Command Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN
Nimitz “Graybook”
7 December 1941 – 31 August 1945

Volume 6 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by CINCPAC staff
covering the period 1 January 1945 to 1 July 1945

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The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

**Volume 1** (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861

**Volume 2** (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 – 1262

**Volume 3** (1 January 1943 to 30 June 1943): pages 1263 – 1612

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**Volume 6** (1 January 1945 to 1 July 1945): pages 2486 – 3249

**Volume 7** (1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945): pages 3250 – 3548

**Volume 8** (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 – 30 April 1942 and pertaining to the Battle of Midway): pages are not sequentially numbered. Note: Volume 8 contains dispatch copies, many of which were poorly reproduced at the time of compilation. Some portions are illegible.

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United States Naval War College, Newport, RI
2013
GRAYBOOK SUMMARY

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1 January 1945 - 1 July 1945
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<td>3 January</td>
<td>CINCPAO 031151 (pink)</td>
<td>Warning Order for Phase II - ICEBERG.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 January</td>
<td>CINCPAO 092131</td>
<td>Concurs in ComGenPOA proposed establishment of WesPacBaCom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/10 January</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Third Fleet enters SOUTH CHINA SEA. (Exit 20/21 January).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January</td>
<td>CINCPAO 122013 (pink)</td>
<td>Support of ICEBERG by CG USF CHINA Theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Jan.</td>
<td>CINCPAC 140050</td>
<td>Recommends establishing ComAirPacSubComFord. (Authorized by Cominch 1/7/1946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Jan.</td>
<td>CINCBPF 152201 (pink)</td>
<td>CINCBPF reports to CINCPAC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Jan.</td>
<td>JCS 162254 (pink)</td>
<td>Redeployment 20th BomCom CHINA to MARIANAS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Jan.</td>
<td>JCS 170349 (pink)</td>
<td>Covers ICEBERG Operation.</td>
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<td>20 Jan.</td>
<td>CINCSWPA 200535 (pink)</td>
<td>24th Corps readiness date for ICEBERG (1 Apr)</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 Jan</td>
<td>CNO 231323</td>
<td>Delineates functions PEARL and Advance Hdqtrs</td>
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<td>23 Jan</td>
<td>Cominch–CNO 231341</td>
<td>Covers transfer of lend-lease vessels to USSR.</td>
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<td>25 Jan.</td>
<td>JCS 251348 (pink)</td>
<td>CHINA Theater support of ICEBERG to be as arranged between Minitz and Wedemeyer.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Jan.</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Command 3rdFlt transferred to Com5thFlt.</td>
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<td>26 Jan.</td>
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<td>CTF 58 (McCain) relieved by CTF 58 (Mitscher)</td>
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<td>27 Jan.</td>
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<td>CINCPAC–CINCPAO departed PEARL for GUAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jan.</td>
<td>CINCPAO 290831 (pink)</td>
<td>CINCPAC–CINCPAO arrived GUAM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY</td>
<td></td>
<td>Covers arrangements for support of ICEBERG by CHINA Theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–4 Feb.</td>
<td></td>
<td>CINCPAC flew GUAM to ULITHI, broke flag in INDIANAPOLIS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Feb.</td>
<td>ATC, Wash. 081350</td>
<td>Policy on OATC Centers in POA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Feb.</td>
<td>MARSHALL 081956 (pink)</td>
<td>Movement 58th Bomb Wing INDIA–BURMA to MARIANAS.</td>
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<td>10 Feb.</td>
<td>CINCSWPA 100850 (pink)</td>
<td>Allocation personnel and facilities in SWPA for use by BPF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Feb.</td>
<td>CINCPAO 130620</td>
<td>Staging Facilities in MARIANAS for reserve Carrier Air Groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Feb.</td>
<td>CG AAFPOA 250740</td>
<td>Landing at IWO JIMA.</td>
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<td>25 Feb.</td>
<td>CINCSWPA 261515 (pink)</td>
<td>Movement Data 315th Bomb Wing &amp; 1st 2 Groups 58th Wing.</td>
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<td>26 Feb.</td>
<td>CINCPOA PEARL 270300</td>
<td>Staging and Rehabilitation of POA Divisions.</td>
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<td>27 Feb.</td>
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<td>General Harmon reported missing.</td>
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<td>MARCH</td>
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<td>1 Mar.</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Admiral Nimitz &amp; Admiral Sherman departed for Washington, D. C.</td>
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<td>4 Mar.</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Reconnaissance and Sweeping of CASIGURAN SOUND completed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Mar.</td>
<td>GHQ SWPA 080435</td>
<td>Summarizes results of conference relative petroleum requirements of BPF.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Mar.</td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>Harmon search negative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mar.</td>
<td>CINCPOA 150740</td>
<td>Responsibility of IsComs for Army Base Command administration.</td>
</tr>
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<td>15 Mar.</td>
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<td>16 Mar.</td>
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<td>17 Mar.</td>
<td>COMINCH 171343 (pink)</td>
<td>Fleet Admiral Nimitz and RAdm Sherman returned from Washington conference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 Mar.</td>
<td>COMINCH 241655 (pink)</td>
<td>IWO JIMA secured.</td>
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<td>27 Mar. - 1 Apr.</td>
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<td>Directs planning for FIREBREAK Operation.</td>
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<td>28 Mar.</td>
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<td>27 Mar.</td>
<td>CINCPOA ADV 271214 (pink)</td>
<td>Concerns line of sea communications to the SEA OF JAPAN through TSUSHIMA STRAITS.</td>
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<td>28 Mar.</td>
<td>GHQ SWP 281614</td>
<td>Aerial mining of TSUSHIMA STRAITS.</td>
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<td>APRIL</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Apr.</td>
<td>COMINCH CNO 011327 (pink)</td>
<td>Seaplane Base established KERAMA RETTO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Apr.</td>
<td>CINCPAC 050230 (pink)</td>
<td>OpPlan 2-45 - FIREBREAK Operation.</td>
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<td>Staging of POA Divisions in SWP in accordance with FILBAS Agreement.</td>
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<td>All islands of KERAMA RETTO secured.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Landings on OKINAWA. Yontan and Kadena Airfields secured.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Requests info acceptable months for invasion KYUSHU and/or HONSHU.</td>
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<td>(QUEENFISH 020030 (CINCPAC 030618 (CINCH CHF 071945 (pink) (CINCPAC 090126</td>
<td>Refer Sinking of AWA MARU.</td>
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<td>Policy on Visitors to the forward area.</td>
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<td>ARNOLD 052341 (pink)</td>
<td>20th AF Planning Staff to CINCPAC to aid in planning invasion of JAPAN.</td>
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<td>CINCPAC 090255</td>
<td>Outlines to FOA terms of JCS command directive.</td>
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<td>Warning Order Phase III-C ICEBERG.</td>
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<td>Summary</td>
<td>SWPA Chief of Staff &amp; Staff Members arrived for conference.</td>
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<td>CINCPAC ADV 140826</td>
<td>Directs Army Air Engineer proceed OKINAWA Re: Construction Army Airstrips.</td>
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<td>16 Apr.</td>
<td>CTF 51 160015</td>
<td>Landing on IE SHIMA.</td>
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<td>16 Apr.</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 160250 (pink)</td>
<td>Outlines action to be taken to implement JCS command directive.</td>
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<td>CINCPAC ADV 160252</td>
<td>Relates to Army forces under operational control of CINCPAC.</td>
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<td>16 Apr.</td>
<td>ComGenPOA 162355</td>
<td>ComGenPOA reports CINCAFPAC with Army forces and resources.</td>
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<td>17 Apr.</td>
<td>COMINCH CHF 171512</td>
<td>Substitutes Navy and Marine for Army garrison units in the MARSHALLS.</td>
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<td>GHQ SWP 181010 (pink)</td>
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<td>CINCPAC.</td>
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<td>CINCPAC ADV 210213 (pink)</td>
<td>IE SHIMA secured.</td>
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<td>21 Apr.</td>
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<td>Mounting areas for divisions in assault phase OLYMPIC.</td>
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<td>22-24 Apr.</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 241316</td>
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<td>Re: RAdm Greer as ComFairWing 18.</td>
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<td>CG WESPACBACOM 242321</td>
<td>WesPacBaCom activated.</td>
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<td>CINCPA 302255 (pink)</td>
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<td>1 May</td>
<td>COMSOPAC 010412</td>
<td>Announces Dissolution of COMAIRSOPAC.</td>
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<td>6 May</td>
<td>CINCPA 080234 Reply</td>
<td>Forward Area, CenPac redesignated MARIANAS AREA.</td>
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<td>7 May</td>
<td>CGAAFPOA 072314</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles assumes command AAFPOA; also designated DepCom 20th AF.</td>
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<td>8 May</td>
<td>CINCPA ADV 080319</td>
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<td>10 May</td>
<td>JCS 101844 (pin)</td>
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<td>Com7thFlt 120322 (pin)</td>
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<td>14 May</td>
<td>CINCPA ADV 141341 (pink)</td>
<td>Procedure for Release of Army units to CINCAFPC.</td>
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<td>Admiral Nimitz and RAdm Sherman attended conference at MANILA.</td>
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<td>17 May</td>
<td>CINCPA ADV 170842 (pink)</td>
<td>Summarizes MANILA Conference.</td>
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<td>18 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>VAdm Hill relieved VAdm Turner as CTF 57. ComGen 10 assumed control ashore at OKINAWA.</td>
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<td>CINCPOA 181210 (pink)</td>
<td>Release of Hq &amp; Hq Co. SoPacBase for MANILA.</td>
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<td>19 May</td>
<td>SECNAV 191600</td>
<td>Adm. Hewitt designated to further investigate PEARL HARBOR attack.</td>
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<td>22 May</td>
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<td>Regards OSS Personnel in POA.</td>
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<td>25 May</td>
<td>JCS 250128 (pink)</td>
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<td>26 May</td>
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<td>Proposal for assumption of control of SWP by British.</td>
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<td>29 May</td>
<td>CINCPOA ADV 291605 (pink)</td>
<td>VAdm McCain assumed command of TF 38.</td>
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<td>COMINCH &amp; CNO 291605 (pink)</td>
<td>Covers movements from ETO to POA.</td>
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<td>Cancels FIREBREAK Operation.</td>
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<td>CINCPOA ADV 020034 (pink)</td>
<td>Defers Phase III-D ICEBERG.</td>
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<td>MARSHALL 021909 (pink)</td>
<td>Concern RAF Engineers and 10 Sq. Lancasters.</td>
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<td>4 June</td>
<td>CINCPAC 041231 (pink)</td>
<td>Summarizes results of conference at GUAM with CINCAFPAC Representatives.</td>
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<td>Directive for provision of facilities at ENIWETOK for support of fast carriers.</td>
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<td>6 June</td>
<td>CINCPOA ADV 060742 (pink)</td>
<td>Concerns Cover and Deception conference at MANILA.</td>
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<td>8 June</td>
<td>CINCPOA 081229</td>
<td>Establishes NOB's KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 9</td>
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<td>RAdm Cobb relieved RAdm Hall as SOPA HAGUSHI</td>
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<td>June 11</td>
<td></td>
<td>VAdm Oldendorf relieved RAdm McCormick as CTF 32.</td>
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<td>June 13</td>
<td>CG USFCT 101516 (pink), COMINCH CNO 101620 (pink), CINCPAC ADV 130228 (pink)</td>
<td>Capture of Intermediate Port on CHINA Coast.</td>
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<td>June 13</td>
<td>CINCPAC 130231 SERVRON TEN 241051</td>
<td>Division of SERVRON Ten into Service Divisions.</td>
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<td>JCS 132158</td>
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<td>June 20</td>
<td>CINCAP PAC 200349 (pink), CINCPAC ADV 230106 (pink)</td>
<td>Admiral Sherman departed for Washington. Assigns General Stillwell as COMGEN TEN.</td>
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<td>June 21</td>
<td>CTF 99 210405</td>
<td>Concerns COMGEN POA Responsibility for Mounting Army Air and Ground Units for OLYMPIC.</td>
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<td>June 23</td>
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<td>Organized resistance ceased on OKINAWA.</td>
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<td>June 25</td>
<td>COMINCH CNO 251316</td>
<td>Fleet Admiral Nimitz departed Guam for West Coast and Conference with CominCh.</td>
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<td>June 26</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concerns Complements and Organization of Air Support Control Units, PhibsPac.</td>
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<td>June 26</td>
<td>CINCPAC PEARL 260327</td>
<td>Unopposed landing on KURE SHIMA.</td>
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<td>June 26</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 262310 (pink)</td>
<td>Requests ComMARIANAS to initiate base development at TINIAN for handling 150 single engine Army aircraft per month.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 27</td>
<td>COMPHIBSPAC 271435 (pink)</td>
<td>Troop requirements OKINAWA &amp; IE SHIMA including redeployed units for these bases.</td>
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<td>June 28</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 281348 (pink)</td>
<td>Tentative agreement FEAP and 5th AF concerning Marine Air Warning Sqs. for OLYMPIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 290138</td>
<td>Directs ComGen 10 to assume full responsibility for defense of OKINAWA on 1 July.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 290331</td>
<td>Directs CTF 94 assume responsibility for escorting of all shipping between MARIANAS and RYUKYUS beginning 1 July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29</td>
<td>COMINCH 292140</td>
<td>Authorizes ComSOpAC to discontinue all air, sea and ground defense missions.</td>
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<td>June 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Procedure for establishing Monthly Priority List for Pacific Theater.</td>
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<td>JUNE</td>
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<td>30 June</td>
<td>CINCPOA ADV 300304</td>
<td>Proposes assigning all air-sea rescue services in RYUKYUS to single agency under FAW - I.</td>
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<td>30 June</td>
<td>CINCPAC ADV 300601</td>
<td>Warning Order for Operation OLYMPIC.</td>
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</table>
31 December (Oahu Date) (Continued)

There still appears to have been no landing made at the time of the bombardment on the 26th, and very slight damage was done to the beachhead. Statements by a POW indicate that another DD, the *KAYOSHIMO*, may have been sunk on the night of the 26th, and another POW states that the DD *UGUKI* was sunk by PT off NE coast of LEYTE on the 12th.

CINC EAJT FLT 300415 (green) request permission to send representatives to MANUS to investigate the facilities in that port.

CINCPAOA 010708 (green) outlines to CINC SWPA proposed names for main actions between Japanese and U.S. Naval Forces on 25 October.

CINCPAOA 312359 (green) confirms my designation of authority to various commands to expedite unloading of ships in various areas.

CTG 94.9 010949 (green) outlines strike on IWO JIMA to be executed for January.

1 January (Oahu date)

TF 38 is scheduled to hit FORMOSA on 3 January.

CruDiv 5 plus 6 DD's together with units of the Strategic Airforce are scheduled to hit IWO JIMA on the 5th (I).

IWO JIMA was hit on the 31st and 1st by a number of B-24's. On the 31st 10 B-24's snoop bombed the airfields by radar every 45 minutes. Again on 1 January 19 B-24's bombed both airfields with 36 tons.

One bomb was dropped on LSELY FIELD at SAIPAN on the 2nd at 0245 (K - 10). A short time later at 0416 on the 2nd another Bogey closed to 60 miles but retired from that point to the Northeast.

ComGenAAFPOA 010215 (pink) covers the subject of direct communication between 7th Air Force and 5th Air Force.

COMINCH 011754 (pink) requests that ComNavGrp CHINA disseminate certain intelligence data.

COMAIRPAC 012128 (pink) covers the question of aviation logistic support of the carrier task forces and of the 7th Fleet.
1 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

COMGEN AAFPOA 020205 (pink) covers deployment of certain Engineer Aviation Battalion from ANAUR to GUAM.

CINC EAST INDIES 300941 (pink) states that "MERRIDIAN" is the Code Word for contemplated strike in the SWPA.

CTF 77 011102 outlines the result of interrogation of POW regarding strength of major units of Japanese Fleet.

COMINCH 272019 covers a protest by the Japanese in connection with sinking of certain Japanese ship by an American Submarine in the Western Carolines area on 3 July 1944.

COMINCH 012110 States that the Australian Government has expressed concern over U.S. plans for rehabilitation Phosphate industry on NAURU.

2 January (Oahu date)

Incomplete reports of the lst days strike on FORMOSA indicate that the approach of the Task Force was undetected. The first strike reached targets both at FORMOSA and at OKINAWA. The weather became increasingly bad and cancelled future operations as of 1400 3 January (I) and the force retired to the Southeast. No attacks were made on our ships during this period.

TF 38 targets for S-5 (January 4th) will be either FORMOSA again or Northern LUZON, depending upon the weather.

Com7thFleet gives his estimate of the operational enemy warships as follows: Empire area: 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 2 CA, 2 CL, 22 DD. INDO CHINA and SINGAPORE Area: 2 XCV, 1 CVE, 2 CA, 2 CL, 18 DD.

A delayed report from the DACE (SS-247) reports sinking a medium AK and possibly damaging another off CAPE VARELLA on 28 December.

Another of our submarines report sighting a periscope south of FRENCH FRIGATE SHOALS. There had also been a previous report of the sighting of a periscope in this same general vicinity yesterday.

Com AF-5 estimated Jap air strength in the PHILIPPINES area as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S/E VF</th>
<th>T/E VF</th>
<th>S/E VB</th>
<th>T/E VB</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visayas</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 January (Oahu date) Continued

On the 3rd 97 B-29's of the 21st Bomber Command were airborne for an attack on the NAGOYA Urban area (MICROSCOPE 1). 16 Returned early, 49 bombed the primary target visually, 9 bombed targets of opportunity, and reports of 23 planes were not available. Bombing took place from 1445 to 1533. The bomb load was 1 - 500 pound fragmentary bomb and the remainder incendiary clusters. One B-29 is believed to have been lost over the target.

COMGENAAFPPOA 030625 (pink) outlines to CTF 93 that certain targets of opportunity warrant a variation of planned employment to take advantage of such situations without specific directive from COMGENAAFPPOA.

CINCPAC 030321 references the complement of large carriers namely 73 VF, 15 VSB, 15 VTB.

3 January (Oahu date)

For the 2nd day strikes and searches by TF 38 planes were recalled due to bad weather at the target and operating areas. All planes were recalled at noon. The Task Force is retiring again to the fueling rendezvous. No reports of the strikes carried out in the early morning have been received.

LUZON- 1st and 2nd. 5th Air Force planes on the 1st and 2nd attacked shipping along the west coast of LUZON from SUBIC BAY north, sinking 21 ships and damaging 25-28 more. The ships sunk included: 1 AV, 1 large AP, 2 large AK, and 17 small AK. The attacks were off SAN FERNANDO, in PALAUSIG BAY (north of SUBIC BAY), and SULANGUN BAY (just west of SUBIC). Attacking planes included 60 A-20's plus P-47's, P-51's, and P-40's. One A-20 was shot down over the target, 1 crashed on landing and 1 was missing.

At MINDORO on the night of 1st and 2nd heavy Japanese air attacks inflicted damage on 2 Liberty Ships, one of these ships was so badly damaged that it was necessary to beach it in order to prevent sinking. AA Shot down 5 planes during these raids.

10 Japanese planes bombed the TAGLOBAN strip prior to dawn the 3rd destroying 10 Blue planes and damaging 5 others.

The strike on IWO JIMA by TF 93 plus TG 94.9 (CruDiv 5 plus 6 DD's) is to be carried out on the 5th.

Surface bombardment of SURIBUCHI area (south PARAMUSHIRU) is to be carried out by TF 92 (CruDiv 1 plus escorting destroyers) on 6 January.

CINCPOA's 031151 (pink) sets forth the warning order for Phase 2 of ICEBERG.
3 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

COM3RDFIT's 040130 (pink) notifies CinCSWPA that CTF 38 intends to strike LUZON across the dividing line (17 North) 6 January (s-3).

4 January (Oahu date)

No further reports have been received regarding results of the strike on FORMOSA by Task Force 38 on the 5th. A strike is planned for LUZON today.

CTG 77.3 (RAdm. Berkey) reports that a midget submarine attacked the formation south of APO island on the 5th. Two torpedoes were reported to have passed thru the disposition missing all ships. The TAYLOR (DD 468) rammed and depth charged the sub and probably sank it.

CTF 77 (VAdm. Kincaid) reports that the CVE group which was proceeding with the Bombardment Group thru the Sulu Sea, was attacked by planes at 1720(I)/4th. The OMMANEY BAY (CVE 79) was seriously hit, resulting in fires which got out of control. This CVE was subsequently sunk by torpedoes from one of our destroyers. Survivors reported to date are 722 men and 89 officers.

CTG 73.7 (Comdr. J.C. Renard) reports another air attack on ships off MINDORO on the evening of the 4th. An ammunition ship (name unknown) was hit by a suicide dive bomber and blew up. MONADNOCK (CM 9) and PECOS (AO 65) were damaged. All except two ships left the MINDORO anchorage and put to sea.

The night of January 1-2 85 paratroops were landed by LCI's at MAMHURAO BAY Northwest MINDORO. No casualties resulted from this landing.

On the night of January 2-3 (one reenforced company) from MINDORO at BUENAVISTA (Southwest MARINDUQUE) without incident.

On the 4th PALAU based B-24s dropped 100 pounders on Clark Field destroying an estimated 30 planes which were in revetments. We suffered no losses on this raid.

Night of January 3-4 MINDORO positions were raided by an undetermined number of enemy planes. 3 A-20s were destroyed. We shot down 4 planes during these raids.
4 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

CTF 77 (VAdm. Kincaid) estimates the Jap air strength in the Southwest Pacific Area as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VT &amp; VSB</th>
<th>VM</th>
<th>FP &amp; VCS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon &amp; Visayas</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borneo &amp; Celebes</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately 300 of the 455 in Luzon-Visayas are believed to be in the Clark Field Area.

During the period 2 January to 4 January a total of 55 B-24s attacked the airfield areas at IWO JIMA. Bombing was from 16,000 - 19,000 feet, with results being unobserved in the raid.

At BANGKOK on the 2nd 44 B-29s of the XX BomCom dropped 176 tons on that target. Fighter opposition on this raid was weak.

ARNOLD's 042244 (pink) requests XX BomCom to make a special reconnaissance on the SINGAPORE-LINGGA area to determine the possible whereabouts of the enemy naval force which departed CAPE SAINT JACQUES on 30 December.

CINC_SWPA's 041417 (pink) requests Com3rdFlt include Clark and Angeles Fields in missions by Task Force 38 planes on S-3. He further states that land based planes will also work in this area on S-3. 3rdFlt planes to hit before 0900 and after 1500. Shore based planes between those two hours.

LEMAY's 051046 (pink) advises CinCPA that he will arrive at GUAM at 061034 GCT.

ARNOLD 042253 (pink) advises MacArthur that the 20th Bomber Command has been instructed to perform a special reconnaissance of the SINGAPORE-LINGGA area.

CTF 77 050654 (pink) states that early information of the present location of the enemy force which departed CAMRANH BAY - CAPE SAINT JACQUES area on 30 December is highly important and further states that the primary mission of the submarines in the SWPA is to prevent the undetected approach of this force into the PHILIPPINE area.
5 January (Oahu date)

FORMOSA 3rd-4th: In attacks on FORMOSA and OKINAWA JIMA by TF 38 on the 3rd and 4th extremely adverse weather was encountered. Enemy air opposition was feeble. Com3rdFlt comments, "Nips unwilling or unable to meet challenge." The Force was snooped but no attempt was made to attack the ships.

The following results are reported:

- Enemy planes destroyed: 111
  - 30 airborne, 81 on ground
- Enemy planes damaged: 220
- Our Plane losses: 34
  - 17 combat, 17 operationally
- Our personnel missing: Pilots 17, Aircrewmen 2
- Enemy ships sunk: 16
  - 1 large AK, 2 DE, 1 med. AK, 1 small AK, 1 PC, 10 small coastal AK
- Enemy small craft sunk: 11
- Enemy ships damaged: 49
  - 1 large DD, 4 DE, 6 PC, 1 LSV, 2 large AK, 1 medium AK, 34 small AK
- Enemy small craft damaged: 9

Ground destruction included 11 locomotives and 4 tank cars, several freight cars and gas trucks, 1 railway bridge, hangars, warehouses, docks, ammunition dumps and fuel dumps. Bombs, rockets, and strafing damaged hangars and other buildings, factories, fuel and ammunition dumps, and rolling stock.

Com3rdFlt estimates that there were 750 planes of all types on FORMOSA before the strikes on the 3rd. He reports locations of 519 planes (including trainers) photographed on the 3rd. 56 were seen on OKINAWA and TISHIGAKA (125 miles east of FORMOSA).

TG 94.9 (CruDiv 5 plus 6 DD's) bombarded the DONINS and IWO JIMA on the 5th. The force approached from the ESE through closed in weather. A 260 foot AK was intercepted and sunk 40 miles west of HAHA JIMA. Visibility was poor hence the 2 hour bombardment was conducted by radar. PANNING (DD-385) received one small caliber hit near waterline. D.W. TAYLOR (DD-551) was also hit probably by a mine flooding some forward compartments.

In the second phase, the bombardment of IWO JIMA began at 1500 K. Targets were chiefly coast defenses and AA batteries. The CA's fired for 1/2 hour on the air strips; many fires were reported as being observed and no damage to our ships in this phase was reported. Upon completion of the bombardment the force was scheduled to retire to SAIPAN.
5 January (Cahu date) (Continued)

Forces of the Forward Area landed on FAIS on the morning of 1 January. No evidence of its use as a base by enemy submarines or warships was discovered. Only a few Japanese were on the Island.

The movements to the LINGAYEN area are proceeding according to schedule, however, there has been considerable air opposition. CTF 77.2 (VAdm Oldendorf) reports 12 ships being hit by suicide bombers between the hours of 1630 (I/5) and 1500 (I/6) of which one unidentified ship was sunk and 9 seriously damaged. Specific damage was reported as follows:

- **NEW MEXICO (BB-40)** - hit on bridge; all communication out.
- **WALKE (DD-723)** - plane crashed into after part of bridge.
- **A.M. SUMNER (DD-692)** - hit aft, and after magazine flooded.
- **R.P. LEARY (DD-664)** hit forward.
- **LONG (DMS-12)** and **BROOKS (APD-10)** - both hit, but extent of damage unknown.

On the 6th TF 38 planes maintained a continuous target CAP over the LUZON Fields from prior to dawn to after sunset. The procedure will be carried out again on the 7th.

CTG 77.2 060614 outlines in some detail the damage inflicted by suicide attacks on the force proceeding to LINGAYEN.

CTF 77 060934 (pink) requests 3rdFlt to repeat strikes and continuous CAP over LUZON fields on 7 January (3-2).

COM3RDFLT's 052203 (pink) States that request appearing above will be carried out.

- **5THFIGHTER COMMAND 041609 (pink)** states that when M-1 convoys cannot be covered from LEYTE the 310th Bomb Wing and 42nd Fighter Command will cover forces from MINDORO.

COMAAFSWPA 051625 (pink) advises interested commands that 3rd Fleet will be operating 16-30 N on January 6th and states that Allied Air Force planes will not cross the SANTO CRUZ-BAGABAG-CAPE SAN ILDEFONSO line except in an emergency.

TF 92 completed bombardment of SURIBACHI on the 6th. Fires were observed and no damage reported inflicted on our ships. This TF (CruDiv 1 plus escorting destroyers) is retiring to ATTU.
6 January (Oahu date)

TF 38 is refueling on 8 January (II) after having hit LUZON for 2 days in a row.

CTG 77.2 (VAdm Oldendorf) reports 8 additional ships hit on the evening of the 6th.

- CALIFORNIA (BB-44)
- AUSTRALIA (CA) hit twice
- LOUISVILLE (CA-28) hit twice
- COLUMBIA (CL-56) hit twice
- LOWRY (DD-723)
- NEWCOMB (DD-586)
- OCCA (AVP-49)
- O'BRIEN (DD-725)

CTU 77.4.2 (RAdm Stump) reports that the MANILA BAY was damaged by 2 suicide bombers at 1745 on the 5th. SAVO ISLAND (CVE78) was also hit by a suicide bomber wrecking all her radar but no damage to personnel. Casualty reports on the MANILA BAY (CVE-61 to date are 5 killed, 5 missing, 25 seriously wounded and 60 minor wounds.

The NEW MEXICO (BB-40) was hit on the morning of the 6th on the port navigating bridge by a plane believed to be a Lily. Reports indicate that 4 officers were killed and 28 enlisted men killed and 130 injured.

CTF 77.2 (VAdm Oldendorf) reports that operations on the 7th were carried out on schedule with slight enemy air opposition.

CinC East Indies states that a landing was made on AKYAB as planned on the evening of 3 January. No opposition was encountered and the occupation of the island was completed that evening.

Results of the raids by TF 38 planes on the 6th indicate the following:
- 8 of 18 airborne enemy planes were shot down.
- 19 destroyed on the ground.
- 14 damaged on the ground.

Com3rd Fleet comments that many operational aircraft were present but were difficult to find because of the large number of duds, bad weather, and careful dispersal. Photographs taken on the 6th showed 237 apparently operational planes on 12 LUZON fields, of which 123, more than half, were at Clark. Angeles, adjacent to Clark on the south, had 32 and the other 10 had from 1 to 18. Visual coverage of the other fields indicated very few planes present.

CTF 77 (VAdm Hinkaid) 061824 requests 3rd Fleet to cover as many airfields as possible in the LINGAYEN area and further requests giving consideration to moving 3rd Fleet west of the PHILIPPINES.
6 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

CominCh 031237 sets forth composition of Carrier Divisions 1 through 7.

CTG 77.2 061210 (pink) summarizes results of damage inflicted on our forces on the 6th.

CINCPAC 070312 (pink) covers employment of 3rd Fleet in SOUTH CHINA SEA.

CTF 77 070342 (pink) outlines possibility that major portions of Jap Fleet is at sea to westward of KYUSHU and could arrive at LINGAYEN the morning of the 10th or possibly the night of 9 - 10.

MACARTHUR 070107 (pink) requests bomber missions of the 20th Bomber Command to be diverted to strike airfields on FORMOSA instead of KEELUNG HARBOR.

COM3RDFLT 071044 (pink) outlines his estimate of the situation prior to the LINGAYEN landing.

CINC SWPA 071207 (pink) outlines his estimate of the situation and covers contemplated installation of shore based air subsequent to capture of LINGAYEN air.

ARNOLD 071708 (pink) states that 20th Bomber Command will attack SHINCHIKU Airdrome instead of KEELUNG HARBOR as requested by MacArthur and that strikes will probably take place on 9 Jan instead of on the 8th as originally scheduled.

ARNOLD 072128 (pink) states that subsequent to 9 January both 20th and 21st Bomber Commands will be prepared to perform photographic reconnaissance upon request.
The landings in LINGAYEN GULF area are scheduled for the morning of 9 January (I).

Additional information has been received relative to suicide tactics on our forces:

- SOUTHARD (DM-10) hit.
- BROOKS (APD-10) reported hit yesterday was taken under tow and is now in hands of salvage party.
- APACHE (ATF-67) minor damage.
- MINNEAPOLIS (CA-36) superficially damaged.
- HELM (DD-338) superficially damaged.
- STAFFORD (DE-411) heavily damaged before arrival LINGAYEN.
- AUSTRALIA (CA) hit twice more.
- CALIFORNIA (BB-44) reported hit yesterday received her hit on the mainmast tower knocking out her after sky control station, secondary radios, 5" mount, #4 out of action as result of hit from one of our own ships.

Reconnaissance was made by under water demolition teams and no under water defenses or mines were found in the landing area. All approaches are reported as being equally good. There is a moderate surf.

In the LUZON area on the 6th heavy attacks were carried out. 54 B-24's attacked field targets in the area; an undetermined number of P-38's, A-20's and F4U's made the attacks (probably 100 planes).

On the 7th CVE planes operating in the LINGAYEN area flew 65 VF and 68 VT sorties expending 49 tons of bombs and 178 rockets. 1 TBF was lost.

LEMA Y 070719 (pink). The 20th Bomber Command mission against SHINCHIKU has been delayed to 9 January.

CINCPOA 072207 (pink) expresses concurrence in both 3rd Fleet and CinCSWP's estimate of the situation which was requested by him.

CINCPOA 072241 (pink) states that ComBatDiv 7 (RAdm Badger) in the INDIANA, will arrive SAIPAN 20 January and carry out surface bombardment on TWO JIMA shortly thereafter. Upon completion INDIANA proceeds ULITHI.

CINC PAC 072326 (pink) concurs in Arnold's recommendation to strike SHINCHIKU instead of KEELUNG HARBOR.

COMFWDAREA 072351 (pink) suggests continuous mining of CHICHI JIMA and HAHA JIMA, since most mines already laid have been swept.
7 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

COMMAGRP CHINA 080440 (pink) states that shipping is following close inshore on the Asiatic Coast and recommends that submarines take over blind bombing zones in which they can effectively operate as the 14th Airforce is not considered a serious threat in this area.

CTG 77.2 072046 (Adm Oldendorf) (pink) covers sweep up of bombardment group for operations on the 7th.

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CTG 77.2 072046 (Adm Oldendorf) (pink) covers sweep up of bombardment group for operations on the 7th.

8 January (Oahu date)

Strikes by planes of TF 38 were carried out against FORMOSA 9 January. No air opposition was reported to have been encountered. The northern searches and strikes on OKINAWA and MIYAKO JIMA were cancelled due to unfavorable weather conditions. Only one snooper reached the force and he was shot down by the combat air patrol. Out of 100 planes seen on FORMOSA 17 were definitely destroyed and 17 damaged. In addition 14 smaller ships and luggers were sunk and 17 additional ships (small) were damaged.

LUZON - 6th and 7th: TF 38 planes accomplished the following:

| Destroyed | 18 airborne planes |
| Sunk      | 3 med. AK          |
| Damaged   | 117 plus other possibles |

- All on N & NW coast
- 1 large AK
- 3 med. AK
- 1 tug
- 15 small craft

Ground targets - RR, trucks, barracks, fuel & supply dumps.

Our losses: 15 planes combat
30 planes operationally
25 pilots missing
6 aircrewmen missing

CVE planes used 98 tons of bombs and 1128 rockets in attacks on ground objectives in the area of LINGAYEN GULF. No planes were lost, and 2 enemy planes were destroyed. Heavy damage was done to ammunition, fuel, and supply dumps, to vehicles and gun emplacements, to barracks and other buildings, and to trench systems. Recco flights on the 8th from SAN FERNANDO south to detect enemy troop movements gave negative results. Total sorties were about 300.
During bombardment operations in LINGAYEN GULF on the 6th fighter direction assisted in the shooting down of 15 planes, at least 9 by visual fighter direction.

On the 7th Clark Field was attacked by 40 B-25's and 97 A-20's, destroying or badly damaging at least 60 planes, plus many others damaged, in low level attacks. Ground installations were also hit. P-38's destroyed 2 of 8-10 interceptors. We lost 4 A-20's over the target, plus 3 A-20's missing and 1 B-25 shot down.

On the 9th TOKYO area was bombed by 72 B-29's of the 21st Bomber Command. 14 of these planes, however, returned early; results are not yet known but reports indicate that 6 planes out of the 72 failed to return from this strike.

Operations on the 9th continued according to plans (LINGAYEN area. The CALLOWAY (APA-35) was hit by a suicide plane resulting in 16 casualties (6 dead and 10 critically injured). LST 912 was hit by another suicide plane with minor damage inflicted. (4 dead and 4 injured).

COM3RDFLT's 090004 (pink) states that Plan GRATITUDE is placed in effect. (Operations in SOUTH CHINA SEA).

COM3RDFLT's 090034 (pink) directs TF 38 and the Fast Oiler Group to proceed through LUZON STRAITS on the night of 9 - 10 January for about 5 days operations in the CHINA SEA.

MACARTHUR's 091301 (pink) requests 20th AF to attack targets in the FORMOSA area S Day through S plus 3 within limits of their capability.

CINCPAC's 071842 summarizes possible methods of evading suicide bomber attacks.

CINCPAC's 091301 (pink) requests Strategic Airforce POA to conduct early photo recc of TRUK and to prepare to conduct fighter bomber strikes against air facilities and with particular attention to MOEN airfield.
9 January (Oahu date)

The landings in the LINGAYEN area appear to have been made on schedule with casualties reported exceptionally light.

Com7th Fleet reports additional damage to 3 ships which were hit on the 8th and 9th (I). KITKUN BAY (CVE-71) was hit by a suicide bomber and holed below the water line resulting in the loss of power. This CVE is now enroute to LINGAYEN under tow.

COLORADO (BB-45) was hit by a 15" projectile (special fuzed) dropped by a plane off her port quarter. 6 Officers and 12 men are reported killed and many others wounded. Most of her AA control equipment is reported out of commission.

COLUMBIA (CL-56) was hit for the 2nd time.

CTF 77 (VAdm Kinkaid) reports the formation of the LINGAYEN DEFENSE FORCE. This force consists of bombardment group, TG 77.2, (VAdm Oldendorf), close covering group TG 77.3 (RAdm Berkey) and the CVE Group TG 77.4 (RAdm Durgin), all under the command of VAdm Oldendorf. This force is assigned the task of protecting in, approaching and departing from, LINGAYEN GULF from attack by enemy surface force.

Com3rdFlt is observing radio silence but is believed to be carrying out Plan GRATITUDE and approaching the SOUTH CHINA SEA on schedule.

Photo recco on the 8th CAPE ST JACQUES showed 70,000 tons of merchant shipping. 14th Airforce reconnaissance of this port on the 9th, however, showed only 5 ships in the anchorage.

On 11 January (ELD) CruDiv 5 and 4 DD’s are scheduled to depart ULITHI and proceed to a point some 350 miles east of LUZON to act as a covering force for the slow oilers operating in that vicinity.

PUFFER (SS-268) reports sinking 5 ships out of a 10 ship convoy northeast of FORMOSA on the morning of the 10th. 1 of these 5 ships was a large DD.

PIRANHA (SS-389) reports scoring 2 hits in each of 2 unidentified ships south of KYUSHU on the night of 9-10th.

CAVALLA (SS-244) sank 2 small ships off western BORNEO on the night of the 5th.

BESUGO (SS-321) sank a large loaded tanker on the 6th off the eastern coast of MALAY.

CINCPAC's 100825 (pink) requests clarification of ComPhibsPac 092220 and 100825 relative to the responsibilities to be assumed by ComFwdArea in protection of ships of Joint Expeditionary Force.
9 January (Oahu date)

COMINCH & CNO 082055 requests report be made on employment of Civilian Internees on SAIPAN.

CTF 77 090852 outlines the organization of the LINGAYEN Defense Force.

CINCPAC 091109 directs ComAirPac to submit specific reasons for the relief of Carrier Captains.

CINCPOA 092131 concurs in the establishment of Western Pacific Base Command.

WEATHER 5TH AF 100849-1 summarizes the estimate of the tropical storm currently centered east of LEYTE.

CTF 77 091218 outlines results of the S Day landings.

CINCPOA 052306 (pink) addressed to MacArthur indicates concern relative to readiness of 24th Corps for the ICEBERG Operation.

CINCSPWA 081321 (pink) outlines readiness date of certain units.

10 January (Oahu date)

The 3rd Fleet was maintaining radio silence but planes from TF 38 are scheduled to strike shipping in the CAMRANH BAY area the morning of the 12th (I).

Com7thFlt reports satisfactory operations in the LINGAYEN area on the 10th, landing operations proceeding on schedule. The surf conditions have been somewhat poor, which has resulted in the slowing down of unloading.

Additional damage to our ships has been reported:

DUPAGE (APA 41) hit by suicide plane resulting in minor damage.

KADASHAN BAY (CVE 76) cause and extent of damage not known.

WAR HAWK (AP 168) moderate damage from an underwater explosion.

LST 925 and 1025 - minor damage

ROBINSON (DD 562) superficial damage.
10 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

There was little enemy air opposition, but ships in the anchorage area were attacked by 6 small boats, 3 of which were sunk. Several swimmers with pistols or grenades were captured or killed.

The first echelon departed the LINGAYEN area on the night of the 9th and consisted of one damaged CVE, 3 damaged cruisers, 40 transports of various types and escorts. A typhoon is centered this morning (12th ELD) at 9-30 north 17-30 east moving on course 290 at 11 knots.

QUEENFISH (SS 393) reports 7 ships out of an 8 ship TAKAO bound convoy were sunk in a coordinated attack with the BARB (SS 220) and PICUDA (SS 382) west of FORMOSA during the night of 8-9 January.

In the LUZON area on the 9th 180 medium, attack, and fighter bombers from MINDORO and LEYTE attacked various targets in the central LUZON plain area causing extensive damage to sundry mobile units, bridges, etc. On the 10th in the LUZON area 24 B-24's dropped a number of tons of bombs scoring 50 hits on the GRACE PARK air field north of MANILA.

CTF 77 reports that damaged carrier planes have been landing on the LINGAYEN strip and that enemy air opposition was negligible on that day.

At FORMOSA on the 9th 39 B-29's from the 20th Bomber Command hit KEELUNG Harbor (Northwestern tip of FORMOSA). There were no plane losses and no personnel casualties resulting from this attack.

DEPCOMAF 20th AF 100215 states that BomCom 21 will strike principle air installations of OKINAWA between the 12th and 14th.

MacARTHUR's 101447 states that BomCom 20 has been directed to neutralize air installations on FORMOSA during period 10 through 17 January.

CHUNGKING's 110504 requests clearance from CincPac to lay mines in the CAMRANH BAY area. This to be carried out by 14th AF.

CinCPOA's 110216 discusses release of Pacific Fleet units subsequent to M-1 operation.
11 January  (Oahu date)

Com3rdFleet reports that poor weather prevented great damage to shipping in his FORMOSA strike on the 9th, but that the enemy air had been smothered. TF 38 and TG 30.8 entered the CHINA SEA undetected. 3 Jap transport planes enroute LUZON to FORMOSA were shot down by night fighters. Two oilers collided while transiting BALINTANG STRAIT, but the fueling rendezvous was effected on time and fueling was completed the morning of the 11th. One task group augmented by fast BB was advanced toward CAMRANH BAY at high speed, covered by CAP from other groups. At 1630, 3 JAKES were shot down near this force, apparently before they reported it. Searches were launched at 0300I/12. Apparently the force was still undetected, for a later report originated at 1133I/12 states that planes were attacking the INDO-CHINA coast from SAIGON to CAPE SAHOI, that complete surprise was effected, and that air opposition was negligible. ISE and HYUGA were not located.

In a message sent at 2000I/12 Com3rdFleet reported attacks still in progress. Several convoys plus scattered shipping were subjected to persistent and devastating attacks at SAIGON, CAMRANH BAY, and along the INDO-CHINA coast. 25 ships including a CL and several DD and DE were sunk, 13 others were seriously damaged. Air opposition was light; 39 planes were destroyed. The CL was the largest combatant unit sighted.

The task force is due to fuel today. CinCPac directed Com3rdFleet to cover the LINGAYEN-MINDORO area.

Com7thFleet reports the arrival of the reinforcement group and the landing of 158th RCT and 125th Inf. Div. on the 11th. Returning echelons are apparently departing on schedule, i.e. on S, S plus 1 and S plus 2 days both slow and fast groups have departed. Destroyers from TG 77.7 sank or damaged 20 to 25 barges and a freighter unloading at SAN FERNANDO.

SOPA ULITHI reports that MAZAM (AE9) while at anchor in ULITHI at 0700K/12 was torpedoed in the bow. There was no fire or explosion, and, while the ship is flooded forward, she is in no danger. Local escorts are searching, and there are so far indications of 1 midget sub in the anchorage.

On the 12th, planes from TF 38 attacked targets on the FRENCH INDO-CHINA coast from SAIGON to CAPE SAHOI. Complete surprise was achieved. Preliminary report indicates that 25 ships were sunk including 1 KATORI class CL and several DD-DE. 13 other ships were seriously damaged. Report states that no ships larger than CL referred to above were seen. 45 planes were
11 January (Oahu date) (Continued)
destroyed, which includes 3 transport planes and 3 float planes shot down enroute to the target. There were 13 airborne planes over SAIGON (the only air opposition) and 10 of these airborne planes were shot down. 50 planes were sent on the ground at TAN SON NHUT Air Field near SAIGON and 3 of these were destroyed. 20 seaplanes and flying boats were destroyed at CAMRANH, QUI NHON and CATSLAI seaplane bases. No damage was inflicted on our surface forces.

47 B-29's carried out a raid on the SINGAPORE area on the 11th. Raids were carried out by the 20th BomCom. 22 bombed the SINGAPORE docks and 14 bombed other targets in the MALAY area. 20 to 30 interceptors appeared, resulting in the loss of 4 enemy planes and 11 damaged. 2 B-29's are missing and 4 others were believed to have landed at other friendly bases.

ComGenPOA's 110548 requests information relative to availability of certain units for employment in the iceberg operation.

CTG 77.2 111031 sets forth ComBatRon 1's OpPlan 1-45.

CTG 77.2 111657 sets forth Annex B of Battle Plan B (night battle plan).

CominCh 121241 suggests that arrangements be made to employ the 3rd Fleet in a position west of LUZON STRAIT.

Com3rdFlt's 112239 sets forth the alternate 3rd Fleet exit plan from the CHINA SEA.

Com3rdFlt's 112241 outlines results of the strikes on FORMOSA on the 9th.

MARSHALL's 112206 states that joint combined staff decision requires 97th and 86th Infantry Divisions to be diverted to another theater.

CinCPOA's 121607 requests CinCSWPA and DepCom 20th AF to extend searches so as to cover Cape St JACQUES to SINGAPORE.

CinCPOA's 121606 requests 3rd Fleet to operate west of LUZON.

Com3rdFlt's 121941 pink outlines his employment of the task force in the CHINA SEA and states that he will be able to remain there (CHINA SEA) until 23 January.

CTG 77.2 111611 sets forth Annex A of Battle Plan A.
12 January (Oahu date)

Reports from Com3rdFleet indicate that bad weather slowed fueling of the task force on the 13th and also prevented complete searches. Fueling and searches are reported as continuing today in the vicinity of 18 North 114 East.

Additional damage from suicide planes in the LINGAYEN area covering the night 11-12 follows:

BELKNAP (APD 34) - heavily damaged.
GILLIGAN (DE 508) - superficial damage.
R. W. SUESENS (DE 342) - superficial damage.

A relief oiler group consisting of 7 AOs and 2 CVEs that has been operating east of the PHILIPPINES has been ordered into the SOUTH CHINA SEA. They will arrive off LEYTE afternoon of the 14th, pick up 2 3rd Fleet oilers already stationed there, transit SURIGAO STRAIT and arrive off MINDORO morning of the 16th where they will join the oilers of TG 30.8 which have refueled TF 38. The empty oilers will then return to ULITHI via SURIGAO STRAIT.

BALAO (SS 285) reports sinking a large tanker with 7 hits. She also sank a small sailing vessel.

Continued air attacks on ground objectives by the shore based air force are being carried out in the LUZON area. Cumulative figures since the LINGAYEN operation commenced show the following destruction inflicted on mobile units:

26 locomotives.
309 railway cars.
390 trucks.
8 tanks.
11 armed cars.

Approximately 30 B-24's have been hitting TWO JIMA every day for the past few days. Each plane appears to carry approximately a two-ton bomb load.

Photographs taken on the 12th indicate that all runways on both TWO JIMA air fields continued to be operative, with a maximum of 10 operational aircraft present.

Final results of the strike on FORMOSA by planes of TF 38 follows:
12 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

Enemy planes destroyed.........................42
Enemy planes damaged..............................61
Enemy ships sunk..................................15
(2 DD or DE, 1 large AO, 1 large AK,
2 medium AK, 9 small ships)
Enemy small craft sunk.............................18
Enemy ships damaged...............................62
(3 AO, 5 large AK, 3 medium AK, 1 DD,
5 DE, 45 small ships)
Enemy small craft damaged.........................42

Our losses in this strike were 10 planes, with 5 pilots and
8 air crewmen missing.

The first strike on FORMOSA was carried out the night of
January 11-12 by B-24's based at LEYTE. 40 planes made the
attack on the HEITO air field. There was no opposition,
either fighter or AA.

Joint Chiefs' of Staff 062231 covers request to WEDEMEYER
for photograph coverage of certain areas of the CHINA
coast.

AAFPOA's 102302 covers the effort being made by WEDEMEYER
to support the 20th BomCom during period 10 January to 17
January.

MacARThUR's 121252 relative to employment of 3rd Fleet
in the protection of the LINGAYEN beachhead.

Com7thFlt 121415 covers OpPlan for M-6.

MacARThUR's 301431 covers requirements for M-1 reinforce-
ment convoys and conduct of the M-3 operation.

CinCPoA's 130850 answers MacARThUR's dispatch relative
to employment of 3rd Fleet units to cover the LINGAYEN beach-
head and discusses release of 3rd Fleet units at an early date.

MacARThUR's 130215 requests Com Allied Air Forces to
extend searches to include the CAPE SAINT JACQUES-SAIGON area
in an effort to locate the 2nd Diversion Attack Force.

CinCSWPA 131511 requests Com Allied Air Forces to extend
search sectors along the northwest coast of BORNEO-PALAWAN
with view of possibly locating the 2nd Diversion Attack Force.

DepComAF 20 132144 states that BomCom 20 will comply
with CinCPac's request to search the INDO-CHINA coast in an
effort to locate the 2nd Diversion Attack Force.
13 January (Oahu date)

Task Force 38 is operating east of HAINAN, scheduled to carry out missions against that target. No reports have been received regarding this strike.

Suicide attacks in the LINGAYEN area on the 12th resulted in damage to four ships. The SALAMAUA (CVE 96) was hit by a plane which penetrated her flight deck. The after engine room was reported flooded but indications are that she can travel at 5 knots under her own power. 1 AKA and 2 liberty ships were also hit on this day.

Photographs of 8 FORMOSA air fields by planes of the 20th BomCom showed 259 planes on the 13th.

The 20th and 21st BomComs were active on the 14th. 82 B-29's of the 20th BomCom were airborne for an attack on SHINCHIKU (northwestern FORMOSA). Preliminary reports indicate that instead of hitting the primary target the majority of planes dumped their bombs on the KAGI air field, which was a secondary target. Cloud cover was 10/10, hence results were unobserved.

On the 14th 73 B-29's of the 21st BomCom took off for an attack on the MITSUBISHI Aircraft Factory. Preliminary reports indicate that 41 planes bombed the primary target, 6 visually and 35 by radar. No report of results has as yet been received.

CinCPOA's 122013 requests ComGen U. S. Army Forces CHINA to support ICEBERG operations in accordance with Fivesome Agreement and to continue mining operations in the HONG KONG Harbor.

ComAirPac's 131938 discusses employment of certain carriers and suggests revision of current Cardiv organization.
14 January (Oahu date)

The 3rd Fleet reports that Task Force 38 was snooped on the afternoon of the 14th while fueling. Strike on FORMOSA, plus fighter sweeps on AMOY, SWATOW and HONG KONG, were scheduled for the 15th (I). Com3rdFlt reports bad weather, which probably prevented extensive damage to shipping concentrations which have been reported in the target area the past few days. A strike is scheduled by Task Force 38 on HONG KONG on the 16th and also a sweep of HAINAN is likewise scheduled the same day. The Force is scheduled to fuel on the 17th.

FRENCH INDO-CHINA - 12th (amplification): Com3rdFleet reports final results of the strikes and sweeps of TF 38 planes on the 12th:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy ships sunk</td>
<td>41 ships, 127,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy ships damaged</td>
<td>28 ships, 70,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples: 11-ship convoy of 1 AO, 4 med. AK, 2 DE, 4 PC</td>
<td>total 17,000 tons, completely destroyed. A 19-ship convoy had 11 ships sunk and 8 others beached and damaged - typhoon bait. 80 per cent of ship destruction was substantiated by extensive photos.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy planes destroyed in air</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy planes destroyed on ground</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy planes destroyed on water</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total enemy planes destroyed</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy planes damaged on ground</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Included in planes destroyed were practically all of 23 reinforcing Bettys and 25-30 Tojos and Oscars which arrived in time to be destroyed by the dusk target CAP. Many others from 45 twin-engine -- mostly transports -- and 29 single-engine seen at TAM SON NHUT.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Our combat plane losses</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our operational plane losses</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our pilots missing</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our aircrewmens missing</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ground damage included a long dock at CAMRANH destroyed by torpedoes; 5 of 9 shell tanks at SAIGON; oil storage, buildings and warehouses, a seaplane hangar, and heavy damage to Texas and Standard Vacuum plants.

There was no damage to our surface forces and their withdrawal was not snooped.
Further reports on the strike against FORMOSA by the 20th BomCom on the 14th indicate that 54 B-29's attacked the KAGI airdrome. Seven planes were destroyed on the ground and six were damaged. 69 planes were observed on the ground plus 57 dummy planes. Another strike on FORMOSA is scheduled by the 20th BomCom for the 16th.

TRUK was hit on the 14th by 42 B-24's. Direct hits were scored on the runways and dispersal areas of the north and south MOEN airfields. Three enemy fighters were airborne but failed to attack. Shortly after the B-24's hit this target 10 P-38's carried out a fighter sweep in the TRUK area destroying two enemy fighters. One P-38 is reported missing from this strike.

CinCPac's 140050 recommends establishment of Air Force Subordinate Command, Forward Area, short title: AirPacSubComFwd.

DepComAF 20 142125 outlines to ARNOLD the present plans for development of air fields and facilities for the VLR's in the MARIANAS.

CinCPOA's 150021 (pink) requests clarification regarding assembly for staging of the 24th Corps.

CinCPOA's 150649 (top secret) requests CinCSoWesPac to allow Com5thFlt to send ships to CASIGURAN BAY after IWO JIMA operation to determine suitability for advanced anchorage during OKINAWA operation.

CTF 77 120730 (top secret) covers release of ships to the Pacific Fleet subsequent to Ml operation.

Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia Command 140930 (top secret) states that he has no objection to the 20th BomCom bombing and mining FORMOSA on 22 and 23 January.
15 January (Oahu date)

Com3rdFleet reports successful strikes on the South CHINA Coast on 15 and 16 January. The force was located on the 15th but on the 16th there were no snoopers and no enemy attacks were made on the force. Incomplete results of the strikes on these two days indicate that 16 planes were shot down, 18 destroyed on the ground and 36 were damaged.

Com7thFleet reports that unloading continues in the LINGAYEN GULF with little air opposition encountered.

CTF 94 (Vice Admiral HOOVER) reports that the FLEMING (DE 32), which made contact on a submarine between ENIWETOK and GUAM, probably succeeded in sinking it on the 14th. Reports state that oil is continuing to rise 30 hours after the attack.

63 B-24s, based both at PALAU and in the PHILIPPINES, attacked LUZON targets on the 13th and 14th. Considerable damage was reported as being inflicted. At IWO JIMA attacks were continued on the 15th by B-24s. 14 planes made hits on the No. 1 air field and fires were reported as being observed.

CinCPOA's 130237 (pink) outlines approval for future employment of certain VLR wings in the NANSEI SHOTO area and further authorizes another VLR wing to be employed on GUAM subject to availability of shipping and supporting service troops.

Com7thFlt's 121415 and Com7thFlt's 151018 (pink) outline changes to OpPlan 18-44.

Com3rdFlt's 160211 (pink) recommends to CinCPac that after fueling on the 17th he desires to move east of the FORMOSA-LUZON line in view of the fact that further offensive operations by Task Force 38 are not considered commensurate with the effort and risk involved.

CinCPac's 161836 (pink) proposes to direct HALSEY to move eastward of LUZON STRAIT and strike enemy air force in FORMOSA and OKINAWA and requests concurrence of CominCH.

CominCh 162220 (pink) concurs in CinCPac's recommendation to direct Com3rdFlt to operate east of the LUZON-FORMOSA line.

ComGenAAFPOA's 150102 refers to service troops to support VLR wings scheduled for Pacific operations.

CinCPOA's 151817 approves ComGenAAFPOA's appearing directly above with certain attendant provisions.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, together with Vice Admiral FITCH and party, arrived PEARL HARBOR this date.
16 January (Oahu date)

Task Force 38 continues to fuel on the 17th and if undetected by the enemy will transit LUZON STRAITS on the night of 17-18 January and will conduct strikes against FORMOSA on the 19th and will strike OKINAWA on the 21st or 22nd. Fueling operations will be carried out on the 20th.

ComNavGroup CHINA reports 3 large enemy convoys, one of 9 transports and another of 15 auxiliaries, along the CHINA COAST north of AMOY and another transport group in the CHOSUN STRAITS headed northeast.

B-29 reports indicate that sightings were made in the KOBE HARBOR of 20 large ocean going vessels and similar reports of shipping in the OSAKA HARBOR indicate 55 large vessels (at least 10 of which appear to be large warships plus 1 CV).

Amplified reports from the 21st BomCom relative to the strike on the MITSUBISH plant at NAGOYA on the 14th reveal that 40 B-29s attacked the primary target, dropping 94 tons thereon. 20 B-29s attacked the urban area. Airborne interceptors made aggressive attacks. 20 aircraft are reported as being destroyed, 14 probably destroyed and 31 additional damaged. Our losses were 34 personnel; damage to our planes not stated.

TWO JIMA was attacked again on the 16th by 10 B-24s together with a P-38 escort. The P-38 escort was hampered by unfavorable weather and only two reached the target, one of which was ditched upon returning (25 miles northwest of SAIPAN).

CinC BPF 152201 (pink) covers the reporting for duty to CinCPac by Commander in Chief, British Pacific Fleet, in accordance with the Octagon decisions.

CinCPOA's 161837 (pink) recommends inclusion of LINGGA ROADS in the mining plans for 25 January (20th BomCom).

CinC BPF 151234 (pink) outlines the organization of the British Pacific Fleet regarding nomenclature of units and authorities forming the task force.

CinCPac's 170133 (pink) concerns information received regarding supply of petroleum requirements for the British Pacific Fleet.

CinCPOA's 162359 (pink) requests Com3rdFleet to acknowledge his dispatch relative to immediate employment of 3rd Fleet.
16 January (Oahu date) (Continued)

Com3rdFlt's 170243 (pink) schedules movements of Task Force 38 from 18 January to 22 January inclusive.

CinCBPF 160327 (pink) refers to supply of bulk petroleum products to British units operating in the Pacific and sets forth estimates of contemplated requirements for the month of April.

CinCSWPA's 150110 (pink) covers transfer of certain units in the SoWesPac area to the 24th Corps.

CinCEI 130939, 130956, 131024 and 131046 (pink) cover operations to be carried out against the PALEMBANG refinery on 22 January and further cover dates on which British Pacific Fleet units will arrive Fremantle.

CTF 77 (Vice Admiral KINCAID) 170432 (pink) outlines requirements for certain Pacific Ocean Area ships for employment in the M7 operation scheduled for 29 January and further requests retention in the SoWesPac Area of certain fleet units.

CinCPac's 170305 (pink) covers requirements for combat employment of Marine aviation during the next six months.

17 January (Oahu date)

Due to heavy weather CTF 38 was unable to complete fueling on the 18th and plans to carry out operation plan "EXIT" which contemplates transit of SURIGAO STRAIT instead of LUZON STRAIT as previously planned.

Allied Air Forces assumed responsibility and direct support of ground operations and protection of naval forces on the 17th. This releases 8 CVEs and escorts which left LINGAYEN the night of the 17th for ULITHI.

Troop and resupply echelons for Eastern MINDORO and Western MARINDUQUE completed missions without enemy contact on 16, 17 and 18 January.

The results of air action in the PHILIPPINES are reported as follows:

LUZON (14th - delayed reports):
21 B-25s with P-51 cover striking APARRI destroyed 20 planes on the ground and shot down 2.

- Continued -
17 January (Cont'd)

LUZON (Cont'd)

19 A-20s with P-47 cover hit TUGUEGARAO, south of APARRI, destroying 3 planes and shooting down 1.
36 A-20s destroyed 35-40 planes on the ground in a low-level attack on Clark Field.
PALAU-based B-24s attacked CABANATUAN Airfield, destroying buildings and causing many fires.
10 B-25s hit BATANGAS Area, knocking out 30-40 trucks and 3 tanks.
23 MINDORO-based P-40s attacked railroad installations at TARLOC.

LUZON (15th):
PALAU B-24s hit Clark Field, causing fires.
P-40s attacked MANILA area, strafing 60-70 trucks and 6-8 tanks.
All types of aircraft continued attacking communications and transportation in the BATANGAS-BICOL Area.

BUERTO PRINCESSA, PALAWAN (15th):
25 A-20s bombed airfield, results unobserved.

BORNEO (15th):
33 B-24s bombed JESSELTON Field.
9 B-24s bombed railroad yards.

ComNavGroup CHINA 170631 (pink) states that 14th Air Force will conduct maximum operations practicable during the ICEBERG Operation and will continue the mining of HONGKONG HARBOR.

MacArthur 171229 (pink) urges retention of six old battleships until the situation has clarified in the LUZON Area.

MacArthur 171400 (pink) concerns present utilization of the 24th Corps at LEYTE.

CinCSWPA 171535 (Pink) discusses the dates for return of CVE's and escorts from Southwest Pacific Area to POA.

CinCSWPA 180141 (pink) concurs in Vice Admiral Kinkaid's despatch relative to returning certain fleet units in the Southwest Pacific Area.

Cincpac 180358 (pink) sets forth schedule for the release and retention of certain fleet units in Southwest Pacific Area.

Com3rdFleet 180947 (pink) states that 19 January will be the day for executing Plan "EXIT" (transit of SURIGAO STRAIT).

Com3rdFleet 181001 (pink) that refueling was hampered by severe weather and states that he expects to refuel on the 19th west of LUZON and will transit SURIGAO STRAIT shortly thereafter.

- Continued -
17 January (Cont'd)

Cincpac 181837 (pink) suggests giving consideration to the transit of LUZON STRAIT instead of SURIGAO STRAIT.

Cominch 182120 (pink) concurs in Cincpac's recommendation appearing directly above.

ComAFSWPA 162210 (pink) states that 5th Air Force FORMOSA strikes have been cancelled for 16 January and will be postponed indefinitely during establishment of Air Force in LINGAYEN Area.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 170349 (pink) covers the three phases of ICEBERG Operation and that pending further preparations for the SUBLIME Coast operation should be deferred but preparations should continue for an operation in the CHUSAN-NINGPO Area.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 162254 (pink) covers redeployment of 20th Bomber Command from CHINA bases to the MARIANAS and deployment of the 7th Heavy Bombardment Squadron from INDIA to the 14th Air Force in CHINA upon evacuation of the CHENGDU bases by the 20th Bomber Command.

Cominch 301328 (pink) covers employment of tankers in the Pacific Area.

18 January (Oahu date)

CTF 38 has cancelled plans to transit SURIGAO and now intends to transit LUZON STRAITS (BALINTAG CHANNEL) on the night 20-21 January. Attacks are scheduled against FORMOSA on the 21st and OKINAWA on the 23rd or 24th.

Revised figures have been received relative to the strikes on HONGKONG and HAINAN:

Destroyed: 3 AK and 3 small AK  
Damaged: 2 AK  
1 large AP  
4 AO (torpedoes & bombs-KAMOI)  
9 small AK  
1 DD, 5 DE  
Plus many small craft

Our Losses:

Planes - 26 combat  
27 operational  
Missing - 24 pilots  
19 crewmen

Intense, accurate AA - HONGKONG. High seas, and overcast.

B-29s from the 20th Bomber Command hit SHINCHIKU on the 16th. 78 planes bombed the target with a total of 505 tons.

In the PHILIPPINES unfavorable weather appears to have restricted air operations to some extent. Enemy air attacks on our LINGAYEN and MINDORO positions were reported to have declined materially. The LINGAYEN strip was being used by our fighters and transports commencing the 16th.

- Continued -
18 January (Cont'd)

Cominch 171916 (pink) authorizes Cincpac to establish a new flag officer command, subordinate command of Air Force, Pacific Fleet, in the forward area to be known as AirPacSubComFord.

Com3rdFlt 181022 (pink) advises CinCWWPA that unfavorable weather has caused 3rd Fleet operating schedule to be unpredictable and suggests that he continue his strikes dependent upon his capabilities alone.

CinCWWPA 181231 (pink) grants authority for Com5thFleet to investigate CASIGURUN BAY (16 N, 122 E - E. coast LUZON).

Com3rdFlt 190438 (pink) covers operating schedule from 19 January to 24 January.

Com3rdFlt 190910 (pink) sets forth his estimate of the general situation.

19 January (Oahu date)

TF 38 was scheduled to transit LUZON STRAIT the night of 20-21 and will operate in the near future eastward of the FORMOSA-LUZON line.

CTF 77.2 (V. Adm. Oldendorf), whose forces consist of 6 OBB, 3 CA, 12 DD, covering LINGAYEN GULF have been ordered to remain inside the Gulf prepared to sortie on short notice. Light covering forces continue to operate west of MINDORO.

On the 19th, 64 B-29s from the 21st Bomber Command bombed the Kawasaki Aircraft Engine Plant at AKASHI. Bombing was conducted from 26,000 feet and 640 500-lb. general purpose bombs were dropped on the target. Huge fires and explosions were reported in the target area. Five enemy intercepting planes were shot down, 3 probably shot down and 3 damaged. No mention is made of any losses to blue planes.

MacArthur 191252 (pink) is in reply to a request by Cincpoa relative to the withdrawal of Third Fleet units.

Cincpoa 191729 (pink) concurs in Halsey's estimate of the general situation.

ComGenAAFPPOA 200435 (pink) covers VLR Wing facilities at TINIAN and GUAM.

Cincpoa 172233 (pink) points out that operations against enemy held positions in the MARSHALLS should be reviewed to making certain that expenditure of personnel, fuel and explosive are justified by the results to be obtained.
19 January (Oahu date - Cont'd)

CinCPOA 190158 (pink) authorizes release of the 498th Bomb Group from allocation to the Pacific Ocean Areas.

CinCPOA 190308 (pink) covers CinCPOA responsibilities for providing bulk petroleum requirements for the British Pacific Fleet.

CTF 77 200034 (pink) covers change No. 4 to OpPlan 18-44.

CinCWPAn 200535 (pink) outlines to CinCPOA that the 24th Corps will be ready for ICEBERG to meet its scheduled date of 1 April.

20 January (Oahu date)

Task Force 38 made strikes on FORMOSA and SAKASHIMA GUNTO on the 21st. No reports have been received as to damage inflicted.

Incomplete reports indicate that the TICONDEROGA was damaged, however she is proceeding to ULITHI under her own power. All available tugs at ULITHI have been ordered to the fueling area, 20-30 N, 125 E.

A destroyer and cruiser sweep around SAKASHIMA GUNTO originally scheduled for 21 January was cancelled.

A report from the ZEILIN (APA 3) indicates that she was hit on 13 January by a suicide plane.

A strike is scheduled for 22 January by units of the British Fleet against PALAMBANG oil refineries.

Com3rdFlt reports numerous Japanese planes observed ferrying between FORMOSA and LUZON, majority of which were southbound. Ten of these planes being ferried were shot down.

Air activity continued on the 19th against TWO JIMA and CHICHI JIMA. 9 B-24s hit the former target and 7 B-24s bombed the latter target.

There was no enemy air activity over the LINGAYEN Area for a period of 48 hours (17th to 19th). Air attacks by our forces continued in the LUZON Area. A number of planes were destroyed in sweeps over LAOAG, LIPA, LEGASPI and SAN MARCELINO Fields.

CinCPOA 201817 answers CinCWPAn despatch relative to release of 2 damaged battleships for overhaul.

CinCPOA 210156 (pink) answers CinCWPAn despatch relative to release of the 24th Corps for the OKINAWA Operation.
21 January (Oahu date)

On 21 January (ELD) Task Force 38 attacked the enemy air force, shipping and installations in FORMOSA. Forty-three Japanese aircraft were destroyed in aerial combat, 97 were destroyed on the ground, and approximately 100 more were damaged in attacks on the airdromes at HEITO, CHOSHU, MATSUYAMA, EIKO, KUPUTSUA, GIRAN, KOSHUN and TAIEN. Intense antiaircraft fire was encountered at TAKAO. At TAKAO two large ships and the docks and industrial area were left burning furiously. Considerable damage was inflicted on shipping at KEELUNG, TOSHIEN and NAN WAN in FORMOSA, at MAKO in the PESCADEROS and in the SAKISHIMA Islands.

During this operation the TICONDEROGA (CV-14), LANGLEY (CVL-27) and MADDOX (DD-731) were damaged.

Eleventh Army Air Force planes attacked KATAOKA WAN on the island of SHIMUSHU in the northernmost KURILES.

Docks and buildings on YAP were bombed and small craft at BABELTHUAP were destroyed by aircraft of Fleet Air Wing ONE.

The FOURTH Marine Aircraft Wing aircraft continued neutralization of islands in the MARSHALLS.

22 January (Oahu date)

Vice Admiral Oldendorf with CALIFORNIA (BB-44) and NEW MEXICO (BB-40) has left the LINGAYEN area for ULITHI. Rear Admirals Weyler and Sowell are remaining in MISSISSIPPI (BB-41), PENNSYLVANIA, (BB-38), WEST VIRGINIA (BB-48) and COLORADO (BB-45).

Com3rdFleet's 221010 advises completion of photographic strike on OKINAWA and withdrawal toward ULITHI.

Com3rdFleet's 221545 reports damage to HANCOCK (CV-19) by deck explosion of a bomb on own airplane and advises 10 days required to repair HANCOCK (CV-19) and LANGLEY (CVL-27).

CinCPac's 222059 (pink) covers status Rear Admiral Hall at LEYTE.

MacArthur's 211541 covers modification of FILBAS Agreement concerning individual Army personnel.
TOP REPORT

22 - 26 January 1945 (Guam dates)

Preliminary report of 3rd Fleet strikes against FORMOSA on 21 January follows:

- 43 planes shot down in the air.
- 97 - on the ground.
- Substantial shipping damage at TOSHIEN, KEELUNG, AMOY, and SAKA-SHIMA.
- At TAKAO the docks and industrial areas were left burning furiously.
  - 70,000 tons of shipping were estimated sunk.

On the 22nd strikes were again carried out on FORMOSA, resulting in the following damage:

- 27 planes destroyed on the ground and 41 others damaged.
- 1 medium AK exploded and 31 small vessels were sunk, plus 27 others damaged.
- Excessive damage was inflicted on buildings on IE SHIMA, and other installations in the area were also damaged.

TICONDEROGA (CV 14) was hit by 2 suicide bombers on the 21st and 22nd. The HANCOCK (CV 19) was damaged by an explosion of a bomb in one of her own planes. Repairs are estimated to be completed in 10 days. The LANGLEY (CVL 27) also was hit by a bomb and estimated time for completion of repairs is 10 days. The MADDOX (DD 731) was hit by a suicide bomber.

Com7thFlt (VAdm Kinkaid) announces the organization of a new heavy covering group (TF 77.2) consisting of:

- PENNSYLVANIA (RAdm Weyler, CTG)
- MISSISSIPPI
- WEST VIRGINIA (RAdm Sowell)
- COLORADO
- SHROPSHIRE
- PORTLAND
- MINNEAPOLIS
- and 12 DD

This group is charged with the defense of shipping in LEYTE GULF from surface attack.

A coordinated attack (TF 93, 21st Bomber Command, and TG 94.9) against IWO JIMA took place on the 24th. Spotting reports indicate that the ship bombardment was successful. 3 small AK's were sunk, 1 plane was destroyed and 3 damaged. A heavy weather front forced the bombardment group to break off after expenditure of only 60 percent of allotted ammunition.

A hunter-killer group made a definite kill of an enemy submarine on the 22nd west of ULITHI.

BARB (SS 220) reports 8 hits in a convoy anchored on the CHINA COAST north of the STRAITS OF FORMOSA. 3 ships are claimed to have been sunk in this attack.
ComSubsPac reports that GUARDFISH (SS 217) sank one of our own ships, the USS EXTRACTOR (ARS 15) at 232127 GCT at 15-44N, 135-29 E, (between GUAM and LUZON). Commanding Officer and 72 personnel were rescued; 6 are reported missing. The sequence of events leading up to this sinking is as follows: At 2117/23rd, GUARDFISH reported a radar contact on a small ship at 15-11N, 137-00E, and stated that she was tracking and requested information as to possibility of its being a friendly submarine. At 0001/24th she gave her position, the course and speed of the target, further stating that she would maintain contact and attack "when positive of enemy character." At 0235 CTF 77 listed the friendly submarines in the vicinity and told the GUARDFISH that if she was in a Joint Zone, the contact, if a surface ship, was probably friendly. The sinking took place at 0627. ComFwdArea has ordered a board of inquiry.

 Strikes were carried out against IWO JIMA from the 20th to the 23rd by 80 B-24's attacking airfield installations. Enemy planes attempted to intercept on three occasions, with a total of 10 to 12 Zekes.

 On the 21st an unreported number of B-29's escorted by 16 P-38's attacked TRUK meeting no enemy opposition.

 On the 23rd an unreported number of B-29's bombed the MITSUBISHI Aircraft Engine Plant at NAGOYA. No details have as yet been received.

 Com3rdFlt transferred command to Com5thFlt at 1400 GCT 26 January, and CTF 58 (VAdm Mitscher) relieved CTF 38 (VAdm McCain) at the same time.

 ComGen BomCom 20 251115 (pink) outlines tentative schedule of 20th Bomber Command operations during the month of February.

 Cominich & CNO 231341 (pink) proposes transfer of vessels under lend-lease to USSR in DUTCH HARBOR or other base in that area, and requests ComNorPac's comment on feasibility.

 MacArthur 240259 (pink) concurs in Cincpac 222059, designating RAdm James L. Hall as Senior Officer of the Pacific Fleet Present and Cincpac's representative on LEYTE.

 JCS 251348 (pink) states that CHINA Theater support for ICEBERG will be as arranged directly between Admiral Nimitz and General Wedemeyer and authorizes direct communication and exchange of liaison officers as necessary.

 Cincpac and Cincpoa departed for GUAM 26 January 1945.
27 January 1945 (Guam Date)

A report has been received regarding the damage incurred by the HANCOCK (CV 19) on the 21st. Upon return from a combat mission a TBM was taxing up the deck when a 500 pound general purpose bomb fell to the flight deck and exploded. An area in the flight deck some 70 feet by 50 feet received severe structural damage. 7 officers and 43 men were killed and approximately 80 others wounded.

PARCHÉ (SS 384) reports several hits in a large Tanker west of KYUSHU on the 19th.

SILVERSIDES (SS 230) reports two hits in an AK NW of OKINAWA.

On the 24th more than 120 British Carrier Planes attacked the Petroleum center at PALEMBANG (SUMATRA). No details of this strike have been received as yet.

On the 25th IWO JIMA was hit by 14 B-24's loaded with 100 pound bombs. Bombing was conducted at 18000 feet. Clouds prevented observation of results.

CominCh 261459 (secret) outlines proposal to assign Navy Air Groups to the Flagship and Relief Flagship and Marine Air Groups to the other 4 ships of the first 4 Divisions of COMMENCEMENT BAY (CVE 105) class carriers.

CinCSWPA 271407 (secret) covers coordination of operations of the 14th Air Force and the Allied Air Force during current operations.

MacArthur 251304 (pink) refers to return of APD's for duty in 5th Fleet.

Com5thFleet 252041 (pink) makes available certain surface ships to ComPhibsPac for DETACHMENT Operation.

CinCBPF 260649 and 260737 (pinks) outlines readiness date of certain units of British Pacific Fleet (15 March 1945).

CG 10th Army 262113 (pink) outlines readiness date of 77th Division, 7th Division and 96th Division and further states that the 24 Corps will not be available for relief until arrival of Americal Divisions.

CTF 77 270156 (pink) outlines certain surface units to be returned to Cincpoa for duty.

Cincpac and Cincpoa arrived GUAM 27 January 1945.
28 January 1945 (Guam Date)

21st Bomber Command reports that 100 merchant vessels were sighted East of TOKYO on a course 90° (in several large V formations).

The Headquarters of the 5th Air Force, the 5th Bomber Command, and the 5th Fighter Command moved from LEYTE to MINDORO on the 27th.

CTF 93 (Lt. Gen Harmon) reports that (26 January marked the 50th consecutive day IWO JIMA has been bombarded by the 7th Air Force Liberators, averaging 28 planes per day. Marine Mitchells on the same date completed 52 consecutive night searches of the BONINS-KAZANS area, averaging 3 planes per night.

80 B-29's from the 21st Bomber Command attacked MUSASHINO aircraft plant at TOKYO on the 28th. Reports indicate the destruction or damage of 75 enemy interceptors. 5 B-29's are reported missing. No further details have been received.

CNO to NAVOP/01 231323 (secret) outlines the functions to be carried out by the Advance and Pearl Headquarters.

Cincpac 280040 (secret) states commencing 0000 GCT 29 January action will be taken by Advance Headquarters on all dispatches.

Com5thFleet 280001 (pink) (Admiral Spruance) states that he will provide coverage of MARCUS, WOLEAI, LAMOTREK and TRUK and further states that neutralization of these bases will be carried out by TF 93 as per his OP Order.

29 January (Guam date)

A landing was scheduled to be carried out on the 29th near the SAN ANTONIO Area in LUZON. No reports have been received as yet. Purpose of this landing is to endeavor to hinder any retreat that the Japanese might make on the BATAAN PENINSULA.

A diversionary attack is scheduled to be made in the UNISAN Area of southwest LUZON on the night of the 30th. 24 PT's and 24 LCI's will participate. After dark on the 30th they will move to the target area and conduct simulated landings at midnight on the 31st employing rocket shore bombardment and radio deception measures.

PICUDA (SS 382) reports an attack on a 5-ship convoy on the 28th in the EAST CHINA SEA resulting in the sinking of a medium AK and damaging 2 others, either AP's or AK's. The BARB (SS 270) at the same time attacked a northbound convoy in the same area obtaining 2 hits in an AK.

On the 28th 3 Marine PBJ's attacked a total of 4 DD's and 7 AKs in three groups north and south of CHICHI JIMA. 1 DD was hit twice on the stern and 2 explosions were observed. It appeared to be stopped and dead in the water. A second DD was hit twice, emitting fire and smoke and a third DD was slightly damaged. A medium AK was hit underwater. Search PB4Ys were ordered to search for any cripples from these attacks.

- Continued -
29 January (Guam date) (Cont'd)

On the 27th at SAIGON 22 B-29s from the 20th Bomber Command bombed the naval yards and arsenal dropping 66 tons thereon. No losses were reported of our planes and no enemy planes destroyed.

A British carrier force (composition not stated) struck the PALAMBANG oil refineries on the 24th. Extensive damage was inflicted on the power houses, distilleries and distillation plants in the target area and further damage was inflicted on enemy intercepting planes. 13 enemy fighters were shot down in the air and 34 planes destroyed on the ground. British losses numbered 9 planes.

74 B-29s from the 21st Bomber Command were airborne for an attack on the Musashino Aircraft Plant at TOKYO on the 27th. Of this total 65 planes dropped 173 tons on the secondary target which was in the TOKYO harbor area. Enemy fighter opposition was heavy. Reports indicate that approximately 1,050 attacks were made by various types of intercepting fighters. 21st Bomber Command reports that 57 enemy planes were destroyed, 21 probably destroyed and 41 damaged. Our losses were 5 B-29s lost to enemy action and 2 others missing. One B-29 crash-landed at base due to damage from the enemy fighters.

Cincpoa 290831 (pink) covers arrangements for support of ICEBERG by the CHINA Theater.

AAFPOA 290515 (pink) refers to assignment of five Army Fighter Groups to the 20th Air Force.

Wedemeyer 270725 (pink) covers pending conference between Commanding General, CHINA Theater and Cincpoa.

30 January (Guam date)

There is only one report of the results of the landings in the SAN ANTONIO Area, which states that SUBIC BAY has been substantially cleared of mines, and that mine-sweeping operations will be finished today.

Com7thFleet reports that CAVALIER (APA 37) was torpedoed off SUBIC BAY. The hit was aft on the port side; the ship is unable to proceed under her own power and is being towed to LEYTE. A preliminary investigation indicates 4 weeks at a Navy Yard are required for repairs.

21 B-24s hit IWO JIMA on the 29th with 42 1/2 tons from 18,000 feet. AA did minor damage to 5 B-24s and seriously wounded one aircrewman. In addition, 33 B-29s were airborne from TINIAN for attacks on IWO JIMA. Of the 33 planes, 30 acutely bombed the airstrips one and two resulting in heavy explosions. All planes returned safely, though one was damaged by AA fire. 3 PBJs report damaging 1 medium AK and 1 large AK from 2 convoys of 8 & 9 ships each, and possibly damaging a DE in the vicinity of the BONINS.

BOARFISH (SS 327) reports sighting 2 CL, 4 escorts and 2 escorting planes at 17001/30 off QUINHON on a southerly course, speed 20.

Joint Staff Planners 292045 (pink) states that alternate plans for the defeat of JAPAN under various dates for redeployment from EUROPE are now under examination. Also that Joint Logistics Committee is re-examining subject of availability of forces and resources after ICEBERG.

- Continued -
30 January (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CinCSWPA 300023 outlines modifications in composition of 24th Corps.

Cincpac 300613 (pink) requests confirmation of tentative plans for employment of the British Pacific Fleet in the ICEBERG Operation.

Wedemeyer 301331 requests concurrence in contemplated B-29 aerial mining of mouth of YANGTZE RIVER west of 122 East Meridian.

31 January (Guam date)

Report from CTF 77 (V. Adm. Kinkaid) states that the M-7 landing was carried out successfully on the 29th without opposition. The scheduled bombardment of the beachhead was not carried out due to the fact that no opposition was encountered. Direct air support was provided by the CVE group, but no reports of air opposition have been received. Unloading was delayed somewhat due to the fact that there were no suitable beaches in the landing area.

The diversionary operation at UNISAN was completed the night of the 30th in accordance with the plan.

ComNavGroup CHINA reports that on the 30th 3 cruisers, 1 DD and 2 troop transports were sighted off Quiniton headed north and 4 cruisers and 1 destroyer sighted headed south.

CTF 71 reports that PARGO (SS 264) scored a hit on a DD or CL with 3 escorts at 1700 1/31st.

BESUGO (SS 321) reports results of wolfpack operations in the SOUTH CHINA SEA. BLACKFIN (SS 322) sank a SHIMO class DD and damaged a large tanker on the 24th. BESUGO hit a medium tanker.

BARB (SS 316) submits a further report. Dispatched a boarding party who recovered charts and books of doubtful value, but did obtain Jap radio receiver and transmitter.

BERGALL (SS 320) off BRUNEI BAY sank two PCs unaided and obtained two prisoners. Two reluctant patrol vessels still in port.

28 B-24s in strike and snipe missions attacked IWO JIMA airfields on the 30th with 100 and 500-pound bombs. One of 3 intercepting Zekes was damaged. 5 of our planes sustained AA damage.

76 B-29s, carrying 6 to 8 mines each, were scheduled to mine the waters around SINGAPORE, SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, and CAMRANH BAY on the 25th. Secondary targets were PENANG, MERGUI, BANGKOK, and TAVOY HARBOR.

ComFifthFleet 300840 (pink) directs that coverage of MARCUS, WOLEAI, LAMOTREK and TRUK be conducted at irregular intervals, averaging approximately once weekly.

Cincpac 310212 (pink) requests estimated date of release of four battleships retained by CTF 77 (V. Adm. Kinkaid).
31 January (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CinCPAC 310734 (pink) concerns effort to be made to improve the runway at IWO JIMA as soon as possible for the operation of Navy search Liberators after provision of minimum requirements for fighter defense.

CinCPAC 312305 (pink) concerns the assigning of NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON for bombardment of IWO JIMA and also authorizes an increase of the interval between the carrier strike on the Empire and the assault on IWO JIMA.

ComINCH 311825 (pink) concerns allocation of British Pacific Fleet units to Pacific Ocean Areas control.

1 February (Guam date)

A landing was made on NASUGBU in the BATAYAS PROVINCE on the 31st. No opposition was encountered at the beachhead and reports indicate that our forces are continuing inland.

SERPENS (AK 97), while at anchor at LUNGA POINT (GUADALCANAL), exploded on the 29th and sank immediately. Reports state that there are ten survivors from the ship. A submarine contact was made at the time of the explosion and indications point to the fact that the explosion may have been caused by a torpedo.

Reports from MacArthur indicate that our advance patrols are 28 miles from MANILA. Casualty reports have been received stating that on LEYTE as of 29 January 71,624 Japanese have been killed with 631 POW. Our casualties during the LEYTE Campaign are announced as: killed, 3,135; wounded, 9,865; missing, 160.

On the 31st, 20 B-24s hit IWO JIMA. Interception by 4 aggressive Zekes inflicted no damage. Photographs taken on this date showed 11 probably operational planes on airfield number 2. On the day preceding, 14 aircraft were photographed on the same field.

Two Marine PBJs made strikes on a DD 10 miles north of HAHA JIMA on the night of the 31st.

CTF 77 010308 recommends release date of 5 February for the 4 BBs assigned to SoWesPac.

CinCSWPAC 011243 requests information regarding CinCPAC's proposal for the protection of the LUZON Area, and states that the release of the 4 old BBs should not be made until heavy bomber strength is installed in the CLARK FIELD Area, which time is estimated to be the end of February.

2 February (Guam date)

French sources report that 3 cruisers were sighted off the coast of QUINHON on a southerly course at 1600, 1 February.

SILVERSIDES (SS 236) reports sinking a large AK on the 25th west of KYUSHU.

THREADFIN (SS 410) reports sinking a small AK on the 30th near ITIE SAKI.

ComSubsPac has formed a Wolfpack of 5 submarines to be stationed between FORMOSA and LUZON to intercept reinforcements or withdrawals from the LUZON Area.

- Continued -
2 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Reports have been received from the CHINA Theater indicating that the airdrome at SUICHWAN has been taken by the Japanese. The majority of 14th Air Force airfields in that area have been destroyed by our forces preparatory to withdrawal.

At IWO JIMA on the night of the 31st-1st 9 snooper B-24s bombed the dispersal areas from 10 to 14,000 feet. On the evening of the 31st and on the 1st 21 additional B-24s bombed the same areas starting fires visible for a number of miles.

At SAIPAN on the 2nd 1 Myrt (carrier based reconnaissance plane) was intercepted and shot down by the Combat Air Patrol at 1025. This enemy plane was on course 340 when intercepted.

On the 31st at PALAU a total of 76 fighters and torpedo planes hit targets in that area on the 3 days - 31st, 1st and 2nd.

The British Carrier Task Force again attack oil installations in the PALAMBANG Area on the 29th. 100 sorties were flown against the targets and 24 fighters swept enemy airfields in the vicinity. Photographs show hits on a large cracking plant and extensive fires were reported to be spreading on withdrawal of the planes from the target area. 8 enemy fighters were shot down and British losses were 15 planes. However, 8 crews were reported to have been picked up.

CinCSWPA 010626 (pink) outlines the search plan and operations to be carried out in support of ICEBERG Operation by CinCSWPA.

MacArthur 010628 (pink) requests direct communication between Commander Allied Air Forces, SWPA and Commanding General, 20th Bomber Command during air operations supporting ICEBERG.

CinCPoa 012240 (pink) concerns the substitution of the 5th PhibCorps for the 3rd PhibCorps for Phase 3 of the ICEBERG Operation.

Cinc pac flew from GUAM to ULITHI and broke his flag in the INDIANAPOLIS.

3 February (Guam date)

Seven submarine contacts have been reported in the last 36 hours. Contacts were made in the MINDANAO SEA, between MANUS and LEYTE, south and west of ENIWETOK, and off KWAJALEIN.

Com7thFleet reports that an attack was made on the SAN ANTONIO beachhead on the 31st by a group of enemy power boats. PC 1129 was sunk as a result of this action. No further losses were sustained. The enemy craft were either all sunk or driven off.

On the 2nd at IWO JIMA 20 B-24s dropped 45 tons of incendiaries on the area east of the number 2 airfield. One of three airborne Zekes was damaged and 6 B-24s sustained slight damage due to AA and enemy interception. On the 3rd at IWO JIMA 12 P-38s and 5 F-5As covered IWO from low level, photographing in good weather. Automatic weapon fire was intense and accurate. 1 P-38 was lost, cause unknown, and 1 F-5A (photographic version of P-38) burst into flames over the target and was lost. 3 enemy planes were airborne but did not press their attack. Again on the 3rd at IWO JIMA 4 PBM4s photographed the island in clear weather. 7 single engine enemy fighters intercepted, 3 of them were possibly damaged.

- Continued -
3 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

At HANKOW on the 30th, 25 B-24s bombed the docks. 32 escorting fighters met no opposition. Amplifying report on the attack by B-29s of the 20th BomCom on SINGAPORE indicates that 110 B-29s took part this attack. 200 tons of bombs were dropped on the SINGAPORE Area and 21 planes dropped 50 tons on GEORGETOWN (west portion of MALAY PENINSULA). 15 to 25 enemy fighters intercepted; 2 claimed destroyed, 6 probably destroyed and 8 damaged.

CinCBPF 260739 (pink) sets forth present composition of the British Pacific Fleet.

MacArthur 022004 concerns requests for personnel relative to Filbas Agreement and authorizes ComGen USAFFE to communicate directly with ComGenPOA in certain specific cases regarding personnel.

DepCom 20th AF 030921 (pink) covers the schedule to be carried out by 21st BomCom in support of DETACHMENT Operation.

4 February (Guam date)

B-29s report heavy concentration of shipping in FUTAMI KO CHICH (23-30 ships) and 50 ships, 10 of which were heavy, at 33-18 N 135-42 E (S. of OSAKA).

There is additional submarine activity reported in the vicinity of ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN. A merchant ship reported sighting and firing on a periscope at 10-19 N 164-17 E, and a submarine was reported by a transient plane in the same vicinity approximately an hour later. A plane observed an oil slick and made a definite contact with a submarine at 12-23 N, 155-53 E at 1630 MIKE time on the 4th.

Heavy strikes were carried out in the PALAU Area on the 30th, 75 planes attacking BABELTHUAP.

Fighters are evidently hitting FORMOSA from the PHILIPPINES as reports indicate that 6 enemy fighters were shot down on the 29th and 10 additional on the 30th.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 040430 (pink) authorizes WASP and ESSEX to sail with excess fighters for the next operation, but thereafter the excess fighter strength will be reduced in accordance with prior directives.

Cincpac returned to GUAM from ULITHI.

5 February (Guam date)

Reports have been received indicating that elements of the 1st Cavalry entered MANILA on the night of 3 February with little opposition encountered within the town itself. Our forces liberated about 800 military and about 550 civilian prisoners as well as many internees. Reports received indicate that up until 5 February, 1945 18,000 Japanese have been killed in the LUZON Area.

A photographic plane from the 20th Bomber Command reports having sighted 1 BB and a small CV in the SINGAPORE Area.

On the 4th and 5th at IWO JIMA 23 B-24s hit the airfield and surrounding installations. Bombing was carried out from 16 to 18,000 feet. 9 operational enemy aircraft were observed on the field. On the 5th, HAHA JIMA was bombed by 10 B-24s with results unobserved.

- Continued -
On the 4th, 110 B-29s were airborne for an attack on KOBE. 267 tons of bombs were dropped on the primary target (KOBE) by 71 planes, and 28 other planes dropped 104 tons of bombs on last resort targets (other cities in the KOBE area). Enemy aircraft opposition was slight. No B-29s were lost over the target. 1 plane ditched on the way home due to fuel shortage. 10 of the 11 crew members were rescued. 3 enemy interceptors were claimed as having been destroyed.

On the night of 4-5 Feb. 3 B-29s bombed KOBE visually. Results were undetermined due to the fact that large fires were reported as already burning.

ComGen BomCom 21 050712 (pink) outlines anti-picket boat searches prior to the DETACHMENT Operation.

CinCPac 050746 (pink) concerns arrangement for facilities for 3 Marine Divisions in the PHILIPPINES area and states dates at which time these divisions will move from the objective area to the PHILIPPINES.

CominCh 051255 (pink) applies to operational allocation of units of the British Pacific Fleet and further states that arrangements in connection with bases, anchorages, fuel, communications and intelligence will be handled by CinCPac in accordance with understandings previously reached.

CinCPac 061307 requests CinCSWPA to conduct reconnaissance of CASIGURAN SOUND to determine presence enemy forces or installations and feasibility of use as a fleet anchorage.

A report from 20th Bomber Command states that photographs of the SINGAPORE area reveal a damaged NACHI Class CA in drydock at SINGAPORE, a damaged ATAGO Class CA in JOHORE STRAIT and many merchantmen and small craft.

SPADEFISH (SS 441) reports sinking 3 AK's and 1 PC in the YELLOW SEA on the 4th.

Six PBWs struck PONAPE on the 6th dropping 16 500-lb. bombs on the No. 2 airfield with 9 direct hits. Buildings and field installations were strafed.

On the 31st 24 B-24s, escorted by P-38s, struck FORMOSA resulting in the destruction of 25-30 enemy aircraft on the ground at HUTO airdrome. On the same day, 12 other B-24s sank a DD, left another seriously burning, and damaged a third -- all heading south for FORMOSA. Five Jap fighters covering this convoy were shot down. 24 B-24s hit FORMOSA again on the 1st causing fires and explosions at the TAINAN air-drome and heavy damage at the TOKI seaplane base. 16 to 20 planes were destroyed on the ground at OKAYAMA in another B-24 strike on the 2nd.

A single PBC from LINGAYEN reports sinking a 1000-ton AK off ISHIGAKI ISLAND (E. of FORMOSA) on the night of the 5th-6th with 2 100-lb. hits and a straddle with 2 500-lb. bombs.

CinCPac 012254 (pink) requests concurrence in the proposal that certain arrangements involved in the NF-1 Agreement be made by CominCh rather than CinCPac. Also requests allocation of units of the British Pacific Fleet to operational control of CinCPac for ICEBERG Operation.

Wedemeyer 050750 (pink) sets forth the strategic and tactical phases of the current situation in CHINA and outlines projected operations by China Theater Forces.
6 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpoa 060758 (pink) requests CinCSWPA to return by 16 February the 4 battleships temporarily loaned to 7th Fleet in order to effect necessary repairs prior to employment in ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac 060801 (pink) concerns policy of rotational changes in aviation flag commands.

7 February (Guam date)

Sightings reported by unknown originator include 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 1 tanker and 3 AK's at TAKAO, and a convoy of 2 large AF's, 2 cruisers and 3 DD's off QUINHON headed south.

On the night of 6th/7th, PAPANITO (SS 383) scored two hits in a large AK of a northbound convoy in the SOUTH CHINA SEA.

BARBEL (SS 316) failed to make rendezvous with two other patrolling submarines off PALAWAN, and has not been heard from.

On the 6th, CHICHI JIMA was bombed with incendiaries from 15-16,000 feet by 10 B-24s. A single enemy fighter took off from SUSAKI airfield, but failed to attack.

At IWO JIMA on the 6th a strike by 14 P-38s, escorted navigationally by 3 B-24s, was turned back 100 miles short of the target by weather. 20 B-24s are scheduled to hit IWO JIMA again on the 8th.

6 PBJS on the night of the 6th/7th attacked 2 convoys north of IWO JIMA. The first convoy, consisting of 4 ships, course 205, speed 8, was attacked with rockets. A hit was obtained in 1 large vessel, other results were unobserved. The second convoy of 5 ships was attacked 250 miles north of IWO JIMA, course 350, speed 10. 8 rockets were fired causing an explosion and smoke in a large vessel.

33 B-29s are slated to strike TRUK at 1030 K(-10) on the 8th with 165 tons of 500-lb. GP bombs from 28,000 feet.

In the North Pacific on the 6th, 6 B-24s, bombing by radar, attacked the KATAOKA naval base (SHIMUSHU) with 150 100-lb. bombs with unobserved results. There was no opposition and all planes returned safely.

B-29s of the 20th Bomber Command mined SINGAPORE waters on the 25th from altitudes of 2000-5000 feet, encountering only meager and inaccurate AA fire.

On the night of the 5th/6th 3 B-29s dropped 9 tons of fragmentation clusters on KOBE resulting in several large explosions and fires. On the following night, 3 B-29s bombing by radar dropped 42 GP bombs causing fires. No airborne opposition was encountered in either of these strikes.

CinC Eastern Fleet 030453 requests U.S. type helmets, telephones and oxygen masks be furnished British Pacific Fleet for use in conjunction with possible emergency employment of U.S. fighters aboard British carriers.

CinCSWPA 061815 outlines plan for initiation of Search Plan "J".

CinCSWPA 070403 (pink) covers schedule of operations by SoWesPac air forces in support of DETACHMENT Operation.

Cincpoa 070455 (pink) informs 5th Fleet of 21st Bomber Command strike schedule on TOKYO and NAGOYA areas during DETACHMENT.
13th Bomber Command reports having sighted an unescorted enemy aircraft carrier headed south in MAKASSAR STRAIT at 0150(1) on the 8th. Carrier was seen to be launching aircraft.

A preliminary evaluation summary of recent submarine contacts reported in the MARSHALLS-GILBERTS area includes 5 positive contacts, 1 probable and 1 questionable. Of the 5 positive contacts, 1 submarine is believed to have been sunk by surface craft with evidence of damage to three others.

PAMPANITO (SS 383) reports sinking large AK (previously reported as hit), and blowing up another ship loaded with ammunition or gasoline in the SOUTH CHINA SEA on the night of 5th/6th. From this same convoy, GUAVINA (SS 362) sank an AK.

17 B-24s struck IWO JIMA on the 7th bombing radio and radar installations and dispersal areas resulting in numerous fires and explosions.

8 tons of bombs were dropped on the airfields at PONAPE on the 8th by 17 F4Us and 1 B-25 scoring 10 hits on the new field and 16 on the old, both of which appeared inoperational. Buildings were strafed and 3 small boats were sunk.

At PALAU on the 7th and 8th 24 F6Fs and F4Us destroyed bridges, damaged a pier and started a number of fires.

3 B-29s dropped 10.5 tons of GP bombs on KOBE on the night of the 7th/8th with unobserved results.

CinC BFF 070306 (pink) requests Com7thFlt's concurrence in proposed conference for discussing use of LEYTE GULF facilities by British Pacific Fleet Service Force.

CinCPOA 070617 (pink) sets forth CinCpoa's appraisal of enemy naval capabilities in SoWesPac area.

Com7thFleet 080121 (pink) requests clarification of Com7thFlt responsibility and authority with respect to provision of naval shore facilities in SoWesPac for British Pacific Fleet and nature and extent of new construction to be undertaken for or by British Pacific Fleet.

CinCSWPA 080314 (pink) directs Com7thFlt to return to MANUS by 16 February the 4 battleships temporarily loaned to 7th Fleet.

Cincpac 080713 (pink) requests CinC British Pacific Fleet to advise him of any desired arrangements for use of anchorages, shore facilities, fuel, etc. in order that such arrangements may be made in accordance with NF-1.

Cominch 072020 (pink) states that British Task Force will not be available for first phase of ICEBERG Operation.
2 February (Guam date)

COOK INLET (AVP 36) reports attacking an enemy submarine on the morning of the 9th while enroute from PEARL to ENIWETOK. Results have not been reported.

RONQUIL (SS 396) reports sinking a large tanker near the BONINS on the night of the 7th/8th.

On the 8th at IWO JIMA, 20 B-24s, bombing in two formations from 14-16,000 feet, dropped 36 tons on installations and dispersal areas, knocking out 1 AA gun position and scoring 100% hits in the dispersal areas. One B-24 was lost when it was rammed by an intercepting Zeke; both planes exploded. 3 other B-24s sustained minor damage. 10 additional B-24 snoopers dropped 19.5 tons in dispersal areas and on airfield No. 2.

B-29s of the 21st Bomber Command attacked MOEN Airfield in TRUK Atoll on the 9th with 194 tons of 500-lb. bombs. No airborne opposition was encountered and all planes returned safely.

ATC, WASH.  D.C. 081350 directs the establishment of overall policies and procedures with regard to operation and expansion of Oceanic Air Traffic Control Centers in the Pacific Area.

CinCSWPA 090300 clarifies responsibility and authority of Commander Allied Naval Forces and Com7thFleet in providing facilities and allocation of land areas for British Pacific Fleet.

Cincpac 090525 (pink) requests recommendations for assignment of carriers to night group and training duty during ICEBERG Operation.

Com7thFleet 090706 covers movement of naval forces from LEYTE to ULITHI and MANUS.

Cincpac 090824 (pink) reports results of informal investigation of alleged bombing of MACAO in neutral Portuguese territory.

10 February (Guam date)

Recent reports indicate increased transport movements in a southerly direction along the INDO CHINA Coast.

The 4 OBB remaining with 7th Fleet have departed LINGAYEN for LEYTE from whence PENNSYLVANIA and 2 DDs will sail for MANUS; MISSISSIPPI, WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO and 4 DDs are ordered to ULITHI -- all to report to Cincpac on arrival.

PARCHE (SS 384) reports sinking a small AK near AMAMI O SHIMA on the 7th.

BATFISH (SS 310) reports being attacked with torpedoes by BLUE planes in LUZON STRAIT. On the 4th, she attacked a Jap LCI 70 miles south of FORMOSA, and sank an I Class submarine just north of LUZON on the 10th.

ComNavGroup CHINA states that Chinese near SHANTUNG PENINSULA report excellent results of submarine activity off the CHINA Coast, and further that the ports of KANKO and GENSAN are gaining in importance as main shipping points to JAPAN, replacing PORT ARTHUR and DAIKEN.

- Continued -
10 February (Guam date (Cont'd))

14 B-24s dropped 28 tons of fragmentation clusters on radio and radar installations northeast of the airfield at IWO JIMA on the 9th. 8 additional B-24s dropped 16 tons on defense installations and bivouacs north of SURIBACHI YAMA. 10 snooper B-24s dropped 21 tons on air installations at airfield No. 2 and on AA defenses. On the 10th fighters destroyed 4 Bettys and 3 Zekes and strafed a DD. Low altitude photo coverage of IWO JIMA was completed. 1 P-38 was lost with pilot probably lost.

On the 9th, 4 rocket carrying PVs, meeting no fighter opposition, scored hits on radio installations and a lighthouse at KOKUTAN ZAKI (northern SHIMUSHU).

At FORMOSA on the 7th 5 pre-dawn B-24s caused many fires and explosions at TAKAO. Other B-24s struck HEITO airdrome, demolishing barracks and underground supplies and causing fires and explosions. 15 enemy planes were airborne but failed to attack. Escorting P-38s shot down 1 plane, destroyed many railcars and trucks, sank a coastal vessel and a barge.

DepCom 20th AF reports that B-24s on a shipping strike over south FORMOSA on the 7th shot down an enemy reconnaissance plane, sank a submarine, fired a seatruck and destroyed an unspecified number of trucks.

Cominch & CNO 092141 (pink) informs CinC British Pacific Fleet that all logistic and administrative arrangements should be made with CinCPac in accordance with NF-1 Agreement.

Cominch & CNO 092141 (pink) refers to CinCPac for action Com7thFleet's 080121 requesting clarification of responsibility and authority for provision of facilities in SoWestPac for British Pacific Fleet.

CinCSoWPAC 100850 (pink) concerns allocation of personnel and facilities in SoWestPac for use by British Pacific Fleet.

11 February (Guam date)

Numerous sightings, all in the general area between 140 and 142 E from 29 to 30 N, resulted from the picket-boat sweep conducted by 21st BomCom on the 11th. Reports included the following: 3 picket boats (course 300, speed 5); 3 small freighter-transports, 1 medium transport, 1 freighter, 4 escorts (course 290, speed 10); 2 small freighter-transports, 1 medium transport, 2 escorts (course 100, speed 10); 2 medium freighter-transports, unspecified number of cargo ships, 4 escorts (course 90, speed 12); 1 freighter, 2 escorts (course 300, speed 10).

BATFISH (SS 310) which previously reported sinking an I Class enemy submarine on the 10th, now reports sinking another on the night of the 11th north of LUZON.

6 Marine PBJs attacked a medium tanker at 25-20 N, 141-00 E on the night of 10th/11th causing 2 or 3 explosions. 8 explosions resulted from an attack on a stationary AK at 26-28 N, 140-50 E on the same night.

At HAHA JIMA on the 10th 10 B-24s dropped 10 tons of incendiary clusters on building areas in OKIMURA TOWN with unobserved results. 1 B-24 was lost due to AA and 2 others slightly damaged. 1 survivor was picked up.
11 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

20 B-24s, escorted by 10 P-38s, struck IWO JIMA on the 10th. Except for destruction of 7 planes by fighters (previously reported) results of this strike have not been received.

On the night of the 9th/10th 2 B-29s bombed the OSAKA Gas Company with 6 tons of bombs while a 3rd plane dropped 3 tons on the MITSUBISHI Aircraft Factory at TOKYO. 2 B-29s bombed the NAKAJIMA Aircraft Plant at OTA and the TOKYO industrial area with 9 tons of bombs on the night of the 10th/11th. Bombs were seen to strike 1,000 feet to the right of the aircraft plant and fires were reported in the TOKYO area.

BERING STRAIT (AVP 34) reports rescuing 23 survivors of 2 ditched B-29s, and ROBERT H. SMITH (DMS 23) reports having rescued a part of the crew of a third plane returning from OTA on the 10th.

13 P-51s attacking TSINGTAO on the 10th report destroying 46 and damaging 52 planes on the ground. No AA and no air opposition were encountered.

Cincpca 110043 requests CinC British Pacific Fleet to submit detailed requirements for berths and shore facilities at MANUS, and further informs him that arrangements for anchorages forward of MANUS are to be deferred until operational allocations of units of British Pacific Fleet are announced by Cominch.

Cincpac 110045 presents to CinCSWPA the proposed program of furnishing anchorage and aircraft facilities at MANUS for British Pacific Fleet.

Cominch 110151 (pink) outlines procedure for assigning tasks ComNavGroup CHINA in participation of deception plan in such form that purpose is not disclosed to him.

12 February (Guam date)

Air Base Commander at KWAJALEIN has requested lost plane procedure of the Air Base Commander at JOHNSTON for a C-54 due at JOHNSTON at 1035 K(-10) on the 12th. No further details are available.

At IWO JIMA on the 11th 21 B-24s dropped 47\(\frac{1}{2}\) tons of bombs on airfield No. 2 and on radio and radar installations NE of airfield No. 3. 4 B-24s were damaged by AA and one aircrewman was slightly injured. On the night of the 11th/12th 10 B-24 snoopers put 20 tons of fragmentation clusters on airfield No. 2, and on AA defenses. 3 enemy planes were airborne but did not attack. 21 B-29s struck IWO JIMA again on the 12th dropping 40 tons visually and 44 tons by radar. Results were not reported in detail, but were described as "good". All planes returned safely.

NAGOYA was struck on the night of the 11th/12th by 3 B-29s dropping 9 tons by radar from 30,000 feet with unobserved results and without opposition.

Amplifying report of the strike on OTA on the 10th states that 34 B-29s dropped 192 tons of GP bombs and 45.5 tons of incendiaries on the Nakajima Aircraft Factory from 27,000 feet. 14 other B-29s dropped 39 tons on 8 other targets of opportunity. Bombing results were good to excellent. 110 intercepting planes were reported with a total of 305 attacks. 18 enemy planes are claimed destroyed, 15 probably destroyed, and 26 damaged. Our casualties were 12 wounded, 93 missing. 11 B-29s were lost: 2 collided over the target, 1 shot down by fighters, 6 ditched and 2 unknown.
12 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Marshall 081956 (pink) directs ComGen INDIA-BURMA Theater to prepare for movement of the 58th Bombardment Wing to the MARIANAS.

Wedemeyer 110921 (pink) requests information on availability of Jap equipment to be furnished Chinese troops and guerilla forces in the area of the Jap held corridor HANKOW-HONGKONG.

CinCBPF 120251 (pink) (3 parts - 120237, 120245, 120251) requests advice as to status and command relationships of British Pacific Fleet.

13 February (Guam date)

A Japanese force of 2 BB's, 1 CA and 3 DD's, contacted on the 12th off the INDO CHINA Coast, passed through the first line of submarines without damage. South-west Pacific planes picked up the force on the night of the 12th/13th and tracked throughout the day. At 1400 I/13th BLOWER (SS 325) fired 6 torpedoes at the force obtaining one timed hit in a BB and another in a cruiser. Two distinct oil slicks were observed. BERGALL (SS 320) reports firing at 2120 I/13th 6 torpedoes, scoring a probable hit in one of the BBs. Tracking planes reported the force still proceeding that night at sustained speed.

BATFISH (SS 310) reports sinking a 3rd Jap submarine at 0550 I/13th north of LUZON.

HOLLANDIA (CVE 97) reports 3 unidentified radar contacts on the 11th along the shipping lane between PEARL and ENIWETOK north of JOHNSTON.

A sweep along projected track of TF 58 by 5 submarines was completed without contact. 21 BomCom VLR planes will sweep the same area on the 14th.

19 B-24s and 10 SB-24s bombed IWO JIMA on the 12th without opposition. Spotting plane reports hits on air installations and AA defenses.

Successful minelaying operations in FUTAMI KO (CHICHI JIMA) were completed on the 12th. 30 B-24s participated in the operation. 1 plane carrying 2 mines and crew were lost.

ComAirPac 110144 and ComFirstCarTaskForPac 110836 (pink) submit requested recommendations concerning assignment of carriers to night group and training duty during ICEBERG Operation.

Cinpoa 130210 (pink) cancels Phase III-a of the ICEBERG Operation, which provided for seizure of an island in the DALTO SHIMA as a site for a Loran station.

Cinpoa 130620 outlines plan for providing staging facilities for reserve carrier air groups in the MARIANAS and establishment of Naval Air Bases KAGMAN POINT and KOBLER.
14 February 1942 (Guam date)

Southwest Pacific planes continued tracking the Japanese task force contacted on the 12th. A report at 1030 I/14 placed the force about 70 miles SW of HONGKONG on course 030.

Bombardment of MANILA BAY was begun on the 13th by a force of CLs and DDs, closing to 8,000 and 5,000 yards of CORREGIDOR respectively without suffering return fire. Operation is proceeding according to plan.

Task Force 58 will begin final approach to TOKYO on the 15th, with Support Force enroute IWO JIMA and Attack Force departing SAIPAN.

On the 13th at IWO JIMA 25 B-24s dropped 45 tons on radar, AA defenses, and air installations. Results were not reported.

A single PB4Y on the 11th probably sank a 2000-ton AK in the SOUTH CHINA SEA with a 500-lb. direct hit. Intense and accurate AA damaged the plane and wounded 3 men, causing a crash landing on return to MINDORO.

Cominch & CNO 131945 (pink) directs Cincpac to proceed by Court of Inquiry with investigation of alleged bombing of MACAO.

Cincpac 140110 (pink) clarifies situation with respect to communications with ComGen USAF CHINA concerning operations of 14th Air Force in support of ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac 140112 (pink) directs that all units of all services stationed at IWO JIMA will be under military command of the Island Commander. Tactical units staging through IWO JIMA will remain under administrative and operational control of organizations to which assigned.

Cincpac 140456 (pink) reports sighting of enemy force of 2 BBs, 1 CA and 3 DDs; estimated advance through FORMOSA STRAITS hugging CHINA Coast, probably refueling between AMOY and GOOCHOW, continuing on to Homeland.

Cincpac 140759 (pink) cancels Phase III-b of ICEBERG Operation which provided for the capture of KUME JIMA.

15 February (Guam date)

The enemy BB force in the SOUTH CHINA SEA was last contacted at 1100 1/15th by search planes of TF 73 at 24-40 N, 119-00 E (in FORMOSA STRAIT). Composition reported twice on the 15th as 2 BB, 1 CA and 7 DD. Force proceeding at indicated speed of about 17 knots. ComSubPac has disposed 11 submarines in the EAST CHINA SEA in intercepting positions.

Bombardment of CORREGIDOR and minesweeping of MANILA BAY continued with minor interference from shore batteries. 7 enemy and 22 blue mines have been swept.

A B-24 on escort mission reports observing a torpedo hit in an escort of the Mine Group enroute IWO JIMA at 0320 (GCT) on the 15th in position 22-00 N, 142-10 E. No confirmation has been received.

- Continued -
15 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

5 B-24s dropped 100-lb. bombs on Susaki airfield at CHICHI JIMA on the 13th from 12-14,000 feet. 2 strings landed on and near the field; others were unobserved. On the 15th, a search plane left an AK burning and listing 100 miles northwest of CHICHI JIMA.

At IWO JIMA on the 14th, 17 B-24s dropped 34 tons of 100 pounders on AA defenses, radio, radar and air installations. 1 of 3 intercepting Zeke's was damaged. 5 B-24s sustained minor damage from AA. On the 15th, an unspecified number of B-24s escorted by 8 P-38s struck IWO JIMA while 5 P-38s conducted a fighter sweep over the same target. 3 enemy fighters intercepted and 1 was damaged. Fire and smoke were reported between airfields 1 and 2 following the bombing run. P-38s observed no planes, shipping or other enemy activity in the vicinity of the island.

117 B-29s participated in an attack on NAGOYA on the 15th bombing the primary target, secondary and last resort targets visually and by radar and dead reckoning with results ranging from unobserved to good. 21 planes hit the Mitsubishi Aircraft Factory (primary target) visually. 9 planes returned early and 1 ditched between the northern MARIANAS and the VOLCANOES.

Cincpoa 142220 (pink) to Cominch clarifies Cincpoa's 110043 requesting Cinc BFF to submit detailed requirements for berths and shore facilities at MANUS.

ComGen 6th Army 151650 outlines plan for reconnaissance of CASIGURAN SOUND and further states that no U.S. garrison is located at BALER BAY and that patrols have found no enemy activity in that area.

16 February (Guam date)

No further report has been received on the Jap force last contacted at 1100 (1)/15th off AMOY.

Minesweeping operations in MANILA BAY have been delayed by accurate shore battery fire; preliminary naval bombardment having failed to eliminate all gun positions in caves on CORREGIDOR. RADFORD (DD 446) and LAVALETTE (DD 448) both struck mines, causing damage and flooding, and have retired to SUBIC BAY. FLETCHER (DD 447) was hit by a 6 inch shell, killing 3 men and causing considerable damage. HOPEWELL (DD 681) received 4 hits; 1 officer and 6 men were killed and 8 wounded; extensive damage was inflicted. YMS 48 was set afire by a shell hit, and later sunk by our forces; 3 men are missing.

No reports have been received from either Com5thFleet or CTF 58. Cloud cover prevented extensive observation by a B-29 on station as observer. Minesweeping was carried out as scheduled at IWO JIMA with no results except for 1 old mine found adrift. Only part of scheduled gunfire was carried out, no photographs were obtained.

Three submarine contacts have been reported in the area north and west of SAIPAN; 1 reported by a plane about 300 miles north of SAIPAN, 1 just west of SAIPAN and 1 northwest of SAIPAN on track of one of the Tractor Groups.
At DWO JIMA on the 16th support planes from CVEs left two 500-ton luggers burning and sinking. A spotting plane shot down 1 Zeke, and probably destroyed 3 Bettys on the ground. Air strikes were limited by weather. Jap heavy AA was light, disorganized, and ineffective; light AA was intense but generally inaccurate. Sporadic enemy fire at surface ships was quickly silenced; ships and planes report a considerable number of enemy installations destroyed or damaged, but accurate evaluation will depend on photos to be taken.

36 F4Us, F6F-Ns and TBFs using rockets, bombs and Napalm bombs attacked BABELTHUAP in the PALAUS on the 15th causing fires and explosions. YAP was struck by 8 other F4Us.

P-47s on a fighter sweep over FORMOSA on the 11th shot down 10 Jap planes and probably destroyed 2 others. B-24s in a pre-dawn strike on Heito airdrome burned an unspecified number of enemy planes, and later in the day 14 B-25s and 34 P-47s destroyed an unstated amount of motor transport and rolling stock in south FORMOSA. P-47s destroyed a bomber west of the island.

CNO 160219 announces possibility of Soviet transports deviating from established routes and being carried into the Pacific Ocean through straits of the KURILE CHAIN as a result of drifting ice in the OKHOTSK SEA.

Cincpoa 160419 (pink) to CINCSWPA requests approval of availability of facilities at MANUS for use by British Pacific Fleet.

Cincpac 160427 (pink) outlines plan for rehabilitation of 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions following DETACHMENT Operation.

ComGenAAFPOA 160530 states that insufficient personnel prevents establishing staffs for Air Base Commands in areas where a senior air echelon is stationed and recommends that Island or Area Commanders exercise responsibilities for Army Air Bases through the commander of the senior air echelon who will accomplish administration and operation of air bases by utilizing forces and staffs assigned.

Cincpac 160846 (pink) modifies assignment of rehabilitation areas following DETACHMENT and ICEBERG Operations.

Cincpoa 160919 (pink) requests CINCSWPA to release PORTLAND (CA 33) and MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36) in time to report to Cincpac at ULITHI by 5 March.

ComGenAAFPOA 161112 (pink) clarifies status of 347th and 348th Air Service Groups by outlining policy regarding assignment, responsibilities and command relationships of these units.

Cincpac 161145 (pink) directs ComServRon 10 to order WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48), plus two destroyer escorts, to proceed immediately to WORKMAN.
17 February (Guam date)

A LINGAYEN search plane sighted the force of 2 BB in FORMOSA STRAIT at 1201/16th, course 040, speed 15.

The landings on the 15th and 16th in the BATAAN-CORREGIDOR area were carried out by TG 78.3 under Rear Adm. STRUBLE and consisted of 5 APD, 6 LCI(L), 5 LST, 6 LCT and 20 LSM.

Troops involved were transported from SUBIC BAY to the objective after bombardment by cruisers and destroyers on D-2, D-1 and D plus 1 days.

More than 272 Japanese mines were swept and the presence of controlled mines is suspected. In addition to damage to 4 DD and 1 YMS already reported, LSM 169 struck a mine and had to be beached, and 4 LCS were destroyed or damaged by enemy suicide craft.

UDT reconnaissance of IWO JIMA on the 17th found no underwater obstacles and the east beach suitable for all types of landing craft. A sand terrace on the northern half of the beach may block LVTs. Western beaches were also good, though there are sand bars covered by 1 fathom 75 yards offshore. Surf is 2 feet on eastern beaches, 7 to 4 feet on western beaches.

LCI(G)s supporting the UDTs received heavy fire from north and south flanks when about 1000 yards offshore. 8 of 12 are known to have been hit. Reports of casualties from 7 total 31 dead, 83 wounded and 1 missing; 11 shock cases. 1 LCI(G) capsized; several are out of action.

On the west beaches there was little shore fire. Minesweepers, who were also inshore off the east beaches, drew only sporadic fire, and completed most of scheduled sweeps.

PENSACOLA (CA-24) was hit off the northeast coast and suffered many casualties, including her executive officer killed.

Scheduled fire support was delivered and support air struck many targets. Yet majority of known installations apparently remain intact. Heavy fire and air strikes will be delivered today against east beaches and their flanks.

On the 15th B-24s snooped both CHICHI and IWO. At IWO on the 16th 42 B-24s encountered 10/10 overcast and returned without bombing. On the 17th 43 B-24s bombed the target through intense, fairly accurate heavy AA. B-29s and 41 B-24s are scheduled to repeat on the 18th. During bombing runs, naval bombardment of AA positions will be conducted.

On the 17th CVE aircraft strafed 5 planes and 16 small craft at CHICHI and 16 vessels at HAHA. AA was intense at both targets. 2 Jap planes were shot down by destroyer.

TRUK was bombed by B-29s on the 17th. The attack will be repeated on the 18th.
17 February (Guam date) (Cont’d)

In the SOUTH CHINA SEA on the 16th PB4Ys sank 2 AKs and damaged 2 ocean going tugs. That night a PBY left a 1700 ton AP dead in the water off FORMOSA with one bomb hit.

Cincpoa 170557 requests survey to determine feasibility of improving infantry combat training facilities for Marine Division at SAIPAN, which will remain a Marine rehabilitation area indefinitely.

Cincpac 170608 directs that copies of operation plans and orders and corresponding operational reports be furnished the Secretary of the Admiralty and the CinCBPF for specific operations involving units of the British Pacific Fleet.

Cincpoa 170648 approves project for limited training of Army replacements in the forward area.

Cincpac 171220 covers reassignment of Commodore MORAN (ComMTBsPac) and further directs Com7thFleet to clear with Cincpac any recommendations concerning redisposal of Cincpac personnel and ships temporarily assigned to his command.

18 February (Guam date)

Hydrographic conditions at IWO JIMA are reported as excellent; no more beach obstacles have been found, and there is little surf. Minesweeping operations have been completed except for two small areas close inshore; no mines were found. Bombardment was concentrated on eastern beaches and flanks with 4 BB and 1 CA closing to between 1800 and 3000 yards offshore. LEUTZE (DD 481) received a hit from a 3 or 4-inch shell which detonated in her stack causing some topside damage. Of 13 LCI(G) which participated in fire support on the 17th, only 1 remains fully operative.

CTF 52 reported at 2200 on the 18th that although weather had prevented complete expenditure of ammunition allowance and that more installations could be found and destroyed with 1 more day of bombardment, it was believed the landing could be made as scheduled (H-hour designated 0900 K(-10) 19th).

On the 17th, 42 B-24s struck IWO JIMA defense installations and bivouac area on north side of Suribachi Yama scoring 90% hits in the target area with fragmentation clusters. 10 damaged planes were seen on the airfield, and 2 large and 2 small fires were observed. AA damaged 4 B-24s.

4 B-24s and 2 PB4Ys bombed and photographed MOEN, ETEN and PARAM airstrips in TRUK Atoll on the 17th. 4 operational planes were observed. A fighter sweep over TRUK is scheduled for the 21st.

B-29s of the 21st Bomber Command will make a D-day (19th) strike on TOKYO.

Two reports received from ComNavGroup CHINA state that: (1)(rated C-3) Japs have flown 1500 planes from JAPAN to FORMOSA recently; and, (2)(rated B-3) High Command has ordered all Army and Navy air forces remaining in the PHILIPPINES to withdraw to FORMOSA.

ComGenPOA 140541 replies to War Department proposal to equip forces to be deployed from other theaters and from the United States from stockpiles of equipment and supplies at forward bases in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

- Continued -
18 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CNO 161500 requests information relative to rebuilding and rehabilitating GUAM with view to using achievements as basis for extending naval administration to other islands.

Cincpac 180624 outlines procedure for informing Cincpac Advance Headquarters in cases where aircraft under flight control of ComGenPacDiv ATC are missing, overdue or lost.

Cincpao 180736 (pink) modifies availability of rehabilitation and staging facilities in the PHILIPPINES for POA forces.

CTF 52 181220 recommends that landing at IWO JIMA be carried out on schedule despite incomplete expenditure of bombardment ammunition allowance.

Com5thFleet 182215 summarizes results of two-day carrier strike on TOKYO.

19 February (Guam date)

CTF 77 reports that opening of MANILA BAY is proceeding satisfactorily with minesweepers operating both north and south of CORREGIDOR. Additional troops have been landed on CORREGIDOR with slight opposition.

Com5thFleet has reported excellent results of strike by Task Force 58 on TOKYO on the 16th and 17th. Approach was executed completely undetected. Weather resulted in extremely difficult flying conditions over the task force, and much of the target area was closed in. Jap planes avoided our fighters and were not aggressive. Results are compiled as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>322 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177 destroyed on the ground</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many probably destroyed (including 150 1st day)</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numerous air installations destroyed</td>
<td>Numerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft factories bombed</td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunk: 1 CVE, 9 coastal vessels, many pickets</td>
<td>Sunk:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged: 1 DD, 2 DE, 1 AK, 22 coastal vessels</td>
<td>Damaged:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our air losses:
- Combat: 49 aircraft, 40 pilots, 6 crewmen
- Operational: 21 aircraft, 5 pilots, 4 crewmen

Increasingly bad weather resulted in cancellation of strike on 18th. The force retired without having been attacked. All Jap planes that followed returning strikes were destroyed by CAP over destroyer picket line between surface force and target. 2 DD (BARTON and INGRAHAM) were damaged in collision, a 3rd (DORSTCH) by gunfire from a picket boat, and a 4th (WALDRON) by ramming the same picket boat.

Landings at IWO JIMA were carried out as scheduled following intense naval gunfire and air bombardment. 8 battalions supported by tanks were landed by 1020 K(-10) 19th, encountering little initial opposition, though some fire was directed at LST's and boats. Mortar and artillery fire developed on all beaches, particularly beaches BLUE and YELLOW. 6 tanks and elements of the 27th Marines had reached the southern edge of the airfield by 1030. Personnel casualties were moderate and the situation was considered favorable. Regimental reserves are being landed. GAMBLE (DM 15) and BLESSMAN (APD 48) both sustained damage and heavy casualties from bomb hits and are ordered towed to SAIPAN.

- Continued -
19 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

150 B-29s of the 21st Bomber Command were airborne for an attack against the Musashino Aircraft Plant at TOKYO on the 19th. Heavy overcast prevented bombing the primary target, but 110 planes bombed the harbor and dock installations at TOKYO as secondary target. Enemy air opposition was moderate. 21 planes were claimed destroyed, 20 probably destroyed and 25 damaged.

14 B-24s, the first of 3 squadrons, attacked defense installations on IWO JIMA on the 19th placing 90% of bombs in the target area with others unobserved. The 2nd squadron was directed by surface control to return to base with bombs; the 3rd squadron arrived at the target late due to faulty navigation and did not bomb.

A PB4Y search plane on the 19th attacked an enemy submarine 225 miles NE of PAGAN at 1315 K (-10). 4 depth charges were dropped from 50-75 feet while the submarine was diving with conning tower still visible. An oil slick with 300 foot radius was observed following the attack.

Com5thFleet 182351 (pink) outlines employment of Task Force 58 following DETACHMENT landing support.

Com5thFleet 190129 (pink) presents OpPlan for strikes on TOKYO, NAGOYA, KYUSHU and OKINAWA by Task Force 58. Operation designated JAMBOREE.

CTF 51 190150 covers the landings and current situation at IWO JIMA.

Cincpoe 190531 concerns arrangements for anchorages to be used by British Pacific Fleet.

Cincpoe 190539 covers arrangements for loaning dredges to Com7thFleet on the basis replacements are made available to Cincpac.

CinCBPF 190701 outlines prospective movements of British Pacific Fleet and requests assignment of British Pacific Fleet to Cincpac prior to ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpoe 190823 presents Cincpoe's congratulations to the forces involved in the strike on TOKYO and the landings on IWO JIMA.

CTF 93 191129 covers B-24 strike on IWO JIMA on the 19th.

Cincpac 191143 concerns proposed changes in routing of convoys through the Central Pacific to the PHILIPPINES.

Cincpac 191144 requests recommendations from CINCSWPA in regard to foregoing proposal.

Cincpac 192306 (pink) requests information as to prospective operations and clarification of status of British Pacific Fleet.

J. C. Ohr
20 February (Guam date)

Landing operations at IWO ISLAND continued throughout the 19th with 4 RCT's, 2 Infantry Battalions, 2 Tank and 4 Artillery Battalions ashore by 1800. The 5th MarDiv met light to moderate opposition, secured the south half of airfield No. 1 and swung left flank toward SURIBACHI. The 4th MarDiv met intense mortar and machine gun fire from the right flank. Unloading operations were shifted from YELLOW Beach to RED and GREEN Beaches.

At 0230 on the 20th a counter attack by an estimated 1,000 Japs was repulsed by the 27th RCT after heavy fighting. Enemy mortar and artillery fire continued. During the night 2 cruisers and 11 DD's supported our landing forces with illumination and harassing fire. After heavy naval and air bombardment our attack was launched at 0345 K(-10) 20th (D plus 1) against strong opposition and continuing heavy mortar and artillery fire. The 5th MarDiv moved forward to the slopes of SURIBACHI and pushed to the north securing all of the airfield in its zone of action. The 4th MarDiv swung to the north its assigned sector. By 1200 the entire airfield was in our hands. YELLOW and BLUE Beaches remained closed by enemy gunfire, soft sand and wrecked vehicles. Traffic on the GREEN and RED Beaches continued. The general situation was somewhat improved. At 1800 enemy mortar and artillery fire on our position continued, rockets being fired on our right flank. Front lines remained substantially unchanged from 1200.

Comprehensive casualty reports are not yet available. Battleships, cruisers, destroyers and LCI(G) all continued to provide fire support. 4 LSMs were damaged.

SOLACE (AH 5) and PINKNEY (APH 2) have been called forward early. Garrison Group 0 has also been called forward.

All groups of TF 58 are available at the target.

HAWKBILL (SS 366) sank 1 large and 1 medium AK in the SOUTH CHINA SEA early on the 20th.

GUAVINA (SS 362) sank 1 large AO off CAPE PADAIRAN. After the attack, she bottomed in 190 feet and took 98 depth charges, but suffered only minor damage.

Operations in the MANILA BAY entrance area are proceeding satisfactorily.

At IWO JIMA on the night of the 19th-20th 3 or 4 enemy air raids of 2-4 planes each approached within 10-20 miles of the island but all retired on the approach of our night fighters. Scheduled air strikes on the 20th were increased by 45 planes from the fast carriers, but poor visibility hampered the afternoon strikes. 2 TBM's were ditched, with all crew members rescued; 2 other TBM's collided, but were able to return to the BENNINGTON and landed safely, and the 1 aircrewman who bailed out was picked up; a 5th TBM on ASP from the SARGENT BAY failed to return.

CTF 58 has informed Com5thFlt that he can furnish 4 carrier task group strikes on the 21st, weather permitting, each strike of about 100 planes (27 VB, 30 VT, 40 VF). CTF 51 has requested all 4, with the first over the target at 0730 K(-10). Armament would be 500 pounders, rockets and Napalm. CTF 58 adds that "our Napalm runs 50% duds." In addition to these 4 strikes, TG 58.2 will furnish CAP and call strikes.

Amplified report of 21st BomCom strike on TOKYO on the 19th indicates a total of 138 B-29s bombed the harbor and dock area and other targets. 4 B-29s were lost.
20 February (Guam date) (Cont’d)

Com7thFleet estimates Jap air strength on 19 February at 531 aircraft in the NANSEI SHOTO, FORMOSA, the PHILIPPINES, BORNEO, CELEBES and the eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Of this total 415 are in FORMOSA and the NANSEI SHOTO. Most of the Empire offensive air strength is reported to be concentrated in southern KYUSHU.

CinCBPF 180619 (pink) outlines BPF communication requirements.

CinCBPF 190743 (pink) indicates that MONAB was being sent to MANUS in belief NF-1 constituted approval and that unless the MONAB was unloaded at MANUS in late February or early March as planned, considerable delay in its establishment would be experienced.

CTF 51 191320 (pink) is Summary No. 2 covering IWO situation 1800/19 (D-Day).

Cincpac 192308 (pink) questions schedule of 5thFleet OpPlan 4-45 (JAMBOREE) in providing only 7 days at anchor for carriers before ICEBERG.

Com5thFleet 200349 (pink) asks whether 24th Corps can meet ICEBERG date.

CTF 51 200600 (pink) is Summary No. 3 covering IWO situation to 1200/20 (D plus 1).

Cincepta 200728 acknowledges congratulations from House of Representatives.

Com5thFleet 200847 (pink) revises JAMBOREE to include only OVERHEAD (TOKYO) and LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) with 2 task groups returning to ULITHI by 2 March and 2 more by 5 March.

CG LanFor 200925 summarizes situation at IWO from 1800/19 (D-day) to 1800/20 (D plus 1).

CTG 50.5 201013 (pink) outlines special search in support of JAMBOREE.

CTF 51 201210 (pink) is Summary No. 4 covering IWO situation 1800/20 (D+1).

Com5thFleet 201314 (pink) modifies his OpPlan 4-45.

Cincepta 201421 directs that ships now enroute PHILIPPINES will no longer be held for forward call and announces SWPA escort for shipping from KOSGOL to LEYTE.

21 February (Guam date)

During the night of 20-21 February, operations on IWO were marked by minor ground activity and unsuccessful attempts at infiltration. A Jap counter attack supported by tanks and artillery, launched at 2315 K (-10), against our left flank, was repulsed by RCT 27. 2 cruisers, 11 destroyers and 2 gunboat support units again provided harassing and illuminating fire during the night. The attack was resumed by our forces at 0300 K/21st (D plus 2) with airfield No. 2, the 0-2 line, and MT. SURIBACHI the main objectives. By 1145 K the 5th MarDiv had advanced 1,000 yards reaching the west of airfield No. 2. The 4th MarDiv approached to within 200 yards of the southern tip of the airfield - a gain of approximately

- Continued -
21 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

500 yards. RCT 28 reached the lower slopes of MT. SURIBACHI, employing flame throwers and tanks against intense opposition. RCT 21 from 3rd MarDiv Corps Reserve was landed by 1800. Another RCT has been ordered to be off the beach by 0730 K/22nd (D plus 3).

Beaches were congested by vehicles wrecked by enemy fire or bogged down by volcanic soil and steep beach slopes. Three mat roads have been laid inland and some Marston matting is being laid on the beaches. Pontoon causeways are being assembled to assist in unloading of supplies. By 1200 I/21st on 30% of transports had been unloaded. Due to beach conditions it appeared inevitable that unloading of garrison echelon would be considerably delayed.

As of D-Day, there were an estimated 20,000 enemy troops on the island. First estimates of casualties have been received. As of 1800 on the 21st (D plus 2) 362 enemy dead had been counted and 1 POW had been taken. Our casualties were estimated as 3,650 (150 officers, 3500 enlisted men); 3,063 wounded have been placed on board ship. Number killed in action and missing are unknown at this time.

At 1640 K/21st, TF 51 was attacked by an unknown number of Jap suicide planes resulting in damage to several ships. SARATOGA (CV 3) was hit by 4 planes causing a 20-foot hole in starboard side near waterline and fires topside. At 2300 she reported situation under control and was proceeding toward ENIWETOK at 23 knots. BISMARK SEA (CVE 95) was also hit by suicide plane at 1850 K. She burned furiously, turned over, and is believed sunk. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94) reports damage under control, extent unknown. SAGINAW BAY (CVE 82) was attacked but no details of damage have been received. CTG 52.2 reports at least 4 of attacking planes shot down; SARATOGA reports 3 shot down close aboard.

SAMARITAN (AH 10) was hit by a 5-inch ricochet from one of our ships, but no explosion resulted, and she later departed from the objective with no mention of damage or casualties from this hit.

LOGAN (APA 196) suffered minor damage to her bow when she rammed NAPA (APA 218) as result of steering casualty. NAPA has effected temporary repairs and can make 10 knots.

ATULE (SS 403) reports sinking a medium AK off SHANTUNG on the 24th.

3 snooper B-24s bombed Susaki airfield on CHICHI JIMA on the 19th with 100-lb. bombs by radar. Results were unobserved except for 1 large fire seen through the clouds.

PAGAN was bombed on the 21st by 24 P-47s. Napalm bombs were dropped along the west coast and northwest side of the island. No enemy activity was reported and the runway and taxiways appeared inoperational.

A PB4Y search plane from LEYTE sank a coastal AK and 3 seatrucks, damaged 2 additional seatrucks (1 loaded with troops), shot down 1 Zek and 1 Kate over Naha airfield on OKINAWA JIMA on the 20th. 24 operational planes were reported on the field.

ComGenPOA 202209 (pink) states that no information has been received to indicate that the 24th Corps will not be able to meet mounting date for ICEBERG.

Cincpoa 202305 outlines plan for providing night fighters and carrier training during first phase of ICEBERG.

- Continued -
21 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

DepCom 20th AF 210004 (pink) revises schedule of operations by 21st Bomber Command in support of DETACHMENT.

CinCPOA 210223 (pink) requests reply from CinCSWPA regarding availability of facilities at MANUS for use by British Pacific Fleet.

CINCPAC 210225 (pink) advises CinC BPF to permit arrangements for movement of his MONAB to stand firm.

CINCPAC 210306 concerns issuing by War Department of instructions affecting employment of shipping within the local theater of operations.

CINCPAC 210429 (pink) approves revised schedule of operations for 21st Bomber Command.

CTF 51 210500 is Summary No. 5 covering IWO situation as of 1200/21 (D plus 2).

CINCPAC 210514 (pink) informs ComS5thFleet that ICEBERG date is not expected to be delayed.

ComS5thFleet 210550 discusses problem of quickly locating concealed enemy batteries firing on our troops during amphibious landings. Also reports successful re-arming operations by TF 58.

CTF 51 211210 is Summary No. 6 covering IWO situation as of 1800/21 (D plus 2).

CTG 52.2 211238 (pink) submits preliminary report of air attack by suicide planes on TG 52.2.

22 February (Guam date)

On IWO JIMA during the night of 21-22 February the enemy attempted infiltration along the entire front with a strong counter attack launched against the left flank of RCT 27. An unconfirmed landing on the west coast in the zone of the 5th MarDiv was also reported. All lines held firm. Our forces resumed the attack at 0835 on the 22nd (D plus 3). The 21st RCT from 3rd MarDiv relieved the 23rd RCT in the 4th MarDiv zone of action. 28th RCT began the assault of enemy positions on the face of MT SURIBACHI. Strong opposition was met on all fronts, and by 1130 there were no appreciable changes in front lines. During the afternoon, both the 4th and 5th MarDivs made small gains. RCT 28 continued the attack on SURIBACHI supported by tanks, artillery, demolitions and flame throwers. Japs dropped hand grenades and demolition charges on our advancing troops. By 1400 the base of the mountain had been encircled. A counter attack developed on the left of the Corps front, but was repulsed at 1810. Another counterattack on the right flank was taken under fire by naval gunfire and artillery; results unknown. Combat efficiency of our troops was considered to be 70%.

Beaches were still congested but demolition teams are working to clear passages through the wreckage. Our casualties as of 1800/21st (D plus 2) were:

Landing Force (less RCT 25) - KIA 644, WIA 4,168, MIA 560. RCT 25 - 1,072. Total casualties 6,444. Enemy casualties totaled 1,222 dead, 2 POWs.

- Continued -
22 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Naval gunfire support at IWO JIMA has been hampered by poor visibility; however, expenditure of ammunition has been extremely high, and CTF 51 has ordered night gunfire reduced to counter battery fire and that necessary to break up counter attacks and disperse assemblies.

One and possibly two TBM's were shot down by our forces when 4 TBM's from the ENTERPRISE appeared through the clouds over TF 51 after warning had been sent to all planes to keep clear of surface forces while in Condition RED. Pilot and crew of 1 TBM have been rescued.

TRUK Atoll was photographed on the 21st by PB4Ys. On the same day, 18 P-38s and 4 PB4Ys hit Moen airfield strafing parked planes and starting 1 fire.

In the North Pacific on the 20th 4 B-24s bombed KURABU ZAKI (SE PARAMUSHIRU) with 118 100-lb. GP bombs. 4 of 5 intercepting enemy fighters were damaged. 1 B-24 was slightly damaged, but all planes returned safely. On the 21st, 4 PVs attacked MINAMI ZAKI (SE SHIMUSHU) with rockets. Heavy AA was encountered. 3 PVs returned; pilot of the 4th reported intention of bailing out over CAPE LOPATKA.

Summary of mopping up operations in the forward area for the period 11 February - 17 February shows the following results:

**SAIPAN**
- 48 Japs killed, 7 POWs. Our casualties - 1 wounded in action. An area in the central part of the island was shelled and patrolled on the 15, 16 and 17 resulting in killing or capture of 131 Japs, not as yet classified.

**TINIAN**
- 9 Japs killed, 2 POWs. Our casualties - 2 killed in action.

**GUAM**
- 33 Japs killed, 6 POWs. Our casualties - 5 killed in action, 2 wounded in action.

**PELELIU**
- 4 Japs killed.

Com7thFleet 150433 present OpOrd covering investigation of CASIGURAN SOUND to determine presence of enemy forces or installations and suitability as fleet anchorage.

Cominch & CNO 201651 (pink) requests Cincpoa's views and recommendations on proposed modification of present concept for KURILES operation to keep open a sea route to the Maritime Provinces.

CTF 58 210358 (pink) proposes modification to Com5thFleet's plan for JAMBOREE operation.

CINCSPWPA 211730 approves use of MANUS by British Pacific Fleet, including augmentation of U.S. naval carrier aircraft pools and personnel.

Com5thFleet 212317 (pink) replies to modification recommended by CTF 58 for JAMBOREE.

CinCEFF 210619 (pink) concerns establishment of bases forward of MANUS.

- Continued -
22 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC 211328 allocates certain facilities to Cinpoa for use by British Pacific Fleet effective 14 March.

Cominch 211635 (pink) clarifies status of British Pacific Fleet.

Cominch 211650 (pink) states that commitment of units of BPF is dependent upon decisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff which are expected to be reached about 15 March.

Cinpoa 220115 (pink) modifies operations of 21st BomCom in support of Task Force 58 strikes on the Empire.

Cinpoa 220116 (pink) designates 2nd MarDiv as Area Reserve for DETACHMENT; Division to be prepared for loading on 48 hours notice.

Cinpoa 220234 expresses concurrence in ComGenFOA serial, 0091 of 10 Feb. 1945 concerning FILBAS Agreement and overhead allotment of SoPacBaCom.

CTF 51 220410 concerns ammunition supply situation at IWO JIMA and establishes new quotas in the interest of ammunition conservation.

Com5thFleet 220647 (pink) further modifies his plan for JAMBOREE operation.

Com5thFleet 220801 (pink) suggests possibility that IWO must be left without adequate fleet support unless a delay in ICEBERG is accepted.

Cinpoa 220813 states that coordination of inter-theater communications should be effected by JCS or by arrangements between Theater Commanders.

CTF 51 221240 is Summary No. 3 covering IWO situation as of 1800 K(-10) on the 22nd (D plus 3).

23 February (Guam date)

During the night of the 22nd-23rd Jap infiltration tactics were again employed but were repulsed along the entire front. A group of enemy swimmers came in on the west coast in the rear of RCT 26, but were wiped out. Our attack on the 23rd supported by artillery jumped off about 0800(K). Enemy fire was again intense. Both divisions were held to very short local gains. At 1200(K) their lines were approximately the same as when the attack began in the morning. RCT 23 attacking SURIBACHI made the most significant advances and at 1035(K) the ensign was raised on the rim of the crater. The regiment held a line on the northeast and south rim of the crater. The attack was continued from the noon positions but by 1630(K) the only sizable gain was in the zone of the 4th MarDiv on the right flank. The lines here were pushed ahead 300 yards. In the center, 21st RCT captured the southern tip of Airfield No. 2. Front lines otherwise remained static. RCT 23 began mopping up operations on SURIBACHI. Block houses and pillboxes were reported to be within the crater. 717 enemy dead had been counted in this area. KANGOKU ROCK, off the NW shore of IWO, was taken under fire by DDs and the mortar emplacements and landing craft located there eliminated. As of 1630(K) 23 Feb. the 4th and 5th MarDivs plus the 21st RCT (3rd MarDiv) and most of Corps Artillery had been landed. In the front lines were (from left to right) 27th RCT (5th MarDiv), 26th RCT (5th MarDiv), 21st RCT (3rd MarDiv) and 24th RCT (4th MarDiv). The 23rd RCT (4th MarDiv) and the 25th RCT (4th MarDiv) had been pulled back from the front lines into Corps Reserve along with two battalions of the 27th RCT. The 9th RCT (3rd MarDiv) was scheduled to land 24 February.

- Continued -
23 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Beach conditions at TIVO were somewhat improved. Roads or satisfactory exits for tracked vehicles extended inland from all beaches except from Beach BLUE 2, although YELLOW and BLUE Beaches were still subjected to intermittent mortar and artillery fire. The most satisfactory vehicles so far found for negotiation of the beaches are amphy trailers (trailers attacked to amtracs) and weasels (tracked jeeps). Six foot breakers pounded the eastern beaches throughout the day. Use of pontoon causeways has been temporarily abandoned as the surf conditions cause them to breach. Investigation of the western beaches indicates that they are suitable only under ideal conditions.

No material change in the disposition of our forces. Naval support gunfire continues. Replenishment has been slow due to weather. 3 LST, 1 LSM, 1 YMS and 2 patrol craft have sustained damage but are still operating under their own power.

347 of the 836 on board the BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95) are missing.

ComNavGroup CHINA reports 5 convoys off the INDO-CHINA Coast. One consisting of a large AP and escorts, and another of four ships were last seen headed north. The 3rd, 3 AOs with 2 escorts, returned to SAGINAW with dead and wounded after attack by a plane. The 4th, 2 APs and 2 escorts, was attacked by a submarine at 1100 1/22 northeast of CAPE PADARAN. 1 AP was sunk. The 5th, 2 AOs and 2 escorts, passed CAMRANH BAY going north on the 22nd. This convoy was tracked by planes all night, vectoring submarine to the scene.

The 73rd BomWing reports sighting in the INLAND SEA 2 CV, 1 CVL, 1 BB, 1 BB or CA, 4 CL and 18 DD.

FOUNDER (SS 251) which was operating off the INDO CHINA Coast reports having been rammed while submerged by another submerged sub "believed friendly". Superstructure was damaged and radar carried away. Hull is sound. Sub is proceeding to SUBIC BAY.

The suicide attacks on our surface forces on the 21st came from an estimated 50 Jap planes, both Bettys and Zeke's (also Jills, apparently), that attacked from 1640 to 2000. The planes attacked in small groups. 11 planes were shot down. At 1501 on the 22nd a group of 4 Jap planes attempted unsuccessfully to attack the SAGINAW BAY. At the same time 2 enemy groups of about 4 planes each were picked up by radar but did not close. During this Red Alert 2 ENTERPRISE TBM's were shot down by our surface forces. Although bad weather hampered air support, more than 400 combat missions were flown on the 22nd between daylight and 1430, when strikes were cancelled. Scheduled air strikes on the 23rd were carried out with emphasis on the destruction of pinpoint targets under the direction of the air coordinator and air liaison parties. During the morning a strike on CHICHI JIMA destroyed 3 and damaged 3 of 10 planes seen on the ground; 2 TBM's were damaged by AA, but both returned safely. Spotting planes reported Jap AA launched 3 foot parachutes at 2000 feet, each supporting a 4 foot cadre from which dangled a flame spouting object 2 feet long.

B-29's will bomb TOKYO (or NAGOYA) on the 25th rather than the 24th.

A search plane attacked 4 DE and 1 AO in CAMRANH BAY leaving the AO afire and 1 DE damaged.

- Continued -
23 February (Guam date)

Com 20th AF 192302 (pink) covers directive outlining primary and secondary missions of 20th and 21st Bomber Commands.

Com7thFlt 220247 concerns construction of shore facilities at SAMAR, support of fleet operations at LINGAYEN, SUBIC and MANILA and supply stocks in SoWesPac Area.

Cincpoa 221303 informs CINCBBF of approval of his use of MANUS as fleet anchorage, requesting him to make detailed arrangements with ComNavBase MANUS.

Cincpoa 222343 pertains to SWPA shipping through POA.

Cincpoa 230145 (pink) requests CinCWWPA to authorize PacFlt PB4Y photographic planes to operate from LUZON in conducting photographic reconnaissance of OKINAWA.

CTF 51 230500 is Summary No. 9 covering IWO situation as of 1200 K(-10) on the 23rd (D plus 4).

ComGenStrAirPOA 230606 states that all units of TF 93 are available to assist CTF 51 with bombing strikes.

Cincpoa 230637 outlines arrangements relative to visit of General Maxwell and party to Cincpoa headquarters.

Cincpoa 230640 (pink) disapproves proposal of ComGen10thArmy regarding construction for civilian population of OKINAWA.

CTF 51 231150 is Summary No. 10 covering IWO situation as of 1800 K(-10) on the 23rd (D plus 4).

24 February (Guam date)

After a comparatively quiet night, our forces on IWO continued the attack on 24 February (D plus 5) supported by artillery, tanks and naval gunfire, encountering stiff enemy resistance throughout the day. Advances were made along the entire front, the most notable being made in the vicinity of Airfield #2, half of which was captured, and along the extreme right flank where the lines were pushed forward 300 to 400 yards. At 0955 (K), the Commanding General, Landing Force (Maj.Gen. Schmidt) assumed command ashore. By 1300 all troops except 3rd RCT (3rd MarDiv) had been or were being disembarked. Construction battalions and engineer battalions had been ordered ashore and one strip of Airfield #1 cleared of mines. Reports indicate that all Jap defenses were expertly planned and fanatically defended. All emplacements, including block houses, pillboxes and caves were mutually supporting and built of concrete, in some instances four feet thick. Minefields were numerous with many torpedo heads being used for explosive charge. A new type of incendiary grenade about the size of an orange was found. It was also discovered that the Japs were using approximately 1,000 pound rockets which were probably the cause of much of the damage on D Day and D plus 1 previously attributed to mortars. Some Japs were found wearing Marine uniforms. Beach conditions have continued to improve and supplies and equipment are now moving more rapidly than at any time during the operation. The hydrographic group has completed its survey and work on nets and mooring buoys has been initiated. Our casualties as of 1800 23 Feb. (D plus 4): KIA 706; WIA 5,125; MIA 531. Enemy casualties as of the close of D plus 5 were: 2,799 killed, 6 P0Ws.

-- Continued --
The air attack on our forces at IWO on the 23rd was made by several small groups of enemy planes. There were no fighter interceptions. Planes dropped window, but apparently made no attacks. TF 51 employed extensive radar jamming and smoke. CTF 51 reported that the night air attack may have come via MARCUS. Our air support strikes on the 24th were reduced owing to carrier refueling and search operations. 1 TBM spotting plane with Marine Corps observer crashed in flames; no survivors. Fire support was furnished throughout the day by 2 OBB, 3 CA and 10 DD.

210 B-29s from the 21st BomCom are scheduled to strike the TOKYO dock and urban area on the 25th with 564 tons of incendiaries. The attack will occur between 1430 and 1630 in conjunction with carrier plane attack.

Beginning 25 February, CTF 93 has ordered daily attacks on Susaki airfield at CHICHI JIMA by 1 squadron of B-24s during daylight and 7 B-24s at night. Carrier sweeps will be discontinued.

Com7thFlt announces plans for aerial mining of waters around AMOY, SWATOW, HONGKONG, HAINAN STRAIT, YULINKAN BAY, MAKO (FESCADORES), TAKAO and TAINAN (FORMOSA) during March and April.

ALUSNA MOSCOW 211430 (pink) covers arrangements for turning over certain types of U.S. mine, patrol and landing craft to Soviet crews at COLD BAY, ALASKA.

ComGen20thBomCom 212105 (pink) requests clarification of orders regarding transfer of 58th Wing from INDIA to the MARIANAS.

CTF 51 232315 requests CTF 93 to make day and night strikes on CHICHI JIMA, HAJA JIMA and MINAMI JIMA.

CTF 51 240700 is Summary No. 11 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) 24 February (D plus 5).

CTF 51 241310 is Summary No. 12 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K) 24 February (D plus 5).

25 February (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA the old BBs together with CA and DDs continued to furnish close gunfire support for troops ashore. During the night of 24-25 February minor infiltrations were attempted against the central portion of our lines; all were repulsed. On the 25th, ground activity continued with only limited gains being made. The most sizeable gains being made in the central and western portions of the line. It is believed that our troops are now attacking the principal enemy offensive positions on the island. The latest casualties as of 1130 on the 25th were as follows: KIA 83; WIA 5,428; MIA 404. 2,327 enemy dead have been counted and 7 POWs have been taken.

CTF 58 is still maintaining radio silence; however, VLR reports indicate that weather over TOKYO is unfavorable and therefore the carrier planes may have had difficulty in reaching their targets.

During the air raid at IWO JIMA on the evening of the 24th the HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS (DD 663) and the BRYANT (DD 665) collided causing extensive damage to the EDWARDS.
25 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Planes from the CVEs supporting the IWO JIMA operation will renew dawn and dusk sweeps against CHICHI JIMA and HAJA JIMA since CTF 93 has reported that he can only carry out night intruder attacks at these targets. B-24s have been assigned artillery, blockhouse and gun emplacement targets for their scheduled 1500 attacks.

On the 24th MARCUS was attacked by B-24s. The runways appeared in good operational condition prior to attack. The attack was made with delayed fuse bombs from an altitude of 10,000 feet.

On the 25th, 229 B-29s were airborne for an incendiary attack on the TOKYO urban area. 22 of these planes returned early and 2 were lost when they collided at the assembly point some 60 miles west of CHICHI JIMA. No survivors were located by a plane which circled the area for approximately 2 hours. 184 of these planes bombed TOKYO by radar through 10/10 undercast. 20 other B-29s bombed Empire targets including YOKOHAMA, SIZUOKA, HAMAMATSU and NAGOYA. All results were unobserved and all planes returned safely except the 2 which collided. There was no fighter interception and flak was meager to moderate and generally inaccurate.

CinCSWPA 250430 (pink) outlines searches and strikes to be carried out in conjunction with the fast carrier strike on the NANSEI SHOTO.

CTF 51 250515 is Summary No. 13 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K)
25 February (D plus 6).

ComGenAAFPOA 250740 concerns movement data of 315th Bomb Wing and the first two groups of the 58th Bomb Wing.

26 February (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA on the night of 25-26 February the enemy attempted only minor infiltrations and no major counterattacks were reported. It was the quietest night since the beginning of the operation. On the 26th at 0800 (K) the front line divisions commenced their assault. Stubborn resistance was met throughout the entire day, but by late afternoon noticeable gains had been made in the center of the line where the entire No. 2 airfield had been seized. At the present time our troops occupy the most important terrain, from a tactical standpoint, yet occupied, the troops now being on high ground and from the front line positions can observe the entire northern half of the island.

Two of our observation planes landed at strip No. 1 on the morning of the 26th. The strip has been cleared to 1,500 feet. AA weapons have been brought ashore to aid in protection of the troops and planes expected to be operated from the airfield very shortly. Information from prisoners of war indicate that the only source of drinking water now available to the Japanese is rainwater which is being collected in barrels. Our own supply is adequate, 15 distillation units being in operation on shore. The morale of the Marine Divisions employed in the operation is reported to be excellent and the reserves adequate to complete the mission of capturing IWO JIMA.

CVE based planes flew support missions on the morning of the 26th but all air operations were cancelled early in the afternoon because of unfavorable weather.

- Continued -
26 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

On the 26th planes from the ENTERPRISE made a dawn sweep against CHICHI JIMA destroying 1 airplane, 1 small AK and 2 medium AKs. 15 wrecked planes were observed on the field and 8 small vessels were observed in the harbor.

4 submarines have been reported in the vicinity of IWO. (A) A plane from the ANZIO (ASW CVE 57) made visual contact with a large submarine at 0210/26th, (25-12N, 140-15E) dropped a SONOBUOY and attacked. An explosion was heard and the sub is believed to be damaged. (B) Four hours earlier, at 2210K/26th an un-named ship from TF 54 made a radar contact with a probable submarine (25-04N, 140-23E), NEWCOMB (DD 536), BENNION (DD 662) and CAPPS (DD 550) attacked; all heard heavy underwater explosion at the same time, then no depth charges were being dropped. There is no report of debris. (C) At 0804K/26th FINNEGAN (DE 307), escorting returning transports from IWO, had an underwater sound contact (22-31N, 141-29E). Attacks brought debris and wood with Japanese characters on it to the surface. (D) Another contact was made 5 hours later about 50 miles to the south. The TULAGI (CVE 72) ASW group is conducting hunter-killer operations there but no results have been reported.

COM7thFleet reports that preliminary minesweeping of the main portion of MANILA BAY has been completed with negative results.

A Task Unit of 1 DD, 1 DE, 2 AM and 2 LCI left LEYTE on the 26th to proceed to CASIGURAN SOUND to land scouts for reconnaissance and to sweep the bay for mines.

It now appears that TF 58 did not attack NAGOTA on the 26th. The TOKYO attack was broken off after one day and they are now scheduled to arrive at a fueling rendezvous today.

CTF 51 260525 is Summary No. 15 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) on the 26th (D plus 7).

DepCom20thAF 260650 (pink) requests ComGen 21st BomCom to continue efforts to photograph OKINAWA until such time as photographic results are obtained other means.

Cincpac 260725 (pink) concerns employment of WISEMAN (DE 667) in the PHILIPPINE area to provide for emergency electric facilities.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 260855 requests Com5thFleet to station a lifeguard ship NE of IWO JIMA on days of VLR major strikes. This request extends only for a period during which 5th Fleet ships remain in the IWO JIMA area.

CTF 51 261315 is Summary No. 16 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K) on the 26th (D plus 7).
27 February (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA on the 27th limited gains were made during the day, the most sizeable of which were made along the center of the line and along the right flank where the 4th MarDiv made an advance of approximately 400 yards along the coast. Garrison forces have been ordered to commence landing on 1 March.

BST 884 was hit by a medium caliber shell putting 1 screw out of commission, and an un-named AKA was hit with minor damage resulting. 1 or 2 LSTs and 4 LSMs were damaged from beaching. CAILHOUN (DD 301) collided with an AKA and an APA while getting underway. Slight damage resulted.

28 February was the scheduled date for an operation in which troops will be landed in the PUERTO PRINCESSA area on the Island of PALAWAN. The 186th RCT (Reinforced) from the 41st Infantry Division of the 8th Army was scheduled to make the landing. Combat troops for this operation number 5,752; service troops number 2,246. The initial objective will be the two airstrips in the PUERTO PRINCESSA area; the final phase of the operation will consist of the development of airfields, naval and logistic facilities, and eventually the control of the entire island of PALAWAN.

Com5thFleet reports results of the TOKYO strike by TF 58 on the 25th as follows:

**Enemy Losses:**
- 158 planes destroyed of which 47 were shot down.
- 2 trains, 1 radar station and hangars destroyed.
- OTA Plant 75% destroyed.
- KOKUSAI Plant hit heavily.
- 5 coastal vessels, 7 small craft probably sunk.
- 9 coastal vessels, 5 small craft damaged.

**Own Losses:**
- 9 VF planes and 4 VF pilots in combat.
- 3 VF, 1 VT and no personnel operational.
- No damage to surface forces except minor damage to PORTERFIELD and PASADENA.

Approach to the target was through bad weather, which required slowing down several times to prevent damage to destroyers. 4 DDs suffered structural storm damage. The weather was bad on the 25th, and a strike on NAGoya (where better weather was predicted) was cancelled on the morning of the 26th due to weather. During retirement night of 25/26 the force sank 5 small enemy vessels including 1 picket boat which caused minor damage, 1 officer killed and 13 men wounded on PORTERFIELD (DD682) and minor damage and 2 men wounded in PASADENA (CL 65).

The force fueled on the 27th. Then TG 56.4 was detached to return to ULITHI. The other 3 groups are headed for OKINAWA when they will conduct their strike on 1 March, a day early, and possibly strike also on the 2nd.

BLENNY (SS 324) reports destroying 1 and possibly 2 tankers from a 3 tanker northbound convoy off CAMPBELL BAY on an unstated date, probably the 25th.

CinCSWPA 250539 refers to SoPacCom personnel to be transferred to SWPA.

CinCSWPA 261515 (pink) refers to staging and rehabilitation of POA divisions as contemplated in the FILBAS Agreement. MacArthur states that they will be unable to stage and rehabilitate the divisions as planned in the FILBAS Agreement.

--- Continued ---
27 February (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Com5thFleet 262107 outlines TOKYO strike on the 25th by TF 53.

Cincpac PEARL 270300 covers report concerning Lt.Gen. Harmon's flight to OAHU from KHAWALEIN.

CTF 51 270535 is Summary No. 17 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) on the 27th (D plus 3).

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 270304 refers to proposal to augment surface escort between ENIWETOK and the MARIANAS and WESTERN CAROLINES.

Cincpac 270324 (pink) authorizes the establishment of a British Pacific Fleet MONAB at PONAM ISLAND.

CTF 51 271130 is Summary No. 18 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K) 27 February (D plus 3).

Cincpac 271415 (pink) requests information from ComGenPOA relative to certain service troops assigned to SWESpac.

Cincpac 271416 requests ComMarGils to strike enemy airfields in the MARSHALLS without delay.

28 February (Guam date)

On the 28th advances were made at IWO JIMA to the extent of 200-300 yards all along the line. Our casualties as of 1800 K 27 February are as follows: KIA 1570, WIA 7656, MIA 552. Total casualties 9778. Enemy casualties as of 1800 K on the 26th: 4784 killed, 10 POWs.

Task Force 58 was scheduled to strike OKINAWA on 1 March.

PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA 19) received structural damage to her side plating during unloading operations on the 28th.

The search for General Harmon's plane has been negative up until the night of the 28th. At least 70 planes have been searching for the past two days.

CinCBPF 240215 outlines short titles of various British Pacific Fleet commands.

MARSHALL 230026 (pink) fixes the departure date for the 2nd water echelon of the 58th Wing at 15 April at the earliest.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 280047 (pink) informs CinCSWPA that 5 PB4Ys of VD-5 will arrive SAWAR evening of 28 February for photographing OKINAWA targets in coordination with the Fast Carrier strike thereon on 1 and 2 March. These planes will stay in the SWP area until about 1 April.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 280129 (pink) gives CinCSWPA information relative to Fast Carrier strike on OKINAWA on 1 March and possibly on 2 March.

- Continued -
28 February (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 51 280510 is Summary No. 19 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) 28 February (D plus 9).

Cincpaci Adv Hq 280529 (pink) sets forth the Warning Order for Phase III-c of ICEBERG Operation with target date named as "A-Day".

CTF 51 281035 is Summary No. 20 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) 28 February (D plus 9).

1 March (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA during the night 28 Feb.-1 March enemy artillery blew up the ammunition dump of the 5th MarDiv. During the day of D plus 10 gains were limited along the entire front; however, the 3rd MarDiv was able to seize a portion of Airfield #3. Airfield #1 is now reported operational for emergency landings of fighter aircraft, 1 carrier plane having landed on the field already.

Minor damage was inflicted on our shipping at IWO JIMA. TERRAY (DD 513) received a medium caliber hit from enemy artillery fire flooding her forward engine room; 9 men were killed, 18 wounded. CALHOUN (DD 801) was hit aft which resulted in 1 killed and 7 wounded.

TF 58 completed its mission of a strike against OKINAWA and is now headed for ULITHI.

ComNavGroup CHINA reports the arrival of the transport AWA MARU at SAIGON on 23 February. This ship which was granted safe conduct passage in order to transport supplies for POWs was reported to have unloaded 600 tons of munitions and 20 crated planes.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Rear Admiral Sherman departed for PEARL HARBOR with ultimate destination WASHINGTON, D.C.

ComGenPOA 272155 (pink) refers to transfer of SoPacBaCom overhead allotment to POA.

ComGen SoPacBaCom 010042 (pink) sets forth units transferred from SoPacBaCom to various operating areas.

Cincpaci Adv. Hq. 010135 (pink) lists tentative assignment of ships to CTF 58 for ICEBERG Operation.

CTF 51 010600 is Summary No. 21 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) 1 March (D plus 10).

CTF 51 011130 is Summary No. 22 covering IWO situation as of 1300 (K) 1 March (D plus 10).
2 March (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA on the 2nd advances up to 700 yards were made by the 3rd MarDiv in the central portion of the island. The other two divisions, the 4th on the right and 5th on the left, made exceptionally small gains throughout the day. Airfield #3 has now been secured and 4,000 feet of airfield #1 has been rehabilitated. Our casualties as of 1700 (K) 1 March were: 592 officers, 10,663 EM. Total casualties are now 11,255 of which 1,774 are listed as KIA. Enemy casualties as follows: Killed, 7,127; POWs 15 Japs, 17 Koreans.

The occupation of PUERTO PRINCESSA is proceeding without opposition. Fire support units and minesweeping units were released on H-Day. MANILA HARBOR has now been cleared of mines throughout with the exception of a portion along the breakwater. The reconnaissance of CASIGURAN SOUND is proceeding satisfactorily. The anchorage appears to be good, no mines have been found and no enemy activity was reported in the vicinity close to the beach.

Task Force 58 is now enroute to ULITHI. DD's from this force picked up 7 or 8 aviators (VLR) who were down south of FAREBE VELA.

Again on the 2nd all searches for Lt. Gen. Harmon were negative.

Beginning on the evening of the 3rd, about 5 to 10 B-29s will fly reconnaissance search missions to the NAGOYA area for the purpose of taking radar scope photographs.

Marshall 241305 delineates the boundaries of the AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST Theater.

Com5thFlt 020359 (pink) states that he considers it advisable to strike KYUSHU first in the next operation, leaving ULITHI 1 day early if necessary, and requests Admiral Mitscher to make an alternate plan covering this strike on KYUSHU.

CTF 51 020515 is Summary No. 23 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) on the 2nd (D plus 11).

DepCom20thAF 020654 (pink) outlines employment of 2 VLR wings at MIYAKO JIMA.

CTU 78.9.2 021058 outlines the results of the shore reconnaissance of CASIGURAN BAY.

CTF 51 021120 is Summary No. 24 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K) 2 March (D plus 11).
3 March (Guam date)

At Iwo Jima on 3 March steady though not extensive advances were made on both the left flank and center of the Corps front lines throughout the day. Enemy opposition was extremely stubborn throughout the day. Heavy mortar fire was experienced by all 3 divisions. Airfield #1 is scheduled to be ready for garrison fighters on 6 March. However, transport planes are now landing on this field. Unloading is continuing, however due to unfavorable weather and poor beach conditions it is being carried out under extreme difficulties.

Casualties as of 1700 (K) 2 March are as follows: 602 officers, 11,674 enlisted men; total casualties 12,276 of which 1,997 are listed as killed in action. Enemy dead as of 1800 (K) 2 March totaled 10,329. POWs 30 Japs, 43 Koreans.

Task Force 58 is due to arrive at Ulithi on the afternoon of 4 March.

In the Southwest Pacific Area sweeping of a northern passage through the Philippines is continuing and reports indicate that progress is satisfactory. The Verde Island Passage is clear and no mines have been found in Tikao Pass. Landings have been made on Lubang Island and Verde Island.

Saunter (AM295) struck a contact mine in Manila Bay on the 26th which resulted in the flooding of engine rooms and causing severe structural damage. 2 men were killed and 13 wounded.

3 Task Groups of Task Force 58 obtained majority of the necessary photography of Okinawa and other islands of the Nansei Shoto Group on 1 March. Poor photographic conditions existed on that day and the prediction of lower clouds on March 2nd caused the abandonment of plans for a second day at the objective. No air opposition was encountered and only 4 enemy planes (all twin engine bombers) were shot down. 37 additional planes were destroyed on the ground (9 twin engine and 28 single engine) plus 50 or more damaged. Some of the latter planes, however, may have already been damaged in previous strikes. We lost 21 aircraft (17 VF, 4 VT), 13 of these in combat. 5 pilots plus 3 aircrews were reported missing.

In attacks on shipping 13 vessels were sunk (including 1 DD and 2 medium AK), 13 were probably sunk (including 1 medium AK), and 26 were damaged (including 4 DE or PF, 1 medium AP and 4 medium AK).

On the ground many buildings, including barracks, administration buildings, sugar mills, a lumber yard, warehouses, radio and radar installations, and airfield installations were destroyed or damaged on Amami, Tokuno, Okinawa, Kuma, Erabu, Minami and Okino Daito.

During its retirement, the task group conducted a night bombardment of Okino Daito starting large fires.

191 B-29s were airborne for an attack on Tokyo at 0100 (K) on the 4th. Primary target was the Musashino Aircraft Plant near Tokyo.

Air evacuation of the wounded by landplanes began at Iwo Jima on the 3rd.

Richardson 280546 (pink) concerns certain Army facilities to be transferred to naval jurisdiction on a temporary loan basis.

ComEsCarFor 020943 (pink) recommends increasing, prior to next operation, the VF pilot complement on CVEs due to the arduous schedule resulting in excessive pilot fatigue.

- Continued -
3 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CTF 58 021247 outlines photographic coverage obtained by TF 58 of the NAISEI SHOTO area on 1 March.

CHQ SWPA 021912 (pink) refers to proposal in the FILBAS Agreement to stage 9 POA divisions in the PHILIPPINES.

CinCPac Adv. Hq. 022329 (pink) states that for CinCBP's information there is no change in current situation relative to employment of BPF.

Com5thFlt 022357 outlines departure of certain units from IWO JIMA in order to make ready for next operation.

CTF 51 030110 is Summary No. 26 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) on the 3rd (D plus 12).

CinCPOA Adv. Hq. 030219 (pink) states that he desires 494th Bomb Group be returned from CinCSWPA to operational control of CinCPOA not later than 15 April.

CTF 51 030605 is Summary No. 25 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K) 3 March (D plus 12).

Richardson 031022 refers to officer and enlisted shortages in the 24th Corps.

4 March (Guam date)

The front lines at IWO JIMA remained practically unchanged throughout the entire day of 4 March. Our casualties as of 1700 (K) 3 March are as follows: 676 officers, 12,656 enlisted men; total 13,322 of which 2,175 are listed as KIA. Enemy casualties as of 1800 (K) 3rd are: 12,863 dead, 36 Jap POWs, 45 Korean POWs.

Reconnaissance and sweeping of CASIGURAN SOUND has been completed. No mines were found nor were any enemy installations discovered on shore. 22 mines were swept in BALER BAY.

2 destroyers, YARNELL (DD 541) and RINGGOLD (DD 500), both assigned to TF 59 enroute to ULITHI, collided, considerable damage being caused to both ships. No personnel casualties are reported by the RINGGOLD but 1 man was killed and 6 wounded aboard the YARNELL. Both ships will require extensive repairs.

TREPAI (SS 412) sank an AK on the morning of the 3rd off NAGOYA.

Results of the raid by B-29s on the TOKYO Area are as follows: Primary target, Musashino Aircraft Plant, was hit with 27 tons from 9 B-29s, bombing by radar from 25-28,000 feet through 10/10ths undercast. 154 other planes dropped 4,32 tons (284 GP, 148 LB) on the TOKYO urban area by radar from 25-29,000 feet. There was no fighter opposition, but heavy AA was meager to moderate and accurate to inaccurate. 13 planes bombed 5 other targets with 56 tons. Results were unobserved because of weather. 1 B-29 ditched on return, 9 survivors were rescued by a Navy Dumbo. 1 other B-29 was forced to land at IWO JIMA because of fuel shortage. The plane was refueled, took off and landed safely at TINIAN. All other planes returned safely.

CominCh & CNO 022020 concerns the category of defense of the UNALASKA Sector.

PhotRon 5 Adv Ech 031136 (pink) states that Clark Field is the only field in LUZON suitable for Liberator operations and that no avgas will be available there prior to 20 March and states that 5th AF is scheduled to fly F5 photo planes over MIYAKO.

-Continued-
4 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 58 O432346 (pink) states that he proposes to sortie from ULITHI 14 March (ELD) for the next operation.

Chennault's O40417 (pink) refers to weather reconnaissance to be made prior to ICEBERG OPERATION.

CincPOA Adv. Hq. O40340 (pink) requests DepCom 20th AF to conduct reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS in order to determine routes used by shipping through these Straits.

CTF 51 O40440 is Summary No. 27 covering IO20 situation as of 1200 (K) 4 March (D plus 13).

CincPOA Adv. Hq. O40336 (pink) comments on withdrawal of Heavy Bomber Groups assigned to POA for conversion to Long Range Groups.

CTF 51 O41040 is Summary No. 23 covering IO20 situation as of 1300 (K) 4 March (D plus 13).

5 March (Guam date)

No change in the ground situation resulted from activity on the 5th at IWO JIMA. The reason for this was that all the Marine Divisions were reorganizing; reserves of ammunition were being built up and personnel reequipped. Mopping up in the rear areas continued. Casualties as of 1700 (K) on 4 March were 14,355 of which 2,419 had been killed in action.

MANILA HARBOR minesweeping operation has been substantially completed. The Harbor has been opened and naval ships of all types are now unloading in this harbor. Minesweeping in BALER BAY and in SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS continues. Guerrillas were landed on MASBALE ISLAND on the 3rd.

Com5th Fleet in the INDIANAPOLIS departed IWO 1600 (K) on the 5th for GUAM and ComPhibsPac is scheduled to leave on the 6th also for GUAM.

Com5thFlt 040313 directs CTF 58 to maintain the equivalent of 2 task groups of Task Force 58 in readiness for sortie on 18 hours notice.

CinCSWPA O40429 states that his new Advanced Echelon GHQ opened in MANILA at 1800 I (-9) on 5 March.

CinCSWPA 040811 (pink) outlines to ComAlliedAirForces the search plans to be put into effect for the ICEBERG Operation.

Com5thFlt 040830 (pink) approves CTF 58 OpPlan for ICEBERG with the exception of minor changes in composition of task groups.

CinCSWPA O41759 states that operation of 5 photo Liberators of VD-5 from Clark Field about 10 March is approved.

CinCSWPA 050313 (pink) states that 494th Bomb Group can be returned to CinCPOA operational control prior to 15 April.

CinCSWPA 050434 states that ComGenPOA may send a control group to assist in mounting out 24th Corps Garrison Echelons.

- Continued -
5 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CTF 51 050435 is Summary No. 29 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K)
5 March (D plus 14).

ComGenAAFPFA 050450 (pink) refers to staff setup for LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) and WORKMAN (IWO JIMA).

DepCom20thAF 050452 (pink) recommends that request of CincPOA for the 21st Bomber Command to conduct reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS be approved provided it does not seriously interfere with the prime mission of the 20th AF.

ComAirPac 050615 (pink) recommends that the CABOT, together with its Carrier Air Group (29), be returned for Navy Yard availability prior to 15 March. ComAirPac states that this Air Group is not fit for further combat.

CTF 51 051015 is Summary No. 30 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K) 5 March (D plus 14).

Cincopac Adv. Hq. 051246 terminates the designation of 2nd MarDiv as Area Reserve for IWO JIMA Operation.

Cincopac Adv. Hq. 051410 (pink) recommends to Com5thFlt that CABOT be retained, plus its Air Group (29), for participation in the next operation (at least in the initial stages).

6 March (Guam date)

IWO JIMA - reorganization of the 5th PhibCorps was completed on the morning of 6 March, no changes being made in the disposition of the front line divisions. Intense artillery preparation was laid down prior to jumping off. However, exceptionally slight gains were made along the entire front lines throughout the day.

SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT has been swept with no mines being found. CASIGURAN SOUND and BAY are reported ready for immediate use. The airfield site at this locality was reported to be satisfactory.

5 OBB are scheduled to leave IWO JIMA on the afternoon of the 7th. This will leave 2 CA and 1 DD Squadron for fire support at the objective.

HENNET (DD 473) reports a hole in her plating and a flooded compartment from an unknown cause. The damage inflicted could possibly be due to a dud bomb or torpedo dropped by a Betty which this destroyer shot down on 1 March. No personnel casualties were suffered, but docking will be required.

British Pacific Fleet arrived at MANUS on the 7th and is reported to be ready for immediate duty.

ComGenAAFPFA (Admin) 032135 (pink) discusses assignment of certain Air Force units in the ICEBERG Operation.

ComGenPOA 040558 outlines assignment of Army facilities on KAUAI.

CinCPOA Pearl 051800 (pink) reaffirms to Cominich that it is essential that there be no reduction in bombardment strength assigned to POA.

CinCPOA Adv. Hq. 060150 (pink) replies to ComWesSeaFron (Adm. Ingersoll) relative to possibility of attack on U.S. West Coast.

- Continued -
6 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CTF 51 060500 is Summary No. 31 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K)
6 March (D plus 15).

CTF 51 061010 is Summary No. 32 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K)
6 March (D plus 15).

7 March (Guam date)

At IWO JIMA on the 7th little progress was made by any of the divisions.
Limited gains up to 500 yards were made by the 5th MarDiv on the extreme left flank
and approximately 200 yards in the center and on the right flank. No advances were
made by 3rd or 4th MarDivs. Casualties as of 1700 (K) 7 March: 685 officers, 13,608
enlisted men, of which 2,681 are listed as killed in action.

The IWO JIMA Expeditionary Force is to be reorganized effective 9 March.
The naval forces pass to the control of Admiral Hill and the ground forces will be
under the direct control of Major General Schmidt, USMC. The Island Command assumes
the designation TG 10.16 until control is passed to ComFwdArea.

300 B-29s are scheduled to take off at 2000 K(-10) on the 9th to bomb TOKYO
at 0330 (K) on the 10th. This strike is the largest scheduled up to the present time.

CTF 58 260630 (pink) sets forth his suggested Task Force 58 organization
for ICEBERG.

CTF 58 050817 (pink) outlines sortie date from ULITHI and strike dates for
the ICEBERG Operation.

CincPac Pearl 060324 (pink) authorizes 1st MarDiv to use KAUAI facilities
for rehabilitation and staging following the ICEBERG Operation.

CinCBPFF 061140 (pink) states that the 4th and 8th Submarine Flotillas are
reporting for duty and requests confirmation of continued assignment to SoWesPac
Forces.

Arnold 061419 (pink) discusses requirements for 2 additional very heavy
bomb wings for employment in MIYAKO JIMA.

CTF 51 070510 is Summary No. 33 covering IWO situation as of 1200 (K)
7 March (D plus 16).

CTF 51 071100 is Summary No. 34 covering IWO situation as of 1800 (K)
7 March (D plus 16).

CTF 51 071255 (pink) discusses evacuation of 4th and 5th MarDivs and departure
of OBBs and recommends retaining ENTERPRISE at IWO JIMA until night of 15 March.

Cinopac at Washington 071319 (pink) directs that fuel estimates for BPF be
bases on training and passage between ports but no combat operation during Phase I
of ICEBERG.

Com5thFlt 072050 (pink) approves CTF 51’s despatch relative to evacuation of
4th and 5th MarDivs subject to developments ashore, but desires earlier release of
ENTERPRISE Group if night fighter squadron is ready to take over at IWO JIMA.
I&WIMI,March (Guam date)

Small but steady gains were made at IWO JIMA on the 8th. In the center of the line our troops are now within between 400 and 500 yards of the coast.

P-51s on the 8th flew their first strafing mission at IWO JIMA in support of the ground troops. 2 squadrons of P-51s and 1 VMFB squadron have arrived.

13th Bomber Command reports that a Liberator attacked an enemy CVE at 2225 I on the 6th at 117-43E 00-29N, (off E. coast of BORNEO in MAKASSAR STRAIT). 3 hits were scored resulting in an explosion. The vessel was identified visually to have been on course 020 at 20 knots and was dead in the water when last observed. 6 enemy fighters were airborne in the vicinity but failed to close.

8 squadrons of B-24s and 3 squadrons of P-38s were scheduled to attack ZAMBOANGA targets in preparation for the amphibious assault scheduled for 10 March.

14th AF planes attacked TOURANE (FRENCH INDO CHINA) on the 5th causing considerable damage to planes and airfield facilities. 32 operational planes were still observed on the airfield, 6 other planes being destroyed.

Sterlet (SS 392) reports sinking a large tanker off TOKYO the night of the 5th and a medium AK east of MIYAKI on the night of the 1st.

ComGenFMFPac 010151 (pink) discusses arrival of replacements for Marine Divisions to be employed in Phase III of ICEBERG Operation.

CTF 58 060810 (pink) answers Cincpac’s despatch relative to return of the CABOT and her Air Group for availability and reformation.

Cominch 071945 (pink) discusses availability of CBs for overseas employment during 1945 and first part of 1946.

ComGenFMFPac 080011 (pink) makes further reference to replacement troops for employment in ICEBERG.

DepCom20thAF 080500 (pink) requests authority from Cincpac to lay acoustic and magnetic mines without sterilizers in the forthcoming operation at SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 080533 (pink) states that he will defer action on the return of the CABOT for availability until receipt of Com5thFleet’s recommendation.

CTF 51 080550 is Summary No. 35 covering IWO JIMA situation as of 1200 (K) on the 8th (D plus 17).

XXI BomCom 080730 (pink) outlines the operations to be conducted by the XXI Bomber Command in support of the ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 080753 answers Cominch despatch relative to installation of quad 50 caliber guns on certain CVs.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 080903 (pink) informs Com5thFlt that 21st BomCom is prepared to conduct picket boat sweep in conjunction with strikes in ICEBERG if desired.

CTF 51 081045 is Summary No. 36 covering IWO JIMA situation as of 1800 (K) on the 8th (D plus 17).

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 081445 (pink) requests information from Com5thFlt as to what missions he wishes BomCom 21 to carry out in connection with ICEBERG carrier strikes.
The landing at ZAMBOANGA by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area is scheduled for tomorrow, 10 March.

323 B-29s took off from GUAM, TINIAN and SAIPAN at approximately 1800 (K) on the 9th for an attack on TOKYO. Bombing commenced at 0040 (K) on the 10th. Preliminary reports indicate that results achieved were excellent.

CTF 51 020135 (pink) discusses assignment of ships assigned to his command in the forthcoming operations and makes recommendations for provision of additional escorts.

Cincpacific Pearl 060325 concurs in Comincheck modification of Category of Defense in the UNALASKA Sector.

GHQ Adv MANILA 080435 summarizes results of conference at 7th Fleet Headquarters on 26 February relative to BPF petroleum requirements at MANUS and LEYTE.

CTF 51 030920 (pink) recommends that 5th Fleet direct ENTERPRISE to remain at IWO JIMA to support troops and cover ships present instead of immediate return to ULITHI.

MarCorps 081942 (pink) outlines battle replacements to be assigned 5th Corps.

ComWesSeaFron & ComGen WDC 090015 refers to possible fast carrier raid on West Coast prior to pending conference in San Francisco.

Com5thFlt 090147 answers CTF 51 recommendation that ENTERPRISE remain at IWO JIMA and states that due to demands of over-all situation ENTERPRISE should be sailed to arrive ULITHI morning of 12 March.

Com5thFlt 090229 recommends that SHANGRI LA be sailed from PEARL to join Task Force 58 at earliest practicable date.

DepCom20thAF 090555 (pink) approves BomCom XXI scheduled participation in support of the ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac Adv Hq 090748 (pink) recommends to Comincheck that the 4th and 8th British Submarine Flotillas be assigned to 7th Fleet as of 1 April.

10 March (Guam date)

Most notable advances made on IWO JIMA on the 10th were carried out by the 4th MarDiv in the north and central portions of their zone of action. They are now within 200 to 250 yards of the coast in their sector. The 3rd and 5th MarDivs made very little headway.

Troops of the 41st Inf Div landed on ZAMBOANGA on the morning of the 10th. Rear Admiral Royal landed the troops in this operation. The operation was carried out with very little opposition being encountered. Only slight return machine gun fire was reported.
10 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

ComNavGroup CHINA reports the presence of a great number of miscellaneous barges, ore carriers and small freighters in the vicinity of southern KOREA. Extensive rail, dock and warehouse facilities in this area indicate extensive use of these ports for shipping from MANCHUKIA and KOREA.

KETE (SS369) reports sinking 3 medium freighters on the night of the 10th in the RYUKYUS Area.

The southern airfield at IWO JIMA is now reported graded for 5800 feet, with airfield No. 2 scheduled to be in operation around the 14th of March, provided the combat situation permits.

TOKYO was hit on the night of 9-10 March by 285 B-29s from an altitude of from 5000 to 9000 feet. Bombing was done both visually and by radar through 1/10 to 7/10 clouds. 2,377 tons of incendiaries were dropped on the TOKYO urban area resulting in the destruction of 15 square miles completely burned out. Air opposition was slight and ineffective and AA varied from moderate to intense. An estimated 75 to 100 searchlights were reported as being observed from landfall to the target. 5 B-29s landed at IWO JIMA on the morning of the 10th, 1 of them going off the end of the runway and the other 4 making successful landings. These 4 took off for the MARIANAS that afternoon.

CTG 52.2 281036 (pink) recommends that as many CVEs as practicable should be made available as rotating reliefs for the CVEs now assigned for the ICEBERG Operation; reference is made specifically to CVEs scheduled to be RFS in the near future on the West Coast. (CTG 52.2 - R.Adm. Durgin).

ComPhibsPac 050120 (pink) concurs in Admiral Durgin's recommendation appearing above and requests that certain CVEs be made available for Phase II of ICEBERG.

Com5thFlt 080345 (pink) further concurs in recommendations outlined in the two foregoing despatches.

Joint Security Control 082317 (pink) refers to deception program to be carried out during movement of 20th Bomber Command to the MARIANAS.

CTF 51 091015 is Summary No. 37 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 9th (D plus 18).

Cincpoa (Wash) 091337 (pink) outlines to CinCSWPA the future scheduled employment of Marine Air Wing ONE in the Pacific Ocean Areas subsequent to 1 July.

Com5thFlt 092359 (pink) outlines the planned track of TF 58 and requests ComSubPac to make an anti-picket boat sweep in advance of the proposed passage of the Task Force.

CTG 51 100435 is Summary No. 38 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 10th (D plus 19).

Cincpac ADV. HQ. 100535 (pink) requests photographic coverage by CTF 58 of KERAMO RETTO and KEISE SHIMA about L minus 9.

CTF 51 100900 is Summary No. 39 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 10th (D plus 19).
11 March (Guam date)

Progress was good on D plus 20 (11 March) at IWO JIMA. We are now in control of the entire coastline along the eastern coast in the zone of action of the 4th MarDiv and along the northern coast in the 5th MarDiv zone. It is estimated that there are 1,000 Japs located in this extreme northern end of the island plus scattered elements yet to be eliminated by the 4th MarDiv. Our total casualties as of 1800 (K) 11 March are listed as: 17,463 of which 3,449 have been killed in action.

The RANDOLPH (CV15) was hit by a Jap suicide plane while at anchor at ULITHI at about 2000 the night of the 11th starting fires which were reported under control two hours later. Known casualties are reported as 1 dead and 25 injured. A second suicide plane crashed on SORLEN ISLAND at the same time, damaging certain buildings. Amplifying report will follow later.

P-51s are apparently operating successfully from IWO JIMA. They have been flying close support missions and have been hitting HAHA JIMA with reported excellent results.

On the night of 11-12 March 307 B-29s were airborne for an incendiary attack on NAGOYA. 291 of these planes actually reached the target. The majority of the planes bombed visually and reports of damage inflicted were from good to excellent. Moderate air opposition was encountered and AA indicated as moderate to intense.

CTF 51 050630 recommends that Com5thFlt issue a directive to ComFwdArea to assume responsibility for defense and development of IWO JIMA upon completion of the capture and occupation phase which he estimates will be about 16 March.

ComAirPac Admin 080211 (pink) refers to movements of Marine Air Groups and servicing facilities from OKINAWA to CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO and establishment of an aircraft pool thereat.

Com5thFlt 101400 (pink) outlines certain changes in his OpPlan 1-45 (ICEBERG).

Com5thFlt 102320 directs CTG 51.21 (R. Adm. Hill) and CTF 94 (V. Adm. Hoover) to determine date mutually agreeable for transfer of responsibility for defense and development of IWO JIMA.

CTG 51.21 111000 is Summary No. 41 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 11th (D plus 20).

Com5thFlt 111216 summarizes suicide crash on RANDOLPH at ULITHI.

12 March (Guam date)

On D plus 21 (12 March) majority of enemy resistance was centered at the extreme northern portion of the island in the zone of the 5th MarDiv, organized resistance having ceased in the 3rd and 4th MarDiv zones. Evacuation of the 4th MarDiv will commence 14 March.

At ZAMBOANGA both airstrips have been captured and most of the defensive installations have been evacuated, the Japanese apparently having withdrawn to the hills.

- Continued -
12 March (Guam date) (cont'd)

An amplifying report concerning the NAGOYA strike on the night of the 11-12th indicates that 240 B-29s dropped a total of 1430 tons of incendiaries on the urban areas from an altitude of from 5 to 3000 feet. Majority of the bombing was carried out visually through 0/10 to 3/10 cloud cover. Photographs taken on the 12th reveal 786 acres of the NAGOYA urban area to be destroyed. Only 1 plane was lost on this mission.

ComGenFMFPac 110205 and 110133 (pink) concern battle replacements for the 5th Corps and also discusses rotation policy to be carried out.

Com5thFlt 110800 outlines urgent need for additional CVEs for current and future operations.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 121502 passes the above despatch to ComAirPac for comment.

Com5thFlt 112347 (pink) informs CinCSWPA that British carrier participation is cancelled for the time being and outlines schedule of operations to be carried out during the 1st phase of ICEBERG.

ComGenAAFPOA 120011 (pink) recommends to CincPac that release of 494th Bomb Group from CinCSWPA control be given as 15 April.

CTG 51.21 120215 is Summary No. 42 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 12th (D plus 21).

CinCSWPA 120345 (pink) outlines his strike schedule in support of ICEBERG for period L minus 16 through L minus 7.

Com5thFlt 120420 refers to employment of CABOT in first phases of ICEBERG to be later released when RANDOLPH rejoins the Task Force.

Cincpoc Adv. Hq. 120426 (pink) outlines certain changes to be made by BomCom 21 in support of ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 120743 advises Com5thFlt that SHANGRI LA will not currently be assigned to TF 58.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 120752 (pink) outlines plan for covering movement of the 4th and 5th MarDivs from IWO JIMA to the HAWAIIAN Area.

CTG 51.21 120905 is Summary No. 43 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 12th (D plus 21).

Com5thFlt 120950 (pink) covers report on the suicide attacks made by 2 twin engine enemy planes at ULITHI.
13 March (Guam date)

CTF 58 is scheduled to sortie from ULITHI tomorrow, 14 March.

No appreciable change is reported in the situation on IWO JIMA on D plus 22 (13 March). Our forces landed on KAMA ROCK and KANGOKU ROCK on 13 March (W of IWO). No enemy forces were found but there were signs of previous occupation. Our total casualties as of 12 March — 18,586 of which 3,758 are listed as KIA; 20,000 enemy are reported to have been either buried or sealed up in caves as of this date.

The American Flag is scheduled to be officially raised at IWO JIMA at 0930 14 March.

The officer in charge of the survey of CASIGURAN BAY reports raising the American Flag in CASIGURAN TOWN on the 13th. All Japanese who were previously reported in CASIGURAN had cleared the area.

RANDOLPH 120510 summarizes damage caused by KAMEKAZI crash.

ComAlliedAirForces SWPA 130022 (pink) outlines schedule of fast carrier strikes to ComAF 5, comAF 13 and ComAir7thFlt and outlines operations to be carried out in conjunction therewith in support of ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 130050 authorizes Com5thFlt to make such adjustments of CABOT and RANDOLPH Air Groups as he sees fit.

CTG 51.21 130235 is Summary No. 44 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 13th (D plus 22).

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 130547 (pink) requests CTF 58 to obtain certain photo reconnaissance of THE NINGPO Area.

CTG 51.21 (R.Adm. Hill) 130920 is Summary No. 45 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 13th (D plus 22).

COMAF 13 (LEYTE) 131200 (pink) states that he will support ICEBERG Operation by continuing Search Plan "J" and furnishing convoy cover from LEYTE to OKINAWA commencing 23 March.

BomCom 21 131215 (pink) outlines his plan for operations in support of ICEBERG.

14 March (Guam date)

The backbone of the enemy appears to have been broken as a result of the operations during 14 March (D plus 23) at IWO JIMA. Scattered pockets exist throughout the area that has been overrun by our forces and there is still heavy enemy resistance at the most northern portion of the island. Many attempts were made by the Japs to infiltrate through our lines during the day; however, all of these attempts were repulsed. Our casualties as of noon 14 March were: 18,982 of which 3,844 are listed as killed in action.

TF 58 is enroute to the fueling rendezvous. Five submarines are now commencing an anti-picket boat sweep along the projected track of the force. 2 DDs are conducting a diversionary sweep along the former route that was taken by TF 58 in its raids on TOKYO.

- Continued -
14 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CTG 51.21 estimates that IWO defense and development will be turned over to CTF 94 (V.Adm. Hoover) on the 21st.

No further positive results have been reported in the searches for Lt.Gen. M.F. Harmon.

On the night of 13-14 March 1977 B-29s dropped 2,045 tons of incendiaries on the OSAKA urban area. Bombing was carried at an altitude from 5,000 to 10,000 feet. Many large fires were observed. Enemy opposition was slight and reported as ineffective. AA intensity was varied. No B-29s were lost in this mission. This is the first mission of any considerable size that BomCom XXI has experienced no loss in planes or personnel.

AAFPOA ADMIN 120325 (pink) discusses completion date of northwest VLR fields on GUAM.

Com5thFlt 130544 requests information from CTF 51 (V.Adm. Turner) regarding who will act as SOPA during the next operation until Vice Admiral Turner's arrival.

CG 20th BomCom 131204 (pink) outlines searches to be carried out by that command prior to ICEBERG.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 131621 (pink) outlines his understanding of operations to be carried out by CinCSWPA in support of ICEBERG and requests confirmation of his understanding regarding this program.

Cinpac PEARL 132050 (pink) advises Cominch that he has no information regarding arrangements for any British base in the PHILIPPINES.

Cinpac 132051 states that SHANGRI LA will continue training replacement groups in PEARL until further orders are issued.

ComGenFMFPac 132107 (pink) concerns battle replacements originally scheduled for GUAM to be diverted to PEARL.

Cinpac Adv. Hq. 132234 advises Com5thFlt that SHANGRI LA will continue training at PEARL.

CinCBPFF 132353 (pink) discusses possible employment of Mosquitoes (twin-engine light bombers) for an attack in the future.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 140015 (pink) advises CinCSWPA that a firm date of 15 April has been given as release of the 494th Bomb Group to POA control.

Cincpoa PEARL 140047 (pink) refers to the Army POA conference to be held by ComGenPOA and outlines the assumptions and plans covering this meeting.

CTG 51.21 140250 is Summary No. 46 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 14th (D plus 23).

BomCom 21 140414 (pink) states concurrence in certain changes requested by Cincpoa covering air support in ICEBERG Operation.
14 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 140748 (pink) advises DepCom 20th AF regarding target priorities for scheduled 21st BomCom strike on KYUSHU.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 140750 (pink) outlines to Com5thFlt the scheduled operations of BomCom 21 in support of ICEBERG.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 140752 (pink) informs various commands that British Task Force 113 will shortly be available for participation in ICEBERG and will be subject to withdrawal on 7 days notice.

BomCom 21 140800 (pink) requests information from Cincpac as to priority targets on KYUSHU.

CinCBPBF 141205 (pink) directs CTF 113 (V. Adm. H. B. Rawlings, R.N.) to direct TF 113 and TF 112 to report to Cincpac for duty in connection with operation ICEBERG.

15 March (Guam date)

Mopping up continues on IWO JIMA. The northern portion of the island still holds out as well as certain isolated pockets on the northeastern portion of the island.

TF 58 is approaching the fueling rendezvous.

250-300 B-29s from the 21st BomCom will take off at 1800K (-10) on the 16th for a scheduled night attack on KOBE. All planes will be loaded with incendiaries.

Buckner ComGen 10 140403 refers to establishment of a Far Western Pacific Base Command in the BUNKHOUSE (RYUKYUS) area as soon as that area is declared secured.

CTG 51.21 150225 is Summary No. 43 covering IWO situation as of 1200 on the 15th (D plus 24).

ComGenAAFPOA Admin 150505 (pink) refers to fighter groups being assigned to 20th AF.

CTF 113 150611 (pink) states that TF 113 and TF 112 are reporting to Cincpac for duty and states that they will be ready to sail from MANUS by 1200 K 17 March.

Cincpoa 150654 (pink) requests use of LETYE anchorage for British carrier task force and Fleet Train while participating in the ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 150656 (pink) directs TF 113 to proceed to ULITHI to top off from U.S. tankers prior to participation in ICEBERG.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 150658 (pink) advises Com5thFlt that unless he hears to the contrary he will direct TF 113 to maintain neutralization of airfields in the SAKASHIMA GUNTO in accordance with concept 5thFlt's OpPlan 1-45. Also states that TF 113 will assume the designation of TF 57 upon departure from ULITHI.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 150740 advises ComGenPOA that he does not concur in the further assignment of responsibilities for Army Base Command administration to officers serving as Island Commanders and exercise unified command over all services involved.
15 March (Guam date)(cont'd)

CincpacAdv. Hq. 151235 advises CinCBPF that TFs 112 and 113 be prepared to function without shore facilities when they arrive at LEYTE and that British reserve carrier aircraft on shore will be authorized and established when Pacific Fleet carrier aircraft pool is activated.

CinCBPF advises CinCPAC that TFs 112 and 113 be prepared to function without shore facilities when they arrive at LEYTE and that British reserve carrier aircraft on shore will be authorized and established when Pacific Fleet carrier aircraft pool is activated.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Rear Admiral Sherman returned from Washington conference with Fleet Admiral King.

16 March (Guam date)

Organized resistance on IWO JIMA was announced as overcome at 1800 K (-10) 16 March (D plus 25). It is estimated that the island will be officially turned over to the Island Commander about 22 March. Total casualties are reported as 19,938 of which 4,189 are listed as killed in action.

On the night of 16-17 March 321 B-29s made an incendiary attack on KOBE. Complete reports have not been received but preliminary reports indicate that substantial damage was caused. Fighter opposition was reported as being exceptionally meager and AA described as light. Majority of the squadrons bombed by radar.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 160604 (pink) advises ComGenAAFpoA that he does not concur in the assignment of fighters to the 20th AF.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 160746 suggests reduction of 10% of personnel in Marine detachments in Pacific Fleet combatant ships in order to alleviate the critical Marine Corps personnel situation.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 160916 directs CTF 58 and CTF 93 to brief pilots not to attack the Emperor's Palace until further orders are issued.

CTG 51.21 160920 is Summary No. 51 covering IWO situation as of 1800 on the 16th (D plus 25).

CinCSWPA 161611 (pink) advises Cinpoa that LETTE anchorage will be available for British Carrier Task Force while participating in ICEBERG.

17 March (Guam date)

Mopping up operations continue on IWO JIMA. The 4th MarDiv is now reembarking, the 3rd MarDiv is to assume the responsibility for the 4th MarDiv's zone of action. 5th MarDiv is scheduled to commence re-embarking tomorrow.

No reports from TF 58. Picket boat sweep was completed with negative results.

TF 92 (R. Adm. McCrea) reports bombing MATSUWA on the afternoon of the 16th. Heavy fires were observed. Light gunfire was returned but no damage was incurred by our ships.

SEACAT (SS 399) reports sinking a small AK S. of KOREA.

SPOT (SS 413) reports sinking a medium AK and damaging another in FORMOSA STRAITS.

Amplifying report gives results of the KOBE incendiary attack on the night of the 16th-17th as follows: 305 B-29s dropped approximately 2500 tons of incendiary bombs both visually and by radar from 5000 to 10000 feet. The weather was reported as...
17 March (Guam date) (cont'd)

as ranging from CAVU to 10/10 clouds. Numerous fires were reported as being observed. 3 B-29s are missing for unknown reasons.

21st BomCom 170945 (pink) advises Cincpac that between 27 March and 1 April 1500 mines will be laid in the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

18 March (Guam date)

TF 58 attacked KYUSHU targets today. No reports have been received as to damage inflicted as yet.

On the morning of 18 March elements of the 40th Inf. Div. landed on the southern shores of PANAY in the ILOILO area. No opposition was encountered up until the time of the report which was 1015I. Approximately 14,000 SWPA troops are involved in this operation. Subsequent landings in this area are scheduled for GUIMARAS and NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.

Submarine activity was brisk. SPRINGER (SS 414) reports sinking a DD just west of OKINAWA at 0400 on the morning of the 18th. TRIGGER (SS 237) sunk an AK and damaged another west of AMAMI O SHIMA. POMFRET (SS 391) made an attack on a Jap submarine off BUNGU SUIDO but failed to score a hit. Report indicates that she is doing an "end around" and hopes to make another attack on the same target. SPOT (SS 413) sank a large AK, another unknown type of ship and made attacks on several other AKs and DDs with negative results. In addition, she engaged an AM with gunfire reporting some damage incurred by making hits with 5-inch and several 40mm. Return fire inflicted damage on the SPOT to the extent that both radars and #2 periscope were hit.

On the night of the 18th-19th 294 B-29s bombed NAGOYA with incendiaries. Preliminary reports indicate that results were good. Majority of squadrons report a general conflagration in the area. VF opposition was reported as being slight and AA light to moderate. No report on losses has as yet been received.

Cominch 171343 (pink) directs Cincpao to formulate a plan for detection and interception of a possible Japanese carrier raid on the west coast of the United States.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 180810 informs certain commands that the LETTE-SAMAR Naval Base is expected to replace ULITHI as an advanced base prior to the advent of the typhoon season at ULITHI and requests concurrence of CINCSWPA to utilize anchorages and facilities in that area.

Cincpao Adv. Hq. 181322 (pink) outlines the scheduled operations to be carried out by the British Pacific Fleet during the ICEBERG Operation and sets forth the units which will participate therein.
19th March (Guam date)

Com5thFlt reports that the FRANKLIN (CV 13) was hit on the morning of the 19th by a suicide plane carrying a bomb. Incomplete reports indicate that bad fires were started. The FRANKLIN is now in tow by the PITTSBURG (CA 72) on a southerly course. Evidently this carrier was hit while south of SHIKOKU. Com5thFleet has requested fleet tugs to take the FRANKLIN in tow.

No reports have been received on the KYUSHU strikes other than that the results were "good".

In the Southwest Pacific Area reports indicate that all unloading has been completed at PANAY and that re-supply echelons are underway. Landings on GUIMARAS ISLANDS are planned for the night of the 19th.

A report has been received from ComNavGroupCHINA stating that on the 17th Allied planes damaged a large Japanese naval air transport plane forcing it to crash land near HAIMEN. Report indicates that an admiral and 32 other passengers were aboard the plane. 8 passengers were shot, 4 captured and 21 burned.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 191235 states that TP 58 attacked KYUSHU on the 18th and KOBE-KURE on the 19th and further states that FRANKLIN (CV 13) had been hit.

Cincpac 191330 (pink) sets forth the estimated ultimate requirements of VPB squadrons for anti-submarine warfare tasks in the forward area.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 191332 concerns employment of search aircraft staging through IWO JIMA.

20 March (Guam date)

Com5thFlt submitted preliminary report on strike results for 18-19 March. Despatch was sent to a search plane and relayed to Cincpac by base. Report follows: Enemy aircraft destroyed - 200 in the air, 275 on the ground; Probably damaged or destroyed - 100 first day, large number second day. Large number of hangars, shops and other installations destroyed at many airfields. Oil storage tanks were hit at KONOEY and KURE Air Depots and at KURE Naval Base. Ships damaged: 6 small freighters sunk, 7 damaged, 18 combatant vessels damaged, including: 1 XCV, 1 or 2 BB, 2 or 3 CV, 2 CVL or CVE, 2 CVE, 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 DD, 1 SS and 1 DE. Own casualties: 3 aircraft losses; FRANKLIN damaged but now making 15 knots; 4 other CV damaged, but none seriously - all are fully operational.

Intelligence report states one ATAGO Class and one NACHI Class cruiser left SINGAPORE at noon of the 18th, followed four hours later by a destroyer.

BALAO (SS 285) sank two transports and a possible escort at 29N 122E on the 19th, and destroyed 4 junks later in the day.

DEVILFISH (SS 292) was bombed by Zeke and can submerge only to 90 feet.

210000Z position 25-38 N, 137-30 E proceeding at 15 knots with PB4Y air cover via GULLET and SMOKESTACK to SAIPAN.

Total casualties in IWO operation reported as 20,454, broken down as follows: KIA - 4,121; WIA - 15,647; MIA - 386. Total estimated enemy dead - 21,184; 202 POWs of which 134 are Japs and 68 Koreans. This report as of 1700(K) 20 March.

- Continued -
20 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

On the night of the 18-19th 289 B-29s dropped 1,833 tons on the NAGOYA urban area from 4,500-8,000 feet. Photos taken on the 19th, partially smoke obscured, show .65 square miles destroyed, making a total of 2.8 square miles of NAGOYA destroyed. 30 enemy aircraft were sighted and 14 made attacks. AA was more intense than in previous mission. 1 B-29 ditched 80 miles NW of IWO JIMA. 10 survivors were rescued by the GATLING (DD 671).

Cominch & CNO 192017 authorizes Cinpoa to issue a directive to reduce Marine detachments in combatant ships by 10%.

CinCBFF 200740 (pink) outlines his position in regard to BPF base in the forward area.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 200847 (pink) sets forth the search plan to be placed in effect 1 April to provide air search and anti-submarine patrols along shipping lanes between ENIWETOK, the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES.

Cinpoa Adv. Hq. 200851 (pink) modifies the garrison air force to be employed in MIYAKO JIMA (Marine units to be employed instead of Army).

Cinpoa Adv. Hq. 201340 (pink) advises ComAirPac that fast carriers such as SHANGRI-LA and RANGER are to be ready for emergency combat employment.

CTU 50.5.3 201730 relays the message from Com5thFlt relative to results of strike on Empire targets by TF 58 on March 18th and 19th.

21 March (Guam date)

In a second air attack on the late afternoon of the 20th the ENTERPRISE (CV6), which had been hit earlier in attacks on the 18th, was again hit. She and the WASP (CV 18) have been ordered to ULITHI for repairs.

Also ordered to ULITHI for onward routing to PEARL are the FRANKLIN (CV 13) and SANTA FE. HALSEY POWELL (DD 686) was also hit and slowed to 10 knots due to steering gear damage. The Japs launched a torpedo plane attack the night of the 20th, but no damage was reported. Several planes were shot down by AA fire and night fighters.

ComAF 20 192042 outlines bombing policy of the 20th AF with specific regard to bombing the Emperor's Palace.

Cinpoa Adv. Hq. 200230 advises ComSoPac that ComGen 81st Division can carry out such training as is desired by him but that the troop division must be ready for departure on 7 days notice.

Cinpoa Pearl 202153 (pink) outlines the urgency for increased hospital facilities in the MARIANAS for Army forces in future operations and suggests that establishment of a 5,000 bed hospital at TINIAN is the most desirable arrangement.

Cinpoa Adv. Hq. 202325 (pink) advises MacArthur that in order to properly plan deployment of POA divisions Cinpoa requests what facilities will be available in the PHILIPPINES for POA ground forces and that if complete cancellation of the support by SWPA is contemplated, advises that SoPac service troops must be returned to support POA forces.

- Continued -
21 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

21st BomCom 202332 (pink) advises that no additional reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS has been accomplished as requested by Cincpoa, pointing out that any reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS will detract from 21st BomCom's primary attacks against KYUSHU and the mining of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

Com5thFlt 210030 summarizes preliminary damage to surface ships during the period 18 thru 20 March.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 211358 (pink) states that he does not desire to detract from either the mining program or the attacks against KYUSHU in order to accomplish reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS.


22 March (Guam date)

TF 58 has now been reorganized. Of the 5 damaged carriers, the INTREPID and the YORKTOWN are to remain with the force and the other CVs, FRANKLIN, ENTERPRISE and WASP are organized as TG 58.2 and will proceed to ULITHI along with the SANTA FE and DesRon 52. On arrival at ULITHI the FRANKLIN and SANTA FE are scheduled to return to PEARL; ENTERPRISE and WASP to be repaired at ULITHI, possibly one at GUAM, and rejoin TF 58 when they are again fit for service.

TF 58, which now comprises 3 groups, is scheduled to strike OKINAWA tomorrow.

6 PB4Y-2s hit WAKE on the 20th with 14 tons of bombs. Returning pilots reported that runways at WAKE are criss-crossed with dragon's teeth.

FORMOSA was hit by 40 B-24s of the 5th AF on the 20th. No interception by enemy fighters was encountered, although a reported 25 aircraft were observed airborne in 3 different localities, they made no aggressive move whatsoever.

SEALION (SS 315) sank an unescorted tanker off the MALAY Coast on the 17th.

BALAO (SS 285) reports 2 possible hits in unidentified ships of a YELLOW SEA convoy.

The British task force (TF 113) is scheduled to sortie from ULITHI tomorrow morning. After sortie, this task force will assume the designation Task Force 57.

CTF 58 210903 sets forth the reorganized composition of Task Force 58 effective 21 March.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 220850 directs ComMarGils to cease striking enemy airfields in the MARSHALLS.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 220853 (pink) requests 20th AF to obtain photographs of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA.

DepCom 20th AF 222318 (pink) quotes message received from ComGen 20th AF relative to exchange of fighter groups for employment as VLR escorts.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 222331 (pink) recommends to Cominch that he endeavor to extend the loan of 4 British CVEs from April until 1 July in view of current urgent requirements for these ships.
23 March (Guam date)

An amplifying report from Com5thFlt gives final scores on enemy aircraft destroyed 18–21 March (2-day attack on Empire and the 2 subsequent days):

**Destroyed in the Air**
- Over the target: 168
- By CAP: 84
- By AA fire: 22
  - Total destroyed in the air: 281

**Destroyed on Ground**
- 275
  - Total destroyed: 556
  - Probably destroyed or damaged: 175

Grand Total Destroyed or Dam'g'd: 731

This represents an increase of 81 planes shot down and 75 planes probably destroyed or damaged over the earlier report.

CTF 58 reports that photographic evidence reveals the following damage to air installations during the KYUSHU attacks:

- Nittagahara
- Kagoshima
- Miyazaki

Kanoya - 1/2 destroyed
Omura - 1/3 destroyed
Cita - 3/4 to totally destroyed

Saeki - some damage by strafing and rocketing.

WASP (CV 18) reports damage received on the morning of 19 March. A Judy dove on her out of the overcast from ahead and released a bomb which struck amidships and detonated while passing through the second deck, causing extensive damage on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th decks. Number 4 fireroom, galley, laundry, berthing facilities for 400 men, firemains amidships, and number 3 elevator are all out of commission. 102 men were killed and 200 injured. Fires were extinguished rapidly and flooding controlled. Normal flight operations were resumed within an hour.

In the early morning of 23 March, the HAGGARD (DD 555) rammed and sank a Japanese submarine at 22–57 N 132–19 E. The ship sustained considerable damage to her stem from ramming and to her electrical and electronic equipment from underwater explosions when the submarine sank. HAGGARD is now enroute ULITHI with UHLMANN (DD687).

At IWO JIMA unloading and re-embarkation of troops has been slowed by bad weather. ZUNI (ATF 95) broached while attempting to salvage the LST 727.

Extensive ice flows encountered forced DesRon 57 to abandon bombardment of SURIBACHI.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 230538 (pink) advises Com5thFlt that the battleships of TF 57 may bombard ISHIGAKI as an alternative to MIYAKO on 27 or 28 March.

Cincpoc Adv. Hq. 230620 (pink) concerns escorts for support shipping for LEGUMINOUS.

Cincpoc Adv. Hq. 230841 (pink) covers the probable reduction in Army Service Units due to the fact that Marine squadrons will be employed in MIYAKO instead of the original employment of Army units.

- Continued -
23 March (Guam date)

MacArthur 230900 states his concurrence in making anchorages and facilities available at LETTE for POA forces.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 231201 (pink) advises Cominch that he still adheres to his views previously expressed relative to operational control of fighters by 20th AF. Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 231952 advises CinCSWPA that it is Cincpoa's intention to terminate logistic support of the North SOLOMONS on 30 April unless otherwise requested.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz is scheduled to visit IWO JIMA tomorrow.

24 March (Guam date)

Bad weather hampered operations of TF 58 on the 23rd. Towns, airfields and installations in KERMA NETTO and on OKINAWA, AMAMI and MINAMI were bombed, rocketed and strafed with a loss of 2 of our VF. 3 Jap planes were destroyed. TG 58.1 on a shipping strike damaged 2 small cargo ships and 2 escorts west of OKINAWA, sank a cargo ship, 1 small craft and damaged 1 large, 1 small cargo ship, 1 DE and many small craft.

Detailed damage reports to CVs: YORKTOWN was hit on signal bridge by a 600 pound bomb which detonated outside the ship at second deck level, tore a 15 foot square hole in the side, and generally perforated the ship's side from flight deck to water line, 4 dead, 18 injured. Operating ability not impaired. INTREPID had only minor damage when a twin-engine plane was shot down close aboard, 1 killed, 13 injured. WASP damage reported yesterday. ENTERPRISE first hit on morning of 18th by a plane (probably Judy) with a 600 pound bomb on her forward elevator. Low order detonation caused minor damage and some casualties (number not stated). Second hit put out her main radio, voice circuits, sky forward, main CIC, and primary flight control station. There were many fires on deck. Cause of damage and casualties not stated. FRANKLIN's report is quoted in full:

"AT 0708/19 MARCH FRANKLIN HIT BY AT LEAST 2 PROBABLY 3 BOMBS. WHILE LAUNCHING DECK ATTACK LOAD BOMBS AND TIM LOADED PLANES X 36 VF 9 VB AIRBORNE INCLUDING AIR GROUP COMDR X NEAR MISS PORT QUARTER AT 1500I(-9) X PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ESTIMATE FLIGHT DECK AND GALLERY DECK COMPLETELY WRECKED AND TORN APART BY EXPLOSIONS AND GUTTED BY FIRE X ALL ELEVATORS WRECKED X HANGAR DECK COMPLETELY GUTTED WARPED AND LARGE HOLE FRAME 170 DOWN TO 4TH DECK X DAMAGE REPORT X 2ND DECK AFT OF FRAME 18 BURNED OUT X 3RD DECK AFT OF FRAME 30 DAMAGED BY EXPLOSIONS BY FIRE AND FLOODING X AFTER TWIN 5 INCH MOUNT X READY MAGAZINES EXPLODED X ALL MAGAZINES PROBABLY FLOODED AND EXTENSIVE FIRE DAMAGE IN ISLAND X COLLATERAL WIRE AND EXPLOSIONS DAMAGE THRUOUT SHIP X TOP MAST DOWN X ABOUT 1500 PERSONNEL TRANSFERRED OR PICKED UP BY OTHER SHIPS X ABOUT 250 MEN 5 OFFICERS ON BOARD X ESTIMATE 1200 KILLED MISSING OR UNACCOUNTED FOR X CAPTAIN A J ISBELL USN PASSENGER KILLED X FIRES OUT STEERING CONTROL REGAINED X LIST UNDER CONTROL X STEAMING AT 13 KNOTS WITH 4 BOILERS AND ON 2 ENGINES X DOWN BY THE TAIL BUT CHINS UP"

On the 24th a total of 260 planes took part in attacks throughout the PHILIPPINES (north and central LUZON areas) dropping approximately 100 tons of bombs on various targets.

Photographs of IWO JIMA taken on the 22nd show that all runways and taxiways on the island were trenched and blasted to prevent use.
24 March (Guam date) (cont'd)

Photographs taken by 21st Bomber Command of NAGoya on the 24th show an additional unreported burned out section in this area which makes a total of roughly 6 square miles of NAGoya completely destroyed.

On the night 24th-25th 230 effective B-29s made a strike on the Mitsubishi Engine Works at NAGoya. The attack was carried out at between 6,000 and 8,000 feet and results were reported as being generally excellent. Majority of planes bombed the target by radar.

Cominch 211142 refers to release of British CVEs currently on loan to FOA.

ANPB 231304 outlines the world-wide tanker shortage and further states that everything possible is being done to augment deliveries presently programmed to FOA.

Cinpeoa Adv. Hq. 241138 concurs in 20th Bomber Command's plan to mine the SAIGON, SHANGHAI, CAPE ST JACQUES, SINGAPORE and CAMRANH BAY areas prior to 1 April.

Cominch & CNO 241802 (pink) directs that the subject of the return of the British CVEs be held in abeyance until further instructions.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and Vice Admiral McMorris together with staff members visited IWO JIMA.

25 March (Guam date)

In the ICEBERG Operation conditions are reported favorable for initial landings in the KERAMA RETTO by the 77th InfDiv, scheduled to commence on 26 March (L-6). Hydrographic missions have been completed and surf conditions on all beaches in the island chain are reported as good and are expected to remain favorable throughout L-6; highest surf noted was two feet. UDT reconnoiter indicates some beaches not suitable for LCVPs, but LVTs will be able to go over or through all offshore reefs. Scheduled minesweeping completed with negative results, except for 5 drifter's sunk. Aerial reconnaissance and photo interpretation indicate no increase over estimated opposition (1,500-2,000 enemy in KERAMA RETTO); heaviest opposition being anticipated on TOKASHIKI SHIMA. Fire support missions, encountering only light opposition from beaches, effected substantial destruction of villages behind landing beaches.

Some units of TF 52 (R.Adm.Blandy) were detected during the approach to the objective on the night of the 24th/25th and were attacked by enemy planes. Only damage reported was to ADAMS (DM27) which resulted from premature burst from 5-inch mount aft; 2 killed and 5 wounded.

On the 24th, planes from TG 58.1 destroyed an enemy convoy of 3 large AKs, 2 DDs and 3 other escorts 150 miles NW of OKINAWA with a loss of 3 VTB.

Capture and occupation phase has been completed at IWO and command transferred to CTF 94. Command organization at IWO is as follows: IsCom, Maj.Gen. Chaney, USMC; Air Defense Commander, Brig.Gen. Moore, AC, USA; SOPA (until departure about 23 March), R.Adm. Hill (CG 51.21).

In the Southwest Pacific, the Americal Division (less l RCT) is scheduled to begin landing on CEBU ISLAND on the 26th. The operation will be conducted in 3 phases: (1) Seizure and occupation of CEBU City-MACTAN IS. area; (2) Seizure of facilities and town of TAGBILARAN on BOHOL IS.; and (3) Seizure of town and airfield of DUMAQUETE on NEGROS ORIENTAL. 14,512 troops are involved in this operation with 2 RCT in reserve.

-Continued-
25 March (Guam date)(cont'd)

An amplifying report of the B-29 strike on NAGOYA on the night of 24/25 March states that 221 B-29s dropped 1635 tons on the Mitsubishi Engine Factory from 5,800 to 9,800 feet. Air opposition was nil to moderate and ineffective; AA accurate, varying in caliber and intensity. 5 B-29s are missing, 3 believed lost over the target and the reason for loss of the others unknown. Total burned out area is 5.0 sq. mi., which represents about 11.6% of the total city area.

Cincpao Pearl 202156 covers critical shortage of construction troops for deployment in POA and suggests that all using agencies contribute labor from general service troops and other personnel available.

Cominch & CNO 231302 (pink) directs Com7thFlt not to make commitments for British submarine bases in the PHILIPPINES.

Cincpao Pearl 242243 makes recommendations to Com7thFlt relative to establishment of aviation facilities and aircraft pools at SAMAR and CEBU.

Cincpao Adv. Hq. 250331 recommends to Cominch that aircraft and personnel of PacFlt Flag Transport Unit be made a separate squadron in NatsPac under administrative control of ComNatsPac and operational control of Cinpcac.

Cincpao Adv. Hq. 250429 states that employment of Privateer Squadron, temporarily deployed in MarGils, should be such as to maintain its combat readiness for forward movement, and that it should be used primarily for search rather than attack on enemy shore positions.

Cincpao Adv. Hq. 250608 (pink) requests ComGenPOA to advise what portion of the 98th InfDiv can be made available for designation as Area Reserve for ICEBERG.

Cincpac 250730 (pink) concerns availability of shipping for movement of advance base components from rear to forward bases.

26 March (Guam date)

The initial step in the ICEBERG Operation appears to be proceeding satisfactorily. Air attacks and naval gunfire bombardment were carried out prior to the landings on YAKABII, AKA, GERUMO, HOKAJI and ZANAMI SHIMA in the KERAMA RETTO. Opposition was reported as being either nil or light and HOKAJI and GERUMO were reported as being secured by noon of the 26th. During these operations 71 Japs were reported killed plus 5 POWs plus 200 civilians also taken prisoner. The schedule for tomorrow includes landings on KUBA, AMURO and TAKASHIKI.

Minesweeping continues as scheduled resulting in 18 mines being swept, most of them off western OKINAWA beaches.

TGs 58.3 (RAdm F.C. Sherman) and 58.4 (RAdm A.W. Radford) are scheduled to hit objective area today and tomorrow while TG 51.1 (RAdm Clark) effects fueling.

In the OKINAWA area an air attack was carried out by the Japs resulting in a hit by a suicide plane on KIMBERLY (DD 521). Considerable structural damage was inflicted, 3 were killed on the ship and 30 wounded. Second suicide plane hit the GILMER (APD11) causing only superficial damage resulting in 1 killed and 2 wounded. 2 other suicide crashes missed their targets. In addition 2 planes were shot down by AA and 1 by CAP.
HALLIGAN (DD 584) reports that she was torpedoed and badly damaged. Further reports have not been received as to extent of damage or loss of personnel.

WICHITA (CA 445) and TERROR (CM 5) report submarine attacks off the western beaches.

Reports from IWO JIMA indicate that on 25 March a banzai attack was carried out by an unstated number of Japanese resulting in 100 enemy being killed. On the night of the 25th 8 bogies approached IWO from the north and were met by our VFN approximately 40 miles out. 2 Betty's were shot down plus 1 other possible being shot down. None of the planes approached closer than 40 miles.

Two Wings of the 21st BomCom (73rd and 314th) are scheduled to take off tomorrow for attacks on KYUSHU in support of ICEBERG. Approximately 200 aircraft are scheduled to participate.

Also tomorrow, 105 aircraft of the 313th Wing are scheduled to commence mining operations in the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS. This Wing is scheduled to be engaged in full time mining missions from the 27th of March through 1 May.

Cominch & CNO 231300 (Nimitz only) (pink) covers facilities to be installed by British PacFlt at MANUS and possibly BRUNEI BAY.

Com7thFlt 240305 reports that U.S. Naval Bases at MANILA and SUBIC BAY have been established as of 23 March.

Cominch & CNO 241655 (King to Nimitz) (Pink) requests feasibility of establishing line of sea communications to the SEA of JAPAN through TSUSHIMA STRAIT.

CNO 241840 outlines availability of CBMUs to Com7thFlt.

War Dept. (Somervell) 250117 concerns shipping allocations to the SWPA during the month of April.

Cincpooa Pearl 250345 (pink) advises CinCSWPA that certain materials listed for rehabilitation camps in the PHILIPPINES are not now available for shipment to SoWesPac.

Com7thFlt 250756 outlines location and proposed employment of CB units in SWPA.

Cincpooa Adv. Hq. 251050 requests Cominch approval of the withdrawal of U.S. Army garrison force presently stationed on FANNING ISLAND.

CTF 52 251347 (pink) outlines operations at OKINAWA on the 24th.

CTF 58 252155 outlines to CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) his proposed plan for protection of TF 51.

Cincpooa Pearl 252314 states that a survey of the construction program in the MARINAS is to be carried out and names the officers to be engaged in this survey.

Cincpooa Pearl 260145 Discusses evacuation requirements at Oahu and the forward area.

CTG 51.1 (RAdm Kiland) 260152 (pink) covers landings made on KERAMA RETTO on 26th.

Cincpooa Adv. Hq. 260514 advises CinCSWPA that it is unfeasible to reclassify certain area as a blind bombing zone.

- Continued -
26 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 260625 announces to Com7thFlt present acute need for destroyers and requests advice as to when RADFORD (DD 446) will be ready to proceed to navy yard.

CTF 52 (R. Adm. Blandy) 261402 summarizes activities on 26 March.

27 March (Guam date)

On the morning of 27 March successful landings were made on TOKASHIKI, KUBA and AMURO in the KERAMA RETTO. KUBA and AMURO were reported as being secured by 1800, making a total of 5 islands now completely secured by the 77th InfDiv. Our troops were subjected to mortar fire and counter attacks on ZUMAMI and AKA.

No report has been received from either TF 58 or TF 57. TG 58.1 is scheduled to be at the objective on the 28th while TGs 58.3 and 58.4 carry out fueling. TF 57 is scheduled to bombard either MIYAKO JIMA or ISHIGAKI JIMA tomorrow.

CTF 52 reports air attack on the night of 26/27th by about 15 planes, of which 12 were destroyed, 3 by AA, 2 by CAP, 1 by PBM group, 6 suicides. Damage to our forces is summarized as follows:

NEVADA (BB 36) - Turret #3 out and planes destroyed.
BILOXI (CL 80)  
PORTERFIELD (DD 682)  
DORSEY (DM 1)  - Damaged but operable.
FOREMAN (DE 633)  
SKIRMISH (AM 303)  
OBRIEN (DD 725) - Extensive superstructure damage but operable.
Casualties - 40 KIA, 3 MIA, 98 WIA.

HALLIGAN (DD 584), which was reported torpedoed yesterday, is now believed to have blown up as a result of a mine, with 75 enlisted survivors of which 14 were injured.

Minesweeping continuing; many mines found off demonstration and preferred beaches. Slow progress here has postponed UDT operations. Bombardment proceeding as scheduled except off NAHA, where mines prevent close approach of fire support ships.

4 or 5 submarine pens claimed destroyed and two midgets damaged. CALLAGHAN (DD 792) sank one midget.

Several suicide boats were captured in the KERAMA RETTO. Boats reported as 20 feet long, 8 feet wide, containing mine or bomb and 1 man crew.

B-29s from the 21st BomCom are scheduled to strike targets in KYUSHU today. Targets selected are TACHIARAI, OITA and OMURA. In addition planes from the 21st BomCom are scheduled to mine SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS on the night of the 27th/28th.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 270450 (pink) outlines concurrence in complement of VMF and VMFB shore based squadrons and sets forth forward deployment of Marine squadrons.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 271105 covers results of 21st BomCom strike on KYUSHU.
27 March (Guam date) (cont'd)

ComSthFlt 271141 outlines to CTF 58 his desire to create the impression that a carrier attack is being carried out against KYUSHU and outlines a plan of action to effect this.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 271208 advises various units that IsCom IWO has been incorporated into the forward area as of today.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 271213 (pink) requests Cincpoa Pearl Hq. to make a logistic study of an operation to capture TOKUNO JIMA.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 271214 (pink) advises ComWesSeaFron of provisions in Cincoac's OpPlan 2-45 which calls for the assignment of all fast carriers to the Mid-Pacific Striking Force.


Cincpac Adv. Hq. 271220 recommends to Cominich that there be established a new Fleet Air Wing in the Pacific Fleet as of 1 June. Cincoac proposes to assign squadrons to Fleet Air Wing ONE which will operate in the RYUKYUS and to the westward thereof, and to assign to the new wing the appropriate units operating in the MARIANAS, CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.

28 March (Guam date)

In the KERAMA RETTO the island of TOKASHIKA was reported secured on the morning of 27 March. Sporadic fighting continued on AKA and ZAMAMI. Reconnaissance units landed on AWARE ISLAND found it uninhabited.

During the night of 28/29 March a reconnaissance battalion is scheduled to land on MAE SHIMA and KURO SHIMA.

The seaplane base in the KERAMA RETTO area is announced as having been established.

Minesweeping operations are still being carried out. SKYLARK (AM 63) struck a mine and sank off western OKINAWA beaches. 11 officers and 90 men are reported as being survivors.

TOLMAN (DM 28) on patrol off NAGO WAN engaged 8 enemy MTBs on the night of 27-28 March. 2 were definitely sunk and 4 possibly sunk with no damage having been suffered by the TOLMAN.

In an air attack on the night of 27-28 March H.A. WILEY (DM 29) and ADAMS (DM 27) each shot down 2 planes. The ADAMS suffered slight damage from this attack.

THRESHER (SS 200) bombarded docks on BATAN ISLAND in LUZON STRAIT and PIRANHA (SS 389) bombarded PRATAS REEF.

In the NANSEI SHOTO from 25 to 27 March TGs 58.1, 58.3 and 58.4, in attacks from TANEGA SHIMA to MIYAKO SHIMA, shot down 13 planes, destroyed 13 on the ground, and inflicted the following damage on shipping: 1 midget submarine destroyed, 1 midget sub heavily damaged, 3 DD or DE damaged by rockets and strafing (attacks continuing), 1 AK beached and burning, 4 AK damaged, 8-10 luggers burned; others bombed and strafed with good results. Many small craft damaged or wrecked.

- Continued - 2585
Our plane losses were 6 VF. At least 1 pilot was rescued. On the morning of the 27th, the MURRAY (DD 576) was slightly damaged by enemy air attack, with 5 guns out. In this attack 7 Jap planes were shot down, 5 by CAP and 2 by ships gunfire (included in above total).

On the ground attacks were controlled by CSA on most of the islands in the chain: sub pens and installations at UNTEN HARBOR were heavily hit; barracks, warehouses, and factories were burned, gun positions, trucks, camouflaged tanks, and landing barges were attacked.

On 26/27 March TF 57 flew 574 sorties against MIYAKO and ISHIGAKI JIMAS, with all airfields thoroughly bombed and strafed, and 29 plus planes "shot up", some perhaps previously damaged. Only 1 Jap plane was airborne, and this was shot up.

Several coastal AKs were hit and 1 blew up. Buildings and 1 town were fired.

Losses were 6 aircraft to AA, and 11 to other causes. Killed and missing from all causes were 5 pilots and 4 aircrewm.

TF 57 was sighted during the forenoon of the 26th and again by night (26/27), but was not attacked.

Amplification report of mining in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS states that on the night of 27/28th 102 B-29s were airborne with 388 mines; 97 planes dropped 317 mines in the assigned areas, and 6 (?) planes jettisoned their mines. 70 enemy planes were sighted, but only 7 unaggressive attacks were made; 1 enemy plane was destroyed. 3 B-29s are missing from unknown causes. "It is estimated as a result of this mining that minefield in western approaches of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS will close straits to traffic of all major ships for a period of 2 weeks or longer."

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 280107 authorizes British Pacific Fleet Air Transport Service to operate to the TACLOBAN area through PELELIU.

CINCPAC 280109 states that in forthcoming operations initial assault in small type landing craft is advisable in view of beach conditions at objectives. He requests assignment of 1 AGC, 3 APA and 2 AKA to 7th Flt until about 1 August.

CTF 58 280307 outlines his plan to locate and strike the Japanese Fleet reported departing from INLAND SEA.

CTF 57 280503 outlines operations carried out against MIYAKO and ISHIGAKI on 26 and 27 March.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 280649 requests authority from Cominch to assign 2 PB4Y squadrons on a temporary basis to 7th Flt as relief for 2 PV squadrons currently employed thereat.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 280904 concerns release of certain ships to Com7thFlt.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 280905 directs ComSoPac to maintain token occupation of NAUSORI Airfield.

CTF 52 281512 outlines summary of operations as of evening of 28 March.

CINCPAC Adv. Hq. 282310 directs ComAir IWO to report to CTF 93 for additional duty in connection with offensive operations and directs ComAir IWO to assign fighters to operational control of CTF 93 or DepCom20thAF. Also directs transfer of VHP 612 from TF 93 to TF 94.
29 March (Guam date)

No reports from TF 58 have been received but it is believed that the force is retiring from Empire waters for replenishment prior to L-Day strikes.

The shore-to-shore movements in the PHILIPPINES Area are being carried out. From PANAY a landing has been made on NEGROS and from CEBU a landing was made on MACTAN ISLAND.

A B-29 from the 21st Bomber Command reports 1 BB, 4 CA and 6 DD in the western portion of the INLAND SEA.

TENCH (SS 417) reports sinking two trawlers by gunfire on the 28th east of KYUSHU.

TIRANTE (SS 420) reports sinking 2 small AK's, 1 each on the 25th and 28th west of KYUSHU.

SEADOG (SS 401) reports a hit in 1 of a group of DE off east coast of HONSHU.

BLUEGILL (SS 242) reports a hit in a large AP off CAPE VARELLA on the 28th.

IWO JIMA based P-51s are attacking HAHA JIMA and CHICHI JIMA daily.

B-24s based in the PHILIPPINES have been carrying out concerted strikes against FORMOSA targets. Enemy air opposition has not been aggressive although on almost every mission airborne fighters are reported.

ComPwda Area 280520 dissolves Air Defense Command, MARIANAS and outlines the formation of the local Air Defense Commands to be placed in effect.

GHQ SWPA 281614 states that requirements are being submitted to the Chief of Staff which include a request for 150 LSTs and 150 LCTs. With the provision of this equipment he states that an endeavor will be made to accept POA divisions for staging in accordance with the FILBAS Agreement.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 290619 (pink) outlines to Cominich his views on occupation and development of QUELPART ISLAND.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 290748 (pink) directs Pearl Headquarters to make a detailed logistic study of Phase III(d) ICEBERG.

30 March (Guam date)

All islands of the KERAMA RETTO were reported to have been secured by 1800 I 29 March. At that time all troops of the 77th InfDiv had reloaded, except 1 Bn patrolling TOKASHIKI and the garrison forces on ZAMAMI. A report as of 1800 I 30 March indicates that these latter units had captured considerable quantity of stores on both TOKASHIKI and ZAMAMI.

Enemy casualties as of 1800 I on the 30th were: 231 KIA, 100 POWs. Our casualties as of the same time: 29 KIA, 78 WIA, 1 MIA.

General summary of beach reconnaissance on OKINAWA indicates that all beaches are suitable for landing. Wooden posts, varying from 4 to 8 inches in diameter and from 4 to 8 feet high have been found off all beaches. These are now being cleared by NUDTs. Naval gunfire has breached the sea wall in many places.

- Continued -
Evidence at this time is that the Japanese gun positions and defensive installations on OKINAWA are well sighted for defense of all beaches both by frontal and enfilade fire.

Several bogies in area but only one attack reported. ADAMS (DM 27) shot down one plane. Decrease in air activity due to night interdiction by CVE planes and more effective gunfire on fields by Fire Support ships which can now get in closer.

Two groups of MTB's made a torpedo attack on our ships on patrol off the western beaches and were beaten off. One positively sunk and one probably sunk without damage to our ships.

Minesweeping is proceeding well. A few floating mines still encountered. Over 2500 square miles swept thus far.

UDT reconnaissance and demolition proceeded with only small arms fire from beaches due to excellent support by ships and planes. No ship damage; only 1 wounded. Close range bombardment followed on defenses disclosed. Seawalls all breached.

Support aircraft attacked airfields, gun positions, midget sub pen at UNTEN KO, and special bridges demolished by the 10th Army. 4 sub pens burned and two MTBs destroyed. Our losses 1 VF by AA, 1 VF in collision with another VF which returned safely. 310 suicide boats now destroyed; all survey work completed; 3 underwater contacts today.

BULLHEAD (SS 332) spent some time investigating TAKAO HARBOR. 3 night planes caused some trouble, but there was no air or surface patrol during daylight. No shipping in TAKAO and no patrol off entrance.

From the 28th through the 30th, planes of the 5th AF made several attacks on a heavily escorted northbound convoy in the SOUTH CHINA SEA with the following results:— Sunk: 1 AO (28th, 11,000 tons); 1 (S 2-stack) whaler (10-15,000 tons)(29th); 1 AO (6,000 tons); 2 6600-ton AKs; 1 800-AK; 2 DD; 2 DE; 1 patrol craft. Probably sunk: 1 patrol craft. Total tonnage sunk at least 35,000 tons MV, and at least 6,000 tons escorting warships. P-38 escorts shot down 14 Jap VF plus 2 probable and 1 damaged. Our losses were 1 P-38 in combat and 1 PBM shot down over the convoy at 2316 I 29th.

At 1040 I on the 30th tracker planes sighted 2 DD, 6 DE, 1 SA, 3 SC, 1 VI anchored YULLN BAY (HAINAN), and 3 DD in SAMAH BAY (HAINAN), covered by 2 Oscars. B-25s were called in and attacked, the results not yet reported. 1 MINDORO search plane crash-landed after 1 engine was shot out, with all the crew rescued.

14 B-29s attacked the Mitsubishi Engine Works at NAGOYA on the night of 30/31 from 7-8,000 feet with 500 pound GPs and flares.

95 B-29s were airborne on the night of 30/31 for the second mining operation in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, of 4 early returns, 1 crashed and burned, with 2 survivors. No report of results is yet available.

149 B-29s were airborne for attacks on TACHIARAI and OMURA on KYUSHU on the 31st. TOT was planned for 1035 I with bombing altitude 15-16000 feet.

- Continued -
30 March (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpoa Pearl 280208 states that the increasing requirements for bombs and munitions to support the VLR program are placing an excessively heavy load on shipping and requests ComGenPOA to make a re-survey of current projects not immediately essential in order to alleviate critical shipping situation.

CTF 52 291600 summarizes activities as of 1800 29 March.

ComGenFMFPac 292045 (pink) concerns request for additional troops for Phase III(c) ICEBERG.

Cincpoa Adv. Hq. 300243 (pink) advises CinCSWPA of employment and rehabilitation of the 6 Marine and 6 Army divisions assigned to POA and answers his request for LSTs and LCTs.

ComGenPOA 300548 (pink) concerns designation of the 98th Division as Area Reserve for ICEBERG.

Cincpac Adv. Hq. 300650 summarizes recommendations to CNO regarding VPB program.

31 March (Guam date)

All three groups of TF 58 are scheduled to support landings on "L" Day. From 2 April through 6 April, groups rotate so that each group supports the shore forces for two days and then replenishes.

Seaplanes based at KERAMA RETTO are now carrying out search missions along the RYUKYUS CHAIN to the north.

UDTs report that they removed 2700 of 2900 stakes from the water in the vicinity of the landing beaches. Surf conditions are reported by them to be fair on the Demonstration Beaches and excellent in the area scheduled for the landing.

Landings were made on KEISE SHIMA without opposition and the island was secured by 1015 on the 31st.

INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) was hit on the morning of the 31st by an Oscar carrying a bomb. There was considerable structural damage and flooding; however, all armament is reported as being useable except possibly #3 turret. Casualties are reported as 1 KIA, 14 WIA and 5 MIA. All casualties appeared to have been enlisted men. Admiral Spruance was aboard this cruiser.

TF 57 struck the SAKISHIMA Area again yesterday.

137 B-29s made an attack on targets in the KYUSHU Area on the 31st. 106 of these dropped 460 tons of bombs on the TACHIARAI Machine Works with excellent results being reported. 31 other B-29s dropped 75 tons on the OMURA Airfield, also reporting excellent results. Fighter opposition was ineffective. 1 B-29 was reported missing.

On the 28th and 29th, TF 58 destroyed 45 enemy planes (29 airborne), and probably destroyed or damaged 42 more; sank 2 DE, 1 medium and 10 small AK, and 4 luggers; probably sank 3 medium and 11 small AK. Our losses were 12 planes, 12
31 March (Guam date) (Continued)

pilots and 8 aircrewmen. 5 of the pilots and 3 aircrewmen were lost in combat. Operational personnel losses included 2 pilots in a mid-air collision on the 20th, 2 pilots shot down by friendly AA when they chased a Judy into TG 58.4 on the 29th, and 3 pilots and 5 aircrewmen lost as a result of a 5 plane mid-air collision.

On the night of the 27/28th CruDivs 16 and 17 with DDs bombarded MINAMI, causing fires and explosions, and on the 28th TG 58.3 hit MINAMI with a large strike destroying gun positions, 3 warehouses, a radio station, an ammo dump, and several small buildings.

TG 58.1 in addition to Okinawa missions for CSA flew a search and attack group along East KYUSHU as far north as SAEKI WAN. On this sweep 1 DE and several AKs were sunk along east KYUSHU. No minesweepers were seen. Ground targets were hit at TOKUNO, AMAMI, YAKU and at KANOYA.

On the 29th TF 58 searched east and west coasts of KYUSHU, sighting 1 CA, 1 CL and 9 DD, 10 miles south of KURE, and much shipping at SASEBO, including several DD or DE and a possible cruiser. Most of the shipping was sunk on these attacks. Weather prevented heavy strikes on several fields at KYUSHU, but six fields were hit, as well as a chemical plant and a railroad depot.

CTF 93 290858 (pink) requests the assignment of VMB 612 to his command.

Cincpac Adv Hq 300756 concerns requirements for DMs and DMSs.

Cincpac Adv Hq 300805 (pink) deals with the redeployment of destroyers for 7th Fleet.

Cincpna Adv Hq 310047 (pink) assigns responsibility for neutralization of enemy held positions in the BONINS to CTF 94 and authorizes CTF 94 to request assistance from CTF 93 when required.

Com3rdFlt 310259 (pink) outlines his OpPlan for the FIREBREAK Operation.

Com7thFlt 310318 (pink) concerns employment of British submarines in SWPA.

CTF 52 (R,Adm. Blandy) 310643 states that OKINAWA landings will be carried out in accordance with the "Preferred Plan".

Cincpac Adv Hq 310759 (pink) requests information from ComGenFMFPac as to when the 5th Amphibious Corps will again be ready for combat.

Cincpac Adv Hq 310800 advises CinCSWPA that in order to assist in meeting urgent requirement of the Pacific Fleet for use of Naval Base facilities at SAMAR, he can make available certain ships for this purpose.

Cincpna Adv Hq 310804 sets forth his views as to the need for assignment of additional aviators to TG Commanders for the purpose of coordinating air attacks.

Cincpna Adv Hq 310832 advises ComAirPac that he assumes CV groups will not operate more than 73 fighters.

Cincpna Adv Hq 310833 recommends that allocation of Corsairs to RNZAF be reduced in order to meet the requirements of the Pacific Fleet.

- Continued -
31 March (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv Hq 310835 requests DepCom20thAF to make daily photo reconnaissance mission of KURE in order to locate the fleet reported to be in that harbor.

CTF 93 311223 directs TG 93.2 (Bomber Command - Col. L. J. Carr) to discontinue strikes against the BONIN ISLANDS as of 1 April and to be prepared to strike this area when directed.

ComGen 77th Div (Maj. Gen. Bruce) 311231 (pink) states that registration of Corps Artillery on KEISHE SHIMA has been completed and that 16 guns are in position to bombard OKINAWA on the morning of L-Day.

1 April (Guam date)

At 0830 1 April landings were made on schedule on the western beaches of OKINAWA. All beaches were rapidly secured and the advance inland commenced against light opposition. By 1100 our troops had seized the airfields YONTAN and KADENA and considerable numbers of tanks and artillery together with regimental reserves were being landed. Opposition throughout the day was light and by 1800 we had penetrated to a depth of approximately 5,000 yards from the initial landing points. By 1800 the beachhead was secured from small arms fire and 50,000 troops had been landed. Throughout the day 155mm guns previously set up on KEISHE SHIMA were used in support of the OKINAWA landing.

Fire support was furnished by 10 OBB, 3 CA, 3 CL, 23 DD and 177 support landing craft. Direct air support was furnished both by CVEs and fast carriers.

Casualties: WEST VIRGINIA - some structural damage; 2 40mm guns out; ship fully operable; 3 KIA, 1 MIA, 9 WIA. LST 364 - extensively damaged by suicide plane. LST 824 - light damage from suicide plane, near miss. LCT(M) 807 - gunnery casualty from hangfire. ADAMS (DM 27) struck aft by 2 suicide planes during a suicide attack, suffered some structural damage but no personnel casualties and downed 1 Tojo.

A report from CTF 51 (V. Adm. Turner) warns forces at the objective area that there are some 650 Jap suicide boats remaining on OKINAWA.

TF 57 attacked ISHIGAKI and MIYAKO ISLANDS throughout 31 March with no air opposition, and continued attacks on the 1st. Morning of the 1st the fleet was attacked by 10 aircraft. One suicider hit INDEPATIGABLE at the base of the island, but the carrier is still operable. ULSTER (DD) was damaged by a bomb and is being towed to LEYTE. 4 aircraft were shot down by fighters. In the afternoon aircraft began to stage into the airfields of both islands. 14 of these were destroyed on the ground and 6 damaged. 4 aircraft attacked the force but caused no damage. TF 57 will continue the attack on the 2nd.

COOS BAY (AVP 25) enroute ENIWETOK to ULITHI collided with the WSA TAATAGORDA which in turn was enroute GUAM to ENIWETOK. COOS BAY is now under tow to ENIWETOK.

Amplifying reports of the B-29 strike on KYUSHU carried out on the 31st indicate that considerable damage was inflicted. Photographs show that the OMURA naval air station received 27 bomb hits.

A landing was made on LEGASPI on the morning of 1 April. Troops employed in this landing were the 158th RCT of the 6th Army. Fragmentary reports indicate that heavy enemy battery fire was encountered.

- Continued - 2591
1 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CominCh & CNO 311248 directs withdrawal from the East Coast and Panama Sea Frontier for transfer to the West Coast certain patrol squadrons to operate for the duration of the San Francisco Conference.

ComHawSeaFron 010225 (pink) outlines Hawaiian Sea Frontier OpPlan 2-45 (FIREBREAK).

CinCpoa Adv Hq 010641 (pink) designates 98th InfDiv as Area Reserve for ICEBERG with availability date of 1 May.

CinCpac Adv Hq 010836 (pink) (Nimitz to King) discusses feasibility of occupying a position in the CHINHAE-FUSAN area of the KOREAN Coast.

CTF 51 011300 is Summary No. 2 of the OKINAWA operation as of 1800 the 1st.

CominCh & CNO 011327 (pink) (King to Nimitz) requests information from CinCpac as to the acceptable months for invasion of KYUSHU and/or HONSHU.

CinCpoa Adv Hq 010639 advises Com5thFlt that IE SHIMA may be evacuated and that if so, early rehabilitation of this place is most desirable.

CTF 51 010255 covers Summary No. 1 as of 1100 on the 1st.

