“NIMITZ GRAY BOOK”
Volume 7 of 8

War Plans and Files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Running Estimate and Summary
covering the period 1 July 1945–31 August 1945.

The following series of images is the first step in the American Naval Records Society’s project to produce a scholarly on-line edition of this important, declassified, primary source.

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BOOK #7

GRAYBOOK SUMMARY

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1 JULY 1945 - 31 AUGUST 1945
1 July (Calm date)

GABRIEL (SS 252) tracked properly illuminated hospital ship approximately 300 miles southeast of TOKYO, suspected to be enroute to NARCUS or WAKE.

For the third successive day there have been almost no plane sightings of ships among south KOREAN Islands.

Two more submarine contacts are reported; one by a merchantman southeast of the MARIANAS near yesterday's PC contact, the other near PAREOE VELA by a PC escorting a convoy.

TF 31 dissolved this date and all local defense functions assumed by Commander RYUKYUS. TF 32 remains in the area as covering force. Composition 3 OBB, CA/CI and escorting destroyers. CTF 32 has overall command of other 3rd Flt forces in the area, including TF 39 (Mine Flotilla), TG 30-5 (Search and Recce Group - FAW 1), and unit of 30-9 (Logistics Support Group). TF 39 departed LEYTE today for exercises preparatory to extended operations.

773 B-29s were over the Empire last night on bombing and mining missions. 159 aircraft struck KUMAMOTO, 136 aircraft hit SHOYOSHI, 100 aircraft were over YEB and 154 bombed KURE. One plane was lost enroute to the target, 6 of the crew have been reported rescued. 24 B-29s mined the east entrance to the SHIKOKU STRAIT; the NANAO and PUSKII areas were also mined.

142 Mustangs attempted to strike the NAGOYA airfields. HAMA Matsu was the only field hit due to bad weather conditions over the other targets. 12 aircraft from the same group hit HAMASHIMA seaplane base destroying 1 hangar, 1 SCL, 4 SD; other light vessels were damaged. 2 planes were lost, 1 pilot rescued.

In the RYUKYUS on the 1st 21 B-25s bombed CHIRAN airfield in southern KYUSHU. P-47s on continuous CAP over KYUSHU destroyed 4 seaplanes and disabled 1 Betty. Neutralization raids were carried out against other islands in the RYUKU chain.

7 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer left 1 DD and 1 medium freighter burning in HACHIJOMO BAY. 2 3000-ton freighters were damaged off the 5th coast of KYUSHU.

FAW 1 planes sank 2 small ships and damaged 1 in the YELLOW SEA.

During June search planes of the 7th Flt destroyed 161 ships totalling 30,320 tons and damaged 209 totalling 25,435 tons. In addition 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in the FOA since 18 March (18 Mar. - 30 June, Incl) total 4,941. 5 enemy planes destroyed by TG 99.2 since 1 July.

COMPHIBSPAC 271335 (pink) outlines tentative agreement with FEA and 9th AF for employment of Marine Air Warning Squads in OLIMPIA.

CINCPAC ADV 010151 (pink) outlines action to be taken to alleviate critical backlog of shipping at OKINAWA.

COMMANSEAFRON 010900 (pink) recommends category of defense of HAWAIIAN ISLANDS be reduced to Category of Defense A with modifications.

CINCPAC ADV 010642 directs that CTF 93 continues to have responsibility for neutralization of Jap islands in the Central Pacific.
TOP SECRET

2 July (Oahu date)

Commanding Officer of SPROSTON (DD 577) definitely claims sinking a midget submarine on 28 June.

MURRAY (DD 576) is enroute to intercept and board Japanese hospital ship believed to be TAKASAGO MARU. This vessel may be heading for WAKE. Special air search has also been initiated.

TF 38 is conducting exercises in PHILIPPINE SEA enroute to fueling rendezvous.

TIGRONE arrived at OAHU with 23 survivors transferred to her from three other boats. Added to the record total of 28 survivors which she earlier picked up and disembarked at IWO, this makes a total rescue of 51 fliers brought in by one boat on one patrol.

493 B-29s hit Empire industrial targets on 1 July. Fighter opposition was nil to weak at all targets. At UBE fires were visible to 125 miles on withdrawal.

A 24 plane CAP maintained continuously over southern KYUSHU during daylight on the 2nd shot down 4 Zekes and 4 Torsyas.

FAY 1 planes off western KYUSHU probably sank 1 SAG and 3 SD on the 1st; on the 2nd 1 SC was destroyed off KUNSAN and 1 SD damaged. In attacks near CHUSAN ISLAND 7 P-47s escorted by a FB4Y-2 destroyed 1 SA, left 1 FTC burning and damaged 1 enemy aircraft on the ground. From 25 June to 1 July inclusive planes of FAY 1 sank 13,200 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 9,510 tons. The cumulative totals are 137,675 tons sunk, 138,400 tons damaged, with 37 enemy aircraft destroyed and 26 enemy aircraft damaged. During the week 3 FB4Y-2s with crews were lost.

TAP planes, in addition to KYUSHU and CHINA Coast attacks, continued hitting ISHIJAKI and KIKAI airfields. MAC-31 is now at CHINMU Field and MAC-14 is at AWAKE Field, both on OKINAWA.

CINCPIAC 301407 recommends to JCS continuation of existing Area Petroleum Officers to control theater petroleum requirements.

RICHARDSON 012310 announces that effective 1 July ComGenPOA-ComGen Hawaiian Department assumes the title ComGenPIHMPOA.

CINCPIAC ADV 020021 directs MURRAY (DD 576) to intercept and board hospital ship suspected enroute to WAKE.

CINCPAC ADV 020255 (pink) recommends ComPaciPac and ComGen 6th Army be charged jointly with embarkation of OLYMPIC land forces.

CINCPAC ADV 020909 (pink) expresses no objection to designation of 7th and 27th Divisions in OKINAWA as OIF reserve for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 020913 (pink) requests CINCPIAC's concurrence in proposal for providing Port Director Units at all ports in KYUSHU.
TOP SECRET

2 July (Guam date)

LAPON (SS 260) sighted a hospital ship headed for CHICHI JIMA on 2 July.

The evening of 2 July approximately 275 miles NW of MAEK a party from USS MURRAY boarded the JAP AH TAKASAGO MARU enroute to MAEK and finding no reason to detain her directed her to continue her voyage.

The night of 3 July 4 B-29s hit TOKUSHIMA, KOCHI, TAKAMATSU and HIROSHI. Photographs taken on the 2nd show the following percentage destruction of built up areas which were attacked on the 29th with incendiaries: HIJYO 28.6%, NAKAJIMA 26%, SASAKI 17.9% and SHIMONOSEKI 36%. In the 4 targets here assessed, total destruction reported is 1,755 square miles, which is 28% of the total built up areas in the targets. The assessment is not complete because of smoke.

On 2 July 56 P-47s protected 5 photo FB4s over KYUSHU, driving off 18 Oscars after they had damaged 1 Liberator and wounded 2 crewmen. The 26 planes F04 CAP was over KYUSHU for 2 hours prior to noon, apparently, and not during all of daylight as planned. On 3 July 25 P-47s hit the Kanoya airfield control tower, strafing barracks and administration buildings, and firing 6 single-engine aircraft.

Off TSUSHIMA ISLAND a F4Y 1 Privateer destroyed 1 SD by bombing and strafing on the 2nd. On the 3rd 1 SD was sunk NE of SAISHU TO, and F4Y 18 planes probably sank 1 and damaged 1 SD off HACHijo JIMA.

In attacks on the 2nd against SAKISHIMA 1 TB was shot down by KIYAKO AA. A Dumbo picked up all members of the crew. On the 3rd 32 F4Us hit ISHIGAKI, exploding 1 single-engine enemy aircraft on the ground, and scoring a direct hit on a gun position.

MURRAY (DD 576) 031310 reports boarding the JAP AH TAKASAGO MARU and after examination directing her to proceed on her voyage.

A July (Guam date)

TF 38 is enroute to its first rendezvous, with task groups exercising independently. Units of TG 30.8 departed MARTINAS enroute to rendezvous. TF 39 starts sweep of area "JUNEAU" tomorrow. TF 32 and CVE of TG 32.1 are in support. British oilers are enroute to their fueling rendezvous.

On the 4th, approximately 820 planes were over the Empire on attack, escort, mining and reconnaissance missions. This total includes about 500 B-29s at TAKAMATSU KOCHI, TOKUSHIMA and HIROSHI, 30 B-29s mining, 132 P-51s over TOKYO airfields, 32 P-47s to KYUSHU, 18 P-51s scheduled for KYUSHU, and 104 fighters scheduled to escort photo planes over KYUSHU (confirmation of last 2 missions have not been received).

Enemy aircraft opposition to the P-51 strike was slight and only 1 Jap plane was shot down. On the ground 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 30 damaged.

On the 3rd 26 B-25s and 32 F4Us attacked CHIRAM drone and dispersal areas. 48 P-51s of the 5th AF swept the western coast of KYUSHU, losing 1 plane.

North of the YAKUTSE RIVER mouth a convoy of 2 large DD, 1 small DD, 2 FC, 1 FTC, 1 TB was attacked on the 4th by 8 P-47s, 6 PBM and 2 Priveteers. Rocket hits fired the small DD and strafing fired 1 FC and damaged 1 DD and the TB. FB4s fired 6 torpedoes from 4,500 yards at altitude of 100-150 feet, getting good runs, without hits.

-Continued-
TOP SECRET

4 July (Guam date) (Cont'd)

COMIF PEARL 040540 recommends that all air-sea rescue services from OKINAWA be operated by PEARL.

COMINCH & CNO 041350 (pink) requests review of requirements for artificial harbors for CORONET.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz returned to Guam from the West Coast.

5 July (Guam date)

TAKASAGO MARU departed TAKE at 1600/5th and was intercepted 2½ hours later and boarded by MURRAY (DD 576). MURRAY reported that the ship had 974 patients, all bona fide. 490 were Navy, 442 Army. 15% were tuberculosis, 14 men were wounded, and the rest were suffering from serious malnutrition. Estimated 15% would not survive the voyage. 25% might be restored to duty in 60 days. Most of the others were landed. Destination believed TOKYO, No allied personnel aboard. The ship was directed to continue her voyage.

On the 4th 48 P-51s of the 5th AF swept KYUSHU, meeting no interception but some AA. 96 P-47s escorted 4 photo PBYs over KYUSHU through 8-10/10 clouds. There was no interception. On the 5th 32 P-51s of the 5th AF were over KYUSHU from 1200-1410, from 10,000 feet to the deck. 6 Georges intercepted, 4 of which were shot down, with the remaining 2 probably destroyed. There were no P-51 losses.

26 B-29s laid 228 mines in the western entrance to SHIMOISOKE STRAITS, in HIJIRU and in FUNAKAKA HARBOR (17°15'N 140°10'E).

103 P-51s struck TOKYO airfields on the 5th. On the ground 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 10 damaged. Hangars and installations were fired at SHIMOBETSU, and small and medium shipping targets were damaged south of TOKYO BAY. There was no enemy air opposition. 2 P-51s were damaged by AA.

3 pairs of Privateers roamed over southern and central KOREA, destroying or damaging 9 bridges, blocking 4 tunnels, destroyed 2 and damaged 4 locomotives, damaged a power house, a radio station and 2 lighthouses. An FTO was sunk south of SADEN TO. FAN 1 PBYs sunk 1 300-ton AK off the TAWAZU and damaged a lighthouse and barracks with bombs. Off OKTO HERTO (western KYUSHU) 1 SD was sunk and 1 damaged.

30 F4Us hit OKINO-ERAMU and 24 F4Us plus 14 TBM hit Yan Airfield at KIKAI.

6 July (Guam date)

TAKASAGO MARU now believed headed for YOKOSUKA rather than HOKAIDO. However, she started out on course 330, speed 12, and this course and speed was confirmed by a plane sighting at noon yesterday.

TF 39, the Mine Flotilla in area JUNEAU, has been maintaining radio silence, and has apparently not been discovered. TF 32 has deployed in a covering position to the westward of OKINAWA. TF 38 will pass south of IV0 tomorrow towards its fueling rendezvous on the 8th with TG 30.3.

Sub sweep starts at 1900 tomorrow prior to run-in.

- Continued -

3253
TOP SECRET

6 July (Cont'd)

577 B-29s were over 5 Empire targets between 0013 and 0342 on the 7th. Fighter opposition was nil to slight at all targets and AA was generally nil to moderate.

On the 6th 112 P-51s attacked TOKYO airfields for the 2nd day in succession. Again airborne opposition was light with claims 1 - 0 - 6. On the ground P-51s claim 6 - 1 - 9. 1 P-51 was lost and 7 damaged.

FAW 18 planes destroyed 1 SD off JETUGA WAN, and left a second SD burning. FAW 1 planes sank 1 FTO and 1 FTD off SAICHIU TO, exploded a gas dump on shore and shot down 1 Val.

From OKINAWA 6 photo PB4Ys and 5 F-5s escorted by 136 F4U's and P-47s were weathered out of KYUSHU at 1300. The fighters then attacked a possible FTB, with possible damage and destroyed several small boats in the ASAMI Area. At 1730 35 P-47s hit TAKANO damaging the runways, dispersal areas, and gun positions.

COMGRDFLT 090515 (pink) expresses intention to carry out 10 July operation solely against aircraft but to strike NAGATO on 16-17 July.

CINCAPAC 091353 (pink) requests transfer of 7th AF effective 6 July, including 3 Long Range Fighter Groups.

CINCSPT 051200 (pink) comments to CINCPAC concerning NAIPKO operation for obtaining intelligence in KOREA.

CINCPAC ADV 060553 (pink) requests ComGenAAPOA's comments on disposition of 20th AF fighters in the KYUKUS.

CINCPAC ADV 060554 (pink) concurs in transfer of 7th AF units not later than 15 July.

CINCPAC ADV 060617 requests that 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be released to operational control of Com7thFlt immediately.

CINCPAC ADV 060626 directs that all 7th AF units in OKINAWA report to CTG 99.2 pending assignment to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADV 060822 (pink) concurs in use of destroyers for FORT BAYARD project until about 15 September.

CINCPAC ADV 060829 recommends to Cominch facilities at MANUS to be made available to the British Pacific Fleet.
7 July ( Guam date )

GABILAN (SS 252) reports attacking an RO sub off TOKYO.

COMMANDO has detached a destroyer, WADEVUT (DD 677), with ComDesDiv 108 embarked to search for and intercept the TAKASAGO MARU. She has orders to board, seal her radio, and escort her clear of our forces. CTF 94 has dispatched planes to assist in the search. They have been directed to fly along an area which represents line of position of ship at 15 knots from her last reported position.

TF 39 has completed sweep of the first 12 miles of area JUNEAU without encountering any mines. TF 32 remains in a covering position. TF 39 is at fueling rendezvous with TG 30.8.

31 P-51s of the 5th AF forced by weather to stay in the KAGOSIMA BAY area of KYUSHU, attacked locomotives and railroad cars. 6 photo PBYs, escorted by 128 fighters, found KYUSHU overcast and got no pictures.

F4Y-1 planes damaged 5 DD south of SHANTUNG PENINSULA. Just west of SASKATO a Privateer, attacked by fighters, shot down 1 and then itself was shot down. Subsequent search failed to locate survivors, and the JNAF ROBIN, lifeguard in the area, believes the enemy has them.

PBJs on the nights of 5/6th and 6/7th scored rocket hits on 4300-foot unidentified vessels and 1 150-foot ship, all south and southeast of KURISHU.

F4U-1 planes during June sank 16,300 tons of enemy shipping and damaged or probably sank 11,150 tons more. They destroyed 8 enemy aircraft and probably destroyed or damaged 13.

12 F4Us in attacks on the SAKISHINA GUOTO on the 6th burned 3 planes on the ground. TAF planes burned four at TOKUNO on the 7th out of 12 possibly operational planes seen.

COMINCH & CNO 07/13/10 (dnd) outlines RAF airfield construction forces and requests CINCPAC to designate destination for 1st echelon, known as Shield Force, and site for movement of 2nd echelon, known as Vacuum Force.

8 July (Guam date)

TAKASAGO MARU was picked up by a search plane at 0005 8th at 32°10' N 157° E. Destroyer is on interesting course. No report of her investigation received.

Mine sweepers of TF 39 are progressing in area JUNEAU about as scheduled. On the 7th 19 scored mines were swept and 5 flossers destroyed. All were found along the general line indicated by captured charts.

166 TAF planes attacked OMURA airfield and installations. The 47 B-24s, 23 B-25s and 94 F-47s hit AA positions, barracks, shops and dispersal areas with fragmentary bombs and incendiaries, Many fires were started. 1 B-25 and 9 B-24s were holed by AA but all returned safely.

In attacks on MITSUKO on the 7th 12 F4Us and 18 T4Os destroyed 2 twin-engine planes in a revetment. Other F4Us at ANAGK burned 4 of 11 DD and probably damaged the other 7. 3 fleet planes were strafed and 2 exploded.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

8 July (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADV 080301 (pink) contains proposed reorganization of PhilSeaFor and Com7thFlt in order to free the latter for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 080540 (pink) requests Com7thFlt and ComPhilSeaFor recommendations for reductions in the category of defense.

CINCPAC ADV 080802 (pink) requests early determination by CINCPAC of location of Naval Air Base in the Ryukyus.

CINCPAC ADV 081059 (pink) concurs with CINCPAC 020913 concerning provision of Port Directors for OLYMPIC.

2 July (Guam date)

Manoeuvring operations in East China Sea continue. TF 38 strikes Tokyo tomorrow.

On the 9th 549 effective B-29s were over SENDAI, OSHU, YOKKAICHI, SAKAI and WAKAYAMA, bombing with incendiaries. On the same day 50 B-29s mined the SHIKOKUNI STRAITS.

43 B-24s attacked OIYAMA airfield with P-47 escort. The P-47's shot down 15 biplane trainers over western KYUSHU. 61 B-25s with 43 P-47s escorted, weathered out of CHIBIKU, attacked TAKAHOKO airfield and OIGUNO-SHAKU with 43 tons of frag clusters. 48 other P-47s, weathered out of KYUSHU, attacked KIKAI, AMAM and TOKUNO.

On the 8th 114 P-51s attacked airfields in the TOKYO area meeting aggressive enemy fighter opposition. P-51s shot down 5 and destroyed 28 on the ground. 7 P-51s were lost, but 3 pilots rescued.

2 Privateers of FAW 1 broadcasting a description of their trips over CHIN, sank 2 SCS and 2 luggers, and damaged 1 SD and 2 more luggers off SW KOREA. West of SAIMBO 8 P-47s escorted by 1 Privateer, sank 1 FTC and damaged a 2nd and fired a 150-foot ship. The explosion of the FTC knocked down 1 P-47. The remaining P-47s were attacked by 8 Tojos and Georges and 1 P-47 was shot down. 1 Tojo was also shot down.

FAW 1 seaplanes on the 9th sank 1 SD south of SHANTUNG PENINSULA, and damaged a small FT. Fire from the latter vessel holed 1 search plane and wounded 5 members of the crew.

COM7THFLT 080200 concurs in CINCPAC 060329 concerning recommended facilities for BFt at MANUS.

CINCPAC ADV 080614 warns Com7thFlt that TAKASAGU MARU has a short coal supply and that she should not be brought into a U.S. port.

CINCPAC 090057 (pink) objects to phrases in CINCPAC Joint Staff Study concerning transfer of command from Commander Amphibious Forces to ComGen Expeditionary Troops.

CINCPAC 090600 (pink) directs Com7thFlt to provide 2 LSTs for CINCPAC headquarters ships.

CINCPAC 090901 (pink) outlines naval organization ashore for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 090907 (pink) recommends relocation of NUB KYUSHU from TARAJU to the western side of KUROSHIKA.
TOP SECRET

10 July (Guam date)

ComDesDiv 108 reported that he had taken the TAKASAGO HARB under escort and was proceeding on a general southwesterly course clear of TF 38's operating area. He was directed to release her sometime between 1800 today and 0800 tomorrow, to proceed to YOKOSUKA.

TF 39 is proceeding with their mine clearance without incident. 37 more mines swept and about one-third of the area covered. Force was snooped on the 5th and 6th; 1 plane was shot down.

ComServDiv 104 is shifting all facilities from KOKURA to BUCKINGHAM BAY.

Forces from CHINA are landing on 5 islands off the CHINA Coast in the north part of FORMOSA STRAITS: landings will continue through to the end of July.

Com3rdFlt reports preliminary results of the 1st 3 of 7 strikes against TOKYO airfields on the 10th. Only 9 aircraft were seen airborne in the target area, Photos show 693 aircraft on 17 fields, with pilot reports adding 175 one on 7 additional fields, for a total of 868 on 24 fields. So far 72 enemy aircraft have been destroyed on the ground and 30 damaged. The 71 fuses were highly effective. The force was snooped about noon and 2 recoo planes were splashed by our CAP. Our losses so far are 1 F4U and 4 TBMs. TF 38 will retire tonight to refuel and rendezvous with TF 37 tomorrow.

109 P-51s hit airfields in the NAGoya-Osaka area on the 9th meeting 36 unaggressive enemy fighters over OSAKA. The P-51s scored 12-4-10 in the air, and 6-0-1 on the ground. 1 P-51 was lost and 5 damaged. On the 10th 102 P-51s hit airfields in the KOBSh-Osaka Area shooting down 1 airborne enemy aircraft and scoring 13-O-6 on the ground. 3 P-51s were lost.

On the 9th 43 B-24s with 6 P-47 escorts attacked OMAHA airfield starting 3 fires. On the 10th 41 P-51s attempted to sweep KYUSHU, but weather prevented. 1 P-51 was lost.

On the 9th Privateers in TSUSHIMA STRAIT sank 2 SD and left 13rd burning, beached 1 lugger and sunk 1 L. In SW KOREA 2 phosphate vessels were bombed. FAM 18 Liberators slightly damaged 11 1250-ton target boat and seriously damaged 1 FTD of HORSCHU at 36-18 N. FAM 1 planes, from 2-3 July inclusive, sank 6,780 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 1,040 tons, destroyed 4 enemy planes and damaged 3. Since arrival in the area FAM 1 planes have sunk 159 seagoing ships for 145,650 tons, damaged 19 for 138,980 tons, destroyed 41 enemy aircraft and damaged 29.

COMGENAFPOA 090847 concurs in transfer of Hqtr. 7th AF to FEAF with detailed recommendations to follow.

CINCPOA ADV 100055 directs transfer of operational of 7th AF and temporarily of 20th AF units in KURUSU to FEAF.

CINCPOA ADV 100018 (pink) comments on CINCPAC 090215 concerning coordination of air forces.

CINCPOA ADV 100236 (pink) provides tentative deployment of Privateer squadrons following OLYMPIC.

USAFPOA 100417 (pink) requests 11th AF intelligence information for purposes of coordination of operations between FEAF and 11th AF.

CINCPAC 100601 directs ComGenFEMIDPOA to review requirements for service troops in rear areas with view to their reduction.

CINCPOA ADV 100748 (pink) requests that ComGen CHINA provide CHINA situation.
11 July (Guess date)

ComDesDiv 108 reported releasing TAKASAGO MARU at 24-57N 150-05E at 1000/7 on the 10th with orders to proceed to YOKOSUKA. After release she was tracked at 14 knots, but subsequent sightings indicate a speed of advance of only 9 knots.

TF 38 is scheduled to fuel on the 12th. At 1400 it will depart from fueling rendezvous for the run-in to northern HONSHU. CTG 94.1 has extended sectors from IWO which run east of HONSHU to a maximum distance of 1120 miles and is running a barrier patrol between the force and JAPAN.

43 B-24s weathered out of KYUSHU on the 10th hit KAKI. 59 escorting P-47s ran into accurate AA which killed 2 pilots and forced 3 others to ditch. 62 B-25s bombed ROYOKI. 1 B-25 was lost as a result of a mid-air collision. 49 escorting F4Us strafed KIKAI and knocked out 5 AA positions. Accurate AA killed 1 pilot, forced a 2nd to ditch and a 3rd to belly land at base.

On the 11th bad weather over KOKUSA and MIYAKONJO caused 190 F4Us and 9 TBMs to hit KIYAMA Airfield, starting large fires. 56 F4Us and 9 TBMs weathered out of KANOKA EAST hit INUJO Airfield in the TANBEGA SHIMA.

On the 10th FAW 18 planes left 1 of 2 1000-ton FTD dead in the water. FAW 18 planes on the 11th damaged 2 picket boats at 39-00 N, 141-55E; FAW 1 planes sank 1 SC and fired 1 SD in TSUSHIMA STRAIT.

29 B-29s laid 260 mines on the 9th. 1 B-29 was lost, believed shot down by AA in the target area.

Photos taken on the 11th show the marusan Oil Refinery at NAKAYAMA to have been 95% destroyed by the attack of the 6th-7th.

CINCPAC ADV 030335 (pink) requests CINCPAC and COMZEN CHINA to comment on NAPRO project.

CINCPAC ADV 060626 constitutes Comdt. NOB OKINAWA as administrative senior for all naval activities in the OKINAWA Group.

CINCPAC ADV 110146 (pink) is OpPlan 4-45 for TF 95 for interruption of enemy shipping on CHINA Coast and in the EAST CHINA SEA.

CINCPAC ADV 110153 (pink) forms TF 95 composed of CruDivs 12 and 16.

CINCPAC ADV 110620 requests reply from CINCPAC concerning NAPRO.

CINCPAC ADV 110653 (pink) concerns destinations of units made available to CINCPAC from Pol.

COMNAVGROUP CHINA 110752 (pink) proposes to provide CTF 95 with Chinese interpreters.

CINCPAC ADV 110827 (pink) cancels OpPlan 2-45 for defense of West Coast against Japanese carrier task force.

CINCPAC ADV 110828 lists ports and installations in the SEA OF JAPAN where heavy shipping traffic may be expected.

CINCPAC ADV 110832 (pink) requests ComGeoPAC to prepare and keep up to date plans for the capture of WAKI.

11 Jul 325
12 July (censor date)

Task Force 38 will be in position to strike northern HOKUSHU and HOKKAIDO on the morning of the 13th.

Mine Flotilla continues sweeping in area JUBKAI. Almost half of the field has been covered. A total of 152 moored mines have been swept and 21 floaters sighted.

526 B-29s attacked Empire targets on the night of 12/13 July. 42 B-25s of a group of 58 attacked Kanoya on the 12th through the clouds with 16 hitting other targets. 64 B-24s flew over. 47 B-24s stood TSUKI closed in and hit MAN airfield on KITAKI with 1450 frags. Results were unobserved. 61 B-24s hits TAHEDA and KIKAI. VP-104 in the RYUKUS splashed 1 Sally at 0420.

From 2345-0015 on the night of 11/12th 1 PBM of PAK 1 made 2 runs over SHANGHAI at 600 feet and dropped 9 100-lb. bombs and 3 fire bombs at 6 TB and PT tied up at the docks. No hits observed. The city was dimmed out.

Privateers of PAK 1 on the east coast of KYUSHU on the 12th destroyed 1 factory, heavily damaged a second when the boiler blew up, knocked out 1 span of a railroad bridge, burned 1 passenger train and 2 locomotives. AA holed both planes. 1 SD was destroyed north of SHANDAI.

CINCPAC 090215 (pink) outlines differences between CINCPAC and CINCPAC relative to air coordination and other matters.

CINCPAC 111425 (pink) explains how elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing came to be assigned to Royal Australian Air Force in the northern SOLOMONS.

COM PEARL 112140 (pink) directs ComGenPEAF immediately on transfer of 7th AF to undertake neutralization and destruction of all enemy air forces west of 135 E.

CINCPAC 112159 (pink) contains Cominch's modified proposal for division of control of OKINAWA between the Army and Navy.

CINCPAC ADV 112336 (pink) requests CINCPAC to undertake appropriate strikes on SHANGHAI air bases in support of TF 95.

CINCPAC ADV 120217 (pink) consents to movement of SHIELD and VACUUM Forces to OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 120446 (pink) recommends the establishment of certain communication facilities between Headquarters Soviet Far East Command with SHAEF.

CINCPAC ADV 120535 directs that the 3rd Command OKINAWA proceed with construction of ATC facilities at Naha.

CINCPAC ADV 120726 proposes that 1st MAN arrangements stand until MANILA conference on 20 July.

CINCPAC ADV 120728 (pink) concurs in minutes of 21 June conference on radio intelligence plan subject to specified qualifications.

CINCPAC ADV 120814 requests DepCom 20 and ComGenPEAF to inform CINCPAC in detail concerning Army units required in support of 20th Air Force.

- Continued -
22 July (cont'd)

3G USFOR L21000 (glo) stipulates that all attacks on targets in GHK sector be cleared with 3G CINCPAC and that only precision bombs of urban targets be undertaken.

3G RPT 121015 (glo) requests consent concerning 745-845TAC project.

GHQAF AG L21459 (glo) invites CINCPAC and DoC Con 20th AF to attend conference at YUMA 17 July with GHK sector representatives concerning deception plans.

19 July (cont'd)

GHQAF reported that TF 29 on the morning of the 14th was attacking northern KUSUNO and HOKAIDO, having effected complete surprise.

The Mine Flotilla on the 15th swept 13 more mines and departed the operating area for KUSUNO BAY for logistics. Sweeping will be resumed on the 19th, and is now two days ahead of schedule.

22 F-5Fs swept KUSUNO on the 16th making no interception. They arrested and damaged 1 JF, several small boats, and several airfields.

The Tactical Air Force, KUSUNO, was dissolved as of 1400ZL (GHS 99-2 133000). 11th AF units (B-25, B-26, A-26 and F-5) temporarily assigned to the 3G new report to CINCPAC for operational control, as do 20th AF units (P-47) temporarily assigned to 7AF. All Marine units report to the 2nd Marine Air Wing for operational control. The 2nd MAW now assumes the designation of 299-2.

Many aircraft destroyed in the FOG since 10 March: 10 March - 30 June inclusive - 14; 1 July - 13 July - 17. On the 12-27 74, TF 37 0, TF 92 39, TF 70 39.5 k. 200th AAF 0, TF 14 0, TF 70 99.2 30; total 187.

GHQAF a CNO L21195 (glo) directs CINCPAC to submit by dispatch proposals for reorganisation of naval forces in the Southwest Pacific.

GHQAF c CNO L21731 (glo) directs Combined Air Forces, subject to concurrence of CINCPAC AGH, to strike targets in GHK sector in support of TF 92.

CINCPAC AVN L20714 requests CINCPAC to submit a list of projects not yet completed but which are necessary for development of naval aviation in the Southwest Pacific during the war.

CINCPAC AVN L20714 (glo) comments on JCS 1440/2 which concerns the transfer of control of the GHK sector to GHQAF.

CINCPAC AVN L20752 (glo) in reply to GHQAF 114235 recommends reorganisation of naval forces in the Southwest Pacific.

CINCPAC 130151 (glo) orders in relocation of Fleet Base from KMAM to west coast of KUSUNO, KUSUNO north of YAMASHIKA RD.

CINCPAC AVN L207921 (glo) submits recommendations to GHQAF covering carrier air group complements during early 1944,

- Continued -
11 July (cont'd)

KRONASIK 131037 (pink) recommends against reduction or modification of category of defense in the KONAIAK DEFENSES.

CEMPAC 151119 (pink) recommends postponement of REVITA on 15 August in order that General Springs may be present.

CEMPAC 151121 (pink) reports in CEMCPAC 150926 concerning operational control of the 1st Marine Air Wing.

KRONASIK 151130 (pink) reports results of mine reconnaissance off the SE coast of KONAIAK.

14 July (cont'd)

Attacks on northern KONAIAK and KIDAKAIKO were carried out on the 14th by planes of TF 30. Extensive damage to shipping and docks.

At noon, bombardment Group ANEL (TU 34.6.1) bombarded KIDAKAIKO for 2 hours. The steel mill was demolished. Coke ovens were hit and burning furiously. The entire area was covered with dense smoke rising thousands of feet above the city, making detailed assessment of damage difficult. A plane crashed in the harbor.

In the afternoon, Convoys left petrochemical complex 16 (R.557.1, Jones in HANAIKIG, SOKAUTAGA, AKASHIA, HANAIKIG) and 6 HD of Division 25 for a night attack on shipping convoy along the coast between KIDAIKO and KIDAIKO.

Part of Bombardment Group ANEL (TU 34.6.1), consisting of 100, KANAIKIG and KODAIKO, plus 7 HD of Division 25, was detected early this morning, and bombarded KIDAIKO. Primary target assigned to the steel and iron mills. Secondary target in the coal liquifaction plant.

Weather hampered plane strikes - the only field not completely cleared in the Gailo. Partial field reports show 24 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and 68 damaged, mostly at HANAIKIG, AKASHIA and HANAIKIG fields in northern KONAIKO. 1 scooter was shot down 95 miles from the JFZ.

In attacks on shipping the following resulted:

**REICHHOT**

*41* damaged at sea
19 small AK
1 G5D
2 medium destroyers

**ENEMEY**

1 training destroy
4 medium destroyers
1 medium AP
5 medium AK
8 small AK
2 G5D
1 G5D
1 bomb

Total = 41

- Continued -
24 June (Gann date) (Cont'd)

Deck facilities at Makinohara, and railroad yards and rolling stock in southern Hokkaido were heavily damaged, with 27 locomotives destroyed.

Final reports of 1739 strikes on the Tokyo plains area on the 19th show 199 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and 231 damaged.

Photographs taken on the 19th of 65 airfields in the TOOKO area show 1761 operational planes (2478 single-engine, 313 twin-engine). The planes were extensively camouflaged and dispersed as much as 5 miles from runways, with existing roads used for taxiways.

On the 19th 1160 combat sorties expended 1.54 tons of bombs and 1416 rockets.

Our losses were 17 planes, 10 in combat and 7 operationally, with 7 pilots and 6 aircrewsmen lost.

In the HYOKUS one Betty was shot down at 21,000 feet, 30 miles northwest of OKINAWA.

The T67, new disclosed, destroyed 625 airbase enemy aircraft from 7 April to 19 July, 496 by two Marine Air Group planes, and 199 by ADP 322d Fighter Wing Planes. 160 were probably destroyed, 9 ships were destroyed and 37 damaged.

CemSOpAir 08112 (pink) requests comments of CemSen PFAF concerning absorbing the 7th Air Force by 9th and 13th Air Forces.

CemFleet 1084.20 (pink) Cem也不要 provide any presentation of the "numbered Air Force proposal to Admiral Nimitz."

CemFleet 120014 (pink) comments to CINCPAC concerning reorganization of the 7th Fleet prior to CINCPAC.

WARSOC 130229 (pink) requests that MANILA conference be deferred in order that General Spaatz may attend.

CemSenPFAF 122225 (pink) recommends that 7th Fighter Wing take over administration of Air Force units in Hawaii and that 7th Air Force be retained in existence under CemSen PFAF.

CemFleet 132109 (pink) constitutes annex A-1 Op-Plan 9-45 movement and attack schedule 22 July through 8 August.

CemFleet 132212 summarizes 3rd Fleet operations off TOKE on 20 July.

CemFleet 199125 (pink) outlines coordination required in support of operations from 21 July through 8 August.

Cimases Advance 142255 (pink) proposes conference at Gann about 29 July concerning occupation of JAPAN.

Cimases Advance 140236 (pink) concurs in postponement of Manila conference to 1 August and inquires whether conference will be on staff level or between commanders themselves.

- continued -
TOP SECRET

26 July (Gman date) (cont'd)

Cunqvist finds Lataos constitutes Op-Order for shipping sweep by 79 and 80-J consisting of Grueliv 17 and Division 23 plus three destroyers.

Cunqvist Advance 140401 (pink) requests Cunqvist the Deputy 50 and CEF 73 to provide coordination required by Cunqvist.

25 July (Gman date)

TF 96 completed second day's strike on northern HINISHI and SNARKADO, and is retired to southeast to rendezvous with oilers and TF 97. (See air summary for results of air strikes.)

No report of the shipping sweep by Grueliv 17.

Bombardment of HINISHI not all airbornes or surface opposition. At the HINISHI steel plant there were terrific explosions and fires. At the WEIHDAO iron works many buildings were demolished or on fire.

On the 14th, in addition to bombardment support, TF 96 flew over 600 marine aircraft. Airfields and shipping were the principal targets ranging from HINISHI to WEIHDAO. Only 2 airbornes were seen, both damaged, and 1 was shot down, the other damaged. Most of the destruction was on northern HINISHI fields, especially NAGASHIMA, NAGUDA, and HACHINOKE. Airfields in western WEIHDAO were totally closed in.

In attacks on shipping 23 ships and 25 barges were sunk (for 11,000 tons) including 5 of 7 railroad ferries.

Ships damaged totalled 24 plus 3 barges for 13,000 tons.

On the ground 90 locomotives were destroyed and 24 damaged, and heavy damage was inflicted on 6 trains, numerous warehouses, wharves, tankards, hangars, barracks, railroad yards, and bridges. A large part of HINISHI was burned out.

Our combat losses were 9 planes, 3 crewmen, and no pilots.

On the 15th the 8th 3 strikes, all that are now reported, were carried out again in weather that closed all but a few fields. There was no airbornes opposition. 4 Jap planes were destroyed on the ground and I was damaged.

9 ships and 6 small craft totalling 12,000 tons were sunk.

9 ships and 30 small craft for 12,000 tons were damaged.

103 F-51s attacked NASUDA airfield on the 15th making a few unsuccessful Jap airbornes planes. Some in the air was 6 planes destroyed, and on the ground 9 destroyed. 11 destroyed 3 F-51s.

15 Privateers of FAM-1 in attacks around the coasts of HINISHI sank 1 SS and 3 D, and damaged 3 SS, 4 DD, and 1 tug. 3 locomotives were exploded, 6 railroad bridges were destroyed and 1 damaged, and a tunnel was closed, and damage was done to 4 railroad stations, 1 power plant, 1 reservoir, 2 locomotives and 30 cars.

— continued —
15 July (Oman date)

At 0747 yesterday a plane of TO 30.6 saw and attacked a submarine at 3018, scoring one hit before the sub submerged. Escorts from the group were ordered to the scene. Planes tracked until LAWRENCE G. TAYLOR (NAS16) gained contact at 1130. The ES fired a full hedgerow pattern, making several hits followed by 2 violent explosions. Much debris recovered. This is a definite sinking.

TF 95 also sortied on the 16th for sweep along the East China Coast.

All 5th AF missions at OKINAWA except 1 were cancelled because of weather. 8 P-51's provided cover for a lifeguard sub and then swept Southern KYUSHU, shooting down 1 George caught taking off from HOKUTO.

100 P-51's were over HOKUTO airfields on the 16th where they met 70 enemy aircraft. 1 P-51 was lost over the target, and 1 operational. The WP sorties were 25,000 feet to the deck, from HOKUTO to YOKAHAMA and west to the mountains.

Inflight reports from FM-12 planes on the 16th indicate the sinking of 1 coastal patrol boat off KII SUISO and the destruction of 2 SP south of HOKUTO.
26 July (Date)

CINCPOA ADVANCE 1601A (pink) outlines estimated requirements for construction troops, port companies for FORT BAYARD operation.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 1601A1 (pink) concerns in Richardsone 150946 concerning designation of an air force for operation under CINCPOA.

CINCPAC 1602A7 (pink) indicates that garrison beach parties are required at all beaches on KYUSHU.

COMM USAF 16072 (pink) indicates strategic air force requirements for construction troops in MARSHALLS and KYUSHU and numbers that can be released for other operations.

COMM AF 20 160830 (pink) comments on CINCPAC 1602A3 in expressing intention to continue attacks on primary targets.

COMM USAF 160713 (pink) acknowledges CINCPOA 150728 directing modification CTF 33 Op-Order to include enemy warships as primary targets.

RICHARDSON 150750 outlines requirements for construction troops for support of 20th Air Force.

USAIR 151401 expresses establishment of Headquarters USAIR effective 160001 July.

RICHARDSON 160001 constitutes general order number 7 establishing Army Air Forces Middle Pacific commanded by Major General James H. Parker.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 160199 requests that RICHARDSON 150190 be brought to the personal attention of Admiral King.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 160349 requests that CINCPAC USAIR handle informally such matters as require action pending the designation of a headquarters under CINCPOA for Army Air Forces.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 160255 informs CominCh that agreements with Air Marshall Lloyd contemplated use of British engineers for development of KOSRAE.

CINCPAC 160326 outlines proposed air operations by FWEF in support of 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160353 passes to COM OAHU CINCPAC 072339 concerning the accreditation of War Correspondents.

CINCPAC 161121 expresses intention to retain operational control of 7th Fleet.

[Signature]
17 July (Ganun date)

Summary of 3rd Fleet operations 16th-19th:

966 combat service flights
140 ships of 72,000 tons sunk
255 ships of 26,000 tons damaged
37 aircraft destroyed on ground
43 aircraft damaged on ground
24 planes, 10 pilots 8 crewmen lost in combat
18 planes lost operationally
86 locomotives destroyed; 43 damaged
No airborne opposition
Coastal industrial targets extensively destroyed or damaged.

Bombardment Group "B" plus a British Task Unit consisting of the
KING GEORGE V and escorts, bombarded the HIKASHI area. Due to low cloud, there was no air spot and results were unobserved.

Hunting for better weather on the 16th TF 58 launching point has been
shifted to the south.

TF 32, TF 39, and probably TF 95, are operating to the eastward of
OKINAWA in an attempt to avoid the hurricane.

These forces have been removed from operational control of C-in-
C 3rd Fleet and are directly under CinCPac.

About 380 planes from the 5th and 7th Air Forces and from the 2nd
MAW attacked KYUSHU targets on the 16th damaging several locomotives, bridges;
and small craft.

From these attacks 1 F4U is reported missing and 1 B-24 was ditched.

FAM-1 planes on the 17th sank 1 trawler and damaged 5 SB, 1 SCL,
and 1 tug, and FAM-18 planes sank fishing boat at SHIMA JIMA.

Single F4U's scored 2 rocket hits in a 200 feet repair vessel at the
north end of KAGOSHIMA BAY, and 2 more in a 270 feet vessel in SHIMA HAMA.

FAM-1 planes, during the week of 9 through 16 July, sank 1460 tons and
damaged 2440 tons of enemy shipping.

FAM-18 planes from 1 through 17 July sank 27 ships, all under 150 feet,
and probably sunk or damaged 45 for 11,000 tons.

28 B-29s laid 272 mines at RASHIN, KERIMA, KINAN and FUSAN.
CINCPAC ADVANCE 170423 (p.m.) requests comment from CINCPAC proposal to have ComChiefs report to CINCPAC now for planning CINCPAC and to be released from operational control about 1 December.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170717 (p.m.) indicates August 1 conference was to be on staff level.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170725 (p.m.) directs FEAP ADVANCE to continue operations in support of 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170031 releases ComCruFleet of operational control of TF 32, 39 and 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE outlines to COMANCHE proposal of accreditation of correspondents to CINCPAC, 20th AIR FORCE and CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170342 proposes to transfer to CINCPAC AAF POA units with exception of those committed to defenses of the RTUKUSU and JCC OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 17052A indicates KERAMA BRETT will be used as an emergency anchorage and that military control be maintained.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170539 directs TF 96 to assume responsibility of neutralization of central CAMOLINES, MARCUS and NOEMS.

19 July (Gann Date)

All assigned targets of TF 36 in the TOKYO area were weathered in on the 17th. Few targets of opportunity were attacked and minor damage was inflicted on shipping and ground installations. TF 37 aircraft operated to the north in consequent better weather and destroyed 13 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged installations at KIMIYAMA, MASUDA and HATSU SHIMA. On the morning of the 18th TF 36 recommissioned the TOKIO AREA and by afternoon launched heavy strikes against warships at YODOSUNI. In the face of the most intense flak yet seen the targets were well hit but smoke and fire prevented damage assessment. At noon on the 18th ComCruFleet formed TO 35A with CruDiv 18 losses 2 ships and Destroy 44 losses 1 ship. This force proceeded at high speed to MOJIMA SIE and conducted minor bombardment retiring to the east to rejoin TF 36. Poor visibility obscured results and no shipping was found.

From OKINAWA 40 FANs of second Marine Air Wing attacked KITAMURAO. On the 19th from OKINAWA P 51s damaged boats and dropped on KITAMURAO and scored 12 direct hits on a 10,000 ton AK at AINUKI leaving it down by the stern, afire and probably aground.

27 D-37s conducted mining operations at SEKISHI and FUKUROI-BISHI. FAN 1 probably sunk an FTC in TSUSHIMA STRAITS and sunk 2 barges south of SHIKOKU.
19 July (Oman Date) (Cont'd)

CFO 99 VIA JCO OKINAWA 120918 amends his 120842 concerning aircraft of 2nd Marine Air Wing to be made available to COMSOUTH

CINCPAC ADVANCE 180822 requests that GNO, COMINCH AOF and CINCPACFAC hereafter furnish timely notice of ships destined for OKINAWA in order that tankers may be controlled.

CONREP 7171356 (pink) reports operations of TF 36 and TF 37 of 17 July off TOKYO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 1808451 (pink) designates to CINCPAC elements to comprise the First Marine Air Wing for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 180703 (pink) requests recommendations of CONREP 7171356 and CONREP 717133 for petroleum logistics to be provided by COMSOUTH/COMSOUTH at HINOKI.

CONREP 7180912 (pink) reports additional results of operations of TF's 36 and 37 on 17 July.

CONREP 7181059 reports operations of 18 July off TOKYO.

JCS 181200 (pink) requests CINCPAC comments on proposal to provide an artificial harbor for protection of small craft in lieu of artificial harbor for ocean-going vessels.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 181255 comments on JCS 180417 concerning joint communications board for coordination of communications matters in FOA.

CTO 3544 181345 reports results of bombardment of NOJIMA SAKI the night of 18 July.

19 July (Oman Date)

Ships in BUCKNER BAY were ordered to leave port yesterday evening and operate to the south of OKINAWA. TF 39 and TF 32 are still at sea. TF 39 will return to BUCKNER BAY after storm passes, fuel and resume sweeping, probably the 26th. TF 32 is south of OKINAWA but will commence their EAST CHINA SEA operations tomorrow.

561 effective P-39's attacked 5 EMPIRE targets the night of 19 July. 96 P-39's attacked HATOA area airfields on the 19th, meeting only slight enemy fighter opposition. There were only 11 VF encounters and enemy pilots attempted to evade. P-39's claim 9 enemy aircraft shot down. Few planes were observed on HATOA airfields - several were apparently empty. 2 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground. 77 P-39's attacked southern KYUSHU targets, damaging several locomotives and box cars, and scoring 2 hits on a large AK in MAZE MARINE. P-39's sank 7 SD off west central KOREA, and damaged 2 others. Jap VF obtained without success. Off SAKKI a sub-chaser was damaged and an SD was damaged in BUNGO POTO.
19 July (Oman Date) (Continued)

PAC-10 planes left 1 SE awning off SHIKOKU-MISAKI (HOKSHU). PB's hit a 400 foot AK and 175 foot patrol vessel in the south entrance to the INLAND SEA. The night of the 19th there were 6 raids on the OKINAWA area, with an estimated 9 aircraft. No attacks have been reported on land targets. 2 MAN VP(N) shot down 2 JILLS to the north of OKINAWA, and later hit 1 ZORO, making 34 hits for VP(N) 533, and 500 kills for the 2nd MAN since 7 April. WASS "Fumble Operation" was conducted against WAKE on the 18th without incident.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 182252 (pink) requests information from CINCPAC concerning the latest plan for action of Air Warning units on outlying positions.

CINCPAC 190455 (pink) requests concurrence in proposal to change "Objective Area" with a radius of 120 miles centered on SAKA MISAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190513 (pink) attaches CTF ASW groups from 3rd Fleet and assigns them operational control CTF 96.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 190677 (pink) releases to CINCPAC all coast artillery units in FOA except units at PEARL HARBOR and OKINAWA.

CINCPAC 190611 (pink) requests comment on proposal to move certain elements of 2 Armored Divisions from West Coast in amphibious lift.

CINCPAC 191117 (pink) proposes to take no further action on CINCPAC 170533 concerning release of ConDemPHN for CORONET.

CINCPAC 191423 (pink) reiterates request to JCS for artificial harbor capable of sheltering ocean going vessels.

CINCPAC 190593 (pink) expresses opinion that transfer of 7th Fleet and Marine may be accomplished subject to necessary arrangements with JCS concerning AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH interests.

20 July (Oman Date)

TF 37 and TF 39 complete their replenishment on 21 July and depart that night for their next strike. 2nd RFS ordered Division 61 detached for a shipping sweep of BANSHI W: to take place the night of 22/23 July. Division 113 also ordered detached for shipping sweep in the BOUNTIES the same night. TF 95 enters the RAFT CHINA SEA on 21 July and starts a sweep along the CHINA COAST.

10 B-29's of the 509th Group bombed various EMPIRE targets on the 20th. Only 2 B-29's were lost in the 600 plane attacks on the night of the 19-20th. PAC-10 planes attacked 3 x 2000 ton FC's on the eastern HONSHU COAST (37-42N), damaging 1 by strafing. Off southeastern KYUSHU a PBJ caused an explosion in a 200 foot coaster. On OKINAWA the 19th 248 barges were detected, but none attacked. During alerts in the evening 2 enemy aircraft embarked on OKINAWA and 1 apparent suicide hit near the JMSF J. BADGER (DD 697) in BOUNTIES BAY. Three men were slightly injured by one of the land cracks, but no material damage was inflicted.
20 July (Oman Date) (Cont'd)

COMPHIBPAC 170550 (pink) requests overall approval of revised training schedule of amphibious troops for OLYMPIC,

COMFLEET 201327 (pink) expresses intention to throw light force sweeps along EMPIRE COASTS at every opportunity.

COMINC AND CNO 201619 (pink) approves proposals and CINCPOA's 130751 for reorganization of 7th Fleet.

CINCAPPAC 191119 (pink) agrees to receive British Corps Commander and accompanying officers to arrive if practicable by 1 August.

CINCAPPAC ADVANCE 192137 (pink) concurs with CINCAPPAC 191119 concerning British Corps Commanders and accompanying officers.

COMINCCHINA 200710 (pink) recommends holding conference at GUAM on or about 30 July concerning resources and requirements of CHINA THEATER.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201100 (pink) approves construction of an artificial harbor for COGHOST, project to be a responsibility of Navy.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 201106 (pink) defines directive of VICTORY 73 for division of responsibility at OKINAWA as applying only to the RYUKYUS.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 190655 directs ComSel 10 to transfer Marine Aviation units on ASW search to Com Fair Wing 1.

COMFLEET 190702 lists air fields, central of which have been retained by Commander Allied Air Forces under CINCSWA in accordance with Army directive similar to COMINC AND CNO member 7.

CINCPOA ADV 200114 expresses nonconcurrence in the establishment of a naval MSTS unit on MACTAN ISLAND.

21 July (Oman Date)

TF 37 and 36 are headed west for strikes on KORE KORE AREA. Feulling groups are following fast carriers to new fueling rendezvous south of KORESUN. TF 95 starts sweep north along coast of EAST CHINA on the 22nd. TF 32 has left BUNKER BAY for a covering position north of area JUNASHI where mine sweeping will soon be resumed by TF 39.

On the 20th 90 P-51's attacked airfields in the NAGOYA-Osaka area, finding only 1 airborne enemy aircraft. 2 P-51's were lost to AA and 1 operationally. 27 D-39's laid 214 mines in KORE-Osaka waters, in SHIKOKUSHI STRAITS, and in the GEISHAN AREA.
21 July (Oman Date)(Cont'd)

WARCOS 202296 (pink) outlines logistic arrangements for provision of LCM's and naval escort craft in POST BAYARD project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210420 (pink) estimates from September 20 to October 9 CV, 5 CVL will base ENIWETOK 6 CV, 2 CVL at LATS. After 10 October prophecies will be approximately reversed placing British Pacific Fleet units at ENIWETOK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 210665 (pink) approves ComSubPac plan for minefield investigation.

WARCOS 202299 (pink) proposes to place Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem command 13 Corps in charge of amphibious training of divisions for CORONET.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 211806 (pink) requests Com7thFleet to implement COMINT directive 152819 concerning re-organization of the 7th Fleet.

22 July (Oman Date)

Search planes from OKINAWA sighted a submarine surfaced southeast of Amami, at 0750 on the 23rd and attempted to exchange recognition signals. At 1315 the same sub was sighted again and positively identified as enemy. A strike plane then attacked the sub which went down stern first leaving a persistent oil slick. Photos indicate the sub was similar to the German 1600 ton mine-laying type. Beach 61 encountered a four ship convoy 5 miles south of MAJIMA SAKI at midnight, sent one medium and 1 small cargo ship and damaged the escort. The Fast Carriers pass north of the BONINHS this morning of the 23rd and start their run-in to their launching point for strikes on the HOKUS-HIRE Area. Com7Fleet reports that an unidentified plane over HUCKER BAY early yesterday morning dropped a bomb on a point which hit the MARATHON (APA 200). Damage is under control.

BB NAGATO - Superstructure badly damaged, unable to determine if she is on the bottom.
1 DD, next to NAGATO, blown in half and sunk.
1 ODD heavily damaged.
1 Cable-Layer destroyed.
3 small AK destroyed.
7 MTB destroyed.
DD converted to flak ship - stern blown off.
4 launches and 2 small craft damaged.

TAKASHIMA MARU, anchored about 700 yards from NAGATO near 2 small merchant ships may possibly have been damaged. Our losses were 14 aircraft.

Planes of TF 37 flew 51 combat sorties with no personal losses against airfields in the north TOKIO area. They destroyed 13 enemy aircraft and damaged 25, all on ground. On the 22nd F-51s hit OSAKA airfields, sighting 4 airbases enemy aircraft, 1 was shot down. 1 Deily was destroyed on the water. HANGERS, buildings and factories were damaged. AA destroyed 1 F-51, the pilot was rescued. On the 23rd 77 effective B-29s attacked the USE COAL LIQUEFACTION plant by radar. FAB-16 planes in SAGAMI BAY destroyed 1 SD and 6 barges, and probably destroyed 2 SD. 1 FBAY was reported having ditched.
22 July (Cont'd)

COMMCH AND CNO 201303 (pink) (VIOTCHY 193) proposes to establish special TG for construction of artificial harbor for OLYMPIC.

COMMCH 212043 directs proposed joint Communications Center Pacific, indicating the board will be advisory or not as may be determined by commanders concerned.

COMMUSAF 212250 (pink) announces that all USASAF fighter units will be withdrawn from escort mission and given primary counter air force operations as required by Com3rdFleet in support of his Op-Plan 9-45.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220610 (pink) directs that Commodore Hartley as ComServDiv 103 commands units of ServRon 10 at the objective during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220719 (pink) requests to CINCPACAP that COMMUSAF refrain from issuing orders which directly or by implication attempt to control operations of the fleet and to make area assignments in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220726 directs that joint cargo handling continues until each service can assume individual responsibility at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220729 directs CTG 99.1 to reduce present force drastically to eliminate requests for barracks and garrison ships.

COMMUSAF 220731/1 (pink) requests that he be informed in advance of change in operations of TF 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220742 (pink) approves procedure ComServFor 7th Fleet to provide petroleum logistics for OLYMPIC forces in MANILA AREA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220839 (pink) amends OLYMPIC Warning Order by changing site of NOB to TARA-MISAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220852 congratulates ComDen 10 and others concerned on high average rate of unloading cargo at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 220863 requests COMMUSAF to secure CINCPACAP concurrence rather than CINCPAC for units destined for OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221046 (pink) concurs in COMMUSAF 220715 outlining latter support of 3rd Fleet operations.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221149 (pink) announces modification of Op-Plan 9-45 adding TF 95 in command of V. Adm. Oldendorf.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221150 (pink) directs that effective 250200 onward TF 95 will comprise TFs 32, 39, 93, TU 99.1, 30.5, TU 30.9.4.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 221344 directs that COM MARIANAS transfers 147th Infantry to OKINAWA at the earliest and transfer of 206th AAA BN battalion to IWO JIMA

- continued -
22 July (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 21J300 constitutes action report covering operations off TOKYO 18 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 22J630 warns All Pac concerning encounters with friendly submarines at night.

23 July (Guam Date)

TF 95 reports first sweep conducted as planned. Force was unopposed the evening of 21st on their approach, but no air attacks developed. Only contacts were small craft and junks. The junks turned out to be CHINESE and were not attacked. Force is due to arrive BUCNER BAY this morning. TF 39 resumed minesweeping and reports their buoys remained in position despite the storm with a few flags lost the only damage. 18 mines were swept. TF 92 completed their shipping sweep inside the KURILES, without results. The force left somewhat earlier than planned due to being intensively mined. On the evening of the 22nd the force bombarded the southeast coast of KAMISHIBA with undetermined results. BARN (SS 220) reports 3 frigates patrolling off LA PERUCHE and its approaches. On the 18th she fired 1 torpedo and sank one of the four. Early yesterday a demolition party was landed and placed a 55 pound charge under the railroad which runs along the coast of KARAFUTO. BARN states "while boats were returning at 0147X train arrived on schedule and blew sky high."

Planes of TF 38 attacked KURE at dawn on the 24th, achieving surprise. Targets are combatant naval strength at KURE. 645 B-29's were airstraffed for strikes against OSAKA - NAKOTA targets. 258 planes of the RAF (37 B-25's, 61 B-47's, 160 P-38's) attacked shipping in the SHANGHAI area on the 22nd sinking two ships and damaging 11. In addition to the 2 ships destroyed and 11 damaged, numerous small craft were destroyed or damaged. There was no AA and no interception. A coastwatcher near AMU reports that 7th Fleet search planes on 12-14 July killed at least 120 Jap troops. The estimate of kills beyond this figure is unknown because of Japs burning the bodies and burying the bones. There were no CHINESE casualties.

General Chamberlain 0-3 Headquarters CINCPAC, Brigadier General Dumas 0-3 Headquarters COMFOR TAR and others attended conference at Advance Headquarters Commander In Chief, Pacific Fleet, GUAM, from 20th to 24th July 1945.

ADMIRALTY 202253 announces CCS decision that from 1 June Admiralty replaces COMINCH as effective agent for dealing with FRENCH NAVY.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 21J305 authorizes joint accredited correspondents in FOA to transmit over any facilities available to the press on material which has been cleared by cognizant censors.

JCS 211338 announces approval petroleum supply procedure outlined by CINCPAC CX 22J31 of 30 June, occurred in CINCPAC 032041 of July.

COMINCH AND CHC 22J15 (pink) outlines JAYAMAN project in support of OLYMPIC and indicates that certain Naval support will be required.
23 July (Oama Date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH AND CINCPAC 221922 (pink) describes JAVANAM project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 230903 (pink) directs CominPac to continue sweeping area JUNEAU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 231226 (pink) requests comment from CINCPAC on CB requirements for construction of Marine Fields on KYUSHU.

24 July (Oama Date)

On the 24th planes of TF 38 struck the EMPIRE from northern KYUSHU through the INALIND SEA to NAGOYA, with combatant shipping at KURE as the primary target. An incomplete report from the first 3 of 7 strikes for TF 38 shows the following results:

- 8 enemy aircraft shot down
- 11 destroyed on ground

Ship damage at KURE:
- CA TONE) - hit with many bombs and left
- CL OYODO - burning badly
- ISE CLASS BBxCV at north tip KURASHIKI hit twice.
- ISE CLASS BBxCV
- CA AOBA) - hit with unknown results.
- Large CV at southern and MITSAKO hit with 3 x 1000 pounders.
- BB HARUNA as yet unlocated.

GraDiv 17 and 7 destroyers of Desson 33 conducted a sweep across the mouth of KII SUIDO. On their way in they made contact with and sank a small vessel, probably a picket. No other contacts were made, but the force bombarded the KUSHINOMI seaplane base, the SHINOMI YAKI landing field, and the radio station at UWANO HANTO.

Partial reports of B-29 strikes on 7 targets indicate that 693 airplanes were airborne, and that 1 B-29 was lost over OSAKA. In addition the above, 10 B-29s of the 509th Wing attacked targets in SUMITOMO, KURE and YOKKAISHI. From OKINAWA 2 groups of B-29s escorted by 32 P-51s strike TSUKI, and 48 P-51s sweep KYUSHU.

On the 23rd FAW-1 Privateers shot down 1 Topsy and 1 Tojo, sank 1 SD, set fire to 2 SOS, and damaged 3 SD, and on the 24th damaged 1 SD and 1 SD. FAW-18 planes destroyed 1 SD off HAMAMATSU, and 2 x 135 foot Diesel sea trunks in the ISE BAY, south of Nagoya.

Commander of a task unit consisting of 7 LST's escorted by UNDERHILL (DE 662), 4 PC, 3 SC and 1 PCE reported UNDERHILL was probably completely destroyed by a submarine at 19-20N 126-42E. ComPhilSeaPac estimates there are three submarines in the vicinity and has despatched numerous ASW ships to the neighborhood.

Com3rdFleet reports that during the last replenishment period TF 38 received from the logistic support group:
- 625' tons of ammunition
- 177,157 barrels of fuel oil
- 1,873 tons stores and provisions.

TF 39 continued sweeping in JUNEAU. 29 mines destroyed yesterday.

- continued -
24 July (Guma Date) (Cont'd)

COMCINCHINA 231321 (pink) announces plan to arrive at Guam 6 August for conference.

CNO 232105 (pink) announces approval of JIC 159/20 which approved records of OAHU mapping conference 25-29 May.

COMPHIBSPAC 240140 (pink) requests COMTHLANT to submit to CINCPAC for approval assembly dates for PHIBSPAC forces for OLIMPHIC with emphasis on early assembly for indoctrination and training.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240317 (pink) approves memorandum for record 23 July concerning partitioning of OKINAWA and agrees, on receipt of CINCPAC, to direct COMSUB TEN to report to CINCPAC 1200 31 July.

COMBATION-1 240320 (pink) announces organization of Task Force 95.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240636 (pink) requests from COMEXCH copy of JCS 699/3 and information as to JCS decision placing Air Sea Rescue responsibility on area Commanders.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240844 (pink) modifies OLIMPHIC Warning Order by directing that MANOSE RIVER CUB will remain in support of 5th Phil Corps.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 240850 (pink) directs Rear Admiral Lowe to conduct shipping sweep EAST CHINA SEA.

CINCPAC 241349 (pink) ensures in CINCPAC 220742 concerning procedures for provision of petroleum logistics by SERVON 7 in MANILA AREA.

25 July (Guma Date)

After meeting poor weather over priority targets in the INLAND SEA on the 29th TF 38 and 37 departed to the southward to replenish.

TF 38 heavy strikes on the primary targets on 25 July were weathered out. Fragmentary reports on targets of opportunity show 18 aircraft destroyed on the ground and about 20 damaged, mostly at KIKO and YONAGO. 1 Myrt was shot down over the force. Several small vessels were attacked. The ISE, reported moderately damaged on the 24th, was hit again and a violent explosion followed. Final report for TF 38's attacks on the 24th show the following damage inflicted: 18 enemy aircraft shot down (3 over forces, 15 over target). 21 destroyed on ground, 53 damaged.

Kure warships were damaged as follows:

- Continued -
25 July (Oman Date) (Cont'd)

Outside of KURE waters 3 Dd were damaged, 1 midget sub was strafed, and the CVE KITO was hit by 2 rockets.

**Merchant Shipping**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 medium AK</td>
<td>3 medium AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 small AK</td>
<td>7 small AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 luggers</td>
<td>Many luggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>1 sunk, 2 damaged by night bombers.</em></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

An incomplete account of ground damage shows 9 locomotives destroyed and 5 damaged; HAMAMATSU had 3 warehouses and a power plant burned, and a small factory plus 2 radio stations destroyed. Shop buildings, oil stores, and factories were destroyed or damaged at TOYOHASHI (West of HAMAMATSU), KUSHIMO TO (southwestern tip of HONSHU), ITAMI, TAMABE, TOHATE, KIYOTO (all OSAKA), TOMAOE (MINDO), and OKAYAMA. Our losses will be reported later. Final report shows that TF 37 planes destroyed 21 enemy aircraft and damaged 37 on the ground, and inflicted the following damage to shipping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Probably Sunk</th>
<th>Damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 medium AK</td>
<td>1 KURE type CVE</td>
<td>1 OBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 small AK</td>
<td>1 SGS</td>
<td>1 train ferry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 junks</td>
<td>1 junk</td>
<td>2 large AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 medium AK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 small AK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 medium AK</td>
<td>40 small craft</td>
<td>40 small craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 junks</td>
<td>2 ships on shipways</td>
<td>2 ships on shipways</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In attacks on ground targets in north and east SHIKOKU and in the OKAYAMA-FUKUOKA area of southern HONSHU hangars and airfield installations were destroyed or damaged, and damage was inflicted on flak positions, factories, radio and radar stations. TF 37 lost 8 aircraft to AA and 11 operationally. 9 pilots and 3 crewmen were lost. On the 24th 81-51s hit NAGOYA airfields in 2 groups. Strafing and rocketing destroyed 1 locomotive and 1 wooden building; damaged 12-15 railroad cars, a railroad bridge, a radar station, a radio tower, a small factory and 7 or 8 buildings. 2-3 SD left burning in SUDA WAK. 2 P-51s were damaged by flak. From OKINAWA 120 B-24s attacked KIAMOAN drome at SHANGHAI on the 24th, 34 P-47s and 32 P-51s attacked shipping in the TANOSHIB RIVER, hitting 1 PC with a 500 pound bomb, damaged 3 FTD, and burning 1 S division ship.

JCS 241824 (pink) (V-273) proposes plan for coordination of U.S. Navy and Air operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN.

COMINCH AND CNO 241722 (pink) cancels previous directive requiring that definite number of Cruisers, Destroyers and Submarines be maintained in 7th Fleet.

CINCINNATI ADVANCE 250425 (pink) outlines proposed Seaplane operations during OLYMPIC.

-- continued --
25 July (Guam Date) (Cont’d)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250904 (pink) comments on COMDECH 241824 concerning division of operating areas with RUSSIAN Forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250907 (pink) outlines plan function for CONSERVDIV 102 in objective areas during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 251003 (pink) concurs in JCS V-273 concerning division of operating areas with RUSSIAN Forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 251011 (pink) approves memorandum for record of 23 July with one change.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 251131 (pink) requests CINCPAC concurrence in JAVANAM project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250726 explains proposed coordination of VLR strikes with operations of Fast Carriers.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250906 outlines views on location of major NMTS base in the PHILIPPINES.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250904 (pink) directs that CRUDIV 3 be prepared immediately for service in NORPAC.

26 July (Guam Date)

Only sighting near scene of torpedoing of UNDERHILL was a seaman contact by BARTON (DD 722) which dropped a full pattern on a good seaman contact at 15-33 N 127-21E at 261628 I, causing a slight oil slick. Wreath KIRKPHI VICTORY reported this morning that two torpedoes were fired at her and missed, 200 miles east of ENIWETOK. TF 37 and TF 38 complete their replenishment at noon on 27 July and head north for their launching position on the 28th. TG 95.2 is proceeding north for a sweep off SHANGHAI. TG 95.3 is providing cover for the minesweeping group in area JUNEAU. CVE planes are providing cover for TG 95.2.

On the 25th 76 B-29s hit the HAYAMA and MITSUBISHI oil refineries at KAWASUKA. 1 B-29 is missing. 352 effective B-29s attacked KATSUYAMA, TOKUYAMA and ONIWA on the 27th. 2 Privateers of FAF 1 (VPB 124) are missing from a patrol up the west coast of KOREA. Razing tactics by Japs fighters are suspected. This squadron since its arrival at OKINAWA on 16 June (40 days) has lost 9 planes and 6 complete crews. FAF 1 planes sank 1 SCs in TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 23rd and on the 26th sank 1 SD in the same area. FAF 18 planes sank 1 SD in SAGAMI WAB, and damaged 6 fishing vessels at 33-43, 136-00. PBJs scored 2 rocket hits on each of 2 small vessels off the HONSHU Coast.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 261514 (pink) outlines plans for implementation of FASTEL.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261225 (pink) requests comment from COMNORPAC and CINCPAC PEACHT concerning concerning method of exercising control of OSS office in NORPAC.
26 July (Cass Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC of 22 July COMINCH 251652 PASSED TO CINCPAC ADVANCE (pink) reiterates recommendation against establishment of Joint Communication Board in the Pacific Theater.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 26131 announces transfer of all U.S. Army forces in the RTUKUS, except USASTAF forces, to CINCPAC 1200 31 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260145 congratulates COMHVN 1st and COMHVN 24th Corps for their successful accomplishments of their missions under CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260249 recommends to COMINCH that office of Deputy of COMTHAFLEET be abolished.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260722 directs COMGAR DIVS 23 and 26 proceed immediately to EWINSTOK and report to CINCPAC for duty.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260827 directs COMAIRPAC to have thorough physical examination of Rear Admirals GUNTHER and A.C. Davis.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260824 recommends that work on Cruisers 1 to 10 be limited to essential repairs.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261228 announces the establishment of Air Sea Rescue JUNKS along EAST CHINA COAST and directs that action be taken to prevent their being attacked by our forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 26124A delegates responsibility for Air Sea Rescue to COMHASEAPRON, COMMARGELS, COM MARIANAS and to COMAIRWINO 1 in their respective areas of operation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 26134A suggests that CHINESE be warned of danger of operating vessels of any kind in EAST CHINA coastal waters.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260723 directs the formation of TF 49 and its preparations for duty in NORPAC.

WACPOS 1223367 (pink) outlines proposal for movement of AOE ATLANTIC facilities to PACIFIC with planned augmentation of PACIFIC facilities.

COMINCH AND CNO 252104 (pink) quotes JCS 659/1 concerning theater responsibility for Air Sea Rescue.

COMINCH USASTAF 252256 (pink) concurs with JCS V-273 and recommends that targets lying along air boundaries be assigned to either RUSSIA or United States.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260149 (pink) directs COMHVN 10 to report to CINCPAC with all U.S. Army forces under his command effective 1200 31 July.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260150 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC 250847 concerning modification of memorandum for record of 23 July.
27 July (Gene Rate)

Planes on ASW patrol made possible contact with a submarine 500 miles NE of KURUSHI, near where EUR SHIP KALMAT reported yesterday that torpedoes were fired at her. TF 30 scheduled to repeat attacks against EUR SHIP KALMAT. TF 31 swept up to 21-50 N east of SHANGHAI last night, and this morning one scheduled to be east of KURUSHI on a southerly course. No contacts yet reported. ASW power for this group and for the submarines being provided by TF 31. On the 25th TF 31 completed sweeping the last few miles of the JIMENI mine line. Clearance sweeps about 12 miles further SW, and check sweeps still further south are scheduled for today. Tomorrow a check sweep along the axis of the field will start. 350 mines have been swept and 50 fishermen sighted to date.

TF 37 and 38, in the KURUSHI-KOBE-MAGOA areas on the 26th and 27th report destruction of 436 enemy aircraft and damage to 212. Of these TF 37 destroyed 132 and damaged 166, TF 37 destroyed 24 and damaged 64. In addition TF 37 damaged 22 warships for 234,000 tons, sank 62 vessels for 25,000 tons, damaged 130 other vessels for 60,000 tons, sank 1 medium and 6 small AK, a tug and 12 small craft, while TF 37 probably sank 1 OVE and 2 small AK and damaged 1 OBD, 1 train ferry, 24 AVs, a small tanker and 21 corvettes. On the ground TF 36 destroyed 25 locomotives and damaged 11, and burned 40 hangars. During the 2 days TF 36 lost 64 aircraft, 30 pilots, 27 aircrews. Of these, 40 aircraft plus 25 pilots and 15 aircrews were combat losses. TF 37 lost 24 aircraft, plus 9 pilots and 5 aircrews. 16 of the aircraft were combat losses. Revision of TF 36 report for the 24th shows 2 moderately damaged cruisers now classed as heavily damaged; addition of 17177 to the heavily damaged column, addition to the slightly damaged column of 2 2-5 2-35 and 1 OVE KAITU. Two groups each consisting of 4 TF were intercepted and driven off by CAP and night fighters. TF 37 planes shot down 5 and TF 38 planes got one of these attackers. On the 29th a dummy flew across KURUSHI to resume 2 pilots down off KURUSHI. On his return he skillfully landed in the first formation out of gas. The personnel were taken aboard and the FNM sight. FNM-1 Privatesse sank 18 miscellaneous small craft, damaged one and shot down two enemy fighter planes. All FNM-1 planes returned safely. FNM-1 search planes destroyed 1 x 150 ft, picket boat sank 2 and damaged 4 fishing boats, left 1 x 650 ton TPD burning and sinking east of KURUSHI at 37-28 N.

COMMINS AND GEO 272111 (pink) outlines priority and method of providing communications and aeronautical teams for ROUSKINS.

COMMINS (PODSUM) 265359 (pink) instructs WAPSAF to prepare for re-arrangement of B-29 deployment in connection with planning in event of Japanese capitulation.

GEO 26495 (pink) instructs COMMINS to expedite loan-lease transfer vessels under MILEPOST.

COMMINS 263329 (pink) instructs CINC PAC ADVANCE to expedite delivery vessels for transfer under MILEPOST.

COMMINS 27019 (pink) recommends disapproval of proposed GKI station at ATTU.

COMMINS ADVANCE 270339 (pink) requests early completion information on JAPAN.
27 July ( geen Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270253 (pink) recommends category of defense in the
Hawaiian Group be reduced to category A.

COMREDCINA 270800 (pink) proposes occupation of MIDWAY ISLAND as
preliminary to FORT BAYARD operation.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 280108 (pink) instructs COMINCPAC, COMINCPAC,
and COMINCPAC be prepared initiate operations outlined in CINCPOA 0009587 of
May on short notice.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 271337 sets forth changes in Task Organization and
operational control of Navy units in OKINAWA.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270310 deals with shipping control in the Hawaiian Area
contemplates dispatching JOSOO in October.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270312 instructs COM MARIANAS to transfer part of 206th
AAA AB BN from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA.

CINCPAC 261601 implements memorandum for record of CINCPOA-CINCPAC
conference on transfer of control of U.S. held areas in the MUKDEN.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 270905 advises COMINCPAC proposed transfer of 2 VFM
squadrons to BORPAC must be expedited.

CINCPAC 280457 (pink) requests COMINCPAC to report to Chief of
Staff CINCPAC on CINCPAC proposals regarding Hawaiian Defense matters.

COMINCPAC 250740 (pink) assigns task of capturing islands for air
warning and fighter director to South and Southwest of EASSHU to 69th Infantry,
148th NBT assigned task of securing northern EASSHU SHIMA if ordered.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 280812 (pink) reply to COMREDCINA proposal concerning
KICHIW project.

CINCPAC 280849 (pink) proposes abolition of theater area boundaries.

COMINCPAC 280855 (pink) outlines agreement between CINCPAC, COMINCPAC
6th ARMY, of responsibility for landing CINCPAC forces.

28 July ( geen Date)

After successful attacks in INLAND SEA the THIRD PLANE retired to south
west. Tonight a bombardment group consisting of 3 BP's, 2 CA's, 10 MP's plus
British units will bombard the HAMAMATSU Area. Carden is scheduled to strike
in the TOKYO Plains area tomorrow. 99th completed the sweep off SENHIN, ap-
parently unscathed. The only contact was one small craft sunk by a destroyer of
47. Submarines and Dusho continued their splendid work. Four Subs pickup
up a total of seven pilots in the immediate vicinity of the MPNIR. Meanwhile, one
Dushe, having first picked up 2 carrier pilots off the HINSHU coast, landed in the
INLAND SEA to rescue 5 survivors from a JD-49 while the second picked up the pilots
of 1 IF, 2 FF, 2 VB and the entire crew of a third Dushe - 17 in all.
28 July (Cont'd)

A flash report of the lst of 7 strikes by TF 38 planes on the KURE-KONE area on the 28th shows 19 airborne enemy aircraft destroyed and 75 enemy aircraft destroyed on ground. Most burning and heavily damaged were the ES HAHUNA, MGCY LSE, CL OTODO, GA AOB, and GA TOME. Striker photographs showed the MGCY HYODA resting on the bottom from the 24th attack, with the topside well smashed and the deck and ships under water. The CVE HATUO was again damaged. Also damaged were 12 miscellaneous light craft including 1 DD and 2 RE. 462 effective B-29's attacked 7 MIPPER targets shortly after midnight, in fulfillment of the promise given the resident of 11 Japanese cities by radio and by leaflets in the previous 24 hours. 7 B-24's from NORPAC put 15 tons of 500 lb. incendiary clusters on KATASHIMA NAVAL BASE. All planes returned safely.

Admiral Sherman and party departed GUAM for MANILA conference, on 29th.

29 July (Cont'd)

Within the past two days every major unit of the Japanese Fleet except MAGATO has been sighted by aircraft - most of them sunk or immobilized. In addition to units attacked by THIRD PLATE carrier planes in the YONDEE SEA, 2 carriers were seen at SAKII, and the 2 GA were seen in SHIMA area. A force consisting of 3 RE, 2 CA and 10 DD from TF 38, and a British Unit including HMS George V and DD of TF 37 bombarded HAMAMATSU starting at 0500/1 last night. Only damage sustained was minor operational damage to two British destroyers. TF 95 sweeping in the JUNBAI area. Exploratory sweep of suspected field to the north was negative. In suicide attacks early on the 29th, CALLAGHAN (DD 792) was sunk and Pritchett (DD 561) was damaged. Attacking planes were described as biplanes with non-reflective landing gear slings or struts - probably obsolete or trainer planes - expertly piloted. A submarine released 7 mm from a B-29 100 miles south of SHIKOKU, and a Dumbo from OKINAWA returned to the same place in ILENDAE SEA from which 5 B-29 aviators had been rescued the day before and rescued an additional officer.

Amplifying reports from TF 38 increase the number of aircraft destroyed on the ground in the KURE-KONE area by 36 planes to make a total of 111 and of aircraft damaged by 63 planes to a total of 111. Photos show the CL OTODO an OCA lying on their sides, 3 subs sunk, the ES HAHUNA beached and burning and the MCGY HYODA sunk. In addition all AOB battered and burning with guns silenced and stem on the bottom, the MCGY LSE burning and apparently on the bottom, the GA TOME badly damaged (but she continued firing all day). Of the two CVE present, the AMAGI and the KATSURAGI, one suffered tremendous explosions with debris to 1,000 feet, while the other hit on prior attacks, appeared gassed. Final damage assessment awaits full photo coverage. Also damaged were one CVE, 6 DD/DE and 9 fighter craft. To 28.3 failed to reach KURE in the last strike but along the northern shore of the SOU NADA sank 23 miscellaneous small craft. Two AA was attacked by mistakes; 4 near misses left her down by the stern. On the ground 13 locomotives and 4 oil cars were destroyed. Planes of TF 37 in attacks on SHIKOKU and central HOKKAIDO, destroyed 6 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged 26, sank 1 DD and 29 other vessels of which 17 were junks, damaged 3 DD, 2 RE, 2 SS, 7 good sized merchant ships and about 100 small craft.

3231
29 July (Cont'd)

Principal accomplishments of PNAF were the reported scoring of 5 or 6 hits (including 3 or 4 1000-pounders) by 10 B-24s of the 5th AF on the CVE KATSURAMI, while 42 B-24s of the 7th AF claim 1 direct 1000-2000 lb hits and several near misses on the 39 HANIMA. In addition KANOTSU and KAGOSHIMA airfields, KAGOSHIMA railway yards, and other miscellaneous targets in KYUSHU were attacked by D-24s, A-20s, P-47s and TOKYO airfields were hit by 134 P-51s.

COMMCNPSAC 280930 (pink) sets forth plan assembly for COMMCNPSAC forces for OLYMPIC.

COMMCPAC ADVANCE 280927 (pink) advises COMECHA that COMMCPAC considers establishment CEB/OWI broadcasting station in ALASKANS undesirable.

COMMCP 290209 (pink) lists subjects which CINC BPF proposes to discuss at GUAM.

COMMCPAC ADVANCE 290923 (pink) instructs COMMCNPSAC, COMMCPAC and COMUSMARIANAS take appropriate action in accordance with COMCHENS and GWO 272111 in order to provide communications and aerological teams for MUSULAN.
20 July (Cont'd)

ANDAMAN SEA FORCE operated off PHUKET, clearing minefields off PHUKET conducting air strikes over the MALAY PENINSULA. One British minesweeper was sunk by a mine, another was hit and so damaged by a suicide plane that she had to be sunk by her own forces. British submarines sank several small craft in MALACCA STRAIT. A fighter pilot went down in mouth of SUNDRIE NARE. A Damo sank after his dive and escaped up on landing. TIDE left 09 in the water. Three B-17 sunk in and dropped a bomb. The survivor sailed out and was picked up by MISO (83 265). There is no change in the reported status of major task fleet units. The CVEs ANAGAN and KATSUHAI are apparently still afloat although large portions of their flight decks are missing.

31 July (Cont'd)

The Third Fleet is fueling today. Heavy ships of TF 95 disembarked yesterday and are due to depart soon for shipping blockade off SHANGHAI, PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38), CAROL (CVL 28) and escort DD are scheduled to conduct training strike on WABE today. Convoy enroute OKINAWA are splitting up and maneuvering to avoid the typhoon. ABD 21 has broken loose from her tug, but was reported riding well. Other tugs have been ordered to assist.

Final report for TF 38 shows that 114 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the 30th and 102 were damaged. The afternoon strikes were chiefly on fields in the NAGATA area, as TOKYO was closed in. In addition to previously reported shipping damage, one DD and one warship are reported sunk, and an old type CL passed DD and 4 miscellaneous warships damaged. One strike was carried out on 10 tanks in SHIMODA KO, but results have not yet been reported. In ground 8 locomotives were destroyed and 4 damaged, bomb hits were scored and large fires were started at the KANTO Special Steel Co and the JAPAN International Aircraft Co both at MINATSUBI. Strafing and rocketed were 2 radar station, 4 hangars, 17 factories and railroad cars and turntables. No report on our losses, nor on TF 37 results, is yet available. 130 P-38s (excluding 12 lifeguard escort) attacked KORE airfields. They saw only 7 enemy aircraft airborne, all too far away to attack. Only 14 enemy aircraft were observed on KORE airfields. Low level strafing and rocketed destroyed 2 locomotives and caused considerable damage to ground installations and harbor craft. In addition (MIRA) airfield was hit and fires started and 83, P-47s set the whole of SENDAI (KYUSHU) afire with napalm. Inflight reports from 6 Privates of 70 95,9 ordered to destroy the SHIBEN RIVER bridge in northwest KOREA indicated that they destroyed the main bridge and 1 small bridge, destroyed 2 locomotives, strafed equipment on a new airfield there and coal mine buildings and damaged 3 hangars. F9F-12 planes sank 6 small craft and met in TSUSHIMA STRAITS. F9F-12 planes sank a warship and damaged 3 fishing boats. No reports from B-39s.

OCT/TFLEET S00237 (pink) initial report on 30 July conferences at MANILA. States MacArthur reaction to probable landing of Marines and advises possible need for 3 Marine Divisions.

CINC/PEAC ADVANCE WE306 (pink) replies to initial report of 30 July conference. States nonoccurrence of landing of marines, naval officer on spot must have free hand to act. Limits availability of marines to 3 divisions. Requests saving clause in event of further JCS directive.

- continued -
CONGORESS 310900 (pink) advises CINCPAC difficulties FORT BAYARD as more serious than initially envisaged. Will not require equipment jeopardizing OLYMPIC, WIOCHOW ISLAND an alternate not an additional operation.

COMINCH and CNO 302029 (pink) advises that aerological plans outlined CINCPAC 120446 approved by Sovists and action initiated.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 310820 (pink) refers to COMINCH AND CNO 302029 and instructs COMSERVEDAC comply.

2 August (Dee De Day)

Both TF 37 and 38 with their logistics support groups retired to the southwest in search of better weather. They will fuel today and then depart for KYUSHU strikes on the third, a delay of one day. TF 95 also was inactive. Loral KYUSHU naval forces executed modified typhoon plan X, avoiding the storm to the south. Convoys in the Philippines Sea are finding better weather. AB21 which broke loose from its tug, has been riding well, and her tug expects to be able to make up tow this morning. PENNSYLVANIA (BB 38) and CAROL (CBL-38) completed their training strike on MAIKI. Preliminary reports are 9 guns put out of action; 6 others damaged; distillation and power plants damaged; 1 pump burned. Light AA fire, moderate shore battery fire inside 10,000 yards, No personnel casualties. Two planes lost operationally. Gun director on PENNSYLVANIA hit. Report from HMS STIGIAN indicates that a small British submarine penetrated into SINGAPORE and exploded one of the heavy cruisers there. The mother submarine, which was waiting off NORBURGH, commented: "Spectacle great. Consider cruiser was well-distributed over countryside.

662 combat sorties were flown over the EMPIRE on the 31st by units of the 5th and 7th Air Forces. Attacked HAGASAKI and KOKOSHIMA. Other planes sank 5 small craft and damaged 13. 61 medium bombers dropped 72 tons of bombs on MIYAZUKI one. 64 mediums dropped 76 tons on KAMUYA. All August 2 strikes by FBAF against airbases and installations in KYUSHU have been cancelled because of weather. The 6 Privates of FM 1 amplifying their previous report advise they made direct hits with half-ton bombs on the SINTIH BRIDGE destroying 1 span completely and causing it to fall into the river. 1 pier was slightly damaged. 774 effective B29's attacked HACHIOJI, TOKAMA, HAGAOKA, MITO and the KAWASAKI PETROLEUM COMPARE while 44 more (total 818) mined. Results are reported to have been good. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, and AA generally meager.

CINCPAC 311509 (pink) requests instructions concerning operational control Headquarters 2nd Marine Air Wing.

COMINCH and CNO 011310 (pink) outlines proposed new boundary between United States, British areas and SWPA.
2 August (Cunne Date)

At about 1100Z yesterday a search plane from PEARL.HI sighted 30 survivors in the water at 1130, 1330-00, dropped a transmitter and emergency lifeboat. Later other survivors were seen in lifeboats. Dumbo planes were sent out with emergency equipment, ships were diverted to the scene, and other ships were sent out from UNTIL. By midnight several ships were at the scene, and reported that the survivors were from INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35), sunk on the night of the 25th. The SALAMANDER ASW Group made a sonar contact about 200 miles to westward. The contact was not retained, but the search is continuing. Carriers and oilers are operating in the vicinity of 2500 136045, today, waiting for the weather to clear. 3rd Fleet strike on KUSHUD is tentatively planned for 5 August. Final reports of TF 38 for the strikes of 30 July in the TOKTO AREA: 1224 offensive sorties - 115 aircraft destroyed and 142 damaged, all on the ground; 20 vessels, totaling 20,000 tons sunk and 36, totaling 73,000 tons damaged. In addition considerable damage was inflicted on ground targets as previously reported. Our losses were 11 planes, 8 pilots, and 3 aircrews, all in combat. Meanwhile TF 37 planes flew 188 offensive sorties; shot down 2 enemy planes, destroyed 7 and damaged 12 on the ground, sunk one DD, damaged 3 DD and 5 DT at a cost of 3 VF and 3 pilots in combat and 10 planes were lost operationally.

