Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN
Nimitz “Graybook”
7 December 1941 – 31 August 1945

Volume 3 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by Captain James M. Steele, USN,
CINCPAC staff at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
covering the period 1 January 1943 to 30 June 1943

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The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

Volume 1 (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861
Volume 2 (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 – 1262
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Volume 8 (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 – 30 April 1942 and pertaining to the Battle of Midway): pages are not sequentially numbered. Note: Volume 8 contains dispatch copies, many of which were poorly reproduced at the time of compilation. Some portions are illegible.

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CINCPAC FILES

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SUBJECT Captain Steele's "RUNNING ESTIMATE and SUMMARY", covering the period:

FILE 1 January 1943, to 30 June 1943.
Command Summary
Fleet Admiral C.W. Nimitz
U.S. Navy

Book Three
1 Jan 1943 - 30 Jun 1943

Volumes 1-2
Pages 1263-1612
January 1st.

For the first time in days a group of enemy combatant ships was sighted and attacked in the NEW GEORGIA area. During the afternoon a group of 10 DDs was sighted west of MUNDA on a southeasterly course. 6 B-17's bombed from 20000 feet. This was a waste of effort. Probability of hits on DDs at such altitude is about zero. About six p.m. (local) SBD's from GUADALCANAL attacked and report one hit on two DDs and a near miss on a third. Toward midnight DDs were reported off CAPE ESPERANCE but no further clarifying report was received. The Japs planned to bomb GUADALCANAL during the night but no report of this has been received from our forces. TF 11 and 16 were placed on 4 hours notice.

Comsopac 020702 gives moves of TF 64 and 67 during the AP unloading at GUADALCANAL next week.

Comairsopac 020410 pink gives his latest plan to cover the moves of the CL - DD group which will bombard MUNDA on the 4th. Also, his 020720 and 020730 pink is the plan to cover APs enroute GUADALCANAL on the 3rd.

Comsopac 012335 pink forms TF 19, which is mainly composed of APs, and directs the move to the SW Pac from PANAMA.

Comsopac 010918 is an operation summary for his area. Most of the information contained therein was obtained from intercepted traffic.

After conversations between General MacArthur and General Vandegrift, permission was granted to move the First Marine Division to MELBOURNE for rehabilitation. The 7th Marines will be sent to MELBOURNE when withdrawn from GUADALCANAL in the next few days.

General Marshall states that current nonavailability precludes the possibility of assigning an additional heavy bombardment group to the Hawaiian area, but that he heartily concurs in the desirability of continuing long range bombing missions with present means. It is noted that General DeWitt is not satisfied with the refusal to send more P-38's to ALASKA and offers to send some from his West Coast squadrons. He thinks his West Coast air strength is already too low. Just why this should be so is not clear here. Their combat employment within range of West Coast airfields seems the remotest kind of possibility at this time.

CTF 8 012038 reports another strike on KISKA.

(Continued)
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January 1st. (Continued)

Comin ch 311405 pink is concerned over the progress of the war in the SOLOMONS. Cincpac 020217 pink again makes a plea for tools to work with. The bottleneck is troops adequately trained for our Pacific war.

There is a possibility that CVS are now enroute from the Empire to the BISMARCK area. If that is true we can expect another Southward push in the next week or so.

January 2nd.

Comsopac 021044, 030536, and 030703 are operation summaries for his area for the past two days.

Commencing at 2340 (local) off northwest GUADALCANAL, eleven TULAGI PTs engaged eight enemy DDs. These DDs are presumed to be the "Tokyo Express" which had been attacked by our planes at 1800 (local) near MUNDA the previous afternoon. 6 PT's attained firing position, and of 18 torpedoes fired one hit was claimed on one DD and three probable hits reported on two others. The DDs dropped overboard a quantity of supplies in watertight containers in the hope that at least some would drift to the beach. No troops were seen landing. At daylight PTs and PCs destroyed all of these supplies sighted.

Nine SBDs with fighter cover took off from GUADALCANAL at 0500 (local) to search for and attack the DDs thought retiring from GUADALCANAL after the PT action. They were unable to locate the DDs but delivered an attack on the MUNDA airport at 0725 (local). Heavy AA fire was encountered but all planes returned safely.

The morning search from GUADALCANAL found 8 DDs at 0700 (local) between CHOISEUL and NEW GEORGIA retiring towards BUIN at high speed. Thus the combined air and PT attacks are presumed to have sunk two enemy DDs.

Last night two Catalinas were over MUNDA from 2300 to 0300 (local). During that time four 500 pounders were dropped to harass the enemy. The same night the enemy had 3 planes singly over GUADALCANAL from 2200 to 0120 (local) and dropped a few bombs on our positions. Damage was not reported.

At 1220 (local) 6 B26s from GUADALCANAL escorted by eight P39s dropped 15 500-pounders on MUNDA from 17000 feet. Heavy AA was encountered and one B26 was shot down.

At 1340 (local) 5 B17s from GUADALCANAL made a strike on ships in the BUIN - TONOLEI area. Of 23 ships reported at least
January 2nd. (Continued)

Eleven are thought cruisers or destroyers. All bombs were dropped on the largest combatant type, scoring near misses. Heavy AA was encountered from the ships but all planes returned to Guadalcanal.

Reports continue to be received of minor enemy activity in the New Georgia group. The landing strip at Ballale (Short-land area) is now considered in commission.

Comsopac has started a project to lay a cable between Guadalcanal and Tulagi, with an extension to Port Purvis.

The Porpoise on patrol northeast of Honshu reports sinking at least one AK in a convoy which was attacked on January first.

CTF 8 now estimates that the D Day for the Crowbar operation cannot be earlier than January 11th.

The Russians desire bunkering arrangements for both coal and oil at Dutch Harbor. The feasibility of this is being investigated.

We are still very much in the dark concerning enemy intentions and developments. However, many signs point to an early major push toward Guadalcanal. No major threat in the Central or North Pacific seems probable.

January 3rd.

Catalinas continued their nightly harassing over Munda from 2400 to 0200. The daily B17 sent to harass the Buin area during the night was turned back by the weather but dropped 8 500-pounders on Munda area at 0500. At 1714 (local) 12 SBD's escorted by 16 fighters dropped 12 500-pounders and 24 100-pounders on AA positions, taxiways, and runways at Munda. AA fire was noticeably lighter than yesterday. All planes returned safely. A search plane saw 4 or 5 of the B26 crew shot down yesterday on the beach 10 miles south of Rendova Harbor.

On Guadalcanal minor actions continued. Our forces captured a field piece in the Austen area and gained high ground in the enemy rear. 6 Jap counterattacks were repulsed during which 150 of the enemy were killed.

The final increment of the 25th Division has been landed at Guadalcanal.

(Continued)
January 3rd. (Continued)

Comsopac 040442 and 040322 are operation orders for Task Forces 16 and 65. Task Force 11 was placed on 2 hours notice at NOUMEA. The fast battleships are operating to the south of GUADALCANAL to cover the retirement of the cruiser - destroyer bombardment of MUNDA. This bombardment is scheduled for midnight tonight (local).

Coast watchers report 340 Japs in the vicinity of WICKHAM anchorage. It has been evident for some time that small groups of the enemy have landed throughout the NEW GEORGIA group.

A Jap plane reported a Blue force south of CRISTOBAL ISLAND. While this force can not be identified definitely, it is believed to be transports retiring from GUADALCANAL to ESPIRITU SANTO.

The THOMAS EDISON and the GREBE were completely destroyed by a hurricane at TURTLE ISLAND on January 2nd.

General Harmon suggests that instead of laying a cable between GUADALCANAL and TULAGI, needs can be fulfilled by use of FM teletype links between GUADALCANAL, TULAGI, and PORT PURVIS. The War Department has been requested by General Harmon to ship 2 complete equipments to GUADALCANAL by air with necessary engineers and technicians to install and operate them.

Comsopac's reply to Cominch's proposal for a Deputy Commander South Pacific Area is contained in his 030439 pink.

The WAKE photo plane is now considered lost. Intensive search daily since December 28th has been negative.

As the gasoline situation at GUADALCANAL is now satisfactory for the operation of B17's, Admiral Halsey has requested the return from AUSTRALIA of the 5th and 11th groups (Comsopac 032329). General MacArthur stated that he would return them to CACTUS on the 5th or 6th (local), weather permitting.

There are no significant changes in the BUNA area. Apparently our forces trapped the Japs there three days ago and will eliminate them in due course.

General DeWitt has ordered a squadron of P38's from his command to ALASKA to reinforce the pursuits in the ALEUTIANS.

On entering CRISTOBAL, the CHARLES CARROLL, which is flagship of a transport group enroute to the Sopac, struck an Army mine. Her thrust blocks and steering gear were damaged to the extent that the ship can not proceed with the transport group.
In a despatch to Cominch General MacArthur states his desire to supply medicine and ammunition to guerillas in the Philippines and NEI, and requests that 3 submarines be detailed for this duty. While this is a worth while employment for submarines and second only to sinking enemy ships, it does not seem desirable to divert our modern submarines now being employed on patrol in enemy waters. Cincpac will propose that the (Ex) VI, 2 and 3 be made available for this duty.

Indications continue that the enemy is now preparing for a major push toward Guadalcanal. It seems probable that one or more carriers are now in the vicinity of Truk enroute further south.

January 4th.

CTF 67 050405 describes his bombardment of Munda. Our harassing Catalinas over Munda observed the bombardment and reported it to be very effective. At 0940 (local) the Munda Task Force 67 group was attacked, south of Guadalcanal, by 10 dive bombers and 15 zeros. The report of 10 dive bombers was received from Guadalcanal but the report of CTF 67 only records about five. The attack resulted in one hit on No. 3 turret of the Achilles. Guadalcanal planes intercepted the attacking enemy planes and report shooting down 4 bombers with 2 probable, thus accounting for the difference noted above.

CTF 64 reported being trailed by 4 Jap planes while operating SW of Guadalcanal during the early afternoon.

Comsopac 050845 is an operations summary for the day.

At 1040 local nine B-26's from Guadalcanal made a strike on Munda. 7-500#, 7-120#, and 48-100# bombs were dropped from 10,000 feet. No AA fire was received from Munda and damage was not observed. The crew of the B-26 shot down off Munda two days ago was rescued by the Grayback.

At 1600 local, 5 B-17's escorted by 6 P-38's dropped 20 one thousand pounders on one CA at Buin. The bombing altitude was 18,000 feet and no hits were scored. The P-38's were attacked by about 25 float biplanes and zeros. The score was 3 sure and 2 possible enemy VFs shot down against our loss of two P-38's.

The 7th Marines have been withdrawn from Guadalcanal and are now enroute Melbourne.

Comsopac 040702 is the operation order for TG 66.7.
January 4th. (Continued)

Comamphforsopac 041242 notes the vastly improved unloading of ships at GUADALCANAL.

Cincpac 050009 suggests that Admiral Halsey's plan to release the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI in the next few days be reconsidered as this may take them away before the impending enemy effort.

Cincpac and Comsopac both believe the set-up for a Deputy Comsopac most desirable. Cincpac recommended early adoption to Cominch and requested Admiral Halsey to make his nomination.

The comment requested by Cominch on the proposal to aid guerillas in the Philippines and NEI is contained in Cincpac 050057.

We continue to be in doubt regarding major enemy deployments and intentions. We believe that some CVs may be south of TRUK and that the bulk of Jap combatant strength is in the TRUK-EMPIRE area. But as the Japs have changed nearly all ciphers our educated guesses are not as reliable as they have been.

Admiral Halsey is experiencing trouble in obtaining suitable buildings for his headquarters from the French Governor at NOUMEA. The situation is explained in Cincpac 050757 to Cominch.

January 5th.

There were two major sightings during the day. The first at 1100 (local), just south of NEW BRITAIN consisted of 4 APs escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers, on course 240° speed 12. The second was report by the SARGO at 1500 (local) of a fleet carrier with 1 DD escort just east of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, on course south speed 17.5 knots. It is significant that only one destroyer was seen escorting this carrier.

8 B17s with fighter escort attacked ships and shore installations in the NITIN area at 1230 (local). 12 float biplanes followed the fortresses but did not intercept. 8 type 2-zeros were sighted over NEW GEORGIA but did not attack.

A routine strike on MUNDA from CACTUS was turned back on account of bad weather. At 1020 (local) 7 F4Fs over MUNDA at 18,000 feet received no AA and saw no planes in the air. The field was not observed.

Most gratifying reports from submarines were received during the day. The PLUNGER reported that during landing operations at MUNDA bar on the night of December 16th she sank 1 DD, and on the night of the 17th 1 more DD. The GRAYBACK sank 4
barges on Christmas Day with 50 caliber off SHORTLANDS and
later sank 1 submarine south of RENDOVA. The HALIBUT, on patrol
off the north tip of HONSHU reports having sunk 1 AP and 3 AKs.

Comsopac 060252 gives the dispositions of Task Forces
which were covering AP operations in the GUADALCANAL area from
the 4th to 6th of January. Comsopac 060712 gives the composites
of Task Forces 65 and 66.7. This modifies his 040322, noted
day before yesterday, and results in the retention of the NEW
MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI in the Sopac. Admiral Harry raised the
question as to the length of time Batdiv 3 will remain in
southern waters as he has stripped Batdiv 3 of considerable
equipment in order to build up Batdiv 4.

Comsopac 060252 provides for coverage by Task Force 65
of damaged cruisers enroute to PEARL.

Comtaskfor 19 has shifted his flag to the THOMAS JEFF-
FERSON because of previously reported damage by an Army mine
to the CHARLES CARROLL, and will depart from BALBOA for the
South and Southwest Pacific tomorrow.

KODIAK 060450 reports an attack on an enemy AK approach-
ing KISKA.

The War Department has disapproved General DeWitt's
proposal to send an additional P38 squadron from the 4th Air
Force to ALASKA because of urgent demands from other theaters
of higher priority.

Comsowespac 050525 is the comment on the proposal to
supply guerillas in the Phillipines and NEI by submarine.

While the enemy appears to be strengthening positions
in northeast NEW GUINEA there is no indication of any lack of
interest in the southern SOLOMONS. Signs continue to point to
an impending attack in the GUADALCANAL area. Based on this
estimate, no major threat is seen in the Hawaiian area or in
the North Pacific.
Routine air strikes were made on the MUNDA, BUN, and RABAUL areas. SW Pac planes report direct hits on more ships at RABAUL. The group of 2 cruisers, 4 DDs and 2 APs tracked from NEW BRITAIN toward LAE was attacked by SW Pac planes and one AP was reported on fire.

TF 65, escorting the damaged PENSACOLA and MINNEAPOLIS, departed from ESPIRITU SANTO in accordance with orders noted yesterday. TF 16 and 67 arrive tomorrow at ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 64 is enroute to NOUMEA. TF 11 will exercise at sea for three days in accordance with Comsopac 070402.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

Cominch 052215 revises the procedure in making damage reports to assist in earliest possible restoration of ships to service.

Comsopac 060347 is a proposal to relieve the 4th Defense battalion now at ROSES with Army troops from BORA BORA. Cinopac 070731 requests further information on the proposal.

General DeWitt 052359 gives a plan to commence training of two regimental combat teams in amphibious warfare at FORT ORD on January 15th.

There are no new enemy developments.

January 7th.

Activity in the South Pacific was limited to routine air strikes in the central SOLOMONS and minor patrol action on GUADALCANAL. A routine strike was made on KISKA. The central Pacific area was quiet.

The MINNEAPOLIS lost power because of leaky tubes in her two serviceable boilers and is being towed to ESPIRITU SANTO by the VIREO.

Comsopac 072213 gives procedure for carriers operating together when an air attack is imminent.

Cominch 071245 proposes a commander for PT squadrons in the SoPac to supervise and coordinate training, tactical developments, and operational plans. Cinopac has requested Admiral Halsey's comments on this proposal.

General DeWitt reports troops to be trained and a proposal for a joint directive for the reduction and occupation of KISKA in his 080220. The references in this despatch are included in this summary.

(Continued)
January 7th. (Continued)

The group of cruisers, destroyers, and transports noted yesterday approaching the LAE area apparently reached its destination.

Cominch 071515 gives War Department readiness and material for Ferry Route Bases.

Admiral Halsey has nominated Rear Admiral Wilkinson as Deputy Comsopac.

It is beginning to seem possible that the enemy has changed from the offensive to the strategic defensive in the NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS area. The completion of airfields, fortifications, and troop and plane deployments in that area would release carrier striking forces for operations in other areas. On this basis, the threat of raids on our exposed positions may become more real in the next month or so.

January 8th.

The most important development of the day is the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made to General MacArthur for his plans for carrying out Tasks 2 and 3 in the NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS area. (See Gen'l. Marshall 090053 pink).

Major Pacific Fleet reinforcements are seen in Cominch 081600 pink. This totals one carrier, one battleship, one cruiser, seven destroyers.

Comsopac 082234 pink is a proposal to build up two task forces, each around three ACVs. Also, he strongly concurs with Cominch proposal to set-up a Commander, PT Squadrons, and can supply all officers from his area. Three tenders for the PTs are recommended. (Not clear whether three total or three additional).

The Bureau of Aeronautics has requested the cooperation of a DD, ACV, and if possible a cruiser or battleship in Southern CALIFORNIA waters in producing a training film on abandoning ship. Cominch approves the project in principle.

Activity during the day in the SOLOMONS was limited to routine searches and strikes on enemy positions. Comsopac 080829 and 090638 are his operations summaries.

From conflicting reports it is now estimated by Vice Admiral Carpender that the convoy sighted and attacked approaching LAE via the south coast of NEW BRITAIN day before yesterday consisted of 1 CL, 4 DD and 5 merchant type. In the repeated air attacks on this group in the past three days the following results are reported: one AP sunk enroute LAE; two AP sunk or severely (Continued next page)
January 8th. (Continued)

Damaged at LAE; one direct hit on one AP while retiring; 69 VF definitely destroyed; 28 VF probably destroyed, 40 VF damaged; own losses 6 planes lost, 31 damaged. If correct this is a remarkable performance and any troops and supplies landed cost the enemy a high price.

Comopac proposes to lay a mine field just outside the 100 fathom curve approximately parallel to the coast line between TASSAFORANGA and CAPE ESPERANCE.

Cominach 081930 is a plan for Marine reinforcements for the South Pacific Area during February.

Because of need of yard overhaul for the SWORDFISH and SNAPPER immediately Comsubopac requested one sub as replacement from Comsubpac. This was not approved by Cincpac as it is inadvisable further to reduce patrols in Jap Empire waters.

Compac 090342 is a joint plan for the assault and occupation of KISKA.

DOG day for the occupation of AMCHITKA is January 11th.

Aside from continued indications that the enemy is active in strengthening and developing positions in the SOLOMONS and Northern NEW GUINEA there are no significant enemy developments.

January 9th.

Routine air activities in the central SOLOMONS were hampered by bad weather. Comopac 100614 is an operations summary for his area. The Tokyo Express of eight DDs was reported to be expected in the GUADALCANAL area about 2300 local, but no report of its arrival was made. Ground activity on GUADALCANAL was limited to patrolling reconnaissance and disposition for an offensive. Minor bombing of enemy troop positions there was carried out.

Comopac 090432 and 100352 are a reorganization of task forces in the South Pacific. His 100042 establishes a DD striking group based in the GUADALCANAL area.

Cominach 092009 gives development approved for BOBCAT on October 28th.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.
January 10th.

The Tokyo Express, mentioned yesterday, arrived off GUADALCANAL about midnight. Meagre reports show that our PTs intercepted in the vicinity of SAVO. Damage inflicted is not reported, but we lost two PTs. It seems probable that the enemy was partially successful in this operation. The 25th Division has commenced a reconnaissance in force in the MOUNT AUSTEN region on GUADALCANAL. The enemy dropped five bombs on our Marines during the night. Weather prevented a strike on the Express the following daylight. Other areas were quiet.

The ACHILLES damage, received January 4th, is limited to turret 3. She will be retained with TF 67 for the present.

Comsopac has recommended that a Flag Officer be ordered to command landcraft flotillas in his area. Cincpac approves.

CTF 8 092354 is recommended to reinforce ALASKAN Air.

H.M.S. VICTORIOUS will sail from NORFOLK for PEARL about February 2nd. One month operational training at PEARL is planned.

DOG Day for the AMCHITKA operation has been postponed until January 12th because of bad weather.

Submarine operations in the JAPAN SEA are under consideration. The difficulty there will be keeping our subs from damaging the RUSSIANS and being damaged by them.

After a conference with members of his staff today Admiral Nimitz decided to offer to confer with General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey concerning plans for Tasks TWO and THREE. NOUMEA is the first offer by Admiral Nimitz for the meeting point, and he can arrive there by the 17th local. This date is suggested because of his desire to meet the Secnav, who arrives at PEARL the 12th. If General MacArthur refuses to go to NOUMEA, Admirals Nimitz and Halsey are willing to go to BRISBANE. General MacArthur replied to this offer stating that he is awaiting further advice from WASHINGTON with reference to the basic subject matter involved which, he says, should precede any conference with regard to operational action.

There are no new enemy developments.
January 11th.

Ground activity on GUADALCANAL is progressing satisfactorily with air considerably assisting the reconnaissance in force now underway. The planned offensive is scheduled to commence January 17 (local). Bad weather curtailed routine air operations in the Central SOLOMONS. It is possible that one DD of the Tokyo Express, which visited GUADALCANAL two days ago, was sunk.

The SHAW grounded 1.5 miles S.E. of BULARI PASSAGE, NOUMEA yesterday and was severely damaged. Salvage is underway.

The GRAMPUS has reported sinking 2-3 APs, one AK and 1 DD while on patrol in the SOLOMONS area.

Reports continue to be received of Jap efforts to strengthen their positions in the SOLOMONS and NEW GEORGIA Islands. There are no new enemy developments.

January 12th.

The Secretary of the Navy arrived at PEARL where he will commence an inspection of the Pacific Ocean Areas. Accompanied by CinC Pac, he plans to leave the 14th by air for outlying positions and expects to make BRISBANE the western limit of his inspection.

Again today routine searches and strikes in the central SOLOMONS were hampered by bad weather. There were no major sightings except large concentrations of enemy ships at RABAUL and in the SHORTLANDS area. Ground activity on GUADALCANAL is proceeding satisfactorily, preparing for the offensive scheduled for January 17th (Local).

Taskforces 65 and 69 arrived at NANDI. TF 18 is scheduled to arrive at HAVANNAH HARBOR, EFATE the 16th, local.

Cominch has deferred the program to replace PBY’s in the Pacific with PEM-3c airplanes. The War Department advises no air reinforcements for the ALEUTIANS are in prospect except for the 12 P-38’s being winterized and the 8 B-25’s enroute. (Cominch 122050).

CTF 8 reports that the occupation of AMCHITKA is proceeding on schedule. A plane reported that the WORDEN foundered at AMCHITKA.

There were no new enemy developments.
January 13th.

The schedule for inspection of outlying positions by Secnav and Cincpac is in Cincpac 130445, except that the BRISBANE visit probably is cancelled.

The TOKYO express of 8 DDs was reported enroute GUADALCANAL but no word of its arrival has been received. It would be opposed by the PT patrol near SAVO and 5 DDs based in the TULAGI area. Enemy planes were reported over GUADALCANAL last night.

The BALLALE airstrip is now reported surfaced but no planes were seen on it. There are some indications of airfield construction underway near CAPE MABIRI, BOUGAINVILLE. The KAVIENG field is being improved.

The ARTHUR MIDDLETON went aground at AMCHITKA. Troops of the CROWBAR operation had been landed. Efforts to float the vessel are underway.

No new enemy developments are seen.

Comsowespac 131131 is General MacArthur's amplification of his conception of his July despatch regarding Tasks TWO and THREE. If a conference with Admirals Nimitz and Halsey is held - which General MacArthur discourages - BRISBANE is suggested as the meeting place.

An estimate of the SOLOMON'S offensive was completed today and will be given to Admiral Halsey for whatever it may be worth.

January 14th.

The TOKYO Express of nine DDs ran last night as expected. While early reports give partial account of own attacks, it is not known whether or not the enemy was successful in making a landing at GUADALCANAL. During the night TULAGI Catalinas tracked and attacked the DDs. Beginning after daylight and continuing during the day strikes were made from GUADALCANAL. Hits were claimed by SBDs and PBYs, and near misses by B17s. The net result seems to be two enemy DDs damaged.

Ground action on GUADALCANAL is progressing favorably.

Our submarine near PALAO attacked a convoy enroute from there to DAVAO and succeeded in sinking two marus.
January 14th. (Continued)

No further word was received regarding the CROWBAR operation.

It continues to be indicated that the enemy is forming up for major operations in the South. No major moves in any other direction are seen.

The Secnav and Admiral Nimitz departed for MIDWAY, the first stop of their inspection trip.

January 15th.

Routine air strikes, searches, and photo missions were completed in the Central SOLOMONS. Our planes over MUNDA received heavy AA, and report the landing strip in use. Again it is demonstrated that bombardment and bombing of enemy airfields can be expected to put the fields out of commission for a few hours.

Enemy harassing planes were over our GUADALCANAL positions during the night. Land operations there are progressing. An offense is scheduled for the 18th local and will be preceded by bombardment from four DDs.

Admiral Halsey is not satisfied with the reception accorded to the last Tokyo Express. No interception was reported by the PTs and DDs and air failed to attack effectively during the approach.

There is a shortage of torpedoes for the SoPac PTs.

A command embracing PT squadrons and their tenders in SoPac has been approved by CominCh.

The 10th Defense Battalion will be sent from PEARL to ESPIRITU SANTO, available for transfer to forward positions.

The SHAW has been refloated and placed in the floating dry dock at NOUMEA. Damage was extensive and the ship will require navy yard repairs.

The MIDDLETN which grounded at AMCHITKA is in a bad way. Engine rooms and firerooms are flooded, and the gale which caused her grounding has not abated. No further word has been received regarding the reported loss of the WORDEN. Aside from this the CROWBAR operation is proceeding satisfactorily.

There are no new enemy developments.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

SOLOMON ISLANDS

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASIS FOR SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM.

A. Suitability as to the Appropriate Effect Desired.

(1) Summary of the Situation.

By heavy surface losses inflicted, particularly during the last three months of 1942, carrier losses previously inflicted, and continual victories over the enemy's aircraft, we have secured effective command of the air and probable command of the sea in the GUADALCANAL area.

The situation at the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI base is favorable, but before it can be considered satisfactory the following remains to be done:

(a) Relief of the 2nd Marine Division, and provision for orderly replacements of tired and sick Army troops.

(b) Liquidation of remaining Japs (about 15,000).

(c) Completion of storage ashore, particularly for aviation gasoline.

(d) Completion of landing strips and facilities now underway and projected.

(e) Provide aircraft to capacity of airfields and complete the program to maintain these fields saturated with aircraft.

(f) Provide adequate unloading facilities at beaches, with roads, vehicles, etc., to expedite distribution.

(g) Develop PORT PURVIS as a large anchorage.
Our other adjacent bases:

(a) ESPIRITU SANTO is an excellent supporting point. Development there to major proportions is underway. It must be defended strongly.

(b) NOUMEA is under development as a major base. With the development of ESPIRITU SANTO and the completion of projects in the GUADALCANAL area, NOUMEA will decrease in importance.

(c) EFATE is a minor base overshadowed by ESPIRITU SANTO and NOUMEA but offers dispersal facilities for aircraft and surface ships.

(d) FIJI is of importance mainly as a staging point.

Enemy bases:

(a) A first class base at RABAUL with three airfields in the immediate vicinity, plus one at GASMATA, south central coast NEW BRITAIN.

(b) KAVIENG to the northward is known to be under continuous development.

(c) BUKA has an air strip and is being developed further.

(d) KIETA is inactive but can be used with relatively small effort.

(e) The BUN - FAISI - SHORTLAND area is a staging point of major proportions. An active airfield is located at BUN and one has been completed at BALLAIE.

(f) Development of unknown proportions is underway at NUMA NUMA.

(g) In the NEW GEORGIA group, MUNDA is an active airfield and the area is being developed. Other projects are reported at VIRU, WICKHAM ANCHORAGE, GIZO, and other minor points.

(h) REKATA BAY is an active seaplane base and is being strengthened.
(1) Several bases are under development on the north coast of NEW GUINEA, such as PINOCHHAVEN, MADANG, and WEWAK. The enemy continues to operate from the LAE - SALAMAU area. In the BUMA region it appears that our forces have effective control.

During the past months the enemy has been developing the central SOLOMONS area and the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA. Our forces have been developing the GUADALCANAL area and supporting positions. When adequate forces are available we propose to continue our offensive with a view to the final defeat of the enemy.

(2) Recognition of the Incentive.

The broad tasks for the Pacific Ocean Areas are set forth in WPL-46-PC.

Operations in the SOLOMONS Area are under the broad direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their last directive, dated July 2, 1942, provided for the recapture of the NEW GUINEA - BISMARCK - SOLOMONS AREA in three tasks:

**TASK ONE** - seizure and occupation of SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, TULAGI and adjacent positions.

**TASK TWO** - seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, LAE, SALAMAU and northeast coast of NEW GUINEA.

**TASK THREE** - seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA - NEW IRELAND area.

(3) Appreciation of the Assigned Objective.

Task ONE, not yet completed, is under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Authority was obtained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to delay the occupation of the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS at discretion of Commander South Pacific Force. This project may be considered abandoned, at least for the time being.

The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, has been directed to submit a plan for Tasks TWO and THREE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The conception of working toward vital enemy territory via RABAUL is based on WPL-46-PC and this plan visualizes that the Pacific campaign would be in four stages:
ONE - Consolidation of own bases, and preparation for offensive operations.

TWO - Recapture of the SOLOMON SEA area followed by attrition attacks in the CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

THREE - Seizure of the CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

FOUR - Advance into the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES or PHILIPPINES.

Stage ONE is now merging with the initiation of stage TWO. Offensive operations of stage TWO commenced August 7, 1942, but have not been projected farther than the GUADALCANAL area and along the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA.

(4) Formation of the Mission.

It is expected that the directive for Tasks TWO and THREE, if reissued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will contain the specific tasks and purpose of the second stage of the Pacific Campaign. No material change is expected.

(5) Scope of this Estimate.

The course of the Pacific war to date has made the GUADALCANAL area the point of contact with the enemy in the eastern SOLOMONS SEA area and the natural jumping off place for the advise up the SOLOMON ISLANDS. This estimate is limited to a study of the next step in that advance.

B. Feasibility and Acceptability as to Relative Fighting Strength.

(1) Survey of Means Available and Opposed.

(1) Political Factors.

Japan is a united nation determined to win this war. There is no indication of lack of public support of war aims. Being a dictatorship, Japan can mobilize efficiently all resources under her control.

Relations with other Axis Powers have had little effect on the Pacific War.
(ii) Economic Factors.

Japan has an efficient organization to prepare and supply the armed forces with the sinews of war. Her people are willing to accept great sacrifices. Her economic capacity, at this stage of the war, however, is greatly under that of America.

Only a small part of American war production is being allotted to the Pacific.

(iii) Psychological Factors.

The morale of the Japanese people can be considered high. There is some indication of a lowering of the morale of troops in contact with the Allies in the SOLOMONS SEA area but this can not be taken as indicating the morale of the bulk of her troops.

In training and experience the Japanese armed forces have demonstrated themselves to be a formidable foe. Naval operations, in particular, are extremely skilful in both planning and execution.

It would be a great mistake to underestimate the Japanese.

The American people now support our war effort to a gratifying degree. Increased taxation and restrictions will tend to lower civilian morale. There is great danger in letting the war drag out. People will clamor for results that they can understand.

(iv) Information and Counter-Information Measures.

Because of a general tightening up of Japanese communications we are not able now to obtain information of enemy plans and deployment from description analysis and must rely heavily on traffic analysis. Captured documents continue to be an excellent source of information of past events but rarely foretell the future. Lack of identification of sending units has reduced the value of direction finding. Prisoners have been of little value in estimating the future. The natural tendency of the Japanese to keep important information to themselves is of great benefit to them.

On the other hand, our press keeps Japan well posted on the progress of our war effort.
(b) Factors More Directly Applicable to the Armed Forces.

OWN.

(1) Surface.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan. 15</th>
<th>Apr. 15 (a)</th>
<th>July 15 (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT(5)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>? 90 assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCP</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>? Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGI</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>291 60 assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47 72 assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSI</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>? Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCVP</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Figure in parenthesis takes account of expected attrition based on last 12 months.
(11) Air. (In South Pacific) Levels only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>Jan. 15</th>
<th>April 15</th>
<th>July 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>135 (137)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSB</td>
<td>108 (107)</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTB</td>
<td>24 (41)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPB (sea)</td>
<td>48 (61)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPB (land)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPB (photo)</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOS</td>
<td>72 (61)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VR</td>
<td>24 (20)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>417 (419)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1. Strengths for July 15 are purely conjectural and are based on normal expectancy as to pilot and airplane allocations and on maintenance of present ratio as between North, Central and South Pacific requirements.
2. VF strengths includes one VMO squadron operating fighters.
3. All strengths are unit equipment not including spares. Actual strength entered in parenthesis for Jan. 15 is based on last report plus those enroute with Marine Air Group TWELVE.

ARMY

J.C.S. 97/5, approved October 27, 1942 is the only available basis of strength estimation of Army Air in South Pacific. This paper merely directs that "--the War Department--(will)--insure the flow of replacements--(etc.)", and there is no directive for increase beyond the figures for 1 January 1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>J.C.S. 97/5</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>1 January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHOTO (P-38)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>310</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Two full groups (70 planes) now assigned, of which an unknown number temporarily in SoWesPac.
(iii) Troops.

Available for offensive operations beyond GUADALCANAL in accordance with the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan 15</th>
<th>April 15</th>
<th>July 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious, Army (Regt)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious, Marine (Regt)</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Batt., Marine</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raider Batt., Marine</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Regts., Army</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Army Amphibious Troops:

No Army troops in the South Pacific Area are now trained for amphibious operations and none there are undergoing such training. For the predictable future, therefore, no Army troops will be available for offensive action involving landing against opposition. It is quite probable that in future operations Army troops can be used to infiltrate over an undefended beach and then proceed overland against a defended area.

B. Marine Amphibious Troops:

All Marine amphibious troops in the South Pacific Area are committed at CACTUS. According to prospective dates of withdrawal and the period required for rehabilitation, it is estimated that regiments now in the area will become ready for further offensive operations as follows: 2nd and 6th Regiments - May 1; 8th Regiment - June 15.

The regiments of the 3rd Marine Division, none of which have yet left the United States, should be ready for offensive action in the South Pacific Area as follows: 9th Regt. - Feb. 15; 21st Regt. - Mar. 15; 23rd Regt. - Apr. 15. The situation as to Marine amphibious troops may be improved if the Army takes over the defense of SAMOA.

C. Marine Defense Battalions:

Marine defense battalions now in the area are as follows:

SAMOA : 2nd, 7th, 8th.
FUNAFUTI: 5th.
EPATE 4th.
GUADALCANAL-TULAGI: 3rd, 9th, 11th, 14th.
PEARL HARBOR: 10th, due leave for Sopac about Feb. 1. 12th arrives February and should be ready April 15.
The 3rd and 4th Defense Battalions are to be relieved for rehabilitation. The 4th will not be again ready for employment until about April 15th and the 3rd about May 15. Other battalions are committed with no reliefs in sight. The 10th will be the only uncommitted battalion but only if it is not used to relieve the 4th. The 12th, if organization and equipping is expedited might be ready by May 1. Other battalions will become available if the Army takes over the Samoan defenses.

D. Garrison Troops:

The Army has 13 infantry regiments plus 1 infantry battalion and 6 AA regiments less 1 battalion in the South Pacific Area, and there are 2 Marine garrison regiments in SAMOA. All these troops are committed to defense positions. If the Army takes over SAMOA, the 2 Marine regiments there will be trained for amphibious operations and will not be used for garrison purposes. The GUADALCANAL area will require from 6 to 9 infantry regiments. However, if a northward move is made defense requirements will be lessened in rear areas and the garrisons at NOUMEA, EFATE, and FIJI can be reduced. There is also the possibility that additional NEW ZEALAND troops may be made available. The estimates in the table are based on all the foregoing contingencies and may readily be subject to change.

(iv) Logistics.

There are no insuperable logistic difficulties. Adequate support of all kinds is available in the area. The usual difficulties which are met when landing on beaches with no facilities will have to be overcome.
ENEMY.

(v) Surface.

Note: Figures are the best available and are subject to considerable error. This is particularly true of cruisers and destroyers. These figures are deliberately conservative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan. 15</th>
<th>Available Sopac</th>
<th>In Jap Navy</th>
<th>Number believed sunk in past year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Several</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>40 plus</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>18 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12-16</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vi) Air. - Naval Air.

This does not include ship based planes. Also, there is insufficient information to estimate Army air strength. It seems probable that Army air is moving into the South Pacific.

**EMPIRE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VF</th>
<th>135</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHB</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>72</td>
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</table>

**MARIANAS and CAROLINES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VF</th>
<th>45</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VHB</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**RABAUL Area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VF</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>VHB</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MARSHALLS and GILBERTS

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHB</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaplanes</td>
<td></td>
<td>24 Total 140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total which it is believed physically possible to put in the South Pacific:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHB</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>234 Total 608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Details of above in ICPOA estimate attached.

(vii) Troops. - South Pacific.

GUADALCANAL   -- - - - - - - - - - - - 15,000
Garrisons  - BISMARCK  - SOLOMONS  - - - 10,000
Troops available for assignment -- -- 35,000
NEW GUINEA   -- - - - - - - - - - - 7,500
Total troops South and
Southwest Pacific -- -- 80,000

Note: Details of above are in ICPOA estimate attached. It is believed that the above are maximum figures. Troops are continually moving to the area and a large and well trained reservoir of troops is thought to be available to the enemy from outside the area. Of the numbers indicated not all are effectives; that is, some 50% may be considered engineers, laborers, ground personnel for airplanes, etc.
Survey of the Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.

Information available to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is strictly limited. Sources are sailing directions, charts, monographs of areas and other data received from NEW ZEALAND and AUSTRALIA, photographic reconnaissance, submarine reconnaissance, and meagre information from persons who have visited the area. The Commander, South Pacific Area, may have better detailed information from various persons with local knowledge.

For this estimate the study of the theatre is limited to the SOLOMONS, with stress on possible mid positions between GUADALCANAL and the HUIN - SHORTLAND area. Requirements for airfield construction are taken to be: reasonably safe approach; adequate landing beach; adjacent terrain capable of development with personnel and material probably available and within a reasonable time. Many other places are mentioned because of other possible military value. Still other places are mentioned only because of the negative character of the information.

NEW GEORGIA GROUP

VIRU HARBOR is considered an airfield possibility only because of the adjacent level ground. Because of limited turning space in the harbor it is not suitable for even moderate sized vessels. A vessel of 3300 tons is the largest reported there in the past several years. Photos show extremely dense woods which extend to the water's edge, and no nearby sizeable coconut plantations are noted. The level ground is about 150 ft. above water level and the approach is steep except at small landings on both sides just inside the harbor entrance. Because of the dense woods and undergrowth the clearing of an airfield would be a difficult and long undertaking. The Japs are reported to have used this as a seaplane base and staging point for small craft. No off shore anchorage is charted.

MUNDA is not listed in the sailing directions as a good harbor. However, in the past two months the enemy has been able to construct a good landing strip in the coconut plantation at MUNDA POINT. Three entrances are possible but the one thru HATHORN SOUND is the only one which can be used by vessels drawing over about eight or nine feet. In a flat calm greater draft could be carried over MUNDA BAR, but this condition will not be met with often. Breakers over this Bar are seen occasionally. The entrance via ROVIANA LAGOON is studded with coral heads and is suitable for small craft only. Photos show that there is enough space in the MUNDA coconut plantation for a bomber field, and this project is now underway by the enemy. The terrain to the northward of the airfield is fairly flat but
heavily wooded. It seems possible to approach the landing field from the north, landing on the coast between WOODFORD ISLAND and LEVER HARBOR. Several suitable landing places are seen.

LEVER HARBOR is reported to be the best harbor on the north coast of NEW GEORGIA ISLAND. Adjacent coconut plantations on level ground are sites capable of development.

RICE ANCHORAGE on NEW GEORGIA ISLAND is a possibility also but not enough is known about it to determine its military value.

HATHORN SOUND appears to be a good anchorage which might be used by a division of transports. The beaches are only fair and will present landing difficulties. ARUNDEL ISLAND to the westward of the sound is reported capable of airfield development in coconut plantations. This sound provides an approach to MUNDA.

LINGUTU (NEW GEORGIA) is by hearsay a development possibility. It has been used rather extensively by trading schooners, and there is adjacent level terrain.

No suitable anchorages are known between NJAI PASSAGE and VIRU HARBOR.

VANGunu ISLAND is interesting because of WICKHAM ANCHORAGE. The western entrance is reported deep enough for all vessels, but a turn to the right of about 160° in very restricted water would embarrass medium and large vessels. The enemy had a cruiser or large destroyer in this anchorage in December 1942. Local knowledge might make the entrance easier than the chart shows. Photos and descriptions show dense woods in the vicinity. No reasonably clear level site near the anchorage suitable for an airfield is known. KOLO LAGOON which adjoins to the eastward is poorly surveyed and navigable only by small craft. No airfield sites seem probable on its bordering land. The MAROVO LAGOON area to the north of VANGunu ISLAND seems a possible anchorage. The many shoals would make navigation difficult. The MARIKI PENINSULA to the south of the lagoon is mountainous and densely wooded. An inspection of the chart fails to reveal an airfield site. Very little is known of the southwestern and southern sides of VANGunu ISLAND. Approaches have not been surveyed. Like the western side of this island, this region is presumed to be densely wooded and rugged.

MAROVO ISLAND is reported to have coconut plantations on the north shore. Approaches have not been surveyed.
MONTGOMERY ISLAND is rugged and densely wooded to the water's edge. The southern coast is almost precipitous and is fringed with a reef. On the northern coast WAUGH BAY affords a small anchorage and WEIGALL BAY also is an anchorage. Neither seems suitable for any other purpose.

RENDOVA ISLAND is entirely mountainous and densely wooded. No airfield site is seen. RENARD COVE and RENDOVA HARBOR are temporary anchorages, but the latter has a very tricky entrance called RENARD ENTRANCE.

VELLA LAVELLA ISLAND is densely wooded and rugged. The shore line is imperfectly charted. Trading schooners were able to find indifferent anchorage in numerous small bays. Too little is known of this island to do more than say it does not look promising for any military purpose.

The chart indicates that KOLOMANGARA ISLAND may have some possibilities. The sailing directions show several places that may be used by vessels having local knowledge. The village on the southwest coast is near a coconut plantation and an approach thru a coral reef is shown at two places. Mangroves are reported to the waters edge and the whole island densely wooded. Further reconnaissance is necessary in order to state more of the military value of this island. The Japs are known to be developing VILA on the south coast.

SINGHO ISLAND is of no value as far as the present estimate is concerned.

GANONGGA ISLAND is too little known here to make any statements of value beyond saying that it does not look promising.

CHOISEUL ISLAND

CHOISEUL ISLAND is comparatively unknown. The MANNING STRAIT area may be capable of development for air but not enough is known to state. SALIKAANNA and WAGINA ISLANDS, for example, have coconut plantations and small landings. Because local knowledge would be necessary, large vessels could not rely on charts or sailing directions. Development in this area as a small craft staging point seems feasible. CHOISEUL BAY in the northwest part is a fairly good harbor for small vessels. There are adjacent coconut plantations.

ISABEL ISLAND

REKATA BAY is the most interesting place on this island. The enemy has developed it as a seaplane base and may be building airfields on nearby level ground which has several coconut
the charted entrances. Several good anchorages are available and pictures show adequate landing beaches for all purposes. There are numerous places which can be used as small craft staging points. MARINGE LAGOON is a good anchorage for vessels up to the size of cruisers. It is 85 miles north of GUADALCANAL.

The SHORTLANDS AREA, which includes BUIN, FAISI, and TONOLEI is adequate for large forces and capable of considerable development. At least two landing fields have been constructed in the area - at BUIN and at BALLALE ISLAND. TONOLEI harbor is sheltered and suitable for a tender anchorage. No attempt is made here to set forth information contained in the sailing directions. Photo reconnaissance is not adequate to plan details of development or to complete plans for the reduction of the area.

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND and BUKA ISLAND have been used by the enemy and are under further development. KIETA is now inactive but has a landing strip and seaplane anchorage. The harbor is not the best but can take one or two large vessels. The entrance should be used with caution. At BUKA PASSAGE there has been an airfield for months and development is continuing. At NUMA NUMA airfield construction is reported. QUEEN CAROLA HARBOR and EMPEROR AUGUSTA HARBOR are staging anchorages.

The whole of the SOLOMONS are most unhealthy for troops; malaria is rampant in all parts. Excessive rain and humid atmosphere is not conducive to comfort.

The southeast trades begin in May and continue to October. During this period more than 85 percent of the winds are easterly, and 60 percent are from the east to southeast. From November to April the winds blow predominantly between northeast and northwest. Winds of storm force are practically unknown at any time of the year, and tropical cyclones seldom affect the area. From December to March the rainfall is exceedingly heavy, although ample rain falls throughout the year.
Significant distances are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUADALCANAL to:</th>
<th>ESPIRITU SANTO 565</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MUNDA 180</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REKATA 140</td>
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<tr>
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<td>BUIN 300</td>
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<td></td>
<td>KIETA 325</td>
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<td>BUKA 400</td>
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<td>RABAUL 565</td>
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<td>RABAUL to:</td>
<td>LAE 350</td>
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<td>BUNA 350</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILNE BAY to:</td>
<td>MILNE BAY 380</td>
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<td></td>
<td>CASMATA 170</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILNE BAY to:</td>
<td>MUNDA 430</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REKATA 525</td>
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<td>BUIN 385</td>
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<td></td>
<td>KIETA 410</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BUKA 390</td>
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</table>

(3) Conclusions as to Relative Fighting Strength.

(i) The enemy has greater troop strength in the area at present. As time goes on and our training and rehabilitation program takes effect and if more Army troops are made available for training, we will gain the advantage. At present the lack of ready amphibious troops is the bottleneck of our preparations for further offensive action.

(ii) Enemy surface superiority will continue for at least three more months.

(iii) Enemy shore based air is no longer superior in the SOLOMONS and our advantage should increase markedly during the next few months.

(iv) The enemy has the advantage of positions in the SOLOMONS, and the islands to the northwestward thereof.
II. DETERMINATION OF SUITABLE, FEASIBLE, AND ACCEPTABLE COURSES OF ACTION.

A. Analysis of the Assigned Objective.

As this study concerns an advance by us, own courses will be considered first. Though the enemy may be passing to the strategic defensive, as indicated by his strengthening of the northeast NEW GUINEA, it is quite possible, perhaps probable, that he will make further major efforts against GUADALCANAL. We know that he is still rounding up aircraft and Army troops from various other areas and bringing them to the SOLOMONS area. However, this study is based on the assumption that such efforts will fail and in their failure will leave us at least as strong in comparison to the enemy as we now are.

B. Survey of Courses of Action.

We will base our study of own courses on one more assumption, viz: that the northeast NEW GUINEA operations can be conducted without considerable diversion of strength from the South Pacific Area and Pacific Fleet.

The choice of courses resolves itself into a choice of the next objective to be captured. The possible objectives are taken to be:

(1) RABAUL
(2) BUKA
(3) KIETA
(4) BUIN-FAISI
(5) Intermediate position between BUIN and GUADALCANAL-TULAGI. (A study of the last is stressed in Section I).

This list omits any unoccupied sites from BUIN to the north-westward.

There are strong reasons why enemy bases with airfields are our primary objectives, viz:

(a) The difficulty of establishing ourselves and building an airfield close to an enemy airfield which is already in operation.

(b) It is the quickest way to get an airfield for ourselves.
Before proceeding with a consideration of these objectives, the following "values" are set down:

(a) Dive bombing is the most accurate form of bombing - radius of action of present dive bombers, about 300 miles.

(b) Effective radius of other bombers: U.S. Heavy 700 miles, U.S. and Jap intermediate 600 miles.

(c) When operating against a base defended by fighters, bombers require fighter escort. Average effective radius of fighters: Japanese 500; present U.S. 250 (P-38's 350); future U.S. (F4U) 500.

(d) Fighters are by far the best defense against bombing. To be most effective, they need (a) farflung air warning net, (b) radar.

(e) Initial air operations on newly seized air fields are greatly hampered due to lack of bulk storage for gasoline and unloading facilities for gasoline and other supplies.

(f) It is highly desirable for an air base, perhaps critically so, that there be a secure anchorage for surface ships from which the airfield is easily accessible.

(g) In the initial stages after seizing an airfield, most important assistance can be furnished by air transport.

(h) The threat to communications constituted by enemy air forces within range has been confirmed by this war, particularly when such forces flank the line of communications.

(i) The logistic and military support for practically all of the allied effort in the SOLOMONS SEA AREA comes from the United States.

(j) The land in the SOLOMON SEA AREA is practically devoid of communications. This condition is accentuated in NEW GUINEA by the Owen Stanley Range.
C. Application of Tests.

From a consideration of the foregoing the following preliminary conclusions are drawn:

(a) It is apparent that the Japanese position in the NEW BRITAIN AREA is a most difficult one to outflank. The bypassing of one or more of the enemy positions, even to the point of making RABAUL the first objective, offers strong temptation. However, the following factors point toward conservatism in this respect:

(1) The system of bases that the Japanese hold outside of NEW GUINEA - i.e. KAVIENG, RABAUL, BUKA, KIETA, BUIN, and GASMATA, are mutually supporting and none, even RABAUL, may be considered a keystone, which if captured would cause the rest of the system to collapse.

(2) Even if all of northeast NEW GUINEA were in Allied hands, it would not constitute the base of operations which its strategic position would indicate. This is due to its lack of land communications. Its real communications are flanked by enemy bases.

(3) The real communication line of any base we seized would unavoidably be flanked by the enemy bases we bypassed. Thus it may be said that our advance cannot escape being of a frontal nature.

(4) In order to establish a base successfully with one or more enemy bases in our rear, or to seize two or more positions simultaneously, we would require a preponderance of strength which is certainly not in sight for the near future.

(b) It is believed that the need for continuing our offensive and keeping the pressure on the enemy will prevent us from waiting until we have such a large superiority that we can afford to take a step forward which would bypass any strong base of the enemy. It is also apparent that 300 miles is the present outside limit at which really effective air support (dive bombers with P-38 fighters) can be furnished from one of our air bases (in this case CACTUS). Inside of that range, the effectiveness of the air support will increase proportionally as the range decreases.
D. Retained Course of Action.

It is therefore decided herewith that our next objective in the SOLOMONS will be BUIN or a position short of BUIN. This will be further discussed in Section IV.

III. EXAMINATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY.

A. Survey of the Enemy's Situation.

In general it is believed that the enemy is capable of further offensive moves against our South Pacific positions, particularly GUADALCANAL, but it is quite possible, that, due to the losses he has suffered in previous attempts, he may have passed to the strategic defensive in this area.

In the Central Pacific area there is every indication that the enemy is on the defensive. This may not be by choice, but because the South Pacific venture does not leave sufficient strength to do anything else. The occupation of the GILBERTS is a minor affair and further extension southward from there would be opposed from FUNAFUTI. When and if the enemy establishes a strong defensive position in the South Pacific which will permit employment of carrier striking forces elsewhere, the probability of raids on our outlying Central Pacific positions will be increased.

In the North Pacific the Japs are intrenched at KISKA and can be expected to stay there until we occupy that place. There is no evidence of desire or capacity to move eastward along the ALEUTIANS.

The enemy is in good control of the PHILIPPINES and NEI. Complacent natives in occupied regions, except for parts of CHINA and the PHILIPPINES, plus propaganda will permit and even facilitate early exploitation unless the Allies can prevent.

The defensive position of JAPAN is nowhere seriously threatened at the moment. Although their offensives have been stopped on all fronts, capacity for defense is not disturbed to any significant extent.

B. Probable Enemy Courses of Action.

As indicated above, it now appears that the enemy no longer has capacity for further large expansion. The broad course of action, therefore, seems to be to maintain a strong defensive
position on all present fronts until exploitation of gains have made her Asiatic position too strong for the Allies to do more than accept a stalemate, and thus give Japan her ultimate war aim of complete hegemony in the far east.

Such a broad course of action does not rule out offensive moves in selected sectors to enhance overall defense. These must be expected, and may include:

(a) Further attempts to capture or at least neutralize GUADALCANAL.

(b) Establishment and strengthening of outlying positions in the SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA to provide defense in depth for the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and to provide bases for attrition attacks on Allied shipping and positions.

(c) Attacks on our lines of communications employing submarines, air and surface forces.

(d) Raids on our advanced positions from MIDWAY to GUADALCANAL.

(e) Troop movements toward INDIA.

(f) Political and 5th Column activities in INDIA.

(g) Raids toward north and west AUSTRALIA.

(h) Raids in the ALEUTIANS.

It is considered certain that any offensive moves by us will cause a strong reaction on the part of the enemy and that he will resist our advance bitterly.
IV. SELECTION OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION.

The choice for our next objective in the SOLOMONS has been narrowed to:

(a) The BUIN-SHORTLAND-TONOLEI base.
(b) In NEW GEORGIA Group.
(c) In CHOISEUL Island.
(d) YSABEL ISLAND.

With considerations of airfield, airfield site, and suitable hydrography in mind it will be seen from the information listed in Section I (admittedly incomplete) that the outstanding possibilities for our next objective are BUIN, MUNDA and RE-KATA. These will be considered in detail.

BUIN-SHORTLANDS

In this area the enemy is developing a major staging point and forward defense position for RABAUL. There are two active airfields, i.e., BUIN and BALLALE, and some indications of another under construction near BUIN. Seaplane operations are feasible. The exact defenses and number of troops are not known, but enough is known to state that the area is held in force.

SHORTLAND ISLAND is 300 miles from HENDERSON FIELD - the limit for SB2Ds. It is 265 miles from RABAUL - well within bombing range from there. It is also within easy bombing range of BUKA, NUMA NUMA, KIETA, GASMAITA, REKATA, and MUNDA. In other words the enemy can bomb with fighter cover, from nine active airplane operating positions as against our one at GUADALCANAL. This situation is made more favorable for the enemy if the total possible combatant carrier decks on each side are placed within range. On this basis it is reasonable to assume that we cannot hope for air superiority during seizure and development unless the enemy has been reduced to the point that he hasn't the aircraft to put on the fields. With his ability to move in aircraft from other areas this situation will probably not be brought about prior to our advance.

Our line of communication to BUIN will of course be flanked by MUNDA or any other intermediate air base the Jap may develop. Also, as has been pointed out, it is barely in range for our air support.
The harbor area is adequate for any use we may contemplate. While the chart indicates three good entrances, there is evidence that two of these are mined. Covering forces to support a landing should have no navigational difficulties except when within 40 miles of TONOFEI. They will, however, be subjected to all forms of enemy action when northwest of GUADALCANAL.

If APAs are employed they (assuming a daylight landing) probably would be discovered by about 0900 of the day before the landing and would be under continuous air attack from then until dark. If enemy trailing is efficient, and if he takes prompt action, it would be possible for the enemy to launch a night DD attack on the approaching APs a little before dawn of the landing day.

Even a later discovery would alert the defenses so that no such surprise as was effected on 7 August would be possible.

Our employment of IST's would put less eggs in each basket but would not have much more chance of surprise than APAs.

There is a possibility of transporting troops to the area from GUADALCANAL in landing craft. This offers some chance of undetected approach, but very little, for the night movement of the large enough number of these craft required, and the hiding by day, must be among enemy-held islands.

**MUNDA**

During December the enemy has developed at MUNDA a defended landing strip capable of operating bombers. Various air strikes and one bombardment by our forces have slowed down development but have not stopped the use of this strip.

MUNDA can be considered within enemy bombing range from SHORTLANDS Area (two strips), BUKA, NUMA NUMA, KIETA, and REKATA. This gives (if we include REKATA) six air positions to our one. Here again, and on the same basis as above, the enemy should have shore based air superiority as regards numbers. The employment of CV based planes is somewhat more to our advantage than it would be at BUNIN as enemy CV planes over MUNDA from eastward of the SOLOMONS group could be expected to strike only. Based on past performance, we would hardly expect the enemy to operate CVs in the Eastern SOLOMONS SEA. Also, to get close enough to MUNDA to be effective, enemy CVs would have to come within range of our shore based air.
The approach to MUNDA presents many difficulties. Any force entering HATHORN SOUND thru KOLA BAY must pass into restricted waters. Yet this seems the most favorable approach for APs. A frontal landing from the south would require landing craft to approach thru openings in the coral reef which can be covered easily from ashore, and which are narrow so as to prevent a broad approach. No good anchorage is seen to the south of MUNDA for transports or, later, for supply vessels.

The position of MUNDA, if a southern approach is used, is favorable for operations of our covering force, as the SOLOMONS chain gives cover from the northeast. We have the advantage of a clear approach and retirement to the southwestward whereas the enemy in acting against our landing must enter and leave the SOLOMONS SEA thru defiles.

If our landing were made in the KOLA BAY area, this advantage disappears.

REKATA

At present REKATA is only a seaplane base, but the large number of Japs there recently and a recent report from air reconnaissance suggests that they contemplate a landing strip in the adjacent coconut plantations. If they do get well along with such an endeavor, and if we can take it as we did at GUADALCANAL, so much the better. In any event, the adjacent terrain seems to lend itself to rapid airfield construction.

By air REKATA is 120 miles from GUADALCANAL - within easy air supporting distance. It is 190 miles from BUIN and 280 miles from BUKA. But, like MUNDA, it is probably beyond range of escorting fighters from RABAUL. There is little to choose between MUNDA and REKATA regarding vulnerability to enemy shore based air. Enemy carrier based air can be employed more readily against REKATA than MUNDA.

Neither side has the advantage in the off shore approaches. Major forces can operate with navigational freedom to the eastward. With some navigational hazard - but possibly an acceptable one - our CVs could operate to the north of RUSSELL ISLAND in support of a seizure of REKATA and with less probability of interference from enemy CVs.

The approach to REKATA offers a fairly wide choice for landing craft. No frontal attack is necessary. From meagre information of the terrain, and from recent photos, it would seem entirely possible to land on acceptable beaches both to the north and south of the harbor area in order to envelop the defenders.
Once in control of the harbor, a fine anchorage is available which should be safe from submarine attack, and which would minimize night attack by DDs and smaller craft. The APAs and AKAs so anchored would, however, have little freedom of movement during an air attack.

It should be noted that the southeast tip of ISABEL ISLAND offers an excellent staging point for landing craft. The run there is only 60 miles from GUADALCANAL, and the remaining run to REKATA of about 75 miles could be covered during darkness.

OTHER POSITIONS

These are generally described in the study of the characteristics of the theatre and are of interest mainly as staging points for landing craft, observation points, etc. Due to our lack of complete knowledge of the theatre under study at this time, we may find that the Japs have started development at points now not suspected. But we are forced to leave this possibility to the future, and assume that we have now covered all suitable military positions between GUADALCANAL and BUIN.

V. CONCLUSION.

(1) An attack for seizure of BUIN, without converting intermediate airfields to our own use, would probably result in unacceptable losses.

(2) The choice between MUNDA and REKATA, for our next objective in the SOLOMONS, is a close one, but hydrography makes the latter preferable – even though we have to build a field there ourselves.
BRIEF ESTIMATE ON TASK 2

TASK: Seizure of the remainder of the Solomon Islands, Lae, Salamaus, and the northeast coast of New Guinea.

APPRECIATION OF TASK:

Our situation in the Solomons and an estimate of our capabilities in the South Pacific area for reducing these islands is included in a separate estimate to which reference should be made. The task as stated mentions the Solomons first. This may be interpreted: (a) that operations there shall have priority over those in New Guinea; (b) that operations in the Solomons and New Guinea should be simultaneous; (c) that operations in the Solomons will be subordinated to those in New Guinea. From the point of view of strategy, it is believed that the operations should be simultaneous for the following reasons:

1. Would occupy enemy forces on two fronts and probably cause division of his forces and effort.
2. Enemy concentration against one front would facilitate our operations on the other front.
3. Would permit maximum effort being produced by both Sopac and Sowespac forces at the same time. This is extremely important because inaction in either area by mere holding forces will debilitate them as much physically as if engaged in active operations.
(4) Our forces in the two areas will be mutually supporting and, except against surface forces approaching from the north and west of New Britain, our major surface forces from present bases can cover not only operations in the Solomon Sea but also be in position to furnish a measure of support to the Midway-Oahu line, the holding of which is the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet's primary task.

(5) Will furnish a broad base for operations instead of requiring projection from one point which will produce a salient with vulnerable flanks.

In view of the foregoing, the appreciation of the task indicates that operations in the Solomons and New Guinea should be simultaneous.

COURSES OF ACTION:

The remainder of this study will confine itself to consideration of the New Guinea area; that is, to the capture of Lae, Salamaua, and the northeast coast of New Guinea.

The allied position on the northeast coast of New Guinea is that they hold the entire area east of Gona with the exception of one Japanese pocket in the vicinity of Sanananda. The reduction of this pocket is only a question of time, but it may require such effort that further debilitation of own forces in the area will result. As of this date, there are available for offensive combat 6 infantry divisions; 5 of these are not
immediately available for combat and will not be for several months; 1 division is just now proceeding to the Buna area to relieve divisions that have been in combat there. Australian militia is considered unsuitable for any employment other than garrison duty. However, the militia should be employed to hold Milne Bay and the Buna area when it has been consolidated. There is no doubt that the troop situation is bad but this is not taken as conclusive that no offensive operations are possible for many months. This statement will be tested in the following.

The Japanese are now in occupation of the Mambare River mouth, Salamaua, Lae, Finschafen, Madang, and Wewak on the north coast of New Guinea; and, definitely, at Cape Gloucester and Gasmata in New Britain. The strength at each of these places is not known but is probably not over one or two thousand; if the Japanese are following their usual method of holding with minimum forces until a place is actually threatened. Each of these places, except the Mambare River mouth, has an airfield and this is their only importance. Air distances in nautical miles of these places from Buna are approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Miles</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mambare</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamaua</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lae</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finschafen</td>
<td>170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madang</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wewak</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Gloucester</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasmata</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We must face the fact that from 6 bases the Japanese are within easy range of Buna. Any major effort involving combatant surface forces in this area could be undertaken only if all these airfields were neutralized. Our available forces are incapable of accomplishing this, so we must reject the idea of a major effort in this area at this time. However, if we adopt a passive attitude on the northeast coast of New Guinea at this time, we will play into the hands of the enemy. We will give him opportunity to develop his airfields; bring in large amounts of supplies, ammunition, and aviation gasoline; improve the defenses of each base; and consolidate his holding on the entire area. The only way to prevent this is to maintain a continual pressure on the enemy.

What appears to be a suitable course of action, under the conditions stated, is to reduce enemy control and positions by infiltration; that is, to seize one position at a time, when and as we have the forces available. This course should have great effect in upsetting enemy plans because he would not know where we would strike next; and it would retain an attitude of offensive for us. This last is an important morale factor, not only for troops but for the Australian and American people.

The plan of operations under this course of action may be boldly outlined as follows:

1. Improve own airfields so as to accommodate any type plane in any weather. Provide adequate logistic support, particularly aviation gasoline supply, bombs, and repair
facilities. This will involve movement of large volume of cargo by water. We have meager information on how forces in northeast New Guinea were moved and supplied but we do know that shipping was used to move tanks and other heavy equipment to the combat area. The vessels used were undoubtedly small because the waters do not permit the use of large vessels and there is no knowledge of losses of large ships. The chief requirements for this phase of the operations is for a large number of small vessels which can move by night and hide during the day when under enemy air range.

If the vessels required for this movement are not now available in the Sowespac area, they should be provided from LST, LCT, and LCI(L) and be augmented by vessels from Australia. The Sopac area is at the moment unable to furnish such vessels and its eventual ability to do so will depend upon the rate of flow to that area and the requirements in the Solomons. It is contemplated that the movement of these vessels to forward areas would be without surface support but that they would be given air cover when required. The initiation of these operations should begin immediately within the means available and within 2 to 3 months should build our air bases to the point where they can support sustained operations.

2. During the time when own bases are being built up, their security against Japanese attack must be ensured. Apparently, the present intention is to retain infantry
of only 1 division in northeast New Guinea. The Australian militia is considered suitable for garrison troops only, but this should permit their use at Milne Bay, Tufi, and the Buna area. With our air established in the area, the Japanese will send no major amphibious expedition to attack Buna or Milne Bay. Protection against infiltration would be the chief requirement.

3. During the period in which our own positions are being consolidated, offensive troops will be resting and reorganizing. Amphibious training should be conducted during this period. This amphibious training should be directed to preparing troops for the kind of operations which are discussed in the following paragraph. When our positions are consolidated, several divisions of troops should be ready for further offensive combat.

4. When the foregoing 3 phases have been completed, troops and vessels will be available for a move against Salamaua or Lae. It is contemplated that a move against either or both these places will be made in LST, LCT, LCI(L), APC, or similar vessels. Any great concentration of these vessels at one place would be seen by enemy air observation so dispersion and individual movement are indicated. The Japanese have had much success with such operations and have usually obtained their initial objective before they were discovered. Vessels are hidden by day or camouflaged to appear as islands. The last part of the advance to the
objective and the landing would be made at night. It is contemplated that the place selected for landing should be undefended and that there would be no necessity for naval gunfire to cover the landing. The actual attack against the objective would be orthodox land warfare. The plan of operations herein visualized would also make use of commando troops which are known to be under training in Australia, and parachute troops if such are available. Once it has been determined to attack a place, the troops assigned to the task should be in such superior strength that they can accomplish the task quickly and not/bogged down as has been the case in Guadalcanal and in New Guinea.

The foregoing operations appear to be suitable and feasible and sufficient forces should be available at the time they can begin. It is not presumed that the foregoing is an exact reflection of the intentions in Sowespac but it outlines what would be suitable under existing circumstances.

ASSISTANCE BY CINCPAC:

The present commitments of Cincpac will not be detailed here. What the requirements in the Solomons may become are problematical but it is quite certain that the only assistance which the Sowespac area will give to operations along that island chain is sporadic air support. Despite present commitments and future requirements in the Solomons, Cincpac should be able to assist an offensive in the New Guinea area as follows:
1. By air operations from Guadalcanal.
2. By providing cover to the eastward with surface forces and acting as a magnet to draw Japanese Surface forces toward the areas in which our surface forces operate. Appropriate targets for ships are other ships and neither side will subject its combatant ships to shore-based air attack unless there is probability of inflicting serious losses on enemy combatant ships.
3. By making available to Sowespac such LST, LCT, LCI(L), APC, and other landing craft not required for operations in the Solomons.
4. By making available navy dive bombers until such time as the army becomes proficient in the employment of this type.
5. By making available APDs not required for operations in the Solomons. These vessels can readily be shifted from one area to the other for special tasks.
6. By employing the Argonaut on special assignments when there is need for her in addition to the 3 cargo carrying submarines which are to be assigned to Sowespac.
7. By making large AP and AK available to move troops and supplies in areas outside enemy air range.
January 15, 1943

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

CINCPAC EXAMINATION

SETTING SUN CAMPAIGN
I - General

1. The Campaign is set forth in such general terms that several assumptions will have to be made in this examination. To be of value these assumptions must be realistic.

2. This examination will test the plan for suitability, feasibility, and consequences as to cost.

II - Suitability

1. A plan which makes it possible to destroy the air and seapower of Japan is suitable. We should then first determine whether the taking of CHICHI Jima will place our forces in contact with enemy forces in such ratios that we can destroy them. This plan assumes that CHICHI Jima is so vital to Japan that his entire Navy will be employed to defend or recapture it. There is no way of telling whether or not this assumption is correct. It may be that he will depend on shore based air and troops for its defense. While our plan requires our entire fleet to cover the seizure of the Bonins, there is no positive assurance that the enemy would interpose with his whole fleet. Likewise, there is no assurance that he would expose his whole air power. A good portion, under such circumstances, might be retained for the defense of HONSHU. It seems probable, however, that a thrust so close to the Empire would call forth all or nearly all of his available surface and air strength.
2. The next question is what use can we make of CHICHI Jima. Assuming that CHICHI Jima and necessary near islands are securely occupied by our forces, and that our lines of communications are open to PEARL, and that we still have surface and air superiority up to that point, we are then in a position to:

(a) Bomb Tokyo 523 miles away.

Such a course alone will not destroy enemy surface and air strength or defeat Japan. London is about the same distance from Berlin, and much fewer planes can bomb Tokyo from the BONINS than can bomb Berlin from the London area. Tokyo is more susceptible to damage from bombs than Berlin. It seems more probable that the Japs would destroy our air in detail.

The foregoing is predicated on the consolidation of CHICHI Jima as an adequate base in our hands. ONI Monograph #60 gives the best available information of enemy installations there, and of the topography. It would appear that the rugged nature of this and adjacent islands precludes the construction of extensive airfields within a reasonable time. There is believed to be a naval airfield on the south side of FUTAMI-KO which could be made serviceable at once. The size of this is not known but the chart indicates that it cannot be over 5 - 7 thousand feet in length and 3 - 4 hundred feet wide. No other sites are seen which seem
to permit rapid construction.

In view of this it appears probable that the bottleneck for a land based air offensive against Japan proper is at CHICHI Jima itself. It is hard to visualize more than two or three squadrons at a time taking off from there on offensive missions. The size of WAKE and MARCUS Islands will not permit large numbers of planes to be banked up waiting ferrying westward. Thus, regardless of the number of planes banked up at MIDWAY, it will be difficult to move substantial numbers forward.

Our bombing operations, therefore, probably would be limited to minor raids. The bombers could have VF coverage the whole distance, but even at night the chances of bombers reaching the target area in substantial numbers seem doubtful.

With enemy knowledge of our probable use of the airfield we could expect constant air attacks. These would further reduce our offensive effort.

(b) Intensify our submarine patrols against enemy trade.

An adequate base in the BONINS would be of value in that it would result in more submarines per day on station. The existence of a Jap sub base in the BONINS capable of quick conversion to our use is doubted.
While there are at least three places in the group which could be developed as an advance base, construction of facilities ashore would be a matter of months. In the meantime, however, we could support patrols with submarine tenders. The tenders anchored in FUTAMI-KO could be given some protection against enemy submarine and surface attack in a reasonable time. Acceptable AA protection would not be available for at least three months after occupation.

(c) Make raids in force along Japanese trade routes.

A blockade of Japan by a naval force basing at CHICHI Jima does not seem possible. Raids would interfere seriously with Jap trade but not stop it.

There is no assurance that such raids would cause Japan to expose his fleet. The chances are that he would if he could bring it to bear on a part of ours.

The only good harbor in the BONINS is at FUTAMI-KO. It is large enough to provide anchorage for approximately: 1 Div BBs, 2 CVs, and screen. There would be very little security for such a force and continued basing there would be most hazardous. All logistic support would have to be brought in. Until the main naval strength of Japan is destroyed or contained in other areas it does not seem feasible to employ this as a base for raids.
(d) Use it as a stepping stone to an invasion of Japan.

No adequate force will be available in the foreseeable future for such a project.

CONCLUSION

The plan is not suitable.

III - Feasibility

1. Present estimate of surface forces available on August 1, 1943, in the Pacific are: (Attrition neglected)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>CL</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>DD</td>
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<td>111</td>
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<td>SS</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>APD</td>
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<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The following differences appear as between our estimate of ships available and those stated in the plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Own</th>
<th>Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAs</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. A conservative estimate of enemy garrison troops are:

- **WAKE** - 3000
- **MARCUS** - 2500
- **CHICHI Jima** - 6000

**Total:** 11,500

Our assault force estimated necessary to seize above mentioned bases would then be around 50,000. This would call for about 40 APAs against 25 available. Ten AKAs available might do.

4. The plan requires the ferrying of large numbers of planes westward from WAKE. Based on performance in December 1941, the enemy can launch heavy air attacks on WAKE from the MARSHALLS. As there is nothing in the plan to neutralize this, it is assumed that this bombing will be accepted. Thus, severe damage to planes in transit must be expected.

5. Due to time difference, the attack on WAKE at daybreak will be known at MARCUS before the daybreak attack there. Likewise, the attacks on WAKE and MARCUS will be known before the
daybreak attack on CHICHI Jima. The element of surprise can be considered lacking west of WAKE unless there is a readjustment. Indeed, tactical surprise cannot be counted on except possibly at CHICHI Jima. An undetected approach of the slow OBBS and ACVs seems too much to expect.

6. The plan requires that five task forces or groups attack simultaneously or nearly so, from position not mutually supporting, thus exposing each to superior enemy strength.

