLEET, COMJENSTHARMY, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMJEN USASTAF, COM-MARIANAS, COMAIRPAC, COM7THFLT, CINCPAC, COMJENSTAF, COMJENSTAF ADVOC.

Here is COM3RDFLEET OpPlan 11-45.

- A. Task Group 30.1 Fleet Flagship Group Captain Murray.
- B. Task Group 30.2 British Flagship Group Captain Nicholl.
- C. Task Group 30.5 Air Search and reconn. Group Captain Grant.
- D. Task Group 30.6 Allied POW rescue group Commodore Simpson.
- E. Task Group 30.8 Logistic Support Group RADM Beary.
- F. Task Group 30.9 EMINENTOK service group Commodore Asuff.
- G. Task Force 31 YOKOSUKA occupation force RADM Badger.
- H. Task Force 32 3rd Amphibious Force VADM Walkinson.
 - H Sub 1 and H Sub 2 Task Forces 33 and 34 respectively commanders and forces as assigned by CTF 32.
 - H Sub 3 and Task Force 36 landing force Major General (as specified for each landing).

- continued -

3466

- I. Task Force 35 support force RAdm Jones.
- J. Task Force 37 British Support force VAdm Rawlings RN.
- K. Task Force 38 2nd Carrier Task Force VAdm McCain until relieved by VAdm Towers.
- L. Task Force 39 1st Carrier Task Force VAdm Sherman.

Units for all groups and forces less task forces, 33, 34 and 36 as currently assigned subject to later modification by dispatch. Units assigned Task Forces 33, 34 and 36 as directed by CTF 32.

Para. Japan has surrendered. Information of TOKYO BAY AREA and enemy forces by mail and separate dispatch. Army forces have seized ATSUGI airfield and CINCPAC Advance Headquarters are established there. CTF 31 forces hold YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE and airfields and 3rd Fleet forces are disposed in the TOKYO BAY-SAGAMI WAN AREA. 3rd Fleet Air is patrolling HONSHU and the TOKYO BAY AREA. KANOYA airfield KYUSHU is held by our occupation forces. This OpPlan stems from CINCPAC AND CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45 and covers landing of 8th Army units in TOKYO BAY AREA which operations coincide with execution of CINCPAC B-20 operation.

Para. This Fleet, while continuing missions assigned in my OpPlan FFKU 45, will land and firmly establish ashore at locations as arranged with CINCPAC designated elements of the 8th U.S. Army and assist the Army in enforcing surrender terms in order to gain and exercise military, political and economic control of the Japanese Empire.

Para. Task Groups 30.1, 30.2, 30.5, 30.6, 30.8 and 30.9 Task Forces 31, 35, 37, 38 continue missions assigned by my OpPlan 10-45. Following additional missions herewith assigned as indicated. E Task Group 30.8 provide logistic support for 3rd Amphibious Forces at sea and in TOKYO BAY AREA. G, I, J Task Forces, 31, 35, and 37 support 3rd Amphibious Forces as specified in Annex B this OpPlan. H Task Force 32 Transport, land and establish firmly ashore in designated sections of the TOKYO BAY AREA elements of the U.S. 8th Army. K, L Task Forces 38, 39 cover and support 3rd Amphibious Forces as specified in Annex D this OpPlan.

SubPara X1 SubPars X1 and X3 my OpPlan 10-45 apply.

X2 3rdPhib will land 11th Corps headquarters, 1st cavalry Div and 112 RCY OVER DL KSCT YOKOHAMA and YOKOSUKA about 31 August, American Div over beaches at SACAMI KAWA-TNO SHIMA about 6 September and 43rd Div over YOKOHAMA-YOKOSUKA docks 13 September. All dates subject to later delay.

X3 Annexes A E G H I and J my opplan 10-45 apply to this plan.

X4 Annex B special instructions to Task Forces Annex D air plan will be issued by separate dispatch.

X5 This plan will be placed in effect by dispatch.

Para. Logistics in accordance logistics plan Annex E my opplan 10-45.

Para. Command locations as in annex F my opplan 10-45 with CTF 32 and CTF 39 added as Major subordinate commands. Commander 3rd Amphibious Force or his delegated group commander is in command of the Amphibious Operations until the landing force is established ashore at which time command of forces ashore passes to the landing force commander. Communications in accordance with Pac 70-B CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45 and Annex H my OpPlan 1-45. Commander 3rd Fleet in MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY.

21 2329 COM3rdFLT to CTF 31, 35, 37 info CINCPAC, COMGENEAF, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COM5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMGEN 8TH ARMY, COMTHIBSPAC, 3RDELT, COM 3RDPHIB, COMGEN USASTAF, COMMARLANTAS, COMGEN FEAD ADVON.

Annex B my Oplan 11-45. Special instructions to Task Forces.

Para. Task Force 35 clear water and beach approaches in area SAGAMI KAWA-ENO SHIMA and mark same in preparation for amphibious landings that area on about 6 September. Obtain necessary udts, APDs and other personnel and vessels as may be required for this purpose from CTF 31. Provide fire support units for all landings as CTF 32 may request.

Para. All Task Forces authorized communicate direct with CTF 32 in arranging details accordance these instructions keeping originator advised.

21 2341 COM3RDELT to CTF 38, CTF 39 info COMDICH, CINCIBZ, COMSDELT, COMSUBPAC
COMMARGHLS, CTD 94.1, 95.9, CTF 95, 99, COMSDELT to COMOPAC, COMOPAC
COMPHESPAC, 3RDELT, COMGEN 8THABD, COMCEDEN, COMOPAC, COM 95,
USASTA, COMGEN 20TH AF, COMARIANAS, COMAIRPAC, COMOPAC, COMSDELT,
COMAIRPAC, CINCAPPAC, COMGEN 8FAP, COMGEN 8FAP, COMGEN 8FAP, COMGEN 8FAP.

Para 1. General Air Tasks outlined Annex D my OpPlan 10-45 apply except no air base assembly required from surface units 3rd Fleet. 3rd Flt area of responsibility is combat area east of 139th Meridian and east of air coordinating line except when directed by CINCPAC western boundary 3rd fleet area of responsibility moved eastward to 139th Meridian for sea and area and in the Japanese homeland to correspond to western limit occupation area 8th Army. Also when directed by CINCPAC northern boundary 3rd Fleet area of responsibility moved southward to 40th parallel except that COMJMD FLEET will coordinate activities 3rd fleet and north pacific force in HOKKAIDO-OMINATO area insofar as cooperation with 8th Army is concerned.

Para 2. Operations (A) CTF 38. When basic plan placed in effect CTF 38 responsible for general air tasks east of 139 meridian (areas stars and flagstaff) and east of the line of demarkation of occupation areas for 6th and 8th armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) conduct daily air searches sea approaches Japanese homeland. (2) conduct air patrols over airfields Japanese homeland. (3) Maintain show of force over Japanese territory. (4) Provide air cover occupation forces. (5) Be prepared to furnish direct air support for attack and ground forces as requested by Com3rd PhibFor as follows: For each landing area air cover, air support group with coordinator, tactical observer and photo planes plus both observer and combat air patrol for SAGAMI landing, all controlled by CASFU in 3rd PhibFor Flagship. (6) Be prepared to furnish direct air support for ground forces as requested by 8th Army upon assumption of command ashore. (7) Be prepared to act against any opposition encountered when directed by Com3rdFlt. (8) Be prepared to strike Japanese airborne or ground air-craft air installations or enemy troop concentrations as directed by Com-3rd Fleet. (9) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd Fleet forces as directed. (B) CTF 39. When basic plan placed in effect CTF 39

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

responsible for general air tasks sea area between 139th and 139 meridians (area stripes) and Japanese homeland between air coordination line (Annex D my OpPlan 10-45) and the line of demarkation occupation areas 6th and 8th armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) Conduct daily air searches sea approaches Japanese homeland. (2) conduct air patrols over airfields Japanese homeland. (3) Maintain show of force over Japanese territory. (4) provide air cover for occupation forces moving through sea area of responsibility. (5) Be prepared to act against any opposition encountered when directed by Com3rdFlt. (6) Be prepared to strike Japanese airborne or grounded aircraft, air installations or enemy troop concentrations as directed by Com3rdFlt. (7) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd Flt forces as directed. (C) Com3rdPhibFor. When basic plan phased in effect Com3rdPhibFor being responsible for amphibious and landing operations of 8th Army will (1) request from CTF 38 and 39 air cover required for movement of amphibious forces within the limits of the areas of responsibility of the 2 forces. (2) Request from CTF 38 direct air support required in the conduct of the amphibious and landing operations. (D) CTF 30.5. When basic plan placed in effect C G 30.5 will (1) conduct daily and nightly patrols outlined in tasks assigned in Annex D my OpPlan 10-45. (2) limit patrols to east of 139th meridian and/or south of 40th parallel when directed by COM3RDEFLT. (3) Be prepared for offensive patrols and searches as may be directed by Com3rdFlt. (4) Be prepared to control serve and accommodate limited numbers of transient seaplanes. (5) Be prepared to cover and support 3rd Fleet forces as directed.

Para 3. Garrison. (A) MAG 31. (B) NATS landplane unit. 1 garrison squadrons and ground echelons will be assigned appropriate tasks when installed.

22 0729 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMPHIBPAC, COMUSMACV, COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMSSEAFRON, COMSUBPAC, COMNAVFOR, COMHAWSEAFRON, COMJANAFS.

Operation MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely.

22 1200 COMGEN CHINA to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, WARCOS.

WFBX 5587.

Commanding General CHINA THEATER is instructed to inform CINCPAC of any British-Chinese negotiations re HONGKONG. WAFB 51776 refers. To the present no information concerning subject negotiations between the British and Chinese governments has been reported to me. Query addressed to Generalissimo headquarters elicited that to their knowledge no negotiations had been instituted between the 2 governments covering operations in HONGKONG area.

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

PINA

22 1210 COMGENCHINA to WARDCS, COMINCH info CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

CFBX 5586.

We are instructed that arrangements for full military coordination should be made between British and Chinese Governments prior to British participation in operations in the CHINA THEATER. Also General MacArthur has been instructed to arrange surrender of HONGKONG to British Commander when such coordination has been completed. CINCPAC has forwarded us a message for information which indicates that CINCPAC is requesting fueling and servicing facilities from U. S. resources in Philippines for British Naval forces earmarked for occupation of HONGKONG. To my knowledge the necessary military coordination between the British and the Generalissimo is not being made reference WARK 51481.

22 1835 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info COMMANDER US NAVAL FORCES AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA.

WARK 53079.

Adjustment of the boundaries of the southwest Pacific area (SWPA) and changes in command responsibilities agreed to at terminal will become effective at the time of the formal surrender of JAPAN. Concurrently therewith the command "Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA" will be abolished and all Allied Naval vessels of this command other than United States vessels will pass to British Empire control.

17 1110 COMGEN CHINA to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info WARDCS, CG CCT, CG SOSUT.

CFBX 4928.

The problem of orderly surrender of the bulk of Japanese Troops in the CHINA THEATER with the preservation of law and order in presently Japanese occupied areas resolves itself to one of rapidly deploying central government troops into strategic areas.

Para. Means of moving occupational armies are limited to air, rivers, destroyed railroads highways, due to the condition of the latter 2 and the engineering problems involved in repairs, only air and water routes offer any immediate possibilities for rapid movement of troops and supplies.

Para. The bulk of troops to be moved are in south and central CHINA where by means locally available concentrations may be assembled in the WUCHOW (111-40-23-30) CANTON AND HANKOW AREAS.

Para. Plans are being formulated to airlift 1 Army to NANKING requiring 30 days with the resources available. This will be followed by a 2nd Army which will be moved to north CHINA, this move will require approximately 20 additional days. These troop movements are less than 50 percent of the movement considered essential to meet the emergency situation with which we are faced.

Para. The additional movement of 1 Army (35000 men plus 2000 tons) from HANKOW to SHANGHAI and 1 Army from WUCHOW to TAIKU are considered urgent.

Para. The limitations of airlift are largely based on pool available in the theater, the only present supply line being over the hump.

Para. The following water routes are good movement possibilities:

1. Coastal CHINA SEA.
2. YANGTZE river from HANKOW to SHANGHAI.

- continued -

3470

TOP SECRET
WUJUT (GCT)

- continued -

2. The YANTZ RIVER from CHIAO to HONGKONG. Allied states air attrition of Chinese river craft has been so heavy that only a few powered craft remain available for rapid troop deployment. It therefore follows that limited air lift is the only rapid troop movement and supply means available to the theater under present conditions.

Para. The following measures will help to remedy this situation:

A. Open an east coast port or ports as recommended in my CP 14/40. It is assumed that the Japanese would not attempt to deny allied use of the YANTZ.

B. The assignment of suitable river and coastal vessels. The CP 14/40 recommended 10 craft for this purpose. Later named essential water movements are 1 additional from YAN to TUN, 1 from CHIAO to HONGKONG, and 1 from either YAN or CHIAO to TUN. These are minimum essential moves and should be followed by a continuing redistribution of U.S. sponsored troops to the critical key coastal areas.

Para. Based on the above and your present commitments in the Pacific would appreciate your comment and suggestion as to methods and means which might be available to this theater from your resources.

22 1934 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ info MACARTHUR. HONGKONG.

WAK 53111

Back message. Your 102315 (not required by Information references). In view of Japanese surrender no further action desired with respect to HAFED project for introduction of OCS personnel into HONGKONG by submarine.

23 1516 CHIEF to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC. CHINA. HONGKONG.

For your information. British OCS have issued instructions to CINCPAC that forces intended for HONGKONG should be held at LYNN or some other convenient port until further orders. CINCPAC has been directed by them to conform to MacArthur's views on the timing of Jap surrender.

23 2000 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR. HONGKONG info HONGKONG. HONGKONG.
WAK 53111

WAK 53111 WAK 53785

Top secret back message. Wetmeyer is directed to inform MacArthur when military coordination with him and with the Chinese Board of Military Operations is completed by the British at which time MacArthur will arrange for the surrender of HONG KONG to the British. In this connection the British desire that the surrender should be made to a British commander to be nominated by Admiral Fraser.

Para. The British Chiefs of Staff further state that they will give full facilities through the HONG KONG area (so far as the conditions of the port allow) for the assistance and support of Chinese and American forces who may still be either engaged against the enemy or involved in securing the surrender of Japanese forces in the mainland. Further to WAK 51776, the British Chiefs of Staff state that military coordination on operational matters is being effected by them.

122

THE SECRETARY. Comply with directive my OpPlan with respect to occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and CHINA as soon as practicable after 31 August. Inform me as to your plans.

TOP SECRET. Reference your 220651 not to all or needed. Units listed on Page 5-5 my serial 0805103 include those units listed in your operations instruction 4 Annex 3. Initial operations of Marine fighter groups to be under Com3rd and 5th Fleets for protection embargoes and escorts for shipping. Operational control of these groups to pass to CINCPAC when and as desired by CINCPAC. CINCPAC retains responsibility for logistic support of all units except as modified by my 208700. This cancels my 120624. Naval search squadrons and MATS suggested by VMS squadrons remain under naval control at all times.

My 240116. Your 241415. When will ships of 5th Fleet occupy and control waters of JAPAN.

JOS 242317. The proposals of my 216012 with respect to CHINA assumed the prior seizure of a port in KOREA. Transcon 17 will be ready to sail from OKINAWA 7 September for KOREA with the 7th Infantry Division embarked plus designated Corps Troops. Date of sailing 40th and 96th Divisions from the PHILIPPINES not available to me. Will advise when known.

Para. If the Russians seize HILJO recommend the occupation of FUSAN which commands the KOREA and TSUSHIMA STRAITS and controls important rail communications.

This organization of mobile service forces for operation CAMPUS-
RELEASE modifies my OpPlan 12-45.

Para. COMSERNVON 6 will operate directly under COMSERNVAFAC, will provide replenishment at sea for the Fast Carrier Task Force and other fleet forces as required, and will allocate to their logistic support groups service units from those assigned to SERNVON 6. COMSERNVON 6 may himself command 1 of these logistic support groups.

Para. COMSERVCON 10 will operate directly under COMSERVPAC, will provide mobile base services in the RYUKYUS AREA, MARIANAS AREA, IJAN-CHIA AREA and at LEYTE, and will allocate to service divisions in occupied areas in JAPAN and to the rear bases above mentioned service units from those assigned SERVCON 10. COMSERVIDIVS 101, 192 and 193 with their staffs

TOP SECRET
SECRET (002)

- continued -

may be moved forward to naval anchorages in occupied areas in JAPAN and CHINA at the discretion of COM7TH, 3RD and 5TH Fleets respectively. This modifies my 160833.

25 0853 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCAFPAC.

Refer my 220703. Your concurrence COMINTFLT 188240 requested.

24 1626 COMINTCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

My 191648 was for planning purposes and comment is directed both as to permanent setup and time or times of implementation. Comment should include any desired interim proposals. Reply need not be made until you have had adequate opportunity for consideration.

20 0725 CG CHINA to CINCAFPAC based to CINCPAC ADV. JOE CHAM.

CWB 5250.

Joint Staff Study BELAGER section 6 para B mentions landing forces to consist of Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops in addition to Marine Division query will the composition of Corps be adequate to provide necessary port and limited area construction, hospitalization, military police, ordnance maintenance, motor transportation, port landing and unloading, signal service, depot supply for common user items, and house-keeping personnel such as Army postal service, food inspection, Malaisia control and survey, water publication and port overhead in support of approximately 7500 American Troops (in addition to the landing force) in the SHANGHAI AREA to include 3 or 4 fighter groups, 2 Recon squadron, 2 air service groups and an air depot group. Information is urgent to determine stoppage of certain units now ready for air and water lift from U.S. that were previously set up for BAYARD. Also info required for decision with IRT as to disposition of units presently suspended in IRT where intended to support BAYARD. Prefer bringing in all necessary supply and supporting troops (other than air corps) direct from Pacific to conserve critical transportation trans INDIA and CHINA. Can similar supporting units be later supplied for other ports such as CANTON if required by U. S. Operations.

25 0830 CINCHINA to CINCAFPAC. CINCPAC ADV info COMINTCHINA. COMINTCH. 224P.

CPEX 5849.

Refer to CINCAFPAC 37704 dated 22 August. CINCAFPAC 220810 CST also refers it is now assumed that occupation of SHANGHAI will be accomplished by Chinese Central Government Forces. Marine Divisions will occupy TSN and TSINGTAO in that priority. It is assumed here that these Marine Units will be self supporting and will be supplied by CINCPAC. No marine air units are required as CHINA THEATER can furnish entire air support. CHINA THEATER will operate part of SHANGHAI with resources previously available for operation of FORT BAYARD including some from INDIA SUMMA THEATER and some from CINCPAC as listed in his 070553. Through this port we will eventually support all CHINA THEATER, U. S. Forces and INDIA SUMMA THEATER port operating units and all common user items for 3500 shore based Navy which should take care of LCI crews and YANUTSE patrol shore units.

129

FOUO 24-0023

•

ions are being
as indicated.

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

separate dispatch.

for use at SHANGHAI.

liaison party arrives and meanwhile we both refer to "TIENTSIN AREA".

[illegible]

Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base WAKE.

CONFIDENTIAL

Captain or Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base NASCNS.

3474

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

UrDis 251509. Present tentative plans for demobilization of Marine Corps units include the disbandment of all Marine AAA Group Headquarters and AAA Bns with the exception of 2 Marine AAA Bns which have definite post war commitments in the Pacific Ocean Area. Employment of 2 Amphibious Corps and 5 Marine Divisions in CAMPUZ and BELAGUER simultaneously necessitates the disbandment of certain other FMF units in order to meet additional service requirements and to permit a partial demobilization of Marine Corps personnel. In view of the above regret that AAA units requested UrDis 251509 are not available.

24. 0110 CINEPAC ADV TO CONSTITUT. CONTINUT. CONCORDAC. SUPREME GOVERNMENT ALLIED FORCES.

[illegible]

Para. Col. W. J. Fox USMC is designated as Commanding Officer MAB No. 1 in TIENTSIN AREA. Col. F. J. Schlaepfer USMC is designated as Commanding Officer MAB No. 2 in TSINGTAO AREA. These officers should be ordered to report to COMUSMILSTAF for duty at earliest. COMUSMILSTAF advise earliest of planned distribution of air units between MAB No. 1 and MAB No. 2.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
SECRET (G)

- continued -

26 1713 (Cont'd)

control of COMSINCHINA and will report by despatch to COMSINCHINA accordingly
Para. MyDis 220626. 1 GROPAC

A. For TIENTSIN AREA. Other GROPAC

B. For TSINGTAO AREA. Both GROPACS are assigned operational control
JEDPHICORPS. COMSINVPAC advise designation of GROPAC for each area and
order CO of each to report at earliest by despatch to COMSINVPAC. COMSINVPAC
advise location availability date and shipping implications of
each movement. COM7THPHICORP will be responsible for providing shipping,
loading and movement of all units mounting west of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and
for issuance of general loading and sailing instructions to COMAIRPAC and
COMSINVPAC for units under their cognizance mounting in the HAWAIIAN area
and west coast. CINCPAC PEARL will provide shipping and COMSINVPAC will
arrange for the loading and movement of all units under COMSINVPAC and
COMAIRPAC cognizance mounting from the HAWAIIAN AREA and the west coast.

