

The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History

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Chapter One

The Atlantic Theater: January–December 1813

Many Americans whose congressmen had declared war against Great Britain in June 1812 probably regretted the decision by the end of December. The military campaigns had gone badly. The militia system was ineffective, and the regular army barely existed. The states with the largest prepared militias, those of New England, had populations that were critical of the war and their governors refused to send troops outside their state boundaries. Recruiting for the regular army had failed to produce a sufficient number of soldiers and the supply system was in chaos. President Madison's strategy was to launch a three-pronged, coordinated assault with the objective of seizing and holding a portion of Upper Canada until Great Britain had come to terms, agreeing to halt impressment of seamen and seizure of American merchant ships under the authority of the Orders in Council. New legislation had authorized a 35,000 man regular army, but less than 7,000 were on hand in June. The president was authorized to enlist 50,000 volunteers and to call up 100,000 state militia; the latter were paper armies only. The call for enlistments went out too late, and state militias were not prone to fight outside of their states. Troops that did exist were scattered at garrisons throughout the country.

Of the three small armies that were hastily assembled in 1812, all were poorly equipped, ill trained, and led by timid, aging officers. Major General Henry Dearborn, who commanded the eastern armies, took personal command of an army bivouacked near Albany. Brigadier General William Hull, who commanded the northwestern army, attacked the British surrounding Detroit but was forced to surrender. Dearborn's army, intending to attack Montreal, briefly crossed the border near Lake Champlain and then retreated to Plattsburg after the first signs of resistance.

Dearborn's subordinates, Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer, New York militia, and Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, U.S. Army, commanded successively at Buffalo on the Niagara. In October 1812, Van Rensselaer attacked Queenston Heights from Niagara but was driven back. Smyth made a similar attempt in November, with the same result. In January 1813, a contingent of British troops and Indians badly mauled General James Winchester's Kentucky militia south of Detroit at Frenchtown on the River Raisin. Consequently, General William H. Harrison's Northwest Army was stalled near Fort Meigs in northern Ohio.

To this disheartening situation, one must add the depletion of the national treasury. Revenues had fallen off sharply as a result of the British blockade. Fewer ships in foreign trade meant reduced customs receipts on imports. Treasury Secre-

tary Albert Gallatin employed desperate measures to float loans in order to finance the war. Under these circumstances, it should not be surprising that President Madison would want to take advantage of the offer of the Russian czar in early 1813 to mediate the "dispute" between the United States and Great Britain.

The arrival of this offer in February prompted Madison and Gallatin into action. Madison entered into discussions with the Russian minister Andrei Ia. Dashkov, feeling there was little to lose. Gallatin proceeded to use the offer to woo investors who might lend money to the United States government. The way the war was going, the Russian mediation offer presented at least a possibility of peace, and therefore, a decreased investment risk. To attract investors, Gallatin offered an increase in the interest rate from 6% to 7.5%. As a result, he was successful in obtaining sufficient financing for another year of war.

Were it not for the brilliant performance of the U.S. Navy in the first months of the war, Americans would have had every reason to seek a negotiated peace. The navy raised the nation's morale in a series of ship-to-ship engagements on the high seas and perhaps gave the president and Congress the fortitude to continue the struggle they had begun the previous spring. The Essex-Alert, Constitution-Guerriere, Wasp-Frolic, United States-Macedonian, and Constitution-Java battles were fought between August and December 1812. By the end of the year, this succession of victorious naval engagements raised the reputation of the navy to its highest level in years. Only five years before, the American frigate Chesapeake had been humiliated by H.M.S. Leopard off the Virginia Capes. The Royal Navy soon recognized that American ships and seamen were a force to be respected. On Lake Ontario, Commodore Chauncey established American dominance by late November, demonstrating the efficacy of a lake navy. Despite its small size, the United States Navy was professional and full of fight. The question was: How to use this force in the face of likely British reinforcements in the Atlantic and on the Northern lakes?

The navy's strategy, as stated by Secretary Paul Hamilton in September 1812, was to divide the frigates and smaller vessels into three squadrons. Thus, Commodore William Bainbridge, commanding Constitution, 44 guns, was to sail in company with Captain David Porter's Essex, 32, and Master Commandant James Lawrence's sloop of war Hornet, 18. These plans were frustrated when Essex, requiring extensive refitting after a successful cruise, returned to the Delaware. As Constitution and Hornet were ready for sea, Bainbridge departed, ordering Porter to rendezvous at either the Cape Verde Islands or the island of Fernando de Noronha off the northern Brazilian coast; failing this, he was to use his discretion in determining how best to employ his ship. A second squadron was comprised of Commodore Stephen Decatur's frigate United States, 44, Captain Samuel Evans's Chesapeake, 38, and Master Commandant Arthur Sinclair's brig Argus, 18. As it happened, Chesapeake was not ready, departed later, and cruised independently. The third squadron was to be Commodore John Rodgers's President, 44, Captain John Smith's frigate Congress, 36, and Master Commandant Jacob Jones's sloop of war Wasp, 18. Detained because of repairs, Wasp

sailed later, intercepted a convoy of merchant ships, and captured H.M. sloop of war Frolic, only to be herself captured hours later by H.M.S. Poictiers, 74.

While the squadrons were at sea, Secretary Hamilton took the opportunity of suggesting to Congress the building of a class of 74-gun ships of the line and additional frigates. On 23 December, after more than a month of debate, Congress authorized the construction of four 74-gun ships and six 44-gun frigates. The bill, signed into law on 2 January 1813, was the first major naval construction bill in more than a decade. Unfortunately, the events and shortages of the war retarded construction and reduced the projected number of ships. The 74-gun ships Independence, Washington, and Franklin, and the frigates Java and Guerriere would not be completed until after the war. When nearly finished, the frigate Columbia was burned at the Washington Navy Yard in 1814.

The slow progress of the war and the elections of November 1812 wrought changes among those responsible for naval and military administration. Madison's reelection gave him the confidence he needed to replace Hamilton with William Jones as secretary of the navy and William Eustis with John Armstrong as secretary of war. The navy had done well up to that point, but Madison asked Hamilton to resign because he had become personally unable to manage the rapidly growing pressures of office. It was common knowledge that Hamilton had a drinking problem and that this was affecting his work.

Madison chose William Jones to be secretary of the navy because he thought that, as a former sea captain, merchant, and banker, Jones would be skilled at managing naval officers, ships, and naval finance. He had also served a term in Congress and was a loyal Republican. Jones inherited from Hamilton a skeleton staff of civilians, led by chief clerk Charles Goldsborough, with no professional naval officers to serve as military advisers or to whom he could delegate technical tasks. Jones occasionally consulted nearby officers, such as Captain Thomas Tingey, the commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, and Captain Charles Morris, whose ship Adams was being repaired at the Washington Navy Yard. Jones was a personal friend of Commodore Bainbridge's, from whom the new secretary may have acquired knowledge of the navy's inner workings. When Jones arrived in office, he set about his task with a will, establishing himself as the final authority. He was determined not to be a figurehead with a small staff of long-tenured clerks running the office.

One of his first acts was to replace chief clerk Goldsborough with Benjamin Homans, a man recommended by Elbridge Gerry, the newly elected vice president from Massachusetts. Soon after, he requested from Captain Morris a list of reforms that could be made in the Navy Department. Jones proved to be a competent administrator in an overburdened department, though not a naval strategist. These professional matters he usually left to his senior commodores and captains. John Armstrong, at the head of the War Department, took the opposite course and involved himself in battlefield command, with disastrous results in late 1813.

The navy had stations at major seaports from Portland, Maine, to New Orleans, Louisiana. The commandants of these stations had to contend with the scarcity of men, armament, vessels, and provisions, never knowing when or where the mobile

British would present themselves. Local citizens along the seaboard usually had no one else to rely on for protection. Officers who found themselves in this position were anxious to escape to a command at sea, but the opportunities rarely came. Thus, the Atlantic theater presents a varied maritime geography and the navy's forces ranged from large frigates to gunboat flotillas. The navy's offensive cruising strategy gradually withered as the British strengthened their blockade of key ports.

Initially, British land and sea forces were deployed in Europe and in the Caribbean, where the requirements of war against Napoleonic France and her colonies demanded their presence. The British struggle against revolutionary France and her dominions had been underway since 1793. By the end of 1805, British naval victories had swept the allied French and Spanish navies from the seas, but the blockade of the French ports in the English Channel and the North, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas remained in effect to prevent naval resurgence and to obstruct the enemy's seaborne trade. The new war in America was an added threat, if not an absolute danger to the British Empire. Any ships sent to the western Atlantic to deal with American naval squadrons and privateers would weaken Britain's military posture in the Mediterranean, Bay of Biscay, and the English Channel. The shortage of regular troops in Canada and the lack of ships of the line on the North American Station can largely be explained by these considerations. Yet the European picture had begun to change by late 1812.

Napoleon's armies invaded Russia in June, reached Moscow by September, and were forced into retreat by October. In Spain, the Duke of Wellington's armies were gradually pushing French armies from Iberian soil. He scored a major victory at Salamanca, suffered a setback at Burgos, but recovered at the Battle of Vitoria on 21 June 1813, the turning point of the Peninsular War. The course of events had begun to run against the French emperor. Within a year he abdicated and departed for exile on Elba. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty reversed their initial reluctance to release additional ships for operations against the United States as fewer ships were needed on European stations. The early successes of the U.S. Navy and the slow progress of Admiral Warren in stemming the American tide of heavy frigates and privateers in the first year of war precipitated a more aggressive British stance by mid-1813. Although the impact of British reinforcements was not felt for several months, Navy Secretary William Jones soon faced his severest challenge because the improvement in British military affairs in the European war released troops and ships for use in North America.

Squadron Cruise Reports

The year 1813 opened with the return of three U.S. warships that had left on cruises in October 1812. Commodore John Rodgers and Captain John Smith, in *President* and *Congress*, arrived at Boston on 31 December after making a circuit of the western Atlantic. They sighted but five British vessels and captured only two. Master Commandant

Arthur Sinclair in *Argus*, after parting company with Commodore Stephen Decatur, cruised near Barbados, Brazil, and Bermuda. Because he took just five merchant prizes, Sinclair considered his cruise unsuccessful. All three ships needed extensive repairs. *President* and *Congress* did not depart again until the end of April. Refitting and a special mission delayed *Argus*'s sailing until June.

COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY PAUL HAMILTON¹

U.S. Frigate *President*
Boston Jan. 2nd 1813

Sir

I wrote you on the 31st ult informing you of my arrival with this Ship and the *Congress*—

It will appear somewhat extraordinary when I inform you that in our late cruise we have sailed by our log nearly 11'000 Miles, that we chased every thing we saw, yet that we should have seen so few Enemies Vessels and more particularly when we have from time to time been in the track of his whole commerce to every part of the Globe.

In the hope of being afforded an opportunity of adding additional reputation to our little Navy, we did not return until I may say our Provisions were nearly indeed entirely expended.

Of the last month we cruised about three weeks between Halifax and Bermuda, and the remainder of the time between the latter place and the Chesapeake, without seeing a single Enemy's Vessel: Having experienced much bad weather, both Ships will require considerable outfit, particularly in Spars, Sails, and rigging; and the *President's* Copper appearing defective in several places, will make it necessary to heave her out to repair the same, and which I shall make arrangements for, so as to commence the operation by the time I can receive your approbation.

I am anxious to get to Sea again, and no time shall be lost in refitting both Ships.— The *President* having sprung her Main mast, will require a new one.— I am in hopes on examination that the *Congress* will not be found to require any essential repairs further than in her Sails and rigging.

I forgot to mention to you in my last communication that on the 16th ult in Latd. 35° 51'. Longd. 66° 34' we fell in with and sent back for adjudication, the Ship *Bedford*, of Portsmouth (N.H.) sailing under a British licence, bound from Baltimore to Lisbon, with a cargo of Flour.

Herewith you will receive a chart shewing our track during the last cruise I have the honor to be With the greatest respect Sir Your obed. Servt.

Jn^o Rodgers

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 4 (M125, Roll No. 26). Chart not located.

1. Paul Hamilton resigned on 31 December 1812. William Jones accepted the appointment to be the new secretary of the navy on 14 January 1813.



Map 1. Atlantic and Gulf Theaters

JANUARY-DECEMBER 1813

7

MASTER COMMANDANT ARTHUR SINCLAIR TO
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAMILTON

U States Brig *Argus* Newyork—Jany. the 2d 1812 [1813]—

I have the Honor, Sir, to inform you of my arrival here after a long, unpleasant and, considering the track I have taken, unsuccessful cruize. I was ordered by Comdr. Decatur to cruize far to windward of Barbadoes, unless circumstances should render a deviation from those orders advisable, in which event I was to use my own judgement— In running for this ground I kept well to the Eastward in hopes of falling in with some of the Brazile ships, and on the 27th of October I captured one from that quarter— From her Commander I learned that news of the war had not reached them until two days before his departure, and that there were a number of valuable ships homeward bound from thence— I, by mutual consent, shortened our allowance and kept my wind for the Longd. of Cape St. Rogue, the Eastern point of the Brazile, where most of them pass

Strong S E winds prevailing, by the time I reached it, I found the state of my provisions would not admit of my remaining long in any one place, being particularly ordered to return to the U States to replenish— My crew also began to grow sickly from the excessive heat and short allowance of Water

I then shaped my course under easy sail along down the Line, in hopes of intercepting vessels bound to and from the north part of the Brazile; and particularly down about Surinam I fealt sure of meeting some of Value— After passing this ground as low down as would just admit of my weathering Barbadoes, and not falling in with a single sail, I hauled across to the northward, and spent all the time which the state of my provision would admit— I then shaped my course for Bermudas, and past just to the Eastward of it, hoping to fall in with some of their Small cruizers, who could not be employed on our Coast at this boistrous Season and would probably be here abouts in search of our homeward bound Eastindia ships— Here I had one continued and heavy gale of Wind, which distrest us very much; the *Argus* begining to shew her age in every joint, keeping one pump employed and leaking in every seam and nail head in her upper works— During this gale I fell in with two large ships laying too— Taking them for Enemies Ships of War, who had either not seen me from the thickness of the weather, or were prevented by the gale from chasing me, I wore Ship and stood to windward of them, and after convincing myself they were Ships of War, I hauled again to the Northward under cover of the night— The next morning, the gale having moderated, I chased a small vessel of war, which from her Rig I took to be one of their cruizers, and gained so much on her, that I kept her in sight until a 11 Oclock that night when she got off in a Squall— A few hours more light would have made him ours

Finding continual gales from the Westward I began to feal considerable apprehensions as regarded our provision, I therefore took the necessary precautions in time and went upon little more than would support Nature— The *Argus* being too deep to acquit herself properly in sailing, with 75 days water and provision, which is as much as she can stow, the Commodore ordered me to take in 60 days, and my having been sent out two days before we sailed in company with the other ships in order to reconnitre the enemy; it had brought my

cruise up to 70 days upon 60 of provision, where I fell in with a Squadron of the Enemies ships consisting of six Sail of Line of Battle ships and Frigates, and was closely chased for three days, and run several hundred miles out of my Course with the only favourable wind I had had since leaving the Trades— This remarkable chase and wonderful escape, commenced on the 15 of December in Longd. 61.30—Lattd 35.40; for the particulars of which I beg leave to refer you to the enclosed abstract from my journal; which I feel confident will satisfy you that no expedient or exertion in my power to make, was left untried, and serious as our loss has been, it was indispensably necessary for the preservation of the Ship and did save her from the Enemy—¹ Since that period I have been continually beating about and laying too, between Bermuda and the Continent, and have experienced some as long and heavy gales as are generally met with; which added to the chase and its effects has made a complete wreck of the *Argus* both in Hull and Rigging

So very badly has she leaked in her upper works that there has not been one single dry spot between decks for the last 15 days— The water has been six inches on her Magazine floor, having come first from above into my Cabbin and the ward room, owing to her Beams and decks being rotten and opening while she was labouring in those heavy gales; our sail room has also been full of water, and what was more serious than all, what little bread we had left after having lived since the chase upon four ounces each man for 24 Hours, was totally spoiled, and we have barely made out to keep soul and body together upon a less quantity of Peas and Rice— What has made it infinitely worse for us, has been the vessel affording us no shelter from the wet and cold when below deck— Thirty or forty of those poor improvident fellows have resorted to drinking Salt water, which has completely knocked them up, and some of them have been rendered delirious

They have had not a drop of Spirits in all this hard weather which appears to be one of their greatest wants— We must have perished for want of water before this time had we not been lucky in frequent and heavy rains about the Line where we saved near two thousand gallons.

However there is no doubt but a short time will restore them all, as nourishment is all they want— I feel sensibly mortified, Sir, in having returned from such a lengthy cruise without an opportunity having offered by which I might have added some few Laurels to the number so recently and so gallantly acquired by some of my brother Officers; as I confidently think, from the merits of the Officers and Crew I have the honor to Command that opportunity is all that is wanting to insure them an equal share— I feel much pleasure in saying that in all our difficulties and hardships there has been nothing like a murmur onboard; ~~but~~ such has been their zeal for the service that they have always met the reduction of allowances with cheerfulness, while it appeared to hold out a prospect of meeting an opportunity of sharing in the glory of their brother Tars— I annex you the particulars of five prizes maned by the *Argus* this Cruise, and it is with heart felt regret that I am compelled to state that only two of them are Ships of the Enemy.

As the *Argus* must undergo a thorough repair before she can take a cruise of any length; I will make a correct statement of her state by the next mail— I have the honor to sign myself with respect, Sir, Your Obt. Servt.

A Sinclair

ALS, DNA, RG45, MC, 1813, No. 1 (M147, Roll No. 5). This letter was sent with two enclosures, "A list of Vessels Captured by the United Sts Brig *Argus*, under my command, in the months of October, November, and December 1812—," and excerpts from the log of the *Argus*, 15–18 December 1812.

¹ John Borlase Warren in *San Domingo* chased *Argus*; see Warren to Croker, 25 Jan. 1813, pp. 15–16.

Naval Medicine Ashore and at Sea

Philadelphia naval surgeon Edward Cutbush expressed his frustrations in attempting to provide medical care for a group of undisciplined seamen. Cutbush, a proponent of establishing rules for the government of naval hospitals, reiterated his plea for regulatory measures.¹ Dr. Amos A. Evans, Constitution's surgeon, showed great solicitude for the sick and wounded who were returning home after "Old Ironsides" engagement with Java.²

¹ Pleadwell, "Edward Cutbush," pp. 369–73; and Dudley, *Naval War of 1812, Vol. 1, pp. 140–43.*
² See Dudley, *Naval War of 1812, Vol. 1, pp. 639–49, for the 29 December 1812 action.*

SURGEON EDWARD CUTBUSH TO CHARLES W. GOLDSBOROUGH¹

Sir,

In pursuance of an order, I received from the Department, dated Novr. 19 1812,² I removed the men who had been landed from the *Essex* to Philada., two of them, being in a situation to do duty, were sent to New York with a draft from this place; two have deserted, John Francis, Peter Johnson, they are useless men—of the remainder one refuses to submit to the necessary treatment of his case, *Fistula in Perineo*,³ which does not prevent him from committing great excesses.⁴ Commodore Murray thinks that they should be discharged—it is also my opinion; as they are so extremely unruly, there is no prospect of any good to be derived either to themselves or the public service. Two are the most hardened villians, I have had under my care since I have been in service; the black hole of the Yard, Clog and chain—have no terrors—in fact, from a circumstance which has occurred, I am very apprehensive, that their conduct during the night, and from a disposition to resist the sentinels at the Gates of the Yard, that blood will be shed. The sentinels must do their duty in the night.

As Capt. Porter by letter stated his intention of "discharging them from service had time and circumstances permitted", I beg leave to solicit permission to discharge such of them as are in the habit of going over the fence and returning intoxicated. Commodore Murray declines issuing an order respecting them as they were brought to Philada. by direction of the Department. It appears to me that it would be incurring a needless expense, by keeping a guard of Marines over these men, five in number, especially as they will be useless, and having diseases that were not contracted, except one case, in the line of their duty. Should permission be obtained to discharge the most ungovernable, the Purser, I presume, has the power to discharge the pay that may have become due, since they have been in the Hospital.

On remonstrating with one of these men, an Englishman, on the impropriety of his conduct, and stating that the Government would not support men, who were thus injuring themselves, he had the impudence to say that he knew of no Government in the U.S.—

The above circumstances render it necessary that regulations, sanctioned by the Navy Department, should be adopted for the Government of men in sick quarters; the conduct, of which I complain, is subversive of all discipline, but I have no remedy. I will thank you to communicate the contents of this letter to the Secretary and obtain an order thereon, addressed to me or Commodore Murray.⁵ I have the honor to remain your sert.

E Cutbush
Jany. 4, 1812 [1813]

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No.5 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. Charles W. Goldsborough of Maryland had been connected with the Navy Department since 1798, becoming its chief clerk in 1801.

2. Hamilton had ordered Cutbush to care for the men David Porter left behind at the hospital at New Castle, Delaware, when he sailed on his cruise in the fall of 1812. The secretary could not order their discharge until the state of their accounts could be ascertained; see Hamilton to Cutbush, 19 Nov. 1812, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 205 (M149, Roll No. 10).

3. Passage leading to the urinogenital duct.

4. For more background on these men, see Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, pp. 591–92.

5. William Jones directed Alexander Murray to discharge them if “the good of the service requires it.” See Jones to Murray, 27 Jan. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 235 (M149, Roll No. 10).

EXTRACT OF MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION BOOK OF SURGEON AMOS A. EVANS¹
KEPT ON BOARD THE U.S. FRIGATE *CONSTITUTION*

Sunday Jany 10th

Particular attention must be paid to the sick & wounded: & see that they get their medicines drink & cas ordered.

Johnson must attend to the cooking & procuring water for the sick—

Williams must wash all the bandages &c in Boiling water, & have them ready rolld up. He must also scrape lint & pay a general attention to the sick. He must make the poultices.

Bowen must give all the medicines.

Stephen Vee must make all drinks & give them. He must also see that any man has Lemonade when he wants it. They must all keep their regular watch at night except Bowen who is subject to all calls for medicine &c at night. Johnson must keep his watch.

AD, CtY-M, Medical Prescription Book of Dr. Amos A. Evans kept on board the U.S. Frigate *Constitution*. This is an extract from 1813.

1. Amos A. Evans held surgeon's rank dating from 20 April 1810.

British Reassess Naval War in America

The new year ushered in a period of reexamination for the British. Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, after just three months as head of the North American Station, quickly concluded that more ships were required if he was to conduct successful naval operations against the United States. The Admiralty informed Warren that it was economically impossible to establish a force everywhere to prevent attacks. In early 1813, however, it relented to the admiral's request for reinforcements, agreeing to supply him with more ships and a force of Royal Marines—but with the full expectation that the war would soon be over and they could be returned to their own stations.

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N., TO
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER

No. 67

San Domingo at Sea
5th January 1812 [1813]

Sir

I have enclosed for their Lordships information the statement of the loss of His Majesty's late Gun Brig *Plumper* Lieutenant Bray;¹ and in consequence of the Enemies Privateers becoming daily more numerous, and the assembling a Force of Three thousand Men at East Port on the Frontiers of New Brunswick and menacing that Province with attacks; I am induced again to earnestly solicit their Lordships to send eight of the large Gun Brigs for this particular service, as well as other ships to answer the very many and serious applications made upon me for aid, and protection for the Coats [*coasts*] of British America and the west Indies; and the reduced state of the Squadron under my Command I have the honor to be Sir Your most obedient humble Servant

John Borlase Warren

LS, UKLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 139–40.

1. Lieutenant William Mackenzie Godfrey, R.N., commander of the sloop *Emulous*, reported that *Plumper* had wrecked on 5 December 1812 off Point Lepreau, New Brunswick, with her commanding officer, Lieutenant James Bray, and about sixteen of the crew surviving; see Godfrey to Senior Naval Officer, Halifax, 7 December 1812, UKLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 141–43. *Plumper* had captured several American privateers in 1812.

ADMIRAL SIR HENRY E. STANHOPE, R.N.,¹ TO FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
VISCOUNT ROBERT SAUNDERS DUNDAS MELVILLE

Private

Stanwell House Staines Jan 5. 1813

My Lord

The recent Events incident to the American War lead me to hope for your Lordship's Indulgence for committing my thoughts to Paper, which, but for a Moments unexpected Indisposition I intended Myself the Honor of soliciting Permission to have named personally this Day



Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, R.N.

I think the Americans will be so elated by their unexpected Success that a more than usual Spirit of Enterprize will stimulate, even the Federalists, to the Equipment of Men of War of large Dimensions under the Character and name of Frigates; and altho it be true that at this Instant They have only Three of great Force, the Ease with which They can run up any Number from the Plenty of Materials within Themselves, will I suspect rapidly encrease their Force together with a Host of minor Frigates and other armed vessels— adverting to the just Adage of "*Venienti occurrere Morbo*,"² I would submit for your Lordship to direct a Survey upon the Sixty four, and small Class of Seventy four Gun Ships in Ordinary, to ascertain their State of Condition for speedy Service, and such as should be so considered might be cut down, selecting Such whose Lines would encourage the Hope of their sailing well, when by the Removal of an immense Weight from aloft, they would be lifted much out of the Water while their Stability would be rather increased as the Weight below would continue the same, and their Force should be left as Efficacious as Circumstances would admit, which would place them far above the Americans— Your Lordship will perceive I suggest this merely upon the Spur of the Moment until the Ships ordered to be built could be brought forward; And with Respect to their Annoyance upon the Coast I would humbly submit that any Attack upon the principal Sea Port Towns would be unavailable and disastrous without such a Land Force as the Circumstances of the Country could not perhaps readily admit—but I would effectually blockade them by such a well connected Chain of commanding Force as They should not be able to oppose, composed of small Squadrons under the Command of active intelligent officers; And as these different Squadrons might be exposed accidentally to Attack from Gallies, Gun boats, and similar Craft it would be proper for the Ships to be supplied with Boats of a certain Description for such Emergencies. But as the Coast of America in its vast Extent, has innumerable small Harbours and Inlets as well for Trade, as for the building and equipping of armed Vessels I would suggest smaller cruising Squadrons to be a continual Watch and Annoyance, and that a certain additional Force of Marines well appointed be attached so as to destroy with certain effect whatever might grow up in these Harbours—totally regardless of Capture, so that no Impediment should be to the speediest Reembarkation before any opposing Force of Consequence could be collected. I conceive moreover, by the Way of keeping them in perpetual Alarm, the Demonstration of serious Attack might be made at any particular Port, and when their Force was drawn to it the Squadrons so collected might separate instantly for real Execution upon any Spot where it might have been previously determined. I would submit to your Lordship that even now such Ships as could be spared might be appointed to this Service, and I am fully persuaded the Success would equal the best Expectation—

These are simply Outlines of any future better digested Plan, which I have the Honor to submit to your Lordship's Indulgence, and Pardon for this Intrusion if Such it should appear, arising from much Experience in the Command of small Vessels on that Coast as a Lieutenant and Captain, exclusive of Opportunity from traversing many hundred Miles in various Situations and Disguise upon two Attempts to escape when a Prisoner in the American Contest.³ I am well aware, from whence I speak with great Deference to their distinguished Merit and Abilities that no Men can have greater preeminent Merit than my Brethren ~~at the~~ and Nautical Friends at the Admiralty, while Local knowledge can only be attainable by personal Experience, which has thus brought me to

adventure so much in Submission to your Lordship but still I beg to be understood in due Deference to these distinguished officers who form a Part of that Board, to which, particularly during the Presidency of the late Lord Melville, I stood so highly indebted and attached.

Committing myself to your Lordship's Indulgence, I have the Honor to be My Lord Your Lordship's most humble, and obedient Servant,

H. E. Stanhope

ALS, CSmH, Melville Papers.

1. Sir Henry Edwin Stanhope, a naval veteran of the Revolutionary War, was promoted to admiral on 12 August 1812.

2. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

3. *Naval Documents*, Vol. 2, pp. 1268-69 and Vol. 4, pp. 1304 and 1422.

FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER TO
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

Copy No. 2

Admiralty Office
9th Jany. 1813.

Sir

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had hoped that the great force placed at your disposal as stated in my letter of the 18th November would have enabled you to obtain the most decided advantages over the Enemy, and to blockade their Ships of War in their Ports, or to intercept and capture them at Sea if they should escape the vigilance of your blockading Squadrons.—

In this expectation their Lordships have been hitherto disappointed, and tho' they hope that the measures you have taken for the employment of your forces may have already been attended with success, yet as it is of the highest importance to the Character and interests of the Country that the Naval Force of the Enemy, should be quickly and completely disposed of, my Lords have thought themselves justified at this moment in withdrawing Ships from other important Services for the purpose of placing under your orders a force with which you cannot fail to bring the Naval War to a termination, either by the capture of the American National Vessels, or by strictly blockading them in their own Waters.—

For this purpose H.M. Ships named in the Margin are ordered to proceed to join you, in addition to the 6 Sail of the Line already under your Orders.—

As the force under your Command will thus consist of upwards of ten Sail of the Line, my Lords have thought fit to appoint a Captain of the Fleet to serve with your Flag, and as they are not aware of any individual among the Senior Captains of the Navy to whom the appointment must be limited, who would be more acceptable to you, they have appointed Captain Henry Hotham to that Situation, and have directed him to hoist a broad Pendant & putting to Sea with H.M. Ships *La Hogue* and *Valiant* proceed to join your Flag, putting himself under your Command as soon as he shall enter the limits of your Station.—

The *Sceptre* & *Plantagenet* the former intended for the Flag of Rear Adml. Cockburn, will follow as soon as possible.—

Such addition will also be made to your force in frigates and Sloops as will place 30 of the former and 50 of the latter at your disposal.—

It has not been without interfering for the moment with other very important Services that my Lords have been able to send you this reinforcement and

they most anxiously hope that the vigorous and successful use you will make of it, will enable you shortly to return some of the Line of Battle Ships to England, which, if the heavy American frigates should be taken or destroyed, you will immediately do, retaining with you the four Line of Battle Ships which you may consider as best fitted for the service of your Station, sending the rest in this case under the orders of Commodore Hotham, whose Functions as Captain of the Fleet will then cease, to Spithead, authorizing him to hoist a Broad Pendant when he shall be thus detached.

My Lords command me to acquaint you that they have been surprized to learn that the *Spartan*, which you had ordered to accompany the *Africa*, was seen on the 28th Novr. in Latitude 39°.41.—North Longitude 25 West; and they desire you will call for and transmit to me for their information a Report of the *Spartan's* Proceedings from her parting with the *Africa* 'till she returned to your station and rejoined your Flag or some of the Ships under your Command as my Lords are strongly impressed with the opinion, intimated to you in my Letter of the 18th November, that it is highly desirable that Ships should not, by being detached singly, be exposed to the risk of meeting a superior force of the Enemy; and they cannot suppose that with a knowledge that Commodore Rogers and Bainbridge with their respective Squadrons were likely to be at sea, you could have authorized the Captain of the *Spartan* to expose himself to the danger of meeting them, unnecessarily and out of your Station.

Their Lordships command me to acquaint you that as soon as the other important Services on which they were employed permitted, two Battalions of the Royal Marines were recalled to England in order to be completed, refreshed, disciplined, and equipped with a view to their being sent as soon as possible to Bermuda to be employed by you in such manner as may in your judgment most tend to the advantage of H.M. Service and the annoyance of the Enemy.

The Battalions will each consist of about 640 Rank and File with a due proportion of Officers and Non Commissioned Officers, and an Artillery Company with Guns and all the usual equipments for field Service.

They will be conveyed to you in Troop Ships which will be directed to follow your orders. I am &c.

J W Croker

Copy, National Library of Scotland, Alexander F. I. Cochrane Papers, MS 2340, fols. 37-42. Another copy is in UkLPR, Adm. 2/1375, pp. 365-73. Names of ships written in the margin were *La Hogue*, *Valiant*, *Sceptre*, and *Plantagenet*, all 74-gun ships of the line.

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N., TO
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER

private

San Domingo

Off N. York

Janry. 25th 1813

My Dear Sir

I have sent for their Lordships Information Two Dispatches in Cypher from the French Consul in Carolina to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris. The Cypher may be Discovered at the Office in Downing Street by my old friend Broughton, or some of the Gentlemen in that Department:

I was very near falling in with Rogers a short Time ago, having Taken & burnt a privateer that spoke him in the morning of the Day she fell in with us:

The *Argus* Sloop of War was chased by this Ship, & only escaped by Throwing her Boats & spars overboard & starting her water: you are aware that the *Dragon* 74 *Statira* 38 & *Collibri* Brig are with me: we have Taken & burnt since our being out 16 sail of Ships & Vessels.— I may probably produce some Deficit ere long in the Revenue of the United States: If all my other Divisions are equally active & successful: I am anxious to Take or Destroy some of the Enemys Frigates as they are called, but in reality they are small Two Decked Ships: I trust their Lordships will not be Displeas'd with my having enclosed a Newspaper containing an Official Report of the Committee upon their Naval Affairs; & particularly the size Description and Force of the American Frigates:— As it occurred the Information might not yet have arrived in England: I wish you would send me some Razees of the Description I have stated:¹ & the *Indefatigable*, as well as 8 Gun Brigs for New Brunswick the Gulph of St Lawrence; and another Ship or Two of the Line would render our Force here more useful & respectable. will you have the kindness to present my best wishes & respects to Lord Melville & believe me to be with much esteem My Dear Sir Most sincerely your obed servt

John Borlase Warren

P S. I hope you have received my Letter communicating my having Taken Captain Thompson from the *Collibri* to act in this ship instead of Gill; who I have placed in the *Loupcervier*, the American *Wasp*, as a post ship & Lieut. G. Pechell my Flag Lieut. to act in *Collibri*: There will be a Regular Vacancy in the *Renown* in all probability as the Capt was given over as Sir F. Laforey wrote the word: I could not go on with Gill, he is not equal to the Situation of my Captain: & I cannot say more than has been the case: with so many Demands upon me: & *Cleopatra* has never joined me. Thompson is a Deserving Officer & was my Lieut in the *Renown*, When in the Fleet off Ushant, & as Third in Command in the Mediterranean. Do what you can therefore upon this occasion for me.

I shall be obliged to you in sending the enclosed Letter to Lady Warren.
I return in a few Days to Bermuda

ALS, owned by Ira Dye, Virginia Beach, Virginia. No enclosures were found.

1. "Any of our Old Ships of the line cut down, taking Off their Fore Castle, Poop and Quarter Deck and Manned with 380 men, would answer as Cruizers upon this Coast, to meet the Ships building in America, better than any other description of Vessels"; see Warren to Croker, 25 Jan. 1813, UKLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 241-42.

FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER TO
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

Secret

10th Feby 1813

Sir

I have received your letters as per margin¹ and have it in command from my Lords Coms of the Admiralty to make to you the following observations on the several points of your communications—

In reply to the demands for increase of force which you have made, you will observe by my letter of the 9th of last month that their Lordships have, not without inconvenience to other Services, placed under your command a force much greater in proportion than the National Navy of the Enemy opposed to you would seem to warrant—

Their Lordships have not received from you any account of the number, strength, or preparations of the American Navy; nor have they any reason for believing that it much exceeds what it was at the date of my letter of the 16th November; vizt about fourteen sail of Vessels of all descriptions; to oppose which you have at this moment under your orders, Eleven Sail of the Line, one Ship of 50 Guns, thirty four frigates, Two *en flutes*,² thirty eight sloops, and twelve smaller Vessels; in all a total of 97 Pendants—³

From the circumstance of your having been at the date of your last letters so long without hearing from England, which their Lordships cannot account for, you cannot have been aware of the several reinforcements ordered to join you, and most of which must before this time have put themselves under your orders.

And from your having again omitted to send an account of the disposition of the fleet under your command, my Lords are ignorant of what ships you may actually have with you, particularly as they observe that one of your frigates the *Spartan* has lately been refitting at Gibraltar.

It is true that several of the Ships included in the foregoing statement may not have actually joined your flag; but such as have not, are employed in the Convoy Services of your Station; and the necessity of sending such heavy Convoys arises from the facility and safety with which the American Navy has hitherto found it possible to put to Sea.

It is stated in your letter to me of the 5. Novr. last, that you expected that Commodore Bainbridge would about that day sail from Boston with the ships under his command, and intended to form a junction with the *Constellation* off the Chesapeake; you neither on that occasion acquainted me for their Lordships information of what steps you had taken to intercept them or to frustrate their object; nor do you again in your letters lately received, though dated a month later, state whether or not Commodore Bainbridge had sailed, and whether or not he formed the intended junction off the Chesapeake.

The uncertainty in which you left their Lordships in regard to the movements of the Enemy and the disposition of your own force has obliged them to employ six or seven sail of the line and as many frigates & sloops, not included in the beforementioned number, in guarding against the possible attempts of the Enemy.

Captain William Prowse, with two sail of the line, two frigates, and a sloop, has been sent to St Helena in the apprehension of the American Squadrons having proceeded to that quarter.

Rear Admiral Lord Amelius Beauclerk, with two sail of the line, two frigates, and two sloops, is station'd in the neighbourhood of Madeira and the Western Islands, lest Commodore Bainbridge should have come into that quarter to take the place of Commodore Rodgers, who was retiring from it about the time you state Commodore Bainbridge was expected to sail.

Commodore Owen, who, with one ship of the Line, one frigate, and two sloops, had preceded Lord Amelius Beauclerk, is not yet returned from the cruize on which the appearance of the Enemy near the Western Islands had obliged their Lordships to send this force.

The *Colossus* and *Elephant* with the *Rhin* & *Armide* are but just returned from similar services; so that it is obvious that large as the force under orders was, and is, it is not all that has been opposed to the Americans, and that these Services became necessary only because the chief weight of the Enemy's force has been employed at a distance from your station.

Under these circumstances their Lordships are not only not prepared to enter into your opinion that the force on your station was not adequate to the duties to be executed, but they feel that, consistently with what other branches and objects of the public Service require, it may not be possible to maintain on the Coast of America for any length of time a force so disproportionate to the Enemy as that which, with a view of enabling you to strike some decisive blow, they have now placed under your orders.

In reply to your statement that the Crews of Privateers and letters of Marque, which now amount to six hundred, have in several instances landed at the points of Nova Scotia and the Leeward Islands, and cut out Vessels from the Harbours;⁴ I am commanded to observe that my Lords never doubted that the Privateers of the Enemy would become extremely numerous, as most, if not all, of their commercial Marine would probably be diverted to privateering; but they were convinced of the impracticability of the remedy for this evil which you seem to propose, namely, the meeting them with an equal number of ships. The only measures which with any attention to economy, and any reasonable prospect of success can be opposed to the Enemy's privateering system, are those of blockading their Ports, and of not permitting our Trade to proceed without protection; and for the execution of these purposes the force under your command will, no doubt, by judicious arrangement be found adequate.

My Lords wish that you had stated the particulars of the landings made on many parts of the Leeward Islands and Nova Scotia, that they might have conveyed the information to H.M. Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, whose duty it is to attend to the Shore Defences of the Colonies; as it is not to be expected that in such extensive and detached Provinces a naval force can be stationed at every point of the Coast to prevent the occasional landings of plunderers and privateers; and upon this part of the subject and with reference to Sir Geo. Beckwith's letter inclosed in yours, I have to refer you to the copy (sent herewith) of my letter to Mr. Goulburn, some time since.

You have also stated in very strong terms that our Trade is threatened with absolute ruin. On this subject my Lords desire me to report their opinion, and to signify to you their positive direction that no Merchant Vessels should be permitted to sail without Convoy, & that frequent and regular protection should be afforded between the different Ports of your command; and you will see by the Extract of the Convoy Act, herewith sent, that when regular Convoys are appointed, and no persons are authorized to grant Licences to sail without Convoy, no Vessel can run without being subject to the penalties of that Act; which you are to give due notice at all the Ports that it is their Lordships intention to enforce. An attention to this circumstance will, it is hoped, prevent all serious injury to the Trade, and the execution of the arrangement communicated to you in my Letter of the 14th January will afford it all the facility which the Merchants themselves appear to desire.

My Lords cannot but hope that the reports which you state of swarms of American Privateers being at Sea, must be, in a great degree exaggerated; as they cannot suppose that you have left the principal Ports of the American Coast so unguarded as to permit such multitudes of Privateers to escape in and

out unmolested; and their Lordships are quite sure that by preventing our Merchant Ships from running and by carefully blockading the principal Ports the trade of privateering will be made so hazardous and expensive that its objects will be in most instances frustrated; and that of course the general system will be very considerably checked.

On the subject of the Razees proposed in your letter of the 29th December, I have to acquaint you that their Lordships have already turned their attention to this point; and had ordered four 74 Gun Ships to be cut down & fitted in the manner you recommend, with a view to their being employed on the American Station in lieu of Line of Battle Ships.

Their Lordships had also resolved to send, as soon as the Season would permit, a force of small Vessels to be employed in the Bay of Fundy & on the Coast of Nova Scotia. Their Lordships had considered that six Brigs commanded by Commanders would be sufficient for their Service; but if two more can be spared they shall be sent agreeably to your request. Three of these Brigs will be attached to the Newfoundland Convoy from the Channel on the 25th Instant, and three others to the Nova Scotia Convoy from Cork on the 1st of March.

The *Sceptre* is now at Spithead, and only waiting for a fair wind to proceed to your Station. Her Captain⁵ will deliver to you a copy of the orders he has received from their Lordships, together with this letter.

The *Forester* Sloop is attached to the *Sceptre* for the purpose of protecting the Trade down to Jamaica, where she is ordered to follow Admiral Stirling's orders, and to replace the *Brazen* which yesterday arrived at Spithead from that Station.

A Sloop will also, if she can be provided in time to sail with the *Sceptre*, accompany her to Barbadoes, and on her arrival there be directed to follow the orders of Sir Francis Laforey.⁶ I am &c.

J W C.

Admiral Sir J. B. Warren Bt K. B.
Bermuda. By the *Sceptre*.

Copy, UkLPR, Adm. 2/1376, pp. 73-87.

1. From No. 53, 21 Dec. 1812, to No. 67, 5 Jan. 1813, inclusive.
2. A large warship used as a transport, with lower deck guns removed to make more room, was said to be "en flute."
3. The list totals 98 vessels.
4. See Warren to Croker, 29 Dec. 1812, in Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, pp. 649-51.
5. Charles Baynton Hodgson Ross, R.N.
6. Rear Admiral Sir Francis Laforey, R.N., commanded the Leeward Islands Station.

Navy Department Administrative Problems

Mounting criticism of his stewardship of the Navy Department, as well as personal misgivings concerning his own administrative talents, prompted Secretary Hamilton to resign 31 December 1812. Two weeks later, William Jones, a successful Philadelphia merchant and former sea captain, accepted President Madison's offer to fill the vacant post. Jones immediately faced practical questions of supply, such as those confronting Nathaniel W. Rothwell, the newly appointed purser on the St. Marys Station, and congressional ag-

itation for a reorganization of the department. Jones would spend much of 1813 enmeshed in the minute details of directing the nation's war effort at sea.

PURSER NATHANIEL W. ROTHWELL TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAMILTON

St Marys January 8th 1813

Sir

I arrived here and took charge of Mr. Harris¹ business on the 1st. Inst. and was astonished to find the difficulty so great in procuring Funds Provisions, Slops &c in fact every article for the maintenance of the Flotilla— There is now a considerable amount due officers & Seamen & in February half the men on this Station will be discharg'd.

There is not one Hundred Barrells of Salt Provisions in Savannah & none of moment in Store— Flour can not be purchas'd, & I am therefore directed by Comdr Campbell to request one years Salt Provisions & a few Barrells Flour— All the Provisions will be exhausted by the time a supply could arrive— Say Three Hundred Barrells Pork & Two Hundred Barrells Beef.² It is of the utmost importance to keep up a supply, a deficiency would cause detention & a purchase at extravagant prices— The Whiskey received from Savannah comes higher & is not of so good a quality as the whiskey to the northward—

I will now Sir solicit you to point out the plan I am to adopt in procuring Funds. I cannot negotiate a Bill in this place for \$1000— I can pursue Mr Harris plan, and use the Bank in Savannah, consequently must pay a discount which I shall be compelled to do until I hear from you, receive a remittance, or directions how to proceed— I have a demand on me from the Commanding Officer of Marines, which I shall comply with as soon as in funds, Altho not authoris'd by letter I feel a confidence the act will not be sensur'd, particularly as Mr. Harris has been authoris'd to supply the marine officers with what money they want— You will have the goodness Sir to forward me the proper authority for my Government if you wish me to connect that business with my Pursership. I have the Honor to be Sir Your Obdt Hble St

N W Rothwell

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. I, No. 8 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. Gwinn Harris was the former purser at St. Marys.

2. Jones subsequently contracted for 200 barrels of beef and 200 barrels of pork to be delivered to Savannah; see Jones to Hugh Campbell, 26 Jan. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 236 (M149, Roll No. 10).

LIEUTENANT CHARLES MORRIS TO CONGRESSMAN LANGDON CHEVES¹

Washington Navy Yard Jan. 9. 1813

Sir,

I had the honour to receive your letter of Decr. 28th 1812 requesting any information I might possess, which might expose the present causes of mismanagement in the naval establishment, and suggestions as to the best means of reform.

My opinion is also particularly requested as to the existence of great abuses, waste, and extravagance in the present mode of building, repairing, equipping and supplying the Naval force of the U. States.

The causes of such abuse, waste and extravagance if they exist, and what the remedy?

You are also pleased to submit to my consideration some particular suggestions, which had been made to the committee, and as those suggestions comprehend nearly all the objects of your enquiry, I proceed to remark upon them in their regular order.

1st. "The present mode of supplying the navy through navy agents, is one great source of abuse & extravagance."

This mode of supplying the navy, is in my opinion liable to strong objections.— The compensation of the agents being derived from commissions on the purchases made by them for the government, is an inducement for them to purchase at high prices. I do not mean to say, that such is their practice, but that the present regulations makes it for their interest to pursue such a system.

The limits of \$2000 a year can operate but on few, as the commissions of few amount to that sum.

Whether extravagant prices have or have not been given for different articles by Navy agents, is in the power of the committee to ascertain from other sources.

Remedy. It is recommended that agents should receive fixed salaries, instead of commissions. That in all purchases they should advertise for sealed proposals, and be bound to accept those most favourable to the government; and that they shall regularly make oath at the settlement of their quarterly accounts, that they have complied with the above regulations.

2d. The manner in which contracts are made and carried on, is believed to be another great source of abuse and expence."

This is believed to be correct, under an impression that, in many instances no advertisements are made for sealed proposals. That the contracts are made in too loose a manner. That ample security is not required for their faithful performance, or that it is not properly exacted. And that an indiscreet advance of money is sometimes made to the contractors without due security for the government.

Remedy. Advertisements for sealed proposals. The contracts to be made as explicit and as precise as possible. To require good security for their complete performance and to make no advances, but on such security as should ~~make~~ render the government safe.

3d. The want of regular system and allowance for vessels of each class, in stores and furniture and outfits, is another source of extravagance and waste.

This is unquestionably correct. Most of our commanders have or at least exercise the privilege of following their own ideas of propriety on these subjects, but a greater inconvenience is felt in the armament, equipment, and internal arrangements of the vessels. On these points also commanders are frequently left at liberty to exercise their discretion, and as few are precisely of the same opinion, it sometimes happens, that, vessels of the same dimensions are differently armed, equiped and arranged, so that spare stores prepared for one will not answer for another.

Remedy. To class the different vessels, to regulate the armament, complete equipments and allowances of the various stores for each class.