2 April (Guam date)

Troops of the 10th Army on OKINAWA are reported to have spent a relatively quiet night. Sporadic sniper, machine gun and mortar fire was directed on our forces. Enemy forces are reported to have withdrawn to the SE of NAHA Airfield. Many civilians are reported as taking advantage of surrender terms in response to the propaganda leaflets which have been dropped from our planes. There was little call for supporting gunfire from our ships during the day. Following is a list of damage inflicted on our surface forces due to various actions: ACHERNAR (AKA 53) extensive structural damage; TYRELL (AKA 80) slight damage; LCI 586. These ships suffered damage as result of suicide attacks. Other damage included: PORTERFIELD (DD 682) strafed, SKERRISH (AM 303) minor damage from near miss, VAMMEN (DE 644) starboard shaft damaged from depth charge, LCI 580 and 462 aground, DICKERSON (APD 21) and HENRICO (APA 45) reported damaged from unknown causes.

TF 58 is covering both SAKISHIMA and OKINAWA areas during absence of TF 57 for replenishment. 58.1 is at SAKISHIMA today, 58.3 is at OKINAWA, 58.4 is fueling. Thereafter the groups will rotate, with one always fueling.

KADENA Airfield is reported to be available for emergency landings by all types of planes including long range search planes. 2 Marine Air Groups have been ordered to arrive at YONTAN Airfield and KADENA Airfield about 5 April. Present plans call for about 170 aircraft to be installed by 5 April. A total of 19 OY planes are now operating from these 2 airfields.

On the evening of the 2nd an estimated 12-15 enemy planes approached OKINAWA from the north. About 5 of these planes are reported destroyed both by night fighter and by ships gunfire.

SEA DEVIL (SS 400) reports firing 15 torpedoes at a convoy in a 4-hour radar surface attack during a heavy fog. 10 of the torpedoes hit resulting in 3 unidentified merchantmen and 3 escorts being sunk. 3 survivors were rescued.

- Continued -
2 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

A report from CTF 73 (R. Adm. Wagner) indicates that during the month of March his task force sank or damaged 140 ships totalling 93,000 tons. In addition he claims to have damaged 146 ships totalling 112,000 tons. Enemy planes destroyed reported as 39.

On the night of 1st-2nd 6 B-29s laid 48 mines in the KURE Harbor in the vicinity of the fleet anchorage. 112 other B-29s dropped 1,000 tons on the Musashino Aircraft Factory. Bombing was carried out at an altitude of 6-8,000 feet. Results were generally unobserved but the few crews reporting indicate excellent results. 6 B-29s are reported lost on this mission.

Troops of the SWP forces today made successful landings on the SW tip of the island of TAWI TAWI. No resistance was reported. Landings in the LEGASPI Area are reported as proceeding satisfactorily.

Cincpac Adv Hq 012322 recommends an increase in complement of VC squadrons attached to Kaiser CVEs to a total of 20 VF and 12 VB. Formerly the complement of these squadrons was 16 VF and 12 VB.

QUEENFISH 020030 summarizes sinking of the AWA MARU.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 020152 (pink) advises Com5thFlt that it may become advisable to execute Phase III-d prior to Phase III-c and requests designation of an amphibious force commander to expedite detailed preparations for III-d.

CTF 51 020550 and 021225 cover operations as of 1200 and 1800 respectively on the 2nd.

Cominch 021511 (pink) concerns communication facilities relative to Russian vessels.

Cominch 021550 (pink) states that it is desirable to send Russian radio operators to west coast ports for familiarization and testing of radio equipment.

Cincpac Adv Hq 022120 requests information from ComGenFMFPac regarding instructions issued by him to Marine personnel relative to rotation of personnel.

3 April (Guam date)

The lines on the evening of L plus 2 had been extended in general to that scheduled for L plus 10 in the assigned area of the 24th Corps where all restrictions concerning the L plus 10 line had been lifted and this Corps is to make a drive to the south.

Unloading of supplies is proceeding satisfactorily and roads and ramps are being constructed along the beach and over the reefs. By 1800 on L plus 2 all division artillery had been landed.

Our casualties for the operation so far are reported as being extremely light.

Military Government officers report in excess of 1400 civilians under their control by L plus 1. Majority of these are old men, women and children as reports indicate that other civilians moved to the hills prior to our landing.
3 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Air attacks continued throughout the OKINAWA Area. The following ships were damaged by air attacks on 2 April: DICKERSON (APD 21) seriously damaged and afire; HENRICO (APA 45) extensive damage and flooding; GOODLINE (APA 107) hit on stern; TELFAIR (APA 210) minor damage; CHILTON (APA 38) grazed in mast. Damaged by bombs: PRICHETT (DD 561) near miss holed below water line. LST 599 set afire, ship inoperative, cargo ruined in raid early morning 3 April. VAMMEN (DE 644) damaged by booby trap of floating planks carrying 300 pound depth charge. WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65) damaged; cause and extent not reported. LST 724, not 824, damaged at KERAMA RETTO.

Poor weather prevented TG 58.4 (R.Adm.Radford) from fueling yesterday; therefore replenishment will continue today. TF 57 is reported to have replenished.

On the 30th and 31st TF 58 continued attacking aircraft, shipping and enemy installations in the OKINAWA and AMAMI GUNTOs. 22 enemy planes were destroyed (17 airborne), and 19 were probably destroyed or damaged. TF 58 aircraft losses, if any, are not reported. Sunk were 3 MTB, 7 suicide boats, 2 small AK, and 2 small craft. 1 coastal AK and 4 small craft were probably sunk and 1 MTB, 4 small AK and 15 small craft were damaged.

6 submarine pens were destroyed and a 7th heavily damaged at UNTEN, and buildings, docks, mills, barracks, bridges, covered revetments, pillboxes, gun positions, and radio station were destroyed or damaged on OKINAWA. TOKUNO, AMAMI, KIKAI and MINAMI were also hit.

During a red alert from 0000 to 0700 on the 3rd 11 raids of 60 planes approached from the north and southwest. Ship's gunfire shot down 6 sure and 1 probable, and no damage to our units was reported. Our transports under smoke were approached, but not attacked.

On the 3rd 6 groups of enemy planes attacked from 1720 to 1830 from the north, and 1 group from the southwest. 4 were shot down by ship's gunfire, 7 by carrier VF.

1 Oscar landed YONTAN on the night of 1 April. Pilot made normal approach and landing. Taxied plane to line, and was shot by a Marine when leaving the plane.

CTF 51 reports that on the 3rd a rocket propelled, single-seater suicide monoplane with 12 foot wingspread, 14 feet long, and a 1,000 pound warhead has been examined on OKINAWA. It had no radar or homing devices. It is believed capable of 200-450 miles per hour, as pilot has special breathing gear. Estimate launchers still operational OKINAWA. "Look out for large numbers."

On the night of the 2nd/3rd 10 B-29s laid 78 mines in the immediate vicinity of KURE. No enemy aircraft attacked and AA was reported as meager. Again on the night of the 3rd/4th 9 B-29s laid 54 tons of mines in the KURE-KIROSHIMA HARBOR Area.

On the night of 3/4 April an attack was carried out by 228 B-29s on the aircraft plants at KOIZUMI, TACHIKAWA and SHIZOUKA. Bomb tonnage dropped was in excess of 1700 tons.

CinCSWPA 240534 covers request for assignment of 10 troop ships to the SWPA.

CinCBP 020104 (pink) states that he can probably continue to operate for a period of 2 months before returning to an intermediate base for replenishment.

- Continued -
3 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cominch & CNO 021350 (pink) states that he considers Captain of QUEENFISH should be relieved of command and brought to trial by General Court Martial so that the record may be kept clear.

CNO 021940 requests 10 troop ships from POA be made available to SWPA.

Cincpac Adv Hq 030818 (pink) summarizes sinking of AWA MARU.

Cincpea Adv Hq 030819 places Photo Group TWO under operational control of Cincpea as of 8 April.

Cominch & CNO 031300 concerns substitution of PB4Y and PV squadrons to be assigned to Com7thFlt.

CTF 51 031310 summarizes results of operations in the OKINAWA Area as of 1800 I(-9) 3 April.

4 April (Guam date)

At OKINAWA advances on L plus 3 continued apace with those of previous days, against continued light resistance. By 1800 (I) the entire eastern shore in the ZA of both Corps had been secured. In the north our forces were along the road which crosses the isthmus from south of YAKADA to YAKA. In the south the left flank of the XXIV Corps was at KUBA SAKI with the front lines stretching to the west to the town of UCHITOMARI.

Conflicting reports continued as to the location of enemy concentrations. The latest report indicates that many troops are located around SURI. These have been taken under fire by naval gunfire and air bombardment.

Our casualties as of 2400 3 April total 705, of which 196 are listed as KIA.

T.C. 58.3 (RAdm Sherman) shot down 45 enemy planes on the 3rd. 23 of these were Jap fighter planes encountered over KUKAI SHIMA and 16 were miscellaneous types which were shot down over TOKUNO by returning search planes. The other 6 were shot down by CAP over the Task Group.

On the evening of the 4th one of our submarines and 1 of the British submarines reported the presence of a Jap cruiser together with 4 escorts proceeding south from the JAVA SEA via SAPI STRAITS. An attack was made by the British sub SPARK against this unit.

On the night of 3-4 9 B-29s laid 83 mines in the KURE Area. On the same night, the B-29 bombing effort in the TOKYO Area was distributed as follows: 48 aircraft with 195 tons on the Shizuoka Plant, 1 aircraft with 270 tons on the Koizumi plant, 20 aircraft with 139 tons on the TOKYO urban area, 6 aircraft with 550 tons on the Tachikawa plant, 47 aircraft with 425 tons on the Kawasaki industrial area. In summary, 223 B-29s dropped 1579 tons against negligible enemy air opposition and varying AA. 1 B-29 is missing.

- Continued -
4 April (Guam date) (Cont’d)

Following is summary of mopping up operations in the forward area 25-31 March:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japs Killed</th>
<th>POWs</th>
<th>Our Casualties</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IWO JIMA</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72 196 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATPAN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TINIAN</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUAM</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PELELIU</td>
<td>No ground action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Total casualties for the IWO JIMA operation through 31 March are as follows: Japs KIA 22,093; POWs 306. Our casualties KIA 4,594; WIA 15,955; MIA 301.

JCS 032140 (pink) outlines the directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff covering the command relationships in the Pacific Theater.

JCS 032141 (pink) directs CinCPAO and CinCSWPA to carry out certain plans and preparations for future operations.

CincCBF 020115, 030521 and 030526 (pinks) concern British Pacific Fleet operations in the Pacific Theater.

CTF 51 040205 outlines his operations to be carried out in the near future.

CTF 51 040730 (VAdm Turner) covers his summary of OKINAWA operation as of 1200 on the 4th.

Cincpao Adv Hq 040849 (pink) requests photographic reconnaissance of portions of KOREA STRAIT in order to determine possible submarine route into the JAPAN SEA.

Cincpac Adv Hq 041230 outlines his summary of OKINAWA situation as of 1800 on the 4th.

Com3rdFlt 050006 states that intermittent availability of oilers may adversely affect the FIREBREAK Operation.

5 April (Guam date)

Advances on OKINAWA continued to be satisfactory. The 6th MarDiv throughout L plus 4 pushed its front lines forward 6000-8000 yards and patrols were operating in the vicinity of CHUTA and KOCHIMA.

In the south the XXIV Corps advanced 3000-5000 yards meeting, for the first time, organized defensive areas. Air reconnaissance indicates that there are numerous installations and troop concentrations in front of our lines in the south.

The 1st MarDiv patrolled the occupied portion of the island, and units from this division landed on YUBUCHI SHIMA.
5 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Reconnaissance of the eastern islands by a Marine Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion was in progress throughout the day.

Total casualties as of 2400(I) 4 April numbered 984, with 175 KIA, 798 WIA and 11 MIA.

Military government authorities have reported that by L plus 3 9,000 civilians were under control. Many of these had been injured and were being cared for by our medical units. The civilians are described as being "shocked and nervous, but docile and cooperative".

No damage from air attacks has been reported, except for the following delayed reports: SPROSTON (DD 577) had considerable damage from a bomb near miss; HAMBLETON (DM 20) suffered minor damage when she shot down a suicider close aboard; ALPINE (APA 92) reports considerable structural damage from a suicide plane hit on the 1st; NEVADA (BB 36) was hit 3 times by shore batteries but continues in action.

Logistics situation continues satisfactory except for difficulties encountered in unloading yesterday due to increased surf. The following landing craft suffered damage from broaching or collision with other landing craft: LSM 12, LST 675, 570, 756, 689, 736.

Despite these casualties unloading conditions have improved due to improvement of beaches by UDTs. 29 unloaded APA, 2 LSV have departed.

THORNTON (AVD 11) was badly damaged in a collision with ASHTABULA (AO 51). This is the first collision reported in this operation.

The plan for future employment of TF 58 contemplates its reorganization into four groups of approximately equal size. Unless the tactical situation changes, two groups will provide support and two groups will fuel - alternating every two days.

TF 57 is back at SAKISHIMA to remain today and tomorrow. Summary of TF 57 previous operations: ULSTER was damaged by bomb near miss and her engine room flooded. INDOMITABLE strafed - 6 casualties. INDEFATIGABLE crashed by suicide with some damage to island and radio installations. Remains operational. VICTORIOUS had suicide plane attack avoided by radical maneuvers - wing tip touched ship and plane crashed alongside without damage to the ship. Total enemy losses from 31 March: In air - 5, suiciders - 2, 15 destroyed on ground, 9 damaged on the ground. Own losses: 16 planes and 3 pilots lost.

Airstrips remain operational in SAKISHIMA GUNTO.

TF 58 planes on April 1st sank more than 40 small boats and damaged 30-40 others; shot down 2 Vals near the target; and in large supporting strikes destroyed bridges, buildings, warehouses, trucks, 1 ammunition and 1 fuel dump. They bombed, rocketed, strafed and Napalmed gun positions and entrances to caves and tunnels.

CTF 51 reports that from L Day to 1300 L plus 4 the total confirmed enemy planes destroyed is: 28 by ships gunfire, 21 by TF 51 controlled VF and 16 suiciders (who made 15 hits and 1 miss on 14 ships) for a total of 65.

Com WesSeaFron 050020 (pink) sets forth his OpPlan 2-45 for the FIREBREAK operation.

- Continued -
5 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Cincpoa Adv Hq 050028 requests CinCSWPA to perform a maximum attack on air bases in north FORMOSA.

Cincpac Adv Hq 050110 advises CinCSWPA that Marine Air Groups 24 and 32, including their Headquarters Squadrons, are available for his use until 1 July.

Cincpac 050153 states that Construction Battalions will not be returned to the mainland for reorganization. Re-equipment will be accomplished at Pacific bases and rehabilitation of personnel will be accomplished by individual replacements.

Cincpac 050223 (pink) states that he does not desire CinCBPF to employ XE craft in the Pacific at the present time.

Com5thFlt 050527 states that Admiral Spruance (Com5thFlt) has shifted his flag from the INDIANAPOLIS to the NEW MEXICO.

CamFwdArea 050709 directs Air Defense Commander TWO JIMA to employ VMB 612 in flight ASP at TWO, and attack shipping in the harbors of the Japanese Empire.

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) 050730 is Summary No. 9 of OKINAWA operation as of 1200 on the 5th.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 050837 (pink) advises various interested commands that it may become possible to accomplish subsequent phases of the ICEBERG Operation sooner than originally planned and so warns them to keep their plans and preparations therefor as flexible as possible.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 050840 concerns policy to be carried out with regard to visits of officers to the Forward Area.

CTF 51 051325 covers his Summary No. 10 as of 1800 on the 5th.

6 April (Guam date)

Increased enemy resistance is being met by the 24th Corps in its drive to the south on OKINAWA. In the north units of the 3rd PhibCorps are meeting only scattered resistance.

During the afternoon, apparently very heavy enemy air attacks took place. CTF 58 reported that in the afternoon, aircraft from TG's 58.1 and 58.3 had splashed about 150 planes, exclusive of any shot down by the CAP at OKINAWA. Complete report has not been received as to the damage inflicted on us.

A Japanese task force was located in the INLAND SEA. A VLR plane reported a force of one large ship and 6 DD underway to the west of KURE at 0930/I. This force apparently proceeded south through BUNGO SUIDO, for, at 2010 a force was picked up by THREADFIN (SS 410) on patrol there. HACKLEBACK (SS 295) picked up the force 20 minutes later. Apparently neither submarine was within attack range, but both trailed, and reported the force — which radar indicated to consist of two large warships and 6 escorts. The speed of the force was high 22 - 24 knots, so the submarines finally lost contact at 2345/I.

- Continued -
6 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

To meet this threat our forces have been disposed as follows: Search sectors have been intensified in the direction of the threat. TF 54, while continuing fire support missions, will be deployed to the west of OKINAWA. Submarines have been posted along possible routes of the force. TF 58 is concentrating to the east of OKINAWA in a position to cover the transport convoy routes.

Approximately 150 B-29s are scheduled to bomb TOKYO tomorrow and will be escorted by 70-90 P-51s based at IWO JIMA. This is the first instance of a strike of heavy bombers being escorted by fighters based at IWO JIMA. In addition, a strike is scheduled for tomorrow for 165 B-29s to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant at NAGOYA. These planes will be unescorted.

Cincpac Adv Hq 050230 (pink) outlines the preferable months for invasion of KYUSHU and/or HONSHU.

Cincpac Adv Hq 050830 (pink) states his views relative to the possibility of initiating Phase III of ICEBERG earlier than previously planned and requests reply from Com5thFlt as to his views.

Arnold to MacArthur and Nimitz 052341 (pink) states that 20th Air Force is prepared to furnish a planning staff to Cincpoa to aid in planning for the invasion of JAPAN and further states that he contemplates sending the Chief of Staff, 20th AF to this headquarters about the middle of May.

ComGenFMFPac 060125 (pink) outlines his recommendations relative to employment of 3rd PhibCorps vice 5th PhibCorps in 3rd phase ICEBERG operations.

CTF 51 060540 outlines his plan in the event of enemy surface attack off OKINAWA.

Com5thFlt to Cincpac 060701 (pink) sets forth his comments regarding Phase III of ICEBERG.

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) 060715 covers Summary No. 11 as of 1200 on the 6th.

21st BomCom 060815 (pink) summarizes mining operations carried out by the 21st BomCom in the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS Area.

CTF 58 060847 summarizes results of operations of TGs 58.1 and 58.3 on the 6th.

CTF 51 061645 summarizes operations at OKINAWA as of 1800 on the 6th.

CTF 51 070035 informs TGs 51.5 (transport screen) and 51.6 (service and salvage group) of possible impending enemy surface engagement and requests them to expedite logistics for ships and support craft that can participate in this possible action.

CTF 51 062025 summarizes special report on the enemy air attack afternoon and early evening of 6 April.
7 April (Guam date)

Substantial gains were made by both corps throughout L plus 6 on OKINAWA. In the north the 6th MarDiv continued to advance against little opposition and by 1800 the front lines extended from NAGO southeast towards IGARA YAMA, with patrols as far north as NAKOSHII and to the west near the river, between the towns of USNA and YAHU. Elements of the division landed on the beaches of NAGO in the morning in order to reconnoiter the MOTOBU PENINSULA. During the day other elements of the division reconnoitered the inshore sides of IKE, TAKA and HETANZA ISLANDS. No enemy activity was reported. The 1st MarDiv continued mopping up in its ZA.

In the south the XXIV Corps advanced over rough and clifflike terrain finding the enemy in deliberate defensive positions consisting of blockhouses, pillboxes, and in extensive trench systems protected by double apron barbed wire. The town of UCHI TOMARI and DONIKU were captured and on the left flank the front lines were within 400 yards of OUKI. Only slight gains were made on the right flank. Artillery of the XXIV Corps and of the 3rdPhibCorps was assisting the advance. The 96th InfDiv states that it is possible that the entire 62nd Jap Div is in front of its lines.

Total casualties as of this time are 1,523 of which 282 are listed as KIA.

Following is a chronology of the contacts and engagement with the Jap task force on 7 April:

2345 - Contact lost by submarine THREADFIN off east coast KYUSHU. Force headed SW.

0825 - 1 BB, 2 CL, 10 DD picked up by ESSEX plane at 30-44N 129-10E, course 300.

1030 - FairWing 1 plane reported force 1 BB, 1 CA 9 DD at 31N 128-55E.

1015 - TF 58 launched 380 plane strike against force reported in 31-00N 129-00 E.

1130 - 1145 - ComFairWing 1 issued orders for day and night tracking of force.

1345 - Search plane reported force attacked by VF, VB and VT with considerable damage.

1448 - ComSubPac issued orders to submarines to knock off cripples and search for aviators.

1520 - Search plane reported landing to pick up a survivor at 30-47N 128-05E, and reported 1 CL and 1 DD burning, 4 other DD headed NE, speed 0. ComFairWing 1 ordered planes to search north for the BB and its escorts.

1620 - Search plane sent in a report (garbled) that the BB had not been sighted, but that there was considerable wreckage and enemy survivors in the water.

1705 - Search plane base reported "Survivor states vessel burning not underway to be battleship." Our estimate of others 1 cruiser light, 4 DD sunk, 4 DD undamaged, 1 DD burning, 1 BB burning.

- Continued -
7 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

1701 - CTF 58 reported: "PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE LACKING PHOTOGRAPHS
TOTAL FORCE ATTACKED 1 YAMATO BB 1 AGANO CL 1 CL OR LARGE
DD 7 OR 8 DD. SANK 1 BB 1 AGANO CL 1 CL OR DD 3 DD X 2
DD BURNING BADLY 3 DD APPARENTLY UNDAMAGED X ALL DD STRAFED
OR ROCKETED X. BB TOOK MINIMUM 6 TORPEDOES AND 8 HALF TCN
BOMB HITS X. NO AIR OPPOSITION OVER TARGET BUT PLENTY AA FIRE X
OUR LOSSES ABOUT 7 PLANES" (Later reported 3 planes down in
target area, and 4 fighters from ESSEX down in launching area).

0515/8 Plane 92V464 reported 4 DD, 1 CL course N, speed 2 at 31-12 123-10.

Submarines have been ordered to knock off cripples and pick up survivors.

From 1440 to 1843 on the 6th, 182 planes attacked 22 groups. 55 shot down
by planes, 35 shot down by ships. 22 suicides, 2 near misses. Total 116. The
following ships were damaged as indicated during these attacks:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Heavily damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUSH</td>
<td>HYMAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLHOUN) - 2 DD, 1 DMS</td>
<td>MULLANY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMMONS)</td>
<td>NEWCOMB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MORRIS</td>
<td>- 6 DD, 1 DMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEUTZE</td>
<td>HOWORTH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUTCHINS ) - 1 DD</td>
<td>RODMAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECRUIT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFENSE ) - 2 AM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor damage</td>
<td>WITTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIEBERLING ) - 2 DE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIEL T. GRIFFIN ) - 1 APD</td>
<td>💫</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVASTATOR ) - 1 AM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGAN VICTORY ) - 2 AKE</td>
<td>💫</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOBBS VICTORY ) - 2 AKE</td>
<td>💫</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST 347 ) - 1 LST</td>
<td>💫</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further air attacks morning of 7th (0325 to 1015) 20 planes approached in small
groups and 6 dropped bombs. Of these 20 planes, 6 were shot down by fighters,
6 shot down by ships, and 2 suicides hit (BENNETT (DD 473) and WESSON (DE 135)).
Total ships sunk or damaged during these actions: 10 DD, 2 DMS, 3 DE, 1 APD, 3 AM,
2 APE, 1 LST -- 22 Ships.

CTF 57 reports as follows: "On 6 April bombed and strafed airfields at
ISHIGAKI and MIYAKO, 1 plane shot down in air. Previous craters on MIYAKO filled
in. Force detected by snoopers in early morning and attacked by 4 suicides. No
damage to ships, tho one plane close-missed ILLUSTRIUS after her wing MIYAKO
grazed island. The other 3 planes were shot down, 1 by ships gunfire and 2 by planes."
On 7 April both islands were again attacked. All MIYAKO runways left unserviceable.
Some 20 a/c were seen of which 3 were destroyed on ground. Total enemy losses air-
craft - airborne 5, on ground 3. Own losses 2 planes in combat, 12 operational.
Force retired 7th for two days replenishment and will return to combat area 10th.
From 27 March to 6 April 205 B-29s from 21st BomCom in 6 missions laid 1690 mines in the approaches to SHIMOSEKI STRAITS and in the KURE-HIROSHIMA areas. Mining was by radar from 5-3000 feet, except for 48 mines dropped among major fleet units in KURE HARBOR which was from 25,000 feet. 21st BomCom estimates that 90% of the mines were effectively laid. 3 B-29s were lost in the process, probably to enemy action, and 1 crashed while landing injuring 2 and killing 9.

Cominch & CNO 062116 (pink) states that units of the 7th Fleet will pass to the command of Cincpoa on a schedule to be agreed upon by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CTF 58 062337 outlines first report by carrier plane of enemy force which sortied from BUNGO SUIDO.

Com5thFlt 070105 (pink) orders CTF 58 and CTF 51 to carry out strikes on enemy task force.

Plane 160, Flight 464 070130 sets forth first sighting of enemy force by search plane from ComFairWing ONE.

CTF 58 070304 advises that strike has been launched against enemy surface force.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 070646 advises ComGenPOA that visits to the RYUKYUS by certain personnel will be restricted to those only who are concerned in carrying out operations in that area.

CTF 51 070755 covers his summary as of 1200 on the 7th.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 070825 requests CinCSWPA to authorize direct communications between ComAir7thFlt and ComAirPac regarding exchange of naval patrol squadrons.

CTF 54 070832 (pink) outlines his op-plan for possible engagement with Japanese surface force.

CTF 51 070925 comments on progress of current state of affairs in OKINAWA area.

CTF 57 071204 outlines operations of that task force on 6 April.

Cincpac Adv Hq 071214 concerns search operations being carried out by sea-planes in the OKINAWA Area.

CTF 51 071830 covers summary of operations as of 1800 on the 7th.
8 April (Guam date)

OKINAWA. In the north, light opposition is being encountered; however, to the south limited gains were made only after exceptionally difficult fighting. Minefields were encountered together with fire from all types and calibers of weapons. Front lines as of 1800 are within 2500 yards of MACHINATO airfield on the right flank and within 1500 yards of YONABARU airfield on the left flank.

By L plus 6, 30,000 civilians were under the care of the Military Government authorities on OKINAWA. A general report from the Military Government indicates that the situation is generally satisfactory. Total casualties as of 2400 on 7 April numbered 1,690, 301 of which are reported as KIA.

Search for remnants of the Jap task force attacked on the 7th were negative. Planes from FAW 1 searched all day but poor visibility was encountered throughout the area and no reports were received indicating that sightings had been made. CTF58 launched a 32 plane fighter-bomber strike in the general area of the engagement and the planes returned reporting no sightings. CTF 58 estimates that the remnants of this Jap force consist of 5 DDs.

Ship casualties: Air raid on 6th - MARYLAND hit by bomb which failed to penetrate turret #3. H. F. BAUER (DM 26) hit by aerial torpedo way forward, being locally repaired. YMS 321 hit by suicide plane knocking out her three inch gun and causing topside damage. On the 8th - YMS 427 hit by coast defense gun but remains operational. GREGORY hit by suicide plane, engine room flooded but under control. TF 58 ship casualties: CHAS. S. SPERRY (DD 697) lost port bilge keel. HARRISON (DD 573) 2 guns out due to suicide near miss. TAUSIG (DD 746) electrical gear out due to two near bomb misses. SAN JACINTO (CVL 30) numerous shrapnel holes due to bomb near miss. HANCOCK (CV 19) being returned to ULITHI for repairs escorted by HAYNSWORTH (DD 700) who took a suicide on her bridge and STEMVEL (DD 644) with a fuel oil leak.

TG 51.3 (TransRon 16 lifting 27th Div) ordered to objective. Two divisions (2 RCT) will proceed to HAGUSI beaches for unloading. The other TransDiv (RCT) will go to KERAMA RETTO to prepare for landings on the eastern islands. TG 51.1 (77th Div) and TG 51.2 (2nd MarDiv) remain in waiting areas. TG 58.3 replenishes today. Others remain at objective. Units of TG 52.1 repeat strikes on SAKISHIMA GUNTO. TF 57 continues replenishment. Leaves today for combat area.

First report from CTU 94.4.1 has come in. Unit consists of TALBOT (DD 390) and LSM 331.

A survey of PARECE VELA was completed and foundations installed for hydrographer shack. Reef is reported to be very steep and no anchorage is available.

Enemy continuing to shell CEBU docks. Liberty ship furnished counter battery fire. PTFs active in landing guerilla support, barge hunts, and shore bombardment. They fired an ammunition dump on CARABAO ISLAND (N of PANAY).

BESUGO (SS 321) on the 6th attacked a northbound CL in SAPE STRAIT but missed. Then scored a hit in one of her escorts, which sank leaving many troops in the water.

On the same date GABILAN (SS 252) scored a hit in the cruiser and slowed her down. This permitted the third submarine, CHARR (SS 328), to score three solid hits. The cruiser was heard sinking and breaking up.

- Continued -
SEA ROBIN (SS 407) sank two troop loaded sea trucks bound for SAIGON yesterday, and recovered the only 3 survivors from 200 troops. Cargo also consisted of hundreds of oil drums.

TIRANTE (SS 420) sank an AK in the YELLOW SEA, and SPADEFISH (SS 411) sank a junk.

COBIA rescued 7 13th AF aviators from ditched B-24s off CAPE PADARAN, all in good shape.

SEADEVIL (SS 400) picked up 3 fighter pilots from ESSEX.

Delayed reports from TF 58 for the first 5 days of April indicate that a total of 77 enemy planes was destroyed during that period (59 airborne), with 39 others probably destroyed or damaged. This represents a gain of 28 destroyed and 30 probably destroyed or damaged over earlier reports.

Of 194 B-29s airborne for the attack against the Mitsubishi Aircraft Plant, 137 dropped 574 tons of GPs on the plant primary target visually from 16,500-21,000 feet, and 23 B-29s dropped 107 tons of GPs on targets of opportunity. 123 Jap planes were sighted, and 71 attacks were counted. 14 Jap planes were destroyed, 7 probably destroyed, and 7 damaged. These enemy losses, added to those inflicted by the P-51s and the 73rd Wing B-29s over TOKYO, total 85 Jap aircraft destroyed, 37 probably destroyed, and 51 damaged, a grand total of 173 aircraft.

3 B-29s were lost over the target. 1 was rammed and seen to crash. No parachutes were observed. 1 crashed after a wing blew up over the target. A 3rd was hit in the right wing over the target, spun in and crashed and burned. No chutes were seen.

Photographs taken of both aircraft plants on the 8th show a number of hits on plant buildings at NAGOYA, with fires still burning in the engine test cells, and 42 hits in nearby residential and commercial districts. The east half of the TOKYO plant was obscured by smoke. Damage was observed in half of the TOKYO plant, but again smoke made accurate damage assessment impossible.

At KYUSHU on the 8th 10 B-29s dropped 50 tons on the KANOSAKA east airfield and 38 others hit KAGOSHIMA CITY and airfield with 152 tons by radar from 17-19000 feet. No enemy opposition was experienced. Results were unobserved.

20 B-29s are scheduled to take off at 1800 tomorrow to continue the mining of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

JCS 072051 discusses shortage of shipping and states that it is necessary to direct rear area shipping to be employed in forward movement and requests information as to what can be done to further this program.

Com5thFlt 060340 outlines his policy on the return of damaged ships to rear areas.

CTF 51 080755 outlines his summary as of 1200 on the 8th.

Cincpac Adv Hq 060346 advises Com5thFlt as to proposal for employment of CVEs and requests recommendation from him for redistribution of CVEs now under his command.

CTF 51 081325 outlines his summary as of 1800 on the 8th.
9 April (Guam date)

On OKINAWA the front lines in the drive to the south remained virtually static throughout the day. Only small gains in isolated sections were reported. Present plan of the 24th Corps is to capture the high ground on both flanks. 20 Artillery Battalions are now available for the support of the drive to the south. During the day 2 RCTs of the 27th InfDiv landed on HAGUCHI beaches and have been assigned to the 24th Corps. Remaining RCT will land on TSUGEN SHIMA the morning of the 10th.

CTF 51 reports enemy reaction to OKINAWA occupation evidenced by daily and nightly air attacks, attempts at surface activity by suicide boats and swimmers and an increased resistance in south. A small group of suicide boats attacked ships in the southern transport area. C.J. BADGER (DD 657) hit and holed amidships putting both engines out. STARR (AKA 87) hit with minor damage, apparently because boat hit LSM alongside. At least 4 boats were destroyed and 8 Japs killed. At least two swimmers reported. Only one air attack reported on 9th. STERRETT hit and lost propulsion. Extensive fire support furnished in southern OKINAWA with apparently good results.

Summary of TF 51 ships damaged by enemy action thru the 8th: 12 sunk - 9 by suicide planes, 2 by mines, 1 by suicide boats. 56 damaged - 43 by suicide planes, 6 by bombs, 3 by mines, 1 by aerial torpedo, 1 by gunfire, 1 by suicide boat.

TF 57 is due to strike FORMOSA on the 11th and 12th of April while CVEs from TG 52.1 (R.Adm. Durgin) will maintain neutralization of SAKISHIMA GUNTO.

During the afternoon of the 8th 96 F4Us and 15 F6F(N) of MAG 33 arrived at the KADENA Airfield.

CTF 58 estimates 529 enemy planes destroyed by that force from 23 March thru 7 April inclusive. This total figure breaks down as follows:

\[ \begin{array}{l}
\text{428 Shot down} \\
\quad \begin{array}{ll}
\text{176 by OKINAWA target CAP} \\
\text{21 by night, dawn and dusk CAP} \\
\text{80 near TF 58} \\
\text{6 by VF(N)} \\
\text{19 by ships gunfire} \\
\quad \begin{array}{l}
\text{7 appeared definite suicide attempts} \\
\text{2 suicides} \\
\quad \text{99 destroyed on ground} \\
\quad \text{529 TOTAL}
\end{array}
\end{array}
\end{array} \]

CTF 51 estimates 254 Jap planes destroyed in the same period, including those destroyed by planes of TF 58 when controlled by TF 51. If the 176 planes destroyed by TF 58 OKINAWA TCAp are subtracted, the grand total is 607.

ComMinPac 030321 discusses the necessity and value of assignment of 2200-ton DMs to each minesweeping unit.

ComGenAAFPOA Admin 060535 (pink) discusses base development plans at IE SHIMA and OKINAWA.

Cominch & CNO 071945 (pink) requests Cinopac to ascertain how QUEENFISH established identity of AWA MARU.

- Continued -

2605
9 April (Guan date) (Cont'd)

Cincpoa Pearl 072145 (pink) requests comments from ComGen Ten as to ComGen AAFPOA Admin despatch relative to employment of 316 Wing at IE SHIMA.

Com5thFlt 080256 requests TF 57 to strike northern airfields on FORMOSA on the 11th and 12th.

QUEENFISH 081515 states that the identity of the AWA MARU was established by statement of the prisoner alone and no other confirmation was made.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 090125 advises that in order to insure readiness to meet future counter offensives it will be advisable to return TGs of TF 58 to port for replenishment, upkeep and rest on a rotating basis.

Cincpac Adv Hq 090126 advises Cominch that QUEENFISH despatch relative to sinking of AWA MARU answers information requested by Cominch.

Com5thFlt 090225 requests that Cincpac arrange with SWP to carry out air strikes against southern FORMOSA at the same time as TF 57 is striking the northern fields.

CTF 51 & CTF 56 090235 states that 2nd MarDiv will possibly not be required in Phases I or II and suggests that the 2nd MarDiv be returned to SAIPAN pending decision for employment of this unit in Phase III.

Cincpac Adv Hq 090255 outlines to all Pacific Ocean Areas units terms of the recent directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff involving changes in command organization in the Pacific.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 090625 reclassifies an area north of IWO as a blind bombing zone.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 090642 requests CinCSWPA to strike southern FORMOSA airfields on 11 and 12 April.

CTF 51 090745 covers Summary 17 as of 1200 on the 9th.

ComGen 10 090910 (pink) answers Cincpoa Pearl request for information regarding establishment of VLR sites on IE SHIMA and OKINAWA.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 091157 (pink) authorizes Com5thFlt to return 2nd MarDiv to SAIPAN with the proviso that the Division will remain alerted for employment in either Phase I, II or III of ICEBERG.

CTF 51 091240 covers Summary 18 as of 1800 on the 9th.

MacArthur 091617 directs Allied Air Forces to conduct heavy air strikes on southern FORMOSA airfields on the 11th and 12th of April in accordance with Cincpoa request.
10 April (Guam date)

Lines of the 24th Corps were consolidated on OKINAWA throughout the day and only limited local advances were attempted. The 3rd PhibCorps encountered stiffening resistance on MOTOBU PENINSULA and was subjected to extensive counter attacks on both flanks. Bad weather hampered all operations throughout the day.

During the morning 1 RCT of the 27th InfDiv landed on TSUGEN SHIMA. Considerable resistance was reported. Jap casualties as of midnight 8 April numbered 5,000 KIA and 222 POWs. Military Government authorities report that as of today 73,000 civilians are under their control. All captured males between the ages of 15 and 45 are being used as laborers. There are about 1,500 in this category.

Delayed reports of ship damage: LCS 36 in air attack on 9th. HOPPING (APD51) received 6 hits by shore batteries. After machinery spaces and fireroom inoperative but can make 18 knots.

Fire support continued. 2 OBB, 2 CA, 1 CL and 9 DD supported operations of TG 51.19 engaged in the capture of TSUGEN SHIMA.

TF 57 proceeded to position for strike on HATSUYAMA and SHINCHIKU airfields on northern FORMOSA scheduled for tomorrow. TG 58.1 and 58.2 having been in support for two days are now due to replenish, with TGs 58.3 and 58.4 in the fueling area. TG 51.2 (lifting 2nd MarDiv) starting back to SAIPAN.

Our plane losses at OKINAWA include 6 FAUs missing since the evening of the 9th when they became lost (1 pilot was rescued by LCS 57), 1 FAU crashed, and 1 OF missing. The pilot and aircrewman of the TUSCALCOSA OS2U who bailed out over Jap territory are now safe, having filtered through the enemy lines.

A report from CTG 51.15 (RAdm Kiland) on Jap suicides follows: On basis of intelligence interrogations of personnel and examination of plane parts and documents aboard 8 DDs and other escort types hit by suicides and by own observation of 3 attacks on shipping in immediate vicinity of KERAMA RETTO the following information obtained: (A) Planes generally approach at very low altitude. In some instances 10 to 20 feet off the water. When possible, approach from behind land masses. (B) Suicide planes will often select isolated vessels, crippled ships or ships with relatively weak fire power as targets. This apparently regardless of the presence in same vicinity of higher priority targets. (C) Great variety of planes employed in these attacks but no new models identified. Examination of manufacturers plates from portions of 1 suicide, probably Kate indicates planes built in 1938 or 1939 and some parts manufactured as far back as 1927. (D) Decoy or diversionary planes approach from another direction. (E) Coordinated attacks reported 4 instances with planes coming in from several angles simultaneously. (F) Planes making their approach absorb great punishment without being destroyed or thrown off course, indicating possibility these planes are specially armored. Pieces of 1/4 inch armor recovered.

This morning elements of the 11st InfDiv landed on the northern coast of JOLO ISLAND meeting very little resistance. A landing was also made this morning on BUSUANGA ISLAND southwest of MINDORO.

SPARK, a British submarine, reports seeing the cruiser torpedoes by the CHARR (SS 328). This submarine reports that the cruiser sank after a spectacular explosion. This sinking occurred on the 6th NE of BAILI.

- Continued -

2607
10 April (Guam date)(Cont’d)

On the night of the 9th-10th, 16 B-29s laid 105 mines in minefield M in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS (west entrance to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS) through 8/10 to 10/10 clouds from 5-6,300 feet. There was no enemy air opposition, and no B-29s were lost. "It is estimated that this mission will maintain the blockade of the west entrance of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS for an additional 5-7 days."

ComGen 3rdPhibCorps 082357 recommends to ComGenFMFPac that 3rdPhibCorps rehabilitate at OKINAWA instead of in the MARIANAS or the HAWAIIAN AREA.

CTG 50.6 (Adm Beary) 092358 discusses failure to return escorts from ULITHI to the operating area.

Com5thFlt 030512 (pink) suggests that CTF 58 make a strike on KYUSHU soon.

CTF 58 100025 (pink) advises Com5thFlt that a strike on KYUSHU will be dependent upon when his TF will be released from support of amphibious forces.

Cincpac Adv Hq 10004/4 (pink) requests information from Com5thFlt regarding suitability of OKINAWA Area for the development of certain airfields and facilities.

Cincpac Adv Hq 100048 covers desire of Cincpac that major questions concerning future operations should not be referred to commanders engaged in combat and that any such information will be supplied by the Advance Headquarters.

Com5thFlt 100128 states that no mining strikes are currently planned and recommends release of mines to the VLR program.

Cincpac Pearl 100146 recommends to Cincpac that despatch regarding facilities for LEYTE-SAMAR be sent to CNO.

Cincpac Adv Hq 100223 (pink) covers directive that priority be given to establishment of aviation facilities on SAIPAN.

CTF 51 100315 covers Admiral Turner’s OpPlan for the capture of IE SHIMA.

CTF 51 100705 covers Summary No. 19 of operations on OKINAWA as of 1200/10th.

Com5thFlt 100716 (pink) states that strike on KYUSHU by TF 58 will have to be postponed until shore based air is activated at OKINAWA. He suggests that long range fighter sweeps on KYUSHU fields may pay big dividends.

ComAFSampa 101145 states that he will carry out heavy strikes on southern FORMOSA airfields on the same days that the British carrier force strikes the northern fields.

Cincpac Adv Hq 101159 authorizes ComGenFMFPac to proceed with rotation of personnel of the 3rd MarDiv as originally planned.

CTF 51 101300 is Summary No. 20 covering OKINAWA operations as of 101300.
11 April (Guam date)

Little progress was made in both the northern and southern areas throughout the day. 24th Corps in the south continued to consolidate its lines prior to launching the scheduled all out attack. Our casualties as of 2400 9 April total 2,695 of which 432 were KIA.

CVE planes furnished direct air support, and some planes from TF 58 were active on CAP. 4 Jap planes were shot down and a 5th scored a near suicide miss on the MANLOVE (DE 36), killing 1 and wounding 1. We lost 1 VF to AA, an F4U crashed on take off, burning 1 parked plane and a 0-47 engaged in DDT spraying crash landed at YONTAN Field, demolishing the plane, killing 1 and injuring 7. KADENA Airfield is inoperative because of heavy rains, but YONTAN is in excellent condition.

Between 1000-1040 5 enemy aircraft approached from the north at 20,000 feet to within 15 miles, but were not sighted and retired without attacking. At 1320 2 raids approached from the SW to within 10 miles of KERAMA RETTO, but turned back when the CAP attacked them.

Weather prevented TF 57 from carrying out its scheduled strikes against FORMOSA. The force now plans to attack the same targets on the 12th and 13th.

SAFEGUARD (ARS 23) picked up a B-29 crew 40 miles NW of SAIPAN.

QUEENFISH (SS 393) returning to SAIPAN picked up all survivors of a search plane which was down NW of INO JIMA. These men had been in the water for 43 hours.

Two separate B-29 strikes are scheduled for the 12th. 114 B-29s will take off to attack the Musashino plant of the Nakajima Aircraft Co. at Tokyo and 167 additional B-29s will attack targets in the KORIYAMA area.

JCS 102237 (pink) outlines to CinC SWPA the 1st priority of operations in BORNEO is BRUNET BAY, and that seizure of BALIKPAPAN will not be carried out unless he can do so without prejudice to operations against JAPAN.

Com5thFlt 110247 concerns rotation of units of TF 58 to rear bases for replenishment and rehabilitation.

CTF 51 110730 outlines his OKINAWA summary of operations as of 1200 on the 11th.

Com5thFlt 110909 directs TF 58 to discontinue replenishment and have all groups in readiness for an expected air attack.

CTF 51 110940 states that there is a possibility of strong enemy air attack being carried out from JAPAN and FORMOSA on the 12th.

CTF 51 111340 covers Summary No. 22 as of 1800 on the 11th.

Cam
12 April (Guam date)

The front lines on OKINAWA remained relatively stable throughout 12 April. Troops of the 27th InfDiv which made landings on TSUGEN SHIMA are now reembarked and will land on the HAGUSHTI beaches.

At this time G-2 estimates indicate that 66,000 Japanese troops were believed to be present on OKINAWA and IE SHIMA. Of this number 49,000 are reported to be combat troops. 62,500 of these are estimated to be south of the 24th Corps line.

Our casualties as of 2400 on 10 April were reported as 3,195 of which 478 are listed as KIA.

On the 12th enemy air raids against shipping and our positions on OKINAWA were heavy. About 25 Jap planes attacked during the night and early morning and an estimated 175 enemy planes attacked between early afternoon and evening. Reports indicate that there were 17 separate raids in the afternoon. Considerable damage was inflicted on our forces as follows: Sunk - ABELE (AN 58). Damaged, but able to proceed under own power - TENNESSEE (BB 43), CASSIN YOUNG (DD 793), STANLY (DD 478), PURDY (DD 734), ZELLARS (DD 777), JEFFERS (DE 27), LINDSEY (DM 32), REDDE (DE 185), RALL (DE 304), GLADIATOR (AM 319). Minor damage to a merchant ship whose rigging was hit. All of TF 58 at objective. Most have suffered air attacks; ENTERPRISE (CV 6), half electrical power lost; ESSEX (CV 9) radar damaged, 3 fuel tanks ruptured and forward gyro out from near bomb hit; HANK (DD 702) hit by suicider; BRUSH (DD 745), TAUSSIG (DD 746), HARRISON (DD 573), SPERRY, CHARLES S. (DD 697), BLACK (DD 656), HAILEY (DD 556), MCCONNELL (DD 678), NORMAN SCOTT (DD 690), REMEY (DD 688).

3 groups are scheduled to be at objective on the 13th.

Incomplete reports indicate that in the neighborhood of 200 planes were destroyed by TF 58 and TF 51 during the day. Complete reports will follow. Our aircraft losses were relatively light.

TF 57 struck SINCHEKU and KIIRUN airfields on FORMOSA. 17 planes are reported to have been destroyed plus 5 additional damaged.

4 enemy submarines have been contacted; 2 by planes and 2 by ships. 1 of the contacts was developed by MONSSEN (DD 793) in cooperation with the MERTZ (DD 691) with excellent results. Debris and oil was observed and CTG 58.4 (RAdm Radford) credits these 2 DDs with a kill of 1 submarine.

On the 12th 96 B-29s bombed the Kasashino Aircraft Plant at TOKYO. They were escorted by 78 P-51s. Fighter opposition was reported meager with an estimated 50 enemy aircraft intercepting. P-51 claims were 11 enemy aircraft destroyed and 14 probably destroyed. B-29s claimed 3 destroyed and 4 probably destroyed. No B-29s were lost; however, 4 P-51s are reported missing. Results are described as being unobserved in the main due to poor weather conditions.

141 unescorted B-29s destroyed the Hodogaya and Koriyama chemical plants at KORIYAMA. 3 B-29s are missing from this mission.

ComPhibsPac 260100 concerns UDT teams and rotation of UDT units.
12 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CinCpoa Adv Hq 100442 (pink) requests information from Com5thFlt relative to possibility of staging photographic Liberators through OKINAWA for the purpose of carrying out certain photographic coverage.

CinCpoa Adv Hq 101141 refers to instances of attacks by friendly aircraft on friendly submarines and surface craft and requests disciplinary action be initiated in attacks of this nature.

CinCpoa Adv Hq 101145 (pink) advises Com5thFlt that a sterilization date of 1 September is satisfactory for all mining jobs.

CinCpac Adv Hq 101615 refers to rotation of CB personnel.

CinCSWPA 11014 relieves ComSoPac on 30 April of logistic support of all SWPA forces in the Northern SOLOMONS.

ComPhibs Group 13 110333 (pink) refers to accommodations for British aircraft, officers and men at SANAAR Base.

CTF 51 110545 refers to suggestions pertaining to air cover for radar pickets.

CinCpac Adv Hq 110706 (pink) advises ComMarGils not to send air strikes against WAKE prior to the 19th of April in view of friendly submarine mission to be carried out in that area.

CinCpac Adv Hq 110839 advises CinCinch that steps are being utilized to the fullest extent to move personnel and cargo from rear areas to combat areas.

CinCBPF 111021 (pink) refers to the withdrawal of the ILLUSTRIOUS to be sent to the United Kingdom for refit and further states that FORMIDABLE will relieve ILLUSTRIOUS about 13 April.

Com5thFlt 111235 advises CTF 51 regarding disposition of surface units for maneuver in defense against air attack.

ComCinC & CNO 111830 advises that in view of the shortage of F4Us allocation of these aircraft to RNZAF for May and June cannot be made.

CTF 51 112155 concerns special report of enemy air attacks during the night and early morning of 12 April.

Com5thFlt 120112 requests information from ComAirPac as to the future estimate of planes and pilots available to TF 58.

CinCpoa Adv Hq 120526 requests CinCSWPA to continue strikes on southern FORMOSA air installations subsequent to retirement of TF 57 on the 13th.

MacArthur 121113 answers JCS request for information concerning utilization of shipping in the Pacific Theater.

CTF 51 121315 is Summary No. 24 of OKINAWA operations as of 1800 on the 12th.

CinCSWPA's Chief of Staff and other staff members are scheduled to arrive tomorrow for conference with CinCpac-CinCpoa.
13 April (Guam date)

Little progress was made on OKINAWA on the 13th. Resistance was intense. In the south, the 24th Corps is preparing for a strong offensive which is probably scheduled for the 19th.

Air attacks were reported as being much lighter. No damage is indicated to our naval units during the past 24 hours. 3 additional casualties, however, are reported as results of the heavy air attacks on the 12th. LCS 33 was hit by a suicide plane and sunk. LCS 57 was hit by 3 suicide planes and suffered extensive damage. In return, however, this ship caused destruction of 4 enemy planes, after which she returned to KERAMA RETTO under her own power.

PARCHE(SS384) on patrol off the E coast of HONSHU reports operations for the past 5 days to include the sinking of 1 DD, 2 small AK, 1 large steam trawler and a station picket.

Amplified reports from CTF 58 (Adm Mitscher) state that on the 12th TF 58 shot down 153 Jap planes; 62 by the OKINAWA CAP and the balance by planes over KIIKAI and AMAMI. 8 additional planes were destroyed on the ground. On the 13th TF 58 reports observing only 1 airborne plane which was shot down. 12 planes were destroyed on the ground at AMAMI and KIIKAI and numerous small craft and barges were strafed. CTF 58 reports that from 18 March to 12 April inclusive TF 58 has destroyed 1281 enemy planes, broken down as follows:

914 airborne planes
  73 by ships' gunfire
  841 by our planes
  363 on the ground
  4 suicides
  **1281**

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) reports that the total number of enemy planes destroyed by aircraft under his control to be 128.

On the night of 13-14th 335 B-29s attacked TOKYO Arsenal. Bombing was carried out by radar and reports indicate that a general conflagration resulted. Enemy aircraft opposition was generally slight.

Following is a recapitulation of aircraft destroyed in the POA since March 18th:

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<td>TF 93</td>
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<td>TG 50.5</td>
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<td>20th AF</td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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CTF 58 111103 covers report of attack by enemy aircraft during the afternoon of the 11th.

CTF 57 121237 covers operations of the British carrier strike on FORMOSA on the 12th.

CTF 58 121458 summarizes results of operations 12 April.

--Continued--
13 April (Guam date) (Continued)

CinCPac Adv Hq 122308 withdraws censorship regulations regarding suicide attacks by enemy air force.

CinCPac Adv Hq 122310 (pink) covers Warning Order for Phase III(c) of ICEBERG (MIYAKO JIMA).

CinCPac Adv Hq 122312 (pink) outlines areas at which units now carrying out operations on OKINAWA will rehabilitate and prepare for next operation.

CinCPac Adv Hq 122314 concerns certain proposals for changes in the air base development program in the OKINAWA area.

Com5thFlt 130141 requests CTF 58 to make a strike on the KYUSHU airfields when practicable.

CinCPac Adv Hq 130229 suggests to Com5thFlt that he do everything possible to expedite arrival of personnel and equipment to service air groups and improve airfields in the OKINAWA area.

CTF 51 130825 is summary of OKINAWA operations as of 1200 on the 13th.

CTF 51 130840 summarizes an attack by probable pilot-controlled buzz bomb.

CinCPac Adv Hq 130935 requests strongest practicable strikes to be carried out by CinCSWPA against FORMOSA airfields and installations.

CTF 58 131114 covers summary of operations of TF 58 during the 13th.

CTF 51 131400 covers operations at OKINAWA as of 1800 on the 13th.

CinCPac Adv 131415 (pink) covers Army units to be employed in Phase III-c of ICEBERG.

Certain CinCAFPAC Staff Officers arrived GUAM for conference with CinCPAC.

14 April (Guam date)

No major ground action was reported during the 14th at OKINAWA.

Preparations continued for the landings on IE SHIMA.

NEW YORK (BB 34) suffered considerable damage when a suicide plane crashed amidships.

SIGSBEE (DD 502), while operating with TF 58, was hit by a suicide plane which resulted in leaving only 1 engine operable and her steering gear out. The DD is in tow and a fleet tug has been detached to assist.

TF 57 on the 13th bombed and strafed northern FORMOSA airfields meeting no opposition. The force was under attack by enemy aircraft 3 times during the day but no damage was suffered. During the 12th and 13th TF 57 destroyed 20 enemy aircraft and losses were reported as being light.

On the night of 13-14th 303 B-29s dropped 2150 tons on the TOKYO arsenal area. Photographs on the 14th show the area largely obscured; however, 380 acres of damaged area are visible. 7 B-29s are missing from this mission. - Continued -
14 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cominch & CNO 131641 and 131644 (pink) concern date for the seizure of BRUNEI BAY by CinCSWPA, and states that units of the British Pacific Fleet will probably be allocated for employment in this operation.

CTF 51 132200 states that ComGen 24th Corps has been made responsible for attack of ground units by artillery, naval gunfire and air south of Corps boundary.

ComGenPOA 140058 (pink) recommends effective date the 98th Division be deferred to June.

Cincpac Adv Hq 140232 concerns ships to be assigned and withdrawn from ComMinPac units.

CTF 51 140655 covers Summary 27 as of 1200 on the 14th.

Cincpoo Adv Hq 140626 (from General Kenney) directs Army air engineer to proceed immediately to OKINAWA to confer with Captain Painter relative to construction of air strips thereon.

Cincpoo Adv Hq 140829 (pink) concerns the mission assigned TARAWA.

Cincpac Adv Hq 140833 concerns employment of XE craft against targets in the SINGAPORE area.

Cincpoo Adv Hq 141210 (pink) advises of desire for expansion and acceleration of Naval Base, OKINAWA.

CTF 51 141240 covers Summary No. 28 as of 1800 on the 14th.

15 April (Guam date)

The landing on IE SHIMA is scheduled for tomorrow by 2 RCTs on the southern and southwestern beaches of the island.

No major ground action was reported on OKINAWA on the 15th. In the south the 24th Corps is continuing its preparation for a drive with emphasis being on the stockage of ammunition. Enemy casualties as of 2400 on the 13th are as follows: 9,108 KIA, 391 POWs.

On the night of 13-14th B-29s burned out an additional 10.7 square miles of the TOKYO urban area. Photographs taken on the 15th show that a total of approximately 28 square miles are now burned out in this area. On the night of 15-16th 312 B-29s made an incendiary attack on the KAWASAKI and TOKYO urban areas. Early reports indicate that a general conflagration existed in the target areas.

TF 58 made fighter sweeps against southern KYUSHU airfields on the afternoon of the 15th. No report of the results of this sweep have been received. TF 58 has been reorganized eliminating TG 58.2.

ConTraCarRonPac 080140 (pink) outlines his OpPlan for the FIREBREAK Operation.

CTF 51 131040 summarizes the existing situation insofar as shortage of escort vessels is concerned.

- Continued -
15 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv Hq 142230 advises Com5thFlt that he is considering a request on the 20th AF to make an attack on OKINAWA in front of the 7th Division and requests his comment on practicability of such an attack.

Cincpac Adv Hq 150020 advises CominCh regarding his stand on the question of Naval personnel accepting private employment while on liberty.

Cincpac Adv Hq 150036 requests 20th AF to provide photographic coverage of southern KYUSHU airfields during the critical period of the ICEBERG Operation.

Cincpac Adv Hq 150040 concerns control of Air Support Units.

Com5thFlt 150100 requests TF 58 to strike southern KYUSHU airfields on the 15th or 16th.

Com5thFlt 150120 requests fighters from TF 53 to make strikes against southern KYUSHU airfields.

Cincopo Adv Hq 150410 requests 20th AF to make strike against southern KYUSHU airfields on the 16th.

CTF 93 150620 (pink) directs CTG 93.4 to carry out P-51 strike on KYUSHU airfields.

CTF 51 150700 covers Summary No. 29 as of 1200 on the 15th.

Cincpac Adv Hq 150806 recommends certain DDs be sailed to the Pacific from the Atlantic in view of the severe attrition of the destroyer force during the OKINAWA Operation.

Cincpac Adv Hq 150813 concerns preparation of KAPAII Camp for elements of the rear echelons of the 1st MarDiv.

CTG 93.4 (Brig.Gen. Moore) outlines his plan to sweep KYUSHU airfields with P-51s based at IWO JIMA.

CTF 51 151310 covers Summary No. 30 as of 1800 on the 15th.

Com5thFlt 151418 advises Cincpac that it is not advisable to stage P-51s from IWO JIMA to KYUSHU and thence stage through OKINAWA in view of the large numbers of Marine fighters already based at OKINAWA.

CTF 58 152027 summarizes results of operations from 12 April through 14 April.

Com5thFlt 152357 states that he does not desire at this time an attack by 20th AF on targets at OKINAWA.

CTF 51 160015 states that landing was made on IE SHIMA at 0800 against light opposition.

CTF 51 160205 is flash summary of results of enemy air attacks on the morning of the 16th.

Cincopo Adv Hq 160251 authorizes release of the 81st Division to the operational control of CINCAPAC.
16 April (Guam date)

A landing was made on the southern and southwestern beaches of LE SHIMA at 0300 I (-9) on the 16th. 2 RCTs from the 77th Div made the landing. Enemy reaction was light and the airfields were captured as of 1800.

No appreciable change was reported in the 24th Corps southern line on the 16th. The strong offensive is scheduled to commence on the 19th.

A military government report as of 13 April states that 85,000 civilians were under our care at that time. 10,000 of these are in a civilian camp and the remainder in 13 native villages. No large amount of communicable disease has been noted. 10,200 civilians have been treated by military government medical facilities.

In heavy air attack on the morning of the 16th the following ship damage was incurred from suicide planes: FRANGLE (DD 477) sunk. LAFPEY (DD 724) on radar picket station was under air attack for 2 hours continuously, shot down 6 planes, took 2 bomb hits and at least one suicide hit, and was able to retire to KERAMA under her own power. She finally had to accept a tow due to steering casualty. HOBO (DD 464) damage not stated, but can proceed under own power. BRYANT (DD 565) hit in radar room but operable. POWER (DD 637) had considerable fire damage, but can proceed under own power. HARDING (DNS 28) had much damage forward, magazines flooded, can proceed under own power. LCS 51 holed and cannot back. She is reported to have shot down 6 planes and was being towed to KERAMA with a plane sticking out of her at the waterline. LCS 116 badly damaged. LCS 207 damage not stated. TALUGA (AO 62) hit without serious damage.

TF 58 in addition to conducting fighter sweeps over southern KYUSHU, maintained CAP over OKINAWA and AMAMI, and conducted air support missions. The force was under air attack during the day. INTREPID (CV 11) took a suicider on the flight deck causing extensive fires and holes in both flight and hangar decks. Returns to fueling area with TG 58.1 to see if she can be made capable of sustained operations. MODERNUM (DD 677) was hit by a 5 inch shell which put forward fireroom out of action; she is ordered to ULITHI.

TF 57 struck SAKISHIMA fields as scheduled, observing little enemy activity. All airfields were bombed and left unserviceable. Continued strikes scheduled for today at SAKISHIMA and possibly northern FORMOSA. Retires to new fueling rendezvous tomorrow.

TF 58 from 12-14 April supported OKINAWA operations, strafed, rocketed and burned hangars and buildings on TANEGA SHIMA and at KIKAI. During the two days 77 airborne enemy aircraft were destroyed, including 1 suicide in the SIGSbee (DD 502). At KYUSHU on the 15th 29 enemy planes were shot down, 13 destroyed on the ground, and 60 damaged on the ground with 2 destroyed and 1 damaged at AMAMI. On the 16th maintained a 24 plane CAP over OKINAWA all day, a 12 plane CAP over AMAMI after 0930, sent 28 plane VF sweep to KYUSHU, flew air support, and swept KIKAI. In the day operations so far reported 216 enemy aircraft were destroyed:

- 166 were shot down
- 62 by OKINAWA CAP
- 22 on KYUSHU sweep
- 3 by Dumbo CAP
- 15 by ship gunfire
- 64 by the force, most near AMAMI and KIKAI.

1 suicide (INTREPID)
49 destroyed on the ground

216 - TOTAL

- Continued -
16th - 72 P-51s were over KANOYA, KANOYA E. and KUSHIRA Fields from 1345 to to 1405 immediately after TF 58 planes, and found the pickings slim. They sighted only 15 airborne enemy aircraft, with very few on the fields. No enemy planes are reported shot down, but 1 was observed burning on the ground. 3 P-51s were lost, with 1 pilot reported being picked up by a sub, 1 missing, and 1 believed killed when his chute failed to open.

Box score on enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 13 March, as displayed on the Conference Board:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TF 58</td>
<td>1663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 51</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 57</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF 93</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG 50.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th AF</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 17 April elements of the 8th US Army are scheduled to land on MINDANAO in the vicinity of MALABANG. Troops involved in the operation consist of the 10th US Corps (Reinf) which includes the 24th and 31st InfDivs. Total 8th Army troops for the operation are 49,209.

ComPhibsPac 151040 concerns recommendation that urgent repairs should be carried out by a separate unit to be entitled "Amphibious Salvage and Repair Squadron" to be assigned to the operational command of the joint expeditionary forces during amphibious attacks.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 160250 (pink) outlines proposal concerning action to be taken to implement the JCS directive concerning command in the Pacific and to expedite planning and preparation for the invasion of JAPAN.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 160252 advises ComCenPOA that for the present Army forces now under the control of CincPOA will remain under his operational control except as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CTF 51 160800 covers Summary No. 31 as of 1200 on the 16th.

Com5thFlt 160834 summarizes opinions after an inspection made by him on OKINAWA on the 14th.

Com5thFlt 160847 recommends all out attacks on southern KYUSHU in order to cut down the effectiveness of the enemy mass suicide attacks.

CTF 51 160945 covers a mandatory dispatch relative to ships which have been on radar picket duty.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 165245 states that he assumes the Marine Air Groups established ashore in the KYUSHU have all the replacement pilots and aircraft that can be advantageously employed consistent with aircraft facilities presently available.

Cincpac Adv Hq 161247 requests CinCSWPA to neutralize all FORMOSA fields subsequent to retirement of TF 57 on the 17th.

ComPhibsPac 161250 concerns special recommendations regarding provisions for radar picket ships.

- Continued -
16 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

ComGen 10 161410 states that 10th Army Headquarters moves ashore at OKINAWA at 1200 on the 16th.

CTF 51 161415 covers Summary No. 32 as of 1300 on the 16th.

ComAAFSWPA 162148 warns various units under his command relative to improper recognition procedures being carried out in the SWPA.

Cincopp Adv Hq 162251 assigns 7th Fighter Command units to the operational control of CTF 93.

17 April (Guam date)

The landing on IE SHIMA was accomplished and action on the 17th consisted of continuing scattered resistance. Our front line as of the afternoon of the 17th was approximately 2,000 yards east of the airfield.

No change in the front lines of the 24th Corps on OKINAWA.

During the day of 17 April no damage was inflicted on our forces by air attacks except for BENHAM (DD 796) which is operating with TF 58. A suicide plane crashed causing a near miss and inflicting some damage on this destroyer.

On the 17th TF 58 destroyed 51 airborne enemy planes, majority of which were shot down over AMAMI CUNTO.

CTF 51 (VAdm Turner) has submitted a revised total of enemy planes destroyed during the heavy air attack on the morning of the 16th. His total now has been raised from 87 to 131, broken down as follows: 55 by CAP, 62 by ships gunfire and 14 suicide crashes.

B-29s numbering about 130 made attacks on southern KYUSHU airfields on the 17th. Very few enemy planes were observed on the fields and a moderate number of airborne enemy planes failed to intercept this force.

Box score on enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March: TF 58 - 1716, TF 51 - 620, TF 57 - 84, TF 93 - 32, TG 50.5 - 5, 20 AF - 94; total - 2551.

ComGen POA 162355 reports to CINCAFPAC with Army forces and resources under his control as of this date and states that he expects to report in person in MANILA about 20 April.

CinCBPF 160755 concerns XE craft operations in the SINGAPORE Area.

ComAirPacSubComFord 170104 sets forth F4Us to be ferried to OKINAWA on 18 and 19 April.

DepCom2othAF 170245 (pink) states that 5,000 members of the 58th Wing arrived GUAM from INDIA without certain facilities and requests that effort be made to expedite movement of cargo vessels on which equipment is being shipped.

CTF 51 170520 issues orders stating that in view of possibility of enemy TF arriving OKINAWA ships of TF 54 should deploy to the north and northwest so as to be in position to intercept. - Continued -
17 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CinCPOA Adv Hq 170529 concerns ABSD to be installed at OKINAWA.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 170532 states that he concurs in the diversion of fleet support facilities from SAMAR to the RYUKYUS and MARIANAS.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 170557 (pink) summarizes status of air units either enroute to OKINAWA or scheduled for OKINAWA in the near future.

CinCBPFP 170647 & 170653 (pink) concern employment of that force in the BRUNEI BAY Operation.

DepCom20thAF 170654 (pink) requests authority from CinCPOA to base the 489th very heavy bombardment group and the 369th service group special on North Field TINIAN about 1 July.

ComGenAirFMPac 170725 (pink) advises that certain Marine Fighter Squadrons and Bomber Squadrons from MAW 1 report for duty to ComGenTEN. Readiness date at mounting point in the PHILIPPINES to be 1 June.

DepCom20thAF 170725 advises CinCPAC that beginning 18 April the 21st BomCom will attack KYUSHU airfields with approximately 100 B-29s daily, weather permitting, and will continue so long as CinCPOA considers present emergency exists.

CinCPOA Adv 171155 (pink) outlines to CinCWPAC information relative to current use of enemy air bases by Japanese forces in FORMOSA.

DepCom20thAF 171251 states that daily photo coverage will be carried out of southern KYUSHU airfields until released by CinCPOA.

CinCPOA Adv Hq 171310 (pink) requests comment from ComPwdArea relative to basing certain VIP wings plus FAW 18 at TINIAN.

MacArthur 171505 advises CinCPOA that 81st Division will be assigned to the 8th Army and requests CinCPOA to issue instructions to direct this Division to report at LEYTE.
18 April (Guam date)

Preparations continue for the attack scheduled for 0640 I on the 19th. The line-up for the attack from west to east is as follows:

- 27th InfDiv - 106th and 105th Regts in assault
- 96th InfDiv - 381st and 382nd Regts in assault
- 7th InfDiv - 134th and 32nd Regts in assault

Elements of the 307th RCT from the 77th InfDiv will make a diversionary feint on the southeastern beaches at 1540.

TF 58.7 (VAdm Lee) consisting of 3 BB and 5 DD were detailed for bombardment in support of the effort to be carried out on the 19th. 2 TGs operated in support of OKINAWA operations today and all 3 groups will support the operations tomorrow. TF 57 is replenishing this date.

On the 17th a few enemy aircraft approached the OKINAWA area, 1 or 2 being shot down some distance from the target. On the 18th 3 raids approached from the west at about 1840 resulting in 2 twin engine enemy aircraft being shot down by night fighters about 30 miles west of the operating area.

SEAOVL (SS 405) sank a large I-Class submarine off WAKE ISLAND and possibly destroyed a sampan operating in the vicinity at the same time.

The scheduled strike to be carried out by B-29s on the southern KYUSHU airfields on the 17th was cancelled due to unfavorable weather report.

A revised estimate of enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March is set forth below:

| TF 58 | 1779 |
| TF 51 | 623  |
| TF 57 | 84   |
| TF 93 | 32   |
| TG 50.5 | 5 |
| 20th AF | 28 |
| **Total** | **2621** |

CTF 51 160751 summarises enemy aircraft activity at OKINAWA on the 16th.

Cinopac Adv Hq 171247 directs certain addressees to expedite repairs on all escort vessels as expeditiously as possible in order to make them available for combat assignment.

Cinch & CNO 171512 concerns substitution of Army garrison units in the MARSHALLS by Naval and Marine units.

ComGen 21 BomCom 130005 (pink) concerns the employment of the 316th VLR Wing in the MARIANAS.

Cinopac Adv Hq 180250 requests information from CinCSWPA regarding the unauthorized visit of General Smith (5th Fighter Command) to OKINAWA.

ComServPac 180301 (pink) states that if target date of 20 August for LONGBOM is to be met firm orders for shipments must be submitted not later than 1 May.

- Continued -
18 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 51 180645 covers summary 35 as of 1200 on the 18th.

Com5thFlt 180647 concerns schedule of rotation for fast carrier task groups for rest and replenishment during current operations.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 180653 (pink) concerns assembly of special equipment for LONGTOM and OLYMPIC operations.

CTF 93 180716 concerns VLR escort of P-5ls based at DWO JIMA.

ComGenAAFPOA 180720 (pink) advises Cincpoa that he has been directed to transfer certain fighter groups from the 7th AF to the 20th Air and requests concurrence.

ComGen 21st BomCom 180800 (pink) covers his proposal to base certain VLR units on North Field TINIAN.

GHQ SWPA 181010 (pink) summarizes the proposals of his representatives at a conference at Cincpoa Adv. Hq. and concurs in the proposals agreed to by them.

CTF 51 181156 covers summary 36 as of 1800 on the 18th.

Cominch & CNO 181432 (pink) outlines directive to ComNavGroup CHINA relative to future activities in the CHINA Theater.

CTG 99.2 (MajGen Mulcahey) 181516 (pink) concerns employment of shore based air force in the OKINAWA Area.

Cincpac Adv Hq 181824 expresses appreciation to MacArthur for continued neutralization of FORMOSA airfields.

CTF 58 182039 states that he does not desire to rotate TGs until such time as the shore based air force is ready to take over and TF 58 is relieved from direct support of the OKINAWA Operation.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 182354 (pink) advises ComGenAAFPOA that it is his understanding that all Army fighter groups deployed in the FPA will be under the operational control of Cincpoa unless otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ComGen 21st BomCom 190025 states that daily bombing of KYUSHU will be continued, weather permitting, until cancellation is requested by Cincpoa.
19 April (Guam date)

Report has been received that the troops jumped off in the 24th Corps sector early on the morning of the 19th. However, final results of the day’s action have not as yet been received. Intensive fire support was supplied to the area ahead of the 24th Corps by the following ships: 2 OBB, 2 CA, 5 DD on the east; 4 OBB, 3 CA, 5 DD on the west; 2 OBB, 2 CA, 5 DD supporting diversion; 3 BB, 5 DD (AM only) on east. Diversionary feint landing was carried out satisfactorily.

For the third successive 24-hour period no damage has been reported as a result of air attacks. There were, however, two operational casualties: MOBILE (CL 63) suffered an explosion in the center gun, Turret No. 2; TOLMAN (DD 28) was reported grounded.

SENNET (SS 408) reports scoring a hit in a 7,000-ton AK and another hit in an escort in the same locality - off KII SULDO.

SUNFISH (SS 231) on patrol off the east coast of HONSHU reports that she sank 1 large Maru, 1 gunboat and 1 large escort vessel.

24 P-51s based at EMO hit Atsugi airfield on the 19th. Reports indicate that about 50 enemy interceptors were observed, all being particularly unaggressive. 21 airborne enemy planes were claimed destroyed; on the ground, 26 enemy planes were either destroyed or probably destroyed, and an additional 32 damaged. Our losses were 2 P-51s. Pilots from this sweep reported observing a large cargo vessel sink. It had previously been burning.

A strike on KYUSHU scheduled to have been carried out by B-29s on the 20th was cancelled. However, an attack on airfields in the northern KYUSHU area and on SHIKOKU is scheduled for the 21st.

Cominch & CNO 182020 (pink) states that it is his intention to allocate units of the British Pacific Fleet to CINCSPAC for the BRUNSWICK BAY Operation and he requests information as to the units required and the dates of assignment.

Com7thFlt 190056 (pink) concerns Com7thFlt request for provision of increased repair and supply facilities in CENTRAL LUZON.

CINCPAC Adv Hq 190222 (pink) concerns the proposed meteorological conference and concurs that it should be held in Washington rather than in Manila.

Com5thFlt 190245 directs that rotation of carrier groups will not be placed in effect until the situation at OKINAWA relative to land based air force has improved.

CINCPAC Pearl 190359 (pink) advises action addressees to initiate procurement and assembly of construction and other special equipment for the LONGTOM Operation based on a target date of 20 August.

CTF 51 190625 covers Summary No. 37 as of 1200 on the 19th.

CIN CBPF 190639 (pink) advises certain British units of tentative employment of the BPF in the near future.

CINCPAC Adv Hq 190641 (pink) requests the concurrence of the JCS relative to assembly of supplies common to both OLYMPIC and LONGTOM regardless of the fact that either or both operations may be carried out.

- Continued -
19 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv Hq 190832 (pink) concurs in cancellation of strike but requests continuation thereof as soon as weather permits.

ComAAPSWPA 191033 directs 5th AF to intensify attacks on FORMOSA airfields for maximum possible neutralization.

10th Army 191132 covers summary of operations on OKINAWA as of 1200 on the 19th.

CTF 51 191200 covers summary No. 38 as of 1300 on the 19th.

Cominch & CNO 191817 (pink) concerns control of 7th Fleet elements required for the defense of the SWPA.

20 April (Guam date)

The scheduled attack on the morning of the 19th was carried out as per schedule and the front line as of the morning of the 20th had been advanced approximately 1,000 yards on the right flank, no gain in the center and a gain of approximately 1,400 yards on the left flank. A portion of the YONABASHI airfield had been seized. 26 of our tanks were destroyed during the 24-hour period. Stubborn resistance continues to be encountered on EB SHIMA. It is estimated that about 1,000 Japs remain on the island. No more changes are reported in the front lines.

For the 4th consecutive 24-hour period air attacks have been light and no damage is reported to have been inflicted on our ships. There were, however, 9 small raids on the evening of the 19th. Most of the bogies made no attacks.

250 B-29s are scheduled to make attacks on KYUSHU airfields tomorrow.

On the 19th 63 B-24s bombed SHINCHIKU airfield with results generally unobserved. 23 additional B-24s bombed TAINAN airdrome on the same day.

10th Army 191830 covers the summary of ground operations on OKINAWA during the 19th.

Com7thFlt 200103 states that he reports to Cincpac for purposes of "Navy administration".

Cincpac Adv 200344 (pink) informs CinCSWPA that it is not his intention to assume direct control of naval forces involved in the amphibious phases of the operations directed and to be conducted by CinCSWPA and outlines his reasons therefore.

CTF 51 200550 covers Summary No. 39 as of 1200 on the 20th.

Cincpac Adv 200635 (pink) concerns recent instance of a Task Unit Commander requesting permission to divert a Jap hospital ship to a port to examine same and states it is highly irregular procedure.

Wedemeyer 200920 (pink) concerns additional information received from French Army and Navy relative to cargo carried by "AWA MARU".

ComGen 10 201045 covers OKINAWA ground situation as of 1000 on the 20th.

CTF 51 201210 covers Summary No. 40 as of 1300 on the 20th.
21 April (Guam date)

During the night 20-21 April front lines on OKINAWA remained relatively quiet though several strong attempts at infiltration were carried out against positions in the area of the 7th InfDiv. Gains of from 400 to 800 yards were made in the 24th Corps drive to the south. On NOTOBU PENINSULA last enemy pocket has been wiped out and organized resistance has ceased.

The island of IE SHIMA was secured on 21 April except for IEGUSUGU YAMA. Casualties are reported as follows: 24th Corps, as of 20 April, 4,488 of which 713 are KIA; 3rd PhibCorps, as of 19 April, 1,395 of which 266 KIA.

TF 57 (British force) is retiring to LEYTE with an ETA of 23 April.

216 B-29s bombed airfields and installations on KYUSHU on the 21st. Enemy aircraft opposition varied from none to slight. Photographs taken on the afternoon of the 21st show that 3 major fields in southern KYUSHU are inoperative. The 13 airfields photographed contained 675 single engine and 215 twin engine aircraft. KAMOTA showed in excess of 200 planes.

96 P-51s are scheduled to carry out an attack on Suzuku Airfield in the NAGOYA area on the 22nd.

Cominch & CNO 191257 sets forth his ideas relative to the reorganization of CarDiv 7.

DepCom20thAF 200635 (pink) states that the directive received by him to transfer certain fighter groups to the operational control of 20thAF was initiated by ComGen20thAF and not by the War Department.

Cincpac Adv Hq 202252 covers request for Admiral Kinkaid to proceed to GUAM for conference.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 202253 (pink) requests ComGenAAFPFOA to clarify the proposal to transfer fighter units to the operational control of AAFPOA.

Cincpac Adv Hq 202255 sets forth recommendations relative to a proposed draft covering terms of surrender to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Cincpac Adv Hq 210213 (pink) requests information from CinCAPPAC regarding mounting areas for divisions in the assault phase for the OLYMPIC Operation.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 210214 advises Cominch that he desires JICPOA to remain under the operational control of CinCPAC.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 210217 (pink) requests ComGenAAFPPOA to comment on JCS paper regarding disposition of additional B-29 groups to be employed in the Pacific Area.

ComGen 77th Div. 210445 announces capture of IE SHIMA on the 21st.

ComGenAAFPPOA 210700 (pink) advises Cincpoa of his stand relative to conversion of B-24 groups.

Cincpoa Adv Hq 210740 states his concurrence in proposal for 7thFlt submarines to assume responsibility for area south of 23-00 N and west of 122-00 E at a date to be determined by ComSubPac and ComSubSIPPA.

ComGenTen 211000 & 211630 cover operations summaries as of 1000 and 1600 respectively on the 21st.
22 April (Guam date)

Activity on OKINAWA during the day 22 April was devoted in the main to readjustment of the Corps front lines. Enemy resistance continues to be extremely heavy and little progress has been made.

An air attack was reported on the OKINAWA Area commencing at 1740 and ending at 1950. An estimated 80 enemy aircraft attacked in 11 different raids; the 1st coming from the north and the latter ones coming from the west. 49 enemy aircraft were reported as being destroyed, 35 by the CAP, 10 by ships gunfire and 4 suicides.

CTF 51 reports that reconnaissance of the harbor near TAGUSHI on MOTOBU PENINSULA has been carried out and he plans to set up a boat pool there.

TF 58 carried out strikes on MIAMI GUNTO, MINAMI and KIKAI during the period 13 April to 22 April. From the 20th thru the 22nd planes from TF 58 destroyed 16 enemy aircraft in the air and 10 on the ground, 6 of these by VF(N) and 4 by the CAP on the afternoon of the 22nd.

94 P-51s attacked SUZUKA Airdrome SW of NAGOYA on the 22nd. It was reported that about 30 extremely unaggressive planes intercepted, 9 of which were shot down. SUZUKA and AKENOGAHARA Airstrips were strafed resulting in 16 planes on the ground destroyed and 19 additional damaged. In the same sweep 4 ships were sunk by strafing 1 of which was a 6-8,000-ton vessel which exploded. Our losses were 2 P-51s.

The scheduled strike by B-29s on the KYUSHU airfields for the 23rd has been cancelled due to unfavorable weather forecast.

Adm. E. J. King 141255 disapproves recommendation to increase the aircraft complement to be attached to Kaiser CVEs.

ComAirPac 162154 discusses availability of CVEs for lift of Navy, Marine and Army aircraft.

Cincpaca Adv Hq 190223 advises DepCom20thAF that use of OKINAWA fields by B-29s should be limited to only emergency landings.

ComAirPac 212110 discusses CVG program and recommends that CV BON HOMME RICHARD relieve ENTERPRISE as the CV(N).

Cincpaca Adv Hq 202250, ComFairWing 1 212233 and CTF 94 220351 relate to control of search squadrons and tenders in the forward area.

CTF 51 220530 covers Summary 43 as of 1200 on the 22nd.

ComGen 10 221239 covers Operations Summary 61 as of 1200 on the 22nd.

CTF 51 221315 covers Summary 44 as of 1300 on the 22nd.

ComGen 10 221709 covers Operations Summary 62 as of 1700 on the 22nd.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and members of his staff departed Guam for OKINAWA.
23 April (Guam date)

There were no reported changes in the front line positions held by the 24th Corps on 23 April.

Mopping up on MOTOBE PENINSULA continued. Further details are reported on results of the air raid carried out on the evening of the 22nd: WADSWORTH (DD 516) after near miss from suicide plane is fully operational; CONNEL (DD 547) hit in jackstaff by suicide plane which crashed alongside causing no damage; SEDERSTROM (DE 31) had near miss with man overboard, recovered and no damage; SHEA (DM 30) and CROUZER (DE 11) suffered no damage from near bomb misses; HUDSON (DD 475) hit by suicide Val which glanced off forecastle and caused no damage, only casualty 1 WIA; ISHERWOOD - 27 KIA, 25 WIA and 16 MIA; SWALLOW - 9 WIA, 2 MIA; LCS 15 - 18 MIA. No damage was reported to have been inflicted on our ships during the 23rd.

BESUGO (SS 321) sank a German sub in the JAVA SEA, recovering 1 survivor.

On the 22nd 94 B-29s carried out a strike against the southern KYUSHU airfields. 60 enemy aircraft were reported airborne, however attacks by enemy planes were unaggressive. 2 airborne enemy planes were probably destroyed and 4 damaged. Bombing results were good to excellent, a number of hangars and other buildings being destroyed and runways thoroughly cratered. Photographs revealed a number of aircraft destroyed and/or damaged on the ground.

Photographs of Atsugi Airfield on the 22nd showed 326 operational enemy aircraft plus 43 additional planes destroyed or damaged.

A B-29 strike was scheduled to be carried out on the KYUSHU fields again on the 24th but was cancelled due to unfavorable weather forecast. Weather permitting, B-29s will hit the KYUSHU fields on the 25th.

CTF 51 230750 covers Summary No. 45 as of 1200 on the 23rd.

ComGenPOA 230147 (pink) covers supply requirements for the LONGTOH Operation.

CTF 51 231125 covers Summary No. 46 as of 1800 on the 23rd.

Cincpac via Com5thFilt 231221 states that it is expected that ComFairWing CNE will request CTF 94 to provide squadrons or tenders needed for operations in the KYUKUS.

Cincpaca via Com5thFilt 231240 corrects Base Development Plan for OKINAWA concerning squadrons scheduled for No. 8 Field.

Com7thFilt 231322 (pink) advises Cincpac that the BRUNIT BAY operation is feasible without support of British Pacific Fleet Units.

ComGen 10 231800 covers Summary No. 64 as of 1800 on the 23rd.
24 April (Guam date)

Little progress was made yesterday on the front lines of the 24th Corps.

Up to 1200 on the 24th no enemy air attacks were carried out on our forces in this area.

105 B-29s bombed the Hitachi Aircraft Plant on the 24th. 523 tons were dropped from an altitude of 12-15,000 feet. Bombing results were described as excellent. About 70 to 80 enemy aircraft intercepted making what was described as 230 moderately aggressive attacks. B-29s claimed having destroyed 13 and possibly destroying 18 additional. 5 B-29s were lost or are missing on this mission. 2 were lost to enemy action over the target, 2 planes ditched and 1 crashed at Iwo while attempting a landing.

The tentative B-29 strikes on KYUSHU fields scheduled for tomorrow have been cancelled because of weather.

Cincpac Adv Hq 232303 (pink) advises Cominch of Admiral Kinkaid's reply to a query by Cincpac relative to employment of units of the BPF in the BRUNEI BAY Operation.

ComServPac 240223 (pink) advises Cincpac that bulk petroleum deliveries to FOA in May and June will be considerably below requirements and will result in critically low inventories during the latter part of June.

CinCAPPac 240600 (pink) outlines his proposal relative to release to CinCAPPac of the operational control of Headquarters Army Forces, FOA effective 1 May.

GHQ SWPA 240605 states his views regarding employment of BPF in the BRUNEI BAY Operation.

CTF 51 240630 covers Summary No. 47 as of 1200 on the 24th.

Cincpac Adv Hq 240838 (pink) advises Cominch of the survey of airfield sites on OKINAWA and makes recommendation to cancel Phase III-c and divert facilities originally set up for that operation to the OKINAWA area.

Com5thFlt 241210 directs that his rotation program for TF 58 be placed in effect commencing 27 April.

Cincpac Adv 241319 (pink) directs ComPhibsPac to further direct 3rdPhibFor to initiate detailed planning for the amphibious phases of operation LONGTOM, and states that he assumes troops will consist of a Field Army including the 5thPhibCorps.

Cincpac Adv Hq 241316 recommends that Adm M.R. Greer be ordered to report as ComFairWing 13.

Cincpac Adv Hq 241340 outlines to CTF 93 (Maj. Gen. Hale) that offensive operation for IWO based fighter aircraft be used as escorts for VLR strikes or as independent strikes on KYUSHU airfields.

Cominch & CNO 241501 (pink) states that the anticipated attempt by enemy cruisers to return from the SINGAPORE Area to the Empire may make it practicable to utilize the BPF in operations against this possible eventuality.

ComGen 10 241515 advises ComGen3rdPhibCorps to designate a division from his Corps for 10th Army Reserve. - Continued -
Fleet Admiral Nimitz and party returned from OKINAWA on the afternoon of the 24th.

25 April (Guam date)

Limited gains were made by the 24th Corps throughout the day on the 24th. Some high ground was captured and TANABURU was taken. Reconnaissance of TSUGEN SHIMA was completed on the 23rd. 51 Japanese were killed and 356 civilians were captured and are being moved to OKINAWA.

The 1st MarDiv has been assigned to Army reserve as of 1145 I 24 April, with 1 RCT to be available on 12 hours notice. Enemy casualties for the operation as of 0600 I on the 25th: 21,269 killed, 399 POWs. 115,000 civilians are under Military Government control.

From 1200 I on the 24th until 1600 on the 25th there were no enemy air attacks. Heavy rains made Kadena Airfield inoperative for 24 to 48 hours.

B-29 strike and also a P-51 fighter sweep are scheduled for the KYUSHU area on the 26th.

ComCruDiv ONE 172101 (pink) sets forth his OpPlan for the FIREBREAK Operation

Marshall 241613 refers to civil censorship program for the POA with a view to transferring of certain primary responsibilities from CinCPac to CinCAPPAC.

ComInch 242220 concerns monthly troop movements from the European Theater to the PHILIPPINES via PANAMA CANAL. Also states that it is proposed to move from 60,000 to 80,000 troops per month for a period of about 4 months.

Com5thFlt 250035 requests CTF 58 to inform CTF 93 is a strike by the former is contemplated.

ComMarGilArea 250319 concerns petition of Marshallese residents to be made protectorate of the United States.

CTF 57 250437 (pink) states that unless otherwise ordered he intends to proceed from LYTE on 1 May with TF 57 and continue strikes on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO commencing 4 May.

MacArthur 250533 (pink) covers the composition of the assault force contemplated for the OLYMPEC Operation.

MacArthur 250616 (pink) concerns staging of 1 division from POA in the PHILIPPINES.

CinCPac Adv. Hq. 251339 (pink) sets forth plans regarding rehabilitation of 24th Corps and 1st MarDiv at OKINAWA and the 5th MarDiv either at OKINAWA or GUAM.
26 April (Guam date)

Slight advances were made on the 26th and elements of the 27th Division were reported to have reached the north end of Machinato Airfield.

TG 58.1 is scheduled to depart tomorrow for a ten day breather at ULITHI.

Up to midnight on the 25th there were no enemy air attacks although several enemy planes approached the transport area early on the morning of the 26th.

212 B-29s escorted by 81 P-51s hit targets in the KYUSHU area on the 26th. Weather was very poor and the P-51s had difficulty reaching the target. 6 of the P-51s plus the pilots are missing. No B-29s are missing from this mission.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 13 March:

| TF | 58 | 1810 |
| TF | 51 | 626  |
| TF | 57 | 89   |
| TF | 93 | 30   |
| TG 50.5 | 5 |
| 20th AAF | 138 |
| Total | 2748 |

ComSoPac 182345 outlines the escort policy to be carried out in the SoPac Area.

ComAirPac 230015 concerns long range planning for formation and movement of air groups and squadrons.

ComGen WesPac 242321 states that effective 25 April the Western Pacific Base Command was activated.

DefraAd Hq 250230 (pink) summarises results of reconnaissance with Capt. Painter regarding construction of airfields at OKINAWA.

CincPOA Adv Hq 250653 states that shipping strikes contemplated by CTG 50.5 are not desired at this time until shore based fighter groups are set up in the RYUKYUS to permit reduction of demands on fast carriers and escort carriers.

Cominch & CNO 251631 (pink) sets forth concurrence by JCS in deferring the MIYAKO Operation and in recommendation to divert the resources presently set up for MIYAKO to OKINAWA.

CinCPac Adv. Hq. 260115 (pink) advises all commands that Phase III-C has been deferred.

CinCPac Adv. Hq. 260229 (pink) answers MacArthur's despatch relative to assignment of ComGenPOA to his operational control and discusses Basic Logistical Plan for Command Areas involving Joint Army and Navy Operations.

CTF 51 260600 covers Summary 49 as of 2400 on the 25th.

CinCPac Adv 260504 (pink) outlines rehabilitation program for the 3rdPhibCorps

CinCPac Adv 260742 (pink) concerns current requirements of CinCPac for heavy bombers.

- Continued -
26 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv Hq 260383 sets forth review of status of Japanese Fleet as evidenced by photographic coverage.

Cincpac Adv Hq 260340 concerns replacement aircraft to be supplied to MAG 31 and MAG 33 at OKINAWA.

Comin choc 261340 (pink) concerns shipping requirements for employment in the Atlantic subsequent to VE-Day.

Cincpac Adv Hq 261345 (pink) advises Comin in that after conferences with Com7thFlt (Adm. Kinkaid) he believes that BRUNNET BAY Operation can be carried out without the assistance of the BPF but that British carriers could be used advantageously in striking airfields on southern BORNEO.

CinCSWPA 261442 (pink) clarifies the "follow up" forces contemplated for the OLYMPIC Operation.

27 April (Guam date)

No gains of any particular significance were reported during the 27th. The advance was slow and resistance from scattered strong points was reported as being exceptionally heavy.

The administrative and tactical command of IE SHIMA was turned over to the Island Commander (Brig. Gen. Thomas) on the 26th.

HUTCHINS (DD 476) was hit by a suicide boat during the early morning of the 27th. She is, however, able to proceed under her own power. RALPH TALBOT (DD 390) was hit aft by 2 suicide boats but proceeded to KERAMA for docking. RATHBUN (APD 25) was also hit by a suicide boat. Damage was reported as not severe. CANADA VICTORY (AKS) anchored off OKINAWA was hit by a suicide boat and sank in 10 minutes. The damage reported above was the result of about 3 raids in which approximately 25 enemy aircraft participated. At least 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

On the 27th 110 B-29s hit 6 southern KYUSHU airfields with results described as excellent. 2 B-29s were lost on this mission.

Box score of enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 16 March: TF 58 - 1810, TF 51 - 637, TF 57 - 89, TF 93 - 80, TG 50.5 - 5, 20th AF - 138; total 2759.

ComGen 10 260313 (pink) states that he is assembling the 77th Div on OKINAWA after which the 96th Div will be released to proceed to a rear area for a rest. He further states that he will remove the 27th Div to the north and employ the 3rd Phib Corps on the right of the 24th Corps.

CTF 56 261120 outlines the enemy estimated strength on HUKO and discusses the troops required to effect a landing thereon.

Comin in 261423 sets forth the CarDiv reorganization effective 1 May.

ComGen 10 261700 covers operations summary 67 as of 1800 on the 26th.

Comin in 261752 approves the program for ComSoPac to assume the duties heretofore performed by ComAirSoPac.

- Continued -
27 April (Guam date) (cont'd)

Cominch & CNO 262227 (pink) states that BPF will not participate in the BRUNEI operation and will continue under Cinopac's operational control.

Cinopoa Adv 270014 (pink) approves the employment of the 41st Photo Reconnaissance Squadron in the forward area.

Com5thFlit 270139 approves the tentative schedule of employment of CTF 57.

Cinopoa Adv 270334 (pink) concerns requirements for the LONGTOH Operation as outlined by ComGenPOA.

Cinopoa Adv 270423 (pink) advises Com5thFlit that the fast carriers and escort carriers will be released as soon as possible from their present employment.

Cinopoa Adv 270433 (pink) advises units in the forward area that it is possible an impending air attack on bases in the MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES may develop originating from TRUK or MARCUS.

ComGen 10 270349 covers operations summary 68 as of 1700 on the 27th.

Cinopac Adv 271135 advises CinCINCPAC of certain shipping available for lift of personnel and material forward from rear areas.

Cinopoa Adv 271258 outlines areas of responsibility relative to SS operations.

Com7thFlt 271329 delineates the dividing line between the SWP Sea Frontier and the Philippine Sea Frontier.

28 April (Guam date)

On the night 27-28th the OKINAWA area was subjected to air raids from 2040 to 2315 with an estimated 50 enemy aircraft participating. No damage was suffered by any of our ships. About 10 enemy aircraft were shot down by ships AA and 7 by shore AA. In the afternoon on the 28th planes from TF 58 shot down 12 enemy fighters over OKINAWA and likewise the GAP operating over KIKAI JIMA destroyed 18 additional planes.

CTF 58 reports losses from 18 March to 25 April inclusive as 116 pilots, 40 aircrewmen in combat, 33 pilots, 17 aircrewmen and 1 combat photographer operationally. No information on wounded. On ships, 463 KIA, 71 MIA, 997 WIA.

Kadena airfield, though muddy, is now operational for daylight activity.

CONFORT (AH 6) reported at 2050/28 that she was abandoning ship. At 2110 she reported her position as 127-39 E 25-30 N, that she has been bombed and needed assistance. At 2130 she reported she was proceeding under her own power and would report damage later. Five minutes later CTF 51 directed her to proceed darkened while under escort, and told 2 ATNs to return to previous duty. At 0510 this morning (29th) a despatch was intercepted from CTF 51 directing CONFORT to proceed to GUAM escorted by T. E. FRASER (DM 24).

At midnight 28-29th a single Jap plane attacked the drydocks at MANUS inflicting a certain amount of damage on an ABSD. Ships in the dock were not hurt and there were no personnel casualties.

- Continued -
28 April (Guam date)(Cont'd)

On the 28th at 1120 an enemy reconnaissance plane (Myrt) was shot down by F4Us at 29,000 feet near ULIATHI. The plane had been detected about 48 miles out and the F4Us were vectored into position and shot this plane down 17 miles from base.

At TRUK on the 28th 12 B-29s hit PARRAM ISLAND with 13 tons at 0600 putting 54 of 360 100 pounders in the target area, and an additional 150 within 2000 feet of the designated point of impact. 4 single engine float planes took off from Dublon seaplane base and headed north, and the 4 engine seaplane was still at the base. 15 harbor craft were around Dublon.

KYUSHU fields were bombed by 20 B-29s on the 28th.

CinCPac Adv 280712 advises DepCom20thAF that an attack by 1 squadron on each of 6 airfields will constitute an appropriate effort against targets at KYUSHU.

MacArthur 281045 states that he will assume responsibility for classification of operating zones in the area south of 23 N and west of 122 E effective 29 April.

MacArthur 281045 (pink) requests information regarding the availability of freight supply vessels.

CinCPac Adv 281415 requests CINCPAC to take action to insure that AAF SWPA will not operate northeast of FORMOSA without prior authorization from CinCPac.

CinCPac Adv 281417 advises CTF 93 (Maj. Gen. Hale) that it is agreeable to strike TOKYO with P-51s on 30 April.

CinCPac Adv 281424 advises DepCom20thAF and CinCPac that when fighters of TF 93 are used to escort WVR flights, operational control of the fighters should be passed to the 20th AF for the duration of the operations.

29 April (Guam date)

No ground activity of any particular significance was reported on the 29th.

Naval forces and troops in the OKINAWA area were subjected to heavy enemy air attacks on the 28-29th from early afternoon until early morning of the 29th. Approximately 200 enemy aircraft attacked in an estimated 44 raids. The daylight CAP made successful interceptions of the majority of the attacks before they reached the radar pickets. No enemy aircraft reached the transport area until after dark. 80 enemy planes were reported shot down during the daylight hours. After 1900 there were numerous torpedo, bombing and suicide attacks carried out against all types of ships throughout the area. 19 enemy aircraft were shot down and 5 planes crashed making a total of 24 subsequent to 1900 or a grand total of 104 for the day.

The results of damage to our shipping from mid-afternoon on the 28th to early morning of the 29th summarized as follows: PINDICK (AP 2) hit by suicide starting serious fire. Gutted amidships and engine room flooded. 25 patients killed. WADSWORTH (DD 516) slightly damaged. RENWICK (DD 662) slightly damaged. DALY (DD 519)
29 April (Guam date) (Cont'd)

extensive topside damage. TWIGGS (DD 591) - extensive topside damage. LCI 580. Slight damage. COMFORT (AH 2), hit during these attacks reports all compartments above main deck amidships from frame 66 to 110 demolished. Interior control out. Casualties: 29 dead (including 6 patients), 1 missing, 33 seriously injured. WICHITA (CA 45) has small underwater damage from 5 inch shell. LCS 37 received minor damage in sinking suicide boat reported previously.

19 additional suicide boats were reported destroyed.

HAGGARD (DD 535) and HAZELWOOD (DD 531), operating with TG 58.4 (RAdm Radford) were hit by suicides on the evening of the 29th. Both are under tow to KERAMA RETTO.

B-24s carried out heavy strikes on TRUK on the 28th and 29th. In addition 2 PB4Y's on a special mission severely damaged a 400-foot floating drydock in the TRUK LAGOON.

B-24s also bombed MARCUS on the 29th. Results were not reported.

On the 29th 106 B-29s attacked the southern KYUSHU airfields with excellent results. 2 B-29s were lost on this mission.

CTF 51 290020 summarizes heavy air attacks on the OKINAWA Area on the 28-29th.

ComGenPOA 281000 recommends that the 223rd Field Artillery Bn be moved with the 81st Division to the PHILIPPINES Area.

Cincpac Adv 290203 advises Com5thFlt of the revision of areas of responsibility for search and reconnaissance.

Cincpac Adv 290819 outlines procedure to be carried out by hospital ships in the combat areas and during retirement therefrom and entrance thereto.

Cincpac Adv 290830 (pink) answers Cominch dispatch relative to redeployment of APs to the Atlantic Theater subsequent to VE-Day.

Cincpoa Adv 290835 concurs in deferment of reconnaissance of KUME until situation at OKINAWA is clarified.

GHQ SWPA 290952 concurs in the exchange of VBF 106 for VPB 109.

Cincpoa Adv 291225 (pink) requests Cincpoa Pearl to prepare a revised Base Development Plan for IE SHIMA and OKINAWA.

CTF 51 290400 covers Summary No. 52 as of 2400 on the 28th.
30 April (Guam date)

Fragmentary report was received from forces at OKINAWA stating that the Machinato Airfield had been secured.

TF 58 carried out strikes on AMAMI GUNTO on the 29th. 33 enemy planes were destroyed.

Slight additional damage to ships has been reported as result of raids on the 28th and 29th. BUTLER (DM 29), SHANNON (DM 25) and the merchant ship HALL YOUNG were all hit by suicide planes and all suffered minor damage.

TF 57 consisting of 4 CVs, 2 BBs, 5 Cruisers and 14 DDs departed LEYTE for the fueling area.

On the 30th 63 B-29s carried out strikes on KYUSHU airfields. Strike scheduled for tomorrow on KYUSHU fields by B-29s has been cancelled.

Cincpac Pearl 292154 advises CinCSPWA that power barge "ELECTRA" is not available for transfer to MANILA.

Cincpoa Adv 300208 (pink) enumerates certain garrison forces which were formerly to be employed in MIYAKO but now will be deployed to OKINAWA.

CTF 51 300330 covers summary 53 as of 2400 on the 29th.

ComFwdArea 300541 directs Island Commander IWO JIMA to take immediate steps to safeguard present temporary ammunition storage.

Cincpoa Adv 300549 concerns assigned missions of bases in the Central Pacific.

Cincpac Adv 300613 states that he prefers the ENTERPRISE to be employed in the combat area during May and return to Navy Yard for overhaul about 1 June.

Cincpoa Adv 300614 states that he has not authorized the establishment of any regular passenger service by NATS or ATC between the MARIANAS and the RYUKYUS.

Cincpac Adv 300615 directs ComFwdArea to transfer VPB 106 to Com7thFlt in exchange for VPB 109.

Cincpoa Adv 300655 directs ComAirPac to transfer VPB 123 to ComFwdArea and to transfer VPB 116 to Com7thFlt.

Cincpoa Adv 300659 concerns recommendations made by Cincpac relative to an explosion on the Island of IWO JIMA.

MacArthur 301221 covers new search to be flown by SWP search planes.

Cincpoa Adv 301332 (pink) advises ComGenAAFPOA that the 1st strips for VLR in the RYUKYUS are estimated to be ready 15 August and 15 September.

Cincpoa Adv 301325 (pink) covers recommendation to initiate a deception plan to cover activities and movements of all Army and Marine Divisions rehabilitating in the Pacific Theater.

Cincpoa Adv 301338 (pink) concerns liaison between Cincpoa and 20th AF relative to mapping photography.

Cominch 301454 suggests maximum utilization of LCTs, LCMs and LSMs in order to handle the unloading problem in the forward areas.
1 May (Guam date)

On the 30th the 77th InfDiv took over the responsibility of the area formerly held by the 96th InfDiv and the 1st MarDiv is now in the process of taking over the section held by the 27th InfDiv.

Military government officials report that at the end of April 110,000 civilians were under their care.

Enemy aircraft attacks in the OKINAWA area were light on the 30th.

A landing on TARAKAN off the northeastern coast of BORNEO was effected 1 May. Only slight opposition was reported and operations and unloading are proceeding satisfactorily.

A landing was made on AGRIHAN on the 1st in an effort to locate possible survivors of a B-29 crash. No survivors were found. However about 70 natives including 4 Japs were located on the island.

93 P-51s (IWO JIMA based) were over TOKYO on the 30th about noon. Only 7 airborne enemy aircraft were sighted. Weather was poor and little damage was done to aircraft installations. None of our planes were reported lost.

ComGenPOA 300145 (pink) concerns request to the War Department relative to service units for HYPOCRITE (JAPAN).

Wedemeyer 301150 (pink) requests air assistance from MacArthur stating that the Japanese have been advancing westward in the YELLOW RIVER VALLEY.

Cincpoa Adv 302255 (pink) advises that 2 VLR groups can be received in the OKINAWA area by 15 August and 2 by 1 September. Further states that it is not feasible to deploy additional group at TINIAN without interference with support of other activities.

ComFwdArea 010135 covers ammunition and explosive storage facilities in the forward area.

Cincpac Adv 010144 (pink) states that four strips for VLR are estimated to be ready in the OKINAWA Area on 15 August, 1 September, 15 September and 15 October.

Cincpoa Adv 010226 (pink) advises ComGenPOA of cancellation of certain letters and assumes CINCAFPAC and ComGenPOA will submit requests for space needed in the MARIANAS for support of Army units.

Cincpac Adv 010507 advises CTF 51 that a destroyer within 1 mile of a hospital ship might be construed by the enemy as being an escort and states his desire that normally covering destroyer should be approximately 3 miles astern.

Cincpoa Adv 010533 requests information from ComGenAAFPFOA as to his long range plans for movement of replacement Army aircraft to the forward area.

IsCom IWO 010738 answers ComFwdArea request for information relative to the ammunition dump explosion night of 25-26 April.

- Continued -
1 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpoa Adv 010759 concurs in retention by CINCSWPA of a Marine Air Group headquarters and 1 squadron of MAG 25 further stating that the other squadron of MAG 25 may be needed in June or July on short notice but is available for use in SWPA until further notice.

Marshall 010600 (pink) refers to directive issued concerning control of Army forces and resources in the Pacific.

2 May (Guam date)

During the early morning of 2 May elements of the 7th InfDiv carried out a night attack reporting gains up to 1,400 yards. Early on the morning of 2 May the 1st MarDiv and the 77th InfDiv launched a coordinated attack resulting in an advance of about 300 yards along the front. There were no hostile air attacks reported in the RYUKUS area up until 1500 on the 2nd. Poor weather hampered air support missions throughout the day.

Emergency landing strip at IE SHIMA is now operational. It is reported to be 75 feet by 4400 feet long.

On the 1st and 2nd strikes were carried out on both MARCUS and TRUK by about 10 to 15 planes each day.

Com3rdFlt 292121 (pink) requests assignment of MISSOURI as Com3rdFlt’s flagship and further that it be available to receive Com3rdFlt and staff at GUAM about 18 May.

GHQ SWPA 291149 (pink) concerns assignment of Army forces in the Pacific Theater to CINCPAC.

Cincpoa Adv 010525 (pink) directs ComPwdrArea to move ground echelon of one P-61 night fighter squadron from IWO JIMA to IE SHIMA.

ComGen24thCorps 010810 outlines instances of friendly combat planes bombing and rocketing friendly troops within the lines of the 24th Corps.

GHQ SWPA 011410 requests Maj. Gen. Leavey be made available for assignment as Chief of Staff to Lt. Gen. Styer who will soon assume logistic command of AFPAC.

Cincpac Adv 020012 (pink) concerns studies completed by Com3rdFlt relative to future operations.

Cincpac Adv 020020 advises ComWesSeaFron of certain APA’s to be made available to him for lift to SWPA.

Cincpac Adv 020213 (pink) concerns proposed implementation of the BLUEBIRD coverage plan.

CTF 58 020251 advises Com5thFlt that he does not recommend fighter sweeps against KYUSHU until completely relieved of the responsibility for the defense of OKINAWA.

Cincpoa Adv 020538 advises ComGenPOA of the number of casualties evacuated by Naval Air Evacuation Group from OKINAWA.
2 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Com 5thFlt 020648 directs CTF 58 not to make fighter sweep against KYUSHU.

CTG 50.5 020803 advises CTF 51 that VPB 109 can be accomodated at Yontan without disruption of maximum fighter operations.

Dep Com 20thAF 020917 (pink) advises Cincpoa that decision has been made to deploy the 316th VIR Wing to OKINAWA.

ComWestSeaFron 021846 states that he will require all the APA's offered in Cincpoa dispatch of 2 May and that he will advise definitely as to his requirements on 3 May.

3 May (Guam date)

Activities on OKINAWA on the 3rd followed the same pattern as for the past few days. Our attacks were met with severe resistance throughout the front lines.

In air raids yesterday afternoon several suicide attacks scored on ships in the radar picket stations. Beginning at 1320 an estimated 20-25 enemy aircraft approached from the southwest in 4 raids, apparently from FORMOSA or CHINA bases. The CAP shot down 4, ships were credited with 4 more and 9 made suicide hits. The following ships were hit by suicide planes: AARON WARD (DM 34) after shooting down two planes was hit by 5 suicide planes and is in serious danger of sinking; LITTLE (DD 803) was sunk; MACOMB (DM 23) hit, damage not reported; LCS 25 hit, damage not reported; LSM 195 sunk.

CTF 51 has changed his radar picket stations to positions closer to land cover in order to attempt to obtain protection from land shadow.

CTF 57 resumes attacks on SAKISHIMA today.

Reports from submarines are as follows: PICUDA (SS 382) reports attacking a convoy on the 27th in the YELLOW SEA without results except for a possible hit on an escort. TREPANG (SS 412) reports sinking a destroyer early the morning of the 4th in the YELLOW SEA. RATON (SS 270) sank a 6000 ton gas loaded tanker also in the YELLOW SEA. SPRINGER (SS 414) sank a DD on the 2nd and a DE on the 3rd in the YELLOW SEA.

On the 3rd 66 B-29s bombed KYUSHU airfields with results reported as good. Also on the 3rd, 6 PB4Ys attacked the KANOYA Airfield from 100 feet altitude. 3 twin engine aircraft were reported destroyed. Crews observed very little evidence of a concentration of enemy aircraft in the KANOYA Airfield area, many revetments being reported as empty.

On the night of 3rd-4th 87 B-29s mined the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, KOBE Area.

Box score of enemy aircraft destroyed in the POA since 18 March is as follows: TF 58 - 1,895; TF 51 - 769; TF 57 - 89; TF 93 - 80; TG 50.5 - 11; 20th AAF - 402; TF 94 - 1. (Note: 20th AAF total has been increased by about 170 thru late reports from photographs of enemy aircraft destroyed in KYUSHU attacks since 17 March). Total of figures shown above - 3,247 enemy aircraft destroyed.
Caminch & CNO 022110 approves the release of of atrocity stories in the FOA.

Cincpac Adv 030119 (pink) concerns assignment of Com2ndCarTaskForce (V. Adm. McCain). He is to assume command of fast carrier task forces shortly after Com3rdFlt takes over from Com5thFlt.

Cincpac Adv 030121 (pink) advises Com3rdFlt that Japanese aircraft are possibly being moved northward and requests him to study a possible carrier attack against installations in the HOKKAIDO, OMINATO and Northern HONSHU areas for purposes of destroying enemy air force and shipping.

Richardson 030352 (pink) concerns build up of reserves for HYPOCRITE in the MARIANAS.

Cincpac Adv 030600 sets forth operation "FUDDLE" (hit and run carrier strike on rear bases).

Cincpac Adv 030601 concerns operating procedure to be carried out relative to hospital ships.

Cincpac Adv 020022 (pink) requests clarification from Gen. Jarman as to whether dispatch regarding "Marine stocks this base" was originated in his capacity as IsCom SAIPAN or as ComGen WPBC.

IsCom SAIPAN 030612 (pink) states that action was taken as IsCom SAIPAN and not as Commanding General, Western Pacific Base Command.

Cincpac Adv 030843 (pink) advises Com3rdFlt that certain patrol squadrons may be trained with submarines in the HAWAIIAN AREA provided it will not affect their readiness date to move forward when required.

4 May 1945 (Guam date)

During the night 3-4 May a total of 600 Japs made three counter landings behind our lines on the west coast of OKINAWA and one landing on the east coast. The landing on the east coast was repulsed and during 4 May the 1st MarDiv was busy mopping up the remnants of those Japs who had succeeded in getting ashore on the west. 2 Pows stated that the expedition had embarked at YONABARU with the mission of destroying our artillery positions behind our front lines. Little change was reported in our front lines as of 1600 on the 4th.

Casualties as of 2400 3 May: KIA 2,337; WIA 11,432; MIA 514; total 14,283.

On the 4th air raids were carried out from 0130 to 0445 and again from 0745 to 0915. During the early morning raids about 60 enemy aircraft in 24 raids approached from the north and west. No damage was reported to our forces. 12 enemy aircraft were destroyed, 8 by ships gunfire and 4 by TF 58 CAP. Many bombs were dropped on the shore with 30 or 40 in the Yontan area with 4 scoring direct hits on Marine Evacuation Hospital killing 12 personnel. Later in the morning about 70 enemy aircraft in approximately 14 raids came in and scored 12 suicide hits. Ships shot down 12 enemy aircraft and CAP shot down at least 29. There is a possibility of duplication, but reports indicate that 167 enemy aircraft were destroyed.
during the 4th by our forces. The suicide planes made hits on the following ships: Ships sunk included LUCE (DD 522) - 1 hit, 1 near miss; MORRISON (DD 560) - 3 hits; LSM 194. Damaged by suicide hits: BIRMINGHAM (CL 62), INGRAHAM (DD 694), SHEA (DM 30), HOPKINS (DM 13) and LSM 190. An intercepted message from CTF 51 indicates that the SANGAMON (CVE 26) was sunk on the night of the 4th.

Com5thFlt reports that the first squadron of the 318th Fighter Group (P-47s) can be accomodated on IE SHIMA on 12 May with additional squadrons on succeeding days.

5th AF strikes and strike intents against FORMOSA from 1 through 5 May are as follows: 1st - 87 B24s plus 43 other sorties attacked FORMOSA. 2nd - 2 B24s attacked, 1 B25 reconncitered FORMOSA. 3rd - Intent: 1 B24 to hit KIIRUN (50 hit SAIGON). 4th - Intent: 2 B24s to hit KIIRUN shipping. 5th - Intent: 2 B24s hit SHINCHIKU Drome 0100-0300; 1 B24s hit SHINCHIKU Drome with 4 P51 escorts; 1 B25 recco FORMOSA; 16 P51s hit TAINAN Drome; 8 P51s hit rolling stock. 8 P51s will also hit rolling stock on the 4th in addition to intent above.

ComSubPac 031242 answers 5th AF relative to employment of rescue submarines.

ComGen TAFL 031355 (pink) concerns report of inspection of IE SHIMA airfield activities by members of the Tactical Air Force.

ComWesSeaFron 032106 advises Cincpac Pearl that he can utilize all APAs that Cincpac can make available.

Com5thFlt 032315 advises Cincpac that SoWesPac air forces have made very few strikes on FORMOSA fields.

Cincpac 040204 passes the dispatch appearing above to SoWesPac with the request that his effort against the FORMOSA fields be carried out to the maximum extent possible.

Cincpac Adv 040213 delineates search and reconnaissance areas and responsibilities therefor.

Cincpac Adv 040244 (pink) advises Com5thFlt to establish planning liaison with CINCAFPAC regarding naval facilities required on shore at OLYMPIC objectives for support of fleet forces.

DepCom2othAF 040735 requests BomCom XXI to make strike on the arsenal manufacturing Baka bomb propellant.

ComGen 10 040902 covers OpsSum 75 as of 1500 on the 4th.

Cincpoa Adv 040958 (pink) outlines to Comincht Cincpac’s latest estimate of the air base capacity for OKINAWA and IE SHIMA.

CTF 58 041114 covers his operational summary for the past three days.

ComGen 10 041200 concerns possibility of occupying KUME and states that he recommends employing the 2nd MarDiv in this operation.

Cincpoa Adv 041238 requests DepCom2othAF to bomb KYUSHU airdromes daily until fighter fields at IE SHIMA are activated.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET

4 May (Guam date)(Cont’d)

MacArthur 041252 directs ComAAF to carry out maximum practicable effort on FORMOSA airfields in order to insure continued neutralization of the enemy airfields.

DepCom20thAF 041710 requests BomCom XXI to comply relative to daily bombing of KYUSHU Airdromes.

Cincpac Adv 042124 directs 7thFlt administrative commanders to report with forces under their command to commanders of Pacific Fleet for purposes of type administration.

Com5thFlt 050036 directs CTG 50.5 to carry out provisions of the search plan placed in effect.

5 May (Guam date)

Reports indicate that over 3,000 Japs were killed during the night of 3-4th and the day of the 4th. During the morning of the 5th 24th Corps attacked aggressively making slight gains, the chief gain being made on the right flank by the lst MarDiv which advanced about 500 yards.

Known enemy casualties as of 0800 on the 5th: Killed - 33,462; POWs - 914 (Military POWs - 403; Labor - 297; Doubtful civilians - 214).

Amplifying reports have been received regarding air attacks the night of 3-4 May. Most of these ships have been mentioned heretofore as having been damaged.

AARON WARD (DM 34) - Sustained 5 suicide hits but did not sink. Had severe fires, lost all communication, had engineering spaces flooded, but was towed safely to KERAMA.

INGRAHAM (DD 694) - Had her CIC demolished and will have to return for repairs.

SHEA (DM 30) - Had hit forward by Baka bomb causing fires and considerable flooding.

BIRMINGHAM (CL 62) - Was hit forward at the waterline and will have to return for docking.

LSM 190 - Previously reported damaged, was sunk.

SANGAMON (CVE 26) - Took suicider on flight deck causing a terrific explosion and fires which destroyed all her planes and completely wrecked the flight deck. All ships control forward is out but ship's stability and engineering plant is unimpaired. Many men were blown overboard or forced over by the heat of the fire, but casualties were not high, due to prompt action of nearby ships in picking up survivors and assistance in fighting fires. 10 known dead, 6 missing reported. At least 35 WIA.

HUDSON (DD 475) - Received moderate topside damage while assisting in fire fighting.

BACHE (DD 470) - Had suicide hit but apparently remains fully operational.

- Continued -
LOWRY (DD 770) - Had superficial damage when suicider exploded in mid-air.

GW Inn (DM 33) - Had suicide hit but remains operational.

LCS 31, LCS 57 and YMS 331 received minor damage and remain operational.

Yesterday from about 0200 to 0400 20 enemy aircraft in 9 individual raids attacked with no damage reported. 1 enemy shot down by VF(N).

On the 5th 20 B-29s bombed southern KYUSHU airfields with excellent results. No attack is scheduled for the 6th, but one will be carried out on the 7th if weather permits.

On the night of 5–6th 93 B-29s carried out mining missions in the INLAND SEA, TOKYO BAY and NAGOYA BAY Areas. Also on the 5th, 166 B-29s attacked the Hero Naval Aircraft Factory at KURE. Enemy aircraft opposition was nil. However, 2 B-29s are known to be lost and 4 are reported missing. Strike photos of this mission show that the factory is out - 80% destroyed.

SecNav 041637 concerns provision of items to Allied forces operating as part of the Seventh Fleet.

Cincpac 050505 (pink) requests information from Com5thFlt as to his prospective needs for the 2nd MarDiv.

GHQ SWPA 051116 (pink) concerns operations to be conducted by the Allied Air Forces in support of Wedemeyer's operations in CHINA.

Cincpac Adv 051205 authorizes Com7thFlt to make requests direct to ComFwdArea regarding air evacuation services.

Cincpoa Adv 051247 concerns a "Warning Order" to various commands relative to safety of feminine members in the forward area.

Cincpac Adv 051250 (pink) directs Com5thFlt to form a task force under ComMinPac to clear minefields in the EAST CHINA SEA preparatory to OLYMPIC and LONGTOM.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz and certain members of his staff made an inspection of PELELIU and returned to Guam on the 5th.
6 May (Guam date)

At OKINAWA on the 6th an estimated 15 enemy aircraft carried out raids from 0200 to 0430. ST GEORGE (AV 16) and PATHFINDER (AGS 1) received hits with only minor damage being inflicted.

TG 58.3 and TG 58.4 are in the operating area and TG 58.1 is at ULITHI replenishing. TF 57, enroute to FORMOSA on May 4, was subjected to an enemy air attack by 4 groups of approximately 20 aircraft. 1 suicide plane made a near miss on the INDOMITABLE and another hit the FORMIDABLE causing a small hole in her flight deck. Approximately 8 aircraft were shot down in this attack.

41 B-29s carried out a bombing raid on southern KYUSHU airfields.

On the night of 5-6th 93 B-29s laid approximately 700 mines in the INLAND SEA waters and in the waters around TOKYO and NAGOYA.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in P0A since 18 March: 18 March to 30 April - 3227. Since 1 May: TF 58 99, TF 51 - 132, TF 57 - 18, TG 50.5 - 9, 20thAAF - 1, TF 94 - 1. Total since 1 May - 260.

CTF 51 051815 concerns repair facilities for damaged shipping in the forward area.

ComAF20 052009 (pink) outlines program to deploy 316th Wing to OKINAWA and discusses readiness dates of additional VIR units.

Com5thFlt 060126 (pink) recommends continuation of increased effort by B-29s on KYUSHU Airfields.


Cincpoa Adv 060819 sets forth the composition of the Naval Operating Base, SAIPAN.

Cincpoa Adv 060816 concerns redeployment of the 24th InfRegt now assigned to the garrison at SAIPAN.

Cincpoa Adv 060820 sets forth the responsibilities of the Commandant, NOB, SAIPAN, (RAdm F.E.M. Whiting).

Cincpoa Adv 060821 (pink) is the Warning Order for Phase III-D ICEBERG (KIKAI JIMA) with a target date of 15 July.

Cincpoa Adv 060833 states that effective 1 June the present Forward Area, Central Pacific is redesignated the "Marianas Area".

Com5thFlt 060920 states that SerRon 10 facilities will move from ULITHI to LETTE commencing 7 May and that that unit will be available for the 3rd rotational group of TF 58 in that port when it is ready for replenishment.

Cincpoa Adv 061127 concurs in XXI BomCom program to reduce the scale of attacks on KYUSHU fields provided attacks will average 4 squadrons per day.

Cominch 061520 (pink) advises that HANS TROMP can be attached temporarily to 7thFlt for participation in the BORNEO Operations.
7 May (Guam date)

Lt. Gen. Buckner (ComGen 10th Army) has assumed direct command of the southern front and ComGen 3rd Phib Corps has assumed command of the 1st MarDiv zone of action.

Estimated casualties as of 0800 on the 7th: KIA - 36,535; POW 823 (Military 267; Laborers - 342; Questionable civilians - 214).

ComFairWing 1 reports that up to 1300 on the 6th FAW 1 planes had inflicted the following damage on the enemy: Ships sunk - 53,800 tons; damaged - 23,700 tons (does not include trawlers, fishing vessels and small craft). Enemy aircraft: shot down - 10; destroyed on ground - 5; damaged - 9.

On the 7th 29 B-29s report bombing KYUSHU aircraft factories visually from 12-14,000 feet with poor results at OITA and excellent results at KANOYA, IBUSUKI, and USA. Enemy aircraft were many and aggressive at OITA and USA. There were 19 attacks at IBUSUKI and KANOYA. 2 B-29s were lost over the target and 1 ditched. 10 of the latter crew were rescued.

GHQ SWPA 051120 (pink) concerns employment of SWPA RAAF Squadrons in the OKINAWA Area.

CTF 51 060605 (pink) states that as soon as OKINAWA is captured, sufficient minesweepers can be released to commence minesweeping operations in the E. CHINA SEA.

Cincpac Adv 060846 requests release from SWPA of DesRon 23 and assignment to Cincpac operational control.

Cincpoa Pearl 062209 concerns the airfield construction program in OKINAWA.

Cincpoa Adv 070606 (pink) authorizes ComGen 10 to make such changes in priority of base development as are necessary to meet tactical requirements.

Com5thFlt 070528 (pink) concerns his recommendations regarding minesweeping requirements in the EAST CHINA SEA.

ComGen 10 070622 outlines to Com5thFlt steps being taken to activate the airfields in the OKINAWA Area.

Cincpoa Adv 070639 (pink) advises CINCAPPAC that photography of KYUSHU is considered priority No. 1.

Cincpoa Adv 070640 concerns withdrawal of 24th InfRegt from SAIPAN.

IsCom OKINAWA 071115 advises CTF 56 (Lt. Gen. Buckner) regarding development of fighter airfields on both OKINAWA and IE SHIMA.

CTF 51 & 56 071225 (pink) concerns desirability of capturing certain islands in the OKINAWA area to establish radar thereon. Dispatch further states that no earlier than 30 days after the capture of OKINAWA recommends the employment of 1 division now in OKINAWA to capture KUME SHIMA.
8 May (Guam date)

Small gains were made along the front lines on 8 May. However, rain and mud slowed down activities all along the lines.

96th Div relieved the 7th InfDiv on the left flank as of 8 May. Enemy casualties as of 2400 7 May were: 37,488 KIA, 276 Military POW, 345 Labor Troop POW, 214 Questionable Civilian POW (total 835 POWs). Our own casualties as of the same date totalled 16,425 of which 2,684 KIA.

Fire support forces have been organized into two groups; 1 under CTG 51.19 (RAdm Fischler) who delivers fire on call of the 24th Corps, and the other under CTG 51.22 (RAdm Hall) who delivers fire on call of the 3rd Corps.

TG 58.1 (RAdm J.J. Clark) departed ULITHI for the RYUKYUS Area. Present schedule calls for TG 58.4 to leave the operating area on the 11th for replenishment at ULITHI. TG 58.3 will replenish later.

Planes from the TAF have reported destroying 209 enemy aircraft as of the 7th.

The JALLAO (SS 368) at 1630 (K) reported that six large unidentified aircraft landed at MARCUS. This submarine was stationed off MARCUS on lifeguard mission. A PB4Y strike scheduled for dawn tomorrow has been postponed until dusk.

On the 8th 96 P-51s based at INO JIMA attacked KISARAZU Airfield and TOTEYAMA Naval Air Station. No enemy airborne opposition was reported. Reports indicate that about 7 planes were destroyed on this mission. 2 P-51s are missing presumably over the target.

Com7thFlt 071145 advises that Com7thFlt (Adm. Kinkaid) has turned over command of 7thFlt to VAdm Barbey as of 0600I Tuesday 8 May. This is occasioned by Admiral Kinkaid's proposed conference in Washington.

CTF 51 & 56 071230 (pink) concerns employment of 2nd MarDiv for Phase 3(D).

ComGen 10 071507 (pink) concerns ComGen Ten's recommendation relative to employment of a division for Phase 3(D).

ComGenAAFPOA 072314 announces that Lt.Gen. Barney M. Giles assumes command of Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas effective 4 May 1945. He is also designated DepCom2othAF.

Cincpac Adv 080159 requests information from CINCSWPA relative to advance information on air intents against FORMOSA so that Com5thFlt can be advised if no strike is contemplated.

Cincpac Adv 080233 (pink) concerns assault troops for Phase 3(D) and states that the capture of KUME is not approved if a full division is required for this task.


Cincpac Adv 080236 concerns policy of return of CB's to mainland stating that construction troops are rotated currently as individuals but not as complete units.
6 May (Guam date) (Cont’d)

Cincpac Adv 080518 concerns ammunition loading of cruisers and battleships leaving the West Coast.

Cincpoa Adv 080819 concerns a 4-plane VMF(N) detachment for night fighter defense of the Margils Area.

Cincpoa Adv 080901 (pink) advises ComGen USAF CHINA that it is his understanding that the 14th AF is discontinuing mining operations in the Shanghai Area as of the end of April and requests his concurrence to continue this program by Naval air forces from Okinawa.

Cominch 081345 (pink) concerns transfer of troopships from the Pacific Theater to the Atlantic Theater.

Cincpac Adv 080902 (pink) concerns reply to CINCSWPA relative to desirability of continuing the mining of the Shanghai Area.

2 May (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv is now moving into the front lines and will occupy the right flank in the drive scheduled for 11 May.

On the 9th TF 57 resumed attacks on Sakishima Gunto. In the late afternoon a group of enemy planes attacked. VICTORIOUS was hit twice holing her flight deck and putting her forward elevator and 10% of her armament out of action. She can still operate a few planes at reduced handling speed. FORMIDABLE was hit on her flight deck aft. Some planes burned but the carrier remains operational. The force has retired to repair damage and replenish and is scheduled to return for further strikes on the 12th and 13th.

TG 58.3 fuels today. TG 58.4 remains in operating area, but departs for Ulithi tomorrow. TG 58.1 is enroute operating area.

8 PB4Ys attacked Marcus at low level, destroying 4 Bettys and 1 Myrt and damaging 3 other enemy aircraft. 2 PB4Ys were shot down and all others badly holed. 5 survivors from 1 plane were rescued by Jallac (SS368) after successful drop of lifeboat from B17 Dumbo.

33 B24s and 1 Squadron of P47s attacked Param and Moen; no enemy aircraft were observed in any of the attacks.

Poor visibility and bad weather limited close air support in the Ryukyus on the 8th, although night harassing, propaganda dropping, and observation missions were flown; mud kept the PB4Y-2's on the ground on the 9th - their sectors were flown by PB2Ys. There were no hostile air attacks for the second successive day.

63 effective B29s (313th Wing) were off at 0002-0100 to attack Matsuyama (22), Usa (22), Miyazaki (11), and Hanoya (11). They are scheduled to attack at 0826-0916.

Com5thFlt 060129 states that early maximum employment of fighters in Okinawa is being hindered by lack of avgas and too strict adherence to base development plan schedule.

Cominch 082014 requests information concerning movement of Jap aircraft via Marcus to Truk.

- Continued -
9 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

ComGen WPB 090028 advises that MP Co. at SAIPAN will be needed there for security of increased depot and reserve dumps.

Com 5th Flt 090113 approves CTF 51 & 56 proposal to seize DORI SHIMA about 12 May.

CTF 51 090330 (pink) requests assignment of 1 RCT from 3rd MarDiv for capture of AGUNI and IHEYI.

Cincpoa Adv 090434 (pink) requests views of ComGen CHINA with reference to attacking AMOY targets.

Cincpoa Adv 090547 lists APAs and other assault craft made available and to be made available to Com 7th Flt for temporary duty.


Cincpoa 090802 states 3rd MarDiv not available, elements 2nd MarDiv to be used for capture of AGUNI and IHEYI.

Cincpac 090803 (pink) outlines operations against MARCUS and TRUK to prevent enemy from staging aircraft.

Cincpoa 090817 (pink) suggests consideration of 24th InfRegt for FRICITION garrison.

MacArthur 091526 (pink) requests that all matters dealing with troop units except units of the 20th AF and units for ICEBERG be submitted to CINCPAC for approval.

10 May (Guam date)

On 10 May ASA GAWA was crossed by troops of the 6th MarDiv and the Division established its front lines on the south bank. The 1st MarDiv engaging in hand to hand combat averaged gains of approximately 200 yards. The front lines of the 77th and 96th InfDivs were for the most part unchanged. 38,357 enemy had been killed through 9 May.

On 30 April Military Government responsibility passed from tactical units to IsCom in central portion of island. On 4 May IsCom responsibility was enlarged to include all northern portion of island. On 8 May 135,000 civilians were under military government care.

Usual air support, minesweeping and anti-boat missions were carried out at OKINAWA. During air raids early evening of the 9th, OBERRENDER (DE 344) and ENGLAND (DE 635) were hit by suicide planes.

TG 58.3 remains at the objective. TG 58.4 departs today for ULITHI. TG 58.1 is enroute OKINAWA, will fuel today, and then rendezvous with TG 58.3. If weather permits these two groups will hit KYUSHU on the 13th and 14th.

BOWFIN (SS 287) reports sinking a medium tanker and probably damaging a small freighter off the NE coast of HONSHU early on the 8th.

- Continued -
10 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Early on the 10th 12 B24s attacked MARCUS from 10,500 feet to 12,500 feet. 2 enemy aircraft were seen. Photos taken at 1355 showed the aircraft factory operational, but no operational aircraft. The fighter strike was weathered out.

On the 10th TRUK was attacked by 19 B24s. Photos taken on the 10th showed the ETEN, 2 MOEN and DUBLOM bases operational. Ten operational and six inoperative aircraft were reported.

On the 9th 1 B25 weather reconnaissance and 1 B24 got through unflyable weather to FORMOSA.

In the RYUKYUS from 1820 to 2200 on the 9th about 8 enemy aircraft in 7 raids attacked, generally from the southwest, with a few from the north. 2 suicide hits were scored. Five were shot down by TAF and 3 by AA.

From 0015 to 0100, and 0220 to 0440 on the 10th about 20 enemy aircraft in 11 raids came in low from the north. One plane was shot down by a night fighter.

TG 58.3 attacked MINAMI DAITO on the 10th and reported destroying 4 enemy aircraft on the ground.

67 B29s hit KYUSHU airfields. 412 B-29s hit HONSHU industrial targets during the day and night of the 10th. One medium AK was sunk and a possible torpedo hit scored on a large AK by search planes.

Cominch 081238 provides instructions for the surrender of German submarines.

Com5thFlt 081322 (pink) outlines his views on use of 2nd MarDiv in Phase III-D recommending against the operation as a whole.

Cincpac Adv 090612 describes degree of operational control to be exercised by ComFwdArea over VRE 1.

Wedemeyer 090930 (pink) suggests that a Cincpoa representative be sent to MANILA conference 13 May for coordination of air operations between SWPA and CHINA Theater.

MacArthur 090925 (pink) indicates that 40 FS boats will be available for LONGTOM if OLYMPIC is not undertaken.

CTF 57 091151 describes attack on 9 May on FORMIDABLE and VICTORIOUS in which both ships were damaged.

MacArthur 091430 (pink) lists OLYMPIC assault divisions and their mounting points and directs ComGenPOA to investigate practicability of moving 9th Corps Hq to LEYTE.

Cincpoa Adv 100114 (pink) informs ComGenCHINA that representatives at MANILA conference can not arrive before 15 May.

Cincpac Adv 100117 directs assignment of Navy and Marine personnel on IsCom SAIPAN staff to staff of Rear Admiral Whiting.

Cincpac Adv 100121 (pink) recommends that CinCBPF be authorized to deal directly with Australian authorities concerning local matters.

- Continued -
10 May (Guam date)

Cincpac Adv 100147 (pink) offers to reclassify submarine zones to permit full employment of SWOD Liberator squadrons.

CTF 51 100205 constitutes Summary 63 as of 092400 (-9).

Cincpac Adv 100412 (pink) warns of possible air attack on ULITHI and directs CTF 58 to attack MINAMI DAITO.

Cincpac Adv 100437 requests information concerning readiness to receive VJ squadrons at LEYTE.

Cincpoa Adv 100706 (pink) cancels Cincpoa serial 30663 concerning base development and construction standards at OKINAWA.

Cincpac Adv 100708 (pink) outlines damage to ships in OKINAWA operation from 18 March to 10 May.

Cincpac Adv 100709 states that fourteen PhibGroups will be adequate for the Pacific.

Cincpoa Adv 100717 (pink) outlines planning assumptions with respect to Phases III-D and E of ICEBERG, LONGTON and OLYMPIC.

DepCom20thAF 100752 protests against the curtailment of VLR airfields to 7500 feet in the RYUKYUS.

11 May (Guam date)

On the morning of 11 May the 10th Army, with the 3rd PhibCorps (6th & 1st MarDivs) on the right and the XXIV Corps (77th & 96th InfDivs) on the left, launched a coordinated attack supported by air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire. During the day the 6th MarDiv pushed ahead on the right flank with its deepest penetration being approximately 300 yards reaching the outskirts of AMIKE. Tanks crossed the bridge over ASA GAWA and supported the attack. The 1st MarDiv occupied DAKEHI. The 77th InfDiv in the rugged terrain in the central portion of the island made small gains against bitter resistance including hand to hand fighting. The 96th InfDiv on the left flank penetrated into the hills of the NISHIBARA-MURA Area. Both Corps are now on high ground overlooking the town of SHURI.

Enemy casualties as of 102400 were 39,469 killed and 614 POWs.

On the morning of the 11th, HADLEY, EVANS (DD522) and an unknown merchant vessel were hit by suiciers with damage not yet reported. LCS 38 had her stern blown off.

TF 58 was apparently under air attack as BUNKER HILL (CV 17) has been ordered to rendezvous with TG 50.8 for routing to ULITHI for repairs. Admiral Mitscher has transferred his flag to ENTERPRISE (CV 6). TG 58.3 is NE of OKINAWA. TG 58.1, after fueling, joins for run-in to target for two days strikes on KYUSHU air forces and air installations. TF 57 scheduled to be back at SAKISHIMA on the 12th.

From 0800 to 0930 about 75 enemy aircraft in 15 raids attacked from the north. The attacks were continuing when the dispatch was filed. Up to that time 40 enemy aircraft had been destroyed. The CAP got 30, ships' AA 5, shore AA 2, and there were 3 suicide hits.

- Continued -
11 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

B-24s bombed TRUK and MARCUS on the 11th.

In the KYUKYUS on the 10th enemy planes attacked from 1930 to 2000 from the north and west, scoring one hit with a dud torpedo that did no damage. 1 enemy aircraft was shot down by ships' AA. From 0100 to 0510 on the 11th 35 enemy aircraft came in high from the south, north and southwest in 24 raids. No damage was done and IE SHIMA AA shot down 1.

TG 58.4 on the 11th flew 239 sorties at OKINAWA and TOKUNO. 1 F4U was lost in combat and 3 planes plus 1 pilot operationally. The TG shot down 35 enemy aircraft, probably destroyed 5, and damaged 4. (Probably some duplication in CTF 51 report).

Search planes of FAW 1 sank 1 medium AK and damaged a second off the southern tip of KOREA. FAW 18 planes left 2 SC and 1 SD sinking south of CHIBU PENINSULA, and shot down 1 Nell, and probably sank a small AK, east of SHIONO CAPE.

65 B-29s were over KYUSHU airfields on the 11th bombing by radar. 91 B-29s hit the Kawanishi aircraft plant at KOBE visually and by radar from 17-18,000 feet.

Arnold 101243 (pink) outlines proposed deployment of 20th AF consisting of 40 groups of 4 squadrons each.

JCS 101344 (pink) outlines combat qualities of P-47 fighter bombers and offers additional groups for deployment in POA.

CTF 58 102331 (pink) contains CTF 58's operation racket, air strikes on KYUSHU on 13 and 14 May.

Cincpaco Adv 110040 requests that 20th AF sightings of enemy naval vessels remain secret.

Cincpaco Adv 110042 confirms airfield construction policy for VLR at 7500 feet until further extension is permitted by tactical situation.

ComGen 21st BomCom 110245 (pink) announces intention of discontinuing strikes against KYUSHU.

CINCPAC 110252 concurs in assignment of 24th InfRegt as garrison for FRIC-TION.

Cincpaco Adv 110815 (pink) concurs in discontinuance of 20th AF strikes on KYUSHU to permit incendiary strike against KANOA, Nagoya.

ComGen 10 111001 contains Operations Summary 82 as of 111500.

ComGen 10 111028 directs continuance of maximum pressure on entire Army front at OKINAWA.

Cincpac Adv 111252 establishes escort shipping policy in POA.
TORI SHIMA was occupied without opposition on the 12th.

On OKINAWA progress was limited to the flanks. On the right the 6th MarDiv gained approximately 600 yards along the shore, reaching the general vicinity of NAHA. On the left flank, the 96th InfDiv cleaned out the town of KIBARA and were engaged in clearing the town of YONAGUSUGU. The 1st MarDiv and 77th InfDiv inched along over very difficult terrain north of SHURI through an intricate maze of draws and ridges, with the front lines at one point behind those reported on the evening of 11 May.

Our casualties (less 7th InfDiv) as of 2400 on the 11th: KIA - 2,731, WIA - 12,308, MIA - 249, Total - 15,088. Enemy casualties as of same time: KIA 41,154, POW - 311 Military, 317 Laborers, total 628.

HADLEY and EVANS (previously reported damaged) were severely hurt on the 10th and 11th. HADLEY took both a bomb and a suicide plane after shooting down 19 planes; ship is in danger of sinking. (HADLEY on May 3 fought off 32 air raids). EVANS hit by suicide plane and suffered extensive flooding and damage. LCS 88, though her fantail was blown off, managed to make KERAMA under her own power. PANAMINT (AGC 13) during attack went ahead full speed with full right rudder so as to spin around her anchor chain. By this maneuver she missed two torpedoes, one of which passed 20 yards astern, another 70 yards abeam.

On the evening of the 12th, 2 Oscars came in a surprise raid. First exploded close aboard NEW MEXICO (BB 40); second hit her at base of stack causing extensive damage to her AA batteries, control and radars. 150 dead and injured. Admiral Spruance and his Chief of Staff, CO and Executive Officer were uninjured.

BUNKER HILL (CV 17) reports extensive damage from 2 simultaneous suicide plane hits. Intense fires caused serious damage to her flight and hangar decks and elevators. Shops and electrical fire control are burned out. Much of her armament and most of her communication facilities put out of action. Propulsive plant is substantially intact.

TRUK and MARCUS were each hit by a squadron of B-29s.

A high altitude reconnaissance plane was believed to have slipped through our detection net at ULITHI.

210 sorties were flown against FORMOSA targets by SWP aircraft on the 11th.

During the enemy aircraft attacks on the 11th CTF 51 reports a total of 93 enemy aircraft destroyed - 60 by CAP, 27 by AA (including 19 by HADLEY), and 6 suicides. CTF 58 reports 58 enemy aircraft shot down by CTF 58 planes on the 11th, of which about 40 were over OKINAWA, 9 near the TF, and the rest near AMAMI. Ships' guns got 2 and 2 suicides hit the BUNKER HILL. 4 were destroyed on the ground at TOKUNO.

FAW 1 planes sank 1 SD, 1 medium AK and damaged 4 AKs in waters south of KOREA. 1 Tojo was shot down; 1 PBM landed in the open sea.

On the 14th 550 B-29s and 104 P-51s are scheduled to attack NAGOYA with incendiaries.

- Continued -
12 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpoa 110732 (pink) cancels recent changes in construction policy at advance bases and reinstates earlier standards.

IsCom SAIPAN 120626 describes staff requirements of R.Adm. Whiting and relationships between IsCom and Western Pacific Base Command.

Cincpoa Adv 120700 (pink) substitutes "NAGOYA" for "KANOYA" in 110815 (pink).

Cincpoa Adv 120704 (pink) requests 20th AF to take photography of KYUSHU and TOKYO PLAIN Area.

Cincpoa Adv 120730 defines "token garrison".

Com7thFlt 120822 (pink) submits recommendations for naval establishment ashore on KYUSHU for OLYMPIC.

ComGen 10 120918 indicates possibility major enemy reserves are committed and directs 3rd PhibCorps to envelop SHURI HILL including destruction of forces in immediate front.

Cincpac Adv 121213 (pink) requests acknowledgment of Cincpac 090802 concerning non-availability of 3rd MarDiv for ICEBERG.

13 May (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv pushed patrols across the ASATO GAWA to investigate the approaches to NAHA. Gains were minor. During the night 12-13 May, 6 enemy boats attempted a counterlanding at MACHINATO Airfield. All boats were destroyed by NGF or shore fire. The 1st MarDiv was strongly attacked at 2235 on the 12th by Japs who penetrated about 600 yards into the Division sector before being driven back. The 77th Div, supported by air strikes, moved through heavily protected ravines getting a toe hold on hills east of ISHIMA. The 96th Div, supported by tanks and artillery, reached the top of CONICAL HILL and was attacking hill positions on the right of the Division zone of action. Heavy and accurate artillery concentrations were laid on our front lines during the period. Two Div CP's, 6th MarDiv and 77th InfDiv, being hit. Total enemy killed, 43,328.

ALBIREO (AK 90) at 130625 Z encountered a submarine who attempted to attack at 24-22N 153-40 W, about 270 miles NE of OAHU and near the contact reported day before yesterday.

In air attacks on the evening of the 13th, BACHE (DD 470) and BRIGHT (DE 747) were hit by suicide planes causing fires. Neither ship is in danger of sinking.

Com5thFlt has directed that V.Adm. Hill (Com5thPhibFor) relieve V.Adm. Turner (ComPhibsPac) as CTF 51 about May 17th.

TF 58 is in position for 2nd day strike on KYUSHU. TF 57 is replenishing.

TRUK and MARCUS were again attacked by B-24s.

On the 12th bad flying weather prevented all but 3 SWP B-25s getting through to FORMOSA.

- Continued -
13 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

In the air raid from 1830-1930 on the 12th at OKINAWA, during which the NEW MEXICO was hit, 3 enemy aircraft were shot down; 2 by ships' guns, 1 by CAP. During the day air support was furnished by the TAF, TF 58 and TG 52.1. The TAF in addition flew night heckler missions on southern OKINAWA, TOKUNO and KIKAI, and has scheduled a day strike on KIKAI for the 14th. 23 aircraft from the BUNKER HILL landed at Yontan at 1440 and were assigned as spares for the TAF.

6 enemy aircraft attacked in early morning on the 13th with no damage and no enemy aircraft destroyed. We lost 2 planes, with 1 pilot rescued and the other bailing out behind enemy lines. From 1830-2030 about 35 enemy aircraft attacked from the north in 3 raids, the raids splitting during their approach. The CAP got 4, a PBM on patrol got 2, ships' guns shot down 13 and there were 2 suicide hits, a total of 21.

FAW 18 planes fired 1 SD south of SHIONO, sank 1 AO and damaged a large AO at 36-12, 126-03 on the 12th. On the 13th 1 SC was probably sunk and 1 SD damaged by FAW 18 planes east of CHIBU. FAW 1 search planes on the 13th sank 1 medium AK, 1 small AO, and 1 small FT, and left 1 medium FT burning and dead in the water, all south of KOREA.

536 B-29s took off at 0015 K on the 14th with 20 early returns, for an incendiary attack on NAGOYA.

MacArthur 121450 (Green) directs that instructions be issued for transfer of General Gilbreath and headquarters to MANILA.

Com5thFlt 121709 (pink) acknowledges Cincpoa 090402 concerning non-availability of 3rd MarDiv for ICEBERG.

CTF 51 122151 (pink) acknowledges Cincpoa 090402.

Cincpoa Adv 130008 (pink) informs Com7thFlt that naval facilities recommended by Com7thFlt for installation ashore at KYUSHU are inadequate.

Cincpac Adv 130034 (pink) warns of possible air attack on ULITHI and PELELIU and directs that alert condition be maintained.

Cincpoa Adv 130144 (pink) authorizes CinCBPF to deal direct with Australian authorities concerning local affairs in AUSTRALIA.

CTF 51 130145 passes to TF 51 expression of ComGen 10 appreciation of naval support.

ComGenPOA 130150 (pink) concurs in employment of 24th InfRegt as garrison for FRICION and recommends employment of 296th RCT at ADJOURN.

CincBPF 130213 (pink) declines invitation to GUAM.

ComGen 10 130405 (pink) acknowledges Cincpoa 090402 concerning 3rd MarDiv.

ComGen WPC 130604 deals with shortage of service troops for air and ground at SAIPAN and TINIAN.

Cincpoa 130631 directs movement of 41st Med. Bomb Grp. to Kadena as scheduled.

Cincpoa Adv 131518 concurs in AAPOA schedule for movement of VLR units to OKINAWA with qualification that construction progress will be controlled by tactical requirements.
The securing of Conical Hill on 14 May by the 383 Inf of the 96th Div has enabled the left flank of the Division to advance 2400 yards along the east coast capturing Yonabaru airfield. Japs forming for a counterattack against the hill were broken up by an intense air attack. Elsewhere along the front lines there were no gains of importance, advanced averaging 100 - 200 yards. The 1st MarDiv forward elements received 53 parachute drops of supplies when the supply routes to the Division were blocked by enemy shelling. Enemy killed through 13th - 45,096. 

TG 52.1 remains at SAKISHIMA today. TF 57 resumes neutralization on the 16th. TF 58 completed second day of KYUSHU strikes. The force was attacked by 11 raids between 0614 and 0800 yesterday (14th). At least 21 planes shot down by CAP and AA. Zeke with bomb hit ENTERPRISE on the starboard side of the flight deck, destroying #1 elevator and starting fires. 23 planes were destroyed or damaged, but fires were soon brought under control due to excellent damage control measures. Casualties were apparently light, but the ship will probably have to be returned to PEARL or West Coast for repairs. The force fuels tomorrow and CTF 58 shifts to RANDOLPH with skeleton staff.

CinCEn reports attacks on PORT BLAIR and the NICOBARS on May 6th and 7th.

Only a few SWP planes reached FORMOSA again because of bad weather.

On the 12th and 13th TF 57 expended 148 tons on airfields in the SAKISHIMA GUNTO, damaging runways and destroying 2 enemy aircraft on the ground. AA caused loss of 3 planes.

At OKINAWA direct air support was furnished by TGs 99.2 and 52.1. At 1230 32 F-47s of the 318th Fighter Group (Army) arrived at IE SHIMA. In a similar flight on the 11th 1 F-47 is reported missing at 21-00, 136-30. 5 enemy aircraft attacked from 0300 - 0600 with no damage inflicted and none suffered. Our losses on the 13th were 2 F4Us with one pilot safe.

FAW 13 planes from IWO were kept down by weather. FAW 1 planes on the 14th probably sank 1 medium AK and 1 coastal AK off southern KOREA. North of GUNZAN 1 merchant vessel was left burning and sinking. Off SASEBO 1 small AK was left burning.

During the night of the 13th-14th 12 B-29s laid 139 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and in NIIGATA HARBOR with no opposition.

524 B-29s took part in the NAGOYA incendiary attack on the 14th. 468 returned to bases, 46 landed away from base, 31 at IWO and 10 were lost. Preliminary reports of those planes returning to base indicate that 455 bombed NAGOYA, visually and by radar, from 17,000-18,500 feet. Strike photographs and crew reports show numerous fires starting, with later squadrons reporting heavy smoke to 17,000 feet. Enemy air opposition was weak to moderate and unaggressive.

ComSoPac 010412 announces dissolution of ComAirSoPac.

Cincpoa Adv 131239 (pink) states that on assumption of command by ComGen the SOPA Amphibious Forces will continue to control air defense and forces afloat reporting to ComGen 10 for that purpose.

Marshall 131620 (pink) states that all requirements for Phase III ICEBERG except 414th Fighter Group and VLQ Groups must be procured through CINCAFPAC.

- Continued -
14 May (Guam date)(Cont'd)

ANPB 132150 requests clearance for admission to FOA of committee to study critical petroleum situation.

Cincpac Adv 140136 (pink) directs immediate steps to defend against air attack at ENEWETOK.

Cincpac Adv 140245 (pink) detaches 2nd MarDiv from control of ComGen 10 and designates 2nd MarDiv as assault division ICEBERG III-D.

Cincpac Adv 140247 (pink) requests recommendation for transport squadron to be transferred to PHILIPPINES for training.

Cincpac Adv 140257 (pink) informs CominCh that OLYMPIC Staff Studies are enroute.

Cincpac Adv 140722 recommends against the commitment of NCB's to field support of Marine forces operating inland.


GHQ SWPA 141014 (pink) states that accommodation of last 2 VLR Wings in the RYUKYUS will depend on rate at which tactical air forces are displaced.

Cincpoa Adv 141341 (pink) outlines procedure for releasing Army units to CINCPAC.

Cincpoa Adv 141602 (pink) repeats warning of impending air attack on ENEWETOK, GUAM and ULITHI.

15 May (Guam date)

During the night 14-15 May the Japs again attempted counterlandings in the Machinato Airfield area. All barges were sunk by naval gunfire, presumably before reaching the beach. During the same night two counter-attacks were directed against the 6th MarDiv lines. The first was repulsed shortly after midnight. The second attack was launched from the town of Takamotoji at dawn by an estimated Bn. supported by mortars and smoke. The Japs charged our lines with bayonets and grenades, bitter hand to hand fighting ensued, and the action continued throughout the morning before the enemy withdrew after suffering heavy casualties.

Chief activity in the 1st MarDiv zone of action centered around tank-infantry operations on the high ground at Waha. The 77th InfDiv took "Chocolate Drop Hill", east of Ishimi, after five days of heavy fighting. The 96th InfDiv strengthened its hold on Conical Hill and beat off an enemy counter-attack launched under cover of smoke.

It is possible that TF 58 was trailed by submarines during initial part of retirement. The following message was received from Chinese sources of unknown reliability: "A radio message 2 Jap submarines located south of KYUSHU was intercepted at 0518 hours dated 14 May which stated that precautionary measures must immediately be taken to meet the attack as the U.S. Fleet was sailing southwards to attack the islands of KAGOSHIMA and TANEGASHIMA". The force is continuing to replenish today.

TF 57 is scheduled to return to the objective this morning.
15 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Strikes against MARCUS were cancelled due to bad weather.

40 SWP B-24s attacked Toshien air servicing facilities, and 37 other B-24s attacked HOSAN town nearby.

Direct air support on OKINAWA was furnished by TG 99.2 and TG 52.1. Part of the CAP duties were shared by P-47s that flew into IE SHIMA on the 13th. Planes of TG 99.2 attacked TOKUNO and KIKAI, losing 2.

Photos on the 14th showed all airstrips repaired and operational at MIYAKO and ISHIGAKA despite attacks by TU 52.1.3.

Planes of TF 58 attacked KYUSHU and SHIKOKU airfields, rolling stock, and factories from the night of the 12-13th thru the 14th. During that period 71 enemy planes were shot down (7 by ships' guns), 93 were destroyed on the ground, and 108 probably destroyed or damaged on the ground. 73 additional planes were reported strafed or rocketed or both, with unobserved results.

The only successful enemy air attack hit the ENTERPRISE on the 14th.

Damage to enemy shipping included 2 motor boats and 2 luggers sunk; 15 various ships or boats, including 1 repair vessel burned; and 5 others damaged.

Kumamoto Aircraft Factory was heavily bombed, and photos show it about 50% destroyed or damaged. A chemical plant was severely damaged. 4 locomotives and an oil train were destroyed, and 2 locomotives were damaged. A railroad station was wrecked and several factory buildings were damaged. Our combat losses were about 10 planes. During the attack on the morning of the 14th the BATAAN was hit by a 5" shell on the port quarter, with 4 holes about 24" in diameter 3 feet above the water line.

Off southern KOREA PB4Y-2s of FAW 1 sank 2 medium AKs and heavily damaged a 3rd.

524 B-29s were airborne in the NAGOYA incendiary attack, and 477 were effective. Total bombs dropped were 2722 tons. 142 enemy aircraft were encountered, resulting in 180-200 unaggressive and generally ineffective attacks during the run from the assembly area until after bombs were away. The B-29s claim 23 enemy aircraft destroyed. Strike photos show fires extending across most of the north side of the city, with much of the city obscured by smoke. 11 B-29s were lost.

Cominch for JCS 151442 directs Cinpac to appoint appropriate representatives to confer with newly constituted ATC-NATS Committee on Pacific Air Transport Program.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz, accompanied by Rear Admiral Sherman and Commander Lamar departed Guam for conferences with CINCAPAC at MANILA.
16 May (Guam date)

3rd PhibCorps artillery fired concentrations on Japs gathering near MAKABE on the southern end of the island. Throughout 16 May there were no particular changes in the front lines, the lines as reported being in some places slightly ahead and, in others, behind the line as of 1500 15 May. The 6th MarDiv, supported by tanks, made small advances continuing to probe the outskirts of NAHA. The Jap defense of the hill country north of SHURI continues to be stubborn with burial vaults, as well as caves, being used as defensive positions. Three of six tanks supporting the 307th Inf of the 77th Inf Div were knocked out during the day. Tanks of the 96th Inf Div moved south to a point 500 yards north of YONABARU while the division continued its attacks to the west towards SHURI. Enemy killed as of 2400 15 May - 46,505.

On the 15th SWP B-24s (36) attacked FORMOSA with 82 of them dropping 205 tons on SHINCHIKU drome and town.

TU 52.1.3 continued striking the SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 15th bombing runways and other air installations, and burning 2 planes on the ground. 3 Vals were intercepted and shot down.

From 1900 to 1940 about 12 enemy aircraft approached the RYUKYUS from FORMOSA, but none were able to penetrate closer than 40 miles from the transport area. They were flying low but the dusk combat patrol from TG 99.2 shot down 5 and TG 52.1 combat air patrol shot down 3. Ships' AA splashed a 9th. During the early morning of the 16th several high-flying hecklers approached from the north and dropped some bombs ashore. A VF(N) shot down 1 Betty.

Delayed reports have been received of 2 single-plane, low level torpedo attacks on ships in the OKINAWA Area. Both attacks failed. 1 torpedo missed by 75 yards astern, and the plane was later splashed.

The rescue of 10 survivors from a crashed seaplane was reported yesterday. 2 PBMs in company were attacked by Jap fighters. One PBM was shot down by 6 Toriy's, from which 10 have been rescued by a lifeguard sub, and 3 apparently were killed. These survivors report that the other PBM crashed in flames. No survivors have yet been located.

2 PBY-2s SW of TSUSHIMA ISLAND on the 15th were attacked by 3 very aggressive Jacks. Two of the Jacks were shot down and the third was damaged. 1 PBY-2 was slightly damaged.

South of KOREA planes of FAW 1 on the 16th sank 1 small AO, and NW of GUNZAN damaged 1 SD. FAW 18 planes NE of SHIONO sank 1 SD, and at SHIONO sank 5 fishing boats, damaged 1 railroad bridge and exploded rockets inside 2 railroad tunnels.

29 B-29s took off at 2000 to mine SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and WAKASA BAY.

The first of 519 B-29s took off at 2005 on the 16th for an incendiary attack on TOKYO. 34 were early returns, leaving 485 effective. Of 35 squadrons taking part, 33 report bombing the primary target (4 visual, 29 by radar), and 1 reported bombing a target of opportunity. 11 report a general conflagration, 11 several large fires, 1 many small fires, 2 few scattered fires, 8 had unobserved results because of smoke.

Both groups of TF 58 are now east of OKINAWA. TF 57 is at SAKASHIMA.
16 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

HAMMERHEAD (SS 364) sank a gas loaded tanker on the 6th and a medium freighter on the 14th, both in the GULF OF SIAM.

HAWKBILL (SS 366) sank a minelayer off the MALAY COAST on the 16th.

SEAPOACHER (SS 405) on patrol in the KURILES sank a large steam trawler with 1 torpedo hit and destroyed 2 luggers and damaged 2 by gunfire.

RAY (SS 271) recovered 10 survivors from a FAW 1 search plane south of TSUSHIMA STRAITS. This makes a total of 20 so far this patrol.

CINCPFF 150228 (pink) requests authority to conduct operation "FUDDLE" against TRUK or RABAUL.

CINCPOA ADV 160557/ recommends that ComServPac undertake a study of redeployment of construction troops and facilities from the MARIANAS and PHILIPPINES to the RYUKYUS.

Com5thFlt 160959 directs that control ashore at OKINAWA pass to ComGen 10 at 0900 (-9) 17 May and that CTF 51 report to him for continued control of air defense and naval forces present.

17 May (Guam date)

Units of the 6th MarDiv crossed the ASATO GAWA on 17 May and gained a toehold on the south bank of the river. Other units of the division captured Sugar Loaf Hill, 400 yards NE of TAKAMOTOJI, and were pushing through TAKAMOTOJI itself. The 1st MarDiv supported by tanks and flame throwing tanks reached the outskirts of WANA. The 77th InfDiv launched a night attack without artillery preparation. The attack was successful and, continuing after dawn, brought advance elements of the division to the outskirts of ISHIDAM by noon. The 96th InfDiv, driving on SHURI from the east, met heavy resistance in the hills and draws west of Conical Hill.

Both groups of TF 58 are at OKINAWA. TF 57 starts replenishment period.

SHAD (SS 235) reports she blew the bow and probably sank a medium freighter off the east coast of KOREA in 8 fathoms of water last night. She also sank a small oiler on the 15th off QUELPART ISLAND.

RATON (SS 270) sank a medium AK on the 12th and an AP on the 15th in the YELLOW SEA.

13 B-24s attacked MARCUS from 10-12,000 feet.

40 B-24s attacked TAICHU drome on the western coast of FORMOSA with 159 tons. Seven enemy aircraft were destroyed or damaged on the ground, and numerous fires were started. 20 B-25s attacked railroad yards and alcohol plants with 16 tons.

The TAF struck KIKAI and AMARI on the 16th shooting down 1 enemy aircraft taking off from KIKAI.

At OKINAWA from 2000-2400 on the 16th 25 enemy aircraft from the N attacked in small groups. Some appeared to be biplanes. A few reached the transport area but caused no damage. 1 crashed from reasons unknown. 1 ship reported that a large low-flying Jap plane may have dropped mines.

- Continued -
TF 57 attacked SAKISHIMA CUNTO on the 16th and 17th damaging 3 enemy aircraft, sinking 1 SD, 1 Lugger, 2 suicide boats, and damaging 10 other small craft. No enemy airborne planes were encountered. TF 57 losses were 2 planes in combat and 8 operationally.

CTF 58 reports that through 16 May aircrew losses have been 173 pilots and 65 aircrewnmen, total 238. Of these 184 were lost in combat. This represents an increase of 21 pilots and 8 aircrewnmen over 2 May. Shipboard casualties through 16 May were 875 killed in action, 214 missing in action, 1213 wounded in action. The figures were incomplete for the FRANKLIN, the BUNKER HILL, and two other ships.

Off Western KYUSHU 12 Jap VF attacked 2 PB4Y-2's, damaging both planes and wounding 3. One VF was shot down and 1 damaged.

27 B-29s laid 171 mines in SHIMENOSEKI STRAITS and WAKASA BAY with no losses.

On the 17th 29 F-51's strafed the ATSUGI field on HONSHU. No airborne enemy aircraft were encountered. 7 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground, with 2 probable and 33 damaged. We lost 1 over the target and 3 missing.

MacArthur 030716 (Pink) acknowledges APA and AKA Divisions made available by CINCPAC for amphibious training purposes.

DepCom 20th AF 142255 (Pink) restates the primary mission of 20th AF subject to continuation of existing tactical support.

Cincpac Adv 150610 (Pink) authorizes unloading of 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN for rehabilitation and preparation for Phase III-D.

ComAF20 152056 (Pink) directs 20th AF to perform photography of KYUSHU and TOKYO requested by CINCPAC.

Cincpoa Adv 152347 (Pink) describes proposed schedule for movement of Acorn 54 and AROU to OKINAWA.

Cincpac Adv 160128 (Pink) assigns to Com5thPhibCorps duty to plan for LONGTOM; Com3rdPhibFor to coordinate development of planning.

ComGen 10 160515 (Pink) outlines enemy situation on TOKUNO and estimates that a Corps of 3 divisions is required for its capture.

Cincpoa Pearl 162139 (Pink) summarizes the revised Base Development Plan for OKINAWA and IE SHIMA.

Cincpac Adv 170152 (Pink) authorizes CinCBPF to conduct an operation against TRUK.

Cincpoa Adv 170211 (Pink) approves designation of 296th RCT as garrison for TOKUNO.

Cincpac Adv 170342 (Pink) summarizes memorandum between CINCAPPAC and CINCPAC at MANILA 16 May 1945 concerning plans and preparations for OLYMPIC.

Cincpoa Adv 171344 reaffirms airfield development schedule at OKINAWA and movement of 41st Med. Bomb Grp. in advance of 5th Fighter Group.

Cincpoa Adv 171425 requests CTG 99.2 to submit weekly reports of aircraft availability.
17 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Fleet Admiral Nimitz, Rear Admiral Sherman and Commander Lamar returned to Guam from conferences with CINCPAC at Manila.

18 May (Guam date)

After nightfall on the 17th 6th MarDiv troops who had occupied Sugar Loaf Hill withdrew and the hill was once again occupied by the Japs. On the morning of the 18th, following a heavy artillery preparation, the hill was retaken by the Marines for the 5th time. Infantry and tanks combined to completely encircle the hill. The 1st MarDiv continued its operations around WANA eliminating enemy remnants to the east of the town. The 77th Div, after a heavy artillery preparation, made local gains in the hill country NW of ISHIMI with the aid of tanks, flame throwing tanks, and air strikes. Tank-infantry teams of the 96th Div were fighting in the hills SW of KOKHI, NW of YONABARU, and W of Conical Hill. Patrols on the left pushed forward close to the outskirts of YONABARU while enemy artillery halted our tanks pushing forward in this same area.

Military Government now has 139,858 civilians under custody.

On evening of 17th, DOUGLAS H. FOX (DD 779) was hit by a suicide plane causing considerable structural damage, but ship proceeded to KERAMA RETTO under her own power.

Vice Admiral Hill relieved Vice Admiral Turner as CTF 51. At the same time, ComGen 10 became responsible directly to Com5thFlt for operations ashore and development of the RYUKYUS. CTF 51 controls all naval forces present under Com5thFlt, and in addition has reported to ComGen 10 for duty in control of the air defense of OKINAWA.

TG 58.1 is at the objective; TF 57 completes fueling today.

On the 17th a total of 45 B-24s, 23 B-25s and 26 P-51s attacked FORMOSA.

In the RYUKYUS 387 direct air support sorties were furnished by TF 58, TG 99.2, and TG 52.1. During air attacks from 1930-0030 on the 17th about 30 enemy aircraft came in from the SW and NE. The TAF CAP got 2, ships' guns got 4, 1 was a suicide hit. From 0040 on the 18th until daylight night hecklers were also over OKINAWA intermittently. VF(N) got 1, and the dawn CAP shot down 2 more. CTF 99.2 reports that that force has destroyed 259 aircraft of the enemy through 17 May.

FAW 18 activities included the following: Near SHIONO MISAKI 1 trawler was fired, docks were fired, radar installations were hit by rockets. In the same place 1 SC was damaged, 1 trawler was sunk. Near HAMAMATSU a train was wrecked while crossing a bridge.

Off the SW tip of KOREA 1 small AK was sunk, 1 medium AK probably sunk, and 1 small AO damaged by FAW 1 aircraft.

4 P-47s were over southern KYUSHU during the night of the 18th-19th.

297 B-29s took off to attack the Tachikawa Depot and Aircraft Company, 22 miles W of TOKYO, accompanied by 96 P-51 escorts.

- Continued -
18 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

ComGenAAFPOA 151110 (pink) indicates that Northwest Field, GUAM will not be ready in time to accommodate the 315th Wing on June 1 and July 1 as planned and requests that additional SeaBees be made available to expedite the project.

Com5thPhibFor 170005 reports to ComGen 10 for duty in control of air defense of OKINAWA and naval forces present.

Cincpac Adv. 180005 (pink) requests that plans for the employment of troops after OLYMPIC for CORONET provide for the withdrawal of the 5thPhibCorps from HYPOCRITE prior to commitment of 3rdPhibCorps.

Cincpac Adv 180631 (pink) outlines information available on Jap submarines in Hawaiian waters on and prior to 7 December 1941.

Cincpaa Adv 180742 (pink) informs CinCBPF of proposed employment of TF 57 in July.

Cincpaa Adv 181208 describes MANILA Agreement of 16 May for responsibility for topographic mapping.

Cincpaa Adv 181210 (pink) consents to the release of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, SoPacBaCom for transfer to MANILA provided the senior Army Officer in SoPac is under ComSoPac.

19 May (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv repulsed a counterattack east of TAKAMOTOKUJI. Only minor changes in the division front lines reported. The 1st MarDiv continued to work its way toward WANA RIDGE and reached a position where, in conjunction with the 77th InfDiv, flanking fire was delivered on the ridge. This fire drove the Japs from one strong point immediately north of SHURI. The 77th InfDiv continued its task of reducing pillboxes and consolidated and strengthened its front line positions. The 96th InfDiv is being held up by a virtual fortress 2,000 yards west of KUHAZU. Violent action is being encountered all along the division front.


On the 18th 87 SWP B-24s bombed TAINAN and TAICHU drones on FORMOSA. 22 B-25s continued attacking communications facilities, destroying 2 locomotives, 40 freight cars and damaged bridges and factories.

SWP search planes on the 18th sank 1 medium AK and 6 small AK, probably sank 3 medium AK and 1 small AK and beached 2 large schooners. Most of the damage was north of FORMOSA, but some attacks were along the CHINA and INDO-CHINA Coasts.

In attacks on islands of the AKAMI and TOKARA groups planes of TF 58 on the 16th - 18th destroyed 4 fuel dumps, sank several luggers and 15 small craft, damaged 29 small craft and luggers, destroyed 5 planes on the ground plus 3 probably destroyed, destroyed 1 and damaged 6 radio stations.

From dusk until 2330 on the 18th about 30-35 enemy aircraft attacked in 10 raids from the N, NW and W at OKINAWA. The CAP splashed 9, ships' guns got 4, and 1 was a suicide hit, for a total of 14.
19 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Close support on southern OKINAWA was furnished by TF 58 and TG 52.1, with 339 sorties using 163 tons, 1353 rockets, and 92 Napalm bombs.

FAW 1 planes on the 19th probably sank a medium tanker and a small AK south of KOREA. Sightings declined noticeably, possibly due to bad weather.

FAW 16 planes sank 1 SD, probably sank 1 SC and 1 SD plus 3 fishing boats, all south of HAMAMATSU, and left 1 SD sinking off SHIONO MISAKI.

30 B-29s laid 282 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and WAKASA WAN without losses.

266 B-29s attacked HAMAMATSU city by radar from 24,000 feet when TACHIKA was found cloud covered.

Marshall 170607 (pink) informs ComGenPOA that action has been deferred by the War Dept on Army operational requirements for LONGTOM.

Com2ndCarTaskFor 181035 announces that V. Adm. McCain hoisted his flag in the SHANGRI LAA.

Cominch & CHO 182005 disapproves request for permanent assignment of SeaBees to Marine Amphibious Corps.

Cincpac Adv 190054 directs ComPhibGroup 12 report to CommFlt for temporary duty in connection with amphibious training of Army troops in the PHILIPPINES.

Richardson 190357 (pink) recommends that movement of General Gilbreath and Headquarters to MANILA be continued as scheduled since this movement will not interfere with the functioning of SoPacBaCom.

Richardson 190827 (pink) informs Cincpoa that as a result of Marshall's 170607 ComGenPOA will be unable to support logistically Operation LONGTOM with a target date of 20 August.

SecNav 191600 announces that Admiral Hewitt has been designated to conduct further investigation of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR.

20 May (Guam date)

The north shore of the ASATO GAWA has been stabilized by the 6th MarDiv and the division continues its push south to NAHA. On the 20th units of the division seized a hill SE of TAKAMOTOJI. From our present positions on this flank Japs are visible organizing tombs and other defensive positions on the hills of NAHA. On this flank the defending Japs have recently showed a tendency to leave their caves and attack rather than wait to be dug and blasted out. The 1st MarDiv now swing its left flank 800 yards south of DAKESHI. The 77th InfDiv repulsed 3 counter-attacks, made by Japs estimated to be from a platoon to a company in strength, and captured a strong point 900 yards north of SHURI using tanks and flame throwers. In this sector 3 Japs wearing Marine uniforms were killed. The 96th InfDiv pushed south of Conical Hill and, pushing west, reached a hill 1600 yards east of ISHIMI.


- Continued -
20 May (Guam date)(Cont'd)

Harbor development at OKINAWA is continuing. Unloading beach at MACHINATO completed and operational. Hydrographic work has been completed in YONABARU WASH. Net installations at NAGASUGASUKU WASH are proceeding satisfactorily.

LST 808 was hit by a bomb and badly damaged.

TF 57 completes second day of strikes at SAKISHIMA. Then has another two day replenishment period before least scheduled strikes on 24th and 25th. Destroyer QUILLIAM was damaged by collision and is proceeding to rendezvous with TF 112 in tow of the cruiser BLACK PRINCE. A CVE and tug from the fueling group are enroute to assist. Both groups of TF 58 are in the operating area.

16 P-47s strafed airfields at TRUK. 9 B-24s bombed MARCUS.

On the 19th 102 B-24s attacked KURIUN HARBOR and dock installations with 256 tons. 21 B-25s continued attacking railroad yards and factories. 71 P-38s divebombed and strafed TAINAN (35 aircraft) and GIRAN (36 aircraft) dromes.

At OKINAWA close support was hampered by weather. 244 sorties used 34 tons of bombs and 206 rockets.

FAW 1 planes sank 1 medium freighter-transport and probably sank 2 small AKS of KOREA. Off FUKUE SHIMA 4 P-47s assisted a Privateer in sinking a picket boat by strafing. The P-47s went on to strafe TOMIE FIELD on FUKUE SHIMA.

30 B-29s mined SHIMOMOSHI STRATTS and WAKASA BAY.

271 B-29s dropped 1,480 tons of bombs by radar on HAMAMATSU.

ComGen 10 190431 recommends mounting garrison and resupply shipping for Phase III-D in LSTs and LSMs from the MARIANAS.

MacArthur 190942 outlines operations of Allied Air Forces, SWP in support of CHINA Theater.

Cominch & CNO 191808 (pink) expressed general agreement with Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC.

ComGenAirPac 192355 outlines existing plans for relief of Marine fighter pilots at OKINAWA on a 10-month combat tour.

Cincoa Adv 200209 (pink) suggests that JWFC 293/3 be revised to indicate general unsuitability of TANEGA for airfield construction.

Cincoa Adv 200701 assigns PhotoGrp 1 to FAW 1 for administrative purposes and outlines photographic responsibility and control in the RYUKYUS.

Cincoa Adv 200704 (pink) requests ComGenPOA's recommendations concerning employment of 2nd MarDiv in Phase III-D in lieu of 96th Division.

ComPhibsPac 200830 directs ComPhibsTraPac to submit program for amphibious training of Army troops.

ComAAFSWPA 201734 requests clearance for overwater flights by SWPA aircraft to SHANGHAI, FORMOSA and CHINA Coast as far north as FOCHOW.
During the night 20-21 May the 6th MarDiv repulsed a counter attack of about 500 Japs, killing half. Some of the attackers wore our uniforms and carried our weapons. On the 21st the heaviest enemy artillery concentration to date fell in the 4th MarRegt area resulting in heavy casualties among our troops. In the last 3 days there has been a noticeable lack of infiltration and suicide anti-tank rushes against our right flank positions. Sugar Leaf Hill is now completely secured, after having changed hands 11 times, and the division is pushing south of this point. In the 1st MarDiv zone of action 3 groups of Japs with demolition charges wrapped around their waists attacked a tank company. The Japs were dispersed with no loss to our tanks. Fighting for WANA RIDGE continues with one prong now under our control and fierce fighting taking place in our efforts to take the southern prong. The 77th Inf Div launched a night attack at 0300 on the 21st. A limited objective was reached and, continuing the attack, the div captured TATNA MACHI just north of SHURI. The town was held despite an enemy attempt to recapture it late in the afternoon. The 96th InfDiv pushed to the south and west. On the left flank the outskirts of YONABARU were reached and patrols reported that the town itself was deserted. To the west an extremely strong hill position, 1600 yards west of KIBARA, was captured.

Our casualties as of 2400 20 May: KIA - 4,555; WIA - 20,254; MIA - 392; total - 25,201.

At OKINAWA 2 or 3 midget submarines were active on the evening of the 20th, of which all were believed to be destroyed or damaged. About the same time, dusk air attacks inflicted the following damage: BUTLER (DMS 29) took 2 suicide hits on her mainmast knocking out all her radars but causing no hull damage or personnel casualties. THATCHER (DD 514) took one suicider amidships which put her forward engine room out of action, but the ship was able to proceed to KERAMA RITTO under her own power. TATTNAL (APD 19) was bombed, extent of damage unknown. RECENTER (APD 92) had a suicider crash on deck destroying her 40mm and causing some hull damage. CHASE (APD 54) had a suicide plane crash alongside opening her seams and flooding her engineering spaces. LST 808 was hit again.

ComNorPac reports that 5 DD of DesRon 57 maintained patrol from the morning of the 17th until the evening of the 20th along a 90 mile front inside the northern KURILES, apparently without detection and without sighting any enemy vessels. On their departure the night of the 20th the force bombarded the harbor of SURIBACHI, starting fires and explosions. Two enemy planes attacked the force but caused no casualties.

At FORMOSA on the 20th 20 B-25s attacked railroad yards at 4 places, and bombed an alcohol plant.

In the RYUKYUS, bad weather cancelled distant air support and limited close support by TG 99.2, TF 58, and TG 52.1 to 135 sorties (113 tons, 754 rockets, 16 Napalm). From 1823 - 2000 dusk attack by 35 low-flying enemy aircraft from the N and W, avoiding picket stations but apparently coordinated with midget sub activity, resulted in 6 suicide hits or near misses, 11 shot down by ships' AA and 9 by TAP CAP for a total of 26 destroyed.

A FAW 18 plane left 1 SC and 5 fishing boats sinking and damaged 1 Pete, at an unreported location.

FAW 1 planes, from 14-20 May sank 8 ships for 14,980 tons, and damaged 12 for 10,850 tons. 3 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 3 damaged. 2 FEMs were lost with 14 personnel missing. Since arrival in the OKINAWA Area shortly after L-Day (1 April) FAW 1 planes have sunk 36,680 tons, damaged 81,500 tons, destroyed 21 enemy aircraft, and damaged 15 enemy aircraft. - Continued -
21 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Com3rdFlt 200400 (pink) constitutes Com3rdFlt's OpPlan 3-45 for support of consolidation of the RYUKYUS.

MacArthur 200912 (pink) describes planned artillery organization for OLYMPTC.

Cincpoa Adv 210143 (pink) proposed transfer from 7thFlt of 2 VPB(ML) Sq. to PacFlt and 2 VPB(HL) Sq. to NorFAC.

Cincpac Adv 210350 requests that additional CVEs be made available for transport duty and that as many CVEs from British be procured as possible.

ComGen USF CHINA 210300 (pink) outlines arrangement for FEAF air assistance to CHINA Theater.

22 May (Guam date)

Rain and mud slowed down the offensive along most of the front lines throughout the 22nd. However, excellent gains were made on the left flank where the 7th InfDiv has replaced the 96th InfDiv. The 7th launched an attack under cover of darkness during the early morning of the 22nd and drove through YONABARI to the high ground south of the town in the vicinity of ITARASHIKU. The 96th InfDiv is still in the front lines between the 77th and 7th InfDivs. On the left flank the 6th MarDiv mopped up bypassed enemy pockets and continued to strengthen its front lines along the ASATO RIVER. The 1st MarDiv repulsed a counterattack of about 200 Japs, killing 60.

Command changes: RAdm Price, ComPairWing 1 has relieved RAdm Kiland as SOPA KIRAMA BETTO; RAdm McCormick, ComBatDiv 3, has relieved RAdm Smith, ComCruDiv 5, as CTF 54.

On the 20th fog over both islands prevented all but one strike at HIRARA. On dawn of the 20th GUILLIAM had her collision.

On the 21st TF 57 dropped 60 tons at HIRARA. 1 Myrt was shot down. British losses: 1 plane in combat, 2 operationally. After striking on the 24th and 25th, KING GEORGE V with 3 DD will leave for GUAM; the rest of the force will fuel and then proceed to MANUS. Both groups of TF 58 fuel today.

CINCEI reported sinking a Nachi Class cruiser 5 miles off PENANG before dawn on the 16th by DD attacks.

The night of the 21st 5-6 enemy aircraft attacked IWO JIMA doing slight damage, 2 Bettys were shot down by AA.

Scheduling of heavy day attacks on FORMOSA on the 22nd and 23rd has been prevented by bad weather.

Scheduled strikes on KYUSHU and SAKISHIMA were weathered out on the 21st and only 62 close support sorties were flown (using 4.5 tons, 116 rockets). 1 F-47 is missing from a raid on KYUSHU, and 1 F6F was shot down by friendly AA near IE SHIMA on the morning of the 21st.

- Continued -
22 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

At dusk 12-15 enemy aircraft attacked in 2 raids from the west catching our CAP on the ground because of bad weather. 3 enemy aircraft were destroyed by AA and suicide attempts. There were none of our ships damaged.

A summary of air strikes in support of the 24th Corps on OKINAWA from 8 April to 18 May shows: Total direct support missions - 798, total support aircraft sorties - 6,684.

Along the southern HONSHU Coast, from SHIONO MISAKI to CHIBU PENINSULA, FAW 16 planes, on the 21st and 22nd, sank 1 SD, 3 fishing boats and 5 luggers; heavily damaged 2 small AK; shot down a glider, probably destroyed the Sally towing the glider plus a Pete, and destroyed a bridge on SHIONO CAFE. 1 F4Y ditched 30 miles north of TWO, with all the crew rescued.

FAW 1 planes on the 22nd south of KOREA left 4 SD burning off SHANGHAI, 2 of 7 luggers were left dead in the water; outside HANGCHOW BAY 4 of 7 SD were damaged.

30 B-29s laid 184 mines in 3 west channels into SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, and in MAIZURU HARBOR (NAKASA WAT) on the 21st and again on the 22nd.

ComAir 7th Flt 110330 (pink) submits to 7th Flt recommendation for reduction of VPB Squadrons.

ComAir 7th Flt 140938 submits similar recommendations covering seaplane tenders in 7th Flt.

MacArthur 210114 (pink) constitutes his comments on Joint Staff Study (Preliminary Draft), OLYMPIC.

Richardson 220546 requests that all matters involving movement, use or disposition of Army troop units in POA be referred to ComGenPOA before final decision.

MacArthur 220610 (pink) outlines additional service troops to be supplied by redeployment to meet requirements in the RYUKUS.

23 May (Guam date)

The 7th InfDiv continued to advance on the left flank. The 134th InfRegt pushed into the OZATO Hill mass and captured high ground south of TAIRO. This advance protects the Army left flank as the lines swing to the west toward the envelopment of SHURI. Other units of the division pushed westward, along the road net crossing the island to KOKUBA-GAWA, and reached high ground south of YONATA. The 96th InfDiv was subjected to a counter attack by an estimated Jap Bn during the early morning of the 23rd. Japs at some points penetrated 600 yards into the division lines before they were repulsed and the division lines reestablished with no loss of ground after a three hour battle. Throughout the 23rd the division was held up by enemy resistance from hills in front of its lines from which positions the enemy poured mutually supporting fire. The 77th InfDiv, attacking hills south of ISHIKAWA, made no reported gains throughout the day. Our artillery fired on SHURI CASTLE from this division zone and, in return, the division received heavy mortar fire. The 1st MarDiv repulsed another counter attack against that portion. 2 Bns from 4th Marines, 5th MarDiv, forded ASATO RIVER under cover of smoke to establish a bridgehead on the south bank of the river. Engineers are now constructing a vehicular bridge to permit tanks to cross and consolidate the bridgehead.

- Continued -
23 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Enemy casualties - 2400 22 May - 56,190.

A TU consisting of 2 LCI and 1 DE has completed its reconnaissance of the northern MARIANAS. During this sweep the unit visited ASCENSION, NAUG, AGRIHAN and PAGAN. 22 Japs and Okinawans and 16 natives were brought back.

32 P-47s attacked TRUK on the 23rd destroying 1 single-engine plane on NOEN. A launch was blown up off TOL ISLAND.

TU 52.1.3 attacked SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 22nd and 23rd destroying 1 enemy aircraft on the ground, and probably destroying 5.

Bad weather hampered close support on OKINAWA. A night fighter shot down 1 of 4 attacking enemy planes during the evening. Other hecklers were over the island around midnight, but did no damage.

CTF 51 reports total Naval casualties through 22 May as follows: KIA - 1,011; WIA - 2,933; MIA - 1,237. Total - 5,181.

FAW 1 planes sank 2 SD and damaged 2 others south of KOREA; sank 1 SD between SAISHU and SHANGHAI, and a fishing boat south of SAISHU.

A PB4Y of FAW 18 sank a net tender and a small AK in SURUGA WAN, and shot down 1 of 2 attacking Nicks. The PB4Y was slightly damaged. 1 PB4Y ditched 5 miles east of IWO, with 3 rescued and 8 lost, including 3 pilots.

558 B-29s were airborne and 533 effective in the incendiary attack on the southern TOKYO urban area on the night of 23-24th. Bombing was from 8-12,000 feet.

Box score of enemy aircraft destroyed in FOA since 13 March (to 30 April): TF 58 - 325, TF 51 - 349, TF 57 - 29, TF 93 - 9, TG 50 .5 - 11, 20th AAF - 116, TF 94 - 9. Total - 848.

ComNorPac 300015 (pink) constitutes NorPac OpOrd 4-45, mission to destroy enemy shipping in OKHOTSK SEA, etc.

MacArthur 221434 concurs in plan for logistic support of Fleet Marine Force as arranged by Brig.Gen. Edson during his recent visit.

MacArthur 221530 (pink) agrees to removal of Marine Corps from DIABOLIC; first 2 divisions approximately X plus 90, 3rd division depending on existent situation.

JCS 222139 requests immediate statement concerning value of OSS in FOA.

CinCPac Adv 230049 requests ComGen BomCom XX be instructed to hold the 22 multi-engine aircraft in rear areas ready for forward call to OKINAWA.

CinCPac Adv 230213 (pink) replies to CINCPAC 210214 which commented on Joint Staff Study Preliminary Draft, OLYMPIC.

CinCPac Adv 230215 (pink) requests reconsideration of CominCh order that Operation FIREBREAK be conducted as a training exercise.

- Continued -
23 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpao Adv 230216 recommends that ComGenAAFPOA give consideration to development of NAHA as an unloading depot for fighter aircraft.

Cincpao Adv 230559 (pink) directs ComGen to submit to CINCPOA his comments on relocation of Headquarters, XX BomCom and 7th AF.

Cincpao Adv 230849 (pink) replies to Cominch concerning need for CSS in POA.

Cincpao Adv 230853 (pink) submits to CINCAFAC for consideration a proposed communication plan for OLYMPIC.

24 May (Guam date)

Mud continued to limit advances along most of the front lines. However, the 7th InfDiv, against light opposition, pushed farther into the OZATO-MURA hill mass and seized high ground 500 yards south of TAIRA and 600 yards west of TAIRA. The 96th InfDiv beat off an enemy counterattack against its right flank. The 77th InfDiv mopped up isolated enemy strong points. The 1st MarDiv engaged in active patrolling behind its lines. The 6th MarDiv completed 2 bridges across ASATO RIVER. Marines have crossed the river in strength and entered ASATO TOWN, but the lack of self propelled guns and tanks, mired in the mud, is slowing down reduction of enemy strong points.

Casualties as of 2400 23 May: Enemy - 56,385. Own - (Less 27th InfDiv) - 26,675.

SWPA search planes from PALAWAN extended their sectors to MALAY PENINSULA and made a thorough reconnaissance of the SINGAPORE Area. A Nachi Class cruiser was seen at the Naval Base with another Nachi or Atago Class nearby. Both groups of TF 58 remain northeast of OKINAWA. Airplane calls for fighter patrols over the northern RYUKYUS, with dawn and dusk CAPs at AMAMI and KIKAI. TG 58.4 departed yesterday from ULITHI to relieve TG 58.3. TF 57 is scheduled to complete their last strike for the time being at SAKISHIMA tomorrow.

24 B-24s bombed MARCUS on the 24th.

There were 5 raids during the early morning of the 23rd, 2 more in the early evening, and several more from 2330-0230, all concentrated in the IE SHIMA Area. 6 planes were shot down by the BRADFORD (DD 545).

Bad weather limited air support from TG 52.1 and 99.2 to 93 sorties (33 tons, 521 rockets, 26 Napalm).

At 2020 35 F4Us from MAG-22 arrived on a ferry flight from GUAM.

At 2355 CTF 51 reported persistent air attacks beginning at 1930. There were 19 raids with an estimated 60 enemy aircraft involved up to the time of the dispatch. 15 enemy aircraft had been shot down with no report of damage to surface craft. The attacks were continuing, apparently concentrating on airfields. IE SHIMA was hit in the vicinity of the naval base. 1 enemy aircraft landed wheels up on Yontan strip, letting out several Japs who were attacking parked planes with hand grenades. Considerable damage was reported.

FAW 1 planes shot down 2 floatplanes and destroyed 3 SC west of SASEBO.

- Continued -
24 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

FAW 13 planes shot down 1 Nick, sank 1 SD and 3 fishing boats off CHIBU; left 1 FTD dead in the water off SHIONO MISAKI, and seriously damaged 1 PC and destroyed 4 luggers off HAMAMATSU.

104 TOKYO bound P-51s aborted 2 hours from IWO because of bad weather.

Marshall 222315 outlines policy under consideration by JCS and proposed by State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee for handling Allied Nationals which are now held prisoners of war by the Japanese.

Cominch 222316 requests comment on Marshall 222315.

Cincpac Adv 240255 (pink) assigns CTF 93 responsibility of neutralizing MARCUS and enemy bases in the BONINNS as well as responsibilities assigned by OpPlan 4-45.

Cincpac Adv 240258 (pink) assumes TG 99.2 will make maximum effort against KYUSHU to disrupt enemy attacks now forming.

CINCPACPA 240513 (pink) reports that the study of Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC reveals a number of basic differences in interpretation of recent planning directives.

Cincpac Adv 240540 informs CTF 93 that the means used in neutralizing TOJUK and MARCUS is a matter left to the judgment of CTF 93.

Cincpac Adv 240558 (pink) indicates that the arrival of fighter groups destined for FRICTION must take place by 15 October.

Cincpac Adv 240600 proposes uniform procedure for release of Army units to CINCAPPAC.

Cincpac Adv 241257 (pink) requests that specific information be supplied by CINCAPPAC concerning differences in interpretation and proposes early conference.

Cincpac Adv 241259 comments on proposed method of handling liberated Allied prisoners of war now held by the Japanese.

25 May (Guam date)

In spite of continued rain and mud on OKINAWA both flanks made advances during the day. On the right the 6th MarDiv pushed south of the ASATO RIVER line and expanded its bridgehead into NAHA. Many streets in the town are reported mined. Tanks have crossed into the city but mud prevents strong support. Jap artillery has failed to destroy the bridges across the ASATO GAMA. The 1st MarDiv limited its activities to aggressive patrolling. The 77th InfDiv cleaned out the town immediately north of SHURI. The position of the 96th InfDiv remained unchanged. On the left flank, the 7th InfDiv repulsed a Jap counter attack.

Casualties as of 2400 24 May: Enemy: 57,407 killed; POWs - Military, 641; Laborers, 403. Own: KIA 73, WIA 336, MIA 61, total - 470.

Casualties as of 2400 24 May: Enemy: 57,407 killed; POWs - Military, 641; Laborers, 403. Own: KIA 73, WIA 336, MIA 61, total - 470.

At OKINAWA air raids continued during morning of the 25th. 3 DD, 2 DE, 1 DMS, 3 APD, 1 AM, 1 XAK, 1 LSM were damaged by suicide planes.

- Continued -
During the raids earlier in the evening, ships on radar picket station 15 (north of BOLO) attacked several small fast surface targets believed to be suicide boats. All were believed destroyed; none made any surface attack on our ships.

TF 57 fuels today and then departs for MANUS and GUAM. Neutralization mission taken over by CVE Group.

TF 58 during the period 19 thru 23 May attacked airfields, seaplane bases and ground installations on MIMAMI, TOKUNO, KIKAI and ARAKI O SHIMA. 1 plane splashed; 4 destroyed on ground. 3 small craft sunk; 8 damaged. On the 24th, during sweeps over KYUSHU 12 planes were destroyed and an unestimated number of probables. 2 more were shot down over TOKUNO.

Naval casualties to 22 May: KIA and MIA 4,270, WIA 4,171. (Increase since 17 May of 300 and 200 respectively). This does not include all casualties from BUNKER HILL and 2 DD, nor casualties from recent air raids, TF 57 casualties.

No strikes were scheduled on FORMOSA on the 24th.

Enemy air attacks which began at 1930 on the 24th continued intermittently until 0430 on the 25th, and began again at 0800. Between 1940/24th and 1200/25th CTF 51 estimates 175 enemy aircraft attacked. Of these, an estimated 111 have been reported destroyed so far, and the final score may be higher. The dusk CAP got 9, the night CAP 9, (including 3 Betlys); ships guns during the night destroyed 9; IW SHIMA AAA (reported by ComGen 10) destroyed 1 of 23 overhead; Yontan Field got 6 Sallys by AAA and crash landings, plus 5 others by AAA; the day CAP on the morning of the 25th destroyed 48. There were 3 suicide hits and 1 near miss on 4 ships from 0020 to 0330; and 7 suicide hits plus 1 near miss on 7 ships from 0615 to 1200.

About 2250 6 Sallys attempted to land on Yontan; AAA got 5, and a 6th crashed, wheels up. An estimated 22 Japs from the Sallys attacked parked planes with incendiary grenades and demolition charges, destroying 4 transports, 1 fighter, 2 bombers, with 2 transports damaged. ComGen 10 reports 25 aircraft damaged on Yontan. A 70,000 gallon gas dump was burned. The N-8 and E-7 runways were inoperational until 0800 because of debris from exploding planes. On Yontan we had 1 killed in action and 9 wounded; ComGen 10 reports 12 Japs killed. Tanks and foot patrols were combing the area for the remnants. One bomb hit a Naval dispensary dugout on IE SHIMA with an estimated 25 KIA and 35 WIA.

The TAF sent 28 F-47s to strike KYUSHU on the afternoon of the 24th. They bombed and rocketed KUSHIRA, MIYAZAKI, and KANOH; shot down 3-4 planes and shot down 1 George on the return to base.

1 small AK was damaged south of KOREA by FAM 1 aircraft on the 25th.

Including tomorrow night's mining mission, there will have been 90 B-29s engaged in mining in 3 missions on 3 successive nights. The SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS continue as a prime target.

69 P-51s escorted by B-29s hit TOKORAZAWA and MATSUDO dromes (20 miles NW and 10 miles NE of TOKYO) from 1230-1345. They shot down 8 enemy aircraft, with 1 damaged and scored 10-3-56 on the ground.
25 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Photos taken on the 25th through haze and smoke show an additional 3.2 sq.mi. of TOKYO destroyed. Considerable additional damage is probable when clearer photographs can be taken.

JCS 242237 (pink) fixes responsibility for civil censorship in OLYMPIC and CORONET on CINCPAC.

Cincpac Adv 250507 (pink) requests that concurrence given by Admiral Sherman in telephone conversation with Admiral Cooke concerning operational control of gunfire support be held in abeyance.

26 May (Guam date)

Rains have reduced 10th Army zone of action to a quagmire. During the night 25-26 May the 6th MarDiv repulsed a counterattack. The 26th was spent chiefly in organizing front line positions. Foot bridges across the ASATO RIVER have been washed out. However, one Bailey bridge remains intact. On the right flank 1 Co. from the 184th InfRegt attacked to the south in order to strengthen our ASATO hills position. One hill 1200 yards east of TAIWA was captured. During the past two days about 1,000 mines have been cleared in the areas south and west of YONABARU. Artillery and planes are taking action against what may be large scale troop movements south of SHURI.

Additional data on damage from raids on 24/25th: LSM 135, previously reported beached, has been abandoned; BARNEY (APD 29), badly damaged, beached at KERAMA; BATES (APD 47), hit by two suicides, capsized during salvage operations.

On 24-25 May TF 57 dropped eighty tons of bombs on installations at SAKISHIMA GUNTO and left all fields unserviceable on departure. No aircraft encountered.

All three groups of TF 58 have rendezvoused and are fueling on a northerly course today.

Amplifying reports from P-47 pilots who attacked TRUK airfields at low altitude on the 23rd indicate that only 3 planes were possibly operational, and that 2 of these were shot up and probably destroyed. The Irving, reported several times from photographs, was observed to be on jacks, although it had been recently moved.

There were no additional enemy air attacks after 1200 on the 25th. It is now estimated that over 200 enemy aircraft took part. The final score of enemy aircraft destroyed, as reported by CTF 51 for the period 1300/24 to 1200/25 stands at 166, a jump of 55 over yesterday, distributed as follows: CAP, 94; ships guns, 30; shore AA, 27; suicides (hits and misses), 15. Included in the above totals were 34 enemy aircraft shot down by P-47s of the 316th group who encountered the enemy force on the morning of the 25th during an aborted strike at KYUSHU. We lost no planes in air combat in these encounters.

CG, TAF reported that on 26 May 455 aircraft of that force were present on OKINAWA and IE SHIMA fields.

On the 25th and 26th 439 B-29s bombed TOKYO with 3700 tons of incendiaries in what Wing Commander says was the most successful mission yet. 6 B-29s are known lost and 19 others are missing, and presumed lost over the target.

- Continued -
26 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

GHQ S/PA 251102 (pink) discusses differences between CINCPOA and CINCAFPAC in command relationships for OLIMPTC.

JCS 252158 (pink) constitutes the directive for OLIMPTC Operation and defines responsibilities of CINCPOA and CINCAFPAC.

Com3rdFlt 252217 (pink) outlines considerations favoring ENIWEJOK as fleet anchorage in support of KEELBLOCKS and other operations to the north.

Cincpac Adv 252315 (pink) concurs in the assignment of the Army Fighter Command at IWO JIMA to 20th Air Force.

Com5thFlt & Com3rdFlt 260231 (pink) jointly recommend Cincpoa Op-Plan 4-45 be placed in effect 2400 (-9) 27 May.

Cincpac Adv 260342 (pink) requests early comment on feasibility of occupying CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO using only Marines.

Cincpoa Adv 260843 outlines requirements for combat CVEs which are set at 30 for combat purposes and 40 for transports.

Cincpac Adv 260930 (pink) recommends the establishment of a U.S. commercial airline from the West Coast to AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND and ultimately to GUAM and MANILA.

27 May (Guam date)

Report from ComGen 10 was not received.

In addition to the normal fire support on the 26th, NEW YORK (BB 34), VINCENNES (CL 64) and NEW ORLEANS (CA 32) fired on troop concentrations moving in open country south of SHUEN, killing an estimated 500. RALPH TALBOT (DD 390) destroyed 2 native boats filled with troops armed with explosive charges and grenades off NAKAGUSUKU WAN. PC 1603 was hit by two suicide planes and abandoned.

At midnight last night Com3rdFlt relieved Com5thFlt in command of the naval forces in the combat area.

16 P-47s attacked TRUK at low level on the 27th. 9 B-24s bombed MARCUS from 7200-9000 feet on the 26th.

49 B-25s attacked fuel plants, railroad yards, and targets of opportunity on FORMOSA on the 26th.

The only new air attack reported at OKINAWA was a small one at 1545/26th during which 2 suicide hits were scored on PC-1603. The CAP splashed 3 enemy aircraft during this attack, plus 3 others in the morning. Delayed reports indicate that ships guns shot down 4 more enemy aircraft during the heavy attacks of the 24th-25th.

The TAF gave diminished close support on the 26th because of bad weather. Planes of this force have now shot down 371 enemy aircraft, including 75 during the attacks of the 24th-25th. 1 pilot is missing from the 25th.

- Continued -
27 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 58 reports 5 enemy aircraft shot down on the 25th, 4 of them near the force.

Attacks on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO continued on the 26th by TU 52.1.1.

FAW 18 planes sank 1 FTC and 3 fishing boats, probably sank 1 75-foot diesel trawler, and damaged 2 SD on the 27th. 1 search plane failed to return from patrol.

One plane of FAW 1 sank 5 small ships and damaged 4 more.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in FOA 18 March to 30 April, inclusive: 3,227.
From 1 May to date: TF 58 - 330, TF 51 - 516, TF 57 - 29, TF 92 - 27, TG 50.5 - 13, 20th AAF - 139, TF 94 - 10; total - 1,064.

JCS 250128 (pink) describes proposal made by U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the British concerning assumption by the British of control of the SWPA.

MacArthur 261634 concurs in CinCPac 240600 outlining procedure for releasing Army units to CINCPAC.

CinCPac Adv 262315 (pink) announces assumption by Com3rdFlt of control of Commander RYUKYUS forces and forces heretofore in the 5th Fleet.

CinCPac Adv 270117 (pink) announces that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed Operation OLYMPIC.

CinCPac Pearl 270141 requests ComGen Ten to report unloading rate at OKINAWA which is now twenty-one days behind schedule.

CinCPac Adv 270540 directs ComAirPac to designate two VPB(HL) Squadrons for NorPac.

CinCPac Adv 270541 requests concurrence of CINCSWPA in reduction of 7thFlt VPB(HL) Squadrons from six to four.

CinCPac Adv 270633 directs ComGen Ten to accelerate airfield construction on IE SHIMA.

CinCPac Adv 270725 provides that clearance for all visitors to OKINAWA must be made through CinCPAC.
During the 27th and 28th advances were again made on both flanks with the center of the Army lines, north of SHURI, practically static. On the right the 6th MarDiv launched an attack before dawn on the 28th pushing south against rifle and MG fire occupied all of that portion of NAHA west of the canal which runs north and south through the center of the city. The 1st MarDiv making its main effort on its right captured the town of ASATO. On its left flank the Division reached the crest of a hill 100 yards west of ISHIMA twice only to be driven back by heavy enemy fire. Elements of the division are still attacking in this sector. The front lines of the 77th and 96th InfDivs remained static throughout the day. Patrols sent out in front of our lines received heavy fire indicating that there is no lessening of resistance by the Japs in the SHURI positions. The 7th InfDiv pushed its lines farther south into OZATA HILLS and patrols, against virtually no opposition, ranged far ahead of the front lines being reported in the vicinity of TERA, KAMIZATO and SHINZATO.

Casualties, 2400 27th: Enemy - KIA 59,055 (Estimated); POWs 1,323. Own - KIA 51, MIA 227, MIA 4; total - 282.

In persistent Jap air attacks at OKINAWA on the 27th, the night of the 27-28th and the morning of the 28th, a total of 15 ships were hit. One sank, twelve remained operable.

53 SWP B-25s used about 50 tons in striking at factories, railroad yards, and towns on the southern part of FORGUSA. 4 P-38s destroyed 4 locomotives and 4 trucks.

During the 25 hours from 0730 on the 27th to 0830 on the 28th an estimated 150 enemy aircraft attacked the OKINAWA area in 56 raids of 2-4 planes each. Incomplete figures indicate that 79 were destroyed including suicides. Determined efforts were made to penetrate our transport area defenses and reach the heavy ships, but again DDs and other small ships took the brunt of the attacks. From 0730-1130 on the 27th an estimated 25 enemy aircraft attacked from the N and NE in spite of foul weather. 16 were destroyed (CAP3, ships' guns 3, 5 suicides). From 1700 attacks continued all night in bright moonlight until 0630 on the 28th. During the night the CAP destroyed 7, ships' guns got 13, and 8 were suicides. (Total - 26). After daylight TF 38 CAP shot down 15 and the TAF CAP got 20. Final breakdown: CAP's 45; ships' guns 21; suicides 13, for a total of 79.

Direct air support on the 27th was hampered by bad weather. 65 sorties were flown.

FAW 1 Privateers on the 27th sank 1 DE or DD (described as dead in the water, minus bow), 1 SD (described as damaged), and 1 large AK (described as damaged), for a total of 7 ships sunk and 3 damaged, south of KOREA. On the 28th Privateers shot down 1 Nate in foul weather. 2 Privateers were kept on the ground because of lack of gassing facilities.

FAW 15 planes probably sank 1 SG and 1 FTD west of HONSHU on the 28th.

On the 28th 46 P-51s attacked KASUMIGAURA Airfield, 30 miles NE of TOKYO, claiming 1 airborne enemy aircraft destroyed, 5 destroyed or probably destroyed on the ground, and 35 damaged on the ground. 1 P-51 was lost over the target.

Photographs taken on the 28th showed that the 2 heavy 21 BomCom incendiary attacks of 23-24 and 25-26 May had destroyed 13.6 sq. mi. of TOKYO. A total of 51.3 sq. mi. or 46% of the city of TOKYO has now been destroyed.

- Continued -
26 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpac Adv 230058 (pink) informs Cominchi concerning plans for the use of ENIWETOK by 3rdPlt.

Cincpac Adv 230059 (pink) requests that all matters on deployment of naval combatant forces in PUA be referred by Cominchi to Cincpac rather than to AirPac or other type commanders.

Cincpac Adv 230124 (pink) approves visit of General Casey and requests exact date of General Chamberlain's proposed visit.

22 May (Guam date)

During the 28th patrols from the 6th MarDiv crossed over to ONOYAMA ISLAND in NAHA HARBOR. During the night 28-29th engineers constructed three bridges across the canal in NAHA and by the 29th all of NAHA north of the harbor had been captured with the exception of scattered pockets of resistance. Pushing to the SE the division made gains of approximately 900 yards. In the 1st MarDiv ZA "Q" Co., 1st Bn., 5th Marines captured Shuri Castle. Japs were found swimming in the moat. The castle, itself, has been used as the headquarters of the 32nd Jap Army and was the hub of the SHURI defensive position. To the north the left flank of the 1st MarDiv and the entire front lines of the 77th InfDiv remained static. During the night of the 28th, the 96th InfDiv repulsed a Jap counter attack, preceded by a 40 minute Jap artillery concentration. The 7th InfDiv repulsed a counter attack on its left flank and killed swimmers attempting to land behind the division lines. A reconnaissance unit in a LCI skirted the coast from YONABARU to the southern tip of the island, firing on targets of opportunity with no retaliatory fire being received.


In raids at OKINAWA on evening of 28th, SHUBRICK (DD 639) was hit by a suicide and was towed to KIHAMA HEUNTO.

2 groups of TF 58 remain to east of OKINAWA. TG 38.3 departed operating area for LYTE to arrive forenoon of 1 June, except for RANDOLPH which comes via GUAM to disembark V.Adm. Mitscher.

Vice Admiral McCain has assumed command of TF 38.

At FORMOSA on the 28th 39 B-25s bombed fuel and sugar plants and 3 P-51s destroyed 1 locomotive and damaged 15 boxcars.

120 B-24s with P-51 escort are scheduled to hit TAKAO installations on the 30th.

On the 28th the TAF splashed 17 more enemy aircraft for a 2-day total of 40; late reports credit ships AI with 18 more kills, and 2 more suicides are reported. The 2-day total of enemy aircraft destroyed now stands at 116. CTF 31 reports that suicides continued to cause the greatest damage, but an increase in the frequency of torpedo attacks was noted. Only 1 Baka was noted, on a Betty shot down by the CAP.

- Continued -
29 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

TAF intruders were over KYUSHU during the night and early morning of 28-29th. TG 32.1 continued to attack the SAKISHIMA GUNTO, and reports losing 2 VF with pilots on the 27th. 3 fishing boats were sunk north of MIYAKO.

On the 26th there were 111 close support sorties from TF 38, TG 32.1 and TG 99.2.

FAW 1 sent 2 Privateers up the eastern coast of KOREA to 39-00 N during which 1 medium AK was sunk. PBM's sank 2 small AK and probably sank 1 SD.

Com FAW 1 reports that from 21-27 May inclusive FAW 1 planes sank 5,470 tons and damaged 3,180 tons of enemy shipping. 2 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

510 B-29s were airborne against YOKOHAMA on the 29th, 35 were early returns, leaving 475 effective. 7 B-29s were lost. 97 escorting P-51s met 140 moderately aggressive and very maneuverable enemy fighters. The P-51s claim 26 destroyed. 3 P-51s were lost.

Com3rdPhib 232356 (pink) estimates that seizure of CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO can be accomplished without occupation of NINGPO PENINSULA.

Cincpea Adv 290244 directs that all OSS requests for personnel, intelligence material and utilization of POMs be submitted to Cincpea.

Cincpea Adv 290246 (pink) requests ComGenAFFCA to coordinate with CINCAFPAC the deployment of all non-VLR aviation units for deployment in the RYUKYUS.

Cincpea Adv 290331 (pink) confirms movement of Acorn 54 in 15th echelon scheduled for development of carrier pool.

Cincpac Adv 290519 (pink) replies to Com3rdFlt 280929 (yellow) by referring to Cincpea 051250 (pink).

Cincpae Adv 290659 (pink) requests all movements from the ETO for discharge in PCA ports be referred to Cincpea.

Cincpae Adv 290718 (pink) requests comment from ComMarGils Area concerning ability of ENIWETOK to support fast carrier groups.

Cincpea Adv 290858 (pink) announces plan for entry of submarines into JAPAN SEA and requests continuance of mining blockade of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

Cominch & CNO 291605 (pink) indicates training operation FIREBREAK will not be conducted.

Chu
The 6th MarDiv pushed forward slowly after being held up by an enemy pocket on the eastern edge of Naha. Elements of the 1st MarDiv which yesterday occupied ruins of Shuri Castle repulsed enemy infiltration attempts during the night and raised the American flag on the highest point of the SHURI battle grounds. The 77th InfDiv dispersed a night counter attack with artillery. ISHIMA was captured plus high ground 500 yards east of SHURI. At dark the division was engaged in very heavy fighting attempting to make a junction with the 1st MarDiv in SHURI. The 96th InfDiv against opposition which was generally light captured ISHIMA and a group of mutually supporting hills northeast of SHURI which the enemy had defended stubbornly for 19 days. The 7th InfDiv made advances ranging from 300 to 800 yards. Patrols from the division have reached the vicinity of TENEK TOWN on CHINESE PENIN-SULA.

Casualties as of 2400 29 May: Enemy - KIA 61,066; POWs 731 Military, 613 Laborers. Own: KIA 59, WIA 236, MIA 8; total - 303.

Fast carriers augmented local air support and sent strikes to northern RYUKYUS. CVEs struck SAKISHIMA. Usual fire support.

16 P-47s strafed 4 airfields at TRUK on the 30th finding no airborne enemy aircraft, and only 2 on the ground.

10 B-24s bombed MARCUS from 10,000 - 13,000 feet.

On the 29th bad weather and rain allowed only isolated enemy raids, 1 of which came from the SW for the 1st time in several days. 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed during the day. 1 twin-engine enemy aircraft during the afternoon eluded the CAP by superior speed. CVE planes continued attacks on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO, and TF 38 planes attacked AMAMI. Close support by TF 38, TG 99.2 and TG 32.1 totaled 140 sorties (45 tons, 469 rockets).

COMNABS OKINAWA reports that from 1-29 May inclusive, 499 carrier planes landed at Yontan for refueling, rearming, minor battle damage repairs and because of being weathered out of the carriers. On the heaviest day 51 planes landed.

Naval casualties to date total 1,075 killed, 3,422 wounded, 1,400 missing. From 17-29 May inclusive 382 enemy aircraft including suiciders were destroyed by CAP, ship and shore guns, and interceptors.

FAW 1 planes on the 30th damaged 1 SD and destroyed a 2nd. A FAW 18 PV shot down a Topsy off SHIONO MISAKI and damaged a radio tower on O SHIMA.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in POA 18 March to 30 April - 3,227. From 1 May to date: TF 38 - 345, TF 31 - 626, TF 37 - 29, TF 92 - 54, TG 30.5 - 14, 20th AAF - 150, TF 94 - 10; total - 1,228.

CINCPAC Adv 290250 concurs with limitations with Cominrich proposal to arrange transfer of Japanese naval personnel for hospital ship through POA by air.

CINCPAC Adv 290901 magazine stowage for torpedo warheads on carriers and the elimination of torpedoes from escort carriers.

CINCPAC Adv 290903 cancels previous directives for movement of 41st Bomb Group and authorizes establishment of both 41st Bomb Group and MAG 14 at Kadena temporarily.
30 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cominch 292207 announces transfer of 4 Atlantic CVEs to TransRonPac and further that 3 British CVEs now assigned to TransRonPac must be released to British.

Cincpac Adv 300525 (pink) suggests that Japanese electronics industry be accorded first priority in carrier strikes against the Empire.

Cincpac Adv 300526 (pink) outlines principal categories for employment of BPF.

Cincpac Adv 300632 (pink) assigns first priority to low oblique photo missions of southern KYUSHU.

Cincpac Adv 300826 (pink) constitutes directive covering VLR ammunition stocks in MARIANAS.

Cincpac Adv 300829 (pink) recommends strongest possible representations be made to British for retention by PacFlt of 3 transport CVEs.

Cincpac Adv 301225 (pink) outlines projected employment of TF 37 and anchorages to be used by BPF.

CTF 31 301300 (pink) suggests employment of LCIs in lieu of 6 or 7 MTBs for air-sea rescue purposes at OKINAWA.

31 May (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv advanced about 1000 yards securing the entire north shore of NAHA HARBOR and overrunning KOBACHU TOWN and hill, in the area of the town, from which Japs had directed fire against the division during the past two days. The immediate objective of the division is the north bank of the KOKUBA RIVER. The 1st MarDiv closed on the Jap pocket in north SHURI and the WAMA hill country aided by air strikes. Patrols from the division were in visual contact with patrols of the XXIV Corps. In conjunction with the 1st MarDiv the 77th InfDiv closed in on the SHURI pocket from the NE against little resistance and brought its lines up to the NE edge of the town. The 96th InfDiv attacking west towards the Corps boundary captured hills south of SHURI. The 7th InfDiv captured hills to the NE of CHAN dominating the town.


One group of TF 38 is fueling; one group provides TCAP at OKINAWA.

117 P-24s attacked TAKAO. 3 others hit the southern tip of FORMOSA. 40 P-38s and 30 P-51s flew escort and attack missions.

TU 321.3 used 72 tons of bombs and 1191 rockets in attacks on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO on 29 & 30 May, sinking 3 fishing boats and damaging other targets. 2 planes were lost to AA.

FAW 1 planes on the 30th damaged 3 picket boats, 2 large transports, a light ship and a small oiler off the YANGTZE RIVER in the EAST CHINA SEA. Intense AA killed 1 man and wounded 2. On the 31st FAW 1 planes damaged a small AK and shot down 1 Tojo.
31 May (Guam date) (Cont'd)

FAW 18 planes on the 31st sank 1 and damaged 2 SD, damaged 1 FTD, shot down 2 Pete's and damaged 1 Grace. A PBJ from IWO scored 3 rocket hits on an unidentified 150-foot ship south of HONSHU.

509 B-29s took off at 0640 on the 1st to attack the OSAKA urban area with incendiaries. 49% were effective. 145 P-51s were scheduled to escort.

Coverage of YOKOHAMA shows the principal portion of the city virtually destroyed. New damage totals about 6.9 sq. mi, representing 34% of the built-up portion of the city. Total damage to YOKOHAMA is now 8.9 sq. mi.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in POA 18 March to 30 April: 3,227. 1 May - 31 May: TF 38 - 345, TF 31 - 627, TF 37 - 29, TF 93 - 54, TG 30.5 - 14, 20th AAF - 155, TF 94 - 10; total - 1,234.

SecNav (Dir PubRel) 302100 announces new policy concerning release of damage to vessels on arrival at PEARL or West Coast.

Com7thFlt 310020 informs CINCSTPA that CINCPAC approves agreement of 16 May covering SWPA air support for CHINA Theater.

Cincpac Adv 310236 (pink) concurs in CINCBFF 300110 in decommissioning of EE craft.

ComGen 10 310334 (pink) announces adoption of additional title of Headquarters 10th Army and RYUKYUS Area for exclusive use with respect to RYUKYUS area matters.

Cincpac Adv 310343 requests that PacDiv ATC modify their June air transport schedule.

Cincpac Adv 310425 outlines repairs and alterations desired in 4 Atlantic CVEs to be transferred to PacFlt.

Cincpac Adv 311251 (pink) requests ComGenFAMPac to direct ComGen 5th Phib Corps to report to ComGen 6th Army by dispatch for purposes of OLYMPIC planning.

1 June (Guam date)

In spite of recent rainfall of 11 inches and adverse terrain conditions the Japs SHURI position has been broken up and the 10th Army is driving and realigning its divisions towards the south end of the island. The 6th MarDiv drove south to the bank of the KOKUBA RIVER seizing high ground in its advance. Patrols have crossed the river and are probing to the south. There is considerable Jap activity reported between NAHA airdrome and NAHA KO. The 1st MarDiv completed the capture of WANA hills and began the mopping up of SHURI. The division drove south 2000 yards to hills overlooking NAHA-TONABARU ROAD. The 24th Corps is now reorganizing and beginning to shift the zone of action of the 96th Div to the south where it will move to the west of the 7th Div. The 7th InfDiv swung all its units to the south and drove a wedge further into the OZATO hills. Indications at present are that the Japs are preparing their final line of resistance across the island from ITOMAN eastward to HANAGUSUKU.

- Continued -
1 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Own: Report not complete.

In view of prospective enemy air attacks with the advent of better weather, 
IHEYA SHIMA landing was postponed to the 3rd.

Both groups of TF 38 are in the operating area today. TG 38.4 is scheduled 
to launch a long range fighter sweep over southern KYUSHU fields. TG 38.1 will continue 
neutralizations at SAKISHIMA.

A red alert at IWO from 0250 to 0415 was caused by 3 or 4 unidentified enemy 
aircraft attacking from the north with a few incendiaries. 3 were killed and 19 wounded, 5 seriously.

116 B-24s attacked FORMOSA on the 31st with 316 tons. 100 P-51s and P-38s destroyed 14 locomotives and damaged a number of locomotives, railroad cars, trucks, and busses. 24 B-25s achieved good destruction at GIRAN TOWN.

Only 1 air raid closed the OKINAWA area and 3 planes were shot down. TU 32.1.3 attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO with 39 tons and 419 rockets, sinking 4 boats, and losing 1 VT. 2 F4Us and 3 P-47s are missing from the 30th, and 2 F4Us collided on the 31st. Close support included 140 sorties (94 tons, 637 rockets, 4 Napalm). TRMs dropped food and water to front bases.

On 31 May 256 day fighters and 26 night fighters of the TAF were in commission (out of 364 and 42 present).

FAW 18 planes sank 1 SC off IPO CAPE, and FAW 1 planes damaged 1 tug and 1 oil barge north of SHANGHAI.

148 P-51s were airborne to escort the B-29 strike on OSAKA on the 1st. 98 aborted because of weather, 23 were over the target from 1120-1200, finding no airborne opposition. 27 P-51s are missing. 421 B-29s bombed OSAKA, 12 hit other targets, 45 have not reported.

Cincpoa Adv 302308 regrets that it is impracticable to authorize visit to OKINAWA of Mr. Luce and party.

ComGen 10 311715 summarizes estimated unloading rates at OKINAWA.

Cincpoa Adv (Originator: Maj. Gen. Chamberlin) 010042 (pink) outlines proposal for withdrawal of two Army divisions from OKINAWA and cancellation of Phase 3D ICEBERG.

CINCPAC 011014 (pink) concurs in proposals contained in Cincpoa 010042 concerning withdrawal of two divisions from OKINAWA and cancellation of Phase 3D ICEBERG.

2679
2 June (Guam date)

A respite of 48 hours from heavy rains has greatly aided artillery support. The 6th MarDiv sent an Amphibious Reconnaissance Co across the KOKUBA estuary to reconnoiter the area north of NAHA Airfield. No active defenses were found though numerous caves occupied by civilians were located. The 1st MarDiv pushed south approximately 1000 yards and overran a large ammunition dump in bringing its front lines just south of the NAHA-YONABARU ROAD. The 24th Corps received light artillery fire and small infiltration attempts during the night. The 77th InfDiv remained to the north patrolling and mopping up in rear areas. The 96th InfDiv, now moving south, cleaned up CHAN and reached northern part of TERA. The 7th InfDiv seized OGUSUKU, met heavy resistance in hills west of IMASOMI, and moved south of SHIZATO.


11 B-24s attacked TRUK on the 2nd. 111 B-24s, 60 P-38s and 20 P-51s attacked FORMOSA targets.

Only 1 enemy plane penetrated to the shipping areas on the 1st and it was shot down. P-47s attacked KYUSHU and CVE planes continued attacks on the SAKUSHIMA GUNTO. 135 close support sorties were flown (46 tons, 90 rockets). A Dumbo picked up 5 men from 3 ditched planes.

PAA 1 planes sank 1 SD in HAICHOW WAN (MW SHANGHAI). A PB2Y crash-landed in KAGOSHIMA KATAN (southern KYUSHU) to rescue a ditched pilot, and was unable to take off. 40 minutes later another Dumbo landed in the midst of enemy fire and rescued the first survivor plus the whole PB2Y crew, sinking the PB2Y.

PBJs damaged a 200-ft. minesweeper south of NAGOYA, and left an unidentified 300-ft. vessel dead in the water in SURUGU WAN. Rockets were used.

TG 36/4 fighters swept southern KYUSHU airfields on the 2nd, shooting down 2 planes and destroying 11 with 23 damaged on the ground.

Com3rdFlt 011157 (pink) requests submarine mine reconnaissance inside 100-fathom curve in certain areas off the coast of HONSHU in order to permit close offshore bombardment.

Com3rdFlt requests 1 division of 2200-ton DMS's for assignment to TF 38.

Cincpae Adv 012309 approves the temporary diversion of construction troops on OKINAWA to maintenance of combat troop supply line.

Cincpae Adv 020034 (pink) defers Phase 3D ICEBERG indefinitely.

Cincpac Adv 020035 constitutes OpOrd 6-45 for bombardment of JALUIT ATOLL by NEVADA and escorts.

ComSubPac 020317 (pink) reports that there are no properly equipped submarines for mine reconnaissance except the 9 about to enter the JAPAN SEA.

ComPhibsPac 020600 (pink) comments on Com7thPhib's proposed amphibious training schedule.

Cincpae Adv 020607 (pink) requests immediate study to determine communication requirements for naval installations ashore in OLYMPIC.

-Continued-
The XXIV Corps again drove rapidly south, the 7th InfDiv placing troops in the SE coastal plain, cutting off CHINEN PENINSULA. The Jap forces are now split and it is believed that the bulk of the remaining Japs are in the southwestern end of the island. The 96th InfDiv gained 500-1200 yards securing TERA and KAMIZATO. On the right flank the 1st MarDiv advanced 800-1000 yards against heavy MG and mortar fire with its farthest penetration to Hill 87 200 yards north of KANARA. No report concerning the 6th MarDiv. RCT 8, from the 2nd MarDiv, landed on IHEIA SHIMA unopposed at 0945, 3 June. A 1000 yard beachhead was quickly established and secured. 3 BLTs plus artillery and tanks are ashore and advancing on the 0-1 line. Unloading is being expedited with surf and beach conditions satisfactory.

Progress of troops ashore has permitted initiation of minesweeping and hydrographic work preparatory to establishing unloading facilities at YONABARU WAI, BATEK KO and NAHA HARBOR.

Today and tomorrow one group of TF 38 fuels each day.

37 B-24s, 45 P-38s and 25 P-51s attacked FORMOSA on the 2nd.

TU 32.1.3 attacked SAKISHIMA on both the 1st and 2nd shooting down 2 enemy aircraft, strafing several small craft, and bombing and rocketing buildings, runways, and dispersal areas. The Japs continued repairing runways as soon as they were hit.

There were no enemy air raids at OKINAWA up to midnight on the 2nd. During the night an F6F(N) splashed 1 Irving, and on the 3rd TAF planes shot down 25 enemy aircraft at unreported locations. 1 TAF plane was lost. Close air support on the 2nd was furnished by 83 sorties (5 tons, 208 rockets, 43 Napalms).

FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD off KII SUIDO, sank 1 FTC and damaged a picket boat south of HAMAMATSU, sank 1 small AK and damaged a lugger and a patrol craft off SHIKOKU, and sank 1 FTD NE of TOKYO. FAW 1 planes destroyed 2 float planes south of KOREA.

On the 3rd planes of TG 38.4 found bad weather and strong airborne opposition. Some 20 airborne Japs provided aerial interception of the highest quality in both pilots and planes, and prevented attacks on KOKUBU, CHIRAN, KAGOSHIMA and TOJIMBARA. 6 enemy aircraft were shot down and 3 destroyed on the ground at MIYAKONOJO and RONCHI. We lost 3 F4U for a two day total of 6 combat and 3 operational losses.

Photos on the 3rd showed 220 enemy aircraft on KANOYA, KANOYA EAST, and KUSHIRA, although pilots sighted few. The force was not molested; the closest bogey turned away at 30 miles.
3 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Cincpoa Adv 03024 (pink) approves the transfer to the PHILIPPINES of 1 flight of 36th Combat Mapping Squadron (Army).

Cincpoa Adv 030257 amends controlling policy for ATC schedules from GUAM to OKINAWA.

ComSubPac 03041 (pink) requests Fleet Air Wing ONE to cover and provide diversion for submarines passing through TSUSHIMA STRAITS by attacking anti-submarine vessels.

Cincpoa Adv 030824 (pink) approves the transfer to the PHILIPPINES of 1 flight of 86th Combat Mapping Squadron (Army).

Cincpac Adv 031207 passes to CINCPAC certain dispatches concerning attachment of Naval Construction Battalions to the 5th Amphibious Corps for OLYMPIC.

4 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv supported by NGF landed on ORAKU PENINSULA. A 1200 yard beachhead was quickly established and the 4th Marines pushed south to capture the northern half of NAHA Airfield by nightfall advancing through heavy rains along flooded runways. Other units of the division captured ONOYAMA ISLAND and a bridge has been constructed across the harbor with the island being used as a connecting link. The 1st MarDiv gained 400-1100 yards during the day capturing Hill 107, the key of the approaches to the town of IWA. The 77th InfDiv has moved south to the vicinity of CHAN in order to cover the right flank of the XXIV Corps. The 96th InfDiv gained 900-1200 yards pushing its right flank to the northern outskirts of IWA, from here its front lines extend to the east along high ground to a point NW of MEGA. The assault elements of the division were being supplied by air drop. The 7th InfDiv cleaned out MEGA, reached positions on the outskirts of ANAGUSUKU, advanced SW to MINATOGA and then to GUSICHAN and approached NAKEME. Mopping up was progressing satisfactorily on CHINEN PENINSULA with 1000 more civilians coming under Tenth Army control. NAKEME SHIMA was secured at 1245 4 June.

Casualties as of 2400 3 June: Enemy - 64,600; POWs 465 Military, 644 Laborers. Own: KIA 12, WIA 82, MIA 2 - total 96.

Development of harbors at NAKAGUSUKE WAN continues with main entrance practically closed off by nets. Most naval activities at OKINAWA were suspended or curtailed in preparation for possible typhoon. TG 38.1 suspended fueling and TG 38.4 left the operating area on southeasterly courses.

13 B-24s attacked MARCUS on the 4th; 75 B-24s hit FORMOSA on the 3rd.

On the 3rd 45 Jap aircraft were destroyed, out of an estimated 75 attacking in 18 raids. The heaviest raids came in the early afternoon. Most were from the north, and most were below 10,000 feet. TAF planes splashed 35, CVE planes 3, and ships splashed 7, including 1 suicide hit. In the largest single attack 25 Zekes came in at 17,000 feet, and 4 F4Us shot down 9 without loss to themselves. Some bombs were dropped on IE SHIMA airfields, with damage not reported.

- Continued -
4 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

During the 24 hours ending 032400 TAF planes flew about 400 sorties, including NCAP (3-6 VFN), DADCAP (24-52 VF), Day CAP (about 50 VF), RAFCAP (10 VF at all times from 0501-1810), AMAMI barrier patrol (8 P-47s) direct support for IHEYA and southern OKINAWA, supply drops (24 TBM) ASP, observation missions, photo missions. Through 3 June TAF planes have destroyed 495 enemy aircraft. Direct support, hampered by weather, was furnished by 139 sorties (20 tons, 398 rockets, 66 Napalm).

FAW 1 planes damaged a tanker south of KOREA. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SC and damaged 2 SC and 2 SD south of HONSHU. 1 of 15 attacking fighters was shot down and 2 others were damaged.

PBJs seriously damaged 1200 ft. ship with rockets off the HONSHU Coast, and scored hits in a 75 foot picket boat.

On the 5th 496 B-29s (excluding 29 early returns) took off for an incendiary attack on KOREA.

CinCBFF 040259 (pink) estimates that TF 37 will be ready to sortie from MANUS on 2 July or from LEXTE on 8 July.

ComGen 10 040325 is OpOrd 13-45 for capture and occupation of OKINAWA.

Cincpac Adv 040626 (pink) requests advice from Com7thFlt as to availability for OLYMPIC of forces now assigned to 7th Fleet.

Cincpac Adv 041223 (pink) approves deployment of the 414th Fighter Group at IWO JIMA.

Cincpac Adv 041231 (pink) summarizes results of conference with representatives of CINCAFPAC concerning OLYMPIC Operation.

5 June (Guam date)

CG 10th Army daily report not received.

Unloading operations at OKINAWA were secured and ships put to sea or were sent to protected anchorages on the 4th. Early yesterday morning the typhoon alert was lifted and normal conditions resumed.

TG 38.4 reported no storm damage.

TG 38.1 had considerable damage:

HORNET (CV 12 and BENNINGTON (CV 20) each lost 25 feet of flight deck and sustained damage to additional 25 feet.

DULUTH (CL 87) had her bow buckled upward from frame 21.

PITTSBURGH (CA 72) lost her bow to frame 26. Her bow was later found floating in good condition.

- Continued -
5 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

JOHN RODGERS (DD 574) has her main generator out.

BLUE (DD 744) steering by hand.

Other ships lost planes, boats and suffered minor damage.

TG 30.3 also took considerable damage:

CONKLIN (DE 439), heavily damaged, but can proceed on 1 engine and one boiler.

LUXEMBOURG VICTORY (AKE) has not been heard from but as of 0600/I 5th was not in trouble.

WATERMAN (DE 740) was also separated, but apparently has rejoined.

SALAMAUA (CVE 96) and WINDHAM BAY (CVE 92) had severe structural damage and are not operable as carriers. Other CVE took considerable damage to planes.

Com3rdFlt has formed TG 30.3 consisting of PITTSBURG (two sections) two ATF, DULUTH, CONKLIN, BLUE and 3 escorts en route GUAM at SOA 6 to 8 knots.

Liberators of FAW-18 joined up with 5 P-51's from IWO to attack an APD or DD north of CHICHI. The P-51's, homed in by the PB4Y's, scored 7-8 rocket hits and strafed the ship thoroughly. The PB4Y's bombed, scoring a near miss. When last seen the ship was heading 120 under her own power, trailing oil.

There were no air attacks on the OKINAWA area on the 4th. 40 direct support sorties were flown.

TU 32.1.3 attacked SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 3rd. 5 enemy aircraft (including 4 biplanes) were destroyed on the ground at NOBARA (MIYAKO), and 7 boats were damaged.

FAW-1 exploded 1 large fleet oiler off SASEBO, and believes it to have sunk; 1 SD was sunk, 1 beached, and 2 were left sinking.

For the week of 28 May to 3 June, inclusive, FAW-1 planes sank 1,785 tons of enemy ships, damaged 6,525 tons, and destroyed 5 enemy aircraft. Cumulative totals since coming to the area are 94,405 tons sunk, 91,205 tons damaged, 28 enemy aircraft destroyed, 16 enemy aircraft damaged.

FAW-18 destroyed 2 SD and 1 small FT, and damaged 1 SD and 1 PC.

Photographs show 3.3 square miles of new damage at OSAKA from the incendiary attack on the 1st. Total OSAKA damage is now 11.53 square miles, 18.7% of the built-up portion of the city.

On the 5th 446 B-29's bombed KOBEL.
5 June (Guam date)(Cont'd)

MARSHALL 021909 (pink) requests comment on desirability of immediate acceptance of 16,500 RAF engineers and 10 squadrons Lancasters.

CINCBPF 040107 (pink) requests provision of additional facilities at MANUS.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 041843 (pink) outlines proposed cover plan for OLYMPIC and requests comment.

CINCPAC ADV 050612 (pink) informs CINCBPF that sortie from MANUS should be made by TF 37 as early as repairs permit.

CINCPAC ADV 050616 outlines airfield construction standards at OKINAWA to CINCPPAC.

CINCPOA ADV 050658 (pink) contains recommendations to COMINCH against the deployment of RAF squadrons at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 050842 (pink) constitutes directive for provision of facilities at ENIWETOK to support fast carriers.

CINCPOA ADV 050845 requests authority from COMINCH to commission naval operating bases at KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK.

CINCPOA ADV 051209 (pink) outlines to COMINCH shipping requirements for OLYMPIC.

COM3RDFLT 040330 recommends daily photo coverage of Empire airfields and establishment of interprons at OKINAWA and IWO for interpretation purposes.

COMGENAAFPOA 050800 requests that all 7th Air Force and 7th Bomber Command pilot rehabilitation areas be made available for the same purpose for the 20th Bomber Command.

COM3RDFLT 050743 (pink) constitutes 3rd Fleet Op Plan 5-45 for sweeping a clear approach in the EAST CHINA SEA.

COM3RDFLT 050559 (pink) indicates Task Force 38 will withdraw to LEYTE about 12 June, departing 1 July for extensive operations, and directs that TG 30.8, operating at sea, should be reduced to minimum required for service to TF 31.
6 June (Guam date)

Development of supply lines on the 5th and improved weather conditions on the 6th aided ground movement, air support and artillery fire. On the right flank the 6th MarDiv secured NAHA Airfield. Patrols reached the town of GUSHI. An armored Amtrac Battalion took a small island of the northwestern tip of ORAKU PENINSULA. Elements of the 1st MarDiv were reducing a by-passed position in the vicinity of TOMUSU throughout the day. The drive south carried to SHINDAWAKU with patrols farther to the south meeting negligible resistance. The 77th InfDiv continued to cover the XXIV Corps right flank. The 96th InfDiv captured IWA on the 5th and on the 6th met moderate resistance in advancing to the northern outskirts of ARAGUSUKU on its right flank and TOMUI on its left flank. The division is now 1000 yards from the YAEJU-DAKE escarmment from which strong Jap resistance is expected. The 7th InfDiv captured ARAGUSUKU on the 5th and high ground in the vicinity of TOMUI on the 6th. Heavy resistance was being met southeast of GUSHICHAN. Mopping up on CHINEN PENINSULA was continuing satisfactorily.

Military Government reports that 148,000 civilians are now under its care. Casualties as of 2400 5 June:— Enemy: 65,677 killed, POWs - 594 military, 659 laborers. Own: WIA 250, KIA 47, MIA 1, total - 298.

In raids on the evening of the 5th, LOUISVILLE (CA 28) was hit by a suicide plane abreast her #1 stack causing considerable topside structural damage. MISSISSIPPI (BB 41) was hit aft of amidships, damaging her hull and blister for about 30 feet.

Fire support ships on the 5th, in addition to gun positions, concentrated on enemy troops. Many claimed killed. Frontline troops on the east are being supplied in part by landing craft shuttle service. Work is proceeding on clearing the ASATO RIVER for supply of 3rdPhibCorps by water.

IsCom IWO reports SHEEPSOOT (AOG 24) grounded and sank during the typhoon. LUXEMBOURG VICTORY has joined without damage. A search plane discovered an SC (hull number not stated, but believed to be the missing 1349) and gave her instructions to proceed. No definite word from ANCHOR (ARS 13). Intercept received from CTF 31 directing two LSTs to report their positions.

Weather cancelled heavy, medium and fighter strikes on the 5th at FORMOSA.

Ships shot down 3 planes and 2 others scored suicide hits in raids from the west and southwest between 1930 and 2030 on the 5th. Close support was held down because of weather. SAKISHIMA, hit on the 4th by TU 32.1.3, was weathered out on the 5th. 1 TAF pilot was rescued from a ditching, and 1 F6F(N) is missing. 10 tons of supplies were dropped.

Improved weather on the 6th permitted greater air support. TAF planes strafed ahead of ground troops, and TBMs flew 34 paradrops.

A FAW 1 Privateer shot down 1 Tony, and 2 PBMs, attacking 6 Jap planes, damaged 4, 75 miles NW of AMAMI. A seaplane landed 330 miles E of the N tip of LUZON to rescue all 12 members of a seaplane crew ditched on the 5th. Homing signals from the survivors had been received 200 miles and 2 hours and 20 minutes away by the rescue plane.

Strike photographs show fires scattered throughout the entire length of the KOBE target area. Half of the city is smoke obscured.

—Continued—
6 June (Guam date)(Cont'd)

441 effective B-29s (excluding 8 early returns) took off on the 7th to attack OSAKA with incendiaries. 25 B-29s take off at 1700 tomorrow to mine the east and west entrances to SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

CINCPOA 052220 (pink) requests CINCAFPAC to take action required concerning movement and re-equipment of Army divisions to be released from OKINAWA.

DEFCOM AF 20 060223 requests additional housing to meet urgent requirements for war correspondents.

CINCPAC 060230 (pink) indicates that mining of BUNGO SUIDO by DMs in support of OLYMPIC is risky but possible.

CINCPOA ADV 060512 (pink) informs CNO of plans for installation of mobile Loran station in KYUSHU during OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 060513 directs that plans be established by ComAir7thFlt for automatic search during typhoon weather.

COM3RDFLT 060611 (pink) outlines proposed employment of TF 37 with TF 38.

COMGEN TEN 060630 (pink) requests 24th InfRegt be assigned garrison duty at OKINAWA.

COMGENAAFPOA 060724 (pink) requests that the possibility of airfield sites at IHEYA and AGUNI be investigated.

CINCPOA ADV 060806 directs that DepCom 20th AF request for additional material for camp site for war correspondents be submitted to CINCPOA through customary channels.

GHQ SWPA 060930 (pink) proposes to the JCS basing RAF units on southeast OKINAWA or deferring their movement until they can move into Army Air Force fields.

CINCPOA ADV 061242 requests COMGENAAFPOA to screen more carefully the requests for visits to OKINAWA.

CINCPOA ADV 061243 (pink) requests early estimate of potential airfield sites on IHEYA and AGUNI.

COM3RDFLT 061247 (pink) is 3rdFlt OpPlan 6-45 for sweeping areas in EAST CHINA SEA for mines.

CINCPAC ADV 062241 (pink) directs Com3rdFlt to submit track of major 3rdFlt units and estimated track of typhoon from 3 - 6 June.

CINCPOA ADV 062242 (pink) authorized 3rdFlt to conduct a second strike on KYUSHU prior to return of 3rdFlt to LEYTE.

CINCPAC ADV 062243 (pink) confirms that 3rdFlt OpPlan 5-45 complies with Task One of CINCPOA 050619 for sweeping channel into EAST CHINA SEA.
7 June (Guam date)

Improved weather permitted tank and air support for infantry attacks on strongly fortified YABU-DAKE escarpment and OROKU PENINSULA. The left flank of the 6th MarDiv met heavy resistance. The right flank drove along the coast to a point opposite SERAGA-SHIMA. Farther inland GUSHI was reached. The 1st MarDiv secured hill 108, 500 yards west of DAKITON against determined opposition. The right flank of the division pushed close to the coast and was reported 900 yards N of TONMAN TOWN. The 96th InfDiv captured hills 600 yards NE of YUZA. The 7th InfDiv was meeting very heavy resistance in the GUSHICHAAN Area. The 32nd Inf from the 7th Div landed on O-SHIMA during the day. The island was secured by 1550 with only civilians being encountered.


Several RED alerts from OKINAWA were received last night. No report received from CTF 51. On the evening of the 6th there were more raids, and J.W. DITTER (DM31) was hit by 2 suicide planes.

Further report from IsCom IWO concerning storm damage discloses little other damage. 1 LCT was broached with but minor damage; 1 DD lost a man and whaleboat. All merships were escorted to sea and had no damage. SHEEPSCOT (ACG 24) may be salvagable. No damage to shore installations.

Com3rdFli reports details of damage to ships of TG 30.8. ATTU (CVE 102) and BOUGAINVILLE (CVE 100) had miscellaneous damage but still have operational flight decks. A total of 46 planes were destroyed and 70 damaged from these two and SALAMAUA and WINDHAM BAY. MILLICOMA (AO 73), SEBEC (AO 87) and CALIENTE (AO 53) had some structural damage. SHASTA (AE 6) had major part of her 16" projectiles damaged, when 700 tons of her ammunition shifted. 2 DE had minor damage. PITTSBURGH bow was still under tow last night, with another tug sent to assist. It is proceeding at 3 knots with an ETA at GUAM of the 19th. DULUTH and the rest of PITTSBURGH are apparently having no trouble, and are due at GUAM on the 10th.

TF 38 strikes KYUSHU with a long range fighter sweep over the target at 1130 on the morning of the 8th if the weather is favorable.

Yesterday a P-38 crashed into the flight deck of the RANDOLPH at anchor at LEYTE.

FAW 1 aircraft west of SASEBO on the 7th sank 2 small AK and left a 3rd sinking. North of SHANGHAI 1 SD was destroyed, 2 were burned, and a 4th was left sinking.

349 B-29s are known to have bombed the OSAKA urban area on the 7th. 133 P-51s escorted the B-29s. 2 enemy aircraft were shot down and 1 P-51 was lost.

3,227 enemy aircraft were destroyed in POA from 18 March to 30 April, inclusive. 1,354 have been destroyed from 1 May to date.

COMINCH & CNO 051538 dissolves the 10th Fleet and assumes direct command of all anti-submarine functions of the 10th Fleet.

CINCPOA ADV 060742 (pink) informs Cominchi of conference at MANILA for preparation of Joint Cover and Deception Plan for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 061244 (pink) approves Com3rdFli 060329 and directs withdrawal of TF 38 to LEYTE after strikes on KYUSHU on 8 June.

- Continued -
7 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH 062242 (pink) requests comment on CINCAFPAC 060930 concerning employment of RAF Lancasters at OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 070123 (pink) directs that Com3rdFlt arrange suitable radio diversion in combat area.

CINCPAC ADV 070151 describes to ComServRon 10 his duties at LEYTE for support of 3rdFlt and BPF.

CINCPAC ADV 070559 (pink) provides that the 8th Marine RCT of the 2nd MarDiv with accompanying replacements will remain under the operational control of ComGen 10 after capture of AGUNI.

CINCPAC ADV 070725 directs that torpedoes be removed from all CVEs.

CINCPAC ADV 070813 (pink) summarizes organization for providing weather service to 3rd Fleet.

CINCPAC ADV 070816 (pink) comments to Cominch on CINCAFPAC 060930 concerning proposal to base RAF Lancasters at OKINAWA.

COM5THFLT 072340 (pink) recommends that mines and equipment for laying by DMs be landed at OKINAWA to be available when desired.

8 June (Guam date)

The 1st MarDiv advanced unopposed approximately 1600 yards to the south bringing its front lines along the north bank of the MUKUE GAWA. Supplies were being brought by boat at a point 400 yards north of ITOMAN. The 6th MarDiv on OROKU PENINSULA again found heavy resistance from strong, organized defensive positions. Gains for the day were limited. However, the Japs remaining on the peninsula are now virtually surrounded. The lines of the 96th InfDiv remained static in front of the YAEJU-DAKE escarpment. The 7th InfDiv averaged gains of about 400 yards during the day reaching the outskirts of HANAGUSUKU against heavy fire.

Casualties as of 2400 7 June: Enemy: KIA 66,834; POWs 622 military, 670 laborers. Own: KIA 34, WIA 181, MIA 0; total - 215.

Progress on new unloading locations. ASATO CHANNEL nearly cleared. Minesweeping to MINATOGA completed. YONABARU approaches have been cleared and buoyed. Emergency supplies are now being landed at NAHA, though there is much clearing still to be done before it can be fully utilized. North HAGUSHI beaches are to be abandoned for all unloading except from LSTs.

Further storm damage reported by TG 38.1: BELLEAU WOOD (CVL 24) had a tractor get loose on her hangar deck, which did considerable damage. SAN JACINTO (CVL 30) received structural damage forward. MASSACHUSETTS (BB 59), ALABAMA (BB 60) and INDIANA (BB 58) had minor topside structural damage. BALTIMORE (CA 68) had structural damage to her bow structure. 3 other cruisers and 7 destroyers not previously reported had minor damage.

Com3rdFlt reported results of KYUSHU strike on the 8th as apparently highly successful.

- Continued -
8 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Heavy enemy air attacks were made on the 6th at OKINAWA from 1600 to 1730 from the north and from the southwest 1900-2030; 39 enemy aircraft were destroyed. 8 other enemy aircraft were shot down by TAF planes over KYUSHU. On the 7th attacks began at dawn, during which the NATOMA BAY was hit. In the evening, from 1800-2400 11 raids were made. Altogether throughout the day 12 planes were destroyed over OKINAWA. TAF KYUSHU sweeps shot down 14 more on the 7th, and the next day, shot down 11 over KYUSHU. In the KYUSHU attacks the Japs offered aggressive and skillful opposition, but no friendly planes were lost.

On the 7th 1 squadron of MAG 14 arrived at Kadena Field. Dumbos rescued 2 TAF pilots and 12 survivors from a special weather plane. 2 planes were missing from the 6th. 2 OS2U from the TENNESSEE, floating out of gas about 215 miles SE of MINAMI DAIITO, were finally located after extensive search. On the 6th and 7th there were 422 direct support sorties, using 168 tons of bombs, 417 rockets, 90 Napalms.

FAW 1 planes sank 1 medium AK off SHANGHAI, damaged 1 small AK, and shot down 3 planes on the 8th.

26 B-29s successfully laid 240 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and in FUKUOKA HARBOR on the 7th.

CTG 38.3 071147 reports crash of Army P-38 into RANDOLPH at LEYTE.

RANDOLPH 071247 reports Army P-38 crashing on her forward flight deck.

GHQ SWPA 071432 (pink) concurs in the release of 2 Navy Liberator Squadrons from 7thFlt and offers to release 3 PV squadrons in addition.

JCS 071603 requests recommendations on proposal for reorganization of theater Army-Navy petroleum procurement.

Cominich 072107 authorizes establishment of Naval Operating Bases at ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN.

ComGenFMFPac 072319 (pink) expresses desire to use 2nd MarDiv in lieu of 4th MarDiv for OLYMPIC.

Com3rdFlt 080250 (pink) expresses intention to withdraw TF 38 from the KYUKUS on 10 June.

CINCPAC ADV 080519 (pink) paraphrases for CinCBPF Com3rdFlt's plans for service areas and authorized BPF to draw bulk fuel at ENIWETOK.

CINCPOA ADV 080520 withholds approval for movement of RCM squadron to MARIANAS until an Army field can accommodate it.

COM3RDFT 080815 (pink) reports completion of KANOYA strike.

CINCPOA ADV 081229 established NOB's at KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK.