Para. Mounting out supplies 30 days classes 1, 2, 3, 4, including water
in drums and cans 2 gal/man/day 5 days, winter clothing, chemical protective
clothing and equipment, construction supplies as directed by JEDPHICORPS
for minimum rehabilitation airfields, waterfront facilities and roads, class
V 30/F combat troops, 1 U/F service troops, V-A 10 minutes. Direct liaison
and communication between COM7THPHICORP, COMSINVPAC, COMSINVPAC and
COMAIRPAC is authorized. Instructions on resupply, levels, maintenance etc.
to be issued later.

27 0106 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ALL FLAG OFFICERS.

Questions as to disposition and use of captured or occupied territory
are political ones to be determined by responsible officials of the govern-
ment. Where the governmental policy has not been announced the American
position should not be embarrassed by high ranking naval officers giving
expression to their own opinions particularly as they may be lacking
information on all the considerations involved. You will be governed
accordingly.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET (G)~~

26 1520 DEANE to AGWAR FOR WABOOS. CINCAPAC - COMINT PASSER TO COMNAV ASIAN.

MX 25417.

Following is U.S. Military Mission Moscow RUSSIA MX 25416 to War Department dated 25 August 1945.

Antonov called me early this morning and handed me the following letter which he wishes transmitted to General MacArthur "After reading your letter of 19 August 1945 which contained the Instrument of Surrender of Japan the General Staff of the Red Army considers it necessary to include in this Instrument the following amendments.

1. Change paragraph 3 to read we hereby command all Japanese Forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith. To preserve and save from damage all ships, aircrafts, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and by the separate Allied High Commands in their respective theaters of operations or by agencies of the Japanese Government at their direction.

2. Change paragraph 5 to read. We hereby command all civil military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and by the separate Allied High Commands in their respective theaters of operations to be proper and to effectuate this surrender and issued by them or under their authority and we shall direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non combatant duties unless specifically relieved by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by the separate Allied High Commands in their respective theaters or under their authority.

3. Change paragraph 8 to read. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or to such organization as the Allied Powers may create for these purposes who will take such steps as they deem proper to effectuate these terms of surrender". Antonov stated that the above amendments had the approval of Generalissimo Stalin. He explained that the amendments to paragraphs 3 and 5 were for the purpose of taking care of the local situation in the different theaters of operation.

Para. Inconnection with the amendments proposed in paragraph 8 he stated that initially the authority of the Emperor would be subject to the sole authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, but that it might later be founded desirable to set up an organization for the government of JAPAN similar to that which now exists for the government of Germany. I request I be given information upon which to base a reply. Ends.

27 1300 COMNAVCHINA to CINCFOA ADVANCE INFO COMNAVCHINA

WFB 6092.

Consent in including a marine aircraft wing at reduced strength for marine corps operations in TIENTSIN and/or TSINGTAO area of north CHINA.

~~SECRET (G)~~

[illegible]

Para 1. Supply.

B. Resupply. Agencies listed above responsible for providing resupply. COMUSMACV:AC is charged with responsibility for coordination of procurement, assembling and shipping of resupply of all classes for all Navy and Marine forces ashore in the objective. CINCPAC will furnish shipping as requested by COMUSMACV:AC. Resupply shipments of classes 1,2,3,4 will be scheduled to arrive 15 Day intervals beginning H plus 10 and will consist of 30 days each until supply level is reached. Supply levels to be maintained at objective 30 day minimum and 30 day operating level of classes 1,2,3, and 4, 3 units fire combat troops, 1 unit fire service troops. 10 missions class V-A. Automatic supply lot 120 days. Supplies in MARIANAS, OKINAWA, and HAWAII will be used in accordance current directives. Direct liaison and communication between COMUSMACV:AC, responsible supply agencies, 7th Fleet and 7th PhibFor authorized.

COM/THPNIHFOR responsible providing shipping, loading and movement all white mounting west of Hawaiian Islands and issuance general loading and sailing instructions to COMAIRPAC and COMSERVPAC for white under their cognizance mounting in Hawaiian Area and west coast. CINCPAC Pearl provide shipping and COMSERVPAC arrange loading and movement all white under COMSERVPAC and COMAIRPAC cognizance mounting Hawaiian Area and West Coast. Shipping designated later by despatch.

Para 4. Troop list. 3RD PHIBCORPS consisting of HQ and HQ Tps, 1st MarDiv, 6th MarDiv (less 1 BCT) plus 1st Marine Air Wing consisting of Helibn 1, Seron 1, MAW Sq, MAG 12 with Helibn 12 and Seron 12, VHF Sqs 215, 221, 218 MAG 24 with Helibn 24 and Seron 24, VHF(N) Sqs 533, 541; MAG 32 with Helibn 32, Seron 32, VMSB Sqs 244, 343, VMSB Sq 134, MAG 25 with Helibn 25, Seron 25, VMS Sqs 152 and 153. 2 GROPACS. Troops TROOP 40 AREA 22, 100, TROOP 41 AREA 31, 100 total troops 53,200.

Para 6. Miscellaneous. Currency and mail directives issued later.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

27 0755 COM7THFLT to CTF 79, COMPHILSEAFRON, COMSERVRON 7 info COMSERVPAC, COMSERVRON 10, COMSERVDIV 101, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CINCPAC, CG AFWESPAC, COMINCH.

Action addresses hereby directed to assume as applicable all present logistic responsibilities and commitments of COM7THFLT in the supply of Allied Naval Forces. Further direct COMSERVRON 7 under the operational control of COMPHILSEAFRON and administrative control of COMSERVPAC furnish logistics requirements personnel and supplies to all naval units afloat and ashore in SWPA including all U.S. Navy vessels. Thus continuing logistics support to naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA and MANUS and having access to the resources of MANUS, HOLLANDIA, PHILIPPINE BASES and other south west pacific bases. In the event means are not then available make representations to COMSERVPAC for necessary additional supplies and facilities. Responsibility of COMSERON 7 for logistics support to the 7th Flt terminates upon the departure of latter in operation CAMPUS at 0800 I(-9) 28 August 1945. 7th Flt thereafter will receive logistic support from Commander Service Force Pacific.

27 0513 COM7THFLT to GUAM CB2, AA CUNNINGHAM, (DD 752), COMDESDIV 127, NEW ORLEANS (CA 32), ALASKA (CBI), STEVENS (DD 479), TE EVANS (DD 754), HARADEN (DD 585), BURNS (DD 588), COMDESRON 64, info CINCPAC ADV, COM5THFLT, COMPHILSEAFRON, COM3RDFLT, INGHAM CG, COMCARDIV 27, ALL TFC AND TGC 7THFLT, COMDESDIV 44, CTG 95.4, RADM BUCKMASTER.

This is my OpOrder 4-45.

A. Cruiser Group TG 77.3 RADMLow. CruDiv 16. ALASKA and GUAM. CruDiv 6 San Francisco, New Orleans, Minneapolis and Tuscaloosa. DD'S Haraden (585), Stevens (479), Wiley (597), Bell (587), Burns (588), Hubbard (748), Cunningham (752), Frank Evans (754), John Bole (755).

Para 1. Enemy forces have been forbidden to operate. However be prepared for attacks and alert for treachery. Further information including enemy and allied mine fields in Annex C my OpPlan 13-45 now being distributed by air. Own forces are not yet operating in the YELLOW SEA. TG 94.5 is sweeping area SKAGWAY, and may sweep mine line 7 just west of KUKUZAN to. Fair Wing 1 continues regular searches.

Para 2. This force will operate to control the YELLOW SEA.

Para 3.(a) Rendezvous as directed off OKINAWA and proceed into the YELLOW SEA. Conduct operations as directed by Commander 7th Fleet.

Para 4. Logistics in OKINAWA and as called forward.

Para 5. Guard 7th Fleet Task Force and Task Group commanders circuit (4135 series) and appropriate POA Foxes. Commander 7th Fleet in Minneapolis

27 1328 COMGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC, COM7THFLT.

CFBX 6132.

Subject is your 260127 concur in your recommendation that whether the landing in North CHINA be at TAKU or CHINWANGTAO be left for decision later. Henceforth we will refer to TIENTSIN AREA.

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
SECRET (G)

27 1419 CINCPAC to WARCOS (JCS) info CINCPAC ADV. CG USASTAF. CHINA. BRIT JOINT STAFF MISSION.

CX 10320.

The assumption contained in WX 54882, 25 August is correct.

25 1944 JCS to MACARTHUR info NIMITZ, SPAATZ, WHICKLER, WHEBOSER, AND BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION.

WARX 54882.

The British Chiefs of Staff have asked if their assumption is correct that the Japanese Commanders will be required to furnish any information required direct to the representatives of the Allied Commander and their representatives.

Para. We are informing the British Chiefs of Staff that the foregoing assumption is correct and that you are acting accordingly.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ (C)

28 1225 COMCHINA to CINCPAC. CINCPAC info COM7THFLT. COMSOCT.

CFEX 6228.

Your CX 36362 it is desired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force 93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date. Preliminary information given by my representatives recently in MANILA indicated that necessary minesweeping would allow entry on 15 September. Please comment. Occupation of SHANGHAI by Chinese Nationalist Troops will proceed on schedule. See my CFEX 5404. For Lattimore. As Port operations will be from ship to wharf directly naval boat, barge and DUKW cross from IJT THEATER are being dropped.

28 1219 CINCPAC to WAR DEPT - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C 10526.

Among other minor changes made in General Order Number 1 replying your WX 55352 is 1 directing the Japanese to surrender their forces in the KYUKYUS to CINCPAC with Commanding General 10th Army being designated to receive the local surrender. That officer has been under the command of CINCPAC since August 1 and the designation of CINCPAC to receive the surrender there would not only be confusing administratively but would also contravene the general directive providing that respective local theater commanders receive surrender.

29 0050 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COM7THFLT.

Your 250759. Expect to meet now advanced target date of 7 September for KEUJO landing with lightly armed troops of 7th Division and elements of 24th Corps using shipping immediately available and follow with heavy equipment as additional shipping availability permits. 40th Division should land KEUJO about 1 October. The date and place of landing the 96 Division in KOREA are not yet firm.

Para. 24th Corps plan also includes sending a small advance party by air to arrive 4 September if approved by SCAP and can be negotiated.

29 0751 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT info CINCPAC. COMCHINA. OG SOOCT.

Comment direct to COMCHINA his CFEX 6228 DTG 281225. Re: It is desired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force 93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date.

PINK

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

29 1357 MOUNTBATTEN SACSEA to CARTON DE WIART MA CHUNGKING info HARCOURT, CTG 111.2.

SAC 20299.

With reference to BAAG signal 6420 of 261640 not to CTG 111.2. If you and Ambassadors see no objection I should like you to give Wedemeyer the following message from me. "As you know Rear Admiral Harcourt will take surrender of HONGKONG as soon as General MacArthur has concluded his surrender meeting in TOKYO and will when Admiral Fraser thinks fit, hand over to SEAC forces under Major General Festing. In the meantime the Generalissimo has stated he will not send Chinese Troops to HONGKONG. I have reports that some small American Units are however planning to enter HONGKONG by air or overland. May I have details.

30 2141 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC.

WARX 57346.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer not to change the provisions of General Order Number 1 as approved by the President. Reference surrender procedure in the RYUKYUS and therefor direct that while the arrangements now in progress under the direction of General Stilwell may be continued their execution by Stilwell will be subject to the supervision of Admiral Nimitz.

31 0137 CINCAFPAC to COMGENCHINA info CG SOSCT, COM7THFLT(AFLOAT) - INTERCEPT MESC.

Cite CX 11158. Entrance SHANGHAI earliest practicable date is desirable reurad CFBX 6228 AY exact information respecting progress of minesweeping will come from Navy sources. Original Task Force 93 now designated Task Force 74 by 7th Fleet operation Plan 13-45.

30 2141 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ, info CINCLANT, COMFESSEAFRON.

My 191827 refers. Your 280740 approved except those CV'S unable transit Canal without prior removal gun sponsons are to be routed via CAPE OF GOOD HOPE or STRAITS OF MAGELLAN depending upon shortest route at time of release

31 1138 CINCPAC AFLOAT to COM3RDFLT info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

Your 310404 approved with the understanding that tenure of occupancy of minor naval bases will be limited to time required to seize or render inoperative the midget submarines and suicide craft present. Early report on adequacy of YOKOSAKA airfield for R5D operations desired.

31 1745 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Subject is OCEAN AND NAURU. Following furnished for your information. British Chiefs of Staff propose "A" NAURU surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander and "B" OCEAN surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander acting in behalf of UK in company with a representative of the high commissioner for the Western Pac. U.S. Chiefs of Staff have replied in substance as follows: To interest of expediting surrender and occupation these islands there is no objection to use of AUSTRALIAN forces and shipping provided commander concerned reports to CINCPAC for this employment and accepts surrender in his name. Whether representative of CINCPAC is to accompany AUSTRALIAN forces is left to CINCPAC discretion.

AUGUST (GCT)

TOP SECRET
EXCLUDED
JULY (1950)

YELLOW

03 1300 COMINCH & CMC TO CINCPAC ADV (KING TO NIMITZ) (CONT'D)

"Item 3. Whatever facilities can be afforded under (1) and (2) above the First Sea Lord considers it essential that we should have increased use of MANUS and that we should be given authority to install 1 more Monab at PITIUI. Some storage for ammunition at MANUS is also required. These additional facilities at MANUS will certainly be required for the forthcoming operations.

"Item 4. Eagle Farm at BRISBANE is not being used to any extent by US air forces and is required urgently by the B F to erect aircraft which are being shipped to AUSTRALIA.

"Item 5. We can provide some 2600 engineers and 3000 pioneers (unskilled labour) to construct airstrips at any intermediate base which may be allocated for the BPF. In addition to these labour forces we have call on 2500 RAF constructional personnel who are the 1st echelon of the VLR project and are now on passage to the Pacific and may be available if any delay occurs in supporting work at OKINAWA. Can it be stated that the services of those parties will be required at a forward or intermediate base.

"Item 6. A very early reply would be appreciated in connection with Item 2 since the constructional personnel are immediately available and ships carrying material now in AUSTRALIA cannot be held and have to be unloaded now unless allocated elsewhere."

I am making representations to General Marshall in connection with Item 4.

03 2226 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR NIMITZ AND ARJOLD.

15-4/1950 15-4/1950 15-4/1950 15-4/1950
WARK 26350. EYES ONLY. KYOTO, HIROSHIMA, KOKURA and NIIGATA will not be attacked by any forces under your command unless further directions are issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. Knowledge of the above instructions will be limited to the minimum number of persons essential to carry out the instructions.

04 0825 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC (NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR ONLY)

I request that COMFEAF be directed to cancel his 040540 which I consider to be improper and lacking in military courtesy. Responsibility for air sea rescue operations within the POA west of Long. 135-00 E has been assigned by me to ComFairwing 1 and my directive must stand until other arrangements have been reached between you and me.

05 0820 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC (NIMITZ TO FRASER)

While I regret the delay in your visit I agree as to the advantage in conferring after the conference in EUROPE. I am holding Hopkins here through the 6th for conference with Commodore Boak to assist me in making further recommendations to Admiral King concerning your increased use of MANUS.

05 0815 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING)

Your 031300. Item 1. The anchorages in question will probably be LATTE ULITHI and ENNETOK. Item 2. Establishment of British shore facilities or use of British construction forces at such anchorages is not recommended. Item 3. Increased use of MANUS by BPF is desirable. Commo Boak will arrive GUAM tomorrow 6 July for conference concerning details. Item 4. CINCPAC agrees. Item 5. British construction forces are not repeat not desired in MARSHALLS MARIANAS CAROLINES or PHILIPPINES. Reports on KUMU SHIMA indicate desirability turning the island over to British for development with British resources.

348

TOP SECRET
NEUTZ ONLY
JUL (GCT)

YELLOW

05 0655 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (NEUTZ TO KING)

Para 1. The following is submitted for consideration in connection with proposals understood to be before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for changes in command responsibilities in the KYUKYUS.

Para 2. The recently captured positions in the OKINAWA group are being developed to meet initially requirements in connection with OLYMPIC and subsequently requirements in connection with other operations for the defeat of JAPAN. The developments include bases for the operation of the tactical and strategic air forces of the Army, a Naval Operating Base for the support of the Pacific Fleet including airfields for fleet aircraft and also facilities for staging and mounting troops. The Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of OLYMPIC. It is also essential to future fleet operations in the EAST CHINA SEA, YELLOW SEA and SEA OF JAPAN. It will be our most western naval base through the final phases of this war and extending into the post war period.

Para 3. Plans have now been integrated and the development of the various base installations and facilities is in progress. A change in overall command from CINCPAC CINCPAC to CINCPAC CINCPAC as understood to be proposed would be undesirable simply because it would be a change and the required reorganization would be inherently wasteful of much needed time. The development of OKINAWA during the next few months will be best supported by avoiding changes. The support of future fleet operations including Fleet Air Wings after OLYMPIC will be best assured by retention of present command arrangements. Even though a transfer to CINCPAC would facilitate Army operations administration and logistics in the immediate future, naval operations administration and logistics would suffer now and during the foreseeable future.

Para 4. If however a change is decided upon it is recommended that it be based on the following principles:

- A. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for the local ground and air defense and military government of the OKINAWA Group. CINCPAC to retain responsibility for the naval defense as at present.
- B. CINCPAC to retain direct command and control of the Naval Operating Base including the waters of ENSEN BAY and the shores thereof and the naval and marine airfields at YAGUJIRU CHUO AGASE and the island of TOUGEN SHIMA.
- C. CINCPAC to retain direct operational control of naval forces based in the KYUKYUS including Fleet Air Wing 1.
- D. CINCPAC to retain control and responsibility for the sea areas now in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
- E. CINCPAC to retain direct control of units of the Fleet Marine Force and naval construction troops in the KYUKYUS except as they may be passed by him to the temporary control of the Island Commander to assist in island defense and general island development.
- F. CINCPAC to retain operational control of the naval communications facilities and naval radio stations except as he may pass them to local control by the Island Commander for joint use under arrangements agreed to by CINCPAC.
- G. Naval personnel and resources to be released by the Army Island Command as rapidly as possible under the concept of JCS 032140 of April 1945.

3484

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~UNITZ ONLY~~
~~JULY (GCT)~~

YELLOW

09 0857 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ to KING)

I do not know what prompted CINCPAC'S 090057 at this time. It appears to substitute "at all times" for "in case of exigencies". The phrase objected to appeared also on page 10 of my preliminary draft of 13 May and has not before been objected to. The language immediately preceding was drafted by CINCPAC and incorporated in our agreement of 16 May. The matter should be of little consequence but I am disturbed by the implications. I shall make no reply pending receipt of your comment. You may have information as to background which is not available to me.

09 0920 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ to KING)

I am deferring action on certain matters connection OKINAWA until future com and status is settled. Accordingly request I be informed if it is decided to let present arrangements stand.

09 1035 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CIG. (NIMITZ to KING)

CNC 052055. Recommend no repeat no change in category defense or command arrangements in ALIUTIAN at this time because of possible requirements incident to Russian entry into war.

09 2010 COMINCH & CIG TO CINCPAC ADV. (KING to NIMITZ)

It appears to me the 1st part of last sentence on page 16 referred to in CINCPAC'S CX 24142 and in your 090057 was not entirely necessary particularly in the light of the immediately preceding paragraph. The last part "who then assumes command and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN" does present a basis for proper objection, and for that reason should be withdrawn. There is a continuing responsibility vested in CINCPAC. However "including control in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault" is intended to apply only in those cases in which exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual amphibious assaults being executed against hostile beaches.