4. "The delay of ships wanting repairs, spars and other articles, form another article of expence, while the public at the same time looses the service of the vessels."

Very considerably inconvenience has resulted in some instances from such delays. These delays have generally been owing apparently to an incorrect view of the importance of magazines in different ports supplied with such articles as are most commonly wanted for the services requiring considerable time for their construction or collection, and such magazines or depots is the only adequate remedy for this inconvenience.

5. The employment of more artificers, workmen, and labourers in the Navy Yards, than can be employed to advantage, is another source of great expence.

On this subject I can only say, that, comparing the expence of labour in some of the yards, with the service performed, induces me to believe that it is at least injudiciously directed. Horses and oxen I should presume might be substituted for men, to great advantage, for the removal of heavy articles. And I am disposed to believe that, many articles might be attained by contracts, of equal quality and at much less expence, than by having them made by artificers employed in the yard on daily pay.

6. "The discretion which officers exercise in altering their vessels when in commission, is another source of extravagance and waste."

The alteration of vessels when in commission has heretofore been attended with very considerable expence. In some instances the improvements made, have compensated for their cost: but in most cases, the alterations have been attended with no good consequences, and in some, have been very injurious.

Remedy. A regulation forbidding any commander to alter in any degree the vessel under his command, unless by particular permission or order from the Secretary of the Navy; or when on foreign service, from the commanding officer of the squadron: and that no such order or permission shall be given, but upon the recommendation of a majority of three or more commanders, previously ordered to examine & report the advantages which would probably result from such alteration.

7. The want of accountability in the warrant officers before they are discharged from the ship they have served on board of, is an other source of loss to the public.

This I believe is not strictly correct. If a loss has been sustained by the public, through the warrant officers, it must have been from the neglect of their commanders, who are required by existing regulations to audit their accounts weekly, and keep check books of their receipts and expenditures; which if performed, would prevent loss to the public.

An additional and very considerable expence is believed to have been incurred by a neglect to carefully preserve the various stores and equipment landed from vessels laid in ordinary. Great inconvenience has been felt, and the expence of repairs been very much increased from the want of dry docks in some of our ports to which vessels requiring repairs or examinations below light water mark, might have been taken, instead of pursuing the only other mode of repairing them, which is heaving them down. In calculating these inconveniences and expences: the removal of all their armaments, stores ballace [*ballast*] &c. The expence of additional preparations for heaving down; & the increased detention of the vessel, must be taken into consideration, together with the injury the vessel unavoidably sustains under the strain of the operation; and the risque of those she may probably sustain from accident.

The advantages which it is conceived would result from such an establishment are such as in my opinion require the earliest attention to the subject, particularly since it is contemplated to build ships of the line.

The practice of repairing vessels at yards situated on long rivers of tedious and difficult navigation, is believed to have caused very considerable expences, beyond what would have been incurred if the repairs had been made at yards more conveniently situated.

In estimating the amount of these expences, attention must be paid to the time necessarily lost in the navigation; to the difference of freight for those articles usually procured from the coast, or by water. The difficulty and expence of procuring seamen to man vessels at such places—and when the vessels require lightening to pass shoals between the sea and those yards; the trouble and expence of transporting her stores and equipments in other vessels.

It is also believed, that, for several years past, a very considerable portion of the naval expences has been caused by the gun boats. A discription of force, which though it may be serviceable in some particular situations, does not appear sufficiently important to warrant its continuance at the great expence it has hitherto occasioned.

If however it is deemed expedient to continue the use of gun boats; I beg leave to suggest the propriety of detaching them from the regular naval Establishment— From their size and construction they are only proper for harbour defence, and even then, they can only act with effect in two situations; one is, under the protection, or in conjunction with land batteries. The other, when they can occupy a situation on, or behind some shoal, fairly within range of point-blank shot, and where they can not be approached by the enemy's vessels within the range of grape—for if the vessels are beyond point-blank range the fire from the boats would do very little injury; and if within grape distance, the boats must either retire, surrender or have all their men swept from their unsheltered decks. A very small portion of naval knowledge is necessary for their management in the harbours: while on the skill and ability of those charged with the service of their artillery depends almost the whole of their utility. Their force will not authorise the employment of experienced naval officers to command them, and they offer no opportunity for the inexperienced to improve in naval knowledge. I would propose, that, the gun boats in the different harbours, should be placed under the direction of the military commanders at those places who, from their knowledge of the batteries under their command, are best qualified to assign them their proper stations. Let an officer acquainted with naval affairs have a general superintendance of their movements as ordered by the military commander. To each boat assign two petty officers, four seamen and four ordinary seamen, to take care of and manouvre her; and when they may be wanted for action, let a requisite number of artillery be detached to each boat, for the proper management of the gun. The person performing the naval part of the duty in the boats might be made subject to the army or naval laws, as should be deemed most expedient. The officers superintend the naval duties in the establishment, should be considered as distinct from the regular naval service, and as having no right or claim for promotion in it, but might be eligible to an adoption in it as a reward for particular acts of bravery or good conduct. By adopting some arrangement of this kind, the military commanders will always have the control of that floating force, but adapted for their particular purposes; without having occasion to consult with any other officer.

The regular naval establishment service will be relieved from an establishment which, without even having formed one good officer, has ruined a great number of promising young men: and the country it is believed, will receive equal advantages from the gun boat establishment at a very reduced expence.

To your general question "as to the present causes of mismanagement in the naval establishment;" I can only offer an opinion, which I give with much diffidence, as it has been formed from the limited observations, I have been able to make, while attending to the details of service in a subordinate capacity.

One of the great causes of the present mismanagement is in my opinion owing to the want of an efficient and uniform system for the government of all the different branches of service. A system which, should fully and clearly establish the duties of every officer, and the mode in which those duties should be performed; a system which should control the expenditures of the public monies in all the minute details, as well as in more general expenditures: which should prescribe the armaments and equipments & the proper allowances of every description, for vessels of each class, and which should enable the department at all times to ascertain with precision the actual state & condition of the whole establishment; and provide in season for its probable wants.

Another and perhaps, greater cause of the present mismanagement is, the want of a board of professional men, to advise the head of the department on questions merely professional, and to superintend the details of service; and particularly to see that, all established regulations shall be carried into complete and full effect. To this board might be assigned also, the duty of making all contracts, of examining the accounts of all officers charged with stores (pursers excepted) to examine midshipmen & certify to their qualifications for promotion.

The proper persons to constitute such a board at present, are conceived to be three naval men, having under their direction a surgeon general and contractor general. With the greatest respect I have the honour to be Yours &c &c &c

Honble. Langdon Cheves
Chairman of the Committee of Naval Enquiry

Copy, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones. Morris forwarded a copy of his response to Cheves's inquiry to Jones shortly after his appointment as secretary of the navy.

1. Langdon Cheves was chairman of the House of Representatives' naval affairs committee during the first session of the Twelfth Congress. Burwell Bassett chaired it during the second session.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WILLIAM JONES TO
CONGRESSMAN BURWELL BASSETT

Honorable Burwell Bassett
Chairman of the Naval Committee
House of Repr.

Navy Depart.
2d Feby 1813

Permit me to revive the Suggestions I had the honor to make to you in conversation relative to the better organization of the Navy Department, and though it would be premature in me to offer any general system of improvement yet in my view there are some prominent defects in the establishment



Secretary of the Navy William Jones

which are susceptible of a simple remedy similar to that which necessity urged the adoption of in relation to the War Department.

The vital error appears to me to consist in loading the Chief of the Department with the Cognizance of details and with the execution of duties which divert his attention from the sound direction of the great & efficient objects of the establishment, or the inevitable alternative is to submit the execution of those duties to subordinate Agents whose responsibility does not afford a sufficient guarantee to the public for the judicious & faithful discharge of the trust of this nature is the duty of forming Contracts, making purchases and the effective controul and accountability of Navy Agents now spread over the interior as well as the Atlantic Coast, and which I conceive would employ to great public advantage a distinct department directed by a responsible and able head. If in the present state of our Navy this view of the subject is in any degree correct the increase as now provided for by Law must render it indispensable.

I would therefore respectfully suggest the idea of a Naval Purveyors Department with deputies as many as may be necessary to be nominated by the President to the Senate. The Purveyor to reside in some of our Central Sea port towns, where the state of the market & the information necessary to form Contracts to advantage can be best known and effected with the best Security: the Secretary of the Navy retaining the controul and general direction of all important contracts to be formed by the purveyor.

Permit me also to ask of you to consider the propriety of increasing the appropriation for Clerks in the Navy Department so as to admit of the addition of two able Clerks to the number now employed. I would also suggest the propriety of providing for the appointment of an additional number of Captains in anticipation of those authorized by the Act for building the 74s— There is not now a single vacancy and unless a Captain is taken from one of the Navy Yards, there is no Commander for the *Macedonian* although a distinguished Master Commandant has been designated for that promotion and command;¹ indeed we have none to provide for Casualties or the fate of Battle.

I would also draw your attention to a species of force of vast importance for short Coasting Convoys as well as for the annoyance of the enemy. I mean Corvettes such as the *Hornet* or rather larger (such as the enemy employs) of this valuable class of vessels we are almost destitute.

I think Six vessels of this class would be desirable. They can be built by Contract on favorable terms and in service in four months. Orders have been given to construct and equip two Corvettes at Erie and one at Sacketts Harbour with a view to the complete command of the whole of the Lakes. I think Sir the public could be amply remunerated for the additional Six Corvettes, by a reduction of the number of gunboats now in Service and of the officers and Crews of those that may be retained in Situations admitting of such diminution. I have the honor to be very respectfully &c.

W Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, Letters to Congress, Vol. 2, pp. 147-48.

1. On 1 February 1813, Master Commandant Jacob Jones was ordered to New York to supervise the repair and equipping of *Macedonian*. He was promoted to captain on 3 March 1813.

Privateer Activity

American privateers menaced the high seas throughout the war, wreaking havoc on British merchantmen and forcing the Admiralty to send out more naval vessels for the protection of British trade. Highflyer and Comet from Baltimore and America from Salem all had successful careers as privateers. Although Highflyer was captured early in 1813, she had netted her owners an estimated \$187,000. The British capture of Highflyer was a great coup. Comet earned her Baltimore investors about \$220,000 before being sold in 1814 to a group of New Yorkers.¹ America brought in six prizes valued at \$158,000 after her first cruise from September 1812 to January 1813.² The following grouping documents Highflyer's capture, alleged mutinous activity on board America, and a day in the privateering career of Comet.

1. Ganitee, Republic's Private Navy, p. 272.

2. Maclay, American Privateers, p. 333; for an account of America's career, see Crowninshield, "America of Salem."

CAPTAIN JOHN P. BERESFORD, R.N.,¹ TO ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

His Majesty's Ship *Poictiers*
at Sea, 9th Jany. 1813—

Sir,

I beg leave to acquaint you that His Majesty's Ship under my Command in Company with the *Acasta* Captured this day the American Schooner Privateer *High Flyer*, mounting five Guns and having on board a Compliment of 72 men; She was on her return from the West Indies where she had made several Captures, is a particularly fine Vessel, Coppered and Copper fastened, and sails remarkably fast.² I have the honor to be Sir, Your most Obedient humble Servant

Signed J P Beresford Captain

Copy, UklPR, Adm. 1/503, p. 281.

1. John Poo Beresford had been sent to the North American Station at the beginning of the war.

2. The British used *Highflyer* in their Chesapeake operations, retaining her name. U.S.S. *President* recaptured *Highflyer* in September 1813.

DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH ROPES

To the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy
of the United States of America,

Joseph Ropes Esquire Commander of the Private Armed Ship "*America*" of Salem¹ in the County of Essex and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in pursuance of an Act of the said United States entitled "An Act concerning Letters of Marque, Prizes and Prize goods" passed the 26th day of June AD 1812, and the fifteenth section of said Act,² respectfully represents that he the said Joseph Ropes as Commander of the said Ship *America*, and by virtue of a Commission

or Letter of Marque under the seal of the said U. States, and the hand of the President of the same bearing date the second day of September AD 1812, sailed from said Salem on the seventh day of September in the year aforesaid on a Cruise, that Charles Still, entered on board the said Ship for the said Cruise as a quarter master, that on the twentieth day of October AD 1812, while on the said Cruise on the high seas and from 12, to 15, leagues to the Westward of St. Michaels he the said Ropes fell in with the Ship Eliza of Philadelphia, bound to Cadiz, after closely examining the papers of the said the Eliza, he the said Ropes suffered her to proceed on her voyage; shortly after, on the same day, the said Still came to him the said Ropes Commander as aforesaid, then being aft, on the poop deck, and in a very insolent manner demanded in the name of the crew, from the sd. Ropes the reason why he the sd. Ropes had not manned out the said Eliza—to which the sd. Ropes replied that he the sd. Still might inform the ships's company that he did not think proper to send her in— the said Still then said to him the said Ropes that they (the crew) did not come for pleasure and were not to be put off so— he the said Ropes then ordered the said Still forward and commanded him to say no more— the said Still then in a very mutinous manner and with much indecent language said to the said Ropes that this was the third good and lawful prize to his the sd. Still's knowledge which he the sd. Ropes had let go and that if he the sd. Ropes chose he might order him the sd. Still in irons— the sd. Ropes then ordered the first Lieutenant of the said Ship to call the Master at Arms and put the said Still in irons— the said Still on hearing this immediately went forward and thirty or forty of the Crew set up a loud shout and immediately the ship was in much confusion— the sd. Ropes told the sd. first Lieutenant to take but little notice of it but to see that the said Still was put in irons— the sd. first Lieutenant then went forward with the Master at Arms (after calling the sd. Still to come aft a number of times without effect) but shortly returned and informed him the sd. Ropes, that many of the Crew appeared determined to resist the putting the sd. Still in irons— Upon this the marines were paraded aft and the officers of the sd. Ship called on deck with their pistols— while this was doing, the said Still with some little assistance, began to cast loose the bow gun, saying, at the same time, that the Captain and officers were arming themselves but if they (the Crew) would join him the sd. Still, he the sd. Still would blow them the sd. Officers all to damnation— the said Still was then stopped by the Boatswain from proceeding further— the Crew were then called aft and after a few words were said to them upon the folly of their conduct, he the said Ropes ordered the Master at Arms to put the said Still in irons which was done accordingly one man only making any opposition to it who desisted upon being spoken to— the said Still was confined in irons on board the sd. Ship until her arrival in Salem aforesaid which was on the seventh of January Instant, he the sd. Ropes not having met with any public ship of war of the said United States at sea. The said Ropes would further represent that the sd. Still is now in the custody and safe keeping of John Rodgers Esquire Commodore, and Commander of the public Ship of War of the sd. United States and also a squadron of public ships now lying in the harbour of Boston in the sd. Commonwealth he the said Ropes having, upon the above representation, requested the said Commodore, to take into his custody the said Still to abide the order of the Secretary of the Navy, of the sd. United States, upon the representation which he the sd. Ropes, should make to the sd. Secretary touching the sd. Still, and agreeably to the Act aforesaid. Whereupon the sd. Ropes,

and in consideration of the premises, requests the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy of the said United States to call a Court Martial for the trial of the said Still for mutiny and for exciting and endeavoring still further to excite among the Crew aforesaid a mutiny on board the said Ship "America" against the authority of him the said Ropes Commander as aforesaid, and the officers acting under his Command and authority, agreeably to the Act aforesaid and the fifteenth section thereof. And the sd. Ropes would further represent that the witnesses to substantiate the above facts on the trial of the sd. Still are John Kehew, first Lieutenant, John Harris, Prize Master & Capt. of the Bow gun, Thomas Poor, Boatswain, & Jesse Brown Seaman and Benjamin West, Seaman of and on board the Said ship America during her said Cruise, some of whom are bound again to sea, and he the sd. Ropes would therefore respectfully represent that it might be for the security and advancement of justice if the Court Martial for the trial of the sd. Still should be called without much delay and as speedily as possible. All which is respectfully submitted

Salem January 15th AD 1812 [1813]
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Essex

By Jos. Ropes

Personally appeared this sixteenth day of January AD 1813, the said Joseph Ropes and made oath that the facts contained in the foregoing representation are true

Before me John Pitman Jun. Justice of the Peace.

Copy, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 26 (M124, Roll No. 53). Joseph Ropes probably copied the deposition.

1. George Crowninshield & Sons of Salem owned America, a 350-ton vessel built in 1804; she usually carried 20 guns. This was America's first cruise as a privateer; Joseph Ropes, a very capable and well-known sea captain, commanded her; see Maclay, American Privateers, p. 328.

2. Section fifteen was reprinted in Dudley, Naval War of 1812, Vol. 1, p. 169.

COURT-MARTIAL OF CHARLES STILL¹

[Extract]

Marine Barracks, Navy Yard Charlestown Tuesday the 9th of March 1813

The Court met pursuant to adjournment, and having deliberately considered the evidence for the prosecution, and that of the prisoner, and the statement made by the prisoner in his defence, are of opinion that he is not guilty of Mutiny nor of exciting or attempting still further to excite a mutiny on board said private armed Ship America; but that he is guilty of such parts of the charge as fall within the meaning of the last clause of the Thirteenth Article of the rules and regulations for the government of the Navy of the United States in as much as he is guilty of having uttered Seditious and Mutinous words, and that he treated with contempt his superior officers, while in the execution of their duty, as charged in the complaint of Joseph Ropes commander of said Ship America, and do therefore adjudge that the said Charles Still receive one hun-

dred lashes on his naked back, alongside or on board such Ship, or Ships, and at such time, and place as Commr. John Rodgers shall direct.

signed
Isaac Hull President
L. Warrington
Tho Gamble
John H. Elton
B. V. Hoffman

Thomas Welsh Junr
Judge Advocate

Copy, DNA, RG125, CM, Vol. 4, No. 131 (M273, Roll No. 4).

1. On 9 February, Jones ordered Commodore Rodgers to convene a court-martial of Charles Still; see Jones to Rodgers, 9 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 249 (M149, Roll No. 10).

LOGBOOK ENTRY OF PRIVATE ARMED SCHOONER *COMET* OF BALTIMORE,
CAPTAIN THOMAS BOYLE,¹ COMMANDER

Remarks on Saturday 30th January 1813

The first of these 24 hours light winds & pleasant weather in chase of the before mentioned Ship @ 1/4 past 12 maridian hoisted American Coulers & began firing at her in hopes to cut away Something to impede her way as She Sailed fast which we Soon did & approached her verry fast when She began firing the action then became general we endeavouring to close with her a fast as possible @ thirty minutes past maridian we opened our whole battery of big Guns & musketry upon her at forty minutes past maridean they hauled down the English Coulers in Submission to the *Comet* we having one man killed & three wounded one with the loss of his leg by a Round Shot came in through the quick work between the fore riging & Bridle Port on boarding found her to be the Ship *Adelphia* of abberdeen from Liverpool with Salt & Dry Goods for St. Salvador put Wm. Barlet prize master on board with eleven men & ordered for america at 7 PM Parted with the prize She mounting Eight Eighteen pound Caronades middle & latter parte Pleasant. Lattd. Obsd. 13" 30 South

D, MdHi, Ships' Logbooks and Papers, MS. 748.

1. Thomas Boyle settled in Baltimore when he was nineteen. In July 1812, he took *Comet*, a 187-ton schooner built by Thomas Kemp in 1810, on a three month cruise. This log entry is for Boyle's second cruise in *Comet*, December 1812 to March 1813. Just before capturing *Adelphi*, a 361-ton ship out of Liverpool, Boyle had driven off a Portuguese warship escorting three well-armed English vessels. *Comet* took the latter as prizes; see Garitee, *Republic's Private Navy*, pp. 149-51.

Commodore Hull-Anaconda Affair

By early 1813, Liverpool Packet, a very successful British privateer operating off New England, had menaced the American coastal trade for months. Boston merchants enlisted the navy's support to end this scourge by privately purchasing a schooner and lending it to Commodore John Rodgers to man and use as a coastal convoy. While entering Provincetown harbor on 16 January 1813, this schooner, Commodore Hull, Acting Lieutenant Henry S. Newcomb, commanding, encountered the American privateer brig Anaconda. Some fishing vessels informed Newcomb that she was a New York privateer. The lack of a viable signalling system between public and private warships, however, resulted in the privateer ship's firing on Commodore Hull, she being mistaken for the greatly feared Liverpool Packet.¹

A court-martial acquitted Anaconda's Lieutenant George W. Burbank of the charges of insulting the flag and of deliberately wounding Newcomb and two crewmen from Commodore Hull. The court concluded that there was reasonable doubt about the schooner's nationality.

1. The 18-gun brig Anaconda, owned by New Yorkers Peter H. Schenck and Francis H. Nicoll, was commanded by Captain Nathaniel Shaler. On the day of the incident with Commodore Hull, Shaler was conducting business on shore and had left the vessel in the charge of his first lieutenant, George W. Burbank.

COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAMILTON

U.S. Frigate *President*
Boston Jany. 13th 1813

Sir

It being represented to me, by a Committee of Merchants, of this place, that the coasting Trade between here and Martha's Vineyard had of late sustained great injury by the deprivations of a certain British privateer Schooner called the *Liverpool Packet*; they at the same time having offered to equip, and furnish a suitable vessel for the purpose of affording Temporary protection to said trade, provided I would employ her to that effect: I have in consequence acceded to their proposal, and shall employ in the completion of the before mentioned object the Schooner *Capt. Hull*¹ which they yesterday purchased, until your pleasure shall be known—

The *Capt. Hull* is about 100 Tons, and was built for a Privateer. She is armed with Four carriage Guns (Six Pounders) 50 Muskets, 50 Pistols, and 50 Sabres, and officered and manned from this Ship, in the character of a Tender, by one Lieutenant, Four Midshipmen, the Coasting Pilot, and Forty five men— She will sail tomorrow for Martha's Vineyard, to convoy to this place a number of Coasting Vessels, now waiting there, and afraid to put to Sea, it being represented that the *Liverpool Packet* is laying wait for them in the vicinity of Cape Cod

I should not have taken upon myself to have employed this Vessel, as before stated, without having the approbation of the Secretary of the Navy, would not the delay which must unavoidably ensue, before I could receive his instructions, entirely defeat the object in view.

In the present situation of the *President*, refitting as she is, the before mentioned Fifty officers and men could not be more advantageously employed, and

I hope the same may meet your approbation I have the honor to be with the greatest respect Sir Your Obdt. Servt.

Jn^o Rodgers

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 20 (M125, Roll No. 26).

1. Rodgers meant *Commodore Hull*.

COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Frigate *President*.
Boston Jan'y 19th 1813

Sir

I regret being under the necessity of requesting that you will authorise me to order a Court Martial to try George W. Burbank, First Lieutenant of Private armed Brig *Anaconda*, on the charge set forth in the enclosed paper—

The *Commr. Hull* is the Schooner which I informed you on the 14th Inst.¹ that I should employ for the protection of the Coasting trade to this place, until your pleasure should be made known to me . . . The *Commr. Hull* I had given the command of to Lieut. Newcomb, of this Ship, and on his passage from this to Holmes Hole, to afford Convoy to Coasting vessels, fell in with the Privateer Brig *Anaconda* of New York.

The enclosed will shew the cause of my request for authority to order a Court Martial— I have taken the advice of Mr. Blake, the district attorney, in the business, and he agrees with myself that the First Lieutenant of the Privateer (and who was commanding officer of the *Anaconda* at the time the accident happened) is subject to a trial by Naval Martial Law. . . . Perhaps it might have been as proper for me to detain the Privateer until I could be informed of your determination, but my repugnance to injure the owners of the vessel for the rash act of her officer, will induce me to permit her to proceed on her cruise . . .

The *Commr. Hull* left Cape Cod this morning with a small convoy to proceed as far as Holmes' Hole, and to afford such vessels as she may find there convoy to this place.

Lieut. Newcomb I have reason to hope is not badly wounded. I have the honor to be With the greatest respect Sir Your Obdt. Servt

Jn^o Rodgers

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 24 (M125, Roll No. 26). Ellipses are the writer's.

1. Rodgers meant 13th.

[Enclosure]

To George W. Burbank, 1st Lieutenant of the Private Armed Brig *Anaconda*, now at anchor in the Harbour of Boston

By authority vested in me by certain Laws passed on the 26th day of June 1812, concerning Letters of Marque and reprisal: I do hereby arrest you, that you may be held to appear before a Court Martial, to answer to the charge of having unjustifiably fired into a Vessel in the service of the United States, called

the *Commodore Hull*, and thereby wounding the Commanding Officer and Two Seamen belonging to said Vessel.

Specification

Namely, that you George W. Burbank did on, or about the 16th of the present month, while laying in Cape Cod harbour, and while acting in your capacity of First Lieutenant, and Commanding Officer of the private armed Brig *Anaconda*, whereof Nathaniel Shaler is commander (but who was not at the time on board) direct, cause, or permit certain cannon of said Brig, which were loaded with Powder and Balls, to be fired at the Schooner *Commodore Hull*, commanded by Henry S. Newcomb, a Lieutenant in the Navy of the United States, and thereby wound, by said Shots so fired, the said Henry S. Newcomb and Two Seamen, belonging to the said Schooner *Commodore Hull*, and that you did thus proceed to insult the Flag of the United States, and to wound and maim her said ~~commander~~ officer and Seamen without any justifiable cause whatever

Captn. Greenleaf, commanding the Marines of the U.S. Frigate *President*, is to serve this arrest, and you are to be confined to the limits of said Frigates decks, until the decision of the Honble. the Secretary of the Navy shall be made known to me, relative to the further proceedings necessary in your case

Jn^o Rodgers
Comd'g the U.S N forces
at Boston

U.S. Frigate *President*
Harbour of Boston, Jan'y. 19th 1813

Copy, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 24, enclosure (M125, Roll No. 26). This copy was signed by Rodgers.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE W. BURBANK AT HIS COURT-MARTIAL

[Extract]

6 March 1813 10 A.M. Marine Barracks Charlestown Navy Yard

I sent Lt. Miller on board the Schooner to ascertain what she was, our people in the mean time was conversing on the subject, and from the appearance of her sails, which appeared to made of English Duck, the fur caps of the men¹ & the refusal of the officer to tell us what she was, it was generally believed it was the *Liverpool packet* and a determination was impressed amongst us to ascertain beyond doubt, what she was, on Lt. Millers return he informd me he could get no satisfaction that the commanding officer refused to tell the name of the schooner or any thing about her except that her colours & his uniform ought to satisfy him that she was a United States vessel and he a United States officer. The schooner then began to get underway . . . Believeing it to be my duty to prevent the escape of the Schooner till I knew what she was, I ordered the shot to be drawn from the Bow Gun, the Cannister was drawn but they were not able to get out the round shot, and I then ordered the gun to be so elevated that the shot would not strike the Town & I gave orders to fire the Bow Gun a head of the Schooner with the intention of preventing her from getting underway— the

three guns were then fired which occasioned the accident. That I did not direct cause or permit a gun to be fired into the Schooner I believe is fully proved from the evidence and that I did not insult the flag of the United States is also true, because at the time I ordered the gun to be fired ahead of the schooner I thought her an enemy and at no time had I supposed her to be a vessel of the United States.

That Lt. Newcomb meant to conceal the name & character of the schooner from me while I had given him Satisfaction respecting the Brig is evident²

Signed G. W. Burbank

Copy, DNA, RG125, CM, Vol. 4, No. 131 (M273, Roll No. 4). This is an extract of a lengthy court-martial proceeding that lasted from 27 February to 11 March 1813. Burbank read this defense statement and then presented a copy of it to the court.

1. Previous testimony at the court-martial indicated that this type of fur cap was popular in Halifax, raising doubts about *Commodore Hull's* nationality.

2. On 11 March Commodore Rodgers concurred in the acquittal of Burbank and ordered his release.

Secretary Jones's Reflections on His New Position

Less than two weeks after receiving his appointment from the president, Jones arrived in Washington energetic and confident to undertake the new challenge. Unlike Hamilton, Jones had a maritime background, having sailed in a Pennsylvania privateer during the Revolution. He had developed ties with Congress while serving a term as Philadelphia's Republican representative in the Seventh Congress (1801–3). As a vocal war hawk he had promoted the American declaration of war. Jones realized that he would make enemies but was optimistic that he could effect change as secretary of the navy. In the following letter to his wife, Jones noted his intention not to shrink from necessary reforms.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO ELEANOR JONES

Washington 23d Jany 1813

My dear Wife

I arrived safe here after an agreeable journey at 3 O'clock this afternoon and for the moment have put up at Davis' Hotel until I can look about for agreeable permanent quarters. Genl Armstrong had written on to a friend and has taken the rooms offered to me by Mrs. Wilson— I have this evening heard of a place that I think will suit me better. I called for a moment on the President who indeed expressed great pleasure— I am to see him in the morning on business, and take a family dinner with him. This evening, I called on Mr Gallatin and had some interesting conversation relative to public measures connected with my department. I have not seen my friend Macon yet. Those of my friends whom I have casually met with greet me with pleasure and express great confidence, but commiserate me in the Herculean task I have to encounter.

Be it so, but I am sure it will give you pleasure to learn that though the report of its difficulties increase as I advance my hope and confidence is strengthened

and the terrors appear to diminish with the serious contemplation I have given to the subject. Having accepted the trust with reluctance, but with the purest motives and most ardent zeal for the sacred cause of our Country why should I despair? My pursuits and studies has been intimately connected with the objects of the department and I have not been an inattentive observer of political causes and effects. The truth is that the difficulties I have to encounter are artificial, but they are not the less difficult on that account. They arise from the corruption of self interested men who have taken root in the establishment and like the voracious poplar nothing can thrive in their shade. But (as we did in our yard) we can cut it down replace the fair pavement, and let in the cheering beams of the sun of truth and honesty. I shall take care however not to cut rashly and indiscriminately. If I cut off the noxious plants, I will cherish the useful trees.

But of what avail you will say is honest intention, and faithful services if assailed by the breath of calumny and faction. I answer, if I am incompetent & grossly negligent it will not be calumny— If I am faithful and reasonably competent the consciousness of virtue and fidelity I hope will sustain me. To expect to pass without lashing would be idle. I have only to request you not to mind it when it does occur. My love to all friends. Your ever affectionate Husband.

Wm Jones

ALS, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones.

Charleston Station and Force Report

Captain John H. Dent, commanding officer at Charleston, South Carolina, began 1813 with a force composed of barges and four schooners: Alligator, Carolina, Ferret, and Nonsuch.¹ In response to enemy harassment of the coast, he deployed those vessels that were adequately manned, but lack of men and officers hampered his operations. Having received approval from the former secretary to make necessary repairs and improvements to the rented navy yard, Dent spent the winter collecting supplies. Writing to Jones on 16 February about the anticipated work, Dent obviously had not received the secretary's letter of 9 February in which the latter had ordered Dent to suspend all permanent improvements at the navy yard.² Dent, along with Surgeon George Logan, would press Jones throughout the first half of 1813 to establish better and less expensive medical care for the station.³

1. Alligator was the former gunboat No. 166. For background on Carolina and Ferret, see Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, pp. 583–86. Nonsuch, formerly the successful Baltimore privateer of the same name, owned by George Stiles, was purchased in 1812 at Charleston for \$15,000; see Gariter, *Republic's Private Navy*, pp. 87, 271, 279.

2. See Dent to Hamilton, 5 Dec. 1812, in Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, p. 589 and Jones to Dent, 9 Feb. 1813, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 249 (M149, Roll No. 10).

3. See pp. 121–22.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Charleston 30th January 1813.

Sir

Official information having been received here that ten or twelve coasters with full cargoes of rice had been chased into Bull's Bay by an Enemy's Brig of War, on Saturday, and were exposed to be cut out by her boats, I immediately manned from the Guardship two Barges, and dispatched them for their protection, they have not yet returned. I also transferred the crew of the Schooner *Carolina* to the *Nonsuch*, and directed her commander, Sailing Master Mork,¹ to proceed to Sea, and remain off Bulls Bay, and protect as far as practicable the vessels therein, or draw the attention of the enemy from that point. The weather has been extremely thick and boisterous since, the enemy could not have remained near the coast, the vessels are still safe, and I expect them all in to day.

I have dispatched a barge to convoy an Army transport, loaded with ordnance, inland to Savannah. It will be impossible to man, the Schooner or Barges, what few men are here, are either taken by the privateers, or engaged for France, at 45 dollars pr month. The Schooner *Alligator* sails this morning for her station in Port Royal Sound, to protect the inland trade. I Have the Honor to be With great respect Your most Obt. Svt.

J H Dent

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 40 (M125, Roll No. 26).

1. Sailing Master James Mork was Dent's second in command.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

The Honorable William Jones

Charleston 16th Feby. 1813

Sir

The Season has been so cold, that little more has been done to the wharf at the Navy Yard than collect the materials, the weather begins to break, and I shall tomorrow commence with the workmen, and continue until compleated. The Artificers Houses are in a State of forwardness and will be compleated in three weeks. I have applied at different times, to the Marine officer on this Station for a guard to be placed at the Yard for the protection of the public Stores therein, and he has not been able to supply one, without breaking up the guard at the barracks, I beg leave to suggest the moving of the present Marine Barracks to the Navy Yard, where suitable and good accommodations can be had untill proper barracks are built; they are now paying a high rent for a House in the environs of the City, and if removed to the yard, would save considerable expence to the department, and be rendering important Service at the same time. I suggested this arrangement, at the establishment of the Yard. Also our Hospital is in the city the Surgeon having orders to rent quarters for the Sick, and disabled Seamen attached to this Station; the expence attending this establishment has been greater than was necessary, and if removed to the yard, where there is a house calculated to receive for the present the Sick & wounded. The late fire destroyed his House, with Several sets of instruments, and considerable medicine belonging to the Station.

There has not been a commissioned Officer attached to this Station for the last year. The Schooner *Carolina* is ready for Sea, half manned, and requires an Active Lieutenant for a Commander, She is a very fine vessel, and I think will Sail fast: eight Midshipmen, and two Surgeon's mates are much wanted on this Station. I have been obliged to appoint my clerk Mr Matthew Reardon to act as purser of the *Carolina*. Since in commission, he has performed that Service much to my satisfaction, and is in every respect qualified, to do that duty, I shall feel particularly gratified if his appointment is confirmed, knowing that he will be an acquisition to the Service. Muster Rolls of the different vessels and boats under my command will be immediately forwarded for your information. I Have the Honor to be With great respect your obt Svt.

J H Dent

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 76 (M125, Roll No. 26).

Lack of Adequate Medical Care and Regulations

Dissatisfaction with the medical treatment provided for the gunboat crews at Beaufort, North Carolina, induced the sailing master who was in charge there to recommend contracting for the services of a local private practitioner. Having to rely on the naval surgeon at Ocracoke was inconvenient and medical care suffered.

The complaints at Beaufort were representative of problems throughout the naval community. On 26 February 1811, Congress recognized the need for more uniform medical care for seamen and passed a law providing funding for separate naval hospitals through various revenue sources.¹ Secretary of the Navy Hamilton solicited the recommendations of several naval surgeons in drafting rules and regulations for the government of those hospitals. Dr. Edward Cutbush headed this naval commission, and Hamilton presented its findings to the Twelfth Congress. The measure languished throughout the war. In the second document that follows, Cutbush apprises the new secretary, William Jones, of the need for reforms in the naval medical establishment.

1. Statutes at Large, Vol. 2, Stat. 3, Chap. 26, pp. 650-51.

SAILING MASTER JOHN C. MANSON¹ TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

William Jones Esqr.

Beaufert N. Ca. Feby. 1st 1813

Sir

We have been here nearly six months, in which time the Crews of U. States Gun Boats No. 147 & 148 have been very sickly owing to the severity of the winter several of them have had the Desintery & Plurisy, but by taking great care of them have not lost but one man who died after a short illness of the latter disease. Sir I have now 3 on board sick and one on shore & Mr. Haddaway has on board his Boat No. 147 about the same complaining.

I am sorry to say during the time above mentioned we have not been visited by Doctor Morrison but once, from Ocracock.

Sir I have taken the liberty which I hope you will excuse to send inclosed a copy of a Contract made between the U. States, and a Doctor James Manney

who lives at this place, who wishes if you approve of the same to furnish Medicine & attend both Boats regularly for \$30. pr. Month.

Sir as the people still continue sick & thought it would be much the cheapest way and I hope will meet with your approbation, as it is not convenient for Doctor Morrison to attend to this station & the Ocracock Station.

Sir you will please to have the goodness to drop me a line to inform me whether I shall employ Doctor Manney or not.² I have the Honor to be Sir Respectfully Yr. Mo. Obt. Servt.

John C. Manson, S. M.

P.S. Sir there is no Hospital at this place & we have to give \$2 a week for the sick on shore. Respect. Yr. Mo. Obt. Svt.

John C. Manson

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 42 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. John C. Manson was a sailing master from 15 July 1812 until his discharge, 10 June 1815.

2. No response by Jones to either Manson or Dr. James Manney was found.

SURGEON EDWARD CUTBUSH TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Sir,

A System of rules and regulations for the government of Naval Hospitals, drawn up by myself, and concurred in by Drs. Davis, Marshall and Ewell, were presented to Congress at the last session by Mr. Hamilton; they were examined by a Committee appointed for the purpose, and reported to the house with some amendments, July 11. 1812, but were not finally acted upon. Although there is no law authorizing the establishment of Naval Hospitals,¹ yet as temporary buildings have been appropriated at different places, for the reception of the sick and wounded belonging to the Navy, I conceive that some rules and regulations for their government are necessary. The want of a system of rules, authorized by an act of Congress, was sensibly felt by me, during the last summer, in the small hospital at New Castle under my direction; I therefore beg leave to solicit your attention to the subject, for, without regulations, it is impossible to restrain the convalescents from acts injurious to themselves, to the service and to the inhabitants, who reside in the vicinity of those establishments. I likewise beg leave to state, that a certain number of Hospital Surgeons are appointed for the army, but none are authorized for the Navy!! With due deference, I conceive that the responsibility attached to those who act in that capacity in the Navy, not only entitles them to the rank, but to the same pay and emoluments, received by an Army Hospital Surgeon, Whilst engaged in attendance on the Hospital at New Castle, I was only authorized to charge the extra expenses incurred in my visits, between the Navy Yard at Philada. and that place. Permit me, Sir, (as the subject of the rank of Officers has been brought before Congress) to solicit your attention to that of the surgeons of the Navy, when you take into consideration the relative rank of Officers. Although, it is apparently of little consequence, yet, I can assure you, that the description of a Naval Surgeon, by the pen of the celebrated Dr. Smollett in his *Roderick Random*,² has prevented many men of professional abilities from entering our service, under an idea, that the surgeons and mates, were considered in the same

menial situation, and I must add that the pay is not a sufficient inducement. There is scarcely a village in the U S where a practitioner of medicine and surgery, does not receive a greater compensation than a Naval Surgeon. There is not a sufficient degree of respectability attached to the Surgeons of our Navy. In the British service, at present, the pay increases with the number of years that a surgeon serves, and the rate of the ship to which he is advanced; it is considered a promotion to be advanced from a sloop of war to a Frigate, and so on to a first rate; he likewise ranks with Sea Lieutenants and Captains of the Army, subject, however, to the orders of the Lieuts in the line of his duty as a surgeon. In the French Service, I believe the rank has been made still more respectable. I hope, Sir, for the honor of our Navy and the profession of Medicine that, (although the army surgeon receives more pay) you will permit no invidious distinction in point of rank.

As to Naval Hospital Surgeons, I humbly conceive that they ought to rank with Hospital Surgeons of the army, and with the same grade of officers with whom they are ranked. I have the honor to remain your humble Servant.

E Cutbush

Philada. Feby. 13 1813

ALS, DNA RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 60 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. The 26 February 1813 act authorized a board of naval commissioners to procure sites and construct buildings for naval hospitals. Nothing was done until the 1820s, however.

2. *Roderick Random*, 2 vols. (London, 1748) is a novel about the adventures of a picaresque hero who enters the service of a physician, by popular British novelist Tobias George Smollett (1721-71). Smollett received an M.D. from Marischal College, Aberdeen, in 1750.

Jacob Lewis and the New York Flotilla

Jacob Lewis, captain of the privateer Bunker Hill early in the war, was appointed master commandant in the U.S. Navy in November 1812. He was given the command of all the gunboats and fire ships stationed at New York. Lewis accepted this new challenge and set out immediately to assess the status of his flotilla. He found it undermanned and "in a pitiable State owing to the prejudice which has existed against it." Lewis knew that he had local support because the committee for harbor defense, fearful of a swarm of British ships in the spring, exhorted the state legislature for money for defense. Unsure of Jones's support, Lewis enlisted the aid of Secretary of State James Monroe in convincing the Navy Department that gunboats used in coastal defense freed frigates for sea duty. He feared the flotilla would become emasculated through drafts of its crews for other duties. His fears were realized when Jones asked him to recruit for the Lake Champlain service; more importantly, the secretary did not spare New York from the gunboat reduction order. Lewis was ordered on 26 February to reduce to 15 gun vessels. As on other stations, public reaction was adverse.¹

1. Paul Hamilton to Lewis, 27 Nov. 1812, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 211 (M149, Roll No. 10); Lewis to Jones, 10 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 115 (M124, Roll No. 53); Jones to Lewis, 9 Feb. 1813, and 26 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 249 and 281-83 (M149, Roll No. 10).

MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Sir

I have to inform you that the Flotilla under my Command requires about three hundred and fifty men to compleat the number required for that servise, the Rendezvous in this City is clos'd for the want of monies to pay the recruits, I am very apprehensive that the Flotilla which I have the honor to Command will fall very short of that state of preparation which may be expected, by the month of Apl. I have the honor to assure you of my high Confd. & Regs.

J Lewis
Comg U.S. Flotilla

N Yk. Feby. 6th 1813

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 96 (M124, Roll No. 53).

MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS TO
SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES MONROE

Honble. James Monroe

Private

Sir

I am very desirous of possessing the confidence of the present Secretary of the Navy as I did of the late Mr Secy. Hamilton. I am now very much occupied in raising and organising the Crews of the Flotilla under my Command, it is my intention to make them land as well as Sea Soldiers,—and I trust when my Crews Shall be compleated I shall be able to throw on shores at Sandy hook one thousand effective men (in Case of emergency) and at the same time place the flotilla in a place of perfect safety where the Enemy could not possibly get at them—

I will exercise and train the Crews on the hook to landing, Embarking, Marching, forming and displaying Colloms— They shall be amphibious Soldiers, But in order to render this force thus formidable and effective, it will be necessary I should have the good opinion of the Secretary of the Navy, and that he should offer me prompt and ample support, Gun Boats hitherto have been held in the utmost contempt, owing to a false prejudice the inhabitants of this vast City now begin to believe, that the City cannot be defended without the Auxillary force of this floating defence, and great deal I now expected from it, in the event of an attack, the new arrangement made in the Flotilla has already brought it into [respect as?] any number of the first Masters of Ships out of this Port are Constantly tendering their Servises to me, I could chuse out of one hundred,

The prejudice of the Navy against G. Boats has arisen from an Idea that the appropriations made for Gun Boats, in Case of their non-Existence, would have gone to the Increase of the Navy, (in fact) they have viewed it as a substitute for a Navy &c The fact is very different, Gun Boats take the place of Frigates in the defence of harbours therefore frigates instead of being employ'd for that purpose go on the bosom of the Ocean and Cruize for Glory & pelf— The Flotilla including the fire vessels would have been in compleat readiness for Servise Ere this moment, had it not been for a system of drafting from them, or enticing them to Volunteer for the Ships or Lakes, hundreds have been taken out of the boats in this way, and altho the men that I have recruited has been under special Contract, that they shall not go on any other Service other than the defence of the harbour of New York, yet I know an attempt is now on foot to take men from the flotilla, allow me to assure you Sir that such a procedure, will not only astonish disgust and damp

the ardour of the officers, but produce a Cabal among the Inhabitants of this City, and for myself I assure you I shall feel very much mortified, I am perfectly aware of the importance of Gun Bs so much so, that I would, suggest a plan to take from the two frigates which are and will remain Blockaded in the Chesapeake their Crews & send them to the Lakes they will make all Canada tremble,—

The mode of doing it, would be to order the ships put in ordinary, afterwards call on the Crews to volunteer, the men will all go, and where ever our Ships are Blockaded be it here, or Elsewhere, I would send all their Crews on to the Lakes—

I have taken the liberty of thus freely addressing you, from the best of motives, as well to Solicite your good offices near the Secretary of the Navy. Come. Chauncey has done wonders, he had Carte Blance, from the late Secretary; the Present has renewed it—

it was most certainly the intention of Mr Hamilton to place the whole Flotilla for the defence of the harbour of New York under my distinct Command, and I have reason to believe that it was the Presidents also,

I am perfectly satisfied to Command what has been always despised by the Navy, and thus I make it useful, I ask nothing more than the smiles of my Country—and the approbation of my Government, I have the honor to be with the hight. Cnsi. & Respt. your very Obt. & Huml. Sert.

J Lewis
Come. U.S. Flotilla

New Yk, Feby. 27th 1813

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 11 (M124, Roll No. 54).

Lieutenant Drayton Reports the Loss of *Vixen*

Because of the illness and death of Vixen's commander, Master Commandant George W. Reed, the Navy Department did not receive an official report on the capture of Vixen by Southampton in November 1812. Lieutenant Glen Drayton, Vixen's second in command, recounts here the unequal contest between the two ships, the subsequent loss of both vessels, and the lack of sufficient funds to support the American prisoners while in captivity. Drayton and most of his officers left Jamaica in April, arriving at Cape May on 2 May. The remaining officers and crew gave up waiting for a cartel ship and took passage on the American merchant ship William Penn, arriving at Little Egg Harbor, New Jersey, about a month after Drayton.

LIEUTENANT GLEN DRAYTON¹ TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY HAMILTON

Spanish Town (Jamaica)
February 8th 1813

Sir,

I am extremely sorry that by the Death of Capt. G. W. Reed, (late of the U.S. Brig *Vixen*) it devolves on me as Senior Officer of said Vessel, to inform you her Capture and Subsequent loss by Shipwreck, the particulars of which are as follows.

Being on our return from a Cruise of Thirty days without meeting any of the Enemy's Vessels, having ranged along the West India Islands from as far Eastward as

Turk's Island, on the 22d Novr. being in the Lat of 30° 30' N and Long. 79° W at 7 A.M. discovered a Sail to the Northd. the wind being light from the Eastd.; which we soon discovered to be a large Ship, apparently a Frigate standing for us, We immediately made sail and hauled our wind to the Southd., finding her gaining on us fast, Capt. Reed ordered the water started, and the wind becoming light we got out our Sweeps, by the means of which at first hoped to escape. about 1. P.M. the wind freshened and became more steady, when she again overhauled us, Our private Signal being made, which was not answer'd Capt. Reed directed the Anchors to be cut from the Bow, the Bow Guns, Kedge Anchors, Shot, and all lumber to be hove overboard in order to lighten the Vessel, slacken'd up the Stays, & started the Wedges of the Masts, all of which proved ineffectual, we then bore up, in hopes of eluding her untill Night, but from her superior sailing she soon got within Gunshot when she commenced firing, her shot then passing over us, and there appearing no possible chance of escape, Capt. Reed called us together, where conceiving that any resistance against so superior a force would be a Wanton and useless Sacrifice of a brave Crew, we were compelled after firing two Guns to surrender.— She proved to be His Majesty's Frigate *Southampton* of 38 Guns, Sir James Lucas Yeo, (commander). Capt. Reed went on board the Frigate & tendered his Sword, which was immediately returned him, the Officers and Men being taken on board the Ship, both Vessels filled away, steering to the Southd. & Eastd. from the 22d. to the 25th. the wind blowing fresh and Sea running high could have no Communication with the Brig, consequently could not get our Trunks &c from on board. On the night of the 26th. about 1/2 past 12, being at Meridian in Lat. 24° 54' N. Lon. 74° 30' W. the Ship Struck on a reef of Rocks, immediately afterwards, the Brig struck on our Starboard Bow about a quarter of a Mile from us. At 3 A.M. The Officer and Crew of the Brig deserted her, she having bilged. At daylight on the 27th we saw the land astern which proved to be Little Windward, or Conception Island, where we were fortunate enough to land the Crews of both Vessels in safety. Our Officers and Crew however were unable to save anything from the wreck of the Brig, she having settled so quickly. Boats were then dispatched to New Providence and the neighbouring Islands to procure relief, on the 6th Decr. H.M. Brig *Rhodian* with two Transports arrived to our assistance on board of which the two Crews were embarked and Sailed on the 9th for this Island where we arrived on the 14th and were put on parole, the Men being put on board the Prison Ship at Port Royal.