CINCPAC ADV 081520 (pink) directs Com3rdFlt to include railroad ferries as targets in strikes on HONSHU-HOKKAIDO areas.

CINCPAC ADV 081521 (pink) approves reequipment of 5 APA's as casualty evacuation ships but directs that they be employed during OLYMPIC for carrying amphibious troops in the assault echelon.
2 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv continued to compress the Japs in the pocket at the base of OROKU PENINSULA. The 1st MarDiv reconnoitered the approaches to KUNISHI RIDGE. The XXIV Corps continued its preparations for attack on the YAEJU-DAKE escarpment with a heavy pounding by NGF, artillery and air strikes. The 7th InfDiv attacked with its main effort on the left to seize Hill 95, 300 yards south of HANAGUSUKU. Strong patrols penetrated enemy positions on the division right flank and center for maximum gains of 700 yards against heavy MG and mortar fire.

First assault wave landed on AGUNI SHIMA 0612 (I) 9 June. Island secured at 1200 on the same day. No opposition and no casualties reported.

Summary of mopping up operations in the MARIANAS 27 May - 2 June:

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Rear Admiral Cobb relieved Rear Admiral Hall as SOPA HAGUSHI.

Yesterday TF 38 fueled. Battle cruisers bombarded OKINA DAITO. Planes from TF 38 struck MINAMI DAITO with no air opposition and found airfields there inoperational. Photographic assessment of the June 8th strike on KANOYA airfields confirms a minimum of 28 planes destroyed on the ground. The force is scheduled to leave for LEYTE today.

CruDiv ONE and DesDiv 114 in NorPac are scheduled to bombard MATSUWA at 1600 on the 10th. The bombardment will be followed by a sweep inside the northern KURILE CHAIN.

A heavy cruiser sighted on the 7th leaving BATAVIA has been sunk by TRENCHANT, British submarine operating under CTF 71.

Weather prevented heavy strikes on FORMOSA on the 8th.

FAW 1 planes sank a 1,000-ton AK and damaged 1 SC off SHANGHAI, left 1 SD sinking and damaged a 2nd. FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD and 1 FTC south of HONSHU.

297 effective B-29s took off to attack 5 aircraft plants and an army air arsenal in the TOKYO Area on the 10th.

CINCPOA ADV 090855 (pink) requests comments on proposal to capture KUME with 8th Marine RCT.

CINCPOA ADV 090857 (pink) reiterates recommendation that American Flag commercial airline to the South Pacific be established.
9 June (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADV 091339 agrees to employment of troops of Japanese ancestry in the main HAWAIIAN ISLANDS but recommends against such employment at positions west of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

10 June (Guam date)

On OROKU PENINSULA the 6th MarDiv continued to compress the remaining Jap pocket, reported to be held by Naval Construction troops. The Bailey bridge leading from ONOTAMA ISLAND to the SW shore of the harbor was shelled by enemy artillery with minor damage incurred. The 1st MarDiv attacked towards KUNISHI ridge. Three of 4 major outposts in front of the ridge were captured. The XXIV Corps began its attack to reduce the YAEJU-DAKE escarpment receiving fire from all types of Jap weapons. The 96th InfDiv gained 800-1000 yards. The 77th InfDiv made slow advances against rifle fire from HANAGUSUKU. A message drop from ComGen TEN called on the enemy commander to open negotiations by 1800(1) 11 June for the surrender of his forces.


In air raids of the 9th, no damage to our ships is reported. On the 10th, a suicide plane struck the W.D. PORTER (DD 579) in radar picket station 15. The ship sank about 3 hours after she was hit.

Harbor clearance is proceeding well. Preliminary survey of NAHA has been completed; the harbor is clear of mines and is in use by LCTs. Supplies for 24th Corps still being transported by water.

CVEs continue to neutralize SAKISHIMA; TF 38 is now retiring to LEYTE.

Weather cancelled all missions against FORMOSA.

60-70 Jap planes attacked OKINAWA on the 8th in 37 raids, with apparently no damage inflicted on our forces. Our CAP shot down 11 and a DD got 1. During the night 9/10, 14 heckler raids were made on the OKINAWA Area. CAP got 2, IE SHIMA AA 2, and a P-47 shot 1 dawn north of AMAMI. A few bombs hit land, firing fuel dumps at IE SHIMA and YONTAN. Our dusk CAP shot down 1 of our VF(N), and our AA wounded a pilot who was escaping from an F4U.

Air support on the 8th and 9th totalled 376 sorties, using 70 tons of bombs, 1751 rockets, and 26 Napalm bombs.

FAW 18 planes sank 1 SD; FAW 1 planes probably sank 1 SD and 1 SC, and damaged 3 SD and 1 SC.

P-47s attacking KYUSHU on the 10th shot down 17 enemy aircraft. In 1 melee 9 P-47s attacked about 50 enemy aircraft, shooting down 14 with no losses reported. Lt. Robert Stone got 5.

Photos show the KAWANISHI aircraft plant to be almost completely destroyed. 78% of the roof area is destroyed. The KAWASAKI plant showed little damage. 2 AICHI plants show respectively 96% and 52% destruction or damage. The SUMITOMO Light Metal Mfg. Co. at NAGOYA shows 3 large heavily damaged buildings.

(Continued)
10 June (Guam date)(Cont'd)

CINCPAC ADV 090657 directs that PCs and SCs remain the type responsibility of ComServPac since they are not basically amphibious types but will be assigned to operational control of ComPhibsPac for sufficient periods to permit training.

COMINCH & CNO 091847 requests current typhoon counter measures and plans for their improvement.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 091950 (pink) describes overall deception directive to be expected from Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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JOINT SECURITY CONTROL 091950 (pink) describes overall deception directive to be expected from Joint Chiefs of Staff.
11 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CFAW 1 reports that during the week of 4-10 June FAW 1 planes sank 14,075 tons of enemy shipping, damaged 7145, destroyed 3 enemy aircraft, and damaged 4 enemy aircraft. Damage inflicted since coming to the area totals 108,450 tons sunk, 98,350 damaged, 31 enemy aircraft destroyed. During the last week 1 PBM was lost, with all personnel recovered.

52 P-51s attacked TOKOROGAWA and ATSUGI airfields in the TOKYO Area, shooting down 2 enemy aircraft, and on the ground scoring 15 - 3 - 33. 2 other airfields were strafed. These attacks took place on the 11th. No P-51s were lost.

With the 3.4 sq. mi. of damage from the 7th raid, total damage to OSAKA is now 15.65 sq. miles. 24% of the built-up portion of the city. With the 4.3 sq. mi. of damage to KOBE from the 5th raid, total damage is now 8 sq. mi., 51% of the built-up portion of the city.

MACARTHUR 101320 (pink) requests review of proposed movement of 24th Infantry to OKINAWA in view of port congestion and presence of 1 MarDiv there.

CG USFCT 101516 (pink) proposes capture of an intermediate port on the CHINA COAST such as FORT BAYARD in LIUCHOW PENINSULA Area.

COMINCH & CNO 101620 (pink) requests comment on CG USFCT 101516 proposing capture of an intermediate port on the CHINA COAST.

CINCPOA ADV 110248 requests concurrence in the movement of 24th Inf Regt to OKINAWA notwithstanding the presence of 1 MarDiv.

CTF 31 110330 (pink) constitutes CTF 31 OpOrd A205-45 for reconnaissance of KUME.

MACARTHUR 110518 (pink) requests clearance for movement to OKINAWA of Brig. Gen. Hutchinson and air echelon of 14 C-46 transports.

CINCPOA ADV 110800 outlines purposes of conference to be held at PEARL concerning transport of aircraft by CVEs.

CINCPOAC ADV 110802 summarizes attrition sustained during OKINAWA campaign and damage inflicted on the enemy.

CTF 31 111210 (pink) constitutes Air Plan for strike against southern KYUSHU with purpose of concealing withdrawal of TF 38.

CINCPOA ADV 111300 (pink) concurs in movement of Gen. Hutchinson to OKINAWA and of air echelon subject to timing as determined by ComGen 10.

COMGEN TEN 111430 (pink) directs IsCom OKINAWA to comply with CINCPOA ADV 100231 concerning base development.
12 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv continues to close in on the Jap pocket on OROKU PENINSULA. An attempted Jap landing on ONOYAMA ISLAND during the night 11-12th was repulsed. The 1st MarDiv, after beating off Japs counterattacking with satchel charges, launched a night attack at 0330. Against surprisingly little opposition the division right flank reached the top of KUNISHI RIDGE after an advance of 1000 yards. At dawn the Japs directed very heavy fire on these troops and Marines on the ridge were forced to dig in. The division left flank consolidated its recently won position on Hill 69. The 96th InfDiv held on to its position on top of YAEJU-DAKE, seized YUZA and high ground 200 yards south of the town. A night attack by the 7th InfDiv gained 500 yards and brought elements of the division to the top of the escarpment on the east. On the division left advances were made in the HANAGUSUKU area supported by flame throwing tanks from Hill 95.

Casualties as of 2400 11 June: Enemy: KIA 72,957; POWs 731 military, 536 laborers. Own: KIA 67, WIA 359, MIA 5; total 431.

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Tomorrow, minecraft organized as TG 32.3 will start sweeping mines to the southwest between OKINAWA and MIYAKO.

ComNorPac reports CruDiv 1 bombardment of installations on MATSUWA was completed without damage to our ships.

Bad weather again prevented attacks on FORMOSA on the 11th.

A Jap bomb dropped by 1 Jap plane on the 10th showing IFF hit IE SHIMA and killed 9, wounding 32.

PB4Ys, escorted by P-47s, on photographic mission over KYUSHU on the 10th were intercepted by 75 Jap fighters. 17 Japs were shot down.

In minor air attacks in the OKINAWA Area on the 11th our CAP splashed 5 enemy aircraft, ships AA shot down 4, 1 suicide hit was scored, for a total of 10 enemy aircraft destroyed. Incomplete reports indicate that 4 more were shot down over KYUSHU by TAF planes.

184 sorties were flown in support of ground troops on the 11th. 2 squadrons of MAG 14 arrived at Kadema on the 11th.

FAW 13 planes on the 12th sank 4 SD, 2 off KII SUIDO and 2 west of KOZU SHIMA. At the latter point a large warehouse or fish cannery was destroyed and the entire harbor area was set ablaze.

PBJs scored 4 and 2 rocket hits respectively on a 300-foot ship and a 200-foot coaster east of CHIBU PENINSULA.

20 B-29s laid 182 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and TSURUGA BAY.

CINCPOA ADV 110304 expresses desire that TAF 10th Army operations not be handicapped by the necessity of demonstrating efficiency of Napalm.

CINCPOA ADV 120149 (pink) suggests that 133° E. Long. be agreed on as the dividing line between areas of primary responsibility during OLYMPIC.

CINCPOA ADV 120444 (pink) proposes to provide assault air warning units for OLYMPIC and suggests discussion between ComPhibPac and ComGen 6th Army.

- Continued -
12 June (Guam date) (Continued)

CINCPOA ADV 120501 (pink) requests that all units from the MTO and ETO available for redeployment be reported to CINCAFPAC who will schedule into OKINAWA and OLYMPIC.

GHQ MACARTHUR 120851 concurs in movement of 24th InfRegt from SAIPAN to OKINAWA.

CINCPAC ADV 121831 (pink) passes to CINCSWPA concurrence of ComGen 10 in movement of Brig. Gen. Hutchinson's party and flight echelon to OKINAWA.

13 June (Guam date)

Organized Jap resistance on OROKU PENINSULA has been destroyed and the 6th MarDiv is now engaged in mopping up small enemy groups in caves. During the 9 days of operations on the peninsula over 3,500 Japs were killed, including 150 found dead in a Jap sick bay overrun by the Marines. The 1st MarDiv continued to consolidate its positions along KUNITSHI RIDGE. The right flank of the 96th Div gained 4-500 yards to the northern outskirts of OZATO. Gains of approximately 400 yards were made in the division center while the left flank was held up by MG and 47mm fire. The 7th InfDiv pushed its right flank 250-500 yards along the escarpment and reached the northern edge of a small town 400 yards west of HANAGUSUKU. A Jap counterattack by an estimated two companies against Hill 95 was repulsed and artillery later broke up a concentration of enemy forming to attack the hill.

Casualties as of 2400 12th: Enemy: KIA 74,783, POWs 816 Military, 570 laborers. Own: KIA 6,225, WIA 26,901, MIA 226; total - 33,352.

The 12th at OKINAWA was quiet with little naval activity. No air raids and no damage to ships reported. Fire support activity on a reduced scale. Close support was furnished by 98 sorties (24 tons, 330 rockets), and the SAKISHIMA GUNTO was attacked by TU 32.1.3 (55 tons, 52 rockets), which destroyed 2 planes on the ground.

2 PB4Y photo planes, escorted by 20 P-47s tried to photograph KYUSHU but clouds interfered. The P-47s met no enemy aircraft. 32 F4Us bombed and rocketed KANOYA airfield despite 8/10 clouds at 2,000 feet and a few strafed KUSHIRA. 1 F4U pilot bailed out near OKINAWA but was dead when picked up.

CTF31 121240 (pink) submits to Com3rdFlt recommended composition of fleet and amphibious units to remain at OKINAWA as TF 31.

CINCPAC ADV 130228 (pink) comments to Cominch on proposal of ComGen USFCT to open FORT BAYARD or equivalent intermediate port on CHINA Coast.

CINCPAC ADV 130229 (pink) outlines LST availability for OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 130231 proposes to Cominch dividing ServRon 10 into Service Divs.

CINCPAC ADV 130335 requests instructions from Cominch concerning maintenance of a token force at JUA AMOTU Airfield on TONGABABU.

CINCPAC ADV 130849 directs ComServPac to resubmit tentative organization of Service Force, Pacific Fleet separating Staff organization from Force organization.

COMA.AFSVWA 131100 reports circumstances surrounding crash of P-38 into RANDOLPH.

CINCPAC ADV 131621 comments on CTG 111.2 proposal to bombard TRUK.

CINCPAC ADV 131629 directs transfer of 24th InfRegt to OKINAWA and of 1 Bn of 147th InfRegt from IWO to TINIAN.
14 June (Guam date)

The 6th MarDiv in its final mopping up on OROKU PENINSULA on the 13th captured 102 Japs. There were numerous surrenders, individual and group suicides, and shooting of Japs trying to surrender by their own comrades. In the south the Japs are now confined to an area 3 miles by 5 miles. The 1st MarDiv continued to consolidate its right flank on KUNISHI RIDGE. The southern edge of KUNISHI TOWN was reached after a bitter fire fight. On the division left flank 600-800 yards were made bringing the lines up on the ridge to the east of KUNISHI TOWN. 96th InfDiv reached the southeast edge of OZATO TOWN. The 7th InfDiv made gains of 300-700 yards against moderate to heavy resistance, reaching the center of NAKAZA. The 6th Marine Recon Co. landed unopposed on SENAGA SHIMA, 600 yards off SW coast of OROKU PENINSULA, at 0500 14 June. The reconnaissance of KUME SHIMA was completed without casualty during the night 13-14 June. Preliminary information indicates approximately 50 Japs on the island.

Casualties: Enemy: KIA 76,542; POWs 906 military, 574 laborers. Own: KIA 48, WIA 374, MIA 12; total - 434.

Total naval casualties of TF 31 to 13 June are 1102 KIA, 1403 MIA and 3592 WIA; total 6,097. (Increase of 900 since 23rd)

Minesweeping between MIYAKO and OKINAWA proceeding according to schedule, with negative results for the first day's operations.

TG 111.2 continues 2nd day training strike on TRUK. In addition to air strikes originally scheduled, cruisers may bombad DUBLON ISLAND. TG 32.1 in operating area. TG 30.6 patrolling north of convoy routes.

During the 13th there were no air raids for the 2nd day. P-47s of the TAF strafed small craft and a factory in southern KYUSHU, losing 1, and TU 32.1.3 attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO with 42 tons and 476 rockets, probably destroying 1 Dinah. Close inspection of runways showed 3 3000 foot and 1 2600 foot strips operational and the rest inoperational. CVEs and TAF planes furnished 93 close support sorties, using 12 tons and 544 rockets. A strike by 65 F4Us using 19,220 gallons of Napalm and 465 rockets was also made on a probable Jap headquarters area near MABUNI TOWN on the S. coast of OKINAWA. The area was left a mass of flames, smoke and dust. 1 F4U crash landed, killing the pilot.

FAW 1 seaplanes on the 14th off SW KOREA left 1 SD afire and settling, sank 3 SD off KUNSAN, KOREA and left 3 others burning and listing. Privateers dropped 4 2000 pound mines in a channel off SW KOREA.

A PBJ claimed serious damage on an unidentified vessel south of TOKYO BAY.

29 B-29s laid 311 mines in SHIMONSEKI STRAITS and NIIGATA HARBOR.

487 B-29s (excluding 25 early returns) took off to attack OSAKA-AMAGASAKI urban area with incendiaries. P-51 escorts were scheduled.

CTF 38 100612 (pink) comments on relative performance of F4U-1 and Jap fighters Frank, George and Jack.

CTF 38 120245 (pink) recommends strongly for retention of the maximum number of VF in CVGs.
14 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADV 131623 directs that all type commanders screen and reduce all requirements in the MARIANAS in order to alleviate strain on critically burdened port facilities.

JCS 132153 outlines procedure for repatriation of Allied prisoners of war.

COMPHIBSPAC 140030 (pink) estimates LCT requirements for OLYMPIC.

15 June (Guam date)

The 1st MarDiv made little changes in its front lines. The 96th InfDiv completed the seizure of OZATO and was pressing forward to the south. The 7th InfDiv pressed its attacks towards Hill 153 reaching a point 1/2 mile from the hill, after fighting through Jap defensive positions located in jutting coral formations.

Casualties as of 2400 14 June: Enemy: KIA 77,719; POWs 953; Military, 604 laborers. Own: KIA 64, WIA 337; total 401.

Sightings indicate that Jap merchant shipping is still backed up in Korean ports. BomCom reconnaissance and photographs indicate that only the smallest ships are now using the SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS.

TG 111.2 completed TRUK training strike without opposition.

For the 3rd consecutive day there were no enemy air raids. Close support continued with 112 sorties using 69 tons and 488 rockets. TU 32.1.3 continued attacking the SAKISHIMA GUNTO with 70 tons and 773 rockets, sinking 6 small boats and exploding 1 small armored gunboat off ISHIGAKI, and damaging 11 small boats off TRIOMOTE. Off IKEMA 2 60-foot boats were damaged. Runways and other installations were attacked. 5 new biplanes and 1 fighter on ISHIGAKI appeared operational.

The TAF maintained a 72 plane CAP from dawn to dusk, when other CAP's took over. The TAF KYUSHU strike was weathered and hit AMAMI instead, 1 F4U and 1 P-47 ditched near the KIKAI shore, and both were Dumboed under enemy fire with our fighters strafing enemy gun positions.

FAW 1 planes damaged 2 SD and 1 SC SE of SHIKOKU, and probably sank 1 2000-ton PT. FAW 18 planes destroyed 1 SD off KII SUIDO, and on the E shore of KOZU SHIMA destroyed 6 SD on a ramp, damaging 3 SD and 4 fishing boats.

COMGEN TEN 141350 (pink) estimates that 3 airstrips can be constructed on AGUNI and 1 on IHEYA.

CINCPAC ADV 141713 summarizes existing arrangements for locating and tracking typhoons.

CINCPAC ADV 150812 (pink) requests from Com3rdFlt amplification of proposal by Capt. Brown to operate TF 37 as a group of TF 38.

CINCPAC ADV 150816 (pink) designates 2nd MarDiv in lieu of 4th MarDiv for OLYMPIC.

CINCPOA ADV 150835 (pink) requests CINCPAC's concurrence in substitution of 1 Marine Scout Bombing Group for 1 of the 4 Marine Fighter Groups to be employed in OLYMPIC.
16 June (Guam date)

In the center, the 96th InfDiv reached the crest of Hill 167. By nightfall the division was fighting down the SW slopes of the hill with the Japs offering stiff resistance. The division left flank advanced approximately 600 yards across the plateau. The 7th InfDiv advanced towards Hill 153 supported by tanks and flamethrowers. Latest reports state that the hill was finally taken shortly before nightfall. Tanks in support were hindered by dense, high grass, heavy tree growths, and coral pinnacles. On the division left 500 yards were gained along the coast and Hill 115 secured. The lst MarDiv continued reorganization and consolidation on KUNISHI RIDGE. Patrouls were working through KUNISHI TOWN and towards MEZADO (MAZATO). During the past week infiltration has increased with 1161 Jap infiltrators being killed during this period.

Casualties as of 2400 15 June:- Enemy: KIA 79,180; POWs 995 military, 622 laborers. Own: KIA 6,358, WIA 27, 811, MIA 238; Total - 34,407.

34 B-24s (including 44 previously reported) bombed FORMOSA on the 15th. TAIWAN Drome was bombed starting fires and explosions, and destroying or damaging fuel, warehouses, etc. 25 B-25s hit OKASEKI drome destroying 5 - 7 buildings plus locomotives and airfield installations. Photos taken on the 15th of FORMOSA airfields (plus earlier photos of 4 fields) showed 63 VF and 26 VB operational.

At OKINAWA from 2000-2200 on the 15th a small number of Jap planes raided the area doing little damage and losing 2 planes to our VF(N). 3 bombs hit IE SHIMA and 5 hit near Kadena. AA shot down 1 Nick.

Direct support was furnished by 90 sorties with 67 tons and 228 rockets. TU 32.1.3 hit SAKISHIMA GUNTO, sinking a harbor lighter and a fishing boat, and damaging 1 SD, 1 barge and 1 enemy aircraft. We lost 2 VF to AA with no rescues. Other losses during the day included 1 O52U, over enemy territory, and 1 TAF VF. 38 P-47s and 32 F4Us of the TAF were weathered out of KYUSHU on the 16th and hit KIKAI and TANEGA instead. The CVE planes with 30 TAF F4U escorts were also weathered out of KYUSHU and hit the northern RYUKYUS instead. CVE planes hit KINYI seaplane base (AMAMI) and NAGA (AMAMI). 1 CVE VF and 1 TAF F4U were shot down, the latter pilot bailing out over TANEGA, and the former awaiting rescue.

FAW 1 aircraft on the 16th probably sank 2 SD and damaged 3. 2 luggers were also sunk. FAW 18 shot down 2 Zekes east of CHIBU, and probably sank 1 SD, 1 trawler, and damaged 1 150-ft. sea truck. FBJs east of CHIBU left 1 ship dead in the water.

30 B-29s laid 319 mines in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, FUSHI, FUKUOKA and KARATSU.

COM3RDFLT 160007 (pink) outlines plans for operation of TF 37 with TF 38.

CINCPAC ADV 160548 directs ComGen 10 to occupy KUME SHIMA as soon as practicable.

CINCPAC ADV 160902 proposes to exchange CruDiv 6 for CruDiv 12.

CINCPAC ADV 161445 proposals to withdraw TG 32.1 from OKINAWA not later than 1 July.

CINCPAC ADV 161451 requests 3 7thFlt Liberators be made available for weather reconnaissance.
17 June (Guam date)

The 22nd Marines from the 6th MarDiv relieved the 7th Marines in a pre-dawn passage of lines. At 0730 the 22nd attacked, pushed through MEZATO and brought its left flank 200 yards south of the town. The right flank was held up by a Jap strong point on the nose of a ridge NW of OZATO. The 1st MarDiv supported by artillery advanced its front SE and S of MEZATO. The 1st MarDiv left flank was held up by heavy flanking fire from the escarpment. In the 96th InfDiv zone 115 Japs were killed during the night 16-17 June attempting infiltration and in hand grenade duels. The division right flank advanced 100-200 yards SE OZATO. The 7th InfDiv mopped up concealed enemy positions on Hills 153 and 115. 300 civilians were persuaded to surrender by loud speakers mounted on tanks. Admiral Ota, Commander of the Naval Base Force on OKINAWA, committed suicide in his cave headquarters on OROKU PENINSULA.


TWIGGS (DD 591) was hit by a torpedo off OKINAWA in air attacks on the evening of the 16th and sank about 3/4 hour later. Bombs straddled LINDENWALD (LSD 6) but caused no damage to the ship.

Minesweeping of NE half of area "Z" NE of MIYAKO has been completed, with negative results, and TG 32.3 has been ordered to complete sweeping the area.

On the 16th 81 B-24s attacked KIRUN warehouses and harbor installations, starting heavy explosions and fires and destroying or damaging many small boats. 13 B-24s were holed and 3 men were wounded by AA. 24 other B-24s bombed TAKAO, destroying or damaging 12-14 warehouses. 3 B-32s bombed TAITO TOWN with 30 tons from 19,000 feet. Photos on the 16th showed only 35 VF and 25 VB at FORMOSA (as compared to 63 VF and 26 VB on the 15th).

There were 4 early morning raids on the 16th at OKINAWA and 1 raid undetected in the evening. At 2045 the TWIGGS (DD 591) was sunk by a torpedo from a low-flying plane, and probably hit by the plane itself. Incomplete reports list 188 survivors.

In the "SOCKEM" Operation 84 aircraft of TU 32.1.3 were involved. Results were reported yesterday.

70 air support sorties on southern OKINAWA used 10 tons, 288 rockets and 30 Napalm bombs.

2 FAW 1 PBMs at SUSAKI on the southern coast of SHIKOKU destroyed or probably destroyed 5 SD (including 2 under construction), sunk 1 lugger, damaged 12 SD by strafing, completely burned a 2 acre shipyard, burned a 100 foot pier, and badly damaged a 120 foot 2-deck ferry boat which beached. 2 FAW 18 PB4Ys preparing to attack a large tanker type ship 5 miles E of CHOSI POINT (E of CHIBU) were attacked by 12 aggressive Zekes and Oscars. 3 fighters were shot down and 5 badly damaged in a running fight to 120 miles off shore. There was no damage to the PB4Ys. A PBJ scored 2 hits in a patrol craft south of HONSHU.

COMGENAAPOA 160614 (pink) constitutes resume of plans for utilization of RAF units at OKINAWA.

COMINCH & CNO 161904 authorizes establishment in ServRon 10 of ServDivs 101 thru 104.

CINCPAC ADV 170715 (pink) disapproves Com3rdFlt proposal for operating TF 37 with TF 38.

- Continued -
17 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPAC 171109 (pink) announces that additional VLR wing will not be moved to the MARIANAS and that RAF units will be deployed at OKINAWA when Army Air Forces units move forward.

COMGEN TEN 171407 (pink) indicates that reconnaissance of KUME cannot be made until the island is secured about 1 July.

18 June (Guam date)

ComGen 10 in a dispatch dated 180935 stated, "Enemy resistance in OKINAWA broken today." The Japs are reported fleeing south and west on the southern tip of the island and are being brought under our artillery fire. During the day the 5th Marines (1st MarDiv), 8th Marines (2nd MarDiv), and 22nd Marines (6th MarDiv) broke through the Jap defense lines and by nightfall had pushed on to the NAGUSUKU-MAKABE Highway. Elements of these regiments had reached the outskirts of NAGUSUKU TOWN and MAKABE TOWN. The 96th InfDiv advanced to southwest gaining 200-1000 yards, bringing portions of its front lines along the southwest edge of the escarpment from which the troops can overlook MADEIRA and the ocean 3000 yards to the south. The 7th InfDiv advanced 300-700 yards against heavy small arms and MG fire from hollowed out coral heads with enemy resistance centering around Hill 110, 1000 yards north MABUNI.

Casualties as of 2400 17 June: Enemy: KIA 81, 901; POWs 1,096 military, 730 laborers. Own: KIA 47, WIA 354, MIA 10; total - 411.

On the 19th 7 squadrons of B-24s hit KIIRUN, 3 squadrons of B-25s attack SHOKA railroad bridge, and 3 B-32s also attack bridges.

There were 3 small air raids at OKINAWA in the early morning on the 17th and 1 in the evening with no damage reported. The CVE strikes on the SAKISHIMA GUNTO continued as did TAF strikes on the northern RYUKYUS. 2 TAF pilots were rescued off KIKAI beaches. South of AMAMI, on the northern coast of KAKEROMA, 7 heavily camouflaged SB were sighted. 73 support sorties were flown using 40 tons, 469 rockets and 24 Napalm bombs.

FAW 1 planes laid 8 2000-lb. mines off SW KOREA. A PEM of FAW 1 ditched SE of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA and 3 officers and 3 men were rescued by another PEM. FAW 18 planes sank a 70 foot fishing boat and damaged 1 80-foot lugger.

25 B-29s laid 250 mines in SHINONOESEKI STRAITS and KOBE HARBOR.

Strike photographs the night of 17/18th at OMATA, HAMAMATSU, YOKKAICHI and KAGOSHIMA showed many fires burning and pilots and crews reported extensive fires. 13 B-29s are missing, 1 of which was seen to explode over the target.

CINCPOA ADV 1801/4 (pink) requests explanation of proposal to delay occupation of KUME until 1 July.
19 June (Guam date)

The collapse of Jap defenses across the entire line was increasingly evident. On the right flank the 22nd Marines mopped up in the KUWANGA-NAGUSUKU area and protected the Army right flank. The 4th Marines pushed to the south against meagre resistance reaching the northern slopes of MABUNI MURA. The 8th Marines plus one battalion from the 5th Marines by 1700 had reached the SE Coast 700 yards south of KO-MESU. The 96th Div advanced 500 yards bringing its lines just north of ARAGACHI. Its left flank was reported meeting stubborn resistance at the base of the escarpment, though one report states that our advance in this sector is impeded less by the character of enemy resistance than by the great number of Japs that are just in the way and have to be killed. The 7th InfDiv averaged 300 yards against stubborn resistance of small enemy groups in caves and other fortified positions. Numerous enemy are reported jumping off the cliffs along the SE shore.

Casualties as of 2400 18th:- Enemy: KIA 83,492; Own: KIA 61, WIA 447, MIA 11; total - 519.

Only 1 small air raid took place at OKINAWA in the early morning of the 18th and it caused no damage. The TAF KYUSHU strike was again diverted to AMAMI because of weather. TU 32.1.3 continued the neutralization of the SAKISHIMA GUNTO. 71 sorties were flown in air support, using 42 tons, 536 rockets and 48 Napalms. On the night of the 18/19th our VF(N) shot down 3 Betty's. On the 19th the entire crew of a search plane down 82 miles 078 degrees from POINT BOLO was rescued.

FAW 18 planes on the 19th damaged 1 SD off SHIONO MISAKI and shot down 1 Oscar. 2 crewmen were wounded. Off KOZA SHIMA 1 SD and 5 fishing boats were sunk. FAW 1 planes destroyed 1 and damaged 2 SD off SW KOREA, left 1 small stack-aft AK sinking in TSUSHIMA STRAITS, and damaged 2 luggers north of SHANGHAI. A PBJ scored 2 hits on an unidentified ship near O SHIMA.

Photos taken on the 18th covering 25% of the area attacked showed .57 sq.mi. or 16% of the YOKKAICHI area destroyed or damaged from the incendiary raid on the early morning of the 18th. Several fires were still burning on the waterfront. 7 numbered targets show damage, including 2 oil refineries. YOKKAICHI is the site of the second largest naval fuel depot in the Empire.

On the night of 19/20th 439 effective B-29s attacked SHIZUOKA, FUKUOKA and TOYOHASHI around midnight.

COMGENSENV 131524 (pink) estimates cargo to be handled through destinations in POA during August from ETO and MTO.

COM3RDFIT 140903 (pink) outlines estimated destroyer requirements for TF 38.

CTF 31 180555 (pink) recommends ships for TF 32 for cover and support during JUNEAU Operation.

CINCBBF 180836 (pink) estimates sortie date from MANUS as 6 July.

COMMARGILS 181326 estimates that 1 CVG in full operating status can be accommodated at ROI.


COM3RDFIT 190115 estimates that TG 38.4 will arrive ENIWETOK about 1 August.
19 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CINCPOA ADV 190834 (pink) releases the 2nd MarDiv, less the 8th Marines, from Area Reserve for ICEBERG.

COMGEN TEN 190936 (pink) estimates 200 enemy troops on KUME and expresses intention of landing on 25 June.

MACARTHUR 191213 (pink) concurs in exchange of CruDivs 12 and 6 subsequent to 7 July.

CINCPOA ADV 191335 (pink) requests recommendations for the modification of the category of defense for HAWAII.

CINCPAC ADV 191737 (pink) proposes to CINCAFPAC that CINCPOA assume responsibility for bulk petroleum supply of all forces and activities at OLYMPIC.

CINCAFPAC 200213 assigns General Stillwell to command the Tenth Army.

CINCAFPAC 200349 (pink) requests concurrence in designation of ComGenPOA as agency responsible for mounting all Army Ground and Air Units from POA for OLYMPIC.

20 June (Guam date)

The Japs on OKINAWA are now confined to three pockets on the southern end of the island. Elements of the 6th MarDiv drove to the south on the Army right flank reaching the coast and SE slopes of MABUNI MURA, confining the Japs in a pocket on ARA-SAKI about 1000 yards square. Masses of civilians are coming to our lines to surrender and some Jap soldiers are reported coming in with these civilians. The 1st MarDiv continues to attack Hill 81 against heavy enemy fire and other elements of the regiment are working through and mopping up MAKABE where 170 Japs were killed during the day. The 96th InfDiv is meeting heavy resistance just north of ARAGACHI and along its left flank from ARAGACHI to MADEERA. The 77th InfDiv made 1000-1600 yards to the south and southwest. The advance was impeded by heavy fire from Hill 82, 600 yards NE UDO. Mopping up on this hill is now in progress. The division left flank made 300-800 yards capturing a hill (Hill 89) 200 yards south of MABUNI.

Casualties as of 2400 19 June:— Enemy: KIA 87,343; POWs 1,503 military, 1,062 laborers. Own: KIA 6,740, WIA 29,598, MIA 250; total - 36,588.

CALVIN VICTORY (XAK) was torpedoed early on the morning of the 21st 300 miles west of ENIWETOK. ENDYMION (ARL 9) sighted a torpedo at 0633K at 12-40N, 156-22E while enroute SAIPAN to PEARL.

During the night of 18/19th DUNLAP (DD 354) on anti-shipping patrol off CHICHIJIMA destroyed 2 small craft each reportedly of 30 tons, and 1 small 100 ton AK NE of CHICHIJIMA. Prisoners were taken who stated that the mission of these vessels was to evacuate non-combatants to the homeland from CHICHIJIMA with as much gasoline as possible.

TU 32.1.3 used 24 tons and 811 rockets to hit the SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 18th. 2 small boats were sunk and 9 were damaged. 1 CVE pilot ditched and was rescued. The TAF hit AMAMI again after finding KYUSHU closed in. There were 35 support sorties, using 10 tons, 250 rockets, and 23 Napalms. The shore based ADCC (Air Defense Control Center) was placed in operation on IE SHIMA at 1800.
20 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

FAW 1 planes on the 20th in NISHI SUIDO sank 1 SC, 1 SD, and 1 coastal passenger steamer, and off the YANGTZE RIVER damaged an 800 ton coastal AK. South of HAICHOW WAN 1 PT was sunk. 1 Tojo was probably destroyed and 1 damaged. FAW 18 planes off HAMAMATSU shot down 1 Zeke and damaged 2 others. All FAW 18 planes at IWO were ordered evacuated to TINIAN on the evening of the 20th because of the impending typhoon.

CINCPOA PEARL 200205 (pink) outlines current petroleum supply and tanker situation to ComServRon 10.

CINCPOA ADV 200228 recommends to Cominch against adoption of changes in current petroleum supply functions and suggests augmentation of area petroleum offices instead.

COMNAVU 14th AF 200235 requests information of damaged ships and tankers in YELLOW SEA for attack by 14th AF aircraft staging through North CHINA fields.

DepCom20thAF 200443 (pink) requests concurrence in movement of 508th Fighter Group from OAHU to IWO JIMA.

COM3RDFLT 200819 (pink) requests that decision be deferred on ComServRon 10 170217 until arrival of Capt. Cross with study of July requirements for fleet oilers.

CTF 31 201340 (pink) constitutes Com5thPhibFor OpOrd A-207-45 for seizure and occupation of KUME SHIMA.

21 June (Guam date)

Lt. Gen. Geiger has announced that organized resistance on OKINAWA ceased on 21 June (L plus 81) and that mopping up is continuing to eliminate two remaining pockets. During the day the 6th MarDiv announced that organized resistance in its zone ceased at 1027(1). The 1st MarDiv repulsed a Banzai charge by an estimated Jap platoon during the night 20-21 June. In fighting today, the 5th Marines secured Hill 81. The XXIV Corps has been impeded in its attack by large numbers of civilians, plus military personnel, who are coming through to our lines. In the 96th InfDiv zone resistance centers around MADEIRA and Hills 79 and 85, 600 and 700 yards SW of MADEIRA respectively. These positions are now under attack by the division. Along the southern coast many Japs are walking into the water and drowning themselves. A large cave, believed to be the headquarters of Lt.Gen. Ushijima, is under attack by elements of the 7th InfDiv. Many Japs are coming out of the many exits to the cave and surrendering. More than 1700 military prisoners were taken during the day, 754 of these by the 7th Div. 3 Majors, 2 Captains, and 5 Lts. plus other officers not yet identified were made prisoners. In several cases Jap officers led their men into our lines to surrender.

Casualties as of 2400 20 June: - Enemy: KIA 90,401 (estimated); POW,480 military, 1,273 laborers. Own: KIA 99, WIA 468, MIA 4; total - 471.

1 raid occurred during the evening of the 20th at OKINAWA in which a single Betty made an unsuccessful torpedo attack.

TU 32.1.3 continued coverage of SAKASHIMA GUNTO. "Z" minesweeping operation will be resumed on the 23rd, and expected completed 24th. Only 2 Nip snoppers 15-19th have bothered this operation so far. Due to high wind and swell all LSTs at HAGUSHI beaches were withdrawn. All cargo discharge to IE SHIMA suspended for the same reason.

- Continued -
21 June (Guam date)(Cont'd)

ComMarGils and AtCom ENIWETOK hunter-killer group formed. ATA 198 dispatched to ENDYMON. Shipping departing ENIWETOK held up. Shipping enroute to westward of ENIWETOK diverted south. Exact number of torpedoings still undetermined, as another ship, SS PORT WASHINGTON (US tanker), also reported a torpedoing, 8 miles from ENDYMON position, but it may be that it was a relay of ENDYMON report.

34 OKINAWA P-47s hit the OMURA aircraft plant with undetermined results. 195 enemy aircraft were photographed on the airfield. Other P-47s and F4Us hit AMAM and KAKEROMA, firing 4 small ships. 29 F4Us hit CHIRAN dome, with results unreported. 1 TAF pilot is missing.

TU 32.1.3 covered the SAKISHIMA GUNTO again. A CVE VF pilot ditched and the ASP seaplane which landed to rescue him could not take off. A Dumbo landed and picked up all 15 safely. 1 TAF pilot who bailed out was picked up by a DE, severely injured.

All FAW 13 empire searches on the 21st were weathered out. FAW 1 planes off the YANGTZE sank 1 800-ton FT and severely damaged 1 200-ton tug. Off KOREA 1 small FT and 1 large coastal AK were damaged. In MISHI SUIDO 3 of 7 SD were damaged.

Photographs of the 19th & 20th show the following damage to recent B-29 industrial targets in percent of built-up area destroyed. OSAKA 26%, HAMAMATSU 40%, YOKKAICHI 59%, FUKUOKA 66%.

CINCPOA ADV 201312 approves British carrier replacement pool at PITYILYU.

CINCPOA ADV 210342 expresses preference ATC in SoPac be continued until roll-up completed.

CTF 99 210405 announces termination of organized resistance on OKINAWA.

COM MARIANAS 210451 indicates development for 4th Fighter Group at IWO under way and accommodations for 5th Fighter Group under construction.

CGUSPCT 210645 (pink) summarizes to JCS possibilities of capitalizing on Japanese withdrawals in CHINA.

CINCPOA ADV 210903 (pink) outlines schedule of withdrawal of elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing from SWPA.

COMGEN TEN 211116 (pink) constitutes 10th Army OpOrd 16-45 for seizure and occupation of KUME SHIMA.

MACARTHUR 211237 (pink) requests 3 CVEs for OBOE TWO Operation.

COMGEN TEN 211405 (pink) announces that Air Defense Command is ready to assume full responsibility for air defense on 1 July.

CTF 38 211415 (pink) summarizes intentions for carrier operations during July.
22 June (Guam date)

U.S. colors were formally raised on the island of OKINAWA at 1000(I), 22 June. On the SW tip of the island the 29th Marines have surrounded an unstated number of Japs. About 160 of these were observed committing suicide with grenades during the day. A small sector is held by Japs in the vicinity of ARAGACHI-MADEERA. In the town of MADEERA a group of enemy officers and NCOs resisting to the end and 5 MGs are reported as operative. Gen. Ushijima is believed to have been killed in his headquarters on 21 June by our artillery or mortar fire. A considerable number of Japs are believed to be hiding out in the bush in the rugged terrain of the extreme north of the island.

Casualties as of 2400, 21 June: Enemy: KIA 94,919; POW 3,526 military, 1,999 laborers. Own: KIA 66, WIA 382, MIA 2; total - 450.

Three hunter-killer groups are now operating between ENIWETOK and the MARIANAS, and it appears that there may be two submarines, one in the general vicinity of 12-30N 156-00E, and the other at 10-30N, 144E. ASW planes have had recurring and disappearing radar contacts and have conducted holding down operations for the past 36 hours.

During a red alert before dawn on the 22nd at IWO single plane bogeys were detected approaching from the north. 3 F-61s were scrambled. None of the 3 approaching planes got closer than 18 miles.

Heavy strikes against FORMOSA were weathered out, and only 13 P-51s attacked island communications, damaging a railroad tunnel, locomotives and railroad cars, a roundhouse, and an electric plant. On the 23rd 18 B-24s attack the KOBI butanol plant.

For the first time in 10 days a sizeable group of enemy aircraft raided the OKINAWA area on the 21st and 22nd. Raids began at dusk on the 21st, when a small group of enemy aircraft showing IFF code 6 attacked the KERAMA RETTO, with suicides hitting the CURTISS and LSM 213, sinking the ex-BARRY and LSM 59, near-missing the KENNETH WHITING. A strafer did some damage to a DE which splashed the enemy plane 76 feet away. PC 469 splashed 2 with no damage to herself. From 0000-1130 there were 30 raids, the heaviest between 0800 and 0900. Good work by the CAP and north pickets prevented all but a few stragglers from getting through, and these were knocked down by AA with only insignificant damage reported to 1 LST and 1 DE in the east anchorage. During this period 1 P-47, 2 TBM and 2 F4U were lost with the crews of the 1st 3 planes rescued.

TU 32.1.1 flew 200 sorties using 48 tons and 1052 rockets in neutralizing the SAKISHIMA GUNTO. 3 planes and 1 pilot were operational losses.

Off west KOREA FAW 1 planes sank 1 very large sailing vessel. In NISHI SUIDO Privateers damaged 3 SD, and in HAGASHI SUIDO heckled 2 DEs. No other picket boats were seen.

27 B-29s laid 176 mines in N HOMSHU harbors. 403 B-29s are reported bombing Empire targets on the 22nd.

CINCBPFP 210854 (pink) requests permission to dock KING GEORGE V for a few days at MANUS.

COMGENPOA 220342 (pink) recommends that 1 full strength fighter group be retained in the Hawaiian Area for air defense.

CINCPAC ADV 220630 outlines to Cominch proposed organization of TrainComPacific as a task force commander afloat.

- Continued -
22 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

CTF 38 220832 requests with Com3rdFlt concurrence that the complement of all CVLGs be changed to include only fighters in time for the next operation.

CINCPOA ADV 220955 (pink) directs the formation of a task group consisting of 3 CVEs and 6 DDs to report to Com7thFlt for OBOE-2.

CINCPOA ADV 230106 (pink) concurs with CINCAPPAC with limitations in proposal that ComCharPOA be responsible for mounting all Army air and ground units in the POA for OLYMPIC.

23 June (Guam date)

Systematic mopping up is now being conducted in each Corps zone of action. Small enemy groups are being killed or captured. Jap soldiers remaining appear non-aggressive but are trying to escape through our lines to the north. The town of MADEيرا has been cleaned out, but many Japs are reported to be holed up in caves along the coast south of MAKUNI.


"Z" Sweep concluded. Entire area now considered safe to a maximum depth of 90 feet. During the day's operation 25 mines were swept. Total for entire operation 101 since sweeping begun. Covering force of TU 32.1.1 will retire to LEYTE.

34 B-24s attacking TOSHIEI fuel storage on FORMOSA bombed an oil refinery, AA positions, silenced 3 of the latter and scored direct hits on oil tanks and a cracking plant. A tremendous explosion in the oil installations sent a sheet of flame to 2000 feet, with black smoke billowing to 10,000. 9 B-24s were holed by AA.

During the evening of the 22nd a few small enemy raids continued at OKINAWA. 1 torpedo attack on screening vessels was ineffective. During the 48 hours prior to midnight on the 22nd our forces destroyed 57 enemy planes over OKINAWA (including 4 over AMAMI), with 2 more shot down over KYUSHU. Of this total (59) ships' AA got 6, night fighters got 6 (5 Marine & 1 Army), 6 were suidiciders, day CAP got 39 (including 4 over AMAMI), and 32 F4Us over KYUSHU got 2. We lost 5 planes, with 4 pilots missing. Enemy pilots were reported as aggressive and skillful, using coordinated air combat tactics seen only infrequently in recent months. One TAF pilot after expending all his ammunition shooting down a Betty is reported to have rammed a Zeke near a picket ship and then bailed out. 2 Bettys were sighted carrying Bakas, and 1 or 2 Bakas were seen in free flight. During the heaviest raids between 0830 and 1100 on the 22nd, the TAF CAP numbered 121 fighters.

CVE planes on the 22nd continued attacking the SAKISHIMA GUNTO. TAF P-47s found OMURA closed at 0800 so attacked ITAZUKI Airfield near FUKUOKA, with results unobserved. Intense AA from the harbor prevented strafing the airfield. Since 7 April TAF planes have now destroyed 593½ enemy aircraft. In TSUSHIMA STRAITS Privateers blew the stern off a 2-masted sailing vessel and damaged 3 SD.

90 P-51s on the 23rd attacked airfields in the TOKYO Area. They shot down 19, probably destroyed 2 airborne and damaged 13 airborne enemy aircraft. On the ground they destroyed 13, probably destroyed 12 and damaged 10. We lost 3 P-51s, but 2 pilots were picked up by a sub.
23 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

Photos show total damage of 2.04 sq. mi. to KAGOSHIMA - 42% of the built up portion of the city. Strike Photos show that a majority of the naval arsenal buildings got 1 or more direct hits, causing structural damage. The BB HARUNA (KONGO Class) had 2 near misses and 1 probable direct hit on the stern, with some damage to the stern reported.


CINCPOA ADV 230546 emphasizes critical unloading situation at OKINAWA and requests CINCPAC to review all shipping requirements and reduce them to absolute minimum.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz departed GUAM by air for conference with Cominach on West Coast.

24 June (Guam date)

Mopping up continues on OKINAWA and the screen of troops across the island from NAHA to YONABARU has been placed in position to catch Japs attempting infiltration to the north. Recent contacts with Japs have been limited to small groups of 2 to 10 men.

Casualties as of 2400 on the 23rd:– Enemy: KIA 101,853; POWs 5,213 military, 2,689 laborers. Own: KIA 24, WIA 188, MIA 2; total 214.

Four submarine contacts are reported as of the 24th: One east of JOHNSTON by a transport plane, a second west of the MARINAS attacked unsuccessfully by surface craft, a third 300 miles N of ULITHI attacked for 3 hours with 1 hedgehog hit claimed and a fourth in the same general area as the 3rd attacked unsuccessfully with search continuing.

Landing on KUME SHIMA has been postponed until tomorrow.

15 B-24s bombed the KOBI alcohol refinery on FORMOSA on the 23rd scoring direct hits.

On the 23rd there were 2 single-engine enemy raids at OKINAWA about 2100 but no attacks were made. At 0340 on the 24th 4-6 Jap bombs holed the southern end of IE SHIMA E runway and scored a direct hit on a 90mm gun position, killing 15 and wounding 13.

17 TBM's and 36 F4Us in 1 raid and 32 F-47s in another attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the 23rd. On the 24th HIRAPA FIELD on MIYAKO was bombed and rocketed by 37 F4Us and 18 TBMs with the airfield, dispersal areas and AA positions as targets. A 100-foot AK was damaged.

1 SD was exploded off the SW tip of KOREA on the night of the 23/24th by FAW 1 aircraft. 2 PBJs scored rocket hits on 2 small AKs, 1 E of CHIBU and 1 off BUNGO SUIDO. In TSUSHIMA STRAITS on the 24th 2 SD and 1 medium FT were set afire, and 6 SD and 2 tugs were left smoking.

- Continued -
24 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

COMINCH & CNO 171550 requests information on ship repairs undertaken in the forward area by reason of anticipated delays in west coast shipyards.

CINCPAC PEARL 212003 outlines proposed relationship of ComServRon 10 Rep. at ENIWEETOK with ComMarGils and NOR ENIWEETOK and their respective responsibilities for fleet support.

COMINCH 232046 requests early estimates of 1946 requirements for all types of shipborne landing craft.

COMAIRPAC ADMIN 232208 recommends strongly against approval of CTF 38 220832 proposal to install all VF CVGs on CVLs.

COMWESSEAFRON 232220 outlines program of return of APAs and AKAs to mainland for troop and cargo lift.

CINCPOA ADV 230555 (pink) directs transfer of 8th Regt. to 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN as soon as no longer required for KUME operation.

COMSERPWRON 10 241051 outlines plans for establishment of ServDivs 101 through 105.

MACARThUR 241305 (pink) requests clarification of responsibility for 20th AF units and assignment of fighter groups to 20th Air Force.

25 June (Guam date)

No damage to ships at OKINAWA in air raids of the 24th. Landing on KUME SHIMA is scheduled for tomorrow. Task Group 31.25 consists of 4 DD, landing craft and miscellaneous small craft.

SPADEFISH (SS 411), the first submarine to report after exit from the JAPAN SEA, gives her patrol results as 1 large freighter, 5 medium freighters sunk by torpedoes and 3 trawlers and 1 sampan sunk by gunfire.

There were no strikes on FORMOSA on the 24th.

Night fighters at OKINAWA shot down 2 twin-engine bombers on the 24th. TAF F4Us and P-47s attacked the SAKISHIMA GUNTO, concentrating on ISHIGAKI, on the 24th and again on the 25th, with a total of about 150 planes. There was no airborne opposition, although 12-15 apparently operational planes were on the airfields. 1 150-ft. AK was damaged by strafing. 1 F4U ditched, with the pilot rescued. ISHIGAKI and MIYARA fields were believed inoperational after the attack on the 25th.

The crew of a downed PBM was rescued on the 24th by the HAMBLETON (DM-20).
25 June (Guam date) (Cont'd)

FAW 1 planes on the 25th sank 1 merchant vessel S of FUSAN (SE KOREA), and destroyed 1 PT off SW KOREA. PBFs shot down 1 Oscar and damaged a 2nd. FAW 18 planes at HACHIJO SHIMA destroyed 1 SD and 1 SC. FAW 1 planes from 18 to 26 June, inclusive, sank 4,070 tons of enemy shipping and damaged 12,400 tons. They shot down 1 enemy aircraft and planted 58 2000-lb. mines. Cumulative totals since arrival in the area are 122,645 tons of shipping destroyed, and 128,890 tons damaged, with 36 enemy aircraft destroyed and 24 damaged.

511 B-29s will be over the Empire tomorrow for bombing attacks on 9 targets, principally the NAGOYA Area, plus a mining mission. 148 P-51s are scheduled to escort.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in POA since 18 March: 18 March - 30 April (Incl.) 3,227. 1 May to date: TF 38 401, TF 31 409, TF 37 31, TF 93 130, TG 30.5 23, 20thAAF 229, TF 94 12, TG 99.2 456; total 1,691.

COMGEN TEN 240230 (pink) announces that he will be prepared to assume responsibility for air defense in the RYUKYUS on 1 July.

CTF 99 240616 (pink) recommends deferring all but construction troops, air units and cargo handling troops until current critical unloading situation is alleviated.

COM MARIANAS 250623 (pink) reports that without unacceptable reduction in dispersal, 5 fighter groups can not be accommodated on YO JIMA.

CINCPAC ADV 250645 approves tentative plans for docking KING GEORGE V at MANUS.

COMINCH & CNW 251316 approves in general Marine and Navy aspects of CINCPAC serial 006068 concerning complements and organization of Air Support Control Units, PlbsPac.

26 June (Guam date)

Landing on KURE SHIMA, approximately 52 miles west of OKINAWA, was unopposed. All waves were ashore at 0700 with the initial beachhead secured by 0715. Unloading of supplies and the Garrison Force had commenced and was proceeding satisfactorily. Mopping up and interception of Japs attempting to infiltrate to the north continues on OKINAWA.

Casualties as of 2400 25 June: Enemy: KIA 105,225; POWs - 6,479 military, 3,019 laborers. Own: KIA 6,313; WIA 28,467; MIA 105; total - 34,885.

Submarine contacted between ULITHI and OKINAWA on the 23rd was believed sunk by CHAMPION (AM 314) and GILLIGAN (DE 508).

Eight of the nine submarines operating in the JAPAN SEA have now successfully retired through LA PERouse STRAITS. The ninth, BONEFISH, has not been heard from since the 18th when she requested permission to enter TOKAMA BAY. Five boats report sinking 26 vessels consisting of 1 large AO, 1 large AK, 14 medium AK, 4 small AN, and 6 miscellaneous craft.

516 B-29s and 144 P-51s attacked Central HONSHU on the 27th. 2 B-29s were lost and 2 others at last report were unheard from since take off. The P-51s sighted 48 enemy aircraft at NAGOYA and 4 at OSAKA. They claim 2 destroyed and 6 damaged. 1 P-51 was lost but the pilot was rescued by a lifeguard sub.

- Continued -
26 June (Guam date) (Cont’d)

26 B-29s laid 153 mines on the 25th in SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, MAIZURU and OHAMA.

2 PB4Y-2s were missing from an anti-shipping sweep between SHANGHAI and 35-00 north. **South of KOREA 1 SC and 1 FTC were left burning.** FAW 18 planes will intensify their shipping attacks along the southern HONSHU coast and will extend their search along the eastern HONSHU coast to 800 miles.

Between 2250/25th and 0240/26th there were 16 enemy raids at OKINAWA, principally by float planes. There was no damage to shipping, although 3 men aboard the AUBURN (AGC 10) were wounded by fragments from a near suicide miss. 12 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

41 TBMs and F4Us attacked MIYAKO at 1710 with bombs, rockets and strafing. 2 planes were slightly damaged.

CINCENAFPOA ADMIN 250227 recommends reconsideration of CINCPAC serial 002449 of 14 August 1944 concerning storage of toxic gas in the forward area.

CINCPAC ADV 251516 outlines influence of heavy work loads in continental shipyards in performance of repairs in the forward areas.

COMINCH & CNO 251520 approves continuance of six existing Marine Amphibious Truck Companies and authorizes activation of two battalions.

CINCPOA PEARL 260327 requests MarMarianas to initiate base development at TINIAN for handling 150 single-engine Army aircraft per month.

CINCPOA ADV 260351 (pink) disapproves movement of 508th Fighter Group from CAHU to IWO.

CINCPOA ADV 260352 denies CTF 38’s request for all VF complements in CVLs.

CINCPAC ADV 260435 (pink) approves retention of 5th PhibCorps Headquarters at MAUI.

COM3RDFLT 261245 (pink) constitutes proposed interdiction plan for operations early in July.

27 June (Guam date)

On KUME our forces continue to sweep across the island against no opposition. 30 civilians have been taken into custody. They report that most of the civilians fled to the hills at our landing and that approximately 40 Jap sailors are on the island.

On OKINAWA the bodies of Gen. Ushijima and Gen. Cho, who had committed Hari-Kari, have been found.

Casualties as of 2400 26 June: Enemy: Garbled. Own: KIA 17, WIA 62, MIA 1; total - 80.

The submarine sighted and attacked on the 26th was again picked up by a plane from the MARIANAS. The sub was attacked as it submerged. Photographs show a slick...
with 2 torpedoes or midget submarines. A few pieces of splintered wood were seen in the slick and the torpedoes or midgets sank. This submarine was believed to be damaged. Another contact was reported by a DE, but contact was lost to the SE at 13N 157E. Extensive anti-submarine operations are continuing. A CVE and DE ASW Group is in the vicinity. Other DEs are patrolling. Barrier search continues, and other planes are covering the shipping lanes.

On the night of 25/26th 2 OCL and 4 DD of TF 92 on sweep inside the KURILE CHAIN encountered an enemy convoy southeast of PARAMUSHIRU and sank 1 AK (2000-ton), 1 SC and 1 large tug. One smaller vessel was probably sunk and another small vessel damaged.

FAW 1 planes, off western KYUSHU, probably sank 1 SD, and damaged 4 small ships on the 26th; on the 27th 1 2300-ton AK was probably sunk off SW KOREA, and 1 SC was sunk. 1 Privateer was shot down by AA from a DD off SW KOREA. This is the 3rd Privateer lost in 2 days. Search for the other 2 N of SHANGHAI found some debris but no positive information about the missing planes. A FBJ in SUO NADA on the 27th scored 2 rocket hits on a 350 foot ship, with damage undetermined. FAW 18 planes E of CHIBU sank 1 200-ton trawler and damaged 1 SD. Since 23 April, when CTF 94 took control of MARIANAS based search planes, they have destroyed about 36,000 tons of enemy shipping and 17 enemy aircraft.

TAP F4Us, TBM's and P-47s continued attacking MIYAKO and ISHIGAKI. CAP was flown all day over OKINAWA and over KUME. 1 pilot bailed out and was rescued. On ISHIGAKI on the 27th 1 operational Betty was destroyed in a revetment, and 5 boats were exploded. At KAKIROMA 51 VFB burned 1 SB, fired 1 SC, damaged 2 SC and damaged 1 barge.


CINCPOA ADV 262310 (pink) outlines troop requirements OKINAWA and IE SHIMA including redeployed units which have been accepted for these bases.

COMGEN TEN 270426 recommends reduction of ammunition storage at OKINAWA to 20-day level.

CINCFA C ADV 270436 in reply to COMGENAAPP 250227 reaffirms existing policy on storage of chemical ordnance.

COM3RDFLT 270671 (pink) recommends withdrawal of CTF 31 from RYUKYUS and assumption of full responsibility for defense by ComGen 10 on 1 July.
28 June (Guam date)

On the 28th, ANTARES (AKS 3) was attacked by possibly two submarines. SPROSTON (DD 577) proceeded to the scene and made several attacks on sonar and sight contacts. 2 periscopes were seen, 1 of a fleet sub, the other of a midget. Midget sub was attacked by gunfire and disappeared. Several large oil slicks were seen, but again no debris. Night of the 28th, shortly before midnight, a merchant vessel reported seeing a submarine. 5 hours later another merchant ship reported a submarine but gives no details. These contacts considered sufficiently good to justify starting ASW operations. Another contact was made 300 miles east of LEYTE.

SKATE (SS 305) reports seeing 2 ships early on the 13th in LA PEROUSE STRAITS. One was approached within 1100 yards; no lights were seen, and she was torpedoed and sunk. The other, seen shortly thereafter on a southwesterly course was recognized from 3,000 yards as a Soviet vessel. One of these may have been the Soviet ship TRANSBALT which was sunk on the 13th near the position of these sightings.

TUNNEY (SS 282) reports that the BONEFISH (SS 223) when last contacted on 13 June, had sunk to that date 1 large transport and 1 medium AK. She was then given permission to enter TOYAMA WAN, and has not since been heard from.

SKATE (SS 305) reports her results for the patrol as 1 Y-Class submarine sunk, 1 medium and 3 small ships sunk, and 1 medium ship damaged.

494 B-29s made incendiary attacks on the 28/29th against OKINAWA, SASEBO, MOJI and NOBEOKA.

1 Pete was shot down by night CAP at OKINAWA in the only action reported on the 27/28th. MIYAKO intruders hit the KIRARA area and started one large fire in the revetment area. ISHIGAKI airfield was hit by Avengers and Corsairs. Wan airfield, KIKAI, was hit by fighter bombers leaving several fires.

In attacks against enemy shipping, Thunderbolts from OKINAWA sank 2 luggers off ISHIGAKI and hit other small ships around AMAMI, destroying 1 SC. Attacks were made against 10 ships on the NE shore of OLGEATEROMA, and 1 SB was reported as exploding. 2 other SB were damaged.

FAW 1 planes sank 1 SD, 1 stack-aft and 2 small tankers, and damaged 4 other small ships. FAW 1 planes also laid several mines off SW tip of KOREA. On the 28th FAW 1 planes bombed and strafed 1 SD which had been beached on the west coast of KOREA. 1 plane sank 2 luggers, 1 unidentified ship, 1 small fishing vessel SE of KYUSHU. 3 hits exploded a 4-masted schooner off the W coast of KOREA.

CINCPAC ADV 281347 (pink) requests Com3rdFlt to designate a commander to exercise control of TF 32, TF 39, TG 30.5 and TU 30.9.5 during periods when Com3rdFlt is in radio silence.

CINCPAC ADV 281348 (pink) directs ComGen 10 to assume full responsibility for defense of OKINAWA on 1 July.

CINCAPPAC 281355 (pink) outlines War Department proposal to load 3 Liberty ships for delivery at FORT BAYARD about 15 August, and 2 additional ships 20 days later and further requests comment on possibility of providing air cover presumably by CVE.
29 June (Guam date)

Submarine contact between GUAM and ENIWETOK was confirmed by plane sightings of an oil slick which appeared to be moving slowly. ASW unit is still on the scene. Last night about midnight, the same merchant ship that had reported sighting a submarine 250 miles west, reported a torpedo wake passing her at 12N 154°-23 E. A DE reported a sound contact 50 miles NE of ULITHI, and ASW operations were instituted here. North of OKINAWA a submarine was sighted on the surface by a DD. The sub submerged and subsequent searches were negative.

Much small activity is reported north of OKINAWA. Sub also sighted. Marine Air Warning outpost illuminated 3 objects on surface closing point, which disappeared when taken under fire. Investigation of this activity continuing.

Two more submarines from the JAPAN SEA Group have reported. Total damage to date: 30 ships and 16 miscellaneous craft sunk.

25 B-29s in three groups laid mines in West SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS, MAIZURU and SAKATA on the 29th. 34 B-29s struck an oil refinery at KUDAMATSU, reporting fair to excellent results.

On the 29th the tactical air force carried out raids on MIYAKO, AMAMI SHIMA, and other islands in the RYUKYUS Chain. Six Corsairs were lost during the day. 1 pilot was recovered. In a raid against NOBURA airfield on MIYAKO 10 Corsairs were armed with VT fuzed bombs. Three planes were lost due to the explosion of their own bombs and a fourth was lost from the explosion of his wingman's bombs.

FAW 18 sank 1 SD along the coast of JAPAN, and had 1 plane shot down in KATSUURA HARBOR. No survivors were observed. FAW 1 sank 1 fishing boat. 1 aircraft was reported overdue from daily searches.

COMINCH & CNO 272122 directs maintenance of a token garrison at QUOIN HILL temporarily in addition to BAUER FIELD.

COMINCH & CNO 281306 amends Cominch & CNO #7 of December 1943 concerning abandonment of airfields to include abandonment of seaplane bases.

COMINCH & CNO 281309 directs the token garrison be maintained at TONGATAPU but that no token garrison be established at JUA AMOTU pending further instructions.

CINCPAC ADV 290138 directs that CTF 94 assume responsibility for escort of all shipping between the MARIANAS and the RYUKYUS beginning 1 July.

COMAIRPAC 290242 recommends that facilities for 1 replacement CVG be established at ROI.

CINCPAC ADV 290331 grants ComSoPac authority to discontinue all air, sea and ground defense missions.

COMGENAAFPOA 290505 requests statement from CINCPAC concerning feasibility of moving ATC from Naha to Yonabaru.

COMGEN TEN 290725 (pink) recommends early conference concerning ammunition and bomb supply storage on OKINAWA.

COMTHFPLT 290754 (pink) comments on feasibility of convoying ships to FORT BAYARD.

CINCPAC ADV 290838 (pink) outlines to Cominch proposal for OPI services for OLYMPIC.
20 June (Guam date)

This morning a plane on anti-shipping sweep on the CHINA Coast reported 1 CA, 1 DD and 5 merchantmen anchored in HANGHOU. At noon, another plane reported 1 DD, 2 smaller escorts and 6 merchantmen including 3 tankers. Attacks were launched from OKINAWA.

CHINA reports a large concentration of junkers at AMOY in connection with the Jap Army evacuation.

3 merchantmen report sighting submarines or periscopes - 1 west of ULITHI, 1 between MANUS and ULITHI, and 1 SE of the MARIANAS. An AK reports a possible periscope E of ENIWETOK. A transport pilot made a doubtful sighting of a submarine between GUAM and ENIWETOK. 1 of TG 96.9 also reported a contact at 12-30 N 157-37 E, but this was lost. TG is now sweeping back and forth along the shipping lanes. At 0600 the morning of the 1st a barrier patrol plane reported a periscope at 15 N 158 E.

3 small enemy air raids on OKINAWA were reported between 0030 and 0300. No damage was inflicted, and 1 Pete was splashed by night VF. The Tactical Air Force struck AMAMI and SAKISHIMA. TAF splashed 1 Jake on the 20th for its 600th kill. One group of Thunderbolts strafed, bombed and rocketed KUSHIRA and KANOYA in south KYUSHU.

5 small surface ships were sunk by FAW 1 planes in the YELLOW SEA and 1 on the 30th by TAF off the west coast of KYUSHU. 6 other small vessels were damaged by FAW 1.

Enemy aircraft destroyed in POA since 18 March- 18 March to 30 April - 3227.
1 May to date: TF 38 401, TF 31 419, TF 37 31, TF 93 130, TG 30.5 23, 20th AAF 230, TF 94 12, TG 99.2 468; Total - 1,714.

COMINCH 292140 outlines procedure for establishing monthly priority list for personnel movement to the Pacific Theater.

CINCPOA ADV 300304 proposes to CINCAFPAC to assign all air sea rescue services in the RYUKYUS to a single agency under Fleet Air Wing ONE.

CINCPAC ADV 300513 (pink) designates ComRYUKYUS the single agency responsible for coordination of ammunition supply for all forces in the RYUKYUS.

CINCPAC ADV 300601 (pink) constitutes Warning Order for Operation OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC ADV 300608 informs ComGenAAPOA that naval aviation requirements at Yonabaru preclude ATC operations there.

CINCPAC ADV 300617 (pink) directs that Hqtrs 5thPhibCorps remain at MAUI.

CINCPAC ADV 300618 outlines proposed procedure for visit of important civilians.

CINCPAC ADV 300732 informs CinCBPF that only limited air stores can be made available to meet BPF shortages.

CINCBPF 300735 (pink) proposes possible missions for British force of 1 CV, 3 CVLs and appropriate escorting units.

CINCPOA ADV 300811 (pink) summarizes Com3rdFlt OpOrds 3-45, 6-45 and 9-45 for CINCWP.
19 1830 GMT IOTHRAY to CTF 51 INFO COMSTHFLTL+CINCPAC ADV HQ

1. A. Early this afternoon, front lines of the 4th Marines were advancing and the VND BN following mopping up rear areas. 29th Marines are attacking NW to seize the high ground and prevent enemy further withdrawal in that direction. Para. Little enemy activity reported. 16 Japs killed this morning on MOTOBU PENINSULA. B. 24th Corps: Progress of attack by Corps reported as satisfactory. Enemy artillery classified as moderate. Lines pinned down at points along the front by MGs and mortar fire from well concealed, covered strong points. Para. Enemy fired 4 spigot mortar rounds in 361st Inf area. Vicious closed in fighting reported in 184th Inf area. Para. Japs delivered counterattack against area 206th Inf, undetermined size. Para. Shortly after noon 27th Inf supported by tanks were in the village of KAKAXU. Para. Large fires in YANA BARU, few buildings western part of town still standing. Para. Town of INA has many fires raging. Para. Fire director unit SHIMA is setting up on KEDO MISAKI with 2 search stations operating. Para. IE SHIMA no reports. Para. 10th Army CP opened ashore. Para. 181200-TA3667 closed EDLORADO 181159.

20 0550 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLTL INFO CINCPAC BOTH, 5THFLT.

Summary No. 39 as of 201200, Ships gunfire continued to support ground troops. During the night 19-20 3 CA 1 CL 5 DD assigned 3rdPhibCorps and 77th Div while 1 OBB 2 DD fired in support of 24th Corps from the E and 3 OBB and 1 DD fired from the West. Fire missions conducted during the night were illumination harassing fire missions and interdiction types. 51.19 report from NAKAGUSUKU WAN as of 1800 19th that eastern beaches and shorelines were well neutralized as result of yesterday’s bombardment. 5 heavy ships and 3 DD operated in YONABARU WAN West of Long 127-50 as far as navigation permitted and drew no enemy fire. LCI 764 destroyed 3 mines on reef near CHINEN POINT and destroyed 3 beached boats. From 51.15 at KERAMA RETTO comes word that repairs on southern net handicapped by weather and that unloading of ammunition ships proceeded very slowly yesterday due adverse weather conditions. 51.21 at IE SHIMA as of 1800 19th reported unloading was resumed at daylight and beach conditions continued to improve throughout the day. Removal of cargo from beach and dump areas hampered by rifle fire and mined roads. 3 LST and 2 LSM were beached within LAGOONA T RED T. Intend to install 3 pontoon causeways at end of harbor as pier for small craft and to increase landing for total 4 LST and 6 LSM. At 1418 an LST not identified was taken under enemy artillery fire appearing to come from SESOKO TA 9424. No damage. TUSCALOOSA neutralized suspected area. First attempt to tow off TOFUMAN previously reported grounded at high tide yesterday was unsuccessful. Attempting again today. All double bottom tanks forward of machinery spaces are punctured and flooded. Blowing flooded tanks. Revised MOBILE casualty figures are 5 KIA 17 WIA. Routine minesweeping was conducted in area QL channel and transport area with negative results. GREGORY STERETT RALL departed for rear areas 19th. During bogey raid this morning at 0429 1 small bomb dropped 150 yards off starboard quarter of BAUER. No damage or casualties. BREIZHE southern patrol KERAMA reports torpedo fired at her evening 18th. REVENGE on station PL5 18 miles east of EDLO opened fire visually at 0205 on 3 low flying twin engine bombers apparently Irwins which passed over her bow. Reputed 2 crashed in water. No flames or explosion observed. Para. Naval air arm engaged in direct support troops. Strike missions furnished by fast carriers of TF 58 and CVEs of TG 52.1. PETROF RAY CAP planes on return to base strafed KURE SHIMA at 1010. Fires

- Continued -

2716
were started. No enemy aircraft sighted. Search flights were made by PBMs. At 0255 2 DEs were sighted 31-25N 123-20E. Routine ASP was flown by PBMs. On 19th an oil slick with continuous bubbling fresh oil 2 miles long 150 yards wide sighted 27-07N 127014 E. Sonar buoy pattern negative. DITTER send to aid investigation. 2 PBs were damaged in takeoff KERAMA morning 19th due to swell. Enemy air was active from 0425 to 0610 when small group of planes approached from the north and returned to north. There were no interceptions and no damage to our forces. End of summary.

20 1045 CG10 TO CTF51 Info CINCOPA BOTH, CON5THFLT.

Ops Sum 57 as of 20/1000. 3rdPhibCorps continues operations to eliminate remaining enemy northern OKINAWA and MOTOBU PENINSULA. 1st MarDiv reconnoiters islands guarding CHINU WAN. Patrols working northward south rugged NW coast OKINAWA met late yesterday near AHA TA 4032 completing coverage northern part island proper. Corps losses period 130001 to 182400 KIA 1 WIA 0 MIA 0 NBC 6 0 casualties period 2 no report enemy dead. 24th Corps sector quiet last night received scattered artillery fire. Result of yesterdays attack lines advanced southern front generally 1000 yards and secured. Penetration of 1400 yards on left flank. Lines reported this morning 7878K 77770 7976CH 8076K 8176K 8276P 83761MN 8375Y 8473MS 8574UV 8673B. Casualties period 130001 to 182400 KIA 4 WIA 80 MIA 2 NBC 95. Enemy dead not reported. 26 of our tanks were destroyed in yesterdays action. 77th Div continues drive today to seize south and eastern section TE SHIMA and capture TE GUSUGU YAMA. Yesterday Div encountered stubborn resistance from isolated positions. Enemy strength on TE SHIMA estimated 900 to 1100 exclusive of present casualties composed of 50th Special Inf Bn TAMA 1650. Plan to unload 77th Div over HAGUCHI beaches upon completion of TE SHIMA operation. Enemy casualties period 171600 to 181600 KIA 207 WIA 4 total period ending 181600 KIA 735. 77th Div casualties period ending 171600 KIA 22 WIA 149 MIA 0 NBC 16. Para. Supply situation 10th Army satisfactory strong SW winds and heavy rain yesterday slowed down discharge of cargo. Weather clear today.

20 1210 CTF 51 to CON5THFLT Info CINCOPAC BOTH No. 5THFLT.

Summary No. 40 as of 201300. Naval gunfire support was furnished throughout the day by 1 CA and 4 DD in the zone of the 3rdPhibCorps and 77th Div on TE SHIMA. 6 OBB 1 CA 2 CL 9 DD worked for the 24th Corps from the west and 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD reinforced from the east. 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD replenished ammunition. HUTCHINS in direct support of the 32nd Inf obtained many hits in numerous caves and destroyed gun position during todays firing. COLORADO had a fire aboard between handling rooms 1 and 2 at 1030 caused by an explosion of 16 inch powder charge while loading ammunition KERAMA. 8 main battery magazines were flooded. Loading continued aft and preparations made to remove powder forward. Ship sustained no damage to installations or equipment beyond capacity of ships force to repair. Late report from TOMAN as of 1715 indicates ship still fast and pounding badly. Departures for the day included CombatDiv 3 in INANO ComPhibGrp 1 in ESTES HART MTCALF WILLIAMSON JICAPILIS departed 1300 for GHAM and BILICH PORTLAND BRYANT STANLEY CROSSLEY TISDALE departed for ULITHI. Para. Naval air activities consisted of strikes in support of troops by fast carriers of TF 58 and 6Vs of TG 52.1. Search flights were made by PBs with sighting of 1 DE at 1335 on course 270 speed 15 33-30N 135-30E. Routine ASP was flown by PBs. Enemy air activity was limited to 1 high flying plane approaching to within 50 miles of OKINAWA.

- Continued -
from the west at 1330. No interception and no damage. Tonight 9 small raids approached. Torpedoes dropped at pickets apparently without result. Para.
Weather light scattered to broken clouds. Wind northerly 20 to 25 knots.
Visibility 5 to 10 miles. 77th Div not employed at IW SHIMA Landing HAGUSHI.
End of Summary.
Operations summary number 59

situation as of 21 SLFSH 10001. 111 Phib Corps, 4th RCT and 5th RCT of the 6th Mar Div yesterday reduced the enemy pocket previously reported and advanced to the northern shore of MOYOBU PENINSULA. Light infiltration on 6th Mar Div rear areas during night. Plan for today mopping up. Marine amph Bn patrols returned from reconnaissance of SESOKO SHIMA (9423) and YAGACHI SHIMA (1026) during early hours today. Preliminary report islands lightly held. 24th Corps. Reported quiet last night only sporadic artillery and mortar with minor endeavors to infiltrate except in 7th Div zone where infiltration was heavy and being mopped up today. Corps continued attack this morning at 0630. 77th Div. Enemy continued to offer strong resistance from PINNACLE and town at TA 87326 has secured island except PINNACLE and town which is being worked over today. Airfields Kadena 5 and Yontan 6 were subjected to 4 air attacks during night. AAA reports 2 enemy planes probably destroyed. 1 AAA S/L was damaged. At 2050 unknown number of enemy bombs fell in the TAF area. Drake field was strafed damaging 2 hellcats, 1 off EM KIA 3 OFF 12 EM WIA. Between 210330 and 210530 enemy shelled Ruby field with 15 rounds destroyed 1 Corsair and damaged another. Drake field was also shelled during same hours with 11-15 shells. No reported damage. Minna Shima was shelled at 200755 with 20 to 40 rounds HE and WA. KIA 14, N WIA damaged 1 howitzer and 5 vehicles. Source of fire is being investigated.

Operations summary number 60

situation as of 21/1600 I(-9). 77 Inf Div. At 1025 I today the American Flag was raised on IEUSUGU YAMA, the pinnacle which has been the center of resistance on IE SHIMA. It was estimated that 200 to 300 Japs remained in caves on this pinnacle at that time, some of the caves 3 stories deep. The 77 Div expected to have all resistance cleaned out today. CG 77 Div described the fighting as the bitterest he has ever witnessed. 9 Com APO Geo 45, has been directed to commence Base Development 3rd Phib Corps. All organized resistance on MOTOU PENINSULA has ceased. No major changes in position since previous report. 29th and 4th RCTs of 6th MarDiv remain on Northern shore of MOTOU (0928 to 9631) which position was reached last night. Latest report active patrolling today has produce no enemy contacts. Total 3rd Phib Corps casualties to 2400 19 April KIA 266 WIA 1125, MIA 4, NBC 1043, total 2138. Enemy KIA 2591, POW 244, Civilians in area 67305. 24th Corps. Bitter fighting continued with only small gains reported. Hill 178 in front of 7th Div continues to be a major obstacle, crags and small hills blocking the approach to hill 178 have changed hands several times. At 1845 a 2nd enemy counterattack was repulsed in zone of 3rd Bn 23831, 96th Div, 150 Japs were killed. It is estimated Corps now has 10 to 3 U/F and with present unloading rated should be able to maintain this level.
Summary 43 as of 221200. Fire support throughout the night was furnished 24th Corps by 1 CA 2 CL 4 DD from the E and from the W by 5 OBB 1 CA 3 dd. Of these ships 2 DD & OBB and 1 CA were in general support in addition to direct support assignment. 1 DD was in support of 3rdPhibCorps. Night fire missions consisted mainly of harassing and illumination. 1 OBB 1 CL 3 DD are replenishing ammunition. CROUTER reports Kate or Jull attacked 211212 with torpedo in screening station A38A. Torpedo missed. Plane hit possibly splashed. During air raid last night R W SUESSENS in screening station A33 reported hostile plane dropping window about 2042. 2047 torpedo was dropped 500 yards on port beam from altitude of 25 feet. SUESSENS maneuvered radically evading torpedo. Plane was taken under fire and reported hit in fuselage. CROUTER in station A33 was under air attack at 2200 on 2nd run plane dropped torpedo at 800 yards which missed, plane taken under fire and hit probably destroyed. HALLORAN in area B7 -8 SW of KERAMA RETTO took bogy under fire about 2130. Torpedo dropped but missed. BROWN in RP4 SADSWORTH in RP 10 and COWELL in RP 1 were under hostile attack by single planes about same time and PUTNAM by 3 planes. PUTNAM splashed 1 and BROWN AND PUTNAM 1 between them. No damage to ships. LCS 31 splashed 1 Val 2255. TOLEMAN previously reported aground is still fast on reef flooded down hard to prevent pounding. Salvage operations continue expect to attempt to re-float on 24th. Minesweeping of channel and transport areas and area 31 around TA 9923 and 9279 were completed. LCS 34 reports sinking floating object possible mine on RP sta 10 at 1900 21st. Casualties to LCS 51 damaged 16th now reported as 2 WIA. UDT 16 has completed reconnaissance of TA 9725 MOTOKU area finding excellent well protected harbor for small craft deep channel approach capable of docking 2 LSTs at a time. It is planned to establish boat pool this harbor. Repairs to NW net KERAMA now completed. FORREST yesterday recovered body from sea identified by clothing marks as C W PHILLIPS but ship unknown. Buried at sea 26 -36 N 127-31 E. Para. Planes from CVEs of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 58 and shore based air of TG 99.2 gave direct support to ground troops. KIFF SHIMA was strafed by 4 fighters at 1130. No activity noted. Search flights were made by FBMs from KERAMA. At 0135 2 DD were sighted at 31-26N 124-09 E course 000 speed 15. ASF was conducted by FBMs. TULAGI on antisub sweep of shipping lanes to SE. No contacts. Destroyed 2 mines 23-38 and 150-17. Hostile air attacks occurred between 1940 and 2305 and from 0040 to 0250 with planes approaching from N and W in numerous small groups. Results above plus P6FN night fighter shot down 1 unidentified plane 90 miles from OKINAWA. Plane losses occurred at 0710 when 1 FM from MARCUS ISLAND collided with FM from SARGENT BAY. Both planes crashed burned. Pilots presumed lost. Rescue of pilot reported down near SAKIKEBA previous summary was made by sub prior to arrival of Dumbo. MAW Sqdn now established on N tip of OKINAWA are controlling part of CAP. Entire shore based radar reporting unit is now tied by a force flagship CIC. Strip for observation aircraft now established on SE SHIMA in TA 83340. End of Summary.

221239

CONCENTRATION TO CTF 51 Info CINCPAC BOTH, CTF51.

Operations summary 61 as of 221200. 3rdPhibCorps. Quiet night. 6thMarDiv reconnoitered SESOKO SHIMA 9423 no enemy encountered. Marines moved 1 En by motor to ASA 0119 embarked 23 April for attack on SESOKO. Remainder 29th moved to TOUCHI 9725. 6thMarDiv today reconnoitered YAGACHI SHIMA. Some enemy sniping during night units near base of MOTOKU PENINSULA no further.

- Continued -
22 1239 CG TEN SUMMARY NO 61 - CONTINUED.

Details. Patrols eliminating remnants of 150 enemy UDO force 0918-1018. Switchboard in 8800G attacked last night strength unknown our casualties KIA 3 WIA 1 in Yead by 0130. Bomb dropped near 6thMarDiv CP during night no casualties. Elements 1st MarDiv today occupied TAKE BAHARE from which base patrols HANNA-HAMAZUKI-IKE SHIMA. 24th Corps front lines as of 220700 7 Div 83760W 83755J 837533T 837533X 837443E 837443M 837443E S 6 Div 83765Q 82760WWT 27 Div 7776 ABHI G 7876QKSTS. Enemy defensive position consists of mutually supporting concrete and earthen pillboxes and dugouts interlaced trenches. Japs throw grenades and satchel charges when our troops attack. DD fire house XPHACUN June Bug 03. Intermittent enemy fire during night most sectors 106-155 GPs extensive shelling between 2200-2400. At 2318 157th Inf repulsed counterattack Corps continues attack today capture high ground adjust lines 27th Div cleans up KAKABU and vicinity. At 2319 165th received counterattack supported by FAP arty 27th Div arty took under fire. Mires cut to all REXTs ROME radios cut out no further info. Both pontoon and Bailey bridges in 7976 destroyed by Jap fire during night. Enemy counterattacked 0515 at 0615 today no further report. 24th Corps casualties period 192400 202400 KIA 97 WIA 745 MIA 92 NBC 123 Corps casualties to date KIA 317 WIA 4454 MIA 217 NBC 2542 total casualties to 202400 5527. Strength of command 202400 7th Div 13857 96th Div 12540 27th Div 14240 Corps 16573. Jap casualties 24th Corps KIA 17818 P F 27 civilian 29342. Isabella dump now contains approximately 10 days rations for units ashore. All routes in area being widened and surfaced provide 2 way all weather roads progressing satisfactory. DRAGE Field hit by 3 Bonys at 212005 1 plane damaged 1 officer 3 enlisted men slightly wounded again hit 210245 no damage reported. At 0900 MGC fighter reported splash 1 Betty N of OKINAWA.

22 1315 CTF 51 to COMSTFHLT Info CINCPOC BOTH 5THFLT.

Summary 14 as of 221300. Surface activities for the day included naval gunfire support to 3rdPhibCorps by 1 DD 24th Corps from the E by 1 CA 2 CL 4 DD and from the W by 2 CA 3 DD. ST LOUIS reports good effect on caves trenches and emplacements with 9 inch gunfire. HALLORAN reports that for the past 2 nights bogies have dropped float planes W of KERAMA. The following types departed for SAIPAN today: 5 AFA 1 AM 5 AKA 2 YAP 3 XK 2 DD 2 DE 2 AF. Para. Naval air activity consisted of direct air support to troops by fast carriers of TF 53 and CVEs of TG 52.1. TG 52.1 again struck SAKIJIMA GUNTO today. Results of strike on ISHIGAKI by TU 52.1.3 on 21 April show runways dispersal areas buildings and gun emplacements hit. Night hecklers sighted Zeke airborne. Later burned 1 on ground. Routine search flights and ASP was flown by FMs. 24 TMs of WMT 232 landed at Kadena Field 1430 and 1600 4 F5 planes landed at YORTAN Field belonging to TG 99.2. Our plane losses were: 1 YORKTOWN TM crash landed in water off western OKINAWA at 1220. Enemy air attacks from 1740 to 1950 22 April. Estimate 30 planes in 11 raids approached OKINAWA. Early raids came from N latter ones from W. 35 planes estimated shot down by CAP, 10 by ships crediting SNUGERS 2 RANSOM AND DENTSETT jointly 2 Vans WADSWORTH 1 Val HUDSON 1 SHAY 1 WICKER 2 SIDERSTROM 1 Betty. Ships hit by suicide: ISHERWOOD in screen had fire and extinguished it. 1 depth charge exploded. 20 WIA. Proceeded under own power to KERAMA. SWALLOW capized and sinking. LCS in RPS 14 unreported damage. ROCKS 15 mi. W HAGUSHI beaches reported bomb misses her area WADSWORTH near miss. CAP reported Vals jettisoned fixed landing gear then attacked by our fighters. Total enemy destroyed 49. No further details at this time. Para. Weather partly cloudy with visibility 10 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. Wind NE to SE 10 knots. Slight sea.
22 1709

CC TEN to CTF 51 into CINCPAC BOTH, CONTUHLT.

Ops Sun 62 as of 221700. Japs opposing 24th Corps are resisting with deadly tenacity assaults of the corps. Enemy positions protected every conceivable approach deeply entrenched with numerous pillboxes and caves. Activity today mainly devoted to combat patrolling with attempts to probe pillboxes mopping up rear areas from infiltrations last night and early this morning together with readjusting Div Lines. Para. In the 7th Div ZA early this afternoon an assault of ROCKY PEAK by a double envelopment of 2 companies was repulsed by terrific enemy fire of all types. Arty fire by heavy tanks ineffective. Troops were reorganized and a concerted effort launched utilizing Imf, 2 Flats medium tanks and flame throwers supported by 155mm howitzers from positions only 500 yards to the rear. Resistance continues heavy and determined. No further report of progress this phase available. Para. Caves in 7th Div zone have been explored found to contain bodies of many Japs. 1 cave contained 100 another 200 another 50. Apparently majority killed by arty fire and placed in caves instead of burying. Para. Troops cleaning up KAKAZU area reported advancing slowly early this afternoon against rifle mortar fire. KAKAZU RIDGE which had been fought over bitterly for 2 weeks still occupied by number of deeply dug in Japs. 27th Div is working on TEF. Jap occupation of ridge gives small salient and observation into our lines. Para. 3rdPhibCorps at 1420 6thMarDiv reported 1st Bn 22ndMarmed had killed 5 Japs and sighted main body of enemy force estimated 150 vicinity 1417 enemy withdrawing W 1st Bn is in pursuit. Para. Landing operations against SESOKO SHIMA commenced at 1200 with landing of Armd RCN Bn and 1st ARMD AMTRAC BN. At 1340 our forces were half way across the island. 6th MarDiv plans landing operation on KOURI SHIMA on 230600. Para. CTF 51 has requested permanent port organization assume control all unloading at OKINAWA except those on NAGUCHI beaches and IE SHIMA NAGO WAN areas. Para. Fair weather and good unloading conditions expected until 24 April with winds slowly shifting to NE. Para. Assault shipping 77th Div is 22% unloaded. Para. IE SHIMA was declared secure at 211025 with only mopping up to do and completing Phase 2.

23 0750

CTF 51 to CONTUHLT INFO CINCPAC BOTH, 5THFLI.

Summary 45 as of 231200. Demands for naval gunfire support have decreased since completion of Phase 2 operation. CG 3rdPhibCorps states no further need for naval gunfire support and expressed appreciation for excellent work of fire support ships. Fire support to 24th Corps yesterday was furnished by cruisers and destroyers only. From the E direct support was had by 1 CA 2 CL 3 DD and from the W by 3 CA 1 CL 4 DD with 1 CA 1 DD harassing and illuminating southern OKINAWA airfields and boatpens. Results of yesterday's gunfire indicate direct hits on AA emplacements various dumps trenches blockhouses and caves effectively covered by fire. To prepare against probable air attacks in force yesterday evening no covering force was deployed. All OBs were anchored in smoke cover and covering force screen assigned to inner screen transport area. Amplifying information on last nights air raid shows the following: ISHERWOOD previously reported as hit by suicider now reports that after engine room machine shop port shaft aley flooded. Ship proceeded to KERAMA under own power. RAILORAN and DENSITY rescued 4 survivors. Preliminary casualty report 30 KIA 25 WIA 13 KIA. LCS previously reported hit by suicider now identified as LCS 15 and sank in 3 minutes. LCS 37 did excellent job rescuing 25 by line and ladder including 5 badly wounded. After first aid transferred 6 officers 50 EM including 6 seriously wounded survivors to VAN VALKANBURH and LST 195. Report is that 18 NTA. PG B GAYEETY SPECTOR MOLALA performed...
excellent rescue job of 105 survivors of sunken SWALLOW including captain and 7 officers, only 1 reported MIA. Casualties and survivors transferred to PINKEYE and MATRONA with PCE 855 rendering excellent assistance. WADS- WORTH reports hit but near miss by splashed plane which fell 15 feet on starboard beam causing 6 small holes above waterline. Ship fully operational. 1 WIA. CREUTHER on Sta 438 at 2048 reported small bomb dropped 300 yards off port quarter by hostile plane. No damage. CONSELL in RP 1 hit in jackstaff by suicide Val which missed ship and crashed. No damage. HUDSON enroute to transport area from RP 12 hit by suicide Val which glanced off forecastle and crashed with no damage to ship. 1 WIA. SEDERSTROM had suicide crash close aboard. No damage. 1 man overboard recovered at 1929. SHIMA in screen station B24 at 1936 received superficial damage from an explosion of bomb or torpedo from hostile plane crashing 25 feet off port beam. 2 WIA. DENISTRY at KERAMA had torpedo miss with no damage at 1300. At 2328 LCI 803 sighting raft in TA 9232 E of LE SHIMA went alongside and took 6 enemy privates 1 NO3 prisoner. R W GUSSENS in sta A33 sighted horned mine at 0744. Took under rifle fire with contact lost. LOS 14 reported mine caught in her anchor chain position 1 and 1/2 miles W of HAGUSHI berth H282 at 0927 April. Mine disposal officer despatched and cleared mine at 2100. 51,19 reports lower entrance NAKAGUSUKU WAN cleared and large sections of bay also checked by sweeps. BROWN beaches and approach from SHIRAHAMA ZONE TA 9173 sounded and swept with negative results. Channels and transport area swept. Entrance at TA 9665 in area Q1 clear. All negative. No change in TOLMAN previously reported grounded. STANLEY previously damaged has been repaired and has reported to CTF 51 and been assigned to duty in screen. Naval casualties reported by 105 ships are: 582 KIA 1575 WIA 623 MIA total 2870. Para. Naval air operations include direct support by CVEs of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 58. Strafing attack on KUME SHIMA hit 1 camouflaged Oscar burning it. Exploded mine on beach. TG 52.1 attacking SATSHIMA GUNTO on 22nd dusk strike found 24 planes turning up for take off on NOBARA field. Bombs rockets and strafing destroyed 15 plus many personnel. 5 airborne Oscars shot down over NOBARA and 4 more Orcars shot down over ISHIKAKI. Search flights were made by PBMs. Between 2200 and 0100 sighted several enemy freighters with escort general area 32-00 N 133-00 E. Special search by Dumbo PB2 around radar picket station 14 for survivors was negative. At 1030 PBM Dumbo landed at AKAMARU NODASHI GAK 10 miles S of north tip OKINAWA to bring off badly wounded Marine for hospitalization. Routine ASP was flown by PBYS. Additional information on enemy air attack evening 22nd reveals fighter total now 32 by TG 99.2 and 5 by fast carriers. Ships which shot down planes not previously reported: CONSELL, LUCB, DAILY. Grand total 54.

23 1125 CTF 51 to COMSTFLEET Info CINC PAC BOTH. STEFLT.

Summary 46 as of 231800. Gunfire support was furnished to 24th Corps throughout the day by 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD firing from the W and 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD from the E. General support was provided by 2 OBB 1 CA 1 CL. Ammunition situation is excellent with replenishment continuing satisfactorily. DAILY reported possible periscope vicinity of RP3 at 1400. Plane in sector 4 is investigating in collaboration with DAILY. Correct ISHERWOOD casualty report now shows 27 KIA 25 WIA 16 MIA and SWALLOW now reporting 9 WIA 2 MIA. Para. Air activity for the period comprised direct support missions by CVEs of TG 52.1 and fast carriers of TF 58. KUME SHIMA was again investigated this afternoon by 4 flights of fighters. No air

- Continued -
activity was noted but 2 camouflaged planes in addition to those previously reported and 1 boat were destroyed. Search flights and ASFP were made by F6M's covering all sectors. F6M's are providing air cover to damage sub SEA HORSE proceeding from 29-30 N 133-33 E to GUAM. 6 F6M's privates of TG 50.5 have arrived Yontan Field for duty. At 0700 an F6U of TG 99.2 shot down 1 Val 50 miles NE of DOLO. Our plane losses for the day are: 1 F6U from TG 99.2 damaged was abandoned. Pilot parachuted 12 miles bearing 225 from ZAMPA at 1359. Rescued by AMBEN and on board within 11 minutes. Pilot of TG 52.1 made water landing SE of ISHIGAKI too late to be rescued by Dumbo today. Dumbo will attempt rescue daylight tomorrow. Bulk aviation gas delivery from YOGLs to tanks ashore by pipeline commenced today. There were no hostile air attacks this afternoon. Para. Weather overcast. Visibility 6 miles. Wind E to SE 3 knots. Temperature average 75 degrees. Sea calm. Negligible swell. End of Summary.

23 1800 CONGEN 10 to CTF 51 Info CON5THFLT, CINC PAC.

Ops Summ 64 as of 231800. 3rd Phib Corps. Reconnaissance completed HEMANZA SHIMA 231255 and KOURI SHIMA 231200. No enemy found. Reconnaissance HAMARMA SHIMA in process. 1st Bn 22nd Marines continued mopping up remnants UDO force TA 1126. Other units no change. Casualties 22001 to 222400: 1st MarDiv KIA 1 WIA 6 MIA 0 NBC 17 total 24. 6th MarDiv KIA 1 WIA 14, MIA 0 NBC 43 total 58. 3rd Phib Corps tropst 93 WIA 6 MIA 1 NBC 1 total 11. Corps: Reconnaissance of TSUGEN SHIMA began 0930 no report results. No change corps front except capture cag 83474. Plan drop unfuzed Naval bombs KAKAZU tomorrow followed by concentration WP. 96 Div reports naval gunfire very effective stopping Jap counterattacks. 383 Inf no advancing hills 8275ABG. 7th Div 1701 took cag 8474A at 1245. Casualties 22001 to 222400 Corps troops KIA 0 WIA 3 MIA 0 NBC 14 total 17. 7th Div KIA 25 WIA 131 MIA 1 NBC 111 total 268. 27th Div KIA 38 WIA 215 MIA 59 NBC 84 total 396. 96th Div KIA 19 WIA 71 MIA 3 NBC 21 total 114. Corps ammo 201600 in GF/UF, small arms 20155H 2.95, 155 gun 2.05, 82H 3.65. Casualties enemy up to 3100024 TOTAL KIA 13043 PW 21 KERAMA KIA 536 PW 172. Total casualties APG 341 M2 222400 KIA 1 WIA 31 MIA 0 NBC 31 total 113.

24 0630 CTF 51 to CON5THFLT INFO CINC PAC BOTH, 5TH FLTLT, CONGEN 10.

Summary No. 47 as of 241200. Direct support was furnished 24th Corps during the night from E by 1 OB2 2 CA 4 DD from the W by 3 OB2 2 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 1 CA and 2 DD were assigned duty in NAHA area. Excellent reports on effectiveness of naval gunfire included ST LOUIS closed 14 caves HALL destroyed gun emplacement with direct hits WEST VIRGINIA destroyed underground storage and radio station SALT LAKE CITY closed several caves and made many hits on blockhouses pillboxes and trenches BIRMINGHAM damaged camouflaged gun position. Replenishment continues satisfactorily. Ammo situation good. Routine sweeps of channel and transport area were made and entrances to area QL checked. All results negative. GLADIATOR reported bombed in station B-11 at 230050 no damage. TANAN material condition unchanged. Tugs took pull at high tide but unable to refloat apparently must wait for spring tide. ICI 373 grounded night 22-23 on reef SW LE SHIMA while investi-
CRITICAL

APRIL (CCT)

24 0630

CTF 51 SUMMARY NO. 47 - CONTINUED.

...gating suspicious objects. TAWAKANU towed her clear on high tide afternoon 23rd. No damage. At 0400 HNIN made possible submarine sound contact bearing 322 degrees 25 miles from BOLO. Attacks were made at 0430 and 0445 with negative results. Search continues. Search on submarine contact made by AARON WARD at 221713 was abandoned with negative results. D T GRIFFIN sank floating mine by rifle fire at 0330 bearing 130 27 miles from BOLO. Mine was spherical with 4 horns and in good condition. JEFFERS destroyed 1 mine at 221944 position 23-47 N 126-46 E. Loading and unloading operations progressing smoothly on IE SHIMA. All assault shipping has been discharged and 50% of GroPac units ashore. 5000 feet south net completed and 7 moorings reeled at KERAMA. Revised casualties on ISHINWOOD 38 KIA 30 WIA 14 MIA. Casualties reported to date by 110 ships of TF 51 KIA 530 WIA 1594 MIA 627. Total 2801. Para. Direct air support of troops not furnished today due to bad weather. CAP was maintained but search flights and anti submarine patrols were flown by PBMs. No in flight contacts were reported. 1 PBM is assisting surface search by HNIN for possible submarine bearing 322 degrees 25 miles from BOLO. TU 52-1-3 is continuing strikes on SAKISHIMA GUNTO. No enemy air contacts since last report. Tactical air observers commenced operations from YONTAN Field in TMs of TG 97.2 relieving TMs of TG 52-1. Pilot TU 52-1-3 reported in water last night SE of ISHIKAWA too late for Dumbo rescue was recovered Dumbo PBM at 0750 today. Para. Weather overcast with clouds breaking in afternoon. Scattered showers. Visibility 6 miles. Wind 15 Knots from 300 to 000x. Slight sea. Temperature average 75 degrees.

260400

CTF to COM 5TH FLT report to COMGEN 10, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, 5TH FLT.

Summary Number 49 as of 2524001 (-9). Naval operations for the period consisted of reinforcing fire missions in support of 24th Corps during afternoon 25 April by 2 OBB. 1 CL 4 DD operating on east shore and by 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 3 DD working west shore. During the night 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 4 DD gave direct support to 24th Corps from the east and 2 CA 22 CL 3 DD from the west. All fire was under corps control and consisted mainly of call fire missions and illuminating fires. Further report on gunfire support of 24 April indicates NEW YORK destroyed hostile gun and 8 artillery emplacements in TA 7974L. WICHITA destroyed 1 2-gun emplacement and 1 3-gun battery in TA 8072G. On 25 April COLORADO reports destruction of 10 buildings 3 guns and enemy personnel covered effectively. TEXAS closed 6 caves and CALLACHAN destroyed 1 hostile gun. OFLAHERTY had sound contact at 0320 on 25 April bearing 130 true 28 miles from POINT REUNION. Unable to maintain contact and rejoined screen at 0435 because of reduced screen for flight operations. Evaluation possible submarine. RALPH TALBOT reports sound contact at LAT 21-50 North 131-21 East at 1340 on 24 April. Hunter killer operations in effect. Reports so far undetermined. BASS had sonar contact at 1720 25 (10 groups missing) 9-34 East. Made 2 attacks with negative results. Contact evaluated as probable sub. PUTNAM sank 1 JH Type mine in position 26-11 North 128-06 East at 1450. SHEA destroyed 1 holed mine in position 26-47 North 128-43 East at 0711. ANZIO Group destroyed 1 mine at 0830 in position 25-59 North 133-58 East. Outgoing convoy reported sighting mine in position 25-00 North 128-26 East at 2200. Hydrographic survey MS TH IE SHIMA completed 24 April. Minesweeping for the period included channel
in B-5 Transport Area and QL entrance and selected areas rechecked.
Negative results. Ships by type departed for SATPAN 25 April as follows:
1 APD, 3 AM, 1 PEB, 1 PC, 3 SC, 1 LCOFF, 5 LST, 18 LSM. Para. Naval air
missions conducted CVE'S of Task Group 52.1 Fast Carriers of Task Force 58
and shore based air of Task Group 99.2 in direct support of troops. During
the night a night heckler mission was flown by a TBM of Task Group 99.2
over southern OKINAWA. Task Unit 52.1.3 continued neutralization of
SAKITSHIMA GUNTO. Search flights were made by PBM'S from KERAMA BASE and
PELY'S from YONANT. At 1100 2 DZ were sighted 30-18 North 128-50 East.
At 1100 and again at 1330 KUSIKAKI radio station was strafed and at 1515
radio station at GACA SHIMA was bombed and strafed with minor damage. ASP
patrol was flown by PBM'S. TULAGI Group covered area around 26-30 North
134-30 East. ANZIO Group made Sono Buoy contact on possible sub 22-08 North
131-28 East and are still working on it. ANZIO plane sighted submarine on
surface 26-43 North 133-26 East at 1852/I. Made special attack with results
unreported. Commenced hunter killer. 1 Dumbo PPM was maintained on station
near SAKITSHIMA GUNTO for Task Unit 52.1.3 but no rescues were required.
There were no hostile air attacks during period but from 0230 to 0445 26
April several enemy planes approached transport area at low altitude.
TENNESSEE fired at 1 without results. At 0347 LCS 56 shot down 1 SALLY
off northeast coast OKINAWA. PARA. Weather mostly cloudy. Wind variable
5 to 6 knots. Temperature average 75 degrees. Visibility 10 to 15 miles.
Smoothe Sea. No appreciable swell of surf. End of Summary.

26 1700

GOMEN TEN TO CTF 51 INFO CINCPOA BOTH, COMMANDING GENERAL

Ops Sun 67 as of 261800. During the period 251200-261200 no enemy aircraft
were reported in OKINAWA area. Para. Between 252030-260100 the enemy
launched 3 counter attacks in groups 20 to 30 men each in 24th Corps zone.
All attacks repulsed. Small enemy groups armed with satchel charges and
and other explosives continued infiltration attempts all along 24th Corps
sector. Advances of 300 to 2000 yards were made all along 24th Corps
front. 165 Inf of 27th Div reached the northern end of the airfields in
TA 78755 at 0730. 105 Inf of 27th Div reached its initial objective in TA
78755 at 1200. Main opposition 27th Div front centered around bypassed
NAKANA. Captured map indicates the enemy 24th and 25th Bns of the 2nd
Inf Brig oppose the 27th Div. Para. During the night division killed 4 and
captured 1 of an infiltrating party and identified the 24th Div RCT Regt.
Mission of enemy patrol was to locate GPS and kill high ranking officers
of the 7th Div RCT TROOPERS/CHASED ICHINOMIYA by 0700. Patrols all along the
Div front continued to encounter and engage small enemy groups. Other Bns
of the Div continued mopping up and scaling caves in areas previously by-
pass. Para. 96th Div at 1200 meeting relatively heavy mortar and MG
fire. Advance continued slowly. Enemy documents indicate that Div opposed
by elements 24th Jap Div 2. Para. Front Lines 24th Corps at 261500: 27th
Div TA 7777 KI 7777 HIO 7876 KI 7875 BB 7379 1C D79 96th Div TA 8375/FEIS0
8175 FD 8075 1J 28714A 815X 287149 in 7th Div TA 83714 XWY 3274/KFW
3274/KFX 8374 RX 8373 ABCD 8374 FXXY 8672 D. 3rdFilCorps: During the
night mortar fire fell on NAGO. No casualties damage reported. 6th MarDiv
killed 23 enemy 25 April. 1 MarDiv continued patrolling and reported no
enemy activity during night 25-26. Para. Kadena airfield now operational
except during rains. 24 plane dawn and dusk CAP maintained on schedule.
26 1700 COMGEN TEN SUBJEC 87 - CONTINUED.

A 2 plane CAP over each of 5 picket ships north of M YAWA during the day. 2 Marine Avengers maintained night CAP over 24th Corps zone dropping 100 bombs on enemy arty located by flashes. A plane night CAP reported no enemy contacts. Casualties period 250001 to 252400. 24th Corps: KIA 0 MIA 3 MIA 0 7th InfDiv KIA 19 WIA 75 MIA 0 27th Div KIA 16 WIA 119 MIA 4 77th Div 96th Inf Div KIA 2 WIA 28 MIA 2 3rdPhibCorps KIA 0 WIA 2 MIA 0 1st MarDiv KIA 2 WIA 3 MIA 0 6th MarDiv KIA 2 WIA 26 MIA 2 TOT 367.

27 0849 COMGEN TEN TO CTF 51 INFO CINCPAC, COMFLTL.

Ops Summ 68 as of 271700. 24th Corps: Generally quiet during night. 7th Div received small amount 75MM at 2200. Jap activities at KUHAKI to area A 8273 early today broken by artillery fire. Several scattered rounds Jap artillery fell in 24th Corps area during night. No damage reported. 27th Div received 200 rounds light and medium with some white phosphorus TOTTAR. This is 2nd report latter type. Air strike yesterday employing 2000 and 1000 pound bombs on conical hill 8271 excellent results. Today's advance progressed slowly meeting resistance from scattered strong points. 32nd EST patrols reached town at 0373 KL about noon. 91st Div attacked 0700 B1 IPP had advanced to 3741 be continued against light opposition. 7th Div attacked 0730 at 1335 engaged hand to hand co bat fighting thru pillboxes mutually supporting caves. 27th Div slight activity during morning, attacked 1600 moving forward slowly some opposition from pillboxes. Front lines as of 1500 27th Div 7676V 7576 R 7876 K to M 7875 I to 7975 CK. 96th Div 8075F to R 8074 AE 7th Div 8274 W to 6273 EC 8147 A to D 5874 R 8673 E. 3rd PhibCorps quiet night continued mopping up prepares future employment. Casualties period 260001-262400 24th Corps Troops KIA 1 WIA 1 MIA 1 NBC 7. 7th Div KIA 4 WIA 61 MIA 1 NBC 26. 27th Div KIA 29 WIA 164 MIA 5 NBC 23. 77th Div not previously reported KIA 3 WIA 13 MIA 1 NBC 29 96th Div KIA 9 WIA 71 MIA 0 NBC 13. 3rdPhibCorps NBC 6. 1st MarDiv NBC 39. 6th MarDiv WIA 1 NBC 33. TAF MIA 2 NBC 3. AGP 331 MIA 1 NBC 3. 53rd AAW Brigade KIA 1 WIA 2 NBC 1. Total KIA 51 MIA 314 MIA 8 NBC 136. MAG 31 has 58 of 96 Corps ready. 10 of 14 HNMPST Halicats. MAG 33 has 63 of 83 FAs and 10 of 14 F6FN ready of 24 Avengers 13 are set with night CAPs. A Photo F6F ready. Usual night and day pickets with night CAPs throughout period. No contacts. VTB flew heacker sorties. 1 Avenger hit by AA down in friendly territory crew reported walking away no further info. 4 ground support missions by Corsairs yesterday.

29 0400 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, COMGEN TEN, 5THFLT.

Summary No. 52 as of 282400. Naval operations for the period comprised gunfire support to 24th Corps by naval vessels in East and West sectors. Cruisers, DD's and small craft engaged in fly catcher missions along both coasts. Other fire support ships were organised for defense against air attacks. Results of gunfire support during period show MEXICO hit 4 barracks in TA 7570 and various caves and revetments with several hits on radio station in TA 7570. Troop concentrations well covered with air bursts. MOBILE and TENNESSEE reported destructive effect on various caves. ST LOUIS and HALL engaged in small boat extermination plan covering all of enemy held west coast. Reports by ST LOUIS show 9 small boats destroyed with HALL destroying 5 and CALLAGHAN 3 suicide boats along NAHA REEF.

- Continued -
LCI(G) 347 destroyed 1 suicide boat night 27-28 April. LCS 84 reports tactics employed by suicide craft is to lie still until closed by patrol craft then to make run past at high speed. CWIN in station B10 at 0130 28th reports near miss by bomb or torpedo. RALPH TALBOT now reports 5 KIA and 10 WIA. THOMAS E FRASER in station 154 was under attack at 200415 by Betty which dropped dud bomb or aerial torpedo nearby with no damage to ship. SAGITTARIUS shot down 1 enemy plane in transport area at 0300 28th. LCS 63 in area 150 destroyed 1 small craft at 041528 April. CANADA VICTORY tentative casualty report shows merchant marine personnel 14 WIA 7 MIA. Navy Guard 1 KIA 13 WIA 3 MIA Army 1 MIA. LCS 803 in TA 9232 at 0330 28th had near bomb miss with no casualties or damage. ENGLISH in position 3407 14 miles from BOLO had near miss by suicider at 2205 28 April. GROOTER at station KILLER 4 11 miles N of BOLO reports several bogies during night 27-28, showed weals signals similar to emergency IFF and showed running lights. Showing of weals IFF by 2 planes last night shot down by BUTLER without loss of any friendly. LCS 37 reports damage to steering shaft and stern plating from depth charge in action with suicide boat previously reported destroyed 0240 28th. PINKLEY which was station ship at KERAMA hit amidships by low flying suicide plane at 1928. Severe fire started burning from bridge aft was soon under control but entire midships gutted. Engine room flooded. Tug alongside pumping out. Last report indicates ship is able to provide for her own casualties but others being transferred to hospital ship. Captain wounded now aboard MT MCKINLEY. Estimate 25 patients killed by explosion and fire. WICHITA suffered underwater damage at 2351 041528 April and sank at 27th while at NAGASUKU WAN. Inspection by diver reveals small caliber shell penetrated skin of ship and exploded in fuel oil tank. Hole about 5 inches in diameter 5 feet underwater port side. Probably came from shore AA. CTG 51.21 reports 21 midget sub discovered in TA 0825 to TA 0827. Contained 5 wrecked subs and 16 inch torpedo without warhead plus maintenance equipment. Minesweeping for 28th consisted of routine channel and transport area sweeps. Area in E1 E2 E4 east of OGAN MISAKI REEF completed. Area 11 between 100 and 10 fathoms GUNVES cleared. 1 floating mine sunk in TA 3928 and 1 sunk in TA 5136. Additional sweep in area GL was negative. ELLISON sank drifting horned mine 26-44 N 128-23 E at 1645 28th. To date 7 ships have reported total of 18 WIA from friendly AA fire during action night 27-28. Indiscriminate firing by ships. AA is a difficult problem to solve. Para. Our air activity for the period consisted of direct support to troops by TF 58 TG 52.1 and TG 99.2. Large YCAP was maintained over OKINAWA throughout the day and did a grand job. TG 52.1 continues to strike SAKISHIMA GUNTO. The strike of 27 April lists runways hit at NOBARA ISHIGAKI MIYARA where large fires were started. 1 lugger fired 5 luggers strafed IKEMA JIMA. Continuous patrol maintained over target area from 0100 to 2100. No activity noted on fields. RUMBE SHIMA was again strafed with no enemy activity noted. Search flights were made by PBMs from KERAMA BASE and PB2Ys from Yontan who went through TSUSHIMA STRAIT with many sightings. Several small ships strafed. At 2242 27th 6 PBMs in masthead attack of hostile convoy 33-05 N 122-35E, made 4 hits with 500 pound bombs at 114AHME 1 DE was sighted 33-52 N 126-18E. At 1155 1 SB 1 SA 1 FTC sighted 34-34N 128-00E. At 1220 convoy of many small ships sighted 34-43N 124-28E course 000. Special flight sent to track and strike. Night of 28-29 10 PB2Ys with bombs and torpedoes attacked shipping in SHIMONOSEKI STRAIT. ASP flown by PBMs in OKINAWA area with no contacts reported. Emergency landing WPQFF now available on IE SHIMA and is the north 3,000 feet of the east strip surfaced in eastern half bears
29 0400 CTF 51 SUMMARY NUMBER 52 - CONTINUED.


30 0330 CTF 51 to COMSTHEFLT INFO CINCPAC BOTH, 5THFLT, COMGEN TEN.

Summary No. 53 as of 292400. Naval surface operations consisted of gunfire support by battleships cruisers and destroyers. 21th Corps operating in both east and west sectors. Destroyers and cruisers continued fly catcher operations on both coasts. The remaining fire support ships were assigned for defense against air attack in transport area. Reports of naval gunfire show suicide boat pens in NAHA area hit 7 small boats destroyed and 6 damaged fires started in various area large explosions followed hit on cave in TA 7673 K and NAHA Airfield interdicted at dusk and dawn. Transport area was smoked for 4 hours and 35 minutes during the night. There has been heavy expenditure fog oil during past 3 days equal to 10 days normal operating expediture. Ammunition situation is good with satisfactory replenishment. Amplifying reports from TWIGGS show attack pressed home by 2 groups of 5 to 6 hostile planes. Initial detection at 32000 yards and taken under fire at 12000 yards. Suiciders all under heavy fire as they commenced to dive from 2000 to 3000 feet. Damage to ship caused by near miss. Ship maneuvered at high speed. At 2150 28th PAKANA in position 353T 10,5 miles from BOLO was under torped attack by low flying plane whose approach was not detected until release of torpedo close aboard. Plane strafe coming in 1 3-inch salvo exploded near plane without result. Torpedo missed. LCI(R) 770 on station south channel entrance to KERAMA REITO was attacked by low flying Val at 0051 28th. Bomb hit deck richochetted and exploded 50 yards off port beam with superficial damage to LCI and no casualties. BUTLER during air action night 28th received damage to hull pierced above waterline near stern and minesweeping gear winches and magnetic tail rail damaged by near miss of suicider. 6 WIA. However the BUTLER splashed 5 planes. Ships damaged during air attack of last night additional to previous reports were: SHANNON slightly damaged when bogey splashed close aboard. Fire control radar out. BENNION in RP 1 with minor damage when bogey dove through rigging. SS HALL YOUNG off IE SHIMA at 0401 hit in #5 hatch by suicider. Fire started but was reported under control. Minesweeping included transport and channel sweeps. Areas H1 and G2 completed. All with negative results. Units 14, and 13 remained in transport area during the night as emergency units. LSM 109 in RP 4 at 0215 28th, sank 1 mine in 26-26N 128-37 E and 1 in 26-41 N 128-40 E at 0647. PAUL G BAKER sank 1 floating mine at 0740 29th in TA 6644. GroPac 12 from IE SHIMA reports that good progress is being made developing beach and harbor installations with unloading steadily accelerating. Pontoon causeways have been installed NAGE WAN and approaches. Para. Air operations consisted of direct support to troops by TF 58 TG 99.2 and TG 52.1. Continuous CAP was maintained both day and night. In addition to close support missions enemy small boats and fuel dumps and truck were specific targets. TU 52.1.3 struck SAKISHIMA GUNTO. Report as of 28th indicates TU 52.1.1 HENK Y bombed rocketted and strafe runways and dispersal.

-Continued-
areas. Fuel dumps were set on fire AA gun emplacements buildings and radio facilities were hit ACMASBARA. Hangars and buildings attacked. 2 Zekes and 1 Oscar shot down by CVE CAP. Search flights were conducted by TBMs and PB4Ys from KERAMA and PB4Ys from Yontan OG PB4Ys made dusk sweep TUSUSHIMA STRAIT sighting 1 freighter transport 1 FTC 1 SB KRAYPEP 3 2 stack at 1105 N 34-15 N 129-40 E. At 1130 attacked 1 SD. Left burning and in sinking condition at 29-00 N 121-35 E. ASP was flown by TBMs around OKINAWA area with 1 TBM from TG 52.1 over CHE YOHGORGE. These TBM ASP planes are effective and are doing an excellent piece of work. TULAGI group operated in shipping lanes to southeast. TBMs engaged in hunter killer 30 miles bearing 270 from COTO. Enemy air attacks: At 0610 LCS 87 in RP 2 shot down 1 hostile plane. From 1700 to 1745 planes approached from east in 3 raids possibly part of a group which had attacked carriers. BOWERS shot down 3 CONWELL 1 and 1 by CAP from RANDOLPH. From 2100-2300 some 15 planes in 5 raids approaching from the north. There was no damage to our forces and no enemy shot down. From 2330-0120 and again from 0210 to 0550 approximately 30 planes in 10 raids were over the area. Night fighters shot down 1 plane. Ships gunfire accounted for others as follows: BENNION 2 CROU TER STANLEY TATNALL SHANNON LCS 18 1 each. Shore based AA brought down 1. Total 10 enemy destroyed. Later reports of air action for night 27-28 April shows AARON WARD shot down 2 this brings total 29 enemy destroyed including suicides. Planes shot down on night of 28-29 and not previously reported are; WADSWORTH 2 TWIGGS 2 DALY 4 ST GEORGE 2 LCS 21 1 LCS 31 1. Revised CAP scores are TF 58 13 TG 99.2 36 TG 52.1 9 for a total of 58 by CAP. Grand total including suicides 100. Our plane losses were; 1 F4U from KADENA Field shot down by AA over OKINAWA. Pilot made water landing and rescued by LCS 63. Other rescues were 1 fighter pilot from BUNKER HILL rescued by LCS 11 at 1700 28th and 1 air crewman from SHANGRI LA TBM who parachuted from burning plane and was rescued by Dumbo at 1128 5 miles south KIKAI. Dumbo then taxied 4 miles to rescue 2 airmen of SHANGRI LA SB2C. These planes had been lost due to enemy AA. Dumbo was under fire during rescue. Special photo mission was flown by F5 planes over BATTLE and NAHA for purpose of locating suicide boat hideouts. Para. Weather partly cloudy with scattered clouds. Easterly winds 3 to 12 knots. Good visibility 20 miles. Temperature average 75 degrees. Calm rippled sea. Negligible swell and surf.

04 0902 COMGEN TEN TO CTF 51 CINCPAC BOTH INFO COM5THFLT, COMDET TEN.

OpSum 75 0,14500. Mite 3-4 May Japs ATENDED 4 counterlandings 04,0230. Hit TA 7577 DTA 7776 MTA 8280 BTA 8673D last repulsed. Others being liquidated. 2 Pws Eng. Ship. Regt. stated expedition embarked YONABARU TOWN mission destroy our arty posts rear area. Para. Est 600 Japs participated many killed on reefs or while swimming ashore. Elements 7th Mar Regt killed 200 Japs, 150 contained TA 7575DE. BJS elements 1st MarDiv continue mop up on remnant. Undetermined number landing craft sunk. Remainder destroyed or abandoned on beaches. Para. Front lines 1st MarDiv ANB 300 yards on left and 200 yards on right flank. Para. Est 150 enemy counterattack 77th Div right 031630. Broken up within hour. Div left received approx 150 rounds enemy mortar fire during night including areas of clearing stas and GPs. Para. Heavy fire from 7th Div night 3-4. Arty fire disorganized Jap counterattacks this morning. Little progress made during periods front lines as of
Summary 63 as of 092400. All times Item. Surface craft consisting of DD, cruisers and BB continued their support to 10th Army from sectors covering both E and W sides of island. Reports coming in show effective results. NEW MEXICO placed 3 direct hits on coastal gun in TA 7 and destroyed barracks. BEALE shot up artillery emplacements and machine gun positions. ROCKS reports many enemy personnel casualties while firing in support of 7th Div. ST LOUIS accounted for 17 enemy trucks destroyed. FORTLAND reported 10 hits on concentrated defense installations in TA 7459. Boat launching ways previously reported are now definitely located in TA 8360 CK. 4 launching ways serving 7 caves have been counted. No boats observed. Routine fly catcher and illumination missions were carried out with no small boat activity indicated. During hostile air raid of early evening 9 May 2 ships were hit by suicide planes as follows: At 1900 OBERRENDER in screen station bearing 297 13 miles from BOLO was hit vicinity forward fire and engine room causing fire in forward fuel tank which was brought under control. All power and communications went out. FARENHOLT stood by and PCE(R) 855 rendered emergency medical assistance and received casualties. TEKESTA towed OBERRENDER to KERAMA. ENGAND in screen station hit 1 hit. Damage and casualties unreported. Taken in tow by VIGILANCE. Arrived KERAMA early this morning. Minesweeping consisted of routine channel and area sweeps. Sweep units 13 and 14 remained in transport area during the night. DANIEL T GRIFFIN sank 1 horned type floater mine at 1745 in position 23-08 N 103-20 E. Cumulative naval casualties as of 9 May reported by 152 ships of TF 51 lists 781 KIA 2377 WIA 1025 MIA total 4183. Para. Air operations consisted of direct support to troops and CAP furnished by TF 58 TG 99.2 and TG 52.1. Close support missions consisted of strikes on troop concentrations boat pens and launching ways FBM's and PB2Y's from KERAMA carried out search flight missions. At 1145 2 DD were sighted 34-33 N 124-49 E. 2 DD 1 CL were observed 34-11 N 125-08 E course 035 speed 15 at 1215. 2 CL 3 DD were seen anchored 34-11 N 125-38 E at 1345. A medium freighter was strafed at 34-50 N 126-20 E at 1355, abandoned and resting on bottom. At 1410 1 FTB was attacked 34-30 N 126-09 E and believed to have been hit. At 1900 1 FTC 1 SC were attacked 36-18 N 125-21 E with slight damage to SC. At 1910 1 CL 1 DD 1 FB 2 escorts were attacked 34-39 N 125-37 E. 2 FBs were sighted at 2115. 2 FBs were attacked 2210. Routine ASP was carried out by PBM 1 with TBM over transport area and TULAGI covering shipping lanes to SE. Enemy air attacks occurred from 1820 to 2200 with planes approaching generally from the SW with several from the N. 2 raids prior to dark were suicide attacks later raids were hecklers. Yontan field received 1 bomb hit 2154. CAP shot down 4 Putnam. Shot down 1 friendly fighter missing. At 2009 a twin engine plane possible Betty crashed 2 miles from NEW YORK in NAKAGUSUKU following shallow dive and without being fired upon. From 0015 to 0110 and from 0220 to 0440 about 20 planes in 11 raids approached generally low from the N. There was no damage to our forces and no enemy shot down. During early morning 10th 2 search planes kept out of KERAMA area because of smoke and air raid landed at sea. 1 made successful landing other crashed at 0500 with 3 survivors rescued by GAINARD. Search is being made for the others. On morning 10th as on previous mornings after enemy air attacks single high flying enemy twin engine fighter Nick engine planes either Nick or Dinah made several passes over transport and land areas leaving vapour trails. CAP made visual contact several times but soon lost contact, as enemy is very fast and Corsairs were unable to close. Radar gave no early indication and few plots were had even when sighted. Finally our CAP caught the intruder and shot him down 50 miles N of OKINAWA at 0930. Para. Weather scattered clouds. Visibility 15 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. Wind N 15 Knots. Calm rippled sea no swell.
11 1001 COMGEN TEN TO CTF 51 Info CINCPOA BOTH, COMTHPAC, COMINCH, CGMFPAC, COMDETEN.

Summary 52 of 111000

Army front last night received intermittent arty and mortar fire local counter attacks and attacks by small infiltration groups. Our arty and NGF support ships maintained counterbattery and harassing fire throughout night. 10th Army launched coordinated attack support by air strikes arty and NGF this morning. Gains of 500-600 yds made along front. On the right, outskirts of TA 7473 enterd, DAKESHI occupied eliminating strong Jap positions and major portion of Jap salient which had resisted all efforts for past week. Both Corps seized high ground affording observation over SHURI. Southern edge GAIJ gained and advanced up slopes of key hill to left front begun.

Para. 3rd Phib Corps: Enemy arty active during night considerable fire falling VIC ASA KAWA Bridge.

Para. 6th MarDiv: Making main effort in center gained average 600 yds against continuous mortar and arty fire and MG fire and groups in caves. Bridge across ASA KAWA repaired under arty fire permitting crossing of 25 Tks.

Para. 1st MarDiv: 3 Japs KFA VIC 7th Mar OP during night. 3rd Bn 5th Mar Atchd 7th Mar received counterattack 0530 by estimated 200 Japs. Believe all Japs killed supported by Tks Div attacked this morning drove into DAKESHI gained average 400 yds. Combat Engrs and Tks employed against caves.

Para. 24th Corps: Yesterday Bn of 17th Inf thoroughly combed rear area where Japs had APDK new corps CP. Many caves destroyed. Few Japs killed. Corps attacked 0700 preceded by arty concentration on known enemy installations and gun positions. By noon forward elements had advanced up to 600 yds on Corps right and 200-400 yds on left. Enemy resistance continued stiff across entire corps front.

Para. 77th Div: From midnight to dawn estimated 525HRDQ Jap arty fire fell on Div front. 32 Jap infiltrations killed. Div attacked supported by flamethrower this gained 500 yds in center. Bitter hand to hand fighting against fanatical resistance. 2 155mm Hows and 1 155mm gun furnished direct fire for attacking Inf. NGF and arty pounded SHURI in support of Div attack.

Para. 96th InfDiv: 383rd Inf relieved 184th Inf. 381st Inf relieved 32nd Inf. 96th RON Tr occupied zone Div left. 32nd Inf at 2110 repulsed Japs who assaulted with hand grenades. Gains of 200 yds on right and center made against MG and mortar fire from direct front. Tks supported Inf.

Para. 7th InfDiv in Corps Reserve: 184th Inf assembly area TA 8781. 32nd Inf assembly area TA 8682 atchd 77th InfDiv as restricted Div reserve.


Para. 2 Japs single plane raids over OKINAWA 0234-0312. AAA damaged 1 plane. No damage from enemy. 4 air raids total 5 planes over IE SHURI during darkness this morning. AAA destroyed 1 Jap plane 2 possibles.

Para. 10th Army TAF splashed 1 Tony by night fighters at 0530. CAP splashed 2 Tonsy 7 Nates 1 Dinah 1 Betty 3 Zekes 3 Vals 2 Hams past 24 hours.

Para. Estimated enemy casualties 102,400 KIA 39,469 FW Mil 298 RBR Tks 316.

JANUARY (GCT)
01 0949  CTG 94.9 to CTF 94 info CTF 93, CINCPAC.

01 1657  CTF 94 to CINCPAC info COM3rdFLT, CTG 94.9, CTG 17.7.
My OpOrder 6-44 operation SKULLDUGGERY calls for Task Group 94.9 strike CHICHI at 050700 K(-10) and IWO at 051500 K. Coordinated air strikes as in CTF 93 despatch 010631 and 010627 not to all.

01 1639  COMFWDAREA to CTG 94.MILIE, CTF 93 info CINCPAC.
As a Joint Operation my OpOrder 6-44 requires relative timing air and surface forces be as specified. CTF 93 previously reported the 5th to be earliest practicable date.

01 0652  CINCPAC to CINCPAC.
I am concerned that lack of experience of U.S. Meteorological methods may hamper the operations of ships of British Pacific Fleet. If acceptable to you I would like to arrange the appointment of a British Naval Meteorological Liaison Officer to work at a suitable Weather Central.

27 2019  COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC.
Japanese have lodged strong protest connection sinking M/V TAIEI MARU between YAP and PALAU on 3 July 1944 by American submarine alleging shooting of survivors of gun attack who were in water. Protest states 7 survivors rescued by Japanese. Remainder civilian refugees and 1 crew member allegedly killed by submarine crew. Investigation establishes attack made by CLEANCORE on 9th War Patrol. 5 Survivors recovered placed in custody Provost Marshal First Cavalry Hq LOS NEGR0S on 8 July. Desire Air Mail report of interrogation survivors in custody regarding incident as basis reply to Japanese Govt. Ex Commanding Officer ALBACORE now NEW LONDON has been directed submit amplifying.
Further interrogation results my 280556. Evaluated Baker 2 with much confirmation from other sources. Major units Japanese Fleet comprise 7 CV 1 OR 2 CVE 2 CVL 2 CV-BB 4 BB 7 CA 5 CL. Para. CV HAYATAKA and AMAGI completely operational. KATSURAGI and 4 NRYU class cruisers completed and training. Available for battle operations probably February or March. AMAGI and KATSURAGI built on YAMATO type battleship hulls and have displacement 45000 tons. Total of 6 UNRYU class Carriers bearing names UNRYU HIRYU SORUYA AKAGI KAGA plus one unknown (25000 tonners with prominent bridge on starboard side forward of amidships. 2 Stacks on port side bent downward and to rear. Deck extends to tip of bow and is high off hull) constructed during last year but UNRYU sunk December 19th and 1 unidentified ship sunk November 29 by submarine. Expect carrier KAITO and possibly OTAKA operational. CVL RYUHO and HOSHO operational. CV-BB ESE and HYUGA operational and last known at SAINT JACQUES. Battleships YAMATO NAGATO KONGO HARUNA have just completed repairs in Empire. Heavy Cruisers IBUKI KAOEN 8000 tonner (TONE ASHIGARA completely operational HOGURO completing minor repairs at SINGAPORE TAKAO (with 8 boilers out) docking SINGAPORE for temporary repairs prior return to Empire. HYOKI heavily damaged probably still at BANGKOK where was towed after submarine attack early in December. AOBA heavily damaged (in Empire) CL OYODO YAHAGI operational SHINANO and her sister ship (Presumably SAKATA) believed operational ISUJI heavily damaged and now at SURABAA repairing. In addition to other destroyers a total of 27 Matsu Class Destroyers (bearing names of trees, flowers and GRARLES) known completed during past year. Para. YAHAGI was scheduled depart Empire December 24th and arrive CAMRANH 30th or 31st. YAMATO NAGATO TONE to leave Empire about same time or shortly after enroute OUTWARD to CAMRANH SAIGON, or LINGGA anchorage. Common assumption aboard prisoners ship this force being brought down to CTIX counter anticipated Blue landings MANILA area near Future. Para. Prisoner had heard 4 sister 10000 ton heavy cruisers planned. Named KASAGI and also plus 2 unidentified (presumably IKOMA and KURAGE). KASAGI and ASO known under construction as of May 1944. None near completion and doubted to be converted to carriers.

Australian Government have expressed concern to State Department over report reaching them of plans originated by U.S. Navy for rehabilitation Phosphate
01 2110  COMINCH to CINCPOA (Continued)

Industry on NAURU duplication their own efforts. Plans on file do not include NAURU Phosphates request your comment as further basis for reply.

03 0321  CINCPAC to COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COMAIRPAC, COM1STCARRIER TASK FORCE, COM2ND CARRIER TASK FORCE Info COMINCH & CNO.

The established complement of large carriers is 73 VF, 15 VSB, 15 VTB. Any departure from this complement for a particular operation or because of a deficiency in pilots or airplanes of a particular type is of a temporary nature only. Para. All training and logistic preparation shall be based on meeting the requirements of the established complement.

09 0401  COMGENAAPPPOA to CTF 93 Info CINCPOA, CTF 94, RONCOM 21, COM3RDFLT.

AAPPOA 0419. Conduct early photo recon air facilities TRUK, WOLEAI and MARCUS with particular attention to MOEN Airfield TRUK. Prepare to conduct fighter bomber strikes against these objectives in order of priority as listed as soon as results of photo recon obtained. ComBombCom 21 has been requested to confer with you on preparation Plan for coordination your strikes with practice missions 313 Wing scheduled to start about 16 January. Expedite submission thereof.

08 2055  COMINCH & CNO to CINCPOA.

Article on SAIPAN in Newsweek Magazine 28 August issue states all able bodied men registered for labor and work 8 hour Day on airfields New Construction etc. Japanese protest points out Forced Labor contrary to agreement with United States and further that employment Civilian internees on construction Military Airfields is unlawful even if voluntary. Desire investigation and report.

09 0852  CTF 77 to ALL TFC & TFG'S 7THFLEET Info CINCSOWESPAC, COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC, COMAAF, COMAF 5.

Commencing night of 10 January TF 77.2 less damaged ships directed to be returned to LEYTE by separate despatch will proceed to sea and join TG 77.4 escort carriers augmented by TG 77.4 and TG 77.3 close covering group 3 combined Groups under CTG 77.2 will comprise the LINGAYEN Defense Force. CTG 77.4 and CTG 77.3 will report to CTG 77.2 for duty. While continuing present missions assigned these various Groups by my OpPlan 17-44 the LINGAYEN Defense Force
09 0852

CTG 77 to ALL TCG & TFG's 7THFLEET Info CINC(SOWESPACE), COM3RDGFLT, CINCPAC, COMAAC, COMAF 5.

under VAdm Oldendorf will assume the mission of protecting our forces in and approaching M HUCHPIRING from LINGAYEN GULF from attack by enemy surface Forces. CTF 77.2 is free to exchange ships between the various Groups as deemed necessary for best accomplishment of assigned Tasks and to provide for replenishment. A maximum of 3 CVE's will be assigned CTG 77.3 while close covering Group to engaged in Slope covering echelons to and from LINGAYEN. UTILIZING Carrier Planes as available conduct searches as necessary to insure against unprise attack by enemy surface forces.

09 1109

CINCPAC to COMAIRPAC.

Your 090014. It is not the policy of CINCPAC to recommend relief of carrier captains without a specific reason in each case. Normally these reasons are requirement for services elsewhere, Professional Unfitness, Physical Unfitness or Fatigue after a long period. I look to ComAirPac for recommendations for long range planning in connection with aviation personnel but desire such recommendations by letter with specific reasons for each change proposed.

09 2131

CINCPOA to COMGENPOA

Your serial 0003 of 6 January. Establishment of Western Pacific Base Command concurred in with understanding personnel in headquarters will be kept at the lowest practicable number.

10 0849-I

WEATHER 5TH AF to COMAF 13, 494 BombGroup, 309 BOMBWING, 310 BOMBWING, ALL INTERESTED IN CURRENT OPS. SOWESPACE.

J-0126T Tropical Storm centered 150 miles east of southern LEYTE at 0800 I (-9) /10. Winds above 30 knots in storm area with intermittent rain but slight turbulence. Forecasted movement west North-west at 12 knots. LEYTE terminal expected closed after 1200 I (-9) 10 January.
Prior dawn today 9 January transports and supply ships of assault echelon entered LINGAYEN GULF and proceeded to unloading areas. Preliminary bombardment of beachheads by fire support groups and rocket LCI followed by straffing from support aircraft proceeded in accordance with plan. First wave landed on schedule at 0927. By 0940 Assault waves ashore on all beaches without opposition except for slight amount mortar fire on eastern SAN FABIAN Beach. Troops moved quickly inland against minor and sporadic opposition. Approximately 68500 troops ashore by dusk. Unloading progressed rapidly at ALL beaches. By late afternoon Commanding Generals 6th, 38th, 40th and 43rd Divisions had reported assuming command ashore. Enemy air opposition during the day was comparatively light but attacks by suicide planes were effective in damaging COLUMBIA, AUSTRALIA and COLORADO which were hit. COLUMBIA for second time and HMAS AUSTRALIA for 4th time during present operation. Damage to above ships extensive but not critical. Evening 8th during approach KITKUN BAY hit by suicide diver holed below water line lost power and now enroute LINGAYEN under tow. 1 Engine expected to be operational near future. Delayed report. HATSU HARU Class destroyer intercepted by escorting DD of TF 78 enroute objective area evening 7th and sunk.

To locate 2nd diversion attack force (ISE HYUCA) as soon as possible request maximum extension SWPA searches to south of Cape St JACQUES and Coverage St JACQUES to SINGAPORE by 20th Air Force including eastern portion of Gulf of SIAM.

Effective immediately and continued until further instructions from this headquarters sectors southwest Pacific search planes will be extended to include the CAPE SAINT JACQUES-SAI GON area maximum coverage within capabilities of CAM RANH BAY-CAPE SAINT JACQUES-SAI GON area will be maintained to locate OUTLINE 2nd Diver sion Attack Force (ISE HYUGA) 20th Air Force has been requested to maintain maximum coverage of CAPE SAINT JACQUES-SINGAPORE area including east portion of GULF OF CAM RANH.
Refer urdis 290331 December. Experience has proven value of night carrier in offensive action against enemy. CVL carrier has been reported as unsatisfactory for night operations due to its narrow deck and excessive motion in seaway. SARATOGA urgently required Hawaiian area for training replacement CVG's in group operations. Assignment of CVL's to training not considered best employment for this class. Para. Propose following action to effect return of SARATOGA to PEARL for training duty and assignment of day air groups to BATAAN and INDEPENDENCE: (A) Transfer CVG (N) 53 from SARATOGA to TICONDEROGA at ULITHI about 5 March and return CVG 80 for reforming. (B) Assign CVLG-23 to INDEPENDENCE about 25 January as relief for CVLG(N)-41. CVLG-23 will be moved from MANUS to embark at GUAM or ULITHI. (C) Sail BATAAN from PEARL in February with CVLG-47 embarked. (D) Redesignate CVEG-36, 38 and 50 now training west coast as CVLG's with standard CVLG complement and readiness dates of 15 April, 15 April and 1 March respectively. This makes total 18 CVLG available for 8 CVL carriers. Required due forward area relief and reserve for early relief of operating groups. (E) Revise CarDiv organization set forth CominCh 031237 January as follows: CarDiv-7 ENTERPRISE (F) CMA TICONDEROGA. CarDiv-6 BENNINGTON(F), SHANGRI-LA, LANGLEY and BATAAN. CarDiv-2 FRANKLIN (F) HANCOCK, INDEPENDENCE and SAN JACINTO.

There is an increasing need for a subordinate command of Air Pac in the forward area to coordinate and supervise the activities for which ComAirPac is responsible including logistics, training and administration of replacement carrier air groups and replacement pools of aircraft and pilots. These duties are now being superimposed on those of ComNavAirBases GUAM which arrangement is not satisfactory. Accordingly, recommend establishment of a geographical subcommand of AirPac SubComFwd. Title "Commander Fleet Air" considered and rejected because Commander will not in fact exercise command of other fleet aircraft operating from bases in the area. Para. Recommendation for Flag Officer to command contained in my 102048 to BuPers.
Radio date time group 122324 January 1945. Recommend that the availability of service troops as given in WARX 84316 dated 30 December MARSHALL to RICHARDSON, info. MACARTHUR and CINCPOA be accepted as an interim measure for the support of VLR wing coming to this area. Desire to emphasize that though the numbers and types of ground service troops on hand in and committed to theater may be insufficient for complete support, a greatly increased air effort will result with the arrival of this wing.

Your 150102 approved subject to the understanding that the service and support of the VLR wings will be below normal standards and that the tactical units may have to improvise measures to become partially self sustaining until additional service troops become available.

Concurred in is your proposal to modify the terms of FILBAS Agreement so that concurrences of CINCSWPA and CINCPOA must be obtained on requests for units only and not for individuals or small groups of individuals. NLP an integral part of a larger unit. To accomplish this change suggest the final sentence of paragraph 7A FILBAS Agreement be amended to read "The Exemption of Specific Army Units from this General Policy Covering Army Service Units will be made only by Mutual Agreement between CINCSWPA and CINCPOA."

Your 182045 ComNorPac 162218 authorized. Arrangements should be concluded locally between ComNorPac CGAD and appropriate Canadian authorities that area. State and War Departments Concur.
JANUARY (GCT)

26 1459
COMINCH to CINCPAC BOTH HDQTRS info COMAIRPAC, CONARAIRFMFPAC

Propose assign Navy Air Groups to flagship and relief Flag and Marine Groups to other 4 ships of 1st 4 Divisions COMMANCED BAY (CVE 105) class carriers except CarDiv 27. Navy Group in Flagship to have night fighter element of 8 VF(N). Marine Groups will be assigned CarDiv 27 according CominCh and CNO 062109 November 1944 with Navy Groups initially in SULA GULF and SIBUNAY of this Division. Comment.

27 14072
CINCSWP to COM ALLIED AIR FORCES ADVANCED ECHelon info COM5TH FLT, HQ USAF CHINA THTR ADV ECH APO 579, HQ USAF CHINA THTR REAR ECH APO 629, CG 14TH AIR FORCE ADV CHQ COMDR, ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (WASATCH) COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA), CINCPAC

CX 57087. Allied Air Forces are authorized to strike water targets along the CHINA and INDO CHINA coasts in coordination with operations of 14th Air Force. Coordinate with and notify 14th Air Force direct of projected operations as nearly as practicable 24 hours in advance. Strikes on land targets along the CHINA and INDO CHINA coasts will be made only at the request of Commanding General CHINA Theater or by prior arrangement between Commanding General CHINA Theater and this headquarters. Allied Air Forces authorized to strike the decks and shipping area in SAMAR BAY (18-15 north 109-30 east) as practicable. Strikes will be coordinated with 14th Air Forces. Commanding General CHINA Theater APO 879 and this headquarters will be included as information adees in all messages coordinating air operations with 14th air force.

CNO to NAVOP/01

Cinccpac/Cinccpoa Advanced Headquarters have been established. The Staff functions of Plans and Operations will be conducted by that command. Functions of Logistics. Military Government. Administration and routine fleet movements East of Hawaii will be conducted by Cinccpac/Cinccpoa Headquarters Pearl. To effect distribution dispatch traffic the following categories and grouping of subjects have been established by Cinccpoa. Category A: Strategic planning. Operational Planning. Allocation of forces. Aerological. Frequency coordination. Category B: Radar. IFF. Counter measures. Administrative matters. Routine Logistical administration. Electronic material. Category C: action reports. Operation Plans. Logistic Planning. Intelligence. Area operational matters (all services). Combat Readiness. Fleet training and organization. Personnel. Public Relations. Convoy and routing operational matters and operational communications. Dispatches pertaining to items in category A are to be addressed Cinccpac/Cinccpoa Advanced Headquarters. Category B to Cinccpac/Cinccpoa Headquarters Pearl. Category C to Cinccpac Headquarters Pearl and Advanced Headquarters.
JANUARY (GCT)

28 0040 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC PEARL.

Refer Cincpac Pearl 221802. Commencing at 0000 GCT 29 January action will be taken by Advanced Headquarters on all matters contemplated by my 122322. No action will be taken here on despatches with date time groups of the 28th or earlier unless you refer them to Advanced Headquarters by procedure signal for action. Suggest you so refer all such despatches except those which require action without delay.

30 0023 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info COMGENPOA, CONGENTENTHARY, COMPHIBSPAC, FT SHAFTER.

This is a partial report. Composition of 24 Corps as defined in Cincpoa serial 0010 60 has been accepted (CX 57234). All organizations defined in this serial under the 24 Corps will be attached immediately to 24 Corps for administrative control with the following modifications: AAA organization to remain in position until relieved at an early date, but not later than 22 February. All port companies, ammo companies, quartermaster service companies will continue on present duties in support of rehabilitation and loading of 24 Corps. 3722, 728 and 743 Signal Air Warning Companies will remain on present duties pending arrival of replacements. This is necessary in view of the integration of these organizations in the Central PHILIPPINES air warning net. Constructions are now in preparation by GHQ SWPA to give effort to above. Para. General Engsvhart and I concur and consider our mission in this regard fully accomplished. I plan to leave for PEARL as soon as above orders and instructions are published. All other matters satisfactorily concluded. From General Feldman.

30 1331 WEDEMEYER to CINCPOA-PEARL Info CHENNAULT. CHENNAULT to CINCPOA ADV.

Chennault was info Cincpoc got action on Wedemeyer 300823 GCT and now reencrypts action Cincpoc Adv. Hdotrs. "Contemplate B29 aerial mining of mouth of YANGTZE RIVER west of 122 East Meridian. Request your concurrence."

16 2021 COMINCH & CNO to CINC BR PAC FLT Info CINCPAC, CINGSOWESPAC, COM7THFLT ADMIRALTY, COMNAVEU.

Welcome to service in the Pacific. Your 150136. Allocations to meet operational requirements of CinCSWPA and CINCPOA will continue to be made by me in consonance with arrangements made at QUEBEC and in the same manner as is now done in my capacity as executive agent of the US Chiefs of Staff with respect to the US Fleet. Early information your 151241 on composition of units, dates of arrival of "Units and Authorities" in Pacific and of operational readiness requested.
01 0308 CTF 77 TO CINCSWPA TARLAC Info CINCSWPA LEYTE, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

In his 310122 to CTF 77 info CinCSWPA and others requests for planning purposes estimate as to date of release of 4 BBs. Cinpaca 161836 concurred in by Cominch 162220 contemplated retention in 7th Fleet of 4 BBs for "about 3 weeks". CinCSWPA 191252 indicated criterion for release date was "the installation of our air force on LUZON". Recommend release date of 5 February which coincides with inauguration of search plan J. Request instructions for reply.

CINCSWPA to CTF 77 Info GHQ SWPA (LEYTE), CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

011243 Reference your 010308. Release of 4 old battleships now protecting the LINGAYEN Base can not safely be contemplated until heavy bomber strength in force is installed in Clark Field. This is now estimated to be the end of February depending upon laying of gas line from SUBIC or MANILA BAY but no exact fixed date can be given until dictated by the cited event. We will not have heavy bombers on LUZON until then. What will be the naval disposition you propose for the protection of this base if these 4 battleships are released under possible conditions of unfavorable weather fronts for air defense and the possibility of undetected night attack due to potential proximity of enemy fleet query. This harbor holds approximately 400,000 tons of merchant shipping which figure will not materially change in the proximate future until our base is shifted to MANILA or SUBIC BAYS.

02 2004 MACARTHUR to CG USAFFE Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMGENPOA.

CX 57472. Attention is invited to our CX 55786 and Cincpoa's 162159 to CincSWPA and Cinpaca's 290207 to ComGenPOA. In order to faciliate and expedite action on the numerous requests from ComGenPOA to ComGen USAFFE for exemption of individuals from the general policy of the FILBAS Agreement, you are hereby authorized to communicate (communicate?) directly with ComGenPOA in all such cases involving individuals as differentiated from units or groups of individuals who are an integral part of a unit set up for transfer to SWPA. In the case of requests for exemption of units from the general policy covering Army service units. Such exemption can be made only by mutual agreement between CinCSWPA and Cincpaca.

03 0453 CINC EASTERN FLEET to CINC US PAC FLT ADV, CINC US PAC FLT REAR, Info COM5THFLT

FOC AIRCRAFT CARRIERS EASTERN FLT, FLAG OFFICER NAVAL AIR STATIONS AUSTRALIA, FLAG OFFICER FLT TRAIN BR PAC FLT.

In order to give operational flexibility it may be necessary as temporary measures to replenish British CV at short notice with aircraft from US source. In an emergency US Hellcat and Avenger could be operated by British carriers if air crews were equipped with US type helmets telephone and oxygen masks. Corsair cannot be made interchangeable since folded height US Corsair is too great to be accomodated in British carriers. (3) It is therefore requested that 200 sets US helmets complete ear phone microphone and oxygen masks be supplied British Pac Fit at MANUS by 6th March in order set may be distributed to each CV. (4) It is not known whether reciprocal arrangements would also prove practicable.

06 1307 CINCPAC AD HQ, to CINCSWPA Info COM5THFLT.

Reference by request for Com5thFit to visit CASIGURAN SOUND and your concurrence. Request that as early as practicable you have made reconnaissence of that general area and advise me as to presence of enemy forces or installations including mines in the vicinity and as to the feasibility of its use as a fleet anchorage.
FEBRUARY (GCT)

06 1815 GHQ SWP to CINCPOA, CG CHINA THEATER APO 879, CG CHINA THEATER REAR ECHELON.
HXT 627, CG 14TH AF, COM7THFLT LANDOPS, 1ST AUST ARMY, COMGEN 6TH US ARMY,
COMGEN 8TH US ARMY, COMDR ANF (WASATCH-TOLCSA-HOLLANDIA), CTF 73, COMDR ALLIED
AF ADV ECH, CG 20TH BOMCOM, CG 21ST BOMCOM ADV ECH GHQ.

CX 57746. Reference our CX 57595 too 041534 GCT. Conditions airfields on
LUZON due to heavy rains caused following changes in initiation of search Plan
J; sectors from MOROTAI, MINDORA, DARWIN and sectors J, K and L from LEYTE
will be initiated on 7 February. LEYTE sectors OP and Q will be flown beginning 10 February.
Sectors 1 through 9 of search plan H will be flown from LEYTE until LINGAYEN fields are operational.
You will be notified at an early date when entire search plan J is in effect. MacArthur.

08 0314 CINC SWPA (ADV ECH GHQ) to CINCPOA, COM7THFLT Info GHQ SWAP, CINCUS FLEET.

CAX-50326. In view of Para 2 of your 060758 providing strategic naval cover
of LINGAYEN Base I have directed 7th Fleet to comply with request of Para 3.
All these ships and all others which have participated in the operations
have performed splendidly and fully maintained the highest traditions of
the Navy. I am very proud and grateful to have had their invaluable assist-
tance in this vital campaign.

08 1350 ARMY TRANSPORT COM, WASH DC (KRISTOFFERSON AND ATKINSON) to ATC HICKAM FIELD
Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ.

Oceanic Air Traffic Control Plan as outlined in your letter dtd 6 Jan 1945 has
been approved by Gen. Arnold and by memo Admiral King has been so advised.
Your APE directed to report to Cincpoa for temporary duty assuming the respons-
ibility to establish overall policies and procedures with regard to the opera-
tion and expansion of oceanic air traffic control centers in the Pacific. You
subordinate officers in charge of each center will report to the respective
area or sub area command with regard to air traffic control problems which are
peculiar to the respective area. Problems of the area or sub area commands
which may affect the overall policies and procedures will be referred to you
for appropriate action. In case of tactical emergency your subordinates will
report to the area command concerned. Advise if this clarifies the oceanic
air traffic control situation in the Pacific area.

09 0300 CINC SWPA to COM7THFLT, Info NAVBASE AT MANUS, ADMIRALTLY IS., COMINCH, CINCPOA
CIN BMANUS, GHQ SWPA.

When operating as part of the United States Pacific Fleet the British Pacific
Fleet will use facilities at MANUS on same basis as United States ships and
logistics support being as arranged by Cinpac. Para. Commander Allied
Naval Forces or Com7thFlt will not provide personnel or material for construc-
tion or for other facilities nor allocate land areas unless specifically author-
ized by this headquarters. Service involving British Pacific Fleet as an
independent entity in its relationship with the Southwest Pacific Area should
deal directly with the Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area in all matters
of policy such as those appreananted in your 060121. None of the matters to
which you refer has been submitted to this headquarters and the Commander in
Chief has no previous knowledge of them. The only information possessed by
this headquarters was conveyed in verbal statement by Cincpoa to effect that
British Pacific Fleet when operating as a part of the United States Pacific
Fleet would avail itself of anchorage facilities at MANUS with all logistic
support being provided by BPF Train and that same facilities would be provided
at ESPIRITU SANTO.
FEVERAY (GCT)

09 0706 COM7THFLT to CTG 77,2 Info CINCWSWA TARLAC & LEYTE, CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMBATRON 1
COMSERVPAC, COMDES PAC, ALL TF AND TG COMS 7THFLT, COM7THFLT REAR ECH, COMAAF,
COMAF 5 & 13, COM 308 & 309 BOMING.

TG 77,2 R.Adm. Weyler in PENNSYLVANIA, MISSISSIPPI. ComBatDiv 4 in WEST
VIRGINIA, COLORADO. ComDesRon 6 in MAURY, GRIDLEY, MCGALL, ZARD, STEVENS,
DASHIELL. Depart LINGAYEN GULF 10 February proceed via standard route ELEPHANT
and CARIBOU to LEYTE. SOA 15 knots. Upon arrival fuel all DDs. You are authorized to retain 1 DD at LINGAYEN to receive mail for ships your Task Group arriving accordance ComSerFor7thFleet 071151 not to all. DD to rejoin Task Group at earliest practicable time. Para. R.Adm. Weyler authorized to shift flag to MISSISSIPPI at discretion. Para. At LEYTE form TU 77,2.6 PENNSYLVANIA
STEVENS DASHIELL. From LEYTE TG 77,2 proceed via approximate direct route to
ULITHI. TU 77,2,6 proceed via route BUFFALO to MANUS. Upon arrival destination TG 77,2 and TU 77,2,6 dissolved. All ships report Cincpac for duty. Para. Upon departure above ships from LINGAYEN remaining ships of present
tG 772 redesignated as TU 77,3.5 orders by separate despatch.

11 0043 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINC BPF Info CINCWSWA, COMINCH, COM7THFLT.

Until operational allocations units British Pacific Fleet are announced by
Cominch desire defer arrangements for anchorages forward of MANUS but to pro-
ceed with those for MANUS as expeditiously as practicable an assumption they
will be necessary under concept my 110045 to CINCWSWA. Request by dispatch
your detailed requirements for berths and shore facilities at MANUS in-
cluding approximate date each project and estimate of officers men and con-
struction required.

11 0045 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCWSWA (ADV HQ) Info COMINCH, CINCBPF, COM7THFLT, CG FEAF.

Para 1. Your 100850 see Cominch 092141. The provisions of NF-1 all of which
were read by Lieut. Gen. Sutherland at LEYTE on 27 December include the fol-
lowing "Arrangements will be made by Cincpac for the use of MANUS by the
British Pacific Fleet for anchorage and carrier aircraft as rapidly as cir-
cumstances permit". The "anchorage" requirements will be covered by separate
dispatch. Para 2. The initial arrangements needed for carrier aircraft are
envisioned as similar to those planned at advanced anchorages in the Central
Pacific; namely, "augmenting the American pools and their personnel with
British aircraft and personnel". Later however it will be necessary that the
British Fleet have shore facilities for refresher training of carrier pilots,
for staging replacement air groups and for aircraft maintenance and repair.
The date at which any existing air strip can be released at MANUS for these
purposes should be determined by CINCWSWA. Early advice on this point is re-
quested. Para 3. Request your concurrence in general concept of foregoing
after which I will submit to you or such headquarters as you may designate
a more detailed program covering aviation facilities for British Fleet at
MANUS.
Recommend: (A) CV SARATOGA resume training duties. A large carrier capable of exercising CVG's in group operations at PEARL prior combat assignment is an urgent requirement. This phase of training is impracticable with CVEs now in CarTrainRonPac. Unless a CV is available replacement groups cannot be made fully ready for combat. (B) Night group composed of CV ENTERPRISE plus 1 CV9 (ESSEX) as designated by ComlstCarTaskFor preferably WASP, ESSEX, YORKTOWN or HANCOCK due imminent relief of assigned air groups. Assign to selected CV night group now in SARATOGA. (C) COWPENS and CABOT require return for yard availability due to poor material condition and CVL MONTEREY will be unavailable due to recent damage. INDEPENDENCE requires about 3 weeks availability and BATAAN 10 days prior further assignment.

In order to provide as soon as possible staging facilities for 3 reserve carrier air groups in the MARIANAS and to maintain their combat efficiency, confirming conference agreement between Cinpoa, ComGenAAFPOA and ComFwdarea the following plan will be implemented. Para 1. The 30th Bomb Group will be returned to the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS prior to 1 March 1945 leaving space for 1 carrier air group at KOBIZER FIELD. ComAirPac will furnish Acorn and CASU (F) to support this group and operate field to arrive as soon as possible after March 1st. Housekeeping facilities of 30th Bomb Group will remain as may be arranged between ComGenAAFPOA and ComAirPac. Para 2. In order to make room for 2 reserve carrier groups at KAGMAN POINT the 6th night fighter squadron will be moved to KOBIZER FIELD when the 318 Fighter Group moves forward about 4 May 1945 and the P-38 component of the 318 Group will be retired. ComAirPac will provide Acorn and double CASU (F) to support these 2 carrier groups and operate field. Additional housing and facilities will be necessary at KAGMAN PT. Para 3. Carrier groups will be required to furnish fighters for air defense of SAIPAN-TINIAN area similar to provisions of aircraft operating policy and doctrine, Hawaiian Area, Cinpoa-Cincoa serial 06295 dated 7 Nov 1944. Para 4. KAGMAN POINT FIELD and KOBIZER FIELD will at dates to be announced later become Naval Air Bases under the type command responsibility of ComAirPac. Para 5. Previous plans for MARPI POINT remain firm. Para 6. AGANA FIELD will not be used for carrier aircraft after 1 March and 11th Bomb Group will remain at Depot Field until staged forward.
Cite WL 2447. Reference recco CASIGURAN SOUND your 1312/4 GCT. No US garrison at present located BALER BAY. However our patrols have watched BALER and found no enemy activity. Lt. Chandley with BLAMO Scout Team of 9 men and several guerrillas familiar with CASIGURAN area will be ready to come aboard at town of BALER beginning 19 NOV and accompany task unit to CASIGURAN area and conduct reconnaissance. No info available from guerrilla sources on enemy strength or defenses CASIGURAN area. Jap garrison in that area if any not believed in excess 50 to 100.

Following received from Soviet Naval Staff: "Winter conditions of navigation in the OKHOTSK SEA are often bound up with drifting on the ice and for that reason with the possibility that Soviet transports may deviate from the established route and be carried together with the ice into the Pacific Ocean through 1 of the Straits of the KURILE Chain, therefore please take these circumstances into account when issuing instructions to the Commanding Officers of the American warships and aircraft operating in these regions with the view of avoiding the consequences of erroneously identifying Soviet vessels with those of another nation on account of their deviating from the established route or their being involuntarily in Japanese territorial waters off the inland of HOKKAIDO sea the islands of the KURILE Chain and the GULF OF AZOV. In particular at the present time the Soviet vessels LIKTH PRAL and TEREK are under threat of being carried into the Pacific Ocean together with the ice through the southern straits of the KURILE Chain. In case these vessels are carried out into the Pacific Ocean they were ordered to return to the OKHOTSK SEA through the FRIK STRAIT".

The War Department has refused to provide personnel specifically to staff an Air Base Command in an area in which there is also stationed a senior air echelon, as the senior air command present, with his staff, is readily able to absorb this function. Station complement squadrons and or service groups are provided by the Army Air Forces to man air bases. The individual air bases can be commanded by the senior air officer present who may be either the Commanding Officer of a service group or the Commanding Officer of the station complement squadron. Par the present bulk allotment of officers and enlisted men from the War Department to ARFPOA is insufficient to furnish either air base commanders, or to provide vacancies in the desired grades to augment the Island Commander's staffs for this purpose. Par it is recommended that Island or Area Commanders in this theater exercise their command responsibilities for Army Air Bases through the Commander of the senior air echelon present. The senior air echelon commander will accomplish the administration and operation of air bases by utilization of assigned forces and staffs.
170557 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMFWDArea Info COMGENFMFPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGEN2NMARDV ISCOM SAIPAN.

Request survey to determine feasibility improving infantry combat training facilities for Marine Division at SAIPAN. ComGen 2nd MarDiv 160347. Use of SAIPAN as rehabilitation area for 1 Marine Division will continue indefinitely.

170608 CINCPAC ADV HQ to ALPAC Info COMINCH, CINCBFF.

This is Cincpac number 5. Whenever units of the British Pacific Fleet are involved include the Secretary of the Admiralty Whitehall London and the CinC British PacFlt in the distribution of copies of operation plans and orders for the specific operations and corresponding operational reports.

170648 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMGENPOA Info COMFWDArea, CINCPOA PEARL, ISCOM SAIPAN.

Para 1. Your 150527. Project approved in principle with the understanding that as much as possible of the training of Arrnw replacements will be accomplished before they arrive in the forward area and that training in forward area will be that which is essential to their readiness for operations definitely in prospect. Para 2. At earliest convenience request you submit to me by letter complete description requested by my 110046 and also copy of policy referred to in your 150527.

171220 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM7THFLT Info COMINCH, BUPERS.

Your 160443 proposes to Cominch reassignment of Commodore Moran who by my records is assigned to Pacific Fleet and is type commander for Motor Torpedo Boats, Pacific. That fact was taken into account in my proposal to temporarily send MTB's from PELELIU to LEYTE. Your 290733 May 1944 recommended permanent assignment Moran to 7th Fleet but Cominch 302047 May stated he was there on temporary but indefinite basis. Please clear through me any recommendations concerning redisposal of Cinpcap personnel and ships that may be temporarily under your command.

140541 COMGENPOA to WAR DEPT Info COMGENSPOE, COMGENSPEC, CINCPOA(REAR PASSED ADV)

RJ 51521-13TH. Basic Plan as outlined in War Dept radio WARK 26872, date time group 260022Z January 1945 is subject. Bases in the MARIANAS are already taxed to the maximum in handling VLR units, base units, and Army and Marine troops presently being staged in that area or scheduled for return there. Establishment of bases in the PHILIPPINES in sufficient time to handle a large volume of redeployed troops is not presently assured. It is considered that redeployment of forces from other theaters and from the United States will be well under way by the time that the objectives to be taken in the immediate future by Pacific Ocean Areas Forces are secured and have been developed to the extent necessary to accommodate redeployed troops and from there issued equipment for missions that may be assigned to such troops. Air Corps units currently being sent to the Pacific Ocean Areas are already taxing our facilities on island bases to the limit, and those Army Air Force units presently arriving are only a small part of the total Air units whose deployment is planned for this area. The islands of the HAWAIIAN group are the only bases in the Pacific Ocean Areas that are sufficiently organized and established to handle issues to any
Continuation

appreciable number of redeployed troops in the manner proposed by you. It is not considered desirable or practicable to funnel all redeployed troops through the HAWAIIAN Group base. Moreover, it is emphasized that in order to place any burden of redeployment on the HAWAIIAN Group, it is essential that adequate service troops be sent to that area in sufficient time to re-open facilities that have been placed in standby or near standby condition due to the fact that service troops previously manning these facilities installations have been displaced forward to take part in operations currently under way or planned for the immediate future. Such service troops must be brought to the HAWAIIAN Area sufficiently far in advance of other troops to have completed all necessary preparations of areas for the receipt of supplies and equipment. If these conditions can be met in the HAWAIIAN Group, it may be possible to receive a limited number of redeployed units in the HAWAIIAN Area, but it must be emphasized that service troops must arrive prior to other troops, and that equipment for standard type organizations must be pre-shipped in its entirety in sufficient time to be available for redeployed troops upon their arrival, as depot stocks in the Pacific Ocean Areas are insufficient to make complete issues of T/E including MMSR items to units arriving without such equipment, and normal measures for supply of MMSR items do not operate fast enough to insure pre-supply. War Department plan as proposed is not believed to be practicable for general application in the Pacific Ocean Areas and frequent changes in operational destinations of Army, Marine and Naval units which in the past have proven to be normal, make the adoption of such a plan exceedingly dangerous from the supply standpoint. It must also be pointed out that the adoption of War Department plan will require large stockpiles of equipment and supplies on each island base in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Redeployed troops will be used in operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas either in the actual assault on enemy held territory or will be part of the early garrison shipments for newly captured islands or land masses. It is not believed feasible to issue equipment and supplies as proposed by War Department under these conditions. Therefore, adequate facilities must be provided on the Mainland to permit a substantial portion of redeployed troops to be mounted (with prescribed equipment and supplies including ammunition) and combat or convoy loaded in the United States to go directly to the target. In the particular case of the South Pacific Area where units are moving direct to the Southwest Pacific Area, an agreement has been reached between the 2 theaters concerned, that units so destined for movement will move with full T/E insofar as shipping space permits. Any change of this procedure to agree with part 4 of the referenced radio at this late date is considered undesirable. War Department plan under no circumstances can be placed in effect immediately in this theater and, insofar as it affects general purpose vehicles, it is believed that the proper stockage point for these vehicles is the west coast of the United States and not within the theater. In view of the statements made above, this headquarters can not concur in Plan A or B in part 3 of your radio at this time.
16 1500 CNO to CINCPOA BOTH HQ.

House appropriations Committee considering rebuilding and rehabilitating GUAM with view to using achievements there as reason for extension Naval administration to other islands. It is requested that CNO be furnished by 1 March if practicable information concerning character and extent your projects and their effect on Civil Affairs in GUAM during periods of (A) Military operations and (B) Post-war activities including following subjects: (1) Removal of war damage debris. (2) Relocation of civil population. (3) Restoration of dwellings and other buildings public and private. (4) Building of roads expansion and relocation of government structures and public works for both military activities and island government. (5) Acquisition of and compensation for land required for above. (6) Reestablishment of former economic and cultural institutions, civil government and civil courts including list of any proclamations concerning use or non-use of civil courts.

18 0624 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGENPACDIV-ATC (OINC OATC) Info COMMATS PAC.

In order that Cincpac Advance Headquarters be kept informed of cases where aircraft under your flight control are missing, overdue beyond fuel endurance or lost request that OATC furnish following information by dispatch: (A) Report point of departure and time, ETA and destination. (B) Overdue and presumed lost give pertinent details. (C) When search is instigated inform Cincpac when plane is located or presumed lost. Forward by airmailgram list of passengers in cases where aircraft is declared lost.

18 1220 CTF 52 to CTF 51, Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, COM5THFLT.

Though weather has not permitted complete expenditure of entire ammunition allowance and more installations can be found and destroyed with 1 more day of bombardment I believe landing can be accomplished tomorrow as scheduled if necessary. I recommend however special attention before and during landing to flanks and east coast of island with neutralizing fire and white phosphorus projectiles immediately available if required. Amplifying report follows immediately.

18 2215 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info ALL TG CMDRS 5THFLT.

1st report of TOKYO strike. Task Force approach completely undetected and target area was not alerted until strikes neared targets. Weather conditions both days low clouds and squalls over Task Force making extremely difficult flying conditions. Bad to unsatisfactory over target with much of target area completely closed in. Results of 2 days strike 332 enemy aircraft shot down, 177 destroyed on ground, many others probably destroyed or damaged including at least 150 1st day. KLECAAS shops and installations destroyed at many airfields and air depots. Ota Aircraft Plant effectively hit by 1 small strike. Mushashimo Tama and Tashikawa Engine Plants each well hit by 1 Task Group strike. Bombing apparently excellent. 16 Feb, 9 coastal vessels sunk 1 DD 2 DE 1 AK. 20 coastal vessels damaged. TOKYO BAY Area closed in most of time preventing large percentage of strikes reaching assigned air field targets. 17 February 1 Cvl or CVE at YOKOHAMA hit with 6 quarter ton bombs set fire down at bow and rolled over on side apparently resting on bottom. 2 coastal vessels damaged. Increasingly bad weather 17th and forecast of same for 18th dictated cancellation of plans for continuation of strike and retirement was started after recovery of early afternoon sweeps.

- Continued -
18 2215 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info ALL TG COMDRS FIFTHFLEET (CONT'D)

17th. Total air losses both days:- Combat 49 aircraft 40 pilots 6 crewmen. Operational - 21 aircraft 5 pilots 4 crewmen. No report on lifeguard recoveries. No attacks reached our surface forces and no damage to our surface ships from enemy action. Special combat air patrol stationed over destroyer picket line between our force and TOKYO destroyed the few Japanese planes that followed our returning strikes. BARTON (DD722) and INGRAHAM (DD694) in collision causing extensive damage to BARTON bow limiting speed to 12 knots. Minor damage to INGRAHAM. WALDRON (DD 699) sustained minor damage to bow in ramming enemy picket boat night 17th. Ramming necessitated by range too close for firing with picket boat changing course toward center of task group. DOROTHY (DD 670) previously slightly damaged 3 killed 7 wounded by gunfire from same picket boat. BARTON, INGRAHAM, WALDRON proceeding independently SAIPAN 30A 12 as Task Unit 58.4.9. Numerous enemy picket boats destroyed during night retirement 17th-18th. Comments. Airmanship of our pilots under hazardous flying conditions superb. Jap planes not aggressive and avoided our fighters about 2000 planes or dummies on fields in TOKYO area. No shortage planes but possible shortage pilots or gasoline. To ridicule Jap superstition that weather is their infallible friend suggest publicity to effect that weather operated against them and allowed undetected approach and 2 days attack by our forces without damage to us in near vicinity TOKYO. I have sent following despatch to TF 58. "Congratulations to all hands on a superlatively well done job. Only courage skill and intelligent teamwork by every member of Task Force 58 could have produced these historic results in spite of opposition by both enemy and weather. I know that our future operations will hurt the enemy even more". Para. Commander 5th Fleet and CTF 58 desire express appreciation for cooperation and assistance provided by 21st Bomber Command all submarines Pacific and Task Group 50.5. Para. Today's operations. Topping off DD's. Anti picket boat sweeps. Deck load strike by 2 Task Groups on CHICHI JIMA.

19 0150 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, TF COMDRS 5TH FLEET.

This is summary number 1. Following intense naval gunfire and air bombardment 5thPhibCorps landed as scheduled. 8 Battalions supported by tanks landed by 1020. Little opposition was met initially though some mortar and artillery fire at LST's and boats. Mortar and artillery fire developed on all beaches particularly on BLUE and YELLOW. Several LVT's or tanks and LSM 74 and 211 hit. 6 tanks and elements of the 27th Marines reached southern edge of airfield by 1030. Front lines 1100 TA 1 in from TX-14, 7 DIO-14, 6 FBD-164 XYT-165 FWN-166 FCD. Left flank battalion 5th MarDiv TA ORY32 C to 14 SJ ENN T. Regimental reserves being landed. Personnel casualties moderate. Enemy strong on right flank. Para. Situation considered favorable. Para. GAMBLE and BLESSMAN hit last night by bombs. Casualties heavy. Will tow to SAIPAN.

19 0531 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCWPAC, CINCBFF, COM5THFLT, Info COMINCH.

Com5thFlt's 171028 concerns arrangements for use of LEYTE Area by British Pacific Fleet. My 110043 states my desire to defer arrangements for anchorages forward of MANUS until operational allocations are announced by Cominch whose 092141 indicates his assumption that such arrangements will be made by me.
19 0539 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CNO Info CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COM7THFLT, COMINCH.

Ref UR 071938. Although some undesirable delay will ensue in dredging program at GUAM as well as some decrease in dredging capacity for planned operations am agreeable in interests of overall war effort to loaning dredges NORFOLK and LOUISIANA to Com7thFlt until about 15 Sept provided you procure replacement dredges of similar characteristics. Request estimated dates of arrival this theatre. Dredges MCWILLIAMS and WEEBER or dredges of similar types and capacities considered satisfactory replacements. If you concur I can order both dredges together with crews and attendant plant including first 2 dump scows to arrive from mainland direct from FRAY to ULOD. Before any such orders are issued however, it is important that definite arrangements be made for replacements and for ultimate return of dredges NORFOLK and LOUISIANA as I have no reserve to cover possible losses in coming operations and no operating dredges for operations scheduled late this year. It is infeasible for me to follow suggestion of your 071938 to integrate dredging requirements POA and SWPAC as I am without authority in that area and am incompletely informed as to their requirements. In view foregoing request you make arrangements for replacements mentioned above and prescribe date for return of dredges to Cincpac.

19 0823 CINCPOA ADV HQ to ALPOA Info COMINCH.

The officers and men of the First Carrier Task Force of the Pacific Fleet have dealt the enemy a crushing blow which will long be remembered. The same courage, skill and teamwork which enabled our carrier pilots to destroy the enemy in bad weather over TOKYO are now being displayed by the forces which are taking NIO ISLAND only 660 miles from TOKYO. They will also bring success when our troops land in JAPAN itself covered and supported by the ever increasing power of our air forces and of the guns of the Fleet. Para. To those brave officers and men who have been and are in combat and also to those whose support and assistance in rear areas are essential to their success "Well Done!".

191129 CTF 93 to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CTF 94, 21st BomCom, ComGenAAFPOA, CTF 96, CTG 50.5, 7thBomCom, 7th Air Force, ComGen 73rd Bombing, ComFAW 2, COMAIRPAC, COM5THFLT, CTU 50.5, 713th Bombing.

Over two 4-5000 feet went 44 Libs with centuries to bomb defense installations N of E boat baring and bivouac area north of crater. 14 Libs put 90 percent bombs in target area 10 percent unobserved. 2nd squadron on first run over target did not drop due clouds. Requested permission for 2nd run denied by surface control and planes directed return to base with bombs. 3rd squadron arrived target late due faulty navigation did not drop bombs. 1 Navy Lib obtained photo and movie coverage of bombardment and landing. 9 Libs dropped 180100 pound on SUSAKI airfield 181215 GCT to 182010 GCT. 36 bombs had 6 hour delay 36 more had 12 hour delay. 1 Lib bombed fire north shore PUTAMI KO. results night snooper Libs unobserved.
The routing of PHILIPPINE destined shipping through the Central Pacific to KOSSOL is causing unnecessary delays. The reasons for this situation are (A) The scarcity of available escorts. (B) The unfavorable conditions at KOSSOL making call up from ULITHI necessary. (C) The addition of POA shipping to this route and (D) The added delay of forming convoys from ULITHI to KOSSOL. To relieve this situation it is proposed that all shipping proceeding to or from LEYTE through the Central Pacific shall stage through ULITHI instead of KOSSOL. This plan appears doubly desirable in view of: (A) The probable reduction in net defenses at KOSSOL as a result of net deterioration and lack of replacement nets and (B) The saving in time from somewhat shorter distance, entering anchorage, reforming, etc.

Para. To effect the departure of a convoy from both LEYTE and ULITHI every 6 days by this plan it is estimated that 6 escorts must be employed using two escorts for each convoy with a 2 day turn around period at each end and 2 escorts constantly inoperative for upkeep. The proportionate volume of shipping indicates that for the time being Com7thFleet should provide 4 of the escorts required and that ComFwdArea provide 2. Further propose that a PHILIPPINE SEA escort commander with an appropriate 7th Fleet Task Unit designation be appointed by Com7thFleet who will control the operation and upkeep of all 6 escorts. Escorts would be ordered to report for temporary operational control to the task unit commander thus established and to be replaced on a ship for ship basis by Com7thFleet or by ComFwdArea at their discretion. This arrangement to continue so long as profitable to each of the Commanders concerned and to be terminated by either commander at such time as the shipping interests of his area no longer demand this mutual assistance. Request your comment as early as practicable.

Urdis 180347 not to all. Agreements reached at HOLLANDIA conference of 21 September 1944 and restated in my 280110 of September of higher classification prescribed that SWPA shipping would be moved forwarded on call from SWPA command. Your 240225 of Nov and 090348 of Dec and my replies of 250215 of Nov and 120106 of Dec established SWPA regulating officer at KOSSOL ROADS who would be responsible for calling forward SWPA shipping at ENIWETOK and ULITHI to meet schedules set forth by Commanding General 6th Army. Once call forward is requested by SWPA regulating officer shipping has been and will continue to be moved forward to regulating port with all possible dispatch. In this connection see my dis 191143 not to all suggesting use of ULITHI instead of KOSSOL. Receipt of info requested by Com7thFlt 150715 should insure ability to institute call forward sufficient time to meet logistic requirements in PHILIPPINES. Welcome any suggestion from you as to procedure for expediting movement of ships.
The Honorable Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: My heartfelt thanks for the message of congratulations just received from the House of Representatives to the officers and men of The United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. We are enormously proud to have the confidence and encouragement of the House. There exists with us a keen awareness that our achievements can be traced back to those who were instrumental in providing us with the means to outshoot, outfight and overpower the enemy. The victories we are winning in Japanese home waters had their genesis on Main Street and in the Halls of Congress. We are profoundly grateful for this continued generous and enthusiastic support. Your heartening message was transmitted at once to everyone under my command. Signed C.W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

In every convoy to the westward include all Southwest Pacific shipping now in part or enroute which is destined for Leyte. Such shipping will no longer be held awaiting call forward unless specifically directed by CINCPAC. Convoys routed direct from Eniwetok or Ulithi to Leyte shall include SWPAC shipping to destination. CINCSWPA will escort own shipping departing Kossol for Leyte. Expedite movement all possible.

This is part 1 my 200925. This is my dis summary from 1800 Feb 19 to 1800 Feb 20. During night of D-Day 11 DD's 2 CA's and 2 LCI mortar units supported the Corps. A total of 145,000 rounds of 4.2 mortar was fired. Night activity characterized by intermittent mortar and arty fire falling on both divs. At 2315 enemy attempted to infiltrate our lines on west coast by landing barge in zone of 28 Mars but were repulsed. At about 0345 1 battalion enemy counter attacked across airfield No. 1 but were repulsed by RCT 27. Divs commenced a coordinated attack at 0830 preceded by air, arty, and NGF preparation and by 1200 had advanced about 500 yards to the north while RCT 28 had made gains of about 200 yards against Suribachi Mountain to the south. Intermittent mortar, arty and rocket fire fell on troops during the morning, especially on beaches Green Red, and Blue 1. During the early afternoon 4th MarDiv beaches received very heavy concentrated arty fire. Our arty situation had improved by noon and 4 complete Bns and halves of 2 other Bns were ashore and firing in support of the attack. Slight gains were made during the afternoon against increasing resistance. Fighting against heavy resistance the total advance of the day was approximately 800 yards in 5th MarDiv's zone of action and from 200 to 800 yards in the 4th MarDiv's zone of action. 11 DDs, 4 CA's and 5 BBs supported the attack throughout the day.
Part 1. Following plan will be followed to provide for night fighters and also accelerated carrier training during 1st Phase of next operation. (A) SARATOGA will be returned to CINCPAC immediately upon completion use in present operation. (B) INDEPENDENCE and BATAAN will arrive ULITHI with standard groups not later than 13 March. (C) ComAirPac will equip temporarily the 1st Essex Class carrier practicable to send forward from PEARL with a night group, using units now in SARATOGA at discretion. Para 2. ComAirPac nominate carrier for purpose in SubPara 1(c) above and advise probable date of joining Task Force 58.

The practice indicated in WARX 31259-3rd of the War Dept issuing instructions to subordinate commands in this theater which affect employment of shipping within the theater is considered to be at variance with policy set forth in JCS 1003-45 Dec. The 1st reference did not include CINCPAC as an alee and it's implementation without CINCPAC's knowledge has caused the embarrassing situation indicated ComGenSoPacBa 080456 and CINCPAC 110104. Concur in the objective sought by the 1st reference but does not concur in the method of implementation established therein. Request this be brought to attention Chief of Transportation ASF.

Summary No. 5 211200. Para. Landing Force resumed attack 0810 objective capture of airfield No. 2 the 0-2 line and slopes of MT SURIBACHI. The advance is being met with heavy machine gun, sniper and mortar fire. Para. During the night 20-21 only minor ground activity was reported. Numerous attempts at infiltration made along entire front but were unsuccessful. A local counter attack supported by several tanks and artillery was made against the Corps left flank at 2015 but repulsed by RCT 27. Small arms mortar artillery fire and sporadic rocket fire continued against our front. Numerous enemy defense installations require taking by individual troop action. Para. Our lines as of 1145 K (-10) reported as follows: From TA 132 R to 131 E thence along west coast to 197 Y thence 193 UX south edge. 181 E 182 K 142 MJ to 166 D. Para. 1st estimate of casualties as of 210800 K (-10) approximately 150 officers 3500 enlisted men of which 3063 are wounded and on board ship. Total of 25 LVT's destroyed 20 under repair 320 serviceable. 13 LVT(As) have been destroyed with 14 under repair and 78 serviceable. 12 tanks destroyed leaving 56 serviceable 10 under repair 16 unserviceable 7 bogged down. 11 DUKWS destroyed 19 trucks 3 cranes 3 bulldozers 1 tractor knocked out. Ammunition dump on RED Beach 2 B EG UP during night. 1 supply dump on beach BIUS 2 destroyed this morning. 4th BN 14th Marines lost 7/105 MM Howitzers in DUCKS which sank due to rough water. Para. Naval gunfire repeated illuminating harassing and interdiction missions throughout the night with 2 cruisers, 11 destroyers and 2 gunboat support units. Naval gunfire has continued throughout the morning with scheduled fire and call missions. Para. Scheduled air strikes have been augmented by 4 special large strikes from fast carriers making total of more than 800 airplanes on direct support missions today. Para. SUAMIGO and AI's SHASTA and WRANGLE arrived fueling and ammunition replenishment area in progress. LOGAN (APA 19) (2 groups garbled) retirement suffered steering casualty and rammed USS NAPA (APA 218) causing considerable damage on port side abcast number 4 hold latter ship but in no immediate danger. LOGAN has minor damage to bow.

-Continued-
21 0500 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC'S FIFTHFLEET. (CONT'D)

SAMARITAN received hit by 5 inch ricochet from friendly firing vessel but projectile did not explode. BRADFORD while rendering close in fire support hit submerged object off reef damaging port propeller. LSM 799 hit by mortar fire with slight damage. No casualties. Para. LVT's and DUCES continued unloading ammunition and rations throughout night. Demolition units started at daybreak to clear wrecks from YELLOW and BLUE Beaches. Causeways are being placed on beaches this morning.

21 0550 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Serious problem in amphibious landings on strongly defended objectives is present inability quickly locate concealed enemy mortar batteries and artillery firing on our troops. Any plan already developed or which can be developed by scientific research will be of great value in future operations. New subject. CV and CVL task force 58 successfully rearmed with bombs at sea by SHASTA and WRANGELL. Transfer rate initially 26 tons per hour improving to 30 tons. SHASTA recommends issue load of 4000 tons by 290053 January. Results substantiate previous conclusions. With experience increased transfer rate possible.

21 1210 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC FIFTHFLEET.

Summary No. 6 211800 K(-10). Ground attack continued this afternoon against heavy opposition consisting of intense small arms heavy weapons and artillery fire. Bombs and minefields covered by enemy mortar and artillery fire slowed the advance. Resistance was best organized and most severe in center of the Corps zone just south of airfield number 2. RCT 28 attack against MT SURIBACHI has been against very strong defenses. By 1500 they reported reaching the base of MT SURIBACHI and were using flame throwers on defensive installations. 4 tanks supporting this attack were casualties due to mines. Demolition equipment and personnel from 5th Engineer Bn are with RCT 28 to assist in their advance. RCT 28 reported counter attack in the area east of MT SURIBACHI at 1236 which was repulsed. Numerous booby traps and terracotta mines have been encountered. RCT 21 in Corps Reserve completed landing at 1800. Coordinated attack will be resumed tomorrow morning for the capture of 0–2 line. Para. Latest estimate indicates 362 enemy dead counted since D-day. Only 1 prisoner of war captured to date. Estimate received from Landing Force Commander that there are 5000 additional naval troops above the original estimate on TWO JIMA. His estimate indicates a total 20,000 enemy on TWO JIMA on D-day. Troops were ordered to dig in at 1700 on most suitable terrain in their forward area prepared to meet possible counter attack tonight. Some variation occurred in the lines during the day. At 1700 we held the general line from TA 132 VLF to 131 JN thence along west coast to 197 Y thence 196 V south edge 181 BE. 182 AKT. 183 MHTY 166 E. Para. LSM 43 sustained considerable structural damage due to rough sea while unloading transports. Temporary repairs to NAPA will permit speed of 10 knots but requires docking. LOGAN damage requires repair ship. Para. NAPA reports 5 men missing. During the day BBs and heavy cruisers supported attack by deep supporting fires. This was in addition to normal close support. Para. Air attacks separate with summary tomorrow. Para. Special report on beach conditions. Breakers not heavy but are a handicap due to steep slopes. Soil on all beaches of volcanic ash extends from water to airfield No. 1, very loose and will not permit passage of any type of wheeled vehicle. Almost entire beach.

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frightage now congested with wrecked LCVP's, LVT's, vehicles, and tanks. Supplies being furnished to troops inland only by LVT's. Demolition teams now clearing beach wreckage. Marston beach matting being laid but much will be needed. 3 mat roads completed to top of ridge. Mortar fire on beaches diminishing in intensity since 1200 but still a serious problem. Only satisfactory landing craft are LST, LSM, LCT and LVT. Trying to get portion causeways rigged will try unloading by pontoon barges. Net result is that while about 12 LST's are unloaded transports average only about 30 percent. This means considerable delays in unloading garrison echelons. Beaches west coast under investigation but not believed suitable.

Desp. OpPlan 2-40. NS STON ES current operations permit form Task Unit designated CASIGURAN SOUND. This unit composed of 2 DD or DE 2 AMs equipped for sweeping 1 LC ALEM. Para 1. Enemy occupies in minor strength points along east coast of LUZON. Enemy air on KUANH is now negligible. Scattered enemy SMES are operating in PHILIPPINE waters. There are no known enemy mine fields coast defense installations or troops in the CASIGURAN SOUND and Bay section of Eastern LUZON although BALER BAY and DINGALEN BAY are reported to be mined. Elements of the 6th CC Army have occupied BALER and DINGALEN BAYS. No friendly submarines are operating in Eastern LUZON waters. Para 2. This force will investigate CASIGURAN BAY and SOUND for the purpose of determining the presence of enemy forces or installations and suitability as a fleet anchorage. Para 3. Assemble Task Unit at LEYTE earliest practicable date. When RPS proceed BALER BAY contact local 6th Army Commander and as arranged with him embark scouts with interpreters. Proceed CASIGURAN SOUND land scouts at points as previously arranged with 6th Army to determine presence or absence of enemy forces or installations CASIGURAN SOUND Area including prewar emergency landing field on west side of sound. Make exploratory minesweeps in CASIGURAN SOUND and BAY. Inform Com7thFleet by despatch progress of operations and results of mission. Without interfering with primary mission destroy any enemy forces encountered. Return troops to destination arranged with 6th Army upon completion debarkation return LEYTE. RSG unit dissolved on arrival. Arrange air cover required with Allied Air Forces. In order avoid accidental engagement keep all interested commanders informed on movements. Logistics at LEYTE. Communication in accordance CAMP NTMI PLAN 5-44, Com7thFlt at TOLOSA. Para. Com7thPhibsFor inform Com7thFleet and all interested the names and radio calls of vessels in Task Unit as soon as assignments are made.

CX 10744. There follows answer to Cincpoa's 110045 and Com7thFlt's 160423. Island field with facilities thereat allocated Cincpoa for use of British Pac Flt effective 14 Mar 1945. Com7thFlt is authorized to complete all arrangements by direct correspondence with Cincpoa. CincSWPA accepts no obligation for additional construction except from forces locally available which are not required for other projects in Southwest Pacific Area.
21 1730 CINCPOA to CINCPAC ADV, COM7THFLT, Info COMINCH, CINCPA PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMALLIED AIR FORCES, ADV ECH GHQ.


22 0234 CINCPA ADV to COMGENPOA Info CINCPA PEARL.

I concur in the comment of your serial 0091 of 10 February 1945 and do not consider that FILEAS Agreement is applicable to overhead allotment of SoPacBaCom. Request you initiate request direct to Chief of Staff US Army to implement sub paragraph 5(B) of your serial 0091.

22 0410 CTF 51 to TF 54, CTF 53, CTG 56.1, CTF 56 Info TG 51.1.

Ammo expenditures have been enormous and at present rate exhaustion of effective gunfire support will occur in 2 days despite constant replenishment. Up to the present night firing has been very wasteful and much of it unnecessary. It must be reduced both for AA common and star shell. It will hereafter be limited to firing for counter battery, to break up counter attacks and disperse assemblies. Continuous star shell illumination cannot be maintained. Ammo quota each night hereby established at 300 AA common and 50 stars per ship for 2 to 3 cruisers and 10 destroyers. The amount of ammo expenditure during the day must also be reduced (it is essential that Division and Regimental Commanders exercise a more rigid control of Battalion calls with a view to better and more efficient coordination).

22 0818 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGENAAFPOA Info COMINCH.

Your 220131. Do not desire participation in proposed conference by officers assigned to the Pacific Ocean Areas. Coordination of intertheater communications should be effected by JCS or by arrangements between the Theater Commanders.

22 1240 CTF 51 to COM7THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TF COMDRS 5THFLT.

This is Summary No. 8 221800 K. Our troops continued attack this afternoon against stubborn resistance. RCT 21 on the left flank of the 4th Division was pinned down by heavy rifle and mortar fire and made only slight gains to the north against airfield center (number) two. The 5th Division on the left flank advanced about 200 yards north of the O-1 line but were unable to advance farther ahead of RCT on their right. RCT 28 supported by tanks artillery demolitions and flame throwers continued attack on MT SURIBACHI. Strong reconnaissance patrols were sent up the cliffs and existing trails and were met by enemy troops dropping hand grenades and demolition charges. At 1400 it was reported that the base of the crater was entire circled and that the elimination of enemy defenses was progressing. In the attack today the 5th MarDiv was supported by 3 Bns of the 13th Field Artillery and 1 Battery of Corps Artillery.

- Continued -
22 1240 CTR 51 to COM7THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TF COMDES 5THFLT. (CONT'D)

5 Bns of Field Artillery were in support of the 4th Division. Part 2. Strong enemy counter attack was reported organizing on the right flank of the Corps at 1100 and was taken under fire by naval gunfire and field artillery. Report of 1600 indicated the counter attack materialized but details not available. RCT 26 reports a strong enemy counter attack at 1700 along their front on the left of the Corps front. This attack was reported repulsed at 1810. At 1630 troops were ordered to dig in and prepare to resist counter attack and infiltration tonight. The attack will be continued at 0730. Arranged in boundaries objectives and zones of action. Front lines as of 1600 are as follows: TA 131 NSX 121 DE 122 A 132 UVIKF 131 JN thence along west coast to south part 197Y thence 198U 199 RH 182 UDK 181 J 182 KOXIT 182 MNY to 166 E. Casualty reports as of 1800 21 February: Landing Force loss BCT 25 KIA 644; WIA 4,168; MIA 560. Total for RCT 25 1072. Total of ground forces 6444. Enemy counted dead reported as of 1800 2 February total 1222. 2 prisoners of war. Para. Naval gunfire support has been hampered by unfavorable weather conditions with heavy rain and low visibility.

22 0247 COM7THFLT to CINCSWPA LEYTE Info CINCPAC, CONSERVPAC, COMSERFOR7THFLT.

7th Fleet has commenced facilities on shore SAMPAR with manpower and materials to the limit of its resources while simultaneously meeting requirements to support active fleet operations at LINGAYEN, SUBIC and MANILA. Numerous minor operations are to follow in rapid succession. It may become necessary to withdraw some of this manpower to meet operational needs elsewhere in the area. For at least 4 months after arrival of CBs from CINCPAC naval forces at LEYTE must in general be supported by and accompanied by provis doy etc ships. Also there will be an almost complete lack of harbor craft small boats small oilers water barges and other essential ships to service a fleet at anchor unless sent in with working vessels. Commencing about 1 May stocks on shore can be built up. Request ComSerFor 7th Flt be authorized correspond direct with ComServPac in order to arrive at an understanding as to stock levels and responsibility for maintenance.

22 1303 CINCPAC ADV to CINCRPT Info COMINCH, COMNAVBASE MANUS, CINCSWPA, COM7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT.

According CINCSWPA 211730 use of MANUS as a fleet anchorage augmentation of carrier pools and arrival of liaison officer and party are approved. Request you make detailed arrangements direct with ComNavBase MANUS. I will advise you concerning use of airfield and establishment your MONAB as soon as I can.

22 2343 CINCPAC/CINCPAC ADV to CINCSWPA Info COMFWDAREA, COMMARGILAREA, COM7THFLT COMPHIESEAFRON, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, SCOPA.

Your 201608. Delays of more than a few days in routing of SWPA shipping through POA have in the past resulted from the fact that shipping was not called forward by the SWPA regulating officer in Kossol. My 191143 and 22 201421 were issued with the idea of alleviating this condition. If all limitations requiring the calling of ships forward are removed SWPA ships should reach the westernmost staging port (either ULITHI or Kossol, whichever you select) expeditiously after which their onward sailing will be entirely within your own control.
This is my Summary Number 9. Both fronts were relatively quiet during the night 22-23 Feb. Usual enemy infiltration tactics were attempted but without results. Group of enemy swimmers came in on west coast in rear of lines of RCT 26 which required some mopping up. Our attack this morning to the north was as follows: 5th MarDiv on the left with 2/27, 2/26, 3/26 (from left to right in line); 4th MarDiv on the right with 2/21, 1/21, 2/24, 3/24, 1/24 (from left to right in line). BLT 3/26 was held up on the right shortly after leaving line of departure by heavy mortar and artillery fire. RCT 21 reported at 0825 they were pinned down. Resistance continued heavy but reports indicate that the advance is continuing. RCT 28 on the south continued their attack against MT SURIBACHI and at 1035 reached the rim of the crater on the north. Mopping up operations proceeding this area with flame throwers much in evidence. The 13 and 14 Marine Artillery is in direct and general support of the attack. Intending landing headquarters and 9th RCT of 3rd MarDiv 24 February. Para. Front lines as of 1200 SURIBACHI area indefinite but many troops in sides and occupy rim of crater north east and south. West coast no change. North front lines are from; 197Y1981X21 199 PU1828LMN0 183 PCHNY133E. Para. Night illumination and interdiction gunfire was delivered throughout the night by 3 cruisers 10 DDs 1 mortar support unit. Scheduled and call fire continued throughout the morning. SOLACE arrived and is embarking casualties. Rough water has interfered with operation of boats. Para. Scheduled air strikes are being carried out this morning with emphasis on destruction of pin point targets under direction of Air Coordinator and Air Liaison parties. Strike this MEBUK on CHICULI DNA destroyed 3 damaged 3 of 10 planes seen on ground. 14 small craft seen. 2 TBM planes were damaged by enemy anti-aircraft fire but both returned. Air artillery spotting plane reports enemy AA fire launched white 3 foot parachutes at 2000 feet. To each parachute was suspended by a 4 foot cable an object 2 feet long which spurted streamers of flame. It has now been determined that 2 TBM planes from ENTERPRISE which were searching for SARATOGA pilots were shot down about 1530 22 February instead of 1 plane as reported in my Summary No. 8. A search for survivors from this plane and for crews of 2 missing SARATOGA is continuing. Para. Beach conditions are somewhat improved. BLUE 1 and YELLOW 2 were subjected to some mortar fire early this morning and several snipers killed near beaches. 3 roads now exist for vehicles from YELLOW beaches to airfield. Beach RED 1 now has 1 exit for tracked vehicles and 1 for wheeled vehicles. Beach RED 2 has 2 for tracked vehicles and 1 for wheeled vehicles. Beach GREEN has 1 for tracked vehicles. BLUE 1 has road for tracked vehicles. BLUE 2 can construct road when free of enemy machine gun fire. Weather partly cloudy, visibility good JING north-northwest 20-25 knots. 6 foot breakers on eastern beaches and choppy enough off shore to impede unloading and replenishment of ammunition.
Ref Marshall signed Maxwell 221906Z. Cincpoca will be glad to facilitate the purposes of visit of General Maxwell and his party. On matters which are not strictly Army but do concern Pacific Ocean Areas I request he confer with by Deputy Vice Admiral Towers instead of directly with any subordinate member of my Staff as indicated in reference. Admiral Towers will arrange for such conferences as may be found necessary with other officers under my command.

23 1150 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

This is my Summary Number 10 231500 K(-10). Stubborn resistance from concrete pillboxes, caves and entrenchments continued to limit the advance of our ground forces. Limited gains were made in the zone of action of the 4th MarDiv on the Corps right with a maximum advance of 300 yards in the area of the 24th RCT. The 5th MarDiv on the left holds positions along the 0-1 line. RCT 21 in the center has captured the southern tip of airfield No. 2. RCT 25 in the SURIBACHI area continues mopping up operations. Block-houses and pillboxes have been reported within the crater. 717 enemy dead counted in the RCT 28 area. Enemy landing craft and mortar fire reported from KANGOKU ROCK were eliminated by DD gunfire. Battery A 2nd En Corps Artillery landed in general support. Remainder this Bn and Corps Artillery HQ were ordered to land during the day. Front lines as of 1630 are: SURIBACHI area no change. North front TA 197Y thence 198 UXT 199 FU 182 B GLRNO 18 3 NCHIQ 134 FU 167 A. Para. Naval gunfire continues the support of the ground troops. Ammunition replenishment was carried out throughout the day by PENSACOLA from transports, DDs from AEs and LSTs, LCIs from LSTs. Replenishment is slow because of high winds and moderate sea. The following operational casualties are reported: LST 390 in collision with LST 807 while retracting from beach. Extensive damage forward including 5 foot hole starboard bow doors and mechanism damaged bow anchor lost. Emergency repairs will be made prior to retirement to rear area. LST 716 lost ramp. Emergency repairs to weld steel bulkheads and steel ramp are underway. YMS 361 has leak in hull but ship still operational. SC 1027 snapped starboard shaft. Is operational and can make 12 knots. PC 377 has damaged starboard propeller but operational and can make 11 knots. SOLACE burned out anchor engine with 30 fathoms of chain out. Repairs by ships force in progress. LSM 92 fouled by wire in propellers. Efforts to remove it are underway. Para. Air strikes in support of ground troops continued throughout the day. Correction my Summary No. 3. Fire on TBM's from ENTERPRISE was from unit with SWEARER but not from that vessel. 1 TBM from RUDYARD BAY has been missing since 1700 22 February after reporting a contemplated water landing 21 miles bearing 255 from INO. Immediate surface search was made and 2 searches on 23 Feb with negative results. At 1350 23 Feb an OS2U plane from NEVADA crashed inside our lines on INO. Pilot Lt. Hugh William Sheldon, USN killed; Capt. John A. Friday USMC passenger seriously injured. All plane documents retrieved and burned. Latest check on survivors from BISMARCK SEA indicates 100 officers 513 enlisted men survived out of 124 officers and 836 enlisted men on board. Figures include squadron V C-36 and passengers. Large personnel lost considered due to initial explosion and fire amplified by later explosion of torpedoes. Para. Sweep of CHITAI JIMA was made during afternoon of 23 Feb. by planes from fast carriers O DECATIN AND OOTG ATLS BN I on this mission 1 plane from BELLEAU WOODS was reported down 10 miles from target. Air-sea rescue operations are underway. Para. GREEN & RED beach considerably improved. Supplies continue to be landed by LSTs LSMs and LCTs. Troops report they trailer highly successful in moving supplies over heavy sand. Wessels — Continued —
23 1150 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TCG'S FIFTHFLEET (CONT'D)

are effective in carrying supplies to front lines. Salvage EFFORXEDMELLEAR BEANIES shows considerable progress. Supply dumps are being moved in and THIS relieve congestion. Beaches YELLOW and BLUE continue to receive sporadic mortar or artillery fire which impedes work considerably. Pontoon barges and causeways not being used due to steep beaches and heavy surf which causes broaching.

23 2315 CTF 51 to CTF 93 Info COMAF 7, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFG AND TGC 5THFLT, COM5THFLT.

Appreciate your 230606. Request you make day and night strikes on CHICHI JIMA, HAHAJIMA and MINAMI JIMA, FREE MINAMI JIMA for neutralization of airfield and destruction of aircraft and shipping. Advise intentions and results of missions. Attacks by carrier planes will be discontinued except in emergency.

24 0700 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFG 5THFLT.

Summary No. 11 241200 K(-10). Ground forces had relatively quiet night. Minor attempts at infiltration sporadic mortar and artillery fire. At 0915 resumed attack with the objective the general line 180E 198W 199H northwest road junction 204A 200F 200R northeast 184F 167B with 4th MarDiv main effort on its left: 5th MarDiv with main effort on its right. Attack preceded by heavy air naval and field artillery bombardment concentrated in general areas 199 and 200. Tanks supported the attack. By 1200 some ground had been gained in the center along southwest edge of airfield number 2 against stiff enemy resistance. RCT 23 continued mopping up SUKIBACHI area. Patrols have entered the crater. Our front lines as of 1130: TA 180E 181ACE 182 AEBHJ 183 FUKAKO 184 FU 167A. All Corps artillery new ashore. CG LanFor assumed command ashore 0955. RCT 9 and Hq 3rd MarDiv commenced landing at 0800 on beach YELLOW 1 and RED 2. Tanks of 3rd MarDiv landed and moved to assembly area last night. Casualty reports 5th Amphibious Corps as of 231800: KIA 706, WIA 5125, MIA 531. Casualties on LCS 33 result from friendly anti-aircraft fire during air raid. Para. Naval gunfire continues to support the ground forces. Heavy pre-K hour bombardment fired this morning in support of the attack. Ship casualties due enemy action: LSM 47 had near miss by bomb. No mentionable damage but 2 minor personnel casualties. LSM 46 hit by enemy artillery fire 1 hit starboard side water line after part crews compartment; 1 hit port superstructure deck starting small fire and damage in ships office; 2 dead 9 wounded. Laid seaplane mooring buoys and survey for mooring buoys and nets underway. 6 search and 3 Dumbo seaplanes requested for tomorrow. The following operational casualties occurred during the past 24 hours: WILLIAMSON extensive structural damage port side while fueling. Operational but tender availability required. PC 573 several holes in hull due servicing small boats. LSM 92 previously reported as fouled by wire in propeller requires docking. KEOKUK and ABELE (AN59) assisting force beachmaster in installing causeway pier. Numerous vessels now anchored for discharge of cargo. HYMAN WILEY and TALBOT and 8 planes searching to westward for 2 LSMs reported adrift with personnel. SOLACE expects depart for SAIPAN sunset. Report as of 1800 23 February indicates 87 LCVPs 10 LCMs and 1 LCPR wrecked or sunk. Para.
Enemy aircraft approached in several small groups between 1340-2100 23 February. 2 planes identified visually 1 as RUPES 1 as BETTY. No fighter interceptions. Planes dropped window but apparently no attacks made although FRAZIER reported straddled by bombs. SARATOGA reports 29 dead, 57 wounded in suicide attack of 21 Feb. Reports 3 enemy planes shot down. This raises number enemy planes shot down night 21 February to total 15. Para. At 0953 1 TBM from STEAMER BAY shot down with 5th MarDiv observer over IWO in flames. Plane crashed in water. No survivors 1 body recovered. Para. Conditions on beaches improving. Lateral communications now established. General cargo unloading underway. Numerous LSTs and LSMs were beached and unloaded during past 24 hours. Several Japs reported as wearing Marine uniforms. Weather high scattered alto-cumulus with lower scattered strato-cumulus. Temperature 65-67 wind north-northeast 10 knots. Visibility high.

Summary No. 12 241800 K(-10). Enemy resistance remained strong throughout the afternoon. Artillery and heavy weapons fire increased as the attack progressed. Intermittent high velocity artillery fire fell on area south of MOTOMIYAMA airfield. Many enemy mines and booby traps were found throughout the area. Some Jap bazooka fire against tanks reported in zone of advance of 5CT 21. Considering defense employed by enemy advances made this afternoon were substantial. Front lines as of 1730 generally as follows: TA 190E 192TOMO 199 KOWXY 183ABODE 184 PKWX 167A. Mortar and artillery fire on the interior beachhead greatly decreased. 32 tanks destroyed since landing by 8 mines. 31st CB Bn plus 5th Engineer Bn ordered ashore by 5th MarDiv. 4th Engineer Bn and 4th Motor Transport company ordered ashore by 5th MarDiv. CB 3rd MarDiv opened ashore at 1530. HMJVIDXODRES 1 strip airfield No. 1 cleared minefields. North half beach RED 2 combined with south half beach YELLOW 1 now called BLACK BEACH passed to control 3rd MarDiv 1600. Jap defenses at IWO are mutually supporting concrete emplacements blockhouses caves in depth entire island. Many more than air photographs show uncovered by blast effect gunfire. Blockhouses reinforced concrete 4 feet thick. Storage tanks concrete. Area 183STWXY more than 100 man made caves 30-40 feet deep with stairways. Incomplete reports show 115 emplacements destroyed SURIBACHI. Minefields encountered in 1650 are torpedo heads. Drums on beach contain small arms ammunition. Believe 145th Infantry not yet committed. Few rifles or rifle ammunition found. New type grenade size ORANGE clay cover burns brightly. 500 KG bombs nose fuze with rocket motor have been identified and these doubtless caused the heavy explosions D and D plus 1 reported as heavy mortar or Howitzer fire. Counted 2,799 Japs killed 6 prisoners to date. 5th Corps attacks morning 0930 objective 0-2 00 K. Para. Fire support throughout day by 2 OBB 3 CA and 10 DD. Heavy fire WEST VIRGINIA, PENSACOLA main batteries delivered in support. 160 16 inch 350 8 inch plus 8 smaller batteries directed against enemy positions. TLXVRG replenishment ammunition improved today due to smoother sea. Air surface search for personnel reported adrift in 2 LCM's completed today LCM's found but no personnel in them. HAMLIN completed laying seaplane mooring buoys is anchored in berth close to beach southeast end SURIBACHI. Hydrographic survey group completed survey locating anti-submarine nets and buoys 1400. Vessels of net and buoy unit directed to lay mooring buoys as directed by survey group. Unloading transports continued throughout day. Unloading expedited by improved weather and fact that transports can now anchor close to beach. FINKNEY arrived and will commence evacuating.
24 1310 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC FIFTHFLT. (CONT'D)
casualties tomorrow. SOLACE departed. Following operational casualties: SG 1027 breakdown in port engine ships force can effect temporary repairs. LSM 202 extensive damage port side hull plating stanchions deck plates davits etc. LSM 241 extensive hull damage port side with buckled beams much minor damage both ships damage due to rolling in seaway alongside other ships while unloading. DMS 7 port engine unable back. LSM 49 rammed by LCI 356 receiving 12 inch hole in side. Para. Routine air support missions flown. Number strikes reduced due carriers fueling and search operations. Sweep made on CHICHI JIMA no reports yet. Para. General conditions beaches much improved. Equipment and troops unloaded at accelerated pace. Occasional artillery and mortar bursts still being received BLUE beaches.

25 0515 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.
Summary No. 13 251200 K(-10). Throughout night minor attempts infiltration. Our areas subjected some mortar rocket and artillery fire. Small local counter attack area BLT 3/21 repulsed 0030. Preceded by 45 minute artillery air and NGF preparation troops resumed attack at 0930 with 3 Divisions abreast: 1st MarDiv on right, 3rd MarDiv less 3rd RCT in center, 5th MarDiv less RCT 23 in Corps Reserve on left. Main effort in center zone. Objective 0-2 line. 26th RCT still mopping up SURIBACHI. Report as of 1130 indicates only minor gains. Our casualties to date: KIA 534, WIA 5428, MIA 404. Lt. Col. A.A. Vandergrift Jr. USMC through wounds both legs, condition good, will be sent out on PINCKNEY. Enemy dead counted 2227 POW 7. Para. Estimated 3000 enemy killed 7 POW. Naval gunfire support was furnished during the night by 2 CA 10 DD 1 mortar support unit and 1 gunboat support unit. 1 DD illuminated enemy cave positions SURIBACHI area by searchlight. Mortar support unit under heavy enemy fire during night. No damage. During morning 1 UFRO BBs 2 CAs 10 DDs furnished scheduled and call fires. H L EDWARDS (DD 663) and BRYANT (DD 665) collided last night during air raid. Extensive damage EDWARDS frame 19 RFX flooding 3 feet compartment CMQ 005L. Para. About 10 enemy aircraft in 3 small groups near IWO from 2020-2225 wr Feb. About 30 bombs dropped from 12000 feet part ashore seemed to be in enemy territory part in smoke covered transport area. Para AUBURN straddled. No damage to BLUE. Enemy used window and radar. Retired on course 055 to over 75 miles. ENTERPRISE night intruder downed 1 HELEN over CHICHI JIMA night 24 February. Para. Beach conditions much improved but east wind today causing delays. Weather high scattered clouds alto-cumulus 5/10 at 12000 feet. Visibility high wind east 20 knots temperature 69.

25 0549 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CG AAFPO, CG 7THAF, CG 2ND MARAIRWING, CG 4TH MARAIRWING
Info CG 21ST ROHCOR, COMGEN PEAFL, CINCSWPA.
A message with date time group 222135 addressed to you from an unidentified originator requesting information as to the strength of your command in tactical aircraft should be disregarded. It may be spurious. Addressees under my command will not report strengths except through the established chains of administrative and operational command.
26 0740 COMGENAAFPOA to CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMFWDAREA, ISCOM TINIAN, COMGEN AAFPOA
ADMIN, COMGENPOA.

AAFPPOA 0495. The following Telecon from 20th AF to this Hq is passed for your info. This does not alter the present concept which indicates arrival of 1st air and flight echelons at TINIAN on or about 20 April. "From 20th AF to CG 20th BomCom and CG 21st BomCom. Subject: Movement of ground echelons. The following item from a report made by the AC/AS DG and R to the Chief of Staff, 20th AF, is quoted for your information: Movement of ground echelons. The ground echelons of the headquarters and headquarters squadron 315th Bomb Wing and of the 1st 2 groups (all of which had readiness dates of 1 Feb) now have a boat call of 10 March. This means that these ground echelons will be delayed in their arrival. This will not affect the 315th Wing but it will necessitate a 3 weeks delay in the movement of the air echelons of the 1st 2 groups of the 58th Wing. It is not anticipated that this undesirable delay can be avoided at this date." "Telecon message number G-24-3"

26 0525 CTF 51 to COMSTHILT Info ALL TFG’S 5THFLT, CINCPOA BOTH HQ.

Summary No. 15 261200 K-10). Ground force picture since last report reveals significance of reported gains registered 25 February. 3rd MarDiv gained 400 yards to seize high ground north intersection of runways airfield number 2 on right division zone of action. This gain affords Corps observation on enemy held ground to north. Against heavy opposition 3rd MarDiv make short gains on their left on division boundary which secured commanding ground and should facilitate advance 5th MarDiv today. No reports important enemy activity during night 25-26. Generally quiet with some infiltration attempted. Sporadic enemy small arms mortar artillery fire including several rocket bombs received. Troops resumed attack at 0800 to seize 0-2 line. 3 divisions abreast main effort in center zones of action boundaries unchanged. Line of departure on front line. 5th Division on left with 2 battalions in assault. 3rd MarDiv less RCT 3 in center with 2 battalions in assault. 4th MarDiv on right with main effort on its left with 5 battalions in assault. Corps artillery reinforcing fires of division artillery with 50 percent fire mission zone of action 3rd MarDiv remainder equally to 4th MarDiv 5th MarDiv. 45 minute preparation by artillery with Corps preceded attack. By 1052 good progress had been made in the center and left flank. Front lines follow TA 197J 198EJ 199 FLO 200 KINY 201J 184AKQF 197A. Tank casualties 2. At 0900 4th MarDiv reported capture hill 382 TA 200 SY. RCT 28 mopping up SURI-BACHI killed 10 isolated Japs. Indications shortage water soon may produce enemy crisis. Units 433nd AAA battalion 506th TUN battalion landed by 1600 25 February in position ready to give AA protection by 2000. Enemy snipers reported concealing themselves under enemy dead during daylight hours coming out at night to fire. Additional enemy identifications reported: 10th Independent Rapid Fire Battalion (auto cannon Bn 25mm AA); 2nd Mixed Brigade Engineer Unit, TOSU 2101; Murikami Tai Mano Tai, part of 145th Infantry Regiment; Nishi Yama Tai Communications Company; Ashi Buti Battalion 2nd Co, 3rd Independent MG Bn; 15th Fortress Engineer Co. 4th Division VMO squadron expects to complete landing today and commence operation north-south runway number 1 airfield now cleared for 1500 feet. Cumulative report 1300 25 February 11st total casualties ground forces KIA 1113, WIA 5698, MIA 530 total 7341. Total counted enemy dead 3568.

- Continued -
POW 9. Considerable number additional enemy sealed in caves on SURIBACHI. Marines demonstrate high degree of offensive spirit against fanatically held positions. Morale excellent combat efficiency considered high adequate reserves available. Para. During night 9 DD 2 CA 1 Mortar support unit and 1 gunboat support unit provided close supporting fires and illumination. 1 BB 1 CA 1 CL reinforced shore artillery with 30 minute preparation prior attack. Scheduled and call fires continued throughout morning. 9 DD available for call fire missions throughout day. Ammunition replenishment of troops being made from COLUMBIA VICTORY. Eastern beaches due steep grade and sure unsuitable for use pontoon causeway. Hunter-killer operations underway on 2 submarine contacts in positions 295 degrees distance 67 miles and 176 degrees distance 140 miles HOT ROCKS. Carrier based planes continue close air support ground troops. 2 CY planes of 4th MarDiv launched from WAKE ISLAND landed TUO JIMA 1005. 1st U.S. aircraft to commence operation from this island. DD HAMILTON on 24th rescued 1 ENTERPRISE pilot downed near CHICHI. 1 TBM on ASP made forced water landing near CVEs night 25 February crew rescued. ENTERPRISE plane TURVI in crew downed 4 miles northeast CHICHI this morning. Air-sea rescue mission in progress. 2nd Air-sea rescue mission BELLEAU WOOD pilot and B29 crew downed southwest CHICHI JIMA 23 February unsuccessful. Para. Organization of beaches and construction road NMD much improved. Equipment and supplies landed in increasing quantities though today hampered by south wind and moderate swell. Practically all shore party equipment now in operation shore party depot regiment functioning. 8 water distillation units operating ashore. Construction battalion restoring airfield number 1. Dumps ashore well stocked. Selective unloading has been eliminated as far as possible. 10 transports 28 LSTs unloaded to date. Weather hazy light rain visibility poor evercast 2000 feet with low nimbus. Temperature 74-76 wind SSW 10-16 knots shifting to west north west at noon.

26 0655 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info DEP COM 20 AF, CTF 51, CTF 94.

DepCom20thAF has requested that a surface ship lifeguard be stationed northeast of TUO JIMA at 1500 en days of VLR major strikes which will occur approximately every 4 days. Ship would be released upon passage of last plane at about 2000 unless engaged in rescue. Stations in order of preference are 27 north 144 east, 26 north 144-20 east, 25 north 144-30 east. Desire to comply with this request if CTF 51 can furnish a suitable ship without prejudice to current operations. Advise when conditions of radio silence permit. CTF 51 comment at discretion. This commitment would extend only for the period during which suitable 5th Fleet ships remain in the TUO JIMA area.

26 1315 CTF 51 to CINCPAC Info ALL TFC FIFTHFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

This is summary No. 16 261800 K(-10). Increasingly strong resistance encountered this afternoon held troops to substantially same lines reported earlier. Enemy opposition heaviest in Corps center zone of action 3rd MarDiv and left of 4th MarDiv. In addition to heavy weapons artillery rocket fire encountered to date heavy volume small arms fire and grenades indicates enemy infantry in strength being employed. 5th MarDiv's employment of LTA indicative heavy tank losses sustained both operational and enemy action. Latest report 1730 gives front lines as: TA 197J 198FJ 199KJSP 200KLSA 201U 194AKQU 167A. Corps ordered divisions consolidate
for night 1/700 with limited local attacks authorized thereafter to improve positions. Attack to resume tomorrow 0800 boundaries objectives unchanged. Little enemy fire has fallen on interior of beachhead during day. 1 Battalion plus 2 batteries 12 Marines 3rd MarDiv artillery ashore moving into action. BLT 3/24 reports 200 enemy dead large number documents found in cave deep entrance tunnel. Pillboxes overrun in area north airfield number 2 believed ammunition storage. 13 horned mines some yardstick mines removed area north BLUE Beach. Part 2. Fow states rainwater enemy's only source of water supply stowed in drums each installation. Bleed bank established ashore. Para. Summary submarine contact past B-SUGS hours follows: A Bennion made radar surface contact 2210 25KBRUAR 305 degrees 45 miles HOT ROCKS. Hunter-killer operations made possible kill. Search to discontinued tonight 0100. B plane made surface visual contact 295 degrees 67 miles HOT ROCKS 0210 26 February. Submarine dove. Attacked and reports possible damage because of explosions sonar buoy. Hunter-killer operations until midnight. C Finnean underwater sound contact 0804 26 February position 176 degrees 140 miles HOT ROCKS. Attacks brought debris plus wood with Japanese characters to surface. Additional contact made Lat 21-40 north Long 142-00 east. TULAGI group directed for hunter-killer operations both these contacts. Operational damage ships follows: LST 121 rammed by LSM 140 minor damage operational. HOWARD: number 4 boiler casing and uptake split due shock gunfire. HAMLIN: searchlight destroyed outer casing stack pierced by 5 inch shell unidentified probably ours. FULLER (APA7): 2 holes starboard side shell plating above waterline repairs later. Para. Air operations including B-24 strike cancelled 1330 due weather. ENTERPRISE dam sweep CHICHI JIMA strafed airfield burned 1 Jill sank 1 small merchant vessel burned 2 medium merchant vessels destroyed oil storage. 15 wrecked planes observed on field 8 small vessels in harbor. GREGORY air-sea rescue mission 1430 retrieved HUD ENTERPRISE airmen from TBH shot down over CHICHI JIMA. GREGORY under fire shore batteries no damage. Para. Surf conditions this afternoon restricted landing to LST'S LSM'S LC'T'S. Supply situation generally satisfactory. 15 water distillation units operating ashore. Water supply reported adequate.

CX 10963. Reference Cincpao's 210206 CgT February attention is invited to radio RJ 4604 6 January 1945. Which indicates War Department reduced SoPacBaCom's bulk allotment by 330 officers, 41 warrant officers, 1706 enlisted personnel, for a total of 2077, including general officers. Subject radio specifically states that personnel reordered overstrength to SoPacBaCom overhead allotment as a result of this reduction will be transferred to SWPA at the earliest possible date. Radio H give 967 8 January 1945. From SoPacBaCom to CINCWP A. States reassignment of above surplus personnel has been and is being effected as appropriate vacancies occur within SoPacBaCom EUNYUKHGH states that reassignment of such personnel will not be made and surplus now on hand will be transferred to SWPA by orders this headquarters. It is further pointed out that the 731 overhead personnel transferred to SWPA by War Department radio WX 54639 30 October 1944. Pre DXH dares both the FILIBAS and TRANSO Agreements and was proposed on the basis of transfer of less than 20% of service troops now set up for transfer to SWPA. It is requested therefore
that this 2077 indicated by the War Department be transferred to SWPA as soon as practicable. In view of the very substantial increase in service forces ODER TDAT originally set up for transfer to SWPA under the PILHAS Agreement. It is deemed essential that a proportionate number of the 5909 bulk overhead allotment still remaining in SoPacBaGoa be set up for transfer to SWPA.

26 2107 COMSTHFLT to CINCPOAC ADV Hq.

Struck TOKYO area 25th. Because of unfavorable weather there attempted to strike NAGOYA-KOBE area 26th but prevented by weather and sea and withdrew morning 26th. TOKYO target area was closed in except northeastern portion and ceiling mostly too low for bombing in that portion. Later in day could not get through to any targets except JASHUJO JIMA. Incomplete reports give 158 total planes destroyed, 47 of these shot down in on ground. Approximately 75 damaged on ground, 2 trains 1 radar STAGNIFYINGARCS destroyed. CTA plant struck again and photos shown 75 percent buildings destroyed and 15 percent heavily damaged. Most important buildings KOIUMI plant heavily hit by 1 task group strike. 5 coastal vessels 7 small craft probably sunk. 9 coastal vessels and 5 small craft damaged. Our combat losses 9 VF and 4 VT pilots. Operational losses 3 VF 1 VT, no personnel. No damage by enemy to our surface vessels except minor damage by picket boat described next sentence. During night retirement 25-26 Feb sank 5 small enemy vessels including 1 picket boat which GL130ED minor damage 1 OFFICICUGL413 13 men wounded in PORTERFIELD and minor damage 2 men wounded in PASADENA. Following weather DAGA ERX PRESTON sound dome damaged but later repaired and number 1 gun out of commission. STEPHAN POTTER buckled frames 25 and 30. JOHN W WEEKS mount number 1 caved in CANNOCATRAIN in FUSER. MOALE considerable structural forecastle damage. Comments. Weather was major factor throughout and necessitated slowing down nights 24-25 Feb and 25-26 Feb to check destroyer damage, particularly 2200 ton class. Combination high percentage of bad weather in Empire area with impossibility of better than approximate prediction makes timing of strikes extremely difficult particularly when tight schedules permit little or no flexibility. Until arrival off TOKYO predicted weather there was favorable 25 and probably favorable 26th. NAGOYA-KOBE attempt was made because prospects there were less unfavorable than in TOKYO area. Storm was too widespread and severe however and because of seas position for strike could not have been reached until too late in afternoon for launching. Enemy's policy and reaction at present are definitely passive. He could have found us with search planes during daylight 24th but there was no indications of search. 2 search planes heading out passed the formation close aboard NUVME on either side, FAS launching began off TOKYO dawn 25th cut apparently neither one reported us. Thereafter there was no apparent attempt either to locate or to attack us. Only about 100 airborne aircraft were seen and most of them sought to avoid combat. All but 3 of 42 aircraft shot down were fighters. Full coverage and estimate of number and type of enemy aircraft in TOKYO area prevented by weather. Apparently fewer aircraft than before on major combat fields but about same number present as before on other fields. Many combat types at these fields appear to be reserve aircraft without pilots.

2769
27 0300 CINCPAC PEARL to CHIEF, COMMARDELS, Info CINCPAC ADV, NAS JOHNSTON, CG AAFPOA, COMGENAAPOA ADMIN.

C 87 plane. Lt. Gen. Harmon on Board. Call sign 68Y. TAUC number 174. Departed KWAJALEIN 260828 GMT on direct flight to OAHU. Due HECKAM 262243 GMT. Last contact with KWAJALEIN 261050 GMT give position 11-05 N 174-15 E. Institute coordinated search in respective areas.

27 0535 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info ALL TFC 5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HG.

Part 1 of 3 parts. Summary No. 17 271200 (K). Activity during night limited to small scale infiltration snipers and intermittent mortar and artillery fire. Enemy activity on 3rd MarDiv front included troop vehicular and tank movement dispersed by artillery fire. Large calibre shells landing in our rear areas effected some damage and hampered communications. Rocket bombs also reported starting fire in vicinity of SURIBACHI. HINDEBALE and IWO anchored near SURIBACHI reported shells landing close aboard. LEO hit 1 man wounded. Mortar support unit on night mission received sporadic 40mm and large calibre fire throughout night from northern tip of island. 2 enemy ammunition dumps believed fired by this unit. 2 CA 9 DD 1 gunboat support unit 1 mortar support unit furnished naval support during the night. Attack resumed at 0800 same boundaries objectives and zone of action with main effort in center. Artillery with Corps fired 45 minute preparation with 50 percent in 3rd MarDiv zone 25 percent each to 4th and 5th MarDivs. 1 BBL CA fired pre-K-hour preparation. 9 DD 1 gunboat support unit on call fire missions today. Resistance continues from heavy defenses well placed and camouflaged. New positions being reported hourly and taken under fire. 5th MarDiv reported enemy use of white phosphorous hand grenades at 0820 K(-10). Part 2 of 3 parts. The 5th MarDiv on left flank of Corps zone advanced about 300 yards this morning and the right flank of the 4th MarDiv moved up the east coast approximately 400 yards. Some advance was made on the left of the 3rd MarDiv other lines remaining the same. Lines at 1200 generally along: TA 215W, 198 DE 189 ABTJJO 200 FLAST 183 E 184, FKW 167 C. Para. 506 AA En now in position with radar and optic fire control. NGF control established ashore. 11 tanks lost yesterday to enemy artillery and mortar fire and 2 reported today. Some enemy fire falling beach and rear areas today. New identifications include 20th spec machine cannon unit and 21st Machine cannon company. Enemy headquarters reported in KITA. Para. At 0215 LST 884 hit by medium caliber shell at waterline starboard side. Starboard screw inoperative no personal casualties. At 0217 27th ASP reported possible submarine contact 270 degrees 24 miles from SURIBACHI. BENNING and NEWCOMB conducted hunter killer tactics until daylight. CONNELLY and RIDDLE dispatched for same mission until noon today. PINGUINH escorted by CASSIN departed for GWAM 1800 26 Feb with casualties. BRYANT on fire support mission 1100 off northeast coast fired on by 2 gun shore battery estimated 6 inch 21 salvos fired no hits. WEST VIRGINIA silenced battery. Fleet post office in limited operation LST 809. Operational casualties this period LST 779 extensive damage shell plating and deck beams ruptured waterline slight flooding under control due to beaching and damage ALVAYENHAVEWAVEVAYVESDDPOINTK PAPANAPITFDFRENSUCKGRJXKGRID closed operating gear crushed buckled frames plating davits port side. LSM 44 hole at waterline. LSM 47 split seams forward taking water. LSM 140 hole in wardroom and after troop

- Continued -

2770
FEBRUARY (CCT)

27 0535 CTF 51 to COMSTFELT etc. (CONT'D)

compartment starboard screw damaged. LSM 261 hole in hull at engine room. Para. Direct air support by CVE planes. Improved weather conditions makes possible extensive flight schedules. Special search CHICHI JIMA area 4 BELLEAU WOOD pilot downed 23 Feb negative. Para. Estimate most unloading of transrons 15 and 16 and 2 divisions of TransRon 11 be completed 28 Feb. Garrison echelon directed to arrive 28 Feb. and begin unloading 1 March. (10 groups missing) Marines. Beach conditions improving. YELLOW beaches operating to approximate capacity but BLUE beaches only 25 percent. Beaches cleared of all wrecked craft except LVT's. Surf 4 feet wind east northeast 20 knots. Mowale and combat efficiency excellent.

27 0804 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMFAIRWING 1, COMFWDAREA, COMAIRPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

It has been proposed to augment surface escort along the shipping lanes between ENIWETOK the MARIANAS and WESTERN CAROLINES by supplementary aerial anti submarine search and convoy coverage. Para. VPB squadrons 22, 26, 25, 267, 205 and 208 are experienced, especially trained and equipped for ASW. Proposal includes assignment 3 or 4 of these squadrons to the operational control of ConMarGils area to cover shipping in the following areas: (1) Originating at SAIPAN: (A) Sector 075 degrees clockwise to 145 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. (B) Sector 225 degrees clockwise to 270 degrees for a distance of 500 miles; and (2) Originating at ULITHI: (A) Sector 045 degrees clockwise to 090 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. Para. Proposal assigns 1 of the above squadrons to the operational control of ConMarGils area for similar employment in sector originating at ENIWETOK from 264 degrees clockwise to 308 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. Para. This plan would accomplish routine search requirements in the areas described and would relieve ConFairWing 1 of such responsibility. The responsibility for searches outside the described areas would not be affected. Para. Contemplate equipping additional FairWing 1 PBM Squadrons with sono-buoys or redeployment above squadrons as necessary to meet requirements of next operation. Para. Comment and recommendations are requested on proposed plan including availability seaplane tender requirements to support.

27 1130 CTF 51 to COMSTFELT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC FIFTHFLT.

This is Summary No. 18 271800. Late reports indicate that 3rd Div advanced to within 200 yards of 0-2 line on Division left with 4th Div advancing 200 yards on its right and center. Remainder of front pinned down by enemy fire power. Reports indicate enemy employing tanks hull down, Light and medium anti-aircraft fire increased after several days cessation. Believe anti-aircraft fire comes from automatic anti-tank weapons. Anti-tank and personnel mines being met with throughout area. Local counter attack broken up by artillery 1110 front 5th MarDiv. POW reports extensive fortified areas in vicinity of NISHI defended by 145 (5 groups missing) continue high 11 tanks with tank battalion destroyed yesterday. Total 37 tanks remain operational entire Corps. Lines reported 1800 as TA 1986E 1996E 200 ELMT 201 UV 134 EFKUW 167 G. Captured dugouts evidence excellent field engineering conducted over long period with high terrain appreciation. 300 pillboxes various types counted in zone of action 3rd MarDiv alone, 1 blockhouse TA 235 reported 150 feet long 4 feet concrete walls. Para. Naval fire support reinforced ground artillery with scheduled and call fire. Ammunition fuel replenishment per schedule. CAITHCUM in collision with LIBRA (AKA 12) and KNOX (APA46) - Continued -
27 1130 CTF 51 to COMSOUTHFLT, ETC. (CONT'D)

Clearing fouled anchor while getting underway. LERA no damage. KNOX minor. CALHOUN starboard side forecastle saved in frame 29-32. Hit reported on LNO (AKA 60) apparently from about 40mm which exploded INVOKE believed from direction of land. Para. CVE planes reinforced ground troops with close support strikes. B-29s strategic airforce made strike prearranged target AREA 1:445. 1 OY plane successfully launched from LST 778 plane lost pilot saved. 3 PMI's arrived seaplane base. Routine dawn sweep CHICHI JITA. 3rd air search for EUELEAU WOOD pilot unsuccessful. Para. Surf conditions restricted unloading to LSTs LSMs LCTs this afternoon.

27 1416 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMMARGELS AREA Info CINCPAC PEARL, MAS JOHNSTON, CHIEF.

Strike enemy airfields in MARSHALLS as heavily as practicable without delay. Make reconnaissance other atolls to detect any enemy activity.

New Subject: Provide armed escort between KWAJALEIN and JOHNSTON for 2 AIT 054.4's which will leave GUAM in company at 272200 GCT with important passengers.

24 02150215 to COMSOUTH, CINCPAC ADV HQ, REAR ADMIRAL BRIT ADMIRALTY DEL WASH, COMSOUTH, COMSOUTH.

My 151241 as amended by my 090250. 1 (A) Vice Admiral Second in Command short title is now TFC or ESL. (B) Flag Officer Fleet Train Brit Pac Flt operating title is CTF 112. (C) F.O.C. Aircraft carriers Brit Pac Flt short title is now ACO. Carrier squadrons now organized into carrier squadrons short title RAA. Consisting of Fleet Carriers short title is ACO. Carrier squadrons consisting of ferrying V5 inclusion carriers short title (GR CARRIED) AC, short title of senior officer AO 20.

28 0510 CTF 51 to COMSOUTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFCs 5THFLT.


Part 2. Noon reports show the following progress made: 200-400 yards center 5th MarDiv 100-200 yards center 3rd MarDiv 200 yards center 4th MarDiv. Front lines follow: TA 197 E 198 AD 215 XT 216 PQW 200 AFT 201 UI 34 BG 167 D. 506 AA Bn in position ready to fire both air and ground missions. Revised statistics of our casualties 1800 27 February records; KIA 1570 WIA 7656 MIA 55 total 9778. Unit classification follows; Corps troops KIA 1 officer 3 EM MIA 3 officers 53 EM MIA 2 EM total 67. Corps Artillery KIA 3 EM WIA 1 officer 15 EM MIA 1 officer 2 EM total 22. 3rd Division KIA 15 officers 230 EM, WIA 52 officers 333 EM MIA 41 EM total 1226; 4th Div KIA 55 officers 761 EM MIA 205 officers 3940 EM MIA 2 officers 334 EM total 5237. 5th Div KIA 32 officers 530 EM, - Continued -
A summary of the operations conducted on 28th and 29th of February, 1945, with particular emphasis on the actions taken by the 5th Marine Division and the assistance provided by Navy and Marine Corps forces.

On the 28th, 134 officers were wounded and 96 enlisted men were wounded. The corrected figures for enemy dead were 1800. The POW information indicates that the enemy group HQ is located in caves TA 216 VG. Rocket launchers mounted on trucks were reported. Ten percent of the rocket motor was added. Previously, 550 kg bomb size was confirmed, but the discovery of a dud led to the correction of the figure. The operation of the enemy's water supply was noted. The enemy's local counterattacks were directed at the installation of our water facilities. However, the enemy's dish fires and previous reports of 550 kg bombs were not confirmed.

On the 29th, 23 officers and 236 EM were wounded, bringing the total to 3226. The correct figure of 1800 on 26th February was indicated by POW information. The rocket launchers were reported to be on trucks, and the reported bomb size was 550 kg. A dud was discovered, leading to the correction of the figure. The enemy's water supplies were reported as low. The enemy's artillery was displaced to TA 235 236 216. Para. 1 OBB 1 CA reinforced ground artillery in preparation for morning attacks. Call fires were delivered throughout the morning by 9 DD. LST 42 hit by mortar fire on 22th February. Gasoline drums quickly extinguished the fire. The operation of the radar picket station was reported.

On 27th February, President Adams received considerable damage to his port side during unloading operations. He exploded a horned ammunition type enemy mine on 27th February. The explosion occurred at 1625, and the lines were consolidated for the night at 1700. Our front was reported as 1710 TA 215NO 216KLSY 200ABC 217 WRSY 200ET 201PV 184DRX 1679. GCHRAL rounds were reported in the mortar fire on the BLUE beach. Resumption of call fire was requested for the night of 0310 tomorrow. The 2 TBM aircraft from 100 feet sprayed with VDT area occupied by our troops.

VOC-1 from WAKE ISLAND furnished effective spotting naval gunfire. Dusk strikes were made by President Adams. On 27th February, 27th February caused explosion seaplane base FUJAKI KO, FISUDDALI unidentified vessels off seaplane base. No enemy observed airborne. REGENDER PEM arrived this afternoon.

Summary No. 20 281800. Led by tanks in the 5th Marine Division zone of action using flame throwers, infantry advanced front line generally 400-500 yards along the front of the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions. Progress was made by the 3rd Division through the center of enemy main line of resistance advanced beyond the village of MOTOMA. Small gains of several hundred yards were made opposite the right flank and center of the 4th Marine Division. Local counterattack of 5th Marine Division front was broken up by artillery. Lines were consolidated for the night at 1700. Our front was reported as of 1710 TA 215NO 216KLSY 200ABC 217 WRSY 200ET 201PV 184DRX 1679. GCHRAL rounds were reported in the mortar fire on the BLUE beach. Resumption of call fire was requested for the night of 0310 tomorrow. The 2 TBM aircraft from 100 feet sprayed with VDT area occupied by our troops.

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Summary No. 21 01300 (K). Hostile artillery fire harassed our rear area during night exploding 5th MarDiv ammunition dump with serious loss of several types of ammunition. No hostile counter attacks. 0330 troops resumed attack. RCT 28 less 1 BN reverted to 5th Div control at 0630 passed through RCT 27 with mission seizing high ground along boundary between 5th MarDiv and 3rd MarDiv. 3rd MarDiv main effort in right; 4th MarDiv to maintain its center and left and the left keep pace with advance of 3rd MarDiv. Attack proceeded by 45 minute artillery preparation. Mopping up SURIBACHI continues. 5th Div pushed forward thru moderate rifle and mortar fire. All reports indicate troops and tanks approaching TA 216 GHL. 3rd Div front moving forward rapidly. BLT 3/21 by 1015 reported CR 325 in TA 201B. Elements of BLT 2/21 reported across MOTOKAYA Airfield No. 3 vicinity TA 2171 at 1130. No reports available on 4th Div as of 1200. Rugged nature terrain in zone of action 4th Div prohibits use mechanised equipment and field artillery fire relatively ineffective. Hostile artillery fire was received all morning from along northeast coast in TA 202 219 236 235. Minor Banzai charge in zone 3/25 repulsed. Result of morning's operation reveals good progress made in Corps center zone of action but front lines can not be accurately reported. Ground force casualties 1500 28 Feb. KIA 1635, WIA 8204, MIA 606. Total 10445. Casualty evacuation now direct from beaches to hospital ships and to transports by ducks LKITCHET. Combat efficiency morale reported excellent. Para. 1 OBB 2 0A 8 DD 1 gunboat and 1 mortar support unit provided night illumination harassing fires throughout night. Naval gunfire operations for the day include counter battery and reinforcing fire missions by 1 OBB 3 CA 8 DD 2 LCSL and 1 LCM unit with 5 VOF planes spotting fires. Ships casualties follow: LSM 59 at 0420 holed flooding engine room and without power. Damage caused while retracting from beach. TERRY in screening station C-5 received 1 medium caliber hit enemy artillery fire at 0721 penetrating starboard side main deck and hull near frame 100 filling forward engine room to waterline. 9 KIA 13 WIA. STREMBEL in screen straddled by enemy fire no damage. COLUMBUS at 1008 on support mission hit by 1 medium caliber enemy shell in after torpedo mount No. 3 gun mount and MK 51 director 1 KIA 7 WIA. COLUMBIA VICTORY at 1046 straddled by medium caliber shells off western beaches with damage superficial 1 EM WIA. Close direct air support missions reinforced ground troops with control assigned landing force CASCU ashore. Might intruders over CHICHI JIMA 28 February fired rockets seaplane base small ships in harbor results unobserved. No enemy aircraft air borne. AA meagre inaccurate. No serviceable enemy aircraft observed. PBM planes operating NO seaplane base morning 1 March covered 7 sectors search to 500 miles. 17 OY spotting planes now operating from airfield No. 1. Air raid NO area 0230-0430 by estimated 4 planes SPOTS possibly 1 Helen. BENNETT radar picket station 2 shot down 1 Betty, planes used window. Night fighters airborne with 1 contact no kills. All planes came in low with no planes over transport area or island. 1 plane dropped bombs 5000 yards from radar picket. MALL delivered troops by parachute from R5C plane. 1 TBM LUNGA POINT 0932 with 3rd MarDiv observed shot down crashed within our lines burned with no survivors. 1 PETROFF BAY fighter hit 1020 made emergency landing emergency landing airfield 1. No casualties. Para. North-south runway field No. 1. Now available emergency landings carrier planes. Permanent cemetery now established ashore. Weather 2/10 scattered low Cumulus clouds at 2000 feet wind east-northeast 13 knots. Temperature 65-70 light northeast swell visibility high beach conditions fair today but rough during night.
Part 1 of 2 parts. Summary No. 22. 011800 K(-10). Meager reports were available this afternoon concerning fighting in 5th and 4th MarDiv zone. Early afternoon 5th Div headed by tanks progressed to vicinity of TA 216 GHS, but later withdrew to line 216 FIM RCT 28 on the Div right received heavy mortar fire from area NISHI. In 3rd Div zone BLT 1/21 in area 217FM covered the gap between 3rd and 5th Div due 3rd Div morning gain. 5th Div brought up 3/26 between the right of the 28th RCT and 1/21. Slight change made in right boundary 5th MarDiv to east to make room for this. BLT 2/21 3rd Div was pinned down by fire from hull down tanks advancing little beyond this mornings position while BLT 3/21 on Div right flank extended its position generally along south edge airfield No 3 and pushed east to line 216R 201D. Part 2. BLT 3/24 passed through 3rd Div zone to occupy gap existing between 3rd and 4th Divs and now deployed along 3rd and 4th Div boundary line. 4th Div front line was static except in sector occupied by BLT 3/25 on the division right flank which gained 200 yards over rugged terrain. Front lines as of 1700: TA 216FKIMST 217FQJMT 215FQOXM 201DHHKPU 184 ABSHIPS. 167D. Para. Occasional artillery fire fell on BLUE beach. No casualties or damage reported. 3rd MarDiv took 17 FOWs. 442nd Port Co transferred to 4th Div shore party. Para. 15 heavy AA and CD guns reported destroyed by main battery fires from 3 OBB 3 CA. TULAGI group completed hunter-killer operations and negative results and rejoined TU 52.2.1. Para. Direct air support this afternoon used napalm fire bombs.

Part 2
(FEB)24 1805 MARSHALL to ALL THEATERS & BASE COMMANDS Info CINCPOA PEARL HQ.
25 0855 RICHARDSON passed to CINCPOA ADV HQ.

WARR 42960. Middle East Theater effective 1 March 45 is redesignated the AFRICA-MIDDLE EAST THEATER with boundaries to include the entire continent of AFRICA, PALESTINE, TRAC-JORDAN, the island of CYPRUS, TURKEY and the entire SAUDI-ARABIA PENINSULA, except IRAN and TRUCIALOMAN. Boundaries of the MEDITERRANEAN THEATER of operations effective 1 March 45 include the entire MEDITERRANEAN SEA (except the Island of CYPRUS and the Turkish islands adjacent to the Turkish mainland) ITALY, AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, ROMAINIA YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, BULGARIA and GREECE. Para. Effective 1 March 45 the boundaries in the EUROPEAN THEATER of operations are adjusted to include SPAIN, PORTUGAL and the AZORES. North Atlantic Division ATC retains administrative control of the AZORES except in the event of tactical operations. Para. Command: No change in personalities. Para. PERSIAN GULF Command: No change.

dominating ground vicinity airfield 3 threatens to split Jap forces and places our troops on ground more favorable for maneuver. 3rd MarDiv yesterday destroyed 8 enemy tanks. Front Lines reported 1135 are: TA 216AEGIO 217KLH 217/JC 218MNZ 219DIFU 124ABTMS 1679. Cumulative ground force casualties 1700 1 March: 592 officers, 10,663 EM total 11,255 with 1774 KIA. Enemy dead reported by ground units is 3rd MarDiv 1344; 4th MarDiv 2740; 5th MarDiv 3038; land force troops 5 total 7,127. 15 Japs 17 KOREANS POWs. Koreans report our propaganda leaflets induced surrender. Para, 1 OB 2 CA 7 DD gunboats and 1 mortar support unit carried out night illumination and call missions throughout night. Mortar LCT's received no retaliatory fire 1st time since D Day. They have proved great value to landing force. One OB 1 CA 1 CL 10 DD participated in preparation for morning attack executed call fire missions throughout morning. Heavy ships disposed for counter battery missions. DDs gunboats support units with shore fire control party teams working at close range on coastal caves. Garrison group 0 arrived transport area this morning and unloading started. SAMARITAN departed 1 March with casualties. Para. CVEs furnished air strikes in preparation for attack and other close air support missions throughout morning. PBM search activities curtailed due rough water sea drome area. 1 plane holed in starboard side by enemy AA while on search mission, 1 plane dragged on beach 27 Feb probable total loss crew safe ashore. 1 TEM RUDYARD BAY hit in engine by medium AA shell plane made emergency landing airfield 1 with no casualties. 1 PBM 1135 1 March sighted 5 FTO 31-10 138-30 E. PETROF BAY fighter reported hit my Summary No 21 is error. Emergency landing due mechanical failure auxiliary tank. ENTERPRISE sent 2 VTN 4 VTN over CHICHI 1300 to 1915, 1 March. 900 heavy AA firing and aircraft on ground observable. 1 March 8,600 ft dropped 24 GP centuries including 12 with 1-6 hour delay plus 16 rockets on OMURA TOWN 1 explosion and fire observed. On barracks area NE SUSAKI 12 GP centuries half with 1-6 hour delay plus 19 rockets. On MANAMISAKI guns and searchlight positions 4 rockets. On AA positions west SUSAKI airfield 4 rockets. All results unobserved. Searchlights observed at 213 Q 280 Y and possibly 245 R inaccurate. AA heavy and medium meager inaccurate Para. General supply status good except artillery ammunition low due loss enemy action and difficulties unloading resupply ship. Roads 4 th MarDiv area being surfaced with clay from local quarry. Weather scattered cumulus 2000 feet wind east and east-northeast 16-20 knots temperature 68 visibility unlimited 5 foot swell seriously hampered unloading on beast last night and today.