7. The logistic considerations are appended.
8. A study of the employment of land forces is appended.
9. The plan involves the employment of almost every combatant type in the Pacific - all in a high state of training. This would mean the complete withdrawal of Sopac forces for at least two months. It does not seem probable that we can afford to depend on shore based air and garrison troops in the Sopac until that area is much stronger. Specifically, it would be reasonably safe only when we have completed Tasks TWO and THREE of the current campaign in the Sopac. August 1, 1943, is an early estimate for this completion.

10. While the employment of ACVs is not stated in the plan, it is assumed that they will be required to provide air coverage for the accompanying surface vessels and assist in the reduction of shore defenses prior to the landing. This type has been in the Pacific Fleet only a short time. None has been used in actual combat to date. Their tactical employment in a task
force is now under test. Cinopac cannot state definitely at
this time that they cannot be employed as assumed above, but
does feel that the prospects of development for such employ-
ment and in such numbers by August 1, 1943, is questionable.

CONCLUSION

The plan is not feasible with strength now in sight available to Cinopac.

IV - Consequences as to Cost.

1. In substance, the plan proposes to fight a full fledged
naval battle in the vicinity of the Bonins; a hazardous of
most if not all of our naval strength in a disposition of forces
that allows piece meal defeat.

2. If the enemy does not expose his fleet, and after we
have taken the positions named, we are faced with a different
logistic problem which offers Japan extremely favorable condi-
tions for successful attrition tactics.

CONCLUSION

The plan is attractively bold and does not offer suf-
ficient returns for the risk involved.

V - Recommendations.

(a) That the plan be kept alive until circumstances are
more favorable.

(b) That continued study be made of plans to short circuit
the campaign WPL-46-PC, which now appears to offer Japan oppor-
tunity to remain on the defensive long enough to exploit the Far
East, gain hegemony there, and force us into a stalemate.
1. The aspect of the SUNSET Operation herein discussed is that affected by the number of land forces required for the entire operation. The most important factor from this viewpoint is that overall success of the operation depends upon assured capture of three widely separated places. Delay in obtaining complete possession of the airfields at WAKE, MARCUS, and CHICHI Jima may jeopardize the entire operation; and failure to capture any one of those three islands will result in failure of the entire operation. Manifestly, the ground forces for the attack of each of the three islands must be in sufficient superiority quickly to capture and eliminate Japanese ground forces. A small margin of superiority of force, which, given time, could completely capture the islands, will not be acceptable.

2. Heavy personnel losses must be expected where initial assault waves are compelled to land over beaches which are defended by obstacles and fire. At WAKE the whole seaward shoreline is known to be heavily defended and it is presumed that a similar condition obtains at MARCUS. At CHICHI Jima there are few feasible landing beaches along the otherwise rock and cliff bound coast. These few beaches are assumed to be defended and opposition at the beach should be expected. Our only experience in landing against Jap opposition has been at TULAGI, GAVUTU, and MAKAMBO. The initial estimate of forces for this attack was too small, but fortunately a reserve was available to turn the
tide. We employed about 6000 troops against about 1000 and fighting continued for several days. The foregoing is stated not for the purpose of deriving the ratio of attacking to defending troops required for success, but for the purpose of emphasizing that the SUNSET Operation must have sufficient land forces assigned to accomplish the capture of each island quickly and completely. This factor is given its appropriate weight in the following estimate.

3. Another vital factor common to capture of all bases is the amount of naval gunfire and air support to be given the landing forces. The four ACV allotted for WAKE and MARCUS will not have sufficient bombers to provide adequate support for a large scale daylight landing and for further troop operations ashore. One old BB can cover only 17,600 square yards with required density of gunfire. Two old BB will be incapable of providing the required gunfire support at either WAKE or MARCUS, measured in terms of volume, distribution, and effectiveness. The foregoing statement on adequacy of air and naval gunfire support is made to show that the aircraft and fire support vessels assigned in the SUNSET plan are insufficient. However, it is assumed that our troops will not be employed in a landing operation without giving them adequate fire support and no increase in landing forces is included in the below estimates because of these two factors. A revision in estimate of ACV and fire support ships for the different operations seem indicated.
4. As soon as the islands are seized, they will require base personnel for repairs, construction, maintenance, aircraft servicing, and defense. Only base defense personnel will be considered herein. Such base personnel will have to provide and man defensive coastal and AA weapons with which offensive troops are not equipped. Strong AA protection must be provided at each base if the general purpose is to be achieved. These requirements are additional to those for the initial seizure.

5. At WAKE and MARCUS there are no harbors or even sheltered areas where debarking and landing of troops can be accomplished without interference from the weather. Subsequent unloading of supplies will have to be done by boat and barges and will require much manpower and time. Enemy air and submarine attacks can interfere with such operations to the greatest practicable extent. Heavy losses in men and material must be anticipated and provided for in the initial plans.

**WAKE ISLAND**

The Marine Forces, 14th Naval District, for several months, have been studying the recapture of WAKE. Although their estimates have not been formally submitted and accepted, they will be used as a basis for the WAKE estimate herein. The troops required for the initial move to WAKE are estimated as follows:

(a) Assault troops 12,500
(b) 2 Defense Battalions 2,500

TOTAL 15,000
MARCUS ISLAND

The estimated enemy strength at MARCUS is about 2,500 men. This island is considerably smaller than WAKE and has much less shoreline. The Japs have not had the incentive to defend this island as strongly as WAKE and its position makes it less vulnerable to attack than WAKE. Landing troops and supplies on this island will be a hazardous and laborious operation. It is estimated that, based on the foregoing assumption, the following troops should be in the initial movement to MARCUS:

(a) Assault troops 8,000
(b) Defense Bn (Reinf with small and medium cal. AA) 2,000
TOTAL 10,000

CHICHI JIMA ISLAND

CHICHI Jima is the southern of three islands that lie along a North-South line about 10 miles long. All three islands are fortified and mutually supporting by gunfire. To secure CHICHI Jima for our use, therefore, requires simultaneous operations against three islands. Little is known of the strength of forces on these islands but what has been called a conservative estimate places the garrison at about 6,500. The terrain on all three islands is rugged and difficult of transit except on established highways of which CHICHI Jima has a good network. The coasts are generally rocky with cliffs that prevent
landing from the sea. The estimate of forces required for the capture and subsequent defense of the CHICHI Jima area is:

(a) Assault Troops 22,000
(b) Defense Bn. 3,000

TOTAL 25,000

RECAPITULATION

WAKE 15,000
MARCUS 10,000
CHICHI Jima 25,000

TOTAL 50,000
ESTIMATE OF LAND FORCES REQUIRED FOR SUNSET OPERATIONS

1. The aspect of the SUNSET Operation herein discussed is that affected by the number of land forces required for the entire operation. The most important factor from this viewpoint is that overall success of the operation depends upon assured capture of three widely separated places. Delay in obtaining complete possession of the airfields at WAKE, MARCUS, and CHICHIJIMA may jeopardize the entire operation; and failure to capture any one of those three islands will result in failure of the entire operation. Manifestly, the ground forces for the attack of each of the three islands must be in sufficient superiority quickly to capture and eliminate Japanese ground forces. A small margin of superiority of force, which, given time, could completely capture the islands, will not be acceptable.

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3. Another vital factor common to capture of all bases is the amount of naval gunfire and air support to be given the landing forces. The four ACV allotted for WAKE and MARCUS will not have sufficient bombers to provide adequate support for a large scale daylight landing and for further troop operations ashore. One old BB can cover only 17,600 square yards with required density of gunfire. Two old BB will be incapable of providing the required gunfire support at either WAKE or MARCUS, measured in terms of volume, distribution, and effectiveness. The foregoing statement on adequacy of air and naval gunfire support is made to show that the aircraft and fire support vessels assigned in the SUNSET plan are insufficient. However, it is assumed that our troops will not be employed in a landing operation without giving them adequate fire support and no increase in landing forces is included in the below estimates because of these two factors. A revision in estimate of ACV and fire support ships for the different operations seem indicated.
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The Marine Forces, 14th Naval District, for several months, have been studying the recapture of WAKE. Although their estimates have not been formally submitted and accepted, they will be used as a basis for the WAKE estimate herein. The troops required for the initial move to WAKE are estimated as follows:

(a) Assault troops 12,500
(b) 2 Defense Battalions 2,500
**TOTAL** 15,000
MARCUS ISLAND

The estimated enemy strength at MARCUS is about 2,500 men. This island is considerably smaller than WAKE and has much less shoreline. The Japs have not had the incentive to defend this island as strongly as WAKE and its position makes it less vulnerable to attack than WAKE. Landing troops and supplies on this island will be a hazardous and laborious operation. It is estimated that, based on the foregoing assumption, the following troops should be in the initial movement to MARCUS:

(a) Assault troops 8,000
(b) Defense Bn (Reinf with small and medium cal. AA) 2,000

TOTAL 10,000

CHICHI JIMA ISLAND

CHICHI Jima is the southern of three islands that lie along a North-South line about 10 miles long. All three islands are fortified and mutually supporting by gunfire. To secure CHICHI Jima for our use, therefore, requires simultaneous operations against three islands. Little is known of the strength of forces on these islands but what has been called a conservative estimate places the garrison at about 6,500. The terrain on all three islands is rugged and difficult of transit except on established highways of which CHICHI Jima has a good network. The coasts are generally rocky with cliffs that prevent
landing from the sea. The estimate of forces required for the capture and subsequent defense of the CHICHI Jima area is:

(a) Assault Troops  22,000
(b) Defense Bn.  3,000

**TOTAL**  25,000

**RECAPITULATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAKE</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCUS</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHICHI Jima</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>50,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Logistic Considerations

To enable a study under this heading certain assumptions must be made in addition to those mentioned in the comments of the preceding text.

The main assumptions are:

1. That all surface units (exclusive of submarines, transports and cargo ships) and carrier aircraft must be supported for thirty days exclusive of time required to reach initial attack positions.

2. That surface units will proceed from PEARL to initial attack positions and return to PEARL at average speeds of 15 knots.

3. That distances travelled by task forces from PEARL to initial attack positions will be 20% in excess of shortest routes.

4. That after reaching initial attack positions and for a period of thirty days thereafter surface units involved will average not less than one day in five at 25 knots, for vessels capable of that speed, and at maximum sustained speed for other vessels. The return trip to PEARL is assumed to be included within this period.

5. That the three occupation forces will be landed with initial stocks of supplies of food and ammunition for 60 days.

6. That aviation gasoline in the amount of 500,000 gallons must be landed with or shortly after each of the three occupation forces, and that a minimum of 1,000,000 gallons monthly
supply must be furnished to each of the seized bases. It is to be noted that this supply must be in drums for the initial occupation and for a period of at least three months thereafter.

7. That all cargo ships and transports will retire to PEARL immediately following the occupation and discharge of cargo. As noted in paragraph 1, this eliminates necessity of providing logistic support for transports and cargo ships during entire operation while away from PEARL.

8. That tankers supporting the plan which proceed to PEARL for reloading will return to a median point at Lat. 30° N, Long. 150° E (arbitrarily selected for computation of distance only).

Premised on the foregoing, the following estimates of fuel are submitted. For convenience this analysis is made in detail for each of the task forces involved and then summarized. It should be noted that in the absence of certain organizational details of the Plan regarding destroyer and cruiser escorts, an appropriate available number of these vessels has been added to each of the task forces indicated. Combatant vessels remaining at sea for the thirty day period after initial attacks are assumed to return with bunker capacities filled to 50%.

**TF 7.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10 ACV</th>
<th>Distance PEARL to Initial Point (less 20%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 OBB</td>
<td>4000 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 DD</td>
<td>11.1 days at 15 knots.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 APA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 AKA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Fuel Requirements (Barls)

## Explanation of column headings:

1. Type in Task Force.
2. Average bunker capacity for type.
3. Fuel required from PEARL to attack position.
4. Fuel required for 24 days at 15 knots.
5. Fuel required for 6 days at high speed.
6. Sum of columns (3), (4) and (5) minus 1/2 column (2) x number type in task force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>853359</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TF 7.1

- **Distance PEARL to Initial Point (≠ 20%)**
- **2400** miles.
- **6.7 days at 15 knots.**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1809</td>
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<td>6000</td>
<td>276958</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TF 7.2

- **Distance PEARL to Initial Point (≠ 20%)**
- **3100** miles.
- **8.6 days at 15 knots.**

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OBB</td>
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<td>9890</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TF 7.3

- **Distance PEARL to Initial Point (≠ 20%)**
- **3700** miles.
- **10.3 days at 15 knots.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>6000</td>
<td>162732</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TF 7.4

This submarine TF will require no logistic support while in area.

---

1331
TF 7.5
5 CV (Essex type)
6 BB (fast)
5 CA
8 CL
2 GL (AA)
27 DD

Distance PEARL to Initial Point
(7 25) 3700 miles
10.3 days at 15 knots.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CV (Essex) 38000 11639 27120 21600 206795
BB (fast) 40000 9785 22800 21000 201510
CA 20000 8034 18720 16800 167770
CL 14700 6901 14100 14100 238248
CL (AA) 8900 3708 6000 6000 27696
DD 3400 2781 6480 360786 366147

Summary of Fuel Requirements

| TF 7  | 853359  | 20730 | Avg/Day |
| TF 7.1 | 369888  | 10000 |
| TF 7.2 | 327074  | 8470 |
| TF 7.3 | 360786  | 8950 |
| TF 7.4 | None    | ---- |
| TF 7.5 | 1208166 | 30000 |

Total 3119273 Bbls 78150 Bbl/day

Tankers required to furnish the above quantity of fuel can be considered from either of two standpoints; viz., a sufficient number assigned to carry the total requirement in one outbound voyage from PEARL, or by a combination of single trippers and those which can make two deliveries to the Task Forces during the period involved. The second of these schemes is the more economical but is definitely limited as to the number of tankers which can make two deliveries. This follows from consideration of the fact that although the average consumption of all task forces is approximately equal to a tanker load per day that no fueling at sea except of destroyers would take place during the first ten days.
Since the turn around time of a 15 knot tanker from the assumed rendezvous point of L 30° N and 150° E and PEARL is 18 days by the shortest route, it is apparent that tankers making two deliveries during the whole operation would have to be released to pick up their second loads at a time not over eleven or twelve days from initial departure from PEARL. Again assuming that the average rate of consumption is a tanker load per day for all forces, it follows that the maximum number of tankers which could make two deliveries is about ten. Actually this number should be estimated at not more than eight. On the basis of 80,000 bbl load for the average fleet tanker there will be required, therefore, the following number of these vessels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Capacity (bbls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 at 160,000 bbls (2 deliveries)</td>
<td>1,280,000 bbls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 &quot; 80,000 &quot; (1 delivery)</td>
<td>1,839,273 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals 31</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,119,273 &quot;</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The present number of fast fleet tankers assigned to the Pacific Fleet is 15. This number (neglecting attrition) will be increased to 23 by August 1943. To meet the fuel requirements of the Plan, therefore, 8 additional fleet type tankers would be needed. In this connection it should be noted that commercial type allocated tankers are unsuitable because of lack of facilities for fueling at sea, and further that all of these now assigned would have to be employed in replenishing stocks at PEARL and in other areas.

In addition to the problem of supporting ships of the Plan with fuel during the active period consideration must be
given to topping off of bunkers prior to departure from and after return to PEARL. Assuming an average of 8000 bbls. for each of the 232 ships involved for the above purpose there would be required, in addition to the 3,119,273 bbls for the main operation, about 2,000,000 bbls., or a total of 5,119,273 bbls. Prudence would demand that most of this amount be accumulated at PEARL in advance of the operation. Using a thirty day cycle and an average capacity of 80,000 bbls, it would take 10 tankers five months to provide at PEARL 4,000,000 bbls of the above amount. If the Plan is to be undertaken the foregoing 10 tankers should be assigned immediately in addition to those now available to the Pacific Fleet.

**Gasoline and Diesel Requirements**

No difficulty should be experienced in meeting these requirements except as indicated under the heading of general comments which follows.

**Provisions and Miscellaneous**

Same remarks as under the preceding paragraph.

**General Comments**

At WAKE and MARCUS, and to an undetermined extent at CHICHI Jima, the problem of landing equipment and supplies of all kinds in large quantities will be extremely difficult. It would be unwise to estimate discharge rates at more than 400 tons per ship per day. On this basis the unloading times for APA's will average 10 days and for AKA's 15 days. Enemy sub-
marine and aircraft attacks may, and probably will, extend these periods. Attention should also be directed to the improbability of discharging cargo at WAKE and MARCUS from more than about four ships simultaneously. The formidable problem of getting equipment and supplies ashore quickly should, therefore, be thoroughly appreciated. Failure to do so might well spell disaster for the whole expedition.

It should be stressed particularly that it is vital to the transfer and effectiveness of aircraft banked at MIDWAY to provide at all three seized points immediately on landing a sufficient quantity of aviation gasoline. This amount should not be less than 500,000 gals. (20,000 drums). The man power necessary to handle this quantity is alone of such magnitude as to clearly indicate the tremendous difficulty of establishing logistic supplies during the occupation period.

Conclusions

Logistically the Plan can be met subject to the following conditions:

(a) That approximately 5,000,000 bbls of fuel oil be accumulated in advance at PEARL. This will require five months and 10 more tankers than are now available to the Pacific Fleet.

(b) That 8 more fast Fleet tankers be made available in addition to those now in sight (neglecting attrition) by August 1943. A total of 31 are required.
In view of the acute tanker situation in other than Pacific areas it is extremely unlikely that either conditions (a) or (b) can be satisfied. This conclusion, coupled with the previously mentioned difficulty of physically landing and handling the tremendous quantities of supplies during the occupation period, render the Plan impracticable from a logistic viewpoint.
ADDENDA TO ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION SOLOMON ISLANDS, DATED JANUARY 15, 1943.

1. No change is made in the Estimate of January 15th. The problem remains the same. Changes which result from progress made in the past 30 days are covered herein.

2. All organized enemy resistance on GUADALCANAL ceased on Feb. 9th. This makes possible the reduction of troops thereon.

3. RUSSELL Islands are to be occupied about Feb. 21st. The only immediate effect will be to deny it to the enemy. Work will be started at once to build an airfield on that Island.

4. The enemy appears to be completing the construction of an airfield at VILA.

5. During the past 30 days we have lost one CA and one DD. The enemy has lost several DDs.
January 16th.

PBYs were over KAHILI from 2300 to 0100 (local) to harass the enemy. Earlier in the evening (2000 local) 5 B17s dropped bombs on the airfield. Yesterday there were two raids on MUNDA, at noon and at 5:30 p.m. (local). Except for these raids and the preparations for the offensive on GUADALCANAL scheduled for the 18th (local), the Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet.

Except for T.G. 67.5 (4 DDs) enroute to GUADALCANAL for a bombardment mission, and the normal logistic moves, all major forces are in port.

CTF 8 170935 gives the progress of the GROWBAR operation.

No new enemy developments were noted.

January 17th.

No major sightings were reported in any Pacific area. Usual air activity in the central SOLOMONS continued. Ground action on GUADALCANAL was progressing satisfactorily.

Reports from our submarines on patrol are most encouraging. Sankings are increasing as more submarines become available along productive routes. During the recent Subpac concentration in the RABAUL area there was a considerable drop in our sinkings along trade routes. It is interesting also to note that our mine plants off HONSHU are successful and well worth the effort.

Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS stopped air operations scheduled for today.

Nothing has been learned today of the deployment of major enemy units or of enemy plans. Large scale enemy operations are expected in the SOLOMONS Sea area between now and the end of the month.
January 18th.

Comsopac 191022 (four part) is his operations plan 2-43 for the bombing and bombardment of the VILA area commencing January 23rd local.

Routine air operations in the SOLOMONS were hampered by bad weather. On GUADALCANAL the reconnaissance in force has developed into a full scale offensive toward the westward.

The S.S. LIPSCOMB LYKES grounded on DURAND REEF, to the eastward of NOUMEA, and may be a total loss. A salvage attempt will be made.

Air Commodore Goddard, RNZAF, conferred at length with O1 today regarding the command set up for NEW ZEALAND air operating in the Pacific Theater outside of their homeland. The matter will be considered further in a few days upon the arrival at PEARL of Rear Admiral Wilkinson (Deputy SoPac).

CTF 8 states that lack of aerial photo planes in the ALEUTIANS is seriously affecting his plans for future operations. Unloading is progressing slowly at AMCHITKA but is improving.

There was an air raid alarm on OAHU during the night. All clear was sounded at 1:00 a.m. The alarm was caused by a false radar contact.

No new enemy developments were observed.

January 19th.

There were no major sightings in the area. A fairly large concentration is noted in the SHORTLAND area with considerable moves between the NEW GEORGIA group and BOUGAINVILLE. Several air strikes were made but only one hit was claimed - a 500 lb. skip bomb from 250 feet on a DD. Bad weather continues to hamper air operations.

Very fine reports were received from our submarines. Off TRUK the SILVERSIDES sank one AO, one submarine, and got five hits in three AKs. The surface vessels were in a convoy. It is interesting to note that the convoy was intercepted as a result of decrision analysis. The GREENLING sank one AK off NEW HANOVER. The SWORDFISH reports one hit on an AK off BOUGAINVILLE Strait. In the same vicinity the NAUTILUS got one hit on a MOGAMI Class cruiser.

It seems probable that the TOKYO Express of one cruiser and seven DDs ran yesterday, but was not intercepted. In this

(Continued)
connection, the five 2100 ton DDs sent to TULAGI (TG 67.5) to operate from there as a striking force, are returning to ESPIRITU SANTO. The reason for this is not reported.

No report has been received regarding ground action today on GUADALCANAL.

Unloading at AMCHITKA continues under difficulties. The MIDDLETON is being unloaded by man power. It is confirmed that the WORDEN sank on January 12 with loss of 14 enlisted men. Bad weather has prevented effective attack on enemy shipping at KISKA. Of five B-24s sent to attack there none reached the objective and four were destroyed in crashes on return.

The location of major enemy vessels continues obscure. It is probable that 2 CVs are in the TRUK area, and that 3 CVs have just about completed intensive training in Empire waters. Signs continue to point to major operations in the SOLOMONS Sea area in the near future. No major threat is seen in any other direction but raids in the HAWAIIAN area are still a possibility.

January 20th.

Again today our air operations in the Central SOLOMONS were greatly hampered by bad weather. Minor sightings in the BUIN area were reported. The large concentration of enemy ships at RABAUL continues.

Task Forces 63 and 67 are operating in preparation for the bombing and bombardment of VILA (NEW GEORGIA) scheduled to commence the 23rd (local). Other task forces are in port.

The enemy dropped eight small bombs on ESPIRITU SANTO today. There were no casualties or damage.

Enemy planes were reported over GUADALCANAL last night. Thus, Secnav and Cinpac might have seen a show as they were there on inspection.

It seems probable that the ARGONAUT was lost in action off GASMATA January 10th (local).

Enemy subs torpedoed two tankers off SYDNEY the 16th (local). One of these, the MOBILUBE, reached SYDNEY and the other sank.

Comamphibforpac will prepare plans jointly with the Army for the reduction and occupation of KISKA on the assumption that he will, under the Commander Northern Force, command the operation when and if it is ordered.

There were no new enemy developments.
January 21st.

Routine air activities in the central SOLOMONS continue to be hampered by bad weather. However, the weather is improving. No important or significant sightings were reported.

The GRAMPUS returning from patrol in the RABAUL area reports sinking one 7000 ton AK; one 8000 ton AP, one 10000 ton AP. Also, she probably sank the DD ASASHIO.

Enemy planes were over GUADALCANAL again last night on harassing missions.

The clipper which left PEARL for SAN FRANCISCO yesterday is presumed lost. Embarked was Comsubpac and nine other key Pacific Fleet officers.

In spite of unfavorable weather the unloading at AMCHITKA is proceeding. Work has been started on a fighter strip.

Recent increased activities in the MARSHALLS suggest the possibility of a raid on our Central Pacific positions in the near future. This sort of operation is, of course, well within enemy capabilities. We are very much in the dark concerning major enemy deployments but believe their main interests continue to be centered in the south. An airfield is being constructed at VILA KOLOMBANGARA.

January 22nd.

In accordance with Comsopac Op-Plan 2-43, previously mentioned, three strikes were made on MUNDA today. The first, at noon, was made by 6 B-26s followed immediately by 8 SBDs. The second, at 1400, was made by 8 B-17s. The third, at 1730, was made by B-26s and SBDs. These strikes immobilized the air strip for the time being at least. The TONOFEI field was also bombed by B-17s. Also, in accordance with the plan, the SARATOGA planes landed at GUADALCANAL for operations against VILA and to cover TF 67 tomorrow.

ESPIRITU SANTO was bombed again on the 22nd (local). No damage was done.

Enemy planes were over GUADALCANAL again last night. Damage and casualties were very light. Ground activity there was limited to patrol.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

The enemy sub operating off SYDNEY has now torpedoed a total of two tankers (mentioned before) and one AK in ballast.
January 22nd. (Continued)

In the SW Pac our pressure on the enemy continues in the BUNA area.

The Army photo mission to WAKE was turned back because of bad weather.

Cominch 222037 pink gives prospective assignment of new CVs to Pacific Fleet during the next six months.

From 3 to 4 enemy carriers, several BBs, cruisers and destroyers are indicated at TRUK. At least one CA and DD screen are in the MARSHALLS. The latter would be a good set-up for a hit and run bombardment of CANTON.

January 23rd.

Two CL and three DD of TF 67 carried out the planned bombardment of VILA. This was followed by the planned strike by the SARATOGA air group. Results are reported to be very satisfactory.

Routine searches in the SOLOMONS did not sight anything unusual.

Comsowespac reports a very successful air strike on RABAUL shipping. Of eight bombers, three used skip bombing. Results reported: 2 AK sunk, 2 marus exploded, 1 maru left on fire.

TF 11 is proceeding to NOUMEA. TF 67 is proceeding to ESPIRITU SANTO. Other SoPac combatant task forces are in port.

A full scale offensive is underway toward Jap positions on GUADALCANAL.

Heavy gunfire was reported north of CANTON. Air search to investigate is not yet completely reported. Subs have been reported in the vicinity of CANTON recently.

Enemy subs have been reported south of OAHU the past week, but no definite contacts are reported.

There were no new enemy developments.
Notes on the Conference held at Noumea
1520 to 1700, January 23, 1943.

Present: Cinopac and two members of his staff; Comsopac, his C of S, War Plans, Operations, Intelligence Officers, and Chief of BuAer.

Admiral Nimitz - The object of this conference is to review the situation in the South Pacific and to exchange views. No decision will be reached. Indeed, we may not agree on all points.

First, as to GUADALCANAL. What is Comsopac's view as to progress, approximate date Japs will be eliminated. Shall we need more troops? What number should be left as a garrison on completion of the operation?

Gen. Peck (War Plans Officer) - Based on no greater rate of Jap reinforcement we believe that Japs will be eliminated April 1st. We think that our force remaining after the withdrawal of the 2nd Marines will be ample. After enemy elimination we should maintain two divisions plus service troops until we go further. We estimate a total of 8,000 Japs with 4,000 effective. We do not believe Japs will strike further at GUADALCANAL but will hold the defensive in order to contain our force there in greater number to them.

Admiral Halsey - Peck has not been there for two weeks.

Admiral Nimitz - here sketched the operation at GUADALCANAL commencing on January 22nd. If we are successful, we will complete prior to April 1st.

Gen. Peck - My estimate was conservative. The Japs may use delaying tactics which will prolong the business.

Captain Browning - Gen. Patch hoped to hasten the operation by the use of an envelopment by sea, but he held this course of action in abeyance because of the shortage of boats, and the man power required both for land offensive measures, and for unloading ships.

Admiral Halsey - Gen. Patch expects his enveloping movement (land) starting January 22nd to be successful.
Admiral Nimitz - That's a good argument for placing stores at Guadalcanal -- What use could be made of a pontoon (cellular barge) dock at Cactus?

Admiral Halsey - We are not sure of its value there.


Admiral Nimitz - What is Comsopac's ideas on future operations from Cactus-Ringbolt at the end of February with what you have, or on April 1st when planes will increase in number?

Admiral McCain - Promised increase in supply of planes.

Admiral Nimitz - Is the increase of planes proceeding?

Captain Browning - Yes as regards Navy planes, not as regards Army planes.

Admiral Nimitz - Will Comsopac originate a dispatch to Cominch info Cinopac requesting Army to carry out Army replacement and upkeep program?

Admiral McCain stated he would get behind this project on receipt of dispatch from Cominch i.e. Cominch usually passes a dispatch like the projected one from Comsopac to his desk for action -- A rather protracted discussion here took place on Army aircraft, the only result of which was to call for the presence of Gen. Harmon who at a later stage joined the conference.

Gen. Peck - In the absence of Admiral Halsey, the staff has been exploring the use of Russell Island (He here got the nod from Admiral Halsey to go ahead on his exposition). Our idea is to take it with one raider battalion and part of a defense battalion and to use it as a staging point for our landing craft, for a P.T. boat base, and to deny it to the enemy. It will be in the nature of a minor movement preparatory to an advance on Munda, and its possession will add to the security of Cactus. Russell is 80 miles from Cactus. It may possibly be used as a fighter field.

Admiral Halsey - It sounds reasonable to me.
At this junction Capt. Small and Col. Ferrin explained Gen. Patch's scheme of maneuver.

Admiral Nimitz - There seems to be no dissenting opinion regarding the operations. It is only a question of time when the Japs will be eliminated. When will KOLI strip be completed?

Captain Browning - Thirty (30) days after the arrival of material.

Admiral Halsey - About January 25th.

Admiral Nimitz - What is the best date based on this discussion?

Admiral Halsey - It should be ready for heavy bombers at the end of February but in emergency could be used the middle of February.

Admiral Nimitz - How will Cactus be used next?

Gen. Peck - It will be used as a supporting base for further advancing movements in the SOLOMONS.

Admiral Nimitz - It is my idea that no permanent installations should be erected there. The only construction should be that necessary, and there should be a reduction in the rear areas. Everything should be based (predicated) on a forward movement. What are the essential features of the PORT PURVIS development?

Gen. Peck - Moorings, submarine nets, and one defense battalion. We expect to pile stores up in floating equipment.

Admiral Nimitz - But there is little space on the shoreline for storage.

Gen. Peck - We expect to use KOLI POINT for stores, and PORT PURVIS as a safe anchorage for ships. As to defense we plan to place the 11th Defense Battalion at PORT PURVIS, the 5th to be scattered through TULAGI and GAVUTU, and one regiment on FLORIDA.

Admiral Nimitz - What would the Japs want to go to FLORIDA for?

Gen. Peck - Only to raid for its nuisance value.
Admiral Nimitz - Will it help you to go into MUNDA?

Gen. Peck - Yes. By the time we expect to go into MUNDA it will require a division of troops, because the Japs will have land based aircraft by that time.

Admiral Nimitz - You will need naval surface craft to get into RUSSELL?

Gen. Peck - Yes, and after the landing we shall require ships for a few days to get supplies in.

At this stage Gen. Harmon entered after which Admiral Nimitz explained the purpose of the conference in substantially the same words as given in the opening paragraph of this record.

Admiral Nimitz - It is our understanding that the Army is behind in fulfilling its plane requirements.

Gen. Harmon - Yes. I have merely pointed out to the War Department that we are behind in our January deliveries.

Admiral Nimitz - We desire a copy of the statement of the Army plane situation.

This was promised.

Admiral Nimitz - Go ahead with the exposition of plans beyond the middle of February.

Gen. Peck - The 10th Defense Battalion will be necessary for the operation.

(Note! Find out when 10th will arrive and notify Comsopac)

I estimate the enemy strength in RUSSELL to be between 200 and a battalion. We plan to use the 3rd Raider Battalion against them. The 1st Raider Battalion will be ready on March 1st. The 2nd Raider Battalion could be used now although reported by the Corps to be only 25% effective. However, I do not believe this.
Admiral Nimitz - When do you think that you can move against MUNDA?

Gen. Peck - April 1st.

Admiral Halsey - How many men?

Gen. Peck - One division - either the 2nd Marine Division or a composite division composed of Army and Marines, using part of the 43rd division. Some of the latter are to be trained here in Noumea in February for amphibious operations. The 2nd Marines will be out in plenty of time for this.

Gen. Harmon - We will also train elements of the Kiwi Division for amphibious operations. The reequipment of the troops who were in the COOLIDGE (172nd Infantry plus reenforcing artillery) has been completed, and they may be considered effective now.

Admiral Nimitz - When the Japs are eliminated from GUADALCANAL between the middle of February and April 1st, we can consider Task I completed. -- We have here a copy of a letter which I wrote CominCh requesting a revision of Tasks II and III. This is dated December 8, 1942.

Note: Take copy of this letter to next conference with Cominch.

At this time, Gen. Peck read the letter out loud omitting a few details.

Admiral Nimitz - Are there any objections to the letter? (There was none).

You have seen by the dispatches in the middle of January that there is no disposition to get a revision of command for Tasks II and III as originally laid down, however, I think that we may be able to get some concession as regards part of Task II at least. Then we are all satisfied that Comsopac should retain command of operations in the SOLOMONS as outlined in my letter of December 8th, as read by Peck.

Here Admiral Nimitz outlined the present situation regarding surface forces and stated that we should take every opportunity to strike at concentrations of Japanese ships by air and surface craft. I know that you will be on the alert. He referred to Murray's operation in October 5th as one well planned and executed and only cheated by weather.
Admiral Nimitz then sketched the ALEUTIAN situation and developments including AMCHITKA and KISKA. He stressed the Jap concern with fishing as a food source.

The next question brought up was the matter of the employment of the RNZAF. The letter regarding unity of command in the Pacific areas and the changes thereto regarding New Zealand were read. This made Comsopac responsible for the defense of New Zealand through the New Zealand Chief of Staff. New Zealand has never notified Comsopac what forces have been assigned for its defense. Mention was made of Comsopac's letter to the New Zealand Chief of Staff dated December 20, 1942 to which no reply has been received. (Copy of this letter was obtained).

Admiral Nimitz - Send to me copies of all correspondence with the New Zealand government. When you receive an answer to the above mentioned letter make a specific request for forces you want, and tell them how you are going to employ each unit. Then you can devise the command set-up.

The next matter covered was Cinopac's serial 96 of January 11, 1943. This touched a phase of censorship. Admiral Nimitz stated that Comsopac was to handle censorship in his area and that when he returned to PEARL he would take up with Drake the project of writing a letter to Comsopac withdrawing the letter in question. This would be done in writing to keep the correspondence files straight.
January 24th.

There were no major sightings in the Pacific Ocean areas today. Bad weather hampered routine air activities in the SOLOMONS Sea area.

The offensive on GUADALCANAL has now progressed to KOKUMBONA, which was captured today. The progress being made may effect plans to lay a mine field in the vicinity of KOMA reef.

The WAHOO reports sinking a DD off WEWAK while enroute to patrol in the PALAO area.

It is now certain that our occupation of AMCHITKA has been discovered by the enemy. Today bombs were dropped by two float type zeros near the MIDDLETON which is aground in CONSTANTINE Harbor.

So far as is known, there continues to be a major concentration of combatant ships at TRUK. The force is thought to include three to four CVs, at least two BBs (YAMATO, MUSASHI), several cruisers and destroyers. The presence of a TONE Class cruiser in the MARSHALLS was commented on day before yesterday.

January 25th.

The Tokyo Express of one cruiser and seven destroyers was sighted by a search plane south off NEW GEORGIA in the early evening headed for GUADALCANAL. No arrival report was received. As a result of this report TF 67 was placed on two hours notice. 5 DDs of this force are at TULAGI and the remainder of the force is at ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 11 and 64 were put on four hours notice.

Senav GUADALCANAL 250639 describes air action near SAVO. It does not seem probable that our small number of planes were able to turn back the Jap planes. It seems more probable that the Japs were unable to locate their objective. Comsopac 250506 is an operations summary. Bad weather prevented a planned strike against shipping seen in the KOLOMBANGARA area.

Enemy planes were reported over ESPIRITU SANTO during the night.

Four Army B-24's made a photo reconnaissance over WAKE today and all planes returned to MIDWAY. Clouds obscured part of WAKE making the photos of doubtful value.

Our forces at CONSTANTINE Harbor, AMCHITKA, reported that at 1020 (local) two float type zeros dropped four bombs

(Continued)
which did no damage. Unloading there is proceeding, but slowly. CTF 8 reports that heavy seas are taking toll on his old DDs and on the INDIANAPOLIS.

Nothing was learned of the plans of the combatant force believed to be at TRUK. The most probable employment of this force is considered to be some sort of an operation in the SOLOMONS Sea area. As time goes on there seems to be less probability of an enemy major attempt to recapture GUADALCANAL. However, there is no indication of any lessening of interest in that direction. It may be that the force at TRUK is there to be employed in countering any advance they may think we are about to launch up the SOLOMONS.

The presence of subs off our outlying positions in the Central Pacific now seems a prelude to a raid.

January 26th.

There were numerous minor sightings in the Central SOLOMONS during the day. Routine air activities in that area resulted in further bombing of MUNDA and a SWPac B-17 strike on RABAUL shipping which resulted in the sinking of one Maru. The black cat search from TULAGI picked up the Tokyo Express (noted yesterday) at midnight. After dropping four bombs which missed, the pilot lost contact but believes the Express was turned back.

TF's 11, 63, 67 are preparing to cover the transport moves to GUADALCANAL scheduled to arrive there the 30th and 3rd local (SoPac Op Plan 3-43).

The advance to the westward on GUADALCANAL continues slowly in spite of heavy resistance and terrible terrain.

On the 25th local, between NEW GUINEA and TRUK, the WAHOO sank an entire convoy consisting of 2 AK, 1 AP, 1 AP in a running gun and torpedo battle lasting fourteen hours.

The JAMES WILSON is aground in the ESPIRITU SANTO area. Salvage is underway.

An enemy sub was reported off MOLOKAI.

CTF 3 242101 pink gives plan for training and requests data on APs and AKs. Cinopac 260613 pink gives prospects on availability of these ships. This is further commented on by CTF 3 in his 262328 pink.

H.M.S. VICTORIOUS with part of Desron 22 as escort should depart BALBOA for PEARL about February 8th (48)
January 26th. (Continued)

Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS caused a cancellation of all air activity.

Because of the possibility of a bombardment of CANTON by the TONE in the next few days that island was alerted. The alert was passed to other outlying positions in the Central Pacific as it is not definite that the target would be CANTON.

Comgen GUADALCANAL 260855 is an interesting translation of a captured document.

January 27th.

Comsopac 271145 is his Operation Plan 4-43 which moves all task forces except 65 to the CORAL Sea area. The reason given is that Admiral Halsey has indications of a Jap movement in strength toward the Southern SOLOMONS. While we believe here that there is a strong combatant force in the TRUK area, we have no indication that this force, or a large part of it, is moving South. Based on our information, SoPac task forces are unlikely to find suitable targets at this time, and may encounter enemy submarines.

There were no major sightings by search planes in the SOLOMONS Sea area. Six DDs were reported off VELLA LAVELLA. Several AKs were seen in the central SOLOMONS area presumably employed in carrying supplies to new Jap positions.

The offensive on GUADALCANAL continues but has been slowed down by very difficult terrain. There were eleven PTs on night patrol in the GUADALCANAL - SAVO area. This is the highest number of these so far reported on this patrol. As was the case on the 25th (local), a large group of enemy bombers approached GUADALCANAL but retired without dropping any bombs. B17s made a routine strike on MUNDA at 1600 (local). Nine SBDs and five TBs attacked one AK and one DD near VELLA LAVELLA at 1740 (local). SBDs got 2 hits on the AK and 3 near misses on the DD. Five torpedoes aimed at the AK missed.

The WAKE photo reconnaissance group has returned safely to OAHU. No report has been made of the Army photo reconnaissance planned from FUNAFUTI to OCEAN and NAURU.

Boiler tubes for the MINNEAPOLIS are in the JAMES WILSON which grounded the 26th (local) at AMBRYN ISLAND (NEW HEBRIDES). This may delay MINNEAPOLIS repair. The PENSACOLA arrived at PEARL for battle damage repair.

Cinclpac has recommended against a Department plan to provide 200 gliders for Sopac. No specific need for gliders in the South Pacific is seen at this time.

(Continued)
January 27th. (Continued)

Admiral Halsey is concerned about the shortage of Army planes in his area. (Comsopac 271210).

The Japs made their third two-plane raid on our AMCHITKA position today. Again no damage was done.

No further indication was received concerning a possible raid on CANTON but the alert continues. Lack of information concerning the location of enemy carriers continues. While they are believed in the area between TRUK and the Empire and probably destined for employment in the South, it is within enemy capability to raid our Central Pacific positions before we can place adequate surface forces in an intercepting position.

January 28th. (Oahu date)

The Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Nimitz, Rear Admiral McCain and party returned to PEARL from an inspection of Pacific positions. The Secretary will leave for San Diego tomorrow.

While operating 35 miles South of GUADALCANAL in accordance with Comsopac Op. Plan 4-43, the cruiser-destroyer group under Rear Admiral Giffen (CTF-18) was sighted and tracked by enemy planes during the afternoon. Fragmentary reports show that a large group of enemy planes commenced an attack on TF 18 shortly after sunset. The CHICAGO received damage to her motive power and was taken in tow by the LOUISVILLE. The task force was subjected to heavy bombing for one hour and the attack was still going on at 2100. No air coverage from GUADALCANAL or from the ACV's in company was possible during darkness. TF 16 was ordered to proceed to cover TF 18. TF 18 was ordered to proceed to EFATE.

Routine air activities continued in the SOLOMONS Sea area. Seven B-17's bombed the BUIN airdrome at 1920 (-11) (Jan 29-10) Senavguadal 280838 describes a strike made by 3BD's and TBF's on 6 DD's, 1 AK, and 1 AE. 5 B-26's with fighter coverage bombed the WILA area at 1350 (-11) (-11)

An air reconnaissance of HOWLAND and BAKER will be made daily until further orders. No activity was noted on those islands today.

The photo reconnaissance of OCEAN and NAURU was successfully completed today.

On the 25th another B-24 photo plane bound for TRUK from GUADALCANAL was unable to find TRUK but photographed PULUWAT atoll and PULAP atoll. Another try at TRUK will be made.
January 28th. (Continued)

CTF 3 272247 pink requests information from Cominch regarding landing craft for the Kiska operation.

Admiral Halsey's request to occupy Russell Islands will be approved by Cincpac.

The Massachusetts and three DDs are ordered to proceed to Pacific Fleet for duty. They will leave the East Coast on February 6th\(^{(18)}\)

No significant developments were reported in the Central and North Pacific areas.

There were no new enemy developments.

January 29th. (Oahu date)

At noon today Admiral Giffen was ordered to proceed to Efate with his cruisers leaving the Chicago in tow of the NavaJo with maximum DD escort with the ACVs and Chicago. At 1630 (-11) while the Chicago group was proceeding toward Espiritu Santo, the group was attacked by nine enemy torpedo planes. As a result of this attack the Chicago was reported sinking and the LaVallette hit.

TF 16 is providing air coverage for the remainder of TF 18. Other forces in the Coral Sea area were fueling. The air groups of the ACVs of TF 65 were ordered to prepare to move to Guadalcanal.

During last night the New Zealand corvettes Kiwi and Moa destroyed a Jap sub carrying troops near Kamimbo.

No report was received regarding the land offensive on Guadalcanal. General Patch plans to land troops from one APD and six LCTs at MarovoVo.

Routine strikes on Munda and Vila received heavy AA fire. It is evident that the very heavy bombings on these positions, and shelling, are only able to inflict comparatively minor damage and do not immobilize these airfields for more than a few hours at a time. We cannot expect to cause the enemy to abandon positions by these means.

Russell Island probably is occupied by a small number of Japs. The number of the enemy there should not prevent our occupation.

Photos taken a month after our December 24th raid on Wake show disappointing amount of damage inflicted.

Cincpac desires a Seabee detachment at Canton for the rehabilitation of the NATS base.
January 29th (Continued)

The action of enemy air in the SOLOMONS Sea Area shows that our combatant vessels are prime targets. Although four APs were good targets at GUADALCANAL yesterday they were passed up in favor of TF 18. It would appear that the present enemy intention is to rely on shore based air and troops for the defense of the SOLOMONS Sea Area. This frees surface forces for action elsewhere. While we continue to believe that the enemy will make at least one more major effort in the SOLOMONS Area, his ability to strike in the Hawaiian Area and along our supply lines constitutes a threat which must be kept clearly in mind.

The Secretary of the Navy was prevented from leaving PEARL today by weather. He expects to leave tomorrow.

January 30th. (Oahu date)

The Secretary of the Navy and party left for the West Coast.

Later reports show that the CHICAGO was sunk by torpedo planes at 1644 (-11) January 30 by enemy torpedo planes. 96% of the personnel was rescued by the escorting DDs. At the time of the attack TF 16 was in a covering position 50 miles away. Of the thirteen enemy torpedo planes seen attacking, twelve were shot down by ENTERPRISE planes - but not until some had released their torpedoes.

TF's 11, 16, 64, 67 will fuel as soon as possible then operate in the eastern CORAL SEA.

The ground offensive at GUADALCANAL is proceeding satisfactorily. Three of the four APs involved in Op Plan 4-43 have left GUADALCANAL. The remaining one should leave tomorrow.

Routine air activities in the SOLOMONS SEA area were hampered by weather. At 1745 (-11) January 31st 12 SBD and 7 TBFs with VF coverage attacked 1 DD, 1 AK, 1 corvette south of the SHORTLANDS. 2 direct hits with 1000# bombs and one torpedo hit was reported on the AK. 2 500# direct hits on the DD was reported. Ten 0's intercepted of which five were shot down. We lost two P-38's. Searches sighted numerous DD and Marus in the area, but no major units were seen. The VILA field was reported not yet ready for use.

Cincpac is planning to reinforce air strength at FUNAFUTI to counter possible surface raids expected in the near future. Reinforcement for CANTON for the same purpose are underway.

CANTON was shelled by two Jap subs (probably I class) about 0500 (-11) January 30th. Damage was negligible.

(Continued)
January 30th (Continued)

The NAUTILUS returned from patrol off BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT and reports that she sank one DD, probably sank two AP, damaged one CA and one AO. (The CA was the MOGAMI class previously noted).

Salvage of the MIDDLETON at AMCHITKA is progressing satisfactorily and it is expected to refloat the vessel on the 31st. Cincpac has disapproved the request of General DeWitt to send LSTs to ALASKAN waters because of green crews and pressing needs elsewhere.

CinC 2nd departed from TRUK on the 30th. This important news may mean an all out offensive directed at GUADALCANAL. On the other hand, and as remarked yesterday, dependence on shore based air and ground troops for the defense of the SOLOMONS SEA area may permit the employment of CinC 2nd elsewhere. Our forces in the South Pacific are being deployed to counter the enemy in the SOLOMONS SEA area.

The enemy continues to run Marus into KISKA. Two ships are expected there very shortly.

Air strips have been completed on both OCEAN and NAURU ISLANDS.

January 31st (Oahu Date)

A "Tokyo Express" variously reported as composed of 16 to 20 cruisers and destroyers was reported departing from the FAISI area at 1222 (-11) the 1st. The ships were seen by a coast watcher north of VELLA LAVELLA on course southeast at 1320 (-11) the 1st. A search plane reported the "Express" position, course and speed at 1515 (-11) February 1st, and at 1600 (-11) February 1st. At 1820 (-11) February 1st, GUADALCANAL planes attacked the enemy ships between NEW GEORGIA and ISABEL ISLANDS without success. These planes reported the force to be 12 CL or DL and 8 DD, a much larger "Express" than usual. It is assumed that the enemy force arrived at GUADALCANAL during the night.

Routine air activities continued in the central SOLOMONS. Five B-17s with VF cover got three hits on an AK just off SHORT-LAND Island at 0850 (-11) February 1st. Heavy AA from ashore damaged four fortresses. Four unescorted B-17s enroute to bomb shipping at BUIN were attacked by 20 zeros a few minutes later. Three B-17s are missing. Twelve SBD and 4 TBF with VF cover bombed MUNDA at 0800 (-11) February 1st. In this strike two SBDs were lost. A search plane reported approximately 35 ships in the BUIN area at 0820 (-11) February 1st.

(Continued)
January 31st (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Our position at GUADALCANAL was bombed at about 1130 (-11) February 1st by seven VB. Only one plane dropped bombs which did minor damage to the bomber strip. The enemy lost at least three bombers.

Between 1445 and 1530 (-11) February 1st, 10 enemy dive bombers covered by 30 zeros attacked the DeHaven between SAVO and ESPERANCE. The DeHaven sank five minutes after being hit. The enemy lost 12 zeros and 3 bombers. We lost two F4Fs.

Our advance on GUADALCANAL has been slowed down at the BONEGI river by stiff organized enemy resistance.

The GUARDFISH reports sinking two enemy DDs off HANOVER and one AP northwest of RABAUL. Continued excellent submarine work shows that they are a most effective weapon against Japan. To date, however, we have not made the most of this weapon. There has been no coordination between air and submarines noted here, for example.

The S.S. J. B. WILSON was refloated January 31 (-11) and arrived at ESPRITU SANTO the next day.

As the YFD 20 was lost near Eureka, California, in a recent storm, the YFD 21 will be towed to SoPac next month.

The attempt to float the MIDDLETON at AMCHITKA was unsuccessful but salvage continues.

It is believed that a major attack on GUADALCANAL is materializing. It may well be that enemy strength will surpass anything previously seen in this area. Thus far no enemy transports have been reported enroute GUADALCANAL. We can expect the enemy to employ new tactics. The night torpedo attack from planes on the CHICAGO is a sample of enemy proficiency and ingenuity. In that attack there was introduced a new employment of marking flares, flashing float lights, and a marker plane. We are deploying our entire South Pacific naval strength to meet the enemy. In addition to TF 11, 16, 64, 67, a new task force (69) of 4 GBBs, 3 ASVs, and a DD screen under Vice Admiral Leary has been ordered to operate to the northeast of ESPRITU SANTO, arriving in that vicinity February 3rd (-11).
02 0702 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, 64, 67, CTG 62.6, CTU 66.1.6 etc.

About 1100 GCT January 3rd Task Force 67 proceed west of SOLOMONS via point queen to arrive vicinity point tare at 0800 GCT 4th. Detach MUNDA bombardment unit that point. Arrange junction Task Force on 5th along daylight retirement line toward point queen returning vicinity point tare at 1000 GCT 5th, retiring daylight 6th generally toward point queen. Task Force 64 proceed west of RENNELL to arrive vicinity point uncle at 0900 GCT January 4th making daylight retirement 5th generally toward point sugar returning vicinity point uncle at 0900 GCT January 5th, retiring south daylight 6th. Comtaskfor 63 provide air coverage as practicable for above daylight retirements Taskforces 64 and 67. Point tare lat. 09-30 south, longitude 159 east. Point uncle latitude 10-30 south, longitude 159 east. This is to Comgen CACTUS and Comnavbase CACTUS have in another system. Comgen Sopac has for info via hand.

01 0918 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC, etc.

MUNDA raids as follows. 6 B-26's, 12 VF over at 1630(-11) 31st. 3 Black cats harassing New Years Eve and 9 B-26's there again at 0700 (-11) today. AA heavy but not too accurate. About 8 large caliber guns in area. During strike the 1st no planes seen on field, no Japs airborne. On GUADALCANAL our SED's bombed reported enemy division headquarters near KOKUMENA but heavy jungle hid results. At 0910 (-11)/lst our search saw heavy surface force underway course 070 3 miles north of SHORTLAND ISLAND. Comsopac sends. BALLALE ISLAND fighter strip reported 3 weeks from completion. DF noting heavy ORANGE sub traffic near RABAUL. GROPER reports sinking 8360 ton AK off BUKA 12/17. RDO AUCKLAND not an addee pass to NZNB.

01 2038 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGEN

37 600 pound bombs were dropped by six liberators on AK's KISKA HARBOR at 0040 GCT January 1. Photographs show staddle within 50 feet smaller ship with probable damage. Other bombs unobserved due clouds. Attack covered by 9 lightnings. 1 of 6 zeros in the air shot down. 4 twin two single float zeros on beach in harbor. 2 recently arrived AK's remain KISKA, larger showing evidences of fire. Cominich info, Comgen ADC by hand Cincpac action. Adees pass. Reconnaissance FORMULA negative. From Comtaskfor 8
Our forces CACTUS concentrating Jap strongholds MT AUSTEN MATANIKAO areas forcing enemy readjust posits to avoid artillery. Japs engaged by BLUE patrols healthy well equipped. New Year's search reported several planes on NEW BALI ALE strip. Sightings second BUIN-FAISI area 2 CL's or large DD's, 5 DD's, 3 AK's. MUNDA strike today by 6 B-26, 9 dive bombers and 16 VF concentrated taxiways, AA defenses. 6 gun emplacements and building blasted. Search second REKATA 2 barges, 7 planes on water. Forenoon first coast watcher VELLA LAVELLA saw large sub surfaced west his island Comsopac daily info. Other watcher reports small nip party exploring islands ROVIANA LAGOON and FORAGING FOOD since 30th. At dawn 31st 20 man barge called OLILAVATA east coast GANONGGA departing dusk same day. Sopac fortresses hit large warship during RABAUL strike first. KAVIENG drome being further improved,53 planes there 31st. Pass to NZNB.

This is part one of 2 parts of daily dope. TOKYO Express ran again night 2 DDash, 3 D. 10 DD's course southeast seen 25 miles south of SHORTLAND at 1426 L (-11) /2 by 5 B-17's and 5 P-38's enroute to hit BUIN area. Dropped 40 bombs on the DD's nil hits. At 1800 L SBD and fighter strike from CACTUS intercepted the 10 DD express just off RENDOVA scored direct hits 2 ships left 1 apparently sinking, 1 burning badly. Own air shot down 1 of 10 plane umbrella forced DD's change their heading. Express reached CACTUS however retiring northwest from ESPERANCE by 0200 L today. Dawn air sent to hit them could not find but later search plane saw 8 surviving cans 25 miles from FAISI streaking back to base. Drums and boxes littering water off ESPERANCE dawn 3rd. During night second dash third while TOKYO Express near ESPERANCE 3 enemy planes separately over LUNGA dropped several bombs on field. Strike which failed locate nip DD's today hit MUNDA 0725 L. Dive bombers destroyed 3 more AA guns. Radar located on hill north of runway. New Year photos MUNDA show new taxi loop also north of runway similar battered loop to south. Comsopac sends. NWZ pass to NZNB.

This is part two of daily dope. On CACTUS our infantry still working in Mount AUSTIN area usual patrolling and 30-35 less Japs alive. 8 marauders, 11 fighters swept REKATA 2nd strafing float planes firing stores on beach. Natives and watchers report as follows: Apparent sub off NW MALAITA AMOSECON. Nip party prowling ROVIANA LAGOON took soundings KUVUKUVU ISLAND, also KOLOMEANGARA being occupied in force 400 men at VILA but no clearings seen.
ORANGE parties landed TEOP NE BOUGAINVILLE 1st. 2 more barges KOLO LAGOON, NEW GEORGIA morning 2nd. Ship sightings 2nd: 87 vessels at RABAUL. 4 DD, 3 AK and possible CL in BUIN-SHORTLAND area. Small AK at MUNDA wharf. Small sub off North MANGUNU where a midget sub base may exist. Comsopac sends. NWZ pass to NZNB.

03 2329 COMSOPAC to COMSONESTPAC Info COMGEN GUADALCANAL
Pass to MacArthur. The profitable targets offered by present concentration heavy combatant ships in BUIN area coupled with large reserve of avgas just now available at CACTUS, presents opportunity which I desire exploit to the fullest in covering CACTUS troop movement. Accordingly request Forts of 5th and 11th Groups be despatched.

04 0442 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info COMGEN at GUADALCANAL, CINCPAC etc.
Task Force 16 Rear Admiral Sherman in ENTERPRISE, SAN DIEGO, MORRIS, ANDERSON, MUSTIN, ELLET, depart BUTTON daylight local January 5th proceed arrive general area Point XRAY daylight 6th prepared for offensive operations. Comsopac sends. Point XRAY Lat 9-00 South, Long 162-30 East.

04 0322 COMSOPAC to CTF 65, PENSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, COMBATPAC, VIREO.
Task Force 65 Rear Admiral Mason in NASSAU, ALTAMAHA, BUCHANAN, MCCALLA, WOODWORTH, CUMMINGS, PENSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, VIREO depart BUTTON when ready about nineteen hours GCT. Six January proceed via SELWYN STRAIT to Point A. Lat. Sixteen degrees south, Long. One seventy seven degrees Ten minutes east. Task Group 66.7 Vice Admiral Leary in NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI, MARYLAND, COLORADO, MONAGHAN, FARRAGUT, HULL depart FANTAN ONE in time to rendezvous with Task Force 65 at point A at a time designated by CTF 65. Upon joining reform Task organization as follows: Task Group 66.7 Vice Admiral Leary in NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI, PENSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, MONAGHAN, HULL, VIREO.
Task Force 65 Rear Admiral Mason in NASSAU, ALTAMAHA, MARYLAND, COLORADO, BUCHANAN, MCCALLA, WOODWORTH, CUMMINGS. Further orders for Task Group 66.7 and Task Force 65 after rendezvous will be issued separate dispatch. ComTask Force 65 pass action to VIREO and Comseronsopac Subcom Info. Comseronsopac in info by hand.
05 0405 TF 67 COMSOPAC to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC

Tried for one hour and twenty minutes to clear the following by radio GUADALCANAL and NOUMEA on 3 separate frequencies with no results. "042345. Night bombardment MUNDA successfully completed on schedule. No opposition. Catalina reports results fine. Expended 2800 rounds 6 inch, 1300 rounds 5 inch all in target area. Task Force 67 originator reports with regret that in attack by about five Jap dive bombers southwest of GUADALCANAL at 0935 L (-11), fifth number 3 turret ACHILLES hit and out of action; six killed, seven wounded. Other bombs missed. Observed 2 Japs shot down by CACTUS fighters". Later info: ACHILLES turret badly hit but following from Captain Mannergh "Our fighting value is only slightly reduced and our fighting temper greatly increased." Quoted despatch also sent to TULAGI by plane because of refusal operators to answer up.

04 0702 COMSOPAC to CTG 66.7, CTF 65, VIREO, TERN Info COMINCH etc.

Task Group 66.7 after forming at point a accordance my 040322 proceed PEARL via point s lat. 14 degrees 45 mins south, long. 170 degrees, 45 mins west thence via route passing between FANNING and CHRISTMAS ISLANDS. Estimated speed of advance 8 knots. Variation in route authorized on basis weather, condition of escort ships and enemy information. CTG 66.7 keep interested parties informed of movements as practicable. Fuel available at STRAWSTACK if required. Task Force 65 operate as directed by CTG 66.7 to provide air coverage for Task Group 66.7 to point about 300 miles east of point a. When detached Task Force 65 proceed PANTAN 1 for fuel conducting training operations for about 3 days enroute. Expedite fueling and report readiness to depart for BUTTON. TERN relieve VIREO vicinity STRAW as designated by CTG 66.7 and proceed to PEARL with Task Group. VIREO when relieved reverts to control of Comseronsopac. VIREO is action alee. Other action alee please pass. Info is Comgen PANTAN and SAMOA also Comgawseafron, Comserforpac. Comgensopac info by hand. TERN who is action has in another system.

04 1242 COMAMPHORSOPAC to COMNAVACTSOL Info COM TG 62.6 etc.

It is with a full appreciation of the difficulties you face and are overcoming that Comamphorsopac notes the highly complimentary reports from TF 62 officers concerning the vastly improved effectiveness of your freight and personnel unloading organization, and also the smoothness of the naval tactical coordination now in effect. Please accept my sincere congratulations, also extend to the Commanders of Army, Navy, and Marine units concerned, and to the splendid men of all services who have so strongly labored to bring about this important result.
January (GCT)

06 0252 COMSOPAC to CTF 67, 16, 63, 64 CTU 66.1.6 Info CTF 62 etc

Comseronsubcom deliver to Port Director BUTTON both info. Originator Comsopac sends to Comseronsopac, Comgensopac, Port Director WHITE POPPY, Comnavbasesopac all info. Comgen, Comnavbase CACTUS, also info. 5 AP's Task Group 62.6 departed CACTUS 0330 GCT January 5th. Safe withdrawal these ships considered completed by end evening twilight the 6th at which time covering tasks my operation plan 1-43 are terminated. At that time 4 AP's enroute SUMAC-SPONNER in approximate position lat. 14 South long. 162-30 East, 1 AP enroute BUTTON at about lat. 13-20, South, long. 165-30 East, estimated speeds of advance 14.3 knots. Present intention return surface task forces to port. Unless otherwise directed. Task Force 64 proceed WHITE POPPY to arrive forenoon January 9th. Task Force 67 proceed BUTTON to arrive forenoon January 8th contacting Task Unit 66.1.6 enroute at point oboe and taking in company. Task Force 16 proceed BUTTON to arrive during daylight January 7th or forenoon January 8th. Task Unit 66.1.6 report to Comtaskfor 67 at point oboe at one of three daily times my Op Plan 1-43, proceed in company to BUTTON. On return to port Task Forces 16, 64, 67, and Task Unit 66.1.6 assume 24 hours condition of readiness.

06 0712 COMSOPAC to CTF 65, PENSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, COMBATSHIPS etc.

My 040322 modified. Comsopac talking. Add STACK to Task Force 65 departing BUTTON. Upon joining at point afirm reform organizations as follows: Task Force 65 Vice Adm. Leary on NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI, MARYLAND, COLORADO, NASSAU, ALTAMAHA, BUCHANAN, MCCALLA, WOODWORTH, CUMMINGS. Task Group 66.7 Captain Lowe in PENSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, HULL, FARRAGUT, MONAGHAN, STACK, VIREO. CTF 65 pass to VIREO also an action adee. Comseronsopac info has by hand. Comgen FANTAN has in another system.

06 0732 COMSOPAC to CTF 65, CTG 66.7, VIREO, TERN Info COMINCH etc.

My 040702 cancelled. Comsopac sends. Task Group 66.7 after forming at point afirm accordance my 060712 proceed PEARL via point baker lat. 14-45 South, long. 170-45 West thence via route passing between FANNING and CHRISTMAS ISLANDS. Estimated speed of advance 8 knots. Variations in route authorized on basis weather, condition of escorted ships and enemy information. Comtaskgroup 66.7 keep interested parties informed of movements as practicable. Fuel available at STRAWSTACK if required. Comtaskfor 65 provide coverage for cruisers of Task Group 66.7 to a point about 300 miles east of point afirm. Upon detaching Task Group 66.7 Task Force 65 proceed FANTAN One for fuel conducting training operations for about 3 days enroute.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
January (GCT)

06 0732 (Continued)

Expedite fueling and report readiness to depart NEW HEBRIDES area. TERN relieve VIREO vicinity STRAW as directed by Comtaskgroup 66.7 and proceed PEARL with Task Group. VIREO when relieved reverts to control of Comseronsopac. Comtaskfor 65 pass to VIREO also action adee. TERN action adee has in another system Comseronsopac info has by hand.

05 0442 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPACFOR, etc.

This from Comsopac. In response to appeal from Bishop Wade of BOUGAINVILLE relayed via Coast watcher system to evacuate party of seventeen American white women whose presence and whereabouts believed made known to Japs by natives, NAUTILUS was diverted from patrol in adjoining area to TEOP HARBOR where night of 31st were taken off seventeen women, nine men including one suspicious character and three children. Pursuers entered TEOP next morning. Sub Commander gave coast watchers storage batteries supplies and X-Mas stores. Sub then carried party vicinity FLORIDA ISLAND where they were transferred to TEOP HARBOR where night of 31st were taken off seventeen women, nine men including one suspicious character and three children. Pursuers entered TEOP next morning. Sub Commander gave coast watchers storage batteries supplies and X-Mas stores. Sub then carried party vicinity FLORIDA ISLAND where they were transferred to PC 476 out of TULAGI daylight January 4 and put on board HUNTER LIGGETT for passage to AUCKLAND. Investigation reveals only four more white females, three of whom are missionaries left in SOLOMONS. Will release story to press locally.

06 0450 KODIAK to COMINCH, CINCPAC Info COMGEN ADC.

Adees pass to Cominch and Cincpac. Enemy AK three thousand tons, approaching BOODLE discovered and trailed by Catalina noon today. Three B-25's bombed and left ship burning in approximate position lat. 53 degrees North, long. 178 degrees East. Trailing Catalina reports ship sank. Liberator (weather plane) scored one direct hit, two near misses at one hour GCT 6th on another enemy ship type not yet reported lat. 53 degrees North long. 173-10 East. Comgen ADC by hand.

07 0402 COMSOPAC to CTF 11 Info ALL CTF SOPAC, CG SUVA, etc.

Task Force 11 get underway about 0530 GCT January 7th for 3 days tactical operations. Comsopac sends. Proceed via route eighty miles south ISLE OF PINES to NEW HEBRIDES-FANTAN area remaining south of latitude 15 degrees south. Unless otherwise directed return WHITE POPPY during afternoon January 11th. Port Director NOUMEA, Comseronsopac, Comgensopac and Comnavbase WHITE POPPY have info by hand. Comnavbase EFADE and BUTTON info.
Subject damage reports. In all cases of serious damage whether in action or otherwise make 2 dispatch reports. (a) 1st estimate of damage and its cause. (b) all important details including replacement items that can be determined in damaged condition. Include Cominch in action address of both. Supplement dispatches by letter after thorough examination. Originator of letter and of each endorsement send copy to Cominch direct using airmail when possible. Cominch will make immediate distribution to Vice Opnav and bureaus. Parallel letter and endorsements by dispatches if gain of time is apparent. Accomplish foregoing with minimum addition of reports to those required by other authorities. Purpose is earliest restoration to service by expediting repairs and procurement of special material and units requiring replacement. Classify above damage reports secret. Vice Opnav, Buships, Buord and Buaeer have for info.

Sending is Comsopac,action Cincpac, info Cominch, Harmon concurs following proposals. Relieve 4th Defense battalion ROSES by moving 198th Coast Artillery AA complete with equipment and personnel and the personnel of 276th Coast Artillery (GD) from BOBCAT to ROSES. 4th Defense battalion to remove all weapons and equipment except 5-inch/51 guns. 4th Defense battalion after rehabilitation in SPOONER and replacement of equipment will then be ready for offensive operations. No replacement coast defense weapons for this unit available in this area. All Army anti-aircraft and coast defense artillery now at BLEACHER which will become available after relief by NEW ZEALAND forces are required for adequate defense BUTTON-ROSES-WHITE POPPY area. Proposed move will result in more homogeneous units at ROSES and reinforcement BUTTON with aimed minimum adequate personnel manning both defense areas. Considering needs of forward areas as paramount believe transient presence of fighter planes, 1 Army anti-aircraft auto-weapons, battalion (SEP) and 1 Army harbor defense battalion type D 155 guns which should be moved from UNITED STATES to BOBCAT soon as practicable must suffice for that base. Request approval.

Does urdis 060347 contemplate that recommended harbor defense CAC battalion bring 155 MM guns from mainland or man present eight 7 inchguns at BOBCAT. Due to undesirability making two shifts of personnel each requiring familiarization with new weapons have you considered personnel direct from mainland for 5" ROSES, or the employment
DECLASSIFIED

January (GCT)

07 0731 (Continued)

Personnel now manning BLEACHER 6 inch guns which according your secret serial 0098C are to be left for NZ troops.

05 2359 COMGEN WDC to CINCPAC

Joint directive referred to in my dispatch December 28 and reference your 292034. To Cincpac from Dewitt, CG WDC C 01017. I plan for two regimental combat teams of the 7th Division to arrive at FORT ORD prepared to initiate amphibious training on January 15. In order that arrival at FORT ORD of landing craft unit made available to Comamforpac may be coordinated with arrival of Army units, it is highly desirable that issuance of joint directive referred to be expedited to permit organization of joint staff and begin training of units immediately upon arrival.

07 2213 COMSOPAC to all CTF SOPAC, Info CINCPAC, COMINCH.

When more than one large carrier being operated together either in 1 Task Force or incident junction 2 Task Forces, it is directed that OCC provide for separation when an air attack imminent to permit complete freedom of individual maneuver by each carrier.

07 1245 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Propose order Commander PT Squadrons South Pacific to supervise and coordinate advanced training, tactical development, and operational plans for PT boats in that area. Commander also would coordinate administrative and maintenance matters for squadrons and tenders as directed by Comsopac. Am considering assigning one or more converted AVP for duty as tender to give greater mobility those PT squadrons for operations South Pacific. Proposed PT squadrons commander would be Captain with suitable staff. Comments and recommendations desired.
January (GCT) 17's Summary of 7 January, 1943.

07 0331 CINCPAC to COMWSEAFRON.

For Lt. General DeWitt. Your 052359. Your dispatch of 28 December not received. Please repeat. I assume your reference to my 292034 is Cominch's dispatch concerning landing craft which had that number.

23 0407 (Dec) CINCPAC to COMWSEAFRON Info COMINCH.

For General DeWitt. Concur your 211820 as basis for initiating training. Request you send me your suggested draft of the Joint Directive we should issue in carrying out Task B of Cominch 181315. Foregoing based on assumptions. Affirm. That troops have been or will be made available to you. Baker. That location of amphibious training is satisfactory to Rockwell. Cast. That necessary transports for the indicated combat loading can be made available for the actual operation against BOODLE.

21 1820 DeWitt's (See Pinks).

07 1515 Cominch to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPACFOR.

Reference your 0256 W of 26 November regarding defense Ferry Route Bases War Department reply states following "Material will be made available for distribution as recommended by you for general purpose for which it is allocated 12 155 mm guns available in three months 16 40 mm AA with directors at once 8 90 mm AA with directors available in 2 months 20 90 MM AA with directors available in 6 months if still required 6 50 cal MG at once 6 SCR 268 at once 7 fighters will be dispatched to Hawaii in 3 months 16 A24A dive bombers will be dispatched to Hawaii in January ". Augmentation of personnel of present garrisons of Ferry Route Bases from sources outside Pacific theater impossible at this time. Therefore manning of above items of ordnance must be an additional duty present personnel or authorized for each base. War Department issuing directive for shipment ordnance items indicated above in accordance with para 8 of your study as submitted to Cominch. Army cannot provide 20 mm AA. Information later on feasibility of Navy provision of 20 mm guns with Navy mounts. Advise Emmons and Harmon and confirm appropriateness of Army directive regard shipment or of changes you may desire. Chief of Staff Army has for info. OPD Pacific Theater informed.
Coast watcher reports 2 new potential VF refueling strips NEW GEORGIA ISLAND. 1 located 1 mile north west SEGI (southeast tip NEW GEORGIA), other 4 miles SE VIRU. Watcher reports nips could be secretly developing with native labor. Both sites accessible small vessels easily defended. At 1300 1(-11)/7 our planes strafed camouflaged sloop KOLOKOPE POINT south coast STA ISABEL ISLAND. Same afternoon sighted small boat MUFU POINT small twin masted craft anchored west KORIGOLE HARBOR and 10-12 apparent old landing boats plus 2 large rafts ALBATROSS BAY. 6 Marauders, 12 P-39's swooped low over REKATA 1545 1(-11)/7th started fire damaged 2 float planes, lost 2 planes to AA fire. Morning search same day saw nil shipping in BUIN-FAISI area. Watcher reports BUKA drome quiet the 7th Japs have moved sawmill and building material to KILTA. Natives say recent BUKA bombings damaged 11 twin motored bombers blasted brand new searchlight. CACTUS Hudson bombed native village unfriendly to BOUGAINVILLE watcher.

During afternoon 8th 2 DD's, 1 AK were sighted heading east northeast from FAISI. At 1550 1(-11) ships were 20 miles north northwest of KOLOMBANGARA on course 160 probably ran down to MUNDA or VILA evading strike despatched from CACTUS. Air search saw same vessels 0850 1(-11) today just off eastern VELLA LAVERELLA course 030. Also north northwest KOLOMBANGARA BLUE sub saw 6 or more DD's heading south southeast at 2030 1(-11)/8. No further report this sighting. 5 fortresses without VF escort bombed 3 unfriendly native villages southeast BOUGAINVILLE on 8th and shot down 2 of 12 zeros attacking over friendship. All our planes returned. Two forts visited REKATA separately 8th dropping total 16 500 pound bombs. Searched same day, saw 2 DD's anchored west coast BUKA, another DD and small umident west coast BUKA headed south, may be duplication. BUKA watcher reported cruiser, 2 DD's in 7 ship convoy east of passage heading north also large AK going north via west coast all the 8th. North of RINGDOVE BAY was small patrol boat heading north. Black cat harrassed MUNDA with bomb flares darkness 8th-9th. One plane believes scored direct hit on 4 gun AA battery MUNDA POINT. Natives report VILA plantation house dismantled moved into BUSH Western boundary plantation. Comsopac again.