I am extremely sorry, Sir, that much to be lamented Death of Capt. Reed who died of a Fever in this place on the 5th of January, prevents his recommending his Crew (which I know to have been his intention), their orderly & decorous behaviour during the time of the Ships striking, and afterwards, on the Island, was such as to induce Sir James, to assemble them, before his own Crew, and thank them publicly for their Service, and I trust Sir, that tho' they have been unfortunate, they have not been inactive, and should it please their Country to call them out again, they will support the dignity of her Naval Character which has so recently and generally been established—

On our arrival at this place Capt. Reed drew a certain Sum of Money in order to supply the Officers & Crew with cloathing &c. Since his death I have also been compelled to draw, as the scarcity & high price of provisions will not permit us to live on the allowance made by the British Government— I feel it a duty incumbent on me Sir, to inform you that there are upwards of Four Hun-

dred American Prisoners now at this place, who I believe would willingly enter the Service should a Cartel arrive.—

Mr. Satterwhite late purser of the late Brig, I have entrusted this to, who also has the several Indents, and Vouchers respecting the Monies drawn, he has obtained permission to return home from the Admiral, being considered a non-combatant, the Surgeon & Clerk have also applied, and I have no doubt, will allow permission—

Trusting Sir, that upon our arrival in America, and the usual enquiries being made into our conduct, it may meet your approbation. I have the honor to be, Sir, Yr. most, Obt. Servt.

Glen Drayton,
Lieut. U.S. Navy

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 46 (M148, Roll No. 11). The original document has been corrected grammatically in pencil in another hand. These corrections have been omitted. When Lieutenant Drayton was paroled, he returned George Reed's papers to his brother Joseph Reed. Among them was a copy of his official letter on the surrender which the Navy Department had not received. Joseph Reed sent an undated, unaddressed, and unsigned copy of this letter to Jones; see DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 95 (M124, Roll No. 55). For the British account, see Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, pp. 594-95.

1. Glen Drayton had served as acting lieutenant in *Vixen* since reporting for duty in May 1811. In January 1813, while he was still a prisoner, the Senate confirmed his appointment as lieutenant.

Naval Construction in 1813

A desire to continue the blue water victories of 1812 spurred passage of the naval expansion act of 2 January 1813, authorizing the building of four 74-gun ships and six 44-gun frigates. Three American ships of the line were eventually begun under this act: Franklin at Philadelphia, Washington at Portsmouth, and Independence at Charlestown. Construction of three frigates was undertaken in 1813: Columbia at the Washington Navy Yard, Guerriere at Philadelphia, and Java at Baltimore.

Fully expecting that the British would enforce a strict blockade of the coastline in 1813, Jones believed that smaller vessels could be built faster, would be better commerce raiders, and might succeed in diverting the blockaders from their stations. Congress approved an act authorizing construction of six additional sloops of war on 3 March 1813.¹ Argus was begun at the Washington Navy Yard; Erie, Ontario, Wasp, Peacock, and Frolic were built under private contract, the first two at Baltimore, and the last three at Newburyport, New York, and Boston, respectively.²

In letters to William Doughty, newly appointed naval constructor at the Washington Navy Yard,³ and the navy agents at Boston and Philadelphia, Secretary Jones stressed the importance of inventoring and purchasing materials for ship construction as expeditiously as possible.

1. For the January and March acts, see Statutes at Large, Vol. 2, Stat. 2, Chap. 6, p. 789; and Vol. 2, Stat. 2, Chap. 54, p. 821.

2. For a full description of the design and construction of American vessels during the war, see Chapelle, *American Sailing Navy*, chapter 5.

3. William Doughty operated a small shipyard at Georgetown, District of Columbia. He was the principal designer for several of the new frigates and sloops.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO WILLIAM DOUGHTY

Mr. William Doughty
 Constructor, Navy Yard
 Washington

Navy Depart.
 feby: 8th 1813

On application to Captain Tingey Commandant of the Navy Yard, he will put into your possession the Mould loft, together with a convenient office, and all the Draughts, plans, Books, Instruments and every other thing appertaining to the Constructor's department, and will afford to you every facility and assistance you may require in the discharge of the duty assigned to you for which you will receive instructions from this Department. As I wish to form an approximate estimate of the timber, plank, thickstuff &c now in the yard (exclusive of what may be necessary to complete the work on hand and the Live Oak for the 74) in order to ascertain what may be necessary to procure without delay for laying down and building a Frigate, you will by exhibiting this letter to Capt. Tingey receive such information as may facilitate your estimate of what may be in the yard, as well as of what may be expected under existing Contracts within a reasonable time for the object in contemplation

The draughts of the 74 and of the Frigate *Congress* I presume are among the number in the Navy Yard—these I wish to inspect. You will also ascertain whether there are any half breadth models of the Frigates or other vessels.

W Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, pp. 354–55 (M441, Roll No. 1).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO NAVY AGENT AMOS BINNEY

Amos Binney Esq
 Boston.

Navy Depart.
 9, feb. 1813

You will, without delay, procure on the best terms in your power all the necessary plank, thickstuff and other materials of wood for a 74. gun ship, which it intended to build at Boston. Consult Capt. Hull as to the best means of procuring these materials of the choicest quality. If the plank &c can not be had, let the trees be cut down immediately.

A bill of Scantling will be sent on, as soon, as the Constructor has it prepared. Mean time as delay must be avoided, you can obtain from some experienced builder a general description, and proceed to act upon it.

Among other considerations, which induce me to urge your proceeding without delay, in the execution of these instructions, the fact that this is the proper season for cutting the timber, and that it is rapidly passing away is very important. Should we not avail ourselves of this Season, we may be compelled to suspend our operations till next winter, and thus lose that time, during which it is hoped, by proper & prompt arrangements, the object may be accomplished. I am resp'y.

W Jones

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, MLS, Vol. 11, pp. 186–87 (M209, Roll No. 4).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO SENATOR SAMUEL SMITH¹

The Honorable S. Smith
 Chairman of the Naval Committee
 Senate.

Navy Depart.
 Feb: 22d 1813.

It has so happened, that I did not see the Bill which you enclosed in your Note of the 20th until after it had passed the House of Representatives. Some of its provisions may have been suggested by a letter I addressed to the Honorable Chairman of the Naval Committee of the H. R.²

We have now in Service but one Sloop of war of the class (but smaller) of those contemplated by the Bill now pending before the Senate.³

Of the utility of such vessels the practice of the enemy is pretty strong evidence and as applied to our Circumstances, they will be found still more so. Their force is inferior only to a frigate—their cost and expenditure only about one third in actual Service; and in pursuit of the Commerce and light cruisers of the enemy three Sloops of the class proposed may reasonably be expected to produce a much greater effect than a single Frigate.

Moreover they may be very useful in our own waters and for the protection of our Coasting trade against the depredations of the enemy's light Cruizers.

Aided by these vessels our Frigates would be enabled to take a wider range in pursuit of higher game. I propose to rate them 18 guns, to mount 18–32 pd. Carronades and 4 long 12 pdrs.

The cost of such a Sloop of war including two months wages in advance, and four months provisions I estimate at 75,000 Dollars. The 2d Section of the Bill I presume was suggested by a similar one in the "Act concerning the Naval Establishment" passed the 30th March 1812 and from some doubts, whether the authority to put a vessel in Commission the creating an additional Captain &c though the construction and practice has I believe been in the affirmative hitherto. In respect to the 44s some doubts have been suggested, whether the authority given by the "Act to encrease the Navy of the U States" viz as soon as suitable materials can be procured therefor to cause to be built &c would warrant the building by Contract with private Builders.

These are merely my own ideas on the subject without presuming to explain those which prevailed at the passing of the Bill, and are submitted with great deference and respect. I have the honor &c

W Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, Letters to Congress, Vol. 2, pp. 162–63.

1. Samuel Smith, Republican senator from Maryland, was chairman of the Senate naval affairs committee during the second session of the Twelfth Congress.

2. Smith asked Jones to clarify some points in the House bill relating to the construction of sloops; see Smith to Jones, 20 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 152 (M124, Roll No. 53). Jones is probably referring to his 4 February 1813 letter to Burwell Bassett; see DNA, RG45, Letters to Congress, Vol. 2, pp. 149–50.

3. *Hornet*.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO NAVY AGENT GEORGE HARRISON

George Harrison Esqr.
Philadelphia.

Navy Depart.
5th March 1813

I have received your letter of the 1st inst. with the Note from Mr. Dallas on the subject of the Navy Yard, and when I receive the report of Messrs. Humphreys Penrose¹ & Davis, I shall determine what course to pursue.

The obstacles which induced Mr. Penrose to decline a participation in the building of the 74 having been removed. He will unite with Mr. Humphreys for that purpose and I have desired them to confer together and fix upon an equitable compensation for their Services. It is a heavy undertaking & I am sure the public Service will be benefitted by their joint talents, and public confidence & Satisfaction conciliated.

Messrs. J. & F. Grice² having proposed to superintend & direct the building of one of the 44 gun Frigates upon the terms (copy) enclosed and having stated to me that they had a considerable quantity of timber at their refusal and some live oak timber of their own fit for the purpose, You are hereby authorized to enter into an engagement with them on the terms proposed to superintend & direct the building of and completing to a cleat a 44 Gun frigate of such materials, dimensions & form, and in such a manner as shall be directed by this Department and also under your direction to purchase & collect the timber necessary for the purpose.

I also agree to purchase all the Live Oak they may have suitable for the purpose at such valuation as competent and disinterested persons, chosen with your approbation, may determine. If Live Oak for the Main transom, upperpiece of Stern apron Hawse pieces &c are not to be had in Philadelphia, there is a prime Cargo of Mahogany in Baltimore lately purchased by my order out of which these principal pieces or a part of them may be selected & sent round by way of French town—no time should be lost in procuring the Timber materials. I am &c

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, MLS, Vol. 11, pp. 215–16 (M209, Roll No. 4).

1. Samuel Humphreys, son of former naval constructor Joshua Humphreys, and Charles Penrose designed and built ships in Philadelphia.

2. Joseph and Francis Grice, brothers, were Philadelphia shipbuilders.

Lieutenant Crane Seeks Promotion

William M. Crane's naval career was in a state of flux during the winter of 1812–13. In November he was ordered by Hamilton to command the Charlestown Navy Yard. Then in February 1813 Jones transferred him to the New York Navy Yard to replace Charles Ludlow. This was to be a temporary assignment, for Isaac Chauncey was expected to return to the post. No doubt dissatisfied with these shore positions after a long naval service, Crane, while visiting his family in New Jersey, decided to solicit senatorial assistance in obtaining a promotion. Crane was appointed master commandant in March 1813.

LIEUTENANT WILLIAM M. CRANE TO SENATOR THOMAS WORTHINGTON¹

Elizabethtown. N Jersey 10 Feby. 1813

Sir

I have just received a letter from my brother Joseph H. Crane of Dayton in the State of Ohio. He informs me that you had been good enough to assure him that whenever the expected promotions are made in the Navy you will give your aid in obtaining such promotion as I may be entitled to—for this promise Sir I beg you to receive my thanks—

It may not be improper for me to state that I have been in the Service near fourteen years— Was at Tripoli with Commodore Preble and actively engaged in all the attacks made on that place—in which service I had the Command of a gun boat— In 1805 I received from Commodore Rodgers the command of a Cutter Sloop of 8 guns in which I cruised a year and then returned in her from Mediterranean to the U States.— I have served as first Lieut. to Capt. Hull and Commodore Decatur & Have commanded the Sloops of War *Argus* and *Nautilus*— I may further say that from the time of my entering the Service until now I have been constantly employed in Service, and at least one half the time on foreign stations— I am personally known by all the Captains and Commanders in the Navy and should in all cases wish to refer to them for every information which may be thought necessary with regard to my character & professional acquirements— I trust Sir that it is considered by the government, that I have on all occasions endeavoured to serve my country with zeal and firmness and hope soon to have an opportunity of shewing that I am not unworthy of the Station in which the President & Senate may choose to place me— With much respect I am Sir Yr. Hl. Servt.

W. M. Crane

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 175 (M124, Roll No. 53). Crane's letter was enclosed with Worthington's 24 February 1813 letter of recommendation to Jones; see DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 174 (M124, Roll No. 53). Worthington noted that Crane lacked "influential relations to press his claims."

1. Thomas Worthington served Ohio in the Senate, 1803 to 1807 and 1810 to 1814.

Orders to Cruise Singly

Fearful that the British blockade would prevent American vessels from getting to sea, Jones wrote to several of his officers requesting details of their proposed cruises and inquiring when they expected to sail. Captain Charles Stewart, whose Constellation was already blockaded in the Chesapeake, proposed a coastal cruise to South Carolina and then Newfoundland, across the Atlantic to Portugal, and then westward to the West Indies and home. Commodore John Rodgers had several alternatives for President: cruising from Newfoundland to Nova Scotia, Ireland to France, Norway to Denmark, or into the mid-Atlantic. Commodore Stephen Decatur's projected cruise plan included intercepting the British blockading squadron off Charleston, South Carolina, and then sailing between Newfoundland and the Azores to menace British merchant vessels coming from the East and West Indies and Brazil.

After receiving responses from his commanders, Jones expressed his own views that they should consider cruising near the West Indies. The anticipated British buildup of naval force along the Atlantic coast of the United States would deplete the enemy's strength in the Caribbean, leaving the area unprotected and ripe for commerce raiding.¹

1. See Jones to Stephen Decatur and Jacob Jones, 17 Mar. 1813, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 306-309 (M149, Roll No. 10).

CIRCULAR FROM SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO
COMMANDERS OF SHIPS NOW IN PORT REFITTING

Circular

Comre. Rodgers	Boston	} Navy Department 22. Februy. 1813 To Commanders of Ships now in port refitting ¹
" Bainbridge	"	
" Decatur	N. York	
Capt. Stewart	Norfolk	
" Morris	Present	

There is good reason to expect, a very considerable augmentation of the Naval force of the enemy on our coast the ensuing Spring; & it will be perceived that his policy will be to blockade our Ships of War in our own harbors; intercepting our private cruisers, prizes and trade, and Harrass the seaboard.

Our great inferiority in naval strength, does not permit us to meet them on this ground without hazarding the precious Germ of our national glory.— we have however the means of creating a powerful diversion, & of turning the Scale of annoyance against the enemy. It is therefore intended, to dispatch all our public ships, now in Port, as soon as possible, in such positions as may be best adapted to destroy the Commerce of the enemy, from the Cape of Good-hope, to Cape Clear, and continue out as long as the means of subsistence can be procured abroad, in any quarter.

If any thing can draw, the attention of the enemy, from the annoyance of our coast, for the protection of his own, rich & exposed Commercial fleets, it will be a course of this nature, & if this effect can be produced, the two fold object of increasing the pressure upon the enemy and relieving ourselves, will be attained.

Cruizing singly, will also afford to our gallant Commanders, a fair oppertunity of displaying distinctly their Judgement, skill & enterprize, and of reaping the laurel of Fame, and its solid appendages, which so extended a field of Capture, without impairing the means of continuing the persuit, cannot fail to produce,—with this view, I wish to be apprized, (a short time in anticipation) of the period when each Ship, now refitting, will be ready for Sea, in order that instructions may be forwarded from this Department.

Your own ideas of a Cruize, with this general view, will be acceptable to me.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, CGO, Vol. 1, pp. 99-100 (M977, Roll No. 1).

1. John Rodgers in *President* left Boston in late April for a cruise; see pp. 250-55 for a discussion of his return. William Bainbridge decided to wait for *Independence*, 74, to be built; see Bainbridge to Jones, 1 Mar. 1813, Phi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones. Stephen Decatur in *United*

States left New York in May, but was forced to put in at New London in early June, where he remained blockaded by the enemy for the remainder of the year. Charles Stewart took command of *Constellation* in late 1812. The British blockade prevented his escape early the next year, forcing him to seek refuge in Norfolk. Jones reassigned Stewart to *Constitution* in early May, but Stewart did not leave Boston on a cruise until December 1813. *Constellation* never got to sea during the war. No response from Charles Morris was found. Because he was in Washington, he might have spoken to Jones directly. His ship, *Adams*, did not slip through the blockade until 1814.

CAPTAIN CHARLES STEWART TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

United States frigate *Constellation*
Norfolk Harbour March 2. 1813

Sir/

I have received your letter of 22d ult. and observe the desire you have of giving our ships of war, singly, the most extensive range for the annoyance of the Enemy's Commerce, which fully accords with my ideas of the subject since the commencement of the war. Our Naval means are truly limited, but no doubt much may be effected, small as they are, by the exertions and enterprize of the Officers when judiciously scattered over an extensive field of operations; and each ship, separately, will be more on their guard and better enabled to take care of themselves should they be endangered by too great a superiority of force. The difficulty of remaining out a sufficient length of time, owing to the small quantity of provisions and stores they can carry, will be a great objection to their proceeding into distant seas, and the difficulty of returning to the ports of the United States will increase daily, as the enemy are now making arrangements to block up our waters. How far we can rely on supplies from other places I do not know, but most of the ports we dare go into among the allies of England are incompetent to furnish them. The greatest advantages would be derived by the frigates having a small fast sailing schooner with them as a tender; they would facilitate the procuring supplies, and prevent often times the necessity of putting the frigate to great hazard: my ideas, therefore, would be to attach to each of the frigates, a vessel of that description, calculated to carry six or eight light guns, which in the first instance could be put in the hold, the schooner then stowed full of provisions and stores, with a sufficient number of men to navigate her, and to proceed from the United States and keep company with the frigate. But in case of separation to proceed to a fixed rendezvous, which each Commander could fix on; and when they were relieved sufficiently from their cargo, they could mount their guns, and be officered and manned from the frigate, and cruise with her, and on all occasions would do away the necessity of the frigates going into port for supplies. There are other advantages to be derived from them; in case of capturing valuable property they would afford the means of securing it on some desolate island untill the cruise was over. I will here beg leave to illustrate this observation, by observing, how useful such a vessel would have been to Commodore Bainbridge, as all the valuables on board the frigate *Java* could thereby have been saved to the gallant *Constitution*.

My plan for the *Constellations* cruise, could I have got to sea, was to have proceeded off the coast of South Carolina, and endeavoured to have picked up some of the Enemy's small cruisers, from thence off the Western Islands, from thence off Cape St. Vincent and Cadiz, from then off Madeira and the Cape de

Verds, from thence off to windward of the Caribbean Islands, then down through the West Indies to the Gulf passage and home; my stay on each station being prolonged or shortened according to success, information, the state of my supplies, and other circumstances; but should a small vessell be given the ship as a tender, my cruise could be much lengthened and varied to greater advantage.

The *Constellation* will be in readiness to sail as soon as we can get one suit of her sails enlarged; (most of her sails being one third too small, and all our spare canvass has been used to alter what is done), which will I hope be accomplished in the course of this week. I have the honor to be Very Respectfully Sir Your obedient Servant

Ch^s. Stewart

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 6 (M125, Roll No. 27).

COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Frigate *President*
Boston March 8th 1813

Sir

As you suggested (in your circular of the 22nd ult) that my ideas of a cruise would be acceptable, permit me to say, that there are in my opinion Five different stations where our Ships might be employed with much advantage in capturing and destroying the Enemy's commerce—Namely—On the Eastern edge of the Banks of Newfoundland, in the direction of their Trade between England and Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland—Between the Manilla reef and the South-westernmost part of the Banks of Newfoundland—Between Cape Clear and Ushant—Between the Naze of Norway and Jutland, and on the Equator, between the Longtd. of 24° and 31° West.

By stationing a Ship or Ships, at each of these places, all the Enemy's East India and South American trade would twice on its passage, both outward and homeward, have to pass in the direction of our cruisers— All her West India commerce once going out and thrice returning— All her Newfoundland and Nova Scotia trade twice going out and twice returning home: and all her trade to the Baltic once going out and once returning.

The Ships stationed near the Bank of Newfoundland, and Between it and Manilla reef, being near our own Coast, might easily receive their supplies from the U. States. Those stationed near the English Channel receive the like from France— Those stationed near the Cattegat from Sweeden and Denmark: and those stationed on the Equator from various ports in Brazil, provided the policy of England does not induce her to oblige the Portuguese to shut their Ports against our Ships of War, when they have for their object the procuration of Supplies.

It is a matter of indifference to me which of these stations shall fall to my lot— Indeed I should have no objection to remaining on our Coast, if I am to cruise alone, as I flatter myself that I shall have the *President* in such order, so far as relates to her sailing qualities, as to have nothing serious to apprehend from any force that she is not equal to encounter— perhaps by being Stationed on our own Coast, and having an understanding with the Commanders of the Frigates *Constellation* and *Adams*, I might be enabled to draw the Enemies Blockading

Squadron so far off from the Chesapeak, as to enable them to get to Sea; and without which they may perhaps be kept in port during all the next Summer.

The weather, since I wrote you last, has been so intollerably cold, and the Country so covered with Ice and Snow, that we have been able to do but very little towards the Ships completion for sea— The mercury in the Thermometer stands to day Six degrees above Zero—a degree of cold scarcely ever known here at this Season I have the honor to be with great respect Sir your Obdt. Servt.

Jn^o Rodgers

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 150 (M125, Roll No. 27). This letter is bound with those for April 1813. It was originally dated "Feby" but changed to March.

COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

New York March 10. 1813

Sir

Your instructions to select the Lieutenants for my ship from the commissioned officers have been received. I am unacquainted with any of the Lieutenants holding commissions, at present unemployed and shall be much obliged if you will furnish me with the names of those from whom it is intended I shall select— Having obtained Captain Smiths consent that Mr. Warrington should join me I shall have him for my first Lieutenant with Mr. Nicholson & Mr Gallagher—

The new mainmast for my ship will be finished to day and the principal cause of my detention so long in port being thus removed I have the honour to comply with your request by submitting to your consideration my thoughts on our next cruise—It appears by the newspapers that Lord Townsend in the *Eolus* [*Eolus*] with some smaller vessels is employed off Charleston in the blockade of that port— The *Argus* being in great forwardness will be ready about the same time with the *United States*—and with this force (if that of the enemy be no greater than I suppose it, a frigate and two sloops) I am confident by taking a circuit to the Eastward of Bermuda, the cruisers to the northward may be avoided and a successful blow struck at his Lordship. This subordinate enterprize (to be undertaken only on certain information of the blockading force) being complete I would proceed in pursuit of the main object of my cruise to the Eastern edge of the Grand Bank in about the Latitude of 42 and cruise in the direction of Ushant to about 20 West Longitude— Here I would continue cruising until compelled to go in for refitment or refreshment— I shall be in the track of all the British Commerce returning from beyond the Cape of Good Hope from the Brazils & the West Indies and shall probably find their Merchantmen separated from their convoys as they commonly are dispersed before they have so far completed their voyage home—

From the information I have of the preparation of the enemy there is no doubt that our whole coast will be lined with his men of war during the summer months— This presents but little difficulty to our going out but will render our return during the mild season extremely hazardous— I would prefer to remain out as long as possible & by all means untill the approach of the autumnal

equinox when the attention of the Enemy will be occupied in providing for his own safety. To enable me to do this I shall take between three & four months provisions which is as large a supply as my ship can carry and would recommend, that the Government should employ some confidential agent to take up a neutral vessel, lade her with provisions and proceed in her to one of the Cape de Verd Islands—there they may be retained ostensibly for sale but at prices to prevent purchases— St. Iago would be preferred because water can be obtained there with the greatest facility and altho' considerably distant from the proposed cruising ground I should both in going & returning be in the way of the Enemies outward bound Indiamen and by sweeping along the coast of Portugal would be constantly in the way of annoying their Mediterranean trade and occasionally intercepting their supplies for the Peninsula— I am perfectly satisfied of the advantages which will result from our vessels cruising singly as you propose— After the attempt on Lord Townsend (should that be deemed expedient) I think the *Argus* had better separate from me & continue by herself but take up the same ground as that contemplated by me for a cruise— All which is with the utmost deference submitted by Sir your most obedient & very humble servant

Stephen Decatur

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1814, Vol. 2, No. 31 (M125, Roll 35); bound at 10 March 1814.

Gunboat Reduction Order

In late February Jones made arrangements for reducing and apportioning gunboats among the stations. This was an economy measure, for he considered them to be "scattered about in every creek and corner as receptacles of idleness and objects of waste and extravagance without utility."¹ The gunboats in actual service were poorly manned and recruiting efforts had stalled. Jones proposed the following distribution of gunboats: fifteen at New York, five in the Delaware, fourteen for the Chesapeake, six at Georgia, and ten at New Orleans.² All others were to be laid up in ordinary—ready for emergency service. According to Jones, the government could not be expected to defend every point of the long coast. The stations must make do with a small naval force. Jones realized that a mix of ship sizes was essential to meet the anticipated British blockade. He strongly supported the Congressional bill authorizing construction of sloops of war. Jones recognized that reducing the number of gunboats in service would save on maintenance expenditures. These savings could help pay for the sloops' construction.³ Individual station commanders and coastal residents, however, disapproved of the reductions.

1. Jones to his brother, Lloyd Jones, 27 Feb. 1813, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones.

2. For gunboat reductions at New Orleans, see pp. 638–39; 661–63.

3. Symonds, *Navalists and Antinavalists*, p. 186.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO COMMODORE HUGH G. CAMPBELL

Hugh G Campbell Esqr
Commg. Naval Officer St. Marys Ga.

Nav. Deptmt.
26 Feb. 1813

It has been determined that no more than Six gunboats shall be retained in commission on the station under your command; & that all the residue, together with all the barges, shall be laid up in ordinary, but kept in a state of readiness, to receive crews on an emergency—which in such event will consist principally of volunteers, of & near the places where they shall be laid up. The whole number of gunboats at other places, are to be proportionately reduced.¹

Each of the six gunboats to be retained in commission under your command must have a crew to consist of a commander at 40\$ 2 midshipmen a 19. or 2 masters mates, at 20\$ 1 acting gunner. 1 steward. 1 cook each a 18\$. 8 able seamen, at 12\$. 16 ordinary seamen & boys. at 6 to 10\$ total 30. All the other gunboats & barges must be laid up together, at such places as may in your opinion be the most suitable—and to take care of them.—one master & one cook for the whole, & one seaman for each. For all the gunboats including those in commission, as well as those in ordinary, there will further be allowed, one surgeon, one surgeons mate & 1 purser. No other officer or man of any description will be allowed, either the boats in commission, or those in ordinary.

For the gunboats in commission, or rather for those to be retained in commission, you will select Six of the most approved masters, & if you have them at present on board of gunboats, 12 of the most promising midshipmen— The names of the other masters, & of the remaining midshipmen, should there be any, with your opinion of each, you will be pleased to transmit to me. The masters, & if they should be undeserving, the midshipmen, I shall dismiss

The *Troup* may remain at Savannah for the protection of that harbor, her crew must consist of, a Lieut. commanding a 40\$, a master, 4 midshipmen, 1 boatswain, 1 gunner a 18\$ 2 masters mates a 20\$, 4 qt. gunners, 2 qr. masters, 1 coxswain, 1 armourer, 1 master at arms, 1 steward, 1 cook, each a 18\$ 1 caps. clerk a 25\$ 30 able seamen at 12\$ & 40 ordinary Seamen & boys at 6 to 10\$ & 1 Surgeons mate may be attached to her— The purser provided above, must keep the accounts of the *Troup*, as well as the accounts of the gunboats, & barges in ordinary.

All the officers, other than those herein authorised to be retained, or required to be reported to me—and all the Petty officers, able seamen, ordinary seamen & boys (unless they should be required for the *Enterprise*,² are to be discharged & paid off, & you will accordingly, have them discharged & paid off— If the *Enterprise*, or any other cruising vessel should require any of these officers or seamen, you will of course turn them over to such vessel, in preference to discharging them.

For yourself, you may retain a clerk at 25\$ per month—and should you judge them necessary for the public good, a small boats crew, not to exceed 1 coxswain & 4 oarsmen; & you may also retain an ordinary seaman, as your porter.

You will be pleased to report to me the names of all the officers retained in Service, & transmit to me a general roll of every person on the station—whether on board the *Enterprise*, the gunboats in commission—The *Troup*—or attached to the boats & barges in ordinary—after you shall have executed the above instructions; & you will execute them without delay. You will also report particularly the state &

condition of the gunboats, retained in commission; & the numbers of Boats & Barges retained in ordinary, with their condition, should you want any officers under this arrangement. You will report to me the number &c.

W. Jones

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 280–81 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. See Jones to Jacob Lewis, Alexander Murray, and Thomas N. Gautier, 26 Feb. 1813; Jones to John H. Dent, 28 Feb. 1813; and Jones to John Shaw, 1 Mar. 1813; all in DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 281–87 (M149, Roll No. 10); and Jones to Isaac Hull, 26 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, pp. 364–65 (M441, Roll No. 1) for similar orders.

2. *Enterprise*, Johnston Blakeley commander, departed the New Orleans Station in company with *Viper* on 2 January. She parted company with *Viper* on the seventh and arrived at St. Marys eleven days later; see Blakeley to Hamilton, 23 Jan. 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 49 (M124, Roll No. 53).

Navy Department Personnel Changes

Upon taking office, William Jones found the office of the secretary of the navy severely disorganized and partially blamed its chief clerk, Charles W. Goldsborough. As early as 5 February, Secretary of State James Monroe sought information about Benjamin Homans as a possible replacement. Jones had probably asked Monroe's advice about prospective candidates, and the latter wrote to Vice-President-elect Elbridge Gerry about Homans. Gerry reported that Homans was a good Republican, a former commercial ship captain, and an honest, diligent administrator. Gerry, a Massachusetts native, extolled Homans's bureaucratic acuity in organizing the office of secretary of that commonwealth. Jones firmly but compassionately obtained Goldsborough's resignation and appointed Homans to the post of chief clerk.¹

1. The chief clerk of the Navy Department ensured the safety and accuracy of that office's records; drafted reports, annual budgets, and responses to correspondence; and oversaw the daily operation of that office. Goldsborough was chief clerk from April 1802 until March 1813. Homans succeeded him and retained that position until December 1823.

NOTES MADE BY SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES REGARDING A VISIT BY CHIEF CLERK CHARLES W. GOLDSBOROUGH

Notes

Mr. Goldsborough called at 5 O'clock and expressed himself much satisfied with the liberal manner in which I had made known to him my determination—felt great anxiety lest it should bear the appearance of an abrupt dismissal which might countenance the idea that I had discovered in him a want of integrity or breach of duty, and afford to his enemies a triumph, to the prejudice of his Character and future pursuits; declared that he had faithfully discharged the trust reposed in him and instead of having accumulated property by his situation in the Department was absolutely poor and should have to dispose of his house & furniture and seek a support elsewhere and as the prospect during war was dull solicited the appointment of Storekeeper at Portsmouth N H—requested a postponement of his resignation if convenient until the end of the quarter which would give to the affair a favorable aspect and in the interim he would announce to his friends his intention to resign.

On my part really wishing to render the manner of his retiring as little irksome to him as possible and my determination to dispense with his services being

founded upon the excessively disordered and confused state in which I have found every Branch of the Department of which he has been the principal Director for twelve years, and at the same time witnessing his capacity and facility of business am compelled to attribute it to some other cause than the want of the requisite qualifications, I am justified in selecting another and this he readily admits.

I have agreed that he shall continue and pursue his own course for ten days in the meantime stating publicly his resignation and which I am also to mention.

He also expressed a wish that I would purchase some of his furniture which would strengthen the appearance of an amicable separation, and declared that so far from feeling any irritation on the occasion he was thankful for the candid course I had observed towards him and declared that if he had entered the Department under circumstances similar to myself he would have acted in the same manner. He said that he had long contemplated the subject of reform and prepared and digested a system secured from the information he had received from Commodore Preble and others as well as from his own observation which he hoped I might find worthy of perusal and approbation.

His manner was such as to excite regret for the necessity of his resignation rather than any opposite sentiment

AD, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones. Jones decided to replace Goldsborough as head clerk in the Navy Department on 27 February. Goldsborough called on Jones the morning of the 28th, but because Jones was not available, left a note saying he would return at 5 p.m.; see Jones to Goldsborough, 27 Feb. 1813 and Goldsborough to Jones, 28 Feb. 1813, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones. Jones indicated in this undated memorandum that Goldsborough called at 5 o'clock—most likely on the 28th as he had said he would. Jones probably wrote these notes after their meeting, the evening of 28 February.

BENJAMIN HOMANS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

In examining into the State of the Navy Department, I find much of the important business so blended with the Accountants Office,¹ that it becomes necessary to have free personal Communications with him, and through him to obtain information, as well as free access to the Documents, and mode of transacting business in the various payments and money concerns; this will require time, and requires also a Corresponding disposition on his part, to afford me a knowledge of the routine and distinct operations of his office—independently of the usual jealousy of office, the political antipathies of party, and the personal pride of those who feel the superiority of knowledge from long experience, are among the obstacles to the speedy attainment of these objects.

To obtain a knowledge of the state of the Contracts, and of the actual supplies of Naval Stores, provisions &c, I must depend in great measure on the aid of Mr. Turner, and I frequently find that important Documents when wanted, are in the Accountant's Office; it would therefore facilitate the business of the Department to have a general statement from the Accountant; with a schedule of such papers and Documents generally, as he keeps constantly in his custody.—To know the exact state of expenditures on the specific appropriations, some rule must be adopted in passing accounts, so as not to over-charge a particular head of appropriation, is this the sole business of the Accountant?—or what concern have I in directing the

filling of Warrants?—as I conceive it will be proper to balance the appropriations every day, in order to keep in view the state of the funds, to meet further drafts.—

The Store Keepers returns are irregular, and many deficient & some of them greatly overcharged with details of small articles not worth enumerating;—if a regular form of Returns were adopted, it would aid them, and simplify the entry, under Classification of the most important Supplies.

There are no Returns (that I have seen) of Gun powder in the Navy Magazines.— nor do I know of any rule for supplying each Ship. The Captains in the Navy, have not made regular returns of their Muster Rolls on Sailing, and of their Prisoners on arriving in Port, if such have been made to the Accountant, ought they not to be first sent through the Department, & then passed over to the Accountant. It is a question, in what manner and to whom the report is made, of the fulfilment of each Contract agreeably to its tenor— Many of the Store Returns, mention damaged and perishable provisions—ought they not be sold,—or enquired into?— If another Room could be procured for the Clerks to write & record in, they would be more free from interruption and save much time—the former habits & Customs of the offices are detrimental to the discharge of business, and any innovation attempted on my part now, would be illy received, and add to the jealousy, and ill-will that appear to prevail against me— The Cases in the room I occupy, are badly constructed, and almost useless for filing away letters & papers, they could be sold for near as much as would pay for convenient pine Cases, where all the Documents & Papers and letters of one or two years could be kept for immediate uses, until filed away with old papers in order, for future references— There is an upper Room filled with Books old Letters & papers of various kinds (some important) in great disorder & dirty.— all the intervals of time, after Office hours & public business, I purpose to devote, to put every thing in good order, and to take cognizance of the documents & Affairs of Office— that it has not already been done, is owing to my state of health, anxiety of mind to get myself settled, and to find the means of temporarily providing for my family, and to pay off my expenses here for Six Months past, destitute as I have been of a Dollar, and a prey to many mortifications, disappointments and consequent low Spirits and almost habitual despondency—with a little encouragement, I shall recruit, and my whole time will be faithfully devoted to the office, and to reduce by degrees everything to a systematic operation—

I cannot, and I ought not after the experience I have had, doubt of my ability to give satisfaction in the performance of any and all the duties that may devolve upon me,— I want only that confidence that most men have enough of, and my disposition would lead to render the duties easy and agreeable to all connected with me—but as a perfect Stranger, labouring under some disadvantages, and finding an Office in such a State, that time alone can enable me to become acquainted with its routine of duties, and to remedy defects.—

My great object and desire are to be essentially useful, to support all in my power the honour & reputation of the Government, and to prove myself a faithful & attentive servant.—

Benjamin Homans

ALS, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones. This unaddressed, undated letter was probably written in late March after Goldsborough had vacated his post.

1. Thomas Turner served as accountant of the navy from 9 January 1800 until his death on 15 March 1816.

Charleston Station Report—March 1813

By March 1813, Captain John H. Dent reported increased British activity off South Carolina. He was discouraged by obvious American collaboration with the enemy. Dent employed Nonsuch as a coaster against privateers and complied with Jones's order to reduce the number of gunboats and barges. Jones mistakenly thought that there were still gunboats on that station, but earlier orders had sent them southward to assist the Georgia station. Dent commanded barges and four schooners, but, as with other station commanders, he was unable to man them with full complements. This was one reason why Jones advocated gunboat reductions, because maintaining undermanned vessels was a waste of money. Coming just as the British were increasing their blockade, the cutbacks in local naval forces angered citizens in vulnerable ports.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

The Honble William Jones

Charleston 1st March, 1813

Sir

I have the honor to inform you that the *Nonsuch* arrived here on Saturday with the ordinance & Stores from fort Johnson (N.C.) She fell in with an Enemy's Gun Brig, off Cape Roman,¹ exchanged a few Shot in reconnoitering, and escaped easy by Superior Sailing. The Frigate *Eolus* [*Æolus*] and Brig *Sophie* with the two Small Privateers are Still off our bar, by information received from the fishing Smacks, they have made no Captures of Consequence. five Schooners & Several Ships Sailed on Saturday for France, unobserved by the blockading Squadron; it appears that Lord Townsend is perfectly acquainted, with the State of this harbor, and also the destination of every vessel in it, with the politics of their owners &c. he sent in yesterday some prisoners taken in a small vessel from the Southward, I regret that I am not authorized to prevent the fishing smacks from going out while the Enemy remains off the bar, no doubt but all the information goes through that channel, altho rigidly searched at the Guard vessel.

The *Nonsuch* will sail the first wind with orders to cruize between Savannah and Cape Fear, and endeavor if possible to destroy the privateers, or oblige them to keep with the Frigate, she will cruize on the outer edge of the Gulf Stream, in order to recapture their prizes bound to Bermuda & Providence. Sailing Master Mork commanding the *Nonsuch* is an active, intelligent, officer well acquainted with that class of vessel, and I think if possible Should be promoted² I Have the Honor to be With great respect Your most obt. Sevt.

J H Dent

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 3 (M125, Roll No. 27).

1. Cape Romain is 37 miles northeast of Charleston.

2. James Mork, a sailing master since July 1812, was commissioned a lieutenant on 27 April 1816.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Charleston 15th March 1813

Sir

I had the honor to receive your letter of the 28th ult. directing me to lay up in ordinary all the Gun boats of every discription and barges under my command, and discharge from the service the Petty officers, Seamen &c not wanted to complete the crews of the Schooners, *Carolina* and *Nonsuch*.¹ The Guard vessel coming under, that class, I have ordered her to the Navy Yard, with the Barges, and shall immediately have them placed in ordinary and have directed Mr. Gautier Senior Officer at Wilmington to do the Same, with the two boats under his orders, and after discharging the petty Officers, send the seamen, Ordinary Seamen & boys, here under the care of the Midshipmen, by the first safe conveyance to complete the crews of the Schooners. I presume the Schooners *Ferret* & *Alligator*, the one stationed in Port Royal, the other in St Helena Sound to protect, the Inland Navigation, which is very much exposed at those points, as not coming within this order, and shall wait your further orders relative to them.² the Gun Boats at Newbern & Beaufort (N.C.) I do not consider under my command having received no instructions to that effect altho' the officers have occasionally made me reports of their proceedings having no purser or no channel through which they could receive their pay, and having received many complaints on that head, I directed Mr. Halsey Purser, on the Wilmington Station, to advance them one quarters pay, should it be due, and to act as purser for them, until further orders.

The Guard vessel in this port was commanded by Sailing Master Joseph Taylor with an Acting Master and two mates, no midshipmen. Mr. Taylor also attended the recruiting service, his is a new appointment, and little acquainted with the etiquette & routine of the Service, other wise a Smart active officer: The barges have but two regular Masters, Drew & Lord, the others are acting. Mr. Drew is an old Master in the service, and formerly commanded a Gun Boat on the Wilmington Station, but was arrested, and tried by a Court Martial, for violence committed on the inhabitants & City of Wilmington, in part found guilty, and suspended from his rank &c for two months, he is a man of no education, with violent & ungovernable passions; Mr. Lord has held several warrants as Master in the Service, when inconvenient to him to perform any Service he resigns, and after some time obtains a new appointment, he is a man of good connections, and education & if possessed of Stability would make a good officer. Mr. Gautier was formerly Lieutenant in the Service and resigned on the reduction of the Navy, was appointed Sailing Master in 1806 or 7,³ and since has been in charge of the Wilmington Station, he is an active good officer, and is on board Gun boat *No. 167*. Sailing Master Levy commanding Gun Boat *No. 7*, is neither a seaman or officer, there are two midshipmen, Mr. Robert Rogerson & Mr. Archibald Campbell attached to these boats.

To keep the barges on duty, I have been compelled for the want of officers, to appoint a few Masters of vessels to command them, with the rank & emoluments of Masters—all such I have ordered discharged. I Have the Honor to be with great respect your obt Svt.

J H Dent

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 43 (M125, Roll No. 27).

1. Jones to Dent, 28 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 285–86 (M149, Roll No. 10). There were barges, not gunboats, on the Charleston Station.

2. Jones evidently had intended that Dent retain *Ferret* and *Alligator*, for they were used throughout the spring of 1813 to protect South Carolina's coastal and inland waterways.

3. Thomas N. Gautier was warranted a sailing master on 4 August 1807.

British Gunnery Exercises

*The defeats suffered by the Royal Navy at the hands of the much smaller American navy shocked the Admiralty into a reexamination of naval policy. Attributing some of the American victories to superior gunnery, the Lords Commissioners directed Admiral Sir John B. Warren to emphasize gunnery exercise. The court-martial of the captain and crew of Peacock attributed one of the causes of her capture by Hornet in February 1813 to a "want of skill in directing the Fire, owing to an omission of the Practice of exercising the crew in the use of the Guns for the last three Years. . . ."*¹

1. For the sentence handed down at the 7 June 1813 court-martial, see University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library, Hull, England, Hotham Collection, DDHO/7/98. See pp. 68–75 for after-action reports of this engagement.

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.,
STANDING ORDERS ON THE NORTH AMERICAN STATION

Genl. Order

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having in their examination of the Logs of His Majestys Ships & Vessels deserned that in too many instances the Captains & Commanders of His Majestys Ships & Vessels appear to have omitted to exercise their respective Crews at the Great Guns and in the use of the small Arms as frequently as the importance of this part of their Duty requires, and directed me to call the attention of the Captains & Commanders of His M Ships & Vessels under my Orders to the 9th 10th and 11th Articles of the 4th Chapter of the General Printed Instructions; you are hereby strictly enjoined to cause the same to be duly carried into execution.

Their Lordships trust that all the Officers of His Majestys Naval Service must be convinced that upon the good discipline and the proper training of their Ships Companies to the expert management of the Guns, the preservation of the high character of the British Navy most essentially depends, and that other works on which it is not unusual to employ the Men are of very trifling importance, when Compared with a due preparation (by instruction and practice) for the effectual Services on the day of Battle. On these and all other suitable occasions the respective Officers should earnestly endeavour to impress on the minds of the Men that the issue of the Battle will greatly depend on the cool, steady and regular manner in which the Guns shall be loaded, pointed & fired, and that nothing but the most perfect discipline and practice in these particulars can insure proper effect from their fire upon the Enemy and prevent accidents to themselves.¹

You will be careful that the times of exercising the Great Guns and small Arms be always entered in the Ships Log conformable to the General printed Instructions.

Bermuda 6 March 1813
Signed) J B Warren

LB Copy, University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library, Hull, England, Hotham Collection, DDHO/7/45.

1. In a 23 March 1813 circular to the admirals, Croker reiterated this admonition by ordering that scouring the iron stanchions and ring bolts "be gradually discontinued and abolished, and that the time thrown away on this unnecessary practice be applied to the really useful and important points of discipline and exercise at Arms." See UKLPR, Adm. 2/1376, pp. 164-65.

Gunboats in Ordinary—North Carolina Station

*Sailing Master Thomas N. Gautier, commander of the Wilmington, North Carolina, naval station, considered himself under the authority of Captain John H. Dent of Charleston. When Jones ordered Gautier to lay up all the gunboats in North Carolina and discharge many of their crews, the sailing master responded that he would await Dent's orders concerning the dismissals because Dent might need seamen at Charleston. Jones answered that this was unnecessary because Gautier must obey Navy Department orders only. Gautier's official response to the gunboat reduction order was efficient and courteous. Privately, Gautier complained to Dent that once he had laid up all vessels, "I then shall sit down in sullen retirement and view the Boats in the mud and to reflect on the situation of my state not a single armed vessell allotted for her defence."*¹

1. *Gautier to Dent, 29 Mar, 1813, NrU, Wilson Library, Southern Historical Collection, Gautier Papers, #273.*

SAILING MASTER THOMAS N. GAUTIER TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Smithville N.C. March 10th 1813

Sir

Have this day the honour of receiving yr orders of 26th Ulto. Have written Capt. Dent respecting the men & shall await his orders concerning their discharge. Have also written the Comdg. Officers of all the Gun Boats stationd in the waters of No. C. & to Surgeons Mt. E. D. Morrison ordering them to this place, on their arrival shall proceed according to yr orders. I would beg leave Sir to represent the necessity of my retaining a Clerk for the purpose making returns issuing provisions &c, shall take the liberty to await yr further orders respecting his discharge. The Boats are commanded viz

Sailg. Mastr J. M. Levy	on this Station	1
Ditto George Evans	} Ocracock Station	
Ditto J Wolfenden		
Ditto Manson	} Beaufort Station	
Midsn. E Hadaway		

On this Station an Surgeon J. Cowdery, a Gentleman of great intelligence in his profession, was taken in the *Philadelphia* at Tripoli and has seen much active service; he is in an infirm state of health; has a family of 5 children at Norfolk, to which place he is desirous of being ordered.

James Moore has been rated Gunner 14 years. Midshipmen Archibald S. Campbell & Robert Rogerson (By last returns there were no midshipmen on either the other Stations except E Hadaway) Mr. Campbell is an intelligent young man of firm & steady habits, obedient to orders, & promises to make a valuable officer. R. Rogerson is a boy, has behaved Correctly & given me much Satisfaction, he possesses the qualifications requisite for a good officer.

Was there a Navy Yard at Wilmington no doubt or hesitation could arise with me in laying the Boats in ordinary, but as it is private property, beg leave to submit the following.

Shall the Boats have sheds over them & their Hull preserved with varnish &c.

