Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN
Nimitz “Graybook”
7 December 1941 – 31 August 1945

Volume 2 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by Captain James M. Steele, USN,
CINCPAC staff at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
covering the period 1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942

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The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

Volume 1 (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861
Volume 2 (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 – 1262
Volume 3 (1 January 1943 to 30 June 1943): pages 1263 – 1612
Volume 4 (1 July 1943 to 31 December 1943): pages 1613 – 1830
Volume 5 (1 January 1944 to 31 December 1944): pages 1831 – 2485
Volume 6 (1 January 1945 to 1 July 1945): pages 2486 – 3249
Volume 7 (1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945): pages 3250 – 3548
Volume 8 (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 – 30 April 1942 and pertaining to the Battle of Midway): pages are not sequentially numbered. Note: Volume 8 contains dispatch copies, many of which were poorly reproduced at the time of compilation. Some portions are illegible.

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United States Naval War College, Newport, RI
2013
SECRET

WAR PLANS

CINCPAC FILES

SECRET

SUBJECT Captain Steele's "RUNNING ESTIMATE and SUMMARY", covering the period

FILE 1 September, 1942, to 31 December, 1942.
01 0305 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH CTF 63 61 62 COMGENSOPAC.

Most Secret. Fully concur with Comairsopac 310402. CACTUS not only a base of major value to nation holding but is first foot of ground taken from an enemy who has some cause to consider his armies invincible. The strength of his forces in and enroute to the area plus additional available forces indicated as being prepared to move in and the relativity short line of communications leave no doubt of an all out offensive. Repeated and sometimes successful attempts to land infiltration or advance troops clearly indicate CACTUS as a major preliminary objective. It is my considered opinion that at this time the retention of CACTUS is more vital to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific than any other commitment. CACTUS cannot be held unless strong air forces of types of planes requested in reference and in other dispatches of like import plus inshore patrol forces previously requested be promptly supplied. Comgensopac and Comtaskfor 62 have by hand.

01 1315 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Handle this with the greatest secrecy. At this distance it is difficult to understand how enemy operations such as are reported in Comgen lst Mardiv 310200 and the destroyer bombardment in his 250955 can approach and proceed relatively unmolested.

01 1256 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC CTFs 11,16,17,18 Info LEARY etc.

Operations September 1st. Handle as most secret. Enemy force estimated at least 2 cruisers 2 DD located by SBD 2 miles West TAIVO Point GUADALCANAL 0050(-11) 31st. 1 cruiser JINTSU class. Planes attacked 1 near miss on cruiser. 10 SBDs took off but lost contact when ships dispersed. 3 P4 planes failed to return from patrol went in response air raid alarm GUADALCANAL 31st. Fletcher states SARATOGA able to make 14 knots but damage makes it necessary return her PEARL. Leaving large part of her planes here for carrier replacement. 3 YPs arrived GUADALCANAL.
Comamphorsopac fully supports the opinions expressed by Comairsopac in his 3104.02 and recommend that the air supe
the desires be provided. Para. While always in favor of
the move to TULAGI it may be remembered that I warned that
such a move to be permanently successful would entail con-
tinuous support by strong Naval and air forces. Para. Here in the SOLOMONS we now have an unsinkable aircraft carrier
which I believe may finally be multiplied into an invincible fleet adequate for a decisive move, but this will require
patience, and the determined support by forces of a strength
and character which you do not now have under your control.
Para. The enemy is now hampered by his adventures in the
ALEUTIANS and Eastern NEW GUINEA. I believe that the im-
mmediate consolidation and extension of our CACTUS position
is now possible and advisable, and is a golden military
opportunity that ought not be missed.

Comairsopac 3104.02 Comsopac 010305 all aircraft that can be
spared from ENTERPRISE SARATOGA being transferred Comsopac
for use present campaign. Employment carrier aircraft and
pilots from shore bases necessary because of lack suitable
Army type planes for GUADALCANAL fighting but such use car-
rrier pilots most uneconomic from military viewpoint and our
present shortage trained carrier air groups. To ensure suc-
cess present campaign steady flow to SoPac of suitable Army
aircraft with trained pilots must be instituted at once.
Consider P-38 A-24 B-25 B-26 suitable present types. My
252241 and my serial 0164W of July 17, '42. Let's give
CACTUS the wherewithall to live up to its name. Something
for the Japs to remember forever.

Handle as most secret. Cominch 271320 (in 3 parts) refers
me to you for emergency assistance my air effort. Situation
CACTUS is most difficult and becoming critical due heavy and
frequent air attacks to meet which do not have fighters in
sufficient numbers or adequate performance. Army P-400 sent
CACTUS from POPPY exhausted. Replacements enroute cannot
be made available CACTUS prior lates September and will be
P-39 type. Can you send me small force of P-38 fighters with
pilots and few key mechanical personnel. I can provide trans-
portation.
Your 271320 in 3 parts. In so far as I can determine I have no information as to types of aircraft embarked in vessels enroute SUWAC. Nor have I been able to interpret the instructions to Harmon such as to give me authority to divert aircraft in ships for use this area. What I have urged and Harmon has likewise urged is that I be reinforced with aircraft (particularly fighters) of suitable types for effective use in present operations. I am asking MacArthur for such P-38's as he can spare from his present operations. I again urge that my requests and requests of Harmon be given favorable and prompt consideration for the reasons previously given that other types of fighters not effective as evidenced that out of 14 P-400's sent to CACTUS only 2 remained effective yesterday. In present operation we must have planes suitable to effectively combat the enemy and P-39 series is not effective against his high altitude operations. Authority for diversion of SUWAC bombers in transit by air is fully understood and has been and will continue to be applied with the most careful consideration requirements Sopac and Sowespac.

01 2313 C.G. CACTUS to CTF 62, Info COMSOPAC.

To CTF 62 Info Comsopac from CACTUS. My 202013 and Comsopac 201132. Appears enemy is building up striking force by continuous small landings during darkness. Due to difficult terrain areas are beyond range of land operations except at expense of weakening defense of airfield. We do not have a balanced force and it is imperative that following measures be taken: Affirm. Base planes here capable of searching beyond steaming range during darkness. Baker. Provide surface craft DD's or motor torpedo boats for night patrolling. Cast. Provide striking force for active defense by transferring 7th Marines to CACTUS. If not prevented by surface craft enemy can continue night landings beyond our range of action and build up large force.

03 1231 COMSOPAC to CTF 11,16,13,17, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

Handle as most secret. Operations 3rd. B 17 on patrol made 1 500 pound bomb hit on AO or AV Lat 7-16 South Long 158-3 East 1100 2nd. Ship stopped. Fire forward. Large oil slick. PBY on patrol got near miss on DD possibly escorting SS at 2-40 South 160-18 East 1100 L (-11). At 0500 L (-11) 2nd several hostile planes bombed GUADALCANAL. 1 killed 1 wounded. No material damage. At 1140 L (-11) 2nd 18 twin engined bombers dropped bombs GUADALCANAL. 1 killed 5 wounded. 1 SBD destroyed also some Avgas and ammunition. Our planes brought down 3 bombers 4 zeros. AA shot down 1 bomber. All our planes returned. Leary pass to MacArthur. Afternoon 3rd TF 18 arrived NOUMEA. WILLIAM WARD BURROWS unloaded and floated off SYLVIJA reef after being aground for 3 days.
While Taskforce 18 is engaged in replenishment and pending reorganization on carrier task forces the directive assigned carrier task forces in Mydis 271026 of August is modified as follows: Task force 17 operate generally south of latitude 12 degrees. Avoid remaining in same locality to prevent concentration of enemy submarines against you. Destroy promising targets whenever located. Your freedom of movement as may be required by the presence of enemy submarines or other is not limited by any general restrictions herein given.

Operations 4th. At 0200 L (-11) 3rd 3 hostile SS shelled GUADALCANAL. No damage. No casualties. Our planes 3rd straffed several boats and barges on and near beaches southeast TAIYU Point. BURROWS departed GUADALCANAL 1645 L (-11) 4th.

Your 032013 for your information I plan to put the 7th Marines into GUADALCANAL probably Southeast TAIYU Point as soon as plans and arrangements can be made. Desire but small force on TREVIION Island possibly from a battalion of Army troops to permit preliminary work on air field that station and as deterrent to enemy action against AVP operating planes from GRACIOSA Bay SANTA CRUZ. Comsopac to Cincpac.
Ultra secret from Comgenforsopac those not addressed stop decoding. Beginning about 13 September under my command your unit plus embarked troops plus raider battalion in APDs plus approximately one third of 5th Defense Battalion will hold 2 battle rehearsals of landing on beach GREEN against opposition for establishment of strong supporting position. Troops will be commanded by a general officer to be named later. Para. Prepare detailed troop and material landing and tactical plans suitable for rehearsals generally similar to CACTUS landing my Op Plan Afirm 3 Annex Dog except assume beachhead will be established by Raider Battalion during darkness. Propose withdraw surface vessels at the of 14 hours therefore plan must be carefully drawn to ensure landing only essential personnel and material and rapid unloading at beach. Para. Following points are emphasized Afirm country is jungle with many streams. Motor vehicles must be few. Amphibian tractors and rubber boats will be required. Baker Engineering equipment largely hand operated. As many machetes shovels axes brush hooks intrenching tools as possible plus wire and stakes. Sandbags in bundles of 100. Camouflage nets. Large supply radio batteries all types. Paulins and flys for protecting stores. Nil tents except shelter hanes and few hospitals. Water filtration plants out nil distilling apparatus. Cast. Carefully balanced stores for 30 days. Rations 30 days class baker 10 days cast or king and 5 days dog. Gasoline kerosene in tins McCawley will land fuel in drums. Dog. 3 units of fire but maximum amounts grenades canister demolitions charges and land mines. Para. You will be able to land some excess vehicles prior to rehearsal to clear access to cargo. Para. You are aware of errors we made at CACTUS and RINGBOLT. Avoid them in this operation.

Handle as most secret. Operations 5th. 13 boats southeast coast ISABEL Island and 30 landing craft southwest coast SAN JORGE Island were discovered by GUADALCANAL air patrol 3rd, were bombed strafed, most were left sunk or burning. At 0200 L (-11) 5th 5 hostile DD's shelled GUADALCANAL, sank LITTLE and GREGORY. Casualties not yet known believed heavy.
Uutmost secrecy. In the event of threatened enemy landing in Hawaiian Sea Frontier Task Force 1 with maximum available screen will probably be ordered to sail immediately to repel the attack. Maximum available cover by land based aircraft will be furnished. Current plans for your operations and training must be based on this contingency.

Arrived BLEACHER. Following ships to accompany SARATOGA Pearl: NEW ORLEANS, ATLANTA, PHELPS, DEWEY, WORDEN, CUMMINGS, WILSON, Commander Cruisers Task Force 11 on MINNEAPOLIS. That ship with MACDONOUGH PARRAGUT MONSSEN GRAYSON being provisioned to capacity and awaiting your orders. No fuel available. Ships remaining in area have enough fuel to reach WHITE POPPY. Necessary this force fuel prior departure or enroute to Pearl. Transferring remainder aviation material BLEACHER. SARATOGA still has six officers including flight surgeon and 86 men to transfer to her squadrons at ROSES and BUTTON. Am forwarding via airmail report as requested your 030600. Temporary repairs being effected. Will advise later when ready depart probably 3 or 4 days. Expect to make 15 knots enroute Pearl. No deaths and only few slight injuries as result of torpedoing.

Handle as most secret. Operations 6th. Two B-17s bombed three enemy DDs 5th position 06-30 south Long 153-33 east results negative. 12 officers 226 enlisted from GREGORY and LITTLE reported rescued. Enemy force which sank them now reported at least one cruiser two DD. Morning patrol from GUADALCANAL fifth sighted 15 large Jap landing boats each carrying about 75 men approaching northwest GUADALCANAL. Straffed boats three sank. P-400s attacked with bombs and light machine guns. Appeared to cause many personnel casualties. Bombs sank one boat. SEDs straffed boats on beaches. Believed to have destroyed several. 1245 L(-11) 5th 26 twin engined bombers covered by 20 zeros approached our position GUADALCANAL. Only few our fighters intercepted due previous alert. These caused bombers to drop bombs ten miles westward LUNGA POINT. Two bombers one zero shot down. One F4F lost during boat straffing operation. Chormley sends. Leary pass to MacArthur. One F4F missing three damaged one pilot wounded. Lieut F.C. Riley on patrol in PBY at 1310 late 5th shot down one Kawanishi type four engined patrol boat Lat 05-35 South Long. 163-02 east. Confirmed by second plane which saw Jap plane burning in water.
06 1720 COMINCH to CinCPac, CTF 8, and other commands concerned.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are addressing. Greenslade pass to DeWitt and furnish him copy of CTF 8 042027. Most secret. The occupation of PRIBILOFF approved subject to provision last sentence ComTaskFor 8 042027. Modification of occupation of TANAGA as set forth in CTF 8 052130 also approved.

06 1950 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

Most Secret. My 042027. Am in receipt of message from BUCKNER stating he has orders from DeWitt to occupy PRIBILOFF and will advise me when to supply escorts and length of time they will be required. My present orders oblige all my surface forces in FIREPLACE operations as stated in reference. DeWitt has never asked me whether or not local naval forces are prepared to support PRIBILOFF move. When PRIBILOFF fighter strip is installed DeWitt apparently expects fighting planes stationed there without again consulting me although I command Alaskan air forces. I am in effect being ordered by DeWitt to take certain action although in no way subject to his command. Shall take no action nor reply to Buckner until I have your directive in premises.

07 0452 Comsopac to BOISE, MacDONOUGH, and various others.

Handle as most secret. A screening and attack force designated Task Force 64 is hereby established composed initially as follows: Rear Admiral Wright in MINNEAPOLIS Task Force Commander with BOISE HANZS LEANDER DESDIV 22 FARRAGUT and MacDONOUGH. Task Force 64 assigned temporarily to ComTaskFor 62 for operational control, units now at BLEACHER to act as escort for transport movement from BLEACHER to BUTTON as directed by ComTaskFor 62. BOISE and LEANDER will join Task Force 64 at BUTTON. ComTaskForce 62 and LEANDER have for action ComTaskFor 18 for Info.

07 1150 Comsopac to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, MacArthur, CTF 62, 11, 17, 62, 16.

Operations 7th. Handle as most secret. On 6th 2 PBYs attacked serial 43 lat 05 south long 163-50 east getting hits but no visible damage. B-17 attacked serial 43 on 6th at latitude 07-30 south long 157-40 east. Many hits but Jap escaped in rain squall. 11 SBDs escorted by 6 fighters bombed installations and buildings south side GIZO harbor 6th. Serious damage caused. No ships or planes seen. No AA. Reconnaissance shows 36 Jap landing boats were sunk SAN JORGE Island and CAPE ESPERANCE in attacks previously reported. During 6th and 7th Task Force 17 attacked 3 enemy SS'S. Results twice promising one negative.
Most Secret. For Admiral Nimitz only. During 6th and 7th TF 17 attacked 3 enemy subs vicinity 13-20 south 162-40 east results 2 promising 1 negative. 11 SBD with 6 VF attacked installations and buildings GIZO causing serious damage 2 SBD lost in storm failed to return. No ships or planes seen and no AA. 36 Jap landing boats destroyed NW coast GUADALCANAL in previously reported attack. Para. TF 64 Rear Admiral Wright MINNEAPOLIS BOISE LEANDER Desdiv 22 FARRAGUT MacDONOUGH established as screening and attack force under Turner. Para. Ghormley requests establishment advance supply base WHITE POPPY. Has moved Bowman and staff to POPPY and requests additional personnel for AUCKLAND. SOUTH DAKOTA hit uncharted 35 foot pinnacle off entrance LAHI channel 5.5 miles bearing 321 from MALINOA light. Damage to fuel oil and reserve feed tanks estimated time in dry dock for repairs 2 weeks. Because of possible speed reduction to 20 knots Ghormley recommends her coming to PEARL which have approved. Para. 450 prisoners enroute LONGBOW in ZEILIN. CG CACTUS reports 600 casualties to date requests early replacement program. Para. Sub reconnaissance results NAURU positively occupied by Japs land planes there. OCEAN negative. No shipping either place. Para. Theobald is unloading 1200 tons daily at FIREPLACE completion first phase about September 13th. Urges CG ALASKA push fighter field project ATKA now for completion both same time.

Handle as most secret. Operations 8th. In attack on GIZO 6th 2 SBD'S lost in storm on return trip. B-17 which attacked serial 43 6th had 1 engine and upper turret put out of action but continued search on 3 engines and strafed Jap landing boats south end ISABEL Island. Enemy SS was attacked by patrol plane 7th lat 07-12 south long 163-14 East with bombs and mg. Did not dive but returned with AA. No damage. In view probable attack tonight 8th by 1 Jap CL 10 DDs, fuller and Bellatrix directed stop unloading GUADALCANAL proceed to eastward through Lengo Channel.
06 2210  COMGEN ALASKAN DEFENSE to COMALSEC  
COMALSEC t'd on to COMINCH, CINCPAC

Since sending my 060250 received following from CG WDC  
begin received message from CTF 3 outlining his objections to garrisoning Pribilofs which Admiral Nimitz concurred in. If you (Buckner) agree with Theobald and CinCPac movement to Pribilofs will be cancelled MOSES POINT garrison going to Atka as previously planned end paraphrase. I replied to Dewitt saying would not occupy Pribilofs at this time but would send MOSES POINT garrison to Atka. At later date contemplate sending garrison St. Paul.

08 1736  CINCPAC to COMSOPAC info COMSWESPAC, CINCPAC-COMINCH ADMIN

Make ready to turn over to MacArthur one regiment of 3 combat teams of experienced amphibious troops plus quota of auxiliary troops and 1 division of combat loaded transports with attached AK. Leary pass to MacArthur. This at direction of Cominich who is with me. Cominich headquarters pass to Army Chief of Staff.

08 2237  COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC info COMSWESPAC

Handle with utmost secrecy. Following from War Department is forwarded for information: War Department records show Army planes in central and south pacific under Nimitz control as of September 2nd as follows: Heavy bombers on hand 75, enroute or being prepared 44 of which 6 are enroute SoWesPac. Medium bombers on hand 24, enroute or being prepared 11. Light bombers 7 on hand. Fighters on hand 270, enroute or being prepared 202 of which 30 are being transferred from Australia. Para 2.

Replacements set up for October are 12 heavy bombers, 15 medium, 44 fighters. Para 3.

War Department considers that it is not possible to move short range aircraft from United States to Guadalcanal in time to meet present requirements there. Para 4.

The P-40 type is considered by War Dept. as apparently suitable for use against Japanese types. Para 5.

Above information subsequent to and supersedes Parts 2 and 3 Cominich 271320.
Operations 9th. Handle as most secret. 0100 (-11) 9th TULAGI shelled by 1 hostile surface craft. No damage. Convoy unloading TULAGI bombed 1900 (-11) 9th and again 1140 (-11) 9th by 26 bombers which apparently also dropped bombs TASIMBOKO. Near misses but no damage our ships. Our raiders and paratroops landed TAVU POINT, GUADALCANAL daybreak 8th striking enemy position. After some skirmishing Japs withdrew to Southwest leaving large amounts food ammunition 4 75mm guns 1 37mm gun considerable radio equipment at least 27 dead Japanese. Village of TASIMBOKO was burned. Marine casualties 2 dead 4 wounded. Planes supported operation throughout by bombing and strafing enemy positions. Our troops withdrew before dark. Estimate that enemy had a reinforced Battalion of not less than 1000 in area. Documentary evidence captured not yet examined.
September (GCT)

09 1016 COMSOPAC to TF 18, 17, 62, 64, 11, 63 & Info comds concerned.

Handle as most secret. This is part 1 of 2 part dispatch.

OpPlan 3-12. Task Organization of (A) Task Force 61, SoPac striking force, Rear Admiral Noyes consists of Task Force 17 and Task Force 18 (B) Task Force 62, SoPac Amphibious Force plus 5 DMS's. Repeat of Minron 1 Rear Admiral Turner (C) Task Force 63, Air Scouting and attack force Rear Admiral McCain consists of SoPac area aircraft and tenders (D) Task Force 64, screening and attack force Rear Admiral Wright as initially constituted in my 070452. Para 1. Enemy action and changes in the situation since August 27 have necessitated regrouping of certain Task Forces and a modification in the general concept expressed in mydis 271026 of August. Since our seizure of CACTUS-RINGBOLT the enemy has attacked regularly by air and conducted night raids by surface forces. On two occasions approaches by hostile transports have been turned back. A hostile landing attack in force has not developed but remains a strong possibility. Para 2. This force, by a combination of our shore based aircraft, carrier aircraft, surface vessels and defending troops, will (A) Defend and strengthen the CACTUS-RINGBOLT position and existing bases and (B) Destroy promising enemy targets when they appear while remaining in readiness to prevent a landing in force. Comgensopac has by hand. Leary pass to MacArthur.

09 1018 This is part 2 of above.

This is part 2 of my 091016. Most Secret. Para 3. Afirm. SoPac striking force operate generally south of latitude 12. Destroy promising targets wherever located in order of priority carriers transports battleships cruisers destroyers shipping. Freedom of movement this force as may be required by presence of enemy submarines and other vessels not limited by general instructions herein given. Baker. Amphibious Force defend and strengthen CACTUS-RINGBOLT positions and expedite development of airfield CACTUS, mop up adjacent enemy outposts, prepare to occupy APRICOT on further directive, maintain the flow of supplies. Cast. Air Scouting and Attack Force continue search designed for timely location of the approach of enemy in force, gain control of the air over CACTUS-RINGBOLT, destroy enemy ships located. Dog. Screening and attack force operate in support of other task forces as directed but initially under operational control of CTF 62. Para XRay. Task groups will be assigned to various forces for the accomplishment of special operations as the need occurs. In carrying out this plan which leaves much to the initiative of Task Force Commanders keep in mind that there is no quicker means to ultimate victory than the sinking of enemy ships. Para 5. Communications accordance Pac 70 and other special arrangement. All Taskforcecom CACTUS

(Continued on next page)
and other newly established land forces initially on Task-forceoms frequency. This plan cancels the directives contained in my dis 271026 of August and my dis 030736 of September and is effective on signal.

10 0255 COMSOPAC to CTF 64, 61, 63, 62, 17, 18, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGENSOPAC.

Enemy information additional that given para 1 my Op Plan 3-42 follows: Indications of strong landing force sailing from TRUK on 9th for CACTUS via RUKA. Can arrive CACTUS area by 12th. Ultra. 1 CV and several DDs only naval units thus far associated this move. 7 XCV's and CV's excluding one damaged strongly indicated as in or close to TRUK, some possibly further south. Believe 4 available for task forces. Other 3 ferrying. NEKATA Bay believed either in use as seaplane base or detachment there to service planes which may arrive during pending operations. Comairsopac pass to Comgen CACTUS verbally by pilot first opportunity. Comgensopac has by hand.

10 1156 COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC, COMGENSOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Your 08237. Situation SOLOMONS not viewed as transitory. Anticipate intensive air action for months to come and movement of fighters from United States to this area should be continuous. Suitability is relative. Unquestionably the high altitude performance of P-38's and P-48's make the more suitable than any of the P-39 or P-40 series. Will make maximum possible use Army fighters of whatever type available this area. Of P-40 series the P-40L with 1650-1 engine considered best. Although War Dept states that the P-40 type is considered as apparently suitable for use against Jap types there are no P-40's this area or enroute except a few P-40 E-1 at BLEACHER. Refer Harmon despatch to Marshall of Sept 3 Comairsopac 310402 and my 270226 Aug and 020400 Sept.
Handle as most secret. Situation as I view it today extremely critical. Ultra information indicates enemy Naval Military forces in superior strength in TRUK SOLOMONS PLAU area. Same source indicates powerful effort against CACTUS area. Rain has reduced efficiency CACTUS field to point where several planes crashed in take off. We hope hostile attack will find us with dry field. Marston mats being moved to CACTUS slowly. Even with mats it may be necessary, judging from experience other fields, to rebuild field laying a firm base although information lacking this respect. Turner en-route CACTUS today for first hand information. Food situation CACTUS not good. Our transportation problem increases steadily as Japs perfect their blockade methods. Becoming increasingly apparent that ships can remain in area only during daylight and then unloading frequently interrupted by air raids. Sooner or later we are bound to lose some of our valuable AK's on this duty. Due to operational and combat losses our effective air strength CACTUS yesterday was 11 F4F4's 22 SBD's 3 P400's. Arrival plane reinforcements this area as we see it: 58 single engine Army fighters in TILERY and WHIPPLE 20 pilot replacements, 12 Navy PBY5A's from central pacific if replaced from U S but positive information lacking, 19 Marine F4F4's and 19 Marine SBD3's in HAMMONDSPORT, 21 Marine F4F4's and 12 Marine SBD3's in COPAHIE. Difficulty landing planes from ship to field but expect to find a way. Due reduction in our carrier strength their relative effectiveness as a striking force has been greatly reduced. Great freedom of action must be allowed Task Force Commanders in order to get better than an even exchange of losses. Due to this lack of effective striking force, threat of hostile attack in great strength, and Jap infiltrations in unknown strength am planning to employ 7th Marines to augment strength CACTUS, however this can be done in time only if hostile attack delayed beyond date now anticipated. Referring Cincpac 081736 relative having experienced amphibious troops ready to turn over to MacARTHUR, it appears at present time that only regiment is 8th Marines which will be ready about 1 October.

Operations 11th. Handle as most secret. PBY on patrol 10th lat 05-30 south Long 162-52 east attacked serial 43. Some hits but no apparent damage. At 0015 and again at 0130 L (-11) 10th hostile DD shelled TULAGI harbor. Hit and destroyed YP previously damaged. Our SBD's bombed so-called village vicinity VISALE GUADALCANAL believed occupied by Japs. At 1225 L (-11) 10th 27 twin engin bombers dropped bombs on position GUADALCANAL. 11 killed 14 wounded. Attacked by F4F4's. 4 bombers shot down. Our losses 1 fighter missing 1 badly damaged. 24 F4F4 to fly SANTO to GUADALCANAL today 11th patrol plane 1053 L (-11) 11th after reporting 1 DD and 1 AK lat 02-05 south long

(Continued on next page)
long 160-40 east in vicinity was attacked by enemy plane type unknown and was apparently shot down. Presence enemy carrier that vicinity a possibility.

Treat as ultra secret to be decoded only by aee. The only experienced amphibious troops in Sopac are those in Cactus and it is impracticable to withdraw them para 7th regiment left the east coast in March and has since engaged in establishing a garrison defense in straw. The last time it received, Amphibious training was in August 1941 and presumably it has received little field training in Straw. Therefore it is not ready for amphibious combat. It can be made ready for a comparatively simple landing such as Taivu Point in 1 week, and can probably be placed in a reasonable state of effectiveness to face real opposition in about 1 months uninterrupted amphibious and field training. The 7th regiment has no amphibious tractors and no antiaircraft elements para Crescent City Hayes Adams Jackson Alchiba now carrying this regiment probably require considerable reloading of cargo to meet combat conditions. Alchiba should have services of Whitney to repair generator for about 1 week. Otherwise vessels are available para while not required by your 092140. Respectfully invite attention to the present insecure position of Cactus and Ringbolt. Adequate air and naval strength not been made available to ensure their security, and in the absence of these forces much greater dependence must be placed on troop defense. Vandergrift consistently has urged he be reinforced at once by at least 1 more regiment as essential to clearing enemy out of north Guadalcanal and I concur. In addition it is essential that we occupy Kdeni as soon as possible and establish numerous outposts in other positions if we are to have a reasonable expectation of bringing the southeast Solomons under a firm control which is the prerequisite for any successful offensive against the enemy in the Rabaul-Bougainville region either from here or Australia. This will require more troops that we have or have in prospect.

Most secret. Contaskfor S reports progress of Fireplace. 3 transports 1 cargo vessel and 15 barges unloaded. 2 more cargo vessels will be unloaded in about 2 days. This will complete phase 1 and task 1 of project. 4th transport departing Kodiak for Fireplace about 12 September. 2nd convoy barges left Chernofski on 10th. Next ship convoy leaves Chernofski 17th for fireplace with 1 transport scheduled for cavern. Army has constructed flying field by draining Sweeper Creek reports 9000 feet long and average width 500
hard sand. First place B-19 pilot Colonel Eareckson landed yesterday 10th reports field best in Alaska. P-38s being sent fire place today to base and operate from there. Believe movement still not known to enemy.

12 0315 CINCPAC TO COMINCH INFO COMSOPAC

In view of Ghormleys 110518 I consider his plan to use 8th Marines if necessary to reinforce MacArthur is best that can be done under the circumstances.

12 0530 COMAMPHORSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO CTF 61, 62, 63 CINCPAC COMINCH

Ultra secret. From Comamphorsopac. Personal reconnaissance and a careful review of situation with Gen Jut 1st MarDiv confirms opinion expressed by 022300 that at least 1 more regiment is essential to defense Cactus now. Vandegrift and I agree that control of north coastal plain requires dispersed strong points with troops and coastal antiaircraft artillery and additional airfields, but timely immediate threat shown your 100255 air confirmation by Opnav are of opinion Kukum should be reinforced at once para urgently recommend approval my departure from Hutton for Cactus morning of 14th local with McCawley transdiv 2 7th Marines Task Force 64 covered and supported by Task Force 61 and 63. 7th Marines will disembark to east of Tenaru River. CFW front will be CHILU para later deployment will depend on developments.

12 1241 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH CIAHOS OPSEC CINCPAC COR etc.

Operations 12th. Handle as most secret. 1240 L (-11) 11th 26 bombers covered by zero's bombed Guadalcanal. 6 killed 29 wounded. 1 P-400 burned 1 F4F badly damaged. 6 bombers 1 zero shot down. 1 F4F lost pilot reco area. B-17 on photo mission over Guadalcanal 1300 L (-11) 11th shot down 4 zero. 1200 M (-12) 11th SBD'S attacked Gizo with 3 500 pound bombs. Buildings destroyed. Strafed and sank small boat near Gizo on return trip. At 1350 L (-11) 11th 11 SBD'S went to attack cruiser 2 DDs bearing 500 from Guadalcanal. Contact made but no hits due low ceiling. At 0217 L (-11) 12th Mackinac in Graciosa Bay Keno Island was shelled by presumed 33. 6 shots no damage. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.
13 0540 COMSOPAC to CTF 61, 62, 63, 64, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Most Secret. Execute reinforcement CACTUS proposed by Comamphibsopac 120530 subject to following directives.

Close air coverage of CACTUS area by CACTUS based planes. Task Force 61 support operation by destroying threatening hostile vessels with special attention hostile carriers. Task Force 63 intensify search operations with due regard physical and material limitations. Task Force 64 under operational control of Task Force 62. Comsopac OpPlan 3-42 remains in effect.

14 0133 CTF 63 to CTF 61 Info COMSOPAC.

Ref your msg to me via patrol plane requesting info Turners plan. Turner departed 0600 L (-11) today Monday to arrive 0500 L (-11) 16th off Tenair Point CACTUS. Route via east and north BUTTON south and west SAN CRISTOBAL east and north CACTUS. Task Force 64 operates within 100 miles to westward transports until rendezvous lat 11-20 long 161-50 at 1600 L (-11) 15th. His force will land 7th Marines between TENARU and block 4 rivers CACTUS completing operation by 2000 L (-11) 16th. Above from his Oplan A15-42 of 13 September. Aircraft on CACTUS will provide close coverage this force and at moment are sufficient this purpose. You and I to support operation as indicated Comsopac 130540.

12 0544 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC CTF 61 CTF 17 BUAER.

Following is encipherment Comgen Cactus mailgram 030600. Action Comsopac Info Comairosopac and Comtaskfor 62.

"Your 300259 since installation 90mm antiaircraft Jap bombing operations conducted from 24 to 27,000 feet. P-400's service ceiling precludes their use for interception at these altitudes. In fighter combat at lower altitudes they cannot turn with zeros due heavy wing loading. F4F4's able fight or intercept altitudes up to 30,000 feet. In combat with zeros here they have proven equally maneuverable and superior in fire power. Zeros arrive here with heavy gas load and avoid full throttle maneuvers. This factor increases apparent superior performance of F4F4's".
Operations 14th. Handle as most secret. Rekata Bay 13th B-17 on patrol attacked 4 serial 33's on water. I burned 1 damaged. Same plane attacked by 2 serial 33's in air believe 1 shot down. Sowespacfor 33 reports believes sink enemy CL 2 Sept off Savo Island. During night of 12th-13th and during 13th Guadalcanal under continuous attack including night bombardment by at least 1 cruiser and 4 DDs both TULAGI and GUADALCANAL, probable landings west of Taiyu Point and active patrolling in or near our positions. Some casualties and light damage from naval gunfire. Fire returned of our 5 inch. 1 enemy ship believed hit. Enemy maintained continuous air patrol over area until dawn.

0510 1 (-11) 13th plane formation reported approaching Guadalcanal from northwest. Our planes took off but enemy turned back. 1020 L 13th 26 zero's over Guadalcanal engaged by 28 Grummans. 1335 L 28 twin engine bombers covered by Zero's intercepted by 20 Grummans caused bombers to Jettison bombs 15 miles away. 1730 L 13th 2 single float planes shot down 1 SBD. Enemy air losses 4 zeros 4 bombers. 2 Grummans crashed 2 missing. On ground our losses 4 killed 12 wounded. Jap losses exceeded 40. Enemy force consisting 3 BBs 4 cruisers, 4 DDs, 1 AP sighted 1030 L 14th at 7-40 S long 163-50 east course 140. Was attacked at 1515 L by 9 B-17s. First report states 2 hits 4 near misses. Another hostile force 1 CV, 3 cruisers, 4 DDs reported 1 lat 06-30 south long 164-1 ly east at 1140 L 14th course 160. Throughout day Guadalcanal attacked by enemy ground forces all sectors. Last report states situation satisfactory. 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines shifted from Tulagi to Guadalcanal. Usual daily bombing raid 14th was by 26 twin engine bombers. At 0930 L 4 zeros on floats approached field and were destroyed by VF 5 pilots. 25 land zeros 5 Fokkewulff bombers over field at 1340 L 1 zero 1 bomber shot down. 12 single engine land planes delivered bombing attack at 1830 L 14th. Todays attack believed to indicate heavy bombers being saved for special mission.

CTF-8 TO CINCPAC

Longview with bomber and fighter field is key of further Aleutian operation but it stands alone 330 miles from Happylark the nearest supporting position of strength. Securely held it is springboard of our future offensive and safeguard against further enemy advance. Its loss would at once give enemy staging land fields as far east as Cavern whose capture would inevitably follow that of Longview. This would create
immediate enduring threat to Happylark and Whirlaway. Recognize defense of Longview is Army job but is matter of serious concern to Navy as all operations in this area must be joint. In long period of low visibility so frequent here or if our comparatively weak offensive air forces should be neutralized, mobile ground defense must be strong enough to guarantee U.S. security of this base. Reinforcement after an enemy attack is launched would be extremely difficult if not impossible. Consider full strength triangular division plus specialized units with strong tank support in addition and decided early reinforcement of Army Alaskan offensive air forces is essential. Present plans as now known to be provide by end of October mobile ground troops of approximately one third this infantry and artillery strength and no tanks. Am of opinion that even these forces are arriving at Longview at a rate which is endangering operation as planned by neglecting consideration of time factor so essential to success despite the favorable start which apparent lack of enemy observation and consequent enterprise has permitted to date. The last troop echelons arrive the end of October.

15 0929

Handle with utmost secrecy. At 1440 WASP torpedoes hit 12-32 long 164-15 burning fiercely. Believe casualties heavy. From TBS intercepted partial report from Duncan to Juneau that Captain and Admiral were on bridge of WASP when bridge blew up. TF-13 remaining with WASP. North Carolina received one torpedo hit frame number 60 port at 1452. Is with me and can make 24 knots. O'Brien received one torpedo hit damage local he can make 15 knots. Ordered to Button. At 1730 in lat 12-45 165-03 course 065 speed advance 16. Will continue on present course until 0700 local tomorrow then 145 T. Am sending 15 SBD to Button to make room for recovery Wasp aircraft. From CTF-17 passed by Comairsoc.

15 1255

Handle with utmost secrecy. Necessary to destroy Wasp completing destruction about 200 M (-12) 15th. Have lost touch with Murray. Unable to entirely break his 150929. Request rendezvous be designated. This from Scott to Ghormley info McCain Murray Turner. Have assumed temporary command will arrive 25 miles north Espiritu Santo at 1700 M (-12) 16th. Will send in plane to make arrangements land badly wounded from DDs. Request instructions other survivors. Total number not known but in 5 DDs. Loss of life believed small. Noyes and Sherman in Farenholt apparently good shape.
Operations 16th. Handle as most secret. 15th 2 B-17's bombed enemy base RUKATA Bay started fires. Light AA at 1000 Love (-11) 16th 13 SBD's and 5 TBF's attacked 3 enemy CL's 4 DD's at 07-37 south long 156-55 east. 1 torpedo hit on CL. 1 bomb hit 2 near misses on 2nd CL. 37 enemy land planes approached to within 100 miles GUADALCANAL bearing 290 but turned back at 1200 love (-11) 16th. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

Operations 17th. Handle as most secret. 16th 2 B-17's bombed dock area GIZO. No ships present. 1 B-17 strafed shore installations RAKATA Bay 1 enemy plane on beach. On GUADALCANAL 16th active patrolling continued by Marines. Only 1 light contact. Enemy troops there appear be awaiting reinforcements. 14 SBD's bombed 1 CA believed KAKO class and 2 DD's at 1750 (-11) 16th Lat 08-07 south Long 150 east. No hits. Several near misses. Ships continued on course 120.

Operations 18th. Handle as most secret. 17th B-17 bombed ships GIZO at 0855 Love (-11). Nil hits. Another B-17 bombed shore installations GIZO at 1110. No ships present. B-17 bombed shore installations RAKATA Bay. Results undetermined. From GUADALCANAL four planes made ineffective attack on two enemy CA's at 07-50 south long 157-30 east at 1810 love 17th. Active patrolling continued by Marines at GUADALCANAL. Several contacts with enemy patrols to south of position. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Task force 65 began landing 7th marines reinforced at 0600 love 18th at GUADALCANAL. No hostile activity air or ground up to 1835 love 18th.

Handle as most secret. Brief summary CO WASP preliminary report. While covering movements TF 65 enroute CACTUS WASP had just finished launching 200 mile afternoon search and was turning to base course when at about 1444 mike (-12) 15th 3 torpedoes sighted close aboard 3 points forward starboard beam 4th torpedo passed ahead. Two hits well below water line between bow and bridge. Third torpedo broached then submerged and hit close to surface 50 to 75 feet forward bridge. All hits vicinity gasoline tanks and magazines. 45 planes lost with ship. Bad fires below decks and in hangars. Starting immediately with torpedo hit continuous explosion ready ammunition particularly noted. About 1505 M severe internal explosions followed shortly by severe explosion in hangar. Severe fire throughout ship. WASP finally destroyed by torpedoes. Comsopac sends.
18 2200 COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC COMSWESPA C MACARTHUR

Threat as ultra secret. MacArthur's C506 to Marshall quote in case the enemy launches a sea air and land attack at New Guinea what assistance may I expect from the Pacific Fleet. The naval forces at my disposal are minor in strength, practically half were lost or seriously damaged in the Solomons operations, and my air and ground troops are entirely inadequate to meet a balanced attack from the enemy comprising large sea elements. In my C307 August 28 I suggested that the naval force under Admiral Ghormley include in its mission the covering of the southeastern tip of New Guinea but this was disapproved both by him and by Admiral Nimitz. It is absolutely essential that I be informed as to what the Navy contemplates in case of a seaborne attack on New Guinea so that I can plan accordingly. I regard the potential situation with the gravest concern unquote. Comment. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

20 1240 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64, etc

Operations 20th. Handle as most secret. Estimated 4 DD's bombarded GUADALCANAL from 2400 to 0100 L (-11) 19th. 2 killed 2 wounded. Jap ground patrol was wiped out in only contact 19th. 19th B-17 bombed AOKO area GIZO. B-17 bombed another strafed REKATA Bay. 7 enemy killed in mopping up operations FLORIDA Island 20th. P-400's bombed and strafed near ESPERANCE. Indications there that considerable enemy stores destroyed in strafing of 17th. 6 SED 6 Grummans attacked shore installations REKATA Bay 20th. No affirm no ships no planes. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

20 1542 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC

Utmost secrecy. Desire early detailed report of tactical situations existing at the times of recent successful Japanese submarine attacks. It is obvious that protracted operations of our task forces on a strategically static bases in submarine infested waters is proving increasingly hazardous. The determination of escort requirements as demonstrated by tactical experience, particularly for carrier operations, has an important bearing on other operations in prospect and on the destruction of destroyers.
200145 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info to COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPACE, MacARTHUR.

Your 182200. Retention our present holdings in SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA vital to success future offensive operations. If enemy uses transports under naval escort or covering force to make attack from seaward against MORESBY consider this should afford Ghormley opportunity to attack enemy expedition. Success of such attack would depend upon timeliness and accuracy of information of enemy obtained by SOWESPAC air reconnaissance cma relative strength of enemy naval forces involved and losses inflicted by SOWESPAC air attacks. Until direction of enemy movement has been definitely determined to be against MORESBY with no concurrent attempt on GUADALCANAL consider present conditions make first duty of Sopac Naval Forces protection of GUADALCANAL and its communications from attack while it is being consolidated. Later best employment would probably be to cover our expansion along SOLOMONS when it is undertaken. If we can maintain sufficient pressure in SOLOMONS I believe this will prevent landing attack in force against MORESBY particularly if allied aircraft based in NEW GUINEA remain active.

2011322 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 Info CINCPAC, CTF 18, 62, 63, 64 COMSOWESPACE, COMBATDIV 6.

Handle as most secret. Mission to support withdrawal task force 65 completed. Pending arrangements for task force reorganization the carrier task force with attached units will operate in the retired area defined below prepared for offensive action against suitable enemy targets located within striking distance. Operate in general area bounded by latitude parallel 13 and 20 degrees south meridians 165 and 177 east. Avoid direct routes POPPY - BUTTON and POPPY - FANTAN insofar as practicable. Rendezvous for task force units now at WHITE, POPPY and Task Force 64 units from BUTTON to join you will be designated later in order effect reorganization of task forces in accordance with instructions to be issued.
I gathered from our conference yesterday that Alaska Army Air Forces should be somewhat increased especially the B-25 for use as torpedo planes with eventual number of latter type set at 3 squadrons or 48 planes in full operation. Butler now reports that your Chief of Staff told him air force strength would remain unchanged until completion Fireplace operations. Thereafter Alaska air forces would be reduced as follows: Fighters from 6 squadrons to 4, loss 50 planes. Medium bombers from 3 squadrons to 2 and 13 operating planes per squadron, 26 crews total. This would give 26 operating medium bombers and 8 spare planes. Heavy bombers cut from 3 to 2 squadrons loss 8 planes. Also losing the medium bombers used for coastal patrol on eastern Gulf of Alaska. My statement that Fireplace required permanent increase Alaska air forces. Consider minimum requirements of planes in full operations for Alaska air forces are following: Heavies 32 and mediums 48, fighters 150 with 13 old mediums for coastal patrol with adequate spare planes of each type to permit overhaul and repair.

Your 201322. Desire consideration be given anchoring carrier task and other covering and striking forces at White Poppy or other protected anchorages except when employed for specific tasks. This will decrease hazard from subs conserve fuel save wear and tear and give air groups better chance to train. Request reports required by Cominch 201542 be obtained from Task Force Commanders remaining your area. Also your comments.

To be handled most secretly. Your confidential letter 32CL-42. Am I authorized retain Murray as carrier task force commander with Lee in Washington part of that force.

Operations for 21st. Handle as most secret. On Guadalcanal 20th during day only 1 contact along Lunga River where ground patrol killed 19 with loss 2 wounded Marines. At 2100 L(-11) 20th enemy launched nuisance raid against forward southern strong point. Contacts continued throughout night. Our losses 2 killed 7 wounded. Many Jap dead left in wire. 2 SBD's on evening search bombed Gizo. At 1735 L 20th 10 SBD's attacked enemy cruiser 150 miles northwest Guadalcanal. 4 near misses. Believe some damage. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.
Operations 22nd. Handle as most secret. On GUADALCANAL continued patrolling but no hostile contact during day 21st. 2345 (-11) 21st 3 SBD's bombed and strafed 4 DDs landing boats vicinity CAPE ESPERANCE. No hits on DDs which left on Northwest course. 21st installations REKATA Bay bombed and strafed 3 times by single B-17's. Dock area GIZO bombed by B-17. Near misses on buildings. Plane sighting enemy CA near FAISI proceeding slowly with long oil slick to Southeast indicates may have been damaged in SBD attack of evening 20th.

Refer Cincpac 220035. Propose following plan for occupation (a) about 4 155 guns, 4 90 mm guns, 10 50 caliber AA, 5 tanks with personnel and administrative units from 5th Defense Battalion to embark WHITE POPPY. (b) 2 company infantry from 3rd Marines SAMOA. (c) Tender and 6 patrol planes from OAHU as none can be spared here. Tender also bring from OAHU for use 5th Defense Battalion 4 twin mount 20 mm guns with 10 units fire. (d) Escort of about 2 cruisers and 4 to 6 destroyers from SoPac. Units rendezvous near HOORN ISLANDS. (e) Occupation about 2 October zone M(-12). (f) Command logistic and construction responsibility then pass to ComGen STRAW. An ACORN too large for purpose. Construction personnel to part from STRAW to be replaced. Infantry from SAMOA to be replaced from States. Need immediate REELO. Above proposals subject minor changes as details are worked out.

Have reason to believe enemy may move into ELLICE ISLANDS about October first with weakly escorted forces similar to his GILBERT Operations. Ultra. Consider FUNAFUTI should be denied immediately by Marine Force from SAMOA. Suggest about 900 men four 155 mm guns 8 heavy AA one platoon tanks and one half special weapons group of defense battalion one infantry company one SCR dash 270. For subsequent development of defenses and airfield a defense battalion and an ACORN now allocated to you could be employed. Comment.
COMSOPAC TO CTF 63, CGSSTRAW, CTG 62.6 INFO CTF-62 CINCPAC

26 0826

Handle as most secret. Comsopac sends action Comtasfor 63 CG STRAW Contaskgroup 62.6 info Contaskfor 62 Cominch Cincpac only addressees decode beyond this. Comtasfor 63 cover Fetlock operation. On dog minus three and dog minus two day by B-17 and Hudson search from Fantan and PBY search from Button. On Dog minus one day discontinue Hudson search and transfer PBY's to Fetlock basing on destroyer tender searching enroute. On dog day conduct B-17 search from Fantan, PBY search from Button and Fetlock plus local search by SOC with B-17s from Fantan furnishing local fighter support. On dog plus two day withdraw PBY and tender from Fetlock maintaining striking group of B-17s on call at Button and Fantan. Commander task group 62.6 transfer 4 scout planes with beaching gear and small stock supplies for local patrol at Fetlock. CG STRAW provide flight crews and small service detachment. Contaskfor 63 provide moorings, bombs, ammunition and matting for ramp. Modifications in above as necessitated by circumstances authorized.

COMSOPAC TO CTF 63, CTF 62.6 CG STRAW INFO CINCPAC etc.

26 1156

Most secret. Comsopac sends action CTF 63 CG STRAW CTF 62.6 info CTF 62 Cominch Cincpac addressees only decode further. Change that part of mydis 260826 regarding transfer of cruiser planes to Fetlock as follows. CG STRAW furnish 4 scout seaplanes, necessary crews and material. Crescent City available for embarkation material and ground personnel on not to delay basis. Planes to be flown to Fetlock ready for operation on dog plus one day.
24 0206 COMSOPAC to CTF 62, COMAIRSOPAC, CG SAMOAN GROUP, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMGENSOPAC, COMSOWESPACFOR, MacArthur, CG FANTAN.

Handle as most secret. Comgensopac has by hand. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Other than addressees decode no further. Task Force 62 occupy FETLOCK about 2 October with about 4 155-mm, 4 90mm, 5 40mm, 10 50 cal AA guns, 5 tanks and appropriate service and administration units of Amphib-force SoPac, and 2 infantry companies of 3rd Marines. Comgen STRAW direct 2 infantry companies of 3rd Marines report at once to Comamphibforsopac for FETLOCK operation. See my 231120. Details of air support later. After debarkation and withdrawal of ships of Task Force 62 command and logistic responsibility for FETLOCK pass to Comgen STRAW. Comtaskfor 17 and 64 informed for info by another dispatch.

24 1630 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, Info NAS DUTCH HARBOR.

Handle this with the greatest secrecy. Cincpac 222327 concur your understanding that transfer Marine combat teams dependent on developments. Assume that you plan use 8th Marine regiment to garrison NDEI. Confirm. Para 2. Subsequent to the arrival of the Army 43rd division in SoPac area desire further consideration be given to transfer of combat teams. Inform me your plans for the employment this division. Para 3. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

25 1124 COMSOPAC TO CG FANTAN AND STRAW info CINCPAC

This is most secret. Comsopac sends. Actions Comgens Fantan and Straw. Info Cincpac. Communication plan for Fetlock occupation is contained my serial 0055E to Comamphibforsopac with copy fifth defense battalion and Comgens Straw and Fantan. Requires radio silence except for special use of coast watcher radio channel to Suva where Comgen Fantan reenciphers in Santa. Will be forwarded next air to Suva and Samao. Fetlock will use Fepek only until silence lifted then joins Straw circuit. Temporary call Z6F.

25 1228 COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO RADM WRIGHT

Ultra secret from Comairsopac. Agree Cincpac 242207. Believe 4 SOC planes sufficient. Recommend they come from Minneapolis Chester less crews. 4 sets beaching gear and small stock spare parts from same source. CG Straw provide flight crews small service detachment servicing equipment. Ballard will provide moorings, bombs, ammunition and Summerfeld matting for beaching ramp. Have conferred Radm Wright who has this by hand. Comairsopac does the sending.
Super secret from MacArthur Carpender passing. NSS pass to Marshall for action for info to Adm Nimitz and Adm Ghormley. There are growing indications that the enemy intends to throw large ground reinforcements into NEW GUINEA from the north by means of numerous small increments using usual Marine infiltration technique. A golden opportunity is being lost by not anticipating the enemy through clearing the coast as far as BUNA by trained amphibious combat teams operating in conjunction with projected enveloping movement by infantry over the trails of the OWEN STANLEY Mountains. Earnestly request reconsideration of previous decision not to make available such forces until later developments. Small craft for landing and maintenance of supply are a necessary adjunct of the combat teams.

Your 241630. Most secret. Present plan employ portion 8th Marines initially at APRICOT. This regiment needs special training before it can be considered an Amphibious unit. Cincpac and Comsopac have conferred with General MacArthurs representatives. What he requires are troops capable of operating along northeast NEW GUINEA coast from medium sized shallow draft troop barges or small troop carriers. To use highly trained amphibious units on such work not economical. There are no troop barges or small troop carriers of the required type in this area. At this time all trained amphibious units in this area are employed at CACTUS-RINGBOLT. The 43rd division requires organization and training on its arrival here. Tentative plans subject to change contemplate employing this division in garrisoning present bases to relieve more experienced troops for forward area. This area at present has no reserve. Cincpac who is with me concurs. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.
Handle with utmost secrecy. Comsopac sends. Enemy information contained in Daily Bulletins and additional dispatches addressed to task force commanders. Task Force 17 proceed to fly off position south of BUIN-FAISI and at sunrise dog dag attack enemy shipping that area with air striking force. Priority of targets carriers, transports, other combatant types, oilers, cargo ships. Recover aircraft and retire to White Poppy at best speed consistent with fuel limitations. Comtask force 63 will provide B-17s to act as fighter cover from about 8 to 12 hours love (-11) on dog day. Comsowespac has been requested to provide maximum reconnaissance dog minus two and minus one days and to hit Kieta and Buka sunrise dog day with air striking force. Depart White Poppy fueled to capacity. Comsopac will send fleet oiler to rendezvous with task force enroute to White Poppy during retirement. Fuel available at Button. Dog day five October unless otherwise ordered. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.
To obtain full benefit B-17s operating accordance your 011427 and in creating diversion and neutralization enemy aircraft at source suggest following modification of plan. Your 011302: Affirm Sowespac air striking force hit both aerodromes at Rabaul instead Buka Kieta. Baker Sopac B-17s hit Buka Kieta sunrise dog day thence proceed vicinity carrier to arrive about 0800 love (-11) and provide air support according to plan until 12 hours love (-11). Attention invited to fact that while B-17s have excellent defensive qualities neither in speed, maneuverability, diving characteristics nor positioning of armament does it possess capability successfully intercepting and carrying its gunpower offensively to attacking enemy aircraft. CTF-17 should thoroughly understand this in forming his plan of action.

Action Comtaskfor 17 info Comsoupac. Originator Comairsopac assumes that you will launch at 0500 L (minus 11) GCT 5th in position 120 miles bearing 180 true from Buin and that thereafter point option moves at 20 knots along 135 true until 0800 L (-11). B-17 air support after daylight attack Buka will attempt rendezvous at about 0800 L (-11) on basis foregoing assumptions with IFF operating. B-17 cain of leader OV40 will use call quote Blue Base unquote for carrier. Voice frequency 6970 kcs. Key 4435 kcs. Will maintain radio silence unless called. If foregoing assumptions and arrangements incorrect or unsatisfactory advise by whatever means practicable.

FETLOCK occupation completed. Handle as ultra secret.
Taskgroup less landing unit withdrawing at 18 hours mike (-12) third. Pass through following points all south and east. 10 and 179-30. 15 and 178-30. 23 and 168. Will refuel destroyers to permit all vessels arrive NOUMEA with 20 percent fuel. Expect dissolve task group organization at about 14 hours mike fifth. Expect arrive NOUMEA cruisers and 5 destroyers afternoon 7th. Radio NOUMEA pass to Comsoupac and Comtaskforce 62 for action. Radio SAMOA pass to Comgen STRAW. Comairsopac has this and will pass to Comtaskforce 64. No evidence enemy discovery prior to departure.
Troops of 1st MarDiv will be transported by CACTUS boats from KUKUM to KOKUMBONA for landing and attack about daylight October 5th. From CTF 62, Task Group 64.6 GRAYSON GWIN arrive off boat landing KUKUM at 4 hours L (-11) October 5th and embark officers from 1st MarDiv who will deliver attack plan. Para. Provide gunfire support for landing during 5th and 6th as requested by ComGen CACTUS. Consistent with supporting mission exploit any favorable opportunity to destroy enemy surface or submarine forces in CACTUS area. Giving due consideration to information concerning location and strength enemy surface forces you are authorized at your discretion to retire to RING-BOLT or to eastward through LENGO CHANNEL during night October 5th-6th. Para. When action commences October 5th break radio silence and inform originator your fuel situation. Para. On completion assigned task and not later than 2000 L (-11) October 6th return to BUTTON advising by radio prior departure CACTUS ETA BUTTON. ComGen CACTUS has in another system.
October (GCT)

05 1202 COMSOPAC to CTF 64 Info CINCPAC, CTF 62, CTF 63.

Handle as most secret. Following tasks are in prospect for Task Force 64 during period 7-27 October. (a) Provide escort for COPAHEE to fly off point and return. This movement under operational control of Commander Task Force 63 my 050552. (b) Beginning soon as practicable have striking force operate in position of readiness to attack enemy vessels landing reinforcements at CACTUS generally in accord idea proposed your dispatch 040600 returning BUTTON for fuel as necessary. (c) Provide escort consisting of 2 CA and 4 DD APRICOT occupation force departing WHITE POPPY about 17 October. The forces available to you during this period will be Task Force 64 as organized my 221002 September plus Fletcher O'Bannon. Additional details covering these operations will be furnished later. Comsopac originator.

06 2000 COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC.

This to be handled with greatest secrecy. Question has been raised as to whether fighter squadrons at Birch and Bleacher are essential and would better be employed elsewhere. Also whether fighter squadron at Holly should not be replaced by light or medium bombers. Further whether medium bombers in Cactus would not be helpful in knocking out enemy ships which are landing enemy troops and bombarding our positions there. Comment.

07 0306 COMSOPAC TO CG ARMY SOPAC INFO COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Handle as most secret. Request you dispatch earliest practicable 1 army infantry regiment to Cactus consult Comamphibforsopac relative details including transportation to be furnished by him. Regiment will report to Comamphibforsopac for duty under principle unity of command. Replacement rations a naval responsibility. Also request your recommendations relative early reinforcement BUTTON garrison to total infantry strength of 1 infantry regiment reinforced.
08 1229 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, HARMON.

Most secret. In view use BLEACHER as advanced Fleet Base consider air production essential Cominch 062000. My plan contemplates movement forward from BLEACHER all personnel American fighter command and replacement by RNZAF which will take over American equipment. This then to be considered, as one of the 10 NEW ZEALAND Squadrons to be equipped in accordance approved plan. Medium bombers will be definitely helpful CACTUS area. Have 2 squadrons B-26s now available and 1 flight B-25s reported as available near future. Propose employment these from CACTUS earliest opportunity but cannot do so until improvement and expansion runways and airdrome facilities now underway is accomplished. Comsopac sender. Harmon has by hand.

08 0333 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRPAC.

Cominch 062000 most secret consider fighter squadron BLEACHER could be better employed forward areas but should be replaced by 6 light or dive bombers. For CACTUS medium bombers would be most useful for both attack and search missions. Do you agree.

14 0230 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMMWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Comtaskforce 8 sends. Station addressed deliver to Cinopac for action. Cominch and Comdr Westseafron for info. Most secret. My earlier estimates, particularly with respect consolidation LONGVIEW (my 292340 of August) revised in light of effect of enemy commitments in So-westpac upon his intentions North Pacific as set forth your 130139. After increment combatant troops arrives LONGVIEW about October 23rd bringing strength there to 9000 troops, Army now plans to move 4000 troops to AMULET before further strengthening LONGVIEW (My 122234) static situation of main middle ALEUTIAN gaps will thus be reached with unloading of FILMONE about 1 November. Revised estimate is thus this situation can be maintained with Seafrontier forces augmented by cruiser escorts specially assigned for important troop movements plus certain additions enumerated below. Therefore recommend Task Force 8 be withdrawn from North Pacific about 1 November and Naval effort in task of holding enemy to present positions, opposing his efforts to further consolidate those positions, while strengthening own positions be assigned Sea Frontier Forces as contemplated by Comnowestseafron Op Order 2-42 dated September 10. In addition returning LOUISVILLE about October 17 relieved

(Continued on next page)
specifically as follows. Afirm. Withdrawal surface units on following approximate dates. October 23 INDIANAPOLIS October 28 Canadian Naval Units, November 1 SAINT LOUIS, NASHVILLE, BANCROFT, BAILEY, COGHLAN; Minelayers on completion LONGVIEW mining project. Baker. Withdrawal Fleet submarines end of present patrols Captain Golclough being relieved. Commander Gray in command submarines. About November first submarines, DMS's, Patwing 4, old destroyers be assigned to Nowestseafron and operation control of these forces pass to the Comnowestseafron. Withdrawal of Task Force 8 be considered complete as of that date. Comtaskforce 8 answering. Pending decision have had no discussion with local Army authorities. Request early information of contemplated action in order to provide Army with as much advance notice as possible of changes in Naval dispositions this area.

Most Secret. Addees only decode. Comtaskforce 8 reply to Cominch 141325. Bombardment practicable as follows. A. From Eastward using direct fire against North and South Heads and Submarine Base and new installations Southwest side of harbor and indirect fire against main camp and shipping both of latter screened by high land on and near North Head. B. From Southward using indirect fire. Damage from air action or gunfire should be negligible. Some menace possible in Eastern attack but improbable to Southward in view recent operations our submarines along South Coast but consider fast mine sweepers desirable in either case. Consider submarines constitute main enemy threat against repetition of bombardment and recommend strong anti submarine screens. Unless BROOKLYN class cruiser is in close support for counter battery fire recommend against employment of additional destroyers for bombardment due to proximity of destroyer firing lanes to possible shore batteries. Suggest use dive bombers and torpedo planes from AVG against shipping immediately following bombardment. Lessened chance of fog at this time of year increases possibility of air spot which will need fighter protection. Planes should include coordinated land base bombing and fighter support but should recognize uncertainty of accomplishment due weather conditions.
Most Secret. Operation your 141325 considered practicable and its morale and training value for the OEBs and psychologic effect on country are recognized. However do not recommend it for following reasons. Afirm. Consider air attacks are already making KISKA untenable to enemy therefore even small risk to OEBs from subs mines and aircraft hardly justified. Baker. Bombardment of important section of KISKA must be by indirect fire and air spot for this usually impossible due to low ceiling. Cast. While enemy attack against MIDWAY is not considered probable the OEBs in this area are, due to our concentration to southward, our main reliance against such an attack. Para. If operation is directed NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI would be only units available as there are no 16-inch high capacity shells available. Amount 14-inch this type would permit 30 rounds per gun. Rebaging powder and shifting ammunition would require about 8 days. Believe air coverage should be furnished by shore aircraft especially P-38's from bases within range. ACV cannot be counted upon as combatant carrier as it is slow in handling aircraft and cannot conduct flight operations unless there is at least a 10 knot wind. First ACV to train with own aircraft is NASSAU which has just commenced training. Para. Request early advice.
SECRET
October (GCT)

16 0937 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral King only. Ultra from Cincpac. Halsey his Chief of Staff and Intelligence Officer will be with Ghormley sixteenth our date. In view Ghormley's 160440 and other indications including some noted during my visit I have under consideration his relief by Halsey at earliest practicable time. Request your comment. If Halsey becomes Comsopac would expect him utilize Ghormley as long as needed.

16 0245 COMINCH to CINCPAC

For Admiral Nimitz only personal and secret. Most secret. Your 160937 approved.

Copy Concours 160440 July here.
SECRET

October (GCT)

18 1350 COMSOPAC to ALL TF COMS SOPAC, ALL COMGENS SOPAC AREA, etc.

Handle as most secret. Action all Taskforcoms Sopac all Comgens Sopac area Comtaskfors 16 and 17 From Comsopac. Most Secret. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey has this date relieved Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley as Commander South Pacific Force and South Pacific area. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Comairsopac pass to Comgens BUTTON, CACTUS and ROSES by mail. Comsopac Admin pass to NEW ZEALAND Chiefs of Staff and to USS CLARK for delivery Aher to Comgen BLEACHER via President JACKSON and to Comgen BOBCAT on arrival.

19 1954 COMINCH to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC.

Handle with greatest secrecy. In order that urgently needed submarine support may be furnished to and coordinated with forces now operating in the SOLOMONS the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that TF 42 be placed temporarily under the operational control of Comsopac during the continuance of Task 1 and that TF 42 be built up to 12 fleet submarines in transfer from Western AUSTRALIA as soon as possible. This force may base and/or operate in either Sopac or SWPAC area in accordance with paras. 7 and 10 B of the basic directives to Cinc Pacific Ocean Areas and Supreme Commander SWPAC Area as amplified by Cominch and Army COF 112150 of last May. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Deployment of submarines should be so adjusted that sufficient number can be readily moved to oppose possible Japanese concentrations against NEW GUINEA. This from Chief of Staff Army and Cominch.

20 1540 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Treat as very secret. Cominch 191954 consider greater concentration of Pacific fleet submarines in SOLOMON ISLANDS Area than indicated in your 180245 should be made. Comment and advise me of action taken.
October (GCT)

20 2215 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMSUBPAC.

Most secret Cominch 201540. Will sail PacFleet subs to Sopac as follows all to proceed as indicated from present locations toward BUTTON passing your operational control on crossing equator: (a) SKIPJACK and SILVERSIDES now TRUK at once remaining endurance 10 and 13 Nov respectively. (b) POLLACK and PLUNGER now 5 days out from MIDWAY to JAPAN at once endurance 22 and 26 November. (c) GRAYLING sailed PEARL 19 for Sopac as permanent transfer. (d) TARPON departed PEARL today for TRUK will now divert to Sopac. (e) To depart PEARL for SOPAC GROWLER 22nd, FLYING FISH 23rd, STINGRAY 26th, GATO and WAHOO about 30th. (f) ALBACORE and GROPER from MIDWAY for Sopac about 30th. (g) AMBERJACK already in area under Comsopac. Para. FULTON to SOPAC as soon as possible. Captain Roper on board for employment advisor or command as you desire.

20 2309 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSUBPAC.

Most secret. Your 201540. Unless otherwise directed will reinforce Sopac submarines as indicated my 202215. This and Comsowespac 200635 will total 24 subs under Halsey. Leaves 10 PacFlt subs for Western Pacific patrols, 9 of which are now on or near station. Of these WHALE has mines. Remainder mining program will be deferred.

21 1540 COMINCH to COMUS NAVFOR EUROPE, Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

Ultra secret. Say to General DeGaulle that it is necessary that Comsopac establish Headquarters ashore at NOUMEA immediately and that due to overcrowded conditions there I have authorized him and staff General Vogel and Staff and the Army on basis of urgent military necessity to occupy certain buildings left vacant by departure of Dargentlieu and his mission. Para. I urge that DeGaulle delegate full authority to local governor Montchamp to negotiate with Comsopac concerning additional matters that may arise. This authority should be independent of movements of Dargentlieu.

21 1400 COMINCH to ADMIRALTY, Info CINCPAC.

Pass to Admiralty for action. Highest secrecy. Following from Cincpac quote Present Japanese concentrations of all services in SOLOMONS area with consequent deduction to minimum in other areas offers golden opportunity for positive action against enemy by Allied or British action in BAY of BENGAL or along MALAY BARRIER. In my opinion our situation in SOLOMONS urgently requires easing of pressure which would result from such action unquote. I concur. Cincpac informed.

Most secret. Halsey has requested reenforcement by 1 or more carriers of the British Eastern Fleet. In view urgent and immediate need for every possible increase particularly of carriers I recommend that this idea be explored to utmost.

Comsopac to Cominch info Cincpac, Comairsopac, Comgensopac. Handle as most secret. Following plan employment Army fighters and medium bombers, CACTUS dash JUTTON area. Your 241520. Maintain CACTUS one single engine and one P-38 fighter squadron dash total 50 airplanes. Maintain CACTUS dash JUTTON area two medium bomb squadrons dash 26 B-26 or B-25. To be maintained from reserves POPPY which should be 50 percent for fighters and 25 percent for medium bombers. Attrition at rate of 20 percent per month for medium bombers and 50 percent per month for fighters. Above in no way reduces total requirement fighters and medium bombers Sopac area which has been previously reported as 7 squadrons fighters and 4 squadrons medium bombers. Comgensopac has by hand.

This is part 1 of 2 parts from CTF 8. My 150039 September. LONGVIEW, securely held, guarantees our northern flank and its loss to the enemy could cause irretrievable harm. While enemy commitments elsewhere give us complete freedom of action

(Continued on next page)
in the ALEUTIANS assuring the impregnability of LONGVIEW should be our primary aim. If and when enemy commitments elsewhere east sufficiently it is inconceivable that the enemy will endure our constant air attacks upon KISKA without counter action. The expansion of our position in the middle ALEUTIANS by the occupation of AMULET and the creation of air fields there must be a further invitation to early enemy reaction to these new middle ALEUTIAN happenings. My 150039 September recommended full strength triangular division. Due to non availability more troops the conference with DeWitt and Buckner produced a compromise accepting 2 combat teams instead of the 3 which were my original and still preferred figure. Cominich despatch 022120 stated Joint Chiefs of Staff considered 11,000 adequate. Army will now have 9200 at LONGVIEW on October 30 of which 3100 are infantry, 1297 field artillery, or one combat team plus additional artillery. After that date the occupation of AMULET by 4200 troops has priority in local Army plans. Part 2 follows.

This is part 2 of my 280215. This situation does not meet the local Army-Navy compromise agreement, does not meet number troops approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff, is one third the number of combat teams originally recommended, and one half the number of combat teams mentioned as basis of agreement in DeWitt-Theobald conference. Eventually LONGVIEW garrison is to be reinforced by additional infantry regiment. Firmly believe that primary position of LONGVIEW in ALASKAN situation should be recognized by bringing the defense force at that place to accepted strength before initiating AMULET operation. Adequate ground troops at LONGVIEW far more vital to LONGVIEW defense than a second or dispersal air field 55 miles away which is all that AMULET means to LONGVIEW in a military sense. Two. Due to reduced numbers of planes in Army squadrons, the Alaskan Air Force, instead of being reinforced as recommended in my 202100 September, is actually reduced in combatant strength. Reiterate my opinion that with less than the minimum ground strength of two combat teams at LONGVIEW we can lose that vital position of the middle ALEUTIANS at any time during these next months whenever either neutralization of Army air forces or period of low visibility would permit the enemy to effect the landing there. Comtaskforce 8 sends to Cincpac.

COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC.

Very secret. Increasing use of enemy submarines for scouting and general information purposes is indicated. We do not appear to be making enough similar use of own submarines.
31 0206 COMSOPAC to COMGENSOPAC, Info COMAIRSOPAC, CTF 61, CTF 64, etc.

Handle as most secret. Request you dispatch earliest practicable one Army infantry Regiment reinforced less one battalion infantry to CACTUS. Consult Comamphibfor-sopac relative details including transportation to be furnished by him. Regiment will report to Comamphibfor-sopac for duty under principle unity of command. Replacement rations a Naval responsibility. Comgensopac has for action all others are info.

01 1312 COMSOPAC to COMINCH. Info CINCOPAC.

Most secret. CTF 17 reports as follows quote HORNET completely immobilized about 1010 GCT 26 by two torpedoes starboard side at forward engine room plus bomb hits forward and aft resulting complete loss power, light, water. Thereafter unable reestablish. Towing operations attempted by NORTHAMPTON throughout day unsuccessful. First wire parted. Second cast off due repeated enemy attacks. By late afternoon damage so complete from these torpedo hits five bomb hits two crashed enemy planes all possibilities towing and salvage operations exhausted. In lat 09-41 Long 167-35 two DD's fired 16 torpedoes at HORNET 9 hits followed by 300 rounds 5 inch shells to sink her. At 2030 6 DD's withdrew from area with HORNET still afloat burning fiercely for full length. Subsequent air search indicated no trace. Unquote. At 1730 CTF 17 had reported his proposed action to destroy with which I concur and which I had anticipated.

01 1050 COMSOPAC to CINCOPAC.

This is most secret. From best information now available re your 010501. Halsey talking. Enemy planes shot down 115 certain. 46 probable total 161. Own losses from all causes VF 27. VSB 24. VT 13 total 64. Personnel losses from two airgroups 24. Preliminary but more detailed information with McFALL now enroute by air to PEARL.

02 1618 COMINCH to CINCOPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Handle with greatest secrecy. Your 012115 Office of War Information states that Associated Press despatch from NOUMEA dated October 28th passed by Censor there contained news of loss of ship. News released here with approval of highest quarters. Loss anticipated but not positively known here until receipt of Halsey 011312 in reply to my 311800.
This is ultra secret. From CTF 16 to Cinopac. Comsopac has by hand. Captured enemy code and notebook and decoded messages give following information relative to action 26 October. (a) An aviator's notebook reveals he left KURE on board UNYOU 25 Sept. He sent aboard ZUIKAKU 1 Oct. His route was KURE to SAIPAN to TRUK. Whether by ship or plane unknown. (b) Senior officer probably Comcardiv 1 was in SHOKAKU. (c) Comcardiv 2 present in HAYATAKA. (d) Carriers present SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, ZUIHO, HAYATAKA. (e) According to notebook planes from 3 carriers were composed as follows: CV1, 17 torpedo, 21 bombers, 25 fighters. CV2, 19 torpedo, 21 bombers, 24 fighters. End of part 1 of 2 parts.

This is second part from Comtaskfor 16. Ultra Secret. CV3, 18 torpedo, nil bombers, 7 fighters. (f) Planes from REKATA BAY took part in action probably search planes and horizontal bombers. (g) One of surface ships present as HAGI. (h) After launching enemy carrier believed ZUIKAKU kept planes informed his position about every half hour. (i) Presence our carrier search planes reported to enemy cruiser. (j) Planes reported weather our vicinity. (k) Enemy air group commander in our area appeared to direct attacks by each wave as it arrived and also reported wind frequently. (l) After dark enemy surface vessels searched for HORNET assisted by flares from more than one plane. (m) Partly decoded message included what may be words "Operations postponed". (n) Captured documents forwarded to you by air mail. End of second part.
November (GCT)

05 1524 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC.

I am becoming disturbed about multiplication of special commands such as Commander Bases Sopac Area when work done is inextricably linked with that of Subcomserforpac. This is HiCom. Para 2. It seems to me that Comserforpac should have appropriate number of deputies one of whom should do much of work Comserfor is now doing thus enabling him to exercise more overall supervision. In case of Sopac should include all logistic matters including bases. Para three. Be prepared to discuss these matters when we meet.

06 1345 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

Planning and development bases this area is a major problem. Functions of logistic supply and battle repair and maintenance provide full load for Sersonopac. Under these circumstances considered essential relieve Comseron of base development and command. Conditions here such that prompt action was and is necessary to prevent spread of chaotic conditions particularly WHITE POPPY. Your 060217.

08 1505 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. After consultation with Admiral Boyd regarding employment of ILLUSTRIOUS in Pacific Fleet submit recommendation as to immediate employment in Sopac (Afirm) with present complement (Baker) necessity of proceeding to PEARL or other U.S. Base for modifications and outfitting of torpedo squadron with TBF's. View held here based on Halsey's despatch that services of carrier urgently required now and consequently immediate problem is employment of ILLUSTRIOUS if and when she is made available.

08 2145 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

After consultation with Boyd and Towers. Most secret. Believe period of about four weeks at PEARL for equipping with TBF's indoctrination and training is essential to meet the Japs. Do you consider your present situation will permit this. Cominch 081505.

09 2107 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, ALL TF COM SOPAC, COMSWP.

Excellent. Ultra. Indications that major operation assisted by carrier striking force slated to support movement Army transports to GUADALCANAL. Cinc Third (Carrier Striking) now proceeding fueling rendezvous near one north one fifty seven east. Cinc Eleventh Air Fleet to operate

(Continued on next page)
against CACTUS from Zed minus three days. Eight fleet to escort Army convoy. Large movement enemy planes to KAHILI base near BUTU. Striking force to hit CACTUS Zed minus one day. Army AA Unit to embark eleven November proceed land CACTUS. Jap sub to attack BLUE plane tender VANIKOHO and NDENI. Zed day not known but research continues. Air attacks on CACTUS to be augmented by Army Air on Zed Day. All aircraft under command of striking force probably on Zed minus one day. Estimate available combat carriers ZUTHO, HAYATAKA, transport carriers HOSHO, OTAKA, UNYO, but last two have not had combat air groups assigned in past. While this looks like a big punch I am confident that you with your forces will take their measure.

Further conference with Boyd and Towers on Comsopac 110954. Most secret. Assuming ILLUSTRIOUS reports direct from Eastern Fleet with complement 36 fighters 15 Swordfish or Albacore. Proposals your 061505. Affirm. Require replacement of British planes with Grumman TBF. Baker. U.S. squadron acceptable but British pilots with TBF preferred. Cast. Only in view urgent need indicated by Halsey consider carrier could be equipped and personnel indoctrinated at Sopac base providing necessary planes available there. Para. Should point out small offensive power this carrier with approximate complement 36 VF 15 VTB. Alternate may include 6 SBD as deck park at cost about 9 VF. Para. In lessened urgency or if British Atlantic carrier furnished it should definitely equip and indoctrinate at Pearl or U.S. Base. This would be much more efficient considering minor but essential modifications necessary in ship and in British planes. Para. Boyd comments that if INDOMITABLE has large elevator capable taking SBD planes this ship would be invaluable in Pacific operations.

Our forces in action with enemy off SAVO ISLAND about 0230 L (-11) this morning. Most details lacking but apparently ATLANTA and JUNEAU damaged and PORTLAND steering inoperative from torpedo hit. At least one enemy unit sunk and several burning. ULTRA. Enemy relief being sent from BUIN and his Zed day postponed. Para. SEAWOLF unable to catch carrier off PALAU.
COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC CINCLANT OPNAV.

Utmost secret. Begin. CinClant direct WICHITA CLEVELAND SUWANEE SANGAMON JENKINS MURPHY RADFORD WALLER CONWAY proceed Panama preferably but not necessarily in one group as soon as they can be made ready. Also CHENANCC when other destroyers assigned Pacflt are available for escort. Upon arrival Panama report Cincpac for duty. Advise expected departure dates. Para. Cinpac send BOGUE and CARD to Lantflt as early as practicable. Present intention assign BOISE to Lantflt and keep Lant modern cruiser strength up to 6 including those shaking down by holding MONTPELIER until BOISE ready. Opnav informed.

CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

Most Secret. Your despatch 220120 indicates plan for relief 1st Marine Division. KIWI "C" will soon be in POPPY. Your despatch 210436 indicates command relations CACTUS not yet settled. In order that I may have information required for own planning and as basis for representation to higher authority request early advice your plans for following based on forces now available to you. A. Relief of Marines at CACTUS. B. Final command organization CACTUS indicated your despatch 210436. C. Commander CACTUS after relief 1st Marine Division. D. Commander CACTUS after relief all Marines. E. Command organization and Base Commander POPPY after arrival KIWI "C" and departure American Division. Also request your plans under A. to E. above based on 25th Division Army being made available to you with first echelon of 1 regimental combat team ETD PEARL November 25 followed by 3 other increments ETD PEARL December 6, 15, and 31.

COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC COMSOWESPACE MACARTHUR.

Treat as ultra secret. Chief of Staff Army has by hand for info. Army has received urgent despatch from MacArthur "Is it possible to give me some Naval support for the North coast of NEW GUINEA. My submarines on east coast are no longer available, operational control having passed to South Pacific. PT boats would be invaluable in existing situation. If nothing can be done please let me know at once as the increasing enemy Naval pressure may force me to revise my plan of campaign". Para. 2. Return 6 submarines to operational control of Comsowespac area. Para. 3. Place at least 6 preferably 8 PT boats at disposal of Comsowespac area for NEW GUINEA operations pending arrival of boats assigned to Sowestpac for which depart Canal Zone about mid December. Para. 4. Carpender pass to MacArthur with the suggestion that time could be saved by taking up coordinating arrangement such as this directly with Halsey.
SECRET

24 0330 COMINCH to CINCPAC

This is a reencipherment of Comsowestpac 231113 referred in our ZMT2 (NPM 5351/23) which you had to ZPL1 correction ZML1 begins. Handle this as super secret. Prior receipt cominch 230032 I had no knowledge MacArthur's despatch. At 0600 Love (-11) 23rd 3 submarines stationed directly assist defense northeast coast New Guinea namely off Cape Ward Hunt. 1 off GASMATA and 1 north TROBRIAND enroute VITIA. MacArthur was informed of this on 19 November. From Comsowespacfor action Cominch. In addition 3 subs south NEW IRELAND and 3 west and south BOUGAINVELLE directly assist in defense NEW GUINEA. Consider continuance present method operational control submarines under Soupac increases flexibility and permits more adequate defense NEW GUINEA than would be accomplished by assignment of 6 submarines this area. Prior to start of BUNA campaign L explained to MacArthur that because most authentic navigational in formation shows that draft in excess 12 feet cannot proceed beyond Cape NELSON toward BUNA and because of inaccurate charts destroyers cannot be sent via this passage beyond Cape NELSON from MILNE BAY. I further explained that surface forces could not be sent into this general area north of the TROBRIANDS unless adequate air cover was available. I concur that PT boats are required at earliest date.

25v2330 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. Contemplate taking up with Army practicability relief by Army of Marine Corps ground and air units now on garrison or defense duty in SAMOAN and HAWAIIAN AREAS. If such relief were effected following would result: AFIRM. 2 reinforced infantry regiments would be available for assignment to First MarcomphCor as elements of a new division. BAKER. Release/Defense Battalions in these areas would permit their assignment to advanced zones of action. CAST. This relief of defense Battalions would obviate necessity for organization of new defense and airdrome battalions in United States as now scheduled. DOG. Personnel thus saved would be diverted to new division and advance its availability to summer 1943. EASY. Release of defense air groups would permit their assignment to offensive operations in other areas. PARA. Request your comment and recommendations. MarCorps informed.
CTF 8 to CINCPAC

CTF 8 replying to Cincpac 242319. Estimated total of 7500 to 10000 mixed troops consisting of engineers, construction, infantry and artillery on BOODLE. 1 Battalion 82nd Infantry of from 500 to 1000 on JACKBOOT. Possible coast watcher force of about 10 on western end FORMULA. Same number (10) may be on AL_ID in SEMICHI. No other forces believed on any other islands. Ultra.

26-0155  CTF 8 to CINCPAC info COMINCH

your 252227. Am despatching surface striking force 2 cruisers 4 modern destroyers at best sustained speed accordance my 260014. 1 cruiser 3 destroyers sent forward from KODIAK yesterday at best speed to fuel LONGVIEW where other cruiser and destroyer join. When your ultra secrets received yesterday they were departing KODIAK with delayed convoy and were immediately detached from this escort duty. Have intensified air search to westward and have alerted air force for strongest possible air attacks to supplement surface attacks. Have alerted air and Navy at western bases against possible enemy diversive action advising Buckner of this. Only submarine in ATTU area alerted against enemy approach. Ultra. CTF 8 sends to Cincpac and for info to Cominch.

26 2305  CINCPAC to COMINCH

Utmost secrecy. Agree in principle with relief Marine ground and air units Urdis 252330 to provide amphibious troops aircraft and defense battalions for further offensive moves. In HAWAIIAN area consider such relief should not be made until assured organization of Army units permit present scale and effectiveness of defenses with approximately same number of troops (about the maximum that can be supported on these islands). In SAMOAN area including FETLOCK agree that relief be effected as soon as Army can make available troops of equivalent training and experience to marines now there. It is recommended Army units for that area also be especially organized for the various tasks to avoid increase in personnel with attendant logistic demands. Para. In line with basic proposal the assignment 25th Division to Sopac for use CACTUS would make available almost immediately one Marine Amphibious Division for further offensive action.
29 1906 JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF'S to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

This from Joint Chiefs of Staff to Cincpac, Comsopac, Comsowespac area. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Nimitz pass to Emmons. Halsey pass to Harmon. Para 1. 25th Army Division is assigned to Sopac area and will proceed to WHITE POPPY. Para 2. 1st Marine Division is to be relieved without delay, as assigned to Sowespac area and will proceed to AUSTRALIA for rehabilitation and employment. The purpose of this transfer is to provide an Amphibious Division for the future formation of an Amphibious Force to carry out amphibious operations under the commander Sowestpac area. Para 3. Halsey arrange with MacArthur details of transfer 1st Marine Division. Chief of staff Army and Comdt Marine Corps informed.

30 2350 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Comtaskforce 67 reports opened fire on four ships believed transports at CAPE ESPERANCE. Hit and fires were seen. Six minutes later three and perhaps four heavy cruisers struck by torpedoes believed fired by destroyers and submarines. Since then have been unable communicate with other ships. NORTHAMPTON burns total loss. Believe PENSACOLA same NEW ORLEANS proceeding to TULAGI 5 knots MINNEAPOLIS same with bow blown off three firerooms flooded believe HONOLULU all right. No information of destroyers.

30 2350 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC.

At TULAGI are following: PENSACOLA torpedo hit and severe fire damage aft. NEW ORLEANS bow blown off back to number 2 turret. PERKINS, MAURY assisting above ships undamaged. MINNEAPOLIS as previously reported. LARDNER and LAMSON are with Tisdale and undamaged. No further word of NORTHAMPTON, FLETCHER and DRAYTON reported separately by FLETCHER. 1 Jap cruiser seen to blow up and it is known additional Jap ships were destroyed as well as others damaged. Am collecting data. Last NPM number received was 604. Am unable decode messages in crypto channels 7 and 19. Can guard Task Force Commanders circuit only.
30 1915 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

To be decoded by Nimitz and Halsey only. Ultra High Command. Para 1. Final decision cancelling AOLA BAY project in CTF 62 260458 brings to climax my uneasiness of several weeks duration lest we continue to use up our fighting strength in virtual "Frontal" operations such as are involved in expulsion of enemy from CACTUS which if followed in principle throughout CACTUS-RABAUL area will keep us busy for years. Para 2. It seems to me that there are now -- see my 291906 -- adequate Army troops in Sopac to garrison CACTUS and secure airfield there and "contain" enemy forces which should enable us not only to withdraw First but also Second Marine Division latter for use in seizure of enemy position further northwest in SOLOMONS preferably one where enemy has airfield. Para 3. Conception sketched in preceeding para looks to "Flanking operation" relative to CACTUS by seizure of enemy base used for operations in support of CACTUS whereby latter be made untenable for enemy and what is more important enables us to get on with the job of clearing enemy from SOLOMONS-RABAUL. Para 4. Request your comment on premise that next step will be done by Affirm Comsopac Baker Comsowespac. CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

01 0931 For Admiral Halsey only from Cincpac. Utmost secrecy enjoined. I contemplate making following reply to Cominch 301915. Quote. Am in complete accord as to necessity for readying our amphibious troops preparatory to pushing along the SUSAN area. I asked for the 25th Division so that it could relieve the Second Marine Division. Halsey is relieving 1st Marine Division with American Division from POPPY. I had not contemplated that the 1st Marine Division would join Sowestpac for I estimate that provided we have the necessary Naval and Air superiority we will require at least 2 Divisions to capture BUIN (The nearest enemy base with an airfield unless he builds one at MUNDA or REKATA). Para. As the 1st Marine Division can hardly be ready until 1 Mar. there will continue to be a phase in which CACTUS remains an area of strong contention. All indications point to continued enemy moves to land reinforcements there and I believe these will include at least one more major effort. Also during this period we must develop CACTUS-RINGBOLT as a secure Naval and Air base from which to launch our offensive. The foregoing plus the ALEUTIAN situation stresses necessity for much stronger land sea and air forces than are in sight for the Pacific. I urge immediate action to obtain them. Para. I strongly recommend that Task 2 in the SOLOMONS SEA area be revised to provide that Comsopac continue to command the forces which will extend control up the SOLOMON CHAIN. I estimate that the bulk of the Pacific Fleet will continue to be required and I consider that a change of command of these forces which Halsey has welded into a working organization would be most unwise. Para. Unquote. Request early comment.
03 1141 COMSOPAC to COMSOWESPAC, MacARTHUR, Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, CTF 61, 62, 63.