10 0900 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING)

Your CX 24142 DTG 090057. The sentence referred to will be deleted incident to the next revision of my Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC which will be issued after the conference referred to in your 090215 and my 100218. However it is my understanding that "including control, in case of exigencies of the actual amphibious assault" is intended to apply only in those cases in which exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual amphibious assaults being executed against hostile beaches.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

11 0201 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, KINZEL, STAFF

WARI 29976. The JCS have this date approved the following directive:

1. The War Department has established an air command designated "4. 2. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF)" consisting initially of those combat and service units assigned to or operating with the 20th AF, the 8th and 9th AF, 5th AF, and other elements subsequently to be mutually agreed upon by CINCPAC, CINCUSAF, and the Commanding General, USASTAF, or as prescribed by higher authority.
2. ComUSASTAF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of land based strategic air operations against JAPAN with the object of accomplishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN's military, industrial and economic systems to a point where her capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. He will collaborate with CINCPAC and CINCUSAF in such strategic air operations of Army Air Forces or Navy carrier based air forces as CINCPAC and CINCUSAF may elect to conduct. This responsibility will be discharged in accordance with directives which have been or which may be issued from time to time by the JCS through the ComGen, Army Air Forces as executive agent.
3. ComUSASTAF will continue operations to support the accomplishment of the overall objective to defeat JAPAN and will cooperate with CINCPAC and CINCUSAF in the preparation and execution of plans for the invasion of JAPAN.
4. ComUSASTAF will be responsible for the internal administration and internal logistical support of all forces assigned to USASTAF and will present his requirements for theater logistical support to CINCPAC and CINCUSAF respectively, as required. USASTAF will be administered as directed by the War Department. CINCPAC and CINCUSAF are charged with the responsibility of meeting CG USASTAF's logistic requirements subject to the overall availability of resources.
5. A headquarters will be designated to discharge the functions of AAFVCA which are not assumed under the provisions of this directive by USASTAF. The transfer of functions will be subject to agreement between CINCPAC, CINCUSAF and COMUSASTAF.
6. All understandings, commitments, agreements and directives with reference to the 20th AF will remain in effect and apply to USASTAF until amended or rescinded by the appropriate authority.
7. Commanders concerned will implement this directive as expeditiously as possible without interference with current operations.
8. Directives in conflict with the above are modified accordingly.

TOP SECRET
JULY (G-3)

YELLOW

11 0101 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, SPAATZ
MAY 29 1948.

The JCS have this date approved the following directive:

1. The War Department has established an air command designated "U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF)" consisting initially of those combat and service units assigned to or operating with the 20th AF, the Hq and Hq Bde, 8th AF, and other elements subsequently to be mutually agreed upon by CINCPAC, CINCPAC and the Commanding General, USASTAF, or as prescribed by higher authority.
2. ComGenUSASTAF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of land based strategic air operations against JAPAN with the object of accomplishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN'S military, industrial and economic systems to a point where her capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. He will collaborate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in such strategic air operations of Army Air Forces or Navy carrier based air forces as CINCPAC and CINCPAC may elect to conduct. This responsibility will be discharged in accordance with directives which have been or which may be issued from time to time by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces as executive agent.
3. ComGenUSASTAF will continue operations to support the accomplishment of the overall objective to defeat JAPAN and will cooperate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in the preparation and execution of plans for the invasion of JAPAN.
4. ComGenUSASTAF will be responsible for the internal administration and internal logistical support of all forces assigned to USASTAF and will present his requirements for theater logistical support to CINCPAC and CINCPAC respectively, as required. USASTAF will be administered as directed by the War Department. CINCPAC and CINCPAC are charged with the responsibility of meeting CG USASTAF's logistic requirements subject to the overall availability of resources.
5. A headquarters will be designated to discharge the functions of AAFPOA which are not assumed under the provisions of this directive by USASTAF. The transfer of functions will be subject to agreement between CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMGENUSASTAF.
6. All understandings, commitments, agreements and directives with reference to the 20th AF will remain in effect and apply to USASTAF until amended or rescinded by the appropriate authority.
7. Commanders concerned will implement this directive as expeditiously as possible without interference with current operations.
8. Directives in conflict with the above are modified accordingly.

10 2347 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ INFO INTERSTATE WARNS, ARNOLD
MAY 29 1948.

Plan PASTEL as agreed at conferences between your representatives and Joint Security Control in Washington is approved. Para 5 B (4) of the plan calls for an annex setting forth details of specific responsibility and timing of the strategic operational deception and special deception measures to implement PASTEL. It is suggested that you hold conference of planning and communications representatives of all addressees in order that this annex may be expeditiously prepared and coordinated.

3487

TOP SECRET
NO FORN DISSEM
NO FORN DISSEM

YELLOW

11 2335

11 2335

11 2335 ADV TO COMNAV. (11 2335)

11 2335

By 020152 and your 020115. The continued existence of the remaining Japanese naval forces when it necessary to use on defense operations. Further naval forces than would be available. The remaining heavy enemy ships must be eliminated prior to 1950 and the responsibility is the responsibility of the Pacific Fleet. If there are other important enemy vessels are still in being and 11 2335. It is ordered our escort requirements will be larger than need otherwise be.

11 0930 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO WEDENYER, NIMITZ, MAGAMHER, HED, HENRIAD.
WEEK 29912.

With reference to the FORT BAYARD supplemental supply project for CHINA, there remain additional factors of interest to the JCS on which further action appears necessary. These include the exchange of additional information, with information copies to the JCS on:

- (1) Wedenyer's estimate of enemy air capabilities and evaluation as to sufficiency of available counter measures;
- (2) Information on minefields; and
- (3) Earliest considered estimate of unloading time required for FORT BAYARD.

To enable JCS to evaluate cost of continuing supply through FORT BAYARD subsequent to 5 cargo ships now scheduled, it is desired that CINCPAC, after necessary consultations with CINCPAC and CG CHINA Theater, submit his views on naval resources required. For planning purposes, it will be assumed that 3 cargo ships per month will follow the last 5.

At such time as adequate information becomes available to Wedenyer, the JCS desire him to submit complete plan for the FORT BAYARD supplemental supply project to include: Hydrographic information, aid for discharging cargo needed from outside CHINA-SUMMA-INDIA Theater, unloading time for ships, Air defenses for FORT BAYARD, target date, air support plan and enemy and allied mine fields.

13 0747 CINCPAC ADV TO COMNAV. (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

My comments on JCS 1406/2 drafted in form for general use are transmitted separately. If you want acquiesce in giving Army control over their projects and can get no better settlement paragraph 4 of my 030455 represents the absolute minimum with which we can operate successfully. You should know that General MacArthur and General Kenney are virtually in control of their CHINA projects now. General Kenney is obviously operating on the assumption that JCS 1406 as originally proposed is or soon will be approved. I shall if possible avoid disagreeable incidents with him but an early decision will be helpful in that regard. I have confidence in Stillwell and he is optimistic as to unloading and base development. Price will take over our BOS on 15 July.

3489

SECRET
NOFORN
NOVA 01X

YELLOW

14 0723 CINCENRAC TO CINCPAC ARMY, WARGOS INFO CINC US FLEET. (MACARTHUR TO EIGHTH AND MARSHALL INFO KING)

CI 25423

1. I have been concerned for some time with regard to the execution of the directive set forth in JCS 1259/4. This directive required a transfer of Army and Navy resources "as expeditiously as possible" until each service was under the control of its own service commander. The fundamental purpose was to rearrange the command system in the Pacific to facilitate the war against JAPAN and it must have been the intent that this rearrangement be effected prior to the launching of the decisive campaigns. This directive specifically indicated that "conflicting provisions of existing directives to CINCPAC and CINCSWPA are modified accordingly". With this interpretation in mind, you will recall I sent staff representatives to CMH in mid-April to explore the general problem and determine procedures to comply with JCS directions. This conference was not fruitful because of the differences in our respective interpretations of the JCS directive. In response to your radio 160250 GCT April in which you proposed to turn over administrative but no operational control of Army forces in your area I accepted in radio CI 14288 as a 1st step in compliance with instructions, but stated that greater control of Army resources would be required by me. This reply took into consideration that under the operating procedures in Pacific Ocean Areas an abrupt reversion of resources to appropriate service control in certain instances was inadvisable. I guessed in my CI 14288 to turn over at once all Naval resources under my command to you. This was resented for the reasons set forth in your 200344 GCT April. There have been numerous exchanges of radiograms between you and myself concerning separate features of this general problem, but the resultant effect as it applies to the compliance with the JCS directive has been disappointingly meager. On several occasions you have quoted certain directions which were issued prior to JCS 1259/4 and which you ~~have~~ believed were not modified by JCS 1259/4 irrespective of the quote given earlier in this radio. In this belief I do not concur.

2. Three and one-half months have now elapsed since the issuance of the JCS directive and I find that there has been transferred to my full control the 7th Air Force, 9th Corps Hdqrs, 4 InfDivs, and a sprinkling of combat and service support troops, with administrative control only of other units, a control completely ineffective in so far as the fundamental concept of the directive of the JCS is concerned. There remain under your control General Richardson's Hdqrs, 1 of my main echelons of command in the Pacific, an Army Hdqrs, a Corps Hdqrs, and numerous ground, combat and service support units estimated to aggregate upon arrival of redeployed units between 325,000 and 350,000 troops.

3. It has become increasingly embarrassing for me to plan future operations with the Army resources of the Pacific when I am denied the authority to control the relative priority of their retention at various locations or determine the relative importance of their requirement in comparison with their need for the invasion of JAPAN. I must necessarily under the existing circumstances resort to negotiations for each individual unit with you, causing great administrative labor and delay. Determination of the Army redeployment requirements of resources from EUROPE and the U.S. without a knowledge of the detailed employment or need for the resources now in the Pacific in your area is little better than an educated guess, with the inevitable result that any unnecessary movement of resources into the Pacific will cause a dispersion and waste of the critical shipping means of the U.S. This situation has been exemplified in the last few days in a conference of various officers throughout the Pacific to survey our deficiencies as relates to the support of the

TOP SECRET
NOFORN
JIA (C-5)

YELLOW

17 0723 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV HQ. MARCOS INFO CINC 82 FLINT (CONTINUED)

20th Air Force. This conference was attended by 42 officers of various organizations. The solutions accepted at the conclusion of this conference necessarily reflect the mass of conflicting and complicated command arrangements and leave uncertainty and confusions in many minds.

4. By year 080301 OCT July you indicate a need for the naval resources of the Pacific to be more closely controlled by you in order to launch the operations against JAPAN. I likewise need a closer control over the Army resources of the Pacific to fully perform my functions. I consider that the time has now come for final accomplishment of the JCS directive concurrently with consideration of your 080301 July. This would involve:

(A) A plan for the turn over of Army resources in the Pacific to CINCPAC.
(B) A determination of the localities to be transferred on the basis of paramount interest.

(C) The establishment of procedures whereby operational control of the forces of each service may be placed under CINCSIPA or CINCPAC to conduct operations as specifically directed by the JCS from time to time.

(D) A target date for completion of the above.

5. If you are now prepared to discuss the full implementation of the JCS directive, it is suggested that a conference be arranged. If, however, you are of the opinion that there are irreconcilable points of view, I feel that they should now be presented to the JCS for decision.

14 0904 CINCPAC ADV TO COMUSMACV US FORCES CHINA INFO CINCPAC. (NIMITZ TO WEDDERBURN INFO MACARTHUR)

Your 121015. It would be extremely helpful in clarifying our plans and concepts of future operations if you or your representative could visit my headquarters at GUAM to discuss naval support of your operations along the CHINA Coast and the employment of fleet units to exercise control of the sea areas adjacent to the Coast of CHINA. If you find such a visit feasible I will invite General MacArthur to send a representative also.

16 1119 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

C 25992

In view of your 150720 I doubt that any practicable result can eventuate from another conference on a theater level and therefore prefer to leave any further clarification if they so desire in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

18 1409 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADV HQ Info AGNAR, NAVY DEPT.
V73 BQ152

TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR and NIMITZ. In order to facilitate preparation for and execution of OLYMPIC, CINCPAC and CINCPAC will arrange to transfer to CINCPAC at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August control of U.S.-held areas in the RYUKYUS, all U.S. Army forces located in the RYUKYUS, including 10th Army, responsibility for defense of the U.S.-held positions, and responsibilities pertaining to USSTAF units now vested in CINCPAC.

Para. CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of all naval and naval air installations and development projects in the RYUKYUS, the movement of naval forces and supplies into the area, and harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all U.S. Naval forces in the RYUKYUS will be vested in CINCPAC.

18 1212 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC, AGNAR, NAVY
DEPT. V66 BQ145

TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ. For your information pertinent extracts of CINCPAC's C-24215 of 9 July have been passed to the British Chiefs of Staff at CCS 17 July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted in principle the use of British Commonwealth forces for employment in the main operations against JAPAN. The substance of the British proposal was covered in WAR 28274 of 7 July to MACARTHUR, copy of which War Department will repeat to CINCPAC together with CINCPAC's reply, C-24215 of 9 July. The acceptance in principle of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff pertained only to ground forces. The British proposal as regards a tactical air component was left as a matter for further discussion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further approved the British request to dispatch an Army corps commander to the Pacific to consult with CINCPAC and CINCPAC on the various factors involved in the employment of British Commonwealth forces and to submit recommendations as a result of such conferences. It is understood that air and naval officers will accompany the corps commander. It is requested that CINCPAC and CINCPAC indicate when this visit can be conveniently made.

Para. Although decision has not been made, the British Chiefs of Staff indicate they have under consideration the use of the 8th Indian Division from ITALY which had a notable record in the Italian campaign, and is therefore acclimated, the 2nd or 36th Divisions (both British) now in SEAC, as well as veteran NEW ZEALAND, CANADIAN and AUSTRALIAN divisions. The British Divisions are not included in the SINGAPORE campaign. Due to improbability of reequipping British, Indian and Australian divisions the Canadian division with U.S. equipment would probably operate in a U.S. corps. Plans have not developed to the point where decision can be taken on the composition of the forces.

TOP SECRET
NOCTZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC.

WDCMC SVC 15259.

Following is relay of War 28274 dated 7 July to MacArthur from Marshall. British participation in the invasion of JAPAN is subject. In addition to the British Pacific Fleet and VLR force of 10 squadrons, the British now propose that the VLR force be increased to 20 squadrons at a later date when more airfields become available, and that a British force of 3 to 5 British, Indian and Dominion divisions participate in CORONET under American Command. The British do not give source of these divisions but some or all are apparently expected to be released after the capture of SINGAPORE, scheduled for November 1945. They would also be carried in British ships, provided with the necessary assault lift and supported by the East Indies Fleet augmented by the British Pacific Fleet if necessary and by a tactical air force of some 15 squadrons. The British have made the 3 following specific suggestions as to the use of this force:

- A. A force of 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the assault, together with 2 or 3 divisions in the build-up, administratively largely self-supporting.
- B. A force of 3 divisions in the assault and immediate follow-up and 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the build-up, relying, to a considerable degree, on American administrative assistance.
- C. A force of up to 5 divisions in the build-up administratively largely self-supporting.

British prefer a course which allows them to take a part in the assault. Simultaneously with CORONET the British would maintain pressure from BURMA toward SIAM and additionally might conduct amphibious operations against SIAM, JAVA, SUMATRA or HONGKONG. Request for use at the coming conference your initial comments by 9 July on this proposal, followed by any more detailed comments you wish to make. It is evident that the use of these British Divisions should replace U. S. Divisions to the same number. Such a course would meet with wide public approval from the viewpoint of lessening the requirements of U. S. soldiers, especially on the part of the articulate who assail British and ~~AFRICAN~~ administration for non-participation of allies in conquest of JAPAN, etc. Request your views include comment on command and control arrangements.

Now begins answer to preceding War message. C 24215 from CINCPAC
 "From CHQ SWPA and MacArthur to WARCOS for MARSHALL cite C 24215. Msg is TOP SECRET. The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET, replying your W 28274, presents problems not heretofore encountered when the CANADIAN and FRENCH contingents were considered. These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date. This operation, at present visualized as being launched across beaches on the 2 sides of LANCEWOOD BAY, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines. The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval and ground forces, and within the

TOP SECRET
NOV 12 1951
JULY (OCT)

19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC (Continued)

ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures and doctrines will complicate command, operations and logistic support. Redeployment geared to the support of HOMOGENEOUS forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefore. The changes in redeployment alone will have world wide effect and is apt to cause confusion. British forces participating in operations against SINGAPORE in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in CORONET. It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient. Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for CORONET dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date. Bearing the above in mind, it is considered that any solution in the use of British troops must discourage their employment in the assault and the establishment for them of a separate logistical chain. Considered solely from the standpoint of public approval, the following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above. This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces.

- A. Limit British Empire participation to 1 corps of 3 divisions; 1 British, 1 Canadian, and 1 Australian.
- B. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops.
- C. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area.
- D. Require British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area or as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there.
- E. Amphibiously train 1 British division and 1 Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained.
- F. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about Y plus 10. It will there be

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC (continued)

used as the AFPAC Assault Reserve Afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the BORNEO-MOROTAI area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending on where it is concentrated.

G. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States army. Reserve the privilege to utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand. I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required. Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon. The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied Air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support all troops in CORONET operations. Therefore, I recommend that the offer of the British tactical squadrons be declined and acceptance of the proposed increase in British very long range squadrons be delayed until the availability of more airfields is assured. Although not mentioned in your radiogram, it is proposed that you have considered that extensive augmentation of Allied effort in the Pacific, including components from the various forces, may cause a demand for the establishment of an overall command under CCS control similar to that employed in EUROPE.

20 1407 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH

Confirmation is requested of my understanding that JCS 151409 vests in CINCPAC responsibility for Military Government in the RYUKYUS.

21 0810 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN USASTAF.

To clarify logistic planning request you obtain definition of "External logistical support" and "Internal logistical support" as used in JCS despatch 110101 WAREX 29978 paragraph 4.

21 1415 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WHEELER, AGNEW, and NAVY

VICTORY 169 BG 248 for your information the combined chiefs of staff on 20 July approved the following directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia with the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the DUTCH, NEW ZEALAND, and AUSTRALIAN governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command setup in Southeast ASIA and Southwest Pacific. Directive begins.

Para 1. Your primary task is the opening of the STRAITS OF MALACCA at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (CCT)

- continued -

YELLOW

21 1415

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WEDMEYER, AGWAR info NAVY.

Commonwealth Land Forces should take part in the main operations against JAPAN which have been agreed as the Supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the outer zone to the extent that forces and resources permit.

BOUNDRIES OF COMMAND

Para 2. The Eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include BORNEO, JAVA and the CELEBES.

Para. Full details of this extension are contained in the appendix.

Para 3. Further information will be sent to you regarding INDO-CHINA.

Para 4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after the 15th August, 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility.

Para 5. From that date, such DOMINION and DUTCH FORCES as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on AUSTRALIA.

Para 6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an AUSTRALIAN COMMAND under the British Chiefs of Staff.

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN

Para 7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from 3 to 5 divisions and, if possible, a small tactical air force should take part in the main operations against JAPAN in the spring of 1946. Units of the EAST INDIES FLEET may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination.

Para 8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for 2 divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Para 9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against JAPAN must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below.

OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER ZONE

Para 10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations assigned to:

SubPara A. complete the liberation of MALAYS.

SubPara B. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the BURMA-SIAM frontier.

SubPara C. Capture the key areas of SIAM.

SubPara D. Establish bridgeheads in JAVA and/or SUMATRA to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course.

Para 11. You will submit a programme of operations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.

DEVELOPMENT OF BASES

Para 12. You will develop SINGAPORE and such other bases as you

- continued -

2495

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

- continued -

21 1415 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WHEATON, AGWAR info NAVY.

may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. Directive ends. Appendix Begins.

EASTERN BOUNDARY OF COMMAND

Para. Beginning on the coast of INDO-CHINA at 15 degrees north; thence through the BALABAC STRAIT along the 193 9 boundary line between the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO to latitude 05 degrees north, thence eastward to 05-00 north - 128-00 east, thence southwestward to 02-00 south - 123-00 east; thence southeastward to 08-00 south - 125-00 east; thence southwestward to 18-00 south - 110-00 east end of directive and appendix.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

211820 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC/CINCPHA BOTH Hqs. info COMINCH AND CNO ADMIN.

✓ Understanding contained in your 201407 is confirmed.

25 0830 CINCPAC to COMANF info COMINCH, CINCPAC ADVANCE Hqs.

Eyes only for Kinkaid, King and Nimitz. CX 28196 authority granted your 240810 to intercept, board and inspect for violations of existing conventions and to bring into port if violations are discovered Hospital Ship TACHIBANA MARU.

25 0906 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Nimitz to Towers only. Obtain from COMAIRPAC and send to me in this system his nomination of escort carriers with 2 Flag Officers to concentrate in MARSHALLS in near future for use in KFKLBLOCKS 4 if required. Also warn COMSERVPAC to be continually prepared on short notice nominate SERVPAC units listed page 6 my serial 0005067 of 26 May. Utmost secrecy directed.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

26 1946 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info SPAATZ, AGMAR, NAVY DEPT.

BG 412 V 357

Coordination of plans for the procedure to be followed in the event of Japanese governmental surrender is now a pressing necessity. Early information is desired regarding the conference reported to be in progress at GUAM on this subject.

Para. It appears to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF that in such event immediate naval occupation of critical parts of JAPAN is desirable to include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate communication and permit airborne troop landings.