I have also a fine Guard Boat, clinker built ader bottom, 40 ft long 8 wide; shall she be hauled up & put under a shed; are the Guns to be landed. The Stores &c shall deliver to the Agent.

Is it not most elegeble to rent a wharf which can be had low at this juncture. Have the honour to remain Sir very Respectfully Yr. Ob. Svt.

T. N Gautier

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 111 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. Wilmington Station.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO SAILING MASTER THOMAS N. GAUTIER

T. N Gautier
Commdg. Officer. Wilmington NC.

Nav: Deptmt.
19 March 1813

I have your letter of the 12th¹ respecting gunboats &c. on your station. You will observe the orders from this Department supercede the necessity of waiting orders from Capt. Dent. I cannot see the necessity of a clerk for a few gunboats in ordinary with one Master for the whole, & one man for each boat let the master see to the issuing provisions, or perhaps the Master & men may board at a rate, not exceeding the value of their rations, which if you find practicable, it will save the trouble of issuing rations. You will order Doct. Cowdery to Norfolk, & order James Moore, gunner, Midshipmen Campbell & Rogerson to report themselves to the commanding officer at Charleston.

If the gunboats cannot be moored in a tier along the shore, you will inform me of the lowest rate, for which they can be laid up at a wharf

You will have the gunboats & guard boats covered to preserve them from injury by the weather & the guns & Stores will remain on board, under care of the officer & men, where they can be preserved as well as on Shore.

W. Jones

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 310-11 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. Gautier's letter is dated the 10th.

SAILING MASTER THOMAS N. GAUTIER TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Wilmington April 2d 1813

Sir

I have the honor of reporting to you the Boats in Ordinary: viz No. 167-No. 7-No. 146-147-148-150

Doctor Jonathan Cowdery is orderd to Norfolk. Mr. Morrisson discharged, James Moore Gunner, Midsn Campbel and Rogerson under Orders for Charleston and will sail in a Day or two—

Great difficulty arises in regard to the Officers and men, attached to the Boats from Ocracock and Beaufort, and untill there accounts come on from Norfolk they will be an expense to Government—

I have retained for the Boats in ordinary Six Seaman, one for each Boat, one Cook for the Whole, one Acting Gunner, one Sailing Master, Makeing Nine in the Whole,—

As no Purser will be on the Station will you Sir be pleased to Order Mr. J. Potts, Navy Agent to pay my requestions Quarterly for payment of Officers, men and contingencies—

A Mr. Machesnay [*McChesney*], Midn. attached to No. 147 (under command of Midn. Haddaway) is I understand Adicted to liquor, his appearance Slovenly, and in his manners nothing prepossessing—

I have an Offer of the very uppermost wharf in Town detached from all Others, it has a shed and a Building formerly occupied as a Blacksmith and Turners shop, and a Dwelling House, for the Occupancy of the whole Three hundred & fifty Dolls. per annum paid Quarterly, but without the Buildings it will be Two hundred & fifty, it is by far the best station for the Boats, and if the whole is taken the House will serve to Mess in and for a hospital and the Sheds to put our Boats under, The property could be purchased for \$3.500 at three years Credit by Instalments, the details I did not enter into—¹ I have the honor to be Sir Yr. Obt. Servt.

T. N. Gautier

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 162 (M148, Roll No. 11). A letter book copy of this letter dated 3 April is held by NcU, Southern Historical Collection, Gautier Papers, #273.

1. Jones authorized Joshua Potts, navy agent for Wilmington, to pay the rent for the wharf and sheds that Gautier had recommended if Potts thought they were reasonable; see Jones to Gautier, 22 May 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 406 (M149, Roll No. 10).

Mutiny on Board *General Armstrong*¹

A naval court-martial required at least five commissioned officers to adjudicate a case. This created major problems at small stations where there often were not enough officers to try a case expeditiously. Naval courts-martial had jurisdiction over offenses committed on board private armed vessels. When the privateer ship General Armstrong put into Wilmington, North Carolina, on 17 April, her captain, John Sinclair, accused the officers and most of the crew of confining him, taking possession of the vessel, and engaging in acts of

piracy. Sailing Master Thomas N. Gautier took the accused into custody and held them on board the gunboats then laid up in ordinary, although as a warrant officer he lacked this authority. Because there were no officers at or near Wilmington, Jones was faced with the dilemma of either permitting the prisoners to suffer indefinite incarceration or of requiring five officers to abandon their posts. Before Jones had the chance to get legal advice, a misunderstanding occurred between the keeper of the privateer and one of the sailing masters in charge of a gunboat where some of the mutineers were confined. Jones ordered the prisoners released, basing his decision on the lack of naval jurisdiction over piratical offenses.

1. This General Armstrong, captained and partly owned by John Sinclair, should not be confused with the very successful New York schooner of the same name, commanded at this time by Guy R. Champlin. For an excellent secondary account of this affair, see Mouzon, "General Armstrong."

MEMORIAL OF THE CREW OF THE PRIVATEER *GENERAL ARMSTRONG* TO JOHN SINCLAIR

Copy of the Memorial handed Captain Sinclair, on board the American privateer armed ship General Armstrong, latitude 22, 03, N. longitude, 25 W. at Meridian, Thursday, 18th March, 1813

Captain John Sinclair,

Sir—

Eleven days have now elapsed since we left the Isle of Brava, all of which time we have been endeavoring to get to the Eastward; but our prospects are *now* no better than they were in our opinion of effecting such a thing when we started— For the ground we *gained* the evening before our coming to anchor in Brava, convinced us fully of the impracticability of our ever being able to work to windward among those islands, without getting a slant or two of wind, and should your object have been to touch at one of the Canaries, you would doubtless have stood well to northward first, so as to have got out of the Trade Winds, your intention surely cannot be to touch at one of the Cape de Verds, when you were apprised of a British Squadron being among those Islands which caused you to quit Brava in the manner you did, without purchasing any supplies for the remainder of the cruise; well knowing the situation of our stores, not now having above *100 lbs. Bread, two and a half tierces of rice, two barrels of Cow-Peas, and one barrel of Flour*; water we had abundance of, say upon a moderate calculation 6000 gallons, and yet allowed only 2 quarts per man a day, and one quart per week to boil rice or pease with. Great discontent (and God knows not without sufficient cause) which has for some time past prevailed on board, among officers and men. *STARVATION now staring us in the Face, for we are fully convinced your intention is to go on the coast of Africa. Langor and weakness* already having possession of half of the crew, and that among the best of us, induces us to apprise you that we are aware of the situation we are likely to be placed in, even allowing that fortune should throw another prize within our grasp and she be of half the force of the one we lost; we hesitate not to say, that she will also slip through our fingers. If your intention has not been of a nature that may prove fatal to us, it has excited much alarm. Why did you not purchase (for you said you could) sufficient supplies at Brava? and not attempt to *gull* us with the *story* of a

"British Squadron being off those Isles." But, Sir, we are fully convinced that *all is not clear on your part*. The privations we have put up with from the commencement of the cruise, will convince mankind, when they come to be fully stated, (and that they will one day or other) that we have done more than any commander of a private cruising ship could or would have expected from his crew, and still *you would wish to make us more than slaves*. Allowing Sir, you were at Africa, *You could purchase no more there than what you could at Brava; & the time that it will take us to get on the coast will terminate our cruise, &* (from threats you have thrown out) there is no doubt many there are among us that you may have in your power, on whom you will execute them, *if we have or may take any step*, that you may think improper. Be it so. In our *native country*, we are ready at any and all times to have an investigation of our proceedings; *but not trust to your clemency* in a strange land, among a set of Turks, or Africans. But, Sir, a presumption as strong as Holy Writ and the *first law in nature* bids us *shape our course home*, and that presumption is, sir, *that there are a hundred chances to one, but we will fall in with one or more English cruisers on the coast*; and then, sir, would it take much philosophy to tell what would become of us? A prison ship, for life; for there would be no exchange under two years, and it is not likely one of us would weather that time out; or if by superior sailing, we should run away, we must starve to death. *The crisis demands that we go to the Westward and the prospect far better, both for owners and crew*. In fact in taking the one (going home) we have great hopes of doing better. In the other; *The Horrors of a Prison Ship on a coast that is known to be fatal to Strangers at the coming season, or starvation on board our own ship*; by standing to the Westward, should we fall in with any supplies, *Let us stay out until the cruise expires*; if not, let us proceed to the United States. Trusting you will consider seriously the dreadful situation you are about placing us in, and without the most singular interposition of Divine Providence *will prove a total loss to yourself and owners*; We say, *we trust you will shape our course towards the United States*, or if you think we can get to France before our provisions be out, go thither; in so doing, *we are willing and at all times ready to obey your commands*.

[Here follow the names of sixty-three persons who signed the above]

Unidentified newspaper clipping of an article attributed to the *Wilmington Gazette* (N.C.) enclosed in DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 142 (M124, Roll No. 55).

SAILING MASTER THOMAS N. GAUTIER TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

19th April 1813
Wilmington NC

Sir

I have the honor of informing you of the arrival of the private armed Ship *Genl. Armstrong* John Sinclair Esqre. commander at this Port the 17th Inst.

I submit to you the copies of letters addressed to me & of my proceedings & wait your orders I have divided the mutineers in Number Sixty one on board *N. 148* J. C. Manson S M N. *147* E. H. Haddaway Mids. *N. 150* George Evans S. M. & *N. 146* John Wolfenden S. M.

I have ordered the Boats out in the Stream for the better safety of the Prisoners to merit your approbation is my highest ambition & am Sir most respectfully your Obedt. Sevt.

T N Gautier

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 201 (M148, Roll No. 11). For Gautier's instruction to his subordinate sailing masters regulating the prisoners' confinement and his arrest order, see DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, between Nos. 194 and 195 (M148, Roll No. 11).

[Enclosure]

Copy of a letter received from Captn. St. Clair of the private armed Ship *General Armstrong* dated Wilmington NC 17. April 1813

Sir

You will perceive by my declaration made & sworn to before two Justices of the Peace at the Court house of this Town & now furnished you that the private Ship of War *General Armstrong* of which I am the only legal Commander and largely concerned in as owner and which Ship is now lying at Anchor in the Stream in this Port Was on the 18th. March last forcibly, feloniously & Piratically taken possession of by the officers, Seamen &c in said declaration named who at same time confined me & others of my officers & crew and who have since kept me confined in the most vigorous, wanton cruel & unprovoked manner from said 18th, day of March untill this day when I was relieved by the Civil Authorities they in the mean time directing & Converting my said Ship, on such courses, and to such purposes as they saw fit Capturing, detaining boarding overhauling & plundering such vessels as they may meet without any legal authority to such acts I have therefore to request you as Commandant of the Naval force of the United States on this Station to cause said Offenders to be arrested & confined in such manner and in such place as you may judge expedient untill they be brought before a Court Martial then to answer for the crimes & felonies & piracies, they have respectively done & committed I am very respectfully Yr. most obedt. hble Servt.

John St Clair

Thomas N Gautier Esqr. Commandant of the
United States Naval force Port of Wilmington NC

Copy, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, between Nos. 194 and 195 (but an enclosure to No. 201 above) (M148, Roll No. 11). The copyist misspelled Sinclair's name.

SAILING MASTER THOMAS N. GAUTIER TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Wilmington N.C. April 28th 1813

Sir

It is with great regret that in performing my Duty I report to you an unfortunate event that has raised the public mind to a high pitch and wounded my feelings as Commanding Officer— On the Evening of the 26 Inst a few minutes after 8 O. Clock glass was set the guard Boat was on the Tour to watch the Privateer *General Armstrong* and all the Mutineers or Pirates on Board the Gun Boats, and to bring too and examine all Boats passing to and fro from said ship or Passing the

Boats.— The said guard Boat Commanded by S. M. Evans,¹ soon after started from along side *No. 150* espied a Boat putting off from the *Genl. Armstrong* (of which Ship a Capt. J. S. Oliver was keeper) and consequently excited some suspicion (as their were still a few Mutineers on Board of her) he ordered his men to row towards her and when sufficient near hailed who goes there and received for answer that it was Capt. Olliver whom they all Knew very well and that he was going across the River Mr. Evans informed him he could know no one at Night that he only wanted him to step on Board *No. 147* and if all was Clear, should be treated like a Gentleman and allowed to pass over— Capt. O replied he would not come along side and that he was in a Damnable hurry at any rate— Mr. Evans answered he was in no hurry, but that he must come along side and be examined or if he did not he would make his painter fast and tow him up— Olliver replied that any man that attempted to touch the painter of my Boat I will Knock him Down and I will not go on Board— Mr. Evans said if he did not he would have to fire on him— Oliver answered fire and be damned You are nothing but a set of cut throats and villians and I'll see you all Damned first before I go—with which Mr. Evans Snaped a Pistole at him to deter him but it Mised fired and he laid it down— Then Mr. Cunningham Masters Mate a Board of *No. 147* asked Mr. Evans what was the matter. Mr. Evans informed him their was a man that resisted his authority and the execution of his Orders. Mr. Cunningham immediately in his Boat and they tied Oliver's Boat to the stern of the Guard Boat. while they were fastening the painter, O. took one of his oars and aimed at two men which struck one in his side— Mr. Cunningham then gave O several strokes with the flat part of his Cutlass— Oliver jumpt forward in his Boat to the stern of the guard Boat and seized a Pistole in the stern sheets of said guard Boat and snaped her twice the third time it went off and Mr. Cunningham and a coloured man fell over board which Mr. Evans seeing (as he had got on Board *No. 147*) ordered fire (meaning the alarm gun. Mr. Macchesney Midn. did fire which accidently wounded him (Oliver) so mortally that he expired in less than 15 Minutes— Mr. Macchesney was arested by me soon after and Delivered him & Mr. Evans over to the Demand of Civil Authority, on Tuesday Morning the Court of Justices after due examination and herd the pleading of his Counsil for bail declared their offence not bailable and consequently committed them to a filthy hole of a Dungeon. Mr. Evans Sailing Master & Mr. Macchesney Midn. of the U. States Navy from which I hope they will be releived by Genl. W. W. Jones & John London Esqr. their Council applying immediately for bail and Authorized in Asserting that they can obtain security to any amount, unfortunately the form is that not only the Prisoners but all the securities must appear in Raleigh before the Judge to sign their which I fear is impossible from the Distances— Myself & Mr. Evans feel as much Distressed as others that so melancholly a Circumstance has happened— but if he executed his orders it has been from no bad Motive (as he is a good officer) but he imagined that a Boat coming from the Pirates ship should be particular examined and the triginal issue is owing to the rashness and hardehood of the deceased—who was herd to say by some Gentr. in town (upon reading a notice I had posted up under the Public Court House of my having issued orders to bring too and examine all Boats and hoping no one would refuse to conform as any accident would be regretted by the execution of them particularly situated as we were with the Prisoners and Ship *Genl. Armstrong* in Charge) that he would be Damned if ever he would come too for any of them (Meaning the Officers) and that he would make the experiment but Mr. Evans knew not at the time that Oliver had ever ex-

pressed himself in that Manner & positively knew not Oliver personally Subjoining are two Orders refering to this Case both the 19th Inst. for your investigation and fear the Officers will have to be confined untill next superior Court in October without bail can be procured at Raleigh,—

29th Cunningham the m. mate was yesterday taken up as accessory & committed I am with respect your Obedt. Servt

T N Gautier

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 217 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. George Evans, a native of Philadelphia serving under a sailing master's warrant dated 11 June 1812, was a brother of Captain Samuel Evans, U.S.N.

[Enclosure]

(Copp)

Mr. Manson (Circular)

19th April 1813

I need not point out to you how necessary it is that every care should be taken that none of the Prisoners escape for which purpose I request a guard to be rowed round the boats & Ship *Genl. Armstrong* every Night During the hours of Eight at Night and Day light alternately— You will Direct the guard Boat to Night

Mr. Haddaway 2nd.

Mr. Evans 3rd.

Mr. Wolfendon 4th.

You will suffer no intercourse between the Prisoners from one Boat to the other no shore Boat to but by your permission to Come along Side, You will Keep it in view I expect the Assistance of all the Officers in the execution of the Duties devolved on us, I shall give the officer of the Night the Guard word at 4 O Clock each evening,—

T N G.

Copy, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 217, enclosure (M148, Roll No. 11).

[Enclosure]

Copy

Mr. Manson (Private)

19th. April 1813

Sir

You will in case of sudden alarm, mutiny, rescue or disobedience fire one of your small guns or large muskets upon which signall the Boats manned & armed will proceed to the Gun Vessell giving the Alarm

a Copy of this you will give to each officer (as Private) of course no gun, musket or pistol will be fired from any of the Gun Vessells but on alarm or attack &c.

T N G.

Copy, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 217, enclosure (M148, Roll No. 11).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO JOHN SINCLAIR

John Sinclair, Esqr.
Commdr. of Privateer
General Armstrong, Wilmington N C

Navy Department,
June 7. 1813.

Sir,

Your letter, of the 29th ultimo,¹ and the papers which accompanied it are before me. Without touching the merits of the case, it may be remarked, that the arrest of the persons alluded to was irregular, as Mr. Gautier is only a Warrant Officer, whose command and authority did not embrace the case; and moreover, under the previous orders from this Department, which he was bound to execute, the naval force there being laid up in ordinary, he had no force to take or to keep the offenders in custody.

The Act of Congress which gives jurisdiction over such offences committed on board privateers, as are cognizable by a Court martial, "did not mean to interfere with, or supersede the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, and the most serious crime which the offenders appear to have committed after the mutiny, was that of Piracy, which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts. Besides, the Act of Congress does not contemplate impossibilities, or mean to subject the public interest to peril and injury. A Court Martial of commissioned officers could not have been assembled for the trial of the offenders without leaving their Stations in the time of War, to the great danger and injury of the service and of the Public.

There are, it is conceived, abundant reasons for the course which has been pursued. Without the most distant application of the suggestion to your case, a contrary doctrine would subject the officers of the Navy and the Public interest to the caprice, passion, or resentment of any individual who may command a private armed Ship, and demand the arrest and trial of an indefinite number of persons in the remote corner of the Union. I am, respectfully Your Obedt. Servant

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 456-57 (M149, Roll No. 10). Another copy of this letter is in DNA, RG45, MLS, Vol. 11, pp. 298-99 (M208, Roll No. 4).

1. Sinclair was angry that Gautier had released the alleged mutineers on Jones's order and that the civil authorities in Wilmington refused to take cognizance. See Sinclair to Jones, 29 May 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 142 (M124, Roll No. 55).

Hornet vs. Peacock

Constitution and Hornet left the United States together in October 1812. Commodore William Bainbridge, after setting fire to the severely damaged Java, returned Constitution to America on 6 January, leaving James Lawrence behind to blockade Bahia as long as he could. Hornet was then to cruise along the northeastern coast of South America.¹ There she met H.M. brig sloop Peacock at the mouth of the Demerara River. Several



Medal Commissioned by Congress Commemorating the Victory of U.S. Sloop of War Hornet over H.M. Brig Sloop Peacock

naval historians have attributed Peacock's loss to the British ship's ineffective gunnery. The well-trained and disciplined crew of *Hornet* defeated the so-called polished "yacht."²

1. For Bainbridge's revised cruising order, see Bainbridge to Lawrence, 5 Jan. 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 7 1/2 (M125, Roll No. 26).

2. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, p. 169; and Mahan, *Sea Power*, Vol. 2, pp. 7-8.

CAPTAIN JAMES LAWRENCE¹ TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Ship *Hornet*

Holmes' Hole, March 19, 1813

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you of the arrival at this port, of the U.S. Ship *Hornet*, under my command, from a cruize of 145 days, and to state to you that after Commodore Bainbridge left the Coast of Brazils (Jany. 6) I continued off the harbour of St. Salvadore, blockading the *Bonne Cityonne* until the 24th, when the *Montague* 74 hove in sight, and chased me into the harbour; but night coming on I wore and stood out to the southward.— Knowing that she had left Rio Janeiro for the express purpose of relieving the *Bonne Cityonne* and the Packet (which I had also blockaded for 14 days, and obliged her to send her mail to Rio in a Portuguese smack) I judged it most prudent to shift my cruising ground, and hauled by the wind, to the eastward, with the view of cruising off Pernambuco, and on the 4th Feby. captured the English brig *Resolution* of 10 guns from Rio Janeiro, bound to Maranham [*Maranhão*], with coffee, jerked beef, flour, fustic, and butter, and about \$23,000 in specie. As she sailed dull, and I could ill spare hands to man her, I took out the money and set her on fire. I then run down the coast for Maranham, and cruized there a short time, from thence run off Surinam. After cruising off that coast from the 15th until the 22d. of February, without meeting a vessel I stood for Demerara with an intention, should I not be fortunate on that station, to run through the West Indies on my way to the U. States; but on the 24th, in the morning, I discovered a brig to leeward, to which I gave chase—run into quarter less four, and not having a pilot, was obliged to haul off. The fort at the entrance of Demerara river, at this time bearing S.W. dist. about 2 1/2 leagues. Previous to giving up the chase I discovered a vessel at anchor, without the bar, with English colours flying, apparently a brig of war. In beating round Corobana bank, in order to get to her, at 1/2 past three P.M. I discovered another sail on my weather quarter, edging down for us— at 4.20 she hoisted English colours, at which time we discovered her to be a large man-of-war Brig, beat to quarters and cleared ship for action, and kept close by the wind, in order if possible, to get the weather guage.— At 5.10 finding I could weather the enemy, I hoisted American colours & tacked. At 5.25 in passing each other, exchanged broadsides within half pistol shot. Observing the enemy in the act of wearing, I bore up, received his starboard broadside, run him close on board on the starboard quarter, and kept up such a heavy and well-directed fire, that in less than fifteen minutes he surrendered (being literally cut to pieces) and hoisted an ensign union down from his fore rigging, as a signal of distress. Shortly after, her main-mast went by the board. Dispatched Lieut. Shubrick on board, who soon returned with her first Lieut. who reported her to be his Britannic majesty's late brig *Peacock*, com-

manded by Capt. Wm. Peake,² who fell in the latter part of the action,—that a number of her crew were killed and wounded and that she was sinking fast, she having then six feet water in her hold. Dispatched the boats immediately for the wounded, and brought both vessels to anchor. Such shot holes as could be got at were then plugged, guns thrown overboard, and every possible exertion used to keep her afloat until the prisoners could be removed, by pumping and bailing, but without effect as she unfortunately sunk in 5 1/2 fathoms water, carrying down thirteen of her crew; and three of my brave fellows, viz. Jno. Hart, Joseph Williams, and Hannibal Boyd. Lieut. Conner, and Mid. Cooperer, and the remainder of my men employed in removing the prisoners, with difficulty saved themselves by jumping into a boat that was lying on the booms as she went down. Four men of the thirteen mentioned, were so fortunate as to gain the fore top, and were afterwards taken off by our boats. Previous to her going down, four of her men took to her stern boat, that had been much damaged during the action, whom I sincerely hope reached the shore; but from the heavy sea running at the time, the shattered state of the boat, and the difficulty of landing on the coast, I am fearful they were lost. I have not been able to ascertain from her officers the exact number of killed. Capt. Peake and four men were found dead on board. The Master, one Midshipman, Carpenter and Captain's Clerk, and twenty-nine men wounded, most of them very severely, three of which died of their wounds after being removed, and nine drowned. Our loss was trifling in comparison. John Place killed, Samuel Coulson and Joseph Dalrymple, slightly wounded; Geo. Coffin & Lewis Todd severely burnt by the explosion of a cartridge. Todd survived only a few days. Our rigging & sails were much cut. One shot through the foremast and the Bowsprit slightly injured. Our hull received little or no damage—

At the time I brought the *Peacock* to action, the *Espiegle* (the brig mentioned as being at an anchor) mounting 16 two and thirty pound caronades, and 2 long nines, lay about 6 miles in shore of me, and could plainly see the whole of the action. Apprehensive she would beat out to the assistance of her consort, such exertions were used by my officers and crew, in repairing damages &c. that by 9 o'clock our boats were stowed a new set of sails bent, and the ship completely ready for action. At 2 A.M. got under way, and stood by the wind to the northward and westward, under easy sail. On mustering next morning, found we had two hundred and seventy-seven souls on board (including the crew of the American brig *Hunter* of Portland, taken a few days before by the *Peacock*) and as we had been on two-thirds allowance of provisions for some time, and had but 3,400 gallons of water on board, I reduced the allowance to three pints a man, and determined to make the best of my way to the United States.

The *Peacock* was deservedly styled one of the finest vessels of her class in the British navy. I should judge her to be about the tonnage of the *Hornet*. Her beam was greater by five inches, but her extreme length not so great by four feet. She mounted 16 four and twenty pounds caronades two long nines, and twelve pound caronades on her top-gallant fore-castle as a shifting gun, and one four or six pounder, and two swivels mounted aft. I find by her quarter-bill that her crew consisted of one hundred and thirty-four men, four of whom were absent in a prize.

The cool and determined conduct of my officers and crew during the action, and their almost unexampled exertions afterwards, entitle them to my warmest

acknowledgments and I beg leave, most earnestly, to recommend them to the notice of government.

By the indisposition of Lieut Stuart, I was deprived of the services of an excellent officer. Had he been able to stand the deck, I am confident his exertions would not have been surpassed by any one on board. I should be doing injustice to the merits of Lieut. Shubrick, and acting-lieutenants Connor & Newton, were I not to recommend them particularly to your notice. Lieut. Shubrick was in the actions with the *Guerriere* and *Java*— Capt. Hull and Commodore Bainbridge can bear testimony as to his coolness and good conduct, on both occasions. With the greatest respect, I remain, sir, your obt. servt.

Jas Lawrence

P.S. At the commencement of the action my sailing master and seven men were absent in a prize, and Lieut. Stuart and six men on the sick list— As there is every appearance of the winds coming from the E'd I shall stand for N. York in the morning.

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 61 (M125, Roll No. 27).

1. James Lawrence was promoted to captain on 4 March 1813.
2. William Peake, R.N., had been a commander since 22 January 1806.

LIEUTENANT FREDERICK A. WRIGHT, R.N., TO
LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY

New York 26th March 1813.

Sir

The much to be lamented death of Captain William Peake who fell gallantly fighting his Ship while engaged with the United States Ship of War *Hornet*, places me in the painful situation of announcing to you the Capture of His Majesty's Brig *Peacock* while on a Cruize of the Coast of Demerary. On the 24th February, Entrance of the Harbor bearing SW distance nine or ten Leagues At 3.30 PM observed a Ship on the Lee Bow standing to the westward made all Sail in chase. on nearing observing her to have the appearance of a Man of War made the Private Signal Strange Sail tack'd from us and shewed English Colours finding her unable to answer Signal clear'd Ship for Action At 4.10 Strange Sail tack'd towards us and hoisted American Colours bore up with the intention of bringing him to close Action At 4.45 Commenced the Engagement by exchanging broadsides within half Pistol Shot distance on contrary Tacks *Peacock* passing to Leeward immediately Wore and gave Starboard Broadside Action was continued by both Vessels at close distance keeping nearly before the Wind. At 4.55 Vessel forging ahead Enemy took up a position on our Starboard Quarter where he poured in a destructive fire from his whole Broadside while we were unable to bring more than the two after Guns to bear on him and owing to this every Man stationed at the Four After Guns was either Killed or Wounded by this incessant discharge of Grape and Small Shot which was fired from the Musquetry and Swivels placed in his Tops and which from the closeness of the Ships at this time made every person on the Quarter Deck a Distinct Object. The Topsail and Gaff halyards being Shot away the Topsails fell on the Cap and Boom Mainsail was

rendered useless, at this period of the Action Captain Peake was wounded by a Musquet Shot and by a Splinter which knocked him down he continued however to retain the Command of the Ship for some Minutes longer when he gallantly fell nobly defending his Ship by a Cannon Shot which instantly deprived him of Life, and the Service of a Meritorious and brave Officer The Command of the Ship now devolving on me the Action was continued with an ardour characteristic of British Seamen but the injury the Vessel had sustained from the Enemys Shot under the Quarter made it apparent we could not long sustain so Unequal a Contest At 5.10 it was reported to me by the Carpenter that the Vessel had six feet water in her Hold and was fast sinking the four after Guns were rendered unserviceable the whole of the Standing and Running Rigging cut away the Main Mast badly wounded and without support yet as the fire was briskly kept up by the Waist Guns I was determined to support the honor of the British Flag as long as defense was practicable but the Main Mast going close by the board a few minutes afterwards and the Enemy again taking up his raking position and the Vessel an unmanageable and sinking Wreck, I was at length to save the lives of the remaining Crew however reluctant and painful it was compelled to wave my Hat in acknowledgement of having struck the Ensign having fallen with the Gaff into the Water When we came to compare the disparity of Force between the two Vessels with the extraordinary Number of Men on board the Enemy which allowed them to keep a large number in their Tops who supported an incessant galling and destructive Fire. I hope it will appear that every thing was done to support the honor of His Majesty's Arms while defence was practicable.¹ The Enemy have nothing to boast of in this conquest except the possession of a few Prisoners as the Vessel went down in half an hour after their getting on board her although they used every means in endeavouring to keep her afloat by the Pumps bailing at the Hatchway heaving the Guns overboard Cutting away the Anchors & lightening her in every possible manner. I regret to add that eight of the unfortunate Survivors of the Action are supposed to have gone down in her it being impossible from the removal of the numerous Wounded who were first attended to and the short time the Vessel remained above Water to save them all as she sank in five fathoms Water many of the People who got into the Fore Top were afterwards picked up by a Boat which floated off the Booms Three of the Enemy went down in the Brig The Casualties I regret to say are extremely numerous three Men besides the Captain were killed five have since died of their Wounds & thirty three wounded most of them severely as will be seen by the enclosed return It is impossible for any language of mine to do justice to the merits of the surviving Officers and Ships Company or to the spirit they shewd throughout the whole of this unfortunate affair which had they not been opposed to an overwhelming force would under more favourable circumstances and with any thing like equality of Guns or Men have ensured success they were every thing an Officer could wish for & I feel happiness in bearing testimony to their determinate resolution and bravery which was beyond all praise The Comparative force of the Vessels I give underneath. I have the honor to be Sir Your Obedient Servant

(Signed) Frederick A Wright Senr. Lieut.

Peacock Sixteen 24 Pounder Carronades & two long 6 Pounders and one Hundred and twenty two Men

Hornet. Eighteen 32 Pounder Carronades & two long 9 Pounders and one Hundred and Seventy Men

Copy, UkLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 491-93.

1. The officers and crew of *Peacock* were honorably acquitted because of their bravery and zeal during the action and because the ship was sinking when they surrendered. The court criticized their gunnery. See *Peacock* court-martial, 7 June 1813, University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library, Hull, England, Hotham Collection, DDHO/7/98.

[Enclosure]

List of Killed Wounded and Missing of His Majesty's Sloop *Peacock* in Action with the United States Ship *Hornet* on the 24 February 1813.

Killed		
William Peake Esqr.	Commander	
Richard Physk	Seamen	
Peter Solly	Do	
James Cotte	Private Marine	
Wounded		
Mr. Edward Lott	Master	Slightly
Mr. C. D Unwin	Purser	Do
Mr. George Marr	Carpenter	Do
Mr. William Stone	Mid	Severely
Mr. John Wordsworth	Do	Slightly
Mr. William Isaac	Clerk	Do
James Manson	Boatsn. Mate	Severely
Thomas Roberts	Sail Maker	Do
Edward Brady	Captain Mast	Do (since dead)
John Smith	Quarter Master	Do
William Lourey	Carps. Crew	Do
James Medcalf	Quarter Master	Do
John Evans	Captn. M Top	Slightly
Thomas Harding	Seaman	Do
Barney Higgins	Do	Severely (since dead)
James Massey	Do	Do
Richard Williams	Coxwain	Do
James Steele	Seaman	Slightly
William Watt	Do	Do
John Beer	Do	Do
William Evans	Do	Do
Edward Mckellap	Do	Severely
James Boyle	Do	Do
William Blackwell	Private Marine	Do
Daniel Regan	Do	Do
Peter Hunter	Do	Do (since dead)
Robert Mansell	Private Marine	Slightly
Henry Beard	Do	Do

William King	Boy	Severely
Thomas Trithowen	Do	Do
Samuel Johnson	Do	Do
George Adams	Do	Do (since dead)
George Harris	Do	Do (since dead)

Supposed to have sunk in the Brig

Joseph Medcalf	Quarter Master
James Ekin	Captain Fore Top
James Rolston	Do
James Kett	Seaman
Evan Williams	Do
James Redgrove	Do
Robert Robertson	Do
John Langmead	Private Marine

(Signed) Frederick A. Wright 1st Lieut

(Signed) John Whitaker Surgeon

Copy, UkLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 495-96.

British Naval Strategy

The Admiralty's strategy in 1813 for winning the American war combined a strict blockade to cripple the U.S. economy with a convoy system to protect British commerce. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty had dispatched four additional ships of the line to Warren and they now believed, considering the weak state of the American navy, that the admiral had ample resources to accomplish his mission. They rejected Warren's comparison of ship strength during the Revolution with the current war as fallacious because Warren had no French fleet with which to contend; they questioned his failure to blockade Boston more closely and refused to accept bad weather as an excuse; and they enjoined him to make do with available resources and then increased the area he must blockade to encompass the ports from Rhode Island to the Mississippi. The proposed division of ships that Warren sent the Admiralty in late March was outdated a month later, demonstrating how difficult it was to keep current with changing circumstances on both sides of the Atlantic.

FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER TO
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

[Extract]

20th March 1813

Sir

I have this day received your several despatches numbered in the margin, dated the 20th and 26th of last month; and as the subjects to which they relate are very much connected and blended together, I have received the commands

of my Lords Commissrs of the Admiralty to communicate to you in one despatch their general observations and Instructions on the whole. . . .

With regard to the watching Boston, I am to state to you that my Lords are aware that this Port cannot be effectually blockaded from November to March, but they must also observe that Commodore Rogers with the *United States*, *Congress*, and *Argus*, and Commodore Bainbridge with the *Constitution* and *Hornet* appear to have sailed in the month of October, and in the month of December, tho' it was not possible perhaps to have maintained a permanent watch on that Port, yet having as you state in your letter of the 5th Novr last precise information that Commodore Bainbridge was to sail at a given time, my Lords regret that it was not deemed practicable to proceed off that Port (at a reasonable and safe distance from the land) and to have taken the chance at least of intercepting the Enemy if the weather should not have permitted you to blockade him.

With regard to your future operations and the disposal you propose to make of your force, I have to express to you their Lordships approbation of the general arrangement. They observe however that this arrangement was made before you were aware that four additional Sail of the Line were given to your command, two of which join'd in the interval between the writing & despatching your letters.

This accession of force will enable you to establish a better system of relief than you contemplated at the time you wrote.

On the details of your proposed distribution my Lords command me to state their opinion that in each separate Squadron which you may form, there should, if possible, be one Line of Battle Ship at least; but as your measures must necessarily depend on the state and disposal of the Enemy's Ships, and on many considerations which cannot be anticipated, they must leave to your own judgement and discretion the appropriation of your force and the measures which it may be right to adopt in counteraction of the Enemy's views.

My Lords are glad to think that you will consider the amount of force now under your orders as most ample— It exceeds very much what on a mere comparison with the means of the Enemy would appear necessary; and in addition to this great force not less than Ten sail of the Line, as many heavy Frigates, and double the number of sloops are employed for the protection of the Trade against the Americans, some of them occasionally within the limits of your Station, the rest in situations to which it appears most probable that the Enemy, escaping from your Station, should direct his operations.

The comparison which you make between the amount of force employ'd in the last American war & the present is by no means just; you will recollect that at the former period the fleets of France were actually in the West Indies and American Waters, and it was chiefly to oppose them that so great a force was then necessary.

If the french (as is perhaps not improbable) should push out a force to succour the Americans, my Lords would & will feel it their duty to increase your Squadron in an equal or even greater proportion; but the force now permanently under your orders of upwards of 100 Pendants and 16- or 1700 Men,¹ they have placed at your disposal to be employed against an Enemy whose principal Ports are capable of being blockaded, and whose force according to the statement inclosed in your letter No. 78 consists of 4 large & 3 smaller frigates, and 1 Sloop & 4 Brigs in Commission, manned by 3400 men, and of two or three small frigates in a state of forwardness.

With regard to the state of the Squadrons under your orders, as to their Complements of men, which you represent as being very short, my Lords observe from your state and condition of the 21st Feby. and from those of Jamaica & the Leeward Islands of the 31st Jany. that on a full Complement of 14673 your fleet was only 727 short, while on the other hand there appear to have been 1388 Supernumeraries in the Squadrons, leaving (if the accounts be correct) 661 men over & above the full Complements of the several ships. . . .

With respect to the observation which you take occasion to make on Admiral Stirling's proceedings, and the opinion which you intimate that the several Commands should be so far separated, as that while you retain'd a general authority over the whole, the divisional flag officers should have a greater share of responsibility than is at present, as you conceive, imposed upon them, I am on the first point to observe to you, their Lordships agree with you in disapproving Admiral Stirling's proceedings in the particulars referred to, and will not fail to acquaint him that they do so;² and on the subject of the conveyance of Specie they direct you to give orders that in future no Sum exceeding £100,000 be sent home in less than a heavy frigate; and if a Sum of £500,000 should be likely to be collected, you are to appropriate a Line of Battle Ship to it's conveyance— But on the 2nd point, my Lords command me to say that they do not exactly comprehend your proposition, or how the Junior Officers can be at once under your orders & separately & distinctly responsible—³

You observe that all that you would wish to consider as being within your power, are the general Stations of the force, the power of withdrawing or adding to the force on each Station, & the Convoys being regularly attended to— These, my Lords agree with you, are the principal points on which the interference of the Commander in Chief is likely to be called for; but how these most important subjects are to be separated from the general responsibility of an Admiral their Lordships do not see.

It was with the view of giving unity & effect to our operations against a single Enemy that the stations were united into a single command. If you should find that you are unequal to the management of so extensive a duty, it would be better, in their Lordships opinion, to have again three distinct and responsible Commanders in Chiefs, than to have three Officers with divided authority and mixed responsibility. . . .

The obvious course is that you should allot to the divisional Admirals such force as from your view of the state and disposition of that of the Enemy you may judge necessary or expedient; that you should give them express orders on such subjects as may admit of them, and discretionary orders where they may be most proper; and for the execution of these and for the due employment of the force you entrust to them, they must be held responsible in the first degree to you, but thro' you to their Lordships and His Majesty in the same manner that all other divisional Admirals now are, and at all times, and in all situations, have been; and while my Lords recommend and expect the most conciliatory conduct on the one part, and cordial cooperation on the other, they command me to say that they will not fail to visit any contravention of your commands as strongly as of their own. . . .

Finally my Lords command me to recall to your attention my several letters of the dates named in the margin, and to recommend to you the most active and vigorous prosecution of the War during the Season when the whole of the

American Coast is accessible by your Squadron, and which will admit of your placing all the Enemy's Ports in a state of close and permanent Blockade. . . .

J W C.

P.S. I am further to signify their Lordships particular approbation of the measures you propose to take for the protection of the Trade & Convoys destined for the River St Lawrence—

Copy, UklPR, Adm. 2/1376, pp. 341-67.

1. Croker no doubt meant 16,000 to 17,000 men.

2. The Admiralty recalled Vice Admiral Charles Stirling in the spring of 1813 to face charges of corruption in the letting of Royal Navy ships for convoy. Specie was always transported in the king's ships for safety; when this was done a charge of 2 1/2 percent was levied, of which the admiral and the captain of the ship received a share. Stirling was accused of levying upon petitioners for convoys a charge for freighting specie even when there was no specie. On 9 May 1814 a court-martial determined that the charges had been proved in part and sentenced Stirling to remain on the half pay list and to be excluded from promotion. See Ralfe, *Naval Biography*, Vol. 3, pp. 73-107.

3. Because of the distance of the West Indies from the "seat of war" and Warren's inability to have full and current information on the situation there, he had recommended that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty consider the "expediency of placing upon the Admirals Commanding in the West Indies both to Windward and Leeward, the entire responsibility and governance of their own Stations, empowering me only to Command the Force under them, in the event of necessity requiring a consolidation." Warren to Croker, 26 Feb. 1813, UklPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 223-26.

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY VISCOUNT ROBERT SAUNDERS
DUNDAS MELVILLE TO ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

Private.

Admiralty
26th. March 1813

Dear Sir,

I mentioned in my letter to you of the 23d. Inst. that we intended to dispatch a Sloop with our replies to your letters; but as the Troop Ships with the Marine Battalions are on the point of sailing & will probably make their passage nearly in as short a time, we shall detain the Sloop till she can be attached to a convoy. She may possibly go with the *Asia* which is intended to sail on that service for the West Indies on the 10th. April.

You will receive by the present opportunity an order for blockading all the principal Ports in the United States to the southward of Rhode Island & including the Mississippi, and we calculate that your force is amply sufficient to enable you to execute this service effectually.¹

We do not intend this as a mere paper blockade, but as a complete stop to all trade & intercourse by Sea with those Ports, as far as the wind & weather, & the continual presence of a sufficient armed Force, will permit & ensure. If you find that this cannot be done without abandoning for a time the interruption which you appear to be giving to the internal navigation of the Chesapeake, the latter object must be given up, & you must be content with blockading its entrance & sending in occasionally your cruisers for the purpose of harrassing & annoyance. I do not advert to enterprizes which you may propose to undertake with the aid of the Troops, as these will of course be directed with an adequate force to spe-

cial objects. I apprehend also that it is scarcely necessary for me to request your most particular attention to the leaving an adequate force on the Jamaica & Leeward Islands stations for the purpose of guarding the various points which are likely to be assailed by Privateers; the clamour has been great here, though apparently unfounded, on your withdrawing a large portion of the West India force to the northward. The providing of sufficient convoys between Quebec & Halifax & the West Indies will not escape your attention, nor the husbanding & refitting your Force by having a certain number only engaged in cruising, so that the whole may be kept as effective as possible, & your blockading vessels be occasionally relieved. You have under your command some of the most active & intelligent Officers in the Navy, & I rely on your rendering them available to the public Interest.— I have the honor to be, Dear Sir, your very faithful & obedient Servant

Melville.

ALS, InU, Lilly Library, War of 1812 Manuscripts.

1. A few days later the Admiralty ordered Warren to "institute a strict and rigorous Blockade of the Ports and Harbours of New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah and of the River Mississippi." See Admiralty to Warren, 26 Mar. 1813, National Library of Scotland, Alexander F. I. Cochrane Papers, MS 2340, fols. 49-50.

No.	Ships' Names	Rate	Station & No.	Remarks
1	<i>Marlborough</i>	74	No. 1 Blockade of the Chesapeake	To intercept the Enemies' Trade and Cruizers from Washington & Baltimore & to prevent the produce of Virginia from going to market. To destroy their Revenue & Resources, there being the greatest No. of Privateers from those Ports upon the whole Coast of America.
2	<i>Victorious</i>	74		
3	<i>Maidstone</i>	36		
4	<i>Junon</i>	38		
5	<i>Laurestinus</i>	26		
6	<i>Fantome</i> a Tender	18 8		
1	<i>Poictiers</i>	74	No. 2 Blockade of the Delaware	Ditto Ditto
2	<i>Narcissus</i>	32		
3	<i>Paz</i>	10		
1	<i>Dragon</i>	74	No. 3 Off New York	Do. Do. This Port may be Blockaded by taking possession of Sandy Hook with Troops & anchoring some Ships within it, & by another Squadron off Montuck Point to anchor, Water & Refit in Gardiners Bay E. end of Long Island where 18 Sail of the Line under Adml. Abuthnot in the old American War used to lay.
1	<i>Belvidera</i>	36	No. 4 Off Nantucket Shoal, Block Island, Montuck Point	
2	<i>Acasta</i>	40		
1	<i>Rattler</i>	18	No. 5 In the Bay of Fundy	To protect the Coast of New Brunswick from Invasion.
2	<i>Emulous</i>	14		
3	<i>Nova Scotia</i>	12		
4	<i>Bream</i>	6		
5	<i>Herring</i>	6		

1	<i>Shannon</i>	38	No. 6 For the protection of Nova Scotia	To cruize upon St. Georges Bank, off the Gulf of St. Lawrence & on the Banks of Newfoundland.
2	<i>Tenedos</i>	38		
3	<i>Nymphe</i>	38		
1	<i>Aeolus</i>	32	No. 7 Off Charleston, Beaufort, Ocracoke & Roanoke	To intercept the Trade, Privateers & destroy the Revenue, several additional Vessels must be added to distress this part of the Enemy's Coast.
2	<i>Sophie</i>	18		
1	<i>Viper</i>	14	No. 8 Savannah & St. Augustine	The most implacable & virulent people in the whole Union.
1	<i>San Domingo</i>	74	No. 9 To relieve the Ships in Chesapeake and Delaware	To unite to meet an Enemy, or to Cruize occasionally whenever an additional No. of Frigates or Sloops arrive so as to afford relief upon the several Stations here alluded to, two Frigates & two Sloops of War will be added to my Division to enable me to detach upon the space of the occasion to any given point wanting Force or in search of any of the Enemy's Ships. In the month of March it will be necessary to add a new Squadron to attend to Boston & Rhode Isld., as the weather will then be sufficiently mild to admit of Ships keeping that Station. The Three heavy Frigates under Captain Broke will be wanted off the great bank of Newfoundland and from thence to Cape Race, and in the opening of the Gulf of St. Lawrence to cover the Canadian Convoys and Re-inforcements of Troops and Stores for those Provinces and Nova Scotia.
2	<i>Ramillies</i>	74		
3	<i>Statira</i>	38		
4	<i>Orpheus</i>	32		
5	<i>Colibri</i> a Tender	18 8		

J B Warren

DS, UklPR, Adm. 1/4359, Warren enclosed this document with his letter numbered 104 of 28 March 1813 to Croker.

Bibles for Seamen

Through its chaplains the navy attempted to provide religious instruction for enlisted men. A chaplain's duties in the early nineteenth century were to read prayers at specific times, preach to the crew on Sundays, and instruct the midshipmen and volunteers in writing, arithmetic, navigation, and lunar observations.¹ Dr. Andrew Hunter was the chaplain at the Washington Navy Yard, where he had taught navigation to the midshipmen. He had accepted an appointment as chaplain and mathematician in the navy in March 1811.

1. Andrew Hunter to Jones, 29 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 116 (M124, Roll No. 54).

CHAPLAIN ANDREW HUNTER TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Navy-yard, Mar. 31st 1813.

Sir,

Since my connection with the Navy, and particularly since my arrival in this city, I have endeavoured to supply every public ship that went out of the harbour with a number of bibles for the use of the seamen. The marine barracks have also been furnished with a number of New-testaments and religious tracts. The effects produced by their spending their spare time in reading those books have been visible to a number of the officers. If some plan could be adopted for supplying the ships at regular periods with the scriptures and some small religious and moral tracts I have no doubt it would produce an amelioration of their morals and increase their civilization. For notwithstanding chivalry and the increase of moral & physical science have had great effects in civilizing a portion of mankind yet I think it might easily be demonstrated that the Old and New testaments have done infinitely more, and at a much smaller expense. My long acquaintance with soldiers warrants me in saying that the greater number of them as well as of sailors value highly what they call religion, however great and culpable their aberrations from it may be. Public opinion seems to look for the adoption of some general rule on this subject, and christianity would certainly give its approbation. Our seamen and marines would be more attached to their government and their country if they found themselves regarded as rational beings, independent of the services which we demand and expect from them in defence of our country and its precious rights. My limited situation has not enabled me to furnish so ample and regular a supply of books as circumstances seemed to require. The manner of procuring the books which have been distributed has been by my ardent application to individuals in the state from whence I came, and to different Bible-societies. How long these supplies will be afforded is uncertain, therefore I thought it my duty as a chaplain to lay these remarks and this information before the Head of our beloved Navy for his consideration. And in the event of our not being able to supply the ships in the above way to request some aid from the public. I have recently received advice that a hundred new-testaments had been shipped for me by the Bible-Society of Philadelphia. These are daily expected to arrive, and shall be distributed as opportunity may offer. When that society shall have stricken off an edition of the Bible with the stereotypes which they have lately imported, we shall I hope be able to procure another supply. I have been endeavouring to procure some assistance from the Bible-society

at Boston, but am not able to say anything as to the success of the attempt. The want of a free water-transportation impedes our designs in this as well as in many other things. With great respect I am, Dr. Sir, your obedient servant

Andw. Hunter

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 160 (M148, Roll No. 11).