On the 1st 37 P-51s and P-47s hit the KOSO-KAGOE area meeting no airborn or enemy aircraft, and observing few on the ground. They destroyed 1 locomotive and damaged barracks and hangars at OKAZAKI, administration buildings at ITAMI, hangars at KAGOE east. We lost 1 P-47 and 3 P-51s; 1 pilot was observed to bail out; the other 3 are missing. FAF planes flew 525 combat sorties on the 1st. In attacks on shipping 1 mission of 24 B-25s (5th AF) destroyed 8 vessels and 2 tuggers and damaged all northwest KUSHUD. In other attacks on shipping 1 small merchant was destroyed, and 1 large AK plus 2 small AK were damaged. A P-51s (4th AF on a VF sweep off KUSHUD, intercepted 16 Franks over TAKE SHIMA that were attacking B-24s. The P-51s shot down 4 Franks with no losses to themselves. 23 B-24s (7th AF) dropped 51 tons on AMAMI and KAMERIMA, and were attacked by 12-20 Jap VF, of which, 2 were destroyed and 1 damaged. 2 B-24s were damaged, 2 men were killed, and 6 wounded.

021500

GEOX J. DOYLE (DE 368) contains information concerning sinking of INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35).

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020126 outlines CINCPAC views concerning proposal to establish Pacific Joint Communications Board.

CINCPAC 020126 (pink) authenticates Sherman - Chamberlin - Lindsey 1 August agreement for coordination of air operations.

COMTHFLEET 020547 (pink) places Commander Submarines advance base and reorganization both Navy 3002 to report to COMPHLSEAFRON I for matters pertaining to defense, maintenance and construction.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020710 (pink) designates former ICHIBO reserve as MARIANAS OLYMPIC reserve, directs addresses to implement and contains detailed instructions thereafter.
CINC PAC ADVANCE 021036 (pnt) advises a special operation by 309th Bomb Group, instructs all ships or aircraft of Pacific Fleet to approach within 50 miles NAGASAKI, KOKUSA or HIBISHIMA immediately before, during and after time of strike (to be announced later).

CINC PAC ADVANCE 021129 (pnt) requests confirmation of assumption that all combat units of British Pacific Fleet will be at CINC PAC disposal and of assumption that COMINC will not object to practice raids against THRUN, WAKE and POMARE.

3 August (Oahu Date)

Third Fleet is remaining in fueling area. OKINAWA based craft of TF 95 returned from typhoon patrol sortie. No reports from TG 95.2 and TG 95.3 blocking SHANGHAI. About 400 survivors of the INDIANAJOULIS have been recovered and search for others continues. Commanding Officer, one of survivors, says that he believes the ship was hit by two torpedo boats or a mine at about 0645 on 30 July. This was followed by a magazine explosion and the ship sank in 15 minutes. Survivor of Japanese MTB sunk on the first by the CUMMINGS (DD 365) said his mission was to evacuate navy personnel from KYTA YO JIMA; stated 40 to 50 MTB's based at KYTA JIMA. ASPRO (SS 309) rescued an Army pilot in SAGAMI WANG at 05-11-1, 139-21 E. This position is 25 miles inside the bay, and 8 miles from the shore at the head of the bay. Two search planes sighted the survivors in a B-17 Lifeboat, and rescued the submarine in. The planes and submarine were attacked by five Japanese enemy VF and five VC. Although all strafed and 4 500 lbs were dropped ASPRO escaped undamaged and our aircraft shot down 2 VC and damaged the VF. Boarding party left aboard a junk when COD was forced to dive was recovered by other submarines.

139 USASTAF P-51's attacked the NAGOYA-KOBE area sighted only 1 airborne aircraft and observed very few on the ground. Other ground damage included 16 locomotives destroyed, and damage to 2 hangars (KOMAKI), factories at (KAKOEKA), stations, power lines and natural gas tanks, 14 small vessels 50-150 feet were damaged or destroyed. Photographs of B-29 strikes against TOYAMA show more than 90% of the city enveloped in flames. At NAGAKOYA photos of poor quality show a considerable number of large fires. USAAF, CTG 73.4 passes on a report from a coast watcher at AMOY that FAM-17 planes have killed 750 to 1,000 Jap troops attempting evacuation AMOY to SHATAN.

COMINCH and CNO 301733/14 defines condition for approach of recognition signals in non-combat areas.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 311355 sets forth operational control MAP ground forces on OKINAWA.

010900

PENNSYLVANIA (BR)/describes 1 August FUDDE on WAKE.

COMP TH FLEET 020018 describes NATS proposed Flt Wing; suggests MACTAN ISLAND for headquarters.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 030207 states necessity for disembark TF 93.
CINCPAC ADVANCE 030208/643 officially dissolves TF 93 and 93.4, directs 93.4 report to COMGEN USAF for duty.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030227 approves completion air facilities under construction SAMAR and completion of seaplane ramp JINAMOC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030247 recommends authorized complement of Phototrons 1 and 3 be increased from 6 to 9 PBY-1P that crew replacements based in forward area for these squadrons be similar to other multi-engine squadrons.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030253 withdraws recommendation for major NATS base at SAMAR and recommends KACTAN instead.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030742 advises FMF PAC marine personnel required for local defense and internal security OKINAWA and directs use of at least 2 infantry companies or equivalent under command COM MOB OKINAWA pending arrival requested MP battalions.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030912 operational control Headquarters and Headquarters squadron 2nd MAN passed to FEAF, appropriate change being made in memorandum for record GUAM conference 23 July.


CINCPAC ADVANCE 030915 advises addresses AITUTAKI and PEBEREDO considered to have sufficient Post War Significance to justify token garrisons. Requests instructions if Navy and Coast Guard personnel will be required.

CTU 95.9.2 011355 requests that communication facilities (CTU 95.9.2) 311301 July be expedited.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 311338 (pink) requests operational direction 64th and 30th Engineers be returned to CINCPAC on 22 or about 31 July.


COMGEN AIR 311349 (pink) recommends AMCHITKA most suitable location for basing WLR Squadron in NORPAC and describes facilities.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 311351 (pink) advises FMF PAC units should be prepared for occupation duty on basis of 5th Phil new, 4th W.R.Div in September, 3rdPhil (less 4th W.R.Div) in October.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 301323 (pink) advises reducing SS 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons and of plan to further reduce to 1 Sq after British Command area is formed and provided enemy CFA SINGAPORE are immobilised.
RICHARDSON 302320Z (pink) dissents at length the proposal for change in category of defense for the Hawaiian Group.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030211 (pink) requests continuance of aggressive air attacks for neutralization of FORJUSA.

CINCPAC 030429 (pink) suggests paragraph 3 Sherman-Chamberlain-Lindsay memorandum be amended making 5th Fleet primarily responsible for air defense and omitting provision now in the memo concerning offensive responsibilities.

A August (Guam Date)

FAM-1 PENs sank 1 SD in HAICHOW Wdn, damaged a dredge and shore installations while FAM-18 Liberators shot down 2 enemy aircraft and damaged 2 more off SAGAMI WDN and off CHOSU POINT. No reports received of USASTAF strikes. All missions FEAF on the 3rd were weathered. No reports for 4 August. CAF shot down 1 twin-engine seaplane at 30,000 feet, 25 miles west of the island. 15 sorties were flown from PalaU, attacking and sinking 1 SD. 6 NORPAC B-24s dropped 9 tons on KADACIA NAVAL BASE and KOKUTAN CAPE, both on SHIMUSHU, with unobserved results.

There was little naval activity yesterday. Early morning of the 4th enemy SS made two unsuccessful torpedo attacks on an OKINAWA to LORTE convoy. An escort, EARL V. JOHNSON (DE 702) made 4 depth charge attacks, the last of which resulted in a severe delayed underwater explosion. Oilers and carrier forces of the THIRD FLEET are moving east from the PHILIPPINES SEA to a position about 450 miles ESE of TOKYO, where they will replenish on the 6th prior to further strikes. Two destroyers from the 7th Fleet boarded a Japanese hospital ship in the JAVA SEA, found her with munitions on board, and are taking her into WOKTAL.

WARCONS 021145 (pink) advises of necessity for early installation early warning radar and fighter director installations for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 030154 (pink) authenticates Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreement of 1 August concerning air coordination.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040026 (pink) desires to CINCPAC 030429 on grounds that proposed change would affect respective responsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet within objective area.

CINCPAC 040109 (pink) sets forth proposed early warning and fighter director radar installations for OLYMPIC in response to WARCONS 021145.

COMGEN USASTAF 040353 (pink) authenticates Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreement of 1 August concerning air coordination.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040747 (pink) directs 3rd Fleet to concentrate next effort against enemy air in northern HONSHU and HOKKAIDO.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 040841 (pink) requests that agreements concerning long lines as well as internal wire installations already made for OLYMPIC also apply to CONOWHY.
TOP SECRET
ADVIS (Cox)

- continued -

4 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

COMCHUFLEET 041011 (pink) acknowledges CINCPAC 040747 and advises strike plan for 8 August.

COMMAF SWPA 302140 states COM AF 13 responsibility for operations in SWPA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 032345 requests COM7THFLT to furnish complete data on existing operational command areas affecting units of AIR 7THFLY.  

5 August (Guam Date)

Carrier Task Forces are proceeding toward their rendezvous tomorrow morning with their oiler groups at 38N 149E. Reserve group of oilers is standing by further to the south where they will be joined by the ANTIZIO ASW Group. BRISTOL (DD 857), an oiler escort, damaged her bow while alongside ASHTABULA (AO 31) and is returning to Guam for repairs. Adm. Low's fast striking force and the heavy covering force under Adm. Oldendorf leave their SHANGHAI patrol stations this afternoon for BUCKNER BAY. RAZORBACK (SS 394) reports destroying 6 sea trucks and damaging 2 small craft by gunfire in the southern KURILES on the 2nd.

588 effective B-29s attacked 5 targets last night. 96 hit MAKABASHI (50 mi. NW TURTO), 256 hit NISHIKOMIYA (NW OSAKA), 12 groups by radar, 4 visually. 65 hit IMABARI (NW SHIKOKU) by radar. 64 hit SAGA (S. of SASANO), 2 by radar and 2 visually. 107 hit UBE coal liquefaction Co by radar. WFO opposition was nil at IMABARI and SAGA, nil to slight at UBE and NISHIKOMIYA, and nil to moderate at MAKABASHI. AA was about the same. No planes have so far been reported lost. All 7th AF missions and all but one 5th AF missions were weathered out. In the latter, 25 B-29s put 14,5 tons on an unidentified industrial area in east central KYUSHU, damaging a railroad bridge and railroad yards. FAN 1 FAN's sank 2 small warships and damaged a PC and several small ships. FAN 16 planes sank 1 SD off INAMIO WADA, were attacked by 8 Zekes, shot down 2 and damaged 2 others. A search plane over TRUK sank a 40-ft. Lanch loaded with oil drums. 4 Privates of FAN 4 carried out an anti-ship sweep off PARAMUSHIRU, bombing TORISHIMA KITTO and damaging 1 SD and 10 landing craft with strafing.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 041451 (pink) collaborates on reasons for change in Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreements contained in CINCPAC 30410. States proposed change not intended to lessen FEF effort but to obtain assurance that primary responsibility for air defense in CAP rests with Fifth Fleet.

COMGEN AIR 041943 (pink) contains technical data and information on JAVMAN PROJECT.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050100 (pink) instructs COM MARLinas to inaugurate air search and provide ships to intercept empty units MARCUS bound.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 042320 (pink) replies to CINCPAC ADVANCE 041451. Recommends original draft Sherman, Chamberlin, Lindsay agreement stand. Future details to be subject future agreements between FEF, CINCPAC and USAMFL.
5 August (Queue Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050751 (pink) special requests to PEAR and USJSTAF unnecessary in view of planned routine operations.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050754 (pink) makes TACLOBAN available CON5THFLTL to copy communications of interest to CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 050755 (pink) confirms need of 500 aircraft pool at OKINAWA for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC 050845 (pink) contains further information relative to JAVAN PROJECT.

6 August (Queue Date)

Third Fleet fuels this morning prior to strike tomorrow. TF 95 encountered no surface activity. INTREPID (CVII) completed her training strike on WAKI yesterday. Buildings and gun positions were destroyed and others damaged. Light AA holed one plane. There were no casualties. The lifeguard submarine SEARCHER (SS400) bombarded the island with 135 rounds of 5" after the strike. Shortly before midnight the Merchant Ship ETHIOPIAN VICTORY at 16-35N, 169-45E sent out SOS signals and said she was on fire and abandoning ship. Nearby merchant ships are providing assistance. Cause of fire not known.

President Truman has announced that HIROSHIMA was bombed on the 6th (EOD) by an atomic bomb with explosive power equal to 20,000 tons of TNT. The bomb was described as having more than 2,000 times the blast power of the British "Grand Slam" and 11 ton bomb. The bomb was dropped by planes of the 20th AF. Of the 588 effective B-29s attacking on the night of 5th-6th, none was lost to enemy action. 1 ditched north of SAIPAN, and 12 were rescued from it. 6 P-51s are reported down from the TOKYO fighter strike scheduled for the 5th. THE SCARBOROUGH has picked up 3 pilots, 2 others went down over land and 1 in TOKYO BAY. Results of the strike have not yet been received. TARAKI in southern KYUSHU was attacked by more than 275 PEAR planes on the 5th, using high explosive incendiary bombs. Returning pilots describe the entire city as being aflame. 1 Privateer of PAN 1 was shot down by ships AA off FUSAN and burned with no visible survivors. In TSUSHIMA straits other PAN planes sank 1 SC and left another sinking. In addition a lugger was sunk and an SD was damaged.

CINCPAC 060719 (pink) acknowledges and states that action is being taken on request for continuing neutralisation of FORMOSA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 060819 (pink) states that units of 1st MAW aerials now at EMIRAU to be concentrated in southern PHILIPPINES as soon as possible, following which island is to be taken over by the British.
ENTEREDOR (BB 34) sighted a small Japanese Hospital ship headed into MURUS. Ship sighted by search plane at about the same time. Ship departed yesterday evening unharmed after bombing raid in the afternoon. CASABAN (DD 372), on station north of IMO, was ordered to intercept, board, and investigate. Later last night a destroyer from one of the 3rd Fleet flotilla groups intercepted a lighted hospital ship at 31-33N 150-00W and reported she was tracking her. Third Fleet is scheduled to strike northern HOKUSHU and HOKKAIDO this morning. TG 95.2 and 95.3 report maintaining barrier for 4 days. Night sweeps were conducted by TG 95.2 between latitudes 32 and 33 as far west as 122-30W. On the last two nights, night search planes assisted. TG 95.3 operated a little further to the south, and provided day CAP for TG 95.2 and searches. Both forces were snooped, but neither was attacked. Four planes were shot down by CAP, and one driven off by gunfire. Neither force had any enemy surface contacts. TG 95.3 conducted a fighter strike on TINGHAI on the 6th.

114 effective B-29s with 96 P-51 escorts attacked TOTOKA NAVAL ARSENAL (SE NAGOA). 97 P-51s attacked TOKYO airfields, meeting no airborne enemy aircraft and scoring 1 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 21 damaged on the ground. Ground installations were damaged and 2 x 200 foot ships were damaged. 4 P-51s were lost to AA, and 2 to other causes. 3 pilots were rescued and 3 are missing. Approximately 450 FEAF planes were over KYUSHU and TSUSHIMA STRAITS waters on the 6th. Of these 168 attacked KAGOSHIMA starting a number of large fires in the railroad yards in factory areas. 304 planes attacked MATSUMOTO using mostly Napalm bombs, starting 20-30 fires in the city. 49 B-25s attacked shipping in TSUSHIMA STRAITS and nearby land targets, sinking 6 ships and damaging 3 others. On the ground 2 radar stations, buildings and docks were damaged. 41 shot down 2 B-25s and holed 11 others. FJ-1 planes sank 6 vessels on the seventh, left 1 SK sinking, and damaged 2 small tankers, all in TSUSHIMA STRAITS while 16 FJ-1 planes sank 1 SC in SUGZHA WAN.

CINCAPAC 040403 (pink) suggests 3rd Fleet strike concentrations enemy aircraft in Northeast HOKUSHU and HOKKAIDO. Mentions strong indications of airborne attack against OKINAWA.

CINCAPAC ADVANCE 070331 (pink) recommends CONCORD and RICHMOND remain in present area until about 1 October.

CINCAPAC ADVANCE 070330 (pink) reports to COMCHINCHINA on progress of conference concerning FORT BAYARD project.

CINCAPAC ADVANCE 070553 (pink) advises COMINCH of proposed naval participation FORT BAYARD Project.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070717 (pink) reports to COMCHINCHINA on further progress of FORT BAYARD project and naval proposals for participation therein.

CINCAPAC ADVANCE 070624 (pink) disapproves request for floating storage at OLYMPIC.
7 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070633 (pink) states that Navy can furnish assistance and materials in EIL component for JAVANIAN peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM from OKINAWA. Recommends all materials be obtained from COMRON TEN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 070902 requests comments on policy concerning attacks on Junks, states CINCPAC inclination to interdict all traffic north of YANOTEK.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 070819 requests that JCS 100345 of December 1944 be modified to eliminate CINCPAO responsibility for shipping for Army controlled ports in RYUKYUS.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 070020 prescribes use of standard AAF air defense grid for use by CINCPAO forces in air warning and fighter direction and radar telling circuits.

8 August (Guam Date)

CASSIN reports that she intercepted and boarded the KIKU MARU at 1830 K, 8 August in Lat. 26°46'N Long. 150°29'. No violations of any kind were found. Patients on board were 81 wounded, 42 nutritional deficiency and 4 tubercular, a total of 130. The ship was directed to proceed. Ship had papers indicating she was boarded and satisfactorily inspected on 4 August by a Sub-Lieutenant of the Royal Navy. Carrier planes of the 3rd Fleet are attacking north HONSEN this morning. 3 BB, 2 CA, 10 DD, and a British unit of cruisers and destroyers is scheduled to bombard KAMAISHI this morning. Weather ETHIOPIAN VICTORY, earlier reported on fire, is now reported proceeding to WAVETON under her own power.

TJ 125, 6 (NEW JERSEY, SIOUX and DD's) report completion of their training bombardment on WAKES. 11 buildings, 2 ammunition dumps and 1 AA gun were destroyed. Damaged were 5 guns, and RDF station, distillation plant, bridge and power plant. Light to moderate coast defense and AA fire was encountered. Our forces sustained no damage and no casualties.

242 effective B-29s attacked YAMATA, accompanied by about 140 P-47s. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, and AA varied. Most of the bombing was by radar and 2/3 of the planes reported results unobserved. 3 lost 2 operational, one combat, 2 crewmen rescued from one, survivors of a second sighted in raft.

38 (of 64 effective) bombed the NAKAJIMA Aircraft Co visually at TOKYO. 6 others hit the TOKYO ARSENAL. Results are described as good to excellent. 1 B-29 was hit by AAA and exploded over the target. 1 chute was seen. There was no fighter opposition. 92 attacked FUKUZAMA, half by radar and half visually. General conflaguration. No losses have been reported. The Atomic bomb destroyed 4.1 square miles of the built-up area of 6.9 square miles of HIROSHIMA, 60% of the city. Amplification of previous reports indicate 65.5% of the built-up area of NAGASAKI was destroyed, and less than half a city block of TOYAMA'S 1,066 square miles of built-up area was left. 3 B-29s of the 509th Group are scheduled to attack NAKASAKI URBAN area. In the North Pacific 5 B-24s attacked KABAHA NAVAL BASE and 4 Privates attacked TORISHIMA RETTO and ONEKOTAN ZAKI.

CINCPAO ADVANCE 081965 announces declaration of war by Russia on Japan.

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TOP SECRET
AUGUST (Cont'd)

8 August (Oman Date)

CG USFC 080500 (pink) concurs in plan for BAYARD operation. Requests Navy Department action to obtain JCS approval.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 080522 (pink) approves COMORDFOREST plan for 9 August strikes on HONSHU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 081540 (pink) concurs in CINCPACFAD amendments to agreement on logistics responsibility for KYUKUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 082227 (pink) recommends to COMOROBAC that 49 bombardiessel objectives in KURILES.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 071505 (pink) outlines Red Navy desires for communications set up.

9 August (Oman Date)

Two enemy submarines were reported on the LEYTE-Okinawa route. Two of our lifeguard submarines report definite periscope sightings, one at 29-55 131-53 and one at 38-15 142-06. SALMAUA ASV Group reports a successful encounter with a submarine on the OKINAWA-LEYTE convoy route, with one midget reported sunk and a second probably sunk, both at 20-25N 126-54E. After a rather successful strike yesterday TF 38 and TF 37 are scheduled to renew their attacks against the northern EMPIRE today from a launching position somewhat further to the south. Fighter sweeps over TOKYO Plains fields are also scheduled. The force encountered more air opposition than usual. BORIE (DD 704) was hit by a suicide plane on her signal bridge, but is able to return under her own power. A bombardment unit consisting of BatDiv 8, CruDiv 10, 2 British light cruisers and screening destroyers bombarded KAMASUMI. Ships used planes to spot. Hits were scored in coal hoppers, transfer tables, rolling mill, storage plant and new industrial area. No casualties to our own forces.

Incomplete reports of the first TF 38 strike on N. Honshu targets indicate that TF 38 planes destroyed 12 enemy aircraft on the ground and damaged 57, mostly at MATSUSHIMA, JINMAKI, ITSUWA, and HACHINOE drones. The planes apparently were fueled and burned. There was no air opposition over the target, but 11 enemy aircraft were splashed by ships guns and TOMCAT CAP. The BORIE (DD 704) was hit by a suicider but splashed 2 others. The Wasp shot down a suicider close aboard. In attacks on shipping TF 38 planes sank 1 DE, 1 FF, 1 PT, and 7 luggers. Planes from TF 37 also attacking N. Honshu targets destroyed 12 enemy aircraft and damaged 19 on the ground, and destroyed 24 gliders at MATSUSHIMA. They sank 1 DD and damaged 2 DE and 1 net layer. 100 effective B-29s attacked the NIPPON OIL REFINERY CO. at AOKASAKI from 0019-0307 K, bombs by radar. In flight reports show results. Fighter opposition was nil to slight, AA meager to intense. No losses have yet been reported. 151 FAF P-47s escorting B-29s shot down 12 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 1, losing 5 P-47s at YAMATA. 78 B-29s took off from 0245-0327 K to attack the NAKAJIMA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, OSHINO PLANT at TOKYO. In heavy attacks on 3 targets not previously reported, concentrated principally on KYUSHU and the TSUSHIMA STRAITS area, planes of the FAF sank 2 small AK and damaged 1 DE or FF, 0 PT, 1 SCL, and 2 SD. In air combat P-47s shot down 6 enemy fighters. 18 B-24 attacking USA, destroyed 8 enemy aircraft on the ground and 24 B-25s destroyed a bridge near KANAHABBA.
TOP SECRET

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AUGUST (00T)

2 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

FAW-1 planes destroyed 3 small AK and damaged 1 small FT, 1 tug, and
2 luggers. One Privateer was lost in the explosion of the ship it attacked.
FAF's damaged 2 small FT with rockets on the night of 8/9.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 062028 (pink) assigns North Pacific Force CruDiv 5
Cardivas 23, 26 and DesRon 45 establish and maintain control of communications
from the ALEUTIANS across the SEA OF OKhotsK. Neutralize Japanese bases in the
area and protect convoys between ALEUTIANS and escort Turnaround points in the
SEA OF OKhotsK.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090027 advises addresses of operational boundary
established for operations U.S. and SOVIET forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090050 (pink) requests action to ensure that U.S.
submarines in the SEA OF JAPAN north of SOVIET, U.S. boundary be protected
pending reallocation. Requests use of TARTARY STRAIT for entry and exit. States
that Pacific Fleet Submarines will be kept outside neutral zones pending establish-
ment of liaison.

CON3RDFLT 090129 (pink) advises of intent to continue present attacks
on 10, 12th and 13th.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090216 (pink) requests that requests for action by
Pacific Fleet Units in support of USSPS be addressed to CINCPAC via CONUSPCT.

CINCPAC 090503 (pink) concurs in CINCPAC ADVANCE 070553 which
outlines proposed naval participation in FORT BAYARD project with minor reservation.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 090816 (pink) detaches CRUDiv 16 from CTF 95 and directs
it to report 3RDFLE

CINCPA 091403 (pink) states boundary line delimiting air and naval
separating areas for U.S. and USSR and states that CINCPA air forces not operate
north of boundary line at SEA OF OKhotsK except on specific authorization.

10 August (Guam Date)

Although somewhat hampered by the weather, TF 37 and TF 38 continued
strikes against air, shipping and communications targets in northern KONSHI.
Today both forces are scheduled to fuel. Units of the Nine Flotilla left BUCKNER
BAY to start sweeping in area SKAGWAY today. In the North Pacific TF 92 (20 C1
and 5 DD) is scheduled to rendezvous with 7 DD of DesRon 54 at 47-00 154-45
preparatory to an anti-shipping sweep and bombardment along the KURILE CHAIN.
Submarines rescued 4 pilots from TF 37 and 38 yesterday. JALLOR reports sinking
a large ship believed to be the TARATASU, with 2 hits, and PARO reports getting
6 hits in an escorted convoy on the 8th, both in the INLAND SEA. ZCFLREP sunk a
junk by gunfire off west coast of KYUSHU, DSZLIPshelled radio and radar installa-
tions on TOI SHIMA and MUSKALLUNGE after failing to score hits with torpedoes
in 7 northbound sea trucks in the KURILES, surfaced - damaged 2 in a gun action,
receiving a hit in her periscope, with 1 man killed and 2 wounded.

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3234
In 2 days of attacks against HOKKAIDO and northern HONSHU TF 38 and 37 destroyed 318 and damaged 326 enemy aircraft. Revised report on shipping indicates that TF 37 sank 1 CDD, TF 38 sank 1 DE, and both forces together sank 2 DE, 1 FTD, 3 SD, and 6 tankers, damaging 2 DE and 1 PTU, all on the 9th. On the 10th in the first 4 strikes TF 38 planes damaged 1 Kaibokan and 7 merchant vessels. Results of TF 37 shipping attacks on the 10th will be reported later. On the ground TF 38 (on the 9th) destroyed 10 hangars and damaged 16, and destroyed 3 locomotives. On the 10th, despite bad weather, TF 38 planes destroyed 11 locomotives, 4 freight cars, 4 tank cars, and damaged hangars, barracks, railroad facilities, bridges, factories, and other industrial buildings. TF 37 in strikes on the 10th destroyed 3 locomotives, 3 freight cars, 3 tank cars, plus cranes, factories, docks and air installations. No report on our losses has yet been received. 72 B-29s hit the TOKYO ARSENAL, (it was the secondary target), half bombing by radar and half visually. Results were unobserved. No B-29 losses have so far been reported. On the 9th 2nd MAN damaged 27 PUUs, 6 SD and 8 motor launches in attacks off south KYUSHU.

COMAIRING ONE 080700 reports refusal of FEAF to provide air cover for rescue submarines.

ALUSNA VLAVDIOSTOK 080940 reports official Soviet statement that Soviet shipping no longer using LA MEROUSE, reports preparations for beginning convoy of merchant ships.

COMINCH AND CNO 092200 instructs CINCPAC to deal directly with ALUSNA MOSCOW and VLAVDIOSTOK where desired.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100012 directs COMPOAC to exercise administrative and operational control MABS, Air Fields and Aviation matters in SOPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100612 directs COMORPAC continue planned operations TF 92.

COMMAGCHINA 101210 concurs in interdiction of sea traffic north of YANOTSE.

COMINCH AND CNO 101605 approves NATS establishment at UACTAN with installations held to a minimum.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957 (pink) contains detailed description of Soviet convoy plan.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 091540 (pink) requests that Soviets be advised when all American submarines have left their zone.

COMGRDFLEET 092115 (pink) advises of intention to shift attacks after 11 August to TOKYO AREA if northern targets inaccessible or no longer profitable.

COMINCH AND CNO 092202 (pink) requests comments on Red Navy convoy plan.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 100811 (pink) comments to COMINCH at length on Red Navy convoy plan.

- continued -
10 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCAP ADVANCE 101609 (pink) quotes text of Joint Staff Study campus relating to occupation of an operational airfield at each principal anchorage.

CINCAP ADVANCE 101614 (pink) warns against relaxation of vigilance against Japanese attacks as a result of Japanese peace proposals.

11 August (Guam Date)

On completion of fueling yesterday, the Carrier Task Forces and their fueling groups remained in the same general area awaiting improved weather and political developments. Contained reports are received from submarines active both in rescue and offensive capacities. PLAICE recovered five airmen from a D-25 off KYUSHU on the 11th and GALAXY recovered a RANDOLPH bomber pilot and his radioman off north HONSHU on the 10th. In addition to previously reported 207 results from her JAPAN SEA patrol sank a medium tanker and damaged a large tanker. ARONAUT bombarded a radio station on SHICHINHATSU and on the 7th BUMPER sank a tug, a barge and a lugger off HAIFA ISLAND on the 5th.

Final reports on 3rd 11 attacks on the 10th indicate that planes from TF 37 and TF 36 during 2 days attacks destroyed 398 enemy aircraft (13 airborne) and damaged 364. The aircraft types ran more to trainers than they had previously. Very few operational twins were found. Two previously unbushed stock pile fields at KAMUROGA and at OBAHANAGA provided most of the planes for the destruction on the 10th. In attacks on shipping in addition to damage previously reported planes of TF 36 sank 5 merships and 4 luggers and damaged 11 merships, 2 passenger ferries and 4 luggers. CTF 38 states "enormous damage was inflicted upon airfield installations, oil storage, transportation facilities, docks, yards, and industrial buildings." TF 37 in attacks on shipping on the 10th sank 6 merchant vessels and 8 small craft; probably sank 1 DE, 1 mership and 2 luggers and damaged 1 DE and 8 merchant vessels. On the ground considerable damage was inflicted on locomotives and railroad equipment, barracks, hangars, and a power station, 5th and 7th AF planes flew about 600 combat sorties over KYUSHU and near by sea areas on the 10th. Heaviest attacks were on KUMAMOTO with high explosive and Napalm. The city was left flaming and smoke obscured. Other attacks included 22 B-24s on CITTA, 36 B-25s on AMAYA, 39 B-25s on shipping in the JAPAN SEA, and 48 P-47s on CVE's in SASEBO Harbor. In the latter attack 12800 pounders were described as near misses, with apparently no damage inflicted on the ships. Oil storage tanks were hit, however. In attacks on shipping in the JAPAN SEA and elsewhere 1 DE or DD, 5 merchant vessels and 3 small craft were sunk and 1 DE or DD and 3 small craft were damaged.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCI)

11 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 020912 (pink) requests sterilization by 1 December 1945 of mines laid in Central, South and Eastern Hokkaido ports and Inland Sea areas except SHIMONOKI STRAIT approach etc.

CINCPAC 101407 (pink) requests that amphibious force representative designated to work with 6th, 8th and 10th Armies contact respective Army commanders for detailed planning.

CINCPAC 105507 (pink) requests comments on proposal to authorize direct liaison between representatives of 5th PhibCor and 13th AAF, latter assigned mission of supporting 5th Phib during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102514 (pink) concurs in foregoing despatch but points out that 1st Marine Air Wing is component of P.T. forces, suggests Marine ground forces be supported where practicable by Marine Aviation.

CEMINCH and CNO 102000 (pink) quotes at length War Department policy for public relations and censorship concerning military use ATOMIC WIDE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102315 (pink) states that although CINCPAC does not favor NAPO project at this time he is prepared to furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 102317 (pink) states provision of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS for coordination with CINCPAC and controlled by COMMCORPAC of amphibious movement and debarkation. Instructs amphibious force commanders to establish liaison with appropriate Army commanders.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110217 (pink) states that CINCPAC intends to continue headquarters at Guam in event of Jap capitulation, but moving between Guam and South Dakota when necessary.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 110829 (pink) advises that presence of pressure mines makes it impracticable to operate in KOSO-CUSA area until February 1946.

COMSOUTHINA 111215 (pink) requests that FORT BAYARD project be continued even though Japanese capitulation
TOP SECRET

AUGUST (GCT)

12 August (Guam Date)

OAK HILL, LSD 7 at 21-15H, 131-02 E reported at 2226 KUNG last night that she was followed by a piloted torpedo for 20 minutes, that the speed of the torpedo was 10 knots and that the torpedo exploded 2000 yards astern. She was south bound and escorted at the time. Co3rdFlt reported at 0620 KUNG this morning that the TOKYO area was under attack, and that a snooper had been shot down. 30-8 the fueling group, is proceeding to the southward. TG 38.5 has been formed from the following ships of TF 37: KING GEORGE V, 1 CV, 2 CL's and accompanying DD's. The remainder of TF 37 is proceeding to MANUS. At 2045 HOURS last night the PENNSYLVANIA was hit aft by an aerial torpedo while anchored in BUCKNER BAY. The dispatch states that the weather was clear, plane approached low on water and attacked undetected. Damage and casualties undetermined. V. Adm. Oldendorf and staff uninjured. He had shifted flag to the PENNSYLVANIA and now is returning flag to TENNESSEE. 2 OCL's (RICHMOND, CONCORD) and 12 DD's of TF 92 in an anti-shipping sweep of north KURILE Chain yesterday destroyed a total of 10 trawlers and one small mership. A simultaneous bombardment was conducted by TF 92 against MATSUNA, KURABU ZAKI and SURIBACHI starting many fires. Considerable return fire was received from KURABU ZAKI with no damage suffered by our forces, except machine gun hits (no casualties on DD's). TF 92 is now returning to ATTU.

On the 12th F6F's of FAF-1 fired a lighthouse in HANGCHIN YAN and destroyed a lighthouse-weather station at the tip of SHANTUNG PENINSULA. F6F planes attacked KYUSHU and nearby shipping targets on the 11th with about 575 aircraft. Attacks on shipping sank 8 AK plus 4 small craft and damaged 1 submarine, 2 transports, 1 lightship and 1 barge. Most of the shipping was sunk in the INLAND SEA. Other attacks were made on KURIJIMA with 159 tons of incendiaries, on TOSU railroad yards near KURI, east KYUSHU bridges (6 were hit and damaged), YAMAKA and IBUSUKI on the south tip of KYUSHU. Cover was furnished by 82 F-51a, 1 Zeke was downed and 2 P51c lost. 8 F4U's damaged a bridge and a lighthouse on YAKU SHIMA, and strafed TOKUNO airfield.

At 0900 Admiral Sherman and party departed for conference at MANILA.

13 August (Guam Date)

TF 38 retired to the southward during the night and commenced fueling at 0600 this morning at 32N, 142E. TF 37 (less 38.5) enroute to MANUS. Sweeping operations by 95-4 are underway in the SIKAHAY AREA. MinRon 20, fast minesweepers are proceeding toward TOKYO from BUCKNER BAY. CINCPAC reports that 4 carriers and 4 destroyers are now cruising in BAY OF BENGAL awaiting developments. Reports have been received from the PENNSYLVANIA stating that she has a large hole 30 feet long and 20 feet wide in bottom of ship, aft, that both starboard propeller shafts are broken and the inboard port shaft and rudder are damaged, that flooding was believed to be under control. BORIE (DD 704) with TF 38 was hit by suicide plane on 9 August 1945, reports the following casualties to ship's company: killed in action: 1 officer, 34 enlisted men; 13 enlisted men missing; 2 officer, 32 enlisted men wounded.
13 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

An incomplete flash report of the 1st 4 3rd Fleet strikes against the TOKYO area indicates that planes of TF 38 shot down 21 enemy aircraft (12 believed to be snipers and 9 Kamikazes), and destroyed 46 enemy aircraft on the ground plus 71 damaged. Bad weather in the morning improved as the day wore on. No enemy planes reached the force. A report on damage to ground targets, including electronic plants and airfields installations, is scheduled to follow. PAF planes flew 675 - 700 strikes over KYUSHU, MIYAZAKI, and sea areas on the 12th. The heaviest attacks were at YATSUYAMA (KYUSHU). In attacks on shipping 12 small and medium AKs were sunk, and 1 claimed CA (in TSUSIMA STRAITS), 1 A6, 6 small AKs, and 3 luggers were damaged. 137 F4F's and F-38s attacked KYUSHU bridges, destroying 2 and damaging 2. KAKOYA and CHIYAN airfields were heavily attacked. 3 enemy aircraft were shot down. In one encounter 10 F5A-1s shot down 30-40 A6s and shot down 1. All but 4 Franks fled. 26 YAM 2 Franks hit YATSUYAMA drone in northern KYUSHU, flying more than 500 nautical miles to the target in their first AMASA attack. They used 167 rockets and strafed. 1 enemy aircraft was exploded on the ground and others were probably disabled. Somewhere to assist building targets were also strafed.

Admiral Sherman and party returned from conference at HONOLULU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 11059 (pink) warns CINCPAC to alert 1 FCT from 6th Marine Division for immediate occupation duty if required.

ALICEA MOSCOW 111344 (pink) advises that entry and exit of U.S. forces into TANGANYKA STRAIT depends on exchanges of liaison groups and development of system of recognition signals.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120111 (pink) requests early action on HURST NAVYARD proposal.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120122 (pink) requests complete data on status of 3 FCS (R) reported to have been converted into communication ships.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120244 (pink) states that commanders of Fast Carrier Task Forces should take all practicable measures to insure that VC pilots on dusk CAP are capable of night landings.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120405 requests that pilots of OKINAWA based planes be briefed that friendly submarines are operating in JAPAN SEA, south of KOREA and in the vicinity of KYUSHU.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 120807 (pink) advises of and describes modifications of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS with respect to areas of responsibility of CINCPACFLT and COMTHFLEET.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (Gov)

14 August (Guan Date)

Report from Com3rdFleet at 0620 this morning states the THIRD FLEET is attacking the TOKYO Area. At 0730 KING time Com3rdFleet acknowledged receipt of orders from Fleet Headquart rs to suspend attack operations. TF 37 (less 38 S, British Carrier Group is proceeding to MUKOKO, 308 remaining in fueling area southeast of TOKYO, 954 is continuing sweeping of SHINKAN area. Additional vessels en route from BUNKER BAY ETA SHINKAN area daylight 16 August. Com3rdFleet has directed HUN 20 (fast mine sweers) to join TF 308 (oiler group). MUSH Dumbo plane rescue reported yesterday as being in TOKYO BAY has been confirmed. This Dumbo rescued three survivors of a torpold plane from the TATONDOGA. If four TAO-based fighters last yesterday attacking the ENFIELD, three were rescued, one by the sub TIGON just west of JAPAN HLS. The TIGON also reports that an otherwise dull day was relieved by bombardment of MIKIGA ISLAND resulting in ten hits in radio station 6 on light tower. SHIKISHIMA reports sinking 1 class submarine at 29N-12E after tracking it for 11 hours with 2 torpold hits out of 6. One prison rescued from wreckage.

On the 14th 725 effective B-29s attacked 6 targets. 161 aircraft hit HIKARI ARSENAL, 148 hit OSAKA AMRY ARSENAL and 110 hit KANAGA RAILROAD YARDS (INAKURU, SW KYUSHU). No losses have been reported for any of these last day missions. There was no fighter opposition, and AA was nil to moderate. 135 aircraft hit KIPPOO CIR, REFINERY Co. at AKITA, 87 hit ISEZAKI UBER (NW TOKYO) and 82 hit KINAGAYA UBER (NW TOKYO), all by radar. Again there was no fighter opposition and no losses have been reported. AA was nil to moderate at all 3 targets. Reports of FAF activities on the 13th show 263 sorties flown. Ship/air attacks by B-24s and B-25s in TSUSHIMA STRAITS resulted in sinking 8 AMs and damaging 1 FTD. 48 P-47s on a sweep off KOREA report destroying 1 enemy aircraft over KAGETO, with 2 probably destroyed. 1 P-47 is missing. In a separate dispatch ComAF 5 reports that the CVE KAIYOC, attacked in ENHAN WAT (NE KYUSHU) by the 380th Bomb Group on the 9th, is now lying on her side. On the 13th 2nd NAV FAFs burned 1 x 75 and 1 x 100 ft. boats in the W. KYUUKO, and 1 operational B.26k on NAV airfield, KEKAI JIMA. FAF 1 planes damaged 1 SB and 1 SA in TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 14th. In the North Pacific 7 B-29s put 10,5 tons on KATACKA and NAVAHU airfields, and 2 Privateers hit KURABU with 24 x 1000 pounders.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 120246 enters forth responsibility for execution of Federal Foreign Propaganda program.

CINC BFP 121202 (pink) advises of plan to move 3 small British groups with air and logistics support to HONG KONG, SHANGHAI and possibly SINGAPORE.

CINCAPAC 121527 (pink) enters forth amendments to 3rd edition BLACKLIST plan; 24th Corps to be occupation force KOREA.

COMINCH AND CHC 122148 (pink) approves assembly personnel and material for operation to supply Chinese (FORT BAYARD plan).
14 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 140629 (pink) warns action and info addresses to be prepared to execute CAMPA on short notice, 5th PhibCor to be ordered to report to COMFIBB 5TH ARMY, designates Lt. Col. R. J. Truitt, as HilAirBase commander YOKOSUKA, Col. B. L. Smith HilAirBase commander SASEBO-HAGASAKI, instructs COMAIRPAC nominate ComAirBase KURE, Capt C. J. Dufek designated CINCPAC CHIEF NAVY CHAIN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 140629 (pink) instructs COMAIRPAC at earliest possible date pass to COMMILLOGPAC all remaining functions as senior Naval Commander JAPP.

CINC JAP 140629 (pink) deals with logistics necessary in connection with Admiralty plan to send British naval forces to HKG KONG.

CINCPAC 141455 (pink) advises that vessel loaded with materials and personnel for construction of bulk aviation gas facilities TOKYO is on route from MARILA, requests water facilities at KINAWA and TOKYO be provided.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 142304 orders cessation of offensive operations against Japanese forces, continues searches and patrols, maintain defensive and internal security measures.

15 August (Guam Date)

Swan songs of the submarines: During the last few days of hostilities ARGONAUT, in EAST CHINA SEA destroyed a junk by gunfire SHIME KOSHIKI (this on the 12th) on the 11th, FOMFRET in EAST CHINA SEA sank sea truck off FUNAIKI SHIMA and on the 13th an empty cargo junk in SAKSHU KAIKYO both by gunfire (FW total 23 Japs and 7 KOREANS), LAMPSY in JAVA SEA sank 1 junk, 1 lugger, PARDO in SEA OF JAPAN sank small AK on 10th, CAVALLA was attacked by unidentified long range bomb at noon yesterday in 35-40°N, 141-20°E, bomb missed 100 yards astern, no damage, COBY reported at noon yesterday from 40°-140°N that she had successfully exited from the SEA OF JAPAN via LA PERouse STRAIT at the surface, APA 126 (LA ORANGE) in BUCKNER BAY was hit in superstructure amidships by suicide plane at 1745 IST on evening of 13th. Fire was soon brought under control. Considerable structural damage resulted. TF 38, while retiring southeast yesterday, was being heckled by numerous bogies. At 1323 JTF 3rd Flt reported that he was continuing to splinter those approaching the force and that so far the count on such was 5 since noon. The force is operating at economical speed in an area southeast of TOKYO, with 30.8 and 112.2 further to the south. CINCPAC in DUKE OF YORK and accompanying DD's joined TG 38.5 this morning. Regimental Combat Team of 5th Marines departed JAP last evening in 5 APA's (LST 1) escorted by 3 DD's, to report to COM3rdFlt for duty on 18th. OZARK (LST 2) with Brig. General Clements and Headquarter Task Force 146, 6th Marine Division, embarked, accompanied by SHADWELL (LST 15) and 2 DD's are enroute to report COM3rdFlt for duty. ETA noon on 17th.

Prior to the receipt of CINCPAC's order to cease offensive operations planes of the THIRD Fleet encountered about 45 Jap fighters over CHOSU, ATSUGI, and SAGAMI WAN, shooting down 26 of them. On the ground at KYANGAHARA 5 unidentified enemy aircraft were destroyed. During the morning and early afternoon the CAP shot down 8 enemy aircraft approaching the force, and a DD shot down 1. Total enemy aircraft shot down was 35 - total destroyed 40.

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Final figures on the THIRD Fleet attacks on the 13th show 422 enemy aircraft put out of action on that day: 19 shot down, 258 destroyed on ground and 149 damaged on ground. The percentage of casualties was very high. Nagano loaded with over 100 trainers was wiped absolutely clean. 18 classes (181) were destroyed and 1 damaged; 8 cruisers were destroyed and 22 damaged. In the ground 14 locomotives were destroyed and 5 damaged; 11 hangars were destroyed and 5 damaged; 13 industrial buildings, 7 airfield shops, and 5 warehouses were damaged. In 1167 offensive and 444 CA sorties on that day we lost 20 aircraft (12 combat), with 6 pilots and 2 aircrews. In the 14th PAF planes in 105 sorties sank 3 AF, 1 sloop, and 2 small craft, and damaged 1 "I", 2 flak boats, 7 small AF, and a large number of small craft. We lost 3 "476s, with 1 pilot recovered. 7 "729s on 14th August dropped 5.5 million leaflets telling the Japanese people the terms of the Jap surrender offer and the reply of Secretary of State Byrnes, plus the terms of the JCSSTAD declaration. The populated centers - TYORK, KOB, OSAKA, KYOTO, etc. got most, but all islands were covered. 2 B-29s on the 15th and 4 on the 16th are scheduled to drop 4 million leaflets on 31 major cities, keeping the Japanese people up to date on negotiations. In the North Pacific on the 14th 2 Privates attacked PARAMUS, and 6 P-24s put 135 tons of incendiary clusters on KASHI-WABARA staging area, starting a large fire.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 152310 (pink) requests Japanese to send ship to rendezvous with Halsey and lead him to SAGAMI BAY.

CINCPAC & CINCPAC ADVANCE 150213 congratulates General MacArthur on appointment as Supreme Commander.

MARRASSU 142318 (pink) informs addressee to British Chief of Staff have issued instructions to Admiral Fraser for acceptance of Japanese surrender in HONGKONG and have asked concurrence of U.S. Chiefs of Staff on instructions to Mountbatten which are set forth in full.

COMINCH and CNO 15000 advising State Department of Japanese sets forth full text of reply.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150206 (pink) sets forth changes in BLACKLIST staff: study.

CTF 95 150215 sets forth recommendations for dissolution T0 95,5, abolish title COMNAV KYUKUS assignment of CTF 99 duties set forth in CTF 95 OpPlan 3-45.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 150216 (pink) advises that Halsey acknowledged receipt orders for cessation of air attacks at 142130 August but that initial attack was under way when directive was received by CINCPAC.

CINCPAC 150245 (pink) sets forth priorities on allocation of airborne troop lift for Phase one of BLACKLIST.

CINCPAC 150305 (pink) warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation COM GHQ 6th and 8th Armies and 21th Corps directed to expedite arrangements with 5th, 3rd, 7th Amphibious representatives, and all action addressees are instructed to initiate the execution of operations to occupy JAPAN and KORE.

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SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED ARMIES 150355 instructs Japanese authorities designate radio station in TOKYO for use between headquarters. Station JUN on frequency 13705 Kc be used in future.

CINC PAC ADVANCE 150620 requests immediate dispatch to Japanese authorities that any Japanese aircraft approaching our naval disposition must be destroyed for defense purposes.

CINC PAC ADVANCE 150846 sets forth in detail naval requirements in addition to those contained in BLACKLOT.

CINC PAC ADVANCE 150842 enjoins officers to conduct themselves properly in their treatment of Japanese.

CINC PACCAP 151333 (pink) advises that accomplishment of occupation mission the U.S. zone of KOREA will require 1 additional Army Division if KOREA is occupied, states that occupation of SHANGHAI by 2 divisions of 3rd Army Corps is feasible barring unforeseen developments, recommends that any other occupation on CHINA COAST be U.S. forces be subordinate to primary operations.

CINC PAC 151842 warns of intense activities along shores of JAPAN WAU probably organized prior surrender but possibly indicating contaminated treachery.

SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED ARMIES 150503 directs cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces notification of effective date and hour of such cessation directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send representative and sets forth means for this representatives to reach PACTIA.

16 August (Guam Date)

At 0200 Admiral Sherman and party departed for Manil conference with Japanese Representatives.

SEA SCOUT sank small coastal vessel on 15th in the GULF OF THAILAND.

CARBONERA destroyed 4 schooners, 2 junks, 2 sampans off the MALAY COAST prior to 15 August. TIPPER and TRUMP (British) sank 15 junks and 1 patrol vessel all before 9th in vicinity of south of JAVA. PLACCE exploded 12 mines in last 4 days, vicinity 32-28N, 128-12E. TIPPER was forced down, bombed and depth charged by Japanese plane at 1845 (I)-9) yesterday, 16th. TORSAX sank 2 HIKURA Frigates before final bell with torpedoes in the SEA OF JAPAN. ATULX exploded a frigate with 1 hit on morning of 15th and possibly scored 1 or 2 hits on another frigate after 165-mile chase also in JAPAN SEA. BAILOA sank one picket and beached another in TONIWAN on 14th. All submarines south of KURILES except 1 off BUNGO SUIDO and 1 off KII Suido for life guard duty are being returned to base. For present submarines are remaining on station in YELLOWS SEA, EAST CHINA SEAS, SEA OF JAPAN and in northern KURILES AREA. Apparently some enemy submarines continue their attacks. HEALY (DD 672) reported submarine contact at 75-13N, 144-19E at 0952 (-10) on 16 August. Challenge unanswered, HEALY made 3 attacks, and there are indications of damage to sub. Additional DD's have been sent to the scene. Clearing of SHINây of mines progress despite breakers during the nights of 14th and 15th. TF 38 is operating in vicinity of POINT READY, and replenishment ships in vicinity of POINT DRINK.
TOP SECRET

AUGUST (Cont'd)

16 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC 141101 (pinky) states amendment in BLACKLIST plan, substituting 5th Amphibious Corps for 1st Army Corps in SADIKI-HAGATNA area. Remove 27th Division from 24th Corps for use in D-60.

MACARTHUR 150529 (pinky) announces assumption of command of Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces by General MacArthur. Announces channel of communication with Japanese Imperial Government will through MacArthur Headquarters.

COMCINCPAC 150930 recommends that JCS be requested on V-J day to remove restriction imposed on Hawaiian Area by modifying category defense B.

COMINCH AND CNO AND JCS U.S. ARMY 152127 (pinky) suggests in view of Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison groups at Khabarovsk and Vladivostok be modified. Suggests provide liaison representatives with Cruiser to deal with Russian command in whatever Asiatic port appears desirable. Mentions possibility of Dairen but warns that occupation of that port is not to be communicated to Soviets at this time.

JCS 160045 (pinky) directs CINCPAC to release to full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160250 (pinky) advises that Rear Admiral Sherman will proceed to Manila to represent CINCPAC during meeting with Japanese representatives. States intention to send a liaison group headed by a flag officer to represent CINCPAC at CINCPAC headquarters at Tokyo Area.

CNO SAKUR 160433 (pinky) refers to FORT HAYARD operation. Announces assignment of officers from FABU 13, announces receipt of designation of 7 LTFs. States intention to begin loading on arrival.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160724 (pinky) suggests cancellation of exchange of flag officers between CINCPAC headquarters and FABU and Soviets at Vladivostok in lieu thereof Admiral Settle to be provided with Cruiser and proceed initially to Vladivostok.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 160809 (pinky) sets forth naval facilities required to be furnished at (A) Yokosuka (B) Chiniato (C) Hiroshima (D) Sasebo.

KUANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS 161117 advises Soviets that Japanese forces of Kuantung Army have ceased all military movements and requests Soviets cease their attacks. States forth procedure for maintaining communications.

CINCPAC 161141 (pinky) states that CINCPAC has no further need for military liaison group for Khabarovsky, inquires if project shall be continued in these circumstances.

WAROOS 161608 sets forth agreement by Japanese of receipt of messages from U.S. Government and MacArthur. Sets forth steps which are being taken in response thereto.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GT)

18 August (Quasi Date)

War is not yet over for some of our subs. In SEA OF JAPAN reports that
the fallen enemy is maintaining day and night air patrol of SEA OF JAPAN and that
she has been dunked four times and bombed once since the 16th. This is report
of the PIERS. Enemy submarines also are reported. Merchant ship (KAMITE MAIT) on a westerly course at ten knots sighted submarine at 1430(-10) yesterday at
10-24W, 134-52E. The submarine was sighted 500 yards on ships port quarters,
remained partially surfaced for two minutes, then submerged. No indication of
hostility. A DE has been ordered to investigate and take offensive action if
and as may prove necessary. A plane of Fleet Air Wing ONE at 1430(-9) yesterday
sighted an unidentified submarine 21N-121-455 on a southerly course, moved between
6 and 10 knots, running decks awash. OTP 95 has directed Fleet Air Wing ONE
to attack the submarine if it proceeds south of 27-20N. TF 38 is replenishing
again today. BatDivs 3 and 4 (less MARLYLAND) have been assigned to the THIRD
Fleet and are being assembled at PUCKER BAY ty August 22 as TG 32.90. TF 33,
TOKYO Occupation Force, RAAdM, Badger in IONA with SAN DIEGO, 6 APA, 1 AKA, 1 LIV,
1 LSD, 6 RMS, 6 APD and DesDiv 106 has been directed to conform to the movements
of TF 38 and remain within T3C range until otherwise directed.

JNP (HDO TOKYO) 170212 requests that Allied forces refrain from approaching
the home waters of JAPAN proper until sufficient time has elapsed for the cease
fire order to have been fully effectuated.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED FORCES 170711 confirms the impression of
Japanese GHQ that the tasks of the representatives in Manila does not include
signing of surrender agreement. Orders them to act without further delay.

MACARTUR 171337 quotes messages nos. 5 and 7 from Japanese GHQ; no. 5 advises Soviet forces still on offensive, requests steps to be taken to bring this
offensive to a halt. No. 7 advises that the parties for CHINA, MANCHURIA and the
south left on 17 August.

JACOOS 171907 quotes broadcast from Khabarovsk to CC KHANTUNG Army suggesting that Japanese cease military action at 1200 20 August, whereupon Soviet forces
also will cease.

COMINCH AND CNO CHIEF OF STAFF 161940 (pink) proposes cancellation of
Army, Navy liaison groups for Khabarovsk and Vladivostok with Russia in view of
termination of hostilities. Instructs military mission MOSCOW contain Soviet
concurance.

COMINT CHINA 170615 (pink) passes along Chinese request that the term
MANCHURIA be defined as including LIAONING, KARIN and HEILUNGKIANG but not JAPAN,
which Chinese consider integral part of CHINA.
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18 August (Guam Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADVANCE 170906 (pink) instructs CINCPAC and COM MARIANA to make plans and preparations to receive surrender of Japanese forces remaining in BONINs, MARIANAS, CAROLINAS and PAPUANAL. Refers to CINCPAC CRELAM 12-45.

Preliminary plans to be made for activation naval air fields at YAF and YATC for use of NAFs.

CINCPAC 171045 (pink) advises that J3. J3. 5181 has been passed to COMPHIBSPAC who is asked to submit best estimate earliest possible date for movement to CHINA.

COMG 41 WUISTAF 180920 (pink) states WUISTAF desire to reserve right to review current construction projects in light of post V-J, requirements for V-J and to propose construction which may be required.

19 August (Guam Date)

Merchant ship sighted supposed enemy submarine eastbound on surface at 01-09W, 132-19E. Plans of FAW Sub sighted another submarine yesterday morning in same location as previous day (28W, 120-50E) and also on southerly course, speed 6-10 knots. Search is being conducted by 2 DD's. JPD on her 17th war patrol in South CHINA SEA and JAVA SEA ending August 4 sunk 23 junks and an oil barge for a total of 2200 tons sunk. Progress of clearing SAMPAY area continues.

THIRD Fleet is continuing to replenish today. TF 34 is being reform to TF 38, 2nd Carrier Task Force, and TF 39, 1st Carrier Task Force. Aboard the LSVY yesterday, Japanese officers representing the Chief Commander of MILLE tentatively accepted unconditional surrender terms, subject to approval of MILLE Commander. The terms were presented by Captain R. B. Crow, acting for Rear Admiral Harrill (ComVоро-Gila). Japanese were given 48 hours in which to communicate with Imperial Headquarters for final instructions.

MARCOM 190023 (pink) sets forth President Truman's attitude toward acceptance of surrender of HONGKONG by British Officer.

COM3RDFLEET 190219 (pink) sets forth in detail Com3rdFleet's alternative plans for landing of marines in coordination with 11th Airborne.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 192113 (pink) contains instructions for MacArthur and Wedemeyer concerning arrangements for surrender of HONGKONG with British Officer.
20 August (Julu Date)

The Third Fleet is continuing to replenish and reform today. Replenishment will be concluded by dusk. "USS TRISTAN, INTREPID and CAGS XIX, are escorting 9 DD's sorted ENTER 0 at dawn today for joint REAP to join THIRD FLEET. REAP is dawn 25 August. Sweeping of the southern half of the JIMAY area will be finished 25 August. Information concerning the axis, depth and spacing of this minelaid was obtained from the Japanese representatives at "PALA." Information concerning enemy submarines also was obtained from these envoys. 6 subs are at sea: 3 near OKINAWA, 2 in the vicinity of the "PALA" and 2 near TRUK. On the 16th these submarines were ordered to cease hostilities and return to base. This order was repeated on the 18th. However, yesterday morning a plane of PD 16 reported an enemy submarine at 14-14N, 147-42W, submerged with periscope showing, on a course of 60 degrees. The periscope disappeared after 8 seconds. Also a late dispatch from COMHILSEAPLAN reports an attack by DD 387 on a good sonar contact at 21-45N, 127-30E early morning of 21st. This attack was made after failure of submarine to answer challenge. The Japanese Commander of HILL ATOLL has displayed a signal indicating he was ready to sign the instrument of unconditional surrender. Arrangements are being made to effect the surrender aboard a DK at noon on the 26th.

The Japanese envoys departed "PALA" for JAPAN at 1000 yesterday.

AAMCC 1023132 (pink) advises representatives of Australia, Canada, France, Netherlands and the Netherlands to attend Japanese surrender unit at later Department's request to confer on future arrangements accordingly.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED FORCES 190050 (pink) contains official text of (1) Proclamation by Emperor of Japan accepting "FUDAKU" terms, (2) Instrument of surrender. (3) General Order Number 1 containing directions from Imperial General Headquarters to all areas commanders in Japan and abroad to cease hostilities and surrender to appropriate commanders. Order also covers disarmament, status of police force, resumption of information, disposition of ships, minesfields etc.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED FORCES 191047 (pink) requests MACUSA and OCC Australian Military forces to arrange between themselves areas in which each will receive surrender of Japanese forces.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED FORCES 17/16 (pink) agenda paragraph in General Order Number 1 dealing with surrender of forces on VMEIC mainland, KURAFUTI and KURILE TALITION to OCC Soviet forces.

21 August (Julu Date)

To avoid the typhoon, THIRD Fleet units moved to the southward yesterday, and at dusk return to assigned areas to the north. No reports of surrenders of enemy submarines yet. A merchant ship sighted a periscope yesterday afternoon at 12-39N, 125-30E. A floating mine resembling a barrel was exploded by straining late yesterday afternoon at 21-21N, 127-50E. This is just 19 miles to the eastward of the sonar contact made by the destroy 0TH early yesterday. Aviation personal rescued by submarines since 28 May totaled 227, of these 47 were from carriers, a total of 36 were Navy and 145 were Army.

- continued -
TOP SECRET
August (GFT)

21 August (Guam Date) (Cont'd)

The Japanese Government has been informed that the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers will accept the surrender of the Japanese armed forces in
TOKYO BAY on a United States Battleship on 2 September 1945, on 26 August an advance
party will arrive by air at ATSUCHI airdrome. U.S. Naval forces (led by a Japanese
ship) will arrive in SAGAMI BAY, and U.S. Naval Forces (with Japanese pilots) will
advance into TOKYO BAY. On 28 August, the main airborne force will commence
landing at ATSUCHI airdrome and Naval and Marine forces will land in the vicinity of
YOKOSUKA Naval Base. These forces will occupy and establish themselves at once
within a specifically designated area pending consummation of the formal surrender.
On 29 and 30 August these landings of airborne and naval forces will continue. On
31 August designated later, landing of airborne and naval landing forces will
continue; at an hour aboard a U.S. Battleship in TOKYO BAY the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers will receive from duly authorized representatives, the proclama-
tion signed by the Emperor and the instrument of surrender to be signed at this ceremony,
and immediately following the ceremony of surrender, these two documents together
with General Order No. 105 will be promulgated to the Japanese people.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 202137 (pink) advises that in view of large amount
of air seaborne traffic in the JAPAN and NORTH areas and throughout the PACIFIC
weather centers will be needed. Suggests that liaison to handle details of ship
and aircraft movement coordination be handled by liaison group aboard ship.

CINCICAC ADVANCE 210010 (pink) advises of concept of operations for landings
on CHINA COAST concurred in by representatives of CINCICAC, COMHERMIL, COMCHINA
and staff members of CINCICAC and sets forth concept in detail.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES 210941 (pink) changes surrender
date set forth in CHAP 517 from 21 August to 31 August. States instructions
received by SAC concerning acceptance of surrender in SOUTHEAST ASIA areas by
SAC and AUSTRALIAN and requests latter to arrive between themselves division
of the area.

22 August (Guam Date)

Units of the Third Fleet have completed replenishment, have returned for
the pending operations, and are operating at economical speed in areas assigned.
As of 20 August 460 mines plus 3 floaters have been swept in the SAGAMI Area. A
check sweep of the southern extremity of the area corroborated the information
received from the Japanese envoys at WACILA as to the southern limit of the mine-
field. Planel of Fleet Air Wing 18 reported a submarine yesterday morning, sub-
merged, at 1552 N, 152-51E. Destroyer Escorts CROOK and MILLS made depth
charge attacks on separate contact in vicinity of 21-22N, 127-19E. Contacts were
challenged prior to attacking. The CROOK evaluates these contacts as probably
non-submarine. Aboard the USS LYNX (DT 162) inside MILLE Lagoon, shortly after
yesterday, the Imperial Japanese Navy Commander of MILLE ATOLL surrendered un-
conditionally to Captain Crow, acting for Rear Admiral Harrill, Commander, Marshall
Gilberts Area, August 28 has been set for raising American Flag on main island
of the Atolls.

CINCAPAC 210517 (pink) concurs in putting in effect the General Provisions
of COMINCFLTS plan 2 with certain supplementary instructions.

- continued -
CINCPAC 220915 (pink) replying to CINCPAC CINCPAC 5250 (not held) states that CINCPAC has made no estimate for any service troops to support marine forces available for CHINA COAST operation.

CINCPAC 220915 (pink) states assumption of CHINA THEATER representatives concerning availability logistics support and personnel lift of occupation forces for CHINA THEATER.

CINCPAC 220915 (pink) states that disarmed Japanese military personnel may be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by naval commanders pending arrangements to return them to their homes in accordance with KUJITAM proclamation.

CINCPAC 220915 (pink) states that CINCPAC 220915 (pink) sets forth CINCPAC opplan 11-45.

CINCPAC 220929 (pink) sets forth Annex A to CINCPAC opplan 11-45.

CINCPAC 220929 (pink) sets forth Annex B to CINCPAC opplan 11-45.

CINCPAC 220929 (pink) sets forth Annex C to CINCPAC opplan 11-45.

CINC PAC ADVANCE 220729 (pink) advises that operation MAJESTIC is suspended indefinitely.

CINCPAC 221200 (pink) advises that to the knowledge of the Generalissimo no negotiations between CHINA and JAPAN concerning British operations in KOREA/CHINA area.

CINCPAC 221210 (pink) advises CINCPAC and CINCPAC that necessary military coordination between British and CHINA relative to occupation of KOREA/CHINA by British is not being made.

CINCPAC 221335 (pink) states that command responsibility as agreed to at KUJITAM will become effective with formal surrender. Commander Allied Naval Forces CHINA will be abolished and all naval forces except U.S. will pass under British control.

CINCPAC 221335 (pink) sets forth in detail plans for movement of central government troops into strategic areas in CHINA to cope with the problems of orderly surrender and preservation of law and order.
23 August (Okinawa)

Third Fleet is operating at economical speed in an area southeast of \textit{Okinawa} (HD 670) made a submarine contact at 21-77N, 149-12E early yesterday morning. The submarine fired a yellow flare. Its attack was made by the NORTON. Continued Fleet has directed CGB 10-8 to conduct an air and surface search of the area, and CGB 30-4 to search the area from ores of contact toward NEPTUNE. If the submarine is located, it will either surrender immediately or be destroyed.

OCTOBER 230536 (pilot) advises that OCTOBER had been instructed to hold \textit{Nakajima} forces at \textit{Hitokapi} or other convenient ports pending further orders, and to continue to maintain a view on training Jap submarine.

JOINT STAFF OF STAFF 230536 advises that no further action is desired with respect to \textit{Nakajima} project.

OCTOBER AND CGB 230535 note forth presidential directive to all concerned to take necessary action to prevent release of any information concerning Atlantic Bank.

CHURCHILL (pilot) advises that he is acquainted with Admiral \textit{Nakajima} for naval policy support, that \textit{Nakajima} AERODROME DIVISION and air support liaison officers.

CHURCHILL 230535 notes forth schedule of return of aircraft corps and steered to U.S. when relieved or released.

CHURCHILL 230539 notes after schedule of return of aircraft corps and steered to U.S. when relieved or released.

CHURCHILL 230533 advises CHURCHILL has been instructed that a plane will continue plan 2. Illustrates CHURCHILL to arrange with Admiral \textit{Nakajima} for naval policy support, that \textit{Nakajima} AERODROME DIVISION and air support liaison officers.

CHURCHILL 230539 advised CHURCHILL of number of officers of \textit{Allied} Forces correspondents etc. who will be present on \textit{Nakajima} for surrender ceremony.

OCTOBER AND CGB 230536 note forth view of CHURCHILL on proposal for grandstand \textit{Nakajima} on \textit{Nakajima} to provide events. Advises that ship will be turned to \textit{Nakajima} for docking and limited repair.

CHURCHILL 230536 considers implications to circumstances at circumstances at base to merchant service. Influence of \textit{Nakajima} air base service would establish termination date for operations and campaigns in progress. States belief that \textit{Nakajima} Guard and must remains on merchant ships for the time being.

CHURCHILL 230537 considers in use of Hospital ships for evacuation of WAKE and \textit{Nakajima}.
21 August (Cossack)

Units of the THIRD FLEET are operating in designated areas to the north of the strategic area and east of Point PLEIST. TF 30 has proceeded to operating areas in coastal waters north and south of JUKO. Later in the day, units will be proceeding to Point PLEIST, rendezvous point for entrance plan. All force, group, and unit commanders have been given full discretion in taking action to avoid the path of the storm.

TF 34-36 (Inland, Midwaters), with Battleships 3 and 4, is en route to Point PLEIST for fueling, 20 August. KITANO destroyer is on station between JUKO and JUKO for air-see rescue duty.

Japanese CIIC reports to FCAP that four merchant vessels were attacked and sunk by a submarine, presumably Russian, on 23 August in the coastal waters of northern ESKIMA.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246271 deals with the establishment of onshore and surface air-see rescue services within area of responsibility of CINCPOA.

JCC 232100 (plink) directs Vosper to inform Macklin when British have coordinated arrangements for surrender of KUNMUN with him and with the Chinese; advice that British will provide facilities through KUHNUN area for assistance and support of Chinese and Allied forces in CHINA.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246272 (plink) directs addresses to comply with OpPlan for occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and ESKIMA as soon as practicable.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 2462727 deals with implementation, operational control, and logistical support of Marine Fighter groups, naval search and transport squadrons.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246272 requests dispatch advice of text of Annex No. 11 of CINCPOA Operations Instructions No. 4.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246272 advises that necessary arrangements to accomplish surrender of Japanese forces in KUHNUN to British are to be made directly between Rear Admiral Harcourt, General Macklin, and Chinese Board of Military Operations. Contains supplemental instructions.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246272 expresses CINCPOA desire concerning conditions associated major ships in TOKYO BAY.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246276 directs addresses to nominate a CINCPOA for temporary duty in 7th Fleet.

CINCPOA ADVANCE 246276 states CINCPOA intention that CINCPOA in Assistant waters be commanded by R. Adm. A. C. Davis, and that ships be those best prepared for extended service.
The schedule for the entrance and occupation of the TOKYO BAY AREA has been postponed 2 days because of the typhoon over the BEPPEL. Plan calls are in the zone assigned south and east of the TOKYO BAY AREA, operating at discretion to avoid the path of the storm. TO 19-1 and 21A are in central waters to the north and east of TOKYO, TO 20-3 to the north and west of TOKYO. With 20-3 to the WAFP, which sustained damage to the forward end of the flight deck from heavy seas in the typhoon. OYX 31 (V.SN. Wiltshire) with Captain HMB 10 (EBB 28) with Constab 11th Corps 1st Cavalry Division and 111st Cavalry BRT established has reported to ConstabPAC for duty and to evacuate from PHILIPPINES to SMHNET BAY entrance, ENOOSO 3 September. With approval of KFAK a Japanese relief vessel departed TOKIOKA for MARCUS 14000 (Y-9) 25 August on direct course ENOOSO 14000 (Y-9) 20 August. Departed MARCUS 14000 (Y-9) 29 August, ENOOSO 14000 (Y-9) 1 September. Vessel is destroyer type with explosives removed, gun inoperative. This vessel has been granted safe passage. OYX 131 (Bulldozer) with 2 90, 2 CL, 4 DD, 1 AB, 7 SB, 1 AA and 9 AHS reports that he intends to sail TO 110 to arrive off KIAHOKI daybreak 25 August. He will endeavor to bring Japanese Naval and Military representatives on board on 29 August and to enter KIAHOKI harbor as soon as arrangements have been made to preserve law and order. Final surrender to take place on 16 September subject to the surrender to the Supreme Commander having been effected.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250039 (pink) asks when ships of 40N will occupy and control coastal waters of JAPAN.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250039 (pink) advises that KMO IIbb Leptin from CINCPAC and recommends that if Redman seize KIIJO, FUSAR be substituted as objective.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250039 (pink) modifies OpPlan 13-45 with respect to organization of mobile service forces.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250039 (pink) requests concurrence proposed date for Combined Forces to assume responsibility to senior naval commander 40N.

OCCUPY AND CNO 250046 (pink) advises that proposed set-up of areas in Alternate U.S. Naval Jurisdiction as set forth in OBAJUHE 10/26/45 was for planning purposes.

OCCUPY JIA 250753 (pink) asks whether composition of Marine Corps will be adequate for service functions in SHANGHAI AREA.

OCCUPY JIA 250830 (pink) states assumptions of SHANGHAI will be accomplished by Chinese while Marines occupy TAKU and TAIWAN, further assume Marines to be self-supporting. Advice that entire air support can be furnished by CINCPAC THEATER. Port of SHANGHAI will be operated with resources intended for 40N BAY.

CINCPAC 251111 reiterates guidance concerning in utilization of resources must be last priority in occupation of JAPAN, 2nd to 40NIA and review at length plans and CINCPAC attitude toward operations in other areas.

- continued -
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES 250608 postpones all dates for occupation operations for 48 hours.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 250907 recommends that JCS directive 093/5 be revised so that all logistic support for strategic air forces be made away responsibility.

CINCPAC 251101 reports in proposal for transfer of responsibilities senior Naval Office SWPA as indicated in COM UNIFIL LOG 5.

CINCPAC 251309 states CINCPAC attitude toward repatriation and opinion that it is advisable to initiate repatriation of Japs on WAKE and MARUS prior to 3 September.

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES 25 2307CJ advises that JMP will coordinate evictions of POW TOKYO AREA, requests 3rd Fleet not to undertake unilateral action.

26 August (Gunn Date)

At 0000(−9) at a point 20 miles southeast of O-SHENNA a Japanese ship is scheduled to meet units of the THIRD FLEET, transfer ammunition to the SHENNA via KURUMOTO, and load them into SAGAMI WAI in the following order: Task Group 30.1 (Fleet Flagship Group), Task Group 30.2 (British Flagship Group), Task Force 35 (including Task Group 35.10) (Support Force) plus GTO 35.6 in SEI JUNE, Task Force 37 (British Support Force), Task Force 31 (TOKUSKA Occupation Force). Fugitive cover for these units will be provided by GTO 36.4. Rear Adm. Hall (NEW 33) with Vice Adm. Williams (COM 3rdPHIBFOR 33) accompanying, Transports 28 and Tetravoy 65 with COMALLTHE FORCE 1st Cavalry Division, and 15th Cavalry FLOT deployed en route TOKYO area to arrive 3 September. INNISFAIL, CASABLANCA and four destroyers have been detached from Task Force 30 to proceed to INNISFAIL FLOT arriving 30 August to report to Commander SEVENTH FLEET for duty.

SAP 260419 (pink) states that indications are that initial movement of light assault troops of 7th Division can take place departing O-SHENNA 4 September arriving HELIO on the 7th, to be followed with heavier equipment, actual occupation of HELIO to take place on 11 September.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260827 (pink) advises that Corps Troops are scheduled to land with Marine units in North SHENNA and that if this plan is followed no similar CINCPAC units will be available to use at SHANGHAI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260908 (pink) advises of plan to activate WAKE as Naval Air Base under COMSHIN, instructs COMHUAL, COMSHIN, COMHREAD, and COMHREAD to nominate commander NAV WAKE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260907 (pink) cancels 260906 except to MARUS and places inland within cognizance of COM MARUS.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260901 (pink) advises CINCPAC that AAA units required in his 251309 are not available and gives reasons.

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26 August (Same Date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC 250510 advises of forces available for taking surrender
RABaul, OCEAN and RABIN.

CINCPAC 250510 advises of intent to sail 1611-2 to arrive off
KURE 28 August and receive Japanese naval and military representatives on 29
August to accept final surrender (subject to surrender to SCAP have been
accepted) on 1 September.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 260763 asks if TACHIBANA can make trip to WAKE or
MARCUS returning with full load of Japanese without reconvening.

SCAP 261169 states policy with respect to surrender of aliens and
natives must be turned in and policy is to request Japanese officials to attend
surrender ceremony without arms to avoid necessity of tender of arms.

SCAP 261169 states desire of SCAP that senior Japanese commanders
formally surrender to designated representatives of CINCPAC (subject to final
surrender) as follows: in PHILIPPINES to CINCPAC/PH, at Manila;
in the KYUSHU to COMZENTEN; in KOREA to CINCPAC/FORCES.

CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER ONZ AFFPAC 260436 advises that representative of
CINCPAC would board MISSOURI in TOKYO to install HF radio equipment and
message center for CINCPAC.

MARCO 262006 advises that designation of CINCPAC ships to receive surrender
in KYUSHU is contrary to provisions of General Order Number One.

CINCPAC and ONZ 251555 outlines tentative ultimate postwar disposition
of units of Pacific Fleet.

27 August (Same Date)

A plane of Fleet Air Wing 18 sighted a periscope early yesterday afternoon
at 0920Z, 180-15S (2.5 mi. off KUC). Yesterday morning, carrier planes of 351.
sighted a submarine flying the Japanese ensign and a black flag at 35-45 150-12.
About 40 minutes later a second Japanese submarine, also flying the national
ensign and a black flag was sighted at 37-46 140-12. B-47s were dispatched to
intercept both subs and board them. The same time 3200Z was directed to
send a prize crew for each submarine to relieve the temporary boarding parties.
Sims then be brought to SAGAMIHARA WGP. A Destroyer and Destroyer Escort
were departing GUMM today for TOKYO to conduct preliminary negotiations for surrender.
Negotiations for the surrender of ROTA, PALAU, MARCUS and JALAPA are already
underway. RAdm. Harcourt, RN, CTO 111-2 in ENTRAPABLE is to order KURE
tomorrow, August 28th to accept the Japanese surrender of KURE and KURUMAN on behalf of
the United Kingdom, subsequent to the general surrender ceremony at TOKYO.
Destroyer reports that they intercepted a plain language message from
MARSHALLS reporting KURE's landings on the 26th. Japanese Destroyer and the
3rd Fleet of the 3rd Fleet at O-SHAKA at 0800 yesterday as scheduled and the transfer of rep-
resentatives to the MUSUMI was effected without incident. TP 31 commenced

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3314
27 Aug 45 (Cont'd)

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contacting submarines yesterday. If clearing of American coastal mines has been satisfactorily completed, the - in the North and destroyers will enter off. They will move into Tokyo Bay 30 August.

CINCORPAC 267220 outlines CINCORPAC plans to enter OMAHA with TF 92 on 9 August with air cover by TF 49.

CINCPAC 270711 reports contact with Japanese 40 of OMAHA to pick up Japanese emissaries, pilots and interpreters.

JCS 271944 (pink) confirms British assumption that Japanese commanders will be required to furnish information direct to representatives of the allied commanders.

DEANE 261320 (pink) contains certain conditions to instrument of surrender of Japanese required by USSR.

CINCORPAC ADVANCE 261713 (pink) warns of preparation for operation HIJIMA with target date 30 September 1945.

CINCORPAC ADVANCE 270809 (pink) outlines for planning purposes only tentative logistic plans for naval and marine forces HIJIMA (part 4, Annex E, OpPlan 12-45).

CINCORPAC ADVANCE 270122 (pink) advises flag officers that questions concerning dispositions and use of captured or occupied territory are political and that unless government policy has been announced high ranking officers are prohibited from expressing their own opinions.

CINCPAC 270513 (pink) notes fourth 7th Fleet Op Order 1-45 for operations in SWPA.

CINCPAC 270725 (pink) directs action addresses to secure logistic responsibilities 7th FIA, further directs CINCPAC 7 furnish logistic requirements to naval units in SWPA.

COMMAGNA 271920 (pink) concurs in inclusion of a reduced strength MAN for Marine Corps operations in Tientsin or Peiping area of North China.

COMMAGNA 271930 (pink) concurs in recommendation that decision date of certain landings in North China will be in Tientsin or PEIPING, and that henceforth reference will be to TIENTSIN AREA.

COMMAGIAC 271949 (pink) confirms assumption that any information required of Japanese Commanders shall be delivered direct to representatives of Allied Commanders.
26 August (Date)

Admiral Harada, Admiral Sherman and party left for TOKO.

No word has been received on actual location of units in the SAGAMI BAY- TOKO BAY area. However, TF 31 should be inside TOKO BAY with the heavy ships moving in today. In addition to the two Japanese submarines which surrendered yesterday and are on route to SAGAMI BAY with prize crews, the MUSHIMO (DD 595) captured a third submarine at 39-10W, 144-6E, has put a prize crew aboard, and is escorting it to TOKO. One of the submarines which surrendered yesterday discharged 2000 tons, has two decks and is equipped for catapult planes and submarines. Com/PhilSeaPac relieved Com/PhFlot of all duties as Senior Naval Officer in PHIL, except those as Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA. Task designation of PhilSeaPac is now TF 78. Com/PhFlot departed Manila yesterday in MINNEAPOLIS with Group 6, to rendezvous with ComFlot 16 off OKINAWA. Mine-sweeping group has departed Philipines for sweeping operation at KEIZO on west coast of KOREA. A CVE group will provide air cover. Two Australian cruisers, SHROPSHIRE and HOBART with two DD's are on route to TOKO to participate in surrender ceremonies. With planes in the air and DD's firing salutes, RAdm. Harrell yesterday witnessed U.S. colors hoisted at MILLE ATOLL.

COMINCH 261225 (pink) expresses desirability for TF 78 units to enter SHANGHAI at earliest possible date, request comment on practicability mine-sweeping and enter by 15 September; states that occupation of SHANGHAI by Chinese troops will proceed on schedule

COMINCH AND COM 272312 advises that War Department agrees to maintain token garrison at ATURARI and FERNANDO pending completion State Department negotiations.

CINCPAC 289760 proposes that CINCPAC accept responsibility for conveying all allied FOWS from SHANGHAI to MANILA; that SACFA arrange for resettlement of all Indian personnel from MANILA to INDIA; that movement begin as soon as CINCPAC is ready receive FOWS.

SCAP 281225 sets forth exact breakdown of responsibility for acceptance of surrender of Japanese armed Forces between SACFA and CenDeministerial Forces.
29 August (Coss Date)

At 1405 I yesterday Admiral Nimitz and members of his staff arrived at TOKYO BAY by seaplane, and 15 minutes later Admiral Nimitz broke his flag in the SOUTH DAKOTA. SHERWOOD (SS 398) is escorting her captured Jap sub with prime axes aboard to TOKYO. Planes of PAN 18 commenced tracking a submarine at 1800 yesterday at 13-32N, 147-14E, on westerly course. Sonar buoys were dropped, oil slick seen. Today is "L" Day for landings in TOKYO BAY area. At 0600 airbornes landings commenced at ATSUGI airfields, and Marine landings of 4th RATE at TOSOSUKA and at FUTTOSU SAKI were to be coordinated with the airbornes landings. RAdm. Cates will accept the TOSOSUKA Naval Areas 30 minutes after the Marines land. Japanese men of war will be collected in the TOSOSUKA area. 12 submarines with crews gathering off SAGAMI WAI to participate in surrender ceremonies. Already in TOKYO BAY are the SOUTH DAKOTA, MISSOURI, DUKE OF YORK, IOWA and TP 31. Other units in SAGAMI WAI.

CINCPAC 261239 (pink) explains designation of COMCHINMAC ARMY to receive Japanese surrender in KURUSU.

COMTHFLT 290050 (pink) advises of expectation that target date of 7 Sept for KURUSU can be met with small advance party by air on 4 Sept. subject approval of SCAP and successful negotiations and reception.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290751 (pink) instructs COMTHFLT comment direct to COM GHQCHINA on proposal for TP 93 to enter SHIKOKU.

HADENSTRITTM SAGAMI 291397 (pink) requests permission to ask GHQCHINA INFO for information concerning American units to enter on schedule ENTRANS.

SCAP 261299 sets forth islands and areas to be surrendered to SAGAMI and COMCHINMAC-AUSTRALIAN military forces respectively.

CINCPAC 261353 sets forth General Order No. 41 General Date ENTR.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 261823 advises that CINCPAC has concurred in occupation of OCSAN and MAKIN by British with understanding that occupations forces are subject to coordination by CINCPAC-FOA.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 290811 requests CINCPAC-FOA to resubmit recommendations for reduction of his forces.

CINCPAC 291331 advises of revised dates occupation KADZU ANNA; requests that Japanese ship meet U.S. Naval forces West of SATA-MEISHI with pilots and interpreters to land U.S. ships into KAGOSHIMA WAI.

ADMIRALT 260553 and 260559 comprise a single dispatch but quote two messages: First from British Consul to Secretary of State for Colonies advising of Consuls ability to set up civil administration and requests instructions. Second is Reply from Secretary of State Colonies instructing Consul to comply with instructions of CTO 1112 who will establish military government by proclamation.
Admiral Nimitz's headquarters were established at YOKOSUKA Naval Base at 1030 1 August. Landings of Marines and airborne forces continue. AP 130 LONG STREETING, escorted by 2 DB's arrives off CAOMITA today with representatives of allied governments to be present at signing of surrender. SHERMAN and other submarines scheduled to be present are currently en route to SAGAMI WASH today. YOKOSUKA airfield is ready for limited service and CINCPAC Fleet recommends it be used by NAI as early as possible for evacuation of POW's. WASH, damaged in typhoon, is being detached from 36.3 and routed to Pearl via MANDALAY. Remainder of TF 36 is refueling into two Carrier Task Forces of 2 groups each. Inshore and FOW camps in YOKOSUKA have been found to be black hallowed. Evacuation of POW is well underway. POW (except U.S.N., personnel and Marines) will be evacuated to Manila as directed by SCAP. At PAGAN ISLAND in the north MANILA an aero plane of FOW 18 at 0945 K saw crosses and waving people; second plane saw personnel disembark from a launch and remove crosses at 1020 K, also red flash believed by crew to be small arms fire. Two other launches offshore did not land. A third plane saw no crosses visible from 50 feet at 1500 K.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 30211A (pink) advises MacArthur that Stilwell may accept surrender of KYUKUS but will not be subject to supervision of Admiral Nimitz.

31 August (Guam Date)

The 4th Marine RCCT landed in the YOKOSUKA Area. 36.1 is replenishing today. 36.4 has returned to the area north of TOKYO. In view of the desperate situation in FOW camps, Admiral Nimitz has proposed joint action by Army and Navy to close contact teams of 20 be formed and flown to every POW camp in the Empire, to supervise care, administration, evacuation, etc. CARDIV 5 in ANTIKAT, DIKESOFF and CABOT with DB's has reported to COM/Pac for duty, and 6 CVF 72 is proceeding to EAST CHINA SEA and YELLOW SEA to support SEVENTH Fleet operations, and to make a show of force over CHINA Coast and KORIA. COM/Pac in Minneapolis is already operating in EAST CHINA SEA with CRDIV 6 and 16. Further sweeping of SHANTAY Area has been deferred in favor of ANCHORAGE Area to the northwest which will be completed by 10 September. Other sweeping assignments include KIJO Area, west coast of KORIA (10th Day for landings is 14 July for 7th Division and 24th Corps Sweeping starts 4 September). MARSHAL 6 from KINAIKA will rendezvous with COMMARFAC 30 miles south of point "ANKI" 15 September, to sweep channel of Eastern TENGU STRAIT to OINATO. COMMARFAC plans to enter OINATO on 7 September. Sweep unit will arrive off southern KYUSHU on 1 September to sweep path into KAGOSHIMA WASH to the KAROTA Airfield. (10th Day 4 September). GIMMET with 12 wing departed SEAMICH BAT last evening for PEARL. Only submarines now operating are 5 in Sea of JAPAN and one on lifeguard duty off SAKISHIMA GUNTO. 12 submarines at TOKYO will return to U.S. immediately after surrender ceremonies. Yesterday evening Rear Admiral Whiting, representing Commander Mariana Areas, accepted the surrender of MARNOUS ISLAND on board the destroyer RANLEY. Surrender negotiations continue throughout the Pacific, with surrender ceremonies being deferred until the TOKYO surrender is accomplished tomorrow. Vice Admiral Murray left Guam this morning in PORTLAND to accept the surrender of TRUK.

CINCPAC 31037 (pink) reiterates desirability of earliest possible evacuation of SHANGHAI; advises that former TF 93 now designated TF 74.

331°
SECRET
JULY (CIO)

03 1310 MURRAY (DD 576) TO COMLOGMARIN, CINCPIAC ADV.

After thorough search found no grounds for detaining TAKASAGO MARU and directed her continue voyage. Crew 157 civilians Navy boat crew and communicators. Naval medical 169. Half sand ballasted. Rations on board estimated 1500 men 1 month. General and medical stores very low. Her captain states destination WAKE to evacuate sick and wounded. Expects stay few hours then return KURUSAN. Received utmost cooperation. By 030730. By fuel midnight 96000 gallons. Am trailing. Ship reports sighting surfaced US submarine on 28th or 29th and aircraft today. Boarding party gained impression this crew fully aware of ultimate fate of Empire.