Para. It also appears to JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF that it would be highly desirable for similar procedure to be followed on the ASIATIC MAINLAND in following order or priority: SHANGHAI, FUSAN IN KOREA, CHEFOO, and CHINGWANGTAO on the MANCHURIAN BORDER. Also that preliminary landings on ASIATIC continent might best be carried out by Marines. A landing at TAKU to permit the blocking of the critical communication points of PEIKING-TSINTSIEN would be more desirable than at CHINGWANGTAO but probably is impractical from the viewpoint of Naval Craft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not desire to become involved in the campaign in CHINA on the mainland other than by air, but it is considered highly desirable to seize the ports in order better to facilitate the reoccupation of the country by CHINESE Forces. The occupation of the north tip of FORMOSA would be a great aid to air operation and communication to JAPAN and CHINA.

Para. There appears to be a necessity for an early decision as to the movement of divisions of the 1st Army now in the United States, particularly as concerns complication regarding their equipment now enroute to PHILIPPINES. It might be desirable to route some of these divisions directly to JAPAN as follow up units, thus avoiding the shipment of divisions from the PHILIPPINES for the same purpose.

Para. The formal surrender or enforced submission of the Japanese government will be received jointly by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz or their designated representatives. In order that there may be a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with Japanese Imperial Headquarters or its ministries, representatives of CINCPAC and CINCPAC will jointly perform this function until CINCPAC has actually landed in JAPAN and personally assumed this responsibility. The foregoing provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local surrenders by naval or other U. S. Commanders concerned.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (CCT)

28 0102 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRFAC, COMSERVAFAC info CINCPAC PEARL H.

NIMITZ TO MONTGOMERY AND SMITH ONLY INFO HOOVER ONLY.

Plans for procedure to be followed in case of Japanese surrender are under development. It is anticipated that requirements would include 1 streamlined ACORN and 1 streamlined GROPAC for emergency use at YOKUSUKA air and seaplane base and 3 other ACORNS and GROPACS to follow promptly for other areas. Survey situation and advise units most readily available. My present inclination is to direct COM MARINER be ready to produce a streamlined ACORN by stripping local facilities. Comment.

28 0107 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORFAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO FLETCHER ONLY, INFO KING.

In order to be ready to execute KEELBLOCKS 4 on short notice am sending you PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY and CHESTER and 2 more Destroyers and am preparing Task Force 49 with 6 CVE and 9 DD ready to move on short notice from ENIWETOK. 2 Heavy landplane search squadrons have been sent you.

Para. Use forces available to extend and exercise your control of the eastern portion of the SEA OF OKHOTSK.

Para. Request from me info COMSERVAFAC such augmentations in auxiliary vessels as you must have to service your combat units as they are increased.

27 1318 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPACFAC info COM7THFLEET, COMINCH.

My 270920. If agreeable to you will send Rear Admiral Sherman accompanied by Brig Gen Mandell, Brig Gen Goss, Capt Espe, Col Mabie and Lieut Comdr Grant to arrive MANILA afternoon 29 July to coordinate occupation plans.

New Subject. Conference with COMGEN CHINA my 140304 will take place 4 August and presence of representative from your headquarters would be welcome.

27 0920 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPACFAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

NIMITZ TO KING, INFO MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ.

The following information is furnished to inform you of the status of planning in reply to 2nd sentence of JCS 261146 (V 357).

Para. During the visit of CINCPACFAC representatives to CINCPAC'S Advance Headquarters 21-23 July which was concerned primarily with making detailed arrangements for compliance with the JCS directive V 73 of 18 July concerning the RYUKYUS copies of CINCPACFAC'S plan BLACKLIST were received and since that time CINCPAC'S tentative plan CAMPUS has been revised to accord with BLACKLIST insofar as the occupation of JAPAN by Army Forces is concerned. CAMPUS contemplates naval and amphibious

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

- continued -

27 0920 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF.

NIMITZ TO KING, INFO MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ (Cont'd)

operations in 3 phases. Phase A. Emergency naval occupation of TOKYO BAY.

Phase B. Complete deployment of naval occupation forces.

Phase C. Amphibious operations connected with the occupation of JAPAN by U. S. Army Forces.

Para. Copies of the CAMPUS draft as revised will be taken to MANILA for conference with representatives of CINCPAC on 29 July. Propose draft separate plan for occupation critical points CHINA COAST (using Fleet Marine Force) in conference with COMGEN CHINA who will arrive GUAM 4 August under present arrangements and with CINCPAC representatives.

COMNORPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMSERVPAC.

31 0112 Reur 280107 request 1 AD be made available this command upon arrival CRUDIV 5 and escorting DD's. With arrival TF 49 request following additional auxiliaries 1 AO, 2 YO, 2 YOG, 1 ATF, 1 YG, 4 LCM and 1 refrigerated cargo ship in addition to the 1 presently supplying all armed forces in the ALEUTIANS.

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM7THFLEET.

MEMORIS TO SHERMAN ONLY.

Do not concur that landing of Marines or occupying airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is to be made as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para. 2nd paragraph your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and developments which immediately follow with the time of any such landing if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this interpretation is correct then concur otherwise need amplification.

Para. In view prospective requirements for marines elsewhere it appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be required initially. You are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available for early and rapid movement into JAPAN if your discussions there indicate advisability of so doing.

Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent directives giving CINCPAC a free hand until CINCPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces any agreements or understanding you make should carry a proviso for revision of any part that might prove to be inconsistent with any later directive issued by JCS.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
JULY (GCT)

YELLOW

28 1948 COMAIRPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL H.
MONTGOMERY TO NIMITZ INFO HOOVER.

Concur that streamlined ACOBN be produced from units currently in Marianas. Your 280102. Additionally are ACOBNS 53, 55 and 57 all West Coast. Last scheduled for RATSBAVE other 2 presently unassigned.

28 1239 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to CINCPAC info COMINCH.
NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

Your 280459. I consider that JCS 142307 June (WARX 17064) together with JCS 261946 (BG V 357) constitute a directive requiring prompt compliance on my part and accordingly will send Rear Admiral Sherman and party to MANILA tomorrow as planned the coordination of occupation plans is the principal purpose of their visit at this time. They will have incidental conferences with COM7THFLT and COMPHIBSPAC concerning naval matters and those required can remain for conference with your staff and USASTAF representatives concerning OLYMPIC air coordination.

Para. My 140304 gives the purpose of the conference with COM7TH U.S. Forces CHINA at GUAM on 4 August. However advantage will be taken of that meeting to improve coordination and understanding on various matters now pending including the FORT BAYARD project and possible occupation measures along the CHINA COAST. Your representative will be welcome at that time as always.

28 0721 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COMINCH info BUPERS.
NIMITZ TO EDWARDS info JACOBS.

In view of JCS 271000 (Victory 371) request immediate assignment to my headquarters of an officer qualified to be my liaison officer with Commander Soviet Pacific Fleet. Captain Frank P. Thomas believed to be well qualified and is requested if available. If not available request names of others available.

01 0931 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COM7THFLEET.
FOR REAR ADMIRAL SHERMAN EYES ONLY.

Immediate delivery desired. Various articles in press and other pronouncements are critical of existing command arrangements in Pacific. CINCPAC desires that if possible agreement be reached regarding command exchange of information spheres of operation intelligence etc of air forces of CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMSTRATEGIC AIR FORCES. In order to secure close coordination and effectiveness. Believe SPA-7 entertains much same concept as ourselves. If not already done make every effort to secure an understanding for maximum effective air effort against Japanese by coordinated action. Such a goal is not incompatible with retention of independence of action by respective commands.

Para. Your 010545 just received. If you think advisable delay departing to act on this message.

1506

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NEOTZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

30 0237 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE H. (Cont'd)

JAPAN because it appears impossible for Army to move sufficient divisions rapidly without some marines.

Para. The foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement unless unforeseen demands are made. His plans are being made and ours will be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are concerned.

28 2113 COMSERVAC to CINCPAC/POA BOTH H. COMAIRMAC.

SMITH TO NEOTZ INFORMATION HOVER AND MONTGOMERY ONLY.

Your 280102 GROPAC 13 immediately available at HEAD for streamlined GROPAC provided it not be used in FORT BAYARD or OKINAWA as previously suggested. For 3 other GROPACS recommend (A) slowdown and curtailment OKINAWA base development thus permitting CNOB to form 3 suitable GROPACS from personnel under his command and equipment drawn in construction materials pool shipments see entry 119 of my serial 001402 of 19 Dec 1944. (B) 1st alternate form 2 GROPACS from OKINAWA as outlined in (A) and a similar unit from MARIANAS. (C) 2nd alternate form 3 GROPACS from units assembling on West Coast for OLYMPIC. If emergency action be taken on (C) under personal direction of service force representative consider that suitable units could be ready for sailing in 30 days.

28 0459 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

C 28946.

Will be glad to welcome Admiral Sherman and his party who I understand will be prepared to discuss matters pertaining to air coordination for OLYMPIC your 271318. Our respective views on occupation are so divergent that I believe it would be difficult to coordinate them prior to the receipt of some directive from the JCS. We will of course be glad nevertheless to discuss the matter with Sherman when he comes.

Para. Regarding the WEDDERBURN conference, it was our understanding that it had as its purpose the coordination of the FORT BAYARD project. Insofar as this headquarters is concerned it would not be deemed advisable to attempt to expand it into a discussion of plans for operational occupation of the CHINA COAST until a definite directive has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

TOP SECRET
NDICIZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

YELLOW

01 0545 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS.

Completed air coordination conference and expect return GUAM tomorrow 2 August.

Para. Plans for occupation coordinated satisfactorily insofar as troop movements are concerned. Early naval occupation of "Japanese Waters" accepted by CINCPAC but any landing whatsoever by naval or marine elements prior to CINCPAC's personal landing is emphatically unacceptable to him. Accordingly I have left that feature as one on which agreement could not be reached and in which Joint Action is not essential and concentrated on other features which because of their nature do require coordination. There will be no written record of our planning conference other than the plans themselves which will be adequately correlated except for landing force operations prior to the arrival of Army troops in strength.

'31 0024 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

EYES ONLY. SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS ONLY.

Conference and revision of both BLACKLIST and CAMPUS proceeding satisfactorily although considerable insistence still required on my part. CINCPAC's headquarters is hoping for a directive along OLYMPIC lines or which will give CINCPAC overall command for the occupation.

Para. Have deleted provisions for early landings and inserted provision for a CINCPAC representative to go to Halsey's Flagship and thereafter Halsey and the CINCPAC representative would function as the Quote Joint Representatives Unquote mentioned in last paragraph of JCS message.

Para. It now appears that CINCPAC will occupy the KOBE OSAKA KYOTA AREA instead of the KURE area so the 5th Fleet will be initially at KOBE. The 5th PhibCorps is planned to occupy the KOBE-OSAKE AREA initially. The 3rd PhibCorps is reserved for the CHINA COAST which I now believe will not be covered in CINCPAC's plan as it is WEDEMEYERS area.

Para. Have promised to make TULSA available for purpose of guarding navy circuits and supplying CINCPAC with intercept traffic after landing. They will not ask for the 3rd LST.

30 0237 COM7THFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MCMORRIS ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and very amicable conference with General MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air show of force as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing any marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the JCS message but did not consider it a directive and has asked for one.

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 MarDivs available to army for

DECLASSIFIED

YELLOW

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ONLY~~
~~ADVISORY (CC)~~

03 0209 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NDMTZ TO KING ONLY.

Your 312010. My understanding is that Sherman's relief should have about 2 months overlap and that he would be available in August and preferably early August. It is my desire that Sherman remain with me until all plans and preparations for OLYMPIC are completed but not necessarily until after execution OLYMPIC which might drag indefinitely. My 260811 was based on assumption that Schoeffel would be available in August.

03 0212 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NDMTZ TO KING ONLY.

Cities of KYOTO HIROSHIMA KOKURA and NIIGATA were reserved for special attack with which you are familiar. SecWar directed substitution NAGASAKI for KYOTO. Understand reason being that latter is an important cultural center that he did not wish destroyed. Request I be informed if KYOTO is to remain immune from normal bombing attacks. Assume also that JCS are familiar with fact that POW camp is at NAGASAKI.

03 0911 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Passed to Com 31 Feb

NDMTZ TO KING.

Sherman returned from MANILA and reports that BLACKLIST and CAMPUS have both been revised and are mutually acceptable except for the question of landings by naval or marine personnel before CINCPAC lands in person. The language of CAMPUS in this regard was drafted as follows: "At each principal anchorage, an operational airfield will if practicable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings, and for subsequent development for naval purposes. The timing of this occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength, but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet the requirements of the situation as it may develop after the arrival of naval forces in Japanese ports."

Para. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the principal anchorages may be occupied if such action becomes necessary to ensure the safety of naval forces".

Para. Since this particular language was not accepted by CINCPAC it was noted on the margin of copies furnished him that "it is subject to later revision as directed by CINCPAC".

Para. The sequence of ground occupations as now contemplated by BLACKLIST and CAMPUS in the 1st phase is as follows KANTO PLAIN, SASEBO, NAGASAKI, OSAKA-KOBE-KYOTO, KILJO AOMORI-OMIYATO. The 5th Philb Corps is planned to be used in the OSAKA-KOBE-KYOTO area and the 3rd Philb Corps is left available for use on the CHINA COAST.

Para. An offer to place a command ship (AGC) at the disposal of CINCPAC was accepted. An offer to accommodate in Halsey's flagship the representative contemplated by last paragraph of JCS 261946 V 357 was not accepted on the grounds that CINCPAC would have no representative before he arrived in person.

DECLASSIFIED

- continued -

3503

DECLASSIFIED

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

03 0911 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMINCH (CONT'D)

Para. Am informed that all discussions were carried on in a most amicable manner and that General MacArthur received my representative most cordially.

Para. Agreements concerning coordination of all air forces from now until after OLYMPIC were quickly reached to the satisfaction of all concerned in conference between SPAATZ, KENNEY, CHAMBERLIN, SHEERMAN and PRIDE.

Para. I see no better time than the near future for a visit to the Western Pacific by you and Marshall and hope that you will come prepared to make decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

03 1332 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY ONLY.

It is imperative that there be no interference with operations of 509th Bomb Group. Although their objective has been indicated it may be changed. It is accordingly directed that you send no planes over KYUSHU or western HONSHU until specifically authorized by me. It is my intention to give you freedom of action as soon as the special mission has been completed. At this time it appears probable that task will be completed on the 5th and that you can strike as you currently plan on the 6th. Will keep you informed.

Para. After your next attack desire your fleet return to port in order that it may be ready to renew operations in late August. Acknowledge.

04 0827 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

As soon as possible after arrival in PRDY would very much like to visit you with about 4 of my staff. If agreeable to you please designate convenient date arrange air transportation and advise.

New Subject. Intend shift my flag to New Jersey BNINETOX leaving Missouri in all respects ready to receive CINCPAC.

04 0753 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ TO COM5THFLEET, COMPHIBSPAC.

NIMITZ TO SPRUANCE AND TURNER ONLY.

As yet no agreements have been made in connection with the coverage of OLYMPIC by press representatives. Until arrangements have been made between CINCPAC and CINCPAC as to the degree to which Pacific Fleet correspondents may cover operations on shore make no firm commitments connection reception AFPAC correspondents in ships of the fleet. Requests for such commitments should be referred to CINCPAC for coordination.

DECLASSIFIED

3501

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

04 0612 COMGENUSASTAF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

EYES ONLY NIMITZ AND MACARTHUR.

Operational intention is to strike primary HIROSHIMA at 060945/K (-10) or secondary KOKURA at 061010/K or tertiary NAGASAKI at 061030/Y. A firm decision confirming the times listed above will leave this headquarters by 051430/K. It is mandatory that no friendly aircraft enter a 50 mile area around the 3 targets scheduled for attack between the hours 060545/K and 061700/K if firm decision confirms the above target times

04 2253 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLEET.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY.

Your 040805 may further complicate an already complicated situation with respect to command and coordination of air forces in the Pacific Theater. In the minds of many Army Air Commanders there begins to arise questions as to which forces are "Primary" and which are "Supporting". Accordingly I must request that your suggestions as to overall coordination of FEAF, USASTAF and Fleet Aircraft be made to me only. Definite agreements have been made as to principles and are being mailed to you which cover this matter from now through OLYMPIC.

06 1630 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Pursuant to agreement with Soviets, 4th Question Victory 351 refers Look up. Joint Chiefs of Staff will propose establishment Army and Army Air operational liaison group at Khabarovsk headed by General officer to which will be attached only 1 Captain and about 2 enlisted from Navy, and establishment at VLADIVOSTOK of naval operational liaison group headed by Flag Officer to include 3 officers and 3 enlisted from Army Air Forces. Estimate here that total personnel VLADIVOSTOK group will entail 20 officers 45 enlisted to handle liaison, convoy and routing, and necessary communications which would include ADAK FOX, ADAK-VLADIVOSTOK, ship to shore, and VLADIVOSTOK-GUAM via Khabarovsk weather central. Envisaged that operational communications with PETROPAVLOVSK would be to station ship as no shore facilities other than weather central contemplated there. Your comment on this arrangement with particular reference to number of personnel VLADIVOSTOK is requested as a matter of urgency. In this connection note that reciprocal Soviet liaison group of similar composition at GUAM may be expected. Similar information has been provided MacArthur and Spaatz by Army in MARK 44735.

TOP SECRET
NMATTZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

04 1831 ARNOLD to STATE info CINCPAC, CINCPACMAC.

WARX 44014.

Further to WARX 29978 dated 10 July which states your overall mission priority of objectives is as follows:

Para. 1. Mission.

SubPara A. Your overall mission is as stated in JCS 742/12. In carrying out the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN'S military, industrial and economic systems, your priority of objectives is as follows:

Para. 2. Objectives.

SubPara A. Primary objectives (in order).

SubPara 1. Initiate and carry out attacks upon suitable Japanese railway targets of special importance to economic traffic.

SubPara 2. Continue the present program against aircraft production.

SubPara 3. Conduct concentrated attacks against major ammunition storage areas.

SubPara 4. Complete the present program against industrial concentrations and stores located in urban areas.

SubPara B. Secondary objectives.

SubPara 1. Attack selected arsenals producing heavy ordnance.

SubPara 2. Direct available surplus effort against secondary aircraft targets and against nitrogen production and oil storage as auxiliary to invasion and preparatory to post invasion operations.

SubPara C. Other objectives.

SubPara 1. Mining operations. To continue present mining operations that cannot be performed by FMAF or Navy in order to maintain the blockade of Japanese Home Islands.

SubPara 2. Photography. Continue the program of photographing for operational purposes and complete the present program of photographing JAPAN and approaches thereto as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

31 2014 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE

HAILEY TO NMATTZ.

Pending receipt of directive from you I have formulated OpPlan for preliminary steps phase 1 salient features being. A. Arrangements for delivery of your terms. B. Receive local surrender on board MISSOURI and dictate local terms. C. Com3RdFlt in MISSOURI with suitable screen proceed initial anchorage SAGAMI WAN. D. Fleet at sea in striking position. E. RAdm Badger local Task Commander with headquarters YOKOSUKA and staff and necessary subordinate Task Commanders supplied to Com3RdFlt. F. Initially occupy only YOKOSUKA including airfield and seaplane base and locally initiate following measures. 1. Minesweeping. 2. Evacuation enemy armed forces from YOKOSUKA PENINSULA except key hostages and certain service personnel. 3. Spiking or covering continued enemy installations. 4. Harbor patrol. 5. Local security. 6. Minimum

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

YELLOW

31 2014 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE (Cont'd)

essential civil administration. 7. Sanitation. 8. Receiving Ship facilities and hospital ships. 9. Communications. 10. Other local practicable measures. G. Com3rdFleet will initiate the following: 1. Instructions for withdrawal of enemy forces beyond a specified fixed line. 2. Freezing of all enemy forces in TOKYO AREA. 3. Delivery of specified shipping weapons, equipment and transportation. 4. Delivery and care of allied prisoners. 5. Security air patrol and other necessary surveillance measures. 6. General communication regulations and restrictions. 7. Preparations to receive CINCPAC including readiness of WISCONSIN. 8. Preparations to receive ship borne or air borne occupation personnel and forces. 9. Logistic support of Badgers local occupation force.

Para. Foregoing not complete but intended to indicate nature and extent of plans to utilize forces and facilities immediately available and pave the way for extension of control.

Para. Plans will be prepared take similar measures at other designated focal points east of arbitrarily assumed line 134 east assuming CTF 95 will act west of 134.

Para. Plan will be airmailed to you when annexes are completed but no distribution will be made other than to Badger pending further instruction. Am prepared to send staff representative to GUAM.

07 0832 CINCPAC ADV H. to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ TO KING. Your 061630. Is it intended to establish a direct radio circuit ADAK to VLADIVOSTOK or will relay through Khabarovsk be satisfactory. See Annex 1 to Appendix C KERELBLOCKS 4.