James Biddle and the Delaware Flotilla

Jones authorized the retention of only five gunboats for the Delaware flotilla in his February reduction order.¹ He refused to give Alexander Murray, commander of the Philadelphia Station, any more gunboats until local pressure and fears of a British buildup in the area made Jones change his mind. At the end of March, Jones asked Master Commandant James Biddle² to take command of the Delaware flotilla, consisting of ten gunboats. Later he purchased two cutters, which were converted into the block sloops Buffalo and Camel. By the end of April, Biddle had manned only four of his ten gunboats. After convoying two vessels with military stores down the Delaware River, Biddle reported the British strength in the bay and the enemy's efforts to reconnoiter using the stratagem of a flag of truce.

Jones had intended the flotilla command to be a temporary assignment for Biddle; when Hornet required a new commander, he offered that ship to Biddle on 30 April. Lieutenant Samuel Angus replaced Biddle in the Delaware command.³

1. Jones to Alexander Murray, 26 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 283 (M149, Roll No. 10).

2. Biddle was promoted to master commandant early in March 1813. He had been captured in the action between Wasp and Poitiers and was inactive for four months after being paroled in November 1812. See Dudley, Naval War of 1812, Vol. 1, pp. 536-41 and 579-83 for the Wasp-Frolic action and Wasp's subsequent capture by Poitiers. See Long, Sailor-Diplomat, pp. 39-59, for additional background on Biddle.

3. For the orders concerning the Delaware command, see Jones to Biddle, 30 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 387 (M149, Roll No. 10), and Jones to Angus, 1 May 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 389 (M149, Roll No. 10).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO MASTER COMMANDANT JAMES BIDDLE

(private)

Navy Department
March. 31. 1813

Sir

Do you not think that the command of ten of the best of the Gun Boats at Philada. with 35 men each officers included would afford you an opportunity of chastising the invaders of your native stream with credit to yourself and infinite satisfaction to your fellow citizens? If you have an inclination to try the experiment I will give you an official order.¹ A popular officer whose spirit and enterprise attracts public confidence may recruit men when ordinary means fail. A judicious position under cover of night or in a calm would enable you to inflict such wounds as would teach the enemy caution and perhaps terminate their annoyance of the Delaware. With 350 men you would have nothing to apprehend from boarding but on the contrary under favorable circumstances might become the assailant yourself.

As this service would be but temporary and as five of the Boats are I presume already manned could not the other five be manned with volunteers and commanded by some of our popular and spirited ship masters to whom I would grant temporary Warrants as Sailing Masters for that purpose. I am respectfully Your Obdt. Servt.

W. Jones

ALS, PHi, Letters of Commodore James Biddle, Vol. 1, No. 2620.

1. See Jones to Biddle, 6 Apr. 1813, PHi, Letters of Commodore James Biddle, Vol. 1, No. 2622.

MASTER COMMANDANT JAMES BIDDLE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Philadelphia April 4th 1813

Sir

I am honored with your letter of the 31. ulto. I am decidedly of the opinion that Gun boats are a species of force calculated to render important Service in still waters; and with a force of ten Boats in the Bay of Delaware, well equipt, judiciously applied, & under favorable circumstances, I should think there was a reasonable ground to expect that the Enemy's Ships could be either destroyed, or compelled to evict their anchorage and put to Sea. I have the honor therefore to state that I shall be happy to receive your orders to command the flotilla fitted out for the defence of the Delaware—

With regard to Volunteers, I should think that while an Enemy was in the Bay, a sufficient number of them might be procured, for a short period, to man at least the five Boats, especially if popular & respected masters of vessels of this port were employed in them. Many volunteers certainly could be had from this city; and as the conduct of the Enemy has been such as to excite exasperation in the minds of the people on both shores of the Delaware, I should think that many could be procured also from below. This opinion is confirmed to me by the Bay-Craft-Men with whom I have conversed. Permit me to add that no exertion shall be wanting on my part to procure the volunteers, & that all my endeavours shall be used towards effecting the objects for which the flotilla is Equipt— I have the honor to be With great Respect Sir Yr. hbl. Obt. St.

J. Biddle

ALS, DNA, RG45, MC, 1813, No. 45 (M147, Roll No. 5).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO MASTER COMMANDANT JAMES BIDDLE

Navy Department
April 25, 1813

Sir

The two cutters, the *Buffaloe* & the *Camel* now fitting out at Philadelphia for the Service of the U S Navy on the Delaware are to be attached to your command.¹ They are to be fitted with a solid enclosed bulwark 5 feet 10 Inches high covered with gratings shod with Iron so as to be proof against any number of boarders and are to be armed with two long 18s. and two 24 pd. carronades (if

such of the latter as are used in the Navy are to be had) to shift over so as to fight one long 18 and the two carronade of a side and the two long 18s. through the thwartship bulwarks forward or aft as occasion may require.

The after part of the bulwark may be fitted up so as to afford you excellent accommodations.

With respect to the bulwark Mr. Penrose the builder has my particular directions and Come. Murray is directed to attend to their armament &c but as you are to command and fight them it will be well to attend to their equipment. I wish the original appearance of these vessels to be retained and when the guns are housed and ports in, the bulwark painted yellow will resemble a deck load of lumber (when painted of that colour) which those vessels are accustomed to carry and may answer an excellent purpose of deception night or day. I am satisfied that these vessels thus fitted are the best calculated for the defence of the Delaware of any that can be devised.

They are known to sail remarkably fast even with a heavy deck load of lumber—they work well, draw little water, have a great Beam are very stiff, and able to bear a very heavy armament, and will also row remarkably well.

The great object is the complete defence against boarders, any number of which they can repel or destroy by a proper use of the Battery and musketry. The practice of the enemy in our waters is to send powerful boarding parties.

In the attack and capture of the *Dolphin* Privateer & others lately in the Rappahannock there were 21. Boats averaging 40. men each.² I am respectfully yours &c.

W. Jones

ALS, PHi, Letters of Commodore James Biddle, Vol. 1, No. 2624.

1. Jones ordered George Harrison, Philadelphia navy agent, to purchase two river vessels. They were converted into the block sloops, *Camel* and *Buffalo*, and served as commissioned vessels with the Delaware flotilla throughout the war; see Jones to Murray, 22 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 362-63 (M149, Roll No. 10).

2. See pp. 339-40 for this account.

MASTER COMMANDANT JAMES BIDDLE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Philadelphia April 28th 1813

Sir

I have the honor to acquaint you that Genl. Bloomfield¹ some days since asked of Commodore Murray to furnish a Convoy for the protection down the Bay of two vessels containing Military Stores for Lewistown & Cape May, & that at the request of Come. Murray I proceeded down on this service with four Gun Boats, using all that are as yet equipt and manned. Owing to unfavorable weather I was absent twelve days, & returned to the city last Evening having seen one of the Vessels safely up Duck Creek & the other to Bridgetown on the Cohanse.

By information from the inhabitants below it appears that the Enemy have two small Schooners one Sloop, and three barges, which have occasionally been up as high as the upper end of Bombay hook. The barges are the Ship's launches with one small carronade; the Schooners & Sloop are of a slight armament tho' generally full of men. I was disappointed as well as mortified at finding that notwithstanding the depredations committed by these Vessels, yet the

As soon as the bill of Sale of the *Neptune* is corrected and received, I will remit the amount of Purchase money of both vessels to you. I am, very respectfully, your Ob: Servant.

W Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CLS, 1813, pp. 3-5.

1. Jones appointed Sailing Master Joseph H. Dill, formerly a seaman in the merchant service, to command *Perseverance*.
2. *Neptune* sailed in May, carrying the two peace commissioners, Albert Gallatin and James A. Bayard, to Europe for mediation talks sponsored by the Russian czar.
3. Jones named his brother, Lloyd Jones, to captain *Neptune*, giving him the temporary rank of master commandant.

St. Marys Station—April 1813

When Secretary of the Navy Jones ordered a reduction of the number of gunboats, Commodore Hugh G. Campbell had twelve gun vessels on the St. Marys Station: four on the St. Johns River cooperating with the army; four about St. Marys; and four stationed at different inlets along the Georgia and South Carolina coasts. Campbell's inability to man some of his barges made them unserviceable.¹ Receiving no response from the department regarding a cruise for Lieutenant Johnston Blakeley in *Enterprise*, Campbell ordered him to transport provisions to the army in Florida. The following letter from Blakeley to Jones epitomizes the restlessness of a naval officer anxious to cruise against the enemy.

The other brig on the station, *Troup*, purchased by Acting Lieutenant Charles F. Grandison, was discovered to be rotten and unfit for service. Grandison had been under suspension since the beginning of the year for misbehavior. A court of inquiry convened on 19 April sustained the charges of unofficerlike and ungentlemanly conduct. Jones dismissed him from the navy, however, not because of these charges but for the unauthorized purchase of the brig *Troup*.²

1. Campbell to Jones, 6 Mar. 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 17 (M125, Roll No. 27).
2. Court of inquiry relating to Charles F. Grandison, DNA, RG125, CM, Vol. 4, No. 133 (M273, Roll No. 4); Jones to Grandison, 1 May 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 388 (M149, Roll No. 10).

LIEUTENANT JOHNSTON BLAKELEY TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U S Brig *Enterprise*
Savannah River 8th April 1813

Sir

With no feigned reluctance and much real regret do I intrude upon your attention at this time. A period of almost ten months of war has elapsed, without this vessel being permitted to cruise a single day. While in the Mississippi the opportunity to do so was withheld, until an application, in consequence of that refusal, was made to the Navy Department and we were ordered to this station. On 18th January we arrived; since which, I have repeatedly applied for permission to make a cruise and altho I expected every day to receive orders to that effect, no such order could be obtained. I have been too long in the habits of sub-

ordination to question the propriety of those placed over me in command; but when it is considered that I have already lost rank and am likely to lose more and when the means of obtaining reputation is not only denied, but the certain consequence will be the diminution of any little I might possess; I trust will plead my apology for troubling you. Thirteen years have I been in service; almost the whole of which time has been actively employed, and now only ask, to enjoy in common with the rest of the Navy an opportunity to go against the Enemy. While every vessel of the United States every revenue cutter and every privateer are or have been engaged in cruising this one alone remains chained to her moorings. To the magnanimity and justice of the Honourable the Secretary of the Navy I look, in the fullest confidence, that I may no further be a sufferer in rank and reputation: tho the former is only desirable as it may tend to increase the latter. I have the honour to be very respectfully yr mot Obt Servt.

J. Blakeley

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 6 (M124, Roll No. 55).

COMMODORE HUGH G. CAMPBELL TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Duplicate

St Mary's 14th April 1813

Sir,

I cannot rest in silence on the subject of the *Troup* lately purchased on Government account at Savannah— It is to be regretted that Mr. Grandison ever had any thing to do with her, he may be qualified to fit out the cabin of a Merchant ship, but to the outfits of a ship of war he appears a stranger.

The *Troup* has been some old French Privateer or sharp built vessel Risen on and literally speaking rotten from Keel to Gunwale, her upper works much better than her lower frame— I have examined her and had most of her Timbers boarded, but have not found five that are sound— Mr. Grandison unship'd the Mizemast and stowed the cambouse on deck, which while a British Packet was camped below This change left no room for a boat on deck, which induced me to have the Mainmast, pumps and Topsail sheet Bitts moved farther aft to give room for that purpose— In making this alteration we find the want of new channels all of which the Carpenter has agreed to make good for sixty dollars— On striping the Mainmast, we find the Maintop entirely rotten and part of the Masthead defective, the latter we can make good, the former is to be made for thirty four dollars—

The timely arrival of Lieutenant Walpole relieved me much, as I had not an officer on board on whom I could depend— Mr. Edwards whom I found acting Lieut. on board the *Troup* appears so totally ignorant of his duty as to render it absolutely necessary to supersede him in the command by Mr. Walpole, with whom I have left positive instructions not to expend a dollar upon her but what is absolutely necessary, which by every calculation of mine will be Trifling, there being already near twelve thousand dollars expended on her exclusive of the purchase— On an overhaul of all the spare rigging Blocks &ca I find in addition to a full rigged ship as far as shrouds, stays, Backstays, Bowlines, &c, &c, from the lower dead eye to the Top Gallant Truck, flying & ring bound Ends,

seven spare Topmast, Backstays, three hundred and twenty spare Blocks, Eight spare Marlin spikes and other articles— Mr. Grandison has a new suit of sails of much larger size than her present spars—it was his intention to new mast and spar her in his own way, all of which I have forbid, having found in the Hull of the *Troup* nothing more than a small armed Transport or Guard ship for a Harbor I have the Honor to be With Great Respect Sir Your obedient Servant

Hugh G. Campbell

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 182 (M125, Roll No. 27).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO COMMODORE HUGH G. CAMPBELL

Hugh G. Campbell, Esqr.
Commanding Naval Officer,
Savannah, Gea.

Navy Department.
April 24. 1813.

Sir,

Enclosed is my answer to the letter of the Mayor of the City of Savannah, relative to the naval force limited for the protection of the district under your command which you will please to peruse and deliver sealed.—¹ Its contents are also intended for your information and government.

I wish to write you much at large on the subject of your command, but time, at this moment, does not admit. I however rely fully on your prudence and judgment for the correction of the extravagant expenditure which has marked all our Southern Stations.—

You will confine yourself to the force already limited, and enter into no new contract, purchase or expenditure, without special authority from this Department.—

Should the military forces of the United States be withdrawn from Florida, the naval force will return from that station to St. Mary's, but of this movement you will be apprized in due time.² You will, in all cases, cooperate with the Military Commander, but of the manner and extent of such co-operation you will be the judge.—

On that subject I enclose to you a joint regulation of the war & navy Departments for your government.³ You will immediately order the United States Brig *Enterprise* to proceed, without delay, direct to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, or the first convenient port in that vicinity, and report to Captain Isaac Hull at Portsmouth, Commanding Naval Officer of that district, whose further orders Captain Blakeley will obey.—⁴ I am, very, respectfully &ca.—

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 370–71 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. See Jones to George Jones, 23 Apr. 1813, MLS, Vol. 11, pp. 252–53 (M209, Roll No. 4). Jones responded in the same vein in answering all such entreaties for more naval support—that resources were limited and stations must make do with less.

2. See pp. 153–54.

3. See Agreement Governing Joint Operations, 8 April 1813, pp. 434–35.

4. Not having received this letter from Jones, Campbell had ordered Blakeley on a short cruise in mid-May to intercept merchant vessels; see Campbell to Blakeley, 15 May 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, Vol. 3, No. 130 1/2 (M125, Roll No. 28).

Building the 74s

Shipbuilding burgeoned during April, while the government found itself competing for supplies with shipbuilders who were constructing large privateers. William Jones rewarded Commodore William Bainbridge with the command of the Charlestown Navy Yard after his victory over Java. He was to superintend construction of a 74-gun ship, Independence. Bainbridge replaced Captain Isaac Hull, who took charge of the long-neglected yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where he spent the second quarter of 1813 attempting to collect enough timber to build a 74. It was mistakenly thought that there were sufficient supplies at both the Portsmouth and Charlestown stations to build two ships of the line. The materials left over from the unfinished building program of the late 1790s, however, had suffered from appropriation over the ensuing years. Hull found his inventory very low of critical items, especially the live oak which could be obtained only from southern forests.

Drafting the designs for the 74s and the frigates occupied several months that spring, as Secretary Jones and William Doughty at Washington, Charles Penrose, Joshua and Samuel Humphreys at Philadelphia, William Bainbridge at Boston, and Isaac Hull at Portsmouth all expressed their views on construction. Former naval constructor Joshua Humphreys swayed Jones, arguing that "By making our ships large, it is the only plan by which this country can in any wise be formidable with a small comparative number of Ships, it will in some degree give us the lead in naval affairs."¹

1. Joshua Humphreys to Jones, 24 Apr. 1813, PHI, Joshua Humphreys Letter Book, pp. 117–18. For background on the building of the 74 at Portsmouth, see L. McKee, "Portsmouth."

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL

Isaac Hull Esq.
Commandant of the Navy Yard.
Portsmouth N.H.

Navy Depart.
april 9th 1813.

I have received your letter of the 3rd announcing your arrival at your Station. I wish you immediately to prepare the ways for laying down the 74, which is to be built under your inspection with as much dispatch as may be consistent with the careful collection of the best materials and the faithful execution of the workmanship. The copy of the original draught of the 74 I presume must be in possession of the Navy Agent and as the entire frame is cut to moulds and rough bevelled, it therefore cannot be deviated from. Their proportions and lines are good and fair, they will be noble ships, but too crooked, and their top side tumbles home too much, this however cannot now be helped except the sheer which I intend to straighten by raising it amidships and dropping at each end. The upper deck is to be flush without poop. A Mr. William Badger has been mentioned to me as the most experienced & respectable builder in Portsmouth. I wish you to ascertain his qualifications and that of others and let me know the terms or rate per annum, at which any one or two of them will engage to direct the work as master builders. You will require a Smith's shop and some other necessary improvements in the yard, and I should like to have an estimate of the cost of the improvements absolutely requisite.

On your taking charge of the Navy Yard and effects attached to it the functions of Mr. Langdon will be simply that of Navy Agent with no other perquisite or allowance than that allowed by Law viz. One per Cent on the amount of his expenditure. You will have to engage a complete master Ship Smith to execute the work in the yard.

The entire Superintendance and controul of the Navy Yard and everything attached to it is with you, and I rely with perfect confidence upon your judicious arrangement and economical management, to prove to the public that establishments of this nature are not necessarily scenes of extravagant waste and expenditure.

You will if you think proper remove all the public Stores to the navy yard and give up the Stores that have been hired. In a former letter I authorized you to continue such of the masters of the Gun Boats as appeared to you to merit their Stations and to report to me those of a contrary character if any in order that they may be discharged from the Service.

In your estimate of the improvements you may include the probable cost of the Stores you suggest the propriety of building.

Mr. Langdon made a return on the 27 Feby last of the timber on hand, which you will please examine and compare with the Stock actually on hand—also a return of articles belonging to the Navy Department at Portsmouth copies of which you can obtain. I am respectfully Your obt. Servt.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, pp. 393–94 (M441, Roll No. 1).

CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Navy Yard Portsmouth 23 April 1813

Sir

I find it impossible to ascertain precisely the particular pieces of live oak Timber there is in this Yard. Consequently we cannot tell what will be wanting, untill we begin to work, and get it all out of the sheds; there can be no doubt, but there will be many pieces wanting. Indeed from what I can now see, I should suppose that we have not more than two thirds of the frame of live oak— Will you be pleased to inform me how the deficiency is to be made up, when a particular piece is found wanting? I should suppose that the white oak of this Country would answer for floor timbers should any of them be wanting, which I have no doubt will be the case. I should be much pleased to know your wishes particularly on this subject as the distance from this to Washington is so great that the Service may suffer very much before I could write to the Department and get an answer relative to a particular piece of timber that might from time to time be found deficient. Indeed at such a distance it will be impossible for me to consult you on every thing that relates to the building of the Ship, without some inconvenience to the service. If therefore I should use my own ~~judgement~~ ^{judgement} discretion in little matters, and should be so unfortunate as not to meet your approbation, I pray you to be assured that it will be only from an error in judgement, and not from the want of proper care and zeal for the service. Very respectfully, I have the honor to be Sir, Your obedient Servant

Isaac Hull

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 34 (M125, Roll No. 28).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO COMMODORE WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE

Commre. William Bainbridge
Commandant of the Navy Yard,
Charlestown, Massetts.

Navy Depart.
april 28th 1813.

You cannot be more desirous than I have been to increase the dimensions of the 74s. not so much on account of defective proportions as a desire to make them superior to their Class of the Enemy's Ships. The moulded beam of our 74s. is 48 f 6 which is exactly equal to 49 f 2 inches according to the British naval rule of measurement, as they include a 4 inch plank on each side. If there is a 74 Gun ship, old or new, in Europe of 49 ft 2 inches beam and 19 ft 6 inches depth from the Ceiling, to the top of the lower Gun deck Beam, I do not know it, and will thank you to point to the authority. I know that a Ship may be destroyed as *effectually* by an excess of Beam, as by any other disproportion.

The formation of floating bodies, their relative dimensions and complicated connection with the multifarious objects of force, velocity capacity, strength, stability, ease and safety, requires a life of study and practice tested by the experience of those nations who have attained the highest eminence in the art, illustrated by that of our own, in which every variety of form and fancy has been indulged even to excess. It is therefore at least problematical whether we are correct in finding fault with their relative proportions of the French Ships of War, for it is notorious, that the Science and system of that Nation has led the way to all the improvements in the art of Naval Construction, and that as other Nations have adopted those principles of Construction, so have they attained that degree of excellence, for which modern naval architecture is so justly admired. Mr. Hartt¹ exhibited a draught of a large line of battle ship of his own Construction, in which the principal object appeared to be the greatest possible Stability and capacity but in my judgment carried to such an extreme, both as to extravagant breadth of Beam, and excessive fullness, of the 2nd futtock, that no arrangement of the Ballast and Stores could possibly prevent the destruction of her rigging and masts, if not of the Ship. Yet Mr. Hartt is an ingenious and excellent Builder, and his error arises from his endeavouring to encrease those two essential qualities, without sufficiently considering the effect upon the other no less important properties. My only embarrassment with respect to extending the dimensions of the 74s. arose from information and a belief, that the timber was cut very close to the moulds and bevelling, and being sufficiently acquainted with the principles and practice of Construction, to know the difficulty of converting timber under such circumstances, I despaired of making any essential alteration and having the entire responsibility, I was not disposed to hazard any thing upon speculative opinion. I however have been relieved by information derived from Mr. Joshua Humphreys, the original Constructor of our Navy, under whose direction the timber was cut, who says "The Timber being cut large, it will be sufficient, unless great alterations are made in their Shape." In conformity with this opinion and my own judgment, I have written this day to Captain Hull at Portsmouth on the subject as follows, which I will quote for your government.²

"I therefore desire that the length of Keel for straight rabbet may be increased from 150 to 155 feet and the moulded breadth from 48.6 to 50 feet and

the original depth continued the same as it now is. The increase of length is a simple operation, but the Builder will understand me; as to the increase of breath by supposing the midship frame to be cut through the middle line and spread horizontally (not by running the frames up upon the ribbands) to the desired breadth, and the other frames fore and aft, in the same manner by gradually diminishing by a waterline to a point at the rabbit and the Stem and post. The Sheer to be straightened as much as possible, by raising it amidships, and dropping it forward and aft, so as to approach the line of the gun decks, as near as may be, and avoid cutting the thick stuff with the Port cills forward and aft; also the tumbling home of the topside to be diminished as much as the timber will admit. The form of body with these alterations will be very good, indeed the moulded timber will admit of but little alteration in that respect, if we were disposed to improve it. This increase of dimensions will admit of 15 ports of a side on the lower deck and 16 on the 2nd Deck. I wish the Builder to attend to these general ideas relative to the alterations, and accommodate his new draught as nearly as may be to the original Body and Horizontal planes. If the lines of the fore body can be swelled a little as high as the 3rd or 4th Horizontal Section, the form and qualities of the Ship will be improved; the after body is in fair proportion. With the dimensions thus extended, the Poop will be retained; you will observe that the increased length and breadth are in the precise proportions of those relative dimensions in the original draught. I shall send you a copy of the original Bill of Scantling, in detail, as given by Mr. Humphreys, the gentleman, who was then naval Constructor.³ I am very respectfully your obt. St.

W. Jones

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, pp. 400–402 (M441, Roll No. 1).

1. Jones is probably referring to Edmund Hartt, who, with his son Edward, was building the 74 at Boston until a dispute with William Bainbridge in the summer of 1813 resulted in their resignation and dismissal respectively.

2. Jones to Isaac Hull, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, pp. 364–65 (M441, Roll No. 1).

3. The end quotation mark is missing.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL

Isaac Hull Esqr.
Commandant of the Navy Yard.
Portsmouth N.H.

Navy Depart.
April 30th 1813

In reply to your letter of 23rd Current, I can not but express my regret that so great deficiency in the timber at Portsmouth should be discovered at this late period, particularly as the transportation by water is almost entirely cut off by the enemy. A complete frame was deposited originally at Portsmouth, and I cannot suppose much of it to have been actually consumed; if the deficiency could be ascertained as the work progresses without causing delay, it might probably be supplied from the Navy Yard at Charlestown, as two frames were deposited there.

It is very desirable not to mix the common White Oak with the Live Oak, if it can be avoided, particularly in those parts most exposed to decay. Those that may be wanting in the floor being less exposed to decay than those above, may

be readily supplied with White Oak; indeed if some of the Live Oak floor timbers can be converted into such pieces as may be deficient elsewhere, they can be replaced without inconvenience by the White Oak.

In cases not of essential importance in the progress of the Ship, you will exercise your own best judgment in supplying deficiencies as they occur. I am respectfully your obedt. Servt.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, p. 405 (M441, Roll No. 1).

Charleston Station—Admonitions and Complaints

By April 1813, Jones had had almost three months to study the naval strategies and financial accounts of the various stations. In a highly critical letter to Captain John H. Dent, Jones questioned his decision to deploy Nonsuch beyond the Carolina coastal waters when Charleston citizens were demanding more naval protection. Moreover, the secretary found Dent's navy yard improvements and the establishment of a naval agent at Beaufort to be fiscally irresponsible. Dent had been so discouraged with the reductions on his station that even before receiving this reprimand he had requested transfer to a seagoing command. He further expressed his unhappiness with Jones's orders when, in a letter ordering William Joyner, Beaufort navy agent, to disband that station, he said, "I must thank you for the interest and satisfaction you have given in that Station & am sorry to say our new Secretary, has so far curtailed, the force on this Station, that I shall have little or nothing to do."¹

Nonsuch, the vessel Dent had permitted to cruise to Florida, returned with a privateer prize captured off Savannah. As ordered, Dent would now keep Nonsuch within South Carolina's territorial waters.

1. Dent to Jones, 5 Apr. 1813, CL, Vol. 2, No. 132 (M125, Roll No. 27); quotation from Dent to William Joyner, 23 Apr. 1813, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT

John H. Dent, Esquire
Commanding Naval Officer,
Charleston, So. Ca.

Navy Dep'tm't
April 9. 1813.

Sir,

Your three letters of the 2nd have just appeared, and I find that the Schooner *Non-such* has been dispatched upon a cruize on the coast of Florida,¹ instead of being employed for the protection of the trade & harbour of South Carolina; and this at the very moment when the City of Charleston is complaining of the want of Naval protection by the reduction of a few Barges.— The latitude of discretion you have been in the habit of exercising is altogether inadmissible, and must not be repeated. You are within Six days post of this Department, and on every occasion of importance can readily consult with, and ask instruction from, me.— The expenditure on your station has been very extravagant and must be

corrected; and for every expense not authorised by law, or the sanction of this Department, previously obtained, you will be held accountable.

The Schooners *Non-such*, *Carolina* and *Ferret*, and the Gun Boat at Beaufort,² are to be employed for the protection of the coast and harbours of South Carolina, and are not to go off soundings,³ or leave that coast, without orders from this Department. The agency you have created at Beaufort must be instantly abolished, as well as the establishment of the Navy Yard at Charleston, and all persons employed therein discharged. In short your command and authority are limited to the four vessels above mentioned, and to those in ordinary; and no other expenses or charge will be allowed. You will not undertake to appoint or employ, any person, in any capacity whatever, not specially authorised by this department. The Public property and improvements at the Navy Yard I shall direct the Navy Agent, Mr. Robertson, to dispose of, either by sale, or compromise with the proprietor of the yard, and pay the rent up to the time. You will, therefore, carry into execution, forewith, the orders I have given you on this subject. I am, respectfully, yours &ca.

W. Jones

P.S. When it may be necessary to replenish the supplies, or refit the vessels employed near Beaufort, both, or one, may repair to Charleston for that purpose.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 342-43 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. Dent instructed Sailing Master James Mork to take *Nonsuch* out as far south as Cape Canaveral to intercept five merchant vessels reportedly sailing without an escort from Havana; see Dent to Jones, 2 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 119 (M125, Roll No. 27).

2. Jones meant the other schooner, *Alligator*.

3. Off soundings means in water too deep to be fathomed by a hand sounding line.

SAILING MASTER JAMES MORK TO CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT

Savannah 11th April 1813.

Sir

Having according to your orders finished my cruize, and on my way back on Friday the 9th inst at 5 P.M. Savannah light House in sight from the mast head, I made four sail, a head two standing for me, when near enough saw one to be a Schooner, the other a Sloop finding them to be enemies. I engaged them when near enough the Schooner Keeping long ways to Windward, and after firing one broadside into the sloop, she struck her Colours. I am happy she proved to be the privateer Sloop *Caledonia* of Nassau mounting Eight guns and forty men, I arrived safe in with her last evening. The Schooner escaped when I took possession of the cutter. She was the *Mayflower* privateer of two guns & forty men, belonging to Nassau, the other two vessels were a Spanish Schooner & a Pilot boat. The *Caledonia* besides her eight guns mounted has eleven in her hold, of different sizes, as soon as I can give up the Prisoners, I shall return to Charleston. I Have the Honor to be with great respect your obt Svt.

James Mork

The *Caledonia* has
3 Killed
7 Wounded (2 dangerously)
3 Missing

The *Nonsuch* has
Alexr. Markinson, O. S. Wounded dangerously.
William Herringbroke Seaman
Wounded Slightly

Joseph Sacket do.

LB Copy, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book. Another copy of this letter is found in DNA, RG45, CL, Vol. 2, No. 184, enclosure (M125, Roll No. 27).

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

The Honble. Wm. Jones

Charleston May 8th. 1813

Sir

Our port continues Blockaded by a sloop of war & two Brigs, they have in company the Privateer *Dash* of one gun, they have made a number of captures, principally coasters, by the prisoners landed here to day, I learn the privateer was to an anchor yesterday in Bull's Bay, and made some captures inland, if the Blockading Squadron should leave the coast, I shall direct the *Nonsuch* to look into the different inlets, and endeavour to capture the privateer, I regret I have not the use of two Barges, to take advantage of vessels of that class that will occasionally infest those exposed rivers & particularly Bulls Bay when all the trade from the North pass immediately in view, the Boats belonging to the Schooners are too small to attempt any expedition—¹ I have the honor to be very respectfully yr. obd. Servt.

J H Dent

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 105 (M125, Roll No. 28).

1. Jones replied that Dent must expect the enemy to visit all U.S. ports and therefore must make do with the vessels he had; see Jones to Dent, 14 May 1813, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book or DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 415 (M149, Roll No. 10).

Chesapeake's Cruise Report

United States and *Argus*, under squadron commodore Stephen Decatur, left Boston in October 1812, but the third ship in the group, *Chesapeake*, under Captain Samuel Evans,¹ was still refitting and did not sail until 17 December. Evans headed for his designated cruising ground near the equator between 24° and 30° west longitude. By mid-January *Chesapeake* captured two British merchant ships that had left their convoy and proceeded alone to South America. Evans decided to remain in his cruising area instead of venturing out after the rest of this convoy, but after taking only one vessel during a

three-week span in February, he decided to leave these barren waters for Surinam. Two weeks there proved fruitless as well. Turning northward to Barbados and running a Boston-bound course parallel to the east coast of America proved more successful.

Returning to a Navy Department under new leadership, Evans soon learned that Secretary Jones expected him to refit as expeditiously and economically as possible for another independent cruise. Evans was no doubt tired after sailing for almost four months; a recurring problem with his left eye from an old wound spurred him to request shore duty.² The resignation from the navy of the commandant of the New York Navy Yard, Charles Ludlow, and Evans's decision to forego another cruise created employment problems and opportunities. The command of the New York Navy Yard finally devolved on Evans, and James Lawrence was assigned Chesapeake.

1. Samuel Evans's service in the navy dated from 1798. His past assignments included commanding *Nautilus*, *Siren*, *Argus*, *John Adams*, and the gunboat flotilla at Baltimore, as well as being a naval inspector proving guns and shot. Before taking charge of Chesapeake in August 1812, Evans commanded the Gosport Navy Yard.

2. Evans to Jones, 30 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 70 (M125, Roll No. 28).

CAPTAIN SAMUEL EVANS TO COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR

(Copy)

U.S. Frigate *Chesapeake*
Boston April 10th 1813

Sir,

I avail myself of the termination of the *Chesapeake's* Cruise which has ended by her arrival in this Port, to inform you of the principal transactions thereof. I believe it is known to you that we Sail'd from Boston on the 17th December last— On the 31st at 3 P M. We discover'd the first Sail, to which we gave chase, but night Coming on We lost Sight of her— On the first of January at half past 3 P M. being in Lat. 34° N. and Long 32° West we discover'd another Sail to which we gave Chase— At 5 Lieut Page boarded her and discover'd that She was the American Brig *Julia* of Boston from Lisbon bound to Boston— And that she was Sailing under a British License—which the Captain deliver'd to him— In consequence of this I determin'd to place her papers in the hands of a Midshipman and send him in her, to her port of destination, that she might be proceeded against if proper, but the night being now advanc'd, and the weather boisterous, I concluded to Lay by with her until morning. When at 1/2 past 8 A M—while about despatching her—Two Sails were discover'd in the Winds Eye of us—Standing directly for our weather bow— About 1/2 past 9, I discover'd by their Sails they were vessels of War, one of which appear'd to be a large Ship— Midn. Blodget and the Captain of the Brig were now despatch'd to her with direction to Steer his course by doing which he Would go large, and some Distance from them— And on the return of the Boat, I wore round and Stood under Double reef'd topsails and fore topmast Stay Sail, so as to bring them about three points on our Weather Quarter, with the double purpose of drawing them from the Brig— And by Compelling them to haul more up, to be enable'd to ascertain more Correctly the force of them— After standing some distance from the Brig I back'd the Mizzen Topsail to let them approach us; but finding they bore directly up and that by remaining with it aback they would be quite Near us before we could discover their force, I fill'd it

again and Stood one point higher than before. And they again haul'd up but not so that we could discover more than the round of their bows, and nearly in this position, they kept untill about 11 A M. when we lost sight of them in a heavy Squall— About this time our Fore top mast was discover'd to be Sprung and by Meridian the Sea and Wind had increase'd to that degree that it was necessary to bring the Ship to a reef'd foresail and main topsail with hous'd Top Gallant masts— At 2 P M having every thing snug and being desirous to ascertain their force so that if there was not a great disparity I might endeavour to obtain a position to bring them to Action on the Weather's moderating, I wore and Stood in the direction we had last seen them until 5 P M. When having discover'd nothing of them, I again Wore and proceeded towards our place of destination— On the 9th We made the Island of St Anthony one of the Cape De Verds— Here it may be proper to mention that our passage until the 10th of January when we were in Lat. 15°30' N. and Long. 25°11' W had been uncommonly boisterous— We had by that day lost Two topmasts And from the Day of our Sailing untill then the Gun Deck had not been dry— On the 12th at 6 A M we discover'd a Sail bearing N b E to which we gave chase, and at 10. brought her too and boarded her. She proved to be the British Ship *Volunteer* from Liverpool to Biaha [*Bahia*], one of a Convoy of 12 Sail bound to different part of South America, and the Pacific Ocean under charge of the *Cherub* Sloop from which she had parted five days previous to our falling in with her. She had on board a considerable invoice of Dry Goods and I put a Crew on board her and despatch'd her to America— The next day at 6 A M we discover'd another Sail bearing W b N. to which we gave Chase and at 11. boarded her. As she was known to be the Brig *Liverpool Hero* one of the convoy, I boarded her under English Colours, in hopes of being enabled to gain such information as would bring us in Sight of the fleet, I found that she had left them the day after the *Volunteer*, that she had but little that was valuable in her, and as her Main Mast would make us an excellent Main topmast, which we were much in want of, I determin'd to take out the Valuable part of her Cargo and Destroy her. While in the execution of this at 4 P M. another Sail was Discoverd. On seeing us she made Sail from us, and as the Wind was light and no possibility of coming up with her before dark— I judged it best to take what we could from the Brig While day lasted and to run part of the night to the Southd. and Westward in hopes to intercept her next day— This I did and lay by the latter part of the Night and most of next morning. When seeing nothing of her I bore up and Stood in a direction to intercept the fleet, if they had passed the inside of the Cape De Verds which from the course they were Steering when the Brig Separated from them, and the information I was enable'd to glean from the Capt. and Crew of her before I inform'd them who we were, I was Strongly impress'd with the Idea they had done but I regret to say that after pursuing this course until I arriv'd on our Cruizing ground we saw nothing of them— Perhaps Sir, the idea may suggest itself to you, that taking into Consideration the latitude allotted in my instructions, it would have been proper for me to have pursued them further, and I will therefore give you my reasons for not doing so— As I have mention'd heretofore I boarded the Brig under English Colours. I believe the Captain had not the Smallest Suspicion of our being other than an English Frigate until I undeceived him— By different questions I learnt that there was not the smallest apprehension in the fleet of falling in with American Cruizers, between where they were and their places of Destination; and that it was very possible that they had nearly all separated, as the evening when he last saw the Commodore they were much scatter'd

some a considerable distance astern of the Brig and others as far ahead, And by the papers I obtain'd I learnt they were bound to nearly as many ports as there was Vessels These Considerations operated forcibly to determine me to abide on the ground allotted me, and I reason'd thus— It is evident that by this time they must be Separated, and the only probable chance I can have of falling in with any of them will be to proceed, directly, and Cruize off a Neutral harbour—by doing this I may possibly fall in with one or two that are bound to the most northerly ports—but while I am occupied looking for those Vessels which may be in Shore of me When I see them and escape— The chance is the others will be safely arrived in port—besides at this period an alarming Malignant fever had made its appearance in the Ship, Which threatn'd to be epidemical and, I was apprehensive that by going into the Sultry latitudes when we might Calculate upon almost continual rain, there would be no possibility of checking it— Again; this was only one fleet, and from one port; we were in the track they saild, both homeward & outward— The Newspapers we had obtain'd announc'd that the Governor General of India would sail in a few Weeks, in a Frigate for his Command— By remaining where we were, was it not possible we might be so fortunate as to intercept him? Finally taking into consideration all those circumstances I determined to remain on our cruizing ground, be the event what it would; and I have now to regret that I must inform you I could scarcely have made a more unhappy determination for after Cruizing there untill the 23d of February, We discover'd but one Sail which proved to be the British Brig *Earl Percy* from Bonavista to Brazils with a Cargo of Salt; Her I manne'd and order'd in— It now remains for me to relate to you the Transactions since we left our Cruizing ground— From the 5th of Feby when we took the *Earl Percy* and were in the Long. of 24°.30' W. and Lat. 2°32' N. untill the 23rd—the Weather had been such as to deprive us of the benefit of Lunar Observations— Apprehensive that we had a Westerly Current, I had part of the time been plying to the Eastward. When on the 23d we found ourselves by a Lunar in 30°.30' W. As we were now in my opinion to the Westward of the *General* track, and it would take all the time We could allow ourselves to remain to the Southd.—to gain three or four degrees of Easting, I concluded we could do no better than abandon the ground we had been so unfortunate on— And on the 24th bore up for the Coast of Surrinam— Here we arriv'd on the 2d March and remain'd until the 6th—without seeing any thing— When we made Sail to the Northd, and pass'd about a Degree to the Eastd. of Barbados and the other Caribbee Islands—untill to the Northward of them. When we Steer'd to the Westd parrallel to the Different passages until Long 75 —when we hauld to the Nord. & Eastd. along our coast; In this route we fell in with the following vessells which we Boarded—and we chased one Ship and one Sloop— The former of which escap'd us in the night and the other in thick Weather. In Lat 25°.51' N. Long 66°.56' W. March 19th boarded a Spanish Schooner from Porto Rico to Cadiz. In Lat 25°.58' N. Long 68°.15' W. March 21 boarded the Ship *Charleston & Liverpool Packet*, from Cadiz to New York. In Lat 26°.20' N. Long 70°.6' W March 23d—boarded the Cartel Schooner *Thetis*, from St. Bartholomews to New York, out of which we obtain'd seven volunteers— On the 3d of April in Lat. 37°.51' N Long 71°.9' W boarded the Portuguese Brig *St Antonio De Invego* from Lisbon to Wilmington (NC) on the 5th April. Lat. 40°.18' Long 68°.24' W boarded the Ship *Virgin* from Lisbon to New York— On the 7th April Lat 41°.55' N. Long. 68°.7' W retook the Schooner *Valerius*, in the Possession of an English Prize master, who Stated that he cut her out of Tarpaulin Cove. On the 8th April

Lat. 42°.57' N Long 68° West boarded the Brig *Jane* of Portland for St. Bartholomews— I am happy to inform you that independent of the fever I have before alluded to, the Ship has been unusually healthy for a New Crew. We have not now so many on the Sick list as we sail'd with— And owing to the judicious arrangements of the First Lieut Page, and the Surgeon, and the Zeal with which they were carried into execution by all the Officers, We were fortunate enough to check it in a Short time, with the loss of Seven men, who all died in from three to seven Days illness—

The Ship will require a new Main Mast, the one in being decay'd and in working in yesterday a heavy flaw carried away the Main topmast by which we unfortunately lost three men, and Sprung the head of the Mizzen Mast which I expect will have to be replac'd likewise— We have on board between forty & fifty Prisoners. The Masters of the *Volunteer & Liverpool Hero* I permitted to proceed in the *Earl Percy* on parole— I am with respect Sir your Obed. Svt.

sign'd Samuel Evans

Copy, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 166, enclosure (M125, Roll No. 27). Evans forwarded to Jones this copy of the cruise report that he had sent to Decatur.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO CAPTAIN SAMUEL EVANS

Samuel Evans, Esquire
Commdg. the U.S. Frigate, *Chesapeake*,
Boston

Navy Dep'tm't.
April 19. 1813

Sir,

I have received your letter, of the 10th instant, covering a copy of your report of the cruize of the United States Frigate *Chesapeake*, under your command, and congratulate you on your safe arrival in port, as your return being anticipated much solicitude had been excited for your safety, on account of the powerful force maintained by the Enemy on our coast, of which, possibly, you might not have been apprized. If, from fortuitous circumstances, your cruize has been less brilliant than your zealous efforts merited, it has not been ineffectual, and I have the most perfect confidence that if fortune had thrown an enemy in your way worthy of a contest for glory, the commander, officers and crew of the *Chesapeake* would have rendered her name as conspicuous in the annals of fame as any of her more fortunate sisters. It is of great importance that not a moment should be lost in refitting the *Chesapeake* for a separate cruise, for which you will receive instructions from this Department in due time. I regret the necessity you mention for delaying your outfit for a new main mast, & perhaps, a mizen mast. The expense, though very great, (for indeed, those frequent repairs cut deep into the naval resources) is not the only evil—time is still more precious; for the effect of our limited force depends upon its constant activity and enterprize. I, therefore, trust that if it is possible to render your present masts fit for service, and avoid the ruinous delay consequent upon the procuring new masts, you will immediately repair them and prepare for sea: and I further trust that in your whole equipment the strictest economy, consistent with real utility, will be strictly observed. The last equipment

of the *Chesapeake* was, in many respects, highly extravagant; particularly for the luxurious indulgence of the fancy of her commander and officers, much of which will never be allowed by this Department.

In illustration of this I refer you to the accounts signed by yourself for the splendid equipage of the cabin and wardroom. I am very respectfully, your Ob. Servant.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 356-57 (M149, Roll No. 10).

Pension Certificate

An officer, seaman, or marine who was disabled in the line of duty was entitled to receive a pension for life or during his disability. The amount of the pension depended on the nature and degree of the disability but was not to exceed one-half the person's monthly pay. Funding for these payments came from the money accrued from the sale of prizes. The government pledged to make up any deficiency in the fund and any surplus was earmarked for the further comfort of those who had served their country. A board, the Commissioners of the Navy Pension Fund, composed of the secretaries of the navy, war, and treasury, administered the fund and presented an annual report to Congress regarding its status.¹ This document is representative of pension certificates issued during the war.

1. "An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States," April 23, 1800; Statutes at Large, Vol. 2, Stat. 1, Chap. 33, Sec. 9 and 10, p. 53.

PENSION CERTIFICATE FOR WILLIAM LONG

William Long of Wiscassett in the State of Massachusetts Late seaman on board the United States Frigate *Constitution* having been wounded in his left arm & Shoulder in the action with the British Frigate *Java* on the 29th day of December 1812 and having been disabled in the service of the United States while acting in the line of his duty, he is entitled to receive Six Dollars per month from the Commissioners of loan of the State of Massachusetts, payable half yearly on the first day of January and first day of July, in every year during his life or the continuance of such Disability to Commence the Eighteenth day of march 1813.

The same will be paid to the said William Long in person or on his legal power of Attorney, but no payment will be made on a power of Attorney unless the said William Long appeared before the said Justice in the month next preceeding that in which the payment is to be made and that his disability still continued.

Given under my hand and Seal of the Navy Department the 13th day of April 1813

Registered

Benja. Homman [*Homans*]
Secretary to the board of Commissioners
of the navy pension fund

W. Jones

Copy, DNA, RG45, AF4 (M625, Roll No. 4).

Secret Mission of John Adams

John Jacob Astor, the wealthy fur trade entrepreneur, had established a foothold in the Pacific Northwest in 1811 with his Pacific Fur Company. Citing both economic and strategic reasons, Astor persuaded the Madison administration to send an American vessel to his outpost, Fort Astoria on the Columbia River in the Oregon territory. He hoped an American presence would prevent the Northwest Company (a Montreal-based fur company) from setting up a trading post there. Secretary Jones decided to send Master Commandant William M. Crane in John Adams on this special mission. Since secrecy was essential, Jones ordered Crane to Washington in early April to receive oral orders. Excited about finally getting a sea command, Crane spent the next two months repairing, refitting, and manning John Adams, which had been undergoing repairs since the war began.¹

1. For background on Fort Astoria and the navy, see Gough, Royal Navy, pp. 8-28; and Bridgwater, "John Jacob Astor."

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO MASTER COMMANDANT WILLIAM M. CRANE

William M. Crane, Esquire,
U.S. Navy,
Baltimore

Navy Dep'tm't.
April 16th 1813.

Sir,

You will proceed immediately to New York and take the Command of the United States Ship *John Adams*, destined, by the President, for a special and confidential object, and in order to render her fit for service it will be necessary to cut down her top side, and re-convert her into an efficient Corvette, as she was previous to the last repair and outfit at Boston.