04 0540 CINCPIAC ADV TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCAPAC COMFPA COAPCO CINCPOA COMSUBPAC COMGAC COMCICPAC COMCHICPAC COMCICPAC.

At 0740Z, Re CINCPOA ADV 19D 500304 to C5th AP subject Air Sea Rescue services. This Fed concurs in the establishment of a single agency to operate air sea rescue service from OKINAWA and current plans contemplate such operation. Since far east air forces will have primary interest in the service, on arrival in OKINAWA of its air sea rescue units FSP will assume responsibility for all air sea rescue in the HOKUSU-CHINA SEA-YELLOW SEA-ENTREAT area west of 134-40. The 5th Emergency Rescue Group No. 3rd Rescue Sq, 6th Rescue Sq 14 Rescue Boat Sq have been ordered into OKINAWA to provide necessary service. Provisions of Allied Air Forces SOP1 number 29 June 21 will govern operations. Request for assistance of naval facilities will be made necessary to operate the best service possible to facilitate the rescue of airmen of the Army and Navy Air Forces.

06 0617 CINCPIAC ADV TO CINCPOA INFO COMCICPAC COMCICPAC COMCICPAC.

Addendum 2 to Cnps Instructions No. 96 issued by Hqtrs AAF SHPA under date of 27 June places 1st Marine Aircraft Wing under operational control of the Royal Australian Air Force. Request the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing be released now to the operational control of Com7thFlt to prepare for future operations.

06 0626 CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 03, CTF 99.2 INFO COMCICPAC CINCPIAC COMCICPAC COMCICPAC.

1st action addSee direct all 7th AP units established in OKINAWA to report to CTF 99.2 for operational control until command of the 7th AP is passed to CINCPIAC.

06 0829 CINCAC ADV TO CINCPOA INFO COMCICPAC CINCPIAC COMCICPAC ADMN CINCPIAC PEARL.

After conference with ComNavBase PEARL it is recommended that at the earliest date the following principles be approved in connection with the use of MANUS by the British Pacific Fleet in order to increase the effectiveness of its support of forthcoming operations,

(A) CINCPIAC be authorized to establish British construction forces and construct on LKA HOKUSO ISLAND in the vicinity of Red Beach and DIAKOMO dock (between HONOTU and HOKUSO airfields) such facilities as he requires using if desired camps and camp sites as made available by Com7th Flt MANUS.
(B) CINCPIAC be authorized to establish a Monab at PITTILU in addition to the one already established at PONAN and be permitted to share also the use of HONOTU airstrip as necessary to meet requirements of transport operations.
SECRET
JULY (CCT)

06 0829 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INT. COMANDTCTL, CINCAPAC, ETC. (CONTINUED)

(C) Unused housing at the Section Bar Base MANUS be made available temporarily for the use of British personnel who would furnish their own sleeping arrangements at that base.

(D) A detachment of British officers and men be accommodated and messed at the headquarters of the US Naval Base for purpose of maintaining communications and general administrative coordination.

(E) CNB MANUS be authorized to make available to CINCPAC surplus buildings and equipment subject to their being replaced at a later date as required.

Early concurrence of CINCPAC and CONROYTHELF requested.

08 0200 CONROYTHELF TO CINCPAC INF. COOCHCH CARUS MANUS CINCICA ADV. CONROYTHELF CONROY- THELF.

Concur in CINCPAC ADV 060829.

08 0644 CINCPAC ADV TO CONROYTHELF COMANDTCTL 106 INFO CTF 38, CTF 30.3, CINCPAC, CONROYTHELF.

Officers who previously boarded TAHITIAN BARU report English speaking Japanese aboard and that her coal supply probably gave little reserve over requirements for round trip from Empire to KURE. Desire that we be spared necessity for diverting a ship to take her in or the embarrassment of obtaining coal and looking out for the sick and wounded pending arrival of such coal if the ship is brought into one of our ports for lack of coal.

Ascertain at once if she has sufficient coal to carry out ConRoyTheFL 07/21 23. If not escort her to position Lat 37 11 Long 140 E then release her before daylight 10 July with orders to proceed by most direct route to TSUKUBI STRAITS. Upon release ASCENBUT proceed on easterly course for 4 or more hours then to rendezvous with TG 30.3 during daylight hours. This modifies ConRoyTheFL 07/21 23.

09 0847 CONROYTHELF TO CINCPAC CINCAPAC.

NBR 5015.

This headquarters concurs in the transfer of headquarters 7th AF to the PEA a f effective this date. Detailed recommendations as to the units which are to be transferred to PEA with the hqtrs of the 7th AF will be forwarded not later than 15 July.

10 0055 CINCAPA ADV TO CTF 10 INFO CINCPAC CTF 38, CTF 30.3, CINCPAC COMANDTCTL, CONROYTHELF, CINCPAC.

Transfer operational control of 7th AF and temporarily of 20th AF units based in RYUKUS to ComGen PEA. Retain 2nd Marine Wing under your operational control for the primary purpose of air defense RYUKUS and also for support of other U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific.

Under your direction CTF 2nd Marine Wing may make aircraft available to participate in offensive operations of PEA when agreeable to local commanders concerned.

Advise all concerned when transfer becomes effective.
10 0601  CINCPEAC TO COMPEAC/INFO PEACE, CINCPEAC ADV HO-CK 2/11.

With further operational responsibility practically eliminated except for support of 20th AF the continuing necessity for shipment to APMDPAC of large number of service type units from ETO, MTO and the U.S., whether from redeployment or otherwise is not understood here. It is believed desirable that you service force requirements be completely reexamined in the light of changed operational concepts and plans and the critical shipping situation developing as a result of large shipping backlog in indirectly redeployed units. The utmost economy in requirements is essential in order that available troop lift can be utilized to the greatest advantage, and in order that INDUSTRIALLY needed in APAC to launch operations directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff may not be compromised by less essential troop movements. Request conference with your representatives in MANILA on or about 1 August on this subject.

06 0626  CINCPEAC ADV TO CINCPEAC/INFO PEACE, CINCPEAC ADV HO-CK 2/11.

Effective upon relief of CORNO E. D. White USN by RADN J. D. Rice USN as CTU 99.3/4 the Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA will be expanded to include all naval and Marine shore facilities including all naval and Marine Air Bases in the OKINAWA Group subject to the following:

(A) Naval Base IE SHITA will remain under the operational control of IesCom IE SHITA but its Commander will report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA for type and administrative command.

(B) Naval communication activities in the Joint Communication Center will remain assigned to the operational control of the officer in charge of the JCC but will also report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA for type and administrative command.

(C) ComNavAirBases OKINAWA will retain units presently assigned to them but will report to Comdt NOB OKINAWA.

(D) Organization and control of TU 99.3/5 Construction Troops OKINAWA will continue unchanged CEUS remaining assigned as before but all Naval Construction Troops will be under the overall administrative control of Comdt NOB OKINAWA for naval purposes.

(E) Marine Corps units including Marine Air Wing 2 Prov Marine AA Group 12th Service Bn and units rehabilitating will for purposes of the general administration of the naval service be under the supervision of CTU 99.3/4. Their operational control and Marine Corps administrative channels remaining unchanged. Issue necessary orders to implement the foregoing.

11 0625  CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPEAC/INFO PEACE, CINCPOA ADV HO-CK 2/11.

Request early reply to my 07/25 (Top Secret).

11 0628  CINCPEAC ADV TO COMPEAC/INFO PEACE, CINCPEAC ADV HO-CK 2/11.

Answering Com3dIn 100000, SFO JAPAN ports capable of ship repair in order of importance are MAISURU, FUSHAN, OTARU, HIAGASHI-TWASE, Tsuchi, NITOMI, HAGAH. Other important ports where heavy shipping traffic may be expected are SAKAI, FUSHAN, GRIZAN, BOKURUSHI, REIL, SAKATA, YUKI and KONAN. Known facilities for building and repair at SOKIS are: MAISURU has 3 drydocks, 660 feet 260 feet and 750 feet respectively plus 2 building ways 930 feet each and 3 cranes of 10 to 20 tons capacity each. HAGASHI-TWASE has port

- Continued -

3321
For present, more valuable targets are available in southern HOKUSHI. The primary targets are combatant ships.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding it is hereby directed that the IsCom OKINAWA proceed with the construction of Army Air Transport Command facilities at the Naha Airdrone as required by the Base Development Plan.

In view your 11U25 propose existing arrangements stand until conference with our representatives at NAHMA about 20 July at which time conditions under which to NAV will be readied for next operations should be determined.

The logistic support of the 20th AF by Army resources has been far from adequate insofar as engineers are concerned. It is requested that DepCom 20th AF and CIC YRA inform CINCAP AC in detail as to the Army units required both for internal and theater logistical support to implement JCS Order 29/76 in an adequate manner.
13 2123 COMMISSION TO GATHER ALL INFORMATION
ALL THE NEWS.

Final report 30/7/72 states that on 10 July, on 11th combat sorties against
YOKO airfields A54 two bombs dropped 1646 resulted in 109 planes on ground and damaging 241. Many other planes balancing damaged by VT
uraniumagua but positive proof lacking. No air opposition to targets and only
planes known to be near forces were 2 masers shot down by OAH. On
means contact 1 Cairo 1 Balloch 3 Averagers 7 pilots 6 aircraft. Operational
1 Cairo 1 Balloch 2 Averagers. Shipping craft 1 large freighter 1imento 1
launch. Damaged 1 large 1 motor junk. Ground targets destroyed 1 house
MASAMU 2 hangar HANG 1 hangar TOKUMA 1 bridge TAIKOKU 1, hangar
BOGARU and house TSUKI HATITORI 1. HANGAFAUTOKI TAIKOKU
YASUMIKA KASHI ONO KASHIKA KABUKIKAHARA TAIKA.
Several fantasy buildings KABUKI. 10 car freight train UCHI HAMA. Power begins 23/7.

Surveys sub mixed by planes 37-15 H 147-30 E at 1615 on 11th being held
down by destroyers approximately 12 floating mines sighted 11th between 39-60
H 148-50 E and 37-55 H 149-15 E. 5 floaters reported 12th within 50 mile
radius of 40-30 H 164-30 E. Possible sub contact 0716 13th at 40-30 H 144-35E.
Request immediate release 10 July strike figures.

14 0635 COMMISSION TO GATHER ALL INFO TAIKA ALL YOKO 17-30 OFFICE 6 COMMISSION 25

FROM TASK GROUP 35-3 RAJA JONES in PAGANDA with Crealiv 17 Basilla 29 base
NURIKA HAEWINA SIG (HAA). At 1600 14 July T/P 35-3 depart from TF 38 proceed
to point Lat 39-60 H 145-80 E to arrive 1900 14 July. Then proceed due east
to approximate position 59-60 H 142-05 E to arrive 2200 14 July. Remaining
outside 100 fatoms chart course high speed until shipping奠基 be continued
destroying any enemy encountered. At 0700 15 July from approximate position
40-60 H 143-17 E set course to rejoin TF 38 at earth disturbance possible time during
daylight 15 July. O/I TF 38 advise Crealiv 17 data on launching point and
point O/P FOR 15 July. Furnish night fighters over 15 TF 38 during darkness
14-15 July and O/A during daylight 15 July.

Note you will be in joint area and friendly subs may be encountered.

15 0549 COMMISSION TO GATHER INFO CONTINUE ONE MANUAL COMMISSION 30/7

Following comments are made on the detailed requirements listed in
paragraph 3 of your 06/107 of June. As also by 06/069 and Comedak and

ulations:

(1) Agree with the understanding that the British personnel will eventually
be located in the LOS INEROS Area.

(2) Agree. LOS INEROS available.

(3) Agree.

(4) Agree.

(5) Agree on a temporary basis.

(6) Agree. 2 plates for DAPA and 2 plates for RAPA will be made available as practicable considering the
requirements of all ships present.

(7) Agree. It is recommended that the housing for British Royal personnel
be up until shortly after arrival at OLIVER HAMPSHIRE

(8) Agree. We consider that this covered storage should be erected at
"O" Point.

(9) Agree.

(10) Agree and again suggest LOS INEROS as the eventual site.
15 0722 CINCPAC ADV to COMNAVALGREF: CONTAINING WAR INFO CTU 50-5-2

Commanders allocate submarines for lifeguard duty for CVHESS based planes when other commitments permit. These are in addition to present stations off SAKINABA COAST and northwest PACICHA but include any assigned to station off EAST OAHU COAST. Air sea rescue unit of Pacific CINCPAC initial stations desired and priority for filling stations. CVHESS based air commands will be advised to make request for lifeguard service, to supply strike and distress information and to arrange ASR details direct with CTU 50-5-2.

15 0725 CINCPAC ADV to COMHIS.

Your 131940 see CINCPAC 131425 and 131321 and CINCPAC 131726 passed separately.

15 0727 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC INTEäm CTU 50.

Com2ndCarTaskFor serial 00221 of 26 June 1945, in subparagraph 3c is in conflict with my Op-Plan 4-45 which assigns shipping as a primary attack objective for the 3rd Fleet. Take appropriate action.

15 0830 RICHARDSON to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV NO. 60202.

RF 65722.

In answer to your CX 2421 of 104601 GCT July.

Para. At present this headquarters is charged by CINCPAC with responsibility not only for support of 20th Air Force but also for other Army units in FOA and for support of air transport operations and air operations other than 20th Air Force. These missions are in addition to those assigned by CINCPAC.

Para. Troops available to discharge my responsibilities are not only inadequate now but have been over since I assumed command. In order to meet my directives and fulfill the requirements for the ICHESS operation and in the forward areas, it was necessary to strip the rear areas of many units essential to the proper maintenance, care and repair of equipment and supplies. At the present writing I am forced to use tactical troops for service functions while directed by the War Department to train the units in question for their primary combat missions. The units furnished for ICHESS and the forward areas must be replaced if this base is to function efficiently. Even the forward area of the units referred to has been inadequate to meet completely the operational needs of the forward area.

Para. The unit priority list expresses, in order of importance, pending troop requirements remaining unfilled. When units have been ordered for the purposes are balanced against the unit priorities list. Only a portion of the total FOA requirements have been met. The priority list totals 48442 in ground units. Of this 13977 has been made available from all sources, leaving an unfilled balance of 34465. The unfilled balances are allocated 3247 to forward areas and 1106 to MARSHALL ISLANDS and HAINAN area. This does not include shortages of 16460 ASPRO and 53095 20th AF.

- continued -
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- Continued -

16 0349 CINCFOA ANF to COMMUN USAFSTAF into CINCAPAC, COMMUD, COMM, CINCFOA

(Cont'd)

formally such matters as may require action pending the designation of a
headquarters pursuant to the direction of paragraph 5 of JCS WAP 29978
DTS 110101.

16 0355 CINCFOA ANF to COMMUN USAFSTAF. COMM 10, COMM AFINFO.

COMM COOCHA and CINCFOA.

The agreements recently reached with Air Marshall Lloyd contemplate
the use of the British Engineer to develop at KBB additional airfields
primarily for the use of the Army Strategic Air Force or associated
British units.

16 0853 CINCFOA ANF to COMD OAHANA into COMD 10, CINCAPAC PEARL. CINCAPAC,

SOUTH CINCPAC.

My 070407 not to all is hereby cancelled. OHSWPA 071329 signed
MacArthur is quoted herewith in part for your information and guidance:

"Appreciate your offer of assistance. Believe it advantageous however
that War Correspondents accredited to this command report its activities
in same manner as they have in the past. They will be assigned to AFPA
operational units, using signal corps channels provided by those units
for relay through HAINA. Censors from this command will be stationed
at transmission points of this command".

CINCFOA correspondents will not be given release or matters dealing
with AFPA operations. Instruct CINCFOA press censors accordingly and
report when this has been done.

16 0901 FM CINCAPAC to COMMUD, CINCAPAC PEARL. COMM UNFRS 10, CINCAPAC

SOUTH CINCPAC.

RT 67782.

General order number 7 this headquarters dated 16 July 1945 establishes
effective 1606012 (CST) July 1945 provisional Hq and Hq AF Army Air Forces
AFINFO. Same order establishes Army Air Forces Middle Pacific Area Title
AFINFO-MP which will consist initially of all AF units currently assigned
to AFINFO. Majer General James A. Farley USN is appointed as Commanding
General Army Air Forces Middle Pacific. This refers to USAF radio
0305 DTS 151401 July and RT 65785 DTS 190946 both not to all or speeded.
Prov Hq AFINFO-MP will assume those functions of the Army Air Forces
Pacific Ocean Area for which Hq AFINFO was previously responsible to AFINFO-MP,
by letter of instructions this headquarters dated 13 December 1944 as amended.

16 1121 CINCAPAC to CINCFOA BOTH HQ INTO CONTACT.

C 29979

CINCFOA 080901 refers. Although immediately after receipt of the
directive contained in JCS 1239/42 suggested the transfer to your command
and control of 7th Fleet I now refer, in view of later developments, to keep
the fleet, whose commander is also commander allied naval forces, under
my operational control.
CINCPAC hereby relieved COMNAVFleet of operational control of forces under action addresses. Predicted location of typhoon center 180811(1)
(-9) Lat. 23-40 N Long. 122-00 E. 1819000(1)(-9) Lat 27-30 N Long 122-
30 E. Movement northerly speed 15 knots. Suspend operations all action
addresses immediately. Forces retire to eastward of OKINAWA until typhoon
is clear. Currently expect winds 35 knots in OKINAWA anchorages.

17 0227 CINCPAC ADV to COMNAVFLEET, SENNAV into CINCPAC FAAI, NO.

Current directives give area commanders control of communications and
 censorship with respect to the operations of forces under their command.
The letter is an unquestionable military necessity. In the MARIANAS
by mutually satisfactory arrangements correspondents accredited to CINCPAC
have covered activities of 20th Air Force and their material has been
transmitted by CINCPAC facilities after censorship by 20th Air Force
personnel. The presence of OKINAWA of forces under control of CINCPAC
has created desire on the part of correspondents to cover local operations
of forces of both CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

Para. My 040826 my 050207 CINCPAC 071329 10000 OKINAWA 151337 and
my 160853 show development of situation at OKINAWA. I am agreeable to
simultaneous dual or triple accreditation and a joint censorship or some
similar arrangement as indicated in my 160852 in order to furnish prompt
clearance for press material concerning operations under different
commanders conducted in same general vicinity. In absence of such an
arrangement which could be prescribed only by higher authority I will
continue to impose on CINCPAC correspondents restrictions such as those
in my 160852.

17 0342 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPACGAP into USASTAF, COMNAVFLEET, CINCPAC.

The units listed in ComDemsAFFGA 150746 passed to you separately are
proposed for transfer to FEAP except that it is considered necessary
that these units commit for the defense of OKINAWA, wire construction
on OKINAWA and for air division JOC OKINAWA continue under the operational
control of CINCPAC.

17 0528 CINCPAC ADV to COMNAVFLEET into C17 92-1, C17 92-2

Your 160827. Anticipate OKINAWA REITO will be used as emergency
anchorage only. Desires military control that area maintained but cease
in movement AAA gun line to OKINAWA at your discretion.

17 0539 CINCPAC ADV to C17 91 into COMMANDANTAF, C17 92.

Effective immediately Task Force 91 will assume the responsibility
for the neutralization of central CAROLINES, MARSHES and HODDOO. In this
connection see my 010142. Direct communication is authorized with
ComDems USASTAF with regard to any assistance that may be practicable
as indicated in AFFGA Letter 24 June.
27 1356

All assigned targets TF 36 weathered in shortly after sunrise 17 July and the only 2 sweeps launched aborted. Flash reports show few losses; targets of opportunity including 10 float planes in river vicinity SHIBUYA BAKI of which 4 burned and 6 damaged. Hangar and dock 2756 AEIBO demolished. Oil dump KUJI fired.

Para. TF 37 with slightly better luck in weather destroyed 13 planes on ground at KITAGATA MASUSHIMA and MASUDA. 3 planes attacked while pilots recovered. Installations including hangars MASUSD burned. Hangars and barrack at KITAGATA airfield and railroad station KAJINSHI damaged. 3 locomotives exploded.

18 0622

An excess backlog of approximately 900,000 measurement tons of cargo now is afloat for discharge OKINAWA AREA. This is largely due to the following causes:

A. Diversion of shipping from deferred operations to OKINAWA.
B. Redeployment of Army forces from ETO and ETO to OKINAWA without sufficient advance notice for CINCPAC to integrate into shipping schedules in accordance with discharge capabilities.

Further difficulties are being encountered by requests from CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV for shipping to OKINAWA without prior request to CINCPAC ADV for tonnage allocation.

An additional complication arises from the sailing of the shield and weapon convoys to OKINAWA without previous reference to CINCPAC.

A condition has thus arisen where CINCPAC is unable to comply with the provisions of JCS dispatch of 100345 of December 1944 due to conditions beyond his control. If JCS 100345 of December 1944 is to be an effective instrument all agencies requiring shipping allocations to FO need some clear with CINCPAC sufficiently in advance to allow for sound planning of shipping schedules.

It is requested that action be taken to furnish timely notice in order prevent further aggravation or recurrence of present conditions. CINCPAC ADV 290659 of May also refers.

18 0912

Add to my 171356. TF 36 planes sunk 1 picket boat 2 small craft damaged 7 barges 3 small craft. Destroyed 2 locomotives 1 hangar. Damaged 1 train 3 locomotives 3 factory buildings 2 radio stations 2 lighthouses 2 warehouses 1 hangar. All ground targets KITAGATA. 1 VF lost in combat 2 VF with pilots lost operationally.

Para. TF 37 also damaged 3 planes on ground. Sank 1 JUNK and damaged 1 SS 1 SC 1 BOOM defense vessel 1 Junk 6 fishing boats 1 hangar. Additional ground targets damaged hangars MASUSHIMA trains SAKAMATSU area radar.

Para. Bombardment KITAGATA completed as scheduled. Spotters weathered out. No damage assessment possible. No damage to ships.

Para. Clearing weather permitted 2 sweeps 1 strike TOKYO area after noon 18th. No reports yet.


SECRET
JULY (CCT)

18 1033 COMDRPFLT to CINCPAC ADV info CTF 36, CTF 37.

Reconnoitered TOKYO during forenoon watching weather. In afternoon launched heavy coordinated attack on combatant ships YOKOSUKA. Coordinated reports attack carried out as planned in face of most intense Flak ever seen. Targets well hit but too much smoke from burning targets and other fires to accurately assess results. Suggest CINCPAC arrange photo recce. Will fly final report days operations to IWO 22 July.

18 1545 CTF 35.4 info COMDRPFLT, CINCPAC ADV Hq.

At 2350 I (-9) cruisers this Task Group at range 8 miles commenced minor bombardment radar and radio installations and possible coast defense guns on POINT NOJIMA SAKI. Fired about 240 rounds. Poor visibility prevented observing results. Although 1 large explosion resulted no lasting fires observed. 2 mark 11 radars frequency 91 and 97 Megacycles which had been tracking us for several hours during approach were silenced. No counter battery. Still shelling no results yet.

12 0918 CTF 99 VIA JCC OKINAWA to DECOMAF 20 AF, COMGENPEAF, CTF 99.2, COMGENPEAF ADVANCED info CINCPAC ADV, COMGENNAAPAC, COMDRPFLT, CINCPAC COMGENPEAPAC, COMFAIRWING.

Next to the last sentence my dispatch 120042 CET is changed to read as follows: "When not required for air defenses this area as 2nd Marine Wing may make available aircraft to participate in offensive operations of PEAf when agreeable to local commander of PEAf and to 2nd Marine Wing all addresses both action and info requested to inform all holders of copy of my 120042 CET to modify accordingly.

18 1255 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH AND COMX.

Comment on JCS 150447 CET (VARX 32627) proposal to establish a Joint Communication board for coordination of communication matters pacific area. It is not indicated to whom the board would be responsible. Assuming that function of board would be strictly advisory to the principal commanders.

Para. (a) Following additional assumptions made as to composition and operation of proposed board
(1) Members to be the senior staff communication officers of 3 service commanders pacific plus representatives from ComPhibsPac. This would equalize Army and Navy representation
(2) Working committees from same staff sources to assist board.
(3) Continuing coordination by board and committees normally to be conducted by dispatch with meetings only when needed to be held at headquarters service commanders.
(4) Required Groups of officer specialists to be established as working committees to effect continuous coordination essential particularly in frequency matters.

Para. (b) Under above listed assumptions CINCPAC acquiesces in establishment of a pacific joint communications board. In effect it would formalize conference procedure currently utilized

Para. (c) Concur fully in the guiding principles.

Para. (d) If above concept of proposed board is at variance with JC concept request more information upon which to base recommendation.
SECRET

190655 CINCPAC ADV TM to COMAIR PAC to COMAIRPAC J. CONRAD/STAFF & COMAIRPAC OIL. COMAIRPAC TM to COMAIRPAC.

As soon as practicable pass to Com Fair Wing 1 responsibility for local anti-submarine air patrol and operational control of VMF 234, VMF 612, VMF 232 and VMF 242. On arrival of MAC 29 it will be assigned to the operational control of Comdt NOS OKINAWA through Comsdm 2nd Marine Air Wing.

190702 COMAIRPAC TM to COMAIR PAC to CONAIR TME PAC, CONAIR TM PAC, CONAIRTM PAC, CONAIRM PAC. TM to COMAIR PAC.

Your 121624. CINCSWPAC has overall control of all air facilities in Southwest Pacific Area. Control of following fields has been retained by Commander Allied Air Forces operating under CINCSWPAC: OTAIM and LANGAU fields MAKAWAI, PIHOU north and south and TONOIMA fields HOUHOU, Wakahama and ENTRAU. Under direction from War Department General in TAOI with COMAIR CNO number 7 CINCSWPAC will clear with War Department the abandonment or release of control of any U.S. Air Fields under control of Commander Allied Air Forces. Naval air and air support units have been ordered forward from above named fields from time to time and all air force units have occasionally been ordered to operate from Navy built air bases since 15 June 1944 but PEARL HARBOR retains control for United States. CINCSWPAC censors with foregoing. ComAir/7th clear roll up of seaplane bases with you after obtaining concurrence CINCSWPAC, COMAIRPAC and COMAIR PAC.

200114 CINCPAC ADV TM to COMAIR into COM NATS. CINCPAC PEARL NAC. COMAIRPAC.

While I agree that additional service may be required by NATS in the PHILIPPINES and that the proposed organization is sound and necessary I do not concur in the establishment of what appears to be a major NATS unit at the naval air base MACTAN ISLAND. The logistic and construction implications are such that considerable doubt that activation of MACTAN ISLAND could be accomplished in time to assist in the present war. This answers your 181351.

201303 COMAIR AND CNO COMAIR HQ TM to CINCPAC BOTH. COMAIR PASSED TO CINCPAC.

VICTORY 135.

CINCPAC CID-24577 and JCS 201148 refer. I desire a TM charged with the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project be set up in the immediate future, initially under COMAIR AND CNO later to pass to CINCPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Rear Admiral or a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations by my headquarters are desired. The staff, which initially need not be large, should include civil engineers and 1 or 2 officers.

212043 COMAIR to CINCPAC ADV TM.

Your 181255 your assumption that the proposed CINCPAC NATS would be responsible to the principal commanders of the pacific namely CINCPAC CINCPAC and COMUSNOSTAF is correct. Whether or not this would — continued —
21 2043 CONTROVER TO CINCPAC ADV HQ (Continued)

be only an advisory agency is for the above commanders to decide. Member-
ship of proposed board would be that agreed to by the 3 PACIFIC commanders.
Terms of reference of proposed board wholly a matter of local agreement.
Consider essential that full time working committee be formed to co-ordinated
and assign frequencies within Pacific Theatre.

22 0726 CINCPAC ADV to COMEN TEN info COMDT NOB OKINAWA.

Your 180906.
In view pending command reorganisation desire joint cargo handling
continue under COMDT NOB OKINAWA as heretofore until such time as each
service can assume responsibility for handling own cargo.

22 0729 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 99 info CTF 99, COMPHIBSPAC, COMBONRON 1.

Your 151551 not understood. Your requirements for 2 APB and 1 APA
flagship indicate either that large numbers of personnel who are assigned
to shore bases are being improperly quartered on board ship rather than
ashore or that evacuation of personnel who are not supposed to remain in
the area is not being carried out with transportation which is available
daily.

Para. Neither is your request for additional escort types understood.
You now have 18 DD 6 DE 8 APD in addition to numerous smaller craft which
should be ample for the local defense and support of the area.

Para. It will be necessary to reduce your present force drastically
in the near future in preparation for future offensive operations. It is
therefore directed that you immediately reduce your requirements for barr-
sacks or garrison ships and that you so organise your escort and patrol
assignments that your essential tasks can be performed with reduced forces.

Para. Specifically (A) crescent City will be detached about 25 August
(B) No APA flagship will be provided (C) no additional garrison LST will be
provided but the 20 LST now present will probably be reduced to 10 LST
on 1 September. No additional escort or patrol craft will be provided but
the present allocation will be reduced by 1 September to not more than
17 DD, 111 DE, 911 APD, 43 LCS/LCI, 18 PC/36, 911 APB.

22 0842 CINCPAC ADV to COMREN TEN, JCCM OKINAWA, COMDT NOB OKINAWA info COMREN
AND ONR.

CINCPAC notes with gratification that during the first 17 days of July
the average rate of unloading cargo at OKINAWA was approximately 35,000
measurement tons per day as compared with 20,000 in June and 17,000 in
May. Please extend to the officers and men responsible a "Well Done".

22 0843 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC, info CINCPAC, COMEN TEN, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Concur your 210049. In view pending transfer of responsibility for
HUKUS to CINCPAC request hereafter you secure his concurrence rather
than mine for acceptance of units for that area.
22 1244 CINCPAC ADV to COM MARNASI M INTO COMPOA, CINCPAC HAEU, COMCOM TIM.

Garrison needs in RTUKUS require that you transfer 14th infantry regiment to OKINAWA at earliest. Upon arrival destination operational control of unit passes to COMCOM TIM.

Para. To augment garrison strength TWO JIMA and to provide opportunity for training as a unit transfer 206th AAA BN (less Btries C and D) from SAIAPAN to TWO JIMA.

21 1300 CINCPAC ADV HQ INTO COMCOM 21 BONCOM, CTF 93, OMGAIRuco,

AIL, FOC 3RD FLEET, CTF 37, CINCAP, CINCPAC, COMAF, COMAF YAN, CINCPAC TIM, FJAF AUTOM, CTF 99, 92.

During afternoon 18th July TF 38 flew 592 sorties against TOKYO AREA. On the ground 30 planes destroyed including 13 BETTYS KUMAGAYA 3 BETTYS JODAMA and 42 were damaged at HYAKURIGAHARA KODORI YAMABE. Our plane losses: in combat 6 VF, 3 VT, 35B all to flak, operational 1 VF jettisoned and 1 VB. Personnel lost in combat were pilots of 6 VF, 3 VB, 3 VT plus crews of 4 VB, 3 VT. Shipping. YOKISURA photos show: NAGATO superstructure badly damaged but unable determine whether she is on bottom, 1 DD by deck next to NAGATO blown in half and sunk 1 ODD at 3rd Dock heavily damaged with cable layer alongside, disintegrated 3 small cargo vessels and 7 MBs near NAGATO destroyed by several shorts stern blown off, fleet DD converted to flak ship, also ATOMAHAY and OBIKA respectively 4 luggers and 2 small craft were damaged. Ground. Flak positions at YOKOSUKA well covered by VF fuse bombs and pilots report definite diminishing intensity subsequent to release. At INVIA 3 locomotives destroyed, 1 damaged with 3 more damaged YUNOTO. 4 hangars were destroyed and 12 damaged at 7 fields. Power plant transformed destroyed and 4 elecito cars derailed by rockets at KUMAGAYA. AYMO dump exploded HYAKURIGAHARA oil tank burned YOKOSUKA 89 yards at mite, airfield facilities HYAKURIGAHARA ER cars and turntables in KITI KUMAGAYA, UMOTO area and many other barracks shops and small industrial buildings damaged by rockets and strafing. Photos show TAKASIMA MARI anchored YOKOJUKKO0 ABOUT 700 yards from NAGATO near 2 small combatant ships and may possibly have been damaged. Also on afternoon 18th TF 37 flew 51 combat sorties without any personnel losses against airfields north TOKYO area 13 planes were destroyed on the ground at KONOKE KITAIURA KATORI MUTO MOBARA and 25 were damaged at same fields plus KITAIWA. 2 VF planes were lost in combat and 2 operationally. 24 Junkys were damaged near GHOSI. Hangars plus installations at KONOKE, KITAIWA, JUN, KATORI, MARUTO with railways freight cars at KATORI were well strafed and rocketed.

Para. Photos of HITACHI bombardment covering all targets except P-56 show HITACHI engineering works 21-00 and HITACHI area factory P-458 severely damaged. HITACHI copper refinery 812 damaged.

Para. New subject. Free Balloon shown ONI WEEKLY WR 927 sighted at 33-42 north 16-12 east at 1300 July 19 at 19000 feet ascending 300 feet per minute. Shot down by CAP sunk before recovery possible.

22 1629 CINCPAC ADV to AILAC.

In night anti-shipping sweep recently U.S. Destroyers fired on a friendly submarine in a joint zone. Fortunately no damage resulted.
incident apparently caused by large error in navigation and by mistaken belief that radar contact at 27000 yards could not be a submarine.

Para. 50F-1 prohibits attack on a joint scene from submarines out to 20000 yards unless identified as enemy beyond possibility of doubt. Single radar contacts may be submarines or surface ships and must not be attacked until positively identified as the latter. Near boundaries of Joint Zones commanding officers must also be alert to possible errors in navigation and be governed accordingly. Tactical situation will rarely justify firing on a single unidentified target when any possibility exists that it may be a friendly submarine.

20 2253 ADMIRALTY to CINCPAC, FORFAP, CINCPAC, BAD, CINCPAC NA PAKIS, CINCPAC NA FW, CINCPAC INFO FO OKANAGA, WA, NA PAKIS - CINCPAC PASS TO COMCHIN, COMNAV, NA PAKIS, CINCPAC, NA FW, COMFHQ, COMGHQ.

CGS have decided that from 1st June ADMIRALTY replaces COMCHIN as executive agent for dealing with FRENCH NAVY under CGS 358 (Revise) (Para 3). ADMIRALTY letter MD4020/43 of 18/10/43 not to all refer.

Para. Following will be normal procedure under new arrangements:

A. Requests by the FRENCH NAVY for supplies will continue to be processed through established channels.

B. Proposals initiated by FRENCH requiring formal reference to CGS will be communicated by Admiral Perard to BAD, to expedite decision Marine PARIS should inform ADMIRALTY at the same time as they instruct Admiral Perard.

C. Proposals initiated by FRENCH not requiring formal CGS decision will be made either through Admiral Perard to BAD or direct to ADMIRALTY in latter case, ADMIRALTY will be responsible for informing COMCHIN and obtaining his consent when necessary.

D. Proposals initiated by ADMIRALTY or COMCHIN and requiring ANKLO-US agreement will be cleared through BAD reference being made to CGS when necessary. The ADMIRALTY will be responsible for ARRANGING clearance with FRENCH.

E. Proposals from subordinate FRENCH authorities not made through Marine PARIS or Admiral Perard should be made to the British Commander-in-Chief concerned who will forward them to the ADMIRALTY info BAD and NA PARIS. This procedure is designed to ensure single channel of approach. Admiral Perard will be responsible for clearing such proposals with CGS, COMCHIN and FRENCH as may be necessary.

Para. Executive action to implement decisions will be taken by ADMIRALTY with Marine PARIS. BAD will also communicate all formal decisions of CGS to Admiral Perard and keep the latter informed of such other decisions as they may deem appropriate.

Para. BAD and NA PARIS are requested to inform Admiral Perard and Marine PARIS respectively of the above and to emphasise the great importance of using 1 channel only at a time for making proposals.

21 0625 CINCPAC ADVANCE to ISCOM OKINAWA, info COMCHIN, SECOM, CBON, CDN, PAF.
material which has been cleared by cognizant censors. CINCPAC will continue
to honor his jointly accredited those Navy correspondents who are temporarily
in SOWSPAC. Army Correspondents desiring joint accreditation status should
apply through SECNAV for Navy accreditation. Temporary Navy accreditation
may be secured from CINCPAC in emergency cases where application has been
made to SECNAV.

21 1338 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, COMCPUSASTAF, CINCPAC - WAR DEPT
PASSED TO CINCPAC, DECPAC 20.

WARL 35909 in JCS 1362/2, copies of which will be forwarded to your
headquarters by officer courier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved
petroleum supply procedure for the Pacific as outlined in CINCPAC message
CX 22431 of 30 June 1945 and concurred in by CINCPAC in naval message
032041 July CINCPAC PEARL to ANPB and memorandum 11 July acting Chief of
Staff, 20th Air Force, to ANPB.

24 0850 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBUDIV-1 info COMBUDIV 16, COMINCH.

UTF 95 230413. When HPS direct RAdm LON with the same force as in
preceding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of
Long 125-000E between Lat. 30-00 N and 32-30N. Avoid mine restricted area
in SHANGHAI-HUAN AREA. Keep COMCHOPFLEET, COMEXCHINA and UTF 99
informed of movements this force.

25 0908 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH-GNO info CINCPAC PEARL, COMHFLY, COMAIR,
COMAIRSPAC, COMAIRPAC.

After conference with COMINCHSPAC and representatives of COMAIRPAC/COMORD on
COMAIRPAC/COMIRD adhere to opinion expressed in my 20011A and consider that major
NATS base in the PHILIPPINES for support of Pacific Fleet operations in
this war should be located at SABAR with turnaround facilities at MANTIA.
Para. However will submit firm recommendation after conference
between my Deputy Chief of Staff and COM7thFLEET in MANTIA about 1 August.
Para. Assume COMINCH-GNO serial 001487 of 10 June applies.

25 0726 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMHFLY info CTF 37, CTF 38, COMCPUSASTAF.

Situation your 240543 appreciated. Concluded in VLR 24 July strikes
only after careful consideration of difficulties involved in routing re-
quired for attacks on targets adjacent to yours. Weather prompted VLR
strikes on targets further east. You will continue to be info on all VLR
intents to include precise routes to and from targets when they are known
to be near your force. Army Strategic Air Force advises that all aircraft
will show IFF from land and hereafter. Believe it intractable to elim-
nate problems especially since VLR effort will soon be greatly augmented.
For each individual operation where your effort and that of Strategic Air
Force are against same enemy area everything possible will be done to effect
coordination that will avoid Army Strategic Air Force units passing over
or near your forces.
SECRET

25 1652 CINCPAC to WARCOS - COUINC PASSED TO CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

C 27447.

Reference JCS W 32627 reiterating a proposal contained in W 1A399 for a local joint communications board to coordinate, control and integrate signal communications in the Pacific. Our radio C 19519 of 16 June did not concur in this proposal. Stating as follows: "Cooperation and coordination between services in the Pacific has already been laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with primary responsibilities in some cases. Pre establishment of a formal board with a limited membership to handle one these only is therefore believed to be unnecessary and undesirable. CINCPAC-CINCSPWPA has used most effectively a local committee organization which includes not only the members proposed in W 1A399 but also representatives of all interested elements. To coordinate frequencies. To designate call signs. And to ensure the efficient utilization of equipment. Such committees are now operating to insure the effective coordination of these matters in prospective operations. CINCPAC and 20th Air Force, among other, are represented. The arrangement has proven so effective it is considered inadvisable and undesirable to change it." CINCPAC and USASTAF have had and will have membership on all committees affecting their interests and the findings of such committees have been and will be formalized and coordinated in the respective headquarters formal operations instructions. Communications annexes and signal operations instructions and standing signal instructions of the forces concerned. Since under the provisions of JCS 1250/4 and 1331/3 CINCPAC is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of operations I must reiterate now concurrence in the establishment of an agency (in which APPAC would have the plurality membership) for the control of such a vital element to successful operation as signal communications. Since both the Navy and the Strategic Air Forces are supporting forces in the projected operations it does not seem appropriate that an agency should be constituted that would enable such forces to control the signal communications of the commander carrying primary responsibility. The primary consideration in the coordination of communications in this theater has been to ensure all of the contributing forces all the signal communications they require to insure success in combat. Any disagreements in committees having to do with these matters would be brought to the attention of commanders. The existing system has operated with complete success and harmony. It is considered that a joint communications board would be less effective than the procedure which has been followed with complete satisfaction during the entire period of our operations. The Joint Board could accomplish no more and might be less efficient or give rise to friction which has so far been non-existent. Changes of this nature should not be considered just when the decisive campaign in the Pacific is about to be accomplished even if having some theoretical long range object they would add an element of uncertainty by providing a new and unproven agency to replace one which has operated with complete success and satisfaction in the past. We are already committed to the operations and it is too late to consider basic changes in such a vital matter.

26 0231 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO ALFOA.

Effective 1200 I (9) 31 July control of U.S. held areas in the \textit{ATURUS} and U.S. Army Forces therein pass to the control of CINCPAC except for units of the Army Strategic Air Forces which remain under COMUSUSASTAF. Control of the naval operating base \textit{McNamara} and all U.S. Naval forces including Marines in the \textit{ATURUS} remains under CINCPAC.
SECRET
July 26, 1944

26 0145 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMCHIN, TAI, COMAIR, TAI, COMAIR, FUK, CINCPAC, COMCHIN, AND CNO. COMAIR, TAI, COMAIR, CINCPAC, TAI, CNO. COMAIR, TAI, COMAIR, CINCPAC, TAI, CNO.

On the occasion of the transfer of the 10th Army from the command of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas congratulates the 10th Army the 24th Corps and the officers and men on their magnificent record of achievement in the campaigns of the past 3 years. The Pacific Fleet will long remember its close association in battle with the troops who fought at ATTU, MCHIN, KWAJALEIN, ENIWETOK, SAIPAN, Guam, Palau and Okinawa. In these operations there developed a standard of unity of purpose and of integrated effort which will not be forgotten. To you all "Well Done" the sincere good wishes of the officers and men of the Pacific Fleet go with you all.

26 0249 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMCHIN AND CNO info COMCHIN, TAI, COMAIR, TAI, COMAIR.

Your 261332 not to all. Recommend office of Deputy Commander 7th Fleet be abolished now. As a matter of policy I do not wish to have Deputy Commanders assigned to Task Fleet Commanders which status will be assumed by COMSEVENTHFLT on 1 October. Headquarters still required in 30PAC.

26 0722 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CVF 95 info CVF 95 A.I., COMAIRPAC, COMCARDIV 23. CVF 96., CINCPAC PEARL.

Direct COMCARDIV 23 in HOGGATT BAY (CVE 75) proceed immediately to ENIWETOK where upon arrival COMCARDIV 23 report by despatch to CINCPAC for duty. Direct COMCARDIV 26 in FANSHAW BAY (CVE 70) proceed immediately, where upon arrival report to COMCARDIV 23 for duty. To ENIWETOK.

26 0827 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC PEARL HU.

Rear Admiral E.L. Gunther and Rear Admiral A.C. Davis now on leave in mainland. On Expiration leave of these officers and prior their departure from mainland desire that both these officers have thorough physical check to determine their fitness for duty at sea. COMAIRPAC take necessary action.

26 0624 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCHIN AND CNO.

Your 241910. Recommend that work on Cruisers one to ten be limited to essential repairs in order that they may render maximum service before being decommissioned.

26 1228 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC. CVF 95. ALL TO COMAIR, TAI, CVF 95. CVF 99. CVF 99. info COMAIRPAC, COMCHIN, TAI, COMAIR, TAI, COMAIR, TAI, COMAIR.

COMCHIN reports that rescue agency known as AMAS has started operating picket junks off and paralleling EAST CHINE COAST AMOY to FOOGNOM. Picket junks will be utilized to pick up downed airmen. Following markings will be used. Red Sail with white patch on center. Red Cloth with white patch spread over the cabin. White area running length of Gunwales based in by 3 inch Red Stripes. Operational base these picket junks KEISHUA (25-56W 119-49N). Intended these junks will operate over considerable period of time. Take appropriate action to prevent attacks on these junks by our forces.
SECRET

26 1244 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMMARLNAH, COM MARGILS, COMPACFLT into CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC, CG USASTAF, CG FRAF, COMTAGS, COMCHUFL, COMMARLNAH, COMMARLNAH, COMMARLNAH, COMMARLNAH, COMMARLNAH.

The current JCS directive pertaining to the operational control of the Sea Air rescue is contained in paragraph 3 of JCS 669/1 which states "Operational control of air sea rescue activities and facilities is a responsibility of theater or area commanders".

Para. Within the Pacific Ocean Areas this responsibility is delegated to COMMARLNAH, COMMARGILS, COMMARLNAH and COMPACFLT for Hawaiian Sea Frontier MARSHALL GILBERTS SUB AREA the MARIANAS SUB AREA and the combat areas to the westward of 135-00 degrees east longitude respectively.

26 1414 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONGEN US FORCES CHINA THEATER into COMMARLNAH CHINA.

U. S. Navy surface forces are operating in various parts of EAST CHINA SEA including waters close along CHINA coast and will continue to do so in order to exercise control of those waters. Suggest CHINESE be warned of danger of operating vessels of any kind in such coastal areas.

26 0723 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCINCPAC, CONTFRW, CINCPAC PEARL, CGF 90, COMCINCPAC 26, CINCPAC 45, KITAKINMIYAZAKI BAY CTF 71, KURE BAY CTF 70, KOJIMA BAY CTF 41, SHIMO ISLAND CTF 78, FULLAM (DD 474), GIBBS (DD 252), HODSON (DD 474), HALFORD (DD 450), STANLEY (DD 478), WAINWRIGHT (DD 449), FRENCH (DD 662), KITSEN (DD 499), GRAY (DD 649).

Upon your reporting to CINCPAC for duty send my 260722 form Task Force 49 composed of info ships and prepare them for duty in NorPac.

27 0310 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENPAC into CONSFARPAC, COM 14, CINCPAC PEARL.

Reference CINCPAC serial 3769 of 18 March subject shipping control Hawaiian Area. The interchange of comments both formal and informal in connection therewith and proposed changes in that directive have been noted and given consideration. Meanwhile JOSCO has apparently been functioning effectively. In view of prospective marked decrease in shipping activities involving both services jointly in POA it is contemplated that JOSCO will be disbanded about October. At which time Com 14 will be required to assume responsibilities for CINCPAC shipping in Hawaiian Area which are now charged to JOSCO. COMGENPAC will be called upon to designate an agency with which Com 14 can coordinate such joint shipping activities in the Hawaiian Area as would previously been handled by JOSCO.

27 0312 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM MARIANAS into CONGENPAC, COM TAGPAC FL, JSSCM JIMA, JSSCM SAIPAN, CINCPAC PEARL.

COMGENPAC dis 250332. In order not to reduce the AAA defense of IWO JIMA at this time and to assemble elements of the 206th AAA BN for training transfer the 206th AAA BN (less Btrics C and D) from SAIPAN to IWO JIMA as soon as practicable.
CX 28596.

Para. 1. Reference (forwarded toaction addresses on 29 July 1945) is memorandum for record of staff conference by representatives of CINCAPAC-CINCPAC at Guam 21/22 July 1945, subject: Transfer of Control of United States Held Areas in the Ryukus from CINCPAC to CINCAPAC.

Para. 2. Under provisions of agreements in reference and effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July, 10th Army with assigned and attached United States Army units and the United States Army Forces of the Island Commands of Okinawa and IE Shima will be transferred from control of CINCPAC to CINCAPAC.

Para. 3. At the same date and hour:

SubPara A. The 10th Army including assigned and attached units will become a tactical and administrative command reporting directly to CINCAPAC. CINCPAC (now CINCAPAC) will publish the necessary orders passing administrative control directly at APAC of 10th Army thus constituted.

SubPara B. The Island Commands Okinawa and IE Shima, including all United States Army units assigned and attached to the CINCAPAC Army Service Command CINCAPAC, will be assigned to CINCAPAC. ASCOM 1, less United States Army Anti-aircraft units, passes to the operational control of CINCPAC. ASCOM 2, to the operational control of CINCPAC.

SubPara C. CINCPAC will issue the necessary orders to constitute ASCOM 1 and assign ASCOM 1 and included units to CINCAPAC.

SubPara D. CINCPAC will include in his orders all units new or transferred or scheduled for movement to the Ryukus under CINCPAC orders and redeployed units already assigned to APAC by APAC orders. (Draft order is letter order this headquarters subject, assignment of units (44) dated 17 July).

Para. 4.

SubPara A. At the same date and hour CINCPAC 10th Army will:

(1) In conjunction with the local naval and air forces, assume control and defense of the U.S. held areas of the Ryukus. (2) Conduct such minor offensive operations from time to time as may be necessary to protect and consolidate U.S. positions in the Ryukus or as may be directed by this headquarters. (3) Conduct military government in the Ryukus.

SubPara B. CINCPAC, reinforced Marine Air Defense Units and U.S. Army anti-aircraft units (see paragraph 3 B above) will support the 10th Army and conduct the air defense of the Ryukus.

SubPara C. (1) CINCPAC 10th Army, CINCPAC PAC and CINCPAC NAVFAC OPERATING BASE, OKINAWA will make local arrangements for coordination of defense of the U.S. held positions in the Ryukus, formning such boards, committees or information centers as may be required. (2) CINCPAC 10th Army will exercise overall coordination of internal security in the Ryukus. The command of each force will provide for its own internal security. (3) CINCPAC PAC will exercise local air control in the Ryukus as arranged with local air commanders concerned.

Para 5. Logistics (at the same date and hour).
SECRET
JULY (CITY)

26 1601
CINCPAC to CONGENAPAC, CONGEN 10, CONGENFIFTH, CONGEN FIFTH, CONGEN KPOE, CONGEN TSOC 02 OKINAWA info CONGEN TSOC 02 SHIMA, GARCOS, WARTAG, CINCPAC 5TH NO. 00 5TH ARMY, 00 8TH ARMY (Cont'd).

SubPara. A. Supply. (1) CONGEN 10 charge with responsibility for logistic support of U.S. Army forces within the KYUKUS (including RAF and USAF) except for air force technical and air force ammunition supply. (2) COMMANDING GENERAL APACDPAC will continue existing logistic support of all U.S. Army Forces (except USAF air force technical and ammunition supply) which remain as currently arranged in the KYUKUS. Responsibility for delivery terminates at the waterline. (3) Logistic support of all naval and marine forces will remain the responsibility of CINCPAC.

SubPara. B. Evacuation of casualties. (1) CINCPAC retains responsibility for hospitalization of naval and marine corps patients and for surface evacuation of patients of all services. (2) CONGEN 10 will assume responsibility for hospitalization of all patients, including USAF, and in emergencies for naval and marine corps casualties in excess of hospital capacities under control of CINCPAC in the KYUKUS.

SubPara. C. Transportation. (1) CONGEN 10 will be charged with the responsibility for: (A) call forward from the regulating points the destination of all ammunition shipping and other shipping for the support of army forces in the KYUKUS, (B) the unloading of all army cargoes, including USAF cargoes and ammunition for naval and marine corps units, and the integration of arrivals of such additional shipping as may be directed by this Hqtr. (2) CONGEN 10 will be responsible for the initiation and prosecution of construction of all Army and Military Government facilities and for the Army portion of Joint Facilities. (3) Existing supervision headquarters will temporarily be retained within headquarters 10th Army.

SubPara. E. An area petroleum officer will be assigned by the responsible to this headquarters for requisitioning, call forward, delivery, storage and issue of all petroleum products (bulk and packed) in the KYUKUS except for those fleet units normally supplied by naval service squadrons or divisions.

Para. 6. Direct radio communication between CINCPAC and CONGEN 10 will take place so as to become effective at 1200 GMT, 31 July 1945. Call signs and frequencies to be assigned by separate radiogram the AFRICAN station of this circuit will be temporarily provided by APWESPA.

Para. 7. For further details, see provisions of memorandum for Record of staff conference by representatives of CINCPAC-CINCPAC as CVAM 21/23 July 1945, all provisions of which are hereby placed in full effect. Detailed orders will publish later.

27 O505 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONAIRPAC info COMAIRWESTCOAST, COMFAIRWEST, COMNORP

COMFAIRWESTCOAST 250502. Not satisfactory see my 270540 May. Expedite movement of VPB 122 as practicable.
SECRET
JULY (GOT)

27 1317 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 99.2, CTUs 99.2.1, 99.2.3, 99.3.1, 99.3.12 info COMSTFT, COMGRFT, COMSTFT, COMINCH, CINCPAC FSAF, COMFREN TEN, ALL TF AND TG COMMANDS PAC FLEET.

Following changes in Task Organization and operational control effective 31 1200 (1) July.

Commandant NOB OKINAWA assume designation CTF 99 and report by dispatch to CINCPAC. Present TU 99.3.12 report to CTF 99. COMFREN 2ND MARINE AIR WING with headquarters pass to operational control COMFREN AIR FWM PAC. Present TU 99.2.1 pass to operational control COMFREN PAF.

Present TU 99.2.3 report to CTF 98.9 (COMFAIRWING 1).

02 0126 CINOPAC ADVANCE TO COMINCH.

Para. A. CINCPAC ADVANCE 181255 still presents CINCPAC's views. COMCUNUSASTAFS concurrence in Joint Chiefs of Staff proposal to establish Pacific Joint Communication Board noted in COMCUN USASTAF 162.025. There is no Navy Communication interest in Pacific is naturally considered equal to that of Army and no general dominance of Pacific Communications by any one of 3 services would be acceptable.

Para. B. In POA Joint Communications have not yet been utilized fully. In SWPA separate army and navy communications have been utilized and there is obviously no desire by CINCPAC to change. It is therefore not expected that CINCPAC will be agreeable to any coordination and integration of service communications which might affect the degree of control be now has.

Para. C. If board were established in accordance CINOPAC 181255 and was advisory only it is probable that coordination but not integration could be improved. CINCPAC and CINCPAC have coordinated communication matters by conferences and dispatches. This can be continued and is reasonably satisfactory.

Para. D. Referring to your 212023 the creation of a full time working committee to coordinate frequencies within Pacific may become necessary in connection with large scale operations when frequency representatives for 3 services should be together to adjust frequency difficulties as they occur.

Para. E. No comment on command responsibilities expressed and implied in CINCPACS C 27447 will be made herein as COMINCH is already fully informed.

Para. F. In view of CINCPACS expressed opposition to the formation of a Pacific JCB and a method of coordination is working at present recommend against any further effort at this time in this connection.

02 1500 CECIL J. DOYLE (DE 565) to COMWES EBSURANEA info CTF 94 (INTERCEPT).

Have arrived area. Am picking up survivors from USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) torpedoed and sunk last Sunday night.
SECRET

30 1733/14 COMINCH AND CNO to NAVP (CONFIDENTIAL DISPATCH)

Following effective 1 August.

Para. 1. In all combat sea and land areas which are defined in para 2 below, (A) Recognition signals for warships and aircraft are abolished except as required for training purposes. (B) Recognition procedure for entry into defended ports is abolished. (C) Warships merchant ships and Ground Forces are not to engage aircraft. (D) Aircraft are not to engage warships and merchant ships. (E) Use of IFF by warships and aircraft is abolished except as required for training purposes and for purposes of distress and air/sea rescue. (F) Holders of recognition signals publications are to retain them.

Para. 2. Non-combat areas are defined as follows. (A) S.A. North Atlantic including Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, Arctic Ocean, Baltic and North Sea, Mediterranean, Black and Red Seas, South Atlantic Ocean east of 74°00 West to longitude of Cape Town, North and South Pacific east of 120°00 West but see paragraph 3 below. (B) Land Areas, United Kingdom, European theater, West Africa (Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French West and Equatorial Africa, and Belgian Congo). Countries bordering on the Mediterranean Sea (except Spain and Spanish Morocco) and the Mediterranean west of 45°00 East.

Para. 3. Notwithstanding the instructions above, in the Panama Canal area, recognition signals will continue to be used between local defense forces and aircraft and such instructions concerning local defense forces engaging aircraft as are in effect in that area will continue in effect.

Para. 4. All other areas including the ports of Capetown and Aden are combat areas and full British/United States recognition procedures will continue to be used.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMCENTAF: Adv CINCPAC, COMINCH, CNO ADV, PACOM, CONMC, COMUSPACOM, COMLETHAF, NMC, FORAIR, etc.

In connection CINCPAC ADV HQ 260151 (ALPOA). Operational control of PFP ground units OKINAWA will be as follows:

(a) 3rd Field Corps units rehabilitating OKINAWA will be under COMCENTAF.

(b) 12th Marine Service Bn will be under Commandant NCB

(c) 2nd Prov Marine AAA Group will be under Marine Air Defense Command.

01 0900 PENNSYLVANIA to CINCPAC PEARL HQ INTO CINCPAC ADV HQ

Completed operation Puddle Wake. AA fire meager and inaccurate. Share battery fired moderate inside 10,000 yards. Coverage CINCPAC ADV 239907 being furnished by USS CAROT. No personnel casualties. Fragments hit on PENNSYLVANIA disabled 1 director Mark 50, 1 P6 and 1 50 last operationally both pilots recovered unarmed. Preliminary reports indicate following. 9 guns including both 8 inch at PENNSYLVANIA POINT out of action. Damage to 6 other guns distillation and power plants. 1 dump burned.
02 0018
CONTRIBUT to CINCPAC/CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMAIR PAC, COMAIR PAC, COMAIR PAC

Have conferred with your Deputy Chief of Staff regarding NCTC major base in PHILIPPINES in accordance your 250908. Information given him is now submitted to you for consideration in submitting your first recommendation. NCTC proposed flight wing will consist initially of 2 R&D quadrions Numbers 6 and 13 and 1 crew Number 10. These squadrons will serve the Asiatic area only. MACTAN suggested as location headquarters service maintenance facilities for wing. MACTAN ISLAND considered logical site for repair and maintenance NCTC equipment service PHILIPPINES and adjacent areas with twin engine airplanes for the reasons that: A. It is centrally located with respect areas served by the wing. B. Local weather conditions best this area. C. Will make common use of station aircraft supply transportation and repair facilities of Naval Air Base MACTAN. Facilities for initial use by NCTC to extent of 6 R&D wing 300 NCTC personnel will be available MACTAN 1 September. Suggest present facilities MANUS and SAMAR continue to be utilized by NCTC as necessary/product NCTC move to MACTAN be progressive as facilities MACTAN become available. Suggest trans-Pacific NCTC PHILIPPINES terminal be LYFTE to turn around and non facilities only. It being understood that major repair and maintenance will be provided in MARIANAS and HAWAII. NCTC trans-Pacific seaplane terminal facilities now being constructed SANGLEY and will allow progressive expansion of NCTC seaplane service. Samar which is now PHILIPPINES terminal of NCTC trans-Pacific landplane service is suggested as temporary terminal to be used only until Neilsen Field MANILA facilities now under construction are completed. Neilson facilities to be supplemented by use of strip at SANGLEY which will be available prior to completion Neilson.

03 0207
CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 93 Info COMAIR HQ, COMAIR FPOE, COMAIR FPOE, COMAIR PAC, CINCPAC PAC

The reorganisation of air forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas has made it necessary to disband Task Force 93. The mission of your force has been accomplished under difficult conditions in an efficient manner for which I am most appreciative and congratulate you on a job well done.

03 0208
CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 93 Info ALPAC

The Strategic Air Force Pacific Ocean Areas with designation of TF-93 and TO-93A are dissolved. CTO-93A report with the forces under his command to ComGen USASTAF for duty. See my 242315 for concerning fighter defense FW JO JDA.

03 0227
CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIR PAC Info CINCPAC FPOE, HQ, COMAIR PAC, COMAIR PAC, COMAIR PAC, COMAIR PAC

Your L14155 is hereby approved insofar as CINCPAC is concerned.

3342
SECRET

03 0347 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH AND CNO info DGON (AIR), BUADRO, CINCPAC, FRM.

Increasing photographic missions to meet the requirements for amphibious operations, assessment of target damage, photography for use in connection with shore bombardment, photo reconnaissance of bypasses bases plus the increased attrition rate due to enemy action dictate the necessity for a readjustment of the present deployment, rotation and composition of Navy photoRms. Therefore recommends:

(A) That the authorized complement of PhotoRms 1 and 3 be increased from 6 to 9 PhRB-1F as soon as practicable.

(B) That these 2 squadrons be supported forward on a crew replacement basis in a manner similar to other multi-engine squadrons.

(C) If required in order to implement the above or to provide compensating personnel complements recommend PhotoRms 4 and 5 be decommissioned.

Para. This is my action on COMAIRPAC 242028 and serial 001795 both of July not to or needed by all.

03 0742 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH and MARCOMPS, CINCPAC, FMW.

Marine personnel will be used for local defense and internal security of Naval Operating Base OKINAWA. CINCPAC ADVANCE 030747 an MP BN has been requested from COMINCH for this purpose however until such unit is available CMNFPAC will meet this requirement on a temporary basis by providing at least 2 infantry companies or equivalent units from FMF personnel locally available at OKINAWA. Such unit or units should report to Commd NOB OKINAWA at earliest. Commd NOB OKINAWA is authorized to require CMNFPAC to furnish such additional troops for tactical purposes as the situation may require.

03 0912 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE to CMNFPAC info COMCH, MARCOMPS, CINCPAC, FMW.

Headquarters and headquarters squadron 2nd Marine Air Wing inadvertently not mentioned in memoranda for record GUAM conference 21-23 July refer to your 311501. Operational control that unit passed to FAAF so that the method of controlling Marine Air Defense units through the 2nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters will continue. My 271317 being changed accordingly.

03 0913 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info CMNFPAC ADJUN., COMCH, MARCOMPS.

Change my 271317 to read as follows. Following changes in Task Organization and operational control effective 311201 (-9) July. Commd NOB OKINAWA assume designation CTF 99 and report by despatch to CINCPAC. Present 99.3,12 report to CTF 99. COMENN2ND MARINAIR WING with present 99.3,1, TU 99.2,2 and headquarters and headquarters squadron pass to operational control FAAF. Present TU 99.2,3 report to COMAFFN 1.
03 0915 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COUNCH AND CNO into CINCPAC FERRY.

Your 311607. Consider that there is sufficient possibility that AIUTAKI and PEARL may have post war significance to justify continuance of present token garrisons. Navy and Coast Guard personnel will be substituted for Army garrisons if so direct or if it is the only means by which garrisons can be maintained.

01 1355 DTW 95-9-2 to CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO COUGENSAITAF, CNO 27TH AF, CNO 94-11 COUGEN PT AF, COMAFC FOR CNO.

Your 301599 it is desired to continue rescues in all pilots. Conference representatives COUGEN PT AF advise that they will continue their splendid and cooperative fighter cover for all rescue missions and searchs necessary. Communication facilities recommended by 311301 not all or needed should be expedited for optimum rescue operations.

30 2140 COMAFC SWPA to COMAF 13, COUGEN 82 FLYER WING (ADC), COMAIR 7TH FLEET, CINCPAC ADVANCE to COUGEN PACIFIC AT GUAM. COMAF 13, COMAIR 7TH FLEET.

AX-79283.

Further to your AX-78080, 21 July (not to all). Comaf 13 combat responsibility includes entire 5th Air Force area of responsibility in SWPA, as outlined in enclosure 1 to operations instructions number 94. This combat responsibility includes strike and rescue airsea rescue and operational control of all shore and tender-based aircraft of Comair 7th FLEET, as outlined in paras 111, operations instructions number 94, except units specifically placed under control air defense command for airway's airsea rescue operations.

Para. 85 fighter wing will assume responsibility for (A) airsea rescue airway's coverage in PHILIPPINES at 30011(-9), 5 August 65, and JPN, the operations of VFP 71 bases SAMAR and 1-half VFP 20 based IWO JIMA to accomplish this mission. (B) area, strikes and rescue airsea coverage on or about 15 September 1965 for all craft operations within and from the PHILIPPINES, at which time 1 Army airsea rescue squadrons will be assigned in addition to Navy squadrons. Letter directive follows to ADC.

03 2345 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMAF/FLEET INFO COUNCH.

COMAFC SWPA 302140/1(-9). Request letter report giving complete data on existing operational command arrangements as they affect all units of air 7th Fleet.
SECRET

07 0020  CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to ALFOA Info CINCAPAC.

The standard army air force air defense grid which is now employed by
the forces under CINCAPAC is hereby prescribed for use by forces under
CINCPAC in cases when a grid is employed in exchanging air warning and
fighter direction information on radar reporting and radar telling
circuits. Effective date 1 September 1945. This grid is not to be
confused with the AMS world Polyconic grid which is used for gunfire and
air support. It is not intended to replace the polar coordinate system
used by fleet elements at sea or the polar coordinate system of local
reporting from a fixed reference point at the scene of an operation. The
air defense grid supersedes the Jangrid the use of which in the POA is
accordingly discontinued. Information on the air defense grid will be
disseminated separately.

07 0819  CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH Info CNO, CINCAPAC, CINCPAC PEARL H.Q.

JCS 181409 and the resulting agreement between CINCAPAC and CINCPAC
Memorandum for Record of 23 July 1945 subpar 3, 4 and 5 of para 85
regarding division of responsibility for shipping in the RTUKUS imposes
a condition for the present wherein the overall responsibility for
procurement and sailing of shipping remains with CINCPAC but responsi-
bility for unloading and turn around at OKINAWA is divided between
CINCPAC and CINCAPAC.

Subpar 855 specifically provides that CINCAPAC may introduce addi-
tional shipping at OKINAWA without reference to CINCPAC. Under such
circumstances CINCPAC does not have the authority to exercise the overall
control over shipping in the RTUKUS which JCS require of him under
JCS 100345 of December 1944. Request JCS 100345 of December 1944 be
modified to eliminate CINCPAC responsibility for shipping in Army
controlled ports of RTUKUS.

07 0902  CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN CHINA Info CTF 95

Reference C.F.A.W. 1 022330 separately passed. Would appreciate
your comments as to attack on junk traffic. I consider visit and
search will normally be impracticable and that visual identification
as to friendly character will usually be unreliable. My inclination
is to intercept all traffic north of the YANGTZ. Early reply
requested.
SECRET

AUGUST (GCT)

08 1955 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to ALPAC.

The Soviet Union has announced that a state of war exists between
that country and JAPAN.

09 0027 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COM3RDFLT, ALL TF AND TG COMMANDS PACFLT, COMSUBPAC,
COMNORPAC, COMTFIDFJT info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CG FEAP & ADRON, CG USASTAF.

Following operational boundaries established for operations US and
Soviet Forces.

Para. In sea of JAPAN the boundary will be along the lines connecting
CAPE BOLTN (41-50N 129-43E) to point 40-00N 135-00E to point 45-45N
140-00 E thence along parallel 45-45N to line connecting CAPE CRILLON
(NISHI HOTOKO MISAKI on southern tip of southern SAKHALIN) with SOYA MISAKI
(on northern tip of HOKKAIDO). U.S. forces air and naval (including
Submarines) will operate to the south and east of this boundary.

Para. In the north Pacific, SEA OF OKhotsk and BERING SEA. Boundary
will be established along the line from CAPE DEZINHEV to DIOMERE ISLAND thence
along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and UNITED
STATES to the parallel 51-30N thence to point 50-35N 157-00 E thence
to point 49-50N 156-20E thence along parallel 49-50N to the ONEKOTAN STRAIT
thence southwest along the KURILE ISLANDS CHAIN. The area to the south
and east of this boundary is a zone of United States operation, to the
north and west a zone of mutual operations. The zone of mutual operations
the operations of the USSR and UNITED STATES naval and air forces
will be coordinated.

Para. In the sea of JAPAN operations of the U.S. forces north and
west of the boundary will be subject to coordination with the USSR.

Para. The boundary line between operational zones of the UNITED
STATES and SOVIET air forces in KOREA AND MANCHURIA shall be as follows: CAPE
BOLTN, CHANGCHUN, SINCING, LIAOYUAN, KALU, CHIIHENG, PEKING, TATUNG,
and thence along the southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA.

Para. United States aviation will operate south of this line includ-
ing all the above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this
line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change.
United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations
south of this line must be coordinated. When necessary for United States
aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north of the
boundary line coordination will be effected by local liaison. Further
information regarding identification and recognition signals later includ-
"
08 0700 COMINCH ADVANCE CINCPAC ADVANCE H. info CINCPAC 93,92, CONAIRPAC.

Shipping strike by FEAF AD ECH August 7 TSP SHIMA STRAITS did not provide cover submarine at lat 32-45 long 120-00. Dembo was assigned and fighter escort requested this sub for maximum rescue coverage. Fighter escort was refused although request was relayed to COMINCH FEA ECH by landwire and CW. After refusal message was delivered also by hand for determining policy fighter escort future strikes to insure maximum rescue coverage and protection submarine lifeguards stationed for primary duty to cover FEA strikes. Explanation refusal or policy future requests not answered. FEA ECH establishing own rescue facilities limit their equipment and exercising operational control over other than distress frequencies this includes crash boats. Duplication and resulting confusion hazard efficient rescue and unnecessarily jeopardizing lifeguards. This change in cooperation is recent but applies to practically all air sea rescue operations.

08 0940 ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK to COMINCH and CNCO info MOSCOW - CNCO PASSES TO CONAIRPAC. COMSOPAC, CNRIPC, BOTH HCS.

Convoy officer today officially states Soviet shipping no longer using LA FERROUSE. Would not divulge exact date stopped all the local rumors indicate several days. My 1003. They also preparing to start conveying by planes and warships merchant to and from VLADIVOSTOK via TARTARY and INOKHTOKSI. Describes LA FERROUSE as dangerous for their use because of Jap subs as well as American warships. Also expresses fear last KURILE STRAIT might soon be closed because of military operations.

09 2200 COMINCH AND CNCO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CONAIRPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW, ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK.

Deal directly with ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK on such matters as you require. New Subject. Tentative plans for a suitable ship for communication purposes at PETROPAVLOVSK should be made. Interpreters are available COLD BAY connection HULA project. Suggest this ship be communication link to Soviet Naval Command pending establishment CINCPAC-VLADIVOSTOK circuit.

10 0012 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC info CINCPAC PEAK, COMSOPAC.

COMSOPAC is directed to exercise administrative and operational control of Naval Air Bases and airfields and aviation matters in 30FG utilizing the services of a naval aviator whom COMAIRPAC is hereby directed to order to the staff of COMSOPAC. COMAIRPAC shall exercise type command functions including aviation logistic support and aviation personnel matters. This answer COMSOPAC 310223 July.

10 0812 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONSHOFAC info CNINCH, CGF 90, 91, 92, ALUSNA MOSCOW, ALUSNA VLADIVOSTOK.

Your 100030. Continue operations of Task Force 92 as planned. Aerial bombing of KURILE chain authorized. In order that Russians may be notified announce your intents to me and to ALUSNAS MOSCOW and VLADIVOSTOK.

AUGUST
10 1210 CONGENCHINA to CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO CTF 95, CINCPAC.

Glance at Urdls 070902 and CPNW 1 022330 concern with interception of all sea traffic north of YANGTZE RIVER. Action being taken by this headquarters to notify Chinese of their policy on shipping strikes. Recommend this unrestricted warfare not start until 25 August, so Chinese KUH sufficient time to get notice out.

10 1605 CONCINC AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO CINCPAC FARE, JOINTFLEET, CONCINC, CNO.

Temporary establishment headquarters NATS ASIATIC WING with service and maintenance facilities at MACTAN approved. Ur 030225 and my secret speedletter serial 001911 of 1 August refer. Hold installations to a minimum as MACTAN is not to be a postwar base.

12 0405 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC INFO CONGENFRAF, CONGENFRAF ADVJC, CTF 95.

Request pilots of OKINAWA-based planes be briefed that friendly submarines are operating in JAPAN SFA. Others are south of KOREA and in addition to lifeguards there will be submarines on special missions in vicinity of KYUSHU. Recent bombing of submarine lifeguard BAYTISH indicates pilots are not being properly briefed as to boundaries and bombing restrictions in submarine patrol zones. SOP-28 requires that no submarine shall be attacked in submarine patrol zones. Therefore pilots must refrain from bombing unidentified targets during daylight and should not attack single targets during darkness or low visibility.

12 0246 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to JCSO SFA, CHINESE, PAVANIS, WALKER, WHEELER AND BATES.

WARX 48488.

Propaganda directives originated by the Office of War Information have been reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as causing some confusion in certain theaters as regards their authenticity and status. Clarify this situation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to recall that under executive order No. 9512, the CINCPAC is responsible for planning, development, and execution of the federal foreign propaganda program subject to approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where areas of actual or projected military operations are concerned and subject to control of program execution by theater commanders. Army and Navy Liaison officers designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate in preparing the CINCPAC directives which are reviewed by the CINCPAC overseas planning board on which the state, war and Navy Departments are also represented.

Para. Since propaganda directives must be kept abreast of developments it is desirable to hold administrative processing to a minimum, hence they are normally communicated by CINCPAC to its representatives in the field.

Para. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that these directives be accepted in accord with executive order No. 9512 as reflecting the approved national propaganda policy for execution under your own responsibility and military considerations permit. Whenever exceptions are made to any particular directive for circumstances peculiar to any theater, the nature of the exceptions and the reasons therefore will be communicated to the information of the appropriate agency of the State or Navy Department.

AUGUST (GCT)
14 2304 CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS to ALPAC info COMINCH.

Cease offensive operations against Japanese forces. Continue searches and patrols. Maintain defensive and internal security measures at highest level and beware of treachery or last moment attacks by enemy forces or individuals.

14 2310 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to CINCPAC info COMINCH, COMINCHFLIT.

As essential preliminary to further naval operations TOKYO BAY AREA request Japanese authorities be directed to send Japanese ship to meet Halsey 20 miles bearing 135 from G SHIMA to lead his forces into SATHAMAN and advise time of arrival at rendezvous.

15 0000 COMINCH AND CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE info COMINCHFLIT.

For your information the State Department has received official Japanese acceptance of surrender demands and is replying through the intermediary power to the Japanese as follows:

1. Direct prompt cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

2. Send emissaries at once to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying force to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

For the purpose of receiving such surrender and carrying it into effect, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and he will notify the Japanese Government of the time, place and other details of the formal surrender.

15 0218 CINCPAC AND CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPACFL.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

Please accept my hearty congratulations on your appointment as Supreme Commander for the occupation of JAPAN and my assurance of full support by the forces and resources available to me.

15 0620 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPACFLIT, COMINCH.

Request immediate despatch to Japanese authorities that our own measures for defense require our naval forces to destroy any Japanese aircraft approaching our dispositions. See COM3RDFllet 150423.
Pursuant to the acceptance of the terms of surrender of the Allied Powers by the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers hereby directs the immediate cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is to notify at once of the effective date and hour of such cessation of hostilities, whereas Allied forces will be directed to cease hostilities.

Para. The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers further directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send to his headquarters at Manila, Philippine Islands, a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender. The above representative will present to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon his arrival a document authenticated by the Emperor of Japan, empowering him to receive the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Para. The representative will be accompanied by competent advisors representing the Japanese Army, the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Air Forces. The latter advisor will be thoroughly familiar with airbase facilities in the Tokyo area.

Para. Procedure for the transport of the above party under safe conduct is prescribed as follows: Party will travel in a Japanese airplane to an airdrome on the island of Ie Shima from which point they will be transported to Manila, Philippine Islands. In a United States Airplane. They will be returned to Japan in the same manner. Party will employ an unmarked airplane, type Zero Model 22, I2, I3. Such airplane will be painted all white and will bear upon the sides of the fuselage and top and bottom of each wing green crosses easily recognizable at 500 yards. The airplane will be capable of in-flight voice communications in English, on a frequency of 6970 kilocycles. Airplane will proceed to an airdrome on the island of Ie Shima, identified by 2 white crosses prominently displayed in the center of the runway. The exact date and hour this airplane will depart from Ie Shima, on the southern tip of Kyushu, the route and altitude of flight and estimated time of arrival to Ie Shima, will be broadcast 6 hours in advance, in English, from Tokyo on a frequency of 1625 kilocycles. Acknowledgement by radio from this headquarters of the receipt of such broadcast is required prior to take-off of the airplane. Weather permitting, the airplane will depart from Ie Shima between the hours of 0800 and 1100 Tokyo time on the 17th Day of August 1945. In communications regarding this flight, the code designation "Ie Shima" will be employed.

Para. The airplane will approach Ie Shima on a course of 160 degrees and circle landing field at 1000 feet or below the cloud layer until joined by escort of United States Army B-36s which will lead it to a landing. Such escort may join the airplane prior to arrival at Ie Shima.

AUGUST (OCT) - Not Top Secret - Plain
SECRET
Aug. 55
15 0355 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES TO THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, THE
JAPANESE EMPIRE, GOVERNMENT, THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, NAVAL, AND NAVY
HEADQUARTERS, CINCOPAC.

I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces
(The United States, The Republic of China, The United Kingdom, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and empowered to arrange directly
with the Japanese authorities for the cessation of hostilities at the
earliest practicable date.

Para. It is desired that a radio station in the TOKYO area be official-
ly designated for continuous use in handling radio communications between
this headquarters and your headquarters. Your reply to this message should
give the call signs, frequencies and station designation. It is desired
that the radio communication with my headquarters in MANILA be handled in
English text. Pending designation by you of a station in the TOKYO AREA
for use as above indicated, station JUN on frequency 13705 kilocycles will
be used for this purpose, and WTA MANILA will reply on 15965 kilocycles.
Upon receipt of this message, acknowledge. MacArthur.

15 0215 CTF 95 to CINCOPAC ADVANCE info CTF 99.

Originator and CTF 99 jointly recommend as follows. Your 150436 refers.
A. To meet situation as it exists now. Effective 1 September CTF 95
dissolve Task Group 95.5 CINCOPAC abolish title commander Naval Forces
Ryukyu and assign to CTF 99 duties as OpPlan 3-45 paragraph 6. Items
1 to 6 inclusive. Remainder duties under this paragraph will be assumed
by units of TF 95.

B. To meet developments during and after OLYMPIC or occupation of
JAPAN. When control of shipping is passed by COMPHIBSPAC establish Task
Organisation JAPAN similar to that proposed JP YAN MEF. Each organisation
to take over control of CHOP line to be established by CINCOPAC.
Consider duties in above will not be affected except magnitude of
shipping with corresponding increase in escorts required. In approved
CTF 95 will transfer personnel and vessels now assigned TO 95.5 to permit
accomplishment assigned responsibilities. CTF 95.6 will be assigned
duties as SOPA at HUCKER BAY and will carry out plans prepared by
Naval Base Commander for clearing harbor in emergency. He will be
responsible for military functions afloat including such as control of
AOG AA fire etc.
SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 0842 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to ALPAC.

With the termination of hostilities against JAPAN it is incumbent on all officers to conduct themselves with dignity and decorum in their treatment of the Japanese and their public utterances in connection with the Japanese. The Japanese are still the same nation which initiated the War by a treacherous attack on the Pacific Fleet and which has subjected our brothers in arms who became prisoners to torture, starvation and murder. However the use of insulting epithets in connection with the Japanese as a race or as individuals does not now become the officers of the United States Navy. Officers of the Pacific Fleet will take steps to require of all personnel under their command a high standard of conduct in this matter. Neither familiarity and open forgiveness nor abuse and vituperation should be permitted.

15 0846 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COM3REDLT, COM7THFLT, COMTHFLT.

Refer appendix C to my serial 0005103. It is requested that naval requirements as stated in reference plus the following be presented to Japanese Embassy at MANILA.

1. That the Japanese Imperial High Command will promptly direct all Japanese and Japanese controlled ships, warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft to comply with the following instructions:
   A. Ships in harbors to remain in harbor pending further directions from CINCPAC; ships at sea report their positions in plain language immediately to the nearest U.S. British or Soviet Radio Station on 500Kc/8600 meters and to the call sign NJO on 1 of the following high frequencies: 4235, 8470, 12705, or 16940 Kc/s. Proceed to nearest allied port or such port as CINCPAC may direct pending further orders. Ships will burn navigational lights at night and display searchlights with beams held vertically.
   B. Submarines will remain on surface fly a black flag or pennant and show lights at night. Report their positions in accordance with (A) and proceed on surface to nearest of following ports, AGANA GUAM, MIDWAY ISLAND, SUBIC BAY PHILIPPINES. Upon arrival at point 10 miles from entrance to port communicate with port and lie to until boarded by allied naval forces.
   C. All warships and merchant ships whether in port or at sea will immediately train all weapons fore and aft. Torpedo tubes will be unloaded and all breech blocks will be removed from all guns.
   D. All minesweeping vessels will carry out prescribed measures of disarmament, fuel as necessary and be prepared immediately for minesweeping service under the direction of CINCPAC.

2. The Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that Japanese naval aircraft are not to leave the ground or water or ship pending directions from CINCPAC.

3. The Japanese High Command will forthwith direct that any neutral merchant ships in JAPAN or Japanese controlled ports are to be detained pending instructions from CINCPAC.

4. The Japanese High Command will forthwith issue categorical directions that:
   A. All boom defenses at all ports and harbors are to be opened and kept open at all times; where possible they are to be removed.

- continued -
E. All controlled minefields at all ports and harbors are to be dis-connected and rendered ineffective.

F. All demolition charges in all ports and harbor works are to be removed or rendered ineffective and their presence indicated.

G. The existing wartime system of navigational lighting is to be maintained except that all dimmed lights are to be shown at full brilliance.

H. All pilotage services are to continue to operate and all pilots are to be held at their normal stations ready for service and equipped with charts.

I. Japanese Naval and other personnel concerned in the operation of ports are to remain at their stations and continue to carry out their normal duties.

J. The Japanese Imperial High Command will be prepared to deliver forthwith to CINCPAC representative in TOKYO BAY AREA:

A. Corrected copies of charts showing all minefields laid by Japanese or Japanese controlled vessels or aircraft and all other underwater obstructions.

B. Details of all Japanese coastal convoy routes, searched channels and of all buoy lights and other navigational aids.

C. Exact information with regard to disposition of Japanese naval units.

D. Detailed lists of fuel stocks including furnace diesel gasoline and coal.

K. The Japanese Imperial High Command will forthwith direct that except as may be required for the purpose of giving effect to the above special orders all personnel in Japanese warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships and other craft are to remain on board their ships pending further directions from CINCPAC or his representatives.

L. The Japanese Imperial High Command will issue instructions forthwith that:

A. The YOKOSUKA, HIRONISHI, OMURA and KAGAYAMA airfields be prepared immediately for occupation by U.S. Marine and Naval Air Units.

B. The YOKOSUKA Naval Base be prepared immediately for occupation and possible operation by U.S. Naval Service Units.

C. All troops and personnel other than those required for normal care taking functions be removed from the foregoing areas prior to the arrival of U.S. Forces.
15 1844 CINCPAC BOTH HEADQUARTERS.

Reports from Soviets yesterday given high evaluation by these indicate following: Intense activity reported along shores SAGAMI WAN on 13 and 14th August just past. Many troops naval personnel and civilian volunteers concentrating that area and digging fox holes and gun positions. Beaches contain many anti-landing devices and entire shore this bay reported heavily fortified. If this report true activity probably organized prior surrender orders but possibility of treachery connection BLUE landings must be considered.

15 0930 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC COMMISSION.

BY 68266.

Recommend Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to remove, effective V-J Day, restriction now imposed by modified category of defense B under which this area now operating ordered reduce present alert status of ground and air forces in Hawaiian Group after formal declaration V-J Day.

16 1117 KWANGCHANG AHEAD HEADQUARTERS TO MACARVER INFORM HEADQUARTERS FIFTH TOWER.

1st. Japanese land line forces have ceased all military movements at their present positions. It is hoped that the Soviet forces will also cease their attacks. Especially in the vicinity of MUTANGANG, the Soviet attacks should be speedily stopped.

2nd. Hereafter, the intentions of the Japanese side will be notified every hour for 10 minutes on frequencies of 6035 kilocycles and 13590 kilocycles. The same will be transmitted via wireless on frequencies of 13590 kilocycles and 5815 kilocycles and 7940 kilocycles at the same hour. The Soviet side is requested to carry out similar communications via the KHABAROVSK radio and the same news agency. Wireless communication should be established between the supreme field headquarters of both the Japanese and Soviet Armies. Specify the wave length on which your communications will be transmitted.

16 1608 KANADA to MACARVER info DRUM, MACACHEH, MCCLURE, MACAIR, MACMST.

Urgent NR 21497 following is text of English language broadcast from TOKYO dated 16 August furnished for your information. We are in receipt of the message of the U.S. Government transmitted to us through the SHEEL Government, and of a message from General MacArthur received by the TOKYO radiograph office, and desire to make the following communications:

Para 1. His Majesty the Emperor issued an Imperial order at 6 PM on August 16 to the entire Armed Forces, to cease hostilities immediately.

Para 2. It is presumed that the said Imperial order will reach the front line and produce full effect after the following lapse of time:

A. In JAPAN proper, 48 hours;
B. In CHINA, MANCHU, KOREA, southern regions - except BOUGAINVILLE - NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES, 6 days.

END (SGT) - continued -
C. In BORAINVILLE, 8 days.

D. In NEW GUINEA and the PHILIPPINES, in the case of various local headquarters, 12 days. But whether and when the order will be received by the 1st line units, is difficult to foresee.

Para 3. With a view to making the August wish of His Majesty, regarding the termination of the war, and the above-mentioned Imperial order thoroughly known to all concerned, members of the Imperial Family will be dispatched as personal representatives of His Majesty to the headquarters of the KYANGTOY Armies, the expeditionary forces in CHINA and the forces in the southern regions respectively. The itinerary, type of airplane, making, etc. will be communicated later. It is accordingly requested that careful conduct for the above be granted.

Para 4. As regards to the request to dispatch a competent representative accompanied by service advisors, to the headquarters of General MacArthur in MANILA, leaving SANTA MISAKI in KYUSHU on August 17, we find ourselves embarrassed, as it is impossible for us to arrange for the departure of your representative on August 17 due to the scarcity of time available. We will, however, proceed as soon as possible with the necessary preparations and notify General MacArthur as to the date of the flight of such a representative which will take place as soon as possible.

Para 5. It is proposed to MAC if communications with the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the following manner:

A. Sender and receiver on the Japanese side, the General or the government.

B. BROADCASTING on the Japanese side, TOKYO station, call sign JNP, frequency 15755, 740 kilocycles.

C. Means of communications, radiograph.

D. Language, English.

Para. Communication received from General MacArthur. We request therefore, that the message be repeated, bearing upon the type fully and clearly.

Para 7. In order to make sure that we have received without fail, all the communications sent by General MacArthur, we beg him to repeat them once again through the route of communication specified under heading single quote 3 NYANGTOY, and single quote of the PARIS communication end of quote.
17 0212 JNP (RDO TOKYO)  INTEREST MESSAGE.