Para. I have succeeded in limiting the liaison officers exchanged with CINC British Pacific Fleet to the grade of captain. This has the advantage of avoiding large liaison staffs and permitting business to be transacted between liaison officers and appropriate staff officers except where major policy is concerned. Strongly urge that liaison officers exchanged with Soviet CINC be captains also. If Soviets are permitted to send a flag officer British will undoubtedly demand to do likewise. Housing of senior officers and their staffs is an important factor.

Para. Otherwise concur in your 061630.

07 0554 CINCPAC ADV H. to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ TO KING ONLY. In a separate dispatch I am proposing to order Rear Admiral Buckmaster to command the South CHINA Naval Force as a task force commander. Before the FORT BAYARD project became urgent I had planned to recommend eliminating the Western CAROLINES Sub-area as an echelon of command no longer necessary and such a recommendation will follow in a few days.

Para. It appears probable that FORT BAYARD will be followed after OLYMPIC by CANTON and HONGKONG either by combat operations or as a result of Japanese collapse or local withdrawal. It is therefore timely to establish a flag officer in the area and have him

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

07 0554 (continued)

prepared to handle additional forces when necessary.

Para. For the present prefer that he remain responsible to CINCPAC in order to avoid precedents in connection with relations with CHIANG KAI SHEK.

07 0837 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCARDIV 4

NIMITZ TO BOGAN ONLY. Have been informed that you will be ordered as Comdt NOB KAGOSHIMA reporting to me for that duty about 15 September after suitable leave. Commodore Kessing now comdg LION 9 which will be 1 of major components your command. Comment on proposal that he serve as you deputy and chief of staff.

Para. Desire you visit my headquarters prior going on leave.

08 2226 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDEFLT info COMINCH. COMNORPAC.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING AND FLETCHER.

In order to indicate strong support of RUSSIAN attack desire you continue operations against enemy air forces and airdrome installations and targets of opportunity in northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and ETOROFU for at least 2 days after 10 August.

09 0443 CINCPAC to WARCOS passed by COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ (ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ONLY)

TOP SECRET. C 31897 EYE ONLY for GENERAL MARSHALL from MACARTHUR.

Reference WAR 45369 (071535Z). I am certain that the Japanese air potential reported to you as accumulating to counter our OLYMPIC operation is greatly exaggerated. We have recently seen the 3rd Fleet approach the northern and central shorelines of JAPAN close enough for gunfire bombardment and yet no reaction from the Japanese air has taken place. Our air forces are daily flying throughout JAPAN and provoke no reaction. The situation repeats that of the PHILIPPINE campaigns. Prior to the invasion of LUZON, reports were received of the concentration of air both on LUZON and on FORMOSA. An erroneous estimate of widely dispersed planes being held back for the eventuality of landings was repeatedly made. I further doubt the often repeated reports that large numbers of aircraft are still being manufactured in JAPAN. As to the movement of ground forces, the Japanese are reported as trying to concentrate in the few areas in which landings can be effected from TOKYO southward, and it is possible that some strength may have been drawn from the areas of northern HONSHU. I do not credit, however, the heavy strengths reported to you in southern KYUSHU. The limited capacity of railroads and the continued shipping losses discourage belief that large forces can be concentrated or supported effectively in southern KYUSHU. Kenney's air forces are only now becoming effective from OKINAWA and it is anticipated that there will be a rapid buildup to an effective strength in early September of approximately 2000 combat planes, and prior to OLYMPIC of approximately 3000 planes. These are in addition to the VBR and escorting fighters in the MARIANAS. It is anticipated that this great weight of air will quickly seek out

TOP SECRET
NAVY ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

09 0443 (continued)

and destroy in the southern Japanese islands all enemy air potential and will practically immobilize ground forces in their present positions. The maintenance of such forces in southern KYUSHU cannot fail to become increasingly difficult and it is anticipated that they will be greatly weakened prior to OLYMPIC.

Para. In my opinion, there should not be the slightest thought of changing the OLYMPIC operation. Its fundamental purpose is to obtain air bases under cover of which we can deploy our forces to the northward into the industrial heart of JAPAN. The plan is sound and will be successful. An attack directly into TOKYO or to the northward thereof would have to be made without the benefit of land based aviation other than VLR and for that reason alone would be fraught with greatest danger. I seriously doubt the advisability of a direct attack into TOKYO without the installation of heavy air forces closer than OKINAWA. Only a limited study has been made of the SENDAI and OMIYATO areas. Insofar as OMIYATO is concerned, weather alone would seem to indicate the impracticability for an attack during 1945 or early 1946, especially for the installation of air forces which would prepare the way into the industrial heart of JAPAN. SENDAI has somewhat greater potentialities although some difficulty in establishing satisfactory bases might be experienced. This area is very close to the TOKYO area and would be subjected to heavy infiltration of ground troops therefrom. Throughout the Southwest Pacific Area campaigns, as we have neared and operation intelligence has invariably pointed to greatly increased enemy forces. Without exception, this build-up has been found to be erroneous. In this particular case, the destruction that is going on in JAPAN would seem to indicate that it is very probable that the enemy is resorting to deception.

07 1535 OPD WAR (MARSHALL) to MACARTHUR passed b COMINT to CINCFAO ADV HQ

TOP SECRET. FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ONLY. MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR EYES ONLY. WAR 45369.

Intelligence reports on Jap dispositions which have been presented to me and which I understand have been sent to your staff are that the Japanese have undertaken a large buildup both of divisions and of air forces in KYUSHU and southern HONSHU. The air buildup is reported as including a large component of suicide planes which the intelligence estimates here consider are readily available for employment only in the vicinity of their present bases. Concurrently with the reported reinforcement of KYUSHU, the Japanese are reported to have reduced forces north of the TOKYO PLAIN to a point where the defensive capabilities in northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO appear to be extraordinarily weak viewed from the standpoint of the Japanese General Staff. The question has arisen in my mind as to whether the Japanese may not be including some deception in the sources from which our intelligence is being drawn.

Para. In order to assist in discussions likely to arise here on the meaning of reported dispositions on JAPAN proper and possible alternate objectives to OLYMPIC, such as TOKYO, SENDAI and OMIYATO, I would appreciate your personal estimate of the Japanese intentions and capabilities as related to your current directive and available resources.

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

09 2205 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

KING TO NIMITZ EYES ONLY.

Desire your comments on WAR 45369 (071535) and MACARTHURS 31897 (090443) passed to you EYES ONLY. Send your reply info MACARTHUR.

10 0731 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV. COMGEN TEN info AFMIDPAC, JCS.

32204.

Concur Richardson's 262220 concerning return of infected prisoners to RYUKYUS. Reference CINCPAC ADVANCE 280725 and COMGEN TEN 030434Z. Desire prisoners presently at OKINAWA remain there pending immediately forthcoming conference in RYUKYUS between representative of Chief Provost Marshall AFPAC and COMGEN TEN.

10 1135 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

KING TO NIMITZ.

This is a peace warning. TOKYO has indicated in ultra channels that JAPAN wishes to bring about peace immediately and that she will accept the Joint Declaration by leaders of U.S., Great Britain and CHINA provided that the stipulations do not include a demand for alteration of the authority of the emperor to rule the state. It is now probable that the Swedish or Swiss governments will soon transmit official messages to the Allies regarding Jap capitulation desires. Your movements and dispositions should be guided by this information pending further more definite word or instructions.

01 1400 COMINCH AND CNO to ALUSNA MOSCOW. - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADV. COM-
NORPAC.

Pursuant to terminal agreements and conversations with Russians it is apparent that U.S. convoy of Soviet shipping from West Coast ports and of HULA 2 ships cannot be instituted after outbreak of hostilities until operational liaison groups as agreed to are set up and functioning. Apparent further that western terminals these convoys must be SAKHALIN GULF area until Soviets open LA PEROUSE or we open TSUSHIMA. In order plans here for institution convoy escorts may have firm basis desire answers to following in light of foregoing stipulations. A. What is deadline beyond which sailings from West Coast ports and GOLD BAY should cease until escort can be effected. B. What is size and frequency of convoys desired by Soviets when sailings can be resumed. C. Where is desired CHOC line where U.S. responsibility and control of convoys ceases and Soviet escorts begin. In connection foregoing desire arrangement with Soviets whereby their submarines keep clear of convoys while under U.S. protection and thereby acknowledge that U.S. protection is available for U.S. assets and necessary supporting fleet and repair ships.

TOP SECRET
URGENT (GCT)

10 1357 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ.

Your 100813 acknowledged and understood. Must make sure however that you understand the following. During last 2 days over 500 enemy planes positively destroyed or damaged in north HONSHU and a great many others strafed rocketed, bombed and undoubtedly damaged but not claimed. North HONSHU is for the time being wrecked and powerless. Stationary fog belt whose southern edge lies at about lat 39. This unless otherwise directed I will now do in effort to find an operating area from which to attack HOKKAIDO KURILES but unless you signify that such attack is of utmost urgency will not take the abnormal risks to pilots involved in flight operations when fog is present or positively imminent. Typhoon may alter all plans. Will keep you advised.

10 1646 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT, info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING.

Your current orders hereby amended. While striking at discretion move your fleet to southward and prepare to execute operations under concept my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS dated 9 August. 10 copies will be flown to Island Commander IWO JIMA forenoon 11 August to await pickup by carrier aircraft. COM3RDFLEET remain in Missouri. Am ordering New Jersey to GUAM. My 082226 amended to accord with above.

10 1608 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Pending the arrival of the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet in Japanese waters the Commander 3rd Fleet will be his designated representative for purposes indicated in JCS 261946 Victory 357.

10 1602 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info COMFAIRWING 1, COM3RDFLT, COMINPAC, CINCPAC.

Alert 2 squadrons of patrol seaplanes and adequate tenders for immediate movement northeastward for duty with Com3rdFlt. Alert all available fast minesweepers and a suitable tender for similar movement. Advise numbers available and prospective dates readiness. See my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS.

Para. Prepare units of BatRon 1 now in OKINAWA (except your Flagship) for similar movement with suitable screen.

10 1604 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMNORPAC info COMINCH, COM3RDFLEET.

NIMITZ TO FLETCHER INFO HALSEY AND KING.

Warning order. In the event of Japanese capitulation which now appears imminent you will be directed to employ forces under your command for naval occupation HAKODATE - AOMORI - OMINATO area with forces under your command. Forces contemplated are 3 CA, 2 OCL, 9 DD, 1 AV, 1 AVP, 1 AR, 1 ARL available minesweepers. You will be authorized embark in a ship of this force and exercise personal command if in your judgement such action is advisable. An AGC may become available.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

10 1144 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, AC, USASTAF, CINCPAC ADV HL.

WARX 47190.

TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, AND SPAATZ FOR INFORMATION.

As a result of administrative errors code word OLYMPIC was compromised by being published in a memorandum classified restricted. Investigation failed to show that meaning of code word was compromised. As a matter of absolute safety decision reached to cancel OLYMPIC and substitute MAJESTIC instead.

10 2002 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HL.

FROM ADMIRAL KING FOR THE EYES ONLY OF ADMIRAL NIMITZ.

SecNav is of the opinion that an opportunity should be afforded the American people to pay tribute to the men of the Navy which they will undoubtedly wish to express. He suggests that whenever operational requirements permit a task group composed of some outstanding vessels be sent back to the U.S. as a token return of the Fleet. He further suggests that your return with this group at least to the 1st port of call would enhance public enthusiasm and interest but the Secretary appreciates that any arrangements depend on demands of your time in the Pacific. Desire your comments.

11 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH, COM7THFLT.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING AND KINCAID.

In the event of Japanese surrender it is my plan to place at your disposal immediately 1 of the command ships (AGC) now in the Philippines and to assign it to a special task group which will be commanded by a Flag Officer and will include an appropriate escort. I believe that this class of ship will best serve you as a headquarters afloat with adequate accommodations and communications. Request your comments.

09 0326 COMAF 20 to CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMUSASTAF.

AFCOM 5449. KIDQUATRICK TO NIMITZ AND SPAATZ.

Note: This is extract of copy to Washington (In view of the effects of TRINITY and HIROSHIMA which far exceeded optimistic expectations, Farrell, Parsons and Farrell believe question of targets should be reviewed immediately. The subject was discussed with Nimitz and Spaatz today at GUAM and both concurred in our views expressed below.

Para. Because of great potency targets should where practicable be at least 3 miles on a side. Targets with partially burned out areas having large remaining population and some industry offer great possibilities for psychological effects. We consider the "Scare Radius" to be at least 10 miles. It is recommended that the War Department should no longer require visual bombing but leave decision to the field command. Every effort will be made to get best bombing conditions. We consider remaining approved targets with exception of KOKURA as inadequate or improperly shaped areas. We do not want to waste any of effects. It is recommended that the list be revised to include several large cities. It is expressly recommended that the region of TOKYO be included as a target.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

11 2254 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

EYES ONLY ADMIRAL NIMITZ.

Plans under consideration contemplate that for the occupation of JAPAN and the enforcement of surrender terms MACARTHUR will be the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers and together with representatives of the U.S., GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA and USSR will accept the Japanese surrender on board the MISSOURI. You will be the U.S. representative. Foregoing for your advance information.

11 2010

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMJUSPAC, CHUNGKING, info COMGEN USASTAF GUAM, COMGEN US ARMY LIAISON SECTION, HDQTS SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND KANDY CEXLON.

WAR 47945.

TOPSEC BOOK MESSAGE TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, WEDDESEYER, SPAATZ AND HUEY FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Para 1. Further to WARX 17064, 14 June 1945 and VICTORY 357 of 26 July, key areas of JAPAN proper, KOREA and the CHINA coast will be occupied upon capitulation or collapse of the Japanese Government. Occupation operations will be initiated on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para 2. Preparations for the operations required under paragraph 1 above, must be subsidiary to, and without jeopardy to, those for directed operations prior to Japanese capitulation or collapse. The operations following Japanese capitulation should in so far as practicable be planned as developing from the dispositions, preparations and arrangements for the Campaign in JAPAN, except that as practicable Marine Corps troops allocated CINCPAC should be used for preliminary landings on the ASIATIC CONTINENT.

Para 3.

A. In order that there may be a continuity of policy and procedure in dealing with the Japanese Imperial High Command and existent agencies of the Japanese Government, representatives of CINCPAC and CINCPAC will jointly perform this function until CINCPAC has landed in JAPAN and assumed this responsibility.

B. Except as indicated in paragraphs 3C and 3D, below, CINCPAC and CINCPAC are charged with carrying out the military operations incident to the occupation in accordance with the same command responsibilities and arrangements established under WARX 87938 of 25 May 1945. In preparing plans for occupation operations on the CHINA COAST, CINCPAC and CINCPAC will collaborate with COMGENCHINA.

C. COMGENCHINA will assume command or operational control of Pacific Theater forces after they are established ashore on the CHINA COAST in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon by the commanders concerned. COMGENCHINA is responsible for coordination GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK of those parts of those parts of the occupation plans pertaining to CHINA.

D. Forces involved in the immediate naval occupation of critical ports in JAPAN, as contemplated in VICTORY 357, and on ASIATIC MAINLAND will continue under the control of CINCPAC until such time as CINCPAC and COMGENCHINA are in a position to exercise control of the occupation.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)
NIMITZ ONLY.

- continued -

YELLOW

'11 2010

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC. CINCPAC ADVANCE. COMJUSPECT
CHUNGKING. info COMJEN USASTAF GUAM. COMJEN US ARMY LIAISON SECTION
HD TS SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND KANDY CEYLON.

Para 4.

A. The immediate objective of occupation operations against JAPAN and KOREA is early introduction of forces (including seizure of critical ports and port facilities and airfields) into major strategic land and sea areas in order to seize control, immobilize and disarm enemy forces and impose the conditions which are required by the immediate military situation. Earliest possible U.S. custody of allied prisoners of war and interned persons is essential.

B. The 1st objective of occupation operations on the CHINA COAST is to afford such assistance to CHINA THEATER forces, by gaining control of key ports and communications points, as is practicable without involvement in a major land campaign.

Para 5.

A. Prompt occupation in JAPAN PROPER is the supreme operation and constitutes a 1st charge upon resources available to Pacific Commanders.

B. Early occupation of KEIJU in KOREA and acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces in that area constitutes a second charge upon such resources.

C. Subject to the above priorities, operations will be undertaken on the CHINA COAST and FORMOSA.

Para 6. The responsibility for the execution of the terms of surrender in JAPAN PROPER and in KOREA is assigned to CINCPAC.

Para 7. CINCPAC and CINCPAC will arrange for immediate acceptance of possible local surrenders by any U.S. Commander on the spot. These arrangements will include provision for continuity in dealing with local Japanese authorities.

Para 8. Planning will recognize the probability of participation of small allied task forces of other nations in subsequent phases of the occupation and in accordance with directives to be issued later.

Para 9. In order to facilitate operations, KOREA is included in the Pacific Theater in so far as United States Command is concerned.

Para 10. CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMCHINA after consulting or exchanging views will submit recommendations concerning occupation operations on the CHINA COAST and FORMOSA.

Para 11. Upon designation of a supreme commander for the Allied powers, as is contemplated, the foregoing responsibilities and command arrangements become subject to the authority conferred upon him by his directive.

12 1055

CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

C 32887.

FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ALONE FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR.

In view latest plans for surrender received this date which differ fundamentally from those previously envisioned it is suggested that if possible you send a representative to this Headquarters as these latest instructions make necessary a reconsideration of all local plans previously considered.

3514

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

12 0520

COMCHINNA to WARGOS, MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

NR 4352.

EYES ALONE TO WARGOS, MACARTHUR AND NIMITZ.

Para. 1. Deeply concerned am I relative possible lack of appreciation in Washington of explosive and portentous possibilities in CHINA when JAPAN surrenders. Instructions emanating from Washington (I cite WAR 47943, WARK 47945 and WAR 48004) indicate that I have failed to impress the implications of Chinese Communist movement and effect upon realization of U.S. objectives in this area.

Para 2. It is my considered opinion that the American contingents contemplated in occupational plans (WAR 40831) must arrive as promptly as possible in CHINA. WARK 47945 places Japanese Archipelago in 1st priority, KOREA in 2nd, and CHINA in 3rd or last priority. As I view overall situation in Far East upon surrender of Japanese, the Archipelago will present no immediate problems relative to control, repatriation, disarmament or disturbances of revolutionary characters; whereas on the ASIATIC MAINLAND we are confronted with 2 serious possibilities requiring prompt action on part of Allies. 1st, Chinese communist forces may precipitate civil war in CHINA; 2nd, the Japanese Army remaining on the mainland, approximately 2,000,000 strong, may continue to fight either in force or in isolated areas, requiring continued employment of air and land forces. The area of CHINA is so vast and communications so limited, the problems posed by the above 2 conditions obviously require TIMEUX and appropriate disposition of allied forces, American and Chinese. Definitely CHINA THEATERS minimum requirements for American occupational forces should be given 1st priority.

Para 3. The Chinese communist leader today issued a radio proclamation to Japanese and Chinese puppets admonishing them to surrender to nearest anti-Japanese troops. Ambassador Hurlwy has provided State Department with copy of proclamation. The primary object of Chinese communists is to obtain Japanese arms and equipment and thus further strengthen their capabilities. It is not unreasonable to expect Japanese cooperation in this regard. The geographical objectives of the Chinese communists have been and continue to be the very same key and strategic points and theas RECOOHMAED as vital by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who selected the majority of such points and areas for projected American occupation; including SHANGHAI, NANKING, TAKU, TIENTSIN, PEKING, TSINGTAO and CANTON. We will do utmost to redispense and employ Chinese forces in strength to preclude widespread uprising and disorder, and to localize Chinese communist efforts. U.S. resources available will be employed in consonance with new CHINA THEATER.

Para 4. In my personal letter to you, delivered by SIMPSON, and in subsequent radios, I have tried to portray the problems presented in CHINA, particularly pertaining to the total lack of organization and planning. We americans can and do make plans embodying sound recommendations, but their implementation in this land of confusion, intrigue and indecision remains problematical. I am sure that you appreciate my position and earnest desire to comply with instructions from Washington. Throughout my service here I have tried earnestly and objectively to

- continued -

3515

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

12 0520 COMCHINCHINA to MARCOS, MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

PROVIDE YOU AND THE Joint Chiefs of Staff factual data and considered judgement relative to the application of instructions to the realistic conditions prevailing in CHINA.

Para 5. Recommendations in view of above following forces be dispatched in 1st Priority.

Sub-Para A. 2 divisions to SHANGHAI area.

Sub-Para B. 2 divisions to TAKU area.

Sub-Para C. 1 division to CANTON area.

Sub-Para D. If above is impracticable, I consider it imperative that, as absolute minimum, 2 divisions be dispatched to SHANGHAI AREA, 1 division to TAKU AREA and 1 regiment to CANTON AREA immediately.

Sub-Para E. If at all possible MACARTHUR stipulate at surrender meeting that Japanese commanders in CHINA be instructed to surrender to Chinese Central Government Commanders.

12 1837 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ info WEDEMAYER.