Results of shore reconnaissance indicate that 7000 foot airstrip can easily be constructed axis bearing 030 degrees on old ELC on grassy plain about 1500 yards inland from shore 2 miles west of DILALONGAN. Marston mat and 2 construction battalion months are estimated requirements for initial operation. Supply and fuel pier is feasible in the immediate vicinity. All areas within CASTIGURAN SOUND & BAY north of a line bearing 330 degrees from CAPE SAB IDEPONISO afford good anchorages except up at SW R of.way produce chop in sound. Preliminary check indicates soundings shown on BSC & GS chart 4278 are accurate except for uncharted 4 and ½ fathom shoal located at 16-09-20 N 122-00-40 E. No enemy activity was observed either by shore party or water reconnaissance close to shore of both sound and bay. Scouts indicate about 100 nips in area possibly concentrated vicinity CASTIGURAN TOWN. Should have more detailed report on this tomorrow. 2nd day is summarized by CTG 78.9.2 in CONY. Results negative contemplate deep sweep tomorrow. Expect complete mission CASTIGURAN Area by dark 3 Mar. debark troops at BALER 4 Mar.
Summary No. 24 021800. 5th PhilCorps with 15 Bns in assault from left to right as follows 5th MarDiv BLTs 3/22 1/28 2/26 3/26 3rd MarDiv BLTs 3/9 2/21 1/21 2/9 1/9 4th MarDiv BLTs 3/24 2/24 1/24 1/25 2/25 3/25 continued to expand its salient NW. During morning 3rd MarDiv in clear advanced about 700 yards along Div boundary to seize Hill 362 TA 235 U. The center and left flank of 3rd MarDiv advanced 200 yards against small arms automatic weapons mortar fire. At 1530 this Div jumped off in renewal of attack with main effort on Div right with Hill 362 TA 219U as objective. 20 minute artillery preparation preceded attack. At same time BLT 2/21 attacked N to fill gap between BLT 3/26 with BLT 3/9 attacking SE. 5th MarDiv had limited gains both flanks. RCT 28 gained 200 yards on Corps left along coast. BLT 3/26 advanced generally abreast of BLT 3/9 of 3rd Div right causing gap between BLT 3/26 and RCT 28. Gap was filled by BLT 2/26. 1530 RCT 28 repelled local counterattack estimated 150% of enemy killed many. 4th Div advanced slowly against heavy mortar artillery AIF sniper fire in its ZA. 200 yards gained by 24th RCT SE MOTOTAMA 1500. Limited gains made on extreme E flank by 25th RCT. Troops consolidated at 1700 with lines along TA 216ABGHMN 217KSFGM123Y 235 UV 218DFNSY 219ETHMPU 134EKHSY 167E. Cave system on island complex. 1 found in TA 183L has 9 entrances main passageway extended 600 yards came out MINAMIT VILLAGE. Searched but documents and equipment previously destroyed. Many Jap dead found. Former CP. Prisoners indicate most caves in north part island are small filled with wounded food water low. Korean POW says 13000 enemy on island on D-Day, believes 5000 to 6000 remain. Past 24 hours has been good counterbattery work by Marine artillery definitely taking out numerous medium caliber field pieces isolated cave positions. Engineers destroyed many caves pillboxes containing stores ammunition. Para. LGT 1029 struck underwater object at 0310. Hull pierced engine room flooded ship broached on beach. 175 tons ammunition successfully unloaded. Heavy surf prevents present salvage. HERCULES (AK-41) grounded on pinnacle shoal NE BLUE beach 1245 towed SS HER no visible damage. SCLACE departed 1700 with casualties for CHAI. LST 224 struck port side by LCS 52 as she came alongside inflicting following structural damage considerable. 0945 LST 634 struck same ship starboard quarter in retracing while on beach inflicting tear in hull plate between frames 39 40 other minor damage. Summary naval battle battle casualties cumulative to 2 March: beach parties KIA 44 WIA 49 MIA 12 ships personnel KIA 145 WIA 73 MIA 440 total 1063. Para. CVEs continued direct air support. Sledge conditions prevented sealane searches today. Last instant identifications 2235 1 March saved 1 B-24 from gun attack by ENTERPRISE. Planes showed very weak IFF and flew directly over TG 52.2.5. BENNION sighted visually 1 sniper Zeke 1805 1 March taken under fire no% hits. ENTERPRISE fighters chased plane northward without result. CHICHIMA sweep by ENTERPRISE planes 1330 1 March dropped bombs shot rockets causing explosions and fires. 2 TBMs sprayed DDT 1715 today previous coverate and toxic effect reported excellent. Para. Approximately 4000 feet NE-SW runway airfield #1 rehabilitated. Subject sporadic artillery fire transport planes can land now and have been requested. Limited reserving facilities available tomorrow. Tomorrow should clear field of artillery fire, and permit use by fighter squadrons which have been alerted. Para. Long swell from ease make eastern beach condition bad. Expect use 1 western beach on 3rd.
Based on pilots reports required photo coverage NANSEI SHOTO completed 1 March with following exceptions: (A) Verticals MIYAKO and IRABU (B) Verticals Western KERAMA RETO (C) Verticals TOKUNO SHIMA (B) Verticals west shore OKINAWA south of 25-18 North(E)verticals coverage of beach area OKINAWA from ZAMPA MISAKI to 26-13 N 90% complete at 1 to 8000. Missing 10% is that farthest from beach. 1 batch run with 25% clouds at 1 to 5000. All above due weather except (A) out of range. Photo conditions generally poor due low lying haze. More low clouds forecast for 2 March.

No air opposition. Shot down 2 Betty's 1 Sally 1 Dinah. Destroyed on ground 9 twin engine and 23 single engine aircraft. Probably destroyed or damaged about 50 planes some may have been previously non operational as many other non operational seen used as decoys. Sunk 1 DD 1 MTB 2 SBLS 2 FTCs 1 FTD 3 SF 1 ocean tug 2 luggers. Probably sunk 1 FTC 6 SDs 6 luggers. Damaged 4 DE or FFs 1 TB 4 FTC 1 FTD 3 SD 6 SC 10 luggers. Sank or damaged several small craft. Many buildings including barracks administration buildings, sugar mills, lumber yard, warehouses, radio and radar stations and airfield installations destroyed or damaged on OKINAWA OKINACERBU AMATSUSHIMAI KUNO and TOKUNO SHIMA. Our combat plane losses 10 VF 3 VT pilots 4 VF 1 VT crewman 3 VT. Operational losses 7 VF 1 VT to personnel. Looked for but could not find string of mines reported off KATENO by search plane. On retirement conducted night bombardment OKINO DATTO starting big fires. Pilots report new grass air strip on northeast side KAKAI SHIMA.

Summary No. 26 031800 (K). Land force action marked by slow progress against stubborn resistance. 5th MarDiv straightened out its lines and advanced from 200 to 400 yards with deepest penetration to CR 315 TA 234W. Much small arms and mortar fire received this area compared previous day. 3rd MarDiv reports progress extremely difficult under heavy fire mortar rockets high velocity weapons. This division gained up to 400 yards opposite its left flank and center progressing vicinity RJ 322 TA 2137. Following a 5 minute artillery preparation including smoke hill 362 TA 219UX 3rd MarDiv launched attack 1500 reports of this attack not available. BLT 3/9 operating in 5th MarDiv ZA passed through by BLT 1/27. BLT 3/9 moved into position left flank 3rd MarDiv ZA. BL 1/21 entered line 3rd MarDiv ZA between BLT 2/21, 2/9. 5 Bns now 3rd MarDiv assault with total 18 ELTs in line. 4th MarDiv held up by heavy mortar fire TA 201WY. Division made 200 yard gain on extreme right flank. Pocket remains MINAMI area otherwise front lines at 1800 are: TA 216AE, 217A, 234 UWM 235UW, 218 DEJOTEX 201DECTR 186GHOKIY 167 E. Para. 75mm shell OSR GANS ashore hit BOLIVAR 1 EM KIA 2 RL WII. No damage ship. BENNETT round hole in bottom frame 15 2 compartments flooded possibly due dud torpedo or bomb from plane shot down 1 March. Requires docking. Para. Special strike BONINS 1300-1500 3 March bombed rocketed dock buildings OGHRA TOWN. No ships present except sampans CHICHES. Rocketed strafed seaplane base hangar building radio tower TA 215E. Building tower TA 213U. Building TA 247A. 1 45000 ton AK at pier HAGASHI HARBOR HAHA JIMA strafed and runs made covering ENTERPRISE torpedo attack which attained direct hits sank ship at dock. 3 other strafing runs made vessels HIGASHI HARBOR. No change AA CHICHES. AA medium moderate HAHA. 1 heavy battery NATH JIMA HAHA JIMA GUNTO no report damage our aircraft. Close air support restricted due small enemy area remaining. 1 B24 photo plane on station making colored movies of island. Commenced evacuation casualties by landplane. Para. Several ships now unloading over western beaches. 5 foot surf still restricts eastern beaches.
RICHARDSON to CG USAFFE, CINC SWPA HQ, Info 24TH CORPS, 10TH ARMY, CINCPAC.

03 1022

RJ-5A111. Look at 24th Corps radio TFGAP 168 dated 28102/42Z GCT Feb 45 not to all or needed of which you were info added. This theater will cover officer shortages by combat appointments which will leave 24th Corps a minimum of 3000 enlisted personnel short for mounting. This shortage due to delays in return of casuals as well as large numbers of non battle losses evacuated from LEYTE. Time element precludes furnishing above shortage from this theater prior to mounting. Request SWPA furnish 3000 replacements to 24th Corps prior to mounting. This personnel will be replaced to SWPA as follows: All casuals returned to 24th Corps at LEYTE between 10 March and 10 April 1945 will be assigned to SWPA. On later date an inventory will be made of such personnel and the difference between that number and the total furnished to 24th Corps by SWPA will be shipped from FPO to arrive at designated stations in SWPA about 1 May. Your agreement to above plan urgently requested by ComGenPOA.

CG 58THFLT to CINC PAC ADV HQ, Info CTF 51, CTF 52.

02 2357

CH-220801. Situation ashore much better and success assured. Assume you concur departure TF 58 this general area as planned on completion fueling today. Have in mind retention here small ENTERPRISE Task Group until air capabilities ashore are adequate, accepting arrival Task Group components late for next operation if necessary. Will submit plan in more detail later when situation is clarified. Think build up on air ashore and commencement of next operation will relieve pressure on DIS JIMA.

CTF 51 to CG 58THFLT, Info ALL TFC FIFTHFLT, CINC PAC BOTH HQ.

03 0605


-Continued-
Land Force 602 Off 11/674 EM. Grand total 12,276 of which 1997 KIA. Combat efficiency very good to excellent. Enemy dead as of 1300 2 March 10,329. Total POWs 30 Japs 43 Koreans. Of this total 3 Japs died since capture. Para. There was no naval gunfire preparation this morning due limited area remaining on NWOPS front. Call fire executed. Night of 2-3 March and day 3 March 2 CL furnished general support with 1 CL 7 DD 2 LCSLS in direct support. BERKLEY (APA 62) during unloading incurred considerable structural damage. Steamship qualities unimpaired. Fueled completed support carrier units. Part 3: CVE's furnishing support missions with control by land force CASCU. PHM aircraft provided searches to north and west. 7 B5C air planes dropped parachute supplies Field No. 1. 1st transport plane landed Field #1 1100 followed by 4 additional. Dusk strike CHICHI 1330 2 March bombs rockets damage unobserved. 1 TBM holed enemy AA returned to base. ENTERPRISE planes completed 174 hours continuous day night flight 2200 2 March. 8 VF and 8 VT made dawn attack on merchant shipping CHICHI JIMA previously reported. Result rockets hit 1 8500 ton freighter other results unobserved. Total 11 freighters. Intense AA all types. AA holed 1 TBM which made water landing. ABELE rescued crew. Another strike same size repeated 1100 results unreported. 1 fighter shot down target area no survivors. STEAMER BAY fighter shot down 1 Jap Francis 1215 position bearing 230 degrees 70 miles HOTROCKS. Para. Estimate Field #1 and servicing facilities ready to receive 2 VF squadrons garrison air force 6 March. Unloading LCT's LCM'S PURPLE Beach west shore now in progress. Unloading continues very difficult due sea conditions. General supply situation KE-D with ammunition supply arriving. Road conditions fair. Considerable rolling stock destroyed to date enemy action. Report follows: LVT's operational 255 under repair 31 destroyed 162. DUKWs operational 112 under repair 22 destroyed 116. Weasels operational 53 under repair 3 destroyed 7. Tanks operational 83 under repair 30 destroyed 32. Weather clear wind SSE varying to SSW. 12-15 knots. Easterly swell surf 5 to 6 feet. Temperature 72-74. Visibility excellent.

Present approved modified Category of Defense A in UNALASKA Sector requires manning of harbor defenses. War Dept proposes eliminating this requirement for ARST installations in this sector stating that requirement can not be met due to withdrawal of certain units and personnel from Alaskan Department as a result of UNALASKA defense at DUTCH HARBOR are now in caretaker status. Cominch prepared to concur but desires your comment before taking action. Refer JCS 1080/2 forwarded CincFOA and info aces by cy serial 003139 of 26 October 1944.

04 0440 CTF 51 to COMSOUTHFLT Info ALL TFC'S FIFTHFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ (CONT'D)

terrain. BLT 2/27 engaged sealing caves SURIBACHI. 5th MarDiv reports hand to hand fighting along its front reports enemy defensive positions lack reinforced concrete features positions previously encountered but nature defensive strength of terrain make going slow. Summary casualties 1700 3 March; 3rd MarDiv KIA 23 Off 330 EM WIA 75 Off 1514 EM MIA 0 Off 36 EM Total 3rd Div 38 Off 1910 EM. 4th MarDiv KIA 65 Off 924 EM WIA 240 Off 5030 EM Total 4th Div 300 Off 279 EM. Total 5th MarDiv KIA 47 Off 773 EM WIA 175 Off 3370 EM MIA 1 Off 137 EM Total 5th MarDiv 222 Off 4330 EM. Corps Troops KIA 1 Off 7 EM WIA 5 Off 93 EM MIA 0 Off 2 EM Total Corps Troops 6 Off 102 EM. Corps Artillery KIA 0 Off 5 EM WIA 1 Off 7 EM MIA 1 Off 1 EM total Corps Artillery 2 Off 23 EM. AA Artillery KIA 0 WIA 1 Off 7 EM MIA 0 total AA Artillery 1 Off 7 EM. Garrison Force in assault shipping KIA 1 EM total casualties LandFor 636 Off 12,656 EM. Grand total 13,292 of which 2175 KIA. CINCPAC air evacuation unit now operating ashore. Corps Artillery reports 5 additional enemy field pieces destroyed. Intelligence reports indicate Rear Admiral Ichimaru Commanding naval forces IWO. Enemy rocket launcher captured intact. Para. 2 OA 7 DD 2 LSL gunboats provided support fires during night and available call fire missions throughout day. 36 inch horned mine sunk 24-35 N 140-32 E Para. Air support missions CAP and ASP cancelled due weather conditions. ENTERPRISE dusk strike CHICHI dropped bombs rockets results unobserved due weather. 4 seaplanes engaged search missions this morning. Para. Weather wind NE 3 knots light rain 8/10 low stratus at 700 feet temperature 69-73 sea light to moderate surf 4 feet visibility low.

04 1040 CTF 51 to COMSOUTHFLT Info ALL TFC 5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Summary No. 28. 041800 (K). Stiffening enemy opposition held troops to small local gains during period. BLT 3/21 passed through BLT 1/21 pinned down by small arms fire after advancing average 30 yards. Front line remains static since last report. Local counter attack ZA RCT 28 several hundred Japs 1340 repulsed many killed. Enemy land mines found along west runway airfield #3. Land Force records 12,864 Japs total 31 as of 1300 3 March. Several rounds enemy artillery fire hit airfield #1339 with no damage reported. Large water distillation unit estimated 300,000 gallons per day capacity and large tanks discovered cave TA 152 R. Para. Gunfire missions provided by 7 DD 2 LSL this afternoon. Hydrographic survey unit in SUMMER (ACS5) with YP 42 arrived. CorvDesRon 50 in DesDiv 99 arrived. Para. Unfavorable weather prevented afternoon air support operations. 1 B29 returning Empire strike made successful emergency landing IWO 1457 refueled departed TINIAN 1720. 2 TMS MAKIN ISLAND sprayed DDT occupied area. Para. Surf conditions eastern beaches improved but unloading restricted to LSTs LSMs. Western beaches taking LCTs LCUs with excellent development potential. Road net shows improvement.

04 0313 COMSOUTHFLT to CTF 58 Info ALL TFC 5THFLT, CTG 50.2, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

During current upkeep and replenishment period at ULITHI maintain as practicable equivalent of 2 Task Groups of Task Force 58 ready for sortie on 15 hours notice. Desire this precautionary measure not interfere with scheduled upkeep and replenishment.
CINCPAC to COMAAF TOLOSA, COMAFF TOLOSA, COMAFF, CINC 1ST AUS ARMY, CG 8TH ARMY, CG 6TH ARMY, CG USAFFE REAR ECH, CG USASSF TACLOBAN, ROSTY HOLLANDIA, CG US FORCES NORSOL Info G CIF S WAR DEPT. CINCPAC BOTH HQ COMSOPAC, CG CHINA THEATER, CG CHINA THEATER REAR ECH, COMSTIFLT, CG ARMY AIR FORCES, SAC SSA KANDY, ADV ECH GHQ SPPA.

CX 11515. Advance echelon GHQ opens MANILA 1300 I(-9) 5 March 1945 and closes SIR WIGUEL, TARIJA sale same date and hour.

04 1759 GHQ SWPA SGD MACARTHUR to VF-5 ADV ECH (SAMAR) Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, ALLIED AIR FORCES (TOLOSA), ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA), ADV ECH GHQ.

Your 010403. Approve operation of 5 photo Liberators from Clark Field about 10 March with Commander Allied Air Forces stating actual date of transfer from SAMAR. Direct communication with Commander Allied Air Forces is authorized to arrange details of Clark operations.

05 0434Z MACARTHUR to COMGENPOA Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMGEN 8TH FORC, COMGEN 21ST CORPS, COMGEN USASOS.

Cite CX 11515. ReURad RJ 53900 dated 2 March your proposal to send control group of 4 officers headed by Colonel Herbert William Mansfield to assist in mounting out 24th Corps garrison echelons is concurred in. FD STF priority item N-3W-2-372-AGF-MFI.

05 0435 CTF 51 to COMSTIFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 29 051200 (K). Front line reports indicate night 4-5 March enemy infiltration attempts broken up by artillery fire. Considerable small arms mortar fire received. Morning activities marked by reorganization divisions in preparation for concerted Corps attack eastward 6 March. Total troop casualties to 1700 4 March: 3rd MarDiv less 3rd Marines KIA 27 Off 388 EM MIA 85 Off 1732 EM MIA 2 Off 67 EM Total 3rd MarDiv 115 Off 2183 EM. 4th MarDiv KIA 67 Off 1028 EM MIA 249 Off 5372 EM MIA 1 Off 231 EM Total 4th MarDiv 317 Off 6631 EM. 5th MarDiv EKIA 49 Off 846 EM MIA 179 Off 3677 EM MIA 2 Off 197 EM total 5th MarDiv 230 Off 4729 EM. Corps Troops KIA 1 Off 7 EM MIA 5 Off 102 EM MIA 0 Off 2 EM Total 6 Off 111 EM. Corps Artillery KIA 0 Off 5 EM MIA 1 Off 17 EM MIA 1 Off 1 EM total Corps Artillery 2 Off 23 EM. AA Artillery KIA 0 Off 1 EM MIA 0 Off 9 EM MIA 0 Total AA Artillery 1 Off 10 EM. Total LanFor 671 Off 13,684 EM. Grand Total 1/3,355 of which 2,419 KIA. Para. 1 CA 1 CL 7 DD's and 2 LCSL provided night illumination and call fires with 1 CL 1 CA and 6 DD's available throughout day. Para. 7 search sectors flown by PEMs TWO seadrome. 1 PEM search plane investigating submarine report possible ditch unknown plane position 30-25 N 141-45 E. CVE furnished direct air support call missions throughout morning. Para. Unloading progresses over both western and eastern beaches. Western beach is taking LOT'S LCM'S DUKWS while eastern beaches restricted to LST'S LSM'S due surf condition though this is improved. Weather overcast scattered low clouds. Wing light northerly 5 knots. Temperature 73. Visibility poor. Low swell with 4 feet surf.
05 1015 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLIT Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, ALL TFG 5THFLIT.

Summary No. 30 051300 (K). 4th MarDiv and 5th MarDiv completed reorganizing with 3rd MarDiv reported progressing satisfactorily. Reserve ammunition built up and reequipping of personnel accomplished. Jumping up rear areas in progress. Details plan of attack tomorrow unavailable at this time. Para. Search plane 1400 sank small enemy vessel 28-30 N 134-50 E. Francis shot down 1215 3 March by fighter STEAMER BAY instead NATOMA BAY previously reported. TINIAN search FB41's stage thru IWO on return trip commencing 5 March and landcats will replace seacats. Expect to decommission seaplane base 6th. Enemy AA hit 2 TBMs MAKIN ISLAND 1205-1220. Both landed safely IWO Field. 1 crew member WIA. Previous report possible ditch unknown planes 30-25 N 141-45 E now identified as B-29 which made IWO base. Para. Surf conditions favored unloading this afternoon.

05 1246 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMSTHFLIT, CTF 51, COMGENMFFPAC (PEARL) Info C32ND MARDIV, IJSCOM SAIPAN, CTF 56, CTG 56.1, CO ENDECMFFPAC.

Designation of 2nd MarDiv as area reserve for DETACHMENT Operation terminated herewith.

04 0558 COMGENPOA to CINCPOA PEARL HQ Info CINCPOA ADV HQ, COMGENMFFPAC.

BJ-54282. Army facilities KAUAI listed FMF PAC 200340 Feb included in my serial 00069 Feb 10 ResRads 202205 and 272132 Feb with understanding that in case it becomes necessary to send additional Army troops to KAUAI as a result of present status of FILBAS Agreement or redeployment this support to Marines must of necessity be curtailed accordingly.

06 0500 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLIT Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, ALL TFG FIFTHFLIT.

Summary No. 31 061200 (K). Usual infiltration attempts with small arms mortar fire received during night 5-6 March. Troops completed reorganization. Preceded by most intensive artillery preparation this operation and reinforced by naval gunfire 5th PhibCorps attacked in echelon on limited front with 3 divisions abreast K Hour 0300 with Corps objective 0-3 line. A rolling barrage accompanied attack each division. 5th MarDiv commenced attack 0300 with main effort on right to seize high ground to NE in conjunction with 3rd MarDiv on right. 3rd MarDiv jumped off 0300 with main effort on left its ZA in conjunction with 5th MarDiv seize 0-3 line right elements of this division supporting. At 0900 right elements of 3rd MarDiv attacked on the right ZA in conjunction with the left of 4th MarDiv to seize high ground vicinity Hill 362 TA 219U. Right elements 4th MarDiv supported advance of attacking elements. 4th and 5th MarDiv authorized move troops supplies thru ZA 3rd MarDiv when necessary support attack their interior flank elements. 14 En's are in assault disposed as follows: 5th MarDiv BLTs 3/28 3/27 3/26 2/26 2/27. 3rd MarDiv BLTs 2/21 1/21 2/9 R/9. 4th MarDiv BLTs 2/23 2/24 1/21 1/25 2/25 3/25. 11 En's artillery were massed for K hour and K plus 60 preparations. 22300 rounds artillery fired preparation and barrage. Naval gunfire reinforced artillery preparation with 50 rounds 14 inch 200 rounds 8 inch. Report 1200 indicated 3rd MarDiv has advanced average 400 yards along it's entire front. 4th 5th MarDivs no report. Progress generally is slow against heavy opposition. Revised casualty lists 1360 5 Mar now show KIA 2584 WIA 10664 MIA 589 total 13,837. This figure less than previously reported due fact sick previously carried as WIA Divs report total 14456 enemy dead. Para. 2 CA 7 DD 2 LSL furnished illumination call fires throughout night with 1 OBB 2 CA 7 DD and 2 LSL.

- Continued -
06 0500  CTF 51 to COM5THFLT  Info CINCPEA BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT  (CONT'D)

available throughout day. YANGYI (AKA 93) has accumulated extensive structural damage during unloading operations since D Day still operational. Para. Sea Drome decommissioned with FBM seaplanes returning SATPAN 0900. FBM search planes now refuel TWO on return flight to TINIAN. 28 Army P51 landed 1200 with 12 Army P61 planes due arrive afternoon. CVE's furnished direct air support. 1 TBM SAGINAW BAY hit by gunfire 0830 made wheels-up landing TWO Field with 1 crew member KIA. Unloading conditions both beaches good. Weather clear high scattered clouds. Visibility excellent. Wind SSE 8 knots. Temperature 75. Surf 2 feet low easterly swell.

06 1020  CTF 51 to COM5THFLT  Info CINCPEA BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 32  061800 (K). In spite of heavy prolonged artillery fire reinforced by strong naval gunfire and air strikes troops pinned down by hostile small arms and mortar fire throughout day. Small salient was extended to depth 200 yards vicinity of NW at TA 2358 along Division boundary 5th MarDiv 3rd MarDiv. Small gain opposite center 3rd MarDiv extending to 331 in TA 213T. Otherwise no change front lines which at 1730 K were 233UV 234UV ST 235UVRSY 218EJOTX 201DEJINRW 181DEGHNTY 167E. Para. TransDivs 31 32 with casualties departed 1800 GUAM. BOYEN (APAI) straddled by light caliber artillery projectiles. 1 hit forward boom putting it out of commission. 91 casualties. Not known whether fire friendly or enemy. Para. CVE planes concentrated on rocket strafing attacks against small targets throughout afternoon. 1 SALT LAKE CITY OS2U shot down 1500 crashed nil survivors. 12 P61 night fighters Army garrison arrived 1300. 2 TBMs ENTERPRISE made rocket attack seaplane base CHICHI JEMA 0430 results not observed.

07 0510  CTF 51 to COM5THFLT  Info CINCPEA BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 33  071200 (K). Following relatively quiet night V PhibCorps resumed attack this morning 15 assault Ems in line boundaries and objective unchanged. 4th MarDiv with main effort on its left jumped off at 0800. 3rd MarDiv with main effort capture Hill 362 TA 219U attacked at 0500. 5th MarDiv with main effort on its right to take high ground to NE their ZA attacked at 0730. By 1030 3rd MarDiv reports WEIXING Hill 362 and by hand to hand fighting had advanced approximately 500 yards but advance then checked. 1100 report indicates 100-200 yards advance left center 4th MarDiv. No report 5th MarDiv. CP BTL 2/23 received direct hit 0645 causing staff casualties. Present front lines are: TA WXTQ33 WV XY 234UV WST 235PU VEGYLI0 SY 218E 219 AKFILU 201 EJ GAP 202F 203PAPEOPKS XRYTWDXIA L146CGHNTY 167E. Our casualties 061700 are HAMMON 3rd MarDiv KIA 29 Off 147 EMP WIA 93 Off 1906 EMP MIA 2 Off 68 EMP total 3rd MarDiv battle casualties 124 Off 2491 EM. Division non-effectives 16 Off SEVENONXERO EM. 4TH MarDiv KIA 69 Off 1137 EM (10 groups missing) Off 180 EM total 4th MarDiv battle casualties 315 Off SNF086 EM. Division non-effectives 15 Off 977 EMP. 5th MarDiv KIA 56MUVVWVN FPXREP EM WIA 177 Off 3678 EMP MIA 5 Off 272 EMP total 5th MarDiv battle casualties 238 Off 4907 EMP. Division non-effectives 9 Off 361 EM. Corps troops KIA 1 Off 7 EMP WIA 5 Off 85 EMP MIA 0 Off 3 EMP total Corps Troops battle casualties 6 Off 95 EMP. Corps troops non-effectives 1 Off 20 EMP. Corps artillery KIA 0 Off 5 EMP MIA 0 Off 11 EMP MIA 1 Off 1 EMP total Corps Artillery battlecasualties 1 Off 17 EMP. Corps Artillery non-effectives 1 Off 8 EMP.

- Continued -
MARCH (GCT)

07 0510 CTF 51 Summary No. 33 (CONT'D).

AA artillery KIA 0 Off 3 EM WIA 1 Off 9 EM MIA 0 total AA artillery battle casualties 1 Off 12 EM. AA artillery non-effectives 0 Off 2 EM. Total Land Force battle casualties 68K WTE Off 13608 EM. Grand total 14,293 of which 2681 KIA. Total non-effectives 2120. Para. 2 OBB 7 DD 2 LCSL carried out night illumination and harassing missions with 9 DD on call throughout day.

Samaritan (AH10) arrived 0843 for casualty evacuation. Para. ENTERPRISE planes on dusk strike CHICHI and HAHA 6 March encountered solid overcast. Bombs rockets used results unobserved. ENTERPRISE planes on special intruder mission over CHICHI from 0400 til dawn 7 March. CVEs augmented ENTERPRISE dawn sweep struck 0630 1 ANZIO TBM shot down over target nil survivors. 1 Sagitaw Bay TBM landed two Field Dueffskije port wing. shore based Army P 51s took over local CVP 1200 7 March. CVEs furnished morning direct air support. Para. Sea conditions yesterday best experienced to date but use LCMs on steep eastern beaches still not practicable without heavy losses. On west beach LSM LCT LCM Ducks in use with water too shallow for LST. Unloading conditions afloat and ashore optimum with available water transportation. Short tons unloaded 24 hours ending 061800 were 1150TWM. assault transports 7 Fugu gyoHo ammunition 2850 garrison. Unloading conditions good with north wind 5 knots. 9SLXGTLNBO strato cumulus 5000 feet. Temperature 71. Visibility fair. Calm sea low short westerly swell.

07 1100 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ. ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 34. 071800 (K). Continued heavy resistance mainly small arms and machine gun fire held ground troops to limited gains throughout afternoon. 5th MarDiv estimates Japs withdrawing from caves vicinity TA 234 SP. Japs blew up ammunition dump TA 233. 3rd tank En states Jap suicide group charged tanks and were mowed down. Positions ordered consolidated at 1700 with attacks after that hour authorized to seize limited objectives. Gains of 500 yards made along left flank of 5th MarDiv narrowing to 200 yards center and right. ComCruDiv 5 relieved ComPhibGrp 11 as CTF 51. All OBBs departed for Ulithi 1800. Cape Stephens propeller damaged by LCM. Para. Thick weather cancelled support missions by CVE planes 1500. CAP by garrison P-51s secured 1530 due to weather. Search for ANZIO TBM pilot lost over CHICHI JIMA with negative results. Para. Favorable conditions for unloading.

08 0550 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info ALL TFC 5THFLT. CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Summary No. 35. 081200 (K). Night 7-8 March uneventful. Corps continued attack in echelon to capture remainder of island. 4th MarDiv attacked 0620 with main effort on its left. 3rd MarDiv 5th MarDiv attacked at 0750 with main effort both divs on right. Zones of action boundaries unchanged except boundary between 5th and 3rd MarDiv extended to TA 236F. 4th MarDiv reports enemy withdrawing from caves on its front. Fragmentary reports indicate stubborn resistance continues. Little advance on all fronts. 1030 report shows 200 yard gain along 5th MarDiv center and left flank with 200 yard salient extended to TA 236U opposite left flank 3rd MarDiv and 200 yard salient advanced to TA 202G opposite left flank 4th MarDiv. Translation captured undated document reveals order issued by Commander Defense Force to poison - Continued -
with hydrocyanic acid all water not removed to rear. LanFor cumulative casualties 1700 7 Mar: 720 Officers 14090 enlisted men. Grand total 14810 of which 2847 KIA. Total LanFor non-effectives including sick and injured non-battle 47 Off 2265 enlisted men. For cumulative casualties 1700 7 Mar: 720 Officers 14090 enlisted men. Grand total 14810 of which 2847 KIA. Total LanFor non-effectives including sick and injured non-battle 47 Off 2265 enlisted men. 

SOLACE arrived 0930 for casualty evacuation. Seaplane base group HAMLIN (AV15) and CHINCOTEAGUE (AVP24) departed SAIPAN 0900. Seaplane base discontinued. SUMNER (AGA5) hit by small caliber enemy shell with 1 enlisted man KIA 2 enlisted WIA. Total. Non-effectives including sick and injured non-battle 47 Officers 2265 enlisted men.

Night fire support 17 DD 7 LCSL with 1 CA 7 DD available throughout day. SOLACE arrived 0930 for casualty evacuation. Seaplane base group HAMLIN (AV15) and CHINCOTEAGUE (AVP24) departed SAIPAN 0900. Seaplane base discontinued. SUMNER (AGA5) hit by small caliber enemy shell with 1 enlisted man KIA 2 enlisted WIA. Total. Non-effectives including sick and injured non-battle 47 Officers 2265 enlisted men.

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08 1045 GTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 36. 081300 (K). Results of ground action for the day showed slow but steady progress being made against enemy defending desparately every inch of ground. Early morning attack appeared to confuse enemy but they reorganized quickly and slowed down our progress light heavy machine gun small arms fire. Our tanks took out many pillboxes moving over difficult terrain. Japs booby trapped Marine dead during night with pressure released FUZ satchel charges. Front line troops again report snipers wearing Marine uniforms. As day ended troops were in position along line: TA 233B 234FGHNT 235PQRS1 236U 219ALQ7 202ACK 201OVW 184CHM5Y 167E prepared to resume the attack at dawn. Para. OVERTON (APD23) destroyed horned mine 21/87 March 21-15N 111-17E. LCT 1029 broached and heavily damaged eastern beach. Salvage and repair impossible. Craft towed to sea sunk 153 fathoms. SAMARITAN departed GUAM 1800 with casualties. Para. CVE based planes continued direct support missions. 1 strafing mission flown by shore based P-51s when coming off CAPOBJJCLAP. 1 RUDYERD BAY TBM hit crash landed IWO Field with slight injury 1 crewman. 2 additional Army P-51 squadrons and 1 Marine TBM squadron arrived afternoon IWO Field. Further information dawn sweep CHICHI indicates field cleared of WECCOS and operational.

08 0435 ADV GHQ MANILA to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL, COMCARDIV 30, COMSERV7FLT CAX 508777.

As a result of conference at 7th Flt Hqtrs LEYTE on 26 Feb attended by your representative Capt House to discuss BPF petroleum requirements at MANUS and LEYTE, the following is forwarded for your concurrence: Para 1. Navy special fuel oil: It will be the responsibility of Cinpac to supply and transport to the SWPA all BPF requirements. Sub Para A. Those quantities scheduled through MANUS will come under the control of ComServ7 upon arrival at MANUS. An equivalent amount will be issued to the BPF at MANUS by ComServ 7 or if required at LEYTE through ComServon 10. Sub Para B. Those quantities transported direct to LEYTE by Cinpac will come under control and be issued to the BPF by ComSeRon 10. Para 2. Avgas MoGas #11 diesel and lubricating oil will be provided from SWPA stocks, as requested by Cinpac. Sub Para A. At MANUS ComServ 7 will be responsible for providing all of these products. Sub Para B. At LEYTE on request of ComServon 10 diesel and lubricating oils will be provided by ComServ 7 and Avgas and MoGas will be provided by area petroleum officer or his representative. Para 3. Details in regard to the submission of requirements, reports on consumption and movements of tankers as outlined at SYDNEY conference are satisfactory. It is important that full information as to BPF requirements be furnished SWPA area petroleum officer and ComServ 7 together with times and places of delivery.

09 0015 COMWESTSEAFRN, COMGEN WDC to COF S USA, COMINCH, INFO CINCPAC ADV, COMGEN AAF

Commander Western Sea Frontier and ComGen Western Defense Command consider pending conference SanFron offers attractive opportunity to JAPAN for fast carrier raid as propaganda and offensive answer to "Where is Fleet" and in view of approaching inability his carriers to exist in home waters. This can be effected with carriers now available behind cold front on a non-recoverable basis and undetectable by air search. This suggests desirability of early attacks on enemy carriers. Meanwhile Army & Navy air forces except antiaircraft on coast are generally adequate in numbers but all are in training. Effective defense will require much earlier warning than provided by coastal radar. Screen of radar equipped surface vessels plus carrier scouting
and striking force essential to adequate detection. Recommend necessary
authority to establish condition 2 of flight regulations and modify
training schedules as necessary to establish adequate defenses. Immediate
basis decision requested. Detailed plans and requirements of Army and Navy
being forwarded.

09 0147 COMSTHFLT to CTG 51.21 Info CINCPAC ADV, CTF 58, CTF 51.
CTF 51 080920. Overall situation demands availability ENTERPRISE group for
next operation in preference to lesser usefulness as now employed. Sail
ENTERPRISE group so as to arrive ULITHI by early morning 12 March at latest
and report CTF 58. Employ shore based aircraft fullest extent to meet air
requirements IWO and BONINS Area.

09 0229 COMSTHFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CTF 58, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC.
Am approving CTF 58 050817 as basis for planning. FORMOSA strike can be
added later if developing situation makes this advisable. Details regarding
coordination with other forces by separate dispatches. Have ordered ENTER-
PRISE group return ULITHI my 090147. Recommend SHANGRI LA be sailed so as
to join TF 58 earliest practicable date. Importance and magnitude coming
operations justify her combat availability at expense some interference with
training until situation allows resumption use of CV at PEARL. Concur with
Mitscher that CABOT retention without fresh air group is inadvisable.

06 0325 CINCPAC PEARL HQ to COMINCH Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, COM 17, COMALASSEAFRON.
Cominch and CNO 022048 (022020) concur.

09 1015ZCTF 51 to COMSTHFLT, Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.
Summary No. 37. 091800 (K). During night of 8 March 5th MarDiv front
generally quiet. 3rd MarDiv received sniper and rocket fire. 4th MarDiv re-
ported heavy rocket and mortar fire and infiltration attempts in strength.
564 enemy destroyed in attempts. 1 CA and 7 DD provided illumination and
harassing fire. Attack resumed at 0700 with 3 Divisions abreast. No
change in zones of action. Encouraging progress was made by troops today
against continuing stiff resistance. At 1315 patrols of RCT 21 reached the
beach at TA 236W. Rocket fire reported from KAMA or KANGORO SQLS Corps
Army continues to provide general support. AOF provided during day by 1
CA and 4 DD. CVE groups continued close support missions. P-51s gave
additional support with excellent results. 1 P-51 crashed on landing and
damaged 2 parked planes. At 1421 1 B29 made successful forced landing on
airfield No. 1. Casualties as of 1700 9 March. Battle casualties 760 Off
15251 enl. Grant total 16011 of which 3098 KIA. Non effectives total 2113.
Unloading and evacuation continues on eastern beaches. 9 garrison force
completed unloading this morning. Total tonnage last 24 hours 2810. Be-
tween 0345 and 0400 estimate 3 bogies closed without attacking as described
CTF 51 dispatch 082020. Landing conditions eastern beaches good, western
beaches unsatisfactory. Front lines as of 1700 (K). 250V 234 BHMNOT 235
KLRNST 236 FTV 219 BCMEN 202 BAPGLQU 201Y 184 EDCGHMSY 167 EJ.
Following is 101200 (K) situation summary (No. 38). Night fairly quiet with minor attempts at infiltration. 4th MarDiv reported at 1130 (K) that initial morning advance met only light fire. RCT 24 reported held up by sniper fire and RCT 25 getting sniping from rear. Have encountered no large groups of enemy. Resistance generally spotty. 3rd MarDiv reported at 1150 (K) little activity in RCT 21 sector. BLT 1/21 has patrols on beach in TA 236W and 219D. RCT 9 on beach swinging south at 1120(K). BLT 2/21 estimates few enemy on its front. BLT 3/21 moving slowly against caves and pillboxes. 5th MarDiv reported 1130(K) RCT 26 being held up on flanks. RCT 28 having trouble with blockhouse or pillbox in TA 235A.

Summary No. 39 101800(K). Troops continued to make steady progress. Substantial gains made on right flank against resistance termed as generally spotty and disorganized. At 1500 patrol reached beach in TA 186A. Close air support furnished entirely by P-51s except for VOF planes which strafed and dropped napalm bombs. Air support confined to extreme northern end of island in TA 250 and 251. During daylight 1 CA and 3 DD gave close support. Last night 1 ASP plane from CVE TULAGI (CVE72) emergency wheels up landing airfield 1. No injuries. During morning 5 B29s landed 1 plane ran off end of runway. Others landed safely. During afternoon 4 B29s took off, at 1430(K) shore based VMTB assumed ASP relieving CVEs. 2 rusted spherical contact mines believed to have broken loose from fields in BONINS were sunk bearing 025 50 miles from HOT ROCKS. Unloading continues on eastern beaches under favorable conditions. Heavy surf still prevents use of western beaches. SOLACE (AH5) departed with 568 patients. Estimated enemy casualties 21,086. Front lines consolidated at 1700 as follows: 2502V 234GI30 235PQRSNSTY 236U 219ABCHMNOTX 202GBAFMSX 185DHEHCAH north to IKPTY 167E. Plan to continue the attack at 0830 tomorrow.

Date of completion capture and occupation Phase Para 5F your OpPlan 13-44 may be difficult to determine exactly and may occur while you are in radio silence. Estimate that CG 5th Corps and 4th and 5th MarDivs will be evacuated and TNO turned over to IsCom by 15 March. In view withdrawal fleet units by that date recommend responsibility for defense and development TNO JIMA be transferred to ComFwdArea about 16 March exact date to be determined by later arrangement between that officer and CTG 51.21. Recommend directive to that effect be issued by you not later than 10 March. Para. Request designation of SOPA TNO JIMA TOR HOS CTG 51.21 may transfer responsibility.

Anticipate that Com5thFlt will be in radio silence when capture and occupation phase TNO JIMA is completed. Desire action aces confer to determine date mutually agreeable for transfer of responsibility for defense and development. CTG 51.21 promulgate announcement of completion of capture and occupation phase and of transfer to IsCom Maj Gen James Chaney USA CTG 10.16, and transfer of SOPA functions to command designated by CTF 94. When command transferred CTF 94 assume responsibility TNO JIMA conforming to Cincpoa directives.
11 1000 CTG 51.21 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC5THFLT.

Summary No. 41 111800(K). Organized resistance was overcome on 3rd and 4th MarDiv sectors except for northeast corner of 3rd MarDiv sector and small pocket of resistance in 4th MarDiv sector. 5th MarDiv made small gains against heavy resistance from northern tip of island. 5th MarDiv estimates 1000 Japs still remain in 5th MarDiv zone of action. Front lines as of 1700 pocket in 4th MarDiv zone TA 185RLPU 168A. In 5th Div zone TA 250W 2340 235LW. TA 219A 236WV. LanFor reports general supply situation satisfactory. Total LanFor battle casualties to 111800(K) 817 Off 16646 Enl. Grand total 17,463 of which 3449 KIA. Total noneffectives 3,094. Combat efficiency very good. P5ls executed 2 support missions during afternoon in TA 250 and 251. At 1140 all P5ls which attacked CHICHI JIMA returned safely. Pilots report 22 hits on SUSAKI FIELD on runway and among planes, 1 transport 1 damaged Kate 2 unidentified planes 1 direct hit 2 probables 5 near misses on estimated 16 to 18 small ships in harbor. Strafed Susaki Field and KITAMURA TOWN nad OKIMURA TOWN on HAHA. Set fire to radio weather station at OKIMURA. At 1017(K) CTU 12,6,1 reported 1 horned type mine had been exploded by gunfire in area CELLAR. Unloading now being controlled by Port Director IWO. Plan to continue the attack at 0800.

11 1216 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Jap suicide plane crashed RANDOLPH (CV 15) at anchor about 2010X(K)-10) starting fire now under control. Casualties 1 known dead about 25 injured. Second suicide plane crashed SORLEN ISLAND same time damaging buildings. More later.

12 0905 CTG 51.21 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 43 121800(K). 16 P5ls struck OKIMURA TOWN with bombs and strafing. Intense AA fire 1 plane hit but all returned safely. At 1145 K submarine sighted bearing 125 distance 40 miles from HOT ROCKS by ASP plane. Sub dived. Depth hunter killer operations continuing. At 1410 damaged PB4Y search plane landed. Mopping up continues in 3rd and 4th Div zones. At 1240 3rd MarDiv reports all organized resistance ceased their zone of action, to boundary at TA 236G. Resistance in 4th MarDiv area now confined to small pocket about 200 yards square TA 185K. 5th MarDiv meeting continued stiff resistance. Front lines as of 1730 K TO A 250W west center to 34D southwest to CR 291 to RJ in 235 K to K center LOAYN FUL east a southeast along div boundary to coast at 236 G. Situation shows more improvement than is reflected in space gained. Most important enemy defensive installations have been destroyed including 23 pillboxes in TA 234 DI and the strong enemy position in TA 235RST has been taken. No enemy artillery reported. 1st Garrison came in 73 percent unloaded.

12 0950 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV Info CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, CTF58, USS RANDOLPH, CTF 52, CTF 54.

My 111216 not to all. Suicide attacks were made by 2 twin engine planes both carrying bombs. 1 plane hit SORLEN ISLAND boat repair base and other hit RANDOLPH starboard quarter at flight deck level. Some material damage SORLEN ISLAND 2 dead 6 injured. RANDOLPH after 60 feet starboard side flight deck has hole 40 feet wide. Sections underneath wrecked. Estimate can be repaired Servton 10 in 3 to 4 weeks see my 120X35. 11 RANDOLPH planes destroyed 6 seriously damaged, 18 dead 47 injured 22 of whom transferred to RELIEF.
(_,._.)L.5THFlt to CINCPAC ADV HQ, ETC. (CONT'D)

Plane loss and casualty data subject to later revision by RANDOLPH. Examination of Jap planes with notes and maps found therein indicates planes came from KANOTA via OKINAWA or MINAMI DAITO. See memorandum sent you today by officer messenger. 3rd plane discovered this morning wrecked in shallow water near YAP. YAP airstrips remain nonoperational but are being covered by daylight strike and dusk CAP to eliminate possibility of staging. Additional precautions being taken. Recommend withholding release regarding attack unless announced by Japs in which case restrict release to destruction 2 planes.

110800 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFORD.

CVE situation. Losses of escort carriers in combat have not been replaced. These losses can be expected to increase. (B) Missions assigned CVE and their value at objectives have greatly increased. (C) Assignment for next operation of only 4 transport CVE to support 5th Flt is inadequate. Lack of sufficient transport CVE makes it necessary to assign all those available to support TF 58. This leaves 18 CVE engaged in close support at objective without provision for aircraft replacement except by withdrawal of 1 or more of them from already inadequate number. (D) This serious situation requires remedial action. Para. Recommend assignment 4 additional transport CVE now from CarTransRon. Believe this can be balanced by more intensive employment of remainder and accepting reasonable reduction of number replacement aircraft now in pipeline and at bases to rear of MARIANAS and ULITHI. Para. Recommend additional and longer range action to expedite availability of more CVE from new construction and sources outside POA.

121502 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC Info COM5THFLT. Com5thFlt 110800 comment.

120215 CTG 51.21 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 42 121200(K). Quiet night on all fronts. Minor infiltration attempts and mortar fire in 4th and 5th MarDiv Sectors. POW estimates 300 Japs remain in pocket of resistance TA 185 PQUV. K hour advanced to 0700. 3rd and 4th MarDiv continue mopping up. Japs remaining in caves are being sealed in. Some Japs killed have been reported to be in Marine uniforms.

5th MarDiv reports general movement along front and advances of 75 to 100 yards. NGF support provided by 1 CA 2 DD 2 LCI(G), F-51s continue to give support in TA 250 and 251. Last night 2 and this morning 7 B-29s made emergency landings. 3 B-29s have already departed. No. 1 airfield NE-SW runway now operational 5800 feet. Airfield No. 2 will be operational about 14 March with NE-SW runway 2200 feet long and E-W runway 1200 feet long. Begin evacuation of 4th MarDiv morning 14 March. RDO IWO JIMA teletype installed and ready to test. BOUNTIFUL arrived and is loading casualties. Net laying operations commenced.

120420 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ INFO CTF 58.

CTF 58 120136 passed to you for action recommending approval. Expect CABOT will be assigned local patrol duties and released when RANDOLPH rejoins.
Training importance and requirements are such that assignment SHANGRI LA to TF 58 is considered infeasible. Concur your recommendation as to CABOT but prior issuance movement orders suggest consideration be given adjusting RANDOLPH Group for employment in CABOT for forthcoming operation and returning CABOT’s Group in RANDOLPH.

Summary No. 44
131200 K. Quiet night all along front. Minor infiltration attempts. Sporadic mortar fire. Total of 106 Japs killed during night. Illumination and harassing fire provided by 3 DD. Attack resumed at 0730K by 5th MarDiv with 2 RCT in assault. 3rd and 4th MarDiv continues systematic mopping up. Yesterday 1 RCT reported sealing up 115 caves. NCF support provided by 3 DD. After reconnaissance late yesterday 1 Company landed on KAMA ROCK this morning. No enemy present. During morning 1 B29 and 1 PB4I made emergency landings on airfield No. 1. 1 OY crashed in 235H. Details not available. Hunter killer operation on sub last contacted yesterday afternoon continues without results. Total casualties to 121800 LanFor battle 840 Off 17,364 enlisted. Total 18,204 of which 3,653 KIA. Garrison Force battle casualties 11 Off 204 enlisted of which 44 KIA. American Flag will be officially raised on IWO JIMA at 0930 14 March.

Summary No. 45
131800 K. Enemy small arms MG and knee mortar fire from pillboxes and bunkers many of which resisted our artillery fire have limited advance to small gains of 5th MarDiv. 4th MarDiv continued to reduce enemy pocket in 185 K. Mopping up proceeds. Landing made on KANGOKU ROCKS. No enemy present but signs of previous occupation. No close support missions flown today. Japs maintaining close contact with our lines to reduce effect of our artillery. No enemy artillery. 16 P5ls with bombs to CEBCHI. All returned safely. Direct hit on radar station SE of Susaki Airfield and hits in wharf and dock area with unobserved results. Light AA intense and accurate. TU 12.6.2 plus PRESIDENT POLK and CHINA VICTORY commence reembarkation of 4th MarDiv tomorrow. Figures submitted by Divs show 19,995 enemy buried by LanFor and by Japanese or sealed in caves. Unknown number awaiting burial. Have requested clarification. Total POWs to 131800 121. Total LanFor battle casualties 850 Off 17,736 enl. Total 18,586 of which 3,758 KIA. No appreciable change in front lines.
At 2009K 11 March RANDOLPH was hit by KAMEKAZI at starboard edge of flight deck frame 205. Enemy aircraft was Frances carrying bomb of undetermined size. Bomb and starboard engine went under flight deck where bomb exploded in aviation engine shop and after hangar space. Fire and bomb explosion caused following damage. 27 dead or missing of which 21 bodies recovered. 52 injured still under treatment. Hole in starboard half of flight deck frame 197 to frame 209. Extensive damage by fire to flight deck abait frame 193. Arresting gear unit frame 198 badly damaged. All shops storerooms guns and equipment between flight deck and hangar deck abait frame 194 badly damaged. Vertical flight deck support frame 203 starboard bent and twisted. Roller curtains damaged both sides abait frame 145. Some damage to hangar and fantail and 2nd deck resulting in flooding of 5 compartments 2nd and 3rd deck. Several holes in hull port quarter above water line caused by assisting craft. 14 aircraft destroyed plus 12 damaged beyond capacity this ship. 3 Japanese bodies recovered. 1 chart showing pencil course 143 degrees from DAITO SHIMA. Estimates to effect temporary repairs vary from 14 to 30 days without replacement of arresting gear unit controlling arresting wires 1 and 3.

13 0201 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CTF 58, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC.

Your 120743. In view planned light duties for CABOT and prospective availability RANDOLPH within 3 or 4 weeks disruption her Air Group by partial use in CABOT not justified. My 090229 non-availability RANDOLPH now makes need for SHANGRI LA greater. Request reconsideration decision to use her for training rather than combat during early part forthcoming operations.

13 0544 COM5THFLT to CTF 51 Info CTF 52.

In view of change in CTF 54 will CTF 51 act as SOPA RVY SXSE during next operation until your arrival. Subbest modification 3rd sentence Para 3 E in your OpPlan to clarify situation.

13 2051 CINCPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ, COM5THFLT, CTF 58, COMAIRPAC.

Com5thFlt 130201 SHANGRI LA will continue training replacement groups and personnel until further orders. Nimitz.

13 2234 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info COMAIRPAC, CTF 58, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 130201. After long and very careful reconsideration and full appreciation your operational needs adhere to previous decision to continue SHANGRI LA training air groups. Without such action timely replacement of Air Groups suitably trained cannot be achieved and the efficiency and tempo of combat operations would be unacceptably reduced.
Summary No. 46 - 141200. During night 3rd MarDiv and 4th MarDiv zone quiet except for knee mortar and grenading from enemy attempting to escape from isolated pocket. Activity in the 5th MarDiv zone consisted numerous attempts to infiltrate. Attack resumed at 0630K, 3rd and 4th MarDiv continuing to mop up their areas. 5th MarDiv attacking against stiff resistance from prepared positions and spider trap foxholes. NGF support by 2 DD. P-51s made 1 Napalm strike. LanFor gives best approximate of enemy dead as 20,000 reports combat conditions make accurate count impossible. At 131800 hunter killer operations ended. During morning 9 B29s made emergency landings on IWO. Have since taken off. American Flag officers raised on IWO 0930. 4th MarDiv commenced reembarkation. 2nd garrison echelon commenced unloading.

15 1235 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCBP Info CINCWPA, CTF112 & 113, VA(Q), COM7THFLT, COMPHILESFRON, COMPHIBSGROUP13, COMPHIBSPAC.

Your 141315. Desire TF 112 & 113 be prepared function without shore facilities when they arrive LEYTE. Advance officers may be sent to consult with Sr. Officer PacFlt at LEYTE now R.Adm. Davis who controls all PacFlt facilities present. He or his successor will assist as practicable with facilities at his disposal and in making local arrangements. Establishment British reserve carrier aircraft on shore will be authorized when Pacific Fleet carrier aircraft pool is activated.
SECRET
MARCH (GCT)

15 0740 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMGENPOA Info CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

ComGen 10 Rear Echelon TA 1517 (140403). In view possible changes in overall command organization do not concur in further assignment of responsibilities for Army Base Command administration to officers serving as Island Commanders and exercising unified command over all services involved.

16 0746 CINCPOAC ADV HQ to COMINCH Info MARCORPS, COM5THFLT, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

In order to assist in alleviating critical Marine Corps personnel situation temporary reduction of 10 per cent of personnel in Marine detachments of Pacific Fleet combatant ships without change of complement is acceptable to Cincpac.

16 0916 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CTF 58, CTF 93 Info COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, COMINCH, DEPCOM 20TH AF, COMGEN 21 BOMCOM.

Since the Emperor of JAPAN is not at present a liability and may later become an asset his Palace at TOKYO will not be attacked until further orders. Brief pilots accordingly.

16 0920 CTG 51.21 to COM5THFLT Info ALL TFC 5THFLT, CINCPOA BOTH HQ.

Summary No. 51, 161200. All organized resistance in IWO overcome at 1800K after continued advances by 3rd and 5th MarDivs. Small pockets and some mopping up remains. Estimated island can be turned over to IsCom about 22 March. IWO Airfield No. 2 operational. 16 P-51s bombed and strafed CHICHI. No flak. On return observed 2 small cargo vessels at KITAMURA. Not attacked due to shortage of ammunition. Hunter killer operations continuing. Casualties to 1800 15 March: LanFor battle 881 officers 18,738 enlisted - total 19,619 of which 4,043 KIA. 4th MarDiv continuing re-embarkation.

18 0810 CINCPOAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT, CINCWPA, COMAIRPAC, COMFWDAREA, COMSERWPAC, Info CINCPOA PEARL, COMINCH & CNO, COMSERON 10, COM5THFLT.

Pursuant to FILEBAS Agreement augmentation and completion of naval facilities in LEYTE area has highest priority of projects for support POA forces and the LEYTE SAMAR Naval Base is expected to be ready to replace ULITHI prior to the advent of the typhoon season at ULITHI. Present plans for supporting Pacific Fleet in Western Pacific include: (A) Retain principal advanced base and major portion of SeRon 10 at ULITHI until May and then transfer to LEYTE SAMAR. (B) Limit use of CASIGURAN to anchorage with no facilities on shore except recreation facilities established by SeRon 10. (C) Movement of train vessels to CASIGURAN will be limited to tenders, oilers, ammunition and supply ships called forward by Com5thFlt for a specific purpose and for a specific period. All ships called forward shall be able to withdraw rapidly under their own power. (D) Retention at ULITHI of facilities afloat and ashore for support of merchant shipping escorts and occasional combatant units Para. The concurrence of CINCWPA is requested in connection with the contemplated use of SWPA anchorages and facilities.
19 1235 CINCPAC ADV HQ to ALL COMS INTERESTED IN COMBAT REPORTS Info COMINCH, CINCSPWPA, COM7THFLT, DEPSCOM AF 20.

Flash report from Com5thFlt, TF 58 attacked KYUSHU 18th and KOBE-KURE area 19th. Strike results good. FRANKLIN (CV 13) hit morning 19th now retiring in tow of PITTSBURG (CA 72) covered by TF 58.

19 1332 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMFWDAREA Info COMAIRPACSUBCOMFORD ISCOM TWO, COM7THFLT, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

Confirming conference with ComFairWing 1 Venturas may be substituted for Liberators in search aircraft staging through IWO total of both not to exceed 18 allowed by my 171102 not to all. ComAirPac augment CASU 52 as necessary to support foregoing plus 3 air sea rescue PB2B5As, PB2B spares and a few Ventura mechanics are already at IWO. ComAirPac also augment ground echelon of VMF 612 as required by ComFwdArea for support not to exceed 6 TBMs of VMF 242 staging at IWO, total aircraft of both VMF 612 and 242 at IWO nto to exceed 18. Base Development Plans will be modified accordingly. ComFwdArea coordinate direct with ComAirPac and answer his 142058.

19 2017 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ, MARCORS EPS Info CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, MARPAC, COMGEN MARFORCES 14TH.

As emergency measure make temporary reduction of 10 percent in Marine detachments in combatant ships Pacific Fleet. Cincpae issue directive to execute. Marcorps report when situation permits regularly authorized strength to be resumed.

20 1730 CTU 50, 5, 3 to CINCPAC.

Following relay received by V402 plane. From VIKING to LONE STAR. Preliminary and incomplete report follows: Aircraft destroyed both days in air 200 on ground 275. Probably destroyed or damaged at least 100 1st day large number 2nd day. Own aircraft losses 5. Very large number hangars shops and other installations destroyed or damaged at many airfields. Also at KANOE and KURE air depots and at KURE naval arsenal oil storage tanks, 6 small freighters sunk. 7 freighters damaged. About 13 combatant vessels damaged including 1 BBCV or 2 BB 2 or 3 CV 2 CVL or CVE 2 CVE 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD 1 SS plus 1 DE. Own ship damage DIXIE now making 15 knots, 4 other carrier damaged none seriously. All fully operational. Enemy countered with large number individual plane attacks believed mostly suicide which were aided by low broken clouds. No attack since mid-afternoon yesterday. Complete summary tomorrow. This is VIKING 20052.

19 2042 COMAF 20 to COMGENBOMCOM 21 Info DEPSCOMAF 20, for CINCPAC.

Bombing of Emperor's palace. Bombing policy of 20th Air Force remains in force; i.e. to attack specific assigned targets. Emperor's palace has not been assigned as a target and will not be intentional objective of attack unless so designated. It is, however, subject to the same hazards as any other building or installation in TOKYO.

20 0230 CINCPAC ADV to COMSOPAC Info COMPHIBSPAC, COMGENPOA, COMSOPACBACOM, COMGEN81STDIV COMTRANSRON 11, ADCOMPHIBSPAC REAR HQ.

When TransRon 11 is EFS arrange direct for such amphibious refresher training as desired by ComGen 81st Div and as is feasible with consideration for the fact that TransRon and troop Division must at all times be ready for departure for combat on 7 days notice from Cincpac. Keep ComPhibsPac and me informed.
21 0030 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COMSERON 10, CTF 58.
21 0128
My 200452. 4 other damaged carriers are INTREPID, ENTERPRISE, YORKTOWN, WASP. INTREPID minor damage from near miss. YORKTOWN damage not serious. ENTERPRISE and WASP require repairs. Have ordered FRANKLIN, WASP, ENTERPRISE, SANTA FE escorted by DesRon 52 to ULITHI. FRANKLIN for voyage repairs and onward routing to PEARL with SANTA FE. SANTA FE, WASP and ENTERPRISE for local repair if practicable. In attacks late afternoon 20th ENTERPRISE hit 2nd time 1st being on 18th. Also HALSEY, POWELL with steering gear damage which slowed her to 10 knots and has required protection from TF 58 less TG 58.2. Repairs her steering gear expected shortly when she will speed up to 25. No damage reported aircraft torpedo attacks last night. Several planes shot down by anti aircraft and night fighters. My 0800 (J-9) position 27-25N 134-50E heading toward BEDBUG HALSEY POWELL astern with THE SULLIVANS X FRANKLIN group ahead. New subject. Your 201729 see my 200615.

20 2055 CTF 58 to CTGs 58.1, 58.2, 58.3, 58.4, 58.5 Info COM5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CTF 58.3, COMSERON 10 to ULITHI.


22 0850 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMARGILS.

Compliance my 271416 February completed. Resume compliance with my 172233 January.

23 1952 CINCPA ADV HQ to CINCSWESPAC Info CINCPA PEARL, COMSOPAC, COMINCH, COMGEMPOA.

On 26 Jan 1945 in para 6 of Cincpao serial 000153 it was assumed that logistic support furnished by ComSoPac for north SOLOMON axis would cease about the middle of February 1945 upon the relief of the American Division by Australian forces and CINCSWPA was requested to advise on that assumption. To date no reply has been received. Operations planned by Cincpao and the necessity for rollup of South Pacific Area make impractical continuation of above support beyond 30 April 1945. It is intended to terminate logistic support of NorSols by ComSoPac on that date unless otherwise requested.

23 0900 MACARTHUR to COM5THFLT, CINCPAC ADV HQ, Info CINCPAC PEARL, COM5THFLT, COMFWDAREA, COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMSERON 10, COMINCH, CNO.

CAY-51168. Concur within limitations of Com7thFlt radio 220247 Feb not to all addresses in making SWPA anchorages and all possible facilities available as outlined in Cincpao Adv. Hq. radio 180810 March.
Reference your 201943. Due critical world wide tanker shortage and lengthening of Pacific supply lines our ability supply your requirements petroleum products with tanker tonnage presently available is being taxed to utmost. Our weekly slate is fairly accurate indication of maximum deliveries possible with present tonnage. Everything possible being done here to augment deliveries presently programmed to POA by expediting repairs and deferring drydocking of tankers. However it is extremely doubtful that even with benefits to be derived from this action that increased fuel oil requirements for April and May can be fully met. Any substantial increases which can be effected over and above deliveries presently scheduled will be passed to you by dispatch.

Admiralty advises that British CVEs PATROLIER, REAPER and RANEE are required at an early date for fitting out as replenishment carriers for BPF. Release 2 of these CVEs as early in April as practicable. 3rd CVE may be retained until end of April. When released sail them to UK. Inform Admiralty of approximate sailing dates and place of departure as soon as reasonable firm. Admiralty O21330 A January refers.

In view extent to which AROU-2 has been unloaded, recommend its retention SAMAR. If decision is made for establishment at CEBU recommend:
(A) Carrier pool at SAMAR be limited to 500 aircraft. (B) ARU GUADAL be established at CEBU and augmented by engine overhaul and associated facilities and pilot camp from SAMAR as shipping becomes available. Air establishment at CEBU should comprise initially ARU GUADAL, ASA plus necessary facilities to support local aircraft and 500 plane pool. Additional space should be reserved at CEBU for eventual location of above engine overhaul facilities or AROU-2, pilot camp and major portion of supply facilities initially at SAMAR plus 500 plane pool initially at SAMAR. Thus CEBU will eventually have total 1,000 plane pool. Para. Realize that final evaluation of location and details of establishment must be made locally.

Recommend that the aircraft and personnel of the PacFlt Flag Transport Unit be constituted as a separate squadron in NatsPac. The sqdn should include all 4 engine flag transports in the CenPac. ComNatsPac should control and be responsible for administration, maintenance and operating procedures and efficiency. Cincpac will exercise direct operational control (allocation of aircraft to flights or special services) as at present and the sqdn Comdr should report to Cincpac for additional duty for this purpose. It is intended that the headquarters of the squadron for the present be at NAS HONOLULU with a detachment at NAB AGANA.
Privateer Squadron in MarlGils is deployed there temporarily, in readiness for forward movement when and if required. Its employment should be such as to maintain its combat readiness and should normally be for primary mission of search rather than attack on enemy shore positions.

Due to the insufficiency of total number of construction troops to effect the desired deployment in the POA the provision of many necessary facilities may be impossible of accomplishment. In the very near future the requirements for planned operations make inevitable a greater reduction in the number of these troops in the rear areas, including the MARIANAS, than is commensurate with the expected reduction in the work load. Accordingly it is believed that many essential projects may be left unfinished and others unstarted unless special methods are instituted to increase labor available for construction work and to eliminate unessential projects and portions of projects. It is suggested therefore that respective using agencies be required to contribute labor from general service troops and other personnel available to them to augment such supervisory, engineering, and skilled personnel as may be available for work on the project desired by the particular using agency. It is again directed that all construction be of the simplest utilitarian type and without embellishment.

US Naval Base MANILA and US Naval Base SUBIC BAY both LUZON PHILIPPINE ISLANDS established 23 March 1945. Request info adees disseminate as appropriate.

Your 220413 and 220427, Para 2 my 0039230 requested Cincpoa to advise the number CBMUs available from area and also requested BuPers to advise number which could be formed from available SeaBee personnel. It did not approve the 20 additional units, Cincpoa 250111 Feb and 122104, March authorized continuation temporary assignment 5 CBMUs in SOSSOLS for ULOD and requested transfer CBMU 502 to GUAM. Cominch & CNO 07/1945 advised overall limitation SeaBees and assigned area ceiling quotas citing inability to bring currently authorized units to full strength and directed adjustment magnitude and rates of construction work to suit allocations or to accomplish work with Army or local civilian labor. There are approximately 47,000 SeaBees now in SoWesPac and will all unit now assigned or to be loaned would be over 66,000. This exceeds Cominch ceiling quota of 60,000 for SoWesPac. It will therefore be impractical to make more CBMUs available for the US for ULOD or for additional locations and operations listed.
SPTOP 93. April allocations in WAR X 54085 preceded your CX 12350 revising 7th Flt requirements. As result 3 additional east coast loadings will be made totaling 11 Navy in April and possible 10 more available can be found on west coast for SWPA April sailings. Cincpoa expression of need for SAMAR base prior to typhoon season at ULITHI prompts Joint Military Transportation Committee to consider favorable allocation of ten new availables for Acorns, SeaBees, and BuDocks material for that purpose subject to your confirmation.

Data requested your 202105. Read info after each numbered unit in columns this order. Present location, present employment, proposed transfer date, proposed location, proposed employment. Latter columns omitted for some units engaged in miscellaneous construction at locations indicated and where future plans not sufficiently crystallized to permit definite assignment units after completion present projects:

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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Present Location</th>
<th>Present Employment</th>
<th>Proposed transfer date</th>
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- Continued -
Proposed use of CBMUs 553, 568, 569, 582, and 586 subject CNO approval my dis 220413. Foregoing does not include units ordered to SAMAR from US and CenPac which are not yet in SWPA. No units presently assigned SWPA except as indicated above will be available for reassignment outside area before 1 Sept. Following are base companies by location and number now assigned. Present plans do not contemplate transfer of any Base Company prior Sept 1.

25 1050 CINCPOA ADV HQ TO COMINCH Info CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENPOA.

Due to acute troop shortage POA request approval withdrawal US Army Garrison Force of 2 officers 48 enlisted men now stationed at FANNING ISLAND. US troops were stationed FANNING to replace NEW ZEALAND troops in April 1942. Should British Government desire regarrison this station with Australian or New Zealand troops before withdrawal of US forces request earliest date our troops can be withdrawn.

25 2155 CTF 58 to CTF 51 Info COM5THFLT, CTF 52. (Intercept)

From photos whole island of OKINAWA appears to be honeycombed with caves, tunnels and gun positions particularly along roads. Tanks and armored cars seen entering caves. It will probably be tough. NW and SW quadrants cannot be covered by my radars since I must remain E of island. Timely warning from you will assist. Will furnish all air protection possible day and night with my reduced facilities. Will attempt interception from east and northeast. Am searching island chain twice daily between bearing 330 to 040 as far north as OSUMI GUNTO. Believe most of raids will be during moonlight periods.
A survey of the construction program currently authorized for the MARIANAS is being initiated with a view to elimination of all projects and parts of projects that do not contribute directly and materially to the support of combat operations. Action akees will assist Cincpoa staff officers engaged in this survey as may be necessary. Group is headed by Capt. W. L. Painter CEC, USNR. Para. No new projects will be submitted to Cincpoa by info aees that do not contribute directly and materially to the support of combat operations and all projects submitted will be covered by statement of responsible commander to the above effect. Para. The authority of all action aees to approve projects under existing Cincpoa policies and directives is hereby suspended except for projects of such emergency nature that time will not permit their submission to Cincpoa for action.

ComGenPOA 240949. In view (1) Shortage of beds in forward area resulting in increased casualty reception requirements OAHU and (2) Period necessary to clear required bed capacity in OAHU consider any course other than that directed in Cincpoa 072327 unwise. Provisions of that directive remain unchanged. As soon as circumstances indicate safety and practicability return to 120 day evacuation policy will be authorized. Request this situation be presented to War Dept with urgent recommendation that personnel replacement flow from mainland be increased to offset the loss of replacements resulting from curtailing of evacuation period which is regarded as an operational necessity.

Regret that plans for future operation of POA submarines, aircraft and surface ships in area described in your 240801 serial CX 12836 make unfeasible its reclassification as a blind bombing zone.

My 190857 assigned DD STEVENS and YOUNG as relief for RADFORD and LAVALLETTE. RADFORD 200705 indicates no action being taken to make RADFORD sufficiently seaworthy for her to proceed for repairs and that deterioration of material and personnel is progressive. This is a matter of much concern to me as destroyers are badly needed and if RADFORD's report is correct a valuable fleet unit is not being readied for future useful employment. Request advice as to when she can be made ready to proceed to navy yard.

During morning twilight 26 March about 8 enemy planes attacked ships near KERAMA RETTO. 1 splashed by CAP 2 by ships gunfire. 2 suicides missed ships and crashed. 1 hit KIMBERLY causing considerable structural damage with 2 5-inch guns 1 40mm mount beyond repair otherwise ship operable. Successful landings preceded by effective gunfire and air support made on AKA GERUMA ZAMAMI HOKAJI YAKAHIT. Opposition light. By noon HOKAJI GERUMA reported secured. Incomplete reports indicate Jap KIA 71 POW 5 civilians taken 200. Landings on KUBA AMURO TOKASHIKI scheduled tomorrow. Minesweeping approximately on schedule 3 moored mines swept in southern B5 and 15 in So. B 3 other areas negative. Ships gunfire accomplished as scheduled. Careful air...

-Continued-
observation disclosed no important defensive installations TONACHL. No enemy fire during bombardment or at minesweepers passing close aboard. Support aircraft in addition to supporting landings attacked many installations OKINAWA including probable midget sub base UNTEN. 3 small luggers beached and destroyed. 1 TONY splashed by CAP of CVE. 1 of own planes reported shot down not confirmed. WICHITA and TERROR while off area ASKAG beached reported submarine attacks and torpedoes passing close aboard. Large oil slick after attack on 1 en~ sub. Cam Task Group 52.2 at 1913(-9) reported HALLIGAN DD 584 torpedoed and badly damaged. CTG 52.22 with several ships standing by. No further details. Casualties in morning air attacks GILMER KIA 1 WIA 2 KIMBERLY KIA 3 WIA 30.

Flash report on KYUSHU from BomCom 21 planes in flight. All planes carried 1/4 ton GP bombs and dropped from 15,000 feet. 78 dropped 268 tons on TACHIARAI with results 48 excellent 19 good 11 fair. 35 dropped 122 tons on OITA with results 20 excellent 15 good. 40 found KANOTA weathered in and dropped 180 tons on OMURA with good results. All aircraft accounted for.

Desire to create impression carrier attack on KYUSHU is impending by sinking picket boats on a line estimated extending from about 28-00 N 132-30 E to 29-00 N 135-00 E just before sunset on March 29 by coordinated destroyer and CV aircraft attacks. Following general plan is suggested for your consideration. Use units from TGs 58.3 or 58.4 on 29 March. 1 DesDiv which has fueled 28th begin sweep from western end of line about 1545. Aircraft begin sweep from eastern end of line about 1630. Destroyers discontinue sweep after sinking 1st pickets contacted and not later than 1800 proceed to rendezvous with you. Aircraft sink others. Suggest 1 sqdn fighters and 1 sqdn bombers be launched from about 25-20 N 133-20 E at approximately 1500 form scouting line centered at approximately 29-00 N 135-00 E about 1640. Estimate destroyers will be met about 1730 at which time both planes and DDs depart area.

The Island Command IWO is hereby incorporated into the forward area and its garrison into TF 94. The senior officer present afloat at IWO is assigned additional duty under CTF 94 for purposes of the development and defense of the island and all forces present.

Recommend establishment in PacFlt of a new Fleet Air Wing as of 1 June. Thereafter it is proposed to assign to Fleet Air Wing 1 the appropriate squadrons operating in the KYUKYUS and to the westward and to assign to the new wing the appropriate units operating in the MARIANAS CAROLINES and MARSHALLS.
28 0107 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCBPFA Info CINCSWPA, COM7THFLIT, COMFWDAREA, ISCOM PELELIU, CINCPOA PEARL.

Authority granted to extend British Pacific Fleet Air Transport Service to TACLOBAN staging through PELELIU subject to conditions contained in CINCSWPA 260556.

28 0109 CINCSWPA to COFS WAR DEPT Info COMINCH, CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COM7THFLIT.

CX 13072. Beach conditions at objectives forthcoming operations indicate advisability of landing initial assault in small type landing craft from transports. It is therefore requested that a transport division consisting of 1 AGC, 3 APA and 2 AKA be assigned temporary duty with 7th Fleet until about 1 August. This TransDiv should be available at MOROTAI not later than 15 April.

28 0307 CTF 58 to CTG 58.1, 58.3 and 58.4 Info COM7THFLIT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMSUBPAC ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Task Group 58.1 join TF 58 in position 29-15 131-15 at 0530 March 29 in order to locate and sink Japanese Fleet reported rounding Southern KYUSHU during night 28-29 March. At 0520 TG 58.3 launch reenforced day search and attack plan Y distance 250 miles between bearings 330 to 020. When search planes report contact with enemy fleet linking communication planes will inform strikes from all TGs and obtain acknowledgments as well as informing TG Comdrs. At 0545 each TG launch full VB-VT deck load strikes plus VB as practicable to proceed to position near TAKE SHIMA then skirt west coast KYUSHU to distance of not more than 200 miles from launching point. If enemy fleet not reported by then TG 58.1 air groups strike KOKUBU airfield. TG 58.3 air group strike KANOYA airfield and TG 58.4 air groups strike KUSHIRA and KANOYA east airfields. If airfields are attacked VT loaded with torpedoes strike any shipping target or if none jettison. Ships may be in KAGOSHIMA BAY. Arming Plan A Alternate modified so that not more than 1/2 VT carry torpedoes. Retain at least 56 VF per TG for CAP. Request ComSubPac furnish rescue submarines UNSTAYINONOTDNEEE, 2 and 4 if practicable and advise.

28 0649 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMINCH Info COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLIT.

Request authority assign 2 PB4Y squadrons temporarily to 7thFlt as relief for 2 PV squadrons with the understanding that they will be available for return to PacFlt when needed.

28 0905 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH.

Your 170057 and 270351. Maintain token occupation of NAUSORI airfield as of post-war significance. US installations at LAUTHALA seaplane base which was developed primarily by NEW ZEALAND may be dismantled or abandoned.
MARCH (GCT)

28 0904 CINCPAC ADV to COM7THFLT Info COMINCH, CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, CINCSPWA.

Cominich 262044. Ships can be released to you as follows. LAVACA (APA 180) is now unloading at SAMAR and is immediately available. DAWSON (APA 79) and BOTETOURT (APA 136) are loading on west coast for ESPIRITU SANTO with arrival dates of 15 April and 23 April respectively. LST 172 can be released in S0SOLs by 1 May. Desire LAVACA returned GUAM upon completion lift as indicated in ref despatch. Orders will be issued to ships when you advise locations desired.

28 0503 CTF 57 to COM7THFLT Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, CINCBFF.

Daylight air operations comprising 574 sorties were carried out against MIYAKO and ISHIGAKI on 26 and 27 March. Para 2. All airfields were thoroughly bombed and strafed. Installations, facilities, and barracks continuously attacked. Para 3. 20 plus aircraft were shot up on ground. Some of these are believed to have been previously damaged. Para 4. Only 1 aircraft airborne. This shot down at HIRARA. Para 5. Several coasters hit. 1 blew up. Other administrative buildings fired and OHAMA TOWN left burning. Para 6. Photographic results poor owing to cloud. Para 8. No air opposition flak moderate to heavy. Para 8. Losses due to flak 6 aircraft. Other losses 11 aircraft. Para 9. Killed and missing all causes 5 pilots and 4 aircrew. Para 10. This force was sighted during forenoon 26th and again by night 26/27, but was not attacked.

28 1512 CTR 52 to COM7THFLT, CTF 51, Info CINCPAC ADV, TF 51 (ECM HOLDERS).

Summary as of 281800(I). During night 27/28 MORRISON and SHEA off eastern OKINAWA made good attacks on sub contact. TOLMAN while on patrol of NAG0 WAB engaged 3 Jap MTBs having estimated speed 32 knots which sortied therefrom and made torpedo attack on her. 2 MTBs definitely sunk possible 4 others. No damage to TOLMAN. H A WILLEY STRANGELY and ADAMS at night patrol at objective splashed 2 planes which attacked them. No damage to WILLEY slight damage to ADAMS who reported part of 1st plane and most of pilot landed aboard. After part HALLIGAN is grounded eastern shore TOKASHIKI. CTG 51.1 investigating. Further details including disposition classified documents and ECM equipment when known. TOKASHIKI secured morning of 27. Only snipers remain ARA. Sporadic fighting still continued 26/27 this morning. AWARE uninhabited. Incomplete reports own total casualties KIA 24 WIA 65 enemy KIA 292 POW 49 including 1 officer. More suicide attack boats captured same with booby traps. 12 women found strangled and 1 baby alive in cave. TG 51.20 arrived and established seaplane base. Planes will arrive commencing tomorrow morning. Northern net installed and southern net installation nearing completion. TG 50.18.34 arrived. Tankers commence fueling operations and reamunitioning scheduled to commence tomorrow. Minesweeping progress expected to permit UDT reconnaissance on preferred and demonstration beaches tomorrow. UDT reconnaissance COMMEMORAL TO KEISE during minesweeping operations SKYLARK (AM63) struck mine and sank in Lat 26-20.5 N Long 127-41 FFNPYBOIBEE E. TOLMAN reports recovering 11 officers 90 men of whom 5 and 20 WIA respectively. Evidence that enemy is launching floating mines off western OKINAWA possibly floating down BASHIGAWA. Increasing night patrol off beaches tonight. Naval gunfire proceeded on schedule but at ranges 3 to 11,000 yards because of unswept water. Expect to get in to close range tomorrow. Support aircraft very active on OKINAWA 2 MTBs destroyed and probable base at TOBUCHI heavily hit. 5 landing barges strafed 3 set afire. Many gun positions attacked. Several planes on YONTAN Field strafed about 4 apparently still serviceable.

- Continued -

2805
28 1512 CTF 52 to COM5THELT, CTF 51 Info CINCPAC ADV, TF 51 (CONT'D)

there. YORKTOWN pilot who had spent 3 days in cave OKINAWA rescued off MACHINATO TOWN by combined efforts ELLISON and VOs from SAN FRANCISCO. Pilot states Japs fire own guns from caves into ground to confuse our spotters. 2 of own planes collided over objective no survivors seen. During air attacks yesterday morning 1 own VF and 1 VT crashed probably hit by own AA no survivors. 2 VF had water landing pilots recovered. Weather good for all types operations today and same weather forecast tomorrow.

28 2310 CINCPAC ADV to CTF 93, 94 Info ISCOM IWO, COMAIR IWO, DEPCOM20THAF.

Paral. My serial 0005000 of 7 January CTF 93 280704. Take following action. (A) Direct ComAir IWO report CTF 93 for additional duty connection offensive operations. (B) Direct ComAir IWO assign fighters to operational control CTF 93 or DepCom 20th AF by allocations from his command on request from those 2 commanders. (C) Transfer VMB 612 from TF 93 to 94.

28 1614 GHQ SWPA SGD MACARTHUR to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COFS WD, COMGENPOA,ADVONGHQ.

CX 13132. Your 211042 relative to facilities support of POA divisions re-survey of resources for the development of PHILIPPINE bases in progress. Statement is being made to Chief of Staff of our requirements to fulfill the provisions of FILBAS Agreement. The great destruction of facilities which were in part depended on to provide adequate discharge rates, and inability to construct others rapidly impose a problem beyond the resources of this theater. These conditions are correctable quickly only by provision of a considerable amount of long range self beaching equipment to assist in bringing in service units, materials and equipment from rear areas, and ship-side floating equipment to unload heavy ships. Our requirements being submitted to the Chief of Staff will include 150 LSTs and 150 LCTs the former to be employed a minimum of 4 months. With early provision of this equipment and a moderate increase in engineer battalions and heavy shipping, an endeavor will be made to accept POA divisions for staging in accord with the timing indicated your 180736 February. The plan will provide staging for 1 Corps each IYRT, CEBU, LOTT. Port facilities, port and depot service, and hospitalization, access roads, water and construction materials, will be provided. Engineer units of divisions so staging will be expected to arrive early and extend program of internal camp development. Final preparation by HUONGSPXGEUZ can you assist in provision of above specified self-beaching equipment.

28 0520 COMFWDAREA to ISCOM SAIPAN, GUAM, AIRDEFCONS DR MARIANAS Info ISCOM TINIAN, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFORD, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMGENAFTPOA, CINCPAADV, COMGEN21BOMCOM CTG 50.5, CTU 50.5, CTU 50.5, CTU 50.5, MAG 21.

Dissolve ADC MARIANAS (TU 94.4.1) and in lieu thereof form the following local air defense commands: (A) Air Defense Command SAIPAN-TINIAN (COL. Saxton, AUS) under IsCom SAIPAN. (B) Air Defense Command GUAM (Lt. Col. South, USMC) under IsCom GUAM. Aircraft deployment as follows. For day defense retain VMF 225 at GUAM. At SAIPAN ComAirPacSubCompord thru the senior air group commander will assign minimum of 10 VF and pilots from CV training groups for exclusive use of IsCom SAIPAN during daylight hours with remaining Navy fighters present as a ready reserve available for air defense in emergencies. Administrative control CV planes and pilots remains with ComAirPacSubComFord. For night defense retain VMF(N) 534 at GUAM with a 6 plane detachment at SAIPAN under
28 07 MARCH

28 05 20 COMFDAREA to ISCOM SAIPAN, ISCOM GUAM AIRDEF COMDR MARIANAS ETC. (CONT'D)

IsCom SAIPAN rotating as necessary. 6th Night Fighter Squadron available for other assignments when this deployment accomplished. For anti-submarine patrol VMTB 131 (until relieved by VF 152) based at Guam with detachment at Tinian under ADC SAIPAN-TINIAN. Control and coordination of aerial target practice areas presently under ADC MARIANAS remains with ADC SAIPAN-TINIAN. Para. AD Comdr reduce personnel in present ADC MARIANAS making surplus available for other assignment after requirements are met. Reorganization effective about 1 April. Notify originator when accomplished. When reorganization complete Brig Gen Cushman, USMC, will be made available for reassignment.

29 1600 CTF 52 to COM 5THFLT, CTF 51 Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, TF 51.

Summary as of 29/1800I(-9). Last night enemy planes were reported landing and taking off from fields on OKINAWA by ships on patrol whose interdiction fire at long range due to minefields was ineffective. Estimate 20 to 30 planes made uncoordinated attacks on ships on patrol stations and in retirement areas. About 14 planes destroyed by AA and crash attacks. Of these at least 4 suiciders. In these attacks LSM(R) 188 had serious damage beyond capacity of repair in this area and is now in KERAMA anchorage. Other ships had little or no damage. WYANDOT (AKA 92) in night retirement sustained underwater damage forward from near bomb miss. At last report flooding under control and ship entering KERAMA. HA WILEY observed SARGENT BAY VF shot down by AA at 0615I(-9) and rescued pilot apparently uninjured. 4 engagements between ships on night patrol and Jap boats. 4 boats destroyed plus 1 possible. Of them 3 were attempting to reach MAE SHIMA from TOKASHIKI and blew up when hit. 1 survivor of a sunken boat was taken prisoner. LCI(G) 558 was shaken by depth charge attacks by Jap boats and 2 engines placed out of commission. LSM(R) casualties reported 11 KIA 3 MIA 37 WIA. Other casualties in all above actions reported as 5 WIA none serious of whom 3 injured by own 40mm fire. HALLIGAN survivors now total 1 officer 150 enlisted of whom 1 officer 20 men WIA. Dispatch to all ships present to report survivors on board fails to disclose more. KERAMA RETTO had several air alerts last night. 1 bomb dropped on ZAMAMI. Islands all secured. Troops less 1 battalion patrolling TOKASHIHI and garrison ZAMAMI reloaded. Army casualties total 24 KIA 61 WIA none MIA. Enemy 306 KIA 99 POW. Estimated 140 sealed in caves. LCI(G) 462 580 nonoperational due non combat damage and required drydocking for repairs. Fueling and ammunitioning schedule underway at KERAMA RETTO. Planes from seaplane base now executing ASP operations. Buoy in seaplane and installation light on AWARE completed. 290 suicide attack boats destroyed in KERAMA RETTO 2 retained for intelligence. Documents giving table of organization total number these boats this area and plan for use in defense OKINAWA captured. Possible 700 more in GUNTO mostly on OKINAWA. Jap 2nd Lieutenant specialist in these boats also captured. Boats appear identical to description JICFOA weekly intelligence bulletin Vol. 1 NBR 3226 of Feb. 45. Minesweeping now substantially on schedule. Mines reported being swept in area W. Approximate total 123 swept and destroyed. Lost found in area C2. UDT reconnaissance successfully completed all preferred beaches demonstration beaches and KEISE SHIMA. Negligible enemy reaction on preferred beaches. Detailed reports not yet received but no casualties to ships or personnel have been reported. Demolition on preferred beaches scheduled tomorrow. Support aircraft supported UDT operations and strafed and bombed NAHA KADEN and YONAN Fields as well as gun positions. GAP splashed a Val. 2 enemy planes shot down over airfields

- Continued -
15 destroyed on ground and others strafed. Underground hangars discovered at YONTAN. 2 boats and several guns destroyed. Unsuccessful search for ANZIC plane which failed to return from night ASP. Planes report complete lack of observable activity on IE SHIMA. Airfield still trenched and barricaded. Fire support ships successfully covered UDT operations. Reports and photos show ships beginning to locate and hit defenses with increasing effectiveness. Arrivals objective BOWDITCH SHELDRAKE. Weather partly cloudy slight sea no swell off western OKINAWA. Wind NNE 8 knots.

The rapidly increasing requirements for bombs and other aerial munition to support the VLR program are placing an increasingly heavy load on the limited available shipping which can only be met through a sharp curtailment in movement of materials other materials. Critical examination of all currently authorized construction and development projects in the MARIANAS is being made with a view to elimination of all possible projects and parts of projects. Request you review your projects and proposed projects with a view to further elimination or curtailment, with consequent reduction in shipments of materials pertaining thereto. Current projects not immediately essential to the prosecution or support of combat operations will be eliminated, deferred or reduced. Proposed future projects both in MARIANAS and elsewhere will be reviewed and reduced, eliminated or deferred on same basis. Reduction in allocations of ship tonnage for maintenance supplies and materials of all types will be made by Cinpoa as necessary to provide essential munitions for VLR support up to the maximum practicable limit and all aades will be prepared for such reductions. Last 2 info aades take action to make similar surveys of projects under their cognizance and be prepared to correct material shipments as directed by Cinpoa.

Para 1. My plans for operations to be conducted during the remainder of 1945 require the active operation of a minimum of 17 shore based Marine Fighter or fighter bomber squadrons. 5 groups (15 squadrons) will be engaged in active combat at bases north and west of the MARIANAS and these squadrons will continue to be Corsair equipped. 1 squadron in the MARSHALLS and 1 at PELELIU could use other types if necessary. Para 2. Information supplied by ComAirPac indicates that the supply of Corsairs will be short as to necessitate operating with inadequate pools of aircraft for support of Corsair squadrons afloat and ashore and that complements of an increased number of reforming CVGs must be all Hellcats. ComAirPac estimates Corsair deficits of 200 in May and 280 in December. Para 3. Request that any action practicable be taken to increase Corsair deliveries to Pacific Fleet.

Refer CNO secret serial 0017531. Recommend approval of the division by types of the 60 VPB Sqdns provided for in para 3 of reference. Para. Recommend decommissioning VPB sqdns 33,34,52,54 and 216 now. Para. Recommend no VS Sqdns be decommissioned at this time. Para. Recommend that the division be ultimately supported by crew replacement program and that every effort be exerted by the training establishment to maintain the squadrons on a sound
rotation basis. Para. Until PacFlt VPB crew replacement program is firm or until tempo of operations in NorPac warrants deploying all NorPac squadrons forward continuously in that area intend to rotate them between ALASKA and West Coast. Para. This summarizes recommendations contained in speedletter correspondence being forwarded air mail.

A review of the DM and DMS situation indicates a current requirement of 12 of the former and 24 of the latter for employment in PacFlt operations. It is anticipated that the last of the above DMS now undergoing conversion from DDs will be ready for service in the Pacific in June. Para. It is not contemplated that these numbers will be increased nor that those which may be lost due to battle casualties will necessarily be replaced. The hazardous nature of their duty however may result in casualties to such a degree that prompt replacement would become an urgent necessity. Such replacement could not be readily effected under present circumstances because (A) Conversion of additional DD is slow due to the material required much of which has to be manufactured (B) Old DM and DMS have reached an age and a material condition which renders them unfit for duty in combat areas. Para. In connection with old DM and DMS 5 of these ships now have availability on west coast and several more will be made available shortly. The expenditure in manpower and critical materials to make these ships satisfactory for combat operations is considered to be out of all proportion to their value to the fleet. Para. In view of the foregoing the following recommendations are made: (A) In order to enable quick conversion of 1630 ton DD to DMS provide 6 spare sets of conversion material to be held in readiness on west coast. Each set consisting of material not ordinarily available in navy yards, to convert 1 ship. (B) For the same purpose but in connection with DM provide 2 spare sets of conversion material as above to convert 2200 ton DD to DM. (C) Limit the overhaul and accomplishment of alterations on all 1200 ton DM and DMS now assigned PacFlt to a minimum in the interest of conserving critical materials and labor. Refit these ships to enable them to provide training services to the fleet, or to be employed as escorts in the rear area. Re-classify as ODD'S.
31 0643 CTF 52 to COM5THFLT, CTF 51 Info TF 51.

Consider preparations and prospective weather will permit successful landing on OKINAWA tomorrow in accordance with preferred plan. KEISE secured this morning and landing of artillery commenced. Further details in my 1800 I(-9) summary.

31 0804 CINCPOA ADV to COMINCH, CNO Info COMAIRPAC, CTF58, CINCPAC PEARL, COM5THFLT.

Concerning ComAirPac 240544 following extract from CTF 58 serial 0045 of 13 March is concurred in by Cincpac and Com5thFlt: "Recent comments have proposed additional aviators to TG Comdrs for the purpose of coordinating air attacks. It is the opinion of CTF 58 that this additional overhead of pilots and aircraft is not warranted or necessary. Each TG contains 3 or more air group commanders whose primary duty has been and will be to control and coordinate as necessary the operations of TG sweeps and strikes. These air group commanders are considered fully qualified and authorized to represent their TG commander in the air in this capacity."

31 0833 CINCPOA ADV to COMINCH, CNO Info COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMWESSEAFRONTIER.

Your 282021 to ComAirPac. ComAirPac 300748. See my 300418. Strongly recommend allocation Corsairs to RNZAF be reduced in order maintain supply to PacFlt at a more satisfactory level. Cincpoa has no need for RNZAF fighters in the present strategic situation.

31 1248 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCLANT Info COMAIRLANT, COMEASTSEAFRON, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMPASEAFRON, CG PAN DEPARTMENT, COMWESSEAFRON, COMAIRWESTCOAST, COMAIR ALAMEDA, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMAIRPAC.

Withdraw VPB 32 and VPB 84 from EastSeaFron and remaining 3 aircraft VPB 84 from PaSeaFron. Transfer these squadrons to West Coast port designated by ComWestSeaFron for temporary duty ready to operate commencing 20 April for duration San Francisco Conference. Para. As replacement for above squadrons transfer 1 PBM squadron from each of CaribSeaFron and PaSeaFron for duty in EastSeaFron.

011300 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 2 011300. Landings on all beaches continued with good progress inland against light opposition. Beachhead has been secured from small arms fire. Approximately 50,000 troops have landed over beaches including 8 RCT with FA Bns 2 Bns medium artillery and approximately 15,000 service troops. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire received on beaches early morning. AA fire meager. 420th FA Group with 2 Bns 155 guns in position KEISE SHIMA and firing in support ground troops. This Bn received heavy artillery fire early hours morning with no damage. Liaison plane strike KEISE SHIMA now in operation. Front lines as follows: 3rd PhilCorps: TA 7895 KO 7995 KOE 8096 UV 8195 ALRSY 8295U 8294 ABCHNOLT 8394 PV 8393 CICOTY 8392 EY 8491 AU 8490 A 8390 JB 24th Corps: TA 8689 LON 8688 CX 8687 DX 8686 DK 8686 JU 8486 TW 8485 BAN 8484 COTY 8483 EU 8482 A 8382 JW 8381 CF. 1 HANCOCK SP26 made water landing 110 degrees 16 miles ZUMPA at 0805 with 2 crew members rescued by CALHOUN. 1 FM SAGITAN BAY crashed in flames inland 0925 no survivors. 9 F4U INTREPID used 113/4" rockets on support missions. 1 CABOT TEM crash landed NAKAGUSUKU WAN 1109. Crew rescued by Dumbo PBM. 1 PBM engaged

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2810
WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT SECTOR 140 degrees to 160 degrees from BOLO 500 miles distant. 1 enemy aircraft shot down 0500 reported carrying robot bomb similar to German HENSCHEL type 293. Small raid bogies approached from north at 1900 passed over transport area. Night fighter splashed 1 Zeke. 1 suicide hit WEST VIRGINIA 1945. Fire was started but immediately controlled no other details. Para. Unloading supplies over HAGUSHI beaches commenced using LVTs DUKWs LSMs and LST s. AWS 8 unloaded on NAGANNU. Para. Direct fire support throughout day by 10 OBB BBE 3 CL 23 DD and 177 LCI, LSM support type. ARKANSAS in position north of NAHA air strip was fired upon by coast defense gun with no hits received. LST 884 hit by suicide plane with extensive damage by fire. Towed to KERAMA RETTO. LST 824 received light damage by near miss of suicide plane. LCI(M) 807 suffered mortar explosion while checking misfire. 1 KIA 1 WIA 12 overboard with injuries unknown rescued by small boats. ADAMS hit at stern port side during suicide attack by 2 planes with substantial damage to port side deck rudder and ramroom. Depth charge rack damaged. Ship badly shaken up. No personnel casualties. Downed 1 Tojo. MADISON destroyed floating mine believed mark 6 at 2141-30N 128-14E 31 March. High order detonation. Transport Group E sighted 5 mines area 20-22 N 130-132 during movement LEYTE to OKINAWA. BARTON probably destroyed 1 submarine 1555 31 March. After 2nd attack submarine was seen to come to surface and go down immediately. Retrack made by BARTON. Heavy oil slick with diesel odor observed. Further search unproductive. Logistic replenishment all types carried on at KERAMA RETTO. Para. Direct air support furnished by CVEs and fast carriers. Search flights to north made by PBM planes from KERAMA RETTO. PBM planes from KERAMA RETTO covered 5 sectors ASP. Propaganda bombs were dropped. CHENANGO ASP plane ditched 75 miles south ZAMPA at 2105. Search by DD negative. 1 TBM ESSEX shot down by AA fire near ZAMPA with 2 crew members rescued by MUSTIN.

Flash summary No. 1 as of 011100. Preceded by intense naval and air bombardment troops of 10th Army began landing HAGUSHI beaches at 0830 I. Troops landed on all beaches against very light opposition. Practically no fire against boats none against ships. Considerable number tanks and artillery landed regimental reserves now landing. Troops are advancing inland standing up. All of YONTAN and KADENA airfields are in our possession. Troops of 3rd PhibCorps along approximate line 7859Q to 8294K to 8292I to 8191 to 8290K with advanced patrols. 24th Corps have elements in 8389 8489 8388 8286 8484 8383. Para. HINSDALE (APA 121) hit by mine or torpedo engine room flooded troops transferring other craft. Towing to KERAMA. ADAMS (DM 27) hit by suicide plane. 7 enemy aircraft shot down by CAP and AA fire. Para. Have sent for 4 transport carriers with garrison aircraft.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info CTF 51, COMGENTENTH, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

CTF 52 311640 last 2 sentences indicate IE SHIMA may be evacuated. Assume that this condition if it exists will be exploited. Early rehabilitation IE SHIMA will simplify many problems both now and in the future.
Cumulative evidence contained in combat reports of KAISER Class CVE indicates practicability of operating 20 VF(PM-2) and 12 VTB. Recommend increasing complement of VC squadrons attached to Kaiser CVEs from 16 \textbf{km} VF and 12 VTB to 20 VF and 12 VTB. If approved this program would be implemented as rapidly as planes and pilots become available after CVE 105 Class and present operating requirements of CVG and CVLUG have been met. New subject. Also indicated is the need for a VC squadron in each Kaiser Class CVE Division that is trained in observation and spotting of shore bombardment. Recommend that presently designated VC squadrons be redesignated as VC squadrons and that 1 VC squadron per division be trained in the observation and spotting of gunfire for shore bombardment.

QUEENFISHSS 393) to COMSUBPAC

QUEENFISH 2nd. Deeply regret sinking AWA MARU at 010500Z (GCT) posit 25-25 Long 120-07. Surface attack in fog with firing range 1200 yards. 4 torpedo explosions seen but lights on ship not visible. Ship exploded and sank immediately with few survivors or debris. Picked up 1 who identifies ship as 12,000 ton NYK Liner 2 years old. He stated definitely that cargo consisted of rubber, tin, lead. 2,000 Nips on board but no troops, wounded or POW. Decision to attack based on single ship speed 17 with initial range only 17,000 yards. Believed ship to be destroyer or DE and used 3 foot depth setting. Location of attack 11 mile from posit SEAFOX attacked 7 ship convoy 10 hours earlier getting 1 hit.

CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 3 as of 021200. Both Corps reported quiet night with some sniper, machine gun and mortar fire. Estimate enemy has withdrawn his major forces to southern part of island. Attack resumed 0830. Being pushed vigorously so as to take full advantage of light resistance. Patrols from reserves mopping up pockets rear areas. Fragmentary reports indicate our troops have reached major portion L-3 line and continuing advance against minor opposition. Naval gunfire heavy air strikes support the attack with schedule and call fires. 6 piloted bombs or rockets having wing spread 15 feet cigar shaped body 15 feet long captured and held for JICPOA Intelligence Team. KADENA airfield reported serviceable for emergency landings. Some construction work necessary to make fully operative. OY planes landed YONTAN airfield today. Propaganda bombs dropped 0830. Reports indicate civilian populace considerable numbers taking advantage of surrender terms of leaflets. Tentative identifications enemy units reported all sources include: 32nd Army Hq, 62nd Div, 22nd InfReg, 24th Eng. Reg of 24th InfDiv, miscellaneous units including 11th Shipping Group. No enemy ground activity KERAMA REPTO during past 24 hours. Para. Gunfire support furnished throughout night by 3 OBB 8 CL 14 DD gunboats, ARCHENAR on night retirement hit by suicide plane. Fire quickly extinguished. Ship maintained position in formation. Extensive structural damage including 3 holds inoperative, deck winches damaged, radar out, no electric power forward, light flood forward. 5 KIA, 40 WIA. TYRELL hit by suicide plane with slight damage. 1 MTA. Skirmish received bomb miss from 2 attacks mast height. 1 20mm gun knocked out. 1 JIA. VALENTI damaged starboard shaft resulting from accidental dropping 300 pound depth charge due striking floating plank. Preliminary damage report WEST VIRGINIA hit by suicide plane 1913 1st April shows frame 69 port side 02 deck, galley, laundry, engineers compartment damaged. 250 Kg dud bomb.
shattered on second deck. 2 20mm guns wrecked. 5 inch range finder damaged. 3 KIA 9 WIA 1 MIA. Ship fully operative. LCI 580 aground KERAMA RETTO. Both shafts and propellers damaged. KCI 462 also aground KERAMA RETTO. Port shaft screw damaged. Fire aboard LST 884 hit by suicide plane 1st April caused loss individual organic equipment. 1 Inf. Company, detachment amphibious tractor. Corrected casualties reported by INDIANAPOLIS 9 KIA 18 WIA. Demonstration group conducted 2nd demonstration off southeastern beaches 0830. COPA established KERAMA RETTO. Logistics replenishment continuing satisfactorily. 1 AO being brought HAGUSHI beach to expedite refueling. Sweep unit 2 on station PL6 tracked several small surface targets from northwest corner YURON ISLAND at 30,000 yards within 2500 yards at 30 to 45 knots but not sighted. Para. Direct air support furnished troops by CVEs and fast carriers with other attack missions made by offcoming CAP which strafed 30 boats various sizes along western beaches north of ZAMPA. Search flights made PBMs covering 5 sectors. ASP patrol flown by PBMs KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. Enemy air attacks from 1800 to 1930 1st April and 2300 1st to 0700 2nd with approaches from north and south in 11 raids and many single attacks. 6 enemy destroyed by gunfire, 5 by VF during period LUNGA POINT and SAGINAW BAY hit down 10 0856. 1 BENNINGTON VF made water landing 208 degrees 45 miles from ZAMPA at 1000 with rescue by WIKES. Para. Beach conditions good with general unloading started. Weather low scattered cumulus clouds 1/10 at 1500 feet. Visibility good, wind ENE 10 to 20 knots. Temperature 74 degrees. No appreciable swell of surf.

CTF 51 to COM 5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TF & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 04,1800 (No. 4, 03,1800)(?). Ground forces made good progress this afternoon. Reports indicate elements 3rd PhibCorps reached I-5 line ZA 6th MarDiv with 1st MarDiv approaching 5-5 line. 24th Corps advanced rapidly east in ZA 7th InfDiv south and east ZA 96th InfDiv. at 1FUR 50 2nd battalion 17th Inf reached east coast vicinity TOBARA TA 9085. On the corps right 96th Div advanced into rugged terrain to east encountering stiffening resistance. The division right pushed through to vicinity FUTEMA TOWN with advance elements penetrating ISA TA 8380. All division CPs in operation ashore. Air observers reported enemy activity including troop concentration area southeast NAHA airfield. Enemy opposition mostly by small scattered units engaging in sporadic mortar small arms fire. Due rapid advance front lines are fragmentary: 3rd PhibCorps TA 81978 8296AY 8395AY 8494AY 85994U 8593AGLOV 8592BCHMW 8591DICTY 8690AV 8689BCHM 24th Corps: 9188X 9178CK 8584EHU 8583A 8483 JX 8482DX 8481E 8531AHOSRVU 8481XU 8281XU. Para. Gunfire support furnished by 3 BB 9 cruisers 21 DD and gunboats. Few call fires during day necessary due weak resistance. ANZIO conducted hunter-killer operation on CAP plane radar contact in 25-15N 128-22E. No report. PORTERFIELD strafed by Jap fighter 0021. No damage to ship 1 KIA. Rearming all types continues satisfactorily. LCI 568 reported hit by plane 1859. No other details. Para. Direct air support continued by CVEs and fast carriers. CAP coming off station destroyed 12 barges, 2 50 foot boats, 3 small boats in NAKAGESUKU WAN and NOTOBO PENINSULA. Support aircraft north discovered 12 mines 100 yards offshore in area NE MAGAHAMA TA 8197. 4 exploded by strafing with destruction continuing by aircraft. Search flights were made by PBM and ASP planes KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. OY planes ashore from CVEs brodie LCT. Total 19 OYs at YONTAN and KADEN airfields. SAN JACINTO TBM crashed near NAHA 1305. No survivors. MARCUS ISLAND FM plane made water landing 65 miles bearing 050 ZAMPA at 1230. COLHOUN rescued pilot. 1st carrier plane landed Kadena Field.
when CHENANGO F6F made emergency landing 1617 due AA fire. 1 crew member WIA. 2 TBM's sprinked DDT occupied area OKINAWA 1630. Additional propaganda bombs dropped. Flash RED 1837 estimated 12 to 15 enemy planes approached from north southwest. HORNET night fighters definitely shot down 2 Jills. 1 probable. BENNION probably splashed 1. WICKES reports 2 planes shot down by gunfire near her 50 miles bearing 210 from ZAMPA. General unloading continues satisfactorily.

02 1225 CTF 51 Summary (Cont'd)

02 2120 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGENFMFPAC Info CG3DMARDIV, CO FWDECHFMFPAC, CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COMMARCORPS.

Advised existing instructions issued by you for rotation of personnel 3rd MarDiv or any other MarDiv. Desire in the future any plans for rotation of personnel in MarDives which have a major effect on the combat readiness of those units be referred to Cincpac for approval. Further desire existing instructions for mass rotation of personnel 3rd MarDiv or any other Divs be held in abeyance pending action by Cincpac.

24 0534 GHQ SWPA to COMGEN ARMY SERVICE FORCES Info CNO. CNO passed above to CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMWESSEAFRON for Info.

02 1930 Refer GHQ SWPA CX 12886, Subject assignment of troop ships to SWPA. Reference is made to CNO signal 032000 (GCT) of June 44 which assigned 10 troop ships to this theater as result of a request made by Major General MARPALL when on a visit to Washington at about that time. In view of the greatly increased lines of communications within this theater and the greater number of troops deployed it is being clearly demonstrated that the troop ships assigned to the theater are inadequate to meet requirements. Owing to the inefficiency of moving troops in cargo ships and to the extensive requirements that exist within the theater for moving cargo (supplies from AUSTRALIA and rolling up rear bases) the use of Liberty ships other than cargo movements is most undesirable. It is requested that 10 additional troop ships be assigned to this theater for employment until our deployment of troops into the PHILIPPINES is completed. And average capacity of 2000 troops with 2000 measurement tons of cargo and a capability of moving in 14 knot convoys is desirable.

02 1940 CNO to CINCPOA PEARL Info CINCPAC ADV, CINCSWPA, COMWESSEAFRON, COM7THFLT.

Refer GHQ SWPA CX 12886 being passed to you by CNO 021930. Allocation of 10 troopships to CINCSWP for 60 day retention to meet requirements approved. JMTC proposes assignment of following vessels to CINCSWP. SEA SCAMP, CAPE COD, EXCHANGE, LPA MARLIN, CAPE CLEARE, JOHN LYKES, CAPE HENLOPEN, GEN PATRICK (AP 150), GEN MORRIS (AP 149), GEN BLATCHFORD (AP 153). Request those vessels now in your area be made available to SWPA unless some or all are obligated for return loadings to US in which case recommission comparable substitutions which may be made available to CINCSWP at approximately same dates.

03 0819 CINCPOA ADV to CTFs 93, 94, 51, COM5THFLT Info COMAIRPAC, COMPHOTO GRP 2, CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COMFAIRVITING ONE, COMGEN 21 BOMCOM, ISCOM GUAM.

Photo Group 2 assigned to direct operational control Cincpoa effective 0000 (I) (-9) 8 April. This change in assignment will in no way change services now being rendered to all commands concerned.
03 1300 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV Info COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT.

Provided such action is satisfactory to CINCSWPA your 280649 approved because of shortage of Venturas. If the 2 FB4Y squadrons are withdrawn they should be replaced with equivalent of 2 PV squadrons which they are relieving.

03 1310 CTF 51 to COM7THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TF & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 6 as of 031800. Both Corps advanced rapidly in their respective ZA with negligible resistance. 3rd Phib Corps: Reconnaissance elements 6th MarDiv extended operations along north coastal road to L plus 15 line reporting they would continue operations southeast along road from NAKADOMARI TA 8798 to ISHIKAWA TA 9097. This division made steady progress in rugged terrain confronting them and have reached L plus 10 line in left of their ZA and division right flank is within 800 yards L plus 10 line. 1st MarDiv drove its left flank to the vicinity SUNAN TA 8995 SE to point 200 yards E of INUBI TA 9193 thence S to corps boundary along L plus 10 line to KATSUREN BAY. From this point line extended across KATCHIN PENINSULA isolating same. KATCHIN PENINSULA reconnoitered. No enemy or installations found. Reconnaissance in progress north along roads from SUSHIKAWA TA 9589 to HIZAONNA TA 9095. Plan to land 2nd MarDiv 5 April on YELLOW beaches. 24th Corps: Area from Corps boundary S to AVASHI PENINSULA seized and latest reports indicate 7th Div line as KUBA TA 8960 to UMJO TA 8781 thence SE to Div boundary. 96th Div advanced south along west coast to CHIYUANNA TA 8380 and FUTAMA TA 8481. Rapid movement troops precludes showing fixed lines. Division reports attacked by 5 men and 11 women dressed in soldiers uniforms. Women committed suicide when attack failed. 12th Ind Inf En identified. (Part 2). Para. Fire support provided 24th Corps by 1 OBB 3 CA-CL 10 DD. 3rd Corps by 3 OBB 3 CA-CL 3 DD. General support eastern bombardment 1 OBB 1 CA 6 DD. Special Army support 1 OBB 1 DD. COLORADO reports good fire effect tank park and troop assembly, TA 7969. Minesweeping off eastern island covered by 2 CA 2 DD. OlO R W SUESENS splashed 1 Tony KERAMA RETTO not previously reported. FOREMAN hit by bomb starboard side Ol20 with major engineering damage 4 WIA. LST 599 set afire during air raid early morning. Ship inoperative. Cargo ruined. BUNCH slight damage starboard side while alongside DICKERSON fighting fire. Repaired by ships force. Para. Direct air support furnished troops by CVEs and fast carriers. TG 58.1 covers SAKISHIMO GUNTO while TG 57 fueling. Search flights and ASP by PBYS from KERAMA RETTO. Flash RED 1720 to 1830 with planes approaching from North in 6 groups. From SW 1 group. Enemy destroyed by gunfire: 1 by unknown DD at 1757. 1 by ABELE 1810. 1 by BENNION 1824 another by BENNION 1829. Destroyed by VF: 1 Zeke TULAGI FM 1722. 3 Judies HANCOCK F6Fs 1747. 2 by HANCOCK 1743. 1 by HANCOCK 1753. (Part 3). Own plane losses: 1 TBM TULAGI made crash landing YONTAN Field 1608, 1 Oscar landed YONTAN night 1 April. Pilot made normal approach and landing. Taxied plane to line. Shot by Marine when leaving plane. Para. Brief summary beach conditions follow: at 1730 53 LSTs and LSMs were being unloaded over the reef. At 0600 the 24th Corps shore party commander assumed command of the 7th & 96th Div beaches. BROWN beaches closed. Not needed due availability other beaches. New road being built in 1st MarDiv area. Lateral beach roads poor to fair. 24th Corps shore party building 4 lane highway parallel to beach. 24th Corps has built 4 or 5 sand ramps over reef. 3rd Phib Corps will build ramps when equipment lands. Unloading conditions generally satisfactory. Weather generally clear. ENE and E winds 3 to 12 knots. Temperature average 79 degrees. Visibility 10 miles. Slight sea no swell.
Information indicates eastern islands OKINAWA lightly held except for TSUGEN SHIMA. Minefield entrance NAKAGUSUKU WAN. Sweeping vicinity islands in progress. To avoid if possible committing 27th Div to assault. Eastern islands CTF 51,19 will execute reconnaissance in force of IKE SHIMA TAKA BATARE, HEANYO SHIMA, HAMAHITA SHIMA, TSUGEN SHIMA, KUTAKA SHIMA with amphibious reconnaissance battalion embarked in KINZER and SCRIBNER and UDTs 7 and 11 embarked in HOPPING and KLINE with UDT 21 as standby in BUNCH (FLAG). Gunfire, air and minesweeping support as requested. Commerce operations soon as possible not later than 6 April. ComGen 10 concurs including detail of recon battalion.

Summary No. 7 (041200). Both Corps continued to make rapid advances against no effective opposition. No enemy ground activity was report during night. 1st MarDiv seized HIXAMA TA 9095 after dark last night. No resistance. 1st MarDiv resumed advance at 0300 to seize L plus 20 line. 1200 reports indicated troops advancing rapidly on line FUTRSI TA 8800 to PFIKAWI TA 9097. 6th MarDiv pushed to east coast. Unconfirmed reports of 1135 indicated 3rdPhil Corps troops had reached east coast line in its ZA including KTVHIN PENINSULA 24th Corps advancing to L plus 20 line pushed south to the general line TOWN TA 8179 NODAKE TA 8540 KURI SAKI TA 8980. Previous report indicating SHURI and AWAASE being possible concentration points main enemy strength not confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. Para. 3 OBS 5 CA-CL 13 DD provided naval gunfire support. DD resting in comfort. WAKE ISLAND in area HELMET had 2 near misses from enemy plane 1750 3 April. Shell plate has 10 foot hole frame 25 below water line. Many shrapnel holes, LCI 82 in anti small craft screen operating outside NAKAGUSUKU WAN was sunk in action against enemy MTB also destroyed. LCI 347 has 41 survivors 4 WIA aboard. TRACY has 9 survivors 5 WIA aboard. Afternoon 3 April LCI(3) 559 on patrol north IE SHIMA picked up 8 men 1 woman civilians from small boat flying white flag. 0410 BENNETT took bogey under fire 260 degrees 70 miles from BOLO. Bogey retired north. 0504 SPROSTON reported near mss in area 010 degrees 45 miles from BOLO. 0240 ELLYSON and HEMBLETON repulsed attack by 2 to 3 enemy aircraft which used window and brilliant flares. ELLYSON HEMBLETON RODMAN attacked 3 times by single enemy aircraft from 0204 to 0410. No ships damaged. No planes shot down. 1500 3rd April WILLMARTH and BOWERS relieved HUDSON to continue search on contact CADY by ASP plane morning 3 April. WILLMARTH made 4 attacks 1800 with negative results. During A/S patrol 1825 2nd April northwest IE SHIMA RODMAN attacked on good sound contact in Lat 26-57N Long 127-21E. Contact loss after 1st run. MACOMB and plane assisted until 0400 when search abandoned. LCI 366 at 1130 3rd April destroyed floating mine TA 6770. Para. Direct air support by CVEs and fast carriers. Extensive reconnaissance and photograpic flights over entire target area has failed to locate any sizable enemy concentrations but HEED reported numerous previously unreported targets which have been subjected to air and naval bombardment. Strafing attack made by fighters on 50 foot boat near MOTOBU PENINSULA and on boats and seaplanes near RETTO SHIMA. Search flights made by PBMs from KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. ASP furnished by TFMs from CVEs in inner sectors and TFMs from seaplane base in outer sector. 1 PEM hit reef northwest corner KERAMA RETTO while taxiing night 2 April and sank all personnel recovered. Enemy air attacks occurred intermittently during night from 0200 to 0750. Planes approached
from north in small groups. Enemy planes destroyed by VF were 1 Betty by CAP at 0227, 1 Sonia by CAP 0434, 2 Zeke by HANCOCK F6Fs at 0747. No damage incurred from these attacks. 1615 3 April CAPOT F6F was downed in position 28-15N 129-45 E. 1124 BUNKER HILL F6F CAPOT MAIMAIMADEV made emergency landing YONTAN Field, 1155 Santee F6F made emergency landing YONTAN Field. 1 PBM Dumbo with 4 ESSEX fighters as cover at 0815 proceeded to rescue CAPOT and BATAAN pilot downed between AMAMI and KIKAI SHIMA and 1 CAPOT crewman rescued. Air delivery supplies made to units 1st MarDiv 0925 and 1130 by TBMS from FANSAN BAY NATOMA BAY. TBMs MAKIN ISLAND sprayed DDT over friendly areas. SARGENT BAY TEM dropped propaganda leaflets 1030. Floating mines sighted by air observer 0900 between IE SHIMA and OKINAWA. 1 exploded by strafing.

04 1230 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINC PAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 3 (041800). Reports this evening indicate our troops continued the advance against scattered resistance. 1 enemy group ambushed Company L 7th Marines in TA 9098 with 40 enemy killed. No report on our casualties. Elements 1st MarDiv are along line TA 9300C to TA 9203B blocking off north exits to isthmus. Entire east coast line from TA 9203B south to KUBASAKI TA 8980 now in our hands. 24th Corps advancing south reached the line UCHI TOH MAI TA 8078 KAMIYAMA TA 8378 to north edge of NAKHUSUKI TA 8379. Air observer reported many enemy troops in TA 7970 and 8070 and vehicles in TA 7865 were taken under fire by naval gunfire and air bombardment. Advance CP 24th Corps now ashore. Cumulative casualties to 032400 follow: 1st MarDiv 29 KIA 88 WIA 0 MIA. Battle total 117 NBC 30. 1st MarDiv 13 KIA 40 WIA 0 MIA. Battle total 53 NBC 35. 7th InfDiv 32 KIA 155 WIA 3 MIA. Battle total 190 NBC 54. 96th InfDiv 20 KIA 115 WIA 5 MIA. Battle total 140 NBC 14. 77th InfDiv 43 KIA 161 WIA 0 MIA. Battle total 204 NBC 48. 24th Corps non divisional units 1 WIA NBC 4. Grand total: Battle 705 NBC 205. 3rd Phib Corps non divisional units and Army not reported. Para. Fire support provided 3rd and 24th Corps by 2 OBB 6 CA-CL 14 DD. General support eastern bombardment 2 OBB 4 DD. Army support 3 OBB 1 DD. Ammunition replenishment exceeds current expenditures. Command of TG 51.1 transferred to ComTransRon 171900 2 April. PENSACOLA starboard propeller damaged by LST during rearming 31 March. 3 tips bent forward 2 to 6 inches. WILMARTH and BOWERS completed search on contact developed yesterday at 292 degrees 70 miles from BOLC. Results negative. SOLACE sailed for GUAM. Many unloaded transports departing tomorrow morning. Minesweeping being conducted around IE SHIMA and sections east of OKINAWA. Para. TF 59 attacked KIKAI and TOKENA Fields. This attack based on information from rescued pilot who spent last night in a boat off KIKAI SHIMA and who stated 10 enemy fighters landed there during night. Intensive air search north OKINAWA revealed few significant installation. Mines destroyed by aircraft east of IE SHIMA. Enemy air approached between 1700 to 1715 from SW and retired to west after closing 60 miles from OKINAWA. Chased by CAP without making contact. At 1425 F6F SUNWANEE crashed behind enemy lines. At 1700 TEMS crashed on take off from YONTAN Field. No casualties. 2 TEMS RUDYARD BAY sprayed DDT 1435. Air drop rations and water to 1st MarDiv at 1600. Friendly aircraft over IE SHIMA 0830 received light mauser AA fire from base of tower 8 western tip of TA 8134NW. 12 small boats destroyed this afternoon on YORONISHIMA by roving air patrol. No other pay targets this island visible. Para. Beach conditions follow: 24th Corps completed construction of roads in beach area. All barges and causeways in the OKINAWA Beach areas have been launched with the exception of 2 causeway sets. 23 barges
have mounted cranes and are in use as transfer stations. Several causeway piers are in use on various beaches. 22 barges are handling general cargo, 9 hauling fuel or ammunition, and 5 operation as Bowser fueling stations. Weather clear this morning with overcast this afternoon. Visibility good. Winds north to northnortheast 8 to 10 knots increasing to 20 this evening. Temperature average 74 degrees. Surf slight increasing to 4 to 6 feet by nightfall.

050006 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL.
Your 041212 understood and complied with. Logistic support Mid Pacific Striking Force will now depend on intermittent availability of oilers in transit. Therefore the prompt initiation and aggressive execution of your OpPlan 2-45 and mine of same number may be adversely affected. This for information connection your planning.

05 0028 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info Com7thFlt, COM5THFLT, CTF 58, CTF 57, CTF 51 COMGEN FEAF.
Cinapac PEARL 041932 to Com7thFlt. Request maximum attack on air bases northern FORMOSA.

05 0110 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COMAIRPAC, COM7THFLT, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMINCH & CNO, COMGENFEAF, COM MAIRWING ONE.
My 091337. Your CX 13451 DTG 031443 not to all. Marine Air Group 24 and 32 including their HedRons are available to you until 1 July.

(March) (05 1711) CINCPAC to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info BUDOCKS, DIPACDOCKS SANFRAN & PEARL.

05 0153 CINCPAC PEARL Info COMFWDAREA, CTG 94.5.
Construction Battalions will not be returned to the mainland for rehabilitation and reorganization. Reequipment will be accomplished at Pacific bases. Rehabilitation of personnel will be accomplished by individual replacements.

05 0527 COM5THFLT to 5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.
Com5thFlt shifted flag and administration to NEW MEXICO. Request Cinapac inform others who need to know.

05 0709 COMFWDAREA to ADC IWO JIMA Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMSUBPAC, VMB 612.
Until blind bombing zone approved by Cinapoa direct VMB 612 perform night ASP at IWO JIMA and attack shipping in harbors of Jap Empire. Will advise you immediately when other areas become available.

05 0730 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.
Summary No. 9 as of 051200. Minor enemy troop activity reported during night. 24th Corps reported high velocity or large caliber artillery fire 1,000 yards west of FUTEMA TA 8481 at 042004 from suspected positions north NAHA BAY. Counter battery fire on that target resulted in explosions and fires. 6th MarDiv continued attack north of L plus 20 line on ISHTIKAWA

- Continued -
PENINSULA. Patrols have been reported as far north as ONNA TA 9306 KOCHUDA TA 0805 and CHUDA TA 0511. 1st MarDiv patrolling the occupied zone and consolidating positions. 1st MarDiv reported landing of troops on YUBUCHI EHKA TA 0084, off KATSUREN PENINSULA at 0900. No further reports were received. 24th Corps were ordered to continue attack to the south with no reports received on progress. 96th InfDiv reported 2 tanks lost to land mines and 1 lost when dropped into camouflaged tank trap. ComGen 3rd Philippine Corps assumed command ashore 1500 4 April. Towns encountered so far not fortified. Captured enemy pilot states entire crew his plane had no prior combat experience. Ordered from training school to pick up plane at KISARAIN Naval Air Base. Flew to KINOA and proceeded to attack mission. (Part 2). Para. Call fire illumination and harassing fires furnished both Corps by 6 CA-CL 9 DD. 1 OBB, 1 CA 5 DD to eastern group. 1 OBB 1 DD on general support special missions. Accelerated unloading yesterday as result excellent UDT work preparing reef for LSTs on north beaches. 15 LSTs now able beach simultaneously. Unloading stopped all beaches last night due heavy surf with some damage to boats and landing craft shipping. Incomplete reports show LST 12 broached on WHITE 1 beach NV 0035 in bad condition with engines and generators out. 3 feet water forward compartments engine room after steering. LST 675 badly broached. LST 756 reported 2300 that reef punctured holes in ballast tanks and engine room. All power lost. Water coming in fast. PAKANA standing by. LST 689 broached on WHITE beach 3. LST 736 beached on WHITE 2 with engine room flooding. These craft unable retract due stage of tide and heavy loading. (Part 3). Many towing missions by tugs and some LCIs because barges and small craft adrift in anchorage. Further report from PROSTON and HAMBLETON. PROSTON received near miss from enemy bomb. Sonar gear and gyro deranged. Main battery computer jarred out of position. No personnel casualties. HAMBLETON suicider crashed close aboard after being shot down. Minor damage. Some underwater damage possible as vibration more prominent. No casualties. Sweeping in progress of minefield entrance NAKAGUSUKU WAN. Gunboat destroyed mine 2 miles NW southern tip OKINAWA 0900. LCS 115 at 0230 definitely sighted submarine at 1400 yards which submerged on approach to location 266 degrees 68 miles from BOLO. HUDSON in adjoining radar picket station despatched to area. 13W/41 PBM assigned for hunter-killer. HUDSON at 1000 reported making 2 firing runs and 3 dry runs on contact practically dead in water at 600 fathoms. Oil slick rising from contact. 4 other firing runs made earlier resulted in light oil slick hunter relieved by GENDREAU and BOWERS with 17W/61 now assisting. (Part 4). Replenishing and rearming at KERAMA RETTO continues satisfactory. Hulk of DICKERSON sunk. 29 Unloaded APA 2 LSV 21 escorts departed for GUAM and SAIPAN. Para. Early morning air strikes were made but weather caused cancellation of missions after 0830. Direct air support furnished by CVEs and fast carriers. Special air search being made for mines in NAKAGUSUKU WAN. Search flights by PBM's from KERAMA RETTO seaplane base. ASP during daylight flown by PBMs from CVEs in inner sectors and by PBMs from KERAMA RETTO seaplane base in outer sectors. During night all sectors covered by PBMs. 7 PBMs arrived from SAIPAN. I returned SAIPAN for repairs. No enemy air attacks during period. 4 men in lifeboat reported by aircraft in position 6 miles S of MITAKO at 1005. Dumbo with VF cover proceeding to make rescue. 2 twin-engine planes destroyed on NAHA Field by FMs from RENSHAW BAY at 0900.
Past experience has shown that after a new position is taken from the enemy many requests are soon received for permission to visit such localities for a wide variety of reasons. In many instances the date or information sought could be obtained from reports or by letter without serious detriment to the prosecution of the war. Where visits have seemed essential the size of parties has often been larger than necessary. These visitors require valuable transportation and accommodations enroute but far more serious is the fact that their presence and the assistance they require in forward areas takes up time of busy officers and retards in greater or less degree the work that must be accomplished there. Addressees are requested to screen all applications for visits to forward areas particularly the Ryukyus. Unless they consider that prosecution of the war might suffer if the visit were not made it is requested that they disapprove applications without forwarding them to Cincpoa except where there are special reasons that merit consideration. Cominch is requested to furnish copy this message to chief of staff of the Army for such action as he finds appropriate within the war department.

Summary No. 10 as of 051800. Fragmentary reports indicate the 3rd Phib Corps engaged in active patrolling to the north up the Ishimami Peninsula with no opposition. 22nd Marines now astride the general line TA 9908 M to 0199 R with patrols at Chuda TA 0511 and Kochima TA 0605. 24th Corps advancing south met increased resistance in organized defensive area along their front. Advances up to 3000 to 5000 yards were made and at 1300 line held as: TA 8777 C 8476 U 8278 F 8079 V to TA 8079 V. Air reconnaissance reveals numerous enemy installations and troop concentrations along the front. Reconnaissance of eastern islands preparatory to landings of 27th Army Div in progress. Total personnel casualties to 042400: 3rd Corps troops: 1 KIA 0 WIA 0 MIA NBC 7, 1st MarDiv 32 KIA 94 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 126 NBC 90. 6th MarDiv 37 KIA 119 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 156 NBC 68. 24th Corps non divisional units: 0 KIA 1 WIA NBC 4. 7th InfDiv 35 KIA 172 WIA 5 MIA. Total battle 207 NBC 40. 77th InfDiv 43. KIA, 161 WIA, 0 MIA. Total battle 204 NBC 48. 96th InfDiv 27 KIA 251 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 278 NBC 19. Grand total 175 KIA 798 WIA 11 MIA NBC 296. Para. Fire support furnished both corps included 3 OBB 6 CA-CL 14 DD, 3 OBB 3 CA-CL 7 DD supported minesweeping NAGASUKU WAN. Special interdiction and harassing fires in southwest sector by 1 OBB and 2 DD, 1 cruiser and 1 DD supported minesweepers off western OKINAWA. DDs and gunboats searched along coast for enemy PT and suicide boats. LCS 12 and LCT 1027 reported 1240 sighting midget submarine bearing 225 degrees 3000 yards from Bolo. CatRon berth 870 about 237 degrees 1700 yards from Bolo reported periscope 300 yards and torpedo wake passing close aboard, at 1243. Hunter killer operations with results negative so far. About 1750 NEVADA hit 3 times by shore battery TA 7869 or 7269. No details but ship continues in action. Para. Logistic situation satisfactory. Para. CVEs and fast carriers furnished direct air support. Expect increased air support will be required tomorrow on the southern front. Beach reconnaissance of eastern islands made by FANSHAW BAY TBM at 1120. Reconnaissance of NAGASUKU WAN for mines STEAMER BAY TBM at 1230 negative. Search flights made by PMMs KURAMA RETTO seaplane base. ASP carried out. 1 enemy Val approached at 1300 splashed by SANGAMON F6F at 1625. Dumbo PEM at 1330 rescued 4 airmen from liferaft 6 miles south of MITAKO previously reported in progress. COLHOUN 1610 rescued
05 1325  CTF 51 Summary No. 10 (Continued).

pilot of BENNINGTON F6F 87 miles bearing 037 from ZAMPA. Dumbo PBM rescued pilot of HORNET F6F 160 miles bearing 047 from ZAMPA at 1708. At 1440 pilot from TG 58.4 sank while friendly fighters orbited and Dumbo was enroute. 2 YORKTOWN aviators reported downed close to southern ISHIGAI at 1620. Dumbo could not effect rescue today but will try early tomorrow. From L day to 1800 L plus 4 Day total confirmed enemy planes destroyed is as follows: 28 by ships gunfire. 21 by fighters controlled by TF 51 plus 16 suicides who made 15 hits and 1 miss on 14 ships. Ships which have shot down planes but have not been previously mentioned by name in summaries are: BENNETT, WILEY, ADAMS, FRAZIER, LCI 1078, ELLYSON, GOODREAU, LCS 64, SUSEUME, BUSH. DDT sprayed but 2 RUDYERD BAY TBMs 1245 and by 2 SANGAMON TBMs at1440. Para. Beaches well organized with well regulated dumps located inland. Unloading has been retarded seriously last night and today due to severe weather conditions. Probably there will be a delay from this cause in activating airfields. Weather overcast with intermittent light rain. Winds averaging 25 to 35 knots from the north decreasing to 20-25 knots at end of period. Temperature 66 degrees. Visibility 5 to 7 miles. Moderate sea and swell from northwest.

06 0540  CTF 51 to CTF 58, COMBATRON 2 Info COM5THFLT, CTF 53, CTF 55, CTF 51.1, CTF 51.19, CTG 51.2, 51.3, 51.5, 51.15, 52.1, 5018, 50.5.

To provide for indicated possibility of enemy surface attack to eastward or westward of OKINAWA early morning of 7th 8th 9th TF 51 will be directed to execute following: (A) TGs 51.1 and 51.2 including tractor groups will be moved 100 to 150 miles to SE of present positions generally near regular routes. (B) TG 51.3 will proceed to arrive KERAMA RETTO on 9th as scheduled unless otherwise directed. (C) TG 51.19 will continue reconnaissance of eastern islands and gunfire support except early morning 8th will move to 5 miles south of OKINAWA KA U. (D) KERAMA RETTO and HAGUSHI beach operations will continue as scheduled except transport screen will be NEDUASU to assign additional DDS to TF 54. (E) TF 54 will deploy between THeya RETTO and AGUNI SHIMA nightly with 7 or 8 OBB 6 cruisers 15 to 20 DD. (F) Night ASP as scheduled. TG 52.1 will send daily 2 flights of air scouts 250 miles up the NANSEI SHOTO CHAIN as directed by Com5thFlt and TF 58 will provide troop support aircraft during day to replace this effort. Para. Request action ades comment and advise as to other measures if desired.

06 0847  CTF 58 to COM5THFLT.

06 1250  COM5THFLT Info CTF 51, CINCPAC.

Aircraft of WGS 58.1 and 58.3 splashed about 150 planes today exclusive of any shot down by OKINAWA target CAP. Our losses high. Some ships damaged all operational.

06 2025  CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC, ATFC5THFLT, ATG5THFLT.

Special report enemy air attack afternoon early evening 6 April. Includes TF 51 ships and planes controlled by TF 51. From 1440 to 1843 total 182 enemy airplanes attacked in about 22 groups. 55 shot down by our planes 35 shot by following ships. BUSH 3, ST LOUIS, LCI 809, TUSCALOOSA, LST 693, GREGORY, ESTES, MORRIS, COHOUN 2, STERRET, HYMAN, BOOS, STRENGTH, TAWAKOUI, BENNET 2, WICKES, All ships in transport area jointly 4. Unknown ships 11.
06 0715 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT. (CONT'D)

Plane score includes 1 by PBM and 1 by TBM. Total of 22 suicide hits made, 2 suicide misses. Total enemy planes destroyed 116. 2 friendly planes shot down by our AA. Para. Following ships hit by suicides, BUSH sunk, COLHOUN alongside BUSH affecting rescue hit 3 times sunk 4 hours later. HUMAN heavily damaged. EMONS sunk. RODMAN heavily damaged. MULLANY, WITTER, NEWCOMB hit twice. MORRIS, LEUTZE sinking condition. DEVASTATOR, FIEBERLING minor damage. RECRUIT, HOWORTH, DEFENSE, MORRIS, HUTCHINS, HOBS VICTORY (AKE) in KERAMA REFTO on fire towed clear. All damaged ships being assisted. Para, BUSH, COLHOUN radar pickets. EMONS, RODMAN, MULLANY, WITTER, MORRIS, DEVASTATOR, FIEBERLING, HUTCHINS transport screen vessels. Other naval vessels hit were fire support vessels or minecraft.

07 0035 CTF 51 to CTG 51.6, CTG 51.15 Info CTGs 51.5, 52.2, CTF 54, TF 51.

Information received indicates enemy surface force heading toward OKINAWA ETA tomorrow morning 3. CTG 51.6 expedite repairs on destroyer types that can be made ready to fight or screen, CTG 51.15 sail when ready any destroyers or destroyer types at KERAMA that can be made ready for action or screening to report to CTG 51.5 advising readiness condition. Para. CTG 51.15 expedite logistics for ships and support craft that can be made ready today.

06 0715 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 11 as of 061200. Reports indicate 3rd PhibCorps is advancing north against scattered small enemy groups while 24th corps is meeting increasing opposition in the south. In the north sector the 1st MarDiv is engaged in the organization and defense in its area with the 7th Marines less 1 BN in Corps reserve ordered to move to the vicinity of ISHIKAWI. 6th MarDiv advancing to the north to secure the corps objective line CHUDA TA 0511 KUSHI WAN T A 1007 and RCT 29 patrolling well in advance to the north.

Air observer reports all roads and trails both sides ISHIKAWI ISTHMUS free of enemy troop movements. 1200 report RT from air observer placed 3rd PhibCorps troops on line TA 0510 H(-8) to TA 0807 0(plus 2), 1st MarDiv patrols completed reconnaissance YABUCHI ISLAND TA 0034. No resistance or installations. Other patrols blasted 50 caves in division ZA. During night 1 enemy plane made single strafing run on YONTAN airfield. No report of damage received. Progress 24th Corps this morning unreported. Additional reports of 5 April indicate that increasing resistance can be expected from that area. 96th Division reports that afternoon 5th April artillery fire was received and a counter attack. An estimated company supported by 3 tanks repulsed in vicinity KANIKU TA 8277. 1 enemy tank destroyed. Enemy position estimated bn strength with numerous machine guns mortars reinforced by artillery was developed southwest GINOL TA 8278. 77th Div states 5 Japs armed with demolition charges killed attempting to infiltrate our position ZAMAMI SHIMA night 5 April. Enemy killed to date KERASA area totals 359, 166 POWs.

ComGen 24th Corps assumed command ashore 051 XPOBLKUFERK. Reconnaissance of TSUGEN IMA CRASHYRAYSUGO 377 by FMF amphibious reconnaissance bn night 5-6 April indicates garrison force 75-100 troops with machine guns mortars registered on beach. Military government operations satisfactory. As of 4 April approximately 9,000 civilians interned with some 300 injured being adequately cared for. No contagious diseases reported. Civilians appear good health docile cooperative. Food and water sufficient. Undamaged houses serve as temporary shelter. 2 camps and 2 G-6 hospitals OMVXP installed.
permanent location OKINAWA, KERAMA REPFO civilians our care number 332. Adequately cared for locally. Civilian casualties evacuated from other islands to ZAMAMI and cared for by G-10 unit. Civilians RSJUJEMU other islands are self-supporting. Para. Night illumination and harassing fires provided 3rd Corps by 1 OBB 3 CA-CL 5 DD. 24th Corps by 3 CA-CL 5 DD. 10th Army support by 1 OBB 1 DD. General support covering eastern OKINAWA from ARAZAKI to KANAZAKI and eastern islands provided by 1 OBB 1 CA 6 DD. Mine-sweeping progress made possible fire support eastern side ISHIKAWA Isthmus. Para. Further details relative NEVADA. 1 hit aft frame 101 port side main deck demolished 20mm mount. 2nd hit penetrated frame 73 starboard 3 feet above 2nd deck. Pierced 5 WT bulkheads exploding frame 73 port side 2nd deck crews compartment. Degaussing coil damaged. 3rd hit mast between 3rd and 4th turrets starboard. Struck deck port side frame 108 4 feet from side of ship and roccocheted clear. After SG radar damaged. Addition hoist out. 2 KIA IONUIA. Ship otherwise operational. THORNTON badly damaged in collision with ASHTABULA 24-24 N 128-58 W. MUNSEE STOCKTON, GILLESPIE standing by. ASHTABULA damage not serious. LST 554 damaged during storm previously reported. Extent not known. LCI 1059 damaged above waterline night 4-5 April as result leon dragging down on her. LST 781 severe structural damage. Starboard shaft inoperative. No other details. Torpedo fired at HYMAN 728 passed close under stern. HYMAN made attack 3 miles west point BOLO. Local ASP vectored and hunter killer commenced. CASSIN YOUNG in RP station reported 3 bombs dropped nearby 0303. No damage. NESHANIC departed. Today for rear areas 10 APA 2 AKA 2 DD and 4 DE. WAKE ISLAND departed 0300 for GUAM. Para. Search flights made by PBMs KERAMA base. ASP flown during daylight by TBMs from CVEs inner sectors by PBMs from KERAMA outer sectors. During night all sectors flown by PBM. This morning an additional TBM from CVEs flew ASP over inner transport area. Direct air support furnished by CVEs and fast carriers. VOC 1 in WAKE ISLAND exchanged with VC 87 in MARCUS ISLAND. VOC 1 remains OKINAWA. MUNSEE STOCKTON VC 87 returns GUAM. Enemy air attacks by about 35 planes occurred intermittently during latter part of night 5-6 April. Planes approached from N and NE. Enemy destroyed by gunfire: 1 by ZELLAZ 0129, 1 by LCS 110 at 0310. MACOMB 1 at 0455. CHASE 1 at 0430. 2 by unknown ships at 0628. 1 by STARLING at 0559. 0603 CASSIN YOUNG reports bandit exploded off port bow. 0826 ST LOUIS reported being under attack 10 miles north BOLO. No other details. Enemy destroyed by VF: 1 by RUDYERD BAY FM at 0755. Own damage none reported. Dumbo PBM rescued 2 crewmen from WORMTOWN TBM close to southern ISHIGAKI 1300 5 April. 2 other crew members reported lost in crash. DD sprayed propaganda leaflets dropped photographic flights made.

06 2337
CTF 53 to ATFC5THFLT Info CINCPAC ADV, COM5THFLT.

ESSEX search plane 1st report. 1 battleship 2 light cruisers 10 destroyers 30-44 N 129-10 E on course 300 speed 12 at 070825 I(-9).

07 0130
PLANE 160 FLIGHT 464 to COMFAJRING 1, OINC FLIGHT 462.

This is my 1st report 1 battleship 1 cruiser heavy 9 destroyers north 31-00 Lat east 128-55 Long course 000 speed 17 knots WE and 60V track.
07 0304 CTF 58 to COM5THFLT Info ALL TFC5THFLT, CINCPAC ADV, COMSUBPAC, CTG 51.1.

At 071015 launched 380 plane strike against enemy surface force in Lat 31-00 N Long 129-00 E course 200 speed 17 knots. Launching position Lat 27-00 N Long 129-45 E. Am maintaining target CAP over OKINAWA. No enemy attacks on this force today - yet. Request area be thoroughly swept by Dumbos and submarines for downed pilots.

07 0755 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TFG & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 13 071200. During the past 24 hours we have been hit badly by enemy aircraft but thanks to our great support from TF 58 and TG 52.1 we can sustain our losses and if this is the best the enemy can throw against us then we can move further forward. Para. Ground force action during the night was marked by a lack of enemy activity to the north in the ZA of the 3rd Phib Corps while in the south the 24th Corps reported receiving intermittent artillery mortar and machine gun fire and some infiltration attempted. Both Corps resumed the attack this morning. In the 3rd Phib Corps the 6th MarDiv was advancing to the north with the objective of securing the line TA 0716 to TA 1313. On securing this objective the advance was to continue to the line TA 0718 to TA 0919. The 1st MarDiv continued mopping up in their ZA. Elements of the 6th MarDiv were landed on NAGO beaches at 0800 with the mission of reconnoitering MOTOBU PENINSULA. Other elements 6th Marines reconnoitering inshore side of IKE BANARE TAKA BANARE and HELANZA BANARE yesterday and reported no enemy activity. Noon reports show the 6th MarDiv on the line TA 0912H TA 0716B TA 1312H. The 24th Corps confronted by exceedingly rough cliff like terrain with enemy defenses consisting of blockhouses pillboxes extensive trench system double apron barbed wire. These defenses appear to be of long standing rather than new construction. 96th Div reported that it is possible entire 62nd Jap division is disposed across their front. 1st MarDiv reports the capture of a large coastal gun in TA 9498. 6th MarDiv captured a suicide boat armed with 300 pound rocket mounted in bow. Para. Fire support missions during night were furnished 3rd Corps by 2 CAs and 2 DDs. 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 CA 5 DD. General support eastern bombardment group by 1 OBB 1 CA 6 DD. TF 54 covering force consisted of 6 OBB 2 CA 4 CL and 15 DD. Ammunition situation is good in FS ships but loss of 2 ammunition vessels LOGAN VICTORY and HOBBS VICTORY due enemy action limits the reserve on hand. 3 more ships in addition my special report namely LOGAN VICTORY, HOBBS VICTORY, LST 347 are probably a total loss. 2 additional ships the WESSON and BENNETT damaged through air action this morning. INDIANAPOLIS 3 APAs and 1 AKA 1 DM battle damaged 2 DDs 1 of which battle damaged 2 APDs departed for GUAM 0900. Para. The area was again under air attack during morning 7 April 0325 to 1015. Bombs were dropped in transport area by about 6 planes. Total of about 20 enemy planes approached in small groups of which 12 were shot down. 6 by fighters and 6 by ships crediting BENNETT GENDREAU NICKES LUCE JEFFER IDAHO with 1 each. Suiciders hit WESSON and BENNETT. Direct air support of ground forces was flown by CVEs planes only today. Search flights were made by PBMs KERAMA base. TF 58 conducted search for Jap fleet with ESSEX plane reporting contact 50 miles west of YAKU SHIMA. Routine ASP was flown by PBMs. The search for midget sub south of MOTOBU reported negative. Special searches by Dumbo PBMs were made for survivors of ships sunk during night 6 to 7 April and for an aviator reported downed 20 miles bearing 070 from ZAMPA but results were negative. Add to list of ships shooting down planes during 7 April air attack: 1 each by GRIFFIN DEFENSE GLADIATOR YMS 311. These planes previously listed under those shot down by unknown ships and do not raise total shot down. GRIFFIN reports 2 bomb misses. Our planes losses as result yesterday's attack show 1 additional friendly plane shot down by mortar over KERAMA REEFS. I FARNHAM BAY VP reported missing 1700 6 April.
07 0925 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC.

I MAY BE CRAZY BUT I THINK THE JAPS HAVE QUIT THE WAR AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

07 1214 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COM5THFLT, COMAAFSWPA, ADV ECH GHQ SWPA, COMFAIR WING ONE, COM7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT.

Refer your CX 13177 timed 291207 not to all. Seaplane facilities not yet fully established at OKINAWA. Planned searches are shown on appendixes 2, 2A and 2B of ComFAIRWing 1 OpPlan 2-45 copies of which are held by Com7thFlt. Additional copy airmailed to you yesterday. Searches currently flown have south limit bearing 280 from KERAMA RETTO. Request your search sectors 5 thru 10 be continued as now flown for the present except radius should be reduced to 650 miles. ComFAIRWing 1's searches will remain clear of these sectors.

07 1204 CTF 57 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, CINCBPF, CTF 112.

6 April. Bombed and strafed airfields ISHIGAKI and MYAKO. Found previous craters MYAKO filled in. Splashed 1 Francis. Fleet detected 0350 by snooper and attacked 1700 by about 4 suiciders. Heavy airborne jamming on FD frequencies preceded attack. Fighters splashed 1 Judy 1 Zeke. Fighters and ships guns KAHUF 1. 1 suicider near missed ILLUSTRIOUS crashed in sea after wing tip hit island. No damage. No casualties. 7th April ISHIGAKI runways bombed. At MYAKO approximately about 20 aircraft seen at HIRARA some believed damaged. Low cloud prevented decisive strafing. Destroyed 3 on ground. All MYAKO runways heavily bombed PM and believed unserviceable. Own losses 2 by flak 1 ditched pilot recovered. Heavy cloud over islands both days. Efforts to contact KINGFISHER in area SPINDLE failed both days. No trace pilot CTG 58.4 referenced in 051228. Total enemy losses airborne 5. 3 destroyed on ground. Own losses in combat 2. Other causes 12 aircraft. TF 57 withdrawing to replenish in area Cootie on 8 and 9 April. Expect reach combat area dawn 10 April. Strike 10-11 April. The Nips do not seem to be trying very hard down our end.

07 0646 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGENPOA Info CINCPAC PEARL.

While active operations are in progress visits or temporary duty to RYUKYUS will be restricted to those considered necessary to facilitate those operations. Your 010052 is disapproved for the present. Should you find it desirable to do so request may be renewed in early May and will be given further consideration.

07 0825 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COM7THFLT, COMAIRPAC, COMAIR7THFLT.

Request ComAir7thFlt be authorized communicate direct with ComAirPac concerning exchange of naval patrol squadrons your 060845.

07 1830 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TFC & TCS 5THFLT.

Summary No. 14 as of 071300. 10th Army made substantial gains in operations today. 24th Army Corps drove south against stubborn resistance over broken terrain containing numerous pillboxes and blockhouses. 7th Div penetrating enemy defenses reached a point on its left flank to within 400 yards of OUKI TA 9574. Slight gains were made on the right flank of the 7th Div. The 96th Div advanced along its entire front and captured

- Continued -

2825
UCHITOMARI TA 8078 and DONIKU TA 82766. Divisional artillery is now reinforced by 24th Corps and Marine artillery. 24th Corps front now stands at: TA 79730 8276K 0475D 8575U 8675C. 3rd PhibCorps moving north met only minor resistance reported its lines from NAGO TA 0816 extended diagonally SE towards IGARA YUMA TA 13130 with strong patrols as far north as NAKOSHI TA 1221K and to the west near the river between the towns of USNA TA 0418B and YAHU TA 0418G. Cumulative ground force casualties to 062400 are: 3rd PhibCorps non divisional units 10 KIA 13 WIA 2 MIA. Total battle 24 NBC 10. lst MarDiv 40 KIA 139 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 219 NBC 342. 6th MarDiv 54 KIA 172 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 226 NBC 114. 24th Corps non divisional units: 0 KIA 2 WIA 4 MIA. Total battle 6 NBC 84. 77th Div 49 KIA 173 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 222 NBC 48. 7th Div 44 KIA 248 WIA 5 MIA. Total battle 297 NBC 93. 96th Div 35 KIA 474 WIA 9 MIA. Total battle 268 NBC 106. Grand total battle 1523 NBC 602. Para. Fire support was provided the 3rd PhibCorps by 2 OBB 3 CA-CL 5 DD and the 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 CA 5 DD. Support for 51.19 on eastern side of island was provided by 1 OBB 4 CA-CL 8 DD. These ships also engaged in general support missions to both corps from that side of the island. Ammunition situation is excellent. Some damage and casualties were caused by our own AA fire during air attack yesterday. The AUDRAIN was hit by AA on bridge structure with 6 WIA. MENARD reported she had casualties. PCS 1390 control gear out and 1 KIA 5 WIA. BUTTE 1 WIA. BARNETT had forward rigging severed and boom shot away 5 WIA. COMFORT at 0400 felt heavy explosion throwing out all engine room pumps. Believed depth charge or torpedo close aboard. Otherwise no damage. 1 mine destroyed by STEFFET 342 degrees 12 miles from BOO. 16 mines swept off eastern island 8 floating destroyed 6 April. Para. Small craft made rescue from damaged ships. LCS 63 picked up 70 to 80 BUSH survivors including commanding officer. LCS 37 recovered 70 bodies and 2 survivors from BUSH. PURDY rescued 80 from MULLANY. PCE 855 has 17 survivors from BUSH. Para. YONTAN airfield received its 1st land based fighters this afternoon when 82 Marine F4Us and 7 F6FNs of VMF 224, 311 441 UR 2N arrived. Routine search flights and ASP were flown, 2 enemy planes entered the general area this afternoon. YORKTOWN CAP destroyed 1 July at 1547 and GREGORY shot down the other at 1745. 2 ESSEX fighters had mid-air collisions. Both planes crash landed, 1 pilot killed, 1 rescued by GREGORY. A MARCUS ISLAND FM crash landed south of KADENA Field 1230. Pilot survived. 2 Dumbos covered the TF58 strike and a search plane rescued 1 pilot of TF 58 near KYUSHU. SAGINAW BAY fighter while escorting photo plane saw 2 Vals and splashed 1 Val in suicide dive 28 March and 1 Tojo on 2 April both at BERAMA and not previously reported. Para. Unloading over the beaches progressing well due to better weather. Overcast, wind NE 12 to 14 knots. Temperature average 71 degrees. Slight sea and swell. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Surf 3 to 4 feet.
07 2051  JCS to CINCPAC/CINCPOA  RE:  CINCAFPAC—CINCSWPA  Info  COM7THFLT.

1. Shortage of shipping has immobilized large quantities of supplies and considerable numbers of service troops necessary for the care and handling of these supplies both in the South Pacific and in rear areas of the Southwest Pacific. Expeditious movement forward of these resources is required in order that we may continue to apply full weight of our means against the enemy and to permit timely preparation of the PHILIPPINES and other forward positions as bases for the forces required for decisive operations. Every available means must be exploited to this end.  

2. I APPRHA substantial numbers of assault ships and craft could be made available during the next several months to assist in the movement outlined above.  

3. Addressees will carefully examine their requirements for assault shipping in the light of current operational directives to the end that such as can be spared without prejudice to current and projected operations will be made available to assist in redeploying troops across the Pacific and in moving forward troops and supplies from the South Pacific and the rear areas of the Southwest Pacific.  

4. Report what can be done.

08 0340  COM7THFLT to CTF 51, 58, CTG 50.9  Info  5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMSEVPAC.

General policy regarding return of damaged ships to rear areas. Ships with minor damage which are fully or nearly fully operational and whose continued services in objective area are desirable shall be temporarily repaired by ships force or local repair facilities afloat and retained.  

Ships with minor damage which can be spared from combat area and ships with major damage shall receive only voyage repairs in combat area and be returned to rear area as promptly as practicable. Large ships which require docking and ships requiring Navy yard availability shall be routed to GUAM.  

Latter ships for voyage repairs and onward routing. Larger ships not requiring docking and all ships not requiring navy yard repairs shall be routed ULITHI. ComSeRon 10 may divert these to GUAM or SAIPAN depending upon relative availability of facilities.

08 0846  CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM7THFLT Info  CINCPAC PEARL, CTF 51, 58, COMAIRPAC, AIRPACSUB.

Please be assured that Cincpac and ComAirPac are making the most effective allocation of escort carriers to meet conflicting requirements. The general proposal of your 080325 and previous messages on the same subject namely to increase your allocations at the expense of others is not feasible and would defeat your own purposes in a short time. I will be pleased to receive from you recommendations for redistribution of CVEs now under your command so as to best serve your needs.

08 0755  CTF 51 to COM7THFLT Info  CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 15 as of 081200. 10th Army continued the assault this morning with the 3rdPhibCorps making rapid advances to the north in the ZA of the 6th MarDiv and by 1000 had established a line generally across the neck of MOTOBU PENINSULA from TA 0617F to TA 0717J along the road to TA 11210 with patrols working to the objective line TA 9720M 02240 0626S 0825B. By 1200 these elements had reached TA 0421C 08271 and HAJIYA TA 1322. This division encountered some mines and undefended road blocks in their ZA. The 1st MarDiv is engaged in patrolling their area sealing caves and...
improving roads. In the area of the 24th Corps both the 7th and 96th Divs received considerable enemy artillery fire during the night and numerous attempts at infiltration of our lines were made. The attack this morning was against stubborn resistance. Enemy defenses are reported as skillfully emplaced with approaches covered by anti-tank guns and heavy caliber weapons. Numerous anti-tank ditches and minefields were encountered. 47th Div tanks were knocked out yesterday by 500 pound bombs buried in minefields. By noon only slight advance had been made along the corps front with front lines substantially the same as reported last night. Intelligence reports indicate that main Jap artillery positions are in the vicinity of SHURI TA 7872 that 96th Div is now passing through the lst enemy defensive position. CA tactical air force AXSMTH Army established ashore 071000. 3 squadrons day fighters and 1 squadron night fighter MAG 31 2nd MAW are operating from YONTAN airfield have 90 FW and 100TF F6PN. Reconnaissance of eastern islands was completed by FMF reconnaissance Bn. No Jap garrisons except TSU Gray lightly held and KUTERA no details. There is no ground action reported in KERAMA RETTO. KIERE SHIMA was subjected to heavy caliber enemy artillery fire at 071905 on the area of the 420 FA group resulting in damage to 1 gun and 1 WIA. Very low altitude reconnaissance of IE SHIMA revealed enemy marines in installations all unoccupied. No AA fire was received or other enemy activity noted. Para. TG 5x0 3 GREERINX arrive 9th will land all but 1 RCT on western beaches and use 1 RCT to capture eastern islands. Para. Gunfire support was provided 3rd Corps by 1 OBB 1 CA TACE DD. 24th Corps by 2 OBB 1 CA 3 DD. General support by 1 OBB 1 CA 6 DD which also covered reconnaissance on the eastern islands and provided harassing fire in 24th Corps and Army zones on south OKINAWA. TT LOKOS in NAHA area silenced guns which had shelled artillery position on KIERE SHIMA. All fire support DDs west side of island were relieved 0900 last night by DM-DM from TG 52.2 so as to provide large screen for TDOX SNAIR in event of surface action. These DDs returned to F S duty this morning. MARYLAND now reports hit during air action 6 April by bomb on No 3 turret top badly dished turret but no penetration some damage to supports sprinkling and air line systems and radar antennae WIA 15 MIA 6 KIA not identified. HARDING received near miss 1830 6 April. Minor damage all repaired. No casualties. YMS 311 likewise hit on 6 April by suicide plane with 3 inch gun demolished EDMAX BOXES deck. Minor topside damage. No report of casualties. About 1700 7 April while in the SW part of NAGAGUSUKU WAN YMS 427 was hit by CD gun with 3 KIA 1 WIA. WICHTA silenced NP battery. YMS remains operational. PEM 18 mine disposal vessel and YMS 103 struck mines in NAGAGUSUKU WAN at about 0700 sinking quickly. No report on survivors. WICKES sank horned mine in RP60700 7 April. BOWERS destroyed 6 horned mines at 245 degrees IG T 7 miles from BOLO. Sweeping of OHTMU WAN completed with negative results. Sweeping of NAGAGUSUKU completed except small area which is now in process of completion. 12 drifter were sunk. At 0200 an LCM sighted sub 5 miles north of BOLO. CUMMINGS and GENDREAU engaged hunter-killer but failed to establish contact. Search discontinued at 0615. U torppedo was fired at STARLING at station A29 which bears 257 degrees 25 miles from BOLO. MILLS and FIEBERLING conducting hunter-killer. Following ships departed OKINAWA 0900 for LEPTE: 1 LCPF 18 LST 1 DE 2 FC 2 FOS 1 SC. Para. Air support missions were flown by CVEs and fast carriers. A special strike by CVE planes was made on MIYAKO and ISHIJAKI. No reports received. Routine search flights and ASP were flown by PBMs from KERAMA RETTO base. We were subjected to hostile air attack from 2030 to 2400 night 7 April 4 planes approached from the SW of which 1 was shot down by gunfire over KERAMA the others suspected of landing at NAHA. At 0610 to

- Continued -

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08 0755 CTF 51 Summary No. 15 - CONTINUED.

0623, 2 planes approached from the SW over LESAMA. Both were shot down by gunfire by MAKIN ISLAND fighter. Air support of the 24th Corps has been turned over to landing force air support control unit as of 1200. 1 F4U from BRETON on ferry flight to YONTAN field shot down 1 Betty during afternoon 7 April. Our plane losses for the period are: 1 LUNGA POINT TEM shot down over enemy terrain at 0539. 1 FANSHAW BAY TEM on propaganda leaflet mission was hit by AA. This plane landed YONTAN Field. Pilot uninjured but gunner WIA. 2 survivors sighted in NAGAGUSUKU WAN 1155. COLORADO OS2U Dumbo dispatched to THEE/RIDD. 3 Dumbo PHMs from KERAMA base are operating with TF 58 and 1 with TG 52.1. 2 more searching for missing ESSEX pilots. Enemy planes which strafed YONTAN Field during night 6 April destroyed previously captured transport planes of MAT service arrived from GUAM this morning. 2 R5Ds returned to GUAM shortly after.

08 1325 CTF 51 to COMSTHFILT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 16 as of 081800. Action of the ground troops is characterized by open warfare tactics in the ZA of the 3rd PhibCorps while in the south the fight is settled down to assault of strong defensive positions in depth. 6th MarDiv continued its progress up the MOTOBU PENINSULA and by night had reached a general line from TA 0218 J to TA 0421 C to KAGUSUKU TA 0922. The 24th Corps is meeting continuing stiff resistance as the drive proceeds south. The right of the 96th Div is within 2500 yards of MACHINATO airfield. 7th Div on the left is within 1500 yards of the uncompleted YONABARU airfield with patrols reported near the airfield. Gains are being made only after difficult fighting with heavy fire of all calibers and weapons falling along its front. At 1800 the Corps right remains substantially the same as last reported showing gains of about 200 yards in the ZA 96th division to average of 400 yards ZA of the 7th Div. Corps front line generally along the line TA 8574H 8575 P 8575 P 8176 M 8077 K 7978 MISE. Naval gunfire observers and air liaison parties have located many new targets which have been subjected to bombardment. Several reports described a torpedo launching battery or a midget submarine base in TA 3469 M. This target has been taken under fire by aerial bombardment with results reported as good. 24th Corps reported 4 rounds from large caliber weapon fell in their area last night detonating with terrific concussion and making craters 30 to 40 feet in diameter. Believed possibly 500 Kg bomb or rocket. Map found on the body of a dead Jap pilot indicates the staging point for enemy planes as northern KYUSHU and possibly KANGA. Casualty reports as of 072400 follow 3rd PhibCorps non-divisional units: 10 KIA 13 WIA 2 MIA. Total battle 25 NBC 10. 1st MarDiv 41 KIA 153 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 194 NBC 162. 24th Corps non-divisional units: 5 KIA 33 WIA 4 MIA. Total battle 42 NBC 95. 6th MarDiv 53 KTA 182 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 235 NBC 126. 77th InfDiv 58 KTA 338 WIA 5 MIA. Total battle 401 NBC 149. 96th InfDiv 35 KIA 474, WIA 9 MIA. Total battle 568 NBC 106. Grand total battle 1600 NBC 692. Para. Fire support missions throughout day were provided 3rd PhibCorps by 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 CA 3 DD. General support to TG 51.19 by 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 1 9 DD. CTF 52 in MAHA area by 1 CL 1 DD. 2 DDs covered mine sweeps in NW sector. CARLSON hit by AA fire from friendly ships evening 6 April. Minor damage. YMS 92 operating in NAGUSUKU WAN struck mine, Still afloat. No other details. Reconnaissance by UDTs on eastern beaches commenced today. Small sub sighted bearing 190 degrees 6 miles from TSUGEN ISLAND at 1400. ISHERWOOD and ASP plane conducted hunter-killer but unable to gain contact. GREGORY hit forward by suicider during - Continued - 2829
air raid this evening. Engine room flooded but under control and proceeding
in company with MACOMB to transport area. GRIFFIN reports considerable
structural damage received on 6 April while alongside MORRIS fighting fire.
Para. Air activities for the day consisted of direct air support of troops
by CVEs of TG 52.1 with search flights and ASP patrols. Our plane losses
were one TBM from CHENANGO hit by AA fire at 1725. Landed on YONT.
Field with 1 WIA. AT 1250 OS2U from COLORADO and OS2U from SALT
LAKE CITY each rescued 1 aviator from LUNGA POINT TBM in NAGASUKU
WAN. Dumbo PBM search at 1510 for a member of UDT lost on KATAKA
ISLAND was negative. Dumbo PBM retrieved body of dead pilot near
ISHIGAKI at 1425. Dumbo PBM rescued BUNKER HILL pilot 30 miles south of
KYUSHU at 1755. An air raid took place from 1800 to 1900. 2 Nips shot down
by fighters 2 by GREGORY before being hit by 3rd suicider 1 by an unknown
LCI 3 by unknown LCS. Para. During today's favorable weather unloading
generally satisfactory. 

08 1515 USS QUEENFISH to COMSUBPAC Info CINCPAC ADV.
QUEENFISH 6th. Identity of ship established by statement of prisoner with
no other confirmation. Identification therefore not positive but believe
prisoners statement is reliable based on his knowledge of itinerary and
description of AWA MARU. Could not determine if lights and special mark-
ings were lighted at any time. Ship was never sighted in visibility of
200 yards and sank in 3 minutes postran 32-00N 126-00E.

09 0126 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH and CNO.
QUEENFISH 081515 contains information required by your 071945 (Top Secret).

03 0321 COMINPAC to CINCPAC BOTH, COM5THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMPHIBS
COMPHIBS 1, COMPHIBS 2, ADCOMINPAC.
The OKINAWA operation has proven the necessity and inestimable value of
the 2200 ton DM assigned to each sweep unit. Their close in gunfire and
strong antiaircraft support have been the means of saving many light bat-
tery minesweepers from damage or destruction by enemy bombers suicide planes
and shore batteries. These DMs manned by personnel familiar with the task
furnish communication navigation and command assistance as well as provide
the sweepers with confidence during a hazardous operation. In all future
operations it is recommended that their numbers be maintained and that the
above described use of modern DMs under this command be continued subordi-
nating the diversionary demands of other commands to this end.

06 0256 COM5THFLT to CTF 57, CTF 51 Info CTG 52.1, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

TG 52.1 continue neutralization SAKISHIMA 10 April. TF 57 cancel its
scheduled SAKISHIMA strike that day. If my 090225 approved by CINCPAC
desire CTF 57 strike SHINCHIKU and MATSUYAMA airfield FORMOSA 11-12 April
while TG 52.1 maintains neutralization SAKISHIMA. CTF 57 advise if not
within his capabilities.
As fighter groups become established on shore in sufficient strength and in view of the heavy pilot losses inflicted on the enemy it will be advisable to return TGs of TF 52 to port for replenishment upkeep and rest on a rotating basis in order to ensure readiness to meet future counteroffensives and to exploit opportunities to destroy remaining enemy fleet units. Likewise the escort carriers which have borne a heavy load during the fighting so far need to be returned to advance bases as soon as shore based aircraft can take over. Request your intentions in these matters.

UrDis 050227 not needed by info adees. Propose TF 57 strike SHINCHIKU and MATSUYAMA Airfields FORMOSA 11-12 April. If satisfactory request you arrange SWesPac air strikes southern FORMOSA fields same time. TG 52.1 will maintain neutralization SAKISHIMA GUNTO. ComSubPac requested assign lifeguards to stations 9, 10, and if practicable 11 on strike days.

Recent directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued with the approval of the President involve changes in the command organization in the Pacific which have been indicated generally in the public press. Included in the directives which in their entirety are not needed by the lower echelons of command is a provision that the areas under the command of Cincpoa and the Army forces allocated to him will remain under his command until passed to CINCSWP by mutual agreement or by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The units concerned will be informed specifically as such agreements are reached or directives are received. The existing orders and arrangements for unified command within the Pacific Ocean Areas remain in effect until changed.

Cincpoa zone notice A-3. Effective 0000 GCT 10 April the area enclosed by a circle of 30 miles radius centered at 26-52 N 142-10 E is reclassified as a blind bombing zone.

British carriers will strike SHINCHIKU and MATSUYAMA airfields northern FORMOSA 11-12 April. Request Allied Air Force SWPA strike southern FORMOSA fields same time. Escort carriers will maintain neutralization SAKISHIMA Group.
Now appears probable 2nd MarDiv not required Phase 1 or 2. Possibility exists 77 Div may be needed only to limited extent. With view to relieving shipping congestion and avoiding interference with logistics of base development following recommendations made re these 2 divisions: (A) That 2nd MarDiv be returned SATPAN at once for discharge personnel and minimum galley and housekeeping gear pending decision employment Phase III. (B) That shipments 2nd MarDiv rear echelon be delayed. (C) That pending determination employment 77 Div shipments to rear echelon be delayed.

Summary No. 17 as of 091200. Enemy reaction to the occupation of OKINAWA is being evidenced by daily and nightly air attacks attempts at surface activity by suicide boats and swimmers and an increased resistance to our advance to the south. 3rd PhibCorps reported little enemy activity during the night. The front of the 6th MarDiv has been reorganized with RCT 29 assigned to MOTOBU PENINSULA and RCT 4 on the right and RCT 22 on the left of the main part of the island to move north. Other 3rd PhibCorps units continue to patrol and improve their areas and to reconnoiter east coast beaches. At 1000 patrols of the 22nd Marines were reported in the vicinity TA 1623 and 9725D. No other reports have been received. 24th Corps front is being subjected to considerable volume of mortar and artillery fire which is both constant and effective ceasing only during counter-battery fire. Small arms machine gun fire continues with increased volume. Numerous infiltration attempts have been made. Plans for the 24th Corps call for the capture of hill masses on both flanks. The 7th Div is to continue with its main effort on its right. The 96th Div is to push its 383RD combat team to the ridge at TA 8077 ORXY preceded by a 45 minute artillery preparation by corps and divisional artillery and scheduled air strikes in the zone of the 7th Div and by pre-arranged air strikes and artillery fire in the zone of the 96th Div the corps resumed the attack at 0700. No reports have been received as to progress made. 24th Corps now has a total of 20 FA Bns. in support. Small boat loaded with Japs armed with dynamite charges attacked gravel pit at IWASHI TA 9183. These were repulsed. The amphibian reconnaissance En FMFPac has been relieved from attachment TG 51.19 and is now attached to the 77th Div. This En was landed on ZAMAMI SHIMA for rest. Large caliber projectile reported previously as possible 500 Kg rocket bomb has been identified as 240mm mortar. UDT teams are reconnoitering the eastern beaches in the area now under our control. Similar operations were carried out yesterday on beaches in TA 0211 0311 0210 0310. All were found suitable for landing LSTs. 2 AKAs have discharged cargo through these channels using LSMs LCTs in support of the 6th MarDiv advance. Further work is continuing on the NAGO beaches. At 090300 island commander 331 APO Hq at TA 8290A began the progressive assumption of logistic and administrative functions. Effective this time Island Commander assumes 10th Army responsibility for all shore party operations with the exception of those at the beaches north of TA 8693M. These latter remain under control of 3rd PhibCorps. There are now 30,000 Okinawan civilians under military control. Military government operations are proceeding satisfactorily. Undamaged native houses are being fully utilized. Civilians are being fed from local food supplies salvaged by military government and from local garden products. Medical cases not many but are taxing present military government facilities to capacity. Some 3rd PhibCorps medical units have been loaned to military government. A suicide attack on KERAMA RETTO.
resulted in approximately 20 civilians deaths 60 wounded suffered from throat wounds. Para. Gunfire support was furnished during the night in the 3rd PhibCorps by 1 CA 3 DDs. 1 OBB 1 CA 3 DD to 24th Corps. 3 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 8 DD provided support to 7th Div from the east and covered UDTs and reconnaissance parties. 1 OBB 1 DD served in NAHA area. Correction to summary 15 as of 031200 which states YMS 103 sunk. YMS 103 has been beached and may be salvageable. YMS 100 now reports 4 KIA 12 WIA. BGM 13 reported yesterday as hit by mine shows 46 survivors and 15 WIA. Allof area D1 as shown on MS chart No. 2 has been swept. Area F1 L8 and area east of Cl have been completed. Sweeping in Cl continues negative results. The sighting of a SFN reported yesterday by LCM 5 miles north of BOLO is evaluated doubtful. LCI 665 at KERAMA shot 1 swimmer at 0310 7 April. COMFORT departs at 1645 for GUAM. Para. CVEs of TG 52.1 continue to furnish direct air support to troops. Attacks were made on possible radar station on north tip of OKINAWA at 0925. Attacks were also made on suspected torpedo station at south end of NAGAGUSUKU MAN at 0840. A TBM at 1103 destroyed 1 boat and attacked underground boat house north coast of MOTOBU PENINSULA. A TBM fired 2 landing craft on the southern tip of OKINAWA at 1125. Search flights and ASP were flown in all sectors by PBMFs from KERAMA. Our plane losses include 1 FM from SHAMROCK BAY colliding with unknown plane over enemy territory at 0720. Landing over various enemy installations barracks emplacements and reconnaissance parties. 1 Dumbo PBM is on station in station at south end of Oombu HATO. Transport planes are now on a daily schedule from TONTAN field. There has been no air attack this area since last report.

09 1240 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TFC & TCG 5THFLT.

Summary No. 18 as of 091200, 3rd PhibCorps by continued rapid advance has now secured approximately 1/2 of the MOTOBU PENINSULA. The 29th Marines in this area hold the line TA 9720X 0224M 0425Q 05250 0625M 0725PR J 0825 B with unreported patrols operating well to the northern tip of the peninsula. No further reports have been received from the 24th and 22nd Marines operating in the north. On the zone of the 24th Corps only small local gains were made against Jap highly organized positions. Present front lines remain virtually unchanged. 10th Army reports the line as : TA 8675E 8575N 8475E 8476W 8376E 8376W TNHEP 8275E 8176E TURB 9076E 8077XRLGA 7978 YSN.

27th Div less 1 RCT which is to land on the eastern islands tomorrow began landing at HAUSHI beaches today and was assigned to 24th Corps as of 1200. Para. General fire support ships thoroughly covered southern OKINAWA today. Various enemy installations barrack emplacements and caves were reported destroyed. MINNEAPOLIS destroyed gun emplacement in TA 7196W destroyed numerous small boats in TA 7360. ZELLARS damaged coast defense gun in TA 7789 and rocket emplacement in TA 7976 STG. IDAHO damaged numerous small boats in NAHA HARBOR and automatic weapons guns in TA 7169L. Throughout the day 1 CA and 3 DD provided close support missions for the 3rd PhibCorps. 1 OBB 2 CA 7 DD for the 24th Corps. General support missions were fired by 3 OBB 3 CA 2 CL 9 DD. Report at 1730 from PENSACOLA operating off eastern beaches was that HOPPING had been fired upon and hit by shore battery which PENSACOLA took under fire. No other details. SAGE in station A32 reported sonar contact about 1500. GARLAND and GENDREAU are assisting.

Following ships departed 9 April for SAIPAN: 1 LCF 29 LSTs 1 DE 2 AM.

- Continued -
09 1240 CTF 51 Summary No. 18 - CONTINUED.

1 PCE 2 FC 1 YMS 8 APA 9 AKA 1 DD 3 APD. EMMONS sunk on night 6 April now reports casualties as 22 KIA 71 WIA 39 MIA. Para. 96 VF and 15 VFN of MAG 33 from CVEs HOLLANDIA and WHITE arrived KADENA airfield this afternoon. CVEs furnished direct air support to troops and dawn strike against SAKISHIMA "SAKISHIMA GUNTO". Routine search flights and ASP were flown by PBM's. 2 SHIMROCK BAY TEM's were hit by AA at 1715 with slight damage. 1 plane landed YONTAN field 1 WIA. The other plane proceeded to its carrier. All Dumbo missions for the day were negative. Observation and strafing missions were flown this afternoon on IJ SHIMA KURE SHIMA KUTAKA SHIMA HAMANIKI SHIMA. Under air attack tonight commencing 1840. About 10 planes approached from north in 3 raids. STERRETT shot down 4 Vals then was hit by suicide. Propulsion lost. Tug enroute. WICKES missed by torpedo fired from NELL. ENTERPRISE night fighter shot down 1 plane. FIGHTING shot down 1 plane. 1 plane attacked TF 54 without results. Para. There is marked improvement in beach road net and well regulated dumps established inland. Unloading has been favored by good weather. Weather high broken clouds this morning becoming high scattered this afternoon with low rain clouds at night. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Temperature average 74 degrees. Wing SE to S 15 to 22 knots. Smooth sea. Surf western beaches low eastern beaches 5 to 7 feet.

09 1617 MACARTHUR to ALLIED AF Info CINCPOA, ANF (TOLOSA), CTF73, COM7THFLT, ADVON CHQ. CX 13788. Refer Cincpoa Adv Hq 090642 CCT which states British carriers will strike SHINCHIKU and MATUYAMA airfields northern FORMOSA 11 and 12 April. Para. Desire Allied Air Forces conduct heavy strikes southern FORMOSA airfields on 11 and 12 April.

09 2358 CTG 50.8 to COMSERON 10 Info COM5THFLT, PD ULITHI, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

Your 090633. You have again returned a shuttle unit to me with only 2 escorts under my operational control. When this unit sailed you had 12 of my escorts in port 8 of which had been there at least 3 days. Your continued failure to send escorts back to me at same rate they are being returned to ULITHI is handicapping my operations and jeopardizing the safety of the oiler groups at sea. Sail 5 of my escorts with next shuttle unit leaving ULITHI and at least 3 with each succeeding unit.

10 0048 CINCPAO ADV HQ to CINCPAO PEARL Info CGAAPPQAD,M, CGAAPPQ, COF.GenPOA, COMCENTEN ComGenAAFPQ 060553 and Cincpoa Pearl 072145. In order to avoid excess dispatch traffic at cross purposes desire that major questions concerning future operations target dates for deployment of forces on positions yet to be captured and overall concept of air base development in the combat area be not referred to commanders engaged in combat except by these headquarters.

10 0128 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV Info ADCOMINPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMFWDAREA, CTF58, COMINPAC. Your 090816. No carrier mining strikes currently planned. Recommend release of mines to VLR program. Advance notice of future mining plans will be given.
10 0705 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 19 as of 101200. In yesterday's fighting in the 3rdPhibCorps area RCT 29 of the 6th MarDiv advancing up MOTOBU PENINSULA was subjected to enemy counter-attack on its left flank at 1730 with enemy being repulsed after severe WETFLUS fighting. Another counter attack on the 29th Right flank at 1815 was repulsed after an hour of close combat. During the night there were attempted infiltrations on right and center of 29th Marines with center receiving sporadic mortar and machine gun fire. Several small infiltration attempts were made in the area of 7th Marines on ISHIKAWA Isthmus. All other areas quiet. 1100 dispatch indicates elements 29th Marines PN TA 0929PORSY and TA 1028AFK. No reports on location main body. Further reports of yesterday's fighting in the 21st Corps zone indicate that 383rd RCT of 96th Div had a rough day yesterday suffering severe casualties from artillery and several counter attacks after capturing a hill on right flank from which they were later driven off. The 7th and 96th Divs jumped off at 0700 with objective of reducing resistance on both flanks and to gain high ground along both coasts. No further report. 1 RCT of the 27th Div under CTG 51.19 moved to eastern island and supported by naval gunfire and air landed 1 Bn on south beaches of TSUGEN SHIMA at 0840 to clear it of enemy troops and military installations. 96th Div artillery concentrated on bobble rocket launchers in TA 7973Q and report 6 or 8 damaged or destroyed. 

Para, Reinforcing fires to ground troops were provided 3rd Corps by 1 CA 3 DD, 24th Corps by 2 CA 1 CO 2 DD, 1 OBB 1 CL 1 DD gave general support to targets assigned by 10th Army and maintained illumination and harrassing fires along west coast from MACHINATO airfield south to minimize small boat activity. 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 9 DD were in support of TG 51.19 maintaining patrols in NAGAGUSUKU WAN and around eastern islands and provided support to 7th Div from eastern side. STERRETT which was hit by suicider evening 9 April proceeded under own power KERAMA escorted by JEFFERS. Previously unreported was ICS 36 hit at same time proceeded under own power to KERAMA. Damage is loss of mast antennae 5 WIA. PORTERFIELD at 0734 in FS station reports 1 Oscar crashed close aboard. No casualties or damage. 4 submarine contacts southeast of OKINAWA recorded as follows: MANLEY while screening HOLLANDIITA and WHITE PLAINS made sound contact at 0658 9 April in 24-53 N 128-49 E. Attack was made with depth charges with negative results. BROWN escort with 51.21.19 made good sonar at 24-56N 131-21 E at 1417 on 9 April. Dropped embarrassing pattern and marker. Made re attack but traces

Continued
poor and no doppler. At 1856 BROWN observed 4 distinct torpedo wakes 25 to 50 yards apart and 7000 to 10000 yards at 25-00M 130-19 E. Searched for source of wakes with negative results. Routine channel and transport area minesweeps continue. Sweeping is continuing in areas QIGL J2 J1. Casualty report. BUSH as of 9 April lists 14 KIA 18 WIA 73 MIA. Following types departed 0900 for GUAM: 4 APA 6 AKA 1 LSV 1 DE 3 APD. Para. The mornings air activities included an attack on SAOKISHIMA GUNTO by TU 52.1.3 with results unreported. ASP by PBMs in all sectors with a possible submarine contact 30 miles E of north tip OKINAWA at 1020. Air gambit tactics were employed. Routine search flights were made by PBMs from KERAMA and direct support was furnished troops by CVEs of TG 52.1 by strike on TSUGEN SHIMA in support of EASTERN ISLAND landings. After 0830 support flights were suspended due to bad weather. Special searches were made by 1 PBM Dumbo with TU 52.2.13 at SAOKISHIMA GUNTO and 1 PBM Dumbo with TG 58.2. If weather improves other Dumbos will make search for missing F4U pilots. Our plane losses consist of 1 R5BOV of NATS which landed on inoperational runway YONTAN ground looped burned with no personnel injured at 0720. During early morning 1 F4U of MAG 31 operating from YONTAN was seen to crash and explode near CAMERA when wing hit water in a turn. No survivors. During evening of 9 April 6 F4U of MAG 31 operating from YONTAN became lost. All planes are missing. Pilot of 1 recovered by LCS 57. On 3 April SAVO ISLAND and SARGENT BAY were relieved by SHAMROCK BAY and MAKASSER STRAIT in TG 52.1. There were no enemy air attacks this morning. Weather thick high winds from south shifting to NW. Heavy surf in reefs and beaches.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGENKMPAC Info CC3RDMPAR DIV.COFW.DECH ap, MARCOR, CINCPOA/APRIL

In view favorable tactical situation OKINAWA and your assurance that 3rd MarDiv will be ready for active combat by 1 July UrSer 000223 April 6 you are authorized to proceed with rotation of personnel 3rd MarDiv as originally planned. However plans for replacement of personnel in MarDivs on a scale which temporarily affects combat readiness of those units will as a matter of routine be submitted to Cincpoa for approval.

CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ. ALL TFC & TCC 5THFLT.

Summary No. 20 as of 101800. The 3rd PhibCorps continued its advance to the north. 29th Marines made gains averaging 2500 yards for the day. Present front line held by RCT 29 extends generally from UNTEI TA 0928 across MOTOBU PENINSULA to the vicinity MANA RIVER TA 9825 with patrols well in advance. Captured subpens and radar jammer at UNTEI but no boats. In the northern section of the island patrols of the 22nd Marines have reached to the vicinity of TA 1925. No information has been received from other elements of the 6th MarDiv. 24th Corps today consolidated its lines in organized positions secured yesterday. Only limited local advances were attempted during the day. Information received at 1430 indicated that elements of CT 105 of the 77th Div which effected a landing on TSUGEN JIMA this morning was meeting with considerable resistance. 10th Army as of 182400 records 5,009 Japs killed 222 POW and 43,578 civilians cared for. Reports on our casualties are not available. Para. 3rd PhibCorps was reenforced by naval gunfire by 1 CA 5 DD. Fire support was provided 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 CA 2 CL 3 DD. In addition this Corps was supported by 2 CA 1 CL and 2 DD of TG 51.19 operating within MAGAGUSUKU WAN. 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 9 DD supported the operations of TG 51.19 in the capture of SUGEN ISLAND. General support was pro-

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provided 10th Army by 1 CBE 1 CA 2 DD covering assigned areas south of NAHA. NEVADA fired her main batteries at open artillery emplacement in TA 8662F with good results. CruDiv 4 reports various buildings pillboxes concrete emplacements destroyed or neutralized. 1 probable radar location destroyed in TA 72700 and artillery vehicles moving on roads near MABUNI TA 7857Y were taken under fire with good results. Poor visibility hampered effective observation throughout the day. Ammunition situation remains good but heavy seas today interfered with replenishment from ships. Planes involved in hunter-killer at 26-48 N 129-27 E recalled at sunset because of bad weather. RELIEF departed for GUAM evacuating casualties. Further about HOPPING. Hit 6 times in port side by 4.7 gunfire from TSUGEN JIMA. After fireroom and engine room inoperative. Numerous electrical and piping casualties. Operating as 2 motor control maximum speed 18 knots. UDT 7 casualties 1 KIA 3 WIA. Casualties reported to date of naval personnel attached to ships of TF 51 is 283 KIA 899 WIA 412 MIA 1594 search flights were made by PBMs from KERAMA but direct air support of troops was cancelled because of bad weather. ASP was cancelled at 1600 due to bad weather. GABBIT tactics on sub contacts this morning were negative. PORTER-FIELD shot down 1 Mip at 0625 and was missed by suicider at 0638. An OY from 3rdPhibCorps has been missing since 1600. Special Dumbo searches were negative. TUSCALOSA OS2U pilot and crewman who bailed out over enemy territory 9 April are now safe having filtered through enemy lines. At 1355 a NATS R5D approached within 3 miles of YONTAN field but turned back to ETO because of weather. Control of direct air support of 3rdPhibCorps was taken over by landing force air support control unit today. Para. Following beach survey by UDTs. It is learned that HAGAGUEN WANN beaches in TA 9882 9684 and BROWN B3 1 are suitable for small landing craft. Latter suitable for LST in high water. BROWN B2 B3 PURPLE 2 are suitable for LVT only. No suitable exits lead from any of these beaches. UDTs continued work on MOCO beaches reporting MOCO CHANNEL cleared now suitable for 3 LSTs to beach at 1 time. UDT 1'S removed items of intelligence value from sunken enemy gunboat consisting of various charts documents signal devices suggestive of N equipment. Heavy rains have slowed down supply lines to forward echelons over roads. Unloading has been retarded today because of adverse weather with stopping of unloading HAGUCHI beaches. Weather light to moderate rain. Visibility variable from 0 in heavier rain to 6 miles. Temperature average 74 degrees. Wing south to northwest 22 knots average. Swell 6 to 8 feet rough sea.

06 2357 CG 3RDPhibCorps to CGFM FPAC Info CINC PAC PEARL, 3RD ARMY, CTF 51.

Strongly recommend 3rdPhibCorps consisting of 3 MarDivs, Corps Arty, Corps troops rehabilitate at LEGUMINOUS. Following factors make this area superior to MARIANAS and HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: (A) Training areas with ample artillery and small arms ranges. (B) Concentration of Corps in one area. (C) Saving in shipping and time in connection troop movements. (D) Congestion areas MARIANAS and KUAI. (E) Climate.
This is CTF 51 (ComPhibsPac) OpOrd AS-45 effective on receipt. Para. 1. 
Waters surrounding IE SHIMA have been cleared of mines. From number and 
character of fortifications and in absence of complete information assume 
Jap garrison IE SHIMA probably consists 2 JHF BN's plus airfield service 
troops totaling 2500. Para 2. This force while continuing operations re-
quired by CTF 51 OpPlan Al-45 and ComGen 10 OpPlan 1-45 Phase I will capture 
and defend IE SHIMA and establish thereon air base facilities. Para 3A. TF 51 
organized as at present less detachments continue present operations. Para3B. 
TG 51.21 RADM Reifsnider (who also retains title and duties of CTF 53). TG 
51.1 less detachments including TG 56.4 less detachments plus AmphRecon Bn 
embarked in KINZER and SCRIBNER, plus assigned NCF and air support units, 
plus UDT's numbers 4 and 21 embarked in LOY and BUNCH respectively. Capture 
and defend IE SHIMA, establish air facilities. Execute Para 3. 2 ComGen 10 
OpPlan 1-45 landing on beaches in accordance CTG 56.4 Attack Plan. Retain 
garrison and reembark assault troops in accordance with later instructions. 
Execute necessary gunfire and aircraft support beach reconnaissances and 
demolitions beginning W day minus 3. Mark channels to establish navigational 
Aids improve beach approaches unload resupply and garrison material. Para 3. 
1 W day is 16 April 1945 3 hour as set by CTG 51.21. Para 3. 2 CTG 51.21 
submit attack plan with requirements for supporting elements. Para 3.3 Sail 
detachments of TG 51.1 as separately directed by CTF 51 to begin to arrive 
northern HAGUSHI beaches 14 April and report to CTG 51.21. Only those ele-
ments essential for use in the assault will be ordered in. Para 3.4 CTG 
51.21 act as SOPA IE SHIMA and MOTOBU Area. Paras 4 and 5. Logistics and 
communications in accordance CTF 51 OpPlan Al-45. Para. CTF 56 concurs.

Intend to carry out rotation at rear bases for about 10 day periods of TGs 
of TF 58 also of units of TG 52.1 both when local situation permits. Your 
090125. At present time expect further large scale enemy air attacks will 
continue as long as Jap forces on OKINAWA remain undefeated and with firm 
grip on large part of island and so long as Jap high command believes he 
has inflicted much greater losses on us than he actually has. Your 090325 
100317 and 090302 indicate large Jap air strength remains available and is 
slated for such attacks. Damage from mass suicide tactics is such that we 
must be REGAIN protection from CAP interception both vicinity OKINAWA 
and in advanced positions along routes from enemy airfields. Retirement to 
LEYTE in near future of British Pacific Fleet affects situation as JONU 
necessity for daily logistic replenishment of portions of our forces. I 
realize our best defense would be smothering attack on all Jap airfields. 
TF 58 has made 4 attacks on Empire fields but is unable to attack all 
simultaneously with result that enemy withdraws its planes from areas under 
attack. When attacking us enemy mounts his attacks from fields out of our 
reach and stages them through fields we can hit. If TAC-based VFs could 
make fighter sweeps of HONSHU fields timed with TF 58 attack on KYUSHU 
this situation might be partially remedied. Our ability to keep units at 
ULITHI or LEYTE while operating in or near EAST SHIMA SSA will continue to 
be handicapped by distance of these bases from area of active operations.

2838
Summary No. 21 as of 111200. The 6th MarDiv of the 3rd PhibCorps continues its advance northward with the 29th Marines objective to secure the remainder of the MOTOBU PENINSULA. 22nd and 4th Marines are patrolling northern OKINAWA encountering only small enemy groups. The 22nd Marines moved 1 RN up to the vicinity of TA 22251 and 1 Company to TAIRA in TA 25225. 1 Company 4th Marines dispatched to ATTSUBARU in TA 2317. The 1st MarDiv patrolled its assigned areas capturing 5 suicide boats in the area of the 7th Marines. 24th Corps continued to improve its positions with the 96th Div making local attacks on KAKAZU RIDGE TA 8077. Many concentrations of heavy artillery and naval gunfire are being placed on the vicinity of TA 0726. This strong point was knocked out by LVT(A). With the mopping up of TSUGEN all EASTERN ISLANDS are cleared of enemy troops. Incomplete casualty report lists 8 KIA 3 WIA 1 MIA. Enemy killed 150. No POW. Garrison troops occupying ZAMAM in KERAMA RETTO killed 10 Japs yesterday morning. Para. Call fires and illumination during the night were provided 3rd PhibCorps by 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD. In the 24th Corps by 1 OBB 2 CL 3 DD plus 2 DD of 51.19 assisting. 1 OBB 1 CA 3 DD of TF 52 provided general support off southern OKINAWA. Support for TG 51.19 operations off eastern islands was provided by 2 OB 1 CA 7 DD. Summary of suicide boat activity for night of 8-9 April indicates that from 12 to 15 boats were sighted and at least 5 destroyed. 15 swimmers some with hand grenades were killed. 1 boat with 6 Japs in it committed suicide with hand grenades. Suspected suicide boat pens and bases along southwest coast are being neutralized by naval gunfire and illumination and a strong inshore patrol. LST 557 during TSUGEN ISLAND operations was hit by large mortar shell before silenced by gunfire. Ship operational. Casualties 2 KIA 1 WIA. Minesweeping completed in Q1 east of 127-50 except path 200 yards wide on bearing 248 degrees T from CHICUNIGA SHOAL. Not considered safe until rechecked. Other small areas near shoals unswept. No mines encountered. Other minesweeping continues in areas J1 J2. Routine transport and channel sweeps completed. HAMBLETON and YMS 96 collided at 0440 10 April near grid area 7848. No damage to HAMBLETON and YMS 96 towed to KERAMA with engine room flooded. CTU 51.29.11 convoy enroute SAIPAN reported positive sound contacts at 1604, 10 April in Lat 23-17 Long 132-09 with probable kill by escort. RALL at 1100 reported sound contact in screen station A35. Negative results of search. Para. Direct air support of troops is being furnished by CVEs of TU 52.1.1 and 52.1.2. Planes of TU 52.1.2 attacked NIMAM DAITO SHIMA on 9 April with unreported results and is striking SAKITISHIMA GUNTO this morning. Search flights and ASP were flown by PBMs from KERAMA base and a special TBM ASW plane is assisting in hunter killer on contact bearing 165 from ZAMPA. Special searches are in progress by 1 Dumbo PEM covering northern FORMOSA with TF 57. 1 Dumbo PEM covering SAKITISHIMA GUNTO with TU 52.1.3 and 1 Dumbo searching for missing P&JU pilots. Our plane losses this morning consist of 1 friendly fighter plane reported by TUSCALOOSA as shot down by enemy AA at 0245. At 0740 an P&JU taking off from Yontan Field.

-Continued-
11 0730 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT, ETC. (SUMMARY NO. 21 - CONT'D)

crashed into 3 parked planes burning 1 plane. No personnel casualties.
Kadena Field is inoperational due to heavy rain but Yontan surface in excellent condition. Propaganda and photo flights were made by SAGINAW BAY and LUNGA POINT TBMs. Between 1000 and 1040 hostile planes, 5 in 2 groups, altitude 20,000 approached within 15 miles of BOLO from the north. None were sighted and no attacks were made by enemy. 1 was fired at by 1 of our radar pickets. End of Summary.

11 0909 COMSTHFLT to CTF 58, 51 Info ALL TCC & TFC 5THFLT, CTF 52.1.3, CINC PAC ADV.

TU 52.1.3 return OKINAWA area to augment CAP during probable heavy enemy air attack tomorrow 12th. TF 58 discontinue replenishment operations and have all groups available to meet attack.

11 0940 CTF 51 to TF 51 Info CONCEN TEN, CTF 58, COMSTHFLT.

Indications are that 12 April will be good weather and the enemy air will attack very strongly from JAPAN and POP JAS. Be ready. Don't let any get back home.

11 1340 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINC PAC BOTH, ALL ECM HOLDERS 5THFLT.

Summary No. 22 as of 111300. There was little change in the ground situation today. 24th Corps continues to consolidate its lines to include dominating terrain preparatory to resuming the attack. 96th Div has been receiving small arms mortar and artillery fire throughout the day. They report enemy Hiking satchel charges. 7th Div has been conducting patrolling throughout its front and has cleared minefields to OUKI TA 8574. Patrols encountered sharp opposition. Hill 178 TA 8374 on the Div right front an extremely strong enemy position is the immediate key position obstructing their advance. The 3rd PhibCorps situation remains substantially unchanged. On MOTOBU PENINSULA in the area of the 29th Marines the 2nd Bn located in the general area TA 0324 is being held up by organized resistance. Attacks are being directed at isolating this enemy force. Troops in KERAMA RETTO passed to command to WOS On OKINAWA at 121300. Ground force casualties to include 092400: 3rd PhibCorps nondivisional units: 1 KIA 20 WIA 1 MIA. Total battle 22 NBC 18. 1st MarDiv 41 KIA 157 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 198 NBC 185. 6th MarDiv 60 KIA 217 WIA 2 MIA. Total battle 279 NBC 193. 24th Corps non-divisional units: 8 KIA 48 WIA 9 MIA. Total battle 65 NBC 123. 77th Div 49 KIA 173 WIA 3 MIA. Total battle 225 NBC 48. 7th Div 90 KIA 575 WIA 10. Total battle 675 NBC 216. 96th Div 183 KIA 913 WIA 135 MIA. Total battle 1233 NBC 253. Grant total of battle 2695 NBC 1036. Para. Fire support missions throughout the day in support of 3rd PhibCorps were 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 24th Corps west side of OKINAWA 2 OBB 1 CA 2 CL 5 DD on the east side of OKINAWA by 2 OBB 2 CA 6 DD. General support by 1 OBB 2 CA 1 DD. In the Army zone south of NAHA 1 OBB 1 CA 2 DD. 2 DD supported minesweeping operations off the northern coast. Protective measures have been established for Nago Wan anchorage. 36 WIA 67 hung up on reef in grid 0063 damaging both screws. A possible midget sub was reported by CTG 51.19 at 0930 bearing 165 degrees 13 miles from BOLO. MCCLELLAN was sent to this location and special ASP plane was sent to aid in hunter-killer. No further report. ST LOUIS in position 030 degrees 10 miles from BOLO took under fire an enemy Nick which approached from the north at 1017. Plane retired to the northward.

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Last night ESTES and 4 LSTs anchored MAGAGASUKA WAn. Para. Our air activities for the day consisted of direct air support to troops by planes from CVEs of TG 52.1. Search flights and ASP were flown by PBMs from KERAMA RETTO. Strike was made on 14 amphibious tanks and 15 camouflaged boats near south tip of OKINAWA at 1700 with results unreported. Special searches flown by Dumbo PBMs were all reported negative. Our plane losses this afternoon were 1 C47 employed for DDT spraying which crash landed at YONAN field at 1537 demolishing the plane with 1 KIA and 7 WIA. Enemy activity occurred at 1600 when BUNKER HILL F6F in position 53 miles bearing 015 from ZAMPA shot down 1 Tojo. This evening beginning 1820 several hostile planes in 2 raids approached from SW within 10 miles south of KERAMA RETTO meeting opposition and turning back. Possibly 1 or 2 landed NAHA after dark. At 1843 flown in position 40 miles bearing 240 degrees from ZAMPA shot down 1 Zake.

ENTERPRISE plane shot down 1 Tony at 1847 position 60 miles bearing 240 degrees from ZAMPA. MANLOVE in position 34 miles bearing 232 degrees from ZAMPA had near miss by suicide plane at 1935. 1 KIA 1 WIA. Might fighter from ENTERPRISE shot down a 2 engined plane 40 miles NE of BOLO at 2109.

Para. High surf prohibited unloading over HAGUSHI beaches today but unloading continued at NAGO beaches with little hindrance. Weather mostly cloudy. Visibility to 10 miles. Temperature average 65 degrees. Wind NE to north 25 to 30 knots. Moderate sea and swell with 3 foot surf.

Your 240629. Cannot agree that UDT duty is not hazardous. Low casualties to date attributed to excellent personnel, organization, training, gunfire support and enemy unfamiliarity with UDT methods. 1 team was knocked out as an effective unit in BLESSMAN bombing. Casualties among NCDUS in European Theater have been high. Future casualties in Pacific may be high and should be provided for. Teams are now required to live aboard APDs for very long periods. Use of volunteers highly desirable but not absolutely essential now that UDTs are firmly established. However, UDT operations can hardly be compared with assault boat operations as regards personnel characteristics and capabilities. 30 active teams assigned Pacific Area should be sufficient for prospective operations, including those in training, rehabilitating and on leave. Provided attrition does not greatly exceed past experience the reduced program proposed by Cominch should meet requirements. Replacement by individuals from Fleet satisfactory but experience shows very few volunteers. Also, they must be specially screened to obtain men with desired physical and mental capabilities. None from fleet should ever be assigned to teams on active duty in field but should always be put first through the 6 weeks course at MAUI or at FT PIERCE. This points to selection on West Coast by PhibTraPac from experienced officers and men at receiving stations waiting assignment. If exceptional losses are incurred it may be necessary to request increase in program.

CX 13830. Effective 20 April 45 ComSoPac is relieved of logistic support of all SWPA forces in NORTHERN SOLOMONS Aids. Effective 30 April 45 Commander Allied Naval Forces will assume logistic support of all naval elements in
in NorSols. Other than Marine air units now assigned to AAF, it is contem-
plated that all US naval forces in NorSols will be evacuated in near future excepting a detachment of approximately 200 personnel to operate lighterage at BOUGAINVILLE for AUSTRALIAN military forces. Upon transfer of other US naval forces from BOUGAINVILLE and at time to be mutually agreed upon by Com Allied NavForces and ComAlliedLandForces logistic support of detachment operating boat lighterage pool at BOUGAINVILLE will be as-
sumed by Commander Allied Land Forces.

0545 CTF 51 to COMDESDIV 4 Info TF51.

Your suggestions relative to evening twilight air cover for radar pickets are agreed to. The force commander recognizes the predicament of your ves-
sels and admires their gallant performance of a hazardous but extremely necessary duty. Air cover at dusk has been limited because carrier day CAP must land before dark and carrier night fighters are not numerous enough to cover the entire area. Shore based fighters which are now ready for operation will provide a 24 plane dusk CAP with additional planes on ground alert. These have operated for several days and will later be increased.

0839 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

JCS 07/2051. Assault ships and craft are now being utilized to the fullest extent possible for movement of personnel and cargo from rear to combat areas. Virtually all shipping into TINO JIMA from MARIANAS now conducted by LSTs. Large numbers LST and LSM being utilized to expedite movement of defense battalions construction battalions and equipment into OKINAWA in order to capitalize on the rapid advances made by assault troops. LSTs from SoPac being utilized to transport bombs to MARIANAS for use of B-29 and to transport personnel and equipment moving forward incident to roll up. Other ships and craft allocated temporarily to assist in forward move-
ment 7th Flh Hdgtrs as indicated my 280904 and my 250730 of higher classi-
fication. As soon as operations currently in progress and those in immedia-
to future have become clarified it is possible that additional ships can be utilized for logistic purposes. No firm estimate of numbers or dates can be made at this time.

1235 COMSTHFLT to CTF 51 Info CTFs 53,54,55 CTG 51.19.

Consider all battleships, cruisers, destroyers above minimum needed for fire support and screens tomorrow should be kept together in suitable dispositions for maneuvering in defense against air attack.

1830 COMINCH & CHQ TO CINCSWPA,CINCPAC BOTH,INFO COMAIRPAC,COMSOPAC,COMAIRSOPAC, COMSTHFLT,COMAIRSTHFLT, RNZAF WELLINGTON.

Due to increased tempo carrier and Marine fighter squadron to operations with resulting high losses and short supply of Corsairs. Projected allocations these aircraft to RNZAF for May and June cannot be made. Navy Hell-
divers are available to RNZAF if desired.
APRIL (GCT)

11 2155 CTF 51 TO CINCPAC ADV, COMSTHFILT, TF 51, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Special report enemy air attacks night early morning 12 April. 0050 to 0600 about 25 enemy planes in 10 groups approached from north. ENTERPRISE VF(N) shot down 2 Betty 1 Jack. Shore based dawn patrol shot down Zeke. Ships off HAGDSHI beach jointly shot down 1 Betty 2 Zekes. No damage to ships although SAN FRANCISCO missed by 2 sticks incendiaries. 2 Zekes attacked YONTAN no report as to damage.

12 0526 CINCPAC ADV to CINCSWPA INFO COMAAFSWPA, COMSTHFILT, COMSTHFILT, CTF 51.

Request continued neutralization strikes on southern FORMOSA air installations including TAICHU with added strikes on SHINCHIKU and MATSUYAMA subsequent to TF 57 retirement on 13th.

10 1141 CINCPAC ADV to COMSTHFILT, CG 10, CONFAREA, COMSTRATEGIC AF, COMMARGILEAREA, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRFORPAC, INFO DEP.COMAF 20, COMINCH, COMSUBPAC, COMAIRPAC, CINCSWPA, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRSTHFILT, COMAAFSWPA, COM3RDFLT, CCAFPOA

There are repeated instances of friendly submarine and surface craft being attacked by friendly aircraft. This indicates careless briefing, improper identification and inattention to recognition procedures. In addition the offensive approach frequently employed by aircraft and particularly by lifeguard fighter cover leaves the submarine no choice but to submerge or shoot. These dangerous practices must stop and action addressees are directed to initiate action which is sufficiently positive to insure that they do stop. Desire that prompt disciplinary action be initiated where appropriate.

10 1615 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC.

CINCPAC PEARL inquire into issuance ComServPac 10595080 of 28 March which may have been issued without due consideration of effect on planned operations. My concept that replacements should arrive prior to effecting transfers. Desire no withdrawals of CB Bns or marked reduction their strength when operations will be directly affected noted that reference calls for removal from MARINAS of equivalent of nearly 3 Bns. Please arrange to bring 39 CB to strength promptly. As guiding principle desire my prior approval be obtained before any plan or directive is issued that calls for large reductions in strength of any important units afloat or ashore.

12 1118 MACARTHUR TO JCS INFO CINCPAC/CINCPAC, COMSTHFILT.

CAX 51536, Ref JCS 072051 (GCT) continuous study is in progress to utilize all available floating equipment, including amphibious craft in SWPA, in the movement forward of troops and other resources from SoPac and NEW GUTNEA bases. 20 LSTs have for some time past been working as a separate TG to displace forward heavy equipment and troops. This TG will be increased in size as additional LSTs and LSMs are released from operations. LCI's not committed to operations are utilized for movement of personnel having little or no equipment, such as replacements. LCTs except those required at rear ports for loading and unloading large ships are being displaced forward to perform SIE war duties in PHILIPPINE ports.
Summary No. 24 as of 121300. No change today in the situation of the 24th Corps. Corps reports having received artillery fire and mortar fire of 240mm caliber. Fighting in the MOTOBU PENINSULA has developed into combat by separate groups along the general line TA 9725 0928. The 6th Recon Co has reached TA 9630. A Bn of the 22nd Marines is moving up the PENINSULA to TA 2635, and last reports indicate that this Bn had reached TA 2330. A Co of 4th Marines is enroute to TA 2622F. PMF Recon Bn in TU 51.117 is to proceed after dark this evening and land on MENA SHIMA TA 2984. Captured 32nd Army order dated at SHURI 21st March 1945 corroborates other evidence indicating the presence of the 24th Div and the 44th INF on OKINAWA. This document further indicated that all air shipping and service units are to be prepared for ground combat. Casualty reports to include 102400 list: 3rd Phib Corps non divisional units: 1 KIA 20 WIA 1 MIA. TOTAL BATTLE 22 NBC 21. 1st Mar Div 42 KIA 162 WIA 0 MIA. Total battle 204 NBC 203. 6th Mar Div 64 KIA 250 WIA 2 MIA. Total battle 316 NBC 203. 24th Corps non divisional units: 9 KIA 48 WIA 9 MIA. Total battle 66 NBC 130. 7th Division 120 KIA 696 WIA 13 MIA. Total battle 429 NBC 300. 77th Div 19 KIA 173 WIA 3 MIA. Total battle 225 NBC 48. 96th Div 193 KIA 1108 WIA 232 MIA. Total battle 1533 NBC 287. Grand total battle 2195 NBC 1192. Para. Naval gunfire support for the day consisted of 2 DD reinforcing 3rd Corps 1 CA 1 CL supporting 24th Corps plus 2 CA and 2 DD of TG 51.19 supporting the 7th Div on the east side. TG 51.19 was allocated 2 CA 8 DD for general support. There was no deep support provided in Army zone. All firing except of eastern group was controlled by SFCPS or air support in Corps 24. Other naval action included sinking 20m of 2 canoes by LCI(G) 472 carrying 60 natives or Japanese near HANNA SHIMA. Design at 0745 reported sinking what appeared to be torpedo body which on patrol in station O25. UDT 16 is further developing beaches in TA 0616 and investigating TA 7925. RAdm Blandy passed command of Eastern FS group 51.19 to ComCruDiv 4. Para. Our air activities for the period consisted of routine search flights by PBM's from KERAMA BASE with direct air support of troops by CVE's of TG 52.1 which were cancelled during air raids. ASP was flown by PBM's with ANZIO group continuing hunter killer operations on submarine reported in 1200 summary. Our plane losses reported as: 1 F4U crashed and burned on N OKINAWA at 1650. 1 fighter crash landed 6 miles bearing 050 from ZAMPA at 1525 with rescue by COLESBORO. BUNKER HILL fighter crash landed 12 miles bearing 320 THETA at 1540 with rescue by unknown ship. STEELE rescued PETRONFF BAY pilot at 1513 position not given. 1 fighter reported crashed on southern OKINAWA in enemy territory at 1523. No confirming details. Special searches were made by Dumbo PBM which was sent to rescue YORKTOWN and 1 INTREPID pilot downed near AMAMI SHIMA but pilots rescued previously by other means. 1 search PBM rescued survivors lst 28-20 long 130-15 at 1920. Dumbo PBM leading DE to rescue aviator reported downed 47 miles bearing 055 from ZAMPA. Pilot rescued turned out to be enemy pilot who had parachuted from plane, Para. Good weather favored unloading over beaches throughout period. Weather clear. Visibility 10 miles. Temperature 68 to 70 degrees. Northerly wind 15 to 20 knots. Slight sea and swell with 2 to 4 foot surf. End of summary.

Carried out 44 plane strike on each of SHINCHIKU and KIIJUN latter because 9/10 cloud on MATSUYAMA. Few aircraft observed on either field. Splashed 16 mixed types damaged 5. 1 Tess destroyed MATSUYAMA unobserved due low clouds. Todays interceptions show significant traffic between SAKSHIMA and FORMOSA both ways. If weather FORMOSA precludes effective strike tomorrow intend dealing with ISHIGAKI and traffic. In view present situation...
and your 110247 expect to be available further operations 16, 17 April as you direct.

Flash report 12 April. Shot down 153 aircraft of which 62 by OKINAWA target CAP 10 ground force including 3 by gunfire. Balance shot down by CAP over KIKAI TOKUNO and AMAMI except 1 near MINAMI. Destroyed 8 planes on ground at KIKAI and TOKUNO and damaged 9 more. Cratered runways both fields. Fired fuel dump and warehouse. Last night heckled TOKUNO and KIKAI with VFN and VTN starting fires both places. Heckling tonight with VTN. Last night VFN splashed total of 7 including 2 by OKINAWA target CAP TEN. VTN heckler got 1 more. Tonight VFN splashed 1 Betty SETFAR. Mapping photo coverage. AMAMI completed negatives excellent. Pilots report TOKUNO coverage also completed.

Under attack most of afternoon and still going now. During day 18 planes splashed by gunfire and about 20 to 25 more by our aircraft. Radar picket KIDD hit by suicider with about 20 killed and 60 wounded including captain. Severe damage to ship. MISSOURI hit by suicider with slight damage. ENTERPRISE considerable damage from near miss suicider and 2 bomb near misses. 4 men missing. 10 wounded 2 of them seriously. HANK slight damage 2 killed 1 missing from near miss suicider. So far night fighters have splashed 3 Bettys plus 1 probable. Gunfire shot down 2 more.

Because suicide attacks are now the rule rather than the exception and in fact amount to mass suicide by the Japanese Air Force I consider it necessary gradually to divulge the situation to the American people. My previous requests for secrecy are withdrawn.

Your 090910. My 100044 and 100046. Confirming conference 11 April I will await your proposals for changes in air base development program which will be welcomed either as overall or as partial recommendations. Following agreed principles are stated for information addresses. (A) OKINAWA and I E SHIMA will be developed for at least same total air forces as planned. (B) VLR may be based on OKINAWA and other Army aircraft based on I E SHIMA to simplify logistics. (C) 1 field developed initially for a Marine fighter group will be expanded to include carrier replacements and will be accessible for unloading preserved aircraft from ships. (D) The naval air base originally planned for No. 3 field will be adequate for at least 4 landbased squadrons plus a photogroup, NATS and 2 marine fixed squadrons. (E) The governing principle will be maximum early development of OKINAWA as a base for attack on JAPAN consistent with immediate urgent requirements for tactical purposes incident to capture and defense of the island.
Believe enemy is depending strongly on southern KYUSHU fields not for staging only but for ability to assemble and launch heavy attacks such as yesterday and 6 April. See Cinopac Adv 120159 in confirmation. Desire you exploit possibilities whenever you feel situation is right to hit these fields. Turner is directed herewith to keep you advised of any defense requirements.

Because of the importance to the naval and air situation of establishing on shore at OKINAWA as many tactical aircraft as possible as soon as possible desire that you make certain that nothing is left undone which can be done to expedite arrival of personnel and equipment to service air groups and improve fields on a full out basis.

Summary No. 25 as of 131200. No material change in ground action situation. 24th Corps still engaged in consolidating its position and perfecting its plans for initiation for a strong offensive to the south probably about 15th. The enemy plan of defense in this area appears to be 1 of defense in place of the death of all parts of a heavily and fortified area which includes pillboxes with sliding steel doors against which flame throwers are ineffectual. This defensive system in depth extends across the island along the coral front throughout the south end of the island. Hostile artillery fire heavy mortar is increasing in accuracy and volume to the rear of the corps front lines with strong evidence that artillery fires are observed and that their counter battery is assisted by flash and sound ranging units. Various attempts at infiltration were made in the area of the 7th Div during the night. The enemy was armed with rifles, pole spears and demolitions. Around 85 Japs were killed and 6 light machine guns captured. The 1st Bn 243rd Inf repulsed a counterattack of some 900 enemy at 0630. 3rd PhibCorps reported a quiet night. Late reports from the area of the 29th Marines on MOTOSU PENINSULA state that 3rd Bn was heavily engaged yesterday in the area TA 9624. At 1400 they indicated urgent need for fire assistance due to counterattack on all sides. Counterattack was repulsed with the assistance of effective naval gunfire from PRESTON. Noon reports show 1 Bn 26th Marines has reached MONOBARU TA 2635. The 6th Recon Co has captured BISE TA 9631. In other areas of the 3rd PhibCorps patrolling continues with minor contacts with the enemy. Recon by FMT Recon Bn of MONHA SHIMA TA 8824 was completed last night no enemy troops found. During the night 12-13 April 6 enemy suicide boats were captured in TA 9900 in operating condition. Para. Naval operations for the period comprise gunfire support to 3rd Corps by 1 CL 2 DD and to 24th Corps by 4 OB 2 CA 1 CL 3 DD plus 3 DD of 51.9 cooperating from east. General support to TG 51.9 was furnished by 1 OB 2 CA 1 CL 3 DD and 8 DD. Anti boat patrol and coastline illumination was conducted by 1 CL and 2 DD. ST LOUIS kept NAHA airfield interdicted between 0500 and 0600. Amplification of flash report of hostile air action against our ships follows: JEFFERS in RP station A12 at 1415 damaged by near miss from suicide Val and Baka bomb released from twin engine bomber at 1400 yards. JEFFERS with assistance LMS 189 rescued 250 crew 22 officers including wounded from ABELE LMS 189 and LMS 190. LMS 189 strafed and bombed in RP station 84 at 1502. 1 plane dived into con carrying 2 men blown off ship several injured. Several LMSs are stationed near radar picket line.
for rescue salvage and towing purposes. RAIL damaged by suicide plane carrying 100 pound bomb released instant before plane crashed. Bomb passed through ship without exploding. 2 large holes at waterline. Ship riddled with shrapnel. Depth charge impulse charge storage port side blew up. 20 KTA 34 WIA 3 MIA. RIDDLE in station A35 10 miles west of BOLO hit by suicide plane at 1500. Extensive damage beyond capacity of ships force to repair. 1 hole 2 feet in diameter inside on port quarter. 1 gun main battery inoperative. 10 WIA 1 MIA. TENNESSEE attacked by 3 planes. 1 plane carried estimated 250 SAP bomb. Dove on starboard signal bridge damaging area from frame 69 to frame 85. SP radar 240mm quad 5 FP20mm singles and radar on 5 inch director demolished. After Mark 8 director out. Bomb penetrated main deck. 23 KTA 96 WIA. IDAHO suffered near miss by aerial torpedo. 3 upper and 3 lower blisters flooded. After SC and BDM radar antenna out SK KERKY. Steam leak No. 3 engine but speed not reduced. Ship now anchored HAGUSHI making repairs. MMOT V was MS which received slight rigging damage from suicider. 1 WIA. PURDY in RP station 1 hit by suicide plane at 1500. Able to proceed to transport area. NEW MEXICO hit by 5 inch shell from a friendly ship during TF 54 air action afternoon 12th. No damage or casualties. LSM 279 suffered 4 WIA morning 12th from 20mm shell hitting forward well deck. LCS 33 hit by Val 1500 exploded and sank at 1630. 1 KTA 26 WIA 3 MIA. LCS 115 effected the rescue. 3 YMS are patrolling entrance to NAGO WAN. Routine minesweeps of transport area continues. UDTs recon from TA 9585 to 0084A completed. UDTs working north from TA 0084A today. HOPE and SAVARITAN arrived this morning. Para. Air operations include direct air support of troops by CVs of TG 52.1. Search flights and ASP patrol flown by PEMS from KERAMA base. Hunter killer operations with PBM and ANZIO group on contact reported 12 April still in progress. The OKINAWA area was under enemy air attack from 1900 to 2200 12 April. 1 Betty and 1 Nell shot down by CAP at 1910. 1 shot down by HUDSON at 2130. 10 torpedo planes attacked TF 54 about 1500 April, using flares and window. Near misses to ROCKS and IDAHO. Several enemy air intruders were in area from 0200 to 0520 but did not attack. Possibility that 4 Yals landed on IE SHIMA about 2030 but not seen by air search today. Our plane losses are: 1 F6FN from ENTERPRISE last reported north of MOTOU at 0300 still missing and presumed lost. Dumbo and other air search negative. At 2000 12 April PBM ASW plane made forced landing 15 miles north KERAMA. Crew rescued by CONV. Plane later taxied back to KERAMA. The following ships shot down enemy planes not previously mentioned: PORTLAND 1 Zeke morning 12 April. On afternoon 12 April following shot down: PURDY 5. NL 1. PORTLAND 3. LCS 34 1. LCS 32 1. LCS 33 1. JEFFERS 1. ZELLARS 2. ABELE 2. 16th AA 5n ashore shot down 1. This raises total of planes shot down by ships to 36 and grand total to 128. Expect there will be some more when final reports are in.

13 0840 CTF 51 to TF 51 Info CINCPAC BOTH, COMSTIFLT.

JEFFERS (DEMS 27) reports that on afternoon of 12 April while under attack by several planes quote twin engine bomber released apparently large bomb at 14000 yards. Bomb had head on appearance of Tojo, traveled at very high accelerating speed, splashed 50 yards port beam. Believe bomb was pilot controlled though no pilot observed in bubble canopy unquote.

13 0935 CINCPAC ADV to CINCPACWA Info COMSTIFLT.

ComSTIFLT 130113 apparently allocates only 9 B25s and 8 P51s to hit FORMOSA. Our forces ashore and afloat continue under serious enemy air threat and attack from FORMOSA and elsewhere. Intelligence reports indicate continuation of extensive use of FORMOSA for attacks on us. Request strongest practicable strikes to destroy enemy air concentrations in FORMOSA.
Flash summary 13 April. Shot down 1 Myrt only airborne Hip seen so far. Destroyed 12 planes on ground. Cratered TOKUNO and JAN airfields. Destroyed 2 warehouses and started fires at AMAMI and KIFAI. Strafed 23 small craft and barges. Pilot on CAP at about 1530 on 12 April between TORKO and INHEYA SHIMAS saw probable piloted bomb pass about 2000 feet below him at approximately 30 degree glide angle. Bomb appeared silver color. Had wings and tail surfaces. Wing span appeared less than normal for length of fuselage. Could not tell whether it had pilot or cockpit. Bomb emitted 1 short streamer of black smoke while in glide and appeared on direct course toward destroyer. Also saw 2nd smoke streamer parallel to 1st about 200 feet distant but saw no other bomb. Pilot believes bomb or bombs launched from 2 Bettys observed few minutes later about 5,000 feet above. From 13 March to 12 April inclusive TF 58 has destroyed 914 airborne enemy aircraft including 73 by ships gunfire and 363 aircraft on the ground. 4 additional aircraft suicide crashed ships. Grand total destroyed 1281.

Summary No. 26 as of 131800. 24th Corps reports no change in front lines. Operations of the 7th Div confined to improving existing positions reconnaissance placing of artillery fire on selected targets and patrolling to probe hostile positions. Artillery observers with patrols obtained excellent results in bringing artillery fire to pinpoint targets. 96th Div continued consolidation and strengthening of its front line. Close support by well delivered air strikes rockets bombs and strafing produced excellent results on a large enemy column west of INA TA 7864T. Further report on enemy counter-attack of early morning against 96th Div right flank reveals that artillery and mortar fire reached its peak on front lines about 0900 after which fire was lifted to rear areas preceding heavy counter-attack along MIZZU RIDGE TA 8077 against 381st and 383rd Inf by what is estimated as a reinforced Bn. Prompt naval gunfire support by COLORADO NEVADA SAN FRANCISCO BILOXI HUTCHINS H L EDWARDS was reported by 96th Div to have been helpful in repelling counter-attack. Numerous enemy dead were reported. Hostile artillery and mortar fire lessened considerably today. The enemy is tapping wires in this area. No report as to 3rd PhibCorps patrol movements scheduled for the day. 1 Bn 22nd Marines is at HANOHIT TA 3442T at 1150. 29th Marines had numerous contacts with enemy forces estimated as approximately 1000 mixed Army and Navy troops mostly scattered groups with 1 concentration of about 500 in TA 0025, 0022 and 0120. 7th Marines has made contact with an estimated 100 enemy in the vicinity of ONNA T TA 9503. Positive identification of the 23rd Bn of the 64th Brigade was established by enemy dead. The 8th Marine AA Bn has established AA defenses for the beach area in MAGO WAN. Para. Naval fire support given to 3rd Corps by 1 CA 2 DD 24th Corps by 3 OBB 1 CL 3 DD in the west and in Army zone by 1 OBB 2 CA 2 DD from MAGAGASUKU WAN. Support was provided by 1 OBB 5 DD. TG 51.21 bombarded TE SHIMA with 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD in support of UDTs. Here is 1 for the books. ICS 57 hit by 3 suicide planes while in action in RP 1 afternoon 12 April. 1 hole 8 feet extends beneath waterline. After magazines and gyro room flooded. Steering by hand only. Fresh water system out. Flushing system and galley out. Living quarters not habitable. Extensive damage to ordnance. 2 KIA 6 WIA. Ship shot down 1 plane in addition to 3 suicides and returned to KERAMA under own power. 1240 COWELL sighted submarine periscope 27-13 N 126-04 E bearing 315 68 miles from BOLO. ASP plane vectored to area made attack on possible sonar buoy contact with unobserved results.
CONNOLLY and BOWERS sent to assist ASP plane made 2nd attack on sonor buoy at 1630. Results not known. WHITEBURST not previously reported was hit by suicide plane at 121455 has severe damage. LINDSAY when hit 12th had 8 KIA 56 WIA 46 MTA. RELIEF sighted floating contact type mine in position 18-35N 138-10 E. Attempt to destroy unsuccessful. Para. CVEs of TU 52.1.1 and 52.1.2 furnished direct support to troops. Results of strikes made by planes of these units for 12 April include destruction of trucks artillery gun positions various small boats and buildings strafing of troop concentrations and firing of ammunition and fuel storage areas. An attack mission was carried out by TU 52.1.1 on SAKISHIMA GUNTO during the afternoon with unreported results. Several small strikes were made on IE SHIMA. Search flights were made by PBM's from KERAMA seaplane base. ASP patrols were flown. ANZIO ASW group completed 24 hour air search for sub previously reported. Area was under air attack from 1720 to 1800 by 9 planes approaching from the north and then from west in 2 groups. SUNWANEE F6F destroyed 4 Vals at 1740 50 miles bearing 300 from ZAMPA. BUNKER HILL F6F shot down 3 Vals at 1746 40 miles bearing 290 from ZAMPA. 1 downed by STEAMER BAY F6F. 1 suicider missed an unidentified LCS. There was no damage to our units. Only 1 enemy plane got away. Again at 1930 to 2010 an estimated 4 planes came in from the north. DITTER shot down 1 Betty at 1950 40 miles bearing 000 from ZAMPA and shore AA on OKINAWA shot down 1 Betty and 1 Frances at 2000. Para. Weather clear. Visibility 8 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. Wind North 7 to 8 knots. Smooth sea and no swell.

13 2200 CTF 51 to CTF 55, CTG 51.19 Info ComGen 10, COMGEN 24TH CORPS.

Effective 140600I(-9) ComGen 24th Corps has been made responsible for attack of ground targets by artillery, naval gunfire and air all south of Corps boundary including island immediately adjacent to OKINAWA.

14 0232 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINPAC INFO COM5THFLT,CTF51,CINCPAC PEARL,CONSERV2PAC,ADCOMIN PAC

Your 110435. TRACY (DM 19) BREESE (DM 18) HOPKINS (DMS 13) will not be withdrawn from combat area for time being. DORSEY (DMS 1) will be returned to combat area after minor battle damage repairs. All other old DM and DMS will be converted to DD and employed for training and rear area escorts. Decision as to further conversion of DD to DM or DMS to maintain strength of 12 and 24 respectively, will be deferred until conversion kits are available at which time overall situation will again be reviewed. Your 110515 was answered in part by my 130627 and 130628. These plus new construction will constitute an operational force at the objective by 15 June of 33-220 Ft AM, 35-180 Ft AM, 11 new DMS, 11 new DM, 2 old DMS, 2 old DM. Total all types 97 minus those receiving further battle damage. These are totals which can be made available.
Summary No. 28 as of 1400. Information concerning ground force activity has been lacking this afternoon. Summary as of 1400 from 24th Corps reports no enemy activity on Corps front. Late afternoon report relates another counter-attack was received on the 96th Div right at 0315 in which 107 of the enemy were killed. 24th Corps artillery reports 9 enemy guns destroyed yesterday. Only report from 3rd/6th Corps this afternoon relates that elements of the 6th MarDiv have occupied the ridge 9724R-9723Q on the MOTON Singhka against Light resistance. Enemy estimated as 1 platoon with machine gun and mortars. KADENNA airfield received scattered mortar fire at 1600. No other details. Para. Naval units consisting of 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 7 DD bombarded IE SHIMA today. Other support missions were furnished 3rd Corps by 1 OBB 1 DD 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 2 DD from the west and by 2 OBB 1 CA 3 DD from east. General support was furnished by TG 51.15 with 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD. Support was given minesweepers off NW coast of OKINAWA by 1 DD. Excellent fire support was furnished UDTs in reconnoitering IE SHIMA beaches. BBs are now able to render fire support from inside NAGAGUSUKU WAN. Excellent results have been obtained against targets in this area including camouflaged troop installations gun emplacements trenches and caves and against suspected torpedo launchers. All gunfire on OKINAWA is now controlled by CTF 55 in the south and by CTF 53 in the north. At 1930 NEW YORK east of island reported hit by hostile plane which crashed into catapult demolishing 1 plane and cutting transmitting antenna. 2 WIA. Ammunition status satisfactory. About 0400 LOWRY had sonar contact at 25-05 N 127-49 E. Made 1st attack 0407 with apparent good results. 2nd attack made at 0442 with negative results. Search abandoned because of necessity to rejoin carrier screen. Plane continued observant operations over contact. LCS 13 destroyed nine vicinity of RP 12. CONNELLY on hunter killer assignment reported sighting liferaft with 2 enemy in it. Believed they were working radio. CONNELLY investigated and took 1 prisoner. Results of hunter killer negative. CONNELLY returned to transport area. Design investigated contact reported in 1200 summary. Dropped pattern of charges with negative results. Our CVEs of TG 52.1 continued direct air support of troops throughout the period. Attack missions b Tu 52.1.2 on ISHIGAKI and MIYAKO as of 13 April now report enemy aircraft destroyed on ground 1 Zeke 2 Bettys 1 twin engine 3 single engine. Probably destroyed 1 Sally. Damaged 25 planes. All believed non operational. Our losses: 1 VF and pilot. Strike by Tu 52.1.3 on NOBAR-4 and ISHIGAKI on 13 April report various fires started one Betty burned. Search flights were made by PBM's from KERAMA and at 1015 missed 2 small ships with bombs in Lat 30-25 Long 130-25. ASP patrol was flown by PBM's. Several mines were disposed of during the day. 1 by ASP plane in bearing 336 130 miles from BOLO. Another reported by PBM rescue plane at 1222 at 25-30 N 126-27 E. Marked location with dye marker. ASP plane dispatched to destroy. PBM Dumbo made rescue of RANDOLPH pilot south of AMAN SHIMA at 1225 and PBM ASW plane made rescue of pilot from Tu 52.1.2 who made water landing 2 miles SW ISHIGAKI at 1630. Commencing 14 April a 2 plane CAP is being maintained over each of radar picket stations 1, 2 and 3 from 0530 to 1900 by planes from TAF controlled by picket for its own protection. This is in addition to regular CAP. Enemy aircraft approached from north at 1630. BENNINGTON F6F's on CAP destroy 4 Zeke, 1 Vap and 2 unidentified about 76 miles due N of ZAMPA. BELLUE WOOD F6F's on CAP destroyed 3 Zeke's 50 miles bearing 320 from ZAMPA about 1720 at 1905 JUCE splashed 1 Kate and BROWN in radar picket station reported being under attack by 2 planes 1 of which dropped torpedo and missed, CONNELLY shot down 1 Val at 1736 13 April not previously reported. Para. Weather clear. Visibility 12 miles. Temperature average 75 degrees. Wing ENE changing to ESE 10 knots. Sea calm with no surf or swell.
Summary No. 27 as of 141200. The situation remains unchanged on the 24th
Corps front. Around Hill 178 in the zone of the 7th Div the enemy is observed
to be very active preparing communication lines carrying in supplies and
improving gun positions. Several large concentrations of enemy in the front
of the 7th Div were observed by patrols. Following enemy counterattack early
yesterday morning on KAKAHI RIDGES in the ZA of the 96th Div the remainder
of the day was fairly quiet until 2000 when estimated enemy company attacked
this ridge again. This attack was repulsed. The enemy is reported well armed
and equipped. In repulsing yesterday's strong counterattack our forces
captured 9 LMGs several knee mortars 125 rifles and 1 radio. Hostile artillery
fire was heavy during the night. The 3rd PhibCorps zone continues to be
relatively quiet except the area of the 29th Marines on Motobu Peninsula.
29th Marines have been engaged in sporadic combat throughout the area.
The greater part of the area has been covered by patrols and today attacks are
being made on enemy positions in 3 directions from TA 9923 and 0022. The
4th and 22nd Marines continue their advance up northern Okinawa. The 2nd
Bn 22nd Marines has captured NEISO SAKI TA 8751, and other units of the 4th
and 22nd reported moving north over the east and west roads in TA 2535
and 3725. 7th Marines continue operations to destroy enemy group in TA 9503.
Other 3rd PhibCorps elements continue to patrol their areas. Predawn take off
accident at Kadena field resulted in destruction of 5 Corsairs and damaging
of 3 with casualties of 3 Kill 1 WIA. Planes taking off swerved into parked
ready planes which exploded and burned. Afternoon 13 April Corsairs of 2nd
Marines engaged in 1st supporting missions ground troops. Planes
attacked enemy artillery positions with excellent results reported. Enemy
has shelled Kadena field sporadically for past 2 days with slight damage.
Para. Naval gunfire support was furnished the 3rd PhibCorps by 3 DD 24th
Corps by 7 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 2 DD. General support to CTG 51.19 by 2 OBB 2 CA
and 7 DD. SHID reports having been attacked at least 8 times by hostile aircraft
in afternoon 12 April. No damage to ship reported. STANLEY amplifies
previous report hit by 2 suicide planes below waterline with extensive damage
including 5 foot hole through bow with deck above buckled. Fuel tanks ruptured.
Extensive damage to ordnance NYANDOTT underway hit stern of LEM 312
while in anchor off NAGUSHI beaches. LEM 312 lost anchor 120 fathoms cable.
Mine sweeps 14 April include exploratory sweep in area 19 and 5. Sweeping
on eastern half of area C2 and approaches in vicinity of TA 3547 and 5459
to provide for landing radar equipment. Sweep units 11 and 13 are making
channel and transport area sweeps. GI 651 in northern edge transport area
reached near hits by friendly AA this morning with fragmentation damage and
6 WIA. UDT reconnaissance of beaches GREEN TL RED TL RED T2 indicate no
manmade obstacles or mines found. PATTERSON exploded ORANGE colored horned
mine at 0800 13 April in position 25-15 N 127-40E. 5 floating mines dis-
covered off KIHEI UHMA morning 13 April. Mines being rendered safe today.
HOBSON sank floating mine 27-35N 126-05 W afternoon 13 April. CONNelly
and Bowers continued hunterkiller operation with no further results. Evaluation
probable. At 0900 midget submarine was sighted in TA 7280. Hunterkiller
operations by EXECUTE and DESIGN were initiated. Total naval casualties
reported to date from 69 ships plus TG 52.1 343 KTA 1038 WIA 507 MIA. Follow-
ning devarted this morning for MARIANAS: Fast convoy 2 OBB 1 CA 12 APA
1 AP 2 AKA 1 DD. Battle damaged 3 DE 3 ABD. Slow convoy 2 APA 1 AKA 14 LST
1 LEM(R) 3 ABD 3 SC 1 FOS 1 ABD. Para. Air summary for the period includes
direct air support of troops by CVts of TU 52.1.1 and 52.1.3 and by TAF
based on OKINAWA. TU 52.1.2 engaged in strike SAKAIHIGA GUNTO this morning.
Routine search flights and ASP patrol flown by F6Fs from KERAMA. Sub contact 60 miles bearing 300 from ZAMPA previously reported was abandoned. At 1100 a F6F destroyed 1 mine 130 miles bearing 336 from ZAMPA. 1 F6F made forced landing evening of 12 April to avoid friendly AA fire. Plane damaged beyond repair. 2 enemy aircraft in vicinity from 0310 to 0430. Planes approached from north and made no attacks. No planes were shot down from 1105 to 1130 planes approached from SW. No contacts were made and planes departed to SW. Enemy tracked at speed of 380 knots and left 2 section of our VF behind. During air attack at 2000 13 April SUNWANNE F6F shot down additional Val not previously reported. Airplane losses are: 1 INTREPID F6F ON failed to return to base. Last radio contact was at 2300 13 April. Plane at that time was chasing Betty in position 60 miles bearing 230 from OKINAWA. Dumbo F6F and 8 INTREPID F6Fs searching area this morning. At 1100 RANDOLPH F6F pilot made water landing near AMAMI SHIMA. Pilot in boat. Dumbo F6F enroute. 1 Dumbo F6F is in northern area with TG 58.1 strike. Revised totals for 12 April afternoon attacks indicate total enemy destroyed by own aircraft 90. Additional ships shooting down enemy planes are: SEID 1 Val 3 Bettys. WANN 1 Val. Grand total enemy planes destroyed between 1200 and 1800 is 1/47. End of summary.

14 0826 CINCPOA to COMSTAF Info CTF51, CASCU, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMGENIO, COMGEN TACTICAL AIR FORCE/JOINT ARMY.

For General Whitehead and signed Kenny with concurrence of CINCPOA and CINCSWPA message follows send by air immediately your air engineer to OKINAWA to report to ComGen 10th Army for temporary duty to work with Captain Painter USN purpose surveying airforce possibilities to get maximum deployment of air forces on OKINAWA and IE JIMA end of message. Following instructions for air approach to OKINAWA area and landing on YONTAN air strip. Check in point diamond Lat 25-50N Long 127-29E which point bears 224 degrees true distant 17 miles from SW tip of OKINAWA, at 1500 feet altitude. At point DIAMOND report to ComAir Support Control Units voice call GLACIER on 140.58 megacycles. From point DIAMOND proceed on course north for 27 miles arriving at point GRAPHITE. Do not proceed beyond point GRAPHITE without checking IFF with ComAir Support Control Units. From point GRAPHITE proceed direct to YONTAN strip. Call DRAKE tower on 140.58 Mc for landing instructions. Additional useful information comes now. GLACIER has two alternate frequencies which are 6005 Kcs and 4475 Kcs. Best strip YONTAN is 350-170 degrees magnetic and has 5000 useable feet. Beware all other strips. Field elevation 300 feet and field has emergency night lighting. If approach to area made at night turn on running lights when passing point DIAMOND. YONTAN is first strip south of point BCOLO. For verification of approach procedure see tactical air force 10th Army OpPlan 1-45 Appendix OMR.

14 0833 CINCPOA to CINCSPF info COMIMCH.

Following from BEO ref RAMEY 122059. If you consider targets suitable suggest you might desire to propose to SACSEA the use of BONAVENTURE XE craft against them. It is very doubtful if suitable targets will become available in area further to the northward.
CINCPAC ADV 030516. Since current operation commenced 6 escort vessels have been sunk due to enemy action. 22 have been so severely damaged that their return to duty in the near future is highly problematic. 16 have been damaged to the extent that they require overhauls for continued service. Many of the ships used for escort and screening duties are mine-sweepers and the loss of the above ships has curtailed all but the more vital sweeping operations during the operations for the capture of Ie Shima in order to provide necessary screen and fire support. My 020135 of March requested additional escort vessels over and above those already assigned TF 51 as it was believed that an insufficient number had been assigned. The losses incurred to date have made this situation even more critical. Para. 2. It is therefore recommended that Cinpac be requested to reconsider and that DesRon 2 remain with this force until replacements can be provided in this area, and that other steps be taken to provide an adequate number of screen and escort vessels for Phases 1, 2 and 3 of the ICEBERG Operation.

I am considering a request on the 20th AF to make a full out attack with 1 ton bombs on the area in front of the 7th Div or other targets designated by you. Addressers comment as soon as possible and include desired time if attack concurred in.

Request Under Secretary be informed relative to his 121600 that there exists a shortage of naval manpower afloat and in the forward areas and that ComLIl has been ordered to make available for transfer all Naval personnel that can be spared. Under these circumstances it is not feasible to grant to Naval personnel liberty or leave of absence from their naval duties for the purpose of accepting employment with public transportation companies. Moreover as a matter of policy the Navy should not be maneuvered into the position of having manpower available to drive civilian buses while drafting additional manpower for naval purposes.

Request you provide daily photo coverage of southern KYUSHU airfields. Plane counts on fields are of prime importance during this critical period to naval and Army forces engaged in OKINAWA Operation.

The attention of addressees is invited to Cominch secret 3rd Endorsement serial 00666 of 16 March 1945. All personnel of air support control units including "Landing Force Air Support Control Units" will be assigned to CASCO Thibspac. ComGenAirFMFPac report when para 3 of Cominch serial 00666 has been complied with. This is also my action on ComGenAirFMFPac 00851 of 29 March 1945.

My 100716 and 130141. Consider it highly important in view General situation that southern KYUSHU fields be hit at least by long range fighter sweep from TF 58 either today or early tomorrow. CTF 51 reduce requirements from TF 58 to minimum for period involved so that he may have more freedom of action. CTF 58 take action at his discretion with due consideration for situation on spot.
15 0410 CINCPAC ADV TO DEP5204AF, CTF 93 Info COMINCH, COM20AF, COM5THFLIT, COMFWDAREA CONAIR INC, CTF 51, CTF 52.

As an emergency measure request strongest possible attack on enemy air concentrations on southern KYUSHU fields on 16 April using forces you consider will be most effective. VMB 612 available to you. Advise your plans soon as practicable.

15 0700 CTF 51 to COM5THFLIT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL ECM HOLDERS 5THFLIT.

Summary No. 29 as of 151200. The ground force situation on the south front remains as previously reported. 24th Corps continues its preparation for a sustained drive with emphasis on ammunition stockage. Late reports of yesterday's activities tell of 39 enemy killed in mopping up operations on the 7th Div front and an additional 17 enemy destroyed by raiding patrols sent forward to seal caves. During the night some infiltration occurred in the 7th Div particularly the CP of 3-164th Inf where several jeeps were destroyed booby traps and mines laid in the area. In the ZA 96th Div our artillery broke up 3 counter attacks in front of 2-381st Inf at 1930 2330 and 0430. 165th Inf 27th Div relieved the 383rd Inf 96th Div now in Corps Reserve as of 0940. Our artillery has been active in counter-battery neutralizing and destructive fires. Hostile artillery fire of various calibers was placed on the Corps front during the night with no damage reported. No other action has been reported from this Corps this morning. Very favorable reports are being received from front line units on promptness and effectiveness of naval gunfire support used extensively in repulsing night counter-attacks. Activity in the 3rd PhibCorps is described as follows: Elements of the 429th and 22nd Marines of the 6th MarDiv are increasing their pressure on enemy group previously reported in TA 9922 9923 0022 meeting stiff resistance. No further report on this engagement. The 1st MarDiv this morning directed 1 Inf Bn Reinf by 1 Plat of tanks to vicinity of KAWADA TA 2722 to be attached to the 6th MarDiv. Other elements of the 1st MarDiv continue vigorous patrolling within Div area. Previous report of enemy small boats observed along northeastern coast of OKINAWA TA 4337 were hit by air strike with destruction of 6 boats. They were found to be fishing boats and canoes. 3 Bns of FA 77th Div are being landed on NEMUWA SHIMA this morning for support of TF SHIMA operation schedule for 15 April. KEIFU SHIMA TA 6175B has been occupied by our troops. There is some indication that enemy counter attacks are being time with our flash RED alerts. Para. Naval operations consisted of gunfire support 3rd PhibCorps by 1 OBB 3 DD 24th Corps by 1 OBB 1 CA 1 CL and 3 DD firing from west shore and 3 DD inshore of 51.19 reinforcing from the east. General support ships of TG 51.19 included 2 OBB 2 CA 2 CL 4 DD. In addition 2 DD harassed TF SHIMA during the night in connection with activities of TG 51.21. NAGO WAB

- Continued -

2854
anchorage was subjected to artillery fire around 1935 last night requiring ships unloading to retire temporarily. No casualties reported ship casualty list includes WABASH rammed by unknown ship during smoke operation night of 12 April resulting in hole through plating starboard quarter 1 foot diameter 8 feet above waterline. HAZARD was attacked by hostile plane at 1930 14 April which dropped torpedo to stern exploding at end of run. JEFFERS previously damaged by near miss again ready for duty. LCI(G) 31 at 0300 ran aground on reef TA 6769 and was hauled clear by LCI 422 covered by SALT LAKE CITY LUCE and aircraft of CASCU south. Minesweepers cleared area in G2 E of 128-11 to line 229 degrees tangent of NW corner of island. Areas L8 and L9 swept with negative results. Routine channel and transport sweeps made. Requisite at 0832 sank object appearing to be floater type 38 mine in western edge transport area. CONNOLLY reports destroying 1 mine while on hunterkiller mission yesterday. Position not reported. J W DITTER IN RP 1 destroyed 1 floater. PCE(H) 1388 1396 1404 are engaged in hydrographic survey in NAGAGUSUKU WAN. An LCM(M) of division 6 patrolling area between TE SHIMA and MOTORU PENINSULA sighted 8 small boats in TA 9133 at 0245. Boats came out from shore 500 yards and retired under attack. Net at south entrance RETTO dragged 1 mile out of position. Estimate 50% protection afforded. Para. Air operations. Planes from CVEs of TG 52.1 and shore based aircraft of TG 99.2 and fast carriers of TF 58 are furnishing direct air support to troops. TU 52.1.2 is striking SAKISHIMA GUNTO. Search flights are in progress by PBMs from KERAMA. At 0410 search plane made definite radar contact on sub in latitude 28-40 Long 129-45. During 1r April search flights observed many small merchant vessels vicinity YAKA SHIMA. Strafed 1 and left burning. 5 DD sighted off SHIMA coast at 1330 14 April in Lat 29-51 Long 123-02 and 2 more DD at 1525 in Lat 31-50 Long 126-10. Later covered by 2 Betties. Routine ASP flown by PBMs from KERAMA. TG 99.2 furnished part of night CAP for lst time night 14-15 April. At 1905 14 April 2 F4Us on radar picket CAP shot down 1 Judy 20 miles E URAN SHIMA. At 1930 14 April Oscar which was reported in suicide attack on NEW YORK previously dropped bomb near HUTCHINS. ST LOUIS at 1834 on 13th shot down l Val not previously reported. TAP on 13th lost 2 planes and 1 pilot killed operationally. This morning at dawn a Dumbo PBM rescued pilot from TU 52.1.2 who went down 2 miles south of ISHIGAKI afternoon 14th. Plane remained on station for further call during TU 52.1.2 strikes in that area. YONAN field now conforms to left base air traffic pattern.

15 1310 CTF 51 to COMSTRFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ECOM HOLDERS 5THEFIL.
15 0806 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCLAUNT, CINCPAC PEARL.

Battle damage has so far diminished destroyer force by more than 40 ships during current operation. Ships assigned PacFit by UrDis 222312 Dec may require extensive availability as in case of 6 weeks granted SHUBRICK (DD 639). In view of above recommend SATTERLIE (DD 626) and HERNDON (DD 638) be sailed to Pacific without awaiting relief. If approved MCCALL (DD 400) and MAURY (DD 401) will be sailed when SATTERLIE and HERNDON arrive PEARL.

15 0813 CINCPAC ADV TO CONGENFETPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Rear Ech 1st MarDiv should be disembarked KAPAI CAMP. Preparation of camp other than that necessary for Rear Ech should be discontinued. UrDis 140305. Rear Ech 1st MarDiv should be planned to be echeloned into ADJUTANT arriving not sooner than 3rd Ech.
CTG 93.4 150957. Regret landing large number his fighters OKINAWA tomorrow afternoon undesirable due to crowded conditions of fields, probable full out operations during afternoon of Marine fighters based there and impracticability during expected enemy air attacks of bringing in large number unfamiliar planes in safety from AA in immediate vicinity afloat and ashore.

15 2027 CTF 58 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC ADV.

From sunset 12 April thru early evening 14th destroyed total 71 airborne enemy aircraft including suicider that crashed SIGSBE (DD 502). Above total includes 1 Myrt previously reported and 3 planes reported in CTG 58.2 dispatch 14454. In addition to air support OKINAWA and damage previously reported strafed rocketed and set fire to hangar and buildings at INUJO on TANEGA SHIMA and to buildings at both airfields and in villages on KIKAI. On 15 April OKINAWA support missions burned truck and tank and destroyed buildings and carried out attacks on caves and gun positions as directed. Sweeps to KIKAI and TOKUNO found no operational planes but started 2 large fires with apparent explosions from gasoline or ammunition in woods adjoining KIKAI airfield. Flash reports of fighter sweep to KANOYA KANOYA EAST and KUSHIRA show 21 planes shot down and many destroyed and damaged on the ground strafed rocketed and bombed hangars and buildings at all 3 fields starting fires.

16 0015 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL CTF & CTG 5THFLT.


15 2357 COMSTHFLT to CINCPAC ADV Info CTF 51, CTF 56.

Your 142230. Negative at this time. Recommend entire effort 20th AF be used in obliteration attacks on major KYUSHU fields until present situation is brought under reasonable control. When this is accomplished delivery of 1 ton bombs at OKINAWA will be in order.

16 0205 CTF 51 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Flash summary enemy air attacks morning 16th. Estimated 100 planes in 10 raids all approached from north. 1st attack 0742 last attack 1027. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Planes shot down 37 by CAP including 1 Betty which approached to within 3 miles of transport area. 15 by ships. 10 suicide hits. Total enemy destroyed 62. Ships hit by suiciders, PRINGLE sunk. LAFPEY HOBSON BRYANT BOXERS HARDING LCI 407 LCS 51 LCS 116 possibly sunk. Condition LAFPEY not known. Para. Foregoing based on fragmentary report.

16 0251 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMING G CP OF S USARWY, COMGENPOA, COMSOPAC, CGTEN

The 81st Div now at NEW CALEDONIA in area reserve for OKINAWA operation can be released immediately to your complete control. Assault shipping is present adequate to move it unit loaded to the PHILIPPINES if you so desire and so doing would expedite release of other resources in SoPac. If you concur request you designate destination.
In order to provide for continuing and progressive policy, methods and equipment for salvage and urgent repair during amphibious operations it is recommended that there be established under the administrative command of ComServPac a new squadron entitled "Amphibious Salvage and Repair Squadron" for assignment in whole or part to the operational command of commanders of Joint Expeditionary Forces during amphibious attacks. Para. This squadron would have permanently assigned to it vessels especially equipped for amphibious salvage and repair such as ARD, ARS, ATF, ART, electronic and radio repair ships. Salvage and fire fighting LCI. Salvage LSTs carrying salvage LCTs and warping tugs. At least 2 ARDs carrying warping tugs. FCE(R), and other vessels not especially equipped such as at least 1 AR or AB. To these would be added for particular operations additional vessels and boats from ServPac and PhibPac. Para. Also propose that this squadron be commanded by a Commodore embarked in a small AGC. The commander should have an adequate operational, salvage, maintenance and administrators staff. Assigned also should be at least 3 salvage unit commanders embarked in LCG(FF) with small operating and salvage staffs to permit supervision of salvage operations in several areas or subareas. Para. Salvage and repair squadron facilities would be available as practicable for towing and salvage work for other fleet forces in combat area, and for assistance in salvage of boats beyond capabilities of beach party salvage units. Para. Recommended for command of this squadron is Captain Curtis.