As stated in our radiogram No. 1 it takes some time for the said order to reach the front line and produce full effect. It is earnestly requested that the allied forces will refrain from approaching the home waters of JAPAN PROPER until the order will have been fully effectuated.

17 0711 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS to JAPANESE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

Reference your radiogram number 4 August 16th. Your assumption that the signing of surrender terms is not among the tasks of the Japanese representatives to MANILA is correct. The directive from this headquarters is clear and explicit and is to be complied with without further delay. MacArthur.

17 1357 MACARTHUR TO HIS MILITARY MISSION IN JAP. HEADQUARTERS, CHINA COMMISSION, DIV. MA.

Following messages have been received from the Japanese General Headquarters (Z 507) quote message number 5 while on our side the Imperial Order has already been given to cease hostilities, the Soviet Forces are still positively carrying on the offensive and their spearhead is reaching near a point west to MUKDEN early this morning. As the result, the Japanese Forces in MANCHUKUO are meeting great difficulties in carrying out the Imperial Order. It is urgently requested that the Supreme Commander would take proper steps to being about immediate cessation of the Soviet offensive. Message number 7. Re our radiogram number 2:

Para 1. The parties for CHINA and MANCHURIA left TOKYO today at 9:30 AM.
Para 2. The party for the south, reported in our previous message to leave on the 16th, left TOKYO also today at 9:30 AM. In order to avoid possible delay due to bad weather.
Para 3. The type and markings of the planes and their routes are as communicated before. Unquote addressees southwest PACIFIC area take necessary action to provide safe transit Japanese parties for CHINA, MANCHURIA and the south. See also Z 503. Following message received from the Japanese Government: Route message number 6 please correct the sender of our radiogram number 4 from (Japanese GQ) to (Japanese Government). MacArthur.

17 1907 WARNOS to MACARTHUR Info DRAKE, BLOUEN, WHEELER, APRATZ, KIMST.

1532.

Following is text of broadcast from KHABAROVSK in Russian to the USSR on 17 August furnished for your information. "To the Commander of the MANCHUKUO Army:

Para. The Staff of the Japanese MANCHUKUO Army addressed the radio the Staff of the Soviet Troops on MUKDEN, requesting that they cease military operations, whereas not a word was said about the capitulation of the Japanese Armed Forces in MANCHUKUO.

Para. At the same time the Japanese went on with their counter-offensive in number of victors of the Soviet-Japanese Forces.

[Signature]
17 1947 JASOO to MACARTUR info DEAN, MEDDEY, WHEELER, SPAULD, HUNT.

Para. I suggest to the Commander JAPAN'S army troops that he cease all military operations against the Soviet Troops along the entire front, lay down arms and surrender, at 12 O'clock on August 20.

Para. The time mentioned above is given in order that the staff of the JAPAN'S army could issue the order to cease resistance and surrender to all its troops. As soon as the Japanese have done laying down their arms, the Soviet troops will cease military operations.

Para. Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Troops in the Far East Marshal VASILY STALIN, August 17, 1945, 6:00AM.

Para. Following is text of English language broadcast from TOKIO dated 17 August furnished for your information. "JAP TOKYO to WTA JAPAN'S army headquarters in English at 12-42 PM. (Text) to the supreme Allied Commander's radiogram number 7, August 17-our representative to Manilla is selected. Due to unusual internal procedures, he is scheduled to leave TOKYO on August 19. Further details will follow." 6:00 HULL GMT.

20 1945 HULL AND CINCPAC.

The President on 15 August 1945 issued the following directive: Appropriate departments of the government the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent the release of any information in regard to the development, design and production of the atomic bomb, or in regard to its employment in military or naval warfare, except with the specific approval of the President in each instance.

22 1947

Year 210577 (CQ 35347) will execute my plan 2 including occupation of forces vicinity FUKU SANE which I will arrange to have vacated when I am not by necessity off OCEANA. Desire you arrange direct with Hugh Wheeler now in DIAM of OCEANA (departing 15th) for naval gunfire support desired by army forces. McDonald will advise me in the previous when he has, plans join me. I will make all necessary arrangements for gunfire support for Marine Landing Force. I suggest that 30th Airborne HV MAC send air support liaison officers and any desired JASOO elements with McDonald to report to me. My plans call for carrier plane CAP to cover airborne landings with air coordinator constantly over objective. I intend using frequencies as follows. Air coordinator and direct support aircraft for 30th Airborne division 129, 78 KG. MACDAN WALL combat air patrol 124, 02.
22 0629 GENERAL ADVANCE TO G550544 — SUBJECT: MARCHING TIMES

Paragraph 1. Based on the assumption that arrangements can be made for the 5th Amphibious Corps including 3 Marine to be released in February—January from occupation duty JAPAN (either being relieved by Army Units or being released without relief) the following schedule of return of amphibious corps and Marine Divisions to U.S. is recommended for planning purposes: October 5th MarDiv, December 3rd MarDiv, January 5th Phil Corps and 9th Mar Div. May 3rd Phil Corps and 6th Mar Div. Units returning will include personal leaves in area. Above is dependent on strategic situation; however, your approval is requested for planning purposes. In May the 3rd MarDiv will be in CHINA and 5th Marine in MARIANAS—MARSHALLS—NORTHWEST CAROLINAS.

Paragraph 2. Recommend that A Group Headquarters and 3 AAA RRs be disbanded and the personnel used for rotation and to augment the service command. Releasing 2 AAA RRs will be required Marines for present.

Paragraph 3. Confirm/FRs seem in the above. In addition he will submit recommendations for disbandment and readjustment of other units as the tactical situation permits.

Paragraph 4. 6th defense on at KUSAT and Marine Defense force NORTHw will be reduced to miniscule.

Paragraph 5. 52nd Defense on can be released from assigned duties now and returned U.S. 51st Defense on will be required Marshall for the present.

Paragraph 6. The disbandment of units the processing of equipment and supplies the closing out of camps etc., will require a temporary suspension of the service command involving an estimated additional 400 enlisted and warrant and 12,000 enlisted. Command/FRs will submit above requirements to MACUSA by separate correspondence.

23 0609 GENERAL ADVANCE TO G550541

Your 2206092 just received. Commander North Pacific Force has been considered to be a Task Force Commander of the Pacific Fleet and has been included in the Task Organization of all major operation plans issued by COMUS. Initiate compliance on OPNAV 16-43 of which personnel estimates have been furnished you. Keep me and COMUS informed of your plans and the intended positions and movements of your forces. Do not enter COMUS until after 30 August. Acknowledge.

23 1157 COMUS to COMUS ADVANCE CO.

0 3009.

For the surrender ceremony there will be 30 senior officers of Ohio headquarters and other major army headquarters. There are in addition to 30 Allied officers who will attend representing the Allied Powers. Correspondence, personnel can see APPH 129, GHQ 15, MACUSA 16, and MACUSA 16a. Request that the arrangements on the MICMEX be made on the following basic reference Commander 3rd Fleet 22060750.
23 JUNE  ADVANCE TO 2 OCEAN TO CAMP AND BEYOND INTO BATTLE AREA.

Dear 271545,  In view of the potential for extending operations in the North Pacific, I have decided to advance to 2 ocean to the 2nd battle area into Camp and Beyond. This decision is based on the following considerations:

A. The situation in the North Pacific is rapidly changing, and it is anticipated that additional engagements will occur.
B. The 2nd battle area offers improved defensive positions and enhanced capabilities for conducting operations.
C. Advancing into Camp and Beyond will allow for better coordination with other units in the area.
D. The advance will enable us to conduct more effective operations against enemy forces.

Please review this decision and provide any feedback or suggestions.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

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23 OCEAN ADVANCE TO 2 OCEAN TO CAMP AND BEYOND INTO BATTLE AREA.

Censor 171545 on assumption that implications involved in discontinuing combat areas are following:
1. Cancellation payment of damages to Merchant crews.
2. Influence on Marine war risk insurance rates.
3. Would establish termination date for operations and agreements not yet officially terminated.

Attention invited to CINCPAC 193905, 5/6/45 and serial 271545 of 15 August defining the termination date for operations and agreements not yet officially terminated.

Para. 19. While there is more definite assurance that there are isolated independent groups of Japanese unwilling to comply with surrender terms and that armed resistance should be maintained on merchant ships and troop carriers in the Western Pacific until occupation of Japan has been accomplished.

23 JUNE 2020  ADVANCE TO 2 OCEAN TO CAMP AND BEYOND INTO BATTLE AREA.

As indicated in discussions between Rear Admiral Sherman and Rear Admiral Yamaguchi at Manila, CINCPAC-OCEANIC is entirely in accord with use of Japanese hospital ships to relieve the situation in the Western Pacific and requests that the evacuation of VAEIS and DENNAUS be handled as a matter of urgency in that order. Request this action be initialed in your reply to Imperial Japanese Headquarters message number 21, quoted in your 201532. CINCPAC will supervise by detailing Destroyers to escort each hospital ship.

[Signature]
Desire your Op Plans 10-45 and 11-45 establish aircraft and surface air
air rescue services within your area of responsibility as soon as possi-
ble after arrival in TOKYO BAY. Coordinate operation of rescue facili-
ties with air sea rescue group at IMO (GCS 94-11) through CHOFIEF
and with air sea rescue unit OCHOE (G2S 94-9-3) through OCHOE.
Through OCHOE FMAF coordinate with any rescue activities which may
be established by him in TOKYO area. Direct communication between sub-
ordinate commanders with rescue control is authorized.

Para. My 190112 assigns CW frequencies for distress and rescue control.

24 06/12

CHOFIEF ART to SUP OTHER ALLIED FORCES Data Control, OCHOE, FMAF,
OCHOE FMAF, OCHOE.

Annex 56 Basic Outline Plan for BLACKLIST assigns to GEFAS responsibility
for "care and disposition of captured Japanese naval vessels equipment
and supplies. Investigation care and disposition of captured Japanese
naval shore establishment". Corresponding Annex (Number 11) of GEFAS
Operation Instructions Number 4 not yet received. Request dispatch
advice of text in connection these responsibilities in order that plans
and preparations may be made.

24 15/03

GE 0439

By radio 0439 (not to all) GEFAS advises that British Chiefs
of Staff desire that BRITBROK surrender to Rear Admiral Harwood con-
forming to timing required by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Further requests information by urgent dispatch as to earliest date
BRITBROK surrender should be effected.

Para. In OCHOE 0649, 23rd, (not to all) CHOFIEF informs Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has
agreed to delegate his authority for acceptance of surrender of Japanese
forces in HK 900 to a British Comander. Also that Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek will designate a Chinese and an American officer to
participate in surrender acceptance. Further advises that Generalissimo
has requested British to effect military coordination on operational
matters connected with BRITBROK surrender with General Wedemeyer and
the Chinese Board of Military Operations. Requests Supreme Commander for
Allied Powers to make appropriate arrangements.

Para. Desire that necessary arrangements to accomplish surrender of
Jap forces in HK 900 to Rear Admiral Harwood be made directly between
Rear Admiral Harwood, General Wedemeyer and the Chinese Board of Military
Operations. Surrender date can be fixed for any day satisfactory with
which the instrument of surrender is accomplished, now scheduled for 20
August. Further request that this office be kept informed and advised of
time and date of acceptance of surrender. Para. This office will advise
the Japanese to surrender the Japanese forces in Hongkong to Rear Admi-

331
24 0129  CINCPAC ADV NO to CINCPAC

Your 211445 desire anchorage be assigned to ships concerned as follows unless there are compelling reasons to contrary. F 64 KIOU W 96
F 69 DUKE OF YORK F 70 SOUTH DAKOTA F 71 KANSAS F 72 AND F 65
ANCON F 86 THEM. Other ships in anchorage F as desired availing assignment in battleship column to any type except battleships. Adden.

24 0356  CINCPAC ADV NO to CINCPAC, COMDEPAC, COMSOUTH Info COMEX. CTF 18, CTF 29, CTF 39.

Nominate a carrier division consisting of 2 CV and 1 CVL for temporary duty in 7th Fleet.

25 0043  CINCPAC ADV NO to CINCPAC, COMDEPAC, COMSOUTH Info COMEX. CTF 18, CTF 29, CTF 39, CTF 57.

You 240136. Since Basic Post War Plan contemplates maintenance 1 carrier division in Asiatic waters, duty may be of considerable duration.
It is my present intention that division be commanded by Rear Admiral A G Davis ComCanDiv 5 with ships best prepared for extended service.

26 1511  CINCPAC to MACPAC info CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMSOUTH.

CX 26421.

COMSOUTH OPEX 2404 dated 21, CINCPAC 210829 to COMINCH and my CX 19850 dated 19th are references. This radiogram omits WE 30, 31th and WE 57th, 29th.

Para. The primary consideration in the utilization of resources, particularly of amphibious shipping, for occupation operations along the CHINA COAST must be that 1st priority is given to the occupation of JAPAN to the fullest extent of the resources required. SHF has 1st priority. It was possible that after the occupation starts a delay may be permissible after the 1st Phase movement; however, the present time planning should be based on assigning the 2nd phase divisions with the possible occupation of a division in SHF, which would give a total of 12 divisions in JAPAN and 2 in SHF with a possible availability of 1 division for another occupation as indicated in my CX 35050. CINCPAC representatives indicated that the heavy availability of amphibious shipping by the 30th of September would practically eliminate any problem of priority since at that time there would be a 14 division lift available. On this basis and within the limitations indicated in the 1st paragraph the concerns of CINCPAC in this 26421 is generally concerned.

Para. Since conferences with representatives of CINCPAC and COMSOUTH information has been received that SHFCHIN is not occupied by Russians. It therefore appears that the marine contingent specified in CINCPAC 22883 would be a sufficient participation of U. S. troops along the CHINA COAST.
CINCPAC agrees to the relief of 1 Div of the 7th Field Corps from JAPAN about October 1. It will be replaced by 1 on the Philippine divisions if practicable or by 1 being redeployed.

Para. The agreement indicated in para A of OPEX 2404 in balanced to interrupt the deployment into JAPAN to give priority to a movement into CHINA until 15 phases 1 divisions have been placed in JAPAN.

- continued -
25 1031 COMINT to WARDS info CINCPAC OFFICE COMMISSION (SOMA).—

Para. Regarding repatriation of Japanese to the main islands of JAPAN, rate of increase and quota allocations to all countries must necessarily be determined by this headquarters in the light of the overall situation in the Far East existing at the time involved.

CX 96535.

Refer my 2528 to 22094A, 2 531 to 220421, 2 532 to 220430 and CX 9665 to 220445 stating requirements Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for accepting surrender of JAPAN. Due to typhoid conditions all dates specified herein for operations on the 26 August and thereafter are postponed 48 hours. New Schedule: Movements of advance party by air and preliminary naval movements on 28th; air movements in force and initial landings on 30th; Surrender ceremony on 2nd September; advance party landing KAMOTA 3rd September; landing in force KAMOTA 4th September.

25 0905 COMINT to COMINT info CINCPAC, CINCPAC FARK, COMINTA, COMINTB, COMINTC.

In view of the termination of the war with JAPAN, early demobilization of Armed Forces and prospective post war developments of advanced bases in the Pacific Area it is recommended that JCS directive 322/3 dated 7 October 1944 be revised and all logistic support for the strategic air forces be made a responsibility of appropriate Army agency.

25 1033 COMINT to CINCPAC info WARD, COMINT.

CX 96631.

Cover in proposal for the transfer of responsibility of senior naval officer Southwest Pacific Area contained in COMINT 1022/0A. New Allied Naval Forces will terminate when Southern command area is transferred to British now scheduled for 2 September 45. This answers your 23070/0.

25 1293 COMINTC to COMINT/POA ADVANCE.

The rate and timing of repatriating Japanese from any area must of necessity be determined by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (2 972) since determination will be governed by conditions existing in JAPAN after occupation thereof the urgency of Japanese repatriation from WARS and M I N U S as instructed your 2322172 (OUT) must be governed accordingly. In any case it is deemed inadvisable to initiate repatriation action prior to 3 September.
23 1457

THE ALLIED COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES TO INFORM (SOMERSET) APPROVED 1457H.

CIG 26666.

Reference your 260619E (CIG) it is not believed advisable for JN0828A to undertake any unilateral action re cessation of prisoners of war TOKYO BAY AREA. Action being taken by this headquarters to effect coordination in this matter.

23 1030

At request of ACCS following forces have been allocated to cooperate with Army Forces under direction of OOC 1st Australian Army Group for taking surrender of HANOI.

Para. Subject to confirmation of requirement and to no unforeseen circumstances the same forces will be available for GENS and USN.

Para. Effective immediately, TG 111.2 composed of OLD, CAPTAIN A.W. BUZARD CTG, and 2 sloops selected from HAT, EMN, BRAD SIMS, BRADBURY.

Para. HAT report ships selected and name of senior officer to GENS to other addresses of this signal.

23 0620

TG 111.2 to CIG/USCIG (2300) TG 112. CIG 111.2 RECOMMEND

OOC 2453

1. Intend to sail TG 111.2 to arrive off HENGENS daylight 29 August.
2. Endeavor will be made to bring Japanese Naval and Military personnel on board on 29 August and to enter HENGENS harbour as soon as arrangements have been made to preserve law and order.
3. Final surrender to take place on 1st September subject to the surrender to the Supreme Commander having been effected.
4. Intend Task Group follow minesweepers into harbour whilst carriers provide air cover.

26 0908

CIG/USCIG RECOMMEND

Your 29081D. Contemplate use of ship with her Japanese crew and U.S. Peace crew. Do not desire recondition her. Can she make trip to USN or HANIS and carry full load passengers from there to JAPAN.

26 1009

CIG/USCIG RECOMMEND

Enemy terms provide for disarming enemy forces your 29081D. These are considered to include arms, pistols, rifles and as far as possible Japanese Officers and men. At surrender ceremonies it is the policy to require Japanese Officers to attend without arms thus avoiding the tension of these weapons from the exclaimed to the victors but as weapons they should form a component part of the disarmament program.

CIG/USCIG
In carrying out the provisions of paragraph 1, subpara (B), "General Order Number 1, Military and Naval"—advance copy of which was handed your representative in MANILA 20 August 1945, it is desired that senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air, and auxiliary forces in certain areas formally surrender to designated representatives of the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, subsequent to General surrender of Japanese Armed Forces at TOKYO, as follows:

A. In the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, to the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Western Pacific, whose headquarters are at MANILA, at a time and place designated by him. (a-585).

B. In the MUKDEN, to the Commanding General, Tenth United States Army, whose headquarters are at CHITAN, at a time and place designated by him.

C. In KOREA, south of 38°00' north latitude, to the Commanding General United States Army Forces in KOREA (Commanding General 24th United States Corps), whose headquarters are at CHITAN, soon move to KOREA, at a time and place designated by him.

It is desired that the senior Japanese Commander in each of the above areas make contact with the above designated commander concerned by the most expeditious means for preliminary instructions providing for accomplishment of such surrenders on or immediately after 2 September 1945.

26 CINCPAC ORDER GENERAL OFFICER GEN APPAC to CINCPAC ANY ATTD COMMANDER AREA.

Name 99x.

Representative of CINCPAC (Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Schonck) will board USS MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY to install and operate VHF radio telephones and telegraph equipment and message center for CINCPAC. Request name of officer aboard MISSOURI that Colonel Schonck should contact.

26 55565 CINCPAC to CINCPAC INFO USAPT GIBBINS ADVANCE HQ.

WASH 55565.

Designation of CINCPAC 10TH AREA to act for CINCPAC in receipt of surrender in KOREA per your CX 36056 is not understood here in view of the provisions of paragraph 1 D, General Order Number 1, transmitted to you in WASH 4651 of 15 August and quoted in your CX 3315 which direct Japanese in KOREA to surrender to CINCPAC. Advice.

APPROVED (CINCPAC)
25 1555 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADVANCE INTO COM 1 & 2, CINCPAC, COMGRUPAC, COMDESPAC, CINCINNATI, COMSPEARSFRC, COMAIRFLANT, COMAIRFLAC, COMBATON 1 & 2, CONVLANT, COMDESLANT, COMFLANT.

In connection with selection of ships for early return to tentative ultimate post-war disposition of following units under your command is furnished for planning purposes. Ships under construction or repair and ships in Lant are not included. Refer to DIS 122358 for establishment of reserve Fleets. Schedule of build up of reserve Fleets now in mail to you.

   A. Active. INDIANA (BB 58), MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59), ALABAMA (BB 50), IOWA (BB 61).
   B. Reserve Fleet. NEW JERSEY (BB 62), MISSOURI (BB 63).
   C. Decommissioned. COLORADO (BB 45), MARYLAND (BB 46), WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48).
2. Battleships Atlantic Fleet.
   A. Active. NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55), WASHINGTON (BB 56), SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57), WISCONSIN (BB 64).
   B. Reserve Fleet. NEW MEXICO (BB 40), IDAHO (BB 42), TENNESSEE (BB 43), CALIFORNIA (BB 44).
   C. Decommissioned in Lant. ARKANSAS (BB 33), NEW YORK (BB 34), TEXAS (BB 35), NEVADA (BB 36), MISSISSIPPI (BB 41).
3. Carriers Pacific Fleet.
   A. Active. BOXER (CV 21), ANTITAM (CV 36), SHANGRI LA (CV 38).
   B. Reserve Fleet. ESSEX (CV 9), YORKTOWN (CV 10), INTREPID (CV 11).
   C. Decommissioned Fleet. HILL (CV 17), BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), INDEPENDENCE (CVL 22), BELLATU WOOD (CVL 24), CONVENT (CVL 25), SAN JACINTO (CVL 30).
   A. Active. BUNKER HILL (CV 17), BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), INDEPENDENCE (CVL 22), BELLATU WOOD (CVL 24), CONVENT (CVL 25), SAN JACINTO (CVL 30).
   C. Decommissioned Fleet. HILL (CV 17), BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31), INDEPENDENCE (CVL 22), BELLATU WOOD (CVL 24), CONVENT (CVL 25), SAN JACINTO (CVL 30).
5. Cruisers Pacific Fleet.
   A. Active. BALTICORE (CA 68), BOSTON (CA 69), QUINCY (CA 71), SAINT PAUL (CA 73), CHICAGO (CL 126), PASADENA (CL 65), SPRINGFIELD (CL 66).
   B. Reserve Fleet. TOPEKA (CL 67), VICKSBURG (CL 86), DULUTH (CL 87), MIAMI (CL 89), ASTORIA (CL 90), OKLAHOMA CITY (CL 91), TUSCUM (CL 98), AMSTERDAM (CL 101), WILKES BARRE (CL 103), ATLANTA (CL 104), DAYTON (CL 105).
   C. Decommissioned in Lant. MOUNT VERNON (CA 72), SAN DIEGO (CL 53), SAN JUAN (CL 54), SANTA FE (CL 60), BIRMINGHAM (CL 62), MOBILE (CL 63), VINCENNES (CL 64), BILoxi (CL 80), OAKLAND (CL 95), FLINT (CL 97).
6. Cruisers Lant Fleet.
   A. Active. ALASKA (CB 1), GUAM (CB 2), COLUMBIA (CL 56), CLEVELAND (CL 55), MONTPELIER (CL 57), DENVER (CL 58).
   B. Reserve Fleet. CHESTER (CA 27), NEW ORLEANS (CA 32), PORTLAND (CA 33), MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36), TUSCALOOSA (CA 37), SAN FRANCISCO (CA 38), WICHITA (CA 45), NASHVILLE (CL 43), PHOENIX (CL 46), BOISE (CL 47), ST LOUIS (CL 49), LOUISVILLE (CA 28).
- continued -

C. Decommission in Fleet: DETROIT (CL 8), RICHMOND (CL 9), OREGON (CL 10), TRENTON (CL 11), PINAFORE (CA 24), SALT LAKE CITY (CA 26).
    7. Destroyers West.
       B. Reserve Fleet. Decisions 21, 44, 46, 50, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71A, 71B, 71C.
       C. Destroyers East.
       A. Active. Decisions 30, 40, 50, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65.
       C. Decommission East. Decisions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 30, 65.

26 2200 COMPLETED 2 CIRCNAV ANY INFO CIRCNAV, CIRCNAV WDK, CIRCNAV, G8.

Plan depart 30 and 31 August with forces present this area as indicated by operators 9-45 in mail today. Route through MAKU (H) pass via 10, 49-51 H long 17 3-00 E and point BUKLE rendezvous with minesweepers 30 miles south point ANDERS 0900Z 6th September. Will FIT 6th and 7th combat minesweeping operations to clear channel eastern TOUGA 0700Z to CINDARIO anchorage 7th, and if completed enter CINDARIO with Task Force 92 on 8th under air cover provided by Task Force 49 operating vicinity route point CINDARIO.

27 0735 COMMENCE ADVANCE INTO CIRCNAV.

Circumnavigated Japanese Destroyer HATUNAKURA off MISHIMA 0800 this date carrying naval emissaries, pilots, and interpreters.

Para. Text staff Captains Y. Takeda of TOSOHA and L. Smith from naval headquarters TUTUO plus 2 interpreters aboard MISHIMA. Received satisfactory preliminary information from naval emissaries and informed them of the plan schedule and requirements of the occupation operations. Preliminary arrangements satisfactory and no untoward incidents. Minesweeping by elements of Task Force 41 commencing this date.

Para. Text staff DIBO and Destroyers under off MISHIMA 29 August if minesweeping operations for American naval mines satisfactory completed. CTF 41 obtains further complete information from Japanese naval emissaries tomorrow.

Para. Further intent moving heavy ships into TOKYO 29 August if minesweeping has progressed satisfactorily. N-Important for 1930 19-08 1 Day 20 August.

Para. Will establish liaison with Army advance party by air from CONFINS to ATUHR after advance party arrives.

Para. Arrangements incident to your arrival covered by separate dispatch.
SECRET

AUGUST (GCT)

27 2312 COMINCH and CHQ to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC PEARL. COMSOPAC.

War Department agrees maintain token garrisons your 240205 AITUTAKI and PENYRH pending completion State Department negotiations.

28 0700 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV info ADMIRALTY. CTF 111. SAGSKA. CTF 37. YL(AQ). CINCP.

After consultation with Major General Harrison of staff of SAGSKA understand that your intention is that allied POW and internes CHINA, FORMOSA and JAPAN will in the first place be taken by USN transportation to PHILIPPINES for rehabilitation prior to repatriation, and that CINCP AC accepts responsibility for receiving them there.

Para. Propose that (A) CINCP AC FLT accepts responsibility for conveying all allied POW internes from HONGKONG to MANILA. (EM ER) SAGSKA arrange in conjunction with the INDIA government for the repatriation of all INDIAN personnel from MANILA to INDIA.

Para. If para 2 (A) is agreed intend to start this movement as soon as you can informe that POW and internes can be received at MANILA.

28 1225 SAG to SAGSKA(MOUNTBATTEN) CINCPAC(/BLAKEY) info COMALF(MELBOURNE). MARCS (CGS) CINCPAC ADVANCE.

CX 10528.

The Japanese Imperial government has been informed that: "The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16-00 north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLAND INDIES, NEW GUINEA, BISMARCKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Commander Allied Powers, south EAST ASIA command, and to the Commanding General, Australian Forces as later designated".

Para. Exact breakdown of responsibility with the areas listed for the acceptance of surrender of Japanese Armed Forces located therein, was to have been arranged between Mountbatten and the Australians. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has changed with preparation of the details of execution based on the agreement made.

Para. Since only a partial agreement has been reached covering but a portion of the areas listed and because timely preliminary arrangements must be made for and within the entire area, the Japanese Imperial Government is being informed that paragraph 1(C) of General Order Number 1 has been amended to read as follows: "(1). The Senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16-00 north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, LESSER SUNDAS (including BALI, LOMBOK and TIMOR), BOERGE, GERAM, AMBON KAI, AROE, TANIRAR and islands in the ARAFURA SEA, CELEBES, MALANHERA and DUTCH NEW GUINEA shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, south east ASIA command. "(2). The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within BORNEO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, the BISMARCKS and the SOLOMONS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, Australian Military Force".

3367
General Order Number 1, military and naval, is amended as follows: (2.272) para 1 delete subpara C of part 1 and substitute the following 2 subpars:

Subpara 1. "The senior Japanese commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ARABIAN, NICOBAR, BURMA, THAILAND, PHILIPPINE-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, LENOW, SUMBA (including BALI, LOMBOK, AND Timor), ENSCHE, CEINHA, JAVA, BAY, AMER, TANJONG, and islands in the ARAPURA SEA, CEREMO, MAMORNE, and EAST NEW GUINEA, all surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, South Pacific Command."

Subpara 2. "The senior Japanese Commander and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within BOHIO, BRITISH NEW GUINEA, THE HEMANGIE and SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES." Para 2 from Subpara D, part 1 delete "HOTANU". Para 3 in Subpara E, part 1 insert "HOTANU" preceding the phrase "and the Philippines". Para 4 in Subpara 5 of part 2 insert "Have" and "following the word "Land". Para 5 in part 12 delete the 16th word "forces" and substitute the word "Powers".

Following General Order Number 41, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area dated 28 August 1945 is quoted for information and guidance:

"Para 1. In accord with instructions from the U.S. JCS, effective 1200 I (-9), 2 September 1945:

A. The portion of the Southwest Pacific Area south of the following described boundary, except as noted below, is transferred to British Empire controls beginning on the coast of INDIA-CHINA at 16 00 north; thence to the intersection of 97-10 north 116-00 east and the boundary between the Philippines Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to 03-00 north 127-00 east; thence west to 02-00 north 135-00 east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence to 03-00 north 140-00 east; thence east to 03-20 north 159-00 east; thence south

B. The following commands stated in general orders 1, 18 April 1945, are abolished: (1) Allied Land Forces, SFA. (2) Allied Naval Forces, SFA. (3) Allied Air Forces, SFA.

C. All Australians, Netherlands east Indies, and New Zealand land, sea and air forces now under the control of the Commander in Chief, SFA, except as hereinafter indicated, will pass to British Empire control.

Para. Pending availability of transportation to evacuate, all curious to dispose of, and in order to facilitate communications, bases, airfields and other installations now occupied, with personnel and supplies therein pertaining to the U.S., will remain under control of the Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Pacific, for re-occupation, supplies and personnel, and the commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, for
(cont'd)

Novel installations, supplies and personnel. The 2 last named commanders will negotiate directly with appropriate Australian and Netherlands East Indies agencies for the expeditious evacuation of areas so occupied.

Para. Present coordinating center over logistic arrangements and present shipping services rendered by agencies of the STPA will be passed progressively to agencies designated by the British Empire by direct negotiation and in such a manner as to facilitate continuity of operational procedure where required and in the interest of good administration.

Para. Elements of forces and personnel of the Allied Powers indicated in para 1 C above who are serving with U.S. forces or Allied Headquarters north of the boundary described in para 1 A will remain temporarily on duty thereon until orderly relief may be made without detriment to good operational procedure and administration.

28 1823 CONSEC ADV to SCAP info COMINT, CONSEC, CHICOP, CHICHP.

Your 281741. I have occurred in the occupation of GROB and NAMU by British Commonwealth forces under the direction of CHICOP. It should be understood that such forces are subject to coordination by CHICOP-CHICHP since these islands are within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

28 2355 ADMIRALTY to GHO III-2 info CHICHP. CHIC EAST INDIES (INTERIM).

Part 1: 282359 REF an L190032 msg an L30042 msg L19097 msg any to GHO III-2. 1. Following message from GROB for Secretary of State for Colonies and transmitted by messenger to NAMU and transmitted by telegraph from R.M. Consul: "Most immediate. Have sufficient staff and complete information on event and available to set up Civil Administration immediately except patrol stations. For a short period without outside assistance with a British Consular as officer administering the government. Request immediate arrival of Acting Consul at present quite. In NY for looking Allied commander to meet at immediately on arrival. Suggest landing at or near Stanley Camp." 2. Following reply sent by Secretary of State for Colonies. "Your message has been repeated to Rear Admiral Gurney and has been answered immediately on his arrival in HONGKONG to establish military administration by proclamation.

28 2359 ADMIRALTY to GHO III-2 info CHICHP. CHIC EAST INDIES (INTERIM).

Part 2: final Admiralty 282359 press part 2359. You should then at once comply fully with his instructions. In the meantime usually approve your initiative and plans you have made. 3. You should convey Secretary of State's message to GROB in case he has not received copy via NAMU. 4. Both above messages have been repeated to Ambassador CONRAD.

29 GROB CONSEC ADV to COMMISSIONER info CHICOP, CHIC.

In view of the changing status of the war with JAPAN it is desired that you submit recommendations for the reduction of forces within the Australian sea frontier. This to supersede your verbal OSS of 29 July giving consideration to recent directives affecting this subject.

ANSWER (OFF)
From the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers subject to occupation of the KAMYO AREA. (2 645) revised dates for these operations are as follows: advance party will land 3 September and main forces will land 4 September 1945. Desire that Japanese ship beginning not later than 0600 hours, 3 September 1945, take station to meet U.S. Naval forces at 20 miles, bearing 270 degrees, from SATHI-KASAI, southern KYUSHU, and lead these forces into KAGOSHIMA-WAN. 3 pilots with interpreters will be available on Japanese ship. These instructions supersede those contained in para 9 of document A of "Requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers presented to the Japanese representatives at Manila, Philippine Islands, 20 August 1945". Acknowledge.

01 0616 ACWB to SENIOR OFFICER, II.M.A. SQUADRON, ALL M.A.'S I/C, MIA. E1, C.F.S.F., SHIPS (MAJOR WAR VESSELS), 0418 into CINC SFP VA (Q), CINC EI, CINCPAC, NZNH.

Effective 0300 GCT 2nd September that portion of the SWPA south of the following line Indo China coast at 16-00N 116-05E thence along another international treaty limits of Philippine Archipelago to 05-00N 127-00E thence 05-00N 130-00E Equator 130-00E Equator 140-00E 02-00S 146-00E and 02-00S 159-00E reverts to British and Australian control. 2. ACWB assumes naval responsibility for eastern portion of this area to SEAC for THEI western portion. 3. The boundary between SEAC and the Australian area is yet to be decided but for guidance the initial Australian responsibility will be for Borneo and to the eastwards, and the lesser areas to the eastwards of Jambok. It is unlikely however that the Australian army will engage in any operations in Dutch New Guinea, Halmahera or Celebes (except Pinrae). 4. Until the control of Shihsang is relaxed the present boundaries and ship lines established for the control of shipping in the SWPA and adjacent commands remain effective. Chop line between areas referred to in para 2 above will be promulgated as required. FRV BEAD all M.A. ships under the control of CINC SWPA revert to the control of ACWB but are to continue their present assignments until directed otherwise by this authority. 6. Communication plan as in my 371 and 471.
In order to aid in the alleviation of a critical backlog of shipping awaiting discharge at OKINAWA the following action will be taken immediately:

(A) ComSenPOA, ComSenPac and Navy Type Commanders will postpone shipment of all materials not required to establish the facilities prescribed in CINCPOA FEARL dispatch 162139 May (as augmented by CINCPOA ADV 190323 June) to arrive OKINAWA after 1 November 1945, or in the case of airfields becoming operable after 1 November, materials will be shipped at a rate to correspond with operational dates.

(B) ComSenPOA will postpone shipment until after 1 November 1945 of all materials not required to make Army installations (other than airfields) essentially operable by 1 November 1945. For airfields see (A).

(C) Hut and prefabricated housing for all NCOs Army Engineer Aviation General Service and Construction Battalions and Regiments will be cancelled. Such troops will continue to use camp facilities initially approved. Recommended changes to current OKINAWA echelon schedules to implement this directive will be submitted by action addressee by 7 July.

01 0900 COMSOUTHCOM TO CINCPOA ADV.

RecTDA 191335 June recommend category defense reduction HAWAIIAN ISLANDS from Fleet Opposed to Non Invasion and from Category Defense B to Category Defense A modified as follows: FTP 155 Chapter 5 Section 3 Para 31 A eliminate general measure number 5 and number 6 A B and C.

02 0255 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO COMPHIBPAC,CINCPOA RE: PREPARE FOR THE ALLIANCCAMP, TELL CINCAPPAC.CINCPAC, COMPOA, CO TEN.CINCPAC INFO. 3371.

ComPhibPac 190310 not to all or needed, Para.

Following clarification of responsibility proposed, Para.

ComPhibPac and CO 6th Army to be jointly charged with responsibility for planning embarkation of all OLYMPIC land based forces equipment and initial supplies whether loaded in assault or later echelons and whether to be under control of CINCAPPAC or CINCPAC at the objective.

Representatives of appropriate subordinate commanders can be made available to them when requested to assist in planning.

In accordance with existing POA policy ComPhibPac to have overall responsibility for loading the ships of the assault echelon conforming as far as possible to the desires of CO 6th Army.

ComPhibPac and CO 6th Army will include in their overall loading plans recommendations to CINCPAC and CINCAPPAC as to responsibility for loading all shipping exclusive of the assault echelon.

Your concurrence or comment requested.

02 0908 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO CO TEN.COMPHIBPAC(COMPHIBPOA) CINCPOA FRANK.

Your CI 2256 (DTG 03091400). No objection to designation of 7th and 27th Divs in OKINAWA as ONS reserve for OLYMPIC provided that in the event both the 7th and 27th are committed in OLYMPIC another division arrives OKINAWA not later than 1 January 1946 to support garrison forces in emergency.
CINCPAC is equipping Port Director Units for CINCPAC to be established as follows: 1 unit of 25 officers in vicinity of mouth of MAKUFE RIVER, 1 unit of 40 officers at TAMAKAWA at Western Entrance of KAGOSHIMA WAE, 1 unit of 40 officers in vicinity of TAKUSA for naval base on eastern shore of KAGOSHIMA WAE, 1 unit of 25 officers in AKIYAMA WAI at SHIBUSHA of FUNAKIEN GAWA (alternate location UCHIMURA WAI), 1 special unit of 20 officers for Army port at KAGOSHIMA CITY to perform strictly naval functions as piloting, assembly, routing, sailing and reporting of shipping and distribution of charts and hydrographic information.

5 specially equipped LCI will house these units until provision established for them ashore. These units include intra harbor voice and visual signaling equipment. Of these LCI 2 are being equipped at PEARL and 3 are presently at OKINAWA.

Port Director personnel will be assembled at PEARL. Commanding officers these units on or before 1 August will be ordered report to CINCPAC for planning purposes. Other Port Director personnel will join their respective LCI in time to mount to objective with major forces.

Complete Port Director Units will report to CINCPAC when required in time to accompany assault echelons and will later report to CG 6th Army along with other units of CINCPAC as outlined in CINCPAC operations instructions No. 1.

Request your comments or concurrence.

Ref: WAR 25059 detailed information mentioned consists of JPS 703/1 a study of problem bearing no approval but which is being forwarded to you for information. In view of experimental nature these installations. Their doubtful effectiveness. The over-riding priorities necessary to their timely construction with consequent impact on other essential preparations for CORONER. And the difficulties of delivery, I am of the opinion that plans for this operation should not depend on the provisions of artificial harbors unless they are an essential requisite for success. Request you consult with CINCPAC on the matter and submit your views.

Your 020152 intend carry out 10 July operation solely against enemy aircraft and air installations in accordance with carefully laid plans and elaborate briefing. On 16-17 July strikes will undertake destruction enemy men of war TOKYO BAY Area with emphasis on MAGAZTO and destroyers. Now tentatively planning destroy enemy men of war KURU-KOBE Area subsequent to 20 July replanishment.

Ref: CINCPAC-CINCPAC agreement general principles of coordination of forces dated 16 May 1945 request 7th Air Force be transferred to command APOE effective 6 July. Info here indicates following units new TOTOKO K Heavy Bomb Grp, 41 Medium Bomb Grp, 25 Photo Recon Sq, with 319 light Bomb Grp now displacing and 11 Heavy Bomb Grp loaded and ready to deploy. In addition to above, 318, 413 and 507 Fighter Groups attached to 7th AF will installed.
05 1200 CONVOY TO CINCPAC VIA ENO CHAN.

CINCPAC 0512Z briefs project in KOREA and JAPAN.

Comments as requested in radio 0503Z concerning 2285 project in KOREA follow. It is highly desirable that intelligence be obtained concerning Japanese activities in KOREA. This theater is undertaking a project to obtain intelligence and has started to train agents for overland penetration of KOREA from CHINA. Due to the inaccessibility of the target area it is estimated that the agents cannot be in position in KOREA for at least 2 months. In view of this delay, CHINA Theater should receive the subject project which, it is assumed, can be initiated immediately.

Since the base areas and 2 radio listening stations will be outside this theater it is not considered desirable for CHINA Theater to sponsor the project. However, any intelligence which is obtained from this project will be of value to this headquarters.

06 0533 CINCPAC ADV TO COMNORTHAF. DEP0020TH AF INFO CINCPAC. CINCPAC GRT 34.

CINCPAC 031335 request your comment and recommendation with particular reference to units of 20th AF now in RTUKUS. Assume 0000 I (-9) 15 July as time of transfer.

06 0534 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 031335 first obtained from my PEARL HC. Concur in transfer not later than 15 July. Will advise further after consultation with DepCom20thAF concerning units that commanded.

06 0622 CINCPAC ADV TO COMNORTHAF INFO CINCPAC CONTRALT.

CINCPAC 051221. Concur in use of destroyers for FORT BAYARD project until about 15 September when they must be withdrawn for OLYMPIC.

07 1310 COMNORTHAF AND CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC.

The British Chiefs of Staff have arranged for the dispatch of 2 assemblies of RAF airfield construction personnel and equipment to the Pacific for eventual preparation of VLR facilities in RTUKUS. It is my understanding that this construction force will be used with our own and employed wherever needed until required for RAF needs late in 1945.

The 1st convoy known as SHIELD FORCE consists of 6 ships (SAMBA, SAMAPROF, SAMISET, SAMUTA, SAMOEAD, SANGS) containing 15,000 tons of construction equipment and 1000 vehicles. The movement is underway and ships will arrive canal zone in order named between 7 and 19 July. EMPRESS OF AUSTRALIA containing 3100 construction and administrative personnel arrives canal zone about 19 July. The 2nd convoy known as VACUBON FORCE composed of similar ships cargo and personnel is scheduled to sail from United Kingdom between 11 July and 1 August.

Air Marshal Lloyd who is familiar with all details of these assemblies is enroute Guam for consultation. Following consultation with him request you:

(A) Designate destination for SHIELD FORCE and provide such assets as may be required.

(B) Submit recommendation as to movement of VACUBON FORCE which can if necessary be held in United Kingdom.

(C) Advise contemplated employment these forces.
The following measures of reorganization of units now in the Pacific are proposed to be made at the time under the command of OLYMPIC and subsequent operations and facilitate Pacific Fleet administration. Your comment or concurrence is requested. Turner and Seaby have concurred.

A. About 1 October Com7thFlt relieved from duties in SPSA and report to CINCPAC for duties in OLYMPIC.
B. About 1 October ComPhilSeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a Fleet Task Force Commander under the operational control of CINCPAC in command of naval forces assigned duty in Philippines Sea, and

C. On 15 August ComServFor 7th Flt change title to ComServFor 7, Service 7 becomes unit of Service assigned to operational control of ComPhilFlt until 1 October and thereafter to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron to render service to all fleet units in PHILIPPINES as required.

D. Effective 15 August all naval shore facilities including naval air bases in PHILIPPINES pass to command of ComPhilSeaFron.
E. Effective 15 August Com7thPhibFor and staff detached 7th Flt report to ComPhilPaC and assume status parallel to Com3rdPhibFor and Com5thPhibFor.
F. Effective 15 August all units now in 7th PhibFor pass to command of ComPhilPaC; Com7thPhibFor and staff and other units to form a subordinate command of the administrative command PhilPaC (with an organizational status parallel to that of the SubCom at GUAM) for the purpose of rendering service to all PhilPaC units in the PHILIPPINES.

G. About 1 October ComAir7thFlt change title to ComAirPhilSeaFron.
H. About 1 October Fairways 10 and 17 pass to operational control of ComPhilSeaFron through ComAirPhilSeaFron.

080840 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCPAC. COMHIMSAFRON INFO CONTROL.

Submit by letter your detailed recommendations as to reductions in defense measures to conserve personnel and resources on the assumption that category of defense of Hawaiian Area remains as at present but degree of implementation becomes discretionary with CINCPAC.

08082 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC. COMHIMSAFRON INFO CONTROL.

CINCPAC 060319. Determination of organization of naval shore based units OLYMPIC and naval base development planning are being handicapped by discrepancies between CINCPAC Operations Instruction No. 1 and the staff studies of the location of the naval air base. CINCPAC and CINCPAC staff studies both showed development of existing Japanese naval air base KAGOSHIMA of US Naval Air Base. This arrangement had the advantage of proximity to Naval Base at TAKASU which will be the center of major naval activities and naval cargo discharge.

At present Japanese Maritime Service Bases and Marine Divisions operating areas are all to be west of KAGOSHIMA BAY it may be advisable to consider relocating Naval Base at KAGOSHIMA GUY and Army port facilities at TAKASU thus shortening overland supply lines for both services.

Your early comments requested.
08 1959

G39523 relative Port Director Units for future operations.

Request:
1. That in addition to Port Director Units listed in reference consideration,
be given to establish units at MUKAISHI, ISHIGAKI and KUSUKI to aid
in the control and routing of shipping.
2. That a representative from Port Director's staff for SHIBUSHI, and for any
of the localities requested above at which you agree to establish Port
Director Units, confer with representatives of 6th Army and OMSFPAC early
est practicable date at headquarters 6th Army for coordination of operating
procedures.
3. Designations and strengths of all Port Director Units which will pass to
6th Army control be furnished at headquarters in order that they may
be included in the troop list for the operation.

09 0900

CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO COMTFUL. COMHIBSPAC COMCINCPAC.

As many LSTs as possible are being allocated for OLYMPIC Operation. Any
assigned especially for communications or other special purposes must neces-
sarily cause a corresponding reduction in assault lift. In view of need en-
xpressed by you for LST COMTFUL is directed by this letter to make imme-
diately available to you for use as GHQ communication ships 2 LST from
those now assigned to his command and is further authorized to increase the
number to 3 if you so require. He is also directed to send such assistance
as is needed for structural alterations and installation of your signal com-
unication equipment. LSTs will continue as units of Pacific Fleet.

09 0057

CINCAPPAC TO CINCPAC/CINCPAC ADV INFO MAROCS.

The following refers to Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC, U.S. Pacific Fleet
and POA, 18 June 1945: The statement bottom of page 16 "When the Com-
manding General, Expeditionary Troops (ComGen 6th Army) assumes com-
mand of the ground forces established ashore he will report to CINCAPPAC who then assumes com-
mand and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN" is not considered. The re-
 sponsibilities of CINCAPPAC are set forth in JCS 1331/2, particularly para
18(1) "is charged with the primary responsibility of the conduct of the
operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the naval
amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commanders". It will accept
the troops and will exercise at all times the command responsibility directed
as quoted above, by the JCS.

09 0901

CINCPAC ADV TO COMTFUL COMHIBSPAC COMCINCPAC.

Myth 20602. A rear admiral will be designated by CINCPAC ADV as Com-
mandant Naval Operating Base. The Naval Operating Base will embrace all
naval and Marine activities on KYUSHU as indicated in the following sub para
(A) Mom 9 will be utilized to establish the Naval Operating Base facilities
at TAKASE.
(B) The 2 Caves to be designated should be ordered to report to GO 6th Army
for further assignment.
(1) 1 to 3thPhibCorps for employment during the amphibious phase in the
vicinity of the mouth of the NAKAJI RIVER.
- Continued -
(2) The other to X Corps for employment during the evacuation phase in
ARLHIJU ADJ. Both will be under the command of the
Commander of the amphibious phase.

(C) The shore based facilities of the PT operating bases at KYUSHU will
be under the Command of the Commander of the amphibious phase.

(D) The Naval Air Base will be under the command of the Commander of
the Command of the amphibious phase.

(E) The Marine Air Bases at CHINCHIKA and SAIGA will be under the
command of Marine aviators during the evacuation phase. When controlling
V Phib Corps the Marine Air Base command will be under the command of the
Tactical Marine Air Commander at each field. Upon completion of the
operations of V Phib Corps the Marine Air Bases will pass to control of the
Command of the amphibious phase.

(F) The naval construction troops assigned to construct marine airfields
initially will be under the command of the Command of the amphibious phase.
They will pass to control of the Command of the amphibious phase upon completion of the
airfield construction.

(2) The 4 NBCs with V Phib Corps will remain under the control of the
Command of the amphibious phase until withdrawal from KYUSHU at which time they will be
assigned to the Command of the amphibious phase.

(3) All naval construction troops other than those assigned to
(2) will be under the Command of the amphibious phase.

(H) The Marine AAA Groups will be under control of the Command of the amphibious phase. For purposes of
general administration of the marine service they will be under administrative
control of the Command of the amphibious phase. However Marine administrative duties
will remain under normal Marine Corps channels.

(I) The various naval communication activities will be assigned to the
operational control of the respective Command of the amphibious phase. These
will be under the Command of the amphibious phase. Geographical locations listed above are subject to changes which may arise
from further studies.

09 0907 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC FSPRINT INFO CONSRAVAC CHINCPAC PEARL.

ConservPac recommends that the location of the Command of the amphibious phase be changed from vicinity
TAKASU as proposed by CINCPAC serial 0055031 13 June to a location on a level
plain on the western side of KAGOSHIMA W.AN just north of YAMAGATA W.AN. The following advantages will be gained by a change of location:

(A) Construction time on the marine airfields will be materially reduced since
4,000 water front feet of sheet steel piling will be involved in lieu of
25,400 ft.

(B) Dredging operations will be materially reduced from 2,327,000 cu.,yds. to approximately
1,000,000 cu.,yds. and the base can begin to function independent of dredging operations.

(C) Pontoon requirements will be materially reduced.

(D) Considerable road construction and improvement will be eliminated due to
flat area at the new location.

(E) Certain waterfront development is existing and can be utilized in lieu of
complete new construction.

(F) New location is adjacent to PT operating base and in the same general land
area as all other naval activities except those at ARIAKE W.AN with resultant
possible consolidation of administrative control.

(G) Anchorages and waterfront facilities will be in a more protected location.

(H) Naval airfields can be constructed as conveniently and rapidly as existing
airfields at KANDA can be lengthened and brought to proper grade.

- Continued -
(1) Ample flat and usable area exists at the new location so that crowded conditions need not be the consideration for the establishment of both naval operating base and naval air facilities as might have proved existent at the former location.

(j) Since the construction time is limited to 120 days maximum, a new location which requires less construction effort appears to be more practicable and feasible from the standpoint of reduced shipping space required, possible reduction in forces involved and the consolidation of all naval activities in 1 general land area.

The advantages to be gained in relocating the Naval Base and Naval Air facilities as recommended by ComServPac from a base development point of view are such that this plan appears desirable. Acceptance of this plan will obviate discrepancies given in CINCPAC ADVANCE O90162. Request your views.

10 0218 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPEAC INFO CORPSEBOTH AF. CONTINUE.

Your GX 24,152 (O90215) is welcome because it opens the way to an early solution of the problems concerned. The definite information now available as to the future organization of the Army Air Forces will facilitate this solution. I am in complete agreement that the system of coordination which facilitate placing the full force of all air power on any objective with minimum restriction as to targets. I believe that this can best be achieved along functional lines with little use of restrictive boundaries. My conferences with Gen. Giles indicate that he shares this belief. The coordination of the operations of the 20th AF and of the aircraft under my control has been achieved effectively by full exchange of information with maximum freedom of action as to targets.

It will undoubtedly become necessary in the future for fleet units including carriers to attack targets in the INLAND SEA and to operate not only in the PHILIPPINE SEA west of the 135th Meridian but also in the EAST CHINA SEA later in the SEA OF JAPAN and possible also in the YELLOW SEA. I must retain complete freedom of action in such matters subject to the realities of the strategic and tactical situations as they develop.

With reference to sub paragraphs A and C of your message you may be assured that the instructions which concern you are mistaken. I am opposed to any restrictions which delay or impede using any available weapon to damage the enemy. The text concerned is of a general concept and refers only briefly to the salient features of the operations planned. It does not cover the full use of forces against targets of opportunity and any required amplification in that respect.

Gen. Giles has agreed to send Major General Fater and I will send Rear Admiral Sherman to meet with your representative to clarify these matters at MANILA at any time convenient or after 15 July. I consider representation from the headquarters Army Air Forces advisable because it would in turn necessitate representation from the headquarters of Cominade. I believe that these 3 officers can very quickly evolve solutions which will be mutually agreeable to you to Spate and to me.

10 0238 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO PAN 1. PAN 18.
10 0437 USARPAC TO COMUSNAVAIR, COMUSNAVAIR ADV. COMUSNAVSLPAC 16. 12 3,379
Reference is your OPNAV 430. Concurrency in NORTH (CHINA and KOREA) operations of KUITYUS based FEAF aircraft. Operations will begin or after 15 July. Request 14th AF keep FEAF and AdVon FEAF informed of hostile situation and areas occupied by friendly forces in subject area and any other pertinent matters. FEAF will be excluded from bombing attacks except in case of military necessity as determined by this headquarters. FEAF will arrange for attack of targets in proposed area with 14th AF and will notify ADP of operations prior to their dispatch and results thereof on completion of missions. FEAF will be authorized direct communication with 14th AF for the coordination of operations in KOREA and NORTH CHINA, with your headquarters and this headquarters as information addresses. Your comments or concurrence requested.

10 0746 CINCPAC ADV TO COMUSNAVAIR, COMUSNAVAIR INFO COMUSNAVSLPAC, CINCPAC ADV. COMUSNAVSLPAC 16. 12 3,875
A cruiser and destroyer task force has been formed whose tasks will include operations along the CHINA Coast. Request that you arrange to have 1 of KUS missions to CHINA with CHINA situation with particular emphasis on coastal shipping and as many Chinese speaking interpreters as possible up to 9 report to senior naval officer at JAM for further transfer to join Rear Admiral Low in U.S. ship Guam.

03 0335 CINCPAC PEARL TO CINCPAC ADV TO COMUSNAVAIR, COMUSNAVAIR INFO COMCPAC ADV. COMCPAC ADV. COMUSNAVSLPAC 16. 12 3,875
Request your comment and recommendations concerning NAPEX project of the Office of Strategic Services transmitted to you by JCS memo of 18 June.

11 0146 CINCPAC ADV TO COMUSNAVAIR 16. 12 3,875
My OpPlan 4-4 modified as follows:
(1) Add to task organizations (N) Cruiser Task Force (TF 95) Rear Low in Guam (CEB), Crubins 12 and 16, Desron 24, less BACHU (ID 470) WILLY (ID 528) plus WILLL KEITH (ID 775) J.C. GOWES (ID 776) Massy (ID 773).
(2) Add in subpara 3(a) to tasks of 3rd/1st: Provide air cover for cruiser task force as practicable from units in the KUITYUS area on request of GTF 95.
(3) Add in subpara 3(b) to tasks of KUITYUS forces: Provide air cover for cruiser task force as practicable on request of GTF 99.
(4) Add new subpara 3(N): Cruiser task force exercise control of the EAST CHINA SEA, intercept enemy shipping along the CHINA Coast, attacked enemy as to our next assault objective by conducting reported sweeps to the EAST CHINA SEA. Make initial sweep from the vicinity of TAI TAIN TAO (26-26N 120-30 E) northward to about Lat 20-40 N. Be prepared to conduct further sweeps when ordered. GTF 95 request air cover as required direct from TFT 95 and from naval air commanders concerned. Keep CINCPAC CONCEPTS all interested air and naval commands in KUITYUS Area informed of movements. Base at CINCPAC.
(5) Add to para 4: Logistic support at OKINAWA available from ComServDiv 104 in Hamur.
11 0653 CINCINAC ADV TO CINCPOA T2EFU CINCINAC, CINCPOA PEARL

Destinations recommended your O90434 July acceptable except following. You show engineer power plant maintenance detachment for SAIPAN in November whereas no such unit listed in CK 21346 and must mean engineer refrigerator maintenance detachment due in November for which no destination given. Of 4 Engineer Dump Truck Companies listed in CK 21346 already accepted 2921 company for OKINAWA per your 142346 June leaving 1 each for OKINAWA, CAMU and SAIPAN Altho you list 2 for SAIPAN. Likewise acceptable are destinations contained in your 100340 assuming 130 Engineer General Service Regiment to be the 1302 for TINIAN and the 72 Finance Disbursing Section to be the 272 for TINIAN.

11 0752 MILES (COMNAVCH: CHINA) to CINCPOA ADV.

Ur 100748, Will selected Chinese personnel fill your interpreter requirements. We have no Americans with qualifications. Desire to set up direct radio contact between Task Forces and Hqtrs ComNavCorps CHINA Eastern Command. Short title COMNAVCH. Radio call J 89. ComNavCH located at KIETINGE EAC CHINA Lat 27-23 Long 118-08 and has direct operational control of coastal intelligence nets from SHANGHAI to SWATOW. Also operational control of 12000 U.S. Navy trained guerrillas. I am temporarily at KIETINGE in wide swing along coast available anywhere for conference. When do you want personnel. Suggest CHANGTONG 25-45 106-23 as pick up field.

11 0827 CINCPOA ADV TO COMCINCPAC, COMHANSEAFRON, COMTRAFRON, COMAIRPAC, COMTHF, COMSPE, COMTRAC, INFO U.S. NAVY & U.S. CINCPOA PEARL. COMSPE, COMSPE.

-CANCEL my OpPlan 2-45, CINCPOA 2712815 March refers, (FIREBREAK Operation).

11 0832 CINCPOA ADV TO COMCINCPAC INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMCINCPAC. COMCINCPAC.

Request COMCINCPAC prepare and keep up-to-date plans for capture of WAKE ISLAND by Marines supported by fast carrier task force. Assume enemy garrison near 2700 but deteriorating due to repeated attacks and lack of supplies. Keep CINCPOA advised your estimate troops required and units tentatively assigned. Initial report desired as to earliest date considered feasible and troops contemplated for employment.

09 0215 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA INFO U.S. NAVY, COMPOA, COMCINCPAC.

The following refers to Joint Staff Study, U.S. Far East and POA, 15 June 1945. There are a number of differences in concepts between certain sections of the above document and the Staff Study and Instructions of CINCINAC relating to the employment and coordination of air forces. Some of these have been subjects of conferences and correspondence between our staff officers but definite conclusions have not been reached. On the last exchange, your representative indicated disagreement with certain features of air coordination suggested by this headquarters and indicated that an alternate scheme would be submitted. This scheme has not yet been received. By general concept is a simple system of coordination which will permit the full force of all air power to bear on any objective with minimum restriction as to targets in the correct system. Experience in the PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN indicated that 2 air forces could operate in the same area without interference providing each was informed that the other would be present. The system that my representatives have proposed follows this general line of thought.

- Continued -
A. Specifically, on page 7 of the document referred to above, there is a strong implication that you desire to impose restrictions on Army Air Force operations against shipping. I consider that this restriction is unnecessary and undesirable. In the scheme of air coordination proposed by this headquarters, the primary target for Army Air Forces in the KYUSHU was indicated as the land areas, and of the Navy Air Force in the KYUSHU the sea areas, each being free by coordination with each other to operate in the primary areas of the other. I do not agree that Army Air Forces can not operate against shipping.

B. On the same page, you indicate that the Army Air Forces operating from the KYUSHU would be subject to such measures of coordination as you find necessary for safety or operating effectiveness. There is need for a closer understanding on this subject. I have already agreed that the assignment of areas of air, surface and submarine activities is your responsibility. It is expected, however, that this be coordinated with my headquarters as has been the practice during the last year. As to the matter of traffic control, it is probable that this control can be handled locally between air force commanders in the KYUSHU without imposing undue restrictions. Eventually the PAF will be the predominating air force and the commander should have a voice in the coordination provisions prescribed. This matter should be clarified.

C. On page 8, the action of the Army Strategic Air Force is confined to the island of HONSHU. This is not believed to be in accordance with intentions. Conferences with representatives of the Strategic Air Force have already indicated the intent of placing its full weight in the objective area for 10 days previous to the OLYMPIC assault. Moreover, there are targets along the MANNABUKAI mainland and selected targets in northern KYUSHU and SHIKOKU which are included within the anticipated objectives for the Strategic Air Force. These targets are prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but early decisions as to coordinating provisions are necessary.

D. On pages 17, 24, and 27 a plan is indicated to turn over a part of the Marine air force operating in the objective area to the 7th AF for the purpose of escort and protection of shipping and from the objective area. This plan diverges somewhat from our agreement that Marine air operations in the objective area would be under the control of COMAIRPAC. Generally, it is believed that this plan is meritorious. However, since it has not previously been explored in conference, it is believed that it should be further examined in its relationship to the general coordination of air in the objective area.

E. Annex 2 and 3 to Appendix B diverge from similar concepts of the employment of air which has been favored by this headquarters. These matters should be adjusted at the earliest practicable dates.

Para. Since the above points have many ramifications, it is not believed that they can be settled satisfactorily by radio. Moreover, the Strategic Air Force has an important interest in the general air coordination. A conference at the earliest practicable date is suggested. MANILA is preferred because detailed planning is now going on here, but if you prefer otherwise, we will conform. If this is agreeable to you, I will arrange to have the Army Air Forces, Washington, or the Army Strategic Air Force, send representatives in order that final conclusions on these matters can be reached. For purposes of planning, I suggest that the conference be held about 20 July.

1. Effective immediately upon transfer to PAF of operational control of the 7th AF and 20 AF units in the KYUSHU you will direct the operations of these units to extend the air offensive from bases within the KYUSHU against KYUSHU, SHIKOKU and HONSHU west of 135-00 E toe. - Continued -
11 2140 CINCPAC TO CG ADVN PEAQ, INDIAN CINCPAC, GUAM, ETC. (CONT'D)

(A) Neutralize and destroy hostile air forces wherever they may be found.
(B) Destroy air installations, ground forces and defense installations industrial and harbor installations.
(C) Disrupt water lines of communication and close critical points on land lines of communication.

2. Upon establishment of the 7th AF Hq in the HUKURUS the ComGen 7th AF will take over operational control of the 301 Fighter Wing.
3. CG Adm CFAR will immediately institute photographic missions per instructions given him by ComPACAF on 7 July and report to this headquarters when he is ready to strike.

11 1425 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAFF.

CG 2/44.

Ur 0606/17. Relating to placing 1st MarAir Wing under operational control of 7th Flt to prepare for future operations is reference. Addendum 2 Allied Air Force Ops IA Instructions 96 refers only to those 1st MarAir Wing units based in SOLOMONS. July 15th date for assumption of control of 1st MarAir Wing units in SOLOMONS by RAAF command was agreed to by ComGen 1st MarAir Wing in conference with air officer commanding RAAF command and ComAff Allied Air Forces. August 15 tentative date for release of units of 1st MarAir Wing from operations was recommended by ComGen SWAN based on directives his headquarters for preparation for OLIMPIA and consideration of tactical missions in the SOLOMONS. Reminder of 1st MarAir Wing is operating under 13th AF in direct support of operations in HUKURUS and covering fleet units in LEBUS CRU.

In view of above do you still desire the PMA released immediately to the operational control of ComAff Flt to prepare for future operations.

11 2336 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAFF CTF 95, COLOMBIA, CHINA.

My 1101/46. To support initial sweep of TFP 95 request heavy strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets in SHANGHAI area and FORMOSA on date of sweep. CTF 95 advise predicted data and confirm or correct when definite.

12 0217 CINCPAC ADV TO COLNCH & CNF INFO CINCPAC PREAL HSA. INFORM 2/44.

Ur 0713/10 and 1117/37. Ships of SHIELD and VACUUM forces may be sailed as scheduled. Upon arrival PANA propose they be sailed independently and unescorted to ENDWICK where they will remain until sailed forward to HUKURUS in regular echelon convoys as required. There is at present a very heavy backlog of shipping at OKINAWA that will be gradually reduced. Selective unloading is now in effect and will be for some time. It is expected but cannot be assured that personnel equipped with their equipment will be discharged safely promptly. No special priority can be granted the British ships. They will be integrated into the immediate requirements of the HUKURUS as a whole. Representatives of CINCFOA British Admiralty and 20th AF are at present conferring on OKINAWA as to the most effective manner for handling such integration. Will advise you of developments. Also see my 1108/46.

12 0446 CINCPAC ADV TO COMAFF.

Reference mission of Capt Frankel CINCPAC approves of aerological plan submitted by Capt Orrville and makes the following recommendations: (A) Establish a duplex wire telegraph circuit between Guam and a station to be located at KHALAROVSK or default Soviet Far East Command with tentative transmission frequencies from Guam 7350 Kcs 10445 Kcs 17920 Kcs and transmission frequencies from KHALAROVSK 7350 Kcs 10200 Kcs 18030 Kcs. (B) Establish a similar control.

-Continued-
12 0446 CINCOPAC ADV TO COMCINCH (CONT'D)

Circuit connecting a station to be located at PETROPAVLOVSK with the station at KHABAROVSK with frequencies to be designated by the Soviets. (C) Assembly the communication and technical material and personnel in the U. & (2) In the event negotiations completed prior assembly material contained in recommendation (A) initial establishment of simplex manual circuit connecting GUAM and KHABAROVSK recommended using GUAM transmitting frequencies.

12 0728 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCCEAP INFO COA J-10 C-20 P-30 OUT DATE CINCPOA PEARL

Minutes of 21 June conference on signal (radio) intelligence plan are incorporated in subject to following comments,

A. Movement and establishment of radio intelligence units except where already provided for in troop movement schedules and base development plans are on our agenda:
   1. Availability of necessary shipping space.
   2. Ability of those responsible for base development in each area concerned to provide the sites etc. that the equipment required for operation and maintenance of these units.

B. Circuit referred to in subpara 10 5(1) as Army multiplex circuit is the Strategic Air Force Guam-Okinawa multiplex teletype circuit (using Navy supplied multiplex) 1 channel of which has been allocated by StratAirForce for-listed use.

C. Para 10 8. Do not concur in plan for 2 AF direction finder stations on already awarded J-10 JIMA. 1 such station now operated there by 6th radio sqdn mobile. Consider it could be used to serve both FSAF and 20th AF. As alternative consider FSAF and 20th AF could arrange for similar dual use of StratAir FOA station on Guam.

12 1000 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCCEAP INFO C-20 C-50 P-30 OUT DATE CINCPOA PEARL

This Headquarters concurs in priority of targets recommended in TOPSEC C-10 1339 ref MANILA secret rdo 3348 please confirm last city misspelled in 3348 as it was barbelled in transit. Ref your top sec C-10 3399 in view of status of HELPSING as a Chinese National Station we must insist that any contemplated bombing attacks on this city be cleared thru China Theater. Further we desire to re-emphasize the necessity for precision bombing of targets in any Chinese city. Area bombings of occupied Chinese cities in occupied areas of CHINA would result in more deaths and hardships among friendly Chinese than among Japs.

11 2159 COMCINCH & END TO CINCPOA ADV.

Army has not agreed to my proposal that the existing arrangements at OKINAWA should be continued in effect. My modified proposal is contained in paragraph 2 and enclosure of JGS 1306/2 which are quoted herewith for your information and comments.

Para 2. As stated in JGS 1306/2 CINCPOA and the Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet (CINCPOA) have made a Joint Logistic Plan for the CINDICPOA Operation in which have been integrated carefully the matters of priorities of base development, allocation of projects and the movement of men/units into the area, and have set up service forces for their implementation. CINCPOA has been charged with the responsibility for base development on Guam. The responsibility has caused him to allot much of the Naval Construction Program to Army developments. Undoubtedly when and if control of these developments is passed to the Army he will desire to allot as may be practicable units.
of these construction battalions to the meeting of Army requirements. If this control of development of Army facilities is to be transferred as recommended it is my understanding that the control of the development of Army fields both for the Army Strategic Air Force and the Far Eastern Air Forces will be included in the transfer.

Para 3. Both during OLYMPIC and in the continuing future KYUKUS will be a primary naval base in control of a vital sea area and an air base. During OLYMPIC and perhaps for a short period thereafter important facilities and developments are required for use by the Army forces of invasion.

Para 4. As stated in JCS 1406/1 I am doubtful as to the wisdom of disturbing this agreed organization which is now at work and progressing well. However if the Chief of Staff US Army has strong convictions that more effective progress in the prosecution of OLYMPIC will be affected by the transfer to CINCPAC of the responsibility for the development of facilities considered essential for his operations and full control thereof including the logistics involved I acquiesce. This transfer of control to CINCPAC to include full responsibility for and control of development of all Army installations and projects in the KYUKUS (including those for the Army Strategic Air Force) movement of Army supplies into the area and such harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to by the 2 commanders concerned.

Para 5. In view of the fact that the defense of the KYUKUS is primarily integrated to the general naval defense of the sea areas of the Pacific Ocean Areas that the defense is primarily air and naval in nature and according to agreed plans is being implemented by predominantly naval air and naval surface forces responsibility for the defense of the KYUKUS should remain with the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPAC) as is the case with every other position in the POA. Such Army forces as may be required in the defense of the KYUKUS from time to time should be assigned by CINCPAC to the operational control of CINCPAC.

Para 6. Accordingly I propose dispatching the attached message (Enclosure follows.) Message to the CinC US Army Forces Pacific and CinC of Pacific Fleet.

Para 1. CINCPAC in consultation with CINCPAC will arrange to transfer to the latter at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 month responsibility for and control of all Army and Army Air Force (including Army Strategic Air Force) installations and development projects in the KYUKUS the movement of Army troops and supplies into the area and such harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all US Army forces located in the KYUKUS including the 10th Army will pass to CINCPAC except as indicated in the last paragraph below.

Para 2. Similarly CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of all naval and naval air installations and development projects in the KYUKUS. The movement of naval forces and supplies into the area and harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all US naval forces in the KYUKUS will be vested in CINCPAC.

Para 3. The defense of the KYUKUS Area and its military government will remain a responsibility of CINCPAC in accordance with existing directives. For this purpose CINCPAC will assign to the operational control of CINCPAC such US Army Forces as may be required from time to time. (End of Enclosure)."

12 1015 CONSENT TO CINCPAC-Assigned to CINCPAC (Contd....)

OFP 685. Preparation for your BAYARD is subject to further study and recommendations are requested on the following:
A-CINCPAC Theater's responsibilities in convoy operations.

... Continued ...
TOP SECRET

12 1015 CONSENT TO CINCAPAC CINCAPPAC INFO OOSOSST CORSUFOOT.CGIAAF.WARCONS... (CONT'D)

B-Naval harbor facilities required at FORT BAYARD and availability thereof to CINCAPAC reference. NAMSWPS including movement to FORT BAYARD.

C-Nature and extent of command and liaison required between forces of CINCPAC and CINCAPPAC and CHINA Theater involved in FORT BAYARD operation. If a conference is believed necessary on the above, let us know.

12 1159 CINCAPPAC TO CINCPAC ADV DEPOMAF 20.

CI 24062. JCS reidogram XK 29914 dated 10th approves plan FASTEL as amended. CINCAPPAC's detailed implementation plan requires final coordination prior to completion. Invitation extended deception representative your headquarters to conference here 17th July with CHINA Theater and CINCAPPAC representatives for that purpose. Advise.

11 2135 COMINCH AND GFO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CONTFIIL.

Submit by dispatch your concrete proposals for reorganisation of naval forces SWP subject to following considerations.

(A) Reorganisation of Service Force 7thFlt should be accomplished earliest practicable and is not contingent upon departure of Com/7thFlt for JAPAN.

(B) Naval bases in the PHILIPPINES will pass to jurisdiction of Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.

(C) Upon the reorganisation of Service Force 7thFlt and establishment of Service Squadron 7, Commander US naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA will be established. This command will function under Com/7thFlt until CINOSWPA relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time Comd naval facilities will report to CINCPAC direct.

(D) Concurrent with change in area responsibility or sooner if you so desire the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS should pass to CINCPOA jurisdiction and responsibilities will be made to the JCS dependent upon your comment.

(E) Maintain in PHILIPPINE Area naval force sufficient to contain Japanese force remaining in SINGAPORE Area.

13 0731 MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA ADV. CG CHINA. CINCAPPAC INFO CTF 95.

07004.

CINCPOA ADV HQ 110215 giving composition of TF 95 and initial movements, 110436 giving initial mission TF 95 and 114336 requesting strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets are references.

Comd Allied Air Forces will:

1. Subject to concurrence Comd CHINA Theater strike airfields and other appropriate targets with heaviest strikes within capabilities in the SHANGHAI area and FORMOSA on date of initial sweep of TF 95.

2. Inform CINCPOA ADV HQ and CTF 95 of strike intents earliest possible. Para. CINCPOA ADV HQ requested to notify this Hqtrs with info to AAF and ADV HQ PEARL ORKINAWA date of initial sweep.

Request concurrence CG CHINA Theater on strikes SHANGHAI area with info to above addes.

13 0749 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Your 112159. I am concerned at the degree to which the processes of reorganisation and changes involved in any new command arrangements for OKINAWA will absorb effort and create confusion during the critical 3 and one half months remaining before the OLYMPIC assault. During this all too brief period a stoppable base development task is to be accomplished. The latest reports show that this task is well in hand. Construction is accelerating and during the 1st 10 days of July approximately 350,000 tons of cargo
were unloaded.

Commenting on the specific proposals of JCS 1406/2 I wish to point out that:

(A) The assurance of paragraph 2 "He will continue to allot as may be practical units of these construction battalions to the meeting of Army requirements" is undesirable. Actually, although 4 and 1/4 construction Bns are now working on Army airfields in order to get them activated promptly for tactical reasons, current plans call for gradually transferring these battalions to naval and to general island development. The excess of naval engineering effort over naval requirements will approximate requirements of and should be used on projects of common necessity and defense which will be naval responsibilities under JCS 1406/2. It would be better if no commitment were made on the JCS level concerning use of NCBs on Army projects.

(B) As of 7 July 27 and 1/2 NCBs were present of which 15 and 3/4 (including 5 and 1/2 regular Bns, 6 Stevedore Bns, 2 Pontoon Bns and 1 Truck Bn) were on general island development, 3 on naval base construction, 4 and 1/2 on naval and Marine airfields and 4 and 1/4 on Army airfields. Of 32 Army Engineer Bns present 13 were assigned to general island development and 19 to Army airfields. The category of "general island development" which includes work on roads, waterfront, water supply, fuel systems, cargo discharge and supply dumps and which now absorbs 28 and 3/4 out of 59 and 1/2 Bns will decrease in relative priority. Many of the common projects can be allocated to either Army or Navy. However, to avoid impeding the whole effort present engineering plans must remain virtually unchanged and the separation of service responsibilities must take place slowly and carefully. It will probably be necessary to continue supervision of common projects by ComGen 10 for a considerable period. Recommend addition to paragraph 3 of the directive of a sentence approximately as follows: "The Commanding General 10th Army and his Headquarters and also the present Island Commander OKINAWA will continue to act for CINCPAC as at present in connection with defense and developments of common necessity until released under arrangements mutually agreeable to CINCPAC and CINCPAC and CINCPAC of the general island development over the E and the SEA OF JAPAN. The Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of OLYMPIC."

(C) I am in hearty agreement with paragraphs 3 and 5 of JCS 1406/2 as drafted by you. It is my intention to use OKINAWA as a base not only for OLYMPIC and CORONET but also for extending control by the Pacific Fleet initially over the EAST CHINA SEA and as rapidly as possible over the YELLOW SEA and the SEA OF JAPAN. The Naval Operating Base at OKINAWA is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of OLYMPIC.

13 O751 CINCPAC ADV TO COMLINC INFO COM/7THFLT CINCPAC, COMPHILSEAFLRON, CINCPAC PEARL
CONSERVPAC.

Your 112135 not to all addees. Following recommendations are submitted.

See my 080901 and Com/7thFlt 120014.

(A) On 15 August ComServFor/7thFlt change title to ComServRon 7. ServRon 7 become unit of ServPac assigned to operational control of Com/7thFlt to render service to all fleet units in PHILIPPINES.

(B) Effective 15 August establish Commander U S Naval Forces AUSTRALIA NEW GUINEA to function under Com/7thFlt until CINCPAC relinquishes area responsibility to British at which time Comdr US Naval Forces AUSTRALIA NEW GUINEA report to CINCPAC direct.

(C) Effective 15 August pass to command of ComPhilSeaFlt all naval shore facilities including Naval Air Bases in the PHILIPPINES and to ComNavFor AUSTRALIA—NEW GUINEA all US naval and naval air facilities in SWPA outside PHILIPPINES except MANUS.
(D) Effective on or before establishment of NEW BRITISH command area transfer ADMIRALTY ISLANDS to the Pacific Ocean Areas.

(E) Effective 15 August Com7thPhibFor with flagship and staff detached 7thFlt report to ComPhilSeaFron. Other units now in 7thPhibFor pass to command of ComPhilSeaFrcPac bombant units to be reallocated to meet current operational requirements and other units to form subordinate command of AdComPhilSeaFrc to render service to all PhibsFrc units in the PHILIPPINES.

(F) When new British command area is formed all British naval forces remaining in Pacific Theater pass to command of CINC BPF.

(G) On 1 October Com7thFlt pass to ComPhilSeaFron operational control of all units then under his command except those otherwise assigned by CINCPAC to meet OLYMPIC requirements. At this time Air7thFlt change name to Air PhilSeaFron and pass to operational control ComPhilSeaFron.

(H) On 1 October ComPhilSeaFron report to CINCPAC for duty as a fleet task force commander under the operational control of CINCSWPA in command of naval forces assigned by CINCPAC for duty within PHILIPPINE Sea Frontier. These forces to be sufficient to contain Japanese naval forces in SINGAPORE Area.

13 0851 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM7THFLT, CG AFWESEPAC, 6THARMY, CGCSSVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

CX 25216. Cite your 090907. Location of Naval Base north of YAMAGAWA KO instead of at TAKASU concurred in. Army plans no facilities in this area. This also answers your 080802Z.

13 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CGO INFO COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMGRDFLT, COM7THFLT CTF 38, CNO.

Concur in principle with your 091314 except consider 1 February and 1 November 1946 to be more appropriate dates. To assist in planning the changeover in carrier air group complements the following recommendations are submitted:

(A) Changeover to 36 VB CVLPG's be made as soon as practicable. CVLPG's for CVL-48 Class be 24 VF and 24 VBF.

(B) No model distinction between VF and VBF and all single-seaters on any 1 carrier to be same model. VF and VBF in CVBG's and CGV's to be about half and half.

(C) Increase VF(F) in CVG's from 2 to 4.

(D) No change in night groups or units.

(E) CVBG's and MCVG's 18 VBF and 12 VSE.

(F) Standard and spotting ComProns 20 VF and 9 VSE as soon as practicable. ASW ComProns 12 VF and 15 VSE.

Strongly recommend careful analysis VF requirements contained in above comments before cutting back VF production.

13 1033 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV. CG CINCPAC.

RJ 65600.

Inasmuch as any downward revision of category of defense would release, for other use, Army personnel in limited numbers only, disproportionate to the resulting loss of efficiency and security, it is recommended that no change be made in the present modification of category of defense B. This answers your radios 191335 June 'TOPLETO DKE 2359 July also.'
13 1309 CINCAPPAC TO CINCPOA ADV. CG US ARMY STRAT AF (WASH) INFO WARCOS, CGFAAF, CG AAF 20, MARC g AAF 20, COMC FA 196.
CX 25301.

In view of WARCOS 30889 of 12th, not to all, conference proposed for this headquarters 20 July in our CX 24785 for coordination of air operations is now suggested for 1 August in order that General Speer's ComGen U.S. Army Strategic Air Force can be present. Action added please concur or comment with info to all.

13 1311 CINCAPPAC TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CMAAF
CX 25302.

Concur in your 120726 reference maintaining existing arrangements on operational control of MIAW and discussion of MIAW preparation for future operations at MANILA Conference.

131320 RUNNER TO COMSURPAC (PASSED TO CINCPOA ADV FOR INFO).

RUNNER 3rd. More info area between 39-11 and 39-20. Made zig zag search up coast passing within 1 mile of SAKI, SAKI, SANGAN SHIMA and CHAKO SAKI. Also east west searches on Lat lines 39-10, 14 and 18. Tanker and escorts seen hugging beach. Anti submarine vessels traversed area freely. Gear working perfectly. Consider this survey shows definite absence of defensive minefields offshore this area. 10 days practice has made evaluation of contacts less difficult. Resurveyed vicinity of 36-97 140-50 today approaching from direction of shore. This revealed that the vicinity is definitely clear. Complete report on southern ARMY MILITARY WAK. WX 06001, 65775, 2 AUG 23 IVPP OQTRA 36-94ON 140-20E.

09 1442 COMGEN ATR TO CG FEAF INFO CGAFFOA (BOTH HQ).
WARX 29026.

Administration of Air Force units in HAWAIIAN AREA is subject. Do not think the creation of another numbered Air Force for this purpose is desirable at this time ReURad CX 23169 dated 4 July 1945. Possibility is by the 5th and 13th AF absorbing the combat units and service elements of the 7th AF and using the Hqtrs 7th AF to administer the Air Force units not in FEAF and proposed USAF in the HAWAIIAN AREA. This plan is now within the capabilities of the theater and appears to be the simplest solution. Your plans and comments desired.

10 0450 CG AAFPOA TO CG FEAF INFO CG AIR.

3058.

In furtherance of the proposal which I discussed with you and General MacArthur in MANILA regarding the establishment of a numbered air force in HAWAII I have dispatched a message to Gen Richardson with info copies to you and General Arnold (see my 101027 July). This message contained the proposal on which I intended to request Admiral Nimitz concurrence of July 11th and on which Gen. Richardson might comment. In view of the info contained in WARX 29026, date time group 291442 July, addressed to you, I feel that I must now suspend any presentation of the numbered Air Force proposal to Admiral Nimitz. The 7th AF is now yours. General Arnold's message appears to concur in the basic idea of establishing a numbered Air Force in HAWAII. Difficulty arises only in the designation of a numbered Air Force Hqtrs to do the job. I will be very much interested in receiving a copy of your reply to General Arnold.
12 2019 WARCO  TO CINCPACINFO CG USAFMAIDPAC, DEPPOMAFPO (PASSED TO CINCPOA ADV).

ALSO PASSED BY CINCPAC INFO 12/3/51

WARX 30889.

Conference proposes for 20 July in Manila, reference your CX 24152 and CX 24785, at which United States Strategic Air Force in Pacific should be represented, is subject.

Para. In view of the importance of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces to be established as in WARX 30438, ComGenAir is very desirous of having General Spaatz represent him personally at the conference in Manila.

Para. Since General Spaatz cannot be present in Manila until 1 August would it materially interfere with your planning to postpone the conference from 20 July to 1 August.

12 2215 COMGENFEAF SCN KENNEY to COMGENMAFOA.

A 75933.

Reference your Top Secret message 5053 10th: Following is message sent General Arnold under date of 11th July:

"Reference your MX 29026 9th recommend administration of Air Force units in Hawaii by the 7th Fighter Wing now there, this wing slightly augmented is capable of handling the Army Air part of the defense for that area. This augmentation can be taken from 1 of the fighter wings now set up on the redeployment schedule. 7th Air Force, augmented by redeployed units, plays an essential part in the plans for both OLYMPIC and CORONET. If this headquarters is abolished or detached it will be necessary to create another headquarters of similar size to handle the air units assigned to the successive areas and missions now set up for the 7th Air Force."

12 0014 COMTHFLEET to CINCPACINFO ADCOMPHIBSPAC, CTF 72, CTF 76, CINCPAC ADV HQ, COMPHIBSPAC.

The following comments on Cincpoa ADV 060301 are based upon certain assumptions which have not been discussed in the proposed reorganization of units now in the 7th fleet. Prior to separation from SWPA provision should be made regarding the duties of Com7thFleet as Com7F.

2. Provision should be made for control of naval bases in MANUS, NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIA and a command designated to be responsible for their roll up.

3. Provision should be made for the operational control of submarines SWPA. Subject to the above. Concur with A B C E F G and H. Also concur in principle with D except that date of transfer should be not before 1 September and preferably later. New subject. It is suggested that unnecessary reorganization can be avoided, with the last possibility of confusion during the critical period of mounting our forces for the OLYMPIC operation, if the transfer of naval shore facilities from control of ComServ 7th Fleet to Com POF is delayed until after 1 October. Exact date to be determined later. On that date Com 7th Fleet reports to Cincpac for duties in OLYMPIC and CP6F will have control of naval shore facilities through ComSermon 7.

13 1941 WARCOs to CINCPACINFO CG USAFMAIDPAC, DEPPOMAFPO 20, COMINCH PASSED TO CINCPOA ADV.
This is annex A-1 to my Op-Plan 9-45. Movement and attack schedule subsequent to 21 July. See my 261227 June.

Para. Completion replenishment at 1600 21 July Task Force 38 proceed via direct route to point click to arrive 1200 23 July. Thence proceed to launching position vicinity lat. 31-30 Long 135-00 to arrive 0430 24 July. Conduct sustained strikes against combatant naval strength KURE, sweep SHO, strike air and air installations KURE-KOBE area. At dusk commence diversion toward OKINAWA then proceed to launching position vicinity lat. 32-00 Long 136-10 to arrive 0430 25 July. Make sustained strikes against naval combatant strength KURE-KOBE area, sweep MAIZURU, strike air and air installations KOBE-NAGoya area. At dusk proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat 28-00 Long 136-00 to arrive 0700 26 July.

Para. Fuel and replenish until 1200 July when proceed to launching position vicinity Lat 33-00 Long 138-30 to arrive 0400 28 July strike air and air installations in TOKYO-NAGoya area. At dusk retire to southward until time to arrive launching position vicinity Lat 33-30 Long 138-30 at 0400 30 July. Continue strikes as for 28 July.

Para. Task Unit 34.8.1 be prepared bombard HAMAMATSU area of HONSHU at about 2300 28 July or about 1200 30 July as specifically directed later rejoining Task Force 38 on completion. Ammo allowance 30 rounds 8 and 16 inch HC per gun. CTF 38 provide night fighters or CAP for Task Unit 34.8.1 as required.

Para. Completion strikes 30 July Task Force 38 proceed to fueling rendezvous Lat 28-00 Long 136-00 to arrive 1200 31 July.

Para. Compel 1200 1 August Task Force 38 proceed to launching position vicinity Lat. 31-40 133-30 to arrive 0430 2 August. Conduct sustained strikes against shipping SASEBO, sweep FUSAN shipping, strike air and air installations northern KYUSHU-KURE area. At dusk proceed via Lat. 27-55 Long 137-40 and Lat. 28-35 Long. 140-45 to fueling rendezvous Lat. 33-30 Long 147-00 to arrive 0500 5 August.

Para. Compel 1200 5 August proceed via point CHARM to launching point vicinity point LIFE or via points CHARM and SCIENCE to launching point vicinity point GAZETTE as later directed. Launch air strikes against air and air installations in TOKYO-PLAINS area vicinity LIFE or against same targets north HONSHU-HOKKAIDO from vicinity GAZETTE commencing dawn 7 August. Retire east at such and return at dawn to continue strikes from same position on 8 August.