During operations of allied forces in the CACTUS-RINGBOLT area on 8 August a warning originated by the coast watcher on GOGAINVILLE informed our forces of an impending Jap air attack. The timeliness and completeness of the warning was of inestimable benefit and enabled our vessels to take proper defensive positions in the repeat in advance of the attack. Please express to the Coastwatcher my deep appreciation and that of the officers and men engaged in the subject operation. Well done.

02 1958 COMINCH to COMSOPAC, Info COMAIRSOPAC, COMSWPAC, CINCPAC.

Your 020400 information my 271320 as to fighter planes which are part of cargo of certain ships was given to show status and location of replacements command to let you know about when and by what transportation those planes are due to arrive in ports indicated. Para 2. Breakdown of cargoes reported my 271320 as follows: ELLERY has 9 P38's, 24 others. GOODHUE 9 P38's. WINGATE 2 P38's. STEELE 8 P38's, 1 other. LANE 9 P38's, 8 others. ASHE 6 P38's, 8 others. VALE 8 P38's 28 others. Para four. Leary pass to MacArthur. Para. 30. Your basic recommendations are fully understood by me and are under consideration of the War Department.

03 1313 COMINCH to CINCPAC and Info commands concerned.

Prospects for organization of additional raider battalions, your 010309, for present appear limited to: (A) Organization of a 3rd raider battalion at STRAW from CADRES of 2 officers and 25 men each transferred from 1st and 2nd raider battalions with remainder of personnel recruited from units of defense force STRAW without replacements. (B) Establishment of raider replacement training detachment on West Coast in October, personnel about 200. Marcorps advised. Your comment requested.

02 0337 CTF 16 to CINCPAC Info CTF 62,17,16, COMSOPAC, COMINCH, CTF 1.

The present of a fast battleship in task force 16 during past several weeks and particularly during action on 24 August was a distinct asset because of her demonstrated fire power against attacking aircraft and her inherent strength against possible surface contacts. From Comtaskfor 16 action Cinopac. Because of slight deficiency in speed and acceleration and slight inherent slowness in starting a turn the station of the NORTH CAROLINA in cruising disposition and particularly in tight screening disposition during air attacks should be down wind from carrier as was the case on 24 Aug with thoroughly satisfactory results.
PRIBILOFF move by Japs would be totally contrary to their technique of advance to date and contrary to sound strategy. Such an outlying base for them flanked from DUTCH HARBOR and subject to repeated bombing attacks from COLD BAY UMNAK and NAZAN supported as necessary by P-38's using belly tanks for approach flights would always be difficult if not impossible to support logistically and could quickly be rendered untenable to enemy. PRIBILOFF airfield of little use to ALEUTIAN air operations while NAZAN staging field will be of greatest aid as it provides additional field in direct line of operations possibly fog free in an area of constantly shifting local visibility conditions. NAZAN should be given highest possible priority consistent with earliest possible consolidation of FIREPLACE. At present stage of FIREPLACE move can not spare cruiser escort for PRIBILOFF operation which is so eccentric to FIREPLACE as to mean withdrawal of some cruisers from FIREPLACE operation. Covering FIREPLACE and NAZAN is single operation. At least 4 destroyers antisubmarine screen desirable in close support of discharging cruisers at PRIBILOFFS anchored in open sea for days. 2 destroyers are ample at NAZAN. Weather may seriously hamper and lengthen period of discharge at PRIBILOFFS. If PRIBILOFF move decided upon recommend that priority be given FIREPLACE which has inadequate surface naval support at present against any move in force by enemy and that risk of PRIBILOFF move be accepted with 2 destroyer antisubmarine screen and no cruiser escort.
SEPT GCT

05 1050

COMGEN CACTUS to COMSOPAC info CTF-62, COMAIRSOPAC

T'd to CINCPAC by COMSOPAC

ComGen CACTUS to COMSOPAC. My 041510, 042001. Twelve
officers and 226 members crews LITTLE GREGORY reported
rescued. Enemy force consisted of at least one cruiser
two DD. Morning patrol sighted 15 large landing boats
each carrying about 75 men approaching northwest coast
CACTUS. Strafed boats sunk three. P-400s attacked them
with bombs and light machine guns. Appeared to cause
many personnel casualties. SBDs strafed bombèd boats on
beach. Believed to have destroyed several of them. One
boat was destroyed by bombing.

26 twin engine bombers covered by 20 zeros approached
position at 1245. This was second alert and only several
fighters reached proper altitude. These intercepted
planes dropped bombs 10 miles westward LUNGA Point. Two
bombers one zero shot down. One F4F4 missing three
damaged. One pilot wounded. One additional F4F4 and
pilot lost during boat strafing operations.

05 2130

COMTASKFOR 8 to JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

After consideration general Buckner and I jointly recommend
against ADAK occupation TANAGA for purposes of possible
diversion reference para 3 cominch 211830 of August. When
FIREPLACE position consolidated with bombing and fighter
planes operating therefrom the establishment of force at
TANAGA and creation bomber airfield would be highly desir-
able and next logical move in ALASKAN campaign. With
troops and equipment for TANAGA assembled at FIREPLACE
and continual observation sea conditions in TANAGA Bay
can occupy this place by infiltration using period of
favorable weather and sea to effect short haul from FIRE-
PLACE. Move would be covered at all times by close air
support from FIREPLACE supplemented by required Naval
screening forces. With such an operation in contemplation
it appears highly undesirable to evidence interest in
TANAGA in advance thereof.
SECRET

September (GCT)

05 0626 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC & info Commands Concerned.

Refer Cominch 031313 and Cincpac 042210 nature of operation and enemy infiltration tactics make additional raider battalions necessary. Strength of defense force STRAW should not be diminished. Urgently need 2 divisions APD's whose value for island warfare has been proven. What is status of APR'S. Info radio deliver Comgen STRAW.

06 2246 CTG 2.9 to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

SOUTH DAKOTA struck uncharted 35 foot pinnacle bearing 321 true from MALINDA light distant 5.5 miles. This an extension to lead in ANPEXLANI passage. Extensive contamination with salt water of fuel and feed water bottom tanks. Divers report numerous dents and several holes. Largest 2 square feet in outer skin between frames 32 and 90 starboard side. Now serious leakage several inner bottoms principally due displacement sea connections. No apparent derangement propulsive machinery except clogging 1 condenser. Anticipate no difficulty maintaining 20 knots. No vibration observed. To accomplish estimate about 2 weeks in dock. Ready for sea morning local 8th. Recommend proceed PEARL that date. DD escort recommended during daylight local 8th and DD escort last 24 hours prior arrival PEARL.

07 1020 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 Info COMAIRCOPAC, CTF 18, CINCPAC.

Your 070212 and 070834. Your attention is called to my 030736 NPM number 573 which gives you entire freedom of movement. In order that I may be sure you have reference I have had it repeated for you. My suggestion is that you move east of APRICOT BUTTON line at good speed.

07 0217 CTF 17 to COMSOPAC, Info COMAIRCOPAC, CTF 18.

My 070212. Analysis of DF contacts this area and HORNET contacts past 24 hours warrant following conclusions. Afirm presence of large task force in geographical area 10 to 15 degrees south 164 to 165 degrees east known to enemy. Baker approximately 9 enemy subs this area. Para. In absence of important targets consider current directive unduly restrictive and unnecessary hazard. To heavy ships unprotected by adequate number DDs as screen. Para. Foregoing situation will be accentuated upon return Task Force 18 this area. Para. Recommend Afirm task forces operate within 300 miles radius CACTUS south lat 8 and east long 160 east and in southeast direction as necessary to guard CACTUS BUTTON APRICOT BUTTON lines. Baker. Provide two DDs per heavy ship as soon as practicable. Cast. Provide large number anti submarine type vessel to hunt subs this vital area.
06 2040 CTF 8 to COMGEN ALDEF FT RICHARDSON, and Info commands concerned

Based on discharging rate at FIREPLACE of 1200 tons daily present vessels there should be discharged by September 13 completing first phase. Assuming vessels could arrive at FIREPLACE as soon as their discharge can commence increments of second phase could be discharged by following dates based on your cargo estimates for each colon 1st Sept 21, 2nd Sept 30, 3rd Oct 8, 4th and final October 17. Your HL ADC Ft. Richardson 052328 improves previous time schedule but bottleneck now appears to be transports and loading times at points of departure. Desire to help, if possible. Is there anything further that can be done to assist in saving time so vital to success of whole operation. Radio stations deliver.

06 2210 COMGEN ALASKAN DEF TO COMALSEC

Since sending my 060250 received following from CG WDC begin received message from CTF 8 outlining his objections to garrisoning Pribilofs which Admiral Nimitz concurred in. If you (Buckner) agree with Theobald and Cinpac movement to Pribilofs will be cancelled Moses Point garrison going to Atka as previously planned end paraphrase. I replied to Dewitt saying would not occupy Pribilofs at this time but would send Moses Point garrison to Atka. At later date contemplate sending garrison St Paul.

07 2206 COMSOPAC TO CGs BUTTON, CACTUS, etc. INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC, etc.

Comairsopac pass this to CG BUTTON. Fuller pass by hand to Comcubone and CG CACTUS who is to acknowledge. Comcub 13 has. All the above are action addressees. CG SOPAC and all other addressees info. From Comsopac. Plan for employment Cub 1 and 13 and 6th and 7th Construction Battalions follows: Afirm generally Cub 1 and 6th Construction Battalion at Cactus Ringbolt. Comcub 1 report to CG CACTUS as commanding officer advanced naval base CACTUS RINGBOLT. Units of Cub 1 and 6th Const. En. move from BUTTON to CACTUS RINGBOLT as required latter place. Hospital unit Cub 1 establish at BUTTON. Baker generally Cub 13 and 7th Const Bn at BUTTON. Cub 13 unload and establish storage and forwarding camp at WHITE POPPY. Forward material and personnel to BUTTON only as required latter place. Consult Staff Comsopac in this respect. After establishment storage and camp at WHITE POPPY Comcub 13 proceed to BUTTON and report CG BUTTON, under principal of unity of command, as commanding officer advanced naval base BUTTON. Hospital unit Cub 13 remain WHITE POPPY until further orders. Cast for guidance this general principal is established that rigid adherence to cub organization
cannot be maintained. Personnel and material must go where most needed. Consult Comsopac staff freely this regard and consult Comairspac relative Cub aviation personnel and material and construction aviation facilities. Dog. When initiated, construction activities at apricot will be under Comcub 13 in addition to duties outlined above. Easy. Comcub 1 and Comcub 13 submit early recommendations for development respective bases to Comsopac via base commanders and Comairspac. Comcub 1 relieved of all duties in connection with Cub 13.

HQ MARCORP TO COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Urdis 070356 assembling 5 officers 300 enlisted ACPF for transfer Sopac fagtrans after 25 Sept. Also 8 officers and 1200 enlisted available San Diego about 20 Oct. Parachutists for 1st div available initial rate 30 per week beginning 1 Oct. Further replacement will be sent as available and required. Comment requested on early program of withdrawal of FMF officers excess in rank to meet urgent needs U.S.

CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH Admin CINCPAC Admin COMOWESP

Make ready to turn over to Macarthur one regiment of 3 combat teams of experienced amphibious troops plus quota of auxiliary troops and 1 division of combat loaded transports with attached AK. Leary pass to Macarthur. This at direction of Cominch who is with me. Cominch headquarters pass to army Chief of Staff.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC

This part 1 of 2 part message. Part 1 is being transmitted as 082234 and 082240 and part 2 is being transmitted as 082353. With reference Secnav secret letter April 20 1942, subject United Nations operations in Pacific theater, Cominch has approved deletion paragraph 10 (c) of directive to CinC Pacific Ocean areas and is recommending substitution of the following: Quote 10 C (1) in the exercise of command over armed forces which the New Zealand government has assigned, or may assign, for the local defense of New Zealand, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be the agency through which such local command is exercised. COPS USA informed. Quote (2) in the exercise of command the principles of command as set forth in paragraph 14 of ABC 1 are applicable. Quote (3) with regard to the possible movement of New Zealand forces out of New Zealand territory, the following by the U S Chiefs of Staff to the president is self explanatory:
Quote proposals of the U S Chiefs of Staff (for operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas) made to the President as U S Commander in Chief are subject to review by him from the standpoint of higher political considerations and to reference by him to the Pacific War Conul in Washington when necessary. The interests of the nations whose forces or whose land possessions may be involved in these military operations are further safeguarded by the power each nation retains to refuse the use of its forces for any project which it considers inadvisable unquote the New Zealand Government has accepted change and the matter is being referred to United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose concurrence is expected. End Part 1. Refer to this as Cominch 082234.

Part 2 of 2 part message. New Zealand Government in accepting modification pointed out that the following reservations must be borne in mind: (1) New Zealand army equipment is of British type. (2) They must keep up their middle east forces. (3) They have overseas air force commitments for (a) training program in Canada, (b) New Zealand squadrons in the United Kingdom. (4) Consultation with the Prime Minister in New Zealand if required for future movements. Upon approval by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff change to directive to CinC Pacific Ocean Areas will be issued. End 2 part message. Refer to this as Cominch 082234.
09 1215 COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC info CINCPAC.

Comcub ONE from CACTUS recommends SANTA ANA proceed there soon as possible and unload. Comgen CACTUS 080251. In that ship is 700 bundles marston and 1200 rolls sommerfield mats. 3000 drums avgas. Both gas and water tankage. Power shovel. All urgently required. Cub ONE executive has verified locally. Estimated 4 days required to unload working 24 hours. He will put on board some miscellaneous equipment recently requested. Foregoing seems good solution if unloading time acceptable and I concur. Proposals my 08706 become alternatives. 9 planes crashed yesterday attempting to use CACTUS field which today Wednesday is practically inoperative. Situation serious and quick action necessary.

08 0935 COMGEN 1st MARDIV, to CTF 62, Info COMSOPAC.

Urdis 070348. Boats landed vicinity PO038 (not Cincpac Grid). 3 miles west of CAPE ESPERANCE. Jap force thought possibly 1000. Information of strength and exact location being gathered by Coast Watcher. Area distant 2 days. Movement by trail not feasible for forces with necessary arms. Intend to attack as soon as APD's or other suitable water transportation made available to this division. Raiders and para troops made attack at TAIIVU today. Full report on their return. In view this move no further action being taken your 031652 pending conference your arrival.

08 2030 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSOCPAC.

Cinopac 062015 Marcorps directed to comply my 031313. Replacements for personnel assigned raider battalion from units in STRAW will be made at time transfer is effected (about 1 December) if situation warrants. Latest estimates on completion dates for APR's (referred to in Cominch serial 01500 of July 23 1942 as APC's) are as follows September dash 23 October dash 20 November dash 7 total number involved 50. Estimate 2 months from date completion for arrival on station Sopac.

10 0202 COMWESTSEAFRON to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

Comwestseafron originates. RDO Hono pass to Cinopac for action. RDO Washn pass to Cominch for Info. From General DeWitt. Following is paraphrase of personal report from Commanding General Alaska Defense Command on FIREPLACE Operation: August 26th one Army reconnaissance force landed from submarine in KULUK Bay ADAK Island. August 27th one Army

(Continued on next page)
reconnaissance force landed from submarine at SHAGAK Bay. Reconnaissance force on ADAK observed one enemy single motor float plane on August 27th. Plane passed from Northeast to Southwest and return but apparently did not observe our reconnaissance force. No other reports of enemy observation or units. Initial garrison transported on BELL. SAN MIHIEL and BRANCH arrived KULUK Bay August 30th. All troops landed on that day. Unloading of transports completed September 6th. Troops this increment consist of one infantry regiment less one battalion. One antiaircraft gun battery. Three antiaircraft automatic weapons batteries. One antiaircraft searchlight battery. One battery coast artillery 155 millimeter gun. One battery field artillery 105 millimeter howitzer. One battery field artillery 75 millimeter pack. Force headquarters. Aircraft warning platoons, and Station complement. One battalion aviation engineers less one company and two platoons quartermaster corps company arrived via barge August 31st. Total garrison now ashore consists of 184 officers and 4372 enlisted men. Four thousand foot landing strip expected to be ready for operation September 10th. End paraphrased.

T'd by Comsopac to CINCPAC

The situation forecast in your 100725 and nightly bombardment CACTUS-RINGBOLT indicates urgent need for several PacFlt submarines that area. If these are sent recommend SoWestPac submarines operate on line NEW GEORGIA ISLAND - MANNING STRAIT.

This is for Admiral Nimitz from Comsopac. Assume your 091844 refers only to combatant naval forces which are organized as of 11 September as follows units designated as indicated in PacFlt Con notice 18CN-42 dated Aug. 8: Task Force 17 Rear Admiral Murray in HORNET, NORTH CAROLINA Cruisers Rear Admiral Good in NORTHAMPTON, PENASCOLA SAN DIEGO and Desron 2 plus DALE. HUGHES and WALKE at present absent on escort assignments will be ordered join Taskfor 17 as soon as practicable. Task Force 18 Rear Admiral Noyes in WASP Cruisers Rear Admiral Scott in SAN FRANCISCO, SALT TAKE CITY, HELENA, JUNEAU and Desron 12 less WOODWORTH and MCCALLA plus CLARK last named temporarily absent escorting.
COMSOPAC to CINCPAC (Continued)

10 1152

Task Forces 17 and 18 together comprise Task Force 61 Rear Admiral Noyes. Task Force 62 Rear Admiral Turner Transdivs 8 and 10. Transdiv 12 less CALHOUN GREGORY LITTLE. Transdiv 2 less ALMAACK HARRIS. Transdiv 4 less PROCYON and ALCYONE plus ALCHIBA. Following units of Minron 2: Cominron 2 in HOPKINS, ZANE TREVER, SOUTHARD, HOVEY. Transdivs of Task Force 62 are organized into Divs in accord my approved dispatch 170341 of August. Task Force 63 Rear Admiral McCain CURTISS, MACKINAC, MACFARLAND, BALLARD with attached aircraft. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Wright in MINNEAPOLIS, BOISE, LEANDER Desdiv 22 plus FARRAGUT MACDONOUGH. Combatant units available SoPac area not assigned to Task Forces ATLANTA, HULL, AYLWIN, BENHAM Desdiv 15 less WILSON all of which currently or prospectively on escort assignments but later intended in part to augment task forces. Also GAMBLE, BREESE, TRACY currently employed in inter-base and aircraft tender escort assignments. Not included are Task Force 11 as constituted for return to Pearl my 080342 and Task Group 2.12 which I intend assign to Task Force 18 as soon as available, with Combatdiv 6 in WASHINGTON. ACHILLES made available 2 months refit PULCRUM commencing mid September. MONOWAI utilized for special missions of short duration.

11 1028

COMAIRSOPAC to MACKINAC info COMSOPAC, CTF 61.

At 0500 L (-11) tomorrow Saturday MACKINAC BALLARD depart APRICOT retiring to South. All flyable planes take off daylight. Those on search proceeding on mission. Remainder as a group operate in general area to South and within 60 miles APRICOT. If no threatening enemy contact received from search planes by 0830 L (-11) Task Group 63.5 less search planes return APRICOT. As replacement am sending one plane from BUTTON forenoon tomorrow call 46V35. A second plane call 45V35 will arrive after completing search sector 5. Return any 2 your plane crews via BALLARD.
SECRET
September (GCT)

11 1802 COMINCH TO CINCPAC COMSOPAC Info COM 12 COMSEFOR SUBCOM

It will be possible to embark 1 Army regimental combat team of 43rd infantry division approximate strength 5000 in such a manner as to permit direct routing to White Poppy or diversion by you enroute. Estimate this regiment ready depart U.S. early October. Advise if this modification in loading Army units specified in my 291240 August desired by you. CofS U.S.A. informed.

13 0933 Comairsopac to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMINCH.

When I left at 0645 L (-11) today material situation CACTUS Okay except for gas shortage and no Marston mat. Personnel very tired - no rest at night account bombardment by surface craft or by day account air alerts. BUTTON normal. Turner and McCain at BUTTON.

14 1045 CG CACTUS TO COMSOPAC INTO COMINCH CINCPAC

Enemy attacked throughout night striking at both flanks and rear of position. Attack on rear made in strength and repulsed only after severe fightings. Contact and mopping up operations continued throughout day. Our casualties approximately 35 dead 160 wounded. Enemy dead exceeded 500. At 2300 cruiser and 2 DDs bombarded Dukum area little damage no casualties. Enemy zeros over at 0700 0300 and 1745. 4 shot down. Our losses 1 F4. Pilot saved. All times L (-11).

C.G.MAR 1st Div to COMSOPAC, CTF 62.

15 0726 /Your 140120. My 141045. Enemy struck in three areas. Captured operation map indicated attack sent off as planned. Success of either thrust would have given him temporary possession of air field. Thrust at rear was main effort. Difficult to determine numbers in night attacks but forces on right flank and rear probably exceeded 2000. Suspect destruction of boats by aircraft at SAN JORGE Island and CAPE ESPERANCE as cause. At 1200 love (-11) today although numerous snipers in position patrols to flank and rear had only one contact. Main effort made along narrow ridge was stopped by 400 raiders and paratroops under Edson supported by intense artillery fire only after 10 hours hand to hand fighting during which our troops suffered over fifty per cent casualties. We have lost three tanks. Our casualties to date are 363 some of which are only slightly wounded.
For MacArthur from Nimitz. Plan to place one tender and six modern submarines under operational control Ghormley. For best employment these and in view disposal of S-boats made by Cominch 131830 request that as S-boats withdraw you make available for Pacflt sub operations that portion your area bounded as follows. On South by lat 23°S. On west by long 155°E to lat 11°S thence along a line to East Cape on southeast NEW GUINEA. Thence northwest along NEW GUINEA coast to longitude 142°E. Thence north to equator.

My information indicates possible slackening enemy effort against CACTUS for next day or two while reinforcing troops ashore for combined repeated attempts. Consider safest time entrance CACTUS next 2 days. At your discretion and provided sufficient fuel vessels transdiv 2 to make trip in and then out to rendezvous, proceed CACTUS reporting via DD your intention and ETA CACTUS. Am dispatching tanker daylight 17th grid posit G4370 (Long 160-45 E lat 20-00 S) to arrive 10 hours L (-11) 18th thence to Grid Posit G4390 (Long 160-45 E Lat 15-00) arriving daylight next morning. Will issue further orders to tanker based on your intended movements.

In view of questionable value ARGONAUT as a mine-laying submarine in enemy waters due to great noise of mine gear and vulnerability of mine tube doors and recognized future need for combination submarine raider unit and cargo carrier propose converting to an APC by removing mine racking equipment welding tube door plantes and installing bunking facilities to provide for approximately 176 raiders with equipment. Submarine now at yard due to fuel tank leaks. Immediate approval desired to effect work without delay in Navy Yard. No further extensive alterations or Navy Yard work than removal mine racks welding mine tube doors and reballasting intended for present.
12 B-24's, 14 P-38's and 14 P-39's conducted coordinated low altitude bombing and strafing attack on installations KISKA Harbor and on ships in harbor and vicinity. Results: 2 mine sweepers at submarine net sunk, direct hits and near misses on 3 large cargo vessels, hits on several small vessels and barges, large fires in camp area and base, 4 float zero fighters and 1 enemy biplane shot down in flames, 1 Jap 4 engined patrol plane burned on water, 3 submarines strafed by P-39's with 37 millimeter guns, stores near dock strafed and exploded, all installations around harbor repeatedly strafed, total enemy casualties estimated at about 500, 1 enemy zero and 1 biplane possibly escaped. Own casualties: 2 P-38's collided in midair and crashed while attacking zero fighter, both pilots missing. Comtaskforce eight sends. Cominch Cinopac Freeman and Greenslade all for info. Latter please inform DeWitt.

This supplements my 1st report. B3 55 escorted by DALE and ANDERSON ordered to BLEACHER at 2015 M (-12). Damage not serious. About 12 fuel tanks contaminated 120,000 gallons unusable. Leaving heavy oil slick. None killed 2 injured 3 unaccounted for. O'BRIEN ordered BUTTON. Damage localized forward chiefs quarters. No casualties. WASP had 8 fighters and 16 scouts in air. Now on HORNET less 1 scout water landed alongside DD. Pilot and passenger believed recovered. Para. Will send WASP planes BUTTON today and recover HORNET 15 scouts now there. Para. Condition WASP about 1800 M 15 observed from air. Burning fiercely forward of island and slightly down by bow with list to port. Believe ship being abandoned. Remainder task force 18 standing by. Para. Will operate north and east from BUTTON until completion fueling Friday.
Comtaskfor 8 answers Cinopac 180215 with Comnowestseafort info adee. TALECT now at yard BROOKS arriving shortly. Suggest conversion of these 2 ships begin at once. Will release DENT HUMPHREYS SANDS WATERS to proceed designated West Coast yard about October first or as soon as possible after arrival LONG CHANDLER LEMBERTON. Am sending ELLIOT with HONOLULU departing about September 20th as this DMS in urgent need of structural repairs to be returned this force on completion overhaul. Must also return LAWRENCE to Comwestseafort by October 15th. Am having conference DeWitt HUCKNER tomorrow subject unknown to me. Completion present phase FIREPLACE operations about end October should reduce cruiser commitment but will comment more fully after conference. For normal operations consider four modern destroyers adequate screen for four cruisers so GILMER KANE SANDS can frequently be made available for escort duty unless further joint commitments develops for fall and winter. Copy by hand to Comalsec.
SECRET
September (GCT)

20 1949  CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

Troops cargo debarking AUOM SKP transports at climate screened by 2 DD since forenoon 19th. Troops cargo debarked cavern completing occupation. No report yet as to status of work of construction of fighter field. Buckner and I agreed task one of Fireplace project "Seizure and occupation" in accordance Joint Chief Staff directive contained in Cominch 050003 completed. Project now in phase of Task 2. Army forces at Longview have terminated statoidus task group under my command and assumed statoidus unit of ADC. Force now at strength approximately 5,000. My supporting operations air and surface continue unchanged.

21 0030  CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

CTF-8 sends to Cincpac Cominch. Intend repeated low altitude bombing attacks of Kiska but weather has prevented repetition since September 14th attack. Kiska harbor now netted on line from north head to south head prevents for present contemplated MY boat attack on shipping there.
The following reorganization of Taskforces 17 and 64 is effective upon joining of Task Group 66.4 with Task Force 17 and attached units my 201242. Tactical distribution of units YMO new taskforces will be effected when practicable as directed by senior task force commander. Afirm. Task Force 17 striking force Rear Admiral Murray in HORNET, WASHINGTON, NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, ATLANTA, SAN DIEGO, JUNEAU, Desron 2 less O'BRIEN plus BENHAM, BARTON and MEADE. Baker. Task Force 64 screening and attack force Rear Admiral Scott SAN FRANCISCO, MINNEAPOLIS, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, BOISE, HELENA, Desron 12 less WOODWORTH plus NICHOLAS. Absent units will be directed join Taskforces soon as practicable.

Amphibious combined with jungle warfare in South Pacific shows following. Comamphforsopac sends. Need for rapid means to cut trails clear fields of fire and construct field fortifications in dense undergrowth. Japanese are making major attacks at night by ruse infiltration and direct assault. Japanese control is excellent due to effective use of small portable radio transmitters and receivers which are much superior to our own. Our yellow painted munitions are easily spotted by enemy. Aviation bombs are hard to conceal. Japanese see our brightly painted grenades either day or night and throw them back. Need for reducing volume of construction materials to be transported. Para. In view of foregoing recommend following. Afirm. Provide following tools each company three double bitted axes, nine heavy duty pack mattocks, nine heavy duty short handled shovels, six heavy duty long handled shovels, two post hole diggers, two cross cut saws, two dash man. Baker. Double present allowance brush hooks. Cast. Provide two commercial macheetes with broad heavy blade for each squad. Dog. Increase allowance nails assorted by one ton per division. Easy. Provide trip flares of at least one minute duration and long burning illuminating projectiles for use in 60 and 81 millimeter mortars. Fox. Replace present portable radio transmitters and receivers with efficient waterproof lightweight type. George. Increase allowance of these radios so platoon leaders have them. Hypo. Provide efficient portable receivers for squad leaders. Inter. Eliminate yellow, red and other bright colors. Paint bombs, grenades, fuel drums, and vehicles with nonreflecting paint. Army combat vehicles paint suitable except color should be mattled green. Jig. Provide one small portable sawmill with power unit per regiment. King. Double present allowance hand carts. Mike. Three utility
part for second Mardiv recommended as follows. Love. Leave scout car company and one fifty five millimeter howitzer battalion in United States. Mike. Groups three and five equipment and personal baggage particular neutral clothing be reduced to minimum. Negat. Vehicles be only those suitable for rough terrain no sedans nor station wagens. Option. Plan for five units of fire fifty days rations accompany troops in landings plan for equal amounts as reserve with second base depot LONGBOW.

This is CTF 8 Op Order 11-42. Organization. Task Group 8.12. Mike Division 1, PRUITT, SICARD, MONTGOMERY, RAMSAY. Information. Own Army Forces have occupied ADAK and ATKA Islands and are garrisoning and constructing landing fields thereon. Considerable movement of friendly shipping including transports cargo and submarines vicinity of ALLEUTIAN Chain. Japanese have seized KISKA and ATTU Islands. Enemy base on KISKA Har'or. Enemy forces in vicinity may include combatant ships all types plus land and seaplanes plus several types auxiliaries. Code name LONGVIEW is ADAK, and CAVERN is ATKA. Plan. Mine designated approaches to LONGVIEW and provide antisubmarine screens and escorts as directed. Task. Mine Division 1 lay mines in approaches to KULUK Bay in accordance with instructions which will be received upon arrival LONGVIEW. Provide anti submarine coverage and escorts as directed. Proceed LONGVIEW via AMUKTA PASS, thence through point 20 miles north of NORTH CAPE ATKA ISLAND, thence through point 20 miles north of SWALLOW HEAD on GREAT SITKIN ISLAND, and thence to LONGVIEW. Enter KULUK BAY only through northern entrance and during daylight. Report arrival LONGVIEW via first airplane returning to DUTCH HARBOR or UMNAK. Communications. Accordance Pac 70 except guard NPG Fox instead of NPM Fox. Maintain strict radio silence. Obtain standard communication plan LONGVIEW and comply.
The following policy is established relative to the employment of CUB ACORNS and Naval Construction Battalions in the WHITE POPPY BUTTON CACTUS RINGBOLT areas: (a) All materials and personnel of CUBS 1 and 13 and construction battalions 6 and 7 now in BUTTON CACTUS RINGBOLT are available for any one of those bases. ACORN ONE less its construction battalion will be landed at BUTTON and will be available for same bases. Decision as to priorities of needs between those bases as effects aviation construction, facilities and operations is a function of Comairsopac. (c) Option ACORN ONE on arrival report to CG BUTTON under principle unity of command as CO Naval Advanced Base BUTTON. (b) CO CUB 13 designated as CO Base Construction Depot WHITE POPPY which includes materials and personnel of CUBS 1 and THIRTEEN now at WHITE POPPY and the construction battalion accompanying ACORN ONE. This depot will be employed for construction of WHITE POPPY base. (c) In general additional construction material and personnel sent this area will be received by the Base Construction Depot WHITE POPPY and will be available for movement forward by increments as needed, however present and future needs of personnel and material and extent of unloading facilities and congestion of port will be factors in deciding the port of debarkation of future shipments. Advanced areas will advise Comsopac as to requirements not available at BUTTON or in ACORN ONE. My 072206 modified to accord with above. Action COMCUBONE, COMAIRSOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS, COMGEN BUTTON. COMCUB 13 has by hand for action. Anderson pass to COM ACORN ONE for action. Action adees acknowledge by airmailgram. Following have by hand for info COMSERONSOPAC, COMGENSOPAC, COMAMPHIBSOPAC.

WHITE POPPY has of necessity become extremely active and congested port. Unloading handling storing and housing facilities totally inadequate or non existent. Urgent requirement of extreme importance to present operations is equipment to get large quantities of cargo from ship to shore. Request earliest possible shipment of following items robbing all available LION CUB ACORN or other stocks with immediate shipment of available items. Twenty self propelled barges of each of three sizes 50 ton, 100 ton and 250 ton. After cargo congestion of this port has been relieved some of these barges will be moved forward. All barges desired selfpropelled type. 20 wharf units five by

(Continued on next page)
twelve standard. 20 bridge units. 12 five ton truck spares. 12 five ton crawler cranes. 6 fifteen ton crawler cranes. 20 five ton dump trucks. 40 ten wheel trucks ten pickup trucks. 20 jeeps quarter ton. Five 5 ton HYSTER trucks. Two automotive repair shops. Two floating pile drivers complete. Piles lumber and hardware for foray by 500 foot pier with 60 foot piles. All above items to be complete with auxiliary equipment tools spare parts with two sets of general hand tools. Of above items pontoon and weight handling equipment will be of greatest immediate usefulness.

Concur recommendations Comamphi forsopac 212207 except leaving 155 mm howitzer battalion in U.S. Although immediate operations do not require this artillery because enemy had not yet consolidated his positions future operations against defended places will beyond doubt require powerful artillery. 155 mm should be in area when needed.
24 2311 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.

Ghormley sends. Operations 24th. 4 enemy DDs attacked by 8 SBDs 150 miles northwest GUADALCANAL. No damage. 1215 L (-11) 24th bombed enemy transports SHORTLAND Island and TONOHEH HARBOR with B17s. 22 enemy vessels including CL there. Ceiling 15,000 feet. Three hits 6 near hits. 20 enemy fighting planes defended. 1 sure 3 possibly shot down. On GUADALCANAL 23rd extended ground patrols indicate no enemy vicinity position except stragglers. 1 Jan killed 1 prisoner. Continued air strafing TASSAFRONGA to SABUN. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 23rd 1 of 5 single engines single float planes at MANNING STRAIT attacked B17 and was shot down. Bombed REKATA with incendiaries and 100 pound bombs.

25 1456 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH COMSWPACFOR CTF 62-17-63-64 CINCPAC

Operations 25th. On Guadalcanal 24th 1 battalion on extended patrol made contact 4 miles to south of position at sunset. Fighting continued into night when enemy withdrew. Our losses 7 dead 25 wounded. Enemy losses not yet reported. 4 enemy DDs towing landing boats were attacked by 2 SBDs 2100 L (-11) 24th. Despite repeated attacks by other SBDs and TBFs enemy ships continued toward Guadalcanal until 0130 when within 8 miles Cape Esperance were turned away. Damage unknown. Rekata Bay 24th B-17 encountered 3 float zeros one type 95 single float seaplane. Latter shot down. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

25 1950 CTF-8 to TF-8 info CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

Reconnaissance Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay by B-24 on 22 and 23 September drew no gun fire from either place planes flying as low as 200 feet. No vessels in harbor no sign of life ashore. Pilot reports installations between Chichagof and Holts have been abandoned. No guns observed in emplacements. Photographs verified this observation and in addition show dock in Chichagof Harbor has been removed. Original houses of village remain. These observations indicate that the Japanese have abandoned Attu. The presence of light mine layers recently at Attu indicate the possibility that harbors have been mined. Action of enemy probably influenced by the vulnerability of small outlying garrisons. Have issued orders to destroy the remaining buildings and installations on Attu. This from CTF-8. NPM pass to Cincpac and NSS pass to Cominch both for info.
SECRET
SEPTEMBER (GCT)

26 0434 COMSOPAC TO CG POPPY INFO CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

For action CG Poppy info CG Sopac CG White Poppy Comgenserosopac and Captain Dudley have by hand. Comsopac sends. Captain Roy Dudley is herewith temporarily designated as Commanding Officer US Naval Advanced Base White Poppy will report to CG Poppy for this duty under principal of unity of command and will proceed with the organization and development of the base which is to include the following naval shore activities in the port area port directors office, Base construction depot, Receiving Station, Naval supply depot, Naval aviation supply depot, naval ammunition depot, Mobile hospital, section base, Naval radio station, Radio material office, Public Works Office, Fleet post office, Naval dispensary and other naval activities that may be assigned.

26 0645 CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

CTF-8 sends. Considerable increased activity at Kiska many large ships in the harbor one large ship probably submarine tender observed south of the island. Cause this increased activity not yet apparent. Am intensifying offensive air and submarine operation and tightening coverage Fireplace while increasing scouting observation until enemy intentions are determined.
Operations 26th. REKATA BAY 25th B17 strafed beach silencing 2 machine gun emplacements damaging 1 single engine float Bi-plane on water. Same day TONOLEI HARBOR 2 B17's bombed ships. Believe 1 500 pound bomb hit stern CA. In harbor 15 miles southeast BUKA PASSAGE 1 B17 bombed 3 ships. Believe 1 500 pound hit stern AV. TONOLEI HARBOR 25th B17 saw 12 single engine float biplanes and float zeros. Shot down 3 in flames. Another probably. GUADANCAANAL 25th extensive air and ground patrolling continued. Area from KOLI POINT to MATANIKOU RIVER free of enemy forces. All approaches and entire coastline covered by air search from 1500 to 0130 L (-11) 26th but no contact. VBCOGE area bombed. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

Consider that Army and Marine units which may be moved up to forward positions should receive Amphibious training. Anticipate establishing limited number of Amphibious training groups (as equipment and personnel become available) in key locations in central and South Pacific areas, each to consist of 1 standard landing craft unit organized as directed Cominch serial 00811 of August 16 1942. Should you concur, suggest locate your groups as follows, STRAW, FANTAN or WHITE POPPY, SPOONER, and COPPER. Training groups in South Pacific Area under general control of Comamphforsopac. War Department concurs in above plan and suggested locations. Advise. Comsopac pass to C of S US Army (Sopac Theater) for info.

Comtaskfor 8 sends. 15 bombers and 28 pursuit attacked KISKA September 25. Preliminary results as reported by PBY: 1 AK left burning, 1 seaplane fighter shot down and 6 out of 10 seaplane fighters destroyed on water. Photo KISKA HARBOR show 2 AK's or AP's, 2 minelayers. 8 smaller craft and many motor launches. Amplifying report will be made when full particulars are known here.
26 2330 CTF 8 to TF 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COM 12, Etc.

Comtaskforce 8 262020 amplified. 9 B-24's took part in attack with 11 P-39's and 17 P-40's, 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 photo ships. Report hits on 1 transport 2 submarines strafed, 1 float plane shot down and from 5 to 8 float planes out of 20 caught on surface. Shore installations strafed. Enemy casualties estimated 150. Only minor damage to our planes. 2nd attack attempted in afternoon forced to turn back due to weather. 3 B-24's bombed shore installations on previous day. Extent of damage to enemy unknown. Stations addressed deliver locally for info to Cominch, Cincpac, Admirals Greenslade and Freeman and SanFran also to General DeWitt.

27 1436 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMSWPAC CTF 64 63 62 17.

Operations 27th. 26th 8 B-17s struck shipping Faisi Shortland. 1 large AP hit heavily left burning probably sunk. 1 CA hit on stern left afire. 3 float zeros and 3 float biplanes shot down. B-17 on patrol at Faisi attacked by 4 float zeros. 1 damaged forced land in water. B-17 on patrol Rekata Bay strafed single engine float biplane on beach. 26th small enemy force was contacted west Mitanikau river. Was being encircled morning 27th. Patrols on Florida killed 9 captured 3. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 27th at Guadalcanal 1355 Love (-11) 18 Jap bombers escorted by 13 fighters were engaged by our fighters. Enemy losses 4 bombers 5 fighters. All our planes returned. 1 SBD on ground destroyed.

28 1326 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC COMSWPAC, CTF 62 63 64 17.


Attack on KISKA Sept 27th by 6 B 24's: Dropped 48 500 pound bombs from altitude of 1 to 3000 feet on ships in harbor and shore installations, shot down 1 float zero, no further reports as yet, no losses, most AA fire received from ships in harbor. Also 27th Sept 3 bombers attacked enemy transport and destroyer 100 miles north KEMICHI, near misses in stern causing transport to stop. Night attack on KISKA 28 September by 8 B24's supported by 17 fighters: 4 float zeros shot down, 1 submarine reported sunk with 500 pound bomb, hits and near misses by 8 500 pound bombs on transport considered badly damaged and sinking, all bombing at 5000 feet, 64 500 pound bombs dropped on ships and shore installations, AA opposition stronger than on previous attack, our losses one P 39 down at sea 5 miles southeast LITTLE KISKA pilot believed lost, one B-24 hydraulic system damaged by gun fire and cracked up on landing 1 of crew slightly wounded, 3 destroyers left KISKA harbor during attack. 2nd attack launched 1058 W (plus 10) no reports as yet. Catalina dropped 2 charges 28th alongside small enemy freighter 50 miles north of BULDIR with possible damage to freighter. Also 28th September bombers burned and photographed ATTU village no opposition however weather plane reported being fired on from ATTU, no amplifying report but possible indication presence of lookout station.
SEPTEMBER (GCT)

30 2335 CTF-3 TO TF-3 INFO CINCPAC COMINCH COM-14 etc.

Comtaskfor 8 amplified report of operations 28 Sept. 3 B-24s destroyed with thermite bombs all buildings Attu village except church, heavy explosions among houses during fire, bombers then dropped 4 thermite bombs astride freighter north of Buldir Island also strafed ship silencing AA guns. 5 B-24s supported by 16 fighters in afternoon attack on Kiska bombed shipping at 9000 feet, near misses, no interception, no battle damage. 3 B-24s bombed freighter north of Sirius Point at 1 to 4000 feet, near misses. Observation south of Kiska reports tents, stores, excavation, auxiliary vessel and boat in Gertrude Cove, encountered 37mm fire. No morning mission 29th due to weather. Deliver locally to Cominch Cincpac Freeman and Greenslade all for info. Latter to inform Dewitt. Buckner has by hand.

30 1022 COMAMPHFORSOPAC TO BUSHIPS OPNAV INFO CINCPAC COMINCH Etc.

This is part 1 of Comamphforsopac 301030. Following despatches not to all addees are referenced. Comtrans-groupsopac 232350 August. Buships 022231. RDO Washington 032120. Com 12 230120. My 232249, 250607 and 290604. Incident to operations August September following landing craft have been left at bases Cactus Ringbolt Button Fetlock and are necessary to their operation maintenance and support: Tank lighters 26 tare roger 55 tare 74. Due weather and enemy action others have been damaged beyond repair. Replacement boats actually received form negligible proportion of above total. In addition to actual existing deficiency of approximately 150 boats (33 percent) in 18 ships of transgroups boat engines and spare parts are being depleted at an alarming rate. This due to continuous necessity utilize large number boats in loading unloading and shifting cargo without dock or adequate water transport and lack boat repair and maintenance facilities at forward bases.

30 1030 Part two. Some boats not operatable due lack of necessary engine parts. This force as a whole therefore not now ready for large scale task by reason boat deficiencies. Para none of references indicate any replacement tank lighters enroute this area and this type is essential. Para previous request have been to small and have failed to envision past present and prospective needs. Para in addition to replacement existing deficiency of 150 landing craft, replacement plans should provide starter stock 50 percent spare boats latter to be increased to 100 percent within next 6 months plus additional numbers for training pools. Corresponding increase in repair and maintenance facilities afloat and at bases this area also required. Para request this be threaten as urgent requisition and that movement boats and parts to this force be expedited. End.
COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC OPNAV

Request acorns 3 and 4 be shipped to White Poppy. Cominch 172240. Recommend plans be held in abeyance for shipment to Sopac area of remaining 4 acorns. Request 1 complete Yards and Docks component of Cub including 1 construction battalion be sent to White Poppy. Lion components depend on approval of projects for spooner but the current importance of bases in spooner has decreased and White Poppy development is of the greatest urgency in view of extremely limited shore facilities. Critical items are equipment for unloading and weight handling, water transportation, tugs, and spare parts for all such equipment. Following additional recommendations are also in answer to Vice Opnav 241725 regarding escort vessels. For major maintenance base Auckland directive for which has been issued by Opnav recommend surface ship repair component of Lion including also 1 flating drydock ARD 2 type. For voyage repairs Borabora Samoa Tongatabu and Noumea recommend repair facilities equivalent to an AD plus an ART 2 dock at Tongatabu. Vice Opnav letter 020803 August 17 not received.
30 1300 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, COMINCH, MacARTHUR, TG 62.6, etc.

Operations 30th. On GUADALCANAL during 28th and 29th continued patrol activity but no contact. Enemy remains in occupation MITANIKAU line. FLORIDA patrol killed five Japs at HAROVO. No casualties our patrol. 29th at 1400 love (-11) about 20 zeros followed by small group bombers approached from northwest. One squadron our fighters intercepted zeros. Bombers jettisoned northwest SAVO and fled. Two zeros probably four shot down. Our loss one plane one pilot. 30th ALHENA reports being torpedoed while returning from CACTUS Lat 10-47 south long 161-16 east. Shaft sprung. NAVAJO enroute to tow her. Ghormley sender Carpender pass to MacARTHUR.

01 1716 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.

Fires started Jap gasoline storage REKATA BAY 30th by 9 quarter ton bombs. Operations first. 29th GUADALCANAL patrol activity only. No ground contact. Search planes destroyed 2 float biplanes bombed AA installations REKATA Bay. 4 enemy boats landing supplies VISALE attacked by our search planes later by P-400's and SBD's. P-400's bombed strafed enemy trucks and troops near KOKUMBONA. Yesterday's report air action GUADALCANAL should read 4 shot down probably 6. GHORMLEY sends. Carpender pass to MacARTHUR. GUADALCANAL 30th usual patrols. SBD's attacked REKATA BAY damaging 2 float planes and burning dump. SBD's and P-400's attacked supply dump KOKUMBONA and TENARU. No plane losses.

01 2100 CTF-8 TO TF-8 INFO COMINCH CINCPAC COMWES & NORWES SEAFRON

Attack on Kiska September 30th made by 9 B-24s at altitude of 15000 ft. Photographs show one possible two direct hits one near miss on transport left burning. Three fires started in camp area. AA fire heavy but inaccurate. One bomber attacked by two pursuits. No damage to own planes. September 29th photo ship dropped bombs at low level and strafed deck of small cargo ship which was bombed 28th north of Attu. No opposition or sign of life. Possibly abandoned. Photos taken. Comtasfor 8 sends. NSS pass to Cominch. NPM to Cincpac. NPC to Comnorwestseafrontier and NPG to Comwestseafront.

01 0812 COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC.

Comsopac replying to Cominch 181236. Carrier task forces have now used White Poppy as replenishment anchorage on two occasions. Carrier anchored Great Road just inside anti torpedo net cruisers generally berthed Dumbea Bay due necessity use Great Road berths to facilitate unloading cargo ships with limited dock and barge facilities. Only one berth inside Great Road feasible for carrier or battleship. Dumbea Bay affords large number BAT ships berths satisfactory except no underwater protection. Material on hand for 2 individual anti torpedo nets not yet prepared for use due employment net detail in-
stalling Great Road and Little Entrance nets. 2 nets on hand expected ready within 2 weeks. Following underwater defense equipment requires to make safe anchorage for single carrier task force. A. material for 3 additional individual anti torpedo nets. B. Sound equipped gate barges to detect sub attempting entry behind ship. C. Small craft sound equipped to patrol in vicinity of loop. Simultaneous use of White Poppy as replenishment anchorage by 2 carrier task groups not considered advisable.

C OF S ARMY TO CG HAWDEPT INFO CINCPAC.

397/29th - To provide amphibious training for units your command in preparation for possible assumption offensive action in Pacific, Cominich contemplates dispatching your area one standard landing craft unit capable of transporting reinforced infantry battalion (Cominich dispatch 261302 NCR 9532). Your comments desired on the following plan for establishment of amphibious training center: 1. Initial location on Island of Hawaii with a view to giving training to units of 27th division without unnecessarily interfering with accomplishment of assigned mission. 2. Movement of training center or combat units so as to provide rotational training of all divisions your command for Hawaiian Department (signed Marshall). 3. Amphibiously trained units echeloned forward as needed for offensive action. 4. Forces echeloned forward to be replaced by mainland units which will in turn be trained in amphibious and jungle warfare. Complexity of defensive organization on island of Oahu fully appreciated by war department. However, deemed necessary to train 24th and 25th divisions with view toward their possible utilization elsewhere on offensive missions and assumption their present functions by less well trained division. Priority radio reply desired to include requirements in Army boat and shore units necessary to augment navy landing craft unit to provide training on scale you feel essential. Marshall.
OCTOBER (GCT)

02 1436  COMSOPAC TO CTFs 17, 62, 63, 64  CINCPAC COMINCH COMSWESPAC

Sopac operations. October 1st 5 SBDs 5 TBFs from GUADALCANAL attacked 4 Jap DDs 1at 09-05 S, Long 158-05 E, at 1900 L (-11). 1 DD damaged left dead in water. 3 TBFs failed return. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

02 2025  CTF-8 to TF 8 info CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

7 B-24s from 15,000 feet bombed seaplane base and other installations Kiska Harbor and main camp with incendiary and demolition bombs during morning October one. Fires observed. Photos taken. Enemy shipping evidently now being routed well north of Kiska and close to track of Russian ships. From CTF-8. Stations addressed deliver locally to Cominich Cincpac West and Norwest Sea Frontier Comdrs and Comgen West Def Command.

02 2120  COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO CTF 8 COMWEST & NORWEST SEAFRON

If you are not an addressee do not decode further. Dewitt and Theobald have agreed on the following garrisons: (A) Adak about 11,000 including 2 regimental combat teams 1 regiment AA artillery 15 light tanks 8 155mm guns and 8 105mm or 75mm field guns. (B) Tanaga about 4,000 including 1 battalion infantry reinforced 2 batteries auto weapons AA 4 155mm CA guns and 4 105mm or 75mm field guns. Para 2 War department considers it impracticable at this time to increase present commitments to 11th air force which are 30 heavy bombers 40 medium bombers and 155 fighters. Pars 3 The chief of Staff Army and I consider that under present circumstances the aforementioned forces are adequate for area in question.

03 1356  COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 62, 63, 64, 17.

Daily dope. Sopac operations. GUADALCANAL 1st October only one ground contact. One prisoner. P-400's and artillery straffed small hostile groups from KOKUM BUNA to VISALE. Hostile plane over GUADALCANAL 2130 Love (-11). 3 more at 0405 love 2nd. Dropped few bombs igniting gas dump. 80 foot boat with antenna and radio equipment straffed set on fire by B-17's reconnaissance at GREENWICH ISLAND. Reconnaissance planes REKATA BAY 2nd dropped ten 100 pounders. Large explosion in palm grove. October 2nd usual ground patrols. No contact. One prisoner. 30 zeros followed by small group bombers our area at 1310 no bombs dropped four zeros shot down. Our losses 6 fighters four pilots. One SBD landed in water. Gunner
03 1356 COMSOPAC (Continued).

Rescued pilot killed. Two SBD's failed to return search. Single hostile plane over area at 2100 and 0430. Japs attacked by P-400 at NARABO, TENARO, KOKUM and POINT CRUZ. Crews of three TBF's lost on first reported rescued. Morning search disclosed large group enemy landing boats well camouflaged inside VIRU repeat VIRU HARBOR south coast NEW GEORGIA. On afternoon third 9 enemy DD one CA sighted northwest of CACTUS. 7 SBD and TBF attacked cruiser and 2 DD 1st 08-32 south long 158-15 east at 1715 love with no apparent damage. Ships observed to continue on course 120 speed 30 until 1800. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacARTHUR.

03 2010 11 B-24's and 6 P-39's attacked KISKAR HARBOR and installations morning of October 2nd. 25 1,000 demolition bombs dropped from 10,000 feet on 2 cargo ships, no direct hits observed. 71 500 pound demolition bombs dropped in camp area, hits throughout area, direct hit on hangar at seaplane ramp. 1 Jap biplane destroyed by B-24, 4 zero float fighters shot down by P-39's. Our losses 2 killed in head on attack. AA fire heavier and more accurate than usual particularly from north HEAD. Shore stations deliver info copies. NSS to Cominch NPM to Cinopac NPC to Comnowestseafon. NPG to Comweseafron and Comgen WDC.

05 0211 COMSOWESPACFOR to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSUBSOWESPAC.

Plans now developed advance base EXMOUTH GULF with further plans move bases northward soon as possible. Part 2 from Comsowespacfor action Cominch Info Cinopac Comsubsowespac. 2 vessels Subdiv 201 have reported Cinopac and last 2 vessels this division depart SUMAC about 19th October. Recommend as follows (A) Complete transfer to Southwest Pacific Force of Subron 6 and 8 total 24 submarines as proposed in Cinopac Serial 0192 of 26 August. (B) Transfer Subdivs 21, 22 and 202 in exchange accordance schedule proposed same reference. (C) Retain 3 tenders (PELIAS, HOLLAND and GRIFFIN) in Southwest Pacific area. HOLLAND to be transferred Cinopac in exchange for FULTON at date to be determined later. (D) In addition retain Subdiv 53 (6 S type subs) until additional division fleet submarines arrives to relieve them. (E) Complete assignment at least 30 fleet submarines this area at earliest date. This number to be increased to 36 soon thereafter as possible.
SECRET

OCTOBER (GCT)

05 0150 COMSOWESPACFOR to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSUBSOWESPAC.

Cominch Serial 00928 of 6 September 1942. Minimum 30 fleet subs plus 3 tenders required this area to comply with the provisions above reference as applied Southwest Pacific Area. 20 Fleet submarines plus 2 tenders inadequate. Minimum 12 subs plus 1 tender required adobe to support offensive operations in the Solomon area where major Jap forces and effort now concentrated. Reference ComSWPacFor 160419 of Sept in which Cominch concurs by his 161345. This action Cominch info Cinpac Comsubsowespac from Comsowespacfor. Consider Griffin plus docking facilities adobe capable cope with all logistic and repair problems except major overhaul and modernization. Minimum 16 subs plus 2 tenders required cover major supply routes Indo China Philippines plus strategic shipment routes by blockade runners to and from Europe. Completion marine railway Pinafore where 1st sub just docked gives equal facilities that port as Adobe. Part 2 follows.

03 2201 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, CTF 62.

No ground contact. 15 landing boats attacked at VIRU HARBOR. All destroyed or damaged. 30 zeros overhead at 1300. 7 Grummans made contact shooting down 9 certain 1 probable. AA shot down 2 certain 1 probable when 3 zeros attempted strafe field. Our losses 1 Grumman pilot rescued. Jap bombers following zeros turned back 85 miles CACTUS. 9 DDs 1 CA sighted 1500 by evening search Lat 08-30 South Long 158-20 East. Force protected by over 20 zero land planes. Striking force attacking 1715 opposed only by float biplane. No hits. Ships attacked during night. 1 hit on CA near SAVO. 3 DDs at MARAVOVO, 3 at VISALE, 3 at TASKAFOR-ONGA believed unloading troops and supplies. All were attacked but damage unknown. 1 SBD failed to return. Scattered bombing during night by single Jap planes. Hostile groups totaling 7 DD 1 CA heading Northwest picked up by morning search 120 miles CACTUS. Speed 20. CA smoking at stern. Our planes now on strike.

05 2030 CTF 8 to TF 8. CG ALASKA DEF, RDO BREMERTON, SAN FRAN, etc.

Comtaskfor 8 summary action Oct. 3rd. Six B-24's supported by 4 P-38's 8 P-39's in attack on KISKA. 5 bombers concentrated on hangar and camp area dropped eighty 100 pound incendiaries and 12 500 pound demolition bombs from 10 to 11000 feet observed hits on target. One bomber dropped 5 1000 pound bombs on cargo ship beached near TROUT LAGOON results unobserved. Our fighters shot down six twin float Jap fighters 5 at 16000 feet and one which attacked bombers. AA fire light and inaccurate. All our planes returned without damage. Shipping observed KISKA one medium AK beached one mile West South Head. One large AK beached near TROUT LAGOON. One medium AK West of

(Continued on next page)
North Head. Two small DDs patrolling entrance. One AK second cove West TWIN ROCKS, One AK off REYNARD cove. 
Enemy planes dropped 39 bombs on LONGVIEW at 0400 W (plus 10) no damage. Info radio stations pass to following local commands for info Cominich, Cincpac, Comnorwesseafron, Comgen WDC and Comwesseafron.

MacARTHUR

05 1226

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMSWPAC CTF 17, 62, 63, 64 info/

Sopac operations. Guadalcanal 3rd no ground contact. 15 Jap landing barges at Viru harbor New Georgia attacked by our planes. All destroyed or damaged. 30 zeros overhead 1300 (-11) 3rd. 7 Grummans contacked shot down 9 certain 1 probable. AA shot down 2 certain 1 probable when zeros attempted strafe field. Our losses 1 plane pilot saved. Jap bombers followed zeros turned back 85 miles from Guadalcanal. Jap ships consisting 1 CA 9 DDs landed reinforce-ments during night 3rd - 4th. Our planes attacked through-out night. Reported 1 hit CA near Savo, 1 SBD failed return. Enemy ships found by morning search 120 miles north-west Guadalcanal. Consisted 1 CA smoking at stern 7 DDs. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Striking force after them secured 2 torpedo hits on CA. During 4th October 2 small ground contacts along Matanikau. Jap losses 2 killed 3 wounded 1 prisoner. No marine casualties. SBDs and P-400s attacked Jap installations West Cape Tagura Point.

06 2114

CTF-17 TO COMSOPAC INFO CTF 62, 63, 64 COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Results of attack Buin Faisi Tonolei area 5 October. Originator CTF 17. 16 fighters 18 dive bombers 15 torpedo planes participating. Dropped 8 1000 pound bombs 32 500 pound bombs. Extremely unfavorable weather prevented re-mainder attacking. Hits as follows. 1000 pounders 1 heavy cruiser 1 transport. 500 pounders 10,000 ton cargo 1 sea-plane tender 1 cargo. Near misses 1 1000 pound and 3 500 pound on heavy cruiser. Remainder unobserved. In addition put 3 1000 pound bombs on runway and buildings Kieta field. Shot down 1 zero seaplane and 1 float type seaplane in target area. Strafed 10 4 engine seaplanes on water at Faisi believe 4 sunk. Strafed 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer in Shortland harbor. During TF retirement fighter combat patrol destroyed 2 twin engine type 97 Mitsubishi bombers. All aircraft recovered. No damage no losses this force.
Sopac operations. B-17s on strike morning 5th turned back by weather. One plane penetrated to BUKA bombing parking area. Twenty 100 lb bombs. Planes on ground reported damaged. Eighty eight 100 pound bombs dropped on GIZO. No observed results. REKATA BAY attacked by eight planes from GUADALCANAL morning fifth. One small plane and motor launch destroyed in water. Two of six enemy planes shot down. Beach bombed and strafed. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. One SBD forced down SANTA ISABEL. Prep four hundreds attacked boats and installations TASSAFARONGA and MAROVOVO during day fifth. Enemy force six dog dogs approaching from north west were attacked throughout night fifth - sixth. One DD sunk and one reported damaged first attack. Two TBF failed return from night search. Usual ground patrols GUADALCANAL. Several small contacts in MATAIKAU RIVER area. Our casualties one killed six wounded. Jap losses exceed 10 killed.

Oct 6th attack on KISKKA by 8 B-24s supported by 10 P-39s and 8 P-38s. Bombing from 10 to 12,000 feet with 500 lb demolition bombs, 28 on hangar area, 33 on GERTRUDE COVE camp area, 8 on large AK in harbor, 12 on large AK and corvette in GERTRUDE COVE. Pursuit strafing harbor area set fire to one of 5 zero float planes on water damaged another also damaged radio station, reported ship in harbor on fire and sinking also fire in camp area as result of bombing. All planes returned with minor damage to 1 B-24 and 1 P-39. Reconnaissance ATTU and AGATTU showed no signs of any enemy occupation. This is from CTF 8. NSS pass to Cominch NPM pass to Cincpac. NPC pass to Comnorwestseafron NPG pass to Comwestseafron and CGADC repeat CGADC.

Details of additional information urdis 071630 on existing situation between Military and Naval Governors SAMOA not available nor even brought to attention Cincpac. On basis first hand information obtained from officer temporarily at PEARL from SAMOA believe existing situation requires no change in recommendations made my serial 0202W of Sept 6. Only known basis of unsatisfactory situation is that present Naval Governor does not have unrestricted prestige and authority of his predecessors. As in HAWAII this condition follows logically from present military situation and unavoidable during emergency. Believe it undesirable to add civil administrative duties to military governor who is also in command of combatant troops and should be free to move to another area at a moments notice. My recommendations to specific changes proposed are negative to Affirm Baker and Cast. If my recommendations are approved will issue instructions to both governors with view to clarifying situation.
Sopac operations. Morning 5th in extremely unfavorable weather Task Force 17 struck BUIN-FAISI-TONOLEI area with 16 fighters 18 dive bombers 15 torpedo planes dropping 8 1000 pound bombs 32 500 pound bombs. Hits reported: 1000 pounder each on CA and AP. 500 pounders on 10000 ton cargo ship, seaplane tender, cargo ship. Near misses with 1000 pounder and 3 500 pounder on CA. Remainder unobserved. Also dropped 3 1000 pounders on runways and buildings KIETA. Shot down 1 zero seaplane 1 float type seaplane in target area. Strafed 10 4 engine seaplanes. Later believed 4 sunk. Strafed 1 cruiser 1 DD SHORTLAND HARBOR. During Taskforce retirement fighter patrol shot down 2 twin engine type Mitsubishi bombers. No losses no damage to our forces. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Jap SS was attacked by our patrol plane with 4 depth bombs at 0850 love (-11) 6th Lat 11-22 south long 162-20 east. Oil and bubbles appeared. On GUADALCANAL 6th active patrolling continued. No contacts on ground. P-400's bombed strafed probable enemy positions vicinity KOKUMBONO. Air striking force located 3 returning hostile DD's 225 miles northwest GUADALCANAL morning 6th. Did not attack due heavy enemy fighter coverages.

Comtaskforce 8 sends summary offensive air operations against KISKA Oct 8th. 6 B-24's, 2 B-17's supported by 12 P-38's at altitude of 3400 feet dropped 12 500 lb demolition bombs and 57 incendiary bombs on camp area starting at least 3 fires. Also dropped at 3800 feet 12 500 lb demolition bombs on cargo ship in GERTRUDE COVE. 4 P-38's strafed AA installations and hanger also a freighter and a corvette. Another mission 3-B24's dropped 10 1000 lb demolition bombs at 4000 feet on same ship in GERTRUDE COVE, photos taken damage still unreported. Own casualties minor injury by machine gun bullet to waist gunner, 1 B-24 damaged on landing, minor damage from AA fire to 3 P-38's. All planes returned. No enemy aircraft encountered. Shore stations deliver for info. Bremerton to Comnorwestseafron. San Fran to Comwestseafron and CG WDC. Honolulu to Cincpac and Annapolis to Cominch.
COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC

Cominch 261302 Sept Cincpac 272039. Comsopac to Cincpac. Turner at sea and am unable discuss subject with him. A most important and difficult part of Amphibious Training is the training of officers in the intricate planning necessary. This cannot be accomplished in a few months. Of equal importance is training in the coordinated employment of troops boats groups transport divisions naval gunfire support and air support. There must be training in the special communications technique involved. Officers must have a knowledge of transport loading and close acquaintance with supply problems prior during and after landing. Specialized equipment is necessary. The formation of amphibious training groups in Sopac area as in para 4 cominch serial 001006 would be but a minor step in a difficult problem. Officers of the experience necessary for conduction the required training cannot be spared as they are already too thinly spread through the Marine Divisions. Plans now on hand for the training of Marine Divisions Sopac area will actively employ all available transports. There will be plenty of active combat employment in this area other operations than effecting landings against opposition for all army troops made available. It is believed that the training suggested might convert well trained army divisions into half trained amphibious divisions. If amphibious training is necessary for army troops sent to the Sopac area it is recommended that it be thorough and be done in the United States where personnel and facilities perhaps are available.

CTF-8 to TASKFORCE 8 INFO CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

Six attack missions flew to Kiska 9 October. Total planes for six flights: 10 B-24, 8 B-17, 4 P-39 and 8 P-36. Bombs dropped from low altitude, numbers and observed results as follows: 52 500 pound demolition on AK in Gertrude Cove no hits, 25 500 pounders on two small AKs in KISKA harbor possible hit, 40 bombs of 100 pounds on north head also 20 of 100 pounds and 16 of 500 pounds in hangar camp area some hits observed. 4 P-39s strafed freighter and two gun emplacements. No enemy aircraft observed. Own damage: 4 bombers minor damage, 2 fighters damaged by AA fire, all returned to base. Preliminary report for 10 October 3 B-17s and 4 P-38 attacked camp hangar area from 100 feet dropping 45 magnesium fire bombs report large fires started, damage will be verified by photos taken. Three enemy planes observed on water. No change in enemy shipping over previous reports. From CTF 8. Info stations pass to following local aces, Cincpac Cominch Comnowesseafron, Comwestseafron and Comgen WCD.
09 1316 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 62, 63, 74, etc.

Sopac operations. B17 on search SHORTLAND ISLAND 1225L (-11) 8th was attacked sustained minor damage shot down 1 zero. From GUADALCANAL 8th 7 SBD's 4 TBF's escorted by 11 Grummans attacked CA KINUGASA Class 5 DD's at 1800 L (-11) Lat 08-45 South, Long 158-30 East. 1 sure torpedo hit 1 probable bomb hit 4 near misses on CA reported. 3 of 10 float biplanes shot down. 1 other probable. 1 SBD 1 Grumman failed return. 2 search planes which made original contact shot down 1 float biplane one probable. Both our pilots wounded but returned to base. At 1315 L (-11) 9th search plane reports 1 Jan BB on fire approaching RUIN HARBOR with 4 DD escort. Ghormley sends. Carpendar pass to MacArthur. 20 Grummans from COPAHEE arrived GUADALCANAL 1510 (-11) 9th.

11 1314 COMSOPAC to COMSOPAC (Admin), Info CINCPAC.

Your 102324. Flexible situation necessitates employment troops where and when available and precludes formulation fixed future policy.

10 1946 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC COMINCH COMSWPAC CTF 17, 62, 63, 64.

Sopac operations. Two enemy CL 4 DD lat 07-50 South long 157-40 E attacked by Guadalcanal air striking force at 0640 L (-11) ninth. One hit on CL several near misses. Ship left down by bow. Probable hit reported on second CL but damage unknown. 3 of 15 escorting float planes shot down also on 9th search planes from Guadalcanal strafed 5 byplaines bombed AA installations Rekata Bay. Results unknown. Guadalcanal ground forces supported by P 400s concluded on 10th a 2 day attack to west Matanikau river. Completely mopped up area Matanikau village - Point Cruz. Our troops have withdrawn to main positions except for strong force holding east bank Matanikau River. Early reports states our casualties less than 100 Jap casualties heavy. During night 8-9th single Jap planes over Guadalcanal in relays from 2200 to 0215. 2 Jap DD attacked by 9 SBDs escorted by 12 Grummans lat 07-55 S, 157-50 E at 1120 L (-11) 10th. No hits. Ghormley sends. Carpendar pass to MacArthur.

12 0329 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, COMINCH.

While in agreement with Comsopac 111006 consider proposal Cominch 261302 is a step in right direction to provide basic training without diverting AP'S from combat tasks and will expedite ultimate readiness of Amphibious troops for active combat. Concur STRAW, SPOONER and COPPER should each have group. Comsopac advise which of FANTAN and WHITE POPPY

(Continued on next page)
should have group. Attention Cominch invited that boats are now required to fill authorized complements of combat AP and AK in Sopac area. Recommend those complements be filled prior assignment boats to amphibious training groups in order have AP and AK ready further offensive operations.

12 2010 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Info stations pass to following local addreses Cominch Cinopac Comnorwestseafron and CG WDC. CTF 8 sends.

Amplifying attack on KISKA 10 October by 5 B17's and 4 P38's. In addition to 45 incendiaries which started large fires camp area dropped 15 demolitions 100 pound bombs in camp area and 6 same type on ship East of TROUT LAGOON. Fighters strafed AA installations. Jap planes on water reported wrecked, 2 ships in harbor beached, 2 medium AK's South of NORTH HEAD 1 small camouflaged ship in GERTRUDE COVE. Report for 11 October 6 B24's from 8 to 10 thousand feet bombed shipping and shore installations KISKA. 40 - 500 pounders on ship East of TROUT LAGOON and ship West of SOUTH HEAD no hits. 27 same type bombs on camp area damage unknown. Only above 2 previously damaged ships still in harbor also 1 still in GERTRUDE COVE. Catalina on search mission South of KISKA contacted small enemy AK and attacked with 2 500 pound bombs and machine guns bombs missed received an AA hole in wing. Another Catalina on search North of KISKA contacted enemy small AK. 4 heavy bombers dropped 24 500 pounders from 1,000 feet no hits. Catalina dropped 1 bomb which also missed then strafed decks with machine guns. HALIBUT on patrol in this area then made contact and attacked on surface with torpedoes at 1600 yards. Torpedoes did not detonate. Enemy vessel was Queen ship equipped with 3 guns forward and submerged torpedo tubes. Torpedo missed HALIBUT 10 yards to port. HALIBUT retired undamaged.

12 2234 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

Comtaskforce 8 reply to your 112155. Garrison strength LONGVIEW now 7500. Will be approximately 9000 about October 23rd at which time original FIREPLACE project will be approximately completed. CLIMATE and CAVERN 750 each of which is ultimate. AMULET O. When garrison at LONGVIEW reaches approximately 11000 about 15 November plan is to start garrison at AMULET by movement of troops from LONGVIEW. Additional troops from ALASKAN sector will eventually bring total to 11000 troops at LONGVIEW and 4000 at AMULET. Estimate fighter strip at CAVERN will be completed about November 10. Work continuing on additional strip at LONGVIEW. Landing area 3300 by 100 feet will be finished by October 18 at CLIMATE.
OCTOBER (GCT)

13 0139 CINCPAC to CTF 8 to COMINCH, COMMORWESTSEAFRONT.

In view changing situation in Pacific Ocean Areas adjustment of forces must be made. Believe enemy deeply committed in Sopac and not prepared to carry out more than minor raids chiefly by submarines in Northern area. We must continue pressure and replace losses in Sopac and this requires all forces that can be assembled. The above factors and impending bad weather point reduction in Northern Force. Para. Propose following for your comment. A. On completion present patrol reduce surface forces to those actually needed for escort. Do not consider cruisers will be needed except as escorts supplied by Cincpac for important troop movements. B. In view 4 more S boats shortly will be added to squadron 45 retire large submarines after present patrols completed. Would also return Captain Colclough to Pearl if you consider duties can be performed by Comdr. Gray. C. Return F4F4's for employment carriers or Sopac.

12 1316 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. GUADALCANA. 11th had no ground contacts. Patrol found abandoned Jap 75 MM 2 gun battery East of own position. 2 hour air alert beginning 1240 L (-11) 11th. Enemy planes in waves. 16 Ø's then 18 bombers and 4 Ø's then 8 bombers 4 Ø's. Bombs dropped on KOLI POINT. Shot down 8 Jap bombers 4 Ø's. We lost 1 P-39 1 Grumman. Grumman pilot rescued. Our Task Force intercepted enemy surface vessels near SAVO ISLAND about midnight 11th. Preliminary and inconclusive reports indicate enemy suffered considerable damage but details not yet confirmed. Air attack on 2 Jap cruisers at 1020 L (-11) 12th Lat 09 South 157-15 East resulted 1 torpedo hit several near bomb misses on 1 CA left dead in water burning. Ghormley sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 60 hundred pound and 2 1000 bombs dropped BUKA airdrome by B-17 striking force. 5 of 15 Ø's on runway destroyed. Many fires started.

14 1410 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

Situation midnight 14-15 local. Estimate that 6 enemy AP heavily supported by surface ships will land large number of troops on CACTUS tonight. Enemy carriers and a force of cruisers were reported today about 250 miles north of MALAITA. Our carrier group is refueling north west of POPEY. And Task Force 64 is at BUTTON after their recent action. Intend to employ the carrier group and available surface forces to prevent further large scale landings feeling that the situation is critical and enemy reinforcements must be stopped if our position in CACTUS is to be held. Estimate our carrier group can be in position to strike late afternoon 15th and Taskgroup 17.8 can join Task Force 64 and reach the CACTUS area afternoon of the 16th.
SECRET

OCTOBER (GCT)

13 2000 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info CoS ARMY.

Your 070141 movement 12 B-17’s cleared earlier today. Para. This MTGGR must be considered special case incident to certain general allocations of Army aircraft. Para. Whole situation as to Army aircraft in Pacific theater is approaching settlement which when promulgated should enable you to make effective dispositions but without expecting each allocation to involve replacement from here. Chief of Staff Army has by hand.

15 0212 COMSOPAC to CTF 17.8, CTF 64, Info CINCPAC, CTU 62.4.5, etc.

CTF 64 and CTG 17.8 join forces vicinity Cincpac grid posit G 6295 (Long 165-30 E Lat 13-45 S) about 5 hours GCT 15 Oct. Rear Admiral Lee assume tactical command combined force designated TF 64. Send TG 17 destroyers to BUTTON for fuel when considered advisable. Combined TF proceed to operate general area to South and West of SOLOMONS chain in position to intercept enemy forces approaching CACTUS area from westerly direction with apparent intent land forces or attack our position during night. Available enemy info is broadcast addressed all ships and bases. This changes my 141442. Detach units to proceed to BUTTON for fuel as necessary. Carpenter pass to MacArthur

15 0246 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, ALL SHIPS SOPAC.

Urgently need this area 1 additional Army Infantry Division. Present forces including 43rd Division reinforced insufficient to garrison present bases and therefore obviously inadequate support offensive operations. Have neither on hand nor in sight sufficient force to render CACTUS secure against present infiltration tactics. Essential that CACTUS be garrisoned with a force sufficient to provide protection dispersed air fields and to take a sustained and decisive offensive against hostile forces on the Island. Although full division with all components is required urgency of need is such that division should be sent out by regimental combat teams as ready. Plans being prepared for use NEW ZEALAND troops to garrison AZTEC and BLEACHER and to reinforce POPPY. Comgensopac in complete accord. Copy by hand to him.

14 1325 COMINCH to CINCPAC, CTF 8, Info COMNOWESTSEAFRON.

Addressees only decode. Highest quarters interested in practicability of making attack on BOODLE using 2 or 3 OBB for bombardment with an AVG and some DD’s in support and with land based air coordinated in attack. Comment. By hand to Admiral Leahy.
16 0035 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62.

Morning air searches negative enemy land concentrations along coast between KOKUMBONA and CAPE ESPERANCE. Air is striking at them. Request 2 destroyers be made available at once for shore bombardment that area during daylight hours. Profitable targets exist and psychological effect on personnel here would be excellent.

15 2125 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Assume your 110214 refers to evacuation transports designated as APH's. These ships are convoy loaded AP's intended transport troops from United States and evacuate wounded from base hospitals on return. They do not enjoy the immunity of the Geneva Conference and therefore should not be used as hospital ships in advanced areas except emergency and with escort. Normal troop capacity 112 officers 1200 troops and evacuation capacity 166 serious cases remainder troop space for minor cases. No regular hospital ships available. Sopacfor authorized retain TRYON APH 1 for essential purposes and to be returned to United States earliest practicable date. TRYON now under NTS departing West Coast in PHALANX 19 October. Suggest consideration demilitarizing STRATFORD for operation under Geneva Convention. Advise.

15 1744 COM 12 to VICE OPNAV Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, BUPERS, etc.

In view of urgency move large number Navy personnel construction battalions replacement personnel to Pearl Harbor South Pacific Bases and to Consouwestpacific imperative to start program of converting EC2's to carry 50 officers 1000 troops. All transports not necessarily employed in named movements. Recommend 1 EC2 be allocated by War Shipping Administration immediately followed by additional allocations every 3 weeks until situation relieved. To relieve immediate situation recommend MOUNT VERNON be employed for shuttle trip to PEARL before assignment to designated movement. Fleet personnel officer reports at least 8000 enlisted personnel to move. Cincpac pass Serfopac.

15 2050 CTF 8 to TF 8, /CG ADC, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESSEAFRON, etc.

9 B-24's supported by 5 P-38's attacked KISKA 14 October. Dropped 180 incendiaries in camp area, made large fires throughout camp. P-38's destroyed 3 enemy float planes on water, no other enemy planes seen. 1 B-17 took photos and bombed submarine area with 6 500 pound bombs. Ships in harbor reported as follows: 2 beached vessels previously

(Continued on next page)
Comairsopac sends. KERNODLE brings this message from VANDERGRIFT. That Jap has moved in and emplaced artillery of longer range than his which is shelling him positions and airfield at will. That enemy surface craft move at will in surrounding waters and shell his positions destructively both day and night and that he will be unable indefinitely to hold these positions if this continues. Geiger states that he can use no more aircraft until avgas situation improves and until destructive enemy fire on airfield from both land and sea is halted. So long as enemy ships patrol the sea area off LUNGA day and night I cannot see how McFARLAND or PAB barge can be brought in with reasonable chance of success and until this is changed the avgas situation cannot be improved to any extent. Offensive air operations limited now to strikes from BUTTON.

At daylight 15 Oct 5 enemy AP's sighted unloading along coast from KUKUMBONA Westward. Escorted by 11 combatant vessels with constant fighters over. Our air made repeated attacks. Set fire to 3 AP's one of these now sunk other still burning. Remaining 2 FPA but stood out with escort. B17's also attacked and were observed to hit at least 1 AP and 1 large combat ship. Air raid at 1130 AA shot down 3 bombers. Some damage to planes and runways. 5 zero biplanes shot down in air fighting. Our combat losses 3 F4's 3 SBD's 1 P-39. 4 engined seaplane bombed position twice during night. Naval gunfire 0030 to 0130. 3 ships firing. Damage to runways planes and dumps. Casualties 12th and 13th 41 dead 15 injured. Planes available approximately 9 F4's 11 SBD's 7 P-400's and P-39's.

Despite destruction of 4 hostile transports and departure of remaining 2 estimate enemy landed about 10,000 troops yesterday on CACTUS with considerable equipment and supplies bringing total force ashore to at least 15,000. Our force exceeds that number but more than half of it is in no condition to undertake a protracted land campaign due to incessant hostile operations and labor connected with development of this base over period of 10 weeks. The situation demands two urgent and immediate steps; Afirm. Take and maintain control of sea areas adjacent to CACTUS to prevent further enemy landings and enemy bombardment such as this force has taken for the last 3 nights. Baker. Reinforcement of ground forces by at least 1 division in order that offensive operations may be initiated to destroy hostile force now on CACTUS.
16 0812 COMSOPAC to CTF 64, Info CINCPAC, CTF 17 62 63.

Comsopac sends. Your 160330. No contemplated air operations CACTUS Area by Task Force 17 Saturday. See my 160032. Comairspan and Comgen CACTUS will inform you their air operations as practicable. No shore bombardment by your force contemplated at present except as directed in my 160722. In view of one and possibly more enemy carriers operate generally South of Latitude 11-45 until air search information from CACTUS or planes of Task Force 63 indicates approach of suitable target.

16 0722 COMSOPAC to CTF 64 Info TF 64 CINCPAC, CTF 17 62 63.

Send 2 destroyers designating them Task Unit 64.5.1 to proceed CACTUS arriving via LENGO CHANNEL daylight 17th. Direct Task Commander contact Comgen CACTUS on arrival LUNGA roads to receive info bombardment targets then bombard enemy positions as directed by Comgen CACTUS. Upon completion bombardment same day Task Unit withdraw by most expeditious route to South and East of RENNEL ISLAND awaiting further instructions. Caution enemy mines may be laid close inshore LENGO CHANNEL and in minable waters CAPE ESPERANCE-SAVO. MacFARLAND MEREDITH and VIREO with PAB barge in tow may be in CACTUS area or retiring via LENGO CHANNEL during night.

16 0032 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 Info CINCPAC, CTF's 62, 63, 64, 16, CTG17.8.

Sighting of one enemy carrier group and information of possible presence of second group on North flank off BUTTON-CACTUS supply line indicates enemy effort sever that line. Task Force 17 operate in general area to Eastward of BUTTON proceeding thence by route South of ROSES to avoid detection by enemy carrier scouts. Strike enemy carriers when favorable opportunity affords. When practicable inform me by plane your fuel situation. This modifies my 150402.

16 0440 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

From Comsopac. RDO CANBERRA 160233 and 160145 also 1 CV to westward of NDENI. This appears to be all out enemy effort against CACTUS possibly other positions also. My forces totally inadequate meet situation. Urgently request all aviation reinforcement possible.
reported, the one reported west of SOUTH HEAD now reported stripped of removable gear, 2 sunken ships in harbor 1 of which has been previously reported. 3 B-26's made 2 torpedo attacks on ships in GERTRUDE COVE, 1 erratic run observed others probably hit bottom due to shallow water at launching point. Our losses 1 P-38 and pilot. Comtaskforce 8 sends. Radio stations addressed deliver locally to info addees as follows Cominch, Cinpac, Comsowest and Norwestsea-frontiers Com Generals Western Defence Command CG ADC.

Sopac operations. 1040 L (-11) 14th search plane machine gunned 9 biplanes on beach REKATA. Believed all damaged. During night 13th-14th GUADALCANAL shelled for 1 hour 20 minutes by BB cruisers and DD's. Shells identified as 14, 12 and 8 inch. Our 5 inch scored direct hits on 3 DD's. Cruiser planes overhead all night. Occasionally land battery shelled position during night. Morning search showed 2 large oil slicks debris and boats where CA and DD where attacked on 12th. Shelling damaged runways bomber fields bomber fields destroyed 1 B-17, 5000 gals gas. 2 Ø's 1 bomber shot down. At 1600 L (-11) and again at 1820 L (-11) 14th enemy landing force attacked by SBD's. Near misses only on AP's. 1 Grumman missing. GUADALCANAL shelled again night 14th - 15th. Shelling ceased at 0315 L (-11) 15th. No detailed report. At 0300 L (-11) 15th enemy force 4 cruisers 7 or - 8 DD attacked by 4 MTB vicinity SANDFLY passage. L probable hit on cruiser. At 0624 L (-11) 15th GUADALCANAL reported enemy landing force in 5 AP's 1 AP or AK supported by 1 BB 2 CL's 4 DD's 15 miles northwest SAVO. Shortly after enemy began landing troops to westward KOKUMBONA. Air strik of 5 B-17's contacted at 1145 L (-11) 15th. Reported 3 direct hits on transports. 2 transports burning. BB crippled. Shot down 1 Ø. At 1445 L (-11) 15th 5 B-17's out for strike against enemy CV reported Lat 09 S Long 165 E at 1351. No report yet. At 1533 L (-11) 15th Task Unit 62.4.5 attacked by 9 dive bombers Lat 13-18 South Long 163 East. No damage. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. At 1430 L (-11) 15th GUADALCANAL reports 3 transports beached and burning fiercely. Near SAVO Island 1 BB or CA which was hit by B-17 bomb, 1 CL and 5 DD's
16 1326 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 62 63 64 17.

Sopac operations. Comgen GUADALCANAL estimated about 10000 Jap troops landed GUADALCANAL during morning 15th. Morning air searches 16th from GUADALCANAL negative. Enemy land concentrations observed along coast from ESPERANCE to KOKUMBONA. Ghormley sends. Campden pass to MacArthur. 0200 L(-11) 16th VP's on search for enemy CV reported attack on enemy cruiser Lat 09-50 South Long 164-55 East. Believe hits scored on cruiser bow. During afternoon 16th McFARLAND delivered 32,5000 gallons avgas to GUADALCANAL. McFarland bombed 1745 Love 16th. Stern damaged proceeding RINGBOLT. Two Jap AP's seven DD Lat 08-50 South Long 156-10 East attacked by SBD's. One AP hit left burning. Other AP near misses. Continued course toward GUADALCANAL.