Para 1. Pursuant to the directive of JCS 032140 with the Army forces and resources under your command report by dispatch to CINCPAC for purposes of Army administration. Para 2. For the present the Army forces now under the operational control of CINCPAC will remain under his operational control except as may have been or may in the future be directed by the JCS. It is requested that you furnish as soon as possible a list of the units which you consider necessary for the functioning and defense of the Hawaiian Department, under which you command, a list of the units now in the Hawaiian Department which are not so needed and lists of the Army units now in the MARSHALLS, MARIANAS, CAROLINES, and the South Pacific with the dates when they can be released to the operational control of CINCPAC as no longer essential to the functioning or defense of those subareas. Para 3. You are authorized to proceed and report in person to CINCPAC and it is requested that you ascertain his desires in this regard.

Summary No. 31 as of 16L200. Elements of the 77th Div under CTG 51.21 supported by naval gunfire and air bombardment landed on IE SHIMA with 2 RCTs abreast on GREEN T1 and RED T1 and T2 beaches at 0600 with NEDEX. Light enemy reaction reported. The landing is being supported by 77th Div artillery previously emplaced on HENNA SHIMA and by Carrier air and NCF. By 0906 troops had landed on all beaches and moved 500 yards inland. At 1030 RCT 305 on the right reported meeting opposition in its front from S1 direction of GUSUGU WAMA TA 8733. By 1130 troops of RCT 306 had reached the North-South strip of the airfield and RCT 305 had reached the line TA 8533T 8632V. Both RCTs are attacking to the east. 24th Corps continues its preparation for strong offensive tentatively scheduled 19 April.
Coordinated with it will be a landing demonstration SE OKINAWA. There was little enemy activity on OKINAWA FRONT lines period. Enemy appears to be waiting for our intended attack. Enemy artillery and mortar positions were heavily hit by our naval gunfire air strikes and artillery throughout the day of 15 April. 24th Corps plans for the day called for extensive reconnaissance of enemy positions to the front of the 7th Div while the 27th Div completes relief of 381st Inf of the 96th Div and assumes responsibility for new ZA on Corps right (west flank) 96th Div is regrouping within its new ZA abreast and to the east of the 27th Div. 3rdPhibCorps reports that the 4th and 29th Marines continued their attack on MOTOBU PENINSULA which has slowed down by necessity searching out enemy in many ravines and caves. 22nd Marines are consolidating their positions and patrolling the northern end of the island. TAF ashore completed 5 missions totaling 73 planes in support of the 24th Corps yesterday. Numerous targets were damaged or destroyed including 2 locomotives fired. Enemy AA reported light meager and inaccurate. Both YONANTAN and KADENA fields were bombed and strafed during night alert 15 April. There was no damage to KADENA field but 4 VFs were damaged and 1 VF shot down by own AAA. On YONANTAN field 2 night fighters and 10 Corsairs were damaged by our AAA ashore and afloat. 10 to 12 bombs dropped SE corner of field damaging 4 aircraft three WIA. At 0315 this morning enemy artillery shelred KADENA field resulting in 3 aircraft destroyed others damaged but repairable. Small arms ammunition dump was hit 1 KIA 3 WIA. 430th PA emplaced on KEISE SHIMA was again the target of hostile artillery fire on 15 April. No damage sustained. Para. Naval gunfire support was provided 3rd PhibCorps by 1 OBB 2 DD 24th Corps was reinforced by the fires of 1 CL 2 DD of 51.19 firing from the east and 3 OBB 1 CA 3 DD of TF 54 from the west. 2 OBB 4 Cruisers 7 DD provided NF support for IE SHIMA landing. 1 DD engaged in illumination and harassing fires along southwest coast to prevent suicide boat activity. 1 CA and 1 DD operating off NAHA last night were credited with silencing battery that shelled KEISE SHIMA during the day good effect was secured on mechanized equipment troop concentrations gun emplacements and fuel dumps in the CTF 55 area. 3rdPhibCorps reports deep support missions fired by ships under CTF 55 were effective. CTF 51.19 reports that ships gunfire under his direction destroyed boat revetments several blockhouses and pillboxes camouflaged buildings and motor vehicles. Suicide boats were active in areas 103 and 105 during the night. LCI(M) 659 reported destroying 1 boat 8 miles off shore in area 103 at 2340. At 0215 YMS 331 opened fire on suicide boat which dropped charge astern. YMS suffered steering casualty. Continued search but boat escaped. At 0240 LCI(M) 659 contacted another suicide boat which retired at high speed. BARTON in station 105 took suicide boat under fire but failed to destroy. Minesweeping has been completed in NAGASUKU WAN insofar as possible with YMS. Area G2 east of 123-11 and 2000 yards of northern end of H1 swept on 15 April. Routine channel and transport area sweeps were made. CRESCENT CITY and FINKNEY have proved more convenient for evacuation from shore than hospital ships and are being retained here for this use for the time being. CRESCENT CITY off HAGUSHTI beaches. FINKNEY at KERAMA. LCM 15 which broached in reef is now considered to be a total operational loss. During air attack evening 15 April E T GRIFFIN in position 250 degrees 9 MILES PROXY Bolo reports enemy plane dropped bomb exploding 100 yards astern. No damage to ship. Ships departing today for ULITHI are: 1 LCI(P) 26 LSTs 2 PC and the following damaged 1 DD 1 DE 1 DM 3 AM to SALINAN: 6 APA 1 AP 7 AKA 2 LSV 2 DE 4 APD. Para.
Here is another page for the book in which we pay tribute to gallant ships. This morning many enemy planes concentrated against the LAFFEY in radar picket station 1. The enemy was attacked by all the VF we could get there and suffered heavy loss from the CAP but for 2 hours the LAFFEY was under continuous attack. She shot down 6 Vals, was struck by 2 bombs TJ THIA 4 suicide planes, and is now on the way to KERAMA RETTO at 20 knots speed. Para. Naval air arm carried out direct support to troops with planes from CVEs of TG 52.1 and fast carriers of TF 58. DAST L strikes supporting the landing WARD APTED I MTD FJTDSOCRJLXY MBS rockets and Napalm. Search flights were made by PBM's from KERAMA and reported at 0500 that many enemy planes headed south were sighted in Lat 27-18 Long 129-50. At 0810 reported sighting 2 Val XIV% JUMBERANS from 28-01 128-25. At 0905 small patrol vessel was sighted Lat 32-15 Long 123-10. Ship AKAKED and damaged. ASP UMKOV was flown by PBM's from KERAMA. TULAGI relieved ANZIO in special ASW patrols in shipping lanes to southeast of OKINAWA. Hostile air attack occurred from 1800 to 2200 15 April with planes approaching from north in several raids. Planes destroyed in addition to those mentioned in previous summary: 4 Tony's 1 Zeke by CAP from TG 99.2. AA on OKINAWA shot down 1 Hamp 3 Oscars 2 Bettys 1 Zeke 1 Helen. This morning from 0742 to 1027 area was again under attack by estimated 100 planes which approached from north in 10 groups, 37 shot down by CAP, 15 by AA, 13 suicide hits. Ships hit by suicides: PRINGLE (SUNK) LAFFEY ROBSON BRYANT ROEVERS HARDEY LCS 116 LCI 407 LCS 51. More later when all reports are in. The following rescues were made: 1 Dumbo PBM landed at 1925 15 April near WACKES 58 miles bearing 070 from ZAMPA due to engine trouble. This plane had previously rescued 2 survivors 1 from BENNINGTON 1 from BELLEAU WOODS during day. At 0630 plane took off returned safely to base. MCCLEMVAND rescued BUNKER HILL P4U pilot 28 miles bearing 030 from ZAMPA at 1016 1 PBM Dumbo is with TF 58 near KYUSHU. Enemy planes reported on MAHA Field by YMS 360 were taken under fire by SHANNON at 1815 15 April. 1 Betty and 1 fighter wrecked. LCI 407 reported planes took off from plateau of TAKE BANANA during night.

16 0834 CONTTHFLT TO CINOPAC ADV INFO CTF 51.

Your 130229. Made inspection ashore on 14th and discussed situation with responsible officers. YONPAN field is in fair shape for all weather operation and being improved rapidly. KADENA requires blanket of coral for wet weather operation but coral pits are 4 miles away. Construction personnel on fields was to have been increased yesterday. Commodore Bissell states ROYU for airfield No. 1 available SW of base development plan location. Also additional site for fighter field exists on NW corner MOTOBU PENINSULA. Some increase in numbers of planes operating from YONPAN will probably be possible in near future. Major increase OKINAWA will not come until TE SHIMA fields are activated. Development ashore has been handicapped by rough sea slowing unloading and by rains making roads bad for moving cargo to storage dumps. Improvement of roads throughout island will depend upon availability of suitable coral which is not found everywhere as in MARIANAS. Construction of new airfields will probably be slower than heretofore because rolling character of terrain and need to haul coral considerable distance. Unable to locate Painter while ashore.
Scale and effectiveness of enemy mass suicide air attacks and rate of ship loss and damage are such that we must use all available means to prevent further attacks. Recommend maximum and continued use of IWO and MARIANAS based planes, latter staging through IWO as necessary to prevent enemy's use of KYUSHU fields. Also to hit assembly fields feeding attack units into KYUSHU. This recommendation means all types of bombers and long range fighters. Para. Local air situation will not improve greatly until we have rebuilt and activated fields on IE SHIMA. All of our carriers have been carrying a heavy load and must continue to do so. When 24th Corps takes offensive on 19th demands on carrier air will probably increase. Retirement to LEYTE after tomorrow of TF 57 will further increase their load. Continued and heavier strikes by SWesPac air on FORMOSA fields are also required. Para. We have a firm grip on a most valuable Japanese possession and must expect continuance of strongest enemy reaction until as a result of fighting ashore loss of OKINAWA can no longer be questioned. I wish to do everything possible to insure that preventable losses and damage to fleet units do not slow tempo of our future operations.

16 0945 CTF 51 to TF 51 Info ALL TFG & TCG 5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH HCs.

This dispatch is for the purpose of giving special honor to the ships who are and have been on radar picket duty. DD types DDs LSMs and LCS types are all on this distant guard whose work is doing so much to help our troops make this operation a success. We are very proud of the magnificent courage and effectiveness with which these vessels have discharged their difficult and hazardous tasks. Para. Pass this on to captains whose ships have been sunk in this service. Para. Lt. Gen Buckner joins VAdm Turner in this tribute.

16 1245 CINCPAC ADV TO 5THFLIT INFO CONGEN TACTICAL AIR FORCE, 10TH ARMY, CTF 51 CONGEN 10, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFORD.

Unless otherwise advised CINCPAC will assume that Marine Air Groups established on shore in KYUKUS have all the replacement pilots and aircraft that can be advantageously employed with airfield facilities presently available.

16 1247 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPACAF COM5THFLIT, CTF 51, CTF 58.

After TF 57 strikes northern FORMOSA on 17th request PEAR neutralize all of FORMOSA as effectively as practicable.

16 1410 CONGEN 10 to CTF 50, CTF 51 Info CTG 56.3, CTG 53, CTF 55, CTF 94, KINGFORD (DD500), CONGENPOA, CINCPAC, CONGENPOA BOTH, COMAIRPAC, COMDEFEN, COMAIRPAC SUBCOM OKINAWA, CG TAP, CASCU 3, CC 81ST DIV CP, CTG 90.3, C33RDHFTHCORPS.

10th Army closes USS ELDORADO 181200 L-(9) and opens OKINAWA at target grid 8687 W same time.
Summary No. 32 as of 161800. The airfield on IE SHIMA has been captured. By 1730 our troops had secured most of the island west of grid 987. After initial landings the advance eastward was met by scattered light resistance. Machine gun fire and sniper fire was received from caves in TA 8532ACM which temporarily delayed advance but was quickly silenced. An enemy AA gun was later captured in this same area. Mines were encountered on entire GREEN T1 beach. A concentration of mines was discovered around the airfield. It is reported that the enemy has withdrawn for a final stand to pinnacle in TA 8733 where numerous caves and defensive installations exist. Fire from this area this afternoon knocked out 3 of our tanks. Support aircraft made numerous strikes with bombs and rockets on this area together with concentrations by field artillery on MENNA SHIMA. Results of these strikes are unreported. Casualties light. Nothing to report from 24th Corps front. Little activity has been reported by the 3rdPhibCorps. RCT 4 and RCT 29 were indicated to have attacked as scheduled this morning. BLT 22 moved to TA 0119F under 6th MarDiv control and attacked north on the line TA 0022FJ to 0122F. 1 BN of the 29th Marines is attacking from the west against the center of resistance in TA 9923. Heavy resistance was reported by RCT 4 which is attacking eastward against this same strong point. Report as of 1750 shows the 4th Marines on the general line: TA 9925L, 9923S 9924W 9923V 9922W 9720F. The 3rdPhibCorps is establishing an AWS fighter director station at the northern tip of OKINAWA. Para. Naval activities for the day include gunfire support to landing on IE SHIMA by 2 OOB 2 CA 2 CL and 7 DD. Call fires were furnished the 3rdPhibCorps by 2 OOB 2 DD and to 24th Corps by 1 OOB 2 CA 3 DD. In addition 2 OOB 1 CA 2 DD TG 51.19 furnished support from the eastern side. General support was given by 1 CL and 4 DD from 51.19. TALTGA was hit by suicide plane at 0945 this morning 6 miles S AWARE SAKI but proceeded in convoy. 3 WIA 1 MIA. MORRISON enroute RP 10 took under fire many single bogey enroute OKINAWA or returning FORMOSA. MORRISON also reports destruction of 2nd enemy mine position 26-13 N 126-23 E. MASSEY and FULLMAN exploded 1 floating mine each at 0650 today position 25-09 N 127-35 E. Also sighted derelict LCI 15 April position 25-03N 128-38 E. YANCEY sank horned mine on 13 April in position 25-03N 128-51E. STRATEGY at 1230 had possible sonar contact bearing 276 7.5 miles from BOLO. Made hedgehog attack 1255. Negative results. Further details on action of morning 15 April: HOBSON in RP 14 hit by suicide plane about 0923. Returned to transport area under own power about 1530 maneuvering with difficulty. J W DITTER escorted HOBSON. HOBSON has 136 survivors from PRINGLE. PRINGLE was sunk after hit by suicide plane about 0943. Captain 8 officers 77 men aboard LCS 34. BRYANT in RP 2 at 0929 while proceeding to aid LAFHEY hit by suicide plane in main radar room. Radar and communications out. Returned to transport area at high speed with casualties. PCE(R) 851 sent to aid BRYANT. BOWERS at 0955 was hit by suicide plane while in station 7422 bearing 350 20 miles from BOLO. Was able to proceed transport area. SNEAKER after assisting BOWERS extinguished fire took 55 wounded from BOWERS assisted by CONNOLLY his transferring them to HOPE about 1100. SHANNON continued further search of area for survivors with negative results. LCI 407 reported hit by suicide plane at 1002 in station 136 entrance MAKAGUSUKU WAN. Received 4 foot hole above waterline. Forward 40mm gun out. No casualties. Remained on station. LCS 51 in RP 1 hit by suicide plane about 0945. Suffered engine casualty and cannot back. With hole in port side above waterline proceeded to transport area. Has some casualties aboard LAFHEY. LCS 116 in RP 1 hit by suicide plane and badly damaged. LCS 32 took her in tow. Later assistance was required and LSM sent to aid about
16 1415 CTF 51 SUMMARY NUMBER 32 CONTINUED.

1515. Proceeded to transport area. HARDING hit by suicide plane about 1030 while enroute station RF 14. Plane hit near No 1 stack. Much damage forward with magazines flooded. Bulkheads shore. Reported at 1107 she was able to make 5 knots. BUTLER standing by and TEKESTA sent to aid. HARDING arrived KERAMA RETTO 1630. SHEA in position 326 19 miles from EOLO was under attack by many planes at 0950. Within 10 minutes she shot down 6 planes with 1 additional, jointly with HARDING. Reports she did not see any planes getting away. Para. Air support for the day was furnished by planes from TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 53 and shore based air of TG 99.2. Reports of strike on ISHIGAKI on 15 April by TU 52.1.2 now show 3 hostile planes shot down and airfields strafed bombed and rocketted. Search flights were made by FEBs from KERAMA base and at 1130 1 of our FEBs in 33-LO N 128-07 E shot down 1 Jake. Routine ASP was flown by FEBs. Ships which shot down planes in air attack this morning and not yet reported: TEXAS 1 Kate at 0946, SHEA 1 Kate 4 Oscars 1 Nate at 0905. SHEA and HARDING Jointly 1 Nate. LAFPEY 6 plus 4 suicide. LCS 51 4 Vals 1 Zeke. HALL 1 Zeke BEAL 2 Vals and 1 suicide miss. This raises total enemy planes shot down by ships to 38. Suicide hits to 12. Grand total 37. Our plane losses consisted of 1 ST LOUIS SC-1 capsized while being recovered and sunk. Rescue was made by MCCORMICK 1 BUNKER HILL F4U pilot who was shot down by friendly AA during morning attack. MACOMB rescued 1 TG 99.2 pilot and an unknown LCS rescued 1 during the morning. Dumbo FEB rescued pilot from TF 58 from mouth of KAGO SHIMA BAY, in south KYUSHU. On way back this plane rescued 3 survivors of a B-25 15 miles south of KIKAI SHIMA. Aerial observation of TAKE BAHARE SHIMA during afternoon failed to reveal an airfield or any military activity in spite of earlier surface report of planes taking off from there. There were no air raids in this area this afternoon. Para. Weather has been clear. Temperature average 75 degrees. Visibility 8 to 10 miles. Wind northerly 7 knots. Smooth sea. No swell or surf. End of summary.

16 1250 COMPHIBSPAC to CINCSPAC ADV INFO CINCSPAC PEARL, COMCSPAC ADVENDSPACE, COMAIRPAC ADVCOMPHIBSPAC, COMTHOFL, COM3RFI, COM3RDHIB, COMPHIBGROUP TWO.

Radar pickets and fighter director ships plus large CAP have so far prevented serious losses in large ships and troops OKINAWA area. Losses in destroyer types have been heavy since they have taken the full weight of suicide air attacks. Additional radar pickets will be needed for Phase 3 and future operations. Recommend highest priority action to provide (A) 20 special fighter director ships using AM LSM or LCS hulls mounting air and surface search radars with good CIC and powerful communications and maximum 40mm director controlled AA plus 20mm AA. (B) That plans for future landings include placing well trained efficient combat loaded search radar and fighter director teams and equipment with AA batteries and protective troops on outlying islands before or immediately after main assault in order reduce number and exposure of picket ships.

16 2148 COMAAFSPAC to COMAF5, COMAF3, CTF 73, WOC RAADF COMMAND INFO CINCOSWA, CINPOADV

AX 754.15. Many recent reports have reached this Hq of continued attacks by U.S. aircraft on friendly lifeguard subs. Some planes have made hostile passes and offensive approaches, leaving submarine no alternative but to crash dive or fire on approaching plane. These instances indicate careless briefing improper identification and inattention to recognition procedures. Direct that positive action be taken in all echelons of command to impress pilots with the seriousness of this problem and to prevent the possibility that future instances might occur involving aircraft within your command. Action adds below acknowledge.
16 2251 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSTPFL, COMGENAPPAC, COMFWDAREA, INFO ISCOM INO. COMAIR INO, COMAIR INO, COMAIR INO, CINCPAC INO, CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC.

The following regrouping of air forces will take place effective 212400 I(-9). (A) In view increased offensive and decreased defensive requirements at INO Brg. Gen. Moore with 7th Fighter Command Headquarters and 21st 15th and 506th Fighter Groups pass to operational control of CTF 93 but will report to ISCom INO for additional duty as ComAir INO and for defensive employment. (B) Units of Fairning 1 engaged in search operations from the MARIANAS CAROLINES and INO pass to the operational control of CTF 94. (C) VMB 612 and VMTB 242 remain under CTF 94.

16 0755 CINCBFF to BRITISH LIASON OFF VIA CINCPAC ADV INFO COMINCH.

Your 140633 such an operation would have to be carried out by British Pacific Fleet submarines operating under CTF 71 from Pacific base since approach from westward not feasible and SAGSEA will have no suitable submarines for towing. Para 2. Present targets are not considered to be sufficiently worth while as targets in naval base area are inaccessible.

16 2355 COMGENPOA TO CINCPAC INFO WDSCA, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

RJ 59835. Pursuant to the directive contained in Cincpac Adv Hq dis 160252 April 1945, I, with the Army forces and resources under my command, report CINCAPAC for purposes of Army administration pursuant to your desires I will report to you at MANILA in person on or about 20 April 1945 your date.

17 0104 COMAIRPACSUBCOMFOR TO CGAAPLOTHERARY INFO CINCPAC ADV, COMSTPFLT, CTF51, COMAIRPAC, COMGEN LOTHERARY, CTU 99.3,3, COMFWDAREA, NAV OROTE.

Retr 130515, 160610. Ferry flights to you as follows. 16 April 5 F4U-1C and 7 F4UOD. 19 April 2 F4U-1C, 2 F6F-5 and 2 F4U-ID. Propose to maintain squadrons at authorized complement plus pool of 10 Corsairs in area for immediate replacements. Request you advise additional aircraft required on this basis.

17 0520 CTF 51 to CTF 54 Info TF 51, CTG 51.5.

Possibility of enemy TF of unknown composition arriving OKINAWA area during night of 17-18 April. See ComSubPac 162222. CTF 54 in TENNESSEE with NEW MEXICO, WEST VIRGINIA, SALT LAKE CITY, SAN FRANCISCO, BIRMINGHAM, ST LOUIS, HALL, HUTCHINS, EDINBURGH, LONGSHAW, PORTERFIELD, BARTON, EDWARDS, P HAMILTON, LAWS, PRESTON, BOOKS deploy to north northwestward so as to be in position to accomplish primary task and at same time to accomplish the secondary task of protecting radar pickets. Radar pickets under surface attack should join you.

17 0529 CINCPAC ADV TO CONSERVAC INFO CINCPAC & CNO, CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CNO, COMFWDAREA, COMSTPFLT.

Facilities and components except ABSD offered in Com7thFlt 130530 recommended for diversion to KYUKYS and MARIANAS. Further action on ABSD will be taken by separate communication. ConServPac initiate study immediately to determine which diverted facilities should be installed in OKINAWA or MARIANAS or other areas and arrange shipment.
17 0532 CINCPOA ADV to COMINCH, CNO INFO CINCWPA, CINCPOA PEARL, COMSERVPAC, COMTHFLT

Your 072006. Concur in diversion fleet support facilities from SAMAR area to RYUKYUS and MARIANAS as offered in Com7thFlt 1300530. Units which cannot be advantageously employed in RYUKYUS can be so employed in MARIANAS. Detailed studies being initiated to determine optimum allocations.

17 0725 DEFCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA ADV INFO COMTHFLT, CTF51, CTF56, 21 BOMCOM.

Beginning 15 April 21 BomCom will attack KYUSHU airfields with approximately 100 B-29s daily, weather permitting. Attacks will continue as long as Cincpoa considers present emergency to exist.

17 1251 DEFCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA ADV INFO 21 BOMCOM.

Your 150036. Weather permitting 21 BomCom will provide daily photo coverage until released by Cincpoa or Cincpoa states that emergency no longer exists.

17 1505 MACARTHUR to CINCPOA ADV, CG 6TH ARMY INFO COFS WD, COMSOPAC, COMGENPOA, CG10, CG USASOS, CG 6TH ARMY, CG USAFFE.

CX 14240. Your 160251, releasing the 31 Div now NOUMEA to CINCFPAC for duty is concurred in. Destination desired is LEYTE. Upon arrival at LEYTE 31 Div is assigned to 6th Army. The CG 6th Army will provide for embarkation and quartering, arranging necessary details with CG USASOS. CG 6th Army is authorized direct communication with the CG 31 Div. Request Cincpoa issue necessary instructions to direct unit report 6th Army upon arrival LEYTE and to send forward by air to LEYTE at the earliest practicable date an advanced detachment to report to the CG 6th Army, consisting of CG 31 Div or 2nd in command, G3, G4, and Div engineer or their representatives, and representatives of Inf Regiments and Artillery Bns and divisional troops. Further request that this headquarters be advised concerning loading arrangements and ETA LEYTE of various elements of the Division. Desire that troops be accompanied by 60 days of supply classes 1, 2, 3 (lubricants only) and 4, and 5 units of fire.

16 0310 CTF 51 to COMTHFLT PASSED BY 5THFLT TO CINCPAC ADV FOR INFO.

Damage to ships heavy today though number of enemy aircraft committed seems much smaller than on 12th. Consider this due to 2 causes. (A) Attacks today were better massed and coordinated. (B) Absence of TF 58 reduced depth of filter cover. Para. Recommend largest possible number shore based long range filters be assigned to filter sweeps MONSHU and KYUSHU at frequent intervals using not only planes based at IWO but also staged thru IWO in order provide mass effect.

17 1247 CINCPOA ADV to COMWSEAFRON, COMNORPAC, CTF94, CTF96, COMDESFPAC, COTCPAC, COMSERVPAC, CONSERVON 10, COMNAVS GUAM, INFO COMINCH, CINCPOA PEARL, COMTHFLT, CTF 51.

In view of heavy losses which have been experienced in escort types during current operation action akes take the following action. ComWesSeaFron, ComNORPac, ComRon 10, ComNavBase Guam expedite repairs on DD, DE, DK, DM, APF all possible without radical disruption of other work schedules. COTCPAC and ComDesPac curtail training period these types all possible and report their readiness to Cincpac for combat assignment. ComNorPac detach 1 DesDiv of DesRon 57 and route to PEARL for onward routing to the western Pacific. CTF 96 detach CortDiv 36 and direct them report to CTF 94. CTF 94 detach DesRon 12 and direct them report to CTF 51 for duty 5th Fleet.
Desire that execution subparagraph F UrDis 160250 not operate to reduce the availability of Marine and Naval combat units for offensive employment.

180250 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCWSFA INFO CGTEN,COMPHIBSPAC,CGAAFSWA,CG FIFTH AIR FORCE.

ComGen 5th AF 172120. Request by return dispatch information concerning unauthorized visit of General Smith of 5th Fighter Command to Okinawa. My 140826 authorized visit of only "Air Engineer" to survey airdrome possibilities.

180645 CTF 51 to COM3THFLT INFO CINCPAC BOTH, ALL 3THFLT TFC & TGG.

Summary No. 35 as of 181200. Roundup of information concerning yesterday's ground force activity coming in during the night indicated that enemy activity along 24th Corps front was negligible as Corps engaged in final preparations for attack 19 April. Artillery, naval gunfire and aircraft continued to soften up enemy installations with reported excellent results. 7th Div was subjected to some hostile artillery fire forward areas. Active patrolling throughout the day with no enemy contact reported by patrols operating to immediate front of RCT 32. On Div left patrols of RCT 32 supported by light tanks reached points on ridge in TA 3274PC 1200 yards E of Hill 178. Enemy mortar and machine gun fire received as tanks fired on caves along ridge. Enemy activity in 27th ZA was negligible and local patrols to div front reported no unusual enemy activity. Few minor infiltration attempts were made and artillery and mortar fire fell intermittently. General preparations for attack continue. Assault shipping this Div is now 100% unloaded. 96th Div units completed movement into position for continuation of attack. Enemy activity in Div ZA was negligible with very little mortar and artillery fire received. Air and naval gunfire observers directed fire on enemy positions and emplacements to front of RCT 32 throughout the day with good results. Fortified enemy OP at TA 3175I blasted by MGF resulting in considerable damage. RCT 32 patrols mopping up in Corps service area investigated over 500 caves during period. 374 civilians picked up in this area and turned over to MPs. Corps artillery counterbattery and normal harassing missions were continued throughout this period. Destruction of 6 150mm guns located at TA 736FP was completed. Enemy troop locations caves pillboxes and gun positions were taken under fire by naval units during the day with unreported results. 3 air strikes were placed on SHU I CASTLE with estimated 30% destruction. Pillboxes on ridge at TA 8077E were hit with extensive damage reported. A pipeline believed to furnish water to MAHA was cut by 27th Div engineers. Corps plan for the day calls for all units to make final preparations for coordinated attack tomorrow. Elements of 27th Div to secure by 1600 Hill at TA 7978R overlooking town of MACHINATO and cleave corner of ESCARPHONT at TA 1678Q. 96th Div is to consolidate positions along Div boundaries and move 1 BN 383rd RCT to assembly area at TA 8478 in Div reserve. In the 3rdPhibCorps zone 6th MarDiv continued operations to eliminate enemy on MOTOBU PENINSULA with effort being made to prevent enemy organization on high ground to NE. Attack is being made by 4th and 29th Marines. The 1st BN 22nd Marines is mopping up the rear. 22nd Marines less 1 BCT continues patrolling N OKINAWA and has established a defensive line facing south from TA 3550LT 3650PO 3750MN to prevent interference with radar and fighter director station being established on northern tip of peninsula. The 1st MarDiv continued patrolling assigned areas and is to send a reconnaissance group to patrol islands guarding approach to CHUJU WAN. 77th Div on TE SHIMA reports that during - Continued -
the night 17-18 April small groups of enemy supported by mortar fire and small arms attempted infiltration 306 Inf sector. 6 enemy officers and 13 enlisted were killed in this action. The division reports advances have been steady with substantial gains made against determined enemy resistance from high ground vicinity TA 9733 with some machine gun and sniper fire coming from IE TOWN and mutually supporting pillboxes with automatic weapons encountered in TA 87330. Noon report indicates the 306th Inf on the north to have extended its lines to: TA 38353 38354 87330. With no report on BCT 305 on the south. Enemy casualties reported total 333 and 1 FOW with our own casualties of 15 KIA 73 MIA 5 MIA. 4 of our antitanks were destroyed by mines. Coastal patrols around the islands in the KERAMA RETTO group killed 5 enemy and destroyed 2 outrigger canoes north shore ZAMPA MISAKI. Planes of MAG 31 and 33 flew 24, plane CAP at dawn and dusk and provided 2 plane CAP over each of the 5 picket boats from dawn to dusk yesterday. 4 ground support missions of 31 Corsairs struck enemy troops and ground installations in 3rdPhilCorps area with results reported excellent. CP 10th Army opened ashore in TA 8687N as of 111200. Para, Naval elements conducted harassing and night illumination in the zone of 24th Corps using 2 OBB 1 CA 3 DD firing from the E and 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 5 DD operating from the W. 43 firing missions were conducted in this area. Support to the 3rdPhilCorps and 77th Div was allocated to 1 OBB 1 CL 4 DD. 51.19 reports that NEW YORK COLORADO ST LOUIS NOSHIKA PORTLAND plus 3 DD gave all assigned and requested targets a good going over. Targets including gun emplacements trucks blockhouses buildings personnel concentrations. TUSCALOOSA and MUSTIN engaged in illumination against suicide boats SW sector and bombarded NAHA and ITOMAN airfields. Com LST GRP 67 with 9 LSTs 6 LSTs 6 LCIss anchored for unloading in CHICHU WSN. PCS 1404, buying 4 shoal spots and is reproducing anchorage charts of CHICHU WSN. SPICERWOOD also engaged in planting buoys. Minesweeping has been effected in area G2 E of Long 128-11 and Area HI N of target areas 49. Routine channel and transport area sweeps were made. In Q1 YONABAN WSN has been cleared to 2500 yards of land to SW. This will permit fire support ships to move in closer and to place enfilade fire up valleys as well as direct fire to head of WSN. PCS(R) 351 tore out stanchions supporting number 2 gun tub while getting away from alongside LAFER 15 April. PCW 11 which ran aground HAB SHIMA 14 April will require drydocking to repair propellers check shaft alignment. LSM 193 grounded in MAGO WSN 17th. Has 6 foot rip on center line frames 21-22. Requires docking. PRESTON operating last night with TF 54 to the N at 2000 reported hostile plane flying low over formation. Shortly after TENNESSEE felt violent underwater explosion. BECKS 5,000 yards away reported explosion astern of her at 2031. No damage to any ships of TF 54. HURON new reports casualties as 14 KIA 10 MIA 8 MIA. Para. Naval air arm furnished direct support to troops by fast carriers of TF 56 and CVEs of TG 52.1. Other attacks missions included fighter sweep of KIME SHIMA at 1000. Results not reported. Routine search flights and A/S war were flown by PBMs from KERAMA BASH. Enemy air activity occurred from 2000 to 2200 night 17th. A few hecklers approached from west and southwest. No report of damage to our forces. 1 Sally shot down by night fighter. Our plane losses consist of 1 F6F of TG 39.2 who shot down hostile plane close over water off shore from NAHA at 2145 hitting his propeller on water making this attack forcing a crash landing. Pilot rescued 0145 by LCI 754 on anti bomb patrol. Rescue was made by PBM Dumbo at 0315 of MARCUS ISLAND fighter plane who was shot down by AA 1 mile off shore MINAMI DAITO SHIMA. Dumbo was under fire while making rescue. These Dumbo planes are doing a magnificent piece of work in support of our attack planes. Planes of TG 52.1 made air delivery of supplies to 3rdPhilCorps on KOTOKU PENINSULA. 1st B-29 to land at OKINAWA came in on 2 engines 0610. This plane had been enroute to strike KASHIMA.
Intend initiating program of rotation your task groups in succession to ULITHI for 10 day rest and replenishment periods with 1st group departing as early as practicable possibly after last supporting strike 20th. Reliefs will be accomplished on station in operating area. Request your recommendations as to (A) Whether TF 58 should be organized during this time in 3 TGs or 4. (B) Schedule of rotation to ULITHI.

Upon reporting to this command for operational control effective 212400 HyDis 060137 and 050634, not to all are superseded by this dispatch. With 7th fighter command 15th and 21st fighter groups all based JNO JIMA and with 306th Fighter Group based TINIAN reform TG 53.4. BrigGen Ernest Moore continues as CTG. Mission is VLR escort and offensive fighter operations as directed by CTF 93 exclusive of operations against BONINIS directed by CTG 94. CTG 93.4 will conserve aircraft for this mission and will employ for air defense only the number which in his opinion fills minimum requirements for adequate protection.

Summary No 36 as of 181300. CG 10th Army established headquarters ashore. 10th Army set for all out attack southern OKINAWA early morning 19 April. 21st Corps lineup for attack from west to east is as follows: 27th Div 106th Inf 105th Inf assault 96th Div 331st Inf 32nd Inf assault 7th Div with 184th Inf and 32nd Inf assault. The 307th RCT of the 77th Div under CTG 51.23 RAdm Blandy is to conduct the diversionary feint landing off SE OKINAWA in support of the attack. The 3rdPhibCorps continues its operations on MOTOBU PENINSULA and northern OKINAWA with details unreported. 77th Div is making progress against determined enemy on TE SHIMA defending from pillboxes and dug-in positions. The plan of the 77th Div is to completely isolate IsIJUSUGU-YAMA the main enemy defense. Afternoon report locates troops along the line running generally from: 3832EM 3832H 5732ND 5732I 5832RD. Regret troop casualty report not available tonight. Para. Naval support was furnished 3rdCorps by 1 CL 2 DD 21st Corps from the west by 2 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 2 DD. On eastern side of OKINAWA by 1 OBB 2 CA 1 CL 5 DD. Ammunition replenishment was completed in preparation for tomorrow's attack. 3 OBB 1 CA 1 CL 4 DD replenished at KERAMA. JW DITTER and LCS 37 in RF 14, each report 1 horned mine destroyed. MORRISON in RF 10 fired on 2 Hecklers believed to be low flying Bettys. No hits. BOWERS now reports casualties as 34 KIA 56 WIA including Captain and Executive Officer 10 MTA. Naval casualties to date reported by 96 ships list 522 KIA 1520 WIA 584, MTA. Total 2,626. Para. Direct air support of troops continued throughout the period by CVs of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 58 and by shore based air of TG 99.2. TG 52.1 made attack on SAKISHIMA GUNTO with results unreported. Search flights and ASP were flown by PBHs from KERAMA base. TULAGI special ASW group was ordered to conduct hunterkiller on sub contact in Lat 26-29 Long 130-43 developed by TG 58.4. Attacks made by destroyers prior to arrival this group probably sank sub. 2 flights of 6 F4Us replacement planes for TG 99.2 arrived by air from MARIANAS via INO. B-29 which made emergency landing at YONTAN this morning departed 1600 for MARIANAS. There were no air attacks on this area this afternoon. This evening commencing 1840 enemy planes approached from west in 3 raids. 2 twin
18 1156 CTF 51 SUMMARY NO 36 - CONTINUED.

Engine planes shot down by F6FN night fighters from TG 99.2 about 80 miles due west of ZAMPA 1 at 1345.1 at 1914. Para. Weather partly cloudy. Visibility 8 miles. Temperature average 73 degrees. Wind SE 14 to 22 knots smooth sea, no swell.

18 1324 CINC PAC ADV TO CINC SWP.

NOTICE TO MACARTHUR. I add my own appreciation to the following message from Spruance "Appreciate strong action being taken by CINC SwiPAC to keep FORMOSA enemy air neutralized. Continuation will keep our flank secure and our carrier forces available for troop support here and for stopping attacks from Empire".

18 2039 CTF 58 to COM 5THFLT INFO CTF 51, COMSERON 10, CTGs of TF 58.

Your 180647. Do not desire to rotate TGs. Reduction of force in operating area will cause concentration of enemy on remaining TGs with consequent probability of increased losses. Also materially reduces number of available fighters. Prefer to retain entire TF in operating area until shore based air is ready to take over and we are relieved of direct support missions. (A) Sufficient carriers and destroyers are available for only 3 TGs. (B) TG 58.1 plus about 6 cripples of other TGs, TG 58.3, TG 58.4.

19 0025 CGBOMCG021 to CGBOMCG73, CGBOMCG313, CGBOMCG314, INFO CGBOMCG58, CTF 58, CTF 52 CTG 92.4. CINC PAC ADV HQ, CO DET A BONCOM 21 INC.

STNXF-19-1. Subject daily bombing. For your information daily bombing of KYUSHU will be initiated and continued, weather permitting, until further notice. You will be advised each day of proposed schedule for following day including targets, force, bomb load, assembly areas.

19 0245 COM 5THFLT TO CTF 58 Info CTF 51, ALL TG C OF TF 58, CINC PAC ADV.

Your 182039. Rotation will not be placed in effect until present situation has improved. Activation of IE SHIMA fields will probably require about 2 weeks. This will be 1st possibility of any large increase in local WF. Success of 24th Corps attack also affects station.

19 0625 CTF 51 to COM 5THFLT Info CINC PAC BOTH, ALL TGC & TFG FIFTH FLEET.

Summary 37 as of 191200. Surface units supported 10th Army during the night 18-19 April with harassing and night illumination fires by 1 CA 2 DD in support of 3rd PhilCorps and operations on IE SHIMA. In the area of the 24th Corps by 2 OBB 2 DD firing from the west under shore fire control parties with 2 OBB 1 DD under corps control while 1 CL 2 DD furnished direct support under shore fire control and 2 OBB 2 CA 3 DD under corps control call firing from the east. Except in MAHA area illumination was suspended in order to prevent the enemy from detecting movement of our troops. Today fire support ships are engaged in all out effort in support for the attack of the 24th Corps. Under TG 51.19 are 2 OBB 2 CA 5 DD on the east. 1 CA 2 DD under TG 51.21 operating against IE SHIMA. 4 OBB 2 CA 5 DD under TG 51.22 supporting 24th Corps from the east. 2 OBB 2 CA 5 DD under CTG 51.23 supporting the diversionary feint off the SE coast. ComBatRon 2 with BatDiv 6 WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA is bombarding.
SE coast OKINAWA. Results of this morning's gunfire are as yet unreported.
Details coming in on PRINGLE sunk 16 April reveal PRINGLE and HOBSON in RP 1 attacked by 10 to 15 planes. At 0920 was hit square amidships by suicide Val. She broke in two and sank in 6 minutes. Explosion heard by ROCKS and TENNESSEE night of 17th previously reported now believed to be torpedo exploding at end of run. UDTs completed demolition of channel between RED T3 and RED T4 beaches on IE SHIMA. Reinstallation of the net at north channel entrance KERAMA RETTO completed on 18th with repairs on south net continuing. Minesweeping 18 April comprised routine channel and transport area sweeps entrance to RI checked and small boat sweep in TA 9982. PULLAM sank 1 standard chemical 4 horned type mine at 1420 18th in position 24-09 N 126-58 E. NEW YORK lost port anchor 51 fathoms bearing 354 5830 yards from KUZO SAKI on 18th. 41.19 reports 3 LSTs unloading at TA 9589 in NAKAGUSUKU WAN as of 131800. LCS(L) 31 reports that hostile plane sighted in TA 5578 at 2000 18th had bomb bay doors open and actions of plane indicate possibility of mine sowing. CTU 50-7.3 TULAGI ASP group abandoned hunterkiller search at 24-34 N 132-23 E. TOLMAN at 0343 grounded forward TR frame 50 KAISA SHOAL in position 26-16.4 N 127-32 E while on night harassing mission off NAHA. Tugs and LSMs assisting. Following vessels departed today for ULITHI: STNG APA 4, AKA 1 AP 1 AK 2 XAP 3 DD 1 DE 1 AM. Parc. Naval air operations consisted of direct air support of troops by CVEs of TG 52.1 fast carriers of TF 58. Series of heavy air strikes was made on south OKINAWA this morning between 0700 and 0900 over 300 airplanes from fast carriers were engaged in air missions. Flash reports coming in this morning indicate town of IWA TA 7364 well covered with bombs rockets and Napalm. Many buildings destroyed and large fires in area. Town of TUGASAN thoroughly covered buildings leveled and fires raging. Planes attacked troop concentration in town of ZAWA TA 7553 and AKABE TA 7538 also hit. Tank park north of TOLMAN Field in TA 7364 was hit by Napalm. Town of SHURI heavily hit by rockets and Napalm and is burning. Planes laid smoke screen to cover troops in diversionary front landing. Other attack mission carried out was strike against SAKISHIMA GUAMO by TU 52.1.3. Results of previous strike 18th show runways hit. Target CAP was maintained during the day over both ISHIGAKI and MIYAKO. Routine search flights and ASP were flown by FBMIs from KERAMA. TULAGI group continued coverage of shipping lanes to the SE. 2 OXs landed on IE SHIMA at 1015. During evening April 18 several hecklers approached from west. No damage to our units. 2 Bettys destroyed as previously reported last summary. Our plane losses consist of: 1 MCHILE plane capsized on takeoff at O100. No casualties. Dambo picked up SANTETT pilot shot down by AA on photo mission 5 miles south MIIAKO 1315 18th April. 1 unidentified plane reported to have crashed in flames over enemy territory on south OKINAWA 0945. 1 L-5 plane attached to 24th Corps is missing from flight over southern OKINAWA. B-29 which was reported taking off at 1600 18 April is still at YONDAI Field. End of Summary.
A 7569 M. Intensify attacks on FORMOSA airfields for maximum possible neutralization. Every possible source of suicide attacks against 5th Fleet at OKINAWA must be attacked.

Operations Summary 55. Situation as of 191200. 3rdPhibCorps: Activities during last night in the 3rdPhibCorps area, northern OKINAWA, reported as quiet. Some attempts to infiltrate and snipe in GIS. No report from MOUTEBU PENINSULA. BP 24th Corps: Last night, the 3 Regiments of the Corps prepared for a large scale assault on the fortified enemy defensive position in the 10th Army zone of advance to the south. Vigorous patrolling for routes of advance and enemy location, strong points reconnoitered for quick neutralization of prior to jump off this morning. 0000 report indicates advances on right and left flank of Corps, 500 to 300 yards progressing satisfactorily. 7th and 96th Divs jumped off at 190640 against light to 0 opposition. 2 of our tanks were knocked out at 190752 other tank columns have penetrated to 190748 and 0076-0. Naval gunfire, artillery concentration and air bombardment reported as "magnificent." YONABCRU and IWA subjected to air strike with 240 planes participating at 1908 G6 H 5, a reported uniformed 5 Amtracs were landing against the enemy front at TA 7973L. 7th Div: the 32nd Inf was subjected to a severe artillery bombardment between 192345 and 183400. Over 300 rounds of a caliber referred to as lighter than previously experienced was received in the regimental area. Hostile bombardment did little damage, casualties were reported nil as of midnight. Communications with the exception of wire to 1 Bn were all in, and this line was operational at 190200. 184 Inf reported considerable artillery fire of mixed caliber received during the night. 27th Div: 2nd Bn 1069 seized MACHINATO 7973W at 19055 in the 27 zone of advance. Div has constructed BIPCT bridge to assist its rapid advancement. Large fire was reported vicinity of SHURI. 96 Div: 3rd Bn 38 Inf jumped off at 190715 against heavy mg fire. As of 190730 this morning lines were: 3rd Bn 38 St Inf, 51768H 1st Bn 382 Inf 82777U 82758C 2nd Bn LEEHOKUNODEN 730. 3rd Inf 83778U 83760H. 77th Div (Army reserve): Enemy on TE SHIMA is putting up stiff resistance, from well concealed positions, div is progressing satisfactorily. As of 180650 front lines were generally from TA 8334EM to 8833H to 8832M to 87321 to 8832RD. 305th Inf to surround mountain and dig Japs out. Naval Air: Carrier based aircraft on station for 24th Corps drive this morning following: 1 VE(Dumbo), 92 VT(various bomb loads up to 1000 lbs), 36 WB (1000 lb bombs), 155 WFB (500 lb bombs). BrigGen Thomas, ISCOM APO 245, reported to CG 10 on 13 April for conference respect to early activation of airfields on TE SHIMA and expediting discharge of shipping. ISCOM APO 331 was authorized to commence discharge of a 3rd ammunition ship. Priority of discharge was set as follows: (1) 155mm H (2) 105mm H (3) 81mm mortar (4) 50mm mortar (5) 3 MG. CINCPOA was requested to order forward 4 LSTs of 155mm gun and 155mm H ammunition from the emergency reserve in the MARIANAS. This to arrive 27 April or as soon thereafter as practicable. DD the CROSSLEY (APO37) transferred 22 tons of tetrytol, 2½ tons C2, 2 tons TNT, 3 boxes banklorles and 115,000 feet of prime cord to the 1093 Engineer Depot. Air shipment of 8,000 EC fuses for Hell HE, M3 4.2 inch chemical mortar has been requested from ConGenPOA to replace present defective fuses. Arrangements are being made to move fighter director room of MAG 43 to TE SHIMA.
19 1200 CTF 51 to COM7THFLT Info 5THFLT, CINCPAC BOTH.

Summary 38 as of 191300. Naval gunfire support was furnished the ground forces by ships listed in noon report except 3 fast BB from TF 58 departed. Gunfire and air support of the attack of 24th Corps today was probably the largest ever given in similar period to amphibious troops for an attack. All fire missions were coordinated with air and artillery to insure maximum effect. Diversionary feint at landing was completed with general appearance satisfactory. Some mortar fire received from beaches but no ships were damaged. Although expenditures were large and ships are relatively low in ammunition there remains sufficient for normal fire mission requests. Report coming in on today's bombardment state IDAHO sank small steamer off NAHA and destroyed 3 5 inch guns. MOBILE lists 2 guns and several replacements destroyed. ARKANSAS neutralized 3 gun battery. COLORADO scored direct hit on command post, HALL placed direct hit on gun position. MOBILE while engaged in firing mission in area SL NAKAGUSUKU WAN at 2343 18 had explosion of center gun of 6 inch turret No. 2. Preliminary investigation indicates explosion occurred while priming. Center gun inoperative. 4 KIA 13 WIA. LST 929 while proceeding to berth in transport area at 0851 struck LST 267 at anchor. LST 929 port main deck badly buckled between frames 27 and 28. Side caved in above waterline. INGRAHAM at 1032 13th destroyed horned mine in position 24 18 N 13 13 E. Further about TOLMAN: 2 tugs and 2 LSM have been sent to assist unloading. Cargo being cleared from forward preparatory to transfer and oil transferred from forward to aft tanks. SPEAR in station A22 was attacked by 2 enemy planes at 1945 18th. Splashed 1 which crashed 500 feet off port bow. Bomb or torpedo in planes exploded. 2nd plane made bomb run 2 minutes later but missed 200 feet astern. Slight damage no casualties. RE SSUS in station A23 was attacked by low flying plane at 1911 18th. Heavy fire drove off hostile plane PAREDDCC. Air support of troops continues to be furnished by fast carriers of TF 58 and CVEs of TG 52.1 until 1500 when missions were cancelled due to bad weather. TU 52.1.3 made an attack on SAKISHIMA GUNTO. No reports of results received as yet. Routine search flights and ASP were flown by FMs. TG 99.2 received 6 FAs and 3 F6FNs replacements planes from CHAN via TOS escorted by BAD and R5 at 1730. 1 Dumbo FM was on station with TU 52.1.3 off SAKISHIMA GUNTO. Search for missing OY plane is negative. At 1330 air observer of TG 51.21 located a Marine adrift in a small native craft north of NOTOBU PENINSULA and directed surface vessel to rescue. There were no enemy air attacks this afternoon. Para. Weather cloudy. Visibility 10 miles. Temperature average 72 degrees. Wind SSW to NNE 21 knots. Moderate sea. Surf 3 to 5 feet.

20 0103 COM7THFLT TO CINCPAC INFO CINCSWPA,COMINCH, CINCPAO BOTH, ALL TF & TG 7THFLT.

Com7thFlt reports to Cincpac for purposes of naval administration in accordance with CINCSWPA 191230.
20 2252 CINCPAC ADV to COM7THFLT info CINCSWPA, COMINCH

Desire conference with you at Guam at a time when minimum interference with your duties in SWPA will be involved and which is agreeable to you and to CinCSWPA. Your 200103.

20 2255 CINCPAC ADV to COMINCH

My remarks and recommendations on JCS 1275 required by secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff memo of 28 March forwarded by CominCh secret serial 00786 of 30 March are as follows. A. The documents attached should be prepared for the signature of the officer receiving the surrender using the military title assigned to him by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. B. The documents should provide for the Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas taking control immediately of all forces personnel equipment and installations of the Japanese Navy.

21 0214 CINCPOA ADV to COMINCH info CINCSWPA, COMGENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL HQ

Warx 70172. The continued functioning of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Areas under the operational control of Cincpoa is essential. Request the War Department be informed that I desire to retain my Joint Staff complete in all respects and that JICPOA is an activity essential to the effective functioning of my headquarters if reductions in my requirements occur I will release individuals who are no longer required.

21 0740 CINCPOA ADV to CINCSWPA info COMSUBPAC, COM7THFLT, CTF 71, CINCPAC PEARL HQ

Your CX 14454 timed 201400. Concur.

19 1257 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV info COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ

In view recommendation CTF 58 contained in para 47 of his ser 0045 13 March and Ur 310526 March reorganization CarDiv 7 is indicated. This refers ComAirPac ser 00632 of 27 March and Ur 1st end ser 005031 of 7 April. The need for 1 CV(N) with the Fast Carrier Task Force has been recognized by you and it will take at least 2 CV(N) to support 1 in the combat area. Assuming Enterprise to be one of those, make recommendation 1 additional CV to be assigned CarDiv 7 and insure necessary state of night readiness in that Carrier. It is recognized that circumstances may require temporary employment of either 1 or both as day Carrier. Present program of 6 CVG(N) will not be reduced at this time in view development in fighter direction and electronic field. The program can be cut back with HBOE facility that it can be reinitiated. Make recommendation for standardized CVG(N) compleiment and for reassignment INDEPENDENCE and BATAAN to day divisions.
COMGEN 77TH DIV (BRUCE) to CINCPAC ADV, GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, info NIMITZ, SPRUANCE, MACARTHUR, RICHARDSON, TURNER, REIFSNIDER, BUCKNER.

The 77th infantry division after a bitter fight from pill box to pill box, house to house, cave to cave fight planted our American Flag on the highest point of the strongly defended mountain pinnacle on IE SHIMA. Men from Texas planted a Texas Flag on bloody ridge at the base of the pinnacle fortress in honor of those gallant Texans who gathered together at Corregidor to remember San Jacinto Day on 21 April 1942.

ADM E J KING TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

Your recommendation that complement of VC squadrons attached Kaiser CVEs be increased from 16 VF and 12 TTB to 20 VF and 12 VTB is disapproved. Cannot at this time foresee availability of planes and pilots without reduction in the number of combat CVEs or reduction in the ratio of 2 squadrons per ship which is not desired. Action UrNMEM 012322 refers. Your recommendation that presently designated VOC squadrons be redesignated as VC squadrons and that 1 VC squadron per division be trained in the observation and spotting of gunfire for shore bombardment is approved. Make recommendation as to complement these VC squadrons.

COMAIRPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CINCPAC ADMIN, COMAIRTRANSPO.

P-51 replacements ComGenAAFPOA 140347 can be lifted only by elimination of lift of Navy aircraft. Previously scheduled lifts Navy Marine and Army aircraft exceed capacity of TransRonPac ships. Implications of this request are that required aircraft lifts for Army will in future be superimposed in increasing numbers on already inadequate shipping available to meet airborne commitments. Provided aircraft are ready 1 May can utilize available space on combatant carriers proceeding forward as it becomes available after that date. Subject to above remarks CVE can be diverted to requested Army lift if you so direct. Am concerned over indicated lack of other plans to move Army aircraft and increasing demands on transport CVEs in excess of availability.

CINCPAC ADV TO DEPCOMAF INFO C321BONCOM, CG TEN, CTG 92.2, CTF51, COMTHFILT.

Consistent with saving lives desire such action as is practicable to prevent use of Yontan and Kadena airfields by B29 aircraft. This action necessary because of critical tactical situation at OKINAWA.

COMINCH 191257. UrDis 200015. Recommend: (A) Embark CVG(N) 91 in BON HOMIE RICHARD about 1 June at which time return ENTERPRISE for yard availability and CVG (N) 90 for rehabilitation and reforming. (B) Completion yard availability ENTERPRISE late August retain her Hawaiian area in ready standby status with CVG(N) 52. ENTERPRISE assist in Hawaiian night training program unless or until needed in combat. (C) Utilizing pilots and aircraft CVG(N) 53 form CVE(N) 70 and 71 in continental US now with complement 12 VF(N) and 12 VT(N) for embarkation in SADT and SANGAMON about 1 September. Reform

Continued
21 2110 COMAIRPAC TO CINCPAC (CONTINUED)

CVG(N) 52 at QUONSET about 1 June. (D) Defer formation CVG(N) 54 until 1 October. (E) Complement of all CVG(N) be 36 VF(N) 1 VF(P) and 18 VF(N). MySer 00342 of 18 April refers. (F) Night units on day CVS be maintained at 4 VF(N) 8 pilots. (G) ACN HOL-MER RICHARD to Cardiv 7. INDEPENDENCE to Cardiv 1. BATAAN to Cardiv 6. Para. Consider it desirable that the night CVE program be implemented earliest possible to provide night defense in objective area. This can be accomplished on basis of Para C. Para. Only on basis NR Para C can CVG(N) 52 be moved to Hawaiian Training Area. ComAirLant 151622 refers. Para. Overall requirements for night pilots and aircraft will be submitted separately.

20 2250 CINCFOA ADV TO COM5THFLT, COMFDAREA INFO COMINC: CNO, ISCOM Inc, COMAIR Inc, CINCFOA PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFORD, ALL TF & TCC 5THFLT, COMFAIRWING 1 AND 2, COMSENDAREA, COMGENLANT

Amplifying my 162251, not to all. As of 212400 I transfer operational control of units as follows (A) From 5thFlt to ComFwdArea: VPB 102, 106, 108, 116, 118, 133, 151, 22, 205, 15, CASTLE ROCK, HAMLIN, CASCO; ComFwdArea to 5thFlt: WH 3. ComFwdArea be prepared to return VPB 106, 118, and 133 to 5th Flt when OKINAWA fields ready. ComFwdArea assume responsibility PACFlt searches as described by Cincpac 282254, March, and 131407 both as modified by Com5thFlt 131254 except that searches 7 and 20 V 91 limited to 600 miles. Transfer FairWing 1 staff personnel now operating searches from MARIANAS, CAROLINES and BIKO to ComFwdArea for duty. Com5thFlt and ComFwdArea authorized exchange units at discretion of Com5thFlt without interfering with searches required of ComFwdArea.

21 2233 COMFAIRWING ONE TO COM5THFLT INFO CINCFOA ADV, COMFDAREA.

To provide more overall efficiency through retention present task unit system and ability to shift squadrons and tenders to meet varying needs between MARIANAS, CAROLINES and OKINAWA areas. Recommend modification Cincpac Adv 202250 to eliminate mention specific units. Directing instead which specific area searches should be under respective operational control Com5thFlt and ComFwdArea. Request 2nd info addee comment.

22 0351 CTF 94 to COMFAIRWING 1, COM5THFLT INFO CINCFOA ADV NO.

Refer ComFairWing 1 212233. Prefer continue as in CincFOA Adv 202250. If difficulties arise would be glad to reopen.
23 1221  CINCPCAP VIA 5THFLT TO COMSOUTHFL, CONFIRMING 1 CTF 94 INFO CINCPCAP BOTH, COMAIRPAC.

My L62251 and 202250. It is expected that ComFairWing 1 will on his own initiative or as directed by Com5thFlt make request of CTF 94 for squadrons or tenders needed for operations in the KYUSHU which needs will normally be accorded priority over those of searches conducted by TF 94 with the exception of those which extend north of Lat 25-00.

23 1240  CINCPCAP VIA COMSOUTHFL TO CG TEN, INFO COMSOUTHFL, CTF 99.2, 99.3, COMNAVAIR BASE OKINAWA, CINCPCAP BOTH, COMCENAFPOA, COMAFFPOA, COMAIRPAC, COMGENFMFPAC.

My L22314 correct subpara D to read "The Naval Air Base originally planned for No. 3 Field will be adequate for at least 4 heavy landplane search squadrons, 2 medium landplane search squadrons, 1 photogroup and MATS". 
Para. The 2 VTMB squadrons now scheduled for OKINAWA will continue to be attached to Marine Fighter Group (S) designated by ComGen 2nd MarAirWing (CTG 99.2).

24 0605  CHQ SWPA TO CINCPCAP ADV INFO COMSOUTHFL.

CX 14703. Kincaid will arrive GUAM early afternoon Thursday and will discuss use of BFF in C6 operation. My views briefly are as follows: It is possible to conduct C6 operation without the assistance of BFF. However if it appears desirable to use BFF the British Carrier Group can be employed to advantage in striking enemy air fields in southwestern BORNEO.

24 1210  COMSOUTHFL TO CTF 58 INFO CTF 51, CONSERVION 10, CINCPCAP ADV.

Place rotation program outlined my L80647 in effect commencing on 27 April or as soon thereafter as practicable. At your discretion you may either send 1 TG as now constituted or make up special TG composed of ships of each type chosen from all 3 TGs. If latter is done desire you send from 1/4 to 1/3 of total of each type available to you. CTF 51 reduce requests for support aircraft from TF 53 to minimum and for CAP to those deemed necessary to meet enemy air attacks believed likely to eventuate which cannot be met by forces under his command.

24 1316  CINCPCAP ADV TO COMINCH & CHQ INFO COMSOCPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRSOCPAC, SUPERS.

In order to economize on personnel and reduce overhead and to provide immediately an officer of adequate rank and experience to command Fleet Air Wing 18 it is recommended that (A) ComSoPac assume immediately the duties heretofore performed by ComAirSoPac. (B) Comdr T G. Richards be ordered report ComSoPac for duty as Senior Aviation Officer on his staff. (C) Rear Admiral M R Greer be ordered report immediately to ComAirPacSubComPac for duty as ComFairWing 18. (D) On reporting of RAdm Greer ComFairWing 18 be commissioned in HAINANAS. (E) Remainder present staff ComAirSoPac be divided between Wing 18 and ComSoPac as directed by ComSoPac.

24 1340  CINCPCAP ADV TO CTF 93 INFO CG21STBCOM, COMSOUTHFL.

Your 230111, Desire that offensive operations fighter aircraft based at INFO be either as escorts to VLR strikes or as independent strikes on KYUSHU fields unless other operation of these aircraft has Cincpac's prior approval.
Designate 1 Div your Corps 10th Army Reserve. Div designated remain present location and continue present activities with exception 1 Regiment be prepared assemble 12 hours notice in area designated by you south of TA Grid Line 94. Designated Division remain under your command pending employment. Notify this Hq of designated Division and Regiment.

Designate 1 Division to your Reserve. Division designated remain present location and continue present activities with exception 1 Regiment be prepared assemble 12 hours notice in area designated by you south of TA Grid Line 94. Designated Division remain under your command pending employment. Notify this Hq of designated Division and Regiment.

MARSHALL TO CINCPAC, COMGENPOA, COMINCH (COMGENPOA PASSED TO CINCPAC).

WARX 72252 has been repeated to all addresses provisions of JCS number 873/3 as affected by JCS NO. 1259/5 dated 5 April 45 and WD cable number 62744 (Navy Dept number 032141) dated 3 April 45 HOUSTZOK visible review of civil censorship program for POA with view toward transfer of certain primary responsibilities from CinCPA to CINCPAC. Also for consideration is problem of integration when operations in various areas are under different commands as civil censorship has been organized as single unit for former Japanese Empire less MANCHURIA. Suggest CinCPA and CinCAPPAC each send chief Civil Censor or other representative to Washington on temporary duty to meet with WD representatives who have been made responsible for planning and mounting a complete civil censorship organization for these areas. This meeting would be charged with making recommendations on all phases this problem and submitting them to WE, Navy Department, CINAPPAC and CinCPA for approval. Recommended time of meeting is 7 May. Request ComGenPOA pass this message to CinCPA for cable concurrence or comment and that CINAPPAC also cable views.

COMSTFLT TO CTF 93 Info CINCPAC ADV. CTF 51, CTF 58, CTG 99.2, CTG 93.4.

Ur 241831. Latest information is in daily dispatches such as CINCPA Adv 230751 and 240442 which indicate high importance of KUNOA. CTF 58 inform CTF 93 if any strike by TF 58 contemplated. CTF 51 CTF 58 and CTG 99.2 note resemblance Mustang and Tony.

COMMARLYSI AREA TO CINCPAC BOTH INFO ATCOM MAJURO.

Following information from AtCom MAJURO forwarded as matter of interest and political significance of possible value to our government. All Marshallse residents on MAJURO and ARNO ATOLLS including evacuees from WOTJE, MALOELAP and MILLE ATOLLS are submitting petitions requesting MARSHALLS ISLANDS be made protectorate of United States. This represents approximately 2700 natives or 1/3 of MARSHALLS population and is stated to be spontaneous and voluntary act. Petitions and further information will be forwarded when obtained.

COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV. COMPHILSEAFRON INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMOPSEAFRON.

After cessation hostilities EUROPE Army proposes move 60,000 to 80,000 troops monthly from ETO to PHILIPPINES via PANAMA for about 4 months. Transports may be 15 to 16 knots or over 18. CinCPAC 140240 March. Advise your escort and routing policy single ships and conveys proposed movement CANAL ZONE to MANILA and/or DAVAO.
Cancel my 010645 October 1944. The following escort policy is effective in the South Pacific Area. Para 1. While known or anticipated presence of enemy submarines may require a temporary modification of these instructions by routing authorities, under normal conditions all cargo ships and troopers proceeding within the South Pacific Area will be sailed independently regardless of speed and number of passengers. Para 2. When escorts are available they shall be provided for major combatant ships and transport CVE's. However, when escorts are not available the sailing of such ships within the South Pacific Area is authorized under the following conditions: (A) Speed of advance is 15 knots or greater (B) Ships armament is not seriously damaged (C) When it is believed enemy submarines are not operating in area to be traversed. In such circumstances speeds up to 20 knots are prescribed where practicable. Para 3. When vessels with a speed of advance of less than 18 knots, carrying 500 or more passengers, are sailed to the Central Pacific, the appropriate authority in the Forward Area shall be advised promptly in order that escort may be provided for that portion of the voyage north of the Equator. Para 4. In the Southwest Pacific Sea Frontier escorts are not required east of the longitude of BIAP and south of the Equator. Para 5. All ships whether sailing escorted or independent will proceed via established routes only. The carrying of passengers shall be in accordance with GIAO (1944 Article 1423). Para 6. Island commanders will provide all practicable air coverage on the approaches to ports and other focal points of shipping, using assigned base craft for local surface patrols. In addition to local patrol craft there will be maintained at RUSSELS, ESPIRITU SANTO, NOUMEA and FUNAFUTI 1 PC or equivalent in a ready duty status available to the island commander for JASA or rescue work.
COMGEN WESPAC BACOM to COMGEN AGF IWO, COMGEN AGF TINIAN, CO.AGF ANGUAR, COMGEN AGF GUAM Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMFWDAAREA, COMGENPOA, etc.

Effective 0921 25 April the WPBC was activated. Pending the receipt of LOI from this Hq the AGF Commanders will continue to operate under the provisions of their respective LOI from Hq USAFFOPO. All communication will be forwarded thru this Hq except those pertaining to supply and logistics which will be handled as they have been in the past until instructions are issued from this Hq.

CINCPOA ADV HQ to COM5THFLT, CTG 50.5 Info CTF 94

The shipping strikes contemplated by CTG 50.5 250203 are not desired at this time. Until there are sufficient fighters (4 grps) established on shore in the RYUKYUS to permit reduction of demands on fast and escort carriers and reduction of ships now in the combat area desire available field capacity used to increase fighter strength and conduct necessary search and transport services. Strikes on shipping while greatly desired must not prejudice above basic requirements.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF's 73, 93, 94, CINCBFF, DEFCOM 20TH AF, ALL TF & TG COMDRS 5TH FLT, COMMARGILSAREA, COMPHIBSPAC, ACONEBFF, PHOTOGRP 2, ALL CARRIERS 5THFLT, 21 BOMCOM, COMAAFSWPA, CINCSWPA Info CINCPAC PEARL etc.

Review of current Japanese Fleet status from photographic coverage is OpIntel 58. Battleships. NAGATO at YOKOSUKA 17 April in same place where she was observed 18 February. HARUNA at KURE 13 April with repair or construction work in progress on after section. ISE and HYUGA both at KURE 13 April in same mooring where they have been since 28 March. Carriers. 2 UNRYU Class (probably AMAGI and KATSURAGI) at KURE (MITSUO JIMA) 13 April. UNRYU Class (probably KASAGI) at SASEBO 21 April. 2 UNRYU Class hulls on which construction appears to have been suspended located 13 April at KURE and IKEDA WAN (34-27 North 134-14 East) respectively (probably ASO and IKOMA respectively). HAYATAKA at SASEBO 21 April covered with camouflage netting. CVL at SASEBO 21 April believed to be RYUHO. Elevators removed and net camouflaging beginning. CVL at KURE 13 April estimated as HOSHO. CVE KAIYO at NISHINOMI SHIMA (34-11 North 132-12 East) 13 April covered with camouflage. CVE KOBE type at SHIDO WAN (34-21 North 134-12 East) 13 April. Another KOBE type last observed at KOBE 28 March outfitting and repairing. Estimated still there. Unidentified flat top possible MAC Ship at BEPPU WAN (33-18 North 131-32 East) 21 April. Do not consider YOKOHAMA and HABU ships, of which BEPPU WAN ship may be one, have sufficient flight deck to be large enough for CVE. Cruisers. TONE Class at ETA SHIMA 13 April. ACOBA Class at KURE 13 April. Light cruiser OYODO at KURE 13 April. AGANO Class light cruiser last seen at KURE 28 March but not there on 12 April. Present whereabouts unknown. SINGAPORE Area 15 April were 2 NACHI Class and 1 ATAGO Class, 1 of each class severely damaged.
Believe another NACHI Class present in this area making 4 heavies total. On 18 and 22 April respectively a DUTCH Sub contacted a NACHI heavy cruiser near BATAVIA, JAVA. 1 torpedo hit was claimed in the 22 April contact. Destroyers. At KURE 28 March were 27 destroyers broken down into following classes: 4 TERUTSUKI 1 HIBIKI 1 AMAGIRI 4 ASASHIO 1 TAKANAMI 1 HATSUHARU 2 MITSUKI-MINEKAZE-KAMIKAZE 13 MATSU. To this total can be added about 10 destroyers which were in other areas as of that date. Photos taken after BANZAI engagement off KYUSHU 7 April reveal following count: 7 at KURE 13 April 5 at SASEBO 16 April 2 at YOKOSUKA 17 April. Total 14. Other units not exceeding 6 to 8 probably located at other harbors not covered by photographs. Rough check of photographs from EMPIRE FORMOSA CHINA COAST and MALAYA Areas indicates existence of about 20 MATSU Class units. Incomplete coverage of EMPIRE ship-building yards tends to confirm presently estimated rate of construction. 5 units seen building or outfitting in yards covered.
General schedule of employment CTF 57 250/37 satisfactory to me. Recommend approval his plan B.

Reply to your 2015/20 has been delayed until decisions were reached as to pending operations. I am now in position to make available to you until 1 July for lifting personnel and material forward from rear areas the following ships of TransRon 11 upon completion discharge of 81st Div in LEYTE PREMIER (APA 44) KNOX (APA 46) HARRY LEE (APA 10) PRES ADAMS (APA 19) PRES HAYES (APA 20) J CHARA (APA 90) GALLATIN (APA 169) ST CROIX (APA 231) NARRICK (AKA 89) LIBERA (AKA 12) TCDD (AKA 71) ALHENA (AKA 9) TOWNER (AKA 77) ARTICLES (AKA 21). The period of availability may later be extended if conditions permit. Additional APA may also become available. Request you advise me as to number you can employ. Regret that LST can not be provided as all this type in POA will be required to supply accelerated program OKINAWA where unloading docks will not become available for many months.

Effective 29 April propose that you assume responsibility for classification of areas relative to SS operations south of 23-00 N and west of 122-00 E while SWPA forces exclusively are operating therein.

Effective 1 May dividing line between Southwest Pacific Sea Frontier and Philippine Sea Frontier modified as follows within SWPA. From western boundary SWPA, The equator to the west coast of BORNEO at the equator thence in a northeasterly direction to the east coast of BORNEO at Lat 06-00 north thence east to Lat 04-00 north Long 130-00 East. And within POA for purposes of control of shipping by SWPA agencies. CinC SWPA 140321 September. From Lat 04-00 N Long 130-00 E to Lat 06-00 N to 133-35 E.

Following Cardiv reorganization effective 1 May. Your 250223. Cardiv 1. CVN ESSEX (F) CV 15 RANDOLPH. CVL 22 INDEPENDENCE CVL 25 CONCORD. Cardiv 6. CV CV 14 TICONDEROGA (F). CV 20 BENNINGTON. CVL 27 LANGLEY. CVL 29 BATAAN. Cardiv 7. CV 6 ENTERPRISE (F). CV 31 BONHOMME RICHARD. Bureaus and offices Navy Dept notified.

Following numbers assigned action add for use in preparation material on airfields CHINA, MANCHURIA and KOREA. A - CHINA 400-500. B - MANCHURIA 500-600. C - KOREA 251-300. CNO 052109 not to all or needed refer. In accordance with agreement my 31L231 March suggest you notify interested commands including ComGen CHINA and CINCPAC.
For the present it is considered that an attack on the scale of approximately 1 squadron to each of 6 airdromes will constitute an appropriate effort against enemy airfields on KYUSHU.

For CINCSWPA will assume responsibility for classification of operating zones in the area south of 23-00 North and West of 122-00 East.

Com5thAF 28004/7 and 221305. Request positive action be taken to ensure that except in emergency operations of the Allied Air Forces SWPA will not be extended northeast of FORCESA without prior authorization by CINCPOA. No prior notification or arrangements have been made with my headquarters concerning operations reported by 5th AF 28004/7 or those announced only to ComSubPac by 5thAF 221305. The danger inherent in unexpected penetration of air forces through the combat area in the vicinity of the KYUKYUS and KYUSHU must be obvious.

Your 280533 affirmative. (Request authority strike TOKYO area 30 April).

Your 271400. When fighters of TF 93 are used to escort VFR flights the fighters should be passed to the operational control of the 20th AF for the duration of the operation.

Propose revise inter area boundary for search and reconnaissance as follows:
130 East parallel of Longitude to 20 north thenese to 23 North 123 East thenence to 26-30 North 123 East thenence West along 26-30 North to CHINA Coast. Request concurrence.

Special air attack summary. All times I(9). About 200 enemy planes in 44 raids attacked U.S. forces at OKINAWA area from 281436 to 290215. During daylight CAP made successful interceptions majority of raids before reaching radar pickets and no enemy planes reached transport area until after dark. CAP which includes TF 58 planes as well as TG 521 and TG 992 shot down 68 planes before dark. None after dark. Prior 1900 following ships shot down planes: BUTLER 2 LCS in RP 121. Suicide attacks on DALY TWINCS BENNION. Total enemy destroyed prior to 1900 74. Paro. After 1900 numerous torpedo, bombings and suicide attempts against all types throughout area and air bases. Following are credited with splashes: BROWN 2, BENNION 3, LSM 190 1. Unknown ships at KERAMA RETTO 2, WADSWORTH 2. LCS 119 1.
28 0020 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT, ETC. (CONTINUED)

LCS 61 1, ST LOUIS 1, BUTLER 2 giving 4 for day. Shore AA 3. And 1 by unidentified ship in RP 10 area. Total by AA 19. Para. Following hit by suicides after 1900 WADSWORTH 1, LCI 590 1, PICKNEY 1 - total 3. Suicide misses BROWN, BUTLER. Total enemy planes destroyed after 1900 24. Grand total 98. Probably more later. Para. Following fragmentary reports ships hit by suicide planes. At 1744 TWIGGS in radar picket 2 had extensive topside damage from hit. At 1748 DALY with TWIGGS hit near wardroom. Both ships returned transport area at 28 knots. Doctor in DALY killed many casualties reported. Para. At 1843 BENNION radar picket 1 damaged slightly. Para. At 1905 PICKNEY (APH 2) at KERAMA RETTO hit and afire but fire soon brought under control. WADSWORTH radar picket 12 hit near bridge chief damage destruction of Captain's gig. At 2123 LCI 580 damaged not severe but has several wounded. Para. 2250 several bomb hits Yontan Field with minor damage.

28 1000 RICHARDSON COMGENFOA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CG SOPACBACOM, CG 81ST DIV NECAL.

RJ 6014/1. Recommend concurrence CINCPAC be obtained for movement to the PHILIPPINES of this unit with the 81st Division in that shipping now available at NEW CALEDONIA is 223rd Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun), for which there is at present no planned employment in FOA.

29 0203 CINCPAC ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO COMFWDAREA, CTF 51, CTG 50.5.

Revision of areas of responsibility is now being made which will assign search and reconnaissance areas to SWPA, FairWing 1 and FairWing 18. Upon promulgation this revision Com5thFlt is requested to review and resubmit recommendations similar to those contained in his serial 00057 dated 10 April.

29 0819 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 51 INFO COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, COMINCH, COMSERVPAC.

Present circumstances require special procedures for safeguarding hospital ships. Those in combat areas may be attacked deliberately or accidentally by enemy or accidentally by friendly forces. Insofar as practicable the following arrangements should govern when such ships are in or near combat areas. (A) At night darken ship and when possible remain at anchorage to benefit from smoke and protection from other ships. (B) When loaded at sea be covered but not escorted by suitable combat vessels in general vicinity to render prompt assistance if required. (C) When sailing from loading area do so by noon when possible and if loading not completed before mid afternoon defer sailing until following day. Para. When well clear of combat area follow full hospital ship procedure. Para. Foregoing principles are for general guide and may be modified to meet special circumstances.

29 0835 CINCPOA ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO CTR 51, CTF 56.

CTF 56 261120. I concur in deferment of reconnaissance in force at KUME until southern OKINAWA is well in hand.
29 0952 GHQ SWPA TO CINCPOA ADV, COMALLIEDNAVFORCES INFO ALLIED AIR FORCES MANILA.

CX 15108. Reference Cincpoa's 250706. Concur in exchange of VPB 106 for VPB 109. ComAir7thFlt authorized direct communication with Cincpoa to arrange details of exchange with information copies of radios to Allied Air Forces and this Headquarters.

30 0615 CINCPOC ADV TO COMFWDAREA INFO COMAIRPAC, SUBCOMFORD, COMFAIRWING TWO, COM5THFLT COM7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT (LOG), COMAIRPAC, COMFAIRWING 1, CINCPOA PEARL, COMAIR7THFLT COMFAIRWING TEN.

Transfer VPB-106 to Com7thFleet for duty in exchange for VPB 109. ComFwdArea authorized direct communication with ComAir7thFlt to arrange details of exchange. Inform Com5thFlt when VPB 109 ready for duty RYUKYUS.

30 0655 CINCPOA ADV TO COMAIRPAC, COMFWDAREA, COM7THFLT INFO COMAIRPAC SUBCOMFORD, COMAIR7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COMFAIRWING 1, COMFAIRWING 2, CINCSPWA, COMINCH & CNO BUORD, BUAE, COMAIRGULFAREA, CINCPOA PEARL, BUPERS, COMAIR7THFLT (LOG), CTU 94.1.2.

When ready in May transfer VPB 123 to ComFwdArea for duty and eventual assignment to Com5thFlt for duty in FairWing 1. Upon reporting VPB 123 ComFwdArea transfer VPB 116 to 7thFlt as relief for VPB 137. When relieved by VPB 116 Com7thFlt return VPB 137 to US for rehabilitation.

300659 CINCPOA ADV TO COMFWDAREA INFO ISCOM DIVO, ISCOM SAIPAN, ISCOM TINIAN, COMGENPOA, ISCOM GUAM, CINCPOA PEARL, COMWESCAROLINES.

It has come to my attention that there recently occurred on IWO a second serious explosion that destroyed large quantities of material required for development of the island and for prosecution of operations, and that jeopardized life. You will at once require the island commander to furnish you with a report of the circumstances and of action taken to effectively prevent recurrence. Advise me in the premises including your comments and recommendations. For your guidance it is directed that you establish suitable arrangements for keeping yourself promptly informed within your command of important matters of whatever nature that directly or indirectly affect operations in order that you may initiate suitable action. When the circumstances require inform me in connection therewith.

30 1221 MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA ADV, CTF 73, COMALLIEDLAND FORCES, 8TH ARMY/COMAHEF MANILA COMGEN 21ST BOMCOM INFO CG USAF CHINA THEATER, APO 879, MOROTAI AND LUZON CG 6TH ARMY, CG 14TH AF, CO 10TH BOMCOM.

CX 15210. This radio will be considered as operations instructions 101/1 and will become effective 1 May 1945. Operations instructions 101 this headquarters dated 15 April 1945 is amended as follows: Delete that portion of search sectors 21, 22, 23 and 24 lying to the north and east of a line from 26-15 N, 123-00 E to 23-00 N 123-00 E to 21-10 N 127-30 E.

30 1454 COMINCH CNO TO CINCPOA ADV, CINCSPWA INFO COM7THFLT.

This has to do with unloading heavy equipment in SWPA and refers to Cincpac 271135 April and 300243 March and CinCSWPA 201509. In order to handle unloading problem into forward bases suggest maximum utilization of LCTs LCMs and LSMs. Figures available here indicate 103 LSMs and 303 LCTs now in SWPA. In order that additional requirements for LCTs of SWPA can be met desire Cinpcap take positive action as practicable including moving up LCTs under own power transporting own LSDs and possible towing. Cinpcap report action being taken.
Regret that power barge ELECTRA is not available for transfer to MANILA. ELECTRA is supplying power to the Army dredge POINT LOMA which is also under operational control of CINCPAC. ELECTRA and POINT LOMA are now employed in inner APRA HARBOR, GUAM and scheduled to remain there indefinitely. ELECTRA is the only power barge in POA. Recent transfer of USS WISEMAN (DE 667) to MANILA for power supply has already decreased ability to use electric dredges for forward area work in POA to absolute minimum. CINCSWPA 251617 and ComGenPOA 280604 not to all refer.

In view of recent serious accidents and pending completion permanent ammunition dumps in accordance with development plan construction work upon which should be expedited and priority raised accordingly take immediate steps to rectify and safeguard present temporary ammunition storage by (A) Complete isolation of all dangerous salvage material awaiting examination and final disposal from other types explosives. (B) Separation of ammunition in temporary revetments in accordance with War Department TM 9-1900 to fullest extent practicable. Provisions of TM9-1900 Article 116 B 1 do not in my opinion at this late stage island development warrant conditions of unsafe stowage now existing. Deeper revetments with baffles and covering against stray shots most necessary.

Para one. The missions of bases assigned by my serial 0005035 of 15 April 1945 are modified as follows. The reductions involved will be effected by 1 July 1945. (A) At KWAJALEIN ATOLL EBEYE ISLAND will continue as a Naval Air Base to provide headquarters for the Atoll Comdr and ComMarGilS with facilities only for emergency staging of seaplanes. (B) The mission of KWAJALEIN ISLAND is changed to read "A Naval and Air Base to support operations of Fleet units, of the Air Transport Services of the Army and Navy and of Marine aircraft assigned to the MARSHALL GILBERT Area". Under this mission facilities will be retained for 4 Marine squadrons. (C) At ENIWETOK Atoll the mission of ENGEBI ISLAND is cancelled. All its aviation activities will be transferred to ENIWETOK ISLAND except for a token garrison. (D) At MIDWAY ATOLL EASTERN ISLAND will be reduced temporarily to an emergency landing field with personnel for maintenance only. Para

Two. In view change in primary mission of KWAJALEIN ISLAND, decreased defensive requirements, control by Naval Atoll Commander and predominance of naval and Marine personnel desire relief of all Army units except those required for operation and support of ATC including AACS. CINCPAC Pearl initiate action in cooperation with info addees by one July to replace Army combat units and service troops with corresponding Naval and Marine units. AA troops should be replaced by small detachment of the 51st Defense Battalion from ENIWETOK. Desire Naval Aviator as Island Commander.
I have not authorized establishment of any regular passenger service by NATS or ATC between MARIANAS and RYUKUS. Services of AirEvac Group 1 under CTF 94 plus ATC aircraft available for air evacuation and combat transports fill present needs and use services available at OKINAWA. Request you correct your 1 May schedule accordingly and direct ComNatsPac cancel his serial 0358 of 25 April which does not adequately recognize operational control AirEvacGroup 1 by CTF 94. Authorization for regular services will await recommendation CTF 99.

Your 290239. My 162130 provided storage for 60 day stock level each incendiary and high explosive bombs, made up of 500 lb., 1000 lb., and 2000 lb. GP bombs and #46. AN-M17. AN-M76. And AN-M17A2 incendiary bombs. Basis for this was operations planned by 21st BomCom for 5 VLR wings totaling expenditures of 10,000 WT tons per wing per month. At this rate 60 day reserve each incendiary and high explosive bombs totals 200,000 WT tons. Remaining 30,000 tons my 162130 required for stowage miscellaneous types for special missions. 60 day reserve each incendiary and high explosive bombs was considered necessary by 21ST BomCom to accomplish without restrictions whatever operational directives may be assigned including accelerated sustained operations requiring exclusive use of either incendiary or high explosive bombs. Plans for storage contemplate continuation of standard safety factors and standard hardstand construction. In view of limited space on TINIAN as further reduced by 5 general hospitals authorized your serial 001542 it will be necessary to use about 50% of present FEA agricultural acreage for additional bomb storage. Upon reconsideration my 162130 it is opinion this command that 60 days reserve is not required and total stowage figures listed therein may be reduced 1/3 on assumption that uniform flow of replacement ammunition ordered from rear areas will be accomplished. The necessary increase in stowage would then be GUAM 28,000 TINIAN 25,000 SAIPAN 0.

Your 301055 destroyer within 1 mile of a hospital ship might be taken by enemy as escort. Desire that normally the covering destroyer be approximately 3 miles astern. Note that hospital ships should darken ship at sea as well as in port except when well clear of combat area.

Desire information as to your long range plans for movement of replacement Army aircraft to forward areas. Assume that the capabilities of MarAir aircraft to move by air or as deck loads on miscellaneous cargo shipping will be fully exploited in your planning.

Your 300921. Concur in your retention of group headquarters and one squadron of MarAirGroup 25 until last combatant MarAirGroup is withdrawn pursuant to my serial 005034 and mydis 260217. The other squadron may be needed in June or July on short notice but is available for use in SWPA until further notice is given.
Ammunition dump explosion night 25-26 April, see my report of SAI to you in daily airmailgram reports of 26 and 27th. Report of board of officers forwarded you earliest possible date. Investigation of some directed and started at daylight after fire. Present information indicates fire started in a revetted slot containing underwater demolition tubes left by amphibious force and quickly spread to adjoining slots of same material, then to miscellaneous ammunition being sorted, and finally to slot of Navy 350 lb. depth bombs which caused severe explosion. Cause of fire flare released by enemy action or boulder from sidehole MT SURIBACHI. Injuries to personnel were 2 moderate and 1 moderate shock. In addition to destruction of ammunition some organizational equipment of 23rd CB En was burned and damaged in a nearby dump. About 150 drums of motor gas burned, 3 Quonsets were damaged, and about 200 tents suffered some damage, practically all slight and are repairable. Plans were already underway for moving part of this ammunition to extreme northern end of island. Central part of island already had dumps of explosives and is largely taken up with airfields, personnel and installations. Planned ammunition dumps had to be abandoned due to recent modifications made to airfields, changes in locations of airstrips and harbor, and resulting necessary shifting in operating personnel. A second board of five experienced officers headed by Commodore Johnson appointed 29 April to locate storage areas and best method of storage in each of ammunition, explosives and drummed gasoline on this island. When approved, it will be forwarded to your headquarters for information or action. The explosion of dynamite on April 2nd caused by a shot at night killed one and slightly injured 14 to 17. Property damaged other than the dynamite was negligible. In view of CinCPo Adv 300659 indicating large material damage due to dynamite explosion, it is requested that this information be passed thereto. The entire northern half of this island has been the scene of continuous patrolling and mopping up operations day and night. Since March 25 1/2 Japs have been killed to 775 captured they are still aggressive and ammunition has to be safeguarded.

Cite 14 TF GCG. Since L Day there have been repeated instances of friendly combat planes bombing rocketing and strafing troops within the lines of 24 Corps at times other than on called or permitted missions. So far as known no offending pilots have been identified or punished although reports have been made. It is expected that some of these are sightseers or returning CAP planes. Many casualties have occurred from these actions as well as lowered confidence of troops in our splendid close air support. Most recent incidents are:

(A) At about 234720 2 Corsairs strafed from TA 8572A NW to TA 8475K, circled and strafed from TA 8474K to TA 84740. 1 man wounded. 1 plane bore number 550.

(B) 301730 4 planes identified as Corsairs strafed and bombed or rocketed a truck approximately 2000 yards inside lines of 7th Div. Truck had large white star on hood and other easily identified vehicles such as jeeps and 3 quarter tons were in the general vicinity. 7 men killed and 17 wounded. Front lines were clearly marked by large colored panels. 1 of the 4 planes involved was reported to carry the number 20. This plane was reported to have made the 1st pass but did not fire.

- Continued -
01 0810 COMGEN24CORPS TO COMGEN TEN (CONT'D)

Unless these incidents are caused by enemy planes, I do not believe they can happen if all pilots are properly instructed and obey orders. I make urgent request that investigation be made and that if pilots are identified disciplinary action appropriate to punishment for manslaughter be applied. I further request that all hands make every effort to brief all pilots operating in the area to make no attacks at any time on southern OKINAWA except by request or permission of this headquarters on well identified and clearly located enemy targets.

01 1419 GHQ SWPA (MACARTHUR) TO CINCPOA ADV INFO AGWAR, GENERAL STYER.

CX 15276. Lt. Gen. Styer will soon assume command of reorganized logistic command of AFRICOM. He makes an urgent request for the assignment of Major General E. H. Leavey for duty as his Chief of Staff. While it is appreciated that this officer now fills a position of importance it is felt that his special knowledge and wide experience give him the highest qualifications for the proposed position of even greater importance. It would be appreciated if this officer could be made available.

02 0020 CINCPOA ADV TO COMWESSEAFRON INFO CINCPOA PEARL, CINC SWPA, COM THFLT, COMINCH AD COMPHIBSPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, CNO.

Your 282218. 10 APA will be sailed from PEARL to West Coast arriving by 10 May for 1 lift to SWPA. 10 additional APA can be sailed to arrive West Coast for same purpose by 25 May. 15 additional APA can be made available during June provided other requirements do not interfere. Will advise later. Para. The 13 APA now under voyage repairs West Coast are already allocated for POA lifts.

02 0251 CTF 53 to COM 5THFLT INFO CTF 51, CINCPOA ADV.

Your 012326. Do not recommend fighter sweeps against KYUSHU with 2 TGs unless completely relieved of any responsibility for defense of OKINAWA. Believe such a sweep not profitable on widely dispersed aircraft which are staged into the area camouflaged and take off as soon as refueled. In order to produce results on fighter sweeps fighters must remain in the area for considerable time in order to find target and have advantage of weather to insure visibility. If the Baka plane is the Betty type it has a demonstrated cruising and attack range of 600 miles with torpedo.

02 0538 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENPOA INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMNATS, COMNATSPAC, CPACDIV ATC.

Your 302224 is concurred in and my 270020 is modified accordingly. The facts are that the naval air evacuation group operating between OKINAWA and the MARIANAS evacuated 1585 Army 77 Navy and 59 Marines during the period 8-30 April and aircraft of the same group evacuated 232 Army 316 Navy 115 Marines from GHAM to the eastward. Para. Under the provisions of my OpPlan 14-44 as now amended there will be a capacity of 600 patients a week from the MARIANAS to the eastward via ATC and 300 via NATS.

02 0648 COM 5THFLT TO CTF 53 Info CTF 51, CINCPOA ADV HQ.

Your 020251. Do not make fighter sweep.
SECRET
MAY (GCT)

02 0803 CTG 50.5 to CTF 51 INFO COM5THFLT, COMGEN TEN, COM HAB YONTAN, CTF94, CINCPOA ADV

My 010251 not to nor needed by all. Cognizant units at Yontan agree VPB 109 can be accommodated that field now without disruption of maximum fighter operations. On this basis request authority to deploy VPB 109 Yontan when ready estimated about 9 May. Present Privateers will be withdrawn upon arrival VPB 109.

02 1846 COMWESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, ADCOMPHIBSPAC, CNO, COMPHIBSPAC

MyDis 282218 to Cincpca Pearl and 012352 to you. Due to new developments will probably now require all APA's offered UrDis 020020. Will advise definitely 3 May.

02 2110 COMINCH & CNO NO. 43 to CINCPAC/CINCPOA BOTH.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the following policy on the release of atrocity stories. Theater Commanders may clear atrocity stories submitted for censorship within existing security requirements. They may make such official releases on atrocities as they deem desirable. In those cases where it is intended to request than an official protest be made by the United States Government protest must be made prior to an official release concerning the atrocity.

03 0600 CINCPOA ADV TO COMAIRPAC INFO COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, AIRPACSUBCOM, CINCPOA PEARL, COMMARGILS, COMINCH.

Concur with proposals contained in your serial 00347 dated 13 April. In the future movement orders for units containing aircraft carriers in an operational status will contain authority to execute operation "FUDDLE" followed by the target designation. Operation "FUDDLE" will be a hit and run carrier strike on the designated target with the combined objective of keeping bypassed enemy bases in the rear areas inoperational and under surveillance while at the same time providing final training for carrier air groups in all phases of combat operations. Operation "FUDDLE" shall be limited to those attacks that can be made in a 12 hour period. Forward movement of units involved will not be delayed more than 24 hours in order to execute this operation. Target designation will in each instance be obtained from ComMarGils and the approximate date of attack will be included in the order. All concerned must be informed in advance.

03 0601 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 51 INFO COM5THFLT.

Approve your proposal to send out loaded hospital ships with trailing ship not later than 1000 I(-9) with hospital ships proceeding under full hospital ship procedure upon departure and throughout voyage unless otherwise specifically directed. Do not approve hospital ships proceeding darkened executing zigzag and being actually escorted as alternatively suggested. Desire empty AH as well as loaded AH be provided with rescue vessel.
03 1242 COMSUBPAC TO 5TH AIR FORCE RESCUE INFO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Replied to your 030642. No further action taken in view my orders from Cincpoa which are based on compliance his 281/415 to CINCSWPA which 5th AF received for information.

03 2106 COMINESSEAFRON TO CINCPAC PEARL INFO CINCPAC ADV, ADMCOMPHIBSPAC.

Urdis 290055 in immediate future can utilize such additional APA's for cargo loadings to POA destinations as you can make available. Foregoing also applies aka's. Advise names etd PEARL destinations and dates required free of cargo.

03 2315 COM5THFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51.

Comaf 5 040159 indicates practically no strikes by sowespac on Formosa fields today. Weather there appears favorable for strikes. We suffered considerable losses to screening vessels in sundown attacks yesterday made by Formosan planes.

04 0204 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COM AF5, COM5THFLT.

Com5thflt 032315 passed to you with the request that effort against Formosan airfields continue at maximum practicable effectiveness.

04 1200 COMGEN TEN TO NONE INFO CG3RDPHIBCORPS, CG FMF, CINCPOA BOTH, CG 2ND MARDIV

Urgency occupying Kume, Aguni and Iheya thoroughly appreciated. To relieve picket burden in most expeditious and efficient manner recommend obtaining 2nd mardiv. If approved will take action to fly 2nd Div planners here to complete details. Personnel of Div to start loading immediately ready for hurried call up. After securing islands Marines to be relieved by garrison troops from okinawa soon as practicable. Current tactical situation and depleted status 27th Div dictates against use combat troops now present in area. Am taking action to expedite arrival awa 11 for kume. Exploring availability other awa units which might arrive earlier.

04 1252 MACARTHUR TO COMAAF INFO CINCPOA ADV, COM5THFLT.

Cxt 15477. Radios from Com5thFLT and Cincpoa Adv Hq state that their forces in the okinawa area suffered considerable losses from sundown attacks yesterday made by Formosan planes and request that effort against Formosan airfields continue at maximum practicable effectiveness. Desire maximum practicable concentration of effort on Formosa Airfields from which hostile strikes can be made against okinawa forces in order to insure a continued neutralization of enemy air forces.
04 0213 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, CTF 94 Info COMFAIRWING 1, COMFAIRWING 18, CINCSWPA.

Subject is area boundaries for search and reconnaissance responsibilities. Boundary between POA and SWPA is 130 degrees E parallel of Long to 20 degrees N thence to 23 degrees N 123 degrees E thence to 26-30 N 123 E thence W along 26-30 N to CHINA Coast. Within POA boundary between task fleet (FairWing 1) and TF 94 (FairWing 18) from 20 degrees N 120 E to 25 degrees N 135 E thence N along 135 degrees E to coast of JAPAN. Upon request of TF Comdr the area N and W of line 30 degrees N 135 E to 32-30 N 140 E thence N along 140 degrees E to Coast of JAPAN will be assigned to FairWing 1. These areas of responsibility will be the basis for assignment of Fleet Air Forces. This assignment becomes effective at 2400 I(-9) 5 May.

04 1114 CTF 58 to COM5THFLT, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

On 2 May l Tony splashed by VFN, KIKAI and TOKUNO Airfields attacked. On 3 May OKINAWA target CAP shot down 1 Dinah. On ground destroyed 1 plane and damaged 19 at Tokuno, KIKAI and TANEGA SHIMA Airfields. Cratered WAN airfield and started fires barracks revetment and wooded areas near field. Damaged motor boat. On 4 May splashed 96 planes as follows 4 by VFN rear force 21 by UMAAI and KIKAI CAP 67 by OKINAWA target CAP and 4 by division force CAP victored into melee NE of N tip of OKINAWA. Bombed WAN airfield. 1 of our Hellcats was diving on a Val today when an unidentified Corsair dove on him and started firing. Hellcat broke off to avoid Corsairs and Val made a perfect hit on a destroyer in picket station 1. Pilots returning later reported sighting suspicious acting single Corsair over DDs at approach point 2 at 1305I. Corsair took evasive action to prevent close investigation but pilots noticed shiny waxed appearance with vulture marking on starboard wing star on port wing star and no tail markings. Cumulative casualties through 2 May. MTA during flight operations: combat 118 pilots 40 aircrewmen, Operational 34 pilots 17 aircrewmen 1 combat photographer. On board ships 502 killed in action, 162 missing in action, 1121 WIA. Above incomplete for FRANKLIN and HAGGARD as explained my 280514 and includes estimate of 30 MIB on HAZELWOOD in addition known 13 dead and 30 wounded.

04 0735 DEPCOMAF 20 to BOMCOM 21 Info CINCPOA ADV.

CNO 022234 and Cincpoe 040246 request you comply with latter.

04 1238 CINCPAC ADV TO DEPCOM XX AP INFO CG XXI BOMCOM, COM5THFLT.

Your STNXF-19-1 DTG 190025. My 280712 request daily bombing KYUSHU airdromes continue until fighter fields IE SHIMA are activated.

04 1710 DEPCOMAF 20 to 21 BOMCOM Info CINCPAC ADV, COM5THFLT.

See Cincpoe Adv Hq 041238. Request you comply.

04 2124 CINCPAC ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO COMAIRCPAC, COMDESPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COMINCH, COMINPAC, COMATTERONSPAC, COMSUBPAC.

Direct appropriate senior 7thFlt administrative commanders in each type to report with forces under their command by letter to appropriate type commanders Pacific Fleet for purposes of type administration.

2891
Institute searches to cover area previously covered from IWO JIMA and TINIAN and now assigned to TF (FairWing 1) by Cincpoc Adv 040213 and advise search coordinates and sector calls. No coverage to eastward of 135-00 E will be required of you for the present.

In order to maintain stock levels required by your Fleet Instructions your 240855 and with further reference to CNO letter serial 021032 June 12 44 subject Supply of Fuels and Common Naval Stores in SoWesPac. You are authorized by para 3 affirm my ltr of 18 Jan to issue provisions GSK items ammunition and fuel necessary to Allied Forces operating as part of 7thFlt. Foregoing subject to special instructions covering BPF set out in CNO serials 37105-G of 9 April 1945 and 39605-G of 17 April 1945 now in mail.

Your 040851 Air Evac Group 1 is under operational control ComFwdArea. Make requests direct to latter. He is hereby authorized make air evacuation aircraft available to evacuate stretcher cases from TACLOBAN subject to meeting requirements at OKINAWA which for the present have higher priority.

Women are now present and connected with various activities in areas where many of the restraining influences of normal life in a well established and orderly community are greatly weakened. The arrangements for safeguarding life and person that exist in such communities are frequently lacking or exist to only a limited degree. Some of the areas are sparsely settled and primitive conditions exist. In many places members of enemy combatant forces are still at large. You are directed to take adequate measures for protection of our womanhood whether they are in the Armed Services or otherwise present in the area under your command. Such action should include any necessary restrictions on hours and movements of women etc.

In view of large number of damaged ships and urgent need of drydocking time now estimated at well over 100 days and increasing daily repeat recommendations made my 222155 April. A minimum of 4 and preferably 6 ARDs should be provided also sufficient manpower to permit continuous use these facilities at maximum capacity. Recommendation based on:

(A) Necessity of returning units fully repaired to operating status at early date to maintain protection this area.
(B) Need for returning ships damaged beyond capacity local forces for complete restoration to rear areas to prevent loss or further damage.
(C) Certainty of continued air attack with continued percentage of damage rates. This matter becomes more urgent every day. There is berthing and operating room for 6 ARDs.
06 0626 COMTHFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 58, CTF 51.

BomCom 21's 050450. Do not believe scale of enemy air effort justifies reduction in B29 commitment to KYUSHU Airfield attacks. Recommend commitment be increased rather than reduced with special heavy effort just prior to resumption of each enemy periodic full out attack.

06 0814 CINCPAC ADV TO ISCOM SAIPAN INFO CINACFPAC, COMGEN POA, COMFORDAREA.

For Major General Jarman. Incident to your prospective change in status I wish to express my personal appreciation of the loyal cooperation and efficient service which you have given during the past year to congratulate you on your achievements in the development of SAIPAN and to express my hope that our close association in the war against JAPAN will continue until our job is done. Nimitz.

06 0816 CINCPAC ADV TO CINACFPAC INFO COMFWDAREA, COMGEN FMFPAC, ISCOM SAIPAN, COMGEN POA, COMGEN WPBC.

The 24th Inf Regiment now assigned to the garrison of SAIPAN will be available on 15 May for such other assignment as may be desired and will be released to your operational control on departure. It is intended to have their present duties which are decreasing in importance performed initially by available elements of the Fleet Marine Force and later by Marine Military Police and Guard Battalions formed for that purpose.

06 0819 CINCPAC ADV TO ALPOA INFO CIMINCH, CNO.

Effective 15 May there is hereby established the Naval Operating Base, SAIPAN which will comprise all naval shore activities at the Island of SAIPAN in the MARIANAS including the following principal components: NAB, KOBLER; NAB, TANAPAG; NAB, MARPI POINT; NAB, KAGMAN POINT; NSD, SAIPAN; NAVAL MAGAZINE, SAIPAN; Naval Repair Base, TANAPAG; Marine Corps activities, SAIPAN.

06 0820 CINCPAC ADV TO COMFWDAREA, ISCOM SAIPAN, COMDT NOB SAIPAN INFO COMINCH, CINACFPAC, COMGEN POA, COMGEN WPBC, COMGEN 2ND MARDIV.

Effective on reporting RAdm F.E.M. Whiting USN as Comdt NOB SAIPAN about 15 May he will also relieve Maj.Gen. Jarman as IsCom SAIPAN and report to COMFWDAREA for that duty. This action is taken in view of the assignment of General Jarman, US Army, as ComGen Western Pacific Base Command with responsibilities direct to higher authority in the Army for activities outside the island of SAIPAN, to permit the Navy to meet more directly the responsibilities assigned by JCS 250/5 and JCS 819/5 and to release Army personnel to Army control pursuant to JCS 1259/4. It is expected that MajGen Jarman will retain his present headquarters for use in his capacity as ComGen WPBC.

06 0833 CINCPAC ADV TO ALPOA INFO CINACFPAC, COMTHFLT, COMINCH, CNO.

Effective 1 June the present Forward Area Central Pacific is redesignated the "Marianas Area". No change in limits, mission or organization are involved. The long and short titles of the Area Commander will be "Commander MARIANAS" and "ComMARIANAS" respectively.
Movement of ServRon 10 facilities from ULITHI to LEYTE commences 7 May. Complete replenishment and repair facilities will be available ULITHI for TG of TF 58 scheduled arrive there about 16 May. 3rd rotational group of TF 58 should proceed LEYTE when due for upkeep and replenishment. TF 51 ships which can arrive by 19 May proceed ULITHI later arrivals proceed LEYTE. Commencing 24 May complete replenishment and repair facilities available LEYTE for TF 51 ships as well as for 1 group of TF 58. Subsequent 19 May my 080340 April continues in effect except that large ships not requiring docking and all ships not requiring Navy Yard repairs shall be routed LEYTE instead of ULITHI. ComServRon 10 advise originator and action aedes if change in above becomes necessary.

The proposal of 21 BomCom 050450 is concurred in with the understanding that the scale of harassing attack on KYUSHU will average 4 squadrons a day. I will request heavier attacks when I consider the situation requires them.

In amplification of last paragraph my 200344 (not to all aedes) and in view of Com7thFlt's 050659 request release of DesRon 23 to my operational control.

Following steps taken Com5thFlt 060129 and 061204. 1 additional Engr. Bn. being applied immediately Kadena Airfield construction and 1 additional NCB Bn Yontan making total 4 Bns Kadena and 2 Bns Yontan while continuing CHIMU and AWASE Airfields. At IE SHIMA 2 Engr Bns being applied to airfield construction with priority of features to permit earliest possible operation 2 groups fighters. Consultation with TAF indicates present plan widening Kadena strip and provision more taxiways and hardstand will accommodate maximum number VF ComTAF can operate in near future. Have determined this method provides most rapid practicable fighter field construction sequence with means available for earliest maximum employment of fighters. After consultation Com5thFlt IsCom OKINAWA immediately deferred efforts toward heavy bomber priorities and has concentrated efforts on fighter facilities. Being unloaded now are 17 1000 barrel AVGas tanks which will be installed rapidly as possible. These tanks together with 3 additional tanks on hand and pipe fittings and pumps being unloaded will provide total of 8-1000 barrel tanks at Yontan and 14-1000 barrel tanks at Kadena. Additional AVGas bulk tank materials arrive May 10 and May 18. Preliminary work will be accomplished to permit rapid installation this additional tank storage OKINAWA. Temporary bulk tanks and ready tanks IE SHIMA will be completed by May 12. drum AVGas OKINAWA now 2600. 15000 additional drums within week and 30000 additional drums by 17th. IE SHIMA drum AVGas 15000 being discharged now. This constitutes confirmation to IsCom OKINAWA.
Whenever 1st Bn of 24th Inf Regt leaves TINIAN by Dis 060816 request the MP Co now at SAIPAN or an equivalent unit be made available to IsCom TINIAN. Patrols, guard and other duties now being performed by the Inf Bn will then be assigned to MP Co and other forces locally available.

Reference Com5thFlt's 060129 instructions in full accord with expressed desires of Com5thFlt regarding maximum and most rapid development of fighter airfields on both OKINAWA and IE SHIMA were issued by me on 5 May these projects are being pushed to the fullest with all available facilities base development construction program has been deferred where it interferes in the least with the completion of fighter fields at earliest possible date.

Your 032132. It is not contemplated that the airfield construction program in OKINAWA utilizing forces available can progress beyond the essential operational stages. Engineering necessity dictates that the broadened specifications be adopted. It is not anticipated that long continuous grades will exceed 1 percent on VLR fields as the country is gently undulating however if such an increase is dictated due to field conditions then Cincpoa will accept recommendations that the particular field receive special consideration either decreasing the grade to 1 percent or increasing the length depending on engineering considerations. Your 050235 the approaches on IE SHIMA are 0. Fields for very long range fighters will be specified initially at 6000 ft with extensions to 7500 ft when labor is available.

Admiral Kinkaid departs for conference in Washington and turns over command of Seventh Fleet to Vice Admiral Barbey as of 0600 1 Tuesday May.

23641: It, Gen. Barney M. Giles assumes command of Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Areas per general order 62 this Hq. 4 May 1945, and pursuant to General Order 10 Hq. 20th AF office of the DepCom 4 May 1945 is announced as DepCom20thAF POA.

No air intent received from ComAF 5 for 7 May. No strikes against FORMOSA included in ComAF 5 MC724E air intent for 8 May. If practicable request positive advance information when FORMOSA is not to be included for any reason in order that Com5thFlt may be advised of possible increased enemy activity from that area.
Your 061801. I am agreeable to releasing Major General Leavey for service with Lieutenant General Styer as proposed. However in order that he may not be embarrassed by responsibilities to both of us and in order to clarify his status I am detaching him and directing him to report to Com-GenPOA as of 10 May. Request Chief of Staff, U.S. Army be so informed.

The policy set by my 051711 concerning return of Construction Battalions to the mainland was decided upon after careful consideration of all the factors concerned and will be adhered to unless exceptions are directed by higher authority. CNO 071920. My 051711 took into account also the equally long overseas service of the combat troops who are equally desirous of returning to the mainland. Under present instructions both combat and construction troops are rotated as individuals but not as complete units.

In view changed situation as regards probability of major surface action desire cruisers and battleships leaving West Coast or transiting Canal be loaded as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>Loading</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16&quot;, 14&quot;, 12&quot;</td>
<td>40 rounds per gun AP, then HC to capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>60 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>6&quot;</td>
<td>100 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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Each AP projectile should be matched with a service charge, and each HC with a reduced charge (except 6"). Excess powder capacity over projectile capacity should be used for additional service charges. Desire that ships now in forward area with preponderantly AP loads approach this loading gradually be replacing AP expenditures with HC.

Upon transfer of VMF(N) 533 from MarGils to OKINAWA desire maintain a 4 plane VMF(N) detachment for night fighter defense of MarGils Area. Request you take necessary action to implement.
Earliest maximum employment of fighters from fields OKINAWA Area in accordance with Cincpac and my instructions is being hampered by lack of adequate bulk storage ashore for avgas and by too strict adherence to schedules in base development plans which subordinates early construction of fields to permit their use by largest possible number of fighters to their ultimate development for heavy and VIR bombers. Request you give necessary orders to IsCom OKINAWA:

A. To increase bulk avgas storage for Yontan, Kadena as soon as possible using all facilities now available this area including additional pumps and pipelines if needed.

B. Construct additional taxiways and hardstands at Kadena to accommodate maximum number VF Com TAF can operate from present strip.

C. Defer construction program for VIR operation at Yontan Kadena which will interfere with development VF provision in B or with VF operation there until other fields are available to which to move fighter squadrons which are or may be operating from these fields.

Request you give necessary orders to IsCom IE SHIMA to take similar steps to insure earliest development of fighter strips and adequate avgas bulk storage.

Reference Cincpoa Adv Hq 070640. Consider MP Company now at SAIIPAN will be badly needed for security of ever increasing ASE Depot and reserve dumps under control WPBC and for which no other security is available.

Step D your 071225 approved. (Ref. Top Sec)

Your 071454. My 250730 March made available 3 APA and 1 LST to SWPA for lift from rear to forward bases and 2 AK for lift from West Coast. My 271135 made available 8 APA and 6 AKA to SWPA until 1 July. My 020020 made available 35 APA for 1 SWPA lift from West Coast. Com7thFlt 020227 indicates no assistance required in movement of 7th Flt LCT from rear bases. 24 POA LCT now in LEYTE are being offered to 7thFlt this date to augment SWPA facilities for a period of 60 days. All POA LST & LSM currently engaged in accelerated development OKINAWA. If it is found that any of these types will not be required in this employment they will be made available to Com7thFlt for temporary use.

Maj.Gen. Willis Hale will continue to exercise operational control of TF 93 (Strategic Air Force POA) until Lt.Gen. Giles reports to Cincpoa upon his readiness to assume that responsibility at which time he will be designated as CTF 93.
The German High Command has been directed to give the following surrender orders to U/Boats:

To remain on the surface, fly a large black or blue flag by day and burning navigation lights by night.

To report their positions in plain language on 500 Kcs every 8 hours and to make for specified points under allied control. U/Boats apparently complying with these instructions are not to be attacked but should be given a wide berth. W/T reports of such sightings are to be made in plain language in the following form:

A. Number of U-Boats.
B. Position.
C. Estimated course.
D. Estimated speed.

If however, U-Boats commit a hostile act or otherwise disregard these orders reports are to be made by normal distress procedure and all appropriate defense measures taken.

Cominch 171755 of March directed ComNATS to establish Air Evacuation Group 1 as a unit of NATSPac. Operational control of AirEvacGrp 1 was delegated to ComFwdArea with respect to the number of planes to be operated, the times at which they are to operate, and the points between which they are to be operated. All other phases of control and administrative control remains with ComNATS. Including flight procedures and technical operating procedures.

9th May, MYAKO and ISHIGAKI well bombed. Destroyed 2 fresh aircraft on ground 1 being blown up through entrance to beach cave shelter. At 1650I group aircraft very low detected 25 miles. Enemy then climbed 5000 feet and split. Fighters intercepted splashed 1. Enemy next seen diving in succession. 1st steep dived VICTORIOUS hit flight deck forward. 2 shallow dived VICTORIOUS clanced deck and fell in sea. Both enemy hard hit by gunfire, 3rd shallow dived HOWE but splashed close by gunfire. 4th struck FORMIDABLE flight deck setting after air park alight. Damage: VICTORIOUS hole in flight deck. Forward lift, accelerator and 10% armament out of action. Can operate few aircraft at reduced handling speed. Casualties: 3 killed 4 seriously injured 15 wounded. FORMIDABLE: 2 pompons out of action ship remains operational. Casualties: 1 killed few slightly injured. Withdrawing to COOTIE to square things up and replenish 10th-11th May. Will probably be able to resume striking 12-13 May.

Rear Admiral Whiting will arrive SAIPAN about 11 May preparatory to compliance my 060819 and 060820. Request naval and Marine personnel of Island Commander's Staff be transferred to him effective 15 May. Also request temporary assignment such Army personnel as appears appropriate after conference CINCWNWPAC and RAdm Whiting together with joint recommendation to me and appropriate higher authority in the Army.
10 0537 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COMSOPAC, COM7THFIL.

Anti aircraft and training service to Pacific Fleet at LEYTE require availability of additional VJ Squadrons at SAMAR my 060216 and 141222 of Arpil refers movement VJ Squadrons 8 and 13 from SoPac Area should start about 15 May. Request reply.

10 0709 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH, CNO INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMPHIBSPAC.

Your 301307. 14 PhibGroups in Pacific considered adequate. Recommend remaining 2 groups not be activated.

10 0752 DEPOMAF 20 to CINCPA PEARL INFO CINCPA ADV, COMAF20, DEPOMAF20ADMIN, COMGEN BOMCOM XXI, COMGEN BOMCOM XX, COMGEN TEN.

Adoption of restricted very long range airfield construction program at OKINAWA as contemplated in your 062209 May 45 will appreciably curtail the very long range capabilities of OKINAWA B-29 aircraft. Such curtailment is not in consonance with the operational concept for which the airplane was designed and should obtain only for the briefest interval as a temporary emergency situation which cannot be avoided. Para.

Operational experience has firmly established 8500 ft as the minimum runway length to assure full utilization of very long range aircraft performance capabilities. Previously estimated very long range runway lengths have thereby been refuted and must be disregarded.

Very long range runway lengths at OKINAWA should not be reduced below 8500 feet because of acquisition of bases closer to the Japanese Empire nor should currently apparent shorter range objectives influence the 8500 ft minimum very long range runway requirement at OKINAWA.

It is considered essential therefore that the very long range airfield construction program at OKINAWA must provide for extensibility of 7500 ft runways to 8500 ft runways at the earliest possible time.

11 0252 CINCAPPAC TO CINCPA ADV INFO COMGENPOA.

CX 15940. Your 060816 and 090817 May. Concur in assigning 24th Inf Regt as garrison for FRICITION.

11 0040 CINCPA ADV HQ to DEPOMAF 20, CG XXI BOMCOM INFO CINCPA PEARL.

It is requested that information as to enemy naval forces and shipping which may be sighted by units of the 20th AF be held in a secret status and transmitted only to military and naval commanders concerned.

11 0042 CINCPA ADV to DEPOMAF 20 INFO COMGEN TEN, CINCPA PEARL, COMGEN BOMCOM XXI, COMGEN BOMCOM XX, COMGEN 20 AF.

The comments of your 100752 are appreciated. However at the present time at OKINAWA the requirements of tactical aircraft take precedence over those of the 20th AF. The extension of VIR runways from 7500 to 8500 feet will be included in base development plans but with a priority determined after consideration of the requirements of all forces involved in attaining the overall strategic objective in the war against JAPAN.
11 1028 COMGEN TEN TO COMGEN 3RD PHIB CORPS, COMGEN 24 CORPS INFO CTF 51, CTG 51.2
CTG 51.22, ISCOM OKINAWA, COM5THFLT, CINCPAC ADV.

Army

On 12 May continue maximum pressure on entire/front and push envelopment SHURI position. Insure close coordination effort and timing of attacks by adjacent units. Time of attack 0730.

11 1252 CINCPAC ADV TO COMALSEAFRON, COMMARGILS, COMVESSEAFRON, COMPASEAFRON, COMHANSEAFRON, COMSOPAC, COMPHIBFRON, COMFNDAREA INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMINCH, COMSERRVPCOM, COM5THFLT, CINCSWPA, COMVESCARSUBAREA, COM3RDFLT, COMFAIRWING 1, COM7THFLT, COMSERON 10, COMPHIBSGRP 13.

Pass to all routing officers.

(A) My 140240 March established area in which unescorted shipping may be routed under certain conditions. This dispatch amplified by 061446 and 210539 April.

(B) Effective 15 May extend this area under same conditions westward to 130-00 E to include all remaining area under POA shipping control south of Latitude 11-30 N.

(C) ComPhilSeaFron is expected to authorize similar conditions in SWPA areas which will enable through routing of majority shipping unescorted between rear ports POA and LEYTE.

(D) Also effective 15 May KOSSOL remains open only as emergency anchorage.

(E) Escorts when required from ULITHI to LEYTE will be provided by the area commander to whom the shipping is assigned. Independent shipping will proceed along standard routes to position just north ULITHI thence along route IUKE.

12 0626 ISCOM SAIPAN TO CINCPAC ADV, COMGENPOA, INFO COMFNDAREA.

Ref CINCPAC Adv 100117. Deputy Comdr SAIPAN Brig. Gen. Colladay and Rear Admiral Whiting conferred today. The staff of the present IsCom SAIPAN is a unit functioning as the staff of the WesPacBaCom, IsCom, and garrison forces. There is no separate Army Garrison Force Headquarters organized. Total personnel of staff 137 officers and 416 men. This does not include JCC personnel.

Para. Without committing Maj. Gen. Jarman, who will return about 17 May, Gen. Colladay has agreed to integrate incoming naval staff officers with present Island Staff until former are familiar with problems when split off will take place and present island staff released to whole time WPBC functions. This to be expedited maximum. Para.

It was further agreed that certain Army units will be turned over to new IsCom for operational purposes, administration to remain with Army. This includes garrison forces for island functions. Prospective IsCom estimates he will require about 70 officers and 150 men exclusive of JCC personnel for his staff.
The term "Token Garrison" as used with respect to POA bases will be defined to mean a self-sustaining unit of the minimum practicable strength the primary mission of which will be to maintain U.S. possession of the base involved. This unit should comprise personnel and material capable of providing such minimum weather communications or similar services as may be desirable for support of our operations elsewhere. The unit may in each case be increased as necessary to provide for its own security or to provide these services including emergency land or seaplane operations if they are essential or facilitate logistic support of the unit itself. Hereafter when a base or island is to be reduced to a token garrison the subarea commander concerned will submit to Cincpoa the recommended composition of the token garrison required with copies to interested senior type or service commanders.

Captured enemy map believed very recent date indicates 44th Div occupies position north of NAHA opposing 6th MarDiv. Possibility enemy committing major reserves, 10th Army at 130730 I continues maximum effort xcoei front. 3rdPhibCorps exert strong pressure to envelop SHURI HILL mass and destroy forces in immediate front. 24th Corps capture conical hill and continue attack to envelop SHURI position. Close coordination of effort and timing of attack by adjacent units required.

Desire that instructions be issued directing General Gilbreath and his headquarters as a complete unit be transferred to MANILA and report for duty to CINCPAC. Request that General Gilbreath, accompanied by small party, proceed immediately by air transportation. Remainder of personnel proceed by air as they may be relieved from duty and excess baggage and equipment proceed by water transport. All transportation arranged by this headquarters please instruct General Gilbreath to advise at earliest practicable date air and water transport requirements, logistics and approximate dates of readiness.

Following letter received from ComGen 10th Army quoted in abbreviated form
"Desire express my deep appreciation for splendid support ground operation by support ships. Power and accuracy of these ships contributed materially to land success and subsequent advance with minimum loss of life XVPATT INGBSS C0 ships to close shore though faced with foul water and enemy guns permitted more accurate close support and effective C6RIP support ENUANG work of crews under trying conditions of long hours at general quarters and constant threat of enemy air is especially praiseworthy. If I may borrow a Navy term I would like to say well done, Buckner!". This message is greatly appreciated and should encourage us to make our support of the troops even more effective.
D. Shortage of Army service troops for both air and ground operations on all these islands is severe. It is recommended that squadrons on SAIPAN and TINIAN not be moved, that a QM Service Co be immediately sent to GUAM and that 2 additional aviation squadrons from sources outside this command be procured FOHG Depot Field at earliest possible. It is desired to emphasize that neither 457 nor 435 Squadrons can be spared from their functions which are immediately concerned with air force responsibilities.

CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN 10 INFO COM5THFLT, CTF 51, CTG 99.2, 99.3, CGAAPPoa, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENAAPPoa (ADMIN).

Your 081327 not to all. Amplifying my 110822 Cincpoa plans have been and are to establish aircraft ashore on OKINAWA in the following types and priorities: Priority 1 - Sufficient fighters to assure control of the air and provide adequate close air support. Priority 2 - Long range fighters and medium bombers for close support and or neutralization enemy airfields in order relieve other forces of those responsibilities.

Without utilizing an additional Fighter Group at KADENA as you propose you will have available about 22 May 3 Marine Fighter Groups and 2 long range Army fighter groups totaling about 483 fighters. These aircraft are considered capable of coping with the present tactical situation as pertains to fighters. Desire adherence to plans by establishing the 41st Medium Bomb Group at KADENA. This medium group is presently on OAHU and its movement forward will be expedited by ComGenAAPPoa.

My 110822 directed ground echelon MAG 14 be moved OKINAWA earliest possible. Upon its arrival it must be so used as not to delay basing 41st BmbGrp at KADENA as planned my serial 0005045 28 April 1945.

CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENAAPPoa, INFO CG XX AP, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENAAPPoa (ADMIN).

The schedule of your 120845 is in accord with my serial 0005045 of 28 April. It is concurred in for planning purposes with the understanding that construction progress will be influenced by tactical requirements until capture of the island is completed. Delays in capture of southern airfields and requirements for extension of runways to 8500 feet will make it more difficult to meet planning dates.
In accordance ComSoPac 300441 April not to or needed by all, as of 1 May 1945 ComAirSoPac is dissolved and ComSoPac assumes duties previously performed by ComAirSoPac and CG 11.3. For purposes of administration and correspondence ComAirSoPac will be deleted and the address "ComSoPac (Air Admin)" will be used. This unit with senior aviation officer ComSoPac staff as officer in charge will remain at GUADALCANAL until a later announced date and function administratively in same manner as heretofore by ComAirSoPac.

Both Army and Navy are apprehensive as to adequacy of existing and planned facilities in forward areas to meet operational requirements for bulk petroleum products. Since facilities planned and installed in MARIANAS and HYUKYUS have been undertaken under the cognizance of CINCPAC and in view of urgency of this matter the Army Navy Petroleum Board with the approval of Cominch, Army Service Forces, and Army Air Forces has designated a Joint Service Committee with instructions to proceed to PEARL HARBOR and to Headquarters CINCPAC and Headquarters CINCAPAC to discuss existing and planned facilities and to inspect the installations or locations in forward areas designed for this purpose. The committee is being directed to submit any recommended changes and additions for these locations direct to CINCPAC who will make dispatch recommendations to CNO. As a second part of its responsibilities the Committee is being directed to give consideration to the question of adequacy of petroleum product storage and handling facilities to meet all service requirements as proposed by ANPB 61/1 copy of which is being mailed to addressees. The latter consideration will involve matters under the cognizance of ComSoWesPac and CINCPAC. To the extent necessary to assure complete information it is requested that representatives of your commands familiar with the problems accompany and assist the committee in the expeditious completion of its mission. Names of committee members follow: Col. H. W. Howze AAF, steering member; Comdr H. H. Bagey, USNR; Comdr. G. E. Lindley, USNR; Lt.Col. A. D. Small, AUS; Lt.Comdr. P. D. Davis, USNR; Mr. A. J. Yonkers, AUS; and Lieut. E. R. Specht, USNR. In addition either R.Adm. W. H. Smith, CEC,USN, Chief Planning Officer of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Dept, or R.Adm. A. F. Carter, USNR, will accompany the committee for conferences with CINCPAC and CINCAPAC staffs and to such other forward points as developments may make advisable. Request clearance for committee be expedited.

ComGenFMFPac 131504 passed to you separately is not recommended for approval because:

(A) The Naval Construction Battalions prospectively available are needed for heavy construction projects and they are not now constituted equipped or trained for combat engineering duties as units of a field army.

(B) The Fleet Marine Force should continue to be constituted for amphibious operations wherein its elements are supported by the Fleet.
(C) When an amphibious corps or other unit of the Fleet Marine Force operates inland away from the beachhead as a unit of a field army it should be given support by the service organization of the field army in the same manner that such support is given to Army Corps including all services required to make the Marine tactical units effective in such operations beyond the distance at which they are normally supported by the Fleet.


To coordinate the Air Transport services of the Army and Navy in the Pacific both with regard to requirements for air lift of the Theater Commanders and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of air transport services and facilities, you are directed to appoint appropriate representatives from your command to confer with newly constituted ATC NATS Sub Committee on Pacific Air Transport programs. Your representatives and such committee will consider and coordinate the following:

(A) Standards for determining air lift requirements.
(B) Estimated requirements for air route air lift in the Pacific through 1946.
(C) Limitations on route capacities.
(D) Joint use of ground facilities and services, and
(E) Tightening priority procedures to assure that the movement of personnel and cargoes carried is of such urgency in the prosecution of the war as to require transport by air.

Senior members of ATC NATS Sub Committee are ComGen Pacific Division ATC and DepComdr NATS. You should communicate names of your representatives to these ATC NATS officers who will take all necessary steps to facilitate early meeting and action on this subject. War Dept informing CINCPAC of foregoing.

At 0900 I (-9) 17 May coincident with relief of Vice Admiral Turner by Vice Admiral Hill accordance my 130406 command of all forces on shore in OKINAWA Area shall pass to ComGen 10 who shall then assume responsibility to me for defense and development of captured positions conforming to directives issued by Cincpac. Vice Admiral Hill as CTF 51 will continue to control air defense of OKINAWA and of naval forces present and shall report to ComGen 10 for this purpose. Support of 10th Army by 5th Fleet will continue.
17 1344 CINCPOA ADV TO COM5THFLT, COMGEN TEN, INFO CINCPAC PEARL.
Ref My 130631. Com5thFlt 150309 and 150411. ComGen Ten 151130. Refs not to all. Reiterate that 41st Medium Bomb Group will be activated on Kadena with priority ahead of a 5th Fighter Group. Adhere as practicable to schedule outlined in ComGen Ten 151130 which is considered to be best solution under the circumstances.

17 1425 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COM5THFLT, CTG99.2, CGAAFPOA, COMAIRPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFORD.
Request CTG 99.2 submit priority dispatch report each Saturday listing for each Air Group, Fleet Air Wing or other major component the total aircraft on hand total aircrews on hand and the air strength available for operations. Distribution same as this dispatch.

17 0005 COM5THPHIBFOR TO COMGEN TEN INFO COMPHIBSPAC, COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC BOTH.
In accordance with Com5thFlt 160959 report for duty in control of air defense of OKINAWA and of naval forces present.

17 1208 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL INFO COMINCH, CINCAFPAC.
Your 172254. Agreement was reached at MANILA on 16 May between Major Generals Chamberlain and Casey and Rear Admiral Sherman to the effect that CINCAFPAC would assume primary responsibility for topographic mapping of JAPAN for needs of ground forces that CINCPAC would retain primary responsibility for hydrographic surveys and mapping of beaches for needs of amphibious forces and that each CinC would prepare such maps as are needed for his own air forces. The principles of this agreement have the approval of CINCPAC-CINCPOA.

18 1035 COM2ND CARTASKFOR TO CINCPAC BOTH, COMINCH, COM5THFLT, INFO COM3RDFLT, COMAIRPAC, ALL TF AND TG COMDS 5THFILT.
Commander 2nd Carrier Task Force Pacific, V.Adm. McCain, this day hoisted flag in SHANGRI LA.

18 2005 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CGFMPAC, COMDT MARCORPS.
The request for permanent assignment of SeaBees to Marine Amphibious Corps contained in CG FMPAC's 131504 not approved for reasons given in your 140722.

19 0054 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPHIBSPAC, INFO COM3RDFLT, COM3RDHIBFOR, CINCPAC, COM5THHIBFOR COMINCH, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COM7THPHIBFOR.
Para 1. My 140247 and your 150625 not to all addes. When practicable send ComPhibGroup 12 in his flagship to MANILA to report to Com7thFlt for temporary duty in connection with amphibious training of Army troops in the PHILIPPINES. While employed on this duty he will have the status of a TF Comdr or TG Comdr in the 7th Flt as may be directed by Com7thFlt. The detailed naval procedures in amphibious training will conform to directives issued by Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet as the cognizant type commander.
Para 2. TransRon will be sent to report to Com7thFlt for duty with PhibGroup 12.
19 1600  SECONAV TO CINC PAC BOTH INFO COM INCH, COM FOURTEEN, COM TWELVE.

Have designated Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to conduct further investigation of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR. Lieut. John Ford Baecher who has been detailed to assist Admiral Hewitt will arrive PEARL HARBOR about 21 May to conduct preliminary examination of certain records and files prior to arrival of Adm. Hewitt. Fullest cooperation in this investigation should be given.

19 0431 COMGEN TEN TO COMMTHFLT, INFO CTF 51, COMMIBSFPOE.

In order not to unduly subject APs APD AKS to unnecessary risk at target recommend consideration be given to use LSTs and LSMs for mounting garrison and resupply shipping for 3rd D. Recommend all garrison echelons and resupply ships where feasible be staged through MARIANAS. These ships to be discharged there and reloaded into smaller craft such as LSTs and LSMs. Transfer of cargo to small craft: OKINAWA impracticable due additional load on port facilities as result divers on 3rd C shipping here. After transfer cargo. Vessels to sail OKINAWA as control point and be forwarded target in daily increments as unloading situation warrants. This plan will place resupply and garrison shipping at control point from which same can be sent target on short notice and as required. This will insure minimum vessels at target for minimum time. Request your comment to originator and both Cinpac PEARL and Adv.

19 0942 GHQ SWPA TO COM AAF MANILLA INFO CGUSAF CHINA, CINCPOA, CAUF, OG14TH AF.

CX 16547. Allied Air Force operations in support of CHINA Theater is subject. Air forces are authorized to strike target in INDO CHINA and SE CHINA south and east of TIE WING. Inclusive, YANGTZE RIVER VALLEY and road. Water and rail lines of communication from HANKOW through HENGFANG, KWEILING and NANKING to HANOI. 14th AF keeps AAF informed of hostile situation and areas occupied by friendly forces in CHINA and other pertinent matters. Para. Subject to weather and availability of aircraft and profitable targets Allied Air Forces will make strikes as follows:

(1) Against enemy INDO CHINA coastal lines of communications from HANOI to SAIGON.
(2) Against enemy river, road and rail lines of communication extending east, north and west from CANTON.
(3) Against other enemy lines of communication within range as arranged with 14th AF.
(4) Heavy bomber sorties (H2X) nightly against the SHANGHAI-NANKING areas and the HONGKONG-CANTON Area.
(5) Against shipping in the harbors and coastal areas of SE CHINA and INDO CHINA except that north of FOChuck strikes against shipping outside of harbors are prohibited. Allied Air Forces prior to initiating strikes which require aircraft to fly over water areas SUBORNE Pacific Ocean Area will obtain clearance therefor from CINCPOA. Para. For continuing missions such as nightly sorties against SHANGHAI area clearance for the operations as A WHUN will be requested. Allied Air Forces will arrange for attack of targets in CHINA with 14th AF and will notify latter of missions prior to their dispatch and results thereof upon completion. ComCommand Allied Air Forces is authorized direct communication with CINCPOA and with 14th AF for the coordination of operations covered by this radio. Para. ComGen USAF CHINA and this Hqtrs will be made info addees of all communications relating to above operations.
RefUrDis 130126. 148 pilots furnished for reliefs and build up MarAirGrps 31 and 33 on their allowance of 318. Remaining reliefs will be furnished as called for by you. Complete relief pilots at 2 months impracticable due transportation involved and lack of pilots in MarCorps. 2 month rotation requires billeting and pool facilities in rear areas not now available. Present planning calls for 10 months combat tour and 2.2 pilots per assigned pilot seat to permit reasonable employment and periodic rest in combat area. If this is inadequate request substantiation by sufficient data and recommendation for increase in procurement and training program will be submitted to MarCorps. Until revision of allowances approved and additional pilots provided by MarCorps present program will remain in effect. Recommend fullest exploitation rest provisions LEGITIMOUS.

Ref. Para 3 of your Sec Ltr Ser. 00281-B not to all and TAF 10th Army OpPlan 1-45 desire following coordination and assignment of responsibility for photo reconnaissance and photo mapping activities at OKINAWA:

(A) VD-3. VMD-254. InterpRon 1 and any other naval or Marine aerial photographic and intelligence units present will be assigned for operational control to ComPhotoGrp 1 under ComFairWing 1.

(B) ComPhotoGrp 1 will have the following responsibilities for the units under his command:

1. Assign and direct flights for all photo missions.
2. Assign priorities consistent with orders from higher echelons.
3. Coordinate and direct movement of photographic aircraft, supplies and personnel by reference to their support organization.
4. Coordinate and establish a naval and Marine Central Photo Interpretation and Intelligence Unit with InterpRon 1 as the nucleus.
5. Assign priorities to interpretation unit for production of photographic intelligence.

(C) TAF 10th Army will for the present retain operational and administrative control of the 26th Photo Recon Sqdn. Para.

As soon as ComPhotoGrp 1 is prepared to operate CINCPOA will issue basic directives for systematic reconnaissance and mapping photography of selected areas of the Empire and Asiatic Mainland required for naval purposes. Para.

PhotoGroup 2 will remain under direct operational control CINCPOA for staging aircraft through INO and OKINAWA as necessary.

Soon as possible each action adee submit by airmail to originator in ELDORADO draft of type basic amphibious ship to shore training program for Army troops in accord with ComHibspac previous training policies as modified by recent practice. Course should involve training first of BCTs second RCTs third reinforced Army Division, including training of complete division shore parties and also training of Corps Hqtrs and Troops. Entire course for all elements of 1 Div of troops should last 12 training days not including loading times and should include ship to shore movements both in boats & LVTS with subsidiary use of DUKWS. Para.
Expect that control vessels LSTs, gunboats and aircraft will participate. Essential that ship to shore movement of Division, artillery, tracked and wheeled vehicles, other equipment and supplies in considerable quantities be included in plan. Organization and tests of communications should be included in plan. Para.

After coordination by ComPhibsPac final plans will be issued by ComPhibGrp 12 in consultation with C5W Pac and Com7thFlt. Para.

As a separate matter each action area directed to submit a 30 day camp and field training schedule for Army JASCOS in addition to time employed in landing with troops, and each be prepared to send to PHILIPPINES 1 JASCO training team. Scope of JASCO training should be similar to practical field training now conducted by ComPhibTraPac on coast and by ComDesPac, ComAirPac, ComGenFMFPac and AdComPhibsPac in operation at PEARL.

AX 90353. Request clearance for continuing missions of aircraft flying over water areas of the Pacific Ocean Area as follows:

(1) Nightly sorties against SHANGHAI Area.
(2) All strikes and missions on FORMOSA and on CHINA Coast as far north as FOOCHOW.

A clearance will be requested prior to each mission on all other flights over Pacific Ocean Area not mentioned above. CINCPOA and Com5thFlt will be made info adees on all air intents when aircraft will fly over POA. Thus clearance requested in accordance with directive issued by COMAFPOA (Ref CX 16547) as result of recent intertheater conference.

Refer Cominch & CNO 131524. Trained ASW hunter-killer groups not desired but do desire maximum number escort carriers for transport duty. Anticipating increased requirements for moving aircraft and for training recommend endeavoring to obtain as many CVEs from British as possible. Command and recommendations on redistribution PacFlt CVEs between combat, training and transport will be submitted soon.

(This message delivered by hand by RAdm Pennoyer - 22 May)

Your 120839. Release of seaplane squadrons as proposed my 110330 (TS) will permit release of tenders for overhaul and later redeployment in POA as follows. ORCA about 1 June. SAN CARLOS about 15 June. TANGIER about 1 July. TANGIER now scheduled for overhaul in PEARL U. S. leaving SWPA about 15 July. ORCA now scheduled for MANUS overhaul about 15 June but overhaul in U.S. would be preferable if practicable. SAN CARLOS due for overhaul in August. Above release dates are dependent on actual departure of 1 PBM and 1 PBT-5A squadron from this area. If departure of squadrons is delayed release of tenders will be delayed for an equivalent period.
 Instances lately of Army units in POA being moved by direct arrangement between CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC without reference to ComGenPOA. For example, take case of movement of 31st Div and 1 Bn 147th Infantry. URad CX 16699 May 21st. In extension URad C 15861 DTG 091526 May request that all matters involving requisitioning, movement, use of or disposition of Army troop units and resources in POA be referred to this headquarters for comment before final decision is made. Such action will permit continued integrated planning for the proper discharge of ComGenPOA’s responsibility to CINCAFPAC for administration of Army Forces POA and to CINCPAC for support of POA operations.

JCS TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

WARX 86160. House Appropriations Committee, now considering Office of Strategic Services budget estimates for fiscal year 1940-6, has taken cognizance of statements in Washington press to effect that neither General MacArthur nor Admiral Nimitz desire the services of O.S.S. in the Pacific War. Committee requests immediate statement from Joint Chiefs of Staff as to truth or falsity of reports. Urgently request information as to whether or not you desire the services of the O.S.S. in the Pacific War.

CINCPOA ADV TO COMAF 20 INFO DEPCOM AF 20 ISCOM OKINAWA COMGEN TEN COMINCH.

Your WARX 85735 DTG 212331 request ComGen BomCom 20 be instructed to hold the 22 multi-engined aircraft concerned in a rear area prepared to move forward to OKINAWA on call from ComGen 10 in order that arrival may be coordinated in light of tactical and base development situation then existing at OKINAWA.

Para. The small land mass and limited facilities at OKINAWA make it necessary that all movements of forces be carefully coordinated by CINCPOA through ComGen 10.

MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA ADV INFO FMFPAC.

CX 16806. Ref FMFPAC 060013 and your 180210. Concur in plan for logistic group with USASOS FMFPAC as outlined generally by FMFPAC and as arranged by Brig.Gen. Edson during recent visit here. Augmentation of present MarCorps representatives on GHQ FMFPAC Staff to extent indicated is not considered necessary. The following MarCorps officers are desired for the staff of GHQ FMFPAC:

- For G2 2 officers with intelligence background of grade of Maj. These officers would be assigned to sections of GHQ as indicated and would be used to assist in GHQ planning for and employment of MarCorps units in future operations. Request the following MarCorps representatives with qualifications as shown be attached to this Hqtrs for further attachment to 6th Army. For G2 and intelligence officer. For G4 logistic officer. For the special staff chemical warfare officer, engineer officer, quartermaster officer, surgeon ordnance officer, signal officer and transportation officer. This was discussed informally by 6th Army with Chief of Staff FMF. 6th Army will request additional officers at a later date for other sections. Please advise availability of these officers and dates they can be expected to arrive MANILA.
Your 210635 not to all. Recommend you give consideration to development of NAHA Airdrome as a depot at which short range Army Aircraft can be unloaded from aircraft transports and from casual shipping and prepared for flight. It is obvious that such a facility will be needed and NAHA appears to be the best site prospectively available. Your 120536 also refers.

JCS are now considering policies with respect to United Nations Prisoners of War held by JAPAN. Policies have been proposed by State War Navy Coordinating Committee and by British Chiefs of Staff which are substantially the same except SWNCC policy is primarily for post hostilities. SWNCC proposes repatriation of United Nations prisoners of war be given priority second only to military operations and maintenance of occupation forces and places responsibility on the "Supreme Allied Commander" to coordinate policies free prisoners of war from confinement assume command of them and to see that they are accorded proper care and maintenance by the Japanese Imperial High Command. The "Supreme Allied Commander" will accord liaison on prisoner of war matters to duly accredited representatives of the other United Nations and arrange for such representatives to have access to their prisoners of war and permit their governments to conduct relief transfer and repatriation. British proposal estimates that of 168,500 Japanese held prisoners of war, 123,500 are from British Commonwealth 30,000 Dutch and 15,000 American. They exclude Chinese in their proposal. They propose that priority be given to the repatriation of sick and wounded but that no differentiation be made between nationalities services and between officers and other ranks. They propose to charge "Supreme Commanders" with making adequate provision for the care of prisoners of war in terms of any armistice provision of necessary food clothing comforts medical attention and protection for recovered prisoners of war control of prison camp collection and preservation of enemy records and apprehension and imprisonment of enemy personnel charged with serious maltreatment of prisoners of war. They also propose that each Supreme Commander include on his staff personal of each Allied Nation to assist in evaluation of their own nationals. Comments on these proposals are requested.

The task of neutralizing enemy air bases at TRUK and MARCUS is assigned to CTF 93. The manner in which this task is accomplished and the means used is left to the judgment of the TR Comdr. Assistance can be obtained from CTF 94 as practicable. Of the 2 Heavy Bomb Groups scheduled for the current combat area desire that the 494th Grp at ANKHAR be the 1st to move forward and that not to exceed 2 Sqdns of the 30th Bomb Grp now in OAHU move to the MARIANAS in time to relieve the 11th Bomb Grp of its present task of neutralizing enemy air bases.
24 0600 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO COMGENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL.

ComGenPOA dis 220546. UdDis 231044. In order to establish a standard procedure for the release of Army units to you and the movement of Army units within the POA the following proposal is made.

(A) Army units to be released to you will be handled accordance MyDis 1/1341.
(B) Decisions as to movements of Army units within the POA and related matters concerning Army units exemplified in MyDis 20071A will be cleared with ComGenPOA. I will assume that ComGenPOA has coordinated with you before making comment or is acting in accordance your policy.

Request your concurrence.

24 1259 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCWSFA.

Although proposals summarized in WAR 35476 passed by Cominich 222315 are not set forth in sufficient detail to permit full comment, following 2 points appear worth consideration.

(A) As any Chinese prisoners will probably prove to be more political than military and will be likely to present unique problems it appears desirable to accept British proposal to exclude them.
(B) SWOC wording regarding prisoner of war liaison with "Supreme Allied Commander" appears to place such liaison on basis of need rather than right, and therefore seems preferable to British proposal on this subject which refers to "staff".

Para. Insofar as CINCPOA is concerned no need is foreseen for representation of other United Nations at his headquarters and such representation is not desired until need is definitely established. That is particularly true of Dutch and Chinese.

26 0843 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO COMAIRPAC, CAPSCF, COMTRANSRONSFAC, CINCPOA PEARL, COUESCARFORPAC.

Present and future requirements for combat CVEs are set at 30 which provides for escort, direct air support missions, ASW and escorts for logistic support groups. Do not feel this number can be reduced. This requirement will not be met until CarDiv 28 is activated during the first quarter of 1946 and precludes any diversion of PacFlt CVEs from combat to transport or training until that time.

Para. Best present estimate approximately 40 CVEs for transports. 2 more CVEs required for training. 1 now and 1 in September. These requirements can only be met by additional CVEs from ATLANTIC and British.

Para. In view above comments recommend no change in present distribution PacFlt CVEs. Recommend assignment additional CVEs made available from ATLANTIC as follows:

(A) First 4 CVEs to ComCarTransRonsPac.
(B) Next 2 CVEs to ComAirPac (CarDivs 11 & 12) for training.
(C) Remaining plus any received from British to ComCarTransRonsPac.

This answers Cominich and CNO 131524 and ComAirPac 200618. My 219350 also refers. References not to nor needed by all.
At present unloading of garrison and maintenance shipping is 21 days behind schedule. In order that base development may proceed according to plan and that unjustified pile up of shipping at regulating points may be avoided it is imperative that following questions be answered.

1. Do you consider that unloading rate will improve sufficiently to catch up with schedule.
2. If answer to 1 is negative what unloading rate can you maintain.
Your reply will be a basis for adjustments to shipping schedules.

Your 231830 not to all. Designate and initiate training of 2 VPB(HL) Sqs and required service units now on West Coast for transfer to FAW 4 in NorPac as soon after 1 July as practicable. Also designate 2 additional Sqs for transfer to FAW 4 in December of January from those made available by CNO 131329. In order to insure that CenPac requirements are met CINSWA will be requested by separate dispatch to make 2 Sqs from 7thFlt available on call. Movement forward of VPB(HL) 142, 153 and 144 will be as originally planned.

27 0633 CINCPAC ADV TO CONGEN TEN INFO CINCPAC, CONTHFLT, CONAIRPAC, CONCINCM, CONORPAC, CONJNCOG, CONPOA.

Estimated date for reception 413 Fighter Group is disturbingly late. Construction effort must be adjusted to provide facilities to operate units more nearly in accordance with dates set forth in Enclosure B to your serial 0005045. Advise what action you can take to correct this situation and to accelerate entire airfield program and what additional assistance you require.

26 1634 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC Pearl, CONGENPOA.

CX 17129. Ref your 240600 May. Concur procedure suggested for release of Army units. It is assumed that CONGENPOA will clear movements of Army units WITHIN Pacific Ocean Areas WITH this headquarters. It is interpreted that units released by TRANSAFREIGHT are not included in above.

27 0541 CINCPAC ADV TO CONAIRPAC INFO CONTHFLT, CONAIRYTHELF, CONCINCM, CONPOA.

Strength of Air7thFlt by sqdns pursuant to my 040606 April is presently scheduled to be 6 VPB(HL) 2 VPB(HL) 4 VPB(MS) and 2 VPB (MS) amphibious. In order to meet NorPac requirements outlined in my 270540 and as provided by Cominch & CNO 201310 of Sept 1944 it will be necessary to transfer 2 of 6 VPB(HL) Sqs designated for 7thFlt to other PacFlt units, 1 Sq now and 1 in August. As applied to specific squadrons this would result in return of VPB(MI) 137 to west coast as already scheduled and in retention here of VPB(HL) 116. 2nd VPB(HL) Sq designated by you to be transferred in August. Request your concurrence.
Para. To what extent will this alter your CX 16802 timed 221420.
Conditions on OKINAWA continue such as to necessitate restriction of visits there to those whose presence is necessary for the prosecution of the war and whose visit cannot be deferred without detriment to the war effort. Transportation and accommodations are too much in demand to be furnished to others and officers on duty there are too much occupied to have time to attend to wants and needs of entertainers, tourists, sightseers or visitors or officers on temporary duty for special technical purposes whose presence is not immediately required. Clearance for visits will be given only by Cinpac Advance Headquarters. Those who furnish transportation are charged with seeing that transportation is not furnished to anyone who does not have proper clearance. All concerned are requested to disapprove requests for visits to RYUKYUS until they are subjugated unless the case is considered particularly meritorious in which case it may be present to Cinpac Adv Hq for consideration.

Desire the following action taken in connection with OSS:

(A) In every case requests for additional personnel will be submitted to CINCPAC for approval.

(B) Request contained in 240132 implies that OSS intelligence of value is available. Copies of this should be sent promptly to CINCPAC both Hq for utilization.

(C) No POW or civilian internee will be returned to enemy territory overseas for clandestine use unless authorized by CINCPAC in each case. Requests for use of such persons must be accompanied by interrogation reports on the individuals and plans for their utilization including transportation and communications.

(D) Further desire that necessity for assignment Lt.Cols. Hoover be reexamined and if needed request be sent to me.

JCS 100345 of Dec 1944 and JCS 762/10 are considered to remain the basis for the control of shipping in the Pacific Ocean Areas unless specifically cancelled by the JCS.

Par. In order that the references may be complied with shipping which the War or Navy Departments desire to divert from the ETO or east and gulf coast ports for discharge in ports of the FOA should be referred in advance of sailing to CINCPAC for inclusion in his shipping schedules on the basis of the capacity of the ports of destination to receive such cargo for discharge.

Par. Any shipping in the foregoing categories which is diverted with the knowledge that the cargoes are in excess of the capacity of FOA ports to discharge or which is diverted to the FOA without reference to CINCPAC can be accepted only with the understanding that the responsibility for all delay in the discharge and turn around of such vessels rests with the diverting agency.

Par. CINCPAC 142311 of January and CINCPAC 040111 of Feb not to nor needed by all also refer.

Request War Department be informed as appropriate.
CominCh CNO 27/42. Guarantee of safe conduct for aircraft passing through FOA operating area will be difficult if not impossible unless there is precise agreement as to time and route. Operations of Pacific Fleet make it inexpedient to give such guarantee at some particular times. CinCPac's approval of any understanding reached or of any change or modification thereof should be obtained before final agreement is made in order that suitable notifications and arrangements can be made. Subject to foregoing concur.

Ur 24/1929 current and prospective enemy tactics dictate that we cease practice of keeping warheads in ready service condition in hangars or elevator pits. Accordingly consider it essential that magazine stowage for warheads be provided.

Para. However in the case of carriers engaged in "escort and support operations" which is taken to mean CVEs, the possibility of finding suitable torpedo targets does not justify the danger and displacement of other armament which are involved in the carrying of torpedoes on board. Accordingly concur in proposal to remove torpedoes from these ships.

Since it now appears that the prompt forward movement of the ground echelon of MAG 14 from Samar will result in readiness that group to operate considerably in advance of 41st Bomb Group of which the movement has been delayed the previous directives of my 130631 and 171341 are cancelled and replaced by the following:

A. Ground echelons of both groups will be established ashore as expeditiously as possible.
B. Squadrons of both groups will be called forward at discretion ComGen 10.
C. Movement of VMF 612 to Okinawa will be deferred by separate dispatch.

Para. Advise action taken.

Recommendations your 260843 refer.

A. 4 LantFlt CVEs ordered redeployed and assigned CarTransRonPac my 232130.
B. Remaining CVEs in Lant required there for training and will not be redeployed.
C. In response to representations made accordance my 232247 not to all Admiralty states no additional British CVEs can be made available and now necessary to immediately ask for the return of Atheling, Rajah and Tracker in order to support British PacFlt. No change in present distribution of PacFlt CVEs will be made.
30 2100 SECNAV (DIRPUFFEL) TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

My 291925. New policy provides that damage to certain named vessels be released upon safe arrival at PEARL HARBOR or continental port. Others after return to service. To control release of information SecNav only will initially release battle-damage information concerning carriers battle-ships cruisers submarines amphibious force flagships by name or type to any other vessel if initial availability is more than thirty days. District public relations officers may initially release all other vessels upon safe arrival in port and will notify you in advance of ships name and number and date-hour of release. Last date rule will apply. Cause of damage including suicide planes and Baka bombs is releasable. External damage photographs and description releasable. SecNav only will clear photographs or specific description internal or underwater damage.

31 0020 CONTDELFT TO CINCUSPA INFO CINCPOA ADV.

Subject agreements reached at conference GHQ on 16 May relative SWPA and KOFICPAC support of CHINA Theater. CINCPAC and CINCPOA has approved insofar as agreements concern him.

31 0343 CINCPAC ADV TO PACDIY ATC INFO ATC GUAM, ATC HICKAM, COMFWDAREA, NAPO GUAM, NAPO HONOLULU, CINCPOA PEARL.

Consider tactical situation OKINAWA is still in the assault phase. Your transport schedules for June indicate regularly scheduled flights between GUAM and OKINAWA and will lead to unwarranted assumptions concerning travel to OKINAWA that may contravene the purpose of my 270725. All air travel from or via MARIANAS to OKINAWA is subject to priorities established by ComPwdaArea. Request you modify your June schedules accordingly. (FM)

In view urgent need transport CVEs desire only those repairs required to insure reliable operating condition. If alterations can be accomplished during the yard period required for above repairs first priority should be given to those which affect the passenger carrying capacity of the vessel. These alterations are AV 179 increase living accommodations, CVE 250 install additional fry kettle in galley. CVE 174 install dishwashing machine wardroom galley. Move forward wardroom bulkhead at frame 88-1 and install additional wardroom mess table. These alterations only as repair time permits on a no delay basis. Removal of 2nd catapult not desired. This answers your 261734 not to nor needed by all.

30 2308 CINCPOA ADV TO CONTDELFT INFO CTG 33.4

Regret that conditions at OKINAWA are such as to make it impracticable to authorize visit to OKINAWA AT THIS time by Mr. Luce and party. See my 270725. Will reconsider if conditions warrant before he leaves the Pacific.
Re: Unloading rate at OKINAWA will not catch up with present scheduled tonnage until use NAHA, YONABARU and BAREN KO Possible. Discharge tonnage diverted from 3C and additional tonnage for augmented development cannot be accomplished according to present schedule until development above ports and present freight handling personnel and equipment augmented. Estimated can initiate development above ports latter part of June. Since 1 May discharge over present available OKINAWA beaches averaged 16836 M-T day. Tentative estimate for June 19000 M-T day. Details study OKINAWA now being made. Estimated future capacity and additional requirements to accomplish will be submitted by 5 June.

Para. IE SHIMA presently discharging 2780 M-T daily. Entire 6th echelon now called forward. Do not consider the 10 days IE SHIMA now behind necessitates adjustment shipping schedule that island.

Your 311525 approved. The advances of the past few days are most gratifying. I believe you have destroyed the enemy power to hold any new defensive position for long.

This is my OpOrd 6-45. Task Organization as prescribed by CTF 96. Forces assigned are units of TG 96.1 as designated by CTF 96, NEVADA and escorts to be designated by CINCPAC PEARL.

1. Information from native evacuees indicates heavily constructed command post on EMIDJ ISLAND, JALUIT ATOLL impervious to air attacks is used by Army and Navy commanders and command personnel during air attacks.

2. Forces assigned this operation will destroy EMIDJ command post and command personnel by coordinated air and surface attack on J Day in order to reduce Japanese ability and will to resist and to provide combat training.

3. CTF 96 provide supplementary intelligence and issue necessary detailed plan for air strikes, bombardment, neutralization of shore batteries during surface firing and coordination of operations. CINCPAC PEARL route NEVADA and escorts to arrive at objective at time specified by CTF 96 and thence to GUAM. 16 June ELD designated J-Day.

4. Ammunition replenishment for NEVADA and escorts at GUAM.

5. Communications PAC 70B and PAC 71. NEVADA and escorts revert to operational control of CINCPAC on departure from objective. CINCPAC at GUAM.
Your 020120. Believe my 310343 is sufficiently clear to guide your activities. However, following answers are made to specific queries of your 020120.

A. 2nd sentence. Negative.
B. 3rd sentence. Movement of cargo and passengers from the MARIANAS to OKINAWA will be regulated as necessary by Commander MARIANAS to meet the requirements of Commander KYUKUS (ComGen 10) until the tactical situation has been determined by CINCPAC to warrant regularly scheduled operations. My 270725 is reaffirmed insofar as passengers are concerned. It reads in part "clearance for visits will be given only by Cincpac Advance Headquarters".

Para. Suggest you review logistic plan for land based forces Annex D to my OpPlan 14-44 of 31 December 1944. In case you need further clarification suggest you or your designated representative confer with appropriate officer in my Advance Headquarters.

03 1207 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, CG 6THARMY, COMGENFMAPAC, COMTHFPLT.

Am passing to you separately ConGenFMapac 131504 my 140722 and Cominch 132005 to clarify status Naval Construction Battalions attached to Amphibious Corps.

04 0325 COMGEN 10 to 24 CORPS, 3RDPHIBCORPS, INFO CINCPAC ADV, CTF31, CTF32, CTG32.11 COMPHIBSPAC.

This is OpOrd No. 13-45.

10th Army will continue attack to pursue and destroy enemy in southern OKINAWA. Effective 041200 I(-9) June boundary between Corps as follows. Present boundary to crossroads in IWA 7864T southwest along road through SHIDAWAKU 7763D junction 7762R through west edge SHUSA 7661C west edge OZATO 7561X southwest along road to crossroads 7560Y all to 24 Corps. 3rdPhib Corps will continue on present mission. In addition will drive rapidly south in Corps zone of action to prevent the enemy from organizing new defensive position. 24 Corps will continue present mission and in addition will attack to SW capture hill mass 7861-7760-7859 and prevent enemy from organizing new defensive position. Maintain contact with 3rdPhibCorps. Both Corps will take full advantage of enemy disorganization. Destroy him wherever met, and will prevent him from reorganizing his forces. By mutual consent troops of either Corps may cross Corps boundary for maneuver. Be prepared for further advance. Other details no change.
05 0616 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC.

1. In order to expedite construction and take advantage of natural terrain in OKINAWA-IE SHIMA the usual standard airfield specifications have been liberalized with the concurrence of AAFPOA.
   (A) The sight distance at any point 10 feet above the runway to any other point 10 feet above the runway was reduced from 7000 ft to 5000 ft.
   (B) Longitudinal grades have been increased to 1 and one quarter percent.
   (C) Lengths of fighter fields determined in the field with a minimum of 6000 ft for P47Ns.
   (D) Medium bombers 6000 ft long.
   (E) Other bombers except VIR 6500 ft. Glide angle for fighters 1 to 40 bombers 1 to 40.

2. It was informally understood in the early conferences that FEAF specifications were more liberal than CINCPOA's however a close analysis indicates a more rigid type than those in the original CINCPOA specifications except for widths of runways which are specified at 100 ft.

3. It is recommended that where FEAF specifications are in excess of those adopted by CINCPOA as outlined in para 1 above that CINCPOA specifications govern except that lengths of fields as outlined in General Casey's memorandum for the various fields may be generally met with glide angles of 1 to 50.

05 0845 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMMARGILS, BUPERS.

Request authority to establish the Naval Operating Base ENIWETOK and the Naval Operating Base KWAJALEIN to consist of all the naval shore facilities including Naval Air Bases at ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN ATOLLS respectively. If this authority is granted recommend BuPers order Rear Admiral W. K. Harrill as Comdt. NOB KWAJALEIN and Atoll Commander KWAJALEIN and Capt. R. B. Tuggle as Comdt. NOB ENIWETOK and Atoll Commander ENIWETOK. Rear Admiral Harrill's orders as ComMarGils should remain in effect. The purpose of the foregoing is to strengthen and regularize naval administration at these important naval bases.

04 0330 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CTF 38, CINCPOA PEARL HQ, COMAIRPAC.

Proposal contained your 030626 strongly concurred in. Also with future operations in mind it is deemed of the utmost importance that daily photo coverage of Empire airfields be undertaken by planes based at OKINAWA and IWO at the earliest possible moment. Coincident therewith it is requested that interpreters be set up at both places with personnel specially trained in this type of interpretation. These units in conjunction with proposed distribution officers to be charged with the responsibility through the appropriate command for keeping the fleet and other interested commands informed by dispatch and supplied with material resulting from raid missions. Delivery by parachute drop considered feasible where distances too great for carrier planes.

05 0800 COMGENAAFPOA to COMMARIANAS Info CINCPOA.

AAFPOA 3430. To date no combat crew rest camp facilities have been provided in the MARIANAS. This situation has reached a critical state.
there will be 1375 combat crews due for rest and rehabilitation on July 1. During June the 7th Air Force and 7th Bomber Command areas on SAIPAN will be progressively vacated. These areas altho not desirable nor acceptable for permanent rest camp offer the only opportunity to provide facilities to meet this need. It is recommended that these 2 areas in their entirety including both club buildings and the general officers' quarters presently occupied by General Douglass be allocated for this purpose. Some additional shower and latrine facilities will be necessary to make full use of the tents and office quonsets available. Mess equipment, refrig. and generator plants being removed by the vacating units must be replaced. Request immediate reply.

05 0800 COMGENAAFPOA to COMMARIANAS Info CINCPAO (Cont'd)

There will be 1375 combat crews due for rest and rehabilitation on July 1. During June the 7th Air Force and 7th Bomber Command areas on SAIPAN will be progressively vacated. These areas albeit not desirable nor acceptable for permanent rest camp offer the only opportunity to provide facilities to meet this need. It is recommended that these 2 areas in their entirety including both club buildings and the general officers' quarters presently occupied by General Douglass be allocated for this purpose. Some additional shower and latrine facilities will be necessary to make full use of the tents and office quonsets available. Mess equipment, refrig. and generator plants being removed by the vacating units must be replaced. Request immediate reply.

05 2220 CINCPAO ADV to CINCAPAC INFO COMGENPOA, COMGEN TEN, CINCPAO PEARL.

Request you take such action as is required concerning ComGenPOA 050346 and ComGen 10 050834 since they relate to movement and reequipnent of Army Infantry Divisions after they are released to your operational control.

06 0223 DEPCOMAF 20 TO ISCOM GUAM INFO CINCPAO ADV, COM MARIANAS, DEPCOM 20 ADMIN.

3465. Existing in AAFPOA area immediately and urgent requirement for housing facilities to accommodate transient officers, press correspondents and other visiting officials. At present time some of this personal must be housed in CINCPAO area. This arrangement objectionable to both CINCPAO and AAFPOA. Admiral Nimitz has approved in principle immediate construction in AAFPOA area for this purpose. Request 1 each Bl BQ complete with all plumbing etc. be made available from local stocks and constructed immediately. Site available in AAFPOA area cleared and ready accessible for water and sewer connections.

06 0806 CINCPAO ADV to DEPCOM 20 AF INFO COMMARIANAS, ISCOM GUAM, DEPCOM 20 AF ADMIN.

Your 060223 is in error. Fleet Admiral Nimitz has not received and has not approved your request for construction. Desire it be submitted in normal manner including statement as to availability of materials and priority which you recommend relative to other Army projects on GUAM.

Para. All press correspondents housed in CINCPAO area are accredited to the Pacific Fleet and arrangement is not objectionable. Nimitz.

06 0513 CINCPAC ADV to NAVY WEATHER CENTRAL MANILA INFO COM/7THFLT.

For Capt. Danis at weather conference. Proposed plan of 7thFlt to search for typhoons brought no results this week until request for search was made by CINCPAC. Explicit arrangements should be made by which ComAir/7thFlt will initiate weather flights immediately upon formation of storm condition and send reports direct to CINCPAC without requiring request in each instance. For urgent use here please ascertain exactly what weather flights were made and what weather information was promulgated connection recent typhoon in PHILIPPINE SEA.

06 1242 CINCPAO ADV to CGAAFPOA INFO CGAAFPOA (ADMIN), CINCPAO PEARL, COMGEN TEN.

Your 050655 and 060501, Request thorough screening of requests to visit OKINAWA in compliance my 270725. Request of your 060501 granted.
05 1538 COMINCH & CNO TO US FLEET INFO COMNAVEU, ALL NAVDISTS, COMDT COAST GUARD, ADMIRALTY, CO'S US ARMY, ALL BUREAUS & OFFICES NAVY DEPT, NSHQ OTTAWA.

As of 0000/Z (GCT) 12 June 10th Fleet hereby dissolved. Directive establishing 10th Fleet Cominch & CNO serial 02561 of 29 July 1943 is cancelled. At that time ATLANTIC SEA FRONTIERS revert to status prescribed General Order No. 213. All anti-submarine functions heretofore performed by 10th Flt and Assistant Chief of Staff (Anti-Submarine) will henceforth be performed by Cominch. Com10thFlt CANDR becomes COMINCH CANDR with no change in call signs. This is Cominch & CNO number 44.

07 0151 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSERVRON 10 INFO COM3RD FLT COM7TH FLT CINCPAC PEARL ADCOMPHIBSPAC, COMPHILSEAHRON, COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC.

Your 060247. The special duties assigned ComPhibGroj.p 13 are considered terminated. Your duties are those normally assigned plus such duties as administrative SOPA connection 3rd Flt and British Pacific Fleet as may be assigned by Com3rdFleet.

07 0725 CINCPAC ADV TO COMAIRPAC INFO CNO, COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMFAIRWEST, COMESCARPAC, COM3RD FLT, COMMARIANAS, COMSERVRON TEN, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFOR.

CNO 051430. Proceed with removal of torpedoes from all CVE type carriers.

07 1603 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, ARNOLD.

WAX-13084.

1. In view of the complex petroleum programming problem and the projected tight products and tanker situation, it is necessary to adopt an agreed petroleum supply procedure for the handling of Pacific Theater petroleum requirements. Conferences here have resulted in working out the following recommendations which are presented for your consideration:

A. There shall be 2 area petroleum officers in the Pacific Theater: One an Army Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCAF PAC, one a Navy Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCPAC.

B. By mutual agreement between CINCAF PAC and CINCPAC a sub-area petroleum officer will be designated for each locality where the petroleum products requirements are sufficient in the opinion of the Petroleum Officers to warrant such action. The sub-area Petroleum Officer in each area shall combine the total requirements for all services in that area and forward them to the appropriate Army or Navy area Petroleum Officer.

C. As its representative in the Pacific Theater the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Army-Navy Petroleum Board) will designate an officer to serve as Pacific Petroleum Coordinator. The Office of the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator will be located at some forward base to be agreed. He shall be responsible for the consolidation of the requirements forwarded by the 2 Petroleum Officers for the Pacific. He shall forward the combined requirements to the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, giving complete details of required cargoes and destinations, the latter to be set forth in broad area or distribution points in keeping with presently accepted practices.

D. Except as may otherwise be agreed by addressees, the area petroleum officers for the respective service organizations shall determine their requirements separately and furnish them to the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator for consolidation and forwarding to the Army-Navy Petroleum Bd.

E. Upon receipt of consolidated Pacific Theater requirements from the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board shall set up an overall supply program and, in line with current practice, will 

- Continued -
continue to forward to the agencies interested in Pac Theater logistics a weekly slate outlining the projected movement of all petroleum products to all Pacific Theater forces.

**F.** The Area Petroleum Officer for each service shall designate a liaison officer to work with the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator.

**G.** The Pacific Petroleum Coordinator in conjunction with the Area Petroleum Officers or their liaison officers shall arrange the distribution of all cargoes to ports and bases. No diversion of products or cargoes scheduled for the Pacific Theater by the Army-Navy Petroleum Board to meet the requirements of any service shall be made without obtaining prior consent of the service affected.

**H.** Consistent with the principles of efficient tanker operations and product requirements the Pacific Petroleum Coordinator shall arrange with the cognizant authorities for all tanker diversions.

**I.** Until otherwise directed the foregoing provisions will apply only to those areas and forces presently included in the responsibilities of the Area Petroleum Officer, FOA, Area Petroleum Officer, SWPA.

2. Your early consideration of the proposed procedure is desired. Upon agreement by all addressees to the adoption of the procedure as outlined, the JCS (Army-Navy Petroleum Board) will nominate an officer to serve as Pacific Petroleum Coordinator.

**1603 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, Nimitz, Arnold (CONTINUED)**

07 2107 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV Info CINCPOA PEARL, COMMARGILS, BUPERS.

Your 050845 approved. (Ref: Request authority to establish NOB ENIWETOK) and KWAJALEIN

07 1147 CTF 38.3 to COMPHILSEAFRON INFO COM3RDFLT CINCPAC ADV TG 38.3, CTF 38.1 garbage

At 071544 LME HARBOR. Army P-38 crashed and burned on forward flight deck of RANDOLPH resulting in structural damage, serious fire. 10 planes destroyed, 4 known dead, 14 seriously injured, CWMCB for-missing not completed. P-38 made low NAMT run past bow close aboard, pulled up to 4,000 feet and made straight shallow dive to crash. Propeller hub number 100205P recovered with 2 blades. No evidence of bomb. Fire fed largely by gasoline from P-38 as RANDOLPH'S planes not fueled. This is 1 of numerous instances of P-38s which have been playing around and diving on ships this TG FLM. Request Army authorities be requested to take immediate correcting action and inform P-38 units operating this vicinity that unless otherwise instructed by first info addee hereafter P-38 planes diving on ships this TG will be fired on. Fire was withheld on subject plane on account its friendly identification Pilot apparently did not survive.

**CTF 38.3 to COMPHILSEAFRON INFO COM3RDFLT CINCPAC ADV TG 38.3, CTF 38.1 garbage**

07 1247 RANDOLPH (CV 15) to COMINCH. CINCPAC COM3RDFLT, CTF 38 Info COMSERVPAC, COMSERON TEN, COMAIRPAC, COMWESSEAFRON.

Army P-38 of unknown number and home base while flat hatting crashed and burned on RANDOLPH forward flight deck 071544 LEYTE HARBOR. Propeller hub number 100205P with 2 blades only identifiable object recovered. Casualties RANDOLPH 4 dead 14 seriously injured check for missing not completed. Material damage not extensive SEOND. Expect ready for sea 12 June ANIQlAPT destroyed.

08 0520 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENAAPPPOA INFO COMGENAAPPPOA ADMIN.

Your 030617 concurrence withheld until it becomes feasible to deploy the unit concerned on an Army Air Field.
JUNE (GCT)

08 1229 CINCPAC ADV TO ALPOA INFO COMINCH AND CNO.

Effective 10 June there are hereby established the Naval Operating Base KWAJALEIN which will comprise all naval shore activities in the KWAJALEIN Atoll and the Naval Operating Base ENIWETOK which will comprise all naval shore activities in the ENIWETOK Atoll. The Atoll Commanders at KWAJALEIN and ENIWETOK will assume duties as Commandants of their respective Naval Operating Bases.

08 2301 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGRDFLT.

Your 080250 affirmative. (Ref: Withdrawal TF 38 from OKINAWA 10 June)

09 0251 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGENPOA INFO CINCAPAC, COMMARIANAS, COMGENIO, ISCOMS OKINAWA, SAIPAN, TINIAN, IWO JIMA.

Under the procedure established by my 240600 and CINCAPAC 261634 request you obtain concurrence for me in
A. Movement 24th Infantry Regiment to OKINAWA.
B. Movement 1 Bn 147th InfRegt from IWO JIMA to TINIAN.

09 1339 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Your 081630. CINCPAC has great sympathy for the position in which citizens of Japanese Ancestry who are in the armed services find themselves. He recognizes however that the situation in active areas of the Pacific is far different from that in EUROPE where all Japanese were friendly. It is undesirable and inexpedient to have troops of Japanese Ancestry deployed in an active area where their physical characteristics might cause them to be regarded as enemy or where circumstances might arise which would put their loyalty to an undue strain. It is agreeable to CINCPAC that troops of Japanese Ancestry be employed in the main islands of the HAWAIIAN Group. He recommends against their employment in the POA to the westward thereof as the danger and difficulties involved would outweigh any gain in connection therewith.

09 0657 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPHIBSPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

The assignment of ships to Type Commanders for administrative control is based on their designed normal employment over prolonged periods of time which embrace extended intervals of relatively reduced activity as well as intervals of active combat operations. It is recognized that during periods of actual combat and during the preliminary training period PCE, PGS, PC PC(R) and SC are required by Amphibious Force Commander for training indoctrination and employment. For this reason it is intended that they will be assigned to the operational control of ComPhibsPac in sufficient numbers and for sufficient periods of time for this purpose. Since they are not basically amphibious types however it is considered desirable that they continue under ComServPac for administrative purposes. Your 030110 refers.
Inability of TF 38 to avoid typhoon of 5 June is cause for concern particularly in connection future operations. Report in detail what measures are currently in effect to locate and track such storms and whether any were not made use of or failed in the recent case. Advise your plans for further strengthening weather service. Is any additional action required of Department to assist you with material or personnel.

My 290243 contemplated conference primarily for naval purposes "to explore all problems connection with carrier transport". It is expected that information will be obtained as to the extent of Army problems in connection with their fighters and to determine to what extent the fleet may be able to assist with CVE lift after meeting its own requirements. However desire no commitment made. It should be made clear that the Army must rely primarily on its own resources and on normal methods of overseas shipment of Army aircraft and also that except in special cases fleet requirements must be met before CVE lift is made available to the Army.

The planned employment of MarDivs is such that it will be highly desirable and possibly necessary to have in OKINAWA 1 Regiment which will not have to prepare for a future operation or be recently returned from a previous operation. Unless you have other needs for the 24th Inf request your concurrence in its movement.

The following figures cover the OKINAWA Campaign from 18 March to 9 June inclusive and are based on dispatch information.
A. Our plane losses total 965 including 312 destroyed on board carriers as a result of damage by enemy and storm.
B. Fast carriers during Empire strikes sank 14 ships and 14 small craft. During other operations sank 43 ships and 152 small craft. CVEs sank 4 ships and 26 small craft. VPB type planes sank 107 ships and 50 small craft. Total sunk 168 ships and 242 small craft.
C. Fast carriers on empire strikes damaged 139 ships and 73 small craft. On other operations damaged 100 ships and 597 small craft. CVEs damaged 30 small craft. VPB typeplanes damaged 138 ships and 35 small craft. Total damaged 377 ships and 735 small craft. Vessels 100 tons or greater are here classified as ships.
D. Fast carriers on empire strikes destroyed 920 enemy aircraft. On other operations destroyed 1410. CVEs destroyed 275, Marine planes of TAF destroyed 457. VPB planes destroyed 38. Ships AA destroyed 460. Suicide hits or misses destroyed 216. Total enemy planes destroyed by fleet units 3776.
E. At one time or another the campaign involved 13 CVs 7 CVLs 22 combat CVEs 3 MAGs, 10 VPB sqdns with total complements of 2583 aircraft. Replacement carrier aircraft supplied by ComAirPac during the period totaled 1212. Total navy planes involved in the campaign adds up to an estimated 2795.
11 0804 CINCPA ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO CTG 99.2, CTF 31.

After consideration of CTG 99.2 100345 originated by Lieut. Col. Fix it appears to be necessary to comment that the operations of the air units available to support the 10th Army are expected to be those which will contribute most to the task in hand. It is not desired to sacrifice tactical efficiency for the purpose of demonstrating any particular weapon or technique.

12 0851 GHO MACARTHUR TO CINCPA ADV, COMGENPOA.

CX 18624. In view your radio 110248 (not to all or needed) concur in movement of 24th Infantry Regiment from SAIPAN to OKINAWA.

13 0231 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMSERVPAC.

Expanding fleet requirements for floating repair and service facilities in widely separated places in western Pacific necessitate assignment ServRon 10 units accordingly. Importance of general supervision under 1 head continues but definite strengthening of the organization is immediately required. Propose divide squadron into service divisions 101 and 102 and 103 and 104 initially located at LEYTE RYUKUS MARIANAS and ENNWETOK. Plan all ships now assigned ServRon 10 so continue but to further reassign them from time to time among specific divisions giving squadron commander freedom of action to shift a unit from 1 division to another to meet varying requirements.


As foregoing considered of great importance urge approval of the organization and assignment of commanders at early date.

13 0335 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COMSOPAC, CINCPOA PEARL.

Your 222022 and SedNav serial 0040813 of 22 May to Asst Secy State regarding maintenance of token force at JUA AMOTU airfield on island of TONGATASU. No U.S. personnel has been stationed there for many months. Field originally build by NEW ZEALAND forces and operated by them. Reorganization SoPac propose in ComSoPac 00035 of 8 March Enclosure A Page 1 and approved by CINCPAC CINCPOA 0005033 of 8 April provided for only NEW ZEALAND personnel at TONGATABU Current information however indicates about 2 officers and 28 enlisted men remain at NOB. CNO 181945 of April 1944 approved ComSoPac 010040 which proposed retention at TONGA personnel for tank farm only. In view foregoing circumstances is it desired now to establish a garrison force at JUA AMOTU airfield.

13 0849 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSERVPAC.

It is a fundamental principle of naval command that officers on the staff of a flag officer afloat do not themselves exercise command. The authority of a Chief of Staff is authority delegated by the commander concerned. Other staff officers have no authority in their own right and may not issue orders except in the name of the commander and then only when directed by the commander.

The tentative organization of Service Force Pacific Fleet submitted by your conf serial 02938 of 4 June 1945 and also the organization of ServRon 10

Continued
as proposed by your serial 02934 of 4 June 1945 are faulty in that staff officers appear in the chain of command. They are therefore not approved.

Please resubmit both organizations in such form that the chain of command and the internal organization of the staff do not appear on the same sheet of paper. Desire if practicable ComServPac bring with him tentative drafts and be prepared to discuss when he comes to GUAM.

AX 70331. ReURad CX 18131 of 9 June. Investigation reveals that P38 which crashed carrier RANDOLPH in LEYTE HARBOR was from 8 Photo Recon Sqdn DULAG LEYTE. This airplane was being ferried from Clark Field to DULAG on routine nontactical flight. In performing dangerous maneuvers which ended in fatal crash pilot was disregarding previously issued regulations and letter of instructions of FEAF and was violating principles of flying safety which all airmen have been trained to observe. Deeply regret that carelessness of 1 pilot has cost other lives, injuries, and damage. The contents of MyRad AX 70054 is being brought to the attention of all pilots of this command and should prevent recurrence of such incidents.

If proposal of CTG 111.2 had been made from 1 of my own commanders it would have been disapproved as the risk appears greater than any prospective gain. If for purposes of morale or training you would like it done I will authorize it. Please advise.

When relieved by Marine MP Bns transfer 24th InfRegt to OKINAWA for garrison duty. Unit released to CTF 99 operational control upon arrival. In conjunction with above transfer 1 Bn of 147th InfRegt from IWO JIMA to relieve elements of 24th InfRegt at TINIAN. Make shipping arrangements with CINCPOA PEARL.

Refer CINCPOA PEARL 302205. The critical situation outlined therein has become aggravated to the extent that there is now an unacceptable accumulation of ships in the MARSHALLS and MARIANAS awaiting discharge in the MARIANAS. Action addressees are directed to screen carefully all operational projects involving movement of cargo in or out of the MARIANAS and to reduce or defer shipments wholly or in part until the accumulation of ships awaiting discharge and loading is cleared away. Advise CINCPOA PEARL info CINCPOA ADV without delay reductions in tonnage allocations or deferments that can be effected. Report required from action akees.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following directive for the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war in the Far East. Similar instructions being passed by the British Chiefs of Staff to SACSEA.

1. All Allied prisoners of war in Japanese custody including merchant seamen, will be repatriated at the earliest possible date consistent with military operations. The approximate numbers held in JAPAN and Japanese-occupied territory are as follows:

   - British Commonwealth: 123,500
   - American: 15,000
   - Dutch: 30,000

Members of Chinese forces present a scope outside of the scope of this directive.

2. Since the problem is basically of a military nature, all plans for the evacuation and repatriation of prisoners of war must be approved by the War Office or War Department of each government concerned.

3. Repatriation will conform to the necessities of current military operations.

4. Priority will be given to the repatriation of the sick and wounded.

5. Except as stated in para 4 above, no difference will be made in repatriation priorities: OPNBQWKOLCSNB begin

   A. Between Allied prisoners of war of various nationalities;
   B. Between different services (including merchant navies);
   C. Between officers and other ranks (enlisted men).

6. The United States Theatre Commanders concerned and Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia (in conjunction where necessary with C-in-C INDIA) will:

   A. Ensure that adequate provision is made for the care of prisoners of war in any armistice agreement with the enemy;
   B. Make the necessary preparations to ensure that all prisoners of war are repatriated also including provision of staff comprising personnel of each Allied nation whose activity will in general be limited to the problems of registration, financial relief, transfer and repatriation of their own nationals;
   C. Make the necessary preparations to ensure that all recovered prisoners of war within their respective zones are provided with necessary food clothing comfort and medical attention;
   D. Take control of any prisoners of war camps within their respective zones;
   E. Take all necessary measures to protect Allied prisoners of war;
   F. Collect and preserve all records kept by the enemy pertaining to prisoners of war, including those who have died in captivity, have escaped or have been transferred or released, pending instructions from the governments concerned for their disposal;
   G. Ensure that any enemy personnel denounced as war criminals and charged with serious maltreatment of prisoners of war are apprehended and taken into custody.

END OF DIRECTIVE.
RefUr 091847. Current measures to locate and track typhoons are:

(A) Reconnaissance by search aircraft from FAW 1 and FAW 18.
(B) By request reconnaissance by Army 655th Weather Squadron 20th AF.
(C) By request reconnaissance by planes under CINCSWPA and Com7thFlt.
(D) Reports from station weather ships.
(E) Reports from ships at sea.
(F) Current network of reports from islands, submarines and air rescue ships also post flight search reports.

All means available used. During critical period weather reconnaissance flights in PHILIPPINE and GUAM areas by both Army and Navy were incomplete in that specified sectors were not entirely covered at times required due to aircraft operational failures incomplete briefing and communication failures which are the subject of investigation and corrective action.

Typhoon warnings are issued every 6 hours in scheduled weather broadcast and every 12 hours on FOX in both CCM and strip cipher plus messages on BAMS. Once daily in 35 C channel. Plain language dispatch of typhoon warnings were sent to hospital ships note CINCPAC 040521 and 050806 directing them to disregard routing instructions and avoid danger area.

Plans for further strengthening weather service include following:

(A) Provide additional weather ship stations earliest practicable date upon arrival FCE type vessels.
(B) Installation of new weather station on FARECE VELA with estimated completion date about 1 September.
(C) Installation of an automatic weather station on GAHERUT ISLAND estimated completion date 1 September.
(D) Immediate relaxation of weather security plus simplification and elimination of several weather ciphers.
(E) As an immediate measure to ensure positive results Navy aircraft weather reconnaissance will be initiated by assigning 3 operational planes PB4Ys to each of the following points: OKINAWA, IWO, GUAM, PELELIU and ENIWETOK to be held in readiness for weather searches. Request being made to CINCSWPA to provide 6 PB4Ys to CINCPAC for similar use 3 based in LINGAYEN GULF and 3 at SAMAR. Aerological officers will be assigned as weather observers. These planes to be under operational control CINCPAC.
(F) Establishment of a typhoon tracking center.
(G) Duties of coordinator Navy Weather Centrals FOA and Fleet Aerologist to be separated and experienced officers of appropriate rank assigned to respective duties. Request Department take action on following:

(A) Expedite delivery of automatic weather stations.
(B) Require 4 additional aerologists 1 of rank of Comdr and 4 aerographer mates in order to expand weather service at CINCPAC Headquarters.
16 0548 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COM3RDFLT, CTF 31.

Your 150952. As soon as practicable occupy KUME SHIMA establish radar and conduct airfield site reconnaissance on the ground and make recommendations. New subject. I will take no action on ComGen ADC 151015.

16 0902 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COM7THFLT, COMINCH, COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC PEARL.

In order to secure most effective employment of forces in prospective operations propose to exchange CruDiv 6 and CruDiv 12 between 3rdFlt and 7th Fleet prior to 1 July. MINNEAPOLIS (CA-36) will not return from overhaul until about 7 August. Request your concurrence.

16 1445 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COM3RDFLT, CTF 31, CTG 32.1.

I propose to withdraw TG 32.1 from operations not later than 1 July. I consider that at that date adequate shore based aircraft will be established and operating. Request your comments.

16 1451 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COM7THFLT, COMAIR7THFLT, CAAFSWPA, COMINCH & CNO.

Accurate and timely ocean weather information is required by ships of the Pacific Fleet and bases in Western Pacific. Steps now underway to provide this information require weather reconnaissance flights by long range naval aircraft based in the PHILIPPINES. Request 3 7thFlt Liberators each at SAMAR and LUZON be immediately available on call for weather reconnaissance missions when required by CINCPAC Weather Central. Desire direct communication with ComAir7thFlt in assigning these missions. Early reply requested.

16 1904 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC, COMSERVRON TEN.

Effective when directed by you ServDivs 101 through 104 established as Divisions of ServRon 10 to be composed of fleet units assigned by you and ComServRon 10 according to your operational requirements. Your 130231 refers. Orders being issued RAdm A.E. Smith as ComServRon 10 vice Commo Carter and your nominees as ComServDivs 101 through 104 respectively. Nominations being submitted commodore rank for above DivComs.
18 1326 COMMARGILS AREA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMMARIANAS, ISCOM ROI, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPACSUBCOMFORD, C&OC

Can base 1 replacement CVG at ROI in full operating status. This includes considerations your 160235 plus VMR squadron. Will require CASU F component. 6-250 Gal stills and 3 75 KW generators. This and other increased activity necessitates fill station and CBMU complement about 200 personnel and 250 tents or 26 double deck Quonsets. This and some additional detailed equipment will be requisitioned when advised your plan firm.

18 1431 CINCPAC ADV TO CG TEN, COM3RDFLT INFO CGFMFPAC, ISCOM OKINAWA, COMINCH, CTF 31, M: ARCORPS, CINCPAC PDRL, COM3RDFLT.


19 0115 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO AIRPACSUBCOMFORD, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC ADMIN, COMMARGILS.

TG 38.4 with composition as stated in my 170017 will arrive ENIWETOK about 1 August. This answers CINCPAC ADV 130908 and ComAirPac Admin 130120 neither to all. Aged will be advised of later changed in TG composition.

20 0213 CINCARPAC TO CINCPAC ADV.

C-20050. Your 181436. By authority of War Dept I have assigned Gen. Stillwell to command 10th Army and have directed him to report to you at GUAM without delay. He is now in HONOLULU.

20 0228 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCAFPAC, C&OF, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC, ANPB.

Recommendations presented JCS 071603 leading to material changes in current petroleum supply functions in presently constituted Pacific Command Areas and creation of new office of Pacific Petroleum Coordinator do not appear advisable at this time. Effectiveness of present methods of supply have been satisfactorily demonstrated. The establishment of sub area petroleum offices in existing sub areas and in new sub areas as they are established is considered desirable. Suggest that desired coordination within the Pacific Area may be attained by augmenting as necessary the functions of area petroleum offices now established and creation of an even closer operational liaison between the 2 area petroleum offices.

20 0235 COMNAVU 14th AF to CINCPAC ADV INFO COMSUBPAC, COMAIRPAC.

14th Air Force now has gasoline in staging fields in North CHINA which will permit B25s with 1000 pound bombs and P47s to make daylight low level attacks on worthy targets in YELLOW SEA. Area includes DAIREN and LAO YAO. Can be over target within 12 hours after we get word. Suggest targets of damaged ships tankers and large vessels be passed.
20 1312 CINCPAC ADV TO CNAB MANUS INFO CINCBBF, COM7THFLt, COMAIR7THFLt.

Your 190636. Establishment of British Carrier Replacement Pool at FIYIYU MANUS is approved subject to provision by CINCBBF of general service ratings as required by you.

21 0342 CINCPA ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFO COMSOPAC, COMENPA.

Your 160637. In view of ComSoPac 190109 prefer that no reduction of ATC activities in SoPac Area be effected until roll up of other SoPac activities has progressed further. ComSoPac is directed to advise when in his opinion roll up will permit ATC activities in SoPac to be dispensed with.

21 0405 CTF 99 to CINCPA ADV INFO CTG 99.1, CTG 99.2, CTG 99.3, CTF 31, COM3RDFLt, COMGEN 24TH CORPS, COMGEN 3RD PHIB.

Organized resistance has ceased on OKINAWA. 2 small pockets on southern portion island are being mopped up. Geiger.

21 0451 COM MARIANAS TO CINCPA ADV INFO DEP COMAF 20 POA, ISCOM IV.

DepCom 20 POA 200443. Development of space for the 4th VF Group being worked on now at IV0. Expect to get a solution with considerable crowding. The 5th Group proposal required additional time for study and well considered reply. Will be prepared in 3 or 4 days.

22 0630 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Your 202114. Details of organization were discussed by representative this staff with RAdm DeLaney and Capt Chandler. TrainComPacific to be set up as TF Comdr afloat and to be present, normally, at the main fleet base. He would have chief assistants as follows:

(A) TrainCom West.
(B) TrainCom PEARL.
(C) TrainCom MarGil.
(D) TrainCom MARIANAS.
(E) TrainCom PHILIPPINES.
(F) TrainCom RYUKYUS.

Such assistants will report to appropriate commands for logistic support in a similar manner as COTCPac reports to naval districts and ComWesSeaFron.

(A) TrainCom West to perform all the functions in connection with shakedown and refresher training that are now performed by COTCPac.
(B) TrainCom PEARL to be the officer in charge of the Pacific Fleet Training Center which will comprise all activities now grouped under Pacific Fleet Schools.
(C) All subordinate TrainComs to be assigned the operational control of all training activities in their respective areas including UTrons, AATC’s, ASW facilities, etc. as listed in letter which follows. Amplifying paragraph 3 of myser 06102 dated 1 June all training Coms would constitute a single agency in each area to which incoming ships or unit comdrs could address their wishes in regard to training or to whom such unit comdrs could direct individual ships to report for specific training in case they themselves were not in a position to assume the details of conduct of the exercise. They would also be empowered to arrange arrival and departure services in all areas as at present done at PEARL. Institution of this program would largely be a reorganization of personnel now engaged in training. Few additional personnel contemplated.
22 0832 CTF 38 to COMAIRPAC INFO COM3RDFLT: COMAIRPAC PASSED TO COMINCH, CINC PAC ADV AIRPAC SUBCOMFORD, CNO.

Request CVLs be equipped with all VF complement prior next operation. If program cannot support this change in all CVLs urge now equipping as many as possible and modifying program forthwith to accommodate complete changes. Com3rdflt concurs.

23 0058 COMGEN TEN TO CTG 99.1, CG24thCorps, CTG 99.2, CG3rdPhibCorps, CTG99.3 Info CINCPAC

Pursuant orders CINCPAC General Joseph W. Stilwell US Army assumes command TF 99 (RYUKUS Area) and Expeditionary troops and pursuant orders CINCAF-PAC General Joseph W. Stilwell US Army assumes command of 10th U.S. Army all effective this date 23 June 1945.

23 0546 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAF PAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Your 140011, 210309 and 220359. The unloading situation at OKINAWA is critical and gives every prospect of remaining so for some time to come. Accordingly desire to avoid commitments to accept ships beyond reasonable expectation of capacity to unload. Request you review above referenced dispatches with view to:
(A) Reducing shipments to bare requirements for operation.
(B) Shipment of as much as possible in LSTs which can be handled at OKINAWA. IsCom OKINAWA has been requested advise when he can accept the BCLs referred to. You will be advised later. Request advice on date you will assume responsibility for supply of aviation tech supplies and ammo in accordance with Para 4A2 of MySer 005071.

17 1550 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

To assist efforts being made to increase workmen continental repair yards desire report via airmailgram of any vessels giving numbers and types on which your decision to make battle damage repairs in forward areas, and advanced bases, has been influenced by heavy continental repair loads and probable delays in completion incident to labor shortages. In this connection attention invited to fact that east coast facilities have been made available for repairs to PacFlt ships. Can you give any information on comparative completion times between advanced base and continental yards. Has the repair situation in continental yards influenced not returning combatant ships for routine overhauls considering task requirements.

(240237) 21 2003 CINCPAC PEARL TO COMAR CGS AREA, COMSERVPAC INFO CONSERVRON 10, LATER PASSED TO CINCPAC ADV, COM3RDFLT, COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT.

ComServPac 190103 and ComMarGils 161116. In order insure maximum coordination of effort in support forces afloat and at same time facilitate mobility ServRon 10 for possible future movements propose following plan to be effective as long as task forces or task groups are basing ENIWETOK.
(A) ComServRon 10 responsible for support of task forces or task groups basing ENIWETOK and in addition temporarily responsible for furnishing afloat support at ENIWETOK necessary for vessels and craft indicated para 2 my ser 001424.
(B) ComMarGils assign such personnel and storage fed repair facilities afloat at ENIWETOK now under his control to temporary control of ComServRon 10 as may be considered necessary by mutual agreement. Continued
21 2003 CINCPAC PEARL TO COMMARGILSAREA, CONSERVPAC, ETC. (CONTINUED)

(C) The above personnel and facilities to revert to control of ComMarGils when this plan no longer effective.

(D) Myer 0014.24 of 17 April 1945 to be considered as modified accordingly for period during which this plan effective. Request ComMarGils, ComServPac and ComServRon 10 submit comments regarding this plan.

23 2046 COMINCH TO CINCPAC BOTH INFO ACOMEPIBSPAC, CINCAPAC, COM7THFLT, COMPIBSPAC, CONSERF/7THFLT.

For production planning purposes desire early estimates totals and monthly lifts from West Coast for all types shipborne landingcraft requirements Pacific including SoWesPac for calendar year 1946. Breakdown to include:

(A) Replacements shipborne craft.

(B) New garrison boat pools and replacement boat pools.

(C) Fleet services at advanced bases.

(D) Replacements for Army Special Engineer Brigades SoWesPac.

23 2208 COMAIRPAC ADMN TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Desirability of all VF on CVL carriers is recognized and has been recommended. Refer MyDis 110416. Comin 091314 proposed orderly change over of CV and CVL complements for all groups embarking after 1 January 1946 and this procedure is strongly recommended.

By this date Bearcat will have had combat evaluation and its introduction into combat should be on a firm basis. Any increase in fighters prior this date will decrease reserve of fighter aircraft to a point where a major delay or restriction on Bearcat although not expected will adversely affect fleet fighter availability. Changing complements prior next operation will disrupt combat readiness of groups now in advanced stages of training. Unless you consider additional VF a tactical necessity for next operation recommend disapproval of CTF 38 dis 220832.

23 2220 COMWESSEARFON TO CINCPAC BOTH INFO ACOMEPIBSPAC, CNO.

Subject is return of APAs and AKA's to mainland for troop and cargo lift. Troop lift currently and in immediate future required in any type vessels made available with sufficient troop lift to warrant transPacific voyages. CNO 221330 pertains. Current cargo situation precludes guarantee full utilization APAs and small AKAs for cargo lift. Recent increased presentation APAs and AKAs has greatly reduced amount FAY cargo on hand WesCo this together with cancellation FINK, HONK and ARTU has reduced overall requirements cargo ships see my 112228 not to all requesting downward revision June WSA allocated vessels. Summary and restatement ComWesSeaFron position follows. APAs and APs required in fullest number for troop lift with understanding not fully required for supplementary cargo liftings. Large AKAs and AKs usable for cargo lifting supplementing WSA Navy allocated vessels in garrison and maintenance employment with understanding utilization definitely supplemental to WSA allocated vessels view latter generally more suitable due better cargo carrying characteristics and fixed presentation dates. Small AKAs not required recommend inter or intra theater employment. Return of any foregoing vessels to mainland for leave liberty recreation or training of ships company generally practicable within limitations aforesaid when vessels are RFS. Return vessels to mainland for repairs alts annual overhauls or inspections should be within overall limitations MyDis 222241.
Refer CINCPAC ADV 230616. Plan to establish service divisions as follows:
ComServDiv 101 at LEYTE in OCELOT. ComServDiv 102 at ENEWETOK in ARGENNE (formerly Rep A). ComServDiv 103 at SAIPAN in LUZON (formerly Rep C). ComServDiv 104 at KERAMA RETTO in HAMUL (formerly Rep B). Recommend ComServRon Rep D be established temporarily as ComServDiv 105 at ULITHI in PRAIRIE. If this organization confirmed by you, request you notify all interested commands particularly Fleet Post Offices. Further request fleet post offices be notified that individual ServDivs will continue to receive mail addressed to ServRon 10 representatives which they have superseded. Recommend replacement of Reps by ServDivs be given wide publicity in fleet. Unless advised contrary representatives less Rep D commence using appropriate ComServDiv designations as return address in both personal and official mail commencing 1 July. Until further notice send mail for ComServRon 10 to LEYTE.

CINCPAC ADV TO CNCBPP INFO CNB MANUS, COMTHFLT.

Your 210654 CNB MANUS 240106. Tentative plans for docking KING GEORGE V approved. Advise CINCPAC and CNB MANUS of date desired as much in advance of arrival as practicable. While improbable it is possible that emergency demands may necessitate cancellation.

COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC BOTH INFO COMPHIBSPAC, COM CASCUPHIBSPAC, ADCOMPHIBSPAC.

Organization ASCU PhibsPac your serial 006068 approved in general insofar Navy and Mar Corps concerned. Concurrence C/S US Army will be requested. Additional fighter director program being handled separately. Following concerns ASCU PhibsPac serial 007. Propose authorize 15 ship based units and augment staff ASCU (Enclosure A) to form additional unit. Clarification following point required. Enclosure B. Necessity fighter director and night fighter director personnel since each AGC has full CIC team. If required in complement of ship based unit can equivalent reduction CIX complement be accepted. Although recommended components substantially approved neither Navy nor Mar Corps will be able to fill billets rank for rank at present.

COMGENAPPOA ADMIN TO CINCPAC PEARL CG AIR FWD, CHQ SWPA, COMMARINAS, CGAAPPOA, COMGENPOA, PASSED TO ADV HQ BY CINCPAC PEARL 261912.

Attention invited to WARX 21057 DTC 220231 June and T/S ltr. WDept General Staff, operations division OPD 385 TS (14 Dec 44), subject: Capabilities of implementing a decision to initiate retaliatory chemical warfare against the Japanese. In view of changing opinions concerning the use of toxic chemicals in warfare it is recommended that reconsideration be given to your serial 002449 14 Aug 44 subject: Storage of toxic gas in forward area, and this headquarters be advised of the decision on this subject.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO.

Ur 171550. Heavy work loads in continental yards were the determining factor in deciding
(A) To defer indefinitely permanent battle damage repairs and alterations AA battery in MISSISSIPPI.
(B) To repair IDAHO blisters in GUAM.
(C) To perform extensive repair of hull damage WAKE ISLAND in GUAM.

Continued
(D) To repair ruptured bow structure DULUTH in GUAM.

(E) To repair battle damage to LOUISVILLE and BIRMINGHAM at PEARL HARBOR, and

(F) To postpone availability of SAN JACINTO for overhaul.

These were all extensive jobs which required prolonged periods in forward bases where facilities are not equal to those on the continent. A large number of lesser jobs which would normally have been returned to the continent have been performed at forward bases. In general repair facilities in forward areas are being loaded to the limit of their capacity over and above normal maintenance requirements of the fleet in order to ease the work load in continental yards. Estimate that roughly 50% of ships now under repair and overhaul on west coast will be delayed beyond assigned FFS dates. 22 Pacific Fleet ships have been made available to East Coast yards or such availability has been requested. Advance base repairs are usually more expeditious than continental yards but not so polished.

Continuance 6 existing Amphibious Truck Companies and activation 2 Amphibious Truck Battalions of 3 companies each requested your serial 006048 of 3 June approved.

Request base development plan TINIAN be modified to authorize facilities for receiving from tankers and ZEC vessels 150 single engine Army aircraft per month and preparing these planes for flight at west Field no 4. Unloading facilities, asphalt parking areas and modifications to roadways to transport these planes from port to West Field must be provided as necessary. Tent camps and galleys for personnel and necessary temporary working facilities will be required. ComGenPOA is requested to furnish unloading personnel, construction troops, material and equipment as required. ComGenAAFPOA is requested to furnish the necessary AAF operating personnel. Request immediate local implementation in order to receive aircraft as soon as possible.

CTF 38 dis 220832 negative. After consultation with ComAirPac infeasible change carrier air group complements at this time.

Your 250227. Situation described in myser 002149 of 14 Aug 44 still obtains and in an intensified degree. The policy set forth therein is accordingly reaffirmed.

Refer ComAirPac ser 001390. In view cargo discharge situation outlined our 181247 not to all reduction projected ammo tonnage considered essential. Recommend establishment 20 day stock level and integration requirements for 20 AF FEAF and Navy. Request reference be revised accordingly. Overall review tonnage situation with Gen Feldman now in process.
27 2122 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMSOPAC.

In addition to maintaining Bauer Field keep token garrison QUIN HILL FIELD your 240910 pending clearance with War and State Departments.

28 1306 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA BOTH, CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMSOPAC, COM7THFLT, CONSOLANT, COMCHSSANRON.

Provisions of Cominch and CNO #7 of Dec 1943 amended to include abandonment seaplane bases.

28 1309 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMSOPAC.

Pending further instructions do not establish token garrison force JUA AMOTU Airfield your 130335 but retain token force at tank farm.

29 0138 CINCPAC ADV TO CTF 94 INFO COM3RDFLT, CTF 31, 99, CTG 99.1, COMPHILSEAFRON, CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT.

Effective 0000 GCT 1 July CTF 94 will assume responsibility of escorting all shipping between the MARIANAS Area and the RYUKYUS. Refer my 170700 which directed that units be redeployed from 3rdFlt to augment escort forces of TF 94 for this purpose.

29 0242 COMAIRPAC TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COMMARGILS AREA, AIRPACSUBCOMFORD, CINCPOA PEARL, TSCOM ROI, COMSERVPAC.

Hawaiian and Marianas areas will be taxed to limit to handle expanding training requirements for CV groups. Extremely desirable base CVG at ROI per UrDis 160235 to lighten load on other areas. When not so used facilities would be available to air groups of TF 38 for refresher training. In view his 181326 recommend authorize ComMarGils develop adequate facilities at ROI ready to receive operating CVG by 15 August.

29 0505 COMGENAAFPOA TO CINCPOA ADV.

NR 4574.
1. Recent joint planning conferences regarding OKINAWA airfield development have broached the subject of combined ATC and NATS operations at a single terminal such as Yonabaru Airfield.
2. Planning review here indicates likelihood that implications will outweigh feasibility of such a move.
3. Request statement of your opinion regarding feasibility of moving ATC from NAH Depot Airfield to Yonabaru Airfield for combined operations with NATS at OKINAWA.

29 0331 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMINCH & CNO, CINCAAPPAC, COMGENPOA COMMARGILS, COMVESCAROLINES, COM MARIANAS.

Your serial 00571 of 18 June not to all. Authority granted to discontinue all air, sea & ground defense missions in SoPac except internal security and air sea rescue.
Subject is procedure for establishing monthly joint priority list of personnel movements. Ref Cominch 192115 April and CINCPAC PEARL 040111. Request your comment on proposed modifications incorporated in A and B below. War Dept will request CINCPAC comment by separate message.

A. About the 20th of each month Cominch will send for action CINCPAC CINCPAC and CINCPAC CINCPAC CINCPAC info those directly concerned a dispatch containing all Navy movements available for surface lift to Pacific during 2nd following month listing separately movements scheduled for operational control each Commander in Chief. War Dept OPD will send corresponding message for action CINCPAC and CINCPAC CINCPAC info those directly concerned containing all Army movements (except direct redeployment) separated with respect to Commander in Chief of operational control.

B. On basis above dispatches and collateral information CINCPAC CINCPAC will forward to COMINCH info to CINCPAC and others concerned a single priority list containing as previously all Army and Navy movements assigned his operational control desired shipped. CINCPAC will forward to War Dept info to CINCPAC CINCPAC and others concerned a corresponding single priority list of Army and Navy movements assigned his operational control.

C. COMINCH and WAR DEPT OPD will integrate priority lists submitted by CINCPAC CINCPAC and CINCPAC by procedure presently employed.

It is the intention that all air sea rescue services in the RYUKYUS EAST CHINA SEA-YELLOW SEA and Empire areas west of Long 135-00 E be operated by a single agency. This agency is an air-sea rescue task group to be established by ComFairWing 1 and will be based afloat until such time as suitable facilities are available on shore at OKINAWA. This agency will provide air sea rescue services to all aircraft operating in its area regardless of base of origin or branch of service of aircraft involved. It will coordinate the operations of all air sea rescue facilities such as surface vessels, submarine lifeguards rescue boats, seaplanes, landplanes that can be made available. To this end it is requested that the 5th Emergency Rescue Group and any other air sea rescue facilities now available to you and destined for service in the aforementioned areas be made available to ComFairWing 1 for duty in connection with air sea rescue. Request you concurrence. 5th AF 19000 and ComSubPac 201411 not to nor needed by all refers.

Minimum essential requirements naval aviation in RYUKYUS preclude any possibility utilization of YONASARU by ATC.

Ur 271925. Such trips can be accomodated. Recommend they be coordinated by you so that:
(A) Trips depart from W Coast at intervals at least 2 weeks apart.
(B) Each trip consists of individuals with similar interests. Do not send publishers and industrial leaders in same trip.
(C) Trips require about 16 days from coast and return to coast.
(D) Arrangements to enter SoWesPac Area if desired be arranged before departure by SecNav direct with War Dept. Such trips to SWP will increase length of tour 6 days.

- Continued -
Referring your WX 13084 June 7th in view of the long experience and satisfactory result of the 2 existing area Petroleum organizations in the Pacific it is considered neither necessary nor advisable to establish a Pacific Petroleum Coordinator as outlined para 1 C. It is therefore suggested that a directive be issued by JCS substantially as follows:

1. In view of the complex petroleum programming problem, the projected tight products and tanker situation and other considerations it is necessary to adopt the following petroleum supply procedure for the handling of Pacific Theater petroleum requirements:

   A. There shall be 2 area petroleum officers in the Pacific Theater; 1 an Army Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCAFPAC, 1 a Navy Area Petroleum Officer responsible to CINCPAC.

   B. By mutual agreement between CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC the respective Area Petroleum Officers will arrange for:

      (1) Continuing to supply petroleum products to existing bases and installations in the Pacific area.

      (2) The supply of petroleum products for future operations.

      (3) The assignment of sub area petroleum officers to those areas where the consumption of petroleum products or the volume of transshipments requires coordination by special representatives. A sub area petroleum officer in a given area will normally be assigned the responsibility for the supply of petroleum products to both CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC in that area.

2. The petroleum requirements of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC will be determined by the respective Area Petroleum Officers and requisitions and/or slates will be submitted to the Army Navy Petroleum Board in form acceptable to that body, except that:

   A. Certain requirements of CINCAFPAC may be included in CINCPAC requisitions and, conversely, certain CINCPAC requirements may be included in CINCAFPAC requisitions as mutually agreed by the Area Petroleum Officers.

   Copies of CINCAFPAC requisitions will be given to the CINCPAC Area Petroleum Officer, and copies of CINCPAC requisitions will be given to the CINCAFPAC Petroleum Officer. In each case the destination and timing of delivery will be made known to the Army Navy Petroleum Board at the time that the requisitions are submitted.

3. The Army Navy Petroleum Board will arrange for delivery of petroleum products as required by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC and tanker will proceed to destination as scheduled, except that:

   A. By mutual agreement between the Army and Navy Area Petroleum Officers, such diversions may be made as are deemed necessary and advisable to meet unforeseen requirements.

   B. Diversions may be made by mutual agreement between the 2 Area Petroleum Officers in order to expedite tanker turnaround.

4. The operating control of all petroleum tankers, except the small Army Y-Type tankers, is under Navy. It's understood, however, that tankers will be dispatched to destinations as required by the Area Petroleum Officers and that Area Petroleum Officers or their representatives will be responsible for the expeditious discharge and turnaround of such tankers.

5. Each Area Petroleum Officer will designate a liaison officer to coordinate the activities of the CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC Area Petroleum Officers.
(E) Each trip should be classified as to whether or not considered as personal guests of SecNav.
(F) Total number in party does not exceed 4 unless special plane is provided by you.

Imperative British forces be self sustaining your 270841 blanket authority for issue can not be given. Determination as to each item will be made on basis of (A) Emergency nature of requirements. (B) Availability of item for immediate needs US forces. (C) Feasibility of procurement of particular items by US issuing officer for replacement of items thus issued. Para. Issuing officers directed by copy of this dispatch to observe 3 conditions listed prior making issue in each instance. Also to keep CINCPAC promptly advised.

Japanese hospital ship believed to be TAKASAGO MARU in position Lat 33-47N Long 155-22E at 300911z(GCT). Believed to be proceeding to WAKE ISLAND. Description 2 stacks 2 masts length 466 feet 9347 tons displacement. Speed estimated 12.5 to 15 K.

Para. Proceed at best practicable speed to intercept. Board ship and inspect for violation of existing conventions which are listed in War Dept Technical Manual 27-251 forwarded to you by officer messenger and are briefly specified in PacFlt Conf Ltr 26CL-44 of 26 July. In the event violations are discovered place prize crew aboard seal communication facilities and take ship to NWAJALEIN in company with MURRAY for further investigation as directed by CINCPAC. You are authorized to exercise such force as the situation requires. Maintain search operations until contact is made or until otherwise directed by CINCPAC. If no violations of international law are discovered permit ship to proceed after making suitable entry in her log. Keep contact with her and again board and conduct examination after her departure from port.

Search planes from ENIWETOK will be directed by CINCPAC to assist in search. Lt. Huggins and Lt. Brown have reported to you to serve as interpreters. Maintain communication with search planes on 100.58 Mcs primary & 3000 Mcs secondary. Keep CINCPAC informed as to developments. Break radio silence as necessary.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

01 2215 CCOMGEN AAFPOA to CTF 93 info CTF 94, CINCPOA, COMGRUDIV 5.

TOP SECRET. AAFPOA 0071 strike shipping targets in BONINS with all available aircraft as soon as practicable. Reference CINCPOA 010731 and your dispatch 011159. Use optimum bombing altitudes.

01 0627 CTF 93 to CTG 93.2, CTU 93.1.1, CTG 93.3 info CINCPOA. COMGEN AAFPOA, CTF 94, CTG 94.9, CTU 94.4.1, CTU 94.4.2. CTG 30.5, CTU 30.5.3, CTG 17.7, COMGEN 21 BONCOM.

TOP SECRET. This is part 1 my OpOrder 1-45 called SKULDUGGERY. CTG 94.9 with 3 cruisers and 6 destroyers attacks shipping CHICHI JIMA 050700 to 050800 then bombards IWO JIMA 051500 to 051630. TF 93 attacks IWO JIMA in coordination surface forces. CTG 93.9 provide spotting aircraft as required by CTG 94.9. With MarBomton 612 make routine search BONINS and VOLCANOES night of 4th reporting contacts on 7455 KES with no additional aades. CTG 94.9 will intercept. CTG 93.3 photo CHICHI JIMA HATA JIMA then after 051630 photo IWO JIMA. No lifeguards. TF 94.9 available air sea rescue along their track to be furnished pilots who need to know CTG 94.9 guards 7455, 7590, 4475 KES and 140.58 MCG. All times K(-10). All aades see my Dis 010631 GCT for part 2 to ComGen 21 BomCom.

01 0215 CCOMGEN AAFPOA to CONAF 7 Info CINCPOA.

TOP SECRET. Direct communication between your headquarters and headquarters 5 AirForce as requested your DTG 260208 GCT has been granted by CINCPOA. This authority is for the purpose specified and for no other and must be over existing communications facilities. Desire point out that 4 officers and 48 enlisted men will arrive approximately 5 January and will be available for training until approximately 15 March at which time they will go into WORKMAN. From 15 March to 15 May an equal number will be trained for ICEBERG. Request your arrangements with 5th Air Force take into consideration these training requirements for forthcoming operations.

01 1754 COMINCH CNO to CONNAVGROUP CHINA, Info COMTHPFLT, CINCPOA.

TOP SECRET. Cominich and CNO 011754. Information previously received from source BAUR 290430 appreciated. Desire continued emphasis upon spot reports concerning all movements Nip combatant vessels and convoys with specific information concerning fueling rendezvous. Cargo loadings and also important but primary effort should be upon operational intelligence.
01 2128  COMAIRPAC (ADMIN) to CINCPAC.

TOP SECRET. In view of adverse meteorological conditions in LEYTE-SAMAR area of PHILIPPINES, concentration of all carrier replacement aircraft and related supporting facilities in quantities required for aviation logistic support of 7th Fleet and Carrier Task Forces considered hazardous and inadvisable in that locality. Para. Request clarification whether Cominch 261935 was intended to preclude the establishment of SATELLITE facilities of this nature in any other area in the PHILIPPINES. Report of LEYTE board refers. Para. Recommend for LEYTE area a maximum of 500 replacement carrier types plus related activities and a similar depot with limited facilities in the LUZON area.

02 0205  COMGENAAFPOA to CINCPAC Info COMGENPOA.

TOP SECRET. Progress may 19 December indicates parking facilities on airfield ANGAUR being provided far in excess of authorized Base Development Plan. Estimate there is now space on hard stands and extensive parking aprons for 120 B-24's or equivalent. In order to provide facilities at GUAM for an additional Wing it is necessary to Add Engr Avn Battalion strength. The 1st and most readily Available is considered to be the 1887th at ANGAUR. It is recommended it be redeployed from ANGAUR to GUAM immediately. Recommend shipping be made available earliest date possible.

30 0941  CINC EAST INDIES to COMSOWESPAC, COMSOWESPACSEAFRING, AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH NAVAL BOARD, CTF 71, COMTHETL, CINCPAC, SEA 222 GROUP CO SUBS EAST INDIES, NOTC FREMANTLE.

TOP SECRET. Meridian is codeword for operation in my 271230 and Para 1 of my 300935 neither to all addressees.

03 0625  COMGENAAFPOA to CTF 93 Info CINCPOA.

TOP SECRET. AAFPOA 0098. Approved is your 020905. Targets of opportunity such as indicated in 1V223 dispatch 010220 warrant your variation of planned employment to take advantage of such situations without specific directive from here. In case in point my 012215 predicated on belief that target sufficiently important to warrant application greater proportion your force than 1 squadron.
TOP SECRET. Warning order. Initiate preparations for Phase 2 ICEBERG with target date (W-Day) for INDISPENSABLE on L plus 30 in accordance with Joint Staff Study CINCPOA Serial 000170 Dec 21. Operation will be continuation of Phase 1 under same higher commanders. Assault troops required for operation will be selected from those already available to Commander Joint Expeditionary Troops in Phase 1. Garrison Troops will consist of 1 Army RCT from Assault Forces and following major units in addition to those in Phase 1: 1 Army AAA Gun En plus 2 Btries, 1 Army AAA AW En plus 2 Btries, 1 3/L Btry plus 1 Platoon, 2 VEH Groups, 2 VF Groups (Army). Island Commander will be Army and Comgenpoa will provide necessary supplemental Garrison Forces. Commanders concerned submit by 10 January or as they become available specific designations of additional units to be employed phase 2 including defense, Aviation, Construction and Service Units. In designating units the mounting point should be indicated. Copies of designations should be provided Com5th Fleet Com 5th PhibFor and ComGen 10th Army. All units will be furnished initial supplies by agencies in area from which mounted. Para. ComGenPoa nominate at the earliest Brig Gen Army Air Forces for duty as Island Commander and Army Air Base Commander INDISPENSIBLE. ComServPac nominate Commander Naval Facilities.

TOP SECRET. Surface bombardment SURIBUSHI Area by Task Force 92 is planned for 6 January.
04 2244  ARNOLED to LEMAY Info HARMON, NIMITZ, MACARTHUR.
TOP SECRET. We have received information from MACARTHUR that enemy Naval Force departed CAPE SAINT JACQUES 30 December possibly for SINGAPORE. HQ request special reconnaissance SINGAPORE-LINGGA Area to determine whereabouts of this force in view possible influence current operations his theatre. Desire you conduct necessary search and report findings direct in manner now in use.

04 1417  CINCSPWA to COM3RDFLT Info CINCPOA, COMMANDER ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (WASATCH), COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES (AZIMUTH)
This is a reencypherment of my 030345 pls cancel and file. Weight of land based air neutralization LUZON Fields not as much as expected. Request you include CLARK and ANGELES Fields in your missions S minus 3. Land based planes will also work in area on S minus 3. For coordination, ATTACK Air Forces will deliver attacks between 0900 and 1500 Hours Zone 1(-9) time, 3rdFlt before and after those hours. Each Airforce except in emergency to keep planes off of the area during periods allotted the other. 3rdFlt please advise this headquarters and Allied Air Forces earliest convenience action this request.

05 1046  LEMAY to CINCPOA.
TOP SECRET 0398D At 061034 GCT General Lemay will pilot 1 E-29 from HSYINCHING CHINA to GUAM ISLAND. Flight plans as follows from HSYINCHING AIRFIELD at 30-26 103-56 to BATAN ISLAND at 20-26 122-00 at 1600 GCT to REPOCT Field 13-30 144-48 Landing GUAM at 062150 GCT. Request all Naval Units concerned be advised. Also advise approach procedure, IFF Channel, Radio Frequency and any other particulars desired to be used.

04 2253  ARNOLD to MACARTHUR Info HARMON, NIMITZ.
TOP SECRET. WAX 86772 The Commanding General 20th Bomber Command has been instructed to perform special reconnaissance SINGAPORE-LINGGA Area for purpose requested in your CX 55835. Findings will be reported direct.

05 0651  CTF 77 to CTF 71 Info CINCSPWA, CINCPAC, COM5THFLT & 13TH AF, CTF 77, COM3RDFLT, COM7THFLT, CTF 38, COMSUBPAC, COMMAAF.
This is top secret. Enemy Force which departed CAMRANH BAY- ST JACQUES Area 30 December remains
JANUARY (0614)

05 0671  CTF 77 to CTF 71 Info CINCSWPA, etc (Continued)

unlocated & early information of present location highly important. Primary mission submarines is to prevent undetected approach of this force into Philippine Area. 2ndary mission determine present position of enemy force if within submarine operating areas SWPA. Modify submarine dispositions my 311314 December as necessary and until enemy force located.

06 0614  CTF 77.2 to COM7THFLEET ALL INTERESTED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS SOWESPAC Info 7TH FLEET, CTF 77, ALL TFC'S & TGC'S.

DUJSQREUSJXSGJJONS this for URBTHBEUGLNRTIMUFED damage from suicide attacks as follows: (A) New Mexico (BB 40) bridge destroyed all communications are out. ComBatDiv 4 in WEST VIRGINIA in charge San Fabian Task Groups. No info Admiral Weyler. (B) WALKE (DD 723) plane crashed in after part of bridge into CIC. 10 killed 25 burned. All guns in local control. Captain critically injured. (C) A M SUMNER (DD 692) hit aft. After magazine flooded. 2 killed 3 injured. (D) LONG (DMS 12) hit by suicide plane. (E) BROOKS (APD 10) hit by suicide plane. Latter 2 no amplifying reports received as yet as still under attack. (F) R P LEARY (DD 664) hit by plane on both forward guns damage slight. 1 man superficially injured. New subject: Minesweepers report no mines found as yet in entrance mine fields location but several floating mines. New subject: Suicide dive bomber attacks made in determined fashion. Pilots seem to be of high quality and difficult to stop. Group fighter director officer states no radar contacts this forenoon all interception being done by visual lookouts with fighter director. New subject: We require considerably more air support. What we have does not seem adequate at all. We have had 12 ships hit by suicide bombers since 1630 yesterday of which 1 sank and 9 were damaged severely.

06 0934  CTF 77 to COM3RDFLT info CINCSWPA, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COM5TH AF 32 BOMBING, ALL TFC AND TGC 3RD AND 7TH FLTS, COMPEAF.

Damage by enemy planes to bombardment and minesweeping groups described in CTG 77.2 060614 and previous reports indicates urgency of neutralizing Jap airfields in LUZON. Request 3rd Flt repeat today's strikes and HNSP T caps over LUZON fields TOVC XED " minus 2 Day.
05 2203  COM3RDFLT to GINGSOWESPAC Info CTF 38, CINCPOA, COMFEAF, CTF 77, COMAF 5.

Reference your CX 5586 of 041417 GCT. In accordance URDIS 040130 I (-9) will maintain continuous target CAP over LUZON fields from prior dawn to after sunset S minus 3 in the interest of protecting both my force and your echelons. Experience has shown that only by such procedure can enemy air activity be held down. Pilots will be thoroughly briefed regarding your strikes between 0900 and 1500 as stated in the reference.

04 1609  5TH FIGHTER COMMAND to 310 BOMBWING, 42 FIGHTER

CONTROL GEN, 40 FIGHTER CONTROL GEN, CTF 77,
ALL SOURCES INT CURRENT OP's SOPAC Info 49,58 and 8 FIGHTER GRPS: 412, 547 NIGHT FIGHTER SQDN; 13TH
AIRFORCE, 35 FIGHTER CRP, COMMAR1CRP 2, 60 VMF
541, COM5TH AIRFORCE.

J 221 E Whenever it is anticipated that M-1 convoys cannot be covered from LEYTE, the following arrangements have been coordinated with 310 Bomb Wing and 42 FitCooATR to have convoys covered from MINDORO. Code Word BLACKBIRD followed by name of convoy position and fighter director call word will indicate inability to cover said convoy from LEYTE. Reverse BLACKBIRD followed by name of convoy and position and fighter director call word will indicate cover can be furnished from LEYTE. Acknowledge.

05 1625  COMAAFSWPA to COMAF 5, COMAF 13, COMAIR7THFLT,

RGO 310 BOMBWING, CTG 94.5 FOR 22 and 494 GROUPS,
Info CINCSWPA, COM3RDFLT, CTF 38.

AX-30376 3RD FLEET will be operating in LUZON area south of 16-30 North Latitude on January 6. All Allied Air Force pilots will be briefed that Navy Carrier type airplanes may be encountered over LUZON. Allied Air Force Airplanes will not cross the SANTA CRUZ - BAGABAG - CAPE SAN ILDEFONSO line January 6 except in an emergency.
CTF 77 to COM3RDFLT Info ALL TFC's & TG's 3RDFLT & 7TH FLT, CINCSOWESPAC, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMFEAF, COMAF 5, COM 310 BOMBWING.

CTG 77.2 despatch 061210 reports additional damage by crash divers which is growing to serious proportions. Probable that Japs are using small air fields as well as large. Request you cover as many fields as possible in LINGAYEN Area. Further request you give direct Air Support objective area which will be specially required during period loaded TRAIN that area. This would facilitate initiation gratitude operation necessity for which may develop without much warning due to weather fronts CHINA SEA area.

COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC Info COMAIRPAC, CINCLANT, COMAIRTAC.

1. Carrier Divisions, Air Force Pacific Fleet constituted as follows:

**CARDIV 1**
- CV 9 ESSEX (J)
- CV 15 RANDOLPH
- CV 31 BON HOMME RICHARD
- CVL 25 COWPENS

**CARDIV 2**
- CV 13 FRANKLIN (J)
- CV 19 HANCOCK
- CV 38 SHANGRI-LA
- CVL 30 SAN JACINTO

**CARDIV 3**
- CV 10 YORKTOWN (F)
- CV 16 LEXINGTON
- CV 36 ANTIETAM
- CVL 24 BEALEAU WOOD

**CARDIV 4**
- CV 17 BUNKER HILL (F)
- CV 11 INTREPID
- CV 39 LAKE CHAMPLAIN
- CVL 28 CABOT

**CARDIV 5**
- CV 18 WASP (F)
- CV 12 HORNET
- CV 21 BOXER
- CVL 26 MONTEREY

**CARDIV 6**
- CV 14 TICONDEROGA (F)
- CV 20 BENNINGTON
- CVL 27 LANGLEY

**CARDIV 7**
- CV 6 ENTERPRISE (F)
- CVL 22 INDEPENDENCE
- CVL 29 BATAAN

06 1210 CTG 77.2 to COM7THFLT Info CTF 77/ALL TF and TGC's 7TH FLEET.

This afternoon following ships hit by suicide bombers, CALIFORNIA (BB-44), AUSTRALIA, LOUISVILLE (CA 28), LOWRY (DD-770), O'BRIEN (DD-725), ORCA (AVP-49). This makes 12 ships hit today and a total of 17 since 1630 yesterday afternoon. LOUISVILLE and AUSTRALIA have now been hit twice Rear Admiral painfully and seriously burned. Command CruDiv 4 now temporarily in PORTLAND. RAdm WEYLER safe. Consider need of additional air power urgent and vital. Our CVE's entirely inadequate providing air cover. Japanese Suicide Dive Bombers seem able attack without much interference owing radar difficulties affecting all ships in LYNGAYEN GULF area. Airborne radar rarely makes contact with planes. Believe in addition that all fields small as well as large near LYNGAYAN area must be continuously bombed and maintained neutralized. Enemy attacks heaviest morning and evening especially around 1700. Additional damage may seriously and adversely affect this as well as important subsequent operations. More damage may invite action with the Japanese Fleet with which this command is becoming progressively less prepared. Should suicide bombers attack transports results might be disastrous. Recommend 5th Air Force be informed seriousness situation and need more air support. Recommend 3rd Fleet be ordered this area immediately provide additional air and surface cover urgently needed. Consider this matter of such serious import as to warrant immediate reconsideration present plans.

07 0200 COM3RDFLT to CINCN PAC, COM SOWESPAC, CTF 77, COMFEAF, COMAF 5 Info CTF 38, CTG 77.2.

TOP SECRET. 8 January Task Force 38 refuels and will not be available for strikes or cover. Unless recommendation received from MacArthur or Kinkaid Com3rdFlt will decide whether strike FORMOSA or LOZON 9 January covering interested commands.

07 0312 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, COM3RDFLT, CTF 77.

TOP SECRET. Desire limit operation 3rd Fleet in SOUTH CHINA SEA to period necessary for accomplishment covering Task accordance my 231408 and use their aircraft for offensive strikes in Strategic Support. However request your comment on CTFs 77 061824 and estimate as to present ability shore based air forces and escort carriers accomplish essential protection expeditionary forces and direct air support at the objective in accordance previous concepts. When time
070312 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, COM3RDFLT, CTF 77.
(Continued)

permits prefer that requests for major changes in employment of Fast Carrier Task Forces incident to changes in overall coordination of land and carrier based air forces be received from your headquarters.

070342 CTF 77 to COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC, CINCSOWESPAC AREA.
CONFIREST AIR FORCES, COM5TH AIR FORCE, COM7THFLT.

ROPK Via COMNAVGROUP CHINA 061419 OSDFRENCEs
possibility that major portion Jap Fleet hitherto
SINGAPORE is at sea to westward of KYUSHU. At SOA
16 knots force could arrive BAKO 1100(9) 8.
Allowing 1 Day fuel time Force could arrive LINGAYEN
morning 10th. If fueling time reduced or SOA increased
force could arrive LINGAYEN Night 9-10

070342 CTF 77 to COM3RDFLT/CINCPAC/CINCSOWESPAC/COMFAEF/
CMAF 5 Into COM7THFLT.

TOP SECRET. COMNAVGROUP CHINA 061419 indicates
possibility that major portion Jap Fleet hitherto
EMPIRE is at sea to westward of KYUSHU. At SOA
16 knots force could arrive BAKO 1100(9) 8.
Allowing 1 Day for fueling Force could arrive
LINGAYEN morning 10th. If fueling time reduced or
SOA increased Force could arrive LINGAYEN night 9-10.

070107 MACARTHUR to COMGEN ARMY AIR FORCES Info COMGEN 20TH
SOLCOM, DLFCOM 20TH AIR FORCE, CINCPOA, CTF 77,
COM3RDFLT, COMALLIED AIR FORCES.

Situation developing in M-1 Operation indicates
possibility that suicide bombers are coming from
FORMOSA and requires maximum concentrated effort by
all means on neutralization of Japanese Air. Request
that bomber missions 20th BombCom scheduled for
KEELING HARBOR on S-1 be Diverted to hostile air fields
FORMOSA.

071044 COM3RDFLT to CINCPOA.

TOP SECRET. Based on available intelligence. Your
070821. Coordinated attack by enemy northern and
southern forces does not appear possible before 10th.
XOJEORN Force alone could possibly attack LINGAYEN
9th or could attempt contain TaskFor 38 by appearing
near OKINAWA 8th. My air estimate puts greatest air
threat to MacArthur in FORMOSA. Actually TaskFor 38
movements are initially restricted by necessity for
JANUARY (GCT)

07 1044 COM3RDFLT to CINCPOA.

Fueling tomorrow 8th after which I consider best move is to attack FORMOSA as planned on the 9th from which position operation gratitude or AGITATOR can be initiated quickly. I do not recommend transmitting LUZON STRAIT without first attacking FORMOSA (9th at earliest possible). Defensive covering of MacArthur from CHINA SEA as compared to present operating area is (A) more restrictive (B) entails more risk to TaskFor 38 and TaskGroup 30.8 from suicides and weather and (C) involves the ultimate additional risks of the retirement.

07 1207 CX 56037 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info COM3RDFLT, CTF 77, (TPC CIRCUIT).

REFERENCE CINCPOA 070312, it is probable that the bulk of enemy air attacking forces are coming from FORMOSA. Southwest Pacific Air Forces which are at present available for cover at the landing and for the approach and retirement of the various Task Groups. Comprise 16 escort carriers, 3 Fighter Groups, 1 Strafer Group, and 3 Tactical Recco Squadrons (2 Fighter, 1 Strafer) at MINDORO. 3 Fighter Groups, 2 Strafer Groups. Search and mescellaneous elements at LEYTE. In addition to the above there are 4 Heavy Bombardment Groups from PALAU and MOROTAI being used with light bomb loads. 3 Only can be employed per day and employment of all is subject to weather through tropical front. It is anticipated that this air power will be augmented to 4 a total of 4 Fighter Groups at LEYTE and 4 Fighter Groups at MINDORO about 15 January. Appropriate recipient show to MacArthur. One half of one of the heavy bombardment Groups will be displaced to SAMAR by 20 January and 1 additional medium Bomber Groups will be established in MINDORO by 21 January. It is also anticipated that 1 Group of Fighters can be installed at LINGAYEN by S Plus 6 Para Therecan be NE CERPKV neutralization of the many fields on LUZON. Itinerant and casual planes will, for some time to come, be able to launch from these fields and strike in the LINGAYEN Area. It is believed, however that our increasing air power should progressively minimize the aircraft menace over the M-1 Landing Area and along the shipping lanes thereto insofar as hostile aircraft being launched from fields in the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO are concerned. It is further believed that defensive air cover can never positively prevent suicide bombing attacks. The FORMOSA Fields are within easy flying distance of the
07 1207 for suicide bombers. If these airfields are left undisturbed, it is certain that shipping will continue to be menaced and will be subject to considerable loss. It is believed that the 3rd Fleet should be employed on 3 Day against FORMOSA Fields as planned. While remaining prepared to strike LUZON VW KNFTCBOR previous effective action in FORMOSA. Concur in principle in use of Fleet Air Forces against targets beyond our reach but in case of emergency will call for direct support.

07 1708 ARNOLD to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ, LEMAY, HARMON.

The request received in your X 56001 is approved. 20th BomCom will attack SHINCHIKU Airdrome in place of KEELING HARBOR. Recent information indicates that this mission will be delayed on account of weather and will take place on 8-1 Day.

07 2128 ARNOLD to CINCPOA, LEMAY, HANSELL Info HARMON; WEDEMeyer, MACARTHUR, GHITES.

TOP SECRET (WARX 88455) You are authorized effective January 9th to release photo planes held on call for M-1 Operation reconnaissance of OKINAWA by 21st Bomber Command will terminate January 9th both 20th and 21st Bomber Commands will remain prepared to perform upon request from this headquarters special reconnaissance.

07 0719 LEMAY to ARNOLD, DEPCOMAF 20, AHORN, BLANCHARD, HARVEY, KALBERER, EDMONDSON, WEDEMeyer, CHENNAULT, RANDALL, Info STRATEMeyer, AAFPOA pass CINCPOA.

TOP SECRET. Mission OUTRANGE (SHINCHIKU) will be delayed 24 hours because of weather conditions. New D Day will be 9 January 1945. (NOTE: Attention is invited to MacArthur's request that this raid be diverted from KEELING to FORMOSA (070107).)

07 2207 CINCPOA to CT9RDFLT, Info COMINCH, CINOSWPA, COM7THFLT, CTF 38, TG COMDRS TF 38.

Top Secret. I concur in your 071044 and in the general comments of CINOSWPA CX 56037 (071207) both of which are substantially in accord our previous concepts and agreements. Assume you will operate in accordance there with and will take any favorable opportunity to destroy enemy heavy ships.

07 2241 CINCPOA to CT9F93, CTF 94, Info COMCRUDIV 5, COMBATDIV 7, COMSHTFLT, COMRDFLT.

CombatDiv 7 will depart PEARL in INDIANA 10 January and arrive SAIPAN 20 January. Prepare plans and make preliminary arrangements air attack and surface bombardment (Continued)
07 2241  CINCPOA to CTF 93, CTF 94, Etc. (Cont' d)

IWO JIMA as soon thereafter as practicable using INDIANA CruDiv 5 and screen. ComBatDiv 7 CTC surface force. On completion INDIANA proceeds ULITHI.

07 2326  CINCPAC to COMGEN 20TH BOMBCOM, Info COM3RDFLT, CTF 38.

Top Secret. Your 071050 see Arnold's 071708 in which I concur.

07 2351  CONFORWARDAREA to CINCPOA Info COMINFPAC, COMSTRATEGIC AIR FORCE

Top Secret. Suggest continued mining CHICHI JIMA and HAHA JIMA with particular attention FUTAMI KO. Believe most mines already laid have been swept and that continuous mining only way to maintain threat to shipping. No action ComMinPac 042020 pending reply.

08 0440  COMNAVGROUP CHINA to CINCPAC Info COMSUBPAC

TopSec. Answering Urdis 080212. Enemy shipping definitely following close inshore Asiatic Coast whenever possible even going inside islands off CHINA Coast between YANGTSE and FORMOSA STRAITS. 14th Air Force is not a serious threat to this shipping and has wealth of targets in harbors and on land that it cannot bomb due limitations supply. Therefore it is strongly recommended that submarines take over any or all of blind bombing zone in which they can effectively operate.
Conducted bombardment of landing areas this afternoon, continued mine sweeping, made inspection of beach approach areas with underwater teams and continued air strikes with carrier based aircraft. No air opposition was encountered until about late afternoon when PALMER (DM-5) was sunk. Slight enemy opposition to blue bombardment was noted, slight opposition was encountered by underwater teams this opposition being mostly from snipers. Direct air support furnished smoothly without opposition. Report follows: (A) Bombardment. As a general thing suitable targets were conspicuous by their absence. Enemy guns were engaged on ridge in 1173, and in areas 1468, 1366. AA fire was noted from vicinity church in 9731 E. Direct hits noted on road in area 1451, several buildings damaged or burned.

Also destroyed medium calibre guns in area 0646 N, damaged AA battery in 1249 N near ridge, a single Howitzer or mortar not definitely located but believed northeast of RAFA opened fire. Shortage of spotting planes from AUSTRALIA and SHROPSHIRE prevented completion scheduled FGRBS. Above is brief summary of firing ships reports which indicate very few important targets have as yet been located. (B) Minesweeping area ESCHOLIA, BOULEVARD, PENDANT, ANCHOR, SHACKLE, THISTLE (may be THINLE) and PIG were completed. All others well ahead of schedule and will be completed early tomorrow morning (8 Jan). ANILEE only 2 mines reported. No controlled mines of any type discovered anywhere. (C) Direct air support. Tug hit by 4 rockets and strafed, M30 DUMQ4 ASS heavy guns in target area 0820 CICHEIVS certain results. 20 trucks destroyed in vicinity target area 0500; nil AA in SAN FERNANDO; ammo dumps and gun emplacements in target area 0000 hit with excellent results; ammo truck destroyed target area 2563; 4 hits on barracks in SAN FERGUOS; 2 direct hits on boat in target area 6783; fires started in buildings in target area 0875/T and 0975 F and rocket and bomb hits on railroad in same areas; fired several buildings in target area 2075 W. Enemy troop movements southward vicinity ROSARIO. Boats in vicinity of damaged submarine hit JUNILO fire started. Totals for day planes used 61 VF, 68 VT. 20 in direct support and 4 special missions. 19 tons 100 pound bombs 30 tons 500 pound bombs 178 rockets expended. Lost 1 VT. Results today much better than yesterday. (D) Underwater team reports forwarded by separate despatches. New subject. Rear Admiral Theodore Edison Chandler ComCruDiv 4 passed away at 1750/17 January as a result of injuries and burns suffered during suicide bomber attack preceding day.
Report of operations for LINGAYEN GULF Groups for 6 January follows: Bombardments of SANTIAGO ISLAND FORO POINT completed. During afternoon Task Group penetrated distance of 20 miles into Gulf to support minesweepers under attack and to conduct any bombardment feasible. A bombardment of about 1/2 hours duration of ARINGAY-BAPANG Area was effected. During bombardment and upon retirement from the Gulf the Group was subjected to an intense and prolonged suicide bombing attack in which CALIFORNIA, AUSTRALIA, LOUISVILLE, COLUMBIA were heavily damaged as reported my 061210. Para. Specific discussion of each operation follows: (A) SANTIAGO ISLAND. Few important or worthwhile targets were observed in this area. Firing was therefore limited to those targets only and to a considerable amount of small shipping in passage between SANTIAGO ISLAND and Mainland (B) FORO POINT. All targets were well covered. Some counter battery fire necessary and enemy ceased firing. Heavily damaged storages, Heavy ACK ACK, and reported 155MM gun positions. (C) ARINGAY-BAPANG Area. Fire in this area was directed largely at enemy forces which were moving east on road in areas 0783, 0883, and 0483 towards the mountains. Troops were also noted moving north in areas 0781 and 0782. These troops included many vehicles and horse drawn heavy field pieces. The heavy suicide attacks made on our ships coincided with this movement. Results achieved indicate XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (D) Minesweeping conducted in all areas. All results negative to date except 1 mine found in area. Several floating mines were discovered. Operations COMM CCRXHLCP N WIPH Hovey (DM-11), LONG (DM-12), SOUTHARD (DM-10) and BROOKS (APD-10) were hit by suicide bombers. Hovey and LONG have since sunk. (E) Support aircraft. Expended 45 tons bombs, 492 rockets with no losses. Results: Fired or damaged several FDT, LINGAYEN BAY Railroad bridge knocked out for 36 hours. Destroyed 1 railway locomotive this area. Destroyed 1 aircraft on ground, 1 in air. Destroyed ammo dump 8624 B, 4 buildings probably barracks in 9239 and 9240. Extensive reconnaissance failed reveal any targets as provided by advanced intelligence. No coastal guns located. (F) Fighter direction. Destroyed 15 enemy aircraft airborne at least 9 of which were by visual fighter direction. Para. New Subject: Correction my 060614. Last paragraph changed OHUH. "SLCBAVE had 11 ships II by suicide bombers"
CTG 77.2 to COM?THFLT Info CTF 77, etc. (Continued)

since 1630 yesterday, of which 9 were damaged severely". Para. Correct my 060557. 1st Paragraph, 4 sentence change to read "Minesweeping group CAP about dawn destroyed 1 plane". Para. New Subject: weather conditions 1400/1 wind 120 degrees true 8 knots. Barometer 29.86 falling slowly barometer change 6 hours 1/10 inch. ALTO Stratus clouds 8/10 base 9000 feet. Sea smooth moderate NE morning atxnoonh.

CINCPAC to ALPAC.

THIS IS TOP SECRET. Execute plan GRATITUDE. My 282150. G Day 8 January. Estimate Fast Oiler Group will arrive route point A at 2300 9 January being approximately 4 hours behind schedule. ComTaskGroup 30.8 expedite arrival point A all possible. ComTaskForce 38 provide air cover for Task Group 30.8 on 9 and 10 January remaining in vicinity latitude 19-20 North Longitude 119 E on 10 January until rendezvous with Task Group 30.8 can be made then proceed accordance Plan.

TASK FORCE 38 and Fast Oiler Group proceeding through LUZON STRAITS night 9-10 January for about 5 days operations in CHINA SEA. My 0100 04 not to all. During this period there is possibility enemy force approaching PHILIPPINE SEA or forward area bases from EMPIRE. Request you employ all means at your disposal attack and destroy this force should it appear. Task Unit 30.8.12 (slow oilers 2 CVE and escorts) will operate in area ready during this period and will be retired southeast if enemy threat develops.

MACARTHUR to CG ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON, Info CINCPAC, COM3RDFLT, DEPUTY COM 20th AIR FORCE, U.S. ARMY FORCES, CHINA, ADV ECH.
05 2306 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH.

TOP SECRET. NIMITZ to MACARTHUR. I am becoming concerned over the prospects for readiness of the 24th Corps for the ICEBERG Operation with a target date of 1 April. At what date can that Corps be relieved from Combat Operations.

08 1321 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info COMINCH.

TOP SECRET. Progressive movement 7th and 70 - 7th Divisions into staging areas LEYTE GULF commences in about 1 week. All units these Divisions except 1 combat team expected close in staging areas on or before 7th February. Exempted unit which must await arrival advance element American Division will close before 15th February. 96 Division now out of combat and assembling LEYTE GULF Area. Above schedule will be expedited as consistent with the demands for facilities of area connection success M-1 assault.

10 0215 DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA Info COM3RDFLT CTF 94.

TOP SECRET. BomCom 21 has been directed to carry out major effort at earliest practicable date against principle air installations OKINAWA. Probable date between 12th and 14th. Detailed plan will follow.

10 1447 MACARTHUR to COMFEAF, CINCPAC, COM3RD FLT, COMAAF, ADV ECH, ADVANCED ECH GHQ, COMANF, WASATCH, CTF 77, CL47 BOISE.

TOP SECRET. BomCom 20 has been directed to neutralize within capabilities air installations on FORMOSA during period 10 through 17 January. Refer our G 56140, T.O.O. 091301 GCT. WASHINGTON designated targets embracing primary air installations on FORMOSA including SHINCHIKU, DEITO and KAGI.

11 0504 CHUN KING to NIMITZ, MACARTHUR Info CHENNAULT, STRATEMBEYER.

TOP SECRET. Clearance is requested for 14th Air Force to lay mines in CAM RANG BAY.
09 2220

This is TOP SECRET. Joint expeditionary force will conduct rehearsals in Saipan, Tinian Area 12 and 13 February. CAP and ASP will be provided by Joint Expeditionary Force only for the purpose of rehearsing planes and control units. It will be assumed the responsibility for protection of ships from air surface and submarine attack to remain with ComFwdArea unless otherwise notified. In case of emergency planes will be made available air defense commander on his request. Carriers operating to the eastward at distance from islands will provide own CAP and ASP.

10 0825

CINCPAC to COM5THFLT Info COMFWDAREA, COMPHIBSPAC.

TOP SECRET. Consider ComPhibsPac 09220 requires clarification particularly with respect to area within which ComFwdArea is desired to assume responsibility for protection of ships of Joint Expeditionary Force from Air Surface and Submarine attack respectively.

11 0216

CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COM7THFLT, COMINCH, COMBATRON 1, COMESCARFOR.

TOP SECRET. The fivesome agreement of 5 November provides that after M 1 fire support ships "will be released to arrive Ulithi by sail plus 10 to meet target date for detachment if the situation permits". My serial 000164 of 24 December and my 240116 December give desired movement of Pacific fleet units returning from your operational control after M 1. Com7thFlt was informed by me on 28 December that retentions of these ships subsequent to M 1 would not be agreed to. Comdr Allied Naval Forces Op Plan 18-44 of 30 December no received contemplates use of Pacific Fleet units including battleships, cruisers, destroyers and escort carriers not only thru M 1 but also to participate in M 2, M 3 or M 4 assaults and to carry out operations on K Day (29 January) "and subsequent thereto". It is essential that the fivesome agreement be adhered to in order that the detachment operation may take place as ordered by the joint chiefs of staff and as soon as possible after M 1. Request Com Allied Naval Forces Op Plan 18-44 be modified to delete all Pacific Fleet units not allocated to him for the operation concerned.
JANUARY (GCT)

11 0548 COMGENPOA to CINCPOA

Top Secret. Exchange of units between Southwest Pacific and Pacific Ocean Areas is subject. In view of CINCSPWA dispatch CX56038 (D/T 071226 Jan) is the exchange directed in CINCPAOA serial 0001060 plus the return to Pacific Ocean Areas of the 38th and 179th Coast Artillery battalions and designation of detachment 1, 384th Signal Company, aviation, the final action to be expected reference message form this headquarters serial 00086, dated 24 Dec. Early information on availability of these units in planning for iceberg is imperative. Based on reply to this message, final action may be initiated requesting War Department to re-assign units to be transferred.

11 1031 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3, TG 77.4 Info. All TFC & TGC 3rd & 7th, CTF 77, CTF 78, CTF 79, etc.

Top Secret. This is ComBatRon 1 OpPlan 1-45. Para 1: It is believed that the enemy is preparing to resist our occupation of LINGAYEN by surface forces. 1 of the strongest which might be encountered is expected to approach from FORMOSA and could have the following units: 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 2 CA, 3 CL and upward of 15 DD. Own force will be supported by 3rd Fleet Air and surface forces and land based air and additional units made available by CTF 77. Para 2: This force will cover own forces in and approaching and retiring from LINGAYEN GULF Area in order protect them from enemy surface forces. Para 3: TG 77.2 and 77.4 take covering position off LINGAYEN GULF, the general area bearing 315 degrees 25 miles from Point CAW and operate in spaniel, airdale or collie as directed. During daylight, when directed, a combined cruising disposition similar to 4RO will generally be taken. During darkness and low visibility, when directed, TG 77.2 and TG 77.4 will generally take separate dispositions similar in case of TG 77.2 to 5RO1. When latter dispositions are taken TG 77.4 will take station about 10 miles distant from 77.2 on the reverse of the probable enemy bearing line and will be prepared to retire LINGAYEN GULF in an emergency. TG 77.3, whenever practicable maintain a position which will facilitate joining TG 77.2 vicinity LINGAYEN GULF if ordered. Subpara XRAY continue present tasks assigned CANTF-SWPA OpPlan 17-44 and continue air searches Para B Appendix 5 to Annex E CTG 77.4 OpPlan 3-44. Should fleet action eventuate use Battle Plan A or B as applicable. Para 4 Fuel will be available in oilers when requested. In urgent cases fuel destroyers from heavy class. Para 5 Use CANTF-SWPA Communication Plan 2957.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

11 1031 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3, TG 77.4 Info. All TFG & TGC 3rd & 7th, CTF 77, CTF 78, CTF 79, etc. (Continued).


11 1657 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, TG 77.3, TG 77.4 Info. CTF 77, CTF 78, CTF 79, CTF 38, etc.

Top Secret. This is Annex B, Battle Plan B, (night battle plan) to ComBatRon 1, 4 and 5 as in Annex A, Battle Plan A, to Operations plan. Paragraph 2: This force will destroy enemy battle line, engaging it in normal action at moderate ranges, using destroyer torpedo attacks and air attacks by carrier based planes plus maneuver to hold the gun range so obtained in order to protect blue forces in, and approaching and retiring from LINGAYEN GULF. Paragraph 3 As in Annex H Night action CTG 77.2 OpPlan 3-44.