WARX 48625.

As a matter of urgency request MACARTHUR and NIMITZ comments on WEDEMAYERS 4352 of 12 August be furnished Joint Chiefs of Staff with info copies to Wedemeyer.

Para. As for WEDEMAYERS recommendation in paragraph 5 E, present draft of general order number 1 to be issued by Japanese GHQ provides for the surrender of Japanese commanders and all forces within CHINA (excluding MANCHURIA) to the GENERALISSIMO. This general order has not yet been finally approved.

'12 2051 MARSHALL to WEDEMAYER info NIMITZ, MACARTHUR.

WAR 47943.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY FOR MACARTHUR'S AND NIMITZ'S EYES ONLY. FOR WEDEMAYER'S EYES ONLY FROM MARSHALL.

Para. We are in a discussion now regarding deployment of troops into JAPAN and the return of tired out high score men from the Pacific to the United States. The 1st requirement involves immediately the diversion of C-54's to a special run from the Philippines to OKINAWA and another prospective run into JAPAN. This diversion of course immediately reduces the evacuation from the Pacific of high score men by the multiple of just that many planes.

Para. What I should like to know from you is how soon you feel we could make a 1st reduction of HUMP tonnage in order to release C-54's. I mean by this a reduction prior to the opening of a port; for the situation thereafter of course you already have notification.

Para. I should like an estimate from you as to how much longer the present Hump tonnage will be required in order to complete the equipment of the ALFA divisions on the assumption that no further combat operations are required but that of course numerous movements will be involved in order to herd the Japanese Army according to plan. Please acknowledge receipt immediately.

TOP SECRET
NYITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

13 1050 SHEPARD to NYITZ.

From 5 to 6 PM, conferred with General MacArthur and staff concerning occupation and surrender. He considers that as supreme allied commander he is now fully responsible for, and commands all phases of the occupation of JAPAN. He desires no communication with Japanese authorities by forces in the Pacific except through his headquarters. He expects to summon Japanese representatives to MANILA to make a preliminary arrangement for the surrender.

Para. He reiterated in most emphatic terms his disapproval of the use of a fleet landing force prior to the arrival of troops in strength and prior to the clearance of Japanese forces from the area under armistice arrangements. This disapproval is based on both military grounds and effect on service relationships.

Para. He repeated his full agreement with occupation of Japanese ports and coastal waters and complete blockade by the ships of the fleet.

Para. For the initial seizure of the TOKYO AREA he proposes a joint operation using the 11th airborne and 27th infantry divisions, both airborne, and at the same time landing the 4th Marine Combat Team. This operation would not take place until conditions set at MANILA had been met.

Para. I expect to take off at midnight.

Para. General MacArthur was shown the foregoing paragraphs.

13 2331 WAR to CINCPAC ADVANCE H. COMCHINA.

COMES ANOTHER RELAY AT REQUEST OF WAR TO CINCPAC ADVANCE AND COMCHINA
EYES ONLY MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR EYES ONLY.

WAR 48342.

Para. For your information and guidance the President today dispatched to the Prime Minister, Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek and Generalissimo Stalin messages stating in substance as follows:

Para. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is proposed as supreme Commander for the Allied powers to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.

Para. If you will furnish name of the officer you wish to act as your representative, General MacArthur will be instructed to make the necessary arrangements for the representative to be present at the surrender.

Para. The message to the Prime Minister stated that it is contemplated that MacArthur will direct the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to surrender unconditionally Japanese Forces in Southeast ASIA and parts of MALAYSIA to Admiral Mountbatten or his subordinate commanders. In the message to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek, it is stated that Japanese Imperial Headquarters will be directed to have Japanese Forces in CHINA other than those opposing the Russians surrender unconditionally to the Generalissimo or his subordinate

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

- continued -

13 2331 WAR to CINCPAC ADVANCE H.Q. COMGENCHINA. (Cont'd).

commanders. In the message to Stalin it is stated that MacArthur will direct Japanese Imperial Headquarters to have Japanese Forces in the Soviet Area of operations surrender unconditionally to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East or to his subordinate commanders.

Para. Preliminary instructions are being issued to General MacArthur and immediate advice is requested concerning designated representatives so that MacArthur may be notified. It is suggested that direct communication with MacArthur on arrangements be initiated at once. This ends substance of messages sent to heads of state by the President.

Para. The President would like to have the General Surrender take place on American soil, that is, a Battleship, preferably the Battleship MISSOURI.

Para. The present plan for the acceptance of the surrender by you as Supreme Commander provides that each of the 4 Major Powers, U.S., CHINA, UK and USSR, will have a representative present, and Admiral Nimitz will serve in the capacity of U.S. representative at the formal surrender. Admiral Nimitz has been informed of this and also concerning the use of the Battleship MISSOURI.

Para. The foregoing constitutes your preliminary instructions.

Para. The following is purely for your information and is furnished and will be used for planning only.

Para. The State Department has replied to the Japanese Government informing that that the Emperor will be required to authorize and insure the signature by the Government of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the POTSDAM declaration and will be required to direct surrender of Japanese Armed Forces and issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms. No reply has been received from the Japanese Government.

Para. Now being considered on a planning basis for use in case the Japanese accept the conditions is a message to the Japanese Government that it should immediately:

Para. (1) Direct cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

(2) Send Enissaries to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying forces to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

Para. Separate Subject: The British have now proposed transfer to them of areas agreed at terminal effective on capitulation being accepted.

14 1916 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS.

KING TO NIMITZ.

Suspend attack air operations forthwith.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

14 1418 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS.

FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ONLY.

Include in your plans the return of a representative force of distinguished combatant vessels to the United States whenever in your estimation vessels can be spared from duties in connection with the Naval phases of the occupation of Japanese Territory. Your 110736. Concur in your views as to your return in person. SecNav has been informed of the substance of your reply. Submit for approval Brief of your plans.

14 0814 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET. info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING.

MacArthur will be appointed Supreme Allied Commander to "Exercise Supreme Command over all Land, Sea and Air Forces which may be allocated for enforcement in JAPAN of the surrender terms by the Allied Forces concerned". Until otherwise directed by me do not land any in JAPAN. See COM7TH FLEET 131050 passed separately.

14 0845 COMGENCHINA to MARCOS info MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

EYES ALONE TO MARCOS FOR JCS INFO EYES ALONE TO MACARTHUR AND NIMITZ.

CFBX 4580.

Para 1. Provision embodied in last paragraph of WAX 48625 is subject. I am sure that you recognize that MANCHURIA may properly be termed the critical area in connection with current and projected activities of Chinese Communists, and possibly Soviet Communists. If the General Order Number 1 to be issued by Japanese Headquarters provides for the surrender of Japanese Commander and of forces within CHINA to the Generalissimo but excludes MANCHURIA insofar as the Generalissimo is concerned, following implications should be noted:

SubPara A. The attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Chinese Communists has never been determined accurately nor have Soviet intentions in CHINA been formalized to a degree that Americans can view the situation with equanimity. However it is not unreasonable to expect penetration of Soviet communist ideologies in MANCHURIA with cooperation of Chinese Communists. If the General Order above referred to excludes MANCHURIA as now contemplated, there is extreme danger that Japanese equipment will become available surreptitiously or openly to the Chinese Communists in MANCHURIA. Further the Chinese Communist overall plans will be facilitated. If on the other hand the General Order clearly stipulates that Japanese Forces would surrender only to Soviet Russian Forces and/or the Generalissimo's forces, the above dangers would be minimized perhaps obviated.

SubPara B. The ideas embodied in this message and in messages I have sent to you the past several days might suggest partisan leaning on my part. This is not the case. However, the U.S. policy has been and continues to be full support of the Generalissimo who heads the only officially and universally recognized constituted government in CHINA. The Generalissimo is concerned at present to be the strongest

TOP SECRET
NEADITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

14 0845 COMCHINCHINA to MARCOS info MACARTHUR, NEADITZ. (Cont'd).

Chinese leader and the only one capable of possibly accomplishing a modicum of stability during this period of uncertainty. It would therefore appear sound to create conditions by continued U.S. Political, Economic and Military support (short of involvement in fratricidal war) which would strengthen the existing central government's position. This support should include iron clad stipulations designed to insure surrender of Japanese forces and equipment to the Generalissimo throughout CHINA including MANCHURIA, except in the immediate combat areas of the Russians.

SubPara C. I view ASIA as an enormous pot, seething and boiling, the fumes of which may readily snuff out the advantages gained by allied sacrifices the past several years and may also definitely preclude realization of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter, and the TEHRAN, YALTA and POTSDAM agreements. In my CFB 526, 9 July, paragraphs 2 and 3, pertinent ideas and suggestions are expressed that have stronger and immediate application today.

Para 2. I am so remote from international negotiations, it is with some misgivings that I submit following 2 alternate suggestions:

SubPara A. Schedule a conference with representatives from Soviet Russia, U.S., Great Britain, China in DELHI, INDIA, as early as possible to investigate and recommend appropriate steps necessary to preclude Civil War in CHINA, or.

SubPara B. 3 Big Powers issue agreed proclamation to Chinese Communists and Chinese Central Government that Civil War will not be tolerated in CHINA in any form or degree; that Big 3 are determined to take appropriate steps and employ necessary force in premises; that political and internal affairs must be settled without employment of force; that Big 3 recognized CHINA sovereignty and right of determination by Chinese of form of Government; that employment of force by factions in CHINA has serious implications with regard to peace in the Far East and world order in general.

14 1122 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLEET.

NEADITZ TO HALSEY.

Your 140403. See my 140813 which will I believe provide for difficulties and envisage and will also avoid competition between services as to priority of landing.

14 1049 CINCPAC to MARCOS (JCS). AGWAR WASH D C info COMCHINCHINA, CINCPAC.

CX 33449.

Answering your WX 48625, 12 August requesting comments on Wedemeyer's 4325, 12 August. Upon capitulation the prompt occupation of JAPAN PROPER is paramount and that operation should be given the highest priority in the utilization of Pacific resources. The occupation of KOREA should be given 2nd priority, with CHINA 3rd, and then only to an extent that would insure United States ground forces not becoming involved in a major land campaign in any part of the CHINA THEATER.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
NEUTZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

14 1049 CINCPAC to MARCOS (JCS), VMAF WASH D C info COMCHINA, CINCPAC.

Para. Since the resources immediately available to CINCPAC will be required for the execution of BLACKLIST, it would be impossible to divert forces to CHINA as suggested by Medemeyer in the priority recommended and only at a future date is redeployment were continued to supply the means required.

14 0925 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMCHINA, COMINCH, MARX, COM3DEFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMGEOTFLAC, COMHIRSTAC.

CX 33438.

Your 120243/1, prompt occupation of JAPAN in case of surrender constitutes a first charge upon resources available in the Pacific and is dependent on use of Divisions, including 5th Amphibious Corps, which have been prepared for BLACKLIST. Use of 5th Amphibious Corps in KOREA would cause large scale changes in fundamental arrangements for supporting troops and inevitably cause delay and confusion. In accord informal conferences with Admiral Sherman will proceed on basis that 5th Amphibious Corps will be utilized in JAPAN. 24th Corps will occupy KOREA. Noted is your plan for 3rd Amphibious Corps and 1 Regimental Combat 6th Marine Division.

14 0140 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, info MIJTF, MEDEMAYER.

MARX 49182.

Para. Read with reference to FAR 48672:

Para. A. The President has approved the wording of the 1st document which is the directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with the deletion in the 1st sentence of paragraph 3 of the words "as witnesses TDA".

Para. B. The President has approved the wording of the 2nd document which is the proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN.

Para. C. The President has approved the wording of the 3rd document which is the instrument of surrender with deletion of the words "by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" at the end of paragraph 7 and with the addition of provision for signature of representatives of the Allied Powers. The President desires that, after you have signed accepting the surrender, you invite the 4 representatives of the Allied Powers to place their signatures on the surrender document below and to the left of the signature of the Supreme Commander, in order as follows and with the following designations printed or typed under the respective signatures: U.S. representative, Republic of CHINA representative, United Kingdom Representative, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative. The official document will be in the English language.

Para. D. The 4th document which is General Order No. 1, is under consideration here and minor modifications are being made.

- continued -

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

YELLOW

14 0140 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, info NIMITZ, WEDMEYER.

Para E. There are minor editorial changes in the 1st and 3rd documents. Official copies of the 1st, 3 documents are being forwarded today by courier to MacArthur.

Para 2. With reference to the directive to the supreme commander for the Allied Powers, this will become effective when you are officially notified by the War Department of Japanese Capitulation.

Para 3. The British, the Chinese, and the Russians have now all agreed to the proposal of the President contained in AR 4834.2. The Russians have designated Lieutenant General Deivianki as their representative. The British have designated Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser.

Para 4. War Department messages 48342 and 48672 are being passed to Admiral Nimitz and General Wedemeyer.

13 2325 WARCOS to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, COMNAVCHINA, COMSETH.

WARX 49042.

The British Chiefs State that they assume that the U.S. will take the lead in all general matters concerning an early Japanese Surrender but have asked that the U.S. Chiefs keep them informed.

Para. British consider it of paramount political importance that a British Commonwealth Force be sent at the earliest possible moment to accept the surrender of the Japanese at HONG KONG. They propose to send a detachment of the British Fleet at once to HONG KONG, followed as soon as possible by an Australian Force in British Shipping, subject to agreement with the Australian Government and to necessary arrangements being made with you and Nimitz. They also propose that the adjustment of the boundary of SRA as agreed at TEGANAI should take effect upon the date of the cease fire order. They ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to be prepared to instruct you and Nimitz to make available the forces to send to HONG KONG. British will seek the agreement of the Australian Government and instruct Admiral Fraser to concert his plans for HONG KONG with you and Nimitz. End of British proposal.

Para. The U.S. Chiefs have answered this proposal as follows:

Para A. Agree to keep British informed of pertinent action taken by the U.S. Chiefs and have passed WARX 47945 to British.

Para B. The U.S. Chiefs will accede to a request to release to British control at time of surrender all or part of the British Pacific Fleet. However, Nimitz has accepted a British Offer of a force of 1 BB, 2 CL, 1 CV and the necessary destroyers to participate with the U.S. Fleet in the Naval occupation of JAPAN, if such occurs.

Para C. Occupation of HONG KONG is a matter for arrangement between the British and Chinese Governments. The release of British Forces is unrelated to any British proposals regarding HONG KONG. No arrangement with General MacArthur for release of Australians appears necessary other than detailed local arrangements for the turnover.

Para D. Agree that the adjustment to the boundary of SRA should take effect on the date of the Japanese surrender. End of U.S. answer.

Para. The above is furnished you for your information. TEGANAI agreement referred to provided for a passage from U.S. to British Command as soon as possible of that part of SRA lying south of following described boundary: beginning on the coast of INDO CHINA at

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

'13 2325 WARCOS to CINCPAC info CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA, OLSGENIS.

16-00N; thence to intersect at 07-40N 116-00E, the boundary between the Philippine Islands and British North BORNEO; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to 05-00N 127-00E; thence east to 05-00N 130-00E; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00E; thence generally south east to 02-20S 146-00E; thence east to 02-20S 159-00E; thence south.

14 0403 COM3RD FLEET to C NOLAC ADVANCE info CTF 31.

CAMEL 9 August. Strongly recommend reconsideration your L20241. Assignment of a WarDiv considered necessary for following reasons:

- A. Uncertainty of Japanese behavior.
- B. Necessity of conducting shore operations on a normal combat scale.
- C. Task will include occupation of air base, naval base and adjacent danger points. Enforcing evacuation of control zone. Establishing secure and effective perimeter.
- D. Length of interval between naval occupation and the arrival of designated Army occupation forces.
- E. Inadequacy of equipment training and experience of personnel of fleet landing force for other than tasks not involving risk of stiff combat.

Para. Any problem of Army-Navy jurisdiction could be solved by transferring to CINCPAC operational control any troops of WarDiv employed beyond limits of naval zones.

14 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING.

✓ For your information Sherman brought me from Manila a copy of Marshalls W 48672 to MacArthur which contains complete copy of proposed directive to Supreme Commander, proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN, instrument of surrender and general order number 1.

14 0813 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

I concur heartily in the proposal that the initial seizure of the TOKYO AREA be effected by a joint operation using the 11th Airborne and 27th Infantry Divisions both Airborne and at the same time landing the 4th Marine Combat Team and other units of the Fleet Landing Force.

TOP SECRET
NR0174 ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

14 2303 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC, COMCHINCHINA info COM7THFLT, COMINCH.

Request CINCPAC pass to COM7THFLT Wedemeyers CPX 4500 and similar messages which it is appropriate that he see in view of his prospective assignment as Task Fleet Commander responsible for naval operations along the CHINA COAST. Request COMCHINCHINA also include COM7THFLT as appropriate.

14 2302 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH, COMGEN CHINA, WARCS, COM-
 MIIBSPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMGEN FIIPAC.

I concur in your CX 33438 DTG 140925. Re: Occupation of JAPAN PROPER constitutes first charge....

14 2035 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COMINCH.

Your 141916. What action should be taken regarding submarine attacks, bombardment etc. Re: suspend attack air operations forthwith

14 1903 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NMJTF info WEDDEMEYER.

WARX 49334.

With reference to WARX 48004, the Chiefs of Staff have received the following memorandum from the White House:

Para. "Referring to memorandum dated 11 August directing such advance arrangements as are practicable for the occupation of DAIREN and a port in KOREA.

Para. ECVHFAUR further information, it is now considered wise from a political point of view to also occupy as soon as possible after the Japanese surrender some other mainland ports that definitely are not in the area of Soviet operations". This ends memorandum from the White House.

Para. The Chiefs of Staff are not able to appraise your capabilities to execute the primary mission of securing JAPAN PROPER and to seize DAIREN and a port in KOREA as envisaged in WARX 48004 and also to seize 1 or more ports in CHINA definitely not in the area of Soviet operations. Your analysis of the matter will be appreciated for their use.

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

19 0225 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

HALEXY TO NIMITZ.

Sherman's 181019 can meet all requirements but may find it advisable to move heavy ships into TOKYO BAY on 25th instead of 24th depending on satisfactory completion of sweeping and on plans for covering landings (see my 190219 to ECHTELBERGER); this should not upset any other known plans of yours or MacArthur's. Landing forces from fleet consist of:

- A. 1800 marines in 3 battalions under Clements' command and assigned tasks commensurate with their capabilities and equipment.
- B. 1200 U.S. Bluejackets in 3 battalions and a British landing force of 400 men available for security duty in wake of combat troops.
- C. Reserve of 2000 additional Bluejackets in 5 battalions available for security duty but poorly equipped.
- D. Special Bluejacket operating companies of artificers for service duties pending arrival of seabees and garrison forces. Your 181535 plans have at all times taken limitations into consideration and contemplate minimum use ashore consistent with security and doing a proper job. New Subject. Your 181554 most helpful and everything should proceed smoothly.

17 2214 MACARTHUR to MACARTHUR, WHEELER, ANDREYER info NIMITZ.

NAK 50693.

MACARTHUR to MACARTHUR, WHEELER, ANDREYER info NIMITZ.

U.S. Chiefs have informed British regarding matters give in NAK 50693 in substance as follows:

- A. Assent in principle participation of British Ground Forces in occupation of JAPAN, details as to size and composition being matters for later determination.
- B. Presume British will shortly furnish views concerning forces for KOREA.
- C. Consider previous agreements on the employment of British Ground and Air forces in the Pacific superseded and request information concerning disposition of tiger force elements already in the Pacific.
- D. Point out the following in connection with British proposal regarding operations outside of their agreed area of responsibility:
 - 1. Pacific theater less areas agreed to pass to British on day of Japanese surrender (NAK 49042) is an area of U.S. responsibility and U.S. will continue with operations in that area connected with Japanese surrender;
 - 2. Generalissimo is the Supreme Commander in CHINA;
 - 3. Governmental agreement provides for Mountbatten to be responsible for surrender matters in SEAC and parts of MALAYIA and U.S. commander for the Pacific Theater;
 - 4. Chinese agreement to surrender arrangements obtained on the basis that surrender of Japs in CHINA (excluding those opposing the Russians) would be a matter for the Generalissimo;

- continued -

3525

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

17 2214 MARSHALL to MACARTHUR, WEDENYER, WEDENYER info NIMITZ (Cont'd)

U.S. Chiefs have already issued instructions that U.S. forces entering the CHINA THEATER will be with the approval and cognizance of the Generalissimo and subject to control of Wedeneyer who (as his chief of staff) is responsible to the Generalissimo.

E. Matter of priorities within British Area of responsibility is British concern so suggest that any resources that the British have available beyond those required in their own area of responsibility be defined with a view to their use in assisting in the U.S. area of responsibility.

F. U.S. has placed the opening of a CHINA PORT (in collaboration with and to assist Chinese) in a priority below the securing of JAPAN and a port in KOREA. If British are able to make forces quickly available to enter a CHINA PORT, they should be considered for the main effort.