16 2138 COMAIRSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMINCH, EUSAER.

Comairsopac sends. Strongly recommend earliest formation of Navy shore based air striking group for long range offensive operations this area. Group to consist essentially 2 squadrons each B-24's. Fighters and torpedo-dive bombers. Last 2 equipped with latest types now beginning production. In meantime consider highly desirable assignment to CACTUS as replacement for carrier squadrons now in process being withdrawn 1 each fighter. Dive bomber and torpedo squadrons. These to be drawn from carrier replacements of sufficient operation basic training. Actual carrier experience not essential. To be assigned operationally as a group under air commander CACTUS. Combat experience thus gained in shore based status will be invaluable information future air striking groups which definitely necessary to successful war this area.

16 0106 COMSOPAC to CO 4th DF BTN, COMGEN ROSES, CINCPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSP

Comgen ROSES pass to CO 4th Defense Battalion action. Upon arrival ROSES 9th Defense Battalion report Comgen ROSES for duty defense base ROSES under principle unity of command. Relieve 4th defense battalion which embarks same vessels. 5 and 3 inch batteries with ammunition and present installations remain intact at ROSES. 155 and 90 mm batteries complete with ammunition remain aboard ship. Battalions authorized exchange serviceable tентage at discretion. Rations will be exchanged. All other equipment including vehicles and tanks remain with own organization.

17 0800 COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMINCH.

Cincpcac 170123. All 6 fleet submarines now based ABODE are in northeast area as follows: South NEW IRELAND between RABAUL and KAVTING, SAINT GEORGE CHANNEL, FAISI, SOUTH NEW GEORGIA, between NEW GEORGIA and CHOISEUL ISLAND, one proceeding southeast along north coast of SOLOMONS to round.
east and ISABEL ISLAND enroute to base. Tour of these directly supporting Soupacific operations in CHOSIEUL SHORTLAND area. No additional fleet subs can be moved by this area within reasonable time although two more enroute from PINAFORE. My 300818 Sept and 140640 October. 2 S class submarines with 12 torpedoes each can be sent patrol CACTUS area ETA 27 October 12 days on station thence return ABODE for overhaul prior transfer your command accordance first reference. Alternative see Cincpac 092205 October and my 11652. 3 subs of Subdiv 53 can depart ABODE 20 October with 12 torpedoes each ETA CACTUS 28 October remaining on station 12 days thence proceed SUVA and join GRIFFIN plus other three submarines that division. After overhaul there tender and 6 subs proceed PANAMA. Must know immediately if either plan desired in order permit modification torpedo loadings. MacArthur has this.

16 2221 CINC PAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH, COMMON WESEAFRON.

Propose to reduce your cruisers to 2. Advise when present commitments permit and name 6 inch cruiser to go. Due to overwhelming need for strength in SoPac comment on relief of remaining 2 by RALEIGH and DETROIT.

17 1536 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINC PAC, CTF 16, 17, 62, 63, 64, COMS OWESTPAC.

Sopacific operations. Later report PBY attack 0245 Love (-11) 16th states 1 torpedo hit on bow of 1 cruiser of 10 cruisers and DDs Lat 09-50 South, Long 164-55 East. MacFARLAND was attacked at 1745 Love (-11) 16th by 8 type 99 2 place dive bombers. Stern was blown off aft of after deck house. Now anchored TULAGI. 4 zeros shot down. 7 B-17's at 1750 Love (-11) 16th dropped 44 500 pound bombs on enemy supplies KOKUMBA N A BEACH. Several fires started. 5 zero attacked 1 B-17. 1 zero shot down. All our planes returned. B-17 on search Lat 08-55 South, Long 160-46 East shot down serial 43. No ground activity GUADAL CANAL 16th. Our air struck troop concentrations supplies and battery positions incessantly throughout 16th. 14 Aichi type dive bombers and 8 zeros over GUADAL CANAL at 0745 Love (-11) 17th. 8 bombers 2 zeros downed by planes. Unknown number others shot down by AA. Our loss 1 plane missing. No other damage. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 15 twin engine bombers accompanied by many zeros bombed position at 1315 Love (-11) 17th. Our planes unable gain altitude in time intercept. 1 bomber probably shot down. Our losses none.
Sopac operations. CTF 17 reports shot down 1 Kawanishi type 97 twin tail 4 engined flying boat Lat 15-20 South, Long 162-47 at 1255 L(-11) 15th. Also 1 Mitsubishi type 97 twin engine land bomber at 0945 L (-11) 16th. In Jap attack 0745 L(-11) 17th reported yesterday AA got 6 bombers. Morning 17th 2 our DD bombarded enemy positions West of KOKUMBONA. 2000 rounds fired. At least 2 ammunition dumps set off. Many other fires started. Afternoon 17th GUADALCANAL search planes REKATA BAY attacked by 6 float biplanes 1 float zero 1 enemy plane shot down. One SBD missing. GUADALCANAL planes made 4 attacks against Jap positions. GUADALCANAL reported being shelled by single cruiser or DD night 17th-18th. Fire ceased 0010 L(-11). Again reported heavy fire 0013 L(-11). 1250 L(-11) 18th GUADALCANAL attacked by about 20 bombers 20 zeros. 8 bombers 11 zeros shot down. 2 Grummans missing. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Delayed report TF 17 states in daylong operations 16th strafed burned 12 float planes REKATA, destroyed fuel dump aa positions. At GUADALCANAL made 4 direct hits on beached transports set fires supply dumps strafed silenced AA fired landing barges KOKUMBONA to ESPERANCE. No damage no casualties own force.

Suggest earnest consideration sending 9th Defense Battalion direct to CACTUS instead relieving 4th Defense Battalion at ROSES. This move will give Vandegrift double number 155 MM guns he requested which are badly needed. Will double antiaircraft protection for fields, supplies, and installations by both heavy and automatic weapons which in secondary role will tremendously increase ground defense against tanks and troops. Unit also has powerful ground defense power in thirty caliber machine guns. Personnel involved much less than if units of equal fire power but organized for mobile offensive operations were sent in. Unit in ships ready for immediate movement and personnel already acclimated to tropics. Relief 4th Defense would be postponed but move considered impelled by critical situation and am sure personnel of 4th will gladly contribute their part to ensure success CACTUS.
Secret
October (GCT)

19 1256 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 16 17 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. GUADALCANAL 18th no ground activity. 1250 L(-11) 20 bombers 20 zeros dropped bombs vicinity defense lines. Our fighters intercepted shot down 11 zeros 8 bombers. Two Grummans lost. 7 killed 18 wounded by bombing. From 2000 to 0100 love maintained SBD and PBY patrol over Jap positions strafing bombing. Three enemy CA's lat 07-45 South Long 157-05 East at 1700 Love 19th bombed by search planes. No hits. B-17's out for strike afternoon 19th followed by PBY strike at night. No report on these. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

20 1321 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWESPAC, CTF 62 63 64 16 17.

Sopac operations. 1810 Love (-11) 19th 3 DD's with 10 float biplane escort northwest SAVO bombed by SBD's. One DD appeared damaged but continued on course. One enemy plane destroyed. All our planes returned. Due to bad weather only two of 6 PBY's reached target 2 CA's 2 DD's one mile West POINT CRUZ at midnight 19th. From 2000 feet one plane got direct hit on cruiser. Two heavy explosions heard. Other PBY's bombed beach POINT CRUZ to TASSAFARONGA. All our planes returned. On GUADALCANAL little ground activity 19th. 15 zeros over position 1330 L (-11). 2 shot down. One Grumman lost. 0100 (-11) 20th bombed enemy DD off KOKUMBONE. HALSEY sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 30 zeros over airfield at 1045 (-11) 20th followed by 16 bombers at 1145. 7 zeros probably plus 2 bombers shot down. 2 our pilots missing.

20 0407 COMMARWING 1 to COMAIRSOPAC, Info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, etc.

Essential that reserve aircraft be maintained BUTTON area for replacements at CACTUS. Past experiences have required 50% replacements SBD's and F4F's every 10 days. Should Jap pressure continue CACTUS will require 18 F4F and 18 SBD with 100% flight crews every 10 days. Pass to Commarairwingspac.
COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC.

Part 1 of 3 my 211630. Hicomin. Your 172359. Concerning aircraft. Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved following forces by 1 January, 1943. For NEWCAL-FIJI-EFATE-NDENI-GUADALCANAL area: 2 groups Army heavy bombers total 70 planes. 2 groups Army fighters total 150. 1 group Army medium bombers total 52. 5 squadrons VPB total 60. Four 18 plane squadrons VMF. Four 18 plane squadrons VMSB. 1 squadron VMTB. 40 VOS planes. 13 Army and 36 Navy transport planes. 3 squadrons RNZAF Hudsons and RNZAF Vincents and Singapores now at SUVA.

Part 2 of above. Para 2. Jig Cast Sail directive also provides for flow of replacements personnel and material to meet actualities of expenditures and attrition. Para 3. Navy part of these increases in air strength is under control of Cincpac. Copy of JCS directive forwarded by mail. To meet these and other requirements. PacFleet pool during October will receive following approximate totals: 80 VF, 85 VSB, 50 VTB, 20 VPB, 7 VR and inshore patrol VOS.

Here is last part of three my 211630. Hicom. During November: 125 VF, 75 VSB, 50 VTB, 75 VPB and 10 inshore patrol VOS. Foregoing includes VOS planes for new squadrons VS7D 14 and VS8D 14. Para four. Information as to availability of planes and personnel now in area and now enroute is known to you. Information as to dates of Army reinforcements and flow of Army replacements other than that you have not now available but will be forwarded when received. Para five. Concerning other craft in separate despatch. Para six Halsey pass to Harmon.

COMSOPAC to VICE OPNAV, Info CINCPAC, Com 12, HUDOCKS.

Recent developments have intensified the need for immediate shipment of all items in Vice Opnav 131255. The unloading situation has been decidedly improved and there are now only 6 ships in the harbor for unloading. Com 12 152320 to Vice Opnav states that LONGFELLOW, ALDRICH and COLT will be used for shipment of construction materials. Additional cargo ships on West Coast must be made available immediately for further shipment of materials including the complete Yards and Docks component of a CUB requested in my 010454. The large numbers of personnel afloat and ashore and the ships to be supplied from this base require that a major supply depot be established here instead of the Advanced Base Supply Depot originally contemplated. The total covered storage required for Naval supplies is now estimated at one million square feet instead of the two
hundred thousand square feet first recommended. Paymaster General concurs in this estimate. Request 200 more store houses 40 by 100 feet be furnished for this purpose, and 10 more refrigerator storehouses. Request complete lumber and hardware for 160 by 600 foot pier, and 3 complete sets of battalion hand tools for WHITE POPPY, BUTTON and CACTUS. Large number of developments planned at WHITE POPPY requires construction of all types of shore facilities for a complete Naval base including facilities for over 20,000 men. The maximum possible urgency must be assigned to the development of this base. To plan and direct the activities of the 19th, 20 and 24th Construction Battalions which will be temporarily used in this area and to be Public Works Officer of the Naval Base at WHITE POPPY request that a Captain or Commander in the Civil Engineer Corps be immediately assigned for this duty.

Here goes account critical shortage fighters South Pacific consideration being given to proposal load ALTAMAHA with aircraft to proceed direct from SAN DIEGO. It may be necessary to: (a) Reduce AVG units to one third allowance. (b) Reduce VF 11 to half allowance. (c) Take some F4F's from Marine Fighter Squadrons. Based on foregoing request recommendation as to date of readiness and approximate composition of cargo for ALTAMAHA aircraft to be in fly off condition. Recommendation also requested concerning equipping one Marine Fighter Squadron with F4 units and best pilots available for early service in Sopac. Originator Comairpac for action Comfairwestcoast. NPG pass. NSS give to Buser for info. Cincpac has.
October (GCT)

Sopac operations. At GUADALCANAL 21st 7 bombers 15 to 20 zeros over field 1115 L(-11). 6 zeros shot down by Grumans. 1 bomber by AA. 2 bombers left smoking. 2 Grumans missing. 4 others damaged by enemy fire. 9 killed 44 wounded. GUADALCANAL ground forces 21st small contact MATANIKAU. Japs used some 9 ton tanks. These withdrew under artillery fire. Our planes continued harassing missions against enemy ground forces. Occupied village on RUSSELL ISLAND bombed strafed by 3 SBDs. 22nd several groups enemy planes over GUADALCANAL 13 to 1400 L9-11). Made contact with only 5 due to weather. These were fixed landing gear dive bombers. All 5 shot down. Airfield BUTTON shelled by enemy sub 0230 L(-11) 23rd. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

From prisoners statements and diaries learned that CHOKAI KAKO AOBIA KINUGASA FURUTAKA TATSU TAENRYU and 1 of 2 DDs took part in attack on our forces night August 8-9 off SAVO ISLAND. This force came around west side SAVO ISLAND and veered continually left till it retired. Firing was initially to starboard. No Japanese ships sunk or hit by torpedo. AOBIA had damage to forward turret. KAKO damaged. Statement made that force came from KAVIENG or RABAUL. Routes of approach and retirement not known. 1 prisoner says that no land was visible during daytime considered probable that at least part of force came south of Island chain which area not air scouted on 8th. Para. KAKO received 3 torpedo hits and sank about 0700 love (-11) on August 10. Diary says 651 men rescued before KAKO sunk. Diary states AP KINRYU MARU and DD MUSUNI were sunk on August 25. Comamphibforsopac sends. Comsopac has.

Request approval exchange DETROIT and RALEIGH for cruisers in TF 8 in view Theodore's 172343 and critical need for maximum strength in Sopac.
25 1450 COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62 64 61 COMSOWESPAC.

Comairsopac sends. Results B-17 strikes today. All planes armed with four five hundreds. 5 planes sent to intercept enemy LANGLEY victors at Lat 08-05 long 164-30 failed to intercept. 2nd flight 6 planes sighted 12 enemy ships 1430 love (-11) lat 07-50 long 163-40 course 000 speed 25 dropped at 1510 from 15500 feet on BB nil hits. Other ships this force not identified but no CV. Opposed by land plane VF and AA. Third strike 6 planes altitude 13500 at 1710 hit force of 2 CA and 4 DD in lat 0817 long 160 2 hits certain on undamaged CA. Ship reported left dead in water burning heavily. 4 explosions noted after attack. Leader reports his attack was preceded at 1700 by Dauntless attack which also obtained one hit on other cruiser. All planes returned. Please pass to Comensopac.

25 0216 COMSOPAC to COMINCH CINCPAC COMSOWESPAC CTF 62 61 63 64, etc.

Sopac operations. 3 Catalinas made night torpedo attacks on Jap ships SHORTLAND TONOUSHI area at 0245 L (-11) 23rd. Two torpedoes at CL anchored off MOILA POINT one hit certain. One hit probable. Also 500 pound bomb hit on another CL or DD. Third plane attacked probable BB one torpedo vicinity ERVENBA ISLAND results unobserved due to AA and searchlights. All planes returned. Night 23rd search plane contacted two groups enemy Naval force. 2027 L 23rd one group Lat 04-55 South Long 164-52 East CV CL DD. One group CA CL and 2 DD. CV described as flat top no island about 600 feet long. One Catalina with torpedo made contact with CA CL and 3 DD's at 0110 L 24th Lat 06-09 South Long 164-14 East. Torpedo dropped at 400 yards on CA described as MOGAMI class. Force opened with AA after attack. Large explosion which may have been torpedo hit noted during retirement. On GUADALCANAL beginning 1800 L 23rd Japs laid heavy barrage on our front lines along MATANIKAU RIVER. All calibers including six inch. When barrage lifted Japs attempted river crossing in force with tanks and massed infantry. Four attacks thrown back with five large enemy tanks destroyed. Our air and artillery took under fire Jap force observed early morning 24th attempting outflank left MATANIKAU RIVER line. One T3F shot down by Jap AA. Pilot gunner rescued passenger missing. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.
Sopac operations. GUADALCANAL reports 16 Jap bombers about 20 zeros over airfield 1120L (-11) 23rd. 20 zeros 1 bomber destroyed. 3 bombers left smoking. All our pilots safe. Halsey sends Carpender pass to MacArthur. 1315 L 23rd our search plane at INDISPENSABLE STRAIT shot down Jap 4 engine flying boat. Small groups enemy planes over GUADALCANAL 1300 L 23rd. Group of 5 dive bombers sighted shot down. 1 SBD crashed take off pilot gunner killed. On ground only activity artillery fire. Our artillery and air concentrated on enemy 155 mm position which believed damaged.

26 0440 CTF 61 to COMSOPAC.

My 260200. Damage ENTERPRISE more extensive. 2 bomb hits. Number 1 elevator out of commission. Can operate reduced number planes. More details later. SOUTH DAKOTA bomb hit on turret 1. PORTLAND steering gear unreliable. SAN JUAN 2 small compartments flooded. PORTER sunk. Other DD's damaged. Request tanker lat 14 south, 170 east soon as practicable. From Comtaskfor 61 to Comsopac.

26 0210 CTF 61 to COMSOPAC.

1 carrier of SHOKAKAU Class hit by 3 1000 lbs. Other carrier of same class hit by 2 500 lbs bombs. That carrier smoking and being attacked by B-17's in position latitude 07-05 South Longitude 161-56. MOGAMI CA hit by 2 1000 lb bombs. 1 hit and 2 near misses on BB. ENTERPRISE landing HORNET planes. This report will be amplified. ENTERPRISE attacked 4 times. No serious damage. From Comtaskfor 61 to Comsopac. Flight deck immobilized due to portion of HORNET group. Will endeavor to send extra planes to HUTTON. Comtaskgroup 17.2 252340 gives information on HORNET.

26 0210 COMSOPAC to COMSWPAC, CTF 62 42 61 63 64 CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Sopac operations. During 25th Jap naval forces approached GUADALCANAL from southwest north west and north. Others operating to northeast GUADALCANAL. Few reports yet received from our striking forces. 1115 Love (-11) 25th lat 07-50 south, long 160-28 east our search plane shot down Jap flying boat. 1052 love 25th GUADALCANAL reported receiving naval gunfire from 2 cruisers 1 DD. 1300 love 4 SBD's from GUADALCANAL scored 1 hit 1000 pound bomb on forecastle of enemy CA also damaging hit or near miss on CL. CA dead in water. Enemy force consisted 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 2nd SBD strike scored hit on CA and near miss on CL same force at 1700 love. B-17 strike of 6 planes also hit this Jap force at 1710 love. 2 500 pound bomb hits certain on CL. Left dead in water burn-

(Continued on next page)
October (GCT)

26 0210 COMSOPAC to COMSWPAC, etc. (Continued)

ing heavily. 4 explosions noted after attack. At REKATA BAY 2 small AK's with deck load vehicles and boxes strafed by search plane. Plane attacked by 2 float biplanes. 1 bi-plane shot down. On ground 24th little action along MATAN- IKAU where our position intact. Beginning midnight continuing through early morning 25th Japs attacked toward airfield from south. Army battalion reinforced Marines and position held during night. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to Mac- Arthur. Japs still attacking this area morning 25th. In air over GUADALCANAL 25th enemy fighters throughout day at irregular intervals. 17 Jap fighters shot down. 16 Jap heavy bombers over at 1435 love 25th. 5 bombers shot down. 9 dive bombers Aichi type attacked position at 1500 love. Only minor damage by bombs. 2 our fighter pilots jumped and rescued.

27 0426 Comsonac to Cincpac, Cominch, CTF 61 62 63 64 42, etc.

Sopac operations. B-17 on search 1020 L(-11) 25th was at- tacked by 6 Nagoya landplane zeros with bellytanks. 1 zero down in flame. Bombardier killed. Our plane returned. Taskforce 64 made offensive sweep through area west GUADAL- CANAL evening 25th. No surface contact with enemy. Pre- liminary reports from Task Force 61 indicate that force got 3 1000-pound bomb hits on 1 enemy CV. 2 500-pound bomb hits on another CV. Both CV's SHOKAKU class. 2 1000-pound bombs on CA MOGAMI class. 1 hit 2 near misses on Jap BB. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. PBY reported at 0215 L 27th had torpedoed Jap carrier result not seen. Jap force 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD which was reported under attack 25th by SBD twice and B-17 strike once was again attacked by SBD's and P-39's at 0700 L 26th. P-39 got 1 500-pound bomb hit on CA. Very near miss on CL by SBD. Both cruisers proceeding slowly leaving large oil slicks. Jap DD which shelled SEMINOLE morning 25th were strafed by 4 Grumans. 1 DD also hit by 3 5-inch shells from LUNGA battery. At GUADALCANAL Japs attacked in force during night 25th-26th. Main attack down LUNGA River from South. 1 attack this sector by Jap 29th infantry penetrated lines south of airfield. Our lines here restored by strong counterattack of 1 64th infantry. Along MATANKAU River 7th Marines drove Japs to south. During 25th our AA shot down 1 bomber 3 zeros. Ground troops got 1 zero.
October (GCT)

27 0031 COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC, Info CTF 62 61 64.

Amplifying report 51 P 6 261540. At 0055 enemy force 2 CV 1 BB 2 CA 2 CL 1 DD lat 06-51 long 165-06 course 030 speed 20. 1 CV very large with small island other CV smaller with flush deck. No planes on deck either carrier. Fish dropped at 500 yards at largest carrier. Results unobserved due heavy AA. Other Catalina armed with 4 contact 500's made steep glide bombing attack on CA at 0105 L (-11) lat 04-25 Long 164-35 course 080 speed 30. 2 bombs under stern threw water over ship and into tunnel hatch. 2 direct bomb hits fell aft stack lit up ship permitting identification. After retirement 2 large explosions seen at same location. Attack opposed by heavy AA until after both hits. Plane damaged but returned safely. No other ships in area. 3rd Catalina no contact.

27 0045 CTF 61 to COMSOPAC.

My (Comtaskfor 61's) 260440. This action to Comsopac. Damage now determined requires following ships proceed to port for further examination and temporary repairs. ENTERPRISE PORTLAND SAN JUAN SMITH MAURY. SHAW with survivors of PORTER not damaged. Commanding Officer SOUTH DAKOTA seriously wounded. Guns of turret 2 nicked by fragments but may be serviceable. Following undamaged CONNINGHAM PRESTON MAHAN CUSHING. Also JUNEAU now with me. Additional damage ENTERPRISE. Forward gyro out. 4 feet down by the head. Fragment holes in sides. Number 3 and 4 bomb elevators out. Also 5 inch ammunition hoists to groups 1 and 2. Forward 50 feet hanger deck bulged. 3 radio transmitters out. 1 DF loop shot away. Degaussing cables cut. Personnel casualties ENTERPRISE 30 dead 60 wounded. PORTLAND 1 steering unit out other unreliable. Vessels task force 17 are about to join me.

26 0814 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, COMGENSOPAC.

Comsopac to Cominich Info Cinopac Comairsopac. (See Pinks)

27 0437 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info Opnav, Comserforpac, Cominch, Bupers.

A base command separate from Seronsopac is essential this area for planning construction and administration. Your 210225 and my 230837. Long known need for base construction on large scale now reemphasized by damage to ships and lack of facilities for adequate support of land based air and amphibious operations. If approved I plan to assign Captain W R Carter now in this area as Commander Naval Bases South Pacific Area. Request following additional personnel report by air: 1 Capt for aviation planning, 1 Colonel Marine Corps for planning land and AA defenses 1 Captain

(Continued on next page)
CEC for advanced base planning and construction and 1 Commander or Lt Comdr Specialist in each of the following: Aircraft maintenance, Aircraft supplies, Aerology, Ship Maintenance, Radio Material, Radar degaussing loops and sono buoys, mines, nets and booms, torpedoes, ordnance plus appropriate officer personnel for operation of South Pacific Advanced Base Depot. Ref Opnav 241938. Additional assistants to the Commander Naval Bases will be furnished from this area or requested by despatch if recommended organization is approved. Early action requested. Opnav deliver Cominch Fupers and Budocks for info.

28 0311 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral King only. While not having complete picture believe WASP announcement somewhat premature unless certain that Japs had full knowledge of it. Also immediate release of PORTER's name was hard on morale of dependents therefore on our personnel. Recommend previous policy of withholding name of ship until it can be announced that next of kin have been informed.

28 0326 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 61, COMSOWESPAC, etc.

Further report. Sopac operations. PBY attacks early morning 27th states enemy force consisted 2 CV, 1 BB, 2 CA, 2 CL, 1 DD lat 06-41 south long 165-06 east. 1 CV very large small island. Other CV smaller with flush flight deck. No planes on deck either carrier. Torpedo was dropped 500 yards at larger carrier. Heavy AA. Another PBY with 4 contact 500 pound bombs made steep glide on CA at 0105 love (-11) 27th lat 05-25 south long 161-35 east. 2 bombs under stern throwing water over ship. 2 direct hits aft stack. After retirement of plane, 2 large explosions seen. Heavy AA until after bomb hits. Plane damaged but returned safely. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. On GUADALCANAL during night 26th-27th numerous small attacks by Jap land forces. All repulsed outside our wire. Last 5 days our casualties 86 dead, 109 wounded. Jap losses 9 tanks (14-18 tons), one regimental battery, many heavy and light machine guns. At least 2000 Japs killed. TREVER, ZANE report being attacked by 3 new Jap DD while returning from GUADALCANAL 25th. Scored at least four hits on DD's. They report at least 2 of these Jap ships sunk by GUADALCANAL bombers.

28 0351 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH

Am concerned over each of defenses of BUTTON and desire to assist you in every way to improve them. As there
28 0351 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH

was no basic joint plan for its establishment suggest you have one drawn up for its defenses and I will submit it to Cominch for approval and implementation. Enroute to you is copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff Aircraft Plan which sets BUTTONS aircraft complement by January 1st as 13 Army medium bombers, 25 Army fighters, 13 VSB, 8 VOS, and 18 VF.

28 0921 COMNAVUNIT BUTTON to COMSOPAC INFO COMAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC

COOLIDGE struck two mines 0930. Sank SECOND CHANNEL 1050 local October 26 in about 20 fathoms. Vessel and cargo total loss. Army personnel on board 4604. Known loss 1 officer, 3 men. 27 additional missing but reported seen ashore. Navy personnel on board 2 officers, 50 enlisted; all saved. Crew ship reported 290. Only loss 1 fireman. Survivors being temporarily based ashore. Channel open to normal traffic. Ship entered Channel through mined entrance. Master states was not notified of existence mine field. Picket boat with pilot stationed proper entrance could not attract attention of ship or overtake. Signal station ashore warned ship but ship could not kill headway before hitting mine. Beached turned over to port and slid off coral ledge into deep water one hour twenty minutes after hitting mine. Letter report follows. Comairsopac has by hand for information. And passes. Comnavunit BUTTON originates.

28 1001 MACARTHUR to COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC

Can utilize to advantage from airdromes this area any available B-24's. Re Comsopac 272330. Assume planes belong 90th Group. Squadron just arrived here from that group grounded about four days for replacement nose wheel collars. Due to lack protection underneath where interception is normally expected consider this type should be used in night missions. Otherwise operational losses and damage will soon reduce weight of attack below that which can be regularly sustained in night operations. Pilots of squadron just arrived here not yet competent for night operations under adverse weather conditions encountered here, but expect to have them ready in ten days. Every effort being made and will be made to hasten training period for pilots here on arriving. Above facts given in order you may have complete picture of situation. Let me know your decision. From MacArthur to Halsey. Info Nimitz.
Ground situation at CACTUS can be turned in our favor only by offensive action. Our present forces have performed magnificently but their present strength appears to have restricted them to the defensive which may be fatal if enemy succeeds in building up sufficient superiority on Island. Japs have favored dark of moon for reinforcing their troops. Lull after intense activity appears to give us opportunity now for placing strong reinforcements on CACTUS that will permit offensive operations. Comment.

In complete agreement your 282225. Supplies now enroute. From Comsopac to Cinpap info Cominch. Force consisting 2 raider companies, Army infantry battalion, small AA unit and ACORN 2 shortly at AOLA BAY CACTUS to develop supporting airfield there. Above to be increased in strength as field develops. 8th Marines land soon at KUKUM, landing coordinated with offensive launched by present garrison if then feasible. Marine aviation engineer battalion and 2 batteries 155 guns now enroute KUKUM. Marine replacements 1 Army regiment American Division moves to CACTUS as transportation available. Opening phase above operations begins morning 30th L (-11) with ships gunfire on hostile installations. CACTUS will not crack.

WASHINGTON subjected 2 submarine attacks early morning 26th. SoPac operations. Several torpedoes seen each attack. All missed. Torpedoes apparently set to explode at end of run. On GUADALCANAL Japs attacked 3 points on perimeter at nightfall 27th. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. One attack penetrated but position restored by counter attack. Other attacks stopped outside wire. GUADALCANAL air forces attacked Jap 8 gun AA battery at KOKUMBONA with SBD's and P400's. Battery silenced and ammunition dump and stores destroyed. Continued attacks on suspected field gun positions. No fire from these 26th. GUADALCANAL air dropped 11 100 pound 3 300 pound bombs on Jap bivouac area REKATA BAY 0920 L (-11) 27th. Fuel or ammunition dump set afire. 7 float planes strafed on water. Four of these burned. One our pilots parachuted northwest tip YSAHEL ISLAND.

Your 262351 following from Comtaskforce 17 Quote NPM 303 Oct 18. Action addressee incorrectly decoded as Comtaskforce 17 resulted in dispatching ships of this task force.
OCTOBER (GCT)

28 0330 CTF 16 to CINCPAC (Continued).

Mission unsuccessful. Letter and MORRIS action report forwarded when practicable. Unquote. Comdesron 2 in MORRIS raided patrol line about four hours 15 minutes prior raid by Comdesdiv 9 in LAMSON with MAHAN. This originated by Comtaskforce 16. NPM deliver to Cinpacz for action and NSS for info Cominch. Also pass to Comsopac. By visual to Comtaskforce 17.

28 2240 CTF 8 to TASKFORCE 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Comtaskforce 8 reports reconnaissance October 27. SEGULA: Northeast coast negative, one shack on west slope which was in ruins. GARELO: Grey shack observed. No traces enemy occupation either island nor on ATTU also scouted. Damaged ships KISKA HARBOR and GERTRUDE COVE as previously reported. Afternoon mission of 6 B-24's found KISKA closed in and returned with bombs. Info stations deliver to usual local adees Cominch Cinpacz Comwestseafron Comdgen WDC and Comnor-westseafon.

29 0251 COMSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, Info CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC, etc.

Your 240221 concur necessity establishment subordinate command. Eventually propose Comfair each important base in Sopac area. At present WHITE POPPY only such activity in being. Until separate C.C. provided necessary Compatwing 1 continue functioning as Comfair WHITE POPPY. This by mailgram with copy of reference for all info adees.

Ref: Comairsopac 240221: The rapidly increasing importance and employment of Naval Aviation in the South Pacific Area makes it essential that a shore based aircraft subordinate command be established as soon as practicable. It would seem logical that this command be a part of Aircraft Pacific Fleet, that organization being the source of aircraft supply in this area. Para. The duties of Commander Aircraft South Pacific are such that it is impracticable for that officer to carry out properly the administrative functions of a subordinate command. Compatwing ONE for the present is functioning as such for patrol aircraft within the limitations of his organization which is in process of establishment.
Sopac operations. Search plane lat 13-15 South Long 162-45 East dropped 2 bombs on Jap sub submerged at 0735 L (-11) 29th. Large oil slick. Ground action at GUADALCANAL confined to small patrol contacts and mopping up vicinity our position. Patrols operating West MATANIKAU report several hundred Jap dead vicinity POINT CRUZ. 3 additional Jap tanks found destroyed. Hostile order of battle established as OKA Regiment 4th Infantry 29th Infantry 15th Heavy Artillery Regiments and additional units not yet identified. P-400's attacked Jap troops West MATANIKAU. 1730 L 28th 2 P-400's destroyed 2 float planes REKATA BAY. 2 Jap heavy bombers overhead at 0400 L 29th. Bombs fell in water. At 0030 L 30th PT boat reported torpedo hit on Jap DD between ESPERANCE and SAVO. Left dead in water. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

Task Force 65 (3 cruisers 10 destroyers 3 transports) will land 8th Marines reinforced at CACTUS on 3 November to re-inforce garrison. My 291007. Details in CTF 65 OpPlan C1 which Comairsopac and units of TF 65 have. In air mail to other addressees. CTF 63 provide all practicable support by air scouting and striking opposing enemy forces. Comgen CACTUS provide air coverage for TF during approach, retirement and while in CACTUS area. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Request Sowespac air support by continued strikes against enemy forces northwest SOLOMONS area. Priority of targets carriers, battleships, other combatant units. Action addees acknowledge.

PacFlt experience to date with defensive mining not repeat not conducive to extension such measures. Take every practicable step to insure that your defensive minefields are less dangerous to own ships than to enemy.
Searchplane reports. Sopac operations. Attack on Sub lat 13-10 south long 163-44 east. Results negative. On GUADALCANAAL 29th no important ground contacts. We continued mopping up operations. Small patrol captured and damaged 2 Jap 75 mm guns west MATANIKAU. Our planes continued attack missions on Jap positions. 2235 L (-11) 29th SBD on patrol sighted 2 Jap DDs vicinity TASSAFARONGA and dropped bombs. No damage but DDs proceeded toward RUSSELLS. 0015 L 30th 3 SBD's bombed DDs west RUSSELLS. No contact thereafter. 1 SBD missing. 0510 L 30th 7 Grummans attacked REKATA BAY. Destroyed 3 biplanes on water 3 zero float planes 2 biplanes in air. Set fire to and strafed main building and fuel dump. Strafed camp results unknown. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. 0030 to 0845 L 30th 1 cruiser and 4 DDs bombarded Jap positions GUADALCANAAL. Destroyed artillery boats buildings.

Your 281735 believe our situation different from enemys in that area os his operations against CACTUS is quite thoroughly scouted by our aircraft while he has difficulty in projecting aircraft to southward and southeastward of CACTUS. Aircraft are so much more efficient as scouts and submarine offensive role is so much the most effective employment that I consider it correct to keep the majority of submarines in focal areas and make information mission secondary to attack. However, due to repetitious enemy deployment during his advances I believe that employment suggested by Halsey's 300416 offers excellent possibilities.
Mission AOLA BAY occupation group is to construct fighter strip soon as possible to be followed by bomber strip and to deny AOLA BAY to enemy. CTF 62 sends for delivery to STURGIS and CARNEY. Command passes to Comgen CACTUS on completion of debarkation. Para. Plan to reinforce with following units: Afirm - Remainder ACORN ONE. Baker - One five five millimeter guns as soon as available. Cast - Additional infantry to bring total of one regiment less one battalion. Dog - One battalion field artillery.

 Recommend following reorganization Sopac Force. Afirm. Detach first Marine Corps from Amphibious Force. Baker. Establish Corps Commander on same echelon of command as Commander Amphibious Force. Cast. Joint planning between two commanders under control Comsopac. Dog. Comsopac assign units of First Corps to Amphibious Force as necessary for operations or training. On conclusion of training exercises such units revert to Corps. When deemed advisable after conclusion of landing phase of an operation a task organization for the shore phase of the operation will be established, or the Corps units will revert to the Corps, when and as directed by Comsopac.
November (GCT)

01 2359 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC etc.

Sopac operations. 0530 L (-11) 1st 7 Grummans at REKATA BAY destroyed all 5 Jap planes on beach. Many wrecked planes about. Straffed all buildings, started fire in cocoanut grove. AA very heavy and accurate. Our planes damaged but returned. 5th Marines crossed MATANIKAU at daybreak 1st. Attacked to west. Supported by B-17's. Continuous attacks by P-400's and SED's throughout day silenced Jap artillery. Enemy withdrawing slowly. We have advanced about 2 miles with relatively light casualties. Halsey sends Carpender pass to MacArthur.

01 0515 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC info CTF 62 etc.

5th Marines crossed MATANIKAU at daylight this morning and attacked to the west. Attack supported by B-17 bombardments. Constant attacks by P-400's and SED's throughout the day silenced Jap artillery. Enemy withdrawing slowly taking advantage of rough terrain to reduce effect of air and artillery attack. We have pushed forward approximately 2 miles with relatively light casualties. Attack followed up by large reserve force for use in event enemy make determined stand this side POHA river.

01 0501 COMMARDIV 1 to COMSOPAC info COMAIRSOPAC etc.

Bomber field graded 5400 feet. Take off end 1700 feet being crowned to receive mat. Mat laid last 3500 feet. Fighter field one rolled grass surface 4600 feet long completed. Fighter number 2 graded 3250 feet. Soil stabilization in progress prior to laying somerfield mesh.

01 2115 CINCPAC to COMINCH

Unless there is evidence not at hand here that the enemy actually saw the HORNET sink, I feel very strongly that yesterday's announcement was of considerable assistance to the enemy and correspondingly harmful to us in a very critical situation.
03 0130 COMSOPAC to CINC PAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPACFOR, etc.

Sopac operations. Patrol returning from AOLA on GUADALCANAL reported only contact with small groups Japs to eastward our position. No ground activity during night first-second. SBD's harassed Jap positions during night. Our destroyers assisted attack west MATANIKAU RIVER morning 2nd by bombardment. Later report of damage to Jap naval forces by TF 61 26th states: Add 4 1000-pounders on 2nd TONE Class CA. Change 1000 pounder on unidentified BB to 500 pounder on CL. Add 1 additional torpedo hit port side same NACHI Class CA. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

04 0146 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINC PAC, COMSOWESPACFOR, etc.

On GUADALCANAL. Sopac operations. Our attack continued with slow progress during second. One 75, 6 37 mm and many machine guns captured. All units advancing morning third. Two fighters lost due operational crashes but pilots safe. SBD's and P-39's completed numerous missions supporting ground troops. One enemy gun and three trucks destroyed by bombing. 3 SBD's off 1730 L (-11) second to attack hostile force 4 CL, 17 DD. None returned. 1 SBD reported enemy DD vicinity KOKUMBONA at 2130 L (-11) second. Plane failed return. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

04 0725 Retiring CACTUS transports for night to South INDISPENSABLE STRAIT to return tomorrow entering SEALARK CHANNEL at 0430 November 5th. Require 6 more hours. AOLA BAY group will continue unloading tonight estimate complete late tomorrow. 4 cruisers 6 destroyers remain south 09-12 in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT ready to strike favorable targets tonight. This from Callaghan.

04 0235 CTF 62 to CTG 65.5 Info CTF 65 63, COMSOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS.

Comsopac has directed Carlson and two companies second raiders remain AOLA BAY for present and be reinforced with two additional companies. Para. Direct McKEAN, MANLEY on completion debarkation raiders proceed at best speed to arrive BUTTON during daylight refuel embark two companies second raiders. Orders as to logistics and further movements will be issued later. Inform STURGIS and Carlson. Pass to McKEAN and MANLEY by hand. Comgen CACTUS informed in another system. CTF 62 originator.
03 0015 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

For Admiral King only. Believe Army should retain defense HOLLY and increase effectiveness thereof in accordance with recommendations being sent you separately. We need for amphibious purposes all the Marines that can be made available. I note from enclosure your ser 00935 of 7 September that Army troops are only used for amphibious work due to lack of Marines.

05 0524 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 42, 61, 62, 63.

Friendly SS reports. Sopac operations. 2 torpedo hits in NATORI Class cruiser INDESPENSABLE STRAIT 0415 love (-11) 3rd. On GUADALCANAL our attack west MATANIKAU continued successfully. 350 Japs killed one position west POINT CHUZ. 3 field pieces twelve 37 mm, 30 machine guns captured. Jap positions KOKUMBONA shelled by our naval forces. Night third - fourth Japs landed force 7000 yards east KOLI POINT. Attacked at dawn by battalion 7th Marines. Attack driven back by superior forces with artillery. Our ground troops concentrating afternoon fourth to destroy this hostile force. Beginning 1630 love 4th three planes bombed strafed area east KOLI POINT. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.
On GUADALCANAL Sopac operations. Marines holding captured positions west MATANIKAU. Enemy made strong counterattack this area night 4th-5th. Repulsed with heavy Jap losses. On east sector Marines holding vicinity KOLI POINT while 2 battalions Army move to envelop enemy left flank from south. Fighting this sector during 4th limited to patrol actions. Our air maintained continuous patrols over enemy positions. Strafed known hostile positions including mobile gun with ammunition trailer on road east KOKUMBONA. Halsey sends, Carpender pass to MacArthur. 8th Marines landed reinforced GUADALCANAL position 4th-5th. AOLA BAY detachment now ashore. ComGenMarAmph Corps and ComGenSoPac have.

During October, Sopac operations. Sopac airforces destroyed 369 hostile aircraft. No probables or damaged included. At 0400 love (-11) third MCCALLA sighted periscope close aboard submerging 1st. 10-50 south long 161-20 east. Attacked with depth charges. Loud underwater explosions after depth charges exploded. Sub possibly sunk. On GUADALCANAL morning 6th, 164th Infantry had completed passage MALIMBII river and advancing to north to envelop hostile south flank. No large contacts this area. On west our position second marines repulsed light attacks west of POINT CRUZ during night 5th - 6th. TULAGI marines completed successful operation against Jap outpost CAPE ASTROLABE. 19 enemy killed, one captured. All radio equipment documents arms and ammunition captured intact. Only two unarmed Japs escaded to bush. No marine casualties. 1130 love 5th 27 bombers and zeros over GUADALCANAL positions. Our fighters made no contact due cloud conditions. Bombs dropped near defense lines killing one, wounding five. Our air continuously over Jap positions. Five attacks by P-400's, one by SB's on enemy positions. Halsey sends, Carpender pass to MacArthur.

Following planned (A) Sail MOUNT VERNON for WHITE POPPY from SAN PEDRO about 24 November with personnel for voyage repair facilities equivalent 1 AD, 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, Seebees, Mobile Hospital 7 and casualties plus baggage, tentage and galleys for all embarked personnel. Sail JUPITER from HUENEME about 19 November with essential Seebee material and medical supplies and equipment followed by another ship with remainder Seebee cargo and equivalent ad cargo. Ship Mobile Hospital Number 7 cargo later when will not interfere with vital military supplies.
and equipment. Eta MOUNT VERNON 6 December. JUPITER 5 December. (B) Sail coalmine as scheduled (C) Sail ACORNS 3 and 4 when construction equipment diverted to AD's is replaced requiring 30 days, and transports are available estimated middle December. Do you approve? Request immediate reply in order start loading. NDL pass to Mobile Hospital 7 for info.

07 2358 COMAMPHORSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, etc.

Documents captured CACTUS indicate presence our naval forces has prevented landing that part 38th Div. embarked on transports and general attack planned for Nov. 3rd therefore not possible. Sickness and shortage of food and ammunition in enemy forces noted in diaries. Our naval gun fire and air attacks appear very effective and decline in morale noted. Indications continue of presence 17th Army Headquarters on CACTUS. Enemy tank unit identified as 1st Independent Tank Company.

08 0101 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 16,42,62,63,64,65.

No activity, Sopac operations, on west flank GUADALCANAL 6th. On east flank we advanced to METAPONA RIVER, 4 miles east KOLI POINT. No contact enemy forces. Advance to east continuing morning 7th. P-400's made 7 attacks on Jap positions. Destroyed large ammunition dump and boat with gas drums. Continuous SBD patrol over Jap positions. PT boats reported 2 Jap DD off LUNGI POINT 0200 L(-11) 7th. Claim 1 DD sunk. Our air reported later large oil slick boxes liferafts and debris vicinity NUGU ISLAND SKYLARK CHANNEL. MAJABA while unloading supplies to GUADALCANAL struck amidships by one torpedo 2 miles east LUNGA 0930 L 7th. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. At 1730 L 7th air strike consisting 7 SBD 3 TBF 8 P-39 22 F4 attacked 1 CL 10 DD at Lat. 07-103 Long. 159-40East. 2 torpedo hits 1 1000 pound bomb hit 1 near miss on CL. 1 torpedo hit on DD. P-39's shot down 5 float biplanes. F4's shot down 5 float Zeros 2 float biplanes. 4 F4's failed return. One pilot rescued. Enemy headed east 1800. Planes saw explosion after ships no longer visible.
GUADACANAL morning search strafed bombed 3 beached float biplanes REKATA BAY. Destroyed 3 landing boats south CAPE ESPERANCE. Destroyed 3 landing boats west TASSAFARONGA. Evening 8th. Sopac operations. Sighted bombed strafed destroyed a 2 man Jap SS CAPE ESPERANCE. GRAYLING reports 2 torpedo hits in CHIYODA type aircraft tender. 1500 L (-11) 7th LANGDOWNE bombarded suspected Jap positions east KOLI POINT. On GUADALCANAL 7th no activity in west. Our forces moving east from Metapona River but no contact. In attack on CL and 10 DD reported yesterday GRUMMANS scored additional 2 hits 2 near misses with 100 pound bombs on Jap DD. P-400's executed 5 attacks missions Jap ground installations. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comsopac and Comsopac have by hand.

For operations against Jap light forces submit necessity for guns larger than 5 inch. Jap strength in torpedoes necessitates early effective hits which can only be made by larger guns. Effectiveness of 5 inch AA for sinking DD is doubtful. ATLANTA carries only about 10 percent common mark 32. In order make best use of our doubtful torpedoes DD's with 2 or more mounts should be assigned striking groups. Para. For night November 2nd I would necessarily have called off my operation due PT boats western end SEALEK and at KOLI POINT. Was ready to enter SEALEK and proceed vicinity KOLI POINT when info received that PT boats were stationed at both positions. Originator Scott in ATLANTA

Comsopac answers your Cominch 081500. Can now make full power operate 30 fighters 27 SBD's, 9 VTs on 24 hours notice. Expect complete number 1 elevator and hanger deck November 21st. Thereafter vessel capable operate full power complete air group operations indefinitely. Cognizance should be taken longitudinal slit starboard shell below side armor frames 123 aft to 134. 3 fuel ballast tanks open to sea. After pedestal number 2 hypo prep turbine stronger than before break. Similar strengthening being done all other pedestals. Info Cinopac.
OElGEOLf

November (GCT)

10 0316 COMSOPAC to COMSOWESTPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH, CTF 42, 61, 62, etc.

At 2150 L(-11) 8th PT's got hit on 1 of 2 Jap DDs off ESPERANCE. Sopac operations. 1 PT slightly damaged by gunfire. On GUADALCANAL no activity in west. On eastern flank contact with enemy 3000 yards east METAPONA RIVER. Action continuing. Morning search bombed straffed REKATA BAY. Results unknown. 1 plane failed to return. Additional Jap landing boats filled with supplies sunk vicinity ESPERANCE. Evening search 8th sighted bombed straffed 2 man SS beached at ESPERANCE. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Additional enemy air losses 7th not previously included Sopac summary 3 zero float planes, 1 float biplane.

09 2359 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC, Info CTF 62, COMAIRSOPAC, CG SOPAC

On east flank a Jap force of undetermined size has been surrounded near TETERE. On west flank advance toward KOKUMBONA resumed at daylight this morning with 2 regiments attacking in column. Morning search yesterday found 2 CL and 3 DD bearing 300 distance 180 course 300 speed 20. SANTA ISABEL search located 2 masted schooner radio equipped and camouflaged. 4 attack missions by P-39s in support of ground troops. Evening searches negative. Planes available F4F4 34, SM3 20, P-400 2, TBF 13, F4F7 1, P-39 13. Reencipher my 092248.

09 2045 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, Info COMSERFORSUBCOM, COMSERFORPAC, etc.

CTF 8 sends. Mining project LONGVIEW completed. My 110437 Sept. Except magnetic mines in KAGALASKA STRAIT and UMAK PASS in which fields mines exploded prematurely. Do not propose to remine these fields at this time. NPM pass to Cincpac for action and Comserfor for info. NPG pass to Comserfor Subcom for info, NSS pass to Vice Opnav and Cominach for info.

11 0251 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 42 63 67, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPAC, etc

On GUADALCANAL. Sopac operations. East flank a Jap force of undetermined size has been surrounded near TETERE. On west flank resumed advance toward KOKUMBONA at daylight 10th. 4 attack missions during 9th by P39's. SOUTHARD reports sighted attacked enemy SS lat 10-13 south, long 161-09 at 0230 love (-11) 10th. At 1110 love 10th 2 Grummans dived through formation of 15 zeros at 27,000 feet. Shot down one. Halsey sends. Carpenter pass to MacArthur. Comgensopac has.
10 2102 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 63, 67.

Task Force 16 sortie with all units present when ready about 23 hours zed 10 November. Order of sortie and zero hour as directed by Task Force Commander. Local minesweepers will sweep channel to one hundred fathom curve prior sortie. Task force provide own air coverage and surface antisubmarine protection. After sortie fly on air group. Proceed via route to west of POPPY toward CACTUS arriving vicinity Cinpac grid posit G4694 (Lat. 14-00 S, Long. 161-30 E) about 21 hours zed 12 November. Be prepared strike enemy targets CACTUS Area.

10 2156 CG FIRST MARDIV to COMSOPAC info CTF 62, COMAIRSOPAC, NOUMEA.

On West flank advance continued slowly in fact of increasing enemy resistance. On East flank our troops engaged in mopping up Jap position near TETERE. Raider battalion has reached BINIU and is patrolling between BALESUNA and METAPONA rivers. Morning search negative. Enemy planes approached at 1015. Fighters intercepted. One zero hot down. Evening search sighted five DD's 210 miles CACTUS. Striking force of 17 fighters and 8 SBD's got three near misses on each of two destroyers at 1815. One plane lost after takeoff. Pilot and gunner rescued. One pilot lost last week also recovered.

11 0954 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

Consider situation here such that reinforcements required earliest possible time. Highly desirable use own aircraft, bombs, torpedoes, and ammunition along with our landing signal officers, key deck personnel, maintenance crews and torpedomen. If above is done believe 2 weeks training will suffice. Augmentation by Sopac Squadron will be dependent upon timely arrival of additional such this area.

10 2030 CTF 8 to TF 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CGWDC, etc.

Four P-38's escorted by B-17 strafed and destroyed 7 float zeros in HOLTZ BAY ATTU 9 November. Two exploded all burning. Ten or 12 men observed on beach. No opposition no damage to own planes. Two B-26's made low level attack on AK in GERTRUDE COVE resulting in near misses. Two P-38's strafed cargo ship in KISKA harbor and beach area. Heavy AA fire from cargo ship shooting out one engine in P-38. All planes returned. No changes in enemy shipping at KISKA. CTF 8 sends. Info stations pass to following local addes Cominch Cinpac Comwesseafron CGWDC and ComNWSeaFron.
09 0334 FANTAN to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Field report on NANDI NAREWA field follows. No runway construction in progress. New dispersal area is 70% completed. Five heavy bomber hardstandings and three dispersal roads totaling 4000 feet have been completed. Three roads totaling 3000 feet are being stabilized. The last 2000 feet of road is being cleared. Report on DRASA follows. The number two runway is 50% completed. Allow seven weeks to complete. Cat and fill work is being done on the last 2000 feet. Gravel is being placed on the first 2000 feet. Gravel stabilization is 15% completed. Report on NAUSORI aerodrome follows. The one four runway is completed to 5000 feet. The tile drain is 47% completed. The open drains are 90% completed. The 48 inch culvert has been completed. Stabilization is 17% completed.

12 0635 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC, etc.

Amphibforpac at SAN DIEGO faced with necessity of rapidly training for amphibious warfare third Marine division and possibly one Army division. Only combat loaders now available to Amphibforpac are two transports one freighter. Training cannot be carried forward at reasonable rate nor progress beyond elementary stage without sufficient combat loaders for at least a reinforced regiment preferably for a division. Spearhead for next Sopac advance cannot be sharpened without this training. Believe completion troop movements now in hand in your area and delivery of ten liberty class freighters to you of which first is now enroute will materially ease your shipping situation. Therefore I desire that the combat loading transports and freighters which are permanently assigned Amphibforpac but doing temporary duty at present in Amphibforsopac be returned to SAN DIEGO as soon as this can be done without serious prejudice to your current operations. First two transports and first freighter should arrive SAN DIEGO by 20 December if practicable. It will be satisfactory for ships returning to leave in Amphibforsopac all serviceable landing craft and boat crews for them these shortages to be made good after arrival in SAN DIEGO. Advise.

12 0059 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWESPAC, CTF 42 16 17 63.

Referring SOUTHARD attack on Jap SS. Sopac operations. Later reports states attack blew sub stern out of water. Sub surfaced 1 minute later then slid under stern 1st after 1 4" hit in about control room. Search made afterward by HOVEY and PBY. Result negative. Halsey sends.
November (GCT)

12 0059 COMSOPAC (Continued)

Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comgensopac and ComgenSUMAC have. On GUADALCANAL 10th our advance continued on west flank. Enemy resistance there increasing. On east flank our troops engaged in mopping up Jap positions near TETERE. Evening search 10th sighted 5 DDs 210 miles from GUADALCANAL. Striking force of 17 fighters 8 SBD's got 3 near misses on each of 2 DDs. 1 plane lost after take-off. Pilot and gunner rescued. At 0930 L (-11) 10 Aichi Type 97 dive bombers and 12 zeros attacked ships GUADALCANAL. ZEILIN damaged by 3 near misses. No other damage. Our planes shot down 5 zeros 1 dive bomber. 2 zeros 1 dive bomber additional probables. At 1135 L (-11) 11th 5 zeros and 25 twin engine bombers attacked GUADALCANAL. Our planes shot down 6 bombers. AA downed 1 bomber. Our losses 7 Grummans. 2 pilots saved. Also 5 Grummans damaged. No other damage.

12 2322 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CTF 67, 67.4, CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Damage night action 12-13 November off GUADALCANAL. PORTLAND. Torpedo hit aft frame 137 starboard blew large hole in side destroying stern. No means of steering. Minor damage caused by 5-inch shell hit starboard hangar no fire. Can use 2 outboard engines. Rudder appears jammed hard right. Following garbled account from ATLANTA damage as result of night action. 6 turrets out of commission. Both fire rooms and forward engine rooms flooded. After engine room gradually flooding. Have only diesel auxiliary power. Steering gear operating. Foremast gone. Ship received many 8-inch hits and 1 torpedo hit. Latter in number 1 engine room port. Bridge struck. Have requested assistance from CACTUS. Intend to send WORDEN and others NECUJRS to garble garble in case available for garble garble. If not available conditions of ship warrants sinking. Request instructions regarding. Following observed. CUSHING large fire visible under formast from waterline. 2 other friendly destroyers near TULAGI damage unknown.

13 0115 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, ALL TF COMDRS PACIFIC, etc.

Following essential for your information includes originator CTF 67 120522 refused 10 times by circuit Monitor. Para. Task Force 67 on arrival KUKUM 12th received fire from enemy shore battery. This is part one of CTF 67 130200. Our cruisers and destroyers heavily shelled enemy positions silencing battery causing many large fires and explosions. At TASSFARONGA found 75 landing boats some previously damaged. Our ships gunfire destroyed 30 large damaged others. Fire stopped due to enemy air attacks.
13 0140 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, All TF COMS PAC, COMINCH, etc.

This is part 2 of CTF 67 130200. At 1414 12th ships this force plus BETELGEUSE LIBRA SOUTHARD HOVEY while underway in close disposition were attacked by about 21 Mitsubishi 97 torpedo bombers which approached low over FLORIDA during high and dive bombing attack on CACTUS. 9 enemy planes seen shot down by ships and boat gunfire others by fighters only 1 enemy plane seen to escape. SAN FRANCISCO was side swiped stern to bow by heavily burning plane battle 2 after control and radar destroyed causing 30 casualties. BUCHANAN struck by one 5-inch shell some material damage 6 casualties. A few casualties other ships from own fire. No other damage to our ships. Para. All troops debarked from convoy MccAWLEY JACKSON completely unloaded, ADAMS 80%, CRESCENT CITY 50%, BETELGEUSE 40%, LIBRA 20%.

13 0200 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC, etc.

This is part 3 master reference 130200. At 1830 force withdrew to east, Turner with transports and AK's SHAW, McCALLA, BUCHANAN, SOUTHARD, HOVEY for BUTTON, Callaghan with Task Group 67.4 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, intending strike force reported in CTF 63 120030. If enemy was found in Straits Callaghan expected reenter SAVO SOUND through SEALARK between 2300 and 0100. We were aware of enemy forces reported NPM 200 and CACTUS 120625. Para. After arrival BUTTON SHAW MccALLA, BUCHANAN available to you after fueling latter requires some repairs. Comsopac pass to Comgensopac.

13 0428 CACTUS to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, CTF 67, NOUMEA, etc.

First intelligible picture this cockpit. At 1200 love (-11) KONGO Class BB with 7 torpedo hits and 1-1000 pound bomb after part of ship burning fiercely 10 miles north SAVO ISLAND. 5 enemy DD's attempting assist her. 1 ship believed hostile DD beached and smoking north coast OLEVUGA ISLAND. 2 vessels possibly DD's steaming circles trailing oil just east NUGU ISLAND identity unknown. Large vessel INDISPENSABLE STRAIT type and identity unknown. CUSHING burning 5 miles southeast SAVO ISLAND. MONSSEN dead in water near CUSHING both abandoned. ATLANTA and PORTLAND badly damaged 10 miles southeast SAVO ISLAND proceeding slowly eastward. ATLANTA in tow by 30BOLINK. LAFFEY was sunk. 700 survivors picked up 25 percent of which wounded. Much oil and debris and some survivors in water south of SAVO ISLAND. Some enemy survivors taken being questioned to determine name of vessel.
13 1730 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info ALL TF COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMSWPac.

Proceed northwesterly remaining about 100 miles from SOLOMON ISLAND chain. Your objective transports expected moving from FAISI area toward CACTUS. See NPM Fox Number 349 TOR 130110. Intention send Lee similar objective parallel to you near Island chain. Supplement BUTTON and CACTUS searches by your own as necessary to locate and destroy AP's. CACTUS has essentials. CARPENTER pass.

14 1020 COMSOPAC to GUADALCANAL Info CINCPAC.

Task for 16 VF shot down 4 engine seaplane at 1030. Scouts reported 10 enemy planes approaching us but no attack developed. Sent attack group hit enemy near NEW GEORGIA to land CACTUS. Retiring south to fuel DDs tomorrow. If there is an air group available CACTUS can return to pick it up but not advisable. No information regarding number that arrived from Kinkaid. Number 1 elevator out of commission. Has trouble with number 3. MUSTIN separated due change orders proceeding nearest port for fuel. 16 VF remaining on board. No (last three groups garbled). This is Comtaskfor 16 140122 passed to you in another system by Comsopac.

14 0716 COM NAV UNIT CACTUS to RDO TULAGI, Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.

My 140122 air strike from CACTUS have seriously damaged many transports but force may proceed in reduced numbers. Task Force 64 may be in area this evening. Info PT's.

14 1058 SAN FRANCISCO to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, CTF 17, Info COMAIRSOPAC, HELENA.


(Continued on next page)
November (GCT)

14 1058 SAN FRANCISCO to CINCPAC. (Continued)

got 18 main battery hits on KONGO Class battleship at 2000 yards. 5 inch battery sank a DD. SAN FRANCISCO parent night boat to TULAGI originates. Comairsopac and HELENA have.

14 1115 SAN FRANCISCO to COMSOPAC, CTF 17, CINCPAC, Info COMAIRSOPAC.

Originated by SAN FRANCISCO. During air attack afternoon Nov 12 following casualties. Dead 1 officer 10 enlisted. Wounded 5 officers 22 enlisted. Missing 5 enlisted of whom 1 picked up by LAFFEY and on her during subsequent night action. All wounded transferred to transports except Comdr Grouter who later died of additional wounds received in night action. Torpedo plane flew into control aft putting that station after FC Radar and after machine gun platform out of action and damaging battle 2. CO HELENA and Comairsopac have this.

14 1406 HELENA to COMSOPAC, Info CINCPAC, CTF 67, COMAIRSOPAC.

Your 140925. JUNEAU torpedoed and sunk by submarine at 1109 love (-11) 14th posit 10-32 south 161-02 east. HELENA originating this. This information transmitted visually to B-17 patrol plane with instructions to forward to Comsopac at 1121 love. Buchanan joined this group from Turners force at 1215 love.

13 2233 CG 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC, Info CTF 62, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.

Ground action confined to east flank where raiders continued to attack Jap groups southwest of TETERE. At least eighty Japs killed in three contacts. 0730 fighters shot down eight of group 10 zeros near SAVO with loss one fighter. KONGO Class BB attacked 7 times by TBF's and 5 times by SBD's. Seven torpedo hits and two 1,000 pound bomb hits. At 1850 BB still afloat although burning and smoking very little way with five DD escorting. Fighters straffed DD at zero nine thirty and twelve thirty. 2 reconnaissance flights for reported enemy CV's negative. 1745 near miss by SBD on probable Cast Love circling damaged BB. Other SBD's failed make contact due zero weather 2 SBD's lost 1900 Dog Cast 3 crashed off KUKUM. Crew lost zero one thirty dash zero two forty enemy surface craft bombarded airfield. Two hits on fighter strip. One SBD two F4F destroyed. 17 F4F damaged but majority repairable today. Personnel casualties light. Pass to Comgen First MarAmphCorp for Info.
November (GCT)

15 0355 CTF 64 to COMSOPAC, Info CINCPAC, COMAIRSOPAC.

Enemy damage considerable but data incomplete. WALKE, PRESTON lost south SAVO, BENHAM, GWIN seriously damaged proceeding slow speed west and south GUADALCANAL toward BUTTON at 0245 (-11) 15th. Present status not known. SOUTH DAKOTA by gunfire hits 30 dead 60 wounded. Serious damage battery. Fire Control. Radar. Catapult and planes. 5 tanks ruptured but is capable 27 knots. Navy yard repairs required to make effective. WASHINGTON undamaged except washed out kingfishers by own gun blast. Now in company SOUTH DAKOTA proceeding to meet DD's your 142358. Unless otherwise directed will send SOUTH DAKOTA to WHITE POPPY escorted by 2 DD's. Request air coverage BENHAM and GWIN and search for survivors south and west of SAVO. Air attack reported my 142344 planes withdrew before attack developed.

15 0355 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOWESOPAC.

At 1030 L 14th a convoy of 25 ships comprising 12 AP, and the rest escort 115 miles northwest CACTUS course southeast. At 1600 L (-11) 14th CACTUS reported 6 AP seriously damaged several DD milling around 60 miles northwest of SAVO ISLAND. At 600 L 15th, 3 AP are reported burning and abandoned in position of first contact. The same hour 4 AP unloading at TASSAFARONGA and CAPE ESPERANCE. At 1600 L 14th a large enemy force of cruisers and DD's reported at 6-52 south 160 east course 165 speed 17 verified by submarine. At 200 L 15th this force identified as 1 CL 4 CA 10 DD. At 800 L 15th 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD 150 miles north course Ø speed 12. 3 CA and 8 DD missing at 1030 L 15th. Task 64 in 11-00 south 160-45 east. My 122314 ATLANTA MONSSEN and LAFFEY sunk CUSHING and BARTON missing. 1400 survivors at CACTUS. Aircraft losses 1 fighter 2 F4F 3 SBD 1 D-3. Enemy lost 8 of 10 zeros. JUNEAU torpedoed and sunk by SS 1109 L 14th at 10-32 south 161-02 east. Enemy appears to have suffered the following damage 1 DD sunk 1 cruiser blew up 1 BB KONGO or FUSO Class heavily damaged and unreported since afternoon 13th. Another BB damaged. 3 cruisers heavily damaged possibly sunk. 3 DD damaged 1 unaccounted for. This does not include damage to convoy and its escort nor large force cruisers and DD's. Reported at 1600 L 14th in 06-52 south 160-00 east. Comsopac originator. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comsopac Comsenamphib-corsopac info by hand.
In addition to my 150335 regarding 12 AP. Five sunk three burning dead in water northwest of SAVO. Four reported unloading at GUADALCANAL are beached and burning there. Comsopac sends. Lee reports much damage to enemy but no specific information. Carpenper pass to MacArthur. SOUTH DAKOTA requires Navy Yard repairs but still capable of 27 knots. Comgensopac has by hand for info. WASHINGTON unharmed. WAIKE and PRESTON sunk. BENHAM and GWIN seriously damaged. PORTLAND sank 1 SHIGURI type DD night action early morning 13th.

Delivery of aircraft and aviation material to NEW ZEALAND air force has been limited by combined agreements to 10 combat squadrons for period ending April 1943. Now under consideration is question of allocation of aircraft production to various united nations for period ending April 1943. NEW ZEALAND considers herself capable of training air and ground personnel up to 30 squadrons for service in SoPac and would prefer to employ them in that area rather than continue to send them overseas to EUROPEAN and AFRICAN theaters. Present outlook indicates feasibility of increasing all allocations above present levels. NEW ZEALAND's share of increase would be on the order of 50 percent which would give a grand total of 15 squadrons by April 1943. Any disproportionate increase in allocation of material to NEW ZEALAND must be set by corresponding decrease of allocations to other services now in South Pacific. Your views on this matter are desired at an early date in view of studies now being made. In particular desire your estimate of attrition based on the 15 squadrons strength having in mind your plans for their employment. NEW ZEALAND air force is being queried on the subject by their representatives in Washington.

Preliminary report by HELENA of night action 13th by Task Group 67.4 now in airmail. From CTF 62. As result conference today with commanding officers ships of this group present BUTTON. My preliminary evaluation enemy strength and losses and certain other details follows. A enemy in 3 groups totalling 2 KONGO battleships, 2 CA, 4 CL, about 10 destroyers. Our force passed between right and center groups. Most of the firing was at ranges of 1500 to 4000 yards. B 1 battleship was struck with 2 torpedoes seen to detonate also heavily hit set afire by 8 inch. This probably ship found and attacked near SAVO during next day. Am (not clear what finally became of this vessel.
SECRET

November (GCT)

15 1012 CTF 62 to COMSOPAC (continued)

5 destroyers seen about noon assisting believed not to have been in this action. Other battleship hit with 2 torpedoes and gun fire. This probably ship seen at dawn with 3 destroyers 40 miles distant.

15 1015 Part two of master reference 151012 from CTF 62.

C 2 CA seen to blow up and sink from torpedoes and gunfire. D 1 NATORI seen to sink, 2 additional TENRU or NATORI heavily hit and aflame; possibly these were the vessels seen later near NUGU ISLAND. E 1 EUBUKI, 2 or 3 other destroyers blew up, several set on fire, probably one of these later seen beached on CLEVUGA ISLAND. F Center and left enemy groups apparently engaged each other, then all remaining ceased fire and withdrew. G Believe all enemy vessels that escaped were hit. H. Action started at 0148 LAFayette seen to sink from gunfire at 0153. BARTON seen to blow up from gunfire and torpedo hit. At 0156 T Callaghan and most of staff killed within 10 minutes of start of action. This fact not known to other ships until action was over.

Neither Fletcher nor Obannon were hit but latter damaged by underwater explosion possibly depth charge from LAFayette.

16 1124 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC,

Summary of enemy damage. Evaluated by Comsonac. From November 8th to 16th inclusive. Carpenter hand to McArthur. Sunk or destroyed 1 BB, 3 CA, 2 CL, 5 DD, 10 AP, 3 AK, 2 SS. Damaged 1 BB, 6 DD. Comgensopac and Comgenamphibsonac have for info by hand. Comsonac sends. SOLOMON, NEW BRITAIN area from all sources so far reported. Neither less score nor possible bag by our subs included. CACTUS reports raider patrol captured large quantity ammunition and supplies including personal effects Major General Kawacuchi. 15th November bombers with 8 zeros; over 6 zeros shot down, 2 others probable bombers turned back. Our air losses nil. Heavy losses of enemy personnel suffered from beached transports. Their operations unsuccessful. Our continuous bombings started series of fires still burning at dawn November 16th.

15 2246 COMDGEN 1ST MARDIV to COMSOPAC, Info CTF 62 etc.

Daily dope part one. Raider patrol destroyed nip NARAUDER BASE VOUTEA 5 miles southwest of BINIU killing five and capturing large quantities of ammunition supplies and documents. Material recently captured near TETERE included personal effects Major General Kawaguchi. Morning
15 2246 COMDGEN1ST MARDIV to COMSOPAC (continued)

Search reported enemy force 4 CL and DDs bearing 350, course 330, distance 80. 0630 3 enemy AK and 1 AP between POHA RIVER and CAPE ESPERANCE. All destroyed by noon, 1 sunk, 3 completely ablaze. 1530 8 zeros and 10-12 dive bombers intercepted by fighters. 6 zeros certain and 2 probables shot down. Bombers turned back. No fighters lost.

14 1921 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC

From COFS Army and Cominich. Addressees will deliver this despatch to army and navy commanders as necessary.

Army and navy air organizations assigned to the Central and South Pacific areas and navy air organizations assigned North Pacific are subject to deployment and redistribution by Cincpac at his discretion. Jig, cast, sail confidential despatch 041819 of May is modified accordingly.

The purpose of authorizing Cincpac to dispose all navy and army air organizations in the Central and South Pacific areas at his discretion is to allow the commander on the spot entire freedom in the disposition of available forces for the defense of positions for which he is responsible. Redistributions under this authority are limited to the forces allotted by the war and Navy Departments and therefore will not be ordered on the basis of creating requirements for additional units.

14 1928 Part two of 141928.

Necessary delegation to Comsopac of your mentioned authority is authorized.

Any redistribution of air organizations made or planned should be reported to the War or Navy Department as appropriate for information and logistic purposes.

War and Navy Departments will keep Cincpac informed of planned replacements and allocations of aircraft and personnel when in all respects ready for delivery can be loaded or flown to destination desired by Cincpac. A similar procedure will be followed in regard to air organizations made available by War or Navy Department.
open fire. Rolled over and sank in 30 seconds. WALKE hit by heavy calibre shells forward and in waist and possible torpedo, sank in about 5 minutes. MEADE, BOBO-LINK and TP recovered about 24 officers and about 220 men. By hand to Comnavact SOLOMON ISLANDS.

Bombed 3 enemy transports beached on GUADALCANAL morning of 15th (MEADE SENDS). 600 rounds expended no opposition believed personnel landed prior to bombardment. Left transports burning fiercely. Recovered following survivors from waters off SAVO ISLAND from WALKE Executive and 5 officers 129 men, from PRESTON 10 officers 121 men, from BENHAM one man, landed all at RINGBOLT. Straffed by zero 3 my crew minor wounds. Senior naval officer GUADALCANAL has in another system.

Following effective this date. Afirm. Marine units detached from Amphibious Force. Baker. For coordination of operations joint planning will be conducted by Comgen First Marine Amphibious Corps and Comamphibfor Sopac under control Comsopac. Cast. All Marine Corps organizations Sopac Area except Marine aviation regular ships detachments and units in STRAW area and FETLOCK assigned First Marine Amphibious Corps. Dog. Transportation of reinforcements relief units and supplies and equipment to CACTUS RINGBOLT remains responsibility Comamphibforsopac.

Captain Jenkins senior survivor CACTUS sends. Results action TF 67.4 off SAVO 0200 13th. Believe BARTON and LAFFEY sank early in action ATLANTA sank 2015 love (-11) fair search 14th failed to locate MONSSEN and CUSHING latter seen fast burning southeast of SAVO dark 13th. Rear Admiral Scott and entire staff killed in action except Lt. Murdock badly wounded. Lt. Thomas Ranr also killed. Commanding officers ATLANTA, CUSHING, MONSSEN and Comdesdiv 10 among survivors here. Approximate percentage survivors officers and crews above vessels ATLANTA 60, CUSHING 70, LAFFEY MONSSEN 30, BARTON 10. About 25 percent survivors wounded many seriously. Known Jap losses two destroyers sunk, one badly damaged and beached. One BB badly damaged and later information indicates sunk by aircraft.
November (GCT) 16 1133
CTF 62 to COMSOPAC, Info ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Whatever the enemy plans with regard to major offensive measures it is clear that he now will do what he has heretofore neglected to do: Concentrate on damage to our supply lines to CACTUS by the use of submarines, minor surface vessels and aircraft. Para. As the maintenance and building up of our CACTUS position is the cardinal feature of the Sopac campaign, it is recommended that every effort be exerted to obtain protection of our communications in the features and forces which we now lack. These are: About 20 subchasers based in RINGBOLT for direct protection and to operate as hunting groups in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT, 12 VOS seaplanes in RINGBOLT and 12 in MARMASIKE STRAIT for the same purpose, minefields off RINGBOLT and in LENGO CHANNEL, 1 alternate carrier air group at AOLA BAY as soon as the field is ready, and reinforcements of destroyers withdrawn from regions of less imminent importance. Para. It is unnecessary to mention to you the requirement of carriers long range aircraft cruisers battleships and troops and their transport which Cincpac has recommended for offensive employment and for broadening our base of operations. Such forces have been indicated as available but so far have not been sent. Para. It is my belief that the Navy has now the forces which we require for our job, and I hope that the Navy will be able to send us these forces, here when they are needed in the South Pacific, to forward our final victory.

17 0400
PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Part two. Action and info same except Buord not info this part. Still from PORTLAND. After action positively identified one NACHI Class burning until gutted and sank about 0330 L (-11) 13th. Tentative identification one TENRYU Class did same. After action there were nine burning ships lying to of which only three could have been friendly. At daylight saw one Jap DD off SAVO previously reported sunk my 142100 and one HARUNA and unidentified Jap cruiser on horizon. During action in addition to sinking one HIRIKI Class DD PORTLAND hit BB many times with 4 salvos about 4000 yards and several hits 2 salvos one unidentified cruiser. Action report follows air mail. (Note: Part 2 received 1st, part 1 not yet received).

16 0830
PORTLAND to CTF 64, Info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMNAVACT SOLOMONS.

Action Comtaskfor 64 info Comsopac and Cincpac from the PORTLAND. Senior uninjured survivor PRESTON Lt. (jg) Gibson states most of action night 14 - 15th neither PRESTON nor WALKE saw target when BBs opened. Both opened fire on believed cruiser targets about 3 minutes after BBs PRESTON hit by 8 inch salvo plus possible torpedo 3 minutes after

(Continued on next page)
SECRET
November (GCT)

17 0804 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC BUORD.

Here comes part one of two parts. Action Comsopac info Cincpac with Buord info first part only. PORTLAND sends. Examination two fourteen inch hits PORTLAND ANNEFJD AARON WARD clearly indicates Japanese battleships were loaded with bombardment shells instantaneous fused. Practically no penetration and little damage. Half of one fourteen inch projectile base ring recovered stamped 3687520 with 22 under last two digits. Also 142 with inverted 4 over center digit QQ thats all part one,

18 0655 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMGENSOPAC, etc

Action Cincpac info Cominch and Comsowespac from Comsopac. From incomplete reports ENTERPRISE planes made repeated attacks on enemy ships between November 13 and 15 inclusive inflicting following damage. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 8 torpedo hits on BB. 3 torpedo hits on a CL. 4 torpedo hits 3 bomb hits 2 near misses on transports. Comsopac forwards. On troops and equipment 2 500 pound bombs and 25 incendiary bombs. By hand to Comgensopac and First Maramphcorps for info.

17 2205 COMDGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62 RADIO NOUMEA, etc.

No important ground activity with ref enemy landing near TETERE two November now estimated fifteen hundred troops landed. Eight hundred have been killed. Remainder dispersed into groups working back into jungle. Force no longer considered to be effective due disorganization pursuant to loss of supplies and repeated attacks air and ground. Morning searches negative except large fires northern tip of NEW GEORGIA. P-38's and SBD's attacked mission station northern NEW GEORGIA near ROVIANA ISLE reported occupied by Japs. Bombs dropped but no activity noted. Evening searches negative. RDO WHITE POPPY pass to Comgen First Marphcorp.
November (GCT)

18 2131 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMSUBPAC.

In view: A. Effectiveness of past patrols in Empire waters. B. Very low present strength these patrols. C. Lull in enemy activity and improved situation CACTUS area. Propose return to Empire patrol Subron 10 subs now based PEARL and withdraw SILVERSIDES, FLYING FISH, WAHOO from Sopac for far western patrol on completion present patrols and refit by SPERRY at ERISBANE. Would then return SPERRY to PEARL. On assumption twelve Sowespac submarines continue base northeast AUSTRALIA you will have available that number for patrols SOLOMONS SEA. Comsowespacfor to retain a number of submarines from Squadron 2 to keep at 20 the total based AUSTRALIA pending arrival remainder Subrons 6 and 8. I also plan send you ARGONAUT on 23rd. English will send you her new characteristics as APS. Comment.

19 0659 CTF 64 to COMSOPAC Info ALL TF COMDR SOPAC AREA, CINCPAC, etc.

Summary by Comtaskfor 64 of data available from WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA concerning night action SAVO ISLAND 14-15 November indicates following enemy sunk. 1 heavy cruiser or battleship. 3 large cruisers probably heavies. 1 destroyer. Additional enemy ships damaged. 1 14-inch gun battleship hit repeatedly by 16-inch and some 5-inch. One cruiser and 1 destroyer burning. Observed rapid and accurate gunfire from own destroyers which contributed to sinking of 1 enemy DD and damage to other as reported above.

18 2338 COMGEN 1ST MARDIV to COMSOPACFOR Info COMAIRSOPACFOR, etc.

Bomber field graded 5400 feet mat laid 3900 feet. Crowning complete to additional hundred feet. Mat construction to terminate at 400 feet for time being. 5 revetments complete and sixth under construction. Drainage system under construction. Fighter field 2 graded four thousand feet. Approaches 90% cleared. Four retments (probably revetments) under construction. Runways being graded and four hundred feet matted. Road system at bomber field and fighter field 2 being graded. One bomb resistant command post and two personnel bomb resistant shelters completed at bomber field. Weekly report.
November (GCT)

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, etc.

Jap patrols were active and aggressive during the 18th. Our forces pushing strong outposts preceded by patrols across the MATANIKAU RIVER to positions west of POINT CRUZ preparatory to general attack. Comsopac relays P-38's from CACTUS escorted B-17 and B-26's on raid to TONOLEI morning 18th. Former shot down 3 zeros in addition to damage of enemy reported yesterday. Carpen-der pass to McArthur. Ground action GUADALCANAL 19th limited to patrol activity covering advancement of out-post line. About 35 Japs killed; own casualties light. Burned out enemy cargo ship not previously recorded, sank close in shore CAPE ASTORIAE, MALAITA after an explo-sion time 0330 GCT/19. Comgensopac and Comgen IMAC have by hand for info.

ARGONAUT departs PEARL for Sopac November 23rd. Has fol-lowing characteristics. In addition to crew can carry 164 fully equipped enlisted and 6 officer troops. Avia-tion gas capacity 22,000 gallons. Armament 2 6 inch 53 caliber, 5 20MM, 4 submerged and 4 deck firing tubes, 4 deck stowage tubes, 8 interior torpedo stowage racks. Ammunition 200 rounds 6 inch bombardment, 200 rounds com- mon, 15,000 rounds 20MM, 20 torpedoes. If only 6 torpedoes are carried, approximately 100 tons bulk cargo can be car- ried in cargo space of approximately 14,000 cubic feet. Cargo must be able to pass through circular hatch 26 inch diameter. 9000 miles radius at maximum surface speed 13.5 knots. Stowage for 24 marine rubber landing boats. 30 days subsistence when carrying troops. Particularly suit- ed as raider transport with six inch gun landing support, advance base seaplane tender, fueling seaplanes at sea, cargo carrier, bombardment of enemy positions and general submarine duties against bombardment of own forces. Cincpac has for info.

CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC, COMGENHAWDEPT.

Status bases OSTLER and LINEOUT not entirely clear. Understand garrisons have arrived or about to. Re-commend commanding officers report to Comsopac and assume status of other Sopac bases. Will forward in a few days my recommendations concerning ultimate defenses. Com-manding Officer AZTEC should also report to Comsopac if he has not already done so.
CACTUS announces for 21 November. Local operations by Army unit vicinity POINT CRUZ in preparation for general attack. Numerous patrols contacts along upper MATANIKAU. Comsopac daily. P-39's carried out 11 attack missions against enemy installations. MacArthur from Carpenider. Comgensopac and Comgen IMAC have by hand for info.

Your 182131. NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS areas are most fertile hunting grounds so long as RABAUL - FAISI - KAVEING remain in enemy hands and enemy forces on GUADALCANAL. Recommend no reduction in Sopac subs at present. If reduction is made strongly urge 14 subs minimum for patrols in SOLOMONS area divided 7 on patrol and 7 enroute or refitting ABODE. Comsopac sends.

Subject following comments concur fully objectives suggested your 171939. Slow tankers to number required best fitted for COPPER run where convoys still in effect. Intermediate fast and remaining slow ships are in ALASKA oma coastal and Sopac services. Five or six fast Fleet tankers have been kept available in Sopac area for task forces. Incident of ESSO RICHMOND regrettable but was primarily due to lack of any shore storage in forward area. We are now employing J. C. DONNELL as mobile storage for black oil Sopac area and contemplate same use for KANAWHA when current repairs completed. Hulk ERKINE PHELPS will also help that regard. Principal relief will be afforded by shore tanks under construction at WHITE POPPY ROSES and BUTTON. Unless transportation of PT boats of immediate concern do not need any more tankers for present other than those now in prospect. Namely. WHITE PLAINS KAISER (AO) and PATUXENT when ready. Situation may change by February as per Cincpac secret ltr serial 0246 of 13 November to VOpnav. In addition foregoing and in furtherance your suggestions Comseronsopac hereby requested consider. Adopt and report on such of following measures as are practicable. Retain clean tanker FRANK DRUM now in area as mobile storage. Do same for such black oil slow commercial tankers as may be required. Do not use fleet tankers for mobile storages unless absolutely necessary and reduce those held for task forces to reasonable number. Employ fleet tankers so released for freighting. As implied by VOpnav the guiding principle should always be to employ the faster ships on the long hauls.
Part 1 from Combatdiv 6. Tremendous value and some limitations radar demonstrated night of 14-15 November. BB's obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and radar spot plus optical bearings. Strong signals from enemy ships permitted quicker and more accurate solutions and spots than on target practice. Opening range 1st phase 16 and 18000 yards illuminated by setting moon both ships hitting selected targets on 2nd salvos. Opening 2nd phase 6000 to 9000 yards we used some star shells which functioned properly but did not add to accuracy of fire. No indication enemy used radar. When deprived artificial illumination he apparently ranged inaccurately on gun flashes. Hits on B 57 obtained when that ship illuminated by enemy searchlights at about 6000 yards.

Part 2. Second and final part Combatdiv 6. Accuracy own fire definitely better than Japs and superiority increased rapidly with range. SG radar invaluable in finding surface targets and coaching fire control radars on. As currently installed Batdiv 6 SG has wide blind arc astern. Single instrument found insufficient to meet fire control needs and supply adequate ship control and tactical information. Most urgent and most important need for improvement night fighting efficiency BBs is provision additional SG to permit visual access to plan position indicator by flag and conning officer. Elimination blind arcs also urgent and important. SG type radar of little value in enclosed waters as targets are lost in asparagus patch of land signals. Neither SG nor fire control radars could discriminate Jap DD known to be lying in against SAVO ISLANDS.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH.

Your 120635 if ships detached from Sopac in accordance with reference there would remain 7 AP 4 AK of which BELLATRIX temporarily out due to battle damage LIBRA slightly damaged and needs docking FULLER temporarily out due to collision. McCawley urgently requires docking. Present shortage requires sending chartered ship to CACTUS. Am sending remainder American Division plus 6th Marines to CACTUS and withdrawing 1st Marine Division. Plan storing material CACTUS in preparation for next offensive move. 1st Marine Division upon withdrawal must go into amphibious training. Desirable Army and New Zealand troops this area also receive some amphibious training. Even provided no further losses received ships now this area totally inadequate for present and planned operations. Liberty freighters will materially ease cargo shipping situation but are not transports or equipped for amphibious operations. Cannot transfer now or in future any combat loading transports or freighters without prejudice to operations. Comgensopac Comgen FMAC and Comamphibforsopac have by hand for info from Comsopac.
21 0052 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

Request all practicable efforts speed delivery PC's and other listening equipped craft for base patrol and local escort duties Sopac. Comsopac (originator) refers Cominch 151657 of September (Action Cinopac and Info Cominch) need for these units to combat submarine menace in CACTUS area and vicinity established bases increasingly acute.

21 1800 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAIRPAC.

Cinopac 180159. Indicate proposed relationship of subordinate command to Comairsopac and responsibilities toward Marine aviation in Sopac. Would additional personnel be required. If proposed command is established a more distinctive title will be required.

22 1037 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMGENSOPAC, COMINCH, etc.

In face of the stubborn resistance. Comsopac sends. MacArthur via Carpender. Our advance is continuing slowly on west flank. No activity on other sectors. Action Cinopac. Comgensopac, Comgenspac have for info. Enemy positions west of MATANIKAU RIVER under continuous attacking missions by P-39's, TBF's and SBD's. 1 near miss was made on an AK in vicinity of DUNAI, NEW GEORGIA.

22 1541 COMINCH to CINCLANT Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

Transfer to Pac Flt for duty soon as practicable 4 combat loaded APs, one of them suitable for division flagship, plus 2 combat loaded AKs. Advise expected date ready to depart and names of vessels.