12 1241 CominCH & CNO to CinCPac Info. CinCSWPA, Com3rdFlt, Chiefs of Staff Army and Joint Chief of Staff.

Top Secret. Suggest for immediate consideration if not already arranged that 3rd Fleet maintain position in area, perhaps westward of LUZON Strait, such that it can surely protect area MINDORO Strain to LINGAYEN against enemy surface attack from SOUTH CHINA SEA or via FORMOSA STRAIT or LUZON STRAIT.

11 2239 Com3rdFlt to 3rdFlt Info. CinCPac, CinCSWP, Com7thFlt, ComFEAF, Com5thAF, Com13thAF, All TF and TG Comdrs 7thFlt.

Top Secret. This is alternate 3rd Fleet exit plan from CHINA SEA, short title exit. Plan is effective if and when directed. Refer ComTaskForce 77 Op Plan 17-44, Annex C, Appendix 2, Chart 2, which TG Commanders hold. Para. TF 38 will transit SURIGAO STRAIT commencing with arrival fleet TG at point kin at 18 hours 1 Xray day in accordance following schedule. Para. TG 38.1 arrive point kin 18 hours Xray day then proceed at 20 knots SOA through point pad then south arriving east of CAGAYAN prior dawn Xray plus 1. While operating this vicinity provide air cover for all task groups during Xray plus 1 day. Depart this area in time pass through point poi about 2200 1 Xray plus 1 SOA 16 knots MKPIOA. TG 38.2 arrive point kin 21 hours TG 38.3 arrive safe point 24 hours Xray day. Both groups proceed from point kin via
Route CARIBOO at speed of advance LNESL knots. Para. On Xray plus 2 day all groups provide own air cover while proceeding at SOA 16 knots. During transit all groups be prepared catapult night fighters for own protection such to proceed LEYTE or MINDORO fields only if carrier recover not possible. Para. Upon arrival position HOMONHON ISLAND Xray plus two day task groups proceed independently to southwest corner area Mick where rendezvous with oiler groups 0800 Xray plus 3 and fuel all ships. Para. ComTaskForce 77 requested to notify all concerned this movement if plan is placed in effect.

Top Secret. Weather prevented shipping slaughter FORMOSA 9th but enemy air was smothered and own force unlocated. Results by separate dispatch. Two oilers collided BALINTANG STRAIT but Acuff made rendezvous as usual. TF 38 and TG 30.8 entered CHINA SEA undetected. 3 unobservant nip nats planes enroute LUZON to FORMOSA shot down by night fighters. Refueled forenoon 11th. Advanced TG 38.2 and TG 34.5 (augmented) toward CAMRANH at high speed covered by cap from other groups. At 1630 3 jakes chasing SWPA search mariner stumbled onto force and were splashed apparently without reporting. at 0300 item 12th still undetected (one for RIPLEY) launched searches. To be continued.

Top Secret. War 904.17 By JCS decision the 97 and 86 Infantry Divisions have been diverted to another theater.
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12 1606 CINCPOA to COM3RDFLT Info. COMINCH, CINCSWPA, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Para 1: After fueling your 120220 operate to northward disposed to cover the LINGAYEN MINDORO area against approach from LUZON STRAIT, FORMOSA STRAIT or from the south and continue efforts locate enemy heavy ships. If more important targets do not appear strike HONG KONG at discretion. Para 2: When practicable advise me length of time you can remain in SOUTH CHINA SEA with regard to logistic support prospectively available including fuel and ammunition. Assume you will use your 2 tankers previously spotted at LEYTE as well as others under your control. Advise if commercial tanker deliveries desired at LEYTE.

12 1941 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC Info. CINCSOWESPAC, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Your 121606. Estimate oilers sailed accordance my 121935 can reach position west of MINDORO by 17 January. I plan to join 2 oilers now at LEYTE with this group enroute. With fuel available today plus oil in these replacements will then be able remain in CHINA SEA at least until 23 January if required. Estimate ammunition remaining in ships will permit 4 additional full strike days. No commercial tanker deliveries will be required LEYTE unless necessary for 7th Fleet reserve.

11 1611 CTG 77.2 to TG 77.2, 77.3, 77.4 Info. CTF 77, 78, 79, 38/20378, COMINCH, COMAF 5 & 13, CINCSWPA, etc.

Top Secret. This is Annex A Battle Plan A (RYY action) CYNDBC BatRon 1 OpPlan 1-45. Para 1: General situation. Expected that Japanese will react strongly with both Naval and Air Forces against blue Naval and enemy task group of 4 BB, 2 CV, 2 CVL, 2 CA, 3 CL and 15 DD's may be used for this purpose. Own forces will be supported by land based air, by additional forces from TF 77 and by TG 77.3. Para 2: This force will destroy enemy battle line initially by reducing battle line speed by attack by carrier based planes, secondly by engaging enemy battle line in normal action at moderate ranges passing quickly through unfavorable long range bands and finally by any attacks coordinated with gunfire in order to protect blue forces in, and approaching and retiring from LINGAYEN GULF. Para 3: Battle line: CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA, WEST VIRGINIA, COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, MISSISSIPPI destroy enemy battle line by opening fire at about
26000 yards and by closing rapidly to moderate range of about 19000 yards and by then maneuvering to confine action with the enemy battle line to moderate range. Right flank force, Captain NICHOLS, RN, SHROPSHIRE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS. DesRon 56 (temporary), DesRon 60 (temporary), attack enemy battle line; defend own battle line. Left flank force, Rear Admiral BERGERLY, PHOENIX, DENVER, MONTPELIER, DesRon 21 less HOWORTH, JENKINS and LA VALLETTE, attack enemy battle line, defend own battle line. Escort carrier group gain and maintain control of the air. Reduce enemy battle line speed when directed by O T C. Coordinate activities with land based planes. Parag. (X) as in paragraph 3 Xray Day action plan, Annex H, CTG 77.2 OpPlan 3-44. Para four S E one. Para 5. Communications in accordance with Annex E my OpPlan 3-44 with battle frequencies as shown in Article 2212 para (B). Special organization voice and C W calls as set forth in CANF SWPA Communication Plan 5-44. Use zone minus 9 time. Commander LINGAYEN Defense Force in BB44 with battle line.

Top Secret. Photograph projects in CHINA reur CFBX 27103 is subject. Para 1: Cancel existing request my MILES for areas defined in CEAX 18083 dated October 27 and substitute request in paragraph 2 below which is based on statement by CinCP 16th December. Para 2: Minimum immediate requirements for CinCP (Reference map series AMS L581): Subpara A: For mapping, to complete 6-inch vertical cover of all land within area bounded by 121 degrees 45 minutes east, 122 degrees 30 minutes east, 29 degrees 30 minutes north, and 30 degrees 30 minutes north. Wanted by 1 April. Subpara B: Reconnaissance photography as follows: Subparagraph 1: 1st priority: South coast of CHOU SHAN to depth 4 miles inland, south and north coasts of NINGPO PENINSULA to depth 3 miles inland from 121-50 east longitude and HENG PU to eastern tip of peninsula. Include MEI SHAN and channel, also CHI-TING SHAN and channel. Desired by 1 February, approximate scale 1 to 10,000 instead of 1 to 5,000 requested by CinCP which is not considered practicable at this time. Subparagraph 2: 2nd priority:
Complete cover islands TAO-HUA-TAO and LIU-HENG-TAO desired by 1 February, approximate scale 1 to 10,000. Subparagraph 3: 3rd priority: Entire island TAI-SHAN by 1 March, approximate scale 1 to 10,000. Para 3: Minimum immediate requirements stated by Joint Chiefs of Staff are completion of 6" vertical mapping photography of these areas: Remainder of NIMROD SOUND and CHU SAN ARCHIPELAGO, FOOCHOW, SAMSAN INLET, WENCHOW, AMOY, SWATOW, SHANGHAI, BIAS BAY, HONG KONG-CANTON. Photography desired in order listed as soon as possible under present conditions. Technical specifications as in JCS 756/2. Photo cover of bays named should extend inland about 20 miles from shore. Around named towns photo cover should extend about 20 miles and farther if necessary to include adjacent coast and close in islands or important terrain or cultural features. Additional details on location each area being air mailed by WDGBI. Para 4: Longer range AMEDS can be met by supplementing above requirements by trimetrogon photography as planned under JCS 756/2 as your capabilities permit. Completion date October 1945 given your CFBX 28237 acceptable but earlier date desirable. Priorities and various details of JCS 756/2 now being revised and will be mailed you soon as completed. Para 5: Please advise if you can accept request of para 2. Para 6: Security of requirement para 2 is paramount. Request photo missions over lower priority areas be flown concurrently and photos shipped to provide maximum deception.

Top Secret. Every effort is being made by WEDEMEYER to support 20th Bomber Command during period January 10th to 17th regardless of sacrifices entailed. It is estimated that the logistical support he is giving will permit 2 attacks by 20th Bomber Command of approximately 50 to 60 aircraft each with 8 to 10 ton bomb loads on air installations in FORMOSA. These strikes will take place as soon as supply situation and weather permit. Estimate now is that these attacks will occur on or about 13/14 January. Meanwhile 20th
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10 2302  WAR to MACARTHUR, HARMON info. WEDEMEYER, CHENNAULT, LEMAY, HANSELL. AAF POA passed to CINCPOA (Cont’d).

Bomber Command is attacking on 11 January floating dry docks, repair facilities at SINGAPORE with approximately 48 aircraft. 21st Bomber Command is to attack air installations OKINAWA near future with major force. Estimated date on or about 12 to 14 January. This message has purpose informing all concerned. Strike and operational reports will be sent by book message to all concerned.

12 1252  BOISE for MACARTHUR to CINCPOA info. COMINCH, COMBATRON 1, COM7THFLT, COMESCARFOR AND CHQ SWHA.

Top Secret. Reference UR 110216. Operation plans to which you refer are merely sorties to cover possible contingencies. I share your desire to carry out your plans on target dates announced and will do everything within my power to accomplish this purpose. Your message brings up very definitely the general question which I have previously discussed with you as to necessary measures to protect the LINGAYEN beachhead from surface ship attack. The extremely limited strength of the Seventh Flt unless augmented is entirely inadequate for such purpose and is barely sufficient for escort duty to and from the beachhead. To withdraw the 3rd Flt and the elements which have temporarily augmented the 7th Flt will completely expose LINGAYEN to Naval surface attack and would plainly invite disaster. Under these circumstances what is your suggested solution to comply with the Naval mission of the basic directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the LUZON operation.

12 1415  COM7THFLT ADV HQ to CTF 78 info. CTF 77, CTF 79, CINCSWPA, CG 8th ARM, COMINCH, CINCPOA, COM7THFLT CTF 78.3.

Top Secret. Following additional operations to be used as M6 are directed by these additions (Change Number 1) to CANF OpPlan 18-44. Add to para oneysn list of operations instructions new subpara quote (F) 86 dated 11 January 1945 unquote. Add to end of para 2 the following quote end Will transport, protect, land and support minor elements of Eighth U S Army in the BATANGAS and/or TAYABAS Provinces of southern LUZON unquote. Add to end of para 3 (A) Quote Transport, protect, land by 2 successive amphibious
COM7THFLT ADV HQ to CTF 78 info. CTF 77, CTF 79, CINCSEPA, CG 8th Army, COMINCH, CINCPOA COM7THFLT CTG 78.3 (Continued).

landings and support minor elements of Eighth US Army in the coastal sector. AASUGBU-PACBILAON (TAYYATS).

Provide transportation for and support additional supplementary minor operations as requested by Commanding General 8th US Army and as permitted by available means. Designation attack group or unit commander for these operations unquote. Para 3 (X) (8) Insert new subpara quote C.M-6 assault successive operations using 11th Airborne Div (Reinf) mounting from LEYTE target date of landing at initial objective S plus 21 (exact dates are determined by the requirements of the M1 operations and will be designated by GHQ unquote). Renumber old para 3 (X) (8) C to D and add the following quote. The landing locations of the M6 operations will be later designated by GHQ unquote. New subject. Make following corrections CANF SWPA Op Plan 18-44 as change number 2, annex B, Page 2, Para 12 (Item 2) (B) Correct 3 LST under TransDiv 21 to read 3 LSI. Para Item 2 (C) Delete 4 liberty ships. Substitute 11 LSTs as assigned. Interchange ALLEN and ABBOTT. Page 5, para 3-1 Correct 25 January to read 24 January. Page 6: Strike out para 3-1(3). Para 3-2(1) Add AFCBR WARREN quote: AQUARIUS, MERCURY, ELECTRA, RIXEY unquote. Strike out entire paras 3-2(3) and (4). Para 3-4(1) at end of sentence insert quote Plus RIXEY, STARLIGHT, STORM KING, ELECTRA, AQUARIUS, MERCURY unquote. Page 3-4(5) Correct 15 LSM to 30. Strike out para 3-4(6). Para 3-5 Strike out last 4 lines. Para 3-SixTAKMD After combatant ships quote and APDs unquote. Para 4 Insert following as new subpara (1) and number succeeding subparas quote. If required route ships ORAVBDIMS 41 and FYUUEKO (Para 1-2(B) of Annex Baker) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to MOROTAIMOEM to load. After return from M3, and if necessary and practicable, these divisions will pick up boats at HOLLANDIA or MANUS. If required, route ships of TransDivs 11 and 12 (para 1-2(C) of Annex B) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to BIAK to load unquote.
Top Secret. Your 160342 October and my CX 54629 10th December Para (CX 55666) based on estimates of requirements for escort of M-1 reinforcement convoys and conduct of the M-3 assault with target date 29 January. It will be necessary to retain PO aede escort elements, including CVE groups RX as follows: (A) 9 CVE, 8 DD and 6 DE scheduled for release horror 30 December, delay to 29 January. (B) 12 DD scheduled for release stevedore 4 January. Omit to cover battle losses sustained to date. (C) 6 DMS scheduled for release stevedore 11 January, delay to 9 February. (D) 8 AMs, 6 PC and 3 PCs scheduled for release Mainyard 20 January, delay to 9 February. (E) 9 DD scheduled for release Mainyard 20 January, delay to 18 February. (F) 4 DMs and remaining small craft scheduled for release accumulation 25 January, delay to 9 February. (G) 9 DD scheduled for release accumulation 25 January, delay to 18 February. (H) 9 CVE, 12 DD and 12 PC scheduled for release horror 1 February, delay to 9 February Para The question of the old battleships and associated elements will be taken up later, based upon the situation. Para As also amphibious equipment. The release dates indicated above are necessarily computed on the situation we assume will exist. They will of necessity have to be varied with actual conditions. Continuous effort will be made to release this equipment to combat the earliest dates which are found practicable..

Top Secret. The LINGAYEN beachhead is now being covered by all the available major units of the Pacific Fleet. It is clear that the requirements for cover by heavy ships will continue until either the principal enemy units which threaten it are destroyed or our shore based air forces become capable of protecting the beach head with the assistance of light naval forces. The 3rd Fleet will continue to attempt to locate and destroy the principal enemy units now operational. The early accomplishment of this purpose will best solve the local problem and will permit early application of the striking power of the fleet in the carrier attacks on HONSHU which comprise the 1st phase of detachment. These attacks will most effectively contain the
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13 0850 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA info. COMINCH, COM3rdFLT, COM7thFLT (Continued).

enemy fleet units remaining in the empire and will provide effective strategic support for your position in the Philippines. Para. I am glad to have your assurance that you will do everything in your power to permit carrying out my plans on the target dates established and could ask no more. My 110216 was intended to ensure that Pacific Fleet units are not definitely planned to be retained to establish a new beach head at VIGAN or so located elsewhere as to create new problems. Para. It is my hope that the 3rd Fleet will be able soon to terminate the threat of strong enemy surface attack. Meanwhile its destruction of enemy shipping will further cripple the enemy capacity to make ware effectively.

13 1511Z CINCSWPA to COM ALLIED AIR FORCES info. COM3rdFLT, COM ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, CTF 73, etc.

Top Secret. Possibility that Jap 2nd Diversion Attack Force is moving northeast along line: northwest coast of BORNEO-PALAWAN favored by weather. Extend Sectors L, K, and J of search plan H to maximum practicable distance. Initiate special long range searches along northwest coast BORNEO to maximum practicable distance. Maintain above searches until further notice. This radio confirms instructions by telephone this date, MACARTHUR.

12 2013 CINCPOA to COMGEN US ARMY FORCES CHINA info. COMNAV GROUP CHINA, COMGEN 14thAF, COM5thFLT, CINCSWPA.

Top Secret. Subject is supporting operations for ICEBERG. Request you maintain search of area indicated on inclosures to Fivesome Agreement. Continue mining of HONG KONG Harbor. During period L-14 to L-12 inclusive strike HONG KONG. Request your concurrence or comment. L Day will be confirmed by later dispatch.
Top Secret. AAFPOA 0695 Plans for MARIANAS. Development includes provision of field facilities for five wings as follows: Eight groups on GUAM, eight groups on TINIAN and four groups on SAIPAN. Implementation of development of fields for the additional eight groups still is dependent on provision by War Department of required Army Service Forces. As soon as they are made available CINCPAO will schedule 316 and 315 wings into TINIAN and GUAM respectively. Tentative plans for development of a leguminous will provide field facilities for one VLR wing of four groups by W Day. W Day is D Day of Operation for seizure of indispensible. This offers excellent possibility for redeployment BomCom 20. Recommend that this unit, together with appropriate air and ground service troops including mobile transport squadrons be made available for redeployment to POA for stations in leguminous. If approved request detailed information as to units available. Plan for provision of necessary surface and air transport. In view existing shortages in ground service troops CINCPAO urges that maximum ground service troops now supporting BomCom 20 accompany that unit.

Top Secret. Prior correspondence has not clarified completely the staging of all units of 24th Corps. Request immediate advice if all units comprising XXIV Corps in accordance with myser 0001060 of 2 Dec not to all are being assembled for staging with divisions per ur 081321 not to all Para. COMGENPOA requested to take necessary action with War Department to effect transfer of units required by myser 0001060.
Top Secret. Request authority for Com 5th Fleet to send appropriate ships to CASIGURAN BAY during or after the detachment operation to determine suitability of its use as an advanced anchorage during ICEBERG.

Top Secret. CinCPOA 110216. My Op-Plan 18-44 is in effect and addendum to 17-44 covering M1. It provides for the reinforcement of the initial assault and the conduct of such contingent operations as may be ordered. It included in the task organization and assignment of forces all combatant units operating under my command at the initiation of the M1 operation. It was clearly understood by me that the forces assigned were subject to modification from time to time during the scheduled 32 day reinforcement period and as units were returned to the Pacific Fleet in accordance with agreements reached between CINCPOA and CINCWPA. It was prepared prior to the receipt of CINCPOA letter serial 0001164 of 24 December which lists names of vessels and dates for return to POA. It was further understood that the release of CBB and associated elements of fire support group has to be effected on scheduled dates if the situation permitted. CINCSWPA 301431, reply to which by CINCPOA has not been received by CTF 77. Adjustments for battle losses such as 3 CVE scheduled remain in SWPA were also to be made subsequently.

Top Secret. Your 210 13 January. Have no objection or restriction to 20th Bomber Command bombing and mining SAIGON 22 and 23 January. Request information addressees advise action addressee direct if dates satisfactory. Our CX 56055 concurred with request your 204 of 4 January. Signed MacARTHUR.
Top Secret. Reurser 0002 of 3 January which is 1st ind on COMGENAAFPOA letter of 31 December, subject: Revisions to Base Development Plan - GUAM, see mydis 050601. Desire to defer shipment of any materials or units of 2nd GUAM VLR Wing and authorization of construction until necessary service troops are available for support. Required shipping and service troops have not yet been made available. Shipment of construction material and supporting service troops if and when available will precede shipment of VLR units. Base development plan will be revised to indicate the additional facilities only for purposes of planning base layout and allocation of area. To provide sufficient time for procurement required materials and equipment in case 2nd Wing is accepted, the procurement of necessary materials and equipment and stocking same on west coast is approved. One VLR wing is authorized for indispensable and knowledge. Second VLR Wing on GUAM approved subject to availability of shipping and supporting service troops.

Top Secret. Your 160211 received. Desire results your operations 15th and 16th before making decision which I will make about 162330 GCT.

Top Secret. Following additional operations to be used as M6 are directed by these additions (change number 1) to CANF op plan 18-44. Add to para oneysn list of operations instructions new subpara quote (F) 86 dated 11 January 1945 unquote. Add to end of para 2 the following quoteicnd Will transport, protect, land and support minor elements of Eighth US Army in the BATANGAS and/or TAYABAS Provinces of Southern LUZON unquote. Add to end of para 3 (A) Quote Transport, protect, land by 2 successive amphibious landings and support minor elements of Eighth US Army in the coastal sector. AASUGBU-PACBILAO N (TAYABAS). Provide transportation for and support additional supplementary minor operations.
as requested by Commanding General 8th US Army and as permitted by available means. Designation attack group or unit commander for these operations unquote. Para 3 (X) (8) Insert new subpara quote C.M-6 assault from LEYTE target date of landing at initial objective S plus 21 (Exact dates are determined by the requirements of the M1 operations and will be designated by GHQ unquote). Renumber old para 3 (X)(8) C to D and add the following quote The landing locations of the M6 operations will be later designated by GHQ unquote. New subject. Make following corrections CANT SWPA Op Plan 18-44 as change number 2. Annex B, Page 2. Para 12 (Item 2) (B) Correct 3 LST under TransDiv 21 to read 3 LSI. Para Item 2(C) Delete 4 liberty ships. Substitute 11 LSTs as assigned. Interchange ALLEN and ABBOTT. Page 5 para 3-1 correct 25 January to read 24 January. Page 6. Strike out para 3-1(3). Para 3-2(1) add AFOBR WARREN quote. AQUARIUS, MERCURY, ELECTRA, NIXEY unquote. Strike out entire paras 3-2 (3) and STARLIGHT, STORM KING, ELECTRA, AQUARIUS, MERCURY unquote. Page 3-4(5) Correct 15 LSM to 30. Strike out para 3-4(6). Para 3-5 Strike out last 4 lines. Para 3-six TAKMD after combatant ships quote and APDS unquote. Para 4 insert following as new subpara (1) and number succeeding subparas: Quote If required route ships QRAVBDIMS 41 and FYUUBKO (Para 1-2(B) of Annex Baker) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to MOROTATTOEM to load. After return from M3, and if necessary and practicable, these divisions will pick up boats at HOLLANDIA or MANUS. If required, rout ships of TransDivs 11 and 12 (Para 1-2(C) of Annex B) to HOLLANDIA to obtain logistic requirements and pick up boats, thence to BIAK to load unquote.
Make same correction then insert new sentences "Clear and open SUBIC BAY for shipping. Initiate MTB operations at earliest practicable date". Para 3 (X) (8) (B) add "11th US Corps to assault and indicate GHQ reserve to 41st US Inf Div". Delete K-Day and substitute B-Day. Para 3 (X) (8) (D) for third line substitute "The objective area for the M7 assault is the SAN ANTONIO-CASTILLEJOS-SAN FELIPE Area". Wherever occurring correct K-Day to B-Day. M3 assault to M7 assault. Objective area from AIGAN to SAN ANTONIO-FELIPE. Annex B Para Roman 2 arabic 1 Delete entire para and substitute therefore tasks assigned GHQ Op Instructions 87 copies of which mailed action adees. Changes 1, 2 and 3 to include corrected tasks Annex B will be distributed in printed form to all holders op plan.

Top Secret. Upon completion HONG KONG HAINAN strikes today consider immediate future dividends from further offensive operations by this force in CHINA SEA not commensurate with forces and effort involved. As defensive cover Task Force 38 is being contained. Finally CHINA focus of operations so restrictive as to invite air attack. Recommend Task Force 38 move east of FORMOSA LUZON line after fueling 17th. From that position can move to meet any reported enemy fleet detachments approaching LINGAYEN and can photo strike OKINAWA as opportunity offers. Persistent weather front has been lying over OKINAWA and may necessitate considerable waiting before desired photos can be obtained. Para Based on logistic considerations alone Task Force 38 situation as follows: (A) Fuel immediately available for CHINA SEA operations permits 8 more days. If proper notification received this can be extended by bringing in additional oilers. (B) Provisions for more than 30 days. (C) Ammunition for at least 8 more strike days exclusive of AP and fish always reserved for fleet action.
16 1836  CINC PAC to COMINCH info. CINCSWPA, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Para 1. My 130850 to CINCSWPA. Com 3rdFLt 160211. All available intelligence indicates that KONGO HARUNA NAGATO YAMATA Force is still in empire while ISE HYUGA Force in vicinity LINGGA SINGAPORE. Meanwhile enemy air strength in FORMOSA and OKINAWA is increasing to an extent which makes it primary target for carrier attack. 3rd Fleet operations in South CHINA SEA in a more or less fixed position are obtaining diminishing returns with increasing risk. Para 2. Propose direct HALSEY on completing today's fueling move to eastward of LUZON STRAIT and strike enemy air force FORMOSA and OKINAWA. He will still be in position to intercept heavy ships coming from empire. Para three. To cover LINGAYEN dash MINDORO against LINGGA dash SINGAPORE force propose for about three weeks augment KINKAIDS eight American cruisers and fifty destroyers with four battleships in best condition and will plan to conduct detachment bombardment with BatDivFive plus NEVADA, TENNESSEE and IDAHO augmented by fast battleships as necessary. By this means safety LINGAYEN will be ensured and contingent on readiness fast carrier force TOKYO strike and capture of TWO JIMA will take place close to scheduled date with the effective strategic support of PHILIPPINE campaign. Para four. Request concurrence as early as practicable.

16 2220  COMINCH & CNO to CINCPOA info. CINCSWPA, COM5THFLT, COM3RDFLT, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Concur in your 161836.
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15 2201 CINC BPF to COMINCH info. ADMIRALTY, CINCPAC.

Top Secret. Following is a repetition of my 150136. I hereby report for duty in accordance with the octagon decisions. (2) The British Fleet will look forward to fighting along side the United States Navy in whatever area you may assign us.

16 1837 CINCPOA to COMGEN20THBOMBCOM info. DEFCOM20TH AF, CINCSWPA, COM7THFLT.

Top Secret. Recommend if practicable you include LINGGA roads in your mining plans for 25 January.

15 1234Z CINC BPF to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT info. ADMIRALTY BAD WASHINGTON.

Top Secret. This is part 1 my 151241 organization of British Pacific Fleet. Task Force 110 for use by CinC BPF Task Force 117 fleet train Task Force 118 fast carrier force. Remainder unassigned. (2) It is intended to use task force callsigns and frequencies for Task Force 57 for instructional purposes unless otherwise ordered (3) British nomenclature of units and authorities forming the task force are:

Read in 3 columns: 1 unit or authority. 2 Short title of unit. 3 Short title of senior officer.

British Pacific Fleet BPF CinCBPF, Vice Admiral second in command British Pacific Fleet NIL VA BPF, Naval Air Stations NIL FONAS, Vice Admiral Administration British Pacific Fleet NIL VAQ, fleet train NIL RAFT, carrier squadrons NIL RAA BPF.

17 0133 CINCPAC to COMINCH, CNO.

Top Secret. Area Petroleum Officer (Captain LOHMANN) has personal letter from Rear Admiral CARTER AMPB presented by Captain MONTGOMERY RNVR which contains following "As you know Royal Navy petroleum requirements for those units serving in Pacific Ocean areas are to be included in the figures which you send us". Request official information as to source of petroleum products for British Pacific Fleet as soon as practicable to avoid embarrassment in relations with that fleet. See my 290513 to which no reply received.
16 2359 CINCPOA to COM3RDFLT info. CINCSWPA, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, COMINCH.

Top Secret. Comply intent my 161836. Acknowledge at first suitable opportunity.

17 0243 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC info. CTF 38, CINCSOWESPAC, COM7THFLT, CTF 77, COMAAF.

Top Secret. Your 162359 acknowledged. Fueling will continue into 18th due to weather. If enemy still unaware our location will transit LUZON STRAITS night 18-19 January otherwise will force passage in manner best suited to situation. Silence will signify arrival east of Straits on 19th. Plan strike FORMOSA from east on 19th fuel 20th strike OKINAWA 21st or 22nd.

16 0327 CINC BPF to CINCPAC info. COMSEVENTHFLEET BAD WASHINGTON.

Top Secret. (1) I have been informed by the British Admiralty Delegation WASHINGTON which has been in consultation with CDK that the ANPB will be responsible for the supply of bulk petroleum products to all British units operating in the Pacific (2) I have been asked to forward you my requirements which are as follows (3) Initial bulk supplies will be required as follows by 20th February at MANUS (A) furnace oil 70,000 (70,000) tons (B) diesel oil 2500 (2500) tons (C) aviation spirit 1,000 (1,000) tons by 5 March at advanced anchorage (D) furnace oil 140,000 tons (E) diesel oil 2500 tons (F) aviation part one my 160345.

16 0345 CINC BPF to CINCPAC info. COM7TH FLEET BAD WASHINGTON.

Top Secret. Part 2 final of CINC BPF 160345 spirit 2000 tons (4) It is estimated that requirements for April will be approximately (A) furnace oil 130000 tons (B) diesel oil 4000 tons (C) aviation spirit 2500 tons at present it is not possible to give the distribution of that between MANUS and the advanced anchorage (5) Confirmation is requested that these requirements can be met.
Top Secret. Listing of units constituting Army garrison force APO 248 in CinCPOA serial 0001191 differs extremely from the present constitution of that unit as to indicate a fundamental change in the Pilbus agreement. It was agreed that the units now assigned to Army garrison force APO 248 which were organized to establish the YAP Base were transferred to the Southwest Pacific area to perform the same function there. A study of CinCPOA's letter 0001191 indicates that CinCPOA now contemplates the transfer of the 24th Corps of many of these units. Units of the following general categories were not and still are not available in the Southwest Pacific to implement the present accelerated campaign and it was to meet this requirement that APO 248 was made available in the basic agreement. Most important units by type are: Signal construction, air WLR wing and service units, anti-aircraft units, port battalion, amphibious truck companies, engineer LJ Plt, general service and maintenance units, ordnance ammunition and heavy maintenance companies, quartermaster service companies.

Our radio CX 5563 of 30 December to which no answer has been received was intended to clear possible minor variations in the composition of Army garrison force APO 248. It is requested that CinCPOA's serial 0001191 be reviewed in connection with our CX 5563 to bring the former in harmony with the latter and with the obvious requirement of the PHILIPPINE base to perform the function required by PILHAS agreement.

CINCEI to ADMIRALTY, SAGSEAC, ACNB, HQSWPA, COM7THFLT, CTF 71, US COMDRPACFLT, CSWPST, SOET, RANYD, RNLO, DELHI CINCBPFI info. RAABPF, VABPF, VA 3.

Top Secret. Operation will be carried out by Force SI 3 consisting of indomitable (RAABPF) victorious illustrious indefatigable King George 5th Argonaut Black Prince Euryalus and 10 destroyers and Force SI 9 consisting of 1 destroyer (Part 1 my 131024). CINCBPFI 031147 December para 3 not to all addressees.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

13 0956 CINCEI to CINCPAC.

Top Secret. Part 2 CINCEI 131024. Escorting 4 oilers (1 to rendezvous from Fremantle). 2. Object air strike oil refineries PALEMBANG. 3. Outline program WE D minus 9 Force SI 9 sails Trincomalee D minus SI Force SI 3 sails Trincomalee D minus 2 1st refueling D day to D plus 2 1st strike period D plus 4 and 5 2nd refueling D plus 7 to 9 2nd strike period.

13 1024 CINCEI to CINCPAC.


13 1046 CINCEI to ADMIRALTY, CSWPSF, SACSEAB, SOEF, KANDY, ACNB RNLO DELHI, HQSWPA, CINCBPF, CTF 71, COM7THFLT, US COMDRPACFLT info. RAABPF, VABDF, VA3.


170432 CTF 77 to CINCSWPA, LEYTE and LINGAYEN info. CINCPAC, COM7THFLT, COMCINCH, COM5THFLT, 7THFLT HQ LEYTE.

Top Secret. Right as augmented. CINCPAC 161336. Adequate for defense MINDORO-LINGAYEN against enemy heavy surface forces. Assuming retention PORTLAND and MINNEAPOLIS total of US cruisers would be 6 as Phoenix Boise Denver Montpelier only cruisers now with 7th flt although Cleveland is enroute to arrive LEYTE about 30 January. I have one Australian CA the SHROPSHIRE. However this combined total is considered to be adequate at present. Para. The total of 50 destroyers crippled during the reinforcement and contingent operations there presents a difficult problem. Adequate destroyer screens are required for the 4 OBBS 7 cruisers and 6 CVEs. A total of 19 large ships. 22 destroyers (augmented by anti submarine DEs) is considered a minimum with the prevalent type of Jap air tactics. This would leave a total of 28 for harbor defense and anti submarine screens for large volume of merchant type shipping and fleet auxiliaries at LINGAYEN MINDORO and LEYTE.
and CHRTIN escort of transports and amphibious types lifting 5 reinforced divisions plus streamlined airborne division and regimental combat team from points between New Guinea and Leyte Island at Lingayen and coastal points in ZAMBALES AND BATANGAS Provinces for M-1 reinforcement and contingent NSOMSE by combining transport types with LSTs where practicable and accepting delays caused by consequent 8 knot convoy speeds. By reducing destroyers escorting transgroups proceeding separately to not more than 6, and by using only DEs and smaller craft with convoys of merchant and miscellaneous shipping the destroyer requirements for these purposes can be reduced to a minimum of 36, all of which would be at sea on the same day at certain times. The total minimum requirement would thus be 58 DDs until 29 January at THESEFOR Shore. With 30 US and 2 Australian DDs now assigned the 7th Fleet this would require the retention of a minimum of 26 POA destroyers until the completion of the contingent assault now scheduled for 29 January. No allowance is made for losses due to battle or other causes nor for at anchor keep. Para. Our files of communications exchanged between CINCPOA and CINCWPA indicates agreement on the retention of a total of 21 POA DDs until 18 February (7 of DesRon 2, 9 of DesRon 49, 4 of DesDiv 102, plus the ABBOTT). It is recommended that agreement be reached on the retention of 5 additional DDs until 5 February at ULITHI. Suggest that ships assigned be those of DesRon 62 of which only 5 RJGIN this are (BAFAYN LAFFEY, MOALE, INGRAM, KOWREY with minor battle damage).

Top Secret. Para 1. The principal requirements for combat employment of Marine Corps aviation during the next 6 months in order of importance are: A. Shore based operations during ICEBERG in which severe attrition will be experienced in the 3 fighter groups involved. B. Operations from escort carriers and carriers. C. GARRISONS, MIDWAY, MARSHALLS, CAROLINES. D. Operations of Marine Air Wing 1 in
Southwest Pacific Area.Para 2. After discussion with Vice Admiral FITCH I am not certain as to whether or not your 151632 contemplates meeting ICEBERG commitments and continuing loan of MarAirWing 1 to Allied Air Force, SWPA. Opinion here is that manning 16 escort carriers will certainly require withdrawal of Marine Air Wing 1 from the Southwest Pacific and probably not completely feasible if ICEBERG requirements are met and if Marine Corps aviation is not to be expanded. Para 3. If Marine Air Wing 1 is withdrawn to support the carrier program recommend it be accomplished by tactically balanced increments namely a light bomber group and fighter group together in each of 2 increments. Medium bombers as a separate increment. Para 4. Concur in long range plan to man 16 escort carriers with Marines providing other commitments are met without expansion Marine Corps aviation.

Top Secret. LINGGAI anchorage will receive priority consideration for another operation possibly within month. Meagre confirmation here on exact enemy anchorage location. Desire your available data for definition our mine field placements. Urdis 161837 impracticable include LINGGA ROADS in forthcoming operation.

Top Secret. Allied Air Forces attack FORMOSA scheduled 18 January has been called off due to possible interference with 3rd Fleet operations directed in CINCPOAS 162359. Request 3rd Fleet advise when practicable as to his schedule in order that 5th Air Force strikes may be instituted in FORMOSA.

Top Secret. 14th Air Force hitting HONG KONG about 0530 GCT 18th and 19th. B-24s and P-51s involved.
30 1328  COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC Info COM7THFLEET

Your 290513. To effect most efficient employment tankers in Pacific areas and utilize world wide sources of petroleum supply essential that providing these products be the responsibility of a single agency through existing area petroleum organizations. Agreements in CNO serial 0365312 confirmed. Your future requirements submitted via area petroleum office should include increased quantities necessary for Royal Navy units. ANPB will be responsible for delivery these requirements by commercial tankers into areas where Royal Navy will furnish sufficient oilers to service Royal Navy units.

16 2210  COMMAF SWPA to CINCPOA, COMSUBPAC Info CINCSWPA, COM3RDFLT, COMAF 5, CTF 77.

Top Secret. 5th Air Force FORMOSA strikes cancelled 16 January due weather and will be postponed indefinitely during establishment of air force in LINGAYEN Area. Appreciate action by ComSubPac on our request for sub life-guard service. Will make similar request at later date giving at least 48 hours notice.

16 2254  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WEDEMeyer Info LEMAY, MACARTHUR, KENNEY, HARMON, CINCPOA, STRATEMEYER, MOUNTBATTEN.

Reconsideration has been given to basing 20 Bomber Command outside of CHINA in view of your CFBX 31091 of 12 January. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the course of action outlined herein subject to availability of the necessary shipping, the provision of which is now under study: (A) The 20 Bomber Command to vacate bases in CHINA at once. (B) The 20 Bomber Command to prepare to arrive in the MARIANAS, 2 groups by 1 April and 2 groups by 15 April, thereby delaying the scheduled move of the 314th Wing of B-29s to that area. (C) The 20 Bomber Command to conduct limited operations from INDIA bases against strategic targets from SINGAPORE north to the limit of their range employing both bombs and mines, to conduct reconnaissance and also to perform such missions as requested by SOUTHEAST ASIA Command as might otherwise have been performed by the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group. (D) To move the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group and appropriate service units at your discretion from the 10th Air Force in INDIA to the 14th Air Force in CHINA concurrently with the vacating of the CHENGDU bases by the 20 Bomber Command. (E) The 2 fighter groups deployed to CHINA for the protection of the 20th Air Force units at CHENGDU will remain temporarily assigned to the 14th Air Force. They will, however, be retained available for movement to 20th Air Force bases in the Pacific at a later date. (F) You will provide the required support by the 14th Air Force for operation ICEBERG. In this connection you will be expected to deliver approximately the same effort in the SHANGHAI area as would have been possible if the 20 Bomber Command had remained in CHENGDU. - Continued -
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WEDEMEYER Info LEMAY, ETC CONT'D.

(G) The 315th Wing to be retained in training in the U.S. for an additional month making its readiness date 1 May instead of 1 April. The 315th Wing then to take over the base establishment originally planned for the 316th Wing. Since the 315th Wing is a special instrument precision unit, the additional training time is considered most desirable.

(H) The 316th Wing to be similarly retained in the training establishment for 1 additional month making its readiness date for its 1st 2 groups in July instead of June and that it then be deployed to the RYUKYUS in place of the 20 Bomber Command as currently planned. (I) On arrival in the MARIANAS the 20 Bomber Command to retain its present organization but to operate as a wing under the 21 Bomber Command. During this period to reconstitute the 58th Wing so that the 20 Bomber Command may ultimately be released to be deployed in the PHILIPPINE-RYUKYU area to control the reconverted groups to be ultimately based therein. 2. The foregoing courses of action permit you to take the steps you desire, namely: (1) To bring into CHINA the medium bombardment squadron belonging to the 14th Air Force which is still in INDIA and also to bring an additional heavy bombardment group and such supporting units as you elect into CHINA. You are aware of the fact that there are no additional air units available to you in INDIA or CHINA except parts of the 10th Air Force. Your plans to move additional air service units into CHINA will have to be expressed in detail and considered separately.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to NIMITZ Info MACARTHUR, WEDEMEYER.

Top Secret. Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the general concept of the 3 phases of ICEBERG comprises a necessary course of action to insure security and adequate support for further advances, and in view of the prospective limitation in forces and resources, expansion in the BUNKHOUSE following the seizure of LEGUMINOUS is the best course within our capabilities, as we now see them, to broaden the base of operations for fulfillment of the first phase of the over-all objective in the war against JAPAN. Decision as to an operation on the SUBLIME COAST will be deferred for the present. Para 2. It is, therefore, directed:

(A) That plans and preparations for expansion in the BUNKHOUSE following the seizure of LEGUMINOUS along the general lines of ICEBERG be continued. This operation is within your current directive. Para. (B) That pending further decision, preparations for a SUBLIME COAST operation should be deferred, but planning should continue for an operation in the CHUSAN-NINGPO Area.
JANUARY (GCT)

17 0631 COMNAVGRP CHINA to CINCPOA. Info ComGen USF CHINA THEATER, COMFIFTHFLEET, CINCWPAPA.

Commenting on urdis 122013. Concur in suggested supporting operations for ICEBERG. HONGKONG strikes will probably be limited due to weather but will conduct to maximum of my capabilities (signed Chennault).

17 1229 MACARTHUR to CINCPOA Info CINC US FLEET, COMTHIRDFLEET, COMSEVENTHFLEET, GHQ SWPA.

I am concerned at your 161836 suggesting the immediate withdrawal from Kinkaid's local covering force of two old battleships to be returned for repairs. His fleet will then be a central position between two echelons of the enemy's naval forces. He will be clearly superior to the one to the south but will be in doubtful superiority to the one to the north and in unquestionable inferiority if the two enemy airmn units attack in concert. It is not improbable that the Japanese will strike in strength when the Third Fleet is drawn away. I do not believe that the strategic position of the Third Fleet in the Empire or in the MARIANAS will necessarily prevent his movement to the south for a quick attack against Kinkaid's forces. The Seventh Fleet augmented by only 4 old battleships opposed to the enemy force of 8HE possibly 6 battleships might well be unable to cover LINGAYEN which might result in disaster to our PHILIP-PINE operations. I strongly urge the retention of his present strength of 6 old battleships until the situation has clarified. If two old battleships are to be returned for repair they should be replaced by others which are just out of overhaul.

17 1400 CINCWPAPA to CINCPOA Info HDQ. SWPA.

Reference said radiogram 092135, all combat troops Southwest Pacific Area at present in the LEYTE area are expected to be loaded out for operations on LUZON before the end of January. The 24th Corps will be the only combatant unit present, pending the arrival of the Americal Division, which should close in this area about 22 February. Until then, the 24th Corps will have to perform part of the combat mission and will also have to assist in the operation of the port, including working its new equipment and supplies ashore. It will be assembled in accordance with my radiogram 0756091 and rehabilitation and reequipment will be pushed with the greatest vigor. In view of the above, it is believed the operational control of this unit should remain in this area until the unit departs. I could suggest that the preferable system would be to permit free correspondence between the 10th Army and 24th Corps on all matters relating to rehabilitation, reequipment, and launching of this unit. It is hoped that Cincpoa will feel free to send officers of his command to visit this unit and to oversee its preparation without further request on this headquarters.
Top Secret. Delayed dates for return of CVEs and escorts were discussed with Admiral Sherman during visit to LEYTE and at BOMBE was tentatively understood these dates generally would be satisfactory. A confirming radiogram CX 55666 DTG 301431 was dispatched from this headquarters under the DTG (5 gr garble) was received to this radiogram and in order to proceed, the assumption was made that the delayed dates would be satisfactory. These dates cannot be changed without compromising the success of the LUZON campaign, since the escorts are required to protect convoys carrying reinforcing units. A continuing effort will be made to meet the dates which you desire as nearly as the tactical situation will permit. Analysis of your serial 0001164 indicates that the amphibious equipment listed therein will be returned to the places indicated on the dates required with the exception of certain ships which had originally been agreed to be returned to LEYTE and those were changed to more distant locations. It will be impracticable to change plans to effect return of vessels of the excepted category to the more distant location on same schedule as they were to be returned to LEYTE.

Subject to comments in my (top secret) CX 50030 (too 171229) with regard to battleships concur in Com7thFleet dispatch 170342.

This refers your 170432 not to all in regard to destroyers. Of those DD scheduled to return HORROR 24 January you are authorized to retain GRIDLEY, MAURY, and MCCAUL of DesRon 6. STEVENS and DASHIELL of DesRon 25. IZARD of DesRon 56. Para. 57 DD under your operational control through 5 February will then be as follows. 7 of DesRon 2. 5 of DesRon 5. 3 of DesRon 6. 3 of DesRon 14. 8 of DesRon 21. 9 of DesRon 22. 5 of DesRon 23. 2 of DesRon 25. 1 of DesRon 48. 9 of DesRon 49. 4 of DesRon 51. 1 of DesRon 56. Total 57 DD. Para. Of the DD listed above the following are expected to be returned to POA by 18 February. 7 of DesRon 2 and 4 of DesRon 51 at MAINYARD. 9 of DesRon 49 at ACCUMULATION. The following will have reported to you by 18 February. BANKROFT and BAILEY of DesRon 14. DYSON and THATCHER of DesRon 23 and an additional DD to be designated. It is requested that you then release the remaining 3 DD of DesRon 6. 2 DD DesRon 25. 1 DD DesRon 56. Para.

Following these exchanges a total of 36 DD will continue under your operational control as follows. DesRon 5 less LAMSON, DesRon 14 less GAMSEVOORT. CALDWELL, COOCHLAN. DesRon 21 less ROSS. DesRon 22. DesRon 23 less AULICK plus ABBOTT (DD 629) and 1 DD to be designated. Desire ABBOTT be returned.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

18 0358 CINCPAC to CTF, Etc. (Cont'd).

To POA when relieved by AULICK (DD 569) about 2 March. This also answers your 160442. My serial 0001164 of 24 Dec as previously modified is changed accordingly.

18 0947 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC, CINCSOWESTPAC, Info COM7THFLT, COMMAAF, COM13TH AF, ALL TFC's & TGC's 3RD & 7TH FLTS.

In executing Plan EXIT see my 112239. With X Day 19 January.

18 1001 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC, ADV ECH GHQ SWP LIEUTE, CINCSOWESTPAC, Info CINCSOWESTPAC, CTF 77.

Inability to refuel in southern area plus vulnerability to attack and storm damage in LUZON STRAITS during prevailing heavy weather makes eastward passage via that route uncertain and undesirable. Expect refuel 19th under LAE of LUZON and unless otherwise directed will then transit via SURIGAO. Strategic awkwardness recognized but weather and tactical considerations dictate this compromise.

18 1033 COM3RDFLT to CINCPAC.

Halsey to Nimitz only. Your 142233 do not believe proposal can be carried out in practice. Next objectives require full strength of all groups. Best solution would be to (A) Send 1 group back when force still has about 50% bombs. (B) Limit operations of groups remaining at sea to those absolutely necessary to success of the Pacific Ocean Area-Southwest Pacific Area Campaign as a whole. (C) If all of TF 38 can not be withdrawn send single groups back for replenishment as quick succession as possible. Para. This discussion is for planning purposes only and will not be put into effect without further word from you.

18 1812 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH COM7THFLT, COM3RDFLT.

Your 171229, CTF 77 170432 in which I concur generally. CTF 77 180526. I do not share your opinion as to the ability of the enemy to concentrate a force of 6 battleships for a quick attack on Kinkaid's forces nor do I consider the Japanese Fleet capable of inflicting disaster to our Philippine operations if our fleet is employed offensively. Acceptance of the view that the PHILIPPINES must have in addition to your air force a local naval defense force continuously on station capable of meeting all the heavy ships left in the Japanese Fleet would effectively prevent further major offensive operations in the Pacific for an indefinite period. The best naval protection for the PHILIPPINES as well as for the exposed island positions elsewhere in the Pacific is to proceed with offensive operations against JAPAN. Para. I therefore repeat my request for the immediate return of the two damaged battleships most in need of repairs in order that their fighting efficiency may be
18 1812 CINCPOA TO CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, ETC. (CONT'D)

restored and their return to profitable service expedited. Para. The temporary retention of PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS and five additional destroyers requested by Kinkaid's 170432 is approved. Please acknowledge receipt.

18 1814 CINCPOA to CINCSWPA ADV ECH GHQ Info COMINCH, COMGENPOA COMGEN 10.

For General MacArthur personally. Para one. Preparations of the 24th Corps for employment in the ICEBERG Operation have been hampered by certain conditions in the LEYTE-SAMAR area to a degree which unless corrected will jeopardize the success of ICEBERG. Immediate corrective action is requested as follows colon: (A) Acceptance of FO 327 HQ USAFPOA 20 October as modified by FO 333 HQ USAFPOA and my serial 0001060 of 2 December as defining the composition of the XXIV Corps and APO 248 for the purpose of par 7c of the FILBAS AGREEMENT of 4 November. Inability to replace units essential to readiness of the XXIV Corps for ICEBERG compels adherence to these legitimate orders which were in effect when FILBAS AGREEMENT was approved. (B) Relief of all units of the XXIV Corps including all service and supporting units from all operations and duties not connected with rehabilitation. CX transfer of all units of the XXIV Corps, including AAA troops, to control of the Corps Commander and assembly of the Corps in areas suitable for rehabilitation and for the reception, sorting, maintenance, and issuing of equipment and supplies. (D) Transfer of operational control of the XXIV Corps to ComGen 10th Army in accordance with my des 092135 January and under the principles established by JCS 012144 of May 1944 (WARX 30441). "Transfer of administrative control of the XXIV Corps and attached units to ComGenPOA concurrent with transfer of operational control to 10th Army. It is understood that members of the XXIV Corps or its attached units who are returned to duty from hospitals in the Southwest Pacific prior to departure of the XXIV Corps will rejoin their units. This in no way will lessen responsibility for logistical support by SWPA as prescribed by the FILBAS AGREEMENT". (E) Replacement of any critical items of equipment and supply which the XXIV Corps was required to furnish to other units for MUSKETEER Operations and avoidance of future requirements of this nature. (F) SWPA provide lighterage needed by the XXIV Corps in the LEYTE Area. My records indicate large numbers useful landing craft in 7th Fleet at bases in NEW GUINEA or to the EASTWARD. (G) Subordinate SWPA agencies in the LEYTE Area be informed of the provisions of the FILBAS AGREEMENT which affect the XXIV Corps and directed to carry them out. Para. Para 2. In accordance with ComGenPOA 162220 January (passed to you) desire to send to your headquarters a liaison group from ComGenPOA's staff of 4 officers headed by Brigadier General Francis E Englehardt.

- Continued -
I also desire to send to your headquarters for a brief period as my own representative for discussion of matters covered by this dispatch Brigadier General Herman Feldman of my staff. Your concurrence in these visits is requested.

Para 3. The intent of the various agreements which I have approved in connection with the XXIV Corps was to make available to you for LEYTE the same well equipped combat unit which General Richardson had prepared for YAP and then to have it available for ICEBERG in the same strength and with the same composition. General Richardson's Field Orders are the only documents which define its composition authoritatively.

Para 4. The foregoing 3 paragraphs were drafted yesterday after conference with Generals Richardson, Buckner and Hodge and their Chiefs of Staff together with the General Officers of my Joint Staff and has their concurrence. Your 171400 just received is my 1st formal advice of your intention to continue the active employment of the SSIV Corps too long to permit its readiness for the ICEBERG Operation as now scheduled a procedure which must have the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Please acknowledge receipt. Nimitz.

Your 181001. Although I expect you to make the final decision on the spot my views are as follows. In withdrawing your fleet from the SOUTH CHINA SEA the governing consideration is maintenance of optimum strategic and tactical position against possible enemy naval threat to our LUZON position from the north. Passage of your whole fleet through SURIGAO will give enemy definite information of your relinquishment of such a position. Exit via LUZON STRAIT under conditions which will avoid storm damage and concurrently permit offensive use of carrier aircraft is preferred even if your stay in SOUTH CHINA SEA is prolonged several days.

Para 2. There is no objection to sending oilers damaged ships and light units through SURIGAO. Para 3. My weather information although meager is that reinforced monsoon now blowing normally abates after a few days. Para 4. I am proud of your recent successes and have confidence in your judgment.

Concur your 181837.

14 0200. CINCPOA to CINCSWPA Info COM7THFLT, COMGEN 6TH ARMY, COMGEN 8TH ARMY.

This answers your 301431 December received today by lettered paragraphs as indicated. (A) Affirmative. (B) These specific DD's cannot be omitted from redeployment as proposed. However it will be noted in my serial 0001164 of 24 December that a total of 50 DD's are planned to continue to operate with the 7th Fleet until 18 February at which time the number will be reduced to permanent strength presented by Cominm now 36. (C) 6 DMS and 1 DM required HORROR 6 February. (D) 8 YMS 6 PC and 3 PCS not required MAINYARD until 16 Feb. (E) Affirmative. (F) 2 DMS, 1 DM at ACCUMULATION 9 February. Remaining small craft divided equally between ACCUMULATION and MAINYARD. (G) Affirmative. (H) Affirmative. Arrival HORROR 11 February preferable. Para. Aside from the units specifically mentioned herein it is desired that redeployment be conducted as indicated in my serial 0001164. This also acknowledges your 111207.

17 1916 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC Info COMAIRPAC.

Your 140050 approved. You are authorized to establish a new flag officer command in the Pacific Ocean Area as subordinate command of Air Force Pacific Fleet in the forward area to be known as Commander, Air Force Subordinate Command Forward Area short title AirPac-SubComFord. Bureaus and offices of Navy Dept take necessary action. When he is available the assignment of Rear Admiral Gunther to this command is satisfactory. This is Cominch and CNO number 40.

18 1022 COM3RDFLT to CINCSOWESPAC Info CINCPOA, COMFEAF, GHQ ADV ECH, COMAF 5, CTF 38.

Reference your 171443. Unfavorable weather has caused Third Fleet schedule to be unpredictable. Suggest you continue your strikes dependent on your capabilities alone. Meanwhile will keep you advised our plans. Foresee no difficulty of simultaneous strikes by both forces in future provided pilots each force briefed they may encounter aircraft of the other.

18 1231 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info COM7THFLT, COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (WASATCH), ADV ECH GHQ, CTF 77.

Concur your 150649 relative investigation CASIGURUN BAY.
On completion fueling 19th will head for BALINTANG with intent to transit undetected night 20-21 January. Attack FORMOSA 21st fuel 22nd strike OKINAWA 23rd or 24th. Schedule subject to modification by weather, tactical situation or availability of important targets.

Estimate of general situation. Air strength negligible Southeast CHINA Coast and INDO CHINA. Collapsed in LUZON and currently not aggressive FORMOSA. Naval threat to MacArthur from south negligible due loss of NICHIEI and damage to KAOUI. Reported damaged condition of 1 BB-XCV 2 CA (air photo) and shaken confidence resulting from 3rd Fleet operations. Empire naval forces incapable of more than hit and run attack on LINGAYEN; such attack would face early detection. Stiff resistance and harrassed retreat and could not inflict sufficient damage to secure control of the sea nor fatally affect the PHILIPPINES Campaign. Japs know they are licked in the PHILIPPINES and will not attempt serious reinforcement in face of our air surface and ground superiority. Para. Abnormal shipping concentrations north of Lat 22-00 indicate large projects and/or shortage of fuel. Escorts or harbor facilities from estimate of enemy impotency south of Lat 22-00 plus evidence of feverish activity to the north I incline to the belief that enemy may be evacuating vulnerable facilities from FORMOSA but digging in inside perimeter of the EAST CHINA SEA and strengthening local defenses FORMOSA ISHIGAKI MIYAKO SHIMA OKINAWA. If that estimate is correct he has written off the PHILIPPINES and will not indulge in any dubious counter attacks that risk further losses to dwindling defense forces and could not permanently stop our PHILIPPINES Campaign. Para. In view of foregoing it seems important not to delay DETACHMENT and ICEBERG for the same aggressive reason that dictated adherence to MINDORO and LINGAYEN dates. 3rd Fleet's best immediate contribution is vigorous attack on shipping along FORMOSA OKINAWA line with concurrent smothering of enemy air and early return ULITHI in preparation for DETACHMENT.
January (GCT)

20 0435 COMGENAFPOA to CINCPOA info COMGENPOA.

Top Secret. Directives by Cincpoa are necessary to provide VLR wing facilities at TINIAN West Field and GUAM North and Northwest Fields. References as follows:
A. Cincpoa top secret ltr serial 00057 of 12 January 45.
B. ComGenAAFPPOA radio to Cincpoa NR 0274 of 5 January.
C. WarDept radio WARX 21762, Jan 45.
If radio directives are issued at once to provide VLR wing facilities as indicated in references above and in addition to include facilities at the GUAM depot for 2 additional VLR units can be accommodated as follows:
- 2 groups of BomCom 20 on TINIAN West Field by 1 April,
- 2 groups of 315 Wing on Northwest Field GUAM by 1 June,
- 2 groups of 315 Wing on Northwest Field GUAM by 1 July.

New Subject. The deployment of the 316 Wing on INDESPENSABLE will require that 5 aviation engineer battalions be echeloned so as to arrive on INDESPENSABLE between W-Day and W plus 40.

The 1924, 807, 1908, 1909, and 1882 Aviation Engineer Battalions are available for employment in INDESPENSABLE. If practicable to meet the above echelonment of aviation engineer battalions, 2 groups of the 316 Wing can be deployed on INDESPENSABLE by 1 August 45 (W plus 90) and remaining 2 grps by 1 Sept 45 (W plus 120). Recommend that your decision as to availability of facilities be transmitted to ComAF 20 in order that unit readiness dates may be established.

19 1252 MACARTHUR to CINCPOA info COMINCH COM3RDFLT COM7THFLT GHQSWPA.

Top Secret. Your 181812. The temporary retention of the two old battleships in question can not materially affect the accomplishment of future offensive operations against Japan. Nor did my message mean the indefinite retention of a naval force here continuously capable of meeting all heavy units of the Japanese Fleet. It dealt with the relatively short and critical period between your withdrawal of the Third Fleet and the installation of our air force on LUZON which is at present limited to a few fighter squadrons. During that time when the potential of our land based aviation is so low I do not believe adequate protection of the LINGAYEN base against enemy surface craft will be provided if the major naval strength is reduced to 4 old battleships. I shall interpose no further comment however and request that you inform me of the date which you desire these ships withdrawn.

19 1729 CINCPAC to Com3rdFLT info COMINCH CINCSPWA COM5THFLT COM7THFLT COMFDAREA.

This is top secret. Your 190910 completely concurred in. I consider also that shipping is banking up to north because of fear of your activities to southward.
The neutralization of enemy held positions in the MARSHALLS has progressed a point where each operation against them must be reviewed to make certain that the expenditure of personnel fuel explosives and stores is necessary and justified by the results to be obtained.

Recommendations your letter subject "Disposition of Forces" dated 15 Jan 1945 are approved. You are authorized to initiate action to release the 489th Bomb Group from allocation to POA. It is understood that the 494th and 30th Groups will be designated for ICEBERG and that the 11th Group less 2 squadrons will be returned to OAHU.

Cincpoa will be responsible for providing bulk petroleum requirements of British Pacific Fleet while basing at MANUS and while operating in POA. BritFlt tentatively scheduled to arrive MANUS 20 February and requirements until departure will be met by Cincpoa. ETA ULITHI 5 March. Comservpac APO will schedule additional deliveries to meet operational requirements of BritFlt thereafter. Cargoes of arriving tankers are not ear-marked expressly for BritFlt whose requirements will be provided from the total available products in all storage and carrying vessels. Accounting procedures later. ComserRon 10 will include in routine fuel reports as separate items data on amounts on hand in British AO and issues to BritFlt units.

Change 4 to my OpPlan 18-44. Task Organization. (A) TF 78 reduce DD's assigned to 34. (B) TG 77.3 correct to read 4 CL, 6 DD. (C) TG 77.4 correct to read 6 CVE, 7 DD, 4 DE. R. Adm. Stump delete para (F). Para 3a 3rd sentence delete all after "over water movement". Air cover will be provided by shore based air. Delete 6th sentence. Fire support will be provided by vessels of M. Attack group. Additional fire support if required and limited air support and cover to be obtained by direct request to commanders close covering and escort carrier groups. Para 3b delete 1st sentence. Close covering group operate as directed by separate despatch. Delete 6th sentence and substitute "Provide fire support for landings as arranged with CTF 78 and attack group commanders". Para 3c delete 1st sentence.

20 0535 CINCSWPA to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGENPOA, COMGEN 10.

CAY 50063. Your 181814. The 24th Corps will be ready for ICEBERG as previously contemplated to meet its scheduled date of April 1st. I will be glad to have the representatives from your headquarters visit this area for the conference you suggest in an endeavor to compose all details of these Army matters.

20 1817 CINCPAC to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, COM7THFLT, CTF 77.

Your cooperative reply, your 191252, greatly appreciated. I expect a stiff fight for the beaches in ICEBERG and every bombardment unit available will save the lives of many soldiers and marines. Accordingly request immediate release 2 damaged battleships and return for necessary repairs.

21 0156 CINCPAC to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, COMGENPOA, COMGEN 10, COMGEN 24TH CORPS, COMPHIBSPAC.

Am very pleased to have the assurance of your 200535. For your information my present plans involve commencement loading and sailing from LYTE as follows in order to be ready for principal assault on 1 April. 77th Div commence loading 25 February rehearse 9-16 March sail 19 March. 24th Corps less 77th Division commence loading 2 March rehearse 14-21 sail 27 March.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY 1945 (GCT)

25 1115 COMGEN BOMCOM 20 to CINCPOA Info COMSUEBPAC, CTF 71

TOP SECRET. February tentative schedule. Begins with 112 sorties on SINGAPORE Naval Base on 1 February. Similar maximum effort on A's dock area SINGAPORE for 7 Feb. 60 sorties on RANGOON on 11 Feb. Similar medium effort strikes on SINGAPORE floating drydock on 15 Feb. SAIGON on 19 Feb. SINGAPORE on 23 Feb and 27 Feb. Possibility of LINWAKUTNING operation during next MQO period. Also substitute mission of 60 sorties being held in 24 hour readiness status for opportunity strike on enemy shipping within our INDIA base range. This schedule subject to tactical changes but presented to assist in lifeguard service planning.

23 1341 COMINCH & CNO to COMNORPAC Info CINC PAC

TOP SECRET: It is proposed to effect transfers under lend lease following listed vessels in increments to Soviets in DUTCH HARBOR or other base that area: 30 PT 2 XCG 24 AM 36 YMS 56 SC 48 PT 4 YR 6 pontoon barges 30 LCI(L) 30 LQT 5 Army Y tankers. Proposed schedule deliveries extends April to December 1945. Desire comment on feasibility with facilities available for housing messing and shakedown and technical training. Submit data on facilities available this purpose in DUTCH HARBOR and any other ports considered on premise that during no month will personnel requirements exceed about 2500 and that turn over time will not exceed 2 weeks.

24 0259 MACARTHUR to CINCPOA Info CHQ SWPA

TOP SECRET. Concur in your 222059. Reference Rear Admiral James L Hall as your representative at LEYTE.

25 1348 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to WEDEMEYER, NIMITZ

TOP SECRET Support for operation ICEBERG to be furnished by CHINA Theater will be as arranged directly between WEDEMEYER and NIMITZ. Direct communication and exchange of liaison officers should be carried out as necessary. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be kept informed. This answers CF8X-31575 from WEDEMEYER, not to NIMITZ.

25 1304 MACARTHUR to COMTHFLT, CTF 77 info CINC PAC

TOP SECRET. Comply with Cincpac radiogram 210305 GCT regarding return of APD's. MACARTHUR.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

22 2059

CINCPAC to CINCSWPAC, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, INFO COMPHIBSPAC, COMPHIBGROUP 12, COMBATRON 1, COMINCH, COMGENPOA, COMGEN104THARMY, COMGEN24THCORPS.

TOP SECRET. Rear Admiral James L. Hall ComPhibGroup 12 (CTG 13.12) will proceed LEYTE via air in advance of his Flagship. After arrival about 28 January in addition to such duties as may be assigned by ComPhibsPac he will act as the Senior Officer of the Pacific Fleet Present and will represent CinCPac-CinCPoA in coordinating arrangements for preparing and mounting Pacific Ocean Areas Forces for DETACHMENT and ICEBERG. Concurrence of CINCSWPAC requested.
JANUARY (GCT)

25 2041 COM5THFLT to COMPHIBPAC info COMPHIBGROUP 1, CINCPAC - CINCPOA ADV. HQTRS AND PEARL, CTF 58.

TOP SECRET. Your 240310. Plan to make NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, SANTA FE, BILOXI and 1 DesDiv all of TG 58.4 available to assist your bombardment D Day and D+1 Day and longer if necessary. Carriers of TG 58.4 will be available for air support same days. Availability of other task groups of TF 58 for support as tentatively agreed to by you and Mitscher will be dependent upon length of initial EMPIRE strike which I WISH to continue for 3rd Day if situation permits. CVEs available to you are WAKE ISLAND, SAGINAW BAY, LUNGA POINT, BISMARCK SEA, SARGENT BAY, RUDYERD BAY, MAKin ISLAND plus ANZIO ASW group.

26 0649 CINC BPF to COMINCH AND CNO info CINCPAC PEARL AND ADV HQS, CINCSWPA, COM7TH FOOTVOCINCOX EWAVEYLCUVEU

TOP SECRET. Your 162021. A Carrier Task Force designated TF 118 will be ready for operations in any advanced anchorage on 15 March (2) TF 118 will consist of 2 BB, 4 CV, 2 CL, 3 CL(AA), 16 DD's (3) To support the above the following Escorts and units of the Fleet Train designated TF 117 will be available: 8 DE, 16 PCE, 4 CVE, 1 ARB, 1 ARV, 4 AF, 2 AH, 4 ATA, 8 AO, 3 AKS, 1 AD, 1 AW, 1 ARH, 1 AN, 13 AE part 1 my 260737.

26 0737 CINC BPF to COMINCH AND CNO info CINCPAC PEARL AND ADV HQS, CINCSWPA, COM 7TH FOOTVOCINCOX EWAVEYLCUVEU, COMNAVEU

TOP SECRET. Part 2 final is 260737 PPTO0 260659. (4) Names of ships are being forwarded by airmailgram (5) Additional forces are expected which will be communicated as they become available for operations (6) authorities as in my 151241 not to all (7) Admiralty pass to Comnaveu.

26 2113 COMGEN 10TH ARMY to CINCPOA info COMGENPOA, COMGEN 24TH CORPS.

TOP SECRET. Cincpoa reencrypts ComGen 10th Army 260850. Reported by Gen Hodge dispatch received 25 Jan 8th Army advises 77th Div 5 Feb, 7th Div 15 Feb, 96th Div 22 Feb, Corps Troops 1 to 15 Feb, 6200 men from all Divs on SD under CinCSWPA by 22 Feb, all contingent on arrival of American Div as dates for relief of troops 24th Corps and concentration in staging areas. Above dates do not provide desirable minimum for rehabilitation personnel and reequipment of 24th Corps. References Cincpoa 181814 GCT, CinCSWPA 200140 GCT and per 7C memo CG 24th Corps to Admr Nimitz 16 Feb 45. Such delay will require request for additional postponement ICEBERG.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

27 0156 CTF 77 to ALL TF AND TG COMDRS 7TH FLT info CINCPOA, CINCWSFA (LEYTE AND TARLAG), COM7THFLT.

TOP SECRET. Following for planning purposes. DD's now on temporary duty to be returned CINCPOA as follows. 4 DD's of DesDiv 102 Escort CVE's when released to ULITHI then proceed GUADALCANAL. MAURY (DD 409) GRIDLEY (DD 386) MCCALL (DD 400) of DesDiv 11 plus STEVENS (DD 479) DASHIELL (DD 659) of DesRon 25 and IZARD (DD 589) of DesRon 56 Escort OBB's when released to ULITHI. DesRon 2 less HUGHES (DD 419) ANDERSON (DD 411) to arrive GUADALCANAL by 18 February. DesRon 49 to be released CINCPOA central at LEYTE by 18 February. Para. 36 DD assigned 7th Fleet will BECK DesRon 5 less LAMSON (DD 307). DesRon 14 less GANSEVOORT (DD 608) CALDWELL (DD 605) COGHLAN (DD 606). DesRon 21 less ROSS (DD 563). DesRon 22. DesRon 23 less AULICK (DD 569). ABBOTT (DD 629) until relieved by AULICK about 2 March. 1 DD to be designated by Cincpea.

28 0001 COM 5TH FLEET to CINCPOA info COMFAIRWING 1, CTF 93, COMGENNAAFPOA.

TOP SECRET. Will provide coverage MARCUS, WOLEAI, LAMOTREK, TRUK by search planes of Task Group 50.5 as requested your 200049. Assume neutralization these bases if required will continue as function of Strategic Air Force as per his current OP Orders.

27 0725 WEDEMEYER to NIMITZ.

Top Secret to Nimitz. New location POA Headquarters noted. It would be helpful if we could hold conference as you suggested. Such conference probably should follow closely after the conference about to be held involving 3 big boys. Decisions pertaining to global strategy will be firmer. I should like to bring few planners to confer with you and your staff and proceed to Washington accompanied by your able planning chief Admiral Sherman where we could discuss plans and resources with U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and planners for not to exceed 1 week returning via Pacific to finalize plans with you.

29 0831 CINCPOA ADV HQTRS to COMINCH Info COMGEN CHINA THEATER.

JCS 251348. Preliminary arrangements for support of ICEBERG by China Theater made by my 220013 answered by ComNavGroup China's 170631. Further arrangements including exchange of liaison officers will be made direct with General Wedemeyer keeping JCS informed through Cominch.
Joint Staff Planners Washington to Planning Staff CinCSoWESPAC.

WARX-28601. Top Secret. Since our WARX-74738. This is a planning message. You are advised following is being done here. Para A. Our studies listed below have been dispatched to you: Para JWPC 282/1, JWP 293/1, JWPC 285/1, JWPC 289/1. Para B. New subjects under examination. Para L. Alternate campaign plans for the Defeat of JAPAN under various assumed dates in 1945 for beginning of redeployment from EUROPE. Para. Optimum forward deployment of air forces in the Pacific through the time that bases seized in BUNKHOUSE become available and assuming no redeployment from EUROPE. Para C. Joint Logistics Committee is re-examining subject of availability of forces and resources after ICEBERG.

CINCPAC Adv HQ to COMINCH, COMINCH HQ PEARL.

It is highly desirable that tentative plans for employment British Pacific Fleet units in ICEBERG be made firm and that CinC proceed with arrangements outlined in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 NF-1. Action is being deferred until CinC Brit Pac Flt reports to CinC pac and is understood that he awaits directive from Cominch. Request early information since CinC Brit Pac Flts Asst Chief of Staff has completed conferences with Com5thFlt and is at GUAM and Chief of Staff 5th Fleet will arrive tomorrow.
TOP SECRET

JANUARY (GCT)

30 0840 COMFIFTHFLT to CTG 50.5 Info CTF 93, CINCPOA & COMGENAAFPOA.

In complying with 280001 conduct reconnaissance at irregular intervals averaging approximately once weekly.

31 0212 CINCPAC ADV HDQTRS, to CTF 77 Info CINCPOA PEARL, CINCSWPA, COM7THFLT, COMSERVPAC.

My 161836 concurred in by Cominch 162220 contemplated retention of 4 battleships for quote about 3 weeks unquote. To facilitate planning repairs request your estimate as to date they will be released.

31 0734 CINCPAC ADV HDQTRS to COM5THFLT, COMAIRPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENAAFPOA Info COMFWDAREA, COMPHIBSPAC, CTF 51, COMGENFMFPAC, CTF 56, CTG 10.16, CTU 10.16.1, CTG 50.5, CINCPOA PEARL.

Para 1. Sub-paragraph 242.31 Base Development Plan for WORKMAN modified by insertion new 3rd sentence "Every effort will be made to improve a runway sufficiently to permit the operation of Navy search Liberators as soon as possible after the provision of minimum requirements for fighter defense". Sub-paragraph 240.21 of same plan add note as follows "The requirement for operations of PBHL by D plus 50 refers to full load operation with completed facilities see para 242.31. Limited staging operation of Navy search Liberators at light load shall be provided for as soon as possible". The decision as to actual date of operation of Liberators thru WORKMAN and priority between this operation and the increments of the fighter defense will be made by the officer conducting the operation (Com5thFIt). Para 2. Modify supporting plans as necessary to implement the foregoing.

31 2305 CINCPAC ADV HDQTRS to COMFIFTHFLEET Info COMPHIBSPAC.

ComPhibsPac 301220 has been discussed with Rear Admiral Davis who knows my views. No commitment or decision has been made by me and the assignment of NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON is a matter for decision by Com5thFIt who may also increase the interval between carrier strike and island assault if desired. Davis will arrive ULITHI about noon local today.

31 1825 COMINCH AND CNO to CINCPOA ADV HQ.

See my 162021 to CinCBPF upon which basis I await your request for allocation to you of British Pacific Fleet units required by you for a specific operation to include your reasons why you need such units. I now confirm my intention to keep operational allocation of British Pacific Fleet units in my own hands.

010626 CINCSWPA to CINCPOA Info COMGENUSAASF(ADV ECH), COM5THFLT, COMAAF, COMALLLEDNAVFORCES, CTF 73, BOMCOM 20(ADV ECH).


- Continued -
(CX57353) effective date in early February will be announced by later dispatch. Subpara 2: Attacks on enemy air bases and shipping in FORMOSA have already begun and will be progressively increased as LUZON-MINDORO facilities are developed. B24 and B25 airplanes with P38, P47 and P51 fighter escort will be used on these missions. Subpara 3: Offensive PB4Y screens will be provided if requested, but limited number of PB4Y necessitates that planes of Search Plan J provide this offensive screen within limits of prescribed W ARDG areas or in recommended adjacent areas in lieu if search sectors rehashed. Request this headquarters be furnished charts indicating exact routes and time schedule of movement of friendly naval forces in order to provide more effective screen. Searches from LEYTE as indicated in Search Plan J will provide the screen for movement of groups from the LEYTE Area. Subpara 4: Night diversion strikes on FORMOSA and air installations at SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the nights of Love minus 12/11 through L minus 9/8 will be made weather permitting. Subpara 5: Strikes on FORMOSA air installations will be made on L minus 16 or L minus 15 or 1 both days subject to coordination with 20th Bomber Command. Strikes will be made on L minus 14 and L minus 13 if practicable notifying Commander 1st Carrier Task Force and Commander Central Pacific Task Force of times. Place: Strength of strikes including type of planes. Subpara 6: Continuous strikes on FORMOSA will be made as practicable subsequent to L minus 13 in coordination with 20th Bomber Command to cover ICEBERG operation. Subpara 7: Search Plan J covers search plans including sector calls. Strike schedules are dependent on coordination with 20th Bomber Command and will be forwarded by dispatch later.

Southwest Pacific air forces have initiated strikes against the FORMOSA Area. These strikes will increase in intensity as air installations are developed in MINDORO and L UZON. Cincpoa in his top secret letter serial 0055007 plans for both 20th BomCom and SWPA air forces strikes in the FORMOSA SAKISHIMA GUNTO Area in support of ICEBERG Operation. In order to obtain maximum neutralization of the FORMOSA Area commencing at the earliest practicable date. Your concurrence or comments are requested relative to authorizing direct communication for this purpose between Commander Allied Air Forces SWPA and Commanding General 20th BomCom to facilitate and effect maximum coordination.

Your 262047 not to all. Joint Staff Study for Phase 3 of ICEBERG will be reviewed and revised where necessary as rapidly as availability of intelligence concerning terrain and enemy dispositions permits. It may be assumed for logistic planning purposes that 5th PhibCorps will be used in Phase 3 in lieu of 3rd PhibCorps. Employment of an Army Regt Combat Team for Phase 3(A) is also under consideration.
Divided between Advanced Anchorage and Intermediate Base.

Armament store issuing (AE) ship
- CORINDA
- PRINCE DE LIEGE
- DARVEL
- PRINCESS MARIA PIA
- HERMELIN
- ROBERT MAERSK
- HERON
- THYRA S. KETTI
- PACHECO

On passage between Advanced and Rear Bases.

Ferry Carriers (CVE)
- STRIKER
- FENCER

Armament Store Carriers (AE)
- GUDRUN MARSK
- KISTA
- KOLA

Naval Store Carrier (AKS)
- BOSPHORUS

Following operations will be conducted by 21 BomCom in support of Operation: A. On D-5 search area between longitude 135 and 148 east. Mid latitude as determined on D-10. On D-5 search area 60 miles on each side carrier force track to operating area for D-3 as outlined in OpOrd 1-45. Search to begin 800 miles from base and extend as far north as possible. B. Attacks on TOKYO Area during nights of D-4-3, D-3-2 and D-2-1 will be made by aircraft each night operating individually and using RCM. Attacks on NAGOYA Area during nights of D plus 3-4, D plus 4-5 and D plus 5-6 will be made by 3 aircraft each night operating individually and using RCM. C. Weather permitting maximum effort strikes will be made against a primary target in TOKYO Area on D-4, a primary target in TOKYO Area on D, and a primary target in NAGOYA Area on D plus 4. If weather conditions do not permit visual bombing on the above targets on days scheduled strikes may be delayed 1 day and or made against NAGOYA Area as alternate for TOKYO Area and TOKYO Area as alternate for NAGOYA Area. In the event visual bombing is not possible in either area on either of the alternate days radar bombing will be conducted in TOKYO Area on D-3 and D plus 1 and NAGOYA Area on D plus 5. D. Diversionary attack will be conducted on D-2 against NAGOYA Area using RCM.

CTF 77 to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCSWPA (TARLAC AND LETTIE).

Reply to your 310212 contained in CINCSWPA 011243 of which CINCPAC is info addressee.

CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC (PRIORITY), CTF 58, COMTHFLT Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COM NAB GUAM.

CTF 58 290505. ComAirPac 022056. In view necessity maximum fighter strength for initial strikes next operation WASP and ESSEX may sail with excess fighters as planned by CTF 58. Thereafter CNO 282132 will be observed and excess fighter strength reduced by adjustment of replacements. Disposition BombRons 4 and 81 as directed by ComAirPac.
In continuation of my signal DTG 260737 the following is a nominal list of the British Pacific Fleet:

**T.F. 118**

- **Battleships** - KING GEORGE V, HOWE (2 BB)
- **Fleet Carriers** - ILLUSTRIOUS, VICTORIOUS, INDOMITABLE, INDEFATIGABLE (4 CV)
- **Cruisers** - SWIFTSURE, GAMBIA, BLACK PRINCE, ARGONAUT, EURALYUS (2 CL, 3 CL(AA))
- **Destroyers**
  - 4th D.F. - QUICKMATCH, QUIBERON, QUALITY, QUEENBOROUGH
  - 25th D.F. - GRENVILLE, URSA, ULSTER, URANIA, UNDINE, UNDAUNTED
  - 27th D.F. - KEMPENFElt, WESSEx, WAGER, WHELP, WHIRLWIND, WAKEFUL (16 DD)

**Support Forces**

**Escorts**

- 21st M/S.F.
  - BALLARAT
  - MARYBOROUGH
  - LISMORE
  - WHITALLA
  - GOULBURN
  - KALGOORLIE
  - TOOWOOMBA
  - BENDIGO

- 22nd M/S.F.
  - GERALDTON
  - CESNOCK
  - CAIRNS
  - IPSWICH
  - TAMWORTH
  - WOLLONGONG
  - PIRIE
  - LAUNCESTON

**Sloops & Frigates**

- CRANE
- REDPOLE
- PHEASANT
- WOODCOCK
- WHIMBREL
- BARLE
- HELFORD
- PARRETT

**Fleet Train - T.F. 117**

**Advanced Anchorage**

- Replenishment carriers (CVE)
- Aircraft Repair Ship (ARV)
- Repair Ships (ARB)
- Victualling store issuing ship (AF)
- Hospital Ship (AH)
- Tugs (ATA)
- Oilers (AO and AOG)

**Naval Store ship**

**Destroyer Depot Ship**

**Intermediate Base**

- Air Store Ship (AKS)
- Victualling store ship (AF)
- Hospital Ship (AH)
- Tugs (ATA)
- Distilling ship (AW)
- Repair ship (ARH)
- Net Layer (AN)

**Replenishment carriers (CVE)**

SLINGER, SPEAKER

**Aircraft Repair Ship (ARV)**

UNICORN

**Repair Ships (ARB)**

RESOURCE

**Victualling store issuing ship (AF)**

FORT EDMONTON

**Hospital Ship (AH)**

OXFORDSHIRE

**Tugs (ATA)**

2

**Oilers (AO and AOG)**

BROWN RANGER DINGLEDALE SAN AMBROSIO

**Naval Store ship**

BACCHUS

**Destroyer Depot Ship (AD)**

TYNE

**Intermediate Base**

- Air Store Ship (AKS)
- Victualling store ship (AF)
- Hospital Ship (AH)
- Tugs (ATA)
- Distilling ship (AW)
- Repair ship (ARH)
- Net Layer (AN)

- **Continued**
TOP SECRET

FEBRUARY (GCT)

05 0712 COMGENDOMCOM XXI to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COM5THFLT, CTF 58, COMSUBSPAC, CTF 94, CTF 93, CTF 51, CTG 50.5, DEPCOM AF 20 (POA).

X-05-2 Following are briefs of Field Orders 25 and 26 covering anti-picket boat searches given DepCom AF 20s 030921 to Cincpac Advon. Both orders specify 10 a/c from 313th EW taking off at 0645K and flying parallel search at 3000 feet with a/c 12 miles apart. Naval observers will accompany both flights. A/C will make contact reports to 313th Wing ground station for transmission to Z5N. A/C will make identical transmission on 4475 KC. A/C will stand by on channel CVHF for possible voice communication with naval units. Pilots will be familiar with shackle authentication on this channel. No bombs will be carried.

FO25: On D minus 8 search area from 135E to 148E 60 miles on either side of latitude to be determined on D minus 10. FO 26: On D minus 5 search within the following coordinates:


05 0746 CINCPA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA info COMINCH, CNO, COM7THFLT, COMGENFMFPAC, CINCPA PEARL Hq.

My 210203. Availability of facilities for a Corps of 3 Marine Divisions in the PHILIPPINES now planned with timing as follows. Depots rear echelons etc, move from HAWAIIAN AREA to PHILIPPINES about 1 August. Combat elements of Corp move from objective area to PHILIPPINES commencing about 15 Sept and as released thereafter. Para. Request FMFPac representatives in CINCmVPA Headquarters continue search for suitable site with view to readiness when required.

05 1255 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPA ADV HQ.

My dispatches referred to in 1st portion of your 012254 GCT applied only to the matter of operational allocation of units of the British Pacific Fleet. Arrangements in connection with bases, anchorages, fuel, communications and intelligence should be handled by you in accordance with the provisions of the memorandum of understandings dated 20 December previously approved by me. Your request for operational allocation for later phases of ICEBERG now under consideration.

06 0758 CINCPA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, COM7THFLT.

Para 1. The remaining 4 of the 6 battleships which I sent to the 7th Fleet for temporary duty to provide fire support for the LEYTE and LINGAYEN assault are required for the same purpose in operations to be conducted in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Under the terms of our agreement (Fivesome) they were to arrive ULITHI by 19th January but were made available to the 7th Fleet for about 3 weeks by my 161836. Para 2. On 16 February the Pacific Fleet will attack HONSHU and IWO JIMA and will thereby make fully effective its naval strategic support of the PHILIPPINES position. Para 3. Vice Admiral Oldendorf’s report shows that PENNSYLVANIA must be docked and MISSISSIPPI and COLORADO must have extensive battle damage repaired prior to sailing for ICEBERG. All 4 ships are badly in need of upkeep. Para 4. Request you direct Com7thFleet to return MISSISSIPPI, COLORADO and WEST VIRGINIA to ULITHI and PENNSYLVANIA to MANUS all to arrive 16 February.
My acquiescence for long range planning purposes in Fitch's slate for prospective change in aviation flag commands assumed a rotation rate that would not be injurious to the Fleet and contemplated changes only when the present carrier division commanders who are all highly satisfactory to me show need of rest or their services are definitely required on shore. The average interval between detachments of CarDiv comdrs should be a minimum of 2 months. Montgomery is just being relieved as ComCarDiv 3. The timing on the planning slate dated 30 Jan as drawn up by Murray and Fitch contemplates relief of 5 of the remaining 6 CarDiv Commanders by August. That is too rapid and is unacceptable. Although Davison's experience and work are valuable to the Fleet I will not oppose his relief after DETACHMENT if his services are required ashore. Slate should be so amended that other CarDiv commanders will not be moved at intervals of less than 2 months and then only in accordance with the principles mentioned in the 1st sentence.

Top Secret handle as Nimitz only. Para 1. Memorandum record of understandings reached in conference 17-19 December (NF-1) and approved by Cominch serial 0014 of 2 January was based on directive of Cominch 131253 December which is now understood to be superseded by Cominch 162021 and 311825 Jan. The provisions of that memorandum included arrangements in connection with bases, anchorages, fuel, communications and intelligence which should be implemented without delay. It now appears preferable that such of these arrangements as involve the Southwest Pacific Area be made by Cominch rather than CinCPac. If you concur am prepared to submit specific recommendations immediately. Para 2. Request allocation of available carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the British Pacific Fleet together British Fleet Train to operational control of CinCPac for ICEBERG Operation. Contemplated employment is attack on enemy forces and positions south of OKINAWA and other operations as may be required. Augmentation of US Pacific Fleet by British Carrier Task Force is not absolutely necessary but will expedite campaign and by more complete neutralization of enemy air force will reduce our losses.

In response to message from Chief of Staff (WARX 27118 dated 26 January refers) regarding report on CHINA situation following is submitted for your information. Part 1.- Strategic. Para 2. Inevitability of defeat is realized by Japanese. However before calling halt they hope to induce Allies to ameliorate present stringent terms of surrender and purported drastic post war measures against them. This they would accomplish by causing Allies to become war weary as result of prohibitive losses in lives and material and unacceptable duration of war. Para 3. Speed of American advance in Pacific last 5 months undoubtedly has upset enemy time schedule and overall Plans. Japanese no longer possess strategic initiative and their future dispositions and preparations will be determined by defensive considerations. This would not preclude isolated or small scale offensive actions. Para 4. The complete neutralization of Japanese Archipelago, the dynamo of enemy war effort, must continue to be principal objective of American strategy for next several months. Air, naval and amphibious operations should be...
conducted with a view to acquiring bases for the effective employment of strong air and naval forces against the Japanese homeland preparatory to invasion of possibly KYUSHU and or HONSHU. Subsidiary operations should be conducted with a view to cutting enemy main lines of communication leading to and within areas under their control in order to prevent and or restrict redispersion of their troops and movement of vital war materials. Para 5. Large scale land operations on the Asiatic continent by United States forces should not be undertaken during the next several months, if ever. Difficult terrain and inadequate communications make large scale use of modern land armies impractical in interior of CHINA. In undertaking such operations we would play into enemy hands, as Americans would be opposed by strong Japanese ground forces under conditions favorable to them. However, during that period maximum effort must be made by Chinese supported by United States China Theater forces, essentially air. These forces should contribute most effectively by cutting enemy communication lines, destroying important installations and diverting and containing the greatest possible number of Jap air and ground units. At the same time, United States units in the Pacific could establish naval and air bases in RYUKYUS, BONINS, HOKKAIDO, SHANTUNG PENINSULA or FORMOSA. Situation may require the seizure of intermediate objectives along CHINA Coast, south of WENCHOW, in CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO, in KURILES, and in NINGPO if the enemy considerably weaken forces in that area. Situation may develop in such manner as to require extensive ground operations on continent before Japs are compelled to surrender however operations suggested for next 6 to 8 months might suffice. If Jap elects to fight it out on mainland of ASIA, favorable conditions particularly with reference to SES communications and air cooperation will have been created for American all out land-air battles in CHINA. Para 6. Based on limited information of Soviet capabilities, best estimate in event they enter war against Nippon is that they have about 30 trained and equipped divisions in Far East. Effective operations from eastern SIBERIA based on present enemy dispositions and strength would require additional forces (about 30 divisions). This force would take approximately 4 months to move. On assumption that GERMANY capitulates by early spring of this year, Russian reinforcements would not arrive in Far East until late Autumn. Severe winter weather might prohibit and would certainly restrict operations until following year. Soviets disclaim interest in CHINA. However, their local representatives are carefully analyzing all developments particularly regarding the KUOMINTANG, Provincial War Lords and Chinese Communists. In MONGOLIA, Soviet influence is today very great. Chinese Communist movement overshadows other political issues in Northern CHINA, allowing infiltration of Soviet doctrines. This condition will facilitate actual penetration by Russians later. Part II - Tactical. Para 7. Japanese capabilities in CHINA are essentially as presented to JCS in November and December of last year. They still have almost complete freedom of action. In November the Japs could have taken KUNMING or CHUNGKING. More than adequate resources were available to them and the Chinese-American effort could only have delayed their drive. There were no effective Chinese ground forces immediately available to interpose between KUNMING and enemy advance. Now, on 1 February the Japs still have strong offensive capabilities with about 12 Divisions disposed south of CHANGSHA and along the communication lines to CANTON and INDO-CHINA. Para 8. The enemy can also attack KUNMING by way of HANOI-LAOPAY-KUNMING; NANNING-POSEH-KINMING, or PAOCHING-CHIHKIANG-KWEIYANG.
Present indications do not indicate that the Nipponese Supreme Commander in CHINA is committed to any of these courses of action or Japanese know that we have recently moved 2 American trained, fed and equipped Chinese Divisions from BURMA to CHINA. They know further that these 2 divisions can and will fight. MacArthurs successes in Philippines cause enemy increased concern about CHINA Coast. For these 2 reasons, the enemy is not expected to attempt large scale advance westward for example against KUNMING. The latter however remains a capability and we must be alert and prepared for such enemy action. Para 9. The enemy will probably concentrate in coastal areas and in the CHANGSHA-HANKOW-PEKING-MANCHUKOU areas. These dispositions would release Japanese forces for use against possible Allied operations along Chinese Coast; against Soviet attacks in MANCHURIA or for rapid movement to Japanese Archipelago. Para 10. Offensive action by Chinese forces can be taken in July or August with weather favoring the operations. A Chinese force for offensive operations, 15-25 divisions, is expected to be available for combat by that time. Staff studies have been made concerning their most effective employment. We have considered an attack from KWEIYANG eastward to acquire air bases and to cut enemy communication lines in area HENGYANG-LIULING. This would be feasible only if enemy materially reduces forces south of YANGTZE. An air and ground outline plan is being prepared for drive on LIUCHOW-NANNING area thence east against CANTON-HONGKONG. All planned operations will be accompanied by coordinated action by strong guerrilla, commando and clandestine forces designed to disrupt enemy lines of communication and installations. Part III. A-Combat Forces. Para 11. Total combat forces available in China Theatre for offensive operations, as of 1 July 1945 are: Subarea. Air: Entire 14th Air Force; and in addition, 2 fighter groups and 2 heavy bombardment groups. Subarea. Ground: 5 divisions, 1 tank group, 3 battalions 75MM pack Howitzers, 7 Battalions 105MM guns; 3 battalions 155MM Howitzers (all from Chinese forces previously in INDIA and provided with US training and equipment). 20 Chinese divisions from Chinese armies in CHINA (mediocre in training, equipment and leadership). Para B-Schedule of operations. Para. Following schedule of operations within and from China Theater is included for your information. Para 12. Period from present to 1 March. Air - Cooperation with Pacific advances and operations versus Japanese supplies and communications lines. Ground - Clandestine and guerrilla activities. Organization, training and equipping of Chinese divisions. Objective of all forces - insuring security of KUNMING-CHUNGKING area while concurrently preparing for offensive. Para 13. Period 1 March to 1 May. Air - Cooperation with Pacific advances and operations versus Japanese forces and installations particularly communication lines and supplies. Ground - Clandestine and guerrilla activities. Organization, equipping and training of Chinese divisions and movement of forces to forward areas. Objective of all forces - insuring security of KUNMING-CHUNGKING area while concurrently preparing for offensive. Para 14. Period 1 May to 1 July. Air - Operations against Japanese forces and installations particularly communication lines and supplies. Ground - Clandestine and guerrilla activities. Continued training of Chinese divisions, concentration of divisions in selected areas in preparation for commencement of offensive. Objective of all forces - Insuring security of KUNMING-CHUNGKING area, concurrently preparing for offensive. Para 15. Period 1 July to 1 September. Air - Strategic and tactical participation and cooperation in CHINA, phased with Pacific operations. Ground - Offensive operations by Chinese armies strongly supported by intensified guerrilla and clandestine operations.
FEVERUARY (GCT)

05 0750 WEDEMeyer to MACARThUR, NIMITZ, RICHARDSON Info MARSHALL, KING. (CONT'D)

Para 16. Above presents current situation in CHINA and projected operations by China Theater forces. Operations by Pacific Ocean Area or SWPA forces against the CHINA Coast would contribute strongly to success of CHINA operations. CHINA Theater cannot materially aid Pacific operations during the next 4 months except by air strikes. After appropriate ground forces are available (estimated date 1 July 1945) combined and effective operations should be possible at such time and place as would support or assist operations in Pacific against Island objectives or CHINA Coast. Para 17. It will probably be the first of July at the earliest before effective ground operations can be undertaken. CHINA Theater is striving to undertake coordinated ground and air operations against the Japanese from the west in time to disrupt their planned redeployment to meet possible US advances from the Pacific and to prevent the withdrawal of forces from ASIA into JAPAN proper. It is believed that if our operations can be initiated in July they will catch the Japanese off-balance and probably preclude planned redistribution of their forces. In the event they are preparing to withdraw bulk of forces to the north of the YANGTZE these operations will probably hasten that withdrawal. In any event, our operations, if successful, would give the Chinese army much needed combat experience and confidence and could result in opening port of CANTON-HONGKONG. When sea communications are re-established, it will be possible to dispense with the prodigious effort required to supply CHINA via INDIA. Further, the increased flow of supplies in conjunction with victorious battle experience may inspire confidence and create conditions that will enable the Chinese forces to destroy the Japanese on the Asiatic mainland without large scale American ground participation.

07 0403 CINCWPAA to COMALLIED AIR FORCES ADV ECH, Info CINCPOA, COM5THFLEET, COMALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA), ADV ECH GHQ.

CX 57760. In support of DETACHMENT Operation with target date 19 February. Commander Allied Air Forces will extend long range searches sectors 5 through 9 of search plan H and when effective sectors 5 through 10 of Search Plan J to maximum practicable distance during the period D-10 to D plus 10. Continue strikes on FORMOSA airfields during this period with increasing intensity as practicable. On D plus 9 and D plus 10 strike FORMOSA airfields to cover fast carrier strikes on and retirement from the MANSEI SHOTO, Commander 5th Fleet's Op Plan 13-44. Action addressi acknowledge. MacArthur.

07 0455 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COM5THFLEET Info DEP COMZOTHAF, CTF 58, ALL TG COMDRS TF 58.

Your 050432. In the event that the 21st Bomber Command does not strike on D-4 it will strike on D-3 using 1 of the following alternatives. A. If clear weather is predicted at TOKYO proceed to TOKYO and strike target 357 if visual bombing possible. If radar bombing then becomes necessary bomb radar area bounded by Lat 35 degrees 38 minutes - 35 degrees 45 minutes and Long 139 degrees 43 minutes - 139 degrees 52 minutes between 1430 and 1630K. B. If clear weather is predicted at NAGOYA and not at TOKYO strike target 193 NAGOYA. C. If overcast is predicted at both places strike radar area as in A. Para. For NAGOYA area in event 21 Bomber does not strike D plus 4 it will strike D plus 5 target 193 if visual bombing possible. In event radar bombing becomes necessary bomb radar area in the city of NAGOYA bounded by Lat 35 degrees 04 minutes - 35 degrees 13 minutes and Long 136 degrees 50 minutes - 136 degrees 59 minutes between 1430 and 1630K. Should TOKYO be open on D plus 4 a primary target that area will be attacked. No deferment to — continued — 3004
above plans will be made unless weather conditions at home base necessitate. You will be notified of any change not later than 0730 K on D-3 for TOKYO area and 0730 K on D plus 4 for NAGoya area. The foregoing decisions were reached after thorough consideration of your 050432 also of desirability concentrating attack effort and unsuitability air frame plant 1544 as a radar target.

Plans for forthcoming operation include use of LEYTE GULf by British Pacific Fleet service force, though this is dependent on BFF being assigned to CINCPAC by COMINCh. On the assumption that this assignment will in fact be made, I would like to send a small party of officers to LEYTE at an early date to discuss use of anchorage with ComNOB LEYTE and his staff. Please advise if you concur and convenient date for visit.

My 060753. My appraisal of enemy naval capabilities in Southwest Pacific Area follows. Ultra discloses Jap Southern Army plans for evacuation of 46th Division (5th ARMY plus elements of 5th (TOEAL) and 48th (DILL) Divisions to SURABAYA with naval cooperation and subsequent movement to MALAYA indicated. Believe above transportation commencing soon and extending until possibly April. On 21 January CinC Combined Fleet assigned #2 Diversion Attack Force (ISE, HYUGA, ASHIGARA, HAGURO, OYODO plus about 5 destroyers) to CinC Southwest Area Fleet and the next day latter commander assigned the #2 Diversion Attack Force to the Western Force. On February 4 CinC Combined Fleet deleted the #2 Diversion Attack Force suggesting its abolishment as a combined fleet tactical unit and assigned the Western Force and North of AUSTRALIA Force to the tactical command of Commander Southern Area Field Marshal Count TERAUCHI. These assignments stripped CinC Southwest Area Fleet of practically all his commands except minor naval forces afloat and ashore in the PHILIPPINES. Previously the high naval air commands of the PHILIPPINES had withdrawn their headquarters to FORMOSA. Evacuation of air crews and ground personnel from LUZON by air and submarine is in progress. The Jap Army's dissatisfaction with the Navy's failure to prevent U.S. landings in PHILIPPINES is well established. A naval shakeup in command is reflected by the assignment of a new CinC 2nd Southern Expeditionary Force and the indicated detachment of the Comdr #2 Diversion Attack Force plus the suspicion that CinC Southwest Area Fleet may have been relieved of his post. The overwater movement of large numbers of troops in small craft under the reduced Jap air strength available in face of Allied submarine menace and the acknowledged threat of British Task Force raids against JAVA and SUMATRA will probably result in utilization of naval units for escort and cover and possibly to augment available transportation. Japanese Army and Naval air units and naval anti-submarine escort units are engaged in intensified anti-submarine measures covering vital convoys along the CHINA Coast from SINGAPORE to the Empire. An unidentified command on 5 February made inquiry as to amounts of aviation gasoline in drums and in tonnage, also numbers of personnel, that could be carried aboard ISE, HYUGA and ASHIGARA, also amount of aviation gasoline in drums that could be carried by destroyers KASUMI, ASASHIMO and HATSUSHIMO. It is estimated therefore that the enemy naval commander will be incapable of utilizing naval surface forces under his command to attempt to interfere with our supply line to LUZON. Signed NIMITZ.
An increasing volume of requests are being received direct by Com7thFleet and ComdrAllied Naval Forces Southwest Pacific Area and by his subordinates, particularly CNB MANUS, from CinC British Fleet for facilities and services. Among these are requests for provision at MANUS of Headquarters for CinCBPF. Of airfields and facilities and the allocation of ground areas for the construction and installation of accommodations for 14,000 men supply and fuel depots, barracks, docks, etc. It is requested I be informed earliest practicable of status of BPF with respect to CANF and Com7thFleet. Proper communications and correspondence channels and extent of my responsibility and authority with respect especially to provision of naval shore facilities in SWPA. Para. The present load on MANUS for support of SWPA naval and naval air activities requires early decision with respect to nature and extent of transfer to BPF of existing facilities or of new construction to be undertaken for or by BPF.

My 080710. As soon as your next operations are decided upon please advise me of any arrangements desired for use of anchorages, shore facilities, fuel, etc. in order that I make them accordance NF-1 which has been approved by Cominch.

British Task Force not available your 070626 for ICEBERG first phase.

CAX-50326. In view of Para 2 of your 060758 providing strategic naval cover of LINGAYEN base I have directed 7th Fleet to comply with request of Para 4 all these ships and all others which have participated in the operations have performed splendidly and fully maintained the highest traditions of the Navy. I am very proud and grateful to have had their invaluable assistance in this vital campaign.

ComAirPac 131938, January. Request recommendations of addressees covering assignment of carriers to night group and training duty during ICEBERG. Views of info addressees will be welcomed.

Your 062242. Following paraphrase report of informal investigation conducted by V.Adm Lee as directed by CinCPAC. On 16 Jan 1945 (E. Long. date) TF 38 struck shipping, aircraft and installations CHINA Coast from HONGKONG to HAINAN. Fighter aircraft from USS HANCOCK attacked seaplane hangar and base installations in Portuguese territory in MACAO. This target was assigned to TG 38.2 and specifically to HANCOCK for observation and "blanketing". On 13 Jan 1945 CTG 38.2 with concurrence Com3rdFlt and CTF 38 sent dispatch to HANCOCK as
follows: "Since MACAO is owned by neutral PORTUGAL brief all pilots that no attacks are to be made on MACAO or shipping within 2 miles thereof unless Jap aircraft or shipping are on MACAO or in those waters in which case attacks will be limited to those aircraft and ships. Pilots will inspect MACAO for aircraft but will not fly over it". The intention of CTG 38.2 was to prohibit attacks against seaplane base at MACAO unless enemy air activity observed thereon. Because of incomplete briefing of pilots on the HANCOCK as to the intended meaning of despatch quoted above their understanding was not to fly over or attack MACAO, its harbor facilities or shipping therein but to observe from a distance and that the seaplane base about 22 miles from MACAO had been definitely and unconditionally assigned for attack. On day of attack no enemy activity was observed on or near seaplane base MACAO. Details of attacks all by FightRon 7 are as follows all 16 Jan 1945. 0900 5 fighters strafed seaplane hangar. 0930 7 fighters strafed and fired seaplane hangar; strafed revetments. 0940 5 fighters strafed seaplane hangar. 1530 4 fighters strafed burnt out hangar and apparent gasoline stations. The gun camera film record of above attacks are reported to have been destroyed by bomb explosion on HANCOCK 22 Jan 1945.

Information from Commander 7th Fleet indicates that various officers of the Royal Navy are seeking to make major logistic arrangements with him direct. I assume that in accord with NF-1 you will deal with administrative arrangements with, by or through CINCPAC.

Com7thFlt 080121 referred to you for such action as may be necessary and appropriate.

CAX 50405. Subject is British Pacific Fleet's operations and use of SWPA facilities and personnel as requested in CinCBPFP 030223 GCT of 5 February to me copy not to you paraphrased "Approval expected shortly for facilities including air strip to establish a naval air base at MANUS including tented camp site for 1500 men for which will require construction and maintenance personnel. Request confirmation of release of RAAF works squadrons or Australian engineer personnel who have been approached and concur in this request being passed to you required to establish base by 6 March" end of paraphrase. Also CinCBPFP 310537 of 3 February to me copy not to you paraphrased "Approval is requested for CinCBPFP to communicate directly with Command General FEAF regarding the following problems. (A) Providing protection from the air of the bases and lines of communications of the BPF, (B) air formation training of the fleet in company with air, (C) use of facilities of air transport services for the BPF. End of paraphrase. Concur in Commander 7th Fleet 080121 of 8 February 45. Facilities and personnel SWPA allocated to fullest extent in support of present and future operations. In consonance with serial 000169 letter of 19-20 December 1944 and Commander in Chief and CNO 162021 GCT to CinCBPFP, believe requests for use of facilities and direct communication should follow the defined chain of command.
Consider it advisable that so far as possible participation of ComNavGroup CHINA matters of nature your 100531 be handled by assignment of straightforward tasks in such form that purpose is not disclosed to him. To avoid revealing purpose in pertinent future messages to ComNavGroup CHINA substitute cominch for Joint Security Control in addreses. Cominch will deliver such messages to Joint Security Control who have this by hand. My 301923 Jan not to nor needed by all also refers.

MARSHALL to SULTAN, RICHARDSON, WEDERMEYER Info HARMON, LEMAY, RAMEY passed to ISCOMS GUAM, SAIPAN, TINIAN Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

WARX 33285. Now the War Department directs that the Commanding General, United States Army Forces INDIA-BURMA take the necessary action to prepare for movement and to move the 58 Bombardment Wing (VH) and component units as hereinafter indicated from INDIA-BURMA Theater to Pacific Ocean Areas in accordance with the following: Para. Part 1. References: (A) War Department letter AG 270.5 (25 June 43) OB-S-SPMOT-E-M, 30 June 43, Subject: Assignment of Shipment Numbers to overseas commanders. Para. (B) War Department letter AG 370.5(23 June 43) OB-W-E-M, 30 June 43, subject: Procedure concerning movement of Troops Overseas. Para. Part 2. Personnel: (A) 1st Water Echelon: (1) 2275 personnel of the 58 Wing will be prepared for departure CALCUTTA on or about 22 February destination TINIAN. (Total personnel in this echelon plus additional maintenance and staff personnel carried in unit aircraft should be comparable by SSN to the retained air and ground echelons of the 315 Wing remaining in the United States to support unit aircraft. (Complete breakdown of SSNS being forwarded under separate cover). Para. (2) 2664 personnel will be prepared for departure from CALCUTTA on or about 22 February destination GUAM consisting by units as follows: Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 58 Wing 3 officers, 10 enlisted men; ground echelons 2 headquarters and headquarters squadrons Bomb Group each 2 officers, 16 enlisted men; ground echelon 6 Bomb Squadrons each 6 officers, 197 enlisted men; 2 photo labs Bomb Group each 1 officer, 20 enlisted men; 2 Air Service Groups each 44 officers, 3 warrant officers, 667 enlisted men; 338 Signal Company Wing 8 officers, 119 enlisted men. Para (B) 2nd Water Echelon: 3070 personnel consisting by units as follows will be prepared for departure to GUAM with readiness date in April: Hdqtrs & Hdqtrs Sqdns Bomb Group each 2 officers, 16 enlisted men; ground echelons 6 Bomb Squad each 6 officers, 197 enlisted men; 2 Photo Labs Bomb Group each 1 officer, 20 enlisted men; 2 Air Service Groups each 44 officers, 3 warrant officers, 667 enlisted men; 2nd AAF Combat Camera Unit 9 officers, 23 enlisted men; 1903 Ordnance Ammunition Co. 6 officers, 173 enlisted men; Ground Echelon Flight C 1st Reconnaissance Squadron 10 officers, 85 enlisted men; Link Trainer operators 40 enlisted men; total 3070 personnel; 155 officers, 6 warrant officers, 2909 enlisted men. Para (C). The 1st Air and Flight Echelon (90 B-29s, 2 B-26s and 5 F-13s) of the 58 Wing consisting of: Wing Hdqtrs 40 officers, 2 warrant officers, 66 enlisted men; Flight C, 1st Photo Reconnaissance Sqn 30 officers, 60 enlisted men; 2 Ground Hdqtrs each 20 officers, 1 warrant officer, 19 enlisted men; 6 Bomb Squadrons each consisting of 100 officers, 1,12 enlisted men; total 710 officers, 4 warrant officers and 1,016 enlisted men will arrive at 315 Wing bases at TINIAN beginning 1 April. Unit aircraft to be loaded with combat crew and 7 maintenance or staff personnel. Regulation of the flow of aircraft in accordance with the completion dates of airfields on
TINIAN will be accomplished by direct communication between the 21 Bomber Command, the 20 Bomber Command. Para (D). The 2nd Flight and Air Echelon (90 B29s) of the 58 Wing consisting of BomWing Hqtrs personnel 20 officers, 20 enlisted men; 2 Group Hqtrs, each 20 officers, 1 warrant officer, 19 enlisted men; 6 Bomb Squadrons, each 100 officers, 150 enlisted men; total 660 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 958 enlisted men, will arrive at TINIAN beginning 1 May subject to the regulation established in the preceding paragraph. Para (E). The totals of personnel for each unit indicated within echelons are considered only as a guide to indicate totals of personnel that can be moved within the means indicated. Any adjustment between units and within echelons (air or ground) is authorized consistent with the mission of the personnel and the condition of the bases upon arrival. Para (F). The headquarters 20 Bomber Command and the balance of its assigned units composing the 3rd echelon will be the subject of a separate directive. 1 June 45 is established as a readiness date. Para Part 3. Equipment: (A) Personnel of each echelon moving by water will be accompanied by heavy tentage and minimum essential equipment as outlined in POM including such authorized hand tools as transportation facilities will permit. Para (B). Complete tables of equipment, tables of basic allowances and special lists of equipment irrespective of qualifying remarks indicated in applicable equipment tables will be processed and packed for overseas shipment. Tentative deadline at port for organizational equipment of the 1st echelon is 1 March and for the 2nd echelon is 1 April pending receipt of unloading schedule from Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas requested in 4 B below. The Commanding General INDIA-BURMA will establish final equipment readiness dates. Para (C). Commanding General INDIA BURMA will authorize the 58 Wing to ship on vessels nominated for the movement of cargo of each echelon of the 58 Wing, such extra items of equipment accumulated in excess of tables of equipment and tables of Basic Allowances from special projects (except theater projects), special issues and such critical spare parts as deemed advisable using space available remaining after loading cargo specified in the preceding paragraph. Para (D). Based on appropriate tables of equipment and tables of basic allowances, it is estimated that the 1st Water Echelon will have 3700 long tons and 23300 measurement tons (garbage) including 1083 vehicles. The 2nd Water Echelon will have 3700 long tons and 23700 measurement tons including 1089 vehicles. These estimates are based on provisions of paragraph 3 B above. Para (E) A radio report will be rendered by the Commanding General INDIA BURMA Theater to the War Department by 20 February with a copy to Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas giving theater estimate for each echelon to include (group missing); (1) Total weight in long tons and measurement tons. (2) Number of vehicles by type and model. Para. Part 4. Transportation: (A) The Chief of Transportation, Army Service Forces, will: (1) Furnish transportation (group missing) to accomplish the above movement and take the necessary steps to coordinate the movement with overseas theaters. Para (2). Designate personnel shipping by radio immediately for the 1st Water Echelon. Para (3). Nominate cargo shipping upon receipt of information required by 3 E above and 4 B below. Para (B). The Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas will upon receipt of information in 3 E above advise the War Department with copy to the Commanding General United States Army Forces INDIA BURMA Theater of the unloading echelon during which the cargo for the 1st Water Echelon and of the 2nd Water Echelon may be accepted at GUAM. For planning purposes this date has been accepted
as approximately 1 May for the 1st Echelon and as approximately 1 June for the 2nd Echelon. Para (C). Commanding General, INDIA BURMA Theater will by radio to the War Department nominate the port of loading for troops in the 2nd Water Echelon based upon the troop ship schedule in WARX 21332 January 16. Loading time to be between 1 April and 1 May 1945. Para. Part 5. Other Instructions: (A) Troops come under control of the Commanding General Army Service Forces (Chief of Transportation) upon embarkation and pass to the control of the Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas upon debarkation. Para (B). The Commanding General U.S. Army Forces CHINA Theater will provide such assistance as is required for SEPOK RU E aircraft of the flight echelons as outlined in 2C and 2D through bases in CHINA. Para (C). Operational radios implementing this directive will be classified secret. Para (D). Vaccination against bubonic plague will be effected prior to this movement or enroute. Para (E). Direct communication between theater commanders is authorized. Para. Part 6. Report: (A) In addition to reports called for above and in references Part 1, the Commanding General U.S. Army Forces INDIA BURMA Theater will report by radio to the War Department, the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas and the intermediate Theater Commander (if the vessel will call at an intermediate port) not later than two hours after NO AR ARRIVE THE VESSELS the following information: (1) Ship ENTU numbers and letters of the units. Para (2). Total number of officers and enlisted personnel by unit (any female or negro officers and enlisted personnel will (group missing) indicated. Para (3). Date of departure. Para (4). Port serial number FOAVJNTLY assigned to the vessel. Para (5). Estimated time of arrival at an intermediate port (if any) and at destination area. (B) Cargo information will be in accordance with section 3 of War Department Technical Manual 38-41721 March 44, subject: Standardized supply and transportation information from ports of embarkation to overseas theaters.

Serial CFBX 32812. Both east and west of the Jap held corridor HANKOW-HONGKONG are large number of Chinese troops and or guerillas from whom supplies are not now contemplated in the approved U.S. programs. Para. Potentially they can be of great value in resisting further Jap advances, protecting remaining air field, disrupting lines of communications and aiding in possible future operations. Any equipment would aid them and Jap equipment would be particularly appropriate. Para. Logistically, air delivery from LUZON is feasible and fast with the further advantage that it will not create a drain on our hump lift already stretched to sustain the approved Chinese divisions. Para. The question is, what air transportable captured Japanese equipment is available, how much and where. All small arms, mortars, light machine guns, ammunition therefor and hand grenades are of principle interest to us. Para. Will you help us out by speeding the answer. If availability of equipment warrants, we will consider other details of the plan and discuss them with you.
FEBRUARY (GCT)

12 0237 CINC BPF to CINCPAC.

(PART 1)
FRASER to NIMITZ. I find it now a little difficult to understand what is happening. 2. Nimitz directed by you we are trying to plan for ICEBERG but (A) We apparently have not been assigned to any command. (B) I am informed that the British Task Force is not available for early stages of ICEBERG. (C) Cominch 092141 Feb. 1945 infers that I should have no communication with Com7thFleet. 3. With regard to (C)

12 0245 Same as above.

(PART 2)
the only communication I have had are (1) A personal visit on General MacArthur's invitation followed by a proposal to attach liaison officers. (2) A request to CinC SoWesPac Area for the release of some Australian work personnel to assist on airstrip at MANUS. (3) A request to CinC SoWesPac Area to deal direct with Commanding General Far Eastern Air Forces over local air matters. (4) Other local questions in AUSTRALIA.

12 0251 CINC BPF to CINCPAC ADV.

(PART 3)
Part 3 final my 120251. Such as accommodation in SYDNEY. 4. My only object is to try and bring the BPF into action on the dates you desired, but am beginning to feel a little frustrated. Time is getting short, the Fleet is in SYDNEY, and I have as yet no air strip allocations at MANUS.
5. Can you help and advise me if we are doing wrong. It hardly seems to me to be practicable to be based in the command of CinC5SWPA area without having communication on local matters.

11 0836 COM1STCARTASKFORPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPOA PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMCARDIV 7, COMFIFTHFLEET.

Urdis 090525. Due to time involved recommend retention SARATOGA (CV 3) for ICEBERG and assign BATAAN (CVL 29) AND INDEPENDENCE (CVL 22) for training or retain only ENTERPRISE (CV 6) as night carrier for this operation. CVLs are not suitable for night carrier work and doubt if TICONDEROGA (CV 14) could be trained or carry her weight as only a night carrier. All CVs available will be necessary as day carriers during this operation.

13 0210 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCPOA PEARL HQ Info COMFIFTHFLEET, COMPHIBSPAC, COMGEN10.

The seizure of an island in the DAITO SHIMA as a site for a Loran station will be eliminated as a feature of current planning. No forces will be earmarked for that purpose at this time except for the Loran equipment and its operating personnel which will be held in reserve for use at such time as its installation at a suitable site may be accomplished without use of important combat units. This cancels Phase III-a of ICEBERG.
13 1945 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COMTHIRDFLT, COMBATRON 2.

In view circumstances reported your 090824 proceed with investigation by Court of Inquiry when convenient.

14 0110 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN US FORCES CHINA Info COM5THFLT, CINCSWPA, COMNAVGROUP CHINA.

To clarify situation in connection your 090824. No copies of my top secret serial 0005007 were sent to any agency in CHINA and it is unlikely that ComNavGroup CHINA has knowledge of its contents. It was paralleled by my 122013 January addressed to you and ComNavGroup's 170631 signed CHENNAULT understood to be your reply. Para 2. You may be assured that my communications concerning forces under your command will be addressed direct to you. Para. Reference to serial 0005007 in my 040144 was improper and it is obvious that loss of forward bases makes 14th Air Force unable perform tasks which FIVESOME Agreement outlined for 20th Bomber Command.

14 0112 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN AAFPOA Info COMFWDAREA, ISCOM WORKMAN.

Your 102205. All units of all services stationed at WORKMAN (IWO JIMA) must be under the military command of the Island Commander. Tactical units staging through WORKMAN will remain under the administrative and operational control of the organizations to which assigned. The Island Commander WORKMAN will be responsible for efficient operation of all units of his military command. Desire assignment of units mentioned your 102205 be such as to conform to foregoing.

14 0456 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN U.S. FORCES CHINA THEATER FWD ECHelon CHUNGKING Info COMGEN 14 AIR FORCE, COMNAVGROUP CHINA.

ORANGE Task Force of 2 ISE Class BB, 1 TONE or MOGAMI Class CA and 3 DD sighted and attacked with undetermined results by SWPA subs and planes. Composite of sightings indicates speed about 15 knots. Last reported 12-40 N 112-00 E, course 014, at 0430 (I)(-9) February 14. Estimate this force will continue advance through FORMOSA STRAITS hugging CHINA Coast. Speed of advance suggests necessity refuelling probably between AMOY and GOCHOW. Believe they will continue on to homeland after fueling.

14 0759 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, COMGEN 10, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, Info COMAIRPAC, COMGENPOA, COMMINPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMGENAAFPOA.

In view of favorable possibilities of development at INDISPENSABLE (IE SHIMA) and unfavorable terrain shown by recent reconnaissance of KNOWLEDGE (KULE JIMA) the latter will be eliminated from current planning and Phase III-b of ICEBERG is cancelled.
16 0419 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINC SWPA Info COMINCH, CINC BPF, COM VII THRIFT, CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC.

Para 1. CINC BPF 141300x Request approval now of the use of MANUS by the British Pacific Fleet as an anchorage for the augmentation of United States Naval carrier aircraft pools and personnel at MANUS by up to 50 British carrier aircraft with 4 officers and 131 men. Para 2. I will withhold any request for establishment of a British Mobile Naval Air Base (MONAB) until receipt of your action on Para 2 of my 110045 and approval by the Commander in Chief United States Fleet of the establishment of the MONAB concerned. Para 3. If facilities can be made available request also your approval of arrival British Liaison Officer and party proposed by para 8 of Cinc BPF 141300.

16 0427 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMPHIBSPAC Info COM VII THRIFT, COMGEN FMFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, CTG 10, 16, CTF 53, COMWDArea, COM HAWSEAPERON, CTF 56, CTG 56.1, ADECOMPHIBSPAC

Schedule of operations following Phase I of ICEBERG require rehabilitation of 4th and 5th Marine Divisions in Hawaiian Area rather than in MARIANAS following DETACHMENT. Assault TransRons now committed to DETACHMENT will therefore be employed as follows: (A) 1 TransRon evacuate 3rd MarDiv to GUAM after which it will be routed to scheduled mounting point for ICEBERG as previously planned. (B) Other 2 TransRons may be used to evacuate casualties to MARIANAS ro SoPac and will then be routed to scheduled mounting points for ICEBERG without being required to evacuate troops. Shipping for the evacuation of 4th and 5th MarDivs will be provided from (A) APA's and AKA's from 7th Fleet which were scheduled to return PEARL for overhaul, (B) AP's and AK's from 7th Fleet which were scheduled to return PEARL for garrison shipping, (C) AP's and AK's in garrison shipments number 0 and 1, (D) Additional spare APA's and AKA's from PEARL which will be sailed to forward areas immediately. Para. All of these ships except those in (C) above will be concentrated in ULIIfI and ENIWETFOK to be routed to WORKMAN as directed by you. Actual names of ships and arrangement for escorts will be provided later. Assume that landing craft which you leave at WORKMAN for unloading garrison shipments will be adequate for the reembarkation of these divisions. Decision as to which Marine RCT will be left at objective prior to the arrival of the 147 Inf Regt is left to your judgement but this alteration in plan indicates the desirability of selecting 1 RCT from the 3rd MarDiv provided it is committed and provided no other factors are presented.

16 0846 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMGEN FMFPAC Info COMINCH, MAR CORPS, COMPHIBSPAC, COM WDArea, COM S O PAC, COM EN POA, CO FW ECH FMFPAC, CO SOPAC ECH MAPPAC, COM SA, COM VII THRIFT, COM VII PH IBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ

Rehabilitation areas mydis 200006 modified as follows (A) Following DETACHMENT 5th Amphib Corps 4th and 5th MarDivs return to Hawaiian area 3rd MarDiv return to GUAM (B) Following Phase II ICEBERG 3rd PhibCorps & 6th MarDiv to GUAM 1st MarDiv to Hawaiian area and 2nd MarDiv to SAIPAN. (C) Following Phase III-c ICEBERG 5th PhibCorps with 3d 4th and 5th MarDivs to PHILIPPINES if facilities are ready otherwise return to previous rehabilitation areas.
16 0919 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COM7THFLT, CTF 77, COM7THFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMSERVRON 10.

Request PORTLAND (CA 33) and MINNEAPOLIS (CA 36) be released in time report Cincpac at ULITHI not later than 5 March.

16 1145 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMSERVRON 10 Info COM7THFLT, CTF 51, PD ULITHI, WEST VIRGINIA (BB48), CTF 54, COMFWDAREA, CTF 52, CTF 53.

Your 160509. Direct WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48) proceed immediately to WORKMAN as routed by PD ULITHI at best speed of advance. Select 2 destroyers in best operating condition from MAURY, MCCALL, GRIDLEY, IZARD to report CO WEST VIRGINIA as escorts. CO WEST VIRGINIA advise originator and info adees ETA WORKMAN. On arrival report CTF 51 for duty in 5th Fleet. Retain escorts until further orders. See ComPhibsPac 150155 passed separately to WEST VIRGINIA.

16 1112 COMGENAAFPOA to CINCPOA ADV HQ.

AAFPOA 0237. Reference is made to our O119 dated 10 February, and your 140112 February. In order to clarify status of units in question, recommend Cincpoa inform interested agencies as follows: (A) That the primary mission of the 347th and 348th Air Service Groups is to support 21 Bomber Command operations through and activities in WORKMAN. (B) That to insure most effective accomplishment of mission of these units ComGenAAFPOA will issue orders attaching them to 21 Bomber Command for administration and operations. (C) That attachment as provided in (B) above does not affect the overall responsibility and authority of ComGen WORKMAN in regard to island defenses, general administration and discipline, nor his authority in emergencies to take any action which he considers necessary in keeping with his responsibilities. (D) That command control of these units will be vested in an officer designated by ComGen Bomber Command 21. (E) That in the interest of economy of effort, Commander Task Force 10.16.1 will deal directly with the Commander of combined service troops (ie Bomber Command 21 Commander at WORKMAN as covered in (D) above) in utilizing means in excess of Bomber Command 21 requirements to meet overall air requirements at WORKMAN. (F) That ComGenAAFPOA will take necessary action to effect detailed implementation of the above.

18 0736 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COMINCHIEF, CINC, COM7THFLT, COMGENPOA, COMGEN-PEFAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

Due to revision of operational plans it is now considered desirable that rehabilitation and staging facilities in the PHILIPPINES for POA forces in accordance with FILRAS Agreement be made available for units as indicated below: (A) For Army: One corps of 3 Divs with elements arriving as follows: Corps troops and 2 Divs about 1 June. Other Div about 15 June. Additional Corps of 3 Divs with elements arriving as follows: 1 Div about 30 June, 1 Div by 10 July. Corps troops by 15 July. 1 other Div by 15 Sept. (B) For Marine Corps: 1 amphibious Corps of 3 MarDivs with elements arriving as follows: Depots and rear echelons about 1 July. Combat elements during Aug. HyDis 050746 modified accordingly.
Intend following employment Task Force 58 after DETACHMENT landing support. Arrive ULITHI March 8.

This is Com5thFleet OpPlan 4-45 for operation termed JAMBOREE. Task organization: Task Force 58 less SARATOGA, DesDiv 108, Vice Admiral Mitscher. Task Group 50.3 Rear Admiral Beary. Task Group 50.5 Commodore Ketcham. Para. Task Force 58 take air strikes on TOKYO, NAGOYA, KYUSHU Areas and strike and photo mission on OKINAWA. Target priorities (1) Enemy aircraft (2) Engine and aircraft factories. (3) Shipping and shipyards where applicable. Airfield installations are secondary targets all strikes. WW incendiaries and/or Napo. As appears profitable and practicable. Carry out following schedule as practicable: F-2 Day depart DIO JIMA area fully fueled. Approach TOKYO by route to eastward of NANFO SHOTO. F Day, F plus 1 strike TOKYO area from vicinity of latitude 34-00 N 141-20E. retire night of F plus 1 to rendezvous with replenishment unit of Task Group 50.8 at 1000 K (-10) F plus 2 in latitude 28-30N Longitude 141-30 E fuel and replace aircraft. Proceed to arrive dawn F plus 3 at launching position approximately Lat 32-30 N Long 137-30 E for strike on NAGOYA-KOBE area F plus 3 and F plus 4. Rendezvous with unit of Task Group 50.8 at 1000 K (-10) F plus 5 in Lat 38-00 N Long 140-00 E. Fuel and replace aircraft. Carry out strike and movement schedule of Annex K to CTF 58 OpOrder 1-45 with KYUSHU strikes F plus 6, F plus 7 F plus 8 and strike and photo mission on OKINAWA F plus 8. Rendezvous with Task Group 50.8 unit 0700 K (-10) F plus 10 in Lat 22-50 N, Long 139-00E. Fuel and replace aircraft. Proceed to arrive ULITHI F plus 12 for upkeep until required for ICEBERG Operation. CTF 58 modify fueling and strike schedule as circumstances require informing CTF 50.3. Make request to CinPac info ComSubPac for desired Lifeguard submarines and zone notices. Through CinPac 2lst BomCom is requested strike Empire targets with full strikes as often as practicable hitting same targets as Task Force 58 when visual bombing possible alternate targets when only radar bombing possible and also continue weather and heckling missions maximum possible throughout period of operation CinPac also requested arrange maximum possible weather reports from SWPA and submarines particularly vicinity NANsei SHOTO. Empire and at sea. Para. CTF 50.8 direct Task Unit composed of 12 AG, available CVE, 4 ATF, appropriate escort conform to fuel and aircraft replenishment schedule of preceding paragraph or as modified by CTF 58. Furnish ATF rescue units as directed by CTF 58. When not engaged in Task Force 58 replenishment operations operate in area BUMBER MANIFOLD WHEEL until F-4 and areas BATTERY ENGINE HOUSING VALVE F plus 6 through F plus 9. Para. Task Group 50.5 as soon as staging facilities available DIO JIMA for PH4's search for and destroy picket boats in advance of Task Force 58. Para. Xray. F Day is 1st day of TOKYO strike and will be set by dispatch. For planning purposes F Day is tentatively 24 February. This plan effective upon receipt for planning and will be placed in effect by dispatch for execution. Para. Communications CentCom 2. Com5thFleet at present in INDIANAPOLIS with Task Force 51.
19 0701 CINC BPF to CINC PAC ADV HQ.

NIMITZ ONLY. Part 1 my 190725 (ATF 113). The following BPF movements are planned. Fast Carrier Task Force (accompanied by a tanker group consisting of 4 AO 2 CVE 1 AF. 6th March - 15th March at MANUS. 16th March - 17th March at ULYSSE, BPF 112 (Fleet Train) 1st March onwards - units of the Fleet Train arrive ADREANUS. 19th March onwards - certain units of the Fleet Train arrive LEYTE, where it is planned to replenish the fleet after its first period of operations. Part 2. In the absence of other instructions I am continuing with these movements as far as MANUS in case there should be reconsideration as to our taking part in Phase I of ICEBERG. In any case you will realize how important it is not to keep the fleet inactive at SYDNEY for a prolonged period. At MANUS there are few British facilities and you will equally understand how desirable it is that the fleet should be actively employed within a reasonable time. 4. I am also most anxious to establish my MOMAB which is now on its way to MANUS. This forms the subject of a separate signal. 5. I am regarding you as my Commander in Chief although the complicated state of assignment does not make our relative positions quite clear and on this assumption I am not communicating with Admiralty or Cominch on the question of my assignment. Request your advice. 6. I would request your general approval of the foregoing or alternatively your other instruction. Part 4. Should you consider it desirable I would also be grateful if you would represent the position to Cominch and ask that we might be assigned to your area at least for the start of ICEBERG if this is likely to take place before any operation for which we might be required in the Southwest Pacific Area.

19 0720 (Part 3)

CINC PAC ADV HQ to COMINCH.

NIMITZ ONLY. NIMITZ TO KING. Ref CINC BFF 190701-190715-190720-190725 separately passed. I am without information as to prospective operations BPF. In order to assist as far as possible in readying them for whatever employment may be required I propose unless otherwise directed to approve his 190715 as requested in his 190720. Early clarifications of status BPF will be most helpful to both myself and Fraser.

19 2306 CINC PAC ADV HQ to CINC CBFF.

CINC BFF to CINC PAC ADV HQ Info CINC SWESPAC, COM 7 TH FLT.

Part 1 of my 180619. Communications requirements at MANUS. References 1 my 141300 Feb. 2 my 070847 Feb. During the period before the Fleet moves forward from MANUS ROE operations HMS LOHTIN will act as W/T base ship establishing a fixed service with BELCONNEN W/T as in reference 2. 3. When the Fleet moves forward from MANUS HMS LOHTIN will also leave. Fixed service will be discontinued and there will be no British W/T base ship at this period facilities are required(A) For the Liaison officer (short title BNO) to establish (Part 2 my 180619) 1 small portable transmitter ashore and 3 receivers to operate a British port wave and to copy BELCONNEN FOX FOX radio sets will be provided. (B) For passing British traffic on existing fixed circuits maintained by radio MANUS. Existing US visual shore stations to install a small telephone exchange for the use of the SBNO. Equipment for this will be provided but assistance with installation and the provision of the lines to US exchanges is required. 4. To assist in implementing the above British communication personnel will be lent where necessary to ComNavBase and the numbers in Para 3 reference 1 should be increased by 1 officer and 20 ratings 51 additional Quonset huts will be required to accommodate radio sets, telephone exchange and communication.
This is part 1 my 190801. For information with regard to Para 2 of your 160419 (2) A Mobile Naval Air Base (MONAB) was designated to MANUS in the belief that the Cominch's acceptance of NF-1 carried with it an acceptance in principle of Para 2 of NF-1. (3) PREM present position of this MONAB is as follows: (A) Its equipment in SS CLAN MACAULEY is on its way via PANAMA and is due at MANUS on March 11th. (B) Its personnel are due F BUIACDM by 18th February and are planned to take passage in EMPIRE ARQUEBUS to arrive MANUS by 11th March. Part 2 final. (4) If the MONAB equipment cannot be landed in MANUS it will be necessary to divert this ship to AUSTRALIA where her other cargo must be off loaded. This will entail a considerable delay in the final establishment of the MONAB. (5) It is believed that the early establishment of air facilities in MANUS will considerably increase the operational effectiveness of the BritPacFleet in whichever area the latter may eventually be assigned.

Summary number 2 191800 K. RCTs 26, 25, 27, 28, and 2 Tank Battalions completed landing by 1600. RCT R OCSIX (28?) landed 2 battalions by 1800. 4 battalions artillery ashore by that time. Para. Initial landing waves met slight opposition but heavy mortar and artillery fire soon developed on the beaches and boat lanes with some fire in LST area. Enemy fire was particularly severe on BLUE and YELLOW beaches and developed greatly in intensity during the day the fire coming principally from the high ground on right flank although heavy opposition from pillboxes in the vicinity of airfield No. 1 was encountered. Some land mines were reported inshore of several of the beaches. Para. At least 11 probably more LVT's and tanks were destroyed by enemy fire. Para. The 5th MarDiv advanced rapidly across the island and captured the southern end of airfield No. 1 against light opposition and swung their left flank to the left but were held up by strong positions and fire along the edge of SURIBACHI MOUNTAIN. Losses of the 5th MarDiv were light to moderate. Opposition to the advance of the 4th MarDiv across the open slopes to airfield No. 1 was severe and heavy casualties were incurred from mortar and machine gun fire. Average was about 30 percent results. YELLOW 2 Beach party suffered 60 percent casualties. Para. Both divisions dug in for the night beginning about 1600. At 1800 our lines generally ran from TA 132 I to 147 L thence along west coast to 163 M thence through 164, KR GAP 164 XY 165 UCHDE 183 U1W 166 CE. Our tanks are deployed in the vicinity of the airfield and TA 165 IM. Para. CVAKEHSNC lines along airfield and right flank considered insecure. Para. Intelligence information indicates enemy concentrating for counter attack during darkness. Para. Expect to resume advance at 0800 K(-10) on 20th. Para. Propaganda were dropped by 1214. Beach conditions in YELLOW BEACH were unfavorable for movement of vehicles. Beaches GREED and RED were organized and receiving equipment and supplies during afternoon. Several boats broached and lost during AU. Para. Reports of troop casualties not yet received. By 1730 1230 wounded had been passed through hospital LST'S. Para. Very heavy naval gunfire and air bombing were continued throughout the day in effort to destroy well concealed enemy field artillery mortar and machine guns but so far with meager results. More heavy anti aircraft batteries and nearly all coast defense guns were apparently destroyed prior to H Hour. Strong illumination harassing and counter battery fire are planned for tonight. Para. Heavy enemy anti aircraft fire appeared only a few times during the day but medium and light was intense but inaccurate.
19 1320 CTF 51 (SUMMARY NO. 2 - CONT'D)

2 planes were shot down 1 a TBM with 5th MarDiv observer from RUDYERD BAY and 1 OS2U from TENNESSEE no survivors. At 1635 BUNKER HILL TBM reported making a forced landing off the north coast but search failed to find it. Press FBM of VVM 26 in landing at 1645 seriously damaged its tail surfaces which require renewal. Para. HAMLIN will arrive 20th. Delayed report shows BLESSMAN (APD 48) bombed by enemy plane 182115. At 100 feet altitude hit possible by 2 bombs all power lost ships company 18 dead 8 missing 6 wounded. UDT 15 17 dead 22 wounded. On same night about 2130 GAMBLE (DM15) hit by bomb or plane both fire rooms out leakage under control crew removed except 25. Will tow these vessels to SAIPAN. Para. During day LSMs UHFY LMS 74, 211 and 323 were hit by enemy mortar fire and suffered major damage. No report on personnel casualties. Will tow to SAIPAN. Para. Summary shows of the 12 LCI(G)s in action against enemy on 17th, 10 were hit by gunfire while covering UDT operations LCI(G) 474 sunk and 438, 441, 449, 450, 457 466, 49, 471 badly damaged. Para. CHESTER and ESTES in collision at 190600 K. FOMDKW WESTERN DESIREEUXBAD holed but repaired ship operational. CHESTER badly damaged starboard propeller. Tail shaft possibly broken. Being sent to SAIPAN to ComServRon 10 for repairs.

* 19 2025 CTF 56 to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMSUBSPAC, COM5THFLT, COM TG OF TF 56.


19 2308 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT.

Reviewing your OpPlan 4-45 in connection movement schedule your OpPlan 1-45 shows that carrier force will have only 7 days at anchor if both are carried out. Do you consider 7 days adequate or do you contemplate eliminating or shortening of some strikes now planned for period L minus 14 to L Day. It is agreeable to me to leave those questions unanswered until JAMBOREE is underway but consider that they must be answered sooner or later. I do not desire to delay ICEBERG.
20 0349 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC VIA RDO GUAM Info CTF 51, CTF 58.

Turner advises considerable uncertainty exists in latter part of January as to whether 24th Corps could meet ICEBERG date. Request date Corps can definitely meet. Any delay affects current plans of CTF 51 and 58 for DETACHMENT.

20 0600 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TFC'S FIFTHFLEET.

Summary number 3 201200 K (-10). Occasional accurate bursts of enemy artillery and mortar fire on beaches during night. About 200230 K enemy numbering 1000 counter attacked down airfield No. 1 against right wing the 5th MarDiv but attack broken up by RCT 27 at 200345 K. Some supplies landed during night. 2 cruisers 11 DD delivered illumination harassing and destructive fires during night. Para. After strong naval and air bombardment our attack commenced about 0845 K against very strong enemy opposition including intense artillery and mortar fire. At 1200 K our lines from air appeared to be from TA 132M to 132P thence along coast to 18 OF thence through 165B 182X 183X To 166E. Para. Wrecked boats LVT's DUKW's and enemy equipment along beaches YELLOW and BLUE. Due to gunfire and soft sand YELLOW and BLUE were closed and traffic concentrated on GREEN and RED. In spite of this the critical supply situation ashore is somewhat improved. Para. SAMARITAN arrived for evacuation severe casualties. HAMLIN CHINOOK TEAGUE and certain vessels by TG 51.5 arrived others plus TG 51.1 are cruising in waiting areas. Para. TG 54 most transports some landing craft retired during night returned daybreak. Para. Because of very heavy ammunition expenditure TF 58 will provide 4 additional cruisers during 21st and 22nd. Para. 3 or 4 enemy air raids 2 to 4 planes each approached to 10 to 20 miles last night but all retired on approach of our night fighters. Red alert from 1911 to 2050 K. At 0800 K TBM from RUDYERD BAY landed in water 10 miles to eastward all 4 occupants rescued by ASHLAND.

20 0847 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CTF 58.

My OpPlan 4-45 too ambitious unless ICEBERG should be delayed for other reasons. Your 192308. To insure readiness for ICEBERG consider it desirable TF 58 have more time at ULITHI. Will do only OVERHEAT andoughous parts of plan subject to DETACHMENT support requirements and enemy reaction. 2 task groups should arrive ULITHI 2 March and 2 about 5th.

20 1013 CTG 50.5 to CTU 50.5.3 info COM5THFLT, CTF 94 & 93, ALL TF & TG COMDRS FIFTHFLEET.

As soon as staging facilities at TWO JIMA become available commence furnishing 2 plane Liberator offensive screen during daylight. Search for and destroy enemy picket boats and planes in advance of TF 58 on F minus 2 to F plus 8 inclusive. Track of TF 58 follows. F minus 2 depart TWO enroute TOKYO via east of NANPO SHOTO. F day plus 1 strike TOKYO from vicinity 34-00 N 141-20 E. Retire night of F plus 1 to rendezvous with oilers at 1000 K (-10) F plus 2 posit 28-30 N 141-30 E. Arrive dawn F plus 3 posit 32-30 N 137-30 E for NAGOYA-KOBE strike F plus 3 F plus 4. Rendezvous with oilers at 1000 K (-10) F plus 5 posit 28-00 N 140-00 E. F plus 6 plus 7 and 8 cover TF posit 0700 K each day 30-40 N 133-40 E cus 325 SOA 5 knots. On F plus 8 cover TF posit 0710 posit 28-05 N 131-25 E cus 340 SOA 5 knots and 0720 posit 26-25 N 130-30 E cus 330 SOA 5 knots. F day is 24 Feb. Communications VHF channel C 140.58 MGS and normal search freq. Action adee notify info adees plane calls.
CTF 51 TO COMFITHELFLEET INFO CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TF COMDRS FIFTHFLEET.

Summary. 201800 K(410). Para. Troops continued attack throughout the afternoon meeting continuous mortar and artillery fire. Some rocket fire received on right flank. The 28th RCT attacking Mt. SURIBACHI met stiff opposition. The 4th and 5th MarDiv ordered to consolidate and prepare for the defense of their front line positions at 1630. 7 battalions of division artillery and 1 battery of corps artillery are in position ashore and prepared to support troops. Attack will continue at 0810 K 21st.

Enemy units identified to date: 145th Inf. Reg., 310th Independent Inf. Bn., 311th Independent Inf. Bn., 312th Independent Inf. Bn., 313th Independent Inf. Bn., 2nd Artillery Bn., of 2nd Independent mixed Brigade, 1st Detachment TWO JIMA naval guard force, 2nd section special Naval Landing Force, 132nd AA unit (a part of land unit of naval guard force), ARE BUTAI (an AA unit). Para. Front lines as of 1800 K were TA 132 M to 132 E then along coast TA 180 Y 181 UWST 182 south UW 165 OD 182 XY 183 UW to 166 OD. Para. No reliable casualty reports obtained as yet. Para. Gunnery support continued by 1 BB 1 cruiser 12 DD 1 TXH 1 CI(M) using VOP planes for spotting. Rain low clouds and poor visibility afternoon hindered observation. Gunboats fired throughout day in the cliff area north of beach BLUE 2 which contains many well camouflaged waves and is source of hostile artillery and mortar fire. Ammunition was replenished by 4 crasiers and 8 destroyers.

Ammunition expenditure to date approximately 8500 tons. LSM 216 damaged in superstructure by 1 enemy shell which destroyed all radio radar and gyro. Vessel will be used to tow cripples to rear. LSM 59 and LC 354 each have 1 engine inoperable due operational causes. Scheduled and on call gunfire will continue throughout night. Para. Scheduled air strikes were increased by 45 additional planes from fast carriers. Afternoon strikes hampered by poor visibility. 1 observation plane to DC over target during night. 1 TBM from SARGENT BAY (CVE 83) on ASP failed to return to carrier. 2 TBM's from BENNINGTON (CV20) collided in mid-air at 1415 with slight damage planes able to return to carrier. 1 crew member bailed out and was rescued by LEARY (DD 879). 1 TBM from HORNET (CV 12) crash-landed 18 miles north of TWO. All crew members rescued by COTTEN (DD669). 1 PBM landed 1415 and departed 1640 with press material and passengers. Para. BLUE and YELLOW beaches continued to be subjected to heavy mortar and artillery fire. Action is being taken to clear these beaches which are badly blocked by wrecked landing craft. The status of supply ashore is generally satisfactory. DUKWs and LVT's unloading supplies on RED and GREEN beaches.

F day for JAMBOREE is 25 February my OpPlan 4-45 as modified below effective 0000 K(-10) 23 February. Ships of TF 58 temporarily operating with TF 51. Less SARATOGA (CV 3) DesDiv 108 VICKSBURG (CL 86) plus INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) may be released by CTF 51 about sunset 22 February proceed as TG 58.12 ComCruDiv 13 OTC to rendezvous with TF 58 and TG 50.8 at 0800 K 23 Feb. in latitude 25-00 north longitude 145-00 East. Special fueling unit remain in assigned TG 50.8 fueling areas departing in time to rendezvous with TF 58 at 0800 K F plus 3 in Lat. 23-30 N Long 140-00 E. Upon completion fueling CTF 58 direct TG 58.2 and 58.4 proceed UTLTH to arrive afternoon F plus 5 day. With FG 56 and 58.3 conduct OKINAWA strike and photo mission F plus 5 day. CTF 50.8 direct special fueling unit after F plus 3 fueling operate areas VALVE HOUSING ENGINE BATTERY and rendezvous with TG 58.1 and 58.3 at 0800 K F plus 7 in Lat 17-00 N 136-00 E. Upon completion fueling TG 58.1

-Continued-

3020
and 58.3 proceed to arrive ULITHI afternoon F plus 8. Special fueling unit proceed arrive ULITHI 0700 K F plus 9. Para. CTF 58 modify his 192025 to conform to foregoing schedule. CTG 50.9 pass arrival dates ULITHI to Fort Director ULITHI.

20 2209 COMGENPOA to CINCPOA PEARL Info CINCPOA ADV, COMGEN24THCORPS, COMGEN10THARMY.

RJ 52505. While the assumptions stated in ComGenPOA serial 00069 dated 9 Dec 44 to Cincpoa not to all addees or by all needed were not fulfilled in that 24 Corps has not closed up on LEYTE until a week later than assumed, no information has been presented to ComGenPOA by ComGen 24 Corps or ComGen 10th Army to indicate that the 24 Corps can not meet its presently prescribed mounting date for ICEBERG reference oral inquiry Colonel Whitehead Cincpoa Staff.

21 0004 DEPCOM AF 20 to CINCPAC ADV Info COMAF 20, BOMCOM 21, CTF 51, CTF 58, CTF 23, CTF 24.

AAFPOA radio No. 0347. Based on revised plans Com5thFlt, the 21st BomCom proposes to conduct the following operations in support DETACHMENT reference DepComAF 20 0344 search operations: on F-2 search to be conducted in area 60 miles on either side of carrier task force track to operating area for F day. B, weather strike missions: Attacks be made on TOKYO Area during hours of darkness on night of F-2, F day, and F plus 2. 3 aircraft operating individually to make evenly spread attack using RCM. C, Major strikes: weather permitting, maximum effort strike will be made against a primary target in the TOKYO Area or NAGOYA area on F-1. The target will depend upon the most favorable weather area for visual. If forecast appears more favorable for F day, attack will be delayed 1 day and made against TOKYO Area on a visual forecast or against NAGOYA on a forecast indicating radar bombing conditions. In the event that after departure on a visual forecast radar bombing is found to be necessary on the same target and on the same date as TF 58 strikes, the same limitation as to time and space will be observed as those defined in Cincpoa 0700455.

21 0223 CINCPOA ADV to CINCSWPA Info COMINCH, CINCBP.

Urgently request reply to my 160419.

21 0225 CINCPAC ADV to CINCBP Info COMINCH, CINCSWPA.

Your 190801. Recommend you permit arrangements movement your MONAB stand firm pending reply to my 160419 to CINCSWPA and other decisions expected shortly.

21 0429 CINCPOA ADV to DEPCOM 20 AF Info COM5THFILT, CTF 51,58,93,94, CG BOMCOM 21 COM 20 AF.

Cancel my 201310. Ref Com5thFlt 201314. Attention invited to change of FOX Day to February 25. Operations as planned in your 210004 are satisfactory if related to new FOX Day. Also note deletion of strike on NAGOYA by TF 58.
21 0514 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info CTF 51, 58.

Your 200349. ICEBERG target date not expected to be delayed. Refer my 192308. Recent reports from 24th Corps more reassuring.

21 1238 CTG 52.2 to COM5THFLT, CTF 51, Info CINCPAC ADV, COMATRPAC, COMINCH.

Preliminary report Task Group 52.2 less Task Unit 52.2.1 under air attack from 1730 to 2000. SARATOGA hit about 1745 by 4 suicides and is now proceeding south 23 knots with situation under control. BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95) hit about 1850 on fantail by suicide burned furiously with many explosions and finally turned over believed sunk. Captain Pratt of BISMARCK SEA now in charge at scene picking up survivors, Escorts have been ordered return this Task Group after survivors delivered to beach. LUNGA POINT (CVE 94) hit situation under control. Effect on air operations unknown at present, 4 enemy planes shot down by ships gunfire escort carrier group. SARATOGA and CAP score unknown.

22 0115 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info DEP COM 20THAF, COM 21BOMCOM, CTF 58.

Your 210636. Picket boat sweep will not be made by B-29 either in advance of TF 58 track or as diversion west of Longitude 135. B-29 weather strike missions and major strikes will be conducted as outlined DepCom 20 AF 210004 later changed to date time group 201300.

21 0619 CINC BPF to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINC SWPA, COM7THFLT.

Part 1 my 210630. Com7thFleet’s 171028 has not been received. Your 190531 to me only refers. Para 2 Except for my 070306 February concerning a reconnaissance which was repeated to you, no separate action has taken with Com7thFleet for the establishment of bases forward of MANUS as it is assumed that you will make all such arrangements when required. Para 3. In response to your 110843, my detailed requirements for MANUS were forwarded in my 141300.

20 1651 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC. (NIMITZ ONLY)

In view of the answers to questions 27 and 8 of enclosure (c) to my serial 00443 of 16 February to you only the question arises as to whether we should now modify our present concept for a KURILES Operation to keep open a sea route to the Maritime Provinces possibly by considering the seizure of an island or islands in the Southern or Central KURILES. This is being examined here and your planners should examine it likewise. It now appears in view of the Russian requirement that some supplies continue to move via the Pacific following Russian entry into the war that it will be essential to keep a sea route to the Maritime Provinces open. I desire your views and recommendations on this matter on the assumption that the Russians will in fact be able to control LA PERROUSE STRAIT subsequent to seizure and occupation of lower SAKHALIN.

21 1635 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info CINC BPF, CINC SWPA (NIMITZ ONLY).

I am at a loss to understand why there should be confusion as to status of British Pacific Fleet. All arrangements for basing Brit. Pac. Flt. are in the hands of CinCPac including CinCSWPA concurrence where appropriate and always bearing in mind that said fleet is to be self supporting. Para. Allocation of units of British Pacific Fleet for operations remains in my hands. Part 1 my 211650.
21 1650 COMINCH to CINCPOA (KING TO NIMITZ) Info CINCPFE, CINCSWPA.

Part 2 my 211650, Part 1 was 211635. I cannot commit units of British Pacific Fleet to ICEBERG (involving 2 to 3 months) or any other operation until Joint Chiefs of Staff decide what operations are to be carried out other than those already approved. Prospects now are that such decision will be reached by middle of March.

22 0116 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 51, COMGENFMFPAC Info CG2NMARDIV, ISCOM SAIPAN.

2nd MarDiv is designated as Area Reserve for operation DETACHMENT under direct operational control of Cincpca and should be prepared to load on 48 hours notice. Designation as Area Reserve DETACHMENT not to interfere with 2nd MarDiv preparation for ICEBERG including scheduled rehearsals unless otherwise directed by Cincpca.

22 0358 CTF 58 to COM5THFLT: 5THFLT (220445) passed to CINCPOA ADV for Info.

Your 201314. In view increased enemy air strength on KYUSHU and necessary early return Task Force 58 to ULITHI in lieu your modified JAMBREE suggest KYUSHU strikes be carried out with K Day 25 February Annex K my OpOrder. Fuel area VALVE 070024 February and at Let 1820 Long 13600 at 0700 1 March arriving ULITHI afternoon 2 March or morning 3 March. This keeps Task Force concentrated and will permit maximum effect on objectives in time available.

21 2317 COM5THFLT to CTF 58: Passed to CINCPOA ADV by 5THFLT 220448.

Appreciate advice and points made in your 210358 but consider it best to adhere to latest plan my 201314. Destruction of engine plants TOKYO Area remains our most important objective if enemy air strength is to be checked at source. Events such as those this area last night can be eliminated only by attack on source as well as on forces already in operation. I have in mind modification of ICEBERG Plan to cover DIABOLIC (KYUSHU) first. I hope you will continue to make comments and recommendations freely.

22 0647 COM5THFLT TO CINCPAC ADV, CTF 58 Info COMSUBPAC, ALL TFC & TGC 5THFLT.

Modify my 201314. After fueling F plus 3 day CTF 58 proceed with Task Groups 58.1, 58.2 and 58.3 to carry out LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) strike and photo mission. Task Group 58.4 proceed ULITHI. Com5thFleet intends to return in INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) to WORKMAN (TWO JIMA) about 28 February.

22 0801 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CTFs 51, 58.

Strength of enemy resistance plus slowness in landing and distributing cargo, causes of which you know, may be expected to delay date when airfield will be activated and TWO JIMA can be safely left without direct fleet support. This opinion is based both on CTF 51 daily reports and on info of conditions ashore just brought back to me by Colonels Jones and Wiley of my staff. This situation is brought to your attention now as decision may be involved later as to whether TWO JIMA shall be left without adequate fleet support or a possible delay in readiness for ICEBERG accepted.
17 of 19 recent attempts by 20th Air Force to obtain photographs for
ICBEG have been abortive due to weather. Carrier reconnaissance cannot
fill all requirements. As a necessary expedient desire if it can be ar-
ranged to maintain temporarily a section of 4 to 6 FEY photographic planes
of VD5 at Clark or other LUZON field for purpose of making photographic
missions of LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) area as demands arise. Liberater escort
of 2 for each photo plane on a mission is considered to be minimum for
reasonable safety over this area. To avoid overburdening your facilities
with my escort planes request you provide those essential to assist in
carrying out these missions vital to my plans.

Proposal ComGen 10 112015 to provide 1,837,500 board feet of lumber and
3,600,000 square feet of corrugated metal for housing of 180,000 enemy
civilians is not approved. A drastic revision of concepts is indicated
with full recognition of fact that enemy civilian population will thereby
suffer. Hope and expect that at least in early stages of campaign the
civilian population will be forced to continue as a charge on the Japanese
army rather than contrariwise.

(Telecon msg No. G-14-10 and H-19-3). "Subject: Target Directive. 1. The
following directive is issued for your information and guidance and sup-
ersedes previous directives. This does not affect the directive issued to
the 21 Bomber Command concerning the incendiary attack on NAGOYA. 2. The
destruction of Japanese aircraft engine plants as part of the overall Jap-
anean air power continues to be the primary mission of the 20th Air Force.
3. The 21 Bomber Command will continue the attacks on principal Japanese
aircraft engine plants. 3-A. The 21 Bomber Command's priority targets,
until destroyed, are: (1) NAKAJIMA, BUSASHINO (TOKYO). (2) MITSUBISHI,
HATSUKA, NAGOYA. (3) AICHI Engine Plant, NAGOYA. (4) SHIZUOKA Engine Plant
3-B. For secondary visual attack or for diversionary reasons, attacks may
be directed against the following targets: (1) Selected urban areas for
test incendiary attack as directed. (2) Principal aircraft assembly plants.
3-C. Primary targets for radar condition are: Target clusters centered on:
90/20 - 194 NAGOYA, 90/20 - 198 NAGOYA, 90/20 - 264 OSAKA, 90/17 - 52
KAWASAKI, 90/17 - 918 TOKYO, 90/17 - 133 TOKYO. 4. The secondary mission
of the 20th Air Force is the support of planned PACIFIC operations. This
support will consist - unless otherwise directed by this headquarters - of
21 Bomber Command attacks directed against the primary targets as listed
above. 5. The 20 Bomber Command, having ceased operations from CHINA
bases except for photographic reconnaissance, will conduct limited opera-
tions from INDIA bases against strategic targets from SINGAPORE north to
the limit of their range, employing both bombs and mines. They will also
perform such missions as requested by the Southeast Asia Command as might
otherwise have been performed by the 7th Heavy Bombardment Group. 2 groups
of the 58 Wing will be prepared to move to the MARIANAS by 1 April and 2
groups to move by 1 May."
Continued -

[Image 0x0 to 579x758]

Continued -

1.430

21 2105 CO.MINCH Pass

Theater have been completed and B-29s taken for the staging of CG schedule (1) 75 B-29s and 'CoMv¥ESSEAFRON.

Regarding visa procedure Each type is completed. Under LCis. here plus consul and quested regarding required advise. This is satisfactorily arranged. Question of consequently no substaffs of ship. At present in ship. At present

25 officers early April. Plan following (GCT)

21ST your BOMCOM, CG CHINA TH'SATEH, other stations. He lmderstood and agreed. Unquote.

2105 CO.MINCH: COiviiNCH PASSED TO CINCPOA, COMMORPAC, COM 17.

(22 2116) COMMUSNA MOSCOW to COMINCH: ALUSNA

"Following are answers questions your 14/1632. (A) Soviets estimate requiring 45 days afloat training on AM, TMS, SC, LCI and PF types and about 30 days on other types. This time adjustable to local circumstances and adaptability of individual crews. (B) 1st group will arrive at COLD BAY late March. Plan loading about 600 men on each returning Soviet Liberty ship. At present plan includes use of 5 Liberties all to arrive late March early April. Names, departure dates, total personnel will be given as soon as plan completed. (C) Soviet staff and interpreters will arrive on 1st ship in March. Permanent staff for entire turnover program will consist of 23 officers probably headed by Rear Admiral. In addition there will be 5 substaffs of from 8 to 14 officers and 3 to 4 petty officers on each staff for turnover of particular types of ships. 3 of these sub-staffs will arrive with 1st group, 1 each for AMs, SC and all other types in April turnover. 2 other sub-staffs arrive later. 1 for landing craft, 1 for frigates. Each sub-staff will return to RUSSIA as soon as turnover of its particular type is completed. From 45 to 50 interpreters will arrive with 1st group. This maximum total staff will be about 163 persons including interpreters. Regarding visa procedure informed ALAFUZOV that group visa would be used similar to past procedure for subschasers but that due large numbers involved and fact that all personnel was from VLAD area Soviet Navy at VLAD should submit lists direct to Amer Consul VLAD for approval. Will inform Embassy here plus consul and ASTALUSNA VLAD of requirements. If any change in this required advise. Subject moving 3,000 men from MURMANSK via U.S. discussed and Soviets agree to drop it and send all via Pacific route. Question regarding PTs. Request all PTs be loaded deck cargo on Soviet liberties in West Coast ports. ALAFUZOV arranging with foreign trade for this. Consequently no crews will be sent to COLD BAY for PTs. Advise if this can be satisfactorily arranged. Question of LCT's. Are LCT's now sufficiently sea-going to get to PETROPAVLOVSK under own power. Should they be towed by LCIs. If neither practicable what pigs back transport available. Please advise rank of U.S. officer who will be in charge at COLD BAY. Have requested ALAFUZOV that he instruct Soviet administrative staff that they come under control U.S. officer in charge of station and accede to our orders without question to avoid unpleasantness understood to have occurred at other stations. He understood and agreed. Unquote.

21 2105 COMINCH Pass to CINCPOA. CG20THBOMCOM, INDIA (CMDX 9692-J) to WAR DEPT., CG 21ST BOMCOM, CG CHINA THEATER, CHQ SUPA LEYTE, COMAF 20 Info WEDEMEYER, MACARTHUR, LEMAY.

Ref your Telecon K-20-2. In order to clarify our plan for staging the 58th Wing air echelon enroute to MARIANAS the following is a resume of the action taken by this command. (A) Arrangements with the Commanding General, CHINA Theater have been completed and are still in effect for the staging of 58th with B-29s through LULIANG direct to the MARIANAS according to the following schedule (1) 75 B-29s and 5 F13s from the 1st through the 6th April, (2) 75 B-29s from the 1st through 6th of May. In addition approval has been secured for the staging of 4 B-24s through LULIANG and the PHILIPPINES about 1 March. (B) On 15 February radio WAR 37603 from Arnold was received which

- Continued -
stated that Cincpoa recommended that move be staged through PHILIPPINES preferred otherwise through KUNMING. Considering this radio a directive from Washington to stage through the PHILIPPINES if possible this headquarters sent CMDX 0342-Q to LEYTE GUAM WASHINGTON and CHUNKING in which we stated that we had planned to stage 4 B-24s only through the PHILIPPINES but that we were agreeable to staging B-29s also through the PHILIPPINES if the 21st BomCom could supply and initial stock of 20 engines and 3 tons of spare parts and maintenance equipment at staging area we also stated our gasoline requirements in the PHILIPPINES would be 450,000 gallons. Para. It is immaterial to this headquarters whether we stage in CHINA or the PHILIPPINES except that arrangements with CHINA are already completed. If we stage thru the PHILIPPINES there will be a saving in the gasoline that the CHINA Theater will have to supply for our staging requirements. We have been approached on this point verbally by Air Service Command. No difference in tonnage in B-29s however will result because the limiting factor of the amount we can carry is space rather than weight. Para. In view of Cincpoa's recommended action forwarded by Arnold we are somewhat in a quandry as to what action you desire. Para. Request that we be notified immediately as to your desires in this matter.

25 0430 CINCWP A to COMDR ALLIED AIR FORCES TOLOSA Info CINCPOA ADV HQ, COMSTHFLT

CTF 58, COMDR ALLIED NAV FORCES TOLOSA, ADV ECH CHQ, COMSTHFLT.

CX 10957, Cincpoe's Adv. Hq. 210654 is reference. Strikes on FORMOSA airfields on DETACHMENT D plus 9 and D plus 10 day directed in our CX 57760 DTG 070403 assigned the 2nd and 3rd March to cover strikes of 2 fast carrier groups on MANSEI SHOTO. Search Sector 5 through 9 of Southwest Pacific Search Plan H will be flown to maximum practicable range through 4 March. Action Adresssee acknowledge.

26 0650 DEPCOMF 20 to COMBPAC 21 Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, CTF 51, CTR 58.

Ur 210146. My 220725 and Cincpae Adv Hq 251726. The results attained with respect to the efforts expended by you to obtain photo coverage of OKINAWA is clearly understood by all. The importance of this photography is obvious to you. With additional weather being furnished by submarines it is desired that you continue your effort as requested by Cincpoe. When desired results are obtained, by whatever means, you will be released from this requirement.

26 0725 CINC PAC ADV HQ to COMINCH Info CINC PAC PEARL HQ.

Strongly recommend against diversion combat vessels that are needed for combat duties. WISEMAN (DE 667) can be made available for purpose requested your 241525. The diversion of this or any other DEs however at this time will be at the expense of escorts for ICEBERG assault elements or supporting shipping. Availability of escorts for this operation is acute due to accumulation of battle damage during past 2 months. Recommend that any transfer of DEs from POA to SWPA for this purpose be arranged on the basis of a ship for ship exchange in order that no delay will be incurred in the arrival of emergency electric facilities in MANILA and at the same time no reduction in vitally needed escorts in this area will be imposed. If there are excess DEs in SWPA not required for combat duties they can be usefully employed in POA.
FEBRUARY (GCT)

27 1415 CINCPA ADV HQ to COMCPA Info COMINCH, COMSOPAC, COMSOPACBACON, CINCPOA PEARL, C OF 5 US ARMY.

CinCSWPA 261515 advise as soon as practicable by dispatch total number Army Service Troops actually sailed for SWPA pursuant to FILBAS Agreement, number ordered to be transferred and number not yet ordered transferred. Further request breakdown of units in these 3 categories be available at PEARL HARBOR headquarters noon 1 March.

27 0824 CINCPA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA, CINCBIT, COM7THFLT Info COMINCH & CNO, COMNAVBASE MANUS, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

The establishment of a Brit Pac Flt MONAB at POMAM ISLAND is authorized in accordance CinCSWPA 211328.

26 1515 CINCSWPA to CINCPA BOTH HQ Info CHIEF OF STAFF WAR DEPT.

CINX 50667. Reference CinCPA 180736. At the time of the conference which resulted in the FILBAS Agreement the ceiling for rotational retention of ships in the Southwest Pacific Area for planning purposes was in excess of 200. By successive increments that number has been reduced to 120. Concurrently trans-Pacific sailings to this area have been curtailed. With the shipping that remains available, the Southwest Pacific Area can not do more than strive to carry out its own essential operations. It will not therefore be possible to contemplate the staging and rehabilitation of Pacific Ocean Area divisions as planned. It will be practicable if desired to give POMAM ISLAND to these divisions by the mere allocation of adequate land areas. If this were done the preparation of the areas, the allocation of all supporting shipping, the providing of personnel and means for loading and unloading, the provision of troops and material for construction of any kind, and the responsibility for all supply would have to be undertaken by CinCPA. Para. It is regretted that the withdrawal of the means previously available to the Southwest Pacific Area and upon which all plans were based imposes upon me the necessity for the curtailing the assistance that was contemplated.

26 1310 COMINCH to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

TOP SECRET. KING TO NIMITZ. Concur action UrDis 220818 in declining participate proposed conference. Inter theater communications and the allocation of radio frequencies UrDis 220816 are primarily problems for mutual arrangement by Theater Commanders concerned with the JCS settling non agreements which if of operational significance may require conference in Washington.
WARX 44673. Operational plans indicate the desirability of fixing the departure date for the 2nd water echelon of the 58th Wing at 15 April at the earliest. This reference WARX 33285. It is expected the above departure date will permit certain essential B-29 operations from CHINA which will be completed approximately 5 April. Para 2. This departure date also desirable because of delay in predicted arrival of ground echelon of 315th Wing at TINIAN necessitating longer support of flight echelons in INDIA per AAFPA radio 0211 of 18 Feb which states 20 April is the earliest 1st flight echelon should arrive. Answering DepComAF 20 radio 0423 of 23 Feb see no reason to change responsibility for regulating flow of aircraft since direct communication between bomber commands should insure close coordination. Para 3. All messages relative to 58th with movements should include in distribution all headquarters concerned. Distribution used here believed complete. Too 272336.

28 0047 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSPWA Info COMFAC, CTF 58, CTF 93, CTG 22.2, ISCOM SAMAR

Your 261620 not to all info addees 5 PB4Ys of VD5 with 21 officers 60 enlisted men with Comdr. A.D. Fraser commanding will arrive GUINAN Field SAMAR about 1800 local time 28 Feb. 1st mission will be morning of 2 March in coordination with Fast Carrier strike on LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA). 8 B24s escorts will be required for 1st mission. From 2 March to about 1 April these planes will be required to operate daily as directed by VD5 commanding officer who is thoroughly briefed on photography needed. Request priority 2 orders be authorized for officer couriers as designated by the commanding officer VD5 for air travel between PHILIPPINE area and GUAM for purpose of expediting delivery of photography. Your cooperation deeply appreciated.

28 0129 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSPWA (TOLOSA) Info CINCSPWA ADV HQ, CTF 58, COMSTIFLT, COMMAAF (TOLOSA).

Refer your previous 210654 and your CX 10957 timed 250450. Task Force 58 now plans strike OKINAWA on 1 March and possibly also on 2 March. 3 Task Groups will be employed. Strikes by your forces on FORMOSA airfields on 2 and 3 March as planned remain satisfactory. If additional effort is available FORMOSA airfield strikes on 1 March would also be helpful.

28 0529 CINCPOA ADV to CGLOTH ARMY, COMSTIFLT, COMSTIFLTFOR, COMSPEFAC, COMAIRPAC, COMTHPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGENPAC, COMCINCPAC, CINCSPWA, MCRORPS, CGSUPVPAC, CGDOMAF, CGCOMAF, CGCOMAFPOA, CGCMYTHCORPS.

WARNING ORDER. Initiate preparations for Phase 3(c) ICEBERG with target date (4-Day) for ADJUANT (MITAKO JIMA) on 1 plus 90. Operation will be commanded by same higher commanders as Phases 1 and 2. Assault troops for operation will consist of 7 Amphibious Corps with corps troops. 3 Marine Divisions reinforced, 3 Army DIVs. 4 NC Bns. Garrison troops will consist of 1 Marine reinforced which will remain on target until relieved by Army garrison unit. 2 AAA Grp Hqs (Army), 4 AAA AN Bns (Army), 3 AAA guns Bns (Army), 1 AAA Bmd. Hq., Btry (Army), 1 S/L Bn less 1 Btry (Army), 1 CA Grp Hq (Army), 2 CA Bns (155mm Gun) (Army), 1 MP Bn (Army),
garrison air forces, 2 VF groups (Army), 1 VF(N) Sqdn (Army), 1 VMTB, 1 MAW Sqdn, supporting troops in accordance with Cincpca revised Staff Study Phase 3 being issued. Para. Brig Gen Edwin B Lyon U S Army designated as IsCom ADJUTANT (MIYAKO JIMA). As such he is a subordinate commander of CTF 99 with designation CTU 99.4. Brig Gen Lyon should be ordered to report Lt. Gen. Buckner at the earliest practicable. ComServPac nominate officer for duty as Commander Naval Activities. Para. Commanders concerned submit by 10 March to the fullest extent practicable specific designations of units to be employed Phase 3(c) including aviation, defense, construction and service units. Unit designations not available by 10 March will be submitted earliest practicable. In designating units the mounting point should be indicated. Copies of designations should be provided Com5thFleet, Com5thPhibFor, ComPhibsPac and ComGen 10th Army including rear ech. Para. All units will be furnished initial supplies by agencies in area from which mounted.

RJ53510. Transfer of South Pacific Base Command OVESDNUMCES allotment to Pacific Ocean Areas is subject: References are: (A) JCS 713/5 (B) FILBAS Agreement Cincpca-CincSWPA dated 4 Nov 44, (C) CincSWPA radio CX 10963, DNG 250559 Feb. PAROLOGT there are 3 problems involved in meeting constantly recurring operational requirements for overhead: 1. Difficulty being experienced by War Dept in furnishing necessary troop basis vacancies because of ceiling limitations and requirements to meet operations in theaters of higher priority. 2. Critical shortage headquarters type personal in POA because of numerous headquarters which have been recently formed and augmented to meet requirements for approved operations. 3. Necessity for organization of headquarters in sufficient time to initiate efficient operational planning for directed operations and operations approved for planning purposes. Para. No solution is insight to the above problems until well after redeployment unless grades and personal currently authorized SoPacBacom overhead are made available to Pacific Ocean after the South Pacific Area is rolled up. Para. References (A) & (B) do not specifically provide for transfer of grades and personnel of South Pacific bulk allotment to SWPA. However CAEPOTUNITE about 4400 grades and personnel created surplus have been approved by WD for transfer to SoPacArea. It would appear that SWPA proportionate share of overhead as mentioned in reference (C) has already been furnished. Para. The operational requirements for overhead grades and personnel in POA cannot be oversimplified. In addition to the ICEBERG requirements and augmentations currently before the War DiSEOMJALSaIr consideration are the unannounced requirements for LONGSTOM and BUSHUKY 3 for defeat of JAPAN proper as indicated in JCS 924/3 all of which necessitate initiation of detailed planning immediately. Para. Request that the remaining portion of the SoPacBacom bulk allotment be excepted from the terms of reference (A). Cincpca concurs and does not consider FILBAS Agreement applicable to SoPacBacom allotment. In furtherance this concurrence Cincpca has directed ComGenPOA to initiate a request direct to Chief of Staff of Army to secure approval JCS to excepting subject bulk allotment from provisions of references (A) in light of conditions now existing in POA.
H 5234. Submitted is report in compliance your radio RJ 53599 of 26 Feb and Cincpae Adv radio 271/15 GCT Feb. This report is divided into 3 categories. 1st Category is Army Service Troops actually sailed to SoWesPac. No units have actually sailed from SoPac to SoWesPac on authority of FILBAS agreement. However the following 2 groups of movements are listed for your information since it is considered these sailings may be related to FILBAS agreement. 1st group is units moved to PALAU as listed in your radio RJ 45/13 of 2 Jan and our radio H 6249 of 10 Jan. These units total 713 Army Service Troops. The Hq and Hq Det 301 QM Bn and 4th Platoon 397 QM Laundry Co included in this group were earlier assigned to SoWesPac by WARX 54639 of 30 Oct 44 with specific designation given in our top-secret ltr to you file 370.5 dated 14 Nov. 2nd Group is Army postal units moved to SoWesPac in accordance with WARX 22360 of 17 Jan and War Dept ltr file 270.5 dated 18 Jan 45. Postal units sailed in this group total only 27 Army Service Troops since 13 Base Post Office has not yet been lifted. 2nd Category is troops ordered to be transferred. No Army Service Troops have been ordered to be transferred to SoWesPac pursuant to FILBAS Agreement. 3rd Category is troops not yet transferred. Total of 32748 Army Service Troops have not yet been ordered transferred to SoWesPac pursuant to FILBAS Agreement. Units assigned by War Dept to SoWesPac by WARX 54639 of 30 October 44 and earlier War Dept radios are not included in above figures since it is considered that transfer of such units is not pursuant to FILBAS Agreement.

01 0135 CINCPAC ADV Hq to CTF 58 Info COMTHFLT.
Following is a tentative assignment of ships to CTF 58 for ICEBERG. Carriers: Cardiv 1 less COWPENS, BONHOMME RICHARD, Cardiv 2 less SHANGRI-LA. Cardiv 3 less LEXINGTON, ANTLER. Cardiv 4 less LAKE CHAMPLAIN. Cardiv 5 less MONTEREY, BOXER. Cardiv 6 less TICONDEROGA. Cardiv 7. Total 11 CV, 6 CVL. Battleships: BatDivs 6, 7, 8, 9 less IWO and ALABAMA. Total 8 BB. CruDiv 16. 2 CB, Cruisers BALTIMORE, PITTSBURGH, SAN FRANCISCO, 3 CA. CruDiv 11 less TUSCON, RENO. 4 CL/AA. CruDiv 14 less HOUSTON plus BIRMINGHAM, CruDiv 17, 8 CL. Destroyers: DesRon 25 less LITTLE, DesRon 47 less ROCKS, GREGORY. DesRon 48 less ABBOTT, DesRon 52. DesRon 53, DesRon 54 less WADLEY, DesRon 60 less A.M. SUNDER, WALK. DesRon 61, DesRon 62. Total 73 DD.

02 0359 COMTHFLT to CTF 58 Info CTF 51, CINCPAC ADV Hq.
Consider it may be advisable strike KYUSHU 1st in next operation leaving ULITHI 1 day early if necessary. Request you prepare alternate plan on this basis including later strikes in order OKINAWA FORMOSA-SAKISHIMA OKINAWA. Discussion, Enemy's present strategy seems to be to conserve forces by dispersal on ground and await favorable opportunity all out blow. My principal concern is to achieve surprise in order to prevent withdrawal to fields to north thus permitting destruction high percentage of grounded planes.
Subject is 2 wings of VLR for ADJUTANT (MIYAKO JIMA). Para 1. Cincooa's serial 000534 dated 23 Feb 1945, subject: Establishment of ADJUTANT, Directive for Base Development Plan, indicates 2 airfields, 2 strips each; for 12 squadrons of VLR each airfield, or a total of 2 VLR wings for the Island. This is over and above the requirement of 1 wing for INDISPENSABLE (IE SHIMA). Para 2. ADJUTANT is tentatively scheduled for 1 July 1945. It will require at least 90 days for completion of the 1st strip. This will require a readiness date in the States of approximately 15 August for ground echelons of 1st 2 groups. Air and flight echelons of the 2 VLR wings should be available to reach target area during period 1 October thru 1 January. Ground echelons should have readiness dates to insure their arrival at ADJUTANT at least 20 days prior to arrival of air echelons. Para 3. Cincooa dispatch 230529 to this headquarters calls for firm commitment of units, and designation if possible, by 10 March. If VLR units are to receive proper priority on plans being formulated for the Island, full information must be made available prior to 10 March as to tactical units and service forces be committed for this location.

RICHARDSON to CINCPAC PEARL Info ISCOM SAIPAN, CINCPAC REP MARIANAS, AAFPOA later passed CINCPAC ADVON.

RJ 53584. Cincooa Advon dispatch 130620Z GCT of Feb 45 and AAFPOA ADMIN dispatch 3169 of 23 Feb 45. Request your concurrence in the following plan: A. Commanding General Pacific Ocean Areas representative in MARIANAS is hereby designated to handle all details of subjects transfers. In carrying out this responsibility the following principles will govern. Sub para 1. All utilities, including water purification and storage systems, electric generators, and power distribution, which formerly were operated by either 30 Bomb or 71 Service Group, will be turned over to the Navy on a temporary loan basis. Sub para 2. Quonset huts will be turned over on loan basis. Tents will be returned to OAHU, unless same can be replaced by the Navy when subject units return to OAHU. No replacement of tentage can be made by Army at OAHU. Sub para 3. Galley and messing gear will be transferred on a temporary loan basis except all organic messing gear and ranges which will accompany units on return. Sub para 4. All aviation gas storage and distribution facilities will be turned over to Navy on temporary loan basis. Sub para 5. All rolling stock will be returned to OAHU, except 1 ton C & R, 1 ton trailers, 1 ton cargo trailers, motorcycles. These vehicles which are not retained by 30 Bomb and 71 Service Groups will be turned over to IsCom SAIPAN to be used in meeting operational requirements or other Army requirements. Authority is given to interchange vehicles with departing units if vehicles obtained from departing units by such transfers are in better condition. However in no case will interchange be made unless departing units can be shipped with serviceable vehicles. No vehicles will be returned here which are not serviceable. All such type vehicles will be disposed of in accordance with existing regulations. This authority will be very carefully exercised, as no replacements can be made from here except for those vehicles previously listed. Sub para 6. Floating and maintenance facilities will not be transferred to the Navy, but will remain assigned to the Army Air Force. All floating depot repairs and floating maintenance units at SAIPAN will be assigned to Air Depot GUAM for support of
VLR. Commanding Officer Air Depot GUAM will make necessary arrangements with Cincope (Advon) for services desired from these floating units. Sub para 7. When refrigerators, generators, waterproof caisson units, and other utilities which may be turned over to Navy are rendered surplus by installation of central power plants, Island wide water distribution system, and central cold storage plants they will be returned to Army stocks at SAIPAN at the earliest practical rate. Sub para 8. The Navy will assume responsibility for all replacements, maintenance and repair of equipment and facilities turned over to them. Sub para 9. All ATC and Army Troop Transport facilities and equipment will be retained by these organizations as desired. However, such support as being rendered these agencies by Army Air Service Units should be assumed by the Navy. Sub para 10. All permanent and semi-permanent telephone installations on each field will remain intact and be retained there. Sub para 11. Except as noted above all organizational equipment will be returned with departing troops. Sub para 12. Transfer of facilities and supplies to the Navy will be accompanied by the transfer of responsibility for operation. Para B. A complete detailed report of all action taken will be rendered this headquarters at the earliest possible date by Com-Gen POA representative in MARIANAS. New Para. Above action is necessary as replacement cannot be made from stocks available at CAHU. Early concurrence is requested. Upon receipt of concurrence IsCom SAIPAN will be guided accordingly.

02 0943 COMESCARFOR to COMAIRPAC Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COM 5 THEFT CTF 51

Recent prolonged operations under arduous combat flying conditions have demonstrated the urgent necessity of increasing the complement of VF pilots on CVEs. These fighter pilots bear major share of support work averaging well over 100 hours per month for 3 and 4 week periods and with short rest intervals before starting over again. Pilot fatigue definitely indicates increase from 24 to 30 VF pilots necessary. Request this be accomplished prior to next operation.

02 1912 GHQ SWPA to CINCPAC PEARL, CS USASOS Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, GHQ ADV ECH

Cite CX 11409. Reference URad 2/4/302. In negotiating FILBAS Agreement SWPA conference made agreements based on the proposal to stage 9 POA divisions in the PHILIPPINES. The fact that the 24th Corps would be mounted from SWPA for ICEBERG was considered to be extra to the general proposals and as such was specifically treated in para 13 of FILBAS. Para. Sufficient hospitals were not projected for early establishment in LEYTE and LUHON to enable SWPA to accept normal flow of casualties of 24th Corps during engagement in ICEBERG. Emergency casualties only will be accepted at LEYTE by air or water to be hospitalized there or evacuated to NEW GUINEA hospitals as necessary to relieve presently overcrowded LEYTE hospitals.

02 2329 CINCPAC ADV to CINCBPF

Following from BPFLO Adv Hq. Reference employment of BPF there is no change in situation. However a conference now taking place U.S. in which employment BPF is included for discussion. Before departure of Dep. Chief Staff for conference I emphasized to him that in possible event of original plan taking place BPF was and would be ready in every way. Permission for use of LEYTE not yet been asked for by Cincpac but requirements appreciated at this headquarters.
03 0219 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COMGENNAFPOA, ISCOM ANGAR, COMFDAREA, COMVESCAROLINES.

Desire 494 Bomb Gp be returned to operational control Cincpoa not later than 15 April 1945.

03 1136 PHOTRON 5 ADV ECH to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CTF73, CTF93, CTF92, CTF51, COMGEN FEAF AND CINCSWPA.

No photo flights this date. Arrangements completed with FEAF for 5th AF to fly F5 photo planes over MIYAKO and other nearby islands in addition our coverage your 020524. Flights will be staggered to insure best chances on weather. Clark Field only field in LUZON suitable for Liberator operation and no avgas will be available prior 20 March. If NO will be available for Liberator operations in the near future recommend flying there instead of SAMAR because of shorter flight distance.

03 2346 CTF 56 to CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COM5THFLIT Info COMCRUDIV 16 ALL TGC TF 58.


04 0417 CHENNAULT to GROSS Info STRATEGEMER, NIMITZ, WEART.

CAKX-6822. Ellsworth can give immediate coverage reurad top sec MADLE 16 dated 28 Feb, of area within 700 miles of HSDVN for weather recon toward KOREA as directed. SUPRY will you forward date you desire us to begin these operations. Reference further made to recon mission of EAST CHINA SEA and western approaches to KIUSHU by F13's as directed by Arnold by request of CINCPOA in Top Sec radio WKX 40419 for Wedeseyer from Arnold dated 20 Feb. In order to conserve tonnage it is highly recommended that these missions be combined to permit the F13's to accomplish both projects during period L minus 10 to L plus 5. If you concur we will provide weather observations KENJOMANY F13's if necessary.

04 0430 CINCPOA ADV HQ to DEPSCOM20THAF Info CINCPOA PEARL, COMSUBPAC, POMCOM 21.

Neutral shipmasters have reported that Japanese state TSUSHIMA STRAITS are mined. Exact location of minefields is not known. This has prevented access by submarines to profitable ship traffic in the JAPAN SEA. Request you conduct repeated reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS starting as early as practicable and continuing for a sufficient period in order to determine precise routes used by Japanese shipping through these Straits.

04 0836 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMGENNAFPOA Info COMINCH.

Your 010241. Current and future plans based on JCS directives issued and in prospect as well as defensive plans of positions already under our control including the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS are based in part on availability and use of heavy bomb groups currently assigned to POA. Cincpoa does not acquiesce in their withdrawal for conversion to VLR Groups. In view of the employment of such groups in important operations about to be undertaken he desires there be no reduction in their efficiency.
04 0811 CINC SWPA LITTLE to ALLIED AIR FORCES (TOLOSA) Info CTF 73, 5TH FLEET, CINCPOA, COMSUBPAC, ALLIED NAVAL FORCES (TOLOSA), 20TH BOCOM, NDMG HQ.

11536. 5th Fleet conducts ICEBERG operation in accord with 5th Fleet OpPlan 1-45. All addresses have copies. Forces SWPA support this operation. Para. The Commander Allied Air Forces while continuing present missions will: (1) Extend until further orders sectors 5 to 10 inclusive search plan J to maximum practicable distance effective L-15. (2) Furnish support indicated in Commander 5th Fleet Op Plan 1-45 Annex E para 2(c)(3, 4, 5, 6). (3) Destroy hostile shipping and naval forces along the NDCHINA CHINA Coast and deny their movement toward Empire waters within limit of capabilities and without detracting from requested specific support as set forth above. Para. Direct communications as required is authorized between the Commander Allied Air Forces and Com5thFlt and designated Task Force Commanders 5th Fleet for initiating and coordinating offensive screen to be provided and coordination and execution of strikes in the FORMOSA Area. Para. The Commander Allied Air Forces will: (1) report to this headquarters by 10 March tentative strike schedules during the period L-16 thru L-7 to include estimated strength of strikes and types of planes employed. (2) Effective L-18 report to Com5thFlt and all Task Forces 5th Fleet strike intents in the FORMOSA area including targets, number and types of planes involved giving 24 hours notice as practicable. Para. Since 20th BOCOM cannot perform missions indicated in OpPlan 1-45 Annex E Commander Allied Air Forces will assume responsibility for missions assigned 20th BOCOM in the FORMOSA Area as indicated in para 2c (5) and (6) of Annex E OpPlan 1-45.

04 0850 COM5THFLT to CTF 58 Info ALL TOC OF TF 58.

Task organization your 260630 approved with following modifications. TG 58.1 delete LITTLE. TG 58.2 substitute INTREPID for SHANGRI LA. Add SANTA FE until relieved by OAKLAND. TG 58.3 delete RANDOLPH. FLINT joins late. Delete ABBOT. TG 58.4 delete TICONDEROGA, ATLANTA, DULUTH, WADLEIGH, ROCKS, GREGORY, add RANDOLPH, ST LOUIS ENTERPRISE, ALASKA, DesDiv 107 probably not present for initial strikes. Para. ENTERPRISE, ALASKA, FLINT, DesDiv 107 may not leave NWO JIMA until about 15 March and will require time for upkeep replenishment at ULITHI before joining you. You are authorized to shift cruisers and destroyers your TF as considered advisable to equalize strength of groups. Assignments INTREPID, RANDOLPH above subject to your concurrence and subject to your planning. By 020359. Note that in basic plan Appendix E my OpPlan 1-45 insufficient time is allowed between departure ULITHI and arrival first launching position.

05 0313 CINC SWPA to CINCPOA ADV Hq Info ALLIED NAVY FORCES (TOLOSA) ADV ECH GHQ.

11582. Refer your 030219 TOC 49th Bomb Group can be returned to your operational control prior to 15 April. Request as much advance notice as possible of date of return designated by your headquarters.

05 0450 COMGEN APOA to COMGEN APOA ADMN Info COMGENPOA, COMGEN, COMCPA, CINCPOA ADVAN Hq, CINCPOA PEARL Hq.

AAFPOA 0688. Reference Cincpoa Adv Hq 180314/7 CDT Feb quoted below: "To ComGenApoa info lscom WORKMAN, lscom LEHIGH, CINCPOA, PEARL, COMGENPOA, COMCPA, COMGEN. Your 160530, your proposal is understood to be (1) That an Island Commander exercise his responsibilities for air bases thru the "

- Continued -

3034
Senior Army Air Echelon Commander present who will have on his staff an officer acting as executive or assistant for air bases. This arrangement would avoid setting up an additional air base commanders' staff. (2) That each individual air field for which the Army is responsible would be commanded by the senior officer stationed at the field, Para. Since the War Department does not desire to provide personnel for the staff of Air Base Commands as indicated Jan 142109 Jan is rescinded and the command procedure outlined above will obtain at WORKMAN and at LEGUMINOS air bases for which the Army is responsible." Para 1. To initially exercise Army command responsibilities as approved in above quoted radio until arrival of a senior air echelon the following action is passed to you: Para A. Initiate action to insure a staff of five officers and five enlisted men, with 35 measurement tons, are echeloned into LEGUMINOS with Island Command Staff. Para B. Arrange for attachment of this staff for rations, transportation, equipment and shelter are included in measurement tonnage. Para C. This staff to be composed of 7th Air Force Headquarters personnel and will report to them upon their arrival in LEGUMINOS.

DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA ADV HQ.

AAFPOA 0639. For your information the following message was sent to ComAF20 reference UH0 040430 CDT Mar. Quote. Following request from CinCPOA is forwarded to you. "quote" Neutral shipmasters have reported that Japanese state TSUSHIMA STRAITS are mined. Exact location of minefields is not known. This has prevented access by submarines to profitable ship traffic in the JAPAN SEA. Request you conduct repeated reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS starting as early as practicable and continuing for a sufficient period in order to determine precise routes used by Jap shipping thru these Straits. Unquote. Recommend this request be approved and BoxCom 21 be directed to conduct the necessary reconnaissance until desired information is obtained or this reconnaissance seriously interferes with prime mission of 20th Air Force. Unquote.

CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMAIRPAC, CTF 58 Info COM5THEFT.

Though have great confidence in judgment of ComAirPac and CTF 58 am extremely reluctant to accept views expressed former's 060615 and am very hesitant to acquiesce in recommendation made. Necessity for efficiency of groups is thoroughly appreciated but importance of operations about to be undertaken in the prosecution of the war is such that employment of a Carrier Air Group that may have passed its peak is well justified. We can ill afford to reduce our striking power in a campaign of such moment. XX Please give further consideration to this matter and present foregoing views to responsible commanders concerned. Unless capabilities of group mentioned are reduced below what might reasonably be expected after 5 months of operations (even though they have been strenuous months) desire CABOT participate in coming campaign at least in the initial stages. Carrier Air Groups have repeatedly shown not only courage and capabilities of the highest order but they have also displayed great stamina when their services were needed. Consider that CABOT's group should be able to make valuable contributions in the attacks on the enemy during the next few weeks and desire that it be so employed unless definitely unfitted.
05 0615 COMAIRPAC to CINCPOAC ADV HQ Info CTF 53, COMSTFLT, COMAIRPAC ADMIN, CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

ComAirPac top secret serial 00426 March 1, Enclosure A, CVLG 29 in CABOT not fit to be retained in CABOT for forthcoming operation and ComAirPac cannot provide a replacement group. My recommendation is to sail CABOT with CVLG 29 prior March 15 for Navy Yard availability and reforming of group. CTF 58 concurs.

03 2135 COMGENAAFPOA ADMIN to COMGENPOA Info CG 10THARMY, CINCPAC ADV 06 0632 Passed by COMGENPOA to CINCPOA BETH HQ.

AAFPOA ADMIN 369FOMOX. This headquarters assumes request of ComGen 10 in his top secret time group 020025 March is based on desire to be able to deal directly with Army Air Forces Combat and Service Units nominated for ICEBERG on such subjects as postal, sanitation, intelligence, and other matters which affect his overall responsibilities for defense and discipline. It is not considered feasible to attach all individual Army Air Forces Units to ComGen 10 without qualification as matter of operational control and administration by higher Army Air Forces echelons of command is involved, as well as status of tactical and strategic air commands as defined by Cincpoa. Recommend the following procedure: (A) That ComGenAAFPOA take action to assign or attach all units nominated for ICEBERG, exclusive of 20th Air Force Units, to 7th Air Force. (B) That ComGenAAFPOA take action to assign or detach all 20th AF units nominated for ICEBERG to 316 Wing COTATR Depot LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA). (C) That ComGen 10 exercise his overall authority and discharge his assigned responsibilities with reference to Army Air Forces Units through ComAF 7, ComOff Air Depot LEGUMINOUS, and ComGen 316 Wing. (D) That ComGen 10 be authorized, in those cases where it is either necessary or expedient prior to the establishment of respective headquarters for 7th AF, Air Depot, and 316 Wing at destination, to deal directly and in a command capacity with Army Air Forces Units nominated for ICEBERG on matters pertaining to preparation for movement, landing procedures, island defenses and discipline, sanitation, and those other matters not pertaining to the operational control and employment of Army Air Forces Units for which he is responsible. (E) That ComGenPOA instruct interested commands to take necessary action to implement the above.

05 1800 CINCPOA PEARL HQ to COMINCH Info CINCPOA ADV HQ.

ComGenAAFPOA requests War Department be informed of contents by 040836 which is confirmed. It is essential that there be no reduction in the bombardment strength assigned to the Pacific Ocean Areas.

06 0150 CINCPOC ADV HQ to COMMESSRAPRON Info COMINCH, CINCPOC PEARL HQ.

Your 031828. Following is my estimate: Japanese High Command realizes that GERMANY will be defeated in a matter of months. She fears the probability of RUSSIAN abrogation of their Neutrality Pact and the possibility of RUSSIAN participation in the Far Eastern conflict. Her immediate military concern is the defense of the Empire and its inner zone approaches. While adverse weather on the northern route for an attack as outlined your 031828 would large negate Blue air search and enhance the enemy's capability of an undetected approach it is believed that the operations of the Pac Flt will reduce the possibility of such an attempt to remote chance. Psychologically such an attack would not be a suitable answer to the Japanese people's
question "Where is the Imperial Navy". Particularly so when their inner fortress and homeland is under attack. In short they vast ocean areas that are infrequently traveled and the normal weather conditions make possible an undetected raid. Intelligence is not sufficiently comprehensive to give advance warnings. Pacific Fleet will be employed in offensive operations that are very likely to keep enemy forces close to the homeland. An air attack on SAN FRANCISCO could be made. It is highly improbable.

26 0630 CTF 58 to COMSTHFLT.

Suggested TF 58 organization for ICEBERG. TG 58.1 - HORNET (F), WASP, BENNINGTON, BELLEAU WOOD, MASSACHUSETTS, INDIANA, VINCENNES, MIAMI, VICKSBURG, SAN JUAN, DesRon 61 and 25. TG 58.2 - FRANKLIN (F), SHANGRI LA, HANCOCK, SAN JACINTO, WASHINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, BALTIMORE, PITTSBURGH, OAKLAND, Des Rons 52 and 53. TG 58.3 - ESSEX (F), BUNKER HILL (F), RANDOLPH, BATAAN, CABOT, NEW JERSEY, SOUTH DAKOTA, PASADENA, SPRINGFIELD, ASTORIA, WILKES BARRE, INDIANAPOLIS (if present), FLINT, ComDesRons 62 and 48. TG 58.4 - TICONDEROGA (F), YORKTOWN, ENTERPRISE, INDEPENDENCE, LANGLY, WISCONSIN, MISSOURI, ALASKA, GUAM, ATLANTA, DULUTH, SAN DIEGO, DesRons 54 and 47. If one DesRon must be given up suggest DesRon 60. CABOT scheduled to go back for overhaul. Does this include all ships assigned TF 58.

05 0817 CTF 58 to COMSTHFLT Info CINCPAC BOTH HQ, CTF 73, CTG 50.8, CINCSWPA, CTF 94, CTG 50.5, 20TH BOMCOM, ADV ECH CHQ, ALL TGC TF 58.

Your 020359 not to all nor needed. Propose sortie ULITHI 14 March. Fuel Lat 19-47 Long 137-38 E 0700 I(-9) 16 March. Strike KYUSHU 18-19 March. Replenish 0700 March 21 SW corner BEDBUG. On 23-24 March strike OKINAWA GUNTO from 25 N 128 E. On 25 March 58.1 and 58.4 routine strikes from position E OKINAWA while 58.2 and 58.3 replenish SW corner area BEETLE. Beginning 26 March 2 groups strike OKINAWA GUNTO daily from Lat 26-20 N Long 129-35 E. TG 58.2 and 58.3 striking first 2 day period while 2 groups replenish. TG 58.1 and 58.4 replenish first 2 day period beginning 0700 I(-9) 26 March SW corner area BEETLE. Subsequent 2 day replenishment periods beginning at 1000 I(-9) SW corner area GLOWWORM. All groups strike OKINAWA 1 April. New subject. Is DesRon 60 assigned Task Force 58.

06 0324 CINCPAC PEARL to COMGENFMFPAC Info CINCPAC ADV, COMGENPOA, CG SS FMFPAC, CG 3RDPHIBCORPS, CO MARINE CAMP KAUAI, COMGEN TEN, COML4, COMINCH, MARCORPS, COMPHIBSPAC, COMFWDAREA, COMSOPAC, COMSOPACFMFPAC, COMFWDMFMFPAC.

ComGenPOA 060558 makes facilities available KAUAI requested your 200340 Feb. Your 312231 Jan and Cincpao Adv 160846 Feb refer. lst MarDiv authorized to use KAUAI facilities for rehabilitation and staging following ICEBERG Opn. Use beyond this period is subject to future consideration depending upon status FILBAS Agreement and requirements ComGenPOA following ETO redeployment. Direct communication between ComGenFMFPac and ComGenPOA in making final arrangements authorized. References not to all or needed.
06 1140 CINCBFF to CINCPAC ADV HQ, Info CINCPAC PEARL, CINCWPAC, COM7THFLT, CTF71, FOS, CINC EI, S4SB, 7 ADMIRALTY.

This is part 1 of my 061145 Memorandum N61. Para B, Para 2, 8th Submarine Flotilla (MAIDSTONE) comes under my orders on 1st April and is hereby reported for duty. Request confirmation of continued assignment to Southwest Pacific Forces, Para 3, 4th Submarine Flotilla (ADAMANT) comes under my orders on 1st April and is also herein reported for duty. Request you will propose assignment of this flotilla to Southwest Pacific Forces.

06 1145 CINCBFF to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info (SAME AS ABOVE).

This is part 2 final of my 061145. Previous part 061140. Para 4, 8th Submarine Flotilla consists of depot ship MAIDSTONE and submarines MANTALUS, TELEMACUS, ZWAARDVISCH, SIRDAR, SPITEFUL STORM, STURDY SPIRIT, SPARK, TRADEWIND, TUDOR, STYGIAN. Para 5, 4th Sub Flotilla consists of depot ship ADAMANT and submarines TERRAPIN THOROUGH TRENCHANT SUPREME THULE THRASHER RORQUAL SEA SPOUT SELENE TANKIVY TRUMP TIPTOE PARAULI.

06 1419 ARNOLD to RICHARDSON, Info NIMITZ, LEMAY, HARMON, SMALL, 73RD WING (SAIPAN).

(WARX 48274). Requirements for 2 additional Very Heavy Bomb Wings for ADJUTANT (MIYAKO JIMA) in your 0622 dated 2 March 1945 draws the following comments: (A) Assumed here that 316 Wing will be deployed to INDISPENSABLE (IE SHIMA) and 3 groups converted from B24 to Very Heavy Bomb Groups referred to in WARX 43162 of 24 February 1945 will be deployed to LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA). (B) Action now being taken to secure approval for assignment of 489 Group as a Very Heavy Bomb Group to 20 AF and deployment to POA. Assume that this group will also be deployed to LEGUMINOUS. (C) Next step in increasing number of Very Heavy Bomb Groups in Pacific Theaters calls for redeployment of 8 heavy groups from EUROPE for conversion to Very Heavy Bomb Groups in the United States and further deployment to the Pacific Theaters. Believe this plan firm enough to permit you to consummate base developments plans indicating commitment of 8 additional very heavy bomb groups for ADJUTANT. (D) Capability of converting groups referred to in C above present readiness dates for both air and ground echelons in the U.S.: 1 in October, 3 in November and 4 in Dec. Withdrawal of these 8 groups from EUROPE dependent on JCS and CCS approval. (E) Supporting Army Air Force service elements can be provided. Due to critical shortage of Army Service Force Supporting Services, difficulties may be encountered in providing complete Army Service Force support, however, every effort will be made to meet requirements based on the readiness dates of combat elements in D above. (F) To increase strength of very heavy bomb groups, each group to be augmented by 6 UE aircraft plus 3 reserve and 1.7 crews after each unit has been operational for 6 months. This augmentation to commence in August of this year.
07 1255 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CINCPAC ADV HQ, CTF 56.

My 050630 possibly optimistic as to time of evacuation 5th Corps and 4th and 5th MarDivs but continued pressure by troops is having its effect in spite of recent small advances. Consider Hill should stay here as SOPA until evacuation these troops accomplished. Para. All OBB departed ULITHI tonight and 2 CVE but am holding 5 CVE until night of 8th. Also retaining SALT LAKE CITY, TUSCALOOSA and 9 DD at present as need for troop support gunfire is not over. Believe cruisers and 3 DD can leave by 10th as enemy terrain should then be smaller. Army P 51s not trained in troop support but will be given training so as first to supplement and then replace CVE aircraft after 11 March. At that time 81 P 51s and 18 VM TB will be here. Recommend retaining ENTERPRISE here until night of 15th if possible. Para. ELDORADO departs for GUAM forenoon 9th. General Smith and operating staff will be on AUBURN until organized resistance ceases. Para. Believe mopping up will require considerable time.

07 1319 CINCPAC AT WASHINGTON to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMINCH.

Until further instructions are received base fuel estimates for British Pacific Fleet on training and passage between ports but no combat operations during Phase 1 next operation.

07 2050 COM5THFLT VIA CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 51.

Your 071255 approved subject to developments ashore except desire earlier release of ENTERPRISE group if night fighter squadron is ready to take over.

01 0151 COMGENFMFPAC to MARCORPS Info COMINCH & CNO, CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

ReUr 272048. Firm request for 3rd Phase ICEBERG 2500 arrive 1 May 45 for 4th MarDiv MAUI. 2500 arrive 1 May 45 for 5th MarDiv HAWAII. 2500 arrive 10 May 45 for 3rd MarDiv GUAM. 5000 arrive 1 July 45 Transient Center Fwd Ech GUAM. Tentative request to be confirmed 2500 arrive 10 July 45 for 2nd MarDiv SAIPAN. 2500 arrive 10 July 45 for 6th MarDiv GUAM. 2500 arrive 1 July 45 for 1st MarDiv KAUAI. 5000 arrive 15 August 45 Transient Center Fwd Ech GUAM.

06 0810 CTF 58 to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info CINCPAC PEARL HQ, COMAIRPAC.

Your 051410. Appreciate your confidence in my judgement and I believe that I have as great an appreciation of the importance of future operations as that expressed in your 051410 and fully agree that we can ill afford to reduce our striking power, however I cannot agree that the substitution of a worn out Carrier Group can in any way compensate for the fresh Air Groups of the ENTERPRISE and SHANGRI LA. Your attention further invited to the fact that ENTERPRISE has only night planes equipped and trained for night search which in the past has proven to be the most necessary asset for the night carrier operations. Although my opinion has not been asked I agree that we can ill afford to reduce out striking power in a campaign of such moment and importance.
All numbers in this message are thousands of enlisted Seabees. Current ceiling of 272 cannot be raised and authorized induction rate precludes filling this ceiling before April 1946. Totals available for overseas employment worldwide will not exceed the following: For March this year 152 April 194, May 196, June 198, July 200, Aug 202, Sept 204, Oct 206, Nov 208, Dec 210, Jan next year 212, Feb 214, March 216, April and thereafter 218. Minimum of 7 are required for Atlantic and Europe. Para. Estimated Pacific situation June 1945 will be about 60 in SowesPac including those on loan and about 131 in FOA including NorPac, CenPac and SoPac. Not now planned to assign additional Seabees to SowesPac. Estimating start withdrawal those on loan Nov will reduce those available to SowesPac to 40 by April 1946. Therefore total available for all FOA operations will be approximately July 133, Aug 135, Sept 137, Oct 139, Nov 145, Dec 150, Jan 157, Feb 161, Mar 165, Apr 171. Foregoing includes all CB CB Specials CBMU miscellaneous detachments and headquarters units available for work overseas which appears scanty resources to cover all present and subsequent NorPac and CenPac operations in route to and for final defeat of Japan. Para. Complements of CB units now on station in the Pacific aggregate 189 which exceed total available and accordingly many units are under strength. Additional units requested by adees and now formed assigned and awaiting transportation from the U.S. aggregate 32 making total 221 of which only 191 will be available by June and only 218 will exist by following April and thereafter. No indication here that any under this para are for operations beyond Iceberg 2. Para. MF will be necessary to adjust magnitude and rates of construction work and projects to suit foregoing allocations or to accomplish work with Army or local civilian labor. Para. Advise your proposed CB deployment and rollup schedule on basis of foregoing also its effect on approved commitments.

Current total casualties and probable delay in returning same from forward areas the 4th and 5th MarDivs require minimum total of 250 officers and 5000 enlisted arrive at Fay earliest practicable date for Phase 3 Iceberg. Drafts to be composed similar to battle replacement drafts. This request is in addition to my 010151 T/S(plus6,5) to you and my 242319 to CinCPAO. Advise ETB West Coast.

Dispatch 070102 GCT 21 BomCom not held by you recommends that until sterilizers with times of 4 months or longer are available authority be granted to lay mines 25, 25M4, 25 Mod 1, 26 Mod 1M2, 36, 36M2 without sterilizers. Present short time sterilizers make frequent relaying of minefields necessary. Sterilizers not required in 5 months. All magnetic mechanisms capable of being swept by own forces. All mines with A-5 and A-6 mechanism will be laid with present short time sterilizers 5-month sterilising clocks will become available in near future and will be used to sterilize all mines at time requested by Theater Commander. Request authority to lay acoustic and magnetic mines without sterilizers in forthcoming operation at Shimoseki Straights. Further request information as to future sterilizing dates that may be required for any mining target grids. Refer to 21 BomCom top secret letter of 28 February 1945, subject: Target Grids for Operation Starvation.
08 0533 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT.

My 051410 and CTF 58 060810 will defer action until receipt your recommendation.

08 0730 21 BOMCOM to DEP COM 20AF Info CINCPAC ADV HQ.

XXI 0465. Subject: VLR operation in support of ICEBERG. In accordance with discussion between representatives of Cincpacs, DepCom 20AF, and 21 BomCom on 7 March '45 the following operations by this command are proposed. 1. L-22 to L-10: Maximum operations against HONSHU. 2. L-20 and L-10: Photo reconnaissance of NANSEI SHOTO, with particular attention to OKINAWA GUNTO, if requested by Cincpacs. 3. When requested: Reconnaissance for enemy picket boats in specific areas desired by Cincpacs. 4. L-10 to L-5: (A) L-10 or I-9 (depending upon weather); attack against KYUSHU air installations, as selected by Cincpacs, if visual bombing is possible. Under radar bombing condition attack will be made against NAGASAKI or OMURA. (B) L-6 or L-5; repeat above plan of attack. 5. L-10 to L-5: Mining of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS with 1500 mines which is estimated will affect complete closure for 4 weeks. 6. After L-5: Full scale operations against HONSHU will be resumed.

08 0903 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info CTF 58.

21st BomCom is prepared to conduct picket boat sweep in conjunction with carrier strikes in ICEBERG. If these operations desired in lieu of possible similar sweep by TG 50.5 request recommendation details timing and location.

08 1445 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT.

Refer BomCom 21 080730. DepCOM 20th AF will be advised that Item 2 is not required. Advise if Item 3 is desired and if affirmative specify area to be covered. Comment on Item 4. Early reply is requested in order to permit firm arrangements with BomCom 21.

02 0135 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT passed to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

According to present information TF 51 will be assigned for forthcoming operations ships requiring escort: 8 OBB 12 cruisers 16 CVE 188 transport types (not including area reserve) 183 LST 112 LSM plus several miscellaneous types. For this number of ships I consider the minimum proportion of escorts is as follows: 2 escorts for each CVE or a total of 32 escorts. Considering initial fire support requirements 1 and 1/4 DDs are required for each OBB or cruiser or a total of 25 DDs. 1/2 escort for each transport type or a total of 94 escorts. For each LST LSM LCT Group the very minimum is 1 DD and 1 DD type or a total of 10 DD and 10 DD type plus all assigned SC PC types plus reserve minesweeping units. Para. Based on this ratio total escorts required are 171 DD DE types whereas your 211153 assigns 124 DD DE. Para. There are 29 groups for movement in TF 51. Groups have been consolidated for movement even to the extent of moving units to objective before actually required, Para. Due to early movement and initial screening requirements it is considered essential that the western island attack group have a strong escort thus further increasing the need for an adequate assignment of escorts. Para. Due to the extensive and early minesweeping required it
is not practicable to consider minecraft as available, except for reserve units, for escort or screening duty until some time after L day except at night. Furthermore APD's assigned for troops or UDT's while available for screening enroute are required early at the objective and initially are not available for area screening. Para. In view of the foregoing it is requested that additional escorts be assigned. Para. It is proposed with your concurrence that the 4 DE now assigned to the Northern Garrison Group be assigned to the Southern Attack Force and be returned from the objective unless provision can be made for assignment of escorts from new construction or escorts returning from overhaul. Para. It is requested the following additional APD be assigned TF 51 ROPER DIACHENKO CHASE GREENE TATTNALL RINGNESS SIMS STRINGHAM and such of following whose material condition permits participation GEO E BADGER CLEMSON SANDS GOLDSBOROUGH DICKERSON HERBERT HUMPHREYS OVERTON CROSBY KILTY MANLEY SCHLEY and TALBOT. Para. With the assignment of these ships there will still be a deficiency of 16 escorts assuming that escorts for Northern and Southern Garrison Forces are provided from escorts returned from the objective or from other sources. It is requested that efforts be made to provide TF 51 with the 16 additional escorts from TF 58 and rear areas.

080920 CTF 51 to COM5THFLT Info CTF 52.

Your 072050. Shore night fighters have taken over at objective but can not do so in carrier area. Recommend ENTERPRISE remain for that purpose, striking CHICHI JIMA supporting troops and cover for ships present. Request your reply go for action to CTG 51.2.

081942 MARCORPS to CG FMFPAC Info CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMINCH & CNO.

Explain request UrDis 080011, 15,000 battle replacements furnished each Corps prior to DETACHMENT. Latest casualty figures 5th Corps approximately 14,000. 7500 battle replacements ready 1 April for 5th Corps. 5000 replacements planned for arrival Transient Center Fwd Ech GUAM 1 July. Can returnable wounded of 5th Corps be transferred to 3rd Corps at GUAM to allow diversion of 39th, 40th, 45th and 46th replacement drafts to Hawaiian Area and cancellation of request UrDis 080011.

090555 DEPCOMAF2D to COMCOM 21 Info CINC PAC ADV HQ.

(NER 07782). Your 0807302 (GCT) approved.

090748 CINC PAC ADV HQ to COMINCH.

CinCBPF 061140 passed separately. Recommend assignment of 4th and 8th Submarine Flotillas to 7th Fleet as of 1 April as agreed in NF-1 page 2 para 6.
CTG 52.2 to CTF 51 Info CTF 52. COMAIRPAC. COM5THFLT. (5THFLT PASSES AS FOLLOWS)

03 0613 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMESCARFOR.

Com5thFlt 281036. ComAirPac 130506 states RFS dates of CVE's west coast are: All dates April; HOGGATT BAY 2, MANILA BAY 3, NEHENTA BAY 6, KITKUN BAY and SALAMANDA both 17. Also expect the BLOCK ISLAND and possible the GILBERT ISLAND should be RFS during this period. Due to the protracted nature of the "ICEBERG" Operation consider that as many of these CVE's as practicable should be made available as rotating reliefs for the CVE's now assigned and to bring forward if found necessary replenishment pilots aircraft and aircraft spares to the objective area. This provision for replenishment would be in addition to that specified in Annex H of Com5thFlt OpPlan 1-45.

05 0120 COMPHIBSPAC to COM5THFLT Info COMAIRPAC. 5THFLT passed for action to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMESCARFOR.

Concur with CTG 52.2 030613 particularly as to feasibility of making 1st 3 CVE's available during Phase II with additional CVEs for Phase III. Recommend plans be made for early employment of new construction and overhauled CVEs to replace losses from battle damage and operations and to provide reliefs.

08 0345 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC BOTH HQ Info COMAIRPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COMESCARFOR.

CTG 52.2's 030613 and COMPHIBSPAC 050120 passed to you. Concur in recommendations.

08 2317 JOINT SECURITY CONTROL Info REAR ECH HUMNING KANDY CEYLON COMGENPOA, CINGSWPA, AMDEL CO. 21 BOMCOM, 20 BOMCOM, 20 AF, AMMISCA CHUNGKING. CINCPAC PEARL to CINCPAC ADV HQ for Info.

WARX 49890. Para 1. In view of forthcoming transfer of 20 BomCom from INDIA SACSEA has requested approval of: (A) Deception indicating that 20 BomCom will remain in SEAC until 1945 monsoon and (B) That strictest security precautions be imposed to conceal arrival in MARIANAS. Para 2. Subsequent exchanges of cables between commands and agencies concerned has resulted in concurrence in: (A) SACSEA request that 20 BomCom remain fictionally in SEAC until 15 June 1945 and (B) Security measures of air movements as follows: (1) Varied flight by single aircraft. (2) Radio silence to be maintained by aircraft except in distress. (3) Departure and arrival messages transmitted over high level channels preferably Telecon. (4) Radio traffic level between BomCom 20 and all stations to be maintained at present level until 15 June 1945. Para 3. All concerned please cooperate all possible execution these measures which must necessarily be controlled by ComGen BomCom 20 in collaboration with SACSEA and CG USF IBT. Information copies all communications with respect to this subject should be furnished to Joint Security Control. Para 4. SACSEA please keep JSC currently informed of all implementation measures taken (5 code word covering above features will follow).

09 1337 CINCPAC (WASH) to CINGSWPA Info CG FEAF. COM5THFLT. CINCPAC BOTH HQ. COMAIRPAC, COMINCH. COMGENAIRPMFPC.

Marine AirWing 1 will be needed for operations in the FOA after 1 July. The 2 fighter groups will be employed in the latter phases of the ICEBERG Operation. It is requested that they be withdrawn from combat not later than 15 May and prepared for staging northward in June. The medium bomber group will be employed at an objective to be seized in Aug and should be ready for staging -Continued-
northward about 1 Sept. The dates on which the other groups will be needed will be furnished as soon as practicable.

09 2359 COM5THFLT to COMSUBPAC Info CINCPAC ADV, CTG 50, 5, CTF 58, ALL TGC TF 58.

Planned TF 58 track from 0600 I(-9) L minus 15 position Lat 26-50 N Long 135-50 E to 0545 I(-9) L minus 14 Lat 30-00 N Long 132-30 E. Request anti-picket boat sweep of maximum practicable width not to exceed 4.0 miles each side of track. Desire sweep to be undetected if possible and to be completed at latest practicable time but not less than 200 miles in advance of passage of the Task Force. Request your proposal.

10 0535 CINCPAADV HQ to CTF 58 Info COM5THFLT, CTG 51, CTF 51. CTF 52.

Ref UrDis top secret 050817 request photographic reconnaissance KERAMO RETTO and KERISE SHIMA on or about LOVE minus 9. Make photo interpretation to determine accurate location of new military installations and report findings by dispatch to CTG 51,1 prior to LOVE minus 7.

08 0211 COMAIRPAC ADMIN to CINCPA PEARL HQ Info CINCPA ADV HQ.

RAdm Sherman top secret memo of 25 Feb., concerning movement of Marine Air Groups from LEGUMINOUS to IMPROMPTU and subsequent allocation Field 1 for carrier aircraft. In order to provide readily available replacement aircraft for carriers in LONGFOM operation recommend provision advance echelon of ACORN to arrive LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) concurrently with assembly and loading of materials for forward movement by MAG-31 at Field 1. Acorn equipped to take over field operation upon loading of ground personnel and equipment of MAG31 and to assist in maintenance Marine aircraft remaining on field during interim prior their departure. Thereafter to receive and issue only combat ready carrier aircraft at rate of 300 per month, maintaining a pool of at least 200 such aircraft to ensure availability at all times. Acorn to be augmented and CASU added at later date as appropriate to support carrier groups. Assuming navy housing and facilities furnished MAG-31 will remain on field shipment initial increment Acorn estimated to involve 1050 personnel and 9235 MT equipment from West Coast to TESI north. Shipment later augmentation and CASU estimated to involve 596 personnel and 3138 MT.

10 1400 COM5THFLT to CINCPAC ADV, TF 58 Info COM7THFLT, CINCSWPA, COMGEN5THAAF, COMGEN 13THAAF, COMFAWLO, CTF 73, COMGENXXBOMCOM, DEPCOMGEN20THAF, COMFAWPRI, COMSUBPAC, ALL TFC5THFLT, CTG 50, 8, CTG 50, 9.

This is Change 2 my OpPlan 1-45. Change 1 not to all. Make following changes in Annex E, Cancel Tab 1 to Appendix I and substitute the following schedule: TF 58 sortie from ULITHI L minus 13. Commence fueling 19-50N 137-00E at 0700 L minus 16 course 345 speed 12. Strike KYUSHU air installations L minus 14 and L minus 13 from approx position on line between 30-00N 132-30E and 31-00N 133-30E retire to southwest corner area REDBUG passing thru 27-30N 134-30E at 0700 L minus 12. Refuel and rearm commencing L minus 11. At 1900 L minus 10 commence run into 25-00 N 128-00E FMC strikes on OKINAWA, SUKISHIMA, AMAMI Groups and MINAMI DAITO. Present plan is for full TF strike L minus 9 and L minus 8 and thereafter alternately 2 TFG strike daily while remaining 2 refuel and rearm. Refueling and rearming in area BEETLE thru L minus 5 thereafter in area GLOWWORM until L day. If strike on FORMOSA or KYUSHU should be
necessary between L minus 9 and L day information will be promulgated by
dispatch. Para. TG 50.5 furnish offensive screen to cover fast carriers
L minus 16 and L minus 15 and during retirement on L minus 12 and fueling
in area BEDBUG L minus 11 and L minus 10. Other missions remain as assigned
Para 2 (B)(2) and substitute following only. 1) BonCom: (A) Attack KYUSHU
on L minus 5 or L minus 4 and on L minus 1 or L day instead of days as pro-
posed Item 4 in w1 BomCom 080730 not to all. (B) Mine SHIMONOSEKI STRAIT L
Minus 5 to L day. Para. SoWesPac: Delete last sentence in 2(C)(2). Cancel
2(C)(3)A, 2(C)(3)c, TIM (C)(4), 2(C)(5). In lieu of cancelled requirements
request PB4Y screen (Interruption) for carriers fueling and rearming general
area BEETLE from L minus 7 thru L minus 5 and area GLOWWORM L minus 4 thru
L day maximum implementation CINCSWPA 010626 of Feb not to all will fulfill
balance of requirements. Para. Request for lifeguard submarine services
be separate dispatch. TF Commanders pass to subordinate commanders who re-
quire.

1101 33 COMGENFMFPAC to MARCORPS WASH Info CNO, CINCPOA BOTH HQ, COMINCH.

This is Part 2 & final. Part 1 was 110205. Application of ltr of Instr. No.
762 will result in unknown number of evacuees. Best estimate available 5000
replacements my 080011 required to rehabilitate 4th and 5th Divisions over
and above returnable casualties. 2500 battle replacements mounted out each
these Divisions already absorbed on target. Para. Intention to change as
required destination and employment of replacements other than those sched-
uled direct to Divisions my 010151. Para. Consider revocation present plans
2 year rotation 3rd MarDiv and other 5th PhibCorps units only alternative
if you cannot comply my 080011. Para. For your information our figures indi-
cate 899 officers 14864 enlisted now attached 3rdPhibCorps will have completed
24 months overseas by 30 June and will require replacements in addition to
battle casualties upon withdrawal Phase I and II ICEBERG to conform rotation
policy. Force troops not now attached either Corps and supply service data
not included in above figures.

110205 COMGENFMFPAC to MARCORPS Info COMINCH & CNO, CINCPOA/CINCPAC BOTH HQ.

This is Part 1 of 110133. 30000 replacements mentioned your 081942 di-
tributed as follows: 2500 to each VF 6 Divisions and mount out with them.
6250 diverted 2nd MP Bn 1st MarDiv 2nd MarDiv 6th MarDiv and PEARL to bring
organizations to T/O plus approximately 4% prior mounting and accomplish
rotation. 3750 now GUAM as operational reserve DETACHMENT. 5000 in DRAOVS
39, 40, 45 and 46 to GUAM operational reserves Phases I and II ICEBERG. Para.
To accomplish rotation 3rd MarDiv 3750 now GUAM plus returnable casualties
and 2500 presently attached that division required. To complete rotation 5th
PhibCorps units other than divisions will require additional 1500 over and
above all current requisitions. Destination PEARL. Consider this dispatch as
firm request for battle replacements mount out with 5th PhibCorps 3rd Phase
ICEBERG and is confirmed by your 081942. Para. Necessary evacuate maximum
from MARTANAS provide space ICEBERG casualties. Have requested Cin cpoa Adv
HQ expedite evacuation maximum number 4th and 5th Division returnable
casualties to PEARL for return to those Divisions.
11 2347 COMSTHFLT to COMAAFSWPA Info CINCSWPA BOTH HQ, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMAF 5, GTF5

Cite AX-70018 which is your 101650 I(-9). British carrier participation cancelled. If later scheduled you will be informed. Seemly 101400 info CINCSWPA and COMAF 5 for latest planned air operations which include sweeps and strikes by TF 58 against OKINAWA SAKISHIMA and AMAMI Groups and MINAMI DAITO L minus 9 thru L Day as necessary to maintain neutralization. New subject: Because of fleet radio silence deliver other traffic through GUAM via high command radio broadcast channel.

120011 COMGENAASFPOA to CINCPA ADV HQ.

AAFPOA 0827. Reference AAFPOA 020652 GCT March relative to release of 494 Bomb Group Heavy from operational control, and MacArthur's 050313 GCT March which asks as much advance notice as possible of date of return desired by Cincpoa. Recommend FEAF be given firm date of termination of operational control of 15 April 1945.

12 0345 CINCSWPA Info CINCPA ADV, COMALLIED AF, ADV ECH HQ SWPA.

CX 1204.2, Reference is made to 5thFlt operation Plan 1-45, para 2(C)(7) of Annex E. Following is strike schedule in support of ICEBERG for period L minus 16 thru L minus 7: During nights of L minus 12/11 thru and including L minus 9/6 2 special radar Liberators will be over FORMOSA and 1 will be over SAKISHIMA GUNTO. On L minus 16 and L minus 15 the daylight strikes on FORMOSA will be made by 3 groups of heavies, 2 groups medium and 3 groups of fighters. From L minus 14 thru L minus 7 strikes will be continued using 2 heavy groups, 1 medium group and 2 fighter groups for L minus 14 and L minus 13 strikes time over target will be from 1200 to 1400 I(-9). FORMOSA strike intends paper L minus 19 will be forwarded 24 hours in advance. All strikes will be made in accordance with latest intelligence on Japanese air force disposition.

12 0426 CINCPA ADV HQ to BOMCOM 21 Info DEP/COM 20 AF, COMSTHFLT.

Refer your XXI 0465 timed 080730. Items 2 and 3 will not be required. Desire timing your Item 4 be changed to L minus 5 or L minus 4 and on L minus 1 or L Day and timing your Item 5 be changed to L minus 5 to L Day. Your Item 6 change timing to read after L Day. Comment.

12 0752 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCPAC PEARL HQ Info COMGENFMFPAC.

Reference UrDis 032222. Plan for covering movement 4th & 5th MarDivs from TWO to HAWAIIAN Area and indicating their continued presence in forward area should conform to following pattern. Assuming divisions are withdrawn from TWO about 18 Mar. movement to Hawaiian Area will be made under complete radio silence. This radio silence must be continued until about 28 April. Under no circumstances will divisional sets be operated and all traffic to and from the divisions will be handled thru FMFPac without use of call signs of the 2 Divs. In order to give plausibility to this pattern both Divs should send to the MARIANAS enough of their signal personnel and equipment to maintain a minimum of routine intra-divisional traffic in that area. All traffic to and from the divisions simulated as being in the MARIANAS will be handled by the proper IsCom. Divisional call sign for this traffic will be used. About 15 Apr Divs notionally in the MARIANAS will be placed on radio silence to indicate a movement of these units from the MARIANAS. About 2 weeks later the Divs in the HAWAIIAN Area can break radio silence thus indicating the completion of the move from the MARIANAS. It is not practicable to indicate by means of the

-Continued-
radio traffic of the 4th and 5th MarDivs. The presence of 2 new divisions in the Hawaiian Area. Comment.

13 0022 COMAAF SWPA to COMAF 5, COMAF 13, COMAIR 7THFLT Info CINC SWPA, CINCPAC, COM 5THFLT, COMNAVGR, CHINA, COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, ADV GHQ SWPA.

AX 70278. This radio in 7 parts. Part 1. CTF 58 has changed OpPlan 1-45. Fast carriers will not strike FORMOSA unless required. Here is revised schedule: CTF 58 depart ULIJTHI 14 March. Refuel 16 March Lat. 19-50 N Long 137-40 E. Strike KYUSHU southern JAPAN 18/19 March. Proceed to SW corner BEDBUG where refuel 21 March. On 23 March strike OKINAWA, SAKISHIMA and AMANI GROUPS from position Lat 25-00 N Long 128-00 E. Beginning 25 March 2 TGs continue strikes from position E of OKINAWA while 2 TGs replenish SW CORNER BEETLE until 27 March when replenishing will be done in area GLOWWORM alternating groups on strike. All groups 11 April strike OKINAWA. 5th Flt will notify if they intend to strike FORMOSA after 23 March. Part 2. ComAir 7thFlt while continuing present missions will furnish PBAY interdiction against enemy search planes and patrol vessels to cover fast carrier movements stated above within capability, will give cover for convoy enroute LEYTE to LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) from 20 March through 31 March, will continue as directed by 5th and 13th AF extending sector coverage of search plan J and will give PBAY screen interdiction for area BEETLE on 25-27 March and area GLOWWORM 28 March through 1 Day. Part 3. COMAF 5 while continuing present mission will make daily strikes against FORMOSA and night diversionary strikes on FORMOSA and SAKISHIMA GUNTO as contained in 5th AF radio R5833E not to all and which is same strike plan sent in CINC SWPA radio CX 1 to 042 to 5th Flt not to all. Part 4. Within capabilities and without detracting from above missions all forces will destroy hostile shipping and naval forces along CHINA and INDO CHINA Coast and deny their movement toward empire waters. Part 5. COMAF 5, COMAF 13, and ComAir 7thFlt are authorized direct communication with TF 58 for coordination of missions. Include all ICEBERG support missions in daily intents and daily reports with information to this headquarters. Beginning 14 March include Com 5thFlt and CTF 58 as addees to receive intents and reports. Desire 24 hours notice on strikes if practicable. Part 6. 20 BomCom will not perform missions as assigned in Annex E paragraphs 2c(5) and (6) of 5thFlt OpPlan 1-45. Part 7. These instructions cancel all previous directives this TED for support ICEBERG Operation. Desire earliest resubmission of revised plans each force incorporating changes. Acknowledge and pass to subordinate commands who require. /these

13 0547 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CTF 58 Info COM 5THFLT.

ReUr OpOrd 2-45 ser 00029 4 March 1945. If you strike NINGPO Area request you secure photo reconnaissance of areas 306 and 307 as outlined in CINCPAC top secret letter 31 Jan 1945 serial 000187.

13 1200 COMAF 13(LEYTE) to CINCSWPA, CINCPAC, BOTH HQ, COM 5THFLT, COMNAVGR, CHINA, COMDR ALLIED NAVAL FORCES, ADV GHQ SWPA, COMAF 5, COMAIR 7THFLT.

Cite K5602. Re Allied Air Force dis AX 70278. 13 AF will support ICEBERG operations by continuing Search Plan J and by furnishing cover from LEYTE to LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) within our area of responsibility commencing 23 March.
X-13-10. Reference your Telecon message H-9-3, the following is our plan for operations in support of ICEBERG:

1. L minus 22 to L minus 10: Maximum operations against HONSHU.
2. L minus 5 or L minus 4. Attack against KUSUHAI air installations, as selected by CINCPOA if visual bombing is possible. Under radar bombing condition attack will be made against NAGASAKI or OMURA.
3. L minus 1 or L Day: Repeat Item 2.
4. L minus 5 to L Day: Mining of SHIMONSEKI STRAIT with 1500 mines, which it is estimated will effect complete closure for 4 weeks.
5. After L Day: Full scale operations against HONSHU will be resumed.

0719EB. Prelude to ICEBERG. Beginning 21 March until 5 April single plane daily search of EAST CHINA SEA area from Point A at 30-20 123-00 ranging over sea area and returning over plant H at 33-00 120-50. Average altitude 15000 feet. Estimated time over water from 2307 GCT until 0516 GCT. Using Cincpoa's ASR SB-2A section K-2. Frequencies 4475 kcs and 140.600 mcs. Per Cincpoa's recent instructions received D/F in another system no in flight sighting reports will be broadcast, at time of original sightings. Upon crew interrogation at home base urgent dispatch will be sent to NPN via CHUNGKING Navy. Please acknowledge concurrence.

Subject SWPA support for ICEBERG. Your CX 57353, timed 010626 February your CX 57356 timed 040811 and CX 12042 timed 120345 all refer. See also ComAFF SWPA AX 39633 timed 082315 I and Com5thFlt 101400. In interests of mutual understanding recapitulation of prospective SWPA operations is desirable. 5thFlt plans now firm and further notifications not expected except for possible pre-Love-Day strike on FORMOSA if required. Para. My understanding of projected operations follows: (1) Reconnaissance in accordance with Search Plan "J" with sectors 5 to 10 inclusive extended to maximum practicable distance effective L minus 18. Com5thFlt may propose changes about L Day. (2) Offensive PBAY screen against enemy search planes and patrol vessels to cover (A) Advance of tractor groups from LEYTE to LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) from L minus 12 thru L minus 1 and (B) Fueling and rearming of TF 58 in area BEETLE from L minus 7 thru L minus 5 and in area GLOWWORM from L minus 4 thru L Day. (3) Night diversion strikes against FORMOSA and air installations at SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the nights of L minus 12/11 thru L minus 9/8. (4) Neutralization of enemy air strength on FORMOSA by daylight attacks on air installations from L minus 16 until LEGUMINOUS is captured. (5) Destruction of hostile shipping and naval forces along the INDO CHINA Coast and denial of their movement toward Empire waters as practicable without detracting from other supporting missions. Para. Confirmation or correction is requested.

Recognizing desirability facilities concerned to make BFF self supporting request CominCh act on CinCPAC 120713 and 120748 passed separately. CinCPAC has no information of plans for and has made no arrangements for any British base in the PHILIPPINES.
COMGEN FMFPAC to CINCPAC ADV HQ, Info MARCORPS, COMINCH & CNO.

My 080011 and 110133. Request battle replacement drafts 39, 40, 45 have destination changed from GUAM to PEARL. These drafts needed immediately for 4th and 5th MarDivs. Intention to send minimum 3750 personnel requested my 080011 to GUAM to form operational reserve Phases I and II ICEBERG.

CINC BPF to BPFO ADV HQ, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

Your 120004. Though still anxious to carry out Mosquito attack if a suitable opportunity occurs I do not wish you to raise the question at this moment unless Cincpac himself brings it up. SS E expect an early decision concerning the complement of the fleet. ARE G for your information it would take approximately 1 month to mount the operation at MANUS. This notice cannot be materially improved without holding the Mosquitoes in readiness at MANUS which I do not wish to do at present unless there is a good chance of their being employed. 3. Please come and see me whenever you consider it advisable.

CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COMGENAAFPOA, COMWESCARSUBAREA, ISCOM ANGUAR.

Your 050313 March. Firm date 15 April 1945.

AAFPOA ADMIN to CINCPAC PEARL, Info COMGENAAFPOA, BOMCOM 21.

Passed by CINCPAC PEARL to COMFWDAREA, CINCPAC ADV HQ for Info.

4275. Present indications are that completion of minimum operational facilities at Northwest Field GUAM on June 1 and July 1 for 58 Wing is doubtful and this is causing serious concern. Reference is made to ComFwdArea 090301 GCT Feb. 1945. Request confirmation these dates so that 20th AF can be assured the flow schedule for 58 Wing to GUAM and simultaneously the 315th Wing to TINIAN will not be disrupted.

BOMCOM 21 to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info DEPCOMAF 20.

X-14-3. Message: 1 Reference is made to your 120426. 2 The changes in schedule will be made. 3 This confirms information sent to ComAF 20 in msg 131215 and to DepCom AF 20 in msg 131212 copies which were sent to your Hqs for information.

BOMCOM 21 131212. Purpose of KYUSHU strikes by BomCom 21 in support of ICEBERG is to hamper Japanese air operations against 5th Fleet. Manner of carrying out this mission will be left to your discretion. For your preliminary planning, arrangements have been made to supply you with all available intelligence relating to KYUSHU air installation. Any information received from TF 58 strikes will be passed to you immediately. Designation of target priority will be furnished you prior to strikes. Please advise deadlines.
14 0750 CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info CTF 58, ALL TGC TF 58, BOMCOM 21, DEP COM 20 AF

BomCom 21 operations supporting ICEBERG follow: (1) Attacks on HONSHU continue through L minus 10. (2) On L minus 5 or L minus 4 and on L minus 1 or L Day attacks against KYUSHU air installations if visual bombing possible otherwise against NAGASAKI or OMURA. (3) Mine SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS from L minus 5 to L Day. (4) After L Day resume attacks on HONSHU. Para. If radio silence conditions permit desire early and detailed reports of TF 58 KYUSHU strikes giving breakdown by airfields of planes defenses and installations observed or destroyed in order to assist in planning and target selection for BomCom 21 KYUSHU strikes. Nominate specific targets if you desire.

14 0752 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINCSWPA, COM5THFLT, COM7THFLT, CTF 58, CINCPAC PEARL.

Now appears British TF 113 will shortly be available for participation ICEBERG but will be subject to withdrawal on 7 days notice. More later.

14 0800 BOMCOM XXL (LEMAY CG) to CINCPAC ADV HQ.

AIGBI 0852. Target designation priority and target material is subject. Reference our dis 131212 GCT. In addition to specification of installation on KYUSHU information is desired as to priority of those installations and further request that all presently available target information including photographs be immediately dispatched to this headquarters attention AM-2. Further request that this command be furnished on L Minus 12 day information as to any change in priority of targets designated plus information as to damage as result of fleet attack plus report on enemy aircraft and antiaircraft opposition for each target. Further desire copies of photography obtained during fleet strike which should be available on L-9 to be of use on the list of our projected attacks.

14 1205 CINCPAC ADV HQ, ADMIRALTY.

In accordance with instructions received from Cominich you are to report TASK FORCE 113 together with TASK FORCE 112 to Cincpaf forthwith for duty in operations connected with ICEBERG.
14 0047 CINCPOA PEARL to COMGENPOA, COMSOPAC Info COMGENFMFPAC, COMINCH, CNO, CINCPOA ADV HQ.

ComSoPac 100428 not to all passed Richardson's R 55098 to Gilbreath to originator. Request that Army POA conference being called by ComGenPOA be governed by assumptions and plans set forth herein. Para. Assumptions: (A) That PHILIPPINES will not be available for POA divisions until an indefinite future date. (B) That Army divisions redeployed to POA from ETO and for which space is not available in HAWAII, PHILIPPINES or on objectives, will be held on West Coast for direct shipment to targets. (C) That employment of divisions in POA will be in accordance with alternate plan chart No 2 of Cincpoa serial 0005026 of 28 Feb. Para. Chart No. 2 Cincpoe serial 0005026 considered firm relative future use SoPac rehabilitation facilities and movement of divisions thereafter will be approximately as follows: (D) 27th Div mounts for ICEBERG (See MyDis 261950 Dec) 28 March rear echelon to mount for ICEBERG as soon thereafter as transportation and landing echelons permit. (E) 81st Div to remain in NEW CAL as area reserve ICEBERG (See MyDis 032309 Dec) until need therefor is terminated thence to HAWAIIAN Area but not before 5 May. If 81st Div required in ICEBERG rear echelon to mount as soon thereafter as shipping permits for ICEBERG or HAWAII to be determined at that time. (F) If preparations for operations in North Pacific should be directed it would be necessary to send 98th and 81st Divs to ALEUTIANS for acclimation. (G) 3rd PhibCorps troops and 1st and 6th MarDivs mount for ICEBERG 12 March rear echelons to GUAM and HAWAII accordance MyDis 160846 Feb as soon as transportation is available but prior to 1 May. Para. There will be no further requirement for staging troops in SoPac bases following departure of divs in Foregoing para and desired that roll-up of base facilities as directed in MyDis 001023 (2 of which is modified by foregoing) be expedited.

15 0505 COMGENAAFPOA ADMIN to CINCPOA ADV HQ, COMGENPOA Info COMGENAAFPOA.

4435. 508 Fighter Group is now at OAHU, while 556 Air Service Group designated as supporting unit is now loading west coast for movement to OAHU. By War Dept action these units are assigned 20th AF and attached AAFPOA for administrative and operational control. Request your concurrence or comments on proposal to recommend to War Dept that these units be relieved from present 20th AF assignment and assigned outright to theater. Concurrently, the 318 fighter group and 364 Air Service Group supporting, now at SAIPAN and projected for movement to LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) to be relieved from assignment to theater by War Dept, assigned to 20th AF and attached AAFPOA for administrative and operational control in same manner as 508 Fighter Group and 556 Service Group are not attached. The objective in the proposed action is to simplify command relationships in theater as result could be to have the 3 Army Fighter Groups at LEGUMINOUS and INDISPENSABLE (IE SHIMA) assigned 20th AF, while ARSN Fighter Group held at OAHU to meet defensive requirements would be assigned to theater.

15 0611 CTF 113 to CINC PAC BOTH HQ Info CTF 112, VA(Q), FONAS(A), CINCBF, ADMIRALTY.

I hereby report TF 113 and TF 112 for duty in accordance with orders received from CINCBF. I have recalled ships from sea exercises and am embarking air squadrons from shore training. Anticipate TF 113 with complement ary units of TF 112 will be ready by 1200K(-10) 17 March to sail from MANUS as you may direct. I would add that it is with a feeling of great pride and pleasure that the BFP joins the US Naval forces under your command.
15 0654 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CINCSWPA Info COM7THFLT, COMINCH, CINCBPF, CINCPOA PEARL, COMPHILSEAFRON.

Request use of LEYTE anchorage for British Carrier Task Force and Fleet Train while participating in ICEBERG. No shore facilities required for the present.

16 0656 CINCPOA ADV HQ to CTF 112, CTF 113 Info COMINCH, CINCSWPA, COM5THFLT, COMSERON 10 CINCPOA PEARL HQ, CINCBPF, COM7THFLT, COMWDAREA, CTF 58, COMWESCAROLINES.

TF 113 proceed to ULITHI to top off from US tankers in preparation for participation in ICEBERG. Advise by despatch prospective date departure ULITHI. Necessary units of TF 112 may proceed as required to fueling rendezvous selected by you. Capt. E.C. Bwen, US Naval Liaison Officer assigned TF 113 now enroute from PEARL to MANUS. If practicable please send a representative to GUAM by air immediately. Para. Arrangements for use of LEYTE anchorage by TF 112 and 113 will be made separately.

15 0658 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COM5THFLT Info CTF 113, CTF 58, CINCSWPA, COMGENFEAF, CINCBPF CINCPOA PEARL HQ.

Unless you request otherwise I will direct TF 113 to maintain the neutralization of airfields in the SAKASHIMA GUNTO accordance concept your OpPlan 1-45 until otherwise directed by you. Suggest you detach destroyers to break radio silence and transmit further orders. Upon departure ULITHI TF 113 will assume designation TF 57.

16 0604 CINCPOA ADV HQ to COMGENAAFPOA Info COMGENAAFPOA ADMIN, COMGENPOA, COMINCH.

Your 150505. Cincpoa does not concur in the assignment to the 20th AF of any fighters to be based within the POA and requests that the War Department be so informed. It is essential that fighter be completely available for any type of mission required by the strategic and tactical situation as estimated locally without reference to headquarters outside the Pacific Theater.

16 1611 GHQ SWPA to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info COM7THFLT (TOLOSA), COMINCH, CINCBPF, CINCPOA PEARL, COMPHILSEAFRON, GHQ SWPA ADV ECH.

CX 12348. LEYTE anchorage will be available for British Carrier Task Force and Fleet again while participating in ICEBERG as requested your 150654.

17 0945 XXI BOMCOM to CINCPAC Info COMSUBPAC, DEPCOMAF 20.

ADMIN 1079. Mining operations 21st BomCom is subject. This command will blockade SHIDMONOSEKI STRAITS by laying 1500 mines between 27 March and 1 April 1945. These mines will be variously distributed throughout all the grids in minesfields I and M. Refer to my top secret letter dated 28 Feb. 45 subject is target grids for operation STARVATION.
Relative to matter presented ComWesSeaFron and ComGen WDC secret 090015 the following is directed: (A) Cincpao formulate plan for detection and interception possible Jap carrier force. (B) ComWesSeaFron is task force commander Pacific Fleet for this. (C) Plan should include the establishment of a mid-Pacific patrol between the Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutian Islands using surface and air forces available in the Hawaiian and NorPac areas. (D) Plan not to become effective until directed by Cominch and CNO. It is not expected such instruction will be issued unless intelligence indicates such action or major units of Jap fleet are unlocated under suspicious circumstances. Para. ComWesSeaFron furnish Cincpao by air courier copies Joint WesSeaFron-WDC-4th Air Force Plan promulgated ComWesSeaFron serial 00489 of 10 March. This plan has not been approved by War or Navy Departments but indicates planning regarding this matter which has already been done.

Task Force 57 which will participate in ICEBERG comprises the following ships of the British Pacific Fleet. 4 CV (INDOMITABLE Class), 2 BB (KING GEORGE V Class), 2 CL (FIJI Class), 3 CLAA (2 DIDO and 1 SPARTON), 11 DD. Para. Unless otherwise directed by Com5thFlt scheduled movements will be as follows. Depart ULITHI morning 23rd. Arrive point ANT to top off morning 25th. Launch air strikes against SAKISHIMA GUNTO from SE morning 26th continuing strikes days of 27th and 28th with retirement each night to SE during darkness. BB may bomb MIYAKO JIMA afternoon 28th prior departure for area MIDGE for replenishment 29th 30th. Resume air strikes on SAKISHIMA GUNTO 31st, 1st and 2nd. Thereafter fueling and strikes as required or directed by Com5thFlt.

UrDis 140128 not to all or needed. The estimated ultimate requirement of VPB squadrons for ASW tasks is as follows. (A) 6 PBM squadrons deployed as scheduled in ComFairWing 1 OpPlan 2-45. These squadrons are VPB 27, 208, 26, 205, 22 and 19. (B) 6 PV squadrons to be trained and equipped for ASW tasks deployed as follows: VPB 152 to GUAM May; VPB 144 and 153 to TINIAN May; VPB 144 to MARGILS area June; VPB 143 to PELELIU July; and 146 available forward in December. Para. Delay in reporting dates of PV squadrons is accepted in preference to cancellation MIDWAY requirements. Para. No change in present combat training syllabus desired since squadrons will undoubtedly serve in multiple task assignments.
The position with regard to the BPF base in the forward area is that Admralty VAUE LAUNED bulk loaded, and is in the process of sending KATERIUS for a base of the following proportions: (A) Amenities and welfare facilities for 3000 liberty men daily. (B) Transit camp for 500 officers and men. (C) 200 bed hospital. (D) Covered storage to scale SJ 1 victualling store 1 naval issuing SBDM. (E) Mining unit and torpedo UNDCAT. (F) Minor W/T station. (G) Total complement including RME company (maintenance and 500 Asiatic Pioneers would be 3000). Para 2. The material stores and boats for the above base are being shipped in 4 freight ships due MANUS at monthly intervals from early May. Para 3. 2 Construction Battalions (appropriate total of 3000 RMES) are being sent to build the base. The 1st contingent of 800 RMES is due SYDNEY 10 April. Remaining 3 half battalions each of 750 RMES are due SYDNEY May, June August respectively. Para 4. With this construction party it is expected that some facilities would be available after 5 months but that the base would not be wholly operational for 9 months. Para 5. It is not thought that a base on the above scale would meet the full requirements of the BPF and consequently base facilities on a larger scale have been asked for from the Admiralty, but the prospect of getting anything larger depends mainly on our ability to obtain the facilities locally in AUSTRALIA. Para 6. From paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above it will be seen that an early decision on the location of this base is becoming urgent. Request you will report how the matter now stands.

REMY 14.0240. Effective 1 April modify searches Com5thFlt OpPlan 1-45 and CTG 50.5 OpPlan 2-45 to provide air search and anti-submarine patrols along the shipping lanes between ENIWETOK, the MARIANAS and WESTERN CAROLINES as follows: (A) By ComMarGilsArea originating ENIWETOK sector 265 degrees clockwise to 310 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. (B) By FairWing 1 (1) Rotate search V326 to Median line 100 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. (2) Replace search V405 by sector originating SAIPAN 225 degrees clockwise to 270 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. (3) Originating ULITHI add new sector 095 degrees clockwise to 090 degrees for a distance of 500 miles. (4) Originating ULITHI add new sector 235 degrees clockwise to 265 degrees for a distance of 350 miles, Para. Give following priorities to employment of search aircraft. (A) Primary missions forward. (B) Coverage to battle cripples when appropriate. (C) Anti-submarine operations and patrols.

My 280529. Operation ICEBERG III(c). Garrison air force ADJUTANT (MIYAKO JIMA) will be modified as follows: 2 fighter groups and 1 night fighter will be Marine instead of Army. My 050854. ComAirPac Vice ComGenPOA designate air defense commander, WAF(N) squadron in the MARSHALLS may be deployed if new squadron not available. Base development directive will be modified accordingly.
Fast carriers in training squadron such as SHANGRI-LA and RANGER are to be ready for emergency combat employment. This necessitates there being a continuously revised and up to date plan for equipping them with an air group on short notice.

Increased hospital facilities MARIANAS for support of Army forces future operations considered urgent. Consider establishment of 5000 beds under canvas TINIAN most desirable arrangement subject to confirmation of availability suitable sites that location. Since installation these facilities required in immediate future in order to support ICEBERG III-c and III-d as well as ensuing operations their installation should have precedence over and be additional to the fixed bed hospital requirements of those operations.

Your CAX 50687 (Feb 261515) and 021912 March indicate a deferment or cancellation of PHILIPPINES facilities for support of POA divisions as contemplated by the FILBAS Agreement. In order that I may properly plan deployment of POA divisions and installation or retention of facilities for their support in POA request you indicate approximate dates and scope of PHILIPPINES facilities for support of POA ground forces which may be provided by you under the FILBAS Agreement. If complete cancellation of such support is now contemplated request that I be so informed. In this connection SoPac service troops and overhead personnel are required for the support of POA forces and must be retained in POA if POA forces are not to receive the expected support in the PHILIPPINES Area. Reply to your 250559 February withheld pending receipt of above information.

Due to all out incendiary effort against HONSHU no additional reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS as requested your 040430 has been accomplished subsequent to that reported our 110200; from 25 March to 1 April our entire effort is committed to attacks against air installations in KYUSHU and mining of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS in support of ICEBERG operation and any reconnaissance of TSUSHIMA STRAITS will constitute a detraction from this effort. If you place sufficiently high priority on this reconnaissance we will, however, devote during this period whatever force you designate to its accomplishment.

Refer BomCom 21 202332. Do not desire any detraction from either mining program or attacks against KYUSHU in order to accomplish reconnaissance requested by MyDis 040430.