G. Summarizing, U.S. government considers any matters concerning British Forces entering CHINA THEATER should be arranged between British and Chinese Governments. After completion of such governmental arrangements, coordination involving MacArthur, Wedeneyer and Nimitz can go forward. If such governmental arrangements are completed, U. S. stands ready to integrate British proposals (agreed by the Generalissimo) with other Pacific operations. This ends U.S. reply.

Para. The above is furnished for your information.

21 0600 COMINTFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE Hq.

KIRKARD to NIMITZ X

Capt Carroll B. Jones, Naval aviation member advance party to TOKYO was informed by GHO today that he would not be allowed to inspect and obtain 1st hand information on airfield and facilities YOKOSUKA. Party will be kept together vicinity ATGUCHI to prevent possible incident. All available information field and facilities YOKOSUKA is to be supplied to advance party by Japanese.

16 0718 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH AND CNO - NIMITZ TO KING ONLY.

It is my present concept that as soon as troops occupy JAPAN in strength (in about 1 month to 6 weeks) it will be possible to greatly reduce fleet strength in the western Pacific. At that time I propose to have Spruance take over all forces in Japanese waters and return approximately 2/3rds of the present fast carrier task force to the eastern Pacific. At the same time Fletcher can return to the north and or take leave and Halsey can be returned for leave. All fast battleships can be returned except NEW JERSEY and possibly 1 other. It will probably be necessary to retain many of the cruisers and destroyers. Some of the old battleships can return at the same time.

Para. The foregoing is admittedly general in nature and will be made more specific as the situation clarifies. It is furnished now in response to your 141418.

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NAVY ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

17 0830

US ARMY LIAISON SECTION RANDY CAYLOR TST 238 to JAI DE ARMENT XA-
UNDER IN CHIEF USY FORCES PACIFIC ADJUTANT GENERAL VANILA. BULLY LANE
COMINCH passes to CINCPAC.

To Marshall personal info MacArthur and Godeneyer both personal from Wheeler TST 238. Here a paraphrase of top secret emergency operation signal sent by the Commander in Chief British Pacific Fleet to the Commander in Chief East Indies Fleet info Admiralty and ALMA on the 16th of August. Begins.

1. Dispositions have been made for the occupation of HONGKONG as follows:

A. Under Rear Admiral Harcourt in INDENTABLE with venerable SHIPTON 3 DD's and PRINCE ROBERT task force 111.2 sailed from SYDNEY completed insofar as possible with rehabilitation personnel and supplies on the 15th of August for HANKS and HEYTE. This force could arrive off HONGKONG the 26th of August.

B. Proceeding with the Australian Government are negotiations for SHROPSHIRE (Commodore Collins) HOBAIT and 2 DD's to depart from SUBIC with the date of arrival at HONGKONG 2 days after leaving SUBIC. Ran mine sweepers are sailing from HONGKONG probably 20 August. Submarines and MAIDSTONE and EXETER which are now at SUBIC would also join with this force.

2. Task Group 111.3 under rear Admiral Bervae in BEECHDA with COIGONS and 3 DD's left SYDNEY 15 August headed for HANKS and HEYTE and subsequently for duty elsewhere along the CHINA COAST as required.

3. Task Groups 111.2 and 111.3 are augmented respectively by EURNALUS and ARGONAUT and 1 DD each at HANKS. Ends.

18 2312

MARCO to CINCPAC ADV. CINCPAC info DE COM 20AF. H. CT CHANGING.

MARK 51396.

This message should have the minimum distribution essential to its implementation.

Para. For your information, the President today sent to Generalissimo Stalin the following message: "Re your message of August 16, I agree to your request to modify General Order Number 1 to include all the KURIL ISLANDS in the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East. Moreover, I should like it to be understood that the United States Government desires air base rights for land and sea aircraft on some of the KURIL ISLANDS, preferably in the Central Group, for military purposes and for commercial use. I should be glad if you would advise me that you will agree to such an arrangement, the location and other details to be worked out for this purpose.

Para. Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese forces on the island OKINAWA to Soviet forces, it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese forces on all the islands of JAPAN proper, OKINAWA, HONSHU, SHIKOKU, and KYUSHU to General MacArthur.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (GCT)

- continued -

YELLOW

Para. General Macarthur will employ allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of JAPAN PROPER as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our allied surrender terms".

Para. The foregoing is for your information and guidance, and you should amend General Order Number 1 to include all the KURILE ISLANDS in the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East.

23 1945

MARSHALL to COMCHINA info CINCPAC. CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

WARK 53670.

Generalissimo has informed the President in substance as follows: "British have been notified that I agree to delegate authority to a British Commander to accept the surrender of HONGKONG and I will also designate a Chinese and an American Officer to participate therein. British have been asked to effect necessary military coordination on operational matters with Wedemeyer and the Chinese head of military operations." End of message from Generalissimo.

Para. You will shortly receive a JCS directive on this.

24 0148

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCHINA

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ to KINKAID EYES ONLY. Credit 16 with action has been assigned to you and action is being taken to send you a fast carrier division. The importance of the projected operations in the YELLOW SEA KOREA and north CHINA according to 230615 indicates the desirability of your shifting your flag into a CG or EA at early date and exercising tactical command of the North CHINA Naval Force leaving your rear echelon to follow in ADC. Request your views and estimate of timing.

24 1053

CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COMINCH. WABCOE

TOP SECRET. CX 36334. Prime Minister of Australia by urgent dispatch expresses the desire of his government to have Task Force 74.1 consisting of 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers proceed TOKYO BAY to arrive there before surrender August 31st stating that in view of the part played through the Pacific war by Australian forces in association with United States forces the government would be grateful if we would provide necessary facilities, including logistic support to enable this to be done. The force is now at SUBIC and it is stated would have to sail before AM 25 August and fuel at OKINAWA. The Prime Minister also stated that the government wished and Australia hoped to operate under an Australian commander subject only to JCS. With your concurrence as to logistic support I propose to reply giving approval but stating that in order to avoid confusion it is deemed essential that the Commander Australian Squadron report to Com 3rd Fleet upon arrival. Your urgent comment requested.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ (COT)

24 0219 COM 3RD FLT to SCAP Info CINCPAC ADV HQ (Corrected Copy Balow)

HALSEY to MACARTHUR Info NIMITZ. Request statement of your policy concerning my initiating on and after thirty first assistance and evacuation to POWs located in any waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY area.

24 1446 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC Info COMINCH. WARCOS. COMNAVFLT. CTF 95.
~~SECRET~~

TOP SECRET. Year 241053 censur. Will provide fuel OKINAWA and TOKYO.

24 2317 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ Info HENNINGER.

WARX 54514.

WARX 47945 directed the occupation of KIKYO in KOREA as a 2nd choice upon resources available to the Pacific Commanders. WARX 48004 directed that, in accordance with the President's desires, arrangements would be made to occupy a port in KOREA. WARX 49334 requested analysis of your capabilities of securing JAPAN and also occupying a port in KOREA. WARX 50181 directed MacArthur and Nimitz, after consultation with Wedemeyer, to furnish the best estimate of a time schedule for the occupation of a port in KOREA including an alternate port in case the Russians had occupied KIKYO.

Para. While Stalin has agreed in a message to the President to receiving the surrender of Jap forces as provided in General Order No. 1, there is no certain assurance that the Soviets will not continue their occupation movements southward in KOREA until such time as they meet U.S. forces. There are unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are planning movements south of the 30-00 degree line.

Para. Request earliest possible reply to directive contained in WARX 50181 insofar as KOREA is concerned.

24 0219 COMNAVFLT to SCAP Info CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Halsey to MacArthur info Nimitz. Request statement of your policy concerning my initiating on and after 26 August assistance and evacuation to POWs located in any waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY AREA.

25 0802 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

Nimitz to King only. The value of the combatant ships of the Japanese Navy is extremely little insofar as the major powers are concerned. Their nuisance value in the hands of the Chinese or certain other nations might be very great. The process of division can be very vicious and complicated. Accordingly recommend that high level decision be made to make Japanese fighting ships available in JAPAN for technical inspection and then destroy them.

SECRET (COT)

TOP SECRET
NOFORN ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

25 0803 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC. COMMAROILS info CINCPAC PEARL RD. COMINCH.

Mits to Mits and Harrill info King. The resident commissioner TARAWA has asked COMMAROILS concerning plans for reoccupation OCEAN and NAURU. Due to the more urgent requirements elsewhere these islands have a relatively low priority insofar as the use of U. S. Forces is concerned.

Para. Requests from British Commonwealth sources for information concerning plans to occupy ocean and NAURU should be countered by suggestion that those interested submit to COMSOPAC plans and proposals for accomplishment of occupation using British resources.

25 1010 COMINFLE to CINCPAC ADV info SUPREMACY COME FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

SCAP 250608 just received. Still recommend approval my 250935.

25 0813 COMINFLE to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Kinkaid to Mits only. Eyes Only. Your 240148. My intention has been to command projected 7th Flt operations in KOREA and north CHINA with my flag in ROCKY MOUNT. Date RPS ROCKY MOUNT has been advanced to 1 September which will permit me to embark with staff in time to join Amphibious Group departing OKINAWA for objective area. Believe command function can be exercised more effectively from AGC than from MB because of better communications and presence of entire staff. Present Plan. Minesweeper Group start sweeping channel through line 7 minefield on E minus 7 and start sweeping in objective area on E minus 3. Covering Group for minesweeping operations composed of 2 CVE'S now assigned 7th Fleet plus CruDiv 6 and Destroyer screen. Fast Carrier Division upon reporting will be directed replenish then relieve CVE'S which will return to base to prepare for next operation. CruDiv 16 join and proceed to objective area with Amphibious Group.

25 1138 CINCPAC ADVANCE to SCAP.

As a matter of urgency strongly recommend your approval Com3rdFleet 250935. In order to expedite request your reply be to Com3rdFleet info CINCPAC. Your 250608 applies.

25 1458 COMINCH AND GNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINFLE.

From King to Mits and Spruance. AP press releases have report interview with Spruance in which he questions the political wisdom of American retention of OKINAWA. It is probable that the United States will desire to continue the occupation and use of OKINAWA. In such event it is essential that the American position should not be handicapped or embarrassed by ill-advised expressions of opinion on such matters by high commanders in the field. Desire that you issue appropriate instructions in regard to foregoing.

AUGUST (CCT)

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

26 0822 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING ONLY.

Unless you see reasons to the contrary I plan to consolidate my headquarters at Pearl as soon as the occupation of JAPAN is well in hand and to turn the command facilities at GUAM over to Commander Marianas to use and to maintain in readiness for such future use by CINCPAC as may be required. The processes of demobilization and rollup can be handled much better at Pearl in close touch with the type commanders and with a United Staff.

26 0829 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COM3RDFLT.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY.

I will shift my flag from South Dakota to Missouri about 0900 on the day of the surrender ceremony and will shift it back to South Dakota when I return to that ship after the ceremony. To comply with instructions from higher authority it will be necessary that you transfer your flag to South Dakota after I return to Guam and then and then send Missouri to GUAM for my further use as Fleet Flagship.

26 0128 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMCHINA.

NIMITZ TO KENNEDY ONLY.

Your 250820. Marine Air Units are integral components of the Fleet Marine Force. Each Marine Amphibious Corps on the field has attached to it a Marine Aircraft Wing. It is not desired to operate Marine Amphibious Corps without such support. For operations in CHINA my Joint Staff Study contemplates a Marine Aircraft Wing to reduced strength. Your concurrence requested.

26 0147 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM7THFLT info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KINKAID INFO KING.

Your 250813 does not indicate satisfactory compliance my 240118 in that it appears to contemplate delaying use of the naval forces available to you until minesweeping starts and then to orient them entirely with respect to the movement of troops.

Para. I do not consider that there is any air threat which requires use of Fast Carriers to cover minesweeping operations. There is ample access to YELLOW SEA west of Mine Line 7.

Para. My purpose in assigning to the 7th Fleet a Fast Carrier Division, a Heavy Cruiser Division, the GUAM and ALASKA and their escorts is to establish in the YELLOW SEA immediately an impressive naval force which well in advance of the arrival of troops can occupy and control those waters and can by a timely show of naval force influence the general situation in north CHINA and the special situation now developing as indicated by JCS 242317. See SubPara A of 3rd Para my 210818.

Para. Expedite compliance my 240118 using Cruisers initially and augmenting with Fast Carriers when they arrive. Acknowledge.

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY
ADJUT (COT)

26 0419Z SCAP to WARCOS FOR JCS info COMCHINA. CINCPAC ADVANCE. COMZFLT. COMZTHFLT. COMZ 24TH CORPS.

CX 36853.

Reference WX 54514, also CINCPAC 250801 not to all or needed. The present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy KILJO on 11 September. Conference this date indicates that the initial movement of lightly armed troops, IR, APA and AKA, can take place leaving OKINAWA on the 4th arriving KILJO on the 7th. This movement will be followed with heavier equipment as rapidly as possible. This plan is being approved and instructions are being issued to COM GEN 24TH CORPS and others to execute generally as indicated.

26 0748 COMZTHFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info COMCH.

EYES ONLY. KILJO TO NIMITZ INFO KING.

Your 260117. Regret misunderstanding. Com7thFleet will shift flag into MINNEAPOLIS 27 August and depart Manila with CRUDIV 6 on 28 August to be joined by CRUDIV 16 off OKINAWA for operations SHANTUNG-CHINWANTAO AREA accordance SubPara A of 3rd Para your 210618. Unless otherwise directed will turn over to Philippine Sea Frontier duties outlined my 180140 as of 28 August.

26 Aug. WARCOS to CINCPAC - COMZCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

WAR 55315.

State Department gives information that Russian foreign office have asked whether General Order Number 1 has been amended to include KURILES in area to be surrendered to the USSR. Secretary of State is replying confirming that General Order Number 1 has been so amended.

Para. The foregoing is for your information.

26 0531 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSKY TO NIMITZ. The introduction of Japanese Publicies into the picture involves some security consideration which appear unacceptable from a military standpoint and unfair to Allied correspondents from the standpoint of censorship. From both standpoints I look with the utmost disfavor on enemy personnel being accorded the privilege of visiting American men of War or naval installations and urge that U.S. Navy stand on its security rights in resisting any such concessions now or later.

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUG. SEPT. (OCT)

(Cont'd)

C. Place remaining 3rd Fleet Fast Carrier forces under command of Vice Admiral Towers.

D. Establish system of rotation for 3rd Fleet carrier task forces operating in EMPIRE waters. Forces not relieved at sea to anchor in SAGAMI and TOKYO AREA. Separately after completion of fly fly operation will make recommendations as to strength of carrier forces required at sea to cope with Japanese situation.

E. Upon receipt of your action on these recommendations will make reestimate of fuel and logistic support requirements with view to earliest release of surplus.

F. Will at later date separately submit further estimates based on contemplated withdrawal of additional forces to west coast.

31 1743 JCS to NIMITZ, MACARTHUR

WARX 57808.

In view of the Division of responsibility established in the RYUKYUS by JCS 181409, JCS 100345 (Dec 44) should be interpreted as requiring that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific assume responsibility for the supervision and utilization of shipping to Army controlled ports of the RYUKYUS.

29 2316 CINCPAC AFLOAT to COMINCH info CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

NIMITZ TO KING.

Para 1. Your 282050. The following comments on CINCAFPAC C 10526 of 28 August are based on my understanding that the RYUKYUS are located in the Pacific Ocean Areas and that certain positions therein were transferred to CINCAFPAC (NOT CINCSYPA) as stated in Victory 73 "To facilitate preparation for and execution of OLYMPIC".

Para 2. The realities of the situation are that as in the Marianas, Marshalls and elsewhere the surrender of Japanese held islands is best accomplished by the use of naval vessels and landing forces of minimum size. The Japanese forces if repatriated must be transported in ships. Islands which we do not need as bases do not need to be occupied by our troops in strength.

Para. If the enemy held positions in the RYUKYUS are to be transferred to CINCAFPAC as soon as they surrender to CINCPAC it will be advantageous to have them surrender direct to CINCAFPAC. If the RYUKYUS are to revert to the control of CINCPAC-CINCPHA it will be better to have them surrender to CINCPAC.

Para. It is feasible for CINCPAC to accept the surrender of the remaining islands in the RYUKYUS.

29 1755 JCS to NIMITZ, WEDMEYER, MACARTHUR.

WARX 56636.

As a basis for interim operations and for future planning the JCS approve the concept of operations on the CHINA COAST as outlined in CINCPAC 210818 of August with exception of last para which should read:

Para. "F. Prepare for occupation of TIENTSIN-TAKU and/or CHINWANOTAO

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (CCT)

28 0740 CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING

Your 251540. Propose to send approximately following to Atlantic Coast ports under command Vice Adm. F. C. Sherman arriving Canal Zone about 10 October. MISSOURI (BB 63), NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55), WASHINGTON (BB 56), NEW MEXICO (BB 40), MISSISSIPPI (BB 41), IDAHO (BB 42), NEW YORK (BB 34), RANDOLPH (CV 15), WASP (CV 18), ENTERPRISE (CV 6), RANGER (CV 4), MONTNEY (CVL 26), BATAAN (CVL 29), LANGLEY (CVL 27), BOISE (CL 47), RICHMOND (CL 9), CONCORD (CL 10), DESRON 25 and DESRON 23 less BRAINE (DD 630). All except MISSOURI allocated to LanFit by your 251555 and would be transferred to CinLant for duty upon arrival Atlantic. Missouri would return to Pacific upon completion visit.

Para. Propose approximately following to Pacific Coast Ports under command Admiral Halsey arriving by Navy Day. SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57), WISCONSIN (BB 64), INDIANA (BB 58), ALABAMA (BB 60), IOWA (BB 61), WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48), COLORADO (BB 45), MARYLAND (BB 46), ARKANSAS (BB 33), TEXAS (BB 35), TICONDEROGA (CV 14), HORNET (CV 12), SARATOGA (CV 4), BUNKER HILL (CV 17), BALTIMORE (CA 68), PITTSBURGH (CA 72), AMSTERDAM (CL 101), VICKSBURG (CL 86) TUCSON (CL 98), DESRON 61.

31 0404 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC AFLOAT - CINCPAC AFLOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

Subject: Proposed operations in 3rd Fleet area of control. I propose the following.

A. On receipt of adequate information from Japanese initiate Navy operations to temporarily seize all minor Japanese bases for the sole purpose of taking possession of midget submarines, suicide craft, human torpedoes, and other naval installations and equipment. In each case appropriate arrangements to be made with Army. Unless a general covering directive is received from you I will in each case report what installations and vessels are located and will request instructions as to moving same to YOKOSUKA, SINKING, or destroying.

B. Will make general survey of 3rd Fleet area of responsibility and will then make recommendation as to the establishment of inspection or visiting patrols or permanent guard for (10 groups missing - being serviced)

CUFF will make specific recommendation concerning base development necessary for the support of the eastern control forces.

31 0402 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC AFLOAT - CINCPAC AFLOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

Subject: Estimate and intentions based on current information and pertinent instructions from CINCPAC AFLOAT. I plan to institute the following measures.

A. Immediately return officers and men in the fleet landing force who are attached to ships departing for overhaul on 3 September.

B. Order into SAGAMI anchorage all ships due to depart from the western Pacific under vice Admiral Sherman's command to pick up their landing force personnel and clear up fag ends.

YELLOW

TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY.
AUG. SEPT. (GCT)

(Cont'd)

and TSINGTAO or, alternatively if CENTRAL CHINA situation requires when forces are ready, occupation of SHANGHAI AREA.

Para. Command arrangements for these operations will be as prescribed in WARX 47945, 11 August 1945.

28 1830 CINGPAC to SCAP info COM3RDFLT, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGEN 8TH ARMY.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO HALSEY.

Com3rdFleet 281101. In view circumstances outlined in reference urge that you immediately authorize Halsey to take immediate action to contact POW and to take such steps as necessary for alleviating their condition and moving them into American Jurisdiction. In order that the intolerable conditions outlined in reference may be corrected in minimum time and to provide for possible failure or delay in communications Com3rdFleet is hereby authorized, if no reply is received from you by 1300 TOKYO TIME today, to initiate such local action as to POW as humanitarian considerations require.

28 1101 COM3RDFLT to SCAP info CINGPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO MACARTHUR INFO NIMITZ.

Swiss representative of International Red Cross now with CTF 31 anchored off YOKOSUKA reports many prisoners of war sick, 150 seriously ill in SHINGAWA CAMPS hospital. All camps desperately in need of food. 200 aviation personnel in bad state at OMORI camp on the waterfront. The urgency of the situation is confirmed by extensive photographic coverage of POW CAMPS with prisoners waving to planes and signs "Food" on ground, by information from Japanese emissaries that there are 6,125 allied prisoners of war in the TOKYO AREA of which 417 are bedridden, and by information obtained from 2 British Marine prisoners who escaped from KAMAOKI CAMP and were picked up by picket boat near SAGAMI WAN ANCHORAGE. All of the facilities under my command are available to you and to the Commanding General of the 8th Army for the immediate extension of urgent care, assistance and evacuation of the allied prisoners of war in eastern HONSHU. I suggest that liaison officers of the 8th Army be sent to me at YOKOSUKA in order that I may initiate and expedite this task in accordance with your policies.