22 2125 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, COMSUBPAC.

Shift of submarines to Sopac in recent emergency required practical abandonment of our patrol of Jap waters which was very effective. As of this date none of these patrol stations is filled and no sub is yet enroute to them. Consider the most critical period for CACTUS has passed. Unless otherwise directed I will distribute Subs Pac Flt as follows. ARGONAUT plus one to bring to fourteen the number of subs available operations SOLOMONS SEA. Subron forty-five of 13 S boats for ALASKA and Sound School. Remainder Subrons FOUR and TEN for Empire and TRUK patrols comprising about 17 submarines not under navy yard overhaul.
COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, VOPNAV, COMSERFORPAC, ETC.

Comsopac sends to Cincpac info Cominch, VOpnav, Comserforpac, Comdespac. STERETT sustained 11 shell hits port side including 1 major caliber bombardment all above waterline. Number 3 handling room, gun shelter and Number 4 handling room holed. Resultant fires with ready service powder explosions caused extensive damage. Both after guns out necessary replace. Also both torpedo mounts out due direct hits require renewal. Recommend PEART. Repairs make seaworthy completed. Vessel capable full power. BUCHANAN being repaired WHITE POPPY completion December 6. Repairs O'BANNON minor damage completed. Comseroncomsopac by hand. Cincpac please deliver to Comdespac.

COMSOPAC to ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC CTF 16,11,62,63,64, Info etc.

Task Forces under operational control of originator Comsopac are reorganized as follows: Task Force 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey in SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, COMDESRON 6 in BALCH, GRIDLEY MCCALL CRAVEN DUNLAP FANNING. Task Force 16 Rear Admiral Sherman in ENTERPRISE, SANDIEGO, Desron 2 MORRIS, ANDERSON HUGHES MUSTIN RUSSEL ELLET CLARK. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee in WASHINGTON, Batdiv 6 plus screening units as assigned. Task Force 65 Rear Admiral Hill in MARYLAND, COLORADO, NASSAU, ALTAMHANA, PARRAGUT, DALE AYLWIN, HULL, MACDONOUGH, MONAGHAN. Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Kinkaid (Rear Admiral Tisdale second in command) NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, NEW ORLEANS, HONOLULU, HELENA, LAMSON, NICHOLAS, O'BANNON, FLETCHER, GRAYSON, MAURY.

The following units are assigned Task Force 66 (Escorts): LANSDOWNE, WOODWORTH, LARDNER, MCCALLA, MEADE, SHAW, STACK, BUCHANAN. Units not now in company will be directed to join Task Force Commanders by originator Comsopac as soon as practicable. Units assigned Task Forces 62 and 63 remain unchanged. Additional assignments to Task Forces will be made from units now enroute. Combatant units in Sopac area not assigned to Task Forces will operate under orders of Comsopac. The organization herein prescribed is effective zero hours 24 November.
24 0145 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMGENSOPAC.

Your 222241. Comsopac sends for action Cinpcac. Based on forces now available, garrison CACTUS after relief now planned will consist of American Division and 2nd Mar Div (6th, 7th, 8th Marines) plus attached units. Command to senior troop commander under principal unity of command. Command organization be separate despatch. Base Commander POPPY Major General Lincoln, USA commands all defense forces including KIWI CAST under principal unity of command. If 25th Division made available plan send CACTUS relieve 2nd Marine Division in preparation further offensive action. Comgen Sopac concurs and has for info.

24 0525 An enemy encampment. . . Reports GUADALCANAL . . . On the north slope Mambulo was contacted by patrol of 30 men First Marines. ComSoPac Forwards. Orange lost 5 machine guns plus 70 killed. Our casualties 2 wounded. While reorganizing have temporarily halted operations on west flank. On 23rd SBD and F4F4 strike at MUNDA; NEW GEORGE scored Direct hit on warehouse at LAMBETI. Sighted no shipping. Air reports indicate Nips unloading at LIU LIU CHOISEL on 21st. Also 1 AK unloading near MUNDA 20th and 21st. Weather prevented planes from reaching MUNDA. ComGenSoPac ComGen 1MAC and CTF 62 have by hand for info.

25 1215 COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC info Cominch, CTF62, Comsowespac, Comgensopac

Comsopac relays from GUADALCANAL. At three hours love (-11) one enemy plane dropped bombs to the south of the field killing and wounding several. No ground activity of importance past twenty four hours. Shore positions of enemy harassed by nine individual P-39 missions. Four bomb hits on buildings LAMBETI not LOMBEJI as previously reported yesterdays despatch NEW GEORGIA on 24th. Ten Zeros attacked bombers without damage our planes. ComGenSoPac and ComGenlMAC have by hand.

232222 COMINCH TO CINCPAC info COMSOPAC.

Your 200923 Garrisons OSTLER, LINEOUT each total 45 officers and 827 men and consist Headquarters Detachment, 1 Coast Artillery Battery automatic weapons anti-aircraft with searchlight platoon, 1 engineer company aviation, 1 airways detachment, 1 signal anti-aircraft warning company plus miscellaneous service units. Both SS KOTA AGEONG arrived OSTLER November 8 Thence to LINEOUT. Report ComGenSoPac by dispatch. New Zealand joint staff mission assumes commanding officer Aztec already reported Comsopac. Comsopac confirms. Cinpcac give to ComGen Haw Dept for info. COMSOPAC by hand.
Front lines area GUADALCANAL witnessed only ground activity for the day. Our patrols engaged in cleaning out isolated groups offering resistance. Daily Comsopac info. 4 B-17s dropped 8 500-pound bombs enemy convoy 2 DDs and 2 AKs 1 AO vicinity PILOPILO GNONGCA. No hits observed. Our bombers intercepted by 4 enemy zeros no damage resulting. At 0410 L (-11) 26th 2 enemy bombers over CACTUS dropped bombs without resultant damage. Our SED continued nightly patrol over enemy lines. Comgensopac and ComgenIMAC have by hand. Action Cincpac Info Cominch.

Abandonment AOLA project approved. Form Task Unit 62.4.6 Captain Ashe in NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, PRES. HAYES, FORMALHAUT, Comdesdiv 24 in LANSDOWNE, GRAYSON, SHAW, NICHOLAS. From CTF 62. Task unit depart BUTTON earliest daylight Nov 27th proceed CACTUS via east and north of SAN CRISTOBAL and LENGO CHANNEL to arrive 0530L (-11) 29th. Unload on beach extending 3000 yards east of TOGAMA POINT. Embarked personnel establish base at VOLINAVUA as directed by Comgen CACTUS. On completion unloading NEVILLE, HAYES, HEYWOOD return to BUTTON via same route escorted by 2 DD's. When FOMALHAUT unloaded at TOGAMA direct her proceed AOLA BAY accompanied by remaining 2 DD's and load about 75,000 cubic feet heavy cargo for transfer to TOGAMA POINT and RINGBOLT as designated by Comgen CACTUS. FOMALHAUT and escort return to BUTTON on completion. Op Plan Afirm 24 covering this movement being forwarded Comadnavbase by air for delivery to you on arrival.

In order clarify situation urge following action. Afirm. Fitch's title to be only Commander Task Force 63. Baker. Establish Comairsopac at WHITE POPPY in order discharge functions outlined para 5 of PacFlt letter 33 L-42 in Sopac area. Comsopac the sender. Cast. Order aviation Rear Admiral to command same. The Commander of the Task Force comprising the combatant elements of land based aviation is a full time job and must be filled by the most experienced Naval aviator available in this area.
November

26 0247 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAIRPAC.

Commander Fleet Aircraft NOUMEA short title Comfair NOUMEA considered most distinctive title new commander. My 180159 Cominch 211800. See Comairsopac 240221 Comsopac 290251 October now passed to you which basis original recommendation. Also Comairsopac 242331 Comsopac 250609 which comment your 211800. Propose duties Comfair NOUMEA within Sopac area to parallel and extend those now assigned Comairpacific for entire Pacific Ocean Area would concern all Naval air units and air base facilities and would for Marine aviation include supply of aircraft and aviation material plus other administrative assistance as directed by Comsopac. Agree Halsey proposal that Fitch as Comtaskfor 63 exercise operational control over such Army Navy and Marine aircraft as assigned by area commander but consider present inopportune time to reassign title Comairsopac. Additional Flag Officer and Staff necessary to free Fitch of widespread administrative responsibilities.

26 0632 COMSOPAC to VICE OPNAV Info COMNAV, CINCPAC.

Prior receipt of Vice Opnav serial 123739 of Oct. 13 and Cinopac serial 4235 of Nov 16 Comsopac originator directed by his serial 5356 of November 10th all commanding generals at established island bases to designate a U. S. Naval Officer as Port Director where no Port Director had been regularly assigned. Port Director's have also been instructed to act as routing and reporting officers for merchant shipping British route and Vesca arrival signals are prescribed with NZNB as reporting center responsible to pass them to regular US and British Adeees. Authority hereby requested for Port Directors so designated to draw publications listed in paragraph 3 subparagraphs A through F of Vice Opnav Serial 0127320 of May 2nd, Mobile issuing office USS ARGONNE and issuing office NOB FULCRUM will be directed to make issues subject your approval. Names of Port Directors designated will be communicated to the Director Naval Transportation Service. Action Vice Opnav Information Cominch C and R Cinopac.

25 1659 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAIRPACFOR, etc.

Refer to this as Admiralty 1726A/24. Your 1350 21st not to all addressees. Engadine should not complete patrol systems 2 she is to proceed to NOUMEA via AUSTRALIA as soon as she is ready for sea. She is not required to embark Martlets from KILINDINI. 3 ATTENNE is also to be sailed for same destination as soon as ready. 4 Other ships are to come under operational control of Cinopac on arrival in South Pacific Area.
Opnav Bupers Marcorsps informed. 4 APs and 2 AKs escorted by 4 PacFlt destroyers expected depart Base H mid December for CANAL ZONE where report Cincpac for duty. NTS now planning load ALLEN with 3rd Marine Replacement Battalion and 2nd Garrison Replacement Battalion for STRAW and cargo for WHITE POPPY. GEORGE CLYMER, JOHN PENN, TITANIA, ALGORAB, with SeeBees 25 and 37 Pontoon Assembly Depot other personnel and urgent cargo for WHITE POPPY. THOMAS JEFFERSON with personnel for CANAL ZONE thence West Coast or Army personnel to Sopac as desired by you. Comment. Advise also desired division assignments APs and AKs unless you wish retain in new Transdiv 18. This movement direct to Sopac should be considered in connection return APs and AKs to Amphforpac.

NAVAL ATTACHE WELLMINGTON to CINCPAC

Afirm 416-26 November. From Goddard. Just returned from visit to Halsey and Fitch. Neither had been able to consider RNZAF development but hope now to have time to complete my directive and formulate future requirements for RNZAF. Para 2. Was informed Vice Opnav has stated intention to expand RNZAF from ten squadrons to fifteen by April 1944. This is no expansion since we already have sixteen squadrons. Under this arrangement mostly all our future output trained personnel will continue to be sent to England contrary to your wishes. Para 3. Vice Opnav further suggested that if intended allotments of aircraft to South Pacific are exceeded the surplus should go exclusively to American Squadrons. This would effectually prevent employing New Zealand personnel resources. Para 4. Please regard this as advance information only am sending letter by airmail. Please accept congratulations on great successes and regrets at loss of Callaghan. 0645Z/26.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

50 Japs killed number of machine guns captured in local operations west of POINT CRUZ. There were no other ground activities Comgensopac Comgen IMAC info by hand. At 2400 26th 7 B-17's struck aerodrome at KAHILI no opposition encountered. Large fires resulted at dispersal area plus 16 hits on runway. During the night. Comsopac forwards daily summary from GUADALCANAL area. 2 enemy bombers dropped missiles near mouth of LUNGA RIVER no damage. On the 23rd and the 24th CACTUS bombing of KOKONGOLO mission NEW GEORGIA destroyed all houses that area. Nips reported hiding in bush during raids. Enemy explorations toward the eastern side of NEW GEORGIA are continued. On the 21st barge with 50 Japs was reported in BALFOUR CHANNEL near RENDOVA. Good native report states 3000 ORANGE at REKATA BAY.
November (GCT) HELENA to COMTASKFOR 67 Info COMINCH CINCPAC COMSOPAC etc.

14 0001 TG 67.4 engaged apparently 2 enemy forces containing BBs and cruisers plus DDs to SE of SAVO about 0124 bearing 312 range 27100. We approached in long column 4 DDs, 1 CLAA, 2 CAs, 1 CL, 1 CLAA, 4 DDs via LENGO CHANNEL on 280 along north coast close in. Changed course to about 310 True then 000 then 315 at 0137, then 270 closing to about 3000 yards of enemy. Enemy force believed coming in to south of SAVO from NW in 2 or 3 groups. Bearing and distance of groups by sail George radar from HELENA: 5 ships 250 True range 4200 course 120 speed 20, 6 ships 315 True range 7000, 4 large ships 290 true range 10000. At 0143 DDs instructed to launch torpedo attack. At 0145 ordered to stand by to fire. At range of about 3000 yards to group on port bow while turning to course 270 commenced firing at 0148. Enemy turned on searchlights and commenced firing at short range just prior to our opening fire. 0158 changed course to 000 on signal and speed 28 knots. ATLANTA fell out to left and believed on fire at 0210. SAN FRANCISCO hit heavily especially bridge area and Rear Admiral Callaghan and all staff but one killed. JUNEAU hit by torpedo forward engine room time unknown. PORTLAND believed hit by torpedo and lost steering control prior to 0218. Melee resulted in which events uncertain but destroyers both sides very active. Numerous ships afire including one large ship capsized and one large BB or CA stopped and completely enveloped in flames and passed both close aboard. At 0212 attempted to assemble forces remaining. At 0226 gave course 092 True speed 18 Form 18 to ships able to comply. At 0240 contacted SAN FRANCISCO on port bow and she formed up. FLETCHER reported in SEALARK CHANNEL. STERRETT and O'BANNON in LENGO CHANNEL. at 0310 reported condition PORTLAND to radio TULAGI and requested tow and air coverage. After transiting SEALARK destroyers formed screen. At daylight picked up JUNEAU in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT near MALAITA Island. Instructed to join up. Took course to southward and speed 10 knots until SAN FRANCISCO made temporary repairs. Transferred medical assistance to SAN FRANCISCO and sent O'BANNON to position to transmit report on force position and intentions. O'BANNON rejoined at 1530. At 0826 course 180 speed 17 knots Zigzag No. 8 all speed JUNEAU could make. At 1101 torpedo fired from about 260 relative running on or near surface passed astern of HELENA and ahead SAN FRANCISCO and hit JUNEAU (then down 4 feet by head) on port side of fantail (location of hit debatable but aft) as she was Zigging 15 deg. to the right. JUNEAU was third ship in formation about 800 yards on quarter of SAN FRANCISCO due to steering difficulty using one screw and as requested by commanding officer. There was a single enormous explosion filling the area with debris and large cloud of yellow black and brown smoke. Debris fell to such an extent and volume as to cause belief of high level bombing attack. Remaining ships increased to maximum speed and radical course changes. As only FLETCHER and STERRETT screening and ships crippled continued on course and reported events by visual for further transmission to Comsopac via

(Continued next page)
SECRE
November (GCT)

14 0001 (Continued)
B-17 sighted at 1121. Within minute after explosion JUNEAU had completely disappeared. Debris fell and smoke remained for about 9 minutes. No sight or sound contact on submarine. SAN FRANCISCO worst material and personnel casualties including Captain Young. Lt. Comdr. Schonland now commanding. STERRETT extensive personnel and material casualties. Material and personnel damage various extent remaining ships. SAN FRANCISCO and probably STERRETT will require navy yard overhaul. HELENA and O'BANNON tender availability. All times mentioned are minus 11.

28 0309 CTF 62 to CTU 62.4.7, CTU 62.4.6, CTU 62.4.8 Info CINCPAC etc.
MAJABA and ALCIBA have been torpedoed vicinity LUNGA POINT. From CTF 62. Indications that Jap subs are also operating in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT. Possibility that subs enter SAVO SOUND at night and lie on shelf near beach at CACTUS awaiting early morning return of ships to anchorage. Suggest part of screen make sweep close in CACTUS beach prior daily arrival APs and AKs in unloading area. On retirement to eastward recommend units of screen make sweep INDISPENSABLE STRAIT ahead of transports. If retire to RINGBOLT desirable that units of screen patrol SAVO SOUND during night with view intercepting subs on surface.

28 0145 COMSOPAC to MACARThUR VIA COMSOWESPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.
This despatch to General MacArthur from Admiral Halsey. Your 2700055 and 271136. Our common objective is RABAUL. Until Jap air in NEW BRITAIN and northern SOLOMONS has been reduced, risk of valuable naval units in middle and western reaches SOLOMON SEA can only be justified by major enemy seaborne movement against south coast NEW GUINEA or AUSTRALIA itself. Seaborne supply of bases we take on northern coast of NEW GUINEA not feasible until we control SOLOMON SEA, in other words RABAUL. Pursuant foregoing and with history past months in view, consider RABAUL assault campaign must be amphibious along the SOLOMONS with NEW GUINEA land position basically a supporting one only. I am currently reinforcing CACTUS position and expediting means of operating heavy air from there. It is my belief that the sound procedure at this time is to maintain as strong a land and air pressure against the Japanese BUNA position as your lines of communication permit, and continue to extract a constant toll of Japanese shipping, an attrition which if continued at the present rate he can not long sustain. I believe that my greatest contribution to our common effort would be to strengthen my position and resume the advance up the SOLOMONS as soon as possible, while continuing to maintain a naval force in being on the flank of any possible Japanese large scale advance against AUSTRALIA or Southern NEW GUINEA coast. Carpender pass.
SECRET
November (GCT)

29 1050 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

This is MacArthur's 271136 you asked for in your 290709. "MacArthur sending to Comso:pac. Ultra. In connection with my radio of this morning it is reported from our naval sources that the enemy will attempt landing at GONA 5 AK's on the night of November 29 and 4 AK's on November 30 and repeating on the nights of December 3rd and December 4th. The escorting naval force is reported as one cruiser and 4 destroyers. Can you help me by a diversionary move to threaten his flank query? Admiral Carpender, please pass."

29 1100 MACARTHUR VIA COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

MacArthur's 270055 follows. Reference your 290709. Com- sopac passing. This dispatch is for Admiral Halsey from General MacArthur. In my operations in NEW GUINEA my ground forces have driven the enemy back to a shallow beach head in the BUNA GONA area. The air force has provided close support, has transported large numbers of troops and has supplied the entire operation. Pending the establishment of seaborne line of communications, the number of troops I can employ is definitely restricted by limited capacity of air transport. The enemy is making every effort to reinforce and supply the garrison by sea and despite losses from air attack, has recently succeeded to an extent sufficient to prevent my destroying his beach head. He is evidently increasing his efforts and is in position to make a move of considerable magnitude against NEW GUINEA. The Chief of Staff of the Army after discussion with the Navy in Washington, has suggested that I take up with you the detailed naval requirements for the support of my immediate operations in order to reach an agreement as to the practicable measures to be taken with the naval forces now available in our respective areas. I would appreciate an expression of your views. Carpender please pass.

28 1235 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMAIRPAC, COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.

Cincpac 260247 approved. Cincpac hereby authorized to establish new flag officer command in South Pacific "Fleet Air Command NOUMEA". Short title Faircomnoumea will be a subordinate command of Comairpac and Comfairnoumea. Will report for duty to Comso:pac. Bureaus and officers of Navy take necessary action.

29 0035 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, COMMORWESSEAFRON, NVMl, OPNAV, etc.

Radio HONOLULU, pass to Cincpac - refer Cominch 272156. Following status of CTF 8 destroyers. 15 at present operating with TF VIZ four modern, 11 old including sweepers.
Essential duties. 3 old on permanent escort duty between OCEAN BLUE and WHIRLAWAY. 2 old anti-submarine patrol LONGVIEW. 3 to 4 will be assigned AMULET MOVE. Two for anti-submarine patrol. 1 to 2 screening moves between LONGVIEW and AMULET. Minimum 3 required for screening OCEAN BLUE to LONGVIEW for transports and important cargo ships. Movement of important cargo ships will continue indefinitely. At infrequent intervals and periods lasting month must maintain anti-submarine patrol at CAVERN to protect discharging ships. Four modern destroyers now in striking force with cruisers. Operational breakdowns old destroyers frequent. Present status king at BREMERTON urgent repairs. KANE must follow for same when king returns. WASMUTH, PERRY operating with cracked reduction gears which should be repaired when ships can be spared. LAMBERTON has boiler completely burnt out. Destroyers have been operating practically continuously without opportunity for upkeep. Margin with respect to prospective demands now zero. Recent net reduction in escort vessels to the force including Canadian is nine. Request retention TALBOT dent with this taskforce until reliefs can be provided or at least until one January. CTF 8 sends. Radio BREMERTON pass to Commwseafron and NYPS X RDO SanFren pss to Commwseafron and N'MI X RDO Annapolis pass to Opnav and Cominch.

28 1708 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC COMAIRSOPAC COM 12.

Comairsopac 240557 from Comnavbassopac. Do you approve development of BUTTON into LION Base as recommended? If so does this base supplement or replace development herefore stressed for WHITE POPPY? See your 210517 October next to last sentence. If BUTTON development is in addition you must balance large shipping requirements against other shipping needs Sopac. Little additional shipping in prospect. If not approved as recommended specify location of approved components. What is to be division of base functions between BUTTON and WHITE POPPY? Rdo NOUMEA pass to Commnavbassopac.
29 1755 COMINCH to CINCPAC CINCLANT COMUSNAVFOREUROPE, COMSOWESPAC etc.

Addressees promulgate following to extend commands need to know. Para. In event usage gas by enemy is suspected. Afirm. Make immediate dispatch report addressed for action to entire chain of command. Baker. Conduct immediate investigation on spot by qualified personnel. Cast. Make amplifying report confirmed or not confirmed. Dog. No not retaliate with gas until authorized by Cominch and Cast Negat. Option. Use of toxic gas will not be initiated by any units. Sail commander. Undertake instruction and training to insure that retaliation if authorized will be effective. In precaution against initiating use of gas under stress offensive materials are to be kept in ready reserve but not issued to combatant units. Buord will keep addresseds advised regarding availability of materials. VCNO has for action Comdt Marcorps, Buord, Buauer informed.

29 1811 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

Answering Cominch 261230. Unless sterilizers more reliable than indicated by statements Doctor Michels, use of aircraft mines offensively this area subject same tactical drawbacks as mustard inland warfare. From Comsopac. Action Comin. Infor Cincpac, Comsowespac. Basically propose use aircraft mines offensively first in passages much used by enemy traffic and in which later resulting menace to our forces is acceptable; second, as anvil to interdict enemy passage incident to specific attack. First of above dependent upon continuing adequate reconnaissance enemy traffic at his bases, which lack of aerial photo reconnaissance equipment this area has so far prevented. No suitable opening for second use has presented itself up to now. Unable be more specific until campaign features more clearly defined.

30 0841 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, info COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC, COMINCH, etc.

Urdis 270145. Comsopac sends. Torpedoing of ALCHIRA leaves SoPac area with 4 AK's, 1 of which is under repair. Necessity for moving large quantities construction equipment and material to CACTUS and resulting from interruptions and damage by enemy action, results CACTUS food and ammunition supply critical. Even with temporary addition 4 noncombat cargo vessels, several essential cargoes would still await transportation. No AK's can be spared without endangering CACTUS position. Further losses must be expected. All operable AP's except McCawley (SPOONER drydocking) are engaged transporting troops. McCawley essential as force flagship due adequacy radio installations. Following is schedule for amphibforsopac ships. Afirm. JACKSON, ADAMS, CRESCENT CITY,
loaded troops for CACTUS return trip evacuate troops first
mardiv. If 6th Marines to CACTUS these ships occupied until
January 25. Baker. NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BARNETT occupied
transporting Americal Division and 9th Defense Battalion to
CACTUS until December 20. Cast. FULLER under repair col-
losion estimated ready December 25. Dog. ZEILIN departs
for West Coast about 1 December time of repair estimated 3
weeks. Easy. HUNTER LIGGETT enroute CACTUS with troops
returning BUTTON about 10 December. AMERICAN LEGION to load
18th Construction Battalion for CACTUS to return BUTTON about
December 15. Fox. McCawley due WHITE POPPY about December
20. Additional movements anticipated are relief remainder
First Mardiv, movement Army troops from WHITE POPPY and
BLEACHER to CACTUS, movement Third Raiders from STRAW to
BUTTON, training Sopac troops for amphibious operations.
Providing movements mentioned in preceding sentence are post-
poned, estimate that transports can arrive SAN DIEGO on fol-
lowing dates. HUNTER LIGGETT on December 26. AMERICAN LEGION
on January 1. NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BARNETT on January 8. FULLER
and McCawley on January 12. Four ships of Transdiv 2 on
February 10.

01 0335 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, COMAMPHIBFORSOOPAC, etc.
Urdis 300841. NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BARNETT designated for
return Amphib‘orpac. Since KENMORE made available for trip
to CACTUS assume this takes care of 9th Defense Battalion
your item Baker. Therefore sail one of the 3 designated
ships for SAN DIEGO now and the other two upon completion
Item Baker to arrive about 8 January. Appreciate situation
as regards freighters. When 2nd LIBERTY Class freighter ar-
rives Sopac area transfer 1 combat loader to SAN DIEGO and
when 3rd arrives send 2nd combat loader. In addition I will
direct retention ZEILIN on West Coast on completion repairs.
Advise division organization desired by you. Ships which
will remain Sopac including 5 enroute from Atlantic and 10
liberties. Direct ships ordered SAN DIEGO leave all land-
ing craft in Sopac area.

01 1321 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 62.
Yesterday's activities comprised numerous patrols First
Marines captured 6 machine guns on MAHULU killing 15.
Patrol 164th Infantry killed 11 captured 70 mm gun. Marine
raiders on upper LUNGA killed 25 captured 1 75 mm gun and
1 30 mm. Comsopac reiterates. 4 attack missions carried
out by P-39's against ORANGE positions. 3 biplanes and 2
flying boats sighted REKATA BAY by morning search plane drew
AA fire. B-17's sighted 5 ships near KIETA 10 AK or AP
5 DD and possible CV BECN TONOHER evening 30th. Friendly
task force engaged with enemy near SAVO beginning 2300 love
(-11) 30th. Unidentified planes overhead CACTUS at 2300 love
30th and again 0400 love 1 December. Comgensopac Comgen 1st
Mar CTF 62 all info by hand.
November (GCT)

01 0645 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 8.

Lacking suitable target areas within reach there are no plans in immediate prospect for use of aircraft mines in central Pacific. This in reply your 261230. For all other areas including Sowespac am strongly of opinion that this weapon should be used without too much stress on probable failures of sterilizing features hazarding our future actions. This view based on definite experience of British with favorable damage ratio of mines versus bombs even under admittedly different circumstances. We should harass the enemy with every conceivable means. Further of note is certainty that as Japs are driven from any locations now held by them we will encounter more mine opposition. Sweeping measures undertaken concurrently with offensives will therefore give some degree of protection against own mines previously laid.

30 0255 SrAv GUADALCANAL to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC, etc.

Construction of 1000 lineal feet more coral. 15,600 lineal feet taxiway 8000 lineal feet road. 37 plane revetments. Command post shelter. Ready room shelter 67,200 lineal feet drainage ditch. Preparation of camp site. Installation gasoline tanks necessary to complete fighter 2 field. Construction of 4000 lineal feet of Marston mat. 29,350 lineal feet taxiway. 36 plane revetments 8000 lineal feet roads. Command post shelter. Ready room shelter. 67,000 lineal feet drainage ditch preparation of camp site. Installation gasoline tanks necessary to complete fighter 1 field. Reconstruction of 500 lineal feet Marston mat. Construction of 23,100 lineal feet taxiway. 41 plane revetments. Command post shelter. 50,200 lineal feet drainage ditch. 10,000 lineal feet road improvement. Air base office. Repair shop installation gasoline tanks. Necessary to complete bomber field. All of foregoing must be completed before prolonged rains estimated middle December if fields are to operate. No work started fighter 3 or VOLINAVUA fields.

29 0110 CTF 8 to COMINCH, Info CINCPAC, VOPNAV.

Taskforce commander has 25 each Mark XII Mod 1 and Mark XIII aerial mines at DUTCH HARBOR. No others enroute. Plan use Mark XIII's against enemy shipping concentrations CHICHAGOF HARBOR, OTKRITI BAY and Pass between SOUTH HEAD and LITTLE KISKA. Mark XII-1's same purpose HOLTZ BAY, MCDONALD COVE, Pass SOUTH HEAD to NORTH HEAD KISKA and possible anchorages in SEMICHIS if more accurate charts received. Strong anti-aircraft installations KISKA HARBOR prevent mining mission that area until these installations reduced by bombing or other means. The lack of shipping in KISKA at the present time also militates against use mines that location. Failure mark XIII's recent mine plants KAGALASKA STRAIT and UMAK PASS attributed strong ocean currents and 600 foot spacing. Believe cur-

(Continued)
29 0110 CTF 8 to COMINCH, Info CINCPAC, VOPNAV. (Continued)

rents reduced magnitude in areas planned for future use and revised directive for 1000 spacing will insure more successful performance by aerial mines. Pass Vice Opnav for info. Com-taskforce 8 originator. Cominch for action. Cincpac info added.
The damaged SARATOGA is enroute TONGATABU with two cruisers and seven destroyers, and will arrive there the 6th. Her power plant is uncertain and she can only make 10 knots. To enter the harbor she will probably need the NAVAJO and SEMINOLE, both of which are available to her. All her surviving planes except 6 VF, 3 VB, and 4 VT have been flown to the ROSES-BUTTON area for distribution. It seems probable that the sub which torpedoed the SARATOGA was sunk by the MONSSEN before it could get off a report of hitting.

With the ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA out of action for some time to come the WASP and HORNET groups will have to remain in the SOLOMONS-NEW CALEDONIA area indefinitely. The addition of the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA will greatly add to our strength in that area. Nevertheless, the Japs are capable of placing superior forces in the area.

Three Jap DDs landed troops and supplies about 20 miles east of our position on the north side of GUADALCANAL. It has not yet been learned how such operations can take place without satisfactory counter action on our part.

CTF-62 011237 pink joins other commanders there in a plea for more air in the GUADALCANAL area. Thus every major commander in the South Pacific and the Under Secretary of the Navy have urged that the flow of planes in adequate numbers be started to that area. CinCPac 012331 urges specific types of Army planes and pilots to fly them.

In a letter to Comin-ch today CinCpac disapproves the use of carriers to support landings when they are vulnerable to enemy shore based air and when the job can be more properly done by our shore based air. The letter is designed to prevent the use of our carriers to cover landings in Tasks Two and Three.

Comin-ch 020300 pink requests MacArthur to supply P-38s to the TULAGI area. And his 020400 makes a further plea for aircraft reinforcements, particularly fighters.

C.G. CACTUS 012313 explains his fear of the enemy building up a large striking force by repeated small landings during darkness and recommends adequate search by aircraft and DDs or MTEs and the 7th Marines as a striking force.

Submarines continue active in the South Pacific. One was seen off TULAGI today.

In the ALEUTIANS CTF-8 reports that the REID sank the RRo 61 and took prisoners from her.
The Jap forces thought northeast of the SOLOMONS have not been sighted for several days. It seems possible that the KYUJO has returned to the Empire and that one CV is enroute south to replace her. The recent occupation of OCEAN and NAURU now seems a fact. APAMAMA in the GILBERTS was probably occupied today. Cardiv Two is still indicated in home waters.

CinCPac continues to keep the Army here fully informed of the current developments.
September 2.

ComSoPac 031231 gives a summary of operations for the day. The bombings on Cactus took place the day before. Evidently the BURROWS went aground a second time off TULAGI and was hauled off by the GAMBLE. His 030736 pink gives the employment of TF-17 while TF-18 is at Noumea for fuel and supplies. TF-18 arrives at Noumea tomorrow.

ComSoPac estimates that on August 24th local an enemy CV received a torpedo hit. Damage to other units is not clear.

ComSoPac 031141 justly praises the fine work of the Bougainville coast watcher in giving timely warning of an approaching air raid.

Cominch 031958 indicates that 60 P-38s in addition to other planes are enroute Pacific bases.

The DRUM in Midway from patrol off Truk and Kavieng reports poor hunting both places.

Air reconnaissance of the Gilberts by the Japs continued today.

The C.O. at Fanning Island reports serious labor trouble and requests that the trouble makers be deported.

The Army reports 6 APs at Kiska, 2 of which are over 20,000 tons. This report by Alaskan G-3 stirred up the Commander Western Defense. CTF-8 doubts this report as does CinCPac. Steps are being taken by the Army to garrison the Pribilofs.

There is nothing significant about enemy moves.

September 3.

ComSoPac 041116 gives a summary for the day in his area. His 040300 indicates his plan to put the 7th Marines in GUADALCANAL and to put a battalion of Army troops on TREVANION Island (Santa Cruz).

Cominch 031313 does not give much encouragement for large development of raider battalions.

CTF 16 020337 comments favorably on the employment of the new BBs in the carrier task forces. The best place seems to have them down wind from the carrier.
The TAMBOR reports sinking 22000 tons off TRUK.

There is further confirmation of the enemy occupation of OCEAN and NAURU Islands. This being the case, Cinopac will not attempt to send food to OCEAN Island.

As the Japs are apparently occupying TARAWA Island in the GILBERTS, the ALBACORE, which was close by, was diverted to that place to take any appropriate action possible.

The first three transports have unloaded undetected at ADAK Island. At NAZAN Bay the CASCO is still aground and a salvage tug is enroute to assist. There is complete disagreement between the Army and the Navy concerning the activity at KISKA. An Army report of 2 20000 ton APs in that harbor is not believed by CTF 8.

Cardiv 2 is still indicated in home waters. All signs continue to point to an all out enemy attempt to recapture TULAGI and GUADALCANAL.

Admiral Ghormley's 051156 summarizes the South Pacific situation.

The SOUTH DAKOTA will join Task Force 18 on the 8th.

So far in their operations in the South Pacific the combat and operational losses of PBYs run 23% a month.

There is some fear by CTF 62 that the enemy will raid SAMOA tonight or tomorrow.

Comsowestpac requires replacements of ships lost in the TULAGI operation. This involves 1 CA and 3 DD. In addition he wants one destroyer division. These ships are requested to keep the lines open to NEW GUINEA.

To rectify landing mistakes made in the initial TULAGI landing, Comamphibious SoPac 040610 plans an extensive rehearsal of a landing on September 13th.

CTF 8 042027 objects to the Army proposal to garrison the PRIBILOF Islands.

The Jap submarines continue to be active in the South Pacific. One was reported off TULAGI yesterday and one off BLEACHER today.

A major move of Japanese units from the Empire to the South Pacific in the next few days is indicated. Cardiv 2 seems involved in the move.
September 5, 1942.

ComSoPac 061146 (pink) gives the summary of his operations for that day.

The SOUTH DAKOTA group which included the JUNEAU and 3 DD were ordered to leave BLEACHER today to rendezvous with TaskForce 18 on the 8th. When clearing the harbor the SOUTH DAKOTA hit a pinnacle rock and will probably require drydocking.

The SARATOGA group arrived at BLEACHER (CTF-11 052052). When temporary repairs are made and certain spares and stores are unloaded to be left there that ship will proceed to Pearl with 1 CA, 1 CL and 5 DD as escort. ComSoPac plans to send Vice Admiral Fletcher north with the SARATOGA and make Rear Admiral Noyes ComTaskFor 61.

The WASHINGTON and 3 DDs will arrive at BLEACHER Sept. 13. It now appears that each Task Force 17 and 18 will have a new BB with them by around the 17th of September.

Commanding General, CACTUS 051050 reports another small landing. It is probable that these will continue.

The flurry caused by a report of CVs off SAMOA yesterday was found to be the result of an error.

CinCPac 052005 reminds ComTaskFor 1 that the BBs are now at Pearl to break up any attempted enemy landing in the Hawaiian area. It is now probable that Task Force 1 will remain at Pearl during September.

The FLYING FISH on patrol off TRUK was damaged by depth charges and is returning to Pearl. She reports hitting a BB and setting it on fire.

ComTaskFor 8 052130 advises against the occupation of TANAGA at the same time that the move is being made to ADAK. He suggests that when air support is available from ADAK the TANAGA occupation will be much simplified insofar as escort is concerned. CinCPac concurs with ComTaskFor 8 that the Pribiloffs should not be garrisoned at this time.

There is indication that at least five Jap carriers are in or enroute to the RABAUL area. This, together with continued evidence of large reinforcements to the area point to a major effort to recapture positions in the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI area. Activity in the GILBERTS continues. It now seems probable that most of that group are now or will be occupied by the enemy. ComTaskFor 8 suspects mining in the ALEUTIANS but no mines have been encountered there.
SECRET

September 6th.

Comsopac 050626 expresses his desire for more Marine Raiders. The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion left PEARL today for the South Pacific.

Cominch 061720 pink approves the project to garrison the PRIBILOFS and to delay the occupation of TANAGA.

CTF 8 feels that he has been given orders by General DeWitt to provide escort to the PRIBILOFS and registered a protest to Cinopac. He had not yet received the directive above from Cominch. Thus, a few hours delay on the part of CTF 8 would have cleared up the matter and made his protest unnecessary. Army - Navy command relations in the North Pacific are not good.

Admiral Nimitz left PEARL for San Francisco to confer with Admiral King. Developments in all areas since his departure are summarized in CincPac 072305 pink.

There are no new enemy developments.

September 7th.

The day was generally very quiet. Comsopac 081146 pink summarizes operations that area. The transports were ordered to return to GUADALCANAL at daylight.

450 Jap prisoners from the SOLOMONS will arrive in NEW ZEALAND on the 11th. That Government will accept and be responsible for any prisoners we deliver to them during the current offensive.

Comsopac 072206 gives plans for the employment of Cubs 1 and 13.

The SOUTH DAKOTA will come to Pearl with the SARATOGA, NEW ORLEANS and 5 destroyers.

C.G. Alaska 062210 states that he will defer the garrisoning of the PRIBILOFS. Admiral Theobald strenuously objects to the plan as he considers it strategically unsound.

Fairly good information states that the Japs plan to attack INDIA at the end of the present monsoon season; and that the MILNE BAY occupation is the first step in the attack on AUSTRALIA.

The Japs are now concentrating nearly all of their sea-going forces for the expected attempt to recapture their positions in the TULAGI area.
1. Recapitulation of forces at the disposal of ComSoPac made. Verification requested of ComSoPac.

2. Comments on employment of forces by ComSoPac:
   (a) Calculated risk.
   (b) Operations not closely knit.
   (c) Refueling accomplished at inopportune times.
   (d) Delay in setting up TF 64.
   (e) Surprise attack should not have been possible.
   (f) Distribution of Flag Officers.
   (g) Disadvantages of mixed forces.

3. Discussion of the use of New Zealand troops, etc., also replacement of squadron under MacArthur and his refusal to permit. Effect of Lend-Lease arrangements to be sent shortly. The goal is to have all American equipment in Australia and New Zealand. CominCh related his efforts to get Venturas and explained the situation regarding air craft service units, namely that New Zealand has surplus units and Australia has none. Plan is to make surplus units available to Chorley. Australia is short of air fields and facilities. The saturation point must be maintained.

4. Comment on use of Copahee to supply planes.
5. Comments on Andini force -- 7th Regiment.

6. CinCPac to prepare Press Release covering Brown’s 60-day cruise and Fletcher’s 101-day cruise. Fuelling arrangements to be soft-pedalled.

7. Discussion of material condition of ships and their overhaul. CominCh expressed the view that routine overhaul should be abolished as it is a peace time practice. Overhauls during War should be made only when necessary.

8. NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON permanently in the Pacific Fleet. SOUTH DAKOTA is in a different status. Discussion of employment of new BB’s -- one more to go to Pacific Fleet as soon as available.


10. CominCh spoke of the DE building program and discussed the characteristics of DE’s. (F-2 to submit memo to Admiral on the question of whether or not the Army 90/WW gun can be adapted to ship board use.


13. Change of membership of General Board and effect thereof.

FOLLOWING POINTS BROUGHT UP BY REAR ADMIRAL JACOBS:

14. CinCPac to check on salvage personnel.

15. Survivors of ships should not be sent to shore bases. Instead they should go to new construction. (This is being done).

16. Aviation under new organization "ComAirPac" - orders to aeronautical organization. (F-05 to check on title "Commander U.S. Naval Air Forces".

17. Discharge of McCaleb.

18. Relief for Anderson. Are four Admirals necessary in TF 1? CinCPac says "No".

19. Fitness reports to be more descriptive of the duties performed by officers reported upon.

20. Is ComDesPac freezing his personnel? Answer: Temporarily only; matter is now in hand.


22. Cut down passengers going to Pearl Harbor by Clipper.

Space needed for mail.
25. Recuperation Center for Flag Officers in Hawaii.

24. Employment of negro personnel -- will do well in Africa.

(Rear Admiral Jacobs has no more items.)

25. As a matter of policy, Flag Officers are not to take their staffs with them when transferred.

26. Repairs to California: Electrical material delayed.

Predicted date of completion October 1st. WEST VIRGINIA had seven torpedo hits. Completion depends on repairs to rudder post, about January 1st. Will not require further docking until that time. Oglala goes to coast to be refitted as a mine layer. OKLAHOMA will be righted in November, followed by the UTAH. Guns and powder being removed from ARIZONA.

27. (Admiral Halsey now present.) Discussion of aircraft.

Fleet air wings, groups, etc.

28. Establishment of new air fields and facilities. Why not use Army fields where arrangements can be made? Discussion of training program for 2700 planes -- all hands need not be trained simultaneously.

29. Priority of repair work at Seattle. Should it be given to AVG's in preference to BB's?
September 6, 1942

1. Dispatch sent to Ghormley telling him to get ready one regiment of Marines (three combat teams) and stand by to transfer them to MacArthur along with one Division of combat loaded transports and attached AK. Admiral King remarked that Tasks 2 and 3 go out the window.

2. General DeWitt to be told that Army troops used in occupying various islands in the Aleutians must be under Navy control.

3. Vice Admiral Fletcher, now on route to Pearl, is to come to Washington, reporting to CominCh for temporary duty for about one month.

4. The Fleet Air Command at Seattle was discussed. CinCPac stated that the job was important chiefly because of the reported delays in the manning, commissioning, and fitting out of AVG's. (This question solved temporarily by issuing orders to Captain Ginder to report to Com 15 for additional duty in this connection.) Admiral Freeman notified by telephone.

5. In connection with the Seattle Command, the status of Naval Air Centers and Naval Air Training Centers was discussed with particular reference to whether or not they should be commanded by Flag Officers. Incident to the Seattle situation, CominCh announced that aviators must be qualified for advancement in these cases and that they were to be promoted to fill billets only. Methods of determining who should be promoted were also explained.
6. Personnel items:
   (a) CominCh inquired as to whether or not Hoover could be usefully employed in the Pacific Fleet. CinCPac replied "No billet at present". CominCh said he brought up the matter at this time merely for possible accomplishment at an undetermined date.
   (b) Assignment of Fletcher. Probability of various jobs in Washington for him was discussed.
   (c) Bernhard or McWhorter could relieve Hoover, and Buckmaster could be used to fill in where needed.
   (d) Status of Mason, Ramsey, Bogan, and Wagner touched upon; also rotation of Flag Officers in general.

7. CominCh related his efforts to reorganize the Navy Department and explained the present situation in that respect.

8. To be taken up upon return to Washington:
   Should the supervision of the making ready of AVG's be exercised at CominCh Headquarters?

9. CinCPac dwelt on the method of providing escorts in the Pacific Fleet, also whether or not Leary's request for more ships should be acted upon at this time. Decision made to do nothing about the despatch request but instead,Warnley to lend them as a cover force.

See para 1 above.
10. CominCh discussed prospective additions to the Fleet and stated his opposition to overhauls in Australia. He also spoke of the effect of Second Front operations and the small boat building program. In connection therewith, CominCh spoke of the functions of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, their position with respect to priorities, and how they work. CominCh also explained Mr. Nelson's position as compared to General Sommerville's. Expansion of the Army has resulted in surpluses in non-critical materials. These surpluses ought to be used. (Also, Army fighting planes located in various parts of the Country).

11. The formation of Task Force 64 was reviewed. Admiral King remarked that it was about one month late.

12. Consideration given to the possibility of Vice Admiral Ghormley being unable to stand up physically. Possible reliefs for him were mentioned. CinCPac stated that he preferred Turner. (Subsequently, CinCPac stated that he would check up on Vice Admiral Ghormley's physical examination and notify CominCh of the results.)

13. Tulagi operations - Criticisms of:
   (a) Day dispositions all right; night dispositions look bad.
   Was the best use made of the forces available, particularly Flag Officers; that is, why were they absent from both groups? And why was not consideration given to the question of fatigue?
(b) When Turner retired to Ghormley, Vandergrift left to hold out by himself.

(c) Was the surprise attack a result of inefficiency, and why were not means taken to prevent Jap forces from getting in?

(d) Tactical dispositions discussed by CinCPac. Captain McCormick stated that the delayed despatch made no difference, that is, it was received in time to be acted upon.

(e) Over-all responsibility was Ghormley's; immediate responsibility was Turner's; final judgment to be left until receipt of completed reports. (At this point Major General Upshur called, followed by General DeWitt).

14. (Vice Admirals Halsey and Greenslade present.) Vice Admirals Halsey and Greenslade explained the situation at the Supply Depot at Oakland. Despatch sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to send a personal representative to clear the log jam there. CominCh agreed that this would not solve the problem permanently.

15. Vice Admiral Halsey spoke of the situation with respect to AVG's in Seattle. (This point previously covered.)
16. Vice Admiral Halsey suggested that the Commander of the Fleet Air Detachment at Alameda be given quarters. This proposal met with an emphatic negative. Short discussion relative to status of Fleet Air Detachments.

17. Additional comment with respect to the Supply situation, with reference to the possible establishment of more subordinate commands. Decision made that Commander Service Force could have representatives at Seattle, San Diego, Washington, and perhaps elsewhere, but that these representatives could not build up an organization.

18. Should material be assembled at Auckland or Bleacher? CinCPac remarked that this question is academic at this time because material is being sent to the place where it is used as fast as is possible. McCain's proposal touched upon. Captain McCormick read letter from Rear Admiral Turner to Rear Admiral Spruance.

19. Should submarine type Commanders and their staffs draw submarine pay? CominCh read memo on this subject. Decision made to recommend yes, if the new law leaves it up to the Secretary of the Navy, otherwise this question to be answered in the negative. In other words, if the new law merely increases the figure and says nothing about any other change in the prior law, the same personnel now drawing this pay, and no others, will draw it.

20. CominCh remarked on the necessity of freezing certain people
in their jobs for the duration of the war, such as Intelligence, Aviation, Submarine, and Communication jobs. As food for thought, CominCh mentioned the possibility of establishing "Services", the idea being to detail officers in and out of these "Services". CominCh went on to explain the uses of radio intelligence and stated that it is essentially a communications matter and not a proper function of ONI. Copy of the treatise prepared by the Ensign in Redman's office to be given CinCPac and CinCLant.

21. Upon return to Washington take up with the Army, in connection with their route to the Southwest Pacific, what do if Canton Island is knocked out?

FOLLOWING ITEMS BROUGHT UP BY CINCPAC:

22. MacArthur's discussion of Tulagi's operations.
23. Rear Admiral Byrd's letter regarding Ghormley and MacArthur and Tasks 2 and 3.
24. MacArthur's release of news. It is obvious that the information he releases is obtained only from Secret despatches.
25. Assignment of submarines in the Pacific. (Covered yesterday and now fully understood by CinCPac).
26. Fitch to be ComAirPac; Halsey to be TF Commander. (Also covered yesterday.)
27. Releases of War news. CinCPac states that he is bedeviled by reporters. Wishes Elmer Davis to know that he assumes release of war news to the Press means release to the enemy. CominCh replied that he fought that battle at least once a day.
28. Should there be a Civil Engineer on CinCPac’s Staff? 
Answer: No need for one now, but possibly later. Thomas already given additional duty as such at request of Moreell.

29. Fraser wants a Liaison officer with New Zealand forces and Ghormley. New Zealand man is a Lieutenant General. CominCh replied that the matter is up to Ghormley. Short discussion as to probable functions of Liaison officer.

30. Army reinforcements to SoPac and SoWPac. Fourteen Squadrons earmarked. (Note: General DeWitt says assignment of 37 medium bombers to Western Defense Command has been cancelled.)

31. Upon return to Washington: Take up with the Army the proposition of putting at the disposal of CinCPac another Army Division for amphibian training to replace the Third. This division would go to the Amphibious Force Pacific. CinCPac has no more items.

32. CominCh discussed raider battalions, also the situation in the Marine Corps in general and disposition and distribution.

33. Land based planes are to go to CinCPac. CinCPac notified that there are no more restrictions on the type of plane considered necessary. B-17’s are all right.

34. Should mining operations be undertaken in the Aleutians? Theobald has proposed, CinCPac is opposed, but is investigating. Should the mining be done by submarine? Answer: Supply of torpedoes is a factor.
35. CinCPac has been requested by Ghormley and others to set up an Airplane replacement program. As all available planes will be sent, there is nothing to plan at this time.

36. The question of whether or not Fulcrum should be major airplane repair base was brought up. Not feasible at this time.

37. Brief discussion of the characteristics of P-400's and the best way to employ them.

38. Prospective battle damage repairs to be effected. CinCPac gave approximate dates.

39. Upon return to Washington: F-1 follow up day by day the forwarding of material to repair the ENTERPRISE.

40. Kaneohe projects: CinCPac furnished a letter. F-33 comment to F-0.

41. Ways and means to get the Army to bomb from lower altitude. Upon return to Washington request Army Air Force Headquarters to furnish a digest of High Level Bombing Instructions. When received, send copy to CinCPac and circulate to all other forces with Army units cooperation.

42. Forwarding of casualty lists - classification thereof to be Secret. (Also other routine lists).

43. CinCPac to furnish Cominich tomorrow with complete list of forces at the disposal of ComSoPac.
44. CominCh remarked that in effecting battle damage repairs, bringing ships to the West Coast, thereby permitting contact with families, is a factor. Puget Sound now filled up. The question of where to overhaul the PENNSYLVANIA recently arose. The Pearl Harbor gang is excellent.

45. CominCh told CinCPac that loss of cruisers is off-set by one extra BB. Short discussion followed in regard to other BB's, the WICHITA and TOSCOLLA, also as to how many cruisers Theobald should have. Decision made to make no changes until the weather gets bad. CominCh assured CinCPac that he would have more tools as soon as they became available.

46. CominCh inquired as to how Dunn's organization is working. CinCPac replied that it is working all right but that he has too many people, namely, 13 officers and 28 men. Can Navy Yards be trusted to look out for the interests of the sea going forces? Answer: No. Similar situation existing between Fleet Maintenance in OpNav and BuShips illustrates that the technical people and the sea going people do not talk the same language.
SECRET

1. Shift of Aviation Flight Commands discussed. Decision made that Towers should be relieved by McCain, the former to become ComAirPac with rank of Vice Admiral. Fitch to relieve McCain. Halsey to be Task Force Commander, retaining his rank of Vice Admiral but to be subordinate to Ghormley.

2. Command relations in the Aleutians were discussed. Incidents included Theobald's report against Buckner and the reliefs of both Buckner and Butler. In this connection, Admiral King read a letter from Vice Admiral Freeman who recently made a tour of inspection. The gist of the letter is that bad feeling exists because of bombing limitations placed on Army aviators, which has resulted in the lack of effective Army air support. Vice Admiral Freeman recommends complete support of Theobald. Despatch, originated by CincPac, sent to Theobald to the effect that the J.C.S. directive is interpreted by him and ComInCh to give him the authority he desires with respect to the Pribolofs.

3. Admiral Nimitz discussed the Aleutian situation in general and some points of it in particular, namely the occupation of Kiska and what should be done about it, also the Adak move. Admiral Nimitz does not feel that the occupation of the Pribolofs by the Japs would be profitable, hence does not believe they will undertake it.

4. Admiral King read a letter covering reassignment of submarines in the Pacific Fleet. This covered the transfer of SubDiv 53 to...
CinColant. Various Second Front operations discussed. SubDiv 201 can
go to ComSoPac.

5. Admiral Nimitz stated that the docking situation at
Pearl has improved tremendously - special credit due Salvage Party.

6. Personnel items:
   (a) Monroe to relieve Anderson (not decided).
   (b) Should Anderson relieve Holmes?
   (c) Who should relieve Newton? Hewitt a possibility.
   (d) Should Anderson become Com Eleven?
   (e) Discussion regarding casualties following 58 year
       old physical examination.

7. Authority for ComSoPac to make awards on the spot.

8. It was agreed that it would be desirable to change the
boundary line between ComSoPac and ComSoWPac to give Choralley more free-
dom, but the decision was made not to do it because of possible compli-
cations arising from certain protests from General McArthur.

9. Admiral King discussed the Commands in the SoWPac Force.
Also explained the duties to be performed by Vice Admiral Willson.

10. Admiral King explained Admiral Leahy's duties as Chief
    of Staff to the President.

11. Admiral Nimitz brought up the question of employment of
    battleships of Task Force 1. Gave Admiral King a copy of his despatch
    to ComTask Force 1 on this subject.
12. Admiral Nimitz announced that the development of Midway field has progressed satisfactorily. He also stated that B-17’s are now operating from Johnson Island. Be sure to tell Admiral Bloch.

13. Admiral King brought up the subject of Canton Island in connection with the possibility of using it in the development of an alternate route - Bora Bora - Tongatabu.

14. The details of the Makin raid were related by Admiral Nimitz. The captured sword (with blood still on it) goes to the Naval Academy Museum. The captured machine gun to the Marine Corps Museum. In this connection Admiral King stated that a Third Raider Battalion will be formed in the South Pacific, the nucleus to be men taken from the first and second Raider Battalions. Admiral Nimitz stated that he had recently given orders to round up the Marines in the 14th District who were not doing a man’s work to form such a nucleus. Admiral King questioned their suitability to which Admiral Nimitz replied that they could be used to replace those who were suitable. Admiral King said there would be a fourth after a while.

15. The Under Secretary having made some comment about the supply situation, and having intimated that it might be desirable to have another agency in Washington, it was decided that Admiral Calhoun should have a representative in the Navy Department to act in the same capacity there as Captain Eason does for the Atlantic Fleet. Admiral King remarked that the supply situation in general is a matter for the
Paymaster General, who, although not formally designated as such, acts in the capacity of Fleet Supply Officer.

16. Complications in the Command relations under General MacArthur together with his compliance with the directive he received; Items under the foregoing were the failure of General Brett to get along, and speculation as to what Kenny will be able to do in that capacity. In this connection, the employment of New Zealand ships and troops and a question of who was responsible for the local defense of New Zealand was touched upon. Also, what information is due the New Zealand Government and to what official should it be given.

17. Captain McCormick read a letter from CinCPac to CominCh dated September 2nd on the subject of prospective employment of carriers. Copy of the letter delivered to CominCh.

18. Revision of Tasks 2 and 3 Tulagi operations to be made. Admiral King explained how these tasks were originally decided upon and what the various considerations were, including the part played by the J.C.S.

19. Distinction drawn between communiques and press releases. Admiral Nimitz is to issue communiques but if he feels a press release is desirable it should be submitted to Admiral King.

20. General UpShur has appointment at 10:45 followed by General DeWitt at 11:00.
September 8.

Cominch 082234 gives the plan for employment of New Zealand forces in the war.

Cominch 082237 pink summarizes the Army airplanes in and presently en route to the Pacific Ocean Areas. He reiterates that all these planes are under control of Admiral Nimitz.

Cincpac 081736 directs Sopac to make ready to turn over one regiment of experienced amphibious troops and 1 division of APs to MacArthur.

Cominch believes that MacArthur has a squadron of A-24s which are not being used for combat and suggest Ghormley get them.

Investigation shows that the entrance to Bleacher is safe for the WASHINGTON. The 5 fathom coral head which the SOUTH DAKOTA hit has been buoyed. The SUMNER is not needed now to clear out the entrance.

Comsopac 091146 summarizes the operations for the day in his Area.

The SARATOGA can now go ahead on 4 shafts and back on 3.

Headquarters Marines 081556 is planning a replacement program for the South Pacific.

Task forces 17 and 18 will join under Admiral Noyes on September 11th just east of the NEW HEBRIDIES.

The POMPANO returning from off Japan reports sinking 1 AK, 1 DD, 1 PY.

In the north a submarine was reported at SITKA and another off DIXON. General Dewitt stated that his message concerning the garrisoning of the Pribilofs was not a directive to Admiral Theobald. The incident could and should have been avoided. A submarine on patrol sighted two destroyers at ATTU.

The Japanese continue to build up forces in the South Pacific. There are indications that the 17th army left Truk yesterday for Guadalcanal. The APs are escorted by DDs only. If this be true that army can attack Guadalcanal as early as September 13th.
SECRET

September 9th.

Comsopac 091016 and 091018 plus 100255 all pink give the new operating plan for the South Pacific Forces. It will be put in effect by despatch, presumably on the eleventh.

There were no contacts in the South Pacific area yesterday and all forces are busily engaged in strengthening positions. The landing field at CACTUS is inoperative today (Comainersopac 091215).

At least 1000 Japs are estimated to have landed on NW GUADALCANAL (C.G. 1st Marine Division 080935). Thus about 2000 have been landed on that island recently. The second group is in the vicinity of TAIWO.

Cominch 082030 says that the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion will be formed at SAMOA.

The ENTERPRISE will arrive at PEARL for repairs tomorrow. The SARATOGA group, which includes the SOUTH DAKOTA, will fuel at BLEACHER tomorrow and depart immediately thereafter for PEARL. That carrier believes she can make an engine speed of 15 knots for the trip.

TF1 continues training at PEARL. The force is constantly ready to break up any attempted enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN area.

Comnowestseafon 100202 gives the progress of the FIREPLACE operation. The ALEUTIANS are otherwise quiet.

September 10th

The operations for the day in the South Pacific are summarized in his 111320 (pink).

Because of the serious situation which now confronts Admiral Ghormley and because he needs the 7th Marines now at GUADALCANAL, he plans to make the 8th Marines available to General MacArthur when ordered to do so by CinCPac. That regiment will not be ready until October 1st (Comsopac 110516 (pink)).

Admiral Ghormley's 101156 (pink) stresses the need for more VFs. And his 101152 gives the organization of the South Pacific Force as of September 11th.

(continued on next page)
September 10th (continued):

Admiral Turner (100725) suggests that Pacific Fleet submarines now be employed off the eastern NEW GUINEA coast. In this connection, the only submarine now immediately available was offered to General MacArthur for patrol off SHORTLAND Island. The offer was not accepted as ComSWPac is employing his own submarines to the westward of the SOLOMONS.

There was no news from the ALEUTIANS.

The ENTERPRISE group arrived at Pearl. The SARATOGA group should depart BLEACHER today.

Task Force 1 departs tomorrow for four days training off Cahu.

There is some evidence that the forces for the counter attack on GUADALCANAL are now approaching that area. If our information is correct, they can be expected to arrive there in great strength. There is no indication of prospective Jap effort in any place except the South and Southwest Pacific.

September 11.

CinCPac 120315 (pink) states that sending the 8th Marines to reinforce General MacArthur is the best that can be done under the circumstances.

GUADALCANAL 120530 (pink). Admiral Turner agrees with General Vandegrift that GUADALCANAL must have at least one more regiment for defense. Admiral Turner proposes to sail the 7th Marines to that place from ESPIRITU SANTO on the 14th, covering the move with all task forces. His 092300 (pink) gives status of the 7th Marines and stresses need for troops to bring the Southeast SOLOMONS under firm control.

ComSoPac 121241 summarizes the operations for the day. One enemy carrier and one enemy cruiser was sighted by our patrol plane during the afternoon in Lat 7-20S, Long 168-50E. This group was probably seen further South later in the afternoon. A flight of 15 B-17s were ordered to attack, but have not yet reported results. During the night at least one cruiser and four destroyers shelled the Marines on GUADALCANAL.

Admiral Nimitz returned from his conference with Admiral King in San Francisco. It seems very difficult to interest the Army in the war in the Pacific. Cominch 111802 gives the status of one Army regiment of the 43rd Division. It can be expected to be ready to leave the West Coast early next month.
September 11th (Continued)

The GUARDFISH reports sinking 50,000 tons of enemy shipping along their ore route.

In his 112130 (pink), ComTaskFor 8 reports progress in the ADAK airfield operation. The Army found a quick way to make an airfield by draining Sweeper Creek. The field is 9,000 feet long and averages 500 feet wide. A B-18 landed there today. It was expected that the construction of this field would take months. In his 112120 he gives his escort plan for the garrisoning of the Pribiloff's.

CinCPac has approved a plan for quite extensive defensive mining at ADAK.

The enemy continues to assemble his forces for an attack on GUADALCANAL. There are indications that paratroops will be employed in an effort to capture the airfield. There is no new evidence of changes in the Jap deployments.

September 12th.

There continues to be considerable enemy surface and air activity in the Central and Northern SOLOMONS. During the afternoon a patrol plane sighted a good sized group of enemy cruisers and destroyers about 200 miles northeast of MALAITA. GUADALCANAL was shelled again last night by at least one cruiser and two destroyers. The situation at that place is shown in Rear Admiral Turner's 130933. A major attack on GUADALCANAL is to be expected in the near future.

The plan to land the 7th Marines on GUADALCANAL, dawn Sept. 16th, has been approved by Cominich and CinCPac. (ComSoPac 130540 (pink) gives the general directive).

The first ACORN is now enroute the South Pacific and the second should leave the West Coast September 17th.

The ALEUTIANS were generally quiet.

Further enemy activity in the GILBERTs is noted.

Radio Intelligence indicates that Cardiv 2 is still in home waters. The SHOKAKU and ZUKAKU are still unheard. It is still uncertain as to whether or not the RYUJO was badly damaged and possibly sunk on August 24th. CinC Combined Fleet continues to show much interest in the SOLOMONS situation.
September 13.

During the late morning our search planes discovered two enemy forces in the area to the eastward of the SOLOMONS. One force was composed of three BBs, four cruisers, four DDs, one transport heading southeast. When last seen the force was on a northerly course. 14 B-17s attacked and claim 2 hits. The second force was located about 120 miles north of the BB group, and contained 1 CV, cruisers, and DDs.

For the past two days the Japs have been attacking the Marines on GUADALCANAL from the rear and flank. The attacks were repulsed, enemy dead over 10 to our 1. It is believed that the enemy will attempt to surround the Marines and try to capture the airfield. An enemy bombing raid was repulsed.

Due to approaching hostile forces our transports and tenders were withdrawn to the south.

Rear Admiral Turner's plan to land the 7th Marines (CTF-63 140133 pink) may be delayed because of the enemy ships sighted during the day.

Comsopac 120544 again comments on the fact that P-400s are of little use to him. Comairsopac desires about 12 B-17Es from Hawaii at this time. These will be sent. Eventually, when they can be handled in the south about 15 more will be sent from Hawaii.

Twenty fleet subs and two tenders will be maintained at present in the Southwest Pacific. The S-boats now there will be withdrawn.

In the ALEUTIANS a sub was reported off SEGUN Island. The CASCO has been refloated and will be towed to DUTCH HARBOR.

The enemy continues to assemble large forces of all kinds for attack in the South Pacific. At least five CVs and four BBs may now be in the BISMARCK-SOLOMONS area. The Japs seem to be concentrating almost everything they have except their battleline in that area. A small force is now to land in the GILBERTS. TARAWA may be the first landing point. It is probably the best place in that island group.
SECRET

September 14th.

TF 61 composed of the WASP and HORNET groups under Rear Admiral Noyes was proceeding to the westward, speed 12, to rendezvous with TF 64 and 65 (7th Marines in APs and escort under Rear Admiral Turner). The carrier groups had been ordered to cover the landing of the 7th Marines to reinforce our position on GUADALCANAL. At 1440 local 15th the WASP was torpedoes. Twelve minutes later the NORTH CAROLINA received one torpedo hit. Rear Admiral Scott 151255 pink and CTF 17 150929 pink described the action and give future moves. The torpedoing was certainly done by one or more submarines and the subs are indicated as having reported results by radio.

Comsopacs 141350 pink summarizes the operations for the 14th. Much of this has been recorded before.

C.G. Marines 1st Div 141045 pink gives the details of fighting on the 13th and 14th. His 150226 amplifies the first report and goes on to say that after severe fighting his position continues to be satisfactory. If the disaster to TF 61 does not change our plans, the 7th Marines will be landed tomorrow in the vicinity of the LUNGA river. A group of 7 enemy DDs was heading toward GUADALCANAL in the afternoon and it seems probable that they will land reinforcements there tonight. It must be recorded that our surface forces in the South Pacific have done nothing the past 30 days to prevent or interrupt these night landings and shellings of Marine positions.

Cincpac 142247. It is planned to send one tender and six fleet submarines to operate under Vice Admiral Ghormley. The message also requests part of General MacArthur's area for submarine operations.

The WASHINGTON group leaves BLEACHER today for the active area.

TF 1 returned to Pearl from a training cruise south of OAHU.

There was a possible submarine sighting off the FARALLONS.

Rear Admiral Pitch will relieve Rear Admiral McCain as Comairspac. Vice Admiral Leary will relieve Vice Admiral Pye as CTF 1. He may also relieve Rear Admiral Anderson as Combatships.

The GROWLER returning from patrol reports sinking 20,000 tons and damaging 6000 tons.
September 14 (Continued)

In the ALEUTIANS photo reconnaissance shows 4 SS, 3 AK at Kiska and 1 SS, 1 CM and DDs at ATTU. CTF-8 150039 gives his views concerning the strategic location of airfields and the need for Army troops in the North Pacific.

At least 17 enemy submarines are operating in the SOLOMONS area as advance screen and attacking group for the enemy surface forces thought to the north and eastward of the SOLOMONS. While enemy strength in that general area cannot be stated accurately, it is possible that major units include as many as 5 CVs and 3 BBs. The NAGATO may be in the SOLOMONS.

September 15th.

Comsopac 161220 pink summarizes operations for the day. The need for avgas at GUADALCANAL is acute and the BELLATRIX will be sent there tomorrow to supply this need. Comsopac 160900 gives his estimate that the next two days are favorable for unloading stores, etc., in the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI area. Because of the threatening situation Rear Admiral Turner did not bring in the 7th Marines for the planned reinforcement of our Southern SOLOMONS positions.

TF 17 and units of TF 18 were combined to rendezvous September 17 (local) and will operate to westward of the longitude of EFATE and within 200 miles of that base awaiting further developments. Cruisers and DDs of TF 18 arrived at ESPIRITO SANTO where they will land hospital cases, then proceed to NOUMEA.

General MacArthur sees many difficulties in PacFleet subs operating in his area. If any go there he would desire operational control. The plan to send one tender and 6 SS to Comsopac is thus held in abeyance for further study. The AMBERJACK has been moved from patrol of KAVIENG to the north and east of the BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT area.

Our submarine on patrol in lat 24-25 N, long 139-01 E sighted an enemy CV escorted by 2 DD.

Comsubpac proposes and Cincpac approves the conversion of the ARGONAUT to a troop carrying submarine (Comsubpac 150144).

The CUTTFISH in the CHINA SEA reports sinking a 10,000 ton passenger freighter and a 19,000 ton tanker.

In the ALEUTIANS the Army air made a very successful air raid on KISKA (CTF 8 151905). Thus the new airfield at ADAK has started to pay dividends.

It now appears that Cardiv 2 (HITAKA and HAYATAKA included) have left home waters for the South Pacific. There are no other important enemy moves.
September 16.

Consopac 171216 pink summarizes the day in the South Pacific. The NORTH CAROLINA is not seriously damaged (CTF-17 151235 pink) and will arrive at TONGATABU the 19th local date. When temporary repairs are completed she will sail for Pearl. The 7th Marines are expected to arrive at GUADALCANAL tomorrow. Reports of large numbers of enemy vessels, mostly destroyers and auxiliaries, continue to be received from reconnaissance planes over the central and north SOLOMONS.

There is continued minor enemy activity in the GILBERTS. Because of this, consideration will be given to establishing a landing field in the ELLICE Islands.

The USS CRYSTAL grounded at MIDWAY when shifting berth in the lagoon.

TF-1 continues training in the OAHU area and remains ready to oppose an enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN Area.

A PBY on patrol from MIDWAY was attacked by a MITSUBISHI twin engine plane 445 miles southeast of MIDWAY. No damage was done to either plane.

Cominch proposed to convert 6 ODD now with TF-8 to APDs. Replacements would come from the Pacific Fleet.

There is nothing new concerning enemy moves. Interest of the enemy continues to be centered in the South Pacific. As long as this continues there seems little chance of an attack on the MIDWAY-OAHU line.

General Emmons was brought up to date on current happenings at a conference held by Admiral Nimitz this morning.

General Emmons just returned from a visit in the South and Southwest Pacific. He had a long talk with General MacArthur the gist of which was that (1) NEW GUINEA can be taken by the Japs any time they are ready, (2) he thinks our positions in the SOLOMONS is very precarious, and (3) as soon as the Japs clear us out of the SOLOMONS they will attack HAWAII.
SECRET

September 17th.

Comsopac 181231 pink summarizes operations in his area for the day. The B-17 attacks and the SBD attacks were particularly ineffective. The NORTH CAROLINA is not badly damaged, as noted before. She was examined at BLEACHER and the Captain reports her ready for further active service but with speed reduced to 24 knots. The O'BRIEN was examined at ESPIRITO SANTO and is badly damaged. She will be escorted to NOUMEA. The loss of the WASP is briefly described in Comsopac 181140 pink.

The enemy radio at GUADALCANAL reported the arrival of TF 64 and 65. About midnight surface forces arrived and bombarded the marine position. Presumably our surface forces had departed shortly after dark. The unloading of fuel, food, and other needed material in this area is severely handicapped by enemy activity. At present the only solution seems to keep our ships away during darkness and to get them underway when day air attacks are reported coming in. And until a better solution is found our situation will continue unsatisfactory.

The HADDOCK returning from patrol in the East China Sea reports sinking 26,000 tons of freighters.

The landing mat on SAND ISLAND, MIDWAY, is now ready for emergency use.

The Central and North Pacific areas are general quiet.

The COPAHEE left PEARL today with fighter and dive bomber replacements for Sopec. She is also transporting personnel for Patwing ONE. Vice Admiral Ghormley will be given authority to retain her there as a carrier, otherwise to return her to SAN DIEGO.

No changes in Jap deployment are noted. The inability to "read the mail" leaves us in the dark. We can guess, but are never sure.
September 18.

The Pacific Ocean Areas are generally quiet. With the landing of the 7th Marines at GUADALCANAL there are about 15,000 troops there. TF-17 was ordered to cover the retirement of TF-65. The main problem in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area now is to build up the airfield so that land based planes can cover own shipping there.

Vice Admiral Leary arrived from AUSTRALIA and brings a rather depressing view of the situation there. The Australians seem to have little enthusiasm for fighting the Japs in NEW GUINEA who can probably prevent use of the PORT MORESBY airfields.

The NORTH CAROLINA is now reported able to make only 18 knots and has been ordered to PEARL.

Cominch 122200 pink gives General MacArthur's present estimate and wants to know what the Pacific Fleet will do to prevent a seaborne invasion in his area. There are now about 20,000 troops in the PORT MORESBY area and around 10,000 in the MILNE BAY area.

Since the start of the war our submarines in the Pacific Ocean have sunk approximately 1,016,000 tons of Jap ships.

The Hawaiian Sea Frontier will take over the direction of the daily Hawaiian search on September 24th. Up to now it has been run by the Patrol Wings under Cincpac's general direction.

The ALEUTIANS are quiet.

The locations of Jap carriers continues indefinite. It is assumed that at least four are in the area south of TRUK. There is no good indication of the objective of the Japs next move except that it will be in the Southwestern Pacific.
September 19.

Comsopac 201240 pink summarizes the day in his area. TF-17 will be reorganized in the near future. Meanwhile it will operate in the general area bounded by 13 and 20 degrees south, 165 and 177 east prepared to take offensive action against suitable enemy targets within reach. In his 201542 pink Cominch questions the employment of striking forces on a strategically static basis in submarine infested waters.

The question raised by General MacArthur regarding the employment of the Pacific Fleet to repel Jap landings in NEW GUINEA was answered by CinCPac 200145 pink.

Minor enemy surface and plane movements continue to be observed by our search planes in the Central SOLOMONS and in the general area to the east of the SOLOMONS. Major units were not observed within the limits of our search.

A drydock at AUCKLAND capable of taking a damaged BB is under consideration.

Vice Admiral Leary will relieve Vice Admiral Pye as CTF-1 and also assume Combatships on September 20th.

CTF-8 summarizes his need for destroyers in connection with the withdrawal of ODDS for conversion to APDs (his 190225). The first phase of FIREPLACE will be regarded as completed tomorrow.

There is no new information of enemy deployments. The carrier locations are very much in doubt. There is some possibility that the enemy may make a raid similar to our MAKIN raid on our staging route to the South Pacific.

September 20.

Only minor enemy activity is noted in Comsopac daily summary (211221 pink).

CTF-8 210030 states that bad weather has prevented further attacks on KISHA. His 201949 reports the landing of an Army garrison at ST PAUL in the PRIBILOFS, and of an Army landing at ATKA. His 202100 objects to reported reduction of Army planes in the Alaskan Sector and gives his estimate of current army plane requirements.

CinCPac 202147 pink suggests that our striking forces anchor at NOUMEA except when employed on specific attacks.

APAIANA and TARAWA in the GILBERTS report continued enemy activity. This indicates that those atolls are not yet completely occupied. CinCPac is now considering occupying FUNAPUTI in the ELLICE Islands where the Japs are indicated as going around the first of October.

No change in enemy deployment was noted during the day.
**SECRET**

**September 21**

The reorganized task forces under Vice Admiral Ghormley are as shown in his 221002. Rear Admiral Murray retains command of TF 17 in spite of the fact that Rear Admiral Lee in the WASHINGTON is senior.

Operations in the South Pacific are as shown in Comsopac 221256 pink.

Admiral Nimitz expects to arrive in NOUMEA September 28 for a conference with Admiral Ghormley. He will also inspect various South Pacific activities.

Rear Admiral Turner 212207 tells of Japanese methods of fighting ashore and lists some of our shortcomings and makes recommendations to correct deficiencies.

The 2nd Raider Battalion will initially disembark at ESPIRITO SANTO.

CTF 8 202130 gives the mining plan for ADAK.

The SOUTH DAKOTA and SARATOGA group arrived at PEARL for repairs. The NORTH CAROLINA is due at PEARL for repairs September 30th.

There is no new information on location of major Jap units. Carrier deployment is most uncertain. There continues to be strong evidence of a large scale attack to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS.

Cincpac 220035 is a proposal for the occupation of FUNAFUTI.

**September 22**

There were no important contacts or developments in the South Pacific during the day.

General MacArthur seems to expect one Marine regiment about October 1st. On September 8 Cincpac ordered a regiment made ready for duty in the SWPac but it is not yet certain that the Marines will be sent. All available troops in the SoPac are urgently needed by Admiral Ghormley at present.

Admiral Nimitz invited General MacArthur to a conference in NOUMEA next week and General MacArthur invited Admiral Nimitz to extend his trip South to Brisbane. Neither of these officers feel that they can be away from their commands long enough to cross the Coral Sea.

The 3rd Marine Raider Battalion was formed at SAMOA on September 20th.
The first of 12 B-17s from OAHU to SoPac are now enroute and 12 more are being prepared for early despatch.

Comsopac 221226 pink gives his plan for the occupation of FUNAFUTI.

The AMBERJACK on patrol off BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT reports sinking one 5000 ton freighter. While there she grounded and suffered damage to her sound gear.

The ALEUTIANS continued quiet.

There is continued doubt regarding present deployment of Jap major units. A large number of subs are in the South Pacific and a good number of cruisers and destroyers are sighted in the SOLOMONS - NEW BRITAIN area. All evidence continues to point to a large attack in the near future to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS.

September 23

Comsopac 24.0206 pink orders the occupation of FUNAFUTI about October 2nd. Under Rear Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral Wright will command the expedition.

Comsopac 231326 gives the general plan for the employment of CUBS, ACORNS, and construction battalions.

Comsopac 231251 states that the harbor of NOUMEA is very congested and requests weight handling and other equipment. As operations progress in the present offensive it becomes more and more apparent that facilities and equipment needed to support the operation were not made available initially. Cincpac 232249 generally concurs with Rear Admiral Turner's recommendations to perfect our amphibious efforts.

There is some indication that GIZO and FAISI are mined. While the day was quiet in the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI area, all our moves were promptly reported by Jap radio on GUADALCANAL.

There were possible submarine sightings by Army planes today - one off FANNING ISLAND and one 240 miles SW of CANTON ISLAND.

The ALEUTIANS continue quiet.

Indications continue of Jap plans to recapture the southern SOLOMONS and eastern NEW GUINEA. There is some evidence that this operation may be delayed.
Cominchi 241630 pink concurs that a Marine regiment experienced in amphibious warfare to General MacArthur will depend on developments. The message also requests plans for the employment of the Army 43rd Division.

The South Pacific is generally quiet. This may be the lull before the storm as all indications continue to point to major Jap operations there in the very near future. TF 17 is about to enter NOUMEA, while the WASHINGTON group is approaching TONGATA'U. The unloading at GUADALCANAL has greatly improved in the past few days and critical shortages in the area have been supplied.

The ALEUTIANS continue quiet.

There are no changes in Jap major deployments. Apparently small garrisons are being left on the atolls in the GILBERTS and allied coast watchers are being captured.

Arrangements for the occupation of FUNAFUTI regarding air coverage are shown in Comsopac 260826 and 261156, and Comairsopac 251228.

Comsopac 251456 gives operations for the 24th in his area. There were no major developments or contacts. The performance of the SBDs from CACTUS against approaching enemy DDs was not good.

Admiral Nimitz and party were delayed at PALMYRA due to engine trouble in his plane.

Plans are going forward to establish an advanced base at NOUMEA along the lines described in Comsopac 260434.

CTF 8 251950 and 260645 indicate that the Japs have abandoned ATTU. Increased activity at KSKA might possibly indicate an abandonment there also. It is hard to see where the Japs have profited in their ALEUTIAN adventure.

Indications of preparation for a major Japanese offensive in the South Pacific continue. Best guess is that they plan to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS, PORT MORESBY and attack AUSTRALIA. They are thought to be making a major effort to assemble the means for this in the RABAUL area. This being the case, no move on the OAHU-MIDWAY line is expected. Nor will they be able to launch a major attack toward INDIA.
From: Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Amphibious Training of Army Troops for Operations in Kiska Area.

1. Weather conditions in the Western Aleutians since the occupation by the Japanese of Kiska and Attu have been such that neither aircraft bombing or surface ship bombardment of Kiska nor submarine operations off that port have been able to prevent the enemy from consolidating and strengthening his hold in that area.

2. There is no indication that weather conditions will be such as to ensure the ejection of the Japanese from Kiska as a result of aerial bombing to be conducted from Adak.

3. The current stalemate has caused the neutralization of the considerable naval strength now assigned to Task Force EIGHT without a corresponding holding or reduction of Japanese naval forces.

4. Information received from Commander Task Force EIGHT states that he has arranged with General DeWitt for Army garrisons of 15,000 men for Adak and 5,000 men for Tanaga.

5. It is believed that a satisfactory solution for the Aleutian situation can be reached only through the ejection of the Japanese from Kiska and Attu. Such ejection can be effected only by a landing of amphibious troops.

6. It is therefore recommended that the Army at once begin the amphibious training of a suitable contingent of troops now in the Alaskan Area (including Adak and Tanaga) with a view to retaking Kiska and then Attu when suitable ships are available for this operation.
September 26.

Operations for the 26th in the South Pacific are summarized in ComSoPac 261256. Air offensive operations, particularly against enemy shipping in the SHORTLANDS and RABAUL areas, have been stepped up by both ComSoPac and Com-SWPac. Our Task Forces there, except those in the FUNAFUTI operation, are in port.

Vice Chief of Naval Operations suggests SUVA as an advance base depot for storage of Cub and Acorn material. ComSoPac 261259 requests that the decision on this be deferred.

The mail situation has, and continues to be bad in the South Pacific. Officers and men go for months without mail. The job has been sadly bungled.

CominCh 261302 suggests that troops to be moved to forward positions be given amphibious training in the Central and South Pacific. He suggests training centers at OAHU, WELLINGTON, SAMOA, and NOUMEA or FIJI.

ARD-2 will be towed at once from OAHU to NOUMEA.

CTF-8 262020 and 262330 describes another successful air raid on KISKA. The ADAK field is paying good dividends.

General MacArthur wants the marines to clean out the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA. He has about 15,000 troops in that area now and seems to expect 5,000 marines to be necessary in addition. As previously noted, the despatch of amphibious troops to the Southwest Pacific from the South Pacific will depend on developments. No present developments indicate that such a plan is suitable. See his 270800 pink.

C.G. SAMOA urges prompt action in furnishing 2500 marines to bring his garrison up to strength and ComSoPac concurs.

There are no major changes in Jap deployments.

September 27.

The general situation in the South Pacific is improving. Admiral McCain, who has just been relieved as Comairsopac, told the morning conference that GUADALCANAL can be held if sufficient fighter planes and pilots can be brought in to maintain present levels. The Japs are afraid of our F4F and will not attack them consistently. Unfortunately, the requisite number of VF and trained pilots are not yet in sight. Admiral Ghormley's 271436 summarizes the day except that during the day 25 enemy VB covered by 0 fighters approached GUADALCANAL and were intercepted by our fighters who shot down 23 VB and several 0's without loss to themselves. A magnificent performance.
TF-17 is in port at WHITE POPPY. The WASHINGTON group is at TONGATABU. The ENTERPRISE group may be able to leave Pearl for the south about October third.

TF-1 continues to conduct minor training exercises in the OAHU area.

TF-3 continues comparatively inactive as they are hampered by lack of APs for training. In a recent letter Vice Admiral Greenslade reported that our landing boat personnel are definitely inferior to the Army. This is another manifestation of naval growing pains.

TF-8 was quiet.

While there are indications that the Japs will make an all out effort in the Southern SOLOMONS and possibly NEW GUINEA, there are also many signs which point to troubles that he is having. It seems reasonable to suppose that we have now destroyed the cream of his naval air pilots. Also, our attrition attacks on his ships and planes must be causing them extreme difficulties. Our submarines are causing increasing shipping shortages.

Admiral Nimitz and party arrived during the afternoon at NOUMEA.

September 28.

Operations on the 28th in the South Pacific are summarized in Comsopac 281326. Admiral Nimitz apparently completed his conference with Vice Admiral Ghormley and with General MacArthur’s Chief of Staff and with his Air Force General and went on to ESPIRITO SANTO. Among the things discussed was the employment of the 8th Marines which are earmarked for the NDENI garrison and the 43rd Army division for the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area (see Comsopac 290256 pink).

The ALHENA completed unloading at GUADALCANAL. The unloading follows the same pattern each day: the AK with a DD escort unloads during daylight and departs each evening via the LENGO channel, returning that way in the early morning. The Japs have observed and reported this procedure.

The COPAHEE is having some troubles in shaking down.

There are labor troubles at WELLINGTON. Waterfront workers refuse to work overtime and unloading is being unduly delayed.
SECRET

September 28 (continued)

The TROUT reports hitting a large CV off TRUK with two torpedoes. This may be the ZUKAKU. Another Jap carrier reports being attacked by a submarine. As this latter is thought to have occurred off NEW IRELAND and as the TROUT was definitely off TRUK, it seems probable that two Jap carriers are in trouble.

The Central and North Pacific areas are quiet. There is nothing to confirm the suspicion that the Japs plan to evacuate KISKA.

A good RDF cut places the CinC 1st Air Fleet in the vicinity of the GREENWICH Islands. While some CVs seem to be leaving the South for the homeland there is no major change in Jap intentions noted.

September 29.

SoPac 291226 summarizes operations on the 29th in his area. The ALHENA was torpedoed leaving GUADALCANAL but not sunk. She will be towed to BUTTON. Our AKs are continually exposed to this submarine menace. TF-17 continues in port waiting for suitable targets.

Minor activity continues in the GILBERTS. All islands there can be considered visited by the Japs and small garrisons have been placed on the principal atolls. Planes were reported over the ELLICE Islands.

The Central Pacific is generally quiet. Good progress is being made at PEARL in repair of damaged CVs and the SOUTH DAKOTA.

The Army bombed KISKA again on the 27th and 28th. CTF-8 30030 summarizes known results. It seems confirmed that the Japs have abandoned ATU and AGGATU. Withdrawal of some ships of TF-8 from the area may be possible soon.

The Japs are suffering attrition losses of planes and ships in the SOLOMONS. They continue to land troops on GUADALCANAL. And they continue to bring in planes and ships to the general RABAUL area. KAVIENG is becoming an important airplane center.
September 30.