My OpPlan 14-44 for Operation ICEBERG is modified as indicated. In para 1 delete all paragraphs under heading "Own Forces" and substitute the following:

Sub para (A) Air forces of the SWF are supporting this operation by (1) Reconnaissance in accordance with Search Plan J with sectors 5 to 10 inclusive extended to maximum practicable distance. (2) Offensive PB/AY screen against enemy search planes and patrol vessels to cover (a) Advance of Tractor and Transport Groups from 20 thru 31 March. (b) Fueling of TF 58 on 21-22 and 25 thru 27 March. (3) Night diversion strikes against FORMOSA and air installations at SAKISHIMA GUNTO on the nights of 20/21 thru 23/24 March. (4) Neutralization of enemy air strength on FORMOSA by daylight attacks on air installations until LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) is captured. (5) Destruction of hostile shipping and naval forces along the CHINA and INDO CHINA Coast and denial of their movement toward Empire waters as practicable without detracting from other supporting missions. Sub para (B). BomCom 20 is supporting this operation by weather reconnaissance flights with 1 flight every 24 hours over the EAST CHINA SEA between 30 and 35 degrees N. Sub para (C). BomCom 21 is supporting this operation by (1) Maximum operations against HONSHU from 10 thru 26 March. (2) Attacks against KYUSHU air installations if visual bombing is possible, otherwise against NAGASAKI or OMURA on 27 or 28 March and on 31 March or 1 April. (3) Closure of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS for a period of about 4 weeks by mining operations from 27 March to 1 April. Sub para (D). This operation will be conducted in 3 phases. This plan covers Phase 1 and 2. Para. In sub para 3 (x)(i) change last sentence to read: Air sea rescue procedure is prescribed Cincpoa SOP-2A and addendum 2 to SOP-2A. Para. Change sub para 5(e) to read: Cincpoa at GUAM.

22 0853 CINCPOA ADV HQ to DEPCOMAF 20 Info CNO COMINCH.

For purposes of planning future operations reconnaissance photography is required of the SHANTUNG PENINSULA as far west as 119-00 E and south to 34-15 N. This area is beyond the range limits of any reconnaissance aircraft under my command. Carrier task forces cannot yet penetrate into the EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS. Would appreciate your placing the above area as high on your present commitments. Request film positives or dupe negatives of photography obtained be forwarded direct to this headquarters.

22 2318 DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA ADV HQ.

1067. The following message was received from ComAF 20 and I quote it for your information. "I refer to several messages transmitted between commands in the Pacific Ocean Areas on the subject of the exchange of the 508th fighter group and 556th Air Service Group for the 318th Fighter Group and the 364th Air Service Group. OPD letter 31 Jan. subject: VLR fighters for POA, to ComGenPOA which was agreed to by Admiral Edwards for the Navy, clearly established the status of the 5 VLR Groups and insures that POA command has necessary operational control to carry out its functions. The transfer cited therefor appears here to be purely an administrative one insofar as it affects Cincpoa operations. Suggest this be clarified to appropriate Cincpoa agencies". If the JCS direct that the control of the 5 fighter groups be transferred to the 20th AF the exchange of the combat groups and their service groups can be effected at that time.
Admiralty secret 021330 of January approved loan of 4 CVEs until April. In view large requirements for transport CVEs in forthcoming operation plus possibility transport CVEs may be required for combat and reported unavailability sufficient British carrier pilots to keep their CVEs fully manned in sustained operation strongly recommend that immediate representations be made to extend loan of CVEs until 1 July 1945.

Modify MyDis 161322. BB of TF 57 may bombard ISHIGAKI as an alternative to MIYAKO on 27 or 28 March depending on results of air strikes.

In clarification MySer 000299 of 4 March and Cinpac Pearl 100414 (not to or required by all) escorts for support shipping for LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) will be provided as follows. By CTF 96 between ENIWETOK and ULITHI and between ENIWETOK and the MARIANAS as required MyDis 160240. By CTF 51 between ULITHI and LEGUMINOUS between the MARIANAS and LEGUMINOUS and between LEYTE and LEGUMINOUS. In implementing plan it is desired that CTF 51 provide escorts at ULITHI the MARIANAS and LEYTE at intervals as necessary for use by CTF 94 and ComPhibsGroup 13 respectively. The latter two commanders are responsible for assembling support shipping into appropriate convoys and routing them to the objective. Para. Shipping will continue to be routed via ENIWETOK and will be called forward from there by SCOA as required. In general it is desired that support shipping from ENIWETOK stage thru ULITHI rather than the MARIANAS. It is not expected that any significant amount of support shipping will assemble in LEYTE except shipping now at that port or assault shipping which has been discharged and has returned from the objective for reloading. Convoys will be sailed forward from ULITHI and from LEYTE when called for by CTF 51 and when escorts are provided by CTF 51. At a later date (when CTF 51 and his representative have left the objective) the function of calling shipping forward will pass to ComGen10thArmy. At that time the responsibility for providing escorts to the objective will pass to CTF 94 or CTF 99.1 as will be determined by Cinpac. A redeployment of escorts by Cinpoa will be made accordingly prior to that time.

UrSer 000109 dated 10 March. Concur subject to modifications that will be required in view of mydis 200851 not to all. The estimated reduction in Army service units resulting from referenced dispatch aggregates about 7024 personnel as follows: 2 Hq and Base Serv SQS SerVgps, 2 Engr SQS SerVgps, 2 material SQS SerVgps, 1 depot repair SQ, 2 Depot Supply SQS, 2 Sta Comp SQS, 2 Avn SQS, 4 Engr Avn Bns, 1 Hq and Hq CoSAW Bn, 2 Sig SQ Cos, 4 Engr Dump Trk Cos, 2 Avn MP Cos. Para. Troop list showing revised requirements will be published shortly. In view of reduced requirements for Army Service Units as indicated above desire such service units now located forward area not be designated for employment this operation except where necessary.

DepCom20thAF 222318 passed to you separately. I adhere to views expressed in my top sec serial 005020 of 20 Feb and my 160604 to ComGenAAFPOA.
Admiralty advises that British CVEs PATROLLE, REAPER and RANEE are required at an early date for fitting out as replenishment carriers for British Pacific. Release 2 of these CVEs as early in April as practicable. 3rd CVE may be retained until end of April. When released sail them to UK. Inform Admiralty of approximate sailing dates and place departure as soon as reasonable firm. Admiralty 021330 A January refers.

In view your 222331 hold in abeyance my 211442 pending further instructions.

In any conversations which you have had or may have with representatives of submarine flotillas BritPacFlt assume you have not and will not make any commitments for British submarine bases in the PHILIPPINES. This is not intended to curtail present operational commitments for services and replenishment on occasion by tenders in presently established advance bases furnishing similar services to US submarines in TF 71.

UrDis 222011. Additional area reserve MyDis 1722232 would land over established beaches and be supported by Corps or Army troops. Substitution for some minor articles of T/O and E equipment satisfactory. Additional equipment normally furnished to units engaged in an amphibious assault not essential. Consider forces including 2 MarDivs remaining after departure of 98th Div sufficient for defense of Hawaiian Area. Do not desire to use replacement personnel set up for ICEBERG or to interfere with support being given in the form of labor for mounting of units to ICEBERG. The only major reinforcing unit desired for 98th Div if used would be 1 Tank Br. Based on the above advise what portion of the 98th InfDiv could be available for designation as area reserve.

Your 191940. Following ships can be made available for temporary assignment to Com7thFlt. LA VACA (APA 180) now discharging SAMAR for 1 lift rear to forward bases then to be returned CincPac at GUAM by 15 May. DAWSON (APA 79) and BOTETOURT (APA 136) available SoPac last half April for 1 lift. LST 172 available SoPac 1 May for 1 lift. Remaining POA shipping on extremely tight schedule to meet operational requirements. Para. Reference CNO 202015. If necessary to expedite readiness SAMAR Base am willing to accept resultant adverse effect on other projects and make following ships available for 1 lift to assist in movement 3rd echelon assembly 15 from West Coast to SAMAR. ARA (AK 136) and CRATER (AK 70) completing overhaul NYMI 22 April and 2 May respectively plus 2 small APA's from new construction RFS late April. In view possibility congestion SAMAR foregoing should have concurrence CINCSWPA. This echelon includes 5 million feet lumber. By previous despatch authorization has been requested from CNO to divert to SAMAR 4 million feet now afloat at PEARL in excess of LAND requirements. Para. The movement of CBs and equipment from PEARL is proceeding on schedule requested by CINCSWPA. Last phase of movement will be 6 Bns less equipment timed to arrive SAMAR approx 15 May to coincide with arrival of equipment for these battalions from the mainland.
24 1655 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPOA ADV HQ.

KING TO MIMITZ. Wish you would explore question of establishing line of sea communications to sea of JAPAN thru TSUSHIMA STRAIT. Include in exploration the seizure of the 2 airfields reported to be on QUELPAIT ISLAND X Preliminary estimate of requirements for this operation here is 3 Divisions. Assume the completion of ICEBERG and probably that of LONGTOM. Para. Command setup and directive for future operations in Pacific still under discussion with Army with little progress. Your comment on line of communications through TSUSHIMA will be helpful in connection with decisions to be made here.

25 0345 CINCPOA PEARL to CINCSOWESPAC Info COMGENFMPAC Info CINCPOA ADV HQ.

Refer Urrlrr AG 600.12 of 23 Dec 1944. MarCor materials were declared available MySer 000166 of 28 Jan 45 based on original proposed readiness date of rehabilitation camps for 1 Marine Amphibious Corps, Corps Troops, 3 MarDivs and Marine Depot following Phase I ICEBERG. In view of the continued presence of foregoing troops in POA as result my dis 210203 Jan and UrDis 261515 Feb materials listed are not available at this time. Availability of MarCor material will be subject of resurvey when readiness date of rehabilitation camps for Fleet Marine Force units is more definite.

25 1347 CTF 52 to TF 51 Info CINCPAC ADV, COM5THFLT.

During approach to OKINAWA on nite 24, Mar several enemy planes made contact with various units of TF 52. ADAMS (DM27) while engaging 4 planes had casualties 2 KIA 5 WIA caused by premature burst from after 5 inch mount. Low flying plane approached ESTES and small splash about 40 yards astern may have been dud bomb. Minesweeping for 24 and 25 March completed substantially on schedule. 1 moored mine swept in VL, 6 drifters sunk. Otherwise results of minesweeping negative. Sweep of southern third of A9 did not develop minefield previously reported there. Scheduled UDT operations completed in KERAMA RETTO. Preliminary reports indicate no mines or man made beach obstacles. Operations well supported by destroyers LCI(G)s and excellent work by support aircraft. Light return fire from Beach PURPLE ZL caused 1 KIA in LCI(G) 475. No other casualties to ships or personnel reported. Aircraft besides attacking KERAMA RETTO destroyed 1 AA gun at NAHA Airfield strafed planes on YONTAN Airfield and attacked amphibious tank revetments target areas 8370Y 8470U 8469AB. 2 amphibious tanks 4769AB and 4770ST reported destroyed. No air-drome enemy planes sighted. Extensive hunt for boats and barges disclosed few. Photo and hydro observer missions accomplished on schedule. Shore bombardments executed on FSU ONE TONACHI FSU and KERAMA RETTO FSU. Weather and surf conditions favorable today and good weather forecast tomorrow.

26 0152 CTG 51.1 to CTF 52, CTF 51, Info COM5THFLT, CINCPOA ADV HQ.

SITREP 261100 19-9) battalion landings made on AKA GERUMA ZAMAMI HOKAJI beaches by O930. Opposition encountered nil or light. Preferred plan landings on KUBA and YAKABI delayed due necessity as found by UDT reconnaissance of using LVIs. Landings will be made when LVIs are available. Now planned YAKABI afternoon 26th, KUBA TAKASHIKI and AMURO 27th. GILMER hit by suicide plane damage rigging 1 KIA 2 WIA. Also KIMBERLY 2 5-inch 1 40mm gun 5 k guns out 3 KIA 30 WIA. Both operational.

3059
23 1300 COMINCH & CNO to CINC PAC ADV HQ.

Nimitz only. Ur 202310Z (GCT). In view of the magnitude of the project and the time involved MANUS will be too far from the combat areas when the facilities become available. My view is that minimum temporary facilities should be installed at MANUS but for the main base consideration should be given to a location farther forward such as BRUNEL BAY. Final decision in this matter depends on the future operations to be conducted in the Pacific Theater which matter is now under consideration by the JCS. Concur as to shore facilities in the PHILIPPINES.

27 0450 CINC PAC ADV to COMAIR PAC Info CINC PAC PEARL.

Your 252058. Cominch serial 00130 of 15 Jan approved Marine shore based program of a total of 24 VMF and VMFB squadrons. Equipment of VMF squadrons with Helldivers has not been approved by Cincpac. My ICEBERG plans require forward deployment of only 17 squadrons of which 5 groups will be committed in action in combat area (3 in LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) and 2 in ADJUTANT (MIYAKO)) MAG 12 and 14 must be equipped with full Corsair allowance and customary spares. If necessary Corsair equipped squadrons now in Hawaiian Area, West CAROLINES, MARSHALLS and MIDWAY in excess of minimums authorized by my serial 0005021 of 24 Feb should be reduced in aircraft strength pursuant to intent of sub para 3E of Cominch serial 00130. Request your further comments on this basis.

27 1213 CINC PAC ADV to CINC PAC PEARL.

As an alternate to ADJUTANT (MIYAKO) or FRICTION (KIKAI) desire immediate logistic study of operation to capture ADJOURN (TOKUNO JIMA). Forces same as FRICTION except infantry garrison reduced to 1 RCT and fighter groups and airfields each reduced from 4 to 3. Also desire immediate restudy of FRICTION on same basis.

27 1214 CINC PAC ADV to COMWESSEAFRON Info COMINCH & CNO.

Your joint WSP-WDC-4AF Plan received. See my 21001L. Note assignment of all fast carriers available to Mid-Pacific striking force by my OpPlan 2-45 which affects para 5 Annex A to your Joint Plan.

27 1215 CINC PAC ADV HQ to COMNOR PAC, COMHAWSEAFRON, COMWESSEAFRON, COMAIR PAC, COM 5THFLT, COMSERVPAC, COM 3RD FLT Info COMINCH & CNO, CINC PAC PEARL, COMSUB PAC.

This is my OpPlan 2-45. Task organization: (A) North Pacific Force (TF 90-92) VAdm Fletcher, Forces presently assigned less CruDiv 1 and escorts. (B) Hawaiian Sea Frontier Force (TF 97) VAdm Bagley, Forces presently assigned. (C) Western Sea Frontier Force (TF 06) Adm Ingersoll. All naval forces on west coast less units assigned Mid-Pacific striking force. (D) Mid-Pacific striking force (TF 30) Adm Halsey. BONHOMME RICHARD, RANGER, CruDiv 1, DesRon 57 less 1 DesDiv. All major surface units available in Hawaiian Area and on West Coast. (E) Western Striking Force (TF 95) commanded by Senior Officer Embarked. 2 fast carrier groups and logistics support ships designated by Com5th Flt.Para 1. Assumption: That a Japanese carrier task force has been organized for diversionary operations in the Eastern Pacific Area and is unlocated. Para 2. Mission: This fleet will detect, intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces in order to prevent carrier air attack on West Coast of the U.S. Para 3. Tasks: (A) NorPasFor prevent undetected approach of enemy forces to West Coast of United States through North Pacific Area, by maintaining aircraft barrier

-Continued-
patrol along 180th meridian southward from ADAK to latitude 42 N. Augment barrier patrol by sector searches if required. Destroy enemy forces located to limit of capabilities. Sail CruDiv 1 and DesRon 57 less 1 DesDiv to rendezvous designated by Comdr Mid-Pacific Striking Force. (B) HAwSeaFronFor prevent undetected approach of enemy forces to West Coast of US thru Hawaiian Sea Frontier, by maintaining aircraft barrier patrol along 180th meridian northward from MIDWAY to lat 42 degrees North. Augment barrier patrol by sector search if required. Destroy enemy forces located to limit of capabilities. (C) WesSeaFronFor maintain search over sea approaches to principal cities and installations on the West Coast of the US. To limit of capabilities destroy enemy forces located, coordinating attacks with ComGen WesDefCommand and ComGen 4th AF. Sail with appropriate escort to rendezvous designated by Com Mid-Pacific Striking Force all major combatant units on the west coast (fast carriers, including RANGER, battleships and cruisers) which are available for combat service. (D) Mid-Pacific Striking Force intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces. Designate rendezvous for concentration of forces. (B) Western Striking Force intercept and destroy retiring enemy raiding forces (XRAY) This operation is designated FIREBREAK. This plan will become effective only when directed by CinCPac. Para 4. NorPacFor, HAwSeaFronFor and WesSeaFronFor provide own logistic support. Commander Mid-Pacific Striking Force arrange logistic support required with ComServPac direct. ComAfgIt assign necessary logistic replenishment ships for support of Western Striking Force. Para 5. Communications CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Use zone Z(GCT) time. CinCPac at GUAM.

If the enemy fleet and air force can be rendered incapable of effective interference a line of sea communications into the Sea of JAPAN via the KOREA or TSUSHIMA STRAIT can be made secure. The enemy fleet has been greatly reduced and current operations may virtually eliminate its heavy units. The enemy air force has suffered severe losses and is apparently somewhat demoralized. After LONGTOM it may be sufficiently weak to permit us to occupy and develop air bases as close to JAPAN as QUELPART ISLAND if the enemy air force is so weak as to permit the occupation of such bases the desired line of communications can be made secure. Para 2. I will initiate action to obtain adequate reconnaissance of QUELPART. Although understood to be weakly defended it is not well adapted to development. It is well located. Its large population would necessitate quite a large garrison. As soon as my search and reconnaissance from OKINAWA is effective QUELPART'S possibilities can be evaluated accurately. Para 3. It now appears that capture of QUELPART will be more feasible and preferable than capture of a position in the KURILES as soon as the enemy force is sufficiently reduced. This will probably occur before the Spring of 1946 if not by the Fall of 1945. Operations in the KOREA STRAIT REGION will contribute directly to accomplishment of the overall objective by US forces as well as to the preparation of RUSSIA to assist.

Desire detailed logistic planning Phase III(d) ICEBERG proceed on basis your 290217 subject to proviso that completion dates will be advanced if further information warrants. FRICTION (KIKAI JIMA) Base Development directive and Phase III Staff Study will be developed accordingly by Advance Hqtrs.
29 2045 CGMF PAC to CINCPOA ADV Info CINCPOA PEARL, CGTEN(ADV), CGTEN(RE), CGSTH PHIBCORPS CFF II.

Following Army units requested in addition to present assigned 5th PhibCorps Phase III(a) ICEBERG (A) 1 InfDiv available employment by a TM (B) 3 Amphibian Tractor Bns (C) 2 8-inch Howitzer Bns. Due to enemy strength estimated at 27,000 additional units considered essential. Amplified in letter that follows.

30 0243 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COFS ARMY, COMGENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL.

Your CX 13132 (281614), Paral. Since receipt of your 261515 Feb and in view also of the deferment of the probable dates of arrival of divisions from EUROPE plans for the employment and rehabilitation of the 6 Marine and 6 Army divisions available in POA have been recast and logistic preparations have been readjusted accordingly. Under these plans the earliest use which could be made by Marines of rehabilitation areas in the PHILIPPINES would be about 1 October and then only if the divisions concerned were relieved by 3 Army divisions from EUROPE or SWPA 1 to garrison ADJUTANT (KIYAKO JIMA) and two to garrison IMPROMPTU (CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO, CHINA). The earliest use which could be made of SWPA facilities by Army divisions now in POA would be approximately as indicated in my 180736 Feb but only in case divisions from the SWPA or from EUROPE are made available to relieve them as garrisons 2 in LEGUMINOUS (OKINAWA) in early June 3 in FRICHTON (KIKAI JIMA) at the end of August and 3 in SINGLETREE (NINGPO PENINSULA, CHINA) in September and October. See enclosure B to my serial 0005026 of 23 Feb 1945.

Para 2. The need for facilities in the PHILIPPINES for staging Army troops from the POA at the time contemplated by the FILBAS Agreement of 4 November 1944 was predicated on the redeployment of forces from EUROPE at an earlier date than is now possible. Para 3. The construction and service troops and the shipping included in SWPA requirements for development of facilities external to camp sites cannot be spared from the resources in the POA which are now inadequately to as shipping and are deficient as to construction and service troops. The 150 LST's and 150 LCT's likewise cannot be spared because all assault shipping of this character will be needed in operations in immediate prospect. The LCT problem in the Pacific is primarily one of forward movement of those available in rear areas. My extreme shortages in forward areas have recently been partially alleviated by forward movement under their own power from PEARL to ULITHI including the 1270 mile passage from JOHNSTON to MAJURO. Para 4. I appreciate the difficulty of your situation and your desire to work out a solution of the troop staging and mounting problem for eventual operations. However my current plans provide for using all the resources available to the POA in the seizure of positions in the approaches to JAPAN for the purpose of establishing a sea and air blockade and intensive air bombardment of JAPAN. The establishment of adequate troop staging and mounting areas and facilities in the PHILIPPINES is essential to preparation for the use of large forces and resources from EUROPE in the invasion of JAPAN but should not divert and absorb resources essential to maintaining the momentum of the Central Pacific Campaign now in progress.

30 0548 COMGENPOA to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COMGEN 10 ADV AND REAR.

RJ 58110. Designation of 98th Division as area reserve ICEBERG is subject. Reference to your dispatch 250608 March and 172232 March and to my dispatch 222011 March. The entire 98th InfDiv with an attached Tank Bn can be made available for such designation. T/O strength can be met except for 98 officers 9 warrant officers and 1048 enlisted men. Only available Tank Bn not located on LEYTE ISLAND assigned to 10th Army but not earmarked for ICEBERG Operation.

- Continued -
Lift must be made from LEYTE by Cincpoa. Para. 98th Div will not be relieved of present duty until order designating this unit is received here. If to be used request early designation in order to undertake necessary training and preparation for movement. Not recommended is the designation of less than a division.

This deals with the redeployment of destroyers for 7th Flt. Following DD are now assigned: 5 of DesRon 5, 1 of DesRon 12, 6 of DesRon 14, 5 of DesRon 21, 8 of DesRon 22, 7 of DesRon 23, 1 of DesRon 48, 1 of DesRon 49, 1 of DesRon 58. Total 35 DD plus RADFORD, LAVALLETT and RENS a h which have sustained battle damage and are to return for permanent repairs. Para. AULICK and CALDWELL now enroute to report to you. Upon reporting you are requested to detach COCHL d for return to overhaul. W GRANT and KILLIEN of DesRon 56 will be ordered to report to you about 1 May at which time you are requested to detach SUGO and FLETCHER for return to overhaul. Com 5th Flt will be directed to detach HART and METCALF of DesRon 58 as soon as practicable to report to you as relief for ARBO and YOUNG. Para. As soon as operations permit the following deployment will be carried out. DesRon 22 will be interchanged with DesRon 56 now in 5th Flt. DesRon 23 will be interchanged with DesRon 45 now in 5th Flt. 4 ships of DesRon 21 will be relieved by DesDiv 102 now undergoing overhaul. MCCALL of DesRon 12 will be replaced by HAREDEN of DesDiv 101 now in overhaul. SHELD and WILEY of DesRon 58 will be directed to report to you on completion shedown. Para. Ultimate assignment to 7th Fleet: DesRons 14, 45, 51, 56, 58 - total 39 DD less 3 in overhaul and repairs. Total 36 DD. Until total of 36 from above squadrons is reached 5 ships of DesDiv 9 will remain with 7th Flt but will be relieved ship for ship as total exceeds 36 DD.

My OpPlan 14-44 modified in that CTF 94 is assigned responsibility for the neutralization and isolation of the enemy held positions in the BONINS. CTF 94 request assistance from CTF 93 when and if required.

Here is Com3rd Flt (CTF 30) OpPlan 2-45. A. TF 30 Mid-Pacific Striking Force Admiral Halsey. Sub Para A1. TG 30.1 surface striking group rear admiral McCrea CruDiv 1 DesRon 57 less 1 DesDiv, additional units less carriers as assigned by dispatch. Sub para A2. Air Striking Group Rear Admiral Jennings BONHOMME RICHARD RANGER plus additional carriers and escorts as later assigned. B. TG 30.9. Service Group senior officer embarked fleet oilers escort CVE and escorts assigned by dispatch. Para. This plan stems from Cincpac Op Plan 2-45. Assumption: That enemy carrier task force is proceeding for diversionary operations in Eastern Pacific Area and is unlocated. NorPac force and HaseaFron forces have been directed maintain air barrier patrol along 180th meridian from ADAK to MIDWAY. WeeSeaFron has been directed maintain air search over sea approaches to principal cities and installations on west coast U.S. 5th Flt supports by striking retiring enemy raiding forces. Assumption: All ships will maintain maximum readiness for extended operations at sea consistent with current employment and are prepared for towing or to

- Continued -
be towed. Para. This force will intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces in order prevent carrier air attack on west coast of US. Para. TF 30 intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces. TG 30.1 Support Air Striking Group. Be prepared launch day or night gun and torpedo attack against enemy units when directed. TG 30.5 conduct air search for enemy units as directed. Attack enemy units within range with all available aircraft. TG 30.9 provide replenishment services for TF 30. As separately directed. This operation designated FIREBREAK. This plan will become effective only when specifically directed at which time rendezvous at sea for units proceeding from NorPac PEARL and West Coast will be specified. Cruising instructions and battle plan will be distributed by sea mail at rendezvous. Para. Fuel ammunition and supplies at PEARL and West Coast ports. Fuel at sea with TG 30.9. Communications CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Use zone GCT time. CTF 30 at PEARL until shift to BON HOMME RICHARD or alternate flagship is announced.

It is intended to operate British submarines from British tenders stationed only at those advanced bases from which submarines of TF 71 are operating. Your 231302. No commitments have been or will be made for British submarine bases in the PHILIPPINES. Present plan for operations of British submarines under CTF 71 is for tender MAIDSTONE and accommodation ship arrange to arrive about 22 May at SUBIC BAY where 2 US submarine tenders are now stationed. Submarine Base BRISBANE is being rolled up and will be reestablished at SUBIC. Approximately 14 British submarines depart FREMANTLE for patrol JAVA SEA enroute SUBIC to begin arriving about 27 May. Remaining British submarines at FREMANTLE based on HMS ADAMANT. When submarine base FREMANTLE ready for roll up and movement to advanced base (possibly TUTU BAN) ADAMANT and accompanying submarines plus drydocks from ENGLAND to be moved forward for operations from advanced base. Estimate only shore based facilities required by British submarines will be possibly torpedo and ammunition storage.

Cincpca Adv 310047 of higher classification not to all. Discontinue strikes BONIN ISLANDS 1 April. Be prepared strike this area when directed.

Registration of Corps artillery on KEISHI SHIMA completed 311830. 16 guns in position. Estimate all guns in position ready to fire at daylight tomorrow.
29 0858 CTF 93 to CINCPOA ADV HQ Info CTF 94, CTU 94.3.1, CTG 94.3.

Cincpoa 282310Z assigns VMR 612 to CTF 94. In view long range offensive nature this squadron request it be retained by CTF 93 who will exercise operational control through CTG 93.4 as organized by my 280704Z.

31 0759 CINCPAC to COMGENFMFPAC Info COMINCH, MARCORPS.

NIMITZ TO HOLLAND SMITH INFO KING AND VANDERGRIFT. After the troops concerned have reached their rehabilitation areas and accurate appraisal of problems concerned is possible I desire your opinion based on consultation with the Corps and Division Commanders as to the date when each Division of the Fifth Amphibious Corps will again be ready for combat. Para. It is of the highest importance that no estimate announcement or observation on this matter be made to agency outside your command other than to Cincpac (Adv. Hq) and MarCorps. I will inform other commanders as necessary.

APRIL(GCT)

01 0225 COMHAWSEAFRON to NOB MIDWAY Info CINCPAC BOTH, COMWESTSEAFRON, COMSUBPAC, COMNORPAC, COM3RDFLT, COMAIRPAC.

Following is HawSeaFron OpPlan 2-45. TF 97 HawSeaFron forces Vice Admiral Bagley. (A) TG 97.1 Naval Operating Base MIDWAY Commodore Morgan. Air forces currently assigned plus additional aircraft later assigned. (B) Task Group 97.9 Air Forces HawSeaFron, Air Officer HawSeaFron. OAHU based search aircraft currently assigned plus additional strike aircraft later assigned under emergency conditions. This plan based on Cincpac Adv Hq OpPlan 2-45.

Assumption: That an unlocated enemy carrier task force is enroute from JAPAN to the Eastern Pacific for diversionary operations. NorPacFor maintains aircraft barrier patrol along 160th meridian from ADAK to 42-00 N. MidPacific Striking Force under Com3rdFlt intercepts and destroys enemy raiding forces. Western Striking Force ships designated by Com5thFlt intercepts and destroys retiring enemy forces. TF 97 locate and destroy enemy forces to limit of capabilities. TG 97.1 (A) Conduct aircraft barrier patrol in accordance with US Fleet anti-submarine bulletin of Feb 1945 with 180th meridian as western limit and between latitudes 32-00 N and 42-00 N with additional aircraft furnished by ComAirPac and/or ComGenAAFPOA. Assume enemy speed of advance 30 knots and course E. (B) Maintain barrier patrol from MIDWAY ISLAND to latitude 32-00 N and 180th meridian with aircraft currently assigned MIDWAY and additional aircraft as required. (C) Augment carrier patrols with sector search if required. (D) Maintain aircraft contact with enemy forces located. (E) Conduct aircraft strikes against enemy forces in support of MidPacific Striking Force or Western Striking Force. TG 97.9 obtain long range search aircraft planes and striking groups from ComAirPac and ComGenAAFPOA and despatch planes to MIDWAY ISLAND. Maintain air patrols from OAHU. This operation designated FIREBREAK. This plan effective only when specifically directed. Fuel ammunition and supplies at MIDWAY and OAHU. Communications CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Use zone ZEBRA (GCT) time. ComTaskForce 97 at PEARL HARBOR.

01 0641 CINCPAC ADV to COMGENPOA Info CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT, COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBPAC, COMGENFMFPAC, COMGENAAFPOA, COMFWDAREA, COMINCH, CONO, COMGENLOTH, COMGENDETEN.

98th InfDiv (at reduced strength UrDis 300548) reinforced with 1 Tank Bn is hereby designated as Area Reserve Div for ICEBERG, with availability date of 1 May. Para. It is assumed from UrDis 300548 that the assignment of 98th Div to Area Reserve will not interfere with support required in the form of labor for mounting of units for ICEBERG and will not affect the schedule of personnel replacements established for ICEBERG. Para. Advance designation Tank Bn UrDis 300548. If employed Tank Bn will mount LETTE. Para. Referred dispatch is not needed by info addes.
Further consideration of operations in the KOREA STRAIT brings out the possibility that once established in QUELPART (SAISHU) it would be feasible to occupy a position in the CHINHAE-FUSAN portion of the KOREAN Coast and thereby obtain an anchorage as well as additional air facilities from which to control the STRAIT and cut JAPAN off from the ASIATIC Mainland. The concept of close encirclement by occupation of positions in the AMAMI Group during the last phase of ICEBERG followed by occupation of SAISHU and the southern tip of KOREA is dependent as to sequence and timing on further developments and is contingent on the early collapse of the enemy air force.

KING TO NIMITZ. From viewpoint of weather and balancing requirements of amphibious air and ground operations what do you consider as acceptable months of the year for invasion of KYUSHU and/or HONSHU 1st case as entirely independent operations 2nd case as connected operations with perhaps a 3 months interval.

In order to maintain momentum of campaign and also afford more time for recuperation of 5th PhibCorps it may become advisable execute Phase III-d ahead of III-c. For this reason desire firm designation of amphibious force or senior group commander to expedite detailed preparations for III-d. If desirable can arrange temporary accommodations at GUAM for PhibCorps.

All messages concerning HULA from and to HULA 2-4 areas will be transmitted by Army wire instead of by radio. Originators will so indicate. All HULA vessels arriving in Alaskan Sea Frontier waters for MILPOST transfers will maintain radio silence in HULA 2-4 areas. JCS have requested MOSCOW to direct that Commodores and COs of Russian HULA vessels sailing westward from HULA 2-4 maintain strict radio silence while in Alaskan Sea Frontier waters. Remove all US communication allowances and rob from all US HULA vessels upon their arrival at HULA 4-2.

As radio silence must be maintained by HULA vessels in the HULA 2-4 area desirable send Russian radio operators for such vessels to US west coast ports designated by ComWesSeaFron for necessary familiarization and testing of radio equipment. Make necessary arrangements with local Soviet Commander.
FROM: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO: MACARTHUR, CINCPAC, ARNOLD

1. WAXX 62773. Following Command Directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is issued for the guidance of commanders in the Pacific Theater.
*(Line garbled — being serviced)* to Cincpac and CinCINCPAC are modified accordingly. (An Operational Directive follows immediately in a separate message).

2. The over-all objective in the war against JAPAN, to be brought about at the earliest practicable date, is:

To force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN by:

(a) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardments, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

(b) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of JAPAN.

3. (a) The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, is hereby also designated Commander in Chief, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCPAC) and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 below, all United States Army resources in the Pacific Theater (less Southeast Pacific Area and resources under command of the Commanding General, Alaskan Department) are placed under his command. CINCPAC will be responsible for the provision of Army resources to meet requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 below, all U. S. Naval resources in the Pacific Theater (less Southeast Pacific Area) are placed under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas in his capacity as Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Cincpac will be responsible for the provision of Naval resources to meet the requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) The 20th Air Force for the present will continue operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided in JCS 742/5.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will exercise strategic jurisdiction over the Pacific Theater. They will issue operational directives to the Commanders in Chief assigning missions and fixing command responsibility for specific major operations and campaigns. The Commander in Chief of the service who is not invested with the command responsibility for an operation will render every possible assistance to the Commander in Chief of the service who is invested with such primary responsibility, cooperating, each
with the other, in order to accomplish the over-all objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will normally charge CINCPAC with the responsibility for conducting land campaigns and CINCPAC with conducting sea campaigns. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, will act as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters pertaining to U. S. Army forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, will act as executive agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters pertaining to U. S. Naval forces.

5. The transition from the present organization to that prescribed in this directive will be accomplished as expeditiously as possible with

**the objective of CINCPAC and CINCPAC each having under his own control (subject to agreements under provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 below) all resources of his own service.**

6. Until passed to other command by mutual agreement or by direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the localities under command of CinCSWPA and the Naval forces allocated to him will remain under his command and similarly, the areas under command of CINCPAC and the Army forces allocated to him will remain under his command. Changes in command of forces or localities and changes made in existing Joint Logistical procedures will be affected by progressive rearrangements made by mutual agreement, or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. CINCPAC and CINCPAC are each authorized to establish joint forces or designate commanders to exercise unified command for the conduct of operations for which they have been made responsible, and may also do so by mutual agreement. They will also determine by mutual agreement when forces or localities revert or pass to the appropriate commander following operations.

8. Any release regarding the foregoing directive will be made from Washington.

*Conflicting provisions of existing directives

**as possible with

***and arrangements made
FROM: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.
TO: NIMITZ, ARNOLD, MACARTHUR.

A. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, will:

(1) Complete the seizure and development of positions in the RYUKYUS as required by his current directive.

(2) Continue such operations for securing and maintaining control of the sea communications to and in the Western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

(3) Continue planning for seizing positions in the CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO and the eastern portion of the KINJPO PENINSULA. Plans should include the possibility and desirability of confining objectives to the CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO. Assembly of necessary special equipment will be undertaken in a priority which will not jeopardize timely preparations for the invasion of JAPAN.

(4) Make plans for keeping open a sea route to LA PERouse STRAIT, including any North Pacific operation considered essential.

(5) Provide forces and support for the operations directed in B(1) below.

(6) Make plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. Cooperate with GINGAPPAC in the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN.

B. The Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area and U.S. Army Forces, Pacific will:

(1) Complete the occupation of LUZON and conduct such additional operations in the PHILIPPINES as required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective in the war against JAPAN. Further to the foregoing, conduct such additional operations toward completing the liberation of the PHILIPPINES as can be mounted without prejudice to the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

(2) Make plans for occupying NORTH BORNEO, including BRUNEI BAY, using Australian combat and service troops and make preparations at such time as resources can be made available without detriment to the accomplishment of the over-all objective. Units of the British Pacific Fleet may be allocated for this operation.

(3) Provide forces and support for the operations directed in A(1) above.
(4) Make plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN. Cooperate with CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN.

C. The Commanding General, 20th Air Force, will cooperate with CINCPAC and CINCPAC in the preparation of plans connected with the invasion of JAPAN.

D. The operations, as specifically directed herein, will constitute a 1st charge against the resources available to the Pacific Theater under the provisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff command directive contained in WAPX 62773 DSG 032140Z.
02 0104  CINCBPF  MM (Via)
03 0626  CINCPAC ADV Info  CINCPAC PEARL, COM5THFLT, CTF 57.

Part 1 of 020115. In my memorandum BPF 043 dated 25 January 1945 I estimated that the British Task Force (A) Could operate in the combat area for 3 weeks (B) Would then require replenishment at an advanced anchorage lasting about 1 week (C) Could probably continue operating thus for 2 months before returning to an intermediate base for major replenishment.

02 1350  COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info COMSUBPAC.

News in ComSubPac 020653 of such import that I consider you should relieve Captain of QUEENFISH from command and bring him to trial by General Court Martial in order that the record may be clear. Advise immediately position and time of sinking.

03 0818  CINCPAC ADV HQ to COMINCH.

Your 021350. Position of sinking 25-25 Long 120-07 time 011500. Corrected information indicates ship was only about 2 hours ahead of schedule instead of 150 miles as estimated in my 020840 Nimitz to King only message. Your 021350 will be complied with but in interest of war effort I shall continue QUEENFISH on her present patrol for about 10 days longer unless you direct otherwise. About 8 additional days will be required for return voyage. Your message referred to ComSubPac 011300. No record such a message and assume ComSubPac 020653 or QUEENFISH 020030 was meant.

04 0849  CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM5THFLT, DEPTCOMAF20 Info CTG 50.5, BOMCOM21, COMSUBPAC.

Minefields reported in KOREA STRAITS have prevented access by submarines to profitable shipping traffic lanes in the JAPAN SEA. Determination of routes used by shipping through KOREA STRAIT (between KOREA and TSUSHIMA ISLANDS) is desired in order to develop a safe route for the passage of submarines. Request visual, photographic or radar scope photographic reconnaissance of this portion of KOREA STRAITS by planes of FairWing 1 and BomCom 21 as practicable. Location and course of any mine layers observed is especially important. This modifies request of my 040430 Feb not held or needed by 5thFlt addressees.

04 1212  CINCPAC ADV HQ to COM3RDFLT Info CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC.

Request you cancel your 040235. Until directed to be placed in effect I do not wish my OpPlan 2-45 to interfere with efficient employment of forces concerned.

02 0115  CINCBPF to CINCPAC ADV HQ Info  CINCPAC PEARL, COM5THFLT, CTF 57.

This is part 2 of my 020115. Previous part 020104. Para 2. Based on this estimate I expect TF 57 to return to LEYTE about 16 April. As soon after their return as possible I will (A) Confirm or amend the estimate in para 1 above (B) Estimate the length of time required for the major replenishment referred to in Para 1 above and estimate the date on which TF 57 will be ready to continue operations. Para 3. My Chief of Staff who will be discussing these questions with TF 57 on return of latter to LEYTE could if you agree then proceed to GUAM to report the result of these discussions to you.
03 0521 CINCBPF to CINC PAC ADV HQ Info CINC PAC PEARL COMINCH BAD ADMY CINCESSWA COMTH FLIT CTF 71 FO SUBMARINES S4 S3 CINC ET

Part 1 by 030526. My 260737 Jan Para 5 HMS BONAVENTURA carrying 6 XE craft is now in the Pacific and is hereby reported for duty. 2. Subject to your concurrence intend to keep her ready in reserve until it is apparent that an opportunity will occur for using her XE craft operationally. Propose her future employment should be reviewed at monthly intervals but I do not think it is practicable.

03 0526 Part 2 final my 031026 too FF 0521 from CINCBPF. To keep her inactive for too long a period.

05 0020 COMWESSEAFRON to COMSOCALSEC, COMNOWALSEC, COMNORWESTSEC, COMFAIRWESCOAST, COMM GEN WESDEFCOM, COMM GEN ATHAR Info COMINCH, CINC PAC BOTH HQ, COMORPAC, COM 3RD FLIT, COM TH FLIT, COM SUBPAC, COM TPC, COMHAN SEAFRON, COMAIPAC.

This is ComWest SeaFron Op Plan 2-45. Task organization (TF 06): (A) SoCalSec (TG 06.1) - Capt. Lassing - forces presently assigned plus fleet air units. (B) NorCalSec (TG 06.2) - Capt. Blackburn - forces presently assigned plus fleet air units, NorCalSec. (C) NorWestSec (TG 06.3) - Capt. Kerrick - forces presently assigned plus fleet air units, NorWestSec. (D) Army Attack units (TG 06.6) Bombardment units 4th AF organized and turned over to ComWesSeaFron by CG WDC. This plan supports Cinfac Op Plan 2-45. Assumption that Japanese carrier task force has become unlocated and that diversionary operations West Coast are contemplated as propaganda warfare during United Nations Conference. Own protective aircraft barrier patrol has been established in Mid Pacific along 180th meridian from ADAK to MIDWAY by NorPacFor and HawSeaFron and Mid Pacific Striking Force directed to intercept and destroy enemy raiding forces. No major fleet units (carriers, BBs, CA s, etc) will be available to ComWesSeaFron. Mission: This force will maintain air search over sea approaches to principal cities and installations on West Coast of United States, detect, intercept, and to limit of capabilities destroy enemy forces located. Tasks: TGs 06.1, 06.2, 06.3 effect and maintain air patrol and search to extent possible over sea approaches to principal cities and installations in own sector of West Coast of the U.S. (including Mexican and Canadian offshore approaches as appropriate). Augment patrol by sector search if required. Training operations temporarily suspended. Use all fleet air personnel and air units available to limit of capabilities (balance of message will not break and is being serviced). Destroy enemy forces located. Coordinate attacks with Western Defense Command and 4th AF in accordance with existing agreements QFD Op Plan WSF-5. TG 06.6 report numbers, availability, readiness of Army bombardment units for combat operations over water. Move attack units to rendezvous designated by ComWesSeaFron. (X) This operation is designated FIREBREAK. This plan will become effective only when specifically directed by ComWesSeaFron, at which time all major combatant units on west coast (fast carriers including RANGER, battleships and cruisers) available for combat service will be ordered MOPFIL for rendezvous specified by Comdr Mid-Pacific Striking Force 'TF 30'. Sector commanders provide for logistic support at normal bases. Logistic support of Army bombardment units at Army bases. Communications in accordance with existing plans of participating units. Use GCT time. Sector commands at sector JOCs SAN DIEGO, TREASURE ISLAND and SEATTLE, ComWesSeaFron at JOC SAN FRANCISCO.
05 0223 CINCPAC ADV HQ to CINOBPF Info COMINCH.

Your 030521, My views concerning BONAVENTURA and her XE craft are the same as expressed previously. I see no immediate need for them and do not desire to interrupt effective use of other forces in the attempt to create such a need.

05 0837 CINCPA ADV HQ to COMGENPOA, COMGENFMFPAC, COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COMWIDAREA, COMAIRPAC, CINCPA PEARL Info COMINCH, COMGEN 10, CINCSTWPAC, COMSTHFLT CTF 51.

The initial successes and light ground opposition experienced thus far at OKINAWA indicate that it may become possible to accomplish subsequent phases of ICEBERG operations sooner than planned. It is intended to exploit fully any opportunity to expedite the occupation of the positions involved in Phases II and III even if all the forces and resources needed for expeditious development are not fully ready. All commanders concerned are directed to keep their plans and preparations as flexible as possible and to be ready to support an accelerated campaign. Rolling up and drastic reduction in rear areas and MARIANAS as necessary would be expected and required.

05 2341 ARNOLD to MACARTHUR, NIMITZ.

WARX 63941. Joint Chiefs of Staff message number WAR 62774 and Navy number 032241 of 3 April are references. 20th Air Force is prepared to furnish planning staff to meet the requirement of paragraph C of cited message on receipt of advice from you that your planning for the invasion of JAPAN has progressed to a point where participation of the 20th Air Force is desirable. I contemplate sending the Chief of Staff 20th Air Force, Brigadier General Norstad, to discuss this subject with your headquarters about the middle of May.

05 0230 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

NIMITZ to KING. Acceptable months for invasion KYUSHU are May to November with September to November preferable. Acceptable months for HONSHU are May to September with May and June preferable. Believe more than 3 months interval desirable if both operations take place in order develop full effect of forces established in KYUSHU. If 3 months interval adhered to the date of the HONSHU operation should govern.

05 0838 CINCPA ADV to COMSTHFLT Info CTF 51, CTF 56.

NIMITZ to SPRUANCE INFO TURNER AND BUCKNER. Para 1. If the tactical situation on OKINAWA continues favorable it may become possible to initiate Phase 3 earlier than planned. In such case the principal difficulty will be in finding assault divisions for ADJUTANT. Although I have not yet received full reports it is unlikely that the 4th and 5th MarDivs will be ready even for a target date of 1 July. The 3rd MarDiv can probably be ready for an operation in July. Para 2. When opportunity occurs desire that you obtain the views of Turner, Buckner and Geiger as to the employment of the 6 Army and 6 Marine Divisions available in POA to finish ICEBERG and initiate LONGTOM late August possibly confining objectives to CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO only. Consideration should be given to rehabilitating at OKINAWA such divisions as are required to augment uncommitted reserves for the occupation of ADJUTANT. Para 3. You will appreciate that this message is purely exploratory and that reply will not be a commitment.
S Pruittane to Nimitz Info Turner and Buckner. After conference with Turner and Buckner. Your 020300 not to Info adees and 050736 (Geiger ashore and not available on account of weather on beaches) submit the following comments. We recommend against taking further positions to northward immediately following ICEBERG 1 and 2 because of difficulties of landing on and supporting any of islands in question and because we believe value of position to us after capture is not commensurate with damage we are likely to incur from continuing enemy air attacks particularly suicide for which we have as yet no good solution. We recommend proceeding with MIYAKO operation as soon after capture of OKINAWA and Ie SHIMA as availability of assault and service troops will permit using assault troops now committed to ICEBERG. This may involve a somewhat retarded base development of MIYAKO unless availability of service troops can be advanced over present plans. Consider that number of assault troops available in CenPac should be adequate for LONGTOM including capture of NINGPO PENINSULA which is recommended as well as reduction in number of islands to be occupied in CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO. Availability of service troops not known to us. Para. Believe naval forces will be adequate although minecraft and escorts should be increased and additional repair vessels floating docks and certain special types already requested should be provided. Para. In view of foregoing recommend (A) Target date of Phase 3C be 1 June, (B) Phase 3D 15 August. Para. Prior to moving ashore Geiger expressed himself as in favor of using available troops of 3rd PhibCorps for MIYAKO.

Recommend 3rd PhibCorps reorganize and reequip at target and be employed Phase 3C ICEBERG in lien of 5th PhibCorps. This refers your 050737 April and 280529 Feb. In view light casualties and limited opposition believe adequate replacements and materiel replenishments available GUAM and resupply shipments. This should permit advancement tentative target date Phase 3C. Further recommend 5th PhibCorps to be employed LONGTOM in place of 3rd previously recommended.

Bom

06 0815

21st BomCom to COM20THAF Info DEP COM20THAF, CINCPAC ADV, 73RD Bombing, 314TH Wing.

0347. Subject: Summary of Minelaying Operations: B-29s of 21st BomCom have laid a total of 1690 mines using 205 sorties in initiation of complete strategic mine blockade of Japanese home waters. Mining missions of STAR VATION 1 to 6 were designed to obtain closure of SHIMOSENKEI STRAITS and HIROSHIMA-KURE Area in order to terminate all merchant traffic through SHIMOSENKEI STRAITS and prevent free use Jap fleet against our operation ICEBERG. Attempt was made to contain major Jap fleet units, in particular battleships and carriers, since reconnaissance indicated these forces were gathering in preparation for a sortie. This sortie could be through either the SHIMOSENKEI STRAITS or BUNGOSUIDO. Total of 612 mines dropped in field MIKE of which 588 were estimated effective. Total of 654 mines were dropped in field L in which 640 mines were estimated effective. A total of 78 mines dropped in field J of which 70 were believed effective. Total of 252 mines dropped in field I of which 230 mines were estimated effective. Total of 54 mines of which 40 believed effective were dropped in approaches of SASSEBO HARBOR. All above mines dropped from altitudes of 5000 to 8000 feet. Total of 48 mines dropped directly in KURE HARBOR among fleet units at anchor of which it is estimated 40 are probably effective. These mines dropped from 25,000 feet. 20 additional sorties scheduled for 3 and 4 April, 10 on each
night to insure complete blockade of these fleet units by reinforcing Field I. We suffered loss of 3 aircraft, probably due to enemy action and 1 aircraft crashed while landing. Total number personnel reported killed is 9: total number missing 33: total number injured 2. Mine types used were approximately 80% acoustic and 20% magnetic. 1000 pound mines were used at depths from 3 to 15 fathoms; 2000 pound mines from 15 to 20 fathoms. Acoustic mines were set on medium sensitivity without arming delays or ship counts since basic plan assumed this mine could not be swept by enemy and because it was known that enemy was prepared to employ grappling methods to clear channels and shallow waters. Arming delays uniformly spaced were used on 2000 pound magnetic mines and ship counts were distributed between 1 and 10. 1000 pound magnetic mines were used with dead periods equally divided between 8 and 10.5 seconds without arming delays and with 30% of the mines on ship counts of 2. This preparation was made after careful study of effectiveness of Japanese Mk 3 sweep against this type mine with long dead periods. It was possible to prepare and use a small number of magnetic mines designed to select larger ships. In view of extreme difficulty the Japanese would encounter in sweeping these mines with long dead periods, combined with acoustic mines, it was believed that it would be disadvantageous to use long arming delays and ship counts in view of the shallowness of the waters permitting easier uses of grappling methods which would be discouraging if heavy loss of sweepers resulted. It is intention to modify this type preparation as soon as evidence is available in regard to the effectiveness of enemy in sweeping these mines with these particular preparations. The relatively high effectiveness of 90% in this mining operations is ascribed to care taken in preliminary training in radar dropping techniques which were of simplest possible nature. Estimate that SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS will remain closed to all traffic from INLAND SEA areas until at least 7 April and possibly longer. Believe western entrance to STRAITS may be opened by enemy during 1st week in April but it is probable he will encounter appreciable losses after opening passage due to mines with delayed arming. Believe minefields in the SUO NATA will offer a definite deterrent to shipping attempting approach to eastern entrances of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and to naval ships attempting to fuel at TOKUYAMA. Enemy forces consisting of 1 battleship and 10-12 cruisers and destroyers were observed prior to minint at TOKUYAMA. These were later observed on 29 March near minefield between HIMA SHIMA and MAGA SHIMA and have subsequently been observed on 1 April in SAGO-MO SETO. Surmise from these sightings that this force may have attempted passage through minefield and turned back after suffering losses. There is as yet no indication that major Japanese force observed in KURE consisting of 6 battleships, carriers and escorts has been able to sortie forth since minelaying of 30 March. Estimate this force will be contained within KURE-HERO SHIMA area for at least 1 week, that is, until 7 April and that they may suffer losses in attempting to clear mines out of harbor area. Conclude that mining operations were able to completely disrupt any plans that may have been made by Japanese Navy to sortie out and attack our forces engaged in landing on OKINAWA. Mining of SASEBO was designed to trap and interfere with any naval units based there which had been observed by reconnaissance and to prevent use of this base against our OKINAWA assault forces. Opinion of this command is that accuracy achieved by crews in these operations was exceptional. All results will be confirmed by radar score photos taken at point of release. The fact that radar laying techniques were used by all crews and such high success achieved even though visual methods in laying were feasible indicates high effectiveness of training in radar methods in obtaining high accuracy. Believe 90% of mines airborne can be effectively placed by B-29 aircraft mining at altitudes of 5000 to 8000 feet using radar methods in any type of weather encountered.
07 0105 COMTHFLT TO CTF 58, CTF 51 Info CTF 54, CTG 52.1, CTG 50.5, CINCPAC ADV HQ.

My 061520. During afternoon when overall situation and distance permit attack with aircraft force reported ComTaskFor 58 062337. Keep each other and me advised as practicable.

07 0832 CTF 54 to COMINCH, CINCPAC BOTH, TF 54 Info CTFs 51, 52, 53, 55, CTG 51.19, COMTHFLT

Info ORANGE force consisting of a minimum the YAMATO 2 light cruisers or 1 heavy cruiser and possibly 10 destroyers as heading for this area and at 0825 this date was in position Lat 30-44 Long 129-10 E. They can arrive this area after dark. Force believed to be fast striking group of BANZAI type with objective of destroying BLUE shipping and combat ships in objective area. Probably their attempt will be accompanied by suicide and torpedo air attacks. Para. Gen plan this force will interpose between orange surface forces attempting to interfere with BLUE operations in western OKINAWA and destroy them by battleline action at moderate ranges, by light force gun and torpedo action, and air torpedo and bombing attacks when visibility permits in order to protect OKINAWA area. Para. TG 54.5 battleline RAdm McCormick BatDiv 3 IKAO NEW MEXICO TENNESSEE BatDiv 4 destroy enemy battleline by closing to a moderate range of from 17,000 to 22,000 yards FJO then by maneuvering to continue the action with the enemy battleline at moderate ranges. TG 54.6 right flank force RAdm Rodgers CruDiv 13 less SANTA FE, Destroyers BARTON, LAFAYETTE, PORTERFIELD, CALLAGHAN, IRWIN, PRESTON, LONGSHAW, HALL, TWIGGS, HUTCHINS, BENNION TG 54.7 left flank force RAdm Joy CruDiv 6 less NEW ORLEANS plus PORTLAND, destroyers ANTHONY, BEALE, WADSWORTH, ZELLARS, EDWARDS, BOOKS, RICKING, PORTER, MERDER ML ABELE prevent enemy from working around our flanks and keep interposed between him and the transport area. Sink his light forces and prevent torpedo attacks upon our battleline. Torpedo enemy heavy ships when opportunity offers or when directed but keep interposed between enemy and his objective. Destroyers will generally conform to actions of cruisers. Keep CTC informed position ship; also condition and changes speed. Keep clear of islands except for cover. Insure enemy not using islands for cover. Attack enemy, defend own battleline. Para. OpOrd effective on receipt. General principles right battle plan Annex E ComBatRon 1 OpPlan 1-45 apply. Should TF 54 be divided into2 TGs BatDiv 3 plus right flank forces will be TG 54.8 commanded by ComBatDiv 3 and BatDiv 4 plus left flank forces will be TG 54.9 commanded by ComBatDiv 4. Para. Use zone time I(-9), use communication plan Annex C ComBatRon 1 OpPlan 1-45 except use force frequency 75.7 Mcs for TBS. CTF 54 in BB 43 with TG 54.5. OpOrd ComBatRon 1 No. 1-45.

06 2116 COMINCH & CNO to COMTHFLT Info CINCPAC, CINCSWP.

Under the provisions of Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 3 April which has been passed to you for information units of the 7th Fleet will pass to the command of Cincpac on a schedule to be agreed on by General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz or as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Ascertained and report soon as possible how QUEENFISH established identity of vessel she sank on 1 April. It is necessary to know without delay whether or not identification is positive and whether or not it was possible to tell during or after attack if navigation lights and special markings were lighted.

Reference is made to situation with respect to reception of 316 Wing at INDISPENSABLE (TE SHIMA). Base Development Plans as submitted by this headquarters contemplated the completion of 1 VLR strip and 60 hardstands by 1 August, and an additional VLR strip and 60 hardstands by 1 Sept. 5 Engineer Aviation Bns were committed for this operation, which is considered adequate to complete minimum required construction by dates specified above. ComGen 10 subsequently revised Base Development Plan to indicate that strips would be completed 15 Sept and 15 Oct, or a delay of 45 days from completion dates as visualized by us. Service groups and ground echelons of 316 Wing are now echeloned into INDISPENSABLE for arrival dates which would permit supporting flight echelons of 2 very heavy groups by 15 Aug. and additional 2 very heavy groups by 15 Sept. ComAF 20 has requested this headquarters to review entire subject at this time, since 316 Wing already has been delayed 65 days and it is highly desirable to avoid additional 30 day delay if this is at all possible. With due appreciation for the fact that it is difficult to determine at this time an exact completion date for fields on INDISPENSABLE, and that problems of terrain as they may effect construction are not fully known as yet, it is nevertheless strongly recommended that 15 August and 15 Sept be set as target dates at this time for completion of strips and hardstands. Further recommend that interested agencies be instructed to implement this program. This would provide approximately same length of time as has been planned in past operations for similar type work, with due consideration for construction troops committed. Although this headquarters considers 5 Engineer Avn Bns now committed for INDISPENSABLE are sufficient to meet recommended completion dates, the reception of the 316 Wing at the earliest practicable date is a matter of sufficient importance to warrant commitment of additional engineer units, if this is essential. If necessary, this headquarters will reexamine deployment of Engineer Avn Bns in forward area and nominate an additional battalion to be made available for construction work on INDISPENSABLE.

Request your comments on ComGenAAFPOA Admin 060535.

Your 072145. Dates specified in BDP were set after consideration difficulty of echeloning service and construction troops and maintenance and construction materials because of limited beach capacity. Reconnaissance confirms beach capacity is meager. No. 6 airfield (YONTAN) N-3 strip and No. 5 airfield (KADENA) 2 parallel strips excellent for VLR development. Both sites provide grades less than 1 percent 8500 feet strips approach angles 0.

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Ample space for taxiways hardstands and facilities. Good base good drainage coral fill. Reconnaissance in southern sector may disclose additional VLR sites. Recommend consideration be given to development these fields for VLR eliminating 2 or more VLR fields INDISPENSABLE. This has advantage of concentration effort immediate application of present construction forces to task and elimination of difficult logistics problem at INDISPENSABLE. Estimate desired dates can be met at recommended sites if early decision reached. Additional Avn Engr En will assist in expediting completion project. INDISPENSABLE can be developed for fighter fields if desired with less logistics problem or INDISPENSABLE can later be developed for VLR fields in which case consideration should be given to elimination VLR program 3C. This has advantage of concentration of effort nearer profitable targets reduction logistic difficulties and reduction garrison forces required. Corollary subject is airfield No. 1. This site is impracticable has deep mud for foundation difficult approach angles poor drainage and no suitable building materials within reasonable distance. New sites being investigated. Limited reconnaissance discloses airfield No. 8 may be impracticable. Further report when data available.

CTF 51 and CTF 56 not to all. Return of 2nd MarDiv to Saipan for discharge personnel and minimum essential equipment authorized with understanding that division remains alerted for employment when and if needed for Phase I, II or III of ICEBERG.
09 1155 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPAC

Your 090526. Will be glad to see Sutherland and the others on the thirteenth. NIMITZ.

09 1921 COMINCH to CINCPAC.

KING TO NIMITZ. In answer to your 050226 I note your 050230 consider November is latest month in the year for OLYMPIC. It is essential that your overall command setup for naval and amphibious phases of invasion be established in early future for coordination with MacArthur's plans for land campaign. I agree with your view that this command should be Fifth Fleet team of Spruance and Turner. This will make them unavailable for LONGTEM. They should therefore be disengaged from ICEBERG as soon as practicable. To this end I suggest Halsey take the overall command about one May and that Turner pass over the amphibious command to Hill or Blandy not later than one May. Para Two. Assume you will include consideration of Kinkaid dash Barbey "team" as among those who will participate in planning and operations possibly those mounted in PHILIPPINES. Para Three. Wilkinson could then remain for making amphibious plans for LONGTEM and or other amphibious operations preliminary to invasion. Para Four. Assume that you will arrange MacArthur in early future as to method, time and place for coordination of invasion planning and preparations directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff.

08 0512 COMTHFLT to CTF 58 Info CTF 51, CTG 52.1. CINCPAC ADV.

With view to stamping on next fuse desire you make 1-day KYUSHU strike. Factors in timing are shorebased fighters my 080445 available for Turner, status your air groups and indications enemy reactions. With respect to latter, I believe the sooner the better. Turner comment on local support requirements.

10 0025 CTF 58 to COMTHFLT.

Your 080512. Striking date KYUSHU dependent upon when TF released from support amphibious forces. Will require 1 day to fuel TF from 16 oilers center area KYUSHU and then wait for favorable weather.

10 0044 CINCPOA ADV to COMTHFLT. Info CTFs 51 56, CTGs 92.2 92.3. CINCPOA PEARL.

1 of the principle purposes of the occupation of the Ryukyus is to establish air bases for attack on Japan and its sea approaches. The seizure of positions subsequent to OKINAWA and II SHIMA will be dependent to a degree on the extent to which suitable airfields can be developed on OKINAWA. The tentative sites of 4 of the 8 fields planned for OKINAWA namely 1 3 5 and 6 are now in our hands. 2 4 7 and 8 are still held by the enemy but our forces in the area should by now be able to appraise their suitability for development. Para. request as soon as practicable the best local estimate as to (A) Feasibility of constructing the 8 fields planned with the capacity now projected. (B) Feasibility of constructing additional fields and proposed sites. (C) Feasibility increasing capacity of 8 fields now planned while maintaining satisfactory dispersal. Para. In case either number 1 field or No. 8 field cannot be developed as planned it will be necessary either to find adequate sites elsewhere or to use 1 and possibly 2 existing sites for the essential needs of search aircraft and eventually of carrier aircraft as heretofore contemplated for 8 and 1 respectively. The future requirements of the accelerated campaign against

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JAPAN make it imperative that there be 2 naval airfields capable of expansion Para. Desire information as to feasibility of establishing airfields on OKINAWA north of ISHIKAWA ISTHMUS. Para. The proposal of ComGen 10 070910 to develop airfields No. 5 and 6 for VLR is not concurred in unless adequate sites can be found elsewhere for the groups now planned for those fields. Decrease in the planned strength of the tactical air forces to be deployed in the RYUKYUS is not acceptable. Para. Those questions are of the greatest urgency since they affect decisions concerning the seizure of additional objectives to get the needed airbase capacity. Para. Can send Captain Painter to you if you desire his services.

It is urgently necessary that completion of essential operational and supporting facilities in the MARIANAS for carrier aviation be accelerated. It is directed that on SAIPAN the completion of such facilities be given a priority next after essential hospitals. Cincpoa Pearl issue necessary directives to implement and delete 51st NCB from troops for Phase III ICEBERG. This will leave 39th and 51st NCB available at SAIPAN until operations subsequent to ICEBERG are directed to be undertaken.

CTF 51 100450 comply. In addition to conditions he mentions I believe another heavy attack is nearly due. Para. Until shorebased air is reported by Turner to be sufficiently effective major strike contemplated your 100025 in response my 080512 must be postponed. When strike is made expect maximum oilers available will be 12 to 14 instead of 16 requested by you. Para. In interim believe long range fighter sweep or sweeps on KYUSHU fields at critical times may pay big dividends. Desire you do this if at all practicable while meeting Turner's CAF requirements.

WAR 66056. In connection with your CAX 51420 the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the operation of 1st priority in BORNEO is BRUNEI BAY and this area will be seized at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of providing an advance base for the British Fleet. TARAKAN will be seized prior to BRUNEI BAY only if essential to the success of the BRUNEI BAY operation. You are reminded that the British Pacific Fleet can be made available for these operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prefer that you do not commit forces for the seizure of BALIKPAPAN unless you can do so without prejudice to the operations against JAPAN and/or without involvement of US ground troops and/or diversion of amphibious craft and equipment.
Re MyDis Top Secret 040622. Account immediate needs for medium altitude mapping and reconnaissance coverage of southern KOREA, TSUSHIMA and SAIJU-TO it is desired that arrangements be made for staging 2 or 3 Liberators of Photo Group 2 through OKINAWA as soon as possible. Maximum number officers 14 enlisted 39. 7,000 gallons Avgas will be required. Oxygen required. Para. Request you inform Cincpoa expected date Photo Liberators can stage through OKINAWA fields. (*Ref - secret)

Sterilization date of 1 Sept for all mining targets your 090835 is satisfactory. Mining FOCHOW and WENCHOW approved with same sterilization date.

Reference to your letter ET No 2018/432 dated 6 April 1945 not to all. Arrangements have been made and authorization is hereby given for accommodating 25 British aircraft and 4 officers and 55 ratings at SAMAR PacFlt carrier aircraft pool beginning 15 April. Com7thFlt has agreed to provide necessary tentage for personnel. It is requested that no increase in numbers stated in this despatch of British planes and personnel based ashore at SAMAR be made without additional request to ComPhibGroup 13 and receipt of authorization by addressee.

Your 100634. Desire you do not depart from regular routine searches until 19 April. Unless special circumstances arise do not send air strikes against WAKE prior to this date. Complete absence of air during this period will greatly enhance probability of successful accomplishment of submarine mission.

My 260739 January not to Com5thFlt. It has been found necessary to withdraw ILLUSTRIOUS to UK for refit. 2. ILLUSTRIOUS will be relieved by FORMIDABLE in TF 57 after present series of strikes on approximately April 13th.

Cincpac Adv 080846. To keep abreast situation with minimum LAG request CincPac Adv direct ComAirPacSubComFord keep CTF 51 advised current and anticipated need for services additional CVEs for aircraft transportation to combat area basing his estimates on his knowledge planes and pilots in pools and enroute and on direct information from CTF 58 CTG 52.1 and CTG 50.8 who are directed to keep him informed. CTF 51 directed meet requirements by assignment of combatant CVEs from CTG 52.1.

3081
WARNING ORDER. MyDis 260529 Feb modified as follows. In order to be ready to exploit successes in Phases I and II and to prepare to deploy in the ROKUSYU a maximum air force at the earliest possible date initiate preparations for Phase III (c) ICEBERG with target date (A-Day) for ADJUTANT (MIYAKO JIMA) on I plus 76. Operation will be conducted by same higher troop commanders as Phases I and II. Assault troops for operation will consist of 3rd Amphibious Corps with Corps Troops 1st 2nd and 6th MarDivs reinforced or equivalent units designated by ComGen 10th Army from forces under his operational control. Necessary DUH Co and NECs as designated by ComGen 10 attached. 534th and 720th Amph Tractor Bns mounting point OAHU. 726th Amph Tractor Bn mounting point SAIPAN. 750th 8 inch How Mq Hq Det 28th Smoke Gen Bn 67th and 68th Smoke Gen Cos mounting point OAHU. 1 Army Mil Mortar Bn when available. Para. Garrison troops will consist of following: (A) To be provided from troops locally available to ComGen 10. 1st MarDiv reinforced which will remain on target until relieved by Army garrison unit. 2 Firing Batteries AAA Auto Wpons. 1 En AAA guns (90mm). Btry C (Less 1 Flat) 294th S/L Bn. Hq and Hq Btry 230th S/L Bn. (B) To be mounted HAWAIIAN AREA. Hq and Hq Btry and Btry A 867th AAA AW Bn. 10th Hq and Hq Btry CA Grp. (C) To be mounted GUAM. 868th AAA AW Bn. 64th AAA Gun Bn. 771st AAA Gun Bn. 2nd Plat Btry C 294th S/L Bn. 177th CA Bn. (E) To be mounted SAIPAN. Hq and Hq Btry 69th AAA Grp. 206th AAA AW Bn. (Less 2 Btry C and D) Btry D & B 867th AAA AW Bn. 865th AAA AW Bn. Btry B 239th S/L Bn. Hq and Hq Btry 59th AAA Btng. 33rd CA Bn. (F) Mounting point ANAUAU. 45th CA Bn. (C) To be mounted FINISHAVEN. 1 AAA gun En 1 AAA Grp Hq. 1 operations Det. Para. Garrison air forces. MarAirGrp 14 HedRon 14 Seron 14 MarFitRons 212, 222, 223 mounting SAMAR. MarAirGrp 12 HedRon 12 Seron 12 MarFitRon 115, 211 and 218 mounting ZAMBOANGA. HedRon for ATG mounting on west coast. VMP (H) 533 mounting ENSEBET. VATE 331 mounting MAJURO. MAN 32 7 mounting OKINAWA. 2 CMGs and 1 NBC to be designated by ServPac. 2 VTR Wings complete with Hq and accompanying service units. Photo Sqdn NH. Photo lab Bng 62 NH. All to be designated later and all mounting from West Coast. Para. In the following 2 paragraphs the remarks in parenthesis show availability of units as indicated in ComGenPOA serial 0001/5 Mar 29. Para. Additional aviation service units. Mounting point OAHU. Det No. 52, 70th AACS (35% available). 161st Eng Bn. AGS Det 336th SigServNH. Det No 3, 1714th SigServCo Det. Hq 419th Troop Carrier Grp. Mounting point GUAM. Hq and Hq Serv Co 93rd Engr Avn Regt. 1834th 1835th 813th 1899th 1866th and 1924th Engr Avn Bns. 463rd Sig Hvy Const En Avn. Mounting point SAIPAN. 1894th Eng Avn Bn. Mounting Point KWAJALEIT. 1914th Eng Avn Bn. Mounting point west coast. 801st Eng Avn Bn. Mounting point unknown. Det AAF weather Serv POA (20% available). Radio Sqdn Mobile (J) (Short). Det MNT Control Centr. (Short). 6 M.T. Cos (AV) (Short). 4 CA Trk Cos Avn (short). Para. Army ground service units with mounting points indicated where known Adjutant General. 337th APU type M from OAHU. 337th APU type M from west coast and 3 APU type K (short). Chemical. 1 Gen Serv Co (short). 1 Processng Co (short). Engineer. 1 Depot Co (short 1 Flat). 1 Base Depot Co (short). 1 light equipment Co (short). 3 Maint. Cos 1 from OAHU (1 short). 1 Water Sup Co (short). 1736th and 1737th SL Maint Teams from OAHU. Hq and Hq Co Const Grp (short). Hq and Hq Co Base Depot (short). 6 Const Bns (short). 3 Eng Avn Bns Cincop Pearl 090158 substituted in lieu thereof. Designated in lieu thereof. Designated in foregoing paragraph. 1 Composite Serv Co (short). 1 Base Equip Co (short). 1534th 3067th 3068th Dump Trk Cos from GUAM. 2919th Dump
Trk Co from OAHU. 3072th 3073rd 3074th 3075th Dump Trk Cos and 2 other Cos from west coast. 1 Hvy Shop Co (short). 2 Petrol Dist Cos from West Coast. 1772nd Plat Parts Supply from OAHU, 1 parts supply Plat (short). 2348th Gas Gen Det from SAIPAN. Medical. 2 San Cos (short). 1 Field Hosp from PHASE I or II. 317th Gen Hosp and 210th Sta Hosp from west coast. 39th Sta Hosp from ANGAUR. 20th 31st 122nd Sta Hosps from GUADALUPE, NEW CAL, ESPARITU SANTO and west coast respectively. 3 Malaria control units and 2 Med Survey Units from PHASE I or II. 149th Vet Det (food insp) from west coast. 2 Vet Dets (short). 377th Med Sun Team number 5 from OAHU. MILITARY POLICE. 1 MP Co Corps (short). 1 MP En (short) 1 MP Proc Plat from Phase I or 2. 1 Criminal Invest Sec Type 2 (short). 2 Endl Guard Secs Type 3 (short). 1 Mess Team No. 2 (short). 1 MP Co for Military Govt. Miscellaneous. 1 Intell Serv Org and 1 Order of Battle Team from Phase I or II. 77th CTC Det from PHASE II. 2 CTC teams from OAHU. 1 Photo Interp Team from Phase I or II. 1 Special Serv Co (short). Ordnance. 1 Hq and Hq Det Gp (short). 302nd and 1 other Hq and Hq Det En from OAHU. 247th and 248th Ammo Co. from West Coast. 3231st Depot Co from west coast. 3233rd Depot Co from OAHU. 2 Hmq Cos from west coast. 564th Hvy Maint Co Trk from west coast. 351st Maint Co AA from west coast. 382nd MAM Co from west coast. 154th MAM Co from OAHU. 406th and 296th MI Co from west coast. 104th BD SQD from PHASE I. 215th 216th 217th 219th BD SQDs from west coast. Quertermaster. Hq and Hq Det 529th Gp from OAHU. 4474th Depot Co Supply from OAHU. 150th Co Trk Co from ANGAUR. 4102nd 4106th 894th 895th CM Trk Cos from OAHU. 4464th Salv Coll Co less 1 Plt from west coast (1 Plat short). 5 Driver Aug Teams (short). 1 Gas Supply Co (short). 5 Hq and Hq Det CM En (short), 2 Mary Co (available 1 Plat ANGAUR 1 Plat WA). 1 Grs Plat from OAHU. 2 Salv Repair Cos (1 Plat available ANGAUR), 2 Lidry Cos (1 Plat available ANGAUR), 4517th 4518th Serv Cos from west coast. 6 other Serv Cos required (1 Plat available ANGAUR). 2 Fumigation and Bath Cos (short). 2 Sec Hosp Lidry Type EI (short). 5 Sec Hosp Lidry Type EI (short). Signal. 103rd, 105th, 232nd, 250th, 311th radar Maint Units from OAHU. 1 Sig Const Co Hvy (short). 1 Sig Serv Co Ocn (short). Transportation. 1 Hq and Hq Co Amphib Trk En (short). 526th Hq and Hq Det Port En from west coast. 364th Hq and Hq Det Port En from OAHU. 493rd and 495th Amph Trk Cos from GUAM. 491st and 493th Amph Trk Cos from HAWAIIAN AREA. 1124th 1145th 1146th 1147th 1148th and 1137th Port Cos from west coast. Overhead. Hq and Hq Carr Force (83% available). 80 Military censors (short). 87 Military Govt interpreters (short). Para. Army units listed in preceding paragraphs which have not been designated should be so designated with mounting point by ComGenPOA by dispatch as they become available. Para. Naval Service Units in accordance with ComServPac Spdltr Ser 0001003 dated 10 March. Plus the following units: 1 NCB for waterfront work. 2 NCB Regt Hq. Military Govt Hosps consisting of 4 G-6 and 3 G-10 naval functional components. 4 NIA functional components for Military Govt. ComServPac requested to designate units above by dispatch indicating mounting points. Para. Cincpoa Pearl designate necessary military govt dets by dispatch. Para. Units listed this dispatch is a preliminary list of units and is based on revised troops list Phase 3(c) now being formulated. Para. On completion of Phase 3(c) Hq 3rdPhibCorps, Corps troops and 6thMarDiv return to GUAM for rehabilitation and 2nd MarDiv return to SAIPAN for rehabilitation. Para. All combat and garrison units including service, construction, aviation and defense units for ADJUTANT other than those employed in Phase 1 and 2 should be ordered to report at the earliest to ComGen 10 (info CG 10 rear). Garrison units should report in addition to prospective IsCom of ADJUTANT (BrigGen Edwin B Lyon), CTG 99.4. Those not in the immediate vicinity reporting by dispatch. Para. Col. Benjamin Wiman USA is designated as ComDr Const troops. Col. Ford C Rogers USMC is designated as AirDefCmdr. Both Officers should report to ComGen 10 and CTG 99.4 by dispatch. Para. ComServPac expedite nomination of officer as ComNavActivities ByDis 280529 February.
Pursuant to recommendations of ComGen 10th Army rehabilitation and preparation for their next operations subsequent to Phases 1 and 2 of ICEBERG will be accomplished on OKINAWA for 3rd PhibCorps less 2nd MarDiv and for 24th Army Corps including 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Divisions. 2nd MarDiv will be returned SATPAN. After Phase 3 3rdPhibCorps Hqtrs and Corps troops and 6th MarDiv will be sent to GUAM and 2nd MarDiv to SATPAN. 1st MarDiv will remain ADJUTANT until relieved by a non amphibious division.

UrDis 090213. Expect to use for Phase 3(c) ICEBERG see MyDis 122310 the following AAA units: 1 Gun Bn, 1 Grp Hq, 1 Opns Det from FINSCHAFEN. Para. Desire to use immediately 1 S/L Btry for Phase 2 ICEBERG. Para. Request designation of units required for Phase 2 and Phase 30. Para. Plan to use in Phase 3D ICEBERG the balance of units listed UrDis 090213 with the exception of 1 Opns Det which is not required at this time. Request designations these units. Para. Shipping arrangements to mount units will be coordinated by CinCPOA. Para. Based on the above ComGenPOA is authorized to deal directly with action addes as regards these units. Para. Advise CinCPOA as to allocation shipping desired for mounting these units and mounting dates. Plan to have ComSoPac ship equipment referred UrDis 090213 to units concerned as soon as practicable. Please advise destinations desired.

Part 1 of 131644. An advising British Admiralty delegation that tentative date for seizure BRUNEI BAY by MacArthur is 23 May. That units of British Fleet will probably be allocated to this operation, and that British resources referred to in CINCPAC 200740 March not to all should be used for establishing fleet base facilities at BRUNEI instead of MANUS. BRUNEI base will parallel MARINADEPACT U.S. Pacific Fleet Base in LEYTE GULF.

Part 2 final of 131644. Part 1 was 131641. Its use designed to provide for employment of British Pacific Fleet either south, west or north in future operations against JAPAN. Operations to northward will require use of advanced anchorages by British Pacific Fleet such as in the PHILIPPINES and in the RYUKYUS.
14 0058 CONCENPOA to CINCPOA ADV Info CINCPOA PEARL, CG 10TH, CINCPAC, COMFAIRWAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, GOVERNMENT OF PEARL

RJ 59751. In view of information contained in CTF 51 and CTF 56 dispatch 090235 and authorization in your 091157 to Com5thFlt recommend effective date 93th Div is designated Area Reserve to be deferred to 1 June current period preparation of the Div for May 1st alert is well underway but is working a severe hardship upon the facilities of CINCPAC due to critical shortage of service troops and concurrent support required for other ICEBERG forces per radio reply requested.

14 0329 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPOA PEARL, COMCENPOA Info CINCPOA DIV ATC, COMAIRPAC, COMFAIRWAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, GOVERNMENT OF PEARL

Refer Cincpoa secret serial 0093 of 14 October 1944. The mission assigned TARANIA is hereby revised as follows: HAWKINS FIELD BETIO ISLAND to be maintained as an Army Air Base to support activities of the ATC until such time as they may be withdrawn. Necessary maintenance and service personnel for support of the Atoll and Air Base to be provided by the Army. Reduction to meet the assigned mission will be effectuated as hereafter indicated: (A) Immediately reduce to ATC activities and nucleus Army garrison adequate to support same. (B) Army replace Navy garrison as soon as practicable and not later than 1 June. (C) Reduce garrison to token force when ATC can close out activities.

14 1210 CINCPOA ADV to CINCPOA PEARL.

Request your comment on Com5thFlt's 130530. It is desired to expand and accelerate the Naval Base CINCPAC in order to support an accelerated campaign against JAPAN.

08 0140 COMAIRNORTHPOC TO USS RANGER & ASSIGNED ESCORTS, COMAIRPAC, COMFAIRWAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, COMFAIRPAC, GOVERNMENT OF PEARL

Following is TG 30.5 OpPlan 1-45. Task organization. TG 30.5 air striking group RADM R Y Jennings. SubPara A. TU 30.5.1 Carriers RADM Jennings BONHOMME RICHARD plus air group designated by ComAirPac RANGER plus air group designated by Comfairwestcoast additional carriers with air groups later assigned. SubPara B. TU 30.5.2 escorts later assigned. Para 1. Enemy forces: Enemy capable forming strong carrier Task Force. Own Forces: SubPara A. TG 30.1 Surface Striking Group composed CruDiv 1 DesDiv 57 less 1 DesDiv plus additional units less carriers assigned will join and support this group. NorPac and HawSeaFron forces directed maintain air barrier patrols along 180th meridian ADAK to MIDWAY. WestSeaFron directed maintain air searches over sea approaches principal cities and installations west coast. 5thFlt will support by striking retreating enemy raiding forces. Assumptions: Unlocated enemy carrier TF proceeding diversionaly operations eastern Pacific area and possible raids on west coast. Para 2. This group will conduct air searches directed by CTF 30 and will attack enemy units within range with all available aircraft in order prevent enemy attack on west coast. Para 3. SubPara. Carriers. (1) Conduct air patrols and searches according doctrine and as directed. (2) Intercept destroy enemy. Primary target carriers. Sub para B. Escorts: Screen carriers of other units according doctrine battle plan and as directed. Sub Para. (1) This operation designated FIREBREAK. (2) This plan based Com3rdFlt CTF 30 OpPlan 2-45 and effective only when directed. (3) All units maintain maximum readiness extensive offensive operations consistent present employment. (4) Rendezvous of units proceeding from

Continued
PEARL NORTPAC and WEST COAST will be specified by CTF 30. (5) Current doctrine tactical orders and instructions effective and will be supplemented as necessary by annexes. (6) Cruising instructions battle plans CTF 30 and annexes this plan will be delivered in rendezvous. (7) Be prepared towing and to be towed. (8) Conduct training exercises as possible enroute and thereafter as directed. Para 4a. Logistics PEARL and WEST COAST ports. (B) Replenishment from TG 30,9. Para 5. A. Communications CenCom 2 Pac 71.

15 0620 CTF 93 to CTF 93,4 Info CINCPOA, BONCOM 21.

CINCPOA 150410 GCT. Change Mustang strike from ATSUGI airfield to airfields in southern KYUSHU for tomorrow the 16th. Also use WMB 612 in full strength. Intelligence data, Will arrive by 3-24 tonight. Submit your plan to include time of attack to me with info CINCPOA, CTF 58, CTF 51, by urgent dispatch immediately, repeat, immediately. Happy hunting.

15 0957 CTF 93,4 to CTF 93 Info CINCPOA, CTF 58, CTF 51.

Can do KYUSHU this way. Plan A: Sweep south airfields and remain in area for 2 hours proceed to OKINAWA for service and return to base. If approved request you inform OKINAWA bases. Plan B: Strike KANoya airfields remain maximum 40-5 minutes and return to base at TWO. Take off 0900 (-10) over target 1245K.

16 0250 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO CINCSWPA CINCPOA, CINCPOA HQ

1. Your dispatch concurrence is requested in the following proposals concerning action to be taken to implement the directive of JCS 032140 and to expedite planning and preparation for the invasion of JAPAN. (A) CINCPAC and CINCPOA assume immediately command of all forces of their respective services for purposes of Army and Navy administration. (B) CINCPOA release to the operational control of CINCPAC as rapidly as possible all Army forces and resources now under his control except those which CINCPOA considers essential to the functioning development or defense of the POA or to the success of operations which the Joint Chief of Staff have directed CINCPOA to conduct. The resources to be released would include depots and supply systems and similar logistic activities. (C) CINCSWPA release to the operational control of CINCPAC All naval forces and resources except those which CINCSWPA considers essential to the functioning development or defense of the SWPA or to the success of operations which the JCS have directed in CINCSWPA to conduct. (D) CINCSWPA and CINCPOA retain their coordinating authority over logistic matters within their respective areas but each commander assume as rapidly as practicable full logistic responsibility for the forces of his own service. (E) Within the POA the existing Army and Navy responsibilities for joint logistic support of positions in the MARSHALLS CAROLINES MARIANAS and KYUSHU continue in effect until changed by mutual agreement. (F) Army combat units in the garrisons of island positions in the MARSHALLS CAROLINES and MARIANAS to be relieved as soon as practicable by corresponding units of the naval service and released to CINCPAC. (G) CINCPAC and CINCPOA will each establish as soon as possible the necessary command organizations for planning and conducting the phases of the invasion of JAPAN for which they are responsible.
170045 DEPCOMAF 20 TO CONVADAREA Info CINCPAC, DEPCOMAF 20 ADMIN.

1723. Over 5000 members of 58th Wing arrived destination without tentage, other field equipment or transportation. Request every effort be made to expedite movement of cargo vessels CAPE SAUNDERS, CAPE SANDY, CHARLES E SMITH, WILLIAM HAWKINS in this and other theaters.

170557 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSTFL, CONVADAREA, CTFR, COMAFFRAC, COMAIRPAC, COMAIRPAC SUBORD COMMAND CONGEN/AF, MARAG FIRST, CINCPAC PEARL, COMMISSAR SUBAREA INFO CONGEN/AFPOA (ADMN), COMAIRPAC.

Para 1. Additional fighter strength must be established ashore on OKINAWA and IE SHIMA as soon as practicable. Review of information available indicates following status units concerned: (a) Flight echelons MAG 22 less VMF 314 at ENGEBI, VMF 314 enroute GUAM in THETIS BAY ETA 25 April, Ground echelon now loading in MARSHALLS. (b) 318 Fighter Group (111 P-47N) ready at SAIPAN ground echelon afloat ULETHI in KENMORE (AK 221) and mership 3 HALL YOUNG. (c) 1 Night Fighter (F-61) Squadron now in MARINAS available if required. (d) 413th Fighter Group (100 P-47N) ready MARINAS 1 May. (e) 507th Fighter Group (96 P-47N) ready MARINAS 10 May. (f) Units of MAG 11 now at PELELIU, VMF 111, VMF 155 in MARSHALLS. VMF 225 at GUAM can be made available for emergency forward movement if needed before any of the above become available. Para 2. All addressees take such action as practicable to expedite and facilitate increase in shore based fighter strength KYUKUS including forward movement ground echelons subject to necessary coordination of arrival dates at OKINAWA.

(Part 1) 170647 CINCPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSTFL. Part 1 my 170653. If BTF is to provide anything more than a small force for the operation outlined in Cominch 1316/4 (not to ComstFL) TF 57 will be obliged to withdraw from ICEBERG on conclusion of the present series of strikes. (2) The period at LEYTE between the return of TF 57 and the mounting of the new operation (estimated at about 3 weeks) would be employed in replenishment and in planning and practicing for the new operation. (3) This new operation cuts directly into the period planned for the major replenishment of the fleet (Part 2) as projected in my 020115 April. (4) It will be appreciated that our lack of shore facilities in the forward area makes long distance logistic planning necessary and consequently some reduction in operational availability will inevitably result if such plans are seriously upset.

(Part 2) 170653 DEPCOMAF 20 TO CINCPAC ADV INFO ISCOM TINIAN, CONVADAREA, CONGEN/COMZ1, DEPCOMAF 20 ADMIN.

1732. Para 1. Request authority to base the 489 Very Heavy Bombardment Group and the 369 Service Group Special on North Field TINIAN on or about 1 July. Para 2. Sufficient available parking areas exist to accommodate this group/Para 3. Only the minimum necessary housekeeping facilities need to be constructed for these 2 units. Para 4. Unless the above request is approved, existing additional airbase completion schedules will not permit the employment of this very long range group until approximately 15 September. Para 5. Recommend comments of info addees be secured.
WE "...

by 1 Feb...

surveys being able to...

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is planning...

LGGUMIHOUS port...316...

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and mainten ance 50% by

experience...

port capacity, and 3rd, AGF service troop availability. My staff...

engineer is now at LIRP collaborating with Hale's staff engineer in detailed

surveys to determine work required to provide minimum operational facilities

by 1 Aug 45, for additional VLR wing at North Field LIRP. Anticipate

being able to furnish you with additional comments about 21 April.
13 0301 CONSERVPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC, COMCH:U.

Planning for LONGCOM completed in accord CINCPAC ser 0005023. Cincpea Pearl informed. If target date of 20 Aug is to be met firm orders for base units and maintenance equipment must be submitted not later than 1 May. Request instructions. Spald recommendation for naval base commands follows.

13 0653 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL.

Request special notice be taken of subparagraph A3 of JCS 032141 of which last sentence authorizes and directs assembly of necessary special equipment. Since LONGCOM and OLYMPIC are alternates and construction and other special equipment is of same character desire procurement be initiated without delay.

13 0720 CONSERVPAC TO CINCPAC ADV.

1765. I have been directed to initiate the following action:"A. Transfer the 503th Fighter Group (in HAWAII) from the 20th AF to AAFPOA. B. Transfer the 13th Fighter Group (in WORMAN) from the 7th AF to the 20th AF. C. Transfer the 21st Fighter Group (in WORMAN) from the 7th AF to the 20th AF. D. Transfer the 7th Fighter Command to the 20th AF as a means of direct control of the Fighter Groups operating with the 20th AF. This would result in 6 fighter groups moreidcroplC:property:conditionnow present or scheduled to arrive in this theater and a headquarters fighter command being assigned to the 20th AF. Your concurrence is requested.

13 0800 CONSERVPAC TO DEFCON 20th AF Info CINCPAC ADV, COMYVERAREA DEFCONAF20ADMR.

APIN 1116. Proposal to base 439th Bomb Group and 369th Air Serv Group on North Field TINIAN on or about 1 July 45 contained in your TopSec Msg 1732 dated 170654 April to Cinpea Adv apparently assumes 439th Group will be attached to this command and temporarily conduct combat operations from TINIAN pending mounting for movement to forward area about 1 Sept., and further envisions provision of only minimum necessary housekeeping facilities during this period. Unless complete physical facilities and normal logistical support are provided for these units at TINIAN I cannot concur. If adequate facilities and support can be provided, I strongly urge permanent assignment of 439th Groups and other elements of 316th Wing to this command as proposed in your Msg 1681 date time group 150743 April to Com20th AF and my msg to Com 20th AF APIN 1116 date time group 160005 which proposal if approved would assure earliest effective employment of subject units against the enemy.

13 1010 GHQ SWPA to CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S WD, COMCH:U, COMYVERFLT, CINCPAC PEARL, COMCH:U.

CX 14288. The proposals contained in your 160250 based upon the conference between our representatives recently held at your Adv Hqtrs, have my concurrence. It is considered that this agreement is the first step in execution of the JCS directive to place all Army and all Navy resources in the Pacific under their respective commanders. If and when the JCS issue a definitive directive for an attack upon the Japanese homeland it will be necessary for CINCPAC to have greater control of Army resources in the Pacific than is now suggested by you. It is anticipated that this matter will be the subject of continued conference and adjustment and that mutually satisfactory agreements will be reached from time to time as

- Continued -
required for full compliance with the JCS directive. Orders are being issued for the Com/7th Flt to report to you for administrative command. At any time you will give your concurrence I am prepared to pass to you full control of the 7th Flt as suggested through my representatives at Guam.

GHQ SWPA TO CINCPAC ADV AND ETO FOR INFO (CONT'D)

Report to ComGen US Forces CHINA Theater for duty, JCS WAXX 61424 of 6 April refers. Missions and tasks assigned by Cominch remain effective under principles of unified command for US joint operations (JCS 263/2/D of 20 April 1945 and are reviewed in broad outline as follows: (A) Explore and exploit and prepare for use all means available in the FAR EAST that might be of value to the US Fleet and develop maximum Chinese cooperation of present and future value to US Fleet. (B) Take charge of the American participation in the SACO Agreement (and in accordance with such modifications thereto as may be made) and cooperate with the responsible Chinese authorities in activities directed against the Japanese. (C) Establish and conduct in support of the US Fleet communication intelligence, D/F nets, weather nets and coastal reconnaissance and intelligence services. (D) Render all possible assistance to US Army ground and air forces, particularly in connection with mining. Photo reconnaissance and air ground aid. Para. Agreement to supplement SACO Agreement being processed for separate message. Para. Byerley report in person and advise General TAI LI. Miles report by dispatch and in person on arrival. Cincpac deliver to Commodore Miles, CINCPOA ADV 170557 applies. Effective additional fighter strength practicable as follows. (A) Land ground echelons of MAG 22 and 318 Fighter Groups at IE SHIMA without delay. Fly in flight echelons these groups airdrops at IE SHIMA available. (B) Build up MAG 33 and 31 at maximum strength which urgently requires prompt plane and pilot replacements and earliest possible landing remainder personnel and equipment these groups. No additional fighter strength can be effectively based and operated under present construction plans for YONTAN and KADENA Fields. These fields can take increased fighter strength if all construction effort gives way to fighter employment. (C) Night fighter situation will be satisfactory if availability of F6F-5(N) is kept up by prompt replacement of losses and by earliest landing of remainder squadron personnel and equipment now at sea. Believe this far preferable and earlier effective than employment (P61) squadron. (D) Believe best employment units MAG 11, VMF 111, VMF 155, VMF 225 as replacements to keep MAG 31, 33, 22 up to strength. (E) Request 200 additional ground echelon personnel for each MAG 31 and 33 with tentage and bedding arrive earliest fairtrans to alleviate manpower shortage until all personnel these groups arrive. (F) No operable fighter strips in sight for employment 413th and 507th Fighter Groups by availability dates.
18 2039 CTF 58 to COMSHFLEET Info CTF 51, ComSERON 10, CTGs of TF 58.

Your 180647. Do not desire to rotate TGs. Reduction of force in operating area will cause concentration of enemy on remaining TGs with consequent probability of increased losses. Also materially reduces number of available fighters. Prefer to retain entire TF in operating area until shore based air is ready to take over and we are relieved of direct support missions. (A) Sufficient carriers and destroyers are available for only 3 TGs. (B) ROMPDON TG 58.1 plus about 6 cripples of other TGs; TG 58.3, TG 58.4.

18 2354 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENPOA INFO COMINCH, COMGENPOA, COMINDEAVOR, COMCENTEN, CINCPOA PEARL.

Your compliance with the orders issued by the War Dept as quoted in your 180720 is concurred in as a matter of Army administration with the understanding that all Army Fighter Groups deployed in the POA will be under the operational control of CINCPOA unless otherwise specifically directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

19 0025 CG BOMCOM XXI to: CG BOMBING 73, CG BOMBING 313, CG BOMBING 314, Info COMGENBOMING 58, CTF 58, CTF 93, CTG 93.4, CINCPOA ADV, CG DET A BOMCOM XXI INC.

STNXF-19-1 Subject daily bombing. For your information daily bombing of KYUSHU will be initiated and continued, weather permitting, until further notice. You will be advised each day of proposed schedule for following day including targets, force, bomb load, assembly areas.
18 2020 COMINCH & CNO to CINCPAC ADV, CINCSWPAC INFO CINCPAC, COMTHFLT.

It is my intention to allocate units of the British Pacific Fleet to CINCSWPAC for OP6 operation. CINCSWPAC CX 14221 of 17 April 1945 and my 13164 refer.

After consultation action addressees are requested to report units required and dates desired.

19 0056 COMTHFLT TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CHICO SWPA, COMSPEVPAC, CINCPAC BOTH, BASE SHIP CTF 72.

Your 072006. Present plans indicate LUZON will become largest staging mounting area in SWPA. This will entail large concentration of assault and cargo shipping with attendant requirement for supplies and voyage repairs. Base at SUBIC BAY should be expanded to provide increased repair and supply facilities in central LUZON. Components offered my 130530 are at the expense of the SAMAR base and were made available in order to expedite the construction of vitally needed bases in the Ryukyus. However units not urgently required in the Ryukyus together with a proportionate number of construction battalions thus released should be diverted to SUBIC to meet requirements in central LUZON. Cincpac 170532 refers.

19 0222 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPAC INFO SAGSEA, COMGEN CHINA, COMINCH & CNO.

I concur in the proposal of SAGSEA 130625 that the proposed inter-theater meteorological conference be held in Washington rather than Manila.
19 0359 CINCPAC TO COMSVPAC, COMGENPOA INFO CINCPAC ADV.

Initiate procurement and assembly construction and other special equipment for LONGTOM based on planned target date of 20 Aug 1945 ELD. JCS 032141 not needed by all refers. This is not intended to indicate that LONGTOM as an operation has been approved.

19 0641 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMGENPOA, CINCSWPA.

Since OLYMPIC and LONGTOM are alternates and since it is logical to assume that the latter will be the least effort to be undertaken in the second half of 1945 request the concurrence of the JCS in proceeding immediately to assemble in the FOA all supplies and make all preparations which are common to both operations. Such formal concurrence will facilitate processing and support of requisitions and projects in both War and Navy Depts. The dispatch concurrence of CINCSWPA is requested with respect to Army projects and resources.

19 0639 CINCBFF to VAC, FONAS A, ES 1, AO 1, RAPT.

Alternative employments for the fleet in the immediate future are under consideration as follows: (A) Continuation of ICEBERG as at present planned. (B) Withdrawal from ICEBERG and engagement in a different operation with target date of leaving LEYTE approximately 15 May. Para 2. Plans and action to carry out intermediate replenishment of the fleet now para 1A above are to continue. My 060600 refers. Para 3. At the same time plans are to be made for filling up the fleet as far as possible at LEYTE before 15 May to meet the requirement of 1B above (these plans should not be put into effect unless a signal from CINCBFF is received. Para 4. In the meanwhile any executive action such as sending forward additional STAMPS should be put in hand now provided this does not prejudice replenishment required for para 1A above).

19 1817 COMINCH & CMS TO CINCPAC ADV INFO OFS ARMY, CINCSWPA, 19THFLT.

My 062116 your 160250 MacArthurs 181010. I am in full agreement that control of those 7th Flt elements required for the defense of SWPA or for participation in operations conducted by MacArthur cannot pass to you, especially as you have been given no responsibility for the conduct of these operations and have not participated in making decisions and plans thereon. Para 2. Further it should be pointed out that naval units in SWPA other than U.S. (except BFF) are passed by the Allied Governments concerned to CINCSWPA, and by him to ComAlliedNavForces, SWPA who is also Com7thFlt. The command of these allied naval units could not be passed from MacArthur except by the agreement of those concerned.
Para 1. The prompt concurrence of your CX 14288 DTG 131010 is appreciated and I share your belief that mutually satisfactory agreements will be reached as they become necessary. I do not desire to assume direct control and responsibility for naval forces involved in the amphibious phases of the operations directed to be conducted by CINCSWPA because: (A) I believe unity of command is essential in amphibious operations and in the development and defense of newly captured positions. (B) There exist the complications that the Australian naval forces are assigned to you and that the British naval forces which may participate must be coordinated by your Cmndr. Allied Naval Forces SWPA.

Para 2. At such time as any screening vessels of the types in which we are sustaining losses can be spared from your operations for employment in ICEBERG, I would appreciate their release.

20 0835 CINCPAC ADV TO ALL FLAG OFFICERS PACFLT INFO COMINCH.

CINCPAC recently noted from a Task Unit Commander a request for permission if opportunity occurred to divert a Japanese hospital ship to port for visit and search. For guidance of all hands CINCPAC policy is to avoid any interference with enemy hospital ships unless there is prima facie evidence of flagrant violation of international convention and then only if time and circumstances are such that directions by dispatch are infeasible. It is to our distinct advantage that no excuse whatever be given the enemy for retaliatory acts against our own hospital ships.

20 0920 WEDEMEYER TO CINCPAC ADV.

CFB 36005. Regarding your unnumbered top secret from CINCPAC ADV dated 15 April following is repeat and additional information: AVA MARU arrived in SAIGON (no date) flying a white cross flag and had on board 400 wounded and 537 seriously wounded. Following military cargo reported to have been unloaded. 1700 motors in cases, 12 sedan cars, 30 machine guns, 30 trucks and some medical supplies. AVA MARU left SAIGON February 28. Above report dated 1 March. Following is additional information dated 2 March: Reports say included in 1700 cases of motors were 45 aircraft engines and also 5000 tons of munitions were unloaded which included 300 torpedoes or LADYK bombs. Believed still on board at the time were additional materials however no further information has been reported. All above information was checked and confirmed by informers in service of French Army, Navy and Police. No information available on any cargo loaded.
20 0635Z DEPCOMAF 20 POA to CINCPOA ADV

TOP SECRET X NBR 1812. For clarification my 1765 date time group 180720Z signed ComGenAAFPOA was not intended to imply directive from War Department as indicated in your 182354Z. Directive originated from ComAF 20. In view of above does your 182354Z still apply.

20 2253 CINCPOA ADV to COMGENAAFPOA, DEPCOM 20TH AF info COMINCH

TOP SECRET. Your 200635. The concurrence of my 182354 in ComGen AAFPOA 180720 was premised on the assumption that the order quoted were issued by competent authority. If such is not the case the concurrence is withdrawn. If there is any doubt in the matter request ComGenAAFPOA clarify through Army channels and advise me.

21 0213 CINCPAC ADV to CINCAFPAC info CINCPAC PEARL HQ

TOP SECRET. To facilitate preliminary planning for OLYMPIC request you indicate basis you prefer as to numbers and mounting areas for divisions in assault and follow up. Pending reply will work here except for mounting areas on basis JWPC 235/4 and JLC 190/1 which are in agreement but using data as available in ASF-P-SL-11 of 18 December 1944 which is based on same totals but with 9 divisions in assault and 4 in D plus 15 follow up.

21 0217 CINCPOA ADV to COMGENAAFPOA

TOP SECRET. Request your comment and recommendations answering JCS 1190/7 of 27 March and WARX 69495 DTG 181434.

21 0700 1852 TOP SECRET. Reference WARX 69495 conversion of B24 groups. Para 2 of the 3 B24 groups and their service organizations assigned to Central Pacific are committed to ICEBERG operation. Without interfering with that operation the following contribution could be made from units and personnel in AAFPOA. Para A. No lead crews available. 2 potential very heavy bomb group commanders. 6 squadron commanders of whom 4 are actual and 2 potential. 4 actual squadron operations officers and 1 actual group operations officer. Para B. The 30th bomb group now stationed in Hawaii could be converted and could supply the enlisted specialists listed for 1 group. Para C. No specialists available from Depot groups. Para D. If the 30th bomb group is selected for conversion its associated 71st service group could supply the enlisted specialists for 1 service group.
CONCENFOA TO CINC PAC FPEAL, INFO CINC PAC ADV, CGSEPE, CGSPAC.

RJ 60135. Operational project for LONFOM is subject. UrrI 190359 April directed initiation of procurement and assembly of equipment to meet 20 August target date. In order for this headquarters to properly meet the supply requirements for such a date project CP-42 and 67 should be approved by War Dept and approved bill of materials and requisitions be at the port by 1 May. Para. All possible preliminary action has been initiated at this Hqtrs. Following additional actions are required if target date is to be met: 1. Early concurrence by Cincpac in projects CP-42 and 67 in order that they may be forwarded to the War Dept. These projects were delivered to Cincpac on 10 April. Para. 2. Early approval of the operation by JCS. The War Dept has consistently refused to approve projects for operations which do not have JCS approval.

CONCENFOA TO CINC PAC FPEAL.

Your 230156. My reply to General MacArthur contained in my 210735 was as was as follows "Your 200740 cite G 1442. Consider O6 operation feasible without support of BPP. No units that fleet are required. Recommend Cincpac and Cominco be so informed. Cominco GNO 132020."

CINC PAC ADV TO COMIN CH.

On receipt your 132020 I send query to CINC WP a requesting his views. He in turn directed Com/thr/flt to answer. By 230156 requested advice from Kinkaid without delay. His answer contained in his 231322 which I an separately passing to you. Will CTF 57 continue to be assigned to operations with U.S. Pacific Fleet. Request early advice as they can be used advantageously.

CONSE VPAC (APO) TO CINCFOA BOTH INFO COM/SEPMACHAIN/PETOOL/PACGOST), ANPB, CONGENFOA, COMF/DAREA, CO MG/BN/COMC, CO/SEVAC, CO/SEFAC, COMTSPAC CINC PAC, CIN/HAREL, CIN/PMV/CDOV, ANPB, CTF 51, COM/1A.

ANPB 211752 not to all or needed indicates maximum possible bulk petroleum deliveries to F0A in May and June considerably below requirements. This will result in critically low inventories during latter part of June. On 1 July in entire F0A estimate will have on hand 27 days supply of diesel and 15 days supply each of N0Gas and AvGas.

CINC PAC ADV TO CINC PAC ADV INFO C OR S WAR DEPT FOR JCS.

CX 14702. To implement further the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 JCS directive 032410, April 1945, radio dispatch concurrence is requested in the following proposal: Para. That Cincpac release to CINCPAC operational control of Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, effective 1 May 1945. Para. To meet your requirements for the execution of the mission assigned to you by JCS to defend the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, the Comcen, GenPac Base Command, with the Army forces which you have previously approved as essential to the defense of HAWAI, would report to you for operational control. He will act as Task Force Commander for the execution of your orders governing the defense of HAWAI. Para. This proposed action will not change existing Joint Logistical Procedures in the FOA, now will it affect Cincpac’s operational control of other Army forces at present allocated to him. Para. This action is fundamental and is an essential prerequisite to the execution of JCS 1259/4.
PARA 1. My 170040 and 122310. Ground reconnaissance of TE SHIMA and of all but enemy held portion of OKINAWA has been completed. Sites have been located on OKINAWA and TE SHIMA for the air bases heretofore planned to be constructed on TE SHIMA OKINAWA and MIYAKO. They are in such locations that construction troops, equipment and supplies can be unloaded rapidly. Tentative sites have also been located for about 8 additional strips.

Para 2. Only 4 sites are in enemy hands. Progress on the southern end of OKINAWA is very slow. Strong naval air and gunfire support will be needed until the Japanese defense force is destroyed. The only prospects of speeding up the operation lie in the use of the 3rd Amphibious Corps either to rotate with Army Divisions in the existing line or to make an additional amphibious assault on the southern beaches. Para 3. With few exceptions all the amphibious forces and assault troops, construction troops and service troops now planned to be used in the capture development and defense of MIYAKO can now be used more advantageously in speeding up the capture and development of OKINAWA. So doing will give us a larger air base capacity and sooner than would the MIYAKO operation. Para 4. The concurrence of the JCS is requested in the cancellation of the MIYAKO Operation and the use on OKINAWA of all the resources heretofore intended for MIYAKO. Para 5. The occupation of KIRAI and possibly TOKUKO (ICEMBERG Phases 3D and E) can be deferred until summer. The availability of 1 or more air bases for short range aircraft north of OKINAWA will be necessary during OLYMPIC. Para 6. Because of other matters now pending which are affected by this decision request earliest possible concurrence. All the foregoing has been discussed with Spruance Turner Buckner and the senior Engineer Officers concerned and all are in concurrence.

24 1319 CINCPAC ADV HQ TO COMPHIBSPAC.

Direct Com3rdPhibFor initiate detailed planning amphibious phases operation LONGTOM and assume troops will consist of a Field Army including the 5th Amphibious Corps.

24 1501 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV, COM7THFLT.

In reaction to O-6 operation I anticipate probable attempt by operational heavy cruisers in SINGAPORE JAVA area to return to Empire. Timely deployment in SOUTH CHINA SEA Area should be made to provide for this possibility and to effect destruction before escape of Japanese units to Formosa Area. This can best be done by utilizing British Pacific Fleet in coordination with 7thFlt and shore based air in the PHILIPPINES and therefore under operational control of Kinkaid. Present operations of British Pacific Fleet should be so adjusted as to permit its operational availability either to the westward of LUCON or in BRUNEI BAY Area by the date of O-6 Operation. Para. 2. In the light of above desire further recommendations from addressees, Com7thFlt 231322 and Cinpac 232303 refers.
This is ConCrudiv 1 (CTG 50.1) OpPlan 1-45. Task Organization: TG 30.1 
Surface Striking Force Guam McCreesh. Para 1. CruDiv 1 plus any additional 
heavy units assigned. Para 2. This plan based on ConCrudiv CTF 30 OpPlan 2-45. Assumption: Enmy carrier TG is proceeding for diversary operations in EASTERN 
PACIFIC AREA and is unlocated. Own Forces: NorPac and HawSeafRon directed 
maintain barrier patrol along 180 Longitude from ALBATRONS to MIDWAY. 
WesSeaFron directed maintain search over sea approaches principal cities 
and installations West Coast of U.S. Western Striking Force directed 
intercept and destroy retiring enmy raiding forces. TG 30.5 (Air Striking 
Group) of Mid-Pacific Striking Force will conduct air search for and attac 
enemy units. TG 30.9 will provide replenishment services for TG 30. 
Para 2. This group will support air striking group and will attack enemy 
units with gunfire and torpedoes as directed. Para 3. SubPara A. Cruisers: 
Attack enemy with gunfire. Support destroyer attacks with gunfire. SubPara B: 
Destroyers: Attack enemy with gunfire and torpedoes as directed. SubPara X: 
This operation designated FIREBREAK. This plan effective only when directed. 
Maintain maximum practiciable readiness for extended operations pending 
placing this plan into effect. Rendezvous with units joining from other 
areas will be specified. CTF 30 cruising instructions and Battle Plan 
will be distributed at rendezvous. Para 4. Provision ammuniion and fuel 
to capacity prior departing present base. Replacements available PEARL 
and West Coast ports. Fuel at sea with TG 30.9. Para 5. Communications 
CentCom 2 and PAC 71. Zone time GCT. CTG 30.1 in RICHMOND.

Reference is made to your 210213 GCT of 21 April 45. Planning here for 
OLYMPIC is based on an assault force of 3 Corps consisting of 9 Divisions 
plus 1 Airborne Division with a follow up of 1 Corps and 4 Divisions. A 
Marine Corps of 3 Divisions (presumably the 3rd, 4th and 5th Marines) and 
corps troops to be in the assault. The 9th Corps consisting of the 31st, 
96th, 1 Div from BUNKHOUSE and Corps Troops mounted from present locations 
(ACCUMULATION, MANHOLE and BUNKHOUSE) will be in the follow up. The balance of 
the OLYMPIC Divisions to be mounted from EXCELSIOR with the 11th Airborne 
ostaging thru BUNKHOUSE.

CX 14803. Reference to CinCPac letter serial CCS5613 of 13 April 45 subject 
Naval Installations required for support of 1 Marine Amphibious Corps plus 
attacches if staged in the PHILIPPINES ISLANDS. As a result of the recent 
conference held in GUAM between representatives of this headquarters and 
CinCPac Headquarters it is understood that only 1 Division from POA will 
be staged in the PHILIPPINES (21st Div at LEFTT). Therefore the information 
requested by para 8 of referenced letter now appears unnecessary. Con 
firmation of this understanding is requested.

Your 250618 affirmative. Tentative plans involve rehabilitating 24th Corps 
and 1st MarDiv at OKINAWA. 6th MarDiv may possibly be rehabilitated OKINAWA 
otherwise at GUAM.
Para 1. Your CX 14702. Pursuant to the terms of executive order 9439 issued by the President, ComGenPOA is designated as the Military Commander for the Territory of HAWAII and has responsibilities power and authority which make it necessary that in this capacity ComGenPOA continue in his present relationship with CINCPAC in view of CINCPAC responsibilities with respect to the HAWAIIAN AREA. A copy of this Executive Order is being airmailed to you today. Para 2. The directive of the "Basic Logistical Plan for Command Areas Involving Joint Army and Navy Operations" signed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and by CominCh CNO and issued to me by the latter under date of 6 March 1943 has been fully complied with. Under that directive CINCPAC was "charged with control of and full responsibility for all logistical services within the area under his command" and it was directed that the logistical organization provide for "wherever possible supplying items or services common to both the Army and Navy by a single agency". The logistical organization within the POA established pursuant to the directive cited cannot be quickly changed without seriously impeding preparations for CINCPAC and other prescribed operations. Until the organization is changed extensively ComGenPOA will continue to have important logistical responsibilities to CINCPAC. Para 3. It is regretted that for the foregoing reasons I cannot concur in the proposal of your CX 14702. You are assured however that the continued responsibilities of ComGenPOA to CINCPAC will not be permitted by me to interfere unnecessarily with ComGenPOA's responsibilities to CINCPAC.

Para 4. Your CX 3089 April 20. Rehabilitation 3rdPhibCorps units will be as follows. (A) At LEGUMINOUS: 1st MarDiv and such attached units as previously scheduled to rehabilitate KAGAL plus camp facilities for 2500 battle replacements. Corps Artillery Btry (3rdPhibCorps). 4-155MM gun Bns, VMO 7, 1st Sep Eng Eng Bn. Approximate surplus facilities for above. (B) AT SAIPAN: 2nd MarDiv reinforced. (C) AT GUAM: 2ndPhibCorps. Corps troops (less Corps troops listed in (A) and (B) above), 6th MarDiv reinforced. Para. CINCPAC PEARL divert rear ech 1st MarDiv and other units now enroute KAGAL to LEGUMINOUS by shipping in which presently loaded if practicable. Modify 150813 modified accordingly. Para. Rear Ech's of Corps Artillery Btry (3rdPhibCorps) Corps Artillery Bns, VMO 7 and 1st Sep Eng En should be moved to LEGUMINOUS transshipping at GUAM if necessary. Para. 5th PhibCorps will probably rehabilitate on target after next operation except that 1 MarDiv of 5thPhibCorps may return to MARIANAS. Requirements for forward displacement of MFPAc units will be met without use of PHILIPPINES. CINCPAC has been so informed. Para. Displacement of administrative headquarters MF to area now assigned MF troops at GUAM about 1 July is authorized. Displacement of headquarters supply service MF not authorized at this time. Para. Above references not to all or needed.
Unless otherwise ordered, intend to proceed from LETTE on May 1st with TF 57 as required for future duty in operation ICEBERG. Para 2. Consider TF 57 can undertake a further period of from 3 to 4 weeks operations on a cycle of 2 days of strikes and 2 days of replenishment. Unless otherwise ordered I will resume strikes on SAKISHIMA GUNTO starting May 4th after exercising new aircrews and topping off in MOSQUITO BAY 3rd, subsequently replenishing in area COOTIE. Para 3. Subsequent operations of TF 57 are conditioned by logistical need at some period to undertake a major replenishment at intermediate and rear bases, and to allow time for intake of pilots to make good wastage. Para 4. Alternatives appear to be: (A) Return to LETTE for 1 week on conclusion of operating period given in Para 2. Top up and then continue operations for about 3 weeks. Thereafter carry out major replenishment being absent from operating area for a period which may amount to 2 months before all units are ready, as new air squadrons will need training. (B) Carry out major replenishment on conclusion of operating period given in Para 2 being away from operating area approximately 5 weeks. Para 5. I much prefer to aim for alternative (A) so as to give you all the assistance we can now in operation ICEBERG. Please advise CINCBPF which you prefer.

25 0230 COMGEN 10 to CINCPAC BOTH.

After reconnaissance of OKINAWA SHINTO with Capt. Painter I concur with radio report airbases from ComGen 10 to CINCPAC Adv dated 18 April, with info CINCSWA. A minimum of 22 runways can be constructed with estimated average 75 of our standard hardstands on each. There will be enough engineer troops arrive here on present schedule to develop approximately 60 percent of these airbases for minimum operational use in next 6 months. Construction of airfields will require large part of available effort. Location of many fields have been selected to meet their minimum requirements. This island has all requirements for a major air base. More engineer troops are required for any major expansion program. Am returning with full report.

25 1631 COMMON & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 240838. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in procedure recommended by the reference whereby forces and resources presently set up for MIYAKO are diverted to OKINAWA. MIYAKO operations should be deferred rather than cancelled as it may be found advantageous to conduct it at a later date.

26 0115 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC BOTH.

Cancel MyDis 122810, 160745 and 210042. Latter 2 dispatches not to all. Phase III-D ICEBERG will be deferred indefinitely. The JCS have concurred in the diversion of the resources heretofore intended for ADJUTANT to establish additional facilities on EKUMINOUS. Additional instructions including revised Joint Staff Study and base development directive to accomplish above will be issued by CinCPac. Existing studies and directives concerning Phase III-D and III-E remain in effect.
Your WARC 69495 DTC 131435 April. The current requirements of CINCPAC for heavy bombers are (A) 1 B-24 group based in MARINAS whose mission will be the continued neutralization of bypassed enemy air installations within range. This group may be at half strength. (B) 2 groups of B-24s based on OKINAWA. Since 2 groups are echeloned in to OKINAWA and will be at the peak of their operation during the months of September and October it is not considered feasible to disrupt their operation through conversion nor to withdraw specialists from them as their readiness and combat efficiency must be maintained.

26 1345 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCSWP.A, CONSFIELD.

Have conferred with Com7thFlt who states with CINCSWP.A's concurrence that the BRUNEI BAY operation can be carried on without the assistance of the EPF but British Carrier Force could be used to advantage in striking airfields in SW BORNEO. Para. With reference to your 241501 it is now indicated that HAGURO is only enemy cruiser operational in JAVA SINGAPORE region. Submarines and shore based air should be adequate to prevent her escape. Kinkaid concurs in this view. I consider that the greatest contribution of the British Carrier Force to the war against JAPAN in the near future will be in continued participation in ICEBERG at least until additional airfields are activated in JAVA and SHIMA about 5 May and recommend that TF 57 and TF 112 continue under the operational control of CINCPAC until that time. In view of current situation early advice is requested.

26 1442 GHQ SWPA (MACARTHUR) TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

C 14931. This is top secret. Reference your 251337 of 26 April. Phrase in question might better be expressed as 1 Corps of 3 Divisions plus 1 Divisions in Army Reserve.

(INFO)

26 1340 COMINCH & CHQ TO CINCPAC ADV AND PEARL/CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY.

Reference JCS 521/13 which is approved for planning to 31 December 1945. Para. Redeployment from EUROPE incident to VE Day will require employment in ATLANTIC of approximately 1/2 troop ships now in PACIFIC. Para. It will probably be necessary to assist in the redeployment in PACIFIC by utilizing combatant types as well as APA, AKA and other amphibious craft whenever any can be made available without detriment to operations or the build up for approved operations. Comment on advisability setting up a TF to plan and direct this. Redeployment points particularly to OLYMPIC and CORNET but plans must for the present consider that LONGSTOM or other encircling operations may take place.
Assembling 77th Div on OKINAWA after which it replaces 96th Div latter to rear area for rest. Plan following to complete Phase 1 (decision re: Phase 30 will have bearing). Remove 27th Div to Northern areas employ 3rdPhilCorps on right of 24th Corps using initially 1st MarDiv. Later as 27th Div takes over responsibilities 6th MarDiv release letter to 3rdPhilCorps. Details later when announcement re Phase 30 enables firm planning.

In view your 261345 BPF will not participate in BRUNEI operation and will continue under your operational control until further directive is issued. Fare. With regard to CTF 57 250437 desire information as to localities for accomplishment of major replenishment referred to.

Your 260644. The employment of the 41 Photo Recon Sqn in the forward area for staging thru JO JIMA is approved. An Army field on TINIAN will be used as a base instead of depot field GUAM. This does not preclude the employment this unit in LONGTOM.

The directive of JCS 032141 of April 1945 confines LONGTOM objectives to the eastern portion of STRATEGIC (KUROSHIO PENINSULA) and indicates the desirability of confining objectives to IMPROMPTU (CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO). The estimated operational requirements in your serial 000163 of 10 April are based on a more comprehensive concept and consequently exceed the requirements for the LONGTOM operation as it is being planned. However in view of the necessity for initiating preparations for OLYMPIC which will have much greater requirements your serial 000163 is concurred in for procurement planning.

Your 251507. In the present strategic situation it is necessary that the fast carriers and following them the escort carriers be released as soon as possible from their present employment in protecting and covering OKINAWA in order that they may be returned to port and prepared for further offensive employment accordingly it is desired that the fighter strength on shore in the RUOKUS be built up as rapidly as possible and that there be established also a sufficient number of search aircraft of types suitable for offensive reconnaissence in the vicinity of JAPAN. Subject to the foregoing and without interference there with it is desired that the aircraft available to us be used to inflict damage on the enemy and particularly on his shipping. Any suitable squadrons in TF 94 are available to you on request which should be made far enough in advance to minimize disruption of his arrangements.

Indications of impending Jap air attacks on bases in MARIANAS and WESTERN CAROLINAS possibly from TRUK or MARCUS. Take APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. Believe Japs are moving planes from Empire to TRUK via MARCUS.
2037. Para 1. Your 260742 and 260741 April refer. The current requirements of CinCPac for heavy bombers in the MARIANAS and OKINAWA, coupled with previously announced requirement for heavy bombers for air strikes in defense of HAWAII, militate availability of specialist personnel for conversion of B-24 Groups. Para 2. Fully concur in feasibility of withdrawing specialists from 2 Groups of B-24s committed to OKINAWA. The remaining heavy bomber group is the 30 Bomb Group which must now be utilized to meet your heavy bomber requirement in both HAWAII and the MARIANAS by maintaining 2 squadrons in each area. Para 3. With the view of maintaining combat efficiency of 30 Bomb Group and not impairing availability of 2 squadrons required in MARIANAS area, recommend disregarding my 210700 April and accepting this recomputed negative report in lieu thereof.

28 1045 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV.

C 15045. War Department has informed me that it has received request from CinCPac for information for planning purposes concerning availability of freight supply vessels coming from current production and availability of freight supply vessels now assigned to CINCPAC and directs quote in accordance with current JCS policy desire you coordinate this matter with CinCPAC direct and advise War Department of final action taken. Unquote.

29 0830 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO CINCPOA PEARL.

Your 261340. Assume that only AP will be employed in the ATLANTIC and that employment of combatant types to move troops in the PACIFIC will be on a "not to interfere with operations or firing efficiency" bases. Recommend that planning and operational control of assault shipping for redeployment of troops be a function of the Commander Amphibious forces Pacific Fleet since he must in any case coordinate use of same ships for extensive amphibious training, (initial and refresher) and their overhaul requirements as well. The availability of numerous group commanders and staffs will permit him to decentralize as practicable and keep his organization flexible to meet changing requirements. Use of combatant types when practicable can best be controlled by CinCPAC as heretofore.

29 1225 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA PEARL.

Desire Pearl Headquarters prepare as a matter of the utmost urgency a revised Base Development Plan for IE SHIMA and OKINAWA. The development should not exceed the total heretofore intended for IE SHIMA, OKINAWA and MIYAKO in any respect except for supplemental airfields for which sites will be reserved as indicated in my serial 005045. The process of formal directive to and formal recommendations from type commanders will be eliminated. The naval and air base development must be carried on with highest priority since the Naval Base must serve both OLYMPIC and CORONET and air base capacity must reach a maximum by 1 October. Para. This headquarters will furnish within 24 hours a list of garrison forces heretofore intended for MIYAKO and which are now to go to OKINAWA. Para. It is not desired to impose on ComGen Ten any responsibility for decisions concerning naval installations except where interservice coordination may be necessary. Para. As a matter of policy desire no use of Army engineers on naval projects without specific authorization by CinCPAC Adv Hq. Seabees will be used for heeds of projects essential to tactical defense naval projects projects of common interest and to full Army deficiencies in order named. Decisions as to location major projects must be cleared with CinCPac. This answers Pearl Hq Telememos 2936 and 2944.
Reference Cincpao Adv serial 291225 garrison forces combat heretofore intended for MIYAKO and which are now to be used at OKINAWA are as follows:

(A) AAA artillery, all now on OKINAWA, 2 firing Btrys AW, 1 Bn Gun SM type A, Btry C 294th Searchlight Bn (less 1 Plt), Hq & Hq Btry 230 Searchlight Bn.

(B) Army Air Force units, all WH: 2 Hq Bomb Wing, 8 Hq Bomb Gp, 24 Bomb Sq. 1 Photo Recon Sq. (C) Marine aviation: 1 Hq and Serv Sq MAG, 3 VMF Sq, 1 VMF(N) Sq, 1 VMTB Sq, 1 Marine Air Warming Sq in addition to 4 MAW's now on OKINAWA. (D) Naval Forces: All landing yard crafts and patrol craft listed for MIYAKO in my serial 0005038 of 14 April.

30 1332 CINCPOA ADV COMGENAAFPPOA INFO COMGEN ARMY AIR FORCES.

Your 2124 (300646) is in error. The airfield program for OKINAWA is not definite as to dates. The first strips for VLR are estimated to be ready 15 August and 15 September. These dates may be bettered or may be delayed depending on tactical developments.

30 1335 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COMINCH FOR JOINT SECURITY CONTROL.

Initiation of a deception plan to cover activities and movements of all Army and Marine Divisions rehabilitating and training in the Pacific Theater is considered by Cincpao as necessary to support an overall cover plan and to provide security for the employment of these divisions in coming operations. To obtain maximum assistance from this plan believe it should be begun immediately and involve forces of both Cincpac and CINCAFPAC. Believe cover for movement of divisions from EUROPE to PACIFIC should be considered and this operation made an integral part of proposed plan. Request your comment.

30 1338 CINCPOA ADV TO DEPCOM20THAF INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMINCH & CNO, COMGENPOA, CINC-SWPA.

In accordance with JCS directive 756/2 it is desired that liaison between Cincpao and DepCom20thAF be established in order that original negatives of mapping photography requested in my top secret letter 22 April serial 0005621 prior to their shipment may be made available to the mainland to the CO 64th Engineer Topographic now a part of my Advance Hdqtrs. Para. The CO of the 64th Engr. Topo Bn. is designated Liaison Officer between Cincpao and DepCom20thAF for purpose of providing means by which multiplex diapositives of 20th AF mapping photography may be reproduced and distributed for Cincpao's use.

30 0145 COMGENPOA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

RJ 60496. Service units for HYPOCRITE reserve were requested of War Dept by letter this headquarters file P0War CPA 320.2/353 subject: Troops Required for MARIANAS Reserves for HYPOCRITE, dated 5 April copies of which are being furnished all addees. References your serials 000351 of 19 March and 000400 of 5 April, copy of latter serial furnished CINCAFPAC by General Ruffner. Anticipate that the units will not be available.
30 1150 WEDEMeyer TO MACARTHER INFO MARSHALL, NIMITZ, CHENNAULT, WEART.

CFBX 36540. Air assistance to CHINA Theater from Pacific is subject. Japanese have been advancing westward in the YELLOW RIVER VALLEY and also from the vicinity of PAOCHING toward CHIHKIAN and KUEITANG. Their object apparently is to broaden their corridor of communications and space in preparation for successful offensive operations by CHINA Theater forces. Request that any communications concerning assistance that you might render in consonance with above be sent direct to CHINA Theater Headquarters, CHUNGKING. This theater can furnish necessary briefing data.

30 2255 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN20THAF INFO CINCPOA PEARL, DEFCOM20THAF, COMFWDAREA, COMGENPOA, COMINCH.

Your WARX DTG 281621. The original program for establishment of 4 VLR groups in the MARIANAS plus 8 additional if practicable has now been expanded to 21 although Army construction and service troops have not yet been furnished to support the 21. It is not feasible to deploy an additional 4 groups at TINIAN without undue interference with the support of other activities. However the 489th Group can be deployed making 22 groups in the MARIANAS. Para. Sites have been located at OKINAWA suitable for strips to accommodate 3 VLR wings. 4 of these strips are still under occasional enemy artillery fire and dates are not firm. It is estimated however that 2 groups can be received by 15 August and 2 by 15 September. Para. If OLYMPIC operation is ordered a general reexamination of types of aircraft to be based at OKINAWA may become advisable with increased emphasis on types suitable for attacks on enemy air forces and installations or for support of ground operations.

30 0144 CINCPOA ADV. TO COMGENAARPOA INFO COMGEN ARMY AIR FORCES.

My 301332 change 3rd sentence to read "The first 4 strips for VLR are estimated to be ready 15 August 1 September 15 September and 15 October".

01 0226 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENPOA INFO CINCAFPAC, CINCPEA.

Your 300145. The requests contained in my serials 000351 of 19 March and 000400 of 5 April are withdrawn and the 2 letters are cancelled. Assume CINCAFPAC or ComGenPOA will submit request for space and facilities needed in MARIANAS for support of Army units.

01 1600 MARSHALL TO MACARTHER INFO NIMITZ, RICHARDSON.

WARX 75413. ReURad 15140. This is a list of references: Subpara A - Rad WAR 62773 (Directive), Subpara B - Rad 160252 CINCPOA to ComGenPOA. Subpara C - Rad R59835 ComGenPOA to CINCSWPA. Para. In accordance with the references all Army forces and resources previously assigned to the POA assumed the status of assigned to CINCAFPAC at the time ComGenPOA reported to CINCAFPAC for purposes of administration. From that time, CINCAFPAC has had administrative control of all Army forces and resources in the POA. In exercising this control CINCAFPAC has command authority over the movement or use of these Army forces and resources except for elements under operational control of CINCPOA and CO, 20th AF. All Army forces and resources to be moved to the Pacific henceforward will be assigned to CINCAFPAC exclusive of 20th AF units and ICEBERG exceptions noted in para B of his 15140. Para. Effective at the earliest practicable date, all correspondence pertaining to the above will be directed to CINCAFPAC, except for such as he may specifically request be directed to one of his subordinate commands.
29 2121 COM3RDFFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COM5THFFLT.

As verbally directed request is made for assignment of MISSOURI as Com3rdFlt's flagship. Further request MISSOURI be at GUAM 18 May to receive Com3rdFlt and staff. Subject to Cinpac's current orders and approval will proceed in MISSOURI with suitable escort to OKINAWA or port where Com5thFlt may be and at time mutually agreed upon will relieve Spruance and assume command of designated forces.

29 1149 GHQ SWPA TO C OF S WAR DEPT - PASSED BY COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV FOR INFO.

15140. In order to properly carry out the provisions of paragraph 3 JCS directive WX 62773 3 April especially the part which reads as follows "CINCPAC will be responsible for the provisions of Army resources to meet the requirements for operations in the Pacific directed by the JCS" it is requested that effective 1 May the following be assigned to CINCPAC as Commander U. S. Army Forces in the Pacific and that all correspondence pertaining thereto be directed to this headquarters. The above requests are exclusive of Southeast Pacific Area and Alaskan Department. (A) All troops projected in the 16th troops list for SWPA and FOA and all troops to be redeployed from U.S., ETO and MTO. (B) All U.S. Army resources equipment and supplies arriving in the Pacific theater exclusive of those now approved for ICEBERG and normal maintenance. Para. Upon arrival of the foregoing requests instructions will be issued to Richardson.

01 0525 CINCPOA ADV TO COMFWDAREA INFO COM5THFFLT, CTG99.2, ISCOM TWO, COMGENAAPPoa, COMAIR TWO, ISCOM IE SHIMA.

Take necessary action to move ground echelon of 1 P-61 night fighter squadron to be designated by ComGenAAPPoa from TWO JIMA to IE SHIMA at earliest practicable. Flight echelon to follow when ground echelon established ashore and when called forward by CTG 99.2.

02 0012 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFFLT INFO COMINCH, COM5THFFLT.

The requirements of subparagraphs 1B and 1D of my serial 0005034 of 31 March are considered completed. It is understood that a study pursuant to IC will be submitted shortly which will complete compliance with that subpara. Subpara 1A remains in effect.

02 0213 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COMINCH.

Propose implement BLUEBIRD with further communication deception designed to create impression increasing radio linkages between Army and Navy forces in Central Pacific, Southwest Pacific and those in CHINA. If CINCSWPA concurs following plan and Joint Security Control approves, propose that appropriate directives be issued to commands concerned and Joint Security Control coordinate activities not under CINCPAC or CINCPAC.

1) Scrutinize bona fide radio traffic readily susceptible enemy intercept to identify each message linking Army and Navy commands in Central and Southwest Pacific Areas with those in CHINA.

2) Insure gradual increase in number of such messages and their average precedence, with normal variations, until 10 days after target date for LONGTOM or OLYMPIC whichever is later. Thereafter taper off rapidly without introducing conspicuous circuit changes.

3) Prevent radical decrease volume or precedence all circuits involving CHUNGKING, KUNMING and HOCHWAH.
(4) Maintain high volume Letye and Manus foxes unless inordinate quantity dummy traffic required.
(5) Fully exploit bona fide traffic contributing to desired picture originating only when necessary. Navy will comply AlPac 56-45 in preparation of dummies.
(6) For Navy traffic communication security units will arrange details volume precedence crypto systems call signs and methods of transmission, and for communications between units will use CSPS 2561, 2206, 2617, 4044-5-6 according Cominch Conf 04216 of 25 December.
(7) Maintain cover major fleet units and assault forces while at staging bases as straight security measure and to disguise departures, plus such short term tactical deception as TF commanders require.
(8) Above proposals made with understanding that plan can be terminated whenever CINCSWPA CINCPAC and Joint Security Control decide that it has served its purpose or that it interferes unduly with normal communications. Request CINCSWPA advise.

02 0917 DEFCOM2OTHAF TO CINCPAC ADV.

2199. Paraphrase of ComAF20 Telecon message H01013-CH date time group 011242 May is passed in part for your information. Your top secret radio 2124, DTG 30064 April is reference. Decision has been made to deploy 316th Wing at OKINAWA, viewing field availability dates OKINAWA specified in part 1A and readiness dates of 316th Wing units here.

02 0022 CINCPAC ADV TO CMGEN WPBC INFO COMFWDAREA, COMGENPOA.

Your 010351 which refers to "Marine stocks this base" not understood unless the dispatch was originated in your capacity as Island Commander SAIPAN. Request clarification.

03 0119 CINCPAC ADV TO COM1STCARTF, COM2NDCARTF INFO COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT.

Desire Com2ndCarTaskFor hoist flag in BENNINGTON, SHANGRI LA or other carrier designated by CTF 58 as soon as practicable after 18 May. It is my present intention to direct Com2ndCarTaskFor to assume command of the Fast Carrier Task Forces shortly after Com3rdFlt assumes Com5thFlt. Until so directed Com2ndCarTaskFor is available to CTF 58 as a TG commander but his assignment as such is not required.

03 0121 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO COMINCH.

It appears possible that Japanese aircraft are being moved northward either for storage and or training out of VLR range and clear of carrier strikes or for purposes connected with hostilities with RUSSIA. Prior departure PEARL obtain all available data from JICPOA and give consideration to problems involved in a carrier attack against installations in HOKKAIDO, OMINATO and Northern HONSHU for the purpose of destroying air forces and shipping, diverting forces from OKINAWA and general strategic deception. Will confer with you connection this operation at our next meeting.

03 0352 RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC INFO CG WPBC, WAR DEPT, CINCPAC BOTH.

In view Cincpac Guam 010226 May and provisions WARX 75413 May 1 not to all nor needed, unless otherwise directed by CINCAPAC no further action being taken by ComGenPOA to establish with War Dept requirements for troops and supplies necessary to build up HYPOCRITE reserve in MARIANAS. All info addees be guided accordingly. Para. Copy of troop list required to establish HYPOCRITE Reserve and submitted War Dept 7 Apr being forward CINCPAC courier air for information.
Continued

Your 021829. MySer 0005045 of 26 April contains latest estimate air base capacity LEGUMINOUS and INDISPENSABLE. MySer 0005038 of 14 April and 0005625 of 22 April for ADJOURN and FRICTION. Summary follows: LEGUMINOUS and INDISPENSABLE. Army: 3 VF Groups, 2 VBM Groups, 2 VBH Groups, 3 VLR Wings, 1 TC Group less 2 Sqs, 1 Photo Recon Sq, Marine: 4 VMF Gyps, 1 VMF(N) Group, 1 VMTB Group, 1 VMD Sq. Navy: 4 VBM (HL) Sqs, 2 VBM (ML) Sqs. 1 VM Sq. Also following units contingent on assignment of additional construction troops and air force units. Army: 2 VBM Tps. 5 VBH Groups, 2 TC Sqs. Marine: 1 VMB Group. 2 VMB Sqs. These Marine VMB and VMR will be available if LONGFON is not ordered. Para. ADJOURN. Marine: 2 VMF Groups, 1 VMF(N) Sq. 1 VMB Group. 1 VMTB Sq, of which 1 VMF Group 1 VMF(N) Sq and 1 VMTB Sq will be redeployed from LEGUMINOUS. Para. FRICTION: Army: 3 VF Groups, 2 VF(N) Sqs. Marine: 1 VMTB Sq. Which will be redeployed from LEGUMINOUS.

(041523) 03 1355 CG TAF 10th ARMY TO COMGEN TEN INFO COM5THFLT, CTF51, ISCOM LEGUMINOUS, ISCOM INDISPENSABLE - Later passed for info to CINCPAO ADV Hq.

See 280509 from IsCom INDISPENSABLE TO CTF 51, 21. Believe dates this dispatch need revision and further evaluation as to early augmentation effective fighter strength this area. See Cinepoa Adv 170597. Thorough inspection today of IE SHIMA airfield activities by CTF 99, 21 and representatives of TAF. After consultation these people with IsCom INDISPENSABLE, 12 May estimated earliest date airfield operable for use VF Group with 111 aircraft. Too early yet to determine when additional Group can operate. Attention invited Cinepoa Pearl 295126 to CINThArmy. This dispatch specifies width of runway and shoulders which must be attained if we are to operate effectively as follows: (A) From 1 strip 111 VF of 318 Fighter Group, 15 2 engine night fighter aircraft of P61 squadron, and 22 F-5 of 28th PhotoReconSquadron.

- Continued -
(B) From 2nd strip 96 VMF of MAG 22, 24 VMTB of 131 Sqdn and 15 VMF(N) of 533 Sqdn. Do not overlook taxiways and hardstands for this number aircraft, situated so that both groups can operate effectively. Looks like more aviation engineer or SeaBee strength is needed in SHIMA immediately to achieve needed airfields reconstruction and attain necessary road construction. Following dispatches apply: (A) CinCPOA Adv to Com5thFlt 270431. (B) Com5thFlt 271233 and other 5thFlt requests to move in VF and VF(N) ground echelons.

05 0505 CINCPOA ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO CTF 51, CTF 56.

Request information your prospective needs for 2nd MarDiv reinforced. Shipping now being held for entire division. Desire unload and release any elements not needed for Phases 1 and 2 ICEBERG including KUME if its occupation deemed essential to security OKINAWA.

05 1116 GHQ SWPA TO CG USAF CHINA INFO AGWAR, CINCPOA ADV, CG USAF CHINA APO 627(RECK), CG 14TH AF, COMMANDER ALLIED AIR FORCES MANILA.

CX 15548, SWPA air forces are prepared to initiate limited operations against enemy lines of communications and installations indicated in your radio CFRX 36540. Unless CHINA base facilities are available operations can be conducted only with heavy bombers. Intensity and frequency of attacks will depend on weather and range factors, availability or non availability of refueling facilities in CHINA and forces available considering commitments for planned operations. Para. Before initiating attacks, request representative your hdqtrs visit this hdqtrs to discuss details of missions, friendly and enemy dispositions, pertinent intelligence information, communications problems, base facilities and friendly fields in CHINA available for SWPA aircraft, and problems of coordination.

05 1250 CINCPOA ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO COM3RDFLT, CTF 51, COMINPAC.

As soon as operational requirements permit form TF under ComMinPac to clear minefields in EAST CHINA SEA preparatory to OLYMPIC and LONGTOM and with priorities such as to provide sea room first for the fast carrier and escort carrier operations common to both OLYMPIC and LONGTOM.

05 2009 COMAF 20 TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COMINCH, CINCPOA PEARL, DEPCOMAF20, COBOMCOM21, COMGENPOA, COMAPPAC, COMGENAAFPPOA ADMIN.

WARX 77765. References WARX DTG 281627 CinCPOA Adv 302255 and CinCPOA Adv 020021. Para. In view of the field availability dates established in CinCPOA's 302255 as amended by 020021 it is our plan to deploy 316th Wing to OKINAWA 2 groups to meet field availability date 15 August the remaining 2 groups to meet field availability date 1st September providing location of strips is such as to permit maintaining unit integrity of 316th Wing. Para 2. Our present plan for conversion of units in US will permit the following readiness dates in the theater:

A. The 489th Group can meet readiness date in the Theater of 1 Sept.
B. 1 other converted group to have readiness date in the Theater of 1 October.
C. 2 converted groups readiness in the theater 1 November. This completes the 2nd Wing for OKINAWA.

- Continued -
05 2009   CINCPA 20 to CINCPOA, INFO COMINCH, CINCPOA PEARL, ETC. (CONT'D)

D. 2 groups in the Theater by 1 Dec, and 2 groups in the Theater by 1 January completes the 3rd Wing for OKINAWA. Your messages indicate field availability dates that will be adequate to permit the above schedule.

Para 3. Army Air Force ultimate deployment of VHB Groups is now set at 40. Tentative deployment schedules after 1 January are as follows:

1 Wing in Theater Feb. 1st and last Wing in Theater Mar. 1st.

06 0321   CINCPOA ADV TO CGloth ARMY, COM3RDPLT, COMGENPOA, COMTHPHIBCOR, COMSERVPAC, COMGNAAPFOA, COMGENFMFPAC, COMAIRPC, COMTHSPAC INFO COMSOFAC, CTF93, COMNDAREA, CTF95, COMINCH & CNO, COMNORPC, CINCSWPA, MARCORPS, CGSUSERPVMFPAC, COM7THFLT, COM5THFLT, COMGENAIRFMFPAC, COMDET10, COMGEN24THCORPS, CG3RDPHIBCORPS, CINCPA PEARL, CINCPAC.

Warning Order. Initiate preparations for Phase 3(D) ICEBERG with target date (F-Day) for FRICION on 15 July. Operation will be commanded by Adm. W.F. Halsey with V.Adm. H. W. Hill commanding Joint Expeditionary Forces and Lt.Gen. S.B. Buckner commanding Expeditionary Troops. Assault troops for operation will be 1 Div Rein designated by ComGen Expeditionary Troops from the troops under his command. Garrison ground troops will consist of following Army units: Initially 1 RCT to be designated from assault div. 745th AAA Gun Bn (BIAK), 497th AAA Gun Bn (FINSCHAFEN), 104th AAA AW Bn (HOLLANDIA), 945th AAA AW Bn (FINSCHAFEN), 250th S/L Bn (less 1 Btry) (FINSCHAFEN), 198th HQ/Hq Btry AAA Gp (LEYTE), 33rd Hq & Hq Btry AAA Gp (BIAK), 178th CA Bn (GUAM), 1 MF Co. Garrison air forces, 1 Hq Fighter Wing (Army), 3 Groups VF (Army), 2 Sqdns VF(N) (Army).

1 Sqdn VMTB, 1 MAW Sqdn. Supporting troops in accordance CINCPA revised Staff Study serial 0005038 April 14 and 0005625 April 22. Type commanders designate by dispatch other garrison troops not designated above (including aviation, engineer, defense and service units) indicating mounting points. Designation of units insofar as known now should be made by dispatch at the earliest. Designation of others should be made by dispatch as soon as known. ComServPac designate naval officer as Commander Naval Activities. In view of deferment indefinitely of Phase 3(C) ComGenPOA requested to renominate Air Corps General Officer for duty as IsCom FRICION. ComGenPOA also nominate Air Corps officer as Air Defense Commander, FRICION.

06 1520   COMINCH & CNO TO COM7THFLT INFO CINCPAC ADV, COMAFPC.

NETHERLANDS authorities have requested that HMNS TROMP (now on EAST INDIES station) be attached temporarily to 7thFlt for participation in BORNEO operations. Admiralty concurs. Please obtain concurrence CINCSWPA and advise him of my desire to approve request.
05 1120 GHQ SWPA (MACARTHUR) TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CAMP, TOLOSA, COMDR AAF MANILA, CG USAF CHINA APO 379, CG 14TH AF.

CX 15549. 14th AF has discontinued mining operations in the SHANGHAI Area end of April. Consider desirable that these mining operations continue. SWPA RAAF Squadrons are available to continue mission if tender based facilities can be provided by CINCPAC in the OKINAWA Area. Request your comments. If affirmative suggest direct communication CINCPAC to 7th Flt to arrange details.

06 0605 CTF 51 TO COM5THFLT INFO CINCPOA ADV, COMINPAC.

Cinpcac Adv 051250. It is stated that as soon as OKINAWA is captured sufficient minesweepers can be released to commence extensive minesweeping operations. In interim preparation is being made by giving preference to minesweeping types for overhaul repair upkeep and rehabilitation. Para.

All escort types in TF 51 except those recently assigned have had extensive gruelling service and require upkeep repair and a rest. I am trying to accomplish this by decrease in screen locally to minimum safety limit, augmentation of repair facilities, installation of shore based radars, acceleration of development of airfields so carriers may be released and thereby their escorts, rotation of escorts insofar as practicable to rear areas however this excluded to a large degree for DDs because of great need for that type locally for gunfire radar pickets and support. Para. Recommend expediting moving forward for duty in TF 51 all available minesweepers escorts of each type and early action on my recommendations for increase in repair facilities to the end of expediting overall readiness for future operations of minesweepers NOTLYD types of escorts. Para.

In order that necessary minesweeping operations may proceed as required GX recommend following measures be taken:

A. Submarines equipped with special mine location device examine prospective routes and areas of operation.
B. Regular search planes EAST CHINA SEA have 1 or 2 experienced minesweeping observers embarked.
C. Special search planes with experienced minesweeping observers examine suspected areas and located minefields to determine definitely existence extent and characteristics.

As light and sea conditions have considerable influence on ability to locate fields several examinations or areas should be made. Consider photographs taken downwind in choppy sea with light at operators back might be useful.

07 0528 (PROBABLY COM5THFLT) TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51, COM3RFILT, COMINPAC.

Minesweeping requirements in EAST CHINA SEA for LONGTOM and OLYMPIC appear largely arithmetical. Your 051250. Distance between 2 objectives is about 400 miles. Carriers supporting an amphibious objective normally operate in area within 200 miles of it. For LONGTOM plan to sweep mined areas whose approximate centers are given:

A. Lat 25-10 Long 126-00. Comment. This area should be cleared in any case as it will be menace during typhoon season also is needed as support area for B.
B. Lat 27-10 Long 125-00.
C. Lat 30-20 Long 123-45 starting from south end.

In addition check sweeps must be made to insure that channels presumed

- Continued -
Col MinPac has OpPlan for foregoing. For OLYMPIC approaches except in its immediate proximity are non-mineable. Sea room for carrier operations is also available in deep water. No minesweeping can be done within 200 miles of objective under present conditions of enemy air strength. This would have to follow amphibious operation rather than precede. For OLYMPIC believe present enemy defensive minefields in EAST CHINA SEA should be left intact as Jap sea traffic is channeled and easier prey for our air strikes mines and submarines. Concur in desirability of forming task force under CoMinPac as soon as local situation permits. See Turner's 060605.

Requests for photography of DIABOLIC (KYUSHU), made in UrDis top-sec 050432, will be considered priority 1 and integrated with my mapping and reconnaissance photographic requirements as outlined in my Top-Sec ltrs serial 000127 of 23 Jan 1945 and 000157 of 31 Jan 1945.

CTF 51 Top-Secret serial 000201 of 30 April to which originator's agree with slight modifications is now in process of being carried out by CTF 56 for parts not requiring higher approval as follows:
A. AWS and FD stations take BANARI and adjacent islands now being set up and 1 at SETAKE SAKI will be set up if further study indicates desirability.
B. KOBE SHIMA being reconnoitered and if conditions found favorable station of ZAMAMI will be moved there. If not favorable station on NAGAANU will be moved to ZAMAMI to improve coverage.
C. Station IE SHIMA not entirely satisfactory and will be improved. Following steps which require approval of higher authority are recommended:
D. About 12 May dependent on enemy and weather seize DORI SHIMA establish AWS, FD and minor defensive position.
E. As soon as possible probably about 20 May and employing 1 RCT of 3rd MarDiv in succession seize AGUNI SHIMA and THEKU SHIMA establish warning service FD and defenses consisting reinforced company on AGUNI and reinforced battalion on THEKU temporarily formed from assault forces. Capture would be made by troops embarked in landing craft and supply kept up by same means.
F. No earlier than 30 days after completion capture OKINAWA employ 1 Div now OKINAWA TO capture KUME SHIMA develop it for both defensive and offensive purposes. Para.

We consider this expenditure of effort will prove economical and effective in long run, Para.

Request immediate approval step D and approval E and F when practicable. 3112
This is CTF 51 & CTF 56 Joint Top Secret Despatch replying to your 052314 and Cincpoa 050505. Reference is also made to CTF 51 Top Sec Ser 000201 of 30 April to which both originators agree with certain modifications as treated in a separate dispatch. Also reference is Cincpoa 060821 Warning Order for Phase 3(D). Para.

Recommendations are:

A. 2nd MarDiv is not required for capture of OKINAWA and if brought forward would complicate problems of supply, training, and space assignment. CTF 56 has designated 2nd MarDiv for Phase 3(D) see ComGen 10 071053. Recommend it be completely debarked at SAIPAN and shipping in which embarked be released to Cincpoa.

B. This recommendation made on assumption 31st Army Division not available for Phase 3(D).

C. While occupation KUME cannot be deemed essential to security of OKINAWA its possession and development would add greatly to OKINAWA security, to success of naval operations in CHINA SEA, and to neutralization of FORMOSA and SAKISHIMA GUNTO. Its capture will require 1 division. The necessary troops can be supplied from 10th Army on OKINAWA after capture of OKINAWA has been completed and this course is recommended not earlier than 30 days after OKINAWA secure. If KUME must be captured in advance of that time consider 2nd MarDiv only force now available and therefore other troops to be reassigned 10th Army would be required for Phase 3(D).

See Cincpoa 060821. Interpret Warning Order requires Army Div as assault troops. Prior to OKINAWA operation Army Div participated in campaigns which resulted their embarking ICEBERG tired and understrength. All will come out of this fight considerably depleted in personnel and equipment. Target date may not permit rehabilitation and rebuilding proper strength. If future operation permit use 2 MarDiv and 3rd recommend its employment since it is fresh from rest of about year. Shipping available and with minor adjustments unit will be ready promptly to meet target date. Army garrison RCT to be sent from OKINAWA when FRICION secure.

ComGen 10 071507. By 060821. Not intended to require an Army Div as assault troops for 3(D) since 1st 2nd and 6th MarDivs are under operational control ComGen Ten. Am prepared to approve Joint recommendation of CTF 51 & 56 071230 if you concur. The capture of KUME is not approved if a full division is required.

Understand from CHQ SWPA that 14th AF is discontinuing mining operations SHANGHAI Area end of April. Request your concurrence in continuation of this program on approximately same scale by naval air forces from OKINAWA.

It now appears that transfer of troopships from the PACIFIC THEATER to the ATLANTIC in connection with redeployment as discussed in JCS 521/13 will be required at an early date and preparations should be made accordingly. The War Department is similarly informing CINCSWPA.
Your CX 15549. Concur as to desirability mining SHANGHAI. It is not desired however to employ units of the RAAF in the POA particularly when use of U.S. seaplane tenders would be required. If you find the total number of patrol planes available in the SWPA is in excess of your requirements would appreciate information as to the number and types of U.S. naval search squadrons which can be released for operations in the Central Pacific. If ComGen USAF CHINA concurs am prepared to continue mining SHANGHAI Area with U.S. Naval aircraft. See my 080901.

Adviseme about situation regarding movement of Japanese combat air via MARCUS to TRUK presumably headed for ULITHI and what steps are being taken to control it.

Your 090040. ROT from 3rd MarDiv is desired for capture of AGUNI and IHEYI. Originally it had been decided to ask for 1 RCT from 2nd MarDiv but the necessity for designating 2nd MarDiv for Phase 3(D) made this use of a 2nd MarDiv RCT inadvisable. Para.

It may be recalled that 1 of the 3rd MarDiv's RCTs was not used at IWO JIMA. Para.

Consider the occupation of AGUNI and IHEYI in near future and before completion capture OKINAWA is important with relation to protection our operations and reduction losses of picket vessels. ComGen 10 is averse to withdrawing 1 RCT from troops present for capture these 2 islands and CTF 51 concurs.

Request your views on general subject ComNavGroup CHINA 080510 and 081510 with reference to all points on CHINA Coast northeast of Longitude 110 E.

The 3rd Marine Division is not available for ICEBERG. CTF 51 090330. Elements of the 2nd MarDiv should be used for the capture of AGUNI and IHEYI.

Your 082014. ComFwdArea SOPA ULITHI and all Island Commanders concerned were informed in my 270433 as follows "indications of impending Jap air attacks on bases in MARIANAS and Western CAROLINES possibly from TRUK or MARCUS. Take appropriate precautionary measures. Believe Japs are moving planes from Empire to TRUK via MARCUS". At 300100(-9) the JALLAO (SS 368) arrived on station off MARCUS as lifeguard and was directed to advise of any enemy air movements observed. The following sorties have been made against MARCUS.


No enemy planes sighted until JALLAO despatch 080833 which reported 6 large unidentified planes landed MARCUS 080630. This report was broadcast to all interested commands. Strikes on 9th consisted of B24s and PB4Ys which have reported destroying 2 Betty and strafing 4 Betty on ground. Attacks still in progress. Para (Cont'd).
09 0808 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO. (CONTINUED)

The following sorties have been made against TRUK: 28th - 24 B24, 20 P47
1 PB4Y, 30th - 4 PV B24, 20 P47, 1st - 21 B24, 2nd 21 B24, 3rd - 19 B24
1 PB4Y, 4th - 1 PB4Y, 6th - 18 P47, 7th 16 P47, 8th 12 B24 1 PB4Y. During this period 1 Emily has been destroyed. Believe approximately 9 operational planes at TRUK of which estimate 3 or 4 floatplanes 3 or 4 Zekes and 1 or 2 reconnaissance. Para.

Since rotation of fast carrier groups commenced at ULITHI on 30 April 4 radar picket destroyers have been maintained at sea outside Atoll. On 28 April 1 Myrt was destroyed while approaching ULITHI at 23000 feet by shorebased Marine Corsairs.

09 0817 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC, COMGENPOA.

My 060816 and 060821. Suggest consideration be given to assignment 24th Infantry as garrison for FRICITION as preferable to using an FCT from an amphibiously trained InfDiv.

09 1526 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV, COMGENPOA INFO AFWAR, CGUSASOS, CG6THARMY, CG8THARMY.

C 15861. It is requested that effective immediately all matters involving the requisitioning, movement, use or disposition of troop units and resources now in or destined for the Pacific, exclusive of 20thAF units and units approved for ICEBERG, whether operational or as a result of V-E Day redeployment including troop units now set up on the 6 months list, be submitted to this headquarters for approval prior to the taking of any other action. Insofar as is consistent with the foregoing it is contemplated that present administrative procedures will remain undisturbed for the time being except as may hereafter be directed. Para.

In this connection it is requested that your recommendations for the priority of movement and destinations of U. S. Army troops heretofore set up for the Pacific Area and now assigned to CINCPAC either from the U.S. or elsewhere in the July and subsequent monthly quote Joint Priority Shipping Lists for Personnel Movements unquote be forwarded to this headquarters not later than 33 days prior to the month during which they are desired shipped in order that such recommendations may be integrated into or coordinated with the similar list prepared by this headquarters.

08 1322 COMSTHFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 51, CTF 56.

Your 050505 and 080233. If REJOINT Phase 3D ICEBERG is to be executed best use for 2nd MarDiv appears to be this operation. ComGen 10 071153. CTF 51 CTF 56 071230. I still believe Phase 3D unnecessary and unprofitable and would prefer to see 2nd MarDiv used to take KUME and other outlying positions around OKINAWA required for radar defense (CTF 51 CTF 56 071225) and to assist if necessary in expediting capture of OKINAWA itself.

09 0830 WEDEMEYER TO NIMITZ, MACARTHUR, CHENNAULT INFO COMSTHFLT, COMSTHFLT.

CFBX 37072. Ref CFBX 36540 of 3 April. Observe your message 080901 operations SHANGHAI Area. Arrangements made for conference of representatives this Hq with ComGenSWPA at MANILA on 13 May relative to operations of air forces under MacArthur's control against targets in Southeast CHINA. Suggest you have representative present for coordination of plans including POA mining or other air operations against CHINA Theater targets. At present Allied Air Forces are conducting mining operations in SHANGHAI Area.
CX 15360. For planning purposes for OLYMPIC, the following principal units will be utilized: 5th Amphibious Corps (3rd, 4th, 5th Mar Divs) to be mounted from present location; 9th Corps (81st, 93rd and 1st Div from BUNKHOUSE to be designated by ComGenPOA) to be mounted from present locations except 9th Corps Hqtrs and Corps troops; 14th and 11th Corps (1st Cavalry, American 25th, 33rd, 40th, 41st, 43rd and the 11th Airborne Divisions) to be mounted from WHITENASH (LUZON) or INTEGER (VISAYAS) as now located. Para.

6th Army will be responsible for the equipment and mounting of the 14th and 11th Corps and the 81st and 11th Airborne Divisions. ComGenPOA will be responsible for the equipment and mounting of the 9th Corps less Corps Hqtrs and Corps troops and 81st Div. ComGenPOA advise this Hq earliest practicable date division designated from BUNKHOUSE. ComGenPOA investigate practicability immediate movement 9th Corps Hq with such of the Corps troops as are now present MANHOLE to ACCUMULATION; advise this Hq and Cincpac Logistics of movement. Cincpac requested to advise, upon receipt of information, whether 9th Corps Hq and troops can be lifted to ACCUMULATION with shipping under his control with approximate date.

10 0114 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN CHINA INFO CINCSWPA COM7THFLT.

Your 090330. Not feasible have representative at MANILA 13 May but expect to have adequate representation there about 15th. Com7thFlt requested arrange representation for me in preliminary conferences.

10 0121 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

CinCBPF 080111. Recommend action be taken which will permit CINCBPF to deal direct with Australian authorities concerning local affairs in Australia as matters internal to the British Commonwealth. Present procedures in which requests from CinCBPF concerning such matters come to me in GUAM and must then be cleared with CINCSWPA in MANILA seem unnecessarily devious since I have no authority in the matter and can only lend my good offices in an ineffectual manner.

10 0147 CINCPAC ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO COMFAIRWING ONE, COMSUBPAC.

If it is desired to use VPB 109 and similar squadrons for SWOD strikes outside enemy harbors reclassification of areas in EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS will be required to permit freedom of action for aircraft without endangering own submarines. Following measures can be put into effect immediately if you desire:

(A) TSUSHIMA STRAITS north of line running 135 degrees true through KO SAKI at south tip of TSUSHIMA can be made blind bombing zone. In June when submarines commence operations therein north part of TSUSHIMA STRAIT may revert to sub patrol zone.

(B) Refer addendum 8 to SOP-1. Areas 124, 111, and 112 north of 27 N can be classified as blind bombing zones from 2000 to 0600 each night reverting to submarine patrol zones each day to permit life-guard rescues during daylight. Early comment desired.

10 0412 CINCPAC ADV TO ATCOM ULITHI,COM5THFLT,COMSERONLO,CTF58,CTG58.1 Info COMFAIRWING AREA.

Indications air attack on ULITHI may be imminent. Source of planes may be similar to 12 March attack. CTF 58 attack MINAMI DAITO SHIMA if practicable.
10 0706 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL.

Cancel Cincpoa serial 30663. Issue instructions holding in abeyance compliance Cincpoa serial 000490. Hereafter refer to this headquarters all matters of basic policy particularly those which involve inter service relationships.

09 0925 GHQ SWPA TO CINCPAC PEARL INFO CINCPAC ADV, CNO

CX 15815. Your 022118Z. You may assume for planning purposes if OLYMPIC is not executed that LPS boats will be available for use in LONITOM Operation. There is only 1 FS type reefer boat in the allocations to both Army and Navy in SWPA. Therefore the 1/4 reefers included in your request will not be available.

10 0708 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH

Your 081549. Following ships sunk in OKINAWA Operation between 13 March and 10 May. DD: HALLIGAN (DD 584) 26 March, HUSH (DD 529) 6 April, COLOMBO (DD 801) 6 April, N.L. ABELE (DD 733) 12 April, PRINGLE (DD 477) 16 April, LITTLE (DD 803) 3 May, LUCY (DD 522) 4 May, MORRISON (DD 560) 4 May. Total 8 DD sunk. No BB, CA, CL, CV, CVL, or CVE sunk to date. Following ships are now non-operational as result of damage received in OKINAWA Operation during period 18 March to 10 May. BB: NEVADA (BB 36) RF5 at PEARL 4 June; MARYLAND (BB 46) now at NYPS for repairs and normal overhaul; IDAHO (BB 42) RPS at GUAM 14 May; TENNESSEE (BB 43) and WEST VIRGINIA (BB 48) have sustained some damage and are being repaired in ULLATHI, RPS approximately 20 May. CA: INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) returned west coast for repairs estimated completion 30 June; PENSACOLA (CA 24) sustained slight damage and was returned west coast for scheduled overhaul. CL: HILLOX (CL 80) sustained slight damage and returned west coast for normal overhaul; BIRMINGHAM (CL 62) being docked GUAM, may be sent to PEARL for repairs. CV: INTREPID (CV 11); HANCOCK (CV 19) sustained damage and have been returned rear area. CVE: WAKE ISLAND (CVE 65) RPS GUAM 17 May; SANGAMON (CVE 22) will be returned rear area. DD: Following extensively damaged have been returned rear areas: KIMBERLEY (DD 521), O'BRIEN (DD 725), MURRAY (DD 576), HYMAN (DD 732), MULLANY (DD 528), HOWORTH (DD 592), HATNSWORTH (DD 700), GREGORY (DD 802), BENNETT (DD 473), TEREY (DD 407), KIDD (DD 661), FRANKS (DD 554), LAFAY (DD 724). Following have sustained extensive battle damage and will be returned to PEARL or West Coast for repairs: NEWCOMB (DD 586), MORRIS (DD 417), LEUTZE (DD 481), PURDY (DD 734), ZELLARS (DD 777), SIGSBE (DD 502), BRYANT (DD 665), ISHERWOOD (DD 520), RALPH TALLEY (DD 390), VAGGARD (DD 555), HAZELWOOD (DD 531). Following have sustained some battle damage and will be repaired in forward areas: CASSIN YOUNG (DD 793), HALE (DD 642), HUTCHINS (DD 476), TWIGGS (DD 591), BENNO (DD 662), INGRAHAM (DD 694), HUDSON (DD 475), DALY (DD 519), STANLY (DD 478).

10 0717 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMSFFPAC, COMGENPOA, COMGEN- FMFPAC, COMPHIBSPAC; INFO CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMGEN 10, COM 3RD FLT, COM 5TH FLT.

For the time being operational and logistic planning should be based on the following assumptions:

A. If OLYMPIC is directed to be executed in 1945 Phase 3D of ICEBERG will be executed about 15 July and Phases 3C and E will be deferred indefinitely.

- Continued -

3117
10 0717  CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA PEARL, COMAIRPAC, COMSERPAC, ETC. (CONT'D)

B. If LONGTOM is ordered to be executed in the late summer or early fall of 1945 all of Phase 3 ICEBERG will be deferred.
C. If neither OLYMPIC or LONGTOM are executed in 1945 Phase 3D will be executed about 15 July and Phase 3E will be executed about 1 Sept plus such additional minor operations in the RYUKYUS as will contribute to the rapidity with which the overall objective can be accomplished.
D. Under assumption a FRICITION will be developed for temporary use under minimum standards and will be abandoned except for an emergency airfield as soon after OLYMPIC as possible.

10 1243 ARNOLD STIPINS MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR INFO CINCPOA BOTH, DEPCOM20AF, COMPOA COMGENNAFP-POA, COMGEN BONCOM XXI, COMGENPEAF.

WARX 7979. Current 20th AF VJR program provides for 40 groups of 4 squadrons each with 8 US RDSNICTKRAFT per squadron located 20 groups in the MARIANAS and 20 groups in the RYUKYUS. No conversion of Pacific air units to B29 is now contemplated in completing this program. In view of field availability dates as currently established by CINCPOA it is our plan to deploy to OKINAWA the 316 Wing 2 groups 15 August and 2 groups 15 September and to convert units in the US to permit the following readiness dates in the US of ground echelons: the 489 group 1 July; 1 converted group 1 August; 2 converted groups 1 September; this completed the 2nd Wing for OKINAWA; 2 converted groups 1 October; 2 converted groups 1 November; this completes the 3rd Wing for OKINAWA; tentative availability 1st quarter 46 in US as follows: 1 Wing 1 December; last wing 1 January; request theater recommendations on reception of the final 2 wings which are planned here to follow forward displacement of your tactical units. The build up of groups to 4 squadrons will be accomplished as follows: 1st 30 groups in program will be augmented in the theater by activating squadrons in theater in accordance with the following tables:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Date of Activation</th>
<th>Additional personnel req'd</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>20 August 45</td>
<td>1 August 45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>1 September</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>20 October</td>
<td>1 October</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 December</td>
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The last 10 groups in the program will be shipped as 4 squadron groups.

11 0245 COMGEN BONCOM XXI TO CINCPOA ADV, COMAF20 Info DEPCOMAF20, COMSTHF LT, CTF 58-51

X-11-3. Subject: VJR Intentions. Pursuant to Cincpoa's oral decision of this date it is planned to discontinue VJR strikes against KYUSHU airfields effective upon completion of today's operation. All available a/c this command being prepared for series of maximum effort incendiary strikes against urban industrial areas of NAGOYA and TOKYO. Present weather forecast favorable for takeoff on 13 May of initial strike of this series. 12 May will be required for essential maintenance on all assigned a/c and final preparatory measures.

11 0815 CINCPOA ADV TO DEPCOM20AF, CG BONCOM XXI, Info CG20AF, COMSTHF LT, CTF's 51 & 52.

My concurrence in discontinuance 20th AF strikes against KYUSHU as necessary to permit an incendiary strike against NAGOYA in maximum strength is confirmed. Also in view subsequent developments concur in plan as stated in your 110245. Will request further neutralization KYUSHU only in event OKINAWA situation again so requires.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that your plans for OKINAWA call for the introduction of a P47 fighter bomb group on OKINAWA on or about May 12 with 2 additional groups occupying TSUISHIMA shortly thereafter. Para.

Recent reports from ground commanders in EUROPE particularly stress the great advantage our ground forces have had from the close support of P47 fighter bombers capable of carrying heavy bombs for the destruction of fortifications, artillery and concrete pillboxes, holding up our ground forces. This employment, all commanders attest, has saved our ground forces many casualties. Para.

This experience plus the reported very heavy enemy defenses on OKINAWA lead the Joint Chiefs of Staff to query you as to when P47 equipped groups can, in view of present developments, be brought into the OKINAWA Area. Para.

1 additional advantage of the P47 lies in its range which should permit groups so equipped to hammer Jap airfields in KYUSHU from which it appears the Japs launch much of their opposition to our ships and forces in the OKINAWA Area. This would release the B29s for return to their attacks on industrial targets and the continued destruction of key cities. Para.

Please advise if we can be of any assistance to you in this regard as for example by making additional fighter bomber groups available to you.

Operation racket. TF 58 will attack KYUSHU with sweeps and strikes on 13 and 14 May. 130500 launching position about 30-00 N 132-40 E. TG 58.1 in station 3. Aids 030. Radar picket group 1 DesDiv from each TG on station 25 miles N of fleet guide. Air plan 13 May. TG 58.1 target area 1. Priority for sweeps, KANOYA, MIYAKO-NOJO, KOKUBU, OFIRINO. Strikes primary KANOYA and IZUMI alternate SAEKI and KIKUCHI. TG 58.3 during night 12-13 May maintain VTN hecklers over target areas 1 and 2 and VFN dawn patrol over KANOYA. Priority for sweeps, MIYAZAKI, KUMAMOTO, TONITAKA, KIKUCHI. Strikes primary SAEKI and KIKUCHI. Alternates KANOYA and IZUMI. Night 13-14 May VTN hecklers over target areas 1, 2 and 3. 14 May. 140500 launching point 31-30 N 132-00 E. Target areas both TGs later. Rescue sub responsibility. TG 58.1 station 2. 58.3 station 1. Brief all pilots on SASEBO and KURE naval bases. Strikes employ arming Plan 0 with 260 pounds frags on VB wing racks. Use selective arming on VB and VT. Recommend sweeps use arming plan Y with 260 pound frags. Targets priorities and arming plans may be changed by TG Comdrs if later information makes it desirable.

My 110815 May. Change word KANOYA to read NAGOYA.
Construction policy is subject: Cincpoa TS serial 000490 is hereby cancelled. Those concerned will be guided by the following serials not to all addresses or needed:

A. Cincpoa TS serial 000953 subject Housing Policy for ICEBERG Operation.
B. Cincpoa conf dispatch 290126 April.
C. Cincpoa secret dispatch 062209 May.

In order to provide operational airfields by dates established in Cincpoa TS serial 0005045 subject Airfield Development OKINAWA IsCom is authorized to divert Army construction materials to expedite Army air support facilities and similarly to divert Navy construction materials to expedite Navy air support facilities and to provide operational naval support shore facilities by 1 Nov. Cincpoa general construction standards will continue in the future as they have in the past. New construction policy governing Navy construction now under preparation.

Preliminary report. Your 040244. After consultation GHQ SWPA AUAFINS. CINCAPAC concurs. DWJ consideration has been given:
(A) Basic Assumptions Overall Logistic Plan U.S. Navy.
(B) Logistic problem of supporting large army forces involved.
(C) Huge airfield construction effort.
(D) Timing of the succeeding operation.

Recommend:
(A) Maximum use floating facilities for support of escort forces.
(B) No onshore naval facilities at OLYMPIC for support FMF or air FMF.
(C) Minimum onshore naval facilities which are summarized as follows:

Fuel storage - none.
Provisions for emergency issue only.
Water 2,500,000 Gal/Day for amphibious craft.
Ammunition storage - none.
Headquarters advanced base with large communication facilities.
Port director units.
Harbor protection.
Loran Station.
RDF stations.
Boat pool and landing craft repair units.
12 1213 CINCPAC ADV TO COM5THFLT, CTF 51, CTF 56.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding please acknowledge my 090802.

12 1709 COM5THFLT TO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 090802. (Acknowledgment of receipt).

12 2151 CTF 51 to CINCPOA ADV.

Your 090802 acknowledged.

13 0008 CINCPOA ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC, CINCAFPAC.

The facilities envisaged by your 120822 are inadequate. Desire your base plans officer available in MANILA Area 16 May your 120823 at which time tentative draft logistic annex my Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC will be furnished you.

13 0034 CINCPAC ADV TO ATCOM ULITHI, ISCOM PELELIU, CONS ERON 10, COMBATRON 1, CTG 52.4, COMWESCARSUBAREA, ISCOM GUAM, ISCOM TINIAN, ISCOM SATPAN INFO COMFWDAREA, ISCOM IWO JIMA.

In view possibility attack on ULITHI PELELIU area alert conditions should be maintained for next 3 to 4 days. TRUK appears to be most probable source of flights but possibility that point of origin may be Empire using FORMOSA or MINAMI DATO SHIMA as staging base should be considered. Use of radar deception devices may be expected with such flights. Reconnaissance of ULITHI and KOSSOL PASSAGE ANCHORAGE probably made by Japs on 12 May. This is in keeping with usual pattern and past practices. Blue MARIANAS bases can be reconnoitered or attacked by Jap planes flying between EMPIRE and TRUK or via MARCUS.

13 0144 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCBPF INFO CINCSWPA, COMINCH, CINCPOA PEARL.

Your 080011. You are authorized to deal direct with Australian authorities concerning local affairs in AUSTRALIA as matters internal to the British Commonwealth keeping General MacArthur and me informed as appropriate. Cominich and War Dept have concurred.

13 0158 COMGENPOA TO CINCPACADV INFO CINCAFPAC.

BJ 61191. Employment of 24th Infantry your dis 090817 May is reference is concurred in. In view of this employment it is recommended that the 296 RCT which was planned for employment in FRIC TION now be employed in ADJOURN. TRUK EJ ORT employment anticipated for the 296 will facilitate necessary training here prior to the forward area employment.

13 0213 CINCBPF TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 57, COM5THFLT, COMINCH.

Your 120218. Thank you so much for your invitation but I am afraid I cannot manage this period due to approaching replenishment of the fleet.

Para 2. Hope to be able to visit you a little later subject to your concurrence.

Para 3. I am asking Rawlings to arrange his visit.

13 0405 COMGEN TEN TO CINCPOA ADV.

Your 090802 received. See my DTG. (120940 ?)
Because of the severe damage being received from enemy aircraft by naval forces in the Ryukyus, when the provisions of para 5 and 5 of my serial 000147 of 21 November become effective the senior officer present of the Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet will continue to control the air defense of Okinawa and the naval forces present from a command position afloat and will report to ComGen 10 for this purpose. When ComGen 10 is ready to assume the responsibility for the air defense of the forces and shipping present without this assistance he will so inform Cincpoa.

Requirements of Phase III Iceberg except for 414th Fighter Grp and VHB Groups are considered as being included within the ceilings of the redeployment forecast referring AAFPoa Admin 24097 not to all addressees. Application must necessarily be made to CINCPac to provide the balance of air units required for Phase III either from those presently in SWPA or from those scheduled for redeployment from EUROPE.

1. The 2nd MarDiv (less 1 RCT) is hereby detached from operational control ComGen 10 and is placed in area reserve under Cincpoa.

2. 1 RCT to be designated by ComGen 2nd MarDiv remains under operational control ComGen 10 for employment in capture of AGUNI and THEY. This RCT will load immediately complete with personnel and be prepared to sail as directed by CTF 51.

3. 2nd MarDiv is designated as assault division for Phase III-D Iceberg my 060821 and will return Saipan when relieved at Friction by Army garrison regiment. ComGen 2nd MarDiv will report to ComGen Expeditionary Troops by dispatch for planning in connection with Phase III-D.

4. ComGen 2nd MarDiv send staff representative immediately to this headquarters to confer connection with unloading of 2nd MarDiv (less 1 RCT).

The training requirements envisaged by CINCSWPA 131350 are highly important and will require the services of a full transport squadron commencing 1 June. If OLYMPIC is directed in 1945 the training will be continuous and will extend into a period in which Com7thPhibFor will have other duties. Accordingly desire your recommendation as to a transport squadron and also an amphibious group commander to perform amphibious training in the Philippines on a continuing basis.

Lt. Gardner of my staff leaves Guam today 14 May E. Long. with copies of tentative draft my Joint Staff Study naval & amphibious phases OLYMPIC for Cominch. Request early advice any comments you wish to make since firm draft will be commenced immediately on return from conference at Manila 15-17 May.
Pursuant to a directive from the JCS it is desired to release Army units in POA to CINCAPFAC as soon as the services of such units can be spared. To implement this directive the following procedure is prescribed in the sequence indicated:

(A) As Army units become available for release from their respective areas action adees will furnish designations of units and recommend dates of release to ComGenPOA (Info Cincpoa both Hq).

(B) After considering operational requirements ComGenPOA is requested to transmit to CINCPOA Adv Hq his recommendations on each unit.

(C) Release to CINCAPFAC will be accomplished by CINCPOA.

Re my Top Sec 130034 and 140136, not to all. Further evidence Japs contemplate immediate reconnaissance of ENIWETOK, GUAM and ULITHI with blue surface ships principal objective. Main priority ULITHI. Take immediate necessary action.

HMS IMPLICABLE who has recently arrived in AUSTRALIA will be available for operations during the period of the Fleet's main replenishment in June.

Para 2. This ship is fully worked up, but requires battle experience in this theatre and I would like her to carry out live practices against Jap forces on the lines of your operation FUDILS wherever convenient to you.

Para 3. I would allocate a suitable escort of cruisers and destroyers from among the ships replenishing at MANUS.

Para 4. Proposed target and scale of attack subject to your concurrence would be 2 days consecutive attack on either TRUK or RABAUL.

Para 5. If approved request suitable intelligence and target information may be forwarded to reach MANUS By 28 May.

The subject is Fleet support for the OLYMPIC Operation which largely will come from (A) MARIANAS (B) PHILIPPINES (C) THE RYUKUS. With present assignments of construction troops in the above areas it appears that all presently approved naval support facilities in A & B (less those removed for reallocations) will be completed. It is not however considered that more than the minimum facilities in cast as outlined in my Telememo 3677 of 12 May plus augmentation from PINK will be essentially operable by 1 Nov with present forces. ComServPac's 210225 of April recommends certain cancelled LSTTE facilities for BIVE. However due to a diversion from BIVE of 4 of the 7 PHILIPPINES SeaBees it does not appear that the LSTTE facilities recommended for BIVE could be in operation for OLYMPIC unless, repeat unless additional construction troops are assigned.
It is recommended that ComServPac be directed to immediately review his overall logistics requirements giving consideration to:

1. BIVE augmentation from FINH.
2. Additional support from SUBIC BAY.
3. The extent of completion of naval facilities in the MARIANAS by 1 November.
4. The reallocated components from LEYTE-SAMAR to BIVE which will not be completed under present construction troop deployment.

He should recommend:

A. Augmentation by types of facilities, if required, giving desired locations.
B. His plan of construction, troops, shipping and materials necessary to accomplish augmentation.

These matters are of utmost urgency and must be expedited. ComServPac to advise date by which above info will be supplied. Admiral Towers concurs.

MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA ADV INFO COM7THFLT, COM7THPHIB.
CX 15379. Assistance of APAs and AKAs listed your 271135 is greatly appreciated. Additional APAs cannot be profitably employed for troop movements unless used in conjunction with additional AKAs or LSTs. However it is planned to conduct refresher amphibious training for 8 US divisions tentatively selected for OLYMPIC. Completion of this program will require 3 Mobile Amphibious Training Units operating simultaneously. Insufficient ships are available to Commander 7thFlt for this purpose. Therefore it is requested that 1 transport squadron from your command be made available to 7thFlt at SUBIC BAY by 1 June for use in amphibious training. Anticipate these ships will be required for a minimum of approximately 4 months.

DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPOA ADV.

2576. Subject: Statement of WOOD Policy. Passed for your information is the following message from ComAf 20.

1. Now that regular supporting operations for ICEBERG are concluded, it is appropriate to restate our policy governing operations. Current target directives remain in effect until changed as the situation requires. These directives will govern your normal operations. It is anticipated, however, that from time to time you will receive requests for missions in coordination with operations of other forces. Such requests will, of course be considered separately according to policy already established.

2. The primary mission of the 20th AF is to complete the destruction of the major aircraft production and to destroy the principal Japanese urban industrial areas in the shortest possible period of time. It is extremely important, in order to capitalize on the present critical situation in JAPAN, that your effort be concentrated to utmost on these targets which will contribute most to the defeat of JAPAN.

CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN 2ND MARDIV TINFO COM5THFLT, CTF 51, CTF 56, COM3RDFLT, CCMAFPAC, CCGPHIBCORPS, COMFWDAREA, IESCOM SAIPAN, COMGENPOA.

MyDis 140245. 2nd Mardiv (less 8th Marines Reinf.) authorized to unload at SAIPAN rehabilitate equipment. Be prepared to reload and reembark for Phase III-D as directed by Commander Expeditionary Troops.
15 2056 COMAF 20 to CG BOMCOM 21 Info MacArthur, CINCPAO ADV, DEP COMAF 20.

WARX 82567, Ref CINCPAO ADV 120704, and CINCSWPA 16179. You are directed to perform the photography requested by Cincpao and concurred in by CINCAPPAC of the KYUSHU and TOKYO PLAINS AREA. This photography is next in priority to your target photography.

15 2347 CINCPAO ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO COMAIRPAC, CAPSCF, COMEMTAP, RYUKYUS, ISCOM OKINAWA COMNABS OKINAWA, CINCPAOPEOPLE.

ComAirPac Top Sec 022233 not to all. Request comment on following that is under consideration:

(A) Retain Acorn 54 in echelon for establishment at AWASE.
(B) Construct AWASE 150 foot strip with hardstands for earliest operation 1 VMF Group, continue construction to 300 feet and hardstands for 2nd VMF Group, final construction for operation of 1 VMF Group and carrier pool of 500 airplanes the 1st increment of 200 on 15 Oct.
(C) Reservation of space at AWASE for ASD and for arrival AROU on 1 Jan.
(D) About 1 Nov mount out 1 VMF Group from AWASE for OLYMPIC and then increase carrier pool to 500.
(E) Reserve TSUGEN JIMA for additional carrier strip with no development at present.
(F) Concurrence with Para (G) above cancels AGINA FIELD.

16 0128 CINCPAC ADV TO COM5THPHIBCORPS, CGFMFPAC INFO COMPHIBSPAC, COM5THFLT, COM3PHIBFOR.

Com5thPhibCorps assigned duty for developing plans for LONGTOM based on Joint Staff Study. ComGen FMFPac lend assistance as practicable. Com3rdPhibFor coordinate development of plans.

16 0515 COMGEN 10 to COMGEN 10 Rear Info CINCPAC BOTH, COMGENPOA, COMPHIBSPAC.

This cites G-4 Msg TA 2122 DTG 090231 not to all. Based on new estimate possible 13,000 enemy troops on ADJOURN and latest photo interpretation ComGen 10 recommends 1 Corps of 2 Divisions for task with 1 Div Area Reserve LEGIMINOUS. Scheme maneuver 1 land 2 Divs abreast beaches TA 1 2 6 8 1 2 6 7 1 3 6 1 4 6 5. Capture dominating terrain to west. Split island at SETAKI TA 1662. Capture airfield destroy enemy force. Capture southern part. Estimated uncover dates for beaches BOMA and KETOKU G Day. SANNURA G 15. KAMETOKU and KAMETSU G 35. HEDONA G 15. Dates for initiating construction airfields Field 1 G 15. Field 2 and 3 G 30. Alternate site A and B for Field 2 G 40. Consider KAMETOKU KAMETSU and HEDONA unsuitable for handling other than small stores. SANNURA and KETOKU most suitable for development with estimated total capacity 2500 M/T day. Due to danger enemy reaction recommend shipping to target be limited LST and LSM or small AKs.
Para 1. CinCpoa serial 000508 of 12 May subject quote Base Development Plan OKINAWA and IE SHIMA unquote supersedes CinCpoa serials 000221 of 10 February 1945 and 000290 of 2 March 1945 and 000461 of 27 April 1945 and will take precedence over the original serial as corrected to date. In case of conflict CinCpoa serial 000508 will govern.

Para 2. ZG KTB:fillation of CinCpoa serial 000508 the minimum facilities as listed below should be essentially operable to the capacities indicated.

(A) Air installations as established CinCpoa serial 0005085 of 26 April.

(B) Operational FL 1 November 1945:

1. 100% Joint Communications.

2. 80% major and 100% amphibious ship repair facilities.

3. Naval Supply Depot with annexes 1 and 1/2 million square feet in semi-permanent buildings, distributed approximately as follows: NSD proper 1,060,000 sq.ft., SPDC 100,000 sq.ft., ordnance spare parts 100,000 sq. ft., Class 16 200,000 Sq.ft., medical stores 40,000 sq. ft.

4. 5500 fleet hospital beds. 5000 Army hospital beds.

5. 200,000 bbls black and 30,000 bbls diesel storage capacity for forces afloat.

6. Waterfront facilities to unload 800,000 M/T of cargo per month.

7. Dockside fresh water supply 2,4 M.G.D.

8. Marine Corps facilities not to exceed the continuing construction capacity of 1 assigned SeaBee Bn.

9. 100 STD magazines and 16,000 tons outside storage for fleet ammo and bombs.

10. Include such necessary facilities that are germane to the essential operation of the above such as administration installations, roads, harbor protection, etc.

(C) The location of facilities listed under B should be such that any delay in the progress of the more permanent type of harbor development as approved in the original BDP will not interfere with the necessary early functioning of such facilities.

Para 3. CinCpoa 10 may relocate any or all of the proposed installations to suit local conditions and to accelerate their early completion.

Para 4. The pooling of materials within services to meet the above is approved.

Para 5. Major diversions of materials from 1 service to another should only be done with CinCpoa's approval.

Para 6. CinCpoa's 000490 of 6 May 1945 subject Construction Limitations has been cancelled by CinCpoa ADV 110732 May. Retain airfield Specifications as set forth in CinCpoa's dispatches 290126 April and 062009 May. Construction limitations remain the same as set forth in CinCpoa Serial 02018 of 20 May 1944 as modified by CinCpoa's 000933 of 2 November 1944, except that the limiting housing policy date shall be extended to 1 October 1945.
170211 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGENPOA INFO CINCAFPAC. CINCPOA PEARL.

UrDis 130158. For planning purposes concur in designation 296th RCT as garrison ADJOURN.

17 0342 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINGH INFO CINCPOA PEARL. CINCAFPAC.

(See 170841 to

Following are extracts from Memorandum Record of Principles agreed to by CINCAFPAC and CINCPOAC at MANILA 16 May 1945 in connection OLYMPIC plans and preparations:

"CINCPOA will provide facilities for and will assist with all available means at his disposal the establishment in the RYUKUS of such elements of the Far East Air Forces as are designated by CINCAFPAC in order to augment air action to the maximum prior to the OLYMPIC Operation. The operation of these Army Air Forces will be conducted under the control of CINCAFPAC.

When the major portion of the 7th AF is deployed in the RYUKUS as now planned, the command of that force will pass to CINCAFPAC. In case 7th AF units are required thereafter by CINCPOA for support of local operations, arrangements will be made with CINCAFPAC by dispatch.

Para. CINCPOA will continue to press the development of port and airfield facilities, and to assist in establishing increased Army Air Forces in the RYUKUS. CINCAFPAC will furnish, within the limit of his capabilities, U.S. Army resources to assist in the deployment of additional Army Air Forces.

Representatives of CINCAFPAC will inspect the present base and airfield development projects of CINCPOA and advise through CINCAFPAC of changes or additions desired to support the additional air elements to be installed.

Para. Land based air forces of the Army and of the naval service operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and CINCPOA respectively, except:

(A) The 20th AF will operate as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(B) Marine air units assigned to operate with major ground elements of the Fleet Marine Force under Army control will likewise pass to the control of the Army Commander designated by CINCAFPAC.

(C) When the Army is responsible for the air defense of an area or position, Marine units engaged in such air defense will pass to the operational control of the appropriate Army Air Commander.

Para. Each shore installation in JAPAN will be under the authority of either CINCAFPAC or CINCPOA depending on whether it is an Army or Navy installation.

Para. Control of ports in JAPAN used in common will be placed under the authority of CINCAFPAC.

Para. After the Commander, 7th Flt, moves his headquarters to JAPAN, the naval forces required in the Southwest Pacific Area will be assigned as a Task Force under the command of the Commander, Philippine Sea Frontier.

15 1110 COMGEN A FPOA TO CINC POA BOTH HQ INFO COMPODAREA, ISCOM GUAM, AAFP0A ADMIN.

2614. Reference Cincpoa radio 310223 March 45 to Iscom GUAM which directs Iscom GUAM to complete minimum operational facilities at Northwest Field GUAM for 2 groups of the 315 Wing on June 2 and 2 groups on July 1. Disposition of forces made to accomplish this included the allocation of the earth moving equipment of 4 SeaBee Battalions to assist the available Engr. Avn. Bns. It must be noted that due to former high priorities of other than VLR projects the beginning of effective work on this field was delayed until about April 1. Further, the construction difficulties due to meeting hard coral requiring drilling and blasting in the greater part of all cuts were far worse than anticipated. Lack of sufficient drills until shipment recently from TM0 was a contributing factor. Para.

- Continued -
Para 2. It is now apparent that completion for June 1 will fall short of even minimum operational requirements. Only about 1/2 the required 60 hardstands will be useable the remainder of the planes will be forces to occupy the south service apron to the detriment of any adequate plane servicing procedure. Construction forces are so restricted that warehouses, shops and essential operational building will be largely lacking. There is grave doubt that the taxiway will be finished to allow necessary circulation of planes. For the July 1 date, it is apparent that sufficient hardstands and the service apron will not be finished on time. A similar condition at to the essential warehouses, shops, and operational bldgs will exist.

Para 3. It is my opinion that although both runways will be operational by the respective dates, the usefulness of the Wing in the accelerated program of dropping bombs on Japan will be drastically reduced due to lack of the necessary related facilities.

Para 4. Reference is made to current priority guide, Top Sec 5 May in which recommended priority of Northwest Field is 1.530 and many projects previously of higher priority and drawing large construction forces from possible application to Northwest Field have been downgraded. It is understood that these priorities are based on findings of the Painter Board. It appears that application of these priorities additional construction forces on Guam could and should be made available to the VLR program.

Para 5. By CinCPac directive 5 Engineer Avn Bns will depart from Guam between 20 May and 1 July. 2 are engaged on Northwest Field, 2 on North, priority 1,570 and also lacking certain minimum essential facilities, and 1 on Depot construction, priority 1,630. In order to rehabilitate and load for movement, 1 ceased work May 7th, another May 14th. 1 will cease work May 20th, 1 June 10th and another June 15th. The period allowed is only 2 weeks prior to departure date. The replacement Battalions arriving 25 May 1 June, 18 June, 26 June and 1 July will require about 2 weeks to unload, shake down and effectively get to work. A loss of approximately 1 Bn month of construction effort is involved in each exchange. It is a serious disadvantage that this movement occurs at the critical time to threaten completion of minimum facilities.

Para 6. It is urgently recommended that the 4 SeaBee Bns presently engaged on Northwest Field on a limited objective basis or an equivalent engineering force be retained and their use broadened to include construction on both the south and north parts of the Northwest airfield and certain essential work on North Field. It is also recommended that the general construction personnel of 1 or more of these CB Bns be removed from lower priority work, and placed on Northwest Field to speed up construction of essential warehouses, shops and operational buildings to the limit of materials available or to be made available from lower priority jobs. In addition, it is recommended that the earth moving equipment of 1 additional Bn be placed on Northwest Field. This is considered essential to provide clearing of end zones and areas needed for 2 Bomb Groups now in place of the north side of the airfield, the preparation of foundations for essential buildings and minimum road net.

It is requested that plans for the employment of troops after OLYMPIC and for CORONET provide for the withdrawal of the 5th PhibCorps from HYPOCRITE prior to or coincident with the commitment of the 3rd PhibCorps to CORONET. This procedure is necessary to:

(A) Have 1 or 2 MarDivs rehabilitating on OKINAWA at all times in order ensure internal security and release Army troops for employment in HYPOCRITE.

(B) Have 1 or 2 MarDivs in the MARIANAS preparing during CORONET for further naval and amphibious operations which will be necessary to complete our tasks in the Western Pacific.

-Continued-
CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, MACPAC, ETC. (CONT'D)

(C) Avoid having 100% of the MarDivs in action at 1 time which would create an undesirable and impractical peak of replacement and supply requirements at a time when ample numbers of Army Divisions should be available.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMSOPAC INFO CINCPAC, CINCPOA, CINCPAC PEARL HQ.

CINCPAC 16076 of 12 May and ComGenPOA's RJ 61223. Cincpoa has no objection to the release of Headquarters and Headquarters Company SoPac Base Command for transfer to MANILA subject to the understanding that the senior U.S. Army officer remaining in the South Pacific reports to ComSoPac for purposes involved in accomplishment of missions assigned ComSoPac under the authority of basic directive approved by the President on March 30 1942 and such joint logistical procedures still in effect as were established pursuant to the joint directive from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army and Cominch forwarded by Cominch serial 1423 of 3 March 1943.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINC PAC PEARL.

Your 170702. TF 57 is required for further operations as early as practicable in July consistent with battle damage being made good. Request you advise date when force will be ready to leave LEYTE for future operations. My intentions for future use of TF 57 will be sent to you as early as possible.

CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

ULTRA. Cominch 151525. Captured documents and P/GW information identify 18 submarines operating in Hawaiian waters on or just prior to 7 December 1941. Information available on general plan of employment but details available in only a few cases. Information from confidential sources more complete than from Ultra which adds little to the general picture.

MARSHALL TO RICHARDSON INFO MACARTHUR, KELS. RICHARDSON 190250 passed to CINCPAC BOTH, COMGEN TEN REAR FOR INFG.

WARX 83531. Deferred is action on requests URad RJ 61269 May 14 and CP 13436 May 11 and letter referred to therein, pending Joint Chiefs of Staff decision expected at an early date as to next operation.

RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMSOPAC, ACM, CINCPAC.

RJ 61628. Movement of Gen. Gilbreath and his Hqtrs personnel from SoPac to MANILA was ordered by CINCPAC 16076 of 121450 and ComGenPOA RJ 61223 of 130614.

Your 141341 May was received subsequent to action initiated above and established standard procedure for release of units from POA to CINCPAC. Recommend it not be permitted to interfere with the movement of Gen. Gilbreath's personnel inasmuch this movement will in no way affect the functioning of the SoPacBeCom under Gen. Murray, the movement ordered by CINCPAC is largely an administrative transfer of a portion of the bulk overhead allotment of USAPOA rather than a transfer of units, and the movement is in process of accomplishment.

Request radio concurrence earliest.

RICHARDSON TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, WARKDPAC, CGCPAC, CGSPOA, CINCPAC.

RJ 61659. As a result of action referred to in reference am obliged to advise you that this Hqtrs will be unable to logistically support operations LONGBOM based on planned target date of 20 Aug 45 as directed. References are:

(A) WARK 83531, DTG 171607 May. (B) RJ 61269 DTG 140228 May.
20 0209 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC, CINCPAC PEARL.

JWPC 293/3 estimates, based on map studies, that TANEGA JIMA could support 650 aircraft located on 7 fields. Suggest this paper be restudied in view of photo reconnaissance obtained during carrier strikes on 23 April and 17, 18 March which reveal TANEGA to be entirely unsuitable for air base development. None of the 6 possible sites suggested are suitable for development except possibly No. 4 (ARTO). These sites are covered by BUNKER HILL (CV 17) sorties 425 of 17 March, and 437 of 16 March and VD5 113A and 113C of 28 April. InterPron 2 P I report 621 dated 9 May 45 lists complete coverage available.

20 0704 CINCPAC ADV TO COMG39POA INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMTH/23FOR, COMTHFOR 3, CG 2ND MARDIV, COMCAPTH/MFH (BOTH HQ).

Inquiry regarding changes in supporting troops Phase 3 D ICEBERG reference UrDis 170709. Request your representative confer with Gen. Lawson who has conferred with my staff this date. Gen. Lawson will next confer with CG 2nd MarDiv and reach OAHU about 20 May. After conference with him request your recommendations be sent CINCPAC both Hq with info to ComGen 10.

19 1808 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 140257 I have no specific comments to make on tentative draft Joint Staff Study naval and amphibious phases OLYMPIC. I am in general agreement with its provisions and with your views as expressed in your 170842 and 170841. In particular I agree with your remarks regarding SeaBees. However under the provisions of JCS 1259/4 SeaBees may be provided for specific operations in the same manner as other naval forces and resources. This does not constitute "pooling".

20 0400 COM3RDFIT TO CTF 51,57,58, COMB4RTON2, COMRUDIV5, CINCPAC, CTG535, 50, 7, 50, 8, 50, 9, ANZIO, COMB4RTON1, MISSOURI, COM2NDGRPF INFO CINCPAC BOTH, CONSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMINCH, CINC3NP, COM7HTFLT, COMGEN10, COM2FIDAREA, DEPOCONOTHARP 415.

This is Com3rdFlt OpPlan 3-45. Month
   MISSOURI plus escorts as assigned.
B. Task Group 30.5 - Search and Reconnaissance Group. RAdm Price.
   FAW 1.
C. Task Group 30.6 - Anti-submarine Group A. Capt. Montgomery.
   ANZIO, CortDiv 72 less LERAY, WILSON.
D. Task Group 30.7 - Anti-submarine Group B. Capt. Davis.
   TULAGI, CortDiv 70 less CHILIGAN and GRADY.
   Seron 6 with units as currently assigned plus CortDiv 64, less
   O'FLAHERTY and J C BUTLER.
   Seron 10 with units as currently assigned.
G. Task Force 31, 5th Amphibious Force. VAdm Hill.
   Units as currently assigned.
   Units as currently assigned.
   Formed only when specifically directed.

- Continued -
I. Task Force 35 - Light Surface Striking Force. Formed only when specifically directed.

J. Task Force 37 - British Carrier Task Force. VAdm Rawlings RN. Units as assigned by CinCPF.

K. Task Force 38 - Fast Carrier Task Force. VAdm Mitscher (VAdm McCain when later directed by Com3rdFlt).

Units as currently assigned.

I. Task Force 39 - Mine Flotilla. RAdm Sharp. Units as assigned by later dispatch.

Strategic Air Force, SubsPac, NorPacFor, MarGilFor, Marianas Forces carrying out tasks assigned by CINCPAC in furtherance of general task CINCPAC OPPLAN 4-45. SoWestPac Forces while completing occupation of PHILIPPINES and conducting other operations in SWPA support this operation by maintaining searches over SOUTH CHINA SEA and FORMOSA Area and neutralization of airfields in FORMOSA.

Assumption: That capture of OKINAWA is assured or has been substantially completed.

This fleet will attack Japanese naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards and coastal objectives, cover and support RYUKYUS forces and protect sea and air communications along Central Pacific Axis in order to lower Japanese ability and will to resist.

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Para. A. TG 30.1, Flt Flagship Grp operate as directed by Com3rdFlt.

B. TG 30.5, Search & Recon Grp. continue missions as now assigned by Com5thFlt.

C. & D. TGs 30.6 & 30.7, Anti-Sub Grps conduct intensive anti-submarine warfare as separately directed.

E. TG 30.3, Logistic Support Grp. provide logistic support for 3rdFlt in accordance separate instructions.

F. TG 30.9, Base Service Grp. Provide maximum logistic and repair services to all fleet units at all advance bases. Serve as administrative SOFA at all advance bases when Com3rdFlt is present and when requested by any subordinate 3rdFlt commander who may be SOFA.

G. TF 31, 5thPhibFor - Cover and support RYUKYUS forces and conduct offensive amphibious operations as separately directed. Control air defense OKINAWA and naval forces present as directed by ComGen 10.

l. TF 32, Gunfire & Covering Force - Provide fire support for RYUKYUS forces as directed by CTF 31.

II. TF's 34 & 35 - Heavy and Light Surface Striking Forces. Attack enemy naval forces shipping or shore installations when specifically directed.

J. -K. TF's 37 & 38 - CarTaskForces - Attack enemy naval and air forces shipping shipyards and coastal objectives as separately directed.

L. TF 39 - Mine Flot - Conduct minesweeping and offensive mining operations as separately directed.

I. Maintain and extend unremitting military pressure against JAPAN. Effect maximum attrition to enemy air, ground and naval forces merchant shipping and industrial capacity by all possible means.

2. Make preparations for the capture of additional positions as may be directed by CINCPAC.

2. The operating zones, bombing and attack restrictions are prescribed in CINCPAC Standard Operating Procedure SOP-1 and current addenda and CINCPAC Zone Notices. Air Sea rescue procedure is prescribed in CINCPAC Standard
Operating Procedure SOF-2A.

4. Public Relations will conform to Annex F of CINCPOA OpPlan 14-44 except that assignment of correspondents, photographers, and public relations personnel will be made separately.

5. Boundaries of command areas and command relations are described in Annex A CINCPOA OP PLAN 4-45 not to all. These area boundaries are shown in Part I 3RDFLT Standard Instructions.

6. This Plan will be made effective by dispatch.

Para. Logistics in accordance with PacFlt Logistic Plan (Annex C amended to CINCPOA OP Plan 14-44) and Part II 3RDFLT Standard Instructions. Fleet ServPlans for the replenishment at sea by separate dispatch.

Para. Communications in accordance with USF 70A and CentCom 2 until superseded by PAC 70-B. Use zone 2 (GCT) time in DTG of all communications except visual signals to or within ground forces. Use I(-9) time at sea and local time in bases unless otherwise directed. 3RDFLT Standard Instructions to be distributed by mail are effective when this plan is placed in effect. 3RDFLT in MISSOURI normally with TF 38.

20 0912 MACARTHUR TO CINCPOA INFO CINCPOA ADV.

CX 16609. Ref your RJ 61604 dated 18 May. Present plan for OLYMPIC is to augment the organic corps artillery of each corps with heavy field artillery group. Tentatively set up to reinforce 5thPhilCorps is the HQ & Hq Btry FA GP 2 FA Bns 155 How now in HAWAII plus the 1 FA Bn 8 inch How ReQued 05 16196 dated 14 May. 9th Corps organic artillery to consist of HQ & Hq Btry Corps Artillery and Observation Bn now in HAWAII 2 Bns 155 How set up for shipment to ACCUMULATION and 1 Bn 155 Gun now in BUNKHOUSE. Reinforcing artillery for 9th Corps to consist of 1 HQ & Hq FA GP and 1 FA Bn 240 How now in HAWAII 1 FA in 155 Gun and 1 FA Bn 8 inch now destined for ACCUMULATION. This confirms destination MAESTRO for 1 FA Bn 8 inch Gun being shipped on June priority list.

21 0146 CINCPOA ADV TO COMAIRPAC INFO COM7THFLT. COMNORPAC.

In view of changing situation in SWPA and NorPac and of current difficulties with Harpoon and Ventura availability am considering recommendation to Cominch for:

A. Transfer of 2 VPB(ML) Sqns now remaining in 7thFlt to PacFlt as necessary to maintain present scheduled availability of VPB(ML) Sqns in CenPac.

B. Transfer as soon as practicable of 2 of 6 VPB(HL) Sqns now in 7thFlt to NorPac to be followed by 1st 2 of 5 Sqns referred to in CNO 181329.

Para. From information available here 4 VPB(HL) Sqns 4 VPB(MS) Sqns and 2 VPB(MS) Amphib Sqns should meet permanent requirements PhilSeaFron. Request detailed recommendations covering specific squadrons involved rotation VPB(HL) Sqns in NorPac and deferment of availability of additional VPB(ML) Sqns for equipment with Harpoons.

Para. Info Adee comment at discretion.
CFEEX 37731. Since dispatch of my CFEEX 36605, 1 May, direct arrangements for increased air assistance to CHINA Theater by FEAFAF, as authorized in WARK 83426, have been completed. Agreement reached by CHINA Theater representatives in consultation with FEAFAF, HQ SWPA and CINCPOA at conferences in MANILA 14-16 May sets forth following air cooperation against target areas in CHINA. Agreement follows:

Allied Air Forces are free to strike targets in INDO-CHINA and that part of SE CHINA bounded on north by YANGTZE RIVER VALLEY and on west by enemy lines of communication from HANKOW south thru HENGYANG, KWEILIN and NANCHANG to NAMIC (both boundaries inclusive) and parts of this area are occupied by friendly forces, as shown by maps furnished Allied Air Forces and by data supplied from time to time by CHINA Theater through headquarters SWPA.

Para. Matter of restrictions on bombing of HONGKONG-CANTON Area will be clarified by USFCT without delay.

Para. Under present condition Allied Air Forces will conduct operations against CHINA Theater targets generally as follows:

(1) Strikes against shipping in harbors and coastal waters TWT SOUTH East CHINA and INDO-CHINA as profitable targets are presented and as AAF capabilities permit. Water targets off the coast CHINA north of FOOCHEW will not be attacked by AAF. Prior to initiation of operations involving attack of targets in harbors or on land north of FOOCHEW which may require AAF aircraft to fly over the water areas north of FOOCHEW, clearance must be obtained from CINCPOA. Direct communication is authorized between AAF and CINCPOA to obtain such clearance.

(2) Strikes against INDO CHINA coastal lines of communication from HANKOW to SAIGON as profitable targets are presented and as AAF capabilities permit.

(3) Approximately 2 M2B heavy bomber sorties each night against targets in HANKOW-HONGKONG CANTON Area and in SHANGHAI-NANKING Area intermittently as permitted by weather, the tactical situation, and by the availability of aircraft not committed to SWPA operations of higher priority.

(4) Medium bomber and fighter sweeps along the enemy occupied river, road and rail corridors extending west, north and east respectively from CANTON as permitted by weather and the availability of aircraft not committed to operations of SWPA of higher priority.

(5) AAF consider HANKOW Area beyond radius of profitable heavy bomber (or other) operations from PHILIPPINES bases unless staging and refueling are made operationally available in SOUTH EAST CHINA by CHINA Theater.

Para. The CHINA Theater will KOSP provide AAF current weather, target intelligence, communications and other pertinent operational data.

Para. Communications relating to weather, target intelligence and coordination of operations are authorized direct between AAF SWPA and LAAF CHINA Theater with information copies to respective Theater Hdtrs. AAF will notify CHINA Theater Air Forces (14AF) prior to dispatching combat missions against targets in CHINA Theater. Channels for such communications will be as indicated in preceding para.

Para. Reports of results of Allied Air Force operations against targets in CHINA will be announced in messages to CHINA Theater forces (14AF), information copy to Hdtrs CHINA Theater.

Para. Mining operations in eastern YANGTZE RIVER Area, beyond reach of SWPA aircraft. These operations can be undertaken by CINCPOA if PBY or other search squadrons, which can relieve CINCPOA squadrons from other duties, can be made
available to CINCPPOA by CINCSWPA. Agreement Ends.

Air strikes by FEAF against targets along the CHINA and FRENCH INDO CHINA Coast already has been mutually beneficial to SWPA and CHINA Theaters. Further impact against mainland target areas by the combined efforts of Chennault's and Kenney's air forces will deny further freedom of action to Japanese south of YANGTZE RIVER which should eventually seriously reduce their offensive capabilities; thereby affording precious time for CARBONADO operations.

In consonance with agreement reached at MANILA I have lifted all restrictions on targets in CHINA within bombing range of AAF operating from SWPA bases to give Kenney the latitude needed for maximum air effort against SOUTHEAST CHINA.

In view of current preparations for operations against JAPAN explained in WARX 43426, which virtually eliminates all possibility of a CHINA Coast lodgement by US forces from the Pacific, concept for operation CARBONADO remains unaltered. We will continue to exert our all-out efforts toward securing a port to vitalize the under nourished Chinese military potential and thereby insuring the means for ultimate expulsion of enemy from CHINA.

(This dispatch was delivered by hand by R.Adm. Pennoyer on 22 May 1945)

11 0330 COMAIR/THF1LIT TO COMAIR/THF1LIT.

This is top secret. Refer CINCPPOA ADV 080902. Patrol squadrons of aircraft 7thflt can be released to POA as follows:
1 PBY-5A squadron when VPB 53 is relieved in NorSols by New Zealand landcats and becomes available for operations in the PHILIPPINE Area. This date indefinite but expected during late May. 1 PBM squadron during June when Blackcat operations from LINGAYEN along CHINA Coast which are becoming unprofitable can be terminated. 1 Ventura squadron on 1 July after completion of OBOE 6 when there will no longer be any profitable employment for Venturas now based at PUERTO PRINCESA. The release of the above squadrons is predicated on retention in SWPA of 6 PB4Y squadrons. 3 PBM squadrons. 1 PBY-5A squadron and 1 Ventura squadron. 5 of the PB4Y are now present and the 6th PB4Y squadron is due this month. Squadrons will then be deployed as follows: CLARK 2 PB4Y squadrons, MINDORO 2 PB4Y squadrons, PUERTO PRINCESA 2 PB4Y squadrons. These squadron required for regular search coverage.
Mariners 1 squadron for air sea rescue. 1 squadron for operations in BORNEO Area. 1 squadron for ASW duty with PhilSeaFron. Landcats 1 squadron for air sea rescue and utility based at PALAWAN and SAMAR. Venturas 1 squadron for ASW with PhilSeaFron based at SAMAR. Above deployment based on understanding that no more than one Mariner Squadron will be required for operations in BORNEO-MEI Area. Request your concurrence in order enable me to inform COMAIR and CINCSWPA of the above prior to conference regarding operations against CHINA Targets to be held at GHQ 13 May. If you concur recommendations regarding release of tenders will follow.
CX-16766. This radio is in 4 parts.

Part 1: In furtherance of the recent agreement between CINCPAC and CINCPAC relative to the installation of Army PE forces in BUNKHOUSE, arrangements have been made with the War Department to send from redeployment in EUROPE, to arrive about 1 August a considerable number of service units among which are 3 General Service Regiments and 1 Construction Battalion for LEGUMINOUS, 3 General Service Regiments for FRICTION and 2 General Service Regiments for INDISPENSABLE.

Part 2: In addition to the above there will be dispatched to LEGUMINOUS the 1392 Engineer Aviation Battalion now loading HOLLANDIA and the 1373 Engineer Aviation Battalion now enroute to LEYTE ETA 27 May. These units will move on SWP 1ST'S. ETA LEGUMINOUS will be given later.

Part 3: In addition there is now at LEYTE ready for shipment the 872 and 1906 Engineer Aviation Battalions and Headquarters Company 1113 Engineer Construction Group. Query can you furnish transportation for these units.

Part 4: For administrative convenience the units indicated in Parts 2 and 3 will be assigned to Far East Air Forces and will upon arrival LEGUMINOUS pass to your temporary operational control during the period of work at LEGUMINOUS. They will be moved forward to DIABOLIC upon the initiation of that operation.

21 0114 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S WAR DEPT.

CX 16657. Joint Staff Study Preliminary Draft of OLYMPIC Naval and Amphibious operations contains some features which appear to require clarification. The following ASE IN are included in this 7 part radiogram.

Part 1: There are a number of differences in the concept of land operations. Your page MAINLAND Appendix A. Over the concept which was outlined to you during recent conferences. Without going into detail which I hope to furnish you shortly in the form of a written plan. The following is outlined for your information. Total for the operation. 14 Divisions and 1 Regimental Combat Team, 12 Divisions and 1 Regimental Combat Team to be mounted in assault. 1 Division plus 1 Regimental Combat Team of the above available for preliminary operations. The main landings to be 3 simultaneous Corps landings on the East, Southeast and West coasts. A Corps of 2 Divisions to be in floating reserve and 1 InfDiv and 1 Airborne Div as follow-up. 40th Div from TRAGEDY and 153th RCT from WHITENASH constitute the force for preliminary operations. 14th Corps with 25th and 33rd Divs from WHITENASH and 41st Div from FORERUNNER assaults East coast. 11th Corps with 1st Cavalry Div and 43rd Div from WHITENASH and Americal Div from OXYGEN effects SE coast landing. The 5thPhilCorps makes west coast landing. The 9th Corps with the 96th Div from MANHOLE and 31st Div from ACCUMULATION is in the reserve afloat. 77th Div from LEGUMINOUS and the 11th Airborne Div from WHITENASH follow-up echelon.

Part 2: On Page 6 it is indicated that the Army Air Forces operating in the POA would be subject to measures of coordination CINCPAC found necessary including air traffic control. The agency which is to execute his traffic control is not stated. As applied to the OLYMPIC air forces in BUNKHOUSE it is believed that at some stage of the build-up it would be advisable to assign this duty to the Army Air Force Commander since his force will probably be the larger and his missions of primary interest. It is suggested however that this factor does not need settlement at this time or definition in advance but probably should be left to commanders, on the spot for local arrangement.

---Continued---
Part 3: On page 6 and again on page 23 there is a strong indication that the mission of attack on hostile shipping is given solely to fleet aircraft based in BUNKHOUSE. The Army Air Forces which are to be displaced to BUNKHOUSE contain types of planes ideally suited to the attack of shipping. Especially merchant shipping. Both during daylight hours and at night. The aviators have had careful training and much experience in this type of operation. Attack on shipping with the objective of interrupting hostile efforts to move resources into or out of MONKEYPUZZLE is intimately connected with the land campaign and the Army Air Force mission will include this task. Coordination can be obtained locally in BUNKHOUSE.

Part 4: Page 23 indicates that the 1st MarAirWing will be attached initially to the 5thPhibCorps. When questioned on this subject Admiral Sherman indicated that this would not restrict CINCPAC reassigning this unit to a centralized air control if he so desired. Request confirmation of this understanding.

Part 5: Page 36 indicates that CINCPAC assumes responsibility for supply of all bulk Class 3 products for all forces in the operation. It is understood that a study of this matter is now in progress in Washington. Therefore, the statement is but noted at this time with the suggestion that discussion be deferred pending determination of the results of the Washington conference.

Part 6: Page 11 indicates that control of the Army Air Forces will pass at a time mutually agreed upon by ComPhibPac and the Army Air Force Commander. It is believed that it would be advisable that this time be arranged directly between CINCPAC and CINCPAC.

Part 7: There are numerous questions, mostly of omission in the plan, relating to the control and coordination of signal communications. These relate to the supply of naval signal communication equipment for shore installations. Responsibility for installation and the assistance to be expected from Army construction agencies. Responsibility for installation of radar facilities, etc. Such matters eventually must be agreed upon, but it is assumed that they will be subjects of further detailed staff conferences and therefore are not cited in detail here.
This is ComNorPac OpOrd 4-45. Task Organization:
   404th BomSqn - 12 B-24s
   77th BomSqn - 16 B-25s
   13, 54th and 344th FldSqs - 75 P-38s
   FairWing 4 - 24 Venturas.
B. TF 91 - AlSeaFron Forces - RAdm Wood.
C. TF 92 - Surface Striking Force - Capt. Thompson
   Crudiv - DesRon 114, ATR 32.

1. General situation: Japanese shipping OKHOTSK SEA will increase as
   ice fields clear. Enemy forces: Estimated that in the Northern and Central
   KURILES enemy has only miscellaneous picket boats, escort vessels, merchant
   shipping and not more than 20 planes all types.
   Own Forces: Friendly submarines are operating North Pacific Area.
   CINCPAC SOP-1 and Addendum 8 thereto effective.
   Neutral Forces: Info Soviet shipping OKHOTSK SEA given my OpOrd
   2-45. Visual communications neutral shipping accordance Hydrographic Office
   publication 87.

2. Mission: This force will destroy enemy shipping in the OKHOTSK SEA
   and North Pacific Ocean Areas to the limit of its capabilities in order to
   damage the enemy and harass him to the maximum possible.

3. Tasks:
   A. Air Force: As directed or when enemy shipping is located conduct
      strikes against enemy shipping in the PARAMUSHIRO-SHMUSHU Area
      or MATSUNA Area.
   B. AlSeaFron forces provide tanker MASSACRE BAY.
   C. Surface Striking Force when directed intercept and destroy
      enemy shipping. Utilize services ATR 32 at discretion.

Para. For Air-Sea rescue operations Para 1 Annex E my OpPlan 1-45 apply.
This OpOrd effective 12 hours W (40) April 30th.

4. Logistic support available ATTU.

5. Communications accordance UST 70A (NorPacSupp). Rendezvous MASSACRE
   BAY. US W time (40). ComNorPac at ADAK.

22 1530 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMINC, MARCORPS, CEFMPAC, COPOA, CINCPAC PEARL

CX 16812, Your 130005. Agree to removal Marine Corps from DIABOLIC replacing
same with the 2 garrison divisions from US now scheduled for CenPac. 1st 2
Marine Divisions to come out prior to CORNET (Approximately by X plus 90)
and remaining division to be removed in accordance with the then existing
situation.

23 0213 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINC

Your CX 16657 DTG 210114. Concerning Part 1 see parenthetical note at
top of Page 14 my preliminary draft CINCJC. As therein stated my Appendix A
in connection ground forces was included for orientation only and on re-
ceipt your plan will be amended to conform thereto.

Para. Concerning Part 2 agree that it is not necessary for me to designate
now the officer who will be my representative for coordinating local air
traffic control. You may be assured that he will be a competent senior
flying officer.

Concerning Part 3 I expect to employ carrier forces light naval surface
forces submarines and shore based aircraft to complete the task of destroying
enemy naval forces and shipping. Their basic coordination will be effected
from my headquarters with additional coordination by designated commanders
in the operating area. There is no objection to the participation of Army
Air Forces in operations against naval forces and shipping providing that
the necessary coordination is effected but I strongly recommend that the Army
Air Forces deployed in the Ryukyus be selected for their suitability for
attack on objectives in Japan in direct preparation for the land campaign
as envisaged in our earlier discussions of action required to create the
conditions most favorable to the success of OLYMPIC. This task is by no means
as well in hand as is the destruction of enemy naval forces and shipping.
Which has reached an advanced stage.

Concerning Part 4 the 1st Marine Air Wing is attached to the 5thPhibCorps
to assist in providing the direct air support which is requisite in opera-
tions of the character of those in prospect. I would expect the Army commander
in the exercise of his authority and responsibility to employ the Marine
ground and air units in the manner which in his opinion would contribute
most to the success of the operation using Marine aircraft to support Marine
ground troops in cases where other considerations are not in his opinion
more important.

Concur in your Part 5.

Concerning Part 6 will propose new draft which will require ComPhibsPac
and Army Air Commander to recommend and CINCAPAC and CINCPAC to decide time
control is to be passed.

Concerning Part 7 draft of communication annex will be prepared to imple-
ment basic concepts on which we have agreed and will be ready for next
conference. Detailed discussion follows in separate dispatch.

23 0215 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

1. Request reconsideration of your 211315. The ships involved will for
the most part be carriers and destroyers which have recently completed
overhaul and are badly needed in the combat area or will be escort carriers
engaged in training much needed replacements. At this particular time the
ships cannot be spared without adverse effect on actual combat operations.

2. An inherent feature of FIREBREAK was the expedited departure of ships
preparing for sea. Because of the difficult labor situation I propose to
direct that if ordered the exercise shall be conducted without any inter-
ference with Navy Yard or supply base schedules or any other effect on the
civilian labor situation.

23 0559 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COMINCH (CONTINUED)

Submit to me your comment on ComGenAARPOA 210635.

23 0849 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCAPAC.

Reply to JCS WAPX 86160 DTG follows: Owing to the character of the war
in the FOA which has been primarily naval amphibious and aerial the employ-
ment of the agencies of the Office of Strategic Services in the FOA has been
very limited. The minor services rendered could have been rendered equally
effectively by appropriate agencies of the War & Navy Depts.

Although the OSS has been anxious to assist and cooperate it is my consid-
ed opinion that better results would have been obtained and can be obtained
in the future if the missions now assigned to the OSS are reassigned to the
War and Navy Departments insofar as the FOA are concerned.

I have no adequate basis for comment on the need for the OSS in land
campaigns in large land masses.
Preliminary reply to Part 7 Urdis 210114 (CX 16657). Submitted for your consideration are following proposals with respect to general allocation of responsibilities for provision of communication facilities and service. The term Communication Plan as used herein embraces both operational and logistical aspects.

Subject amphibious phase communication plan. For amphibious phase of operations an overall amphibious communication plan extending through the landing phase until CINCPAC takes charge on shore. To be prepared under direction of CINCPAC. For this purpose direct communication between certain Army and Navy commanders concerned (especially ComphibsPac & CG 6th Army) will be essential.

Subject communication plan for land campaign. Propose CINCPAC prepare an overall communication plan including shore based naval forces, Naval and Marine aircraft, Army ground and Army air forces.

Subject responsibility for providing facilities. Consider generally that the using service should supply necessary facilities with certain exceptions especially where one service may more efficiently provide for both services such for example as the outside wire plant and airways facilities by Army and ship-shore communications by Navy.

A. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for communications facilities required to support naval forces and naval operations except as noted below.

B. CINCPAC to assume responsibility for following communications ashore in addition to facilities normally required for support of Army forces and operations,

1. Airways communications, radio aids to aerial navigation except Loran, airport control communications and procedures, except Navy to furnish facilities for Navy and/or Marine airfield control.

2. Organization of integrated area air warning and fighter direction system. Note that on Page 64 of Appendix E MySer 0005053 of 13 May 2 Marine Air Warning Squadrons are contemplated. These might be employed as part of radar system with sitting such that fighter direction personnel will control air defense sector in which VMF normally operate.

3. Installation military wire system to be by Army. Reference is para 2(F) of CINCPOA Conf. Ser. 1105L-45. Normally advance base wire installations in POA have been thus accomplished. Request CINCPAC continue this procedure to avoid duplication in material planning and procurement and in training of personnel. Present policy of Army assuming general responsibility for land line construction and operation of major central offices has been notably successful in POA.

C. Joint Communications to be employed to that extent which will effectively satisfy the operational needs of the various commands involved in order to effect obvious economies.

Para 5. Subject is responsibility for installation of radar facilities.

A. Surface search radar for harbor defense will be provided by Navy as part of the harbor defense organization.

B. Airwarning and fighter direction radar has been treated above. It will require consideration in conference especially to insure adequate shore based radar and fighter director units during early phases of landings.

C. Gun and SL control radar are integral with artillery units and control is a phase of overall command of the defense organization. To facilitate action prefer hereafter to keep separate our messages on radar and those on communications. - Continued -
6. Request comment on foregoing in order to establish basis for further agreements and planning. Particularly desire your proposals on any other communications subjects considered essential. With agreement on general principles details to be determined in conferences particularly the coordination and continuity required for the communication plans for the amphib phase and the subsequent land operations.

24 0255
CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 93 INFO CTF 94, COMGNEF.

My OpPlan 4-45. CTF 93 assigned responsibility neutralization MARCUS and enemy held bases in BONINS as well as responsibilities assigned in Sub-paragraph 3(e).

24 0258
CINCPAC ADV TO COMTHFELT INFO COMGEN 10, CTG 99.2.

Assume that TG 99.2 will make maximum effort against enemy air in KYUSHU as best counter to disrupt enemy forces now forming up to attack your forces.

24 0558
CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPOA PEARL INFO CINCPAC, COMGENPOA, CGAAPOA, CGFEAF.

Dates given in ComGenPOA RJ 61966 for arrival fighter groups are not in accord concept my 100717 which contemplates that FRICITION will be developed for temporary use under minimum standards to support OLYMPIC. Airfield development must be such as to accommodate 3 Fighter Bomber Groups by 15 October. Revised Base Development Directive in preparation.

24 1257
CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH.

I am not aware of the basic differences in connection with responsibilities and command structure referred to in your CX 16898 since they did not become apparent in our recent conference. Request that I be furnished specific information.

I consider that any basic differences should be resolved without delay and before any conferences take place on lower command levels or on staff levels. I therefore urge an early conference and hope that you will find it feasible to visit my headquarters for that purpose.

24 0518
CINSWPA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S WAR DEPT FOR GEN. MARSHALL.

CX 16898. Further to my CX 16557, 20 May, the completed study of CINCPAC OLYMPIC PLAN develops a number of basic differences in interpretation of intent of present planning directives relating to responsibilities and command structure over those held here. These will not be cited in detail now since it is not believed that they can be adequately covered by radio nor advantageously settled until an operational directive has been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime, the many other details of planning and coordination may proceed.
24 2237 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO CINCPAC INFO CINC PAC ADV.

WAR 87435. Directive to CINCPAC in WAR 62773 and WAR 62774 both dated 3 April 1945 to make plans and preparations for campaign in JAPAN is reference.

Para 2. Following responsibilities have been fixed by Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. CINCPAC is charged with censorship of civilian communications in JAPAN (including the 4 main islands, about 1,000 offshore islands, and KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLANDS but excluding the outlying islands as defined in JCS 1231).

B. The War Department will make available to CINCPAC all civil censorship plans for JAPAN as defined in 2A above completed or in preparation to date and will continue the preparation of uncompleted plans and will continue to assist CINCPAC in planning, in procurement and training of censorship personnel, and in the procurement of technical censorship equipment to the same extent as heretofore has been done for CINCPAC.

25 0507 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

FOR VICE ADMIRAL COOKE.

During telephone conference this morning Rear Admiral Sherman's concurrence was asked in a proposed agreement concerning operational control of gunfire support ships. Since reception was not reliable request proposed language be transmitted by dispatch and concurrence be considered held in abeyance.

25 1102 GHQ SWPA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO C OF S ND, FOR MARSHALL.

CX 17032.

Your 241257. At our recent conference, the 2 conceptions of the OLYMPIC Plan were verbally presented by you and by myself. As I understood, your estimate envisioned the campaign as practically divided into 2: The 1st part under the Navy, and the 2nd part cooperatively under the Army and the Navy. The Navy part included practically everything up to and including the success of the beachhead landing. This involved Navy control and command of the Army's forces as well as those of the Navy. In the 2nd part, the Army forces were to operate under Army command while Navy forces were to remain under Navy command, cooperating under the principles of joint action. You will recall I disagreed with this concept, believing that the campaign should not be so divided; that the "campaign" as the term is used in Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1259/4 started many weeks before the actual landing, with the preparatory air phases which have very great effect upon land operations subsequent to landing; that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized this fact in their employment of the term "Campaign" and "Naval and Amphibious Phases of the Invasion" thus apparently contemplating an overall responsibility although each service would operate under the orders of its own commanders throughout. In the long amicable discussion which followed, it became evident that these points of difference were fundamental. It was therefore agreed that certain general principles which were mutually believed to be workable should be made of record and the Staff Study OLYMPIC which you had drawn up should be left at my headquarters for review. That review confirmed the policies enunciated verbally by you and clearly set forth your views of responsibility and command structure with which I had expressed disagreement.

The 1st part of the campaign was to be under your command with you and your subordinate naval commanders not only controlling the operation but actually
COMAsk Commanding IT, including the Army troops. All publicity, including Army as well as Navy elements, was to be controlled by you. After the beachhead was secured and the Army Command Post was established ashore, the Army troops were to report to me and their control for the remainder of the campaign was to be in my hands. The naval elements in this 2nd phase were to remain under your command and cooperate with me in support. Our review yielded many other differences flowing from this basic difference, and showed clearly that a directive defining these fundamental points was necessary before further discussions of this feature. Thank you very much for your invitation to come to Guam. I or my planners if I am unable to come will accept it immediately on receipt of the operational directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

25 2217 COMAFIRFIL TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVPAC, COMAIRPAC.

Your 190749, and also considering KEMEBOCKS. Subject to modification after inspection the following are considered important for consideration.

(A) Airline distance from Empire targets to EMILNEMOK and LEYTE not greatly different but surprise attacks from EMILNEMOK would involve less steaming than from LEYTE. EMILNEMOK closer to navy yards and closer to replenishment sources.

(B) EMILNEMOK weather offers less danger and more benefits to men and material.

(C) If EMILNEMOK is used generous provision should be made for maintenance, replenishment, aircraft pool, service, recreation and water transportation before first visit of combatant forces. Until such full and adequate facilities can be provided at EMILNEMOK the fleet would do better at LEYTE.

(D) By restoring about 1/2 of former maximum shore facilities plus appropriate floating facilities EMILNEMOK can base and support 3 fast carrier groups and related shipping. Estimated 4 to 6 weeks to prepare EMILNEMOK for that load.

25 2315 CINCPAC ADV TO DEPCONF0TH AF INFO COMINCH, CINCAFPAC, CGPOA, CINCPOA PEARL, COMAIRAREA, ISCON INC.

Cincpoea concurs in the assignment to the operational and administrative control of the 20th AF of the Army Fighter Command at TWO JIMA with its fighter groups service and other units. Cincpoea also concurs in the temporary assignment to the operational control of the 7th AF of 20th AF fighter aviation to be deployed at OKINAWA and IE SHIMA.

The foregoing concurrence is contingent on the continued responsibility of the fighter commander at TWO JIMA to the Island Commander for the fighter defense of the island.

26 0842 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDNBFOR INFO COMTHFFLT, COMPHIBSPAC.

Request your early comment on feasibility occupying CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO without MINGPO PENINSULA using only Marines (5th PhibCorps plus 2nd MarDiv). Consult with ComGen5thPhibCorps and include his views. Assume neither ICEBERG 3D or OLYMPIC to be done in 1945.
Para 1. The extent to which military and naval requirements for airfields installations and facilities at PALMYRA, SAMOA, FIJI and NOUMEA have decreased make it an appropriate time to establish an American Flag commercial air service from the West Coast to AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND and I recommend that in the national interest such action be taken without delay.

Para 2. I recommend further that consideration be given now to establish an American Flag commercial air service from GUAM to SAN FRANCISCO at some future date. This service should be extended to MANILA if CINCPAC concurs.

Para 3. The number of civilians now travelling through the Pacific for various reasons would help support such a service and additional support could be given by assigning air mail to use available pay load.

Para A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the invasion of KYUSHU (Operation OLYMPIC), target date 1 November 1945, in order to:
   (1) Intensify the blockade and aerial bombardment of JAPAN.
   (2) Contain and destroy major enemy forces.
   (3) Support further advances for the purpose of establishing the conditions favorable to the decisive invasion of the industrial heart of JAPAN.

Para (B). CINCPAC-CINCPA:
   (1) Is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation OLYMPIC including control, in case of exigencies, of the actual amphibious assault through the appropriate naval commander.
   (2) Will make plans and preparations for the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN and cooperate with CINCPAC in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases thereof.

Para (C). CINCPAC-CINCPA:
   (1) Is charged with the responsibility for the conduct of the naval and amphibious (subject to Para B(1) above) phases of the OLYMPIC Operation, and will correlate his plans with CINCPAC-CINCPA.
   (2) Will cooperate with and assist CINCPAC in his plans and preparations for, and the conduct of, the campaign in JAPAN.

Para (D). The land campaign and requirements therefore are primary in the OLYMPIC Operation. Account of this will be taken in the preparations, coordination and execution of plans.

Para (E). CG EM 20th Air Force, will cooperate in the plans, preparations and execution of Operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 20th Air Force will come under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of Operations directed above.

Para 00. CG CML 20th Air Force, will cooperate in the plans, preparations and execution of Operation OLYMPIC and in the continuance of the campaign in JAPAN. At appropriate times, to be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 20th Air Force will come under the direction of the appropriate commander for the support of Operations directed above.

26 0231 CONTHFLT & COM3RDFJ TO CINCPOA ADV HQ.

Originators jointly recommend your OpPlan 4-45 be made effective 2400(-9) 27 May at which time command of all forces then attached 5th Flt except NEW MEXICO and assigned escorts will be passed to Commander 3rd Fleet.
1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have made a general proposal to the British regarding their taking over a part of the present SWPA and in turn the British have asked certain questions regarding U.S. intentions in the area.

2. The following is under consideration here as a basis for reply to the British. Your comment is requested, to include advice as to initial steps in the progressive turnover and the approximate timing.

(A) Question. Is it the intention of the United States Chiefs of Staff to leave all Australian forces in this area when they give it up? Answer. Yes. In addition it is the intention that all other Allied forces (except U.S.) will remain in the area when the United States give it up.

(b) Question. If so, will they continue to provide for the Australian forces such equipment and logistics as the Australians cannot provide? Answer. Except for emergency supply, the Australians government provide their own equipment and logistic support from local resources and through normal lend-lease channels. The United States will not be responsible for preparation of equipment and logistics for the Australians when the area is given up, except that consideration will be given under normal lend-lease procedures to requests for specific items of equipment which cannot be met from Empire resources.

(C) Question. Will the United States Chiefs of Staff leave the base installations and administrative personnel which are at present being used by the Australian forces? Answer. At present the Australians are not using U.S. base installations for their support. The U.S. does not intend to remove fixed base installations from the area but will displace forward all required movable installations or parts thereof and movable items of equipment and material including refrigeration, tankage and heavy construction equipment. When all supplies and equipment required by the U.S. are evacuated, bases and any remaining equipment will be disposed of by normal procedures.

Para. No U.S. administrative personnel, except some amphibious engineers presently employed in operations, are furnishing direct support to Australian forces. All U.S. administrative personnel now in the area, including amphibious engineers, required in the forward areas will be removed. If the roll-up of U.S. bases is delayed beyond 1 October, it will be necessary to leave some U.S. administrative personnel as caretakers for supplies to be moved forward at a later date.

(b) Question. Will the U.S. Chiefs of Staff leave an amphibious lift? The British Chiefs of Staff reckon that a self-contained lift for at least 1 division with necessary maintenance facilities will be required. Answer. No. However, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff consider that when amphibious operations for the area are approved, allocation of assault shipping should be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the light of the priority and requirements of other forces.

(C) Question. Will the U.S. Chiefs continue to supply the Australian forces with airfield constructional resources? Answer. No. At present U.S. airfield construction effort is not being furnished in support of Australian forces. Steel mat has been furnished. Airfield construction for Australian forces should be by their own troops and from local resources supported as necessary by resources obtained from Empire production and from lend-lease through normal procedures.
(F) Question. Will the U.S. Chiefs of Staff be prepared to support allocations of merchant shipping for the operation and maintenance needs of the area?

Answer. While Australian forces remain under command of CINCSWPA, shipping is made available for their support from U.S. allocations. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are prepared to consider allocations of merchant shipping for the operational and maintenance needs of the area when under British command on the same basis as allocations are made for other areas.

(G) Question. To what extent do the U.S. Chiefs of Staff propose to continue to depend on the civil resources of Australia?

Answer. It is estimated that the SWPA is receiving from AUSTRALIA some 70,000 measurement tons per month of which approximately 35,000 are perishable food and 35,000 dry cargo. The U.S. will continue to depend on Australian resources at the approximate present rate of production based on existing contracts. To do otherwise would disrupt present logistical set up and undoubtedly entail an additional drain on overall shipping. It is probable that U.S. requirements for prefabricated buildings from Australian resources will terminate with the expiration of present contract demands.

3. In addition to the above, the following is under consideration as the dividing line between British and U.S. areas of command: Beginning on the coast of INDO-CHINA at 15-00 N, through BALABAC STRAIT along the 1939 boundary line between the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO to 03-00 N; thence East to 05-00 N 130-00 E; thence South to the equator; thence East to 140-00 E; thence generally southeast to 02-20 S 156-00 E; thence East to 02-20 S 159-00 E; thence South. U.S. control of the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS is necessary due to the extensive naval facilities that have been assembled at MANUS and its continued use as a primary base west of HAWAII for the support of U.S. naval forces.

4. The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate that once decision is made, the turnover of area and forces be accomplished on a schedule to be arranged between COMSIPAC and the British authorities JCS approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

26 2315 CINCPOA ADV TO AFLOA INFO COMINCH, CINCSWPA, COMAARPA, COMLTHLT, CMHBF, DEFCOM 20 AF.

My Op-Plan 4-45 modified by my 131239 and 240255 becomes effective 271500 May. All references not held or needed by all. All forces then in 5thFlt will pass to operational control of Com3rdFlt except:

(A) Commander KYUSHU Forces (CTF 99) will be under the direct command of CINCPOA.

(B) NEW MEXICO (BB 40) and assigned escorts will remain under operational control of Com5thFlt until otherwise directed.

27 0117 CINCPOA ADV TO COMAIRPAC, CONSIPAC, COMKBPAC, COMJEPAC, CMHBF, COMLTHLT, COMSIPAC, COMBFPAC, COMCINCPAC, COM5THFAC, COM5THFFOR.

The JCS have directed Operation OLYMPIC with target date of 1 November. Accordingly as indicated in my 100717 Phase 3D ICEBERG will be executed about 15 July and Phases 30 and 3E and also Operation LONGTON are indefinitely deferred. Base development at FRICOSTON will be such as to accommodate a maximum fighter bomber strength not later than 15 October and no construction will be undertaken which will not directly support OLYMPIC.
28 0058 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH-CNO INFO CINCPOA PEARL.

I am considering use ENIWETOK as a carrier task force anchorage primarily because of the shortening of lines of supply which will result for forces operating off HONSHU and secondarily because of the better climatic conditions and better shore facilities. Intend initiate use in late July by 1 task group building up as developments warrant until by OLYMPIC target date 3rdFlt could base primarily in ENIWETOK-GUAM-SATIVAN and 5thFlt in bases to westward. Plans are not yet firm. Purpose of this dispatch is to inform you of trend of our planning.

28 0059 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH AND CNO INFO COMAIRPAC.

CNO 261832 which crossed my 270540 and 270541 was addressed direct to ComAirPac and requested his comment on proposals for changes in deployment of heavy and medium landplane search squadrons. My 270540 and 270541 are intended to increase and strengthen Fleet Air Wing 4 for strategic reasons in connection KEMBLOCKS 4 and prospective 3rdFlt operations. Request all matters of deployment of naval combatant forces within Pacific Ocean Areas be referred to CINCPAC-CINCPOA.

28 0124 CINCPAC ADV HQ TO CINCSTPA.

Your 270722 and 271314. Visit of General Casey and party completely convenient and will expect them tomorrow Tuesday.

General Chamberlain's visit will probably be convenient but there is a possibility of conflicting requirements. Suggest you give me exact date when he would arrive and by the time it is received I expect to be able to reply definitely.

General Kenney's conference with General Giles is agreeable and my staff will be available to discuss any subject he desires on an exploratory basis.

28 2356 COM5THFIB TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM5THFIB, CG5THFIBCORPS, CGFAFPAC.

In view your 270317 reply your 260342 is made for possible future reference. On basis present intelligence seizure islands with Marine Forces allotted deemed feasible even though peninsula in enemy hands. Heavy reinforcement particularly in artillery of peninsula prior assault would hazard success of operation. Temporary occupation of tip of peninsula during initial assault CHUSAN may be desirable for security. Enemy recapture of peninsula after withdrawal security force and his practicable reinforcement of peninsula which is in medium artillery range of projected airfields other island installations AND best Fleet anchorage would hamper development phase. Possibility continued enemy attempts to effect carrier landings and necessity occupying approach islands to westward of CHUSAN would require large permanent garrison estimated as 4 divisions thereby necessitating retention Marines or their replacement by Army divisions. Subsequent seizure peninsula employing additional forces might prove necessary to insure unimpeded development and fruitful employment base facilities. ComGen5thFibCorps consulted and concurs.

29 0246 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH-CNO INFO CGAPPAC ADMTH, CINAPPAC, CGEAF, CINCPOA PEARL DEPROM 20th AF.

In view of agreements recorded in myser 0005057 of 19 May request that you coordinate with CINAPPAC all proposals for deployment in KYUKYS of Army Air Forces other than VIP groups and the units now definitely planned for deployment in Phases 1, 2, 3D of ICEBERG this replies to your 280327 not to all.
This replys to your 211252 not to all or needed. See also my 152347.

(A) Acorn 54 will be retained in 15th Echelon.
(B) AWASE construction will be expedited to accommodate MAG 14 and MAG 33.
(C) Initial increment 200 airplanes carrier pool to be established AWASE October 15 increased to 500 airplanes as practicable after departure MAG 14.
(D) MAG 14 will be displaced forward in November.
(E) Development of airstrip TSUGEN SHIMA will be deferred. Information regarding augmented airfield development program will be furnished you later after conference with CINCAPPAC.

Your 280929. See my 051250 concerning minefield clearance.

CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFlT.

Cinacap Adv 260625, ComServRon 10 290227, ComAirPac 260123 and Com3rdFlt 252217 which is passed to you separately. Request immediate comments and recommendations on proposal to base and support fast carrier groups at ELEMETOK (1 in July and building up to 3 US and 1 British by October) together with carrier pool of 300 aircraft, 2 carrier air groups staging without aircraft and the tactical aircraft contained in ComAirPac 260123 less 1 VPB(HL) and 1 VMSB squadron plus 1 VF(N) squadron.

Coordinated attack group of 9 submarines will soon force entrance to JAPAN SEA and commence shipping attacks therein on N-Day (now planned for 9 June) to continue for about 2 weeks. This operation will create new opportunities for the destruction of shipping and intensification of the blockade of JAPAN.

Para. For DepCom AF 20. Request PomCom 21 maintain mine blockade of SHIMONOSEKI STRAITS and satellite ports of FUKUOKA and KARATSU during this period and devote remainder of mining effort to attrition and blockade of ports on the north coast of HONSHU after N-Day.

Para. For Com3rdFlt. Desire that FairWing 1 be prepared to intensify shipping strikes on west coast of KIUSHU, off KOREA and in TSUSHIMA STRAITS, employing mines as practicable to drive KOREA Coast-hugging shipping into the open.

Para. Inform only those who need to know that submarines are to enter JAPAN SEA and period of their operations therein.

In view recommendations UrDis 230215 not to all I do not propose to direct implementation FIREBREAK as an exercise. MyDis 211315 refers.
30 0525 CINCPAC ADV TO CONFRDLT INFO CTF 36, COMTHFLT, COM-1ST CARTASKFORCE

Possible developments Japanese electronics industry contain potential threat our forces. Most effective countermeasure is destruction of electronic tube production concentrated in 6 plants named on Cinnac-Cincoa priority list Japanese strategic targets 16 May 1945. Suggest these plants be considered primary strategic targets in any strikes against the empire in the TOKYO area. However not recommended unless there is available sufficient force to destroy 1st 2 plants TOKYO Area.

30 0526 CINCPAC ADV TO CONF OCM & CHO

Your 282150. The future activities of the combatant forces British Pacific Fleet in the war against JAPAN should fall into 2 principal categories. In the 1st they would base on AUSTRALIA with an advance base at MANUS and operate against JAPAN with the 3dFIt sharing anchorages (but with no British shore installations) at ULITHI and ENIWETOK. In the 2nd category they would operate to reopen the MALACCA STRAIT and liberate the enemy held areas in the British command area, proposed by JCS 250128. For this purpose they would need a base in the SOUTH CHINA SEA for which BRUNEL BAY seems well suited. If it is to be captured it seems fundamental that it should be developed. If it is not to be developed and used its capture seems questionable. Para. I see no need for a British base in the PHILIPPINES for either category of operations. If it later develops that British ships operate against JAPAN with a line of supply through MALACCA STRAIT ULITHI and LEYTE can be used as advanced anchorages. Para. In the foregoing I do not regard temporary British augmentation of the United States carrier aircraft pools et cetera as constituting British shore installations.

30 0632 CINCPAC ADV TO CONFRDLT INFO CTF 38, CINCPAC PEARL

Re UrDis top sec 290237. Subject photography is not to be undertaken as a priority 1 task assignment for your forces. Special beach photography requested in UrDis top sec 110518 and 290658 is to be considered a priority 1 photo mission consistent with your recoo and damage assessment photographic requirements when your carriers are operating against targets in southern DIAMICL.

30 0626 CINCPAC ADV TO DEP COM 20 AF INFO CINCPA OA, COMFWDAREA, CINCPAC PEARL

Your 180631 which in effect recommended construction of storage for and build up of VLR ammunition stocks in MARIANAS to 324,550 tons. After careful consideration all factors including the more urgent requirements imposed by OLYMPIC preparations throughout the Pacific decision to limit VLR ammo storage in MARIANAS to total 150,000 W7 tons as indicated in Cinnac Pearl 190102 is confirmed. Recommendations of ComFWDArea based on agreement between that Hq and Comcen 21 BomCom have been approved for distribution between islands as follows: Guam 50,000 SAFAPAN 30,000 TENTIAN 70,000. Due to shortage of shipping and of service troops for construction, handling and transportation of VLR ammo as well as serious backlog of cargo awaiting discharge in MARIANAS and necessity for priority construction of other essential installations it is regretted that additional VLR ammo storage cannot be favorably considered at this time. Para. See ComcenPOA's 280033 concerning troop shortages. Para. Limitation of 150,000 W7 tons applies to construction of facilities in accordance with prescribed safety standards. There is no objection to augmentation of stocks in authorized storage space as feasible provided safety factors in regard to storage are acceptable to both 20AF representatives and is concerned and provided further that additional stocks are not handled at the expense of other material considered more essential by ComFWDArea-1945.
Your 292207. On assumption ATHELING, RAJA and TRACKER were furnished British under lend lease recommend strongest possible representations for their continuance in the Pacific with American crews if necessary.

From BPFLO. Cincpac Adv 270117 and 280058.

1. As early in July as possible after rest and replenishment at LEYTE, TF 37 will commence strikes on targets in HONSHU HOKKAIDO and KURILES. Subject to continued availability to Cincpac he plans to include TF 37 in strikes when fleet returns from replenishment and battle damage repairs. Anticipated that offensive operations will continue up to OLYMPIC.

2. Plans for possible use of ENIMETOK allow for TF 37 to use this anchorage commencing by October. Meanwhile TF 37 works from LEYTE. Plans contemplate inclusion British aircraft and personnel in carrier pool at ENIMETOK.

3. Length of operations referred to in Para 1 will probably be shorter than in ICEBERG before groups return to forward anchorage but increased distances of targets will make matter of tanker groups crux of problem.

4. Admiral Nimitz approves this dispatch.

Your 290525. Cincpac Adv 201326 provides for shipment to OKINAWA of 6 or 7 MTB's to arrive about 20 June primarily for air sea rescue duties. Necessary retain this area for use in garrison duty and Phase 3 large numbers of LCI types which have proved to be very effective against enemy small craft. Consider remaining enemy boat and barge traffic can be successfully countered. In view of this and early advent of typhoon season with facilities for protection small craft against heavy weather already overtaxed recommend that no additional MTBs be moved forward at present. Consideration should be given to their advance in sufficient time for OLYMPIC.

Your 300110. As stated in my 061410 April I cannot see any need for KB craft in FOA and therefore concur in Para 1 your 300110.
Effective 31J500 (GCT) MAY this Hqtrs adopts the additional title of Hq 10th Army and RYUKYUS AREA to be used exclusively for correspondence and written orders dealing with RYUKYUS Area affairs. This title is not authorized for radio traffic for which the titles ComGen 10 and CTF 99 remain in effect for all dispatches addressed to this Hq. The adoption of above title does not imply a division of the Hq 10th Army staff which continues to perform triple function of:
1. Administering RYUKYUS Area affairs
2. Administering 10th US Army
3. Conducting 10th Army operations with attached Marine and Navy units.
Separate files established at this Hq for all correspondence orders dispatched to CG 10th Army and RYUKYUS Area or pertaining to administrative or tactical operations of RYUKYUS Area.

Request you direct CG 5th PhibCorps report by dispatch to ComGen 6th Army for purposes OLYMPIC planning.

Following under consideration here:
A. Return 2 Army divisions from OKINAWA to PHILIPPINES to reduce garrison permit entrance our air forces and eliminate large requirements OKINAWA for additional services. After discussion with Eastwood I will answer in affirmative and designating LETTE and MINDORO as stations unless otherwise advised.
B. Cancel KAIKI JIMA operation in order conserve shipping, engineer effort and service effort required for placing air on OKINAWA. Believe this will permit concentration effort on OKINAWA and result in heavier concentrating air to cover OLYMPIC although distances will be greater. Spruance, Turner, Hill and CINCPAC planners and also Kenny favor this. Will give affirmative opinion for AFFAPC unless otherwise advised. Please acknowledge.

My 010042 originated by Major General Chamberlin.

Concur proposals contained in your 010042.
01 1157 COM3RDFT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMSUBPAC, COMBATION 2, CTF 36.