The following plan issued jointly by Cincpac and Comgen Western Defense Command is to be executed on receipt. Para one. Task. Train force for assault and occupation of BOODLE. Para two. Forces. Army. 7th inf Div. 184th Inf. regt 507th. AA regt plus such portions of BRONZE 1366
garrisons as are made available by Comgen West. Def. Com. Navy. Necessary training staff, transports and landing craft provided by Amphibforpac (Taskfor 3). Supporting craft to be made available when appropriate by Cinopac. Para three. Units within territorial limits UNITED STATES other than those in BRONZE train at FORT ORD under direct supervision Comtaskfor 3. BRONZE units to be trained by Comtaskfor 8 and Comgen ALASKA Def. Com. as directed by Comgen West Def. Com. and Comtaskfor 3. Para four. Command. Comgenwestdefcom and Comtasfor 3 will coordinate directly in carrying out training. Joint staff for training will be formed immediately by direct arrangement among Comgen ALASKA Defcom, Comtaskfor 8, Comgenwestdefcom and Comtaskfor 3 with view to same staff continuing for actual operation. Comweseafron pass to DeWitt. Other addressees pass to appropriate Army commanders.

Para 1. Marcorps will make available on West Coast during month February following units and their cargo for transfer to South Pacific Area. (a) 7th Replacement Battalion. 25 officer, 1290 enlisted STRAW (On arrival STRAW embark replacement Battalion for WHITE POPPY in same vessel). (b) Force Signal Co. 11 officer 178 enlisted STRAW. (c) 12th Replacement Battalion 25 officer, 1290 enlisted WHITE POPPY. (d) 21st Marine Regiment Reinforce plus portion of 3rd Division special and service troops. About 400 officers, 7300 enlisted. Destination as directed by Cinopac. (e) 1st Corps Medical Battalion 36 officers, 470 enlisted. WHITE POPPY. (f) 2nd Anti-tank Battalion 34 officers, 709 enlisted WHITE POPPY. (g) 4th Raider Battalion 37 officer, 857 enlisted. Destination as directed by Cinopac. (h) Aviation replacements 46 officers, 400 enlisted BUTTON.

Para 2. Cinopac inform other action and info adees final destination of units listed in (d) and (g) above and change if any in destination of other units. Early reply requested in order to arrange transportation. Para 3. Vopnav will provide transportation when vessels are available.
3 Marauders, 6 dive bombers hit MUNDA separately forenoon 9th starting 3 fires scoring direct hit on gun emplacement east of gill house and silencing AA end of point. Sighting 9th included following. At 1540 1 (-11) 1 CL with 3 plane cover, course 165 miles northeast CHOCHEUL BAY 1045 1 (-11), 2 DD's east north east KIETA on course 230 plus 3rd destroyer outside TONOILEI heading toward KIETA and anchored, AK CHOCHEUL BAY. RECCE noted possible recent work unused KIETA strip. BUKA watcher saw medium AK arrive there noon the 9th unload in afternoon. Escorting DD departed to northwest. Airdrome quiet. In BUKA area natives report concrete road or runway construction but watcher feels natives now untrustworthy; loyal ones held only through fear retaliatory raids. Japs told natives war now won but warned them take shelter during coming 4 day battle. 2 small AK's and barges reported RIGI COVE near VILA plantation January 5th. CACTUS quiet, routine patrolling.

Short title quote Sopacorg one unquote. Present intention reorganize task forces South Pacific at 0000 hours GMT January 13th as follows: Task Force 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, 6 Destroyers; Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, INDIANA, 5 destroyers; Task Force 16 Rear Admiral Sherman ENTERPRISE, SAN DIEGO, 6 destroyers; Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Ainsworth NASHVILLE, HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, ACHILLES, 9 destroyers including CACTUS striking group of 5 destroyers; Task Force 68 Rear Admiral Giffen WICHITA, LOUISVILLE, COLUMBIA, CLEVELAND, MONTPELIER, SANGAMON, SUWANEE, CHENANGO, 8 destroyers; Task Force 65 Rear Admiral Mason NASSAU, ALTAMAH, COPAHEE, MARYLAND, COLORADO, 5 destroyers; special Task Force 69 NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI Vice Admiral Leary, destroyers as assigned. Task Forces 63 Vice Admiral Pitch and 62 Rear Admiral Turner remain unchanged. Destroyer escorts and DM's remain under Comsopac in Task Force 66. Senior Officer of each type in Sopac will act as type commander. Propose initially base task forces as follows: Task Forces 11 and 64 NOUMEA, Task Forces 16 and 67 BUTTON, Task Force 18 ROSES, Task Force 65 and special Task Force 69 FANTAN 1. Assignment destroyers by separate despatch.
10 0352 COMSOPAC to ALL TF COMS SOPAC, COMSERON SOPAC, etc.

Refer Sopacorg 1. Destroyer assignments to Task Forces as follows: Task Force 11 SAUFLEY, CRAVEN, GRIDLEY, MC-CALL, MAURY, CASE. Task Force 16 MORRIS, ANDERSON, HUGHES, MUSTIN, RUSSELL, ELLET. Task Force 18 CONWAY, WALLER, EDWARDS, FRAZIER, MEADE, CHEVALIER, TAYLOR, LAVALLETTE. Task Force 64 DUNLAP, FANNING, CUMMINGS, RADFORD, JENKINS, Task Force 65 WOODWORTH, BUCHANAN, LANSDOWNE, LARDNER, GRAYSON, MCCAUSA. Task Force 67 DRA'YTON, LAMSON, PER-KINS, REID, plus CACTUS striking group BALCH, NICHOLAS, FLETCHER, OBANNON, DEHAVEN. Necessary movement orders will be issued by Comsopac. Sopac escorts and DM's Task Force 66 LANG, SHAW, GANSEVOORT, WILSON, MAHAN, SMITH, STRONG, CONY, GAMBLE, TRACY, MONTGOMERY, PREBLE

10 0042 COMSOPAC to CTF 67 Info

Propose assign BALCH to TF 67 SAUFLEY with Comdesron 6 to Task 11, and have you provide striking group BALCH, NICHOLAS, DEHAVEN, OBANNON, FLETCHER to base CACTUS area under operational control Comnavbase CACTUS except when released by Comsopac for task force operations. This group will coordinate action with PT'SC as craft and aircraft for defense against Tokyo Express and submarine activities and provide bombardment or other support required in CACTUS area offensive measures. Intend issuing orders this striking group less FLETCHER be in CACTUS area by January 15. Request you designate striking group commander, his flagship and task group number. You will retain your present other four DD's. Will direct BALCH to report at BUTTON or CACTUS as you desire.

09 2009 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPACFOR, COMAIRPACFLT, etc.

Project referred to in Cincpac 062157 for BOBCAT was approved by Navy on 28 October and includes following: (a) two landplane runways, one 5500 by 400 feet; (b) barge landing; (c) mess and housing facilities 75 officers, 400 men; (d) erect buildings for aircraft assembly plant all of above on MOTUMUTE. Navy personnel now on BOB-CAT constructing facilities, being supplied with additional material, etc. by Army. Estimate six months to complete. Army aircraft assembly squadron scheduled leave UNITED STATES in May period no pertinent progress reports received from BOBCAT so far.
In letter dated 31 December 1942, with which Dewitt is in agreement, Buckner recommends that for aggressive operations now starting ALASKAN Air Force be augmented as follows,

A. 1 P-38 squadron be sent immediately to ALASKA for occupation of FORMULA.

B. 1 Additional squadron each of P-38's, B-25's and dive bombers be sent to ALASKA at an early date for training in this area for BOODLE operation. I repeat I strongly concur. With regard to dive bombers present air force is unbalanced for offense or defense without them. They will be particularly effective operating from FORMULA. If Army dive bombers not available recommend at least one squadron with 50 per cent spares of Navy dive bombers be sent here.

New subject: Because of heavy operational losses, the necessity for winterizing planes before sending this area and the delays involved in flying planes to ALASKA there should be maintained in the PUGET SOUND area a pool of planes of each type, winterized and held in reserve ready to proceed this area when required.

Your 102217 War Department advises that at this time and in view of present limited opposing air strength no reinforcements contemplated beyond 12 P-38's now winterizing and 8 B-25's enroute. Understand ComGenADC authorized retain all present planes until further notice, regarding future no additional squadrons of P-38's B-25's or Dive Bombers now in sight but suggest question is kept open pending development of situation.

Secnav Cincpac Rear Admiral McCain with total in party of about 10 in 2 Coronados plan leave PEARL for BRISBANE 14 January stopping enroute one night each at MIDWAY, JOHNSTON, CANTON, ESPIRITU SANTO, GUADALCANAL, ESPIRITU SANTO. After 2 nights BRISBANE return with one night each at NOUMEA, SUVA, CANTON, PALMYRA.

2nd movement troops to FORMULA in 2 AP's enroute to arrive about 13 hours W(-10) 17th. Thereafter will fuel covering group in relays at Longview. Weather moderating. No change condition MIDDLETON. Unloading proceeding slowly due many damaged landing craft. No info WORDEN personnel except proceeding LONGVIEW in KALK and GILLESIE. Incomplete searches 16th. Nil enemy sighted.
COMSOPAC to CTF 11, 63, 67, Info CG CACTUS CINCPAC, etc.

Part One of Four Parts. Comsopac operations plan 2-43. VILA and STANMORE plantations on KOLOBANARA ISLAND are staging points for barges and other small vessels carrying supplies enroute to MUNDA, supply and storage base and refueling point, possibly seaplane and float plane base, possibly 4,000 troops based there. Development and use of MUNDA airfield continues. Additional information by airmail to action addressees. General Task. This force will pulverize VILLA-STANMORE bases by bombing and bombardment and will destroy Jap MUNDA air strength attempting to deny our attack on above bases. Task Organization. TF 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore based air units CACTUS, RINGBOLT, BUTTON. TF 67 Rear Admiral Ainsworth cruisers, destroyers TF 67 less ACHILLES, PERKINS, REID, plus HUGHES. TF 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey, carrier, cruiser and destroyers TF 11 less GRIDLEY plus FANNING. Part 1 ends.

This is part 2 my (Comsopac) Op Plan 2-43. Task Force 63 conduct reconnaissance SHORTLAND-PAISI area including northeast and northwest approaches about sunset January 23rd, strike MUNDA airfield continuously during daylight beginning local noon 23rd repeating this strike at local dawn January 24th and again about 3 hours later, cover Task Force 67 bombardment group until dark January 23rd and during daylight the 24th, provide bombardment group with services Black Cats for radar search, air spot, illumination and night coverage, (Comsowespac requested to augment late reconnaissance 23rd by searching sector 017 to 050 degrees 480 miles from MILNE BAY). End Part 2.

Part 3 Comsopac Op Plan 2-43. Task Force 67 present BUTTON less ACHILLES plus HUGHES depart January 22nd arrive point K about sunset the 23rd, there form bombardment group 2 cruisers 3 destroyers utilizing ships Task Group 67.5 as desired, retiring remaining ships to RINGBOLT to arrive after daylight the 24th via route west of GUADALCANAL and north of SAN CRISTOBAL. Bombardment group proceed with assistance Black Cats to bomb VILLA-STANMORE area in KULA GULF commencing about 1500 GCT January 23rd completing in not more than one hour and retiring to RINGBOLT. Task Force 11 depart NOUMEA early morning January 21st local arrive launching posit point S via point Q, about 1900 GCT January 22nd, launch striking group armed, to land and remain at CACTUS overnight. Ships retire toward BUTTON returning to point S at 0500 GCT 24 January for rendezvous and recovery air group. After recovery retire to southward. SARATOGA air group attack VILLA-STANMORE area shortly after local dawn 24th January. Depart CACTUS in time to rendezvous with and land on carrier at point S about 0500 GCT. No paragraph. End part 3.
Fourth and last part my (Comsopac) Op Plan 2-43. Logistics fuel in carrier cruisers NOUMEA, BUTTON, fleet oiler at BUTTON to sea if required. Communications accordance Pac 70. Task Force Commanders and detached units guard 4205 KCS series. In addition Comsopac will guard secondary series as follows commencing with execution this action 4295 KCS from 0700 to 1800 GCT. 8590 KCS continuously, 12885 from 1800 to 0700 GCT. Employ secondary series as necessary to clear traffic and reduce load on task force commanders circuit. Operational traffic will be paralleled on NFM and Popac lots broadcast during period of operations. Southwestpac reconnaissance planes use 7310 KCS from 2100 to 0900 and 4675 KCS from 0900 to 2100 GCT. Popac reconnaissance planes use 4435 KCS and 11290 KCS. Task force commanders guard and other units guard as practicable. Point K latitude 9-30 South, longitude 58-50 East point Q Lat. 17-45 South Long. 161-40 East point S Lat. 13-05 South Long 161-45 East. This operation Plan 2-43 effective on receipt.

Condition red 1330 to 1502 1(-11). 8 wildcats and 6 P-38's contacted 40 Magoya and type 2 zeros between LUNGA POINT and SAVO at 18,000 feet just under ceiling. Zeros who were above broken clouds would send 2 or more planes under Grummans as lure but got no takers. Behind zeros were many dive bombers exact number unknown and 18 twin engine bombers. Twin engine bombers turned toward TULAGI and hid in clouds. Dive bombers were prevented from coming in by position taken by our fighters. Harbor patrol of 4 individual Wildcats mixed up on this and shot down 3 zeros. Lightnings were right behind and above Grummans and shot down 1 zero. 40 minutes after condition red an additional 8 Wildcats and 8 P-40's scrambled. Only contact made was with screen of zeros, bombers never pressed home the attack and dropped no bombs. All our planes returned safely. Raid pave 10 B-17's take off for strike against shipping in SHORTLAND area.

KOKUMBONA fell to our CACTUS forces 23rd and strong Nip center of resistance is pocketed between left division and front of right division. Reduction of this and other enemy strong points underway. During 24 hour period 23-24 over 90 Japs killed, 40 captured. At 1530 1(-11) 24th search plane dropped four bombs on a Jap tanker enroute to VILLA but all four missed. Subsequent SBD and TBF strike dispatched against this target
encountered bad weather turned back to CACTUS. Sightings 14th 17 vessels SHORTLAND; in A.M. 1 destroyer on AK or AP 7-10 S, 156-20 E, course east at 1540 l. CW reports steamer arrived VILA via BLACKETT STRAIT evening 24th. Shelling bombing of VILLA area demolished STANMORE plantation buildings, dock at VILA and 6 AA emplacements cleared area now 7000 feet long. After midnight 24th-25th prowling cat harassed VILA, MUNDA with 500 pounders and light fragmentation bombs. At 1045 this morning (25th) plane counted 1 CL, 5 DD's, 12 AK's in SHORTLAND area with another DD and 2 cargo ships 20 miles southeast of FAISI course unknown.

26 0855 COMGEN GUADALCANAL to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, etc.

27l-26th as matter of possible interest to your headquarters following extract from captured Jap document is quoted address of instruction signed Sano 38th Div commander dated December 25th classed very secret the Emperor is disturbed by great discomfort over the war situation. The darkness of the dawn about to break in eastern sky very deep. At present best of empire's Army, Navy and Air force are gathering and will head sooner or later toward the SOLOMON ISLANDS, the area of a decisive battle between JAPAN and AMERICA. Its development is close at hand unquote.

27 1145 COMSOPAC to CTF 11,16,63,64,67, CTU 66.1.5, etc. etc.

Comsopac Operation Plan 4-43. Indications of Jap movement in strength toward Southern SOLOMONS. Also possible movement to take CANTON ISLAND. General Task. This force will destroy Jap forces advancing toward the Southern SOLOMONS. Task Force 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, SAUFLEY, McCALL, MAURY, CASE depart NOUMEA 2300 GCT January 27th proceed arrive vicinity point A 1500 GCT 29th. Task Force 16 Rear Admiral Sherman ENTERPRISE, SAN DIEGO, MORRIS, HUGHES, MUSTIN, RUSSELL, ELLET depart BUTTON 0400 GCT January 28th proceed arrive vicinity point E 0800 GCT the 29th. Task Force 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore based aircraft CACTUS-BUTTON. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, INDIANA, BALCH, FANNING, DUNLAP, CUMMINGS depart NOUMEA local daylight January 28th proceed arrive vicinity point D 0800 GCT the 29th. Task Force 67 Rear Admiral Ainsworth NASHVILLE, HELENA, HONOLULU, ST. LOUIS, DRAFTON, LAMSON, REID, OBANNON depart BUTTON 0600 GCT January 28 proceed arrive point F 0800 GCT the 29th. Task Unit 66.1.5 Captain Ihrig CIMARRON, GRIDLEY depart NOUMEA 0400 GCT January 30th proceed arrive point G 0800 GCT 31st. Paragraph. Coordinate efforts to destroy Jap
search and snooper planes. Further directives later. Reference points A Lat. 16 degs 30 mins South, Long. 157 degs East DOG Lat. 16 South Long. 159 East E Lat. 15-30 South Long 161 East F Lat. 14-30 South Long. 162 East G Lat. 19 South Long 161 East. Logistics fuel in battleships, carriers, cruisers, CIMARRON, BUTTON, NOUMEA, HAVANNAH, other oiler to sea as required. Communications as in my Operation Plan 2-43 This operation Plan 4-43 effective on receipt.

Availability Army Aircraft Sopac falling far below Joint Chiefs of Staff commitment for 1 January which heavy bombardment 70 (now 36) medium bombardment 52 (now 17 of which 4 without crews) fighters 150 (now 107 of which 7 without crews). Condition of Army planes and crews such that only about 50 per cent of all Army planes are operable at any one time. Actual operational planes 22 January heavy bombardment 13 medium 10 fighters 69. Estimate of overall losses in area will approximate not less than 20 per cent per month.

12 Dauntless and 4 Avengers escorted by 2 P-38's. 6 Warhawks and 7 Wildcats on strike against shipping reported by coast watcher off north coast of VELLA VELLA. Made contact at 1520 (-11) Lat 7 deg 36 min South, Long 157 deg 10 min East. Avengers saw 6 DD 20 miles to northwest and proceeded to attack these unescorted. Got 1 hit an 2nd DD in north column. Saw and heard big explosion. Ship settled in water and next DD in column came alongside. SBD's attacked 1 AK and 1 AO. Dropped 6 1000 pounders. 4 500 and 4 100 pounders. 1 100 pounder hit on AK starboard beam. 1 1000 pounder near miss port bow. 1 1000 pounder nicked port side of AO and another landed 5 feet off stern. AK stopped and AO smoking and dead in water. Possibility that escort vessel was a corvette. Received only light AA. 4 zeros came down to intercept SBD's. 1 zero on tail of Wildcat was shot down by Warhawk. Saw total of 8 zeros. All our planes returned.
02 0410 COMAIRSOPACFOR to SENIOR AVIATOR AT GUADALCANAL.

Most Secret. Cancel paragraph 3. My Op Ord 1-43. Substitute following: "Detachment 3 CL, 2 DD of Task For 67 en-route MUNDA will be about 30 miles south of SAN CRISTOBAL at daylight 4th proceeding to northwestern past south coast of GUADALCANAL in afternoon. Speed fifteen increasing to twenty-five at sundown. On morning of 5th will be retiring from MUNDA at 25 knots toward point at lat. ten South, long. one five nine forty East arriving 0900 love (minus 11)". Provide fighter cover accordance paragraph 3A my Op Ord. Deny enemy aircraft any chance to track during approach. Comtask Force 67 call 1V77 may vector fighters using call 1V80 for fighter patrol commander on 4500 KCS.

02 0720 COMAIRSOPAC to SENIOR AVIATOR AT GUADALCANAL Info CINCPAC etc.

This is a Comairsopac tale in 2 parts which is most secret. This is my Op Ord 2-43. Information Comsopac Opplan 1-43 his 311100 and Comtaskfor 67 Opord 1-43 copy by airmail 3rd. Task Unit 62.6 is expected arrive position 60 miles south point queen at 0800 love (-11) 3rd where will be joined by Task for 67. Thence proceeds via route north and east SAN CRISTOBAL to arrive LUNGA ROADS about 1800 GCT 3rd. Tasks. BUTTON aircraft provide A/S patrol for Task Group 62.6 from 0800 until 1400 love (-11) 3rd. Para. CACTUS aircraft Brig. Gen. Mulcahey. Relieve BUTTON A/S patrol with 2 Black-cats at 1400 love (-11) 3rd continue patrol until after dark thence conduct radar search along route advance. Provide close fighter protection and A/S coverage Task Group 62.6 during daylight when within range and until departure beyond range. Conduct all night radar search each night of circuit inside following points SAVO, CAPE ASTROLABE, CAPE VIKENARA, KORIGOLE HARBOR, EBARAKU ISLAND, CAPE ESPERANCE.

02 0730 COMAIRSOPAC to SENIOR AVIATOR AT GUADALCANAL Info CINCPAC etc.

This is part 2 of my 020720. Conduct additional day and night searches to northward and south west of SOLOMONS as tactical situation requires. Strike enemy forces and installations repeatedly commencing 3 January as far north as and including BUIN area. Support MUNDA bombardment by Task Force 67 accordance my Opord 1-43. Para. XRay. Point queen love latitude 11-30 south, long. 163-10 east. Communications normal Comtaskfor 63 in CURTISS at BUTTON. Pass for info to Comadnavbase CACTUS.

01 2335 CINCPAC to COMPANSEAFRON Info COMINCH, OPNAV, COMSOPAC, etc.

group CHARLES CARROLL, JOSEPH T. DICKMAN, THOMAS JEFFERSON, ARCTURUS, WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, OBERON, HERMITAGE. Escort group CANAL ZONE to BORABORA CONCORD, WARRINGTON, STRONG, CONY. BORABORA to NOUMEA: SMITH, MAHAN, STRONG, CONY. Para. Information routing to NOUMEA communication plan and special instructions as contained in mydis 182355 December except change latitude route point cast to 23 degrees south. Separate despatch directs SMITH, MAHAN arrive BORABORA 16 January. Para. When loaded and ready Taskfor 19 depart BALBOA proceed BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA via BORABORA and NOUMEA at best speed consistent fuel endurance. Transports enter BORABORA only if required by circumstances. At BORABORA CONCORD, WARRINGTON, detached to orders Comsoutheastpacfor. At NOUMEA WILLIAM P. BIDDLE, OBERON report Comsopacfor for discharge and return routing to SAN DIEGO and upon arrival latter port report Comamphibforpac for duty. Comsopacfor route force NOUMEA to BRISBANE. Comsopacfor authorized revise escort at NOUMEA in which case escorts detached will report Comsopacfor for duty in Sopacfor. Arrival BRISBANE HERMITAGE released to orders Comsowestpacfor for discharge and future movement under direction naval transportation service. Remainder discharge as directed by Comsowestpacfor. Report departure from BALBOA estimated speed advance arrival at BRISBANE and estimated date readiness for return orders. This Opord number 1-43 effective upon receipt. Comsowestpacfor inform MacArthur. Comsopacfor direct STRONG upon latter’s arrival further report Comtaskfor 19 for duty.

31 1405 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC

For Halsey and Nimitz only. Cincpac 310341 cannot readily comprehend delays in withdrawal 2nd Marine Division which was contemplated in my 301915 November. It now appears that campaign continues in current status of delay linger and wait.

02 0217 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC

For Admirals King and Halsey only. On the principle that the man on the spot is better able to recognize his own problems and plan their solution I approve Halsey’s 011136. As stated in myser 0259W I do not think we can expect to seize more enemy territory and hold repeat hold it until we have a superiority in sea, air and land forces. The first two may be considered in sight for the South Pacific but I know of no suitable program for troops particularly those to be trained for amphibious and jungle warfare. The present situation proves that we have been too optimistic as to the readiness with which such troops can be withdrawn from the areas which they capture and the time it takes to rehabilitate them after service in tropical jungles. Also as to the effectiveness of Army troops for jungle warfare unless specially trained. I believe we should face this realistically and, if the strategic offensive is to be undertaken
when the surface and air forces are in hand, a commensurate assignment of troops should be made now for appropriate training. In line with your view expressed at our last conference I urge that our Pacific effort, which we are impatient to apply in a thoroughgoing offensive, be allocated its proper proportion of the nation's strength.

03 0439 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, VICE OPNAV.

Speaking in connection Cominch 31815. Very Secret. Set up outlined highly desirable for SUSAN rpt SUSAN Campaign and readily adaptable here since Sopac headquarters organization has stressed decentralization outside of Combat zone.

05 0009 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH

For Admirals King and Halsey only. Nimitz sends. From your 040322 and 280352 it appears that you are releasing NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI in next few days. As this may take them away before the impending enemy major effort I suggest a reconsideration which will permit the cruisers to proceed PEARL without BB's when well clear to eastward or to wait at NANDI, BLEACHER or TUTUILA if necessary. I consider enemy may employ strength this time which might create the emergency for which these BB's were sent to you.

05 0057 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOWESPAC COMSOPAC.

Utmost secret. Am heartily in sympathy with project to aid guerillas and as a submarine mission consider it only secondary to sinking ships. Consider the primary mission against ships is so important to the success of the Pacific war effort that I am reluctant to divert any of our present submarines except for occasional relief trips. Present assignments are as follows. Southwest Australia 8. Solomons sea area 14. Actually operating in Subpac, which carries all those under Navy Yard overhaul, 19 of which 16 are now at sea. Believe ARGONAUT and NAUTILUS are too valuable for combatant tasks in the SUSAN area to employ their otherwise suitable capacity in the suggested work. As I know of no submarine work more vital than that which can be done against Japan's ships I recommend a reexamination of present sub assignments with a view to increasing the number available in the Pacific. From the little I know of their present status believe BARRACUDA Class would be excellent for relief trips. Carpenter pass to MacArthur.
Comsowespac to Cominch info Comsopac, Cincpac.

Utmost secret with this. Your 021625. Submarines should not be specifically diverted from naval control for full time employment on missions of nature described. Subs available now not sufficient provide full coverage all profitable areas particularly NEI-SOUTH CHINA SEA-PHILIPPINES area and every possible effort should be exerted continue whittling down Japs available shipping. Submarines making occasional transits to PHILIPPINES patrol stations are available carry not over ten tons depending on bulk for quick unloading at designated point in VISAYANS as opportunity permits. Any mission thus authorized should not interfere with regular patrols. Estimate that with number subs presently assigned one such mission possible about every TXN weeks. Impossible promulgate any regular schedule for this purpose in advance.

COMGEN WESTDEF COMMAND to CINCPAC.

Handle as most secret. Comgen Western Defense Command talking about your 070331 via Com 12. Paraphrase of mydis Dec 28th replying your 230407 refer my 211820 concerning training BOODLE mission following troops available me from War Department: 507 AA Regt., 7th Inf Div., 184 Inf Regt for training Ford Ord. Coordination directed between CTF 3 and my headquarters. To carry out task BAKER of Cominch 181315 following suggested draft joint directive to be issued paragraph 2: Comgen Westdefcom and CTF 3 to coordinate directly in carrying out training para one training of force for reduction and occupation BOODLE to be mission para four to constitute without delay Joint Army Navy Staff for training BOODLE mission same staff continue for actual operation, when scheduled, by direct arrangement between these four Comgen ALASKA Defcom CTF 8 and Comgen Westdefcom CTF 3 paragraph 3 units within territorial limits United States other than those in BRONZE to be trained at Fort Ord under direct supervision CTF 3. BRONZE units for use BOODLE mission be trained by CTF 8 and Comgen Alaska Defcom as directed by Comgen Westdefcom and CTF 3. Above paragraphs not numerical sequence constitute suggested joint directive recommend you issue based on assumption actual operations will fill surface vessels available. Adm Rockwell concurs selection Fort Ord best spot for training. Cominch is originator of reference in mydis of Jan 5th. Acknowledge.
DEWITT to CINCPAC.

This is for CINCPAC from DeWitt. See last sentence my reply to your 190215. Paragraph 1 my estimate of strength and organization of force required for reduction BOODLE. 1 infantry division, 2 additional infantry regiments, 1 regiment AA, 1 regiment combat engineers, signal OPNS company plus small administrative and evacuation units. Paragraph 2 recommend infantry division with 1 additional infantry regiment AAA regiment and signal OPNS company be trained amphibiously at Ford Ord California under Commander Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet with training initiated earliest practicable date. Paragraph 3 combat engineer regiment now in ADC trained at Ocean BLUE utilizing LST, LCI(L) and LVT in such numbers as required. Paragraph 4. 1 infantry regiment (less 1 battalion) now stationed at LONGVIEW to train for operation utilizing LST and LCI(L) in such numbers as required. Paragraph 5. Force listed in paragraph 2 to constitute initial landing force combat loaded and assembled at OCEAN BLUE to arrive D - 15. Force listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 to reach FORMULA in such time as to be available thereat as floating reserve when initial landing force strikes BOODLE. Paragraph 6. 1 battalion from regiment listed in paragraph 4 to constitute initially part of occupation force FORMULA and to be available on FORMULA for use as part of BOODLE task force to be transported thereto by utilizing water transportation released by initial landing force or floating reserve after these forces have landed. Paragraph 7. Total strength of above forces 25,000. Paragraph 8. Request your comment or concurrence as basis for preparation of more detailed plans in coordination with Comtaskforces 3 and 8.

Treat this as most secret. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that if reconnaissance of AMCHITKA shows that a satisfactory airfield can be constructed thereon in a reasonable time, the following directive will be executed: Comwestseafron pass to DeWitt. Objective. Occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose. One to render KISKA untenable as an operating base for the enemy. Two. To provide an advanced base for possible operation against KISKA. Tasks. Afirm. Seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. Baker. Train force for assault and occupation of KISKA. The Army assault units as assigned by the War Department can be trained in San Diego. No Marine amphibious units are available for this operation. General instructions. CINCPAC in conjunction with Comgen Western Defense Command form plan for occupying AMCHITKA to be

(Continued)
executed on earliest date. Cincpac furnish CTF 8 immediately 1 AP combat load for first troops to land in occupation of AMCHITKA. Report target days for AMCHITKA occupation and outline of plan and means required for this operation and for future occupation of KISKA. Code name for AMCHITKA operation is CROWBAR. Occupation of TANAGA suspended in accordance with Cincpac (Com 12) 122112.

Further on my 164 January 7 (for MacArthur from Marshall) Joint Chiefs of Staff now request your detailed plans for carrying out Tasks 2 and 3 under the provisions of joint directive transmitted to you in Cominch 022100 July 2nd remodifications thereof with corresponding plans to carry out para exchange of views between yourself, Halsey and Nimitz preliminary to compliance with paragraph above area authorized to enable concurrence to be more readily obtained period it is strongly suggested that if conditions in your respective areas permit your plans be considered personally between you and Halsey or between your personal representatives period your completed plans will be sent simultaneously to Joint Chiefs of Staff Command, Cincpac and Comsopac, latter to comment to Cincpac who will in turn comment to Joint Chiefs of Staff with yourself as addressee para information copies of this radio are being sent to Harmon for Halsey and to Emmons for Nimitz.

Handle with ultra secrecy. Hicom. Escorted by new destroyers assigned Pacfleat direct following movements to MERCURY on approximate dates and with minimum destroyer escorts as indicated. 23 January DENVER l. 2 February HMS VICTORIOUS 3. After ALABAMA ready about 8 February MASSACHUSETTS 3. Para. Upon arrival MERCURY all report Cincpac duty. Modify shakedown periods destroyers force NYD as necessary to meet escort requirements.

Most secret. Organizing newly arrived carriers. One Taskforce being built around 3 SANGAMONS initially and one around 3 NASSAUS. Mason commands the latter. Need additional aviation flag officer command the SANGAMONS but with Giffen as Force commander. Recommend Bogan with temporary rank Rear Admiral. If approved request relief for Bogan as commanding officer SARATOGA.
Handle with utmost secrecy. This is part 1 of 5 parts from Comsowespac who passes for MacArthur. For Nimitz and Halsey only from MacArthur. Reference Cincpac 110221. My conception of the successive steps for the capture of Rabaul is outlined in my joint dispatch with Ghormley to Cominch info Cincpac, Comsopac July 081012. Enemy's present dispositions do not alter my views regarding the general plan but due to his increased strength and development in the area, a much stronger force than originally anticipated will be required to destroy it. The plan is based upon the fundamental necessity for the progressive advance of airfields in order to provide land based air protection for naval movements, both tactical and logistical, and to bring heavy and medium bombers in force with fighter coverage over the objective. It is my firm conviction that an offensive following other methods or attempted with insufficient force and without sound preparation will inevitably lead to disaster para Admiral King's premise that naval action might be directed instantly against the Admiralty Island should be examined critically from the viewpoint of protection by land based air. All operations in these waters are drastically influenced by land based aviation and results have infallibly indicated the absolute necessity for local air superiority. End part 1.

This is part 2 of 5 parts of MacArthur's utmost secret dispatch. The plan as originally set forth in My radio would provide land based air coverage for all operations. I do not believe that an attempt to eliminate any of these steps and move abruptly into the enemy's territory where the air advantage will be entirely on his side will lead to success. I believe that the South Pacific area should exert every effort to clear Guadalcanal and to develop adequate air bases from which effective and continuous air support can be provided. Thereafter the plan should be executed as originally contemplated. This now involves the capture of additional enemy positions which had not been developed at that time; namely Munda, Bum, Tonolei, Kieta, Buka, Finschhafen and perhaps others. Under the protection of the air thus provided the fleet should operate offensively with the destruction of the enemy's fleet as its primary mission.

This is part 3 of MacArthur's 5 part utmost secret. Para It is not now immediately possible to undertake a further offensive in the Southwest Pacific area. I have available or in prospect for offensive combat use 2 U.S. Army divisions the 1st Marine division and 3 Australian divisions. The 32nd Division after exhaustive campaign is now being withdrawn to Australia to be reconstituted and
rehabilitated. The 41st Division is relieving the 32nd on the north coast of NEW GUINEA. 1st Marine Division is being rehabilitated. Vandegrift reports will be 4 to 6 months before available for use. The infantry of the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions was exhaustively used in the PAPUAN Campaign and is being removed to the YORK PENINSULA to be reconstituted. The 9th Australian division, scheduled for return from the Middle East, will go through the same process and must be completely reequipped. End part 3.

13 1150 Part 4 of 5 parts of MacArthur's utmost secret. The Australian militia is not of sufficient quality for employment in the offensive. It can be used only for garrison duty. I have therefore no troops available at this time for offensive action para the air force as now constituted is not sufficient to support the offensive which is contemplated. With present strength in medium and heavy bombardment it is possible to make an intense effort for only a short period of time. For the continuous execution of the proposed action heavy and medium bomber strength must be greatly increased with corresponding increases in auxiliary echelons. A theoretical examination of the number of planes assigned to this area, taken in conjunction with recent comparative operational losses in our own and the enemy's air, might lead to the opinion that present air strength would suffice. However our experience in offensive operations over the enemy's territory at maximum ranges over water and through the most difficult tropical weather provides ample substantiation that existing strength is capable of only a short intense effort para. The great strength which JAPAN has already massed in the RABAUL area and the continuous flow of additional forces thereto, make this area a major Japanese stronghold to the defense of which she is at present subordinating all other efforts. Its capture therefore becomes so important a phase of the Pacific war as to involve concentration of our own forces for its accomplishment. This will require long preparation and great resources. End part four.

13 1159 Part 5 and last part of MacArthur's utmost secret. If predominant strength is not assembled by us for the purpose the attempt will certainly fail. Such an operation must now be regarded as a major campaign which might well become the decisive action in the Pacific zone of war para I have given the above facts and have expressed my views in order that you may have a clear picture of the situation here. An exchange of views may preclude the necessity for an immediate conference that requires long journeys and prolonged absence of higher commanders.

1382
We may thus arrive at basic decisions that will permit detailed planning after conference by Senior Staff Officers. If conference is deemed necessary at this time I suggest that it be held at BRISBANE. Present circumstances here involving current operations and the question of passage of command to an officer of another nationality prevent my leaving the area at this time. End of part 5 and all parts.

22 2037 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMAIRPAC.
Treat with utmost secrecy. Estimated in service dates CV's assigned Pac Fleet prior 1 July. Your 212125. As follows: ESSEX 15 April, INDEPENDENCE 1 May, LEXINGTON 1 June, PRINCETON 10 June. Respective air groups were commissioned March 1, September 30, November 16, November 28, all 1942, are in training. Estimate equipment these groups with latest type planes will be accomplished in time assure readiness prior in service dates parent vessels. As additional info estimate in service dates BUNKER HILL and BELLEAU WOOD to be 15 and 16 July respectively. For estimated dates reporting physically in Pacific add 10 days to each in service date above.

24 2101 CTF 3 to CINCPAC Info COMGEN AMPHICORPSPAC, ACPF
This is very secret. Your 090342. Result conference with General Smith and Commanding General 7th Army Division (General Brown). Informed Army members Joint Staff to report here after 27 Feb. Preliminary training underway but division only 70 percent strength until about 10 Feb. All units not at PORT ORD until 1 Feb. First training embarkation planned 22 February. Believe earliest date of troop readiness approximately 1 May assuming 1 Division of 4 APAS and 1 AKA were available 22 February and similar division 1 March. Present availability follows: HARRIS, BELL, ZEILIN, BARNET, ALGYONE 22 February; NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BETEGEUSE, approximately 1 March. MIDDLETON, BELLATRIX, DICKMAN, BIDDLE, ARCTURUS, CARROLL, JEFFERSON, OBERON unknown. DOYEN, FELAND probably not before late May; HARRIS still requires approximately 3 weeks to complete conversion and necessary alterations as force flag. Can 3 APAS be made available for training by 1 March question.

26 0613 CINCPAC to CTF 3 Info COMGEN AMPHICORPAC
hopeful readiness for service indefinite. Will fore-going meet your requirements?

26 2328 CTF 3 to CINCPAC

This is most secret. Urdis 260513. Assuming BIDDLE requires no major overhaul on arrival she will be able to train troops with NEVILLE, HEYWOOD, BETELGUEUSE about 1 March. Consider readiness upon arrival of DICKMAN, JEFFERSON and CARROLL to undertake intensive training with troops most questionable. Imperative I have one other APA ready to complete second training group. Can CARROLL be routed direct to this area to arrive late February.

27 2243 CTF 3 to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, CTF 8.

This is super secret. Part 1. Joint Staff planning COTTAGE Operation begins tomorrow. Preliminary estimates indicate extensive use LST, LCI LCT(5) types may be mandatory and possibility of employment will have decisive influence on reaching decision. Following references pertain to present commitment and desired employment these types; My serial letter 0010 on assignment of LST's dated Jan 6, Cominch despatch 130115 (in reply), VCNO 261955 (As to availability) CTF 8 desp 220016 (Asking for LST), Cincpac's desp 242355 (negative reply)

27 2247 CTF 3 to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, CTF 8.

Part 2 of 2. For planning purposes earliest possible advise necessary as to whether these types can be considered available. If answer affirmative request 2 LST's be diverted from Sopac for immediate availability and that others of all types be earmarked for priority assignment this force as final decision demands propose employ all types on training this area and also execute my 222252. This is super secret. As the results these test will have vital effect on final places and obtaining equipment this must be concluded earliest possible date.
February 1st. (Oahu Date)

It is now known that the last Tokyo Express was made up of 20 DD. Results of our interception attempts are in Comsopac 020604. Routine day and night air operations continued in the SOLOMONS SEA area.

Our SoPac task forces are operating to the south and southeast of GUADALCANAL waiting developments. Due to shortage of DDs T.G. 67.5 has been withdrawn from the TULAGI area and ordered to operate with task forces above.

Ground forces on GUADALCANAL have crossed the BONEGI RIVER. Enemy planes were over GUADALCANAL from 2055 to 2115 and 2206 to 0400 (-11) February 2. All dropped bombs doing some damage to the bomber strip.

The S.S. SAMUEL GOMPERS was torpedoed and sunk 115 miles south of NOUMEA about 1700 (-11) January 29. Salvage operations on the LIPSCOMB LYKES have been discontinued.

Enemy submarines continue patrolling near CANTON ISLAND.

There were two enemy air attacks on AMCHITKA. In the 1st attack at 1955 (/-10) February 1st, 8 to 10 float zeros bombed and strafed the DALE and LONG who were on patrol off CONSTANTINE HARBOR. In the 2nd attack at 2245 (/-10) February 1st, two float zeros strafed the DALE but no bombs were dropped. No damage was done in either attack. Comnopacfor 011855 (2 part) describes the progress of the CROWBAR operation. CTF 8 desires Canadian vessels for 2 or 3 months to replace his DDs which are in need of repair.

There are no new enemy developments.
February 2nd (Oahu Date)

Our task forces in the South Pacific continue to operate in the general area Southeast of the SOLOMONS, awaiting developments. TF 11 will strike against enemy planes and subs believed basing at INDISPENSABLE REEFS on the 4th (-11).

At 1500 (-11) the lst, 1200 of our troops landed unopposed one half mile west of MOROVOVO, GUADALCANAL. The main advance to the westward on GUADALCANAL continues favorably.

Routine air searches and air strikes in the central SOLOMONS were made. Nothing of particular significance was reported.

An amplifying report states that three instead of five PTs were lost in the action during the night of February 1 - 2 (-11) near SAVO Island. Comsopac 030704 suggests that as many as three DDs of the last Tokyo express were sunk. Previous experience leads us to believe that such a figure may be optimistic.

The MINNEAPOLIS expects to complete boiler retubing and be ready to depart ESPIRITU SANTO for PEARL on the 8th or 9th (-11).

Cincpac 022107 urges Cominch to augment Army air strength in the Sopac. MacArthur 030719 states that he cannot send any bombers to Admiral Halsey at this time.

Sowespac subs continue to sink and damage enemy ships. The TAUTOG returning from patrol in the BANDA Sea reports this bag: One small maru sunk, one 5,000 ton AK possibly sunk, one small naval auxiliary possibly sunk, one NATORI Class cruiser damaged.

Bad weather caused the cancellation of air activity in the ALEUTIANS.

It seems possible that the enemy has sent a CV to the MARSHALLS for a diversion raid on our central Pacific outlying positions. If the enemy plans to depend on shore based air in the coming offensive toward the SOLOMONS Sea area CVs could well be operated in this manner.

The Navy Department issued a press release during the day which stated that a major enemy offensive is believed underway toward the SOLOMONS Sea area. This release was most unfortunate as it practically tells the Japs that we are reading their mail.
February 3rd. (Oahu Date)

The Tokyo Express ran again last night. The preliminary account of our air attacks on it during the afternoon is in Senav GUADALCANAL 040845.

Routine air activities continued in the SOLOMONS Sea area. MUNDA was bombed by 12 SBD with VF cover at 0735 (-11) February 4. Night flying blackcats and B-17s dropped harassing bombs on MUNDA, KIHILI, and in the GIZO area. Comsowespac has been requested by Admiral Halsey to concentrate available strikes on the BUIN - SHORTLAND - BUKA areas.

Task forces in the SOPAC continue to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS waiting developments.

Single enemy planes were over our air fields at GUADALCANAL from 1850 to 1945 and from 2056 to 2150 (-11) February 4. No damage was reported from bombs dropped.

Cominch 021245 gives a plan to advance the date of readiness of the 4th Marine Division.

Routine activities continued in the North Pacific. CTF 8 030700 gives the progress of the CROWBAR operation. Cominch 032053 pink states that further instructions will be given regarding the COTTAGE operation (seizure of KISKA).

Cominch 031535 pink gives the status of Army plane reinforcements to the South Pacific.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 4th. (Oahu date)

As was expected from DI a search from GUADALCANAL sighted what is supposed to be the Advance Force 400 miles southeast of TRUK at 1052 (-11) the 5th. The compositions is not definite but approximately 2 CV, 2 - 4 BBs, 4 - 6 CAS, 12 DD. The courses reported were Southerly. It is believed that this force has been operating in this vicinity for the past two days and will be employed to cover a major push toward the SOLOMONS Sea area. Today is the first time we have had search coverage of this area.

Our task forces in the SoPac continue to operate to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS waiting developments. TFs 11 & 64 completed fueling today and TFs 16 and 67 will fuel tomorrow.

A routine strike was made on MUNDA by 9 TBF and 12 SBD at 0620 (-11) the 5th.

(Continued)
February 4th. (Oahu date) (Continued)

Our ground forces have advanced to the UMANI river against light resistance.

The damaged LAVALLETTE has arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO. It is expected that temporary repairs will be made there to permit her to proceed to a yard under her own power.

No progress has been made in the salvage of the MIDDLETON. Comserfor salvage expert will be sent to the scene via the MARKAB leaving PEARL day after tomorrow.

Major enemy forces are believed to be in jump off positions in the South Pacific. Nothing further is learned of a possible diversion operation toward CANTON or PALMYRA. While all signs point toward GUADALCANAL as the next major enemy objective, NEW GUINEA also is a possible objective.

February 5th. (Oahu date)

Search to the north of the SOLOMONS failed to sight the major enemy force reported yesterday. Minor sightings of no particular significance were reported in the SOLOMONS Sea area.

Routine strikes were made on VILA (1100 (-11) Feb. 6) and MUNDA (1700 (-11) Feb 6). Damage inflicted was not reported.

On GUADALCANAL principal activity was patrol in the UMASANI River area. We have established a strong point near TITI. The minefield which we laid on the northwest coast of GUADALCANAL will be about doubled in length on February 10 (-11).

Our SOPAC task forces continue to await developments. TTs 11, 16, 64, 67 are in the Eastern CORAL Sea. TF 18, 69 are southeast of the SOLOMONS. Consopac 060636 is his daily operation summary.

C.G. Haw. mailgram 4 February 1943 gives his views of the situation in HAWAII resulting from the move of planes from there to SOPAC. As heavy bombers are not very effective against enemy CVs, that type cannot be expected to repel a raid on OAHU.

On the 4th (/10) five float zeros bombed AMCHITKA doing no damage. On that day at about 1300 6 B-24s, 5 B-25s, with VF cover bombed land installations at KISKA. Four of five intercepting float zeros were shot down.

Cominch 042000 pink and 052125 pink transfers 5 APA and 5 AKA from the Pacific to the Atlantic. This hamstrings our KISKA
February 5th. (Oahu date) (Continued)

effort for the present. Remaining APAs are sufficient to move only one reinforced regiment. No AKAs remain. It may affect the plan to seize CHICHIGUMA, MARCUS, and WAKE which is under consideration.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 6th. (Oahu date)

The enemy advance force reported by our search planes 700 miles north of GUADALCANAL on the 4th (Oahu date) has not been sighted by our search since then and is presumed to have retired beyond the search limit.

A 19 DD Tokyo Express with 15 zeros covering ran last night. This enemy force was first reported by search plane at 1342 (-11) February 7th. At 1735 (-11) the 7th 15 SBD with 20 F4F's escorting attacked the enemy DD's 20 miles south of RENDOVA Island. Hits were reported on 2 DD's and two zeros were shot down. No further reports of the progress of the Express were received.

Our task forces in the South Pacific are cruising in the same general areas as before awaiting developments.

The GROWLER on patrol north of NEW BRITAIN reported being rammed. The bow and tubes were wrecked and the Captain and two others were killed. The ship is now proceeding to BRISBANE. (GROWLER can dive)

It is now known that the Japs have almost completed a fighter strip at KISKA. Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS halted all air activity and hampered operations at AMCHITKA.

CominCh 061324 gives plans for heavy bomber groups in the Pacific Areas.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 7th. (Oahu Date)

At 0745 (-11) the 8th, there was a report from a plane of an enemy task force of 2 CA, 5 CL, 10 DD, 200 miles NE MALAITA heading south. Because of this report TF 69 was ordered to intercept and the ENTERPRISE air group was sent to GUADALCANAL. At 1135 (-11) the 8th, this report was found to be enemy radio deception so no further action was taken on the contact.
February 7th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

All SoPac task forces continued underway as before waiting developments. Comsopac 080303 is an operations summary for his area. Admiral Halsey has ordered the GUADALCANAL forces to take more effective measures against the Tokyo Express. On GUADALCANAL ground forces continued to advance slowly. In his 081115 C.G. CACTUS suggests that recent Tokyo Expresses may have evacuated some Japs.

Comsopac 072356 pink states that French forces in his area have never formally placed themselves under Comsopac military command.

The tanker IRON KNIGHT was sunk off Sydney on the 8th (-11) by an enemy submarine.

Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS halted all operations.

Signs continue to point to the enemy's possible adoption of the strategic defensive in the SOLOMONS Sea area. As noted several times before, such a course of action would free major enemy surface forces for operations elsewhere. It must be assumed that the Japs now know our SoPac surface force deployment. And estimating that our strength will continue watchful waiting in the CORAL Sea, they may feel that they can attack or raid in force at any point along our line from MIDWAY to CANTON without being intercepted.

February 8th. (Oahu Date)

Our forces on GUADALCANAL have now advanced against slight resistance and hold all the coast line except between VISALE and DOMA COVE. It seems probable that recent Tokyo Expresses have evacuated many Japs with emphasis on key personnel. Organized resistance on the Island seems about over.

The extended mine field off the northwest GUADALCANAL coast, parallel to the shore line, was completed today.

At 1730 (-11) the 9th, 9 SBD with VF cover made a routine strike on MUNDA. At the same time 2 B-26's and 9 VF's bombed VILA. Air searches in the area were generally negative. The ENTERPRISE air group has returned to the ENTERPRISE from GUADALCANAL.

Our South Pacific task forces continue to operate in the CORAL Sea and to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. The forces in the CORAL Sea are in enemy submarine waters. It is not clear here why Admiral Halsey continues to accept this hazard in view of the almost certain knowledge that no major enemy forces are within or approaching striking distance of the Southern SOLOMONS. It seems that Admiral Halsey plans operations in the SOLOMONS com-
February 8th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

mencing February 13th (-11) as he has requested Comsowespac to make repeated attacks on Jap shipping in the BUIN area from that date. This may be in connection with the occupation of RUSSELL Islands described in Comsopac 070506 pink. The forces planned for this operation are greatly in excess of those mentioned in the recent conference between Admirals Nimitz and Halsey.

At 1150 (-11) six heavy and five medium bombers attacked KISKA. CTF 8 082301 describes airfield possibilities in the NEAR Islands.

Increased tempo of enemy activities in the MARSHALLS and GILBERTS suggests the preparation of jump off points for raids on our communications between HAWAII and the South Pacific. It is probable that the Japs have delayed or abandoned plans to make an all out attempt to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS.

February 9th. (Oahu Date)

Comsopac 100650 operation summary reports the defeat of the enemy on GUADALCANAL. Admiral Halsey is ordering Rear Admiral Mason as Commander CACTUS Air under Comairsopac in order to direct air operations against enemy shipping.

At 1810 (-11) the 10th, 10 SBD, 5 TBF, escorted by 19 VF bombed MUNDA. All our planes returned safely.

Admiral Halsey requested that Comsowespac strike Jap shipping in the BUIN area commencing February 13th. Presumably in reply to this General MacArthur sent the despatch contained in Comsopac 092355 pink.

BB and CV task forces in the Sopac have been ordered to return to their previous bases. Comsopac will return the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI to PEARL in the near future.

Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

Now that the enemy on GUADALCANAL has been defeated decision must be made regarding our next moves. Cominch 092200 pink requests comments on an operation to seize, occupy and hold GILBERT and ELLICE Islands.

No new information was received today regarding enemy plans or deployment.
February 10th. (Oahu Date)

All South Pacific task forces except TF 67 are returning to port. TF 67 will continue operations in the area northwest of ESPIRITU SANTO. The MINNEAPOLIS departs ESPIRITU SANTO the 12th (-11) for PEARL via SAMOA and escorted by the MISSISSIPPI. Our long range searches from GUADALCANAL to the north of the SOLOMONS have been discontinued.

On GUADALCANAL our troops are mopping up cases of individual resistance. Native commandos are a big help in this. The organization of beach defenses and the collection and salvage of captured material continues.

At 1700 (-11) February 12, 4 B-26s with 9 VF escorting bombed and started fires at VILA. Harassing black cats were over both VILA and MUNDA during the night. At 1045 (-11) February 12 4 B-24s with 10 VF escort attacked MUNDA and started fires south of the bivouac area. All our planes returned safely from these operations.

The ORTOLAN will attempt to tow the beached Jap sub from GUADALCANAL to ESPIRITU SANTO.

Comsopac 110547 is an operation summary for his area.

About noon the 10th (/ 10) six heavy and 8 medium bombers escorted by 8 VF bombed KISKA. It is hard to evaluate damage done by such attacks from the despatch reports which usually state that "hits were observed in the target area" or "fires started".

Comsopac 110421 pink expresses Admiral Halsey's views on a campaign in the GILBERTS.

The special alert ordered for our positions between JOHNSTON and FUNAFUTI was cancelled.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 11th. (Oahu Date)

Our task forces are returning to port, except for TF 67 which continues to operate northwest of ESPIRITU SANTO.

At 0740 (-11) the 12th, 17 SBD escorted by 15 fighters bombed MUNDA. At 1430 (-11) the 12th, 3 B-24s with 6 VF escorting bombed MUNDA. One black cat was over MUNDA and one over VILA during the night. Six aviators who previously had been forced down in the central SOLOMONS were rescued by planes from GUADALCANAL.
February 11th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Comsopac 112230 pink is his Operation Plan 5-43 for the occupation of the RUSSELL ISLANDS.

Cincpac 102239 pink recommends steps to be taken in connection with Free French in the SOPAC.

VOpnav 111340 (two part) states that the Board of Economic Welfare will set up an organization in the SOPAC.

Developments in the ALEUTIANS are in CTF 8 111903 and Comnorpac 120630.

Cincpac 112237 pink contains the reasons why Admiral Nimitz does not believe that operations in the GILBERTS are advisable now.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 12th. (Oahu Date)

At 1130 (-11) the 13th, nine PB4Ys (Navy B-24s) escorted by 15 fighters attacked a large AK escorted by a DD and a CL or DL off FAISI without scoring hits. All these planes returned. Six B-24s escorted by eleven fighters attacked an anchored AK at BUIN at 1245 (-11) 13th, scoring one direct hit with a 1000 lb. bomb. In this strike, which encountered heavy AA and was intercepted by 30 land Zeros and 15 float Zeros, we lost three B-24s and 3VF. The enemy lost eight Zeros. At 1720 (-11) the 13th, 17 SBD with 16 VF escorting bombed MUNDA. Our planes returned safely.

On GUADALCANAL the salvage of enemy material and strengthening of beach facilities continued. Since the start of the final offensive on Jan. 15th our troops killed 6066 Japs and made 127 prisoners.

In his 121020 Comsopac urges that the ENTERPRISE be retained in the SOPAC for the present.

Salvage has commenced on the I-One (which was sunk by the KIWI and MOA at GUADALCANAL).

Cominch 122200 gives army night fighter resources in Pacific Theaters.

Cominch 121315 suggests further dredging at MIDWAY. On Dec. 15, 1942 further studies of such a project were commenced here. The bottleneck is dredging equipment now in use on other Hawaiian projects and the need of a hopper dredge from the West Coast.

(Continued)
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

February 12th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

The North Pacific was quiet.

Cominch 122028 (pink) is a directive for relations with the French in the SOPAC.

There are indications that the enemy is about to start submarine attacks on our Pacific Shipping in the NEW CALEDONIA and HAWAIIAN areas.

ComAmphForPac 121918 (pink) indicates that no Army dive bomber squadrons will be available for use in the ALEUTIANS in the near future.

February 13th. (Oahu Date)

All major SOPAC task forces are in port today. Rear Admiral Turner's transports are standing toward GUADALCANAL as a preliminary move for the CLEANSLATE operation. The target date for that operation is February 21st (-11). As there are indications that enemy submarines are about to start attacks on our shipping off NOUMEA and in the NEW HEBRIDES, DD and air "hunter - killer groups" have been formed at NOUMEA and EFATE.

At 1200 (-11) the 14th, 9 PB4Ys escorted by 22 VF got three direct hits on an AK at BUIN. Of about 45 zeros intercepting eleven were shot down. We lost 2 PB4Ys and four VF. Harrassing black cats were over VILA during the night. At 0845 (-11) the 14th, 18 SBD and 3 TBF escorted by 11 VF bombed MUNDA. All planes returned.

On GUADALCANAL mopping up continued.

Rear Admiral Wilkinson (Deputy Comsopac) has returned to NOUMEA from BRISBANE. He arranged satisfactory collaboration with Comsowespac for the CLEANSLATE operation.

Two dispatches of great importance were received from Cominch during the day. His 131250 (pink) requests proposed plans for operations in the Pacific during the next four months. His 131400 (pink) is a partial agenda for a conference planned on the West Coast about Feb. 20th.

Comamphibfor is now revising his plans within the framework of Cominch 042000, previously noted. Cinopac will approve sending 6 LCT(5) from the West Coast to the ALEUTIANS.

About noon 5 B-24s and 6 B-25s with 10 P-38s escorting bombed KISKA. Hits were observed on enemy installations. Three float zeros were shot down.

(Continued)
February 13th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Almost complete lack of information regarding the location of major enemy combatant strength during the past week is noted. We must remember that it is within enemy capability to raid our MIDWAY - OAHU - SAMOA - FIJI line in force.

February 14th (Oahu time)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>PLANES</th>
<th>RESULTS</th>
<th>Plane Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1005(-11)</td>
<td>VILA</td>
<td>6 E-24, 10 VF</td>
<td>Fires started: None</td>
<td>Enemy: Own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1125(-11)</td>
<td>MUNDA</td>
<td>9 TBF, 15 SBD</td>
<td>Not reported: None</td>
<td>Own: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630(-11)</td>
<td>MUNDA</td>
<td>11 SBD, 7 TBF</td>
<td>Not reported: None</td>
<td>None: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During night</td>
<td>VILA</td>
<td>1 Black Cat</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>None: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During night</td>
<td>MUNDA</td>
<td>1 Black Cat</td>
<td>Large fire started</td>
<td>None: None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TF 67 will operate on the 16th (-11) in the area to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. TF 61 transports are standing toward GUADALCANAL for the CLEANSLATE operation. Other SOPAC forces are in port.

The HADDOCK returning from patrol off TOKYO Bay reports sinking one AO and an AK for a total tonnage of 13,300. The GUARDFISH patrolling the TRUK - BISMARCK area enroute from PEARL to the Sowespac between Dec. 20 and Feb. 15 reports the following bag: 2 DDs and one 9,000 ton AK sunk. In a remarkable patrol this submarine managed to penetrate RABAUL harbor, but because of enemy A/S operations, was unable to inflict any damage. In the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO the GUARDFISH was repeatedly subjected to severe depth charging and aerial bombing but managed to continue the patrol for the full time without suffering excessive damage.

The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.

Cincpac 142209 pink delegates authority to Comsopac in broad allocation of war materials.

Cincpac 142357 pink, 2 parts, requests Admiral Halsey's plans for the next 4 months.
February 15th. (Oahu Date)

Bad weather reduced air strikes in the SoPac. One B-24 attacked KIHILI at 2300 (-11) 16th and one heavy bomber attacked BALLALE at 2245 (-11) 16th.

TF 67 continued operating southeast of the SOLOMONS. All other major Task Forces in the SoPac were in port.

The FLYING FISH reported sinking two AKs in the CAROLINES for a total of 13,000 tons. The HADDOCK returning from patrol off HONSHU reported sinking 13,300 tons including a loaded AO.

Pacific Ocean areas were generally quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 16th. (Oahu Date)

TF 67 continued to operate southeast of the SOLOMONS. Other major task forces were in port. The 3 OBBs with DD escort which have been basing at NANDI have been ordered to base at HAVANNAH Harbor, arriving there the 23rd (-11).

At 1740 (-11) 17th 13 SBD escorted by 24 VF bombed MUNDA starting two fires. All planes returned. One black cat was over VILA during the night.

At 1922 (-11) 17th flares were dropped by enemy planes over TG 62.7.2 (4 APA, 6 DD, 1 AO) 20 miles east of SAN CRISTOBAL while that group was proceeding to GUADALCANAL. A torpedo attack of seven enemy planes was reported coming in at 2005 (-11) and the attack was continuing at 2035 (-11). No further reports of this attack were received.

Code books and other papers have been recovered from the I-One and are being studied at NOUMEA.

On the 15th (10) six Jap float planes dropped bombs on AMCHITKA inflicting superficial damage to the runway. Two men were killed and one wounded. CTF 8 170205 reports progress on the landing strip at AMCHITKA.

It seems probable that an enemy BB-CV force has left TRUK for Japan. While a strong combatant force is believed still in the TRUK area, this movement toward Japan may indicate that no major operation toward the SOLOMONS is contemplated by the enemy in the near future and strengthens the belief that, in the SOLOMONS Sea Area, the Japs have adopted the strategic defensive.
February 17th. (Oahu Date)

Between 2305 and 0130 (-11) the 18th 7 PB4Ys and 3 B-24s attacked shipping and shore installations in the BUIN area.

TF 18 continued to operate to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS. Other task forces in the SOPAC, except TF 11, are taking positions to support the CLEANSLATE operation (Dog Day Feb. 21 (-11)). The SARATOGA is being held at NOUMEA because of lack of DD escort, but her air group will operate from GUADALCANAL. Admiral Halsey plans SOPAC task force reorganization in his 180102.

Additional items for conference agenda are in Cominich 161445 (pink).

The VICTORIOUS ETA at Pearl is March 4th (½).

Comsopac 170617 (pink) comments on the GILBERT - ELLICE thrust.

CTF 8 162302 gives plans for new airfields in the ALEUTIANS.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 18th. (Oahu Date)

Between 0005 and 0400 (-11) 19th 6 Army B-24s and 6 PB4Ys harassed the enemy at MUNDA and VILA. Bad weather hampered other air operations in the SOPAC.

Our SOPAC task forces continue to operate as noted yesterday. Cincpac 182221 cancels restrictions on operating Batdiv THREE ships west of FIJI.

Comsopac 190526 is a report of the Jap torpedo attack on our transports the 17th (-11).

North Pacific cruiser groups bombarded shore positions at HOLTZ Bay and CHICAGO Harbor. Results were not apparent.

There were no new enemy developments.
February 17, 1943.

MEMO FOR 16.

1. Preliminary study indicates the following:

(a) It seems entirely feasible to make a simultaneous thrust up the SOLOMONS and in the GILBERTS. Capture of objectives seems probable. Holding in GILBERTS seems doubtful.

(b) Because of preparation time required, May 15, 1943 is selected as the target date.

(c) A study of both enemy and own ships and suggested employment is attached.

(d) Until there is available in the WAKE - MARSHALL area a covering force equal to that set forth in (c) above, plus one CV attack force, the only thing that can be done by May 15th is to make a demonstration on WAKE.

(e) Logistic requirements probably can be met but approval of the plan to this point is necessary for accurate estimate.

2. Lacking Admiral Halsey's plan we assume that:

(a) He will attack MUNDA next and will employ one Marine Division.

(b) That the bulk of his troops must be carried in landing craft. (As 7 APA will be required in the GILBERTS, CTF 62 will have 5 APA for preliminary moves and for the operation over and above the landing craft.)
3. Colonel Pfeiffer has made up a troop requirement estimate for TARAWA and MAKIN.

4. Decision must be made on following:
   (i) Shall SHOULDER and COTTAGE be stopped.
   (ii) Can we use Army 7th Division in GILBERTS.
   (iii) Who will command GILBERT Occupation.
ESTIMATE OF SURFACE FORCES - COMBATANT

May 15, 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Jap Navy</th>
<th>Estimated Total</th>
<th>Required to cover</th>
<th>Required for escort for other purposes</th>
<th>Required in Alaska. to counter to Cinc. &amp; Solomons. &amp; Wake.</th>
<th>Required offensive moves in Gilbert &amp; Marshall &amp; moves in overhaul, offensive at offensive offensive offensive escort of offensive offensive offensive convoy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4(5?)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLAA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>55-60</td>
<td>89 #</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCV (ACV)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10(3)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#

1500t-50
1850t-2
2100t-37
A. **Major Covering Force** (Operating between SOLOMONS and GILBERTS)

**BatDiv 6**
- Rear Admiral Lee
- 5 BB
  - SOUTH DAKOTA
  - NORTH CAROLINA
  - WASHINGTON
  - INDIANA
  - MASSACHUSETTS

**CruDiv 6**
- Rear Admiral
- 3 CA
  - INDIANAPOLIS
  - SALT LAKE CITY
  - LOUISVILLE

**CruDiv 12**
- Rear Admiral Merrill
- 4 CL
  - MONTPELIER
  - CLEVELAND
  - COLUMBIA
  - DENVER

**CarDiv**
- Rear Admiral Sherman
- 2 CV
  - ENTERPRISE
  - ESSEX

**DesRon 2** (1500)
- 6 DD

**Desron 5** (1500)
- 8 DD

**Desron 22** (2100)
- 22 DD

B. **Reserve Covering Force** (To South of Main Covering Force)

**BatDivs 3&4**
- Vice Admiral Leary
- 6 OBB
  - IDAHO
  - MISSISSIPPI
  - NEW MEXICO
  - MARYLAND
  - COLORADO
  - NEVADA

**Auxiliary CarDiv**
- Rear Admiral Mason
- 3 ACV
  - CHENANGO
  - SUWANNEE
  - SANGAMON

**Desron 12**
- 9 DD
C. First Attack Force (Operate in GILBERTS)

CarDiv Rear Admiral 2 CV
- SARATOGA (All SBD except Combat Patrol.
- VICTORIOUS (All VF)

CruDiv 6 Rear Admiral Giffen? 3 CA
- WICHITA
- SAN FRANCISCO
- BALTIMORE

CruDiv 11 3 CL(AA)
- SAN DIEGO
- SAN JUAN

DesRon 6 (1500) 1 DL, 8 DD

D. Second Attack Force (S) (Operate in SOLOMONS)

CruDiv 9 4 CL
- HONOLULU
- HELENA
- ST LOUIS
- NASHVILLE

DesRon 21 (2100) 8 DD

Minecraft 5 DM, 5 DMS

E. Third Attack Force (W) (Operate off WAKE)

BatDiv 2 Rear Admiral 2 OBB
- PENNSYLVANIA
- TENNESSEE

CruDiv 13 2 CL
- SANTA FE
- BIRMINGHAM

Auxiliary CarDiv 3 ACV
- NASSAU
- ALTAMAHA
- COPAHEE
E. Third Attack Force (Continued)

DesRon 24 (2100) 8 DD

F. Troop Movement Escorts

(a) From West Coast
DesRon ONE (1500) 1 DL & 7 DD

(b) From SoPac
DesDivs 15 & 27 (1500) 8 DD

(c) Mineo raft
4 AM & 3 DMS

(d) Destroyer Transports
16 APD

G. Miscellaneous Escorts

(a) Trans-Pacific
DesRon 29 8 ODD

(b) Tankers
DesRon 23 (2100) 4 DD

(c) SoPac
DesRon 25
DesRon 45
DesRon 46 (2100) 9 DD

H. Alaska

Crudiv ONE 3 OCL

DesRon 14 less DesDiv 27 4 DD
### Total Troop Bottoms

**APA**
- From Amphibforpac: 4
- From Amphibforsopac: 11

**AKA**
- From Amphibforpac: 0
- From Amphibforsopac: 6%

  *% 5 if repairs to ALCHIBA are not completed in time.*

**AK (Type EG-Z)**
- From Serronaopac: 10

**LST**
- From Flot. 3, Amphibforpac: 4
- From Flot. 3, Norpacfor: 2
- From Flot. 5, Sopacfor: 28

  *% This total is optimistic, based on delivery dates being met, and shakedown completed without casualty.*

**LCI(L)**
- From Flot. 3, Amphibforpac: 24
- From Flot. 5, Amphibforsopac: 36

  *% Same note as LST.*

**LCT(S)**
- From Flot. 3, Amphibforpac: 11
- From Flot. 5, Amphibforsopac: 52%

  *% Same note as LST.*

**APc**
- From Amphibforsopac: 50%

  *% Same note as LST.*

**APD**
- From Amphibforsopac: 16
## Total Troop Bottoms (Continued)

Total troop capacity of above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Capacity Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>21,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>8,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCI</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT(S)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>55,094</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Forces for Capture</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Inf. Bus. (Reinforced)</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Inf. Bus. (Reinforced)</td>
<td>21,600 (Div plus 1 Regt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 12,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Gunfire Support Ships**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 - OBB</td>
<td>1 CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 - DD</td>
<td>4 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 - OBB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 - CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 - DD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aircraft Support for Attack**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 SBD Squadrons</td>
<td>11 SBD Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 VF Squadrons</td>
<td>8 VF Squadrons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Garrison for Defense**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3200 Grd. Def. For.</td>
<td>1579 Grd. Def. For.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3700 Air &amp; Construction</td>
<td>1500 Air Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6900</td>
<td>500 Const. &amp; Maint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3579 4494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aircraft or Facilities after Capture**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 VF ron.</td>
<td>2 VF ron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 SBD ron.</td>
<td>1 VB ron. (medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 TBF ron.</td>
<td>2 VB ron. (Medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 VP ron.</td>
<td>1 VP ron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 VF ron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 VB ron. (Medium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 TBF ron.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 VB ron. (Heavy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 VP ron.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Available May 15th:

- Army: 1 Div. (7th).

Sopac requirements are estimated as 2 Divisions and 2 Def. Bus.

From troops available, all three operations are not feasible. The Sopac and Gilberts operations can be carried out if the 7th Division is used or if the Army relieves Marines in Samoa and releases 2 Inf. Regts. and 3 Def. Bus.
February 16, 1943.

Estimate of own and enemy strength in Pacific as of present date. Enemy strength based on Radio Intelligence Section, ICPQA Report dated February 15, 1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>OWN</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV (Ex-tankers in use as combatant carriers)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMS VICTORIOUS (Training)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Combatant Carriers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV (MASSAU class, transports)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV (LONG ISLAND, training)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACV (OREGON, shakedown)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCV (16,000 tons, 25-28 knots, 54 planes, used so far only as transports)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Transport Carriers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB (New) (includes MASSACHUSETTS)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB (New) (SOUTH DAKOTA, ready 2/30 in N.Y.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total BB (New)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB (Old) In Pacific</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB (Old) On West Coast</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB (Old) TENNESSEE (Ready 3/15)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total BB (Old)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Does not include CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA (2 Sopac, 1 Alaska)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA (SALT LAKE CITY, at Pearl ready 2/20)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA (SAN FRANCISCO, NYMI ready 2/25)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA (Baltimore, BOSTON, report(?))</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Plus 5 in Navy Yards, extended repairs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL (Old)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL (5500-6000 T.) (U.S. ships are A.A.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL (10,000 T.)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL (Converted)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL (Minelaying)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total CL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD (Less than 1000 T.)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD (1200 T.)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD (1400-1500 T.)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD (1700-1850 T.)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD (2100 T.)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total DD</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>104</td>
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February 19th. (Oahu Date)

At 0820 (-11) the 20th, 12 TBF and 18 SBD escorted by 30 VF bombed MUNDA starting fires and hitting AA positions. We lost one SBD. Between 0138 and 0432 (-11) the 20th, 8 B-24s bombed VILA starting one large fire. All planes returned safely.

Admiral Halsey's proposal to reorganize his task forces, upon completion of the CLEANSLATE operation, is contained in his 200023 (pink).

Admiral Nimitz arrived in San Francisco today for a conference with Admiral King.

The INDIANAPOLIS reported sinking an ammunition ship by gunfire in the Western ALEUTIANS area.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 20th. (Oahu Date)

CTF 61 210551 pink describes the occupation of the RUSSELL Islands. SOPAC task forces, less TF 11, operated to the South and Southeast of GUADALCANAL in support of this occupation.

Of 8 PB4Ys ordered to harass the enemy at VILA and MUNDA during the night February 21st (-11), five bombed MUNDA and only one was able to get through weather to bomb VILA. All planes returned safely.

The TARPON leaving patrol off HONSHU reported that she sank one loaded 9000 ton AK. The PICKEREL, also returning from patrol off HONSHU also sank one AK.

A fragmentary report states that the HALAVO (FLORIDA Isl.) ammunition dump was bombed and set afire.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 21st. (Oahu Date)

Sopac task forces less TF 11 continued to support the CLEANSLATE operation. In the past two days a total of approximately 7000 troops have been landed on the RUSSELL Islands.

Between 0145 and 0305 (-11) 22nd 3 B-24s bombed MUNDA and 2 B-24s bombed VILA. At 1645 (-11) 22nd a fighter sweep of REKATA was made by 26 VF.

Comsopac 220016 deals with surveys in the SOLOMONS Sea Area. His 220558 requests intensified gunnery training of new combatant vessels to be sent to SOPAC.