Para. Task Unit 34.8.2 be prepared bombard HONSHU or HOKKAIDO targets on 7 or 8 August as later directed. CTF 38 furnish CAP for Task Unit 34.8.2 as required.

Para. Task Force 37 be prepared operate in conjunction with Task Force 38 in accordance this schedule as practicable. Also be prepared for separate operations on north HONSHU-HOKKAIDO targets during this period. Movement and attack schedule for Task Force 37 by separate annex later.

Para. Present intention return Task Forces to bases upon completion of strikes 8 August.

Para. All of above schedule subject to change due to weather and tactical developments.

Para. All positions north and east and times I (-9).
14 0255 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, DEP COM USASTAF, DEP COM USASTAF,

My planning staff have been giving considerable attention to compliance
JGS WARR 17064 (142307 June). It would be extremely helpful if 1 or more of
your planners could visit GUAM about 20 July for a brief conference concern-
ing occupation plans and incidentally orient my planners connection your
CORONET concepts as they now stand.

14 0256 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFOCOMINCH, CG USASTAF, DEP COM USASTAF

Your 131309. Delay until 1 August of conference concerning air coordina-
tion OLYMPTC first requested by your dispatch 0X 24152 of 9 July is agreeable
to me. Request information as to whether you now propose a conference on
the staff level between planning representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPAC and
COMGEN USASTAF or a conference between the Commanders themselves.

14 0901 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, DEP COM 20, CTF93 Info CGFEAF, CINCPAC PEARL, COM 3 RDFLT
CTF 38, CTF 37.

132145. Will appreciate your cooperation in coordinated air strikes at
places and times desired by Com3rdFlt 132145 insofar as practicable. Request
you inform this Hq and info addess of your intent and firm plans.
TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

14 2133 COMGENFMFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM 3RD FLEET, COM 5TH PHILEFOR, COMGEN SERVCOMD FMFPAC, COMGEN 5TH PHILCORPS, COMGEN 4TH MARDIV.

Consider 1 MarDiv (reinf) less 1 inf regt as ground force required to accomplish your 110632. 4th MarDiv nominated. Earliest date to commence mounting from MAUI 15 September with target date pending on rehearsal requirements naval forces to be employed. Reinforcing units nominated and present location as follows: 5th and 10th Amtracs bns, MAUI. 1 Co 1st Arm Amph Bn. SAIPAN. 4th Amph Trk Co and 1 Prov Amph Trk Co. MAUI. 1 bomb disposal plat. GUAM. VMO-4, MAUI. 1st rocket det. MAUI. 1 Prov heavy mortar Co. MAUI. 43rd NCB, MAUI. This will require following substitutions be made for units now scheduled for employment with VAC. 4th and 9th Amtrac Bns at GUAM substituted for 5th and 10th Amtrac Bns. 1 NCB to be assigned to 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN to be substituted for 43rd NCB. Early approval desired above tentative troop list in order that changes indicated in unit assignments to VAC may be effected at earliest practicable date. Contemplated that no garrison forces are provided from above assault force.

15 0728 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RD FLEET info CTF 38.

Insure that CTF 38 Op-Order 2-45 modified to conform with objectives your 030515 and my 112335 to the end that enemy combatant vessels remaining TOKYO BAY are destroyed.

15 0720 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCAFPAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING.

It is not quite 2 months since our conference in MANILA at which we discussed the subjects covered by your CX 26423 DTG 110723 and as I thought arrived at understandings which, although they represented concessions on both sides, were to serve as the basis for our preparations for OLYMPIC in the limited time available. Pursuant to those understandings I have released to you all the major combat elements of the Army then under my control except the headquarters 10th Army, headquarters 24th Corps, the 7th and the 27th Infantry Divisions and various attached units all of which are still engaged in mopping up operations on OKINAWA but all of which are by agreement or by accepted plans available to you for OLYMPIC or CORONET as you desire.

Para. It is true that relatively few service troops have been released to you but that is because as was well known there existed in the Pacific Ocean Areas a shortage of Army Service Troops for Army purposes which has been partly but only partly alleviated by the use of naval personnel to fill Army deficiencies.

Para. My 080301 July asked your comment or concurrence on matters which pertained to the internal organization or the 7th Fleet and specifically left under your operational control the naval forces assigned to your area. Similar reorganizations have been made within the Army forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas without reference to me.

Para. I will be glad to confer with you again in connection with these problems at any time that you can arrange to be my guest at Guam for that purpose. Current operations will require my presence here for a considerable period.
TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

12 11/5 CGUSFCT to WARCOS info COREUSFCT, CGSOSGCT, CGUSFIRET, CINCAPAC, CINCAPAC, CINCAPFPOA.

FBX 717.
1. Utilization of FORT BAYARD is subject. Reference Urad WARX 22283, WARX 25857 and WARX 2772 (last 2 radios were not sent to all and are not required to understand this radio). China theater has completed the study of materiel and personnel resources required by CHINA theater for this project and available to CHINA theater and INDIA BURMA theater.

2. The results of this study are as follows: A. FORT BAYARD will be used by CHINA theater as an auxiliary temporary supply base with an air and auxiliary ground line of communication forward to support CARBONADO modified. Target date for 2nd report area is 15 August 1945. B. The capacity of the port area is to be 5 liberty ships or their equivalent per month. C. Type cargo delivered forward initially will be primarily drummed oil. D. Personnel requirements in FORT BAYARD area estimated as 3300 of which CHINA theater can supply 506, INDIA BURMA theater can supply the equivalent of 3147. The shortage is 647 made up of 1 military police company to and E 15-37 less 1 traffic platoon, strength 124; Quartermaster petroleum supply company to and E 10-377 less 1 operating platoon, strength 108; Ordnance mtn company to and E 9-127, strength 116; 1 Quartermaster based depot company to and E 10-367, strength 76 and 1 port company to and E 50-177, and 1 Headquarters and Headquarters detachment port battalion to and E 55-116. CHINA theater is prepared to accept the cost of transporting personnel plus certain equipment from INDIA BURMA theater to CHINA theater and to improvise initially to cover the above shortages. However, CHINA theater must request that the most expeditious action be taken to meet the 647 shortage listed above. E. The material loading on the 1st 5 ships is satisfactory to CHINA theater as specified in WARX 25506 with the addition of T/E equipment for 1 port company and 30 days B rations for 5,000 men. The loading schedule for the follow up shipping will be forwarded to you as soon as possible. In general it will cover maintenance requirements of U.S. forces in port area including AV Gas for transports and fighter squadrons and cargo to be forwarded which we will now examine in closer detail. F. The initial destination of the 1st 5 ships should be determined by CINCAPAC CHINA theater recommends MANILA.

3. At this time WEIGHIN TAO is a questionable venture and will require diversion from FORT BAYARD. The information of this area and FORT BAYARD REQUESTED has been forwarded by separate radio.

4. Concur that LUZON air route appears inadvisable at this time if facilities now allocated to CHINA theater must be used. A detailed study of this will be continued here. CHINA theater has just seen WARX 29972 answers required will be sent later.

16 0141 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH, CINCAPAC, COMGENPOA, CORGNAIR info COMGENBASTF, CINCPAC PEARL H0.

Cinpoa concurs in Richardson's RJ 65765 DTG 150946.

16 0247 CINCAPAC to CINCPAC ADV H0 info CG 6TH ARMY, COMTIPHIB, CONSERVPAC.

CX 25864
Refers to your 0906.10 not to all. Your assumption that functions performed by naval garrison beach parties will be performed by similar
Army units for KOSHIKI RETTO, southeast KYUSHU and east KYUSHU landings is not correct. In addition to 4 naval garrison beach parties desired by 5th amphibious Corps, 6th Army desires 1 each naval garrison beach party for operational attachment to each of 8 engineer shore battalions scheduled for employment. Further desire 3 battalion headquarters attached to Supervise these beach parties.

160727 COMGEN USASTAF to CINCPAC ADV INFO COMGEN AFRICDPAC, CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMGEN AIR, COMGEN USASTAF ADMIN.

0261 look at CINCPAC ADV 120614 GCT July. Requirement given below is based on following assumptions: A. This headquarters responsible all USASTAF construction in MARIANAS and RYUKYUS; B. withdrawal of all construction assistance on USASTAF airfields such as naval construction battalions; C. Withdrawal of all USASTAF units from construction other than VLR and allied functions; D. USASTAF can obtain support from a theater for engineer units other than those supplied by Army Air Forces, i.e., spare parts companies, heavy shop companies, dump trucks companies and ordnance medium maintenance companies. E. The following engineer aviation troops now in this theater or committed clan 4 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 34 battalions, 2 depot companies, 4 maintenance companies, 3 topographical companies, 1 air force Hq company and 3 utilities companies will be retained by USASTAF as long as required. F. Maintenance will be performed in areas to rear of MARIANAS by undesignated air force. 5 utilities companies and 1 separate company now assigned in such areas. Presuming above assumptions correct, USASTAF will require 1 engineer command, aviation, 6 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 36 battalions, 2 Depot companies, 6 Maintenance companies, 3 topographical companies, 1 air force Hq company, 1 topographical battalion and 3 utilities companies in addition to units referred to in D above from a theater. This creates a shortage of 1 engineer command aviation, 2 Hq and Hq companies regiments, 2 maintenance companies, and 1 topographical battalion between units required and units on hand or committed USASTAF. It is understood if the strategic situation remains stabilized as far as VLR requirements are concerned that as construction is completed a progressive release of aviation engineering units will be made to a number required for maintenance purposes only.

160249 CINCAPAC to COMGENFEAF INFO CINCPOA BOTH HQ, DEPCOMEAF 20, COM3RD FLEET, CTF 93, CTF 35, CTF 37.

CX 25865

In support of operations 3rd Fleet as outlined in his Annex 1A operations Plan 9-45 (3rd Fleet Radio 132105 with info FEAF) desire COMGENFEAF in coordination with other RYUKYUS based air forces support operations to the maximum extent practicable with strikes in the KYUSHU-KURE area on schedule as indicated in Commander 3rd Fleets 132145 (info to FEAF). Schedule of strikes to be flexible and to be adjusted to conform to any change in plans of Commander 3rd Fleet due to unforeseen delays. Desire you submit earliest your scheduled plan for support including estimated striking force and targets with information to aedes in CINCPOA ADV 140901.
16 0830 COMGENAF 20 TO USASTAF GUAM info CINCPOA ADV, COM3RDFLEET, COMGENAIR.

AIDCO 1304.

Subject operations in coordination 3rd Fleet. Comments on Com3rdFleets 132145Z (GCT) follows as requested by your 150045Z. Presume air facilities means airbed room installations. Attack against such installations at variance with basic strategic plan. Many VLR primary targets principally aircraft production installations are located TOKYO-NAGOYA area. Intentions are to strike our primary targets during the period 24 July - 2 August when weather forecast indicates reasonable chance visual bombing. Otherwise incendiary destruction of urban industrial areas will be continued.

16 2013 COM3RDFLEET to CINCPOA ADV HQ info CTF 38.

Your 150728 acknowledged. CTF 38 will comply.

17 0523 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC ADV info COMINCH.

Having in mind the desirability of continued supervision of development of OKINAWA by ComGenTEN for our mutual advantage and of having at OKINAWA during the OLYMPIC assault and army officer of STIHEWELS standing and in view also of your CORONET plans for the 10th Army and use of divisions as OLYMPIC reserves I request your comment or concurrence on the following proposals in connection with the release to you of the army units concerned.
A The Headquarters 10th Army to report to you now for CORONET planning and to be released from my operational control about 1 December.
B The Headquarters 24th Corps to be released to you now.
C The 7th and 27th Divisions to be released to you about 1 October.

17 0717 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV info WARCOS, CG USASTAF, DEFCOM USASTAF.

CX 26167

Your 140256Z, August 1 conference coordination of Air. Staff conference was intended, however Army Air Forces wish ComUSASTAF to attend. No objection attendance commanders. Final decisions will of course remain with CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMUSASTAF.

17 1725 ComAFF to CG ADVON FEA F info CINCPAC, CINCPOA BEOH HQ, COMSTRAIR, COM3RDFLEET, CTF 38, CTF 37.

AX 77476

CINCPAC CX 25365 orders that Far East Air Forces, in support of Com3rdFleets operations outlined in his radio 132105 and in coordination with other RTUKUS based air forces, conduct air attacks to maximum extent practicable in the KYUSHI-KURE area. Schedule of these air attacks will be as outlined in Com3rdFleets 1321/5 and will be flexible to conform to any change in plans of Com3rdFleet due to unforeseen delays.

Para. Advon FEA F missions currently ordered comply with this directive. Advon FEA F will announce his intent daily with information to CINCPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, CINCPOA ADV, COMSTRAIR, COM3RDFLEET, CTF 38 and CTF 37.

Para. CINCPOA ADV is requested herewith to direct that radios containing information on fleet operations plans and fleet movements include CG ADVON FEA F as info addes. Copies of references above being forwarded CG ADVON FEA F by special safehand courier July 13.
Following Marine Air Units will comprise the 1st Marine Air Wing for OLYMPIC. Wing Hedron-1, Wing Seron - 1, Marine Air Groups 12, 14, 33, 61 as presently organized. Marine Air Group 32 consisting of Hedron 22, Seron 32, VMFB-244, VMFB-343, VMFT-134. Marine Air Group 24 consisting of Hedron-24, Seron-24, VMFB(N)-543, VMFT(N)-533. Hedron-62 with air Warning Squadrons, 3,4,9,12 and CCl units 1 through 5 inclusive attached. VMF 3 and VMF 4 are light weight units. VMF-254. Colonel Roberts USMC on staff ComGenAirFMFPac arrives MANILA on 19th with detailed logistic information.

CINCPAC 16211L. Paragraph 5 reads "petroleum logistics required by 7th Attack Force afloat that assemble in the MANILA area for the OLYMPIC operation will be provided by ComServ7thFleet and will be slated by CINCPAC."

Para. CominCh 112135 not to all confirms decision to reorganize service force 7th Fleet and establish servon 7. It appears to CINCPAC that Servon 7's responsibilities with respect to petroleum logistics in the MANILA area will be identical insofar as 3rd and 7th attack force are concerned. See also my 130751 not to all.

Para. Request your joint recommendations as to changes in CINCPAC's 16211L necessary in light of COMINCH 112135 and my 130751 which Com7thFleet furnishes to ComPhibsPac.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info AGWAR, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Victory 65 BG 14.2. The provision of a harbor of refuge for the protection of Lighterage and small craft constructed of block ships which would satisfy your primary concern as outlined in CX-24937 is within our means and can be provided on time.

Para. Expansion of the project to include Caissons for the protection of ocean-going vessels requires overriding priority over other major war programs with possibility that this might interfere with other programs more essential to the success of the operation.

Para. Navy Department has advised that its towing facilities are being augmented by 10 ATAs and 45 Liberty ship towing installations. Therefore believe towing of steel caissons and black ships can be undertaken without serious detriment to CINCPAC'S and CINCPAC'S towing programs from west and gulf coasts to forward areas. Navy Department will select towing units with regard to suitability for ready ships which latter may be largely non self propelled.

Para. Navy Department states that given priority caissons can be constructed and delivered to theater on time. Ability to assemble at site must be considered.

Para. In view of the impact on other programs and requirements and the necessity of having reasonably firm assurance that if the caissons are constructed they will be used CINCPAC'S recommendation is requested...
as a matter of urgency as to whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide only a harbor of refuge for small craft constructed wholly of block ships or whether they shall proceed with the construction and delivery of the artificial harbor as defined in CINCPAC's CX-24937 which includes the provision of Caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping, on the understanding that addressers are willing to accept possible impact on towing and other programs. Further request CINCPAC's comments on naval phases of project both towing and siting.

18 2252 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC info COMPHIBSPAC, COMSTHFLEET, CINCPOA PEARL.

In the ICEBERG operation unexpected delays occurred in the early establishment of adequate air warning facilities in the outlying positions which necessitated reliance for air warning on vulnerable surface craft with resultant loss in men and ships. It is of mutual and paramount importance that air warning units that are to go into outlying positions for OLYMPIC be so loaded and echeloned that their efficient functioning is assured at the earliest possible time at the outset of the operation to give the maximum protection to the amphibious effort. Information as to your plans for the early activation of air warning units on outlying positions will be appreciated.

19 0455 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CG 6TH ARMY, CG FEBF, COMPHIBSPAC.

CX 26663.

Objective area designated in para 3x(4) APPAC operations instructions number 1 dated 20 June is subject. APPAC, FEBF and COMPHIBSPAC are in agreement in changing delineation of objective area to that area south of 32-30N which is enclosed by arc of circle having radius of 120 nautical miles with center at SANTA MISA (31-00 N 130-40 W). Purpose to allow more water area for forces of COMPHIBSPAC. Request comments or concurrence.

19 0513 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 94, CGT 30.8, CGT 32.1 info COMORDFLEET, CTF 32, CTF 30.9.15, CTU 32.1.2, COMORD DIV 70, GOSS (DE 44), CONSERV DIV 10, SALAMANCA (CVE 96), ULRICH M. BOOHE (DE 442), K.C. CAMPBELL (DE 443), WM. GERTLING (DE 444).

Info ships hereby detached 3rd Fleet and assigned to CTF 94 for temporary operational control for employment as ASW Task Group.

Para. CGT 32.1 detach SALAMANCA, CGT 30.8 DETACH DE 439 and sail to rendezvous as directed by CTF 94.

19 0647 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC info COMGENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL.

CINCPOA coast artillery unit requirements are now 1 BN at PELUMIU and 1 Grp Hq and 3 Bns at OKINAWA. All other coast artillery units COMGENPOA Dispatch 160213 are available now for release to you. Advise disposition desired. Upon departure these units present stations operational control passes to you.

Para. By 1 August the coast artillery units at OKINAWA will pass to your operational control therefore no action will be taken by CINCPOA on request for conversion of 1 CA BN at OKINAWA to F1 contained COMGENPOA 160213.
TOP SECRET
JULY (GCT)

19 0611 CINCAF PAC to WARCOS, CINC PAC, INFO COMPHIBSPAC, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY.

CX 26685.

Armored divisions for employment in CORONET will not be available for dispatch from the United States until November or December. If staged through PHILIPPINEs, arriving in December or January, respectively, only very limited period can be allowed for shakedown and mounting out on or about 20 January. War Department has agreed to shipment direct to objective area in sea-trains or other means provided armored divisions can be handled at destination as required (W 16507, 13 June).

Para. The following reinforcing units should accompany armored divisions in assault shipping: 2 battalions 155 Gun (SP), 2 engineer combat battalions, 2 Treadway Bridge companies, 2 Ordnance BN companies (Tank), 2 Ordnance Ammunition companies, 2 Quartermaster Gas Supply companies, 2 Quartermaster truck companies (Aug), 1 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Quartermaster Battalion (Mobile), 1 Quartermaster Truck company, petroleum (Equipped under Column 2 D). L Corps headquarters should be alerted to accompany this shipment in the event that a definite requirement is established therefor.

Para. Preliminary investigation here indicates feasibility of releasing from OLYMPIC 50 LST PARV at XRAY plus 35 and 12 APA, and 6 AKA at XRAY plus 50 for dispatch to west coast to lift 2 armored divisions, reinforced, direct to CORONET objective area to arrive not later than 1 Plus 5.

Para. Request CINCPAC concurrence in utilization of assault shipping as proposed herein with information copy direct to War Department.

Para. Request War Department confirmation of availability of units listed above and approval of assault loading and proposed movement of 2 armored divisions, reinforced, as indicated, from west coast direct to objective area.

Para. Movement of these units by amphibious lift as priority would:
A. Insure ample time for preparation prior to entry into combat.
B. Relieve congestion in staging area and ports, and
C. Effect appreciable reduction in Back-Log of shipping.

Para. Early reply appreciated.

19 1117 CINCAF PAC to CINCPOA ADVANCE INFO WARCOS.

CX 26793.

No further action being taken, reference your 170523 (GCT) relative to tactical units on OKINAWA, in view of recent directive of the Joint Chief of Staff.

19 1423 CINCAF PAC to WARCOS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CINCPAC ADVANCE, INFO BPNL PEARL, BPNL CINCPAC.

CX 26866.

This replies to radio Joint Chiefs of Staff 181290. The recommended artificial harbor will be used for the operation as planned and the possible impact of its provision on towing and other programs has been fully considered and is accepted. It is recommended that Joint Chief of Staff authorize construction and delivery artificial harbor as defined in CX 24937 which includes caissons capable of sheltering cargo shipping.
19 0539 COMAFFPAC to CINCPAC and Joint Chiefs (for Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combined Interim Staff).

0541

CI 26448.

I have just concluded a series of conferences in an endeavor to accommodate the transfer of the 7th Fleet to proposed your OODR and the transfer of MAAG as proposed in your JOINT. This modifies my CI 29972 originated 16JUL21. I believe that this can now be accomplished as you desire subject to the approval of your 7th Fleet 122961A and to the overall approval of features which involve the AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH governments. It is my understanding that these features will of necessity have to be arranged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

17 0930 COMAFFPAC to CINCPAC and Joint Chiefs.

Following requested training schedule modified by OODR/25, 20MAY20 and 27JUN21 all of June and has been approved in part by you. Request overall approval.

A. Philippines LSTs 10 LSTs and Transdiv 16 now being employed on continuous basis. Approved by your 190122 of May 220126 of June.

B. An additional Transdiv is required in PHILIPPINES area for period of 1 month commencing 25 July for training additional NUTS not included in original tentative training schedule. Requested by CINCPAC. Action not known.

C. Transdiv 15 (Lecce BEARMAN, BLADBON, BARNOW, LACERTA, MULFORD) 20 LST and 10 LST to arrive PHILIPPINES 30 days prior to landing. Requested by COMAFFPAC 090915 of June approval not received.

D. GUAM 2ND MARDIV Transdiv 37, 10 LST, 10 LSM available 21 August. Approved by your 200724.

E. SAIPAN 2ND MARDIV 4 APs including a division flagship of Transdiv 12, 10 LST and 10 LSM available 8 September. Requested by CINCPAC 140821.

F. OAHU 7TH MARDIV 4 APs including a division flagship of Transdiv 34, 6 LST and 12 LSM available 26 August. Requested by CINCPAC 140821.

G. OAHU 9TH DIVISION Continuation 22 in WESTERNHOLT, KAMEH, KOSTERSAU, BOWIE, KINGSBURG, ALEMANIA, SAPPHO. 10 LST and 10 LSM available 1 August. Approved by your 092316.

20 1557 COMAFFPAC to CINCPAC and Joint Chiefs (for Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combined Interim Staff.

It is my intent to tighten blockade and keep pressure on the enemy by throwing light force sweeps against enemy coast and outlying islands at every opportunity. Objectives denial of coastal sea lanes to enemy destruction shipping and bombardment of shore targets. These raids will usually be ordered suddenly.

Para. Keep currently familiar with locations within operational range with emphasis on enemy coastal shipping refuges. Enemy mine fields, and coastal targets such as harbor facilities, railroad bridges, ports and tunnels, radar and radio stations, shore batteries, factories, towns.
20 1819 CINC PAC and CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ info COMOUTL, CINC PAC, CINCPAC, 07/20 FPO SD, CINCPAC.

Your 130751. Items A B C E G and H are approved. Item D is under consideration. Items F and future of CHINA are under advisement and dependent on action by JCS on proposal to reorganize SWPAC area. Make nomination to me for Rear Admiral to command U. S. Naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA. What are your plans for Task Force 71.

19 1119 CINC PAC to WARCOS, (FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF), CINCPAC ADV HQ.

CE 26794.

Will be glad to welcome British Corps Commander and accompanying officers. Suggest their arrival earliest date and if practicable by 1 August. Reference Joint Chiefs of Staff V 66 NO 145, 19th. CINCPAC requested to comment or concur directly to Joint Chiefs of Staff, information to CINCPAC.

19 2327 CINCPAC ADV to CONTAIN info CINCPAC, CINCPAC MAIL HQ.

I concur in CINCPAC 191119 to WARCOS concerning arrival British Corps Commander and accompanying officers.

20 0710 CINCPAC to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info WARCOS, COM IN F 10, COMSOUTH 10, COMARCINA.

CFRI 1169.

Agree that meeting between representatives from Headquarters CHINA THEATER, Headquarters CINCPAC and Headquarters CINCPAC at GUAM as suggested in radio 14030A is highly desirable.

Para. A study and assessment of resources and requirements of CHINA THEATER is being made now. This study will be completed about the end of July. If you agree it is recommended that conference be held on or about 31 July. Composition of CHINA THEATER party will be furnished later. Present plans are to leave on or about 30 July. Suggest that CHINA THEATER officers return via MANILA to insure coordination of operations.

Para. Captain Painter has arrived and is providing very valuable assistance in both our future and operational planning.

Para. For Headquarters request clearance for 1 C 54 aircraft through your area on or about 31 July. If you feel that a meeting between CHINA THEATER officers returning from GUAM and your people would be beneficial they will return via MANILA for a brief conference.

20 1100 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to ACTION (ARMY) PASS TO WARCOS FOR ACTION info CINCPAC ADV HQ CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Construction and provision of an artificial harbor to meet the strategic requirements set forth in CINCPAC CE 24937 of 12 July is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The construction and establishment of this artificial harbor is charged to the Navy. The Navy will proceed with this project with priority above all Military and Naval programs except Manhattan project and will be assisted by appropriate agencies of the War Department as necessary. Appropriate action by the Joint Egistical Committee and Joint Military Transportation committee is directed.
20 1308 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCAPAC FOR MACARTHUR AND CINCAPAC FOR MACPAC.

With regard to your C 26799, direct your in Victory 73 pertaining only to the ROYALUX. This does not preclude the transfer of responsibilities pertaining to USSTAF units elsewhere in the Pacific by mutual agreement as provided in WAR 62773 of 3 April.

20 2208 WARNS to CINCAPAC. COMMEND USSTAF info CINCPOA ADV NO.

WARX 35530.

For operation and maintenance of LCN's for FORT BAYARD PROJECT CINCAPAC is requested to (see Navy End 192133) arrange landing and onward shipping of personnel with equipment to destination. Possible use of naval escort craft for this should be examined. For information 4th and 9th ships depart NEW ORLEANS for 16th and 21st July respectively.

Para. New subject. CHINA THEATER should arrange to furnish tank fuel and necessary logistic support to these navy personnel on arrival. Believe it proper that navy personnel used in port operations not be charged against existing navy troop ceiling.

Para. New subject. To facilitate detailed arrangements for these operations, it appears desirable for CHINA HQ to establish liaison in CINCAPAC headquarters. CHINA'S CFEX 669 July 12 refers. WD has not received into copies of inter theater cables (CFEX 669) which express decisions reference split of responsibilities for the operation. It is requested that War be included as info addresses in all inter theater cables reference decisions for implementation of this operation.

21 0229 CINCAPAC ADV NO to COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFWD info COMAIRPAC, COMPRFLIEST. GW 28.

From Sept 20 to Oct 10 3 U.S. Groups containing 9 CV, 5 CVL, 5 DD, 19 Cruisers will base ENIWETOK. 2 U.S. Groups containing 6 CV, 2 CVL, 1 DD 12 Cruisers will base LEYTE. After October 10 for indefinite period proportions will be approximately reversed. In addition 3 British CV and 3 CVL will base ENIWETOK.

Para. These estimates are for planning purposes only. They may change radically at any time before or during forthcoming operations. Composition of Groups to identity of specific ships can not be provided at this time.

21 0645 CINCAPAC ADV NO to COMAIRPAC info. ARCOMAIRPAC. COMAIRPAC. COMPRFLIEST. CINCAPAC FIFTH NO. JAPAN.

Plans for minefield investigation proposed in your 130445 are approved subject to following qualification of last sentence. Mine detection subs will in emergency be considered available for offensive missions air sea rescue duties or reconnaissance if necessary arises. COMPOA arrange direct with ComSubPac for conferences if desired.

21 1808 CINCAPAC ADV NO to COMFLIEST info CINCAPAC.

My 130719 COMAIR 201419. Request implementation items approved obtaining concurrence of CINCAPAC where appropriate.

Para. Request your comment on future submarine requirements NEPA.
WARX 35531.

Repeated to all addresses. Reference 26669 of 19 July 1945. It is suggested here to place Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem who now commands the 15th Corps Headquarters in charge of this force upon completion of the scheduled amphibian training of the units you have indicated you desire. This is proposed in order to carry out what is considered are your desires. It is assumed that other reinforcing units for this corps headquarters will be furnished there by you if you intend to use this corps in the role of an armored Corps. Gillem's Corps is an infantry corps but he happens to be 1 of our best armored Commanders also. Furnishing reinforcing units requires minor changes to present redeployment schedule in order to meet target date as follows:

A. 1 field artillery battalion (155 Millimeter Gun) (self propelled) will be indirectly redeployed instead of directly redeployed in 9th month.
B. 2 Engineer combat battalions will be indirectly redeployed instead of directly redeployed in 10th month.
C. Indirect shipment remaining reinforcing units will be delayed in order to carry up with this force.

Para. Upon receipt CINC PAC concurrence concerning assault shipping and your comment or concurrence to the above proposal, the necessary implementation here will be accomplished. An early reply would be helpful.

0349

Request USA STAF message no 0313 dated 171643 OGT sent to your headquarters be withdrawn and destroy the following substitute therefore:

All fighters assigned to USA STAF will be withdrawn from their primary mission of escort and given the mission of counter air force operations of destroying the Japanese air force both in the air and on the ground, attacking airfields and airfield installations, on the dates and at the places requested by COM 3rd Fleet during the execution Op Plan 9-45. WIA forces will be employed against major air targets such as aircraft engineer plants, propeller plants, and other major industrial areas in the general area and on the 15th dates requested by COM 3rd Fleet. Your headquarters will be currently informed as to the names of the places and dates of attack.

300931

CINCPAC to CINCPAC PACIFIC AW 87, CINCPAC F/J 95, CINCPAC AV/J 95 PEAF, CINCPAC JW 95, CINCPAC NW 95.

AX 77920

Reference is wred GX 25195 which directed PEAF to conduct strikes on enemy air bases and other appropriate targets, to assist TF 95. Also reference CINCPAC ADV 110539, 110146, 112539 and CINCPAC 95 radio 192622.

July 45 this had received info of CINCPAC 95 radio 182215/2 which first info that CINCPAC 95 sweep intent for 19 July was not conducted as scheduled. Assistance requested CINCPAC ADV 112539 and directed by wred GX 25260 was conducted as outlined in wred AX 77215 to provide direct assistance for TF 95 sweep scheduled daylight 16 July. Current operational plans, including assistance for 3rd Fleet (see my rad AX 77479, 27 July) precludes furnishing any further direct assistance in general target area for TF 95 (This is tentative; cancel and file 211050 GR 259 and cancel 211627 GR 59).
20 1303 CINC PAC and CNO CONTINUE HC into WASHINGTON BOTH HC—CONTINUE A GIR PARTED TO CINC PAC VICTORY 134.

CINCPAC CXD-24997 and JCS 201148 refer. I desire a TO charged with the construction and establishment of the artificial harbor project be set up in the immediate future, initially directly under CINCPAC and CNO, later to pass to CINCPAC. This group to be commanded by a young Rear Admiral or a Commodore especially fitted to give energetic direction. Nominations by my headquarters are desired. The staff, which initially need not be large, should include civil engineers and 1 or 2 officers.

22 0410 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC ADV to COMPHIBSPAC, COMSVPAC, CONSERV PAC into CONSERV PAC 10.

COMPHIBSPAC 190220, CINCPAC intends that Commodore Hartley in his capacity as CONSERV DIV 103 command the units of SERVRON 10 at the objective in OLYMPIC. These units will initially be largely those for repair and salvage. CONSERV DIV 103 will be under the operational control of COMPHIBSPAC. Captain Curtis will be assigned to the staff of CONSERV DIV as chief salvage officer.

22 0719 CINCPAC ADV to OLYMPIC ADV to COMSVPAC into COMSVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, CONSERV PAC.

Operations instructions number 96 issued by Headquarters Allied Air Forces SWPA dated 12 July with distribution to officers under my command are objectionable to me in the following respects:

A. They give orders applicable to "All Forces" concerning air sea rescue within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

B. They undertake to prescribe primary air attack areas and to issue orders in connection therewith which affect the operations of the Pacific Fleet while operating within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Para. It is requested that the Commanding General Allied Air Forces SWPA be directed to refrain from issuing orders which directly or by implication attempt to control the operations of the United States Pacific Fleet or to make area assignments within the Pacific Ocean Areas.

22 0742 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC FLEET to COMSVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, CONSERV PAC 10 to CONSERV PAC 10, CONSERV PAC.

Refer paragraph 8 CINCPAC 16211 and my 200709. CINCPAC approves procedure CONSERV FOR 7TH FLEET (SERVRON 7) provide petroleum logistics for OLYMPIC amphibious forces assembling in the MANILA AREA. These requirements to be slated by CINCPAC. In addition SERVRON 7 should similarly provide for all other naval forces in the MANILA AREA. Accordingly request deletion of "7th attack Force Afloat" and substitution "Pacific Fleet Units."

22 0839 CINCPAC ADV to COMSVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, CONSERV PAC, CONSERV PAC 10.

COMSVPAC ADV to COMSVPAC 8, COMSVPAC 10, COMPHIBSPAC ADV to COMPHIBSPAC 8, COMPHIB PAC 10, COMPHIBSPAC 18, COMSVPAC 20.

COMSVPAC, Olyc, 26, Olyc 92.

Mydis 090901 modified as follows:

- continued -
The site presently selected for the NOB is at TARA-KISAKI in KAGOSHIMA BAY.

2. The site presently selected for the Naval Air Base is at MINATO.

3. Insert as paragraph (G): The naval hospitals and naval ammunition Depot will be under the Commandant NOB.

Concur your 220715. (Ref: 3rd Fleet Coordination.)

My OpPlan 4-45 will be modified as follows:

1. Add to Task organization: (H) (TF 95) V,Adm. Oldendorf. With forces assigned.

2. Change Task of 3rd Fleet to read: Attack Japanese naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards, and coastal objectives. Protect sea and air communications along the central Pacific axis.

3. Modify SubPara (h) to read: Maintain control of the EAST CHINA SEA and its western approaches. Interdict to limit of capabilities the movement of hostile naval forces and shipping in the YELLOW SEA, TSUSHIMA STRAITS and the southern part of the SEA OF JAPAN. Protect friendly shipping. Cover and defend our positions in the KURUS. Provide air-sea rescue services. Support operations of other forces. Conduct mineweeping as directed by CINCPAC.

4. Add to SubPara (j): CTF 95 area of military responsibility is that part of the combat area west of the 135th meridian except that the 3rd fleet will enter therein in execution of its assigned tasks upon giving prior notification to forces concerned.

5. Add new SubPara (k): For purposes of coordination direct communications between CTF 95 or his subordinate commanders and the commanders of other forces is authorized as at present.

6. This dispatch is effective 250200 at which time my dispatch 110146 is cancelled.

Effective 250200 CTF forces assigned to operational control CINCPAC will comprise those units now assigned to TF-97, TF-38, TG-30, TG-30.4, TG-30.9 plus such other combatant ships as may be assigned.
22 1150  CINC PAC ADV to COMGRDFLEET, COMBATION 1, CTF 95, CTF 39, CTF 99.1, CTF 30.5, CTF 30.9 into COMINCH. CTF 99. CINC PAC PEARL. COMAIRPAC, COMSOUTHCOM, COMAFPAC, COMGENPEAF. COMGRDFLEET ADVON, COMSOUTHCOM. (Cont'd.)

in LEYTE which were formerly assigned to Com3rdFlt and which are not included in the forces listed.

Para. For the information of both commanders the KASAAN BAY and SALAMANDA ASW groups are assigned to CTF 94.

Para. Rotation of CVE to TG-30.8 or to TG-32.1.2 may be arranged directly by CTF-32.1.

Para. This reassignment does not affect assignments to Com3rdFlt contained in my 220259 and 220612. Assignment of additional ships or transfers between 3rd Fleet and TF 95 will be controlled by CINC PAC. Com3rdFlt make recommendations when and as necessary.

22 1915  COMINCH AND CNO to CINC PAC ADV HQ into CINC PAC PEARL HQ. CINC PAC. CG AAF. COFS ARMY.

Refer WARD 33621 to COMGEN PEAHF held by 20 AF GUAM and OAHU. For JAVAAN plan in support of OLYMPIC COMGEN AAF has requested assistance from Navy. It is indicated that your approval will be sought on basis project plan will be under command PEAHF and CINC PAC and be self supporting at BUNKHOUSE and all support operated by OSS personnel to be shipped via MANILA. If you approve operation it appears wasteful to ship special facilities for single operation if available. BUNKHOUSE for temporary use. This applies particularly to LCM, automotive equipment, shops and housing. Para. Operation is set out in separate message. Facilities requested are 1 LCM(3) and following functional components less personnel: 1 A-3, 1 D-12, 1 E-11. 1 C-8, 1 PFA.

Para. Extensive work on boats required in secluded place for security reasons. Advise whether you can provide all or part of facilities on temporary basis.

22 1921  COMINCH AND CNO to CINC PAC ADVANCE into CINC PAC. CINC PAC PEARL. CG AAF. COFS ARMY.

Project my 221915 is to destroy JIOHIOSEKI TUNNELS with 6 dron 85 foot aircraft rescue boats and involves installing JAP SEA truck and lugger false which is prefabricated ready to ship. OSS expects to request ISCOM to assign midget Sub-Base on MOTOMU PENINSULA. If Jap Marine railway at base can be used, estimated installation time with facilities requested in 1 week per boat. 6 Spare boats and false kits being provided.

23 0903  CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMINCH PAC into COMTHISPAC, COMGRDFLEET, COMBATION 1, ADCOMINPAC, CINC PAC PEARL HQ.

Upon completion sweeping area JUNEAU continue minesweeping operations in EAST CHINA SEA using those minesweepers which have arrived most recently in combat area. By use of rotational plan of overhaul and rehabilitation it is expected that sweeping will continue indefinitely. Minefield north of area JUNEAU and field in vicinity of SHANGHAI-CHOSEN are desired swept as early as practicable and prior to OLYMPIC. Your 220697 refers.
TOP SECRET

JULY (CST)

24 0317
CINCPAC ADV HQ to JINCAPPAC Info CINCPAC Philosophy, COMGEN NO, COMDEF, and
Control Center

TOP SECRET. Memorandum for record dated 23 July signed by Major General
Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman approved by CINCPAC. On receipt CINCPAC
concurrence I will direct ComGen 10 with U.S. Army Forces in the HUNGKONG
report to CINCPAC effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July which was earliest date
acceptable to your representative and other Army conferences.

23 1321
COMUSPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC Philosophy, COMRA
Navy, COMUSPAC, COMMU CINCPAC, COMNA CINCPAC, COMAIR
COMAIR

TOP SECRET. CPEX 1480
Due to staff conference at Manila 1 August conference at GHQ has been
postponed until after 4 August. Message GHQ 202351Z (CST) refers. Presently
plan to leave HANGKONG 4 August will arrive GHQ late 5 August or early
6 August. Party expected to number about 15 officers and men (including
General Simpson's party). Request information as to whether this will be
satisfactory. Names of persons composing party will be forwarded later. New
Subject: (For WARCOS) Eminentlly satisfactory is Colonel L. J. Lincoln's
presence at this conference. He can return with CHINA Theater party.

23 2105
CMO to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC Philosophy

TOP SECRET. CMO to CINCPAC ADV HQ 1506/2 revised by JIC 15/12
is subject your 181206 of May. JIC 15/20 has been approved and is being
forwarded to you by air mail. Recommendations of OAHU mapping conference 25-29
May were approved and assignment of responsibilities for mapping photography
of Japanese areas to CINCPAC and CINCPAC mutually with assistance of OAHU
are to be accomplished in accordance with conference agreements.

24 0140
COMUSPAC to COMINCLPF CINCPAC/POA ADV

TOP SECRET. In preparation for OLYMPIC it is considered most important that
ships assemble early for indoctrination and training. The large numbers in-
volved and the complex organization plus fact that present duties of PhibPan
does not permit tactical training require that receive special attention.
It is recommended that the advance and amphibious forces off Bar
serial 000279 of 18 July assemble by 10 September as follows: At LETTE Guam
and CINCPAC Forces, South Attack Force, 3rd Attack Force, Guam CINCPAC Forces,
and in HAWAII forces. In MANILA and HAWAII 7th Attack Force. At LETTE
and in HAWAII Reserve Forces.

Para. Assembly date of 10 September is approximately 10 days in advance of
dates set forth in Joint Staff Study. Submit that complexities of training,
loading, rehearsals, movement to loading, rehearsal, and objective areas,
to gather with necessary upkeep and logistics require a longer period than
at present allowed. If you concur in proposed plan request you submit to
CINCPAC for approval.

3405
CINCPAC ADV HO to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Request by air mail copy JCS 659/3 of 24 March 1944 and by dispatch information as to any JCS decision which places on area commander responsibility over and authority to coordinate sea air rescue within his area.

CINCPAC ADV HO to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMINCPAC,

TOP SECRET. Para (B) bydes 090000 modified to extend that the JUB at MANISE RIVE (or such other place on the west coast as may be selected) will remain in support of V Phib corps as long as needed by the Corps. On or before withdrawal of the V Phib Corps from KYUSHU this JUB will pass to control of Commandant JUB.

CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC ADV HO, Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMINCH, COMINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMINCPAC, COMINCH

CX 28065 TOP SECRET. Concur in change outlined your 22070Z (OCT) July in reply to our 162111. Servon 7 will provide for all naval forces that assemble in the MANILA area. Request Servon 7 be advised of substation additional requirements for inclusion in APPAC slates.

CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC JCS TENSEN, COMINCH, COMINCPAC

Organization TF 95. 95,1 TENNESSEE force flagship Captain Heffernan. 95,2 EASY striking group RAdm Luns. 95,3 Heavy striking Group VAdm Vederford. 95,4 Mine Group RAdm Sharp. 95,5 Base Covering Group RAdm Cebbes. 95,6 OKINAWA Logistic Group Comdr Sluiter. 95,7 Philippine Training Group, RAdm McCormick. 95,8 ESCORT RAdm Durgin. 95,9 Fleet Air Wing 1, RAdm WEST. This dispatch effective 250200 OCT.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH 1, Info CRUDES 16, COMINCH.

CTF 95 230415. When Ks direct RAdm Low with the same forces as in proceeding operation proceed to conduct shipping sweep in area west of BOGALUSA-CHUAN between Lat. 30-00N and 32-30N. Avoid mine restricted area in SHANGHAI-CHUAN area. Keep Comdr it, COMERF-LAF, COMERCHINA and CTF 99 informed of movements this force.

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC ADVANCE

Request your comments on COMINCPAC 210215. CINCPAC considers a total of 4 strips on 2 or 3 fields required to support 1st Marine Air Wing.
TOP SECRET

24 1722 COMMAND AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADVANCE into CONTINUS, CINCPAC, OCEANIAC, CINCPAC PEARL, NO. OCEANIAC.

Referring to item H your 130751 and my 201819 the requirements of my 161305 September 1944 and your 00107 of 12 January 1945, for maintenance of definite numbers of cruisers, destroyers and submarines in 7th Fleet hereby cancelled.

24 1624 NOTE GIVEN to CINCPAC, CINCPAC, OCEANIAC, OCEANIAC PEARL, NO. 01010

V-273.

As a basis of discussion with the Soviet General Staff on the subject of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made the following proposal in connection with U.S. Naval and Air Operations when and if RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN:

A. U.S. Naval surface forces may operate without restriction in the seas of JAPAN and OKhotsk.

B. U.S. Submarines may operate without restrictions in the SEAS OF JAPAN and OKhotsk south and east of a line connecting following points:

- coast of KOREA at latitude 38 north thence to latitude 40 north longitude 135 east thence to latitude 45-45 north longitude 140 east thence east along that latitude.

C. U.S. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east of a line connecting following points:

- CAPE LOPATKA to a point 30-30 longitude 117 degrees-thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 140-20 thence to point latitude 45-45 longitude 130-30 thence to point 41-20 longitude 133-20 thence westward to SKOKHIN KOREAN-thence north to railroad at KOREAN border-thence westward along railroad to YUNKI and CHANCHUN-thence along the river to LIAOTUN KAILU and CHIFENG-thence along the railroad through TOLUN, PADOCHANG, WANCHUAN, TOYPUN, FENGCHEN, TPDING to TONGSOL-thence northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA.

D. The location of these lines may be changed from time to time by mutual agreement as deemed necessary or desirable.

Para. U.S. Submarines and air operations north and west of these lines will be coordinated with the RUSSIANS and similarly their submarine and air operations south and east of these lines will be coordinated with U.S.

Para. Your comment is requested to arrive terminal by 260600Z (OCT).

NOTE (On Originator) - call sign JZBG (The station from which this dispatch was received) has been used on dispatches originated by COMINCH AND CNO and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - Location is POTSDAM, GERMANY.

25 0905 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMANDATION 1 into CONTINUS, OCEANIAC, CINCPAC PEARL, NO. OCEANIAC PEARL, NO.

COMXIV 5, OCEANIAC, OCEANIAC, PENSACOLA, SAN JUAN CIV.

COMXIV 5 will be assigned north pacific forces in near future. Preparation ships for this service is to be initiated immediately.
25 0425 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONTHFLEET into CONTHFLEET.

Your 240650 seaplane operations during OLIMPIK will be conducted in KOSHIKI and ARKAIK WAB ARREAS as determined by CONTHFLEET. Consider in desirability of establishment of tender based seaplane operating area adjacent to other naval activities. Final determination of site upon recommendations of commanders concerned.

25 0904 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH into CINCPAC. CONGEN USASTAF.

Your 241824 (V 273). Strongly urge that decision be reached as to areas in which Pacific Fleet will control and be responsible for safety of shipping (including such part of the sea route from the United States to Russia through the Sea of Okhotsk as may be a U.S. Pacific Fleet responsibility) and that Russian submarines be excluded from that area. Difficulties of communications, language and uncustomed recognition procedures make it extremely inadvisable to permit Russian submarines operate in areas where United States ships and aircraft are escorting shipping.

Para. The boundary proposed for United States submarines is satisfactory.

Para. It is recommended that since the ports railroads and rivers listed in paragraph C of V 273 as the Air Force boundary are themselves centers of target concentrations they be assigned definitely to the United States or Russia in all cases.

25 0907 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONTHFLEET into CONTHFLEET, COMAIRSPAC, CINCPAC FACE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONTHFLEET.

Your 240358 and 222354. It is expected that CONSEVDIV 103, Com. Hartley will be responsible for other logist officers in the objective area as well as for repair and salvage as indicated in my 220440. Captain Curtis will be assigned to his staff. He will be assigned the CAMPBELL (COC-ACC) as flagship and with aide assistants to permit him to discharge these duties. It is expected that he will remain in the area as CONSEVDIV 103. As such he will be under the operational control of CONTHFLEET after departure of CONTHFLEET. The Army Sub Area petroleum officer may accompany Commodore Hartley or Admiral Turner as arranged by the latter. The assignment of the SPENCER (COC) and INGHAM (COC) will be determined later.

25 1009 CINCPAC to WARGUS Site CINCPAC. CONGEN USASTAF.

OREQO. 28231.
Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-273 24th.

25 1011 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into WARGUS. CINCPAC FACE. COMAIR.

CINCPAC ADVANCE into WARGUS.

UL-28232.

Reference memorandum for record, dated 23 July 1945, relating to HYOKUSU, signed by Major General Chamberlin and Rear Admiral Sherman, approved by CINCPAC with the word "Administrative" changed to "Operational" on page 2, para 3A(1)(A). CINCPAC ADV in his 240317/a (OCT) has approved memorandum.

340
25 1A31 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into WARGOS. USAFTR. CINCPAC PMNL. COMAIRVPA. AFIDPAC. COMAIRVPA.

CL-28307.

Subject is JAVAM project reference WX 33621 and COMAIRVPA 221915/Z (OCT) and 221922/Z. Request your concurrence in proposed operational project now assigned to USAF for execution. Target date later to be determined will precede OLYMPIC target date.

12 2336 WARGOS to CINCPAC ADVANCE into COMAIRVPAIDPAC - COMAIRVPAIDPAC PASSED TO CINCPAC BOTH HEADQUARTERS.

WARX 31108.

A study is now undergoing priority consideration wherein ATC facilities (aircraft crews and maintenance personnel) of the Atlantic be moved to Pacific beginning in August.

Para. New grand totals 4 engine transport aircraft to be in the Pacific under this study will be: 373 in August, 375 in September, 399 in October, 423 in November, 537 in December, 600 in January, 655 in February, 707 in March.

Para. 2 plan is being considered. Plan 1 to be base majority of ATC HAWAII with personnel fed to that point by water transportation. Plan 2 is through movement by air from West Coast. Ultimate destination to be PHILIPPINES, LETTE or MANILA or both.

Para. Shipping implications and comparison of net Pacific gain against new Atlantic loss will be resolved here.

Para. Needed without delay is estimate of theaters ability to:

Para. A. Receive via air total 7600 personnel in August, 19500 in Sept., 28000 in October, 39000 in November, 46000 in December, 53000 in January, 61000 in February, and 67000 in March.

Para. B. Provide holding area in Hawaiian department to accommodate 12500.

Para. C. Provide accommodation for greatly increased personnel at HICKAM. (Assuming plan 1 above is accepted)

Para. D. Provide terminal facilities in PHILIPPINES and assume full responsibility for passengers upon landing, to include necessary ground transportation.

Para. E. Provide storage and disbursing facilities for ATC total P.O. requirements of 11000 short tons in August building up to 115000 in March.

Para. F. Provide service forces to support such increase.

Para. Directly related and in amplification this problem is radio DTS 111637 of 11 July 45 (dispatched via Navy channels).

Para. For COMAIRVPAIDPAC only. This is ATC augmentation message to be brought to attention of Colonel Hoshon, OPD, new TD in Pacific which was subject of earlier communication. Hoshon to extend TD to Hawaii and arrange TD with WD for further details of necessary. Extreme case of backlog in West Coast foremost between now and March 1946 is causing great concern here.

25 210A COMAIR and CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE NOTES.

Dr 240636. Copies of JCS 659/1 and 659/3 being forwarded airmail.

No subsequent JCS action modifies paragraphs 3 of 659/1 which states "operational control of Air Sea Rescue activities and facilities is a responsibility of theater or area commanders".
TOP SECRET

25 2236 COMCENUSASTAF to JERG (POTSDAM, GERMANY) into CINCPAC. CINCPAC.

Concur with Joint Chiefs of Staff V-273, 20-4th. Recommend that targets lying along outlined air boundary be assigned to either RUSSIANS or United States.

26 0149 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMEN TIR into COMONCH AND CNO. CINCPAC. CTF 95. COMCENUSASTAF. COMMAND. CNO. CINCPAC. COMCENTIR. COMMAND. CNO.

Effective 1200 I (-9) 31 July report to CINCPAC with all United States Army Forces under your command. At that time control of United States held positions in the NTUKUS will be governed by JCS 162149 July and memorandum for record dated 23rd July as approved by CINCPAC 2A0317 and CINCPAC CR 28232 (DTO 251011).

26 0150 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC into COMEN TIR. ISCOM OKINAWA. COMCENTIR. COMINCH. H-OUSSSOS SWPA.

Your 250847 concur. Copies of memorandum distributed to naval service will have change incorporated.

26 1225 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CONNOCPAC. CINCPAC PEARL HU.

TOP SECRET. Cominch & CNO 251750 request your comment and recommendations as suggestions as to how CINCPAC should exercise control. Expedite reply.

26 1514 RIVER. JOINT SECURITY CONTROL (MARSHALL). CINCPAC. Info CINCPAC ADV HQ. COMCEN USFCT.

TOP SECRET. WARY 28701. Following for your information in implementation planning PASTEL. (A) Chinese underground SHANGHAI presently under United States control. Includes important employees and labor, steamer lines, street railways, harbor activities, public utilities plus 15,000 coastal pirates. (B) ComNavGroup CHINA on 14 July proposed beginning training within 6 weeks 1500 key SHANGHAI personnel for intelligence sabotage Jap installations and protection of port against Jap sabotage. (C) Cominch concurred directs ComNavGroup CHINA that it be "accomplished at expense of your other obligations unless it has sufficient importance to ComGen USFCT to carry increase in theater ceilings on personnel and freight in order to meet a target date for completion, which date is a matter for his decision" Evaluation follows. (A) Sequence of actions if taken and dates set by ComGen USFCT will bear on enemy estimate PASTEL. (B) Assistance provided by CINCPAC or CINCPAC to above projects will accelerate and augment appearance your GIOETNARTS SHANGHAI area in accordance PASTEL. (C) May be possible to relate pirate activities to those of US in operations EAST CHINA SEA. Radio traffic between GUAM and HONGKONG could support this relation. (D) If attention SHANGHAI area maintained or exaggerated after X-55 per PASTEL special means implementation by Joint Security Control must be coordinated appropriately.
TOP SECRET
JULY (C30)

27 1000 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC (MACARTHUR), CINCPAC (NIMITZ), USSSTAFF (SPAATZ), AGWAR.

for U.S. aircraft to attack targets or make reconnaissance flights north of the boundary line coordination would be effected by local liaison and within 24 hours after application. It was further agreed that position of the line would be reconsidered if communications proved too slow to effect prompt coordination.

Para 4th Question—Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, U.S. Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945?

Para 4th Answer—The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with Military Operations of the Soviet Union against JAPAN, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet Joint Chiefs of Staff liaison groups with General MacArthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.

Para. American Liaison Groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, MARSHALL VASSEILIEVSKI, in KHABAROVSK, and with the Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yamashev in VALDIVOSTOK.

Para. The Soviet Command is ready to accept the Radio-Teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.

Para. Action—Agreed with the understanding that liaison would be effected by the commanders in the field without reference to WASHINGTON and MOSCOW.

Para 5th Question—It is assumed that, after D-Day, Soviet or U.S. air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or U.S. ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet Aircraft.

Para 5th Answer—The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above mentioned ships and planes.

Para. For the purpose we can designate:
SubPara (A) Naval ports: in the Japanese SEA, port NAHODKA (American Strati); in the OROCHSK and BERING SEA REGIONS-NIKOLAIEVSK, on the ANUM, and PETROPAVLOVSK, on KAMCHATKA.

SubPara (B) Airfields: in the region of VLADIVOSTOK, in the region of ALEXANDROVSK on SAKHALIN ISLAND and in the region of PETROPAVLOVSK on KAMCHATKA.

Para. Action—Agreed with the understanding that the method of identification of damaged aircraft arriving at Soviet fields would be established by the Commanders in the Field.

26 1559 CONGENAIR (POTSDAM) to CONGEN USASTAF info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, AGWAR FOR CASAIR.
26 1559 CONTAINER (POITSDAM) to COMPEL USASTAR info CINCAPPAC, CINCIN, ADAMAR FOR
OASAR.

Victory 343 BG 400
In connection with planning for program in event of a Japanese capitulation it is planned to implement fully the B-29 program as now scheduled, the units to be deployed as early as practicable. You should prepare for rearrangement of the deployment so as to deploy the 40 B-29 groups in OKINAWA, PHILIPPINES, MARIANAS and for 2 groups in the ALEUTIANS.

26 1951 CNO to COMPEL CEAPRON info COMORPAC, COM 13, COM 17, CINCPIAC BOTH M.

Desire that you expedite lend lease transfer preparation of vessels scheduled for MILEPOST and that you sail them to cold bay as early as practicable maintaining satisfactory standards as regards readiness for transfer. Advise COMINCH and CNO and info addresses of revised estimated date arrival COLD BAY all ships which have not yet departed SEATTLE. Action being taken to advance date of arrival SEATTLE remaining vessels not yet available to you.

26 2020 COMINCH to CINCAPPAC ADVANCE info CINCAPPAC PEARL, CINCIN, COM 13, COMPEL CEAPRON, COMORPAC, COM NAVDET FT RANDALL, COMJASAPRON.

Expedite movement and delivery vessels scheduled for transfer under MILEPOST anticipating arrival and transfer dates as much as practicable. Advise interested areas new arrival dates when known.

27 0019 CINCPOA PEARL to CINCPOA ADVANCE.

It is the opinion of Communication officers here that northern HOKSHU and HOKKAI are included in the directed areas of OUMI SAIFAN stations. The proposed station if placed in ATU would be no closer to the population center of objective area than is OUMI SAIFAN. Interrogation of PWS has so far failed to indicate any general knowledge of operation of propaganda stations of OUMI. PWB has been unable to detect any difference between the OUMI and OSS programs except the pretense of OSS that it comes from a Japanese source. Control of the station could be exercised only by assignment of PWB indoctrinated control officer with freedom of communication with CINCPOA staff. Conclude that station is unessential and recommend that it not be authorized. This refers to your 261225.

27 0250 CINCPOA ADVANCE to COMINCH, CNO, CINCAPPAC.

CINCAPPAC has no technical data in connection with the JAVANA project. However from his general knowledge and based on Pacific Fleet experience with similar projects he is doubtful of the value of the project when measured in terms of the naval support eventually required to place the boats in the desired location. CINCAPPAC requests as complete information as possible on this project and especially as to naval personnel ships or boats that may be required and how it is proposed to move the boats from OKINAWA to destination.

Para. If it is decided to carry out the project it is recommended that CINCAPPAC assign a site on OKINAWA and provide the resources required. CINCAPPAC will provide such material as they Army cannot provide to the extent to which such material is available from naval sources and excess to project of higher priority.

3412
27 0253 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH into CINCPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL H.

In order to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources and in view vastly improved strategic situation it is recommended that the category of defense in the main islands of the Hawaiian Group be reduced to category A and that in view of his continuing responsibilities as area commander CINCPAC be authorized to determine the degree of implementation required with respect to fighter protection, anti-aircraft readiness, mobile combat troops and harbor defenses.

Para. It is also pertinent at this time to consider the necessity for retention of the powers conferred on the Military Commander of the Territory of Hawaii by executive order 9497 of 24 October 1944. Lieut. General Richardson COMINCH considers that they should be retained. Having overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas, I feel that the state of the war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in Military authority by that order is no longer justified and according recommend that it be suspended or revoked.

27 0800 COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMINTACCHINA COMCIN.

CIFEX 1603.

For planning purposes preliminary to impending visit CHINA THEATER party the following is offered for your consideration and comment.

1. The purpose of the PORT BAYARD operation is to open a sea supply route to a temporary base in CHINA, augmenting hump tonnage, to assist in supporting further operations to the maximum extent possible.

2. The PORT BAYARD area has the functions of furnishing a port for unloading and airstrip for distributing car 0. Intelligence information at hand and a study of aerial photo rephpy indicates that these facilities are neither ideal nor immediately available. The airstrip will need refueling. Possibly rebuilding of subgrade, the beaches in the river are wide and benches drying at low tide and ship berths appear desirable to handle the required tonnage, the hydrography is fair from ideal and pilots may be required for river navigation, present indications appear to dictate a limited draft of ships to 19 feet although the list 3 ships are loaded to 22 feet and must cross the bar at high tide. PORT BAYARD as a port, despite difficulties, is most desirable as a step toward later operations.

3. As an alternate operation, or as a preliminary phase of opening PORT BAYARD, NEIRHOF IS. and PRN (10906) unloading facilities considered. This island is now in Chinese hands and the abandoned runstrip appears easy to reconstruct and lengthen. The harbor appears suitable to anchor AK's fully loaded. The sandy beach in the harbor appears usable for all types of landing craft at all tides.

4. Aircover entirely adequate for either operation will be furnished from a field now in our hands at PAPHOI (109-04 21-29). Preliminary plans envisage using 4 P-38 planes giving continuous cover over 100 miles west of the 114 meridian. If convoy arrives at 114 meridian at night fall this should provide daylight cover west of the 114.
5. There is reported a considerable number of enemy troops in INDO CHINA and TO HAINAN ISLAND with minor enemy naval installations. In order to interdict the movement of these troops by water and to protect the port area it is believed that a squadron of PT boats would be extremely valuable.

6. The plan involving use of the island could be put into effect almost immediately, after both PAGHOI and WHICHOW are in our control. Enemy resistance may delay occupation of LUCHOW PENINSULA and it is desirable that time be allowed in the PORT BAYARD OPERATION after occupation to survey the river, install navigational aids and unloading facilities before AES are called up. Our thought is that WHICHOW would be used to accept shipping if LUCHOW is not secured by 20 August and shift thereafter made as soon as possible to PORT BAYARD.

7. For the WHICHOW operation it is assumed that the convoys would proceed south of HAINAN ISLAND. Intelligence sources do not indicate that there are any minesfields in TONKING GULF, however HAINAN STRAIT was once reportedly mined. The mines in this strait are reported to have broken loose and carried into TONKIN GULF. There has been no friendly mining since May 1944 at which time HAIPHONG HARBOR area had about 30 day mines laid by the 14th Air Force.

8. Request your consideration to furnishing a naval command to assist in the operation and to be responsible for the following:
   A. To provide required surface convoy protection and minesweeping.
   B. Assume the responsibility of channel and harbor surveying, installing navigational aids and piloting to anchorage area.
   C. The installation and operation of port protection facilities such as air, anti-aircraft, and minesweeping, including bomb and mine neutralizing.
   D. Furnishing qualified personnel and equipment for functioning of port director in the harbor including maintenance of all landing and other craft.
   E. Provide the necessary command and auxiliary units including housekeeping with 30 days consumables for naval personnel in the area and shipping to move personnel and equipment supplies by the Navy.
   F. Functional components as outlined in our CFB 1007 (Top secret not to all) including 1 Stevedore company and 1 water front engineering company. These units plus pontoon calls for 2 ship berths are considered necessary. Naval engineers requested could install docks and erect the other naval facilities outlined.
   G. CHINA THEATER will assume responsibility for supply of all class 1, 2, and common usage ammunition supplies for naval personnel.
   H. Material and logistical support required for port operations would be responsibility of the naval command.

9. Requested are your comments on the above prior to the departure of CHINA THEATER representatives for conference at your headquarters. This is a planning message only and is not a request or requisition for assignment of naval resources.
27 1111 COMINCH AND CNO to CINC PAC ADVANCE R.

Refer CINCPAC/POA serial 000576 of 20 July para 3. COMINCH approves. Equipment and communication personnel less senior officer of each unit to be assembled aseattle @POA@ report COMINCH temporary duty. Movement designator already assigned and will be promulgated in normal manner. Order of priority movement personnel as follows. Radio Technicians. Interpreters. Aerological technicians. Radiomen. Aerological personal. Target date all personnel and material 25 August. CNO will assemble RUSSIAN speaking liaison teams Washington prior Target Date. Soviets have agreed in principle establishment facilities and are ready to accept material now. Items still undetermined are frequencies and detailed arrangement as to entry U.S. personnel. Unless otherwise advised you will direct CONSERVPAC provide all communication equipment and communication personnel. For info CONSERVPAC all equipment destined for KHABAROVSK has been shipped designated "MOR" for PETROPAVLOVSK "TEAM" for VLADIVOSTOK "A".

27 1000 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINC PAC (MACARTHUR). CINCPAC (HEITZ). USTAIL PAC (SPARY) ADHAR.

Victory 371 80 429
At terminal the Joint Chiefs of Staff put to the RUSSIANs 5 questions which are listed below. With the RUSSIAN answers and the action of the U.S. and RUSSIAN Chiefs of Staff thereon. The agreements are to become effective upon Soviet entry into the war. Preliminary arrangements in regard to the subject matter of the 5 items may be made now.
Para. 1st Question - has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish U.S. weather liaison groups in PETROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK as presented to GENERALISSIMO STALIN by President Truman on 23 July 1945.
Para. 1st Answer - The Soviet Command agrees to establish in PETROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.
Para. As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wise to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations.
Para. In addition to these 2 stations we shall increase the number of local stations in order to give better information on weather.
Para action - Agreed as above except that the radio stations to be established in PETROPAVLOVSK and KHABAROVSK are to be manned by U.S. Personnel.
Para 2nd Question - U.S. Naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the seas of OKhotsk and JAPAN. U.S. Submarine forces will operate without restriction in the seas of OKhotsk and JAPAN, south and east of a line established by connecting bearing and following points: Coast of KOREA at 38-00 North, thence to 40-00 north 135-00 east, thence to 45-45 north 140-00 east, thence along the parallel of 45-45 north. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U.S. Submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of Naval operations?
Para 2nd Answer - separate zones of Naval and Air operations are to be
set up for the U.S. and the USSR in the SEA OF JAPAN. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting CAPE BOLTINA on the coast of KOREA to point 40-00 north 135-00 east to point 45-45 north 140-00 east; thence along the parallel 45-45 north to the line connecting CAPE CRILLON (KONDO) (on the southern tip of southern SAKHALIN) with CAPE SOYA MISSAKI (SOYASAKI) (on the northern tip of HOKKAIDO).

Para. The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line. U.S. Naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.

Para. Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.

Para. U.S. Naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet Naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.

Para. In the SEA OF OKhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Operations in the OKhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.

Para. In the BERING SEA there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from CAPE DEZHENY to DIOMEDES ISLAND and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and the U.S. to parallel 51-30 north and thence through 50-30 and 127-00 east; thence to 49-50 north 156-20 east and thence along the parallel 49-50 north to the 4th KURILE STRAIT.

Para. The remainder of the BERING SEA as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the U.S. Fleet.

Para. Action – Agreed with the understanding that operations by U.S. and Soviet Naval and air forces in the SEA OF OKhotsK and the BERING SEA would be coordinated by mutual understanding and cooperation.

Para. 3rd Question – U.S. Air Forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: CAPE LOPATKA, west to point at 51-10 north 147-00 east, thence to point at 45-45 north, 144-30 east, thence to point at 45-45 north 139-30 east, thence to point at 41-20 north 133-30 east, thence westward to SEISHIN, KOREA, thence north to railroad at KOREAN BORDER thence westward along railroad to YUNCHI and CHANGCHUN, thence along the river to LIYUAN, KAGU and CHINHEI, thence along the railroad through TOLUN, PAOCHANG, WANCHUAN, TATUNG, FENGCHEN, TATUNG to KEISUI, thence northwest to the border of outer MONGOLIA. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. U.S. Air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?

Para. 3rd Answer – The boundary line between operational zones of the U.S. and Soviet Air Forces in KOREA and MANCHURIA shall be as follows: CAPE BOLTINA, CHANGCHUN, LIAOTUAN, KAILU, CHINHEI, PEKING, TATUNG and thence along the southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA.

Para. U.S. aviation will operate south of this line including all the above named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. U.S. air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.

Para. Action – Agreed with the understanding that when necessary for
23 0457 CINCPAC to COMSOUTHPOAC info MARSOS, CINCPAC ADVANCE MD.

CH 28945

Subject: CINCPAC to COMSOUTHPOAC info MARSOS, CINCPAC ADVANCE MD.

Request that you express direct to the Chief of Staff with information on copy here your views regarding Hawaiian Defense matters that were raised in CINCPAC advance dispatch 270253.

25 0740 CINCPAC to COMSOUTHPOAC info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CG ATTNDA, COMSOUTHPOAC ADVANCE MD.

Subject: COMMENDATION

Enclosure (A) my serial 00079 of 13 July. The task of capturing outlying islands in south and southwest of KUKUI for establishment of air warning and fighter direction stations is now assigned to the western attack force and mounting the 40th Infantry Division, in addition to previously assigned tasks. The Southern Attack Force mounting the 19th Infantry Division is assigned the task of landing on and securing northern NUKOA SHIMA if ordered and of reinforcing elements of the 6th Army ashore as directed. In order to avoid confusion with the term "Garrison Rehearsal" which the Army desires used in place of "Garrison Rehearsal", the follow-up force (TF 49) is renamed the reinforcement force. In para 11 the reserve force is erroneously termed the reserve attack force.

28 062 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSOUTHPOAC info CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE MD.

The difficulties in connection with the FORT BAYARD operation carried out in 1944-1945 appear to be greater than were originally envisaged to a degree which prompts me to invite attention to the last sentence of my 112229 June. From the information now presented it appears that the WEHIHOY project will be a preliminary to the FORT BAYARD project and that the total resources involved would be greater than could be spared without undue detriment to CINCPAC. It would probably be infeasible to abandon WEHIHOY until long after FORT BAYARD is occupied. However, I will, of course, be glad to leave more about the project and make a comment upon it before our present conference only because you so request.

Para. Although a technical factor which can be adjusted it should be noted that while FORT BAYARD borders on the Pacific Ocean areas NEIKHOY ISLAND and the TONG KING GULF are in the southwest Pacific area.

28 0649 CINCPAC to MARSOS info CINCPAC ADVANCE, CINCPAC ADVANCE MD.

CH 29969.

I recommend most strongly the abolition within the U.S. coterminous of the Pacific theater of the area boundaries. They have long ceased to serve any useful purpose and now seriously complicate the proper assignment and tactical handling of forces in this single theater of operation. They have long been ignored as diluting anything beyond an economic function of overall authority and represent the complete opposite to the modern unified command system which has now become the operational basis in the theater.

CINCPAC ADVANCE 270253 refer.
Your 112940 not to all. CINCPAC, COMCHUKMAST and COMPHIBSPAC agree on responsibility for loading OLYMPIC forces as follows. COMCHUKMAST has overall responsibility for loading from SHP 120 all navy troops plus those navy and marine troops who will be under 6th Army control at objective. CINCPAC has overall responsibility for loading all navy and marine troops from FOA plus those navy and marine troops from SHP who will be under CINCPAC control at objective. COMPHIBSPAC has responsibility for loading all navy troops from FOA exclusive of KUUKUS and will load as arranged with COMCHUKMAST. COMPHIBSPAC has responsibility for loading all navy troops bothGeneral and air from KUUKUS and will load as arranged with COMCHUKMAST and COMGENECAF. CINCPAC is assuming OLYMPIC operations instructions to terminate COMGENECAF ARNY responsibility and assuming COMPHIBSPAC responsibility as indicated herein. COMPHIBSPAC has responsibility for loading all assault shipping insofar as safe and proper delivery of all assault forces to objective beaches is concerned. Joint planning by CINCPAC and COMGENECAF for loading assault forces progressing very satisfactorily. This agreement has been agreed to by all concerned. Speed letter in amplification follows.

Subject is assembly for OLYMPIC. COMPHIBSPAC 260740. COMCHUKMAST 520645.
CINCPAC 260740. Not to all or needed. CINCPAC has approved the concept of operationally practical, the following plan for assembly except that no prior commitments of ships will be altered to meet assembly dates: A. Major units gunfire and covering forces assemble LEYTE 10 Sept. B. FISCHER LEYTE 10 Sept. C. 3rd Western, and Southern Attack Forces LEYTE 10 Sept. E. 9th Attack Force Mariana, Hagatna and Hawaii 10 Sept. P. Reserve Forces LEYTE and HAWAII 10 Sept.

Para. Ships having prior commitments which will delay them will join their respective forces as soon after assembly dates as practicable.

Para. Upon assembly ship movements will be controlled by respective forces commanders subject to general instructions from higher authority.

Para. Initial logistics indoctrination and training should be stressed in early employment of forces.

Para. It should be understood that PHIBSPAC commanders are responsible for assembly and training of ships.

Northern KHUSUS and KOKAI 40 are within directed zone of GKH SAIKUM station. Proposed station in ALEUTIANS would be no closer to populated center of objective area than is SAIKUM. Your 251730. Anticipate increased communication activity ALEUTIANS and consequent need for present and possibly additional facilities there. For these reasons plus uncertainty as to how BROADAXT/PASTEL could be supported thereby consider establishment GKH/GKH broadcast from ALEUTIANS undesirable.
29 0209 CINCPAC ADVANCE NO.

For CINCPAC ADVANCE NO.

Para. 1. The inclusion of CVL's as a group in tactical cooperation with CV's.

Para. 2. How British Task Groups will be required to operate in October onwards including the scale of effort.

Para. 3. Long term requirements of British Task Groups.

Para. 4. Facilities at ENIWETOK as a result of report from TKA

CINCPAC ADV NO 070445 refers.

Para. 5. Routing policy. My 200619 refers.

Para. 6. Relief for late commander GOERTZ your 220445 refers.

29 0525 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE No.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMMISSION.

Take appropriate action accordance COMINCH AND GNO 27/3111 passed you separately keeping CINCPAC advised. CINCPAC request from GNO such personnel and material required and not presently available for this utilization. GNO hereby requested advice CINCPAC of all action taken to implement.

30 0237 CINCPAC ADVANCE No. to CINCPAC ADVANCE NO.

SHERMAN TO MEMORANDUM ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and very amicible conference with General MacArthur. He accepts to naval features to naval and air crews of force as soon as fighting stops. He insists on this being done as early as possible. He considers it unwise to risk landing marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the Joint Chiefs of Staff message but did not consider it a directive and has asked for one.

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent on operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 Marine Divisions available to Army for JAPAN because it appears impossible for Army to move sufficient divisions rapidly without some marines.

Para. The foregoing considerations will permit reaching an agreement unless unforeseen demands are made. His plans are being made and ours will be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are concerned.

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE NO. to CINCPAC ADVANCE NO.

MEMORANDUM TO SHERMAN ONLY.

Do not consider that landing of marines or seizing airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is to be made as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgment to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para. 2nd Para your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and
ANNEXES TO SHERMAN (Cont’d)

developments which immediately follow with the time of any such landing if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this interpretation is correct then consider otherwise need amplification.

Para. In view prospective requirements for armies elsewhere it appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is essential for early stages of occupation. Some will, therefore, be required initially. You are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available for early and rapid movement into JAPAN, if your discussions there indicate advisability of so doing.

Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent directives giving CINCPAC a free hand until CINCPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces any agreements or understandings you make should carry a proviso for revision of any part that might prove to be inconsistent with any later directive issued by JCS.

31.0000 COMMISSION TO CINCPAC ADVANCE INTO MARCOS, CONTINUE CINCPAC, CONTINUE, CONTINUE, CONTINUE, CONTINUE.

CPEX 2231

Difficulties in connection with operations against LUSON PENINSULA is subject your 26/1/22 Guam refers. Difficulties of OAHY BAYARD operation are no more serious than initially envisaged. Our CPEX 1996 was for planning purposes and information only. The operation will be undertaken with resources available or being made available to this theater. This headquarters is fully in sympathy with presently projected strategy and will not expect equipment or resources which would in any way jeopardize OLYMPIC.

Para. WOHKAN ISLAND is an alternate operation. It will only be undertaken if Japs prove unexpectedly stubborn in BAYARD AREA and it becomes apparent that as a result there will be a protracted delay in securing that port. This headquarters sincerely appreciates your interest in theaters operations.

30 2029 COMMISSION AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE NO.

Project as outlined in your 120/446 has been approved by SCA initiated. CNO will provide all material and personnel required for the establishment of the SHERMAN facilities. Additions to and revisions of this project brought about by CINCPAC/FOA serial 089/62 of 20 July and my 27/211 have not yet been submitted to SCA and are to be considered separately. Advice COMSHERMAN to take no further action.

31.0000 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSHENRPAC into CINCPAC FRAIL NO.

Comply with directive to COMSHERMAN in last sentence COMMISSION 30/2029 passed you separately. See CINCPAC 120/446 passed you.
CI 1200 CI 1200

CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE into CONUS, FRP ADVANCE, CONUS FRP.

CI 23046.

Not specifically included in Marine Air Units available operational control CINCPAC (reference memorandum for record CINCPAC 23-32 July) is headquarters 2 Marine Air Wing which normally control as an integrated force all NUCAS Marine Air Defense units. Without above Headquarters these units would operate directly under headquarters 7th Air Force ONEMBA. Your intentions regarding operational control headquarters 2nd Marine Air Wing requested. Pending instructions COMAV 7 exercises operational control Marine Air Defense units through 2nd Marine Air Wing Headquarters.

CI 1310 COMAIR and CONUS to CINCPAC ADVANCE MG.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed in principle that that part of the southwest pacific area lying south of the boundary described below shall pass from U.S. to British Command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreements of the Australia, New Zealand and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected. "Beginning on the coast of LIDO CHINA at 16 degrees north; thence to intersect at 07-40 north latitude 116-00 east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05-00 north longitude 127-00 east; thence east to 09-00 north 130-00 east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140-00 east; thence generally southeast to 02-20 south 146-00 east; thence east to 02-20 south 159-00 east; thence south". What are your views concerning the disposition of EMIRAU which lies north of this British area of responsibility.

CI 0311 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE NO into CONUS, FRP, NAUCAS, CONUS.

CI 30845.

Agreements for coordination of air operations, signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay, dated 1 August 1945, approved with following change in sub paragraphs 1 A and B, I May minus 7 should be I May minus 8. Copies for local distribution will be changed.

CI 0547 COMUSUL to COMUSUL 7THFLEET, COMUSNAUCK, COMUS, CONUS, CONUS.

Effective 15 August 1945 COMUSUL 7THFLEET will direct Commander Submarines ADVANCE Base; A. Navy 3002. And Navy reconnaissance Corp. Navy 3002. To report to COMUSNAUCK for matters pertaining to submarine maintenance and construction. The operational and administrative control will remain with Commander Submarines 7th Fleet. The intent of this directive is to establish a command relationship between COMUSNAUCK and COMUSUL 7THFLEET analogous to that outlined in general order number 21.
02 0710 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENPAC. CINCPAC, COMGENPAC info CINCPAC.

CINCPAC Pearl Harbor.

Para. 1. Former ICBMRC reserve now redesignated Marianas OLYMPIC reserve. Action addresses will reconstitute this reserve by 15 October with same items and quantities as originally prescribed for ICBMRC and will maintain same at prescribed levels until ordered discontinued by CINCPAC. Effective 15 October and weekly thereafter action addresses will notify CINCPAC info COMHISTRCS of any existing deficiencies and estimated date of replenishment. Negative reports are desired.

Para. 2. COMPHIBPAC or COMGEN 6TH ARMY will forward all requests for supplies from the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve direct to COMHISTRCS for release. COMHISTRCS will coordinate shipments. Action names or their designated representatives will make available for shipment these supplies requested which are in the Marianas OLYMPIC reserve.

Para. 3. Emergency supplies for the EYARIUS or other areas will be filled from regular stocks of normal supply agencies. Marianas OLYMPIC reserve shall not be considered a source of such emergency supplies unless replenishment of the reserve can be effected by 15 October. COMGEN FOA 200425 not to or needed by all refers.

02 10 36 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CENTAF. CTT 94. CTT 94. Info CTT 94, COMCATSPE.

A special operation will be conducted by the 509th Bomb Group on 4 or 5 August at a time to be announced later. No ship or aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will come within 50 miles of NAGASAKI, HIROSHIMA, or KINOMATI from 4 hours before to 6 hours after the announced time. Acknowledge.

02 1429 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMUNGH.

CINCPAC 290284 and 290209. Am I correct in assuming that all combat units of British Pacific Fleet will be at my disposal during OLYMPIC including preparatory phases. If so assume you will have no objections to proposals of reference. In view early arrival CINCPAC will gladly for discussions various matters request reply your earliest convenience.

31 1336 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMGENPAC info CINCPAC Pearl Harbor.

In accordance with para 3 of recommendations made by representatives of CINCAPAC, COMGEN20THAF and CINCPAC at the inter-theater mapping conference held at Pearl 25-29 May which has subsequently been approved by all commanders of theatres involved and the JCS it is requested that operational direction of the 64th and 30th Engineer Topographic Battalions and attached units be returned to CINCPAC on or about 31 July. Outstanding requisitions from AFPA will be completed on the terms of present arrangements.
31 0756 CONSERVTFLT to CONSERVTFLT, COMAIRVTFLT into CNS, CONTROL, CINCVPAC/IMA, both Hq, CINCVPAC, CINCVPAC, CINCVPAC, ALL IT AND TN COBS PUKA SO TMT.

Effective 15 August 1945 there is hereby established under Commander 7th Fleet the command U.S. Naval forces AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA, CTF 79, which will include all U.S. Naval Bases and shore facilities and Naval Air and Seaplane bases in SWPA outside the Philippines except MANUS. The name of the Commander U.S. Navy for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA, CTF 79, and the location of his headquarters will be announced.

Para. CONSERVTFLT and COMAIRVTFLT respectively will direct the commanders of all U.S. Naval Shore, air and seaplane facilities within the Area delineated to report to Com U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA for operational and administrative control. Units decommissioned but not yet moved forward are to be included.

Para. Com U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA will be responsible for:
A. Logistic support as practicable for Pac Fleet and allied Naval Forces, units in his area.
B. Expenditious roll up and staging of U.S. Naval personnel and equipment scheduled for forward movement.
C. Orderly transfer of excess material and facilities of equipment duly authorized to be taken over by other allied services.

Para. CONSERVT as CONSERV 7 will continue to provide logistic support for U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA and to schedule and provide shipping for roll up. New Subject. CONSERVTFLT, CONSERV 7, will continue to provide logistic support for U.S. Nav for AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA and to schedule and provide shipping for roll up. New Subject. CONSERVFLT, CONSERV 7, will retain responsibility for operation. Administration and defense of MANUS pending further decision on Para D of CINCVPAC 30751 not to or needed by all.

31 1349 CONGENAIR to CINCVPAC ADVANCE, DPERCOM 20TH AF info CHQ SWPA.

WARX 41360.

In connection with terminal VICTORY 343 of 26 July, the following information received from ALASKA DEPARTMENT is submitted for your information:
A. Permanent port operation at AMCHITKA practicable and adequate. B. Capacity averaged AMCHITKA 1,510,000 gallons existing. C. Capacity hardstands total 190 very heavy bomber AMCHITKA, length of longest runway 10,000 feet, 2 additional runways 5,000 feet each. D. Available for very heavy bomber deployment is tenthousing. Some prefabricated tent frames and necessary tentage are available. Material for mobilization type construction is available in theatre but additional labor will be required.

Para. In event it becomes necessary to deploy a very heavy bomber force in North Pacific Area, it is believed that AMCHITKA is the most suitable location. COMGEN ALASKAN DEPARTMENT is being advised of the contemplated strength and composition of force for planning purposes.

31 1351 CINCVPAC ADVANCE to COMGEN NAVFAC info MARCORPS, CINCVPAC, JAPAN.

Urbis 280119 to not to all or needed. Target date for the next major operation for which the 3rd Phib Corps is scheduled is 1 March and readiness date for this operation may be set by FNP PAC accordingly however due to the general situation in which you are familiar and in order to take advantage of a surrender or collapse of the Japanese Empire FNP units should be prepared for occupation duty which might well include active combat with readiness dates as follows:
(1) 5th PHIBCORPS units ready now. (2) 4th WarDiv reinforced ready by 1 Oct. (3) 3d PHIBCORPS units (less 4th WarDiv) by 1 October.
TOP SECRET
JULY - AUGUST (GCT)

30 1523 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH and CNO ADMN info COMUSPAC.

Your 201819. Am reducing U.S. Submarines 7th Fleet to 2 squadrons totalling 24 submarines. Plan further reduction to 1 squadron after British Command area is formed provided enemy cruisers SINGAPORE are immobilized at that time. Estimate life guard requirements only after 1 September 1945.

30 2320 RICHARDSON to WARGOS info CINCPAC - AFMDPAC PASSS to CINCPAC BOTH HD.

BJ 67045.

Here reference is made to CINCPAC radio CX 28945 dated 26 July 1945 to COMINCH and CINCPAC, CNO, WARGOS and CNO ADMN info advance. The subject matter under discussion is indicated in CINCPAC dispatch 2702532 (OCT) July 1945 to COMINCH. At this point it is especially desirable to invite attention to the fact that CINCPAC dispatch referred to abovement and relates 2 distinct subjects which actually are unrelated, namely: (1) the category of defense for the Hawaiian Group, which is prescribed by the JCS; and (2) executive order No. 9689 of the 24th of October 1944, prescribing by the President directing the secretary of War to appoint the Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas Military commander for the territory of HAWAII. Para. I will express my views on these 2 subjects in 2 parts in the order listed.

Para. Part 1. Category of defense period under present directives of the JCS HAWAII is under category of defense "B" modified, which provides for fighter protection, consisting of a Group of day fighters of 3 sqs and 2 night fighter flights; 5 battalions of gun (anti-aircraft); 5 battalions of anti-aircraft artillery automatic weapons; 1 battalion and 1/2 of searchlights; complete early warning radar coverage and integrated air warning service. These defenses in general are located around the critical areas of PEARL HARBOR, HONOLULU, and principal air fields. They have been determined by the best local military opinion to be the minimum necessary to provide adequately against the eventuality of a suicide attack by the Japanese. Compared with the overwhelming resources in aircraft and anti-aircraft at the disposal of the American Army, these defensive forces are small indeed and they represent the minimum insurance that the United States Army charged with the grave responsibility of defending HAWAII should provide to protect the vital installations of HONOLULU and especially PEARL HARBOR. To reduce them in order, as CINCPAC recommends "to facilitate economy in use of personnel and resources, etc" is unjustifiable just so long as there is any possibility of a sneak raid and it is particularly unwarranted in view of our ample resources in aircraft and antiaircraft. Any economy of personnel or resources so affected would be extremely small compared with the over all strength of the Army. The reduction could only be justified if the Army was in dire need of units of the character employed in the defense, which of course is not the case.

Para. It is true that the strategic position of the U.S. forces in the Pacific is much more favorable at this time than at any time since the War began and that the likelihood of the Japanese attacking HAWAII is remote. To date, however, I have received no official communication from CINCPAC-CINCPAC notifying me of the complete destruction of the aircraft carriers and aircraft carrier escort of the Japanese Navy, which constitute the main potential threat to any attack on these islands, either by aircraft of a single carrier or of a group of carriers, and I therefore can not assume the impossibility of a sneak suicide raid. Furthermore, it is

- continued -
pertinent to observe that the American people have invested in this war billions of dollars, several of which are represented by extensive vital installations in HAWAI'I, notably PEARL HARBOR, and the people would be in no mood to condone a failure to provide adequate defenses should a Japanese suicide attack occur, especially in view of the prodigality of troops and resources provided by congress.

Para. I can not give my consent to the reduction proposed by CINCPAC BOTH for reasons of prudence and caution, and because the issue would be on the U.S. Army and on the local Commanding General should the risk be accepted of having inadequate defense forces in the event of an air suicide attack by the Japanese.

Para. Therefore, I recommend that there be no change in the present category of defense of the Hawaiian Group, namely category "B" as now modified. Paragraph

Para. Part 2. Presidential executive order number 9489, 26 October 1944. The recommendation by CINCPAC in his radio 27023(‡) (GCT) that the said order be suspended or revoked is based on the following grounds: (A) that its provisions affect his overall responsibility for the security and safety of the territory of Hawaii as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean areas; and (B) that the state of war is now such that continuation of the powers vested in military authority by that order is no longer justified. These contentions will be answered seriatim.

Para. (A) CINCPAC's authority and responsibilities as theater commander stem from directives of the JCS and therefore his responsibilities must be interpreted in the light of these directives. There is an apparent misunderstanding on CINCPAC's part that his directives in some way impose upon him responsibilities connected with the executive order. I know of no directive from the JCS or from any other authority that relates my responsibilities under the executive order to CINCPAC's responsibilities as charged to him by extant Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives.