There were no important contacts in the South Pacific during the day. Comsopac plans to employ TF-17 to strike the shipping in the SHORTLANDS Area on October 5th (local). His 011302 pink.

Comamphibiousforsopac 301022 and 301030 gives the need of landing boats for his operations. At present there is such a shortage that further major operations can not be undertaken.

Comsopac 010454 gives the disposition of Acorns 3 and 4. He outlines the needs of equipment and repair facilities to support his operations.

The 8th Marines are now assembled at TUTUILA and are being trained in amphibious warfare.

Admiral Nimitz plans to arrive at NOUMEA tomorrow and at SUVA the day after.

CTF-8 302335 amplifies the report of army bombing at KISKA. As an enemy plane dropped 1 - 100# bomb at ATKA yesterday it must be assumed that the FIREPLACE operations has been discovered.

The enemy has changed his communication systems completely. Thus, for some time now we can expect very little information from radio intelligence.

October 1.

Comsopac 301300 and 011716 give operations in his area for the past three days. There were no unusual happenings recorded. Other sources report that an enemy DD was hit by our bombs and damaged north of the NEW GEORGIA group and an enemy cruiser is aground on a reef in TONOLEI harbor. During the past weeks our aircraft and submarines have inflicted quite satisfactory damage on enemy ships in the South and Southwest Pacific. During the day enemy fighters and bombers appeared over GUADALCANAL. Our fighters intercepted but lost 6 VF to the enemy's 4 Zeros. Comairsopac 020050 pink suggests that B-17s from GUADALCANAL bomb in the SOLOMONS when the HORNET group attacks the BUIN area and that MacArthur hit the RABAUL area. He also notes that B-17s are not entirely suitable to give a CV fighter coverage. Comsopac concurs if the airfield at GUADALCANAL can take B-17s.

Admiral Ghormley 010812 describes the use of NOUMEA as a carrier replacement harbor and gives needs.
October 1 (continued)

KISKA was again attacked by Army air yesterday. Results were not impressive and are shown in CTF-8 012100.

General Marshall 0049Z/30 directs amphibious training for army units be commenced in the Hawaiian area.

The ZUIKAKA is probably now in Japan. Traffic analysis indicates that only three CVs are in the TRUK-RABAUL area. There are no indications as to when the enemy expects to launch a major attack on the Southern SOLOMONS. Change in all his call signs makes it impossible for R.I. to analyse current Jap moves.

October 2.

Comsopac 021436 gives operation summary for his area on the 1st. Nothing extraordinary happened.

Comairsopac 030244 pink gives his plan of cooperation with TF 17 for the 5th.

CTF 62 022110 pink gives plans to attack Jap positions from seaward on the 5th.

Cominch 022120 pink gives troops and planes agreed to for the FIREPLACE operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No mention is made of the ATKA garrison.

CTF 8 022025 reports Army bombing of KISKA with minor results. He also reports that ADAK was bombed by an enemy plane. No damage resulted but the airfield project there was definitely discovered.

No changes are noted in Jap deployment.

Admiral Nimitz arrived at SUVA.

October 3.

ComSo Pac 031356 gives operations in that area for the 1st. The usual shipping was noted in the SHORTLANDS AREA. FUNAFUTI was occupied as described in TF 62.6 - 040330. The planned landing of marines to the westward of the GUADALCANAL position was postponed at the request of CG 1st Marines. GREENWICH was observed by plane. Only one small non-combatant ship was seen in the lagoon and no air field was discovered. Thus the belief that this place is being used as a fleet anchorage or as a plane staging point is shown incorrect.

CTF 8 - 032010 reports another Army bombing of KISKA on the 2nd.
SECRET

FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

28 September 1942.

1. The following estimate of location of Orange strength in the Pacific is submitted. Locations are of 27 September 1942.

ALEUTIANS

Six submarines. NACHI and CruDiv 22 are in the northern area but probably not in vicinity of Aleutians. About one DesDiv is operating between Aleutians and Empire. Attu has probably been abandoned. No definite estimate of troop strength is possible, but troop movement out of Kiska area is indicated. Not more than twenty planes of all types.

EMPIRE

HITAKA and HAYATAKA remain in the Empire.

SOLOMONS

CruDiv 6, DesRon 3, part of DesRon 4, 2 minelayers, 11th Seaplane Tender Division, a considerable number of subchasers and light craft. There are twelve submarines in the eighth fleet area. Sasebo #6 Landing Force is in transports in the Shortlands area.

NEW GUINEA

CruDiv 16 and a few destroyers. Air strength about 50 planes. Troop strength 5,000-6,000.

NEW BRITAIN AREA

OTAKA arriving in this area. SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU are probably to the south of Truk. One battleship indicated in New Britain area and two or possibly three more are at least as far south as Truk. CruDiv 4 is in the Truk Rabaul area. CruDiv 8 is unlocated but probably still in the southern area with CarDiv One. CruDiv 16 is in the Rabaul area. The air strength is estimated at 142 planes in the whole New Britain-Solomon area. Troop strength 3,500—4,000 in New Britain.

EAST INDIES

Quiet.

MARSHALLS

Estimate air strength 130-140 planes. Three submarines in the area.
SECRET

ESTIMATE OF FUTURE OPERATIONS

No change since last report.
## Flag Cinc Combined

**Cinc Combined in Truk area.**

Part of Staff in SENDAI in Solomons.
No recent information. Truk area 9/16.

**BatDiv 1**

**NAGATO**

No information.
Indicated in Rabaul area by associations.
No information.

**MUTSU**

**YAMASHIRO**

**BatDiv 2**

**ISE**

**HYUGA**

**FUSO**

**MUSASHI**

No information. Indicated Truk area 9/16.
No information.
No information.
Empire.

**BatDiv 3**

**KONGO**

**KIRISHIMA**

**HIEI**

**HARUNA**

Truk area - or south.
No late information.
No late information.
No late information. Indicated Truk 9/19.
**SECRET**

| CARRIERS |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| **CarDiv 1** |
| SHOKAKU |
| ZUIKAKU |
| ZUIHO |
| **Empire.** |
| **At least as far south as Truk.** |
| **Enroute Truk to Empire.** |
| **CarDiv 2** |
| HAYATAKA |
| HITAKA |
| KYUJO |
| **Empire.** |
| **Empire.** |
| **Probably sunk.** |
| **KASUGA MARU** |
| OTAKA |
| HOSHIG | |
| YAWATA MARU |
| UNYOU |
| **May be same ship as OTAKA.** |
| **Vicinity of Kavieng.** |
| **No information.** |
| **May be same ship as UNYOU.** |
| **Enroute Kure to Truk via Chichijima and Saipan.** |
| CRUISERS | CruDiv 4  
| ATAGO  
| TAKAO  
| MAYA  | Truk area or south.  
| Truk - Rabaul area.  
| Probably arriving Empire from Truk.  
| CruDiv 5  
| HAGURO  
| MYOKO  | Some indication CruDiv 5 in Palau area.  
| No information.  
| No information.  
| CruDiv 6  
| AOBA  
| KINUGASA  
| FURUTAKA  
| KAKO  | No information.  
| No information.  
| Solomons  
| Possibly sunk.  
| CruDiv 7  
| KUMANO  
| SUZUYA  
| MOGAMI  | Probably damaged.  
| No information.  
| Under repairs in Empire.  
| CruDiv 8  
| TONE  
| CHIKUMA  | Still in Truk area or south.  
| Probably still in southern area.  
| CruDiv 9  
| KITAGAMI  
| OI  | No information.  
| No information.  
| CruDiv 10  
| NAGARA  | No late information.  
| CruDiv 11  
| AGANO  | No information.  
| CruDiv 16  
| NATORI  
| ISUZU  
| KINU  | Empire.  
| Rabaul area.  
| Rabaul area.  
| CruDiv 18  
| TATSUTA  
| TENRYU  
| KASHIMA  | Involved in New Guinea campaign.  
| Rabaul area.  
| Rabaul area.  
| Flag of 4th fleet.  

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1055
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Truk area 9/19, no late information.
Truk area 9/19, no late information.
Definitely sunk.

Northern area.
No late information. Ominato area, 9/19.

No information.
No recent information. Solomons 9/16.
Northern area.

Indies area.
No late information. Truk area 9/19.
Truk area.
Hongkong.
DESTROYERS

DesRon 1
ABUKUMA
DesDiv 6
DesDiv 21
DesDiv 24
DesDiv 27

No late information. Northern area 9/15.
May be enroute Empire to Truk.
Northern area.
New Britain area.
YUGURE in Truk area. SHIRAT SUYU in Palau,
SHIGURE in Truk, ARIAKE damaged.

DesRon 2
JINTSU
DesDiv 15
DesDiv 16
DesDiv 18
DesDiv -

Rabaul area.
No information.
No late information.
One unit in Rabaul area.
2 units with CarDiv 2. One in Saipan
area, one northern area.

DesRon 3
SENDAI
DesDiv 11
DesDiv 9
DesDiv 20

Comdesron 3 in Solomons.
Shortland - Gizo area.
No late information. Probably Solomons.
Shortlands.
No late information. Probably Solomons.

DesRon 4
NAKA
DesDiv 2
DesDiv 4
DesDiv 8
DesDiv 9

Comdesron 4 in Shortlands area.
No definite information.
Truk area.
South of Truk.
One unit Truk. One Yokasuka. One un-
located.
One unit Penang. Two unlocated.

DesRon 5
DesDiv 5
DesDiv 22
DesDiv 34

Ambon area, possibly escorting toward
Truk.
No late information. Probably East
Indies.
Solomons. One unit Marshalls.

DesRon 6
YUBARI
DesDiv 23
DesDiv 29
DesDiv 30

No late information.
No information.
Two units enroute to Wake.
Two units New Guinea.

DesRon 10
DesDiv 7
DesDiv 10
DesDiv 17

In Rabaul area with Otaka.
Associated with CarDiv One.
Rabaul area.
**UNASSIGNED**

| DesDiv 1 | Northern area. |
| DesDiv 31 | Truk Zone. |
| DesDiv 13 | Formosa area. |
| DesDiv - | One unit Aleutians, two units Yokosuka. |
SECRET

SUBMARINES

SubRon 1
SubDiv 15
SubDiv 2
SubDiv 4

SubRon 2
SubDiv 7
SubDiv 8

SubRon 3
SubDiv 11
SubDiv 12

SubRon 5
SubDiv 19
SubDiv 30
SubRon 6
SubDiv 13

SubRon 7
SubDiv 21
SubDiv 26
SubDiv 33
SubRon 8
SubDiv 1
SubDiv 3
SubDiv 14

Two units Truk. One Saigon.
Two units 8th fleet, two units Truk, one Jaluit.
Unlocated.

Two units 8th fleet, one unit Aleutians.
One unit Jaluit. Two Empire.

Two units 8th fleet area, three units Truk.
One unit 8th fleet area, three units Empire.

One unit 8th fleet, 2 units unplaced.
Two units Saigon

Three units 8th fleet area.

Two units Truk.
Two units Aleutians, one Empire.
Three units Aleutians.

Three units Empire.
One unit Jaluit, Two Empire.
Three units enroute Saigon to Kure.

8th Fleet area - 12
Truk - 10
Jaluit - 3
Saigon - 3
Northern area - 6
Enroute - 4
Empire - 13
Unknown - 3
Total - 34
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIPS</th>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIKOKU MARU</td>
<td>No late information. Believed Rabaul area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKITSASHIMA</td>
<td>No late information. Believed New Britain area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHITOSE</td>
<td>Shortlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIYODA</td>
<td>Empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUJIKAWA MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSHU MARU</td>
<td>Empire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 HINO MARU</td>
<td>No late information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMIKAWA MARU</td>
<td>Saipan area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMITSU MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMOI</td>
<td>Truk area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANTO MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATSUJO MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIYOKAWA MARU</td>
<td>Marshalls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYONS MARU</td>
<td>No late information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAGISON MARU</td>
<td>8th fleet area 9/19.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARUTO MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKON MARU</td>
<td>No late information, Truk-Palau 9/17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISHIN MARU</td>
<td>Solomons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISHIN MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTOJO MARU</td>
<td>Kavieng area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKITSU MARU</td>
<td>New Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANUKI MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANYO MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 SEIJI MARU</td>
<td>In- Truk area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENDAI MARU</td>
<td>No late information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHINSUKE MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORI MARU</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 TONAN MARU</td>
<td>No late information. Solomons 9/16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No definite information.</td>
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</table>
AIR

AREA DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE AIR FORCE

ALEUTIANS

While very little information is available, it is possible to make a fair guess from the absence of Orange air activity that the Japanese do not have more than 25 planes in the Aleutians. The 5th Air Group still appears at Kiska. Attu Island, which with Kiska was rated as a seaplane base, now appears to have been abandoned. The land based VHB reported over Adak in August have not appeared since. A liberal guess of Japanese air strength in this area by plane types is:

2 - Kawanishi 97 four engine flying boats.
5 - Float type reconnaissance planes.
10-15 - Float type ØV.
Total - 17-22 planes.

MALAY AREA

There is not sufficient information available to estimate the Japanese air strength in this area. The 40th Air Group appears in this area and possibly also the 33rd Air Group and 35th Air Group, which are either in Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. There is some slight indication that these groups may also move east. No other information on this area is available.

DUTCH EAST INDIES AREA

No recent information exists on the 23rd Air Flot which has been in this area except that from association it may operate in the Solomons. The commander of Takeo Air Group was still at Kendari 9/24 with a detachment of the group at Truk 9/22. 3rd Air Group has not been heard from since believed enroute New Britain about 9/12. The first attacks on Darwin since August 30th (27VF and 27 VHB) took place September 25th (2 planes) and September 26th (3 VHB). The absence of Japanese air attacks in this area and the previously reported movement of planes to New Britain make it probable that the former strength of about 45 VF and 45 VHB has been greatly reduced. Reconnaissance of Koepeang on September 23rd revealed 2 VHB and of Dili on September 24th and 25th revealed 1 VF and 4 VF respectively.
NEW GUINEA AREA

New Guinea must be considered with New Britain because Japanese VHF bombing Port Moresby and other Allied bases in this area as a general rule operate from Rabaul airfields. Only VF and reconnaissance planes have been permanently based in New Guinea. The 25th Air Flot still appears to be in command of New Guinea air operations, but the 21st Air Flot may also be operating some planes there. There is no recent information on 4th, Tainan and Yokohama Air Groups of the 25th Air Division except that Yokohama seems to be arranging for flying boat replacements from the Empire. The Japanese air strength in this area probably does not exceed:

10 - Type ØVF usually based at Lae or Buna.
10 - 12 - Reconnaissance seaplanes.
2 - Kawanishi 97 flying boats.
27 - Mitsubishi types 96, 97, or 1 VHF operating from Rabaul.

Total 49-51.

Enroute: Probably one full fighter group of 45 type ØVF is enroute New Guinea to replace the heavy losses inflicted during August.

NEW IRELAND - NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS

New Ireland is principally a supply, repair, and assembly base for planes coming from the Empire or damaged in operations. The 21st Air Flot H.Q. is presently at Kavieng, and that Air Flot is associated with both the Solomons and New Guinea. The 26th Air Flot still appears to be the commander of air operations in the Solomons; while the 11th Seaplanes Div is a most important seaplane command in that area. The 12th Seaplanes Div is also in the Solomons. The 11th Air Fleet Commander appears to be in this area. The commander and a detachment of 6th Air Group (probably VF) is in the Solomons, while additional planes of this Group are being or are soon to be ferried from Kiarasato to the south by the Yodogawa Maru and the Zuiko. The 2nd Air Group and Kanoya Air Group appear to be receiving planes (probably VF) from Davao via the Otaka. Toko Air Group (VF) is at Shortlands Island. 106th Air Group is at Rabaul. Other groups that may be in this area have not been heard during the past week. The Japanese air strength in New Ireland, exclusive of planes being assembled, repaired and forwarded to New Britain and the Solomons, by planes and types probably does not exceed:

12-18 - Seaplanes - reconnaissance and float type VF.
2 - Four engined VF.
Total 14-20.
SECRET

Japanese planes by number and types in New Britain and the Solomons probably do not exceed:

45 - land type ØVF.
24 - float type ØVF.
24 - Reconnaissance seaplanes.
12 - Kawanishi 97 four engine VP.
27 - Mitsubishi types 96, 97, or 1 VHB (exclusive of the 27 VHB based at Rabaul and used to bomb Port Moresby).

Total - 132.

Enroute: Probably 45 type ØVF.
54 - Mitsubishi type 1 VHB.
A smattering of other types.

MARSHALLS AND GILBERTS

The 24th Air Flot and its Groups, 1st, 14th, and Chitose, were this week placed on the alert for a U.S. offensive in this area. There is no specific recent information on these air commands, but they are shown still to be in the Marshalls. 19th Air Group is still in the Marshalls and concerned with the Gilberts infiltrations. The total air strength in this area probably does not exceed:

9-12 - Kawanishi 97 four engine VP.
18-24 - Reconnaissance seaplanes with some possibly VP.
54 - Mitsubishi types 96 and 1 VHB.
50 - (approx.) type ØVF assigned to defense of airfields.

Total: 131-140.
Enroute: Probably none.
NOTE: Air divisions are now termed Air Flotillas. The 21st - 26th Air Divisions appear in this report as the 21st - 26th Air Flots. The 11th and 12th Air Divisions, because they are sea-plane tender units, are called the 11th and 12th Seaplane Divisions.

The number of planes shown in any group is the largest number of planes known to have operated in that group at any time.

11th Air Fleet - Cmdr. is very active in the Solomons, particularly in connection with Guadalcanal. Cmdr. may have been at Tenian 9/23.

11th Seaplane Div - Important command in Solomons. H.Q. appears to be at Shortlands.

12th Seaplane Div - Also appears to be in Solomons.

21st Air Flot - H.Q. now at Kavieng. Is receiving planes from Philippines and may already have operated some planes over New Guinea. Associated with both New Guinea and Solomons.

Kanoya Air Group 27VF, 36VHB Cmdr. at Kavieng and group receiving planes from Philippines via Otaka.

Toko Air Group 12 VP. flying boats Cmdr. at Shortlands Is. Operating in Solomons.

22nd Air Flot - No recent information.

Vihooro Air Group 27VHB No recent information on location. Associated with Misawa Air Group and may furnish it with planes.

Genzan Air Group 27VHB Tokyo to Truk for delivery 9/23.

23rd Air Flot - From association is to operate in the Solomons.

3rd Air Group 45VF, 6V0 No recent information.
24th Air Flot - Marshalls.

1st Air Group 27VHB  Still in Marshalls.
14th Air Group 12VP flying boats; 3VJ transports.  Still in Marshalls.

Chitose Air Group 27VHB  Still in Marshalls.

25th Air Flot - Continues to be actively associated with New Guinea and bases and commands there.

4th Air Group 27VHB  Traffic routed by Tokyo to Truk for delivery 9/23. Unit probably south of Truk near Rabaul.

Tainan Air Group 45VF, 6VO  "  "  "

Yokohama Air Group 12VP flying Arranging for VP to be boats, 6 float flown from Empire.
type VF

26th Air Flot - Remains very active in Solomons and in command of air operations there.

6th Air Group VF and VB  Comdr. and detachment in New Britain or Solomons. Other planes of the group about to leave Kisiatsu, probably on Euiho.

Misawa Air Group 27VHB  South of Truk. May receive reinforcements from Eihoro Air Group.

Kisaratsu Air Group 27VHB  No recent information.

2nd Air Group VF  Associated with Kanoya Air Group and Otaka, and may also be receiving planes from that vessel.

5th Air Group Seaplanes  Still at Kiska.

17th Air Group Seaplanes  No recent information.

-15-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Group</th>
<th>Activity/Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19th Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes. Active in Marshalls - Gilberts infiltration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes? At Truk. Active with ferrying of planes to Rabaul area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Air Group</td>
<td>? Indicating possible shift to Rabaul. Not clear whether this unit in Empire, Malay, or DEI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Air Group</td>
<td>? Probably in Malay or DEI. Possible that shift to Rabaul is scheduled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Air Group</td>
<td>? In Malay. Possible that shift to Rabaul is scheduled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108th Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes (?) At Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252nd Air Group</td>
<td>? Appeared for first time, on 9/27 at Kisaratsu Air Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeki Air Group</td>
<td>? In Empire probably supplying local air cover for southbound convoys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo Air Group</td>
<td>? Detachment may have moved south and appears in association with Rabaul and Shortlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinchuchu Air Group</td>
<td>Training Unit or VHB Tokyo has routed traffic to both Truk and Takao for delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suzuka Air Group</td>
<td>? No recent information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka Air Group</td>
<td>13 Seaplanes May be aboard Chitose in vicinity of Shortlands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
JAPANESE AIR PLANE LOSSES
(Sept. 19-26th incl.)

SOLOMONS - Destroyed - Float Type VF - 7 (also 3 probable.
Recco. Floatplanes - 4.
Damaged - Recco. Floatplanes - 3.

NEW GUINEA - Destroyed - Land type VF - 1.

TIMOR - Destroyed - Land type VF - 2 (probable).

ALEUTIANS - Destroyed - Float Type VF - 7.

Total - Destroyed - Float Type VF - 14 (3 probable)
Land type VF - 1 (2 probable)
Recco. Floatplanes - 4.

Damaged - Recco. Floatplanes - 3.
SECRET

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE LAND FORCES AS OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1942

ALASKA -

Attu and Kiska. Radio traffic has indicated that something abnormal is in progress here, and it has been interpreted to be that the enemy forces are withdrawing. Aerial visual reconnaissance of Attu by Task Force Eight revealed no signs of enemy and all works abandoned. Traffic has connected the Maizuru No. 3 Special Landing Force, which was part of the occupation force, with the Rabaul area. Pressure in the Solomons and the isolated position of the Attu - Kiska forces may account for this withdrawal.

GILBERTS -

Islands occupied by the No. 2 Combined Landing Force, the Yokosuka No. 3 Special Landing Force and Yokosuka No. 6 Special Landing Force, plus additional antiaircraft troops, guard units, etc.

Beru - Raided on 26th and probably occupied.
Maina - Occupied.
Tarawa - Occupied.

NEW BRITAIN -

Radio traffic indicates a steady influx of reinforcements for the Solomons area. Information is insufficient to make a new estimate to replace last week's figure of troop strength, but it is probable that more troops have arrived there.

The following units are at, or are connected with, Rabaul:

17th Army Division (part here, part at Buna and part in Guadalcanal).

Davao 1st Landing Force (Army) is sending amphibious troops to Rabaul.

8th Base Force is main identified Naval garrison of Rabaul and adjacent areas.

Rabaul -- - - - - - - - - - - - - 30,000 to 35,000
Fondo-Ulanoao
Gasmata-Willawumez
Peninsula - - - - - - - - - - - - 3,000 (old estimate)
COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

NEW GUINEA

Buna-Gona-Kokoda-Efogi area - Occupied by Sasebo No. 5 Special Landing Force, Yokosuka No. 5 Special Landing Force, and units of the 17th Army Division (cavalry and probably infantry) - Total troops - - - - - - - 5,000 to 6,000.

Lae-Markham Valley area - - - - - - 2,000 to 3,000.

Salamoua - Busma River area - - - - 2,000.

Mubo (cavalry patrols) - - - - - - 900.

Milne Bay - - - - - - - - - Remnants of Kure No. 3 Special Landing Force.

NEW IRELAND

This area is under the 8th Base Force.

Kavieng - - - - - - - - - 800.

Remainder of island and nearby islands are guarded by patrols and small detachments therefrom.

SOLOMONS

Reinforcements are bound for this area. The main units headed there are the Maizuru No. 4 Special Landing Force (probably destined to go there) and the Sasebo No. 6 Landing Force, which is in transports in the Shortlands area.

Bougainville - - - - - - - - 1,600.

Buin-Faisi - - - - - - - - 200.

Gizo Island - - - - - - - 300.

Guadalcanal
(Taivu Point) - - - - - - - 1,400.
(Cape Esperance) - - - - - - 1,200

Traffic has indicated considerable activity at Kaminbo Bay (not shown on H.O. Chart Consec. No. 1689, but it is a bay between Paul Shoals and Fish Reef and is about 3 miles west of Cape Esperance). This bay is the main landing place for reinforcements and supplies for the Cape Esperance Force. At present this force is requesting supplies of food as their staples are sufficient for five days.

The Taivu Point Force apparently consists of Navy troops under the command of Lieutenant Kawaguchi.
SOLOMONS (Contd) -

The Cape Esperance Force is made up of Navy troops, one battalion (Aoba Unit) of Army and a pioneer unit. Lieutenant Kawamoto is in charge of the navy there.

Malaita - Small detachment total -- -- -- -- 100
Santa Isabel
[Mufu Point] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 150
[Vikanara Point] -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100
(Rekata Bay) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 100

Total Troops -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 48,850 to 55,850

LOCATION OF SPECIFIC UNITS

Naval Special Landing Forces (each about 1200 men)

#2 Combined -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Gilberts.
Kure No. 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Parts at Guadalcanal and
Milne Bay.
Kure No. 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Guadalcanal
Maizuru No. 1. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- No information.
Maizuru No. 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- No information.
Maizuru No. 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Was at Kiska now may be
bound for Rabaul.
Maizuru No. 4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- May be bound for Guadal-
canal.
Sasebo No. 1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- No information.
Sasebo No. 2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- No information.
Sasebo No. 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- No information.
Sasebo No. 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- At Buna.
Sasebo No. 6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- In transports in Short-
lands area.
Sasebo No. 8 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- May be in Shanghai.
Yokosuka No. 3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Gilberits area.
Yokosuka No. 4 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- In Taka (Formosa) on 23rd.
Yokosuka No. 5 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Buna.
Yokosuka No. 6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Gilberits.

ARMY UNITS

16th Division -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- No new information but was
connected with Ambo and Palau.

17th Division -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- Parts at - Guadalcanal-Buna-
Mubo-Rabaul.

Davao Special Landing Force -- -- Sending amphibious troops to
Rabaul.
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

October 1, 1942.

1. Preliminary.

Much of the Estimate of Enemy Capabilities for the month of August continues to remain valid and is not repeated.

2. Brief of Events during September, 1942.

SOUTH PACIFIC.

The SARATOGA was torpedoed on August 30 and proceeded to PEARL for repair. On September 5 the SOUTH DAKOTA hit a pinnacle rock at BLEACHER and also came to PEARL for repair. On the 16th the WASP was hit and sunk by Submarine torpedoes and the NORTH CAROLINA received one torpedo hit and proceeded to PEARL for repair.

In the Southern SOLOMONS our position has been strengthened by landing the 7th Marines on GUADALCANAL. Plane strength there is now nearly at a satisfactory level. The maintenance of logistic supply to the TULAGI area continued to be difficult. On September 29th the ALHENA was torpedoed leaving GUADALCANAL. We have been unable to prevent the Japs from bombarding our positions and from landing troops on either flank of the Marine GUADALCANAL position. Jap bombing of the position has been almost completely prevented.

The enemy mopped up the GILBERTS Islands and landed small garrisons on the main islands.

On September 13th enemy major forces made their only appearance in reach of our search to the east and north of the SOLOMONS. The enemy turned back before our land-based air could attack with satisfactory results and before our striking forces could reach them.

Large enemy reinforcements to the RABAUL area continued throughout the month. Except in NEW GUINEA and the landings on GUADALCANAL, they remain in the general RABAUL area. Indications continued that they were assembling forces for an all out effort in the South Pacific.

During the month it has become almost certain that RYUJO was sunk on August 24th. On September 28th one of our submarines probably badly damaged one carrier. Planes have reported hitting cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries but the amount of damage done is uncertain.
The enemy used the FAISI-BUIN area as an assembly point for cruisers, destroyers, transports and other auxiliaries. This area was the jump off point for troop carrying destroyers bound for GUADALCANAL. Airfields at KAVIENG, EUKA, and KIETA were being improved.

The Japs advanced over the OWEN STANLEY mountain range in Eastern NEW GUINEA to within about 15 miles of the PORT MORESBY airfields. At that point allied resistance stiffened, and by the end of the month the enemy was retreating. At MILNE BAY the enemy landed in some force but were unable to capture the airfield, and later withdrew.

CENTRAL PACIFIC.

The area was generally quiet during the month. Good progress was made in strengthening defenses at MIDWAY. Those defenses will serve as a model for JOHNSTON, PALMYRA and CANTON.

Our submarines have been very successful in destroying enemy shipping but the numbers on patrol in enemy home waters continues small.

NORTH PACIFIC.

The airfield on ADAK was first used on the 11th, and the first phase of the FIREPLACE operation was completed on September 20th. The Army has placed a garrison on ST. PAUL Island and plans to garrison TANAGA Island. Each time weather has permitted, KISKA has been successfully bombed and strafed from the new field at ADAK. The Japs have evacuated ATTU and AGGATU.

3. The Situation.

(a) Enemy. For the past six or seven weeks the Japs have been assembling planes, troops and ships in the general RABAUL area. There are no indications whatever of a move in any other direction.

While the Japs may wish to start such an effort in the near future, there is evidence that they are having their troubles. Our planes and submarines are taking increasing toll of their forces. On GUADALCANAL our Marines invariably have thrown back attackers with heavy enemy losses. The Japs may have lost the services of 3 CV, 1 BB, several cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries during the month. Their aircraft losses have been heavy in August and September. All this has definitely slowed up their preparations.
An estimate of Japanese strength in the Pacific as of September 28, 1942 is appended.

The enemy is copying our communication methods with good success. As a result, we continue to be unable to read his mail to any great extent.

(b) Own. We retain TF-1 at PEARL for the purpose of breaking up any enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN SEA FRONTIER. As of October 1st the ENTERPRISE, SARATOGA, SOUTH DAKOTA, and NORTH CAROLINA are under repair at PEARL. With them are cruiser and destroyer escorts. The ENTERPRISE group can reach the SOLOMONS area by about the middle of October. In the South Pacific TF-17 waits in port for a suitable target.

While we think that our OAHU-MIDWAY line is vulnerable to raids, there seems little probability of a major landing. The battleships at PEARL probably could prevent a landing in the area. This situation will improve when more air striking forces, properly trained and indoctrinated, are stationed in the Hawaiian Islands.

The situation in the ALEUTIANS is obscure. It has always been hard to understand how Japan could profit much in the occupation of KISKA and ATTU. Complete evacuation there would be no surprise. Meanwhile TF-8 will continue to cover Army seaborne movements while remaining ready to strike any enemy within reach.

While the situation in the South Pacific has improved considerably in the past month, it is far from satisfactory. We are strengthening our positions in the Southern SOLOMONS but the logistic and personnel replacement programs remain to be put on a satisfactory basis. It is hoped that the Army 43rd Division can relieve the Marines in the TULAGI area soon, but probably not during October. No additional marines will arrive in the area until after the end of the month. The harbors at NOUMEA and ESPIRITU SANTO are overcrowded and unloading facilities are most primitive. Measures to improve this condition will hardly be effective in October. Unloading facilities in the TULAGI area are meagre, and to date we have been unable to provide adequate protection for our AKs during the unloading period. There are no planes in sight to take care of combat and operational losses in the area beyond about October 30th. The airfield at GUADALCANAL with necessary facilities such as underground gas storage, dispersal areas, repair facilities, etc., will not be complete during October. It is, however, now in good use.
Our submarine offensive against the Jap trade in her own waters continues at a low ebb because of the shortage of Pacific Fleet Submarines, which is aggravated by necessary diversions of boats to ALASKA and the MANDATES. In October we hope to commence laying mines in focal points of Jap trade.

4. Threats to Japan.

The UNITED STATES continues to be the only real threat to Japan. The start of our offensive in the South Pacific evidently has caused serious repercussions, and probably caused the enemy to abandon plans in any other theatre until that threat is removed. There is good reason to believe that our own offensive nipped in the bud the Jap plan to cut our lines of communications to AUSTRALIA. As our greatest threat to Japanese interests now is via the South Pacific, it seems most unlikely that they will move toward INDIA or SIBERIA or toward any other place in the Pacific until their South Pacific flank is secured.

HAWAII is always a threat to Japan in that it is an advanced base for supplies and operations. They will always desire to damage our MIDWAY-OAHU-SAMOA line in order to decrease our overall Pacific capabilities.

It does not seem probable that Japan takes the threat from the UNITED STATES via the ALEUTIANS very seriously.

Whether Japan knows it or not, they need have no fear from AUSTRALIA at the moment. The Australians do not even feel sure of being able to hold NEW GUINEA now. However, Japan knows that eventually large forces can get underway from AUSTRALIA and threaten seriously all of their gains inside the MALAY BARRIER.

GREAT BRITAIN, at present, is unable to threaten Japan's Indian Ocean Front. That front only can become dangerous when GREAT BRITAIN is free of her commitments in EUROPE and the Near East.

Today RUSSIA is entirely too occupied with GERMANY to permit her to open the SIBERIAN front. But should the GERMAN situation change radically in favor of the RUSSIANS, there would be a chance of a threat by opening SIBERIAN air bases to the Allies. It is significant that RUSSIA has opened a radio channel with us and has finally begun an exchange of information.

Because of the many uncertainties throughout the world today it is hard to speculate very far into the future. Suffice to say that for October Japan considers our activities in the SOLOMONS her major threat while still remaining very sensitive to possible moves for bombing the Empire.
5. Broad Courses of Action.

There is overwhelming evidence that the enemy's intention is to try to cut us off from AUSTRALIA and then capture or neutralize that continent.

Other broad courses of action within enemy capabilities remain the same as for September, and include:

(a) An attempt to capture MIDWAY.
(b) An extension in the ALEUTIANS.
(c) An attack on Western AUSTRALIA.
(d) Raids on our positions from MIDWAY to NOUMEA.
(e) An offensive toward INDIA.
(f) An attack on RUSSIA.


The enemy's most probable next moves are the recapture of the Southern SOLOMONS, and the extension of control in NEW GUINEA.

It now seems that the effort in the SOLOMONS and in NEW GUINEA will be in the nature of a gradual infiltration followed by a major assault. Whether the final effort in the SOLOMONS will be concurrent with that in NEW GUINEA is not known.

Before any grand assault we can expect the following to continue:

(a) Submarine reconnaissance in the SOLOMONS AREA and along our lines of communications to the South.

While the submarines may now have the primary duty of reconnaissance, it has been shown that they can and will attack important targets. During October the enemy is estimated to be capable of maintaining no less than twenty submarines in the area for this purpose. It is indicated a total of 32 submarines could be made available for this duty.

(b) Air attacks on our positions and shipping using shore based air.

Our recent successes in repelling bombing attacks on GUADALCANAL has reduced the enemy capacity to continue this form of attack, but has not eliminated the danger.
As of October 1st the following shore based air is indicated as in or enroute to the NEW BRITAIN-SOLOMONS area and could be made available for this duty:

108 - VHB
90 - VF

To these it is possible to add, from the MARSHALLS and GILBERTS, about:

54 - VHB
50 - VF

It is difficult to estimate the ability of the enemy to maintain such levels in the area as that ability depends on rate of losses and other circumstances. If losses are excessive they would have great difficulty.

(c) Occasionally shell our shore positions in the SOLOMONS.

This has been possible in the past and will undoubtedly continue. The shelling usually takes place at night and may be incidental to landing of small numbers of infiltration troops.

As many as 16 cruisers could be made available for this duty but only if the usual striking force escort were to be employed. The same situation applies to eighteen Desdivs estimated in the TRUK-RABAUL area on October 1st. While no such numbers are believed possible, the main thing is that there are ample cruisers and destroyers for this job. Submarines may be employed likewise also.

If we are able to cause sufficient losses to the enemy cruisers and destroyers at their jump off points, and enroute, it seems probable that operations of this type will cease to be profitable.

(d) Attacks in the general area from ESPIRITU SANTO, north, on our transports, freighters and escorts, both day and night; especially while unloading, or at anchor.

These attacks are always to be expected from submarines. It is quite possible that the enemy will employ cruisers, destroyers, and motor torpedo boats, if he thinks circumstances warrant. Should he detect a large enough target within reach of a CV or BB striking force he may attempt a
raid. However, it does not seem likely that he will risk any major striking force within reach of our effective shore based air. The most likely attempt would be to make a high speed attack with cruisers or destroyers based on advance information of our movements.

During the all out attack we should expect carrier raids on our advance positions such as ESPIRITU SANTO and ROSES to break up our line of supply. The all out attack most probably would include a determined effort to neutralize the GUADALCANAL airfield.

As matters now stand, it does not seem necessary for ORANGE to employ carriers to cover the landing of troops on the east coast of NEW GUINEA. The Japs have the capacity to make a large landing on eastern NEW GUINEA, and at the same time make an assault on the Southern SOLOMONS. If they continue to land sizeable forces at night on GUADALCANAL they will build up a force which can assist in an assault by attacking on all sides of our position there at the same time. If this were a night attack they would hardly employ carriers to cover the landing at GUADALCANAL.

When and if an all out attack occurs it seems most probable that:-

1. The landing will be at night, the transports, barges, etc., escorted by cruisers and destroyers.

2. CV striking forces covered by BB groups and preceded by submarine scouts will attack our airfields, shipping, and installations at BUTTON and possibly ROSES.

3. SANTA CRUZ Islands will be occupied if we are not already there, - in which case the enemy would be expected to attack that position.

There are many varieties of such an operation and it would only be a guess to set down details.

7. In spite of the fact that enemy intentions appear clear it is desirable to list other operations within the capacity of the enemy during October.

Our estimate of enemy locations shows that it is possible to concentrate sizeable forces almost any place in the Pacific Ocean Areas during October. We know that the great part of his Navy is serviceable and that logistic and other considerations make it possible for him to do much harm in widely separated places. While the following are not considered probable they are discussed briefly.
(a) A raid on PEARL HARBOR.

At the moment fine targets are presented at PEARL. Our defenses have improved but there is no assurance that a well timed raid could not get in. We might well suppose that the cost to the enemy would not be acceptable. On the other hand, if he could hit our ships in dry dock and our tank farms he might be willing to accept anything our Army air could give him. We have not, on October 1st, a force adequate to repel a strong carrier raid. Nor will we be able to meet 4 enemy CV groups in the HAWAIIAN area on equal terms during the month.

But to make such a raid the Japs would have to give up or postpone any powerful attack in the SOLOMONS. They could do this; and because of the RI situation we would hardly find out what was up until too late.

Although this is again stated as not probable, the mere possibility indicates stiffening the search and alertness conditions, at least until the enemy further commits himself. It must be remembered that major forces have not been located for some time.

(b) A raid on MIDWAY or JOHNSTON.

Such an operation would be in the nature of a diversion, but unless made in strength which he can hardly afford at this time, there would be little profit in the adventure.

(c) An attempt to capture MIDWAY.

This has been a Jap objective and still must figure in their plans. While he must know that we have improved our defenses there, he may think that his moves in the South Pacific have diverted sufficient forces to permit success on the second attempt.

(d) Light raids on our staging points south of OAHU.

These are always within enemy capabilities. In fact they are easily possible as a diversion now.
October 3rd Cont'd.

The central pacific was quiet. The BBs of TF 1 are at sea off OAHU for training and will return to PEARL tomorrow. No changes of enemy deployments were noted.

October 4th.

So far as is known TF 17 did not attack shipping in the BUIN area today as planned. Bad weather may be the reason. The COPAHEE will fly in reinforcements of VF's to GUADALCANAL during the coming week. The enemy continues to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL during the night from destroyers. It is not known here why our surface forces have been unable to break this up.

In his 2 part 050211 General MacArthur explains his need for a minimum of 30 fleet submarines in his area. These cannot be supplied by Cincpac without severe reduction of patrols off JAPAN.

The occupation of the PRIBILOFS was completed. Midget subs on a marine railway were seen at KISKA.

As the old BBs of TF 1 urgently require modernization, Cincpac will recommend a program to start in the near future. Among other things, the removal of the 5"/51 battery, conning tower, and boat cranes is to be accomplished.

There are no changes noted in enemy deployments.

October 5th.

Admiral Nimitz returned from his inspection trip in the South Pacific. In general he feels that the situation is favorable. He desires continual pressure on the Japs to prevent them from thinking of adventures in other areas and to prevent them from getting set to re-capture the Southern SOLOMONS. There are quite a few rough spots in the South Pacific set up. The expeditious handlying of supplies is the greatest need at the present. Communications are poor, - the Japs have not yet been prevented from landing troops on GUADALCANAL. This later fault may be corrected by Admiral Scott when he arrives in the area (see Comsopac 051202 pink for operations of CTF 64)

No word has been received regarding the planned attack on the shipping in the BUIN-FAISI area by TF 17. The weather may have prevented air operations. Reports of that area indicate that all ships left the area yesterday but returned in greater numbers to-day.

Com Gen 1st Marines 032201 gives a summary of his activities on the 3rd.
October 5th (Cont't)

It seems probable that our occupation of FUNAFUTI has been discovered by the enemy as one of his 4 engine patrol planes was sighted from there.

CTF-8 052030 gives the results of an Army bombing of KISKA on the 3rd. In the ALEUTIANS the CALDWELL was damaged in a collision with the SPICA and will have to be docked.

There is no new of Jap deployments.

October 6th.

At his regular morning conference, which was attended by General Emmons and Vice Admirals Halsey, Leary and Calhoun, Admiral Nimitz recounted his visit to the South Pacific in considerable detail. The jist of the remarks was to the effect that the general situation is not bad and the many difficulties are being overcome gradually.

Comsopac 070306 pink requests one army regiment for use at GUADALCANAL. He also expresses his desire to increase the army garrison at ESPIRITU SANTO to strength of one infantry regiment.

Cominch 062000 questions the employment of VF at CHRISTMAS, TONGATABU and CANTON. Cincpac believes that plenty of VF's should be in advanced areas.

Comsopac 051226 gives the summary for the 4th and CTF-17 062114 gives results of the bombing of the BUIN area. At that place results were modest, probably because of adverse weather.

Task Force 17 has been ordered by Comsopac to operate generally between NEW ZEALAND and AUSTRALIA. Thus that force is a running sub target and is too far south to be used offensively. The Cincpac would be pleased to see that force at anchor in ESPIRITU SANTO until needed for further offensive operations.

Task Force 64 has been ordered by Comsopac to operate to the south and east of GUADALCANAL. As it has the job of breaking up the enemy landings at GUADALCANAL, it looks like it is poorly placed. A better initial position would be generally to the westward of GUADALCANAL.

The ALHENA arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO where an examination of her damage is being made. This again demonstrates the need of salvage vessels in the active areas.

CTF-8 reports an unsuccessful attack on a freighter north of KISKA by three B-24s.
October 6th (Cont'd)

Continued lack of information regarding enemy moves because of call sign changes makes it difficult to make good predictions regarding the timing of enemy moves. However, there is nothing to indicate that he has abandoned the idea of recapturing the Southern SOLOMONS as soon as possible.

October 7.

The day was generally quiet. In the South Pacific the usual movements of cruisers and destroyers were sighted by our search planes in the Central and North SOLOMONS Area. Admiral Ghormley's 061410 summarizes the 5th and 6th of October.

The query concerning the uses of fighters in rear positions which was made by Cominich is partially answered by Comsopac 081229 pink and Cincpac 080333 pink.

CTF-17 does not believe his ships were sighted on his recent trip to bomb the BUIN area.

An examination of the ALHENA shows that she will require docking.

TF-8 072025 gives the results of bombing KISKA on the 6th. Results were minor.

Call sign recoveries still do not permit traffic analysis. This condition may improve during the next month. As long as this condition continues we will not expect much from RI.
October 8.

Comsopac 081326 gives the summary in his area for the 7th. The daily arrival of troop carrying destroyers at GUADALCANAL continues in spite of our air attacks. During the afternoon of the 7th one CA was reported hit by one bomb and one torpedo. The repeated movement of enemy light vessels into range of our shore based air despite recent damage is an indication of the determination of the enemy to land troops and supplies on GUADALCANAL. Large numbers of cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries in the SHORTLANDS area show that place as the advanced jump off point. TF-64 is not yet in position to intercept these approaching ships.

Rear Admiral Turner will command an expedition to land an Army regiment at GUADALCANAL and is scheduled to arrive there the 13th. TF-61, 63 and 64 will cover the move. On the 15th the VIREO, JAMESTOWN, a MTB division will arrive and be stationed in the TULAGI area.

TF-1 continues at PEARL, conducting training off OAHU and prepared to repel landings in the HAWAIIAN area. TF-16 is preparing to sail for the South Pacific on about the 16th.

TF-8 is quiet. It has been suggested to Cominch that the LOUISVILLE of that force be sent to the Southwest Pacific to replace the CHICAGO.

Traffic analysis of the enemy is still not possible. However, sightings in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS Area shows the presence of a good number of cruisers, destroyers, transports, freighters and miscellaneous smaller types. The major units are not located by any means, but 4 BB and 3 CVs with screening vessels are believed in the TRUK - RABAUL general area.

October 9

Comsopac 071246 gives a summary of operations. These are now two days late, but intercepts here keep us well informed. The pressure by air attacks on the enemy shipping in the central SOLOMONS continues with gratifying results. However, the inability of our surface groups to intercept the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL is disappointing. It is hoped that MTBs arriving in the area the 12th or 13th will be able to get in some attacks.

The CHICAGO will be replaced by a CA from the Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, Marine Corps, will send 20 officers and 1000 recruits monthly to SAMOA to provide replacements in the South Pacific.
MEMORANDUM FOR WAR PLANS:

Subject: Suggested Changes in Air Strength -- Alaska.

1. The Army (ELEVENTH Air Force) now have in Alaska:
   - 146 Fighters
   - 50 Medium bombers (including 22 attached from R.C.A.F.)
   - 28 Heavy bombers
   - 224 Total

As components of the ELEVENTH Air Force these aircraft are not within the jurisdiction of CinCPac. Aside from this fact, however, the present strength can certainly not be called a generous provision to resist sudden attack or to maintain present scale of effort against the enemy.

2. The area of Alaska is provided with a fairly adequate airways system permitting the ready transfer of all types of aircraft throughout the area. This has the effect of reducing the over-all total required to maintain an adequate defense. Unless and until some important change occurs in the strategic situation, it is recommended that the present Army air strength be maintained.

3. The Navy now has in Alaska a total of
   - 12 F4F-4 Fighters (ex-COPAHEE)
   - 35 PBY-5 and PBY-5A Patrol Planes (PatWing 4)

These latter comprise 4 squadrons of which it is the indicated intention of ComPatWing 4 to return one squadron to the West Coast during the bad winter weather period beginning about 1 November.

4. Again considering the importance of the area, it is considered decidedly unwise to reduce the patrol plane strength available there. In the event of a threat from the westward the Defense Forces would undoubtedly rely completely on Navy VP planes for search operations. Dependence could not be properly placed on aircraft of this type, if available, being flown up from the West Coast after the threat had developed.
Subject: Suggested Changes in Air Strength -- Alaska.

5. On the other hand, the basing of carrier type fighters in the Alaskan Area is not justified except to meet some immediate urgency. That situation has long since ceased to exist and the Navy fighters should accordingly be returned to their normal employment in the carrier force at the earliest possible date.

R. A. OFSTIE
PROPOSED REDUCTION OF NORTHERN FORCE

October 11, 1942.

1. The Northern Force, Task Force EIGHT, was formed by direction of Comin ch to oppose an expected enemy major attack against Dutch Harbor and possibly Alaska. The composition and force commander are as assigned by Cinopac who was governed largely by the restriction of employing forces which had not been sent to the Coral Sea.

2. Though the enemy occupied three Western Aleutians, no major enemy threat developed. In fact he soon reduced his surface forces to a very weak nucleus and has never been able to maintain aircraft of suitable types and numbers to constitute much of a threat. He has now abandoned ATTU and AGATTU and is beaten down regularly at KISKA by strong air attacks. He is deeply involved in the South Pacific and we have every hope of keeping him so.

3. Therefore there is little likelihood of a strong enemy effort in the Northern area for some time to come. Feasible operations of the enemy appear to be:

   (a) Air operations from KISKA employing seaplane types, and, if he is able to complete a landing field, land planes. (The feasibility of completing a field suitable for heavy bombers is very doubtful.)

   (b) Submarine patrols off our bases and on our line of communications.

   (c) Cruiser raids for bombardment and against our communications. (Destroyers might be used if fueled at KISKA.)

   (d) Mining off our bases and/or to deny unoccupied base sites,

   (e) Commando raids.

4. Our air base at ADAK may be considered to be well established and is held by a strong garrison (11000). A strongly held outpost (4000) is being placed on TANAGA and another (about 2000) on the PRIBILOFS. There may be a garrison and fighter strip on ATKA. These and the Army aircraft appear ample to handle the minor activities the enemy may undertake, with the exception of submarine and surface raider attacks on communications. We should also keep some pressure with our submarines on the enemy's communications. Now that there is
only one terminal for enemy shipping the number of submarines which can be profitably employed in this way has been decreased. Also any defensive deployment of submarines would have little chance of encountering targets.

5. A factor not yet mentioned is the weather. This will have a tendency to decrease all operations, and will shortly prevent operation of seaplanes.

6. This all leads to the conviction that the Northern Force should be reduced and perhaps abolished as such. Enemy submarine action is regarded as certain. Therefore A/S escorts must be provided.

(a) It is considered that Rear Admiral Theobald's estimate on the number required must be obtained and given full consideration.

(b) The threat of surface raiders is so small that there is doubt whether any cruisers should be left in the area. If, say two, were based at PEARL they could act as effectively against raiders as they could from KODIAK. 8" cruisers would be preferred. We need the 6" for our night work against Japanese light forces in the GUADALCANAL area.

(c) Navy aircraft should be reduced. J5 is studying this. Compatwing FOUR has recently made proposals for a rotation of squadrons.

(d) Comsubpac will make recommendations as to submarines. The S-boats offer quite a problem. There are nine of them being rotated between SAN DIEGO and DUTCH HARBOR. They have been very ineffective but they may have been "pepped up" some and have not been able to demonstrate it because of lack of targets. In any case, if we remove all large submarines we would be decreasing our submarine strength there much more than mere numbers would show. There is only one good submarine "beat" and that is the vicinity of KISKA. The S-boats ought to be able to handle it, but perhaps we should keep one certainly effective unit on station in the ALEUTIANS. With such a reduction it must be determined whether Captain Colclough will continue to be needed.

(e) Should the Northern Force be abolished and Rear Admiral Theobald be withdrawn? I believe the regular sea frontier command set-up can handle the reduced forces. If "fleet opposed invasion" status is continued it should be made consistent with other sea frontiers - Navy control Army bombers and scouts; Army control the fighters.
October 9 (Continued)

Ten EC2 type ships will be sent to the South Pacific at the rate of three per month, starting October.

KISKA was bombed again on the 8th as shown in CTF 8 100150.

No changes in enemy plans or intentions are noted today. Jap interest continues to center in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS area.

October 10.

Shortly before midnight TF-64.2 intercepted an enemy force thought to contain 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers west of SAVO Island. Results are not in yet. During the day the Japs made strong but harmless bombing attacks on GUADALCANAL. Their plane losses were roughly the ratio 4 to 1 of ours. Our Marines now have their battle position on the west of the MATANIKAU river.

The operations for the 8th and 9th are summarized by ComSoPac in his 091316. His 111314 states that the situation will not permit him to give a fixed policy in the assignment of troops. He also has a shortage of communication personnel in his area and requests CinCPac to supply deficiencies.

Acorn One has been assigned to NDENI and Acorn Two to ESPIRITU SANTO.

The AMBERJACK sank the No. 3 TONAU MARU (whale factory ship) in KAVIENG Harbor. As a result of DI the AMBERJACK was also ordered to intercept an AK enroute PONAPE. The AK was sunk.

The ZUIKAKU, escorted by one cruiser and one destroyer, was sighted by one of our submarines to the northwest of TRUK and heading toward that place.

In the SW Pacific the Japs are trying to evacuate remaining troops at MILNE in submarines. Also, there is reported a serious lack of torpedoes in that area and the submarines are now being sent on mining missions.

C.G. SAMOA has inspected FUNAFUTI and finds that the defenses are coming along fine and that preparations are going ahead to construct a landing strip.

The North Pacific was quiet. Admiral Theobald complains that air bombs supplied to him are poor. He reports that three hits on ships at KISKA last month were duds.
October 10 (Continued).

The Japs continue to suffer losses and damage from our air attacks in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS Area, but in spite of that indications continue of preparations for an assault on GUADALCANAL in the near future. The sighting of the ZUIKAKU confirms the belief that she made a trip home.

October 11.

The results of the engagement between Task Force 64.2 off SAVO Island yesterday are not known completely today. It appears that the DUNCAN was sunk, the BOISE severely damaged, the other cruisers slightly damaged. The enemy may have lost four DD and one CA damaged. During the following daylight period our air from GUADALCANAL may have sunk one cruiser, and damaged two destroyers. TF-64.2 is retiring to ESPIRITU SANTO.

Comsopac 101946 summarizes the activities of his area for the 9th and 10th. There were no important developments reported.

Comsopac 111006 and Cincpac 120329 comment on amphibious training in the South Pacific.

As the situation has now changed materially in the Pacific Ocean Areas, and especially in the North Pacific, consideration is being given to a reduction of TF-8. Attached is the whole story. CTF-8 111930 amplifies the report of the bombing of KISKA on the 9th. Army bombing was very poor in spite of favorable circumstances. The HALIBUT ran into what he reports as a decoy (a maru type, guns, 2000 tons) 50 miles north of ATMA Island. His torpedo attack was not successful.

The CALIFORNIA left PEARL for BREMERTON yesterday. The WEST VIRGINIA will follow in about a month. The NYPS thinks they can put these ships in service after 5½ months overhaul.

There are some indications that the Japs have underestimated our strength in the SOLOMONS, and are now gathering considerably more army strength from the PHILIPPINES and the NEI. In this case they would not attempt an all out attack for some time. Meanwhile our attrition successes are bound to effect seriously any plans they may have. In any event we feel quite sure that Japan is so deeply committed in the SOUTH Pacific that they cannot undertake any major adventures in any other area.
October 12.

Fragmentary reports do not permit accurate assessment of the damage inflicted on the enemy intercepted by Rear Admiral Scott's Force in the 2nd battle of SAVO ISLAND. The estimate today is one cruiser sunk, one cruiser damaged, four destroyers sunk or damaged, small transport probably sunk. Our damage was DUNCAN sunk; BOISE badly damaged; HELENA, SALT LAKE CITY, and FARENHOLT slightly damaged.

Rear Admiral Turner brought one Army regiment to GUADALCANAL in the early morning and was able to unload the transports and depart in the evening. He was interrupted by two air raids, and shelling from enemy shore positions on his ships and our shore positions. No damage was done to ships but the GUADALCANAL airfield was damaged by bombs to the extent that heavy bombers could use it only in emergency. Toward midnight enemy ships commenced a bombardment of the Marine position.

Comsopac 121316 gives the summary for his area.

TF 17 was evidently sighted West of RENNEL ISLAND and reported by the enemy. The WASHINGTON group Northwest of SAN CRISTOBAL was sighted and reported also.

Cominich has not yet replied to Cinopac request for clarification of his status resulting from General Marshall's order to C.G. Hawaii to stop the move of the second group of B-17s from HAWAII to the South Pacific. A follow up was sent.

KISKA was bombed on both the 10th and 11th as reported in CTF 8 122010. The new Army garrisons in the ALEUTIANS and PRIBILOFS are shown in CTF 8 122234. We now find that the Army plans an airfield on St. PAUL ISLAND. Cinopac 130139 crystalizes views here on a reduction of TF 8.

A large concentration of enemy ships is reported in the FUIN-FAISI area. There continues to be no doubt in the mind of Cinopac that the enemy is proceeding along the lines shown in the Estimate of Enemy Capabilities dated October 1, 1942.

October 13.

On the 11th (local date) a marine battalion from TULAGI landed to the eastward of our main position on GUADALCANAL and successfully attacked small enemy outposts. Also on that day our CACTUS planes (1) bombed 3 DD badly damaging one, (2) attacked a CA getting one torpedo hit, (3) again attacked the same CA and 2 screening DDs causing the CA to be abandoned and badly damaging one DD.
October 13th (Continued)

On the 12th local B-17s bombed BUKA causing minor damage. Again on the 13th (local) B-17s bombed the BUKA airfield and attacked shipping in the BUIN harbor. Of the 36 vessels reported in that vicinity one AK was damaged. All of these vessels were seen still there the next morning by a coastwatcher and included 2 CA, 3 CL, 10 DD, 1 AV.

The heavy gunfire on GUADALCANAL noted yesterday continued for 70 minutes during the night 13-14th local causing very heavy damage to planes on the field. During the middle of the day there were two bombing attacks on the airfield causing additional damage, but the field was in service for all but the biggest planes.

T&G 62.4 was enroute GUADALCANAL with supplies including avgas. Due to approaching enemy the AKs were turned back and the VIREO towing PAB barges loaded with avgas and escorted by the MEREDITH was ordered to continue to GUADALCANAL. The McFARLAND was also ordered to bring in a deck load of avgas.

During the morning search planes discovered three enemy forces. One consisting of 6 AP, 1 CL, 7 DD and covered by 1 BB, 3 CL, 4 DD was tracked along the east coast of SANTA ISABEL ISLAND and heading for GUADALCANAL. Six B-17s attacked this force in the late afternoon. The second force about 400 miles N.E. of GUADALCANAL, and on southerly courses consisted of carriers escorted by BBs, CAs, and DDs. That force was not sighted again during the day. A third force consisting of cruisers and DDs apparently scouting in advance of the carrier group was sighted during the morning about 225 miles northeast of GUADALCANAL.

As a result of these sightings Comsopac ordered: TF-64 (SAN FRANCISCO, CHESTER, HELENA, LANSDOWNE, LARDNER, McCALLA, BUCHANAN, AARON WARD, LAFFEY) to proceed toward GUADALCANAL (got underway daybreak 15th local); TF-17 to proceed toward GUADALCANAL as soon as fuel permits; TF-17.8 proceed ESPIRITU SANTOS for fuel and report readiness to depart.

The above indicates that the enemy has commenced his major offensive. Because our surface forces need fuel, our lack of adequate avgas at GUADALCANAL (to be flown in), and recent heavy loss of planes, our position is not favorable to prevent a major enemy landing. Planes left are 7 SBD, 4 P-400, 2 P-39; 10 SBDs were flown in during the afternoon.

The positions of our forces in the area have been discovered by the enemy.

The TROUT reports that she got two hits on the OTAKA on September 28th in the TRUK area.

The ACHILLES and LEANDER are to go to ENGLAND for a 4½ months refit.
October 13th (Continued)

Cominch 132000 indicates that there will soon be an agreement on the use of Army airplanes in the Pacific Ocean areas. B-17s were released to SOPAC.

TF-16 is at sea off OAHU training and will probably depart for the South Pacific on the 16th. TF-1 continues training and readiness for PEARL.

CTF-8 140230 pink recommends withdrawal of TF-8 from the North Pacific about November 1st and turning over the job to Commorwestseafort.

October 14th

After midnight an enemy force commenced shelling our position on GUADALCANAL heavily. Damage done was not reported. During night the six enemy transports started landing to the westward of our position. The landing was covered by a BB group west of SAVO and screened by cruisers and destroyers. During the morning search the CV striking force seen yesterday was located Northeast of SAN CRISTOBAL ISLAND.

During the morning a group of B-17s attacked the transports and ships at GUADALCANAL setting three on fire so badly that they were beached, and hitting a BB.

As the day ended all enemy forces in the GUADALCANAL area were retiring. The CV group moves are not clear and may be moving on ESPIRITU SANTO.

TF 17 was probably fueling during the day and may be in a position to strike tomorrow. TF 17,8 fueled at ESPIRITU SANTO and departed at 8 p.m. (local) to rendezvous with TF 64, where the forces will merge as TF 64 under Rear Admiral Lee. Comsopac 150212. This force cannot get to the GUADALCANAL area before day after tomorrow. Because of a possible enemy raid, all shipping at ESPIRITU SANTO got underway toward the South.

The gasoline situation at GUADALCANAL continues critical. The VIREO towing a PAB barge, and screened by the MEREDITH, can arrive there tomorrow morning.

Motor torpedo boats attacked the DDs protecting the enemy APs at GUADALCANAL. Results were not observed. A submarine shelled ESPIRITU SANTO last night.

Our AKs which were turned back from the TULAGI area yesterday were bombed but not damaged.
October 14th (Continued)

Comsopac 150246 feels that he needs another Army division for present operations. Cinopac concurs.

Our cruiser action in the GILBERTS (PORTLAND and SAN JUAN) caused the Japs some uneasy moments. Results have not been reported.

Highest quarters would be pleased to have KISKA shelled by our old BBs. (Cominch 141325). CTF 8 151025, in answer to a query on the operation from Cinopac, states that it is feasible.

The Japanese may be expected to reorganize their forces during the next few days. There is no indication that they have abandoned their efforts to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS, or that they are planning anything in other areas.

October 15th

The days reports indicate that the enemy now has two major forces in the South Pacific. In the central and northern SOLOMONS forces are:

Off NE BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND:
1 BB, 2 CA, 2 DD, 1 AV.

At BUKA:
2 CA, 2 CL, 8 DD, 3 AV, 10 auxiliaries

At BUIN - FAISI:
3 BB, 2 CV, 3 CA, 5 CL, 10 DD, 14 auxiliaries

Along the 165th meridian (east) as far south as 11-00 S:
2 BB, 1 CV, 17 cruisers and destroyers.

In view of the above enemy deployment TF 64 was ordered to operate generally South of Lat 11-45 S. Comsopac 160812. He is also sending two DDs to bombard enemy at GUADALCANAL (his 160722). Comsopac has asked that the vessels in the BUIN-FAISI area be attacked by SWPac air, which General MacArthur promises to do. Comsopac 160032 orders TF 17 to operate to eastward of ESPIRI TU SANTO. Comsopac 160440 considers his present forces inadequate for his tasks.

There is some indication that the LUNGA area may have been mined by the enemy on the 12th (local).

The HOVEY reports capturing 4 officers and 70 men, survivors of the 2nd Battle of SAVO. Preliminary statements of these prisoners are not creditable.
Comairsopac 150921 gives the critical situation at GUADALCANAL. Comgen 1st MarDiv 160005 describes action on yesterday; and his 160035 tells of enemy land concentrations. Also his 160025 tells of needs to relieve his present situation. He requests 1 battery of 155 mm guns be sent to him as soon as possible.

Air strength at GUADALCANAL was increased today by 7 SBD and four R4D1. The shortage of planes and gasoline there now will almost preclude offensive action.

It now appears that we are unable to control the sea area in the GUADALCANAL area. Thus our supply of the positions will only be done at great expense to us. The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.

The McFARLAND did a splendid piece of work in delivering gasoline and ammunition to GUADALCANAL today. As she was about to leave she received a bomb hit on her stern which knocked out her steering gear. It now seems probable that the MEREDITH was lost and the VIREO towing avgas to GUADALCANAL was damaged by enemy air.

Cominch 152125 describes APHs. They are not hospital ships under the Geneva Conventions. Com 12 151744 tells of sending EC2 ships to Sopac.

CTF 8 152050 describes a bombing attack on KISKA the 14th. Results were minor.

Cincpac 160455 pink does not recommend use of BBs to shell KISKA.

There is no doubt now that Japs are making an all out effort in the SOLOMONS, employing the greater part of their Navy.

October 16th

Just as the McFARLAND was ready to leave GUADALCANAL in the evening she was hit by a bomb on the stern. 350 drums of avgas in a barge alongside was also exploded. About 20000 gals. reached the shore. While enroute GUADALCANAL towing a barge with 2000 drums avgas the VIREO was damaged by an air attack and unable to continue the tow. The MEREDITH, escorting, is unreported and suspected missing. The acute avgas shortage continues. The HOVEY and SOUTHARD are scheduled to arrive with deck loads of avgas on the 19th local. There is also a critical shortage of bombs - which may have to be flown in. The AMBERJACK is now enroute ESPIRITU SANTO to be fitted to carry gas.

During the night the Marines at GUADALCANAL were shelled by a cruiser or a destroyer. The results of our bombardment of enemy
October 16th (Continued)

positions by 2 DDs is not yet known.

Sopac 151346 gives his summary for the 14th and 15th, and his 161326 summarizes the situation to the 16th local.

Comairsopac 162138 describes air needs for his command and Comsopac 171230 gives what he considers necessary to reinforce his position.

The New Zealand Army has agreed to garrison BLEACHER and will have a reinforced KIWI ready about November 7th.

The BELLATRIX arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO and reports some damage from an air attack two days ago, which also forced her to cast a PAB barge adrift.

Comsopac 160106 deals with the relief of the 4th defense battalion with the 9th at EFATE.

It has been decided to send about 50 Army fighters from the Central Pacific area to the South Pacific in the immediate future.

Comsopac 170800 is a proposal for the employment of submarines to support Sopac current operations. Two Pacific Fleet subs will be sent to General MacArthur to assist his coverage of the SHORTLANDS-FAISI area.

Cincpac 162221 proposes a reduction of TF 8 forces in ALASKA. Cominch approves an immediate reduction of the cruisers to two. This will permit reinforcement to Sopac. CTF 8 reports that 3 B-26's got hits on a ship in GERTRUDE COVE, KISKA. Also that Army bombers probably sank one DD and damaged another just north of KISKA.

The deployment of the Jap forces in the South Pacific is uncertain. Some forces have left the BUIN area and the CV striking force thought north of NDENI is unreported.
October 17th.

The Admiral's conference this morning was attended by General Emmons and Rear Admiral Bagley. These officers were brought up to date on the situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

The day in the South Pacific is summarized in Comsopac 171556.

Our DDs, previously mentioned, report having fired 1000 rounds per ship into the Jap positions at Guadalcanal. Also, during the day TF17 planes attacked the same positions incessantly. RENATA was also attacked by TF17 planes, Admiral Nimitz will urge Comsopac to repeat the bombardment daily when feasible.

The Japs launched what must be to them a very disappointing air attack on Guadalcanal today. Of the 14 bombers attacking, 8 were shot down by our fighters and 6 were shot down by AA.

A total of 50 Army fighters will be sent to the Sopac from the Central Pacific. 25 were ordered sent by General Marshall and 25 will be sent by Cincpac.

The VIREO will be towed to port and her barge will be towed to Guadalcanal by the SEMINOLE arriving the 19th local.

Comsopac is flying emergency gas and ammunition to Guadalcanal.

It seems most probable that TF64 was seen by the enemy today.

The SAN JUAN reports sinking two small Jap patrol boats when retiring from their raid on the GILBERTS and the patrol lines to the South. Two officers and 14 men were capture. We will continue to raid that line with our ships en-route to and from the Sopac.

The SWPac bombers are having much better success in bombing enemy ships in the SOLOMONS and NEW BRITAIN.

TF16 is enroute to the South Pacific via a point to the westward of FUNAFUTI where it will fuel.

Two fleet subs from PEARL may be sent to operate under General McArthur in the near future in order to provide denser coverage of the SHOR'TLAND - FAISO area.

The position of the main enemy forces in the South Pacific is obscure. It is not thought, however, that they have withdrawn from the general area.
Comsopac 181350 pink. Vice Admiral Halsey relieved Vice Admiral Ghormley as Commander South Pacific Force and South Pacific Area. On the evening of the 15th Admiral Nimitz conferred with members of his staff concerning relieving Admiral Ghormley. It was felt that Admiral Ghormley has not been successful for several reasons and that the critical situation there requires a more aggressive Commander. The following morning, after having received authority from Admiral King to make the change, a decision was made to effect the change upon the arrival of Admiral Halsey who was enroute by air. Rear Admiral Kinkaid will thus retain command of TF 16. See Comsopac 161437 and 161245 (pink)

The C.G. Hawaiian Department has been directed by General Marshall (October 16th) to select one infantry division from his command for movement to the South or SW Pacific and to report earliest date of readiness of the first regimental combat team. Also General Marshall prefers General Collins as division commander as General Fennel is too old. Early replacement this division will not be possible.

The Sopac situation to the 18th was summarized in Comsopac 181426. Generally the day (19th local) was quiet. There were no contacts ashore on GUADALCANAL reported. While 40 vessels were sighted in the SHORTLANDS area, the location of major enemy units was in doubt. 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers were reported enroute to attack GUADALCANAL and CTF 64 was ordered to intercept. However, he was fueling West of ESPIRITU SANTO and was unable to comply. The SOUTHARD delivered almost 10,000 gallons avgas to GUADALCANAL. The SEMINOLE towed the VIREO barge with 2000 drums of avgas aboard into the area but went to TULAGI because of the approaching enemy. No bombardment was reported last night, but some troops and supplies may have been landed. Apparently the VIREO was abandoned by her crew because of fear of an air attack. The crew embarked on the MEREDITH which was sunk by aerial torpedoes and bombs shortly thereafter. The abandoning of the VIREO is not understood. It looks like a disgraceful procedure. TF 64 continues to be trailed by enemy planes. RENNEL and SAVO ISLANDS are occupied by small enemy garrisons.

The SW Pacific air sent 22 B-17's to bomb the enemy in the SHORTLANDS area. Results were minor. The SCULPIN reported sinking two tankers on the 18th.

CTF 64 estimates that in the second battle of SAVO he sank 3 CA, 4 DD, and possibly 1 CL and one more DD. These figures seem high because of the number of cruisers and destroyers seen and attacked by planes the following day.

The PORTLAND reports engaging two DDs and two marus in her raid of the GILBERTS. No sinkings were reported. The attacks
October 18th (Continued)

were not pressed home because of fear of air attack.

The Army in Washington has approved Admiral Nimitz's orders to send 25 P-39's from CHRISTMAS to the South Pacific.

TF 1 has been ordered to prepare a plan to bombard WAKE at an early date - the date dependent upon availability of 1 XAV and 1 CL(AA) to be added to the bombardment group.

Cincpac 182359 urges that the 9th defense battalion be sent directly to GUADALCANAL instead of relieving the 4th at EFATE.

CTF 8 gives the minor results of a bombing of KISKA on the 17th. Comin has approved the immediate reduction to two of TF 8 cruisers but reserves decision on withdrawal of other forces and of Rear Admiral Theobald. The Army plans to increase the garrisons at ADAK and TANAGA to 15000 and 50000 respectively.

There are no changes noted in enemy deployments.

October 19th

Sopac operations to the 20th are summarized in his 191256.

About 9 p.m. local the CHESTER was torpedoed South of SAN CRISTOBAL. She reports being without power and a tug and DD escorts were provided.

CTF 64 sent part of his force to ESPIRITU SANTO to fuel, and the remainder will fuel there in the next few days. CTF 17 is operating to the East of ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 16 is enroute South.

In his 191954 Comin directed Comsowestpaco to place and maintain 12 fleet subs under operational control of Comsopac. Also in his 201540 he desires Cincpac to reinforce Sopac submarines.

There were two air raids on GUADALCANAL. Of the 30 zeros and 16 bombers involved 7 zeros and 2 bombers were shot down. We lost two pilots.

The O'BRIEN broke in two and sank today while enroute PEARL for repairs, after being torpedoed last month.

While the supply of avgas and bombs to GUADALCANAL is still critical, enough is being sent in to permit operations to continue. The AMBERJACK will arrive with a small cargo of gas on the 25th.

The 12 B-17's for the Sopac have left OAHU. This brings the total transferred recently up to 24. Also from OAHU was the
October 19th (Continued)

first of the 19th bombardment group (B-24's) going to AUSTRALIA.

In the BUIN area yesterday were at least 1 BB, 1 AV, 8 cruisers, 8 DD, 8 AK's. At RABAUL were 34 large vessels and 22 of medium size. In that group was 1 CV and 1 AV. Thus we now have the position of most strength in the area except it is probable that 3 BBs, 2 CV, with usual flotilla are somewhere in the general TRUK-RABAUL area.

October 20th

Sopac operations for the 20th are summarized in his 201321.

The CHESTER is making 6 knots under own steam and at that rate should arrive at ESPIRITU SANTO day after tomorrow.

Comair ONE 200407 indicates the shortage of planes at GUADALCANAL. The rate of attrition there is extremely high. Much damage to planes was caused by recent enemy shelling.

Yesterday the Marines repulsed a minor attempt to cross the MATANIKAU RIVER.

Cincpac 202215 and 202309 describe a plan to send 12 Pac Fleet subs to the Sopac. This is an emergency move to provide dense coverage in the active area, and complies with Cominch desire noted yesterday.

RENNELL ISLAND is not occupied by the Japs.

The Fighting French High Commissioner has left NOUMEA for good, in the opinion of Comsopac.

The GROUPER returning from patrol in the EAST CHINA SEA reports sinking 12,000 tons of marus (2 ships).

The very large concentration of Jap ships at RABAUL apparently continues. Photos do not show a CV there as reported yesterday. There is very good indication that the Japs are having to slow up their plans for an attack in force on GUADALCANAL because of large attrition losses.

Cincpac pointed out to Cominch that now is a golden opportunity for the British Eastern Fleet to take action on the Jap west flank.
October 21st

Vice Admiral Halsey will move ashore at NOUMEA occupying certain buildings vacated by the Fighting French High Commissioner. Cominch approves taking over this French property as a military necessity (his 211540 pink).

Cominch concurs in Cinopac proposal for British action (Cominch 211400 pink) and passed the message along to the Admiralty.

In a 3 part (211630) Cominch gives the present plan for Army and Navy air support to the Sopac operations.

TF 16 and TF 17 will join as TF 61 under Rear Admiral Kinkaid at 0300 CST October 24th and make a sweep around north SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, thence southwesterly east of SAN CRISTOBAL to the Coral Sea area in position to intercept enemy forces approaching our positions in the Southern SOLOMONS.

The INDIANA, COLUMBIA, DeHAVEN, and SAUFLEY have been ordered to the Pacific Fleet and will depart Atlantic ports for the Canal Zone no later than November 10th.

Cominch 211631 pink summarizes the MTB situation in the Pacific.

Comsopac 210517 tells of needs of a major supply base at NOUMEA. Comairsopac 212300 tells of needs of VF planes in the forward areas.

There is a shortage of Marines in the STRAW area and at FUNAFUTI.

The 25th Army Division at OAHU has been ordered to move to the South or SWPac starting November 15.

The PORTER sighted an enemy merchant type vessel of about 5,000 tons, apparently armed with several guns, 4" or larger, near the GILBERT ISLANDS. In an engagement which followed the PORTER fired about 1200 rounds without sinking the vessel. No damage was done to the PORTER.

Cominch has approved the withdrawal of the COPAHEE VF squadron from ALASKA and cancelled the directive to maintain one fighter division in ALASKA.
October 22nd.

Comsopac summarizes operations in his area. The use of tanks and small artillery by the enemy on GUADALCANAL indicates the ability of the Japs to land good sized weights. There have been indications of towing lighters to GUADALCANAL by destroyers.

PBVs attacked shipping in the SHORTLAND area early in the morning. Although one plane reported a torpedo hit, DI indicates no damage.

A search plane reported sighting an enemy task force about 350 miles NE of MALAITA about 10 in the morning (local). This was indicated to be a CV striking force on southerly courses. The search kept the force fairly well under observation during the day. During the following night a search plane reported making radar contact in that general vicinity. One hour later the same plane reported 9 ships, of which one was believed to be a CV, and that he dropped his torpedo but failed to get a hit. When last observed the force was reported on course 260 speed 20 - which would permit it to be in a fly off position for GUADALCANAL next daylight. This is the first time in several days that we have been able to get much light on Jap deployments. The RABAUL and SHORTLANDS areas continued to be well filled with Jap ships, most of which were auxiliaries. The combined total in those areas was 93 vessels. From all indications the enemy seems about ready to start his long expected all out attack on GUADALCANAL. The next three or four days are critical.

GUADALCANAL reported three flights of planes coming in from the northwest during the middle of the day but no report of bombing was received.

Comairsonac welcomes the Army P-39's but points out that if they are not the KING series they are no good as fighters but excellent for ground strafing. While the flow of planes to the area cannot be considered satisfactory, it is improving. In the GUADALCANAL area there is enough avgas (over 100,000 gals) to keep General Geiger's planes filled, there is not enough to operate B-17's; nor is there any immediate prospect of so doing. Avgas and ammunition still arrives there in dribs and drabs.

A crew was put on the VIREO. That ship, with PAB #6 in tow, is now enroute ESPIRITU SANTO.

TF 61 will hardly be in a position to intercept enemy forces in the SOLOMONS before late afternoon of the 25th local. TF 64 could be off GUADALCANAL on the 25th. Thus, should the enemy strike tomorrow air and submarines will be the only opposition.

Comamphibforsopac gives information from prisoners on the 2nd Battle of SAVO. General DeGaulle has fully agreed to the assignment of necessary buildings at NOUMEA to Comsopac. Governor Monchamps was authorized to negotiate any other matters with Comsopac. In a very cordial conversation with Comnaveu he emphasized his desire for full cooperation with U.S. About time.
October 22nd. (Continued)

It is possible that the poor shooting reported yesterday and attributed to the PORTER was done by Comdesron TWO in the MORRIS.

TF 1 continues at PEARL engaged in training and upkeep while being prepared to repel landing attempts in the Hawaiian Area.

In the ALEUTIANS enemy submarines were active. One fired torpedoes at the DOLPHIN which missed. The S-32 reports hitting 2 AKs with torpedoes in the vicinity of PARAMUSHIRO and claims one probably sunk and one damaged. The cruisers of TF 8 completed a 10 day sweep as far west as ATTU. Results were negative. Cincopac 222129 requests Cominch approval to exchange the DETROIT and RALEIGH for cruisers of TF 8.

We are still without definite news of the major units of the enemy which are thought to be in the general Sopac area. If our guess is correct they can throw more ships, planes, and troops into the vital area than we can. And this situation will continue for the next few weeks. Having inferior forces we must count heavily on attrition, but losing no chance to come to grips with the enemy under the principle of calculated risk.

October 23rd.

Operations in the South Pacific are summarized in Comsopac 240041. The very fine work of our Marine pilots in shooting down the enemy planes is most encouraging. Rain during the day made the airfield unsuitable for heavy planes. There is much work to be done to provide all-weather fields in the area and several other locations are under consideration.

General MacArthur reports good success in air raids in the RABAUL area. Among other targets claimed hit he reports setting a tanker on fire. If this is verified it is bound to slow up the enemy somewhat.

The submarine concentration in the active area is beginning to shape up with the arrival of two Pacific Fleet subs from TRUK. Ten more are to follow from PEARL, leaving before the end of this month.

Both TF 61 and TF 64 will be in position to strike the enemy in the Southern SOLOMONS by late tomorrow.

The logistic support of our positions in the Southern SOLOMONS is proceeding, but the difficulties of unloading and the great risk to ships involved continues.

The CHESTER probably arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO for emergency repairs today.

(Continued on next page)
October 23rd (Continued)

Our search plane from OAHU reported sighting a submarine about 500 miles southwest of that place. If this can be verified it may be the forerunner of projected enemy operations in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier. R. I. also gives indication of some sort of a raid. A raid in the near future, probably at MIDWAY, is considered a possibility. All signs continue to point to the commencement of major operations in the South Pacific within the next two or three days. If these signs are right, a raid in the HAWAIIAN area or along our exposed positions to the South will be a minor hit and run affair.

The exchange of the DETROIT and RALEIGH for TF 8 cruisers has been approved by Cominch and will be effected as soon as possible.

October 24th.

Reports of enemy contacts from search planes in the South Pacific during the morning were confusing. One force composed of BBs, CAs, and DDs was reported 140 miles NE of the GUADALCANAL airfield. 130 miles to the eastward of that group a second force was reported. This was reported to be 2 BB, 2 CV, 2 CA, 2 CL, and at least 4 DD. A third force stated to be composed of nine ships was reported 210 miles NE GUADALCANAL. Off the east coast of SANTA ISABEL ISLAND a force composed of 1 BB, 3 CL, and 2 DD was reported. Off the west coast of MALAITA a force of two cruisers and three destroyers was reported. While the picture is not clear, enough was reported to show a typical major enemy move toward the south. TF 61 was too far east to attack. TF 64 was ordered to strike any forces encountered in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL. That force made a sweep of the GUADALCANAL area but failed to make contact with the enemy and withdrew. B-17's were ordered to strike the forces nearest GUADALCANAL, probably because they were the immediate threat. Results are shown in Comairsopac 251450. During the morning our position on GUADALCANAL was shelled by two cruisers and one destroyer. As that group was retiring to the northward Marine SB's attacked and reported one cruiser obviously damaged. As enemy might attempt night landings, General Vandergrift ordered motor torpedo boats from TULAGI to strike the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL after dark. During the afternoon enemy planes were reported heading toward GUADALCANAL.

A Catalina night radar search and torpedo strike was ordered from ESPIRITU SANTO to the NW.

One squadron of the 90th bombardment group (B-24's) previously ordered to AUSTRALIA is to report to General Harmon for temporary duty by orders from General Marshall.

(Continued on next page)
October 24th. (Continued)

The 8th Marines have been ordered to EFATE and should arrive there October 30th.

Sopac 250216 gives the summary of operations in that area to the 24th.

Admiral Ghormley arrived at PEARL today enroute to Washington.

A submarine was reported 320 miles west of OAHU. This may be the same one sighted yesterday about 500 miles SW of OAHU.

Two DDs from TF 16 raided the enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS on the 22nd and sank two small patrol vessels. It now appears that a DD of TF 17 also raided the same patrol line on the same day.

The Army planes made a minor air attack on KISKA during the day.

October 25th.

In the early morning TF 61 was about 150 miles southeast of the enemy striking forces noted yesterday in the area to the eastward of the SOLOMONS. Both forces had good knowledge of the approximate position and composition of each other. Our position and strength seemed quite favorable. Shortly before 7 a.m. local an enemy shore based patrol plane made an accurate contact report of TF 61. The enemy immediately launched a carrier strike which was able to find TF 61 without further search. Presumably our carrier strike was launched at about the same time but there is some evidence that it had to search before locating the target. A little after 9 a.m. local the enemy started air attacks on TF 61. The HORNET was severely damaged by bombs and torpedoes and was taken in tow by the NORTHAMPTON. A preliminary report of damage to other vessels is given in CTF 61 260440. Damage inflicted by our CV planes is shown in CTF 61 260210. B-17's from ESPIRITU SANTO were also ordered to attack but the account of damage inflicted is not in. After the first attack TF 61 commenced retirement to the southeast. During the afternoon the enemy CV planes attacked the HORNET again with bombs and torpedoes causing such serious damage that CTF 17 decided to sink the carrier with own torpedoes. As the day ended the enemy seemed to be retiring to the northwest and all of our task forces were retiring on southerly courses except for one force containing BB's which was attempting to intercept our force during the afternoon.

(Continued on next page)
October 25th. (Continued)

For the first time in the South Pacific our CV task forces were able to operate under a search umbrella and the enemy strength and disposition was reported frequently. The Japs have always had this advantage in the area. During the past two days there has been a front along the northern part of the search area which has reduced the efficiency of the search.

No report of enemy plane losses has been received but they must have been very heavy. If the percentage of loss approaches that of previous recent engagements (and it should as we have been loading our ships with AA), the three enemy CV's thought to have been in the battle today will be unable to do much more damage soon.

At daylight TF 64 presumably was retiring from GUADALCANAL. During the morning Comsopac ordered all TF to strike the enemy. Later in the day TF 64 was ordered to retire to the southward.

The enemy group which shelled GUADALCANAL on the 24th also sank the SEMINOLE and a ¥P at TULAGI. The SEMINOLE was fitted for salvage and her loss is serious.

While entering ESPIRITU SANTO the COOLIDGE, with one regimental combat team of the 43rd Army Division embarked, struck one or more mines and sank. While she probably struck our own mine field, there is a possibility that enemy mines are responsible as a Jap sub was in the vicinity recently.

General Harmon is holding usable B-17's at FANTAN for emergency combat. Those held were enroute from AUSTRALIA to OAHU.

Operations preceding the battle in the South Pacific are summarized in Comsopac 260210.

The SARGO returning from patrol off the CHINA coast reports sinking one 7000 ton freighter with torpedos and gunfire. The STURGEON returning from patrol in the FAISI - ST GEORGES channel area reported sinking one loaded 10,000 ton tanker and one 7000 ton freighter. The NAUTILUS clearing patrol area off Eastern HONSHU reports sinking 22000 tons enemy shipping.

The CHESTER will be able to leave ESPIRITU SANTO about October 29th under her own power. Due to extensive damage she will be able to make only seven knots. She will go to SYDNEY for temporary repairs.

There were no important contacts in the Central or North Pacific area. The landing strip on ST PAUL ISLAND is now 100 feet wide by 2300 feet long. The SPERRY and FULTON leave PEARL for the South Pacific tomorrow.

Although the enemy has suffered considerable damage recently in the general SOLOMONS area there is no indication that he has (Continued on next page)
October 25th. (Continued)

abandoned his plan to recapture GUADALCANAL. The Jap subs are ordered to search for and attack our forces in the area. Due to the strength in the South, no major operations in any other area are considered probable at this time. Small nuisance raids in the Central Pacific area are possible.