(Continued)
February 21st. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Cincpac 220245 is a brief of a project to provide more harbor space at MIDWAY.

At 1400 (±10) 20th 5 B-24s, 7 B-25s and 7 P-38s bombed KISKA. Today the weather was bad in the Western ALEUTIANS and all air operations were cancelled.

Cominch 192150 is a new numbering of Fleets and Task Forces to be effective at noon GCT March 15th.

Photos taken on the 21st (-11) of airfields in the central SOLOMONS revealed a total of 82 VF and 15 VB. This is a small number to counter our moves in the SOLOMONS Sea area and cannot be taken as the maximum number available to the enemy in the area. Major enemy combatant strength is believed to be in the TRUK - Empire area, but we cannot say definitely that such is the case. It continues to be within enemy capabilities to raid our outlying positions in the Central Pacific. A raid on AMCHITKA also is a possibility.

February 22nd (Oahu Date)

SOPAC CV and BB task forces have been ordered to return to port. Rear Admiral Giffen's cruiser task force will continue to support the CLEANSLATE operation in a position to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS.

Comsopac 230541 is an operation summary which includes enemy air raids in the GUADALCANAL area.

Rear Admiral Turner continues to land troops on the RUSSELL Islands. He plans to land 800 officers and men at PEPESAI from APDs on Feb 23-24 (-11).

Between 0030 and 0245 (-11) 23rd 4 PB4Ys harassed MUNDA, and another group of 4 PB4Ys harassed VILA.

RDO NOUMEA 222146 refers to Admiral Halsey's Desron reorganization plans.

The POMPANO, returning from patrol in the CAROLINES and MARSHALLS, reported sinking 10000 tons and damaging 22000 tons. Reconnaissance showed no landing field construction at RONGERIK, RONGELAP, BIKINI.

CTF 8 230715 (2 part) summarizes the day in the ALEUTIANS. There were no new enemy developments.
February 23rd. (Oahu Date)

Rear Admiral Giffen's cruiser force continued to cover the CLEANSLATE operation. Other SOPAC task forces were in or returning to port. No reports were received regarding air operations in the SOLOMONS area.

The Central Pacific Area was quiet.

On the 23rd (€ 10) six heavy bombers, ten medium bombers, and eight P-38's attacked KISKA. Results were not observed.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 24th. (Oahu Date)

TF 68 is operating to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS in support of the CLEANSLATE operation. A routine air strike was made on VILA at 1145 (-11) 25th. A projected TBF strike on shipping in the BUIN area was cancelled because of weather.

Comsopac 250616 pink gives plans for operations in the SOLOMONS Sea Area after the CLEANSLATE operation.

Pacific Ocean Areas were unusually quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.

February 25th. (Oahu Date)

At 1245 (-11) 26th 18 SBD escorted by 16 VF attacked MUNDA starting four large fires and silencing two AA batteries. 26 VF made a sweep over KAHILI at 1215 (-11) 26th with negative results.

Rear Admiral Giffen's cruiser force continues to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS.

In his 261022 pink Comsopac gives needs for 60 transport planes for paratroops.

Navat Wellington 252240 describes a riot yesterday at a Jap prisoner camp.

KISKA was bombed by 6 heavy and 5 medium fighters the 25th (€ 10). Results were not reported.

All areas continue to be exceptionally quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.
February 26th. (Oahu Date)

At 1600 (-11) 27th 17 SBD escorted by 15 VF attacked MUNDA, starting three fires. The target area was photographed by an accompanying PB4Y. Pictures were developed in the air and best targets radioed to the attacking planes. At 1740 (-11) 27th 14 SBD escorted by 23 VF attacked one AP and 2 corvettes off the northeast tip of VELLA LAVELLA. Hits were reported on the AP and it was last seen burning fiercely. One corvette also was hit. We lost 45VF. One zero was shot down. Comsopac 270540 is an operation summary for the 26th (-11).

TF 68 continued to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. Other SOPAC task forces were in port.

Comairsopac 270537 is a request for variable time delay bombs.

Bad weather caused the cancellation of all air activities in the ALEUTIANS.

Continued lack of information regarding enemy plans and deployment is noted. Enemy radio security measures are, at the moment, effective. Again we remark that it is within enemy capabilities to raid our Central Pacific positions in force.

February 27th. (Oahu Date)

Cruiser task force operations in the SOPAC for the next few days are in Comsopac 280040 and 280550.

9 PB4Ys supporting a TBF strike in the BUIN area were over the target from 0415 to 0535 (-11) 28th. One AK was seen to blow up. A number of fires were started. At 0745 (-11) 28th 15 SBD escorted by 24 VF attacked VILA.

CTF 61 280827 describes progress of the CLEANSLATE operation. Today there are approximately 9760 troops in the RUSSELL ISLANDS.

Cominch 271220 directs sending 6 P-70 night fighters to SWPAC.

Admiral Halsey plans to plant aerial mines in the BUIN area starting about March 15.

The cruisers of TF 8 have been taking a severe pounding while cruising off the ALEUTIANS this winter. All are now in urgent need of navy yard overhaul.

(Continued)
February 27th. (Continued)

The enemy is expected to place a new set of codes in effect March 1st (-9). When that is done our ability to "read the mail" will decrease sharply. In recent months Maru movements obtained from DI have been passed along to our submarines on patrol with gratifying results. This type of information will not be available to us for a considerable time after March 1st.

February 28th. (Oahu Date)

Admiral Nimitz returned to PEARL from a conference in SAN FRANCISCO with Admiral King. Conference notes are attached.

Between 0420 and 0432 (-11) March 1st 2 B-24s and 11 TBF dropped bombs in the SHORTLAND area. Shipping could not be attacked on account of haze. At 1715 (-11) March 1st 17 SBD escorted by nine VF attacked MUNDA starting several fires. All planes returned safely. Comsopac 280555 is an operations summary for his area.

CTF 61 271628 is a summary of the CLEANSLATE operation.

Cinopac concurs in Admiral Halsey's plan for offensive aerial mining in the SOLOMONS Sea area. Such operations have been contemplated here for months.

Comairsopac 271116 (2 part) pink gives opinion regarding air operations and needs in the SOLOMONS area.

Comsopac 010550 is proposed task force reorganization in the South Pacific.

At 1300 (f 10) 28th 6 heavy and 6 medium bombers attacked KISKA. Results were not reported.

Cinopac has directed that Comhawseafront make all appropriate effort to interest natives in fishing in the Hawaiian Islands, and to encourage all kinds of food production. Every pound of food produced locally is in our favor as it results in decreased shipping demands.
Coming from Comnorpacific for action. Status CROWBAR operation January 31st. Troops at FORMULA 3820. Major tactical units present are 1 Battery 75 mm FA, 1 battery 155 mm seacoast artillery, 2 reinforced infantry battalions and 2 AA batteries 37 mm. Situation critical for unloading barges due repeated storm damage. Available unloading equipment ALASKAN area being rounded up for use FORMULA and repair crews being sent there. AA defence not considered adequate will be reinforced. 1 radar landed not yet installed. Others will follow. Outpost established ALEUT POINT 12 personnel. 2 entrance buoys 4 mooring buoys laid. Other navigational aids underway, a net protection for ships in harbor nearing completion. Continuing offshore patrol by DDs. Task Group 8.6 covering operation. Combat and Anti S air patrol from LONGVIEW maintained during daylight as practicable. Ships in harbor kept to minimum. Port captain assigned. Radio guard ship maintained in harbor pending establishment Naval Radio Station ashore.

Part 2 of my 011855. Construction fighter strip being pushed and is proceeding but less rapidly than expected due soggy nature of soil aggravated by heavy rains. Estimated date completion is now 22 February. Until strip completed Jap planes from KISKA may be expected to attack at times when fighter coverage from LONGVIEW is absent. 3 planes greatest number in any attack to date but this morning 6 zeros sighted at JACKBOOT. Possibly flown in. Para. Additional for FORMULA in February. About 100 infantry. 1 fighter squadron. 1 Airbase Squadron. 1 Battalion engineers with headquarters company. 1 platoon. Approximately 30,000 tons cargo. Estimate unloading 1000 tons daily. Expect refloat MIDDLETON today.

On night of 1st and 2nd Nips sent 20 DD express from FAISI to CACTUS. Incomplete reports indicate our forces sank at least one DD or possible destroyer leader, damaged several more. In day long air activity first at least 23 Jap planes destroyed to 10 of ours. Dive bombers sank DEHAVEN (DD 469) midafternoon and 5 PT's lost in night action off ESPERANCE. 19 DDs including 1 under tow returned FAISI am second. Single bomb hit CACTUS bomber strip during noon raid first. Morning 1st Fortresses scored 3 hits large AK off SHORTLAND. SBDs avengers bombed MUNDA. Condition RED (Enemy planes overhead) at BUTTON 1951 to 2043 L (-11) 1st. REKATA photos 1st show no evidence airfield construction suspected by watcher. Ground forces CACTUS continuing advance to northwest after brief slowdown due strong resistance. Killed sixty Japs first.
Additional info Express run 1-2. PT's report one DD definitely sunk another probably sunk, hit on third. Our PT losses 3 not 5. Analysis all air reports plus MTB action indicates as many as three enemy destroyers may have been sunk. This if more than 20 participated. At 0840 1 (-11) second before Express returned to base following ships seen BUIN-SHORTLAND. 2 CA, 1 CL, 7 DD's, 13 AK's. At 0620 1 second plane saw possible heavy cruiser 115 miles north SAVO retiring north by west. At 1710 1 second six forts scored three hits on big cargo vessel off SHORTLAND left ship burning listing. 20 Jap planes attempted interception and B-17's with VF escort shot down 9 zero plus one probable. SBD's with Wildcat escort hit MUNDA evening 2nd caused 2 explosions several fires in target area. CACTUS had two air raids night of 2nd. 5 bombs dropped across fighter strip during first alert nil damage second. Native report 300 Japs ashore VIRU HARBOR second. Possible landed from 8 barges previously reported there. PM yesterday Cobra strafed 16 new landing boats beached near ARULIGO. Sub sank U.S. freighter south by west WHITE POPPY about 1700 GCT 29th.

My figures air strength Sopac substantially same as Comsopac 271210 and 312359 January. Your 301549 Jan. gives allocation 29 heavy, 23 medium bombers for January. Actual enroute from coast during month 7 B-24D and 8 B-25C. Detachments key flight personnel for service in other theaters have reduced effective flight crews below number required for full use of small number of aircraft available. Para. Request two Army heavy bomber groups complete with combat crews be sent immediately and that JCS commitment for Army medium bombers be met fully. See Halsey's 021120. Inevitable attrition during current major operations requires immediate drastic action. This is a real punch coming up and it needs to be countered.

My bomber resources are so limited that it is impossible to detach elements thereof to your command without risking disaster here. Replying Comsopac 0211101. From their present bases I am using such as I have to maximum capacity to support you and in addition they are in a position to protect my own front. At present therefore they perform the dual function which would not be the case if they were sent to your area. As stated in my 020241 I am giving you every possible support within the limits.
of the exigencies and perils of my own position and the paucity of the forces assigned this area. The information available to me does not indicate that the enemy has yet committed himself to a definite zone of advance and point of attack. My own front may still be the objective. Let me have your specific mission requests and I shall do everything possible to fulfill them.

04 0845 SENAV GUADALCANAL to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINCPAC, etc.

Preliminary report of two attacks on Tokyo Express. Attack by 13 Avenger, 7 Dauntless escorted by 8 Cobras, 4 Lightnings and 15 Wildcats attacked 20 DD, covered by 25 zeros, 200 miles up channel at 1600 l (-11). Report one DD sunk and one badly damaged. Our losses 4 Avengers, one Dauntless and one Wildcat. Seven zeros shot down, five probable. Second attack by thirteen Dauntless escorted by ten Wildcats and four Warhawks attacked eighteen destroyers covered by twenty five zeros. At 1730 l. Report two hits one, one on another DD. One destroyer burning badly. Seen headed northwest in the distance result first attack. Our losses in second attack one Warhawk shot down, two Wildcats and one Dauntless missing. Ten zeros sure, two probable in this attack.

02 1245 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, MARCORPS.

Cominch desires to advance date of readiness of the fourth Marine division by detaching 23rd Marine regiment reinforced from 3rd Marine division and utilizing same as the principal nucleus from which to activate the fourth division. Para. As replacement for 23rd Marine regiment it is the intention to assign one of the Marine regiments reinforced now on duty in the STRAW area to the 3rd Marine division and carry same on temporary detached duty therefrom. This regiment will be augmented as necessary to complete its organization as a normal reinforced regiment. Your comment and recommendation requested. Marcorsps informed.

03 0700 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Comasfor 8 answering Cincpac 022127. With Dog day January 12 original CROWBAR plan due to be completed February 23. Necessary changes since Dog day plus reinforcements now continue intensive operations through May 1st. Until that time contemplate employment surface forces accordance my Op Plan 16-42 except KALK and GILLESPIE have been assigned TG 8.6 Vice 8.8 and rotating period for upkeep for units composed of 1 cruiser plus 1 or 2 DD's at WHIRLAWAY provided. Desirable if
practicable KALK and GILLESPIE remain until May 1st. Otherwise prospective date release these vessels in February 23.

06 0636 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TEG SOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, NZNB.

Here comes Comsopacs daily summary. CACTUS observers report explosion off enemy held coast during Tokyo express visit fourth - fifth. Absence of PT strike or bomb hits from air plus presence oil slick south SAVO daylight 5th indicates 1 Jap DD hit mine. Photo liberator over BUIN area AM 5th see partially completed landing strip PAPUPATUI. Same plane reported 4 ACV's anchored east KAHILI but sighting not confirmed. BLUE search plane 5th strafed enemy tender NNE of ONTOHG JAVA. Vessel was possible weather reporting ship. C/W reports 4 barges each arrived VIBU VILA predawn 5th. Final sightings Jap Task Force 5th indicated composition 2 carriers 4 BBs, 6 CAs, 2 CLs, 12 DDs. Search also reports MAURU airfield well developed. SARATGA patrol destroyed 4 snooping Type 1 Mitsubishi bombers 2nd to 4th. Planes from same CV strafed surface sub IN-DISPENSABLE REEF 4th. Air sighted gun emplacements under construction BAISEN Island RUSSEL group 5th.

04 Mailgram. CGHD to WDOSA info CINCPAC.

The following order from Cincpac quoted for your information "Despatch to Sopac 307 heavy bomb group liberators. Movements of air echelons. 1st of 6 from HOLLY. 2nd from PEARL of 9 to Sopac plus 6 for HOLLY. Remainder on receipt effective replacements from States Cominch 031535. Ground echelon via surface transport. Request being made Cominch for heavy bomb group to replace 307 group" personal attention General Marshall please note this movement includes the group headquarters ground echelon T/BA equipment and 35 airplanes with combat crews and that this movement completely denudes us of bombardment squadrons except for the remnants of a former light bombardment squadron scheduled for HOLLY when its dive bombers arrive. Furthermore we are short 7 complete combat crews to man the 38 liberators now on hand and short 4 complete combat crews necessary to effect the movement above ordered. Since it is strongly possible for a minimum of 3 Jap operational carriers to raid CAHU at almost any time with the likelihood of serious damage it is urgently requested that our heavy bombardment strength be brought up as soon as possible to a minimum of 1 heavy bombardment group of 48 airplanes complete with combat crews, ground personnel and T/BA equipment. Replacements are essential for the group headquarters, the T/BA equipment and the ground echelon as there will be practically no personnel left in the Department for the service of heavy units. In addition it
04 Mailgram, CGHD to WDCSA info CINCPAC.

is requested that 7 complete B24 combat crews be ordered to the Department immediately to remedy the deficiency above mentioned. It is understood that the 96th bombardment group at PYTE TExAS is prepared for immediate movement. If this group cannot be supplied it is believed the urgency of the situation justifies the organization of a heavy group from qualified instructor personnel assigned the Second Air Force.

06 1824 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Cinpac 042211 and Comgenhawdept 912 dated 5 February addressed to Chief of Staff Army. It is not intention of WD to assign at present time more than 3 HB groups to Pacific area. Replacements in planes and crews to bring 3 HB groups to strength assigned that area now underway or setup. See Cominch 031535. Replacement planes to bring Sopac to authorized strength and interchange of ground echelons as between HAWAII and Sopac should be effected as soon as circumstances permit and by air to extent practicable. With reference Emmons 912 what are your final plans.

08 0803 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL CTF SOPAC, COMSOWESTPAC, etc.

Tokyo Express 19 DD's took southern route PM 7th returned to FATSI via ALLEY early 8th. 3BD's with fighter escort attacked express south REDOVA 1735 L (-11) reported hits two ships shot down 2 of 15 covering zeros plus 1 more probable. Time element indicates all 19 DDs may not have gone to CACTUS. Some possibly called RUSSELL. All 19 got back. 20 barges seen off ESPERANCE early 8th. Morning strike despatched from CACTUS could not locate returning express hit MUNDA instead 0907 L today 8th. Following details NAURU Island airfield from aerial Recce. Strip 3500 by 105 feet. 24 AA posits on blast bays. Possible seaplane ramp. Dock for 6000 ton ships. Natives report through coast watcher sound of subs charging batteries north east coast AMITY NEW HERRIDES. Last heard 31st. At 1600 L/7th between BUKA-NEW BRITAIN 3 DD's escorting 4 AK's laid down smoke screens when plane came over. Recce saw possible landing strip BOANG Island off northeast NEW IRELAND.

08 1115 C.G. CACTUS to COMSOPAC Info COMGENSOPAC.

Refer your 080544. Today's progress of our attacks, both the detached force and the main attack, give very strong indications that last 2 Tokyo Expresses have been evacuating part of Jap forces which have not yet been destroyed by our recent offensives. Expect to soon destroy Japs on this island and before he can attempt major effort against us. No accurate estimate of numbers of his evacuees available, but believe evacuees can only be composed of personnel of higher headquarters and the remnants of a badly defeated and disorganized force.
February (GCT)

08 2301 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, COMNOWESTSEAFLRON.

Comtaskfor 8 sends reply to CINCPAC 072135. AGATTU Island generally steep precipitous mountain range but with flat area vicinity CAPE SABAK. Not practicable establish air field there without excessive engineering difficulties. SEMICHIS in SEMICHIS offers excellent possibilities. It should be our jumping off spot when we go West. Surface generally flat with about 200 foot contour along northern side gradually slopeing to sea level on southern coast. Landing beaches do not appear very good. Japs have made survey and appear to be preparing to build field but no physical evidence yet. Our search planes and weather plane make frequent reconnaissance SEMICHIS and AGATTU.

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, All TFC's SOPAC, etc.

10 0650 February 9th marked complete defeat Jap forces GUADALCANAL. Main body attacking BLUE troops joined forces with enveloping detachment just east ESPERANCE capturing or killing resisting Nips. Isolated cases resistance being mopped up. 9 Dauntless with big VF escort hit MUNDA 1730 L (-11) 9th starting large fire target area. 15 minutes later 2 Marauders 9 fighters raided VILA. P-30's strafed sank barge off HOOPER Bay RUSSELLS 9th. 2 transports 1 DD arrived BUKA from south noon 9th according watcher. 1 DD 1 AP 1 small AK departed northwest 1711 L same day. Catalina harassed MUNDA night 9th-10th. CACTUS search plane shot down twin motored medium bomber over north CHOISEUL today 10th.

11 0547 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, All TFC's SOPAC etc.

CACTUS search planes tenth counted 25 vessels BUIN TONOLEI including 2 possible CV's or ACV's 6 AD's 17 DD's. Off BALLALE was big AK. At 1810L (-11) 10th 34 planes raided MUNDA dropping 18,700 pounds of bombs across strip. Pilots saw nip radio station KULA GULF 5 miles north VILA field which appeared further cleared. Photo interpretation reveals following. BALLALE north side taxiway complete 7 fighters 3 bombers on field date 7th. VILA 66 AA guns an increase of 30 over January 2nd coverage date 7th. MUNDA 10 serviceable planes on ground both ends strip damaged date 8th. BLUE Sub with detector reports noting radar shortland. Documents material salvaged (Probably by WABJOER) from TOA MARU hit by air VELLA GULF first. Ship sand 4th off GIZO. GATO sunk cargo ship BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT January 29th. SOWESPAC plane unsuccessfully attacked enemy sub Southwest SHORTLAND 1425 L (-11) /10. Sub torpedoed liberty ship 1924 GCT 9th 160 miles East by South SYDNEY.
This is part 1 NSS 111345 in 2 parts. My 031630 to Cincpac and his reply 050255. As air travel not available for representatives of BEW investigating consumer goods requirements they will travel by surface vessel. It is now proposed that 2 senior BEW representatives proceed by air to HONOLULU for consultation with Cincpac and thence by air to NOUMEA for consultation with Comsopac. 1 of these representatives to then remain directly in contact with Admiral Halsey or in contact with Colonel Westbrook if desired by Halsey or purpose of consultation and advise on interim operations of the joint purchasing board covering exploitation of food resources and consumer goods problem. He would also commence setting up the BEW organization which is eventually to take over these functions.

This is part 2 NSS 111345. It is understood that after taking over these functions the senior BEW representative will continue as a member of Comsopac's staff directly under his orders. After clearing general proposals both Halsey and Nimitz the other senior BEW representative will return to WASHINGTON to direct this project for BEW here. Under this proposal no attempt will be made to submit one complete plan in WASHINGTON for approval but rather separate units of the plan when ready for operation would be sent to WASHINGTON together with comments from Halsey and Nimitz for approval from time to time. This proposal contemplates that at least 2 of present field mission will remain in field to assist senior representative which will save necessity for air transportation now for their expected return to WASHINGTON. Request your comment.

11 1903 CTF 8 to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMWESTSEAFRON, etc.

CROWBAR report. Gen. Jones reports excellent progress fighter strip, estimates 7 more working days to make it usable. Air base organization prepared and ready. Strength FORMULA now two hundred officers, 4800 men. Another Seabee battalion landed but construction equipment will not arrive until 23 February. Navy shore radio station installed and working 36 hours after start. 17 additional 20 MM now set up manned by Army. 15 more soon, also to be Army manned. Unloading still serious problem but clearing gradually.

12 0630 COMNORPACFOR to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Information concerning day's operations 11th February from Comnorpacfor. Searches limited due to weather as follows. Over Western ALEUTIANS from LONGVIEW covered 60 per cent. Southern sectors from same place 80 per cent. Nil contacts.
Anti sub plane over AMCHITKA but all attack missions were cancelled due to weather. No report on KISKA. No enemy air attack. New subject. Photos KISKA on 10 Feb. indicate two midget subs off sub base surfaced and under way. Also probably two others same type moored together not underway.

12 1020 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMSOUTHFORPAC, COMDESPAC, COMAIRPAC etc.

Your 102355. Strongly urge ENTERPRISE and destroyers be not withdrawn for overhaul at this time. The operation and material condition these ships generally satisfactory and they are efficient fighting units. Later when and if new construction brings forces to desired superiority believed suitable time for overhaul. SARATOGA will be held in port during forthcoming operations mainly because there are now too few destroyers in SOPAC to screen her at sea and carry out other required destroyer tasks.

12 1315 COMINCH to CINCPAC, OPNAV, BUDOCKS

If dredging facilities are available in HAWAIIAN area I think it would be well to use them to extend and deepen anchorage area at BALSA not only to prepare for basing more and larger ships for likely operations to westward but to make use of spoil to increase land area for defensive purposes. Comment.

12 2200 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Army advises following resources are available to Army Air Forces for night fighter operations in Pacific Theaters: 3 trained crews in Hawaii 14 pilots, 13 radio observers (I), 4 GCI controllers and 12 radio mechanics (I) trained in operation of P-70 aircraft and equipment who left Army Air Forces school of applied tactics on 5 February and will depart presently for Hawaii by ship. Investigate status P-70 aircraft now in Hawaii with view toward practicability dispatch 4 P-70 airplanes complete with crews and 2 GCI controllers to each of South and Southwest Pacific areas on arrival above mentioned personnel and mobile radar equipment advise promptly.
17 0205 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMNOWSEAFRON, COMWESEAFRON, etc.

300 feet fighter strip FORMULA without mat now useable. At 2140 GCT 1st fighter (P-40) landed and 7 more enroute. Laying of mat will proceed with field in use. Estimated completion 20th at which time full squadron of 24 P-40s will be assigned. Plan maintain daily P-38 coverage from LONGVIEW using FORMULA P-40s for morning and evening patrol only until field fully ready.

16 2302 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

In order to provide emergency airfields to reduce operation losses Comtaskforce 8 requested surveys various ALEUTIAN Islands. Results 2 sights offer relatively simple construction problems. 1 on OGLIUGA Island and another on SAMALGA Island. OGLIUGA is approximately half way between LONGVIEW and FORMULA. SAMALGA off Southwestern end UMNAK. Army (Comalsect) proceeding with assembling equipment including mat for OGLIUGA. Work to be undertaken by SEABEES will be started QDFD PAEM" estimated time of completion 3 weeks. Army will proceed with construction of SAMALGA Island as soon as other commitments permit.

18 0102 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Plan Sopac reorganization Task Forces after CLEANSATE operation. Involves moving force now basing NANDI to HAVANNAH Harbor EFATE leaving NANDI as training area until arrival further forces requires use as a Force Base. Request approval.

19 0526 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info NZNB, COMSOWESPAC.

Jap torpedo attack on transport group 2000 GCT 17th was complete failure. AP's and screen destroyed at least 5 attacking planes. No damage casualties BLUE ships. Morning search over BUIN-TONOLEI 18th reported 8 AK's afloat in area 2 sunken vessels. PM recce saw 1 unident off FAURO 7 AK's off Southeast BOUGAINVILLE shoreline 2 AK's underway midway between BALLEALE TONOIEI and 8 probable DD's in SHORT-LAND Harbor. 10 dive bombers escorted by 14 fighters conducted VILA strike 1740 GCT 18th.
22 0016 COMSOPAC to COMSWESPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Cominch 141741. Believe survey of RUSSELLS and other localities to the northwest of CACTUS should follow close after occupation by our forces. Survey of TULAGI in progress and highly essential. Additional surveys at BUTTON and EFATE are desirable. In reply to Comsowestpac 180620 extensive use of LOUISTADES by large surface forces does not appear probable though a brief survey including erection of sufficient navigation aids to render JOMARD Pass easily navigable and to provide temporary sheltered anchorage in DEBOYNE Lagoon for large forces is considered desirable.

22 0558 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, CINCLANT.

Prompt despatch new combatant vessels to Sopac continues to be necessity. Request intensifying gunnery training while enroute, major effort to be directed toward perfection with radar controlled surface and A/A gunfire. Consider trained combat operations center imperative. Especially require competent radar upkeep and operational personnel be on board each unit prior departure.

22 0245 CINCPAC to COM 12

For Admiral Nimitz. MIDWAY dredging study by Com 14 just completed reveals following. 30 foot depth and anchorage area to accommodate 4 CA, 5 SS, 2 AS and 1 ARD type dock plus widening present channel to 400 feet can be accomplished by March 1st 1944 under these conditions. Preparatory work start immediately. Dredging projects at KANEHOE and runway Baker at KEEHI Lagoon be delayed neither of which considered serious. Army assign dredge SACRAMENTO to which it is agreeable on Cincpac request. Assignment of HOPPER dredge from west coast which Army is requesting anyway for their projects and if allocated now can be made available to us by September. Date of 31 Dec. 1943 can be met if in addition to foregoing conditions privately owned dredge McMullen now working in SAN FRANCISCO Bay is assigned. Increasing dredged depth in anchorage area to 35 feet considered clearly impracticable from time standpoint.

19 2150 COMINCH to US FLEET

This Part One of three of my 192200/2. Para one. Effective noon GCT March 15th U.S. Fleet will comprise numbered fleets with Task Force Organization conforming to following allocations of Task Force numbers. A. U.S. Fleet 00 to 09 and ninth fleet 90 to 99. E. Pacific (first) fleet 10 to 19, third fleet now Sopac for 30 to
39 and fifth fleet 50 to 59 for assignment by Cinpac as desired for forces operating in Central and North Pacific.

19 2155 This is part 2 of 3 of Cominch 192200/2. C. Atlantic (second) fleet 20 to 29, fourth fleet now Solant for 40 to 49 and sixth fleet 60 to 69 for assignment by Cinclant as desired for forces operating in Central and North Atlantic. D. Seventh fleet now Sowespac for 70 to 79. E. Eight fleet now Northwest Africa force. 80 to 89. Para 2. U.S. Fleet task forces are: A. 00, 01 for assignment by Cominch. E. 02 Eastern Seafrontier. C. 03 Gulfseafrontier. D. 04 Caribbeanseafrontier. E. 05 Panamaseafrontier. F. 06 Westernseafrontier.

19 2200/2 This is part 3 and final of Cominch 192200/2. G. 07 Northwest Sea Frontier. H. 08, 09 blank. Para 3. 9th fleet task forces are: A. 90, 91 blank. B. 92 forces in European waters. C. 93 Southeast Pacific force. D. 94 Naval transportation service. E. 95 to 99 for assignment by Cominch. Para 4. Each fleet commander shall allocate at least 1 task force number to the equivalent of quote miscellaneous force unquote. For assignment of task force numbers to small groups operating directly under fleet commander.

23 0541 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TF COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, NZNB.
Photos AM 22nd show 60 fighters 5 bombers KAHILI. 5 fighters BALLALE. 17 fighters 5 bombers BUKA. 21 float zeros 2 flying boats KULITANI Bay area. Liberators harassed MUNDA VILA small hours 22nd. PB4Y's repeated task this morning (23rd) on slightly larger scale. Natives report 57 nippers 7 pro Jap natives effected BAMBATAPA landing 20th. Probably hunting watcher. CACTUS search plane scored depth charge hits on barge full of Japs SAMBI HEAD CHOISEUL afternoon 22nd. Lightnings Cobras and Corsairs conducted fighter sweep to REKATA late afternoon yesterday thoroughly strafed area saw no enemy planes there. 1 man killed 5 wounded when lone Nip nuisance dumped 7 bombs on fighter one at CACTUS night before last. 5 killed HALAVO bombing but material damage light. Morning search saw 12 AK's 3 DD's BUIN SHORT-LAND 22nd. Patrolling Avenger depth charged possible sub off LUNGA Point 1740 L (-11) 21 got oil slicks. Cat from BUTTON reports probable serious damage inflicted on enemy sub 300 miles Northeast CACTUS forenoon today. DF placed another submarine eastern eastern entrance COOK STRAIT 0015 M (-12) today.
This is part 1 Comnorpac's daily report:
Weather generally poor. No searches from UMNAK. Western Sectors from LONGVIEW averaged 35%. Contacts negat. Southern sectors from same place covered 65%. Negat contacts. Weather plane departed LONGVIEW at 1055 W (10) unable observe KISKA due weather and returned to LONGVIEW. Bomber group underway at 1225 W (10) for attack on KISKA returned to base no attack due weather. New subject. Report from McMorriss states only enemy opposition during bombardment AUTTU was AA fire HOLTZ BAY 4 to 6 guns no larger than 3 inch observed. 2 Jap float planes which had been tracking did not interfere with our spotting planes. Little activity observed.

Part 2 of above. No personnel seen. Some damage probably inflicted but no large fires started. New subject. Preliminary report sinking Jap ammunition ship. Target brought into moonlight requiring no illumination. Nip endeavored fake reply to challenge. COUGHLAN, GILLESPIE, INDIANAPOLIS all engaged at average range 8000 yards. Close approach prior sinking prevented by explosions. No survivors after search by COUGHLAN. Life jacket indicates probable Army transport. Jap appeared to be old coal burner four or five thousand tons. New subject. Field at FORMULA now 3600 feet long. Surface good sand. Taxiways and parking areas now under construction. Fighters now on FORMULA will make daily sweep of KISKA as weather permits. Airfield construction party OGLIUGA now unloading.

February 25 during riot at Japanese prisoner camp it became necessary for guards to fire on prisoners. Dead 42. Wounded 70. All sailors, soldiers, airmen. Court of Inquiry 1 March will send details then.
27 0540 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info ALL TF COMSOPAC, etc.

18 Dauntless dive bombers escorted by Wildcats gave MUNDA the usual going over at 1240 L (-11) 26th. 1 Jap plane was destroyed on ground, bombs fell near others. 4 large many small fires started and AA silenced both ends runway. GATO returning from patrol in SOLOMONS area reports sinking 3 cargo ships, 1 transport. All big ones. Also damaged possible cruiser with 2 torpedo hits. Same submarine reports persistent indication enemy radar on beach at ONTONG JAVA. May have been radar equipped patrol planes. OS2U depth charged possible sub off ESPERANCE FM 26th. Got oil bubbles but subsequent air and surface search negative. BUIN FAASI shipping relatively light 26th.

27 0537 COMAIRSOPAC to BUORD, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, OPNAV, etc.

With our shore based air force now attacking in SOLOMONS at extreme range of longest range fighters in face of extremely heavy and accurate AA and preponderantly superior enemy fighter strength over their bases, it is essential that variable time delay bombs up to 100 hours be procured immediately in order to temporarily immobilize enemy landing fields and thus permit our strikes to be made with some measure of equality in fighter strength. See Comairsopac 140139 and BuOrd 182012 December. Situation warrants immediate procurement and direct shipment from ENGLAND if not available U.S. Urge consideration development acoustic and magnetic detonated bombs for use interspersed with time delay bombs this purpose. Advise feasibility adapting MK 32 AA fuse to bombs for use as daisy cutters against AA.

27 1220 COMINCH to CINCPAC

Your 142337. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct you to send night fighter unit of 6 P-70 airplanes with appropriate personnel and associated equipment to southwest Pacific theater at earliest practicable date regardless of resultant weakening of night fighter strength in HAWAII.

28 0827 CTF 61 to COMSOPAC Info ALL TF COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, etc.

Night of 27-28 landed at CLEANSLATE 440 officers and men of 43rd Division and Acorn 3 with 1100 tons of supplies and equipment. Tonight plan to land 550 officers and men and 750 tons supplies and equipment at TENARD and WERNHAM.
Task Force 68 operate generally along the KS line on March 1st. Along the SQ line on the 2nd. Less CAs fuel from NEOSHO (AO48) at fueling rendezvous commencing 2000 GCT March 2nd Lat 15-30 south, Long 164 east. Orders in separate dispatch for new Task Force 68 Rear Admiral Merrill in MONTPELIER, CLEVELAND, DENVER, WALLER, CONWAY, CONY, FLETCHER, OBANNON, NICHOLAS, RADFORD. EDWARDS, FRAZIER depart HAVANNAH 2000 GCT March 1st proceed to make above fueling rendezvous report to Comtaskfor 18 Rear Admiral Giffen in WICHITA, LOUISVILLE, EDWARDS, FRAZIER proceed to arrive HAVANNAH during daylight March 4th assuming 12 hour readiness status on arrival. Task Unit 66.1.9 depart BUTTON during daylight March 2nd make above fueling rendezvous. Fuel new Task Force 68 on completion returning to BUTTON to arrive during daylight March 4th.

Comsopac Operation Plan 6-43. Jap aviation facilities in MUNDA - VILA STANMORE area have been reinforced. PT boats reported present. Additional information being forwarded to Comairsopac for distribution to arrive ESPIRITU SANTO March 2nd. General task this force will bombard and bomb enemy installations at MUNDA-VILA STANMORE in order to reduce their effectiveness. Task Force 68 Rear Admiral Merrill VILA detachment MONTPELIER, CLEVELAND, DENVER, WALLER, CONWAY, CONY, MUNDA Detachment FLETCHER OBANNON NICHOLAS RADFORD after completion fueling at sea March 3rd proceed to arrive ESPIRITU SANTO after daylight March 4th. Detachments depart ESPIRITU SANTO afternoon the 4th proceed via east and north of SAN CRISTOBAL towards RUSSELS. After dark the 5th leave vicinity RUSSELS. MUNDA Detachment proceed to bombard MUNDA, VILA Detachment proceed to bombard VILA STANMORE area, bombardments to start at 1430 GCT the 5th and to last not more than one hour. Destroy any enemy craft encountered. On retirement generally retrace routes to rendezvous off PORT PURVIS. Upon rendezvous report to me. Thence to Point K via SUGAR for fueling. Task Force 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shorebased aircraft GUADALCANAL area provide air coverage for Task Force 68 from daylight March 4th until withdrawal to Point S March 6th. Provide Black Cats to assist bombardment arranging liaison as necessary at ESPIRITU SANTO March 4th. Make dawn strike March 6th on MUNDA. Task Force 42 Captain Fife station two submarines off Western approaches to BLACKETT STRAIT afternoon March 5th to remain generally on station until afternoon March 6th to sink Jap shipping seeking to escape. Paragraph. XRAY reference points as in my Operation Plan 5-43. Logistics fuel LL cruisers, ERSKINE, PHELPS at PURVIS, ESPIRITU SANTO, HAVANNAH, at Point K in AO to be ordered. Communications as in my Operation Plan 5-43. This Op Plan 6-43 effective on receipt. Comsopac at NOUMEA.
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27 0629

CTF 61 to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, ALL CTF SOPAC.

Summary of CLEANSLATE operation. Have landed at CLEANSLATE to date 8770 officers and men 6217 tons material representing supply levels from today as follows. Avgas for torpedo boats 10 days. White gas 20 days. Mogas 25 days. Diesel 14 days. Rations 25 days. Ammunition infantry and artillery 5 units. Antiaircraft 7 units. Other supplies 25 days. Para. Estimate that in one more week can land all remaining personnel of 43rd Division less 472nd combat team, Acorn 3 and 35th Construction Battalion except personnel required to handle supplies at KOLI. Para. On conclusion of major personnel movement plan to retain Comdesdiv 24, WILSON, MAURY, MCGILL, Mine Group less SOUTHARD and HOVEY, and Transdiv 12 and release remaining destroyers and DMS. Para. Utilizing LCT's flat top and PAB barges with occasional night trips by cargo ship estimate 4 weeks required to complete movement all material including 1500 bundles Marston Mat and build up supply level of 60 days and 10 units of fire. Para. Request as soon as practicable after arrival all LCTs and LSTs in South Pacific be sent to KOLI POINT report to CTF 61 for this operation. Para. Above estimate includes remainder of one defense battalion which will be required prior to completion airfield. In view Comsopac 192255 and Comgen 1st Maramphfor 250512 information is requested as to units which will be assigned for augmenting anti-aircraft defenses of CLEANSLATE and probable time of availability for movement. Para. Estimate does not include movement of Marine Aircraft Group understood in prospect for CLEANSLATE. Para. Apparently enemy still unaware our occupation.

28 0555

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TF COMS SOPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

15 SEDs with Wildcat escort unable find burning ship off VELLA after daylight 28th bombed VILA instead. Vessel wrecked by BLUE strike previous afternoon and probably sank during night. Report of Avenger strike against BUIN shipping predawn 28th indicated 1 large AK destroyed by bomb hits. 1 plane on KAHILI field blew up from bomb hit. Huge blaze started east that drome by return engagement TBF strike early first. Planes unable locate shipping because of hazy bombed BALLALE. 1 plane dropped load on coast near KAHILI. Navy Liberators supported Avenger mission 28th with Army Liberators doing same today. Bombers dropped flares illuminate shipping for TBFs also sprinkle fragmentation clusters KAHILI BALLALE. Both TBF-Liberator strikes were preceded by single plane weather flights to BUIN with Hudsons returning via MUNDA to harass. Natives report Japs moving mechanized equipment BUKA to NUMA NUMA or KIETA and additional troops arriving BUKA. Dutch 75 millimeter projectile found at CACTUS had identical inscription as new type land mine previously reported. Indicates mine was Dutch manufacture. Jap subs may be using searchlights to attract mershipping. Rams signal has warned shipmasters.
03 2053 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMAMPHFORPAC

Treat with super secrecy. Comamphorpac 022000 best estimate first AGC ready east coast 20 July assigned at later date. Further instructions re repeat re operation COTTAGE will be issued in early future.

03 1535 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info CONSOPAC, COMGENHAWDEPT

Handle with utmost secrecy. Chief of Staff U.S. Army advises action being taken expedite to South Pacific heavy bombers as follows: As of two February 4 arrived in theater, 2 departed HAWAII for theater, 3 in HAWAII and one Hamilton Field, 3 being prepared and ready departure any moment, 15 moving from SALINA today to depart from U.S. about 7 February - total 28. Additional 7 being processed for departure soon as possible. He suggests and I concur that subject your decision most practicable method reinforce South Pacific at once is to despatch THRPNE from heavy group stationed HAWAII planes and trained crews and replace with planes and crews due HAWAII enroute South Pacific as indicated above. He further advises every effort being made to send South Pacific 30 medium bombers with crews and anticipates they will depart U.S. by 16 February. Your 022107. Pass to Commanding General Hawaiian Department.

04 2000 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info CTF 8, CTF 3, etc. etc.

This is most secret. Joint Chiefs of Staff desire that planning and training and other preparations for operation against BOODLE be modified in accordance with reduced shipping stated below and that revised estimate of forces required for COTTAGE be submitted after situation resulting from and offensives based on FORMULA is apparent. Para. Other projected operations necessitate withdrawal from amphibious force, Pacific Fleet, all AKA and all APA except 3 APA para. 1 damaged plus 1 new construction in April. Para. Estimate 12 LST and 8 LST will report to Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet by 1 April and 4 LST later. Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC have by hand.

05 2125 COMINCH to CINCPAC, CINCJANT, Info COMAMPHFORPAC, CONSOPAC, etc.

This is HiCom most secret. Cincpac transfer to Lentfleit to arrive MERCURY not later than 1 March 5 APA and 5 AKA. Include DICKMAN, RIDDLE, JEFFERSON, plus 2 other APA now in West Coast area. AKA OBERON, ARCTURUS, BELLATRIX, RENELGEUSE, ALCYONE. In addition direct CHARLES CARROL report Cincjant for duty upon completion repairs about 1 March. Send as escort any new destroyers assigned Lentfleit which can be made ready reduction shakedown period authorized.
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07 2356 COMSOPAC to CINC PAC.

This is most secret. Area French Forces have never formally placed themselves under my military command although professing cooperation. Local French Military Commander has informed American Island Commander that he considers himself under latter's military command for defense of Island. Cinopac 020129. Have no information that local French military commander has been informed by his government as per reference.

07 0506 COMSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, CGENSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFOR, etc.

Handle as most secret. Task force 62 occupy RUSSELL Islands for the purpose of a strengthening defense of CACTUS of A: Strengthening defense of CACTUS. B: Denying area to enemy. C: Establishing staging point for landing craft preliminary to further forward movement. D: Establishing advanced motor torpedo boat base. E: Conducting survey for landing field and radar site. Code name this operation and RUSSEL Islands CLEANSLATE. CTF 62 submit recommendations for naval support. Com-gensopac designate Commander landing force and make available two infantry regimental combat teams with future availability remainder of one division. Comgen 1st AmphCorps make available one raider battalion and one third defense battalion. Comnavbases Sopac designate Commander Naval Base CLEANSLATE and make available one ACORN, Construction Units, necessary elements of CUB and personnel for naval base. Subsequent to occupation Comtaskfor 62 establish boat pool at Navbase CLEANSLATE. Comtaskfor 63 furnish air support, direct qualified personnel for airfield reconnaissance party report Comtaskfor 62. Upon completion of occupation and when directed by Comsopac, command responsibility for defense and logistic support CLEANSLATE passes to Comgen CACTUS. At same time Comnavbase CLEANSLATE passes to command of Comnavbase CACTUS, Raider Battalion will be withdrawn subsequently upon order of Comsopac. In the interest of security addressees will keep orders and despatches preliminary to this operation to minimum with minimum distribution. Operation will be initiated earliest practicable, Dog day to be announced by Comsopac.
09 2355 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Following received from MacArthur. Quote. Information here seems to indicate that emergency anticipated by you in your previous despatches has failed to materialize. MacArthur to Comsopac 090440. My own operations envisage the maximum use of my air forces. I am in complete ignorance of what you contemplate. Before considering the dislocation of my plans and the diversion of my air force to your operations it is necessary that I have some knowledge of your intentions. Moreover effective support can only be given if sufficient information is available to me to permit of coordination. Unquote. Wilkinson proceeding BRISBANE first air for conference. Most secret.

09 2200 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

This is super secret. For Admirals Nimitz and Halsey only. Para 1. MacArthur states that he is not in a position to continue offensive action in the solomons area at this time. Para 2. Desire your comment on operation to seize occupy and hold ELLICE and GILBERT ISLANDS. Para 3. The objects of this operation would be to (1) make secure the line of communications from PEARL to WHITE POPPY (2) Divert Japanese war and shipping away from the SOLOMONS in preparation for (3) A continuance of the SOLOMONS campaign. Para 4. Infiltration and other offensive operations directed against RUSSELL Islands and NEW GEORGIA would continue to be carried out. Chief of Staff Army has.

11 0421 COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC.

This is most secret. Rapid consolidation JAP positions in NEW GEORGIA emphasize need for earliest attack and seizure. He is likewise in RUSSELS in sufficient strength to require immediate occupation which I am undertaking about 21 February. Operations in GILBERT and ELLICE your 092200 would divert considerable forces and involve costly delay in SOLOMONS. Support of strong garrisons required to hold islands in GILBERT ELLICE area would constitute logistic and escort drain. Recommend continue with all possible pressure here.
This is most secret. Commence Comsopac Operation Plan 5-43. Jap forces previously in RUSSEL Islands now reported as evacuating. General task this force will occupy RUSSEL Islands in order to strengthen defense of CACTUS and to establish staging point for further forward movement. TF 61 Rear Admiral Turner with forces made available to CTF 62 my 070506 Feb occupy RUSSEL Islands on Dog day. TF 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore based aircraft BUTTON - CACTUS as reinforced strike Jap shipping repeatedly in BUIN area commencing Feb. 13th (coordinating strikes with those requested of Comsowespac for same period) support TF 61 as in Annex A which follows shortly in separate dispatch. TF 68 Captain Merrill, Crudiv 12, FLETCHER, DRONNING, NICHOLS, RADFORD arrive PINMONEY at 6 hours L (-11) on Dog day, provide support for TF 61 subject to call CTF 61. TF 16 Rear Admiral Sherman TF 18 Rear Admiral Giffen WICHITA, LOUISVILLE, SUWANEE, SANGAMON, CHENANGO, CONWAY, WALLER, FRAZIER, MEADE, EDWARDS, TF 64 Rear Admiral Lee Batdiv 6 AULICK, DUNLAP, FANNING, BALCH, CUMMINGS, TF 67 Rear Admiral Ainsworth Crudiv 9 CHEVALIER, STRONG, JENKINS, TAYLOR, TF 69 Vice Admiral Leary NEW MEXICO, MARYLAND, COLORADO, WOODWORTH, McALLA, LANG be prepared to depart bases as directed by despatch to arrive on Dog day in supporting DIJNANTE of TF 61 against major Jap forces. This is Part 1 of 2 parts my 112230.

This is 2nd part of Comsopac 112230. Most secret. Paragraph Xray code name this operation and RUSSELL Islands CLEANS L A T E. Dog day is L time, commences at midnight and is day when 1st major troop landing is made. It will be set by originator by despatch and is expected to be about Feb 21st. Reference points as in my 031022 and 070612 Feb. Logistics fuel in heavy ships, transports, TALLULAH and ERSKINE, PHILPS in RINGBOLT area, oilers at sea as ordered, BUTTON HAVANNAH NOUMEA. Communication accordance Pac 70. Comsopac, TF and detached TG and unit commanders frequency and in addition guard 4295 series as command frequency to be used for no other purposes than in connection with this operation. Information and operational dispatches will be paralleled NPM FOX and Sopac LOTES broadcast. This Operation Plan 5-43 effective upon receipt. Comsopac at NOUMEA.
CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC.

Coincidence intensified Jap activity against BUTTON and CACTUS during presence Secnav party there Comsopac concerned over possible presence enemy agents NEW CALEDONIA. Halsey experiencing difficulty in obtaining cooperation from NEW CALEDONIA military officers. Para. Halsey informs me Commander French forces has never formally placed himself under him as my representative as required by para 8 of Secnav Secret Serial pren sail cast pren A 16-3 Pren 28 Pren of April 20, 1942, although such action implied in your 141445 July. Recommend following solution. Able: You take steps to insure French Commander comply with paragraph 8 noted above. B: When this done I will delegate to Halsey my authority contained in para 5 same letter in his command theatre. Para. With this authority I believe Halsey will have sufficient power to cope with any supply or security problems arising.

CINCPAC to COMINCH, COMSOPAC.

For Admirals King and Halsey only. Concur Halsey's 110421. If situation permitted consider offensive designed to capture and hold TARAWA, MAKIN, NAURU and OCEAN would be most desirable in that it would make opening in outer perimeter of defense line now being set up by Japs, would furnish additional protection to HAWAII SAMOA line and would tend to contain enemy fleet and minimize possible raids on our trade routes and outlying island positions. Surprise capture of any or all of these positions would however bring vigorous attempts by enemy to recapture them with strong fleet and shore based air support. Japanese have numerous well equipped naval and air bases in MARSHALLS from which to operate with shortest distance MILI to MAKIN 200 miles. Our nearest anchorage with single landing strip is FET-LOCK 700 miles from TARAWA. Until present balance has been upset by further destruction of enemy's naval and air forces and by growth of our own believe our experience in capture of GUADALCANAL indicates operations proposed your 092200 not now advisable.
This is most secret. ComGen WestDefCom 111728 paraphrased and passed for info: "War Department advises Army will not be able furnish three dive bomber squadrons duty BRONZE since the only two tactical dive bomber groups at present in US are committed to high priority theatre". My 082116.

Treat this with utmost secrecy. Admiral Dargenlieu in his letter to General Patch dated March 12, 1942 agreed that the superior command of allied troops French, Australian, American be exercised by General Patch and handed over the command of the troops based in NEW CALEDONIA and its dependencies. Command of the troops to continue to be exercised by Lieutenant Colonel DeConchard or his successor. General Patch accepted the superior command in his letter to Admiral Dargenlieu of the same date. Para. Halsey negotiate with commander French forces NOUMEA to the end that he place himself in fact under Halsey accordance agreement and solution Cincpac 102239 results to be satisfactory to Halsey. Para. Should Halsey be unable to complete a satisfactory negotiation and determine that local security is thereby not adequate he is authorized to create a military district within the limits of which there will be American military control announcing that he does not consider the French authorities to be in effective control of the area. This authorization has not been communicated to the British or other foreign authorities.

Ultra High Command for Nimitz and Halsey only. Para 1. Comsopac 110421 appears not to see necessity of operations in central Pacific as well as in Southwest Pacific which are so timed and on such scale as to afford support for all three or at least to endeavor to whipsaw enemy rather than enable him to concentrate in SOLOMONS or attack on JALUIT - GILBERT - SAMOA line or on MIDWAY - PEARL line. Para 2. With above factors in mind, taking into consideration views expressed in my 301915 November which apply in principle throughout SOLOMONS, MacArthurs message to Nimitz dated 13 January and my 121620, desire your proposed plan for operations during next 4 months. Plan should thoroughly consider the desirability of progressive extending of our positions along the ELLICE - GILBERT line in conjunction with operations in the SOLOMONS area. Para 3. Nimitz also see paper on Pacific situation brought by Ghormley which was presented to combined Chiefs of Staff at CASABLANCA.
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13 1400 COMINCH to CINCPAC

This is ultra secret. For admiral Nimitz only. From Cominch. Partial agenda for forthcoming conference follows. Assume you will bring your planning officer.

A. Strategic plan for Pacific including SOLOMON Islands campaign, NEW GUINEA campaign, ELLICE Islands - GILBERTS area, MARSHALL Islands area, ALEUTIAN operations and BURMA operations. B. Command relations in Pacific Area.


14 2209 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH.

Connection Ur 280913 refer my 102239 and comply Cominch 122028. You are hereby delegated the authority to direct and coordinate the creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad allocation of war materials in the South Pacific area.

14 2357 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH.

Most secret. For Admiral Halsey only for action and Admiral King info. This 1st of 2 parts. Para. Request your proposed operations for 4 months see Cominch 131250. Consider evacuation GUADALCANAL by Japs probably indicates assumption of strategic defensive by them. If so they may intend oppose us in SOLOMONS with Army troops shore based air naval light forces some submarines, releasing CVs cruisers submarines for raids on our outlying islands and our communication lines. Can operations you contemplate be relied on to continue to pin down Jap Fleet to TRUK SOLOMONS area question. If not consider entire absence naval strength Hawaiian Area as now existing requires redistribution fleet by moving portion from Sopac. MOST SECRET.
15 0113 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH. (Part 2 of Cincpac 14 2357)

Most Secret. Final part for Admiral Halseys action and Admiral Kings info only. Also desire your further views after conference Price on Cominch's proposal for thrust into GILBERTS. Purpose this thrust to confuse Jap regarding focal point of our action and support operations SOLOMONS Sea area. With this desired end should task be a raid or establishment permanent salient question. Also desire any alternative plan based on previously stated purpose and present forces available. Am arranging recce MAXIN to determine presence airfield. Please comment by February 17th.

16 1445 COMINC to CINCPAC

Treat this as most secret. For Admiral Nimitz only. Further items conference agenda my 131400. (S) Assignment of 2100 ton DD's becoming available after June. Should they replace 1600 tonners now in PacFlt or be divided between Atlantic and Pacific. (T) Establishment of "Naval Air Center Hawaiian Area" and appointment of Commander. (U) Assignment of 4 squadrons of B-24s to Atlantic for Antisubmarine work versus Pacific requirements.

17 0617 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

Most secret for action Cincpac and info Cominch only. Desirability operations central and Sowespac to confuse Jap and for mutual support fully recognized and concurred in. Availability of forces is criterion. Orange position NEW GUINEA and Solomons is pegged by Rabaul. Strong offensive against Rabaul area is surest means of pinning down Jap fleet strength to this area. Strike at Ellice Gilberts although diversionary does not advance us toward any critical objective, constitutes in fact a frontal attack, and support of seized islands, unless prepared continue advance, would constitute constant tactical and logistic drain. We have initiative in Solomons area and my plans are to press against Rabaul area as fast as means permit correlating with MacArthurs operations in New Guinea. Am occupying Russell on February 21st. Propose to get troops into New Georgia by infiltration or other means at earliest possible moment. With present forces I hope to take Munda Vila about mid April. Jap reaction to these operations will be indicative his attitude and the extent to which he dares withdraw fleet units. My estimate Jap cannot let Rabaul go since his entire Southern disposition rests on Singapore Java Rabaul position. Jap has capability of making diversionary raids but I consider that for us to permit him to force our dispersal from focal point Rabaul by such diversions at a time when we have gained initiative to go after it would be to surrender that advantage. He is

(Continued)
on defensive not us. Reinforcement will permit me to step up tempo my operations. Withdrawal of fleet units will slow it down. Price not arrived yet, any additional views will be forwarded.

18 2221 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

Utmost Secret. Urdis 180102. Moving force now bases NANDI to HAVANNAH Harbor approved. This cancels restriction on operating BatDiv THREE ships West of FIJIS. Approval reorganization task forces now in Sopac area except for reconsolidation of squadrons and divisions into their normal tactical units held in abeyance pending receipt your proposals.

20 0023 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Reorganization proposed. Most Secret. Task Forces 11, 16, 64, 67 as at present. Task force 18 Rear Admiral Hill BatDiv 4, 3 AC's at HAVANNAH. Task Force 68 Rear Admiral Giffen, 2 CA's, CruDiv 12 at HAVANNAH. All Task Forces except 18 with 8 DD's 18 with 7. Destroyers being regrouped into own squadrons.

21 0551 CTF 61 to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, etc.

Between 0530 and 1230 L (-11) 21st occupied RUSSEL ISLANDS with first eschelon of Army Navy and Marine troops totalling 4030 officers and enlisted. Third Raiders in PEPESALA. 2nd Battalion reinforced of 103rd combat team at RENARD SOUND. 43rd Division Headquarters First Battalion reinforced 103rd combat team light antiaircraft elements 11th Marine Defense Battalion at WERNHAM COVE. Naval base personnel and PT boats both at RENARD and WERNHAM. One month supplies 5 units of fire small amount engineering equipment landed. No enemy forces encountered up to 1500 L(-11). All our naval vessels departed by 1230 except 1 LCT with 2 damaged engines remained WERNHAM. Expect send one Army infantry battalion to PEPESALA tonight. This is ULTRA. It is considered highly probable that the enemy is not yet aware of this occupation and it is recommended that no public disclosure be made. CLEANS LaTeX will maintain radio silence for the present.
Reference proposed task force reorganization my 220025 destroyers will be grouped by squadrons except as follows: Desdiv 15 and Desdiv 27 assigned to one task force. Desron 2 assigned as escorts to Comsopac preparatory to eventual NYD overhaul. Propose Desdivs 15 and 27 be combined as temporary squadron (suggested squadron number 3) with Captain Harold R. Holcomb present Comdesron 2 ordered as Comdesron 3. HiCom. Comdr. Arnold E. True now Comdesdiv 4 be ordered temporary command Comdesron 2.

Handle as most secret. Present plans contemplate sufficient force available large scale operations NEW GEORGIA early April. For planning Dog Day is 10 April. Cinpac 241628. Comsopac replying. However if reconnaissance now underway indicate feasibility infiltration troops into NEW GEORGIA will be initiated soonest practicable.

Desire use the 2 battalions of paratroops now in Sopac during forthcoming operations. Lack of sufficient paratroops carrying air transports has limited jump training to individual qualifications. This is ultra. This being currently supplied by SCAT planes of MAG 25. In order provide air transport for simultaneous company and battalion jump training, for combat operations, and air logistic support up the SOLOMONS require 60 R4D1 planes be dispatched Sopac. Advise.

This is my 271116 in two parts. This is part one. Treat this as most secret. Para 1. My opinion that Japs have established a major defense point in SHORTLAND BUIN area protected from air attack by heavy concentration AA accurately controlled to above 20,000 ft. In addition over 100 fighters stationed this area. Bulk of shipping is kept under combined protection of fighters and AA. Consider day heavy bombardment strikes against shipping so protected will result in prohibitive losses unless each strike of 12 bombers or less is provided with 50 plane fighter escort, 30 of which employed as close cover. This will require assignment 160 fighters Corsair Lightning and Warhawk models to make two twelve plane strikes daily. As fighter opposition reduced protective fighters can be reduced. Para 2. Day Liberator strikes are now opposed in force result necessity proceeding direct route due short fighter range. My opinion CLEANSLATE may permit some deception this connection but not decisive results. BUIN outside effective fighting range CLEANSLATE based Wildcats. End Part ONE.
March 1st. (Oahu Date)

The Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet. No strikes were reported in the SOLOMONS area. The CLEANSLATE operation continued according to plan. Today there are approximately 9500 troops in the RUSSELS.

Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS caused a cancellation of all air activities.

Cominch 011245 pink requests information on the CLEANSLATE operation. Cincpac 020117 pink requests information from Admiral Halsey. Comsopac 020455 pink is Admiral Halsey's reply.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 2nd. (Oahu Date)

Task Force 67 continues to operate Southeast of the SOLOMONS in support of the CLEANSLATE operation. TF 68 will fuel tomorrow at ESPIRITU SANTO, then will proceed to bomb the VILA - MUNDA area.

At 1030 (-11) March 3rd 10 SBD with 16 VF escorting bombed MUNDA. Between 0155 and 0500 (-11) March 3rd 10 PB4Ys bombed KAHILI and BALLALE. In this strike shipping was the primary target but the ships could not be seen on account of poor visibility.

On March 2nd (-10) SWPac air made strikes on a convoy approaching the Northeast coast of NEW GUINEA and reported 2 medium AKs sunk, one 7 to 9000 ton AP probably sunk, one small AK burning and possibly sunk, two medium AKs and one DD damaged.

CTF 61 020210 states airfield possibilities in the RUSSELS.

The MINNEAPOLIS and MISSISSIPPI arrived at PEARL today. After about one month of temporary repair work at PEARL the MINNEAPOLIS will proceed to Mare Island for complete battle damage repair. The NEW MEXICO will leave EFATE for PEARL about March 8th (-11).

Cincpac 030353 recommends that the Military Governor be discontinued at SAMOA upon the detachment of the present Military Governor - Brig. General Larsen, U.S.M.C.

CTF 8 has asked for two or three OBB to bombard KISKA about March 12th. When highest quarters suggested such an operation some months ago it was pointed out by Admiral Nimitz that that employment of OBBs is not suitable. This view is still held here.
March 2nd. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

CTF 8 030405 pink proposes the occupation of ATTU. This operation was studied by the Plans Section here in January ('43) and found to be suitable. The feasibility would depend upon commitments of transports elsewhere in the Pacific.

Admiral Halsey informed Cincpac today that reliable information based on ground reconnaissance indicates 10000 Japs now in the VILA area. If he bases his plans for a move into the NEW GEORGIA group on that figure we can expect him to require all available Pacific troop carrying bottoms.

March 3rd. (Oahu Date)

Secret despatches describe repeated SWPac air strikes starting the 2nd (-10) on a Jap convoy approaching the Northeast coast of NEW GUINEA. The information is not clear cut but it seems probable that 14 AK, 4 AP, and 4 DD were hit, and of these a number were sunk. Our air losses were remarkably small, viz. 3 VB and 1 VF.

Comsopac 040631 describes air activities in the SOLOMONS. Two Jap planes were over GUADALCANAL from 2200 to 2305 (-11) the 4th. Four to six bombs were dropped which did no damage.

Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet.

Staff officers from SWPac and SoPac will arrive at PEARL March 6th (½ 9½) to discuss future operations in the Pacific Theatre. Preliminary discussions on this subject were conducted by Admiral Nimitz today. While no definite decisions were reached several proposals were explored. Cincpac 040341 pink and 040315 deal with ALEUTIAN situation.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 4th. (Oahu Date)

The planned bombardment of VILA and MUNDA was completed the night of March 5-6 (-11) by TF 68. Rear Admiral Merrill reported that he sank two enemy cruisers in that area, but other evidence indicates that these enemy vessels were large destroyers. At 0715 (-11) 5th TBF escorted by 15 VF bombed MUNDA. Two of nine PB4Ys which bombed the BUIN area from 0400 to 0420 (-11) 5th failed to return. Of 15 PB4Ys recently sent to SOPAC at least six have been lost.

TF 67 continues to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. The carrier and battleship forces in SOPAC are in port. In connection with large fuel expenditures in the SOPAC, Cincpac 042315 is a warning that fuel must be conserved.

(Continued)
March 4th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Cincpac 022045 pink deals with plans for seizure of the VILA-MUNDA area.

Admiral Halsey suggested sending the WASHINGTON to AUSTRALIA for installation of 40 mm guns. Both Cincpac and Cominch did not favor this plan. On several occasions Admiral King has intimated that our ships should not go to AUSTRALIA except for urgent battle damage repairs (Cominch 041410) (Cincpac 050145 pink).

Cincpac 050111 directs Com 14 to proceed with the MIDWAY dredging project.

General De Witt's 042017 pink requests views of ComGen ALASKA regarding an occupation of a position in the NEAR ISLANDS.

We believe that main enemy combatant strength is in the general area between TRUK and the EMPIRE. Lack of definite information continues to raise the possibility of an enemy raid in force on our Central Pacific positions. A raid in force on PEARL is possible but not probable.

March 5th.

Comsopac 060559 summarizes air operations in the SOLOMONS SEA area. Between 1347 and 1427 (-11) March 6th about 12 enemy dive bombers with 25 zeros escorting attacked our positions in the RUSSELL ISLANDS. Our losses were extremely light. Four enemy planes were reported shot down.

Pacific Ocean Areas were otherwise quiet.

Admiral Nimitz discussed General MacArthur's plan for Tasks TWO and THREE in the SOLOMONS SEA area. Staff officers from the South and Southwest Pacific will arrive at PEARL tomorrow for further discussion. What decision the Joint Chiefs of Staff will make as regards the large means called for by General MacArthur remains to be seen. In the meantime early decision must be made in WASHINGTON regarding Admiral Halsey's present plan to move into the NEW GEORGIA group April 10th, as General MacArthur's plan defers this move until operations in the HUON GULF area are completed. Furthermore, under General MacArthur's plan, Cinc SWPAC will set the date for the NEW GEORGIA move.

There were no new enemy developments.
March 6th. (Oahu Date)

Comsopac 070440 describes operations for the day in the South Pacific. The Central Pacific was quiet. Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS halted offensive air activity.

Comairsopac 062147 pink refers to use of an ACV to move an ACORN.

CTF 8 070115 two part pink approves an operation to establish an airfield in the NEAR Islands. Cinopac will direct CTF 3 to make the necessary study.

Staff officers from the South and Southwest Pacific arrived in PEARL today. Admiral Nimitz will confer with them regarding General MacArthur's plan tomorrow.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 7th. (Oahu time)

Staff Officers from the South and Southwest Pacific conferred with Admiral Nimitz today and left in the afternoon for WASHINGTON. Rear Admiral Spruance and Captain Small also left for WASHINGTON to attend the conference on General MacArthur's plan. Admiral Nimitz expressed general views on future moves in the Pacific campaign. It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be requested to approve Admiral Halsey's plan to move into MUNDA about April 10th without waiting for proposed operations in the HUON GULF. Admiral Nimitz pointed out that we must be most economical in fuel expenditures in the Pacific. Possible losses in the Atlantic this coming spring and summer may require tanker withdrawals from the Pacific. The pressing need of increased air strength in the Pacific Theatre also was mentioned. While no decisions were reached it is believed that all hands profited by the exchange of views.

On the 6th and 7th (-11) the TRITON probably sank four AKs in a convoy of six north of the HERMIT ISLANDS.

Between 2300 and 0032 6-7 March (-11) 3 B-24s harassed enemy shore positions at KAHILI, VILA, and MUNDA. At 2121 (-11) March 6th an enemy plane dropped four bombs in the water north of No. 2 fighter strip GUADALCANAL. No damage was done.

Comsopac 080650 gives plans for TF operations for the next three weeks. His 080052 pink again requests 60 R4D1 planes for his area.

Cinopac 072353 pink refers to employment of an ACV to move ACORN 5 and to the employment of the 12th defense battalion.

(Continued)
March 7th. (Oahu time) (Continued)

At 1000 (−10) 7th, 4 P-40s attacked KISKA. During that afternoon 10 medium and 6 heavy bombers attacked KISKA.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 8th. (Oahu time)

During the night 8-9 March (−11) three liberators harassed enemy positions at KAHILI, BALLALE, MUNDA, and VILA. At 1010 the 9th (−11) TF 67, 18 SBD escorted by 31 VF attacked MUNDA starting three large fires and hitting AA positions.

TF 67 continues to operate to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS. The force is covering logistic movements to the GUADALCANAL area. Other SOPAC task forces are in port. Today there are approximately 10,865 troops (including CBs) in the RUSSELLS.

Reconnaissance showed approximately 300,000 tons of enemy vessels anchored yesterday at RABAUL. No major combatant units were seen there.

The Pacific Ocean areas continue generally quiet.

On the 7th (−10) Army planes bombed and strafed enemy installations at ATTU. The S-31 left for patrol against enemy fishing near KAMCHATKA.

It appears that SWPAC air has been very effective in attacks on enemy attempts to reinforce and supply positions on the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA. There are indications that the enemy is short of food and ammunition in that area. Also, indications continue that the enemy is having considerable difficulty in supplying sufficient planes to the SOLOMONS Sea area. At KISKA the landing strip is about 80% completed. In the near future we can expect the enemy to attempt to bring land based VF to KISKA.

March 9th. (Oahu time)

TF 67 will fuel at ESPIRITU SANTO tomorrow and then continue to operate to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS. All other major SOPAC task forces remain in normal ports.

At 0745 (−11) 10th 18 SBD, 12 TBF escorted by 31 VF attacked VILA. All our planes returned. PB4Ys continued to harass the enemy at KAHILI, MUNDA, and VILA. Comsopac 100534 is an operations summary for his area.
March 9th. (Oahu time) (Continued)

At 1310 (-11) 10th about 10 enemy dive bombers escorted by 12 zeros attempted to attack the RUSSELLS. Our intercepting planes shot down 3 zeros and one dive bomber. Damage inflicted by the enemy was not reported.

Combatdiv 6 090812 pink recommends postponement formation Batdiv 8 as contemplated by Cominich

The SUNFISH reported two sure hits in a ship of the ASAMA MARU type off the east CHINA coast on March 9 (-8). The S-32 probably sank an enemy DD off HOLTZ BAY (ATTU) today.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 10th. (Oahu time)

Sopac operations are covered in Comsopac 110635. PBYS harassed enemy positions in the central SOLOMONS early morning (-11) March 11th.

The PERMIT on patrol off OMINATO reported a large ice pack at Lat. 41, Long. 144 East. It is unusual for ice to be this far south. The PERMIT also reported sinking two AKs and one sampan.

Commorpac 110720 is a description of an unusually heavy strike on KISKA made today.

Rear Admiral Spruance will be directed to confer with General DeWitt regarding possible JACKBOOT operations (Comgen WDC 102038 pink).

Comsopac 070911 and Cominch 082126, both pink, deal with the unsatisfactory situation at NEW CALEDONIA.

An enemy raid in force on our outlying North and Central Pacific positions continues to be a possibility.
March 11th. (Oahu Time)

TF 67, after fueling at ESPIRITU SANTO today, will operate to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS. All other major Sopac task forces remain in normal ports. Between 0115 and 0330 (-11) March 12 three Liberators harassed enemy positions in the Central SOLOMONS.

The AULICK struck a reef near NOUMEA on the 10th (-11) and was badly damaged. She may have to be towed to PEARL for repairs.

Comsopac 121105 is a directive for bombardment of VILA on March 16 (-11) by 4 DDs.

Enemy planes dropped seven 100# bombs near the METAPATA river (GUADALCANAL) between 1947 and 2135 (-11) March 12. No damage was done.

Comsopac 110315 is a directive to TF 11 and Crudiv 12 for training exercises March 15 to 17 (-11).

The Russian SS ILMAN was sunk by three torpedoes in Lat. 30-56 N., 136-30 E. It is just possible that the SAWFISH caused this sinking, but we hope not.

Bad weather halted air operations in the ALEUTIANS. In his 111221 pink Cominch states that the Joint Chiefs of Staff look with favor on the JACKBOOT operation.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 12th. (Oahu Time)

At 2008 (-11) 12th 21 TBF attacked MUNDA with 1000# bombs starting two fires. One plane failed to return. At 1020 (-11) 12th 18 SBDs escorted by 23 VF attacked VILA. KAHILI and BALLALE were harassed by night flying B-24s.

Comsopac 130247 pink tells General MacArthur of his plan to occupy MUNDA about April 10th.

A Sowespac submarine expended four torpedoes to sink an abandoned AK. It is not clear why torpedoes were used instead of gunfire. We cannot afford to waste torpedoes.

Cominch despatch favoring the JACKBOOT operation noted yesterday was implemented by Cinopac 130103, 130125, 130151, all pink.

An aerial reconnaissance of HOWLAND and BAKER today was negative.
March 12th. (Oahu date) (Continued)

Bad weather prevented major air operations in the ALEUTIANS.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 13th. (Oahu date)

Bad weather prevented air strikes in the SOLOMONS today. Pacific Ocean Areas were unusually quiet. Comnorpac 140605 is a summary for his area.

Com US Nav Forces Europe 112332 pink describes General DeGualle's action to improve Admiral Halsey's relations with the French in NEW CALEDONIA.

Comsopac 140413 pink gives aerial mining plans for the BUIN area.

Comgen WDC 132210 three part pink raises the command question for the JACKBOOT operation. It was answered by Cinopac 142135 pink.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 14th. (Oahu date)

At 1710 (-11) the 15th 12 SBD escorted by 25 VF attacked MUNDA. At 1735 (-11) same afternoon 12 SBD escorted by 4 VF attacked VILA. Those strikes were made in order to neutralize the strips prior to bombardment by 4 DDs planned to follow about eight hours later.

Cominch 122204 pink suggests employment of a tactical group of 4 to 6 submarines in the SOLOMONS Sea.

Because of one propeller shaft, the NORTH CAROLINA will proceed to PEARL for docking and repairs.

Cominch 141507 pink approves Cinopac set-up for JACKBOOT except withdrawal of AKs from Sopac.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 132021 requests comment on a proposal to set up a special staff to coordinate and handle all phases of radio and radar counter-measures.

The enemy continued to improve his positions in north NEW GUINEA. There are some indications that three or four CVs are training in Empire waters. It is probable that Russian
SECRET

March 14th. (Oahu date) (Continued)

Merchant ships are being routed to U.S.A. via TSUCHIMA STRAIT. If this is true it will complicate our submarine activities off HONSHU. We are directed to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. This does not mean that we can sink any ship encountered. All reasonable precautions must be taken to prevent the sinking of neutral shipping.