Para. Executive order 9489 replaced certain security measures that were exercised by me as military Governor under martial law and which were felt to be necessary for the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. At this point it should be emphasized that Presidential Executive Order is not concerned with military operations against the enemy but deals with the control of civilians in U.S. Territory. It places in the hands of the military Commander means whereby he may secure these islands against espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage that might be practiced by civilians in our own territory. The authority for the exercise of these powers stems from the President to the Secretary of War, who was directed by the President to delegate this authority to me, the commanding General Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Area and to appoint me military Commander of HAWAI'I. This authority does not stem from the JCS and therefore must legally be interpreted as a separate authority because where I challenge in the courts by a citizen or alien, any act of mine committed under this authority I could not plead as a defense that I acted under the authority of CINCPAC-CINCPAC exercising unity of command under Joint Chiefs of Staff directives. As an illustration of the misunderstanding referred to supra, CINCPAC-CINCPAC invoked this executive order as a reason for not releasing my headquarters to the control of CINCPAC in the implementation of JCS directive 1259/4 of April. In his dispatch 260239 GCT April 1945 he states "pursuant to the terms of executive order 9489."

- continued -
issued by the President, COMGENPOA is designated as the Military Commander for the Territory of HAWAII and has responsibilities, powers, and authority which make it necessary that in this capacity COMGENPOA continue in his present relationship with CINCPAC in view of CINCPAC responsibilities with respect to the Hawaiian Area" but for reasons stated above I am unable to recognize that CINCPAC legally has jurisdiction over me under this order. Therefore, CINCPAC's contention that the provisions of the Executive Order affect his overall responsibility for the security and safety of the Territory of HAWAII as well as other parts of the Pacific Ocean Areas is untenable insofar as it applies to the executive order.

Para. Turning now to CINCPAC's 2nd contention, that the state of war is now such that the continuation of the powers vested in military authority by the Executive order is no longer justified, and his further statement that "Lieutenant General Richardson, COMGENPOA, considers that they should be retained" my comments are as follows:

Para. It is true that the present writing I consider that the powers of that order should be retained, although CINCPAC has never invited my recommendations or discussed the subject with me. The reasons for the retention of the executive order are obvious from a study of the security orders issued under its authority.

Para. At the present time there are 6 essential security orders in existence covering the following subjects: They are necessary because of the large alien population in HAWAII.

Para. 1. Conduct of enemy aliens and prohibition against their possessing firearms, short-wave radio, etc;

Para. 2. Instructions to civilians covering vehicular traffic, vacating of congested areas and use of lights in the event of air raids, air raid alarms, etc;

Para. 3. Designation of restricted areas requiring identification passes for entry such as harbor areas and certain vital installations and the handling of explosives in these areas;

Para. 4. Travel control of civilians necessitated by the limited amount of joint shipping in Pacific Ocean Areas; priorities are established for necessary surface and air civilian travel;

Para. 5. Mail and cable and radio censorship and control of short wave radio.

Para. 6. The cargo and passenger control which coordinates commercial use of harbors and harbor equipment with the needs of the military.

Para. In addition, executive order 9498 is the only authority for the evacuation of American citizens deemed dangerous to the U.S. Since the effective date of the order, 21 October 1944, 6 citizens of Japanese ancestry have been evacuated from the territory to TULE LAKE segregation center CALIFORNIA. In testimony before a hearing board these persons openly confessed their loyalty to JAPAN expressing a desire that JAPAN win the war. Some of them refused when drafted to serve in the Army of the U.S. Therefore, it is believed, still other Japanese of TYPICAL HUMANITY in the community.

Para. Minimum use is being made of the authority contained in the said executive order and the security orders which I have issued pursuant to it are reviewed periodically with the view to rescinding any regulation not necessary to the internal security of the Hawaiian Islands. For example, a month ago I dispensed with the Curfew and presently study is being given to relaxing civilian censorship.

- continued -
30 2320 RICHARDSON to MARCOS info CINCPAC—ADVANCE/ PASSES to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Para. My policy has been and will continue to be the resumption of all restrictive security orders just as soon as the need for them disappears.

Para. In view of the above it is recommended that the executive order be kept in effect and, to summarize, that the status of both the category of defense and of the executive order remain for the present undisturbed.

03 0211 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

Relaxation of air attacks on FORMOSAN airfields and installations gives the enemy opportunity for rehabilitation and restoration of his air strength and supplies threat. There is some evidence that this is now being accomplished. Request you continue neutralization of FORMOSA in order to protect our communication lines to the PHILIPPINES, to safeguard our forces and installations on OKINAWA from air attack by FORMOSA based planes and in order to deny the enemy the use of gasoline and other supplies remaining in FORMOSA.

03 0429 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ, COM USASTAF CHAIN

TOP SECRET. CX 20410

To make the phraseology identical in each subparagraph of paragraph 1 B Staff Conference 1 August signed by Sherman-Chamberlain-Lindsay suggest paragraph 3 in parenthesis read "The 5th Fleet will assume primary responsibility for air defense in the objective area but will take such action etc". Request concurrence.

02 1745 MARCOS to CINCPAC - COMUNCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE Hq.

WIR 42740.

Navy has raised the point of the necessity for the early installation of shore based radar for early warning and fighter direction purposes during OLYMPIC. They emphasize the extreme importance of early establishment of land based air warning and fighter direction facilities in order to minimize losses in an operation where frequent and sustained suicide attacks by the enemy may be expected. The foregoing points were raised in connection with a discussion between war and navy department staff officers and are furnished for your information.

03 0154 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC info COMGENUSASTAF, COMGENPAC, MARCOS, COMUNCH.

Reference agreements for coordination of air operations dated 1 August 1945, signed by Sherman, Chamberlain and Lindsay approved after changing Xray minus 7 to Xray minus 8 in subparagraphs 1A and 1B. Copies in local distribution will be changed.

04 0024 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC info COMGEN USASTAF.

It appears to CINCPAC that the change proposed in your 030429 would effect a considerable change in the responsibilities of FEAF and 5th Fleet within the objective area. As it now stands subpara 1(8)(3) states the employment of 5th Fleet aircraft but recognised the planned volume and
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GT)

04 0024  CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to  CINCPAC info  COMGEN USASTAF.

Weight of FEAF air effort within the objective area as worked out between
FEAF and COMHIBPAC. As proposed the change would release FEAF from
responsibilities within the objective area which it should share in order
to give the troops and ships the maximum cover and support. Accordingly
request text stand as now drafted.

04 0109  CINCPAC to  NARCOG info  C3/THAW,  COMGEN/USASTAF,  COMHIBPAC,  CINCPAC
ADV.

CX 30632.

Refers to your # 42740 not to all WLKOPING of navy emphasis of
importance for early installation of shore based radar for early warning
and fighter direction purposes in OLYMPIC. Plans include establishments
for such purposes on 6 outlying islands to south and southwest of
objective area on XRay minus 3. With no satisfactory outlying Ground
Locations to the east and southeast coverage in that direction will be
provided by naval ships radar screen until ground installations are es-
tablished at corps beachheads on XRay plus 2. CINCPAC has been requested
to comment on the above by our 280503 of July not to NARCOG.

04 0353  COMGEN/USASTAF to CINCPAC,  CINCPAC ADVANCE info  COMGEN/THAW,  COMGEN/USASTAF.

1253.

Approve air coordination agreement of 1 August 45 signed by Sherman,
Chamberlain and Lindsay together with changes proposed by CINCPAC and
CINCPAC in their dispatches; CINCPAC 030154, CINCPAC 030429 (OCT).
Local copies will be changed.

04 0747  CINCPAC ADVANCE to  COMRD/FLSST info  CINCPAC- COMINCH.

Your 040351. In view CINCPAC 040403 desire you concentrate your
next effort against enemy air forces in north HONSUI and HOKKAIDO
instead of TOKYO area. All available intelligence data will be furnished
in separate despatch.

04 0841  CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

Request that agreements made for OLYMPIC apply also the CORONET
concerning long lines as well as internal wire installations at naval
establishments.

04 1011  COMRD/FLSST to  CINCPAC ADVANCE H. Info  CTF 38,  CTF 37.

Your 040747 wico. Planning strike 8 August. (reference strike
against enemy air forces in north HONSUI and HOKKAIDO instead TOKYO AREA).
04 1451 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE 124 into CONGENUSASTAF.

CX 30858

Reference your 040024Z, in the agreements of 16 May 1945 we agreed that all air forces in the objective area during the amphibious phase would operate under your control. Responsibility for the air missions in that area necessarily goes with control. The agreement also contemplated that FJNAF would be employed. The objective area and arrangements therefor are now being coordinated in the detailed planning conference in progress. CX 30410 was not intended to imply a withdrawal or lessening of FJNAF air effort in the objective area or to release FJNAF from responsibilities within the objective area which it is expected to share in heavy volume, but to obtain assurance that the 5th Fleet would be primarily responsible for the mission of air defense or CAG in that area as FJNAF and the 3rd FLEET are in other defined areas. Request that my suggestion in CX 30410 be reconsidered.

04 1943 CONGENAIR to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC.

WARX 44043.

Here is further technical data and information requested on JAVANIAN PROJECT in your 270250. JAVANIAN PROJECT involves the employment of 80-5 foot rescue boats each carrying 50000 pounds of explosives. These boats are carefully disguised as Jap luggers and sea trucks and are remotely controlled by radio, radar and television from aircraft having a control range of 55 to 80 miles. The cruising range of loaded boat is 800 to 1200 miles. For this operation 6 disguised ARB boats will be employed; 4 will be loaded missiles and 2 will be escorts and will proceed from BUNKHOUSE to destination under own power. Skeleton crew leave missiles between 10 and 20 miles from target and will return to BUNKHOUSE by 2 escorting ARB boats. 4 Millile ARB boats are then directed to target by radio control and television from B-17 control planes. When disguised Millile enter magnetic field of tunnel, K.A.D. equipment on boat by telemetering records on television screens in B-17 and operator by remote detonation SCUTTLES boat over target. No personnel required from CINCPAC. All personnel, for project already on detached service to CINCPAC. Present plans, because of disguise factor of this 24 HR JNPD EFFORTION, do not contemplate use of naval escort ship or naval escort aircraft. 2 disguised ARB boats will serve as surface escorts and plans call for FJNAF to provide air cover for control planes and ARB Missiles. State of development of this equipment and technique has, as result of many tests against simulated targets, been determined to be completely operational and practical.

05 0100 CINCPAC ADVANCE HS to COM M/support.

Inaugurate appropriate air search and provide naval surface unit for possible interception enemy MARCUS bound units in connection CINCPAC PEARL 041956.
04 2320 CINC PAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to CINCPAC INFO COMUSASTAF.

After thorough consideration of your 041451 OCT and all the associated questions believe that the phraseology of the agreement of 1 August 1945 is preferable to the change proposed by your CX 30410. If the language were to be changed it would be necessary to reword the paragraph considerably to bring out the fact that FEA is also USSASTAF must share in the responsibility for providing in the objective area the full weight of armed forces required for air defense and for support of the troops and ships therein. I believe it better to let the draft stand as let approved by your 020311 and my 030154 and let the details within objective area be developed in the further planning between FEA, PHIBSPAC and USSASTAF.

05 0751 CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMCIFLJET INFO CINCPAC, COMGEN USASTAF, COMGENUS.

Your 042125. Consider it unnecessary to make special request on FEA and USSASTAF in view nature their routine operations at this time. Their strikes are made as often as practicable and cover wide areas FEA, USSASTAF and TF 38 operations are all mutually supporting as normal planned.

05 0754 CINC PAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC, COMTHIFLut, COMHIBSPAC.

CINCPAC has requested that the USS TACLOBAN (EX-TULSA) be made available primarily to copy navy communications of interest to CINCPAC and transmit same to CINCPAC headquarters on shore in objective area. TACLOBAN is hereby made available for this duty and during the OLYMPIC operation will be assigned to COMCIFLJET for operational control. Since TACLOBAN has previously performed same duty for CINCPAC no additional installations will be made.

05 0755 CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMATPAC INFO COMTHIFLut, COMCIFLJET, CAPAC, COMOP OSAKA, COM NAES OKINAWA.

Replacement carrier aircraft must be available at OKINAWA during OLYMPIC to meet needs of the fleet. Existing directives which require the buildup to 500 pool aircraft as rapidly after 1 November as is feasible are confirmed.

05 0845 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV INFO MARCO, COMGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL, APHUPAC.

USASTAF, COMGEN FEAF, DONOVAN DSCF.

CX 30960.

Para. 1. Reference my CX 28307 CINCPAC ADVANCE 270250 OCT and COMINCH 281625 OCT. Proposed to destroy KAMON TUNNEL in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

4 air rescue boats of 85 foot length disguised as enemy craft and loaded with 25 tons high explosive each are mailed into west entrance of STRAITS. Boats are fitted with remote control, radar and television devices and full destructive elements and are controlled from aircraft at a maximum range of 100 miles. Boats are directed to target located by magnetic indicator and scuttled. Main charges are detonated by time delay and counter mining.

Para. 2. All necessary operational equipment and personnel has been assigned FEA. FEA will recover personnel after boats are abandoned by their crews. A heavy bombing attack in the area will cover the operation.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

05 0845 CINCAPPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO WARCOS, CONGENAIR, CINCPAC PEARL, AFQID/AC
USASTAF, CONGENFEAF, DONOVAN OSSF. (Cont'd)

No navy personnel, ships or aircraft will be required.

Para. Part 3. Reference COMINCH 221915 OCT project will be expedited
and shipping conserved if you can furnish for not to exceed 3 months
effective 1 September the following functional components less personnel:
1 A-3, 1 C-8, 1 H-11, 1 D-10, 2 N-13, 1 N-12A, 1 C-8. It is desired to
establish the project and above facilities in a navy base area if possible.

Para. Part 4. Request your concurrence in the operation and indication
of extent above logistics support you can furnish. Separate radio follows
with code name for operation.

06 0719 CINCAPPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE H2.

C 31175a.

Action being taken. Reference your 030211 requesting continuation
of neutralization of FORMOSA.

06 0819 CINCPAC ADVANCE H2 to COMINCH AND CNO.

Your 011310. EMTRAU ISLAND is now in use as a base for Marine Air
Group 61. However it was agreed at MANILA conference 30 July - 1 August
that all units of 1st Har Air Wing will be concentrated in southern
PHILIPPINES as soon as possible. After this is done recommend EMTRAU be
released to British as it will not be needed in the near future by our
operating units and may be of use to British in connection with their
mopping up of RADAUL and KAVIENG. Further recommend retention "Right
to Use" if needed at a later time.

04 0403 CINCAPPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE H, INFO CG FEAF, COM3RDFLY.

CX 30653.

Strong indications that Japs intend an airborne operation against
OKINAWA area after 9 August. Troop Carriers are being concentrated in
northeast HONSHU and HOKKAIDO, both beyond operating radius of FEAF at
OKINAWA. Suggest if practicable that 3rd Fleet during present operations
in EMPIRE waters strike the concentrations in northeast HONSHU and
HOKKAIDO.

07 0331 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH & CNO INFO CONNORPAC, CONCHUPAC, CONSEVTPAC,
CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 061648 recommend CONCORD and RICHMOND remain on present duty
until ice closes traffic into AMUR RIVER about 1 October then proceed
CANAL ZONE.

AUGUST (GCT)
TOP SECRET

07 0330 CINCPAC ADV to COMCHINCHINA CHINCHING info COMPTACTCT, CHINCHING,
COMCHNACT KUNLING, COMCHINCT CHINCHING, COMCHINCT KUNLING, CINCPAC

FORM 5.

Para. 1. Formal presentation of JIMEDAK made at 1000, 6 August.
CINCPAC and key staff attended. Afternoon devoted to discussion of
availability of personnel and supplies. Everyone must cooperate and
intention solving all difficulties.

Para. 2. Admiral Sherman feels that JCS must issue a directive to
establish responsibilities among 3 theaters if operation is to be carried
out on time. He feels CHINA should handle land matters and "KHAN" or "LANTIL"
handle the naval responsibilities.

Para. 3. Lincoln says that War Department is also interested in cutting
red tape with this operation and that S & P produced a draft direc-
tive. No action has been taken due to absence of key people at NUTSDAN.

Para. 4. All timing is based on securing target area by 15 August.
7th Fleet questions whether channel will be secured from ground attack
(coastal or field batteries) in time to set up the initial convoys about
20 August. Conference working on assumption that convoys can safely pass
into channel on or about 20 August.

Para. 5. Tentative ETD KHAN night of 7 August.

07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCHINCHINA, CINCPAC, COMCHINCHINA info COMTHFLEET,
CONSERVAC, CINCPAC Pearl Hts, COMTHFLEET, COMCHINCHINA, CHINCHING, VARIOUS.

The representatives of COMCHINCHINA now at KHAN inform me that it is
confidently expected that the Chinese forces will occupy FORT BAYARD on 15
August. Although numerous exploratory dispatches have been exchanged de-
finitive action does not appear to have been taken to ensure the operation
of the port and the unloading of the supplies available. In my opinion the
advantages to be gained by such action and the obvious disadvantages of
failing to deliver effectively even token supplies to the Chinese when they
first take useful seaport are controlling and justify the minor diversion
of naval resources involved.

Para. 2. In view of the short time remaining earliest concurrence in
the following is requested.

Para. 3. A. Com7thFlt load in 7 l.t. The following naval advance base
personnel and material, prepare them for shipment to FORT BAYARD as soon
as possible and advise readiness date. Listed by component designation
-number of personnel - measurement tons. A3-43-200, B1-27-100, B28-29-210,
B3-18-200, B4-10-500, B5A-6-50, B5B-38-28, B17-21-102, B10-0-100, B3-10-40,
C8-8-23, C9-9-34, 11A6-0-153, D10-26-335, D25-4-9, E9-18-225, F7-98-431,
J2-6-27. One quarter F1-300-1500, one quarter F2-300-2500, 19-0-1500,
P12X-1-30, P12C-1-30, P11L-50-940. Total 985 personnel 9787 measurement
tons.

B. Rear Admiral A. Buckmaster proceed via air and break flag in
SPENCER(CCG) or INGHAM (CCG) as commander South China Naval Force (TF 93)
which will consist of 1 COC-4 (P1-144), 1 F(4-50)-2 (LCS-1) designated by Com-
7thFlt plus 2 CVE-16 (DDE-572)-LACG-1A designated by CINCPAC. TF 93 pre-
pare the forces assigned for movement to FORT BAYARD when and as requested.
07 0553 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBINC, CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA into CONUSPLAC, CINCPAC PEARL H., COMGENFEAF, COMCINCPAC, BAYARD.

by COMGENCHINA and develop naval base facilities at PORT BAYARD. The Escort Carriers with 2 destroyer escorts will be released to CINCPAC after arrival of the 1st AX convoy at PORT BAYARD.

6. On arrival in PORT BAYARD CTF 93 and forces under his command will cover and support the forces of the CHINA THEATER.

D. CINCPAC replace as promptly as possible such naval advance base components supplied by the 7th Fleet as need to be replaced.

E. LoTs to be used only for the initial lift. Other naval craft to be released as required by CINCPAC if necessary to avoid interference with OLYMPIC.

07 0717 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COMGENCHINA, CHUNGKING.

GENERAL CARRAY SENDS:

CINCPAC is sending despatch today to CNO, CINCPAC, COMGENCHINA concerning JESSEAR operation. Components listed therein cover naval requirements for operation of port. In addition it establishes small naval surface force to provide protection for port and convoys thereto. This message is FERN 6.

Para. 2. In opinion of CHINA party proposal if approved furnishes minimum requirements for operation in time to meet target dates.

Para. 3. Recommend that CHINA THEATER make request that War Department take necessary action in conjunction with Navy Department to obtain approval and implementation of CINCPAC's proposed action.

Para. 4. Admiral Sherman and CINCPAC's staff state that the diversions of components and ships to JESSEAR will not interfere with MACARTHUR's logistic support of OKINAWA forces. They further state that personnel and shipping which are necessary to OLYMPIC committed to support of CHINA may be withdrawn for period of that operation, to be replaced or returned CHINA after.

Para. 5. Admiral Sherman indicates naval units operating port installations being placed under Flag Officer because that furnishes most convenient means of administration and control. He indicates that CINCPAC may consider dividing forces into 2 parts, placing port installations under CHINA at later date. It appears that CHINA Theater should insist on operational control now of naval shore installations at port with administrative control remaining under Admiral Buckmaster since these installations will be supporting CHINA and not be for support of naval forces.

07 0824 CINCPAC ADVANCE H. to COMSOUTHCOM, CINCPAC PEARL H., CNO, COMGENCHINA.

Refer to your 262225 of July. Due to importance of subject operation consider floating storage too great risk. Request contained your 262225 floating storage OLYMPIC is disapproved.

07 0833 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMCHIN, CNO.

Reference your 251431 July and 050845 Aug. Feasibility and design of JUVANAN are believed to be matters for determination by CINCPAC and COMGENFEAF. Navy can furnish from resources available to COMCHIN OKINAWA such assistance and materials in E-11 component as are peculiar to PT boats plus 1 LCM. Suggest that all other materials referred to in COMCHIN 221915 be supplies from stocks available to COMGENFEAF.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (CCT)
08 0500 COMMFL to CINCPIAC, MARCOS Info CINCAC ADVANCE H., COMPIRC.
3010.
Concurrence with plan outlined by Advance Headquarters CINCAC in Top-Secret GUAM 070553 of 7 August is expressed by Commanding General China Theater.

Para. To CINCPIAC. Request your concurrence in proposed arrangement.

Para. To MARCOS. Request action in conjunction with Navy Department to obtain JCS approval and urgent implementation of action proposed by CINCAC to make timely provision for operation of port at JEBADAR and a small naval surface force to protect port and convoys proceeding thereto. Request that directive be issued including provision for continuation of cooperative action essential to continued use of JEBADAR port until sub-union becomes available, all without detriment to OLYMPIC, and that command arrangement include operational control by Commanding General CHINA THEATER over shore installations, since these will be serving this theater.

Para. Every effort being made to ensure occupation of FORT BAYARD by 15 August and security of area including local approaches by 20 August.

08 0522 CINCPIAC ADVANCE H., to COMPIRC.

Your 080309 approved. Assume you will take maximum advantage of any improvement in weather to expand coverage over assigned area. With emphasis on destruction of JAPANESE forces. Interested commands will be advised.

08 1540 CINCPIAC ADVANCE H., to CINCPIAC info CINCAC, BLDG. 1, AREA MJC (A, M), CHIEF SUB AREA PETROLEUM OFFICER, ASL/JM KATANA.

Concur proposed amendments your top secret 080939.

07 1505 ALUSMA MClSCO to COMINCH AND CINC - COMINCH PASS TO CINCPIAC ADVANCE HG.

Vice Admiral Gavrilov head of Red Navy Communications today presented Navy's desire for communication set up for use of their operational liaison groups 4th question Victory 351 refers. They desire 2 circuits between VLADIVOSTOK and WASHINGTON 1 being the circuit VLADIVOSTOK FOOTCUT WASHINGTON as now established. A 2nd to be a direct circuit between VLADIVOSTOK and WASHINGTON. For this circuit they propose to use 1 station at VLADIVOSTOK of about 10 Kilowatt power manual operation using international code. This station has previously established commoation with HONOLULU on 13635 KC between 0300 and 0600 GMT. See my 241110 O.F. and related dispatches. They desire the use this frequency and time for 1 schedule but request our recommendation regarding additional frequencies and schedules. They believe 6 periods per day for sending and receiving will be adequate. The call sign CAL is proposed for WASHINGTON and CAL for VLADIVOSTOK. They desire our recommendations and suggestions regarding this circuit before establishing definite program of tests. They desire to establish 1 circuit for our own use between VLADIVOSTOK and CAL. 24 hour service is desired and the following wave lengths and
TOP SECRET

AUGUST (CST)

07 1505

Schedules are proposed to 2100 GCT and 0900 GMT basic wave length 11480 KC standby 16240 KC. Between 0900 GCT and 2100 GCT basic wave length 7990 KC standby 9125 KC. Suggested call signs are VLADIVOSTOK W/04 and GUAM 2TK. Soviet will use own station at VLADIVOSTOK but desire U.S. facilities at GUAM. They are sending a communication team of 1 officer and 4 radio operators and 3 coders to GUAM as part of liaison group. Following is over and above any stations or facilities which United States may desire to establish at VLADIVOSTOK for own use. New Subject. At a meeting with SLAM today regarding weather facilities, see my 07 0830, he stated that questions concerning this project were under study but that no answers were ready at this time.

08 2227

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMDINRAC info CTF 49. CONSERVAT.

Present task force 49 will pass to your operational control upon departure 2000 KTBK. Consider it desirable that you arrange coordinated air attack and surface bombardment against an objective in the KURILs as soon as forces can be assembled and also make sweeps against enemy ships which may appear.

08 2031

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMDINRAC info CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMSERT, ALL TF

North Pacific Force with forces currently assigned plus CruDiv 5, CardDivs 23, 26 and DesRon 49 as separately reconstituted for this purpose assigned following additional tasks.

- Establish and maintain control of a line of communications from the ALIANTANS across the SEA OF OKhotsK.
- Neutralize Japanese bases threatening line of communications.
- Provide protection for convoys against hostile air and submarine attacks between the ALIANTANS and escort turn around points in the SEA OF OKhotsK.

Para. This modifies my OpPlan 4-45.

09 0050

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMDINRAC info COMDINRAC

There are U.S. submarines in the SEA OF OKhotsK north of the boundary established in VICTORY 371. Request action to ensure that they not be attacked. Orders have been issued for them to move south of the boundary line.

Para. In view lack of recognition signals propose to keep Pacific Fleet submarines outside "mutual" zones until liaison becomes effective except for the SEA OF OKhotsK south of 47th parallel which must be used by submarines in passage.

Para. Request use of TARTARY STRAIT be obtained for entry and exit of submarines as soon as possible.

09 0129

CONSERVAT to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 37, CTF 36

Your 082226 intend continue present attacks on 10th fuel 11th strike 12 and 13th. Will advise later as to Task Force 37 ability to participate after 10th. Details of plans by separate dispatch.

AUGUST.
09 0216 CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMNAVF CHINA INFO CINC PAC ADVANCE, CHINA THEATER, COMCHIN.

CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMNAVF CHINA INFO CINC PAC ADVANCE, CHINA THEATER, COMCHIN.

CIC 95.2 080733 passed separately. I request that requests for support of the activities of U.S. forces in CHINA by units of the Pacific Fleet be addressed to CINC PAC whenever time permits and normally through the Comd General U.S. Forces in CHINA. Departure from proper channels in matters of this nature will inevitably lead to confusion and misunderstanding and will not be conducive to the most efficient use of resources which can be made available to support the CINC PAC.

09 0503 CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMNAVF CHINA INFO CINC PAC ADVANCE, CHINA THEATER.

CX 31996.

Reference CX 45950 and CFPX 9910. Concur in CINC PAC ADVANCE 070553 (CTG) relating to naval planning for SOUTHWEST ASIA NAVY (H) is not available. All POSHS this area have been converted to communications ships and are planned for use in our coming operations.

09 0816 CINC PAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 INFO CINC PAC ADVANCE, CHINA THEATER, COMCHIN.

Detach CruDiv 16 when RFS and direct ComNavDiv 16 with his division proceed immediately for Matsu harbor and will be available for inclusion in TF 58 for operations scheduled commence late August.

09 1403 CINC PAC ADVANCE to COMNAVF CHINA INFO CINC PAC ADVANCE, CHINA THEATER, COMCHIN.

CX 32046.

Boundary line connecting the following points delimits air and naval operating areas for U.S. and U.S.S.R. air and naval forces: point at Intersection of 45°E-45°W latitude and line joining CAI CHUN (ROK), (northern tip of SAKHALIN) and CAI CAYA YAMATO (ROK) (northern tip of HAYAIDA), west to point at 45°E-45°W latitude 140°E-00 east longitude, point at 140°E-00 north latitude 135°E-00 east longitude, CAI KOMODOMO (KOMODOMO) on KOREAN L.A.T., CHANGCHUN, LIANYUN, KAIRI, CHINGHAI, TAIYU, PURU, southern boundary of INNER MONGOLIA. All points inclusive to U.S. Forces, U.S.S.R. naval and air forces will operate north of the boundary line and U.S. naval and air forces will operate south of the boundary line. Air forces of this command will operate north of the boundary line and in the area of CHINA on specific authority from this headquarters. Reference our CX 26304, designating area of operations for FISAF in north CHINA and KOREA, FISAF will operate north or west of line indicated in reference only on authority of this headquarters. Clearance is being requested of commanding general U.S. COMCHIN for operations of FISAF in area included between the line: PUMSU KITUCHI, MUKDEN, PEKING and the line: GAO DONGTIA (ROK) CHANGCHUN, LIANYUN, KAIRI, CHINGHAI, PEKING.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (G7)

09 0957 ALISNA MOSCOW TO COINCH AND OKK - COINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Answering your 011400 Red Navy submits following. They estimate convoy can be initiated within 5 to 10 days after beginning of hostilities and consider that it will be necessary to dispatch from 3 to 4 convoys of from 12 to 15 vessels per convoy per month but add that convoys can begin as soon as the U.S. Navy has laid down the necessary operating arrangements in the region around the southern portion of KAMCHATKA and in OKITSK SEA. Their plan submitted for your consideration calls for U.S. convoying of Soviet merchant and mile post vessels to PETROPAVLOVSK except they desire such milepost vessels as are properly equipped and trained to be used as escorts with convoys to PETROPAVLOVSK. Despatch of these vessels to be entirely as decided by U.S. Naval authorities. Convoys for NIKOLAEVSK will be made up at PETROPAVLOVSK. Responsibility for maintaining line of communications between PETROPAVLOVSK and NIKOLAEVSK will be a mutual responsibility of U.S. Navy and Soviet Pacific Fleet but they state they desire U.S. Navy to have control and responsibility of convoys until they arrive at NIKOLAEVSK. The composition of the escort vessels and the convoy command to be assigned by U.S. Navy. Red Navy will furnish supplementary escort strength but is not able now to state numbers or types. Despatch of convoys to NIKOLAEVSK to be a matter of agreement between their Pacific Fleet and the convoy commander. They assume that the escort arriving at NIKOLAEVSK will pick up return convoy with PETROPAVLOVSK at 1st destination Despatch of this return convoy to be a matter of agreement between their Pacific Fleet and convoy commander. Likewise despatch of convoys from PETROPAVLOVSK to UNITED STATES to be a matter of agreement between convoy commander and commander PETROPAVLOVSK Naval Base but UNITED STATES to have entire responsibility and control of these convoys. They desire that the same system that was used with convoy movements from the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to northern posts of the USSR be established. They will take the necessary steps to insure that Soviet submarines will be excluded from areas where convoys are operating and an anchorage will be arranged at PETROPAVLOVSK for escorts and attending auxiliaries. Soviet vessels in BERING SEA between 50-53 north and 57-30 north and east of 166-00 east have been directed to proceed to U.S. Ports. Vessels in allied ports will be instructed as to their future movements by Soviet Convoy Officer. New Subject: They request initial numbers of liaison group for VLADIVOSTOK to be held to lowest possible minimum because of lack of accommodations there. They would also like to inform Red Navy with U.S. submarines operating in SEA OF JAPAN. They state that the Soviet liaison group at GUAM will consist of 4 officers and 7 enlisted men. They were advised that this group could probably be flown to GUAM in U.S. planes which brought in U.S. Liaison Group on assumption this group will be flown in. Request confirmation. They are greatly interested in matter of recognition between surface craft and aircraft and between surface and aircraft and will submit their ideas shortly.

09 1540 ALISNA MOSCOW TO CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO COINCH.

While delivering substance of your 090050 to Red Navy was advised that an American submarine was observed at 1100 on August 8th about 32 miles south of CAPE GALICY and at 1540 on same date Soviet aircraft observed fragments of a Merchantman which had been sunk in the region where the sub had been seen. Presence of U.S. Subs within this area complicates
commencement of their naval activity and they desire to be informed when all submarines have left their zone. They will take such action as they can to assure that submarines are not attacked. With reference to passage of TARTARY STRAIT they promise early reply.

09 2115 CINCSPN to CINCSPAC info CTF 38, CTF 37.

For strikes after August 11th fueling intend to be prepared to shift full weight of attack to TOKYO AREA if my assigned primary northern targets are inaccessible or if fields now under attack are no longer good targets.

09 2202 COMINCH and CNIC to CINCSPAC advance info COMSPAC, ALUSNA MOSCOW.

Refer ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957 being passed to you. Comment on convoy and escort control proposals therein. With respect to recognition systems CNIC 091415 refers.

10 0811 CINCSPAC advance to COMINCH info COMINCH, CTF 38, CINCSPAC, COMSPAC, COMDEPT, COMDEPT.

Your 092202, ALUSNA MOSCOW 090957. Recommend convoy system follow concept my Joint Staff Study KEELBLOKS 4 of 26 May 1945.

Para. Specifically recommend that (A) Chop line as suggested in study be established within the sea of OKhotsk east of which the UNITED STATES have complete responsibility for air and surface protection of convoys and east of which no Russian Submarines operate. West of the Chop line the reverse situation should exist. (B) Convoys assemble at ADAK and routed direct through the KURILES via CINNEKOTAN, SHIKOKU, or HOKUHRO STRAIGHT to Russian ports direct or direct to PETROPAVLK. Minimum traffic between PETROPAVLK and ports to westward. (C) Minimum use of PETROPAVLK. No U.S. Naval shore establishments in Russian ports except for communications and liaison. (D) Dispatch of westbound convoys to be controlled by COMSPAC and eastbound convoys by Russian Naval Command. Direct coordination and consultation between COMSPAC and appropriate Russian naval commander required.

10 1609 CINCSPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH info COMINCH, CTF 38, CINCSPAC, COMSPAC, COMDEPT, COMDEPT.

The text of my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS dated 9 August insofar as naval landing force operations are concerned now reads as follows: "At each principal anchorage occupied an operational airfield will if practicable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings and for eventual development for naval purposes. The timing of this occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet the requirements of the situation as it develops after the arrival of naval forces in Japanese ports. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the anchorages occupied may be occupied if such action becomes necessary to insure the safety of naval forces".

Para. If time permits desire advance notification of any landing force operations under naval command.

AUGUST
10 1614 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO ALPACA info COMINCH.

The public announcement by the Japanese of counter proposals for the termination of the war must not be permitted to affect vigilance against Japanese attacks. Neither the Japanese nor Allied forces have stopped fighting. Take precautions against treachery even if local or general surrender should be suddenly announced. Maintain all current reconnaissance and patrols. Offensive action shall be continued unless otherwise specifically directed.

02 0912 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH CINCPAC info COMINCH.

Desire that any mines laid in SABERCO, HAGOSATU, KOBE, OSAKA, MAKAYA, TOKYO, all other southern and eastern KOMBU ports, and all INLAND SEA areas other than eastern approach to CHONGCHENKI STRAITS and other than INLAND SEA area between 133°00'N and 134°45'E be sterilized by 1 December 1945. Also request that the number of mines planted in INLAND SEA area between 133°00'N and 134°45'E that will not be sterilized by 1 December 1945 be held to a minimum. Stabilizing times for other targets indicated in COMINCH note COM13 700035 June and OMAF 2015 290740 July as agreed to by my 020256 July.

10 1407 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE II.

C 32375.
Tentative troop lists for BLACKLIST are approaching completion in current conferences with 6th, 8th and 10th Army commanders and with FEAR. Request that representatives of the Amphibious Forces which you intend to designate to work with each Army Commander be instructed to contact Army Commanders for detailed planning. Headquarters 6th Army now San Fernando, Panay, Headquarters 8th Army now Leyte; headquarters 10th Army now CINNAWA. Army commanders will be responsible for the loading out of FEAR elements.

10 1507 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CINCPAC FEAR. 23 V MAR AMPHIB CORPS. COMAF 13. COMINCH FEAR.

CX 32403.
FEAF has assigned 13th Air Force mission of support 5th Amphibious Corps during OLYMPIC. Propose authorising direct liaison between representatives of 13th Air Force and 5th Marine Amphibious Corps on matters pertaining operational coordination and utilization aircraft warning control groups in direct support Marine OLYMPIC operations. Involve sending aircraft and liaison personnel to HAINAN required for liaison purposes. Your comments requested.

10 2314 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH. COMAF 13. COAGHET 14TH BDR CORPS.

Your 101507 concurs subject to the comment that the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing is planned to be furnished as a component of the units of the Fleet Marine Force which may participate in OLYMPIC. As far as practicable Marine Ground Forces should be supported by Marine Aviation and Ground Air Liaison with Fleet Marine Force should be carried on by Marines.
TOP SECRET
AUGUST 27

10 2000 OCMINCH and CNO to CINCPAC BOTH H. CONSTRAC, COMHINSTAF, COMULPAG, DON FROM INFO SECNAV.

In order to conform with War Department policy for public relations and censorship purposes concerning military use of atomic energy and atomic bomb war Department policy is quoted below for guidance. Doubtful matters should be submitted to Navy Department pubinfo for clearance War Department or U.S. Office of Censorship representatives. 1. Censors may pass material dealing with atomic energy and military use of atomic energy within bounds of official releases only. 2. Industries universities, individuals etc may be identified with the overall development in general terms but may not elaborate on their technical contributions. 3. Historical information of non-military nature concerning atomic energy provided technical information on atomic research after January 1940 is not revealed. Censors should study for security reasons following information. 1. References to specific processes formulae and mechanics of operation. 2. Stocks location of stocks procurement of stocks and stocks consumption. It may be said that uranium is used. 3. Vails and quantity of production of active materials for bomb. 4. Physical characteristics and future military improvements or developments of atomic energy or atomic bomb. 5. Descriptions or pictures of bomb and nature of its action other than comparative explosive equivalents such as equal to 20,000 tons of TNT or 2000 times more powerful than any bomb yet used. 6. Techniques of operational use of the bomb. 7. Information as to relative importance of the various methods of plants or of their relative functions or efficiencies. General references may be made to these installations only plants adjacent to oak ridge, tennessee and richmond, washington and the laboratory near santa fe, new mexico.

10 2315 CINCPAC ADVANCE to JCS info CINCPAC (PEARL). CINCPAC, CG NSCFT.

Subject is NAVY PROJECT which involves introduction of OSS personnel into Korea by submarine and establishment of 2 radio listening posts at forward bases to receive information.

Para. Objectives are (A) to organize intelligence network in Korea; (B) assist in rescue of downed aviators; (C) provide base for further penetration of Japan power by clandestine agents; (D) organize resistance, sabotage and guerrilla activities. Principal value may lie in (D).

Para. Comments on CINCPAC and CG NSCFT on this project are contained in their 151119 July and 051200 July respectively both of which have been passed to JCS for information.

Para. CINCPAC does not favor project at this time but is prepared to furnish submarine to transport personnel if required.

10 2317 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMULPAG, COMORDPHIBCOR, CONSTRAC, COMHINSTAF, COMINPAT, info OCMINCH, CINCPAC, CG NSCFT, CONSTRAC, CONSHAFB, COMULPAG, COMULPAG PEARL H.

My Joint Staff Study CAVUS provides that the planning and execution of the occupation of Japan by U.S. Army Forces will be coordinated with CINCPAC. COMPHIBCOR will control the amphibious movement and disembarkation of the occupation forces through the various amphibious forces and group commanders. An amphibious force commander will be designated to operate in close coordination with each Army Commander and to conduct the movement to the objective of the forces assigned each Army. COMORDPHIBCOR will more
10 2317 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMSHIPSAC. COMSHIPSAC, COMSHIPSAC, COMSHIPSAC, COMSHIPSAC, FIFTHFLEET. CINCPAC. COMSHIPSAC, FIFTHFLEET, COMSHIPSAC, FIFTHFLEET, FIFTHFLEET, 8TH AF, CINCPAC PEARL (Cont'd).

the 8th Army, COMSHIPSAC the 6th Army and COMSHIPSAC the 10th Army.  

11 0217 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO COMSHIPSAC info CINCPAC. FOURTHFLEET. CINCPAC. FOURTHFLEET. CINCPAC. PEARL H., COMSHIPSAC. U.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.

In the event of a Japanese surrender it is my present intention to continue to exercise my command from my headquarters at Guam except when my presence is required elsewhere for particular purposes. Admiral Halsey will remain in MISSOURI. Admiral Spruance will break his flag in NEW JERSEY. SOUTH DAKOTA will remain in company with Admiral Halsey and will be prepared to serve as my flagship when required. I expect to move between Guam and SOUTH DAKOTA by seaplane when necessary.

11 0829 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMSHIPSAC. CONTINUE.

Due to quantities of United States pressure type mines laid in KYUK-OOSKA AREA specifically in the OSAKA BAY, it appears impracticable to operate in that area until sterilizers render the mines inoperative in February 1946. KYUK appears to be preferable as a base from which to control INLAND SEA. This affects CASSANU and BLACKJET to a controlling degree.

11 2115 CONFERENCE with CINCPAC info CINCPAC. CONFERENCE CHINA, CASGEO.

CONFERENCE 4309.

Regardless of Japanese surrender request all material, shipping and personnel designated for FORT BAYARD at GUAM conference be considered as firm agreements. All material, shipping and personnel accrued upon are required by CHINA THEATER whether port is established at BAYARD, KURORK or elsewhere.

12 0244 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMSHIPSAC info COMSHIPSAC. CINCPAC. COMSHIPSAC, COMSHIPSAC, COMSHIPSAC, CINCPAC. PEARL H.

Refer to CASGU top secret serial 00015 dated 11 July and COMSHIPSAC 2nd endorsement serial 00155 of 7 August thereto subject dusk and dawn fighter patrols.

Para. It is considered infeasible to accomplish the training of fleet pilots on any such scale as visualized. Commanders of Fast carrier task forces should take such measures as are practicable to insure that VF pilots flying dusk CAP'S are capable of landing on board parent carriers after dark.

Para. The maintenance of the day CAP after sunset is within the operational control of appropriate commanders and should be so ordered if required.
TOP SECRET

12 0807 CINCPAC ADVANCE HG TO KUSCHEFT, 217THFLT, COMCHI, CINCPAC, COR20PLT, COMCINCPAC.

For occupation planning an modifying consent my Joint Staff Study with respect to areas of responsibilities of action areas. COMSFLAT will command naval occupation western HOKUSHI, SHIKOKU and KYUSHU and will control INLAND SEA, southern half of SEA OF JAPAN, and waters east of line from southern tip of KOREA at 127°00 east south to 32°00 north 127°00 east southwest to 26°30 north 123°00 east thence south to 20°00 north. This will give CINCPAC responsibility for planning and conducting operations from 11/248/245 along CHINE COAST, in YANGTZE RIVER, and in YELLOW SEA. It will more nearly conform to boundaries between zones of action of 6th and 10th armies. Request your comment.

11 0858 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC INFO JAPAN FOR MARANAS, COMCHI, COR20PLT.

Alert 1 RCT from 6th ArmDiv for immediate occupation duty if required. Unit should be completely equipped and ready for active combat operations. 5 units of fire and 30 days supply to accompany. If employed this RCT will be withdrawn later for subsequent employment with parent division. Advise unit designated earliest.

11 1344 ALUSHA MOSCOW to CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO COMCINCPAC.

Soviets consider that entry and exit of U.S. submarines through TURKMEN STRAIT can be arranged for only after exchange of liaison groups between Soviet and United States Pacific Fleets and after a system of recognition on which they are presently engaged has been worked out. CINCPAC 090050 refers.

12 0111 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCHI.

Request early action on my 070553 since the operations involved will be required to support operations directed by LTRK 47513 (JCS 102217) even if Japanese surrender.

12 0112 CINCPAC ADVANCE to 217THFLT.

CINCPAC 090503 indicates that 3 patrol craft escort (rescue) have been converted into communication ships. It is noted that they were not included in your 12L0406 or 090521 as available for OLYMPIC. Please furnish me complete data on status these craft including date authority and extent of their conversion, present employment, source and service ownership of additional equipment.

Para. All ships of the Pacific Fleet which participate in CINCPAC will be assigned by me to an appropriate Task Organization.

AUGUST

3442
Further to my 1202. I have now been instructed by CTF 112 to prepare
a plan to move 3 small composite groups with air and logistic support to
KOREA KUWAIT EL LIWAN and perhaps SOUTH."  
Para 2. To achieve this all cruisers and majority of destroyers of
TF 37.3 may be required to augment TF 112.2 and these ships will require
replenishment as far as possible at "WHEL.
Para 3. Further signal will be made when situation has been appreciated
and instructions of TF 112.2 have been received.
Para 4. (A) Requirements of TF 37.3 should continue to have
1st priority. Some reduction in the July requirements may prove possible
if situation clears quickly.
(B) Units of Fleet Train and Escorts which are operationally
useful should not come out of "WHEL.
(C) Movements of CTF 112 to AUSTRALIA should continue as previous-
ly arranged.

12 1527 CINCPAC to COFDEFHEX, COINFORTY, COINSTEINHEX, CINCPAC, XN-
THIESPCAC, USACTAF, 30 6TH ARMY, FETAC, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, 30 10TH ARMY, ASCIP,
CO ARMIES, COINSTEIFAC, ASIAPOAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE II.

CX 33017.
BLACKLIST Play, 3rd Edition, dated 3 August, is hereby amended to
designate the 20-4th Corps as occupation force. The 20-4th Corps
will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in KOREA, functioning as
a task force directly under this headquarters. Responsibilities of the
10th Army in the KUMYUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain
unchanged.
Para. Tentative troop list for BLACKLIST distributed 12 August as
attachment to letter to headquarters file 332 (11 August 1945) CC (not
to all or needed) is amended as follows: on page 1 substitute the words
"Part 1: 20th Corps", for the words "Part 1: 10th U.S. Army". Delete the
following units from Part 1: Headquarters and Headquarters Company 10th
Army, 519 Military Police Battalion (Army). 35 signal operations battalion
to headquarters and Headquarters company 10th Army. 10th is designated headquarters
and Headquarters company 24.
Para. The 10th Army will reinforce headquarters, 20th Corps will
commissioned and enlisted personnel, and such other appropriate resources
as may be available to enable the 24th Corps to perform all assigned
area command and military government functions.

12 2148 COMINT and CAP TO CINCPAC ADVANCE INFO CINCPAC CHINA, JCS USA.
U. 0629 CINCPAC ADVISE to CINCPAC, Admiral Albert R. Kirk, Admiral, Bogue, Commander, Pacific Fleet, CINCPAC, COMPOUND INFO CINCPAC, 4C, WADD, COMPOUND, Bogue.

Subject: CINCPAC, COMPOUND INFO CINCPAC, 4C, WADD, COMPOUND, Bogue.

Para. 1. CINCPAC, COMPOUND INFO, is in accordance CINCPAC, 4C, WADD, COMPOUND, Bogue. Information will be in accordance CINCPAC 10094, L20623, L20624. 8th Bogue's should be ordered to report to COMPOUND for planning.

Para. 11. Col. E. H. Truitt, USA, is designated as WarAirBase commander YOKOSUKA, Col. P. H. Smith, USMCR is designated as WarAirBase commander SASEBO-NA, and should be ordered to report to CINCPAC at earliest possible date. Ground sea #22, 10094, should be nominated War Air at earliest possible date as WarAirBase KURE. Capt. F. J. Dufek, USN is designated as CORONADO OCEAN. He should be ordered to report for transportation to 4C of 10094 to be designated for this purpose.

14 0819 CINCPAC ADVISE to COMPOUND INFO CINCPAC, Admiral, Bogue, 4C, WADD.

Since COMPOUND will be required to operate as a Task Fleet Commander outside the southwest pacific area in connection with occupation operations at an earlier date than contemplated for CINCPAC, it is desirable that be named COMPOUND at the earliest possible date. All his remaining functions as senior naval commander in the CINCPAC originally planned for 1 October 1944 as paragraph 7 of my 19751 approved by CONNAV 21020, but placed in effect by my 211009. Request your early concurrence.

Para. Recommend COMPOUND and COMPOUND INFO convay and advise me on CINCPAC earliest practicable date for transfer.

14 0829 CINCPAC ADVISE to CTI 112, INFO CTI 112, 4C, WADD, CINCPAC ADVISE.

Admiralty have now stated intention of sending British naval force to home subject to arrangements with War Chiefs of Staff.

Para. 2. Force will be drawn from TI 112.

Para. 3. Provision of oilers is essential to this move even at some expense of TI 3845.

Para. 4. Consider following moves will provide maximum flexibility:
(A) SASEBO NAVSH and 4C ADVANCE to refuel at ULTTH (B) NAV SH and 4C ADVANCE after refueling at ULTTH to proceed to ULTTH.

Para. 5. CTI 112, (A) report intentions to 4C NAV, CTI 112, (B) make direct arrangements with 4C NAV, and (C) report to ULTTH.

14 1455 CINCPAC ADVISE to CINCPAC.

33551.

Further to conference of 11 August with your representative (Admiral Sherman) a vessel capable of sustained speed 17 knots in being loaded with materials and personnel necessary for construction of bulk aviation gasoline facilities to go forward from WADD, USNavy supply, Inasmuch as water capacity of vessel is limited it is requested that water facilities for wading at both WADD and objectives be made available. The name of vessel will be given in a separate radio. Advise if watering facilities for approximately 500 personnel will be available.

AUGUST (4C7)
TOP SECRET

14 2318 MARSHALL TO THE EYES OF SS.

SECRET

FOR YOUR INFORMATION WITH REFERENCE TO T744978, THE BRITISH CHIEFS
OF STAFF NOW INFORM THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF THAT THEY HAVE ISSUED IN
STRUCTIONS TO ADMIRAL FRASER CONCERNING ACCEPTANCE OF SURRENDER OF JAPANESE
AT HONGKONG.

Para. In another paper the British asked the concurrence or comment
of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on instructions already sent to Mountbatten
on which, in view of the time factor, the British are going ahead with
all preparations. These instructions in summary are that, after ac-
ceptance of Japanese surrender, main tasks will be:
A. Reoccupation of key areas of occupied territory and surrender and
dismantling of Japs.
B. Release of British and Allied prisoners of war.
C. Protection of British interests in CHINA.
D. Participation in the occupation of JAPAN.

Para. Assumptions on policy are:
A. Wingate's South West Pacific will pass to British and Australian
command on cease fire.
B. Highly important British accept HONGKONG surrender and show
British flag at main Chinese ports.
C. British take part in Japanese occupation with British Common-
wealth forces in which Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand and
probably Canada will each be represented by a Brigade Group supported
by an air component.

Para. Mountbatten has been asked to submit plans for operations in
order of priority:
A. Complete occupation of HONGKONG, reoccupy KIAKAUHTU, and occupy
MACAO, KWEI and key areas of HONGKONG.
B. Reestablish a British garrison in HONGKONG using initially British
Pacific Fleet and an Australian force from BURMA. These to be released
as soon as possible with Brigade and tactical air force from MAC.
C. Small forces for certain Chinese ports.
D. Occupation of JAVA.
E. Dispatch of forces to JAVA. Arrangements to be made to ship
French forces and civil affairs personnel as a follow up. Mountbatten's
forces should not occupy more of JAVA than necessary to assure the
control of headquarters of the Japanese southern armies.
F. Dispatch forces to JAVA as soon as possible to accept surrender
there. Arrangements are being made to ship Dutch security forces.

G. JAVA is in lower priority than JAVA.

Para. Australian forces are being asked to take initial responsibility
for BORNEO and enemy occupied territories in BORNEO. Mountbatten
must be prepared to provide the Australians a small proportion
of force and some merchant shipping.

H. Mountbatten should appreciate that many of these arrangements are
subject to agreement of Governments, which the British are now undertaking.

Para. This ends summary of orders issued by British Chiefs of Staff
to Mountbatten.

Para. Request Wedemeyer's and MacArthur's expeditious comments on
the foregoing.

Para. This message passed to Minot at request of Navy Department.
TOP SECRET

AUGUST (GCT)

15 0216 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONTINIA.

At 142130 Halsey acknowledged receipt of orders to suspend air attack operations. The initial attack was already underway when I received your directive to suspend the operations.

15 0305 CINCPAC to CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, CG XXIV CORPS, CG FEB 2, CG AEVFSPAC, AFEDITAC, info CINCPAC ADVANCE, CONTINIA, CORPAC, COMHUB, CG OIC, CG JAPAN, MARCOS, COMSOUTHFOR, CG 1ST ARMY.

CX 33638.

Follows warning order for execution of BLACKLIST operation. Action above will immediately initiate the execution of operations to occupy JAPAN and KOREA as outlined in BLACKLIST. Commander 6th and 8th Armies and 24th Corps will expedite arrangements respectively with Commanders 7th, 3rd, and 7th Amphibious Forces and air Task Force Commanders. Operations instructions number 4 directing preparations for the occupation of JAPAN and KOREA bein issued this date. B Day the effective date of OL number 4 is 15 August 1945. Operation MAJESTIC suspended indefinitely. Warning Orders for execution of B 60 will follow. No actual landing in JAPAN or KOREA will be made prior to a date to be announced later.

15 0245 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE, CG 6TH ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 10TH ARMY, CG XXIV CORPS, AEVFSPAC, AFEDITAC, COMHUB.

CX 33634.

Priorities for allocation of seaborne troop lift for phase 1 BLACKLIST are as follows: 1st, for 8th Army, 3 and 1/3 reinforced Army Divisions plus headquarters and supporting troops as follows: 6th: AFFPAC, 8th Army, 11 Corps, 14 Corps, destination TOKYO. 2nd, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Division of the 5th Amphibious Corps, plus available elements of 5th Amphibious Forces Headquarters both from MARIANAS, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 3rd, for 6th Army, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 6th Army and 1 Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OSAKA. 4th, for 24 Corps, 2 Reinforced Army Divisions plus 24 Corps Headquarters and corps troops, destination KUSHIHUKI. 5th, for 8th Army, 1 reinforced Army Division plus 9th Corps Headquarters and supporting troops, destination OMINATO. 6th, for 6th Army, 1 Marine Division plus remainder of 9th Amphibious Forces Headquarters and supporting troops from HAWAII, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 7th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced Army Division from HAWAII, destination OSAKA. 8th, for 6th Army, 1 reinforced Marine Division from MARIANAS, destination SASEBO-NAGASAKI. 9th, for 6th Army, 1 Reinforced Army division, destination OSAKA. 10th, for 8th Army, 1 and 1/3 reinforced Army Divisions, destination OMINATO.

Para. Where more than 1 Division is allocated for initial movement to a given objective, the movement may, at the discretion of the Army or Corps Commander concerned, (6th Army, 8th Army or 2 CORPAC) and as arranged with the corresponding naval task force commander, be conducted by reinforced division rather than by simultaneous movement of the entire allocation.

Para. The following paragraph for CINCPAC only: This message confirms priorities handed Admiral Sherman at Manila 13 August on BLACKLIST priorities and troop lift estimates. The estimate for the troops involved in the initial movement to the TOKYO area should read "personal, 191 allocation of shipping should be obtained from the Army Commander concerned".
TOP SECRET
AIR FORCE (GCS)

15 1333 CINCPAC to NARCOS FOR JCS info CINCPAC ADVANCE CONCERN US FORCES CHINA.

CX 33830 - This radio in 4 parts.

Para 1. Present planned BLACKLIST contemplates employment, JAPAN 19 Divisions, KOREA 3 Divisions, Philippine Garrison 2 Divisions, reference MX 49354. It is considered that forces and shipping allocated for JAPAN proper must remain available pending determination of conditions after initial landings which will be made by 14 Divisions.

Para 2. By confining KOREAN occupation to BUSAN AREA and reducing initial entry to the initial division only, a division with shipping can be made available for DARIEN at a relatively early date. Eventual accomplishment of occupation mission in the United States some of KOREA will require commitment of an additional Army division not now allocated if DARIEN is occupied.

Para 3. Occupation of SHANGHAI by 2 divisions of the 3rd Phil Corps is proposed by CINCPAC in conjunction with COMGEN CHINA when shipping becomes available, this can be accomplished if no unexpected requirements arise in JAPAN proper or KOREA.

Para 4. It is recommended that any occupations on the CHINA COAST by United States forces further to those cited above be placed in a contingent category dependent upon the development of the situation in higher priority areas and availability of resources.

15 0206 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMHDLT, COMSUBFLT, COMTHTFBR, COMFEAF, COMANCAP, COMGEN
THEMTO CORPS into CINCPAC.

Para 1. CINCPAC staff study BLACKLIST mailed today. Following changes made since publication.

A. 24th Corps designated as occupation force, KOREA. 24th Corps will assume responsibilities assigned 10th Army in KOREA, functioning as a Task Force directly under CINCPAC. 10th Army responsibility in the RYUKUS and for mounting out troops for BLACKLIST remain unchanged.

B. In B 2 the 5th Phil Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 96th Division will be employed for B 10 in the OSAKA AREA.

C. 27 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B 60. 27 Division replaces 98 division within the 14 Corps. 98 Division remains in AFFC reserve.

D. 96 Division is included in 24 Corps replacing 27 Division.

E. Delete all references to occupation of any part of KARAFUTO. Such operations will not be conducted.

Para 2. Foregoing changes also apply to applicable parts of my Joint Staff Study CANTUS.
TOP SECRET

WASH. (CGO)

15 2127

CINCPAC ADVANCE INTO U.S. MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW

With Japanese capitulation previous arrangements for liaison groups Army and Navy at KHABAROVSK and VLADIVOSTOK appear to be subject to modification. In this connection, it is suggested that a cruiser or other suitable vessel be provided for the use of Army and Navy liaison representatives to deal with the Russian Command in whatever ASIA/PACIFIC PORT appears desirable such as DAIREN. The sending of a Cruiser for this liaison purpose should be considered in connection with previous directive regarding the occupation of DAIREN by United States forces. (Foratters reference to visits to or occupation of DAIREN is not to be communicated to the Soviets at this time).

Para. 2. Taking foregone into consideration information desired from MacArthur and Nimitz as to what can be done if any desire as regards present arrangements for liaison groups at KHABAROVSK and VLADIVOSTOK informing military mission MOSCOW at same time.

Para. 3. In connection with above CINCPAC is advised that a group visa for Navy liaison group has not as yet been received but Rear Admiral Settle with 8 additional Naval officers and 6 enlisted men are proceeding by air to GUAM from Washington evening 16 August to report to him for further assignment in connection with this duty.

16 0433

CNS SAMAR TO CONFLICT INFO CONSERVPAC, CONSERV 7TH, CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR.

My serial 0002 of 13 August Re: PORT BAYARD operation. Have assigned 6 officers from NABU 13 including Commander John Harold Soeth USNR 64957 to this operation. Letter assigning Commanding Officer of NABU pending confirmation or designation of another is by higher authority. Essential to have an organized NABU to avoid confusion. New Subject. Designation of 5 LST's received this date. Have not yet arrived but are expected tomorrow. Unless otherwise directed will begin loading upon arrival. Moment appears that 3 additional LST's will be required but will advise of additional shipping requirements later. Personnel from CINCPAC PEARL not arrived. Request shipping designation.

16 0724

CINCPAC ADVANCE TO CONTICH AND CHO INFO WARBOS, CINCPAC.

In view of current developments believe it better to cancel exchange of Flag Officers on basis originally planned. Your 152127, the presence of a Russian Liaison Group at my headquarters would have many disadvantages. Para. In view thereof propose that Rear Admiral Settle report to CINCPAC break his flag in a cruiser and proceed initially to VLADIVOSTOK and later to such other port as may be desirable.

Para. Propose to use LOUISVILLE escorted by a destroyer if you consent.

16 1741

CINCPAC TO CONTICH & CHO WARBOS. INFO US MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW. CINCPAC USS NAV.

34087.

RearAdm 1521272 the mission assigned to the U.S. Military Liaison group which has been organised for station in KHABAROVSK was to effect operational coordination and Liaison with the Red Army in connection with military operations against JAPAN. So far as this command is concerned direct Liaison in no longer necessary query shall the project be continued.

AUGUST (GCT)
16 0809 CINCOPAC ADVANCE TO CINCPAC.

Your 11A507. CX 33547. My 190846 also refers. Naval facilities required to be furnished in each occupational area as follows:

A. Entire naval base at YOKOSUKA with all present facilities and living quarters for approximately 7600 Navy and 5400 4th Marine BCT. 250 acres minimum space. YOKOSUKA Naval air base with living quarters for 4000 Navy personnel. Recreation area SAGAMI BEACH with 1 mile of beach and 50 acres for athletic fields. 50 trucks at least 1 1/2 tons. 25 passenger vehicles.

B. OMINATO. Entire naval base at OMINATO with all present facilities. KABAYAMA airfield with living quarters for 3000 personnel. 50 truck not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger cars. Clearance all highways between port and airfield.

C. HIROSHIMA airfield with living quarters for 3500. Pier and landing facilities as close as possible to airfield with 10 acres cleared for sorting area in rear. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger vehicles. Clearance all highways between port and airfield.

D. SASEBO. Entire naval base at SASEBO with all present facilities. OMURA seaplane base and airfield with all adjacent unloading facilities. Living quarters for 4000. 50 trucks not less than 1 1/2 ton. 10 passenger vehicles.

E. All existing wire communications systems between and in subject airfields and adjacent naval bases or ports. All existing radio station installations at these naval bases or ports and airfields and all communication facilities for port control to be left intact.

F. Airfields to be complete with all existing facilities. Runways taxiways and adjacent areas cleared of debris and ready for operation.

G. Naval bases to be complete with piers workshops, drydocks, hospitals and equipment cleared of debris and ready for operation.

H. Facilities at airfields and bases to include adequate electric power water and sewage disposal.

Para. Various additional facilities may be required and will be requested as the situation develops.

14 1101 CINCAPAC to CINCPAC ANT, FFPAC, HARCOS, COMMFLA, COMPLAN.

CX 33452.

BLACKLIST plan, edition number 3, this headquarters dated 8 August 45 is amended as follows:

A. In B2 the 9th Amphibious Corps is substituted for the 1 Corps in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI AREA. The 1 Corps, reinforced with the 98 division, will be employed for B-10 in the OSAKA AREA.

B. The 27 Division is removed from 24 Corps and will be employed in B-40. The 27 division replaces the 98 division within the 14 Corps. The 38 Division remains in AFPAC reserve.

C. The 96 division is included in the 24 Corps replacing the 27 Div.

D. Delete all references to operations for the occupation of any part of KARAPUTU. Such operations will not be conducted.

AUGUST (CCT)
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

15 0529 CINCAPAC to CINCPAC ADV. CONGENICHT. WARCOS. SACEFA. CONGCHINA. MIL.
MISSION MOSCOW.

CX 33657.

Pursuant to directive from the President of the United States and in
accordance with agreement among the governments of the United States,
Chinese republic, United Kingdom, and Union of Socialist Republics I have
been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces to accept,
coordinate and carry into effect the Japanese surrender. I assume control
accordingly. The channel of communications with the Japanese Imperial
Government and Japanese Imperial Headquarters will be through this
headquarters. MacArthur.

16 0045 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC ADV info CINCPAC. BRITISH ARMY DELAG.
WARX 50182.

You will release to the full control of Admiral Fraser such parts of
the British Pacific Fleet as he requests.

16 0250 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMINCH. WARCOS.

Your CX 33831. Will send Rear Admiral Sherman to represent me at
Manila during meeting with Japanese representatives 17 August.

Para. The presence of a liaison group to represent me at your head-
quarters in the TOKYO AREA will be very advantageous and I propose to
send a group headed by a Flag Officer with communication and intelligence
personnel as required. Will advise shortly as to personality.

15 1442 CONGENICHT to WARCOS Info COMINCH. CINCPAC. CINCPAC. COMINCH

TOP SECRET. CFRIK 4740 In view of final decision that immediate
requirements of China Theater for U S troops to occupy key positions
cannot be furnished, determined measures must be taken to retain control
of the situation here. Refer 4AR 47974. First: It is urgently re-
quested that no aircraft be removed from the India-China Wing, ATC,
see WAR 47983. The present instructions issued General Tunnell in personal ATC message from Washington have caused him to take the mea-
ure of alerting 50 C-54's the removal of which from the Hump is costing
China Theater 12000 tons per month and this loss in the absence of
immediate U S occupation forces on the CHINA COAST is jeopardizing
the new mission of the China Theater; WARX 47983. Chinese troops are
being alerted for move to secure the most critical areas however their
arrival will be a matter of weeks or months if airlift is not employed.
Adequate forces to insure security of these key areas cannot be moved
in time unless all presently assigned aircraft are available to lift
the troops and to bring fuel into CHINA. 2nd: It is urgently requested
that additional assistance be given by making Avigs available at the
airfields in vicinity of HANKING and in the TIENTSIIN-PERING area for
the movement of occupational Chinese forces. It is suggested that U S
Navy convoy shipment of avigs.

Para. Utilizing vessels set up for JEMEDAR should meet our emergency
requirements for the HANKING area, provided we can expect continued
shipments, means which can be made available plus personal and equipment
15 1442

Previously allocated by CINCPAC, CINCAC, and MAR for JEBIDAR should enable us to handle this operation. Request that all resources allocated for JEBIDAR be diverted to NANKING.

Para. In addition request the 7 LST's originally earmarked for naval pre-convoys in JEBIDAR be retained after off loading at NANKING with addition of any others which can be made available for lift of d三千 ton avload from OKINAWA to TAIWAN.

Para. 3rd: The allocation of LCI craft for coastal or river movement into CHINA would materially increase our capabilities for the movement of forces into the vital areas. It is recommended that Task Force 93 be augmented by a minimum of 90 LCI for this purpose.

Para. 4th: The urgency and importance of the above must not be underestimated. There are reports that fighting is already in progress between Central Government and Communist Troops in the TAIWAN area and elsewhere, with the Communists attempting to seize all key towns and airfields in northeast CHINA. Each day's delay further a major force in the critical areas increases the probability of widespread civil conflict and jeopardizes our 1st task of securing the key areas within CHINA as stated in WASH 49374.

16 1940

COMINCH and CHIEF OF STAFF to MILMIS WASH - COMINCH passes to CINCPAC - CINCAC.

My 152127 and MILMIS WASH 25322 since arrangements with Soviets for exchanging Army, Navy Liaison groups Khabarovsk and Vladivostok and U.S. Headquarters were to effect war operational coordination we now propose to cancel these Liaison missions.

Para 2. In order to provide for contact with the Soviet Pacific Naval headquarters we propose to send a Cruiser and 1 or 2 Destroyers initially to Vladivostok and later to such other ports as may be desirable.

Para 3. Obtain Soviet concurrence on above and advise originators and info addressees. Upon receipt of Soviet concurrence regarding visit to LAVIVOSTOK CINCAC make detailed arrangements and notification direct through ALUSHA WASH keeping COMINCH advised.

Para 4. If the need should arise for additional liaison in connection with coordination of QRC surrender activity as proposals thereafter will be furnished at a later date.

17 0615

COMEN CHINA to WASHINGTON INFO CINCPAC - CINCAC -

CFRG 4870.

Reference paragraph A of 4th document "General Order Number 1 Military and Naval" (WAR 48672 as amended by subsequent messages) request that the term "MANCHURIA" be defined. Chinese authorities state that the term "MANCHURIA" includes only 3 provinces, namely, LIAONING, JEBOL and HEILUNGB. However since the Japanese created the puppet government of MANCHUKUO they have included the province of JEBOL which the Chinese government considers to be an integral part of CHINA and not a part of MANCHURIA. The Chinese state that MANCHURIA as a geographical term definitely does not include JEBOL and they feel it to be vitally important that JEBOL be expressly excluded from the term "MANCHURIA" as used in the surrender documents. Request that this matter be clarified and if possible that JEBOL be definitely excluded from MANCHURIA as used in General Order No. 1. Request prompt information as to action taken.
16 OHA

16 OHA Joint Chiefs of Staff to readily and without delay to remain.

WY 30210.

This message refers to WO A9835, MAO 190649 and W 49234 and MAO 190632.

Priority for areas to be occupied as given in WO A9835 and MAO 190649 will not be changed at this time. However, it is desired that every effort be made to expedite the movement of U. S. Forces into key points on the CHINA COAST. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the attitude of the Japanese administration and armed forces in the southwest and the subsequent size and speed of movement of U. S. Forces into the Japanese homeland remains to be determined. In preparing a reply to WO 49234, it is requested that consideration be given to proceeding with arrangements on a basis that in addition to KELJO or another KOREAN port, DALEN if not already occupied by the Russians, a CHINA COAST port will be entered prior to commitment of forces for the priority objectives in JAPAN PROPER as set forth in MAO 190632 dated 25 July. This suggestion is made with the thought that it may be practicable to set up arrangements so that forces intended for points around the YELLOW SEA area, up to their actual landing, will be shifted to the Japanese homeland if the developing situation so indicates.

On the matter of a specific port or ports on the CHINA COAST, this is left for the time being to Commanders concerned. DALEN may be considered for the port to be used, if any can be entered in the near future. For your information, MAO 190649 considers the occupation of TIENTSIN or TASI should take priority over SHANHAI. In light of the foregoing and in covering WO 49234, it is suggested, after consulting WO 30210, MAO 190649 and MAO 190632, to furnish their best estimate of time required to occupy any port in KOREA, DALEN and a CHINA PORT. In your time schedule there should be included alternate ports to be occupied by the forces set up should DALEN and/or KELJO have been previously occupied by the Soviets.
17 0906 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMBARTANAS. CONMARKS Info COMFLUT, COMSOUTH,
CINCPAC, COMRON, CINCPEAC PEARL, CINCPPAC.

Make plans and preparations to receive the surrender of all Japanese
forces remaining in the BONINS, MARIANAS, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS. For
these purposes the command areas shown in Appendix 1 to Annex B of my
OpPlan 12-45 are applicable. Advice means required to implement plans.
Para. Plans should include provision for concentrating prisoners in
the larger islands or Atolls and for their repatriation when circumstances
and shipping permit subject to arrangements between CINCPAC and CINCPAC.
Para. Make preliminary plans for activating naval airfields on WAKE
and MARCUS for use of ATS and other transient aircraft.

17 1045 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE Rl.

C-34353.

From Sherman. Have passed JCS WX 5018L to COMPHIBSPAC and asked him
to submit to you and CINCPAC his best estimates of timing under the
present priorities and possible alternatives to permit earlier movements
to CHINA.
Para. Estimates by Wilkinson contemplates arrivals TOKYO as follows:
B plus 16, 11th Corps Hqt, 1st Cav Div and 112 RCT. B plus 20 2 America
B plus 29 43 inf Div and 14th Corps Hqt. Assuming use of same ships
the 9th Corps Hqt and 1 Div would arrive CHINATO B plus 40. 2nd Div
CHINATO at B plus 47.
Para. 6th Army estimates 1st arrivals as: 5th MarDiv B plus 31. 90th
B plus 4L. 3rd B plus 47. 27th B plus 57.
Para. CINCPAC has asked COMGEN CHINA to send representative here.
Para. Perhaps Carter can produce a helpful estimate from his own
records.

18 0810 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE Info CINCPAC, COMEBAT, COMAP 20,
COMRON, COMBARTANAS.

2346.

Further reference CINCPAC ADVANCE Top Sec message date time group
160808Z August and our number 2229 date time group 176111Z, your attention
is invited to the fact that prior to the termination of hostilities War
Department policy prescribed that USASTAF construction be in accordance
with minimum war operational requirements. As a result, much of the con-
struction that now exists is not desirable for either permanent or semi-
permanent use. In view of either the permanent or semi-permanent nature
that many USASTAF installations may have, USASTAF desire to reserve the
right to review current construction projects in light of post E-J day
requirements and to propose construction that may be either of a permanent
or semi-permanent nature as well as projects in categories you list. You
are advised of USASTAF APOS position in this matter inasmuch as your
policy makes no provision for future war department approval of post-war
projects.

AUGUST (JCT)
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

19 0023 MARCOO to GINCAPAC, CHUNGKING CHINA THEATER HI, INFO GINPOA ADVANCE HI, HQ USAF CHI NEW DEPOT, DREP 20AF JPN.

WALK 51481.

In reply to a message from the Prime Minister, the President has answered as follows: "From the U.S. standpoint there is no objection to the surrender of HONGKONG being accepted by a British Officer provided military coordination is effected beforehand by the British with the Generalissimo on operational matters connected with assistance and support that area to Chinese and American forces who may still be either engaged against the enemy or involved in securing surrender of Japanese forces in the hinterland. General MacArthur will be instructed to arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to the British Commander whenever the above coordination is effected.

Para. The Secretary of State informed T. V. Soong here this morning of thus contemplated action stating that it did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of HONGKONG.

19 0219 CONGREDFLT to COMGENTHARP info GINCAPAC, CINCPAC ADV, CTF 31, COMBATTAN

HALEY TO MICHELEBERGER.

Predicated on assumption fleet arrives SAGAMIHARA 23rd, airborne landing 11th AB division takes place 25th, and troops will initially occupy only ATSUGI-YOKOSUKA area to southward I have formulated 2 alternate plans (plan 1) 4th Marines and Fleet Marine Landing Force under R.G. Clement land at SHINJUKU. 4th Marines spearheaded by tanks make 2 strong simultaneous advance on YOKOSUKA airbase and YOKOSUKA naval base. Fleet Marines protect rear and flanks. Ship fire support in both SAGAMIHARA and TOKYO BAY. Plan 2 forces land at YOKOSUKA air base and envelope YOKOSUKA naval base from rear by land.

Para. Both plans contemplate landings on same day as airborne landings with 24 hour for naval landing approximately same as time designated for airborne landings or as you may direct. Plan 1 preferred as it avoids exposing transports to treachery in very restricted waters. Both plans permit subsequent isolating and dismissing enemy forces on peninsula south of KOKUSUKA-SHINJUKU line after fleet landing forces take over security duty at YOKOSUKA air and naval bases.

Para. Nav. Landing forces comprise 4th Marines and 1800 (3 battalions) marines from the fleet under Clement, a reserve force of 1200 (3 battalions) U.S. bluejackets and 1 battalion (400 men) from British Fleet for security duty. An additional reserve of 5 battalions (2000 men) of U.S. bluejackets can be mustered but with inferior equipment.

Para. In order to crystallize details of my plans request following information earliest (A) on what air field or fields will 11th AB division land (B) is my plan 1 agreeable to you (C) what if any support of airborne operation do you require from 3rd fleet air surface or ground forces (D) do you wish to designate 24 hour for our forces or will you be satisfied with my intent to time it with initial airborne landings (E) are you agreeable to my normal amphibious organization (CTF 31 R Adm Badger Commander attack Force) Brig Gen Clement Commander Landing Force) under which Clement is COMGEN ashore until notified that he is relieved by the officer you designate.

Para. With the answers to the foregoing I can meet my 72 hour notice in advance of earliest scheduled date of airborne landing.

AUGUST (GCT)
WARX 51776.

Concerning WARX 51481, MacArthur will arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to a British Commander as soon as the military coordination with the Generalissimo on operational matters indicated by the President is affected by the British. Wedemeyer will keep MacArthur informed of the progress of these arrangements with the view to expeditious action.

WARX 51397.

State Department requests you be informed that the President has now decided that, in addition to representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, representatives of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the Netherlands will be invited to be present at the acceptance of the Japanese surrender. Reference is WARX 50043. Communications have gone to those governments asking them to name representatives and to communicate, if possible, directly with you on details, including arrangements for attendance.

Para. State Department requests appropriate instructions be issued to you to provide for the presence of these representatives. The foregoing is for your information and guidance.

X 2515.

Herewith for information are official texts of 3 basic documents governing general surrender of Japanese and Japanese controlled armed forces which are being handed to me by Japanese representatives at my headquarters 20 August 1945 for compliance as indicated. (i) proclamation by the Emperor of JAPAN. "Accepting the terms set forth in declaration by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and China on Japan 26 July 1945 at Potsdam and subsequently adhered to by the U.S. of the Soviet Socialist Republics, I have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to sign on my behalf the instrument of surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to issue general orders to the military and naval forces in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. I command all my people forthwith to cease hostilities, to lay down their arms and faithfully to carry out all the provisions of the instrument of surrender and the general orders issued by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters hereunder.

B. "Instrument of surrender". We, acting by command of and on behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain 26 July 1945 at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which 4 powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

- continued -
Para. We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese Armed Forces and all Armed Forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

Para. We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircrafts, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

Para. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese Forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

Para. We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper and to effectuate this surrender and issued by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

Para. We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the POTSDAM declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commanders for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representatives of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration.

Para. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

Para. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.


C. General order number 1, military and naval. "The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its commanders in Japan and abroad to cease the Japanese Armed forces and Japanese controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to commanders acting on behalf of the United States, The Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in
detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their
instructions will be completely and immediately carried out (a) the Senior
Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within
CHINA, (excluding MANCHURIA), FORMOSA and FRENCH INDO-CHINA north of 16-00
north shall surrender to Generalissimo CHIANG KAI-SHEK, (b) The Senior
Japanese command dent and all ground, sea, and auxiliary forces within
MANCHURIA, KOREA north of 38-00 north and KARAFUTO shall surrender to the
Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.

Para. (C) The senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and
auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, SURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH
INDO-CHINA south of 16-00 north, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, NEW
GUINEA, BISMARKS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender (to the Supreme Commander
South East Asia Command or the commanding general Australian Forces) the
exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged
between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. (D) The senior Japanese Commanders and
all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese Mandated Islands,
NEW GUINEA, DOKINS, and other Pacific islands shall surrender to the Commander
in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Para. (E) To the Imperial General Headquarters, its senior commanders,
and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of JAPAN,
minor islands adjacent thereto, KOREA south of 38-00 north and the Philip-
lines shall surrender to the Commander in Chief. United States Army Forces
in the Pacific.

Para. (F) The above indicated commanders are the only representatives
of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrender, and all surrenders of
Japanese forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

Para. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its
commanders in JAPAN and abroad to disarm completely all forces of JAPAN or
under Japanese control, wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact
and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and
at such places as may be prescribed by the Allied commanders indicated above.

Para. Pending further instructions, the Japanese police forces in the
main islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The
police force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for
the preservation of law and order. The strength and arms of such a police
force will be prescribed.

Para 2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt
of this order, complete information with respect to JAPAN and all areas
under Japanese control, as follows:

A. Lists of all land, air and antiaircraft units showing locations and
   strengths in officers and men.
B. Lists of all aircraft, military, naval and civil, giving complete
   information as to the number, type, location, and condition of each aircraft
   and the personnel on such aircraft.
C. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels, surface
   and submarine and auxiliary naval craft in or out of commission and under
   construction giving their position, condition and movement.
D. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of
   over 100 tons (gross), in and out of commission and under construction, in-
   cluding merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which
   are now in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.
E. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps showing
   locations and layouts of all mines, minel fields, and other obstacles to
move
tment by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.

F. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establish-
ments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports
and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast
fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

G. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United
Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Para 3. Japanese armed forces and civil aviation authorities will
insure that all Japanese military, naval and civilian aircraft remain on
the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the
disposition to be made of them.

Para 4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval or merchant vessels of
all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement
pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explo-
sives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives
of all types to safe storage ashore.

Para 5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled military and civil
authorities will insure that:

A. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by
land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions
of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.

C. All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplish-
ment of above.

Para 6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil
authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instruc-
tions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

A. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and
supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material
(except as specifically prescribed in section 4 of this order).

B. All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities
and equipment.

C. All military installations and establishments, including airfields,
seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots,
permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other
fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications
installations and establishments.

D. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories,
testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions
designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of
all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended
for use by military or part.

Para. Military organisation in connection with its operations.

Para 7. The Japanese Imperial Headquarters will furnish to the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of receipt of
this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs A, B,
and D of section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of
each.

Para 8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and
implements of war will cease forthwith.
Para 9. With respect to United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

A. The safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees will be scrupulously preserved, to include the administrative and supply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

B. Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms, and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the Command of the senior officer or designated representative of the prisoners of war and civilian internees.

C. As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, prisoners of war and civilian internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by allied authorities.

D. The Japanese imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, within (time limit) of the receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, indicating their locations.* All Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

Para 11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese officials shall be prepared, on instructions from Allied occupation commanders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population.

Para 12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces of other Allied military authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese-controlled military and civil officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of Allied military authorities and the Japanese Government.

Z 517.

It is anticipated that the actual surrender in TOKYO will take place 28 August. Instructions received by this headquarters direct that the senior Japanese commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA south of 16 degrees north latitude, MALAYA, BORNEO, NETHERLANDS INDIES, HONG KONG, BISMARCS, and the SOLOMONS, shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, southeast ASIA command or the Commanding General, Australian Forces -- the exact breakdown between Mountbatten and the Australians to be arranged between them and the details of this paragraph then prepared by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Para. Action addresses are requested to arrange between them the areas within which they will respectively receive the surrender of Japanese forces and advise at earliest.
ORDER NUMBER 1, MILITARY AND NAVAL, IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: (Z627)
PARAGRAPH 1 DELETE SUBPARAGRAPH C OF PART 1 AND SUBSTITUTE THEREFOR
THE FOLLOWING 2 SUBPARAGRAPHS; (1ST SUBPARAGRAPH) "THE SENIOR
JAPANESE COMMANDER AND ALL GROUND, SEA, AIR AND AUXILIARY FORCES
WITHIN THE ANDAMANS, NICOBARS, BURMA, THAILAND, FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SOUTH OF 16°00 NORTH LATITUDE, MALAYA, SUMATRA, JAVA, LESHER SUNDS
(INCLUDING BAY, LOMBOK, CERAM, AMBON, KAI, AROE, TAMBARAN, AND
ISLANDS IN THE ARARURA SEA, CELEBES, RALUAPARAS, AND DUTCH NEW
GUINEA, SHALL SURRENDER TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, ASIA
COMMAND "X" (2ND SUBPARAGRAPH) "THE SENIOR JAPANESE COMMANDER AND
ALL GROUND, SEA, AIR AND AUXILIARY FORCES WITHIN BORNEO, BRITISH NEW
GUINEA, THE BISMARCKS AND SOLOMONS, SHALL SURRENDER TO THE COMMANDER
IN-CHIEF COA AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES" X PARAGRAPH 2 FROM SUB-
PARAGRAPH D PART 1 DELETE "RYUKYUS" X PARAGRAPH 3 IN SUBPARAGRAPH E PART 1 INSERT "RYUKYUS" THE PHRASE "AND THE PHILIPPINES" X PARAGRAPH 4 IN SUB PARAGRAPH A OF PART 2 INSERT "NAVAL AND RPT."

FOLLOWING THE WORD "LAND" X PARAGRAPH 5 IN PART 2 DELETE THE 14TH WORD "FORCES" AND SUBSTITUTE TRUEDE "POWERS"

(ADDITIONAL ADDRESS FROM READDRESS)

INFO TO: COM7THFLT
        COM5THFLT
        COMNORPAC
        COM3RDFLT

[Signature]
19 1615 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES in CHINA.- COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC (CINC PACIFIC). COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES in CHINA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, CHINA. COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED FORCES in CHINA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, CHINA.

X 2520.

By 2-515, date time group 190909 OCT, (Z 520) paragraph "(C)", General Order number 1 military and naval, the period will be hereby amended to read "The Senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within MANCHURIA, KOREA north of 38-00 north latitude, KURILE ISLANDS shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East". Reference Washington Radiogram WX 51396 (not to all nor needed).

20 2137 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to DEAN in CMAGT. MACARTHUR, SHAATZ.

WARX 52004.

The following with reference to your H 25339 is for your information.

Para. There will be a large number of U. S. aircraft operating over and into JAPAN, particularly in the next months. These include the occupational air forces, transport runs into and from JAPAN and KOREA, and naval air operations. A transport route from the ALKUTANS probably will be inaugurated. U. S. Naval and merchant vessels will operate throughout the north Pacific and the JAPAN Sea. The requirement for the best possible weather service over JAPAN and adjacent areas in the north Pacific will therefore be intensified as a result of the Japanese capitulation and the weather centres will be needed.

Para. As for the liaison groups, it is recognized that some means of liaison will be necessary to handle the details of post hostilities problems you mention. However, the great bulk of these will concern the coordination of movement of supplies and aircraft into a port or area immediately adjacent to a port. It is considered that this liaison can most expeditiously be handled by a liaison group aboard ship, which will permit the liaison group to be present on the spot required and not be immobilized at a place where it may not be needed. In this connection it is believed that the great bulk of the new problems which will arise as the result of the Japanese capitulation will, on the Soviet side, require resolution in MOSCOW rather than by commanders in the field.

Para. Since the Soviets have already been informed of the decision on this matter and the weather personnel and equipment is now on route, it is considered no action should be taken to justify this decision to the Soviet at this time unless they raise the question.

21 0518 CINC PACIFIC ADVANCE to COMINCH into CINCAPAC, COMGEN CHINA, COMCHINA.

A conference took place at Manila 19 August between representatives CINC PACIFIC, COMTHIPLFT and COMCHINA. The following concept of operations was concurred in by COMTHIPLFT, by COMCHINA'S representative and by the headquarters of CINCAPAC on the staff level. It is recommended for approval as the basis for interim operations and for further planning. This constitutes my comment on COMCHINA'S CP 4740 CP-5106 and JCS 50182.

- continued -
210018 CINCPAC ADVANCE to GUAMCHIN into CINCINNE, COMCHINNE, CINCPAC (Cont'd)

Para. It appears that 30 September is the earliest realistic planning date for landing marines on CHINA COAST without undue interference with occupation JAPAN and KOREA.

Para. Concept of operations:

A. Establish north CHINA naval force under CINCPAC in SHANTUNG-CHINHOTAG area as soon as possible to consist of 2 battle cruisers, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 Cardiv and accompanying destroyers. This force would control YELLOW SEA and GULF OF CHINA and also support occupation of KOREA.

B. Establish YANGTSE patrol under CINCPAC with 2 light cruisers, destroyers and small types as CHINA THEATER forces reach YANGTSE and start of minesweeping permits.

C. Establish south CHINA patrol under CINCPAC with gunboats and destroyers escorts as soon as CHINA THEATER forces take a part. Troops available are the 3rd Hq Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops, the 5th MarDiv and the 6th MarDiv less 1 regiment. In view of prospect demobilization requirements it is not advisable to commit the 4th MarDiv which would make a total of 6 Marine Divisions in JAPAN and CHINA. CINCPAC representative indicated that a MarDiv from the 5th Hq Corps could be released from JAPAN when relieved in October by the 95th or 97th Inf Div. This MarDiv could reinforce the 3rd Hq Corps.

Para. Information from COMCHINNE indicates that unless unfavorable developments occur divisions of the Chinese combat command controlled by Chinese officers will by late September be in control of SHANGHAI, NANKING and CANTON and that no other troops will be needed in SHANGHAI to make naval operations feasible in the YAPITSE UVR.

D. Operate temporarily in 7th Fleet approximately 72 landing craft infantry for use as coastal and river transport and gunboats.