October 26th.

The Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, were present at Cinopac morning conference when events of the previous day were reviewed. Admiral Nimitz continues to keep his principal subordinates fully informed of developments in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

The morning search from ESPIRITU SANTO discovered groups of the enemy about 360 miles to the eastward of GUADALCANAL. At least two BBs, 1 CV, several cruisers and destroyers were reported. All were on northerly courses at fairly high speed. Operations in the Sopac area are summarized in Comsopac 270426, which includes a night attack by PBVs on an enemy carrier, which is also reported by Comairsopac in his 270031. TF 61 reports further details of damage to his force in his 270045. After delivering PTs and avgas to GUADALCANAL the TREVER and ZANE engaged three enemy DDs at long range and escaped with minor damage mainly because the Marine pilots joined the battle and are credited with sinking two of the enemy DDs. TF 61 and TF 64 retired during the day toward fueling positions.

TF 64.2 (Rear Admiral Scott in ATLANTA, 4 DDs) is ordered to bombard enemy positions on GUADALCANAL on the morning of the 29th and 30th (local).

General MacArthur is requested by Admiral Halsey to make maximum bombing effort day and night against ships in the BUIN-FAISI-TOMOLEI area.

Admiral Halsey requests carrier reinforcement from the British Eastern Fleet. Cinopac concurs and urges Cominich to explore the idea (Cinopac 270251 pink).

During the afternoon 14 B-17s attacked the enemy east of the SOLOMONS. Nil hits.

Comsopac 260814 gives the plan for the employment of Army fighters and medium bombers in the GUADALCANAL-ESPIRITU SANTO area.

(Continued on next page)
October 26th. (Continued)

Comsopac 270437 sets forth his views for setting up a base command separate from Seronsopac.

There were no developments of note in the Central and north Pacific areas.

During the day a force composed of battleships and other combatant vessels was reported by our planes in a position to the eastward of the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS. The force was reported to be enemy, but was later identified as units of Task Force 61.

October 27th.

Lieut. General Emmons, Rear Admiral Bagley, and Vice Admiral Towers attended the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.

Comsopac 280326 amplifies his report of operations for the previous days. The enemy reported that a unit had received a torpedo hit about the time of the PBY attack. While the enemy usually reports "no damage" or "minor damage" in such cases, we know from past experience that damage inflicted is often much greater than reported.

T.G. 64.2 (Rear Admiral Scott in ATLANTA, AARON WARD, BENHAN, LARDNER, FLETCHER) will be unable to shell the Japs on GUADALCANAL on the 29th as requested and is now ordered to shell on the 30th only.

The McFARLAND will be used to service seaplanes, fuel and gas storage, be an alternate radio station, and other services at TULAGI. It is planned to mount her 4 inch guns on shore for harbor defense. There are indications that she has been discovered by the enemy.

TF 61 is proceeding to NOUEMA, fueling enroute. TF 64 less TG 64.2 was enroute to a fueling rendezvous west of ESPIRITU SANTO. At 3:20 a.m. and at 5:30 a.m., 27th local, the WASHINGTON was attacked by submarines. Several torpedoes were fired in each attack and all missed. Because of the known submarine menace east of ESPIRITU SANTO Comsopac ordered the WASHINGTON and 2 DD to NOUEMA for fuel, and the other vessels in company to ESPIRITU SANTO for fuel. TF 64.2 will also fuel at ESPIRITU SANTO on their arrival there November 1st (local).

The inexcusable loss of the COOLIDGE is described in Comnav-unit BUTTON 280921. The existence of a mine field at ESPIRITU SANTO has been made known widely, especially after the loss of the TUCKER in the same locality.

(The Continued on next page)
Comsoapc offered B-24s from his area to General MacArthur to increase bombing of enemy ships in the NEW BRITAIN-SOLOMONS. General MacArthur replied that he could use the planes to advantage with reservations listed in his 281001.

The approved Joint Chiefs of Staff aircraft plan for the active Sopac area has been received by mail. Cincpac 280351 suggests that Comsoapc have a plan drawn up for the defense of ESPIRITU SANTO which Cincpac will submit to Cominch for approval and implementation. The lack of strength there is cause for concern.

The logistic support of our positions in the Southern SOLOMONS continues, but the risk and difficulties are great.

The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, inaugurated the auxiliary landing strip at WALLIS ISLAND when he landed there in a PBY5A on October 26th (local).

Cominch has stated that as a general rule exchange of information will be direct between our liaison officer and the CinC, Eastern Fleet.

The TRIGGER returning from patrol off BUNGOC CHANNEL reports sinking one 10,000 ton AO and one 5,000 ton AK. While our submarines have had fine success, there are a few spotty performances. For example, recently off TRUK two of our submarines each missed a fine chance to press home attacks on enemy carriers.

CTF 8 280215 and 280255 (pinks) expresses his views on the needed strength and disposition of Army troops in the ALEUTIANS.

Cincpac 280311 asks Cominch for what he believes is the somewhat premature announcement of the loss of the WASP, and of the loss of the PORTER before it could be announced that next of kin informed.

Cominch 281735 (pink) deals with the use of our submarines for scouting and general information purposes.

Although the main enemy strength has retired to the north beyond our air search there is no indication that the Japs have abandoned plans to recapture GUADALCANAL. It seems probable that damage inflicted and fuel needs have made it necessary to retire for the time being. Further attempts to land troops on GUADALCANAL are to be expected.
October 28th.

Events of the previous day were discussed at Admiral Nimitz's morning conference. Lieut. General Emmons and TF Commanders now at PEARL were present.

Cincpac 282225 remarks on the present lull in the South Pacific area which appears to give us the opportunity for placing strong reinforcements on GUADALCANAL. Comsopac 290130 is in complete agreement and gives his plans for troop movements starting on the 30th (local).

Comsopac 290106 is a summary for his area. Land operations on GUADALCANAL during the 27th (local) are described.

The logistic support of Southern SOLOMONS positions is being stepped up. On the 28th (local) there were 45,000 gallons avgas at GUADALCANAL and 4,900 gallons avgas at TULAGI.

The SCULPIN, returning from patrol in the NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE area, reports the probable sinking of 1 - 9200 AO, 1 - 10000 AP, 1 - large AO, 1 - 4000 AK.

A total of 43 ships including 2 BB, 1 XCV, 2 AVPs, 1 (reported) CC, 2 CA, 8 CL, 1 DD, 12 marus were reported in the SHORTLANDS area.

We now have the story of our destroyer raids on the enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS: CTF 16 280330.

The DRUM reported sinking four AK while on patrol off HONSHU.

It appears that the KENDRICK on a shakedown trip was attacked by a submarine off the WASHINGTON Coast.

CTF 8 282240 gives results of reconnaissance in the Western ALEUTIANS.

Some of the enemy strength in the South Pacific is located in the SHORTLANDS area and the remainder is believed to be refueling and reorganizing to the northward of our searches. It continues to appear probable that the enemy will continue with plans to recapture GUADALCANAL.
October 29th

As is usual, present at Admiral Nimitz's morning conference were the principal subordinate commanders now at PEARL. TF commanders at PEARL are thus given a good picture of current operations.

The day was quiet in the South Pacific. Comsopac 300150 summarizes the 29th local.

Plans have been completed to reinforce GUADALCANAL, and to construct an alternate landing strip in the vicinity of AOLA BAY. It is planned that the 8th Marines will be landed to reinforce the garrison November 3rd (local) and that part of the 5th Marine Defense Battalion, 1 BN 147th Infantry, 1 battery FA, 2 COs 2nd Marine raiders, and 500 ACORN personnel will be landed at AOLA the same day. (See Comsopac 300602 for escorts and cooperation by other Sopac and SWPac forces).

The C.O. LION #1 will proceed to Sopac and assist in formulating recommendations and execution of a graduated movement of that LION to the South Pacific.

The Central Pacific was quiet. TF 1 continues training in the HAWAIIAN Area, basing at PEARL. TF 11 has been formed under Rear Admiral Ramsey and will be ready to proceed South in the near future.

Cinopac 301819 deals with defensive mines. Experience to date is not conducive to extension of this method of warfare.

Three enemy cruisers were sighted well to the westward of the ALEUTIANS and were observed on a westerly course. These cruisers may have made a sweep into the Bearing Sea.

Nothing new is reported concerning enemy deployments or intentions.
October 30th.

Following the usual morning conference the question of sending certain old BBs of TF 1 to the South Pacific was discussed. While no decision was reached it was considered feasible to send two BBs to operate either with or without ACVs. If BBs are sent the MARYLAND and COLORADO probably will be the first to go.

The day was extremely quiet in all areas. In the South Pacific our forces were refueling, refitting, and reorganizing. The enemy is presumed to be doing the same. Comsopac gives a summary to the morning of the 30th (local) in his 310534. The SW Pacific air continued attacks on enemy ships in the SHORTLAND and RABAUL areas. Two direct hits are claimed on a probable CA in the former place. These attacks are valuable for several reasons. Army pilots are trained in navigation and bombing; reported hits and near misses may inflict important damage; the enemy is not permitted to rest secure in the harbors.

Cinopac 310355 gives views on the employment of submarines in the SOLOMONS area.

Comsopac 310206 pink requests Compgensopac to dispatch earliest practicable one Army infantry regiment reinforced, less one battalion, to GUADALCANAL.

Due to shipping, the departure of the first combat team of the 25th Army Division from OAHU to the South Pacific is now delayed until November 25th, and the second team should leave early in December.

There is no news of enemy major units in the South Pacific. Five enemy DDs are scheduled to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL November 2nd (local). Cominch points out that enemy actions may well be linked with our national elections due next Tuesday.
October 31st

The Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, and TF commanders at PEARL where present at the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.

The story of the loss of the HORNET is told in Comsopac 011312 pink. The poor torpedo shooting by our DDs is not understood. Also, as the two enemy and nine own torpedoes failed to sink the carrier, there is a suggestion that we should push salvage measures in the hope of saving wounded ships. Comsopac 011050 pink gives his estimate of enemy plane losses and a summary of own plane losses in the October 26th engagement. We still are not fully informed of our own damage on that day. For example, it was learned today for the first time that the MAHAN has serious damage forward, and the SAN JUAN requires docking.

Comsopac is now giving his submarines good information of enemy movements. This should be beneficial.

Tomorrow two AKs and one AP will arrive at GUADALCANAL with supplies including 8 - 155 mm guns.

A task group has been sent to intercept 5 enemy DDs expected to arrive at GUADALCANAL tomorrow night.

CTF 62 310946 describes the AOLA BAY project. A fighter, then a bomber strip will be constructed as soon as possible.

Comsopac 312126 recommends a reorganization of this force. This has to do with the Amphibious Force.

The landing strip at FUNAFUTI is now 3500 feet long. This is a very quick construction job.

The KINGFISH reports sinking 12,000 tons of enemy shipping off HONSHU.

A submarine was reported by a plane 120 miles SW of OAHU.

There are no new enemy developments.
November 1st

General Emmons and the TF commanders present at PEARL attended the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. The events of the previous day were reviewed.

Comsopac 012359 is an operations summary. Comgen 1st MarDiv 010515 reports the crossing of the MATANITKAU RIVER by the 5th Marines. A large force of enemy cruisers and destroyers was sighted by our search planes during the afternoon about 100 miles NE of ISABEL ISLAND. Comsopac estimated that the force intended to make a sweep through INDISPENSABLE STRAIT to attack our surface forces. TF 65 was ordered to attack but was unable to intercept the enemy during the night, and so rejoined the transport group. The transport group had been ordered to retire toward ESPIRITU SANTO. In the absence of enemy contacts, the landings planned for the 3rd will take place on the 4th (local).

During the night the FULLER and CONVYNGHAM were in collision. The destroyer has a flooded fireroom and speed reduced to 10 knots. She was directed to seek shelter inshore at MALAITA. The FULLER damage was slight.

Commandiv 1 010501 gives the progress of landing strips at GUADALCANAL.

Cincpac notified Comsopac of the probable use of MOHAWK BAY in the SWALLOW ISLANDS by the enemy during the last enemy advance. This information was noted in RI and may have been seen by Comsopac.

The SUMNER will complete the survey and have new charts ready November 5th.

Cincpac 012115 gives views on the press announcements regarding the HORNET.

The sighting of enemy forces to the eastward of the SOLOMONS is not good evidence of the resumption of the all out offensive toward the SOLOMONS. As the enemy knew of our moves off GUADALCANAL the day before it seems likely that the force sighted was ordered to make a sweep to the south in order to destroy inferior forces. No CVs or BBs were observed within our search area yesterday.
The following estimate of location of Orange strength in the Pacific is submitted by Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District.

GENERAL

Most of the information on location of Orange surface and air units is now too old to be of any great value. This information should be used with caution and with regard to dates given. Dates set opposite the information indicate date of last location.
### BATTLESHIPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flag CinC Combined</th>
<th>Truk area 10/21.</th>
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<tr>
<td>YAMATO</td>
<td>Truk area 9/29.</td>
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<tr>
<th>BatDiv One</th>
<th>Empire in August.</th>
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<tr>
<td>KAGATO</td>
<td>South of Truk 9/27.</td>
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<td>MUSU</td>
<td>Empire 9/19.</td>
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<td>YAMASHIRO</td>
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<th>Truk area 9/16.</th>
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<td>ISHI</td>
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<td>FUSO</td>
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<td>HOSASHII</td>
<td>Note – listed with</td>
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<td>BatDiv Two for convenience only.</td>
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<td>Truk area 9/19.</td>
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<td>HARUNA</td>
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<td>CarDiv One</td>
<td>CarDiv Two</td>
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<td>SHIKAKU</td>
<td>HAYATAKA</td>
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<td>ZUKAKU</td>
<td>HITAKA</td>
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<td>ZUIHO</td>
<td>RYUJO</td>
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Possibly in Solomon area 10/15.  
Possibly in Solomon area 10/15.  
Reported sighted Truk area 10/9.  
Santa Cruz Area 10/26.  
Santa Cruz area 10/26.  
Empire 10/19.  
Empire 10/18.  
Truk area - headed north 10/5.  
Truk area 10/1.  
Empire 10/1.  
Indicated Ambon 10/17.  
Pitting out 10/1.

NOTE: Submarine GREENLING hit a CV with two torpedoes at 37-30 N, 145-30 E on course 060 T on 10/22.  
CarDiv 2 less HITAKA made a battle report for action north of Santa Cruz 10/26.
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<tr>
<th>CruDiv Four</th>
<th>CruDiv Five</th>
<th>CruDiv Six</th>
<th>CruDiv Seven</th>
<th>CruDiv Eight</th>
<th>CruDiv Nine</th>
<th>CruDiv Ten</th>
<th>CruDiv Eleven</th>
<th>CruDiv Sixteen</th>
<th>CruDiv Eighteen</th>
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<td>ARAO</td>
<td>TAKAO</td>
<td>MAYA</td>
<td>HAGURO</td>
<td>MYOKO</td>
<td>AOKA</td>
<td>KINUGASA</td>
<td>KUMANO</td>
<td>SIZUYA</td>
<td>NOGAMI</td>
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CRUISERS

Division Nineteen (Nine Layers)

TOKIOA
TSUGARU

CruDiv Twenty-Two

TAMA
KISO

Unassigned CA's

ASHIGARA
CHOKAI
MACHI

Unassigned CL's

KUNA
YURA
KATORI
KASHII

Timor area 10/16.

Truk area 9/19.

Ominato area 9/23.

Truk area 10/4.

Singapore area 10/17.

Palao area 9/30.

Shortland I. 10/22.

Ominato area 9/23.

Three CL's reported sighted in Aleutians 10/29 probably TAMA,
KISO, ADUKIWA.
DEFOREIGN

DesRon One
ABUKUMA

DesDiv Six
AMATSUKI
HISIRI
IKAZUCHI
IHAZUMA

DesDiv Twenty-One
KAKABA
BASHKARU
HATSUSHIMO

DesDiv Twenty-Four
KAKAZAI
KAKAZAI
KAAZAI
SUZUKAI

DesDiv Twenty-Seven
SHIRU
ARAIKE
YUGURE
SHIRATSUYU

DesRon Two
JIMBYU

DesDiv Fifteen
CAYASHI
HAYASHI
KIKOSHI

DesDiv Sixteen
YUKAIZE
TOKITSUKAZE
AMATSUKAZE
HATSUKAZE

DesDiv Eighteen
SHIHAIKI
KAGOHO
KASHI

DesDiv Thirty-One
MAGAISHI
TAKAHI
SUZUSHI
MAGIMI

Okinawa area 9/19.
No information.
Yokosuka 9/17.
Departing Kure for Saipan 10/1.
With Cardiv Two 9/26.

Northern area 10/13.
Northern area 10/13.
Okinawa area 9/24 — damaged.

Southern area 9/17.
Sunk by NAUTHUS.
Rabaul area 9/29.
Rabaul area 9/27.

Guadalcanal 10/29.
New Britain 9/24.
Damaged. Guadalcanal 9/7.
Shortlands area 9/30.
Palao area escorting 10/1.

Rabaul area 10/2.
Assigned East Indies Force 9/11.
No information.
No information.
Possibly sunk.

Gilberts 9/5.
Escorting UNIYO 9/7.
Probably under overhaul 9/25.
Truk area 9/9.
Truk area in August.

Maizuru for repairs 9/3.
Rabaul 9/23.
Badly damaged Kiska 7/5.

Truk area 9/25.
With Cardiv Two 9/23.
Yokosuka 10/1.
Northern area 9/25.
With Cardiv Two 9/23.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyers</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SENDAI</td>
<td>Shortlands 9/20.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HATSUKI</td>
<td>At Guadalcanal 9/6.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUTAMI</td>
<td>Save Island 10/11.</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUN YOZUKI</td>
<td>Save Island 10/11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURAKUMO</td>
<td>Rabaul area 10/1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DesDiv 19</td>
<td>Condeesdiv 19 Shortlands 9/27.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIKISHIMA</td>
<td>No information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISHAKI</td>
<td>With ZUKU 9/26.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AYAKI</td>
<td>Rabaul area 9/27.</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMINO</td>
<td>Shortlands 9/28.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DesDiv 20</td>
<td>Condeesdiv 20 in AMAGARI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAGARI</td>
<td>Shortland 9/29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZAKARI</td>
<td>Possibly sunk.</td>
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<tr>
<td>YUDARI</td>
<td>Enroute Kure 9/29.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DesRon 4</td>
<td>Condeesron 4 in Solomons 10/1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Probably carrying flag Condeesron 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURASME</td>
<td>Truk area 9/25.</td>
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<tr>
<td>YUDACHI</td>
<td>Truk area 9/25.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMIDARE</td>
<td>Truk area 9/24.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARUSAKI</td>
<td>Truk area 9/23.</td>
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<tr>
<td>DesDiv 4</td>
<td>Condeesdiv 4 Rabaul 9/30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAI</td>
<td>3th Fleet area 9/18.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOSAKI</td>
<td>Truk area 9/24.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAGIKAZE</td>
<td>Damaged or sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARASHI</td>
<td>Truk area 9/29.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DesDiv 8</td>
<td>Condeesdiv 8 Yokosuka 9/16.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARASHI</td>
<td>Truk area 9/20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASASHI</td>
<td>Escorting Yokosuka to Saipan 10/1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSATO</td>
<td>Makassar in August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDOSHIO</td>
<td>Possibly sunk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HATSUME</td>
<td>Truk area in August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEMUNE</td>
<td>Empire area in August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAGURO</td>
<td>Sunken 1940 August 28th in Solomons.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-7-
DesRon 5

DesDiv 5

TATSUKAZE
HATSUKAZE
HARUKAZE
ASAIKAZE

ConоeоDIV 5 in Ашон аrea 9/28.
Saipan area 10/1.
Saigon area in August.
Saigon in August.
Palau area 9/26.

DesDiv 22

FUMIYUKI
KAGATSUKI
MIHATSUKE
SATSUMI

In Saigon area 9/27.
Empire 9/19.
Enroute Singapore to Empire 9/19.
Saipal 9/30.
Saigon 9/18.

DesDiv 34

YAMATSUKI
HAKAZE
AKIKAZE
YUKAZE
YAKAZE

Solomons 9/24.
Solomons 10/2.
With HOSHO 10/1.
Marshalls 9/27.

DesRon 6

YOKARI

DesDiv 23

KIRITSUKI
HIKAZURI
KISARAGI

Sunk at Tulagi.
South China in August.
Possibly sunk.

DesDiv 29

SUI
ASARAGI
YUBACHI
YUKI

Escorting Palau - Rabaul 10/1.
Palau area 10/1.
Truk area 10/4.
Tarawa 10/15.
Marshalls - Gilberts 9/30.

Note: DesRon 6 disbanded but will continue to be reported here to account for these DDs.

DesDiv 30

HOKITSUKI
UZURI

New Guinea 9/27.
New Guinea 9/27.

DesRon 10

DesDiv 7

SAKAMARI
HAKAMARU
UMIKO
AKASHINO

ConоeоDIV 7 'escorting MYOU 9/28.
Rabaul 9/25.
Truk 9/27.
Rabaul 9/21.
Solomons in August.

DesDiv 10

AKIMOMO
MAMEUMO
KAZAGUMO
YUGUMO

ConоeоDIV 10 Yokosuka 9/30.
Saipal 9/7.
Empire in August.
Yokosuka 10/1.
With Cardiv 1 in August.

1120
Destroyers

DesDiv 17

1. Shikinami
2. Hakaze
3. Isokaze
4. Urakaze

Unassigned DesDivs

DesDiv 1

1. Kasa
2. Hamakaze
3. Hamakaze
4. Kinugasa
5. Kainakaze

DesDiv 13

1. Hamakaze
2. Kurita
3. Yamasuki

DesDiv 32

1. Harukaze
2. Fuso
3. Asagao

DesDiv 33

1. Minezaki
2. Sawakaze
3. Chokaze
4. Shinkaze
5. Oboro

Miscellaneous DD's

1. Yamato
2. Usuzumi
3. Hitokari
4. Hatamoto
5. Osaki
6. Fujiharu
7. Kitora
8. Hana
9. Aratsu
10. Wazukishi
11. Castillo
12. Takazuki
13. Tekutake
14. Suenosuke
15. Akitake

Comdesdiv 17: Truk area 9/27.
No information.
Truk area 9/28.
Rebuilder 9/27.

No information.
Hokasono 9/26.
Chinato area 10/1.
Chinato area 10/1.
No information.

No information.
No information.
No information.

Formosa area escorting 9/29.
Formosa area 9/27.
No information.
Escorting in August.

Comdesdiv 32 escorting in S.E. Asia 8/29.
Saigon 9/27.
No information.
Singapore area 9/14.

Saipan 8/30.
Empire 8/29.
Empire 8/27.
Palaq escorting 10/1.
Northern area 9/29.

Probably in Empire 9/28.
Northern area 9/28.
South China 9/26.
Singapore in June.
No information.
No information.
No information.
No information.
No information.
No information.
No information.
Empire 9/1.

Northern area 9/26.
### SUBMARINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SubDiv 15</th>
<th>In Truk area 10/20.</th>
<th>Eure area 10/4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I-32</td>
<td>Truk area 10/4.</td>
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<tr>
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**Note:** on 10 Aug. I-25 and I-26 added to SubDiv 2 and SubDiv 4 deleted.

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<td>I-166</td>
<td>No Information.</td>
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<td>I-64</td>
<td>Saigon 10/4.</td>
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<td>I-121</td>
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<td>Rabaul - Solomons 10/4.</td>
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<td>I-123</td>
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<td>RO-33</td>
<td>Kure 10/4.</td>
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<td>Kure 10/4.</td>
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<td>RO-69</td>
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<td>RO-61</td>
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<td>Northern area 10/4.</td>
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<td>RO-84</td>
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<td>Yokosuka 10/4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-13</td>
<td>Yokosuka 10/4.</td>
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<td>I-16</td>
<td>Indispensable Straits Patrol 10/29.</td>
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<td>I-22</td>
<td>Jaluit 10/4.</td>
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<td>I-24</td>
<td>Empire 10/4.</td>
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<td>I-34</td>
<td>Pitting out in June.</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-36</td>
<td>Pitting out in May.</td>
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<tr>
<td>RO-100</td>
<td>Pitting out in August.</td>
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<td>I-185</td>
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<td>RO-102</td>
<td>Unlocated.</td>
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<td>I-152</td>
<td>Was stricken from the Navy List 8/1/42.</td>
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1123
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Destination</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIKOKU MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul 9/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKITZUSHIKA MARU</td>
<td>Solomons 9/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHITOSE</td>
<td>Solomons 10/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIYODA</td>
<td>Truk 10/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUJIKAWA MARU</td>
<td>Yokosuka 9/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOSHU MARU</td>
<td>Marshalls 10/21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 HINO MARU</td>
<td>Solomons 9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANIKAWA MARU</td>
<td>Yokosuka 10/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANETSU MARU</td>
<td>Northern area 9/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAKOI</td>
<td>Saipan area 10/27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANTO MARU</td>
<td>probably enroute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATSUJO MARU</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIYOKAWA MARU</td>
<td>Kendari 9/31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LYIJE MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul 10/1</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAGISHO MARU</td>
<td>Yokosuka 9/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARUO MARU</td>
<td>May be damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIKON MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul - Solomon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISHUN MARU</td>
<td>9/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTORO</td>
<td>New Britain 9/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEISHIN</td>
<td>Truk area 9/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTSU MARU</td>
<td>Kure 10/1</td>
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<td>SAKAI MARU</td>
<td>Rabaul 10/1</td>
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<td>SAKI MARU</td>
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<tr>
<td>#5 SEIJI MARU</td>
<td>Solomons 10/18</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEIKAWA MARU</td>
<td>Sasebo 9/12</td>
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<tr>
<td>SENDAI MARU</td>
<td>Yokosuka 10/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHISHIMO MARU</td>
<td>Buin area 10/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 TONAN MARU</td>
<td>Enroute to Rabaul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rabaul in July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To arrive Rabaul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11/2 from Shortlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marshalls in July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Truk area 10/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>enroute to Singapore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1124
When last observed on October 24, there were still no Japanese planes at Kism.

MALAY AREA
No information.

D.E.I. AREA
Insufficient information for an estimate of Japanese air strength, which however, is not believed to be great. The Comdr. of the 22nd Air Flot and the Truk Air Group appeared to be at Truk 10/26. The 33rd Air Group was still in the D.E.I. 10/7, and 35th Air Group was at Ambon possibly enroute New Britain 10/7. Darwin was raided October 24th and 25th by only 3 planes and October 29 by 1 plane. During October very few planes have been seen on Timor and Ambon. The largest number seen at any one time was 3 VP at Dili on October 6 and October 19 and 6 VP at Koepang on October 7 and 8.

NEW GUINEA
Insufficient information for an estimate of Japanese air strength in this area. The 26th Air Flot which formerly had command of operations in this area has moved to the Solomons and no Air Flot appears to have taken its place. Up to and including October 29th, the only Japanese air raids on Port Moresby during October were on October 22 (3 VIB), October 25 (2 VIB) and October 29 (2 VIB). There was one raid on Milne Bay on October 22 (3 VIB) by probably the same planes which raided Port Moresby on that same day. In October 5th, there appeared to be as many as 20 VP at Buna and Lae, but since then, 4 has been the largest number seen at any one time. It appears that practically all Japanese planes formerly in New Guinea have moved to the Solomons.

NEW IRELAND - NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS
The 25th Air Flot appears to have assumed command of operations in the Solomons. The Comdr. of the 25th Air Flot appeared at Truk 10/30. Nothing has been heard from the 25th Air Flot during the past week but it is probably still in this area. Since October 25th, the Japanese air attacks on Guadalcanal appear to have slowed down considerably. This may be due to bad weather or to the destruction of 37 VP over Guadalcanal on October 23 and 25th. The heavy losses suffered by the Japanese appear to have had some effect. At Buna on October 30th, there were 21 VP and 7 VIB (7 of the 27 reported damaged) as compared with 66 on October 3rd. No such concentration as the 72 VP at Lakunai on October 3rd has been seen recently. Since October 13 when 11 VIB and intense activity were reported at Kavieng, that base has assumed greater importance as an air base than ever before. For example there were 5 VP and 22 VIB at Kavieng airfield on October 16 and 9 VP and 10 VIB on October 23rd. It is possible that the Japanese are now flying VIB to Kavieng to protect them from the heavy night raids that have been made on Rabaul.
There is not sufficient information to estimate Japanese air strength in this area but it probably is no greater or not as great as reported last week.

- 60 type \(^*\) VF
- 45 VMB
- 13 four engine VF
- 24 float planes

**TOTAL 147**

Note that this does **not** include carrier and other ship-based aircraft.

**MARSHALLS AND GILBERTS**

The 24th Air Flot and the 1st, 14th, 19th and Chitose Air Groups are still very active in this area. The 14th and 19th appear to be conducting extensive search operations for U.S. Fleet units from the Gilberts with the headquarters for this activity at Makin. Chitose Air Group appears at Mills. The 24th Air Flot is closely associated with major commands in the Solomons but this is probably due to search operations and not to the movement of planes from this area to the Solomons. There is no indication of any increase or decrease in air strength in this area which for some time has been reported to be:

- 12 four engine flying boats
- 24 seaplanes
- 54 twin engine VMB
- 50 (approx.) VF

**TOTAL 140**
AIR FLOTILLAS AND AIR GROUPS

Much of the information on these air units is too old to be of
great value and should be accepted with caution and with regard to
the dates given.

The number and type of planes listed in any group is the largest
number of planes known to have operated with that group at any one
time.

11th Air Fleet
Continues to be an active major command in the Sol-
omens with its control station at Rabaul.

11th Seaplatenly
Continues active in the Solomons.

18th Seaplatenly
Solomons 9/22.

21st Air Flot
Solomons 10/21 at which time it indicated that it
had only 15 planes available for attacking Guad-
calcanal.

Kanoya Air Group
27 VF, 36 VB

Toko Air Group
12 VF flying boats

22nd Air Flot
Appeared to be at Kiopeang 10/19 but traffic routed
to Truk 10/26.

3rd Air Group
45 VF, 6 VO
At Buka Passage 9/30.

Takao Air Group
45 VB
Indicated as being at Truk
10/26.

23rd Air Flot
Indicated a possible move south from Empire on 10/30
Rabaul area 9/13.

Bihoro Air Group
27 VB

Gensan Air Group
27 VB

24th Air Flot
Still active in the Marshalls and Gilberts but
also now closely associated with major commands
in the Solomons probably in connection with scouting but possibly moving some units to that area.

1st Air Group
18 VF, 27 VB
Still in Marshalls. Associated with Rosteto and possi-
bly a detachment at Makin.
24th Air Flot (cont.)

14th Air Group 12 VP flying boats
5 VJ transports

Chitose Air Group 27 VHB

28th Air Flot
Solomons. Appears to have charge of attacks on
Guadalcanal. On 10/16 either Kisaratsu or Misawa
Air Group was transferred from the 26th Air Flot
to the 25th.

4th Air Group 27 VHB

Tainan Air Group 45 VP, 6 VO

Yokohama Air Grp. 12 VP flying boats
6 VP float planes

26th Air Flot
Has probably been replaced by 25th Air Flot as the
operating head in the Solomons. Cnmdr. at Truk 10/30.

6th Air Group VF, VB

Kisaratsu Air Grp. 27 VHB

Misawa Air Group 27 VHB

Additional Groups

2nd Air Group VF, VB
5th Air Group Seaplanes
11th Air Group VP flying boats

Comdr. at Maki 10/23. Detachment at Wake 10/22. Conducting searches south from
the Gilberts.

Comdr. at Milne 10/29.

Rabaul area 9/23. On 8/14 it was proposed to return this
unit to Empire for latest type planes on completion of the
Koresby Campaign.

Comdr. in Rabaul area 9/23. Probably still operating in
New Guinea or the Solomons.

Rabaul area 9/30. On 8/14 it was proposed to return this
unit to the Empire for latest type planes on completion of the
Koresby Campaign.

Still active in Solomons 10/10.

At Rabaul 10/30 and on 10/16 either this group or Misawa
Group was transferred to the 25th Air Flot.

In Rabaul area about 9/23, and on 10/16 either this group or
Kisaratsu Group was transferred to the 25th Air Flot.

At Balma Passage 9/29.

Still at Kiska or north 10/1.

In Empire and possibly preparing to go to Marshalls 9/29.
### Additional Groups

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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<tr>
<td>16th Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes Believed at Palau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes Believed at Truk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes Believed at Saipan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Air Group</td>
<td>Seaplanes Very active in Marshalls and Gilberts. Detachment at Makin 10/22.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Air Group</td>
<td>No data Comdr. at Truk 10/15 and group probably still active in ferry operations from Empire to Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Air Group</td>
<td>No data Philippine Unit. Possibility of transfer to New Britain area 9/20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33rd Air Group</td>
<td>No data Still in D.F.I.; possibly Jojakarta, 10/7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Air Group</td>
<td>21 VIII D.F.I. unit. Probably still there but indicated at Ambon 10/7 and possibly moving to Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40th Air Group</td>
<td>No data Malay area 9/19.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252nd Air Group</td>
<td>No data Comdr. at Kisaratsu 9/30. May be an air base and not an air group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751st Air Group</td>
<td>No data Comdr. indicated at Rabaul 10/19 but Group not there and location doubtful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>752nd Air Group</td>
<td>No data On 10/23 appeared to be a new group possibly at Palau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>753rd Air Group</td>
<td>No data On 10/23 appeared to be a new group possibly at Rabaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saki Air Group</td>
<td>No data In Empire on convoy duty 9/20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasebo Air Group</td>
<td>No data At least a detachment in Rabaul-Solomons area 9/27.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Additional Groups (cont.)

Shinchiku Air Grp. V1B or a training unit  Possibly Truk 9/23.

Suzuka Air Group  No data  South of Truk 10/1.

Yokosuka Air Grp. Seaplanes  Probably at Rabaul or in Solomons.
Based on dispatches received by Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas. Only planes reported as definitely destroyed are included. Late reports for the last few days of the month may not yet have been received. Carrier losses during the sea engagement of October 26th are not included because reports of that encounter have not been received.

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<tr>
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<th>Land type</th>
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<th>Single engine</th>
<th>Flying boat VP</th>
<th>Float type VP</th>
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<tr>
<td>Solomons</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>New Guinea</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50</td>
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**COMBINED SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER JAPANESE PLANE LOSSES**

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<th>Land type</th>
<th>Float type</th>
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<th>Single engine</th>
<th>Flying boat VP</th>
<th>Float type VP</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>Solomons</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>368</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Guinea</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>163</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>411</td>
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</table>

*Not identified in the reports but believed to be float type VP*
SECRET

SUMMARY OF MARU SINKINGS

AS OF OCTOBER 31ST 1942

This summary is made up from data available up to 1200, October 31, 1942 and only concerns vessels of 500 tons or over as far as can be verified and only vessels which are primarily merchantmen (vessels whose names carry the "maru" suffix), although some of them are naval auxiliaries.

The following sinkings are all verified, either by reliable witness, captured documents or translated enemy dispatches. Duplication has been eliminated as far as possible and "probable" sinkings are not listed.

LIST (A) IDENTIFIED BY NAME

| 1. ASO MARU    | 23. MOKAGE MARU |
| 2. BRAZIL MARU | 24. MONTEVIDEO MARU |
| 3. KIPUKU MARU | 25. MYOKEN MARU |
| 4. KI...MARU   | 26. KYONA MARU |
| 5. ERIKO MARU  | 27. HAGASAKI MARU |
| 6. HAKODATE MARU | 28. HAIKAI MARU |
| 7. NOJO MARU   | 29. NISSAN MARU |
| 8. H...MARU    | 30. NISHIN MARU |
| 9. KANAKURA MARU | 31. KAI...KATA MARU |
| 10. KIYAH MARU | 32. RYO... MARU |
| 11. KIJO MARU  | 33. RAKUYO MARU |
| 12. KEIZAI MARU | 34. SHINSEI MARU |
| 13. KDNYU MARU | 35. SUMITOMI MARU |
| 14. KOMAKI MARU | 36. SHOMAN MARU |
| 15. KOWAI MARU | 37. TAKITEYO MARU |
| 16. KALJO MARU | 38. TAITTO MARU |
| 17. LISBON MARU | 39. TAIJO MARU |
| 18. LONDON MARU | 40. TAMAGAWA MARU |
| 19. MATSUI MARU | 41. TANFAN MARU #2 |
| 20. MARU... MARU | 42. TEIKO MARU |
| 21. MEI...MARU | 43. TETSU(TBIKU) MARU |
| 22. MIZUYO MARU | 44. TOHAN MARU #2 |
|                | 45. TOYOHARA MARU |
|                | 46. WAKIO MARU |

LIST (B) UNIDENTIFIED AS TO NAME

- 6 ships sunk in January
- 3 ships sunk in February
- 10 ships sunk in March
- 8 ships sunk in April
- 23 ships sunk in May
- 4 ships sunk in June
- 6 ships sunk in July
- 19 ships sunk in August
- 15 ships sunk in September
- 20 ships sunk in October

121 TOTAL
CURRENT MARU MOVEMENTS

MARTHEAL - GILBERTS AREA

TOYOHAMA MARU  Aground on reef 340°, 5600 Mts.
from Ujae Is.

HANTAKU MARU  330 tons. Arrives Tarawa Oct. 31st
A.M., departs Tarawa Oct. 31 P.M.
Arrives Jaluit Nov. 3rd.

KYOTO MARU #7  PG or FY. Arrived Baru Is. Oct. 26th
for reconnaissance or patrol (temp.)

EMPIRE AREA

? MARU  Oct. 29th enroute Yokosuka via
Chichijima.

7 MARU  Departed Saipan Oct. 30th arriving
Truk Nov. 2nd.

DAISHIN MARU  Departs Bankok for Osaka Oct. ?
with cargo of 7200 tons gold ore.

TEIKO MARU  Departs Bankok for Kobe Oct. ?
with 1060 general cargo, 7500 tons
gold ore.

HANTAI MARU  Departs Bankok for Kobe Oct. ?
with cargo 8000 tons rice.

TEIBU MARU  Departs Bankok for Osaka Oct. ?
with 4900 tons of rice.

BATAVIA MARU  (Regular Indo China - Empire run)
Arrived Osaka from Bankok Oct ?
with 19120 tons rice and general cargo.
Departs ? Empire port for ? Indo China
port (Oct. 30th?).

ARGUN MARU  Departs Bankok for Osaka - Kobe Oct. ?
with 9000 tons of rice.

TOHAN MARU #8  (Regular liner - Japan to SouthEast -
Indo China). Was enroute South Seas to
Kure - Sasebo Oct. 15th with 9700 tons
of rice. Arriving Singapore Nov.? from
Truk via Palau, Balikpapan, Soerabaya.

SHANGHAI MARU  Departs Nov. 18th Nagasaki for
Yangtze river port.

DAIDUN MARU  Departs Bankok late Oct. for Yokohama
with 9300 tons of rice.

NISSEI MARU  Departs Bankok late Oct. for Tokyo
with 9100 tons of rice.

AFRICA MARU  Departed Saigon Oct. 26th for Tokyo
with 4000 tons of rice and 3160 tons
general cargo.

HAKUBASAN MARU  Departed Bankok Oct. ? for Yokohama
with 8500 tons rice.

SAHONI MARU  Arrived Yokosuka vicinity Oct. 30th.
CURRENT MARU MOVEMENTS

EMPIRE AREA (Contd)

DOBE MARU
KYOKYO MARU

TRUK – NEW GUINEA AREA

HIPPON MARU
KYOKANA MARU
TAKUSAGA MARU
MIMUROHAN MARU
SENDAI MARU

TRUK vicinity Oct. 29th.
Shortland Oct. 30th.
Rabaul vicinity Oct. 29th.
Expected to arrive Rabaul Oct. 31st.
Due arrive Rabaul from Shortland

BULIN HARBOR

Sighted in harbor Oct. 29th 11, 3000 ton class AKs, 1, 15000
ton class AK. Oct. 30th 1, A0, 2, A3, 2, AP.

MALAY AREA

German Blockade Steamer

Departed Bangkok Oct. 30th with cargo of rubber, tin, copper, shellac and tungsten.
ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE LAND FORCES AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 1942

1. ALASKA

Kiska - no change. Occupation force appears to consist of one infantry regiment, reinforced, one naval landing force (Kasazu #3) and guard units.

Troop strength - --------------- 5,000 - 4,000

2. GILBERTS

Under the 6th Base Force, these islands are occupied by the Yokosuka #3 and a small part of the Yokosuka #6 Special Landing Forces, and the 62nd, 63rd, 64th and 65th Guard Forces.

Makin:
- 62nd Guard Force - --------------- 60
- 5th Special Landing Force (Home station unknown) - --------------- 200
- Total - --------------- 260

Abemama:
- 62nd, 63rd, and 64th Guard Forces - 276

Mille:
- 62nd Guard Force - --------------- 120

3. BISMARCK - SOLOMON AREA

Lack of ground activity by the Japanese on Guadalcanal since the repulse of their attacks on our lines and attempted movement of more reinforcements to Guadalcanal indicate that the Japanese have lost the initiative.

References to the facts that very few new units appeared in radio traffic during the past week and that associations with convoys were rare seems to indicate that the forces to fight the battle in the Solomons are already in this area.

Vague indications of movements of troops via Palau were seen, but they were so indefinite that no conclusion could be drawn.
Captured documents definitely placed the 21st Independent Mixed Brigade in the Kokoda area, and thus eliminated that Brigade as a reinforcement for the Japanese forces in the Solomons.

The Koril Detachment (1st Battalion 233rd Infantry, 36th Division) which was noted frequently as being on board cruisers seems to be associated more with the Buna-Kokoda area than with Guadalcanal.

More of the 2nd Division has been identified as being on Guadalcanal.

Several landings of reinforcements on Guadalcanal were attempted, and were repulsed and whether or not any fresh troops got ashore is not ascertainable.

Units of the Akatsuki Force, the nature of which is undetermined, still appear at Palau and are an unpredictable factor.

(A) Units recently arrived in this area:
None.

(B) Units already in the area and capable of reinforcing the Solomons:

At Rabaul:

17th Army (less units in New Guinea and Guadalcanal) - - - - - - - - - - 20,000
2nd Army Division (less units on Guadalcanal and enroute there) - - - - 4500 10,000

(Spread in strength due to uncertainty at to whether it is a triangular or a square division)

2 units of the Akatsuki Force (Nos. 2945 and 6187) - - - - - - - - - - ?
Okazaki Anti-Aircraft Unit (probably a regiment or less) - - - - - - - - - - ?
Kure No. 6 Special Landing Force - - 1,500
No. 1 Yobu Brigade - - - - - - - - - - 7,000
In Eulai-Palau-Shortlands Area:

Akatsuki Unit (believed to be engineer regiment of 2nd Division) 300
Sasebo 6 Special Landing Force 1,000
Yokosuka No. 6 Special Landing Force 1,600
Sasebo No. 20 (Picked) Special Landing Force 1,200
Total reinforcements readily available 33,700 49,000

(C) Units associated with this area indicating their possible transfer to this area:

Davao 1st Landing Force (Army) 18th Division (No new information on this unit) 25,000
Total possible reinforcements 25,000
(This figure not included in total troop strength of this area).

(D) Units already on Guadalcanal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Table</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Units of Second Division:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Regiment (Infantry)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59th Regiment (Infantry)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Field Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th (Okinawa) Regiment (Infantry) of 18th Division</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Heavy Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>2,600 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th (Izumi) Regiment of 7th Division</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous Units:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aoba Battalion</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isami Force (Regiment?)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawagushi Detachment</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitamura Detachment</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawamoto Detachment</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sasaki Battalion</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units 6170 and 6171 of Takatsuki Force</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakiya Engineer Co.</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Navy Special Landing Forces:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mace No. 5</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maizuru No. 4</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneers (Satsuki)</td>
<td>(1,300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less estimated losses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop strength</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-25-
(E) Garrisons in Bismarck-Solomons Area.

**New Britain**
- Gamata: 50
- Rabaul: 4,000
- Talaeara: 50

There are probably other small detachments at Ponda and on the Willauer Peninsula.

Total: 4,100 - 4,200

**New Ireland**
- Kavieng: 900
- Remainder of island and nearby islands protected by small patrols and detachments.

**Solomons**
- Bougainville
  - (Buka): 1,000
  - (Sohama): 600
  - (Niela): 100
  - (Bun): 500

Total: 3,200

**New Georgia**
- (Vini Harbor): 200
- (Rendova Island): 50
- (Wickham Anchorage): 50
- (Iringala): 50
- (Gizo): 300

Total: 600

**Malaita** (small detachments totalling): 100

**Russell Island**: 50

**Santa Isabel**
- (Hufu Point): 150
- (Vilkenara Point): 100
- (Rekata Bay): 100

Total: 350

Total Garrison Troops: 9,100 to 9,200

Total Troops in Solomons area proper (Totals of D and E): 21,100 to 21,200

Total troops in Bismarcks - Solomons area (Totals of B, D and E): 59,800 to 70,200
4. NEW GUINEA

Buna-Cone-Kokoda area. Troops here are the 21st Independent Brigade consisting of two infantry regiments 144th and 41st, one engineer regiment (15th), cavalry, and the one mountain gun artillery regiment (3rd), less losses, and two Navy Special Landing Forces (Sasebo #5 and Yokosuka #5) which are probably in the Buna area. Reinforcements have been moving up to the front here and one battalion (1st Battalion (Kori) of the 228th Inf. 38th Div) is apparently bound here.

Total troops ---------------------------------- 6,000

Lae - Markham Valley ------------------------ 2,000 - 3,000
Hubo ------------------------------------------ 1,000
Salamaua - Buana River ---------------------- 2,000
Ferguson Island (Sasebo #5 S.L.F.) ---------- 200

Total troops ---------------------------------- 11,000 - 12,000

Total troops in South ------------------------ 70,000 to 82,200

Possible Reinforcements ---------------------- 25,000

TOTAL ---------------------------------------- 96,000 to 107,000

LOCATIONS OF SPECIFIC UNITS

Navy Special Landing Forces (about 1600 men each).
Kure #3 -------------------------------------- Ineffective due to casualties.
Kure #5 -------------------------------------- Guadalcanal
Kure #6 -------------------------------------- Rabaul
Hainuru #3 ----------------------------------- Kiska
Hainuru #4 ----------------------------------- Guadalcanal
Sasebo #5 ------------------------------------ Buna area, Ferguson Island.

Sasebo #6 ------------------------------------ Duin
Sasebo #8 ------------------------------------ Shanghai
Yokosuka #1 ---------------------------------- Rokassar area.
Yokosuka #3 ---------------------------------- Gilberts
Yokosuka #4 ---------------------------------- Takao
Yokosuka #5 ---------------------------------- Buna
Yokosuka #6 ---------------------------------- Part at Duin and
Sasebo #20 (Picked) --------------------------- part in Gilberts

Duin

1139
Army Units:
17th Army: Rabaul
Parts at Guadalcanal, Buna-Kokoda

Divisions
2nd (Senda or Oki): Guadalcanal
Headquarters Guadalcanal
4th Infantry Regiment Guadalcanal
20th Infantry Regiment Guadalcanal (?)
2nd Field Artillery Regiment Guadalcanal
Takahashi Eng. Regiment Buin - Faisi
Balance Rabaul
21st Independent Mixed Brigade Kokoda Area
16th Philippine perhaps part at Palau
30th Guadalcanal

32nd (Oka) Infantry Regiment Guadalcanal
1st (Kori) Battalion, 233rd Infantry Regiment On cruisers in Bismarcks area bound for Buna

Detachments (of varying sizes)
Aoba Battalion Guadalcanal
Akatsuki Force
Commanding Officer Rabaul
Unit No. 2040 Empire
Unit No. 2042 Manila
Unit No. 2043 Rabaul
Unit No. 6167 Empire
Unit No. 6168 Guadalcanal
Unit No. 6171
Unit No. 6173 Shortlands area

Isara Force
Commanding Officer Rabaul
Unit No. 1339 (Reg.?) Guadalcanal
Kawaguchi Detachment Guadalcanal
Kitsaura Force Guadalcanal
Davao First Landing Force Palau
Wakiya Engineer Co. Guadalcanal
No. 1 Yoku Brigade Rabaul
Okazaki Anti-Aircraft Unit Aboard ship, Solomons area.
1. Brief of Events during October, 1942.

SOUTH PACIFIC. (All dates Hawaiian Time)

On October 1 it was estimated that 3 enemy CVs and 4-6 BBs plus cruisers and DDs were operating in the TRUK - RABAUL area. FUNAFUTI was occupied by us on that day. Admiral Nimitz and certain members of his staff returned to PEARL from an inspection of the South Pacific on the 4th. TF 17 carrier planes raided the BUIN - FAISI area on the 5th. Damage to enemy was only moderate because of extremely bad weather in the target area, but we suffered no losses. On the night of 10-11th TF 64.2 intercepted an enemy force off SAVO ISLAND. Damage inflicted seems to be - 1 cruiser sunk, 3 cruisers badly damaged or sunk, 4 DDs probably sunk. We lost the DUNCAN; the BOISE was badly damaged; and some other ships involved were slightly damaged. On October 12th one army regiment arrived to reinforce GUADALCANAL garrison. On the 13th large forces were sighted east of the SOLOMONS approaching GUADALCANAL. No striking force engagement resulted, but during the next day six APs landing troops on the NW coast of GUADALCANAL were attacked by our planes setting three on fire so badly that they had to be beached. On the 15th the enemy was estimated to have the following combatant ships in the general RABAUL - SOLOMONS area: 6 BB, 3 CV, 7 CA, 7 CL, about 30 DDs. On the 16th the McFARLAND at GUADALCANAL was severely damaged by a bomb hit. The VIREO, towing a PAB barge load of avgas to GUADALCANAL, and escorted
by the MEREDITH, was abandoned due to fear of an air attack. The VIREO crew cut the tow adrift and embarked in the MEREDITH. Sometime thereafter, the MEREDITH was lost in an air attack. The VIREO and barge were salvaged. On the 17th the SAN JUAN and PORTLAND raided a Jap patrol line south of the GILBERTS. On the 18th Vice Admiral Halsey relieved Vice Admiral Ghormley as Comsopac. The CHESTER was torpedoed south of SAN CRISTOBAL on the 19th. Also on that day the O'BRIEN, enroute to PEARL for repairs, broke in two and sank. On the 21st three DDs raided the enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS. TFs 16 and 17 joined up as TF 61 on the 22nd. On the 23rd a major move of the enemy toward the southern SOLOMONS was discovered. The next day the forces were within our search. The SEMINOLE at TULAGI was sunk by gunfire. On the 25th air contact was made between the approaching enemy and TF 61. In the air duel which followed damage inflicted is estimated as: 2 CV, 1 BB, several cruisers and destroyers damaged. (Later reports indicate fair chance of 1 large CV being sunk.) Our damage was: HORNET lost, PORTER lost; SOUTH DAKOTA and ENTERPRISE damaged; several other vessels slightly damaged. The enemy is believed to have lost twice as many planes as we: 130 to 65. After this battle both sides retired to fuel and reorganize.

On October 20th it was decided to send 12 submarines from Submarines Pacific to the South Pacific. These, plus 12 from SW Pacific, were placed under CTF 42 who in turn was placed under Comsopac for operational control.

During the month the enemy continued to land reinforce-
ments on GUADALCANAL; make air raids on our positions there; shell our airfield; and several times attempted to penetrate our positions. The Marines did a splendid job of repulsing all attacks and keeping the position and airfield intact. Marine pilots and own submarines inflicted severe attrition losses on the enemy in the SOLOMONS area. SW Pacific planes were of assistance in scouting and damaging enemy shipping. Toward the end of the month these activities plus our surface action had greatly reduced the surface activity in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL. But in spite of this the enemy has established, and been able to support in some degree, a strong force on the island. Our difficulties in providing logistic supply to the GUADALCANAL area continued throughout the month. We have been able temporarily to control the sea off GUADALCANAL. Our control of the air there has been temporary. Enemy submarines were extremely active along our supply line to the southern SOLOMONS.

As the month ended there was no indication that the enemy had abandoned plans to recapture GUADALCANAL.

NEW GUINEA.

The Jap offensive over the STANLEY MOUNTAINS toward PT. MORESBY was stopped only when the advance had reached within a few miles of the northernmost PT. MORESBY airfield. During the month this offensive has been beaten back slowly and at the end of the month allied troops had recaptured KOKODA and were advancing toward BUNA. Some American troops have been transported to the battle area by air.

After repulsing a Jap landing in the MILNE BAY area,
the allied forces on the eastern tip of NEW GUINEA and adjacent islands have been engaged in mopping up small enemy detachments.

Several small enemy landings have been made during the month on northeastern NEW GUINEA but at no point have new important positions been established.

CENTRAL PACIFIC

The area was generally quiet during the month. Our submarine successes on patrol in Japanese home waters continued. During the month 12 fleet submarines were ordered to the South Pacific to operate under Comsopac. The Army was ordered to transfer the 25th Division from the Hawaiian area to the South or SW Pacific. The Army Hawaiian Air transferred 24 heavy bombers and 50 fighters to the South Pacific.

NORTH PACIFIC

In the ALEUTIANS the major activity was bombing of KISKA by Army planes from ADAK. While some success was achieved, the Japs were not forced to abandon KISKA, nor were our submarines able to find many targets. They, however, abandon ATTU and AGATTU. Some pressure was brought on Cincpac to use BBs to bombard KISKA. Authority to reduce the cruisers in TF 8 to two - the RALEIGH and DETROIT - was approved by Cominch. The garrison at ST. PAUL was established.

At the end of the month the Japs hold KISKA but their position is believed to be almost untenable. Our positions seem reasonably secure with fairly sizeable garrisons.

2. The Situation.

(a) Enemy. Since the middle of August the Japs have
been assembling troops and ships in the general RABAUL area. During the last days of October they were turned back, temporarily at least, in what appeared to be another start of an all out offensive in the South Pacific.

There is good reason to believe that the enemy will continue the attempt to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS, and if successful, will try to extend his control along the island chain to NEW CALEDONIA. Also, he may be expected to attempt to capture the remainder of NEW GUINEA.

Our continued pressure in the SOLOMONS area by all forces has caused the enemy losses and delays, but in spite of that he may consider himself in a favorable position. Our pressure also has the effect of forcing him to a maximum effort in the South Pacific and thus prevents him from undertaking any sizeable operations elsewhere.

An estimate of enemy strength as of November 2nd is appended.

(b) Own. TF 1 continues at PEARL for the purpose of opposing attempted enemy landings in the Hawaiian area. TF 11 is at PEARL, and will be ready to depart for the South Pacific about the middle of the month when torpedo damage repairs to the SARATOGA and NORTH CAROLINA are completed. TF 17 has been broken up due to the loss of the HORNET and damage to the SOUTH DAKOTA. TF 16 is not fit for battle as a CV striking force until the battle damage to the ENTERPRISE is repaired. The WASHINGTON, undamaged cruisers and destroyers, and land based air
in the South Pacific are available to keep the lines of communications open to the GUADALCANAL area, and to intercept the enemy approaching that area. We have 24 submarines available for operations in the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey.

Our air strength in the South Pacific is not adequate to meet completely all demands. We can, however, provide an adequate search and can defend the GUADALCANAL air field. We are unable to count on the Army pilots to find and severely damage the enemy. Improvement in the air situation is to be expected as times goes on. When adequate numbers of planes in the area becomes a fact and when the GUADALCANAL airfield is ready in all respects for all-weather operations, and when supporting fields are constructed, the situation may permit the resumption of the offensive.

Most of the Marines in the GUADALCANAL area are tired and require relief as soon as possible so that they can rest, reorganize, and reequip. The present strength (November 1st) at GUADALCANAL will not permit an offensive to wipe out the enemy on the island, but this may be possible after the arrival of replacements and reinforcements of about 14000 troops by about the 10th, making a total of around 35000 on the island. There are several movements of troops toward the South Pacific in the offing, but as troops arriving are needed for offensive, adequate relief for tired troops does not seem probable during November.

The logistic problem in the South Pacific continues to be cause for serious concern. Movements of fuel, food, and equipment to the GUADALCANAL area are extremely difficult and are undertaken with considerable risk. Handling facilities at
all South Pacific ports and beaches are far short of requirements. Small fast freighters to run supplies to CACTUS from BUTTON do not exist; therefore large and valuable combat loaded freighters have to be employed.

While our situation in the Southern SOLOMONS is far from satisfactory, it is far from hopeless. It is critical, but the determination, efficiency, and morale of our people there is so fine that even the most pessimistic critics must concede that we will win out in the end.

The OAHU - MIDWAY - FIJI line is still vulnerable to raids, but no probability of serious landing attempts is seen.

The ALLEUTIAN situation should give but little concern during November.

3. Broad Courses of Action.

Overwhelming evidence continues to point to but one broad course of action at this time, i. e. to cut us off from AUSTRALIA and then capture or neutralize that continent. However, in spite of this belief, it is necessary to list and briefly to discuss other feasible courses.

If the enemy continues present large concentrations in the TRUK - RABAUL - SOLOMONS area he will be unable to strike in force elsewhere. But the enemy has the capacity to make minor raids elsewhere in the Pacific and still retain superiority in the active area.

Assuming that major forces are moved to another theatre during November, the following courses of action are within
enemy capabilities:

(a) An attempt to capture MIDWAY.

Always a suitable target, but in view of the bitter experience in June, the enemy will be unlikely to make such an attempt unless under more favorable circumstances, i.e. assured absence of, or after defeat of, our striking forces, plus security in the South. It seems most improbable that the enemy can assemble necessary forces and arrive off MIDWAY during November. Nevertheless, major enemy forces are unreported since October 26th. It is thus physically possible for the following to be at MIDWAY on about November seventh - at least 6 BB and 3 CV, with supporting cruisers and destroyers, escorting and covering a major landing force.

(b) An attack on Western AUSTRALIA.

The enemy can shift his strength to the westward and to jump off from the NEI toward NW AUSTRALIA. This might happen if the enemy found losses too great in the SOLOMONS to be acceptable. Such a course seems most improbable.

(c) Raids on our positions from MIDWAY to NOUMEA.

The advantages which might accrue include: damage to our positions and installations of such magnitude as to disrupt temporarily our lines of supply to the South Pacific; and, to force a diversion which would relieve our pressure on the SOLOMONS and thus delay seriously our offensive.

Raids on points near the active area are quite pos-
sible, but as the distance from RABAUL increases the probability of raids decreases.

(d) An extension in the ALEUTIANS.

Considered most improbable because (1) coming bad weather; (2) merely holding KISKA may require all available resources; (3) the enemy is aware of our ADAK position.

(e) An offensive toward INDIA.

No doubt this is an ultimate aim of the Japanese. It cannot take place (with naval support) until the Pacific flank is secure. Therefore, we can dismiss this course for the month of November.

(f) An attack on RUSSIA.

The stiffened Russian defense, especially at STALINGRAD, must have caused repercussions in JAPAN. We do not think that JAPAN will attack RUSSIA until a German victory over RUSSIA in EUROPE is a sure thing. And even then there is no assurance of such an attack.

4. Most Probable Enemy Intention.

For the month of November we conclude that the most probable move continues to be the recapture of the Southern SOLOMONS, and the extension of control in NEW GUINEA.

It is now definite that the enemy suffered heavy attrition losses during October, and considerable damage to striking forces on October 25th. Thus, they could not continue what seems to have been the start of a grand scale attack on GUADALCANAL. On the 1st of November the striking forces are to the
northward of our search. Some major enemy units will have to retire for repair and will be out of action during the month. Enemy plane losses in October were excessive.

While the enemy may still retain the balance of sea power in the SOLOMONS area, the margin seems too small to risk a grand offensive. It is considered more probable that the enemy will - for November - be content to:

(a) Strengthen positions and continue fighting on shore at GUADALCANAL and NEW GUINEA.

(b) Make air attacks on our positions and shipping in the SOLOMONS, NEW GUINEA, and that part of AUSTRALIA in reach.

(c) Attack our communications to the SOLOMONS with submarines and surface vessels.

(d) Shell our shore positions in the SOLOMONS.

(e) Possibly raid our position at ESPIRITU SANTO.

These operations will be along the lines discussed in last month's estimate, - remembering that the capacity of the enemy to conduct such operations has been reduced by October losses. The remark applies to the operations listed in paragraph 7 of the October Estimate.
November 2nd.

Lieut. General Holcomb, USMC, was present at the usual morning conference.

Sopac operations are in his 030130. Unloading of our AKs in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area proceeded during the day without serious interruptions. As noted yesterday, the landing of the 8th Marines and the ACORN group is now planned for the 4th (local). During the night the enemy succeeded in landing a fair number of troops in the vicinity of KOLI, GUADALCANAL.

The PLUNGER reported two hits on an enemy CL in INDISPENSIBLE STRAIT.

The SUMNER has been ordered to survey FUNAFUTI. At that place four PTs arrived for duty there.

The Central and North Pacific Areas were quiet.

There is no new information regarding enemy deployments or intentions.

Cominch 021618 pink is an explanation of the release of the news of the HORNET sinking.

November 3rd.

Lieut. General Holcomb, USMC, Lieut. General Emmons, USA, Major General Lutes, USA, and TF commanders were present at the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. Captain McFall told of the HORNET engagement on October 25th.

The operations in the Sopac are reported in Comsopac 040146. The transport group arrived at GUADALCANAL without meeting opposition and commenced unloading. (CTF 65 040725 and CTF 62 040235). The Marines were moving troops to deal with the enemy landing made near KOLI yesterday and are holding the line to the west of our position.

CTF 61 040235 pink gives information on the enemy line-up for the battle of October 25th.

The general situation at GUADALCANAL is not unfavorable. We have had no real interruption in providing logistic support and sending in reinforcements. Apparently the enemy knows exactly what we are doing but is unable to do much about it. Planes
November 3rd. (Continued)

It is wondered that our escorts arriving with the transports and freighters will shell the enemy positions as often as possible. The situation will not always permit this, but whenever done it helps our Marines.

ARD-2 arrived at Noumea.

Both the Chester and San Juan are being sent to Sydney for repairs. Both the Chester and San Juan are being sent to Sydney for repairs.

Cincpac O30015 pink deals with increase of effectiveness of defense at Canton.

The WHALE has completed the first Pac Fleet offensive mining mission by making a plant of contact mines in the eastern part of Kudaro. That sub also reports five torpedo hits in four freighters.

It now appears that the COOLIDGE cannot be salvaged, but a properly equipped expedition can salvage much of the cargo.

General Marshall has ordered General Emmons to move immediately to Australia for permanent assignment 15 replacement B-24s with 17 combat crews.

General Emmons to move immediately to Australia for permanent assignment 15 replacement B-24s with 17 combat crews.

It seems probable that YP 345 foundered in the vicinity of Layam Island. It is known that he has superior sea power in the area, but may not know it.

There are some indications that the enemy will attempt to resume his all out attack on Guadalcanal in the near future. We believe that he has superior sea power in the area, but may not know it.

The COOLIDGE cannot be salvaged, but a properly equipped expedition can salvage much of the cargo.

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November 4th.

At his morning conference, which was attended by General Holcomb and TF commanders at PEARL, Admiral Nimitz read extracts from a letter written by Admiral Halsey on October 31st. The following were high points: (a) The day before the battle of October 25th, the ENTERPRISE had operational losses which amounted to 12 planes; (b) fighter control during the battle was not too good; (c) heavy damage is believed inflicted on the enemy during the battle - maybe a CV was sunk; (d) the PORTER was lost due to a battle freak - hit by a broaching circling enemy torpedo; (e) an enemy plane landed on the forecastle of the SMITH causing an enormous fire but the ship kept right on fighting; (f) while en-route NOUMEA the MAHAN collided with the SOUTH DAKOTA; (g) the SOUTH DAKOTA is not seriously damaged, but may have to return to PEARL because of collision damage; (h) Admiral Halsey will not keep CVs and BBs at sea continuously in submarine infested waters; (i) logistics in the South Pacific is a headache.

The day in the South Pacific was generally quiet. We were engaged in reinforcing our SOLOMONS positions and the enemy was thought to be reorganizing for another southward push. Comsopac 050524 is a summary to the evening of the 4th (local). During the night two enemy ships were reported in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANCE. Comsopac has requested the NEW ZEALAND authorities to provide NEW ZEALAND troops for the replacement of one U. S. infantry battalion and regimental headquarters at TONGATABU. This is in addition to NEW ZEALAND troops previously requested. Transportation could be available at WELLINGTON on November 18th.

It seems indicated that the loss of the COOLIDGE was due to negligence and disobedience of orders on the part of the Master of that vessel. Comsopac is investigating.

There was a possible sub contact 10 miles south of KOKO HEAD.

The S-31 reports sinking 1 large CM off PARAMUSHIRO - again demonstrating that S-boats skillfully handled can inflict important damage on the enemy.

A nightly dispersal from the anchorage in the BUIN-TAIGI area is reported. A photograph shows a CV at RABAUL on the afternoon of the 5th (local). There are no further indications of major enemy moves.

The following is a summary of damage inflicted by carriers of TF 61 on October 25th, as reported by CTF 61:

SHOKAKU Class CV
2nd Do
- 2 - 500# bomb hits
- 4 to 6 1000# bomb hits

(Continued on next page)
SECRET

November 4th. (Continued)

KONGO Class BB - 2 - 1000# bomb hits
Unidentified CL - 1 - 500# bomb hit
ATAGO Class CA - 1 - possible torpedo hit
1 - possible 500# bomb hit
TONE Class CA - 5 - 500# bomb hits
2nd Do - 4 - 1000# bomb hits
NACHI Class CA - 3 - torpedo hits

Planes destroyed:

Certain 67; probable 23, total 90.

There is still doubt as to the source of the press release concerning the HORNET.
November 5th.

Comsopac 052358 is a summary of operations in that area to the 5th local. As there is increasing delay in receiving action and battle reports from Admiral Halsey he was requested to pass these along promptly in addition to his daily summary. Communication facilities available to Admiral Halsey are not good but constant effort for improvement is being made.

The day was quiet, so far as is known. A flight of enemy planes reported heading for GUADALCANAL is unreported. A enemy group of 1 cruiser and 16 DDs was sighted heading toward the SHORTLAND area during the day by search planes. One XCV, 4 DD, several smaller combatant craft, and 31 maru type were reported at RABaul.

(Navy)

There is urgent need for 3000 men of balanced ratings in the South Pacific Area.

Two enemy ships, thought DDs, were reported about 10 miles north of our position at GUADALCANAL.

Unloading of all APs in the GUADALCANAL area was completed by early morning of the 6th (local). Further movements of troops and supplies to the area are underway.

The CONYNCHAM is being patched by the NAVAJO at MALAITA and should leave for ESPIRITU SANTO in the next day or so.

Cominch (051524 pink) is disturbed about the multiplication of special commands in the Sopac area and desires Admiral Nimitz to discuss the matter with him at the next meeting.

At the request of Comsopac the SUMNER will report to him for survey duty - probably at ESPIRITU SANTO.

Comsopac assumes that the 3rd Raider Battalion will be ready for duty assigned on December 1st.

The Central Pacific and North Pacific areas were quiet. In the ALEUTIANS CTF 8 reports that weather conditions have become so severe that fueling at sea is now rarely possible.

There are no new enemy developments.
November 6th.

General Emmons and the usual Task Force Commanders were present at the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. The general situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas was reviewed.

During the late afternoon planes from GUADALCANAL attacked an enemy force of 1 CL and 10 DDs discovered approaching GUADALCANAL about 60 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND and obtained 2 torpedo hits and one 1000# bomb hit on the CL, 1 torpedo hit on a DD, and shot down 12 enemy planes. Our losses were four F4F4s and three pilots. It is indicated that enemy ships had on board a relief force to be landed near TASSAFARONGA POINT.

The MAJABA was torpedoed while discharging cargo in the vicinity of LUNGA POINT, and was beached. All ammunition had been landed. Eye witnesses believe a midget or very small enemy sub was responsible.

Comsopac 070150 gives operations to the morning of the 6th (local).

Comsopac 061345 is comment on Cominch message regarding the multiplication of base commands in his area.

During the day Comsopac reorganized two major task forces. TF 16 under Rear Admiral Kinkaid is the new CV force and TF 65 under Rear Admiral Callaghan is the new cruiser force.

Vice Opnav 062139 gives the loading of Seebees, etc., in the MT. VERNON and JUPITER for NOUMEA to arrive early in December, and the plans for sailing the COALMINE movement and ACORN 3 and 4 for Sopac.

The 147th infantry less two battalions is scheduled to arrive at AOLA BAY from TONGATABU during the last half of November. When this outfit arrives there will be over 2000 Army troops at AOLA BAY.

A submarine was reported off the North Coast of CALIFORNIA.

Present indications are that the planting of minefields at ADAK will be completed tomorrow. Photographs indicate minor enemy activity at ATTU.

The enemy continues to reinforce and supply troops at GUADALCANAL. It may well be that when the number of troops landed is considered sufficient, the enemy will make a coordinated attack on our positions, employing surface ships, air, and ground troops to the limit of their resources in the general area.

CWM 1156
November 7th.

At 1730 local a force of 4 CL's and 5 DD's was sighted about 125 miles north of GUADALCANAL and apparently headed for that place. Last night and again the night before PT boats off GUADALCANAL report hitting enemy DD's. Comsopac 080101 summarizes operations in his area to the afternoon of the 7th local. A 2-man sub is claimed sunk by a plane off CAPE ESPERANCE. This may be the sub that hit the MAJABA off LUNGA. Rear Admiral Turner will command TF 67 and expects to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL on the 12th local. This move involves one Army regiment, one Marine aviation engineer battalion, and 2000 Marine replacements—a total of about 6000 men. Two companies of Marine 2nd Raider Battalion were landed at AOLA BAY during the day. Good progress is being made on the airfields at GUADALCANAL, and the tank farm for avgas there should be unloaded in the near future.

Comamphibforsopac 072358 deals with enemy troops at GUADALCANAL as learned from captured documents.

Comsopac 290251 gives plans for air base commands in his area.

There is some evidence of mining off LUNGA and the HOVEY has been ordered to sweep the area on the 10th (local). She will also deliver a deck load of avgas to add to the meagre supply.

In the Central Pacific the only activity above routine is the search for a PBY5A down off JOHNSTON and a B-24 down en-route OAHU to CANTON.

Seven float Ø VF were sighted at HOLTZ BAY, ATTU, yesterday. This is not taken as a resumption of enemy activity there. Enemy subs continue small activity in the central Aleutians. There are indications of some personnel trouble with merchant vessels in ALASKA which is being investigated.

The GRAYLING reports getting two torpedo hits in a CHIYODA class AV off TRUK.

There is nothing new concerning enemy deployments or intentions. It continues almost certain that main enemy interest is in the Southern SOLOMONS.
November 8th

At the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz, and attended today by General Emmons and TF Commanders, Rear Admiral Murray, who was recently CTF 17, told of his activities in October - especially on the 5th and 25th. The poor performance of our DD torpedoes was commented on and is a matter of serious concern. Admiral Nimitz congratulated Admiral Murray for the fine work done by TF 17.

The day in the South Pacific was quiet. Comsopac 090126 is the operations summary. Admiral Scott comments on the present employment of the ATLANTA in his 080020. Also, he points to a disadvantage in the employment of PTs north of GUADALCANAL. The EDGAR ALLEN POE is reported to have been torpedoed south of NOUMEA. Comsopac 090347 gives further details on the condition of the ENTERPRISE. Vice Admiral Halsey has closed his administrative office at AUCKLAND and is consolidating his staff at NOUMEA.

The RALEIGH made a sweep along the reported position of an enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS with negative results.

There is strong indication of a grand scale offensive aimed at GUADALCANAL to be undertaken by the enemy in the very near future.

The following is an estimate of the maximum enemy surface combatant force that can be employed in the SOLOMON area for the offensive in the next week:

4 BB, 2 CV, 5 CA, 6 CL, 21 DD.

It must be noted that some of these units may have some damage.

Our surface force available to oppose that offensive is:

2 BB (one damaged), 1 CV (damaged), 4 CA, 4 CL, 33 DD (some required for escort).

Cominchi 081505 pink and Cinopac 082145 pink deals with the employment of the ILLUSTRIOUS in the Pacific Fleet.

Cinopac 092107 pink gives an estimate of enemy intentions in the SOLOMONS.
November 9th.

At the usual morning conference Rear Admiral Mason told of the attack on the HORNET which resulted in her loss.

Comsopac 100316 is the operations summary for that area. The Army regiment which has been moving eastward the past few days have succeeded in surrounding a Jap force of undetermined size in the vicinity of TETERE. (Comgen 1st Marines 092359). A group of 5 DD's was sighted and attacked by the evening air search just off the northeast coast of NEW GEORGIA and these ships arrived in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANCE at 2230 (local). The ATLANTA group will arrive at GUADALCANAL tomorrow, and Rear Admiral Turner's group of reinforcements are scheduled to arrive the day after. His support group is preceding the AP's and is due to arrive one hour before midnight. The SOUTHARD reports the probable sinking of a Jap sub between SAN CRISTOBAL and GUADALCANAL. The FLETCHER reports a possible sub contact to the east of SAN CRISTOBAL.

General MacArthur will comply with the request of Comsopac for maximum air effort against shipping in the BUIN-FAISI-TONOLEI area during the period 11-14 November (local) inclusive. Today at least 61 ships were reported by a coast watcher in that area including six cruisers and 33 DD's. Another coast watcher report from that area states four probable BB's there.

Comsopac has requested that eight P-38's be flown from AUSTRALIA to GUADALCANAL at once.

During the day subs were reported sighted off SAN PEDRO and near DUTCH HARBOR. CTF 3 reports the ADAK mining project completed in his 092045.

It is generally believed that Zed day for the landing of enemy Army troops on GUADALCANAL is November 13th local. This is expected to be a major effort to recapture GUADALCANAL. TF 61 has been put on one hours sailing notice at NOUMEA, but if the attack starts as believed, it will have to get underway at once to intercept.
November 10th.

Sopac operations through the 10th local are in Comsopac 110251. Comsopac 102102 ordered TF 16 to sortie at 10 a.m. today from NOUMEA and proceed toward GUADALCANAL. Two air attacks were made by the enemy this morning. The enemy lost a total of 5 zeros and 8 bombers out of 17 zeros and 35 bombers attacking. We lost 7 F4F4 and five pilots. The ZEILIN was damaged by three near misses in the first attack but was able to start for ESPIRITU SANTO. No other damage was reported. Comgen 1st Mardiv 102156 reports ground activities and the air strike on 5 DDs 210 miles north of GUADALCANAL on the evening of the 10th (local). Just before midnight Rear Admiral Callaghan's force arrived off the Marine position and continued to the westward of GUADALCANAL without making enemy contacts. The APs under Rear Admiral Turner are due at GUADALCANAL at dawn tomorrow. TF 67 approaching GUADALCANAL has been sighted and reported by enemy search planes.

Comsopac has ordered three of his subs to the vicinity of a point 75 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND.

TF 66 has been formed as an escort force. CTF 66 will be the administrative type commander for destroyers, South Pacific.

Comsopac 110954 believes that two weeks training for a British CV will suffice if we use our own aircraft, bombs, key personnel, etc.

The 9th Defense Battalion which arrived at NOUMEA today has been assigned to TF 62 for duty at GUADALCANAL.

Enemy submarines continue active in the SOLOMONS area. One was reported 15 miles east of LUNGA POINT.

Cominch has approved the reorganization of the Sopac Marines as outlined in Comsopac 312126.

The SEAWOLF reported sighting a large CV and 2 DD departing from PALAU for the South during the late afternoon.

CTF 8 reports an air attack on enemy planes at ATTU and a minor air attack at KISKA. There are indications of renewed enemy activity in that area. This may be in the nature of a diversion. ATTU is mentioned and minor activity reported by sub reconnaissance on AMCHITKA.

If our reading of the mail is correct, today is Z minus 2 day and the striking forces will attack GUADALCANAL tomorrow. There are no indications of raids or other major enemy activities in the Pacific except as noted above in the ALEUTIANS.

As a result of our landing in North Africa on the 7th, Vichy France broke diplomatic relations with us at 1930 on November 8th.
November 11th

General Emmons and TF commanders at PEARL attended the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.

Comsopac 120059 is the operations summary for that area. The good news of the day is that 20 to 25 enemy torpedo bombers escorted by 8 zeros were shot down by our planes and AA when they attacked our shipping off GUADALCANAL. Rear Admiral Turner's force arrived as scheduled and was attacked in the early afternoon. Other flights were reported coming in but it is not reported whether or not they arrived. Rear Admiral Callaghan's force made two sweeps to the westward then took a covering position to the westward of SAVO. The APs and AKs were expected to retire from the area during the night of the 12th (local).

Our search planes reported the following enemy forces during the day: 2 BB or CA, 1 cruiser, 6 DD, 270 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND; 5 DD 110 miles north of ISABEL; 2 CV, 2 DD west of GUADALCANAL. There were several enemy search plane contacts in the SOLOMONS area. An enemy sub was reported north of LUNGA POINT.

Fragmentary reports have begun to arrive indicating a battle near SAVO during the night. The PORTLAND steering engine was disabled and a tow requested, and the ATLANTA said she needed assistance. Other known details are in Cincpac 122037 pink.

Cincpac 120031 pink is further information on the employment of the ILLUSTRIOUS.

FANTAN 090334 is a report of airfield construction at SUVA.

ComSWPac reports that a small Allied corvette engaged two enemy raiders at 19-50 S, 92-40 E. One raider was reported hit and afire and the corvette was damaged.

The landing field at FUNAFUTI was put in commission by ComGen STRAW on November 8. It is now 250' x 3500', and will be extended to 300' x 6000'.

The 147th Infantry is now loaded in the PRESIDENT HAYES at BLEACHER.

The first section of TF 11 will depart PEARL for the south tomorrow and the second section will leave when the NORTH CAROLINA is ready - about the 17th.

CTF 8 reports a medium tanker and one DD at HOLTZ BAY. There are several indications of renewed enemy activity in the ALEUTIANS, but because of great enemy activity in the SOLOMONS it is believed that no major effort is probable in the north.

Cincpac 120635 indicates the need for APs and AKs for training purposes on the West Coast.
November 12th

General Emmons and Task Force Commanders at PEARL were present at the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. All present were brought up to date regarding current operations.

The day in the South Pacific was one of great activity. As noted yesterday, a battle was working up in the vicinity of SAVO ISLAND. CTF 67 had completed a good percentage of unloading and departed during the evening. His three part 130115 reports the shelling of enemy positions by cruisers and destroyers at GUADALCANAL during the unloading, and of air attacks, and of percentage of unloading. Rear Admiral Callaghan's cruiser and destroyer group were to intercept the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL. Rear Admiral Scott in the ATLANTA with 4 DD of Desron 12 joined Rear Admiral Callaghan.

At 0310, local, off LUNGA POINT, the PORTLAND requested air coverage and tow, having been hit by a torpedo. At 0705, local, the HELENA originated a message, as senior ship, saying that the HELENA, SAN FRANCISCO, JUNEAU, O'BANNON, FLETCHER and STERETT were proceeding toward ESTIRITU SANTO at 15 knots. All these ships are reported damaged. By 10 a.m. local, Comsopac had accounted for all his ships except the ATLANTA and 5 DDs. Shortly thereafter Comsopac gave details of the damage to the PORTLAND and ATLANTA in his 122322. By 1100 the AARON WARD reported being towed to TULAGI for examination of damage to engines and boilers. By the afternoon the ATLANTA was sinking and had to be abandoned, Comsopac gave those on the spot authority to use discretion in destroying the ATLANTA. The PORTLAND was being towed to TULAGI at this time. At 1755, local, there were about 1400 survivors of Rear Admiral Callaghan's force ashore at GUADALCANAL. During the evening RDO TULAGI asked whether or not to torpedo the MONSSEN. The extent of damage to two other DDs is not completely reported. Preliminary information of damage inflicted on the enemy includes the disabling of one KONGO Class BB and one CL by torpedoes and bombs. One enemy ship was reported blown up.

As the results of the morning air searches came in, the following enemy forces were reported:

KONGO Class BB vicinity of SAVO.
1 BB, 3 DD - 40 miles north of GUADALCANAL.
1 CV, 1 BB, 3 DD - 230 miles northeast of GUADALACANAL, with 3 cruisers and at least 4 DDs about 50 miles to the eastward of this CV group.
10 AP, 12 cruisers and destroyers heading toward and about 50 miles from BUIN.
1 BB, 3 DD - 45 miles north of LUNGA with 1 BB, 1 cruiser 4 DD near that position about 11/2 hours later.

(Continued on next page)
November 12th (Cont'd)

2 CA, 1 DD - 330 miles northeast of MALAITA.

In the afternoon there was reported:

1 BB, 1 DD - 150 miles north of and heading toward GUADALCANAL.
1 CV east of MALAITA.
A large ship 50 miles north of GUADALCANAL.

TF 16 had been ordered to support GUADALCANAL and the withdrawal of our damaged units, operating to the south of SOLOMONS. As a result of these sightings TF 64 was formed with 2 BBs and 4 DDs to prevent the bombardment of our GUADALCANAL position during the coming night. The remainder of TF 16 was directed to continue operations to the southwest of GUADALCANAL, striking suitable targets. TF 64 cannot reach an intercepting position before 0800 local tomorrow but the ENTERPRISE group will be in a position to strike in the GUADALCANAL area at daylight tomorrow. The ENTERPRISE flew in some planes to GUADALCANAL, probably because her damage (70% effective estimated) will not permit her to operate all of her planes effectively.

Comairsopac stated he would attack enemy cruisers if they approached VANIKORO with SBDs and TBFs from ESPITIRU SANTO.

During the day two strikes of B-17s were launched. The first strike of 8 B-17s failed to get hits on the BB northwest of GUADALCANAL, and the other strike is not reported.

At least five enemy plane strikes were made on GUADALCANAL. None were reported reaching that place.

During the day it became doubtful if there were any enemy CVs in the SOLOMONS area.

Air forces from the SW Pacific attacked shipping in the BUIN area with good results, and Admiral Halsey requested further attacks on the APs. He also requested that 18 B-24s be alerted in the SW Pacific for a flight to ESPIRITU SANTO, or EFATE, or NEW CALEDONIA, as designated later.

During the evening GUADALCANAL directed the sinking of the ATLANTA tomorrow at daylight.

Shortly after midnight GUADALCANAL reported being heavily shelled by naval gunfire. The last shelling there caused serious damage and so this report causes much concern.

The enemy has postponed Z day until the 14th (Local). Thus tomorrow may be another very exciting day. We continue to

(Continued on next page)
November 12th. (Continued)

be optimistic. Our forces will be in good position to come to grips with the enemy, and if gunfire did not put HENDERSON field out of commission, our Marine pilots should make the landing extremely costly.

The FINBACK reports sinking 27,000 tons enemy shipping to the east of FORMOSA.

The pilot of the Rickenbacker plane which landed at sea three weeks ago was rescued today off FUNAFUTI. As other personnel are thought in rubber boats near the position where the pilot was rescued, there seems some chance of saving them.

November 13th.

Continuing with the narrative of yesterday Comsopac 130428 describes some results SAVO action. The ATLANTA was sunk by our forces after damage received from the enemy had completely wrecked her. It is found from enemy survivors that our forces may have engaged two enemy groups, - 1st 2 BB, 1 CL, 6 DDs; 2nd 2 BBs, 2 CAs. The PORTLAND and AARON WARD arrived at TULAGI for temporary repairs to permit them to withdraw. The MONSSEN probably was torpedoed by our own forces.

Morning searches discovered the following enemy forces:

(1) A convoy of 12 AP off the northern coast off the north coast of NEW GEORGIA headed southeast.

(2) A group of 25 ships southwest of ISABEL ISLAND headed southeast.

(3) 5 ships (one damaged) 75 miles northeast ISABEL ISLAND headed northwest.

(4) A "large force" of cruisers and DDs 60 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND headed south.

(5) 2 BB, 1 CL, 11 DD just off the east coast of NEW GEORGIA on southeast heading.

(6) 1 BB, 1 CL, 2 DD 60 miles south of SHORTLAND ISLAND and heading to that place.

(7) Several enemy patrol planes.

Other minor contacts were made.
November 13th. (Continued)

Photos yesterday show one direct hit and two near misses by B-17s in first drop on BB of the FUSO Class, and a second drop claims three hits.

The orders for TF 16 and TF 64 are shown in Comsopac 131730.

Both the planes from the ENTERPRISE (See Comsopac 14-1020) and from GUADALCANAL attacked enemy forces approaching in the vicinity of the NEW GEORGIA group. As a result of these air attacks Comgen CACTUS reported 11 enemy AP, 6 of which were damaged, and several DDs were milling around 60 miles northwest of SAVO at 1600 local and asked CTF 64 if he could strike. The results of B-17 and PBY strikes during the day was not reported. ComNavUnit CACTUS 140716 is his belief of enemy conditions.

As GUADALCANAL planes operated successfully during the day it is assumed that last nights shelling did not seriously damage the airfield.