About 16 or 17 feet of the after part of the quarter deck and the top gallant forecastle will be retained, but without armament, or any thing above, other except the Crane Irons and ridge Rope. Her armament will be 20 heavy 12 pounders and four long 18's. The nature of the service requires very great attention to the equipment, Stores and provisions, with a view to the utmost possible extension of time, and of such nature and quality as will occupy the least space, be least liable to decay, and comprehend the most vegetable and antiscorbutic substances. Your hospital Stores must be laid in with great judgment, and your provisions should comprehend a large proportion of Rice, kilndried Indian Meal, Molasses, Sourcroust, essence of spruce, Cremtartar, Slops, vinegar, beans, flour packed in tight barrels, with the inside of the Staves and heads charred to a Coal, pickled Cucumbers, &c &c, and a great abundance of dried herbs, pressed into boxes, for culinary and medicinal purposes.

Of your salted provisions a large proportion should be pork, which, in some convenient part of the Ship, will not only go further, but is very convenient and economical when supplies of fish may be had. The flour of which your bread is made should not be bolted too close, and the bread should be rebaked before it is packed in the Rooms.

Your Military Stores must be of the best description, and put up with care. You will require a very good Armourer and a good Smith, with tools and conveniences for erecting a forge, with a supply of bar, bolt & hoop Iron.

Your Naval Stores should not only be of the best kind, but should be so apportioned as to provide for the consumption of those articles in remote situations, where commerce and the arts do not furnish the means of replenishing.

With these general views you will proceed to equip & prepare the Ship for Sea, and on your arrival at New York you will suggest to me the means which appear to you best calculated to furnish you with Officers and Crew fit for this special service, & of every thing which may expedite and facilitate the Progress of the equipment.¹ Your final instructions will be prepared in due time, with the deliberation due to the importance of the object which has been, in confidence, developed to You. I am, very respectfully, &ca.

W. Jones

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CLS, 1813, pp. 11-13.

1. Crane's first report to Jones on the state of *John Adams* indicated his desire to improve the quality of her crew and to change her armament; see Crane to Jones, 21 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, MC, 1813, No. 48 (M147, Roll No. 5).

President Escapes Boston

Commodore John Rodgers spent the first quarter of 1813 refitting, manning, and provisioning President for another cruise. There would be no squadron for him to command that year, because Jones had ordered single cruises only. The department emphasized commerce raiding over ship engagements. After spending a month in Halifax refitting, H.M.S. Shannon, 38, commanded by Philip B. V. Broke, returned to blockading Massachusetts Bay in late March accompanied by Captain Sir Hyde Parker in H.M.S. Tenedos, 38. Broke sent challenges to Rodgers via fishing vessels, but President and Congress slipped out of the harbor at the end of April, taking advantage of a change of wind during squally weather. For greater protection, the American captains decided to leave jointly and then depart on separate cruises.¹ Just before sailing, Rodgers sent Jones his latest cruising plans, which the secretary approved, except for sailing to the Far East, where Jones believed Rodgers would be overextending himself.²

1. Padfield, Broke and Shannon, pp. 130-37.

2. Jones to Rodgers, 29 Apr. 1813, DNA, RG45, CLS, 1813, p. 14.

COMMODORE JOHN RODGERS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Frigate *President*
April 22nd 1813

Sir

Owing to contrary winds I was prevented leaving Boston until this morning:— I am now preparing the Ship in the best possible manner for hard service, and shall sail upon a certainty on Sunday next if the wind will admit of my getting out.

On leaving here I intend steering for Halifax; off which after alarming and doing the Enemy all the injury in my power, I have it in contemplation to take a direction to fall in with his Store Ships &c coming from England; and after producing alarm and distraction in the neighbourhood of the Eastern part of the Grand Bank, shall shape my course for Corvo; a little to the Westward of which, and in Latitude from 37° to [?°]¹ intend cruising three, or perhaps four weeks;—thence along to the Northward of the Azores off Cape St. Vincent;—thence along the Coast of Portugal and in a northerly direction to meet his Commerce going into the Channel at which point, after remaining ten or fifteen days, pass, according to circumstances, either North about round Ireland, or through St. George's Channel, and cruise some days in the vicinity of Raughlin Island and the Mull of Cantyre.² From this I propose steering to intercept his trade coming from and going to the Baltic, in a situation on Jutland reef; where it is probable I shall cruise until it will become necessary to replenish my water and Provisions; and which I presume I shall find no difficulty in doing in some of the Ports of Denmark.

Having made such a cruise as that which I have mentioned, and finding that hostilities are still continued, it is probable I may proceed into the China Seas, and from thence back to the United States.

You will perceive, Sir, that I have given myself a wide range, and if things turn out as I hope they will, I flatter myself that I shall be enabled on my return to give you a pleasing account of my cruise.

The *Congress* is, and will continue with me until I get clear of Boston Bay. I have the honor to be with great respect Sir Your Obdt. Servt.

Jn^o Rodgers

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 28 (M125, Roll No. 28).

1. Torn document.

2. Rathlin Island is located in the North Channel off the northeastern coast of Northern Ireland. The Mull of Cantyre or Kintyre is a cape on the southern extremity of Kintyre Peninsula off the southwestern coast of Scotland, projecting into the North Channel.

CAPTAIN THE HONORABLE THOMAS BLADEN CAPEL, R.N.,¹ TO
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

H.M. Ship *La Hogue*
at Sea 11th May 1813

Sir

It is with great mortification I am to acquaint you, that since my letter of the 25th of April last, two of the Enemy's Frigates (the *President* and *Congress*) have escaped from Boston. I deeply lament the circumstance, but trust you will be satisfied that every exertion was made by the Ships under my orders to prevent the Enemy putting to Sea—indeed it is impossible for more zeal and perseverance to have been shewn by any Officer than by Captain Broke, who with the *Tenedos* has been invariably as close as possible off the Port of Boston as the circumstances of the weather would permit, but the long continued Fogs that prevail on this part of the Coast at this Season of the year give the Enemy great advantage. It appears that they put to Sea on the morning of the 30th April with the wind at S b E and from all I have been able to learn stood far to the Northward, having been seen (by a Vessel spoken by the *Emulous*) to the Northward of the Isle of Shoals they then

crossed to the Southward. I have Stationed the *Shannon* and *Tenedos* between Cape Anne and Cape Cod in the Bay of Boston—the *Nymphe* between the Latd. 43° 40' Longde. 60° 01 and Latde. 42° 30' Longde. 69° 00' and occasionally communicate with the above named Frigates, while I myself with the *Curlew* Cruized in a line South from Cape Sable to St. George's Bank, and occasionally also to communicate with the Frigates, but I am sorry to say the Enemy succeeded in escaping without being discovered by any of us except the *Curlew* who had parted company.

On the 6th Inst. I spoke the English Privateer *Retaliation*, who the day previous had been boarded by the *Curlew* in Latde. 40° 16' Longde. 66° 30' Captain Head informed the Master of her that he had been Chased the day before by the Enemy's Frigates, and that the last he saw of them was Steering about S by E with the wind Easterly.

I joined the *Shannon*, *Tenedos* and *Nymphe* again on the 10th, of May off Cape Cod and I have the honor to transmit to you a Copy of the Log of my proceedings since the 25th of April, together with Captain Broke's for the same period, and shall forward to you by the earliest opportunity a sketch of the various positions taken by the different ships of this Squadron to intercept the Enemy—The *Shannon* and *Tenedos* has again proceeded to reconnoitre Boston.

The *Chesapeake's* masts are all on end, but I do not apprehend she is near ready for Sea. I have the honor to be Sir your very Obt. Hble. Sert.

(Signed) Thos. Bladen Capel Captain

Copy, UKLPR, Adm. 1/504, pp. 171–73.

1. Thomas Bladen Capel spent all of the War of 1812 on the North American Station.

New Yorkers Provide Support for Gunboats

By April 1813, the British had begun to menace New York City in force. Jacob Lewis found himself in the unenviable position of having to placate both the economy-minded Secretary Jones and the frightened New York citizenry. Jones's gunboat reduction order was based on the premise that vessels that lacked a full complement were inefficient and should be eliminated. Distraught coastal residents, however, sought more gunboats for protection. When the British appeared off Sandy Hook in early April, Lewis called up the gunboats in ordinary. But he soon realized he lacked the sailors to man them.¹

1. See Lewis to Jones, 11 Apr. 1813, *MLR*, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 10 (M124, Roll No. 55).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS

Jacob Lewis, Esqr.
Commanding U.S. Flotilla,
New York Harbour.

Navy Departm't,
April 23. 1813.

Sir,

A few days absence, at Baltimore, has delayed my reply to your letter of the 11th instant.

The discretion vested in you to call the Gunboats laid up in ordinary into service upon any sudden and real emergency, manned with volunteers, did not contemplate calling them into Service upon the mere appearance of the enemy off the Hook; and why call them into service when you have no men to man them?—for you are not authorized to ship a single man, nor is it intended you shall. You appear extremely importunate to increase and extend your force and command, but the force allotted to you must be with reference to the relative force employed at other places, and to the general naval wants and resources, of which you will permit this Department to be the exclusive judge. I, therefore, disapprove of your taking the Gunboats out of ordinary on the emergency you mention, and if any expense has been incurred on that account I shall consider it improper, and you will again replace them in ordinary, there to remain until such an emergency as shall clearly indicate an immediate attack by the enemy on the harbour of New York; when, if volunteers offer to man them, you will call them into service, and not otherwise without orders from this Department. Till then you will consider your command as confined to the fifteen Gunboats officered and manned as directed in my order of the 26th of February last.

As to a "Flag Ship, Hospital Ship and Store Ship", they are appendages with which you must dispense: and, permit me to observe that whilst you keep the 15 Gun Boats in the most efficient condition, you will do it with the strictest economy and good management, otherwise the whole of them will be placed in ordinary. For, it is proper that you, and every officer in the Navy should know, that, if the loose and extravagant expenditure which has hitherto prevailed shall continue, the naval resources will not meet the exigencies of the service.—

If it is not convenient for the Flotilla to leave the Hook in order to replenish the provision and water, the Navy Agent can employ a shallop, occasionally, to convey the supplies to the Flotilla.—

I deem it proper to be thus explicit with you, and, at the same time, to express my confidence in your qualifications as a Commander, and my personal regard and respect. I refer you to my letter of the 26th of February, the last paragraph of which you appear not to have noticed.— The passage of the sound being intercepted the Gunboats at Rhode Island will remain on that station.—¹ I am, respectfully &ca.

W Jones.

18 Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 367–69 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. Jones had requested a list of the gunboats in commission and in ordinary, their condition, and the names of their commanders and crew. In the earlier letter, Jones had ordered all the gunboats at Newport, Rhode Island, to leave for New York; see Jones to Lewis, 26 Feb. 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 281–83 (M149, Roll No. 10).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO NICHOLAS FISK¹

Nicholas Fisk Esqr.
New York

Navy Depart.
May 15th 1813.

In the distribution of the Naval force of the U.S. with a view to active offensive operations and the defence of our extensive waters and numerous harbours, with the limited force and resources at the disposal of this Department, such a

disposition has been made, as to give to each according to its relative importance and local Security either natural or artificial, such proportion as appeared to comport with the obligations of the government for the general defence of all.

The increase of the force at any one point, must therefore necessarily reduce that of another or diminish the force and effect of our gallant Navy on the Ocean by employing the Seamen and resources of the Department in mere preparations for defence and arresting the progress of the efficient increase of the Naval force now in operation, the completion of which is so much to be desired.

In this view of the subject and aloof from any local influence or excitement has the force at New York been limited to fifteen Gun Boats in active Service, the residue to be kept in ordinary in a perfect state of preparation, and called into Service upon any real emergency under the command of Captain Lewis, provided Volunteers are offered to man them free of expense to the United States, and who shall be subject to the laws and regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States while in Service. This order was given to Capt. Lewis on the 26th of Feby. last, and the supernumerary Gun Boats were laid up in ordinary accordingly; but on a late occasion and merely on the appearance of the Blockading Squadron off New York, Captain Lewis informed me that he had taken the Boats from ordinary into Service, but said not a word about men, to man them, and until the receipt of your letter I was ignorant of the proposition of the Corporation of the City, to furnish, pay, and provide for, the crews of 15 additional Boats, which I most readily assent to and authorize Captain Lewis to accept and put the additional Boats into Service whenever the Corporation shall deem it necessary. This Department will provide a Commander for each Boat and furnish the equipment and military Stores. This arrangement, I trust, under existing circumstances will be considered just and reasonable particularly when the very great proportion of the national resources employed for the defence of and expended in New York, and the utter impracticability of defending our extensive coast on all points against the Superior force of an enemy, who can at pleasure concentrate the whole of that force upon any one point, is duly appreciated. I am very respectfully Sir your obedt. Servt.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, MLS, Vol. 11, pp. 277-78 (M209, Roll No. 4). Jones's clerk misspelled Fish's name.

1. Nicholas Fish, a retired lawyer, was a Federalist alderman on the New York City Common Council and the chairman of its Committee of Defense during the War of 1812.

MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Honble. William Jones

Sir

After the severe and unmerited reprimand contained in your letter of 23d of last month, I had concluded that for some cause or other to me unknown, a Total silence on my part (in future) would be most desireable to you I therefore had determined not to trouble you or cause your displeasure either with or by

suggestions or questions but confine my self to formal reports such as my duty made necessary, and the service required—

Yours of the 23d. Ulto. contains another censure equally unmerited, charging me with omission, immediately on receiving it, I left the Hook & waited on the Corporation, with a view of acting on the arrangements gone into between you & them instantly, but to my great disapointment was inform'd by that honorable body that you had misconceived their intentions (which were) to advance the pay for the officers and Crews of fifteen Gun boats, that it was expected the Government would furnish rations, that it ought not to be expected by the Govt. that men would volunteer & find themselves &c and observed to me that nothing could be done at present to comport with my instructions—

Consequently my visit hither has proved abortive immediately after closing this I shall again return to my position at Sandy Hook and there await my destiny—where the Enemy are constantly menacing—and where he I believe meditates an attack—and where most Military men believe he will be successful, to the great injury of the Country and the administration, unless Major Means, are used instead of the existing Minor I would undertake to give you a correct statement of the situation of that very Important post, If I did not fear that it would be call'd super arrogance—or construed into Egotism—thereby again incur your displeasure.

I will proceed to offer a few remarks In vindication of my Conduct, for which I have been so severely reprimanded, with a hope that the prejudice you appear to have imbibed against me, (from false representations I trust) will be somewhat allay'd if not Totally disputed, firstly—with respect to calling the Vessels again into actual servise which had been placed in ordinary—I have the honor to observe, that they were not moved, nor did any expence occur, in consequence It was done in consequence of the Enemys menacing Sandy Hook when a number of men were at work erecting a Battery totally unprotected.

The universal cry of the City was, the Enemy are at the Hook—all the works will be destroy'd & all the Mechanicks & others will be made prisoners, This by every person with whom I consulted from the Commander in Chief down, was considered a Case of Emergency & I confess I was of the same opinion—that it was one in a superlative degree, I have cause however to regret that I so construed it; my humble apology is, that the term being in some measure indefinite admits of different interpretations, I have great pleasure in assuring you that no Ill come from it (on the contrary) it served to prove incontrovertably that volunteers can not be depended on, altho invited not one appeared, and it was on this occasion that the Corporation were induced to take into Consideration, the necessity of coming forward & furnishing the means to produce Volunteers—believing as I did the case an imergent one,—

Secondly—as to the letter you allude to dated 26 feby—I have to assure you no such letter has been recd. by me,¹

Thirdly—with respect to Economiy, be assured Sir, that system enters into all my plans and regulations—but in this as well in other indefinite things, I may err in judging as to what constitutes, or may be consider'd Economiy—in my particular Case my Idea is—to render the Flotilla sufficiently Strong & efficient for the purpose it is intended without useless expense or Extravagance is true Economy—thus far would I go & no farther with deference I herewith hand you a scetch of my proceedings—since I had the honor to command the Flotilla, for either your approbation, or disapprobation on taking Command—inquired into the Cause

of one of greatest evils which appeared to exist which was desertion, I found it and applied the remedy— Since which no desertions have taken place, I have obliged every officer in the Flotilla to repair at his own expense, all damages done, by carelessness or neglect, even the loss of masts Cable & anchors this regulation has prevented the repeated accidents formally happen'd,—

And for extravagance or useless expense, I have invariably either furlough'd or discharged the officer—

I have returned the hammocks and built berths—because the former cost a great deal more, & soon ware out—the latter will last as long as the Boat and are never missing—I have changed several of the Circles to the Guns—because they were mounted upon a false principle therefore in a great measure useless—

I have alter'd one of the double Boats—because she could not be made to ware or Stay (in fact) as she was could not be made useful—and having two 32 lb. and having room for a furnace for heating shot, I deemed it proper to render her efficient if possible, I have compleatly Succeeded—she has a furnace, and now sails faster than any thing in the Flotilla—I have established at Spermecetee Cove at the Hook, with the expense of a few Refuse boards a forge, & with the smiths found on board the Flotilla do all its iron work—I have also a Carpenters Shed and do all that work without expense to the Govt. other than the cost of the materials—

and from imperious necessity I am now about erecting at the same place a temporary Hospital—for the Sick, which will Cost the U.S. five hundred board & 100 lb. nails I deem'd it absolutely inhumane to be cruizing about, with four or five sick person on Board a Gun Boat, groaning—& supplicating to be put on Shore some were, that they may receive comfort & necessary aid—

As to the privations which the Flotilla suffer from being obliged to keep their stations at the hook, I will omit comment—

I am willing to believe that its owing to the alternate manner in which the Command of the Navy Yard has devolved—for Example

From Chauncey to Ludlow—
From Ludlow to Hull—
From Hull back to Ludlow—
From Ludlow to Crane—
From Crane to Ludlow—
From Ludlow to Lawrence—

From Lawrence—to the Deputy Store Keeper &c—these unavoidable Changes must naturally produce more or less inconvenience to the Service I am willing to bear my proportion without a murmer—excuse this hasty & incoherent Scrawl and allow me to assure Sir, that my servises are devoted to my Country—that my attachment is now as it ever has been, indelible, for my Government and Mr. Madisons Administration. I live with the fond hope to deserve well of my Country—and that I shall retain undiminished the Consideration & friendship with which I long have been honor'd by the President of the U. States—as well as the Secretaries of State & War, and I assure you Sir it shall be study if possible to deserve your approbation instead of concur with respt. to the proposals from the Corporation they were forwarded to you as soon after being proposed to me as possible—it was my wish that the proposition should be made direct to you as the proper person to answer it and that it would save

time to do so—which I consider'd all important— I have the honor to be with high consr. & respt. yr. faithful Humble. St.

J Lewis

New York May 23d 1813

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 123 (M124, Roll No. 55). See also No. 124 for note from Nicholas Fish stating that the New York City Common Council had agreed to help pay expenses for defense.

1. In his 11 April letter to Jones, Lewis had mentioned receiving Jones's instructions authorizing him to bring gunboats into service in case of an emergency. Lewis may therefore have received the February gunboat reduction order, but conveniently forgotten it; see 11 Apr. 1813, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 10 (M124, Roll No. 55).

Fulton's Ordnance Experiments

The increase in British naval operations in 1813 prompted proposals to counter enemy attacks. Congress on 3 March 1813 mandated a monetary incentive by authorizing payment to any person who destroyed a British ship equal to one half the value of that ship.¹ In enlisting Jones's support for torpedo experiments, Robert Fulton asserted his view that "every Physical operation which is not contrary or at Variance with the laws of nature is practicable for man to perform; this admitted and torpedoes with practice must succeed, for there is no Physical impossibility to prevent it."² Fulton asked Jones in April to loan him a fire ship at New York so he could gain experience in using torpedoes at the ends of spars. By June Jacob Lewis reported Fulton's success in using columbiads under water.

1. Statutes at Large, Vol. 2, Stat. 2, Chap. 47, p. 816.

2. Fulton to Jones, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 18 (M124, Roll No. 55). For further documentation on Fulton, see pp. 210–12, 354–56.

ROBERT FULTON TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

New York April 27th 1813.

Sir

I am anxious to make some interesting experiment on the practice of Torpedoes and for that purpose require a Vessel and some hands which is too expensive for my private purse. You have here several fire Ships which are idle and the Gun boats have many men which do little. Commodore Lewis and I will go into the experiments if you will have the goodness to order that we may take one of the best of the fire Ships for that purpose and some of the Gun boat men.¹ It is not intended to blow her up or in any way injure her but to use her for experience on the mode of attacking with Torpedoes in the end of Spars as mentioned in one of my letters to you for which purpose She will be anchored with the Gun boats to have the men handy and near their permanent duty. This will be gaining useful experiences without any expence to Government. Your granting this request by return of post will promote a useful art and much oblige your most obedient

Robert Fulton

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 58 (M124, Roll No. 55).

1. When Fulton did not get a prompt response from Jones, he wrote to him again on 8 May. Jones ordered Jacob Lewis to assist Fulton by providing one fire vessel and some men but insisted that the navy "incur no expense whatever on account of these experiments." See Fulton to Jones, 8 May 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 82 (M124, Roll No. 55) and Jones to Lewis, 16 May 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 420 (M149, Roll No. 10).

MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Sir

Your letter which you did me the honor to write to me of the 11th Ultoreached me at Sandy Hook, Its contents was as balm to a wound—the *Argus* left Sandy Hook at 5 Ock Friday Eve—with a prosperous breeze,

The Port remains unblockaded, I have for several days been attending to Experiments such as firing one hundred pound Columbiad—five feet under water, The first experiment was made by immersing a six pounder four feet below the Surface, placing a target 10 feet distance through which the ball pass'd—

The question which then suggested itself was, whether—the Gun would not burst if the Muzzle of the Gun was immersed and the other part remain out of water, (accordingly) a hundred pounder was placed In a box with the Muzzle through its side the water prevented from entering. Into the box, the Gun charged with Ten pounds of powder, and a ball—the box sunk in five feet of water—a Target placed at 25 feet distance under water, and the Peace discharged, without Injury—the Ball entered a very Considerable distance into the Target, which was of three feet thickness.

It is therefore ascertained that Cannon can be Exploded under water with as much Certainty as above, it remains to be known how far ~~the ball~~ from the Ship the ball can be drove through the bottom of a Ship—

I am of opinion that a 42 p—will pass through the bottom of any Vessel at twenty feet distance, this Mr. Fulton will prove In a few days—if he should be successful I think submarine Batteries can be turned to a good Accot.— with the highest Consn. & Respect I am yr very Obt Servt.

J Lewis
Comg. U.S. Flotilla
New York 20th June 1813

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 67 (M124, Roll No. 56).

MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Sir

We have again made an experiment with a 100 lb. Columbiad under water, at a Target six feet distance—the Ball pass'd through three feet of solid oak— we had fired a twenty four pounder, with 10 lb. of powder, the same quantity which was given to the Columbiad and were astonished to find it did not pierce the Target farther than the Columbiad did—it proves that the momentum of weight is greater under water in proportion than in the air—



Robert Fulton

Previous to the last experiment it was believed that the 24 lb. having much less water & wood to displace & being impell'd by the same ignited force, would have pass'd infinitely farther through the Target than the Columbiad— by Experiments Columbiads are preferable to any other Calibre for submarine Batteries—with which together Torpedoes—and Torpedo locks fire Ships & Boats enough to keep the Enimies Boats in—there largest Ships can be driven out of our rivers— I have the honor to be with the highest Resp. Yr. obt. St.

J Lewis
Comg. U.S. Flotilla
N Yk. June 28th 1813

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 106 (M124, Roll No. 56).

British Naval Activity off Block Island

By April 1813, the British were tightening their grip around Long Island Sound. Captain Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy¹ commanded a squadron off Block Island, harassing the coastal trade and privateers. H.M. frigate Orpheus, one of the ships in his squadron, often sent her smaller boats after enemy vessels when her size prevented effective pursuit herself. In this way, the British were able to maintain a strong blockade.

1. Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy, R.N., Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson's flag-captain at Trafalgar, was appointed to Ramillies in August 1812.

CAPTAIN HUGH PIGOT, R.N.,¹ TO CAPTAIN SIR THOMAS M. HARDY, R.N.

Copy

His Majestys Ship *Orpheus*
Off Block Island
April 29th 1813.

Sir

At daylight yesterday morning we chased a ship steering for Rhode Island and there being little wind I sent a Boat armed with Mr. Dance (Acting Lieutenant), to cut her off, this service he effectually performed in a most gallant and judicious Manner— observing her great superiority of force he waited until it was time she tacked off shore and then made an attempt to board under a very heavy fire from four long six pounders and repeated volleys of Musketry and by thus engaging the attention of her Crew she ran upon the Rocks about three Miles up the West River² when he returned on board having a few Men only scratched with slugs. We soon after Anchored within gunshot and observing her Crew land with their Musquets and joined by a strong party on shore, I sent Lieutenant Collins in the Launch with her Cannonade to keep them in check, while Mr Dance with two Boats boarded the ship and turned her Guns upon the Enemy who had kept up a brisk fire from behind the Rocks and Stone Walls.

Lieutt. Collins having advanced with most determined bravery within a few yards of the shore the Enemy instantly directed the whole of their fire at his Boat, but were soon dispersed.

The only person hurt on this occasion was that excellent and brave Officer Lieutt. Collins who received a shot in his Body and one through his right Arm of which I sincerely lament to add he survived but twenty four hours.

Mr. Dance now finding the ship bulged [*bilged*] and with a few Casks of Brandy only on board set her on fire. By the papers found on board I learn she was the *Wampoc* American letter of Marque from L'Orient with eight Guns mounted, and I judge from there being fresh beef on board she had touched at Nantucket or Marthas vineyard and landed the principal part of her Cargo.

Permit me Sir to request you will acquaint the Commander in Chief with the highly praiseworthy conduct of Acting Lieutenant Dance whom I truly wish may be confirmed in his appointment to this ship. I have the honor to remain Sir your most obedient & very Humble Servant

H. Pigot Captain

To: Captain Sir Thos. Hardy Bart.
Senior Officer Off Block Island

Copy, UkLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 629–31.

1. Hugh Pigot, a captain in the Royal Navy since 1804, followed in the naval footsteps of his captain father and admiral grandfather.

2. The west passage of Narragansett Bay.

Delaware Flotilla

Commodore Alexander Murray commanded the Delaware flotilla during an interim period in May 1813, after Master Commandant James Biddle departed for Hornet and before Lieutenant Samuel Angus took charge later that month. Meanwhile, two citizens' groups, the Committee for the Defense of Wilmington, Delaware, and the Committee for the Defense of the Delaware, were bombarding Jones with requests for increases in naval assistance. Jones reproved Manuel Eyre, his personal friend and member of the latter committee, for wanting to divert department funding from offensive to defensive operations, but eventually the secretary accepted the citizens' proffer of help. Jones's initial response to Eyre documents the secretary's strategic planning for the limited forces available to him.

Lieutenant Angus took command of the flotilla in May and, after reconnoitering the Delaware River, reported his great satisfaction with the handling of the block sloops. Obviously concerned with the American gunboats, Admiral Sir John B. Warren ordered Captain Hassard Stackpoole to use rowboats to attack the gunboats and to take care in boarding them.

MANUEL EYRE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Philada. May 9th. 1813

My Dear Sir

Ever since my return from Washington I have been endeavouring to rouse the feelings & patriotism of our citizens to aid the General Government in the

defence of the Bay & River Delaware. After many unsuccessful attempts, I think this desirable object is accomplished. Enclosed you have the proceedings of a general meeting of our Citizens at the Coffee house on 6th inst. when Charles Biddle¹ was chairman and John Sergeant secretary. Altho patriotism actuated many yet the Majority are governed by fear or self interest. The City Councils will I believe appropriate thirty thousand Dollars towards this defence and from individual subscription we shall perhaps raise as much more, these funds will in part if not altogether be put at the disposition of the Managing Committee. It is most probable that this Committee will send a deputation to Washington to call on the General Government for further aid. I have conversed with persons who were some time on board the *Poictiers* and there is every reason to believe an attempt will be made in less than three or four weeks (their reinforcement may arrive) to destroy New Castle & perhaps Wilmington—² The quantity of powder and military stores in the United States arsenal and the State Magazine in the Vicinity of this city makes it very probable that some attempt may be made to destroy them both but my opinion is that more danger is to be apprehended from incendiaries lurking in & about our City than from any attempt of the open enemy. Most of the Englishmen have been suffered to return to this City or its vicinity and some of them the most worthless characters. At a crisis like the present the public safety and the safety of so much public property demands in my opinion an immediate order from the General Government for every English subject without distinction to remove immediately at least from fifty to sixty miles into the interior of the country.

The Committee of Management have it in contemplation and no doubt will build six or eight launches or Row Galleys to be partially manned at the expense of the city unless the General Government will man them— The proposed plan for the defence of the Bay & River by the Committee is to call upon the General Government to put all the Gun boats here say 19 in immediate commission these with the two Sloops to be manned at the expense of Government. The Government to be at no greater expense than the usual allowance to seamen &ca. in the United States service any additional bounty and other expences in obtaining the men will be paid by the Committee. The Committee propose to build six or eight launches or Row Galleys in aid of the Gun boats from 40 to 70 feet long which shall be placed under the officers of the General Government and be manned by the Government if it deems proper if not, the Committee will partially man them & place them under the controul of the United States officers and when required can be manned by volunteers or from the Gun boats for any particular emergency. The Committee also propose to procure a ship or vessel as a store ship for the Gun boats to be always anchored in the rear of the flotilla and I think they would also furnish a very fast sailing schooner as a tender on the flotilla to be manned in the same manner as the gun boats. These are the General out lines of the plan to be proposed by the Committee and if you think well of them and will write me immediately it may be the means of preventing a Committee going down to Washington to call on the General Government, as I know the constant calls and importunities upon the heads of the departments I wish to save you all the trouble in my power— I think there is nothing in this plan but what the Government will and ought to grant.

On a consultation with Genl. Bloomfield it appears a verry desirable object with him either to sink a hulk or to have one ready to sink in the Channel back of Fort Mifflin to prevent any attack in the rear— There are other objects which

the Committee will direct and will be attended with considerable expence & will be paid by the Committee but shall not trouble you with them.

I shall feel gratified if by return of post you would inform me that you agree to put in commission immediately the whole 19 Gun boats & the two shallops and mann the Row Galleys & a fast sailing schooner at the expence of Government. The Committee to pay every expence of extra bounty &ca to procure the men but the Government to furnish all the cannon firearms munitions of war & rations—

If you put the boats all in commission and appoint sailing masters I mention the names of a number of Masters of vessels in addition to those you had when I last saw you, who I believe would accept of the command. Norris Hanley, Capt. Hughes, Isaac Silliman, Capt. Donaldson, Capt. Sheed, James McCullough (if exchanged) James Boviar, James Ramage Daniel McPherson, Capt. Myrrick, William Waters, & perhaps Patrick Hays & Thos. Ruby— The Characters of nearly all these you know perhaps as well as I do and will select such as you deem most proper.

Permit me to suggest an idea that forcibly presses on my mind that you would appoint one of the Captains in the Navy now remaining at home to take command (if only for a short time) of this flotilla in the Delaware, such as Capt. Lawrence or any other whose popularity would give such spirit to the enterprize as to accomplish some thing honorable to our country and be the means of strengthening the friends of the administration here. Altho C Biddle and others are friendly to Murray yet the Committee will do every thing in their power both with the funds at their disposal as well as their personal attention to promote so desirable an object. If you will express your opinion as to the best mode of constructing these Row Galley or any other part of this defence it will be highly acceptable. There is a report of the capture of the Brig *Lightning* in the Bay of Biscay about the first of April altho it is not certain yet the report bears every appearance of being true it was just about the time she must have been in the Bay. It is highly gratifying to me that you are placed in such a situation as not to incur any loss by the capture and all the accounts can now soon be closed—³

I hope Mrs. Jones with her two nieces arrived in safety at Washington are pleased with it and enjoy good health. Mrs. Eyre & my respects to Mrs. Jones and accept my sincere regard. ever truly yours

Manuel Eyre

ALS, PHi, U. C. Smith Collection, Papers of William Jones.

1. Eyre is referring to Master Commandant James Biddle's father.

2. On 29 May, boats from *Statira*, *Spartan*, and *Martin* under the orders of Commander Humphry Fleming Senhouse of H.M. Sloop *Martin* moved up and swept the Delaware and its creeks, returning on the 31st after taking and destroying some twenty American vessels; see Hassard Stackpoole to George Cockburn, 8 June 1813, UKLPR, Adm. 1/506, pp. 147-50.

3. Jones was a part owner of the brig *Lightning*.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO MANUEL EYRE

Private

Washington 12 May 1813

My dear Sir

I have received your favor of the 9th. and the friendship that exists between us will I trust tolerate a free and candid reply. Indeed the subject of your letter

is altogether of a public nature involving the plans and operations of the Department over which I preside and may be considered as addressed officially though directed privately. I shall follow your example in the form of a private letter but as I never write in private that of which I ought to deprecate the publicity you are at liberty to make use of it as you think proper by way of information to the Committee of which you are a member. The laudable zeal displayed in the proceedings of the meeting the copy of which you enclosed, does credit to our City and proves that in the event of real danger the spirit and resources of the people will be equal to the crisis, but upon a dispassionate view of the force and probable designs of the enemy the alarm appears to transcend the real cause of apprehension. My public duty having in a particular called my attention and observation to the movements of the enemy, the result of my reflections may not be unacceptable to you. When the hostile squadron first entered the Chesapeake in force I expected a thousand men would have been landed and by a forced march from Lynnhaven Bay have destroyed Norfolk before a force could have been collected to repel them but after 48 hours delay with a fair opportunity to land I was satisfied they did not mean to attempt it in that way. The Naval force collected there at one time was very formidable and had every appearance of a determination to force the passage of the narrows.

The destruction of the *Constellation*, the Navy Yard Gun Boats and shipping and property at Norfolk was a very strong temptation. Captain Stewart however by a single movement with seven Gun Boats & two small tenders compelled them to slip and run from the station they had taken, and they never again seriously menaced the place, but their object was in part accomplished, for they had caused a very considerable concentration of the public force and a great expense in preparation for defence. They then moved off and proceeded to menace Baltimore in the same way exciting a great alarm and expense and then moved down to Annapolis in the same attitude and producing the same effect. They have finally abandoned that and gone down the Bay perhaps to Sea to watch our squadron or it may be a part of them to the Delaware to play off the same game there with the same effect. Their plan of operation appears to me clearly to be that of a rigorous Blockade and harassing exciting and depredating with the hope of diverting our attention from the ocean and the Lakes by employing our troops and our Seamen in the preparation for the defence of our Sea port towns and innumerable Bays harbours rivers and creeks, and surely if they could reduce us to act on the defensive only while they vary the scene of action by their superior force and keep up the excitement ~~and~~ alarm and constant preparation from North to South their object would be gained, for it is idle to suppose we can be prepared at all points to meet the concentrated force of the enemy, and also act with vigor and effect upon the Ocean and the Lakes.

From what has passed I am warranted in concluding that they do not mean to hazard the safety of their ships or the loss of masts, in intricate and narrow channels in the face of even a very moderate force.

As to the burning of French town, Havre de Grace Hughs's furnace Geo,town cross roads and Frederick there was nothing to oppose them but poor O'Neill at Havre, and in the Chesapeake they are in a spacious open Bay of safe and easy navigation free from shoals and shallow flats and with scarcely any tide. It is remarkable that ever since the Blockade they have carefully avoided entering our narrow rivers and have never attempted any thing by Land where they would not have been beaten by two hundred men. But it appears they annoy our Bay

trade and thereby produce great loss and inconvenience to our Cities. This in the event of War with Britain must have been expected by every rational man for it is the natural result of our extensive and navigable waters and their great naval superiority.

Our only plan is to keep up a reasonable force at the several principal points according to the relative importance and exposure of each, without impairing our active operations against the enemy and with a constant view to the attainable means and resources of the Government and to the continuance of the War. If we act like an unskillful combatant urged by his fears or his passions to exhaust his strength in a furious onset we may expect to share his fate.

With this view of the subject who is to decide upon the nature extent and distribution of the public force of the United States?—those immediately interested in local safety and under the influence of that feeling—or the constituted authorities who have the whole subject before them and whose duty it is to watch over and apply the public force for the common defence of all?

I know you too well to doubt your answer. The present distribution of the Naval force of the U.S. for harbour defence contemplates ten Gun Boats and two Block Sloops with two long 18s ~~and~~ two 24 pound carronades and 50 men in each.

This force I did and still do think if well managed, competent not only to the complete defence and protection of the Delaware river and Bay but to the severe annoyance of the enemy. I therefore deem it necessary to inform you explicitly, that the Naval force and expenditure on the Delaware cannot under existing circumstances be increased beyond what I have thus stated— Indeed it would be an unjust diversion of the resources of the Navy Department from places less protected than the Delaware and whose inhabitants are not less urgent and certainly with not less reason.

You will recollect that the force above mentioned is not more than half manned—that one rendezvous is open and every effort employed to procure men for the special service of the Delaware, and that the competition for men which you contemplate may have the effect of closing our rendezvous and enhancing the difficulty and expense of procuring men for other branches of the public for it is in vain that we increase our Navy if our physical means of employing them shall be absorbed in preparations for mere local defence.

I do not approve of Barges or launches for harbour defence or for convoy; they require a vast number of men and are entirely exposed which we ought to avoid. I would not give one of the Block Sloops with 50 men for five times their number in launches. Whom are you to attack with launches? not the enemys ships, but his launches and tenders full of men, and this may prove an unprofitable work of slaughter. The Gun Boats and Sloops particularly form strong convoys and may by taking favorable positions may cut the enemys ships to pieces. I am fearful that in manning your Barges and launches you will unman our Gun Boats and Sloops and I must be permitted to think that the public good would not be promoted by that effect. These ideas you may make known to the committee and I hope they will be received in the spirit in which they are written. My predilections and attachments secure me from the suspicion of a want of disposition to defend my native city and stream. I am very sincerely and respectfully your friend¹

W Jones

1. Two weeks later Jones did accept the launches offered by the Committee for the Defense of the Delaware and attached them to the flotilla. He directed Murray to officer and man them from the flotilla when necessary for selected service. See Jones to Murray, 27 May 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 443 (M149, Roll No. 10).

LIEUTENANT SAMUEL ANGUS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Private

U.S. Flotilla on the Delaware
off Egg Island—Sloop
Buffalo June 9th 1813

Sir

I rec'd your polite and friendly letter dated April 26 mark'd private which from the circuitous rout it had did not come to hand before—When I rec'd it from the New Castle post office the Seale was broke

I greatly appreciate your good advice and shall endeavor always to merit the character as an officer you say I possess—It is a source of much regret to me that my promotion has been hindred by an error of judgment and that an officer younger than myself in commission (Capt. Biddle) should have been promoted over my head although I must confess at the same time that he merits any thing the government can bestow—I hope sir as the difculty between Comr. Chauncey and myself is now settled to your satisfaction it may not prove a future hindrance to my promotion—¹ the Command you have assign'd me on the Delaware as you justly observe is an important one and I am in hopes before long and when we get our flotilla properly man'd to be a considerable annoyance to the british—my reason for leaving New Castle was to afford the river navigation protection which I hope you will approve off our Night rendezvous since leaving New Castle has been Cohanzy Creek, I have stood down some distance below the Flotilla and can see the british squadron from the deck consisting off 2 frigate the *Spartan* & *Statira* ~~and~~ *Martin* sloop and 8 or 9 sail of shallop and two masted boats (which from Information recd. by the pilot of the Spanish ship *Minerva* which the british Squadron have turn'd back (having taken out their provision and water consiting 9 casks of water and 4 lbs. of provision) having informed him that they will suffer no vessel to go out ~~as the~~ the Delaware being blockaded, I shall for the future suffer no spanish or portugees vessel to go down without a positive order from you or Comr. Murray) which they are now mounting Guns on and observe when they return reinforcement they intend to pay New Castle a visit—

The block sloops are far superior to what could have possibly been expected carrying their Guns well and being remarkably stiff their is but one improvement that possibly could be made to them—the Iron bands or bars on the gratings make it difcicult to ship and unship them if Sir you would grant me permission to take the Iron off the grating and raise the midship combings about 6 Inches above the others so that loop holes might be cut through them for musket or the long pike it would make them utterly impregniable—they sail far superior to the Gun boat and equal to almost any of the finest light (without load) shallops—as the barges are to be attatch'd to the flotilla (from what Comdr. Murray informs me) would it not sir be well to let the Gun boat carry forty and the block sloops 60 men (the Sailors are highly pleased with the block sloops having excellent and roomy accommodation)—and by that means we

shall be able to man the barges from the flotilla and still have sufficient men on board for mannagin the Guns and five additional Lieuts. or masters to officer them. I left Phila. on the 29 of May and have been cruizing up and down the bay ever since, I shall leave Chanzy [*Cohansey*] for New Castle to morrow or the next day as they provissions will then be on out

the flotilla consists of 7 Gun boat from 8 to 10 men short and the *Buffalo* and *Camble* [*Camel*] blocksloops fully mand—In hopes Sir you will grant my requests and suffer me to put two 18 lb carrondaides on the *Buffalo* as she will carry them perfectly well the Iron on her grateing weing nearly as much as two 18 lbs. carron aides would—I have the honor to subscribe my self very respecty. your much oblig'd and most obt. Sert.

Saml. Angus
Lt. Comg. U.S. D.F.

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 122 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. For information on the Chauncey-Angus feud, see Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, pp. 371-74, and, Vol. 2, pp. 438-39.

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N., TO
CAPTAIN HASSARD STACKPOOLE, R.N.

Copy

San Domingo, Hampton
Roads Chesapeake June 28th 1813

Sir,

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 19th Instant communicating the movements of the Enemy's Gun Boats in the Delaware, I recommend to you not to permit any of the vessels under your Orders to be drawn among the Shoals in situations where they cannot close with the Enemy, but rather if any attack is made upon the Gun Boats, that it should be with rowing Boats, and that in boarding the Enemy care should be taken that it is done by entering at the Bow or Stern as many of them have Nettings and a mode of tying up their oars so as to prevent people entering by the Broadside of the Gun Boats

I very much approve of your having sent the *Spartan* to Halifax to refit and to rejoin you, but so soon any Frigate arrives here, I shall in the mean time send her to reinforce you—I have the honor to be, Sir, Your Obedient, humble Servant

Signed John Borlase Warren

Copy, UklPR, Adm. 1/506, pp. 159-60.

Naval Medicine

George Logan, surgeon on the South Carolina Station since 1810, tried to convince Jones in the spring of 1813 that a naval hospital was needed at Charleston. Before

Logan's appointment to the station, the proprietor of a private infirmary cared for the sick, charging 75 cents per day and extra for surgical operations. Logan contended that he had saved the navy money by taking them under his own care, and he indicated through his sick list report that the Charleston Station required a hospital. After consulting Dent, Jones decided to engage a guard vessel for the accommodation of the sick because it would be more economical.¹

Dr. Edward Cutbush was dissatisfied with his post as surgeon on the Philadelphia Station, which included the gunboats at New Castle and in the Delaware River and Bay. He wrote to Jones soon after the new secretary arrived in Washington about a surgeon's position at the Washington Navy Yard. Jones appointed Cutbush to the Washington post and outlined for him the responsibilities and emoluments of the job.² The following letters contrast the naval hospital establishment at Washington with a recommendation for creating one at Charleston, South Carolina.

1. Logan to Jones, 10 May and 11 June 1813, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 2, Nos. 33 and 129 (M148, Roll No. 11); and Jones to Logan, 26 June 1813, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 483 (M149, Roll No. 10).
2. Cutbush to Jones, 21 Jan. 1813, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 15 (M148, Roll No. 11).

SURGEON GEORGE LOGAN TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Charleston, S. C.

Sir!

I have the honor to enclose a report of clinical & other sick of the U.S. Seamen, occurring* under my care since the 19 Novr. last, with a desire to shew the expediency of a Hospital Establishment on this station. It may be proper to remark that the conditions of the several Invalids herein mentioned were such as to occasion much annoyance to the Crew, & rendered their removal into sick quarters absolutely necessary.

I have to regret that the destruction of my papers & Books (with other property) on the night of the 19th Novr. prevents my furnishing a report anterior to that date.¹ I am Sir very respectfully your obt. &c.

19th May 1813.

Geo Logan

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, Vol. 2, No. 59 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. A fire in Surgeon Logan's house in Charleston on 19 November 1812 destroyed medical supplies, books, and documents. See Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, p. 587.

[Enclosure]

Report of the U.S. Invalid Seamen admitted into Hospital quarters on the Charleston Station during Six months ending the 19th May 1813.— viz.

Names	Where from	Diseases & When recd.	When discharged
Elias Wigfal	Guardship	Rheumatism	19th Novr. 1812. Relieved
Andrew Miller	Schr. <i>Ferret</i>	Syphilis. 1st Decr. 1812	23d. Decr. 1812. cured
Andrew Noles	Guardship	Ulcer 7th Jany. 1813	23d Jany. 1813. cured
John Henley	Guardship	Burn. 9th Jany. 1813	23d. Jany. 1813. cured
Christir. Beekman	Guardship	Pulmy. Consumpn. 23d Decr. 1812	15th April 1813 dead
Willm. Miller	Guardship	Paralysis. 29th Jany. 1813.	14th Mar. 1813. dead
James S. Lyons	Gun Boat '153'	Ulcers & diseased scapel ¹	1st Apl. 1813. relieved
Gardner	(Alcorn Commg.) Navy Yard	15. Jany. 1813.	
Peter Rochester	Schr. <i>Carolina</i>	Diarrhea 17th. Feby. 1813	25th Feby. 1813 cured
David Callum	Schr. <i>Carolina</i>	Catarrh. Fever. ² 2d Mar 1813	12th Mar 1813 cured
Samuel Waters	Schr. <i>Carolina</i>	Pneumonia 3d Mar 1813	12th Mar 1813 cured
Walter Hosman	Schr. <i>Carolina</i>	Phthisis ³ 27th Mar 1813	15th April 1813 relieved.
John Wentstrom	Schr. <i>Carolina</i>	Diarrhea 24th Apl. 1813	10th May 1813 relieved.
		Catarrh. Fever 10th May 1813	14 May 1813 cured

Cured & relieved 11. dead 2. total 13.

*(of Invalids admitted into Hospital quarters.)

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 59, enclosure (M148, Roll No. 11).

Geo. Logan

1. Probably scapula, a shoulder blade.
2. Catarrhal fever is an inflammation of a mucous membrane.
3. Pulmonary tuberculosis.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO SURGEON EDWARD CUTBUSH

Doctor Edward Cutbush
Surgeon U.S. Navy.
Navy Yard Washington

Navy Depart.
23rd May 1813

You are hereby appointed to the charge and direction of the Marine and Navy Hospital establishment in this City and of the medical and hospital Stores, which may from time to time be required for the use of the hospitals, or for the vessels of the United States equipped at this place, with the issue whereof you will be charged and held accountable quarter yearly.

The Commandant of the Navy Yard and the Commandant of the Marine Corps will each provide for you a Store room for the preservation of the medical & hospital Stores, of which you will keep the keys and have the exclusive Charge and direction of the issues.

Until the Establishment of the Navy hospital is matured, you will adopt such regulations for the management and direction of the hospitals and of the officers and persons under your authority, as shall appear to you best adapted, to promote the public interest, and the objects of the institutions under your charge. You will observe that none but persons entitled by Law to the benefit of the Navy or Marine medical and hospital Stores, are to participate in the use thereof. It his however to be understood, that if any Master or laboring Mechanic, or common laborer employed in the Navy yard, shall receive any sudden wound or injury, while so employed in the Yard, he shall be entitled to temporary relief. But if the person sustaining such injury be a Slave, his master shall allow out of his wages a reasonable compensation for such medical and hospital aid as he may receive, and if the injury of disability shall be likely to continue, the master shall cause such Slave to be removed from the public hospital. The Commandant of the Navy Yard and the Commandant of the Marine Corps or the late Surgeon of those establishments will cause to be delivered to you all the medical and hospital Stores and Surgical instruments now on hand, for which you will give duplicate receipts, one of which you will forward to the accountant of the Navy Department, in order that you may be charged with the same.