E. Direct supply intended previously for N TT BAYARD to such port as COMCHINNE may designate.

F. Prepare for occupation CHINHOTAG and TAIWAN or, alternately if CENTRAL CHINA situation required, when forces are ready, occupation SHANGHAI area.

210041 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POW. TO SAGA5A, CGC AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES (SAGA5A), INFO HARRIS (JCS) CINCPAC ADVANCE H.
NO SECRE
AUG 14 (10)

21 0517 CINCAPAC to COM3RDFIT Info COAST ARM. CINCAP ADV NO. CSSY MAC, CO LIVI
AIRBORNE

CX 35347. From CG 8th Army to COM3rdFt. Reference your radio dispatched
190219. In view of the fact that NAYAMA, ZUSHI and KAMAKURA have been
selected as the headquarters area of the Supreme Allied Command, and
advice given the Japanese emissaries that the initial landings would be
in restricted areas, it is considered advisable to put into effect the
general provision of your plan 2, with not to exceed what is normally
considered to be a regimental combat team, of 3 battalions of infantry
and 1 battalion of supporting artillery, initially. Additional troops
to be landed as required. Landing force as limited above is acceptable.
Brigadier General Clement will report by radio upon my assumption of com-
mand about 1200 1 (-9) 23 August. His force will land in the vicinity
of YOKOS UKA and occupy the general area: URAJISU-UIBUKISHI-FUKOSHIMA-YOKOSUKA.
all inclusive. Commanding General 11th Airborne Division is charged with
coordination of boundaries. Airfield for 11th Airborne and F Hour will
be designated by JCAF. Employment of elements of the 3rd Fleet air and
naval gunfire support will be arranged directly with Commanding General
11th Airborne Division at CHINA. Recommend liaison officers be dis-
patched by air to Headquarters 11th Airborne Division to coordinate
details. Essential personnel to furnish communications to be supplied by
APAC Jasco unit at CHINA. The emissaries were directed to have the
area evacuated of Japanese troops but we must be alert to guard against
surprise.

21 0755 COMGEN CHINA to SUPREME CINC ADV NO FOR ALLIED COMMANDS Info MARCO, FOR JCS,
passed by COMINC to CINCAPA ADV H.

TOP SECRET. CPBX 5409 Your to sec radio 4 515 assigning areas of respons-
sibility for accepting surrender Japanese entitled reference to the
CODE NAME FORCES. We are assuming that subject area is including in
CHINA Theater's area of responsibility an absence of instructions to the
contrary.

22 0915 CINCAPAC to COMGEN CHINA Info CINCAP ADV H.

TOP SECRET. 35704 Your CPB 5250 dated 20th and CPB 6906 dated 17th
are references. This headquarters has made no estimate of nor received
requests for United States Army service troops in support of the Marine
forces indicated by CINCAPAC available for CHINA coast operations, other
than those previously allocated for the FORT BAYARD operation. Availability
can be determined only after complete requirement is known. Generally
speaking many types of service units are now short of requirements for
occupation JAPAN and KOREA and supporting bases. No understanding is require-
ment for air forces. BELEAGUE indicates availability of Marine aircraft
wing. Fort personnel provided by CINCAPAC for FORT BAYARD project are
now loading and will proceed in accordance with CINCAPAC instructions.

Para. For CINCPAC only, COMINC CHINA CPB 5250 dated 20th is being repeated
to you for information in accordance with this dispatch.

21 1220 COMGEN CHINA to MARCOY Info CINCAPAC, CINCPAC, COMINC, CINCAPAC, CHINA THEATER, GENDA
COMINC CHINA, COMINC KOREA

TOP SECRET. CPBX 5404 REPRESENTATIVES of CHINA Theater, General Command
(continued)

and Captain Painter, USN proceeded to MANILA, 18 August pursuant to a
message requesting conferences among representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPAC
and COMCINCHINA. Message CZ 34/316 refers. Discussions dealt with avail-
ability of occupation forces for CHINA and with problems of logistic sup-
port and personnel lift. The following subjects were discussed on a
planning level only and agreements reached on that level as indicated
below:

Para A. The question of priorities for occupation forces. It was
agreed that the 1st priority must remain JAPAN and KOREA. It was
tentatively indicated that forces would probably be moved into key points
on CHINA coast after 10 divisions had reached JAPAN and 2 divisions had
been put ashore in KOREA. 1st 2 divisions therefore could land in CHINA
approximately 30 September.

Para B. Naval assistance for CHINA. Preliminary examination and planning
are under way covering operations of 7th Fleet under Admiral Kinkaid to
support CHINA Theater forces and to control coastal waters. As presently
planned, 3 naval forces would be established to include: A SOUTH CHINA
Naval Force based general in the CAIFON area; A NORTH CHINA Task Force
in TSINGTAO-CHIEPFO-CHINHAI area, and a 3rd Task Force for
operations in the YANOTZE. The former is subject to approval by CINCPAC,
COMCINCHINA and CNO. WASHINGTON.

Para C. United States forces for occupation in key areas on CHINA Coast.
As previously agreed between CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMCINCHINA 1st
Marine divisions (less 1 regimental combat team) will be available for
occupation of key points on the Chinese coast with a possibility of
later getting a 3rd Marine division if it can be replaced by 1 of the
US Army divisions presently en route from United States.

Para D. Furnishing of transportation for movement of Chinese forces to
key occupation areas. As previously agreed, for 2 Marine divisions
initially allotted to the occupation of CHINA Theater areas can be turned
cover to CHINA Theater for movement of forces thereafter (about 15 October).
In addition, an exploratory examination is being undertaken to determine
whether approximately 50 landing craft infantry can be furnished for use
in moving the Chinese troops along the West, YANOTZE and HUE RIVER/SEP
coastal movement. CINCPAC has stated that this type craft is not suitable
for large scale movement of US forces into JAPAN and KOREA.

Para E. Convoy to open port and furnish supplies to CHINA. It was agreed
that the convoy of the lst 3 ships plus the additional equipment and
personnel furnished by CINCPAC and CINCPAC would be run into the SHANGHAI
NANKING AREA as soon as SHANGHAI and NANKING are secured (estimated about
15 September). It was further agreed that the lst convoy could go into
NANKING if necessary to facilitate distribution of gasoline and other
critical supplies. Thereafter the main port would be established at
SHANGHAI. The lower YANOTZE must be swept of mines prior to the bridging
of the convoy into CHINA.

Para F. Evacuation of U.S. and Allied Personnel stationed in 1945. Discus-
sion onstaff level in CINCPAC indicates that maximum effort presently
be made available by the JOINTFORS recovered personnel could be assembled

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and transported to a port area and meanwhile CINCPAC is examining the availability of evacuation and hospital ships and NAFS aircraft for rapid movement of recovered personnel to OICANAC or the MARLAKAS for processing and necessary hospitalization prior to their being placed in the normal evacuation pipeline via the Pacific, the United States.

Para 9. Japanese disarmed and civilian personnel in CHINA. Preliminary discussions were held with representatives of CINCPAC and CINCPAC on priorities for evacuation of Japanese disarmed personnel from CHINA to the Japanese main islands; and it was agreed that early evacuation of all Japanese military and civilian personnel from CHINA was mandatory to prevent serious unrest in CHINA and the possibility of large groups of Japanese becoming established in Chinese Communities.

Para. Information will be furnished CINCPAC when firm request for naval assistance are forwarded through War Department for processing as per instructions in WAX 5117. That is all.

21 2230 Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur Info Military, Foreign, State, Economic.

WAX 52674. United States Policy Re: United CNA 34637 follows:

Para. "The 4 Allied Powers are bound by the 1945 ultimatum to permit the return of Japanese military forces, after they are completely disarmed, to their homes. Pending such return, which of necessity depends on the availability of transportation, this personnel may be used for such purposes and subject to such conditions and directives as may be prescribed by the national Commanders authorized to receive the surrender. Surrendered Japanese soldiers should be considered as disarmed personnel and not necessarily as prisoners of war.

Para. Until the Japanese Armed Forces are secured, discussion and commitments concerning treatment of Japanese disarmed forces during the period between their surrender and their return to their homes should be held to the essential minimum.

Para. Desire you inform "countbaton of above suggesting that he may wish to adopt a similar policy reference the STLP this personnel.

21 2327 CONFIDENT to CIN 30-1, CIN 30-2, CIN 30-3, 30-4, 30-5, 30-6, 30-7, CTF 31, 32, 33, COMFLEET-ASKWORTHY, COMAND-CHABOT, CINCPAC-CONRAD-CONRAD, CINCPAC-CONRAD-CONRAD, CINCPAC-CONRAD-CONRAD, CINCPAC-CONRAD-CONRAD, CINCPAC-CONRAD-CONRAD, CINCPAC-CONRAD-CONRAD.

Here is COMFLEET OpPlan 11-45:

A. Task Group 30.1 Fleet Flagship Group Captain Murray.
B. Task Group 30.2 British Flagship Group Captain Michell.
C. Task Group 30.3 Air search and recon Group Captain Grant.
D. Task Group 30.6 Allied POM rescue group Commodore Simpson.
E. Task Group 30.8 Logistic Support Group Rear Admiral Beary.
F. Task Group 30.9 EMET/ET service group Commodore Auff.
G. Task Force 31 YOKOSUKA occupation force Rear Admiral.
H. Task Force 32 3rd Amphibious Force Vice Admiral.

H Sub 1 and H Sub 2 Task Forces 33 and 34 respectively commanders and forces as assigned by CTF 32.

H Sub 3 and Task Force 36 landing force Major General (as specified for each landing).

- continued -
I. Task Force 35 support force RAdm Helms.
J. Task Force 37 British Support force VAdm Rawlings RN.
K. Task Force 38 2nd Carrier Task Force VAdm McCain until relieved by VAdm Towers.
L. Task Force 39 1st Carrier Task Force VAdm Sherman.

Units for all groups and forces less task forces, 33, 34 and 36 as currently assigned subject to later modification by dispatch. Units assigned Task Forces 33, 34 and 36 as directed by CTF 32.

Para. Japan has surrendered. Information of TOKYO BAY AREA and enemy forces by mail and separate dispatch. Army forces have seized ATSUCHI airfield and CINCPAC Advance Headquarters are established there. CTF 31 forces hold YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE and airfields and 3rd Fleet forces are disposed in the TOKYO BAY-SAGAMI WAN AREA. 3rd Fleet Air is patrolling HONSHU and the TOKYO BAY AREA. KANAYA airfield KASHIWA is held by our occupation forces. This OpPlan stems from CINCPAC and CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45 and covers landing of 8th Army units in TOKYO BAY AREA which operations coincide with execution of CINCPAC B-20 Operation.

Para. This Fleet, while continuing missions assigned in my OpPlan FFKU 45, will land and firmly establish ashore at locations as arranged with CINCPAC designated elements of the 8th U.S. Army and assist the Army in enforcing surrender terms in order to gain and exercise military, political and economic control of the Japanese Empire.


SubPara. XL, SubParas XL and X3 my OpPlan 10-45 apply.
X2 3rd Phil will land 11th Corps headquarters, 1st cavalry Div and 112 ROY over DL KOSHI YOKOHAMA and YOKOSUKA about 31 August, American Div over beaches at SAGAMI KAWA-WHO SHTMA about 5 September and 43rd Div over YOKOHAMA- YOKOSUKA docks 13 September. All dates subject to later delay.

X4 Annex B special instructions to Task Forces Annex D air plan will be issued by separate dispatch.
X5 This plan will be placed in effect by dispatch.


Para. Command locations as in annex F my OpPlan 10-45 with CTF 32 and CTF 39 added as major subordinate commands. Commander 3rd Amphibious Force or his delegated group commander is in command of the Amphibious Operations until the landing force is established ashore at which time command of forces ashore passes to the landing force commander. Communications in accordance with Pac 70-3 CINCPAC OpPlan 12-45 and Annex H my OpPlan 1-45. Commander 3rd Fleet in MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY.

21 2329 CONSIDER IT to CTF 31, 35, 37 info CINCPAC, COMINTNAF, COMUCH, CIUSPMR, CIUSPMR PT OF CS, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMUS 8TH ARMV, COMUSPMR, 3RDPHIB COGEN USASTAF, COMSHAEWAN, COGEN PEAR ADVOC.

- continued -
Annex B to Oplan 11-45. Special instructions to Task Forces.

Para. Task Force 31 assist Army forces as necessary to clear dock areas in YOKOSUKA-YOKOHAMA AREAS in preparation for disembarkation of troops by 3rd Flot on about 31 August and 13 September. Render such assistance as CTF 32 may request in furnishing advance dock parties at YOKOSUKA, special communications during landings and traffic control through YOKOSUKA naval zone. Provide such personnel and vessels to CTF 35 as may be required to accomplish tasks assigned to him.

Para. Task Force 35 clear water and beach approaches in area SAGAMI KAWA-FUJI SHINDO and make same in preparation for amphibious landings that area on about 6 September. Obtain necessary units, APDs and other personnel and vessels as may be required for this purpose from CTF 31. Provide fire support units for all landings as CTF 32 may request.

Para. Task Force 37 provide fire support units for landings as CTF 32 may request.

Para. All Task Forces authorized communicate direct with CTF 32 in arranging details accordance these instructions keeping originator advised.


Para 1. General Air Tasks outlined Annex D to Oplan 11-45 apply except no air base assembly required from surface units 3rd Fleet. 3rd Flot area of responsibility is combat area east of 159th Meridian and west of air coordinating line except when directed by CINCPAC western boundary 3rd fleet area of responsibility moved eastward to 159th Meridian for sea and area in the Japanese homeland to correspond to western limit occupation area 8th Army. Also when directed by CINCPAC northern boundary 3rd fleet area of responsibility moved southward to 40th parallel except that COMAIRFLT will coordinate activities 3rd fleet and north pacific forces in HOKKAIDO-OMINATO area insofar as cooperation with 8th Army is concerned.

Para 2. Operations (A) CTF 38. When basic plan placed in effect CTF 38 responsible for general air tasks east of 159 meridian (areas star and flagstaff) and east of the line of demarkation of occupation areas for 6th and 8th armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) conduct daily air searches sea approaches Japanese homeland, (2) conduct air patrols over airfields Japanese homeland, (3) maintain show of force over Japanese territory, (4) provide air cover occupation forces, (5) Be prepared to furnish direct air support for attack and ground forces as requested by Com3rd FltFor as follows: For each landing area air cover, air support group with coordinator, tactical observer and photo planes plus both observer and combat air patrol for SAGAMI landing, all controlled by CARBU in 3rd FltFor flagship, (6) Be prepared to furnish direct air support for ground forces as requested by 8th Army upon assumption of command where, (7) Be prepared to act against any opposition encountered when directed by Com3rd Flt, (8) Be prepared to strike Japanese air bases or ground aircraft air installations or enemy troop concentrations as directed by Com3rd Flt, (9) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd fleet forces as directed, (B) CTF 39. When basic plan placed in effect CTF 39
responsible for general air tasks sea area between 130th and 139 meridians
(area stripes) and Japanese homeland between air coordination line (Annex
D my OpPlan 10-45) and the line of demarkation occupation areas 6th and 5th
armies. Within this area of responsibility (1) Conduct daily air searches
sea approaches Japanese homeland. (2) Conduct air patrols over airfields
Japanese homeland. (3) Maintain show of force over Japanese territory. (4)
Provide air cover for occupation forces moving through sea area of responsi-

(5) Be prepared to act against any opposition amount rd when
directed by Con3rdFlt. (6) Be prepared to strike Japanese airborne or
grounded aircraft, air installations or enemy troop concentrations as di-
drected by Con3rdFlt. (7) Be prepared to reinforce support and/or cover 3rd
FIt forces as directed. (C) Con3rdFltFor. When basis plan placed in

Para 3. Garrison, (A) VAG 31, (B) NATS landplane unit. 1 garrison
squadrons and ground echelons will be assigned appropriate tasks when
installed.

22 0729 CINCPAC ADVANCE TO CON3RD. CON3RD. CON3RD. CON3RD. CINCPAC
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22 1210 COMEIGHINA to WAGOS, COMINCH into CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

CPFX 5586.

We are instructed that arrangements for full military coordination should be made between British and Chinese Governments prior to British participation in operations in the CHINA THEATER. Also General MacArthur has been instructed to arrange for the surrender of HONGKONG to British Commander when such coordination has been completed. CINCPAC has forwarded us a message for information which indicates that CINCPAC is requesting fueling and servicing facilities from U.S. resources in Philippines for British Naval forces earmarked for occupation of HONGKONG. To my knowledge the necessary military coordination between the British and the Generalissimo is not being made reference WAX 51481.

22 1035 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, MILITTY into COMMANDER US NAVAL FORCES, AUSTRALIA-N.EW CHINA.

WAX 53079.

Adjustment of the boundaries of the southwest Pacific area (SWPA) and changes in command responsibilities agreed to at terminal will become effective at the time of the formal surrender of JAPAN. Concurrently with the command "Commander Allied Naval Forces SWPA" will be abolished and all Allied Naval vessels of this command other than United States vessels will pass to British Empire control.

17 1110 COMEIGHINA to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info WAGOS, CC OCM, CINCPAC.

CPFX 4928.

The problem of orderly surrender of the bulk of Japanese Troops in the CHINA THEATER with the preservation of law and order in presently Japanese-occupied areas resolves itself to one of rapidly deploying central government troops into strategic areas.

Para. Means of moving occupational armies are limited to air, rivers destroyed railroads highways, due to the condition of the latter 2 and the engineering problems involved in repairs, only air and water routes offer any immediate possibilities for rapid movement of troops and supplies.

Para. The bulk of troops to be moved are in south and central CHINA where by means locally available concentrations may be assembled in the WUCHOW (111-40-23-30) CANTON AND HANKOW AREAS.

Para. Plans are being formulated to airlift 1 Army to HANKOU requiring 30 days with the resources available. This will be followed by a 2nd Army which will be moved to north CHINA, this move will require approximately 2 weeks additional days. These troop movements are less than 50 percent of the movement considered essential to meet the emergency situation with which we are faced.

Para. The additional movement of 1 Army (35000 men plus 2000 tons) from HANKOW to SHANGHAI and 1 Army from WUCHOW to TAKU are considered urgent.

Para. The limitations of airlift are largely based on pool available in the theater, the only present supply line being over the hump.

Para. The following water routes are good movement possibilities:

1. Coastal CHINA SEA
2. YUNG-CHU river from HANKOW to SHANGHAI.

- continued -
22 1936 JOIN ORDER OF STAFF to INSTRUCT INTO MAGNAMARU, QUEMOC.

WAX 35111
Book message. Year 120313 (not required by information allocated).
In view of Japanese surrender as further action decided with respect to
HAPEO project for introduction of OSS personnel into EMMA by submergence.

23 1936 ORDER TO CINCPAC ADVANCEInto CINCPAC, U.S., IMMEDIATE.

For your information, British OSS have issued instructions to CINCPAC
that forces intended for SINGAPORE should be held at LEMUR or any other
contingency port until further orders. CINCPAC has been directed to them
to conform to Homefront views on the timing of Jap surrender.

25 1936 ORDER OF STAFF to MAGNAMARU, QUEMOC, JAP. IMMEDIATE.

WAX 57765
Book urgent back message. Necessity is directed to achieve something
when military coordination with Jap and with the Chinese Board of Military
Operations is completed by the British at which time Headquarters will
arrange for the surrender of NMS I300 to the British. By this surrender
the British desire that the surrender should be made to a British conuner-
dor to be nominated by Admiral Periott.

Forc. The British Chief's of Staff further state that they will give
full facilities through the NMS I300 to allow for the assistance and support of
Chinese and Japanese forces who may still be either engaged against each other
or involved in securing the surrender of Japanese forces in the Mandated. Further
to WAX 57765, the British Chief's of Staff state that military coordination
on operational matters is being affected by them.
24 0118 CONOPAC ADVISE 2 COMINFOTACOM, COMOPAC ADVISE FUTURE COMMISSION
APPROVED

The future. Comply with directive my OpPlan with respect to occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and CHINA as soon as practicable after 31 August. Inform me as to your plans.

24 0229 CONOPAC ADVISE 2 COMINFOTACOM, COMOPAC ADVISE FUTURE

The future. Reference your 220951 not to all or needed. Units listed on Page B-5 my serial 280293 include those units listed in your operations instruction 6 Annex 3. Initial operations of Marine fighter groups to be under CINCIND and 7th Fleets for protection convoys and searches for shipping. Operational control of these groups to pass to CINCPAC when and as desired by CINCPAC. CINCPAC retains responsibility for logistic support of all units except as modified by my 200406. This cancels my L30624. Naval search squadrons and HAT squadrons augmented by VFA squadrons remain under naval control at all times.

25 0119 CONOPAC ADVISE 2 COMINFOTACOM.

My 240118. Your 241115. When will ships of 7th Fleet occupy and control waters of JAPAN.

25 0221 CONOPAC ADVISE 2 COMINFOTACOM, COMOPAC ADVISE CHINA.

JUN 242317. The proposals of my 210921 with respect to CHINA assumed the prior seizure of a port in KOREA. TR DEC 22 will be ready to sail from OKINAWA 7 September for KOREA with the 7th Infantry Division embarked plus designated Corps Troops. Date of sailing 46th and 94th Divisions from the PHILIPPINES not available to me. Will advise when known.

Para. If the Russians seize HILJO recommend the occupation of FUKAS which commands the KOREA and TSUSHIMA STRAITS and controls important rail communications.

25 0259 CONOPAC ADVISE 2 CONPLAN 10, CONPLAN 06, CONPLAN 08.

This organisation of mobile service forces for operation COMPASS-MENAGER modifies my OpPlan 12-45.

Para. CONSERVION 6 will operate directly under CONPLAN 10, will provide service direct for the fast carrier task forces and other fleet forces as required, and will allocate to their logistic support groups service units from those assigned to SERVON 6. CONSERVION 6 may be expected to command several of these logistic support groups.

Para. CONSERVION 10 will operate directly under CONPLAN 10, will provide mobile base services in the HYSKUS AREA, MARIANAS AREA, HAP-AREA and at LAYTE, and will allocate to service divisions in occupied areas in JAPAN and to the rear bases above mentioned service units from those assigned SERVON 10. CONSERVIONS 10, 92 and 103 with their staffs
may be moved forward to naval anchorage in occupied areas in Japan and China at the discretion of CINCPAC, 3RD, and 5TH Fleets respectively. This modifies my 160633.

250953 CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

Refer my 220703. Your concurrence CONTINFLY COMAIR requested.

201656 COMAIR and COMAIR to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

My 191646 was for planning purposes and comment is directed both as to permanent setup and time or times of implementation. Comment should include any desired interim proposals. Reply need not be made until you have had adequate opportunity for consideration.

200729 COMAIR to CINCPAC passed to CINCPAC ADV. JCT ORMN.

CINCPAC 5250.

Joint Staff Study BLOCHNEN section 6 para 5 mentions landing success to consist of Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops in addition to Marine Division quay will the composition of Corps be adequate to provide necessary port and limited area construction, hospitalization, military police, ordinance maintenance, motor transportation, port landing and unloading, signal service, depot supply for common user items, medical control and survey, water purification and port overhead in support of approximately 7500 American Troops (in addition to the landing force) in the SHANGHAI AREA to include 2 or 4 fighter groups, 2 BOMM squadrms, 3 air service groups and an Air Depot group. Information is urgent to determine stoppage of certain units now ready for use and move lift from U.S., that were previously set up for BAYARD. Also info required for decision with JNT as to disposition of units presently committed in JNT where intended to support BAYARD. Prefer bringing in all necessary supply and supporting troops (other than air corps) direct from Funafuti to conserve critical transportation trans INDIA and CHINA. Can similar supporting units be later supplied for other ports such as CANTON if required by U.S. Operations.

250959 COMAIR to CINCPAC. CINCPAC ADV info CONTINFLY COMAIR. JST.

CINCPAC 5989.

Refer to CINCPAC 39794 dated 22 August. CINCPAC ADVANCE got also refer to it is now assumed that occupation of SHANGHAI will be accomplished by Chinese Central Government Forces. Marine Divisions will occupy KYUSHU and TSUKUBA in that priority. It is assumed here that these Marine Units will be self supporting and will be supplied by CINCPAC. No marine air units are required at CHINA THEATER can furnish entire air support. CHINA THEATER will operate out of SHANGHAI with resources previously available for operation of BAYARD including same from INDIA THEATER and same from CINCPAC as listed in his 070953. Through this part we will eventually support all CHINA THEATER, U.S. Forces and INDIA THEATER port operating units and all common user items for 3900 shore based Army which should take care of LCI crews and YANUTSE patrol shore units.
26 0419 SHAP TO HARBOR FOR JCS INFO COMCHINCHINA. CINCPAC ADV. COMCHINCHINA CHINA FRC. COMCHINCHINA CHINA FRC.

CI 34693.

Reference XI 54544, also CINCPAC 250801 not to all or cancel. The present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy NEJIO on 11 September. Conferences this date indicate that the initial movement of lightly armed troops, 2E, APA and AKA, can take place leaving COMCHINCHINA on the 3rd arriving NEJIO on the 7th. This movement will be followed with heavier equipment as rapidly as possible. This plan is being approved and instructions are being issued to COMCHINCHINA and others to execute generally as indicated.

26 0627 CINCPAC ADV TO COMCHINCHINA INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC FRC. COMCHINCHINA, CHINA FRC.

Year 250290 to CINCPAC and 250222 to CINCPAC. Corps Troops to be landed with other units of the Fleet Marine Forces in North CHINA are in general limited to those required for the direct support of the Amphibious Corps and attached combat units ground and air. Detailed list follows in separate dispatch.

Para. If these troops are committed in North CHINA as now proposed there will be no similar units available from resources under my control for use at SHANGHAI.

Para. Year 250290 refers to TAIW whereas my 250222 refers to CHINAKUANGTAO. Suggest this be left open as a local tactical matter until your liaison party arrives and meanwhile we both refer to "TAIWAN AREA".

26 0939 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCMARITIME. CINCPAC, CINCMARITIME INFO CINCPAC, CHINA FRC. COMCHINCHINA, CHINA FRC.

My top secret 170906. Plan to activate WAKA as naval air base (under administrative operational control and logistic support of COMMARITIME) to support limited operation of search and patrol aircraft and primarily for servicing transient aircraft including scheduled operations of MACT. Provide no defense. Limit personnel to minimum for accomplishment above mission initially for landplanes. COMSPECPAC, CINPMARITIME render such assistance as COMMARITIME may require. COMMARITIME nominate naval aviator rank Captain or Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base WAKA.

26 0907 CINCPAC ADV TO COMMARITAS. CINCPAC, COMMARITAS INFO CINCPAC, CHINA FRC. COMCHINCHINA, CHINA FRC.

My top secret 170906. Plan to activate MARINES as naval air base (under administrative operational control and logistic support of CINCPAC) to support limited operation of search and patrol aircraft and primarily for servicing transient aircraft including scheduled operations of MACT. Provide mission initially for landplanes. COMSPECPAC, CINPMARITIME render such assistance as COMMARITAS may require. COMMARITAS nominate naval aviator rank Captain or Commander as prospective Commander Naval Air Base MARINES.
26 0821  CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC Area. CINCPAC FLEET, GRUMMAN, OR 6TH ARMY

URGENT 251 SOR. Present tentative plans for demobilization of Marine Corps units include the disbandment of all Marine AAA Group Headquarters and AAA Base with the exception of 2 Marine AAA Bases which have definite post-war commitments in the Pacific Ocean area. Employment of 2 amphibious Corps and 5 Marine Divisions in CAMPAIGN and ENDGAME simultaneously necessitates the disbandment of certain other FLEET units in order to meet additional service requirements and to permit a partial demobilization of Marine Corps personnel. In view of the above regrets that AAA units requested URGENT 251 SOR are not available.
Para. All Army AAA units in MARIANAS are available for release to you. MyDly 161512 July refer.

26 0110  CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC Area. CINCPAC FLEET, GRUMMAN, OR 6TH ARMY

Comply with directive by OpPlan with respect to occupation and control of coastal waters of JAPAN and CHINA as soon as practicable after 31 August. Inform me as to your plans.

26 1713  CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC Area. CINCPAC FLEET, GRUMMAN, OR 6TH ARMY

WARNING ORDER. Initiate preparations for operation REUNION with target date (E-Day) 30 September 1945 in accordance Joint Staff Study order 0005105 August 13 with emphasis of modifications contained herein. Admiral T.C. Hart will command the operation with Vice Admiral E. H. Rodger in command of amphibious forces and Major General Keller H. Reckey in command expeditionary troops. Occupation troops will consist of I MARINE CORPS, 1st Marine Div. Reinforced (less 4th RCT) occupying TAIWAN AREA and 6th Marine Div. reinforced (less 4th RCT) occupying SHANGHAI AREA. In the event of Central CHINA situation requires, 4th Marine Div. will be in area reserve in HAWAIIAN AREA. Marine Aviation units will consist of 1st Marine Aviation Wing consisting of Battle 1, Carrier 1, 1st Marine Air Wing, MAG 10 with MAG 12, MAG 13, VFP 113, VFP 211, VFP 214, MAG 24 with MAG 26, MAG 26, VFP 535, VFP 341, MAG 22 with MAG 24, MAG 24, MAG 44, MAG 44, VFP 134, MAG 24 with MAG 26, MAG 26, MAG 152, MAG 152. CINCPAC ADVANCE Directive to COMPOE hi, FLEET Combat Forces for disposition for planning.
Para. Gal. W. J. Fox will be designated as Commanding Officer MAB No. 1 in TAIWAN AREA. Gal. F. J. Schmalzel will be designated as Commanding Officer MAB No. 2 in TAIWAN AREA. These echelons should be ordered to report to COMPOE hi, FLEET Combat Forces as early as possible. CINCPAC ADVANCE Directive to be prepared for distribution of air units between MAB No. 1 and MAB No. 2.
Para. MAB's will be under command of COMPOE hi, FLEET Combat Forces. MARINE FLEET COMPOE hi, FLEET Combat Forces to assume command above in CHINA he will be under operational control.
control of COMSHOCINA and will report by dispatch to COMSHOCINA accordingly.

Para. 26. 1713 (Combat '44)

A. For TIENTSOON AREA. Other CHAPAC

B. For TAIHEPAC AREA. Both CHAPAC are assigned operational control

COMSHOCINA. COMSHOCINA advises designation of CHAPAC for each area and

order GO of each to report at earliest by dispatch to COMSHOCINA.

COMSHOCINA advises location availability date and shipping implications of

each component. COM/TEPHIFOR will be responsible for providing shipping,

loading and movement of all units mounting west of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and

for issuance of general loading and sailing instructions to COMSHOCINA and

COMSHOCINA for units under their cogiscnce mounting in the HAWAIIAN area

and west coast. COMSHOCINA PEARL will provide shipping and COMSHOCINA will

arrange for the loading and movement of all units under COMSHOCINA and

COMSHOCINA cogiscnce mounting from the HAWAIIAN AREA and the west coast.

Para. 27. 1708 COMSHOCINA ADVANCE TO ALL FLAG OFFICERS.

Questions as to disposition and use of captured or occupied territory
are political ones to be determined by responsible officials of the govern-
ment. Where the governmental policy has not been announced the American
position should not be embarrassed by high ranking naval officers giving
expression to their own opinions particularly as they may be lacking
information on all the considerations involved. You will be governed
accordingly.
26 1530

DE'REE to AMAR FOR HAGOO, CHINAPPAC - GUNNERS PARAS TO GUNNERS AREA

MX 25437.

Following is U.S. Military Mission Moscow RUSKIA MX 25437 to War Department dated 23 August 1945.

Antevon called me early this morning and handed me the following letter which he wishes transmitted to General MacArthur "After reading your letter of 19 August 1945 which contained the Instrument of Surrender of Japan the General Staff of the Red Army considers it necessary to include in this Instrument the following amendments.

1. Change paragraph 3 to read: We hereby demand that all Japanese forces, wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith.

2. Change paragraph 5 to read:

3. Change paragraph 8 to read:

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government in the future shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or to such organization as the Allied Powers may create for those purposes who will take such steps as they deem proper to effectuate these terms of surrender. Antevon stated that the above amendments had the approval of Generalissimo Stalin. We explained that the amendments to paragraphs 3 and 5 were for the purpose of taking care of the local situation in the different theaters of operation.

Para. 10 on the sheet proposed in paragraph 8 be stated that initially the authority of the Emperor would be subject to the sole authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, but that it might later be found desirable to set up an organization for the government of Japan similar to that which now exists for the government of Germany. I request I be given information upon which to base a reply. Ends.

27 1530

OMERMA to CHINAPPAC ADVISE INTEG CHINA

WFB 6092.

Censor is including a marine aircraft wing at reduced strength for marine corps operations in TIENTSIN and/or TSINGTAO area of north CHINA.

AGREE (247)
For planning purposes only following tentative logistic plan for land based naval and marine forces RELEAGUE part of section II to OP Plan 15-45 is effective. Target Date (W-Day) 30 September. COMPAV agencies as indicated herein are responsible complete logistic support marine and naval unit in occupied areas. Occupied areas TSINIPAO and TIRENARU.

Para 1. Supply.

A. Mounting supplies, COMPORTIPAC, COMAIRIPAC, COMSIPAC and CONCOMPA responsible in accordance existing policy for providing following mounting supplies: 30 days classes 1,2,3,4 including water in drums, tons 2 gal/usb/day; 5 days, winter clothing, chemical protective clothing and equipment. Construction supplies as directed by COMPOPSO for minimum rehabilitation airfields, watercraft facilities and roads. Class 5 units fire combat troops, 1 unit fire service troops, V-A 10 missions.

B. Resupply. Agencies listed above responsible for providing re-supply. COMPORTIPAC is charged with responsibility to coordinate procurement, assembling and shipping of resupply all classes for all Navy and Marine forces ashore in the objective. CONCOMPA will furnish shipping as requested by COMPORTIPAC. Resupply shipments of classes 1,2,3,4 will be scheduled to arrive 20 day intervals beginning 10 times 20 and will equal 30 days each until supply level is reached. Supply levels to be maintained at objective 30 day max and 30 day on operating level of classes 1,2,3, and 4, 3 units fire combat troops, 1 unit fire service troops, 10 missions class V-A. Automatic supply 120 days. Supplies in MARIANAS, OKINAWA, and KOKAI will be used in accordance current directives. Direct liaison and communication between COMPORTIPAC, responsible supply agencies, 7th Fleet and 7th PhibFor authorized.

Para 2. Transportation.

COMPORTIPAC responsible providing shipping, loading and movement all units mounting west of Hawaiian Islands and issuance general loading and sailing instructions to COMAIRIPAC and CONSPORTIPAC for units under their cognizance mounting in Hawaiian Area and west coast. COMPORTIPAC Pearl provide shipping and CONSPORTIPAC arranging shipping and movement all units under CONSPORTIPAC and COMAIRIPAC do not mounting Hawaiian Area and west coast. Shipping designators later by dispatch.

Para 3. Medical. Medical service as in part 1 this annex. Evacuation to Marianas by suffices. 3 AV-13 will be assigned. Air evacuation by VH-1 to OKINAWA and MARIANAS 2 planes per day.

Para 4. Troop list. 3RD PHIBCORPS consisting of 5g and 5r Tpa, 1st MarDiv, 6th MarDiv (less 1 RCT) plus 1st Marine Corps consisting of MARON 1, SERON 1, MAN SQ, MAG 12 with Hodren 15 and Seren 15, WIP SQ 135, 261, 213 MAG 26 with Hodren 25 and Seren 25, WIP(N) SQ 193, 341; MAG 35 with Hodren 32, SERON 32, MAN SQ 264, 363, WIP SQ 134, MAG 35 with Hodren 35, Seren 35, VH-135 SQ 132 and 152. 2 3RD PHIBCORPS. Troops TIRENIPAC AREA 22,105, TIRENIPAC AREA 21,100 total troops 53,100.

Para 5. Base Development. Construction limited to that essential to plane airfields, roads and waterfront facilities for operational units. 2 Marine Airfields will be established, 1 in TIRENIPAC, the other TSINIPAO.

TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

27 0755 COMTHFLT to CTX 79. CONPHIL, CONSERVRON 7 info CONSHYPAC. CONSERV-
RON 10, CONCERDIV 101, CINCPOAC BOTH HQ, CINCAPAC, CG APWESPAC, COMINCH.

Action addresses hereby directed to assume as applicable all present logistic responsibilities and commitments of COMTHFLT in the supply of Allied Naval Forces. Further direct CONSERVON 12 under the operational control of COMPHIL and administrative control of CONSHYPAC furnish logistics requirements personnel and supplies to all naval units afloat and ashore in SWPA including all U.S. Navy vessels. Thus continuing logistics support to naval forces AUSTRALIA, NEW GUINEA AND MANUS and having access to the resources of MANUS, HOLLANDIA, PHILIPPINE BASES and other South West Pacific bases. In the event means are not then available make representations to CONSHYPAC for necessary additional supplies and facilities. Responsibility of CONSERVON 12 for logistics support to the 7th Flt terminates upon the departure of latter in operation CAMPUS at 0800 19-09 23 August 1945. 7th Flt thereafter will receive logistic support from Commander Service Force Pacific.

27 0513 COMTHFLT to GUAM CB2, AA CUNNINGHAM, (DD 752), CONDESDIV 127, NEW ORLEANS
(ALAA CQ 32), ALASKA (CBL), STEVENS (DD 479), TE EVANS (DD 754), HARADA (DD 535)
BURNS (DD 588), COMMISSION 64, info CINCPOAC ADV, COMTHFLT, COMPHIL, COMSER-
RON 10, CONCERDIV 27, ALL TAC AND TAC 7THFLT, CONDESDIV AD, CGT 254, RADM HUCKMASTER.

This is my OpOrder 14,5.
A. Cruiser Group TO 77,2 RADALOW. CruDiv 16, ALASKA and GUAM.
CruDiv 6 San Francisco, New Orleans, Minneapolis and Tucaloosa, DD18
Haraden (585), Stevens (479), Wiley (597), Bell (587), Burns (588), Hubbard
(743), Cunningham (752), Frank Evans (754), John Bole (755).
Para 1. Enemy forces have been forbidden to operate. However be prepared for attacks and alert for treachery. Further information including enemy and allied mine fields in Annex C my OpPlan 13-45 now being distributed by air. Own forces are not yet operating in the YELLOW SEA. TO 94,5 is sweeping area SKAGWAY, and may sweep mine line 7 just west of KURUZAN to.
Para 2. Fair Wing 1 continues regular searches.
Para 3. This force will operate to control the YELLOW SEA.
Para 3a. Rendezvous as directed off OKINAWA and proceed into the YELLOW SEA. Conduct operations as directed by Commander 7th Fleet.
Para 4. Logistics in OKINAWA and as called forward.
Para 5. Guard 7th Fleet Task Force and Task Group commanders circuit
(4135 series) and appropriate POA Foxes. Commander 7th Fleet in Minneapolis

27 1328 COMGENCHINA to CINCPOA ADV info CINCPOA PEARL, CINCAPAC, COMTHFLT.

CPRE 6132.

Subject is your 260127 concur in your recommendation that whether the landing in NORTH CHINA be at TAKU or CHINNANGTAO be left for decision later. Henceforth we will refer to TIENTSIN AREA.

AUGUST (GCT)
27 July 1944

Subject: HQ SAS (JOS) 1st US CINC USA JAPAN (JOINT STAFF MISSION)...

CG 10320.

The assumption contained in WX 54882, 25 August is correct.

25 March 1944

WARX 54882.

The British Chiefs of Staff have asked if their assumption is correct that the Japanese Commander will be required to furnish any information required direct to the representatives of the Allied Command and their representatives.

Para. We are informing the British Chiefs of Staff that the foregoing assumption is correct and that you are acting accordingly.
28 1225 COMCHINMAC to CINCPAC, CINCPAC info COMCHINMAC, COMOCT.

CPHX 6226.

Your GX 36362 it is desired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force 93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date. Preliminary information given by my representatives recently in MANILA indicated that necessary minesweeping would allow entry on 15 September. Please comment. Occupation of SHANGHAI by Chinese Nationalist Troops will proceed on schedule. See my CPHX 5484. For Lattimore. As Port operations will be from ship to shore directly naval boat, barge and DUKW cross from IET THEATER are being dropped.

28 1219 CINCPAC to WAR DEPT - COMCHIN MAC passes to CINCPAC Info HQ.

C 10526.

Among other minor changes made in General Order Number 1 replying your NX 55352 is 1 directing the Japanese to surrender their forces in the KYUSHU to CINCPAC with Commanding General 10th Army being designated to receive the local surrender. That officer has been under the command of CINCPAC since August 1 and the designation of CINCPAC to receive the surrender there would not only be confusing administratively but would also contravene the general directive providing that respective local theater commanders receive surrender.

29 0050 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ info CTODEN.

Your 250759. Expect to meet new advanced target date of 7 September for KEJIO landing with lightly armed troops of 7th Division and elements of 24th Corps using shipping immediately available and follow with heavy equipment as additional shipping availability permits. 40th Division should land KEJIO about 1 October. The date and place of landing the 96 Division in KOREA are not yet firm.

Para. 24th Corps plan also includes sending a small advance party by air to arrive 4 September if approved by SCAP and can be negotiated.

29 0751 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMCHINMAC info CINCPAC, COMCHINMAC, CINCPAC.

Comment direct to COMCHINMAC his CPHX 6226 DTC 201225. Re: It is desired that AK'S and LST'S in original Task Force 93 enter SHANGHAI at earliest practicable date.

348
TOP SECRET
AUGUST (GCT)

29 1357 MOUNTBATTEN SAGSEA TO CARTON DE WIART NA CHINCKING info HARcourt, CTG 111.2.

SAC 20299,

With reference to BAAG signal 6420 of 261640 not to CTG 111.2. If you and Ambassador see no objection I should like you to give Wedemeyer the following message from me. "As you know Rear Admiral Harcourt will take surrender of HONGKONG as soon as General MacArthur has concluded his surrender meeting in TOKYO and will when Admiral Fraser thinks fit, hand over to SEAC forces under Major General Posing. In the meantime the Generalissimo has stated he will not send Chinese Troops to HONGKONG. I have reports that some small American Units are however planning to enter HONGKONG by air or overland. May I have details."

30 2141 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC info CINCPAC.

WARX 57346,

The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer not to change the provisions of General Order Number 1 as approved by the President. Reference surrender procedure in the NUKUS and therefore direct that while the arrangements now in progress under the direction of General Stilwell may be continued their execution by Stilwell will be subject to the supervision of Admiral Nimitz.

31 0137 CINCPAC to COMGENCHINA info CG SOSCT, COMTHFLT(AFLOAT) - INTERCEPT MESC.

Cite CX 11158. Entrance SHANGHAI earliest practicable date is desirable reusd CPX 6228 any exact information respecting progress of minesweeping will come from Navy sources. Original Task Force 93 now designated Task Force 74 by 7th Fleet operation Plan 13-45.

30 2141 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH HQ, info CINCPLANT, COMSEAPTRON.

My 191827 refers. Your 280740 approved except those CVIS unable transit Canal without prior removal gun sponsors are to be routed via CAPE of GOOD HOPE or STRAITS of MAGELLAN depending upon shortest route at time of release.

31 1138 CINCPAC AFLOAT to COM3RDFLT info CINCPAC ADVANCE H4.

Your 310404 approved with the understanding that tenure of occupancy of minor naval bases will be limited to time required to seize or render inoperative the midget submarines and suicide craft present. Early report on adequacy of YOKOSAKA airfield for R50 operations desired.

31 1745 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC BOTH H4.

Subject is OCEAN AND NAURU. Following furnished for your information. British Chiefs of Staff propose "A" NAURU surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander and "B" OCEAN surrender to AUSTRALIAN commander acting in behalf of UK in company with a representative of the high commissioner for the Western Pac. U.S. Chiefs of Staff have replied in substance as follows: To interest of expediting surrender and occupation these islands there is no objection to use of AUSTRALIAN forces and shipping provided commander concerned reports to CINCPAC for this employment and accepts surrender in his name. Whether representative of CINCPAC is to accompany AUSTRALIAN forces is left to CINCPAC discretion.

AUGUST (GCT)
03 1300 COMINCH & GEM TO CINCPAC ADV (KING TO KITTY) (CONT'D)

"Item 3. Whatever facilities can be afforded under (1) and (2) above the First Sea Lord considers it essential that we should have increased use of HMAS and that we should be given authority to install 1 more Hover at PITTAU. Some stores for ammunition at MUNUS is also required. These additional facilities at MUNUS will certainly be required for the forthcoming operations.

"Item 4. Eagle Farm at BRISBANE is not being used to any extent by US air forces and is required urgently by the R.A.F. to erect aircraft which are being shipped to AUSTRALIA.

"Item 5. We can provide some 2500 engineers and 3000 pioneers (unskilled labour) to construct airstrips at any intermediate base which may be allocated for the R.P.A. In addition to these labour forces we have about 2500 R.A.F. constructional personnel who are the last echelon of the V.H.R project and are now on passage to the Pacific and may be available if any delay occurs in supporting work at OKINAWA. Can it be stated that the services of these parties will be required at a forward or intermediate base.

"Item 6. A very early reply would be appreciated in connection with Item 2 since the constructional personnel are immediately available and ship carrying material now in AUSTRALIA cannot be held and have to be unloaded now unless allocated elsewhere."

I am making representations to General Marshall in connection with Item 4.

03 2226 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, AND MARSHALL.

WARX 26330. EYES ONLY. KYOTO, HINCHINBROOK, KOMURA and MIYAKO will not be attacked by any forces under your command unless further directions are issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. Knowledge of the above instructions will be limited to the minimum number of persons essential to carry out the instructions.

04 0825 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC (NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR ONLY)

I request that COMSEAF be directed to cancel his 040540 which I consider to be improper and lacking in military courtesy. Responsibility for air sea rescue operations within the F.O.A west of Long 135-00 E has been assigned by me to ConFair Wing 1 and my directive must stand until other arrangements have been reached between you and me.

05 0820 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC (NIMITZ TO FRANK)

While I regret the delay in your visit I agree as to the advantage in conferring after the conference in HONOLULU. I am holding Hopkins here through the 6th for conference with Commodore Boak to assist me in making further recommendations to Admiral King concerning your increased use of MUNUS.

05 0815 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING)

Your 031300, Item 1. The anchorages in question will probably be LATE UJUND and ENNEKTOK. Item 2. Establishment of British shore facilities or use of British construction forces at such anchorages is not recommended. Item 3. Increased use of MUNUS by B.P is desirable. Commodore Boak will arrive OAHU tomorrow 6 July for conference concerning details. Item 4. CINCPAC agrees. Item 5. British construction forces are not repeat not desired in MARSHALLS MARIANAS CAROLINES or PHILIPPINES. Reports on Nikon SHIMA indicates desirability tugging the island over to British for development with British resources.
Para 1. The following is submitted for consideration in connection with proposals understood to be before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for changes in command responsibilities in the CINCPAC.

Para 2. The recently captured positions in the CINCPAC area are being developed to meet initially requirements in connection with CINCPAC and subsequently requirements in connection with other operations for the defense of JAPAN. The developments include bases for the operation of the tactical and strategic air forces of the Army, a Naval Operating Base for the support of the Pacific Fleet including airfields for fleet aircraft and other facilities for training and mounting troops. The Naval Operating Base at CINCPAC is vital to the readiness of the fleet for effective support of CINCPAC. It is also essential to future fleet operations in the North Pacific Area (NAPA) and CINCPAC. It will be our most western naval base through the final phases of this war and extending into the post-war period.

Para 3. Plans have now been integrated and the development of the various base installations and facilities is in progress. A change in overall command from CINCPAC CINCNA to CINCPAC CINCSEA as understood to be proposed would be undesirable simply because it would be a change and the required reorganization would be inherently wasteful of much needed time. The development of CINCPAC during the next few months will be best supported by avoiding such changes. The support of future fleet operations including Fleet Air Wings after CINCPAC will be best assured by retention of recent combat arrangements. Even though a transfer to CINCPAC would facilitate Army operations administration and logistics in the immediate future, naval operations administration and logistics would suffer now and during the foreseeable future.

Para 4. If however a change is decided upon it is recommended that it be based on the following principles:

A. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for the local ground and air defense and military government of the CINCPAC area. CINCPAC to retain responsibility for the naval defense as at present.

B. CINCPAC to retain direct command and control of the Naval Operating Base including the waters of CINCPAC and the shores thereof and the naval and marine airfields at TULAMO CINCPAC and the island of TULAMEEN.

C. CINCPAC to retain direct operational control of all forces based in the CINCPAC including Fleet Air Wings.

D. CINCPAC to retain control and responsibility for the sea areas now in the Pacific Ocean Area.

E. CINCPAC to retain direct control of units of the Fleet Marine Force and naval construction troops in the area except as may be passed by him to the temporary control of the Island Commander to assist in island defense and general island development.

F. CINCPAC to retain operational control of the naval communications facilities and naval radio stations except as may be passed to local control by the Island Commander for joint use under arrangements agreed to by CINCPAC.

G. Naval personnel and resources to be released by the Army Island Command as rapidly as possible under the control of CINCPAC.
09 0857  CINC PAC ADV TO CHICHE  (NMTZ to KING)  

I do not know what prompted CINCPAC's 090057 at this time. It appears to substitute "at all times" for "in case of exigencies". The phrase objected to appeared also on page 10 of my preliminary draft of 13 May and has not before been objected to. The language immediately preceding was drafted by CINCPAC and incorporated in our agreement of 16 May. The matter should be of little consequence, but I am disturbed by the implications. I shall make no reply pending receipt of your comment. You may have information as to background which is not available to me.

09 0920  CINC PAC ADV TO CHICHE  (NMTZ to KING)  

I am deferring action on certain matters connection OKINAWA until future communication and status is settled. Accordingly request I be informed if it is decided to let present arrangements stand.

09 1035  CINC PAC ADV TO CHICHE & INC  (NMTZ to KING)  

CH. 052055. Recommend no repeat no change in category defense or command arrangements in ALLIANCE at this time because of possible requirements incident to Russian entry into war.

09 2010  CHICHE & INC TO CINC PAC ADV  (NMTZ to NMTZ)  

It appears to me the last part of last sentence on page 16 referred to in CINCPAC's CX 24112 and in your 090057 was not entirely necessary particularly in the light of the immediately preceding paragraph. The last part which then assumes command and responsibility for the campaign in JAPAN does serve a basis for proper objection, and for that reason should be withdrawn. There is a continuing responsibility vested in CINCPAC. However, including control in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault, is intended to apply only in those cases in which exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual amphibious assault being executed against hostile beaches.

10 0900  CINC PAC ADV TO CINCPAC & INC  (NMTZ to VACANT URL INFO KING)  

Your CX 24142 DTC 090057. The sentence referred to will be deleted incident to the next revision of my Joint Staff Study CINCPAC which will be issued after the conferences referred to in your 090215 and my 100215. However it is my understanding that "including control, in case of exigencies of the actual amphibious assault" is intended to apply only in those cases in which exigencies or emergencies arise during the actual amphibious assault being executed against hostile beaches.
The JCS have this date approved the following directives:

1. The War Department has established an air command designated "8th Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF)" consisting initially of three combat and service units assigned to or operating with the 20th AF, the 9th and 3rd SAGs, 8th AF, and other elements subsequently to be mutually assigned upon by CINCPAC, CINCPAC, and the Commanding General, USASTAF, or as processed by higher authority.

2. USASTAF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of land based strategic air operations against JAPAN with the object of accomplishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN's military, industrial and economic systems to a point where her capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. He will collaborate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in such strategic air operations of Army Air Forces or Navy carrier based air forces as CINCPAC and CINCPAC may elect to conduct. This responsibility will be discharged in accordance with directives which have been or which may be issued from time to time by the JCS through the ComSec, Army Air Forces as executive agent.

3. USASTAF will continue operations to support the accomplishment of the overall objective to defeat JAPAN and will cooperate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in the preparation and execution of plans for the invasion of JAPAN.

4. USASTAF will be responsible for the internal administration and internal logistical support of all forces assigned to USASTAF and will present his requirements for theater logistical support to CINCPAC and CINCPAC respectively, as required. USASTAF will be administered as directed by the War Department. CINCPAC and CINCPAC are charged with the responsibility of meeting USASTAF's logistic support requirements subject to the overall availability of resources.

5. A headquarters will be designated to discharge the functions of ANPAC which are not assumed under the provisions of this directive by USASTAF. The transfer of functions will be subject to agreement between CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMSEP USASTAF.

6. All understandings, commitments, agreements and directives with reference to the 20th AF will remain in effect and apply to USASTAF until amended or rescinded by the appropriate authority.

7. Commanders concerned will implement this directive as expeditiously as possible without interference with current operations.

8. Directives in conflict with the above are modified accordingly.
The JCS have this date approved the following directives:

1. The War Department has established an Air Command designated USAF, Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF), consisting initially of those combat and service units assigned to or operating with the 20th AF, the K and K-12坤es, 3rd AF, and other elements subsequently to be mutually agreed upon by CINCPAC and the Commanding General, USAF, or as resolved by higher authority.

2. CommandUSASTAF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of land based strategic air operations against JAPAN with the object of accomplishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN's military, industrial and economic systems to a point where her capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. He will collaborate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in such strategic air operations of Army Air Forces or Navy carrier based air forces as CINCPAC and CINCPAC may elect to conduct. This responsibility will be discharged in accordance with directives which have been or which may be issued from time to time by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces as executive agent.

3. CommandUSASTAF will continue operations in support of the accomplishment of the overall objective to defeat JAPAN and will cooperate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in the preparation and execution of plans for the invasion of JAPAN.

4. CommandUSASTAF will be responsible for the internal administration and internal logistical support of all forces assigned to USASTAF and will present his requirements for theater logistical support to CINCPAC and CINCPAC respectively, as required. USASTAF will be administered as directed by the War Department. CINCPAC and CINCPAC are charged with the responsibility of meeting CG USASTAF's logistic requirements subject to the overall availability of resources.

5. A headquarters will be designated to discharge the functions of AAFPOA which are not assumed under the provisions of this directive by USASTAF. The transfer of functions will be subject to agreement between CINCPAC, CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

6. All understandings, commitments, agreements and directives with reference to the 20th AF will remain in effect and apply to USASTAF until amended or rescinded by the appropriate authority.

7. Commanders concerned will implement this directive as expeditiously as possible without interference with current operations.

8. Directives in conflict with the above are modified accordingly.

Plan FASTEL as agreed at conferences between your representatives and Joint Security Control in Washington is approved. Para 5 B (a) of the plan calls for an annex setting forth details of specific responsibility and timing of the strategic operational deception and special deception measures to implement FASTEL. It is suggested that you hold conferences of planning and communications representatives of all addresses in order that this annex may be expeditiously prepared and coordinated.
By 0015Z and 0017Z, the situation in the area of the remaining Israeli and Jordanian forces remains unchanged. The JOS are in control of the area from Jaffa to Ramla, and from Ramla to the north of Jerusalem. In other important areas, the situation remains as before.

110000 S170005... (JUST TO REMEMBER, KENNY, MAGAZINE, KING BAYARD)

With reference to the FORT BAYARD supplemental supply project for CINCPAC, there remain additional factors of interest to the JOS which further study appears necessary. These include the exchange of additional information, with information copies to the JOS are:

1. Wedemeyer's estimate of enemy air capabilities and evaluation as to sufficiency of available counter measures;

2. Information on minefields; and

3. Earliest considered estimate of unloading time required for FORT BAYARD.

To enable JOS to evaluate cost of continuing supply through FORT BAYARD subsequent to 5 cargo ships now scheduled, it is desired that General JCS, after necessary consultation with CINCPAC and GO CINCPAC Theater, submit to JOS the time on naval resources required. For planning purposes, it will be assumed that 5 cargo ships per month will follow the 1st 5.

At such time as adequate information becomes available to Wedemeyer, the JOS desire him to submit complete plan for the FORT BAYARD supplemental supply project to include: Hydrographic information, aid for clearing out harbors, and from outside CINCPAC-Burma-Theater, unloading time for ships, AA defenses for FORT BAYARD, target date, air support plan, and enemy and allied mine fields.

130707 CINCPAC ADV TO KENNY. (KENNY TO KING ONLY)

My comments on JCS 1306/2 drafted in form for general use are transmitted separately. If you need assistance in giving copy control over their preparation and can get no better substantiated paragraph of any opinions you have based absolute opinion, which we are quite impossible, you should know that General Wedemeyer and General Krueger are virtually in control of under CINCPAC projects now. General Krueger is obviously operating on the assumption that JCS 1306 as originally proposed is or soon will be approved. I wish, if possible, avoid unpleasant incidents with him but an early decision will be helpful in that regard. I have confidence in General, and he is optimistic as to unloading and base development. Price will take over our JOS on 15 July.
140723

SUBJECT: DISPENSE WITH BARRAGE INTO CINC US FLEET. (MESSAGE TO SERVICE AND NATIVE JAPAN)

CX 25423

1. I have been concerned for some time with regard to the omission of
the directive as forth in JCS 1299/4. This directive required a transfer of
Army and Navy resources “as expeditiously as possible” until such service
was under the control of the own service commander. The fundamental purpose
was to reorganize the command system in the Pacific to facilitate the war
against JAPAN and it must have been the intent that this reorganization be
effected prior to the launching of the offensive campaign. This directive
specifically indicated that “conflicting provisions of existing directives
to CINCPOA and CINCSEA are modified accordingly”. With this interpretation
in mind, you will recall I sent staff representatives to CINCPOA in mid-April
to explore the general problem and determine procedures to comply with JCS
directives. This conference was not fruitful because of the differences in
our respective interpretations of the JCS directive. In response to your
radio 140700 OCT April in which you proposed to turn over administrative but
no operational control of Army forces in your area I accepted in radio CX
14299 as a step in compliance with instructions, but stated that greater
central control of Army resources would be required by me. This reply took into
consideration that under the operating procedures in Pacific Ocean Areas an
abrupt reversion of resources to appropriate service control in certain
instances was inadvisable. I proposed in my CX 14299 to turn over at once all
Naval resources under my command to you. This was rejected for the reasons
set forth in your 200740 OCT April. There have been numerous exchanges of
radiograms between you and myself concerning separate features of this general
problem, but the resultant effect as it applies to the compliance with the
JCS directive has been disappointingly meager. On several occasions you have
quoted certain directives which were issued prior to JCS 1299/4 and which
you believed were not modified by JCS 1299/4 irrespective of the dates
given earlier in this radio. In this belief I do not concur.

2. Three and one-half months have now elapsed since the issuance of the JCS
directive and I find that there has been transferred to my full control the
7th Air Force, 9th Corps, 4th Infantry, and a sprinkling of combat and
service support troops, with administrative control only of other units, a
control completely ineffective in so far as the fundamental concept of the
directive of the JCS is concerned. There remain under your control General
Richardson’s 3rd Division, a portion of the Air Force, a Corps, and numerous ground, combat and service support
units established to aggregate upon arrival of redeployed units between 325,000
and 300,000 troops.

3. It has become increasingly embarrassing for me to plan future operations
with the Army resources of the Pacific when I am denied the authority to control
the relative priority of their retention at various locations or determine
the relative importance of their requirement in comparison with their
need for the invasion of JAPAN. I must necessarily under the existing circum-
stances resort to negotiations for each individual unit with you, causing
great administrative labor and delay. Determination of the Army redeployment
requirements of resources from Europe and the U.S. without a knowledge of the
detailed employment or need for the resources now in the Pacific in your area
is little better than an educated guess, with the inevitable result that any
unnecessary movement of resources into the Pacific will cause a disappointment
and waste of the critical shipping needs of the U.S. This situation has been
compounded in the last few days in a conference of various officers through-
out the Pacific to survey our deficiencies as related to the support of the

- Continued -
20th Air Force. This conference was attended by 62 officials of various organizations. The solutions accepted at the conclusion of this conference necessarily reflect the mass of conflicting and complicated command arrangements and leave uncertainty and confusions in many minds.

4. By your 080301 CDT July you indicate a need for the naval resources of the Pacific to be more closely controlled by you in order to launch the operations against JAPAN. I likewise need a closer control over the Army resources of the Pacific to fully perform my functions. I consider that the time has now come for final accomplishment of the JCS directive concurrently with consideration of your 080301 July. This would involve:

(a) A plan for the turn over of Army resources in the Pacific to CINCPOA.

(b) A determination of the localities to be transferred on the basis of paramount interest.

(c) The establishment of procedures whereby operational control of the forces of each service may be placed under CINCPOA or CINCPOA to combat operations as specifically directed by the JCS from time to time.

(d) A target date for completion of the above.

5. If you are not prepared to discuss the full implementation of the JCS directive, it is suggested that a conference be arranged. If, however, you are of the opinion that these are irreconcilable points of view, I feel that they should now be presented to the JCS for decision.

14 0904 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC ADV CHINA INTO CINCPOA. (HUNLEY TO WHEELER DEFO MACARUM)

Your 121015. It would be extremely helpful in clarifying our plans and concepts of future operations if you or your representative would visit my headquarters at OKINAWA to discuss naval support of your operations along the CHINA Coast and the employment of fleet units to assume control of the sea areas adjacent to the Coast of CHINA. If you find such a visit feasible I will invite General MacArthur to send a representative also.

16 1119 CINCPOA TO CINCPAC ADV NO. C 25992

In view of your 150720 I doubt that any practicable results can evaluate from another conference on a theater level and therefore prefer to leave any further clarification if they so desire in the hands of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
18 1409 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADV HQ Info AMAR, NAVY DEPT.

TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR and NIMITZ. In order to facilitate preparation for and execution of OLYMPIC, CINCPAC and CINCPAC will arrange to transfer to CINCPAC at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 August control of U.S.-held areas in the Ryukus, all U.S. Army forces located in the Ryukus, including 10th Army, responsibility for defense of the U.S.-held positions, and responsibilities pertaining to USSTAF units now vested in CINCPAC.

Para. CINCPAC will retain responsibility for and control of all naval and naval air installations and development projects in the Ryukus, the movement of naval forces and supplies into the area, and harbor and unloading facilities therefor as shall be mutually agreed to between them. Control of all U.S. Naval forces in the Ryukus will be vested in CINCPAC.

18 1212 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC, AMAR, NAVY DEPT. V66 RO65

TOP SECRET. From JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ. For your information pertinent extracts of CINCPAC's C-24215 of 9 July have been passed to the British Chiefs of Staff at CCS 17 July 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted in principle the use of British Commonwealth forces for employment in the main operations against Japan. The substance of the British proposal was covered in WAR 28274 of 7 July to MACARTHUR, copy of which War Department will repeat to CINCPAC together with CINCPAC's reply, C-24215 of 9 July. The acceptance in principle of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff pertained only to ground forces. The British proposal as regards a tactical air component was left as a matter for further discussion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further approved the British request to dispatch an Army corps commander to the Pacific to consult with CINCPAC and CINCPAC on the various factors involved in the employment of British Commonwealth forces and to submit recommendations as a result of such conferences. It is understood that air and naval officers will accompany the corps commander. It is requested that CINCPAC and CINCPAC indicate when this visit can be conveniently made.

Para. Although action has not been made, the British Chiefs of Staff indicate they have under consideration the use of the 8th Indian Division from Italy which had a notable record in the Italian campaign, and is therefore acclimatized, the 2nd or 36th Divisions (both British) now in SEAC, as well as veterans NEW ZEALAND, CANADIAN and AUSTRALIAN divisions. The British Divisions are not included in the SINGAPORE campaign. Due to impracticality of reequipping British, Indian and Australian divisions the Canadian division with U.S. equipment would probably operate in a U.S. corps. Plans have not developed to the point where a decision can be taken on the composition of the forces.
TOP SECRET

19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC.

WDCMG SVC 15259.

Following is relay of War 23274 dated 7 July to MacArthur from Marshall. British participation in the invasion of JAPAN is subject. In addition to the British Pacific Fleet and VLR forces of 10 squadrons, the British now propose that the VLR force be increased to 20 squadrons at a later date when more airfields become available, and that a British force of 3 to 5 British, Indian and Dominion divisions participate in CORONET under American Command. The British do not give source of these divisions but some or all are apparently expected to be released after the capture of SINGAPORE, scheduled for November 1945. They would also be carried in British ships, provided with the necessary assault lift and supported by the East Indies Fleet augmented by the British Pacific Fleet if necessary and by a tactical air force of some 15 squadrons. The British have made the 3 following specific suggestions as to the use of this force:

A. A force of 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the assault, together with 2 or 3 divisions in the build-up, administratively largely self-supporting.

B. A force of 3 divisions in the assault and immediate follow-up and 1 or possibly 2 divisions in the build-up, relying, to a considerable degree, on American administrative assistance.

C. A force of up to 5 divisions in the build-up administratively largely self-supporting.

British prefer a course which allows them to take a part in the assault. Simultaneously with CORONET the British would maintain pressure from BURMA toward SIAM and additionally might conduct amphibious operation against SIAM, JAVA, SUMATRA or HONGKONG. Request for use at the coming conference your initial comments by 9 July on this proposal, followed by any more detailed comments you wish to make. It is evident that the use of these British Divisions should replace U.S. Divisions to some number. Such a course would meet with widespread public approval from the viewpoint of lessening the requirements of U.S. soldiers, especially on the part of the articulate who assail British and ARMY administration for non-participation of allies in conquest of JAPAN, etc. Request your views include comment on command and control arrangements.

Now begins answer to preceding War message. C 24213 from CINCPAC

"From GHQ SWPA and MacArthur to MARSHALL cite C 24213. Mag is TOP SECRET. The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET, relying your W 26274, presents problems not heretofore encountered when the CANADIAN and FRENCH contingents were considered. These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date. This operation, at present visualised as being launched across beaches on the 2 sides of LANCEWOOD BAY, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines. The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval and ground forces, and within the
19 0041 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC (Continued)

...ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organisation, composition, equipment, training procedures and doctrines will complicate command, operations and logistic support. 

Redeployment geared to the support of HOMOGENEOUS forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large-scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefore. The changes in redeployment alone will have world-wide effect and is apt to cause confusion. British forces participating in operations against SINGAPORE in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in CORONET. It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilise considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient. Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for CORONET dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date. Bearing the above in mind, it is considered that any solution in the use of British troops must discourage their employment in the assault and the establishment for them of a separate logistical chain. Considered solely from the standpoint of public approval, the following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above. This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces.

A. Limit British Empire participation to 1 corps of 3 divisions; 1 British, 1 Canadian, and 1 Australian.

B. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops.

C. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area.

D. Require British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the BORNEO-MOROTAI area or as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there.

E. Amphibiously train 1 British division and 1 Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained.

F. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about 7 plus 10. It will there be
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCFOA (continued)

used as the APPAC Assault Reserve Afloat. Canadian division to be
lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the
BORNEO-MOROTAI area, and British division and corps troops from that
area depending on where it is concentrated.

C. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States army.
Reserve the privilege to utilize divisions separately within American
corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand. I doubt the
advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex
operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required.
Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops
of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of
acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not conser-
in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon. The foregoing comments
are equally applicable to Allied Air components, aggravated by the dif-
ficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical opera-
tions under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air
deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or pro-
jected for this area to support all troops in COMNET opetations.
Therefore, I recommend that the offer of the British tactical squadrons
be declined and acceptance of the proposed increase in British very
long range squadrons be delayed until the availability of more airfields
is assured. Although not mentioned in your radiogram, it is proposed
that you have considered that extensive augmentation of Allied effort
in the Pacific, including components from the various forces, may cause
a demand for the establishment of an overall command under CCS control
similar to that employed in EUROPE.

CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH

Confirmation is requested of my understanding that JCS 1011409 vests
in CINCPAC responsibility for Military Government in the RTUKUS.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN USASTAF.

To clarify logistic planning request you obtain definition of
"External logistical support" and "Internal logistical support" as
used in JCS despatch 140301 WAKX 29978 paragraph 4.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, TODD, MACNAIR, NAVY

VICTORY 169 PG 248 for your information the combined chiefs of
staff on 20 July approved the following directive to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Southeast Asia with the understanding that the British Chiefs
of Staff would take steps to obtain the agreement of the DUTCH, NEW
ZEALAND, and AUSTRALIAN governments to the proposed reallocation of
areas and command setup in Southeast ASIA and Southwest Pacific.
Directive begins.

Para 1. Your primary task is the opening of the STRAITS OF MALACCA
at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British
Commonwealth Land Forces should take part in the main operations against JAPAN which have been agreed as the Supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the outer zone to the extent that forces and resources permit.

BOUNDARIES OF COMMAND

Para 2. The Eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include BORNEO, JAVA and the CELEBS.

Para 3. Further information will be sent to you regarding INDO-CHINA.

Para 4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after the 15th August, 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility.

Para 5. From that date, such DOMINION and DUTCH FORCES as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on AUSTRALIA.

Para 6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an AUSTRALIAN COMMAND under the British Chiefs of Staff.

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN MAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN

Para 7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from 3 to 5 divisions and, if possible, a small tactical air force should take part in the main operations against JAPAN in the spring of 1946. Units of the EAST INDIES FLEET may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination.

Para 8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for 2 divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Para 9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against JAPAN must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below.

OPERATIONS IN THE OUTER ZONE

Para 10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations assigned to:

SubPara A. Complete the liberation of MALAYSIA.

SubPara B. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the BURMA-SIAM frontier.

SubPara C. Capture the key areas of SIAM.

SubPara D. Establish bridgeheads in JAVA and/or SUMATRA to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course.

Para 11. You will submit a programme of operations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.

DEVELOPMENT OF Bases

Para 12. You will develop SINGAPORE and such other bases as you
21 JUI

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, NORTHERN, AGWAR Info NAY.

may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese. Directive ends. Appendix begins.

EASTERN BOUNDARY of COMMAND

Para. Beginning on the coast of INDO-CHINA at 15 degrees north; thence through the BALABAC STRAIT along the 193 9 boundary line between the PHILIPPINES and BURMA to latitude 09 degrees north, thence eastward to 06-00 north - 129-00 east; thence southeastward to 03-00 south - 123-00 east; thence southeasterward to 08-00 south - 125-00 east; thence southwestward to 15-00 south - 110-00 east end of directive and appendix.

211830

COMINCH & CHNO to CINCPAC/CINCPAC BOTH Hs. Info COMINCH AND CHNO ADMIN.

Understanding contained in your 201407 is confirmed.

25 0830

CINCPAC to COMANF Info COMINCH, CINCPAC ADVANCE HS.

Eyes only for Kinkaid, King and Nimitz. CX 28196 authority granted your 240810 to intercept, board and inspect for violations of existing conventions and to bring into port if violations are discovered Hospital Ship TACHIBANA MARU.

25 0906

CINCPAC ADVANCE HS. to CINCPAC PEARL HS.

Nimitz to Towers only. Obtain from COMAIRPAC and send to me in this system his nomination 6 escort carriers with 2 Flag Officers to concentrate in MARSHALLS in near future for use in JUGGLBLOX 4 if required. Also warn COMSVPAC to be continually prepared on short notice nominate SERVPAC units listed page 6 my serial 0005067 of 26 May. Utmost secrecy directed.
Coordination of plans for the procedure to be followed in the event of Japanese governmental surrender is now a pressing necessity. Early information is desired regarding the conference reported to be in progress at Guam on this subject.

Para. It appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in such event immediate naval occupation of critical parts of Japan is desirable to include in each case, if practical, an operational airfield to facilitate communication and permit airborne troop landings.

Para. It also appears to Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would be highly desirable for similar procedure to be followed on the Asiatic Mainland in following order or priority: Shanghai, Fusan in Korea, Chefoo, and Chinchu Tao on the Manchurian border. Also that preliminary landings on Asiatic continent might best be carried out by Marines. A landing at Takao to permit the blocking of the critical communication points of Peking-Tsingtao would be more desirable that at Chinchu Tao but probably is impractical from the viewpoint of Naval Craft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not desire to become involved in the campaign in China on the mainland other than by air, but it is considered highly desirable to seize the ports in order better to facilitate the reoccupation of the country by Chinese Forces. The occupation of the north tip of Formosa would be a great aid to air operation and communication to Japan and China.

Para. There appears to be a necessity for an early decision as to the movement of divisions of the 1st Army now in the United States, particularly as concerns complication regarding their equipment now enroute to Philippines. It might be advisable to route some of these divisions directly to Japan as follow up units, thus avoiding the shipment of divisions from the Philippines for the same purpose.

Para. The formal surrender or enforced submission of the Japanese government will be received jointly by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz or their designated representatives. In order that there may be a continuity of policy of procedure in dealing with Japanese Imperial Headquarters or its ministries, representatives of CINCPAC and CINC PAC will jointly perform this function until CINCPAC has actually landed in Japan and personally assumed this responsibility. The foregoing provisions will not be allowed to interfere with conduct of local surrenders by naval or other U. S. Commanders concerned.
CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC. COMSERVICPAC into COMUSA. PEARL H.

NIMITZ TO MONTGOMERY AND SMITH ONLY. INFO RECOVER ONLY.

Plans for procedure to be followed in case of Japanese surrender are under development. It is anticipated that requirements would include 1 streamlined ACORN and 1 streamlined CROPAC for emergency use at YOKOSUKA air and seaplane base and 3 other ACORNS and CROPACs to follow promptly for other areas. Survey situation and advise units most readily available. My present inclination is to direct COM PACAFAN to be ready to produce a streamlined ACORN by stripping local facilities. Comment.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMAIRPAC info COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO FLETCHER ONLY. INFO KING.

In order to be ready to execute KILLSHOCK IV on short notice am sending you PENSACOLA, SALT LAKE CITY and CHESTER and 2 more Destroyers and am preparing Task Force 49 with 6 CVE and 9 DD ready to move on short notice from EMENOK. 2 heavy landplane search squadrons have been sent your way.

Para. Use forces available to extend and exercise your control of the eastern portion of the Sea of Okhotsk.

Para. Request from me info COMAIRPAC such augmentations in auxiliary vessels as you must have to service your combat units as they are increased.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC info COMTFLEET. COMINCH.

By 270920. If agreeable to you will send Rear Admiral Sherman accompanied by Brig Gen Kendall, Brig Gen Gosse, Capt Epps, Col Mabie and Lt Cdr. Grant to arrive MANILA afternoon 29 July to coordinate occupation plans.

New Subject. Conference with COMGEN CHINA my 140304 will take place 4 August and presence of representative from your headquarters would be welcome.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH into CINCPAC. COMGEN USASTAF.

NIMITZ TO KING, MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ.

The following information is furnished to inform you of the status of planning in reply to 2nd sentence of JCS 261446 (V 357).

Para. During the visit of CINCPAC representatives to PROVINCIAL Headquarters 21-23 July which was concerned primarily with making detailed arrangements for compliance with the JCS directive V 73 of 18 July concerning the typhoon copies of CINCPAC's plan BLACKLIST were received and since that time CINCPAC's tentative plan CAMBUS has been revised to accord with BLACKLIST insofar as the c-occupation of JAPAN by Army Forces in concerned. CAMBUS contemplates naval and amphibious
27 0920 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMUNCH INFO CINCPACAC. COMGEN USAFAC.

MEMORANDUM TO KING. INFO MACARTHUR AND SPAATZ (Cont'd)

operations in 3 phases. Phase A. Emergency naval occupation of TOKYO DAY.
Phase B. Complete deployment of naval occupation forces.
Phase C. Amphibious operations connected with the occupation of JAPAN by U. S. Army Forces.

Para. Copies of the CINCPAC draft as revised will be taken to MANTL for conference with representatives of CINCPACAC on 29 July.
Propose draft separate plan for occupation critical points CHINA COAST (using Fleet Marine Force) in conference with COMGEN CHINA who will arrive GUAM 4 August under present arrangements and with CINCPAC representatives.

CINCPAC ADVANCE H-1. INFO CINCINDIANAC.

31 0112 Your 290107 request 1 AD be made available this command upon arrival CRUDIV 5 and escorting DD's. With arrival TF 49 request following additional auxiliaries 1 AC, 2 YO, 2 YOG, 1 ATF, 1 YG, 4 LCM and 1 refrigerated cargo ship in addition to the 1 presently supplying all armed forces in the ALBUTIANs.

30 1306 CINCPAC ADVANCE H-2 to COM/THEFLEET.

MEMORANDUM TO SHERMAN ONLY.

Do not concur that landing of the Marine or occupying airfields must be deferred until troops land in strength. No commitment of that nature is to be made as such action is likely to be necessary in order to exercise essential control. The naval officer on the spot must be free to act expeditiously to cope with any existing situation. Trust your skill and judgement to avoid this question becoming an issue in current discussions.

Para. 2nd paragraph your 300237 not entirely clear. It is interpreted to mean that landing operations by naval forces will be contingent upon the situation which exists when naval forces arrive in Japanese ports and developments which immediately follow with the time of any such landing if made to be determined by events as they unfold. If this interpretation is correct then concur otherwise need amplification.

Para. In view prospective requirements for Marine elsewhere it appears here that no more should be committed in JAPAN proper than is essential for early stages of occupation. Some will doubtless be required initially. You are authorized to make up to 3 divisions available for early and rapid movement into JAPAN if your discussions there indicate advisability of so doing.

Para. Having in mind that JCS may issue subsequent directives giving CINCPAC a free hand until CINCPAC arrives in JAPAN with his forces any agreements or understanding you should carry a proviso for revision of any part that might prove to be inconsistent with any later directive issued by JCS.
TOP SECRET
LIMITED ONLY
JULY (23)

28 1943

COMAIRPAC to CINC PAC ADV info CINC PAC PEARL H.

MONTGOMERY TO NIMITZ INFO HOOVER.

Concur that streamlined ACORN be produced from units currently in Marianas. Your 280102. Additionally are ACORN 53, 55 and 57 all West Coast. Last scheduled for FUTUR is other 2 presently unassigned.

28 1239

CINC PAC ADVANCE H. to CINCPACINFO COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR.

Your 280459. I consider that JCS 142307 June (WARX 17064) together with JCS 261946 (RG 357) constitute a directive requiring prompt compliance on my part and accordingly will send Rear Admiral Sherman and party to HANTA tomorrow as planned the coordination of occupation plans is the principal purpose of their visit at this time. They will have incidental conferences with COMTHEFTL and COMPHIPAC concerning naval matters and those required can remain for conference with your staff and USAGAFF representatives concerning CINCPAC air coordination.

Para. By 140304 gives the purpose of the conference with COMPHI U.S. Forces CHINA at OAH on 4 August. However advance will be taken of meeting to improve coordination and understanding on various matters now pending including the FORT BAYARD project and possible occupation measures along the CHINA COAST. Your representative will be welcome at that time as always.

28 0721

CINC PAC ADVANCE H. to COMINCH INFO RUPES.

NIMITZ TO EDWARDS INFO JACOBS.

In view of JCS 271000 (Victory 371) request immediate assignment to my headquarters of an officer qualified to be my liaison officer with Commander Soviet Pacific Fleet. Captain Frank T. Thomas believed to be well qualified and is requested if available. If not available request names of others available.

01 0931

CINC PAC ADVANCE H. to COMTHEFTL.

FOR REAR ADMIRAL SHERMAN EYES ONLY.

Immediate delivery desired. Various articles in press and other pronouncements are critical of existing command arrangements in Pacific. CINCPAC desires that if possible agreement be reached regarding command exchange of information spheres of operation intelligence etc of air forces of CINCPAC, CINCPAC and COMPHIPAC AIR FORCES in order to secure close coordination and effectiveness. Believe SPAFF entails much same concept as ourselves. If not already done make every effort to secure an understanding for maximum effective air effort against Japanese by coordinated action. Such a goal is not incompatible with retention of independence of action by respective commands.

Para. Your 010945 just received. If you think advisable delay departing to act on this message.
CONTTHFLT to CINDCPAC ADVANCE H. (Cont'd)

JAPAN because it appears impossible for Army to move sufficient divisions rapidly without some marines.

Para. The foregoing concessions will permit reaching an agreement unless unforeseen demands are made. His plans for being made and ours will be expanded to cover KOREA and CHINA insofar as troop allocations are concerned.

28 2131 CINCPOAC to CINCPAC, JIA, 20TH F., CHINA.

SMITH to REECE: INFORMATION HEAVY AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 280102 CINCPOAC 11 immediately available at EAD for streamlined GROPOAC provided it not be used in POST BAYARD or OKINAWA as previously suggested. For 3 other GROPOACs recommend (A) slowdown and curtailment OKINAWA base development thus permitting CINCPAC to form 3 suitable vita from personnel under his command and equipment drawn in construction materials pool shipments see entry 119 of my serial 001402 of 19 Dec 1944. (B) let alternate form 2 GROPOACs from OKINAWA as outlined in (A) and a similar unit from MARIANAS. (C) 2nd alternate form 3 GROPOACs from units assembling on west coast for OLYMPIC. If emergency action be taken on (C) under personal direction of service force representative consider that suitable units could be ready for sailing in 30 days.

28 0459 CINCPOAC to CINCPOAC ADVANCE H.

C 28946.

I will be glad to welcome Admiral Nierenberg and his party who I understand will be prepared to discuss matters pertaining to air coordination for OLYMPIC your 271318. Our respective views on occupation are so divergent that I believe it would be difficult to coordinate them prior to the receipt of some directive from the JCS. We will of course be glad nevertheless to discuss the matter with Admiral when he comes.

Para. Regarding the WEDNESDAY conference, it was our understanding that it had as its purpose the coordination of the POST BAYARD project. Insofar as this headquarters is concerned it would not be deemed advisable to attempt to expand it into a discussion of plans for operational occupation of the CHINA COAST until a definite directive has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
01 0545 CONTPLTL to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MEMORANDUM.

Completed air coordination conference and expect return GUAM tomorrow 2 August.

Para. Plans for occupation coordinated satisfactorily insofar as troop movements are concerned. Early naval occupation of "Japanese Waters" accepted by CINCPAC but any landing whatsoever by naval or marine elements prior to CINCPAC personal landing is emphatically unacceptable to him. Accordingly I have left that feature as one on which agreement could not be reached and in which Joint Action is not essential and concentrated on other features which because of their nature do require coordination. There will be no written record of our planning conference other than the plans themselves which will be adequately correlated except for landing force operations prior to the arrival of Army troops in strength.

31 0024 CONTPLTL to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

EYES ONLY. SHERMAN TO NGORRIS ONLY.

Conference and revision of both BLACKLIST and CAMPUS proceeding satisfactorily although considerable insistence still required on my part. CINCPAC's headquarters is hoping for a directive along CAMPUS lines or which will give CINCPAC overall command for the occupation.

Para. Have deleted provisions for early landings and inserted provision for a CINCPAC representative to go to Halsey's Flagship and therefrom Halsey and the CINCPAC representative would function as the Joint Representative UNQUOTE mentioned in last paragraph of JCS message.

Para. It now appears that CINCPAC will occupy the KOBE-Osaka-KYOTO AREA instead of the KURE AREA so the 5th Fleet will be initially at KOBE. The 5th PhibCorps is planned to occupy the KOBE-Osaka-KYOTO AREA initially. The 3rd PhibCorps is reserved for the CHINA COAST which I now believe will not be covered in CINCPAC's plan as it is WEDDING area.

Para. Have promised to make TULSA available for purpose of guarding navy circuits and supplying CINCPAC with intercept traffic after landing. They will not ask for the 3rd IOT.

30 0237 CONTPLTL to CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ.

SHERMAN TO MEMORANDUM ONLY.

Cordially received. Had long and very amicable conference with General MacArthur. He accedes to naval features and to naval and air show of force as soon as fighting stops. He considers it unwise to risk landing any marines or seizing airfields until troops arrive in strength. He had the JCS message but did not consider it a directive and has asked for one.

Para. Unless I receive other instructions I will adjust plans to make all early landings contingent operations with timing to be determined later and will if requested make 3 HarDivs available to army for
CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

LIMITED TO KEN ONLY.

Your 312010. My understanding is that Shermans relief should have about 2 months overlap and that he would be available in August and preferably early August. It is my desire that Sherman remain with me until all plans and preparations for OLYMPIC are completed but not necessarily until after execution OLYMPIC which might drag indefinitely. My 260811 was based on assumption that Schoefel would be available in August.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

LIMITED TO KEN ONLY.

Cities of KYOTO HIGASHIHIRO HOKURA and HIGASHI were reserved for special attack with which you are familiar. SecWar directed substitution NAGASAKI for KYOTO. Understand reason being that latter is an important cultural center that he did not wish destroyed. Request I be informed if KYOTO is to remain immune from normal bombing attacks. Assume also that JCS are familiar with fact that JOUR camp is at NAGASAKI.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMINCH.

LIMITED TO KEN.

Sherman returned from LANIA and reports that BLACKLIST and CAMPUS have both been revised and are mutually acceptable except for the question of landings by naval or marine personnel before CINCPAC lands in person. The language of CAMPUS in this regard was drafted as follows: "At each principal anchorage, an operational airfield will if practicable be occupied to facilitate communications and airborne troop landings, and for subsequent development for naval purposes. The timing of this occupation will be such as to support the landing of troops in strength, but may be adjusted by the local naval commander as necessary to meet the requirements of the situation as it may develop after the arrival of naval forces in Japanese ports."

Para. Key positions on shore in the vicinity of the principal anchorage may be occupied if such action becomes necessary to ensure the safety of naval forces."

Para. Since this particular language was not accepted by CINCPAC, it was noted on the margin of copies furnished him that "it is subject to later revision as directed by CINCPAC."

Para. The sequence of ground occupations as now contemplated by BLACKLIST and CAMPUS in the lst phase is as follows KYOTO PLAIN, SASEBO, NAGASAKI, OSAKE-KOBE-KYOTO, KEIJO AMORI-OMIYAMA. The 5th PHI Corps is planned to be used in the OSAKE-KOBE-KYOTO area and the 3rd PHI Corps is left available for use on the CHINA COAST.

Para. An offer to place a command ship (AOC) at the disposal of CINCPAC was accepted. An offer to accommodate in Halsey's flagship the representative contemplated by last paragraph of JCS 261946 V 357 was not accepted on the ground that CINCPAC would have no representative before he arrived in person.
CINCPAC ADVANCE TO CINCPAC (CONT'D)

03 0911
Para. As informed all discussions were carried on in a most amicable manner and that General MacArthur received my representative most cordially.

Para. Agreements concerning coordination of all air forces from now until after OLYMPIC were quickly reached to the satisfaction of all concerned in conference between SHAP, HIBBARD, KENNEY, CHAMBERS, SHERRID, and PRIDE.

Para. I see no better time than the near future for a visit to the Western Pacific by you and Marshall and hope that you will come prepared to make decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CINCPAC ADVANCE TO CINCPAC

03 1332

CINCPAC ADVANCE TO CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

04 0827

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

As soon as possible after arrival in PENOX would very much like to visit you with about 4 of my staff. If agreeable to you please designate convenient date arrange air transportation and advise.

New Subject. Intend shift my flag to New Jersey HIBBARD leaving Missouri in all respects ready to receive CINCPAC.

CINCPAC ADVANCE H. TO CINCPAC ADVANCE, COMSHIPSAC

04 0753

NIMITZ TO SPURANCE AND TURNER ONLY.