March 15th. (Oahu date)

During the night 15-16 March (-11) four DDs bombarded VILA. Our force met no enemy opposition and suffered no casualties. The following morning at 0635, 20 SBD escorted by 20 VF made a strike on VILA. Comspac 160553 is his operations summary for the 15th (-11).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed submarine operations off MALACCA STRAIT (Comspowespac 160844).

The S-32 on patrol in the western ALEUTIANS probably sank an I-class sub entering HOLTZ BAY and may have destroyed a DD or CM.

Cominch 151620 pink requests Cincpac conclusion regarding maintaining a task force in the Central Pacific. Cincpac has already made the first move to do that as shown by his 1422-17 pink. In the same despatch Cincpac gives a very brief estimate of enemy strength for Central or North Pacific operations and estimated present enemy intentions.

March 16th. (Oahu date)

Bad weather in the SOLOMONS Sea area prevented all strikes. Usual harassing planes were over BALLALE, KAHILI, MUNDA, VILA and VIRU during the night March 16-17 (-11).

A coast watcher reports that the bombardment group which shelled VILA March 5 (-11) sank a ship off STANMORE plantation carrying 500 men for MUNDA. Three survivors were liquidated.

There are about 12,000 troops now in the RUSSELL Islands.

Comnorpac 160811 three part is a summary of heavy air attacks on KISKA the 15th (7/10).

Cincpac (170157 pink) considers it desirable to have an organization at PEARL to handle radio and radar deception.

(Continued)
March 16th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Cincpac 162223 pink concurs in Cominch proposal to provide for the "Wolf pack" type of operation (previously noted) and in his 170121 pink he directed Comsubpac to plan and train for such operations. No reply has been received from Admiral Halsey to Cincpac request for his views on this subject.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 17th. (Oahu date)

During the night 17-18 March (-11) B-17s harassed KAHILI, BALLALE and VILA. At 1645 (-11) March 18 eleven SBD escorted by sixteen VF attacked VILA.

At 1003 (-10) 16th 8 P-38, six heavy and six medium bombers attacked KISKA. Hits were observed on enemy installations. That afternoon at 1340 (-10) eight VF from AMCHITKA engaged eight enemy planes 20 miles south of KISKA shooting down two sure and four probable. Our planes were not damaged.

The TRIGGER on patrol between PALAU and RABAUL near the equator reported sinking an 7000 ton AP. Considerable enemy shipping was seen in this area.

ComGen WDC 171900 pink 2 part requests authorization of the JACKBOOT operation. His 172239 seven part pink is the proposed joint directive for the operation. CTF 51 180105 pink requests more naval forces than were contemplated by Rear Admiral Kinkaid for the JACKBOOT operation. He is particularly worried about AKAs. We are not sure that General DeWitt has solved the AKA problem and will query Cominch. Cincpac 182021 pink requests CTF 16 comments on the above despatches, and Cincpac 182011 pink recommends to Cominch that the JACKBOOT operation be ordered.

There are some indications that the enemy is planning some sort of a move in the ALEUTIANS within the next six or seven weeks.
March 18th. (Oahu Date)

Air activities in the South Pacific were limited to usual searches and a fighter sweep in the central SOLOMONS. Our light forces continue to operate in the southern SOLOMONS and in the area to the southeast of the SOLOMONS.

Comsopac 180335 two part pink gives views regarding coordinated submarine operations.

Comsopac 190532 is an operations summary.

Cincpac 182202 gives plans and objectives for an army strike on TARAWA and NAURU.

In the north Pacific bad weather balked planned air strikes and searches from ADAK. CTF 16 190300 pink concurs in CTF 51 naval force requirements for JACKBOOT. Cincpac 182333 pink discusses forces for JACKBOOT. Cincpac also suggests to CTF 16 the desirability of additional bulk fuel oil storage in the ALEUTIANS.

Photo reconnaissance of the RABAUL KAVIENG area on the 18th(-11) showed 112 VF and 162 VB. This strengthens the belief that the enemy counts heavily on air for defense of positions in the SOLOMONS sea area.

March 19th. (Oahu Date)

On both the 19th and 20th (-11) at 1650 SBDs with VF escort made strikes in the NEW GEORGIA area. 1000# "daisy cutters" now being used in these strikes are reported to be a great improvement over the standard bomb.

Forty-two aerial mines were planted in the BUIN area by 42 TBF from GUADALCANAL beginning at 2040 (-11) March 20th. Nine B17's and 9 - B24's attacked searchlights and AA installations prior, during, and after the minelaying operation.

Com 3rd Fleet 200613 is an operations summary.

At 1105 GCT 19th (-11) an unreported number of enemy 4 engine flying boats dropped bombs on CANTON Island. Details of this aerial raid are not yet available.

During the morning of the 19th four P38's, 12 lightnings, six medium and six heavy bombers attacked KISKA. On the 15th and 16th of March a total of 185,300 pounds of bombs were dropped on KISKA.
March 19th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Cincpac 200147 pink expresses general accord with the views of Admiral Halsey on coordinated submarine operations. Comsubpac 192345 pink gives views on the same subject.

CTF 51 190135 pink amplifies his remarks on the JACKBOOT operation, noted yesterday.

CTF 16 will shift his headquarters to ADAK tomorrow.

Cincpac 200237 directs increased AA protection at FUNAFUTI.

There are no new enemy developments.

March 20th. (Oahu Date)

At 1640 (-11) March 21st eleven SBD escorted by 15 VF attacked VILA and MUNDA. Heavy AA fire was encountered at MUNDA.

All Pacific Ocean areas were quiet. The TG under Rear Admiral Merrill continues to operate to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS. Major Sopac task forces are in normal ports.

Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS caused the cancellation of all planned air attacks.

Cominch 182000 pink requests comment on BB assignments in the Pacific. This despatch was generally concurred in by Cincpac in his 210242 pink.

There seems a good possibility that the Japs will order submarines to attack our lines of communication between the SAMOAN area and AUSTRALIA. Major enemy strength is believed in the general area between TRUK and the Empire. There is a rather large amount of shipping indicated in the MARIANAS. The significance of this is not yet clear.

(Handwritten annotation)
March 21st  (Oahu Date)

Today was extremely quiet in both the South and Central Pacific areas. No strikes were made in the SOLOMONS Sea area and no important enemy forces were sighted by the searches. Five flights from AMCHITKA and one flight from ADAK bombed KISKA today. Results were not observed.

Yesterday commencing at 2043 (-11) 40 SBDs each dropped one Mark 12 mine off BUIN.

Crudiv 12 continued to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. Major SOPAC task forces were in normal ports.

It seems probable that the S-32 sank one DD and one I-class submarine during a patrol off ATTU just completed.

There is good indication that the enemy plans to construct an airfield on ATTU in the near future.

March 22nd (Oahu Date)

Activities in the SOLOMONS Sea area were limited to normal searches and logistic moves. Crudiv 12 continues to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. In answer to Cincpac query on this type of operation Comsopac sent his 220400 pink. Cincpac is still not in agreement with this placement of the cruiser destroyer group to accomplish stated objectives and points out the advantages which accrue by the use of the anchorage at PORT PURVIS. (Cincpac ____ pink).

Comairsopac plans to bombard NAURU with B-24's during the daylight of March 25th (-11).

Two enemy planes dropped bombs on the bomber strip at GUADALCANAL between 2050 and midnight (-11) the 22nd. There were no personnel casualties reported but at least 3 B-24's and one B-17 were destroyed. Dispersal near that field is not good. It may be that now we have too many planes at GUADALCANAL (over 300).

Comsowespac reports the loss of the GRampus and AMBER-JACK while on patrol in the SOLOMONS sea area. Both submarines are now long overdue.

Comsopac has recommended to Cominch that the project to lengthen the dry dock at WELLINGTON be cancelled.

A submarine was sighted and attacked off FANNING ISLAND during the afternoon today.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 221939 pink directs the occupation of ATTU as soon as practicable. A modified version of General DeWitt's proposed joint directive for this was requested (Cincpac 230425 pink).

(Continued)
March 22nd  (Oahu Date)  (Continued)

Comsubpacs proposal for wolf pack operations is satisfactory to Cominch.

Cincpac 230341 establishes a Central Pacific Force under Vice Admiral Leary.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 23rd  (Oahu Date)

Enemy planes were reported over TULAGI today but the time and number were not reported. SOLOMONS sea activities were limited to normal searches and logistic moves. Comsopac 240600 is an operation summary.

At 0805 (9½) today officers and lookouts on board the PIKE sighted an unidentified periscope six miles southeast of BARBER'S Point (Oahu). This probably was an enemy submarine.

In his 232109 pink, Cincpac suggests the use of Port PURVIS by cruisers and destroyers (see Comsopac 220400 pink, previously noted).

In response to a query from Cincpac Comsubpac 240230 pink recommends against sending four subs to SWPac at this time. Cincpac concurs in this in his 242203 pink.

CGWDC two part 231930 - 231940 states troops for JACKBOOT operation will be as previously noted. As certain changes are indicated because of reported airfield construction on ATTU the joint directive will be submitted to General DeWitt and Admiral King for concurrance before issue.

Comnorpacfor 230801 is an operation's summary for that area.

March 24th  (Oahu Date)

Com 3rd Fleet 250607 is an operations summary for his area. CTF 18 with two cruisers and 4 DD will leave ESPIRITU SANTO about zero hours GCT March 29 to patrol southeast of the SOLOMONS. Bad weather halted air operations in the ALLEUTIANS. Comnorpac 240850 gives AMCHITKA airfield progress.

Cincpac 242301 does not agree with Comsopacs recommendation to cancel the project to lengthen the dry dock at WELLINGTON.

Joint Chiefs of Staff six part 232357 pink gives planned additions to ground and troop strength in the SOPAC and SWPAC.
March 24th  (Oahu Date)  (Continued)

Rear Admiral Rockwell apparently thought that the VICTORIOUS group would be available to him for the JACKBOOT operation. This is not the case and he was so informed.

Cominch contemplates returning the VICTORIOUS to the British when the situation here can be handled without her.

It is probable that the enemy will make further nuisance raids on CANTON during the next few days. There were no new enemy developments beyond this.

March 25th  (Oahu Date)

From 0506 to 0610 (-11) the 27th 5 Airsopac B-24's attacked NAUHU ISLAND. No strikes were made in the SOLOMONS Sea area. Enemy planes were reported over GUADALCANAL last night.

Comsopac 260740 establishes a Marine aviation command in the South Pacific area.

Two enemy planes dropped bombs on CANTON shortly after midnight the 27th (-11). Minor damage was reported.

The KINGFISH returning from patrol off the East China Coast reported sinking one large loaded AP, one trawler, and the probable sinking of one AK. An enemy depth charge attack did considerable damage to the KINGFISH.

Comnorpac 260750 two part is an operation summary.

The enemy is expected to escort some Marus to the Western ALEUTIANS to arrive at ATTU in the next day or so. This is not to be considered as a major enemy move.
March 26th (Oahu Date)

Comnorpac 270805 two part describes the action today in which the SALT LAKE CITY, RICHMOND, and DD screen engaged a superior enemy force reported composed of 2 CA, 2 CL, 4 DD, 2 Marus. While we do not know definitely the Jap intentions, it is believed probable that this enemy force was en route ATTU with men and materials for airfield construction there.

At 0144(/11) the 26th and 0216(/11) single enemy planes bombed CANTON.

The FINBACK sank one AK and damaged another AK in an attack on an enemy convoy near PALAO today.

Enemy planes were over GUADALCANAL again last night. Slight damage from bombs dropped was reported.

Six Catalinas bombed NAURU early the morning of the 26th (-11).

At 1312 (-11) 27th 9 TBF escorted by 12 VF bombed MUNDA. At 1317 (-11) the same day 9 TBF with 10 VF bombed VILA. At 1530 (-11) 27th 6 SBD escorted by 7 VF bombed and strafed UGELI (Rendova Island).

In his 260535 Comsopac remarks on the drydock lengthening project at WELLINGTON.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 27th (Oahu Date)

Air search to 200 miles west of ATTU failed to locate any part of the enemy force which was engaged by Rear Admiral McMorris' group yesterday. It seems probable that the enemy was turned back. However, we must expect that they will return in the near future -- possibly with increased strength. Available to reinforce CTF 16 are: Batdiv 2 and one Desdiv now on the West Coast; the SANTA FE and one Desdiv at PEARL, but not ready for about 10 days; units of SOPAC forces, which would take almost a month to transfer to ALASKA.

No strikes were made in the SOLOMONS SEA area today, and air searches were limited by bad weather. Comsopac 280137 pink comments on the deferment of the MUNDA operation as suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cincpac concurs in Comsopac comments but will not comment on redeployment of the Pacific Fleet until the return of Rear Admiral Spruance from Washington.

Four enemy bombers approaching FUNAFUTI were intercepted by two of our VF. One enemy plane was shot down and the others escaped to the north.

Cominich concurs with Cincpac views that the completion of the Calliope project is essential.

(Continued next page)
March 27th (Oahu Date) (Continued)

On completion of the JACKBOOT operation the NEVADA will be sent to the ATLANTIC. The SOUTH DAKOTA will remain in the ATLANTIC until about May 1st.

The enemy is indicated to be strengthening positions in the MARSHALLS and GILBERTS. Twelve fighters are to be stationed at MILLE, MAKIN, and TARAWA.

March 28th (Oahu Date)

In the North Pacific all air searches and strikes were cancelled due to bad weather. No further word was received regarding the enemy force encountered west of ATTU day before yesterday. Rear Admiral McMorris' group is enroute DUTCH HARBOR. It seems probable that the SALT LAKE CITY and the BAILEY will have to go to a navy yard for battle damage repairs. It now appears that the SANTA FE can replace the SALT LAKE CITY for the JACKBOOT operation.

TF 18 will make a sweep of the KOLA GULF area on nights of April 1-2 and 2-3 (-11). On the first night the force will only sweep for enemy ships. On the second night, if no enemy ships are encountered, VILA and MUNDA will be bombarded.

Com 3rd Fleet 290635 is an operations summary. At 0410 (-11) the 29th 13 aerial mines were dropped in the BUIN area. This makes a total of 94 of these mines dropped in that area during the past month.

Comnaveu 251754 gives the status of the French Governor at NEW CALEDONIA regarding his relations with Comsopac.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 29th (Oahu date)

At 1500 (-11) March 31, 16 SBD escorted by 23 VF bombed MUNDA. Part of TF 18 continues to operate to the southeast of the SOLOMONS.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 291803 is a directive for Task 2 in the SOLOMONS Sea area.

In reply to a Cominich query Cinopac 300325 gives plans to reinforce CTF 16. No further word was received regarding Rear Admiral McMorris' force.

There were no new enemy developments.
March 30th

Bad weather in the SOLOMONS Sea area hampered air operations. Com 3rd Fleet 310635 is an operations summary for the 30th (-11). At least six ships including about three large DDs were tracked by our night search planes from 2255 (-11) 30th to 0140 (-11) the 31st in the VELLA LAVELLA area. No landing was observed.

Comsopac proposes to lay a mine field in the KULA Gulf (Mark 6). Cinpacs concurs.

Admiral Halsey was asked for his estimate of Pac Fleet forces required by the NEW SOLOMONS Sea directive in Cinopac 302013 pink.

Cinopac 311841 pink is a joint directive for the seizure and occupation of ATTU and the construction of an airfield in the NEAR ISLANDS.

There were no new enemy developments.

March 31st

At 1040 (-11) April 1st 41 own VF engaged 30 - 40 zeros over the RUSSELLS shooting down 16 zeros. We lost six fighters. Com 3rd Fleet 010621 is an operation summary for the 31st-1st (-11).

Comsopac 010111 pink is Admiral Halsey's estimate of Pac Fleet forces required prior to and during the proposed offensive in the SOLOMONS Sea Area. Cinopac has proposed to Cominch the withdrawal of 3 CA's and one Desdiv from the SOPAC to reinforce CTF 16. Further withdrawals probably will be made to reinforce the Central Pacific Force.

Comnorpac 310915 and 312025 describe attacks on KISKA on March 30th (-10).

CTF 16 310322 two part pink gives an estimate of forces required at this time. The NARWHAL and NAUTILUS will be converted to troop carriers and sailed to the ALEUTIANS, arriving there about May 1st. Cinopac has offered the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI to CTF 16 for the LANDCRAB operation. CTF 51 plans to sail the NEVADA and IDAHO for the North Pacific April 7th.

There were no new enemy developments.
Short title SOPACORG 2. Present intention reorganize SOPAC task forces as follows:

Task Force 11 - Radm Ramsey SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, 8 DDs.

Task Force 16 - Radm Sherman ENTERPRISE, SAN DIEGO, 8 DDs.

Task Force 18 - Radm Hill MARYLAND, COLORADO, SUWANNEE, SANGAMON, CHENANGO, 7 DDs.

Task Force 64 - Radm Lee WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, 8 DDs.

Task Force 67 - Radm Ainsworth NASHVILLE, HONOLULU, HELENA, ST. LOUIS, 8 DDs.

Task Force 68 - Radm Giffen WICHITA, LOUISVILLE, Comcrudiv 12 Radm Merrill MONTPELIER, COLUMBIA, CLEVELAND, DENVER, 8 DDs.

TFs 63 Vadm Fitch and 62 Radm Turner remain unchanged. Destroyer escorts and DMs remain under Comsopac in TF 66. Senior officer of each type in Sopac will act as Type Com.

Propose initially base task forces as follows, TFs 11 and 64 at NOUMEA, TFs 16 and 67 ESPRITU SANTO, TFs 18 and 68 HAVANNAH. Assignment destroyers by separate despatch.

SOPACORG 2 will be made effective by originator.

In reply your 230510. After 2 days in RUSSELLS Colonel Weir my staff expresses opinion airfield conditions are favorable. Consensus is that 3500 foot strip with Marston mat and some dispersal areas can be operating within 6 weeks and that extensions to over 5000 feet can then be well in hand. Ample construction equipment and personnel for immediate needs are now here and will be pushed in as rapidly as possible. Para. Understand 21st Marine Air Group will be assigned CLEANSLATE. Recommend that group less planes and flight personnel be sent CACTUS on arrival Sopac. If this group plus 10th defense are assigned this force at an early date we should be able to transport them to CLEANSLATE by increments in time for them to prepare their installations and to be fully operable by the time the field is ready for planes to use.
03 0353   CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC, COMGENSAMOA, COMDT MARCORPS.

Urdis 082116. Marcors 092017. Mydis 240032. Halseys 010402. Recommend discontinue military governor from detachment Gen. Larsen authority Naval (Civil) Governor derived from President as Commander in Chief and comes from military source hence see no technical involvement for authority of senior officer exercising unity command. Unnecessary specifically designate either Comgen SAMOA or his Chief of Staff to exercise present functions military governor. Such functions would be discharged by present Naval Governor subject to military direction by officer exercising unity of command.

04 0631   COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info NZNB, COMSOWESPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC.

Sowespac air estimates 11 ships sunk as result determined strikes 2nd and 3rd against LAE bound convoy. Undermined number damaged. 6,000 enemy reported occupying MADANG. Liberator strike to BUIN area predawn 4th saw no shipping dropped bombs KAHLFA BALLALE. SBD's with Wildcat escort struck MUNDA 0720 love (-11) 4th starting 4 fires. Wildcats strafed VIRU on return. Native scouts say Jap vessel hit by bombers off VELLA Feb 27th sank dawn 1st. Own air activities 3rd. 2 fighters strafed cutter off IRINGILL 0740 love left craft aflame. 10 SBD's gave MUNDA drome its daily pounding.

04 0315   CINCPAC to CTF 8.

Your 030355 negative. Operation does not ---- (See Pink).

04 2315   CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMSERFORPAC, COMSERONSPAC, etc.

Fuel expenditures in Sopac during past month plus requested deliveries for March emphasize urgent need for strong control measures. Without curtailing strictly necessary task force movements operations which do not interpose against enemy threats or further our advances must be drastically reduced. Coming spring and summer may find us with directive to transfer to Atlantic some tanker tonnage. In addition to foregoing it is imperative to speed up tanker voyages by following. Prompt discharge especially of remnant cargoes. Use slower tankers for the mobile storages. Erect shore tanks with dispatch. Status PEARL fuel stocks will soon require diversion some tankers now in your service.

05 0111   CINCPAC to COMINCH, NOB MIDWAY, Info Com 14.

Proceed with first priority work on MIDWAY dredging as outlined your sec ltr ser. 0060 of 19 Feb. 1943. Cominch is requested to assist in procurement dredge McMULLEN mentioned foregoing reference.
March (GCT)

06 0559 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL CTF SOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, NZNB.

CTF 68 reports his VILA-MUNDA bombardment group sank 2 Jap light cruisers after midnight last night in KULA GULF. Enemy vessels left FAISI for KOLOMBANGARA 1910 L (-11) yesterday 5th came down through WILSON STRAIT. Black cat spotters for surface ships saw 20 minute naval battle then helped cruisers, destroyers shoot up airfields. Large fire started VILA and Jap guns silenced. At 0700 L (-11) 6th SARATOGA Air Group (69 planes) struck MUNDA dropped 30 half ton daisy cutters and strafed area. Reported runway absolutely unserviceable result shelling. 5 Liberators hammered KAHILI predawn today while 3 dropped bombs BALLALE. Fires started dispersal area south runways at both fields. 2 BLUE vessels enroute MAINYARD to LECTERN report unsuccessful attack by Nip high level bombers midday 5th. Additional air activity 5th. Hudson on weather flight to BUIN returned via MUNDA dropped 4 light bombs. 9 Navy Liberators over BUIN area 0400 L (-11) failed find shipping targets dropped bombload BALLALE. 2 aircraft failed return. Search plane bombed enemy activities VIRU . Patrolling sub has detected Jap radars RABAUL, WEWAK, BUKA, SHORTLAND and AITAPE (North NEW GUINEA). 2 dead, 11 wounded result air raid TULAGI night 5th-6th. Searchlight activity probably by sub continues vicinity MANUAU ISLAND, COOK Group. Vessels in TASMAN SEA keep 20 miles clear CAPE EGMONT, NEW ZEALAND. Evidence enemy laid mine field there.

07 0440 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TFC SOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, NZNB.

12 Japanese dive bombers escorted by 20 zeros made first raid U S positions RUSSELL ISLANDS 1347 love (-11) 6th. 1 man killed 12 wounded result strafing and anti personnel bombs. Material damage light. Small blue fighter patrol over islands destroyed 4 dive bombers plus probable 5th. Just prior attack 2 SBD's on antisub patrol near RUSSELLS jumped by zeros. 1 SBD shot down 1 of 3 attacking zeros other fought off 5 nips. Both our planes returned. 2 DD's 7 AK's sighted BUIN area morning 6th. 5 Navy liberators off during morning darkness 7th to strike BUIN shipping were preceded by advance flare plane. Saw no vessels BUIN 1 AK KIETA. Striking planes split to bomb KIETA vessel BALLALE KAHILI VILA. Results generally unobserved.
Assuming no major enemy activity during next 3 weeks desire utilize opportunity for training commensurate with concentrated upkeep program and state of readiness for action. Training exercises should be carefully planned so that minimum training time will produce maximum results along line of breaking in newcomers and of specific preparations for our next offensive which involves all phases of amphibious operations against shore opposition.

10 0534 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info NBNZ, ALL CTF SOPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

11 Torpedo bombers 13 dive bombers escorted by 31 Wildcat fighters struck MUNDI 1010 L (-11) ninth. Avengers dumped half ton bombs set for grass cutter action in supply bivouac areas starting large fires. Dauntless pilots worked over AA posits silencing all guns which opened fire. Coastal watches saw two DDs approaching BUKA from east 0700 L (-11) 10th. Air saw two small freighters SOHANA ISLAND ninth. Additionally sighted ninth. One AK north BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT 3 AKs BUIN SHORTLAND area. Photos ninth placed 51 fighters KAHILI drome. Following from natives: 20 bombers being repaired BUKA ninth. Last week's bombing killed 20 Nips BUKA area. NUMA NUMA natives being stirred up to hunt whites chinese loyal natives. Japs again evincing interest VELLA LAVELLA. Surveyed DOVELI COVE northeastern corner island 7th and next day looked over BILOA area southeastern VELLA possibly considering fighter strip site. Watcher say large oil fire result VILA bombing AM 10th/.

11 0635 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMSOWESPAC, NZNB, ALL TFC'S SOPAC.

Sopac activity 10th centered RUSSEL ISLANDS. At 1310 L (-11) about 10 Aichi 99 dive bombers 12 Nagoya zeros attacked islands were intercepted by local patrol plus fighters from CACTUS. 1 Aichi 3 zeros destroyed. At 2020 L (-11) RUSSELLS had radar contact 7 unident ships north RAISEN Island. 25 minutes later saw gunfire on horizon. PT's despatched. Nil further reports as yet. VILA strike 0745 L (-11) 10th was by avengers and dauntlesses with Wildcat escort. 29 big bombs in target area started several fires. Navy Liberators harassed KAHILI MUNDA VILA early 10th. Similar mission substituted BALLALE for MUNDA early today 11th. Photo flight to BUIN area 1600 L (-11) 10th saw 7 warships 7 merships.
110715 COMNORPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, CTF 3, COMNORTHWESTSEA AFRON, Etc.

Days work March 10th from Comnorpac for. Part one of 2 parts. All times W (plus 10). S-32 reported torpedoing 1 DD off HOLTZ BAY 2300 9th. Depth charged by another with slight damage. No further info. Weather plane reported no new shipping BOODLE 1030 ATTU. 500. 1438 weather plane on way home attacked by 5 float fighters off BOODLE causing minor damage. 4 FORMULA P-40 at 920 dropped 4-300 pound 24-20 pound frig bombs sub base area BOODLE with hits observed. New subjects. Expect Ogluiga emergency steel landing mat ready 11 March with balance of work completed in 5 days. 8 additional P-40's now based FORMULA. First photo negatives taken during large scale attack 11 single float 3 double float monoplanes on beach BOODLE Harbor. Not sighted by attacking planes. Weather generally good. Searches reported averaged 85 percent. Negat contacts.

110720 Part 2 of above. First part is 110715. Comnorpacors March 10th summary. 10 medium 6 heavies 12 P38's from VENTRILIOQUIST attacked BOODLE at 1124. 7 Lightnings strafed radar installations and nearby ack ack battery. 4 B25's followed dropping 4 half tonners on each radar from deck level. Both targets and 1 nearby AA battery hit. 6 B25's smacked NORTH HEAD with two hundred 16-20 pound frag and 35 - hundred pound demolition from four to five thousand feet practically silencing AA many hits seen. Immediately thereafter 6 Liberators plastered main camp area with 36 half tonners. 3 buildings seen hit and smoke that area afterwards. AA heavy against deck level attack but grew weaker with attack on NORTH HEAD. 1 each Mitchell Liberator Lightning and F-5 minor damage DICWD Gunner slightly wounded. All planes returned. All times W (plus 10).

110315 COMSOPAC to CTF 11, COMCRUDIV 12, CONWAY, PHILIP, WALLER, Etc.

Task Force 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey after completion of scheduled exercises about noon 15 March proceed to rendezvous with CruDiv 12 plus action DD's Rear Admiral Merrill at 2000 GCT 15th posit 19-30 South 167 East. CruDiv 12 depart EFATE late afternoon 15th. Thereafter combine force under Rear Admiral Ramsey conduct tactical exercise in area north of lat 19-30 South and West of long 167 East until 0300 GCT 17 March, then Task Force 11 proceed to NOUMEA to arrive prior dark 18th. CruDiv 12 plus DD's proceed to point F to operate along F-Q line.
12 1105 COMSOPAC to CTF 67, COMAIRSOPAC, COMDESRON 21 info CINCPAC etc.

Effective on receipt. This is Comsopac operation Plan 7-43. Jap troop and logistic concentrations VILA STANMORE area heavy. Continuous night reinforcement from BUIN-SHORTLAND area indicated. Additional information in dispatch to follow. General task this force bombard and destroy enemy troop concentrations at VILA STANMORE. Destroy any enemy craft encountered. Task Group 67.6 Comdr. McInerney in NICHOLAS OBANNON RADFORD TAYLOR detached from Task Force 67 proceed via north and east SAN CRISTOBAL in time arrive TULAGI noon 15th March for refueling. Depart TULAGI at moderate speeds in time to pass through latitude 9-54 south longitude 159-16 east at 0845 GCT the 15th. Increase speed to arrive off VILA and commence bombardment at 1500 GCT 15th. Complete prior 1530 GCT. Return via north of GUADALCANAL and north and east SAN CRISTOBAL to rejoin Task Force at point Q at 2000 GCT 16th. Task Force 63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore based aircraft GUADALCANAL area provide air coverage for TG 67.6 from daylight March 15th until local noon March 16th. Provide Black cats to Assist bombardment arranging necessary liaison at TULAGI March 15th. Strike MUNDA and VILA's sunset 15th. Paragraph. Reference points as in my operation plan 5-43. Black Cats warned that unnecessary flying within gun range Task Group seriously interferes with their mission. Communications as in my operation plan 5-43. TG Commander guard Task Force Commanders circuit. TG 67.6 becomes TG 18.6 at 1200 GCT the 15th. Comsopac at NOUMEA.

14 0605 COMNORPAC to CTF 3, CINCPAC, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, COMINCH, etc.

Summary for March 13th. Weather (rain low ceiling some for) again prevented air attack on BOODLE from VENTRILQUOST FORMULA closed in during most of morning also. Few searches made in middle of chain and to westward averaging 50%. Negat contacts. Weather plane returned early due weather. At 1415 W (plus 10) 12 P-40's from FORMULA raided BOODLE dropping 144 fragmentaries GSOTMAMP# area. Planes reported seeing Zeros on beach as per photos. All planes returned. No further details available. New subjects. Laying of Ogliuga mat finished 12th. Arrangements now underway to lay additional matting in order widen runway. 10 P-38's now based FORMULA. Planes now based there are 31 fighters 4 mediums and 2 PBY'S. Comnorpacfors.

# AS BROKE
13 2021 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, to CINCPAC, CINCJANT.

For Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Admiral Royal E Ingersoll. Comment is requested on proposal now before Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide officers with proper background and training to be made available to theatre commanders where their operations require. These officers intended to constitute a special staff and coordination and handling all phases of radio and radar countermeasures including jamming anti-jamming and deception. Constitution of such staffs would depend on theatre and mission and be flexible in all cases. Typical staff for land based operations might include representative of each service sufficiently concerned such as air, ground and signal, also naval operations and intelligence. Book message to MacArthur, Ezero, Bradley, Eisenhower, Andrews, buckner, Nimitz, Ingersoll, Emmons and Brett. Proposal also includes similar provision small countermeasures staff for task forces and defense commands whenever contemplated operations make such desirable. It is not intended that these staffs replace countermeasures and deception officers now reporting for duty staffs Cinopac, Cincjant and other Fleet Commanders. Purpose of adding officers of other services as desired for these staffs is to insure better coordination where needed. Early reply by dispatch desired.

16 0553 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info NZNB, ALL CTP 3rd FLIT, COMSOWESPAC.

As prelude to surface shelling VILA STANMORE 12 SBDs, 25 Wildcats hit MUNDA 1710 Li(-11) 15th. 25 minutes later same number dive bombers, 4 Grumman fighters raided VILA area. 12,000 pound daisy cutters exploded each target area. After dawn 16th 10 more SBDs blasted VILA from low altitude releasing bombs bivouac area. 1 additional Dauntless dropped on MUNDA. Report of bombardment Task Group not yet in but indications mission completed as scheduled and search plane morning 16th reported VILA runway quote Terrible shape unquote. Nip party at BANIU returned BUKA evening 14th. Another group at KUNUA also north BOUGAINVILLE with possible RDF for coast watcher hunt. ANEITYUM in NEW HEBRIDES again reports possible orange sub charging batteries off shore. This times 0700 L 13th. Barge exploration VILLA continues. All search 15th saw only 2 small freighters BUIN area with 10-18 barges off KAHILI. 2 Forts heavily harassed KAHILI early darkness 16th. Intense searchlight activity encountered 1 plane returned via VILA MUNDA dropped flares bombs got nil AA.

DECLASSIFIED

1464
March (GCT)

16 0844 COMSOWESPAC to CTF 71 Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, MACARTHUR, J.C of S

Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed assignment 2 submarines for 1 patrol each between MALACCA STRAIT and MARTABAN BAY to sink enemy shipping enroute RANGOON for purpose reducing enemy reserves preparatory ANAKIM operation. 1st submarine to depart at early date. Information that Japs send 6 or 7 supply ships monthly to RANGOON. Eastern Fleet submarines are employed on offensive patrol northern end MALACCA STRAITS. CTF 71 will assign submarines for this task and direct departure 1st submarine earliest practicable date 2nd sub relieve on station at end of normal patrol.

Communicate direct with Commander Eastern Fleet to obtain additional information desired regarding movements Eastern Fleet. Inform me name vessel designated 1st Patrol and date of departure by priority despatch.

16 0811 COMNORPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 51, COMNORWESAEAFRON, etc.

Results of field day 15 March from Comnorpacfor. Part 1 of 2 parts. No UNNAK searches due fog rain. Western searches completed averaged 98%. All times W (4/10) unless otherwise designated. At 0945 3 FORMULA P-38's slapped BOODLE with 13 quarter tonners from 8000 feet and saw hits camp area. No enemy planes in air or on water. All returned base without damage. VENTRILOQUIST mission comprising 8 heavies 6 mediums 12 P-38's accompanied by 1F-5 photo plane hit BOODLE at 1115. Mediums on separate attack let NORTH HEAD have 36 demolition 100 pound 216 frag 20 pound bombs. Hits observed. AA light. Heavies dropped 3-2000 pounders 12 half tonners on submarine base from 6000 feet with unobserved results and 12 1000 pounders camp area hits observed. AA heavy SOUTH HEAD camp area NORTH HEAD all bombers returned base undamaged. 8 Lightnings top cover 4 strafed beach. No enemy planes seen. Ack heavy scattered some firing at top cover. 1 fighter engine caught fire pilot landed near RAT ISLAND. Rescue planes and DD sent covered by FORMULA P-40's. Believe rescue accomplished. Final report later. Other VENTRILOQUIST fighters returned base.

16 0817 Here is part 2 of Comnorpacfor March 15th summary. Another attack made by 8 FORMULA Lightnings at approximately 1300. 16 quarter tonners dropped main camp and NORTH HEAD from 9,000. Results unobserved. At 1303 weather plane attacked by 3 float planes. No damage. 4 P-40's left FORMULA at 1407 to locate above enemy planes. No further details. Still another BOODLE mission departed VENTRILOQUIST 1520 composed of 6 mediums 5 heavies 5 lightnings. No report received of results. New subjects. S32 off JACKBOOT reported destroying Item Class submarine at 0900 GCT on 14th. No details available. Doubtful sub contact at 0835 near Lat 54 Long 167. Planes and ships conducted search. No new shipping seen BOODLE today.

1465
16 2138  COMNORPACFOR to CG WDC, CINCPAC, CTF 51, COMINCH, etc.

Add this to Comnorpacfor 160811 and 160817 activities 15th March. 3rd FORMULA mission 4 P40's took off at 1407 W (plus 10) found no enemy fighters dropped 60 fragmentation 20 pounders 2 incendiaries on NORTH HEAD. 4th FORMULA mission 8 P38's 3 B25's with photo plane took off 1815 leaving 33-500 pounders on BOODLE. Summarizing. In 4 attacks from FORMULA and 2 from VENTRILOQUIST total of 687 bombs weighing 100,080 pounds dropped on BOODLE. There were 200 take offs and landings from fighter strip FORMULA. Have reported separate despatch sinking of I class subcat HOLTZ BAY by S 32. New subjects. Rescue mission found P38 pilot on beach RAT ISLAND dead from drowning. PBY successfully made 1st landing and take off OGILIUGA emergency emergency strip on 15th. Poor weather prevented observation HOLTZ BAY and CHICHAGOF HARBOR by weather plane. AGATTU negative. Photos taken 15th show 6 enemy planes on BOODLE BEACH at 1115.

19 0532  COMSOPAC to Com 7th FLT, Info ALL TFC 3rd FLT, COM 1st FLT.

11 dive bombers with VF escort attacked VILA bivouac area late afternoon 18th dropped 5 tons high explosives. All planes returned despite concentrated accurate AA. Single nip plane unsuccessfully bombed BLUE DD and oiler enroute AMPERSAND from MAINYARD 18th. Watcher reports 3 barges loaded with Jap troops and natives departed NUMA for KIETA 0930 Love (-11) 18th. TULAGI had condition red night of 18th no report of damage. Morning searches 18th saw little shipping BUIN area. GROUPER returning from patrol reports counting 24 DD's in Tokyo Express run on 4th-5th February. 30 Japs armed with machine gun landed DOVELI COVE VELLA LAVELLA AM 17th.

20 0613  COM 3rd FLT to COM 1st FLT, Info ALL TF COMS, 3rd FLT COM, etc.

Grumman fighter sweep 19th to MUNDA where earlier search same day has reported 15-20 planes on ground. Found only damaged aircraft. Strafed revetments, LAMETI area, and AA positons silencing 1. At 1650 (-11) 19th 9 SBD's bombed VILA with half ton Daisy cutters, 2 BLUE planes hit AA fire but all returned. Search 19th saw nip camp BAMBATANA in Southwest CHOISEUL 2nd camp 28 miles Northwest. Also 2 small groups tents near BAMBATANA. Dauntless on patrol near RUSSELLS depth charged possible sub 0730 (-11) 19th. BUIN SHORTLAND shipping AM 19th was 7 vessels including only 1 possible warship. 2 fortresses harassed KAHILI BALLALE early today 20th. Another unsuccessful bombing attack by lone Nipper took place forenoon today upon MAINYARD bound BLUE convoy east northeast of SAN CRISTOBAL.
20 0237 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, Info COMGEN SAMOA.

Present planned and future air operations from FUNAFUTI expected cause enemy reaction against that exposed position. Increased defenses particularly antiaircraft essential there. Udris 132324 noted. However am requesting VNnav send 8 90 MM and 8 40 MM AA FUNAFUTI with fire control equipment and Navy personnel for maintenance these equipments. Desire personnel two provisional companies FUNAFUTI be trained in operation 90 MM and 40 MM so as to man them from time of arrival until regular crews can be made available.

23 0341 CINCPAC to COMBATPAC, BATDIV 3 LESS IDAHO, VICTORIOUS, etc.

Central Pacific Force under command Vice Admiral Leary in NEW MEXICO hereby organized as Task Force 50 Pacific Fleet. Initially composed of Batdiv 3 less IDAHO HMS VICTORIOUS SANTA FE PRINGLE BACHE CONVERSE STANLY. Batships report for this duty immediately others when directed by Cinopac upon completion navy yard work and type training under their respective type commanders. Previous task group and unit designations of action addressees hereby cancelled. Central Pacific Force will oppose any advance of the enemy in Central Pacific Area and will plan and train for offensive operations in that area and for support of offensive operations in contiguous areas.

24 0600 COMSOPAC to COM 1ST FLEET, info NZNB, ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC, etc.

2 Nip planes raided MAINYARD bomber strip. Alert from 232050 to 240017. No personnel casualties but bomb hit runway others struck near grounded planes destroying 3 Liberators 1 Bt by fire and damaged others. Native says radio located Dovali Cove Vella Vella. Bombardment VILA 160200 destroyed oil and shore dumps caused Japs to withdraw to bush north of plantation. Managers house destroyed. 4 Lightnings strafed REKATA while another 4 screened. 2 AK's 1 transport 1 AH sighted BUIN PAISI morning 23rd. Same day 1 AK at KIETA. All times L (-11).
23 0801 COMNORPACFOR to CINCPAC, COMINCH, CTF 51, COMNORWESTSEAFRON etc.

2 missions each from VENTRILOQUIST and FORMULA to BOODLE returned without dropping bombs due low ceiling solid overcast 2-3000. Snow showers middle of chain. Searches middle and westward averaged 100 percent. HOLTS Bay CHICAGOF SEMICHIS NORTH SHORE AGGATU scouted. Negative contacts. No new shipping no enemy planes sighted BOODLE. Cruiser Group comprising SALIT LAKE CITY RICHMOND 4 DD's covering routes HORMUSHIRO to JACK BOOT - BOODLE. Summary March 22. Additional detail S32 attack on I class sub Mar 15. Large volume smoke seen above conning tower followed 6 minutes later by disappearance sub. This following sound of explosion indicates destruction.

23 1930 COMGEN WDC 4TH ARMY to CINCPAC info COMAMPHFORPAC CTF 16 etc.

Most secret. CG 0317. Reference Cincpacs 230425 designation of troops as indicated in my 172239 discussed.

23 1940 Today with Chief of Staff War who concurs. Therefore Army troops required remain as indicated in previous dispatch. This part 2 of 2 parts our 231330. Request you issue joint directive. Problems indicated in Comamphforpac 190135 will be adjusted locally. Most secret.

25 0607 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT Info NZNB, COM 7TH FLT, etc.

3 fords 18 avengers raided KIHILI. At 242035 forts unloaded 2 quarter tonners in revetment area. 3 avengers followed dropping total 3400 pounds bombs bivouac area starting fire. 14 torpedo bombers then hit revetment area with 1 6600 pounds of bombs starting 4 fires. 1 avenger dropped 12 century bombs on small vessel unobserved results. AA heavy also many searchlights. All planes retrund. Photos 24th show 15' dive bombers 35 VF 3 VB on KIHILI. Usual number planes other fields. Barge activity NUMA TENAKAU ARIGUA East Coast BOUGAINVILLE noted. AK off TENAKAU at 241300. DD or CL plus 3 AK's at HUIN-FAISI morning 24th. MAINYARD alert at 250245. L (-11) time used.

24 2301 CINCPAC to COMINCH. Info CONSOPAC, NOB AUCKLAND.

Do not agree with Consopac 220107 for following reasons. Arrivals of CA and BB floating docks in Sopac area are expectations not certainties. Floating docks are always vulnerable to attack both enroute and in harbor. If worst should happen we would continue to have available only the 2 docks for CA's at SYDNEY and a third of BB size now building with reported readiness about mid 1944. Original recommendation to lengthen CALLOPE dock was premised as assurance this work could proceed without interference continued operation thereof. If this premise still holds which Consopac is requested to verify recommend that planned extension be undertaken at early date.
24 0850 COMNORPACFOR to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 51, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Summary for 23rd from Comnorpacfor. Foul weather resulted cancellation attack missions from VENTRILIOQUIST and limited searches middle ALEUTIANS. Western sectors averaged 110 percent including observation ATTU AGATTU SEMICHIS. Only contact 1 Nakajima 97 southwest VENTRILIOQUIST sighted by Catalina. Apparently searching. Did not attack. FORMULA fighter strip now complete with sand and gravel surface and steel matted warm up pads and dispersal standings for 39 miscellaneous standings. New estimate completion date steel matted bomber strip 200 by 5000 plus some dispersal is April 20.

26 0740 COMRAIRWING 1 to COMRAIRWINGS PAC, Info CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC, etc.

Comsopac has approved establishment under Airsopac of Marine aviation command Sopac consisting first Marine Aircraft Wing, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing plus such other Marine aviation units serving Sopac under command senior Marine Aviator Sopac, designation "Marine Aircraft South Pacific" short title "Marairspac". Request you take necessary steps place this in effect and obtain authority to form effective 1 April "Headquarters Squadron, Marairspac".

26 0750 COMNORPACFOR to CINCPAC, COMSOWESTSEAFRON, COMINCH, etc.

Comnorpacfor sends 1st part of 2 parts March 25th summary.

BOODLE attacks. From FORMULA. 0745 W (f 10) 4 lightnings in low level attacks strafed beach hangar and camp area dropping 4 incendiary clusters and 2 quarter tonners. Complete surprise no ack ack great activity personnel camp area seeking cover while being strafed. 1650 W (f 10) covered by 8 lightnings 3 mitchells dropped 12 quarter ton bombs with hits main camp and on beach south of hangar. Heavy AA 20,000 little seen 8-10 thousand bombing altitude. Of 13 VENTRILIOQUIST liberators 2 turned back mech trouble. 1 had rack failure. Others dropped 3 1 tonners sub base with hits. 256 century demos runway area with hits west end and south side runway. 34 century demos North Head. AA North Head end and North main camp. Slight damage 1 plane. While returning this mission sighted 1 unidentified float plane SEGULA ISLAND approx 1615.
26 0800 2nd part of 2 part summary 25 March. Pass to same adees.

BOODLE weather and through chain variable during day scattered snow squalls. BULDIR AGGATU negative. No new activity SEMICHISIS. Photographed HOLTZ and CHICHAGOF. 8 to 10 barges CHICHAGOF. Encountered AA some from village on FOX HARBOR upon which weather plane dropped 8 quarter tonners. Results unobserved. Sighted 2 cross lined objects on northwest beach CHICHAGOF. Too large for aircraft. No new shipping no enemy planes seen. 4 western search sectors averaged 500 miles from VENTRILIOQUIST. Other 2175. New subjects. S-23 now returning from patrol east coast KAMCHATKA PENINSULA reports no contacts except ice and RUSSIANS. Photos east arm HOLTZ bay 24th and 25th reveal following. Additional 375 feet of rectangular ditches. These ditches extend 850 feet southwest from point 900 feet from beach. Additional grading observed between above ditches and those previously reported. Construction activity covers total length of 2400 feet. Construction definitely identified as beginning of fighter strip. Upwards 500 fox holes counted in vicinity construction.

27 0805 Summary March 26th from Comnorpacfor. First part of 2 parts.

All times W (/10). Cruiser Group SALT LAKE CITY RICHMOND BAILEY COGHLAN DALE MONOGHAN at 0803 made contact with two Atagos or Nachis two Kamus 4 unidentified DD's 2 large AK's or AP's lat 53 long 168-40 east. About 0930 after concentrating McMorris engaged initially at extreme ranges courses generally northwest. Force Comdr suggested retiring action to allow opportunity off-setting enemy superior strength with air. Searching Catalinas formed scouting line. S23 enroute base diverted to HOLTZ Bay CHICHAGOF Area. Cruiser Group courses from northwest to south to east. Surface engagement broken off about 1220. Our forces then heading to eastward. Enemy last reported 20 or more miles to westward. No further contact between surface forces. One enemy heavy cruiser hit by gun fire and probably torpedo. Was firing only one turret when engagement broken off. Probably hits on one enemy light and other heavy cruiser. SALT LAKE CITY received at least 6 hits 2 below water line. Has speed 22. Gyros out emergency steering in use and flooding after engine room being controlled with difficulty. Part 2 will follow.

27 0810 Part 2 of March 26 summary. BAILEY damaged details unknown. COGHLAN director and radar out several injured. MONOGHAM casualty to reduction gear bearing limits speed to 25 knots.

8 Lightnings 3 Mitchells left FORMULA 1329 having been delayed due installation bomb bay tanks bombers. VENTRILIOQUIST planes delayed due being already loaded with miscellaneous bombs for BOODLE. 13 Liberators 3 Mitchells off from VENTRILIOQUIST 1336.
1450 Catalina reported 2 transports course 270 speed 10 no position. 1550 position this plane lat 52-45 166-55 east. 1505 another Catalina picked up 1 AK lat 53-40 166-43 east no course or speed given. All Mitchells and Lightnings landed FORMULA 1905 to 1935. All Liberators landed VENTRILLOQUIST 2030. Bombers did not contact enemy. Weather plane scouted ATTU AGATTU SEMICHIS KISKA. No contacts or new activity. Weather middle chain blizzards VENTRILLOQUIST to westward frequent snow squalls.

26 0535 COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC, NOB AUCKLAND, COMSERONSOPAC.

Cinopac 242301 lengthening Caliope Dock could proceed without interfering dockings of ships but with crane service only 1 side. Manpower situation now considerable more acute than when project was initiated. Prosecution of work would divert manpower from ship repairs and tug construction. These ship repair facilities now being utilized for vessels including combatant. Comsopac sends. Extent of work which can be done in short overhaul period depends on number mechanics available. WELLINGTON floating dock capable handling heavy cruisers with bow and stern overhanging within safe limits.

29 0635 COM 3RD FLT to CINCPAC Info ALL TF COM SOPAC, COMSWPAC, NZNB.

7 Forts 5 Liberators dropped total 10,200 pounds bombs twenty clusters observing shots KAHLI runway revetment area at 290410. All times L (-1). 1 Corsair 5 Lightnings strafed float zeros FAISI seaplane base setting 5 to 7 planes afire at 290620. On return strafed DD 10 miles southeast of FAISI and left ship smoking. All planes returned. Charlie William reports BLUE raid UGELI RENDOVA on 27th caused heavy loss of food and equipment. 2 BLUE fighters intercepted 4 Jan bombers 20 miles northwest FUNAPUTI ELICE Group at 280954 shooting down one bomber dispersing others. 3 DD's 4 AK's at BUIN FAISI morning 28th. Same time 1 AK at TEOP northeast BOUGAINVILLE.
Admiral Dargenlieu has now confirmed information given mydis 112332 and mydis 211156 on instructions given to Governor Montchamps. DeGaulle and Dargenlieu have confirmed powers by letter and despatch. First. Governor in absence of High Commissioner has full power to deal with American command on all local matters. Second. His powers are limited only by normal French laws and regulations and by specific directions not to release 3 named government office buildings and specific military quarters. Third. He has full authority over communications service which has no right to inspect or control his messages. Fourth. In any matters effecting French sovereign rights and causing serious difficulties or disturbances in civil population Governor is advised to report such cases to National Committee. Admiral D'Argenlieu expresses full appreciation of problems faced by U.S. Command and earnestly desires to aid American forces in any possible manner. He hopes American Command understand French difficulties and problems and will not ask the impossible. This refers particularly to housing crisis NOUMEA mentioned by MyDis 211156 and confirmed in my letter serial 0083 of 22 March.

Munda raid at 301500 by 16 Dauntless 23 Wildcats. 8 tons daisy cutter bombs fell on runway revetment area northwest loop and north edge LAMBETI starting fires. Light AA. All planes returned. Blue plane over MUNDA following raid says runway in bad shape. AK off KITTA at 301715. L (-11) times used. Small AK at NUMA east coast BOUGAINVILLE at 310830 another ship arriving from north. Schooner at TERAKA BOUGAINVILLE. Large AK and 2 possible corvettes on easterly course 5 miles southeast OEMA Island at 311000.
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff.
To: MacArthur, Nimitz, Halsey. (All acknowledge receipt)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive communicated in Cominich Despatch 022100 of July 1942 is cancelled and the following directive is substituted therefor.

2. Command.

(a) The operations outlined in this directive will be conducted under the direction of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

(b) Operations in the SOLOMON ISLANDS will be under the direct command of the Commander, SoPac Area, operating under general directives of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.

(c) Units of the Pacific Ocean Area, other than those assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to task forces engaged in these operations, will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (Cinopac).

3. Forces will be allocated for these operations as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Tasks.

(a) Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS.

(b) Seize LAE - SALAMAU - FINSCHAVEN - MADANG Area and occupy Western NEW BRITAIN.

(c) Seize and occupy SOLOMON ISLANDS to include the southern portion of BOUGAINVILLE.

5. Purposes.

To inflict losses on Japanese forces, to deny these areas to Japan, to contain Japanese forces in the Pacific Theater by maintaining the initiative, and to prepare for ultimate seizure of BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

6. Plans.

Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, will submit
6. Plans. (Cont'd)

general plans including composition of task forces, sequence and timing of major offensive operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Foregoing directive has been embodied in Joint Chiefs of Staff paper 238/5/D which has March 28th, 1943, for its date.
During night of 3lst-1st prowling cat contacted enemy force of 5 DD's 1 AK off Southwestern KOLOMBANGARA returning from VILA. Cat dropped 2 500's straddling 1 destroyer also dropped flares then led Army Liberators into low altitude attack. Results unobserved and later strike during night failed to contact. Nip DD's laid smoke screen while under attack. Forenoon 30th 1 twin engine Nip bomber dropped several bombs missing 2 BLUE YP's east of SAN CRISTOBAL. SBD's with VF escort failed to find large AK reported by search plane north northwest REKATA 31st. Hit SUAVANAU on way back to base. BUIN SHORTLAND shipping AM 31st 5 DD's 1 AP 3 AK's 1 patrol vessel other smaller craft.

March 30th. All times W (4 10). Attacks from FORMULA. 4 Lightnings 1015 dropped 4 quartertonners 4 magnesium clusters LITTLE KISKA from 500 to 700 feet. 2 missions later in day with results unreported. From VENTRIOQUIST. 1st mission 6 Liberators 6 Mitchells 4 Lightnings returned from BOODLE without dropping due to weather. 2nd mission 6 heavies 4 Lightnings 2 photo planes approx 1230 dropped 208 demo hundred pounders from 2900 to 3300 feet enemy runway construction east arm HOLTZ Bay. Hits runway and tent area south thereon. AA both arms HOLTZ BAY and CHICAGOF Harbor damaged 1 heavy. 1 radioman injured. 2 float planes on water southeast shore CHICAGOF. 3rd mission approx 1430 5 heavies 4 Lightnings left 118 demo centuries main camp area from 3400 feet. 1 heavy shot down 100 yards east north head large volume AA. Plane caught fire before breaking up and falling into water. Part 2 follows.

Part 2 of above. More info attacks 30th from Comnorpacfor. At approx 1510 W (plus 10) 2 FORMULA Lightnings dropped 2 quarter tonners 2 mag clusters through overcast on camp area. Results unobserved but did observe fires burning LITTLE KISKA from previous attack. 20 hours W in an unusually effective attack 6 FORMULA Mitchells at altitude 25 to 50 feet distributed 18 demo 300 pounders 9 quarter tonners as follows. RDO stations. Radar believed destroyed. Tremendous explosion of smoke and flames sub base probably oil storage. Hangar and camp area. Southeast end runway where 5 or 6 trucks observed. Ninety MM emplacement near runway. Personnel seen and strafed all the way. Met very heavy ack ack. Battle damage three planes one making belly landing on partially complete FORMULA bomber strip. Personnel injuries two minor. Photos taken.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
February (GCT)

27 1308 COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOLS, CINCPAC.

This is 2nd and last part my 271116. This is most secret. Para 3. PS OVLLY instructed Comairsol on 25 February to withhold day heavy bombardment strikes Buin Shortland shipping for present. Night horizontal bombing ineffective this purpose. Weather has prevented low altitude attacks since these conclusions reached and no opinion effectiveness this form attack reached. Para 4. Recommend as immediate measure increased long range fighter strength by requesting temporary transfer one squadron Lightnings from SOWESPAC accordance my 141341 and exchange of airplanes or units of 2 Marine Corsair equipped squadrons now at Pearl for Wildcats in SOPAC. End Part 2.

March (GCT)
01 1245 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Hicom for Nimitz and Halsey only. All others do not decode further. What useful purpose is being served by operations on scale indicated in Comtaskfor 61 despatch 270628. To what end are these operations a means.

02 0117 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC

For Admiral Halsey only. Hicom. Reply direct to me regarding Cominch 011245. Para. My 241628 your 250616 concur paragraph 2 Turners CLEANSLATE Plan able four dash three but am impressed by large increase in number of troops involved compared with number mentioned in conference January 23rd namely one Raider battalion and part of defense battalion. Request your reason for this expansion. What are present prospects of commencing NEW GEORGIA operations appreciably sooner than ten April.

02 0455 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Most secret Hicom for Cincpac only. Operations on scale indicated due necessity strong protection of fighter field which is being constructed as support for coming NEW GEORGIA operation, and probable extent hostile reaction unknown at time of initiation. Cominch 011245. Cincpac 020117. Advancement to CLEANSLATE in excess of subsequently determined actual defense needs consists of troops and material headed in proper direction and thus completing first stage of next movement. I do not consider CLEANSLATE as anything but stepping stone for NEW GEORGIA seizure. Furthermore this type operation with landing craft is first attempted and its comparatively large scale believed would give us invaluable experience and data needed for coming more critical operations. Logistic limitations indicate April 10 soonest practicable for large scale NEW GEORGIA movement. Reconnaissance information still too meagre to indicate feasibility infiltration.
Most secret. In view reduced shipping availability to Comamphibforpac in Cominch 042000 recommend consideration be given to capture and occupation of JACKBOOT about 15 April or earlier if practicable in order support air field to be constructed on SHEMYA simultaneously with occupation of JACKBOOT. This would beat 1 way weather by providing airfield on either side of a front moving eastward permitting more frequent bombing of BOODLE, would permit searches to reach out to westward to pick up enemy supply ships, and would insure reduction of BOODLE unless relieved by strong force from Empire. Request CTF 3 comment direct to Cinopac info me. CG ADC concurs.

Most Secret. Your 030405. Do you have means now in hand or in sight to accomplish proposed task. If not what additional means do you consider necessary. What are possibilities constructing landing field ATTU or AGATTU. Lynd thought southeast end AGATTU looked good from air. Have you sufficient hydrographic information of area of contemplated operations.

Your 030355 negative. Operation does not appear likely to be profitable at present time. In addition see my 160455 October much of which still applies.

For Admirals King and Halsey only. Hi-Com. Halsey is planning to take VILA MUNDA with target date 10 April. Para. He plans use RUSSELLS as jump off for push and subsequently as base for landing craft moving by night with supplies and men in large volume. Strongly held fighter strip RUSSELLS reduces round trip CACTUS VILA by 100 miles. Concur Halsey's despatch same subject.

Sopac 030057 question advisability on score of time required and workmanship of having any but urgent battle damage repairs done in locality mentioned.
05 0145 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMSERONSOPAC, COMSERFORPAC, etc.

Most secret. Urdis 030057. Navy yard PEARL designated for replacement (61.1) quads in Washington by ten forty millimeter quads. Mounts available now. Can undertake work commencing about 1 April completing in 30 days. Definite orders as to when ship is to be sent will be issued later. Do not desire this work undertaken in Australia.

04 2017 DETWITT (COMGEN WDC) to COMGENADC Info CINCPAC, COMAMPHFORPAC.

Activity suggested by dispatch Comtaskfor 8's 030405. CG 0302. Desire your views giving full consideration to logistical plan based on strength of ground and air forces required which will be controlling factor. Your recommendation on type and source of units, place of assembly, estimated length time construction field SEMYA and availability equipment for same. Clarification of details, including possibility of providing the required naval support and strength of permanent garrison, essential prior to submitting to Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. Discuss matter fully with Admiral Kinkaid and give me your views as to feasibility initiation JACK BOOT operation prior completion FORMULA occupation and construction bomber strip that place. Also include estimate present enemy strength on JACK BOOT. Suggest that if Cincpac is favorable as result of reply by Kinkaid to his 040341 Rockwell and I meet you and Kinkaid at SITKA for conference.

07 0103 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMWESTSEAFRON, COMGEN WDC, etc.

This is part one of CTF 8's 070115 in 2 parts. Handle as most secret. Recommended consideration of operations against JACK BOOT contained in my 030405 prompted by belief that shipping now available Comtaskforce 3 is inadequate for COTTAGE. That short period of good weather normally beginning about 15 April should be utilized fully. That there is doubt about additional shipping being available during such period because of demands other areas. That in any event revision of estimate of forces required for COTTAGE after effect BOOBLLE air offensive based on FORMULA becomes apparent will come too late to permit undertaking COTTAGE before summer fogs set in. In view above consider recommended operation effective substitute at this time. Barring major enemy counter action proposed operation can be accomplished with forces available plus certain additions to ships now at Rockwell's disposal as noted in part 2.

Note: Part 2 follows on next page.
07 0115 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, Info COMNOWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Most secret is this part 2 and final of CTF 8's 070115 to same addes. Replying specifically to CINCPAC 040341. Assumption is assume about 500 Japs are on JACK BOOT. No coast defense guns and only few AA guns mounted in HOLTZ-CHICAGO area. SARANA MASSACRE and TEMNAC BAYS believed not defended by shore batteries. Possible mined particularly SARANA. Estimate 1 reinforced regiment including mountain artillery from 7th division now being trained could effect initial landing and occupation JACK BOOT. 4 APA plus 2 or 3 AKA should suffice. Reserve and garrison to follow promptly, composed troops now this area and using Army transportation. Seebees or Army Engineers now this area could build landing strip on SHEMYA in about 3 weeks. SHEMYA preferred because of flat terrain, easy approach for planes and quick construction. Photographs indicate fighter strips could be constructed JACK BOOT but more work required and less desirable in thick weather due high hills in vicinity. Air field about 9000 feet can be built ARMLOCK but presents difficult engineering problem because of rough terrain. Total of 3 or 4 cruisers and 2 or 3 battleships with 2 squadrons destroyers should suffice or for escort, bombardment and covering force. Recommend that Joint Staff under Rockwell be directed study detailed requirements and make plan. Expect bomber field FORMULA be ready by middle May but operation should be undertaken earlier in order not waste any good weather. Buckner concurs in general.

06 2147 COMAIRPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Comsopac 020450 and 060317 Cominich 051315. Auxiliary carrier can move only about 1500 ship tons cargo due to restricted hold space and limitations on total weight carried on hangar and flight decks. Employment to help move ACORN would be inefficient and is not recommended. Recommend auxiliary carriers assigned to combatant service but not immediately required Sopac be sent to yards for material improvement and then employed accordance my serial 00122 of 3 March.
08 0052 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, Info CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC.

This is most secret. Planes requested my 261022 vital for April combat operations and air logistic support thereafter. Desire maintain 60 this area. Request that number be dispatched earliest practicable.

07 2353 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOPAC.

Urdis 051315. Employment ACV to move ACORN 5 considered inefficient use because of restricted cargo space this type and not concurred in. Recommend employment PRESIDENT MONROE and MERCURY as planned. Para. Decision on employment 12th Defense Battalion must be withheld pending decision possible other operations to be reached at forthcoming conference. Recommend Airdrome Battalion now training San Diego area be sent Pearl to complete training when shipping available. Para. Comsopac is requested to advise Cominchkompac on questions raised last para of reference dispatch.

09 0812 COMBATDIV 6 to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMBATPAC.

Handle as most secret. In view prospective absence WASHINGTON during April to receive 40 mm guns in accordance Cincpac 050145 Combatdiv 6 sends and recommends postponement formation Batdiv 8 as proposed in Cominch 071646 until arrival SOUTH DAKOTA at which time he strongly recommends Captain Glenn B. Davis be ordered as Combatdiv 8. This recommendation based upon personal observation character and ability Captain Davis and his performance of duty as Commanding Officer WASHINGTON during past 6 months including night action 15 November.

10 2038 COMGEN WDC to CINCPAC, COMAMPHFORPAC, CTF 8 Info CG ADC.

I have received a communication from ConGen ADC recommending similar action and in general agree. Reference Part 1 number 070103 and Part 2 number 07115 of Comtaskfor 8 to you relative proposed JACKBOOT operations. This is part 1 of 3 part dispatch signed Gen DeWitt CG WDC and 4th Army Presidio of SAN FRANCISCO.

10 2045 Part 2 of above. CALIFORNIA CG 0304. With your concurrence I propose a meeting in near future of Comtaskfor 8, Comamphforpac, Comgen ADC and myself at SITKA or other convenient place for purpose of agreeing on details of Staff for action and upon which Joint directive can be based. Part 3 of 3 part dispatch 102038. Do you agree.
Hi-Com. Situation here Cominch 122028 February marked by desire French Governor cooperate but blocked by Dargenlieu adherents. Instructions given Montchamp by De Gaulle as indicated Cominch 221540 and Comnaveu 221843 October were evidently not adequate to convince Montchamp his continuing authority to negotiate local matters. Possibly those instructions diluted in delivery by local Dargenlieu representative who alone holds codes. Montchamp considers reference Dargenlieu necessary on many relatively MINOR items. Dargenlieu replies dilatory and generally obstructive and anti American. Request presentations direct to De Gaulle to secure reissue general authority Montchamp arrange direct all local matters and specific authority turn over Naval school building to Comsopac. Montchamp will welcome those instructions. Request advices instructions resulting to check against dilution in delivery here.

This is HiCom. For Admiral Stark only. Reference Comsopac 07011 which is being padded to you. Make necessary representations to DeGaulle to rectify unsatisfactory situation.

Most Secret. Reference CTF 8 030405 Joint Chiefs of Staff look with favor on this move provided it can be accomplished with means Cinopac can make available and those previously made available to Commanding General Western Defense Command for COTTAGE. No increase in shipping now available to the Army for ALASKA run can be made. This communication sent at this time in view of short time remaining available for preparation but is not to be a directive to execute operation. It is a directive to plan and train therefore. Employment of old battleships for bombardment purposes approved.
13 0247 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC.

Urdis 122140. This is most secret. Quote. Pass to MacArthur. Present plans contemplate seizure NEW GEORGIA commencing target date April 10th. This discussed with Kenny Souterland. Although anticipate requesting you for limited air action against SHORTLAND PAISI area do not consider assistance from you on major scale will be required. Halsey. Unquote. No reply received.

13 0103 CINCPAC to COMGEN WDC Info CTF 8, COMAMPHIBFORPAC.

In view of Cominchi 111221 concur your 102038. 3 part.

13 0125 CINCPAC to CTF 8, CTF 3, Info CG WDC, SOMWESSEAFRONT, etc.

Most secret. Cominchi 111221. In collaboration with Comgen WDC plan and train for JACKBOOT on basis move commanded by CTF 3 until amphibious phase completed. If operation ordered it would be under CTF 8 general direction. Training along lines Cincpac 090342 January taking into account reduced effort. Surface forces to be made available by Cincpac follow in separate despatch. Comgen WDC concurrence this despatch requested.

13 0151 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info CTF 3, 8, COLWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Most secret. Cominchi 111221. CTF 8 070115. Can make available for JACKBOOT operation Batdiv 2 composed PENNSYLVANIA NEVADA IDAHO. Crudiv 1 less RALEIGH plus SALT LAKE CITY. Desrons 1 and 14 totalling 16 destroyers. APA HARRIS JF BELL ZEILIN HEWWOOD possibly DOYEN this on assumption you do not order additional transfers to Lantflt. Three AKA can be made available only by diversion from Sopac for which is possibly acceptable in view delivery in that area of 9 partially converted type EC-2 freighters but regarding which decision held in abeyance pending decision of form spring SOLOMONS campaign is to take. Only alternative for JACKBOOT is to substitute for AKA such as are ready of the 8 EC-2 freighters ordered fitted out for NTS service and all available Amphorpac LST. Transfer of Desdiv 27 from Sopac acceptable due considerable number subchasers and sound equipped minesweepers now reaching that area to augment antisu-bmarine escort facilities. Early decision required in this respect permit Desdiv 27 proceed ALASKA with equivalent of tender refit at PEARL enroute. Further intend organize task force composed HMS VICTORIOUS SANTA FE PRINGLE BACHE CONVERSE STANLY with U.S. Flag Officer in SANTA FE and train this force in Hawaiian Area until JACKBOOT is well in hand as emergency reserve against unforeseen eventualities.
11 2332 COM US NAV FORCES EU to COMINCH info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC.

Urdis 082125 replying Comsopac dispatch 070811. De Gaulle expresses regret at delays in meeting requests of American authorities at NOUMEA. Instructions are being sent to Governor NEW CALEDONIA to place Naval School Building immediately at disposition Comsopac. National committee will issue new instructions defining powers of Governor to negotiate local arrangements with American authorities. Will inform you of these instructions when issued.

14 0413 COMSOPAC to COMSOWESPAC info COMAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH etc.

On eighteenth or first night thereafter weather permit (this is most secret) Sopac aircraft scheduled to lay aircraft mines BUIN area within 20 fathom curve from vicinity MOILA Point to POPOTALA Island to vicinity east point with random drops inside this line as situation permits possibly repeating succeeding night or nights after first operation. Mine drop to be supported by Sopac bombing and strafing. Will proceed as above unless it conflicts with your plans.

13 2210 COMGEN WDC to CINCPAC info COMNORWESTSEAFRON, CTF 8, CTF 3.

Understand from your dispatch if operation ordered Comtaskfor 3 will command all forces, surface air and ground, until landings completed after which command will pass to Comtaskfor 8. This is book message. Cominch 130125. CG 0308 planning.

13 2215 This is part 2 of 3 parts our MSG NBR 132210 Stop for operation and training of troops earmarked for operation to continue as at present stop if this understanding correct I concur your dispatch stop recommend operations officer Comtaskfor 8 remain available to Comtaskfor 3 in SAN DIEGO as long as deemed necessary by latter in connection

13 2219 with preparation of plans for operation. This is part 3 of 3 parts our MSG NBR 132210. New subject. Will arrange for conference Rockwell Kinkaid Buckner and myself at KODIAK immediately after conference of Admiral Rockwell and myself with Spruance.
March (GCT)

14 2135 CINCPAC to COMGEN WDC, Info CTF 8, 3, CONNWSEAFRON, COMMINCH.

Your 132210 three part. CTF 8 will have supreme command and direction entire operation. Under CTF 8 CTF 3 will command all amphibious operations until landing completed when troop commander takes over command ashore and continues under CTF 8. Otherwise your understanding correct.

12 2204 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC.

This is most secret. Effectiveness of operations and availability of submarines indicate desirability even necessity to form a tactical group of 4 to 6 submarines trained and indoctrinated in coordinated action for operations such as now set up in SOLOMONS to be stationed singly or in groups in enemy ship approaches to critical area as in BOUGAINVILLE MANNING INDISPENSABLE STRAITS and slant or southward of BOUGAINVILLE Island or between latter and NEW GEORGIA.

14 1507 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Your 130151 approved except for withdrawal of AK's from Sopac. War Department and DeWitt investigating means of furnishing AK's and expect answer 15 March.

15 1620 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Uxtmost Secret. For Admiral Nimitz only. What conclusion if any have you come to about maintaining a Task Force organization in Central Pacific area and what are your views about who shall head it. Part 2. Assume you have noted RI indications of concentration in SAIPAN area such as preceded MIDWAY attack last June.
For Admiral King only. Your 151620. Last sentence my 130151 is first move to establish a Central Pacific Task Force under Leary to which the NEW MEXICO MISSISSIPPI would be added. On completion JACKBOOT would also add IDAHO PENNSYLVANIA NEVADA. Employment ESSEX or strength from Sopac would depend on your decision of prospective Sopac operations but consider it unwise to so split forces that enemy can defeat us in detail. Para. My present estimate is that enemy will not operate in north or central Pacific except to make raids in force on our outlying positions. There is possibility but not probability of simultaneous raid on MIDWAY OAHU FIJI line and in Western ALEUTIANS. This stresses need for ample air strength at outposts. Would expect total raiding force maximum strength approximately 3 CV 2 BB 4 CA plus screen. Para. It is still within enemy capacity to repeat MIDWAY type operation anywhere in central or North Pacific with approximately 5 CV 4 BB 6 CA plus screen and train. As I estimate enemy now on strategic defensive Eastern Pacific line such an operation only possible and not probable.

Most secret. Consider it desirable that Commander Pacific Ocean Areas have available to him necessary officers and men to handle proposal your 132021. Concur in general with views of basic principles this subject held by officer whose signal number is 405 and who left PEARL for Washington by air March 15th.

Concur in general with plan your 122204 and will implement in Pacific Ocean Areas. Most secret.

This is most secret. Plan and train for coordinated action along lines Cominch 122204 in which I concur and which is being passed to you. Submit plan to me.
Authorization of JACKBOOT operation is subject. CG 0310 our number. Refer Cominch 111221 and Cominch 141507. Based on these 2 radios recommend you request Joint Chiefs of Staff immediate approval for JACKBOOT operation stating your request has my concurrence and with tentative target date May 7th. This action essential in view of short time available for preparation in order take advantage favorable weather.

This part 2 of 2 parts our rad 171900. Assuming Joint Chiefs of Staff approval am sending by separate dispatch suggested Joint Directive to be issued by Cincpac and Comgen WDC. Have informed War Dept. that logistical support for JACKBOOT oprns can be furnished from shipping available this Command.