The FLYING FISH made an unsuccessful attack on the force of cruisers and DDs northeast of ISABEL. CTF 42 readjusted sub positions in the hopes of getting the cripples, or any other prime targets.

At 1903 local CTF 64 stated he would enter east of RUSSEL at 2200. At 2000 a plane reported a naval battle to the westward of RUSSEL ISLAND. This report is not understood. CTF 64 reported being off LUNGA at 2245. At 2322 CTF 64 reported "engaging enemy".

SAN FRANCISCO damage and casualties are reported in his 141058 and 141115. The loss of the JUNEAU by enemy torpedoes is reported in the HELENA's 141106. It is certain that Captain Young of the SAN FRANCISCO was killed, but no report has been made concerning Rear Admiral Callaghan.

Comgen 1st MarDiv 132233 reports activities on the 12-13 local.

The first NEW ZEALAND troops to garrison NOUMEA should arrive there November 16th.

The PRESIDENT HAYES with Army troops from BLEACHER embarked has been ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO.

For the first time in this campaign P-38s and B-26s are reported at GUADALCANAL.

(Continued on next page)
November 13th. (Continued)

The personnel of the Rickenbacker plane, except one man who died at sea, have been saved.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

As the day ends it seems most probable that while we have suffered severe losses in ships and personnel, our gallant shipmates have again thwarted the enemy. If so, this may well be the decisive battle of this campaign.

November 14th.

General Emmons and the usual Task Force Commanders were present at Admiral Nimitz's morning conference.

As previously noted our BB group had been ordered to parallel the SOLOMONS 50 miles to the westward and the ENTERPRISE group to parallel 100 miles to the westward. The subsequent action of our BB group is described in CTF 64 150355. Probably because the ENTERPRISE damage would not permit her planes to operate efficiently, 54 were flown off to GUADALCANAL. At the end of the day the BBs and the ENTERPRISE were returning to NOUMEA and the ENTERPRISE planes will proceed to ESPIRITU SANTO as soon as conditions warrant. Comsopac 150355 and 151310 give damage to own and enemy forces. The MEADE and air bombardment are credited with the destruction of all four enemy AKs beached in the vicinity of TASSAFARONGA POINT. While a great many of the details of the events of the day in the general GUADALCANAL area are not yet known, it is certain that TF 67, 64, and 16 inflicted such heavy damage on the enemy that the push was completely broken up and the enemy was forced to retire.

During the retirement of TF 64 the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA were attacked by enemy air.

A summary of our losses and damage is:

Lost: ATLANTA, JUNEAU, MONSSEN, WALKE, LAFFEY, PRESTON.

Probably lost: BARTON, CUSHING.

Severely damaged: SOUTH DAKOTA, SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND.

Damaged: HELENA, FLETCHER, O'BANNON, STERRETT, BENHAM, GWIN, AARON WARD.
November 14th. (Continued)

Personnel loss is not known, but includes Rear Admiral Callaghan and three of his staff, and Captain Young – all of whom were in the SAN FRANCISCO and were killed during the night action of TF 67.

The enemy losses are not accurately known. It is safe to assume at least the following:

Sunk: 12 AP(AK), 3 CA, 9 DD.
Severely damaged: 1 BB.
Damaged: 1 BB, several cruisers and DDs.

SW Pac air is expected to strike damaged ships reported entering the BUIN-FAISI area.

We still have to hear of what was accomplished by TF 63, TF 42, GUADALCANAL air, and the PTs.

The INDIANA group arrived at BALBOA and will proceed at once to the South Pacific.

Batdiv 4 has been diverted to NANDI. The SARATOGA group will cross the equator next Monday.

The MANLEY and McKean will land 2 companies of the 2nd Raider Battalion at AOLA BAY and will also tow 4 PTs to TULAGI.

We are two days behind on reports from General Vandegrift. No major land action is reported.

Vice Opnav 141926 gives plans for NEW ZEALAND air employment and requests CinC Pac and Comsopac views.

The Central Pacific area was quiet.

In the North Pacific AA fire was encountered by our planes at ATTU and landing barges were sighted. Possible enemy radio activity was reported at AMCHITKA.
November 15th.

General Emmons and the Task Force Commanders at Pearl were present at the usual morning conference.

It is now definite that the enemy offensive was completely stopped. It is probable that damage we inflicted on the enemy is greater than received by us. As striking forces of both sides have retired from the GUADALCANAL area and can hardly be in large scale action in the near future, it appears that now is the time to move in supplies and to relieve the tired Marine amphibious troops. CTF 62 has already started a movement of supplies to GUADALCANAL.

The ENTERPRISE, SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, and screening DDs are enroute NOUMEA. The NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, and 3 DDs (TF 16.6) are at ESPIRITU SANTO waiting orders where they will be joined by the LEANDER. The PORTLAND and AARON WARD are making temporary repairs at TULAGI. The BENHAM and GWIN are limping toward ESPIRITU SANTO and are being escorted by the SHAW and NICHOLAS.

CTF 62 151012 (2 parts) gives results of recent action after conference with commanding officers engaged. Comsopac 161124 also summarizes results of the battle.

Comgen 1st Marines 152246 reports action on GUADALCANAL, including air activity.

C.O.S. Army & Cominch 141928 (2 parts) gives procedure for distribution, allocation, and replacement of aircraft in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Because of a report of sighting an enemy land plane by our search plane 675 miles NW OAHU, condition ONE was ordered at midnight. The enemy threat did not materialize and normal conditions of alert were resumed about eight hours later.

Except for two reports of enemy submarines the Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.
November 16th.

As the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and Task Force Commanders at PEARL are either present in person or represented at the daily morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz, notation will not be made except to note absentees.

There was no action with the enemy in the Pacific Ocean Areas yesterday except minor air and submarine contacts. During this lull in the South Pacific both the enemy and ourselves are commencing to regroup, and to plan for the repair of damaged ships. Major logistic support for the GUADALCANAL area is underway.

Rear Admiral Turner expresses his views regarding the force necessary to protect our lines of communications to advance positions in his CTF 62 161133.

The action of the PORTLAND in the 3rd Battle of SAVO is in his 2 part 170804 and 170400. The PORTLAND also sends (160830) the account of the senior survivor of the PRESTON. Captain Jenkins, senior survivor on GUADALCANAL describes other losses and personnel casualties (RDO CACTUS 140358). The MEADE 150145 reports bombardment of enemy APs (AKs?) and the rescue of survivors.

An enemy AK was reported stopped and smoking just west of SAVO ISLAND.

The Marine reorganization in the South Pacific is made effective by Comsopac 161144.

Cincpac has delegated to Comsopac authority for deployment and redistribution of Army and Navy air organizations in the South Pacific Area.

Two enemy submarines were reported sighted off CAPE HINCHENBROOK, ALASKA.

There is indication that the enemy is again becoming active in the BUNA area. So far the move of forces to that area is of a minor nature. It is believed, however, that if the enemy can find the means, they will plan to capture all of NEW GUINEA.
November 17th.

The only enemy action of note in the Pacific during the day is the movement of troops and air to the vicinity of BUNA, NEW GUINEA. It appears that the enemy is reinforcing the position there.

The report of ENTERPRISE plane operations between November 13 and 15 inclusive is in Comsopac 180655.

Comgen Mardiv 172205 reports GUADALCANAL operations.

The PORTLAND will require the services of a tug when she leaves TULAGI. That ship recommends repairs be accomplished at SYDNEY.

The delivery of supplies of all kinds to the GUADALCANAL area is now underway on a large scale.

The WICHITA, CLEVELAND, SUWANNEE, SANGAMON, JENKINS, MURPHY, RADFORD, WALLER and CONWAY have been ordered to proceed to the Pacific for duty at an early date. The BOISE will remain in the Atlantic. Cominch 180255 pink.

CTF 8 has been directed to submit a plan as early as practicable for expulsion of Japs from the ALEUTIANS. The plan will also include consideration of early occupation of AMCHITKA to deny it to the enemy as an air field site.

Aside from minor enemy moves toward KISKA and BUNA, there is no new information of enemy deployment or intentions.

November 18th.

Again the day was quiet in the South and Southwest Pacific except for minor activity in the BUNA area. Our logistic movements to the SOLOMONS are proceeding satisfactorily according to plan, and when completed and bulk avgas storage installed much greater strength of our positions will result.

In his 190659 CTF 64 reports damage inflicted during the night of 14-15 local. As some of this was predicted and reported by Comsopac, we are not yet ready to estimate enemy losses. It seems quite probable that damage inflicted is considerably greater than the preliminary fragmentary reports indicated. It may even be that our forces in the south have inflicted decisive damage for this phase of the campaign. In any event we can reasonably assume that with the arrival of TF 11 in the near future and the strengthening of GUADALCANAL now in progress that we can expect to control both the sea and air in the Southern SOLOMONS. If the 25th Army Division can be sent in to GUADALCANAL to relieve the 1st Marine Division, the Marines...

(Continued on next page)
November 18th. (Continued)

can rest, reequip, and prepare for the next step. As the situation now stands there seems to be a good chance to starve out the Japs on GUADALCANAL.

There were no new developments in the Central or North Pacific areas.

In Cincpac 182131 is a plan to withdraw Pacific Fleet submarines from the South Pacific area in order to increase patrols in Empire waters.

November 19th.

The South Pacific continues quiet. Logistic support of GUADALCANAL is proceeding according to plan. The present development of airplane fields at GUADALCANAL is in Comgen 1st Mardiv 182338. Comsopac 201135 is a summary to the 19th local. It is now learned that damage inflicted on the enemy on November 14-15 by TF 64 was not included in prior damage reports made by Admiral Halsey. On this basis a tentative estimate damage to the enemy November 8-16 is

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The remodeled ARGONAUT will leave PEARL about the 23rd for the South Pacific. Her new capabilities are shown in Comsubpac 200021.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet. Cincpac 200923 requests clarification of the status of the bases OSTLER and LINEOUT.

The center of enemy interest in the South has shifted from GUADALCANAL to the BUNA area, but there is nothing yet to indicate anything like a major move toward NEW GUINEA.
November 19th. (Continued)

is nothing new learned of enemy deployments or intentions, except some activity at MUNDA, NEW GEORGIA and the indications of further strengthening at BUKA.

November 20th.

The day in the South Pacific was quiet. Some enemy submarine and air activity was noted but the main interest continued to be the logistic supply of our SOLOMONS positions and the repair of damaged combatant units. Comsopac 210600 refers to plans for the 21st (local). A flight of enemy planes were reported coming in to CACTUS but no arrival report was received. Comsopac urges that Pacific Fleet submarines remain in his area (his 210643).

The tanker situation in the Sopac area is discussed in Cincpac 200925.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

Rear Admiral Giffen's force will leave the east for the Canal Zone, enroute to the Pacific, on December 5th.

There are no new enemy developments.

November 21

The South Pacific continues quiet, as is also the case in the Central and North Pacific areas. The logistic support of GUADALCANAL is proceeding according to plan without opposition. No report of land operations on GUADALCANAL was received during the day. Minor enemy activity continues in the BUNA area. The enemy is landing some troops and materials at MUNDA, NEW GUINEA. The Japs are to try to land troops and supplies on GUADALCANAL from submarines.

Combatdiv SIX 211238 (2 parts) discusses the gunnery of his part in the 3rd Battle of Savo and stresses the importance of radar in night action.

Comsopac 220120 comments on need of present APs and AKs in his area.

Comsopac 210052 requests speed in delivery of PCs to his area.

Cominch 211800 desires further information on Cincpac proposal to establish Comairsopac Subcom.

Consideration is being given to convert 5 additional ODDS to APDs for use in the South Pacific.

There were no new enemy developments.
November 22

The South Pacific continues quiet. Air searches were negative. Complete coverage was not possible due to bad weather.

Comsopac 221037 is a summary of the day at GUADALCANAL. Logistic support is going in, including turkeys for Thanksgiving.

The BENHAM received a torpedo hit during the night of 14-15 November off SAVO. During the following afternoon the ship was thought breaking up and the crew was transferred to the GWIN who sank the BENHAM by gunfire.

There is the possibility that the Japs are using captured Allied planes to trail our forces.

Comsopac 222357 gives progress of repair to STERETT, BUCHANAN, and O'BANNON. The PORTLAND is underway for SYDNEY after temporary repairs at TULAGI.

Comsopac 230612 is the Task Force reorganization of the forces under his command.

Cominch 230032 pink directs the return of 6 subs to Comsowespac and that 6 preferably 8 PT boats be placed at the disposal of MacArthur in response to the latter's request.

Cincpac 222125 is a proposal for redistribution of Pacific Fleet subs.

Cincpac 222241 requests information of troop command relations at GUADALCANAL.

Cominch 221541 directs the transfer of 4 APs and 2 AKs from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet. This will ease the training problem of TF 3.

The enemy continues active in the BUNA and MUNDA area. There is some indication that Jap CVs have returned to JAPAN for reorganizing, refitting and training.
November 23rd.

There were no new developments in any Pacific Ocean Area today. Because of expected enemy submarine operations off GUADALCANAL, Com Gen 1st Marines requests naval forces in additional to the PT's.

The SOUTHERN DAKOTA will go to NEW YORK for battle damage repair, and the SAN FRANCISCO will go to MARE ISLAND.

The proposed command set up at GUADALCANAL is shown in ComSoPac's 240145.

The enemy is planning reinforcements to the BUNA, MUNDA, and GUADALCANAL area by destroyers. As previously mentioned, subs have been ordered to bring supplies and troops to GUADALCANAL. It is evident that the enemy is in no position to dispute our command of the sea area in the Southern SOLOMONS at this time.

November 24th.

As has been noted for several days, the enemy interest in the South and Southwest Pacific concerns: (1) The BUNA relief force, (2) Logistic support of GUADALCANAL by submarines and DDs, (3) strengthening the MUNDA position.

Our logistic support of GUADALCANAL continues in a satisfactory manner. Comsopac 240525 and 251215 summarize activities in the Southern SOLOMONS. At 0320 the 26th (local) enemy planes were reported over GUADALCANAL.

Comsopac believes that the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS occupation should be continued to be held in abeyance because of construction difficulties and desirability of avoiding dissipation of effort.

In the SW Pacific the allied troops are pressing the enemy in the BUNA area. Of a reported group of 1 CL and 4 DDs attacked by SWPac air to the southwest of NEW BRITAIN, two DDs are reported hit and burning.

The NORTH CAROLINA has been sent to SUVA to join other BBs there. The MINNEAPOLIS, PERKINS, and DRAYTON will join TF 67 at ESPIRITU SANTO.

The LOUISVILLE, FRAZER, and GANSEVOORT depart PEARL for the South tomorrow escorting APs loaded with the first combat team of the 25th Infantry Division.
November 24th (Continued)

Cominch 232222 describes the LINECUT and OSTLER garrisons.

Cincpac plans for the seizure and occupation of KISKA, and an estimate for the resumption of the Sopac offensive, are underway.

November 25th.

There were no major activities in the Pacific today.

Comsopac 261300 is a summary for his area. The AOLA project has been abandoned. Apparently the new unloading point is 3000 yards east of TOGAMA Point. (CTF 62 260458). Comsopac 250609 urges that Admiral Fitch's title be CTF 63 only and a rear admiral be ordered as Comairsopac at NOUMEA. Cincpac comments on this in his 260247 to Cominch. The port director setup in the South Pacific is outlined in Comsopac 260632.

The master of the COOLIDGE will be brought to trial. Both Army and Navy have jurisdiction.

Cominch 240330 (pink) relays SWPac despatch to Cincpac showing that Admiral Carpender was not consulted by General MacArthur prior to his recent request to Washington for Naval forces. It also gives sub distribution in support of NEW GUINEA.

Cominch 252330 (pink) suggests possibility of relief of Marines in SAMOA and HAWAII by the Army.

A tanker was attacked off San Francisco Bay today by an enemy submarine.

CTF 8 252030 (pink) gives his estimate of enemy troop strength in the western ALEUTIANS. The estimate seems a bit high. Cominch desires a report and recommendations of landing field possibilities on AMCHITKA. The Army recommended against occupation for that purpose in the early fall. CTF 8 will make a survey as soon as possible.

CTF 8 260155 (pink) 2 CLs and 4 DDs to intercept a convoy indicated now enroute KISKA.

Cominch 251659 indicates British units may soon report to South Pacific for duty.

The Army Signal Corps seems to think action imminent at RABAUL. Here it is believed that no major enemy activity in the South Pacific can take place in the next two or three weeks.
November 26

Comsopac 271254 is the daily summary of his area. The report of 3000 Japs at REKATA is a much larger force than had been estimated there. At 0434/28th local (-11) enemy planes were reported over CACTUS. There is some doubt concerning the combat readiness of the 43rd Division, location of the Americal Division and 9th Defense Battalion, and the 1st Raider Battalion. Comsopac has been requested to keep Cincpac informed of these and the organization and strength of future troop movements.

Cominch 251415 is sending 4 APs and 2 AKs to the Pacific, leaving the east coast mid December. As 3 AP and 2 AKs are to be loaded for the South Pacific it seems best to send them as planned. The need for APs and AKs in TF 3 for training is urgent. Until the planned training there is completed no troops will be available to oust the Japs from the ALEUTIANS. Because of this Admiral Halsey has been asked to comment on the immediate release to TF 3 of 3 AP and 2 AK.

NA WELLINGTON 262230 gives Commodore Goddards views on New Zealand air.

The reported submarine sighting off SAN FRANCISCO yesterday now appears quite doubtful.

Cincpac 262305 pink agrees in principle with the relief of Marine ground and air units at SAMOA and HAWAII mentioned yesterday.

In the ALEUTIANS, the enemy convoy believed enroute to SEMICHI has been delayed 2 or 3 days. CTF 8 is attempting to intercept with 2 CL and 4 DD, working with PBY search.

There are no new enemy developments.

November 27

There were no major contacts with enemy units during the day. Various sightings indicate an AK a fire to the westward of NEW GEORGIA. This damaged ship is in a small group of DDs and Marus apparently standing toward the SHORTLANDS area. The ALCHIKA was torpedoed off LUNGA today. The ship was beached and when last reported was on fire forward but unloading continued from the after hatches. CTF 62 280309 suggests sweeps to reduce the hazard of unloading.

The INDIANA will join up with other BBs at FIJI and the COLUMBIA will go to ESPIRITU SANTO to join the force under Rear Admiral Wright.

(Continued on next page)
November 27 (Continued)

The HELENA 140001 gives additional details regarding the 3rd Battle of Savo, including details of the loss of the JUNEAU.

Ground activity continues in the BUNA area. Neither side is indicated having the upper hand.

In the North Pacific Rear Admiral Smith with 2 CL and 4 DD is making a sweep toward ATTU in the hope of intercepting an enemy convoy which is indicated bringing reinforcements and supplies to the Western ALEUTIANS. B-26's were ordered to attack a small AK reported in HOLTZ BAY. The planes reported 3 hits leaving the AK on fire and sinking. The air search which covered ATTU and SEMICHI reported negative results except for sighting the above AK aground. A possible sub was also reported.

There are no new enemy developments.

November 28th.

The South Pacific was generally quiet during the day. As it is believed that an enemy convoy indicated as eight DDs and 6 APs will attempt to land food at GUADALCANAL tomorrow, CTF 67 was ordered to proceed from ESPIRITU SANTO with available cruisers and DDs to intercept.

ENTERPRISE engine repairs are now completed and the ship can make full power. As battle damage repairs are not yet permanently made, there will be some reduction in the reliability of air operations. No yard overhaul is proposed at this time. The COLUMBIA at BLEACHER has turbine trouble which reduces her speed to 20 knots. The ship will arrive at NOUMEA December 2 (local).

Comsopac 280145, 291050 (passing MacArthur's 271136), and MacArthur's 291100 discuss Naval requirements to support NEW GUINEA operations.

The enemy continues to receive damage from SWPac air in attempts to run convoys to the BUNA area. A DD was reported hit west of NEW BRITAIN and the group, of which this was one, turned back.

Cominch 281235 authorizes "Fleet Air Command, Noumea".

CTF 8 290035 outlines destroyer needs for the North Pacific Force. Those vessels are now operating at maximum capacity and without a reserve number to permit needed overhauls. A sub was reported southwest of SITKA.

The German auxiliary "RAMSES" enroute KOBE to Germany was intercepted by the ADELAIDE. The Germans scuttled their ship.

(Continued)
November 28th. (Continued)

Aside from the Jap attempts to feed and reinforce positions at NEW GUINEA, GUADALCANAL and the ALEUTIANS, there is nothing new known of enemy deployments or intentions.

November 29th

During the night the first reports, came from Rear Admiral Wright (CTF 67). That force had been ordered from ESPIRITU SANTO to intercept an enemy force of eight DDs, plus possible 6 APs, off GUADALCANAL. Action between surface forces commenced about 1030 p.m. local. Of Admiral Wright's force of 4 CA, 1 CL, 6 DD, the first damage reports are: MINNEAPOLIS, 2 torpedo hits; NORTHAMPTON, on fire aft looks like total loss; NEW ORLEANS, torpedoed; PENSACOLA, uncertain; HONOLULU, not reported. As is usually the case we get bad news first; enemy damage is not reported. ComSoPac ordered CTF 11 to proceed at once toward GUADALCANAL (SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, DESRON 6). TF 65 (MARYLAND, COLORADO, NORTH CAROLINA, HULL, MONAGHAM) were placed on 2 hours notice.

The MAC FARLAND, which was badly damaged sometime ago in an air attack off LUNGA, is enroute ESPIRITU SANTO.

The ALCHEBA is still afire forward, and aground off LUNGA. Salvage is being investigated.

COMINCH 291906 (Pink) gives the destination of the 25th DIVISION. It also states that the 1st Marine Division will be sent to AUSTRALIA.

COMSOPAC 291811 gives his plans for aerial mining. He is not ready now for such an offensive campaign.

COMINCH 281708 discusses base developments in South Pacific. ComSoPac is asked whether or not he approves the development of BUTTON into a LION base.

COMINCH 291755 deals with the employment of gas in warfare. Gas warfare is forbidden to be initiated by any U.S. Commander.

The extent of the enemy move to the ALEUTIANS is in doubt. Five convoys are believed to be enroute. Except for this move, and the known activities in the NEW GUINEA area nothing significant is known of enemy plans or developments.
November 30th

Comtaskfor 67 301730 and 302350 pink describes what is now known of yesterdays action. Many important details are yet to be reported. Rear Admiral Tisdale will arrive at BU'rTON in the HONOLULU tomorrow and will be able to make further report.

Cominch 301915 pink is uneasy regarding the South Pacific campaign and requests comment from Cinpac. A tentative answer to Cominch is in Cinpac 010831 pink to Comsopac, for the latter's comment.

In answer to Cinpac proposal to sail 3 AP and 2 AK to San Diego to meet urgent training requirements, Comsopac sent his 300841. Because of the necessity for CTF 3 to start training on a much larger scale than now underway, Cinpac directed 3 APs to return to San Diego in his 010335.

Comsopac 011321 gives CACTUS activities.

The PORTLAND is making satisfactory progress toward SYDNEY. The NAVAJO, which was accompanying the PORTLAND, has been ordered to CACTUS for salvage.

Cinpac 010645 gives views on aerial offensive mining in the Pacific. It is believed that we should harass the enemy with every conceivable means.

The work remaining to be done on the CACTUS airfields is in GUADALCANAL 300255.

The SARATOGA has turbine trouble which reduces ship speed to 27 knots. Repairs are beyond the capacity of the ship's force. So far as is known today the SARATOGA task force is still proceeding to CACTUS, but other SoPac combatant units have been returned to 12 hours notice.

Returning from patrol off NEW GEORGIA the GRampus reports (1) 18 October - possible hit in CL; (2) 6 November - 1 hit in DD; (3) 9 November - 2 hits in DD. The TROUT fired 5 torpedoes at a BB north of MALAITA on 13 November but all missed.

CTF 8 290110 gives his aerial offensive mining plans.

Some evidence is beginning to come in of another push toward CACTUS. It may be that the enemy will employ CVs when and if it takes place. The enemy continues to be active in the NEW GUINEA area but no large scale move in that direction is noted.

In the ALEUTIANS the enemy moves are not clear. It seems probable that convoys now enroute the Western ALEUTIANS are bringing in reinforcements and replacements. Photos show that the enemy is there to stay until ousted by troops.
SECRET

December (GCT)

03 0521 CINCPAC to COMINCH

For Admiral King only. Highest secrecy. Had given full consideration to disadvantages raised by your 011605 as to operating Batdiv 3 in Sopac. Logistics can be met. I have had the AA batteries of Batdiv 3 increased by addition of 2 40 MM quads and 46 20 MM guns per ship, making them comparable to those of Batdiv 4. These AA batteries will of course be improved when they receive their remaining 40 MM guns and replace 5"-25s with 5"-38s but their underwater defense will not be satisfactory until third deck centerline compartments are made watertight. It was with all this in mind I decided in view of the military situation these ships should go to Sopac. My 232047 and Halsey's 250522. It is probable that the enemy will make at least one more powerful move against CACTUS including more of his battleships than he used last time. The need for additional gun power to defeat this move has been accentuated by recent losses in heavy cruiser strength. I consider this situation more acute than those in the past which led to suggestions for use of OBB. Your 272058 of April and 121750 of August. Para. I believe that decision should be made now whether we shall lay up all OBB for lengthy modernization or whether we shall keep available and utilize some in situations where their hitting power may be the deciding factor. Will await your further advice before cancelling transfer of Batdiv 3 one ship at least of which will be required as part of escort for troop convoy departing December 6.

02 2155 CINCPAC to COMGENHAWDEPT, COMHAWSEAFRON Info ASP PEARL etc.

While situation at present does not indicate probability any major Jap attack Hawaiian area on first anniversary of Battle of Pearl Harbor, possibility exists of acts of sabotage by misguided local Japanese or of minor shelling by submarines. Desire modified alert effective from prior dark 5 December to after daylight 7 December with special emphasis on sabotage directed against ships or shore installations. Blackout exceptions made to expedite work on damaged ships and movements important cargoes are not rescinded but excepted activities be particularly alert to blackout promptly if later ordered.

02 0637 To be decoded by Cominich and Cincpac only. Ultra high command. Your 301915. Concur conception therein. BUIN at present key ORANGE position in SUSAN. To take this near future requires: A CACTUS, RINGBOLT development of support planned surface operations. B Neutralize or take MUNDA and REKATA as may be needed later. C Increased air surface and shipping available. Para. Relative above, enemy

(continued) 1180
continues efforts reenforce CACTUS. He has not abandoned it. Securing all development that position and RINGBOLT continue absorb available Sopac effort and are progressing too slowly. Reenforcement and more shipping needed now. Lack anti-sub craft is grave weakness. Jap activity MUNDA, REKATA, BUIN obscure due inadequate reconnaissance which difficult and slow due lack of means and weather. Consider Mardiv 1 required for move on BUIN. Para. Army troops now here plus 25th Division adequate to garrison back areas and CACTUS provided BUIN offensive is gotten underway promptly. In this connection it is essential that next offensive will not be undertaken until ships and troops are available to exploit immediately initial landing and follow through otherwise a 2nd CACTUS may result. Para. Operations involve directly and mainly Sopac forces, bases, and communications. Command should be located accordingly regardless of who it is.

Decode only for Admiral Nimitz. Ultra Secret. Last paragraph your 030521 think only sound course is to continue modernization and rehabilitation of OBB's as underway in TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA which must be adjusted to Navy Yard capabilities after consideration new construction and battle damage repairs. Para. However only acute needs such as now exist in Sopac should cause us to unduly expose OBB's which have not been modernized.

Treat with utmost Secrecy. Due to non-water tightness of centerline compartments of 3rd deck of NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI, I desire that they not be unnecessarily exposed to underwater damage unless they are required in an urgent situation. Under present conditions I consider that operating them west of FANTAN one would result in such exposure. Their AA battery now consists of 8 5"-25s, 4 1.1 quads, 2 40 MM quads and 46 20 MM guns. Half of their secondary battery has been removed. Para. Suggest on his arrival FANTAN you have Leary confer with you on BB employment.

The following reorganization of Sopac task forces is effective immediately for all units in company with Task Force Commanders. Absent units will be directed to join by Comsopac, originator, as soon as practicable. Task Forces 11 and 16, no change from organization in my 230612 November except delete CLARK from Desron 2 and Task Force 16. Task Force 64, Rear Admiral Lee in WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, INDIANA, MAURY, CUMMINGS plus additional destroyers as may be assigned. Task Force 65, Rear Admiral Mason in NASSAU, ALTIMAHA, Combatdiv 4 in MARYLAND, COLORADO, Comdesron 12, WOODWORTH, BUCHANAN, LANSOWNE, LARDNER, MCCALIA, GRAYSON. Task Force 67, Rear Admiral Ainsworth Task Force Commander in LOUISVILLE, Rear Admiral Tisdale second in command in HONOLULU, HELENA, COLUMBIA, Comdesron 5, SHAW, LAMSON, PERKINS, DRAZTON, NICHOLAS, FLETCHER, OBANNON, DE HAVEN, SAUPELFY. The following units will operate directly under Comsopac PENSAOLLA, MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, HULL, MONAGHAN, PARRAGUT, MEADE, STACK, LANG, FRAZIER, GANSEVOORT. Comsopac will act as Comtaskfor 66 using group and unit designations that force for units operating under his direct control. Task Forces 62 and 63 are not affected by this reorganization. Comsopacsopac and Comdespacsopac have by hand for info. Interested Bases Sopac have also for action in another system.

Handle as most secret. Mining plans vicinity CAPE ESPERANCE CACTUS recommended for approval as follows, one standard field of 340 Mark Six mines fitted with five hundred fathoms mooring wire, floats and mines at standard depths against surface ships as soon as prepared at WEST LOCH be loaded on four light minelayers and sent WHITE POPPY soon as practicable. Comsopac sends to Cincpac action, Cominch info. Recommend approximate location of field one mile northeast entrance of TENAMBA RIVER long axis field 040. Foregoing after consultation Captain Hull. This field designed curtain infiltration Jap troops and supplies northwest our position on CACTUS.
09 2145 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMGEN 1ST MARAMPHCORPS etc.

Utmost secret. In connection my 191645 October you are authorized to transfer 10th Defense Battalion to Sopac as relief of 4th now in ROSES when transportation can be arranged. If 10th is utilized, Marcorps will make available to you SAN DIEGO about 10 January; 12th for transfer to PEARL as replacement for 10th. 12th will be retrained to full strength in January. Should you utilize 10th, inform desired date to sail in order arrange transportation. NPM deliver; action Cinpac. NXZ for info, Comsopac, Comgen 1st Maramphcorps. Marcorps has by hand; originator Cominch.

11 2007 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC

Utmost secret. Request comment Cominch 092145. Tenth Defense Battalion consists mainly personnel with year or more experience bases Hawaiian area and expected ready depart PEARL 1 January. Equipped with 155, 90, 40, and 20 MM, plus machine guns, tanks, and other Defense Battalion equipment; strength 50 officers, 1113 enlisted.

14 0932 COMSOPAC to COMGEN CACTUS Info CTF 62 63 COMGENSOPAC, etc.

It is important. Ultra. That action reports be promptly made, by preliminary and one or more amplifying dispatches when necessary. Your 122352 was first report on action off SAVO night of 11th? 26 hours earlier than your time group we had fairly complete report from zeal sources. Necessary that Zed 6 Zed Class 5 Addes be advised in advance of use of surface forces in GUADALCANAL - FLORIDA area. This not to restrict your discretion but to avoid possibility of conflict between forces your command and those of other commanders. Prior to receipt of your 130320 regarding ground reconnaissance at KAMIMBO had received report through TOKYO that 3 BLUE DD covered by PT bombarded the area and landed raiders at MARVOVO the morning of 12th. If true originator should have been informed of plan or orders to our force. Pass to Comadnavbase CACTUS by hand. Action to Comgen CACTUS from COMSOPAC who has given to Comgen Sopac and CTF 62 for info.
16 0424 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

Highest secret. Critical shortage destroyers herewith outlined. Due limited unloading areas beaches and equipment CACTUS, RINGBOlT movements cannot be lumped in large convoys. Small frequent groups into and out of that area make heavy drain on escorts. This situation unavoidable for some time to come and the movements must continue. Lack of maintenance opportunity increasingly apparent in material casualties. Further serious consequence of hand to mouth condition is impracticability retaining any emblance of division and squadron organization. Comdespac suggests Desron 29 be ordered here for escort work. If you can do so earnestly recommend this at once. Relief so afforded will permit some permanency in destroyer assignment and training with task forces and will be reflected in marked increase in battle effectiveness of those forces. I know that you are acutely aware my need for the ships, however, the foregoing may clarify your picture somewhat. At present part of our heavy striking forces are immobilized and remainder suffer gravely reduced battle efficiency due to what I have outlined.

16 0435 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH

Am sending 190 mines in JAMES RUMSEY (most secret) Departing 17th. Comindiv 1 in TRACY and MONTGOMERY both loaded with mines accompany. I do not approve plan proposed your 090506 as it appears to restrict our possible future movements in that area. I will approve fields laid off enemy landing beaches which you will not want to use in future yourself and in depths of not over 200 fathoms.

15 1959 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH

Utmost secret. Expect directive from joint chiefs of staff canceling occupation TANAGA and ordering occupation AMCHITKA. Be prepared carry out latter task at earliest practicable date after receipt of orders.

15 1650 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPACFOR

Ultra secret. Advise Cominch as to strength of all units of all services, less aviation, which are now in CACTUS-RINGBOlT. When various units are relieved inform Cominch as to their Strength and the amount and type of organizational military equipment not withdrawn. This information essential for material and personnel planning. Limited supplies amphibious material available for MarDivs necessitates serviceable equipment and weapons this type should be withdrawn if and when practicable. MarCorps informed.
December 17 0510 COMSOPAC to COMSOWESPAC Info CINCPAC, COMINCH.

This from Comsopac. Strategic location of WOODLARK ISLAND as advanced air base for operations Northern CORAL SEA believed to offer possibilities. Such preliminary information as available here indicates relative ease of establishment field. Subsequent logistic support does not appear to present too great difficulties. Request I be furnished, for information, any recent topographical survey information visual and photographic reconnaissance information also any other useful data available. This is ultra.

17 0327 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC

Your 160424. Have reduced vessels assigned ocean escort to minimum compatible with task. I will continue policy of sending you all I can but regret none in sight except DD's now under repair.

18 1315 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMWESSEAFRON, COMMORWESSEAFRON, etc.

Treat this as most secret. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that if reconnaissance of AMCHITKA shows that a satisfactory airfield can be constructed thereon in a reasonable time, the following directive will be executed: Comwesseafron pass to DEWITT. Objective. Occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose. One, to render KISKA untenable as an operating base for the enemy. Two, to provide an advanced base for possible operation against KISKA. Tasks. Affirm, seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. Baker, train force for assault and occupation of KISKA. The Army assault units as assigned by the War Department can be trained in SAN DIEGO. No Marine amphibious units are available for this operation. General instructions. Cincpac in conjunction with Comgen Western Defense Command form plan for occupying AMCHITKA to be executed on earliest date. Cincpac furnish CTF 8 immediately 1 AP combat load for first troops to land in occupation of AMCHITKA. Report target days for AMCHITKA occupation and outline of plan and means required for this operation and for future occupation of KISKA. Code name for AMCHITKA operation is CROWBAR. Occupation of TANAGA suspended in accordance with Cincpac.

18 2321 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH, COMMORWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Utmost secrecy. Cominch 181315. On assumption that TERRAIN at AMCHITKA proves suitable and that directive for its occupation will be issued by Cincpac and Comgen Western Defense, I desire you continue detailed plans in conjunction with such Army agency as may be designated by Lieut. General De Witt. Consideration will be given to requests by you for forces in addition to those now at your disposal but beyond the one AP very little is immediately available. De Witt is being addressed separately regarding troops. Greenslade pass to De Witt.
SECRET
December (GCT)

18 2345 CINCPAC to COMWESEAFRONT Info COMNORWESEAFRONT, etc.

For General De Witt. Most secret. Referring to Cominch 181315 and my 182321 to Theobald which is being passed to you. After final approval of AMCHITKA project and determination of forces to be employed, I visualize that our joint directive for that project will assign the task and make available the forces decided upon. CTF 8 will be assigned the naval task by me and I presume will command all forces until the amphibious phase is completed. If you concur, please inform him of the agency with whom he will deal in preparing detailed plans. Would also appreciate information as to your plan for the garrison and whether all units are now available to you.

19 0320 COM 12 to CINCPAC

Pass to Cinpaca for action; treat as most secret. Com 12 sending. Paraphrase of despatch sent by Lieut. General DeWitt to Chief of Staff as follows after conference with Cinpaca and staff, Admiral Kinkaid and staff, officers Cominch, recommend adoption following General Plan as basis preparation detailed plan for reduction and occupation BOODEL. Occupy FORMULA at once with garrison formerly destined for AMULET supplemented by additional units from LONGVIEW if necessary. Plan to use 184th Infantry after BOODEL is reduced with units from LONGVIEW, FORMULA and other ADC garrisons as occupational force, BOODEL. 35th Division to be designated task force BOODEL reduction and brought up to full strength. General Corlett and General Landrum to be returned from BRONZE and assigned as division and ass't. division commanders that division, both having served with division in amphibious training. Second part follows four minutes later.

19 0324 COM 12 to CINCPAC

Most Secret for action Cinpaca; second part my 190320 says Com 12. Both officers familiar with Alaskan conditions and have worked joint exercises with Marine amphibious forces. Present location 35th Division, LOS ANGELES and its early relief from Western Defense Command will facilitate training of specific force for reduction of BOODEL. Training can be initiated immediately under Admiral Rockwell provided given first priority by Cinpaca. 184 Infantry now intensive training should be sent OCEAN BLUE immediately for acclimatization and training in preparation occupational task. Recommend approval of above as basis for preparation detailed plan. Request authorization take necessary measures implement plan coordination and collaboration with Kinkaid and Rockwell who have seen this message and concur paraphrase ends reference Cominch 181315 War Department directive therein your concurrence requested in working out plans directly with Admirals Kinkaid and Rockwell subject to your approval. DeWitt.
For General DeWitt. Most secret. Studies by my staff and CTF 8 indicate probable 10,000 enemy at Kiska and that 2 divisions will be required for its capture. Request your comment and that I be kept informed of situation as to availability of troops for the Kiska operation. Rear Admiral Spruance, my Chief of Staff, will confer with you immediately on his arrival San Francisco tomorrow.

This from DeWitt to CinCPac. Answering your 182345 concur in designation ComTaskfor 8 as commander all forces FORMULA project until amphibious phase is completed. Conferring with Admiral Kinkaid here today and will inform him detailed plans will be worked out between him and Commanding General Alaska Defense Command. All units are now available to me for occupation FORMULA and are assembled LONGVIEW except battalion of general service or combat engineers. Initial garrison to consist 1 battalion infantry, 2 AW batteries AA, 1 battery 105 MM howitzer, 1 battalion engineers combat or general service, 1 battalion construction engineers aviation, 1 battery 155 MM gun. Engineer battalion general service or combat will be made available in Alaska Defense Command for movement to FORMULA.

For Lieut. General DeWitt. As indicated in my 212137 I concur your 202304. Following is tentative text of dispatch which I propose that we issue as our joint plan. "Objective, occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose, to immediately deny AMCHITKA to enemy and utilize it as soon as possible in air operations against enemy forces and Kiska installations. Task, seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. In command, Commander Northern Force (TF 8) Pacific Fleet. Forces assigned, Task Force Eight plus INDIANAPOLIS, DEWEY, WORDEN, KALK, GILLESPIE, MIDDLETON. Army garrison of about blank thousand plus construction and transportation forces as designated by CG Western Defense Command. Para. Target date January blank. Command of Army forces less aircraft will revert to Army when CG FORMULA informs CTF 8 he is ready to take over. Code name of this operation is CROWBAR." Request you give me information to substitute for above blanks and also any other suggestions to make the plan acceptable to you. If no appreciable disagreement exists, I suggest you include your approval and I will issue the dispatch as coming from us both.
Buckner and Theobald concur that enemy discovery of CROW-BOW operation must be almost immediate. Threat to BOODLE created thereby assures early and continuing maximum enemy reaction. With force herein recommended, shape of island confines our held position within fairly narrow limits near southern end of island. Subject only to our air action enemy thus has opportunity to infiltrated forces at will by barges, submarine and other transportation in low visibility to unoccupied middle and northern sections of island. It is recognized that our supporting naval surface forces will be weak. Our occupation force must therefore be strong enough to assure our control of area within artillery range of contemplated airfields. These considerations dictate that minimum force desirable is 2 full regiments of infantry, 2 batteries of 155's, 4 batteries 75's, 1 regiment anti-aircraft plus construction and service troops. This full strength must be fully available Day. Commanding General Alaskan Defense Command and Commander Task Force 8 jointly send. Most Secret. Radio HONOLULU deliver to Cinpca for action and Comwestseafron deliver to Commanding General Western Defense Command for action.

Handle this as super secret. Non addressees do not decode begin Cinpca 170545 and 180151 Comsopca 181056. Disregard my 162115. NTS provide transportation for Twelfth Defense Battalion with its normal equipment and supplies from SAN DIEGO to COPPER and if transportation can not be furnished by Cinpca for Tenth Defense Battalion from COPPER to port in Sopac designated by Cinpca. Twelfth Defense Battalion will load SAN DIEGO 4th January or as soon thereafter as transportation can be made available. Marine Corps issue necessary movement order Twelfth Defense Battalion. Cinpca advise whether transportation is or is not required for Tenth Defense Battalion. Marcopca and Opnav informed.

Concur entirely your 220557 pass this to Cinpca handle as most secret Com 12 sending for Gen DeWitt. Army Garrison strength at FORMULA 6,000 including approximately 800 in engineer aviation construction battalion and same number in air combat and service units expected to be stationed at FORMULA upon completion construction air base. Engineer construction battalion aviation armed organically with rifles machine guns both 30 and 50 caliber and 37 millimeter guns and available for combat if needed. Target date January 5th in which Adm Kinkaid concurs. Comwesseafron has by hand.
C 12095 this answers your 242149. To Admiral Nimitz from Gen De Witt. C of S from Alaska Defense Command here a few days ago and brought Buckner's estimate of minimum force desirable for FORMULA project which was approximately same strength and composition as outlined in Theobalds dispatch 212238 sent jointly to you and me. Consider minimum garrison necessary as outlined in my reply to your 162345 and so informed Buckner. This is force of Six thousand strength as contained in our joint dispatch implementing CROWBAR project. In discussion with Kinkaid just prior to his departure for north, which was attended by Admiral Smith who had just returned from ALASKA, various matters connected with CROWBAR project were discussed including the possibility of prompt retaliation by enemy. It was consensus of all present at conference that enemy would doubtless attempt to interfere with CROWBAR operation utilizing all possible means including submarines and possible barging of troops from Kiska. No one at any time expressed confidence that movement would be unopposed or that Navy could prevent anything coming to either FORMULA or LONGVIEW. Kinkaid stated it was Navy job to do everything possible to prevent enemy action interfering with movement and occupation of FORMULA and both he and Smith considered that effective measures with Naval forces available could be taken to seriously interfere with possible enemy barging operations from Kiska. It may become necessary to augment FORMULA force later. This can only be done at expense of other ALASKAN garrisons and in absence of present unloading facilities FORMULA reinforcements should not be scheduled pending change in present estimate of immediate enemy capabilities.

In regard to Gincpac 250303. Comsopac speaks. CACTUS gas situation will not yet permit repeated heavy long range strikes from there. Further impracticable give fighter coverage CACTUS to RABAUL hence night strikes only can be made. Can send you 18 fortresses, 9 B-26 and 8 Lightenings to operate temporarily from Sowespac against RABAUL shipping. Request your opinion and desires in this regard. Very secret Comgensopac has by hand for info.

Hicom Hicom. Only for addressee. Your repeated and long continued indication of carrier training activities in ORANGE waters may repeat may involve rehearsals of operations directed against HAWAII - MIDWAY line or elsewhere other than South or Southwest Pacific.
COMSOPAC to COMTASKFOR 67 Info CINCPAC, CTF 62, CTF 42, etc.

30 0602
Addressees only decode. Most secret. Be prepared carry out shore bombardment against MUNDA airfield on NEW GEORGIA during night of 4 January with three (3) CL and probably 2 DD. Use own planes for illumination and spotting retiring them to RINGBOLT. GRAYBACK available for navigational or other aid desired CMA information to be provided her through Comtaskfor 42 by January 2. Propose to employ VP coverage from CACTUS. Obtain air photos of target area and sea approaches to firing position from Comtaskfor 63. This operation to support landing of own troops CACTUS. Advise ships designated. Comsopac sends. CTF 42 and GRAYBACK have for info in another system.

31 0341 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC

Handle with utmost secrecy. It is apparent from Halsey's 300350 that the estimated dates of readiness of amphibious troops contained myser O259W of 8 December are much too optimistic. Therefore recommend before any directive by Joint Chiefs of Staff be issued that the objective and target date be referred to Cincpac and Comsopac for comment.

31 1815 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC Info CSA, VCNO.

Very Secret. Only for addressees. Comment on contemplated set-up whereby Deputy Commander Sopac area relieves Comsopac of administrative and local operational matters including bases except advanced so that Comsopac is free to give full attention to enemy especially as SUSAN campaign progresses when command relations with Comswestpac area will develop importance. Chief of Staff Army, VCNO informed.
Preliminary survey results night action 30 Nov - 1 Dec. from CTF 67 who has not yet consulted Admiral Tisdale and CGs HONOLULU and 4 DD's. Jap ships sunk 2 AP, 1 AK, 2 CL (YUBARI or SENDARI Class) 4 DD's. 2 other AP's damaged. Some indication that CA was present but escaped undamaged. About 5 destroyers escaped. Am convinced no landings were made from any ship. Jap force believed composed of 5 AP or AK 3 cruisers 9 destroyers. Action commenced 2320 following torpedo attack on transport group by our DD's from 5,000 yards. Gunfire at ranges 12 to 5 thousand yards. SG Radars of great benefit. Jap gun fire unimpressive.

Part 1 of 2 parts. Partial preliminary narrative 4th SAVO. Tisdale sends. 4 DD's 2 miles ahead cruisers ordered launch torpedo attack followed shortly by gun fire from cruisers at targets already along beach area. This at 2323. All time L(-11). HONOLULU commenced fire at 2324 range 8300 closing rapidly. Order in column MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHAMPTON, LAMSON, LARDNER. First hit I saw was on NEW ORLEANS, second PENSACOLA. MINNEAPOLIS, NORTHAMPTON hits not noted. At midnight Wright with 2 torpedo hits and rapidly failing TBS ordered me take charge. Gunfire now desultory or over. PENSACOLA half way SAVO to RINGBOLT speed 8. NEW ORLEANS retiring toward RINGBOLT speed 5 knots. NORTHAMPTON immobilized and burning advised was abandoning. MINNEAPOLIS making 5 knots toward LUNGA POINT. Location DD's unknown. Large fire along stretch of beach seemed fully half mile long. Ordered all destroyers to stand by crippled cruisers. HONOLULU at about 0230 cleared area to westward to await daylight due 0530 when returned via South of SAVO hunting crippled enemy ships south of RUSSEL ISLANDS enroute. None located. LARDNER, LAMSON joined inside SAVO. End of part 1. CTF 67 pass to Comgen CACTUS. Info to Comairsopac by hand. Comsopac pass to Comseconsopac.

Part 2 of 4th SAVO. CTU 67.2.3 originator. MAURY patrolling TULAGI advised PERKINS and all 3 cruisers inside TULAGI HARBOR. Only MINNEAPOLIS visible. Circled off harbor to signal Wright in endeavor arrange convoy to BUTTON but contact broken when MINNEAPOLIS shifted berth behind island. MAURY then advised no disabled cruisers able make trip. DRAYTON, FLETCHER already departed. My group started for BUTTON. Extent damage to enemy PENSACOLA, NEW ORLEANS, PERKINS, MAURY unknown. LAMSON, LARDNER, FLETCHER, DRAYTON, LARDNER, LAMSON, FLETCHER, DRAYTON, (Continued)
HONOLULU undamaged except HONOLULU maximum speed 28 until granted 24 hours availability repair one engine. All require ammunition. 10 cruiser planes if none lost now at TULAGI 10 others BUTTON. Kitts in DRAYTON advises his ship sunk 0257, 57 officers including Captain, Executive, Navigator, Gunnery, Supply, Medical, 1st Lieut. all Comrudy 5 staff 1 British and 667 enlisted arrived BUTTON in FLETCHER DRAYTON. Only 3 enlisted seriously injured. Understand more survivors in RINGBOLT area. Believe entire enemy attack force destroyers and submarines.

02 0600 CTF 8 to TF 8 info CINCPAC.

This is CTF 8 Operation Order Number 15-42. Information. SEMICHI convoy and KISKA convoy enroute these destinations, one at least scheduled to arrive early evening December 2nd. Escort probably consists 1 TAMA and small number of destroyers. Another force speed 24 arrived in an objective area above time or about 0600W (-12) Dec 3rd approaching on course 040. Assumptions. (1) Task Force is covering escort for SEMICHI convoy. (2) This force is carrier raiding force or surface raiding force objective probably LONGVIEW for early morning air attack or night shelling. Plan. This force will locate enemy approaching LONGVIEW and SEMICHI - ATTU on afternoon 2 December or as early as possible 3 December and will destroy fast enemy force by repeated air attacks in vicinity of LONGVIEW or full scale primary attack by air in SEMICHI area and will utilize surface force attack to complete destruction enemy combatant surface force and SEMICHI convoy in order to prevent establishment of enemy on SEMICHI ISLAND while safe guarding forces and installations at LONGVIEW. Tasks. Air Group, Air search unit. Locate enemy force approaching SEMICHI and LONGVIEW as late as possible in December 2nd consistent with predark return to bases and as early as possible on December 3rd. Determine type and number enemy combatant units. As consistent with primary task, assist in attacks on enemy combatant forces and SEMICHI convoy. Air striking unit. Destroy as primary target, fast enemy combatant units protecting SEMICHI convoy. If and when search eliminates probability of presence enemy near LONGVIEW on 3 December, be prepared to dispatch force as early as possible against enemy located in ATTU SEMICHI area. Consistent with tasks against enemy combatant forces, assist in destruction of transports and auxiliaries of SEMICHI convoy. With due regard for offensive tasks, while awaiting information of enemy, safeguard air force at Western Bases to maximum possible especially on early 3 December. Surface striking group. Destroy SEMICHI convoy when search intelligence indicates favorable situation or when ordered. Destroy or drive off enemy combatant units interfering with primary task. Consistent with primary task

(Continued)
and as situation warrants complete destruction of enemy combatant units. Xray. If not located until after arrival, SEMICHI convoy may be found dispersed at SEMICHI, in TEMNAC MASSACRE SARANA CHICHAGOF or HOLTZ BAYS ATTU or in lee of AGATTU. SEMICHI convoy is primary convoy objective. No action against KISKA convoy must interfere with or delay destruction SEMICHI convoy. Organization of groups and units and commanders thereof are set forth in my OPlan 14-42. Tasks of groups not mentioned herein are covered by my OPlan 14-42. This Op Order effective on receipt. Senavoff LONGVIEW assure delivery to BUTLER and LANDRUM.

04 0459 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC

Your 270149. 2 bomber, 2 fighter strips planned for CACTUS. Complement aircraft desired including attack group, 80 VF and pursuit, 40 VSB, 18 VTB, 30 heavy bombardment, 20 medium bombardment, 12 Hudsons, 6 photo and utility. Comsopac sends to Cincpac for action.

032127 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC COMSEROFPAC COMSERONSOPAC.

272203 X SALVAGE OPERATIONS COOLIDGE WITH VIEW TO RAISING not practicable during war activities on account large force of personnel and equipment diverted from salvage and battle damage repairs to combatant vessels. As bow is 66 feet under water and stern 138 feet under water ultimate salvage considered questionable. Present program is cut holes in sides for removal urgently needed military materials of special value. This program will be continued as fill in, when work on combatant vessels permits. Action Cominch. Info Cincpac, Comsopac originates. Comsopac has by hand.

04 1153 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC COMGENSOPAC COMGEN 1MAC etc.

West of POINT CRUZ 164th Infantry patrol killed 5 Japs destroyed machine gun. On upper LUNGA Marine Raider patrol captured 1 mortar some ammunition several machine guns and killed 16 orientals with loss of 4 wounded. Comsopac summary. 3 CAs arrived BUIN from north at 1100. All times Love (-11) December 3rd. Left at 1700. Last seen at 1825 north of CHOISEUL course northeast. 10 DDs left BUIN 1300 course southeast. Probable these ships same as those engaged by CACTUS air at 1830, 150 miles, bearing 300°. Hits: 2 1000 pound hits on 1 vessel, 1 1000 pound hit on 2nd vessel, 2 torpedo hits on DD and 2 possibles on another. By hand to Comgensopac, Comgen 1st MAC, NSS give to Cominch info. Cincpac is action.
December (GCT)

04 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, CTF 8, COMNWSEAFRON, etc.
Addressee only decode. It is considered possible even probable that enemy will make definite effort to effect surprise even suicidal attack perhaps of air raid character on some of our positions and/or forces on or about 7th instant. Para. When you pass this despatch along make sure of adequate paraphrase.

04 2153 CTF 8 to TASK FORCE 8 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGENALDEFENSE.

05 1441 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info CINCLANT, COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, etc.
4 AP's and 2 AK's in addition to those my 251415 November to all adees expected depart base hypo late December for MERCURY where report Cincpac for duty. Now planning embark 158 Infantry Combat Team (trained in jungle warfare) at MERCURY for AODE in JOSEPH DICKMAN CHARLES CARROLL THOMAS JEFFERSON ARCTURUS also Army Navy personnel and cargo at base hypo in WILLIAM RIDDLE OBERON for WHITE POPPY. Comment. Early reply necessary in order arrange loading. Opnav has by hand.

06 0143 Comsopac to Cincpac Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMGENSOPAC, etc.
Night of 4th after remarkable 30 day operation through mountainous jungle 2nd Raiders reached LUNGA. Comsopas passes. They destroyed 5 Jap bases killed 400 enemy. Suffering only 17 dead their own force. West of MATANIKAU 164th infantry killed 7 nips. On 6 missions P-39's strafed 15 enemy landing barges and rafts vicinity TASSAFARONGA. Jap supplies lashed to drums drifted toward beach. Cincpac action. Cominch info. Comgensopac and Comgen First Maramphcorps have by hand for info.
06 2031 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

PENSACOLA scheduled depart RINGBOLT 6th local for BUTTON speed about 8. Comsopac ordered following moves yesterday afternoon, TF 16 proceed toward Lat. 15-00 S, 160-00 E, engine speed 22, NORTH CAROLINA with DD escort from FANTAN 1 toward same position, speed 20, CTF 64 in WASHINGTON with INDIANA, COLUMBIA, and DD escort from WHITE POPPY toward same position speed 20. HONOLULU, HELENA available DDs at BUTTON placed on 2 hours notice.

06 1929 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMAIRCOSPAC, CTF 62.

Your 281708 Nov. The development of BUTTON as an advance operating base of LION dimensions is approved. NOUMEA is too far from present and prospective active combat areas to answer all requirements. NOUMEA however is desirably situated for supply. Provisions. Hospitalization. Training groups and battle damage repairs in conjunction with drydocking tender and shore facilities equivalent to one destroyer tender. Comsopac sends. Cominch action. Cinpac info.

29 Nov COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

Urdis 270341. Afirm. At BUTTON; 172nd combat team with 103rd Field Artillery Battalion plus attached medical company and engineer platoon. Enroute SPOONER to POPPY; one battalion 103rd Infantry, one battery 152nd Field Artillery, one battalion 169th Infantry, detachments of division service troops. Remainder 43rd Division, in POPPY, consists of 103rd Infantry, 169th Infantry, 152nd and 169th Field Artillery Battalions, 43rd reconnaissance troop, attached medical quartermaster, ordnance, engineer units. Entire Division reported as ready to combat except BUTTON contingent which is lacking considerable equipment. Baker. At CACTUS; 164th Infantry (3150), 132nd Infantry less one battalion (2100), 245th Field Artillery Battalion (570), 246th Field Artillery Battalion (496). Enroute CACTUS due 3 December; 132nd Infantry less one battalion (2100), 247th Field Artillery Battalion (400). At BUTTON; 3rd Battalion of 182nd Infantry (900). At POPPY; 1st Battalion 132nd Infantry (900), 221st Field Artillery Battalion (500), reconnaissance squadron (196). All service elements at CACTUS or enroute. Cast. 9th Defense Battalion enroute CACTUS last elements arriving 3 December. Dog. 1st Raider Battalion, present strength 16 officers, 613 enlisted; now based WHITE POPPY. Of these 511 enlisted now NEW ZEALAND for recreation, rehabilitation to return about 20 December. Easy. 6-155 MM guns and 4-155 MM howitzers. Enroute with Defense Battalion; 6 additional 155 MM guns. Marairwing ONE; headquarters WHITE POPPY, forward echelon CACTUS. Group 11 at CACTUS, and BUTTON (moving to CACTUS). Group 14 at CACTUS. Group 25 at TONTOUTA. VMC 251 at BUTTON. VMF 212 enroute USA.
December (GCT)

07 1251 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

As Sopac has first priority your request for shipments are being met and will continue to be met to the full extent that shipping can be made available after denying much needed support to areas of lower priority. In addition to the ships now at NOUMEA and BUTTON ships en-route and loading for NOUMEA will arrive throughout December at rate exceeding 1 per day. Request you reaffirm that this accumulation shipping your area is wanted.

COMSOPAC to COMGEN 1ST MARDIV, COMGEN FMAC, COMAMPHFORSOPAC, etc.

07 0446 Effective 10 December the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI position will assume a status generally similar to other island bases in South Pacific. The base to be known "CACTUS" will embrace the airfields on GUADALCANAL the seaplane base at TULAGI and the Advanced Naval Bases and Naval Local Defense Forces at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI, and all troops and installations in the general area. ComGen CACTUS will command the base under Comsopac. The principal of unity of command will be observed. The administration and operation of aircraft will be responsibility of Comairsopac is covered in "Organization of aircraft Sopac" promulgated by Comsopac serial 225 of August 4, 1942. Naval Advance Bases and Naval Local Defense Forces under Comnavbase CACTUS. For purposes of planning, administration, and development following responsibilities are established: Afirm. Airfields, seaplane bases, advanced naval bases, and naval local defense forces, Comnavbases Sopac. Baker. Troops Comgen FMAC (Passes to Comgen Sopac when Army forces assume defense responsibilities). Comamphforsopac relieved responsibility defense CACTUS but retains responsibility for transportation of reinforcements replacements relief units supplies and equipment until Comseronsopac is able to assume this responsibility. MTRon 3 plus JAMESTOWN, MTRon 2 assigned to operational control Comadnavbase CACTUS. Comgen FMAC, Comamphforsopac, Comnavbasesopac have for action. Comgensopac, Comseronsopac for info all by hand from Comsopac.

08 1225 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC.

Accumulation shipping, your 071251, considered warranted. With arrivals December, plus installation pontoon dock expect materially improve turn around which is main bottleneck at present. This will be further materials expedited by better loading now apparent in recent arrivals. Comsopac sends to Cominch for action, Cincpac information.
December (GCT)

09 0405 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Present garrison ADAK, 16,056; TANAGA garrison 0. Following future arrivals ADAK 12th, 600; 14th, 1264; December 28th, 550 completing troop movement to ADAK. January 5th TANAGA troop movement from ADAK begins. Expected date completion January 15th. Eventual garrison ADAK 14,361. Eventual garrison TANAGA 4,109. Have no knowledge of approved preliminary plan for AMCHITKA occupation. Army survey party proceeds there at early date. CTF 8 answers Cinopac 071049.

11 2025 CINCPAC to COM 14 Info COMINCH

For Admiral Nimitz. B-17 strike reported was in BUIN area. Photos 9th local show MUNDA airfield 90% completed with taxi-ways revetments bomb blast shelters 4 gun positions. Halsey orders Fitch make repeated attacks there. On departure RINGBOLT, MINNEAPOLIS ordered BUTTON; NEW ORLEANS, ACAGIA. PT reports sinking Jap sub off KAMIMBO night 9th local. Tentative Comsopac plan counter Jap subs CACTUS, PBY locate with radar, cruiser planes illuminate area, PTs or available DDs strike. Vandergrift relieved by Patch, arrives BRISBANE 12th. Halsey advises Mac-Arthur 75% lst Mardiv have malaria. Time rehabilitation 3, possibly 6 months considers climate of SYDNEY or further South necessary. RAdm. Wright ordered U.S. temporary duty by Halsey. Radar and sound by DD last night indicate 2 probable subs 20 miles from NE end MOLOKAI. Being hunted today by 2 DD VPBS. No word yet of 11 DD TOKYO-Express expected CACTUS last night.

11 2147 V OPNAV to COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC COM 12, COMNAVBASESOPAC

To facilitate planning orderly flow of base materials assign relative priority on outstanding and future requests for base materials and organizations using decimal system. Pending receipt of priorities intend ship as follows: A. ACORNS 3 and 4 in December. B. Communication component LION 1 to BUTTON, FAGTRANS, CINCPAC 090109. C. Material for development WHITE POPPY and piling requested Comnavbasepac 040421 as space available. D. First echelon LION 1 early January Comnavbasepac 240557, BOAKE assisting. E. Stevedore battalions as requested my 072052. F. Will modify CUB 2 to include all material requested your serial 0089130 and send with its organized and trained personnel to CACTUS and RINGBOLT. Progressive asignment of priorities will greatly assist integrating concurrent development of WHITE POPPY, CACTUS, BUTTON and shipment subsequent ACORNS. Pass to Comnavbasopac

1197
This is option, negat Inter Intelligence Bulletin Number 1 resumes former ORANGE Navy summary informative of trends and new developments when noted here. Zeal. Believe CinC 3rd enroute South and will command striking force of CV's supported by CinC 2nd with available CA's and some CL's plus DD's. In coordination with indicated strong land based aircraft forces in RABAL-SOLOMONS believe primary objective will be to gain control of air first, sea command second. CinC 8th now considered in subsidiary holt concerned logistics GUADALCANAL and HULA with forces limited to DD's, SS's and small number CL's. Info concerning BB's too fragmentary hazard opinion. CinC Combined believed to retain strategic control impending operations. Indication MUNDA further reinforced on 10th.

For Admiral Nimitz. B-17 strike reported was in BUIN area. Photos 9th local show MUNDA airfield 90% completed with taxiways revetments bomb blast shelters 4 gun positions. Halsey orders Fitch make repeated attacks there. On departure Ringbolt MINNEAPOLIS ordered BUTTON, NEW ORLEANS ACACIA. PT reports sinking Jap sub off KAMIMBO night 9th local. Tentative Comsopac plan counter Jap subs CACTUS PHY locate with radar cruiser planes illuminate area PT's or available DD's strike. Vandegrift relieved by Patch arrives BRISBANE 12th. Halsey advises MacArthur 75% 1st Mediv have malaria time rehabilitation 3 possibly 6 months considers climate of SYDNEY or further south necessary. RAdm Wright ordered U.S. temporary duty by Halsey. Radar and sound by DD last night indicate 2 probable subs 20 miles from NE end MOLOKAI. Being hunted today by 2 DD VPBS. No word yet of 11 DD Tokyo Express expected CACTUS last night.

Refer Comsopac (originator) 0704h6. Hereafter following designations will apply: Comnavbase CACTUS includes Subordinate Commands of Comnavbase LUNGA and Comnavbase TULAGI. Comsopac and 1MAC have. Also Comsersonsopac and Comnavadvbase Sopac. Info Cominch and Cinpac.

This from Cinpac. Following has been sent by DeWitt with concurrence of Cominch and Cinpac "Suspend all action in connection with occupation of TANAGA pending further instructions from this headquarters. Retain troops destined for TANAGA at ADAK taking all measures possible to contribute to their comfort and use them to maximum to expedite construction dispersal areas harbors and storage facilities ADAK. Further information later.
11 1629  COMINCH to BUAER, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, Info BuOrd, Opnav, etc.

Plan eventually to return all PBY planes from advanced combat areas, and to replace with squadrons equipped with PBM3C planes. About 14 new PBM3C squadrons should become operative on East Coast by July 1943. Of these half are assigned Cinclant and half Cinpac. Cinclant designate and arrange for transfer to Pacific at least 1 PBM3C squadron per month beginning January. These squadrons as received will replace PBY squadrons now in Pacific. Cinpac designate PBY squadrons to be returned and arrange for their return to Continental U.S. as appropriate. Cinpac is authorized to delay return of these squadrons at discretion. Upon return, PBY squadrons will become available for redistribution by Cominch. Squadron personnel to be transferred will consist of 1 and 1/2 combat flight crews per aircraft assigned, plus 2 ground officers and 6 enlisted technicians per squadron. Transfer of headquarters squadrons or other ground personnel not involved in this movement. Any readjustment of such ground personnel is to be handled through normal channels. BuAer initiate advance flow of supporting material to operating areas as designated by Cinpac. BuAer has this for action. BuOrd and Opnav for info.

15 0422 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSWPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC AREA

Catalina bombed and strafed MUNDA for three hours night of 13th from 2000 feet. Fortresses and CACTUS planes continued attacks on 14th reporting that runway appeared well bombed. Scouts report any casualties MUNDA area from bombing of 12th also that Japs have 5 inch AA gun there. Some sources indicate no Japs on CHOISEUL except radio post on northwest tip at MALAVAGA. Two B17's bombed KAHILI RPT KAHILI on 14th meeting no AA or fighter opposition. From Comsopac. Ground forces continued patrols in GUADALCANAL on 13th and reconnoitered Mount KUSTIN prior to intended occupation. 2 MG positions and crews destroyed. Several ORANGE planes dropped bombs near HENDERSON FIELD fighter strip with damage. Destroyer SAUFLY depth charged sub resulting in oil slick east of GUADALCANAL night of 15th. B17's reports 3 DD's, 3 tankers, 4 AK's, 1 passenger liner possibly AH at BUIN. 3 destroyers south of BUKA; one with stern blown off being towed by another.

10 2147 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMWESFAFRON Info MARCORPS, etc.

Para 1. Marine Corps make following units available for loading at SAN DIEGO beginning 10 January, 1943, and transfer as soon thereafter as practicable to Sopac area: (Afirm) Advance echelon headquarters 3rd MarDiv, 12 officers, 100 enlisted men and 200 measurement tons. (Baker) 9th Marine Regiment reinforced, 243 officers, 5400 enlisted men and
25,000 measurement tons. Para 2. Ultimate destination of units as Cinpac directs. Para 3. NTS provide sea transportation issue necessary instructions regarding loading of vessels, and inform other action addressees of names of vessels involved in movement, date available for loading, and approximate date of departure UNITED STATES ports. Para 4. Marcors (Afirm) Assist in preparation of loading plans as necessary. (Baker) Provide normal weapons and equipment, 90 days supply, 10 units of fore all units. Para 5. Code name this movement Tiresome. Marcors and Opnav have by hand. NXZ give to Comgen 1st MAC. Com 11 pass to Comgen FMF, SAN DIEGO area. Para 6. Execute this plan on receipt.

Information very meager and old concerning DUTCH NEW GUINEA, following best available: positions (Comsowespacforn sending, action Cinpac, info Comsopac) at SOAONG BANO and FAK-FAK total strength 6-800. Allied ship attacked in eastern ARA-FURA SEA 15th by plane presumed from DOBO in AROE ISLANDS where garrison estimated 140 in September. 7000 troops Portugese TIMOR covering north coast thoroughly, 26-4600 Dutch TIMOR mostly KAMPANG area. TORRES STRAIT open but some passes great barrier reef mined according of despatches. Northeast NEW GUINEA, WEWAH and MADANG occupied, no estimate strength, HOLLANDIA not occupied December 4th; native police pro Japanese. LAE SALAMAUA unreliable, estimate 4000 including construction workers and aircraft ground crews. CAPE WARD HUNT area 1400. BUNA area 1400. 3000 along SOPUTA track (leads inland about halfway between BUNA and GONA)

Reference my 092145. Plan send 12th Marine Defense Battalion to COPPER early January to relieve 10th Defense Battalion which will embark same vessel for ROSES. Plan to exchange 12th and 10th equipment thus avoid unloading copper. Remainder of 12th Battalion equipment unable to load in vessel provided by NTS will be sent from West Coast direct to final destination for assignment 4th Defense Battalion on its withdrawal from ROSES. Do you concur? Request immediate reply in order to arrange transportation.
CACTUS ground forces extended patrolling on 15th. Comsopac puts out the dope. 24 Japs killed. 6 Marines wounded. MUNDA bombed by Catalina night of 15th and twice by B-17's on 16th. In the morning strike 3 of 12 attacking float zeros were destroyed and 1 B-17 shot down near TETAPARI, NEW GEORGIA. Crew rescued. At 2240 L (-11) SBD's on strike against 6 DDs seen approaching MUNDA. 1 SBD hit 1 destroyer with 500 lb. bomb near miss with 200 pounders. 2nd SBD bombed same target but failed to return to base and results unobserved. Other SBD's failed to locate target and bombed runway. Fortress bombed KAHILI runway morning 16th. Dauntless and Wildcat silenced antiaircraft positions bombed and strafed REKATA area evening of 16th. KINGFISHER sank midget sub GUADALCANAL area. Small schooner destroyed in RUSSELL ISLAND by CACTUS air. On 15th MUNDA craters appeared to have been filled. Photos on 16th show BALALLE coral surfaced fighter strip 2000 feet long 75 percent completed. Local sources report 2 subs at REKATA 4 different nights during December. 12 DDs, 6 APs AKs, 2 Tankers, 5 float zeros and 7 flying boats reported at BUIN 16th. Damaged tanker still anchored there. 8 of the Destroyers arrived BUIN from north during morning and 6 left for south late in afternoon. HARUNA and KONGO according to captured documents left SOLOMON action October 14th at speed of 29 knots.

My objection to arrangement your 162115 is that in spite concurrence my 170545 to tentative destination ROSES for 10th Defense Battalion I think that situation might require Halsey to change employment this battalion to a forward area. It is the only such organization uncommitted and suitable for this use during the next few months. I had therefore contemplated asking Halsey to consider retiring the 4th Defense Battalion without relief or to fill its place with Army personnel. Due to freedom from malaria 10th will be more effective than 4th even after latter has been rehabilitated. Experience shows undesirability of exchanging weapons particularly when differences exist. Also it has been found most desirable where spare parts are immediately available. To summarize the foregoing I think 10th Battalion should leave HAWAII with its own weapons and thus ready to land and fight in a forward area if required. Request action your 162115 be withheld until Halsey's further comment obtained.
18 1056 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH

Your 180151 to Cominch. Cominch 162115 not received. Until your reference was received have planned: 10th Defense Battalion relieve 4th ROSES; Baker. 4th LONGROW rehabilitation; Cast. 11th (now arriving in area) temporarily to BUTTON pending further probable duty TULAGI-PORT PURVIS; Dog. 3rd now being relieved by Army CACTUS to LONGROW rehabilitation. Result availability, 11th depending results reconnaissance and developments, 3rd and 4th available about March for employment new areas. Will proceed on above basis unless otherwise instructed. Comsopac to Cincpac for info Cominch.

19 2206 SENAV CACTUS to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC etc.

Summary of flights from dawn yesterday until daylight this morning. 12 SED's escorted by fighters hit MUNDA 1330 L-11) destroying several building and received no opposition from enemy planes or AA. 7 B-17's bombed MUNDA 1715 L starting several fires. Anti-aircraft fire light. Runway has several bomb craters from previous raids. These planes sent to attack shipping at BUIN were met by at least 20 enemy planes in air over SHORTLAND ISLAND. Some were Ø's, some float Ø's and other float biplanes. Japs did no damage with phosphorous bombs but 1 B-17 and 5 P-38 received damage from bullets. About 25 float planes and 4 flying boats were in KULITANAI BAY, SHORTLAND ISLAND and AA was received from KORORO. Weather bad in vicinity and our striking force turned back and bombed MUNDA. All planes returned. 1 B-17 over KIHILI for 2 hours starting 0045, 1 over MUNDA from midnight until 0400, 1 spent 2 hours over BUKA leaving there at 0300. They dropped 20 hundred pound bombs, several flares, and many empty bottles at irregular intervals from BUKA; 1 large fire was left burning at south west end of runway; 1 DD at northeast end BUKA passage. 3 SED's, one PBY dropped flares and searched unsuccessfully for transport reported at TASSAFARONGA at 2300 L-11). No signs of enemy activity seen. Small groups of Japs strafed during day on coast road between TONEGI RIVER and TASSAFARONGA. RDO BUTTON pass to Comgen 1st Mar for info.

20 2207 SENAV GUADALCANAL to COMAIRSOPAC, Info CG ARMY FORCES SOPAC, etc.

Condensed version of 24 hours preceding 0600 Love (-11) today. Attack on MUNDA by 4 B-17's with indifferent results at 0700 received little AA. Planes over local Jap territory during entire day saw few signs of activity. Single Bogie on screen at 2350 came to CAPE ESPERANCE and withdrew track 300. 2 B-17's attacked two AKs East of KIHILI airdrome with 500 lb bombs from 0200 until 0345. Direct hit 2 near misses

(Continued)
20 2207 SENAV GUADALCANAL to COMAIRSOPAC, etc. (Continued)

started fire on one ship. 3 near misses on 2nd. Strafed both vessels. Damaged ship settling by stern when last seen. Small calibre AA from ship and airdrome. One Fortress harassed MUNDA for three hours beginning at 0100 dropped 20 100 pounders from 4000 feet. Results unobserved. No sign of Jap activity. One similar type plane spent hour over BUKA dropping 100 lb. bombs. Hit wharf SOHONA TSSPAND (?) and north east jetty starting fire latter place. Small calibre anti aircraft ineffective. Another fortress molested KIHILI from 0200 to 0400 with same armament. Dropped two bombs on NADI village and two on landing strip on BALLALE ISLAND. Daily searches all completed. Air observation indicates field on BALLALE ISLAND ready for use. Request photo reconnaissance. Pass to Comgen lMAC for information.

20 2304 DE WITT to CINCPAC

From General De Witt to Cincpac. Preliminary report FORMULA reconnaissance indicates suitable fighter field strip at the head of CONSTANTINE HARBOR 150 feet wide by 3,000 with metal mat can be constructed in from 2 to 3 weeks. Sites exist for fields more than 5,000 feet long suitable as main field and can be constructed in period estimated as from 90 to 120 days and provide some dispersion. I interpret this report as meaning construction of airfield on FORMULA is feasible and as placing Joint Directive in effect. Do you concur?

21 0215 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

To Cincpac for action. Originator CTF 8 considers additional forces required for escort and covering in CROWBAR operation (your 182321) are three modern cruisers, one of which should be 8 inch and one squadron new DDs. Recognize probable unavailability but state estimated requirements as suggested in reference. Consider early discovery of movement by enemy air and submarines certain threat to BOODLE must result in immediate and maximum possible enemy reaction. First and incomplete report from FORMULA survey party establishes that Japs have dug test holes east end of island within past month and are keeping area under close air observation. Am preparing plans on basis of present local naval strength as any reenforcement can be absorbed with very minor alteration.

21 0630 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINC COMWESEAFRON, COMNOWESEAFRON.

FORMULA Survey Party returned LONGVIEW December 19. Report concerning construction air fields follows. Metal mat fighter strip 150 by 3000 feet head of CONSTANTINE HARBOR feasible by aviation battalion in 2 or 3 weeks after starting construction. Sites exist for main airfield with some dispersion. 90 to 120 days estimated to complete field 5000 by 200 feet by 1 aviation battalion. Tracks and test holes indicate enemy has investigated southern end of island for suitable airfield. Island scouted by enemy air both days but survey party believes they were not sighted. Addees pass to Cincpac for action.
December (GCT)

21 2307 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, CG ADC

CTF 8 reports. Coordinated air attack shore installations KISKA HARBOR 1345 to 1350 W(-10) December 20 by 5 B-24's, 4 B-26's, 4 B-25's, and 9 P-38's. 52 500 pounders on Sub-base area with hits heavy explosions and flames observed in buildings south of Marine railway. South and north heads strafed and bombed with 48 100 pound demolition. Direct hit on gun emplacement and on building AA battery area. Camp area strafed and bombed with 16 each 100 pound incendiaries magnesium and general purpose. Results not observed except hit on munition sheds with heavy explosion. P-38's strafed camp area south and north head and beached cargo ship. All planes returned. Light battle damage from heavy AA. 1 pilot, 1 crew member minor injuries. For Cincpac action, Cominch info, CG ADC by hand.

23 0407 CINCPAC to COMWESEAFRONT Info COMINCH

For General DeWitt. Concur your 211320 as basis for initiating training. Request you send me your suggested draft of the joint directive we should issue in carrying out task B of Cominch 1811315. Foregoing based on assumptions. Afirm. That troops have been or will be made available to your. Baker. That location of amphibious training is satisfactory to Rockwell. Cast. That necessary transports for the indicated combat loading can be made available for the actual operation against BOODLE.

23 0016 DeWITT to CINCPAC Info COMWESEAFRON.

Concur entirely your 220557 pass this to Cincpac handle. (copies in pinks as this despatch is Most Secret).

23 2215 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH CTF 3 COMWESEAFRON etc.

Execute the following plan which is issued jointly by Cincpac and CG Western Defense Command. Objective. Occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose. To deny AMCHITKA immediately to enemy and utilize it as soon as possible in air operations against enemy forces and KISKA installations. Task. Seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. In Command. Commander Northern Force (CTF 8) Pacific Fleet. Forces Assigned. Task Force 8 plus INDIANAPOLIS, DEWEY, WORDEN, KALK, GILLESPIE, MIDDLETON. Army Garrison of about 6000 plus transportation forces as designated by ComGen Western Defense Command. Target Date. January FIFTH. Command of Army Forces less aircraft will revert to Army when CG FORMULA informs CTF 8 he is ready to take over. Code name of this operation is CROW-BAR. Addressees pass for info to interested Army Commands.
23 2359 CTF 17 to CINCPAC Info CONGEN 7th AIRFORCE.

CTF 17 speaking. Pass to ComGen 7th Air Force. Initial estimates of attack are approximately 90% of projectiles were placed in target area. Every indication attack complete surprise. No AA fire until after passage of 1st Airplane. Many fires started which were visible 75 miles. No injury to personnel, only minor damage to aircraft. Photo airplane departed 0420 Y (Plus 12).

24 0616 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TFC SOPAC COMSOWESTPAC NZNB.

Day long strafing Nip positions GUADALCANAL featured activity there 23rd. SBTs, SBDs and fortresses hit MUNDA noon same day concentrating areas just north and east of field and on coastal gun positions and west end runway. 7 zeros downed by fighter escort. Photos this strike show clearing under-way for possible extension eastern end of strip, which appears useable. Single B-17 harassed MUNDA prior dawn today. 1 AK, 8 other ships BUIN yesterday with 20 planes on KAHILI field. At 230535 GCT 1 CL, 1 DD between FAIST and VELLA LA-VELLA on southeast course. From Comsopac. NWX pass to NXNB for info.

24 0225 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Comtaskforce 8 sends. Radio Honolulu pass to Cincpac for action. DeWitts orders to Buckner establish CROBAR Army force as follows: 1st Echelon total 2952 composed of 1 Battalion infantry, 1 Battery 75's, 1 Battery 155's, 2 Antiaircraft Batteries, plus regiment engineers; 2nd Echelon probably 2 weeks later total 1600 composed of 1 Battalion of infantry, plus engineers. 1000 miscellaneous troops not yet assigned to echelons. Total 5560. Buckner's chief of staff reports from personal conference with DeWitt in San Francisco that latter realizes larger garrison more desirable but has decided against increased force for the following reasons: A. Additional freight tonnage involved. B. "The Navy is confident the movement will be unopposed and that they can prevent anything coming either to FORMULA or LONGVIEW.".
CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO COMSOWESTPACFOR, COMAIRSOPAC, COMINCH.

Present concentration over 100 Jap ships in RABAUL offers best chance of war to date to strike crippling blow at enemy overseas transportation service. Request your ideas and specific comments as to planes and munitions available for all out air strike combining low altitude bomb and torpedo attack on shipping by medium bombers and lightning fighter escort from BUTTON via CACTUS coordinated with maximum effort by heavy bombardment aviation against adjacent airdromes and AA installations in RABAUL area. Coordination with Sowespac forces necessary in order to provide maximum effort. Suggest you take up with Mac Arthur. Also believe this enemy concentration warrants greater number of our submarines in RABAUL approaches. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH COMAIRSOPAC COMGEN CACTUS ETC

Comsopac sending. Current night nuisance raids over CACTUS are lowering combat efficiency of our troops through loss of sleep and increased exposure to malaria during hours of darkness spent in fox holes and dubouts. Recommend that a minimum of 6 night fighting aircraft with homing radars and personnel now undergoing night fighter training plus ground equipment be dispatched CACTUS earliest time. Best available altitude determining intercepter radars with night fighter directing personnel should accompany. Advise. Action Cincpac info Cominch, Comairpac, Comgen CACTUS, Comairwingspac, Comgensopac, Comfair NOUMEA by hand, Comairsopac, please pass to Comairwing 1.

COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPACFOR Info CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPACFOR

Christmas photos BALLALE ISLAND show landing strip to be surfaced 3500 feet with 500 feet north east end unfinished. Clearing extends complete length island from northeast to southwest beaches. Dispersal lane southwest end much improved. 1 Revetment finished 7 more under construction. Similar dispersal area started to northeast end. No planes observed but strip looks serviceable. Large concentration stores southwest tip of island. Previous dispatch erroneously reported strip to be shorter. Careful check show these measurements more accurate.

CACTUS Marines killed 110 Japs 27th and results artillery fire plus minor clashes raise total enemy slain GUADALCANAL past few days to 155-165. Pair of small AKs at WICKHAM left blazing exploding total wrecks after 2 BLUE air strikes 29th. Early CATS harassed MUNDA 29th and 30th dropping bombs and mortar shells. Comsopac daily dope. Rdo AUCKLAND pass to NZNE. Heavy AA 29th from point and shore emplacements toward KOKENGOLO. Further reports much barge activity and unloading southeast KOLOMBANGARA. KUNDU POINT west GANONGGA also may be staging point MUNDA supply. Barges small AKs there 27th and 100 men ashore. Native patrol SANTA ISABEL jumped 24 Japs December 28th only 3 escaped alive. 29th air search REKATA saw construction continuing PAPATURA ISLAND strafed 3 float planes on water.

December (GCT)

31 0836 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC, etc.

Daily dope from Comsopac patrols killed 20 more Japs and single dive bomber demolished heavy gun behind their lines the 30th. 1700 love (-11) same day SEB's and F4F's raided REKATA scoring bomb hits new buildings PAPATIRAGIA ISLAND and other structures SUAVANUA POINT. Only slight AA. Special RECCE VILA area southeastern KOLOMBAHARA 1140 love 30 negative. WICKHAM HARBOR empty oil slicks evidence almost certain destruction AK's bombed there 29th. P-39's and F4F's destroyed 5 small barges another point on south VANGUNU 1300 love 30th. CW reports DD close inshore CHOSIEUL BAY 30th and DD patrols off northern entrance TONOLEI area said daily late afternoon routine. Nips hot breath on North SOLOMONS watchers and 1 in CHOSIEUL made forced move yesterday. Shipping still light FASI-BUIN area but 91 vessels seen RABAUL 1000 love 30th. Medium bombers now using MUNDA where PBY's made nuisance raids this morning. At 0600 love 31 search from CACTUS saw 5 submerged possible midget subs in MAROVO LAGOON. Strike despatched. BLUE subs report following successes: ALBACORE got 6,000 ton AK or AP just off MADANG December k3th. GREENLING sank 2 AK's northeast of ADMIRALTYS and DD north by BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT.

31 0830 COMARAIRWING 2 to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC etc.

6 B-26's protected by 4 Lightnings CMA, 4 Cobras CMA, 4 Wildcats dropped 6 500 and 42 100 pound bombs MUNDA field 1630 L (minus 11) CMA altitude 8000. No enemy planes seen on ground or in air. AA heavy but not effective. 1 P-39 landed in water on way up CMA pilot ashore safely RUSSELL. About 8 large caliber AA guns now at MUNDA, Wildcats had difficulty maintaining speed of bombers. Hand for info to Comgen FMAW.

31 0459 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMGENHAWDEPT

Presume you have been informed of Emmons 222325 to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. I plan to give maximum employment to bombardment aircraft as suggested by your 261315. This is not only effective action against enemy but excellent training for all concerned. In addition believe important to add to long range search and striking forces here while there is threat to outlying bases this area. Additional bombardment group is most desirable.
31 1100 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 67 Info COMGEN CACTUS, etc.