As yet no agreements have been made in connection with the coverage of OLYMPIC by press representatives. Until arrangements have been made between CINCPAC and CINCPAC as to the degree to which Pacific Fleet correspondents may cover operations on above make no firm commitments connection reception APPAC correspondents in ships of the fleet. Requests for such commitments should be referred to CINCPAC for coordination.
TOP SECRET

04 0612 CONSENSUS TAF to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLEET.

STS ONLY NIMITZ AND MACARTHUR.

Operational intention is to strike primary HOKOHIMA at 060945/K (LT) or secondary KOKURA at 061010/K or tertiary NADASAKA at 061030/K. A firm decision confirming the times listed above will leave this headquarters by 051430/K. It is mandatory that no friendly aircraft enter a 50 mile area around the 3 targets scheduled for attack between the hours 060545/K and 061700/K if firm decision confirms the above target times.

04 2253 CINCPAC ADVANCE H to CINCPACFLEET.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY.

Your 040805 may further complicate an already complicated situation with respect to command and coordination of air forces in the Pacific Theater. In the minds of many Army Air Commanders there begins to arise questions as to which forces are "Primary" and which are "Supporting". Accordingly I must request that your suggestions as to overall coordination of PEAFT, USAFTAF and Fleet Aircraft be made to me only. Definite agreements have been made as to principles and are being mailed to you which cover this matter from now through OLIMIGHT.

06 1630 O'KINOSH AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Pursuant to agreement with Soviets, 4th Quarter Victory 551 refers.

Look up. Joint Chiefs of Staff will propose establishment Army and Navy operational liaison group at KHLAROVSK headed by General officer to which will be attached only 1 Captain and about 2 enlisted from Navy, and establishment at VLADIVOSTOK of naval operational liaison group headed by Flag Officer to include 3 officers and 3 enlisted from Army Air Forces. Estimate here that total personnel VLADIVOSTOK group will entail 20 officers 45 enlisted to handle liaison, convoy and routing, and necessary communications which would include ADAK, ADAK-VEIADIVOSTOK, ship to shore, and VLADIVOSTOK-QUAN via KHLAROVSK weather central. Envisaged that operational communications with PETROPAVLOVSK would be to station ship as no shore facilities other than weather central contemplated there. Your comment on this arrangement with particular reference to number of personnel VLADIVосток is requested as a matter of urgency. In this connection note that reciprocal Soviet liaison group of similar composition at QUAN may be expected. Similar information has been provided MacArthur and Spaatz by Army in 444735.

350
04 1831 ARNOLD to MAC ART INFO CINC PAC CINC PAC.

WARX 44014.
Further to WARX 29738 dated 19 July which states your overall mission priority of objectives is as follows:
Para. 1. Mission.
SubPara A. Your overall mission is as stated in JCS 742/7.
In carrying out the progressive destruction and dislocation of JAPAN'S military, industrial and economic systems, your priority of objectives is as follows:
Para. 2. Objectives.
SubPara A. Primary objectives (in order),
SubPara 1. Initiate and carry out attacks upon suitable Japanese railway targets of special importance to economic traffic.
SubPara 2. Continue the present program against aircraft production.
SubPara 3. Conduct concentrated attacks against major ammunition storage areas.
SubPara 4. Complete the present program against industrial concentrations and stores located in urban areas.
SubPara B. Secondary objectives.
SubPara 1. Attack selected arsenals producing heavy ordnance.
SubPara 2. Direct available surplus effort against secondary aircraft targets and against nitrogen production and oil storage as auxiliary to invasion and preparatory to post invasion operations.
SubPara C. Other objectives.
SubPara 1. Mining operations. To continue present mining operations that cannot be performed by JAAF or Navy in order to maintain the blockade of Japanese Home Islands.
SubPara 2. Photography. Continue the program of photography for operational purposes and complete the present program of photographing JAPAN and approaches thereto as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

31 1834 COM 3RDPFLT to CINC PAC ADVANCE

HALSEY to NIMITZ.
Pending receipt of directive from you I have formulated (plan) for preliminary steps phase 1 salient features being: A. Arrangements for delivery of your terms. B. Receive local surrender on board MISSOURI and dictate local terms. C. Com 3RDPFLT in MISSOURI with suitable screen proceed initial anchorage SAGAIC WAB. D. Fleet at sea in striking position. E. Radm Badger local Task Commander with headquarters YOKOSUKA and staff and necessary subordinate Task Commanders supplied to Com 3RDPFLT. F. Initially occupy only YOKOSUKA including airfield and seaplane base and locally initiate following measures. 1. Minesweeping. 2. Evacuation enemy armed forces from YOKOSUKA except key hostages and certain service personnel. 3. Sinking or covering existing enemy installations. 4. Harbor patrol. 5. Local security. 6. Minimum - continued -
31 2014 CONSIDER LT to CINCPAC ADVANCE (Cont'd)

essential civil administration, 7. Sanitation, 8. Receiving Ship facilities and hospital ships, 9. Communications, 10. Other local practicable measures. G. Con3rdFleet will initiate the following:
1. Instructions for withdrawal of enemy forces beyond a specified fixed line, 2. Freeing of all enemy forces in TOKYO AREA. 3. Delivery of specified shipping weapons, equipment and transportation. 4. Delivery and care of allied prisoners. 5. Security air patrol and other necessary surveillance measures. 6. General communication regulations and restrictions. 7. Preparations to receive CINCPAC including readiness of WISCONSIN. 8. Preparations to receive ship borne or air borne occupation personnel and forces. 9. Logistic support of Badger local occupation forces.

Para. Forging not complete but intended to indicate nature and extent of plans to utilise forces and facilities immediately available and pave the way for extension of control.

Para. Plans will be prepared take similar measures at other designated focal points east of arbitrarily assumed line 134 east assuming CTP 95 will not west of 134.

Para. Plan will be airmarked to you when annexe are completed but no distribution will be made other than to Badger pending further instruction. As prepared to send staff representative to GUAM.

07 0832 CINCPAC ADV H. to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NITTY TO KING. Your 061630. Is it intended to establish a direct radio circuit ADAK to VLADIVOSTOK or will relay through Khabarovsk be satisfactory. See Annex 1 to Appendix C KES5BLOCKS 4.

Para. I have succeeded in limiting the liaison officers exchanged with CINC British Pacific Fleet to the grade of captain. This has the advantage of avoiding large liaison staffs and permitting business to be transacted between liaison officers and appropriate staff officers where major policy is concerned. Strongly urge that liaison officers exchanged with Soviet CINC be captains also. If Soviets are permitted to send a flag officer British will undoubtedly demand to do likewise. Housing of senior officers and their staffs is an important factor.

Para. Otherwise concur in your 061630.

07 0554 CINCPAC ADV H. to COMINCH

TOP SECRET. NITTY TO KING ONLY. In a separate dispatch I am proposing to order Rear Admiral Buckmaster to command the South CHINA Naval Force as a task force commander. Before the PORT BAYARD project became urgent I had planned to recommend eliminating the Western CAROLINES Sub-area as an echelon of command no longer necessary and such a recommendation will follow in a few days.

Para. It appears probable that PORT BAYARD will be followed after OLYMPIC by CANTON and HONGKONG either by combat operations or as a result of Japanese collapse or local withdrawal. It is therefore timely to establish a flag officer in the area and have his
07 0534 (continued)

preparing to handle additional forces when necessary.

Para. For the present prefer that he remain responsible to CINCPAC in order to avoid precedent in connection with relations with CHIANG KAI SHEK.

07 0837 CINCPAC ADV Hq to COMCINCPAC

NTMCTZ TO BOGAN ONLY. Have been informed that you will be ordered as COUS NOC KAGOSHIMA reporting to me for that duty about 15 September after suitable leave. Commodore Kessing now comdy LION 9 which will be 1 of major components your command. Comment on proposal that he serve as your deputy and chief of staff.

Para. Desire you visit my headquarters prior going on leave.

08 2226 CINCPAC ADVANCE to COKRDFLEET info C-MINCH CINCPACK.

NTMCTZ TO HALSEY INFO KING AND FLETCHER.

In order to indicate strong support of RUSSIAN action desire you continue operations against enemy air forces and air/sea installations and targets of opportunity in northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and SHIREI for at least 2 days after 10 August.

09 0443 CINCAPPAC to MARCONS passed by C-MINCH to CINCPAC ADV Hq (ADMIRAL NTMCTZ EYES ONLY)

TOP SECRET, C 31697 EYES ONLY for GENERAL MARSHALL from MACARTHUR.

Reference NAR 45369 (071535?). I am certain that the Japanese air potential reported to you as accumulating to counter our OLYMPIC operation is greatly exaggerated. We have recently seen the 3rd Fleet approach the northern and central shorelines of JAPAN close enough for gunfire bombardment and yet no reaction from the Japanese air has taken place. Our air forces are daily flying throughout JAPAN and provoke no reaction. The situation repeats that of the PHILIPPINES campaign. Prior to the invasion of LUSON, reports were received of the concentration of air both on LUSON and on FORMOSA. An erroneous estimate of widely dispersed planes being held back for the eventuality of landings was repeatedly made. I further doubt the often repeated reports that large numbers of aircraft are still being manufactured in JAPAN. As to the movement of ground forces, the Japanese are reported as trying to concentrate in the few areas in which landings can be effected from TOKYO southwards. It is possible that some strength may have been drawn from the areas of northern HONSHU. I do not credit however, the heavy strength reported to you in southern KYUSHU. The limited capacity of railroads and the continued shipping losses discourage belief that large forces can be concentrated or supported effectively in southern KYUSHU. Kenney's air forces are only now becoming effective from CHINA/A and it is anticipated that there will be a rapid buildup to an effective strength in early September of approximately 2000 combat planes, and prior to OLYMPIC of approximately 3000 planes.

These are in addition to the VDN and escorting fighter in the MARIANAS. It is anticipated that this great weight of air will quickly seek out
and destroy in the southern Japanese islands all enemy air potential and will practically immobilize ground forces in their present positions. The maintenance of such forces in southern KYUSHU cannot fail to become increasingly difficult and it is anticipated that they will be greatly weakened prior to INCHI.

Para. In my opinion, there should not be the slightest thought of changing the OLYMPIC operation. Its fundamental purpose is to obtain air bases under cover of which we can deploy our forces to the northward into the industrial heart of JAPAN. The plan is sound and will be successful in attack directly into TOKYO or to the northward thereof would have to be made without the benefit of land based aviation other than V-1 and for that reason alone would be fraught with greatest danger. I seriously doubt the advisability of a direct attack into TOKYO without the installation of heavy air forces closer than OCHI. Only a limited study has been made of the KENDAI and OCHI areas. Insofar as OCHI is concerned, weather alone would seem to indicate the impracticability for an attack during 1945 or early 1946, especially for the installation of air forces which would prepare the way into the industrial heart of JAPAN. KENDAI has somewhat greater potentialities although some difficulty in establishing satisfactory bases might be experienced. This area is very close to the TOKYO area and would be subjected to heavy infiltration of ground troops thencefrom. Throughout the Southwest Pacific area campaigns, as we have learned and operation intelligence has invariably pointed to greatly increased enemy forces. Without exception, this build-up has been found to be erroneous. In this particular case, the destruction that is going on in JAPAN would seem to indicate that it is very probable that the enemy is resorting to deception.

07 1535 OPD WAR (MARSHALL) to MACARTHUR passed b QUTRO to CINCPAC ADV H.
TOP SECRET
NIMITZ ONLY
AUGUST (OCT)

09 2205 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

KING TO NIMITZ EYES ONLY.
Desire your comments on WAR 45369 (071535) and MACARTHUR 31897
(090443) passed to you EYES ONLY. Send your reply info MACARTHUR.

10 0731 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV, COMGEN TEN info APDPAC, JCS.

32204.
Concur Richardson's 262220 concerning return of infected prisoners
to RYUKYUS. Reference CINCPAC ADVANCE 220725 and COMGEN TEN 030434Z.
Desire prisoners presently at CHINAWA remain there pending immediately
forthcoming conference in RYUKYUS between representative of Chief Provost
Marshall APDPAC and COMGEN TEN.

19 1135 COMINCH and CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

KING TO NIMITZ.
This is a peace warning. TOKYO has indicated in ultra channels
that JAPAN wishes to bring about peace immediately and that she will
accept the Joint Declaration by leaders of U.S., Great Britain and
CHINA provided that the stipulations do not include a demand for alteration
of the authority of the emperor to rule the state. It is now probable
that the Swedish or Swiss governments will soon transmit official
messages to the Allies regarding Jap capitulation desires. Your
movements and dispositions should be guided by this information pending
further more definite word or instructions.

01 1400 COMINCH and CNO to ALABAMA MOSCOW - COMINCH PASSES TO CINCPAC ADV, COM-
CINCPAC.

Pursuant to terminal agreements and conversations with Russians it is
apparent that U.S. convoy of Soviet shipping from West Coast ports and of
HULA 5 ships cannot be instituted after outbreak of hostilities until
operational liaison groups are set up and functioning.
Apparently further that Western terminal these convoys must be BANANAN
GULF area until Soviets open LA PERouse or we open TSUSHIMA. In order
plans here for institution convoy escorts may have firm basis desire
answers to following in light of foregoing stipulations. A. When is
convoy and what sailing from West Coast ports and HULA 5 ships
expected to begin? B. What is size and frequency of convoys desired by Soviets? 
When will they be removed. C. Where is
desired? How many ships? D. Responsibility and control of convoy
elites should also be set. E. What other planning for escorting Soviet
convoy?
HALSFY TO NILMTOZ. 

Your 100313 acknowledge and understood. Must make sure however that you understand the following. During last 3 days over 500 enemy planes positively destroyed or damaged in N. Honshiu and a great number others strafed rocketed, bombed and undoubtedly destroyed but not visible. North Honshiu is for the time being wrecked and powerless. A strong fog belt whose southern edge lies at about lat 36. Unless otherwise directed I will now do in effort to find an operating area from which to attack"INAOI" KURE, but unless you advise that such attack is of utmost urgency will not take the abnormal risk to planes involved in flight operations while fog is present or positively imminent. Typhoon may alter all plans. Will keep you advised.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONRODFLT, info COMINCH.

NILMTOZ to HALSFY. INFO KING.

Your current orders hereby amended. While striking at discretion move your fleet to southward and prepare to execute operations under concept of Joint Staff Study CAMPUS dated 9 August. 10 copies will be flown to island Commander JMO JMA forenoon 11 August to await pickup by carrier aircraft. CONRODFLT remain in Missouri. An ordering New Jersey to CHAM. My 082226 amended to accord with above.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CONRODFLT info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Pending the arrival of the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet in Japanese waters the Commander 3rd Fleet will be his designated representative for purposes indicated in JCS 261946 Victory 357.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CTF 95 info COMAFFINING 1, CONRODFLT, COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Alert 2 squadrons of patrol seaplanes and adequate tenders for immediate movement northeastward for duty with Con3rdFlt. Alert all available fast minesweepers and a suitable tender for similar movement. Advise numbers available and prospective dates readiness. See my Joint Staff Study CAMPUS.

Para. Prepare units of BatRon 1 now in OKINAWA (except your Flagship) for similar movement with suitable screen.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMORPAC info COMINCH, CONRODFLT.

NILMTZ to FLETCHER INFO HALSFY AND KING.

Warning order. In the event of Japanese capitulation which now appears imminent you will be directed to employ forces under your command for naval occupation HAKOBE - AOMORI - OMINATO area with forces under your command. Forces contemplated are 3 CA, 2 CCL, 9 DD, 1 AV, 1 AVF, 1 AR, 1 ARL available minesweepers. You will be authorized embark in a ship of this force and exercise personal command if in your judgement such action is advisable. An AGC may become available.
10 1144

JCS to CINCPAC, USAFRICOM, JCS ADV

FAX 47190.

TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, AND SPAATZ FOR INFORMATION.

As a result of administrative errors code word OLYMPIC was compromised by being published in a memorandum classified restricted. Investigation failed to show that meaning of code word was compromised. As a matter of absolute safety decision reached to cancel OLYMPIC and substitute MAJESTIC instead.

10 2002

CINCPAC AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE II

FROM ADM. KING FOR THE EYES ONLY OF ADMIRAL NIMITZ.

SeeNav is of the opinion that an opportunity should be afforded the American people to pay tribute to the men of the Navy which they will undoubtedly wish to express. He suggests that whenever operational requirements permit a task group composed of some outstanding vessels be sent back to the U.S. as a token return of the Fleet. He further suggests that your return with this group at least to the last port of call would enhance public enthusiasm and interest but the Secretary appreciates that any arrangements depend on demands of your time in the Pacific. Desire your comments.

11 0216

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC Adv CINCPAC FL.

NIMITZ to MACARTHUR thru KING and KEESLING.

In the event of Japanese surrender it is my plan to place at your disposal immediately 1 of the command ships (AGC) now in the Philippines and to assign it to a special task group which will be commanded by a Flag Officer and will include an appropriate escort. I believe that this class of ship will best serve you as a headquarters afloat with adequate accommodations and communications. Request your comments.

09 0326

CMF 20 to CINCPAC ADVANCE, CINCPAC

ACOM 5449. KEESLING TO NIMITZ AND SPAATZ.

Note: This is extract of copy to Washington (In view of the effects at TRINITY and HIROSHIMA which far exceeded optimistic expectations, Farrell Parsons and Farrell believe question of targets should be reviewed immediately. The subject was discussed with Nimitz and Spaatz today at Guam and both concurred in our views expressed below.

Para. Because of great potency targets should where practicable be at least 3 miles on a side. Targets with partially burned out areas having large remaining population and some industry offer great possibilities for psychological effects. We consider the “Scare Radius” to be at least 10 miles. It is recommended that the War Department should no longer require visual bombing but leave decision to the field command. Every effort will be made to get best bombing conditions. We consider remaining approved targets with exception of KOKURA as inadequate or improperly shaped areas. We do not want to waste any of effects. It is recommended that the list be revised to include several large cities. It is expressly recommended that the region of TKU be included as a target.
TOP SECRET

11 2294

COINCH AND CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE H.

EYES ONLY ADMIRAL NIMITZ.

Plans under consideration contemplate that for the occupation of JAPAN and the enforcement of surrender terms MACARTHUR will be the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers and together with representatives of the U.S., GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA and USSR will accept the Japanese surrender on board the MISSOURI. You will be the U.S. representative. Forgoing for your advance information.

11 2010

J.C. CHIEFS OF STAFF to CINCPAC, CINCPAC ADVANCE, CHUHENG, COUEN, USASTAF CHINA, COUEN US ARMY, CHINA SOUTHEAST ASIA COM, CHENG, CHEN.

TAC 47945:

TO SEC BOOK MESSAGE TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, FEDEERER, SHAAT AND OTHERS

FROM THE JCHS OF STAFF.

Para 1. Further to TAC 17064, 16 June 1945 and VICTORY 357 of 26 July, key areas of JAPAN proper, KOREA and the CHINA coast will be occupied upon capitulation or collapse of the Japanese Government. Occupation operations will be initiated on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para 2. Preparations for the operations required under paragraph 1 above, must be subsidiary to, and without jeopardy to, those for directed operations prior to Japanese capitulation or collapse. The operations following Japanese capitulation shall be planned as developing from the dispositions, preparations and arrangements for the Campaign in JAPAN, except that as practicable Marine Corps troops allocated CINCPAC should be used for preliminary landings on the ASIATIC CONTINENT.

Para 3.

A. In order that there may be a continuity of policy and procedure in dealing with the Japanese Imperial High Command and asistant agencies of the Japanese Government, representatives of CINCPAC and CINCPAC will jointly perform this function until CINCPAC has landed in JAPAN and assumed this responsibility.

B. Except as indicated in paragraphs 3C and 3D, below, CINCPAC and CINCPAC are charged with carrying out the military operations incident to the occupation in accordance with the same command responsibilities and arrangements established under VICTORY 87938 of 25 May 1945. In preparing plans for occupation operations on the CHINA COAST, CINCPAC will collaborate with COUEN.

C. COUEN will assume command or operational control of Pacific Theater forces after they are established ashore on the CHINA COAST in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon by the commanders concerned. COUEN is responsible for coordination with CHINSESE CHUNG HAI-CHIY of those parts of those parts of the occupation plans pertaining to CHINA.

D. Forces involved in the immediate naval occupation of critical ports in JAPAN, as contemplated in VICTORY 357, and on ASIATIC MAINLAND will continue under the control of CINCPAC until such time as CINCPAC and COUEN are in a position to exercise control of the occupation.
Para 4.

A. The immediate objective of operation against Japan and Korea is early introduction of forces (including seizure of critical ports and port facilities and airfields) into major strategic land and sea areas in order to seize control, immobilize and disarm enemy forces and impose the conditions which are required by the immediate military situation. Earliest possible U.S. custody of allied prisoners of war and interned persons is essential.

B. The 2nd objective of occupation operations on the China coast is to afford such assistance to China theater forces, by gaining control of key ports and communications points, as is practicable without involvement in a major land campaign.

Para 5.

A. Prompt occupation in Japan is the supreme operation and constitutes a first charge upon resources available to Pacific Commanders.

B. Early occupation of Korea and acceptance of surrender of Japanese forces in that area constitutes a second charge upon such resources.

C. Subject to the above priorities, operations will be undertaken on the China coast and Formosa.

Para 6. The responsibility for the execution of the terms of surrender in Japan proper and in Korea is assigned to CINCPAC.

Para 7. CINCPAC and CINCPAC will arrange for immediate acceptance of possible local surrenders by any U.S. commander on the spot. These arrangements will include provision for continuity in dealing with local Japanese authorities.

Para 8. Planning will recognize the possibility of participation of small allied task forces of other nations in subsequent phases of the occupation and in accordance with directives to be issued later.

Para 9. In order to facilitate operations, Korea is included in the Pacific Theater in so far as United States Command is concerned.

Para 10. CINCPAC, CINCPAC and CINCPAC will receive consultation or exchange views with submit recommendations concerning occupation operations on the China coast and Formosa.

Para 11. Upon designation of a supreme commander for the Allied powers, as is contemplated, the foregoing responsibilities and command arrangements become subject to the authority conferred upon him by his directive.

12 1055 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

C 32887.
FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ALONG PHILIP GENERAL MACARTHUR.

In view latest plans for surrender received this date which differ fundamentally from those previously envisioned it is suggested that it possible you send a representative to this headquarters as these latter instruction make necessary a reconsideration of all local plans previously considered.
Para 1. Deeply concerned am I relative possible lack of appreciation in Washington of explosive and portentous possibilities in CHINA when JAPAN surrenders. Instructions emanating from Washington (I cite WAR 47943, WAR 47945 and WAR 48004) indicate that I have failed to impress the implications of Chinese Communist movement and effect upon realization of U.S. objectives in this area.

Para 2. It is my considered opinion that the American contingents contemplated in occupational plans (WAR 40831) must arrive as promptly as possible in CHINA. WAR 47945 places Japanese Archipelago in 1st priority, KOREA in 2nd, and CHINA in 3rd or last priority. As I view overall situation in Far East upon surrender of Japanese, the Archipelago will present no immediate problems relative to control, repatriation, disarmament or disturbances of revolutionary characters; whereas on the ASIATIC MAINLAND we are confronted with 2 serious possibilities requiring prompt action on part of Allies. 1st, Chinese communist forces may precipitate civil war in CHINA; 2nd, the Japanese Army remaining on the mainland, approximately 2,000,000 strong, may continue to fight either in force or in isolated areas, requiring continued employment of air and land forces. The area of CHINA is so vast and communications so limited, the problems posed by the above 2 conditions obviously require thinking and appropriate disposition of allied forces, American and Chinese. Definitely CHINA THEATERS minimum requirements for American occupational forces should be given 1st priority.

Para 3. The Chinese communist leader today issued a radio proclamation to Japanese and Chinese puppets admonishing them to surrender to nearest anti-Japanese troops. Ambassador Hurley has provided State Department with copy of proclamation. The primary object of Chinese communists is to obtain Japanese arms and equipment and thus further strengthen their capabilities. It is not unreasonable to expect Chinese cooperation in this regard. The geographical objectives of the Chinese communists have been and continue to be the very same key and strategic points and these RECOMMENDED as vital by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who selected the majority of such points and areas for projected American occupation; including SHANGHAI, Nanking, TAIYING, TIENTSIN, PEKING, TSINGTAO and CANTON. We will do utmost to dispose and employ Chinese forces in strength to prevent widespread uprising and disorder, and to localize Chinese communist efforts. U.S. resources available will be employed in consonance with new CHINA THEATER.

Para 4. In my personal letter to you, delivered by SIMPSON, and in subsequent radios, I have tried to portray the problems presented in CHINA, particularly pertaining to the total lack of organization and planning. We Americans can and do make plans embodying sound recommendations, but their implementation in this land of confusion, intrigue and indecision remains problematical. I am sure that you appreciate my position and earnest desire to comply with instructions from Washington. Throughout my service here I have tried earnestly and objectively to
TOP SECRET
SHOULD ONLY BE READ BY AUGUST (GCT)
- continued -

120520

CONFIDENTIAL TO MARSHALL, MACARTHUR, HINZTZ.

PROVIDE YOU AND THE Joint Chiefs of Staff factual data and considered
judgment relative to the application of instructions to the realistic
conditions prevailing in CHINA.

Para 5. Recommendations in view of above following forces be
dispatched in 1st Priority:

Sub-Para A. 2 divisions to SHANGHAI area.
Sub-Para B. 2 divisions to TANSU area.
Sub-Para C. 1 division to CANTON area.
Sub-Para D. If above is impracticable, I consider it imperative
that, as absolute minimum, 2 divisions be dispatched to SHANGHAI area,
1 division to TANSU area and 1 regiment to CANTON area immediately.
Sub-Para E. If at all possible MACARTHUR stipulate at surrender
meeting that Japanese commanders in CHINA be instructed to surrender to
Chinese Central Government Commanders.

121837

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, HINZTZ. Info VEDENZER.

WAR 43625,

As a matter of urgency request MACARTHUR and HINZTZ comments on
VEDENZER'S 4352 of 12 August be furnished Joint Chiefs of Staff with
info copies to VEDENZER.

Para. As for VEDENZER'S recommendation in Paragraph 5 F, present
draft of general order number 1 to be issued by Japanese G.H.Q. provides
for the surrender of Japanese commanders and all forces within NEPA
(excluding MANCHUKUO) to the GENERALISSIMO. This general order has
not yet been finally approved.

'122051

MARSHALL to VEDENZER info HINZTZ, MACARTHUR.

WAR 47943.

FOR INFORMATION ONLY FOR MACARTHUR'S AND HINZTZ'S INFO. NULL.

VERIFIED DOES ONLY FROM MARSHALL.

Para. We are in a discussion now regarding deployment of troops into
JAPAN and the return of tired out high score men from the Pacific to
the United States. The lst requirement involves immediately the diversion
of C-54's to a special run from the Philippines to KYUSHU and
another prospective run into JAPAN. This diversion of course immedi-
ately reduces the evacuation from the Pacific of high score men by the
multiple of just that many planes.

Para. What I should like to know from you is how soon you feel
we could make a lst reduction of HUMP tonnage in order to release C-54's.
I mean by this a reduction prior to the opening of a port; for the
situation thereafter of course you already have notification.

Para. I should like an estimate from you as to how much longer the
present HUMP tonnage will be required in order to complete the equi-
plement of the ALFA divisions on the assumption that no further combat operat-
ions are required but that of course numerous movements will be involved
in order to herd the Japanese Army according to plan. Please acknowledge receipt immediately.
From 5 to 6 1/2, conferred with General MacArthur and staff concern-
ing occupation and surrender. He considers that as supreme allied com-
mander he is fully responsible for, and commands all phases of the oc-
ccupation of Japan. He desires no communication with Japanese auth-
orities by forces in the Pacific except through his headquarters. He ex-
pects to summon Japanese representatives to VICKILA to make a prelimi-
nary arrangement for the surrender.

Para. He reiterated in most emphatic terms his disapproval of the use
of a fleet landing force prior to the arrival of troops in strength and prior to
the clearance of Japanese forces from the area under armistice arrange-
ments. This disapproval is based on both military grounds and effect on
service relationships.

Para. He repeated his full agreement with occupation of Japanese
ports and coastal waters and complete blockade by the ships of the fleet.

Para. For the initial seizure of the TOKYO, ARIA he proposes a joint
operation using the 11th airborne and 27th infantry divisions, both
airborne, and at the same time landing the 4th Marine Combat Team.
This operation would not take place until conditions set at VICKILA
had been met.

Para. I expect to take off at midnight.

Para. General MacArthur was shown the following paragraphs.
WAR to CINC PAC ADVANCE H., GONG CHINA. (Cont'd).

commanders. In the message to Stalin it is stated that MacArthur will direct Japanese Imperial Headquarters to have Japanese Forces in the Soviet Area of operations surrender unconditionally to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East or to his subordinate commanders.

Para. Preliminary instructions are being issued to General MacArthur and immediate advice is requested concerning designated representatives so that MacArthur may be notified. It is suggested that direct communication with MacArthur on arrangements be initiated at once. This ends substance of messages sent to heads of state by the President.

Para. The President would like to have the General surrender take place on American soil, that is, a Battleship, preferably the Battleship MISSOURI.

Para. The present plan for the acceptance of the surrender by you as Supreme Commander provides that each of the 4 Major Powers, U.S., CHINA, UK and U.S.S.R., will have a representative present, and Admiral Nimitz will serve in the capacity of U.S. representative at the formal surrender. Admiral Nimitz has been informed of this and also concerning the use of the Battleship MISSOURI.

Para. The foregoing constitutes your preliminary instructions.

Para. The following is purely for your information and is furnished and will be used for planning only.

Para. The State Department has replied to the Japanese Government informing that that the Emperor will be required to authorize and insure the signature by the Government of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the JAPSDA declaration and will be required to direct surrender of Japanese Armed Forces and issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms. No reply has been received from the Japanese Government.

Para. Now being considered on a planning basis for use in case the Japanese accept the conditions is a message to the Japanese Government that it should immediately:

Para. (1) Direct cessation of hostilities by Japanese Forces, informing the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of the effective date and hour of such cessation.

(2) Send Envoys to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with information of the disposition of the Japanese Forces and commanders, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying forces to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender.

Para. Separate Subject: The British have now proposed transfer to them of areas agreed at terminal effective on capitulation being accepted.

14 1916

COULTH AND CHG TO CINC PAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS.

KING TO NIMITZ.

Suspend attack air operations forthwith.
TEMP SECRET

14 1418

COMCHIN CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS

FOR ADMIRAL HINZT EYES ONLY

Include in your plans the return of a representative force of
distinguished combatant vessels to the United States whenever in your
activation vessels can be spared from duties in connection with the
Naval phase of the occupation of Japanese Territory. Your 110736
Concur in your views as to your return in person.NavNav has been
informed of the substance of your reply. Submit for approval brief of
your plans.

14 0614

CINCPAC ADVANCE to COMJFLEET info CINCPAC

HINZT TO HALSEY INFO KING

MacArthur will be appointed Supreme Allied Commander to "Exercise
Supreme Command over all land, sea and air forces which may be allo-
cated for enforcement in JAPAN of the surrender terms by the Allied
Forces concerned". Until otherwise directed by me do not land any
in JAPAN. See COMCHIN FLEET 131050 passed separately.

14 0845

COMCHIN to MACPAC FOR CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS

CHIN HINZT EYES ALONE FOR MACPAC CHIN HINZT EYES ALONE

CFEX 4380

Para 1. Provision embodied in last paragraph at MARX 48628 is
subject. I am sure that you recognize that JAPAN may properly be
named the critical area in connection with current and projected
activities of Chinese Communists, and possibly Soviet Communists. If
the General Order Number 1 to be issued by Japanese Headquarters pro-
vides for the surrender of Japanese forces within
CHINA to the Generalissimo but excludes JAPAN insofar as the Gener-
alisimo is concerned, following implications should be noted:
SubPara A. The attitude of Soviet Russia toward the Chinese Commu-
nists has never been determined accurately nor have Soviet Intentions
in CHINA been formalized to a degree that Americans can view the
situation with equanimity. However it is not unreasonable to expec-
t penetration of Soviet Communist ideologies in JAPAN with coopera-
tion of Chinese Communists. If the General Order above referred to
excludes JAPAN as now contemplated, there is extreme danger that
Japanese equipment will become available surreptitiously or openly to
the Chinese Communists in JAPAN. Further the Chinese Communist
overall plans will be facilitated. If on the other hand the General
order clearly stipulates that Japanese forces would surrender only to
Soviet Russian Forces and/or the Generalissimo's forces, the above
dangers would be minimized or perhaps obviated.

SubPara B. The ideas embodied in this message and in messages I
have sent you the past several days might suggest partisan leaning
on my part. This is not the case. However, the U.S. policy has been
and continues to be full support of the Generalissimo who heads the
only officially and universally recognized constituted government in
CHINA. The Generalissimo is concerned at present to be the strongest

- continued -
Chinese leader and the only one capable of possibly accomplishing a modicum of stability during this period of uncertainty. It would therefore appear sound to create conditions by continued U.S. political, economic and military support (short of involvement in fratricidal war) which would strengthen the existing central government's position. This support should include iron clad stimulations designed to insure surrender of Japanese forces and equipment to the Generalissimo throughout CHINA including MANCHURIA, except in the immediate combat areas of the Russians.

SubPara C. I view ADIA as an enormous pot, seething and boiling, the fumes of which may readily snuff out the advantages gained by allied sacrifices the past several years and may also definitely preclude realization of the objectives of the Atlantic Charter, and the TREATY, Yalta and RCSDP agreements. In my CPD 526, 9 July, paragraphs 2 and 3, pertinent ideas and suggestions are expressed that have stronger and immediate application today.

Para 2. I am so remote from international negotiations, it is with some misgivings that I submit following 2 alternate suggestions:

SubPara A. Schedule a conference with representatives from Soviet Russia, U.S., Great Britain, China in DELHI, INDIA, as early as possible to investigate and recommend appropriate steps necessary to preclude Civil War in CHINA, or.

SubPara B. 3 Big Powers issue agreed proclamation to Chinese Communists and Chinese Central Government that Civil War will not be tolerated in CHINA in any form or degree; that Big 3 are determined to take appropriate steps and employ necessary force in premises; that political and internal affairs must be settled without employment of force; that Big 3 recognized CHINA sovereignty and right of determination by Chinese of own government; that employment of force by factions in CHINA has serious implications with regard to peace in the Far East and world order in general.

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPACPEST,

UNITED TO HALSEY.

Your 140613. I believe it will provide for difficulties and envisage and will also avoid competition between services as to priority of landing.

CINCPAC to NARCO (JCS), AGMAR HASH D C info CINCPAC, CINCPAC.

Answering your 496025, 12 August requesting comments on Wavemeyer's 6325, 12 August. Upon speculation the prompt occupation of JAPAN PROPER is paramount and that operation should be given the highest priority in the utilization of Pacific resources. The occupation of KOREA should be given 2nd priority, with CHINA 3rd, and then only at an extent that would insure United States ground forces not becoming involved in a major land campaign in any part of the CHINA THEATER.
CINCAC to MAC90 (JCS), VINCAC 0943 INFO COMINCHCHU, JCSAC

Para. Since the resources immediately available to CINCAC will be required for the execution of BLACKJACK, it would be impossible to divert forces to CINA, as suggested by Stimson in the priority recommended and only at a future date in redeployment were continued to supply the means required.

CINCAC to CINCAC ADVISES INFO COMINCHCHU, JCSAC, JCS
CONSULT, CONULT, CONSULT, XINTOK AC, JCSAC, JCSAC

CX 33432.

Your 120243/3, prompt occupation of CAIN in case of surrender constitutes a first charge upon resources available in the Pacific and is dependent on use of Divisions, including 5th Amphibious Corps, which have been prepared for CAINAC. Use of 5th Amphibious Corps in CINA would cause large scale changes in fundamental arrangements for supporting troops and inevitably cause delay and confusion. In accord informal conferences with Admiral Ferran will proceed on basis that 5th Amphibious Corps will be utilized in CAIN on 24th Corps will occupy KOREA. Noted is your plan for 3rd Amphibious Corps and 1st Regimental Combat 6th Marine Division.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MAC90 (JCS), INFO COMINCHCHU, JCSAC

MARX 49132.

Para. 1. Read with reference to MAR 48672.

Para. 2. The President has approved the wording of the 1st document which is the directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, with the deletion in the 1st sentence of paragraph 7 of the words "as witnesses "TRI.".

Para. 3. The President has approved the wording of the 2nd document which is the proclamation by the Emperor of JAP.

Para. 4. The President has approved the wording of the 3rd document which is the instrument of surrender with deletion of the words "by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers" at the end of paragraph 7 and with the addition of provision for signatures of representatives of the Allied Powers. The President desires that, after you have signed accepting the surrender, you invite the 4 representatives of the Allied Powers to place their signatures on the surrender document below to the left of the signature of the Supreme Commander, in order as follows and with the following designations printed or typed under the respective signatures:

...representative, Republic of CHINA representative, United Kingdom representative, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics representative. The official document will be in the English language.

Para. D. The 4th document which is General Order No. 1, is under consideration here and minor modifications are being made.

- continued -
TOP SECRET

14 0140

JUNTS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR: INFO BETH. - DALKINS.

Para 2. There are minor editorial changes in the 1st and 3rd
documents. Official copies of the 1st, 3 documents are being forwarded
today by courier to MacArthur.

Para 2. With reference to the directive to the supreme commander
for the Allied powers, this will become effective when you are
officially notified by the War Department of Japanese capitulation.

Para 3. The British, the Chinese, and the Russians have now all
agreed to the proposal of the President contained in 14 4316.2. The
Russians have designated Lieutenant General Denishanki as their
representative. The British have designated Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser.

Para 4. War Department messages 4346 and 4572 are being passed
to Admiral Nimitz and General Weydemeyer.

13 2325

WARDS to SENJAC to SENJAC, WINTER, BAGMIR.

WARX 49042

The British Chiefs of Staff that they assume that the U.S. will take
the lead in all general matters concerning an early Japanese surrender
but have asked that the U.S. Chiefs keep them informed.

Para. British consider it of paramount political importance that
a British Commonwealth Force be sent at the earliest possible moment
to accept the surrender of the Japanese at HONG KONG. They propose to
send a detachment of the British Fleet at once to HONG KONG, followed
as soon as possible by an Australian Force in British control subject
to agreement with the Australian Government and to necessary arrange-
ments being made with you and Nimitz. They also propose that the
adjustment of the boundary of SIFAR should take effect upon the date of the cease fire order. They ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to be prepared to instruct you and Nimitz to make available
the forces to send to HONG KONG. British will seek the agreement of
the Australian Government and instruct Admiral Fraser to concert his
plans for HONG KONG with you and Nimitz and British proposal.

Para. The U.S. Chiefs have answered this proposal as follows:

Para A. Agree to keep British informed of pertinent action taken
by the U.S. Chiefs and have passed WARX 42945 to British.

Para B. The U.S. Chiefs will accede to a request to release to
British control at time of surrender all or part of the British Pacific
Fleet. However, Nimitz has accepted a British offer of a force of
1 BB, 2 CG, 1 CV and the necessary destroyers to participate with the
U.S. Fleet in the Naval occupation of JAPAN, if such occurs.

Para C. Occupation of HONG KONG is a matter for arrangement
between the British and Chinese Governments. The release of British
forces is unrelated to any British proposals regarding HONG KONG. No
arrangement with General MacArthur for release of Australians appears
necessary other than detailed local arrangements for the turnover.

Para D. Agree that the adjustment to the boundary of SIFAP should
take effect on the date of the Japanese surrender. End of U.S. answer.

Para. The above is furnished you for your information. TERMINAL
agreement referred to provided for a passage from U.S. to British
Command as soon as possible of that part of SIFAP lying south of follow-
ing described boundary: beginning on the coast of INDO CHINA at
14003

COMMANDER to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CTF 31.

CINC's 9 Aug. strongly recommended reconsideration your L20242.
Assignment of a TaskDiv considered necessary for following reasons:
A. Uncertainty of Japanese behavior.
B. Necessity of conducting shore operations on a normal combat scale.
C. Task will include occupation of air base, naval base and adjacent danger points, enforcing evacuation of control zone, establishing secure and effective perimeter.
D. Length of interval between naval occupation and the arrival of designated Army occupation forces.
E. Inadequacy of equipment training and experience of personnel of Fleet Landing Force for other than tasks not involving risk of stiff combat.
Para. Any problems of Army-Navy jurisdiction could be solved by transferring to CINCPAC operational control any troops of TaskDiv employed beyond limits of naval zones.

140812

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

HEADQUARTERS.

For your information Sherman brought me from Manila a copy of Marshall's L 48672 to MacArthur which contains complete copy of proposed directive to Supreme Commander, proclamation by the Emperor of Japan, instrument of surrender and general order number 1.

140813

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC.

HEADQUARTERS.

I concur heartily in the proposal that the initial seizure of the
TARK AREA be affected by a joint operation us the 11th Airborne and 27th Infantry Divisions both Airborne and at the same time landing the 4th Marine Combat Team and other units of the Fleet Landing Force.
TO SECRET

14 2303

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC ADVANCE to COIN CPX 4500 and similar missile, which it is appropriate that he see in view of his
prospective assignment as Task Fleet Commander responsible for naval
operations along the CHINA COAST. Request CINCPAC also include
COIN CPX as appropriate.

14 2302

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC INFO COIN CPX 4500 and similar
missile, which it is appropriate that he see in view of his
prospective assignment as Task Fleet Commander responsible for naval
operations along the CHINA COAST. Request CINCCHINA also include
COIN CPX as appropriate.

14 2035

CINCPAC ADVANCE to CINCPAC INFO COIN CPX 4500 and similar
missile, which it is appropriate that he see in view of his
prospective assignment as Task Fleet Commander responsible for naval
operations along the CHINA COAST. Request CINCCHINA also include
COIN CPX as appropriate.

14 1903

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, MILITTY, INFO NEWS
WAX 49334.

With reference to WAX 48004, the Chiefs of Staff have received the
following memorandum from the White House:

Para. Referring to memorandum dated 11 August directing such
advance arrangements as are practicable for the occupation of DAEarsers
and a port in KOREA.

Para. Further information, it is now considered wise from a political point of view also to occupy as soon as possible after the Japanese surrender some other mainland ports that definitely
are not in the area of Soviet operations. This ends memorandum from
the White House.

Para. The Chiefs of Staff are not able to appraise your capabili-
ties to execute the primary mission of securing JAPAN PROPER and to
seize DAIKAI and a port in KOREA as envisaged in WAX 48004 and also
to seize 1 or more ports in CHINA definitely not in the area of Soviet
operations. Your analysis of the matter will be appreciated for
their use.
CONFIDENT TO CINCPAC ADVANCE II.

HALKEY TO Halsey.

Sherman's LSTs can meet all requirements but may find it advisable to move heavy ships into TOKYO BAY on 25th instead of 24th depending on satisfactory completion of sweeping and on plans for covering landings (see my 19023 to FUCHSBERG). This should not upset any other known plan of yours or Isoroku's. Landing forces from fleet consist of:

A. 1800 Marines in 3 battalions under Clements' command and assigned tasks commensurate with their capabilities and equipment.

B. 1200 "Bluejackets" in 3 battalions and a British Landing Force of 400 men available for security duty in case of combat troops.

C. Reserve of 2000 additional Bluejackets in 5 battalions available for security duty but poorly trained.

D. Special Bluejacket operating companies of 2,000 men for service duties pending arrival of corps and garrison forces. Your LSTs to plans have at all times taken limitations into consideration and contemplate minimum use more consistent with security and doing a proper job. New subject. Your 17004 most helpful and everything should proceed smoothly.

17 2234

CONFIDENT TO FUCHSBERG, Halsey, and JCS INFO JCS.

Halsey to ACAPULCO.

Navy Chiefs have informed British regarding matters given in Annex in substance as follows:

A. Accept in principle participation of British Ground Forces in occupation of JASA, details as to size and composition being left for later determination.

B. Assume British will shortly furnish views concerning forces for KOREA.

C. Consider previous agreements on the employment of British ground and air forces in the Pacific superseded and request information concerning disposition of forces elements already in the Pacific.

D. Point out the following in connection with British proposal regarding operations outside of their area of responsibility:

- Pacific theater less areas agreed to was to British on day of Japanese surrender (30 JUN 45) is an area of JASA responsibility and JASA will continue with operations in that area connected with Japanese surrender;

- Generalissimo is supreme Commander in CHINA;

- Governmental agreement provides for joint action to be responsible for surrender matters in JASA and parts of "AKINMA" and JASA commander for the Pacific Theater;

- Chinese agreement to surrender arrangements obtained on the basis that surrender of JASA in CHINA (excluding those opposing the Russians) would be a matter for the Generalissimo;

- continued -

352
17 2214  MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR, HOSHI, WEDEMEYER INFO HINT  (Cont’d)

U.S. Chiefs have already issued instructions that U.S. forces entering the CHINA THEATER will be with the approval and cognizance of Generalissimo and subject to control of Wedemeyer who (as his chief of staff) is responsible to the Generalissimo.

E. Matter of priorities within British area of responsibility is British concern and we suggest that any resources that the British have available beyond those required in their own area of responsibility be defined with a view to their use in assisting in the U.S. area of responsibility.

F. U.S. has placed the opening of a CHINA PORT (in collaboration with and to assist Chinese) in a priority below the securing of JAPAN and a port in JAVA. If British are able to make forces quickly available to enter a CHINA PORT, they should be considered for the main effort.

G. Summarizing, U.S. government considers any matters concerning British Forces entering CHINA THEATER should be arranged between British and Chinese Governments. After completion of such governmental arrangements, coordination involving MacArthur, Wedemeyer and limita can go forward. If such government arrangements are completed, U.S. stands ready to integrate British proposals (agreed by the Generalissimo) with other Pacific operations. This ends U.S. reply.

Para. The above is furnished for your information.

21 0600  OMNIBUS TO CINCJAC ADVANCE R5

OMNIBUS TO HINTO X

Capt Carroll B. Jones, naval aviation officer advance party to TOKYO was informed by 2/1 today that he would not be allowed to inspect and obtain list hand information on airfield and facilities YOKOSUKA. Party will be kept together vicinity ATUSHI to prevent possible incident. All available information field and facilities YOKOSUKA is to be supplied to advance party by Japanese.

16 0718  CINCJAC ADV TO CHANCELLER & CINCPAC -- SPECIAL 53. ONLY

It is my present concept that as soon as troops occupy JAPAN in strength (in about 1 month to 6 weeks) it will be possible to greatly reduce fleet strength in the western Pacific. At that time I propose to have 365 carriers take over all forces in Japanese waters and return approximately 2/3rds of the present fast carrier task force to the eastern Pacific. At the same time Fletcher can return to the north ice or take leave and Halsey can be returned for leave. All fast battleships can be returned except U.S. JERSEY and possibly 1 other. It will probably be necessary to retain many of the cruisers and destroyers. Some of the old battleships can return at the same time.

Para. The foregoing is admittedly general in nature and will be made more specific as the situation clarifies. It is furnished now in response to your 10/18.
SPECIAL

TOP SECRET

NOVEMBER ONLY

August (CST)

17 0830

U. S. ARMY LIANANE SECTION ADPO CABO TO JAKA B. NECCH. XI

WANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FORCES TONGA UPTIL THAT U.S. MILITARY

COMMAND passes to CINC AC.

To Marshall personal info MacArthur and Undersecretary both personal

from Wheeler T.S.P. 23. Here a paraphrase of top secret emergency

operation signal sent by the Commander in Chief British Pacific Fleet

to the Commander in Chief East Indies Fleet info Admiralty and A.E.A.

on the 16th of August. Begins.

1. Dispositions have been made for the occupation of A.E.A.N.T. as

follows:

A. Under Rear Admiral Warre in KURUSKA with vulnerable

SHAPPIUS 5 DD’s and KURUSKA & KUK task force 111.2 sailed from

KURUSKA completed inshore as possible with rehabilitation personal & supplies

on the 15th of August for HUKRI and KUK. This force could arrive

off HUKRI the 20th of August.

B. Proceeding with the Australian Government are negotiations for

SHAPPIUS (Commodore Collins) KURUSKA and 2 DD’s to depart from KURUSKA

with the date of arrival at HUKRI 2 days after leaving KURUSKA. Submarine

sweepers are sailing from HUKRI probably 20 August. Submarines

and AIRCRAFT which are not at KURUSKA would also join

this force.

2. Task Group 111.2 under rear Admiral Services in KURUSKA with

KURUSKA and 2 DD’s left KURUSKA 15 August headed for HUKRI and KUK

and subsequently for duty elsewhere along the CHINA COAST as required.

3. Task Groups 111.2 and 111.3 are augmented respectively by

KURUSKA and KUK each at KUK. Ends.

18 2312

KURUSKA to CINC AC ADV. KURUSKA AC info BE CAS 20AP 212 ST CIRCUM.

KUK 51376.

This message should have the minimum distribution essential to its

implementation.

Para. For your information, the President today sent to Eisenhower

containing the following message: "Te'kiro to your recent message of August

10, I agree to your request to modify General Order Number 1 to include

all the USMC TNOA' in the area to be surrendered to the Commander

in Chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East. However, I should like to

be understood that the United States Government desires all air

bases for land and sea aircraft on the list of the USMC TNOA',

preferably in the Central Group, for military purposes and for

commercial use. It should be noted if you would advise me that you will agree to

such an arrangement, the location and other details to be worked out

for this purpose.

Para. Regarding your suggestion as to the surrender of Japanese

forces on the island KURUSKA to Soviet forces, it is my intention and

arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese Forces on all

the islands of JAPAN HACHIJU, ESIAKU, MIYABU, MIYAKO, and KURUSKA

to General MacArthur.
Para. General MacArthur will employ allied token forces, which, of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of JAPAN PROPER as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our allied surrender terms.

Para. The foregoing is for your information and guidance and you should amend General Order Number 1 to include all the KURILE ISLANDS in the area to be surrendered to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces in the Far East.

23 1945

MARSHALL TO COOPERATING AND OMNIPAC, OMNIPAC ADVANCE NO.

WARD 23670.

Generalissimo has informed the President in substance as follows: "British have been notified that I agree to delegate authority to British Commander to accept the surrender of KURILE ISLAND and at same designate a Chinese and an American Officer to participate therein. British have been asked to effect necessary military arrangements on operational matters with Wedemeyer and the Chinese toward all future operations." End of message from Generalissimo.

Para. You will shortly receive a JCS directive on this.

(24 0148)

OMNIPAC ADV NO TO CONTINUE

TOP SECRET. SUBJECT TO KURILE RIVER ONLY. Orderly is with Admiral and has been assigned to you and action is being taken to meet you in the carrier division. The importance of the projected operations in the YELLOW SEA KOREA and north CHINA areas by ORDER indicates the desirability of your shifting your ZIOG into D.C. or N1 at early date and exercising tactical command of the North CHINA naval forces, keeping your rear echelon to follow in N1. Request your views and estimate of timing.

24 1053

OMNIPAC to OMNIPAC ADV NO INFO COMPLER, RAMPERS

TOP SECRET, CI 26234. Prime Minister of Australia by message dated expresses the desire of his government to have Rear Admiral and commander of 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers proceed South to be present before surrender August 21st stating that in view of the war through the Pacific war by Australian forces the retention with United States forces the government would be satisfied if you would provide necessary facilities including logistic support to enable this to be done. The force is now at GUMC and it is expected you will have to sail before 27 August and sail at GUMC. The Prime Minister also stated that the government wishes and expects you to operate under an Australian commander subject only to your own exercise of command. As to logistic support I propose to request your approval but stating that in order to avoid confusion it is essential that the Commander Australian Squadron report to C.M.F. Fleet upon arrivals. Your agreement requested.
24 0219  COM AND FLT to SCAP info CINCFCAP ADV NO  (Corrected Copy Below)

HALSEY to MACARTHUR Info HIMMPEY. Request statement of your policy concerning my initiating on and after thirty first assistance and evacuation to POWs located in any waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY area.

24 1446  CINCFCAP ADV NO to CINCAPAC Info COMCHL, MARCOSS. COMKACIFL, OY. 05, COMMJPAC

TOP SECRET. Your 241053 censor. Will provide full ORIGINA and TOKYO.

24 2317  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR, HIMMPEY Info FURAKAIB.

WARX 34944.

Warx 47945 directed the occupation of OKINAWA in KOROA as a 3rd choice upon resources available to the Pacific Commander. Warx 42944 directed that, in accordance with the President's desires, arrangements would be made to occupy a port in KOROA. Warx 49334 requested analysis of your capabilities of securing JAPAN and also occupying a port in KOROA. Warx 50181 directed MacArthur and Himms, after consultation with Wedemeyer, to furnish the best estimate of a time schedule for the occupation of a port in KOROA including an alternate port in case the Russians had occupied KOROA.

Para. While Stalin has agreed in a message to the President to receiving the surrender of Jap forces as provided in General Order No. 1, there is no certain assurance that the Soviets will not continue their occupation movements toward in KOROA until such time as they must U.S. forces. There are unconfirmed reports that the Soviets are planning movements south of the 30-33 degree line.

Para. Request earliest possible reply to directive contained in Warx 50181 insofar as KOROA is concerned.

24 0219  COMMVL to SCAP info CINCFCAP ADV NO.

Halsey to MacArthur info Himms. Request statement of your policy concerning my initiating on and after 26 August assistance and evacuation to POWs located in any waterfront POW camps in TOKYO BAY AREA.

25 0802  CINCFCAP ADVANCE to COMCHL.

Himms to King only. The values of the constraining ships of the Japanese Navy is extremely little insofar as the major powers are concerned. Their reluctance values in the hands of the Chinese or certain other nations might be very great. The process of division can be very vastions and complicated. Accordingly recommend that high level decisions be made to make Japanese fighting ships available in JAPAN for technical inspection and then destroy them.

AMHRE (COT)
25 0803 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC, COMMANDALS info CINCPAC FLEET No. CONSIDER.

Limits to Henderson and Harrill info King. The resident commissioner TARAHA has asked COMMANDALS concerning plans for reoccupation OKINAWA and NAUKU. Due to the mere urgent requirements elsewhere these islands have a relatively low priority insofar as the use of U. S. forces is concerned. Para. Requests from British Commonwealth sources for information concerning plans to occupy these areas should be countered by suggestion that those interested submit to CINCPAC plans and proposals for accomplishment of occupation using British resources.

25 1010 COMMANDS to CINCPAC ADV info SUPREME COMDR FOR THE ALLIED FORCES.

SCAP 250608 just received. Still recommend approval my 250935.

25 0930 CONSIDER to CINCPAC ADVANCE.

Klimaid to Limits only. Eyes only. Your 240149. My intention has been to command projected 7th FLE operations in KORKA and north OKINAWA with my flag in ROUX MOUNT. Date 7PS ROUX MOUNT has been advanced to 1 September which will permit me to embark with staff in time to join Amphibious Group departing OKINAWA for objective area. Believe command function can be exercised more effectively from AOC than from BOC because of better communications and presence of entire staff. Present Plan. Minesweeper Group start sweeping channel through mine 7 minefield on 3 minus 7 and start sweeping in objective area on 3 minus 3. Covering Group for minesweeping operations composed of 2 CVE'S new assigned 7th FLEET plus CruDiv 6 and Destroyer screen. Fast Carrier Division upon reporting will be directed replenish then relieve CVE'S which will return to base to prepare for next operation. CruDiv 16 join and proceed to objective area with Amphibious Group.

25 1138 CINCPAC ADVANCE to SCAP.

As a matter of urgency strongly recommend your approval CINCPAC 250935. In order to expedite request your reply be to CINCPAC info CINCPAC. Your 250608 applies.

25 1455 CONSIDER and CNO to CINCPAC ADVANCE info CONSIDER.

From King to Limits and Spruance. AP press releases here report interview with Spruance in which he questions the political wisdom of American retention of OKINAWA. It is probable that the United States will desire to continue the occupation and use of OKINAWA. In such event it is essential that the American position should not be handicapped or embarrassed by ill-advised expressions of opinion on such matters by high commanders in the field. Desire that you issue appropriate instructions in regard to foregoing.

AUGUST (Oct)
26 0822 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

LIMITY TO KIRK ONLY.

Unless you see reasons to the contrary I plan to consolidate my headquarters at Pearl as soon as the occupation of JAPAN is well in hand and to turn the command facilities at GUAM over to Commander Marianas to use and to maintain in readiness for future use by CINCPAC as may be required. The processes of demobilization and rollup can be handled much better at Pearl in close touch with the type commanders and with a United Staff.

26 0829 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

LIMITY TO KIRK ONLY.

I will shift my flag from South Dakota to Missouri about 0900 on the day of the surrender ceremony and will shift it back to South Dakota when I return to that ship after the ceremony. To comply with instructions from higher authority it will be necessary that you transfer your flag to South Dakota after I return to Guam and then and then send Missouri to GUAM for my further use as Fleet Flagship.

26 0128 CINCPAC ADVANCE HQ to COMINCH.

LIMITY TO KIRK ONLY.

Your 25040A. Marine Air Units are integral components of the Fleet Marine Force. Each Marine Amphibious Corps on the field has attached to it a Marine Aircraft Wing. It is not desired to operate Marine Amphibious Corps without such support. For operations in CHINA my Joint Staff Study contemplates a Marine Aircraft Wing to redone strength. Your concurrence requested.

26 0147 CINCPAC ADVANCE to continue into COMINCH.

LIMITY TO KIRK ONLY.

Your 24943 does not indicate satisfactory compliance by 24911A to that appears to contemplate delaying use of the naval forces available to you until mine-sweeping starts and then to extend them entirely with respect to the movement of troops.

Para. I do not consider that there is any air threat which requires use of Fast Carriers to cover mine-sweeping operations. There is ample access to YELLOW SEA west of Nine Line 7.

Para. My purpose in assigning to the 7th Fleet a Fast Carrier Division, a Heavy Cruiser Division, the GUAM and ALASKA and their escort is to establish in the YELLOW SEA immediately an impressive naval force which in advance of the arrival of troops can occupy and control those waters and can by a timely show of naval force influence the general situation in north CHINA and the special attention now developing as indicated by JCS 242317. See SubPara A of 3rd Para of 25041A.

Para. Expedite compliance by 24911A using Cruisers initially and augmenting with Fast Carriers when they arrive. Acknowledge.
26 0419Z SACEO TO WABOS FOR JCS Info CONFERENCE. CINC PAC ADVANCE CORPS.

CX 36093.

Reference WX 54514. Also CINC PAC 250801 not to be all or needed. The present plan is for the 7th Division to occupy KELO on 11 September. Conferences this date indicate that the initial movement of lightly armed troops, 11th, APA and AKA, can take place leaving OKINAWA on the 4th arriving KELO on the 7th. This movement will be followed with heavier equipment as rapidly as possible. This plan is being approved and instructions are being issued to COM GEN 24TH CORPS and others to execute generally as indicated.

26 0748 CINC PAC ADVANCE HQ info CONFERENCE.

EVERY TO JCS TO KNOW THIS INFO.

Your 26010.7 regret misunderstanding. CombFleet will shift flag into MINNEAPOLIS 27 August and depart Manila with CRDIV 6 on 28 August to be joined by CRDIV 10 on OKINAWA for operations SHANTUNO-GHIWANG-TAO AREA accordance JCSPara A of 3rd Para your 210818. Unless otherwise directed will turn over to Philippine Sea Frontier duties outlined by 180140 of 23 August.

26 28JUG WABOS TO CINC PAC ADVANCE - CONFERENCE PASS TO CINC PAC ADVANCE.

WAR 55315.

State Department gives information that Russian foreign office have asked whether General Order Number 1 has been amended to include KURILS in area to be surrendered to the USSR. Secretary of State is replying confirming that General Order Number 1 has been so amended.

Para. The foregoing is for your information.

26 0531 CINC PAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO JCS.

The introduction of Japanese PoWs into the picture involves some security consideration which appear unacceptable from a military standpoint and unfair to Allied correspondents from the standpoint of censorship. From both standpoints I look with the utmost dismay on enemy personnel being accorded the privilege of visiting American men of war or naval installations and urge that U.S. Navy stand on its security rights in resisting any such concessions nor or later.
(Cont’d)

C. Place remaining 3rd Fleet Fast Carrier forces under command of
Vice Admiral Towers.

D. Establish system of rotation for 3rd Fleet carrier task forces
operating in EMPIRE waters. Forces not relieved at sea to answer in MACAO
and TOKYO AREA. Separately after completion of fly fly operation will make
recommendations as to strength of carrier forces required at sea to cope
with Japanese situation.

E. Upon receipt of your action on these recommendations will make
reestimate of fuel and logistic support requirements with view to earliest
release of surplus.

F. Will at later date separately submit further estimates based on
contemplated withdrawal of additional forces to west coast.

311743 JCS to NIMITZ, MACARTHUR

WARX 57906

In view of the Division of responsibility established in the RTUKUS
by JCS 121109, JCS 100345 (Dec 44) should be interpreted as requiring that
the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific assume responsibility for
the supervision and utilization of shipping to Army controlled ports of the
RTUKUS.

292316 CINCPAC AFLOAT to CONINCH INFO CINCPAC ADVANCE WO.

NIMITZ TO KING.

Para 1. Your 282050. The following comments on CINCPAC S 10526 of
28 August are based on my understanding that the RTUKUS are located in
the Pacific Ocean Areas and that certain positions therein were transferred
to CINCPAC (NOT CINCSNAP) as stated in Victory 73 "To facilitate prepara-
tion for and execution of OLYMPIC".

Para 2. The realties of the situation are that as in the Marianas,
Marshalls and elsewhere the surrender of Japanese held islands is best
accomplished by the use of naval vessels and landing forces of minimum
size. The Japanese forces if repatriated must be transported in ships.
Islands which we do not need as bases do not need to be occupied by our
troops in strength.

Para. If the enemy held positions in the RTUKUS are to be transferred
to CINCPAC as soon as they surrender to CINCPAC it will be advantageous
to have them surren.der direct to CINCPAC. If the RTUKUS are to revert
to the control of CINCPAC-CINCPAC it will be better to have them surrender to
CINCPAC.

Para. It is feasible for CINCPAC to accept the surrender of the re-
maining islands in the RTUKUS.

291755 JCS to NIMITZ, WEDERMEYER, MACARTHUR.

WARX 56536

As a basis for interim operations and for future planning the JCS approv-
e the concept of operations on the CHINA COAST as outlined in CINCPACS
210818 of August with exception of last para which should read:

Para. "F. Prepare for occupation of TIENTSIH-TAKU and/or CHINANANAPI"
28 0740 CINCPAC ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING

Your 251340. Propose to send approximately following to Atlantic Coast ports under command Vice Adm. P. C. Sherman arriving Canal Zone about 10 October. MISSOURI (BB 63), NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55), WASHINGTON (BB 56), NEW MEXICO (BB 40), MISSISSIPPI (BB 41), IOWA (BB 42), NEW YORK (BB 36), RANDOLPH (CV 15), WASP (CV 18), ENTERPRISE (CV 6), RANGER (CV 4), MONTEREY (CVL 26), BATAAN (CVL 29), LANGLEY (CVL 27), BOISE (CL 47), HICKORY (CL 9), CONCORD (CL 10), DESRON 25 and DESRON 23 lease BRAINS (DD 650). All except MISSOURI allocated to LantFlt by your 251355 and would be transferred to CinClant for duty upon arrival Atlantic. Missouri would return to Pacific upon completion visit.

Per. Propose approximately following to Pacific Coast ports under command Admiral Halsey arriving by Navy Day. SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57), WISCONSIN (BB 64), INDIANA (BB 58), ALABAMA (BB 60), IOWA (BB 61), WEST VIRGINIA (BB 43), COLORADO (BB 45), MARYLAND (BB 46), ARKANSAS (BB 33), TEXAS (BB 35), TICONDEROGA (CV 14), HORNET (CV 12), SARATOGA (CV 4), BUNKER HILL (CV 17), BALTIMORE (CA 58), PITTSBURGH (CA 72), AMSTERDAM (CL 101), VICKSBURG (CL 96), TUCSON (CL 98), DESRON 61.

31 0404 CONCFFRONT to CINCPAC AFOAT - CINCPAC AFOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

Subject: Proposed operations in 3rd Fleet area of control. I propose the following.

A. On receipt of adequate information from Japanese initiate Navy operations to temporarily seize all minor Japanese bases for the sole purpose of taking possession of navi submarnines, suicide craft, human torpedoes, and other naval installations and equipment. In each case appropriate arrangements to be made with Army. Unless a general covering directive is received from you I will in each case report what installations and vessels are located and will request instructions as to moving same to YOKOSUKA, SINKING, or destroying.

B. Will make general survey of 3rd Fleet area of responsibility and will then make recommendation as to establishment of inspection or visiting patrols or permanent guard for (10 groups missing - being serviced)

CUFF will make specific recommendation concerning base development necessary for the support of the eastern control forces.

31 0402 CONCFFRONT to CINCPAC AFOAT - CINCPAC AFOAT PASSES TO CINCPAC ADVANCE.

HALSEY TO NIMITZ

Subject: Estimate and intentions based on current information and pertinent instructions from CINCPAC AFOAT. I plan to institute the following measures.

A. Immediately return officers and men in the fleet landing force who are attached to ships departing for overhaul on 3 September.

B. Order into SAGAMI anchorage all ships due to depart from the western Pacific under Vice Admiral Shermans command to pick up their landing force personnel and clear up flag ends.


(Cont'd)

and TAIWAN, or, alternatively if CENTRAL CHINA situation requires when
forces are ready, occupation of SHANGHAI AREA.

Para. Command arrangements for these operations will be as prescrib-
ed in WAR 47945, 11 August 1945.

28 1200 CINCFAJL to SCAP info COMCINCPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGEN 8TH ARMY.

NIMITZ TO MAHARICH INFO HALSLEY.

Com3rdFleet 281101. In view circumstances outlined in reference urge
that you immediately authorize Halsey to take immediate action to contact
POW and to take such steps as necessary for alleviating their condition and
moving them into American Jurisdiction. In order that the intolerable
conditions outlined in reference may be corrected in minimum time and to
provide for possible failure or delay in communications Com3rdFleet is here-
by authorized, if no reply is received from you by 1300 TOKYO TIME today,
to initiate such local action as to POW as humanitarian considerations requi-
re.

28 1101. COMCINCPAC to SCAP info CINCFAJL ADVANCE.

HALSLEY TO MAHARICH INFO NIMITZ.

Swiss representative of international Red Cross now with CTF 31 anchored
off YOKOSUKA reports many prisoners of war sick, 350 seriously ill in SHIN-
OUWA CAMPS hospital. All camps desperately in need of food. 200 aviation
personnel in bad state at ONOKI camp on the waterfront. The urgency of the
situation is confirmed by extensive photographic coverage of POW CAMPS with
prisoners waving to planes and signs "Food" on ground, by information from
Japanese Emisaries that there are 6,129 allied prisoners of war in the
TOKYO AREA of which 4,179 are bedridden, and by information obtained from 2
British Marine prisoners who escaped from KANAMURI CAMPS and were picked up
by placket boat near SAGAMI WAT ANCHORAGE. All of the facilities under my
command are available to you and to the Commanding General of the 8th Army
for the immediate extension of urgent care, assistance and evacuation of the
allied prisoners of war in eastern HONSHU. I suggest that liaison officers
of the 8th Army be sent to me at YOKOSUKA in order that I may initiate and
expedite this task in accordance with your policies.

Para. I have immediately available in TOKYO AREA 3 hospital ships 2
APAS, 30 doctors, 90 corpsmen, and clothing and food for 3000 men. I will
have available on the afternoon of 1st September in addition to above 2 LSVS
2 APAS, 20 additional doctors and 60 corpsmen, food and clothing for 4000
men. I have a tactical organization ready with all available information
and prepared to act.

Para. I propose for most expeditious action. A. To send medical assist-
ance and food with Red Cross and Japanese Liaison to TOKYO BAY waterfront
camps promptly reporting to COMGEN 8TH ARMY and to you on conditions found.
B. To receive released SOWS on board hospital ships and APAS in TOKYO BAY
for evacuation to points COMGEN 8TH ARMY directs. C. Send on 3 September
with 8th Army Liaison party 1 LSV, 1 APA with appropriate escorts and
minesweepers to an east coast port in the SENDAI AREA to contact camps in
that area extend medical assistance and evacuate to points COMGEN 8TH ARMY
directs. D. To establish transient hospital and supply station for
POW at YOKOSUKA for use as required.
I am off on the monoplane.

09.00

08.03 - Excellent. Please send a copy. Can
LECTURE

THE NAVY IN WORLD WAR II.

Vice Admiral Forrest F. Sherman, USN
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Dept.

Drs. Given — Introductory Remarks.

In the period between the two World Wars we gave very little consideration to the problems of combined or joint operations. Each service went about its own business as if decisive battles of future wars were to be fought independently by air, land, or naval forces. Consequently, when we entered World War II most of our officers were sadly lacking in a knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of their sister services. Jealousies between the services, shortages of funds, lack of facilities, equipment and personnel had retarded training and a development of technique for waging air, ground and naval units into a smooth working, efficient team operating under a single command. During the progress of World War II we learned this team work, but we learned it the hard way, after the fighting started. In order to keep alive this "know how" and to employ our techniques and to disseminate this knowledge to as many officers as possible considerable time has been allowed to this course to the study of air and naval operations, by these two forces acting alone and in coordination with the ground forces.

To assist us in putting over this instruction the Chief of Naval Operations has very kindly designates several of his most distinguished and outstanding officers to address the class during the academic year. We are honored today in having as our first Navy guest speaker, Vice Admiral Forrest F. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, who will talk on the Navy in World War II. There is no officer better qualified to address the class on this subject. Shortly before World War II and shortly thereafter he played a very prominent part in the preparation of war plans for the operation of our naval units on all seas of the globe. After that assignment he was detailed as Commander of the aircraft "U.S.P.," and followed it in all its engagements until it was sunk by enemy action in 1942. In accord with long standing Navy tradition Admiral Sherman was the last person to leave
the "ASP" before it sunk, and some four hours and a half in the ocean, capped with oil, until he was picked up by a rescue party. After he left the "ASP" he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet and of the Pacific Ocean areas. In that capacity he participated and planned many of the operations that took place in this very very extensive area.

It is a great pleasure for me this morning to introduce an old friend and a distinguished sailor and aviator, Admiral Sherman.

Thank you.

Vice Admiral Sherman Speaking —

It is a very great privilege for me to be out here to visit this school. It is my first visit to Leavenworth and it is my understanding that the visits by Naval officers out here have not been as many as they should have been in the past. We intend to take advantage of every opportunity to increase the interchange of officers between our service schools.

During the past year we have worked out a new organization of the National Military establishment and by legislative fiat have created a framework. That framework can be no better than the people in it, and we all look to the educational process to produce the people who will be aware, not only of their own problems, but of the problems of the other services, to make the whole organization work and work well. And it is in those principal service schools that in peace time a great deal of the progress will have to be made.

I was asked to talk this morning about the strategic and tactical concepts of the Navy in World War II. The time available will not permit me to give you a consecutive account of the war in the Pacific and I do not think it necessary to inflict it on you. This diagram (a Pacific wall board) will however, be of use in picking out examples of some of the major points that I would like to make.

Looking back to the prewar years we were all brought up to understand that the purpose of naval forces was really three. First, in peacetime to implement National policy and to further diplomatic action. In war to make sure that we have the use of the seas and that our opponents do not have the use of the seas, whether for military operations or for the move—
ment of commerce. The third great purpose of naval forces has always been to hinder or to support military operations on shore. Under that concept battles at sea by the naval forces is only a means to an end, and I think it is very important to bear that in mind not only in trying to interpret what has gone on in the past but in interpreting and solving our problems for the future. We shouldn't let our concepts of naval warfare revolve too much around an enemy battle fleet and suspending of that enemy battle fleet as an end in itself. For example, after we landed in the Bataan, in the summer of 1944, the Japanese fleet came out and attacked to fly aircraft into Saipan, a southern island, in order to strike our services and our transports that were on Saipan. Admiral Spruance, who was in overall command of that operation was then faced with two alternatives. One was to go after the Japanese fleet, heavier and longer, the other was to be a little more conservative and to give primary consideration to the security of the transports and shipping at the objective area. He made his decision; he operated in such a way as to achieve his primary purpose which was to secure the landing of those troops and the capture of the objective. He also succeeded in destroying practically every Japanese airplane that flew. The results obtained in sinking enemy shipping were not as great as they could have been if he had gone full speed after the enemy. But, on the other hand, the way he operated kept the other Japanese forces coming in from another direction from getting in on his transports. I give you that as an example of the correct interpretation of the purpose of that naval force.

Back in the period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the beginning of World War I, there developed a concept of naval strategy exemplified in the writings of Mahan, which placed great emphasis on the concentration of naval forces at the key points. That naval forces rested in part by the results of the naval concept which was general among naval officers and others concerned with the problem. The Germans appreciated their naval problems as one which required tremendous concentration. They know that they could not be strong everywhere, therefore they attempted to be strong in the North Sea. That in turn imposed on Britain the necessity for reducing the British Naval deployment around the world in order to im-
create it in home waters and to form what became the Grand Fleet. So there resulted two opposing concentrations with minimum deployment away from the vital North Sea area and the trend of World War I from a naval point of view is distinctive because of that great concentration of two very strong fleets opposing each other across a narrow sea and sparring for opportunities to win a decisive action.

During the period between World War I and World War II all of our thinking in our navy and to a degree in the navies of other countries was influenced by the concept of having the strongest possible battle fleet. It resulted in our own training in the Navy being pointed toward fleet action, our preparations being pointed toward fleet action, for many years we had practically our whole fleet concentrated on the coast of southern California, which in terms of the distance from the western Pacific to the eastern Atlantic was stratagemically a mid-point. The strategic concept of concentration of forces and training to bring about a great fleet action in the event of war after which you could gain control of the seas and all other things would be simple, extended even to the preparation of the forces for the minor aspects of war.

In 1939 we did not have an amphibious force. We had not prepared and we had not trained for moving troops overseas and landing them against opposition. Our anti-submarine forces were not as good as they should be, our reconnaissance forces were not adequate, we were prepared to fight a great fleet battle but we were not prepared for the day-in and day-out dirty work of naval warfare.

When the war began we were still operating under the battle fleet concept. We had nearly the whole effective fleet in the Pacific concentrated. The results of that you know. We had too many ships parked in one port and we lost a great many of them for the time being. That reverse (Pearl Harbor) had one very useful effect, in that it freed the carriers and the task forces that were left to follow out a newer and better concept of fleet operations which was of the fast task forces operating separately.

The first phase of the war in the Pacific for the Navy was one of
establishing and maintaining a line of communications. After the withdrawal out of the Philippines into the Dutch East Indies, the loss of the Dutch East Indies, it was decided to hold Australia as a base for further operations. And to a predominantly naval command, with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, was given the task of maintaining the lines of communication from Pearl Harbor to Australia. We had Pearl, we had Midway in our possession, we had Johnston Island, which is about here, we had the island of Canton, we had the Bonin Islands which are from here. We moved into Fiji. An Army task force at the beginning of the war was dispatched and occupied New Caledonia and from there on our early naval operations were continued to hold that line. The Japanese, after their initial success, had their holdings down to the coast of New Guinea and they, in effect, had control of the Pacific out to this red broken line. In the spring, key of 1942, it developed that the Japanese were going to try to extend their holdings down to the Solomon Islands and also to invade Australia. So we were forced then into defensive naval action in which we used the carriers and light forces available to stem their advance. After one or two minor strikes by the carriers it eventually in the battle of the Coral Sea in which both sides suffered losses. The Japanese lost the Shoho, we lost the Lexington, after a devastating attack, but we, in effect, held the line there. Then, as you will know, we moved into the Solomons and there we engaged in a war of attrition for nearly a year.

Going back to proven strategic concepts, we had always visualised amphibious operations as being conducted by the movement of troop convoys with the necessary transports and assault shipping. We visualised it being separate from any such movement and we called it a naval covering force. In World War I the grand fleet in the North Sea acted as a covering force for the first movement of the British Expeditionary Force across the channel. In our own Spanish War the Atlantic acted as a covering force to cover the movement of our troops from the United States to Cuba. The old concept of a covering force was that it interrupted between the troop movement and the enemy fleet. Then we went into the Solomons and we did not do that. We were short of forces and we used our carrier task force in the immediate support
of troop movements. It concentrated first in the Fiji Islands where we held a rehearsal then we moved up to Guadalcanal all in one compact body. There were no preliminary attacks; the main came in at daylight, preceded only by an hour or two, by our air attacks, and it was all one compact force.

That was not the best way; we learned that the older concept of a separate movement was better and in all subsequent operations in the Pacific we always used an initial covering force or a naval striking force which was separate from the amphibious movement. That concept is so important that I would like to develop the use of the covering force and the factors that control the timing of its use. The first operation over long distance at sea was the assault on the Gilberts when our air deployed in these three (AND THE BLACKS) three ships went in and took Tarawa and Makin. Well, our problem was to move ships all the way down from Pearl Harbor to the objective and one of the problems in a long overwater movement was the fact that we had the tractor groups, the amphibious tank and the amphibious tractor, which had to be the first units to land. They had to be embarked in LST's, which were all slow speed, and in a movement over a great distance that presented a difficult strategic problem because these units had to sail and be at sea long before the LST transport group with the great majority of the troops. The significance of that is that the timing of the first strike by our carrier task force had to be early enough to give cover and protection to the movement of that slow tractor group so that the latest time at which we could begin the air attack on our objective was the time when our tractor groups, which were relatively defenseless, would come within striking distance of the enemy air ashore. That point is not well understood and it has led to some conjecture as to the type of preliminary operations that we conducted. So the one of the prime considerations in the use of our carrier task force to cover an amphibious operation was that it had to strike early.

The next consideration was that instead of merely deploying in readiness for action wherever we landed in the Pacific, with the well developed network of Japanese air bases, we always had to use our carrier task force for two purposes. One was to beat down the enemy air which was within...
striking distance of our amphibious assaults and the other was to give direct support to the amphibious assaults.

Our first prime objective in our central Pacific campaign was to get into the Marshalls. However, if we had gone into the Marshalls as an initial operation, we would have had enemy air bases near in this flank, we would have had the air bases at Eniwetok and Nimitz in that flank and this whole series of bases in the central Pacific. So we landed there as a first operation to take those out. Then for the Marshalls assault we used our carrier aircraft to another Eniwetok, which was the only base within reach of the objective area. Our actual landing was at Kwajalein so that our air carriers had the strategic task of damping any enemy air operations from Eniwetok, Nimitz, Niihiwip and Dattel all of which were in enemy hands.

In planning that operation it was to have our carrier task forces arrive and begin its engagements at about the time that our low-speed tractor group was in this position on its way down to Kwajalein. Actually we did this by moving the carriers all the way around and coming in from this direction in order to develop a sort of surprise. Having gotten on station then, about four days or five days ahead of the assault, they had to operate continuously from that time until the assault took place. Then there developed the other requirement of close air support for the troops that were landing which meant that these same aircraft operating from the same carriers which were moving out at a rate that speed had then to be pressed to the control of the amphibious commander and later to the control of the troop commander after he was landed. So, starting in that operation and going on through the war in the Pacific we developed the tactical requirement that the same force of aircraft would have to first be the striking power of the covering force then the covering force. It would have to shift to direct support of the amphibious landing and eventually be under the control of the commander of troops on shore. This took a good deal of doing. To work through a great many growing pains. But it was a well worked out and functioning system at the end of the war.

After we took all these places then developed another requirement for the carrier task force, which was to continue to give air cover and air
support to the position where until fields could be activated and our own shore based air flown in. In the Solomons action we made the mistake of pulling out too soon, to withdraw the carriers on the morning of the third day. Incidentally, the amphibious commander and the troop commander had said they only wanted them for one day. We stayed an extra day and pulled out on the third day and it turned out not to be long enough. But at that stage of the war we didn't have fueling systems worked out, we didn't have the replacement aircraft, or the spare pilots to keep going. But toward the end of the war we found that we had to be prepared to keep the carriers on station until our shore based air had been moved in and was functioning. So these are the major requirements in the duration of the sustained carrier operations. It had to be early enough to give security to the approaching amphibious forces, it had to continue long enough to cover the establishment on shore until shore based air could take over and during the course of this period it had to be sufficiently flexible so that it could be shifted from a place to strike mission in strategic support of the operation over to a close support, detailed pinpoint troop support operation.

Another consideration which governed our operations of carriers throughout the war was that each one of these preliminary covering strikes had to be placed properly in the light of the next operation ahead. For instance, after we were established on shore in the Marshall's, AdmiralSpruance took the carrier task force battle ships and cruisers out west and made the first strike on Truk. This was a form of strategic support which took to press the Marshall's sun off this area completely. As soon as he got back in from Truk we took Eniwetok and then in order to get photographs and information on the Marianas, about which we had known nothing since the beginning of the war, we turned them around and sent them up to strike the Marianas, which gain the Marshall's was protecting because it hit the Japanese right in the pipeline. McCAULAY through which they would have to reinforce Marshall's, and at the same time got us the information we needed with which to make a decision on the next operation. Until we got the results of these two attacks in support of the Marshall's operations we lacked the photographs and the data on which to decide as between Truk and the Marianas.
The next operation of the covering force was in connection with the movement up to Hollandia. During the campaign in the Solomons one up to the spring of 1944, the southwest Pacific forces had had to move up the coast of New Guinea in jumps which were governed primarily by the effective radius of their own fighters in order that they could have their land based air to cover and support their landings. With the rapid augmentation of the fleet by the delivery of new ships we had gotten to a point where we could sustain the operations of the fleet more rapidly than we could assemble and mount amphibious operations. Furthermore, the timing of any move in the central Pacific had to be so adjusted that before we moved from Tarawa up to Knebelain, for instance, or from Knebelain to the Marines, we would have to develop these air bases, get them functioning, and get the land based air to the point where it was effective. So, in order to keep the fleet busy we then shifted it over to covering and supporting the landing at Hollandia. The form of that support which was arranged for and delivered down in Bismark was for the carriers to move all the way out to Palau and deliver a strike there. The reason for the selection of that objective was first to cut off the avenue of supply of Japanese air to Hollandia. Second to get a very nice bag of Japanese cruisers and destroyers which we knew was in port, and third to again struck a place which would give indirect protection to the development of those bases back here.

That operation was successful and gave an additional dividend on the way back to the base, the carrier task force moved over and attacked Truk. It was always a prime consideration in our naval operations in the Pacific to strike the Japanese positions in the land too frequently enough to keep them from becoming safe bases for interfering with the operations along the New Guinea coast. During the early days in the Solomons we had not been able to do that and the result had been that all during the Solomons campaign we were regularly and consistently worked over by Japanese forces coming down from the Mandates, delivering attacks on the Guadalcanal position and then withdrawing.

The next major operation was the movement into the Marianas and that
was accomplished in the summer of 1944, primarily to give us a base from which we could strike Japan proper. The results of that I need not go into but they were very decisive. Following the seizure of the Johnston we worked on down into Palau. General MacArthur's movement into Palau took place the same day under cover of heavy strafing and bombing following which the carriers ranged north to develop information and also reduce Japanese strength in the Philippines as a whole. There again the principle was the same, strike the place from which interference might come and also get information and thus keep up the pressure and continue to destroy enemy aircraft.

From then on the pattern, the use of the force, had been pretty usefully established. In general, the plan was to make a preliminary strike, fall back, give direct support to the landing, then move out again. The phases when we had failures, and we had them, were usually due to mistakes in preliminary planning, over-optimism on the part of the construction people and the shore air commanders to the extent by which they could be ready. Over-optimism in the ground-level operation was responsible for some of our initial reverses. Over-optimism as to the time when the shore-based air force could take over was responsible for, not bad results, but disorderly results in our initial landings in the Philippines, where at one time the carriers were turned loose and then had to go back. Well, we should have planned to keep them there all the time, but the over-optimism on the date by which the fields in Leyte would be operating was due to the fact that the aircraft photographs did not show the end and bed of terrain on which we were planning to build fields.

As the war progressed it became necessary to plan on getting into Luzon. That was a very interesting plan because the preliminary features, the support of the operation involved very different headquarters. There were five theaters, or the equivalent, represented in the preliminary conference which took place in Honolulu in New Guinea one or two days after we landed in Leyte. The China theater was represented, the India-Burma Theater, the Southwest Pacific, the central Pacific and the 20th Air Force, so we had five signatures on the coordination plan for that show. And the
supporting measures ranged all the way from B-29 attacks on Japan to strikes by the carriers along the south China coast, strikes against Formosa, strikes against Okinawa, the attacks from our own Army aircraft in the southern Philippines against Luzon, bombardments of Iwo Jima by ships based in the Marianas. These all had to take place and they were all part of the overall concept of using naval forces, long range air forces, to give the best possible strategic support to the difficult landings, and then shifting the mobile naval units to other support as rapidly as possible. That worked out very well and we then went on for further and even more difficult objectives. The landings in Iwo Jima and Okinawa are for us the over-all strategic concepts presented to new futures. The Japanese fleet had been more or less destroyed, but we still had this fundamental necessity for a fleet to support the landings, and to cover the landings, in its own offensive operations. Actually although we had no enemy fleet left that is where we took our greatest drop in the Pacific. As I recall it we had 323 ships I think it was, put out of action in that three months and in that period of the war the major threat which concerned all of our operations, strategic and tactical, was turned into one of simple arithmetic. We used to keep three curves, one was the number of Japanese aircraft considered to be operational, another was the daily volume of Kamikaze attacks. The other curve, to appropriate scale, was the availability of light escort vessels. As long as our curve of availability of ships stayed above the slope of the one of Japanese aircraft we felt that we would be successful.

There are really the salient factors of the strategic concepts governing the use of our major naval forces. In our planning for the future we are giving primary emphasis to keeping in being the basic units that are needed to make war under the concept of you can separate naval strategy from air strategy. You cannot separate either one of them from ground operations. Where we are keeping in amphibious forces, we are keeping a carrier striking force, we are keeping an anti-submarine force for the protection of lines of communications, we are keeping a submarine force to cut enemy communications and we are keeping the cruiser, etc.

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and gun fire ships that it takes to make them all go.

Looking ahead at the broader aspects of naval strategy and naval deployments we can see that it is that goes up until the time when our possible opponent creates a concentrated battle fleet, that our naval power will be distinguished by small use of concentration but use our only requirement is to be able to oppose an enemy force with equal or stronger, and to the second that we be able to deploy our forces so that we can meet our responsibilities in achieving success with smaller total strengths.

Another problem that we have had is to deploy our fleet and see just the use that we make of the personnel and funds that we have, it is our carry on our training with greater emphasis on joint training. I would say that in our preparations today about 50% of our training is restricted with joint training or training of civilian components rather than merely training internally in a fleet of the type we maintained before the war.

These are the high points and I would be very glad to answer any questions that anyone wishes to ask. Before closing I want to express my appreciation for the privilege of being here and I hope that this interchange of instructors, students and visitors between our service schools will increase in the future.