All requisitions made either by the Commandant of the Navy Yard or the Commander of any vessel of the Navy of the United States, for medical Stores, hospital Stores or Surgical instruments, are to be carefully examined by yourself, which if found correct and reasonable you will approve, but if otherwise, you will reduce the requisition to what you may deem proper for the occasion.

You will make out such requisitions for medical and Hospital Stores and Surgical instruments from time to time, as may be necessary to meet in due time, the demands of this Station, and present the same to this Department, in order that measures may be taken to procure them of the best quality and at the most reasonable rate, by ascertaining the cost at other places and comparing it with the prices at this place. On the arrival of any vessel of the Navy of the United States at this place, for the purpose of refitting, the Surgeon of any such vessel will furnish you with an exact inventory of all the medical and Hospital Stores and Surgical instruments, remaining on board of said vessel, to be certified by the signing officers, which Stores and Surgical instruments you are to receive and deposit in the Store room, and furnish a Copy of the said certified Inven-

tory to the accountant of this Department, in order that you may be charged with the same.

If the Surgical instruments so delivered shall require cleaning or repairing, you will cause the same to be put in order, fit for use, and the medical chests and implements to be cleansed, repaired, or replaced, as the case may require. All that can be performed by the mechanics in the Navy Yard, or Marine Barracks either in making or repairing or other work for the hospital Department, will be done on your application to the Commandant of the Navy Yard, or Commandant of the Marine Corps. You will carefully enquire into and take notes of the present practice in the Hospital Department at this Station, and correct whatever may appear to you, upon a careful investigation, contrary to Law, or incompatible with the public interest and real objects of the institutions.

You will be allowed, for your care, management and direction of all the objects thus committed to your Charge as follows.

By the act of the 27th of march 1804, vol. 7, chap. 53, page 148 the Surgeon attached to the Navy Yard and Vessels in Ordinary at Washington is entitled to the same pay rations and emoluments, as are allowed to a Surgeon in the army of the United States viz

45 dollars per month for twelve months is	\$540.00
3 Rations per day at 20 Cents for ditto do.	219.00
10 dollars per month for forage ditto do.	120.00

The pay, rations & clothing of a Servant if not taken from the line amounting in 12 months to 237 $48 \frac{3}{4}$ 100 dollars viz

Pay at 8 dollars per month	\$96.00	
Rations at 20 Cents per day	73.00	
Clothing	<u>68.48 $\frac{3}{4}$</u>	\$237.48 $\frac{3}{4}$

He is also allowed quarters, fuel, candles, to be furnished by the quarter master of the army: but as that is not applicable to the present case, the following is considered an equitable allowance for those objects at this Station to wit;

For quarters per annum dollars	250.00	
For fuel and Candles	<u>150.00</u>	400.00

In addition to the Pay rations &c allowed under this act, you will be entitled to receive, as superintendent of medical stores

400.00

Making together, the Sum of Dollars 1916.48 $\frac{3}{4}$

Your Pay and Emoluments are to commence here with the date of the letter, by which you were ordered to repair to this Station. I am very respectfully your obedt. Servt.

W. Jones

Chesapeake vs. Shannon

After returning triumphant from the Hornet-Peacock engagement, Captain James Lawrence was appointed to the post of commandant at the New York Navy Yard, and then soon after ordered to command Constitution. He was reassigned, however, to Chesapeake in early May, when Captain Samuel Evans's health problem created a command vacancy in the frigate. Jones, ever anxious to see American vessels cruising rather than in port refitting, directed Lawrence to leave immediately for Boston to oversee her refitting. Lawrence was commander of Chesapeake fewer than two weeks before he met Shannon, whereas Captain Philip B. V. Broke had the advantage of commanding his ship for seven years. Broke, recognizing that Shannon would soon be recalled for extensive repairs, desperately wanted to engage an American frigate as the capstone to his long naval career; he wrote the following letter, cleverly describing the "advantages" of meeting in single combat, but Lawrence had already sailed by the time the letter arrived at Boston.

Some historians have criticized Lawrence for sailing before first working his untrained crew and raw officers into a team. Ordered by Secretary Jones to depart as expeditiously as possible, Lawrence took the first opportunity to sail. Although there is merit to the charge that Chesapeake was not ready, ultimately, Shannon's expertise in broadside gunnery defeated the Americans.¹

1. For more background on this engagement, see Padfield, *Broke and Shannon*, especially chapters six and seven; and James, *Naval History*, Vol. 6, pp. 50-68. For an American point of view, see Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, pp. 176-90.

CAPTAIN PHILIP B. V. BROKE, R.N., TO CAPTAIN JAMES LAWRENCE

His Britannic Majesty's Ship
Shannon off Boston 1813¹

Sir,

As the *chesapeake* appears now ready for Sea, I request you will do me the favor to meet the *Shannon* with her, Ship to Ship, to try the fortune of our respective Flags; to an Officer of your character, it requires some apology for proceeding to further particulars, be assured Sir, that it is not from any doubt that I can entertain of your wishing to close with my proposal, but merely to provide an Answer to any objection which might be made, and very reasonably, upon the chance of our receiving an unfair support,—

After the diligent attention which we had paid to Commodore Rodgers, the pains I took to detach all force, but *Shannon* and *Tenedos*, to such a distance that they could not possibly join in any Action fought in sight of the Capes, and the various Verbal messages which had been sent into Boston to that effect, we were much disappointed to find that the Commodore had eluded us, by sailing on the first change, after the prevailing Easterly winds had obliged us to keep an offing from the Coast; he, perhaps, wished for some stronger assurance of a fair meeting; I am therefore induced to address you more particularly, and to assure you that what I write I pledge my honor to perform to the utmost of my power,—

The *Shannon* mounts twenty four Guns upon her broadside, and one light Boat Gun, Eighteen pounders on her Main deck, and Thirty two pound Carronades on her Quarter deck and Forecastle; and is manned with a Complement of Three Hun-



Master Commandant James Lawrence



Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, R.N.

dred Men and Boys, (a large proportion of the latter), besides Thirty Seamen, Boys, and Passengers which were taken out of re-captured Vessels lately. I am thus minute, because a report has prevailed in some of the Boston papers, that we had one Hundred and Fifty Men additional lent us from *La Hogûe*, which really never was the case;—*La Hogûe* is now gone to Halifax for Provisions, and I will send all other Ships beyond the power of interfering with us, and meet you wherever is most agreeable to you, within the limits of the undermentioned Rendezvous, viz: from Six to Ten leagues east of Cape Cod light House;—“from Eight to Ten Leagues East of Cape Ann lights,—“on Cashe’s ledge in Lat. 43°:00’ No. or, at any bearing and distance you please to fix; off the South breaker of Nantucket, or the Shoal on St. George’s bank.

If you will favor me with any plan of Signals, or Telegraph, I will warn you, (if sailing under this promise) should any of my Friends be too nigh, or any where in sight,—until I can detach them out of our way;—or I would sail with you, under a truce Flag, to any place you think safest from our Cruisers, hauling it down when fair to begin Hostilities;—

You must, Sir, be aware that my proposals are highly advantageous to you, as you cannot proceed to Sea singly in *chesapeake* without imminent risque of being crushed by the superior force of the numerous British squadrons which are now abroad, where all your efforts, in case of a rencontre, would, however gallant, be perfectly hopeless;

I entreat you, Sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to the wish of meeting the *chesapeake*, or that I depend only upon your personal ambition for your acceding to this Invitation, we have both nobler motives,— you will feel it as a compliment if I say that the result of our meeting may be the most grateful Service I can render to my Country,— and I doubt not that you, equally confident of success, will feel convinced that it is only by continued triumphs in even combats, that your little Navy can now hope to console your Country for the loss of that Trade it can no longer protect.— favor me with a speedy reply,— we are short of Provisions and Water, and cannot stay long here; I have the honor to be Sir Your obedient humble Servant.

Captain of His Britannic
Majesty’s Ship *Shannon*
P B V Broke

N.B.— For the general service of watching your Coast, it is requisite for me to keep another Ship in Company, to support us with her Guns and Boats, when employ’d near the Land, and particularly to Aid each other, if either Ship in chase should get on shore;— you must be aware that I cannot consistently with my duty, wave so great an advantage for this general service, by detaching my Consort, without an assurance on your part of meeting me directly, and that you will neither seek, or admit Aid from any other of your armed Vessels, if I detach mine expressly for the sake of meeting you;— should any special order restrain you from thus answering a formal challenge, you may yet oblige me by keeping my proposal a secret, and appointing any place you like to meet us (within Three Hundred Miles of Boston) in a given number of days after you sail. as, unless you agree to an Interview, I may be busied on other service,—and perhaps be at a distance from Boston, when you go to Sea.— choose your terms, but let us meet.

Captain.

To the Captain of the United States Frigate *Chesapeake*.

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 12a (M125, Roll No. 29). The postscript was not signed by Broke. Broke’s letter to Lawrence was enclosed in William Bainbridge to Jones, 3 June 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 12 (M125, Roll No. 29).

1. Broke did not date his letter, but it is probable that he wrote this challenge to Lawrence on 31 May and that it was taken to the Boston post office on 1 or 2 June.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE *CHESAPEAKE-SHANNON* ACTION¹

Copy Thos. Bladen Capel

Shannon Halifax
June 6th 1813


Sir,

I have the honor to inform you that being close in with Boston Light House in His Majesty’s Ship under my Command on the 1st inst.—I had the pleasure of seeing that the United States Frigate *Chesapeake* (whom we had long been Watching) was coming out of the Harbour to engage the *Shannon*— I took a position between Cape Ann and Cape Cod, and then hove to for him to join us—the Enemy came down in a very handsome manner, having three American Ensigns flying—when closing with us he sent down his royal Yards— I kept the *Shannons* up, expecting the breeze would die away— At half past five P M the Enemy hauled up within hail of us, on the Starb. side & the Battle began—both Ships steering full under the Topsails; after exchanging between two and three Broadides, the Enemys Ship fell on board of us—her mizen channels locking in with our fore rigging—I went forward to ascertain her position, and observing that the Enemy were flinching from their Guns, I gave orders to prepare for boarding— Our gallant bands appointed to that Service immediately rushed in under their respective Officers, upon the Enemys Decks driving every thing before them with irresistible fury.— the Enemy made a desperate, but disorderly Resistance— The firing continued at all the Gangways and between the Tops, but in two minutes time the Enemy were driven, Sword in hand from every Post. The American flag was hauled down and the proud old British Union floated triumphant over it— in another minute they ceased firing from below and called for quarter— the whole of this Service was achieved in fifteen minutes from the commencement of the Action.


I have to lament the loss of many of my gallant Shipmates, but they fell exulting in their Conquest.

My brave first Lieutenant Mr. Watt was slain in the moment of Victory, in the act of hoisting the British Colours—his Death is a severe loss to the Service— Mr. Aldham the Purser, who had spiritedly Volunteered the charge of a Party of small armed men, was killed at his Post on the Gangway— My faithful Old Clerk Mr. Dunn was Shot by his Side.— Mr. Aldham has left a Widow to lament his loss— I request the Commander in Chief will recommend her to the protection of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.—

My Veteran Boatswain, Mr. Stephens has lost an Arm—he fought under Lord Rodney on the 12th April. I trust his Age and Services will be duly rewarded— I am happy to say that Mr. Samwell a Midshipman of much merit, is the only other Officer Wounded besides myself, and he not dangerously. Of my gallant Seamen & marines We had twenty three Slain, and fifty six Wounded— I subjoin the Names of the former— No expressions I can make use of can do justice to the merits of my Valiant Officers and Crew.— the calm courage they dis-



"H.M.S. Shannon commencing the BATTLE with the AMERICAN FRIGATE Chesapeake on the 1st June 1813"



"H.M.S. Shannon leading her PRIZE the AMERICAN FRIGATE Chesapeake into HALIFAX HARBOUR on the 6th June 1813"

played during the Cannonade, and the tremendous precision of their fire, could only be equalled by the ardour with which they rushed to the assault.— I recommend them all warmly to the protection of the Commander in Chief—

Having received a severe Sabre Wound at the first onset, whilst charging a party of the Enemy who had rallied on their forecastle, I was only capable of giving Command 'till assured our Conquest was Complete, and then, directing Second Lieutenant Wallis to take charge of the *Shannon*, and secure the Prisoners, I left the third Lieutenant Mr. Falkiner (who had headed the Main Deck boarders) in charge of the Prize— I beg to recommend these Officers most strongly to the Commander in Chiefs patronage, for the gallantry they displayed during the Action, and the Skill and judgment they evinced in the anxious duties which afterwards devolved upon them—

To Mr. Etough the acting Master—I am much indebted, for the steadiness in which he Conn'd the Ship into Action— The Lieutenants Johns and Law of the Marines bravely boarded at the head of their respective Divisions.

It is impossible to particularize every brilliant deed performed by my Officers and Men, but I must mention when the Ships Yard Arms were locked together, that Mr. Cosnahan who Commanded in our Main Top, finding himself screened from the Enemy by the foot of the Topsail, laid out at the Main Yard Arm to fire upon them, and Shot three men in that situation— Mr. Smith who Commanded in our foretop, & stormed the Enemys foretop from the fore Yard Arm, and destroyed all the Americans remaining in it— I particularly beg leave to recommend Messrs. Etough the acting Master, Smith & Leake midshipmen as having already passed their examination for Lieutenants and Messrs. Clavering, Raymond and Littlejohn as equally qualified, and being within a few weeks of their time— this latter Officer is a Son of Captain Littlejohn who was Slain in the *Berwick*.

The loss of the Enemy was about Seventy killed, and One hundred Wounded— amongst the former were the fourth Lieutenant, a Lieut. of marines, the Master and many other Officers— Captain Lawrence is since Dead of his Wounds.—²

The Enemy came into Action with a Compliment of four hundred and forty men— the *Shannon* having picked up some re Captured Seamen had three hundred and thirty.

The *Chesapeake* is a fine frigate, and mounts forty nine Guns—Eighteens on her main Deck—two and thirties on her quarter Deck & forecastle—both Ships came out of Action in the most beautiful order—their Rigging appearing as perfect as if they had only been Exchanging a Salute.— I have the honor to be Sir, Your most Obedient humble Servant

P. B. V. Broke

List of Killed on board His Majesty's Ship *Shannon*

G. T. L. Watt	It Lieut.
G. Aldham	Purser
John Dunn	Captain's Clerk
G. Gilbert	Able Seaman
Wm. Berilles	Do.
Neil Gilchrist	Do.
Thos. Selby	Do.
Jas. Long	Do.
John Young	Do.

	Jas. Wallace	Do.
	Joseph Brown	Do.
	Thos. Barr	Ordy.
	Mickl. Murphy	Do.
	Thos. Molloy	Do.
	Thos. Jones	Do.
	Jno. Oconnelly	Do.
	Thos. Barry	It Class Boy
Marines	Saml. Millard	Corpl.
	Jas. Jayms	Private
	Dominique Saden	Do.
	Wm. Young	Do.
Superys.	Wm. Morrisay	
	Jno. Moriarty	
	Thos. German	

(Signed) P. B. V. Broke Capt.
Alexr. Jack Surgeon.

Copy, UKLPR, Adm. 1/503, pp. 645-53. Edgar S. Maclay, in his study of the U.S. Navy, found that this letter lacked Broke's sanction because the British captain's wounds prevented him from writing or even dictating. On 6 June, the day *Shannon* and *Chesapeake* entered Halifax, Broke lay motionless and spoke only in monosyllables. Maclay asserted that while he was in England, from 1885 to 1886, he received documents from Admiral Sir Provo Wallis, second lieutenant on *Shannon*, that proved that this letter was concocted by Captain the Honorable Philip Wodehouse, commissioner of the Halifax Dockyard, Captain the Honorable Thomas Bladen Capel and Captain Richard Byron in order to get an official account of the victory off to London as soon as possible. Wallis indicated to Maclay that this letter contained inaccuracies relating to the performance of several people and the condition of the rigging. See Maclay, *United States Navy*, Vol. 1, pp. xix-xxi. For a recent account of this controversial letter, see Heine, *Ninety-six Years*, pp. 54-60.

1. Captain the Honorable Thomas Bladen Capel, R.N., was the senior naval officer at Halifax.

2. Peter Padfield computed 146 casualties out of 395 officers and men on board *Chesapeake*; 50 killed outright; 19 wounded, since dead; and 75 wounded and recovered. "This casualty proportion was quite sufficient to ensure the defeat of any man-of-war of the day. No dereliction of duty or cowardice need be attributed to the Chesapeakes." See Padfield, *Broke and Shannon*, p. 233.

LIEUTENANT GEORGE BUDD¹ TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Halifax June 15th 1813

Sir

The unfortunate death of Captain James Lawrence and Lieutenant Augustus C. Ludlow has rendered it my duty to inform you of the Capture of the late United States Frigate *Chesapeake*. On Tuesday June 1st at 8 A.M. we unmoored Ship and at Meridian got under way from President's Roads, with a light wind from the Southward and westward, and proceeded on a cruise. A Ship was then in sight, in the offing which had the appearance of a Ship of War, and which from information received from pilot boats and craft we believed to be the British Frigate *Shannon*. We made sail in chase and cleared Ship for action. At 1/2 past 4 P.M. she hove to, with her head to the Southward and eastward. At 5 P.M. took in the royals and top gal-

lant Sails, and at 1/2 past 5 hauled the courses up. About 15 minutes before 6 P.M. the action commenced within pistol shot. The first broadside did great execution on both sides, damaged our rigging, killed among others Mr. White the sailing master, and wounded Captain Lawrence— In about 12 minutes after the commencement of the action, we fell on board of the enemy, and immediately after one of our arm chests on the quarter deck was blown up by a hand grenade thrown from the enemy's Ship.² In a few minutes one of the Captain's aids came on the gun deck to inform me that the boarders were called. I immediately called the boarders away and proceeded to the Spar deck, where I found that the enemy had succeeded in boarding us and had gained possession of our quarter deck. I immediately gave orders to haul on board the fore tack, for the purpose of shooting the Ship clear of the other, and then made an attempt to regain the quarter deck, but was wounded, and thrown down on the gun deck. I again made an effort to collect the boarders, but in the mean time the enemy had gained complete possession of the Ship. On my being carried down to the cockpit, I there found Captain Lawrence and Lieutenant Ludlow both mortally wounded; the former had been carried below previous to the Ship's being boarded; the latter was wounded in attempting to repel the boarders. Among those who fell early in the action was Mr. Edward J. Ballard the 4th Lieutenant and Lieutenant James Broome of Marines.

I herein enclose to you a return of the killed and wounded, by which you will perceive that every Officer, upon whom the charge of the Ship could devolve, was either killed or wounded previous to her capture.³ The enemy report the loss of Mr. Watt their first Lieutenant, the Purser, the Captain's Clerk, and 23 seamen killed, and Captain Broke, a Midshipman, and 56 seamen wounded.

The *Shannon* had, in addition to her full complement an officer and 16 men belonging to the *Belle Poole*, and a part of the crew belonging to the *Tenedos*. I have the honor to be, with very great respect &c. Sir, Your Most Obt. Servt.

George Budd

ALS, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 2, No. 138 (M148, Roll No. 11).

1. George Budd's commission as lieutenant dated from 23 May 1812. As second lieutenant of *Chesapeake*, Budd became the senior surviving officer after the death of Lawrence and First Lieutenant Augustus C. Ludlow.

2. British historian William James disputes this, saying only that an arms chest "caught fire and blew up, but did no injury whatever." See James, *Naval History*, Vol. 6, p. 56.

3. No list was found with Budd's letter. For a printed version, see Pullen, *Shannon and Chesapeake*, pp. 143–46.

Blockade Frustrates *United States*, *Macedonian*, and *Hornet*

The British established a tight blockade around New York during April and May 1813. Captain Robert Dudley Oliver,¹ senior British naval officer, positioned Valiant, 74, and Acasta, 44, near Sandy Hook to prevent any southerly escape. Captain Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy blockaded the eastern exit between Montauk Point and Block Island with Ramillies, 74, and Orpheus, 36. In their initial cruising plans, Commodore Stephen Decatur in United States and Lieutenant William H. Allen in Argus were to leave New York together and proceed to attack the British blockaders off Charleston, South Carolina,

before separating. Just before Argus sailed, President Madison ordered her to return to port for a special diplomatic mission.² The refitted British frigate Macedonian, 38, under Captain Jacob Jones, joined Decatur on 13 May; and Hornet, 20, under Master Commandant James Biddle, followed on 22 May. The three American ships attempted to sortie through Lower New York Bay but were frustrated by weather conditions. Impatient with waiting and convinced that Hardy's squadron was less formidable than Oliver's, Decatur, the senior American officer, decided to venture his squadron through the narrow and treacherous Hell Gate into Long Island Sound. Captain Oliver, anticipating Decatur's plan, ordered Hardy to switch stations with him so that he could confront the Americans.

1. Robert Dudley Oliver, a captain since 1796, commissioned Valiant in 1810, and commanded her on the American coast from 1813 to 1814.

2. See pp. 140–42.

COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S.S. *United States*. New London June 1813¹

Sir,

On Tuesday the 18th Ult. we got under way at New York in company with the *Macedonian* & *Hornet* with a view of passing Hurl [Hell] Gate, but in our approach to it this ship took the ground slightly, which detained us until it was too late for that tide but without doing the ship any damage— The wind continued Easterly and light until the 24th when we all got under way & stood through Hurl Gate without the least difficulty— On the 26th we came down Sound and continued in the neighbourhood of Fishers Island, changing our situation occasionally, until the 1st Instant. We had various information of the force of the Enemy off Montaug but were only certain of his having a line of battle ship & a frigate there— On the first we stood through the race there being then no vessel of war in sight beside the *Seventy-four* & a frigate & they a long distance to the Southward & Westward of Montaug— As we approached Block Island we discovered two men of war under it and finding the ships which were in chase of us to Leeward hauling their wind to cut us off from New London and those in Block Island channel manoeuvring to prevent our reaching Newport we hauled our wind & beat back through the Race up to this harbour.² Two of the Enemy's ships, the names of which I had not been able to ascertain, a line of battle ship and a frigate are now off here and it is said three of his men of war one or two of them of the line are off Block Island.

On inquiry I found Fort Trumbull the only work here mounted or garrisoned was in the most unprepared state & that only one or two cannon were to be had in the neighbourhood for any temporary work which should be erected— I immediately directed my attention & all my exertions to strengthening the defences of the place— Groton Height has been hastily prepared for the reception of a few large guns & they will be mounted immediately— a small outwork in advance of it has also been mounted with two of the dismounted carronades of this ship and the militia of the vicinity are out in abundant numbers to garrison them— The Enemy has declared his intention to cut us out— and when it is considered how important the destruction of these ships is to him I think if he could detach a force sufficient to secure it there is no doubt it would be attempted— with the force off here I do not believe it will be & have no great apprehension of the result if it should—

If twenty pieces of heavy cannon, 18 or 24 pounders (the latter to be preferred) mounted on travelling carriages could be sent here from New York or elsewhere with authority to lay platforms & incur the expences incident to their being fitted for use, I think the place might be made impregnable; but the hostile force on our coast is so great, were the Enemy to exert all his means or a large portion of them in an attack here I do not feel certain that he could be resisted successfully with the present defences of the place— I am Sir with great respect your very humble Servant

Stephen Decatur

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 3 (M125, Roll No. 29).

1. Decatur did not date his letter, but Jacob Jones and James Biddle wrote their accounts to Secretary Jones on 2 June.

2. Jacob Jones and James Biddle reported seeing "a man of war" and "a large Sail . . . apparently a Ship of the Line", respectively. See Jacob Jones to William Jones, 2 June 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 9 (M125, Roll No. 29); and James Biddle to William Jones, 2 June 1813, DNA, RG45, MC, 1813, No. 67 (M147, Roll No. 5). W. M. P. Dunne carefully studied British records and found no evidence of any enemy vessels in the area except for *Valiant* and *Acasta*. He concluded that the three American commanders, their judgments tainted by false intelligence reports, mistook some vessels near Block Island for British warships. See Dunne, "Inglorious First of June," pp. 214-16.

COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Frigate *United States* New London. June 6. 1813

Sir

Since I had the honour of writing you I have ascertained that the ships blockading the Sound, are the *Valiant* and *Ramillies*, Seventy fours, the *Acasta* & *Orpheus* Frigates, a sloop ship and some tenders,— They are now at anchor within our view a little to the Westward of the Race— The boats of the *Valiant* landed yesterday on Gardiners Island and took from thence some stock— the officers stated, that they had dispatched a tender for a reinforcement, and that when they should obtain it, they intended an attack—

Our present position (from the state of the batteries and the few guns that are mounted on Fort Griswold) is not such, as to inspire me with much confidence as to the result of an attack made by such a force as they can command;—for although I am satisfied, that we should destroy two or three of their leading ships, there is no doubt, but the remaining force of the Enemy would be sufficient to secure the capture of our vessels or their destruction— It has therefore been my determination, in case no favourable opportunity should offer to proceed to sea, to avail myself of the first good wind and dark night, to return to New-York by the way of the Sound— If the Ships of the Enemy in sight maintain their present position we shall be enabled to pass up Sound without risk— if however they should take anchorage off the mouth of this harbour (which there is nothing to prevent) it will be hardly possible that we can pass them— In this event, I shall proceed up the river about [six?] miles, to do which, I shall have to lighten some and bring my ship upon an even keel— At this point we shall be perfectly secure, as the channel is very narrow and intricate and not a sufficient depth of water to enable large ships to follow—

If some of the twenty four pounders in the Navy Yard at New York with carriages could be sent here, and a few of the Gun Boats stationed there, could be

removed here, I feel satisfied our position would be rendered so formidable that no attack of the enemy need be apprehended.

Enclosed is the copy of a letter addressed to me by the Governour of Connecticut—& another from the Collector of Sag Harbor With the highest respect I am Sir your very humble servant

Stephen Decatur

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 21 (M125, Roll No. 29). Enclosures are not printed.

CAPTAIN ROBERT DUDLEY OLIVER, R.N., TO
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

Copy

Valiant at Sea 13th June 1813

Sir

On the 16 May the American Frigates *United States* and *Macedonian* & *Argus* Brig¹ after laying several days at Sandy Hook, and finding no chance for making their escape, that way returned up the North River— On the 20th I received information that they had entered the East River, and that the *United States* had been aground but without receiving any damage,— On the 22d the *Martin* called off the Hook in her way to Block Island & the *Valiant*, and *Acasta*, being reduced to 10 days water (as the only resource within my reach) I sent orders by the *Martin* to Sir Thomas Hardy to join me off Sandy Hook, until I could get water.— On the 25th having received information which I thought certain that the Enemy's Ships had been under weigh in the East River the day before and had probably passed Hell Gates, I pushed for Montuck Point and reached it the Morning of the 26th and learnt from Capn. Pigot of the *Orpheus* that the *Ramillies* was gone off Sandy Hook, I sent her to join her— I anchored the next day off Block Island and procured 20 tons of water, the weather then became so bad I was obliged to desist watering and it was so foggy that I could not reconnoitre the entrance of the Sound till the 30th when I saw the Enemy's Frigates and the *Hornet* Sloop at Anchor to the westward of Fishers Island, the wind was from the westward the floodtide done and As they had the Port of New London so near to them I had no hopes of approaching them in that situation so I returned off Montuk— On the morning of the first of June at 9 O Clock as we were rounding Montuk Point with the *Acasta* the above Ships were seen directly to Windward at about 7 or 8 Miles distance coming down with studding sails set steering S.E the wind at N[W?] As soon as ever they made us out they hauled close upon a wind with every sail they could carry, and altho, we were flying light there not being 40 Tons of water in both Ships we neared them considerably by the time they entered the Race which they effected by 12 O Clock—we both passed it about 3 quarters past 12, by this time the Wind had Changed to W.S.W. and had brought the *Acasta* so near the *United States* that they had a shot each tho' scarcely within distance, the latter had then her studding sails set on both sides steering for New London which she entered soon after two O Clock, the *Macedonian* and *Hornet* kept a head and appeared to sail much better.— I extremely regret it was not in my power to prevent their reaching a Port; there was no person in either of our Ships that had ever been thro' the Race before,

and it certainly is a Navigation from the great strength of the tide and other circumstances that requires some local knowledge—

We repassed the Race and anchored off Gardiners Island, from whence we could see the Enemy's Ships in New London River & I sent the *Acasta* to Fort-pondbay where she got wood and water with great ease also a few Cattle.—

On the 2d. June I pressed a fishing smack and sent an express to Sir Thos. Hardy to join me with the *Ramilies* and *Orpheus* in the hope that something might be done with those Ships at New London, light winds prevented his arrival till the 7th. By this time the Enemy's Ships had moved up the River 5 or 6 Miles to Gales Ferry where I understand there is little more water than they draw—the Forts on each side had been considerably strengthened and Two or three Regiments had Arrived in the Town and it was the unanimous opinion of Captains Sir T Hardy Pigot and Kerr that the destructions of those Ships could not be effected with any prospects of saving our own without having a superior Force to take the place and even then it was very doubtful if the Line of Battle Ships could go up the River, upon no Chart do I see more than 4 fathoms marked and that only at the entrance. The *Macedonian* grounded the first day going in and the *Hornet* was obliged to lighten before she could get off where she touched— On the 8th we Anchored off the West End of Fishers Island within 4 or 5 miles of New London where I continued Sounding and annoying the Coasting trade of the Enemy as much possible till the 12th when leaving the *Ramilies* & *Orpheus* there having previously supplied them with all the Provisions we could possibly spare— I sailed with the *Acasta* and am now making the best of my way to Halifax to replenish, the wind precluding our going to Bermuda with our present supplies much as I feel disappointed in not having been able to do more against the Enemy yet I have great consolation in having prevented their getting to sea from both ends of Long Island and from knowing that they are now in a situation where perhaps they can be more easily watched than in most others.— I have the honor to be Sir Your most obedient humble servant

Signed Rt. Dudley Oliver Capn.

Copy, UKLPR, Adm. 1/504, pp. 223–26. Original is incomplete and badly damaged; see UKLPR, 1/504, pp. 179–81.

1. *Hornet* replaced *Argus*.

COMMODORE STEPHEN DECATUR TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S.F. *United States* New London
June 18th 1813

Sir,

Since I last had the honor of writing you, two of the Enemys ships, (a seventy four & a Frigate) have left their anchorage off this place; it is reported that they have sailed for Hallifax.

The vessels remaining are a Seventy four & frigate, they are at anchor off the Mouth of this Harbor about four miles distant there is also a Frigate cruising between Montague & Fishers Island.— The Gun Boats have not yet arrived from New York, the moment they do, & the weather will permit, I contemplate an at-

tack with them on the enemy;¹ The position they have chosen is the best that could have been for our purpose.—

I have requested the Navy Agent to forward to this place two Forges that were at the Navy Yard New York. They have arrived at New Haven, & will be here in the course of today, I intend placing them on the Gun Boats.—

I am sorry to inform that notwithstanding the vigilance of our guard boats, there is constant communication kept up with the enemy.— One person has been detected in going alongside of the enemys ships, he is now confined by order of the Marshall, there is little doubt that he was employed by Mr. Stewart the Agent for Prisoners at this place. It appears by his own acknowledgement that he is an Alien Enemy. I do trust this man may be tryed as a spy; something should certainly be done to put a stop to this communication.

Mr. Stewart the gentleman above spoken of, appears to have great influence here, he has it in his power, & it is said uses it, to do much injury.— I am informed by many persons entitled to credit, that Mr. Stewart has been in the practice of loading (through his agents) Neutral vessels with stock cleared out for St. Bart's, but discharged their cargoes alongside the enemies ships— I have the honor to be most respectfully your obt. St.

Stephen Decatur

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 85 (M125, Roll No. 29).

1. After learning that Decatur had retreated several miles up the Thames River, Jones told Jacob Lewis not to hazard the New York gunboat flotilla to aid Decatur unless it was absolutely necessary; see Jones to Lewis, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 464 (M149, Roll No. 10).

Admiralty Orders for Warren

The Admiralty's correspondence with Admiral Sir John B. Warren indicated a lack of confidence in his ability to oversee the vast North American Station under his charge. They urged him to deploy more force to protect the seasonal convoys to Quebec and New Brunswick and to enforce a closer blockade off Boston. Furthermore, the Lords Commissioners directed Warren to exchange the ships stationed in the West Indies and North America as the weather necessitated, thus employing his limited force to the best advantage.

FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER TO
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

3 June 1813.

Sir

I am commanded by my Lords Commrs. of the Admiralty to acknowledge the receipt of your Letter of the 20th. of April, transmitting a return of the Disposition of the Ships and Vessels under your orders, and to acquaint You that tho' it does not appear that you have appropriated any Ships or Vessels for the protec-

tion of the Lands to the Northward of Halifax, in the neighbourhood of the Gut of Canso, the Island of St. John, and other parts of the Gulf of St. Lawrence within the limits of your Command, their Lordships trust that a sufficient force will arrive there, agreeably to your intention communicated in your Letter of the 20th. Feby. by the time the first Ships and Convoys from England bound to the different Ports of that Part of New Brunswick and Quebec may be expected to approach the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence where they must unavoidably separate to proceed to their several Ports consequently it is very desirable that the Privateers should be prevented from occupying that ground during the Season in which the Trade is carried on between that part of North America and England.

Their Lordships also hope that in making your Arrangements for annoying the Enemy, you have been able to afford a more considerable force off Boston, where the greatest number of his Ships of War appear at present to be.

I am further to acquaint you that tho' their Lordships are obliged to send a great many Ships and Vessels to the West Indies with Convoy, with directions to follow the orders of either of the Flag officers on the Leeward Island & Jamaica Stations, they trust to you for giving those Flag officers Instructions with respect to what number of them should be kept under their Orders respectively, more particularly during the Hurricane Months, where but little Trade is carrying on in those Seas, and some of the Force may probably with propriety be employed to more advantage, on the Coast of America until the fall of the Year, and the time the West India Trade from this Country may be expected to arrive, by which period, and when operations cannot be so well carried on in America, a sufficient force should be there for the protection of the Outward bound Trade to the Islands, and to the late Dutch Colonies. I am &c

JWC

LB Copy, UKLPR, Adm. 2/1377, pp. 65-67.

New Mission for *Argus*

Lieutenant William H. Allen had served with Decatur in United States from 1809 until early 1813, when he was ordered to superintend the refitting of Argus. Allen received orders from Jones in early May to sail that brig in company with Decatur's United States on a cruise against the blockaders off Charleston, South Carolina, and then to separate on individual voyages. But President Madison required a ship to take the new minister to France, William H. Crawford, to his post. On 28 May 1813, Jones directed Allen to prepare Argus to accommodate the minister and drafted new orders for the vessel while in European waters. Jones, ever the proponent of an offensive naval policy, instructed Allen to make Argus a commerce raider, harassing the British coastal trade and the homeward-bound West Indian fleet. The secretary hoped to bring a taste of the war to the British Isles.¹

1. For documentation on *Argus's* cruise, see pp. 217-24.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO LIEUTENANT WILLIAM HENRY ALLEN

Lieut. W. H. Allen
Comg the U.S Brig *Argus*
New York.

Navy Department
June 5th 1813.

Sir,

When the Honourable Mr. Crawford, Minister Plenipotentiary from the U. States to France, is ready for departure, you will receive him and his suite on-board, and proceed, with the first favourable opportunity to Sea,¹ directing your course, without deviating for any other object, to the first Port you can make in France. In all probability, you will find Brest, or L'Orient, the easiest of access; but should you have an opportunity of landing the Minister, on any part of the coast of France, you may thereby avoid much risk, in attempting to enter a Port, before which you may find a hostile squadron. But in whatever way you may effect the first object of your destination, you will then proceed upon a cruize, against the commerce, and light cruizers of the enemy, which you will capture, and destroy in all cases, unless their value, and qualities shall render it morally certain, that they may reach a safe, and not distant Port. Indeed, in the present state of the enemy's force, there are very few cases that would justify the manning of a prize; because the chances of reaching a safe port are infinitely against the attempt, and the weakening the crew of the *Argus*, might expose you to an unequal contest with the enemy.

It is exceedingly desirable that the enemy should be made to feel the effect of our hostility, and of his barbarous system of warfare; and in no way can we so effectually accomplish that object, as by annoying, and destroying his commerce, fisheries, and coasting trade. The latter is of the utmost importance, and is much more exposed to the attack of such a vessel as the *Argus*, than is generally understood. This would carry the war home to their direct feelings and interests, and produce an astonishing sensation. For this purpose the cruising ground, from the entrance of the British Channel, to Cape Clear, down the coast of Ireland, across to, and along the N.W. Coast of England, would employ a month or six weeks to great advantage. The coasting fleets, on this track, are immensely valuable; and you would also be in the way of their West India homeward fleet, and of those to and from Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean. When you are prepared to leave this ground, you may pass round the N.W. of Ireland towards fair Island passage, in the track of the Archangel fleets, returning home in August and September.

When it shall be absolutely necessary to return home, you will pursue such route as may best promote the objects of your cruize; and endeavour to make some Eastern port, perhaps Portsmouth may be as easy of access, and as convenient, in other respects, as any other. On your arrival in France, you will, with the aid of Mr. Crawford, be better able to form an opinion of the expediency of attempting to send prizes into France, or of touching there, to replenish your stores, in order to protract your cruize.

Your own disposition, and the amiable character of the Minister, insure to him the kindest attention on your part; and I am persuaded, that you will derive the most ample gratification from such an intercourse. Your talents, and honourable services, are deeply impressed upon this Department, and will not

cease to excite its attention. Wishing you a prosperous, and honourable cruize, I am, very respectfully, Your Obedient Servant,

Wm Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CLS, 1813, pp. 29-31.

1. Allen left New York on 18 June, taking the southerly route past Sandy Hook.

Charleston Station at Midyear

Jones reversed his gunboat reduction order in late May 1813 after he received many requests from the citizenry of Charleston and after Captain Dent explained the grave situation there. On 27 May Jones ordered four barges out of ordinary to protect merchant vessels against the small British cruisers. When he learned that Dent actually had six barges out of service, Jones reinstated all of them.¹ Dent now had more vessels under his command, but no sailors to fill the complements. Jones rebuffed Dent's efforts to open a rendezvous at Wilmington, North Carolina, and told him to try Savannah instead. Furthermore, Dent reiterated his request for his own ship because he saw others of lesser rank who were given command of frigates.² His dissatisfaction with his command was so severe that he asked to be returned to Washington, but to no avail.

1. Jones to Dent, 27 May 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 442 (M149, Roll No. 10).

2. Jones to Dent, 17 June 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 468 (M149, Roll No. 10); Dent to Jones, 8 June 1813, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 32 (M125, Roll No. 29).

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Charleston 5th June, 1813

Sir

I have had the honor to receive your two letters of the 27th May. There are no Gun Boats here, I presume you must have meant Barges, and shall have four immediately put in Commission and manned. They are of large dimensions & carry a twelve pound carronade, with accommodations, for one month's provisions for thirty men, they are better calculated to act in the inlets against the Small privateers, that infest them, than Gun Boats and move with greater facility, from one point to another; I shall use every exertion to have them immediately manned, and shall station two in the neighbourhood of Bulls Bay & the other two in Stono & North Edisto, and will no doubt give great Security, to the inland coasting trade of this State. There are three Masters here Drew, Jervey and Lord. I shall want a fourth, also two Midshipmen for the *Carolina*, her compliment shall be increased, to that of the *Nonsuch* immediately, There are but few Seamen here, and I am afraid it will be difficult to man the Barges as soon as I wish, most of them are in privateers, and letters of Marque to France. I Have the Honor to be With great respect yr obt Svt.

J H Dent

ALS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 17 (M125, Roll No. 29).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT

John H. Dent
Charleston, S.C.

Navy Department
June 11, 1813,

Sir,

I have received yours of the 5th instant. When part of the Gun Boats formerly on the Charleston Station were ordered to the southward, the transfer was not noted on the records of the Department, and hence it was supposed that some still remained there. According to the information possessed by this Department, there are six Barges, under your command, which you will man and employ in the most effectual manner, for the protection of the Waters of So. Carolina.— These Barges, together with the *Nonsuch*, *Carolina*, *Ferret* and *Alligator*, I trust, will afford complete protection.¹

Should there be any difficulty in procuring men, the crews of the Schooners while kept in port by a superior force, may be employed to man the Barges as occasion may require.— I am respectfully, Your Obdt. Servt.

W. Jones

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 462 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. Two weeks later Dent ordered *Alligator* back to Charleston for necessary repairs; see Dent to Sailing Master R. Bassett, 24 June 1813, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. DENT TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Charleston. 27th June 1813.

Sir

I have the honor to forward for your information the Copy of a letter from Lieut. Kearney Comg. the U.S. Schooner *Carolina*, detailing his proceedings during his late cruize.¹ Should the port not be blockaded by a Superior force I shall send the *Nonsuch* out in a few days in quest of the privateers, A barge has this morning returned from Bulls Bay where She has been five days protecting, & keeping the enemy's boats from cutting off the inland trade, the officer reports that the privateer, had made several unsuccessfull attempts to enter that Bay, and had once grounded in the attempt, but the tide rising enabled her to get off, several Coasters had been chased into the Bay by the above vessel, and protected by the barge when they were convoyed clear of all danger, and arrived here yesterday & this morning. I shall man two barges from the *Carolina*, and direct one to proceed as far inland as Georgetown & Santees, the other to remain in Bulls Bay. Midshipman Cuthbert has reported himself, & has been ordered to join the *Nonsuch*. I Have the Honor to be With great Respect Your Most Ob Svt

J H Dent

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 123 (M125, Roll No. 29).

1. Lawrence Kearny (not Kearney) had been an acting lieutenant in *Enterprise* for several years and wished a transfer "to a vessel on the Northern Station." He was commissioned lieutenant 6 March 1813 and ordered to command *Carolina* at the end of April; see Kearny to Jones, 17 Mar. 1813, DNA, RG45, BC, 1813, Vol. 1, No. 123 (M148, Roll No. 11); and Dent to Kearny, 30 Apr. 1813, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book.

[Enclosure]
(Copy)

U.S. Schooner *Carolina*
Rebellion Roads 27th June 1813

Sir

In compliance with your orders of the 17th inst,¹ I proceeded to Bulls Bay in quest of the enemy's Privateer of 14 Guns which was said to be there, but not finding her I stood off towards Cape Roman and in a Short time discovered her ahead & gave chase for three hours & was coming up with her very fast when a man of War Brig of 18 Guns (supposed to be the *Sophie*) stood down for the chase and intercepted me I tacked at a leagues distance from her, when she and the Privateer both made all Sail in chase of me, which continued for two hours & eight minutes, when they finding they were losing ground, discontinued the chase. On the 21st Standing off from Charleston bar, I discovered a man of War Brig, & ran down for her, and found her to be the same vessel which had chased us on the day before, She made all Sail in chase but could not Come up with me. On the 22nd I anchored in St Helena's sound and on the 23rd stood out again, after endeavoring to get some fresh water, the water on board being very bad, I ran off Bulls and on the 24th at 4 P.M. I again had the fortune to discover the Privateer. I made all sail in chase, but being late in the afternoon and the heavy Squalls that came on in the evening afforded her an opportunity of effecting her escape which she did.

My cruize having expired, I have returned under the impression you would indulge me with a few more Days, when I may be more fortunate, but I may save myself & you the trouble of that request, as I find (though with the deepest regret) I am displaced.² I Have the Honor to be With Much esteem Yr Obt Servt

(Signed) Lawrence Kearney

Copy, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 123, enclosure (M125, Roll No. 29).

1. See Dent to Kearny, 17 June 1813, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book, in which Dent enjoined Kearny "not to go off soundings" in compliance with Jones's strictures. For Jones's orders, see Jones to Dent, 9 Apr. 1813, p. 96. In other words, Kearny was not to stray from the coastal waters he was supposed to protect.

2. Jones reassigned Kearny to *Ferret* because he wanted a more senior lieutenant, John D. Henley, to command *Carolina*; see Dent to Kearny, 29 June 1813, ScU, John H. Dent Letter Book; and Jones to Dent, 4 June 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 453 (M149, Roll No. 10).

Harbor Defense

Senator Samuel Smith of Maryland, as chairman of the select Senate committee on the naval establishment, requested information from Jones regarding the number of gunboats in service along the coast. He sought to win approval for purchasing a number of barges to protect the entrances of harbors from enemy penetration. Jones suspected that Smith had a self-interest in this issue because the city of Baltimore, having purchased several barges at the height of the recent British incursions along the Chesapeake, now wished to sell these vessels to the government. Jones considered barges less cost efficient than gunboats because they required more men to fill their complements than did gunboats. As there was already a critical shortage of available seamen to man the vessels on hand, purchasing more vessels with little prospect of manning them was a waste of valuable resources.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO PRESIDENT JAMES MADISON

Navy Department
June 6. 1813

Sir

The enclosed report is prepared in consequence of a call from the Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate for a return of the number of Gun Boats in service and their stations, with a view as I understood him in conversation to propose an additional special defence for Baltimore of a number of Barges or Galleys which the City of Baltimore during the late excitement built and now wish to charge them upon the general Government. I deemed it proper on this occasion to exhibit a general view of our coast & harbour defence which I think you will believe with me is amply sufficient to absorb all the resources of the Department applicable to that branch of the Service. I have had a great deal of correspondence with corporations and committees from Maine to Georgia which I did not think necessary to trouble you with. It became my duty to resist their claims and I believe I have addressed arguments and reasoning which has satisfied the most of them. I consider it indispensable to resist the pretensions of local bodys who undertake to prescribe not only the extent but the natures and manner of employing the public force.

As you have repeated applications on this subject the enclosed paper may be a useful reference—I am very respectfully your obdt. Servt.

W Jones

ALS, DLC, James Madison Papers, Ser. I, Vol. 52, No. 50.