311100 part 1 of 3 parts. Comsopac Operation Plan 1-43. Task Group 62.6 Captain Reifsnider consisting 6 AP's, 1 AK, 5 DD's depart WHITE POPPY 1800 GCT December 31st to land troop reinforcements and cargo for GUADALCANAL and TULAGI embark personnel and equipment for further transfer in accordance Comtaskfor 62 Operation Order A26-42. Landings is scheduled to commence LUNGA POINT area by 1830 GCT January 3rd. Estimate withdrawal of 5 AP's with personnel will be completed by local night January 6th. Task organization. Task Force 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore-based air units CACTUS, RINGBOLT, BUTTON. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee Batdiv 6: DUNLAP, FANNING, MAURY, LARDNER. Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Ainsworth; LOUISVILLE, HONOLULU, HELENA, NASHVILLE, ST. LOUIS, COLUMBIA, ACHILLES, FLETCHER, DRAYTON, LAMSON, OBANNON, NICHOLAS, GRAYBACK. Task unit 66.1.6 Commander Ryan: PLATTE, LANSDOWNE, no general task. This force will cover Task Group 62.6 until safe withdrawal of 5 AP's from CACTUS area as determined by Commander, South Pacific Force. End part 1. Addees who have all 3 parts by hand and otherwise stated in part 3.

31 1112 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 67 Info CTF 42, CINCPAC, etc.

This is part 2 of my Opplan 1-43. Tasks. Task Force 63 provide close air protection for Task Group 62.6 from point Q until safe withdrawal 5 AP's, strike enemy forces and installations repeatedly commencing 3 January as far north and including BUIN area, provide air protection for approach and withdrawal of Task Force 67 MUNDA bombardment unit period (Comsowespac Plans to strike RABAUL every morning until and including January 7th). Task Force 64 depart NOUMEA 1800 GCT January 1st arrive point S 0800 GCT January 3rd operating thereafter as practicable in general area point S until otherwise directed. Task Force 67 depart BUTTON 0300 GCT January 2nd contact Task Group 62.6 approximately 60 miles south of Point Q at 2100 GCT January 2nd, proceed independently thereafter to operate 100 miles northeast of point Q, detach unit to bombard MUNDA airfield installation NEW GEORGIA the night of January 4th local date, be prepared to counter enemy threats against landing and withdrawal operations of Task Group 62.6. Task Unit 66.1.6 depart WHITE POPPY 1800 GCT January 2nd proceed to arrive point 0 at 2300 GCT the 4th, operate to eastward passing through point 0 daily at 2000 and 0700 all GCT for fueling rendezvous until further orders. Finish part 2. Addees who have all 3 parts by hand or otherwise listed in part 3.

31 1124 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 64, ALL TF COMSOPAC, GRAYBACK, etc.

Part 2 of 311100 started "This is part 2 of my Opplan 1-43". What follows is part 3 of Comsopac 311100. Opplan 1-43 part 3. Logistics fuel in battleships, cruisers, PLATTE, WHITE POPPY, BUTTON. Communications in accordance Pac 70 TF Commanders frequency 4205 KCS series. In addition Comsopac
31 1124 (Continued)

will guard secondary series as follows: commencing with execution this plan. 4295 KCS from 0700 to 0800 GCT. 2590 continuously. 12385 from 0800 to 0700 GCT. Employ secondary frequencies as necessitated by volumes of traffic or interference on a primary circuit. Operation traffic will be paralleled on NPM fox and logged during period of operations. Point 0 latitude 14 South, longitude 164 East; point Q lat. 12-30 South, long. 162-45 East; point S lat. 15 South, long. 159 East. This Operation Plan effective on receipt. Comsopac for at NOUMEA. End Operation Plan. CTF 62, CTG 62.6 and Comseronsopac have by hand for information. CTF 64 action and Comgensonopac info by hand. Comgen CACTUS and Comnavbases CACTUS and RINGBOLT info. GRAYBACK has in another system as an action adée.

01 0514 COMSOPAC to COMNAVBASESOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS, COMGEN 1ST MAC.

PORT PURVIS (FLORIDA ISLAND) development as fleet anchorage and transshipment point approved. Harbor survey and development of harbor facilities, underwater defenses, shore storage facilities responsibility Comnavbasessopac. Defense PORT PURVIS responsibility Comgen CACTUS. 11th Defense Battalion assigned as initial defense force. Responsible Commanders proceed with development PORT PURVIS earliest practicable date and make detailed recommendation for ultimate development and defense. Code name PINMONEY assigned PORT PURVIS. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comsopac sends. Comnavbase-sopac has as action adée. Also action Comgen CACTUS, Comgen 1st MAC, Comgen Sopac, CTF 62, Comseronsopac have by hand all info. Comnavbase CACTUS info.

31 2140 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGEN ADC.

Air action as follows. All times GCT. For action Cincpac Info Cominch. From CTF 8. 2130 December 30th 14 P-38's, 3 B-25's found recently arrived AK's or AP's KISKA HARBOR. Also 3 small subs probably midgets. 8 Lightnings proceeding for bombing and strafing attack engaged by 4 float zeros at 2000 feet. Attack broken up. 2 Lightnings shot down 1 zero crashed water. 5 other float zeros seen in air. 1 B-25 shot down (Probably AA fire). Other 2 attacked cargo ships with 4 500 pounders and 3 300's. Results unobserved. 2nd attack at 0147 on 31st. 5 heavies 5 medium dropped 77 quarter ton bombs and 5-300 on cargo ships. Observed results include 3 hits one ship 2 on other with smoke and heavy explosion from 1. During afternoon attack bombers encountered 1 Float zero. Catalina off KISKA attacked by 4 zeros evaded in cloud cover. Afternoon photographs show 0 zero (4 twin float 2 single float) on beach also show new ships are approximately 465 and 300 feet in length. Former still loaded. Army Catalina during morning attack landed vicinity crashed B-25 and took off but not heard from since. All planes afternoon mission returned, minor damage, 1 tail gunner killed 2 pilots minor injuries from AA.
For Cincpac Cominch only. From Comsopac. Cominch 311405.
2nd Marine Division being withdrawn as rapidly as availability
shipping permits. Plan loading 2nd and 8th Marines CACTUS
25th and 28th. 6th Marines now enroute arrive CACTUS 4th for
6 weeks combat experience. See also last sentence this despatch.
Ships which land 6th will load 7th for ADOBE. Copy shipping
schedule has been airmailed Cincpac. Last element Army 25th
Division due CACTUS 4th. Present plans for cleaning up CACTUS
situation: A. Seizure by Army of POINT AUSTIN a Jap held hill
mass dominating present position from south. B. Landing re-
inforced regiment vicinity TASSAFARONGA about 18th to sever
Jap communications and pocket Jap main body. C. Subsequent
cleaning up operations. For your personal information were it
practicable to withdraw them earlier I would feel retention
Second Marine Division CACTUS as outlined above essential until
Army combat efficiency has been demonstrated.
December 1st

Further reports of the 4th Battle of SAVO are contained in CTF 67 010655 (via Comsopac) and Rear Admiral Tisdale's 012252 and 020011. It is believed that our damaged cruisers can be patched up and sent to AUSTRALIA for preliminary repairs, then to U.S. yards. Rear Admiral Wright's force has repulsed another push of the enemy and inflicted severe losses. We continue to retain command of the sea in the Southern SOLOMONS.

Twenty six Jap survivors of a Jap DD landed at CACTUS and stated that their ship was one of 5 DDs attempting to run supplies in to GUADALCANAL.

TF 16 will go to FIJI and TF 11 to NOUMEA, both training enroute. The ACHILLIES will join TF 67 at ESPIRITU SAINTO. The LOUISVILLE will go to Savac instead of SWPac.

Activity in the BUNA area continues, but is not of major proportions.

CTF 8 020600 is his operation order to deal with enemy convoys approaching the Western ALEUTIANS.

The MONTPELIER, LaVALLETTE, and CHENANGO are ordered to the Pacific Fleet from the Atlantic.

It is still indicated that a major attempt to recapture CACTUS is making up.

December 2nd.

The Tokyo express, composed of 2 CA, 2 CL, 6 DD was intercepted 150 miles northwest of CACTUS during the late afternoon by planes from CACTUS. Our reports give 2 - 1000-pound bomb hits on one cruiser, 1 - 1000-pound bomb hit on second cruiser, 2 torpedo hits on another ship, 2 possible hits on another ship. On the other hand, the Japs report no damage in this attack. It seems extremely difficult to assess damage inflicted by our planes. Damage is believed less than reported.

There was only minor activity by patrols at CACTUS during the day. The fire in the forward holds of the ALCHIBA continued burning on the 1st (local). All undamaged cargo has been unloaded. Salvage possibilities are being investigated. Other logistic support of CACTUS is proceeding in a satisfactory manner. During the night enemy planes were reported overhead.

Engine repairs to the SARATOGA and COLUMBIA will be attempted at NOUMEA.

(Continued)
December 2nd (Continued)

The McFARLAND is now reported able to proceed to PEARL under own power at about 10 knots.

There were several reports of enemy submarines in the area to the south of the SOLOMONS yesterday. Sub reconnaissance and attacks on prime targets are to be expected.

The First Marine Division at CACTUS will be relieved as soon as possible and sent to BRISBANE, reporting to Comsowespac.

Comsopac 020637 pink comments on Cominch's proposal for speeding up the campaign in the SOLOMONS.

As Cominch expressed doubt concerning operating Batdiv 3 in SoPac, Cinopac sent his 030521 pink which reviews the need of OBB gun power in certain circumstances, and suggests that decision should be made now regarding lengthy modernization of OBBs.

The next section of the 25th Division will move from PEARL to the South Pacific on December 6th, and the final section is expected to leave the 15th.

To warn against minor Jap efforts at PEARL on December 7th Cinopac sent his 022155 to Comgenhawdept and Comhawseafron.

There are no new major enemy developments.

December 3rd.

There were no major developments in the South Pacific during the day. Early in the morning 2 DDs and 3 other enemy ships were seen 100 miles northwest of CACTUS. No report of a strike on these was received, but it is known that the weather was bad. Ground action at CACTUS was limited to minor patrol actions. ComSoPac's 040459 gives plans for landing strips and air at CACTUS.

The GUDGEON returning from patrol in the NEW IRELAND-SHORTLANDS area reports sinking 3 AKs totalling 22,100 tons.

Prisoners of war recently captured from DDs sunk off LUNGA indicate the HEYEL and KIRSHIMA were sunk in mid-November, and that 5 CVs are at TRUK and are damaged.

There is a rather large concentration of shipping in the TULAGI - QUADALCANAL area today. Damaged cruisers are still there and several AKs are unloading.
December 3rd (Continued)

The POMPOM movement is in part the transfer of Marine replacements from NORFOLK to the STRAW area.

Minor activity continues in the BUNA area. A large number of SWPac planes attacked enemy DDs retiring south of NEW BRITAIN but failed to get hits.

Cominch 031740 pink answers Cincpac in regards to modernization and present employment of OBs. Cinpac 040253 does not desire to expose unnecessarily the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI to underwater damage and considers that operations west of FIJI under present conditions would result in such exposure. These vessels depart from PEARL for the South on December 6th.

Cominch has ordered four more APs and 2 more AKs from the Atlantic to Pacific Fleet during December.

It is believed that the enemy is now making arrangements for another major effort to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS. Convoys are enroute to the Western ALEUTIANS, but the strength and purpose of this move is not clear. No major threat to the MIDWAY-OAHU line is seen. Minor raids in the Central Pacific continue to be possible.

December 4th.

The day was generally quiet in the Central and South Pacific areas. TF 11 and 16 are at sea training and will go to NOUMEA and NANDI respectively. TF 67 is at ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 64 is divided between NOUMEA and NANDI with the NORTH CAROLINA at NANDI and the WASHINGTON at NOUMEA. TF 65 is at NANDI. The NEW MEXICO, with CTF 1 embarked, and the MISSISSIPPI will proceed initially to NANDI. The INDIANA and COLUMBIA are at NOUMEA.

There were no major sightings in the Southern SOLOMONS area. Enemy subs continue active in that general area, including midget subs believed using KAMIMBO as a base.

The logistic supply of CACTUS is being slowed down somewhat because of shortage of boats.

Comsopac 041153 summarizes his day.

Our damaged cruisers are still at TULAGI. Their condition today is not reported. The salvage possibilities of the ALCHEBA at CACTUS are being investigated.

The KENMORE grounded when leaving TULAGI, but came off about ten hours later with no apparent damage.

(Continued on next page)
December 4th. (Continued)

Comsopac recommends against an attempt to salvage the COOLIDGE at this time (032127).

An enemy force was reported about 200 miles south of AMCHITKA by a search plane. The report is complete as shown by CTF 8 042153. On return the pilot reported that no positive contact had been made. As we and CTF 8 have good information of enemy convoys approaching the Western ALEUTIANS, the contact was believed authentic. CTF 8 alerted his forces and sent out a search and strike to develop and attack the enemy. His forces resumed operations in accordance with his Op. Order 15-42 when the report was seen to be erroneous. It is not clear here why the report was made.

Cominch 041750 alerts against a Jap move on December 7. No major Jap action on that day is considered likely. The enemy is continuing to gather his forces for another push toward CACTUS but there is no indication that he can move that soon.

December 5th.

Because surface units are expected to attempt to reinforce GUADALCANAL between the 6th and 12th, Admiral Halsey ordered moves indicated in Cinopac 062031. It must be assumed that the SARATOGA is completing turbine repairs as she was not ordered to rendezvous with other combatant units. The PENSACOLA left TULAGI for ESPIRITU SANTO. The MINNEAPOLIS and NEW ORLEANS are not yet ready to leave TULAGI.

The remarkable trip of the 2nd raiders at GUADALCANAL is described in Comsopac 060143.

TF 8 search of the Western ALEUTIANS today was negative. It indicates that the weather was good - may be good enough to bomb KISKA.

Cominch 051441 shows that 4 APs and 2 AKs above those previously mentioned are to be sent to Cinopac from the Atlantic. Cominch proposes to replace 1 OCL with 1 DL in order to make another OCL available for Task Force EIGHT.

Indications of a major push toward the Southern SOLOMONS continue. The time is uncertain. Because of this push no major activity by the enemy in any other Pacific area is considered possible. The move of troops to the ALEUTIANS continues. A minor raid in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier is possible but not probable.
December 6th

Rear Admiral Kinkaid leaves here tomorrow to take command of the North Pacific Force (TF 8). An intensive preliminary study of the problem of seizing Kiska has been made here, and Admiral Kinkaid has been made fully acquainted with the present views of Admiral Nimitz on that subject.

At Guadalcanal our logistic supply of the Marines is proceeding. At eight in the morning the Alchiba was torpedoed for the second time; this time by a reported 2-man submarine. The ship may now be a total loss.

The Honolulu and Helena plus 2 DD have been ordered to join other combatant units of TF 64, mentioned yesterday, on the 8th (local). CTF 64 in the Washington will operate in an area about 200 miles southwest of Guadalcanal. The North Carolina and DD escorts also will join TF 64. TF 16 will fuel starting tomorrow evening about 200 miles southwest of Rennell Island.

Late in the evening the Tokyo Express was sighted heading toward Guadalcanal off the east coast of New Georgia. No further word was heard of this group, which was reported as at least 9 DDs.

In the Tonolei area 2 BB, 5 CA, 3 CL, 12 DD, 5 AP or AK, were reported. At Rabaul at least 30 ships were counted.

The S.S. Edison is aground at Vauta Vatoa. A tug is being sent to assist the Grebe in hauling off the ship.

Either the Clark or Balch will relieve one OCL in the SePacfor. It is expected that the OCL will be added to TF 8.

Comsopac 061929 approves the development of Button as an advance operating base of Lion dimensions.

The enemy is making large troop movements to the Rabaul area. Combatant units, including CVs, are believed assembling for another major attempt to recapture the Southern Solomons. In the meantime supplies are being brought into Guadalcanal by submarines, and DDs seem earmarked for the same duty. As long as these operations continue, no threat to the Midway-Oahu line is seen. Of course, minor raids on our advanced positions in the Central Pacific are always a possibility.

The Aleutian situation is obscure.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Dec 7, 1942

I - SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION

1. As a result of recent actions in the SOLOMONS area we are in command of the sea and air in the Southern SOLOMONS and approaches thereto.

2. Our positions at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI are not apt to be recaptured. At GUADALCANAL there still remain the following major items to be accomplished:
   
   (a) Eliminate the enemy troops thereon.

   (b) Construct alternate landing fields.

   (c) Provide for logistic supply; which includes bulk avgas storage tanks with pipe lines so that bulk carriers can discharge; roads; storage space; weight handling gear; etc.

3. GUADALCANAL is our most advanced position. Its security requires the occupation and development of further advanced positions.

4. The NEW GUINEA situation is not satisfactory but is not dangerous at present. The enemy is attempting to improve positions on the northeast coast, but it is unlikely that control can be extended to the southern coast. This is particularly true if pressure continues in the SOLOMONS.

II - THE PROBLEM

1. WPL-46-PC is the broad directive for the campaign. Task One, which is the seizure and occupation of the SANTA CRUZ Islands, TULAGI, and adjacent positions, has been completed except for the SANTA CRUZ operation which has been deferred.

2. Task Two is the seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMONS ISLANDS, LAE, SALAMAUA and the north coast of NEW GUINEA. The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific was assigned to command for this Task. Due to the changing situation it is evident that that Task, and the assignment of the Commander, must be reconsidered.

3. Task Three involves the expulsion of the enemy from the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO. As is the case with Task Two, certain revisions to meet the situation are to be expected.
II - THE PROBLEM (Continued)

4. The problem is to estimate the how, when, and where of the resumption of the offensive; to restate Task Two; and to suggest command to fit the restated Task.

5. Other tasks assigned to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas are still effective.

III - MEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED.

1. Own. (Under Cincpac)

(a) Surface:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nov. 24</th>
<th>Feb. 20*</th>
<th>May 20*</th>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVD</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
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<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Exact No.</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>in doubt.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>72</td>
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*No estimate of losses included.
(b) **Air:** (as assigned by Joint Plan)

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<th>NAVY</th>
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<td>Class: Aircraft</td>
<td>Class: Aircraft</td>
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<td>VOS: 8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ftr: 25</td>
<td>VF: 18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NDENI</strong></td>
<td>M/B: 7</td>
<td>VOS: 8</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>(When ready)</em></td>
<td>Ftr: 17</td>
<td>VOS: 8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ESPIRITU SANTO</strong></td>
<td>M/B: 13</td>
<td>VOS: 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ftr: 25</td>
<td>VSB: 18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EFATE</strong></td>
<td>M/B: 6</td>
<td>VOS: 8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ftr: 25</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEW CALEDONIA</strong></td>
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<td>VPB: 60*</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trans: 13*</td>
<td>VSB: 18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIJI</strong></td>
<td>M/B: 13</td>
<td>VOS: 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ftr: 25</td>
<td>VSB: 18</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEW ZEALAND</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FONGABATU</strong></td>
<td>Ftr: 25X</td>
<td>VOS: 8</td>
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<td><strong>SAMOA Area</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>(Incl. FUNAFUTI, WALLIS, TUTUILA, UPOLU)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BORABORA</strong></td>
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<td>VPB: 3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CANTON</strong></td>
<td>M/B or L/B-13, or VSB: 12</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Operating throughout NEW CALEDONIA - GUADALCANAL - NDENI - FIJI Area.*

X To be manned by R.N.Z.A.F. personnel.
(b) Air: (Continued)

Explanatory Memorandum on Recommended Employment of Planes.

GUADALCANAL, NDENI, ESPIRITU SANTO, and EFATE are considered front line positions. The first three are to be kept filled with light and medium planes to operating capacity, reserves to an aggregate of 150% or more in the back areas of flyable planes with pilots. The Army considers the planes in NEW CALEDONIA, FIJI and TONGATABU a part of this flyable reserve.

As the capacity of GUADALCANAL, NDENI, and ESPIRITU SANTO increases, the number of planes assigned thereto must keep step with the capacity, with corresponding increases in reserves. This also applies to new positions seized.

Half the Army fighters assigned to the forward positions should be high altitude fighters. This matter was discussed but not concluded.

(c) Troops:

Appended.

(d) Logistics:

There are no insuperable logistic difficulties. Adequate support of all kinds is available in the area. The usual difficulties, which are met when landing on beaches with no facilities, will have to be overcome.
2. Enemy

**Enemy Surface Strength:** November 23, 1942.

- **BB** - 10 (2 were probably sunk; 2 probably damaged)
- **CV** - SHOKAKU - probably damaged.
- ZUIKAKU - probably damaged.
- RYUJO - possibly sunk
- ZUIHO
- HOSHO
- **XCV** - HAYATAKA
- HITAKA - damaged.
- OTAKA
- UNYO
- CHUYO
- **AV** - CHITOSE - damaged
- CHIYODA, NISSHIN, ATISUSHIMA
- **XAV** - 4 - 6.
- **DD** - About 105 in Navy. Not thought feasible to employ more than 40 in the South Pacific.
- **SS** - About 40 available for use in the South Pacific.

**Enemy Air Strength - Naval Air.**

This does not include ship based planes. Also, there is insufficient information to estimate Army air strength. It seems probable that Army air is moving into the South Pacific.

**EMPIRE**

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<td>VHB</td>
<td>81</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>348</strong></td>
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**MARIANAS and CAROLINES**

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<td>VP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>138</strong></td>
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**RABAUL Area**

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<td>VP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>202</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enemy Air Strength - Naval Air (Continued)

MARSHALLS and GILBERTS
VF --- 50
VHB --- 54
VP --- 12
Seaplanes 24 Total 140

Grand total which it is believed physically possible to put in the South Pacific:
VF --- 320
VB --- 54
VHB --- 234 Total 608

Note: Details of above in ICPOA estimate attached.

Enemy Troop Strength - South Pacific

GUADALCANAL - - - - - - - - - - - 15,000
Garrisons - BISMARCK - SOLOMONS - - - 10,000
Troops available for assignment - - 35,000
NEW GUINEA - - - - - - - - - - - - 7,500
Total troops South and Southwest Pacific - - 80,000

Note: Details of above are in ICPOA estimate attached. It is believed that the above are maximum figures. Troops are continually moving to the area and a large and well trained reservoir of troops is thought to be available to the enemy from outside the area. Of the numbers indicated not all are effectives; that is, some 50% may be considered engineers, laborers, ground personnel for airplanes, etc.
IV - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE.

1. In the advance up the SOLOMONS from GUADALCANAL, decision will be made whether to go all the way to Jap positions, such as in the BUIN area, or whether to establish in intermediate positions. If the latter is decided upon the NEW GEORGIA group, ISABEL, and CHOISEUL Islands offer a mid-position insofar as distance is concerned.

From GUADALCANAL to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North part ISABEL</td>
<td>150 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South part CHOISEUL</td>
<td>180 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid NEW GEORGIA</td>
<td>175 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TONOLEI</td>
<td>290 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TONOLEI to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Distance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUKA</td>
<td>120 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABAUL</td>
<td>275 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only places considered are those which seem to offer possibilities which include:

- Reasonably safe approach
- Good landing beach
- Adjacent airfield possibilities

2. NEW GEORGIA

VIRU HARBOR

APs could not be expected to enter the anchorage. Boating in the harbor should be very easy.

The undergrowth appears to extend to the water's edge, but landings could be made at piers on both the east and west sides of the harbor.

Level country around the harbor appears suitable for a landing strip, but because of dense undergrowth clearing the site would be difficult. A coconut plantation on the west side may offer possibilities in this respect.

The Japs are reported here in small numbers.

RENDOVA HARBOR

At least equal to VIRU, but here again the APs could hardly expect to enter without a good pilot.
There are reasonably good beaches and water supply. Nearby coconut plantations seem to offer landing strip possibilities.

HATHORN SOUND

A fairly good anchorage which might be used by a division of APs. Beaches are only fair and will present landing difficulties. ARUNDEL ISLAND has landing strip possibilities.

Just around the coast to the west and north is MUNDA POINT. Recently Japs have landed there. Almost nothing is known of the approach to this anchorage. Entrance is reported by way of a tricky passage through shoals.

Because of adjacent nearby flat terrain the following are possible sites listed:

RICE, LEVER, and LINGUTU, all in NEW GEORGIA.

Recently the Japs have used GIZO HARBOR in a small way. It seems suitable for limited seaplane operation only.

In general, all islands of the NEW GEORGIA group are densely forested. The only roads run for short distances around coconut plantations. Native villages are located along the coasts and lagoons. Population of the group is around 2000.

3. CHOISEUL ISLAND

Very little is known of this island. Sailing directions, and other meagre information indicate that no suitable landing sites for our purpose exist in the southern half of the island.

4. ISABEL ISLAND

REKATA BAY

Seems to be a fine seaplane anchorage and could be developed into a major airfield. It is 170 miles southeast of TONOILEI. The landing of a large force seems to present no great navigational or other dangers. As it is now in use by the enemy as a seaplane base, the landing would be opposed.

MARINGE LAGOON

It is also suitable for landing and development but is only 85 miles due north of GUADALCANAL.

5. The SHORTLANDS area, which includes BUIN, FAISI, and TONOILEI is adequate for large forces and capable of considerable
development. A Jap landing field is under construction. As it is held in some strength and is under the guns of RABAUL and BUKA air, there would be enemy opposition to the landing by both air and shore defenses.

V - ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Enemy’s Problem

1. During the period since our occupation of GUADALCANAL the enemy has suffered severe losses in ships and planes. Resultant enemy strength has been noted. Because of these losses the enemy has been unable to carry out planned operations which included the recapture of GUADALCANAL. As the situation now stands the enemy is faced with the immediate problem of maintaining a supply line to her GUADALCANAL troops. As there are insufficient enemy troops there to drive out the Marines, the enemy must (1) be reinforced heavily, (2) surrender, (3) starve. The latter seems probable as long as we retain local command of the sea. Submarines cannot provide adequate logistic support.

2. The situation is somewhat better for the enemy at NEW GUINEA. We do not control the approaches to the LAE-BUNA area but Allied troops are actively opposing the enemy and Allied air has, and can cause considerable damage to shipping and positions. It seems possible for the enemy to land strong forces on the north coast, but to extend control to PORT MORESBY they must go over the mountains or around the eastern tip of NEW GUINEA by water. Determined Australian opposition should prevent the former and Admiral Halsey’s force can oppose the latter.

3. There is every indication that the enemy is on the defensive in the Central Pacific. This is not by choice, but because the South Pacific venture does not leave sufficient strength to do anything else. The occupation of the GILBERTS is a minor affair and further extension southward will be opposed from FUNAFUTI. Should the enemy decide to assume defensive in the South Pacific enough naval strength could be withdrawn to attack in the HAWAIIAN area and/or our positions to the south of OAHU.

4. The enemy is in good control of the PHILIPPINES and the MALAY barrier. No immediate threat in that region is seen. Here again, as long as the bulk of strength is committed to the South Pacific the enemy is unable to extend control in the direction of Western AUSTRALIA or INDIA. The latter is a land operation which does not involve large naval strength. The enemy has a strong hold on the PHILIPPINES, NEI, the MALAY peninsula, and INDO CHINA, and the sea routes from those places to JAPAN. To permit Japan to exploit that vast area and to transport the strategic materials to Japan on a large scale would be to prolong the war, and might even make the outcome uncertain.

-9-
5. The defense position of Japan is nowhere seriously threatened at the moment. Although offensive has been stopped on all fronts, capacity for defense is not materially disturbed. It is known that JAPAN wanted to extend control to NEW CALEDONIA and neutralize AUSTRALIA in order to perfect her position in the South. There are some early indications that the southern defense outer position will be the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. However, it is too early to state this idea with any assurance.

6. In the North Pacific, the enemy is intrenched at KISKA and will stay there until we occupy that area. There is no evidence of the desire or capacity of the enemy to extend control eastward along the ALEUTIANS or to make major attacks on other ALASKAN positions.

7. Off JAPAN the enemy maintains a comprehensive patrol line. The bulk of her battle line is always ready to repel raids on the Empire proper.

Probable Enemy Course of Action

8. As stated above, it now appears that the enemy no longer has capacity for further expansion. The broad course of action, therefore, will be to maintain a strong defensive position on all present fronts until exploitation of gains have made her Asiatic position too strong for the Allies to do more than accept a stalemate, and thus give JAPAN her ultimate war aim - complete hegemony in the Far East.

9. Such a broad course of action does not rule out offensive moves in selected sectors to enhance overall defense. These are to be expected, and may include:-

(a) Further attempts to capture or at least neutralize GUADALCANAL.

(b) Establishment and strengthening of outlying positions in the SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA to provide defense in depth for the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and to provide bases for attrition attacks on Allied shipping and positions.

(c) Continued attacks on our lines of communications employing submarines, air and surface forces.

(d) Raids on our advanced positions from MIDWAY to GUADALCANAL.

(e) Troop movements toward INDIA.
(f) Political and 5th Column activities in INDIA.
(g) Raids toward north and west AUSTRALIA.
(h) Raids in the ALEUTIANS.

10. We may continue to expect JAPAN to attempt the stabilization of the CHINA affair by political moves. The same applies to BURMA.

VI - OWN COURSES OF ACTION

1. As it now stands, our broad courses of action are set forth in current directives. The overall concept appears acceptable i.e. to defend ALASKA; to hold the MIDWAY-OAHU-CANTON-FUNAFUTI-FIJI line, and, during the second phase of the war, to expel the enemy from the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO. Our immediate concern is the accomplishment of Task Two. Task Three will require readjustments to fit circumstances as the war develops.

2. For many good reasons, of which the appeasement of public opinion and prestige are of importance, the Japs must be expelled from the KISKA area by our land forces and the area occupied. Plans for this project are underway.

3. The MIDWAY-OAHU-FIJI line is secure against permanent capture. Nowhere is the line secure against raids, nor will it be so in the foreseeable future.

4. Our lines of communications behind our present positions are reasonably secure. Convoys must continue as at present and good air and surface coverage must be provided at focal points.

VII - THE SOLOMONS OFFENSIVE

1. As so little is known of the plans, strength, and intentions of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific, that part of the Task Two which refers to the NEW GUINEA area is not discussed.

2. There are the following methods by which the SOLOMONS can be captured and occupied:

(a) Step by step. In this method an intermediate point about half-way from GUADALCANAL to BUIN would be established as the first step. There are several suitable positions available. None are held in strength by the enemy and none are developed to any extent. The only immediate value of any are the anchorages which include advanced seaplane operating positions. All are
vulnerable to enemy air from the RABAUL, SHORTLANDS, and BUKA areas. On the other hand, CACTUS air could support our operations to a limited extent.

The great objection to such an intermediate position is the necessity to develop it. We have learned a great deal about how to go about constructing an airfield in the jungles. We have, or soon will have, adequate and competent construction personnel. We can have adequate material. Nevertheless, this construction must be undertaken under the guns of the enemy. Based on previous experience, the enemy will react violently when our moves are discovered. Our auxiliaries, escorts, and covering vessels will be subject to heavy attrition attacks. The situation during the time we are developing the position will be favorable to the enemy, insofar as they will be able to plan and execute attrition almost at leisure. We must expect to pay heavily for such a move.

(b) Modified step by step. This method would involve the capture of the SHORTLANDS area first. The great advantage is that we would capture an airfield which could be used in a very short time. The dangers and difficulties of the capture are increased: (1) because we move nearer enemy air from RABAUL and BUKA; (2) much stronger enemy forces to overcome; (3) the probability of the approaches being mined; (4) and the lack of VF support from GUADALCANAL.

(c) Simultaneous capture of all major enemy positions in the SOLOMONS. This would involve the capture and occupation of the SHORTLANDS area, the BUKA area, REKATA BAY, and the neutralization of other enemy minor positions such as MUNDA, GIZO, KIETA, and the eventual mopping up of enemy observation positions.

3. Course (a) is feasible. Of the positions investigated earlier, REKATA BAY seems to offer the maximum advantages. It is 180 miles by air from the nearest enemy airfield at BUIN, and 180 miles by water and 140 miles by air from GUADALCANAL. Approaches permit ample sea room for any sized forces. Radar operation offshore should be efficient. Warning of the approach of the enemy from passes through the SOLOMONS may be possible by submarine and coast watcher observation. Seaplane operations can commence almost immediately. Probable enemy local troops should be relatively easy to overcome. The choice of REKATA does not eliminate the VIRU or HATHORN SOUND areas. But because radar will be less effective at those places they are less desirable; and they do not seem to offer any advantages not possessed at REKATA. For the initial landing no more than
one amphibious marine regiment would be required. The move would have to be covered by sufficient surface forces to prevent successful enemy surface attack. The size of our covering force would depend on an estimate of enemy surface strength capable of attack at the time of the move. Air coverage seems possible from GUADALCANAL. Preliminary surface bombardment of enemy positions is possible but not believed required on a large scale. After the initial landing the garrison troops should relieve the amphibious troops. Air field construction personnel and material would follow at once.

There is considerable doubt regarding the suitability of this move. This is mainly because so little is accomplished until an air field is constructed. The immediate result is to deny a seaplane base to the enemy. Past experience indicates that shore based planes could not operate under a month from the date of the landing.

The cost may be high. It will take at least one day to land the amphibious troops. Three or four days will be required to land the air field construction personnel and material. Up to now we have been unable to prevent enemy use of his air fields by bombing. Unless we improve in this respect the expedition will be under air attack during the landings and during the air field construction period. And until antiaircraft weapons are placed ashore the enemy air activity will find little opposition. Surface raids must be expected at all times. Submarines would attack our line of supply.

4. Course (b) is suitable as it denies a most important base to the enemy and permits the use of an air field almost at once.

It is only feasible when there is available two amphibious marine divisions. Because of this important limitation the operation cannot be scheduled before March 1, 1943. There are advantages in such a delay. Our surface forces available then are estimated to be strong enough to prevent any enemy surface opposition. Garrison troops to move in promptly can be available. The disadvantage in delay lies in the expected strengthening of the enemy defensive positions on the SOLOMONS during that time.

As the SHORTLANDS area is a relatively strong enemy position the cost will be higher than at REKATA. It is nearer to RABAUL and BUKA which would indicate heavier air opposition. We would pay heavily for this fine prize, but it might be worth heavy losses. As at any place in the SOLOMONS, our losses will be in proportion to the effort of the enemy to oppose our plan. Should a slugging match take place between surface units, such as at
SAVO, we can expect to inflict at least equal losses. As time goes on our capacity to absorb losses, in relation to enemy capacity, will increase. We must plan to avoid a repetition of the WASP, SARATOGA, and NORTH CAROLINA affairs.

Course (c) is suitable as it accomplishes the major part of our task. The feasibility is open to question. To do this we must land strong amphibious forces in the SHORTLANDS, and at BUKA, and smaller forces at KIETA, REKATA, and possibly MUNDA. Short of six months, the necessary troops do not seem available. We must, therefore, abandon this course for the present. If neither (a) nor (b) can be accepted, and if we are forced to wait until late spring, the details of (c) must be considered in light of developments during the next three or four months.

VIII - Selected Course of Action.

Preliminary.

1. As previously stated, information is lacking regarding the NEW GUINEA part of Task Two. We can only conclude that it will go forward simultaneously with the SOLOMONS operation, and that the Commander Southwest Pacific will make requests for naval support.

2. In any move up the SOLOMONS, the operation will be a continuation of Task One, and the main forces will be those of the Pacific Fleet. It seems logical that the command for that part of Task Two which involves the SOLOMONS be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. After consideration of the various factors involved in the three courses stated for the capture and occupation of the SOLOMONS, it is decided to adopt course (b). For purposes of planning the target date is March 15, 1943.

Discussion

4. The various phases of the course adopted are:

Preparations. The capture of the SHORTLANDS area. The mopping up of intermediate positions. The assault and occupation of BOUGAINVILLE.

5. Preparations. The three major items which must be disposed of before the attack on the SHORTLANDS can get underway are:

   (a) The relief, rest, reorganization, and refitting of amphibious troops now on GUADALCANAL. This is covered in
the appended discussion of troops.

(b) The improvement of the GUADALCANAL position.

Major items are:

(1) Installation of bulk aviation gasoline storage. This is underway at present but will not be on a satisfactory basis until there is at least two million gallons storage.

(2) Building of a wharf, with weight handling devices. This is planned but not started. Materials are in the South Pacific.

(3) Erection of housing for troops, stores, ammunition.

(4) Completion of alternate landing strips.

(5) The ejection or other disposal of enemy troops on the Island.

If we can retain command of the sea approaches for the next month sufficiently to prevent adequate enemy logistic support and the arrival of reinforcements, the enemy must either starve or surrender. There is every reason to expect that the Japs will make at least one more major attempt on GUADALCANAL. If we can repeat the successes of mid-November, there can be little doubt of the ultimate outcome of this phase of the campaign. Enemy success, on the other hand, would reverse completely the situation. With reinforcements now arriving, our situation is favorable - except for carriers.

While it would be desirable to have a landing strip in the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, that position is not considered essential to the capture of the SOLOMONS.

The positions at CANTON and FUNAFUTI are not up to satisfactory strength and must be improved, principally by additional air strength.

Reserve air strength to maintain GUADALCANAL fields saturated must be built up at ESPiritu SANTO, EFATE, FIJI, and NOUMEA.

6. The Capture of the SHORTLANDS Area.

There are so many unknown factors that it is impossible at this time to present a finished plan. It will suffice to outline the operation.
Forces, 1st wave. D day.

Carrier striking groups.
BB covering group.
Cruiser and DD support group.
Transport group - two division marine amphibious force. One defense battalion, plus one Acorn.

Forces, 2nd wave. D + 14 days.

Carrier striking groups.
BB covering group.
Transport and freighter group - one construction regiment and one defense battalion embarked.

Rehearsal. On D -10 to D -5 day transport group, 1st wave, rehearse landing at BUTTON or ROSES.

Embarkation points. Amphibious troops jump off from NEW ZEALAND or AUSTRALIA for rehearsal. Defense battalion, and Acorns embark at BUTTON by D -5 day. Construction battalion embark at BUTTON by D -12 day.

Mopping up of intermediate positions.

Raider battalions will be employed in these operations. As no intermediate position is to be developed under this plan, no occupation troops are required. It may develop that MUNDA and REKATA will be too strong for raiders alone. In this case, amphibious troops may be necessary to assist.

The capture and occupation of the remainder of BOUGAINVILLE will be completed by an amphibious division. The attack on BUKA will be similar to but on a smaller scale than the attack on the SHORTLANDS. In each of these it will be of first importance to secure the landing field for our own use. KIETA will only be neutralized by a raid or short occupation.

The final step is to garrison the SHORTLANDS and BUKA, and release amphibious troops for the capture of RABAUL. Lessons learned, plus availability of Army and Allied troops, should permit the accomplishment of this in two months from D-Day.

Air support. It is essential that the RABAUL and BUKA air fields be neutralized from D -2 to D +4 day. This can be done only if our pilots are willing to get near enough to hit the air fields. It is well known that hedge hopping technique is effective and not too costly. No attempt is made at this time to detail this operation.
IX

1. It will be seen that as long as the enemy does not capture eastern NEW GUINEA in the next three months, that the present status is acceptable. With the proposed increase in pressure in the SOLOMONS there can be no simultaneous enemy threat to NEW GUINEA.

2. With the SOLOMONS in our hands we will be able to attempt the capture of RABAUL. That task is amphibious and is merely a continuation of the same operation. No reason is seen to shift the Supreme Command to the Southwest Pacific. To do so would place the Command in less experienced hands.

3. Task Two is thus restated "Capture and occupy the remainder of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, while holding in NEW GUINEA".

Instructions: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet will execute Task Two except for NEW GUINEA. The South Pacific area is extended to the equator at 145° East, thence to the center of VITIAZ STRAIT, to WOODLARK ISLAND, to ROSEL ISLAND, thence South.
Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

References: (a) Cominch Secret Despatch 301915 of Nov., 1942.
(b) Cincpac Secret Despatch 010931 of Dec., 1942.
(c) Joint Plan for Offensive Operations, Southwest Pacific Area, of 2 July, 1942.
(d) WPL-46-PC, 23 April, 1942.

1. Reference (b) commented, as requested by reference (a), upon certain features of the campaign in the Solomons. This letter is intended to amplify the comment in reference (b).

2. The tenor of reference (a) was that, in exerting our strength against remaining Jap forces on Guadalcanal, we are in effect becoming "bogged down" in a "frontal" operation when we might better cut off the Jap Guadalcanal forces by seizing the base from which they are being supported.

3. The necessity for "getting along with the war" is well recognized by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander South Pacific Force, and every possible "short cut" is being investigated. There are, however, certain conditions which delay us at this time, and I desire to describe the situation as I now see it.

4. In general I consider that Task One of reference (c) (the seizure and occupation of the Tulagi area) will not be completed until this area is sufficiently secure, and developed. I also consider that the forces are not in hand for an immediate initiation of Task Two. It must be remembered that Task One was undertaken with the full knowledge of all concerned that the forces for the accomplishment of Tasks Two and Three were not in sight. Although the Guadalcanal campaign has progressed favorably, I consider that we are now in the period which is,
as was foreseen, one of building up our strength while taking advantage of every favorable opportunity to cut down the enemy's. In regard to the latter, the enemy is apparently going to continue to expose his forces in the Guadalcanal area - a situation over which we should perhaps not be impatient until we have effected the superiority which will make it suitable to similarly expose our forces in operations against his bases.

5. In initiating Task Two, any considerable step forward will require a superiority in sea forces, aircraft and troops, and our supporting bases must be sufficiently developed and reasonably secure. The superiority must not only be local, but there should be sufficient strength to support our new base and its supply lines against the forces the enemy will throw against them. We have learned from Guadalcanal that such efforts by him are liable to be up to the limit of his resources.

6. Sea Forces. While we have been successful in exacting disproportionate losses on the enemy in the Guadalcanal campaign, I do not consider that we have yet a superiority in surface forces. Such superiority will be brought about by our new construction and by further losses we cause the enemy, particularly in his further efforts against Guadalcanal. This superiority may be considered to be eventually assured, but an estimate as to its attainment places it in the late spring of 1943.

7. Aircraft. In general it is considered that equality in aircraft has been reached and can be quickly increased to superiority by allotting sufficient of our air production. The difficulty is to provide the air bases both ashore and afloat. However, we should capitalize on the ready availability of superior air forces to overcome our weaknesses in other respects.

8. Own Troops, particularly those trained for amphibious operations, are considered to constitute a serious bottleneck in our preparations for an offensive. Following is a brief
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

Summary of this situation:

1st Marine Division - now being removed from Guadalcanal, and will require until about March 1st to be ready again for active operations. It is being assigned to the Southwest Pacific Force. Whether it will be available for future operations in the Solomons is not known.

2nd Marine Division - two regiments now at Guadalcanal; will probably be relieved by the 25th Army Division; should be ready 1 February. One regiment in New Zealand which is probably ready now.

3rd Marine Division - should be ready as a division on 1 March; one regiment ready 1 January; another on 1 February.

Army Divisions - none in training, or even assigned, therefore none can be ready in less than three months.

If amphibious troops are assigned for operations in the Aleutians, this will, of course, make the bottleneck worse.

9. Enemy Troops. Delays in our advance are made particularly unfavorable by the abundance of troops that the enemy has available to strengthen his positions. He is showing every indication that he will use freely this component of his strength. Thus, the longer we are delayed the greater the strength in troops we will require.

10. Bases. It is believed that Guadalcanal - Tulagi can be made into a suitable base from which to support our attack. It is, as yet, by no means such a base, either in development or security. Some of the items still required are:

(a) Sufficient airfields with full complements of aircraft.
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

(b) Storage and unloading facilities, particularly for aviation gasoline.

(c) Anchorages or berths secure against torpedo attack.

(d) Improved shore batteries, surface and antiaircraft.

11. Other Strengths and Weaknesses. Our contact with the enemy to date makes possible the following general comparisons:

(a) The Jap is our equal in his willingness to fight.

(b) Surface units must be considered of equal ability except that our fire control radar seems to give us a considerable advantage in low visibility, and our AA batteries are superior. We have no evidence for comparison in day surface action.

(c) Our air forces are definitely superior in quality.

(d) U. S. land forces in the Solomons have proved themselves better armed and more skilful than the Japs, but we could hardly expect a continuation of the disproportionate personnel losses we have been able to inflict, and must realize that we will still require a superiority in numbers at our point of attack.

(e) Our submarines have proved themselves to be more effective units than those of the Japs.

(f) Our great inferiority is in use and performance of torpedoes.
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

12. Objectives.

(a) It is believed that the Japanese position in the New Britain area is a most difficult one to outflank. The bypassing of one or more of the enemy positions, even to the point of making Rabaul the first objective, offers strong temptation. However, the following factors point toward conservatism in this respect:

(1) The system of bases that the Japanese hold outside of New Guinea—i.e., Kavieng, Rabaul, Buka, Kieta, Buin, and Gasmata, are mutually supporting and none, even Rabaul, may be considered a cornerstone, which if captured would cause the rest of the system to collapse.

(2) Even if Northeast New Guinea were in Allied hands, it would not constitute the base of operations which its strategic position would indicate. This is due to its lack of land communications. Its real communications are flanked by enemy bases.

(3) The real communication line of any base we seized would unavoidably be flanked by the enemy bases we bypassed. Thus it may be said that our advance cannot escape being of a frontal nature.

(4) In order to establish a base successfully with one or more enemy bases in our rear, or to seize two or more positions simultaneously, we would require a preponderance of strength which is certainly not in sight for the near future.

(b) With the forces we estimate will be available I believe our question narrows down to whether our next objective is Buin (300 miles from Guadalcanal), or one or more intervening positions between there and Tulagi. This decision depends on:

(1) Relative strengths at the time we make our move.
Subject: Future Operations in the Solomons Sea Area.

(2) Activity of the enemy at the aforementioned intervening positions, and our own counter-measures in connection therewith. Recent information shows that he is beginning the construction of an airfield at Munda, New Georgia (180 miles from Guadalcanal). This should be interfered with as much as possible with our present means, and if the field ever reaches the point of being placed into use, we should strike to take it over with the amphibious forces we have at hand. This would delay an attack on Guin, but would greatly facilitate its success by the increased air support it would render. Three hundred miles is a rather long step to take, particularly before the radii of action of our dive bombers and fighters have been increased.

13. Reserves. Aside from the strength to make this move we should have in sight the forces which will be required for the succeeding move. Otherwise we will have a delay similar to the one we are now experiencing. It appears that the sea forces and air forces will be on hand, but there is no present assurance that amphibious troops will be. As has been pointed out, the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions are the only amphibious troops in the area and the future employment of the 1st Division is in doubt. Time will inevitably be lost if we depend upon the troops which make one assault to be made ready for the next one. Necessity for preparing additional amphibious troops is obvious.

14. Command. The reaction of the Japanese to our seizure of Guadalcanal has been such that practically the whole of the Pacific Fleet has been required for operations in connection therewith. It is firmly believed that this naval force will be required in the operations in the Solomons visualized for Task Two. The present organization under Commander South Pacific has been built up with great difficulty and is only now approaching its maximum efficiency. It is therefore considered vital that the present command set-up of this organization be maintained for the prospective advance up the Solomons.
15. Summation.

(a) Task One will not be completed until Tulagi-Guadalcanal is secure and sufficiently developed as an air and naval base.

(b) Task Two cannot be undertaken until a superiority to the enemy in sea, air and land forces has been attained, and Task One completed as defined above.

(c) One means of attaining superiority is to continue to take advantage of the enemy's exposure of forces in the Guadalcanal area. Another means of overcoming our weakness in other respects is to capitalize on our rapidly mounting aircraft production.

(d) Various considerations require us to adopt a step-by-step advance up the Solomons. Due to the enemy activity in establishing an air base at Munda, that will probably be our next objective.

(e) Amphibious troops constitute a serious bottleneck. Many more should be placed in training.

(f) The operations for advancing up the Solomons should be under the same command set-up as that for the seizure of Guadalcanal.

Copy to:

Comsopac
From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
Subject: Review of Aleutian Situation.

References:  
(a) Cincpac Secret Despatch 290409 of June 1942.  
(b) Cincpac Secret Serial A16(6) 02798 of 24 September 1942.  
(c) Cincpac Secret Despatch 221841 of Nov. 1942.

1. It is considered that a careful survey of the Aleutian situation is necessary at this time - not only because of its own aspects, but because of its bearing on future operations in the present major Pacific theater - the Solomons Sea area.

2. Shortly after the Japanese occupied Kiska and Attu, I suggested in reference (a) that the 2nd Raider Battalion and APD's could be made available for offensive action provided the Army supplied supplementary troops, and then took over the defense of the area including the construction of an airfield on Amchitka.

3. This project was not approved at the time. The views of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet were that:

(a) The Navy would be unable to divert forces from the South Pacific to counter the expected strong reaction of the enemy against the recaptured positions and their supply lines.

(b) The move should not be made before the Army had occupied Atka and Adak, which it was not yet prepared to do.

(c) The raider battalion plus Army troops which could be carried in combatant ships was probably not sufficiently strong to accomplish the task; and in any case it would probably be required in the South Pacific.
Subject: Review of Aleutian Situation.

4. The view of the Commander Northern Force (Task Force EIGHT) was that:

(a) The initiation of such an operation would be unwise unless naval forces including carriers were available to cover the operation for a long period.

(b) In any case it should be an operation for demolition and not for occupation because of difficulty of our supplying this area along vulnerable lines of communications.

(c) Without such an operation, it was probable that the Japs could be made to see that continued occupation was too costly.

5. I believe that, at the time, all concerned thought there was a good possibility that Kiska, at least, could be made untenable for the enemy. Later, this appeared even more favorable after the Army occupied Adak and carried out some effective air raids on Kiska.

6. However, even by 24 September, the above-mentioned possibility became so doubtful that I wrote reference (b), recommending that plans be initiated for the preparation by the Army of sufficient amphibious troops to eject the enemy from the Aleutians.

7. Although the Japanese, since then, gave some slight indications of relinquishing their hold in the Aleutians, and undoubtedly did evacuate Attu at one time, this lasted for a very short period. For the last month they have been vigorously prosecuting the establishment of their position in the area. Kiska installations have grown by leaps and bounds, Attu is active again, and indications point to his occupation of Semichi, and possibly Amchitka.
Subject: Review of Aleutian Situation.

8. On the assumption that there are favorable sites on Amchitka for airfields, I consider that it is the key to the situation. For that reason I sent reference (c) urging its occupation by the Army. I herewith repeat this as an urgent recommendation. I believe that the troops which the Army has earmarked for Tanaga could much better be moved forward to Amchitka. We would thereby place ourselves within a really punishing distance of Kiska, and could render real support with land-based air when amphibious operations against that place are undertaken.

9. Recently I have had studies made of the present problem of a landing attack against Kiska. Commander Task Force EIGHT estimates that there are now 7500 to 10000 Japs on this island. This is confirmed by photographs now available. In addition, these photographs show the defenses to be well placed and of considerable strength. In fact it appears that a landing attack might be too costly an operation to undertake until our supply of amphibious troops is much greater than that now in sight.

10. I believe that this problem of our early action in the Aleutians should be thoroughly reviewed in combination with that of making sufficient forces available in the Solomons Sea area. It is already clear that the placing of many more troops in training for amphibious operations is one matter of great urgency.

C.W.Nimitz
December 7th

On the first anniversary of the war no unusual activities of the Japs were reported.

There were no major sightings in the Southern SOLOMONS. Ground activities at GUADALCANAL were routine. In the NEW GEORGIA group there was some patrol activity, the nature of which is not clear.

TFs 16 and 64 are operating in the CORAL SEA. TF 11 continues at NOUMEA, where the SARATOGA is believed undergoing turbine repairs. TF 42 submarines are covering the SOLOMONS chain and SOLOMONS SEA area with 16 subs on patrol today. Reports to date indicate that these subs are not very effective. TF 65 is at NANDI. The RICHMOND will report to Cinpacific for duty about December 9th.

The 5th Marines will be the first of the 1st Marine Division to be relieved at GUADALCANAL and the relief will be accomplished now. Troop dispositions in the active area are shown in Comsopac mailgram of November 29. About 9000 Kiwi C are in NEW ZEALAND awaiting transportation to NOUMEA. It seems probable that from 3 to 4 thousand New Zealanders have already reported for duty in NEW CALEDONIA.

Cominch 071251 requests reaffirmation of the shipping concentration in the SoPac area.

CTF 8 080112 gives current operations.

There are no new developments regarding enemy intentions or deployments. The build up for another push to the Southern SOLOMONS continues and maru movements toward the Western ALEUTIANS seem scheduled at least to mid-January.

December 8th

Admiral Nimitz left for San Francisco by plane to confer with Admiral King. The agenda includes many important subjects among which are our offensive in the SOLOMONS and the expulsion of the Japs from KISKA.

B-17's from BUTTON dropped 326 100# bombs on MUNDA. The landing strip there appears about ready for use. A planned B-17 and P-38 strike on shipping at TONOUEI from CACTUS has been delayed because rain has temporarily grounded these planes at CACTUS.

TF 16 and the cruisers of TF 64 have been ordered to BUTTON. TF 64 BBs will train in the CORAL SEA for two days, then proceed to NOUMEA. The new Sopac task force set up is shown in Comsopac 090502 pink.

(Continued next page)
December 8th (Continued)

Comsopac 090506 pink proposes a standard mine field in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANCE. Mines are ready at PEARL now but four DMs requested cannot reach the area before January 5th.

The SARATOGA, NASSAU, and ALTAMAHA air groups are on 4 hours notice to proceed to BUTTON, CACTUS, or ROSES.

The bases "CACTUS" set up is in Comsopac 070446.

A plane reports sinking a two-man enemy sub off LUNGA POINT.

Comsopac 081225 tells Cominch that the shipping accumulation referred to yesterday is considered warranted.

The GREBE grounded while assisting the THOMAS EDISON at TURTLE ISLAND and may be a total loss. The MENOMINEE is proceeding there to conduct salvage.

CTF 8 suggests that, as his search has not discovered convoys reported by DI in the Western ALEUTIANS, the enemy may be using radio deception on a large scale. While enemy radio deception is being practiced, this is not believed an example of it.

MUNDA is rapidly developing as an airfield. Planes report the strip almost ready for use. There are no new enemy developments, except that the report of CVs in the TONOLEI area was probably in error.

December 9th.

There were no major sightings or contacts in the South Pacific during the day. Other areas were quiet.

TF 16 and the cruisers of TF 64 are returning to BUTTON. Admiral Lee is training his BBs in the Coral Sea and will leave the training area for NOUMEA tomorrow. The logistic supply of GUADALCANAL is proceeding satisfactorily.

The PENSACOLA arrived at BUTTON. It is expected that the damaged NEW ORLEANS and MINNEAPOLIS will be able to leave TULAGI in about four more days. Each ship hopes to be able to make 8 knots.

The B-17 and P-38 strike mentioned yesterday was made. Three hits were made on one large ship (reported possible CV, but identity doubted here) and two straddles were made on a tanker.

For the second time this month Comsopac reports evidence of landing strip construction at NUMA NUMA, BOUGAINVILLE.
December 9th  (Continued)

It is reported from CACTUS that our PTs are having "unbelievable success" in that area. Details are not given.

Thought is being given by Cominch to the installation of torpedo baffles for unloading at CACTUS, and for an aerial reconnaissance of TRUK. Both of these projects have been considered by Cincpac.

CTF 8 090405 describes troops at and enroute ADAK and TANAGA. An Army survey party will look over AMCHITKA soon.

The enemy is expected to run the Tokyo Express to GUADALCANAL tomorrow night. At least eleven DDs will be employed. The major push toward the Southern SOLOMONS is still building up and should take place fairly soon. Because of this, no major threat is seen any other place in the Pacific.

December 10th

Operations for the day are summarized in Cincpac:

The salvage of the THOMAS EDISON is doubtful, but the cargo probably can be saved.

The SABINE touched an uncharted shoal about 75 miles southwest of ESPIRITU SANTO. Minor underwater damage was sustained.

The Fleet Maintenance Officer estimates that it will take two years and much labor and material to put the OKLAHOMA in service. The OGLALA had a successful dock trial on the 7th. The ARIZONA is being scrapped in place. No work is being done on the UTAH.

The North and Central areas are generally quiet.

There is some indication that the move of 11 - 13 DDs to GUADALCANAL and the bombing of HENDERSON field scheduled for last night was cancelled. We still believe that the Japs intend to launch a major move to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS fairly soon. That being the case, no major threat toward the Hawaiian or Aleutian areas are seen. There have been no sightings of indicated convoys in the Western Aleutians.
December 11th

The operations in the areas for the day are summarized in Cincpac 112025. It is not clear whether or not any part of the 11 DD Tokyo Express arrived at GUADALCANAL. Present ultra information is that at least one enemy DD was sunk. 8 DDs were sighted by the next morning CACTUS search in the NEW GEORGIA area on NW courses.

The first increment of the 25th Division which arrived in NOUMEA this week will proceed in the same ships to CACTUS arriving there the 17th.

Cominch 092145 authorizes sending the 10th Defense Battalion to Sopac. Cincpac 112007 gives condition and strength of this battalion.

Vice Opnav 112147 gives shipment plans for Sopac base materials.

Cominch 102220 is the first ONI Intelligence Bulletin. The guesses therein are not unreasonable.

December 12th

There were no major sightings in the South Pacific area today. Ground activities at CACTUS were limited to patrols. Shortly after midnight 11-12 local our PTs attacked the Tokyo Express off SAVO. One enemy DD was definitely sunk, a second is believed sunk, and a third was hit. We lost one PT. There were two air strikes on MUNDA from ESPIRITU SANTO during the day, and a similar daily strike is planned.

The MINNEAPOLIS departed TULAGI, making 8.5 knots. The NEW ORLEANS will be able to depart for SYDNEY tomorrow. It now appears that the ALOHIBA can be salvaged, and that she can be floated within two weeks. The FLYING FISH reports sinking 2 DDs in the SOLOMONS area.

Names for the Naval base set up in the GUADALCANAL area are in Comsopac 121501.

The SUMNER has completed the survey of HAVANNAH harbor.

The 4th Raider Battalion is assigned to Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet effective 1 January.

Cominch 111629. All PBYs will be withdrawn from advanced combat areas and replaced with PBM5C planes.

Cincpac 122112. With the concurrence of the Army, Cominch, and Cincpac all action in connection with the occupation of TANAGA is suspended.

It is believed that the enemy has no intention of giving up attempts to recapture positions in the Southern SOLOMONS. However, the next large scale move, probably scheduled for December 18, is reinforcement of WEWAK, NEW GUINEA. There is some indication of a plan to attack or attempt to occupy the KULUK BAY area of ADAK. This may be in the nature of a large scale diversion. No threat to the HAWAIIAN area is seen at this time.
In the South Pacific activities were limited to two strikes on MUNDA. The first was 7 B-17s from ESPIRITU SANTO arriving in the target area at 10 a.m. The second was SBDs escorted by P-38s and F4Fs from CACTUS arriving at noon. In the past three days five strikes have been made on MUNDA. While the landing field is believed ready for VFs, no report of such use has been received.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

CINCPAC Eastern Fleet will land agents on the COCHIN CHINA coast by submarine between the 4th and 6th of January.

Rear Admiral Giffen's group expect to arrive NOU MEA January 4th.

The Army plans to bomb WAKE with 30 B-24s between December 21 and 24.

Comsopac 140932 pink deals with delay in action reports in his area.

From fragmentary DI it seems that the Japs plan some sort of a raid in the KULUK BAY area from submarines. If true they must underestimate our strength there. Our search in the ALEUTIANS has failed to locate enemy convoys often reported by DI, but some landings are indicated. The unusual interest in the DUTCH - NEW GUINEA area, and from there westward to JAVA may mean a revival of activity - possibly toward the northwest coast of AUSTRALIA. No troop move is seen at this time. This does not mean that there is any change noted in the enemy prime desire to recapture the southern SOLOMONS. Moves in NEW GUINEA and the ALEUTIANS may be regarded as diversion attempts. Also, in NEW GUINEA there is the suggestion that an attempt is being made to strengthen defense positions in that area, and to facilitate air transport to and from the NEI.

No major threat in the direction of the Hawaiian Sea Frontier seems probable in the foreseeable future, although minor raids on OAHU and our outlying positions are always within enemy capabilities.
December 14, 1942

TF 16 at ESPIRITU SANTO has been placed on 4 hours notice, as have the BBs (TF 64) at NOUMEA. TF 11 is anchored at NOUMEA. TF 67 is at ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 65 is at NANDI.

The CACTUS planes attacked the MUNDA area again today. No AA or enemy plane opposition was encountered. This may indicate successful bombing the past few days.

Enemy planes were reported over TULAGI in the evening.

The unloading of supplies at GUADALCANAL is proceeding under difficulties. There seems to be a shortage of craft to handle stores from the ships to the beach, and on the beach the facilities are inadequate.

Comsopac 150422 is an operation summary.

Cominch 102147 is the "Tiresome" Marine troop movement from the West Coast to the Sopac.

Crudiv ONE composed of the RALEIGH, DETROIT and RICHMOND has been formed under Rear Adm. McMorris.

The Plans Section will reexamine MIDWAY for use as a stepping stone to the Jap positions in the Central Pacific.

There is nothing new of enemy deployment or intentions.

December 15th.

TFs 11 and 64 departed NOUMEA today and TFs 16 and 67 depart ESPIRITU SANTO tomorrow. All will operate in the CORAL SEA for training and to await developments. TF 11 and 16 will continue as TF 61 under Rear Admiral Sherman.

Both MUNDA and REKATA are now daily targets for planes from CACTUS and BUTTON in order to retard development of either place. A report today indicates that the bomb craters we made in the MUNDA strip the past few days appear filled up. Harassing minor strikes are being made daily at the BUIN airfield.

There is some indication of Jap occupation of RUSSELL ISLAND. A small AP was reported unloading there today.

The GRAVYING reports two hits in a CHIYODI type plane tender on November 6th and sank a small tanker on November 10th. Both attacks were made off TRUK.

(Continued)
December 15th. (Continued)

An OS2U reports sinking a midget sub near the NEW GEORGIA group.

Comsopac 160424 pink outlines his critical DD shortage.

Cinopac 160435 pink does not approve Comsopac plan for mines off GUADALCANAL but gives a suggestion which would be approved.

The meagre information of WEST NEW GUINEA and enemy positions west of there is contained in Comsowespac 152350.

Cinopac 151959 pink orders CTF 8 to be prepared to occupy AMCHITKA at an early date.

Captain Coman with the W.P. BIDDLE, CHARLES CARROLL, THOMAS JEFFERSON, J.T. DICKMAN, HERMITAGE, MONTICELLO, OBERON, ARCTURUS, CONY, and escort leave Norfolk about December 27th. On arrival at the Canal Zone the APs and CONY will report to Cinopac for duty.

The enemy is making strenuous efforts to create and improve positions in the central SOLOMONS. As previously noted, positions at MADANG and WEWAK are expected to be occupied in moderate strength about the 18th. Moves toward the Western ALEUTIANS, including KULUK BAY are indicated. None of these indicate a lessening in the enemy desire to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS. It seems probable that large enemy forces are now organizing and training for a major push toward GUADALCANAL. It is believed that losses sustained in the past few months have caused the enemy to abandon plans to extend control beyond the SOLOMONS.

December 16th.

Aside from routine air strikes on MUNDA the Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet. SEAs claim one 500 pound hit on the stern of a DD or CL off MUNDA bar. The only major unit sighted was a CV leaving TRUK on southerly courses by the SCULPIN.

The E. J. HINDS grounded in SEALARK CHANNEL. This ship had about 1200 troops of the 25th Division on board.

The INDIANAPOLIS and WILSON conducted firing tests today off OAHU with the new Mk. 32 fuze. Performance indicates great possibilities and battle distribution of the fuze is underway.

Work on the OKLAHOMA will be limited to that necessary to prepare the vessel to be towed to the mainland for scrapping.
SECRET

December 16th. (Continued)

Cominch 151650 pink requests information concerning the strength of our forces in the CACTUS - RINGBOLT area.

In reply to Comsopac message concerning the critical DD shortage in the Sopac, Cincpac replied that all that can be done is being done (170327 pink).

Comsopac 170510 pink believes WOODLARK ISLAND offers possibilities as an advanced air base and requests information on it from Comsowespac.

DI shows that mines have been laid by the enemy at KISKA. The fields as reported will not hamper us to any great extent. These fields are just one more indication that the Japs are there to stay until thrown out. With the construction of a fighter strip on BALLALE ISLAND (SHORTLANDS area) underway, there is further evidence of the determination to defend RABAUL with considerable air strength.

December 17th.

Task Forces in the South Pacific, less TF 65, continue operations in the eastern CORAL SEA. Two B-17 air strikes were made on MUNDA from CACTUS. The HINDS, which grounded two days ago in the SEALARK CHANNEL, was refloated. New Zealand patrol boats are now operating in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area. Comsopac 170812 is an operations summary.

Temporary repairs have been made to the COLUMBIA turbines permitting speeds up to 25 kts.

In answer to Cominch 162115 regarding disposition of defense battalions Cincpac sent his 180151.

The FLYING FISH reports sinking two DDs in the central SOLOMONS while on patrol there since early November.

Orders were issued to the 7th Bomber command to attack WAKE with 24 B-24's during the night of December 22-23. 3 subs and one DD will be stationed between MIDWAY and WAKE to assist the Army and rescue personnel as necessary.

Cominch is waiting on reports from a special survey of AMCHITKA before deciding whether or not to occupy that island.

A report from the ELLIOT in the ALEUTIANS indicates her back broken. The damage probably was caused by heavy seas.

(Continued next page)
December 17th. (Continued)

The only enemy activity noted during the day was a landing in the MADANG-area. This was predicted. Evidently Sowespac air was unable to prevent the convoy approach and no sizeable air attack on the convoy was reported. The CV sighted by the SCULPIN off TRUK, noted yesterday, may have returned to TRUK. It has never been clear why the Japs would want to use a CV in the operation to occupy MADANG and WEWAK. There is some evidence of Jap desire for a landing field in the HOLLANDIA area, and on WAKDE ISLAND and MOEMI.

Nothing new is learned of enemy deployments or intentions. A strong push toward GUADALCANAL is still predicted, and no major threat in the HAWAIIAN area is seen.

December 18th.

There were no major sightings in the Pacific Ocean Areas today. Activity was limited to the routine daily strike on the MUNDA area by SBDs from GUADALCANAL.

Sopac task forces, less TF 65, continue operations in the east CORAL SEA.

The CHESTER will be ready for sea at SYDNEY December 24th, and the PORTLAND will be docked there that day.

Cominch indicates that KIRWINA and perhaps other islands of the TOBRIAND group may be suitable for an advanced air base for operations in the Northern CORAL SEA area.

CTF 8 reports a B-24 strike on KISKA. Also, that a survey party landed on AMCHITKA the 17th.

Cominch 181315 pink is a directive to occupy AMCHITKA if reconnaissance shows that an airfield thereon can be constructed in a reasonable time. Cinopac 182321 pink directs CTF 8 to continue plans and to recommend forces needed. Cinopac 182345 pink says that CTF 8 will be assigned the Naval task. Admiral Nimitz and General DeWitt probably will issue a joint directive for the operation.

Com 12 190320 (2 part) pink gives General DeWitt's views on the capture of KISKA. Cinopac 190215 pink states that belief here is that 2 divisions will be required. Rear Admiral Spruance will confer with General DeWitt on this tomorrow.

Consopac 181056 gives planned employment of Marine defense battalions in his area.

The enemy was successful in landing at MADANG, WEWAK, and FINCHAVEN. With the completion of this operation we can expect stepped up effort towards GUADALCANAL. No other new enemy developments are seen.
December 19th.

All Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet. A summary of air strikes from CACTUS is in CACTUS 192206.

TF 61 will split up into TF 11 and 16 tomorrow. TF 11 will proceed to NOUMEA and TF 16 to ESPIRITU SANTO. TFS 64 and 67 will continue operations in the CORAL SEA.

While operating off GUADALCANAL the GANESVOORT damaged one propeller and her speed is limited to 23 knots. The E. J. HINDS is proceeding to ESPIRITU SANTO at eight knots. Her grounding damage is limited to propeller and shafting.

In the Southwest Pacific it is reported that an air attack on a group of 1 CL and 4 DD west of NEW BRITAIN resulted in direct hits and possible sinking of the CL.

General DeWitt's 192048 pink gives further details on the occupation of AMCHITKA.

The S-35 was attacked by two enemy float planes south of ANTIGNAK ISLAND yesterday. These probably came from KISKA.

There are no new enemy developments.

December 20th.

There were no major sightings or contacts in the Pacific Ocean Areas today.

TF 67 has been ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO arriving there tomorrow. TF 64 will arrive at NOUMEA day after tomorrow.

The first increment of the 25th division is still unloading at GUADALCANAL and the second increment of the same division is being held temporarily at SUVA.

Routine bombing and harassing strikes were made on the enemy positions in the central SOLOMONS. GUADALCANAL 202207.

A survey of AMCHITKA indicates the feasibility of constructing a fighter strip within about two weeks of the commencement of the occupation, and of the construction of a bombing strip within about three months (CTF 8 210830). CTF 8 210215 gives naval forces he believes required for the operation. General DeWitt (202304) believes that the survey report will permit the operation to proceed under the directive from Cominch. It now appears that the target date will be about January 5th.

(Continued)
December 20th. (Continued)

Our strikes on MUNDA undoubtedly have hindered the enemy, but not caused the airfield project to be abandoned. At BALLALE a landing strip is well underway. The Japs continue to make strenuous effort to improve their Central SOLOMONS position. Sixty-two vessels were sighted at RABAUL yesterday. Signs continue to point to another major drive toward the Southern SOLOMONS within the next two or three weeks. If this estimate is correct no major threat toward the Hawaiian area is seen.

December 21st.

No surface or ground operations of significance were reported during the day. There was a strike on MUNDA by eleven SBDs from GUADALCANAL. These planes were not opposed and were unable to see any ground activity. A few minutes later a B-17 over the runway received AA fire.

CTF 8 reports a strike on KISKA in his 212307.

All Sopac striking forces are heading for or in port, as previously noted.

The 25th Division, 1st increment, disembarked at GUADALCANAL today. The 2nd increment of that Division is waiting orders at SUVA.

It is expected that the PENASCOLA will be ready to leave ESPIRITU SANTO about December 28 and the MINNEAPOLIS about January 5th. The NEW ORLEANS has arrived at SYDNEY. The CHESTER will proceed to Norfolk for complete repair of battle damage.

The Army planes which are scheduled to bomb WAKE the night of December 22 - 23 have arrived at MIDWAY.

For the CROWBAR operation Cincpac will reinforce TF 8 with the INDIANAPOLIS and 4 DD. This will not give all the anti-submarine forces that could be used profitably, but no others are available. A proposal for a joint directive for this operation is in Cincpac 220557 pink. CTF 8 212238 pink estimates the AMCHITKA troop requirements at about 13,500. This number raises the problem of logistic support and involves the Navy insofar as large escort demands can be expected.

Cominch 191906 pink gives moves for the 10th and 12th defense battalions. Cincpac will require transportation for the 10th, and combat loading is not essential.

(Continued)
December 21st. (Continued)

Admiral Halsey proposes to return the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI from the Sopac to conserve escorts and to permit accomplishment of watertight integrity improvements to permit their use in forward areas. Cinopac concurs.

The very large number of vessels seen at RABAUL yesterday is a fine target for air attack both from CACTUS and BUTTON. It seems probable that these vessels are involved in the expected major push toward GUADALCANAL. It would be worth a great deal to break up this shipping concentration. It should be noted that our submarines in the SoPac area seem ineffective. Just why this is the case is not clear. Plotted patrol positions do not provide for maximum concentrations at the two main focal points, i.e. RABAUL and EUN.

The enemy today has at least four combatant CVs available. Some are training in Empire waters. While it seems most probable that the next employment of the CVs will be in the South, the possibility of raids in the Hawaiian Area and on our staging points cannot be overlooked. No employment of CVs in the ALEUTIANS or east of the Meridian of OAHU is seen.

December 22nd.

12 SBD, 5 B-17, with VF coverage made strikes on MUNDA shortly after noon local. Specific damage inflicted is not reported, but AA opposition was encountered by the B-17's.

An extremely large concentration of shipping was observed at RABAUL. Ships of all types, including one or two cruisers and 20 DDs, numbered over one hundred. It would be an ideal set up for a BLUE CV strike, particularly while HYPOCRITE (JAPAN) probably could not oppose with more than one CV. The danger in such an operation is, of course, enemy shore based air. Comairsopac plans to strike RABAUL tomorrow with 6 B-17's, and the next day with at least 12 B-17's.

The B-24 strike on WAKE was made on schedule. All planes returned to MIDWAY safely. Damage inflicted is not yet reported.

The CROWBAR operation (occupation of AMCHITKA) is shaping up. Cinopac 230407 requests General DeWitt to send his suggested draft for a joint directive. This despatch was answered in DeWitt's 230016 pink. The joint directive to CTF 8 should be sent along tomorrow.

There are no new enemy developments.
December 22nd (Continued)

The press indicates that the BRITISH have raided SABANG with carrier based planes. The BRITISH have also started a land offensive against AKYAB.

December 23rd.

There were two strikes made on MUNDA during the day from CACTUS. It is evident that these almost daily attacks are hampering Jap development. However, it was seen for the first time today that zero fighters are operating from the MUNDA field.

No major sightings were reported in the Pacific Ocean Areas. The large assembly of ships at RABAUL, mentioned yesterday, still remains a most attractive target. The B-17 strike on RABAUL which was scheduled for today is not reported and may have been called off on account of bad weather.

Comsopac 240616 is a summary for his area.

CTF 17 232359 is the report of the successful Army strike on WAKE. The photo reconnaissance which followed the strike also was successful. On the day of this strike the TRITON sank a water barge off WAKE. If bombing destroyed a few distillers ashore the Japs may have a serious water problem.

Cincpac 232215 is the joint directive for the occupation of AMCHITKA.

CTF 8 240225 gives forces proposed.

There are no new enemy deployments noted, and nothing new is learned of enemy plans.

December 24th.

The Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet except for air strikes in the SOLOMONS. Eleven B-17's started to bomb RABAUL. Six reached the target and claim three hits on an AK or AP, and several near misses. Other planes were unable to find the target area. This may be because of bad weather. The large number of ships at RABAUL, plus a possible CV, previously mentioned, was reported by returning pilots. In this connection Cinc Pac sent his 250303 which suggests a coordinated air strike on this shipping concentration and the redistribution of submarines to cover RABAUL approaches more effectively. Minor contacts made during the day in the SOLOMONS area are of no special significance. 9 SBD's with VF cover attacked landing barges and the MUNDA airstrip. It is reported that the landing strip is considerably damaged from the past few days bombing.
SECRET

December 24th (Cont'd)

All task forces in the South Pacific are in port as follows; TF 65 at NANDI; TFs 16 and 67 at BUTTON; TF 11 and 64 at WHITE POPPY.

No ground action is reported from GUADALCANAL. The troops in that area have been quiet for some time.

A Jap DD which was sunk at TULAGI is in rather shallow water. It may be possible to recover her charts and other papers of value.

The photo reconnaissance plane sent to WAKE following the recent strike was unable to get pictures because of overcast.

The Allies in the BUNA area are making slow but continuous progress in cutting off the Jap troops and recapturing two airfields.

The DRUM reports that an attack on a carrier on Dec. 12th off Southern HONSHU resulted in two torpedo hits.

CTF 8 plans to make a sweep to the westward with cruisers and destroyers starting Dec. 28th. The S-35 at ADAK had a serious battery fire yesterday.

There are no new enemy developments.

December 25th

At least two enemy submarines were reported sunk. The first was sunk off ST. GEORGE CHANNEL by the SEADRAGON while on patrol in these waters, and the second was sunk by a SWPac PT in the BUNA area.

Two small enemy AKs were sighted off WICKHAM ISLAND, NEW GEORGIA during the day and were attacked by CACTUS air. One of 3000 tons was sunk. Reports from the SWPac indicate good success in air attacks on enemy shipping in the western SOLOMONS SEA. It seems probable that one victim was the ARIAKE (DD). It continues to be of first importance to sink enemy shipping. An efficient way to do this is by low altitude bombing.

At GUADALCANAL current night nuisance raids are lowering our troop's combat efficiency as indicated in Comsopac 250449. The logistic supply of our southern SOLOMONS positions is proceeding satisfactorily.

Admiral Halsey is discussing air strikes on RABAUL with ComSWPac. Comsopac 260612 pink.

-(Continued)
December 25th (Continued)

The present status of the BALLALE airfield is in Comair-sopac 260224.

The MONTPELIER group will arrive at NOUMEA about January 19. TF 65 less Batdiv 4 is ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO. The ACVs are warned to be prepared for further service.

Further discussion of the AMCHITKA occupation is contained in General De Witt's 252050 pink.

There are no new enemy developments.

December 26th

As has been the case for several days, the Pacific Ocean areas were generally quiet. SBDs with fighters made a routine strike on the MUNDA area. Some zero and AA opposition was encountered.

The WAHOO returning from patrol in the Central SOLOMONS area reports sinking one I class sub and one 5600 ton AP in mid December.

There are now 161 planes of various types at GUADALCANAL, but full operation of these is not yet possible because bulk avgas storage is not yet completed. Completion of the tank farm now under construction is promised by January 15th.

The 2nd increment of the 25th Division should arrive at GUADALCANAL about the 28th.

Admiral King says well done to the WAKE bombers, and believes that attacks should be repeated at irregular intervals not only for the effect on WAKE but as prospective cover if and when we may wish to follow the attack with assault. We are giving consideration to other air attacks on enemy Central Pacific positions from JOHNSTON and FUNAFUTI.

Admiral Hepburn will report to Cincpac in a few days to conduct an administrative investigation of the 1st Battle of SAVO.

There are no new enemy developments.
December 27th

There were no major sightings in the Pacific Ocean Areas. A Southwest Pacific plane saw at least 51 ships anchored at RABAUL. No large concentration in the BUNI area has been noted for sometime.

It appears probable that four Jap subs have been sunk in the SOLOMONS SEA area in the past week.

The NEW ORLEANS arrived at SYDNEY the 24th local.

While enroute from WAKE to the South Pacific the TRITON sank an AK off MOKIL (CAROLINE ISLANDS).

All Task Forces of the South Pacific Force are in port for upkeep and to await developments.

Army planes over ATTU encountered some AA from that Island. A reconnaissance plane had reported float planes at ATTU, but a strike sent from ADAK to destroy them was unable to find them. This may have been due to radar warning from KISKA.

Cominch 271750 pink suggests enemy CV employment against the HAWAII - MIDWAY line or elsewhere other than the SOLOMONS SEA area. This is, of course, always possible—as was noted herein on December 21st. The most employment seems to be in connection with another major attempt to recapture positions in the Southern SOLOMONS. Because of new airfields in the Central SOLOMONS and in NEW GEORGIA, the next southward push would involve use of considerable enemy shore based air with better fighter coverage than was possible from RABAUL.

December 28th.

During the day air strikes from GUADALCANAL sank two AKs at WICKHAM ANCHORAGE, NEW GEORGIA. The Pacific Ocean Areas were otherwise quiet.

An Army photo reconnaissance plane returning from WAKE landed at sea 200 miles southwest of MIDWAY. Rescue is underway.

The WASMUTH (DMS) broke in two in heavy seas and sank off UMNAK ISLAND.

The enemy probably is reorganizing and training for another push toward GUADALCANAL. The carriers are training in EMPIRE Waters. The bulk of other surface strength is not located but seems to be in the general area between TRUK and HONSHU.
December 29th

There was very little activity in the Pacific during the day. GUADALCANAL planes made a strike on enemy installations at REKATA. Slight AA was encountered and there were few signs of activity there. Comsopac 300627 is an operation summary for the past few days.

Cominich has directed that 6 to 12 PTs now in Sopac be sent to ComSWPac for temporary duty.

Comsopac 300350 gives the plans for troops in the GUADALCANAL area, and his 301223 reports present troops in the GUADALCANAL-TULAGI area. There seem to be some omissions in the latter despatch. The second increment of the 25th Division has arrived at GUADALCANAL.

Sopac Task Forces are still in port with TF 16 and 67 at ESPIRITU SANTO and 11 and 64 at NOUMEA. TF 65 ACVs and escorts were due at ESPIRITU SANTO at noon today. Batdiv 4 is at NANDI.

Comsopac 300602 pink gives a plan for a cruiser and destroyer bombardment of MUNDA during the night of January 4th (local).

The THOMAS EDISON, which grounded several weeks ago at TURTLE ISLAND, can now be considered a total loss. She broke her back the 19th. Most of the cargo, including 48 torpedoes, has been salvaged. Even better salvage results may be expected with the arrival of the new salvage vessels in the South Pacific. At present ATs with makeshift equipment are employed.

North Pacific cruisers and DD escort under Rear Admiral McMorris will make a sweep to the westward from KODIAK during the next few days. This is preliminary to the CROWBAR operation now scheduled to begin on January 5th.

There is very little known of present enemy deployment and intentions. It is believed that the next major move will be toward GUADALCANAL, and that the recently noted developments in the NEW GEORGIA Group and the Central SOLOMONS are primarily to provide better shore based air coverage. At MUNDA, for example, it is now known that bombers can operate on the airfield. About half of the enemy carriers are believed about to complete an intensive training operation in the vicinity of HONSHU. The bulk of combatant surface strength is thought between TRUK and the Empire. Based on this, no major enemy move toward GUADALCANAL would take place before January 7th. But Cardiv ONE has been silent for the past three days. It may be enroute south. In that case a possible enemy target date may be somewhat advanced. Because of lack of definite information, the best that can be done is to predict as follows:

(Continued next page)
SECRET

December 29th. (Continued)

(a) No major move on GUADALCANAL is to be expected before about January 7th.

(b) A major move on GUADALCANAL is more probable that one toward NEW GUINEA.

(c) It is possible, but not probable, that a raid in strength will be made in the near future on the MIDWAY-HAWAII line or outlying positions in the Central Pacific.

(d) It does not seem probable that much strength will be in the North Pacific to interfere with the CROWBAR operation.

December 30th.

Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet. Comsopac 310836. Our submarines are beginning to show improvement in the SOLOMONS SEA area. Enemy sources indicate that one of our subs sank one ship of a convoy heading from the NEW BRITAIN area toward PALAU and attacked another ship in the convoy about an hour later. (In this latter attack two torpedoes passed under the ship without exploding. This is further evidence of our very poor torpedo performance).

There are no major developments in the SW Pac. Ground forces continued to close in on Japs in the BUNA area. The enemy undoubtedly is improving and building air facilities on the North Coast of NEW GUINEA.

The press reports increased air and ground action in the BURMA theatre. In RUSSIA extravagant reports of success against the Germans appear daily in the press. While the RUSSIANS must be successful in the present offensive, the degree of that success may not be as great as the RUSSIANS report. Little is known of our African Campaign. It seems probable that the advance from the West has been stopped now that stiff enemy resistance is encountered. The advance from the East seems to be slowed down, possibly due to logistic problems.

Comairwing TWO 310830 reports a typical strike on MUNDA.

Our logistic supply and troop replacement program to GUADALCANAL is proceeding well. The second increment of the 25th Division will be landed by January 3rd. Because of Admiral Halsey's 300350, noted yesterday, Cincpac sent his 310341 pink to Cominch. In this connection it is recorded again that no troops are in sight or even contemplated (as far as is known here) successfully to complete tasks TWO and THREE. We know that, after jungle duty,
troops are not available again, because of malaria and other causes, for from three to six months. Until we have the requisite numbers of fresh troops to take and keep up the offensive our situation in the SOLOMON SEA Area will be unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of getting along with the war. Results in 1942 are gratifying considering the fact that we have not had enough tools to work with. While we have managed to stop Jap advances toward AUSTRALIA and the supply lines thereto, we have not impaired Jap capacity to defend gains of 1942. To permit Japan to exploit her present "Far East" holdings would prolong the war to the danger point. All this means only one thing for 1943 - more tools to work with than are now in sight. In addition, we must improve material, such as torpedoes and radio. Cincpac 310459 is one more plea for more tools.

No new enemy deployments or intentions are noted.

December 31st.

For the first time in several days a cruiser - destroyer group was sighted in the vicinity of the SHORTLANDS. Bad weather in the SOLOMON area probably was the cause of an ineffective strike today on MUNDA and of only a part of the usual daily search. The large concentration of shipping continues at RABAUL. We have 81 merchant type in the NOUMEA-ESPIRITU SANTO-GUDALCANAL area.

Comsopac 311100(3 parts) is his Op Plan 1-43 in which he outlines cover for 6 APs and 1 AK in the GUADALCANAL area January 3rd to about January 6th.

Comsopac (010514) plans to develop PORT PURVIS, FLORIDA ISLAND as a fleet anchorage. His 011136 gives his plan to relieve the 2nd Marine Division at GUADALCANAL and to eliminate the enemy there.

Cominch 311815 pink is a proposal to create a Deputy Comsopac to relieve Comsopac of administrative details.

CTF 8 reports an air strike on Kiska in his 312140. Cominch states that the Army is maintaining the ALEUTIAN P-38 squadron at twenty-five airplanes. No additional P-38 squadron is available at present for assignment to the ALASKAN area. This plane is believed the only pursuit which can satisfactorily be employed in that area.

There are no new enemy developments.