Para. I have immediately available in TOKYO AREA 3 hospital ships 2 APDS, 30 doctors, 90 corpsmen, and clothing and food for 3000 men. I will have available on the afternoon of 1st September in addition to above 2 LSVs 2 APAS, 20 additional doctors and 60 corpsmen, food and clothing for 4000 men. I have a tactical organization ready with all available information and prepared to act.

Para. I propose for most expeditious action. A. To send medical assistance and food with Red Cross and Japanese Liaison to TOKYO BAY waterfront camps promptly reporting to COMGEN 8TH ARMY and to you on conditions found. B. To receive released POWs on board hospital ships and APAS in TOKYO BAY for evacuation to points COMGEN 8TH ARMY directs. C. Send on 3 September with 8th Army liaison party 1 LSV, 1 APA with appropriate escorts and minesweepers to an east coast port in the SENDAI AREA to contact camps in that area extend medical assistance and evacuate to points COMGEN 8TH ARMY directs. D. To establish transient hospital clothing and supply station for POW at YOKOSUKA for use as required.

3535

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC

DATE

FROM : AS

SUBJECT: This is a copy of the stenographic
report of my contemporaneous talk
at downtown.

Op-00 ✓

Op-03 - Excellent - Please give me
a copy CWH

1538

LECTURE

THE NAVY IN WORLD WAR II.

Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept.

Lt. Gen. Cerow - Introductory Remarks.

In the period between the two World Wars we gave very little consideration to the problems of combined or joint operations. Each service went about its own business as if decisive battles of future wars were to be fought independently by air, ground or naval forces. Consequently, when we entered World War II most of our officers were sadly lacking in a knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of their sister services. Jealousies between the services, shortages of funds, lack of facilities, equipment and personnel had retarded training and a development of technique for welding air, ground and naval units into a smooth working, efficient team operating under a single command. During the progress of World War II we learned this team work, but we learned it the hard way, after the fighting started. In order to keep alive this "know how" and to deploy our techniques and to disseminate this knowledge to as many officers as possible considerable time has been allowed to this course to the study of air and naval operations, by these two forces acting alone and in coordination with the ground forces. To assist us in putting over this instruction the Chief of Naval Operations has very kindly designated several of his most distinguished and outstanding officers to address the class during the academic year. We are honored today in having as our first Navy guest speaker, Vice Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, who will talk on the Navy in World War II. There is no officer better qualified to address the class on this subject. Shortly before World War II and shortly thereafter he played a very prominent part in the preparation of war plans for the operation of our naval units on all seas of the globe. After that assignment he was detailed as Commander of the aircraft USS, and followed it in all its engagements until it was sunk by enemy action in 1942. In accord with long standing Navy tradition Admiral Sherman was the last person to leave

the "ASP" before it sunk, and swam for an hour and a half in the ocean, covered with oil, until he was picked up by a rescue party. After he left the "ASP" he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet and of the Pacific Ocean areas. In that capacity he participated and planned many of the operations that took place in this very very extensive area.

It is a great pleasure for me this morning to introduce an old friend and a distinguished sailor and aviator, Admiral Sherman.

Thank you.

Vice Admiral Sherman Speaking --

It is a very great privilege for me to be out here to visit this school. It is my first visit to Leavenworth and it is my understanding that the visits by Naval officers out here have not been as many as they should have been in the past. We intend to take advantage of every opportunity to increase the interchange of officers between our service schools.

During the past year we have worked out a new organization of the National Military establishment and by legislative fiat have created a framework. That framework can be no better than the people in it, and we all look to the educational process to produce the people who will be aware, not only of their own problems, but of the problems of the other services, to make the whole organization work and work well. And it is in these principal service schools that in peacetime a great deal of the progress will have to be made.

I was asked to talk this morning about the strategic and tactical concepts of the Navy in World War II. The time available will not permit me to give you a consecutive account of the war in the Pacific and I do not think it necessary to inflict it on you. This diagram (a Pacific wall board) will however, be of use in picking out examples of some of the major points that I would like to make.

Looking back to the prewar years we were all brought up to understand that the purposes of naval forces were really three. First, in peacetime to implement National policy and to further diplomatic action. In war to make sure that we have the use of the seas and that our opponents do not have the use of the seas, whether for military operations or for the move-

ment of commerce. The third great purpose of naval forces has always been to hinder or to support military operations on shore. Under that concept battle at sea by the naval forces is only a means to an end, and I think it is very important to bear that in mind not only in trying to interpret what has gone on in the past but in interpreting and solving our problems for the future. We shouldn't let our concepts of naval warfare revolve too much around an enemy battle fleet and disposing of that enemy battle fleet as an end in itself. For example, after we landed in the Marianas, in the summer of 1944, the Japanese fleet came out and attempted to fly aircraft into Guam, a southern island, in order to strike our forces and our transports that were ~~at~~ ^{off} Saipan. Admiral Spruance who was in overall command of that operation was then faced with two alternatives. One was to go after the Japanese fleet, hammer and tongs, the other was to be a little more conservative and to give primary consideration to the security of the transports and shipping at the objective area. He made his decision; he operated in such a way as to achieve his primary purpose which was to insure the landing of those troops and the capture of the Marianas. He also succeeded in destroying practically every Japanese airplane that flew. The results obtained in sinking enemy shipping were not as great as they could have been if he had gone full speed after the enemy. But, on the other hand, the way he operated kept the other Japanese forces coming in from another direction from getting in on his transports. I gave you that as an example of the correct interpretation of the purpose of that naval force.

Back in the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of World War I, there developed a concept of naval strategy exemplified in the writings of Mahan, which placed great emphasis on the concentration of naval forces at the key points. The ~~main~~ ^{principal} naval forces ~~actually~~ ^{were actually so} constructed in part by the results of the naval concept which was general among naval officers and others concerned with the problems. The Germans appraised their naval problem as one which required tremendous concentration. They knew that they could not be strong every where, therefore they attempted to be strong in the North Sea. That in turn imposed on Britain the necessity for reducing the British Naval deployment around the world in order to in-

concentrate it in home waters and to form what became the Grand Fleet. So there resulted two opposing concentrations with minimum deployment away from the vital North Sea area and the record of World War I from a naval point of view is distinctive because of that great concentration of two very strong fleets opposing each other across a narrow sea and sparring for opportunities to win a decisive action.

During the period between World War I and World War II all of our thinking in our navy and to a degree in the navies of other countries was influenced by that concept of having the strongest possible battle fleet. It resulted in our own training in the Navy being pointed toward fleet action, our preparations being pointed toward fleet action. For many years we had practically our whole fleet concentrated on the coast of southern California, which in terms of the distance from the western Pacific to the eastern Atlantic was strategically a mid-point. That strategic concept of concentration of forces and training to bring about a great fleet action in the event of war after which you would gain control of the seas and all other things would be simple, extended even to the preparation of the forces for the minor aspects of war.

In 1939 we did not have an amphibious force. We had not prepared and we had not trained for moving troops overseas and landing them against opposition. Our anti-submarine forces were not as good as they should be, our reconnaissance forces were not adequate. We were prepared to fight a great fleet battle but we were not prepared for the day-in and day-out dirty work of naval warfare.

When the war began we were still operating under the battle fleet concept. We had nearly the whole effective fleet in the Pacific concentrated. The results of that you know. We had too many ships packed in one port and we lost a great many of them for the time being. That reverse (Pearl Harbor) had one very useful effect in that it freed the carriers and the task forces that were left to follow out a newer and better concept of fleet operations which was of the fast task forces operating separately.

The first phase of the war in the Pacific for the Navy was one of

establishing and maintaining a line of communications. After the withdrawal out of the Philippines into the Dutch East Indies, the loss of the Dutch East Indies, it was decided to hold Australia as a base for further operations. And to a predominately naval command, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, was given the task of maintaining the lines of communication from Pearl Harbor to Australia. We had Pearl, we had Midway in our possession, we had Johnston Island, which is about here, we had the island of Canton, we had the Samoa Islands which are down here. We moved into Fiji. An Army task force at the beginning of the war was dispatched and occupied New Caledonia and from then on our early naval operations were continued to hold that line. The Japanese, after their initial success, ^{extended} had their holdings down to the coast of New Guinea and they, in effect, had control of the Pacific out to this red broken line. In the spring, May of 1942, it developed that the Japanese were going to try to extend their holdings down to the Solomon Islands and also to invade Australia. So we were forced then into defensive naval action in which we used the carriers and light forces available to stem that advance. After one or two minor strikes by the carriers it eventuated in the battle of the Coral Sea in which both sides suffered losses. The Japanese lost the Shoho, we lost the Lexington, but we, in effect, held the line there. ^{after a tactical withdrawal} Then, as you all know, we moved into the Solomons and there we engaged in a war of attrition for nearly a year.

Going back to former strategic concepts. We had always visualized amphibious operations as being conducted by the movement of troop convoys with the necessary transports and assault shipping. We visualized ^{these} ~~as~~ being separate from any such movement what we called a naval covering force. In World War I the grand fleet in the North Sea acted as a covering force for the first movement of the British Expeditionary force across the channel. In our own Spanish War the Atlantic ^{Fleet} acted as a covering force to cover the movement of our troops from the United States to Cuba. The old concept of a covering force was that it interposed between the troop movement and the enemy fleet. When we went into the Solomons we did not do that. We were short of forces and we used our carrier task force in the immediate support

of troop movement. We concentrated first in the Fiji Islands where we held a rehearsal then we moved up to Guadalcanal all in one compact body. There were no preliminary attacks; the assault came in at daylight, preceded only by an hour or two, by our air attacks, and it was all one compact force. That was not the best way; we learned that the older concept of a separate movement was better and in all subsequent operations in the Pacific war we always used a naval covering force or a naval striking force which was separate from the amphibious movement. That concept is so important that I would like to develop the use of the covering force and the factors that control the timing of its use. The first operation over long distance at sea was the assault on the Gilberts when with our air deployed in these ~~bases~~ ^{bases (on the Gilbert Islands)} three ~~groups~~ we went in and took Tarawa and Makin. Well, our problem was to move ships all the way down from Pearl Harbor to the objective and one of the strategic problems in a long overseas movement was the fact that we had the tractor groups, the amphibian tank and the amphibian tractor, which had to be the first units to land. They had to be embarked in LST's, which were all slow speed, and in a movement over a great distance that presented a difficult strategic problem because those units had to sail and be at sea long before the 15 knot transport group with the great majority of the troops. The significance of that is that the timing of the first strike by our carrier task force had to be early enough to give cover and protection to the movement of that slow tractor group so that the latest time at which we could begin the air attack on an objective was the time when our tractor groups, which were relatively defenseless, would come within striking distance of the enemy air ashore. That point is not well understood and it has lead to some conjecture as to the type of preliminary operations that we conducted. So that one of the prime considerations in the use of our carrier task force to cover an amphibious operation was that it had to strike early.

The next consideration was that instead of merely deployin in readiness for action wherever we landed in the Pacific, with this well developed network of Japanese air bases, we always had to use our carrier task force for two purposes. One was to beat down the enemy air which was within

striking distance of our amphibious assault and the other was to give direct support to the amphibious assault.

Our first prime objective in our central Pacific campaign was to get into the Marshalls. However, if we had gone into the Marshalls as an initial operation we would have had enemy air bases ^(now destroyed) here on this flank, we would have had the air bases at Eniwetok and ~~Mileolap~~ ^(the Gilberts) on that flank and this whole mass of bases in the central Pacific. So we landed ~~here~~ ^(the Gilberts) as a first operation to take those out. Then for the Marshalls assault we used our carrier aircraft to another Eniwetok, which was the only base within reach of the objective area. Our actual landing was ~~at~~ ^{near} Kwajalein so that our carriers had the strategic task of denying any enemy air operations from Eniwetok, ~~Wotje~~, ~~Mileolap~~ and Jaluit all of which were in enemy hands.

In planning that operation then we had to have our carrier task force arrive and begin its engagements at about the time that our low speed tractor group was in this position on its way down to Kwajalein. Actually we did that by moving the carriers all the way around and coming in from this direction ^(the south coast) in order to develop a certain degree of surprise. Having gotten on station then, about four days or five days ahead of the assault, they had to operate continuously from that time until the assault took place. Then there developed the other requirement of close air support for the troops that were landing which meant that these same aircraft operating from the same carriers which were moving out at a high speed had then to be passed to the control of the amphibious commander and later to the control of the troop commander after he was ashore. So, starting in that operation and going on through the war in the Pacific we developed the tactical requirement that the same mass of aircraft would have to first be the striking power of the covering force, then ~~the command element~~ would have to shift to direct support of an amphibious landing and eventually be under the control of the commander of troops on shore. That took a good deal of doing. We went through a great many growing pains. But it was a well worked out and functioning system at the end of the war.

After we took an air base there then developed another requirement for the carrier task force, which was to continue to give air cover and air

support to the position ashore until fields could be activated and our own shore based air flown in. In the Solomon action we made the mistake of pulling out too soon. We withdrew the carriers on the morning of the third day. Incidentally, the amphibious commander and the troop commander had said they only wanted them for one day. We stayed an extra day and pulled out on the third day and it turned out not to be long enough. But at that stage of the war we didn't have fueling systems worked out, we didn't have the replacement aircraft, or the spare pilots to keep going. But toward the end of the war we found that we had to be prepared to keep the carriers on station until our shore based air had been moved in and was functioning. So those are the major requirements in the duration of the sustained carrier operation. It had to begin early enough to give security to the approaching amphibious force, it had to continue long enough to cover the establishment on shore until shore based air could take over and during the course of this period it had to be sufficiently flexible so that it could be shifted from a plane strike mission in strategic support of the operation over to a close support, detailed pinpoint troop support operation.

Another consideration which governed our operations of carriers throughout the war was that each one of these preliminary covering strikes had to be placed properly in the light of the next operation ahead. For instance, after we were established on shore in the Marshalls, Admiral Spruance took the carrier task force battle ships and cruisers out west and made the first strike on Truk. This was a form of strategic support which took the pressure off ~~this area~~ ^{the Marshalls} completely. As soon as he got back in from Truk we took Eniwetok and then in order to get photographs and information on the Marianas, about which we had known nothing since the beginning of the war, we turned them around and sent them up to strike the Marianas, which again was protecting ~~this area~~ ^{the Marshalls} because it hit the Japanese right in the pipeline through which they would have to reinforce ~~this area~~ ^{the Marshalls} and at the same time got us the information we needed with which to make a decision on the next operation. Until we got the results of those two attacks in support of the Marshalls operations we lacked the photographs and the data on which to decide as between Truk and the Marianas.

The next operation of the covering force was in connection with the movement up to Hollandia. During the campaign in the Solomons and on up to the spring of 1944, the southwest Pacific forces had had to move up the coast of New Guinea in jumps which were governed primarily by the effective radius of their own fighters in order that they would have their land based air to cover and support their landings. With the rapid augmentation of the fleet by the delivery of new ships we had gotten to a point where we could sustain the operations of the fleet more rapidly than we could assemble and mount amphibious operations. Furthermore, the timing of any move in the central Pacific had to be so adjusted that before we moved from Truk up to Kwajalein, for instance, or from Kwajalein to the Marianas, we would have to develop these air bases, get them functioning, and get the land based air to the point where it was effective. So, in order to keep the fleet busy we then shifted it over to covering and supporting the landing at Hollandia. The form of that support which was arranged by a conference down in Brisbane was for the carriers to move all the way out to Palau and deliver a strike there. The reason for the selection of that objective was first to cut off that avenue of supply of Japanese air to Hollandia. Second to get a very nice bag of Japanese cruisers and destroyers which we knew was in port, and third to again strike a place which would give indirect protection to the development of these bases back here.

That operation was successful and as an additional dividend on the way back to the base the carrier task force moved over and attacked Truk. It was always a prime consideration in our naval operations in the Pacific to strike the Japanese positions in the Mandates frequently enough to keep them from becoming safe bases for interfering with the operations along the New Guinea coast. During the early days in the Solomons we had not been able to do that and the result had been that all during the Solomon campaign we were regularly and consistently worked over by Japanese forces coming down from the Mandates, delivering attacks on the Guadalcanal position and then withdrawing.

The next major operation was the movement into the Marianas and that

was accomplished in the summer of 1944, primarily to give us a base from which we could strike Japan proper. The results of that I need not go into but they were very decisive. Following the seizure of the Larianas we worked on down into Palau. General MacArthur's movement into Morital took place the same day under cover of heavy strikes on Mindanao, following which the carriers ranged north to develop information and also reduce Japanese strength in the Philippines as a whole. There again the principle was the same, strike the place from which interference might come and also get information and third keep up the pressure and continue to destroy enemy aircraft.

From then on the pattern, the use of that force, had been pretty usefully established. In general, always to reach out, conduct preliminary strikes, fall back, give direct support to the landing, then move out again. The times when we had failures, and we had them, were usually due to mistakes in preliminary planning, over-optimism on the part of the construction people and the shore air commanders as to the date by which they could be ready. Over-optimism in the Guadalcanal operation was responsible for some of our initial reverses. Over-optimism as to the time when the shore based air force could take over was responsible for, not bad results, but disorderly results in our initial landings in the Philippines where at one time the carriers were turned loose and then had to go back. Well, we should have planned to keep them there all the time but the over-optimism on the date by which the fields in Leyte would be operating was due to the fact that the aircraft photographs did not show the mud and bad terrain on which we were planning to build fields.

As the war progressed it became necessary to plan on getting into Luzon. That was a very interesting plan because the preliminary fortress, the support of the operation involved so many different headquarters. There ~~were~~ ^{were} five theaters, or the equivalent, represented in the preliminary conference which took place in Hollandia in New Guinea one or two days after we landed in Leyte. The China theater was represented, the India-Burma Theater, the southwest Pacific, the central Pacific and the 20th Air Force, so we had five signatures on the coordination plan for that show. And the

supporting measures ranged all the way from B 29 attacks on Japan to strikes by the carriers along the south China coast, strikes against Formosa, strikes against Okinawa, the attacks from our own Army aircraft in the southern Philippines against Luzon, bombardments of Iwo Jima by ships based in the Marines. These all had to take place and they were all part of the overall concept of using naval forces, long range air forces, to give the best possible strategic support to a difficult landing, and then shifting the mobile naval units to close support as rapidly as possible. That worked out very well and we then were ready for further and even more difficult objectives. ^P The landings in Iwo Jima and Okinawa as far as the overall strategic concepts presented no new features. The Japanese fleet had been more or less destroyed but we still had this fundamental necessity for a fleet to support the landings, and to cover the landings, in its own offensive operations. Actually although we had no enemy fleet left that is where we took our greatest damage in the Pacific. As I recall it we had 323 ships I think it was, put out of action in that three months and at that period of the war the major feature which governed all of our operations, strategical and tactical, had gotten into one of simple arithmetic. We used to keep three curves, one was the numbers of Japanese aircraft considered to be operational, another was the daily volume of Kamikaze attacks. The other curve, to appropriate scale, was the availability of light escort vessels. As long as our curve of availability of ships stayed above the slope of the one of Japanese aircraft we felt that we would be successful.

These are really the salient features of the strategic concepts governing the use of our major naval forces. In our planning for the future we are giving primary emphasis to keeping in being the basic units that are needed to make war under the concept ~~that~~ ^{not} you can separate naval strategy from air strategy. You cannot separate either one of them from ground operations. We are keeping an amphibious force, we are keeping a carrier striking force, we are keeping an anti-submarine force for the protection of lines of communications. We are keeping a submarine force to cut enemy sea communications and we are keeping the cruisers, de-

destroyers and gun fire ships that it takes to make them all go.

Looking ahead at the broader aspects of naval strategy and naval deployments we can see that as time goes on, not up until the time when any possible opponent creates a concentrated battle fleet, ~~that~~ our naval operations will be distinguished by avoidance of concentration but we our only requirement is to be able to oppose an enemy force with something stronger, and to the demand that we be able to deploy our forces so that we can meet our responsibilities and achieve success with a smaller total strength.

Another problem that we have had is to so deploy our fleet and so adjust the use that we make of the personnel and funds that we have so as to carry on our training with greater emphasis on joint training. I would say that in our operations today about 50% of our training is associated with joint training or training of civilian components rather than purely training internally in a fleet of the type we maintained before the war.

These are the high points and I would be very glad to answer any questions that anyone wishes to ask. Before closing I want to again express my gratification for the privilege of appearing out here and my hope that this interchange of instructors, students and visitors between our service schools will increase in the future.