[Enclosure]

Exhibit shewing the number of Gun Boats and vessels substituted for Gun Boats, in Service for harbour and coast defense at the several naval stations and elsewhere in the U States

Stations	Number of Gun Boats	Number & description of force substituted for Gun Boats	Explanations & Remarks
New Orleans and Coast adjacent	7	2 despatch Boats 1 Block Ship building—	progress not ascertained
Georgia	6	2 Barges 1 Ship 18 Guns	
So Carolina	5 ¹	2 Barges..... 2 Schooners 16 Guns ea 1 Schooner 10 Guns	4 of the Gun Boats and the 2 Barges recently ordered into Service
Norfolk	20 2 tenders 1 Bomb vessel	9 of which are fully manned the others partially manned & progressing as men may be procured

Stations	Number of Gun Boats	Number & description of force substituted for Gun Boats	Explanations & Remarks
Potowmac	3	1 Cutter..... 1 Schooner..... 2 Scows ea a 32 pdr	a heavy gun in each
Baltimore	1	3 first rate Schooners 1 smaller.... do.....	Well armed—Loaned to the US by the owners for the defence of the Bay and the River Patapsco—The US. stipulate to return them safe to the owners in the condition they were received. They are manned with about 350 men paid and provisioned by the US. & commanded by N. officers
Delaware Bay & River	10	2 Block Sloops 6 Barges.....	With solid covered Block Houses proof against boarding—armed one with 4 long 18s. the other 2 long 18s and 2 24 pd. carronades manned each with 50 men sail remarkably fast, row with facility and draw but 6 feet water. Well armed—furnished by the City of Philada. partially manned and attached to the Delaware flotilla under the command of the Navy officer
New York	31 The <i>Alert</i> Sloop of War 5 fire vessels	15 of which are manned provisioned and paid by the City and under the command of the U S officer commanding the flotilla—the U S furnishing only the Boats military stores & commanders
Waters of Rhode Island Connecticut & the Sound	11

Stations	Number of Gun Boats	Number & description of force substituted for Gun Boats	Explanations & Remarks
Boston Harbour	4	To be manned generally with the crews of the U S vessels whilst under repairs in that port.
Portsmouth NH	2 U.S. Brig <i>Siren</i> U.S. Brig <i>Enterprize</i>	For the protection of the Harbour and Navy Yard, the crews to be employed in the duty of the Navy Yard. Ordered to this Station from the Southward but were out on a short cruise when the order arrived which will delay their arrival on that station for some time.
Lake Champlain	2	4 armed schooners ²	As the US. Brigs <i>Nautilus</i> <i>Vixen</i> and <i>Viper</i> have been captured it is contemplated to purchase immediately 2 Brigs of 16 Guns ready equipped to be employed for the protection of the coast of Maine New Hampshire & Massachusetts, as depredations have greatly increased there and Gun Boats are not applicable to that coast
Presque Isle or Erie	4	

total 106 Gun Boats in Service. The residue of the Gun Boats that are fit for service are kept in ordinary ready to be put in service on any sudden emergency—those that are decayed and unfit for service are laid up. Respectfully submitted³

W Jones
Navy Department
June 7. 1813

The Hon. Samuel Smith
Chairman of the Naval
Committee of the Senate of the U S.

Copy, DLC, James Madison Papers, Ser. I, Vol. 52, No. 53. This copy was written and signed by Jones.

1. There were no gunboats at Charleston, only barges and schooners; see pp. 35-37 and 57-59.
2. Jones meant sloops. He did not know of the capture of two of the sloops on 3 June; see pp. 488-92, 513.
3. The vessels in North Carolina were still in ordinary when Jones forwarded this report of the gunboats in service to Madison. Jones ordered all six returned to active service on 11 June; see p. 143.

SENATOR SAMUEL SMITH TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Senate Chamber 10th June 1813

Sir,

The Committee of Senate to whom has been referred so much of the President's Message as relates to the Navy of the United States, have directed me to request of you to inform them, whether you consider yourself authorised to hire or purchase vessels as Hulks to be sunk in the Entrances of the harbours of the United States, or to prepare Booms or other impediments to prevent the entry of the ships of the enemy into such harbours.¹ The Committee appear to be disposed to employ large Barges, capable of carrying 18 and 32 pounders, and of such a construction as that they may row as fast as the Barges of the enemy. The committee wish to know how many such Barges would be necessary for the ports of the U.S.—And how much such Barges of 50 feet long, and 70 feet long would cost. I have the honor to be your obt. servt.

S. Smith Chairman

LS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 37 (M124, Roll No. 56).

1. On 16 July Congress approved an act for the defense of ports and harbors that authorized the president to hire or purchase hulks to be sunk at such entrances; see *Statutes at Large*, Vol. 3, Stat. 1, Chap. 13, p. 18.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO SENATOR SAMUEL SMITH

Honble. Samuel Smith
Chairman of the Naval
Committee—Senate.

Navy Department
June 17. 1813.

In reply to your letter of the 10th instant I have the honor to state that "the authority to hire or purchase vessels as Hulks, to sink in the entrance of the Harbours of the United States, or to prepare Booms or other impediments to prevent the entry of the Ships of the enemy into such Harbours" is not considered as vested in this Department. It is believed that such preparations have hitherto been under the direction of the War Department (under whose authority chains or Booms have in some places been long since prepared.) The Islands piers &

in the several rivers and harbours, which have been ceded to the United States by the individual States, and which are necessary for the purpose of extending Booms, having been under the exclusive direction of either the War or Treasury Department. Moreover I am not certain that any Department of the government of the United States, is vested with authority to obstruct the Channel of a River or harbour, by sinking hulks or by other impediments, without the previous sanction of the State having Jurisdiction over the same.

The Barges (or rather Galleys) contemplated by the Committee are certainly a very useful Class of Vessels as an auxiliary force, attached to vessels calculated to afford accommodations necessary for the health and comfort of the crews, without which it would be impracticable to procure them, or to retain them if procured.

The form necessary to produce the greatest celerity of movement by the impulse of the oar, must be long, narrow, and shallow; consequently such vessels being open and of small capacity, cannot afford to a numerous Crew, the accommodations necessary to lodge and protect them from the weather, or to prepare their provisions and carry the necessary Supplies. Hence it results that if these vessels are to be employed distinctly, a given number will require a Store Ship—Hospital ship and receiving ship, in which to prepare the provisions, and shelter the Crew from the inclemency of the weather, otherwise disease will be the inevitable consequence.

But if attached to the Vessels now employed in harbour defence, and manned from those vessels, as the nature of the Service may require, the utility of both Classes of Vessels would be retained; the difficulty of procuring additional Crews obviated; and the expenditure but moderately increased: as the same Crews would perform the alternate duty of both classes of Vessels and the accommodation and comfort of both would be improved.

The only advantage to be derived from Barges is in calm or very moderate weather, for when the wind blows strong, any fast Sailing Vessel can with ease escape from or overtake them. It is impracticable to combine in the same vessels the qualities of very fast rowing and Sailing.

The obstacles to manning Barges are want of accommodations, labor of the Oar, and the absence of pecuniary advantage; whilst they are tempted into the Ships of the Navy, and private armed vessels, by the Stimulus of prize money, the eclat of our Naval Victories, and the preference which Seamen naturally give to Vessels better adapted to their habits and Comfort; and I am satisfied that these causes will be found to operate so powerfully as to prevent any considerable extension of this species of force. We have the capacity to encrease the number of Vessels of every description to any extent, but experience proves that the means of manning them is not so unlimited and therefore policy requires that we should husband our resources. In Philadelphia they have been recruiting nearly three months and with the aid of the bounty given by the Citizens have manned only 7 Gun Boats. In Baltimore Captain Gordon was nearly three months manning one Gun Boat. In Norfolk the recruiting for the Gun Boats has entirely failed. In Charleston, where I have ordered Six Barges into Service, Captain Dent despairs of manning them, and the same difficulty elsewhere but too generally prevails.

It may be said that prejudices exist against Gun Boats which do not apply to Barges; this is yet to be determined. Gun Boats have much better accommodations and afford more comfort to their Crews than Barges, and I think I hazard nothing in predicting, that the difficulty of manning Barges will equal that of Gun Boats. Certain it is that this species of force can be carried but to a very

limited extent under the Naval Establishment. The number of men required in proportion to the efficient force of a Barge is excessively great, and it will be recollected that a vast number of our seamen are still employed in licensed merchantmen abroad and in our public and private armed vessels.

This small and scattered species of force is the most expensive and least susceptible of the economical controul of this department of any that can be devised. The rank and character of the persons commanding on detached and remote Stations ensure no responsibility. Small agencies and offices must be multiplied, and in every view the nature of the Service is incompatible with the rank, duties and indispensable acquirements of the officers of the Navy, and of the existing regulations of the Naval Establishment.

If this system of Harbour defence is to be extended, the public interest will be promoted by rendering the system distinct from that of the Naval Establishment.

If Congress under existing circumstances shall determine to employ a certain number of Barges, I would recommend their being attached to and manned from the force already employed for Harbour defence, as occasion may require. In this way and this way only, does the enemy employ his launches and Barges.

Then with a view to the force alluded to as now provided for Harbour defence the following number and apportionment of Barges may resolve your inquiry viz

Mississippi & Waters of Mobile	8 Barges
Georgia	4
South Carolina	6
North Carolina	5
Lower part of Chesapeak	8
Upper part of Do.	8
Delaware Bay & River	6
New York	6
*Waters of R Island & Long Island Sound	4
total	55

To the Coast and Harbours east of Rhode Island Gun Boats and Barges are inapplicable.

From a comparison of the actual cost of Barges lately built for the Committee of the Citizens of Philada. the largest Class mentioned in your letter say 70 feet long 14 feet wide and 4 feet deep measuring about 36 Tons would cost with Sails, rigging, Oars and every thing complete except armament about \$2500

The Second Class viz 50 feet long 12 feet wide
& 3 1/2 feet deep measuring about 19 tons
complete except armament \$1250

The 3rd Class viz 36 feet long 8 feet wide
3 feet deep, measuring about 9 tons \$ 625

The first Class is capable of carrying a long 24 pd. in one end and a 32 pd. Carronade in the other—would row 36 Oars double banked, and require a Crew of 54 men Officers included.

The 2nd Class a long light 18 pounder, would row 28 oars, double banked, and require a Crew of 42 men, officers included.

The 3rd Class a 12 pd. Carronade, would row 20 Oars double banked and require a Crew of 30 men officers included.

They should be constructed both ends alike to row with equal facility and velocity either way.

Those employed in the Southern waters would require to be copper fastened & coppered, to secure them from the worms, which would increase the cost of

the 1st Class	\$750
of the 2nd Class	\$500
of the 3rd Class	\$300

I am very respectfully Sir, your obedt. Servt.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, Letters to Congress, Vol. 2, pp. 177-81.

Defense of North Carolina

The British blockade of the Chesapeake was so effective by May 1813 that some of the bay area trade moved south to North Carolina. Desiring to close this new outlet in late May, the British sent a schooner, the former Baltimore privateer Highflyer, to reconnoiter off Ocracoke. The British departed after taking a sloop, but left the coastal towns greatly alarmed. Local residents wrote to North Carolina's Governor William Hawkins demanding the return of the two gunboats laid up in ordinary by Secretary Jones's February reductions. Jones soon found himself inundated with requests for coastal protection. The collector of the port of Ocracoke, Thomas S. Singleton, and Congressman William Rufus King¹ solicited gunboats from Jones after receiving many letters from coastal residents.²

1. William Rufus King, a North Carolina lawyer, served that state in Congress from 1811 to 1816.

2. John Gray Blount to William Hawkins, 25 May 1813, *Ne-Ar, Governors' Papers (William Hawkins)*, 1 Jan.-4 June 1813, pp. 189-90; Thomas S. Singleton to Jones, 21 May 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 3, No. 113 (M124, Roll No. 55). For more background on North Carolina during the war, consult Lemmon, *Frustrated Patriots*.

CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM RUFUS KING TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

House of Representatives

Sir

Your engagements having prevented my seeing you at your office, I have taken the liberty of calling your attention to the exposed situation of the Sea coast of North Carolina— Leaving Ocracoke, Beaufort & Swansborough out of the question; I wish to direct your view to the Town of Wilmington situated on the bank of the Capefear river, now (in consequence of the dismantling of the Gun Boats) altogether destitute of any protection, except what is afforded by a sandy mound, called a Fort; which even were it repaired, and rendered competent to the defence of the Inlet it was ment to guard, would still (for the want of some naval force stationed in the river) leave the Town greatly exposed— The Capefear makes its entrance into the Ocean by two separate Channels, so distant from each other that the Fort intended to guard the one can have no bearing on the other— The Channel of this other called the new Inlet continues to

deepen, and even now will afford admittance to Vessels of sufficient force to effect the entire destruction of the Town— The country around is thinly populated; The Town is not adequate to its own defence even against the most inferior force. There are no Troops stationed either there or in the Vicinity; such an enterprize would be safe and easy— It may be said that our coasts will be a protection. That there is no sufficient object to induce an attack— To the first I will barely remark that we are much indebted to nature for the portion of security we now enjoy; none other having been afforded us— To the second I must be permitted to state, that there is in Wilmington two Banking establishments— In consequence of the Blockading of the Chesapeake it is the nearest and supposed to be the safest southern port; it is as might be expected crowded with shipping, and will thus attract the attention of the Enemy. There are several salt manufactories in the vicinity of the Town; the destruction of which would not only be a serious loss to the proprietors, but would be greatly detrimental to the state— I trust sir nothing more need be said to convince you that objects are not wanting to stimulate the avarice of the Enemy— Without greatly exceeding the due limits of expenditure a military force could not be so stationed as to guard to points exposed— A small naval force is alone wanting and from the shallowness of our waters Gun Boats are peculiarly fitted to be useful— I hope you will take the subject under consideration; and oblige me with an answer—¹ Your most Obt. Huml. Servt.

W. R. King

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 94 (M124, Roll No. 56). Jones received King's letter on 12 June, which suggests that the congressman probably wrote it on or before that date.

1. Jones ordered two vessels for Ocracoke and one for Beaufort; see Jones to William R. King, 14 June 1813, DNA, RG45, MLS, Vol. 11, p. 310 (M209, Roll No. 4).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO SAILING MASTER THOMAS N. GAUTIER

T. N. Gautier Esqr.
Comg. Naval Officer,
Wilmington N.C.
Present.

Navy Department
June 22nd 1813.

Sir,

You will repair to Wilmington, North Carolina with the least possible delay, and prepare for immediate service six of the Gun boats under your command; and will recruit the following number of petty Officers, Seamen, and ordinary Seamen for each boat viz.

1 Acting Gunner at	\$20 pr. mo. & 2 rations pr. day.
2 Acting Master's Mates at	20 Do. Do.
1 Carpenter's Mate at	19 Do. Do.
1 Cook	18 Do. Do.
1 Acting Steward at	18 Do. Do.
8 Seamen at	12 and 1 Do.
16 Ordinary Seamen at	10 Do. Do.

Of this force three are to be stationed at Wilmington, one at Beaufort, and two at Ocracoke. Your command will extend to the whole, and you will give such instructions to the several commanders, as the good of the service may require. You will act under the immediate orders of and communicate directly with, this Department, on all subjects relative to your command;¹ and I expect of you, the utmost vigilance and attention, as well to protect the waters and coast assigned to your command, as to guard against the abuses, and regulate the expenditures with the strictest economy, and accountability of all those under your command.

Doctor Morrison will resume his station, and you will employ an acting Surgeon's Mate, (who will be entitled to the pay and emoluments of a Surgeon's Mate in the Navy) for the Boats at Ocracoke &c.

Sailing Master Taylor will proceed with you, to command one of the Boats at Wilmington. Sailing Master Manson is ordered to rejoin you at Wilmington; and as you go through Norfolk, Captain Cassin, upon shewing him this letter, will order four good sailing masters, from the Boats that are not manned, to proceed, under your command, to your station.

Mr. Potts, the Agent, who will also act as Purser for the station, until further ordered, will provide you with the necessary means to carry these orders into effect, and you will exhibit to him, this letter as his authority for the same. You will also man, and employ the Barge, and occasionally visit, and inspect the several stations, with care and scrutiny and report briefly, from time to time, whatever may be interesting. I am, Sir, respectfully, your Obt. Servant,

Wm. Jones

You will be allowed a Clerk for the station, who will receive the pay and rations of a Midshipman. W. J.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 475-76. (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. Jones officially made North Carolina separate from the Charleston Station.

American Forces Leave East Florida

The Madison administration had sought congressional approval for the occupation of the Floridas from the commencement of the war. The Senate narrowly defeated such a measure in July 1812, and the act that passed on 12 February 1813 authorized occupation of West Florida only.

The administration did not immediately order the removal of troops from East Florida, but ultimately it had to acknowledge defeat. Major General Thomas Pinckney, military commander in East Florida, received on 18 March the order from the War Department to evacuate. The army embarked from the St. Johns River on 26 April and evacuated Fernandina on 6 May. Commodore Campbell's gunboats convoyed the troops to St. Marys.¹ In writing Campbell about the changes he was to implement as a result of the military departure from East Florida, Jones queried the commodore about consolidating the Georgia and South Carolina Stations.

1. For more background on East Florida, see Patrick, *Florida Fiasco*, especially chapters 19 and 20.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO COMMODORE HUGH G. CAMPBELL

Hugh G. Campbell, Esqr.
Commdg. Naval Officer
St. Marys Ga.

Navy Department.
June 12. 1813.

Sir,

The naval and military forces of the United States having withdrawn from Florida, the naval force assigned for the protection of the Waters of Georgia, will consist of the ship *Troup*, six Gun Boats and the Barges on that station. The Barges are to be attached to the Gun Boats, or to the *Troup*, and manned from those Vessels as occasion may require, but they are not to have distinct Crews.

You will not confine the Gun Boats to St. Marys or to any particular Station, but so distribute the force under your command as to protect the coast and several Inlets in the most effectual manner.

The evacuation of Florida appears to supersede the necessity of a distinct Naval Station at St. Mary's, which has greatly increased the expenditures.—

You will please to communicate your ideas on the subject, and let me know whether, in your opinion, the entire business of the station cannot be transacted to more advantage, and with more complete control, at Savannah, so as to abolish the establishment at St. Marys, and when the several vessels may want supplies, employ either one of the public vessels, or a craft, for the purpose of conveying them. If the public interest will admit this arrangement, I contemplate extending your Command so as to embrace the naval force on the So. Carolina and Georgia Stations, as a Captain on each of those Stations is thought superfluous. In this event, you would reside at Charleston, and have a trusty Commandant of the Ship *Troup* to superintend the force on the Georgia Station, under your immediate controul.—¹

The Hospital vessel may be continued, and stationed so as to afford the greatest advantage to the whole force.— I was pleased to learn that the *Enterprise* had sailed for her destination.— I am, respectfully, Your obdt. servt.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 463–64 (M149, Roll No. 10).

1. When Jones did not receive a response from Campbell regarding this station consolidation, he wrote to him again on 25 June 1813; see DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, p. 480 (M149, Roll No. 10).

COMMODORE HUGH G. CAMPBELL TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

St. Marys 16th July 1813

Sir

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 25th Ult, expressing a desire to break up the naval establishment at this place and observing that you want to hear from me before you determine

In reply I beg leave to observe that the alteration you propose may promote the Public good in a pecuniary way to a small amount, but how far that would compensate for the want of an establishment on the Frontier, where we have daily in view and very near neighbors, a Foreign nation, allied to the greatest enemy we have, and that the continuance of the war may induce the enemy to

take advantage of the unprotected situation of these waters, into which they may pass with little concern and cut off all communication between this place and savannah by water, likewise, the increased Trade that is likely to recommence at Fernandina, well calculated to promote smuggling, which without a good lookout will be practised with ease across this narrow water, and will likely Bring on frequent misunderstandings between us and the spaniards, that may require some person on the spot to govern our officers commanding Gun Vessels, the most of whom frequently stand in need of advice and correction.

In other respects the plan you propose is economical and compact from which might result a small deduction of Public expence, and should you determine to break up this establishment would not savannah on account of its central Situation be the most proper residence for a commanding officer, where he could communicate more readily with the two extremities of his command I have honor to be With Great Respect Sir Your obedient servant

Hugh G Campbell

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 5, No. 5 (M125, Roll No. 30).

Secret Mission of John Adams—Status Report

By June John Adams was almost ready to sail on her secret mission to reinforce the American fur trading post on the Columbia River. John Jacob Astor was concerned that the Royal Navy would become involved. He was correct, for the Northwest Company's vessel, Isaac Todd, escorted by H.M. frigate Phoebe, had left Portsmouth, England, on 25 March 1813 for Fort Astoria. The Northwest Company had convinced the Admiralty that it was in Britain's national interest to stop this American encroachment. On 26 June, almost on the point of departure, the American mission was indefinitely postponed. Faced with a critical manpower shortage on Lake Ontario, Jones sent William M. Crane and the crew of John Adams to assist Commodore Isaac Chauncey. Despite continued remonstrances from Astor that national security and American interests were at stake, the short-term exigencies of winning the war prevailed. The nation's resources were stretched too thin to warrant such an expedition.¹

1. For background on Fort Astoria, see Gough, *Royal Navy*, pp. 8–28; and Bridgwater, "John Jacob Astor." Jones directed Crane to communicate to Astor the "temporary change" in plans and "to suspend the collateral arrangements." See Jones to Crane, 26 June 1813, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 10, pp. 481–82 (M149, Roll No. 10).

JOHN JACOB ASTOR TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

New York 17 June 1813

Sir

I had the Honnour to address a few Lines to you on the 6th not haveng reicd any Reply I feare the Same has escaped your noties— understanding that Capt. Crane is nearly ready for Sea it would be very Satisfactory to me to be informd as Soon as may be convenient whether it be your wish that I should prepare a

ship for the voyage in contemplation and for the purpose of caring Such Suplys for the use of Captn. Crane as he may be in need of & which he can not carry in his owen ship— I have the pleasure to Inform you that I have a few Days Sence Recd Dispatches over Land—from the mouth of Columbia River there Dates are of the 26 & 29 June last from there I had the Happiness to Learn that the party which went over land had Safly Reached our fort there & that the ship *Beaver* which Sailed from here on the 16 oct. 1811 with men & suplys had also arvid & was Laying in Columbia River when the Dipatches came away—all ware well the pepal felt Secure from the natives and our prospects are most flattering and no Doubt of success is entertaind unless Interrupted by the British of which I have Some feares— Mr. Stewart the Bearer of these Dispatches has not yet arvid here but I exspect him in 10 or 12 Days & he will no Doubt give Some Intersting Information I will thank you Sir to make this known to the president

I think it very Important that if a Ship is Send in aid of Capt. Crane that the Commander should be a man of experiens of confidence & Integritay & abilitys—one who is acquainted with the coast with the Rivers & the country generally such mean are Scars [*scarce*] there is one only whom I know Mr. John Ebbetts & he will not go unless he can be made acquainted with the object of the voyage hitherto. I Did not feel myself at Liberty to make it Known to any one but if I am to Send a Ship I would thank you to permit me to communicate with him— I have the Honnour to be Resptfully Sir your obd Servt.

John Jacob Astor

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 58 (M124, Roll No. 56).

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO JOHN JACOB ASTOR

John Jacob Astor Esqr.
New York

Navy Dept.
June 22nd 1813.

Sir,

My reply to your favours of the 6th and 17th had been delayed, as well by the pressure of Official business, as by the desire I entertained to have a full and final conversation with the President, on the subject of Captain Crane's destination, and the objects connected with it. His indisposition has, however, precluded the opportunity I had desired; but I still hope that the health of the President will be sufficiently restored, before my final instructions to Captain Crane shall be closed. The bulk of the extra articles, which Captain Crane has desired you to prepare, exceeds my expectation, and I have suggested to him, the expediency of substituting rice for a considerable portion of the Bread. Will you please to furnish me with a list of the extra articles, ordered by Captain Crane—of the manner, and the terms on which you proposed to ship them, and of the conditions, on which you proposed to take any surplus articles at the place of destination, which Captain Crane may not require for the use of the United States. You will please provide the articles Captain Crane may have required, and furnish me with the information I solicit, in order that I may lay the same before the President; as it is a contingent affair, requiring your confiden-

tial aide, instead of the usual agency of the regular Agent of the Department, in order to keep the destination and object of the voyage unknown. As to the character of, and conditions on which you may engage a vessel, for the purpose of conveying the extra stores, and such things on your own account, as you may think proper, I shall submit it entirely to your judgment and discretion, satisfied that you will, in this case, act for the United States as you would for yourself. I have some knowledge of Captain Ebbetts, having seen him in Canton, and consider him every way qualified for the command you contemplate for him, and have no objection to your communicating to him, in confidence, the object and destination. I am very much gratified with the information you have received from the settlement, and I sincerely hope, as well for the benefit of the enterprising individuals concerned, as for the future prosperity of an interesting and important branch of the trade of our country, that the destined succours may arrive in time, to afford permanent security to the settlements. I am, very respectfully, Your Obedient Servant,

Wm. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CLS, 1813, pp. 34-35.

Cartel Agreement

After five weeks of sighting no enemy vessels, Commodore John Rodgers captured four ships during the second week of June. The British packet brig Duke of Montrose surrendered to President on 10 June, northwest of the Azores. Rodgers arranged a cartel agreement with the captain of the packet. The Admiralty, however, refused to honor it, affirming that they had informed the American government that exchanges made on the high seas were invalid.¹ The following documents are the packet captain's account of the capture and the cartel agreement between the two commanders.

1. *Norway*, Post-Office Packet Service, pp. 240-42.

AARON GROUB BLEWETT TO CHRISTOPHER SAVERLAND¹

C. Saverland Esqr.

Falmh. June 23. 1813

Sir,

I beg leave to acquaint you for the information of their Lordships the Post Masters General, that H M late Hired Packet *Duke of Montrose*, under my command, being in the prosecution of her voyage to Halifax with the Mails, on the 9th Inst. on Lat. 44.0. Long 29 1/2 at 7 h. 30 m. we discovered a strange sail on our weather bow, at 8 A M perceived her to be a Schooner, under all possible sail in chase of us, and coming up very fast, we mustered all hands to Quarters, and got all ready for Action, the Quarter & Waste Nettings filled with Sails & Hammocks, the Mails ready for sinking got the Stern Boat in & run out the Stern Chase Guns. half past Meridian the Schooner hoisted American Colours, and fired 3 Guns at us, we still keeping our course, waiting for the Enemy to

close, in order to get our Guns to bear more effectually, but finding her to keep on our Quarter at long shot distance, we bore up and got the Stern Guns to bear, & fired them, then hauled across her Bows and discharged our Starboard Broadside at her & again wore to close her, at the same time firing our Larboard Broadside at her, & again wore to close her, at the same time firing our Larboard Broadside at her as they came to bear, the Schooner also tacked to the N.E. & the Action became General, with all Sail set, at 1 P.M. the Schooner tacked to the Westward to keep at long shot, we still kept up our fire with our long Guns, at 1.45 the Schooner tacked to the Eastward & bore up to close us, when the Action was continued until 20 minutes past 2, She then being out of Gun shot, and making all Sail to the Eastward, we ceased firing & tacked to the Westward keeping our course, at 6 lost sight of the Enemy, this Schooner was pierced for 14 Guns & appeared to have a great number of Men. I am happy to say that in this Action no one was hurt on board the *Duke of Montrose*, nor did the Ship receive any material damage.

On the 10th Inst. in Lat. 43.4 Long. 31.40 at 11.45 we discovered a large Ship ahead, at noon we tacked Ship to avoid her, apparently in chase of us, at 2.30 made the private signal for the day to the Chase, which was not answered, at 2.45 the chase was fast coming up with us, and made a Signal at her fore which we did not understand, at 5 she hoisted a broad blue Pendant, at the main & commenced firing at us, at 6 P.M. we hoisted an Ensign & Pendant, at 6.30 we discovd. an American Ensign flying on board the chasing ship, she being then within musket shot with all her Crew at Quarters, the Tompions out of her Guns and apparently intended to fire directly into us. I thought it proper to sink the Mails and haul down the Colours, as it was impossible for us to escape, shortly after the *Duke of Montrose* was taken possession of by an Officer from the United States Frigate *President* Commanded by Commodore Rogers. I was immediately removed on board the American Frigate, where I remained until 8 P.M. when it was ordered by Commodore Rogers, that the Officers, Passengers & Crew of the Packet, together with the Crews of the Brigs *Kitty* & *Maria* (two Prizes taken by the Commodore) should return to England in the *Duke of Montrose* as a Cartel, and consider themselves Prisoners of War until regularly exchanged. We parted from the American Frigate on the 12th inst. at 8 A.M. then in Lat. 43.12 Long 29.45 & arrived here this day.

It gives me much pleasure to say that in the Action on the 9th Inst. with the Schooner, the Crew of the *Duke of Montrose* behaved with the greatest spirit & entirely to my satisfaction & their conduct since their Capture has been such as I could wish.

I cannot close this Letter without bearing evidence to extreme liberality of Commodore Rogers who would not allow the Crew of the *Duke of Montrose* to be plundered of the least trifle. I am &c.

(Signed) A G Blewett

LB Copy, General Post Office, London, GPO, Post 48/7, pp. 443-45.

1. Aaron Groub Blewett, captain of the British Post Office Service temporary packet *Duke of Montrose*, reported his capture to Christopher Saverland, agent for the postal service at Falmouth.

CARTEL AGREEMENT¹ FOR *DUKE OF MONTROSE*

United States Frigate *President*
at Sea. June 10. 1813

We the undersigned being the Officers, Crew & Passengers of H B Majesty's Packet Brig the *Duke of Montrose* this day captured by the United States Frigate *President*, Commanded by John Rodgers Esqr. so obligated ourselves & pledge our sacred Honor in Consideration of said Packets being permitted to return to England, with us on Parole not to serve in Arms against the United States of America during the present War or not until we are regularly exchanged as Prisoners of War.

1. And we do also obligate ourselves to proceed direct for England on said Brig observing strictly her character as a Cartel & that, on our arrival in England she shall be placed in the Hands of the Agent for American Prisoners & subject to his Orders as a Cartel.

2. And we do further obligate ourselves that the said Brig shall be permitted to leave England with a similar number of American Prisoners and also allowed to proceed to the United States of America without molestation or hindrance under the direction of Mr. David West (Private Secretary to Commodore Rogers) who is placed on board the said Brig for the purpose of seeing the above obligation carried into effect.

Signed by Capt'n, Officers, Crew & Passengers

LB Copy, General Post Office, London, GPO, Post 48/7, pp. 446-47.

1. Christopher Saverland forwarded Aaron Groub Blewett's letter and the cartel agreement to Francis Freeling, secretary of the Post Office in London, and expressed his misgivings with Article 3. Receiving word that the Admiralty had disavowed the agreement, Saverland ordered Blewett to fit out *Duke of Montrose* immediately for another voyage; see Saverland to Freeling, 26 June and 2 July 1813, General Post Office, London, GPO, Post 48/7, pp. 446 and 455.

Enterprise at Portsmouth

Captain Isaac Hull's command encompassed the defense of Portsmouth harbor and the coastal area adjoining it to the east, as well as superintendence and construction of a 74-gun ship. Jones ordered the brigs Siren and Enterprise to aid Hull in protecting his station. Enterprise arrived in mid-June, but Siren was still laid up at Charlestown undergoing repairs. Distressed by the strong British presence off the coast, Hull now worried that these ships might easily succumb to the larger British force and recommended that they be sent instead on cruises to the St. Lawrence and Halifax.

CAPTAIN ISAAC HULL TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

U.S. Navy Yard Portsmo.
24th June 1813

Sir

I had the honour a few days since to inform you of the arrival of the *Enterprize* at this place. She is still here, but is ready for sea, and will sail the first wind provided that nothing appears off to prevent it. Two days after she arrived, a Frigate, the *Rattler* Sloop of War and two Brigs were close in with the harbour, and some one of them has been near ever since. That and the want of a good pilot has prevented her from sailing.

When these vessels¹ were first ordered to this Station I believed they would be very useful in protecting the Coasting trade, but since I find the Enemy's Cruizers so much stronger than we are that we can hardly promise security to the trade if we undertake to convoy it. Indeed by sending these vessels into the ports to the Eastward that are not well guarded, they will be in danger of being taken out by superior force, and will probably be the cause of the destruction of other property, if not the towns where they are. With this view of the situation of the Coast, I submit to you whether they would not be more usefully employed taking a cruize near the Southern edge of the Grand Bank, or between that and the entrance of the Gulph of St. Lawrence; they would there be out of the way of cruizers on the coast and would probably fall in with captured Ships bound in or with ships bound to Europe, or to Halifax.

When I am made acquainted with your wishes on this subject I shall act accordingly.² I have the honour to be With great respect Sir, Your obedient Servt.

Isaac Hull

Since writing the above, the *Rattler* and a Brig have appeared off.

LS, DNA, RG45, CL, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 111 (M125, Roll No. 29).

1. *Enterprise and Siren*.

2. Jones responded that the fears of the local populace demanded their use as convoys until such time when he could reconsider moving them to another station; see Jones to Hull, 5 July 1813, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, p. 454 (M441, Roll No. 1).

A Deadly Trap in Long Island Sound

In March Congress passed what became known as the "Torpedo Act." Under the provisions of this law, the government pledged to pay to any individual who burned, sank, or destroyed a British warship, a bounty amounting to half the value of the destroyed craft plus half "the value of her guns, cargo, tackle and apparel."¹ The government's offer of financial reward spawned a number of efforts by enterprising citizens to destroy enemy vessels.² Although none of these attempts ever resulted in the loss of a British warship, the Royal Navy did experience several close calls. The deadliest and most frightening of these occurred on 25 June off New London.

1. Statutes at Large, Vol. 2, Stat. 2, Chap. 47, p. 816.

2. For brief treatments of this aspect of the naval war against Great Britain, see Hutcheon, Robert Fulton, pp. 120–26, and Roland, Underwater Warfare, pp. 120–25.

MASTER COMMANDANT JACOB LEWIS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Sir

I have Inform you that on finding some Persons, who were willing To try their Fortunes, in an attempt to distroy one of the Enimies Ship before New London, I assisted them in their project, a vessel¹ was prepared for the purpose, partly loaded with peas & other Articles such as the Enimy were supposed to be in want of. some naval Stores &c. I had frequently witness'd the Enimies hawling Coasting Vessels alongside for the purpose of hoisting out such articles that they were in want of in preferance to discharging them with their Boats—(the plan was therefore) that if the Enimy should do with this Vessel as they were in the habit of doing with others—that of hawling her along Side of the Ship The Ship should be distroy'd

To effect the object, a Quantity of powder with a great Quantity of Combustables were placed beneath, the articles which the Enimy were to hoist out—the act of displacing these Articles was to Cause an Explosion, by a Cord fasten'd to the striker of a Common Gun lock—which ignited with a train of powder,—the first or Second Hogshead moved the Cord— my plan was to have obtained a Vessel having a mast calculated to make a Top mast for one of their largest Ship and to have conected the Cord to the heel of it—(this because) they could not have taken it out in any other way than getting the Vessel alongside, (however) the expence prevented it, I could not afford the means, (As it is) the result as follows—

This vessel proceeded off New London the Barges as was expected, went in pursuit of her, the persons on board after discharging several vollies of small arms on the Launches abandon'd, in their boat—the Enimy very Triumphantly took possession and stood Towards the Ship evidently with a view of taking her alongside of her

the tide running strong, & the wind failing they were prevented, after great exertion in towing with several of their Launches from getting alongside, and was obliged to bring the Vessel to Anchor & began discharging with their Launches—when the explosion took place, and it is believed distroy'ed every Soul as well the Launches—I am unable to give the probable numbers—you may expect that in a day or two— I am about driving or distroying the Frigate In the Delaware—Ships can be Kept out of our narrow waters and tides way—this is Certain.² and I trust Ere long I shall devise the Means—I have the honor to Assure you of my high Consr. & respt.

J Lewis

Come. U.S. Flotilla

New Yk. June 28th. 1813

ALS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 107 (M124, Roll No. 56).

1. Schooner *Eagle* was fitted out by John Scudder, Jr. See Guernsey, *New York City*, Vol. 1, pp. 279–81.

2. Perhaps because of the near success of Lewis's scheme, Secretary Jones received a nearly identical plan from Mr. A. Anderson of Middletown, Connecticut. See Anderson to Jones, 13 July 1813, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 160 (M124, Roll No. 56).

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N., TO
FIRST SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY JOHN W. CROKER

San Domingo, Potowmac River,
in the Chesapeake July 22nd 1813—

Sir,

I request you will communicate the enclosed Letter from Sir Thos. Hardy to their Lordships, containing a most Melancholy event of the loss of a most Gallant officer and Ten Brave Seamen, by a Diabolical and Cowardly contrivance of the Enemy; Indeed the Dayly attempts practised by Commodore Decatur and the americans against that valuable officer Sir Thos. Hardy and the Ships under his orders now Blockading the Enemy's Frigates in the Port of New London; by means of Torpedoes Fire Vessels and other Infernal Machines, are beyond conception— I have the honor to be Sir, Your most Obedient humble Servant—

John Borlase Warren

LS, UKLPR, Adm. 1/504, p. 49.

[Enclosure]

Ramillies off New London
26th June 1813

Sir,

I beg to acquaint you, that yesterday morning at 10 o'clock, Mr. McIntyre Master's mate was sent from this Ship in one of her Boats to cut off a Schooner that standing for New London, as there was but little wind he easily effected his purpose: but not until the Schooner had reached the Shore, and the Crew, who immediately deserted her, had let go her only anchor— She was taken possession of at 11. o'clock by our Boat under a sharp musquetry from the Shore, but without doing any mischief— at 1. PM. I was hailed from the Schooner by Mr. McIntyre, and informed her name was the *Eagle* of New York, and was laden with Naval Stores and provisions—that he had cut her Cable—and as she had no other anchor on board, Lieutenant Geddes, with the Pinnace was (ordered to relieve the other Boat) and directed to take her alongside a Sloop we had Captured a few days before— at half past 2 o'clock, whilst in the Act of furling her sails; and taking in moorings, the Schooner blew up with a most tremendous explosion, and I lament to say Lieutenant Geddes, and ten Valuable Seamen fell a sacrifice to this new mode of Warfare— Three Seamen who happened to be on the Foretopsail yard are very much burnt; but in a fair way of recovery— The Service will experience a great loss in Lieutenant Geddes, whose gallant and meritorious Conduct I have frequently witnessed—he having served with me at different periods for more than eight Years—and he has left a Widow to lament his loss—

Under the Circumstances, it is most providential that the Schooner was not taken alongside this Ship, as it appears to me quite evident that the Naval Stores and Provisions were placed in her as an Inducement for us to do so—

I enclose a list of the persons who unhappily lost their lives, and of those wounded. I have the honor to be Sir Your most obedient humble Servant

signed T M Hardy
Captain

Copy, UKLPR, Adm. 1/504, pp. 51-53.

[Enclosure]

A List of One Officer & ten Seamen belonging to H:M: Ship *Ramillies* who were killed by an Explosion onboard a Enemy's Vessel Off New London, 25th June 1813.—

No. on SB	Names	Qualy.	Where Born	Remark.
23	John Geddes	Lieutt.	Aberdeen	Wife living in Portsmouth Hants.—
78	Willm. Bentley	LM	London	
131	Peter Dass	Ab	Orkney	Wife & Child living in Shields Northumberland.—
166	Chas. Welch	Ab	London	
167	Jas. Curtis	Ab	Penryn	
277	Philip Petree	Captain Af Guard	Wesel on the Rhine	
288	Jas. Spence	Ab	Orkney	
301	John Williams	Ab	London	
313	Allen McDougal	LM	Campbelltown (Argyle.	
328	Robt. Bean	Ab	London	
357	Wm. Darby	Ord	Dublin	

A List of 3 Seamen Wounded by the above Explosion.

No. on SB	Names	Qualy.	Where Born	Remark.
124	John Good	Ab	Exwell (Warwick)	Much Scorched in the Face, Arms, & Legs, but at present doing well
143	Patk. Farrell	Ab	Cork	
361	Alexr. Keith	Ord	London	

"Signed—" T. M. Hardy Captain

A Copy.—

Copy, UKLPR, Adm. 1/504, p. 55.

GENERAL ORDERS OF ADMIRAL SIR JOHN B. WARREN, R.N.

Genl. Order N 87

San Domingo in the Chesapeake
19 July 1813

In consequence of the unfortunate accident which has lately taken place by the blowing up of an American Prize some time after she was taken possession of, by which His Majestys Service has been deprived of Lieut. Geddes a brave and experienced Officer and ten valuable Seamen belonging to His Majesty's Ship *Ramillies*, from which it appears the Enemy are disposed to make use of every unfair and Cowardly mode of Warfare, such as Torpedoes. It is the Commander in Chiefs directions that no Prize or Boat shall be permitted to be brought alongside of His Majestys Ships & Vessels (but that any American Vessel or Boat with whom it may be necessary to communicate shall be Kept at a proper distance or Anchored) before an examination shall take place.

Signed H. Hotham
Captn. of the Fleet

LB Copy, University of Hull, Brynmor Jones Library, Hull, England, Hotham Collection, DDHO/7/45.

New Signals for Naval Warships

The British gained two prizes the day Chesapeake struck her colors to Shannon: a powerful new frigate, and a set of the American navy's signal books. Potentially, the latter represented the greater of the two prizes, for with them, superior British vessels could lure U.S. warships under their guns.¹ Recognizing the threat Chesapeake's signal books posed in enemy hands, Secretary Jones acted quickly to prepare a new signal system for distribution to all his commanding officers. To assist him in this task, the secretary called on Commodore William Bainbridge.

1. Less than six weeks after the capture of Chesapeake, the Admiralty was providing copies of the American frigate's signals to vessels preparing to cruise in the Atlantic. See Admiralty to Captain Charles Paget, 10 July 1813, *UkLPR, Adm. 2/1377*, pp. 145-48.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO COMMODORE WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE

Commodore Wm. Bainbridge
U.S. Navy
Charlestown Masstts.Navy Depart.
June 30. 1813.

Your letter of the 24 instant has been received.

It is indeed, a subject of regret, that our Signals should have fallen into the hands of the enemy; and it is certainly of the utmost importance that they should be so constructed, as that the private Signals would be unintelligible to

him. They can readily be made so that a simple change of Signification such as can be easily retained in the memory, would render the written significations not only useless to him but of advantage to us, if they should fall into his hands, as the deception would be detected in the first display.

I wish you immediately to confer with Captains Hull and Decatur on the subject, and to prepare such new Signals and Significations as may effectually guard against the evil in future: And also to embrace every opportunity to inform the Commanders of our vessels abroad that the Enemy is in possession of our Signals. To send a vessel in search of them would be so precarious and uncertain as to afford no prospect of success; but, by fast sailing vessels going to France or the North of Europe, if any, it can be communicated through our public agents abroad.— It may, likewise, be conveyed by friendly persons going to Lisbon or Cadiz; and particularly to Brazil, where, I fear the *Essex* is blockaded. The *President* Frigate is probably by this time in the North Sea and the *Congress* perhaps between the Western Islands, and the Coast of Spain and Portugal and Madeira or the Cape de Verds.

The *Argus*, when she lands the Minister at Brest, or L'Orient, will cruize in the mouth of the Irish Channel.

What do you think of making it public in the Newspapers? Some of them might find their way to our Commanders. I am very respectfully your obedient Servt.

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, CNA, Vol. 1, pp. 450-51 (M441, Roll No. 1).

COMMODORE WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES

Navy Yard Charlestown
16th July 1813

Sir

I have the honor of sending to you, by Lieut George Parker—a code of Private Signals which I have made, and the code of Numerical Signals which I have digested Captain Hull approves of them. As yet I have not heard from Comr. Decatur on the Subject to whom I immediately wrote in pursuance to your directions— But considering it important that the Signals should be as speedily arranged as possible, I have declined waiting any longer to hear from Comr. Decatur respecting them.

The Private Signals are so arranged as, in my opinion, to make a discovery of them impossible—except wantonly done— Each Commander of our vessels on receiving them, ought to be directed after reading them, to immediately destroy them and only to communicate them to his first Lt. on the probability of getting into Action, and then to do it, with the strictist injunction of Secrecy. In case of his illness he should then inform his first Lieutenant what the private Signals are. In the present order of the arrangement of the Numerical Signals 363 Numbers and their expressd significations, are fully and much better supplied by the introduction of the Compass Signal. This reduction of numbers, not only lessens the bulk of the Numerical Signals, but brings them within the power of three flags, instead of 4 as formerly required. By transposing the numbers of the late Signal flags (as I have done, and altering the repeaters, and answering flags,

the Signals are so changed, as to make them compleatly unintelligable to the Enemy by their having the late ones—

I recommend the Day and night Signals, to be in one Book—and only one Signal Book to be allowed to each Vessel and that to be kept always in the Captains Possession.

I also send by Lieut. Parker (a most worthy officer, who was my first Lt. in the Action with the *Java*—and whom I have the honor of recommending particularly to your Notice) the flags taken from the British Frigate *Java* after her surrender to the U.S. Frigate *Constitution* under my command. I have the honor Sir, to be with the greatest respt. yr obt. St.

W^m Bainbridge

P.S. For some time past Lt. Parker has been by my orders, superintending the building of the Sloop of war¹ near this Yard—

NB. I enclose a Card of the old flags, and one as I have altered them. I did not put the new ones in the Signal Book, presuming that you would send it, to have new Books printed by it— And if you should, the leaf that has the drawing of the Night Signals ought to be taken out previously so that neither the flags or Shapes of Lights should be seen at the printing office— I also enclose a brief code of Fog Signals which I recommend to be written in the Signal Book Confidentially at the Department in preference of being printed—

LS, DNA, RG45, MLR, 1813, Vol. 4, No. 167 (M124, Roll No. 56).

1. *Wasp*.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY JONES TO COMMODORE WILLIAM BAINBRIDGE

Commodore W. Bainbridge,
Charlestown Massachusetts.

Navy Department
Augt. 1st 1813.

Sir,

Master Commandant Parker¹ is charged with a packet to be delivered to you, containing the General and Private Signals now prescribed for the use of the Navy of the U.S. until countermanded.²

The System is, with some exceptions, that devised by, and received, a short time since, from yourself. Capt. Morris had prepared a set, upon nearly similar principles; but instead of one common number, as in yours, he had a varying number for each day of the week, which, as it would burthen the memory more than yours, the latter was preferred.

The old flags are retained, but with different values, and will save the expense and trouble of new ones.

You will observe some other minor alterations and substitutes in the New Code.

You will please furnish the Commanders, on your station, with copies; under the strictest injunction of caution and care, to confine the mental key to themselves, until the approach of danger, shall render it indispensable to communicate it to their first Lieutenants, only, with like confidence and precaution. My attention has been so engrossed, by important public measures, toward the

close of the Session of Congress, that I have been drawn off from some objects, in your quarter, that will now, I trust, receive notice. Master Comdt. Parker will command the *Siren*, which vessel you will, when repaired, prepare for a cruise of as long duration, as her capacity for provisions, water and stores will admit, without prejudice to her sailing.

It is a little extraordinary, that, North of the Delaware, there is not a Boring Mill and Foundry fit for Naval purposes, which is a serious objection, in time of war, to extensive Naval building and equipment in the Eastern States; and if they had the Foundry and Machinery, the iron must still be brought from Jersey, and it is as easy to send the guns as the iron. We shall be under the necessity of sending the 24 pd. Carronades, for the *Siren*, from this place or Baltimore, through Delaware, Jersey, and the Sound, if clear, or to New Haven, and from thence by land. I shall send you the Drawings, proportions, & minute description of Carronade carriages, of various sizes, and of the Iron work, attached thereto, which, if you have it not already, will be useful to you.

It is probable I may send 10 or 12 of the carronades ready mounted, but of this you shall soon be informed.

The new sloops of war are to be armed with 20. 32 pd. carronades, and two long 18 pounders; for which you may prepare the carriages. The carronades will soon be ready and sent on. If you have the long 18 pounders it will save so much expense of transportation. I am, very respectfully, Your Obedient Servant,

W. Jones.

LB Copy, DNA, RG45, SNL, Vol. 11, pp. 32–33 (M149, Roll No. 11).

1. George Parker was promoted to master commandant on 24 July 1813.

2. A copy of this signal book may be found in DNA, RG45, Signal Books, 1813–June 1865.

British Naval Strength in North America

When the United States declared war on Great Britain, the Royal Navy had eighty-three vessels of all types in the western Atlantic and Caribbean.¹ While this was more than enough force to counter the threat of the infant republic's navy, it was adequate neither for blockading the American coast nor for combating privateers. Over the next twelve months, the Admiralty acted to increase this force with a steady infusion of ships and men, so that by the summer of 1813 British naval strength in North America stood at one hundred and twenty-nine vessels. The Royal Navy's growing strength spelled greater difficulties for the U.S. Navy and additional economic hardship for the nation.

1. For a listing of these vessels and the stations to which they were attached, see Dudley, *Naval War of 1812*, Vol. 1, pp. 179–82.