Joint directive is subject. This is follow-up on my dispatch 171900 and is most secret. CG 0311. Part 1 of 7 parts 172239. Recommend you issue following as Joint directive from Cincpac and Comgen WDC, details concerning Naval Force to be filled in by Cincpac. Objective. Reduction and occupation of ATTU and occupation of SHEMYA at earliest practicable date. Part 2 of 7 parts. Purpose. To sever enemy's lines of communication by seizing and holding ATTU. To deny SHEMYA to the enemy and construct airfield thereon for air operations against enemy forces, to render KISKA untenable, and to create base of operations for possible future reduction and occupation of KISKA. Task. Task, to land on ATTU followed without delay by landing on SHEMYA. Task B, to reduce and occupy ATTU. Task C, to occupy SHEMYA and build airfield thereon. Part 3 of 7 parts. Command. Supreme Command Comtaskfor 16. Comamphforpac to operate under CTF 16 and command amphibious operations until landing completed. Army Commander Comgen 7th Division with 2nd in command to be designated by Comgen WDC. Part 4 of 7 parts. Forces Assigned Navy: Task Force 16 plus blank. Army Forces, assault, reserve and initial occupation troops: Assault on ATTU 7th Division combat team consisting 17th infantry, 1 Bn field artillery, 1 Bn combat engineers for shores party, 1 battery AA automatic weapons, 3 detachments 75th Special signal company, 1 company 7th Division organic combat engineers, 1 medical collecting company 7th Division. Part 5 of 7 parts. 1 platoon 7th Division medical clearing company, Detachment Headquarters 7th Division medical Bn, Detachment 7th Division quartermaster Bn, Detachment 7th Division organic signal company. Initial occupation SHEMYA 18th Combat Engineers from ADAK. Part 6 of 7 part. Floating reserve to be held aboard ship 1 regimental combat team consisting of 32nd Infantry with reinforcements similar to those for 17th Infantry indicated above. Garrisons for ATTU and SHEMYA to be designated by Comgen WDC and to include 17th Infantry combat team 32nd Infantry combat team, 78th CA AA and 2nd Bn 501st CA AA. (Continued)
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
March (GCT)

17 2239 COMGEN WDC to CINCPAC (Continued)

Part 7 of 7 part dispatch 172239. Target Date: 7 May 1943.

Reversion of Command. Command of Army forces less aircraft
will revert to Army when senior Army officer ATTU and SHEMYA
inform Contaskfor 16 Army is ready to take over. Code name
Blank. This ends suggested Joint Directive.

18 0105 CTF 51 to CINCPAC Info CTF 16, COMINCH, COMGEN WDC.

This is most secret. Your 130209. Following submitted as
partial result plans now in progress. Para. Strategical
considerations, VOLUBLE beaches, scarcity screen and combat
loaders preclude simultaneous assault JACKBOOT and occupation
VOLUBLE. Latter being considered as separate phase to follow
JACKBOOT occupation and to be shore to shore movement. Para.
Lack of AK's and attached landing craft will result jeopard-
izing assault operation. This to be continued in a later
dispatch.

18 0126 Part 2 of most secret 180105. Only landing craft available
JACKBOOT appear limited those carried force APAs. This con-
sidered critical. Present info ships ALASKAN run are un-
satisfactory as substitute AK. 1 or more following, speed,
cargo capacity, troop capacity. Para. Aside from 2 LST's
now enroute GOOSEWING 1st LST available duty Comamphforpac
will be april 9th 2 others May 1st and remainder later.
DOYEN probable date readiness not before 15 May. Para. 3rd
and final part later.

18 0146 3rd and final part of most secret from CTF 51. Request
reconsideration assignment of AKAs this force. Require
minimum of 1 with 2 highly desirable. Also considering
normal escort requirements in GOOSEWING, Task Force 51 needs,
and screen VOLUBLE operation request info possibility assign
1 additional Squad DD.

18 0335 COM 3RD FLEET to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, CTF 72.

COMINCH 122204 in 2 parts and from 2 viewpoints. This is
Part 1. For general operations am in thorough accord with
principle and have utilized it when knowledge enemy movements
and availability submarines permitted. My 30416 of October
and 102350 and 140740 of November based on such conception.
Mid January lined up SWORDFISH NAUTILUS GATO for TRUK-SHORT-
LAND and it worked although resulted vacating other fertile
areas. Having such a group to rove PALAU-RABAUL and TRUK-
RAPAUL routes or where convoy air coverage is thin and subs
can pursue to destruction would be ideal. Notable examples
effectiveness 1 sub wolf pack against slow convoys are
WAHOO and TRITON performances. Handle this as most secret.
Part 2 of Comsoac 180335 to same addees. Comment Cominch 122204. Another story is operations in confined waters where sub activity soon reveals presence and location, air cover prevents surface chase or surface escorts keep submarine down while target goes over or around. Java campaign, Battle of Midway and Tokyo Expresses show relative ineffectiveness submarines, one or many, against high speed radical zigzagging men of war with or without surface and slant or air escort. If Cominch has in mind projected operations and contemplates use of submarines against enemy offensive hold to opinion that judicious positioning of subs in probable active spots most promising of success. In any event employment proposed tactical group not practicable until and unless additional submarines available Task Force 72.

This is most secret. 7th Bomber Command plans daylight strike from FUNA FUTI on TARAWA and NAURO near future. Inform Sir Philip Mitchell if strike made objectives will be enemy military installations and works useful to enemy taking precautions to do minimum damage to natives.

Most Secret. In view your 070103 request comment CTF 51 180105 regarding Naval forces required. Also see Comgen WDC 172239 and 171900.

Most Secret. Comment requested on Cincpac 182031. Strongly concur Comtaskfor 51 180105 regarding Naval forces required. Because of scarcity screen and landing craft it is highly desirable consider occupation VOLUBLE as separate phase to follow JACKBOO'T promptly as shore to shore movement. 1 or more AKAs seems essential. An additional destroyer squadron would make the difference between operating on a skimpy minimum with no reserve for breakdowns and operating with adequate screens.

Destroyers for JACK3O0'T operation will not be increased over mydis 130151 (130209). Minesweepers and layers now in Task Forces 16 51 remain so assigned throughout operation. From here and based on calculated risk it looks like routine escorting is excessive. Suggest early orientation available forces including concentration Desron 1 on West Coast and movement Desdiv 27 from PEARL direct to ALEUTITANS when ready about six April. To this end Comtaskfor 16 hereby authorized dissolve Task Group 52.3 and order it report for duty in either Taskfor 16.
18 2333 CINCPAC to CTF 16 Info to COMINCH, CG WDC, CTF 51, CTG 52.3.

or 51 effective immediately. Para. Clarification situation respect to freighters both convoy and combat loaders expected from Cominch per his 141507 unless Comgen WDC 171910 is to be accepted as complete answer this question.

18 2011 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info to CG WDC, CTF 16, 51.

Most Secret. On basis ships my 130151 plus logistic support Comgen WDC 171910 which is being passed to you recommend approval JACKBOOT on lines Comgen WDC 172239 also passed. DeWitt concurs. Tentative target date May 7th.

20 0147 CINCPAC to CONSOPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSUBPAC, COMSOWESPAC, etc.

I am in general accord with views expressed your 180337 however it is desirable to plan and train for coordinated submarine operations so that we can take advantage of opportunities presented. Most secret. Such training should include aircraft submarine cooperation when possible. Plans regarding TRUK PALAU RABAUL routes along lines you suggest are in prospect but operations must await further increases submarines. Plans will require cooperation along equator between Subspac and Subswespac. These will be forwarded you when complete. Cominch 141927 states submarines SW PAC will be increased to 24 by November. Believe further additions will be made before end of year.

19 2345 COMSUBPAC to CINCPAC Info CONSOPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

Handle as utmost secret. Reference Cominch 122204. Subspac are trained and will intensify training for operations of type mentioned. For use in present areas around Empire and Mandates assignment of 2 or 3 submarines to an attack group in likely locations awaits only availability of sufficient submarines. This may be achieved by September. For use in special operations such as example given in reference typical operation plans and orders are being prepared. Communication and special type operation orders are chief problems. During daylight submergence availability of high power low frequency shore radio is necessary to deliver orders etc. to submerged reception coil of submarines. Since telephones removed from submarines they will have to use radio for contact reports etc. or reinstall T33's. Do not plan hold group trained for such special operations in port but submarines now available enroute areas or at bases will permit movement of 4 to 6 submarines with tactical commander toward port nearest to contemplated operation within 24 hours. Would send tender to same place in order supply voyage repairs and logistic needs prior proceeding to stations. I submit that use of any coordinated attack group in operation such as example given must be predicated upon assurance that sufficient targets will be present to insure results commensurate with offensive power of submarines thus immobilized.
This amplifies my 180105 and Cominchs directly to Comgen Western Defense Command 172239. Agree in general with assignment of arms forces but suggest directive allow adjustment, particularly of regimental reinforcing units, to meet requirements final tactical plan. Am recommending to ComGen Western Defense Command that 2 squadrons gliders be made available. Para. Consider 1 regimental combat team should be held VENTRILOQUIST as reinforcement. Not practical use this team as floating reserve because embarked civilian manned AP's with no suitable facilities unloading and with no landing craft. Also lack of screens a governing factor. Para. Ability to meet proposed target date dependent upon following: (A) Satisfactory solution AKA problem. (B) Provision of necessary tugs and barges for VOLUBLE operation. (C) Availability of shipping to move above reinforcement combat team from SAN FRANCISCO about 16 April.

18 2000 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info CINCLANT.

For HiCom only. Request your comment on contemplated assignment of NEVADA to Atlantic and to your assignment of PENNSYLVANIA to your operational training command for gunnery and other training functions. Contemplated assignments would leave available for combat services 3 IDAHOS 2 CALIFORNIAS and eventually 3 COLORADOS 6 NORTH CAROLINAS 3 IOWAS or 8 old and 9 new BB's.

21 0242 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CINCLANT.

HiCom reply urdis 182000. Concur except reassignment NEVADA PENNSYLVANIA to be deferred until completion JACK-BOOT operation for which those ships have been trained. Estimated reassignment date 20 May. Noted that CALIFORNIA and WEST VIRGINIA will probably not be ready until near end of year. When will SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA arrive.
SECRET
March (GCT)

22 0400 COMSOPAC to ADMIRAL NIMITZ, ADMIRAL KING.

From Comsopac for Admiral Nimitz and King only handle as most secret. Your 202057 cruiser destroyer patrol being maintained to protect heavy traffic moving toward GUADALCANAL from possible surface raids and to prevent enemy bombardment of RUSSELLS which are considered highly vulnerable until airfield completed and defenses consolidated. Current frequent bad weather makes timely detection enemy force at BUIN unreliable and ESPIRITU SANTO entirely too far to permit interception of a bombardment force. This employment considered to afford realistic wartime training. With completion RUSSELL Field about April 15 propose to discontinue regular patrol HAT BLOCK.

23 0425 CINCPAC to CG WDC Info COMINCH, CTF 16, 51, COMWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 221939. As result your conference with Army request appropriate modification your 172239. On receipt this information I will fill in blanks and issue as our Joint Directive. Assume you and Rockwell will be able to solve problems mentioned his 190135.

22 1939 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF via COMINCH to CINCPAC, CG WDC, Info COMWESTSEAFRON, COMNOWESTSEAFRON, CTF 16, COMAMPHFORPAC.

In view of indications of development of airfields in ATTU by Japanese Joint Chiefs of Staff desire LANDCRAB operation be undertaken as soon as practicable. Refer Cominch 111221. Para. 2. Army considers forces set forth in Comdg General Western Defense Command 172239 too great and are in direct conference with DeWitt on this matter.

23 2109 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC

For Admiral Halsey only. Hicom. Presume you have considered maintaining a cruiser destroyer group in Fort PURVIS to accomplish objectives your 220400. Present air strength in the area plus ship AA should provide acceptable defense against enemy bombing and the anchorage affords much natural protection from submarines. Another but less consideration is the resultant reduction in fuel expenditure. What is hat block.
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff. (232357 of March 1943)
To: CinCPac action.
     Comsopac info.
     (MacArthur has).

1. Army ground and Army air forces additional to those present and enroute as of March 8th are to be moved to the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas in accordance with schedule given in following paragraphs.

2. South Pacific.
   A. 2nd Quarter:
      Air Forces - Increase both heavy bomb groups to 4 squadrons 12 planes each. Increase medium bomb group to 57 planes, two troop carrier squadrons 13 planes each. Increase photo squadron to 13 planes.
   B. 3rd Quarter:
      Air Forces - Increase night fighter detachment to squadron 12 planes, one observation squadron 21 planes.
   C. 4th Quarter:
      Air Forces - Increase both fighter groups to four squadrons 25 planes each, one photo squadron 13 planes.

   A. 2nd Quarter:
      Ground Forces - One division infantry (1st Cavalry):
      Air Forces - Increase medium bomb strength to 2 groups 57 planes each. Bring light bomb groups to 57 planes. Increase night fighter strength to 2 squadrons 12 planes each. Increase present troop carrier strength to 3½ groups 52 planes per group.
B. 3rd Quarter:

Ground Forces -
One infantry division.

Air Forces -
One heavy bomb group 48 planes. One medium bomb group 57 planes. One light bomb group 57 planes. Two fighter groups 75 planes each. One troop carrier group 52 planes. Increase present observation strength by one group of about 84 planes. Increase photo plane strength to one group.

C. 4th Quarter:

Air Forces -
One light bomb group 57 planes. One fighter group 75 planes.

4. In addition to initial equipment prescribed above, a depot reserve of 25% in the area is planned. Replacement aircraft for attrition is planned at 20% of initial equipment per month exclusive of transports. Actual transport losses will be replaced.

5. Distribution of ground forces indicated above between South and Southwest Pacific is tentative and subject to possible re-adjustments. In addition to major units noted herein, the movement of supporting and service units and replacements to South and Southwest Pacific is planned.

6. Following total shore and tender based naval aircraft squadrons to be deployed in SOFAC by end of periods indicated:

A. 2nd Quarter -
Medium bombers 2, light bombers 10, fighters 9, troop carriers 3, patrol planes 6, photo 2, observation 12.

B. 3rd Quarter -
Medium bombers 4, light bombers 10, fighters 10, troop carriers 4, patrol planes 7, photo 3, observation 12.

C. 4th Quarter -
Medium bombers 6, light bombers 12, fighters 12, troop carriers 4, patrol planes 8, photo 3, observation 12.
Southwest Pacific

A. 2nd Quarter -
   Patrol planes 2, observation 1.

B. 3rd Quarter -
   Patrol planes 4, observation 1.

8. Squadron strength 18 planes except medium bombers, troop carriers, and patrol planes 12, photo and observation 6. Patrol squadrons SOPAC include land type.

9. After conference with representatives of Cinopac, Comsopac, and Comsowespac Area provision has been made to issue a directive to cover execution of operations generally contemplated under Task 2 of the July 2nd directive, Cominch 022100. Departure from Washington of staff representatives will be deferred until completion of this directive.

10. In concurrence with the unanimous recommendations of staff representatives, Joint Chiefs of Staff desire the early development of air bases on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK Islands. South Pacific and Southwest Pacific staffs agree that air base construction on WOODLARK should be accomplished by construction battalions from South Pacific and aircraft complement for this base be provided by Comsopac.

11. Prevailing opinion here indicates desirability of deferring projected MUNDA operations or other major operations in NEW GEORGIA until after establishment air base in WOODLARK and possibly after seizure LAE and HUON peninsula have been effected. Comments of this deferment desired from action and information addressees.

12. Cinopacs comments also invited regarding redeployment of Pacific Fleet units in event of protracted deferment of offensive operations in the SOLOMONS.
CINCPAC 232139. Cominuch 141927 March which was considered satisfactory by Comsubpac provides for building up of submarines Sowespac to 24 by November. With present transfer of SILVERSIDES and DRUM to Southwest immediate transfer of 4 additional subs to Southwest in accordance with desires of Com 7th Fleet 220503 March would cause critical loss to this force. Unless Cominuch considers military situation in Southwest warrants immediate action desired by Com 7th Fleet, urgently recommend that no more submarines be transferred from Task Force 17. Present number of operating submarines this force insufficient to keep important and fruitful Empire areas properly filled. Also desire to augment own force in order to prepare to carry out operations desired and necessary in Cominuch 122204 March.

Most secret. Your 221938 do not recommend increase of submarines to Sowespac beyond those provided for your 141927 at this time. 2 submarines have been ordered to replace the GRAMPOUS and AMBERJACK. The transfer of 2 more to the Sowespac at this time would result in an undesirable decrease in the present insufficient number of submarines on patrol in the important and fruitful Empire areas. As additions are made to Subforspac in the coming months it probably will be possible to comply with the desires Com 7th Fleet 220503.

Concur major operations against NEW GEORGIA by SOPAC forces be deferred until commissioning WOODLARK air base (If reconnaissance proves feasible to build) and that these be conducted concurrently with SOWESPAC large scale operations against LAE and HUON PENINSULA. Will start WOODLARK reconnaissance first week April unless otherwise directed. Propose to continue pressure on NEW GEORGIA (VILA MUNDA principally) by air attack, occasional bombardment, mining, and the use of troops for raids on outposts and for infiltration as further development of enemy strength and intentions may indicate. If as a result of pressure continuous combat reconnaissance indicates Jap is withdrawing forces from NEW GEORGIA or is being so weakened that VILA MUNDA can be taken without major operations and can be logistically supported and built up by us in strength for operations against BOUGAINVILLE, propose moving ahead. This is utmost secret.
From: Joint Chiefs of Staff.
To: MacArthur, Nimitz, Halsey. (All acknowledge receipt)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive communicated in CominCh Dispatch 022100 of July 1942 is cancelled and the following directive is substituted therefor.

2. Command.
   (a) The operations outlined in this directive will be conducted under the direction of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
   (b) Operations in the SOLOMON ISLANDS WILL be under the direct command of the Commander, SoPac Area, operating under general directives of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area.
   (c) Units of the Pacific Ocean Area, other than those assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to task forces engaged in these operations, will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CinCPac).

3. Forces will be allocated for these operations as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

4. Tasks.
   (a) Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS.
   (b) Seize LAE - SALAMAU - PINSCHAVEN - MADANG Area and occupy Western NEW BRITAIN.
   (c) Seize and occupy SOLOMON ISLANDS to include the southern portion of BOUGAINVILLE.

5. Purposes.
   To inflict losses on Japanese forces, to deny these areas to Japan, to contain Japanese forces in the Pacific Theater by maintaining the initiative, and to prepare for ultimate seizure of BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO.
6. Plans.

Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, will submit general plans including composition of task forces, sequence and timing of major offensive operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Foregoing directive has been embodied in Joint Chiefs of Staff paper 238/5/D which has March 28th, 1943, for its date.
FROM: CINCPAC
TO: CTF 16, COMAMPHFORPAC
INFO: COMINCH
COMGEN WDC
COMWESTEAFRON
COMNORESEAFRON

THIS IS A JOINT DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY CINCPAC AND COMGEN WDC PARA X
OBJECTIVE X REDUCTION AND OCCUPATION OF ATTU AND OCCUPATION MOST
SUITABLE AIRFIELD SITE IN NEAR ISLANDS AT EARLIEST PRACTICABLE
DATE X PARA X PURPOSE X TO SEVER ENEMYS LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO
WESTERN ALEUTIANS X TO DENY THE NEAR ISLANDS TO THE ENEMY AND TO
CONSTRUCT AN AIRFIELD THEREON FOR AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY
FORCES X TO RENDER KISKA UNTENABLE AND TO CREATE BASE OF OPERATIONS
FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE REDUCTION AND OCCUPATION OF KISKA X TASK AFFIRM
TO REDUCE AND OCCUPY ATTU X TASK BAKER TO OCCUPY THE MOST SUITABLE
AIRFIELD SITE IN NEAR ISLANDS AND BUILD AIRFIELD THEREON X PARA X
COMMAND X SUPREME COMMAND CTF 16 X COMAMPHFORPAC TO OPERATE UNDER
CTF 16 AND COMMAND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS UNTIL LANDING PHASE
COMPLETED X ARMY COMMANDER COMGEN 7TH DIVISION WITH 2ND IN COMMAND
TO BE DESIGNATED BY COMGEN WDC X PARA X FORCES ASSIGNED NAVY X
TASK FORCES 16 AND 51 X PARA X ARMY FORCES, ASSAULT RESERVE AND
INITIAL OCCUPATION TROOPS COLON ASSAULT ON ATTU 7TH DIVISION COMBAT
TEAM CONSISTING 17TH INFANTRY, 1 BN FIELD ARTILLERY, 1 BN COMBAT
ENGINEERS FOR SHORTE PARTIES, 1 BATTERY AA AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, 3
DETACHMENTS 75TH SPECIAL SIGNAL COMPANY, 1 COMPANY 7TH DIVISION
ORGANIC COMBAT ENGINEERS, 1 MEDICAL COLLECTING COMPANY 7TH DIVISION X
1 PLATOON 7TH DIVISION MEDICAL CLEARING COMPANY, DETACHMENT HEAD-
QUARTERS 7TH DIVISION MEDICAL BN, DETACHMENT 7TH DIVISION QUARTER-
MASTER BN, DETACHMENT 7TH DIVISION ORGANIC SIGNAL COMPANY X INITIAL

-1-
OCCUPATION SELECTED SITE IN NEAR ISLANDS 18TH COMBAT ENGINEERS FROM ADAK, 4TH INFANTRY COMPOSITE REGIMENT FROM ADAK X FLOATING RESERVE 1 REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM CONSISTING OF 32ND INFANTRY WITH REINFORCEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE FOR 17TH INFANTRY INDICATED ABOVE X GARRISONS FOR ATTU AND SELECTED SITE IN NEAR ISLANDS TO BE DESIGNATED BY COMGEN WDC AND TO INCLUDE 17TH INFANTRY COMBAT TEAM, 32ND INFANTRY COMBAT TEAM, 78TH CA AA AND 2ND BN 501ST CA AA X PARA X TARGET DATE MAY 7, 1943 X PARA X REVERSION OF COMMAND X COMMAND OCCUPIED AREA WILL REVERT TO ARMY WHEN SENIOR ARMY OFFICER NEAR ISLANDS INFORMS CTF 16 ARMY IS READY TO TAKE OVER X PARA X CODE NAME FOR ENTIRE OPERATION ELECTROCUTE X
30 0325 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Am sending Desdiv 27 less EDWARDS about 8 April, SANTA FE and EDWARDS about one week later. Kinkaid has been told to move up Batdiv 2 and 4 DD from Coast if desirable. No other reinforcement available except from Sopac and there would be 24 days before arrival ALEUTIANS. This an answer to your 292003. This is super secret.

30 2013 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 291803 what is your estimate of Pac Fleet forces required prior to and during these operations. Overall Pacific situation makes it necessary to provide additional strength in both Central and North areas. I do not believe that planned SOLOMONS Sea operations will pin enemy fleet to that area.

01 0111 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

Estimate Pacific Fleet (most secret) forces required in SoPac Area prior to operations referred to your 302013 should be not repeat not less than those now assigned. At present time one battleship 3 cruisers 14 destroyers 6 DMS's and 3 APD's are under overhaul and these figures will generally apply until middle of May. This vitally necessary overhaul program after prolonged combat operations, plus recent withdrawal of 1 destroyer division for PEARL SAN FRANCISCO escort duty, reduces task forces present to such extent that except in emergency 1 cruiser task force only can be kept in readiness to guard supply lines to RUSSELS and GUADALCANAL. Convoy escort must be maintained, and until overhaul schedule is completed other task forces must be exercised singly in rotation with light screen remaining destroyers in training at sea and in landing exercises for forthcoming major operations. As result of foregoing status strongly recommend against additional withdrawal of units at this time unless Jap action necessitates. Consider at present time (due to movement of major forces into TRUK) he is pinned for any major operation to the SOLOMONS NEW GUINEA area. By harassing him until our major operations are initiated I feel we can keep him occupied here in large part. When major operations commence I estimate we will need the additional battleship and 3 carriers enroute, replacements for battle damaged cruisers now under Navy Yard availability, another squadron of destroyers. At that time anticipate our progress up SOLOMONS and MacArthurs forward movement to NEW BRITAIN will provoke strong Jap reaction necessitating superior U.S. Forces to insure success of both movements.
31 0313 CTF 16 to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, CTF 51.

CTF 16 replying Cincpac 290031. Most Secret. Assumptions are that Japs immediately will try again to get supplies and reinforcements into JACKBOOT - BOODLE area and will continue trying until definitely and fully stopped and drive out ALEUTIAN Chain. This is part 1 of 2 parts of my 310322. Each attempt will be made in greater strength and next attempt may include battleships, possibly backed up by carrier. Due battle damage and operational casualties strength our surface forces at this moment reduced to point that scouting line to westward cannot be maintained and main reliance must be placed on air. RICHMOND DETROIT at VENTRILOQUIST 2 DD's at FORMULA can be sent out in emergency. Within week expect have 3 additional DD's available.

31 0322 Final and 2nd part of my 310322. Most secret. Reenforcements. Rockwell has been requested send soon as possible 2 BB's with 4 DD's. 3rd will be requested when screens available. Need for carrier not felt at this time but do need dive bomber and torpedo planes to base at FORMULA. 1 or 2 CA's while not essential after BB's arrive are highly desirable to increase freedom of movement of cruiser force. DD situation acute now and has always been difficult. 1 Squadron in addition destroyers now assigned and contemplated would relieve continuous shortage this type. 2 fleet submarines highly desirable, could use 4 to great advantage. When surface and amphibious operations are undertaken in KURILE area additional forces will be required. Strongly urge that 100 percent reserve crews be provided for all planes 11th Airforce in order maintain maximum pounding of KISKA and ATTU. 100 percent reserve in fighter planes and 50 percent reserve in bombers are necessary to meet operating conditions this area.
April 1st. (Oahu Date)

Thirteen VF attacked a small AK off VELLA LAVELLA during the day. The scheduled bombardment for last night of the VILA-MUNDA area by units of TF 18 was cancelled.

Cominch has approved the withdrawal of 3 CAs and 4 DDs from SOPAC to reinforce NORPAC.

Cominch 011810 directs Admiral Halsey to confer with General MacArthur regarding proposed operations in the SOLOMONS SEA Area.

CTF 16 proposes the use of fleet subs -- one off PARAMUSHIRO and one off the east coast of KAMCHATKA. His 020400 pink gives an outline of the employment of surface forces during the LANDCRAB operation.

It is possible that Cardiv ONE is in the TRUK area.

April 2nd. (Oahu Date)

During the night 2-3 April (-11) two CL and 4 DDs of TF 18 presumably made a sweep for enemy vessels in the KOLA GULF area. No results were reported. A SOPAC plane reported sinking an I-class enemy sub with bombs off the BUIN area at 1647 (-11) April 3. The fast BBs under Rear Admiral Lee will put to sea tomorrow for three days gunnery training in the South CORAL SEA.

KISKA was attacked by 6 VF from AMCHITKA at 1005 (-10) and again by 6 VF at 1240 (-10). At 1355 (-10) 5 heavy and 5 medium bombers from ADAK attacked the KISKA area. At 1730 (-10) 10 heavy bombers from ADAK made a calculated run attack on KISKA. These "calculated run" attacks cannot be expected to produce good results. Even using a bombsight the planes have had little success in knocking out enemy installations.

The WICHITA, SAN FRANCISCO, LOUISVILLE and 4 DDs under Rear Admiral Giffen are expected to sail from the SOPAC for PEARL to reinforce TF 16 about April 7th. In his 022110 pink CTF 51 makes recommendations on the employment of BBs for the LANDCRAB operation. Rear Admiral Rockwell wants the PENNSYLVANIA as his flagship. Admiral Kinkaid feels that such employment unduly restricts that ship. Also, CTF 16 does not see the need of the NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI, at this time, for the LANDCRAB operation.

A considerable move of enemy air toward the SOLOMONS is indicated. Sizable air attacks are to be expected in the near future. Com 7th Fleet reports positive evidence of the enemy employing acoustic mines off BRISBANE.
April 3rd. (Oahu Date)

CTF 18 made sweeps in the North NEW GEORGIA area on nights 2-3 and 3-4 April (-11) with negative results. Admiral Halsey has ordered these night operations to continue until further orders. On the 9th (-11) Rear Admiral Merrill's cruiser group will cover the laying of a mine field off KOLOMBANGARA.

The fine performance of the WAHOO in sinking 37,000 tons enemy shipping in the YELLOW Sea is described in TU 17.1.2 010900.

Comnorpac two part 032100 is an operation summary for April 2nd (f 10).

Cincpac 022341 pink gives additions to Norpacfor for the LANDCRAB operation (3 CA, 4 DD, 2 SS).

Indications of major enemy air activity in the SOLOMONS Sea area continue. It now seems probable that our positions will be attacked about April 11th (-11).

April 4th. (Oahu Date)

All Pacific Ocean areas were quiet. Comsopac 050619 is an operations summary. The second mining project off KOLOMBANGARA mentioned yesterday has been postponed indefinitely.

Cinc Sowespac area reports remarkable success in air attacks on enemy ships at KAVIENG on April 3 and 4 (-11). The reported bag is 1 CA and 1 CL sunk; 1 CL or DD probably sunk; 2 DD badly damaged. The attacks were during darkness and made from low levels, - some being skip bombing.

Bad weather caused the cancellation of air activities in the ALEUTIANS. The refloating of the MIDDLETON continues to be delayed by weather.

Admiral Nimitz is exploring a redeployment of the Pacific Fleet which involves moving all BBs and CVs to the Central Pacific. This plan when evolved will be sent to Cominch for concurrence.

There were no new enemy developments.
April 5th. (Oahu Date)

CTF 18 has been ordered by Comsopac to bombard the VILA-MUNDA area the night of 7-8 April (-11). On completion that force will retire to ESPIRITU SANTO. Today 6 SBDs with 6 VF covering bombed VILA.

Cincpac will hold the 12th defense battalion at PEARL until SOPAC plans for its use crystallize.

IDAHO and NEVADA will proceed from the SAN PEDRO area to the ALEUTIANS April 7th (-8). Except for the NARWHAL and NAUTILUS which are being sent to CTF 16 as troop carriers, no Fleet subs will be made available for LANDCRAB.

Sopac staff officers arrived at PEARL today enroute south from WASHINGTON. Views regarding the present and future SOPAC set-up were exchanged today and further informal discussions will take place tomorrow.

It now appears probable that the enemy will conduct offensive air operations in the SOLOMONS SEA area April 12th (-11).

April 6th. (Oahu Date)

At 0615(-11) 7th 14 SBD, 4 TBF, 11 VF attacked VILA. At 1215(-11) 7th 6 SBD, 6 TBF, 12 VF attacked REKATA. A direct hit destroyed 1 4-engine flying boat. At 1925(-11) the 7th three enemy planes dropped bombs in the bivouac area at GUADALCANAL. Damage was slight.

During the latter part of the morning it was learned at PEARL that enemy air was expected to attack our shipping and positions in the GUADALCANAL area commencing in the early afternoon. This information was passed immediately to Comsopac. As a result all major shipping in the GUADALCANAL area was ordered to sail at once toward ESPIRITU SANTO and minor shipping was ordered to take cover. The mining project at KOLOMBANGARA was cancelled and CruDiv 12 was ordered to withdraw. The scheduled bombardment in the VILA area was cancelled and TF 18 was ordered to a patrol station to the southeast of the SOLOMONS. TFs 10 and 14 were ordered to proceed to the CORAL SEA south of GUADALCANAL.

At 1530(-11) April 7 the AARON WARD which was escorting two LST from the RUSSELLS received two hits and one near miss from enemy dive bombers. The ship was taken in tow by the ORTOLAN, but sank about three hours later off TULAGI. At 1445(-11) April 7th enemy air attacked our shipping off TULAGI sinking the MOA and damaging the KANAWHA, and the ERSKINE HELPS. Off the north coast of GUADALCANAL the TAPPAHANNOCK and WOODWORTH were attacked by seven planes but no damage was done.
April 6th. (Oahu Date)

246 enemy VF were reported in the northern SOLOMONS today. Comsopac urges an air attack on such a fine target.

A possible enemy sub was reported by a search plane at 0910 (9:10) today 105 miles bearing 40° from OAHU.

In the ALEUTIANS Army planes attacked KISKA at 1410, 1415, and 1655 (4:55) today.

April 7th. (Oahu Date)

Task forces 10 and 14 are operating about 250 miles south of GUADALCANAL. TF 15 is operating approximately 160 miles northeast of TF 10 and 14. TF 18 is operating about 300 miles southeast of GUADALCANAL. Enemy submarines are believed to be in these areas in fair strength. Enemy reconnaissance planes can reach all of these TF operating areas. Beyond several cruisers and destroyers, no enemy surface strength is believed south of the equator and there is no indication that any appreciable surface strength intends to move toward the SOLOMONS Sea area in the near future. Admiral Halsey may have information not available here upon which he has based his present deployment. Not knowing his reasons, we are unable to understand this deployment.

Complete results of the enemy air raid on our ships in the GUADALCANAL area have been reported as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AARON WARD</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANAWHA</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>Sunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERSKINE PHELPS</td>
<td>Badly damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHARA</td>
<td>Damaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARENHOLT</td>
<td>Minor damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAPPENNOCK</td>
<td>Strafing damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOODWORTH</td>
<td>Strafing damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 VF</td>
<td>Lost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 - 34 planes</td>
<td>Destroyed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above it is seen that our air strength in the GUADALCANAL area cannot prevent serious losses and damage to our surface forces in those waters.

Of 12 TBF on a strike at KAHILI at 0420 (-11) April 8th, seven are missing.
April 7th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

The GUDGEON arrived at PREMANTLE yesterday from patrol in the JAVA Sea and reported sinking about 29,000 tons enemy shipping, including a large naval tanker.

On the 7th (/ 10) bad weather halted all ALEUTIAN air operations. The MIDDLETON was refloated April 6th (/ 10) and will be towed to DUTCH HARBOR.

Except as noted above, there are no indications of enemy offensive operations anywhere in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Nevertheless, it continues to be within enemy capability to make raids in force on our MIDWAY - OAHU - CANTON line.

April 8th. (Oahu Date)

The Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet today. Bad weather halted air operations in the ALEUTIANS. No air strikes were reported in the SOLOMONS.

Sopac task forces are operating as shown yesterday except that TF 18 has been ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO.

Admiral Halsey is withdrawing SBDs and TBFs from GUADALCANAL as practicable and sending 45 VF from the ENTERPRISE and CHANANGO to GUADALCANAL to meet an air raid expected in that area the 10th (-11).

In his 082215 pink Cincpac raises the question of operating major task forces as at present (see distribution noted yesterday). Comsopac 090601 is Admiral Halsey's reply.

Admiral Halsey is proceeding at once to survey the feasibility of an early move into the BUIN - SHORTLAND area, presumably by-passing MUNDA.

The TRITON, which has been on patrol in the area between RABAUL and the PELEWSS, is over due and presumed lost.

The TUNNY reported 7 hits in 2 ACVs off TRUK.

Nothing new was learned today concerning the deployment of major enemy forces.
April 9th. (Oahu Date)

Major SOPAC task forces continue to operate in the northeast CORAL Sea area. No targets for these ships can be seen from here. Bad weather in both the SOLOMONS Sea Area and in the ALEUTIANS caused the cancellation of offensive air operations.

The STRONG reported having sunk an I-120 Class enemy sub off the Northeast coast of SAN CRISTOBAL at 1100 GCT 7th.

The POMPAKO reported two possible hits on a CV off the east coast of HONSHU. It does not seem probable that this CV is the SHOKAKU Class.

There were no new enemy developments.

April 10th. (Oahu Date)

The Pacific Ocean areas were generally quiet. No major Japanese units were sighted. Except for Rear Admiral Merrill's cruisers which continue on patrol to the Southeast of the SOLOMONS, all SOPAC major task forces are returning to port.

At 0657 (-11) April 11th 12 SBD attacked MUNDA. The usual night harassing planes operated in the central SOLOMONS.

A possible submarine was sighted today 200 miles Southwest of CANTON Island. During the night a possible sub was sighted off KANEHOE Air Station, OAHU.

At 1100 (7 10) April 10 a plane sighted two enemy DDs in Lat. 54-27, Long. 169-42. An unsuccessful glide bombing attack was made.

Cincpac has approved the master plan for LANDCRAB (Cincpac 110321).

There were no new enemy developments.
April 11th. (Oahu date)

Between 2120 and 2150 (-11) April 11th 6 B-17's attacked BALLALE and KAHILI. Two of these planes are missing. At 0730 (-11) the 12th 6 SBD's covered by 23 VF attacked VELLA.

The TUNNY confirms the report of 4 hits in one ACV and 3 in a big ACV or CV. The enemy reports no damage from one of these attacks. However, the attack has caused the Japs to intensify A/S measures in the TRUK area.

By September the Pacific Fleet should receive 8 new CVs.

At 1000 and 1850 (10) April 11th Army VF from AMCHITKA attacked KISKA. Results were not observed.

An expected air attack on GUADALCANAL today did not materialize.

April 12th. (Oahu date)

MUNDA was attacked at 0815 (-11) April 13th by eleven TBF escorted by 21 VF.

All major SOPAC task forces are now ordered to bases.

Admiral Halsey has requested that the 3rd Marines be replaced in the SAMOAN area to permit it to join the 3rd Division.

At 1000 (10) April 12th 8 P-40s from AMCHITKA dropped 8-500 lb. bombs on KISKA.

There is good evidence that the POMPANO got two hits in the SHOKAKU (previously mentioned).

Carrier planes operating from RABAUL made a large scale bombing attack on MORESEY during the day. SWPac air was able to destroy about one fourth of the attacking planes. Only minor damage was inflicted by the enemy.

From all indications, the enemy continues to be on the strategic defensive in the South Pacific Theatre.
April 13th  (Oahu date)

The Solomons Sea Area was generally quiet. A minor strike was made on camouflaged barges in VIRU Harbor, and the usual searches was completed. No strikes was reported in the KISKA area. There were no major sightings in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

Our radio deception plan is calling enemy attention to the MARSHALLS - GILBERTS area with some results apparent.

The enemy carriers that landed some of their planes in the KAVIENG - RABAUL area to raid PORT MORESBY are expected to reembark their planes in the next day or so. This operation indicates that the Japs are not now willing to expose their CVs to our shore based air.

April 14th  (Oahu date)

At 1130(-11) April 15th 6 TBF escorted by 15 VF attacked MUNDA. At 1535(-11) same day 2 TBF, 4 F4U covered by 15 VF attacked and sank an 80-foot boat or barge at REKATA. At 1608 (-11) same day, 5 SBD escorted by 15 VF attacked VILA.

On the 13th(/10) 6 air attacks on KISKA were made from AMCHITKA and two air attacks were made from ADAK. Numerous hits were observed and several fires started. On the 14th (/10) 2 air attacks on KISKA were made from ADAK and six air attacks were made from AMCHITKA. The MIDDLETON arrived at Dutch Harbor on the 13th.

The SOUTH DAKOTA will report to Cincpac for duty on May 10th at the Canal Zone.

CinC Combined is going to inspect the BUIN Area on the 18th(-9) arriving from RABAUL by plane.
April 15th. (Oahu Date)

The South and Central Pacific areas were unusually quiet. No major enemy forces were sighted. Our SOPAC task forces are at their bases.

Two air attacks were made on KISKA from ADAK starting fires. One heavy bomber was shot down by enemy AA fire.

The North and East Coast of NEW GUINEA continues to be the focal point of enemy interest in the South - Southwest Pacific.

April 16th. (Oahu Date)

Eleven TBF, five B-17s, nine B-24s attacked the KAHI LI area between 2004 and 2130 (-11) April 17. Two enemy planes attacked GUADALCANAL the night of the 16th (-11). Only slight damage was reported.

12 SBD escorted by 13 VF attacked MUNDA at 1415 (-11) the 17th.

Admiral Halsey is in BRISBANE to discuss plans for the continuation of the NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS offensive with General MacArthur. There is considerable newspaper discussion now appearing regarding reinforcements for General MacArthur.

CTF 16 reports 11 VF attacks on KISKA from AMCHITKA the 15th (-10). A total of 91 tons of bombs were dropped on KISKA that day in 13 attacks. The first report of attacks made on the 16th (-10) shows that 49 planes attacked KISKA. Considerable damage was inflicted but will not be assessed until the photo interpretation is completed.

An attempt will be made to intercept an enemy high commander when he makes a projected visit to the BUIN area the 18th (-11).
April 17th. (Oahu date)

Com 3rd Fleet 180611 is an operation summary for his area. Major SOPAC task forces continue in port. It seems probable that CinC Combined was shot down in a plane over the BUIN area today by Army P-38s.

It is possible that a Jap sub is being towed toward the MARSHALLS by a DD and is now roughly half way between CANTON and FUNAFUTI. If the contact can be developed air attacks will be made.

Large scale air attacks continue on Kiska from both AMCHITKA and ADAO. There are beginning to be signs of enemy distress from these attacks. The NEVADA and IDAHO are standing to the westward from ADAO to patrol to the Northwest of ATTU. In view of possible stepping up of Jap sub operations in the ALEUTIANS the use of BBs in this kind of an operation is not without risk.

April 18th. (Oahu date)

Com 3rd Fleet 190603 is an operations summary for the 19th(-11).

A total of 45 VF from AMCHITKA attacked Kiska during the day.

There are good indications that the enemy is strengthening positions in the GILBERTS.

April 19th. (Oahu Date)

At 0740 (-11) April 20, 8 TBF and 12 SBD attacked MUNDA. Other strikes are reported in Com 3rd Fleet 200616.

Admiral Halsey states that he is required to provide a garrison for WOODLARK Island and desires the 12th Marine Defense Battalion from PEARL.

On both the 18th and 19th Kiska was bombed by planes from both AMCHITKA and ADAO.

There is evidence that Jap subs are moving toward our lines of communication to the southeast of CANTON.
April 20th. (Oahu Date)

Between 1840 and 1900 (-11) April 21 five B-24s attacked NUMA NUMA. An airstrip is under construction there. Com 3rd Fleet 210613 is an operation summary for the day.

Major General Hale's strike of 22 B-24s on NAURU was completed successfully. Damage was reported to phosphate installations. At least five enemy intercepting planes were shot down. The planned strike of the same group on TARAWA will be on April 23rd (-9\frac{1}{2}).

No report was received of ALEUTIAN activities for the 20th (-10). Commorpac 210802 two part pink gives changes in the operation plan for LANDCRAB.

There were no new enemy developments.

April 21st. (Oahu date)

Com 3rd Fleet 220628 is an operational summary. At 1600 (-11) April 22 6 TBF and 11 SBD attacked MUNDA. At 1715 (-11) same day 4 VF strafed MUNDA and VILA air strips.

Revised estimate of the NAURU strike indicates refineries and underground fuel supply completely destroyed, and only one zero definitely destroyed. At 0228 (-12) April 22 5 enemy bombers raided FUNAFUTI doing minor damage.

On the 20th (-10) KISKA was attacked by one strike from ADAK and five strikes from AMCHITKA. An increase in sub contacts in the ALEUTIANS was reported.

Comsopac 210654 two part pink deals with reassignment of troops. Cinopac 202217 pink requests policy of sending Sopac troops to SWPac at this time. This was answered by Cominch 211236 pink.

A movement of air in the KURILES area is indicated.
April 22th. (Oahu Date)

Com 3rd Fleet 230721 is an operations summary for the day in the Sopac Area.

Cincpac will authorize Admiral Halsey to provide the garrison at WOODLARK in accordance with Cominch despatch on this subject noted yesterday.

The SCORPION on patrol on the east coast of HONSHU reports having completed a mine plant and having damaged one large Maru.

No report of ALEUTIAN operations for the day was received.

The enemy continues to strengthen NE NEW GUINEA positions. It continues to be indicated that this area is the focal point of enemy interest in the Pacific. However, these operations do not require major fleet units and we must consider that the bulk of the enemy fleet is capable of operations in the Central Pacific. Raids in force on the MIDWAY - OAHU - CANTON line continue possible but not probable.

April 23rd. (Oahu Date)

At 1345 (-11) April 24th, 12 SBD and 12 TBF escorted by 16 VF attacked MUNDA. All major SOPAC task forces are at bases. One ACV is patrolling southeast of GUADALCANAL to cover logistic moves to the GUADALCANAL area.

The bombing attack on TARAWA was completed at 1530 Zed today and Major General Hale, U. S. Army, who led the attack, is returning to OAHU with his Army bombers.

Bad weather prevented air strikes in the ALEUTIANS. Lieutenant General DeWitt is now at ADAK.

Cominch 231632 pink believes it well to hold a task group in the Central Pacific.

There were no new enemy developments.
April 24th. (Oahu Date)

During the day in the Central Solomons four Army VF jumped 10 Jap VB and 20 Zeros, shooting down 5 Zeros. We lost two VF. SOPAC task forces continue in port. No major enemy units were sighted.

In the ALEUTIANS bad weather prevented all attacks on KISKA except for two VF from AMCHITKA.

Admiral Halsey has returned to NOUMEA from a conference in BRISBANE with General MacArthur.

Cincpac 242345 pink desires that Admiral Kinkaid and General DeWitt explore future operations after LANDCRAB.

There were no new enemy developments.

April 25th. (Oahu Date)

Usual air searches in the SOLOMONS were made, but bad weather prevented air strikes except the nightly harassing at KIHILI by 3 B-24s. There were no sightings of major enemy units.

Cominch 251534 confirms Cincpac assumption that the 3rd Marines now at SAMOA will not be furnished relief from the mainland.

Two, possibly three, Jap subs are operating off BRISBANE and during the day sank two freighters.

KISKA was attacked by Army planes today from both ADAK and AMCHITKA. Rear Admiral Kinkaid suggests that it may be unwise to employ the NARWHAL and NAUTILUS in LANDCRAB. (Comnorpac 260124 pink)

Four enemy CV known to have operated in the RABAUL-TRUK area as late as April 11th have not been located since that time.
April 26th. (Oahu Date)

The SOLOMONS Sea area was quiet except for night strikes made on KAHILI, BALLALE and VILA between 0030 and 0515 (-11) April 27th. Major task forces in the SOPAC are in port. Enemy submarines are operating off SYDNEY. The AOBA was sighted today on the reef at KAVIENG.

Com 3rd Fleet 270510 pink is the proposed new SOPAC task force organization.

On the 26th NORPAC light cruiser group bombarded ATTU. Several strikes were made on KISKA by Army planes and it is interesting to note that AA fire was considerably lighter than usual.

Cinopac 270135 pink gives views on employment of the NAUTILUS and NARWAL in LANDCRAB. CTF 51 262351 pink is on the same subject.

Plans Section estimate of operations in the Central Pacific during 1943 was approved today by Admiral Nimitz as a general basis for future planning.

There were no new enemy developments.

April 27th. (Oahu Date)

The South Pacific continues quiet. Air activity was limited to searches and minor harassing in the BUIN Area. The ENTERPRISE and VICTORIOUS are to relieve each other, both leaving present stations May 1st.

A total of 49.8 tons of bombs were dropped on KISKA yesterday by Army and Canadian planes. Today air activities were severely reduced by bad weather. Only one attack was made on KISKA, which was a strike of 4 VF from AMCHITKA. The bomber strip at AMCHITKA will be able to accommodate 10 VB by April 28th.

There were no new enemy developments.
April 28th. (Oahu Date)

Comsopac 290610 is an operations summary. In addition to the operations thus summarized, at 0830 (-11) the 29th, 14 VB escorted and assisted by 20 VF bombed and strafed enemy positions at KOLOMBANGARA. At 1545 (-11) the 29th KOLOMBANGARA positions were attacked again by 14 VB escorted by 16 VF.

Cominch 29158 pink suggests that the VICTORIOUS and NORTH CAROLINA be held at PEARL until the arrival here of the ENTERPRISE and WASHINGTON. It has been our thought all along that this is desirable in view of possible needs in the Central or North Pacific, but Cominch had previously held the view that two CVs should be kept in the SOPAC. Cinopac will concur with Cominch in this matter and hold the VICTORIOUS group at PEARL until the arrival of the ENTERPRISE group. Because of lack of screening DDs, the total force so retained at PEARL cannot be used with reasonable safety.

Bad weather in the ALEUTIANS prevented air attacks on KISKA and curtailed searches.

Based on best available information of current enemy deployment it is possible for the enemy to employ as many as 4 BBs in the North Pacific. This would form the center of a total force of: 4 BB (BatDiv 2), six cruisers, two CVs (converted marus), 12 - 16 DDs.

April 29th. (Oahu Date)

Between 1840 and 1900 (-11) April 29, six B-24s attacked KIETA. At 1125 (-11) April 30 nine SBD, nine TBF, and four VT escorted by 28 VF attacked VILA. Between 0424 and 0510 (-11) April 30 five B-17s attacked KAHILI. Commencing at 1300 Zed May 6th a mine field will be laid by 3 DM between MAKUTI Island and KOLOMBANGARA.

Bad weather prevented air strikes in the ALEUTIANS today.

There were no new enemy developments.
01 0900 TU 17.1.2 (WAHOO) to COMSUBPAC.

WAHOO swop the broom for the mop and mopped up with 8 ships sunk for 37,000. 6,000 tonner damaged due second hit dud. Trawler and 2 sampans wrecked. Everything expended. 4 prematures. 3 ships off DAIKEN 2 off CHINAMPO 1 off PORT ARTHUR 2 middle Yellow Sea 1 CHINETTS Strait. Torpex wonderful. WAHOO returning base as cocky as boot seaman on leave. 81901953. 31 deg. North 147 deg. East.

03 2054 COMINICORPACFOR to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNORWESTSEAFLRON, etc.

Part 1 of 2 parts my 032100. Part 2 of 2 part April 2nd Summary. 12 VENTRILOQUIST Liberators 1733 dropped 60 quarter tonners North HEAD 136 centuries runway BOODLE from 12 to 14,000 feet. Hits observed. Unusually large volume medium but low AA from North HEAD, north and west of main camp, North of SALMON Lagoon and sub base. No planes damaged. No enemy aircraft or new shipping observed. Additional FORMULA missions to BOODLE. 8 P-40's approx 1000 dropped 6 quarter tonners main camp near hanger from 7000. Results not observed. Broken overcast. Moderate AA.

03 2100 This is part 2 and final of 032100. 3rd. 8 Lightnings approx 1000 left 7-1100 pounders 8 quarter tonners mag cluster main camp from 8000 through hole in overcast with unobserved results. AA light. 4th. 8 P40's approx 1250 dropped 8 quarter tonners main camp from 8000. Observed smoke from bombed area. 5th. 8 Lightnings approx 1400 left 8 quarter tonners 7 mag clusters main camp from 3500 to 8000 feet. Results unobserved. Heavy accurate AA some from GERTRUDE COVE. 8th. 8 P40's approx 1600 from 6000 feet dropped 8 quarter tonners main camp with unobserved results. Almost solid overcast. Still another mission was turned back later because of weather. No enemy planes seen. No new shipping. 1 Mitchell which took part in first FORMULA raid on BOODLE but landed at VENTRILOQUIST dropped 2 quarter tonners 1 half tonner BOODLE. Not previously reported.
USS O'BANNON credited destruction by gunfire depth-charging surfaced enemy submarine 0230 L (-11) today 5th. Attack took place in SOLOMONS ALLEY SOUTH SANTA ISABEL. At 1130 L today small BLUE task unit reported under attack by nip bombers north of SAN CRISTOBAL. No details yet. Night of 3rd - 4th Jap planes over RUSSELL ISLANDS dropped two bombs near BANIKA fighter strip 3 more near MONEY ISLAND off northwest PAVUVU. Nil damage. Reliable BOUGAINVILLE source reports greatly increased Jap activity along coast that island northwest from CAPE MARSHIRI area to BANIU. BUIN SHORTLAND shipping from AIRSHIGHT 1445 L 4th. 2 CL's 5 DE's 4 AK's 1 possible AV. Black cats continue nightly patrols harassing. Dropped on VILA night of third - 4th on EMOGAI inlet east shore KULA GULF night of 4th. GRAYBACK returning from patrol reports putting 2 fish in 7,200 ton freighter north of BISMARCKS March 30th.

CINCPAC to CTF 16 Info COMGEN WDC, CTF 51.

11 0321 CINCPAC to CTF 16 Info COMGEN WDC, CTF 51.

Cincpac replying your 100826 approves master plan as modified by your subject to following provisos. ABLE. Employ NASSAU per my 110045 and B decision as to occupation of VOLUBLE should be held in abeyance until you determine whether more suitable location for field exists on JACKBOOT.

Night of 16th saw biggest KAHILI raid in weeks as 11 Avengers 9 Liberators 5 Forts hammered airrome, offshore shipping and BALLALE strip. Over 25 tons high explosives plus hundreds fragmentation clusters and incendiaries fell on KAHILI. 12 times 500 on BALLALE. TBF's scored bomb hit alongside 1 AK. Afternoon 17th 12 Dauntless 13 Wildcats attacked MUNDA. Bomb hits on runway and dispersal areas. Mass strike BUIN KAHILI repeated night of 17th. 2 Avengers scored 5 hits on 10,000 ton cargo vessel which was sinking on last pass. 2 other Avengers got 2 directs on another AK near misses on 3rd. Meanwhile Avengers followed by Forts, Liberators pounded KAHILI strip with tons of bombs firing fuel munitions dumps and starting fires visible 30 miles. P38 flight to KAHILI area 0930 L (-11) 18th shot down 3 Jap bombers 3 zeros to loss of 1 BLUE fighter.
19 0603 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT. Info COM 7TH FLT, ALL CTF 3RD FLT.

CACTUS P70's opened season on nocturnal raiders night of 18th shooting down one of several enemy bombers which made harassing runs during 9 hours alert. 17 bombs dropped but no appreciable damage. Between 2115 and 2215 L (-11) 18th quartet of Liberators bombed MUNDA scoring hits on runway and blast pens and causing one large explosion in BUIN TONOLEI shipping morning 18th two destroyers 5 freighters and 4 patrol vessels.

20 0616 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT. Info COM 7th FLT, CG FIJI, etc.

Fortresses raided KIETA 2030 L (-11) 19th dumped 17 tons bombs in target area. Meanwhile 10 Avengers were hammering KAHILI airfield paying particular attention to runway and blast pens on west side field. 3 hours later 7 more Avengers struck TONOLEI shipping scored direct hit on AK northwest PUPUKUSE Point several near misses 2nd freighter near OVAU Island. Coastwatchers report continuing barge activity VELLA LAVELLA. Recent DF plots and sightings indicate eastward movement ORANGE subs along general line PHOENIX SAMOA FIJI groups. 2 sighted local 19th west PHOENIX Group.

21 0613 COM 3RD FLEET to COM 1ST FLT. Info NZNB, ALL TFC'S 3RD FLT.

8 Avengers 12 Dauntless carrying 7 one ton bombs 12 half tonners 4 quarter tonners raided MUNDA 0740 L (-11) 20th silencing ack ack posies Lambeti Gurusai starting large fire and messing up runway and dispersal areas. ORTOLAN reports finding Nip 2 man submarine resting on bottom in 4 fathoms just off Visale. Preliminary looksee disclosed only minor damage and craft may be salvageable. Am searches 20th saw 1 AK down by stern with line to OVAU Island. This ship damaged by Avengers night of 19th. Also sighted 1 AK off Toikh Island south of EUKA Passage.

22 0628 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT, Info NZNB, SOPAC TF COMS, RDO AUCK.

Afternoon 21st search plane scored near bomb misses Jap radio station vicinity CAPE ALEXANDER CHOISEUL. Fighter sweep to BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT then strafed same area leaving storehouse smoking and hitting radio shack. Avengers Farts and Liberators raided POPORANG Island near FAISI night 21st dropping large number vari-sized bombs plus fragmentation incendiary clusters. Fires visible 40 miles resulted. During POPORANG strike 2 Avengers scored probable hits on AK off POPORANG Point but nip night fighter interception made definite confirmation impossible. Tojo Night Hawks incidentally seem to rely on searchlight crews. Night of 20th 5 B-24's heavily

(Continued)
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
April (GCT)

22 0628 COM 3RD FLT - - - (Continued)

hit NUMA NUMA area BOUGAINVILLE. ORANGE sub called VILA night of 20th says Allied watcher. Unloaded supplies then left by FERGUSON PASS. PRESIDENT ADAMS reports underwater code transmission heard night of 21-22nd near ULAWA Island (North SAN CRISTOBAL).

23 0721 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT Info NZNB, ALL TFC 3RD FLT, Etc.

Enemy Aircraft attacked FUNAPUTI twice prior dawn 23rd. First wave estimated 5 bombers started small fire caused 2 personnel casualties only slight damage. Second flight about 6 planes moderately damaged radio station destroyed 2 parked liberators. At 1600 L (-11) 22nd BLUE dive torpedo bombers hit MUNDA dumped 1 ton bombs squarely on runway silenced ACK ACK posits with ton and half ton loads. Corsair sweep followed hour later strafed area from tree top height firing 3 Nip planes on ground. Fighters continued to VILA set fire to motor truck caught on strip. All our planes returned. During night 22nd-23rd 3 Liberators harassed KAHILI with 60 light bombs. 12 SBDs escorted by 14 Corsairs bombed and strafed REKATA and target area shortly after daylight 23rd. ORANGE sub unsuccessfully attacked tanker WESTERN SUN in posit 13-08 south 167-51 west 2115 GCT 21st. Ship saw periscope of possible second sub 20 minutes later.

25 1534 COMINCH to CINCPAC, MARCORPS Info COMSOPAC.

Cinopac 222151 and 240227 assumption that no relief for 3rd Marines will be furnished from the mainland at this time is correct. Marine Corps hereby directed transfer 1 Airdrome Battalion to PEARL when shipping is available as replacement 12th Defense Battalion transferred to SOPAC area.

29 0610 Com 3rd Flt, to Com 1st Flt, Info Com 7th Flt, TF Coms Sopac.

BLUE troops surprised annihilated Jap officer 3 men 0530 L 28th near BEAUFORT Bay GUADALCANAL. Nip patrol apparently attempting escape from GUADAL was staging from small boat and had landed preceding night. Liberator harassed KAHILI early hours 28th while second plane same type failing find KAHILI account weather returned via VILA dumped bomb load in bivouac area. Early today 29th 2 Fortresses over KAHILI aimed bombs to land on both ends runway and across strip. Lone Mitsubishi type one bomber unsuccessfully attacked small BLUE task unit in usual area east of SAN CRISTOBAL forenoon today. Aircraft spotted possible sub posit 17-45 S, 179-08 E time 1130 L 28th. Quantity of debris so far unidentified washed up on east coast MALEKULA Island NEW HEBRIDES 27th and 28th. Additional wreckage reported found north central coast SAN CRISTOBAL 28th.
April (GCT)

01 1810 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, MACARTHUR.

Handle as super secret. Para. Referring Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive War Dept. 2407 to Comsowespac Area, Rane 4007 CG SOPAC area and 3603 to CG HawDept, desire Halsey confer with MacArthur in early future regarding composition Task Forces sequence and timing of major offensive operations.

Para 2. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timing and sequence must be adjusted to situation regardless contents Para 11 Cominch 232357. Carpender pass to MarArthur.

02 0400 CTF 16 to CTF 51 Info CINCPAC.

Most Secret. NEVADA, IDAHO with screens needed this area now. Please advance date departure as practicable. PENNSYLVANIA should be ready depart on short notice when additional screening DDs become available. Your 312359. Proposed use of PENNSYLVANIA as flagship not in accordance probable task organization. Without having seen LANDCRAB master plan my present concept is briefly as follows. You and ComGen 7th would be in Transport Group and Op. Plan will provide for you operational control over close gunfire support, screening and other task groups participating in actual landing operations. Battleships and cruisers with their screens assigned to distant support and covering groups should have complete freedom of action to meet any situation arising. Adees pass

02 2120 CTF 51 to CTF 16 Info CINCPAC

This is most secret. Your 020400. Impracticable anticipate proposed departing date NEVADA, IDAHO and screens due loading ammunition, readiness DDs and test firing NEVADA. Consider use PENNSYLVANIA my flag mandatory due lack adequate radar, communication, fighter control and other command facilities in any other ship now in my force. New subject. For accomplishment of Task I consider 3 BBs essential at time of landing for bombardment, AA protection and close support. End of Part 1.

02 2301 Part Two of my 022120. However if you intend to accept Cincpac's offer of NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI with 4 DD which I recommend then IDAHO might be included in latter group. Task Group 51.1 (Ex T.G. 2.3) has been extensively trained in shore bombardment in conjunction with troop landings. Combat loading plans and landing force tactical plan now virtually completed utilizing all units assigned TF 51. Am conferring with Landing Force Commander (Gen. Brown) tomorrow (April 3) for final approval. Your agreement with my proposed employment BBs considered urgent in order avoid confusion, revision of plans and probable delay target date. For your info master plan LANDCRAB is result conference with RAd Spruance Generals DeWitt, Smith, and Brown. All concur conception operation and Task Organization. Spruance has given approval to plan and Joint Staff now preparing Command Plan for submittal to you via ENTWISTLE earliest possible date.
Following additions will be made to your force for LANDCRAB. Rad Giffen WICHITA, SAN FRANCISCO, LOUISVILLE and four destroyers available to you at PEARL about 17th. NARWHAL at SAN DIEGO about 12th. NAUTILUS at PEARL about 18th. Subs fitted as transports. para. Forementioned will report to you for orders approximately on dates shown. This is most secret.

HiCom for Admiral Halsey. In current situation with MAINYARD firmly held by U.S. but subject to enemy air attacks do not believe advantage of operating major task forces south and southeastward of that area worth risk from submarine action. Para. Request comment. Do you consider major enemy naval threat against MAINYARD still exists.

Current concentration Jap forces at TRUK in connection with present halt in our offensive makes estimate Jap movement difficult. I am conducting long range air search to detect possible indication his objectives. Consider major Jap threat against RUSSELLS-GUADALCANAL area should not find surface forces unprepared. They were sent to sea originally because of change in "X DAY" and lack of knowledge as to significance of "X DAY". Forces out of bombing range and out of suspected submarine areas are engaging in valuable training which has been difficult in last month because of overhaul program and reported presence of submarines vicinity base operating areas.
Most secret. Part 1 of my 210802. Paras refer to those in proposed Op Plan delivered by Comdr Entwistle. Other than minor changes not affecting plan, final draft changed as follows. Para 2. Seize and occupy JACK BOOT and occupy VOLUBLE constructing airfield thereon at earliest practicable date in order sever enemy lines communications to Western ALEUTIANS, deny Near Islands to enemy, render BOODLE untenable, create base operations future reduction and occupation BOODLE. Para 3 Sub para 1. Occupy VOLUBLE and construct airfield thereon, embarking in transports and proceeding to VOLUBLE, as ordered, as soon as landing force well established on JACK BOOT. Para 3 Sub para J. In second sentence after quote threatening unquote quote assault and occupation JACK BOOT or occupation of VOLUBLE unquote. Para 3 Sub para K. Third sentence after quote supplies unquote quote clear vicinity JACK BOOT and proceed VENTRILOQUIST north of chain. As soon as need for transports no longer exists they will be directed proceed West Coast unquote. Para 3 Xray. Only major change establishes how hour with Comtaskforce 51 authorized change by despatch if circumstances require.

21 0802 2nd and final part Comnorpacfor 210802. Para 5. Change 1st sentence to following. By order higher authority supreme command vested in Comnorpacfor. Comtaskfor 51 (Comamphorpac) will operate under Comnorpac, commanding amphibious operations until landing phase completed. Thereafter landing force (Task Group 51.4) will become JACK BOOT occupation group (Task Group 16.11) operating directly under Command Comtaskforce 16. Task Group 16.11 will revert to Army command when Commanding General reports that status of occupation of JACK BOOT warrants this change and when so directed by Comnorpacfor. New subject. Contemplate Task Force 51 ships remaining ALEUTIAN Area only as long as their services required. In case of combatant ships period will be governed by enemy reaction to seizure JACK BOOT and occupation SHEMYA. Transports will be returned West Coast as soon situation indicates services not required to move additional reserves to JACK BOOT.
20 2217 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Hicom to Adm King only. In two despatches Halsey states he is required to furnish one regimental combat team for garrison WOODLARK and one defense battalion for defense same island. Halsey states these requirements necessitate replacement these troops from outside SOPAC area. Para. See my 200217. JCS 291803 March para three implies allocation forces presumably after JCS approve MacArthur's general plans. Such approved plans not yet available to me. Advise your policy in meeting requirements made on Halsey.

21 0654 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.

This is most secret. Replying urdis 200217. Part 1. Complete information not available until return Admiral Halsey but believe tentative arrangements made for construction airfield on WOODLARK and garrisoning that island by SOPAC. ACORN 5 enroute BRISBANE accordingly. This is part 1 of 2 parts. 1 regimental combat team and 1 defense battalion designated by conference as necessary combat garrison. Assume conference results subject to Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmation for allocation forces.

21 0701 This is Part 2 Comsopac 210654 most secret. Appreciate partial protection afforded SAMOA by FUNAFUTI but in view possible detachment from this area of important fleet units recommend no reduction present garrisons UPOLU and TUTUILA Pact regarding utilization of New Zealand troops. In cooperation with New Zealand officials have recently made study New Zealand manpower Forces. Only active units available are in 3rd Division NEW Caledonia. This division being increased in strength with agreement it will be used offensively. To detach units for garrison duties would detract from offensive power of division.

21 1336 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

This is Hicom for Admirals Nimitz and Halsey only. Your 202217 your reading of JCS 291803 March correct but relative proportion ground forces available in Sopac compared with those in Souwespac for tasks in prospect warrant immediate action to garrison and defend WOODLARK in order to get on with campaign.
23 1632 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC.

UTMOST SECRET. Your 230059 think it well to hold specified task group in Central Pacific for time being to await developments and because forces now in SoPac have been inactive for some time. There is however no objection to sending specified task group to SoPac provided equivalent group is moved into Central Pacific.

23 0059 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC.

Propose sail VICTORIOUS with NORTH CAROLINA Task Group to SO PAC about twenty-eighth unless you have other plans for her employment. HI-COM.

24 2345 CINCPAC to COMNORPACFOR.

For Admiral Kinkaid only. Desire you take advantage presence DeWitt to explore practicability future operations after LANDCRAB. How can we liquidate Jap or at least keep him harried. How can we profitably employ General Browns amphibious troops other than as garrison JACKBOOT Para Immediate reply not required but desire you explore matter thoroughly with DeWitt. Advise results.

26 0124 COMNORPAC to ADM ROCKWELL Info CINCPAC.

Most secret. Only for Admiral Rockwell and CINCPAC info. Indication enemy submarine activity this area steadily increasing. Therefore vitally important there be no antisubmarine restrictions in operating areas on D day and that every submarine contact be promptly and vigorously attacked. Presence NAUTILUS NARWHAL this area definitely increases sub menace to our transports and combatant ships by virtue restrictions necessarily imposed. Furthermore highly desirable flexibility offered by alternate landing plans considerably nullified by necessity for early commitment in order submarines will know where to land scouts. Delays in communicating with subs must be allowed for. Advantages of scout tasks fully appreciated but they are outweighed by vitally important disadvantages. Castner and others in full agreement that transport submarines can and should be eliminated from all landing plans. Additional gunfire preparation for landing battalion combat team RED Beach should compensate in large measure loss of services of scout company. Due scheduled early departure INCUBUS of submarines request prompt reply via destroyer sent clear your formation to break radio silence. If scouts vital to operation desire you consider landing from APD or DD.

HiCom only for Admiral Kinkaid action, Admiral Rockwell info. Subs mentioned UR 260214 were made available by me at considerable sacrifice and effort to assist the Army scheme of maneuver strongly desired by Brown and as strongly advocated by Castner. Understand present plans based on use of submarines. They are distinctive in appearance and are not now suitable for and cannot be used for combat patrols because of insufficient training of MARWHAL and material condition of NAUTILUS. Para. It should be feasible to use them by restricting anti-submarine measures within a well defined narrow area for a definite period of time. Para. The decision in this matter is entirely yours. The purpose of this dispatch is to acquaint you with facts and background.

Most secret. Your 260124. Plans included transport subs because unique advantages: (A) Discovery in area would not indicate imminence landing. (B) Could locate correct beach daylight submerged thus permit night landing and necessary beach reconnaissance and marking. If these outweighed must accept reduced probability successful landing and will require additional DD's transport scouts. Scout mission vital in most plans. If subs ruled out request you designate 2 DD's from your force embark scouts at INCUBUS and report to me at SEAWASP prior 2 May. My screen protection critically weak in view increased enemy sub activity and request additional DD's in any event. Advise.
April 30. (Oahu Date)

All SOPAC major task forces are in port. Operations in the SOLOMONS today were limited to search. Forty-one ships over 1000 tons were seen at RABAUL yesterday and included 1 CL, 6 SS, 1 AO, 24 AK.

In the ALEUTIANS usual air searches were made, but strikes on KISKA were limited to two VF missions from AMCHITKA because of bad weather. The bomber strip at AMCHITKA is now ready and as soon as weather permits 10 VB will be moved in from ADAK. The BB group is at COLD BAY with TF 51. Norpac heavy cruisers are operating to the west of ATTU. The light cruisers are now enroute to that area.

Cominch 291747 pink states that the SOUTH DAKOTA will not join Pacific Fleet as planned but that one BB will be sent to the Pacific early in July.

Enemy 3rd Fleet CVs remain unlocated.

May 1. (Oahu Date)

During the day 6 TBF with 16 VF escorting attacked MUNDA. The SS WILLIAM WILLIAMS was torpedoed by an enemy sub 240 miles SE of SUVA. It has been thought for several days that subs would operate in that general area.

Improved weather in the ALEUTIANS permitted a resumption of air attacks on KISKA. Six attacks were made from AMCHITKA and two from ADAK. Searches to the westward were generally negative. Nine heavy bombers were moved to AMCHITKA during the day.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 2. (Oahu Date)

Between 0810 and 0830 (-11) May 3, twelve SBD, twelve TBF, and twelve VF bombed and strafed REKATA. Both 1000# and 2000# bombs were used.

The continued ORANGE sub activity between SUVA and TONGA which so far has resulted in the torpedoing of the WILLIAM WILLIAMS and the PETER HEARST and an attack on the PETER SYLVESTER has caused a general traffic rerouting and intensified search.

(Continued)
May 2. (Oahu Date) -Continued-

During an enemy strike on DARWIN yesterday, we lost 14 VF against the enemy loss of 3 zeros. Only minor damage at DARWIN was reported.

Comnorpac 020843 is a summary for April.

Air strikes continued on KISKA from both AMCHITKA and ADAK. At 1700 (-10) May 2 five bombers from AMCHITKA attacked ATTU. This is the first bomber strike from AMCHITKA.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 3. (Oahu Date)

Com 3rd Fleet 040534 summarizes operations for the day in the South Pacific. At 1020 (-11) May 4th six TBF, six SBD, and 8 VF bombed and straffed enemy positions on KOLOMBANGARA. Submarines continue active in the SUVA - TONGA area but no new attacks on our shipping.

Cominch 032037 requests comment on the A/S situation in the South Pacific.

The FLYING FISH returning from patrol in the TSUAGARU STRAIT area reports sinking 28,000 tons enemy marus. The submarine reports heavy traffic in that vicinity.

The WAHOO reported one hit in a loaded XAV off the Southern KURILES. The target did not sink.

Early this morning the NECHES grounded at the entrance to COLD BAY.

One strike from ADAK and two from AMCHITKA were made on KISKA during the day. AA was reported to be very light.

It seems probable that two convoys are now enroute to the Western ALEUTIANS from JAPAN. It is possible that they will arrive at about the same time our force commences the attack on ATTU - May 7th. There are no other important enemy developments.
May 4th. (Oahu Date)

Com 3rd Fleet 050556 is an operations summary for the day. It now seems probable that the torpedoed WILLIAM WILLIAMS will be able to reach port.

The Pacific Ocean Areas continue to be quiet. Admiral Nimitz inspected MAUI airfields yesterday.

Because of bad weather D-Day for LANDCRAB has been postponed to May 8. The NECHES backed off the spot where she grounded yesterday and is anchored in COLD BAY. She will require Navy yard repairs but is seaworthy and able to proceed under her own power at 10 kts.

Location of major enemy units continues uncertain. Recent studies of enemy fuel capabilities made for the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirm our belief that the Japs are now unable to conduct major prolonged offensive operations to the eastward of their present lines, but that raids in force on our MIDWAY - OAHU - CANTON - FIJI line are feasible.

May 5th. (Oahu Date)

All pacific Ocean Areas continue quiet. The mining operation off KOLOMBANGARA previously noted is scheduled for tomorrow.

Comnorpac 060903 pink requests NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI and four DDs. Cinopac will be able to sail these ships except that only two DDs are available. The additional fuel requirements can be met by withdrawal of two tankers from another area. Two possible enemy sub contacts were made by planes in the Western ALEUTIAN Area.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 6th. (Oahu Date)

Comsopac plans to mine the western part of KULA Gulf on May 12th (-11). The mining operation on the western side of KOLOMBANGARA was completed successfully today although the forces involved were tracked by Jap planes during retirement. Com 3rd Fleet 070552 is an operations summary for the day. Comsopac intends to reinforce the aerial mined minefield in the BUIN area between 18 and 22 May.

Comnorpac has requested the MISSISSIPPI and NEW MEXICO. (with 2 DDs only)

The NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are patrolling to the NW and SW of ATTU. It is hoped that they have not been directed to conduct offensive patrol, but are waiting to land troops on ATTU for LANDCRAB. Good weather permitted extensive searches to the
May 6th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Westward of the ALEUTIANS. No new enemy sightings were reported. Army air strikes were made on both KISKA and ATTU.

There are continued indications of Jap movements to the ALEUTIANS. While we cannot tell the nature of these moves they are thought to be reinforcements destined to KISKA and ATTU. It seems probable that any convoy moving into the area will be escorted fairly strongly. CinC 5th is indicated having moved from his usual station at OMINATO to PARAMUSHIRO. There is some indication that the 5th Fleet is being reinforced by units of the 2nd Fleet. A very poor DF shows a CV about half way between MIDWAY and HONSHU. The possibility of this being a raiding force approaching MIDWAY is not considered serious enough to retain the NORTH CAROLINA and VICTORIOUS in this area. However, air reinforcements will be sent to MIDWAY.

May 7th. (Oahu Date)

Cincpac has congratulated General Eisenhower on the successful culmination of the North African campaign which was reported by the press today.

Com 3rd Fleet 080538 is an operations summary for his area.

Two very large air strikes were sent during the day to attack the enemy ships crippled by our mines in BLACKETT STRAIT but were unable to reach their targets due to bad weather. The first strike dropped bombs on MUNDA and reported one 1000# hit on the bow of a DD at GIZO.

D-Day for LANDCRAB was advanced to May 9th (\textsuperscript{50}), presumably because of bad weather. During the day strikes were made on both KISKA and ATTU. Cominich has requested aerial reconnaissance of ST. MATTHEW and ST. LAWRENCE Islands.

Cominich 072006 reviews requirements for overseas transportation of Navy aircraft.

Comsopac 080430 pink gives the schedule of moves for the occupation of WOODLARK.

Cominich 081329 pink gives an outline of General MacArthur's plan for the SOLOMONS Sea offensive.

Nothing further was heard of the possible enemy CV in the Central Pacific yesterday. Indications continue of enemy reinforcements believed enroute the Western ALEUTIANS.
May 8th. (Oahu Date)

The LANDCRAB operation has been postponed to May 11th (10) because of bad weather in the Western ALEUTIANS. This bad weather prevented effective search operations and air strikes.

Com 3rd Fleet 090603 is a summary which gives further details on the Jap DDs who ran into our minefield to the west of KOLOMBANGARA. PTs are ordered into that area, arriving tomorrow, to sink any surviving ships.

Comsopac (090501) pink is in general agreement with General MacArthur's plan for the SOLOMONS Campaign noted yesterday. Cincpac also concurs.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 9th. (Oahu Date)

All major SOPAC task forces are in port except Rear Admiral Ainsworth's cruisers which are enroute to the KULA GULF area to cover planned mining operations.

The VICTORIOUS and NORTH CAROLINA departed yesterday morning for the South Pacific, and the ENTERPRISE and WASHINGTON arrived at PEARL yesterday afternoon. The NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI will depart PEARL for the ALEUTIAN area tomorrow morning.

During the day a total of 24 SBD, 24 TBF, covered by 69 VF were dispatched from GUADALCANAL to search for and attack damaged enemy vessels in the BLACKETT STRAIT area. No enemy vessels were seen so 24 - 1000# bombs and 96 - 500# bombs were dropped on MUNDA.

The North Pacific forces are standing by for D-Day, which is May 11th. Winds are reported decreasing followed by heavy fog. Search and striking aircraft were seriously hampered by fog.

We now have a rival of the WAHOO. On the 10th at 1000 GCT the PLUNGER encountered a five maru convoy bound north between TRUK and SAIPAN. Four of the marus were sunk and the fifth was damaged.

There were no new enemy developments. The continued strengthening of enemy positions in North and West NEW GUINEA is noted.
May 10th. (Oahu Date)

While cruising in dense fog to the northeast of ATTU at 2235 (-10) today the SICARD and MacDONOUGH were in collision. The SICARD was directed to tow the MacDONOUGH to ADAK. TF 16 and 51 are cruising off ATTU waiting for the attack which is scheduled for 1040 (-10) tomorrow. Rain, fog, and low ceiling prevented all air strikes in the Western ALEUTIANS and prevented effective search.

The South Pacific area continues quiet. One air strike was made on REKATA at 0940 (-11) the 10th and night harassing planes were over the BUIN area.

The PLUNGER sank the fifth ship of the convoy, mentioned yesterday, with gunfire. In the same general area the PERMIT reported sinking two marus.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 11th. (Oahu Date)

Commorpac 120105, 120614, and 120827 describe the first day of the LANDCRAB operation. In spite of dense fog which prevented planned bombardment, the operation is progressing satisfactorily. There is evidence that the landing came as a complete surprise to the enemy.

At 0840 (-11) May 12 twelve SBD, twelve TBF, covered by 24 VF attacked MUNDA. Harassing B-17s were over the BUIN area as usual during the night. Enemy submarines were located by DF off both TONGA and SAMOA.

After due consideration CinCPac recommended to CominCh no change in the present set-up for the control of merchant shipping in the Pacific Theatre. CominCh had suggested CinCPac responsibility extended to AUSTRALIA CinCPac 120339.

CominCh 111319 pink believes that existing task organizations comprise too many task groups. The matter will be studied here.

The deployment of major enemy units continues obscure.
May 12th. (Oahu Date)

By the end of the day nearly all troops were landed on ATTU and were advancing against strong enemy resistance. Low visibility hampered all operations. It was reported by a plane that an enemy sub fired a torpedo at the PENNSYLVANIA. It is expected that unloading of the AKs will be completed May 15th.

During the night 12-13 (-11) surface units of TF 18 bombarded the VILA MUNDA area. The mine field was planted in KOLA GULF as planned. At 1300 (-11) about 25 zeros were intercepted over the RUSSELLS. 16 zeros were reported shot down against our loss of five VF.

Once again the WAHOO has completed a highly successful patrol. This time off the Northeast coast of HONSHU 25,000 tons of marus were sunk. An XAV escaped damage because of erratic torpedo performance.

18 B-24s now at MIDWAY have been ordered to attack WAKE on May 15 (9½).

The enemy seems alarmed over our move into ATTU and has ordered units to the northern area. The exact nature of this move is not known.

May 13th. (Oahu Date)

The progress of the assault on ATTU is covered in Comnorpac 140745 (3 part). The news of this was made public by both Tokyo and Berlin.

Activity in the SOLOMONS area was confined to minor night strikes. Our planes made a strike in the HUTIN area, while 4 enemy planes dropped bombs on GUADALCANAL doing minor damage.

During the bombardment of MUNDA, noted yesterday, the NASHVILLE experienced an explosion in No. 3 turret which killed 11 and seriously wounded 11.

There are signs that the enemy is moving air strength to PARAMUSHIRO. No major enemy surface units have been noted moving toward the ALEUTIANS.
May 14th. (Oahu Date)

The progress of the assault on ATTU continues favorable to us. Over 11,000 troops have been landed on the island. Bad weather continues to hamper operations and has prevented effective air-ground coordinated attacks. A survey on the spot indicates the possibility of our constructing two VF strips on ALEXAI POINT within about four weeks.

Com 3rd Fleet 150543 is an operation summary for his area. The Central Pacific was quiet.

It is not believed that the enemy will send a strong surface force to repel our forces at ATTU. They will, however, employ submarines and land based aircraft for attrition.

May 15th. (Oahu Date)

Unsatisfactory progress in the attack on ATTU is described in CTF 51 160602, 160915 and in Comnorpac 160630 and 160930.

The SOLOMONS area was quiet. Comsopac 160420 pink is the plan for offensive operations in the NEW GEORGIA area to start about the middle of next month. Several code names used are not understood here.

The GUDGEON returning from patrol in the PHILIPPINES area reports sinking 27,000 Jap shipping. So far in the war this submarine has sunk about 136,000 tons.

Seven B-24s, of eighteen which started from MIDWAY to bomb WAKE, dropped bombs on the target. Results were not observed. We lost one plane forced down at sea. Of 22 enemy VF intercepting two were reported shot down.

There is some indication that units of the 3rd are en route to the North Pacific.

May 16th. (Oahu Date)

In accordance with Comnorpac 161013 pink General Landrum relieved General Brown this afternoon. One battalion of the 4th Infantry will arrive HOLTZ Bay May 18th to reinforce the Northern group. Admiral Rockwell will cover this landing and will then sail for ADAK in the PENNSYLVANIA. The Northern group has reduced the West arm of HOLTZ Bay and at the end of the day was on the ridge between the East and West branches. The Southern group is about 4400 yards inland from MASSACRE Bay engaged in clearing the pass to HOLTZ Bay. Weather permitted minor local air activity but heavy planes were unable to bomb. Surface forces continue to cover the operation. An enemy sub was seen about 40 miles Northwest of ATTU. In general, the situation is more (Continued)
May 16th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Favorable today than it was yesterday.

The S.S. W.K. VANDERBILT was torpedoed 185 miles southwest of SUVA. Except for one man killed, the crew was rescued.

The SOLOMONS front was quiet except for an air strike on REKATA at 0900 (-11) the 17th.

The crew of the B-24 which was forced down while returning from the strike on WAKE was rescued except for one man killed in a crash landing.

There are good indications that 1 BB, 2 OBB, 1 CV, 2 CA, 5 DD departed TRUK yesterday in a northerly direction. This strengthens our belief that (1) the enemy is on the strategic defensive in the South Pacific, (2) the bulk of the enemy fleet is not pinned to the South Pacific by present or enemy estimate of future operations in that area, (3) the enemy is shifting the bulk of his naval strength to the North of the TRUK - SAIPAN area. While it is possible for the enemy to send considerable strength to the ALEUTIANS, this is not probable. This seems to indicate a redeployment concentrating his heavy ships in a central position prepared for eventualities, either North, Central, or South. This does not rule out raids in force on our MIDWAY - OAHU line, nor sweeps toward the ALEUTIANS.

May 17th. (Oahu Date)

Northern troops held position between east and west arms HOLTZ Bay against strong counter attack. Only slight gains by Southern troops, but expect that Landrum will push the offense in that sector. Incomplete casualties to noon local 16th, 68 killed, 321 wounded, 62 missing. Weather continues to prevent effective air operations. Japs are expected to bring landing barges to ATTU by submarine. Salvage of the U.S.S. PERIDA which is aground in MASSACRE Bay, is underway. Operations are not unfavorable.

Comsopac 180614 is an operation summary for the day in that area. The BB and CV task forces under Admiral Halsey sailed from NOUMEA in the direction of the CORAL SEA. The purpose of these operations is not known.

The Central Pacific was quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.
May 18th (Oahu Date)

The entire HOLTZ Bay area was brought under our control today and contact was established between the northern and southern troops. The enemy is concentrated in the CHICHAGOF area for a last stand, where an attack has been ordered for tomorrow. The landing phase has been completed. Rear Admiral Rockwell will proceed to San Diego in an APA from ADAK in the next day or so. If this fine progress continues we should complete the seizure of ATU this week. Then it will be necessary to establish our defenses there, construct a bomber field in the NEAR Islands, and commence the softening up of KISKA.

During the afternoon a probable contact was made with an enemy sub about 22 miles west of BARBERS Point, Oahu.

On the night of the 18th (-11) six enemy bombers dropped bombs on the RUSSELS and GUADALCANAL. No damage was reported. The 1st phase of augmenting the air laid mines in the BUIN area was completed the 18th (-11) and the final phase is planned for tonight.

Rear Admiral Spruance has been ordered relieved by Rear Admiral McMorris.

The enemy is worried about our move in the ALEUTIANS and expect that we will put pressure on the RUSSIANS to obtain bases in KAMCHATKA and nearby Russian Islands.

May 19th (Oahu Date)

During the day SURANA Valley was brought under our control and the Japs were pinned to the CHICHAGOF Harbor area and approaches thereto. Our troops were taking positions during this evening and night for further advance tomorrow. Improved weather permitted air support of the ground troops. Surface forces continued to cover the operation and DDs were employed to provide bombardment support of troops.

At least eight enemy planes were over GUADALCANAL during most of the night May 19-20 (-11) and dropped bombs on at least three runs. Fourteen men were reported killed and twenty wounded. Two enemy planes were shot down.

An enemy task force was reported off HONSHU by one of our submarines. This may have been one BB, one CV, 2 CA, 5 DDs which left TRUK several days ago.
May 20th (Oahu Date)

The enemy occupies the high ground at the pass entrance to CHICHAGOF. Activity at ATTU during the day was mainly to overcome this point of resistance.

In his 192327, General DeWitt proposes the capture of KISKA during September. CinCPac favors the plan and recommended approval to Cominach in his 210247.

The South Pacific was generally quiet. The BB and CV task forces which have been operating to the northwest of NEW CALEDONIA are returning to NOUMEA.

The press announced that Admiral Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet was killed last month when the plane in which he was riding was shot down. It reported further that his successor is Admiral Mineichi Koga.

May 21st (Oahu Date)

Our troops continued to advance through the CHICHAGOF-MASSACRE-SARANA Pass and on the left advanced 2000 yards along the high ridge. The enemy continues stubborn resistance. Casualties reported to date - including sick - total 1014. Surface forces continue to cover and support the attack.

There was a possible sub contact off the Oregon Coast.

The South Pacific was quiet.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the hospital ship situation in the Pacific. We suspect that the Japs are using hospital ships for military purposes. Day before yesterday a Jap sub sank an Allied hospital ship off BRISBANE.

The TRIGGER reported sighting an enemy CV task force standing toward Tokyo Bay.
May 22nd (Oahu Date)

The situation on ATTU is generally unchanged. The Japs have retired to strong positions with their front line about 3000 yards inland from the head of CHICHAGOF Harbor. At 1600 (10) today the CHARLESTON and PHELPS were attacked off HOLTZ BAY by 12 to 15 enemy land based torpedo planes. No torpedo hits were made and no casualties were reported. One plane was shot down. It is fairly certain that these planes came from PARAMUSHIRO.

Aerial mining in the BUIN area was again undertaken last night.

A despatch was intercepted which indicates that the NIAGRA and 6 PTs are on fire just south of GUADALCANAL. This group was enroute MILNE BAY. No other details are known here.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 23rd. (Oahu Date)

Our troops continued to make slight gains toward CHICHAGOF against stubborn enemy resistance. Considering the difficult terrain and bad weather, progress is good. During the afternoon 16 Jap bombers attacking our troops on ATTU were intercepted by 6 P-38s from AMCHITKA. The enemy lost five planes against our loss of two. There has been an increase in small boat casualties at MASSACRE Bay which is slowing up unloading. To provide for more orderly and better disciplined small boat operation there a naval port director has been appointed.

CominCh 241336 pink directs the planning and training phase for the capture of KISKA.

Admiral Halsey requests a submarine concentration at TRUK from June 11th in his 240526 pink. His 240531 is an operations summary for the day. The sinking of the NIAGARA by our own torpedo seems precipitate. In several instances during the war ships have been abandoned and/or sunk while there was still a reasonable chance for salvage. Details regarding the NIAGARA are insufficient for judgment.

There were no new enemy developments.
May 24th (Oahu Date)

On ATTU General Landrum continues to make preparations for a general assault toward CHICHAGOF planned for tomorrow. Taking advantage of good visibility during the day troops reached jump off positions facing an enemy strong position along the high ground to the southwestward of the head of CHICHAGOF Harbor. The local logistic situation has improved. The extent of air cooperation during the assault will, of course, depend on the weather. MASSACRE BAY is recommended by Army reconnaissance for development as main port of the Island because it seems less exposed to the weather than HOLTZ BAY.

At 0955 (-11) 24th 19 TBF and 4 VF attacked RINGI COVE (just west of VIJA). At 0945 (-11) the 25th 13 bombers covered by 3 VF bombed and strafed REKATA. Com 7th Fleet has asked for 4 Pacific Fleet DDs for his operations commencing June 15.

There is no change noted today in enemy major deployment or plans. It is indicated that the Japs will not undertake fishing off the east coast of KAMCHATKA during the coming season because of the situation at ATTU.

May 25th (Oahu Date)

A coordinated attack along the ridge south of CHICHAGOF was started at 1045 (-10) today. By evening hard fighting continued on the ridge in a snow storm. The south force was able to penetrate the enemy position and considerable enemy casualties were believed inflicted. The CHARLESTON bombarded CHICHAGOF village area. Three air strikes were made on the CHICHAGOF area.

The South Pacific area was quiet. Bad weather in the SOLOMONS hampered air operations. D-Day for the NEW GEORGIA infiltration and for the air field construction on WOODLARK and KIRIWINA was moved forward to June 30th. CinCPac 252319 (pink) gives plans for employment of Pacific Fleet subs during these operations.

There were no new enemy developments.
May 26th (Oahu Date)

On ATTU our forces continue to make gains to capture the heights overlooking CHICHAGOF. Enemy resistance is very stubborn. Our planes were able to provide effective assistance to the troops during the day. There are no indications of any enemy surface units enroute for the relief of ATTU.

Bad weather in the SOLOMONS prevented all air activity except searches. The South Pacific was quiet, as was the Central Pacific.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 27th. (Oahu Date)

Admiral Nimitz left today for San Francisco for a conference with Admiral King. The agenda for the conference is in Cominich 270001.

On ATTU sharp fighting continued along the high ridge overlooking CHICHAGOF. Difficult terrain and stubborn enemy resistance continues to make progress very slow.

In the South Pacific 12 SBD, 12 TBF, 48 VF bombed MUNDA from low altitude. Heavy AA was reported. Cominich has directed that four Pacific Fleet DDs be sent to SWPacForce for the coming offensive.

DeWitt's 281710 is a proposed joint directive for the capture of KISKA.

May 28th (oahu date)

On ATTU our troops continued their attempts to drive the enemy from the heights overlooking CHICHAGOF. No substantial gains were reported.

ComGen WDC 272330 is a directive for the KISKA operation. These two plans are summarized in CinCPac 290115 pink which gives our version of the training directive.

Cominich 271427 pink requests comment on employment of Canadians in the ALEUTIANS.

The Central and South Pacific areas were quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.
May 29th. (Oahu Date)

Good progress is being made on ATTU as shown by General Landrum's 301150 two part. The cumulative casualty total today is: killed 184, wounded 821, missing 78, sick and injured 824. Thus the ineffectives in the two weeks fighting are roughly 14% of the total landed.

The South Pacific was generally quiet. Bad weather continues to hamper effective air operations. Two airfields for VF are scheduled for completion by June 15th. All major SoPac task forces continue to be at normal oases.

CinCPac 292113 pink explains CinCPac 290115 pink to Admiral Nimitz who is in San Francisco for conference.

The enemy is sending considerable air strength to PARMAUSHIRO, but there is no evidence of major surface moves toward that area or toward the ALEUTIANS.

May 30th. (Oahu Date)

Our forces, by the end of the day, had reached the head of CHICHAGOF Harbor and had overcome all enemy resistance except small pockets of troops in the overlooking high ground to the east of the harbor. Thus, the capture of ATTU is practically completed. It is expected that the first VF strip there will be ready for planes about June 10th.

CinCPac 292240 pink is the proposed directive to plan, train for, and capture KISKA.

The Central and South Pacific Areas were quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.

May 31st. (Oahu Date)

The activity on ATTU was confined today to the searching for and mopping up of small groups of the enemy and to consolidating our defense positions. The initial move to SHEMYA has been completed and the bomber strip construction on that island should commence this week. Surface forces continue to cover the ATTU operation. It is estimated that about 1500 Japs have been killed on ATTU during the occupation. Our losses are: Killed 208; wounded 1086; missing 71.

The Central Pacific was quiet. Lieut. General Emmons was relieved today as C. G. Hawaiian Department by Lieut. General Richardson.

(Continued)
During April our planes dropped on AMATEUR 5744 bombs weighing 637.8 tons. JACKBOOT received 60 tons 509 bombs. Destroyed or damaged unknown number enemy planes on KISKA beach by bombing and strafing. Our combat losses: 1 Liberator shot down crew lost, 1 Warhawk returning from attack crashed pilot saved. 36 planes damaged varying degrees. 2 crew members received minor injuries. Comnorpac for sends April monthly summary. AFFECTIONATION.

Bomber strip completed. Army strength 10,300, Navy 820 officers and men. BIRD ODPC radar installations established. OGLIUGA. Army has 70 officers and men based there including radar personnel. Radar working. Some emergency gasoline. 6 .50 caliber machine guns and small arms for local defense. Strip already been found invaluable as emergency landing field. GREAT SITKII ISLAND. Construction of fuel oil storage by Sea Bees has begun. ACCENTUATE. Harbor facilities greatly expanded. Motor torpedo boat base in operation. KULUK BAY anti torpedo net partially completed. Sono Buys laid. Light cruiser group bombarded JACKBOOT twenty-sixth April destroying ammunition dump starting fires. S-32 torpedoed one enemy AK off JACKBOOT April 10th believed sunk. PBY bombed 2 enemy DDs northwest of JACKBOOT April tenth nil hits. Army cable laid between AFFECTIONATION and ACCENTUATE now in use. MIDDLETON refloated CONSTANTINE HARBOR April sixth now at INCUBUS undergoing temporary repairs.

COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Your comment on antisubmarine situation SoPac and SWPAC is desired particularly with respect to desirability of making Cin pac responsible for protection of shipping from United States all the way to AUSTRALIAN ports as a means for making best use of escorts available. Above to apply only to through traffic local convoys to be handled by area command full study is being made of reassignment of escort vessels but there can be little reenforcement of your fleet in the immediate future. Do you need any officers with experience in antisubmarine operations in the Atlantic.
04 0534 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT. Info ALL TFC SOPAC, COM 7TH FLT.

58 US aircraft struck REKATA BAY 0810L (-11) 3rd. Avengers Dauntless and Corsairs bombed strafed while 22 Wildcat Lightning Warhawk fighters covered. Ton and 2 ton bombs blasted bivouac areas buildings AA positions starting large blaze. 1 block buster leveled whole 5 acres trees in bivouac area. Airsight 3rd saw 1 DD 11 AK's in BUIN area. WILLIAM WILLIAMS torpedoed 2nd was still afloat and underway 0100 GCT 3rd. AITUTAKI, COOK ISLANDS had radar contact 2 unidentified ships close to Island 0546 GCT 3rd. Vessels later departed Southwest. Evening 2nd unident lights moving West off North Coast SAN CRISTOBAL. Explosions heard shortly afterwards same area.

05 0556 COM 3RD FLT to COM 1ST FLT.

Before dawn 4th 3 forts ordered KAHILI on harassing mission failed get through visited MUNDA instead. Dropped 24 times 300 then over to REKATA for disposal 14 remaining same size bombs. At 1020 L (-11) same morning twin strikes consisting 6 Avengers 6 Dauntless 8 Corsairs raided VANGAVANGA RINGI COVE simultaneously. 6 half-tonners 24 quarter-ton eggs fell each area and thorough strafings followed. 1 fire at VANGA. Smoke from barge and wharf area RINGI. 16 Wildcats 8 New Zealand Warhawks formed fighter cover for both striking groups. Yesterday's dope sheet referred erroneously to 2-ton bombs in REKATA strike 3rd. 1-ton size was biggest used.

07 0552 COM 3RD FLEET to CINCPAC. Info NZNB, COM 7TH FLT, etc.

77 BLUE planes struck MUNDA 0830 L (-11) 6th blasting AA positions, runway, buildings, dumps with high explosive and fire bombs and thoroughly strafing area. Dauntless Avengers Warhawks under Corsair Wildcat coverage participated. Coastwatcher reported explosions continuing to 1050 L and photo planes passing over at 1100 saw fires still blazing. Noon 6th Reece planes sighted 11 AK's in BUIN anchorage area. Afternoon 6th search plane shot down ORANGE float plane Southwest NEW GEORGIA. Another searcher saw possible sub 20 miles East ONTONG JAVA. Sub reported off DIXON reef MALEKULA at 0900 L today 7th. Following from the Coast Watch GRAPEVINE. 2 cargo ships called at VILA night of 5th returning FAISI early 6th. VANGA strike 4th left only 3 houses standing generally messed up the area. Indications Nips about to occupy TEOP Harbor.
08 0538 COM 3RD FLEET to CINCPAC info ALL TFC's THIRD FLEET, etc.

According KOLOMBANGARA coastwatcher recent BLUE operations in BLACKETT STRAIT paid off today May 8 when 2 damaged Nip vessels scuttled themselves at 0705 (-11). 1 CL or DD was standing by possibly damaged. Air strike despatched from CACTUS to catch this one. 2 Liberators heckled KAHILI FAURO Island and BALLALE night of 6th-7th. More dope from coast watchers. Jap landing on GOWER Island from sub is rumored. C UGELI strength appears reduced. REKATA raid by BLUE planes 3rd cost Nips 13 dead many wounded. Friendly scouts killed 2 more Japs

07 2006 COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMAIRPAC, VOPNAV, CHIEF OF STAFF USA

Review of requirements for overseas transportation of Navy aircraft in Pacific. Cominch 171402 February. Indicates need for total of 2 ACV's now, 3 in July and 5 in September to be assigned paramount duty as aircraft transports and such assignment is authorized. To assist in transport of Army fighter aircraft arrange 1 ACV voyage to South or Southwest Pacific with Army fighters in June, 1 in Sept. and 1 a month thereafter to end of 1943. Provide Vice CNO about 20 days notice of availability dates on West Coast of ACV's to be sailed with Army planes in order necessary arrangements with Army may be made.

09 0603 COM 3RD FLT to CINCPAC info NZNB, COM 7TH FLT ALL TFC'S 3RD FLT

SEB's accompanied by Warhawks scored 1,000 pound bomb hit on Nip DD in GIZO Anchorage forenoon eighth slightly damage 1 of 2 other destroyers seen near GIZO. Results this strike plus reassessment coast watcher reports re mine damage indicates 1 DD badly damaged 1 DD slightly damaged. 3 Avengers 32 Corsairs originally part of Blackett strike did not get through so bombed and strafed MUNDA. Afternoon 8th 108 Blue aircraft off-took from Henderson to finish Blackett remnants. Entire strike turned back by weather. DRUM sinking 3 AK's totaling 17,000 tons.

12 0339 CINCPAC to COMINCH

After conference with Captain Allen recommended no change in present set-up by which CinCPac controls escorts in North and Central and South Pacific through subordinate echelons. Consider present system of assigning escorts for convoys moving through Sopac and Sowespac areas by mutual agreement between Force Commanders those areas depending upon availability of escort vessels when required better than control by CinCPac from distance. Urdis 032037.
12 0105 COMNORPAC to COMINCH CINCPAC CTF 97,96 COMGEN WDC NORPACFOR.

Heavy fog has delayed landings and prevented effective air operations LANDCRAB. Progress to present time. Landings from subs and KANE on beach SCARLET successfully completed. 6 boats have landed beach RED. Present Plan CTF 51 is to force landings beaches RED, YELLOW and BLUE at 1530 W (/10) weather permitting.

12 0614 COMNORPAC to COMINCH CINCPAC NORPACFOR "USUAL ADDEES"

Further information on LANDCRAB. Landings are progressing on beaches RED, YELLOW and BLUE in dense fog. ComTaskForce 51 reported that CHICHAOF had been bombarded radar control and our troops were about 3,000 yards inland from beaches RED and YELLOW. This at 1840 W (/10)

12 0627 COMNORPAC to COMINCH CINCPAC CTF 97,96 NORPACFOR COMGEN WDC.

Comnorpac sends additional information May 11th summary. Weather to westward ACCENTUATE dense surface fog or low ceilings. Wind at JACKBOOT initially northeast veering to northerly 5 knots. Fog continued throughout day in JACKBOOT area. Submarine and KANE (DD235) personnel (400 men) landed beach SCARLET. Estimated 1100 landed beach RED, 2000 beaches YELLOW and BLUE by 20 hours W (/10). Commenced main landing about 1530 W on beaches YELLOW and BLUE. CTF 51 reports 5 planes lost but no pilots. Troop casualties not known believed light thus far. AFFECTATION air bombardment groups unable see HOLTZ CHICHAGOF or other targets but on way home 1 flight mediums dropped 38 300's camp area run at AMATEUR. CHIRKOF GRANT (reenforcement troops) with escorting ships proceeding to area 50 miles northeast Point YELLOW on call from CTF 51 searches averaged 450 miles northwest and southwest 615 miles west 400 miles south ACCENTUATE mostly radar. Unloading continues through night with cruiser groups and battleships in covering positions.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
May (GCT)

14 0745 COMNORPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 96, 97, COMGEN WDC, NORPACFOR

West of ACCENTUATE continued fog rain low ceilings and reduced visibility. Wind JACKBOOT Southeast 15 to 30 knots. Part 1 of 3 part May 13th summary. At 1357 W (pl0) today Comtaskfor 51 reported following. PHELPS, IDAHO neutralized enemy batteries HOLTZ BAY which were preventing our artillery from firing. BLUE artillery from beach RED now moving up. Strong winds poor visibility slowing operations and prohibiting air support. General Brown reports "Our plan of attack indefinite awaiting visibility". Intend unload CHIRIKOF beach RED. Little change troop positions since last report. New subject. Morning searches averaged 475 Northwest and West 400 Southwest ACCENTUATE. Mostly radar. Northernmost sector (55-56 North) not yet reported. BELL and CHIRIKOF will continue unloading at Beach RED during night. SICARD and MACDONOUGH (damaged in collision) arrived ACCENTUATE. 4 heavies diverted from ATTU to KISKA by weather dropped 160 demo centuries main camp KISKA. Overcast prevented observation of results. 8 Warhawks dropped 7 quarter tonners from 3000 feet through hole in overcase on LITTLE KISKA. 3 bombs seen to explode in installation area. 2 AFFECTATION motor torpedo boats made sweep off South coast AMATEUR night of May 12th. Negat contacts. For further info see CTF 51 dispatch 140729. Total land bases air attacks in support of our troops on ATTU involved 12 mediums 10 heavies 24 lightnings. Times from local noon to 1615 W (plus 10). Altitudes 70 feet to 7,500. Attacked designated targets HOLT and CHICAGO. Total dropped by land based air 26.2 tons consisting centuries 300's quarter tonners and frag clusters. Many fires started. 4 enemy barges burned. Silenced ack ack periodically. Number attacks by Wildcats during day unknown but believed numerous. Comtaskforce 51 reported following 0901 W (plus 10) today 13th. Enemy submarine reported by Catalina to have fired torpedo at PENNSYLVANIA afternoon 12th. Depth charged 6 hours by FARRAGUT and EDWARDS. Surfaced about midnight. Fired on by EDWARDS. Believed sunk. PERIDA hit rock MASSACRE now beached at Yellow and is now about 5 percent unloaded. APA's average 30 percent unloaded. Troop advance slow due fog and enemy resistance. Early visibility prevented air or naval gunfire support. Naval gunfire support has now commenced.
15 0543 COMTHIRDFLT to CINCPAC, ALL TFC'S, SOCAC etc.

Quartet of bombing TBF'S raided TOIOLKI shipping 2nd successive night 14th again scoring 2 hits on AK with aid of light from flare planes. Supporting Liberators harassed KAHILI airdrome were met by inept Jap night fighters. Other Liberators heckled BALLALE MUNDA. Photos AM 14th showed KAHILI Field to have only sizable concentration of warplanes in entire SOLOMONS Area. 29 VF/5 VB and 2 dive bombers.

16 0602 CTF 51 to CTF 16 info CINCPAC.

Part 1 of 2. Completed conference. Brown states as follows: All present forces committed. Does not have sufficient strength to take ATTU. Doubts if Culin can capture HOLTZ with present forces and believes his position insecure without reinforcements which Brown can not supply from local forces. Requests early conference if possible with you and DeWitt. Believes enemy strength greater than original estimate and possibly thirteen infantry companies plus special troops total number unknown. Enemy casualties unknown. Attributes difficulty to terrain and numerous concealed enemy machine gun positions. Requests immediate reinforcement by forty infantry plus artillery available and remainder thirty-second infantry. In view of emergency expressed by Brown have ordered BELL to remain unloading off RED Beach. Hope to complete tomorrow when she will be directed to recover boats proceed ADAK purpose load such troops as you may direct. CHIRIKOF requires probably 5 day unload and have directed her MASSACRE to complete.

16 0915 Part 2 and last of my 160602. Supplies can then be ferried RED Beach by cane or small boats. Suggest LCT's and barges be sent JACKBOOT assist unloading. HARRIS (APA 2) ZEILIN (APA 3) completed unloading now fueling DD's and will join BELL return ADAK. HEYWOOD remain MASSACRE for emergency evacuation Red Beach. Request your approval my proposed ship movements am submitting suggested distribution naval forces this area by later despatch. Para. Situation today. Brown reports latest complete casualty list is as of 1700 May 13th: 4 officers, 40 men killed. 3 officers, 168 men wounded, 74 missing. Weather poor. No carrier operations. Army heavies in area 4 hours could not drop At 1845 Lightnings attacking in HOLTZ BAY. Kingfishers and Catalinas on intensive anti-sub patrol. Kingfishers ferried bombs to Japs near target 33 ACJOUR northern troops at north side south PFREAG west and at 1830. Slight rains in south but situation generally unchanged. Supplies dropped for scouts.
16 0630 COMNORPAC to COMINCH CINCPAC NORPACFOR CTF 96, 97, COMGEN WDC.

Following information from CTF 51 as of 1020 W (/10) today. Part 1 May 15th summary. Previous report our Northern troops along ridge HOLTZ BAY in error. 2 battalion combat teams of Northern troops are about 600 yards northwest of beach in west arm HOLTZ with provisional battalion 1000 yards farther west. Net advance in this area afternoon 14th 500 yards. Yesterdays bombardment carefully controlled by shore spotters. No progress is reported from Southern area where situation remains unchanged. APA percentage unloading: HEYWOOD 100, ZEILIN 90, BELL 70, HARRIS 70. Expect complete unloading APAs late today or by tomorrow morning. PERIDA 30 percent unloaded, CHIRIKOF 10, GRANT 50. Expect unload GRANT, PERIDA by 17th. CHIRIKOF 20th or later. PERIDA expect completion tomorrow. Total Army wounded embarked from southern area 119. 2 torpedoes fired at BELL off RED Beach. Both missed and hunt is on for sub. Weather still bad this morning. Slight improvement this afternoon and air ground support missions from AMCHITKA are off.

16 0930 COMNORPAC to CTF 51, Intercept.

Your 152310. Due to unsatisfactory progress of LANDCRAB landing phase will not be considered completed upon withdrawal of APA's, but will be held in abeyance while situation is being clarified. Air plan being set up for tomorrow same as last 2 days. Ship movements proposed in your 160615 are approved.

18 0614 CINC 3RD FLT to CINCPAC info NY/NB, ALL TFC'S, SOPAC, etc.

Orange sub sank tanker STOREY posit 17-30 South 173-02 East at 1540 GCT 17th. Rescue planes in contact with nearly 60 survivors in boats near scene. Para. Blue dive bombers attacked REKATA Bay 0850 L (-11) 17th. Search plane reported 30 planes on MUNDA Field morning 17th but fighter sweep and photo recce disclosed no serviceable aircraft there. 8 freighters 3 escort vessels BUIN FAISI same morning. GRAYBACK reports 2 hits in big DD plus 2 hits in 2 medium Marus. Coastwatch boys say small craft traffic continues in and around HUKA passage area.
1st of 2 parts Comnorpac 192345 being passed for General DeWitt. Reduction and occupation AMATEUR subject. Amphibious training force number 9 consisting of 2 Rgts, 1 Regt AA artillery, 1 Regt Combat Engrs with attached troops, total 16,000 men, Gen Corlett commanding, assembled since May 1 at Camp Ord and under training ComAmForPac since that date for AMATEUR operation pd This operation not yet approved as such by Joint Chiefs of Staff. To enable this force to be fully equipped with resulting maximum effectiveness of training without further delay suggest we join in dispatch to Joint Chief of Staff recommending approval this operation. Message to be sent by you stating my concurrence.

2nd and last part Comnorpac 192345. Appreciate this may be considered premature with LANDCRAB still active and with occupation VOLUBLE and construction airfield thereon for use in June dependent on early conclusion LANDCRAB but as result of action 18th and today am confident operation will now be ended promptly and successfully. Consider it imperative advantage be taken of time now available to perfect organization and training this force so as to be prepared to launch AMATEUR attack during next most favorable period weather conditions Aleutian area. As basis for planning suggest consideration be given use AFFECTATION, ACCENTUATE and INCUBUS for staging ground force using APA'S, LST'S, LCT'S and LCI'S. Operation to be set for first week in September with training during month of August in a GOOSEWING area selected by CG ADC and Comnorpac. Experience LANDCRAB operation dictates prudence above action. CG ADC and Comnorpac and Comamphib-corpsecpac concur.

I favor CGWDC 192327 which is being passed to you. My 090342 January initiated training and planning phase which is now well advanced but must be modified as result of changed situation and experience following LANDCRAB. On assumption that sufficient covering force and shipping will remain available to me after withdrawals for operations now planned in other areas I recommend approval.
24 0531 COM 3RD FLEET to CINCOWESPAC, RDO AUCKLAND, CINCPAC, etc.

During night 23rd-24th BLUE aircraft extensively bombed ORANGE posits in SOLOMONS. Between 2350 and 0054 (-11) Army Liberators plus 14 Fortresses hammered KAHILI and BUIN TONOLEI shore line area with 250 times 300 pounders. Avengers failed contact 2 unident ships off MOILA POINT 1 plane this type bombed ERVENTA Island. All this in support and as diversion to successful mining operations. In addition 5 more liberators struck KAHILI BALLALE with half ton bombs scoring direct hits each strip also located 3 freighters BALLALE bombed 1 vessel results unknown. Time 2302-0100 (-11). 10 Forts out later carrying 1 ton bombs dispersed by weather raided KAHILI east point SHORTLAND, BALLALE MUNDA, REKATA. Para. PT tender NIAGARA hit by Nip torpedo due east SAN CRISTOBAL about 1430 (-11) 23rd. Subsequently abandoned survivors reached CACTUS in PT's. Tanker STANVAC MANILA torpedoed 1635 GCT 23rd south of AMADEE Light. GUADAL had 3 plane raid night of 23rd nil damage 1 slight casualty. ESPIRITU SANTO had single plane raid just after midnight same night bombs fell harmlessly in SEGOND CHANNEL.
Communication of yours MSG 281710 May 25 is referred to.
This is part 1, suggested Joint Directive:

PARA 1. Objective. Reduction and occupation of KISKA and
LITTLE KISKA at earliest practicable date.

PARA 2. Purpose. To destroy last remaining hostile forces
in the ALEUTIANS, to make impossible future enemy occupa-
tion of ALEUTIAN territory, to create base for future opera-
tions against Japan and against hostile shipping in North
Pacific.

This is Part 2 of our MSG 281710.

TASK A. To reduce and occupy KISKA and LITTLE KISKA.

TASK B. To improve present enemy airfield thereon or con-
struct suitable airfield on KISKA or LITTLE KISKA.

ComGen Amphibian training force 9.

PARA 4. Forces assigned Navy, Task Force 16 and such ad-
ditional forces as may be assigned thereto. Army Forces,
Assault and Reserve Troops as follows: THIS PART 3 OF
OUR MSG 281710: Assault Forces, present amphibian training
force 9 augmented by one additional infantry regimental
combat team with attached troops as designated by ComGen
WDC. Reserve forces to be Inf Regimental combat team now
in Alaska plus Canadian troops approximating one American
Inf Regimental combat team with attached troops. This part
4 of our MSG 281710. Permanent garrison for KISKA to be
as designated by ComGen WDC.

PARA 5. Target date, on or about September first.

PARA 6. Command of occupied area will revert to Army when
senior Army officer KISKA informs Comtaskforce 16 that Army
is ready to assume command. This ends dispatch.
LANDRUM to COMNORPAC.

CASCO relays. Part 1 of 2 parts. The enemy attack up Chicagof Valley at dawn this morning was made by a force estimated to be approximately 250 men. It was checked as previously reported. This force overran the 3d battalion 17th Infantry and made a vicious attack on the battalion and regimental command post. The losses of command post and medical personnel are not definitely known but are probably heavy, losses in combat units not believed great. Reorganization of this battalion completed. After passing through the command post area the enemy advanced toward the Sarana-Massacre Pass cutting all communication wires. In route they were hit by units of the force reserve and more than hundred enemy killed in a brief fire action. The remainder scattered as individual snipers or holed up in small groups. The day was occupied in cleaning up these pockets, in 1 of which 2 officers and 59 enemy were killed. At this hour the upper floor of the valley and approaches to the Pass have been cleared except for an occasional sniper remaining pocket, well up a draw on Cold Mountain, reported to be approximately 50 strong is isolated and is being worked on by 2 small companies Part 2 follows.

30 1155 This is Part 2 of 2. All details as to numbers are still subject to verification but this has been the biggest single killing day we have had. At this hour conservative estimates of enemy killed today is approximately 6 officers and 200 men. Certain unusual features of this attack are: enemy carried rifles, no machine guns or light mortars (verified) some were reported to be only with bayonets tied to sticks. Not verified. Some reported to be under influence of liquor or drug. Not verified. Many rushed to food dumps and ate ravenously. Partially verified. My wire communication is now being restored. I plan to attack at earliest opportunity permitted by necessity for regrouping of troops used by me for todays mop up. In order to further the security of long difficult supply lines from beach to forward area I am temporarily employing every individual that can be taken from service troops, engineers and AA artillery men.
29 1558 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

ULTRA HIGH COM. I am concerned as to enemy's probable reactions to our heavy deployment of forces in the Western ALEUTIANS. He already has information of the presence of our light cruiser group, he will probably soon have information through planes or submarines of the heavy cruiser group, and possibly information before long of our battleship group. His interpretation of the significance of such heavy assembly of forces may well prompt powerful reactions. Para 2. I suggest for your consideration delay in departure of NORTH CAROLINA and VICTORIOUS until arrival of WASHINGTON and ENTERPRISE so that a task group of this strength is continuously available for deployment by you as needed in the Central or North Pacific.

29 1747 COMINCH to CINCPAC, CINCLANT.

Hicom. Prospective employment 2 battleships on special duty Atlantic will delay intended transfer SOUTH DAKOTA to Pacific. Present intention send that vessel or IOWA to Pacific early July. In view new situation Atlantic Cinclant hereby authorized retain 2 prospective PacFlt destroyers to maintain Task Force 22 screen at total of 5. This is in addition to previous arrangements as to retention of PacFlt destroyers.

06 0903 COMNORPAC to CINCPAC.

Most Secret. In view apparent increased enemy activities Northern KURILES and to provide for strong striking force being continuously on station to westward during post LANDCRAB period request NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI with at least 4 destroyers be sent this area to arrive as soon as practicable.

08 0430 COMSOPAC to CINCSOWESPAC info COMINCH CINCPAC COMSOWESPAC

Handle as most secret. This is schedule for movement of SOPAC units less MTBS and Defense Bn to Sowespac for WOODLARK operation. Your 070158. Para 1 PRESIDENTS JACKSON, ADAMS, HAYES with troops and equipment of 134th Field Artillery Bn, Company C 404th Engineer Bn, miscellaneous Army Service Units, 112th Cavalry less 1 troop and less animals, and ground personnel 1 Army pursuit squadron, escorted by 3 destroyers depart NOUMEA about May 15 arrive TOWNSVILLE about May 19. Estimate will require 3 days to discharge troops and cargo. Request you then route these vessels to NOUMEA Para 2 CARINA with additional Army cargo escorted by 1 Destroyer departs NOUMEA May 21 arrives TOWNSVILLE about May 28. Estimate will require 7 days to unload. Request you provide relief for CARINA escort.
AG CAPRICORN CHANNEL and route CARINA to NOUME'A after unloaded
Para 3. Cantransdiv 16 in GILMER is enroute TOWNSVILLE. BROOKS
is enroute SYDNEY. These vessels are assigned operational
control Comsowespac on arrival. BROOKS has 2 weeks availability
for retubing condenser at SYDNEY already arranged. Para 4.
6 LST's with naval base personnel and equipment escorted by
HUMPHREYS and SANDS with 1 troop 112th Cavalry departs NOUME'A
about May 14 arrives TOWNSVILLE about May 20. On arrival
Sowespac 6 LST's HUMPHREYS and SANDS pass to operational con-
trol Comsowespac. Para 5. Administration of 4 APD's and 6
LST's remains under Comsopac. Para 6. If satisfactory to you
plan to route all vessels for TOWNSVILLE via CAPRICORN CHANNEL.
Assume you can provide barrier pilots. Para 7. In near future
plan to send staff representatives of Army and Navy units by
air to TOWNSVILLE to make bivouac and unloading arrangements
Para 8. PRESIDENTS from anchorage within 1000 yards of beach
at GUADALCANAL have unloaded similar cargo in six hours using
own boats and embarked troops as stevedores. These ships
draw 26 feet and consequently must anchor about 8 miles off
TOWNSVILLE which will greatly increase landing time. Same
applies to CARINA which draws at least 25 feet. If unloading
time is governing factor recommend reconsideration PORT MORES-
BY as destination for the foregoing SOPAC vessels if beaches
suitable for landing craft are available. Advise.
This is MOST SECRET Part 1 of 081355. In answer to War Department despatch request for information MacArthur on May 5 advises as follows. General plan of campaign to accomplish Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of March 29th is briefly as follows:

**Operation 1.**
The Western axis occupation of WOODLARK and KIRIWINA Islands.

**Operation A.**
Eastern axis infiltration into NEW GEORGIA or SANTA ISABEL Island without commitment of major forces.

**Operation 2.**
Western axis capture of LAE SALAMAUA FINCHHAVEN MADANG area.

**Operation B.**
Eastern axis capture BUIN-FAISI area.

**Operation 3.**
Western axis occupation western NEW BRITAIN.

**Operation C.**
Eastern axis occupation KIETA and neutralization BUKA.

Sequence and timing subject to fluctuations of tactical circumstances.

**Assume:** Operation A will proceed during operations 1 and 2.
Operation B will follow occupation and consolidation LAE.

Three task forces are planned:

1. Through SOLOMONS composed of South Pacific Forces.
2. To occupy KIRIWINA and WOODLARK and Western NEW BRITAIN composed of Southwest and South Pacific Forces.
3. In NEW GUINEA composed of Southwest Pacific Forces.

(Continued) 1555
The general details of employment of forces in operations along eastern axis and in Operations 2 and 3 western axis are essentially the same as plans which were presented by staff representatives at WASHINGTON. For the occupation of KIRIWINA and WOODLARK Islands a concurrent infiltration to both is planned covered by Southwest Pacific air forces from GOODENOUGH Island and South and Southwest Pacific air forces from MILNE Bay. Arrangements have been perfected with Comsopac to furnish an occupying garrison for WOODLARK Island composed of approximately 8000 men exclusive of air units. The South Pacific also furnishes floating equipment to facilitate the operations. A Southwest Pacific garrison of similar strength is to supply occupying force for KIRIWINA Island. The occupation of both islands is under a Southwest Pacific task force commander for coordination and control. Southwest Pacific air and naval forces support the operation. Detailed planning is now in progress and June 15th is target date for the occupation although some advance parties may be placed thereon at an earlier date. Unquote.

Para 2. Captain Browning brings tentative plan for infiltration occupation of NEW GEORGIA which indicates infiltration of Eastern NEW GEORGIA in the middle of May. Browning further states that such an operation if desired by Halsey meets with MacArthur's approval.

Para 3. Prompt initiation of operations indicated in Para 2 above will be strongly recommended by Cominch to Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para 4. Cincpac and Comsopac expedite comment.
09 0501 COMSOPAC to COMINCH info CINCPAC.

Handle as most secret. In general agreement parts 1 2 3 of Cominch 081329. Tentative plan NEW GEORGIA envisages practically simultaneous seizure WICKHAM as staging point, VITRU HARBOR as staging point and if reconnaissance establishes feasibility an advance air base, RENDOVA ISLAND as an advance PT base and as base of departure for attack on MUNDA, Tentative date about 15 June, form plan and date to be submitted on return my representatives from BRISBANE about 15 May.

11 1819 COMINCH to CINCPAC info COMSOPAC.

Ultra for addressees only. It is my view that existing task organization comprise too many quote task forces unquote which are in reality quote task groups unquote and which are brought together at intervals to operate as quote task forces unquote. This process has had the result that we find ourselves making use of task force commanders with staffs inadequate as to size and as to experience in handling coordinated operations, so that the task force commander is unable to exercise the full scope of command and must therefore be told, not only what to do, but must be given too much detail as to how to do it. Para 2. The system of numbered fleets was partly adopted in order to make use of task echelons higher than quote task forces unquote which fact now requires full consideration of the creation training and use of quote task forces unquote as major not minor echelons of fleets with the consequent careful selection of task force commanders and organization of adequate task force staffs. Give this matter early and full attention.

16 0420 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, CINCSOWESPAC.

Handle as most secret. My 090501 not to all Addes. Based on staff conference with representatives of Southwest Pacific and on ground reconnaissance APERIERT, TOEMAILS plan envisages practically simultaneous seizure: ARMCHAIR as staging point, BLACKBOY and construction fighter strip thereon (30 day estimate), CATSMEAT as staging point, DOWSER as an advance PT base and base of departure for later attack on JACO~mT. Date to be coincident with South- west Pacific seizure of LEATHERBACK BYPRODUCT earliest June 15. Plan places small forces ARMCHAIR CATSMEAT BLACKBOY employing light craft. Initial movement DOWSER 1 infantry regiment reinforced employing 6 APD's, 4 APA's, 2 AKA's all lightly loaded to arrive debark and depart under cover of darkness same night. 155 guns DOWSER area neutralize JACO~mT. DOWSER force to be built by infiltration to 43rd Division less 1 regimental combat team Marine defense battalion Marine raider regiment less 2 battalions, Naval and miscellaneous units.
This is HICOM. CTF 51 152301 and 152310. My 160400. CTF 51 160602 and 160615. References which have been double headed to Cominch and Cincpac present the unsatisfactory tactical situation on JACKBOOT. Item. Regret the necessity but feel compelled to have Commander Landing Force superseded. Accordingly General Landrum will proceed by plane to JACKBOOT May 16 to relieve General Brown.

Deliver this immediately to Admiral Rockwell personally. The despatch is for Admiral Rockwell's eyes only. All others stop here. Your 152301, 152310 and message received by BUCKNER from Brown requesting large shipment heavy engineer road building equipment indicate that Brown has stopped fighting and intends to consolidate his present position in MASSACRE Bay for an indefinite period. Evidently he does not intend to move his front line or to use his vastly superior numbers vigorously and aggressively until provided with a road net. This procedure jeopardize the entire LANDCRAB operations. Brown's mission is based on necessity for speedy capture of HOLTZ Bay so as to secure base for prompt movement to VOLUBLE and construction of airfield thereon. Tactical employment of troops is Brown's responsibility. If reinforcement by water from MASSACRE to RED BEACH is desirable it should be decided upon at once while landing force facilities are fully available. The view that the reduction of ATTU will be slow is not acceptable. If in your opinion Brown lacks stamina and aggressive spirit necessary for driving attack home at once I intend that he be relieved from command and be replaced by Landrum who has been made available. DeWitt and Buckner concur. Desire your recommendation immediately. Branch and Hoe will be sent when escorts available.

Conference with Brown discloses his belief that present land forces are inadequate to prosecute a vigorous offensive. His reasons given in my references. Was not aware request was being made for road building equipment. Brown's decision as to reinforcements by water from MASSACRE to beach RED was that troops could not be spared. Para. While lack of personal observation of the immediate tactical situation ashore prevents me from forming a positive opinion my feeling is that the offensive potentialities of our land forces are not being fully exploited. Col Weckerling and copy of Brown's estimate left by PBY today and I recommend (Continued)
16 1016 CTF 51 to CTF 16. (Continued)
your decision be withheld until Brown's difficulties are fully understood. Para. New subject. I consider the landing phase of LANDCRAB amphibious operation now completed and unless otherwise directed intend to withdraw May 16th with 3 APA's leaving HEYWOOD as requested by CTF landing force.

22 0211 Com 7th Flt to CominCh, Info Comsubs 7th Flt, Cincpac, etc.

This is Utmost Secret. Operating under Comtaskfor 71 GRENADEUR overdue and must be presumed lost. Departed Fremantle 20 March arrived LEMVOALAN 1 April. Area assigned by arrangement with Cinc EF North of 7 North and East of line NICOBOR-ANDAMANS-CAPE NEGRIAS. 15 April in 13-13 North 96-55 East GRENADEUR reported damaging small ship 3 miles West of PILGRIM Island at 2200 H (-8) 6 April, no other contacts to 20 fathoms Southeast RANGOON and West to Long. 96. Sub directed depart area dark 23 April proceed THWARTWAY Island for 1 week patrol vicinity SUNDA STRAIT and depart 4 May for Fremantle reconnoitering CHRISTMAS Island 1 day enroute. Ship directed acknowledge when feasible. ETA EXMOUTH GULF 10-14 May or Fremantle 13-17 May. GRENADEUR not heard from since 15 April.

24 1336 CominCh to CinCPac Info ComNorPac ComGenWDC CTF 51 etc.

HiCom. Very secret. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct you prepare plan and train according your 210247 except consider target date should be earlier accepting problem low visibility condition. Decision relative to execution will be made upon receipt your detailed plan.

25 0526 ComSoPac to CinCPac Info ComSoWesPac ComSubsPac CTF 72.

This is most secret. Commencing D minus 4 day my dis 160420 request concentration 5 submarines covering all exits TRUK. In event major enemy force heading south desire deployment along TRUK-BUKA line. In latter case request temporary transfer operational control SoPac
25 0451 CINCPAC to COMMORPAC.

Due JACK BOOT occupation Jap fishing operations on KAMCHATKA called off. SHOBU MARU and IBURI MARU my 230507 not going KAMCHATKA will unload laborers and material Northern KURILES. SHINTO MARU which departed HAKO date 17 May after unloading men and material in North KURILES will proceed directly to PETROPAVLOVSK under naval escort.
25 2319  COMSOPAC to COMSUBPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

HICOM. Have given careful consideration plan proposed your 240526. Para. Our best educated guess and gazing into crystal ball leads to firm belief that bulk of enemy surface forces has its center of deployment in Empire Waters. Further believe that move you are about to make will draw on you enemy shore based aircraft and troops but will not in initial phases result in strong movement of enemy surface forces to your BAILIWICK. Para. Consider lack of targets, heavy A/S patrol and unfavorable operating conditions make this area unprofitable hunting ground compared with others. Para. Will cover this area and others through which enemy may pass with sufficient submarine strength to give you probable timely warning of enemy forces and to subject enemy forces to submarine attack.

27. 0001  COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Handle as most secret. High Com from Cominch listing agenda items for forthcoming reference.

3. Flag commands for task forces to be organized.
4. Carrier night training.
5. Future base requirements in the Pacific.
6. Coordination of BURMA and Pacific Campaigns.
7. General plans for the defeat of Japan.
8. Organization for the coordination of anti-submarine measures routing of convoys San Francisco to Australia.
10. Analyses of actions.
11. Rotation of personnel.
12. SOLOMON ISLANDS NEW GUINEA Campaign.
13. Command responsibility for development of Alaskan and Aleutian bases.
14. Screening of requirements for PacFleet Aviation activities.
COMINCH to COMPACFLT info COMNORPAC

This is bigot hicom. Subject to final Canadian agreement Army approves sending 1 Canadian battalion infantry and 1 AA battery of 40 mm guns to AFFECTATION about 15 June as garrison troops. These troops to be included within present troop ceiling established for the area as are the Canadian troops now on VINETTE ISLAND. Canadians have further offered to make available to equivalent of a regimental combat team for future amphibious operation troops to be moved to GOOSEWING for training both our troops about 1 month prior to operation. These troops to be a temporary task force in excess to troop ceiling unless later used to replace garrison troops. All supply and equipment except armament and ammunition will be by U.S. Comment on inclusion of Canadians as assault of floating reserve.

CINC PAC to COM 12

Com 12 for Admiral Nimitz. HiCom from CinCPac Admin. Reference DeWitt's 281710 which is being passed to Com 12. Following is CinCPac version of Joint Directive to be issued action CTF 16 CTF 51 info CominCh ComGen WDC ComWesSeaFron ComNorwesSeaFron, if you and DeWitt concur. This is Joint Directive issued by CinCPac and ComGen WDC effective on receipt and supercedes my 090342 of January. Para. Objective. Reduction and occupation KISKA and LITTLE KISKA. Purpose. To destroy last remaining hostile forces in ALEUTIANS, to deny KISKA and LITTLE KISKA to enemy, to create base for future operations against enemy in North Pacific. Para. Task in collaboration with ComGen WDC plan and train for reduction and occupation of KISKA and LITTLE KISKA. Para. Command/ Supreme command CTF 16. Amphibious operations CTF 51. Army commander ComGen Amphibian Training Force 9. Para. Forces. Navy task forces 16 and 51. Army Assault and reserve troops as follows: Assault forces present Amphibian Training Force 9, augmented by 1 additional infantry regimental combat team with attached troops as designated by ComGen WDC. Reserve forces to be infantry regimental combat team now in ALASKA plus Canadian troops approximating one American infantry regimental combat team with attached troops. Permanent garrison for KISKA to be as designated by ComGen WDC. Para. Target date earliest practicable but not later that September 1, 1943. Para. CTF 51 submit plan to CinCPac ComGen WDC, CTF 16 at earliest practicable date. Command of occupied area will revert to Army when senior Army officer KISKA informs CTF 16 that Army is ready to assume command.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
May (GCT)

27 2330 COMGEN WDC to CINCPAC info CTF 16, COMGEN ADC.

Classification of this MSG Secret Security C09063 communication of yours number 242145 May 25 referred to. **Part 1.** This first part is suggested plan, 2nd part following is suggested joint directive, both for submission to Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

**Para 1.** Train force for assault and occupation of KISKA.

**Para 2.** Forces Army, Amphibian Training Force 9 now at Fort Ord plus 1 infantry regimental combat team proportionately augmented by necessary engineers, signal, medical and quartermaster troops as may be necessary to provide adequate shore part personnel and service elements, these additional forces are to be obtained by ComGen WDC and transferred to Fort Ord. In addition the above troops to be augmented by 1 infantry regimental combat team now in ALASKA with their attached troops. Canadian forces approximating 1 American infantry regimental combat team will probably also be made available for this operation. Navy forces, those made available to CTF 16.

**Para 3.** Units within territorial limits United States other than those in ALASKA to complete training at Fort Ord and to be moved to ALASKA for approximately 30 days additional training. ALASKA unit to be trained by CTF 16 and ComGen ADC as directed by CinCPac and ComGen WDC. Canadian forces upon arrival in ALASKA to be trained also under CTF 16 and ComGen ADC.

**Para 4.** Command, CTF 16, ComGen WDC and ComGen ADC to coordinate directly in carrying out all phases of training. Joint Staff for training, planning and operation to be formed from those officers available to CTF 16 and ComGen Amphibian Training Force 9. This ends **Part 1, Part 2 follows**

29 2113 CINCPAC to COM 12.

Hicom for Admiral Nimitz only. CinCPac 290115 considered all that is necessary to cover training and planning phase. Believe plan developed by CTF 51 should be approved CinCPac CGWDC CTF 16 prior submission Joint Chiefs of Staff instead submitting DeWitts 272330 and 281710. CinCPac redeployment proposal and Halseys needs for APAs and AKAs in August and September affect composition of TF 16 and 51 for actual operation but means believed now available to CTF 51 for training. Note that DeWitt does not mention CTF 51 in either plan. Consider it essential that plans training and amphibious phase of assault be under CTF 51.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
May (GCT)
CINCPAC COMGEN WDC to COMINCH, WAR DEPT, Info, CTF 16,
BUCKNER, COMGEN AMPHTRAFOR 9, CINCPAC ADMIN, CTF 51.

Part 1 MyDis 292248. There are 3 parts. Desire to issue
following Joint Directive and request immediate approval
thereof by Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral King concurs.
Directive follows:

OBJECTIVE - Reduction and occupation KISKA and LITTLE KISKA.

PURPOSE - To destroy last remaining hostile forces in
ALEUTIANS, to deny KISKA and LITTLE KISKA to
enemy, to create base for future operations
against enemy in North Pacific.

TASK A - To make plans and train force for reduction and
occupation of KISKA and LITTLE KISKA.

TASK B - To reduce and occupy KISKA and LITTLE KISKA at
the earliest practicable date.

TASK C - To improve present enemy airfield thereon or
construct suitable airfield on KISKA or LITTLE
KISKA.

COMMAND - Supreme command CTF 16. For this operation CTF 51
report immediately to CTF 16 and to thereafter
function as a Task Group Commander under CTF 16.
Army Commander ComGen Amphibian Training Force 9.

FORCES - Navy Task Forces 16 and 51 latter to function as
group under Task Force 16. These forces to be
supplemented with such additional forces as may be
assigned. In addition to air forces Task Force
16, 2 squadrons of dive bombers to be furnished to
provide support during these operations. Army
assault and reserve troops as follows: Assault
forces present Amphibian Training Force 9 augmented
by one additional infantry regimental combat team
with attached troops as designated by ComGen WDC.
Reserve forces to be infantry regimental combat
team now in ALASKA plus Canadian troops approx-
imating 1 American infantry regimental combat team
with attached troops.

Permanent garrison for KISKA to be designated by ComGen WDC.
Target date, August 15th 1943. CTF 16 to submit overall
plan to CinCPac and ComGen WDC at earliest practicable
date. Command of occupied area will revert to Army when
Senior Army Officer KISKA informs CTF 16 that Army is ready
to assume command. Preliminary estimate of assault require-
ments 5 APA's, 5 AK's plus 12 LST's plus 10 LCI's plus
36 LCT's.
May 31st. (Continued)

The South Pacific was generally quiet. At dusk the 31st (-11) three B-24's bombed an enemy position on NE BOUGAINVILLE to encourage the natives and on request of a coast watcher.

The following are indicated at PARAMUSHIRO: 4 CA, 3 CL, 8-12 DD. This is believed only a defensive concentration.

June 1st. (Oahu Date)

Our troops on ATTU continued to mop up the remaining small groups of the enemy. Total known enemy dead is reported as 1791, which is almost double the number estimated by ICPOA.

The Central and South Pacific Areas were quiet.

The War Department has approved CinCPac 292248 (previously noted) except that decision regarding Tasks B and C will be rendered later. CG WDC is proceeding with the organization and equipment of troops involved.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 2nd. (Oahu Date)

ATTU was quiet today. Our troops continue to find and eliminate small groups of the enemy.

CinCPac 022248 pink orders the commencement of the training phase for the capture of KISKA.

The South and Central Pacific Areas were quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 3rd (Oahu Date)

On ATTU the job of disposing of small enemy groups continued. Norpac surface forces continue to cover ATTU, but there seems little probability that the enemy will send surface forces to that area in the near future.

The Central and South Pacific Areas were quiet. Enemy subs continue to operate along lines of communications between NOUMEA and the FIJl-SAMOA-TONGA area.

There were no new enemy developments.
June 4th. (Oahu Date)

The North Pacific was quiet except for radar guided air strikes on KISKA. Results were not determined. Nine Japs were killed on ATTU.

There was a possible submarine reported off MIDWAY.

At 1155 (-11) June 5th 18 SBD, 12 TBF, 53 VF attacked in the BUIN area. It was reported that 8 zeros and 6 float zeros were shot down. One DD was hit several times and reported sunk. A corvette and small AK were left burning. We lost 2 SBD, 1 TBF, 1 VF.

ComNorPac 042200 pink gives a training plan for the KISKA operation.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 5th. (Oahu Date)

On ATTU activity was confined to defense, airfield, and harbor development. The move to SHEMYA continues. On that island two air strips are planned. One strip is to be generally east and west near the South shore and about 10,000 feet long. The North and South cross strip will be on the Western side of the island and a length of 5,500 feet seems possible. Fighters will be able to operate from SHEMYA around June 21, and by July 15th 5,000 feet length is expected. Accumulated casualties reported today total 412 killed and 1141 wounded.

At 1050 (-11) the 6th, 9 SBD, 12 TBF, escorted by 32 VF attacked MUNDA. At 1545 (-11) the 6th, 18 VF strafed KAKASA Village, CHOISEUL, where a coast watcher reported that the Japs had considerable supplies.

Batdiv 3 (KONGO and HARUNA) are believed en route TRUK.

June 6th. (Oahu Date)

Only a very small number of Japs now remain on ATTU and these are being rounded up and eliminated. Surface forces continue to cover the operation. As many as eight enemy subs are now believed in the ALEUTIAN area, but no attacks have been made recently. This suggests that their mission is reconnaissance. AmphibTraining Force 061953 is a suggested procedure for planning the KISKA operation.

At 1110 (-11) June 7th between 40 and 50 enemy planes were intercepted near the RUSSELLS. 19 zeros were reported destroyed against our loss of seven VF.

(Continued on next page)
June 6th. (Oahu Date) (Cont’d)

Plans section is engaged in a study of Joint Chiefs of Staff Pacific Operations for 1943-44.

There are no new enemy developments.

June 7th. (Oahu Date)

Admiral Nimitz returned to PEARL from a conference in San Francisco with Admiral King. One of the main problems considered at that conference was a move into the MARSHALLS in the late fall of this year. Major General Smith (Comamphibcorpac) accompanied Admiral Nimitz to PEARL.

The hunt for isolated Japs on ATTU continues. Today 16 were located and eliminated. Our surface forces continue to cover ATTU and approaches thereto. The question now arises as to the forces necessary to support logistic moves in the western Aleutians between now and the KISKA operation, the employment of excess Norpac forces during that time, and the naval forces needed for the KISKA operation. (See CincPac 080057).

ComNorPac 070226 pink gives a change in the training program for Amphibian Force NINE.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 8th.

Mopping up operations continue on ATTU. The fighter strip at ALEXAI Point is now ready and one transport plane landed there today. ComNorPac has ordered a night DD anti submarine patrol off both the north and south entrances to KISKA.

General DeWitt’s 082230 explains plans for equipment of Canadian troops which will participate in the KISKA operation.

In his three part 080223, pink, Admiral Kinkaid sets forth plans for the training and planning phase of KISKA operation. CTF 51 two part 081910, pink, requests more information on CTF 16 plans and makes recommendations for loading assault troops and for the training of these troops. ComGen ADC and ComNorPac 060040, pink, gives Alaskan training sites for the KISKA operation.

CinCPac has asked CG WDC whether or not he will be able to get a firm commitment for two army dive bomber squadrons for the KISKA operation. CTF 16 is anxious to have those squadrons arrive at ADAK by July 15th for indoctrination.
June 8th Cont'd.  (Oahu Date)

Contrainact Atlantic 072039 gives date of arrival at SAN DIEGO of certain LST's.

It is not now planned to send the NARWHAL to SoPac for forthcoming operations as her completion date of overhaul has been delayed until June 25th.

A study has been started to determine the feasibility of constructing strips and operating VB from HOWLAND and BAKER Islands. The small land area seems to indicate the necessity of assisted take-offs.

ComSoPac has ordered the 3rd Marine Division from AUCKLAND to GUADALCANAL commencing early July. The reason for the move was not given.

Seven B-17's covered by 16 VF bombed MUNDA at 1503 L (-11) June 9th.

All major SoPac task forces continue in port. CarDiv 2 (ESSEX, ENTERPRISE) is at PEARL with Rear Admiral Sherman embarked in the ESSEX. The WASHINGTON continues at PEARL undergoing repairs, with Rear Admiral Lee embarked.

The bulk of the Japanese Fleet continues to hold extensive training exercises in Empire Waters. While this is believed to be designed to perfect defensive tactics, the fact that the Jap Fleet is capable of making a raid in force on our Pacific Island Bases and on our lines of communications cannot be overlooked.

June 9th.  (Oahu Date)

The detection of isolated Jap parties on ATTU continued resulting in 19 more killed including 1 officer and 5 made prisoners.

Two B-24's night prowled over KAHILI, found no ships, and dropped 4 - 1000 each on KAHILI and BALLALE. Ten B-24's covered by 11 P-40's and 4 P-38's bombed VILA revetment and bivouac areas from 22000 feet. No results observed.

Japs attempted attack on convoy going into GUADALCANAL commencing 1100 (-11) in waves. They were intercepted by air from GUADALCANAL - 4 enemy medium bombers shot down and two others turned back. No report as yet from convoy.

Cominich 091729 pink states his views as to some aspects of command organization. This was passed to Comsopac for comment.
June 9th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

ComPhibPac 100231 (pink in four parts) states his views to ComNorPac re: training and planning phase AMATEUR operation.

Cominch 082128 pink refers to secret grid charts not yet received.

June 10th. (Oahu Date)

66 more Japs killed on ATTU and 1 captured. Other small groups reported on same island. PC 487 depth charged, attacked with gunfire, and rammed Jap sub 40 miles Northeast of SHemya.

In SoPac, convoy mentioned yesterday arrived undamaged GUADALCANAL in spite of waves of uncoordinated air attacks by enemy medium bombers. Strike was made on VILA.

TRIGGER put 4 torpedoes into enemy CV off YOKOHAMA.

CGWDC 102245 pink comments on ComPhibPac 100231.

CGWDC 100045 pink states no Army dive bomber squadron available for AMATEUR. Navy will try to provide.

ComNorPac 100331 pink gives his views on naval vessels required in GOOSEWING.

CominCh 091256 pink gives his views on headquarters ship for CTF 51 in next operation and asks recommendations.

Admiral Nimitz left today for SoPac for conference with Admiral Halsey.

June 11th. (Oahu Date)

ComNorPac dropped 29.4 tons bombs North Head, South Head, main camp, runway, Gertrude Cove area, and barges in Kiska harbor. Many hits on all targets. Bombing done from low altitude. 3 medium bombers damaged, and 2 Lightnings and 1 Ventura lost.

40 to 50 Jap planes were intercepted Northwest and East of RUSSELS and 25 sure and 8 probable zeros knocked down. Our losses 1 Corsair, 4 Wildcats, 1 Kittyhawk. Only two of our pilots missing. No enemy bombers were seen.

ComSoPac 120517 is summary of the 11th (-11), (10th) Oahu date.

(Continued on next page)
June 11th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

In SoWesPac 15 B-24's heavily raided KOEPANG on TIMOR.

CinCPac 120021 pink is reply to ComNorPac 100331 on naval vessels required in GOOSEWING.

CinCPac 112105 pink to CominCh suggests possibility of converting CHILTON (APA 38) as headquarter's ship for CTF 51. (See CominCh 091256 pink).

DeWitt's 112015 pink discusses Canadian forces in AMATEUR operation.

ComNorPac 111700 pink replies to ComPhibPac 100231 pink generally concurring.

CominCh 101330 pink to CTF 51 explains special secrecy surrounding beach jumper unit.

Com 3rd Flt 110412 pink is comment on CominCh 091729 pink.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 12th. (Oahu Date)

Weather bad in ALEUTIANS.

In SoPac 7 Liberators and 3 Fortresses bombed KAHILI night 12-13th (-11) - no results observed. Weather generally bad.

Nothing of great importance in SoWesPac.

ComAirPac 130334 pink recommends against assignment of Navy or Marine dive bomber squadrons to AMATEUR operation.

CTF 51 122151 pink recommends PENNSYLVANIA as his command ship for AMATEUR operation.

ComAirSoPac 130341 (OpOrd 11-43) is plan to support Hale's photographic mission.

There were no new enemy developments.
June 13th. (Oahu Date)

Fog hampered air operations in Aleutians. SHEMYA fighter strip is 48% complete. Casualty list to date at ATTU: 514 killed, 1140 wounded, total 1654. FRAZIER (DD) very good evidence of destroying an enemy sub, 3000 yards east of KISKA. Believed another sub present.

Com 3rd Fleet 140452 contain summary SoPac. Condition Red at GUADALCANAL at 2055 (-11) the 14th. One enemy bomber dropped 3 bombs at KOKUMONA, no damage or casualties.

Nothing of note in SoWesPac.

Com 3rd Fleet 132125 pink is Op-Plan designed to back up infiltration move into NEW GEORGIA by shore bombardment by surface vessels if necessary.

June 14th. (Oahu Date)

Fog again prevented air attacks and searches in ALEUTIANS. Progress continued on SHEMYA fighter strip, now 56% complete.

Com 3rd Fleet 150600 is his operation summary - strikes on SHORTLAND area by night and by day on VILA.

Minor air operations in SoWesPac.

Cominch 122212 pink states not possible to convert CHILTON in time for use as ComPhibPac command ship. CinCPac 150121 pink to ComNorPac gives his views on use of PENNSYLVANIA as command ship and places matter in his hands.

CinCPac 140623 pink to Cominch is recommendation for assignment 1 APA and 1 AKA from other areas for employment KISHKA operation.

CinCPac 150051 pink is reply to Cominch 091729 on command and planning matters.

J.C.S. approve in Cominch 142219 pink the joint directives of CinCPac and CG WDC 292248 (May) for KISKA operation with proviso that CinCPac and CG WDC determine actual date of execution.

Cominch 141557 pink desires comment on amphibious training requirements Hawaii area.
June 15th. (Oahu Date)

Fog present ALEUTIANS. In afternoon (15th) local date dropped 8.5 tons bombs on KISKA vicinity main camp. SHEMYA strip now 64% complete.

At GUADALCANAL at 1407 (-11) June 16 60 enemy fighters and 60 bombers swarmed over head. ComAirSols claims enemy losses thus: 32 dive bombers, 45 zeros destroyed, 12 damaged. 6 of our planes shot down with only 5 pilots missing. No report made of damage sustained by ships and ground installations.

18 TBF, 12 A-24, and 24 F4F bombed heavily BAEROKO, Jap supply center Western NEW GEORGIA.

Comso pac 160545 is his operation summary.

In SoWesPac various bombing missions accomplished.

ComNorPac agrees in his 151014 pink to use of PENNSYLVANIA as headquarters ship for ComPhilPac. ComNorPac 160033, CTF 51 - 142341 and 152241, all pink, have to do with allocation of ships to KISKA operation.

CominCh 092155 pink sets forth J.C.S. directive making it unnecessary to submit subsidiary plans for psychological warfare to J.C.S. once basic plan in theatre approved.

CinCPac 160226 pink orders his staff to plan strike on NAURU by 7th Bomber Command on night 28-29 June (east longitude date). Presumably this is to divert Japs from Halsey's infiltration in NEW GEORGIA commencing 30 June.

J.C.S. (A WAR 151655 Z) pink requests MacArthur to submit his time schedule of operations and suggests one for him. Schedule is necessary in order to plan Central Pacific operation. States planners contemplate attacking MARSHALLS on 15 November. It is here noted that we have no official description of MacArthur's Operation I, A, II, B, C, III; only that contained in a personal letter from Halsey.
June 16th. (Oahu Date)

Fog again hampered operations in ALEUTIANS. Weather plane reported no shipping at KISKA except 1 barge. McVEIGH (Army AK) grounded in fog on KIZKT Island, near SHEMYA. Salvage and unloading is proceeding. Strip on SHEMYA now 73% complete.

Com 3rd Flt's 170529 is his operations summary. It will be noted a Navy AK CELENO and 1 LST were damaged. A coast watcher reports that Japs state they have evacuated KIETA because of our heavy bombing of that place. This seems doubtful.

CominCh 152220 pink is J.C.S. directive to CinCPac requiring outline plan for MARSHALLS operation to be mounted 15 November.

CominCh 161309 pink is his reply to CinCPac 140623 asking for one additional APA and AKA for KISKA operation.

CinCPac (Admin) 162305 pink to CinCPac reports projected 7th Bomber Command strike on NAURU 28-29 June with 22 bombers.

CinCPac 162247 pink explains further to CominCh his strike of 18-19 June.

CinCPac 162145 pink allocates DD's to ComNorPac for KISKA operation.

June 17th. (Oahu Date)

No air attacks on KISKA because of fog. SHEMYA strip now 78% complete.

Com 3rd Flt's 180510 is his operations summary. Condition RED at GUADALCANAL from 2040-2224 (-11) 17th. Unknown number of planes dropped 2 flares and 3 bombs in water. No damage, no casualties. CELENO was hit by bomb and now beached at LUNGA PT. Probably can be salved. LST 340 beached TENAKU, probably a total loss.
June 18th.  (Oahu Date)

Admiral Nimitz returned to PEARL from a conference with Admiral Halsey in NOUMEA and an inspection of CANTON, WALLIS, SUVA, NOUMEA, ESPIRITU SANTO, GUADALCANAL, and PALMYRA.

Planes of the 7th bomber command completed a photo reconnaissance of MILLE and JALUIT and a harassing strike on TARAWA. An air strike was made during the night 17-18 June (-11) on NAURU. Complete results have not been reported. At 2110 (-11) 18th 9 B-24's bombed KAHILI. The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 19th.  (Oahu Date)

At 0805 (-11) 20th 18 TBF, 18 SBD, covered by 26 VF attacked VILA. All planes returned.

Because of a report that a small number of Japs landed at SEGI, Rear Admiral Turner will land two companies of Marine raiders there tomorrow morning to eliminate the enemy in that area and hold it for the move scheduled for June 30th.

It is now planned to release the VICTORIOUS to the British on August 1st.

CinCPac 200145 pink requests landing craft for amphibious training in the Hawaiian area.

The North and Central Pacific areas were quiet. The landing strip on SIHEMYA is now 88% complete; this is very fine construction progress.

The enemy continues to strengthen the MARSHALLS. It is indicated that our current RI deception plan is having the effect of causing the enemy to believe we are about to strike in the Eastern MANDATES.
June 20th. (Oahu Date)

Bad weather prevented effective searches and other air operations in the ALEUTIANS. The VF strip at SHEMYA is 93% complete.

During the night June 20 - 21 (-11) 4 B-24's dropped bombs in the BUIN area. The same night there was condition RED twice at GUADALCANAL but no enemy planes were sighted. At 1600 (-11) 21st 18 SBD, 12 TBF escorted by 32 VF attacked MUNDA. Tomorrow morning Rear Admiral Turner plans to land two additional companies of Marine raiders at SEGI (NEW GEORGIA). The landing today caused some flurry in Jap communications.

DARWIN experienced a raid by 20 enemy VF and 25 VB, 49 Spitfires intercepted and shot down 9 sure and 3 probable with own loss of two - a better score for them than previously reported.

ComSoPac 210951 pink gives troop employment for future operations in the SOLOMONS area.

CominCh letter serial 3559 of June 17, 1943, gives instructions for revision of base developments in the Pacific Ocean Areas. While this letter does not say so, it is now believed (stated orally by Admiral King at last San Francisco conference) that CinCPac has authority to move troops as desired within areas, informing CominCh of the moves made. In this connection CinCPac 04.2259 (June) is pertinent.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 21st. (Oahu Date)

The Central and South Pacific areas were quiet. Preparations for the forthcoming SOLOMONS offensive apparently are proceeding satisfactorily. Bad weather continues to hamper air operations in the North Pacific.

The Army will supply two dive bomber squadrons for the KISKA operation. ComNorWesSeaFron has been ordered to furnish all necessary support for that operation.

ComAirPac has been ordered to submit a plan for a photo reconnaissance of KWAJALEIN, WOTJE, and MALOEILAP.

At least two BBs, 3 XCVs, and 12 DDs have arrived at TRUK. It seems probable that this force will be employed defensively, and does not indicate a shift of the center of gravity of the Jap Fleet from the Empire to the Mandates.

CWM
June 22nd. (Oahu Date)

Because of fog most searches in the ALEUTIANS were radar to 200 miles. This kind of search does not give the coverage of visual search. CTF 16 suspects midget subs off KISKA.

At 0455 (-11) 23rd an enemy sub torpedoed two escorted AKs about 50 miles South of SAN CRISTOBAL. One sank at 0953 (-11) and the other was sunk by own gunfire later in the day. At 0845 (-11) 23rd 18 SBD, 12 TBF, 24 F4F attacked REKATA. At 0920 (-11) 14 VB and 24 VF attacked BURI village, GANONGA.

CinCPac 212021 pink is a proposed despatch to CGWDC to execute the KISKA directive (CinCPac 292248 May). CGWDC 221905 pink concurs. CinCPac 232359 is the Joint order to execute the KISKA operation.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 23rd. (Oahu Date)

Insofar as contacts with the enemy are concerned, all Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet. The movement of landing craft to GUADALCANAL for the next offensive is underway.

CinCPac staff explorations of the move into the MARSHALLS have commenced. Preliminary raids in the Central Pacific also are under discussion.

CominCh 231437 pink approves in general CinCPac recommended Fleet redeployment.

CominCh 222145 pink proposes movement of Marine air-drome battalions to PEARL. CinCPac approves this.

ComNorPac proposes a sweep against Jap fishing vessels off KAMCHATKA starting the 25th employing 3 CA, 1 CL, 5 DDs. As ultra information indicates there will be no fishing in that area this summer, CinCPac will order cancellation of the operation unless CTF 16 has further information on Jap fishing craft which is not available to CinCPac.

There were no new enemy developments.
June 24th. (Oahu Date)

Com 3rd Fleet 250540 is an operation summary for the day in his area. Condition RED obtained at GUADALCANAL and the RUSSELLS from 0413 to 0455 (-11) June 25. Minor damage was caused by 16 bombs which landed on the RUSSELLS. The THORNTON was attacked by 4 - 5 Jap planes near the SANTA CRUZ Islands. No hits were made.

Good progress is being made on the VB(M) strip at SHemya. Strikes were made on KISKA during the afternoon by Army planes from AMCHITKA.

CinCPac 250115 pink recommends assignment of additional AKs to SoPac.

ComNorPac 242337 pink states that the sweep against Jap fishing in the KAMCHATKA area is being held in abeyance.

Richardson (24 June) (pink) gives plan of strike on NAURU scheduled for night of 28-29 (-12) June.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 25th. (Oahu Date)

It now appears probable that the full radar control shooting done by the MONAGHAN off VEGA POINT, KISKA on the 22nd resulted in the destruction of a small Jap sub as photos show one beached in that vicinity. Jap subs continue active in the ALEUTIANS.

Condition Red was set at GUADALCANAL between 0438 and 0520 (-11) the 26th. No damage was reported. Commencing at 0402 (-11) 26th, 18 B-24s attack BALLALE. At 0834 (-11) 26th 15 SBD, 13 TBF, 24 VF attack MUNDA. At about the same time 12 SBD, 12 TBF, 23 VF attacked VILA. Thus, air strikes are being stepped up preparatory to the coming offensive. 1 CL and 2 DD were sighted near NAURU today. A small convoy escorted by 1 CA and 1 CL headed SE was sighted during the day about 40 miles east of BOUGAINVILLE. Two CA and one CVE arrived at RABAUL. The Japs are making active preparations to meet our next move and seem to have some advance information—possibly by sightings only.

While exercising off PEARL the No. 3 gun of the HUTCHINS was fired accidentally into No. 2 stack. Several men were killed and wounded.

CominCh 251303 deals with the employment of wing commanders in sea frontiers.

(Continued)
June 25th. (Oahu Date) (Continued)

Cominch 241301 pink deals with amphibious training for Central Pacific Operations.

ComSoPac 250515 and 250518 deal with suggested withdrawal of one VB(H) and one VB(M) group for other operations.

June 26th. (Oahu Date)

At 0430 (-11) 27th seven B-24s attacked KAHILI; at 0500 (-11) 27th one B-24 attacked MUNDA; at 0348 (-11) 27th six B-24s attacked BALLALE. At 0815 (-11) 27th 13 SBD, 9 TBF, and at the same time 12 SBD, 11 TBF attacked VILA, both strikes covered by one group of 23 VF. Extensive combat searches were made in the Central SOLOMONS and in the NEW GEORGIA group.

The FINBACK on patrol in the MANDATES reports sinking 23176 tons enemy shipping. Our submarines continue to be very active and the patrols are productive to a most gratifying degree. Three subs departed MIDWAY on the 24th and 25th June to conduct a patrol in the JAPAN Sea.

On the 25th two strikes were made on KISKA from AMCHITKA during the afternoon. Both ATTU and SHEMYA are now under Army command and no longer task groups of TF 16.

CinCPac 260315 pink is a proposed bombardment of WAKE and a raid on the enemy patrol line East of HONSHU.

June 27th. (Oahu Date)

A PBY sighted and attacked 3 enemy DDs in BLACKETT Strait at 0030 (-11) 28th. Extensive searches and offensive air operations in the Central SOLOMONS and NEW GEORGIA continued in preparation for the forthcoming offensive.

On the 26th seven strikes were made on KISKA from AMCHITKA during which 30.8 tons of bombs were dropped. On the 27th 34.5 tons of bombs were dropped on the same target.

FUNAFUTI 281628 pink cancelled part of the planned strike on NAURU because of operational losses.

CominCh 271613 pink gives views on tentative August operations in the Central Pacific.
June 28th. (Oahu Date)

Air operations in the SOLOMONS were seriously hampered by bad weather. Surface forces are taking position for D-Day tomorrow. The CV task force has taken a covering position in the Coral Sea. Rear Admiral Merrill's force is expected to lay mines and bombard in the BUIN area early tomorrow morning. Rear Admiral Ainsworth's cruiser force is operating to the N.E. of ESPIRITU SANTO preparatory to a bombardment in the VILA area on July 3rd. Rear Admiral Merrill's force is expected to lay mines and bombard in the BUIN area early tomorrow morning. Marine raiders are proceeding toward VIRU from the vicinity of SECI Point. At 1600 (-11) 29th 18 SBD, 12 TBF, 32 VF attacked REKATA; and at 1630 (-11) same afternoon 18 SBD, 12 TBF, 30 VF attacked MUNDA.

Fog prevented air operations from AMCHITKA today. One strike on KISKA was made during the day from ADAK. Cumulative ATTU casualty report is: killed 552; wounded 1140.

CinCPac 282315 pink sends approval to General DeWitt of CTF 16 outline plan for the KISKA operation so that a joint approval can be sent to Vice Admiral Kinkaid.

There were no new enemy developments.

June 29th. (Oahu Date)

The offensive into the NEW GEORGIA group commenced as planned. Fragmentary reports indicate that landings were made at WICKHAM, SECI, and VIRU; and that Rear Admiral Merrill's bombardment/minelaying operation in the BUIN area was completed successfully. At RENDOVA the landing commenced at 0656 (-11) 30th and by 1450 (-11) the APAs were unloaded. A Jap torpedo plane attack resulted in a hit in the engineroom of the McCawley at 1550 (-11). At 2024 (-11) the McCawley was hit and sunk by two submarine torpedoes. Other vessels in the vicinity also were attacked by subs but no hits were reported. The GWIN received one hit from a 4.7 while bombarding MUNDA which resulted in disabling the port engine. At 1120 (-11) VILA was attacked by 16 TBF, 12 SBD. Bad weather hampered searches. The enemy launched three air attacks on our surface forces off RENDOVA during the day in which they lost at least 65 planes against our loss of 17. In their last attack they employed float zeros and float observation planes, indicating a lack of more suitable types.

CinCPac 292053 requests air enlisted ground personnel for coming operations in the Central Pacific. CinCPac 292145 pink directs Admiral Halsey to investigate airfield possibilities in the ELLICE Group.

The North Pacific was comparatively quiet, with some enemy submarine activity in the ALEUTIANS reported.
June 30th. (Oahu Date)

Information regarding the progress in the SOLOMONS offensive is still sketchy but that which has been received indicates that the operation is proceeding according to plan. At 0833 (-11) July 1st 17 B-24s attacked VIRU. At 1330 (-11) 18 TBF and 11 SBD attacked VILA, and at 1410 ten SBD attacked AA positions at LAMBETI plantation. 25 VB(M), 18 SBD, and 18 TBF attacked MUNDA at 1615 (-11). Com 3rd Fleet 010630 is a summary for yesterday. Further information states that the enemy lost 101 planes in three strikes made on our force off RENDOVA yesterday.

The Seventh Air Force will attempt further photo reconnaissance at JALUIT as soon as possible after 14 July.

CinCPac 010035 requests a minimum of 3 advanced air base assemblies for the Central Pacific.

CominCh 261309 gives a plan for a visit of a British Joint Service visit to the Pacific.

The North and Central Pacific areas were quiet.

(Copy - original with July group)
Your 010723 affirmative. This is in conformity with CinCPac policy of reducing defense forces at bases in rear areas to minimum required by present situation in order to make available additional units for offensive employment. This can be accomplished by reduction of base defense area to close defense of base installations and maintenance of beach head for reinforcement of garrison in event hostile landings are effected in undefended areas.
Suggest following procedure in planning AMATEUR operation.

Plan 1. Assembly of all troops Amphibian Training Force 9 in combat area utilizing transportation made available.

Plan 2. Assign each battalion combat team to types of transportation when lists of ships and small landing craft are known so that each battalion will be prepared to land at a separate destination, combat loaded.

Plan 3. Tactical plan to be made in ALASKA.

Believe that Plan 1 and 2 can best be made in the United States with information received concerning units to be provided in ALASKA and their concentration points. Plan 3 will be greatly simplified and should by all means be made at ADAK with all interested agencies participating. SGD Corlett CG ATF 9. Admiral Rockwell, General Smith of the Marine Corps, and General Corlett have been in conference on this and are making every effort to determine the best method of utilizing each type of landing craft in the coming operation. In this planning the battalion combat team will be the basis combat unit. The regimental overhead will be used as a group or area headquarters which may or may not include the battalions of its regiment. Conception of battalion combat team (battalion landing group) is a self sustained unit including infantry field artillery shore party engineers coast artillery anti aircraft and supply and evacuation services, combat loaded with 30 days maintenance and rations and 10 units fire for ground weapons. Snow jeep (light tank cargo tractor) is believed by those experienced in ALASKA suitable for tundra transportation and hauling. In connection with this we are developing cargo pallets that can be used as toboggans. This may effect the combat loading of both small craft and APA. Suggest if practicable a member of Comnorpacfs staff come to ORD to observe preparation for a few days and return ADAK.

08 0057 CINCPAC to COMNORPAC.

Request your estimate at earliest practicable time of naval forces required for support operations ATTU SHEMYA and blockade KISKA. How would you employ forces now under your command but not so required pending further operations. Desire return NEVADA with MULLANEY to San Francisco after arrival TENNESSEE for transfer to LantFlt.
08 2230 DEWITT to ADV CP, Info CTF 51.

Difficulties Canadian participation AMATEUR well understood this Hq. CS 0604. Canadian Units being equipped with American equipment except for arms and ammunition. Canadian arms and ammunition will be used by units making up Canadian Combat Teams and maintenance of arms and ammunition will be by Canadian government through our supply system technical Canadian personnel being provided for this purpose. Signal equipment and procedures will be same as in American forces. Training in these procedures now being carried on.

07 2039 COMTRAINACT & REAR ECHelon PHIBLANT to COMAMPHORPAC Info COMNORPAC, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Your 042227 to Cinclant. Earliest possible arrival LST's at San Diego estimated July 3d. All crews have had basic training but shakedown of LST have been reduced to a minimum and these ships should be given at least 5 more beachings each.

12 0517 COM3RD FLT. to COM 7th FLT, COM 1st FLT, CINCSOWESPAC.

Destroyer escorted transport group arriving GUADAL morning 11th reports Jap Bettys shadowed then unsuccessfully attacked ships night of 10th. This was force Nips were after all day 10th when BLUE fighters destroyed 4 Bettys off North MALAITA. Another BLUE surface group unsuccessfully attacked by lone Betty noon 11th 60 miles South Southeast of SAN CRISTOBAL. Coastwatcher reports 100 Japs landed HUIHRANGI village North Coast SANTA ISABEL night of 7th. 7 Forts 8 Avengers visited BUIN area after nightfall 10th. Avengers failed contact shipping, Forts bombed KAHILI drome starting small fire. 1 Fort missing cause unknown, 1 Avenger forced down returning by engine trouble. BUIN shipping morning 11th 1 unident South of TREASURY Island 2 small vessels off SHORTLAND 3 small ships off PUPUKUNA POINT.
ComAirSoPac OpOrd 11-43. Reconnaissance and fighter aircraft operate from Jap occupied NAURU Island airdrome. ComSoPac orders night harassment NAURU to increase Jap disquietude incident photographs JALUIT and MILLI and bombing of TARAWA by 7th Air Force. This force will attack with bombs in order destroy power plant, aircraft and airdrome installations. Task Unit 33.1.2 Admiral Mitscher despatch maximum practical B-24 strike to hit NAURU about 171430 GCT. Task Unit 33.1.1 Captain Kendall stage 6 Cats through VANIKORO strike NAURU about 171300 GCT. Para. Load cats 500 pound daisy cutters and incendiary clusters, heavy bombers instantaneous demolition and incendiary clusters belly turrets strafe with incendiary ammunition. Cat flight advise completion of mission and pertinent info helpful following waves. Search and recce frequency. GUADAL flights use call flight 99 SANTO flight 96. 1 B-24 carry radar detection equipment.

Com 3rd FLT to CINCSOWESPAC, COM 1st FLT Info NZNB, COM 7th FLT, ALL TFC'S, SOPAC.

7 B-24's, 3 B-17's raided KAHILI night of 12th-13th with unobserved results. 130 times 100 pounds less 67 fragmentation clusters was the total bomb load. 6 Avengers started out on ship strike to BUIN but weather forced them back. Para. Fighters from SUWANEE report damaging Jap Betty snooping around one of our small task units. Time about midday 13th. Para. SOLOMONS planes noon 13th from limited photo coverage were 7 VF's, 2 dive bombers KAHILI, 5 VB's BALLALE, 21 floatplanes FAISI. No ship sightings reported.

Fortresses Liberators raided KAHILI Area evening 13th repeating performance last night 14th. First strike was by 13 planes dropping 100's light bombs. 6 Avengers simultaneously looked for shipping but found none. Bomber pilots saw fires BALLALE Island which claimed they didn't start. Last night's job by 11 planes who dumped ton 1/2-ton 1/4-ton eggs KAHILI plus 9 1/4-ton size on SHORTLAND. At 0800 L (-11) 14th Mitchell medium bombers made debut in force this area when 18 of them bombed VILA Airfield concentrating on runway and gun posits east of strip. 18 Corsairs covered. GUADALCANAL had hour and quarter alert night of 13th for at least 1 enemy bomber which dropped 3 bombs harmlessly near KOKUMBONA. Early today 15th 3 more nippers came over dropped 5 bombs near KOLI Point. No damage reported.
16 0545 COMSOPAC to CINC Pac, CINCSOWESPAC, Info NZNB, COM 7TH FLT, ALL TFC'S 3RD FLT, NOB AUCKLAND.

16 Dauntless 12 Avengers screened by 24 Wildcats hit BAEROKO Western NEW GEORGIA supply center at 0745 L (-11) 15th. Each Avenger carried single 1 ton bomb while Dauntless had half ton load. 2 fires started 1 combined with explosions. Para. Coastwatcher dope has it that Nip base at SANOIGAI CHOISEUL 5 miles Northwest of BAMBATANA mission is now complete. Japs in strength further reported MALEVOLII and KAKASA Southeast BAMBATANA. Guns at VANGVANYA Southwest KOLOMBAANGARA have been dismantled moved to VILA plantation. Para. Weather hampered photo recce 15th. BUKA only drome covered showed only 3 VF for unstated coverage. 1 medium 1 small vessels were in MATCHIN Bay. Para. GUADAL had raid night of 15th bombs fell in water.

17 0529 COM 3RD FLEET, to COM 1ST FLEET. CINCSOWESPAC, Info Com 7th, Etc.

Today's big news is yesterday June 16th fiasco for the Japs when 104 Blue fighters destroyed 32 nip dive bombers 45 zero's over GUADALCANAL beginning at 1407 L (-11). This brings total Jap planes destroyed by SoPac forces that month to 146 and grand total since July 31st 1942 to 1414. Our losses in yesterday's fracus were 6 fighters. Jap bombs damaged Navy AK CELENO 1 LST. ORANGE aircraft participating estimated 60 each bombers fighters but may have been more. Para. At 0830 L 16th 18 Avengers 12 Dauntless escorted by 24 Corsairs flattened Sangigai Choiseul where coastwatcher had reported Jap base set up. Ton and half ton bombs used. Para. Night 15th 2 Mitchells, 1 Black Cat searched fruitlessly for BLACKETT STRAIT shipping. Dusk 16th watcher saw 3 vessels North of VELLA on Northwest course. Para. Additional coastwatch dope. Natives report Japs say bombing forced KIETA evacuation. Scouts found no Japs on GIZO or MAKUTI Islands (BLACKETT STRAIT). 200 Japs now at HUHURANGI 42 miles Southeast REKATA Bay. SAY they are from REKATA and intend early occupation ESTRELLA Bay area.
19 SBD's each carrying one half ton Daisy Cutters raided REKATA BAY 1640 (-11) 17th. Hits were scored on SUAVANAU POINT and nearby AA posits. 16 Wildcats covered. Further info on big doings over GUADAL 16th indicates total BLUE casualties afloat and ashore 25 killed 29 injured 22 missing. Both damaged vessels will be returned to service. Coast Watcher reports 1 fighter following retiring enemy VF formation down in 1000 SHIPS BAY off Southern SANTA ISABEL. GUADAL had alert night of 17th for unknown number planes. 2 flares seen and 3 bombs fell in water off TULAGI with no reported damage or casualties. At 0545 (-11) today 18th LOI reported sighting sub 1 mile off TULAGI net. Patrol plane attacked surface sub VILA EFATE forenoon 17th. At 1115 (-11) 16th auxiliary carrier task group operating Southeast of SAN CRISTOBAL added 1 snooping BETTY today's plane bag. Night of 16th 8 Liberators hit BALLALE with fragmentation clusters. One plane failed return but dumbo mission next day picked up 8 of 10 crew members. Also rescued last pilot missing from June 7th action over RUSSELLS.

During early dark hours today 25th 13 Army Liberators attacked KAHILI airdrome dropping hundreds fragmentation clusters West of runway and in camp areas North of JAKOHINA mission. 5 fires resulted. 7 additional B-24's bombed BUKA same time dropping similar clusters. Smoke seen rising from southern strip. Para. Avenger patrol off BOUGAINVILLE Mitchell off Northeast ISABEL found no targets last night. Para. After dawn today 25 and 24 Dauntless Avenegers respectively covered by 32 Wildcats plastered Lambeti plantation area MUNDA vicinity with 36 and one half tons of high explosives. All planes returned. Para. Late afternoon yesterday Wildcats strafed Jap barge at WICKHAM anchorage. Para. Shortly after local noon today USS THORNTON enroute GUADALCANAL to ESPIRITU was attacked from high level by 4 twin engined bombers. 3 or 4 bombs fell 600 yards on port bow nil damage. Para. Following are SOLOMONS planes from AM photos 24th. KAHILI 22 VF's 6 VSB BALLALE 2 VF's 3 VB's FAISI 19 Float Planes. Photo planes saw 3 AK's 1 small unident BUIN TONGLEI. Para. Patrol plane sighted attacked enemy sub 0845 L (-11) today posit. 19-48 South 174-47 East.
This modifies my airmailgram 121739 of July 1942. It is directed that wing commanders within sea frontiers be utilized in the capacity of task group commanders in exercising operational control of wing aircraft assigned to sea frontiers. Similar employment of air group or squadron commanders when appropriate in subordinate task group commands is also directed. Operational control is defined as comprising those functions of command involving formation of task forces assignment of tasks designation of objectives and necessary coordination to accomplish the mission. It should be exercised where practicable through the responsible tactical commander of units assigned. It specifically does not include the administration discipline internal organization or training of those units.

Prospective operations in the Central Pacific require a greatly accelerated expansion of shore based naval air groups, aircraft service units and advanced air base units. Preliminary estimates show that critical feature of accelerated program will be enlisted personnel of which availability has lagged behind that of airplanes and pilots. Fleet Air West Coast is now 2500 men short of July requirements under present plans. Fleet Air South Pacific is 3000 men short. Principal shortages are in general service ratings and non rated men. To meet new demands of accelerated program to be submitted recommend drastic action. Suggested remedy is to eliminate or reduce mainland and 15th Naval District shore activities of little value in present strategic situation. Typical activities which might release men are NAS Astoria, the combat drone project, section bases on Pacific Coast and training activities. Chief of Staff AirPac after conference with ComFairWest will bring to Washington estimates personnel requirements for fleet aviation program.

British Chiefs of Staff wish to send British Joint Service Mission to investigate types of equipment and most suitable organization of units and formations required for full scale operations against Japan. Mission will consist of about 10 officers headed by Major General plus 2 U.S. officers in advisory capacity and will proceed on date to be communicated later from Washington to Sopac SouwesPac and India - Burma for visits with field forces. Mission desires to visit headquarters of ComSoPac and to be afforded opportunities for attachment to troops in actual combat with Japanese. Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the foregoing. Desire you facilitate the work of this mission all practicable.
DECLASSIFIED

June (GCT)

02 2248 CINCPAC to CG AMPHIBIAN TRAINING FORCE 9, CG ADC, CTF 16, CTF 51, Info: CG WDC, ComWesSeaFron, CinCPac Admin, Chief of Staff WarDept, Cominch, Comalsec.

This is Joint Order issued by CinCPac and CGWDC. HiCom. Execute our Joint Directive contained in CinCPac 292240 except Task B and Task C which await approval Joint Chiefs of Staff. Target date remains same.

04 2200 COMNORPAC to CTF 51, COMAMTRAINFOR 9, Info CG WDC, COMINCH, CINCPAC.

This is HiCom from ComNorPac. Following is general plan for amphibious training of Amphibian Training Force 9. 5 battalion combat teams and 1 battalion combat engineers to be trained to land from combat loaded APA's. 4 battalion combat teams and 1 battalion combat engineers to be trained to land from landing craft (LST's, LCI's and LCT 5's). Remainder force to receive sufficient transport training for landing from non combat loaded AP's and same troops to be trained to land from landing craft. Desire at least 1 battalion combat team from each regiment be trained in APA's and 1 from each regiment in landing craft. Commander Amphibian Training Force 9 (ComAmTrainFor 9) requested designate to ComTaskForce 51 battalions to be joined in accordance above.

07 0226 COMNORPAC to CTF 51, COMAMTRAINFOR NINE, Info COMINCH CINCPAC, COMGEN WDC, COMGEN ADC (HAND).

HiCom. In view decision to replace 17th Infantry JACKBOOT with 159th from Ord and to bring 17th to ACCENTUATE, change training program for Amphibian Training Force 9 (My 042200) as follows. 3 battalion combat teams in lieu 5 to be trained to land from combat loaded APA's. 3 teams in lieu 4 to be trained to land from landing craft. Desire that landing craft training be expedited in order those battalions can begin movement to GOOSEWING at an early date. Comgen WDC has indicated this movement will begin about June 20th.
Hicom. In order clarify atmosphere surrounding various aspects AMATEUR this despatch is sent in 3 parts. Addressed to subjects as follows. Part I Planning and Joint Staff. Part 2 Training. Part 3 Shipping and Water Movements. ComGen ADC concurs. This is Part 1. Landing and Tactical Plans will be prepared at ACCENTUATE combined staff of ComGen ADC and Comnorpac undertaking preliminary planning. Comgen ATF 9 with staff arrive ACCENTUATE by July 15 and send members of his staff prior that date as they can be spared. CTF 51 requested send to ACCENTUATE by 1 July Comdr. Tucker, Lt.Comdr. McMillian, Lieut. Hauck and to arrive with remainder of operating staff by July 15. Desire sufficient members General Smith's training staff arrive ACCENTUATE by June 21 to assist in training of GOOSEWING regiments and Canadians and General Smith and remainder training staff arrive by July 15. Prior arrival of Comgen AFT 9 and CTF 51 at ACCENTUATE, suggestions and desires regarding landing and tactical plans are requested by despatch officer messenger airmail as is most practicable.

This is Part 2 my 080223 on subject of training. Hicom. My 042000 and 070226. Basic concept is that each regimental landing group will have 1 or more battalions trained to land from APA's and 1 or more from landing craft, in order provide for flexibility in developing plans while maintaining regimental organization where that proves desirable. On this basis, and with 5 APA's, 2 battalions of 17th will be embarked for the operation in APA's, and 1 in landing craft. Of the 2 regiments from Fort Ord (omitting the 159th) 1 will have 2 battalions embarked in APA's and 1 in landing craft and the other regiment 1 battalion embarked in APA's and 2 in landing craft. Amphibious training should be so planned that each battalion receives maximum possible prior departure for ACCENTUATE, so as to reduce to minimum amphibious training and allow maximum field training after arrival here. Comgen AFT 9 is requested to designate type of training for each battalion at Fort Ord in accordance with above.

HiCom. Part 3. Shipping and water movements. CinGPac and CG WDC Joint despatch 292240 of May contemplates following shipping, in addition ATS Transports and exclusive of AK's 5 APA's, 12 LST's, 10 LCI's, 36 LCT's. Of this shipping, following now in ALEUTIANS: 1 APA (HARRIS) departing for West Coast about June 9, 4 LST's and 8 LCT's. CTF 51 requested to designate by name the 5 APA's to be used and remainder landing craft by numbers. Also give estimated dates when remainder landing craft ready depart from West Coast. LCI's and LST's should be used to transport troops and equipment as practicable from Fort Ord to ACCENTUATE. Loading and movement of APA's. All to be combat loaded prior departure from SAN FRANCISCO. 2 proceed ACCENTUATE to arrive
by July 3, transporting troops trained in landing craft. These 2 APA's will be used in the operation to transport 2 battalion combat teams from 17th and such adjustments as necessary in their combat loading should be made to allow troops from Fort Ord with their individual and organizational equipment to be disembarked here and 2 battalion combat teams of 17th to be embarked. Remaining 3 APA's with combat loaded battalion combat teams arrive ACCENTUATE by July 15. Maintenance supplies all classes for Fort Ord troops while at ACCENTUATE will be furnished without disturbing transport loading. CG WDC requested make arrangements and provide transportation to move Canadians to ACCENTUATE, to arrive prior 1 July.

Part 1 of 2 parts. This is HiCom. Recommendations made by Corlett were made without my authority and are not concurred in by me. Plan conference with him Fort Ord tomorrow and will then forward suggestions. Final recommendations cannot be submitted until more is known of your assault plan, scheme of maneuver and assignment of troops. Present best estimate availability assigned forces follows: ZEILIN, HEYWOOD, BELL, HARRIS 5 July provided HARRIS returned immediately and final conversion postponed indefinitely. DOYLE and FELAND not yet reported probably ready late July and August. 4 LST and 8 LCT (5) now operating GOOSEWING. 7 LST, 10 LCI (L) and 5 LCT(5) now operating Fort Ord to be joined by 1 LST about 20 June. 6 LST each with 1 LCT(5) on deck presumably enroute from east coast state of training and date of arrival unknown.

This is HiCom. Troops at Fort Ord have received no training in APA's although 159th and 184th have completed preliminary Amphibian training with 7th Division and are now training in LST and LCT(5). 67th Infantry being organized on arrival this week. New subject. Other trials commitments and responsibilities make it mandatory that General Smith and I be absent this area short a time as possible. Training staffs already reduced to minimum nivo would seem advisable that the 4 available APA'S and complementary troops Fort Ord train here until about 1 August where facilities, boat replacements, functional schools etcetera are available and that other troops with LST's, LCT's and LCT's be sent GOOSEWING. In this connection strongly advise consideration be given planning assault from APA's in orthodox manner with reserves and reenforcement troops embarked LST's, LCT's, and LCT's.
HiCom. On assumption 159th Infantry replaces 17th Infantry on ATTU following is designation of training sites in GOOSE-WING Your C 06013. 1 regimental landing group from ORD amphibiously trained accordance My 042200 to ATKA. Remaining regimental landing group from ORD amphibiously trained and Canadians to train at ADAK. 17th Infantry will be refitted at ADAK and if replacement 32nd Infantry by regiment from Fort ORD is approved, 32nd will also be refitted here. In latter case only Canadians plus regiment from ALASKA will be trained at ADAK. Engineers, field hospital, AA and miscellaneous units should accompany respective landing groups proportionately in conformity with regimental assignment. No amphibious training is necessary for regimental landing groups sent from Fort ORD to ATTU. CG ATF 9 to ADAK when above movements are made.

Your 042227 to CinCLant. Earliest possible arrival LST's at San Diego estimated July 3rd. All crews have had basic training but shakedown of LST have been reduced to a minimum and these ships should be given at least 5 more beachings each.

Most Secret Hi-Com. Proposals made to me which appear to have merit first put jurisdiction of air bases SoPac directly under Comairsopac second assign Naval and Marine Corps aviators to planning staffs of high commands third make full use of ComAirPac in consideration of operations involving air.

This HiCom. This is part 1 of 4 parts. Following represents best judgment Amtrainfor 9, Amphcorpac, and originator regards training and planning phase. Para. Subject movements and training 159th and 17th regiments. Move 159th to ATTU in FILLMORE CHIRIKOF when ships available about 28 June. Combat load above vessels plus Branch at San Francisco with supplies ammunition and maintenance items for 17th. Banch direct to ADAK and remainder bring 17th to ADAK ETA about 22 July. 17th will then be designated for embarkation in above AP's supplemented with LST's and LCT 5's for operation. Para. Subject 184th Reg. Continue (Continued on next page)
train shore to shore at ORD until next AP's available at San Francisco about 7 July. Then combat load LST's at San Francisco with equipment impedimenta ammunition and supplies for 184th Regiment. Part 2 to follow.

**10 0315** Part 2 of above. Route North and send all regiment except shore party in AP's. Shore party will be sent on board LST's. For operation 184 to be embarked in landing craft. Para. Subject 87th Regiment. Due arrive ORD about 15 June. Reorganize indoctrinate and preliminary training until APA's available about 5 July. Then train landing exercises 15 days, rehabilitate, overhaul ordnance, combat load at San Francisco ETD 1 August. 87th to be embarked in APA's for operation. Para. Subject Alaska regiment. Use AP's which are to bring 184th to ADAK to embark Alaska regiment for operation. These vessels are HOE class and will carry supplies to back up all assault teams with sufficient remaining space for Alaska regiment organizational equipment and impedimenta. Para. Subject Canadian Brigade. Ships available ETD from 5 to 12 July. Propose combat load same type ship and in similar manner as for Alaska regiment. Canadians combat load at port of embarkation and remain embarked for operation. Part 3 to follow.

**10 0352** Part 3 of above. This is HiCom rpt HiCom. Para. Subject factors affecting plans: (A) ZEILIN, HARRIS, BELL, HEYWOOD permit combat loading only 1 regiment consisting 3 battalion combat teams. If APA DOYEN becomes available suggest embarking units of 17th that vessel but capacity only about 350 troops and very limited cargo. (B) The 110th and 104th combat engineer battalions are being trained as shore parties for the 87th and 184th regiments. (C) Consider LST, LCIS and LCT's suitable only for landing at secured beachheads or at beaches where landing is unopposed. Our carefully considered opinion is assault should be delivered from APA's. (D) Only few tractors and track laying vehicles and special equipment and no heavy clothing received at ORD. WDC attempting expedite but movement supplies slow. May necessitate postponement target date. Will keep you advised. (E) Troop movements outlined above are based earliest possible availability transportation. Believe target date should be adjusted to allow 2 weeks to 1 month field exercises and training all troops on Alaska terrain. (F) Total landing craft available. 4 LST in Alaska. 7 at ORD. One (1) to arrive ORD about 20 June, 6 enroute from East Coast ETA unknown. 8 LCT's in Alaska. 5 enroute or at ORD. 6 enroute from East Coast carried deck load in 6 LST's. Final part to follow.

(Continued on next page)
**DECLASSIFIED**

**SECRET**

(June GCT)

10 0231 COMPHIBPAC to COMMORPAC. (4 parts) (Continued)

10 0409 Part 4 and last part of 100231 above. This is HiCom.

10 LCI's at ORH. Maximum available 18 LST's, 19 LCT's, 10 LCI's. (G) Preliminary training indicates 11 LST, 9 LCI and 12 LCT necessary to transport 1 regiment comprising 3 battalion combat teams. Suggest surplus craft if then available be employed implement landing of 17th from AP's. Para. Subject recommendations. (A) Because DCBX limitations, transportation schedules training complications most strongly recommend all 3 battalion combat teams of any 1 regiment be similarly trained. (B) Suggest equip 7 EC 2's of the HOE class being provided by Army with 6 landing craft each and boat crews. Am proceeding to accomplish this. (C) Recommend commanders and staff ATF 9, Amphicorpac and Taskforce 51 remain this area until departure 87th in APA's and proceed by air.

08 2128 COMINCH to CINCPAC. Info COMSOPAC, COMMORPAC, COMSOWESPAC, MacARTHUR, C of S ARMY.

HiCom. Have shipped you set of secret colored gridded chart maps scale 1 over 50000 mercator projection covering BOUGAINVILLE SHORTLAND Island Area. Hydro now constructing similar series covering RABAUL area and another scale 1 over 25000 polyconic projection covering KISKA. Hydro prepared continue this work as continuing job for secure group of selected personnel. Each series similar to 1 shipped you requires approximately 2 months to complete and can be undertaken at rate of 1 per month. Consider this type chart map most desirable to enable land sea and air forces utilize same reference in amphibious or shore bombardment operations. Comment desirability these chart maps indicating in order of priority other series you desire in Pacific Ocean Areas, projection to be used type and origin of grid to be overprinted.

09 2059 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

This is most secret for Admiral King only. Refer MySer 0054 of 25 April (with enclosed ComGenHawDet letter of 17 April) and our discussions on requirements for heavy bombardment aircraft in Hawaiian Area. Urgently request that you press to successful conclusion early assignment to Central Pacific of second heavy group both for reasons mentioned above references and to assist in accelerated offensive action this area.
MOST SECRET. Desire to provide headquarters ship for next operation to ComTaskForce 51 who stated at last Pacific conference that APA is unsuitable and specially equipped BB or DD is necessary. Next AGC delivery date 1 September. Provision essential headquarters facilities similar to conversions recently accomplished in MONROVIA and BISCAYNE for NAVVANW can readily be made in PENNSYLVANIA and is possible in 2100 ton DD if contributed by CinCPac and available at West Coast yard by 20 June. Agree with ComTaskFor 51 headquarters ship should not carry assault troops or equipment or have planned part in combat or bombardment. Consider importance warrants temporary diversion PENNSYLVANIA or DD for this duty and possibly permanent diversion DD for repeated use as Amphibious headquarters ship. Converted DD can carry crew for only about half its battery and likely to prove unsatisfactory. Do you agree either proposal or have you other recommendation? If in addition you can nominate 1 APA for conversion to modified headquarters for emergency relief purposes without encroachment on troop capacity, conversion will be accomplished by NY Mare Island in shortest possible time but will involve equivalent of at least 4 weeks availability.

Re ComPhibPac 100231 June 10 in 4 parts. DeWitt sending CG 0608 HICOM to ComNorPac for action. Following are my comments each para thereof.

Subject movement and training 159th and 17th Regts concur except that dates can be bettered by 2 days.

Subject 184 movement concur.

Subject 87th Regt concur.

Subject Alaska Regt concur.

Subject Canadian Brigade concur except ETD July 10th.

Subject factors affecting plans (A) concur on use of DOYEN only rpt only if you consider this practicable as I consider this subject for local decision by you.

(B) concur. (C) concur. (D) While only few tractors and track laying vehicles special equipment and heavy clothing yet received at ORD receipt this equipment and other supplies not repeat not delay movement. This is part 1 of a 2 part message.
10 2245 CGWDC to COMMORPAC, etc. (Continued)

WD rpt WD has given necessary directives and shipments under way. Will not rpt not be necessary postpone target date on this account.

(E) Do not repeat not agree target date should be changed. Target date should be held to without fail but DOG day must by necessity be designated by you dependent on situation that area. Designation DOG day is your decision and I appreciate period training troops in Alaska must be adjusted by you to conform.

(F and G) No comment this your decision.

Subject recommendation (A) concur. (B) concur. (C) This is not repeat not subject that I can properly comment upon as decision yours but do consider it advisable that Com-PhibPac should send competent staff officer thoroughly familiar his views your HQ by air without delay to assure clarification subjects connected all matters involved to movement, training and planning phase, my opinion is meeting of minds on subject matter very difficult to resolve by dispatches.

New subject. First special training force approximate strength 2200 has been made available for AMATEUR operation and Joint Chiefs of Staff desire its use. This force considered most highly trained unit on amphibious and commando operations in U.S. All specially selected men. Comdg officer (Col Frederick) arrives this HQ tonight or tomorrow for conference with me. Will inform you more in detail after seeing him. Consider it extremely fortunate this fine unit made available to us for this operation. This is part 2 of 2 part MSG SRL NBR 102245 GCT and this msg SECRET SECURITY.

10 0045 COMGEN WDC to CINCPAC.

No Army dive bomber squadrons available for AMATEUR operation (C 06035) this SECRET SECURITY. REURAD 082355. Decision not yet reached but War Department advises that if dive bombers to be used they will be Navy planes. Am convinced this type of plane a definite requirement this operation and hope you can assure availability.
ComNorPac replies to CinCPac 080057. HiCom. Naval forces required support occupations ATTU SHEMYA and blockade KISKA and allow for much needed overhaul and training exercises are approximately those now in this area. Pending further intensive operations plan make about one third all types continuously available for material upkeep and training. Presence of ORANGE heavy and light cruisers PARAMUSHIRO indicates possibility cruiser raids on ATTU-SHEMYA area and supply lines thereto. Such raids might be supported by battleships and might be accompanied by attempts to run much needed supplies to KISKA. 3 battleships 4 to 6 heavy cruisers 4 light cruisers 2 squadrons destroyers considered adequate prevent enemy attempts disrupt our rapid development ATTU and SHEMYA and break KISKA blockade. Now have 2 destroyers on A/S blockade KISKA. Desirable maintain 4 on blockade stations which could be done if 6 were available therefor. Should it be assumed enemy concentration and preparations Northern KURILE purely defensive above forces could be reduced. About 12 escort ships sufficient for A/S patrol and screens for ATTU SHEMYA shipping. To maintain this number necessary to release those similarly employed AMCHITKA and Eastward. Additional destroyers and ships suitable for escorting would be very useful. When situation permits diversion cruisers and destroyers from tasks in Western ALEUTIANS exploratory raid Jap fishing grounds western BERING SEA can be made and when risk of enemy shore based air action is justified raids on enemy patrol stations, weather ship stations and shipping East of KURILES.

COMINCH to CTF 51 Info CinCPAC, COMSOPAC ComNorPac CinCLANT.

Your 031950 requesting beach jumper unit not to all addees. Unit of 10 officers 20 men all Marines will complete training 1 July. Employment of sonic equipment which is a principal item requires prior approval of plan by CCS whose policy is withhold until stake warrants first disclosure and success is probable. Handle this as utmost secret. For security intent is to retain unit at PhibLant training center for the present. Suggest you send an officer of your staff at convenient time to witness demonstration ALSO/LT Colonel Bare to evaluate progress. Advise employment will require use of up to 10 large fast boats from area sources. PT SC PC and aircraft rescue types suitable.
This is HiCom. Present organization all airfields and seaplane bases on each island grouped as air center which like all other unit establishments on island are under direct military command of Commanding General and Administrative direction of appropriate senior. Thus naval bases are administered by ComSerRonSoPac, Army Service Commands by ComGen SOSPA and Air Centers by ComAirSoPac. Placing air bases whether individual airfields or grouped as air centers under direct jurisdiction of ComAirSoPac would invalidate unity of command on island bases and highly desirable coordination of activities thereon. CominCh 091729. Have Naval and Army air representatives on my planning staff. Assume air operations will be referred to ComAirPac by CinCPac as desired by latter. All matters concerning air operations in SoPac are referred to ComAirSoPac.

This is HiCom. Your comprehensive and highly informative despatch in 4 parts beginning 100231 is greatly appreciated and is approved in toto subject to following comments. A. While fully concurring that all troops should have 2 weeks to 1 month training on Alaskan terrain, desire present target date be retained until postponement is known to be absolutely necessary. B. Proposed time of departure for ALASKA of Commanders concerned and staffs is too late. Plans and training should not and will not be completed until after their arrival. Commanders and staff members should come North as nearly as practicable in accordance request made in my 080223. Decision this question left to your discretion. C. Buckner concurs in the above and will send all communications to Corlett through ComNorPac in order to keep the record straight.

Available for AMATEUR operation is 1st Special Service Force consisting United States and Canadian Troops total strength 173 officers, 8 warrant officers, 2287 enlisted. C 06039. This is HiCom most secret. Composition of force: 3 Combat regiments and service battalion (42 officers, 8 warrant officers, 655 enlisted); each combat regiment (39 officers, 541 enlisted) comprises 2 combat battalions (17 officers 253 enlisted each) of 3 companies (5 officers 84 men each) of three platoons (1 officer 27 men each); composition and armament was subject of conference between you and Col. Frederick (Force Commander) January 10th, 1943. Unit has completed training as follows: Amphibian, winter warfare, demolitions, parachute, assault and raiding tactics. Contemplate moving unit direct from United States to ADC to complete special training in ADC for operation. Desire you designate station for assembly and training. Prompt reply desired in order to arrange for movement.
11 2105 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMPHIBPAC, COTCPAC, VCNO.

Cominch Hicom 091256. From such info as is available here believe CHILTON (APA38) now at San Pedro enroute East Coast to complete conversion. Suggest possibility holding CHILTON West Coast with 4 weeks availability at Mare Island for equipping as Headquarters Ship and assignment Comphibpac until delivery 1st AGC in September.

12 0021 CINCPAC to COMNORPAC.

Hicom. Concur in general urdis 100331 but consider exposure heavy ships to possible submarine attack should be minimized by varying covering areas and retiring battleships to ADAK or COLD BAY whenever situation warrants. Will endeavor to maintain destroyers in your area at 20 plus and as target date approaches make available 1 squadron 2100 ton class for transport screen and close supporting fire.

12 2151 CTF 51 to CINCPAC.

This is most secret. HiCom. Your 110259. My comment on CominCh 091256. Have not been informed my role in prospective operation but if I am to command attack force strongly urge PENNSYLVANIA be given suggested conversion and assigned as flagship. This recommendation based on certain knowledge her present state of training and facilities. Consider reduction in fighting power and probable insufficient space in 2100 ton DD indicate inadvisability diversion this type at this time. However would like opportunity to study conversion plans with idea future employment specially for shore to shore operations. Am having CHILTON (APA 38) inspected to obtain information possible facilities as modified headquarters emergency relief and present status. However if she could be made immediately available as an APA for this operation she could be most effectively employed due to additional assignment first special service battalion consisting 2200 and probability assault will be made from APA's.

13 0334 COMAIRPAC to CINCPAC. (Most Secret)

Recommend against assignment Navy or Marine dive bombing squadron for operations in the ALEUTIANS because (A) none are available without diversion from SoPac or Central requirements. (B) Their use will require advanced base facilities not now planned and since they can not fly to area will add to shipping requirements. (C) They can not be operated from NASSAU Class ACV. (D) Reports of other operations indicate medium bombers better adapted to operating conditions including weather. Your 122127.
HiCom. Scheduled night June 17 GCT are minor bombardment and photographic missions against TARAWA JALUIT MILLI. Sorties by 7th bomber command staging through FUNAFUTI. Daylight reconnaissance Southern GILBERTS to follow.
Handle this as most secret. Reference my OpPlan 14-43 and CTF 31 OpPlan AS-43. At any time after D day and when directed by ComSoPac it may be necessary to bombard MUNDA, KOLUMBANGARA and other enemy positions in connection with their capture or destruction. To this end a bombardment group consisting of following units is formed herewith. 2 CLs plus 3 DDs nominated by CTG 36.2 and designated TU 36.2.9. 1 BB plus 3 DDs as directed by CTU 36.3.2 and called TU 36.3.9. Senior officer bombardment group is OTC and may expect to operate as directed by CTF 31. Use grid system as given in paragraph 5 (d) in 2nd reference. CTF 33 provide air coverage and plane spotting as requested by CTF 31.

12 2212 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info VICE CNO, COMPHIBPAC, COTCPAC.

Your 112105. Not possible complete SHILTON in available time. Vice CNO advises only conversion possibilities for next operation are PENNSYLVANIA as operating headquarters and ZEILIN as emergency relief with headquarters facilities on reduced scale not including quarters extensive plotting rooms and the like.

14 0623 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC ADMIN COMSOPAC CTF 16 CTF 51.

This is HiCom. Consider it necessary that ComPhibPac transport group be reinforced at earliest possible date by 1 APA and 1 AKA. At present only 4 APA's and no AKA's are available to Rockwell for training. For move to ALEUTIANS and assault of KISKA 1 additional APA(DOYEN) now West Coast is remote possibility. Para. Careful investigation SoPac situation reveals no withdrawal's APA's or AKA's possible as troop moves to combat areas accordance current directives will employ these types to their limit and preclude further amphibious training after July 1st. Para. Request 1 APA and 1 AKA be made available to CinCPac from other areas at once and until September 1st.

14 2219 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMNORPAC CTF 51.

Utmost Secret. Joint Chiefs of Staff approve Cinpcac-ComGen WDC 29 2248 with the proviso that the actual date of execution of Task B will be determined by CinGPac and CG WDC.

14 1557 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info VCNO.

Following HiCom for Adee only. Comment on requirements looking to readiness for setting up and training amphibious forces in HAWAII Area for prospective operations to westward.
11 0412 COM 3RD FLT to CINCPAC.

HiCom. Present organization all airfields and seaplane bases on each island grouped as Air Center which like all other unit establishments on island are under direct military command of Commanding General and administrative direction of appropriate senior. Thus Naval bases are administered by ComSerSoPac, Army service commands by ComGen SossaPA and Air Centers by ComAirSoPac. Placing air bases whether individual airfields or grouped as Air Centers under direct jurisdiction of ComAirSoPac would invalidate unity of command on island bases and highly desirable coordination of activities thereon. CominCh 091729. Have Naval and Army air representatives on my planning staff. Assume air operations will be referred to ComAirPac by CinCPac as desired by latter. All matters concerning air operations in SoPac are referred to ComAirSoPac.

12 2135 CinCPac Admin to Admiral Nimitz only.

VERY SECRET HI COM. This reencipherment CominCh 111731. Quote. Delivered to Chief of Naval Personnel for Info. What are your views about Commodore rank for senior naval officer in command at MIDWAY and if you concur is present incumbent recommended. End Quote.

13 0507 CinCPac to CominCh.

For Admiral King only from Nimitz. After conference with Halsey I recommend Shafroth relieve Wilkinson as Deputy ComSoPacFor and Area at once and that Wilkinson report to ComAmphibForSoPac with view to relieving Turner after completion first stage NEW GEORGIA Operation. Turner then report to CinCPac for temporary duty. Halsey concurs.

13 0627 CinCPac to CinCPac Administration.

Desire Captain Redman be ordered proceed without delay by air report ComSoPac for temporary duty and on completion thereof return resume regular duties.

14 0833 BuPers to ComSoPac, Info CinCPac.

RAdm John F. Shafroth Jr. hereby detached report ComSoPac duty Deputy ComSoPacArea and SoPacFor.

14 1243 CominCh to Admiral Nimitz.

Personal for Admiral Nimitz Only. In case Brigadier General Lynd is detached your staff do you recommend him for an award. Answered negative.
14 2313 CinCPac to CominCh.

Utmost for Admiral King only. Negative your 141243.

15 0710 CinCPac to CominCh, Info CinCPac Admin.

I recommend Captain Harold Mike (M) Martin your 111731 senior naval officer at MIDWAY for promotion to rank of Commodore.
15 0051 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSOPAC, CHIEF BUAAER, CHIEF BUPERS.

HiCom reply ur 091729. Concur with ComSoPac 110412 being passed to you. Naval aviators are assigned to staff this command and are consulted freely. Marine aviators are available for consultation. Full use is being made of ComAirPac in planning operations involving air.

15 0121 CINCPAC to COMNORPAC Info COMINCH, COMPHIBPAC, COTCPAC, VICE CNO, COMSERVPAC, PENNSYLVANIA.

ComInCh 091256. 122212. Mydis 112105. ComPhibPac 122151. All passed to you for info. Assignment PENNSYLVANIA as operating headquarters for ComPhibPac satisfactory to CinCPac originator. Use of ZEILIN as emergency relief with reduced facilities at discretion ComPhibPac if time for necessary installations can be spared from training. If you concur direct PENNSYLVANIA report ComPhibPac. Latter arrange necessary NYD availabilities direct ComSerVPac.

09 2155 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Director Office of Strategic Services in Washington that once an Office of Strategic Services Basic Plan for psychological warfare within a particular theater or area of military operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is not necessary to submit subsidiary operational plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that such subsidiary plans may be submitted by the Office of Strategic Services to its theatre or area representative for use in planning the psychological warfare program.

14 2341 CTF 51 to COMINCH, Info COMGEN WDC, COMNORPAC, CINCPAC.

This is most secret. Following ships in addition APA's and landing ships proposed for use in AMATEUR operation. AP 29. AP 32. XAP PRESIDENT FILLMORE, RICHARD MARCH HUE. HENRY FAILING, CHIRIKOF. DAVID W BRANCH, WILLIAM L. THOMPSON, JOHN B FLOYD, TJISADANE, XAK's HENRY WARD BEECHER, GEORGE JULIAN, ELI WHITNEY, GEORGE WYTHE, GEORGE FLAVER. Anticipate it will be necessary furnish Naval Liaison Officer of suitable rank to each above except AP's and following communication personnel and equipment to each: Personnel 1 junior officer. 1 radioman 1st class. 1 radioman 2nd class. 4 radiomen 3rd class. 1 signal 2nd class. 2 signalmen 3rd class equipment 1 TX. 2 TXY. 1 visual signaling kit. Necessary cryptographic aids. Request officer and enlisted personnel be ordered to report to originator at SAN DIEGO for training and indoctrination prior 1 July. Request equipment be supplied by same date.
Present Naval strength in the Pacific (This message is from Joint Chiefs of Staff to CINCSWPA for action Richardson and Harmon pass to Nimitz and Halsey for information signed Marshall) with prospective re-enforcements dictates increased tempo of operations against enemy in Pacific Areas. BURMA operations may require specific naval operations in Pacific in November. Joint Chiefs of Staff are now considering operations in Central Pacific based on following assumptions relating to C/TWHEEL:

A - Operation ONE commences thirty June complete one August.

B - Operation AFIRM complete fifteen September.

C - Operation TWO commences one September complete thirty November.

D - Operation BAKER commences fifteen October complete thirty November.

E - Operation CAST commences thirty November complete thirty one December.

F - Operation THREE commences one December complete one March.

Tentative plans submitted by planning agencies contemplate employing Second MarDiv RPT MarDiv all combat loaders and major part of naval forces from South Pacific Area and first MarDiv from Southwest Pacific against MARSHALLS from PEARL or South Pacific port about 15 November. Arrival of last six LSTS repeat LSTS allocated to SoPac would be delayed about two months till mid December. Urgently needed for immediate planning purposes is an outline of operations in South and Southwest Pacific areas giving dates that may affect present basis of planning for Central Pacific operations. It is recognized that it will probably be necessary as the successive operations develop to alter these dates accordingly. However, unless they are established now for planning purposes it is not RPT not practicable to provide able structure for our operations throughout the Pacific and Far East. Para.
Desire following specific information:

A - Operation BAKER not (repeat not) be commenced until after completion of Operation TWO.

B - Composition of Task Forces for each operation, with particular regard to designation of major ground force units.

C - What ship to shore and what shore to shore operations are contemplated with dates of commencement and completion and numbers and types of assault shipping and landing craft to be employed.

15 1014 COMNORPAC to COMPHIBPAC, PENNSYLVANIA, Info CINCPAC, COMINCH.

CINCPac 150121. HiCom. PENNSYLVANIA report ComPhibPac as operating headquarters. ComPhibPac comply referenced despatch regarding conversion PENNSYLVANIA and ZEILIN.

15 2241 CTF 51 to COMINCH, Info CINCPAC.

Most Secret. Assume 6 LST and LCT your 141830 are in addition 6 LST and LCT your 021509. Latter together with all flotilla 3 ships and craft are committed to AMATEUR operation. Movement of these to GOOSEWING is scheduled commencing early July. Upon sailing of LST's 485, 486, 488 for SoPac about 5 July no LST's will remain this coast and training of Gold Acorns in this type will necessarily be suspended.

16 0033 COMNORPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMPHIBPAC.

HiCom. Additional destroyers trained in shore bombardment highly desirable for future operations. Request consideration be given to assigning to NorPacFor ships reported in ComPhibPac 142347 as being so trained.

16 0226 CINCPAC to CINCPAC Admin, Info COMAIRSOPAC, COMSOPAC Admn.

This is most secret. Desire 7th Bomber Command strike NAURU night 28-29 June (East longitude date) staging through FUNAFUTI from WALLIS. Suggest planes now in area be augmented as necessary to produce effective strike. Advise.
DECLASSIFIED

June (GCT)

15 2220 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

Most secret for Adee only. From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Nimitz. As explained in War Dept 4952 of 14 June Joint Chiefs of Staff are now considering the employment of forces to mount operations against the MARSHALLS from PEARL or South Pacific about 15 November. Joint Chiefs of Staff direct you submit an outline plan for the seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS to include following and occupation:

A - List of forces required for seizure.
B - Shipping required.
C - Positions to be seized.
D - Concept of plan.
E - Proposed date for initiation of operations.
F - Major favorable and unfavorable factors.

16 1309 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info CTF 51, CINCPAC ADMIN.

This is HiCom. Your 140623 THUBAN only AKA available assigned PhibPac to arrive West Coast by 20 July my 111331. Understand DOYEN expected report for shakedown about 15 June. Consider both must be made ready to complete total 5 APA and 1 AKA for operation. No additional APA available from PhibLant or conversion program in time for operation.

COMNORPAC, Info:

16 2145 CINCPAC to COMPHIBPAC, COMDESPAC, COTCPAC, COMINCH.

UrDis 160033. ComAmphibPac 142348. MyDis 120021. Present plan assign Desron 24 less DALY to NorPacFor duration AMATEUR operation. Squadron should be assembled and trained as such under own squadron commander. If you concur I will (ABLE) direct Comdesron 24 in BROWNSON report to you and ComPhibPac for duty on arrival SAN DIEGO from CANAL ZONE about 1 July. (BAKER) AMMEN MULLANY BUSH upon completion shakedowns during which all will have been trained in shore bombardment. (CHARLIE) HUTCHINS BEALE both bombardment trained now proceed PEARL to SAN DIEGO to arrive by about 10 July. It will be necessary for you to send BACHE ABNERREAD from your other forces without relief. Assignment BOYD, HALFORD not approved because total destroyer allocation cannot be increased and tactical undesirability of scrambling squadrons. Intend ANDERSON relieve LANSDOWNE about mid July. No other changes nor increases contemplated.
SECRET
June (GCT)

16 2247 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

HiCom. Exercises mentioned my 120127 scheduled night 18-19 June (East Long Date) includes simultaneous strike NAURU by Cats and heavies from SoPac.

16 2305 CINCPAC/HiCom. Info to: COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC.

This is HiCom. With 22 bombers will strike target your 160226. All basing CANTON staging through FUNAFUTI.

20 0145 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info VICE CNO.

HiCom for Addees only. On assumptions that MarDiv is trained on Mainland CominCh 141557 that minimum of one Army Div is trained Hawaiian Area that training this area must solve problems involved landing over coral reefs recommend that landing craft now available here 12 LCM, 45 LCV be increased by 100 LCR(L) with outboard motors. 15 LCM, 50 LCVP, 30 LVT, 1 LCT(5), 1 LST. Boat crews and maintenance personnel with adequate spare parts should be furnished for these additional boats. These additional facilities to be made available by 1 August 1943. Recommend monthly replacement schedule of 15 percent of above boats to replace casualties in reef landings. Para. Foregoing constitute requirements for preliminary training only. Further details contingent on formulation of detailed plan which will probably require final training all troops this area in particular coral reef landing.

21 0951 COMSOPAC to CINCSOWESTPAC Info CINCPAC, C.G. SOPAC.

HiCom handle as most secret. Following SoPac data is relevant to Joint Chiefs of Staff 151655. Major ground force units operation A to accomplishment seizure NEW GEORGIA. 43rd Division about l/3rd 37th Division 2 Raider Battalions 2 Defense Battalions supporting artillery. All available Naval Units will be employed in support and covering operations. Operation B 3rd MarDiv 25th Division, 2 Raider Battalions, 2 Defense Battalions, 1 AA regiment, supporting artillery. Will employ all combat loaders and all available landing craft. All available Naval units in support and covering operations. Timing in accordance with your directive. As KIPTA and BUKA situation cannot be foreseen at this time no details of operations have as yet been prepared, it is believed however that above units less

(Continued on next page)
21 0951 COMSOPAC to CINCSOWESTPAC. (Continued)

combat loaders can handle the situation. Had tentatively selected 2nd MarDiv and NEW ZEALAND Division plus other lesser units for RABAUL in early 1944 contemplated detachment 2nd MarDiv and all combat loaders will result in NEW CALEDONIA having no infantry garrison after about August as intend START NEW ZEALAND Division to GUADALCANAL as reserve, will put severe strain on my logistics and will prevent relief in forward areas of any divisions suffering from battle and climatic spoilage. We are thus allowed no leeway in time manpower or transport for operation B. After withdrawal of 2nd MarDiv and the initiation of operations B all my divisions including NEW ZEALAND Division will be stationed in SOLOMONS with exception of 1 division in FIJI. Harmon concurs.

21 2021 CINCPAC to CG WDC.

CominCh 142219 being passed to you. Request your concurrence following Joint Despatch from CinCPac-CGWDC to CTF 16 "Execute our 292248 May. Target date remains Aug 15th. D date to be set by ComNorPac".

22 1905 COMGEN WDC to CinCPac.

Concurrence is transmitted reference your 212021 (Secret Security Message signed DeWitt CG WDC and 4th Army) CO6076 containing execution, target date and Dog day directive.

23 2359 CINCPAC to COMWESEAFRON, COMNORWESEAFRON, COMINCH, CG WDC, CTF 51.

Execute our 292248 May. Target date remains August 15th 1943. ComNorPac set D date.

22 2145 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

UrDis 170545 December. HANDLE AS SUPER SECRET. 1st air-drome battalion will be available for transfer to PEARL in August if desired by you. MarCorps plans to form 155 MM groups in second and first airdrome battalions successively by assigning from United States with M1 gun training 50 men monthly beginning August with view to changing designations later to 17th and 15th defense battalions respectively presence 2 airdrome battalions PEARL will expedite personnel rotation at outlying Hawaiian bases and will provide defense units for other operations.
23 1437 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

For Adea only. With offensive operations in Central Pacific in mind, your recommended redeployment of Pacific Fleet in CINCPAC serial 00693 dated 8 April 1943 is approved in general and as indicated in memorandum to CINCPAC dated 26 May 1943; subject also to decision which may be reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for future operations. Amplifying letter follows.

24 1937 CINCPAC to ComNorPac, Info CominCh.

My 250451 indicates that fishing has been stopped off KAMCHATKA. Most Secret. Unless you have contrary information that it is in progress cancel operation planned your 230651 and employ time for upkeep and training next operation.

24 2337 ComNorPac to CinCPac, Info CominCh.

Most secret. Your 241937. Decision to make sweep along fishing grounds based upon report from Soviet ship ARCTIKA that Jap DD and transport with alleged Jap fishing workers was sighted at PETROPAVLOSC on June 10. Do not consider this evidence conclusive and am holding operation in abeyance pending further information.

24 June Richardson to CINCPAC.

General plan of attack reurad 202215 GCT as follows: 22 B-24's to base at WALLIS and CANTON stage thru FUNAFUTI and bomb NAURU with general purpose, fragmentation and incendiary cluster. Task Force Commander will select targets after careful study of photographs of recent bombing of target by planes from SoPac. Commanding General 7th Air Force will keep you fully informed.

25 0115 CINCPAC to Vice CNO Info CominCh, ComSoPac, ComServPac, ComServRonSoPac.

Most secret. ComSoPac 230412. Recommend approval efffective completion current assignments of ships concerned and upon completion first discharge in SoPac area. However AK 90 to 97 should later be replaced in ServRonSoPac by freighters from subsequent program as those named have all been fitted with towing engines and are peculiarly useful to Com 12 in TransPacific towing.
HiCom. Present intention that TG 16.7 (ComCruDiv 6 with WICHITA, SAN FRANCISCO, LOUISVILLE, SANTA FE and 5 DDs) depart ADAK about 25 June to search for and destroy enemy forces and shipping including fishing craft in Western BERING SEA. SANTA FE and 2 DD will make close in search from CAPE AFRICA to GULF of AKADIR. Task Group will return ACCENTUATE about July 2nd.

HiCom. Allocation of Divisions for Central Pacific amphibious operations has not yet been determined your 200145. Pending this allocation organizational preparation must be taken now to provide for execution of operations at earliest possible time. Para 2. My survey indicates that regardless of objectives finally selected by you for attack provision for the following must be made: A. Basic training for amphibious craft and troops on West Coast on increasing scale. B. Expansion of amphibious training in Hawaiian Area both basic and advanced for landing on coral islands. C. Amphibious command with planning staff at PEARL to develop and integrate plans under Central Pacific Force for Central Pacific Operations. This command organization at PEARL should provide for the planning and execution of at least 3 simultaneous attacks on separated objectives. D. Provision for above needs must be made in immediate future and before completion of COTTAGE which may well continue through September. Para 3. Establishment of subcommand proposed by ComPhibPac 161641 will provide required training activities in San Diego and is hereby approved. Para 4. Your comment and recommendations to provide for other needs set forth in Para 2 are desired.

Handle as most secret. HiCom. The following for your information: "5376 Urgent 22nd. Plan for operations against MARSHALL and or GILBERT ISLANDS in implementation of trident decision is under consideration by Joint Staff Planners (from Arnold to MacArthur for action Kenney and to Harmon signed Marshall) proposal involves employment of 1 heavy bomber and 1 medium bomber group in addition to Royal Air Forces as available. Request expression of your views as to specific effect on air operations in your area if these groups are withdrawn from either area for MARSHALL-GILBERT operations about 1 November or 1 December, taking into consideration probable specific effect proposed Central Pacific operations will have in diverting enemy air strength from your areas. Same question propounded relative to a later date, January or February next."
25 0518 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Handle as most secret. HiCom. The following for your information: "To CinCSowesPac for Kenney (Action) Info to Chief of Staff War Dept. Info ComSoPac (By hand) 8519 of 25 June. Following presents our views in connection with Marshall's 5576 of 22nd (Harmon sends to MacArthur for Kenney action info to Chief of Staff War Dept. for Arnold AFAEP. ComSoPac has by hand for info) Regardless of the date of withdrawal of bombers, the specific effect would be to reduce the capabilities of our strategic air striking forces. Realizing that a minimum allocation of air strength at dates mentioned is safely allowable. Reference November/December diversion, assuming our operations proceed approximately on schedule, diversion of bombers would seriously jeopardize our chances of success at what appears will be the most critical stage of the campaign. Reference January/February diversion, not until we are firmly established in RABAUL, KAVIENG and North Eastern NEW GUINEA can we afford any reduction of our air strength. It is estimated that this situation will not exist until sometime subsequent to February next. The allowable scale of reduction in air strength at that time will depend upon factors which cannot be evaluated at present. Do not consider that the possible diversion of enemy air strength which might result from Central Pacific Operations would diminish our requirements for landbased bombers. ComSoPac is in full accord. Harmon."

26 0315 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

Utmost for Admiral King only. It is my considered opinion that once our effort is disclosed enemy will write off AMATEUR as a loss and attempt no reinforcement of any weight. But as a preventer I have studied the possibilities of McCain's proposed operation as a diversionary raid and recommend against it as involving disproportionate logistic difficulties and incommensurate risk. Para. In substitution thereof the following is planned which surmounts logistic difficulties minimizes risks yet should produce the same effect as McCain's proposal. (A) CVL-CL raid against Japanese patrol craft usually stationed about 700 miles East of TOKYO provided intelligence at proper time indicates patrol craft on station. (B) CV-surface ship bombardment of WAKE. Target dates both operations 5 to 10 days prior AMATEUR target date (15 August). (C) Landplane attack on WAKE just prior to surface force attack and followed by landbased photo coverage.
27 1613 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

HiCom for Admiral Nimitz only. Concur with the views expressed first 2 sentences your 260315. Further question the wisdom of any diversionary operation in support of COTTAGE. Part 2. Operation (A) is considered a desirable operation in itself but not necessarily as a diversion in support of COTTAGE.

28 1628 FUNAFUTI to HICKAM FIELD.

Of last 8 off 2 crashed and burned so I cancelled further mission take offs. 3 crash victims already recovered good chance of recovery. 1 formation of 4 will attack other 2 ordered to land daylight when remaining planes will return to operating base. I remain here until mission returns.

28 2315 CINCPAC to CG WDC.

HiCom for Gen. DeWitt approve ComNorPac secret serial 0443 with the addition to paragraph 7 of "Task Group 16.8 will revert to Army command when commanding general reports that the status of the occupation of AMATEUR warrants this change and when so directed by ComNorPac" Para. If you concur will issue joint approval of this overall plan.

29 2145 CINCPAC to CONSOPAC.

HiCom for Admiral Halsey only. Seizure of MARSHALLS via ELLICE and GILBERTS is under consideration. Using this route additional airstrips will be required north of FUNAFUTI. At earliest date require for planning photo recco followed by ground investigation Northern ELLICE atolls. Include NUKUFETAU VAITUPU NIUTAO NANOMEA.