Tentative plans Empire strikes by TF 36 in July include long range bombardment HOKKAIDO and HONSHU targets from approaches which current intelligence shows to be free of mines. In order to verify this information and permit bombardment shorter ranges request submarine mine reconnaissance inside 100 fathom curve be conducted earliest practicable in following areas with order of priority indicated:
1. East Coast HONSHU between 36-20 N and 37-00 N.
2. Due south of NASDORO between 144-10 E and 144-40 E.
3. East of KALALSHU between 39-11 N and 39-20 N.
4. South Coast HONSHU between 137-20 E and 138-00 E.

01 1217 COM3RDFT TO CINCPAC ADV, COMBATION 2 INFO CTF 36.

See my O11157. Request 1 Division 2400-ton DMS be assigned TF 36 by 1 July. Desirable that division be given all training practicable as high speed sweeping unit prior this assignment. If approved intend this division sweep ahead of bombardment groups in approaching Empire targets.

02 0034 CINCPAC ADV TO COMEBPOA, CGAAPOA, CGLOTH ARMY, COMPHIBFOR, COMFIFPAC, COM3RDFTL IT CONSERVAC, COMETPAC, COMPHIBPAC INFO COMHPAC & CIN, CINTHFLT, CGOORDBOBPS COMCIPAC, COMSUBPAC, COMPAC, CINOPAC PEARL, CTF 96, CINSCPA, CGSFIFPAC, CINAPAC

Cancel N01157, No FM Sonar equipped submarines now in area except 9 about to enter JAPAN SBA. Recommend no diversion of these ships. New gear now being installed PEARL as received from coast. 1 new submarine may be able to investigate requested areas beginning 8 July. Will make preliminary investigation requested areas with REDPEN beginning about 20 June. Her gear has no security hence use depends on absence A/S vessels. Therefore cannot guarantee success but will do what we can.

02 0317 COMSUBPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COM3RDFTL, COMSUBPACADCOM, A10, CTF 17.10

COM3rdFlt O11157. No FM Sonar equipped submarines now in area except 9 about to enter JAPAN SBA. Recommend no diversion of these ships. New gear now being installed PEARL as received from coast. 1 new submarine may be able to investigate requested areas beginning 8 July. Will make preliminary investigation requested areas with REDPEN beginning about 20 June. Her gear has no security hence use depends on absence A/S vessels. Therefore cannot guarantee success but will do what we can.

02 0600 COMPHIBPAC TO COM7THFPAC FOR INFO COMPHIBGRP 12, CG6TH ARMY, COMTRANSRON 16, CMTFHPTL, CINPOA ADV.

Your serial 00013 of 22 May concerning Amphibious training very helpful and appreciated. Letter to ComPhibGrp 12 now being issued directs him as TG or TF Cdr of 7thFlt to coordinate detailed training procedures with ComPhib and ComBen 6th Army accordance best amphibious practices.

Para. Following comment on the reference:
A. Consider amphibious training group and special schools for officers training will be very useful as that course might be expanded to 2 weeks. Desire to send to you if you agree for attachment to training group staff officers from PhibsPac experienced in recent operations for advice and lectures on subjects of naval gunfire support, air support, UDT operations, beach party operations, control line operations, amphibious communications and transport quartermaster duties for ships and troops.
B. With present plan of having ComPhibGrp 12 in direct charge of training there is doubt as to value of mobile training units as now organized.

- Continued -

3151
02 0600 COMHIBPAC TO CONGENPOA INFO COMHIBCRP 12, ETC. - CONTINUED.

Suggest possible reduction numbers of officers in units and that if used these units be ordered report to ComTransition 16 for duty.

C. In my letter am placing emphasis on desirability of training divisions as a whole JNT/FOR shore parties and all other units and also desirability of training Corps (1 group missing) FREGUNI THOME. Due lack of time and ships this may not be initially possible but am making effort obtain additional ships because training major staffs only during rehearsals is not entirely satisfactory.

Para. Any initial arrangements agreeable to you and ComHibCrp 12 satisfactory to me with reserve that desirable changes may be agreed on later.

02 0607 CINCPOA ADV TO CONGENPOA, CONSERVPOA INFO CINCAFPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, COMTHPT, CONAIRPAC, CNO.

1. Preliminary conference with representatives CINCAFPAC discloses that CINCAFPAC has not included provision for wire communication within naval establishments ashore in OLYMPIC. Neither material nor troops on hand or under redeployment has been projected for this purpose.

2. Request immediate study be made jointly to determine material and personnel requirements for installation and operation of wire interior communication facilities for all naval installations ashore in OLYMPIC. ComAirPac requested to advise you of naval and marine air requirements. ComGenPOA requested submit projects for procurement of such personnel and material requirements which are in excess of POA resources now available or planned for other operations now indefinitely deferred. Note paragraph 2F my letter 11CL-45 which applies x

3. Following assumptions and considerations apply:
   (A) Army forces Pacific will install long lines system.
   (B) AFPAC will serve naval activities closely associated physically with Army installations.
   (C) Material procured under central Pacific projects for LONGBOM and other bases in the Pacific combat and MARIANAS areas, which may not now be required therefor, is available for use in OLYMPIC and CORONET.
   (D) Project wire installations on basis of contemplated naval developments ashore as contained in CINCPOA Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC or later estimates which may have been developed in conference with 7thFlt representatives.
   (E) Construction planned should generally be limited to tactical or semi-permanent type which will fulfill requirements and permit most expeditious installation.

02 0650 CINCPOA ADV TO CONGEN TEN INFO CINCAFPAC, CONGENPOA, CINCPOA PEARL, COMTHPT.

Pursuant to a directive from the JCS it is desired to release Army units in the POA to CINCAFPAC as soon as the services of such units can be spared. My Top Sec 14L341 May prescribes procedure for the release of Army units except those under ComGen 10.

Para. As Army units under ComGen 10 become available for release ComGen 10 will furnish designations of units and recommend dates of release to CINCPOA into ConGenPOA. On receipt concurrence of ComGenPOA CINCPOA will accomplish the release.

Para. For the present and least 1 Army and 1 Marine Division will be retained under ComGen 10 in the RUSKUS. In order to permit preparation for future operations Army divisions will be released in the sequence 77th, 7th, - Continued -
96th or as requested by CINCPAC. It has been agreed between CINCPAC and CINCPAC that 2 Army Divisions will be withdrawn from OKINAWA to the PHILIPPINES as soon as the tactical situation permits.

Para. Instructions covering the release of Headquarters 10th Army and Headquarters 24th Corps will be issued later.

Your 301935 informs that 27 WSA cargo vessels will load out starting mid-June for discharge BIVE. Request by return dispatch unit designation and tonnage breakdown for troops involved in order that they may be integrated into shipping echelons only in the manner which will most effectively support OLYMPIC preparations.

Your 011217. There are no 2200-ton destroyer mine sweepers. The 1630 ton ships of this type which have been converted and are now in operational condition are 4 in number and are operating under CTF 39. It is expected that they will be required to assist in performing the tasks mentioned in my 051230 and 290519 and your 230929 and 020411. The 8 2200 ton destroyer mine-layers which are operating with CTF 39 are not equipped for sweeping and are not available as carrier force screens.

ReUrDis CX 17519 DTG 010452 not to all or needed 1 flight 4 F-7 and 6 combat crews 36 combat mapping squadron will be made available as soon as possible to report to CINCPAC for operational control. ComGenAAFPOA hereby directed to take requisite action. Direct communication with CINCPAC and ComGen FEAF authorized as required to expedite.

On 4, 5 and 6 June 1 group of 3 submarines each day will pass through TSUSHIMA STRAITS for patrol in JAPAN SEA. Passage through the straits will be made submerged during daylight hours using the channel to the north and west of TSUSHIMA ISLAND. After entering JAPAN SEA they will remain undetected until all subs have reached their patrol stations. Date for starting attacks is tentatively scheduled for 9 June. Would appreciate any assistance your planes can render during this operation such as strafing and heckling antisubmarine vessels vicinity of TSUSHIMA and along north coast of HONSHU and east coast of KOREA.

My OpPlan 5-45 hereby placed in effect. T-Day will be confirmed later.
Your 010834.
1. Provided no unforeseen difficulties in making good battle damage become apparent when the Fleet is inspected on arrival at SYDNEY I expect TF 37 to be ready to sortie from either
   A. MANUS on the 2nd of July, or
   B. LEYTE on the 8th of July.
2. Information would be appreciated on the next combat and servicing areas to be allotted to TF 37 in order that consideration may be given to the best anchorage from which to operate.
3. If these areas are to be in the neighbourhood of HOKKAIDO or Northern HONSHU there would be much to be said for operating from MANUS rather than LEYTE. Advantages would be:
   A. The haul from MANUS to LEYTE would be OAVED.
   B. The typhoon area would be avoided.
   C. Some British air facilities are already established at MANUS.
   D. British air facilities would not require to be established at LEYTE for the present.
4. The main disadvantage would be the rather longer haul from MANUS to the probable servicing area which would be at present just beyond the capacity of my tanker resources. If the previous rates of striking are to be maintained, this disadvantage however would be offset if some of my tankers could occasionally draw from bulk of supplies at GUAM and SAIPAN.
5. Early advice on para 2 would be appreciated as in the event of operating the fleet from MANUS it will be necessary to divert to MANUS the aircraft pools at present planned to be established for the next operation at SAMAR.
6. On receipt of your reply I would like to send my assistant Chief of Staff Captain Brown to your headquarters at GUAM to discuss implications (such as that referred to in para 4) of long range operations to the northwards.

In estimating availability naval forces following now in 7th Flt are assumed to be available for assignment to 5th Flt for OLYMPIC. 6 CL, 9 DD, 14 DE, 6 AGC (3 large, 2 small), 60 LST, 24 LSM, 10 LCI(G), 15 LCS(L), 24 LCT. These totals do not include those FCT units assigned PhibGroup 12 for amphibious training or APAs AKAs LSMs LSTs assigned for temporary cargo and troop lifts all of which will be required for OLYMPIC. Advise as to whether or not these estimates can be met with ships in all respects ready for combat duty by 15 Sept. Further advise what additional ships or craft might be made available.

Your proposal to base the 414th Fighter Group at IWO JIMA as a unit of the 20th Air Force is approved. Please arrange details with Com MARIANAS direct
1. CINCPAC CINCPAC Staff Conferences at GUAM completed and CINCPAC conferees returned MANILA. Conference was highly productive and accomplished a great deal. Copies of memorandum record will be airmailed to you.

2. CINCPAC's Staff Study OLYMPIC was discussed in detail and concurred in generally except that it was incomplete as to definition of functions and provision for coordination of various air forces. This matter will be taken up separately with CINCPAC as soon as possible. For your information assault lift is required for 45,047 troops 72,852 vehicles 687,505 LWLT. I will submit my estimate of shipping implications shortly. It was not feasible to deploy at OKINAWA the full FEAF air strength planned and reductions were made as per paragraph 4 below.

3. OLYMPIC arrangements covered by conferees included determination of assault shipping requirements and roll up requirements, naval components of OLYMPIC troop list, location of planning staffs, withdrawal Army division from OKINAWA, amphibious training, withdrawal of Marine divisions from OLYMPIC Area, tentative deception plan, communication responsibilities, responsibilities for procurement movement and control of shipping and stockage of emergency supplies, evacuation, mounting and support of Marine troops, allocation of land areas, use of landing craft and harbor clearance and development.

4. Arrangements were completed for construction at OKINAWA of 11 air strips for Far East Air Force 6 for VLR groups a depot field at NAHA for Army Air Forces and 3 fields for Navy and Marines. This program will make available to FEAF tactical fields on which it is planned to deploy 21 groups from the PHILIPPINES. These added to 7 from the 7th AF 12 VLR groups 5 equivalent USMC groups and 2 equivalent Navy groups will make a total of 47 groups.

5. This involves movement from PHILIPPINES of FEAF units including 73,026 FEAF personnel 18,702 vehicles and dead weight tonnage of 164,596. It also involves use of 8 engineer battalions from SWPA and maximum practicable use of Army service and construction troops from other sources including redeployment. Principal controlling limitations will be suitable shipping and ability to unload cargo and clear it from ports and beaches. It represents the maximum practicable effort in the time available before OLYMPIC and can be accomplished only by the most careful handling of engineering and shipping resources. In order to ease the logistic load it has been agreed to withdraw 2 Army divisions to the PHILIPPINES as soon as the tactical situation permits.
MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR, RICHARDSON, NIMITZ.

WARX 10737. Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the basing of 10 squadrons of approximately 220 XG British aircraft (mainly Lancasters) in the RYUKYUS and it is contemplated that these forces will come under US command.

British have informally advised that 3500 British aviation engineers are prepared to sail in British ships from UK in mid June; 2500 more in mid July and 2500 in mid August; to be followed by some 8000 miscellaneous Army Engineers, totalling 16,500. Personnel will carry full equipment, tentage, and 1 month's rations. Subsequent logistic support is expected to be a British responsibility and not a drain on theater resources. These units are primarily intended for support of the RAf, but it is understood that they may be used for any purpose pending firming of plans for the deployment of British aircraft.

Your comments are requested as to desirability of immediate acceptance of these engineer units prior to the finalization of plans for employment of British air combat units, and on the shipping schedule proposed by the British. If June increment can be accepted, request shipping instructions.

04 0107 CINCBPFF TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COM7THFLT, CNB MANUS, SBNO MANUS, VAQ

In view of the forthcoming increase in the British Pacific Fleet I should be very grateful if you could provide some increase in the facilities at MANUS.

A. To enable larger numbers of the fleet to be serviced there during replenishment periods.
B. To provide a staging point in the line of supply which I believe American and certainly British experience has shown to be an important requirement.

2. These facilities are I believe essential requirements quite apart from the questions now under consideration regarding arrangements further forward.

3. The following are the main requirements contemplated:
A. An increase in British naval personnel at MANUS to approximately 50 officers and 750 ratings. This total would include all naval personnel except those at airstrips.
B. An increase in the number of British harbour craft and a site for the setting up of repair facilities for them.
C. A site for setting up small motor transport repair trucks.
D. At the earliest date which circumstances permit the establishment of a 2nd MONAB on another airstrip besides FONAM this will be manned by 45 officers and 450 ratings and will require accommodation for 90 disembarked aircraft 50 reserve aircraft and about 1600 officers and men.
E. The continued use of the existing recreational facilities on PITYILL.
F. The loan of up to 4 LCTs and 10 LCMs while the fleet is at MANUS until British craft can be provided.
G. The extra accommodation for personnel in (A) above will need to include extra huts for additional offices and camp stores.
H. A site for the erection of 60000 sq feet of covered storage.
I. Continued accommodation for handling fleet mail and sick cases awaiting air transport.
K. A possible requirement for setting up minor instructional facilities for the fleet. Equipment would be provided from British sources.

4. A great deal of time would undoubtedly be saved if some existing buildings and possibly some equipment could be lent for requirements A B D G and H. Similar quantities of sectional huts and sheds could be turned over in exchange from British supplies now arriving. - Continued -
5. It is understood that minesweeping section base MANUS is likely to be closed down shortly. If this can be turned over to us it would accommodate item B and 200 personnel for item A. This site would also provide room for expansion later if necessary.

6. It is proposed that this camp should be self contained as regards victualing and cooking, etc., but it would be greatly appreciated if remaining officers and men at the main camp could be victualled from US sources as existing personnel now are.

7. Depending on the amount of constructional work required, it may be necessary to use up to 300 British construction corps. These would not all be in addition to the numbers in Item A, some of whom would not arrive until the former had left. If para 5 above is approved, construction corps could erect their own tented accommodation alongside existing buildings, and would be self contained.

8. Item H could perhaps be erected at the minesweeping section base in continuation of existing sheds, but the dock would probably require to be enlarged.

9. I would like to say how grateful I am for the great assistance that we have always had from ComNavBase and his staff at MANUS. I fully realize that we are asking a great deal, but there is not time to build our own base if our ADS ONM ships are to operate this summer.

10. If you concur in these proposals I would like to send representatives to MANUS to discuss details such as water supply, electric power, telephones, docks, equipment, etc. on the spot.

JOINT SECURITY CONTROL TO CINCWPAC, CINCPAC, FRANK Info ON MISCA CHUNKING, REAR ECH HQ USF CHINA THEATER.

WARX 114. Overall Pacific deception objective provides cover and deception objectives for OLYMPIC as HOKKAIDO and FORMOSA shifting latter gradually to CHUSAN-SHANGHAI then to TSINGTAO. Those under study for CORONET are SHIKOKU and TSINGTAO shifting latter gradually to FUSAN and continuing HOKKAIDO as practicable. Special means of Joint Security Control have been used since immediately prior to ICEBERG to tell the following strategic story to explain why we landed OKINAWA instead of FORMOSA-Coast of SOUTH CHINA.

(1) Cincpac required strong base in RYUKYUS to protect right flank for further westward move.

(2) If European war had ended January 1945 OKINAWA would have been about CTME time but subsidiary to FORMOSA-SOUTH CHINA landings and made possible by forces from European theater redeployment.

(3) PHILIPPINES Operation lasted longer than estimated thus forces from there not available for westward operation.

(4) Hence OKINAWA only practicable operation in April.

(5) With occupation of OKINAWA high command now believes soon be in strong position for westward movement. Story ends.

Until receipt of your cover and deception plan for OLYMPIC and in order to keep strategic special means productive for future use JBS PCLAPTHEM continue deception story for present as follows:

(1) Recent movement of Jap strength from SOUTH CHINA to localities farther north have been noted but FORMOSA remains an enemy fortress and air base threat to our westward movement and this threat must be eliminated.

(2) Present plans contemplate an assault against FORMOSA this summer.

(3) Meanwhile investigation proceeding to determine most suitable landing field sites and harbors on CHINA Coast in vicinity of FORMOSA and to the north in order to mount further bombing offensive against enemy and to establish an oceanic supply line to CHINA.

- Continued -
04 1843 JOINT SECURITY CONTROL TO CINCSWPA, CINCPAC ADV ETC. (CONTINUED)

(4) Undoubtedly points on CHINA Coast which provide little or no enemy opposition will be favored. End Story. Such a story will provide opportunity for later plausible shift of story for cover and deception objectives farther north. Advise.

05 0612 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCBPFT INFO COMINCH CINCPAC PEARL COM3RDFLT COMSERO 10.

Your 040259.
1. At present time consider you should plan to sortie from MANUS as early in July as repairs to battle damage permit. Will keep you informed of any change of date.
2. Details of service areas have not yet been promulgated by Com3rdFlt but initial combat area will be NE of TOKYO.
3. It is not possible to draw bulk fuel supplies from MARIANAS but ULITHI could be used.
4. Concur with your proposal to send Capt. Brown to my Adv Hqtrs. Capt. Ewen USN will shortly be leaving GUAM to visit you and after conferring with you I would like him to confer with Com3rdFlt and CTF 38 before rejoining TF 37.

05 0658 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCAFPAO COMGENPOA CINCPAC PEARL.

1. Marshall's WARX 10737 passed to me by Richardson arrived after the completion of conferences between staffs of CINCAFPAO-CINCSWPA and CINCPAC-CINCPAC reported by my 041231. At about the same time I received a letter from Giles which requested concurrence in the following recommendations:
   A. That the 316th Wing be redeployed from LEGUMINOUS to North Field, TINIAN.
   B. That initially 1 Royal AF Wing of approximately 200 Lancaster or Lincoln aircraft be deployed to LEGUMINOUS vice the 316th Wing.
   C. That a logistical planning program be initiated to determine the feasibility of continued RAF augmentation in the POA until a final deployment of 40 Lancaster Squadrons is attained.
2. The proposal to base an additional VLR Wing at North Field TINIAN is not a new one. It was examined carefully and as stated in my 302255 May was found not to be feasible without undue interference with the support of other activities. Pertinent to this situation is the fact that on 31 May ComGenAAFPOA informed me with reference to future flow of Army aircraft through the MARIANAS "the tactical bases of the 21st BomCom have a maximum a maximum load at this time and cannot take any part of this traffic". It is increasingly evident that normal increases in Army and Navy staging requirements and transport services will saturate the airfield capacity and will absorb the logistic capacity available for that purpose in the MARIANAS. Accordingly I reaffirm that it is not logistically feasible to deploy an additional VLR wing in the MARIANAS between now and OLYMPIC.
3. Under agreements made with General MacArthur in MANILA on 16 May our engineering representatives have examined sites and consulted with the engineers in the field and as the result of efforts of the staffs working separately and in conference together there has been evolved a coordinated plan to exploit to a maximum the potentialities of OKINAWA and IE SHIMA to support the operations which must take place to prepare for OLYMPIC and to support the OLYMPIC Operations itself. We desired to install a larger air force but found it impossible to do so. As reported in my 041231 it was possible to deploy only the equivalent of 21 groups of the Far Eastern Air Force. Para.
Planned deployment of engineer troops in RYUKYUS now includes 37 Naval Construction Battalions, 31 Army Aviation Battalions, 8 Army Construction Battalions, and 20 Army Combat Battalions, totaling 96 battalions plus 8 Army general service maintenance regiments.

As pointed out in CINCWPAC CX 17638 DTG 030514, conditions in the Pacific are not like those in EUROPE. An attempt to increase the air forces to be deployed in an island position involves a precisely coordinated use of shipping port and beach capacities, land transportation, and advance base overhead. The FEAF has more units than can be deployed in the RYUKYUS prior to OLYMPIC and they are of the types and have the training in the Pacific which makes them well suited for their tasks. The same is true of the naval aviation units involved.

It is not feasible to deploy any units of the RAF in the RYUKYUS before OLYMPIC without displacing equivalent U.S. units. Displacement of any U.S. air units with consequent disruption of carefully integrated plans will have an extremely adverse effect on our attempt to prepare for OLYMPIC in the short time available. Displacement of VLR will be least prejudicial to OLYMPIC, but is not recommended.

It is recommended that the decision to base British aircraft in the RYUKYUS be reconsidered. It is further recommended that no British aircraft or British personnel arrive in the RYUKYUS prior to OLYMPIC.

Desire preparations be initiated as outlined below to support 1 fast carrier group at ENIWETOK in July building up immediately to 3 US and 1 British by October and thereafter total of 4 or 5 indefinitely. Due to limited land area facilities ashore must be limited to those for support of garrison, aircraft pool, replacement pool, and fleet recreation. Supply for fleet units must be from floating facilities. Following total tactical aircraft squadrons will be based there and other squadrons now present will be transferred to make additional space ashore. 1 FB (ML), 1 VMP, 1 VF (N), 1 WJ (TOWING) and 1 WJ (DRONE). Any additional search required will be provided by seaplane units to reduce load on fields.

A. Aviation support. Establish aircraft pool of 200 planes at ENIWETOK and 100 at ROI equipped to receive preserved carrier aircraft and issue in combat-ready condition. Provide staging without aircraft for 2 CV groups. Augment NAB, CASU, HedRon, and SeRon as necessary to support this plan bearing in mind necessity for keeping total personnel ashore to bare minimum. Deferral roll up of ASD ROI as necessary to support increased air.

B. Naval base support. Provide following augmentation for boat pool: 18 LCT, 100 LCM, 20 LGVP, 24 LCI or LCT as available, 4 self-propelled barges 100 ton and necessary operating personnel, in increments as required. Provide additional E-10 component. Add 1 BB telephone and 20 small boat moorings. Provide logistic support companies as necessary to supply forces afloat basing them in APs. Augment base administration, piloting, postal facilities, port director and shore patrol personnel as necessary.

C. Construction. Fields. Field resurfacing not feasible at this time. Modified form of compacting such as used at MIDWAY authorized as necessary to maintain fields. No additional Avgas storage ashore contemplated. Housing to be in tents to greatest extent possible and where space limitations require bib barracks. These barracks available PEARL and require less space per capita housing than quonsets. Install 1 G-4 unit augmented by dental and optical units in vicinity of present defense battalion facilities. Increase.
facilities as necessary to provide shore recreation for fleet units. Augment 3 CBMU's at ENIWETOK to full strength. Transfer 1 Construction Battalion TINIAN to ENIWETOK as soon as possible to start work essential to carry out augmentation of base. Supply additional distillers as necessary to provide water for increase in population.

D. In executing above plan all personnel and facilities possible will be drawn from other bases in MarGils. Aviation personnel and facilities not required at ULITHI also available for this augmentation. Desire floating repair facilities under ComSeRon 10 Rep ENIWETOK augmented as follows with dates indicating dates of arrival ENIWETOK. BASILAN AG 68 or BAHEM AG 71 15 July. LAERTES AR 20 1 July. DIONYSUS AR 21 1 Sept. DELTA AR 9 1 Sept. ALCOR AD 34 1 July DENEBOLO AD 12 17 July ALTAIR AD 11 1 Sept. ARD 29 15 Sept ARD 30 15 July ARDC 7 1 July YF 618 1 July YF 730 1 July YF 722 15 July. In event dates can not be met ComServRon will make necessary adjustments to provide equivalent facilities by 1 October. Desire ComServRon 10 Rep with adequate staff be established ENIWETOK immediately.

Following preliminary forecast of shipping requirements for CINCPAC-CINCPAC developed as result of conference between CINCAFPAC-CINCPAC and CINCPAC-CINCPAC at GUAM 1-4 June.

Commencing early in September and continuing through January all APA and AKA APD LST LCM and smaller assault types in POA will be required for mounting OLYMPIC.

CINCPAC-CINCPAC requirements for continued development and support of present bases in the POA including RYUKUS. August 23 AP 273 AK Sept 21 AP 270 AK Oct 17 AP 213 AK Nov 16 AP 183 AK Dec 17 AP 183 AK Jan 15 AP 179 AK Feb 16 AP 172 AK. Foregoing in terms of sailings.

Following are CINCPAC shipping requirements for OLYMPIC based on assignment of shipping responsibilities agreed on at GUAM conference and destined to arrive at objectives in months indicated. Nov 8 AP 25 AK Dec 8 AP 45 AK Jan 14 AP 45 AK Feb 2 AP 12 AK. AP estimates based on 1500 troop lift per transport. Assume CINCAFPAC will submit to appropriate Army agencies his requirements for shipping for which he has responsibility for procurement as mutually agreed at the GUAM conference.

Refer JCS 521/13 Annex D page 110. APA can be made available on West Coast in numbers indicated during July and August but will not be available for remainder of scheduled redeployment. Request estimated dates and embarkation points for ships required for redeployment during July and August.

CINCPAC-CINCPAC estimates of shipping requirements will be revised monthly for succeeding 3 month periods in accordance current practice.
050559 COM 3RD FLEET to CTG 30.3 Info CTF 38, CTF 31, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, COMSERVPAC.

TOP SECRET. Presently expect withdraw TF 38 to LETTE about 10-12 June. Task Force will depart LETTE about 1 July for extensive operations at sea necessary details of which will be given to you in conference and by hand. Will require replenishment services at sea during July including special group of about 12 fastest and most reliable oilers for advanced fueling. Servplan details will be furnished later.

Para. Desire you reduce your group operating at sea when Task Force 38 withdraws to minimum required for service to Task Force 31 using direct sailings from ULITHI and LETTE to OKINAWA where possible. Send BOUNTIFUL (AH 9) to LETTE when Task Force 38 retires. Suggest you proceed LETTE in DETROIT as soon as practicable after TF 38 proceeds there.

050743 COM 3RD FLEET to CTF 31, CTF 31 (32), CTF 39 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC BOTH HQ, ALL TASK FORCE COMS AND ALL TASK GROUP COMS 3RD FLEET.

TOP SECRET. Here comes Com3rdFleet OpPla 5-45.

A. Task Force 31 5th Amphibious Force VAdm Hill units as currently assigned.

Para. This force while carrying out the general mission prescribed in my OpPlan 3-45 will sweep a specified area of enemy mines in order to provide a clear approach area into the EAST CHINA SEA.

Para. A. Task Force 31 sweep approximately the north eastern half of area Z completing this sweep by 5 July 1945.
   1. Instructions contained in sub paras 11, 3, 4 and 5 my OpPlan 3-45 apply.
   2. Area Z is bounded on 5 sides by a line joining following points Z1 25-17N 126-36E, Z2 24-48N 126-00E, Z3 25-18N 125-23E, Z4 25-40N 125-49E, Z5 25-43N 126-07E.
   3. This plan effective on receipt.

Para. Para 5 my OpPlan 3-45 remains in effect.
06 0724 COMGENAAFPOA TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCAPAC, COMGEN TEN, COMGENAAFPOA ADMIN

3480.
1. The deferment of FRICION accents our airdrome requirements to support OLYMPIC Operations.
2. Although IHEYA RETTO and AGUNI-SHIMA were captured largely for radar purposes, it is believed it possible to build airdromes, at least fighter airdromes, on these islands.
3. Request all possibilities, including physical reconnaissance, be explored to determine airfield potentialities of these 2 islands. Request earliest advice of investigation results.

06 1243 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN TEN.

At earliest convenience after capture of IHEYA and AGUNI are completed please give me your estimate of practicality and desirability undertaking airdrome developments thereon having in mind program now projected for OKINAWA.

06 0930 GHQ SWPA to CHIEF OF STAFF WAR DEPT, CINCPOA ADV.

CX 17860. Ref WX 10737 2nd, arrangements have been perfected between CINCAPAC and CINCPOA to displace 21 and 3/4 groups of FEAF to the RYUKYUS prior to 15 September for the support of OLYMPIC. Generally speaking, this will absorb potential airfield sites on northern and central OKINAWA and IE SHIMA which are susceptible of development during the rainy season. It is the understanding of CINCAPAC that the support of the increased forces will likewise absorb all port and service troop capacity during the next few months. 2 plans would appear to be practicable, based on the studies which have just been completed between CINCAPAC and CINCPOA.

Plan 1. Allocate potential sites in the vicinity of TAMAGUSUKU, referred to as X1, and NARVZA, referred to as X2, and a possible site in the vicinity of OZATO, all on southern OKINAWA. Allocate the southern portion of YONABARU WAN for development of harbor facilities by the British. The areas indicated are still occupied by the Japanese and detailed surveys have not yet been made. From information at present available, it appears that 1 6500 foot and 1 7000 foot runways could be obtained in the 1st 2 mentioned areas.

Plan 2. Retard the entrance of the Lancasters into OKINAWA until after 1 November, at which time it is anticipated that FEAF will displace forward in the OLYMPIC Operation and the facilities thereby vacated will be available for British use.

CINCAPAC refrains from comment relative to the desirability of immediate acceptance of the engineer units indicated since the ability of ports to take in this additional equipment is a problem of paramount interest to CINCPOA. CINCPOA is requested to comment on the 2 plans above indicated.
Your 050612 and 050613. Commencing by Paras.

(1) When they join up I tentatively plan employ British carrier group as tactical unit of TF 38. British Service Group because of speed and technique characteristics will be separate from SERON 6 but operated in same general vicinity insofar as circumstances permit. British forces can be incorporated into our combat and service operation scheme at any time. The sortie of TF 38 from LEYTE and the initiation of TF 38 offensive operations need not be affected by availability of British forces.

(2) Service areas will depend on location and sequence of targets, tempo of attack, and enemy capabilities and will be selected to meet existing conditions and announced as a part of appropriate 6pOrds. Had understood and tentatively planned KURILES HOKKAIDO NORTH HONSHU as initial combat area rather than TOKYO.

(3) No comment other than offering the thought that British carriers might be able to carry out longer sustained operations and more strikes per cruise if TF 112 could replenish at ENUWETO.

(4) Am looking forward to seeing Ewen and unless otherwise directed will direct Lefanu (RN) to make refresher visit to his own command while TF 38 is in LEYTE.

Ref ComGenPOA RJ 62716 DTG 022228 and CINCPAC Adv Hq 020650. Request 24th Inf Regt be assigned garrison LEGUMINOUS for early shipment. Needed for protection installations outlying islands. Size and terrain of LEGUMINOUS requires garrison division organized as complete tactical unit not only for organized hostile units roving mountains who must be continuously hunted. Presence 24th Inf Regt will release earlier some Army units under 2nd reference SANBE.

Mining of BUNGO SUIDO by DMs may be desirable in support OLYMPIC. Possible though risky to lay extensive fields outside enemy mines under cover carrier aircraft attack. Closure expected 3 to 30 days most effective just prior assault. SANGAY now in MARIANAS has sufficient mines for this operation and for sidear closure KII SUIDO which might be desirable about 1 month earlier. In these operations contemplated request SANGAY remain MARIANAS or MARSHALLS available to supply mines to DMs at OKINAWA in August. All other shipments of surface mines to OKINAWA cancelled by my 150731 May not to all.

Your 022030. Subject Loran. The assumptions concerning an EAST CHINA SEA chain with stations in the KYUKUS are not in agreement with present plans. Phases 3C 3D and 3E of ICEBERG have been deferred indefinitely and as a result there are no Loran locations available in the KYUKUS except in OKINAWA. The next available site would be in KYUSHU late this year. Preliminary conference with representatives of CINCPAC reveals that present plans are for FEAF to install air transportable equipment in this location.

Conference to be held in the near future by representatives of CINCPAC CINCPAC and 20th Air Force to coordinate Loran requirements for coverage of the CHINA SEA and the Empire. On conclusion of this meeting combined requirements for these areas will be submitted to JCS.

Recommend (A) MENKAR continue present schedule. (B) ComWesSeaFron ship chain from the U.S. to PHILIPPINES. (C) This equipment to be installed in such locations as become available and are agreed upon by CINCPAC, CINCPAC & 20th AF.
06 1247 COM3RDFLT TO CTF31, CTF 32, CTF 39 INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC BOTH, ALL TFC & TGC
3RDFLT, COM5THFLT.

This will be my OpPlan 6-45.

A. TF 31 5th Amphibious Force - VAdm Hill. Units as currently assigned.
   1. TF 32 Gunfire and Covering Force - VAdm Oldendorf units as assigned by CTF 31.

B. TF 39 - Mine Flotilla - RAdm Sharp - Units as assigned by Com3rdFlt.
   Para. For information own and enemy forces see my OpPlan 3-45.

3rdFlt forces not specified in this OpPlan support this operation by execution of missions assigned in Com3rdFlt OpPlan 3-45.

These forces while carrying out the general mission prescribed in my OpPlan 3-45 will sweep specified areas in the EAST CHINA SEA of mines in order to provide a clear operating area in this sea for our forces.

A. TF 31 provide necessary air and surface support to TF 39. Provide logistic support for own forces and TF39 in KYUKYS.

B. TF 39 clear area JUNEAU of enemy mines completing this sweep by 1 Aug 1945.
   1. Instructions contained in sub paras XI, 3, 4, and 5 my OpPlan 3-45 apply.
   2. Area JUNEAU is bounded by line connecting following points:
      - C. Lat 26-04 Long 124-09
      - D. Lat 26-15 Long 124-31
      - E. Lat 27-38 Long 126-01
      - L. Lat 28-20 Long 125-20
      - M. Lat 27-00 Long 123-50

3. This plan effective 0000 GCT 5 July unless notified otherwise by dispatch.
   Logistics as in OpPlan 3-45. CTF 31 arrange for logistic support in KYUKYS as required.
   Para 5 OpPlan 3-45 remains in effect.

06 2241 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CTF 38, CTG 38.1, CTG 38.4

As soon as practicable submit your estimated track of recent typhoon and each major Task Group for period 3-6 June inclusive.

06 2242 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CTF 38, CTF 31 COMGEN TEN COMINCH CTG 99.2

Your 060653 received subsequent my 061244 2nd strike authorized to be made at your discretion prior to return to LEITE.

06 2243 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT.

Your 061219 affirmative.
06 0742 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCSWPA.

For Joint Security Control. Arrangements made for CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC deception representatives to meet in MANILA 11 June to prepare Joint Cover and Deception Plan for OLYMPIC. Plan to be presented to JCS immediately following this conference.

Your attention invited to appendix F of Preliminary Draft of CINCPAC Joint Staff Study OLYMPIC which has tentative agreement in principle by CINCAFPAC planners.

Is your 041843 a firm directive or a proposal.

07 0123 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Unless already provided for Com3rdFlt arrange for suitable diversion ship to remain in combat area transmitting traffic apparently from you. Recommend transfer to diversion ship at least 2 operators who have been recently on your ship shore circuit preferably those with noticeable transmitting characteristics. CINCPAC PEARL inform Com3rdFlt of any such characteristics recently noted by monitors at WAHIAWA. While in port note that forces in your company should continue receive traffic on foxes. Bonafide outgoing traffic should be filed ashore for transmission with codress headings.

07 0559 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT CTF 31 COMGEN 10 Info CINCAFPAC CG2NDMARDIV, CG3RDPHIBCORPS, COMMARINAS, MARCORPS, COMGENFOA, ISCOM SAIPAN.

To clarify Para 2 MDis 140245. 8th Mar RCT remains under operational control of ComGen Ten after capture of AGUNI and is available for employment Phase 1 ICEBERG if desired. This includes accompanying replacements.

06 1244 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO COMINCH, COMGEN 10, CTG 31, CTG 38, CTG 39.3.

Your 060829 (to me only) approved. Unless otherwise directed by later dispatch withdraw TF 33 to LEYTE after strike on KYUSHU fields about 8 June.

06 2242 COMINCH TO CINCPAC ADV INFO NONE.

Reference CINCAFPAC CX 17860. Do you desire to make any comment further than your 050658.

07 0813 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT.

This replies to that part of your 050209 regarding weather service information. The 1st indication of a cyclonic circulation with a possible development of a typhoon was on 31 May when an intense wave passed GUAM. Immediate steps were taken to track and cover this disturbance. In addition to the normal coverage the following coverage was requested.

(A) FairWing 18 directed by my 011105 to cover on 2 June the area 500 miles N and 250 miles W of PELELIU.

(B) On 2 June a B-24 from 655th weather sqdn was ordered to area 600 to SW of GUAM.

(C) FairWing 1 to cover on 4 June area south of NAHA to 20 N between 123-133 E.

(D) CINCSWPA on 4 June to effect weather reconnaissance of tropical storm at 18-00N 127-00 E.

(E) On 4 June a B-29 WRM to TOKYO was diverted to 23-00N 129-00E.

(F) For 5 June CINCSWPA to repeat reconnaissance of 4 June.

(G) For 5 June B-29 to circle storm expected in area 20-00N 127-00E.

As info adee you were advised of flight plans covering weather reconnaissance.

Continued -
Para. On 3 June storm was out of range from POA bases but within range of 7thFlt aircraft. Information is being obtained as to action taken by 7thFlt.

Regular weather broadcasts at 6 hour intervals gave latest information available. Twice daily broadcasts to "All USN Ships" (NERK) at 0800 and 2000 were made. At 1600 daily broadcast on channel 35 C was made.

Following comment made on CINCAFPAC CX 17860. Plan 1 extremely inadvisable and all of YONABARU WAN required for U.S. Naval Base facilities. Plan 2 is less objectionable but submit that U.S. Air Force will contribute more effectively to the defeat of JAPAN than will deployment of British units and creation of mixed forces within a congested island.

Desirability of fields proposed by COMINPAC 060230 cannot be determined this long ahead of operation. Recommend mines be landed and available for loading in minelayers at OKINAWA so that fields may be laid either just before or during operation if conditions then existing make this desirable.

Concur in release of 2 PB4Y squadrons as specified in your 270541 with VPB 116 remaining in POA and 2nd Sqdn to be designated at a later date for transfer in August. Our CX 16802 May hereby cancelled. The following units may be released to CINCPAC. 3 PV1 Sqdns as follows: Return VPB 137 to USN now. Release VPB 128 upon completion of 0 operations. Release VPB 149 when VPB 53 from northern SOLOMONS becomes available in the PHILIPPINES. All 4 VPB(MS) Mariner Sqdns and both VPB (MS) Amphibious Sqdns will be retained. The tender TANGIER can be released in July. No other tenders can be released at this time. Direct communication authorized with Com7thFlt to effect details of transfer of squadrons and tender.

Will 8th Marines and attached units rejoin 2nd MarDiv at SAIPAN in time to permit employment this division with 5th PhibCorps. Your 070559 refers. If available desire utilize 2nd MarDiv in lieu 4th MarDiv for OLYMPIC.

My 050612, Com3rdFlt has made following comments. "Service areas will depend on location and sequence of targets and will be selected to meet existing conditions and announced as part of appropriate OpCords. Am looking forward to seeing Ewen and unless otherwise directed will direct LEFANU to visit CINCBPF while TF 38 is in LEYTE".

Refer my 050612 Para 3. You will be authorized to draw bulk fuel supplies from ENIWETOK if you consider this preferable to ULITHI.
08 0250 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 38 CTF 31 CTG 99.2 ComGen 10.

Your 062242 believe earliest return TF 38 to base for upkeep and storm damage repair will best serve your plans for future operations. 1 Squadron MAG 14 has arrived OKINAWA others due 9 and 10 June. Unless OKINAWA air defense situation seriously deteriorates intend withdraw TF 38 from this area 10 June arriving LEYTE 13 June.

08 0815 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 38 CTF 31.

KANOA strike completed with negligible plane losses and no threat as yet to surface units. Good surprise achieved. Details and damage assessment by later dispatch. Refuelling tomorrow.

08 1520 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO COMINPAC, CTF 38.

In connection with your prospective strikes against the northern HONSHU-HOKKAIDO Area the HAKODATE-AOMORI railroad ferries should be included in target assignment. Special intelligence information on this target is being prepared for distribution.

08 1521 CINCPAC ADV TO COMPHIBSPAC INFO COMSERVPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMINCH & CNO, COM3RDFLT, COM3RDFLT, NAV MED SUP DEP PEARL.

ComPhibsPac 060200 not to all and not needed. The request to fit out SAMUEL CHASE (APA 26), THOMAS JEFFERSON (APA 30) and J.T. DICKMAN (APA 13) as casualty evacuation ships similar to CRESCENT CITY (APA 21) and GOSPER (APA 170) is approved. These ships will be directed report AdComPhibsPac at PEARL for necessary work. ComServPac will supply required additional medical personnel on request. Medical equipment and supplies will be provided by Naval Medical Supply Depot PEARL. Minor alterations to provide operating room facilities authorized. My 061330 of March refers.

It has been agreed that all PacFlt APA's which are in operating condition will be made available for employment in OLYMPIC and it is desired that the above 5 ships be employed in this operation in their primary mission of carrying amphibious troops for the assault and not in the 1st garrison echelon as suggested. It is further desired that the PREMONT (APA 44) designated by ComPhibsPac 040225 as flagship for ComPhibsGrp 13 be employed as an APA in the assault in addition to her flagship mission.
09 0848 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO INFO DCNO(AIR) COMAIRPAC COM7THFLT COMAIR7THFLT CINCSWPA.

Com7thFlt and CINCSWPA consider 4 VFP(HL) Squadrons 4 VFP(MS) and 2 VFP(MS) Amphibious Squadrons can meet naval air requirements in SWPA. I concur that these numbers are ample now and consider they may be reduced later as strategic situation decreases requirements. Request your concurrence in deploying in POA squadrons in excess of 7thFlt requirements as stated above.

09 0856 CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 31, COMGEN 10 Info COM3RDFLT COM5THFLT COMPHIBSPAC.

Desire your comments on proposal capture KUME SHIMA after AGUNI SHIMA using 8th Marine RCT. Unless you have reliable local information as to garrison and defenses operations to obtain intelligence are indicated.

09 0857 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH & CNO.

Your 061314. My 260930 contemplated the establishment of an American flag commercial air service to the South Pacific in the interest of the United States as a whole. Consider that it should be on a straight commercial basis not an Army or a Navy contract service and should have modern equipment such as C54's obtained by release of production by Both Army and Navy on a pro rata basis. Consider delay until end of year relatively undesirable but acceptable if other plans and preparations are made in advance.

09 1950 JOINT SECURITY CONTROL TO GHQ SWPA, CINCPAC ADV INFO CG USFCT.

WARX 14392. Reaching you and info addressees in a few days will be overall deception directive. Reference CINCPAC ADV 060742. CINCAPAC CX 17832. Directive does not include COOKHOUSE (SHIKOKU) as objective for OLYMPIC nor DEERSLAYER-COROLLARY (CHUSAN ISLAND-SHANGHAI) as initial objective. Following fictional operations are included. Amphibious assault against CULTURE (FORMOSA AREA) in late summer 1945. Advance in YELLOW SEA in winter of 1945-46 to secure bases for air and inland operations. Operations against LABORATORY (HOKKAIDO) early Fall 1945 with simulated buildup in ALEUTIANS. An assault from the PHILIPPINES by CINCAPAC coordinated with overland assault by Allied mainland forces against FRENCH INDO CHINA in Fall of 1945.

10 0231 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO ISCOM OKINAWA, ISCOM IE SHIMA, CINCAPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENPOA, COMGENAAFPOA.

Pending issuance of changes to Base Development Plan request you initiate development in accordance my Ser 0005071 as modified by CINCSWPA 071605. Paras 2 G and 5 B my serial establish priority of development. Instructions covering procurement of materials referred to in Para 2 G will follow.

10 0507 CINCPOA ADV TO CNO INFO CINCAPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENPOA, DEFCOMAF 20.

Recommendations and conclusions of conferees of Joint Mapping Conference as submitted in letter subject Mapping Conference, OAHU, T.H. 25-29 May 1945, dated 29 May are approved by CINCPAC. Recommend that JCS 756/2 be changed accordingly.
1. Plans are being perfected to take fullest advantage of the Japanese withdrawal as it continues in the MANNING-LIUCHOW area by stretching available resources to the utmost. Build up of present sub minimum stock levels is being delayed to permit maximum intra CHINA forward movement. It is planned to augment present intra theater movement by direct air shipment from INDIA BURMA Theater as soon as airfields in the LIUCHOW-NANNING area will permit. However a demand for additional tonnage in LIUCHOW-MANNING area to permit rapid following up of Japanese withdrawal still remains.

2. It is believed that capture of an intermediate port, probably FORT BAYARD, in LIUCHOW PENINSULA area by approximately 1 August may be a definite possibility without detracting appreciably from the main effort. Investigations are continuing to select the exact area.

3. It is therefore requested as a matter of urgency that War Department advise me of arrangements that can be made and resources particularly shipping, amphibious craft, materiel, and minor naval harbor defenses which can be provided and the timing thereof to utilize this opportunity of improving CHINA theater's line of communications based on assumptions given below. Upon receipt of this information from War Dept, and after necessary coordination with the INDIA BURMA Theater, I will advise War Dept of my course of action.

4. ASSUMPTIONS:
   A. Material required initially to be shipped through this port are primarily trucks preloaded with drummed avgas and drivers, self propelled road repair equipment and operators, equipment for reasonable naval harbor defense and minor equipment for harbor repairs. A list of material for other than naval harbor defense is being prepared by ComGen services of supply CHINA Theater and will be forwarded in next 48 hours. I request recommendations of the Navy Dept as to requirements for a reasonable harbor defense for the assumed.
   B. FORT BAYARD will be used after 1 August 1945.
   C. 1st month capacity 30000 MT and 60000 MT per month thereafter.
   D. An anchorage should be provided where shipping can stage and be called forward.
   E. Shipments will continue over the present line of communications to full capacity after capture and development of FORT BAYARD Area.

5. There are no personnel available within present CHINA Theater troops basis to provide for port rehabilitation, port operations, including transshipment, if necessary, and harbor defense. ComGen INDIA BURMA Theater is being furnished by me with a list of personnel required for the lst 2 functions to determine availability. Request recommendations of the Navy Dept as to harbor defenses required and availability thereof. Latest information on FORT BAYARD Area indicates that LST is most suitable craft for this operation.

6. Capture and development of an intermediate port area would result in the following advantages to CHINA Theater.
   A. More adequate support of American and Chinese forces, hence permitting a strengthened assault of HONGKONG-CANTON Area.
   B. Simplification of a very complex line of communications.
   C. Provision of vital equipment at the point required.

Desire your early examination and comment on CGUSAF CHINA CFBX 38894 passed to you as Cominch 101516. Wedemeyer's proposals offer promise not only as to augmentation of Chinese participation in war, but as to cover for OLYMPIC. On the assumption that sufficient shallow draft shipping can be made available.
Ref RJ 63069, 8th, and ComGen 10 060630 June. In view of the intent of CINCPAC to leave 1 MarDiv on OKINAWA indefinitely and the anticipated continued staging of 2 Army Divisions thereon until CORONET, it appears to CINCPAC that the movement of the 24th Inf to OKINAWA is of doubtful necessity. Such a move would appear to be particularly undesirable at the present time because it absorbs shipping which is badly needed for the rool up of troops in rear areas and because it will tend to congest ports needed to support CXU operations in support of OLYMPIC. It is suggested that this matter be reviewed in view of the factors indicated above and this headquarters be further advised as to your conclusions.

CTF 31 (Com5thPhibFor) OpOrd A 205-45

TASK ORGANIZATION

A. TF 31 (5thPhibFor) VAdm Hill as currently organized.
B. TG 31.26 Reconnaissance Group Lt. Comdr. Street in SCRIBNER (APD 122) with KINZER (APD 191) and FMFPac Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion Major Jones less Co. A.

1. Information as in current orders and dispatches. By separate directive ships of radar picket station 11 A will be directed to cover reembarkation from KUME SHIMA.
2. This force will while continuing present operations make reconnaissance of KUME SHIMA in order to obtain information of enemy garrison and to determine suitability of beaches for amphibious landings.

3-A. TF 31 continue present operations.
3-B. TG 31.26 embark reconnaissance personnel in NAKAGUSUKU WAN 11 June. Depart OKINAWA 12 June and rendezvous with ships radar picket station 11 A by 1600 same date. At 2000 depart radar picket station proceed to debarkation points and land reconnaissance personnel on north and south coast KUME SHIMA. Take prisoners as practicable and obtain information on enemy garrison. Determine suitability of beaches for amphibious landing. Complete reembarkation of reconnaissance personnel about 0430 13 June proceed OKINAWA make report to CTF 31 and CG 10. Deliver prisoners to CG 10. After disembarkation troops revert command ComGen 10. At that time TG dissolved SCRIBNER KINZER report to CTF 31.4.

4 and 5. Logistics and communications as in CTF 51 OpPlan Al-45.

CX 18398. Request clearance for following:
A. Brig.Gen. David Hutchinson and party of 3 to proceed LEGUMINOUS on or about 12 June and
B. Air echelon of 14 C-46 transports with 70 officers and enlisted men with equipment on or about 13 June to establish Advon FEAF prior to arrival of FEAF units in area.
C. On or about 15 June to initiate B-25 courier plane service from Clark Field to LEGUMINOUS on alternate days. All above planes will require servicing and RON. If above dates not practicable request earliest dates A, B and C above can be cleared. Due to large number similar air echelons suggest arrangements for future movements be made by FEAF directly with 10th Army with information to CINCPOA ADV HQ and CINCAPAC.
11 1210 CTF 31 to CTG 32.1 CTG 99.2 CTG 31.20, CTG 30.6 Info CINCPAC ADV, COMSUBPAC

COM3RD/fit.

Operation SOCKEM, Air Plan. On Y-Day this force will conduct air attack in force against enemy aircraft and aircraft facilities in southern KYUSHU area. Take off time from OKINAWA fields about 1000, TG 32.1 provide attack group of 36 VF and 30 TBM staging through OKINAWA fields. TAF escort and otherwise support this operation with approximately 60 long range fighters. CTG 31.20 provide weather service immediately preceding the operation and Dumbo service. CINCPAC will be requested to provide lifeguard submarine 165 degrees 50 miles from K5 of SOP 2A. CTG 99.2 furnish preliminary target intelligence. Effect local coordination traffic control and arrange logistics. CTG 32.1 furnish target coordination call SOCKEM HARD. CTG 30.6 requested to take station and conduct radio deception tactics to simulate DECFIT of STINGER Operation. For planning purposes Y-Day tentatively established 15 June to be confirmed by dispatch.

11 1300 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCARPAC INFO COMGEN TEN.

Agree in principle to your 110516. Specifically:
A. Concur. Clearance for actual flight to be obtained from ComGen 10.
B. Concur. Timing to be promulgated by CG 10 after conferences with General Hutchinson have located satisfactory camp sites and determined the feasibility of servicing FEAF aircraft.
C. Concur. Timing subject to desires of CG 10. Future movements FEAF aircraft should not interfere with tactical requirements and present air traffic GUAM to OKINAWA which is expected to continue on present scale.

11 1430 COMGEN TEN TO CTG 99.3 Info CINCPAC ADV, CTU 99.3.5.

CINCPAC ADV 100231 not to all is quoted for necessary action. (CINCPAC ADV 100231 is already in the graybook).

12 0149 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC.

Comparison of Annex 3 Appendix B CINCPAC Staff Study OLYMPIC with Annex 3B(5)(B)4 CINCAFPAC OLYMPIC study shows difference in dividing line between normal operating areas of MYUKYU Air Forces and carrier forces. For uniformity and clarification suggest that 133 degrees E Long. be agreed on as the dividing line between areas of primary responsibility. This is also the dividing line between 3rd and 5th Fleet areas. It is understood that overlapping will occur subject to coordination initiated or requested by the unit crossing the line.

New subject. Para 3B(5)(E) and (F) page 19 CINCAFPAC OLYMPIC study. Request clarification of first coordinate. It is assumed that the line described is intended to be that shown on Annex 2 Appendix B CINCPAC OLYMPIC Study.

12 0444 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CG FEAF, CG6THARMY, COMPHIBSPAC.

Subject assault air warning and fighter direction units OLYMPIC. It is anticipated that during 1st phase of operation and before adequate heavy facilities are established ashore, air warning and fighter direction and the coordination thereof will be the responsibility of ComPhibsPac. A system of command ships, radar guard ships and outlying picket ships will be employed for this purpose. In addition effort is being made to obtain effective aerial radar pickets.

To assist in expediting the rapid establishment ashore of early warning and fighter control stations, a number of Marine Air Warning Squadrons or 

- Continued -

3171
12 0444 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCAPPAC INFO CINCPOA PEARL, COMGEN FEAFF, ETC. (CONTINUED)

Teams therefrom can be made available if desired. Some of these units especially those now in the OKINAWA area, have had considerable experience with both Navy and Army elements during the critical early period when forces ashore and afloat are most vulnerable to air attack. They would be equipped with special assault control posts mounted in LVTs and with light weight early warning and night fighter direction components. Suggest discussion of this feature of assault by ComPhibsPac and ComGen5thArmy after ComPhibsPac arrives MANILA Area.

12 0501 CINCPOA ADV TO CNO INFO CINCAPPAC, CINCPOA PEARL, COMGENPOA, CG TEN, CGAFFPOA COMMESSEAFRON.

Ref Ur 052015. See GHQ SWPA 291149 to C of S WD. Troops listed your 052015 cannot be identified as troops "now approved for ICEBERG". Some units are scheduled in your 025015 to move to FRICTION and ADJOURN capture of which have been indefinitely deferred. CINCPOA requirements Army troops have been made known to CINCAPPAC and arrangements made for movement many of these to objective in LSTs in order to meet serious unloading problems. All units listed your 052015 should be reported to CINCAPPAC in accordance his 291149 and should be moved only in accordance his instructions. None of these units should move directly to destinations indicated except in accordance our agreements with CINCAPPAC and his instructions based thereon.

12 1831 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCSWPA INFO COMGEN TEN.

Refer your 110518 and my 111300. Comgen 10 indicates
A. Affirmative,
B. Affirmative except prefers 7 planes per day instead of 14 on 1 day and that they not RON if practicable.
C. Approve to Yontan.

12 1240 CTF 31 to COM3RDFLT INFO CINCPOA BOTH, ADCOMPHIBSPAC, SUBORDCOM ADCOMPHIBSPAC COMSERVPAC, COMPHIBSPAC, COMSERVRON 10, CGLO, CTG 99.1, CTF 32, CTF 39.

In view prospective close of military operations at OKINAWA the following estimate of requirements TF 31 is submitted. General plan of retrenchment provides for:
(A) Departure of ammo vessels, and early transfer of TU 30.9.5 to NAKAGUSUKU WAN except for repair elements which will remain KERAMA RETTO for present with TG 30.5.
(B) Elimination gunfire support vessels, Oldendorf recommends detention for present 3 BB 4 CA or CL 9 DD as composition of TF 32 covering force pending return TF 38 at which time further recommendations will be submitted. Hope to reduce picket stations to 3 and possibly to 2 by July 1, dependent upon progress of island radar installations. Have commenced reduction in LST LSM and LCI types to approximate figure shown in PhibsPac serial 000208 except recommend total 104 LCI Type remain for present. Delay development NAHA and eastern beaches plus additional unloading requirements to meet expanded development program will necessitate use of HAGUSHTI beaches for indefinite period thereby creating additional requirement screening and smoke vessels. Delay in construction naval base facilities will also necessitate retention receiving ships and floating storage for present. Based upon general shore based air picture expect release 1 group CVEs after island secure and other group after completion
CINCPAC ADV TO COMPHIBSPAC.

Your 090335: A total of 555 LSTs are assigned ComPhibsPac for employment in OLYMPIC. This number includes all LSTs assigned for assault lift whether cargo is ammunition, fuel, oil, vehicles, spare parts, mail or personnel. It is not expected that additional LSTs will be provided.

The above LSTs will be provided from the total number of 709 LSTs which are expected to be available in the Pacific Ocean by 15 August. This number includes 546 LSTs now in POA, 136 LSTs now in SWPA and 27 now being redeployed from the Atlantic.

Additional requirements for LSTs in POA during OLYMPIC will be met by the remaining 154 LSTs in the Pacific including SWPA. Some will be overhauling.

It is anticipated that 45 of this 154 LSTs will be employed during OLYMPIC as a reserve pool and will be available for subsequent lifts to the objective.

12 0245 CTF 38 VIA COM3RDFLT TO COMAIRPAC INFO COM5THFLT. CINCPAC BOTH, COM1STCARTF, COM3RDFLT.

ComAirPac 292035. The early 1942 concept of the carrier striking force continues to have undue influence on front line equipment and concomitant supply. Planning should recognize instead the actual needs of present and future operations in this war. CVs will never get far from beachhead when the real invasion begins because they are the only source of close CAP and support. For this work VF and VBF are practically the only useful type. Under the control of CASCUV VT and VB now aboard have been used only for supply missions and for bombing and strafing where anti-aircraft is ineffective. These types are more vulnerable to AA than are VBF when excursions into strategic activity are made VBF properly and understandingly handled can carry greater punishment to the enemy over longer ranges than the VB type. The foregoing is the experience of the last year and emphatically of the immediate past. The compelling advantages of single seat bombers (VBF) over multi place bombers (VSB-VTB) in every prospective type of carrier operation are demonstrated in CTF 38 confidential serial 01310 dated 27 May. Even after this war our CV and CVB complements will likely be designed at least for some years for operations off littorals against shore based air rather than against navies.

Complements of the CVBs should have the same high proportion of single seaters as is recommended herein and has been recommended previously for CVGs. The present complement alternate complement and proposals A through D of ComAirPac's 292035 are not recommended as they do not realistically meet the needs of the operations planned for this task force. The single seater will continue to predominate during this war. Production and supply should be altered forthwith to accommodate. Training needs no appreciable change. New and better types of VF are of course welcome. Recommend CVBDand CVG complement to occupy the following proportions of ship capacity. VF(F8F when available) 30%, VBF (F4U) 60%, special (F7F) 10%.

10 0612 CTF 38 to CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAIRPAC, COM3RDFLT, CNO.

CINCPAC 070315 CNO 062025 not to all. Technical details fellow. Pilot reports performance comparison made between F4U-1D and Jap positively identified by gun camera as Tony.

A. Between 15000 and 25000 little difference in climb with slight CILVNDX F4U.

B. No direct comparison top speed but comparable.

C. F4U was unable to close distance in dive.

--Continued--
Z minesweeping operation unless further sweeping operations undertaken. Basis of no further operations after completion Z sweeping consider practicable reduce initially forces OKINAWA to following by July 1 with further reduction as conditions permit. TF 32 as listed above. TF 31 as recommended separately by CTF 39. TF 31 (to be later established as TG 99.1 naval forces RYUKYUS under RAAdm Cobb on my departure) 24 DD to be reduced as picket stations are eliminated. 8 DE-APD 18 PC or SC 10 YMS-AM types. 4 AN 20 LST 2 APB 29 LSM 104. LCI type 4 AP 4 ATF 3 ARS 4 ATR MBs as presently assigned. TG 30.9.5 as recommended separately. The above does not include any escort requirements for shipping between OKINAWA and rear areas. In event EAST CHINA SEA sweeping conducted increase TF 32 by 1 group CVE and escort plus 6 DD (FOB DMG) for close cover of mine force. In event KUMIS operation undertaken concurrently increase TF 31 by 4 additional DD and LSTs required for troop lift.

If above plan approved a reduction as to bow numbers and detailed breakdown of types will be submitted as soon as practicable.

13 0228 CINC PAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CGUSFC

Wedemeyer's CFRX 38894. Your 101620. I am in agreement with General Wedemeyer as to the desirability of establishing at the earliest possible time a more efficient line of supply to the United States forces in CHINA not only to increase the scope of their operations but also to augment Chinese participation in the war against JAPAN. I recognize also that minor operations on the coast of CHINA will help cover OLYMPIC. I have repeatedly advocated establishing sea communications with our forces in CHINA and need not enumerate the advantages of doing so.

However OLYMPIC requirements for shipping particularly for light draft assault shipping in the LST-LSM category both for preparatory movements and for assault lift are critical. It is probable that deficiencies in assault lift will exist and must if necessity be accepted with consequent cuts in the assault forces. 1 of the principal reasons for deferring Phase 3 of ICEBERG was to avoid jeopardizing OLYMPIC by absorbing shipping of this type and also other resources.

Any large operation or any appreciable diversion of critical shipping to support CHINA or our forces in CHINA is incompatible with the effort to be ready for OLYMPIC in time. Accordingly as long as the current directive for OLYMPIC stands assistance to CHINA must be sharply limited.

It is estimated that the assumed measured tonnage of 30000 in August and 60000 per month thereafter could be lifted by a total of 20 LST each making 2 round trips per month between MANILA and FORT BAYARD. It seems probable that such a number might be obtained directly or indirectly from sources outside the Pacific Fleet not now obligated for OLYMPIC. Transfer of cargo in the PHILIPPINES would be necessary. It is believed that the very minor harbor defenses required at FORT BAYARD can be supplied. The naval escort and cover for movements of shipping from the PHILIPPINES to CHINA in the quantity indicated can be supplied without serious prejudice to OLYMPIC.

If the project is undertaken it should be with the firm understanding that the very natural tendency to increase its scope and to exploit successes gained must be curbed if we are to be ready for OLYMPIC this year.
D. Tony had superior rate of roll at 400 knots indicated. Deduce Tony may be fitted with uprated engine. Less definite comparison but some indication George and Frank comparable in top speed and superior in climb. These comparisons not surprising in view wing loading of 35 or less and power loading about 4 to 4.5 ascribed to Frank, George and Jack. Attention called to unreliability of performance comparisons made during combat.

Para. In tactical comparison Jap interceptor pilots were: (A) Aggressive (B) Skillful in technique of flying. (C) Evidently well drilled in teamwork and tactics of mutual support. (D) Poor shots as usual. It was anticipated and should be expected that enemy interceptor squadrons are better trained in coordinated aerial combat than the suicide single seater groups. This should cause no grave concern in as much as our average VF squadrons are far superior in gunnery and tactics. The Kamikaze attack against ships remain the only real threat against our naval operations.

Substance of this report has been transmitted to forces afloat concerned. See my 050255 intent of which was to assist pilots in realistic appraisal of the enemy. Text of this dispatch was that Jap interceptors can be shot down by adherence to rules already taught in training. Detailed reports to higher commands were underwritten through prescribed channels.
Your 061243 refers. Three airstrips on Aguni and 1 on Iheya are practicable.

Part 1: Aguni 2 7500 foot strips from TA 2415D to TA 2517E and from TA 2515F to TA 2617G also a 6000 foot strip from TA 2515H to TA 2617M 3 strips parallel and in direction of prevailing wind. Minimum amount cut and fill required. No rock cut. Ample space for 100 hardstands and connection taxiways on each of the 7500 foot strips and 50 hardstands and taxiways on 6000 foot strip. Estimate 5 Bn months required for each of longer strips including 100 hardstands and connecting taxiways and 3 Battalion months required for 6000 foot strip. Coral and or gravel for surfacing available with short haul. Fair weather landing beach of limited capacity TA 2515. A WS station will be established requiring minimum development and garrison this island whether or not airfields are developed.

Part 2: Iheya, 1 crosswind airstrip with maximum of 50 hardstands practicable. 5000 foot strip from TA 0371B to TA 0471A or 6500 foot strip from TA 0371L to 0571B. Shorter strip requires 2 and 1/2 Bn months and the longer strip, which involves greater cut and fill, 3 and 1/2 months to construct. No rock rock cut anticipated through borings not made. Suitable gravel for surfacing readily available. Fair weather landing beach of limited capacity at TA 0571b. A WS station will be established requiring minimum development and garrison this island whether or not airfield is developed.

Part 3: Desirability undertaking airdrome development these islands depends upon the need for additional fields this area in excess of available sites on Okinawa and IE Shima also on availability of construction and other service troops required. If not too satisfactory landing facilities are acceptable Aguni in particular offers very favorable possibilities for additional airstrips.

Part 4: Ena Shima, aerial reconnaissance and study of available maps indicate possibility of 2 airstrips, 1 7500 foot TA 0160C to TA 0359W and other 7000 foot from TA 0059C to 0057S. Considerable cut and fill both strips. Ground reconnaissance contemplated.

15 0812 CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLT.

Your 150223. Request information as to what is contemplated. See paragraphs 3 and 4 of Nimitz-Fraser Agreement of 20 December 1944.

15 0816 CINCPAC ADV to CGFMFPAC INFO CINCAPPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMPHIBSPAC, COMMARIANAS MARCORPS, COM3RDFLT, COM5THFLT, CGPOA, CG3RDPHIBCORPS, CG5THPHIBCORPS, CG2NDMARDIV CG 4TH MARDIV.

In accordance with your request 2nd MarDiv Reinforced hereby designated for employment with 5thPhibCorps in OLYMPIC in lieu of 4th MarDiv Reinforced. Mounting point 2nd MarDiv Reinf is Saipan.

15 0835 CINCPOA ADV to CINCAPPAC.

Ref your changes to Staff Study OLYMPIC. Page 15 shows 4 Marine Fighter Groups. This should be 3 Marine Fighter Groups and 1 Marine Scout Bombing Group. This necessary in order to provide aircraft suitable for both ASW and close support ground troops. Plans this headquarters were to assign 1 VMF(N) group less 1 squadron for this operation. If concurred in page 21 your changes should read 6 MAG Hedrons and 6 MAG SeRons. Page 15 should read 1 Marine Night Fighter Group less 1 Squadron.
Your 150812 and 150836. Contemplate TF 37 operate with guide normal intergroup interval from the guide of a US flank group. CTF 38 will pre-
scribe point option and maneuvers for US groups and CTF 37 will conform thereby contributing to and sharing the benefits of our force defense. This concept does not infringe on British position guaranteed by Nimitz-Fraser Agreement.

Para. Surface tactics present no problem but in order that British air units air warning and fighter director units may understand TF 38 techniques I recommended to Brown that appropriate British representatives visit LYTTE for conferences prior to TF 38 sortie.

17 0104 CINCPA ADV TO ONO INFO CINCAFPAC, CINCPA PEARL, COMGENPOA.

This is partial reply your 131545. Agreements between CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC referred to my 120510 and your 131545 are summarized in my serials 0005680 of 9 June and 0005071 of 6 June copies of which furnished Cominch.

Confirmation schedules referred to your 131545 cannot be given at this time as they will require review by CINCAFPAC on basis of above agreements. See also my 170103 to CINCAFPAC.

16 0614 CGAFFPOA TO CG FEAF (FOR ARNOLD) INFO CINCPA ADV, COMGENAIR (BAKER).

1. There follows a resume of what has occurred in the matter of utilization of Royal Air Force forces in the Pacific from information available to this Headquarters.

A. Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that 10 Sqdns of British Very Long Range aircraft of approximately 220 aircraft will be based in the Ryukyus for operation under U. S. command. (See WarX 10737 of 2 June 1945 to MacArthur).

B. The British, aware of the JCS decision, have 4 Lancaster Sqdns now at ports in England ready for movement to the Pacific.

C. 3000 British engineers have been at United Kingdom ports since May 15 and will be followed shortly by 5000 additional engineers. These engineers are available for any job they can perform in support of the combined effort. It is expected that their efforts will be used in support of British VLR units when a firm decision on RAF participation is established.

D. At General Arnold's recent conference with Admiral Nimitz it was mutually agreed that nothing definite be done at the present in the matter of use of the RAF units in the Pacific in view of the fact that we are already crowded in trying to find airdromes for all of the U.S. air units planned for the Pacific. General Arnold commented that as soon as air units are deployed forward from Okinawa there may be some room available for the British in the Ryukyus.

E. In compliance with a request from Hqtrs AAF for plan whereby RAF units might best be employed by this Hqtrs in the Pacific(?) a recommendation was made that the 316 Wing be diverted from Okinawa to Tintian to operate out of North Field in addition to the 313 Wing now located there. This move was designed to make available space at Okinawa for the initial movement of RAF units to the Pacific. CINCPA does not concur in this recommendation.

F. Air Vice Marshals Sharp and Satterly are now here.

2. Recommendation:

A. Based upon reasons of National Policy, of which this Headquarters is not completely aware, the RAF might well be employed in operations against the SINGAPORE Area from a separate British base in the NETHERLANDS INDIES area, perhaps BRUNEI.
B. If National Policy indicates that the RAF must go into the RYUKYUS consideration should be given to the acquisition of another island which could be allocated entirely to the British and from which they could completely support their operations against JAPAN.

C. If neither of the foregoing solutions are expedient this Hqtrs is firmly convinced that the reassignment of the 316 Wing to TINIAN and the assignment of the 4 British Lancaster Squadrons to the fields thus made available in the RYUKYUS is the solution which will deliver the maximum bomb tonnage on JAPAN in the shortest time.

17 0715 CINCPAC ADV TO COM 3RDFLT.

Your 160007 is not approved. Operate TF 37 separately from TF 38 in fact as well as in name under arrangements which assign to Rawlings tasks to be performed but leave him free to decide upon his own movements and maneuvers.

17 1109 CINCAFPAC TO COM 20th AF info CINCPAC, CG AIR.

CX 19562.

From Arnold at MANILA ref your No. 3990. I have discussed with MacArthur the matter of employment of the RAF Lancasters. We are in complete agreement that:

A. The present plan for establishment of 12 B-29 groups in the RYUKYUS this year be not changed.
B. The Lancasters be employed in the RYUKYUS after sufficient airfields are evacuated by forward displacement of FEAF units. Estimated date of airfield availability for the RAF is 1st December.
C. British engineers be accepted and sailed to OKINAWA as early as possible consistent with the theater's capability of receiving them. Engineers must have full organizational equipment prior to departure from U.K.

The original agreement with the British which was confirmed at YALTA clearly indicated that the RAF would be employed in the bombing of JAPAN proper. The acquisition by US forces of another island solely for employment of the RAF is unacceptable. It is also unacceptable to change the destination of the 316 Wing.

17 1407 COMGEN TEN TO CINCPOA ADV.

See my 141350 for information requested your 061243. Airfield reconnaissance KUME cannot be made until island is secured on or about 1 July. This answers your 150446.
18 0144 CINCPOA ADV TO COMGEN TEN INFO CTF 31.

Mittitz to Buckner Info Hill. Delay until 1 July in securing KUME not understood in view of availability 8th Marines. Your 1714.07. Highly advisable secure this island as early as practicable.

14 0903 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 32.

Subject DD requirements for TF 32. The following operational factors are mentioned as of possible use in planning:

(A) Each TG should have 14 and not less than 12 DD in screen.

(B) Linking vessels are needed between groups and also between groups and strike pickets owing to limited range of TBS.

(C) Not less than 2 strike picket stations must be manned and each such picket group should be composed of 3 or preferably 4 DD in order to properly defend themselves.

(D) As many as 9 additional single ship radar pickets may have to be posted around the force to insure adequate air warning.

Para. When TF 32 is organized into 3 groups a minimum of 60 DD is needed and even this will require cutting down some elements to provide full number of radar pickets and it does not allow for the formation of a scouting line such as described in fast carrier task force instructions.

If TF 32 is organized into 4 groups an absolute minimum destroyer requirement is 75. Assuming 11 CV and 6 CVL available by 1 August a 4 group organization is indicated as of that date but present indications as to DDs available may prevent forming 4th group and necessitate keeping 3 group organization in spite of any awkward increase in number of carriers per group.

If released ATLANTIC DBs can be made to serve in lieu of DDs in any of contemplated TF 51 OLYMPIC functions the DD situation for the mobile 3rdFlt might be eased.

18 0555 CTF 31 to COM3RDFLT INFO CINCPAC ADV. CTF 32. CTF 99. COMGEN TEN. CTG 99.2. COMBERON TEN.

CINCPAC ADV 170300. My 121240. Recommend following ships be assigned TF 32 covering and support during JUNEAU operation. TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, NEVADA, ST LOUIS, WICHITA, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, OKLAHOMA CITY, SUMNER, SANDIEGO, CHICAGO, San Diego, RICHMOND, CLEVELAND, FRANKFORT, LAFAYETTE, 9 DDs, and 9 DEs. CTF 32 concurs. In view of fact that TF 32 intends to operate as a single unit only 1 of 3 CLs your 131433 required. None of references to all or needed.

18 0836 CINC 3FF to CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COM3RDFLT, BS1, AC L. RAFT.

My 040259 not to Com3rdFlt. To ensure satisfactory completion of battle damage repair, date of sortie from MANUS is now expected to be 6th July.

19 0834 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT. COMGEN TEN. CTF 31. CGF2NDMARDIV INFO COM5THFLT COM MARLANS. COMGEN3RDPHIBCORPS. COMGEN5THPHIBCORPS. TSCOM SATPAN.

MyDis 140245 May not to all. 2nd MarDiv (Less 8th RCT) is released from area reserve ICEBERG and reverts to control ComGenFMFPac.

19 1213 MACArthur TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMDR ALLIED NAVFORCES TOLOSA.

CINCPAC ADV 160902 and Com7thFlt 180137 relative exchange CruDivs 12 and 6 are references. CruDiv 12 is committed to 0-2 Operation which is now in progress. Concur in exchange of CruDivs 12 and 6 subsequent to 7 July as arranged directly with Comdr Allied NavForces.
19 1335 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGENPOA, COMHAWSEAFRON.

Request you submit recommendations as to modifications in category of defense for HAWAII with view to reduction of defense forces.

19 1737 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCAFPAC INFO CINCPAC PEARL.

Following addition proposed to CINCPAC-CINCPAC serial 0005070 dated 6 June 1945. CINCPAC will assume responsibility for supply bulk petroleum for all land based forces and activities including air at target OLYMPIC. OKINAWA will be commercial tanker terminus for bulk petroleum destined OLYMPIC with onward movement from OKINAWA effected by use of suitable shuttle tankers and barges. CINCAFPAC will advise CINCPAC-CINCPAC number and capacity of Army petroleum barges to be made available at OKINAWA for OLYMPIC Operation.

13 1524 COMGENPOA PASSED TO CINCPOA PEARL PASSED TO CINCPAC ADV(190214)

Although you have undoubtedly cleared with POA on redeployment shipments come misunderstanding apparently exists as to their ability to receive troops and equipment from ETO-MTO note CINCPOA ADV 020822. Cited dispatch apparently reflects early planning figures before specific units and destinations were nominated. Present estimate of cargo to be handled thru various destinations in POA to arrive 10-20 August is: LEGUMINOUS 48000 MTs including 1800 vehicles, FRICTION 26000 MTs including 850 vehicles, INDISPENSABLE 11500 MTs including 400 vehicles, STEVEDORE 6000 MTs including 200 vehicles, TEARAWAY 600 MTs including 20 vehicles. Troopers are scheduled to arrive during same period. These movements are based on your priority lists. Any earlier movement dates are not possible and deferments would tie up available fast cargo ships. Detailed loading directives from CINCPOA not practicable, schedule should be accepted as above. CNO is replying to above cited dispatch copy to you giving detailed breakdown by units. Specific ships for destinations not available at this time.


Based on estimated less than 200 enemy soldiers on KUME, landing force KUME Operation of FMF RON BN plus Rein Rifle Co 1st MarDiv begins loading 22 June. Your 1801A4, not to or needed by all. Plan landing 25 June. Engr. and AWS survey team accompanies assault forces.

20 0349 CINCAFPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMGENPOA.

CX 20061. CINCAFPAC OLYMPIC Plan, Page 8R, contemplated that ComGenPOA (U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific) will mount units in the POA for CINCAFPAC. In the RYUKYUS, some of these units are Army ground units and some are Army Air Units. With your concurrence, plan to charge ComGenPOA with mounting both ground and air forces and with the preparation of ground forces for the operation. ComGen FEAF prepares air forces.
CINCPAC PEARL TO COMSERVRON TEN INFO CTG 30.3, COM3RDFLT, CINCPAC ADV, COMSERVPAC (APO), CTF 31, COMSERVRON TO REP, COMMARIANAS, COMMARGILS AREA.

CTG 30.3 152330 not needed by all and Ur 170217 of higher classification indicates advisability of dissemination of current information on petroleum supply and tankers availability as follows:

1. Stocks of fuel readily available to PacFlt operations now at their lowest point during past year. Pearl stocks on hand equal to approximately 1 week's POA requirements. Recent operations have completely exhausted west coast fuel stocks with result that only 1 cargo scheduled from there from 20 June through 31 July which is extent of current listings. This serious fuel stock position is result of tanker shortage when during recent operations fleet requirements had to be met by short haul Pearl and West Coast instead of distant primary sources. CINCPAC current fuel requirements now scheduled to be met by transporting from PERSIAN GULF, BALBOA, NWI, and U.S. GULF. Current California production required for construction of local facilities.

2. Supply of all gasolines is adequate, diesel sufficient, and fuel oil short.

3. Tanker availability indicates possible deficit of 54 ships on 1 July increasing to deficit of 257 ships last half 1946.

4. The assurance of continued supply of sufficient bulk petroleum to maintain planned operations plus rebuilding reserve stocks in POA demands the elimination of every possibility for shortening the supply line maintained by our allocated commercial tankers which includes maximum use of AOs, AOCs and IXs in onward shuttling service. Determination of commercial tanker terminals to be based solely on maximum utilization of these ships as petroleum carriers and cannot be influenced by despatch of personnel, freight, etc.

5. Concur establishment of ENIWETOK main tanker turnaround point. Concur MARIANAS supply method. Do not approve removal tanker turnaround facilities ULITHI. Your proposed shuttle OKINAWA fuel from LEMTE would result in unacceptable increase of approximately 1500 miles to commercial tanker turnaround. Petroleum supply situation is such to require constant study of operational procedures to effect maximum results from allocated tankers assigned.

DEPCOMAF 20 to CINCPAC ADV INFO COMAF 20, CINCPAC, COMMGENPOA, COMMARIANAS.

Air Staff plans provide for 10 fighter groups to be assigned the 20 AF for long range VLR escort. To properly deploy these forces 5 groups are needed in IWO and 5 groups in the RYUKUS area. Desire your concurrence in deploying forward from OAHU to IWO the 50th Fighter Group which is assigned to the 20th AF, on or about 1 August. It is contemplated that the unit can be reequipped with long range fighter aircraft prior to that date. Availability of 2 additional fighter groups for RYUKUS not yet known.

COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, COMSERVRON SIX, COMSERVRON TEN.

Request you make no decision regarding ComServRon 10 170217 until arrival Capt. Cross. Study of July requirements for fleet oilers indicate following:

(A) 12 oilers required for supply supporting forces OKINAWA not including 2 additional now exclusively for AvGas and diesel.

(B) 36 oilers required for direct support TF 38 planned operations.

With total 40 oilers now available to TG 30,8 it is apparent that either an alternate plan for OKINAWA supply must be employed or TF 38 operations must be scaled down to permit 28 oilers to provide sufficient support. Cross proceeding to GUAM 21 June with complete data.
20 1340 CTF 31 to COMDESRON 63 INFO CINC PAC BOTH, COMP HIB SPAC, CCFM PAC, ISCOM OKINAWA CNO AND COM INCH, CTG 99.2.

This is CTF 31 (Com 5th Phib For) Op Ord A-207-45.

Task Organization:
A. TF 31 - Vadm Hill - As currently organized.

Both following units as organized in his Op Ord 2-45. FMF Recon. En plus reinforced Rifle Co.'s from 1st Mar Div, and other troops as assigned by CG 10, Maj. Jones, USMC. GAINARD (DD 706) BEALE (DD71) GUEST (DD72) LST(H) 951, LST 1040 (P), LST 570, PCE (R) 856, PCE 873, JOHN BLISH (AGS10) LC(F)368, LCS 2, 4, 74, 101, 103, DELIVER (ARS 23), BUNCH (APD 79) with UDT 21 embarked. Support aircraft as assigned by CTF 31.

1. Information as contained in current orders and dispatches, minesweeping at objective will be accomplished prior assault as directed by CTF 31.

2. This force while continuing present operations will, beginning on K-Day capture and secure KUME SHIMA in order to establish additional air warning and fighter director stations thereon.

3. TF 31 continue present operations.

3B. KUME SHIMA Attack Grp move from OKINAWA to objective, capture and secure KUME SHIMA. When islands are secure troops operate as directed by CG 10.

3X1 K-Day is 25 June 1945. Long Date, H-Hour, time of landing 1st assault wave, will be designated by CG 31.24.

3X2 After Kume SHIMA has been secured and when directed by CTF 31 TG 31.24 dissolved.

3X3 This order effective 0800 I (-9) 24 June 1945.


21 0903 CINC POA ADV TO CINC SWPA INFO COM ALLIED AF MANILA, COM AIR PAC, CG ATD FMFPAC.

Ref is your 200829. Latest withdrawal dates 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Hq and component units follows. To be withdrawn in August. MAG 32 HedRon and SeRon. MAG 25 see my OL0759, May, regarding this group. VMB 611.

Tentatively scheduled for employment OLYMPIC with mounting dates to meet Marine airfield schedule of activation. Hq 1st Mar Air Wing. MAG 12 with attached squadrons. MAG 61 with attached squadrons. MAG 24, HedRon and SeRon plus VMSB 244. Air Warning Sqdns 3 and 4. For October withdrawal MADS 1. Other squadrons attached to MAG 24 and MAG 32 will be returned to URR or decommissioned as shown my serial 0005034 of April.

21 1116 COMGEN TBN TO CTF 31, CG ISCOM 331, CG TAF, CG 24 CORPS, CG 3 RDF PHIR, CG FMFPAC RECON BN INFO CINC POA ADV.

This is KYUKUS Forces and 10th Army Op Ord 16-45.


As agreed by CTF 31 naval attack force with landing force attached will make assault landing SW coast KUME. Capture and secure island. Initiate mop up enemy personnel construction landing craft and reconnaissance air warning and airfield sites.

Landing Force will begin loading 22 June in ships designated by CTF 31 from areas designated by IsCom 331 and report for duty to CTF 31. When command passed from naval attack force commander to landing force commander later repor.

- Continued -
TOP SECRET
JUNE (GCT)

21116 RYUKUS FORCES AND TENTH ARMY OPORD 16-45. (CONTINUED)


TAF will provide air support as requested by CTF 31. Missions initially under op control Naval Attack Force Comdr. In conjunction IsCom 331 establish maintain and operate UUPJ range search and fighter control facilities KUME.

IsCom 331 will mount landing force. When landing force Comdr reports for duty IsCom KUME responsibility garrison defense and base development passes to IsCom 331. At earliest practicable date consistent tactical situation IsCom 331 will return following units to OKINAWA. FMFPac Recon Bn. Shore fire control party. 20 AmphTracs and crew. FUN AmphTanks and crews. On arrival OKINAWA units revert parent org.

Following reports to CG 10 fastest practicable means. Time of landing, resistance encountered, daily Ops Summ closing 1200 hours. Special reports covering Recon air warning site. Unloading facilities, airfield recon at earliest practicable time. Direct communication authorized all agencies concerned.

Logistics. IsCom 331 responsible logistics support assault and garrison forces. Construction landing facilities for LCM or larger will be initiated without delay. Request CTF 31 provide 2 LCM and 3 LCVP with all crews for KUME Boat Pool. IsCom 331 replace crews not later than K plus 30. Civil population remain on island. Military prisoners to OKINAWA.

210645 CGUSEOF TO JCS VIA WARCOS INFO CINCAPAC, CHINPOA.

OPEX 39739. Para 1. Possibility of capitalizing on Jap military deterioration and withdrawals in CHINA is subject. Ref WARX 15811, 13 June.

2. There have been no substantial changes in Jap capabilities since China Theater's last biweekly report. The enemy continues to concentrate in key coastal defense areas from FRENCH INDO CHINA to MANCHURIA. South of YELLOW RIVER it is possible that they are adopting the German strategy of defending the main ports strongly in order to hamper seriously allied operations.

3. The enemy is now conducting operations in the CANTON-KUKING CORRIDOR. There is as yet no clear indication of the purpose of these operations. Meanwhile the Japanese are conducting delaying action as they withdraw.

4. At present Chinese forces are in contact with Japanese near CAO BANG and LUNGSHOW along FIC border and are threatening LIUCHOW and KUEILIN towns. Pressure by Chinese forces is being exerted west of PACching.

5. The main China Theater forces continue on the active defense, following up Japanese withdrawals with minor non US sponsored forces while preparing for planned operations. Action to accelerate projected operations, taking advantage of enemy withdrawals, has been initiated. New 1st Army (38th and 50th Divs) will commence arriving at NANNING from BURMA via air in near future to secure area and cover build up of additional Carbonado forces and supplies. Other preliminary measures to be undertaken at once include:

A. Securing and consolidating LIUCHOW, KUEILIN and TANCIHOK (WULINKOW) (110-45 25-30) airfield areas. Airfields will be made operational for minimum air supply and air defense.

B. Accelerating build-up of air and ground forces in preparation for early advance on CANTON-HONGKONG.

C. Maintaining pressure against withdrawing Japanese with forces now engaged.

-Continued-

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D. Securing and developing an intermediate port and airfield area at FORT BAYARD and/or at other coastal supply points.

6. Mission of projected operations presented by me in March to JCS remains unchanged. Modified timing and phasing follows: Main Effort.

A. Phase 1 (target date 1 Sept 1945): 1st: To advance from NANNING-LIUCHOW-KWEILIN base area on final objective via west river and/or PINGLOK-KUKONG AXIS. 2nd: By air and sea bombardment to soften up principal enemy strongpoints in final objective area.

B. Phase 2 (target date 1 Nov 1945) to assault and capture CANTON-HONGKONG port area. Secondary effort: To advance on final objective along the coast from vicinity of LIUCHOW PENINSULA making maximum use of seaborne supplies, COLLE and animal transport, all at no expense to main effort from LIUCHOW-NANNING Area.

7. Distance of KUNMING TERMINAL of supply from final objective over extremely difficult terrain and under adverse weather condition, where adequate land communications have never existed, is a great hindrance to acceleration of CHINA Theater operations. Operation of all intermediate port or suitable coastal landing points along south CHINA would offset these logistical difficulties somewhat and contribute substantially to successful attack on CANTON-HONGKONG. This fortified area may be organized on scale similar to that of Germans defense of channel ports. If so, task will be formidable.

8. Further exploitation of the deteriorating enemy situation in CHINA by forces outside CHINA Theater may be accomplished in 1 of 2 ways as follows:

A. Assault by amphibious forces from outside of the theater to secure ABTD lodgement along the CHINA coast phased in support of projected CHINA Theater operations.

B. Provision of shipping, small craft, necessary naval complements, supplies and equipment for delivery to points along the coast when secured by CHINA Theater forces.

9. If a small scale operation to secure lodgement along CHINA Coast becomes feasible this year, the area south of SWATOW extending to HONGKONG appears most desirable. An amphibious assault and timed with Carbonado would accomplish the aids expressed in WARY 15811 and materially assist effort in CHINA. Later during 1946 as revitalized Chinese Armies advance toward SHANGHAI, lodgement areas in vicinity of NINGPO would be desirable.

10. Investigation on the ground of local forces and resources in the area between AMOY and SHANGHAI is continuing. Continued Japanese withdrawals and advance east and west of HONGKONG and SHANGHAI make it improbable that any material advantage will accrue to Pacific operations from an unopposed landing in this area even though it is possible that some effective Chinese forces could be gotten together. With their equipment supplemented by supplies from the Pacific these forces might, after period of reorganization and training, be able to exert additional pressure against the Japanese in the SHANGHAI Area during the remainder of 1945. Experience is proving however, that furnishing supplies and equipment to units with which there are no substantial U.S. Liaison teams is unsound. The leaders of such units tend to hide the additional equipment for use in post war struggle for power. The semi autonomous armies in OUSTERN CHINA areas and the complex political situation rapidly developing there make it doubtful whether result envisaged by JCS will be achieved from landings in that area without considerable prior preparation. Pending report of investigating teams it must be assumed that the ports such as FOCHOW will only be usable by shallow draft vessels and landing craft and that the only feasible way to get the supplies inland to effective Chinese armies will be by KIA. With regard to increasing the blockade our information indicates that there is little Japanese shipping operating south of SHANGHAI.
11. Landings on the Coast north of SHANGHAI could be militarily advantageous. Politically such landings are unacceptable to the Generalissimo and could result in the flaring of an open civil war between the Central Government and the Communists prior to the ending of the war against JAPAN. It is also probable that the Japanese WAKUYOGO-CENTY landing attempts from SHANGHAI northward with a determined defense.

12. 2nd method of exploiting the deteriorating enemy situation by forces outside of CHINA is part of problem under current study in this theater. The FORT BAYARD area and perhaps 1 or 2 other intermediate areas between FORT BAYARD and HONGKONG appear to have great possibilities as intermediate supply points for increasing supplies to the armies and enabling the Chinese to extend the area of their attack against CANTON-HONGKONG. Preliminary estimates based on the assumption that most supplies would be moved inland from BAYARD by ground HLOC have already been submitted by CHINA Theater to the War Dept. A new study is now underway examining the movement of supplies inland using air lift principally. Considering the timing of CHINA's operations it appears that the results of this study will give a more realistic picture and would provide the maximum aid from outside the theater.

13. If there is no landing on the CHINA Coast in an area and in Phase with CHINA Theater operations, the development of intermediate coastal supply bases to supplement China's existing tenuous lines of communication will do the most toward intensifying operations by Chinese armies and lessening current and future logistic difficulties.

21 1237 MACARTHUR TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COMMAF, CTF 78.

CX 20439. Adverse weather and terrain conditions have prevented preparation of fighter field TARAKAN in sufficient time to cover 02 operation. Alternate plan of providing air cover from TAWI TAWI by long range fighters has become uncertain because of weather. 7thFlt is recommending that escort carriers be utilized if available to ensure air cover. Request that 1/2 escort carrier division with screen be provided in BALIKPAPAN Area for operations during period 30 June to 2 July 1945 inclusive.

21 1405 CINCPAC TEN TO CTF 31 INFO CINCEFPAC, CINCPOA BOTH HQ.

ReUrDis 120450 ADC ready to assume full responsibility for all air defense functions OKINAWA Area 1 July present location. Recommend ADC be assigned immediately, the operation and control of air warning net and fighter direction both day and nite. Consider number of shore based fighter aircraft currently available sufficient for defense this area.

21 1415 CTF 38 to ALL FLAG OFFICERS TF 38, ALL CVS & CVL TF 38 Info COM3RDFLT.CTF37.

Present intent for planning. TF 38 sortie 1 July. Period 1-8 July training under type, TG and TF condms as follows:

A. 2 days anti-aircraft firing.
B. 4 days air training including squadron, air group, task group, and task force exercises. Fuel 8 July. Air strike TOKYO fields 10 July target is aircraft. All carrier types will be employed. Principal loadings VT fused frags and rockets possible M29 clusters. Maximum strike distance 250.
Para. Fuel 12 July. 13 July strike HOKKAIDO and NORTH HONSHU target rail road ferries, aircraft, strategic targets. Loadings as before except 500 and 1000 GP bombs also used as appropriate. Maximum strike distance, 250.
Midday July 14 bombardment group A bombard KUSHINO Area. Air strikes in...
support and repeat previous day as practicable. Extensive photo coverage
including mapping, reconnaissance, damage assessment.

Fuel and rendezvous with TF 37 on 15 July. On 16 July strike TOKYO area
similar to plan of 10 July. If and as directed execute bombardment plan A
night bombardment coast vicinity Portland, OR, 36-30 to 07-00 night of 16 July or bom-
3841. Interim plan B midday bombardment same area 17 July. If no bombardment ordered
or night bombardment ordered intend air strikes against strategic targets
17 July. If day bombardment is ordered all air effort will be in support
against airfields. Retire evening 17 July.

Target assignments as follows: Airfields TOKYO. Each includes major
airfields listed plus minor fields adjacent. Area T2801, 2803, 1468, 1469,
2796, 1472, 2754, 2760, 1644, 2777 assigned to TG 38.1. Area U2809, 1404,
2780, 2750, 298, 373, 2781, 2787, 1222, 1412 assigned to TG 38.2. Area V
1465, 1466, 1474, 2765, 2753, 1416, 1406, 2783 assigned TG 38.4. Area B 2814,
2773, 2887, 2895, 2897, assigned TG 37 when present. Airfield numbers from
SecCarTaskFor serial 01373 of 20 June distributed by officer messenger mail
today. For strategic targets TOKYO all groups be prepared to handle as
later assigned targets F electronics plants numbered 496, 488, 497 or target
G aircraft engine plants number 2016 X P-127, P-117. From CINCPAC secret
serial 005972 of 16 May to Com3rdPfIt subject Jap Industrial targets. Target
assignments HOKKAIDO as follows. Area W 2932, 2920, 2930, 2923 assigned TG
38.1. Area X 2890, 2836, 2838 assigned TG 38.2. Area Y 2935, 2934 assigned
TG 38.4. Strategic targets same areas. Intend make minimum changes area
assignments in these and subsequent operations.

Late photo coverage TOKYO expected 25 June. Brief on recognition SEAFIRE,
FIREFLY, CLIPPED EAGLE Corsair. British Plane insignia. Operation and training orders will follow.

Night carrier be prepared provide night heckling, intruder in target
areas as ordered. Also provide night spotting and illumination for night
bombardments if ordered.

21 0654 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC FEARL,COMNAVAIRBASE MANUS,VRNO MANUS,VO(C),COM
SERVON TEN,BSL,ACL,COM/TF38.

It is desired to dock and refit all capital ships of the BFF requiring
such work before OLYMPIC. The target is to use 4 BBs, 5 CVs and 4 CVLs for
that operation.

2. Owing to underwater repairs necessary the CVs
will occupy Capt. Cook dock at SYDNEY almost continuously.

3. It would be appreciated if it were possible to dock KING GEORGE 5TH for
a few days at MANUS on return from operations at beginning of August. It is
realized that it might be necessary to cancel the docking at short notice
should a commitment with a higher priority arise.

22 0342 COMGENPOA TO CINCPAC ADV INFO DEPOM DEPOM DEPOM AF ADMIN.
RJ (44). Plans to deploy total of 10 fighter groups of 20th AF as indicated
DepComAF 20 200443 June not previously known here. Redeployment forecast
provides for total of 34 groups to PACIFIC, assignment not specified. In ac-
28572 DTG 232290 August 4, JCS radio 72134, DTG 032157
December 4, CINCPAC 20449 Sep 25, CINCPAC top sec serial 0001727
October 20, and CINCPAC serial 06632 Nov, provision has been made in rede-
ployment plan for the retention of 1 fighter group as part of minimum defenses
of the HAWAIIAN GROUP. This requirement now met by 508 fighter group, presently
only fighter group HAWAIIAN AREA.

Separate reply is being made to your 19135 June. Incorporated therein will
- Continued -
be recommendation that an organized fighter group remain as a minimum requirement on OAHU. Therefore this headquarters does not concur in forward movement of the 508 Fighter Group without replacement. It is requested that before CINCPAC makes a final decision to reduce the presently prescribed Army fighter protection, including night fighters, for the HAWAIIAN GROUP, this headquarters be so informed in order that further representation may be made on this subject.

22 0955 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM3HDLT INFO COM7THFLT, CTF31, CTG32.1, CINCSPAC, COMAIRPAC.

MacArthur 211237. Form TG 3 CVE and 6 DD or DE with EscDivCom as TGC. Detach this group from 3rdFlt and direct TGC report by dispatch without delay to Com7thFlt for temporary operational control.

23 0106 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM7THFLT.

Your CX 20061 (DTG 200349). Concur. It is understood that your arrangements for preparation and mounting units involve no change in CINCPOA command authority responsibility including control of harbor and shore facilities and the movement of shipping in the RYUKUS.

24 0106 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV INFO COM7THFLT.

Affirmative your 230555. (Re: ABSD 2 for docking KING GEORGE V).

24 0229 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL, CG6THARMY, COMPAC, AFESPAC.

CINFPAC 210035 indicates Hq 5thPhibCorps will be at SAIPAN. CINFPAC 210349 also refers. This Hq does not concur with such move if contemplated. Hq 5thPhibCorps now at MAUI. To establish at SAIPAN will require move extending over at least 6 weeks period and involve approximately 250 officers 2000 enl 400,000 cu.ft. 2500 short tons 35,000 sq.ft. Because of requirements for detailed planning, preparation of orders and to attain adequate state of readiness strongly recommend that Corps Hq and Hq units including communication and reproduction units must remain at present location, CG VAC concurs.

24 0849 CINCPAC TO CINCPAC ADV INFO TTHFLT, CINCPAC PEARL, CG6THARMY, CGPAC, AFESPAC.

Request you furnish as soon as possible maps indicating areas and acreage desired with their proposed use for all CINCPAC shore installations in DIABOLIC (KYUSHU) in order to make tentative allocations of sites for Army and Navy establishments ashore. Also in order to facilitate planning request designation of commander and agency constructing Marine Force airfields in DIABOLIC and your concurrence in their direct communication with representatives of Gen 6th Army, PEAP, and AFESPAC as appropriate.

24 0918 CINCPOA ADV TO CTF 31, CG10, CINCPAC, CG3RDPhibCorps INFO CINCPOA PEARL, GGPOA, CORDIANAS, CG2NDMarDiv, CINCPAC PEARL, TSCGSAIPAN, TSCG GUAM, CTF99.1, CTG99.3.

1. When the tactical situation permits and the 8th RCT is no longer required as reserve for the KUME operation transfer the 8th RCT plus the 4th separate laundry platoon to SAIPAN. Operational control of above units passes to CG2NDMarDiv on arrival SAIPAN.

2. The following Marine units of the 3rdPhibCorps are scheduled to rehabilitate OKINAWA: 1st MarDiv Reinf, 2nd separate Eng. Bn., 3rdPhibCorps Arty (Hq Btry VMO 7 and 4 Bns), 7th Field Depot (7th Service Regt). Upon completion of Phase 1 ICEBERG and when the tactical situation permits transfer all other units of 3rdPhibCorps to MARIANAS as previously designated by CGMCPAC.
3. When no longer required for the KURE operation transfer MIF Recon Bn or make other disposition as desired by FMFPAC, CGFMFPAC advise.

4. CTF 31 nominate and direct approx 75 LSTs from those now discharging and enroute LEGUMINOUS for movement of material and equipment of units listed in preceding paras (LSTs assigned temporary operational control 7th Fit for aviation augmentation MyDis 240920 are not available for nomination above). Approximately 200 personnel will be lifted each LST. Personnel lift required in addition to those on above 75 LSTs will be covered by separate dispatch. CG3rdPhibCorps indicate to local authorities OKINAWA priority desired for return of units.

5. Desire CG3rdPhibCorps and key staff members (Approx 11) be transferred GUAM when their services can be spared. Class 2 air priority via NATS certified. 100 lbs. excess baggage authorized while in air travel status. Authorized to travel private plane if desired.

24 1305 MACARTHUR TO MARCOS INFO CGPOA, CGAFFOA, CGFEAF, CINCPAC.

Subject is radio WX 13836 dated 8 June 1945 which contains proposal that certain 7th AF and 7th Fighter Command units be reassigned to 20th AF. As a result of conference with CGAir, reassignment of 15 and 21 fighter groups, 347, 348, 363 and 386 Air Service Groups, 318 Fighter Grp and 364 Air Service Groups is concurred in with the understanding that: The 301 Fighter Wing at INDI S P E N S A B L E will remain under operational control of FEAF unless and until required for VHF escort out of LEGUMINOUS. Confirmation of this understanding is requested. Hq and Hq Sqdn 7th Fighter Command, less personnel and equipment, remains assigned to FEAF as per agreement with ComGenAir. Ref remaining units listed in WX 13836 attention is invited to radio ComGenPOA WD 63422 dated 13 June 1945. In view of ComGenPOA comment, request clarification of theater responsibilities with respect to 20th AF and consequently clarification of 20th AF requirement for remaining units WX 13836 requests be reasigned.

24 0230 COMGEN 10 CINCPPOA ADV INFO COM5THPHIBFOR, COMPHIBSPAC, CTG 99.1, COM3RDFLT, CTG99.2

See CINCPPOA 131239 May ComGen 10 will be ready 1 July 45 to assume the responsibility for the air defense of the forces and shipping present in OKINAWA area. Com5thPhibFor concurs.

24 0640 CTF 99 to CINCPPOA ADV INFO CTG 99.3

Your 230853. Unloading situation so critical that cargo arriving for next 30 days at least must be limited to cargo handling troops and equipment, construction troops, air force units, base development material required for original project and necessary maintenance. Recommend shipment from PHILIPPINES of signal construction supplies and air sea rescue equipment be deferred to arrive not earlier than 1 August. Will advise further on 15 July reference ability to receive.

25 0623 COMMARIANAS TO CINCPPOA ADV INFO ISCOM INOJIMA. CINCPPOA PEARL, DEPCOM 20 AFPOA.

Ref DepCom 20 TS 200443 June COMMARIANAS 210451 June. COMMARIANAS conf. ser 01956 1 June 45. Careful study indicates that with current directives on aircraft dispersal a 5th Fighter Grp cannot be accommodated at INO. If current dispersal of 6 plane hardstands at 300 ft be reduced to 6 planes at 200 ft between groups 5 groups can be stationed INO. Would also necessitate lengthening of North Field 1000 ft which can be accomplished. ComMarianas opinion this 200 ft dispersal not safe due to damage in 1 hardstand causing progressive damage to adjacent ones.
26 0351 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV TO DEFPOA 20 INFO COMMISSION, COMMARTANAS, TSOC TPAC.

Your 20204/3. Do not concur in movement forward of 508th Fighter Group from OAHU to TUCSON. This invitation is invited to CINCPAC serial 06682 17 Nov 44, subject AAF Units for Hawaiian Air Defense. See also COMMARTANAS 250623 which indicates a 5th Fighter Group cannot be accommodated at TUCSON without relaxing current dispersal directives which is not advisable at this time. This also answers ComGenPOA 220342.

26 0435 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV TO COMPHIBPAC.

Your 210095 and 212340. In view disadvantages pointed out CINCPAC 24029 and others it appears extremely desirable that headquarters 5thPhibCorps remain MAUI rather than shift to SAIPAN.

26 1245 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 38, 37, CTF 30.2, 20.5, COMSUBPAC, ALL TCG-TT 38.

Request you institute following interdiction plan connection my OpPlan 9-45. During approach TF 38 from LEYTE via CHESS On 6-7 July, during fueling vicinity INDEX on 8 July and during high speed approach via ESQUIRE on 9 July maintain interdiction patrol in V391 and V402 sectors between force and Empire.

On retirement of force to northeastward on 11 July and while fueling on 12 July extend sectors 16 and 12V391 to maximum practical limit doubling as necessary to patrol between force and Empire.

While fueling on 15 July and again during period 18-20 July maintain same procedure as outlined for 12 July.

Prime mission of interdiction destruction of enemy search planes which might contact our surface forces. Schedule above is intent but unforeseen delays may occur in which case request interdiction be planned to cover movements of force in accordance with basic plan outlines. Dependent on radio silence conditions you and interested commands will be kept informed of plan changes all practicable.

Insure shore based air commands fully briefed on movements of TF 38 TG 30.2 and submarine anti-picket sweeps.

26 1225 COM3RDFLT TO CTFs 30.6, 30.8, 30.9, COMBATRON 8, COMBATDIV 7, CTF 37 & 38, TUCSON KASAAN BAY INFO CTF 93, COMINC, CINCPAC BOTH, 3RDFLT, COMSUBPAC, COMSDF, CINCPAC, COMAIRPAC, COMMARINAS, COMFRA 18, 21ST BOMCOM, COMMARINAS.

This is Com3rdFlt OpPlan 9-45.

A. TG 30.2 Radio Deception Group - Capt. Ayrault TUCSON.
B. TG 30.7 ASW Group B Capt. Perkins - Units as assigned by later dispatch.
C. TG 30.8 Logistic Support Group - RAdm Beary - Units as assigned by separate dispatch.
   1. TG 30.6 ASW Group A - Capt. Montgomery - Units as currently assigned.
D. TG 30.9 - Base Service Group - Commo Carter (until relieved by RAdm Smith) Units as assigned currently.
E. TG 34.8 Bombardment Group - RAdm Shafroth.
   1. TU 34.8.1 Bombardment Grp A - RAdm Shafroth - BatDiv 8 less, ALABAMA plus SOUTH DAKOTA QUINCY CHICAGO DesRon 48 less KIDD plus HEERMANN.
   2. TU 34.8.2 Bombardment Grp B - RAdm Badger - BatDiv 9 IOWA NORTH CAROLINA ALABAMA ATLANTA DAYTON DesRon 54.
F. TF 37 British Carrier force - VAmd Rawlings - Units as assigned by CINCBPP.
G. TF 38 Fast Carrier TF - VAmd McCain - Units as assigned in my 170017 modified by my 230635.

- Continued -
26 1225 COM3RDFLT OP PLAN 9-45 (CONTINUED).

Information own and enemy forces as in my OpPlan 3-45 and by separate dispatch. 3rdFlt forces not specified in this OpPlan support this operation by execution of missions assigned in Com3rdFlt OpPlan 3-45.

This Fleet while carrying out the general mission prescribed my OpPlan 3-45 will attack Japanese naval and air forces shipping shipyards and coastal and assigned strategic objectives in order to lower Japanese ability and will to resist.

A. TG 30.2 carry out radio deception in accordance deception plan Annex C this OpPlan. Remain in assigned TGs of TF 38 when not on detached deception duty.

B. TG 30.7 Conduct ASW operations as separately directed by Com3rdFlt.

C. TG 30.8 Provide logistic services for TF 38 at sea in accordance SerPlan 1 which is Annex B this OpPlan. Employ TG 30.6 for ASW operations in vicinity of TG 30.8 unless otherwise directed by later dispatch.

D. TG 30.9 Provide maximum Logistic and Repair services to all fleet units at all advance bases. Provide Logistics for Fleet forces in OKINAWA Area as required.

E. TG 34.8 Operate in assigned groups of TF 38 except when otherwise directed. Bombing enemy coastal objectives when specifically directed.

F. TF 37 Conduct air strikes against enemy objectives as specified in movement and attack schedule Annex A this OpPlan or as later directed.

G. TF 38 Conduct air strikes against enemy objectives as specified in movement and attack schedule Annex A this OpPlan or as later directed. Furnish combat air patrol for TG 34.8 and spotter when directed.

1. Sub para's 2, 3 and 4 my OpPlan 3-45 apply.
2. This OpPlan effective on receipt.
3. All ships be prepared for towing and to be towed.

Logistics and repair facilities available in EMINEMOK MARIANAS LEYTE and OKINAWA. Logistics at sea for TF 38 in accordance SerPlan 1. CINCIPLE provides logistics for TF 37.

Communications in accordance with USF 70A and PAC 70B (effective 1 July). Use zone 2 (GCT) time in DPG of all communications. Use I(-9) time for all operations at sea. Annexes A, B and C by separate dispatch. Com3rdFlt in MISSOURI.

26 2310 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC INFO CINCPAC,CINCPAC PEARL, COMGEN TEN.

UrDis 250256 is partially answered as regards ETO MTO units by mydis 250156. Troop requirements OKINAWA and IE SHIMA established by following.

Original phases 1 and 2 your serial 00432. ADJUTANT diversions by CINCPAC PEARL 040106 of May. FRICTION diversions by CINCPAC PEARL 090322 June. FEAF troops by para 2D CINCPAC ADV ser 000568O. Redeployed special units by para 2D latter serial. Round out and balancing troops by para 1 latter serial. Gen. Feldman of CINCPAC ADV now at OKINAWA conferring with CG 10 regarding possible additional requirements of which will keep you advised when reporting same to CINCPAC.

27 0751 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 31, 32. CTG 99.1, 99.2. CG 10, CTF 39, CTG30.5 CTF 30.2.

Recommend OOCO GCT 1 July as time date for withdrawal CTF 31 from OKINAWA Area. If approved following should be placed in effect at that time date:

A. CG 10 assume responsibility for the defense of OKINAWA including responsibility for the air defense of the forces & shipping present in OKINAWA Area.

- Continued -
27 0751 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 31, CTF 32, ETC. (CONT'D)

B. Air sea rescue responsibility assumed by CTG 30.5 as prescribed by my 190135.

C. CG 10 (employing naval and air forces at his disposal) assume responsibility for all ASW within area bounded by circle of 100 mile radius from Point BOLO, calling on CTG 30.5 for such additional air assistance as may be required.

If this recommendation approved I will direct CTF 32 and CTG 30.9 assume responsibility for tasks now assigned CTF 31 by my OpPlan 6-45.

28 1347 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT.

Your OpPlans 3-45, 6-45 and 9-45 are so worded that in absence of CTF 31 the following 3rdFlt organizations will remain in the RYUKYUS-EAST CHINA SEA Area without any overall command arrangement except through Com3rdFlt who will be far afield and often under radio silence. TF 32 Vadm Oldendorf, TF 39 RAdm Sharp, TG 30.5 RAdm Price, TU 30.9.5 Capt. Rhodes.

While Com3rdFlt is operating under restrictions of radio silence, all of these commanders as well as ComBen 10 and CINCPAC will be uncertain as to what individual if any has the overall authority and responsibility for the coordination of these varied commands.

Request you designate a commander to exercise authority over the activities mentioned during the period that your own attention is concentrated elsewhere.

Since all 3 of OpPlans mentioned with their various changes and modifications are partially effective, a clarifying order would be helpful.

Order conforming to your 270751 para A and C being issued by CINCPAC.

Request early reply by OP dispatch.

28 1348 CINCPAC ADV TO CG 10 INFO COM3RDFLT, CTF 31, CTG 30.1, CTF 32, CTG 30.5.

Pursuant to my OpPlan 4-45 effective 010000 GCT July assume full responsibility for defense of captured positions in the RYUKYUS. This task includes responsibility for the air defense of forces and shipping in the OKINAWA Area and responsibility for all ASW operations within 100 miles of Point BOLO.

In execution of this task you are authorized to call on CTG 30.5 direct for additional air assistance when required and latter is hereby directed to so assist when possible.

28 1355 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CINCPAC ADV.

CX 21986. A number of radiograms have been passed through the Pacific between the War Dept, the CHINA Theater, CINCPAC and APPAC relating to establishing a supply line to the CHINA Coast in the vicinity of PORT BAYARD. The latest War Dept radiogram, WY 22283 dated 25 June, proposes the following general scheme: Load 3 Liberty ships in the U.S. for discharge at PORT BAYARD about 15 August. This shipment to be followed approximately 20 days later by 2 additional Liberty ships. War Dept requests our comments concerning feasibility of protection across CHINA SEA and during unloading. Your immediate comment is requested relative to naval surface protection. For your information, air cover can be furnished from the PHILIPPINES to the limit of range if required. Inquiry is being made of CHINA Theater as to what air cover can be furnished from that end.
29 0725 CCOMGEN TEN TO CINCPOA ADV INFO CINCPAC PEARL. COMGENPOA. CINCPAC. CGAAPP, COMGEN 20 BOMCOM. CG FEAF. JSCOM OKINAWA. CG TAP. COMAIRPAC.

Study of aviation ammo and bomb problem this area reveals necessity for clarification and adjustment of requirements submitted by various agencies. Tonnages indicated appear prohibitive from point of view of storage areas and beach capacity. Aviation ammo companies and handling equipment needed require further analysis. Consider essential single agency responsible for coordination ammo supply problems among FEAF, Naval ASR and 20 BomCom. Recommend conference at early date to include all interested agencies. Problem acute and requires immediate clarification. See also our 270428.

29 0754 COMTHPLT TO CINCWPAC INFO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 281355 cite CK 21986. The feasibility of the proposal will naturally depend on the ground and air situation in CHINA at the time. To obtain maximum protection from enemy air and also facilitate entry it will be necessary to make final run in during darkness to arrive and enter at daylight. The size and draft of ships employed should permit passage over the bar and traversing channel during any stage of the tide. Adequate surface and A/S protection can be provided. Escort should not remain FOR BAYARD Area during unloading. Would require fighter cover as follows:
1. Dawn to dusk on approximate direct route from LINGAYEN between limits of 250 and 120 miles from ISLE NAODOW.
2. From dawn following day off ISLE NAODOW.
3. Cover for retiring escort on reverse track until dark, about 200 miles.
4. Dawn to dusk during unloading and until departure.
5. As in 1 above for return trip.

Considering enemy air and suicide boat capabilities in the area (even though LUCHOW is captured and reestablished as an Allied airfield) the operation would be hazardous. Further information desired from the CHINA Theater:
1. Probable unloading time. By intelligence indicates this operation would be unduly prolonged due absence docks and adequate port unloading facilities.
2. Confirmation no enemy or allied minefields exist in area.

29 0638 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH, CNO INFO CINCPAC PEARL. SEABRAV. BUSHIPS.

This summarizes CINCPAC ser 0005696 of 21 June, for your preliminary consideration:
(A) Essential OFI services will involve facilities for OLYMPIC capable of transmitting press material from mobile stations in objective area to GUAM for relay West Coast including facilities for radio teletype radio photo and voice broadcast. Transmissions required from at least 5 points near objective back to GUAM.
(B) Operational communications facilities can in part also meet press requirements if material Mydics 080131 supplied. Necessary to provide terminal equipment and operating personnel for both voice broadcast and radio photo transmission in 5 flagships.
(C) Essential you provide at least 1 and preferably 2 or 3 ships as mobile radio press relaying and origination ships. Recommend seaplane tenders BARNEGAT (AVP 10) class be outfitted as described my ser.
(D) Limiting dates for program 15 Sept for press ships on West Coast and 1 Sept for radio-photo. Voice broadcast and radio teletype material and personnel End of letter.

Comment. General conditions on OKINAWA then will probably be such that relaying of press material from that point instead of GUAM is not recommended.
Com RYUKYUS hereby designated single agency responsible for coordination new supply all land based forces operating from RYUKYUS. Submit recommendation as to date and place for conference suggested your 290725. Concur in delegation of routine logistic support to IsCom OKINAWA as in your 280833.


CINCPAC units to be employed in operation will be as outlined in Appendix E of referenced CINCPAC Joint Staff Study. Type Commanders concerned submit to CINCPAC Adv by 15 July to the fullest extent practicable specific designations of units to be employed. Unit designations not available by 15 July will be submitted earliest practicable. In designating units indicate personnel and both measurement tons and long tons of all cargo involved and mounting points. Copies of unit designations should be provided CINCPAC, COMEN6THARMY, COMSTTHFLT, COMPHIBSPAC, CINCPAC PEARL, COMMARTANAS, COMMARGIS, COMGENPOA, CTF 99.

CGMFFAC 240220. ComPhibPac 290700. Hqtrs 5thPhibCorps will remain MAUI.

30 0735 CINCEff TO CINCPAC ADV.

1. It is expected that a force consisting of INDOMITABLE 3 CVLs 2 Battleships 2 or 3 CLs and 9 DDs will be available at MANUS for operations in mid-August.
2. The scale of operations of which this force is capable is governed by:
   A. The time available. It would be necessary for them to return to MANUS by Mid September in order to be incorporated in TF 37 in preparation for OLYMPC.
   B. Logistic support particularly with regard to tankers.
3. Apart from its actual composition the 2 considerations referred to in para 2 above would appear to preclude the use of this force as a group of TF 38 in operations against the Japanese mainland at this time.
4. While worthwhile operation within the capability of this force is an attack on the MALAY PENINSULA. Due to the considerations outlined in para 2 above such an operation could not be sustained but its military effect would be much enhanced by its being in phase with SACSEAS impending assault on MALAYA.
5. I have not of course mentioned this to SACSEA but I am sure that anything we can do there at that time would help him.
6. Other alternatives might be the capture of TRUK which might prove useful as a base or of NAURU which seems to be important in assisting food production both in AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND. For either operation Australian or New Zealand troops would have to be available and this might not prove practicable.
7. If you agree I would like to send a staff officer to your hqtrs as soon as convenient to you with any further details that may be helpful to you in deciding on the employment of this force.
Here is brief of Con3rdFlt current operation orders 3-45, 6-45 and 9-45 all of which remain effective during period of current operations. 3rdFlt will attack Japanese naval and air forces, shipping, shipyards and coastal objectives, cover and support RYUKUS Forces and protect air and sea communications along Central Pacific Axis.

TF 38 Fast Carrier and TF 37 British Carrier forces conduct air strikes and bombardment accordance following schedule.

(A) TF 38 departs LEYTE 1 July proceeds to fueling rendezvous 8 July and on 10 July conducts air sweeps and strikes against enemy air and air installations in TOKYO PLAINS Area.

(B) Force retires and about 13 July strikes in northern HONSHU and KOKAI'DO Area.

(C) 14 July force strikes KOKAI'DO again and bombs KUSHIRO Area.

(D) Force retires to rendezvous with TF 37 which will have left MANUS about 6 July. Repeatt strikes 17 July if ordered. Bombard HONSHU Coast between 36-20 N and 37-00 N if ordered.

(E) Both forces retire to E for replenishment at sea. Time and place of subsequent strikes depends on tactical situation. Foregoing schedule subject to change due weather and tactical developments. Para.

TGs 30.2, 30.6 and 30.7, 30.8 and 30.9 respectively conduct deception missions, carry out ASW operations, and provide logistic support at sea and at advanced bases.

As TG 30.5 PairWing 1 conducts search and shipping strikes in EAST CHINA and YELLOW SEAS, around KOREA and off JAPAN west of 135 E.

TF 39 conducts minesweeping operations in area "JUNEAU" bounded as follows: 26-04 N 124-09 E, 26-15 N 124-31 E, 27-38 N 126-01 E, 28-20 N 125-20 E, 27-00 N 123-50 E, Sweeping scheduled to start 5 July at north end of area. Ships retire each night to SE. Estimated completion 1 August. Suspension of operations for logistic replenishment of ships planned from 15 to 18 July.

TF 32 provides naval cover for RYUKUS and TF 39. CTF 32 is in overall command of 3rdFlt forces operating in RYUKUS, namely TF 32, TF 39, TG 30.5 and units of TG 30.9.

Tentative agreement among FRAF, 5th AF and ConPhibsPac on use of Marine Air Warning Squadrons for OLYMTC has been reached and is now being recommended in detail to CG 6th Army. Plan includes following major features. 3 radar and fighter director units and 1 control center to go into western islands with 60th Division. 4 radar and fighter direction outpost units to go on small islands to south and southwest of objective. 4 radar and fighter direction outpost units and 1 control center to go in with 5thPhibCorps. This control center to cooperate with AmFor ASCU to eventually form a unified control center similar to the army tactical control center which will go in with the 3rd and 7th Attack Forces. Details of equipment recommended are being given to 6th Army who will forward to CINCPAC in accord with previous dispatches. Total of all Marine Air Warning and fighter director units will be equivalent of approximately 4 standard Marine Air Warning Sqdns with per ponderance of SPFM and AN/TPS-1B radar plus additional radio equipment and personnel which experience has shown to be essential to successful operation. This info for your consideration and possible advance planning since believe CINCPAC will approve and forward similar recommendations as soon as practicable.
CTG 77.2 Dispatches (VAdm dendorf)

JANUARY (GCT)

06 0614

CTG 77.2 to COM7TH FLEET, ALL INTERESTED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS SOWESPAC Info CTF 77, ALL TFC's & TGC's 7TH FLEET.

During operations this forenoon ships received damage from suicide attacks as follows: (A) New Mexico (BB-40) bridge destroyed all communications are out. ComBatDiv 4 in WEST VIRGINIA in charge SAN FABIAN Task Groups. No info Admiral Weyler. (B) WALKE (DD-723) plane crashed in after part of bridge into CIC. 10 Killed 25 burned. All guns in local control. Captain critically injured. (C) A.M. SUMMER (DD-692) hit aft. After magazine flooded. 2 Killed 3 injured. (D) LONG (DMS-12) hit by suicide plane. (E) BROOKS (APD-10) hit by suicide plane. Latter 2 no amplifying reports received as yet as still under attack. (F) R.P. LEARY (DD-664) hit by plane on both forward guns damage slight. 1 Man superficially injured. New subject: Minesweepers report no mines found as yet in entrance mine fields location but several floating mines. New subject: Suicide Dive Bomber attacks made in determined fashion. Pilots seem to be of high quality and difficult to stop. Group Fighter Director Officer states no radar contacts this forenoon all interception being done by visual lookouts with Fighter Director. New Subject: We require considerably more air support. What we have does not seem adequate at all. We have had 12 ships hit by suicide bombers since 1630 yesterday of which 1 sank and 9 were damaged severely.

06 1210

CTG 77.2 to COM7THFLT Info CTF 77/ALL TF AND TGC's 7TH FLEET. COM7THFLEET PASSED TO COM3RDFLT, COM51W/FORCE, CHQ SOWESPACAREA, CINCPOA, FAR EASTAIRSERVCOM, COMINCH.

This afternoon following ships hit by suicide bombers. CALIFORNIA (BB-44), AUSTRALIA, LOUISVILLE (CA-28), LOWRY (DD-770), O'BRIEN (DD-725), ORCA (AVP-49). This makes 12 ships hit today and a total of 17 since 1630 yesterday afternoon. LOUISVILLE and AUSTRALIA have now been hit twice Rear Admiral Chandler painfully and seriously burned. Command CrDiv 4 now temporarily in PORTLAND. RAdm Weyler safe. Consider need of additional air power urgent and vital. Our CVE's entirely inadequate providing air cover. Japanese suicide dive bombers seem able attack without much interference owing radar difficulties affecting all ships in LYNGAYEN GULF area. Airborne radar rarely makes contact with planes. Believe in addition that all fields small as well as large near LYNGAYEN area must be continuously bombed and maintained neutralized. Enemy
Continued:

attacks heaviest morning and evening especially around 1700. Additional damage may seriously and adversely affect this as well as important subsequent operations. More damage may invite action with the Japanese Fleet with which this Command is becoming progressively less prepared. Should suicide bombers attack transports results might be disastrous. Recommend 5th Air Force be informed seriousness situation and need more air support. Recommend 3rd Fleet be ordered this area immediately provide additional air and surface cover urgently needed. Consider this matter of such serious import as to warrant immediate reconsideration present plans.

CTG 77.2 to COM7THFLT Info CTF 77, ALL TF AND TG COMMANDERS 7TH FLEET, COM7THFLT PASSED TO COM3RDFLT, COMPAREAST AIR FORCES (LEYTE).

TOP SECRET. My 061210 add 2 ships not previously reported. (A) COLUMBIA hit twice. 1st plane struck antenna damage negligible. 2nd Hit main deck penetrated to sea. Turret 4 out permanently, turret 3 out due PON I TCPRTAGET. ND oil flooding. Steering engine out of commission. Now steering with engines casualties about 20 dead and 20 were critically wounded. (B) NEWCOMB damaged by straffing near miss ZEKE crashed. Mark 4 radar damaged beyond repair. Many minor holes in bridge structure and after deck house. Casualties 1 dead, 1 missing, 1 critically wounded, 10 slightly wounded. New subject: CTU 77.41 reports one Lilly DES OMBM EMBXD no tail gunner and quantity of hits absorbed. DNOICJPEEK self-sealing tanks and substantial armor. Believed to be a suicider.

CTG 77.2 to COM7THFLT, ALL COMAIR NOR SOLS Info CTF 77, ALL TF AND TG COMMANDERS 7TH FLEET AND 3RD FLT, CINCPAC, CINCSWPAC, COMINCH, COMAAF, COAAF 5, COM 30 BOMWING.

TOP SECRET - Today's operations went off on schedule with very slight air opposition. No attacks were made on this Force until 1840 when PALMER (DMS-5) Was bombed and sunk. Reason no attacks obscure but most probably stepped up counter air activity by Blue Forces. Comments on today's operations report in separate dispatch.
CTG 77.2 to COM 7THFLT Info CTF 77, ALL TF AND TG COMDRS 3RD AND 7TH Fleets, CINCPAC, CINCSWPA, COMINCH, COMFEAF, COMAFAF, COM 310 BOMBWING, COMAAF.

Since my last report additional info has been received concerning damage to ships. (A) SOUTHARD (DMS-10) hit by suicide bomber. Is operative but requires repairs. (B) BROOKS (APD-10) hit by suicide bomber. Taken under tow and now in hands of salvage party and anchored off SANTAAGG ISLAND. (C) APACHE (ATF-67) hit by suicide dive bomber and suffered failure of number 4 propulsion armature and some small damage incident thereto. (D) MINNEAPOLIS (CA-36) superficially damaged suicide bomber near miss. SK radar and some antennae out. (E) PALMER (DMS-5) hit by bomber and sunk today. This brings the total of all ships sunk or damaged since arrival at LINGAYEN to 20 ships. The OMMANEEY BAY (CVE-79) sunk, the MANILA BAY (CVE-61) slightly damaged. The SAVO ISLAND (CVE-78) superficially damaged. The HELLM (DD-388) superficially damaged and the STAFFORD (DE-411) heavily damaged before arrival LINGAYEN GULF. Bring the grand total of 25 ships sunk or damaged in present operations up to 1900 I (-9) January 7th.

CTG 77.2 to COM 7THFLT, ALL COMAIRS UNDER COMAIR NOR SOSOLS Info CTF 77, ALL TF AND TG COMDRS 3RD AND 7TH Fleets, CINCSWPA, CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMFEAF, COMAFF, COM 310 BOMBWING, COM ALLIED AIR FORCE.

Strong evidently suicide planes equipped to stand phenomenal punishment. In 1 of yesterday's attacks a French advanced 2000 yards at 25 foot altitude against a most concentrated and accurate fire from all calibers of AA before crashing. A current practice is for Fast planes to come in flying so low as to leave wake from propeller wash, then, by banking climb to collide with ships superstructure. They generally come on from the sun or from a land background suitable to their camouflage. Few high altitude attacks were noted. New subject: Could these planes which attacked Task Group 77.2 so effectively FS 6 January have been carrier based AIRCRAFT the COLUMBIA reported roughly tracking 1 of these pilots from out latitude 15 degrees longitude 118 degrees.

CTG 77.2 to COM 7THFLT Info CINCPAC, CINCSWPA, COMINCH, COMFEAF, COMAFF, CTF 77, COMAFAF, CTF 77, COM 310 BOMBWING, ALL TF & TG COMDRS 3RD AND 7TH Fleets.

TOP SECRET. 2 Suicide attacks made on damaged AUSTRALIA about 0720 I (-9) today. 1st Plane shot down close aboard, 2nd A Dinah hit port side. Ship holed near water line, steering from aft, AA Battery now reduced to 1/3. Carrying out bombardment mission. Attacks were conventional high altitude 45 degree glide.
Conducted bombardment of landing areas this afternoon, continued mine sweeping, made inspection of beach approach areas with underwater teams and continued air strikes with carrier based aircraft. No air opposition was encountered until about late afternoon when PALMER (DM 5) was sunk. Slight enemy opposition to blue bombardment was noted, slight opposition was encountered by underwater teams this opposition being mostly from snipers. Direct air support furnished smoothly without opposition. Report follows: (A) Bombardment. As a general thing suitable targets were conspicuous by their absence. Enemy guns were engaged on ridge in 1173, and in areas 1468, 1366. AA fire was noted from vicinity church in 9731 B. Direct hits noted on road in area 1451, several buildings damaged or burned. Also destroyed medium calibre guns in area 0646 N, damaged AA battery in 1249 N near ridge, a single Howitzer or mortar not definitely located but believed northeast of RAFFA opened fire. Shortage of spotting planes from AUSTRALIA and SHROPSHIRE prevented completion scheduled FGRBS. Above is brief summary of firing ships reports which indicate very few important targets have as yet been located. (B) Minesweeping area ESXOLTA, BOULEVARD, PENDANT, ANCHOR, SHACKLE, THISTLE (may be THINELE) and PIG were completed. All others well ahead of schedule and will be completed early tomorrow morning (8 Jan). ALYEE only 2 mines reported. No controlled mines of any type discovered anywhere. (C) Direct air support. Tug hit by 4 rockets and strafed, M50 DUMOS ASS heavy guns in target areas 0820 OCHSIVS certain results; 20 trucks destroyed in vicinity target area 0500; nil AA in SAN FERNANDO; ammo dumps and gun emplacements in target area 0000 hit with excellent results; ammo truck destroyed target area 2563; 4 hits on barracks in SAN FYRUS; 2 direct hits on boat in target area 6763; fires started in buildings in target area 0875/T and 0975 F and rocket and bomb hits on railroad in same areas; fired several buildings in target area 2075 W. Enemy troop movements southward vicinity ROSARIO. Boats in vicinity of damaged submarine hit JUNKNO fire started. Totals for day planes used 61 VT, 68 VT. 20 in direct support and 4 special missions. 19 tons 100 pound bombs 30 tons 500 pound bombs 178 rockets expended. Lost 1 VT. Results today much better than yesterday. (D) Underwater team reports forwarded by separate despatches. New subject. Read Admiral Theodore Edson Chandler ComCruDiv 4 passed away at 1750/1 7 January as a result of injuries and burns suffered during suicide bomber attack preceding day.
This is Top Secret. Both planes which made suicide attacks on AUSTRALIA this morning were Dinahs. New subject: My 071536 statement COLUMBIA tracked one of these pilots in error. Val which crashed COLUMBIA at 1730/06 contained Japanese pencil diagram entitled "Diagram for route of aircraft carrier attack and Ensign (or Second Lieutenant) IWAX". Plane take off indicated at unknown time and place on course 060 speed 200 knots then at 1900 change course to 150 degrees speed 110 knots ETA at target 1925. Course of target shown as 090 degrees speed 13 knots. Comment assuming diagram drawn to scale and plane carrier borne suggest launch was made forward 2 hours. Bomb was 800 kilogram type 99N 080 made from 16 inch shell and understood to be strictly navy type. New subject: Weather conditions 1515 and 340 degrees true 11 knots. Barometer 29.90 steady. Cumulus 3/10ths the base 2000. Sea smooth. Location southern end LINGAYEN GULF.

Report of operations for LINGAYEN GULF Groups for 6 January follows: Bombardments of SANTIAGO ISLAND PORO POINT completed. During afternoon Task Group penetrated distance of 20 miles into Gulf to support Minesweepers under attack and to conduct any bombardment feasible. A bombardment of about 1/2 hours duration of ARINGAY-BAPANG Area was effected. During bombardment and upon retirement from the Gulf the Group was subjected to an intense and prolonged suicide bombing attack in which CALIFORNIA, AUSTRALIA, LOUISVILLE, COLUMBIA were heavily damaged as reported my 061210. Para. Specific discussion of each operation follows: (A) SANTIAGO ISLAND. Few important or worthwhile targets were observed in this area. Firing was therefore limited to those targets only and to a considerable amount of small shipping in passage between SANTIAGO ISLAND and Mainland. (B) PORO POINT. All targets were well covered. Some counter battery fire necessary and enemy ceased firing. Heavily damaged storages, heavy Ack Ack, and reported 155 mm gun position. (C) ARINGAY-BAPANG Area. Fire in this area was directed largely at enemy forces which were moving east on road in areas 0783, 0883, and 0483 towards the mountains. Troops were also noted moving north in areas 0781 and 0782.
These troops included many vehicles and horse drawn heavy field pieces. The heavy suicide attacks made on our ships coincided with this movement. Results achieved indicate MXOYNELPLI CIPEH QOFERFXTVCPK (D) Minesweeping conducted in all areas. All results negative to date except 1 mine found in area. Several floating mines were discovered. Operations CONEH THAYXHLCNP D HMT JH HOVEY (DMS-11), LONG (DMS-12), SOUTHARD (DMS-10) and BROOKS (APD-10) were hit by suicide bombers. HOVEY and LONG have since sunk. (E) support aircraft. Expended 45 tons bombs, 492 Rockets with no losses. Results: Fired or damaged several FDT, ALINGAYEN BEY Railroad Bridge knocked out for 36 hours. Destroyed 1 Railway locomotive this area. Destroyed 1 aircraft on ground, 1 in air. Destroyed ammo dump 8624 B, 4 buildings probably barracks in 9239 and 9240. Extensive reconnaissance failed reveal any targets as provided by advanced intelligence. No coastal guns located. (F) Fighter direction. Destroyed 15 enemy aircraft airborne at least 9 of which were by visual fighter direction. Para. New subject: Correction my 060614. Last paragraph changed OBUCM. "SLGAVE had 11 ships IL by suicide bombers since 1630 yesterday, of which 9 were damaged severely". Para. Correct my 060557. 1st paragraph, 4th sentence change to read "Minesweeping Group CAP about dawn destroyed 1 plane". Para. New subject: Weather conditions 1400/1 Wind 120 degrees true 8 knots. Barometer 29.86 falling slowly barometer change 6 hours 1/10 inch. Alto Stratus clouds 8/10 Base 9000 feet. Sea smooth moderate TB MORNINGS.
10 0640 KINGFOA to COMINCH.

NDITZ to KING. Para One. Immediately upon receipt of JCS 032140 and 032141 I sent my 050228 to General MacArthur. His 090526 passed to you stated his inability to absent himself from his campaign at this time and proposed conference here with General Sutherland and other key staff officers. My 091155 concurred and conference will commence GUAM thirteenth. The coordination of planning and preparations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be arranged with General MacArthur as expeditiously as possible. Para Two. Desire defer reply to paragraphs your 091921 concerning flag assignments until major concepts have been clarified in the exploratory conference here followed by a personal conference with General MacArthur for which I will proceed to MANILA, rather than forego the advantages of a personal conference.

12 1215 CINCPAC to COMINCH INFO COMPFIFTHFLEET.

NDITZ to KING INFO SPRUANCE. Sherman has just returned from brief conferences at OKINAWA with Spruance and later with Turner and Buckner. The following is his estimate based on their opinions and his own observations and impressions. Para. There are 62,500 enemy troops in southern OKINAWA 1000 in northern OKINAWA and 2500 on IE SHIMA. This does not include the large numbers able bodied civilians who have been drafted as laborers. Troops in south include Japanese 24th Div at practically full strength and 62nd at about 7500 due to casualties inflicted by us. Also 44th and 15th Independent Mixed Brigades. Enemy is strong in artillery and his artillery fire is said to be most effective experienced by us in the Pacific. Buckner is proceeding methodically and effectively to penetrate and pinch off the extremely strong and cleverly prepared Japanese defenses and is using all the field artillery naval gunfire and air support available. Lowest responsible estimate for overcoming organized resistance is 30 days from now and this is probably optimistic. 77th will capture IV SHIMA this week and then move into OKINAWA to join Hodge. Prior to landing of the 27th Div the Japanese had more troops in the line than did the 24th Corps. Para. Thru 10 April unloading over the HACUCHI beaches though hampered by bad weather totalled 593,499 measured tons plus 208,136 short tons which is twice the corresponding SAIPAN figures. Some airfield sites are disappointing but the overall development can exceed initial plans. Thorough reconnaissance being initiated. Para. Morale is high and Buckner, Hodge and Geiger all wish to rehabilitate troops on OKINAWA. This will be ordered. Turner rates Buckner very high and wishes to work with him in the invasion. Para. 2 Marine Air Groups are ashore but KADENNA will be inoperative in wet weather until Marston mat is laid. Air evacuation inaugurated and functioning well. Para. Spruance and Turner both point out need to move into Pacific all available destroyer and escort types because of losses being experienced and expected to continue from suicides who pick off the screen and pickers. The feeling is that our ships can outlast Jap suicides but we will need all the screen we can get in the next few months. Para. We are in a fight which will be hard until the Japanese run out of the means for continuing mass suicide attacks but there is no doubt that our ships can take it. Our defensive organization and teamwork between ships and aircraft and our antiaircraft gunnery is improving. The enemy skill is deteriorating rapidly. Para. There is general agreement that we cannot seize any position northeast of OKINAWA until the supply of suicides is greatly reduced.
NIMITZ TO KIJK.

Following message received over Telecon conference circuit by Major Gen Leaven my staff in Guam from Major Gen Lutes HQ ASF in Washington. "Gen MacArthur has requested 150 LSTs for use in moving supplies forward from rear areas to PHILIPPINES. LSTs are needed because ports are so damaged that Liberty ships cannot be discharged now and are not available. It is understood that 133 LSTs under Navy control are now proceeding North on West Coast United States. General Somervell requests that you personally urge Admiral Nimitz to divert 150 LSTs to SWPA or as many as now practicable. In addition to LSTs MacArthur has asked for 150 LCTs. End". This question was previously raised in MacArthur's 261614 to which I replied in my 300243. Request following reply be delivered to War Dept for Gen Somervell from Cinopac/Cinpoa. "All LSTs and LCTs now assigned to POA are required for operations which have been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No portion of this number can be made available to CINCSWP without curtailing necessary assault lift for these operations or the movement of garrison units and equipment essential for the early implementation of the functions for which these new bases are acquired". Suggest that War Dept agencies be requested to make future representations of this nature to Cominich or to Cinopac rather than to members of my Staff.

KING TO NIMITZ EYES ONLY.

I consider it important that you be told that Joint Chiefs of Staff will soon discuss with the President the general strategy for the ultimate defeat of JAPAN along following lines. There are two general alternatives first encirclement (siege or blockade) second invasion (assault). It is apparent that both alternatives have their merits and demerits. A third method is to proceed with "encirclement" while preparing fully for "invasion" in which case encirclement can be expected to facilitate invasion.
NIMITZ TO KING ONLY. Lieut Gen Sutherland and party including General Kenney arrived afternoon 13th and I held an initial conference in the evening with only Sutherland, Chamberlain, McMorris and Sherman present. Para. General MacArthur's idea as expressed by Sutherland is as soon as possible to take command (operational control as well as administrative and logistic) of all Army forces throughout the Pacific including the garrisons of the shore positions in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Sutherland advanced the view that all our previous command arrangements had been "unsatisfactory" and that unity of command was an unworkable "shibboleth". He further stated that in future (post ICEBERG) no Army troops would be allowed to serve under an Admiral. He was informed that unity of command in the Pacific Ocean Areas had gotten us through our period of adversity had moved us to the inner approaches of Japan and was the only feasible arrangement for operating and defending an area and coordinating area matters. Para. I expect to relinquish to MacArthur the operational control of the disposable assault troops and other Army units as they are released from operations to be prepared for further operations and it is clear that he will assume administrative and logistic control and responsibility. However the essential garrisons of all positions in the Pacific Ocean Areas must remain under my operational control as long as I am responsible for those areas. Abolition of unity of command in the subareas and outlying islands would produce chaos and would retard the prosecution of the war. I shall not therefore accede now to his assuming operational control of Army forces ground air or service which are essential to the defense and functioning of the Pacific Ocean Areas. This is in accordance with my understanding of paragraph 6 of JCS 032140. Para. It appears that MacArthur expects to take over the Ryukyus and Kenney expects to take over air operations in the Ryukyus. Para. Sutherland indicated that MacArthur expects to be able with difficulty to mount and support an assault on Kyushu in November. The Fleet will of course be ready if the enemy air force is overcome by that time. Para. The foregoing is to keep you personally informed. Discussions will continue today on the Chief of Staff level and I will inform you daily of progress made.

KING TO NIMITZ. I am in complete agreement with your views expressed in your 132346.

NIMITZ TO KING ONLY. My 132346. Conferences continued on staff level. Detailed proposals were made by Kenney for moving 5th Air Force into Okinawa to operate under his direction and by Sutherland for CinCPac to take command of Ryukyus because of his "paramount interest" in the Ryukyus as the axis of advance into Japan. Our needs for naval and air bases and for coordination of naval and air bases and for coordination of naval and air attacks on Japan in congested areas during naval and amphibious phases of invasion were stressed. Para. The proposal to make the experienced and effective 5th Air Force available to exploit fully the potential airbase capacity of the Ryukyus is sound. The question of Army air command is a complex one and I shall make no commitments for the present. Would appreciate your appraisal of this question as I do not know the War Department's intentions as to GIs status under the new directive. Para. Tentative plan is for CinCPac to send over his draft of strategic plan for...

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14 2242 CINCPAC/CINCPAC to COMINCH. (CONT'D)

OLYMPIC after which my planners will redraft and revise with respect to naval and amphibious matters and then proceed MANILA for next planning conference. There is general agreement as to concept of invasion operations although ideas as to command relationships will need to be resolved. Para. An interesting sidelight is that Sutherland says MacArthur will land in KYUSHU about D plus 3 stay a short time and then return to MANILA until time for the HONSHU landing.

15 1406 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

LIMITZ TO KING ONLY.

The SWPA conferences today prepared and submitted a paper which in effect proposed that quote localities be transferred without delay unquote apparently referring to KYUKUS and other shore positions where Army troops predominate, that after OKINAWA and IJ SHIMA have been captured the Army Air Forces in KYUKUS pass to command of CINCPAC and that CINCPAC assume operational control and responsibility for naval operations in SWPA. Since these ideas were consuming valuable time and delaying constructive planning I authorized McMorris to inform Sutherland in writing as follows quote Para 1. It is highly important that the conferences proceed as soon as possible to arrange the method, time, and place for coordination of the invasion planning and preparations directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This is necessary in order that the naval command organization for planning and conducting the naval and amphibious stages may be established and commence to function. Para 2. The following information is furnished concerning the intentions of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, in order that our conferences may be expedited: (A) He will not at this time transfer any important shore positions from the Pacific Ocean Areas to the Southwest Pacific Area. (B) He will not at this time relinquish operational control of any Army forces, ground, air or service, now under his control, which he considers essential to the functioning, development or defense of the Pacific Ocean Areas or to the success of operations which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have or may direct him to conduct. (C) He will exercise operational control over the major forces assigned to operate from shore positions in the Pacific Ocean Areas unless otherwise directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (D) He will retain the coordinating authority over Logistic matters given him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recognized by the memorandum of the Chief of Staff U S Army, dated 26 March 1945 (JCS 1259). (E) He will not assume direct control of naval forces involved in the amphibious phases of operations directed to be conducted by the CINCSWA. He will provide naval cover for such operations and will allocate naval forces for direct participation under CINCSWA. Para 3. The position taken in para 2 is in complete accord with the directive of JCS 032140. Unquote. Later after further discussion during which it was urged by McMorris and Sherman that the conferences expedite consideration of ways and means for planning and preparations for invasions I authorized McMorris to submit another memorandum as follows "quote. In amplification of subparagraph 2(C) of my earlier memorandum of 15 April, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas will be prepared to reconsider that subparagraph after the completion of the ICEBERG Operation or when a firm directive is received for the OLYMPIC Operation. Unquote. The SWPA conferences were assured that the 6 Army Divisions in POA plus other assault garrison and service units would be passed to CINCPAC's operational control as rapidly as they could be disengaged from pressing employment. Para. It now appears that the SWPA party will leave at 160800. Very little useful discussion has taken place concerning invasion plans.
and preparations and the SWPA party was apparently not prepared for such discussion.

FOR KING, MACARTHUR, SPRUANCE, HALSEY, KINGFORD AND TURNER AS APPROPRIATE. In order to expedite plans and preparations for OLYMPIC it is my present intention as soon as the capture of OKINAWA and IE SHIMA is completed to have Spruance and Turner and necessary staff establish planning headquarters at GUAM initially and plan for OLYMPIC Halsey to take over the fleet in the combat area.

MDITZ TO KING ONLY. After arrival in Pacific General Vandergrift requested my permission to visit OKINAWA. His desire as head of the Marine Corps is to display his deep interest in the personnel engaged in active combat and to encourage and cheer them by his presence. He also wished to talk with Geiger on general Marine Corps matters. Had a similar request occurred in the NIO JIMA campaign where the troops engaged were all Marine I should have granted it. In this instance I have considered it advisable to deny it. Vandergrift is of a higher grade than Lt. Gen. Buckner who is conducting the land campaign and the majority of the troops engaged are Army. If Vandergrift is permitted to go to the front during active operations it will be difficult if not impossible to refuse a similar request that is sure to be forthcoming from Richardson and doubtless others. My experience has shown that visits of this character while immediately helpful to the morale of some of the forces involved frequently lead to subsequent criticisms and invidious comparisons of the organizations participating in the campaign. The net result has been harmful rather than helpful. This information is furnished you in order that you may be informed if this or similar action may later be brought to your attention. Vandergrift will remain here for several days and if there are considerations which I may not have taken into account that cause you to believe that my decision should be changed please advise.

MDITZ TO MACARTHUR. General Richardson has requested my concurrence in his proceeding to MANILA for a conference requested by you. I consider it preferable that your conferences with the Army commanders now assigned to the Pacific Ocean Areas and my conferences with the naval commanders now assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area be deferred until you and I have conferred as proposed in my 050228 and have discussed the procedures for transfer of command pursuant to Joint Chiefs of Staff 032140 (WAR 62773) and the schedule contemplated by Cominich 062116.
ADVISER TO KING, INFO HALSEY SPINTANCE TOWERS. The primary purpose of the MIYAKO operation is to get more airfield capacity as soon as possible. I am making full preparations to conduct it with target date 16 June. Meanwhile thorough ground reconnaissance of OKINAWA and IE SHIMA is being conducted to determine airfield potentialities of those islands. After all data is available as to airfield sites construction forces and combat air forces firm decision can be made between capture of MIYAKO and concentration of all resources on development of OKINAWA and IE SHIMA. The latter course if feasible will conserve combatant ships and aircraft as well as troops and shipping for use later in year and will deploy additional air forces sooner though in somewhat smaller numbers. Preparations being madle for MIYAKO will facilitate accelerated development OKINAWA if sites and unloading capacity permits. Will keep you advised. The KIHAI operation is a smaller one and need not take place until air forces from OKINAWA control the air in its vicinity.

18 0030 ADMIRAL HALSEY TO FLEET ADM KING INFO FLEET ADM NIMITZ.

Your 162023. (A) I favor retention of the organizations of the Navy and War Departments streamlined internally as necessary to procure and administer the material and personnel needs peculiar to each service. (B) I recommend a superposed commander of the armed forces of the United States in whom is vested operational control of all armed forces and whose office includes coordinating agencies to effect all possible economies in matters common to services. In view of the fact that Americans have a deep-rooted conviction that no enemy must set foot on our shores it must be accepted that the American concept of war involves overseas invasion, therefore the supreme commander of the armed forces should be a naval officer in order to ensure proper conduct of overseas movement leading to deployment of troops in enemy territory. (C) I favor a civilian secretary of the armed forces with under secretaries for Navy, Army and (if necessary) Army Air. (D) I oppose strongly a separate subdepartment having cognizance over all aviation or seeking equality with Army and Navy (each with own aviation components) on the cabinet level. (E) I recommend immediate selection and training of appropriate officers to exercise command and staff functions in composite forces comprising all arms. (F) I recommend retention of a Marine Corps within the framework of the Navy. American instinctive aversion to large standing Armies and to imperialism will continue to prevent overseas use of Army troops in time of peace whereas Marines may be legally so employed with apparent sanction of public opinion. During peace amphibious skills will also be best maintained by a Marine Corps integrated with the Navy. Para. See my serial 344 of 10 Dec to Admiral Richardson for discussion and OUTLINING arguments copies being airmailed to both sides. Concept outlined in referenced paper prevents improper domination of the nation's strong peacetime Navy by an Army and Army Air Force which will surely be skeletonized or greatly reduced after hostilities end.
16 0228 CINCPOA ADV to COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING. Your 171512. Intent of subparagraph F my 160250 is to pave the way for installing a flag officer of the Navy as IsCom SAIPAN and a captain as IsCom KWAJALIN if such action becomes necessary. On the 1st project it would be necessary to replace a colored Infantry Regiment by a Marine MP and a Marine Guard Battalion. These could be limited service personnel and Vandergrift says he can do it. Some shifting of AA Battalions would be involved also. It is not yet timely to move in this matter but I have it in mind if the Army insists on using Jarman as MacArthur's administrative representative in this region. Will keep you fully advised and will comply with intent your 171512.

16 1822 CINCPOA ADV TO COMSTFIL, COMGEN TEN, COMPHIBSPAC.


16 1951 COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPOA ADV.

NIMITZ FROM KING. Have sent a memorandum to Marshall requesting his views on air command set-up and status of Giles your 142242. Will advise you further on receiving his reply. Para. 2. As a solution for this very complicated problem I have in mind the following on which I desire your comment. (1) During progress of ICEBERG operations, which will continue for some time, all shore based air in your forward area, except 20th AF, to continue under your command as at present. Between completion of ICEBERG and such other encirclement operations as may be directed by JCS and the beginning of amphibious phase of invasion (if undertaken) have 2 shore based air command in the Pacific: (1) The Strategic Air Force under Kenney composed of 20th AF units and additional Army air units assigned solely to the objective of bombing JAPAN; this force to be under MacArthur. (2) A Tactical Air Force under Giles composed of all shore based Army (except Strategic Air Force) Marine and Navy air units in GHQ forward area; this force to be under you. (3) With the undertaking of amphibious phase of invasion both Strategic and Tactical Air Commands to be under CinCPac. (4) With the initiation of the land campaign phase of invasion command of Strategic Air and essential elements of Tactical Air to pass to MacArthur.

19 0730 SR. USNLO, BF to CINCPOA ADV.

CINC EAST INDIES reports as of 14 April that he considers U-boat potential broken on EAST INDIES station.
HALSEY TO Nimitz. Referring Cinopac and Foa top secret serial 0005034 of 31 March 1945. Priority of Staff Study of and plans for North Pacific operations has been reduced from 1 to 4 in view of your despatch 160406 April concerning target dates. Para. Separate operations of "Eastern Forces" during LONGTOM may not be advisable but if undertaken can best be determined by then current estimates of enemy strength, disposition, reactions, and the availability of targets. No long range study of these operations appears profitable and any long range plan would only be crystal gazing. Therefore Control will unless otherwise directed defer further study and planning for these operations until a later date when and if execution of LONGTOM is ordered. Para. Preliminary drafts of other Staff Studies now completed and will be forwarded with additional comments and recommendations for future operations not later than 27 April. Para. Though SHANTUNG operation appears to be quite hazardous to shipping estimated benefits from air operations against Japanese industrial installations in southern MANCHURIA and in KOREA may justify certain calculated risks. Destruction of Japanese plants and installations in those areas will to a large extent reduce their efforts to continue the war on the continent. I will continue to work on SHANTUNG plans (priority 2) until and unless operations called off and will assume target date of 20 Nov. Para. KOREA STRAIT operation involving occupation of TANEGA MUKUE SHIMONO KAMINO is feasible and recommended with target date of 1st Phase, seizure of TANEGA 15 June, modifying or cancelling other plans as necessary. Initiation of Phase seizure of MUKUE SHIMONO KAMINO 1 month later unless initiation of operations in southern KYUSHU takes priority for strategic reasons. I will proceed with work on KOREA STRAIT plans priority 1. Para. I am studying problem of early direct assault on KYUSHU following TANEGA seizure as best answer to overall strategic program and will comment on completion of study. Para. The planning implications for this command involved in your 160254 to Cominch are being studied although positive information is lacking as to meaning of "OLYMPIC" and as to its target date.

Nimitz to King. I have no notes on my conversation with the Richardson Board but assure that their report records my views of which the gist is as follows: (A) Unified command is essential to the efficient conduct of war. (B) The Foa excluding continental land masses such as JAPAN and the PHILIPPINES should be held and controlled for the U.S. under unified command now and in the foreseeable future. Since the responsibilities are primarily naval and air the commander should be particularly well qualified in those aspects of war. (C) Other vital outlying strategic areas should likewise be controlled and held for the U.S. under unified command. The experience of this war and the development of new weapons and methods of attack make it necessary that there be increased preparation and increased vigilance in outlying areas in the post war years. (D) For planning and preparation and for coordination of peace time defense and for the conduct of war when war occurs there should be established in Washington a single commander of the Armed Forces of the U.S. He should be responsible only to the President and should have an adequate staff composed of officers from all services who have been relieved of all responsibility in or to their respective services. (E) All officers exercising unified command should have joint staffs. (F) The professional heads of the individual services should have the right to appeal to the President concerning the decisions of the Commander of the Armed Forces and to advise the

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latter who should, however, be free to make his own decisions without delay and without any more debate and argument than he chooses to hear. (G) The administrative organization of the departments which administer and support the fighting services is less important than the unified command outlined above. I strongly recommend against the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments because the problems of the two services are different, because consolidation would increase civil control of military preparedness and because decentralization of administration is less ponderous and more efficient. Separate and even competitive experimentation and development are desirable. Moreover the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments would produce a single department of such large size as to place under one civilian secretary too large a proportion of the administration of our government and would inevitably give his office political power and importance incompatible with our form of government. (H) Naval aviation and the Marine Corps must continue as essential components of the naval service. Likewise the Army should continue to have its own air component. The foregoing views are based on the experience of over 3 years of war in the Pacific during which successes have been achieved, often with extremely slender means, which could not have been achieved without unity of command as well as unity of purpose. They are concurred in generally by McNorris and Sherman and are I believe representative of those held by many of the senior officers who have been responsible for combat operations in the Pacific. We have developed a single fighting team which should not be disrupted now or in the future.

19 1259

COMINCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV NO.

UNITZ FROM KING. In reply to CINCPAC 170601. Basic policy is to announce loss of each ship by name as soon as security permits provided next of kin have been notified. Exceptions may be made in case of major actions or special circumstances when preliminary announcement should be made in general terms such as "moderate loss" or a specific number of major ships or light craft. Avoid mention of specific categories where names of ships are not given. With reference to last sentence your despatch I desire that you announce the sinkings by name.

20 0511

CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Para 1. My comments on para 2 your 181951 are as follows: (A) Experience throughout the war has shown that it is necessary to assign the Fleet Air Wings (search, patrol and rescue) to fleet and to naval area commanders. Fleet Air Wing units in MARSHALLS are now under Harrill. Those in ROKKUTS are under Sprague. Those in MARSHALAS are under Sprague but will soon pass to Hoover. The Army in the Pacific has not asked for any control over our Fleet Air Wings and naval control of search is essential. Accordingly it would be most unfortunate if Fleet Air Wings were brought into the problem of control over strategic and tactical air forces. Likewise certain Marine medium squadrons used for night attack on shipping should be attached to Fleet Air Wings rather than to Army commanded units. (B) I see no military reason for giving General MacArthur operational control over Army air forces which are engaged in bombing JAPAN from bases in the PAC until encirclement is completed and OLYMPIC is next on our program. At that time or during OLYMPIC planning I believe suitable arrangements can be made with General MacArthur under which General would control all Army air forces in the ROKKUTS (plus such Marine units as I allocate to

- Continued -
him) and would during appropriate phases be responsible to MacArthur for softening up land objectives or to me for supporting my naval and amphibious operations. Kenney and his headquarters are better prepared for this assignment and the bulk of the forces will be those he now has. (C) All B-29s and Army fighters in the MARIANAS IWO Axis are now engaged primarily in attack on JAPAN. In my opinion it would be better for Giles to command the Army Air Forces based in the MARIANAS and IWO plus at appropriate times the B-29s in the RYUKYUS. I am prepared to relinquish operational control of the fighter groups (Army) at IWO to Giles if he is given command of the B-29s which they escort. (D) In my opinion the detailed remote control of the 20th AF from Washington is extremely undesirable. The force should be under CinCPac but in any case its local commander should have greater freedom of action. I hope that Giles will have it. In this connection see ComGenAAPFOs 130720 and my 132354. I have since learned that Hales orders were from Norstadt by telecon rather than from a source having authority over both 7th and 20th AFs. Para 2. My views on unity of command do not need repetition. I recommend that there be obtained for me as much control as possible over the air forces in the POA without which the naval and amphibious forces cannot be fully effective.
Top Secret. War 670935 Para. Within the next few days it may be necessary for me to discuss with the other Chiefs of Staff, the question of our basic strategy in the western Pacific. There is an honest difference of opinion on this problem. Para 1 school of thought is that much more preparation is necessary than is possible with target dates of 1 December and 1 March for the main operations. Hence a campaign of air-sea blockade and bombardment should be adopted which involves a CHUSAN operation, and perhaps others such as a lodgment on SHANTUNG or KOREA or the islands in the Tsushima Strait area. The points made for this scheme include the high casualties incident to landings on JAPAN proper, the necessity for further beating down JAP air power, the cutting off of JAP reinforcements moving from the mainland of ASIA and the possibility of bringing about surrender without a major landing on JAPAN proper. There is a point about the Japanese reaction to a landing on the sacred soil of JAPAN. Also there is the question of our ability to get SPPONDECFV YAM JAPAN against JAPAN proper soon enough so that our present pressure will be maintained without let-up. Para 2 The other school of thought believes in driving straight into JAPAN proper as soon as the forces can be mounted from the PHILIPPINES and land-based air established in the KYUKYUS. This school of thought considers that JAP air and sea power will be weakened sufficiently by the end of this year to permit invasion. Our Naval operations, plus air operation from the KYUKYUS, plus the limited capabilities of JAP shipping and island transport, will prevent material reinforcement of JAPAN. RUSSIA's entry into the war would be a pre-requisite to a landing in the Japanese homeland in December. The B-29s and carrier strikes will have devastated large areas (4 groups missing) and the Jap homeland. As to landing operations involving high casualties, experience in the PHILIPPINES and even in CHINA shows that wherever the US has been able to employ all the supporting arms and services on a battlefield, suitable for maneuver either on land or amphibiously, the Jap has been defeated with acceptable losses. On the other hand, a series of island and limited objective operations results in high losses per unit engaged, may result in commitment of large numbers of troops, and does not assure the early termination of the war. Furthermore, there is always the chance of being sucked into the commitment of large forces in a non-decisive operation, such as on the coast of CHINA. As to weather, any month is suitable, although winter months are less desirable for sea operations and more desirable for air and ground operation. Para 3 In summary, 1 school of thought places emphasis on the 1st paragraph of the over-all objective in Appendix B of CCS 776/3 and questions the need for invading JAPAN; whereas the other school of thought considers that by the end of the year the 1st part of the over-all objective will be adequately accomplished and an immediate invasion is the quickest and cheapest way to assure the end of the war. Para 4 Will you let me have your thoughts on this problem for use within the next few days in possible discussions.
Top Secret. C 1442. 1. Analysis of strategy in western Pacific indicates that there are three general courses of action open to us: Course 1. Encircle JAPAN by further expansion to the westward, deploying maximum air forces preparatory to attacks on KYUSHU and HONSHU in succession or directly against HONSHU. Course 2. Encircle JAPAN by further expansion to the westward with a view to its complete isolation and endeavor to bomb JAPAN into submission without effecting landings in homeland. Course 3. Attack KYUSHU and install air forces to cover a decisive assault, on HONSHU. 2. Course 1 would provide greater air power for final assault and would attain a high degree of neutralization prior to attack; would isolate the Japanese islands from access to outside reinforcement or resources; might permit the bypassing of KYUSHU and a direct attack on HONSHU. It would deploy our resources off the main axis of advance; would not increase short range air coverage of vital areas of the Japanese islands; would require a large part of the available resources in the Pacific; would prevent an attack on the main Japanese islands until after redeployment from EUROPE; might commit III United States to heavy involvement on the mainland of CHINA; unless KYUSHU can be bypassed, might require a postponement of the HONSHU operation until 1947; involves a definite loss of time by inserting comprehensive operations prior to delivery of the main attack; would result in great loss of life. 3. Course 2 if successful would betveck minimum cost of life but would prolong the war indefinitely; would fail to utilize our resources for amphibious offensive movement; assumes success of air power alone to conquer a people in spite of its demonstrated failure in EUROPE, where GERMANY was subjected to more intensive bombardment than can be brought to bear against JAPAN, and where all the available resources in ground troops of the UNITED STATES, the United Kingdom and RUSSIA had to be committed in order to force a decision. 4. Course 3 would attain neutralization by establishing air power at the closes practicable distance from the final objective in the Japanese Islands; would permit application of full power of our combined resources, ground, naval and air, on the decisive objective; would place our forces in the most favorable location for the final assault; would deliver an attack against an area which probably will be more lightly defended this year than next; would continue the offensive methods which have proven so successful in Pacific campaigns; would place maximum pressure of our combined forces upon the enemy, which might well force his surrender earlier anticipated, and would place us in the most favorable position for delivery of the decisive assault early in 1946. Our attack would have to be launched with a lesser degree of neutralization and with a shorter period of time for preparation. 5. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the possible courses of action clearly indicates that course 3 is the preferable plan. It should be
adopted unless: A. It is considered that we have insufficient air power to support the operation, or B. The resources in the Pacific are insufficient or cannot be gathered in time for its launching this year and therefore another course of action should be pursued in the interim in order to maintain unrelenting pressure upon the enemy, accepting the delays incident to the conduct of such operations concurrently with concentration for the main attack. 6. I am of the opinion that the ground, naval, air and logistic resources in the Pacific are adequate to carry out course 3. The Japanese fleet has been reduced to practical impotency. The Japanese air force has been reduced to a line of action which involves uncoordinated, suicidal attacks against our forces, employing all types of planes, including trainers. IG HNJ (I GROUP OUT) QM is heavy and its power for sustained action is diminishing rapidly. These conditions will be accentuated after the establishment of our air forces in the KYUSU. With the increase in the tempo of VLR attacks the enemy’s ability to provide replacement planes will diminish, and the Japanese potentiality will decline at an increasing rate. It is believed that the development of air bases in the KYUSU will, in conjunction with carrier based planes, give us sufficient air power to support landing on KYUSHU and that the establishment of our air forces there will ensure complete air supremacy over KYUSHU. Logistic considerations present the most difficult problem. Provision of necessary service troops to activate and operate bases and at the same time to provide a service garrison for KYUSHU requires prompt supply of transportation for concentration and a ruthless combing out of rear areas. With 1 exception it is believed that with a vigorous pooling of our Army and Navy interests throughout the Pacific the necessary service troops can be found to perform the minimum required functions by the exception of hospital beds. It is estimated that some 36,000 additional beds not now available in the Pacific will be required; not all of them, however, prior to D Day. Vigorous displacement of land based air into the KYUSU will be necessary and potential airfield sites are believed to be available. Concentration of engineer effort with the corresponding reduction of projects in rear areas will be essential. By pooling resources of Army and Navy it is believed that engineer effort can be obtained. 7. From the standpoint of weather it appears that November would be the best month to initiate the operation. 8. Initial studies have been based on an attack to be launched on 1st December, but it is believed that this date might be moved forward to 1st November, providing: 1. That every non-essential be eliminated. 2. That this headquarters exercise a high degree of control over Army resources in the Pacific. 3. That the Navy assist materially in moving forward service troops, equipment and supplies from NEW GUINEA and SOFAC bases. 4. That the War Department allocate additional shipping immediately to assist in the movement forward of supplies, and provide sufficient shipping for direct resupply to KYUSHU. 9. If this campaign is to be initiated during 1945 and particularly if we are to take advantage of the most favorable weather in November, it is essential that the decision be made promptly in order that logistic plans may be perfected and procurement initiated in the United States.
COMINCH & CHIO to CINCOPAC ADV HQ.

Top Secret. King to Nimitz. With reference to my 112045 CinCSWPA C-14442 of 20 April and War Dept. War 67098 of 12 April have been passed to you. Desire your comments and recommendations on matter as presented in General Marshall's message in light of General MacArthur's comment as soon as you can give a considered opinion. Make your reply info to MacArthur.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF to MACARTHUR Info Nimitz

Top Secret. WARX 71546 Nimitz only. Para A. Base development in the PHILIPPINES should proceed under the following assumptions and concept which are revisions of those contained in Sections II and III inclusive of base development plan submitted to the War Department by CinCSWPA. A copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff study explaining these revisions is being forwarded to CinCSWPA and CinCPOA. Para II. Assumptions: Para 2. Own Troops.

Para A. That it is necessary to give consideration to the probable expansion of base facilities to provide logistic support for the large scale redeployment of forces prior to and during the initiation of large scale operations against JAPAN.

Para B. That the bulk of United States Army forces in the Pacific will be concentrated in the PHILIPPINES.

Para C. That the KYUKYU and BONIN ISLANDS will be occupied or neutralized by friendly forces.

Para D. That minimum garrison forces will hold the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA Area; and that except in MANUS no United States Forces will be used in this area.

Para E. Such operations as are conducted in BORNEO and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES will employ Australian troops, utilizing bases in NEW GUINEA and AUSTRALIA.

Para F. That United States Forces will seize, occupy and consolidate the PHILIPPINES.

Para G. That the staging and garrisoning of United States Forces in the Pacific will follow generally a pattern similar to that indicated in the study being forwarded (Appendix "B" of JCS 1253/1).

Para H. That forces conducting operations in the VISAYAN SEA islands will be based on LEYTE.

Para I. That any BORNEO-NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES operations will be logistically supported so far as practicable from bases other than the PHILIPPINES.
Para J. That the bulk of the United States Air Forces allocated to SWPA will be deployed initially in North Luzon and the Central Luzon Plains.

Para K. That 4 United States Very Heavy Bomber (VHb) Air Groups of the 20th Air Force will be deployed in the Central Luzon Plains area by the end of November 1945, building up to 12 in February 1946.

Para L. That upon the cessation of hostilities in Europe some aircraft and combat crews and some ground echelons of redeployed air groups will be staged in the Philippines.

Para M. That Naval installations for the support of the 7th Fleet, and 1-3rd of the rest of the Pacific Fleet is the initial target for Naval developments in the Philippines.

Para N. That facilities for the simultaneous mounting of 11 assault divisions of 20-2000 mounting strength by February 1946 will be the maximum demand for future large scale operations.

Para O. That only the minimum civilian utilities and industries essential to the immediate prosecution of the war will be rehabilitated by the military forces.

Para P. That components of the Armed Forces of the Philippine Commonwealth will be garrisoned and trained in ante-bellum facilities not initially used by United States Forces, facilities constructed for the United States Forces and subsequently vacated, or constructed in priorities junior to the essential needs of the United States Forces.

Para Q. That the United States bases in the South Pacific Area, Australia, Solomon and New Guinea, except Manus, will be liquidated as soon as the hostile situation, service effort, and shipping means will permit.

Para R. That to provide for necessary possible expansion, facilities will be planned to permit expansion without interference in operations of the initial installations.

Para S. That Philippine imports will be the minimum required to prevent necessity, and those required to exploit fully local resources which will effectively contribute to the war effort. Any additional imports will be in a priority below requirements for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

Para T. That the maximum direct shipments from the United States to the objective areas of combat operations will be employed in support of operations.
Para III. Concept: Para 1. The concept envisages establishments in the 
PHILIPPINES TO:

Para A. When basic future operations of the main effort against JAPAN.

Para B. Support future operations to complete the liberation of the 
PHILIPPINES, including subsequent provisions for the necessary garrisons 
therein.

Para C. Receive, stage and garrison a total of 20-2 (22?) U.S. divisions 
plus supporting troops and replacements by November 1945. Detailed opera-
tional plans must progress before a firm determination can be made of the 
exact requirements.

Para D. Provide facilities for the reception and operation of 20-3 U.S. 
air groups of approximate strength of 140-9000. This is exclusive of 12 
VHF groups of the 20th AF (strength 60,000).

Para E. Provide facilities for total U.S. forces in the PHILIPPINES, as 
indicated in subparagraph C and D, above, exclusive of Navy subject to such 
modifications as may be indicated in detailed theater planning progresses.

Para F. Provide port receiving, transshipping and clearance capacity 
with fixed harbor installations and lighterage to handle required tonnages.

Para G. Provide naval base facilities for the support of the 7th Fleet 
and 1-3rd of the rest of the Pacific Fleet.

Para B. The planning basis set forth above is subject to changes which 
may be indicated by development of detailed plans for future operations.

28 0235 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCSWPA COM3RDFLT COM5THFLT COM7THFLT.
NIMITZ to KING, MACARTHUR, HALSEY, SPRUANCE, and KINKAID only.

Para 1. My views on the subjects covered by WAR 67098 of 12 April and 
CINCSWPA C 14442 of 20 April not to all are as follows.

Para 2. Until we are able to invade JAPAN with assurance of success 
we should continue to encircle and isolate by occupying positions which 
will cut off JAPAN from CHINA and KOREA and from which bombing of JAPAN 
can be intensified. Movement to the CHINA Coast will have the additional 
effect of ensuring RUSSIA's entry into the war. Movement to positions 
which control the KOREA STRAIT will have the additional effect of opening 
an all season sea route to RUSSIA.

Para 3. However I am in agreement with the invasion of KYUSHU at the 
earliest date as the way to achieve decisive victory if the requisite con-
ditions are met on which my comments follow:

(A) Control of the sea. This has been virtually accomplished by the 
destruction of the greater part of the Japanese Fleet.
(B) Control of the air. The fleet and the shore based air forces are rapidly destroying the enemy air force in being and 20th AF is effectually destroying the enemy ability to replace his losses. The mass suicide tactics are damaging many ships but we can better afford our ship losses and damage than the enemy can afford his air losses. By concentrating resources on the development of OKINAWA as a naval and air base we can improve our naval and air position and accelerate the deterioration of the enemy air force.

(C) Combat troops. This is primarily an Army question. An amphibious Corps of 3 Marine Divisions can be ready.

(D) Shipping. This is the most critical problem. We should not commence an invasion of JAPAN without adequate reserves of personnel and supplies in the PHILIPPINES MARIANAS and RYUKYUS. If these reserves are to be available procurement and movement must be commenced without delay. The shipping now and prospectively available in the Pacific must be increased rapidly. Control should be entrusted to an agency in the Pacific.

(E) Logistic organization. Readiness for invasion this Fall will necessitate making full use of existing logistic organizations and procedures. Drastic reorganizations will consume time which cannot be spared.

(F) Supplies. I assume that the Navy Department can furnish all the naval supplies needed including winter clothing for sailors and Marines.

(G) Weather. The risk of typhoons has been accepted in other operations and is not controlling. However the assault must take place early enough to leave time for unloading troops and supplies over the beaches before the heavy winter surf commences. November 1st is the last target date recommended.

(H) Intervening operations. At least 1 position should be taken between OKINAWA and KYUSHU. KIKAI JIMA (ICEBERG III D) is the best. Attacks on JAPAN by the Fleet and shore based air forces and the sea and air blockade should be intensified through the summer.

Para 4. Maximum acceleration of developments in the RYUKYUS requires that additional Army air forces be made available together with construction and service troops to support them. If decision is made to invade KYUSHU this Fall it would appear advisable to replace VLR wings planned for the RYUKYUS with types better adapted for attack on enemy air forces and air installations and for close support of troops.

Para 5. I have designated the principal naval commanders for the naval and amphibious phases of OLYMPIC and have earmarked an amphibious corps. The MIYAKO Operation has been deferred in the interest of rapid development of OKINAWA. Assault shipping is being made available to CINCSWPA as rapidly as revision of plans permits.

- Continued -
Para 6. In my opinion the feasibility of OLYMPIC in 1945 depends on the prompt provision of adequate shipping and adequate Army supplies and services. The Fleet including the Fleet Marine Force can be ready.

Para 7. If OLYMPIC cannot be done this year I recommend occupation of the CHUSAN ARCHIPELAGO followed by operations to control the KOREA STRAIT. Any important diversion of resources to open a sea route and supply RUSSIA this summer may prevent OLYMPIC this Fall even though effected under the minimum concept of escorting through the KURILES. The shipping itself will be an important diversion of resources and may make the difference between readiness this Fall and postponement.

Para 8. Wherever our best troops have met the Japanese Army on the defensive in prepared defensive positions it has been a competent fighting force. Our previous successes against ill fed and poorly supplied units cut off by our overpowering naval and air action should not be used as the sole basis for estimating the type of resistance we will meet in the Japanese homeland where the enemy lines of communication will be short and enemy supplies more adequate. However I am confident of the ability of our soldiers and Marines eventually to defeat the Japanese Army anywhere.

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MACARTHUR TO NIMITZ AND SPRUANCE. CX 15205. Reference your 300233. Your 260736 was received garbled and service was completed only today. Instructions have been issued to curtail reconnaissance Southwest Pacific Area as suggested. 5th Air Force operations in the vicinity of KYUSHU, your 281415 and 5th Air Force 291705, are under investigation. In the meantime, instruction have been issued to Allied Air Forces to restrict operations of their planes northeast of FORMOSA, as requested by you, except shipping strikes in YANGTZE RIVER VALLEY, see our CX 12998, which had been cleared with CHINA Theater, 1st investigation of 5th Air Force report 291705 indicated that the position reported as 31-20 N 131-20 E, may have been 31-20 N 121-20 E instead.

WEDEMEYER TO MARSHALL FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO NIMITZ, MACARTHUR, WEART, SULTAN.

NIMITZ ONLY. CFEX 36605. Enemy situation in CHINA Theater present indications are that Japanese are determined to broaden corridor running generally south from HANKOU to FRENCH INDO-CHINA. Advance in YELLOW RIVER Area is probably designed to deny airfields from which our planes have been operating against enemy lines of communications and installations. Advance west of PAOCHING is for purpose of capturing CHIHKIANG; again to deny us effective airfield. If our counter-measures are not effective in this area enemy may push on to KWEIYANG, an important focal point of communications leading toward CHUNGKING or KUNMING. Para.

My comment: While denying complete liberty of action to the Japanese, we are preparing for RASHNESS (Offensive operations to be undertaken by China Theater during 1945) Plan. Analysis of campaign in CHINA the past 4 years indicates that both Chinese and American efforts have been dissipated over vast areas and throughout unwieldily ineffective large number of Chinese divisions. We are attempting to restrict enemy advances with minimum forces, air and ground, and concurrently to concentrate American equipment and training on selected small number of Chinese divisions. I have pointed out danger of dispersal of effort to the Generalissimo and the Minister of War. They fully recognize and are cooperating in program that envisages drastic and early reduction of the number of divisions. At present there are 327 Chinese divisions and an attempt by this impoverished country to maintain a modicum of strength both in personnel and equipment in so large a number of units has resulted in deplorably ineffective ground forces. Implementation of my proposal to cannibalize and to deactivate many divisions is difficult. Numerous influential warlords and officers will be out of jobs. I am urging Generalissimo to use best personnel of deactivated divisions as replacements in those we have selected for build up to CAI standard. Also I recommended that additional personnel be made available by deactivation be organized into labor battalions for work on road maintenance and in the fields. All of these ideas have been accepted and are in process, however, execution is discouragingly slow and laborious. Para.

We are moving the new 6th Army from the CHANYI area to vicinity of CHIHKIANG (should be completed by May 10th) in order to stop Japanese advance on KWEIYANG. Such movement entails air lift which in turn impinges strongly on hump tonnage, thus delaying scheduled preparations for RASHNESS. We are resorting to every expedient in order to minimize air lift required for this movement. At present our air force is greatly restricted in operations as result of tonnage allocations made necessary by this move.

- Continued -
Para. MacArthur's air force is operating effectively along the coast of CHINA and FRENCH INDO CHINA. I am studying possibilities of LUSON air force striking interior targets in CHINA in the hope that we might further alleviate our current local situation. While I strongly deplore diversions from Pacific forces that might militate against overall strategic plans against the Japanese, there may be resources air, naval and/or ground available at this time in Pacific that could be effectively employed along coast of CHINA. It is my conviction that such employment would contribute to our overall position against the enemy much more strongly than would operations against objectives south of the PHILIPPINES. There may be resources available to secure a lodgement on the East Coast of CHINA and establish air bases with sea communications. From such bases enemy lines of communication within CHINA and between Japanese occupied areas and the Japanese Archipelago could be increasingly and more effectively severed. Favorable conditions for assault on Japanese occupied areas in CHINA would be created and concurrently our policy of implementing CHINA in the war effort would be accomplished. Para.

I have tried to be objective and to avoid placing disproportionate amount of importance relative to CHINA Theater role in assessing advantages and disadvantages of allied lodgement on CHINA Coast. I do not have information relative to availability of resources or the timing and other details of projected pacific operations, however, it may be well within time schedule or resource availability to assist CHINA the next few critical months. In your considerations pertaining to CHINA I offer the following observations. The enemy has accumulated forces in northern FRENCH INDO CHINA. These forces are composed of personnel evacuated from BURMA and the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. Such evacuees probably have only limited equipment. However, it is reported that the enemy has stockpiles of equipment in HANOI and HAIKHONG. The Japanese High Command has probably written off these units, however, they might be profitably employed in a drive north from FRENCH INDO CHINA against KUNMING, the loss or neutralization of which would to all intents and purposes put CHINA out of the war, at a time when we might reasonably expect to realize dividends from tremendous effort to support CHINA. This remains an enemy capability, however, I am not immediately concerned for I believe we can cope successfully with such enemy move. Para.

When in Washington I did not urge operations to gain lodgement on CHINA Coast because I recognized such operations would entail diversion from operationally and strategically sound Pacific advance against the heart of the enemy. The establishment of a lodgement on the coast would of course electrify the Chinese and cause them to redouble their efforts to gain land contact and thus open communications. Also inflation remains rampant. Our present land and air communications do not permit introduction of materials in quantities sufficient to alleviate the situation. Until sea communications are established and textiles as well as war materials flow into this country in quantity there will be delicate balance maintained between dangerous inflationary conditions and a limited war effort.
Joint Chiefs of Staff desire your views at an early date on the most desirable and practical course of action to secure a northern line of communications by sea to Eastern SIBERIA. Desired particularly is comment on practicability of maintaining a convoy route without occupying positions in KAMCHATKA or the KURILES.

Para 2. As there may be a possible requirement for an operation in KAMCHATKA or the KURILES to open and maintain a sea route to Eastern SIBERIA in 1945, it is desirable that plans be completed at an early date.

Para 3. The foregoing does not take into account the possibilities of a southern route via TSUSHIMA STRAITS and the SEA OF JAPAN which will be treated as a separate subject.

If not already in your hands suggest you obtain copy of Wedemeyer's 011005 to Marshall for JCS. Also his 301150 to MacArthur info Marshall.

"Without occupying positions in KAMCHATKA" your 030017 does not bar use of PETROPAVLOVSK as an advanced anchorage.

Refer your 032117. Believe northern lines of communication by SIA to Western SIBERIA can be maintained with fair degree of security without occupying positions in KURILES or KAMCHATKA. Such a line can only be maintained from Mid-June thru November. Assuming Soviets provide port facilities for unloading and make expeditious turn around it is considered the following U S forces will be required to protect convoys:

(A) A minimum of 4 CVEs with destroyers for escorts.
(B) Destroyers in sufficient numbers to escort convoys. Number DDs will depend on size and frequency convoy sailings. DEs not recommended in view AIS menace.
(C) Additional logistic shipping and base facilities such as repair ship and replacement squadrons with CASU must be supplied for forces assigned.
(D) Increase TF 90 by 1 group heavy bombers in order to neutralize KURILE bases. Para.

In view of my lack of information on various important factors bearing on this plan I recommend an officer my staff proceed PEARL for conference.
05 1249 CINCPOA ADV TO COM7THFLT.

NIMITZ TO SPRUANCE ONLY. Your 041159 in response to my 040144 reveals an unsatisfactory situation and inadequate compliance my 130229 161245 and 170557. It may indicate an inadequate appreciation by ComGen 10 of the necessity for using construction troops in manner which will most quickly release for offensive employment the carriers and also the 20th Air Force. If this is the case take corrective action.

05 1250 COM7THFLT TO CINCPOA ADV.

FOR FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ ONLY. Your 040243. Concur with your proposal. In addition I should control shorebased Navy or Marine fighter group to provide local fighter cover and to cover convoys. Present plan to arrive GUAM 1400 Tuesday 8 May enroute WASHINGTON. Depart GUAM early Wednesday.

04 0243 CINCPOA ADV TO COM7THFLT.

NIMITZ TO KINKAID. Connection pur conversation as to your part in OLYMPIC and CORONET desire your views on proposal that you command naval forces based in JAPAN and naval shore activities located there. This would in effect continue your present relations with CINCAFPAC but I would expect you to exercise operational control over naval search and patrol planes based in JAPAN the alternative being to retain them under 3rd or 5th Fleet. In this connection I intend to secure the transfer of control of Air7thFlt to to you or to Kauffman if at all possible during discussions of giving Army operational control of Army Air Forces in RYUKYUS. I envisage your status in JAPAN in connection with transports, escorts, et cetera as being similar to that of H. B. Wilson at Brest in 1918. I would expect Kauffman to continue in present capacity but with increased scope when you move forward. This has not been discussed with Cominch. Will discuss with you whenever you come to GUAM next but desire your views by dispatch.

02 22117 JCS to MACARTHUR, WEDEMEYER, SULTAN, NIMITZ.
03 0240 RDO WASHINGTON TO NIMITZ.

"Number WZ WARX 76206 (0222117). Stories on atrocities may be released in theaters in accordance with following policy.

1. Theater may clear atrocity stories submitted for censorship within existing security requirements.

2. Theater Commanders may make such official releases on atrocities as they deem desirable.

3. In those cases where it is intended to request that an official protest be made by the U. S. Government protest must be made prior to an official release concerning the atrocity".

03 0117 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING. To facilitate progress on additional KEELBLOCKS Plan under directive your 012140 request decision as to whether "Without occupying positions in KAMCHATKA" bars use of PETROPAVLOVSK as an advanced anchorage. KEELBLOCKS III practically completed with general concept of occupation of KAMCHATKA and escorting through KURILES.
03 0219 CINCPA ADV TO COM5THFLT.

NIMITZ TO SPRUANCE EYES ONLY. My serial 000147 of 21 November 1944 requires Buckner become responsible direct to you when amphibious phase is completed. Activation of adequate shore based air is possibly a prerequisite to his assuming responsibility for "Defense". It is obvious that delay in formal release of Buckner from Turner's command will be cited in connection OLYMPIC planning and his release should not be deferred any longer than necessary. If Buckner does not feel ready to assume responsibility for defense and development that fact should be made a matter of record. I intend to take action accordance para 5 prior to your turn over to Halsey after which as CTF 99 Buckner will be responsible to me as is Hoover.

04 1308 MACARTHUR TO CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFO COMAF 20, CINCPA ADV.

CX 15479. Reference sub-para 2K of Assumptions, WX 71548, 22nd, in which the basic assumption is "That 4 U.S. very heavy bomber (VHB) Air Groups of the 20th AF will be deployed in the Central LUZON Plains Area by the end of November 1945, building up to 12 in February 1946". Present information available indicates that this plan has not been definitely approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Paucity of engineer effort available for the accomplishment of existing missions in the PHILIPPINES makes it highly desirable that available resources be not diverted to preparation of facilities for VHB units until the requirement is definite. Further information relative to the probability of the deployment of 4 groups by November and 12 Groups by February will be helpful in the arrangement of the program of use of our engineer resources.

05 0549 MACARTHUR TO NIMITZ.

Personal for Admiral Nimitz from General MacArthur. C 15505. In view of your old intimacy with the PHILIPPINES it would probably be of great interest to you to see at first hand their present situation.

It is needless for me to tell you how warm would be your welcome from all ranks here if your operational duties ever permit you to get away.

06 0822 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO KING. CINCPAC has made inquiry as to the possible availability of a 2nd airstrip at MANUS for a 2nd MONAB in connection with expansion of his force to 2 carrier task groups. Before asking CINCSWPA for a 2nd strip which would have to be one released by the Army I would like to have your estimate as to future employment of British Fleet forces. If they are to be used to Southwest of BRUNEI BAY the 2nd MONAB would be better placed at BRUNEI BAY.

06 1125 COM5THFLT TO CINCPAC ADV.

SPRUANCE TO NIMITZ. Your 051249. Investigation ashore yesterday does indicate unsatisfactory conditions exist. See my 060129 which was sent as a matter of record and to confirm what I said in person. Trouble seems to have been that IsCom OKINAWA has insisted on strict compliance with letter of base development plans and has been more concerned with trying to get fields ready on time for Army heavy bombardment aircraft than with needs of current tactical situation. Have heard rumors of this attitude before but yesterday was 1st time I have been able to bring it out in the open. Believe

---Continued---
06 1125 COMSTHFLT TO CINCPAC ADV. (CONT'D)

base development plans should have a foreword to the effect that they are a guide made under conditions of inadequate and inaccurate knowledge of terrain and of no knowledge as to how the tactical situation will develop during capture. That they should be modified as necessary best to meet requirements of tactical situation and to attain results indicated in the plans.

06 1142 COMSTHFLT TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

SPRUANCE TO NIMITZ.

Spent yesterday ashore seeing Buckner Hodge DelValle Bruce Ready Arnold Mulcahy Wallace. Your 030219. Buckner and Hodge were loath to make any prediction as to when end of organized resistance would come but when pressed said they hoped for it toward end of May. Both DelValle and Bruce emphasized very tough character of fighting in which their divisions are now engaged. I do not believe accurate prediction possible at present. Until end of organized resistance continuance of amphibious phase with its gunfire and air support appears essential. Even after all troop air support can come from local fields protection from Jap air attacks given our ships by CAP must remain function of Amphibious Commander. Believe only end of organized resistance will cause enemy to cease his large scale air attacks including suicide planes which are major threat to our ships. At that time with elimination of gunfire support ships from area and with establishment of outlying radar and fighter director units Area Commander should be able to assume full responsibility under you for defense and development. See Turner's 050325 for arrangements in hand to turn over to Buckner's subordinates certain functions now exercised by Amphibious Force. Our troops ashore have much hard fighting ahead. I feel that our fleet must continue with its support until the job is done.

08 0506 COMSTHFLT TO CINCPAC ADV. (SPRUANCE TO NIMITZ)

Your 042305. Recommend Buckner be not designated for LONGTOM. Consider ICEBERG is too important and will last too long to warrant his leaving here in time to plan LONGTOM. As Troop Commander for latter suggest first Geiger, second Harry Schmidt. This on assumption Holland Smith not available. Have just discussed command for LONGTOM with Wilkinson whose ideas coincide with mine. Early designation of Area, Naval Base and other subordinate commanders very desirable. For LONGTOM our Troop Commander must be man who will move rapidly to seize area on mainland within perimeter selected before enemy has time to build up strength against us.

07 0607 CINCPAC ADV TO CINCPAC ADV. (NIMITZ TO MACARTHUR)

The gracious invitation of your C 15505 is greatly appreciated and I will hope to take advantage of it at some future time. Para.

By about 15 May I will have a tentative draft of my plan for the naval and amphibious phases of OLYMPIC and wish to confer with you about it since it must interlock with your plans. I would be delighted to have you visit GUAM at that time with such members of your staff as you desire but if you are unable to come I can arrange to come to MANILA for that purpose.
08 1119 GHQ SWPA TO CINCPAC ADV (PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ).

C-15755. Thanks for your cordial invitation. In the absence of President Osmena and due to civil affairs demands am unable to leave here at present. Would be delighted if you and staff could come here. Will send you by courier officer toward the end of the week a copy of our plan for employment of Army forces. Signed MacArthur.

10 0430 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR INFO NIMITZ.

GH WARX 79828. Para.
Directive to CINCPAC (War 62774 3 April 1945 WAR 62773 3 April 1945) to make plans and preparations for campaign in JAPAN is reference. Para.
Following responsibilities have been fix by Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A. CINCPAC ISNS @KRAM (is charged) with military government of JAPAN (including the 4 main islands. About 1,000 offshore islands and KARAPUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLANDS but excluding the outlying islands as defined in JCS 1231).
B. Chief of Staff US Army is designated as executive agency for Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters pertaining to military government of JAPAN.
C. Procurement and training of personnel for military government of JAPAN are War Dept responsibilities subject to such administrative arrangements or operational expediencies as are agreed between the services or between the services and other agencies of the US Government.
D. War Dept is responsible for procurement shipment and distribution of supplies necessary to accomplish objectives of the Military Government of JAPAN as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Foregoing is subject to such administrative arrangements or operational expediencies as are agreed between the services or between the services and other agencies of the US Government. Para.
As basis for planning you will be informed separately in near future as to current status of JCS plans and preparations for Military Government of JAPAN.

08 2347 MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR INFO DEPCOMAF 20, CINCPOA.

WARX 79224. Cite your CX 15479, 4 May. Recent incomplete information from CINCPOA indicates that possible VHB air base sites are more numerous in ICEBERG Area than originally estimated when assumption 2K was included by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in WARX 71548. Pending more complete information and firm decision of Joint Chiefs of Staff on deployment of remaining scheduled VHB Groups, you are authorized to suspend action on assumption 2K relating to preparations for VHB units in LUZON and concentrate engineer effort on other projects of higher priority.
11 0031 MARSHALL TO MACARTHUR, RICHARDSON - RICHARDSON PASSED TO CINCPOA ADV.

WARX 80205. Personal to MacArthur and Richardson from Marshall, Richardson please pass to Nimitz and send me his comments.

I wish to send General Stillwell to the Pacific to see if the training of our replacements here and in the redeployment training in Europe is what it should be for the particular employment in view, and to check up on the special weapon and technique requirements of Infantry and Artillery in operations against the Japanese. Stillwell commands the army ground forces and as such is in charge of the training of replacements and all combat units, and I wish to send him to Europe to bring their training into line. To accomplish this purpose he should spend considerable time with troops actually in combat in the PHILIPPINES and on OKINAWA.

Please let me have your approval. Stillwell would leave here between the 15th and 20th of this month.

11 0746 CINCPOA ADV HQ TO CINC BRITISH EAST INDIES FLEET.

Personal for Admiral Sir A. J. Power, Royal Navy from Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

I wish you all success in eliminating the NACHI Class cruiser and destroyer reported as attempting to reach the ANDAMAN ISLANDS on evening of 12 May although I had hoped to have them as targets in this area.

11 0630 WEDEMEYER TO CINCPOA ADV INFO MISPOAN MACARTHUR, MIL X SWPA, CHEVES (FOR AGAS)

CFFX-37168. 1 Agent

1 agent was dispatched last October into FORMOSA. Contacted prisoner of war camps at TAIHOKU and TO. He has returned. Agent brings back proposal for escape and evasion work. We are sending 2 agents into FORMOSA, 1 to go to HEITO and 1 to TAIHOKU. We are furnishing ILAION and a half Chinese money, they will operate junk communications between FOCHOW, AMY and TAIHOKU. These agents claim they are connected with approximately 15,000 active guerillas and that the group intends to carry out sabotage, intelligence activities and general 5th column work in addition to escape and evasion. We are interested only in escape and evasion. Request your concurrence in our carrying out this work. If you wish to control all activities we will turn over to you the ground work and contacts that we are now establishing. Funds are authorized only for escape and evasion, but feel that once the agents are in FORMOSA we will be unable to prevent these other activities.

11 1810 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPOA ADV. (KING TO NIMITZ)

British Chiefs of Staff have been informed that object of operations against BORNEO are primarily to secure a naval base at BRUNEI for British Pacific Fleet and secondarily to secure sources of oil. British consider BRUNEI undesirable from standpoint of distance from main theater of operations against JAPAN, tardiness of base development and distance from Australian IJN base. Preference was expressed for PHILIPPINE Area base or alternatively the continued use of facilities at MANUS, Para. British are in process of being informed by JCS that there are no sites available in PHILIPPINES, that MANUS is too far from scene of operations and that they should reconsider BRUNEI BAY as a base the capture of which we regard as a desirable operation regardless of its use. Para.

- Continued -
Your 060322. The following is a quotation from a draft memo to British "The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that the main theater of naval operations against JAPAN extends in the Western Pacific from the KURILES to the MALAY BARRIER. Both United States and British naval forces may be employed in any part of this area. There will be naval operations required in the SOUTH CHINA SEA, in support of operations in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and the MALAY PENINSULA. It is considered that such operations can best be supported from an advanced base at BRUNEI BAY. The establishment of an advanced base at BRUNEI BAY is not intended to preclude the employment of the British Pacific Fleet in any part of the theater of operations or to influence necessarily the localities in which it may be employed. The question is rather one of utilizing to the best advantage the base facilities which the British Admiralty is providing for the Pacific."

Do not consider that a 2nd air strip at MANUS should be provided for British Fleet. For your information only assurance in general terms is being given British that airfield constructional resources will be supplied Australian forces to be left in SWPA supported logistically with resources they cannot themselves provide.

FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. The offer of JCS 1018/4 to make additional fighter bomber groups available for use in OKINAWA is greatly appreciated. The 318th Fighter Group (P-47-N) will fly to IE SHIMA 1 squadron a day commencing today. The ground echelons of the 413th and 507th Fighter Groups (Both P-47N) can not reach OKINAWA until about 20 May and 10 June respectively. These are the earliest dates which were permitted for departure from Mainland. Marine Corsair Groups in the Pacific Ocean Areas were deployed earlier and have been extremely effective. The effectiveness of fighter bombers in close support of troops has been demonstrated throughout the Central Pacific Campaign and the F6F P4U and P47 have all been so used with a high degree of success. Very intensive use of carrier type aircraft for direct support of troops as well as naval gunfire beyond all precedent has characterized the OKINAWA and preceding Pacific operations. The P47 was used and proved very effective in the capture of SAIPAN and TINIAN.

Para 2. After P47-N Groups are established in OKINAWA and IE SHIMA it is intended to use them for counter air force action against KYUSHU and to continue the Marine Fighter Groups in local air defense as well as the direct support of troops for which they are outstandingly well qualified.

Para 3. It has been necessary recently to divert all the striking power of the fast carrier task forces and also to a limited degree the striking power of the 20th Air Force from offensive operations against strategic targets to operations to cover and support the troops and ships engaged at OKINAWA. However, the 20th Air Force has now been released and the carrier striking forces will likewise be released as soon as possible.

Para 4. The rapid development of OKINAWA for the deployment of an air force of maximum effectiveness will be discussed with CINCPAC within a few days. The pressing need at the present time is for Army construction and service troops to prepare fields and support Army Air Forces.

Para 5. As indicated in Para 4 of my 280235 a decision to execute OLYMPIC this year may make it desirable temporarily to replace some part of the VLR wings planned for OKINAWA by types better adapted for attack on enemy air forces and air installations and for close support of troops. This will be discussed with CINCPAC.

- Continued -
12 0220 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Para 6. Request information as to dates when additional Army construction troops, service troops and P47 Fighter Groups could be made available for deployment in RTUKUS to supplement present planned deployment of Army air forces or additionally to replace 11th and 494th heavy bomber groups or to replace any or all of the 1st 8 very heavy bomber groups.

14 0256 CINCPAC ADV TO COM5THFLT INFO COMINCH.

Top Secret. Nimitz to Spruance only. Info King only. My 030219.
Prior to or coincident with Turner's relief accordance your 130406 desire arrangement paragraph 4 my serial 060117 of 21 Nov. as modified by my 131239 placed in effect. I do not desire to have Buckner placed under Hill's command. Support of 10th Army by 5th Fleet will continue.

16 1355 COMINCH AND CNO TO CINCPAC ADV HQ.

KING TO NIMITZ. Issuance of directive for OLYMPIC has been under discussion for some time. My latest proposal to the Army is as follows "Further to WAR 62773 and 62774 to CINCPAC and 032140 April and 032141 April to CINCPAC: Pursuant to Paragraphs A(6) and B(4) and C of WAR 62774 and Navy 032141 April the Joint Chief's of Staff direct the invasion of KYUSHU target date 1 November 1945". CINCPAC ADVANCE forward to Admiral Nimitz if communication arrangements provide.

17 0841 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO KING)

During our conference just completed at MANILA there was general agreement as to tactical and strategic concepts and the preliminary draft of my OLYMPIC plan will require no important changes in that regard. The principal point in which MacArthur's tactical scheme differs from our assumptions is that he plans to land an Army Corps at AREKAKE WAN and at MIYAZAKI and lands the 5th PhibCorps at KUSHIKINO to drive east to secure the city of KAGOSHIMA.

Para. The only plan shown us was an incomplete overall campaign plan called "DONNFALL" which he expected to issue to cover operations of both services in both OLYMPIC and CORONET and to which I was to contribute only the sections concerning naval matters. Included therein were certain basic ideas of command to which I could not agree including transferring to him complete control of the RTUKUS and complete control of all "land based air forces" except those engaged in "naval search" this principle apparently to extend throughout the Pacific. Photostat of promulgating letter for DOWNFALL being airmailed to you.

Para. After considerable very frank discussion it was agreed that I will prepare and issue my plans as directed by Joint Chiefs of Staff clearing with him the parts which affect his forces and that he will do likewise. I have left my draft with him and expect his detailed comments by letter. He will send me his draft when it is ready.

Para. The drafting of an overall campaign plan by MacArthur as outlined above would prove tedious in the extreme and be mechanically difficult to keep up to date. It would further carry with it the implication of unity of command being exercised by the Army for the entire campaign for the defeat of JAPAN. A "Joint Plan" to signed by MacArthur and me would be equally difficult to draft and keep up to date and would involve protracted and contentious conferences. For these reasons I will issue my own plan for the naval
17 0341 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH (CONT'D).

and amphibious operations consulting with MacArthur as necessary on matters which affect his operations. Actually the Joint Chiefs of Staff now exercise overall command and their directives now constitute the campaign plan.

Para. I agreed to the establishment of Kenney's Air Force in the Ryuku Islands as soon as possible under arrangements approximating those existing for the 20th Air Force with CINCPAC controlling all Army air forces except the 20th. I retain area control and responsibility for development and defense. An important point in this regard is that it was clearly indicated that CINCPAC would like "pool Engineer troops" and thereby get control of our Seabees to use on Army projects for which adequate Army resources are not being made available. I retain control of naval aviation except for Marine units with the Army.

Para. To conserve naval construction troops for naval projects essential to fleet support I can not too strongly urge early provision of Army engineers needed to expedite Army construction projects in preparation for Olympic.

Para. Text of extracts from Memorandum Record of our agreement follows. See Enmarch 19 1809 hereafter.

15 0411 CON5TFIT TO CINCPAC ADV. (SPRUANCE TO NIMITZ)

My 150309 gives airfield status as obtained ashore yesterday and contains certain recommendations. Believe your 130631 should be modified to permit maximum use of Kadena for fighters until such time as additional fields are ready for half or all VF which we have planned to operate from Kadena. Com-Gen TEN 140002 being passed to you gives status of bulk AvGas storage OKINAWA and IE SHIMA. I do not know how fast additional tanks on OKINAWA will come into use but note that completion date is end of May and there has been no improvement in bulk storage situation since 5th when I emphasized to Gen. Wallace necessity for more bulk storage. Whatever the reasons record of 6,100 barrel tanks available for use on OKINAWA 6 weeks after our landing is not impressive.

17 0133 JCS TO WDEMKYBER INFO MACARTHUR, SULTAN, CINCPAC/CINCPAO ADV.

WARX 33126.

We are appreciative of the situation confronting you in the China Theater as outlined in your CFEX 36605. It now appears that preparations which have been directed for major operations planned to take place late this year, together with the demands on redeployment, will absorb all available means and resources, particularly shipping. Unless it is found impracticable to conduct operations against Japan proper this year, it does not now appear that operations to secure a lodgement on the China Coast will be within our capabilities.

Para. Current operations in Borneo are on a much smaller scale than would be required for operations on the China Coast, and are employing Australian forces not available for operations to the North.

Para. Such assistance to your campaign by air operations from adjacent theaters and areas as can be arranged directly with appropriate commanders without prejudice to directed operations is favored.

18 0235 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

In connection with my 180005 to MacArthur note that unless the 5th PhibCorps is withdrawn from Kyushu as I have requested we will be unable to conduct even minor amphibious operations without Army troops and consequently divided
command. I visualize considerable mopping up and several minor amphibious operations on the Asiatic mainland to secure ports and restore sea communications which can best be accomplished by the Fleet using only the Fleet Marine Force. It was indicated at MANILA that the SWPA planners contemplated leaving the 5thPhibCorps in KYUSHU but General MacArthur personally requested that I keep a MarDiv in OKINAWA to release Army Divisions for CORONET. This can be done just as 2nd MarDiv kept SAIPAN secure while preparing for future operations.

21 0119 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO COMNORPAC,COM3RDFFLT.

NIMITZ TO KING, INFO HALSEY AND FLETCHER ONLY.

Para 1. My KEELBLOCKS III and KEELBLOCKS IV are being completed and will be airmailed within a few days. KEELBLOCKS IV contemplates:

A. Augmenting North Pacific Force by 3 CA 7 CVE 26 DD or DE and appropriate auxiliaries 1 Army heavy bomber group and 1 or 2 naval heavy landplane search squadrons.

B. Basing escort forces at ADAK where a carrier aircraft pool will also be installed.

C. Passing convoys from ADAK north of ALEUTIANS to vicinity of ATTU thence through the KURILES Via ONNEKOTAN, SHADKOTAN or MUSHIRU STRAITS. Russians to assume responsibility west of 147th Meridian or north of 57th Parallel in SEA OF OKHOTSUK.

D. Naval air search from ALEUTIANS to be extended to cover convoys while under U.S. escort.

E. Fast carrier strikes on HOKKAIDO and southern KURILES as necessary to support Russian operations in SAKHALIN or to cover convoy movements.

Para 2. The operations required in foregoing concept are considered feasible in the strategic situation anticipated to exist and constitute the only method of accomplishing the desired result without unacceptably adverse effects on OLYMPIC or LONGJACK.

Para 3. Whenever the situation at OKINAWA permits I plan to withdraw the entire fast carrier force and after a period of replenishment if then practicable send it to attack northern objectives according to 030121.

21 2313 JCS TO NIMITZ, MACARTHUR AND ARNOLD.

WARX 55707. Book message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, Nimitz, and Arnold for action.

Responsibility for mapping, charting, and photography of JAPAN and approaches incident to invasion and campaign therein is considered integral part of planning and preparations directed in messages Navy 032140 (WAR 62773) April and Navy 032141 (WAR 62774) April. Addressees should therefore confer and mutually agree on necessary action, including recommendations as to changes in JCS 756/2 considered appropriate. Message C 15100 dated 29 April from CINCPAC-CINCPOA not to COMGEN 20th Air Force is reference.
Refers to your 110118 Re SoPac Navy rollup. ComServPac records show 405,000 MT of all types of excess Navy materials and equipment reported for movement and estimate that this is approximately 50% of total to be reported. Excess components reported total 181,000 MT. Of the amounts reported 23,000 MT are now moving and instructions issued to move 110,000 additional MT. June and subsequent maintenance tonnage allocation will provide movement for 155,000 MT of CB and NSD stocks reducing continental requirements in like amount. This does not include SWP movements of Navy tonnages. Included in the unreported 50% is 156,000 MT of impediments of 57 organized activities for which readiness dates are as yet undetermined. Destination of these units is dependent on availability dates. Types of assault shipping heretofore available have not been suitable for lifting large amounts of heavy construction equipment. Approximately 75% of assault shipping now scheduled for SoPac rollup is moving Navy cargo. Present cargo operation commitments for GUAM already exceed estimated port capabilities by approximately 20% thru August. Records at this headquarters indicate ability to receive cargo at OKINAWA is averaging 16,000 MT per day contrasted to 20,000 MT per day already on shipping schedules. In addition to availability of suitable type shipping the factors of trans-shipping FRICION cargoes from merchant ships to LSTs and LSMs, reception of redeployment shipping from the ATLANTIC and build-up of reserve supplies for LONCHOM and CLYMETC must be evaluated and priority established. Repeated acceleration of VLR requirements is an imposing demand on shipping and terminal port reception capacities. ComServPac records of SoPac rollup are current and we are exploiting every opportunity to fullest extent to move SoPac cargo. A study is being made as to the possibility of bringing a limited amount of SoPac Navy stocks to PEARL in order to make them more readily available for issue and expedite closeout of ESPIRITU and NOUMEA at an earlier date than could be accomplished by moving the supplies to the MARIANAS.

24 0035 CINCPOA ADV TO COMOILFT INFO CMSTHILT.

HULITZ TO HALSEY INFO SPRUANCE. Request you cancel such part of your 230934 as refers to Buckner and Mallory. They are both engaged in important combat operations and should not be called on board your flagship. If conference is needed it can take place ashore before you assume command responsibilities.

24 0343 CINCPOA PEARL TO CINCPOA ADV.

TOWERS TO HULITZ ONLY.

Para 1. In accordance your instructions have carefully examined executive order No. 9439 and all available documents relating thereto. Have also discussed it with Richardson and Bagley.

Para 2. Richardson strongly opposed to any consideration towards its cancellation or modification. He states that he does not consider there is any method which is legal, suitable and feasible by which matters covered by 9439 can be handled. He states further that cancellation would not relieve him of any responsibilities to you because he does not recognize any responsibility on your part for any of the functions he performs under the terms of 9439. I disputed that point. My suggestion that Para 1 of order might be modified to permit some officer other than ComGenPOA to be assigned as "Military Commander" was countered by Brig. Gen. Morrison with the statement that...
Solicitor General had insisted that officer (by title) who had exercised authority of Military Governor must exercise authority under Executive Order. Morrison claimed Solicitor General because of certain legal implications would not recede from that position.

Para 3. Bagley is opposed to cancellation because he considers essential the control presently exercised and sees no suitable substitute method unless sufficient authority is vested in you. I am confident such authority does not exist.

Para 4. I recommend against any steps at this time towards obtaining cancellation. Austin concurs. Further details will follow by letter.
25 0519 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

HUNTZ TO KING ONLY. Para 1. In view of recent exchanges of messages it appears necessary to inform you as a matter of record that:

A. The text of the agreements contained in my serial 0005097 was drafted by the staff of General MacArthur.
B. The text of Sub Para (K) which covers the transfer of command was inserted at the instance of Maj. Gen. Chamberlain.
C. The entire draft was taken by Maj. Gen. Chamberlain to General MacArthur who gave it to me personally in his own house and it was thereupon agreed to by us.
D. I consider that the draft constituted a firm and binding agreement within the meaning of JCS 0321/40.

Para 2. It was implicit in all our discussions that CINCPAC would control the amphibious phase and Sub Para 1Gl is a firm agreement which gives CINCPAC control of land based air in the objective area during the amphibious phase.

26 0552 CINCPOA ADV TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH.

HUNTZ TO MACARTHUR INFO KING.

1. I regret that my concept of command relationships in connection with the OLYMPIC Operation has been misunderstood to the extent revealed in your 251102 and will attempt to restate it briefly in terms which will I hope remove the misapprehension which apparently prevails.

2. Our operations up to and including the capture occupation and development of the PHILIPPINES and RYUKYUS have been conducted under the principle of unified command within our respective areas. In addition the forces of the 2 command areas have supported each other under arrangements made between CINCSWPA and CINCPOA. However the command directives of JCS 0321/40 and 0321/41 made it clear that for the invasion of JAPAN a new command organization would be employed in which CINCPAC would command the land campaign in JAPAN which would be carried on primarily with Army forces while CINCPAC would command the naval phases and also the amphibious phases in which naval forces embark, transport and land Army forces at the beaches selected by the Army. Concurrently CINCPAC would of course continue to command the overall naval campaign in the Pacific in strategic support of OLYMPIC and other operations ordered by the JCS and for the general purpose of accomplishing the overall strategic objectives of the war.

3. Under present plans and agreements, well in advance of OLYMPIC the Army Air Forces operating against JAPAN from the MARIANAS-TWO axis will be commanded by General Arnold and the Army Air Forces operating against JAPAN from the RYUKYUS will be commanded some by General Arnold and some by CINCPAC. Under the concept of my Joint Staff Study of OLYMPIC and the concepts which I advanced in our conference at MANILA, the only cases in which Army forces engaged in OLYMPIC would come under naval control would be:

A. Troops would necessarily be under naval control from the time they embark in naval vessels at points designated by the Army until they are disembarked on beaches designated by the Army. Thereafter as is customary in amphibious operations they would remain under the control of naval amphibious commanders until the appropriate Army Commanders are willing to assume their normal command responsibilities. Any procedure which you can propose to shorten this period will be welcomed. The procedure agreed upon at MANILA for passing to the Army Command of recently landed troops was drafted by your staff and accepted by us without question.

- Continued -
B. I likewise agreed in MANILA to the arrangement by which the aircraft of both services, while within the amphibious objective area, would be controlled initially by the Amphibious Commander and later by the Army air commander on shore.

4. I have no desire to exercise any command or control over Army forces in the OLYMPIC Operation except as necessitated by their being embarked in naval vessels or in the case of air forces as necessitated by the realities of the tactical situation at the beachhead. In the conference at MANILA it was pointed out on the staff level that the Army was disturbed at the possible implications of the customary naval term "Commander Joint Expeditionary Force". It was agreed to substitute in revision the administrative title "Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet" and likewise to use the title "Commanding General, 6th Army" in place of a functional title.

5. The character of future operations against JAPAN as exemplified by the fighting now going on in the vicinity of the KYUSHU and elsewhere in the Pacific makes it essential that the operations of large naval forces be coordinated by a naval commander in a well equipped command position on shore. All our experience in this war has proved this to be necessary. Complete flexibility must exist with respect to the transfer of ships between task fleets and naval task forces to meet a constantly changing strategic and tactical situation. Accordingly it is necessary that, except for naval aircraft engaged in direct support of troops, the naval forces engaged in OLYMPIC remain under my command. I had understood that you advocated that I command the naval forces just as I advocated that an Army officer be responsible direct to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the conduct of operations ashore in JAPAN.

6. I trust that the foregoing will serve to allay any apprehensions which may exist and to permit the expeditious prosecution of OLYMPIC planning on a satisfactory basis in accordance with the current directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the agreements which we made in MANILA.

Having evaluated the situation at OKINAWA and capabilities of own and enemy forces after discussion with all principal Navy, Army and Marine Commanders my estimate is as follows:

A. Withdrawal of TF 38 will entail increased risks to OKINAWA shipping unless shore based fighter strength is augmented.

B. 1 additional shore based fighter group would about counterbalance the loss of TF 38 support. (Withdrawal of British carriers and neutralization of SAKISIMA GUNTO by TAF or CVEs important factors in this estimate).

C. Immediate offensive potentialities of TF 38 seriously reduced by shortage of carriers, shortage of specially equipped DD, poor material condition which is reported to be general.

D. Further attacks against KYUSHU at this time not profitable due lack of strength in TF 38 and further due to juggling and concealing of planes by Nips, their apparent intent to avoid aerial combat and virtual impossibility of effecting surprise now.

E. More vigorous prosecution of installation of shore air warning and related communications is necessary for relief of pickets and installation of JCC and the internal communication systems required by shore based activities should be expedited.

- Continued -
F. Gunfire support and air support of ground operations by TAF and CVEs may continue into July but CTF 31 rotation plan should insure adequate support for Phase 3D and subsequent operations.

G. Continued use of mine craft by CTF 31 for screening purposes may adversely affect preparations for future minesweeping projects.

H. TAF 31 and TAF can cope with any enemy surface threat. I strongly recommend (1) ground and flight echelons MAG 14 be ordered OKINAWA immediately. Ground echelon 41st Medium Bomber Group proceed OKINAWA as scheduled but that planes be withheld pending readiness of AWASE about 1 July.

Para. Pending being informed as to your action on these recommendations I propose:

K. To continue defensive and interdiction support by TF 38.

If recommendations approved I propose:

L. Withdrawal TF 38 to bases when 1st squadron of additional fighter group is activated or on latest date that will permit 14 days availability prior departure for next approved operation. If recommendation not approved I then recommend:

M. Acceptance of added risks to OKINAWA forces and withdrawal of TF 38 not later than JUNY June to permit 14 days availability prior striking HOKKAIDO area about 1 July.

Para. Plan for support of KEELBLOCKS and Phase 3D by separate despatch.

28 0929 COMBDFLT TO CINCPOA ADV (HALSEY TO NIMITZ)

My 280921. I recommend TF 38 strike Northern HONSHU-HOKKAIDO-KURILES about 1 July. TOKYO Area about 7 July. KYUSHU Area prior to and during Phase 3D. Request early OLYMPIC minesweeping directive in order adequate ships may be transferred from TF 31 to CTF 39 for preparation training and initiation of projects. Suggest for consideration the team possibilities of coordinating the timing and objectives for VR, TAF and TF 38. Detailed suggestions will be submitted later.

28 0910 CINCPOA ADV TO COMSTFIBFOR. (NIMITZ TO HILL ONLY)

The following message is to be delivered at once in a sealed envelope to LtGen Buckner marked for his eyes only. "The base and airfield development at OKINAWA and AS SHIMA must be developed to the maximum extent and with the utmost speed to support the invasion of JAPAN. Official dispatches and reports of several competent observers give me the definite impression that one or more changes may be necessary in the senior officers responsible for base development and airfield construction in particular. The last is disturbingly slow. Request your frankest comments."

29 0859 CINCPOA ADV TO COMBDFLT. (NIMITZ TO HALSEY)

Your 280921 and 280929. Maintain at least 2 carrier task groups in position to cover and support OKINAWA. Inform me when you consider withdrawal to base advisable.

Plan on 2 full weeks at anchor for Task Force 38 followed by attack on Northern HONSHU-HOKKAIDO-southern KURILES using TF 38 and also British carrier task force. When dates are firm CINCPOA will arrange coordinated action by other forces.

Nominate now a U.S. carrier task group to base ENIWETOK after mid-July.
29 0900 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDLT.CM3RDLT,COMPHIBSACP,COMPHIBGROUP 3, CTF 31.

NIMITZ TO SPRUANCE, TURNER, HILL, CONNOLLY and HALSEY ONLY.

The purpose of the capture and development of FRICTION is to establish fighter bombers in a position intermediate between LEGUMINOUS and DIABOLIC which will facilitate defense and development of LEGUMINOUS and will improve the air support in the OLYMPIC Operation. Occupation of FRICTION will also of course deny use of that position to the enemy.

Para. The advantages of having such a position to support OLYMPIC will be somewhat offset by the reduction in the state of preparation of fleet forces for OLYMPIC and in the diversion of offensive effort to cover the development of the position which will be difficult and protracted.

Para. Request by dispatch direct to me your brief estimate and recommendation as to whether or not Phase 3D ICEBERG should be executed in July to prepare for OLYMPIC on 1 November.

Para. Com3rdFlt comment when feasible.

29 1725 COMPHIBGRP 3 to CINCPAC ADV. (CONNOLLY TO NIMITZ)

Your 290900. Assuming that no substantial reinforcement or augmentation of defenses of the objective occurs and that enemy air capabilities are approximately equal to present, believe Phase 3D ICEBERG is an essential and profitable operational interlude between fall of LEGUMINOUS and OLYMPIC attack in order to maintain offensive pressure and to bring about reduction in air strength rather than allow respite in which enemy will recuperate. All air power that can be brought to bear for direct neutralization and air defense should be employed in early stages 3D which will minimize reduction fleet readiness for OLYMPIC. Recommend execute.

29 1912 COMGEN 10 to CINCPAC ADV.

Reply your 290910 passed Buckner by Hill. THIS FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ EYES ALONE. Airfield development OKINAWA IE SHIMA originally was on limited scale compared to greatly increased present plan. Commander construction troops staff and organization geared for the smaller job and has not yet expanded to meet enlarged program. Certain directives your Hq. (Cinpoa Adv O62209), (Cinpoa Pearl 171418, Cinpoa Pearl 210305 all May) in some instances subject to misinterpretation by local operators caused initial delay. I have interceded (intervened) assuming full responsibility for interpretations. Additional corrective action has been initiated which should remedy faults and permit development to proceed in a manner calculated to meet your desires, that is CIN has requested staff augmentation through his canals and Army has additional personnel already enroute. Am convinced any change at this time in senior officers charged with responsibility for base development while possibly improving the overall projects will operate further to delay fighter field completion dates. This situation is so important as pertains to vital future plans that should you elect to prefer a change am prepared to make available my Engineer Brig Gen Nold an officer of valuable experience in whom I have utmost confidence, or I shall be happy to accept any officer or officers of your selection whom you consider better qualified then the present incumbents. Amplifying ltr follows.
Your 290900. Consider LEGUMINOUS development can be accomplished without taking FRICITION and further believe that FRICITION will soon be interdicted to enemy by OKINAWA air. FRICITION would not be worth the effort if only its contribution to LEGUMINOUS development were concerned. However its importance to OLYMPIC appears great. Continuous CAP over naval assault forces will be an essential to success and concurrent widespread blanketting of enemy airfields will be a vital factor in restricting and reducing enemy air offensive. Distance (and weather at times) prohibits continuous use of OKINAWA FIGHTERS for either of above tasks thereby forcing sole dependence on carrier aircraft for the job until shore based air is effectively established in DIABOLIC unless some nearby shore based air support is available. In view of the foregoing I consider taking FRICITION vitally important to the success of OLYMPIC.

Para. By midsummer enemy air potential should be so reduced that the diversion of effort incident to Phase 3D and the resulting FRICITION combat losses should be a reasonable price to pay for the saving in OLYMPIC life shipping and material resulting from availability of FRICITION air support.

Para. I recommend executing Phase 3D as planned. Development to be limited to installations needed for maximum fighter air effort with temporary construction wherever practicable but speed of development and plenty of SeaBees emphasized.

29 2258 CINCPAC ADV TO COMGEN TEN (NIMITZ TO BUCKNER ONLY)

Your 291012 will make no changes unless you so recommend. If additional officers are desired please inform me by dispatch. It is of utmost importance that nothing except urgent tactical requirements be permitted to delay the establishment of air forces.

30 1445 CTF 31 to CINCPAC ADV.

Principal advantages FRICITION Operation are as outlined your 290900 plus desirability keeping enemy off balance by constant attack and also providing opportunity for inflicting further serious air losses which are probably becoming irreplaceable. Following principal disadvantages:

A. Lack of suitable harbors or beaches together with advent of typhoon season will render unloading slow and uncertain thereby retarding base development.

B. Experience OKINAWA indicates that own damage particularly in light vessels will be appreciable and may seriously restrict availability full strength for OLYMPIC.

C. Proximity of FRICITION to DIABOLIC renders it specially susceptible to air attack and hit and run surface raids. For its protection naval covering force will be required until activation of OLYMPIC.

D. Proposed schedule coupled with prospects another month fighting at OKINAWA will preclude much needed upkeep and relaxation for many of smaller craft causing resultant in efficiency.

E. FRICITION has no permanent value.

Para. By studies of FRICITION lead me to believe that also suitable landing beaches are non-existent, it can be taken without too much difficulty. However consider advantages gained as outlined above far outweigh disadvantages. In view prospective ability to maintain fighter CAP from LEGUMINOUS over any portion DIABOLIC for support of OLYMPIC, do not believe FRICITION is worth the possible losses and consequent effect on OLYMPIC. Recommend cancellation. Hill.
While realizing definite advantages during early stages of OLYMPIC of possession of an air base to northward of OKINAWA I believe OLYMPIC as a whole would be furthered more by elimination of Phase 3D ICEBERG. My reasons are as follows:

A. Poor beach conditions will delay development to such extent only barest essentials can be accomplished by OLYMPIC target date and in meantime FRICHTON will be a military liability on account its exposed position and required naval support.

B. Ships, construction and other service units involved can be used to better advantage in
1. Completing and stock piling MARIANAS bases
2. South and Southwest Pacific rollup
3. Accelerating OKINAWA development

I recommend Phase 3D be cancelled.

Well developed fighter bomber bases at FRICHTON prior to OLYMPIC would be worth considerable effort and cost if they could be activated in time and without unduly weakening forces required for OLYMPIC. However, in view of present target dates for Phase 3D and OLYMPIC, combined with losses and damage to fleet units already received and probable additional losses prior OLYMPIC, consider probable value of FRICHTON is offset by following:

A. FRICHTON will be a difficult campaign, poor beaches, rough terrain and stubborn enemy resistance may retard early activation of FRICHTON airfields. Target date and development period now scheduled occur during time of year when most unfavorable weather is to be expected. Lack of shelter at target and at OKINAWA during the adverse weather may well cause unacceptable operational losses and prolong operations unduly. Enemy air attacks on our forces will probably be severe. It is doubtful that FRICHTON can be completed in time to be of much value to OLYMPIC without great cost in men and ships.

B. Forces required for Phase 3D could well be employed to expedite development OKINAWA area and in direct reduction of enemy air strength, productive capacity and shipping, the time factor in continued attrition of the enemy is important if OLYMPIC is to be successful and enemy attrition must be kept greater than our own attrition.

C. Many of the ships to be employed in Phase 3D have already approached limits of endurance of machinery. Unless an interum period with adequate upkeep and preparation is available it is considered doubtful whether we can develop full strength for OLYMPIC even if future losses can be reduced.

It is therefore recommended that Phase 3D be omitted unless OLYMPIC is to be postponed. In the latter case, it might be possible to execute Phase 3D in October.

Nominate TG 38.4. Your 290359. This group contains largest number heavy ships which will best test facilities and allow ConGrdFt and CTF 38 to inspect. This early selection requires element of crystal gazing as later tactical developments may require change.
01 0112 COM5THFLT TO CINCPAC ADV.

Your 290900. Believe value of position in question will not be commensurate with its cost for occupation and development. Recommend operation be cancelled.

31 2100 CNO TO CINCPOA ADV. (FOR FLEET ADMIRAL NIMITZ)

Colonel Wm P Fisher AC USA will arrive GUAM about Sunday 3 June bearing Cominch and CNO top secret serial 00040305 dated 29 May. It is considered appropriate that you discuss contents thereof and previous information on subject with Lieut. Gen. Giles and Maj Gen. Lamy to facilitate arrangements for initial delivery of weapon.

01 0223 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV INFO CTF 38 (HALSEY TO NIMITZ)

Your 290859 not to info adee. For planning purposes when may I expect British carrier task force to be ready to sortie from advance base for offensive operations.

01 1201 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCAPAC,COM5THFLT,COM3RDFLT,COMMHISPAC,COM5TH-HIBFOR

Para 1. The purpose of the capture of FRICITION (Phase 3D ICEBERG) is to establish fighter bombers in a position intermediate between LEGUMINOUS and DIABOLIC which would facilitate defense and development of LEGUMINOUS and improve air support in OLYMPIC. It would also maintain pressure and tempo of combat.

Para 2. However, it has become increasingly apparent that the beaches and terrain are unfavorable to expeditious capture and development and that with an OLYMPIC target date of 1 Nov, it will not be possible to activate sufficient air forces in FRICITION in time to justify the cost in combat and logistic effort.

Para 3. The CINCAPAC-CINCPAC staff planning conferences now in progress at GUAM have made it clear that the resources involved will be more productively employed if concentrated in early development of OKINAWA. The shortage of both personnel and cargo lift is an important factor. Of greater importance is freeing the carrier task forces for offensive strikes at the sources of the suicide attacks which as long as they continue will be a serious military threat to the success of OLYMPIC.

Para 4. My 290900 Halsey's 301337 Spruance's 010112 Turner's 310455 Hill's 301445 and Towers' 312010 passed separately for information of Cominch only.

Para 5. I am deferring ICEBERG Phase 3D indefinitely and propose until OLYMPIC to concentrate available logistic resources on full development of OKINAWA and devote fleet effort to offensive naval operations.

01 1351 CINCPOA ADV TO COMINCH.

MyDis 011201. CINCAPAC has also concurred in indefinite deferment of Phase 3D ICEBERG.
01 2204 CONRDFLT TO CTF 31 INFO CINCPAC ADV. (HALSEY TO HILL INFO NIMITZ)

I view with concern any possibility of failure to take IHEYA at this time. Weather protection and Task Force 38 operations will never be better.

01 2306 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO NIMITZ, MACARTHUR.

WARX 10463. Annex "D" to the Appendix to JCS 742/6 is the reference. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces has proposed (to which the JCS have agreed) the transfer of the Headquarters, 20th AF, now operating in Washington to the Pacific as of 1 July 1945, and its establishment initially in GUAM. The 20th AF will simultaneously be redesignated the United States Army Strategic Air Force (USASTAF) and will be commanded by General Carl Spaatz. Also on 1 July the XX Bomber Command, scheduled for deployment in the PHILIPPINES will be redesignated the 8th AF and the XXI Bomber Command, now operating in the MARQUAS, will be redesignated the 20th Air Force.

Para. This arrangement will enable the Gen. USASTAF to present to CINCPAC and CINCPAC his requirements so that adjustments necessary to meet changing conditions will whenever possible be made in the Pacific.

Para. Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise demanding such action, ComGenUSASTAF upon request will make available for utilization by CINCPAC or CINCPAC USASTAF aircraft which are based within their respective areas for purposes other than their primary strategic mission, immediately informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, of the action taken. Should there be any conflict in requests for such emergency use the issue will be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Para. All commitments, agreements and directives relating to the 20th Air Force will be applicable to USASTAF.

Para. Your comment is requested.

02 1202 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC.

The organization agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as noted in the 1st paragraph of WARX 10463 (JCS 012306) is concurred in. The location of the Headquarters of the Army Strategic Air Force at GUAM will facilitate the prosecution of the war against JAPAN.

02 1203 CINCPAC ADV TO 5THFLT (BY HAND)

Com3rdFlt 020411. Request your early comment.

02 0411 CONRDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV-PASSED TO 5THFLT. (HALSEY TO NIMITZ)

If 5th Flt commands OLYMPIC EAST CHINA SEA carrier operations I feel that areas to be swept in EAST CHINA SEA should be prescribed by CINCPAC. In order to ensure timely preparation and initiation of any major sweeping project you may approve I intend to issue my dispatch OpPlan 5-45 about 4 June directing completion passage through north half of Z by 5 July and completion by 10 October of an operating area (and approaches thereto) in EAST CHINA SEA totalling about 26,000 square miles of exploration and an estimated 15,000 square miles of sweeping.

- Continued -
CX 17638. Reference your WX 10463 1st. I assume that the only changes in the existing and previously proposed air command structure in the Pacific are:

1. That the actual command of the VLR bomber organization is transferred from CGAAF to General Spaatz with the headquarters at Guam.
2. The 20th and 21st Bomber Commands are redesignated the 20th Air Force and the 8th Air Force respectively and these 2 air forces are combined into the Strategic Air Force.
3. That except for the fighter units now set up to support the Strategic Air Force all other air units to be redeployed from the ETO and the LTO will in general be assigned to FEAF.

Para. Airdrome space now built and possible of construction this year will accommodate the 20th Air Force on the MARIANAS HONSHU Axis. In the RYUKYUS there can be based the B-29 groups as presently scheduled for this year with their supporting fighters plus the FEAF and naval land based air units for the defense of the base and search missions for the U.S. Fleet. Any further deployment must await the acquisition of airdromes in JAPAN itself.

Para. Conditions here are radically different from those in EUROPE. We are limited to the employment of much smaller numbers of planes. We have extremely limited areas in which to deploy them. We have a serious shortage of engineer troops for the preparation of airdromes. And we have projected a time schedule that requires most intimate coordination in the establishment of priorities and in the employment of means. Our objective is geographically small and our targets comprise only a small fraction of the area. Under the proposed set up we would have working from restricted areas against concentrated targets the Far East Air Force, the Strategic Air Force, Navy land based air forces and carrier based air forces. It is my firm conviction that coordination of these efforts will be extremely difficult unless the land based air forces are set up to operate under the general coordinating control of a single commander.

Para. The supply and logistics problems involved are extremely difficult of solution under either the existing or proposed arrangement. I believe that there is grave danger that air operations will not only be prejudiced but such confusion may result that at some critical stage of an operation its very success will be endangered unless the supply and logistic organization for the Army Air Forces in the Pacific be placed under a single control.

Signed MacArthur.
Para. I offer for your consideration my own opinion that this project will entail effort and losses probably not justified if OKINAWA shore based air can cover CHINA and KOREA targets which would be normally taken under carrier attack. KYUSHU targets can be effectively struck from deep water South and Southeast of KYUSHU.

03 1206 CINCPOA ADV TO 3RDFLT INFO COMGEN 10, INFO COMINCH.

NIMITZ TO HALSEY AND BUCKNER ONLY INFO KING. By 290859 to Halsey only. Desired movement of flight echelons MAG 14 to OKINAWA expedited. It is my present intention that Task Force 33 shall strike KYUSHU when last squadron MAG 14 is ready to operate at OKINAWA and then retire to LEXTE for 2 weeks at anchor.

04 0118 CINCPOA ADV TO MARCORPS INFO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO VANDEGRIFT INFO KING ONLY)

Since Mulcahey has been in combat under strenuous conditions for over 2 months I intend to return him to the Mainland for leave and assign Woods as his relief as Commander Tactical Air Force RYOKYUS. Request your concurrence. Woods can be released for other duty in July or August after Tactical Air Force is dissolved and Kenney takes over Army elements. If Mitchell's return is urgent suggest a more junior relief than Woods since Marine Air Wing 1 will be relatively inactive for some months.

04 0200 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPOA ADV.

Your 031203. In view deferment of LONGTOM and predicated on assumption that shorebased air will be able neutralize air bases in EAST CHINA and KOREA concur 3rdFlt 020411 that sweeping Northern EAST CHINA SEA areas neither profitable nor necessary at this time. Sufficient deep water exists for Amphibious Force approach to DIABOLIC from southwest and for fast carrier operations from south to southeast. In view of approaching typhoon season and to afford ample sea room to ships in OKINAWA vicinity in event of typhoon and because of value in connection with cover plans recommend entire area ZEBRA be swept earliest practicable and in addition area bounded by 24-04 N 124-09 E., 26-15 N 126-31 E., 27-33 N 126-01 E., 28-20 N 125-20 E, 27-00 N 123-50 E.
04 0719 COMGENAAFPOA TO CINCPOA ADV. (PERSONAL FROM GILES TO NIMITZ)

1. Reference your top secret operational priority radio 020034 June which defers Phase 3D ICEBERG indefinitely. It is desired to acquaint you with the imminence of the positioning of a very long range fighter group and its supporting unit.

2. The 414th Fighter Group and 555th Air Service Group were committed for this operation with west coast mounting point. The following is the movement status of these units:
   A. Ground echelon of 414th Fighter Group has a tentative loading date at Seattle of 6 June.
   B. 555th Air Service Group is in staging area at Fort Lawton preparing to load.
   C. 2 CVEs have been allocated, each to pick up 48 P-47N aircraft with flight detachment at Alameda, on 14 and 27 June respectively.

3. It is desired to position the above units on IWO JIMA for the purpose of augmenting the strike and escort capacity of the 3 very long range fighter groups now located at IWO JIMA. I believe the ultimate requirement for IWO based very long range fighter aircraft will be 5 groups and therefore the sudden availability of the 414th Fighter Group and its supporting service group is particularly acceptable to my augmentation plan for very long range IWO based fighter aircraft.

4. In view of the short time that exists before these units are to be loaded, recommend this matter be expedited so that instructions may be implemented my administrative headquarters with appropriate theater and mainland agencies.

05 0657 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH. (NIMITZ TO KING)

In view of the extent to which CINCPAC 040107 has implications which bear on the subject of paragraph 3 of JCS 261610 and departs from the principle of the British being logistically self supporting request your comments.

New subject. Will the British carrier force be available to me for attacks on Northern HONSHU-HOKKAIDO-SOUTHERN KURILES with 3rdFlt in July.

06 0629 COM3RDFLT TO CINCPAC ADV. (HALSEY TO NIMITZ)

Your 060820. TF 38 ready to strike KANCYA fields with 2 groups June 8th as per 060653. BENNINGTON operable but am detaching her to LETTE after strike for repairs to flight deck damaged by storm. HORNET has storm damage to flight deck but is operable and unless otherwise directed will be retained with TF 38 until normally due to return for overhaul.
All forces ready to execute assigned tasks despite damage which is being summed up for early despatch report.

06 0620 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT. (NIMITZ TO HALSEY)

Request immediate report of condition of readiness TF 38. Have received no report since your 051007.

06 1244 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT (HANDLE AS NIMITZ ONLY)

Your 060629 (To me only) approved. Unless otherwise directed by later dispatch withdraw TF 38 to LETTE after strike on KYUSHU Fields about 8 June.
07 0614 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH INFO CINCPOA PEARL (NIMITZ TO KING INFO TOWERS ONLY)

I consider it necessary to strengthen the organization of the naval shore facilities at OKINAWA by placing them in a single command. At present the air bases are planned to be under Commodore Dillon. The small so-called Operating Base under Commodore Kirtland and there are other smaller bases in prospect. Complex relationships with the Army are involved. Request authorization to consolidate all naval shore facilities at OKINAWA into a single Naval Operating Base. Recommend that R.Adm. Richard E. Byrd be ordered to command the Naval Operating Base OKINAWA with Commodore Kirtland as his deputy. As such he would report to Major General Wallace, the Island Commander, OKINAWA for local operational control and to me for administrative and general naval matters.

07 0615 CINCPAC ADV TO COM3RDFLT INFO CTF 38, CNO. (NIMITZ TO HALSLEY INFO KING AND MCCAIN)

Press releases from flagship TF 38 transmitted by IOWA indicate interview in which Captain Thach released information not reported to me and of a nature to give aid and comfort to the enemy. Direct CTF 38 make full report technical details concerned see CNO 062025. Take steps to prevent further release of such information by units in the combat area. Article by Ernie Hoberecht quoting Captain Thach as advocating use of poison gas against Japanese being censored here and forwarded to Cominch.

08 0221 CINCPAC TO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO KING ONLY)

At present Buckner as CTF 99 is responsible to me for the RYUKYUS forces Wallace as CTG 99.1 is Island Commander and Cobb as CTG 99.3 is afloat to command local naval forces RYUKYUS and will eventually function as a permanent administrative SOPA. See Annexes A and F my OpPlan 14-44.

Within the Island Command there are now 2 separate naval shore commands. The former Lion 8 now the Naval Operating Base under Kirtland and the Naval Air Bases under Dillon. Additionally contemplated are a small mine base and a motor torpedo boat base. Amphibious base facilities will be necessary also to support OLYMPIC. My proposal is to consolidate all naval shore facilities under 1 rear admiral with the title of Comdt Naval Operating Base OKINAWA and assign Kirtland as his deputy with no other duties. This would parallel action already taken at SAIPAN. The changes recommended are all internal to the Island Command OKINAWA and will not affect Cobb.

So long as we were organized for unity of command the establishment of several separate naval entities under an Atoll Commander or Island Commander conformed to an effective concept developed by experience in the Pacific. The change made at SAIPAN and recommended for OKINAWA ENIWETOK and KWAJALEIN is necessary to ensure effective functioning under the new concept of JCS 032140 of April which contemplates an eventual separation of the services.

08 0511 COM3RDFLT TO CTF 38 INFO CINCPAC ADV. (HALSLEY TO MCCAIN INFO NIMITZ)

CINCPAC 070815. Make required report. Apparently written background material prepared to cover Thach's interview was misinterpreted or Thach verbally went beyond written brief. Take immediate appropriate steps to prevent personnel your command from divulging to pressmen confidential information except as is proper for off the record background briefing. CINCPAC censors in IOWA will be separately instructed by originator.

08 0754 CINCPAC ADV TO COMINCH.

Concur ComSubPac 261245. (Re: 10 British subs to SoWesPac)
PERSONAL FROM ADMIRAL KING TO THE FIRST SEA LORD.

I have carefully reviewed the series of memoranda interchanged between the United States and British Chiefs of Staff relative to establishment of British intermediate base facilities at a point sufficiently far forward to be useful to support operations in the main theater against the Japanese. I have also reviewed the despatches which have been exchanged between Admiral Fraser and Admiral Nimitz on this subject. It is my opinion that the utilization of the materials provided by the British for the establishment of shore facilities in Western Pacific would contribute best to the overall needs in that theater if they were established in BRUNEI BAY. Such operations as are required by the British Pacific Fleet in areas to the north will be supported by fleet anchorages and shore facilities now established or being established by the United States Fleet and such operations as may be conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA in support of operations in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and MALAYA can best be supported from the base which I propose in BRUNEI BAY. Objection to the establishment of facilities at BRUNEI has been presented by the British Chiefs of Staff in that they would not become available until the end of the current calendar year and therefore at a time when SINGAPORE itself might be available. The same consideration would apply to the establishment of similar facilities in the PHILIPPINE Area even if sites therefor could be made available. It appears even more objectionable to crowd in additional facilities at MANUS which will be even farther away from the scene of operations on 1 January 1946 than is now the case. If in the light of the foregoing the British Chiefs of Staff do not desire to meet our wishes for the establishment of shore facilities to support a fleet anchorage at BRUNEI BAY I have no further suggestions to offer as to the employment of the resources involved.

09 2213 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO NIMITZ INFO MACARTHUR.

WARX 14514. In the indefinite deferral of Phase 3D ICEBERG reference your 011201 the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur.

10 0250 CINCPAC ADV TO COMSTHFLT INFO COMPHIBSAC. (NIMITZ TO SPRUANCE INFO TURNER)

ComPhibsSac 090225 requires clarification. Desire your command organization for OLYMPIC employ ComBatRon 1 (V.Adm. Oldendorf) in a suitable command capacity relative to BatRon 1 and other units of the gunfire and covering forces. BatRon 1 as whole will not be placed under the command of a Rear Admiral.

13 2255* CINCPAC ADV to COM3RDFLT INFO COMINCH (NIMITZ TO HALSEY INFO KING)

Request your comment on proposal that CruDiv 17 plus 1 DesRon leave LETTE as soon as practicable refuel at KERAMA RETTO proceed at high speed to vicinity WENCHOW during 1 or 2 daylight sweep WENCHOW BAY CHINA Coast north toward HANGCHOW BAY with air cover as practicable from OKINAWA then return via OKINAWA to SAIPAN for replenishment and rejoin TF 38 at sea enroute July operation. Purposes would include destruction small craft being used by enemy for coastal transportation, cover and deception, diversion and disruption of enemy plans and keeping up the pressure.
Again referring to your WARX 15054 and supplementing my 3811 DTG 130140 I discussed in detail with Nimitz the proposed plan of moving the Twentieth Air Force Headquarters to GUAM and activating the Eighth Air Force in the RYUKYUS. I also explained to him the necessity of setting up a Strategic Air Force Headquarters to control and operate these two air forces. Further that I propose to set up a Strategic Air Force Headquarters on GUAM with Spaatz commanding. To all of this Nimitz fully concurred, stating that he had given his concurrence to this plan as proposed in JCS message and that he had not changed his mind. In accordance with above headquarters 20th AF should be moved to GUAM and redesignated Headquarters USASTAF on one August 1945 and on same date Headquarters XXI BomCom be elevated to AF status and designated 20th AF. Likewise, on 1 August 1945 hqtrrs XX BomCom be redesignated Hqtrs 8th AF.

New subject: I discussed with Nimitz the subject of inactivating AAFPOA Hqtrs. Nimitz stated that in his opinion there should be some kind of an organization set up to control and operate the small static group of Army Air Forces airplanes that would remain in HAWAII and the MARIANAS and other islands under his control primarily for defensive purposes. It is therefore recommended that AAFPOA be continued on a greatly reduced scale for the operation of Army Air Forces units which are assigned to Nimitz. Further, that the commander of AAFPOA be named by the ComGen USASTAF and that the ComGen USASTAF outline the policies and directives and operations functions for AAFPOA in conference with Nimitz.

General Arnold conferred with me at length on 14 June with Giles, McMorris and Sherman present.

He discussed last the establishment of the Army Strategic Air Force. I confirmed the concurrence of my 021202 in the organization already agreed to by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as announced by JCS 012306. He then discussed in general terms a list of 12 items that Spaatz has requested to be included in his directive. I commented informally. Today I have been shown an exact statement of these items and have addressed to General Arnold a formal memorandum giving my formal comment. Copy airmailed to you.

I could not agree to 2 items namely "That USASTAF have organically assign to it and under its control all the means required for the defense of airdrome and USASTAF "Have command of the base areas I.E. command of the islands or other areas on which USASTAF units are the predominant force".

He told me that British have only 1 Lancaster ready and proposed that "nothing definite be done for the present".

He read me a dispatch from Marshall informing him that you were now proposing a change from JCS 012306 and expressed strongly his opinion that he should organize his air forces without interference by the Navy. Being uninformed as to this development I made no comment. I did inform him that I continued to believe in unity of command within each area.

During our conference and later by telephone he discussed a proposal that MacArthur establish temporary headquarters here at GUAM prior to OLYMPIC. I told him that while I did not consider it necessary I had no objections, that I had repeatedly invited MacArthur to visit my headquarters and that he had never accepted, that on 1 occasion Col. Knox and I offered to come to his and

- Continued -
he discouraged it, that I had been to MacArthur's headquarters on 3 occasions and that I doubted MacArthur's willingness to come to Guam. What the implications of Arnold's proposals about MacArthur's headquarters are I do not know.

It is logistically infeasible to create extensive additional command facilities for Spaatz or MacArthur at any early date. Spaatz will have to take Giles and Giles take Lemay's. I could care for MacArthur only on the same basis of "double up and share" as is now used for Spruance.

Subject to your approval TF 38 will sortie 1 July launching 1st attack northern area about 10 July. Will you wish to see me at Guam during this in port period.

WARX 15811. Recent changes in enemy dispositions in East China indicate trend of withdrawal to the north and evacuation of certain coastal positions. While it is unlikely that the Japanese will withdraw from positions suitable for our use in direct support of the invasion of Japan, under suitable circumstances it may be possible without detraction from the main effort to exploit such withdrawal to accomplish: diversion and deception, increased effectiveness of blockade, and possibly the eventual establishment of a limited supply line to support Chinese forces. It may be that the support of the campaign in Japan will absorb all available resources, particularly shipping, thus making it impossible to provide major tonnages to aid Chinese forces prior to the completion of planned invasion operations. However, the changing situation in China requires continuing review and reconnaissance with a view to capitalizing at small cost on Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals. Your views and recommendations are desired from time to time as the situation develops.

CINCPAC considers the action indicated in COMAFSWPA 101750 will stop further attacks on ships by SWPA aircraft. Desire CTG 38.3 now withdraw his threat to shoot down our Army aircraft.

With the initiation of submarine operations in the Sea of Japan it is possible that 1 or more submarines may be so damaged as to have to return to the surface. Request any information you can obtain as to Russian action in case a damaged submarine

(A) Requests voyage repairs at Vladivostok or Sovetskaya Gavan (Soviet Harbor)
(B) Requests pilotage through Tartary Strait.

Is there any preference between Vladivostok Soviet Harbor or possible Castries Bay as a point at which to apply for repairs to make a submarine seaworthy or for internment.

I wish to brief submarine commanders as to action to take in case they are too severely damaged to exit through Korea Strait or La Perouse Strait.
Your 130355. Question as to probable Russian reaction and attitude has
been referred to MOSCOW. Pending receipt of guidance from MOSCOW it is con-
sidered that SOVETSKAYA GAMAN should be preferred to VLADIVOSTOCK.

14 2397 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF TO MACARTHUR, NIMITZ INFO ARNOLD.

Book message to Macarthur and Nimitz for action, to Arnold for informa-
tion. WARX 17064. Further to WARX 37938 dated 25 May 1945. Although there
is at present no evidence that sudden collapse or surrender of JAPAN is likely
the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that plans be made to take immediate advant-
age of favorable circumstances, such as a sudden collapse or surrender, to
effect an entry into JAPAN proper for occupational purposes.

14 2330 COMAF 20 to DEPGMAF 20 (TO CHIEFS FOR ARNOLD FROM ANDERSON).
Note: Not in CINCPAC Communication files.

Telecon 155.
President has indicated desire to meet with Joint Chiefs of Staff
afternoon 18 June to discuss details of Campaign against JAPAN. He ex-
pects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and pros-
spects. Information requested by him is:
Number of Army personnel and Navy vessels necessary to defeat JAPAN.
Estimate of time required and casualties resulting from invasion of JAPAN proper.
Estimate of time required and casualties resulting from effort to de-
feat JAPAN by isolation, blockade and bombardment.
Useful contribution, if any that can be made by other United Nations.
President intends to make decisions on campaign with purpose of econo-
mizing to maximum extent possible in loss of American lives. Economy in
time and money is comparatively unimportant.
Joint Staff Planners have been directed to submit draft of suitable
memorandum that can be submitted by Joint Chiefs to President at meeting.

COMGENAIR (ARNOLD) TO WARCOS FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (Not in Comm. files)
16 June 1945

3974. Paren for Marshall for JCS from Arnold at Iwo Jima paren. Major
General Curtis Lemay and his intelligence officer Colonel Garcia have pre-
pared able factual and dramatic presentation of the effectiveness of strategic
air to date upon the war making capacity of JAPAN. They have also a reasonable
projection of the further results to be reasonably expected from our continued
air offensive against JAPAN. The expected results of the air offensive
against GERMANY can now be specifically compared with the actual damage to
German systems of objectives thru the data in the hands of the Dolier Group.
Item am of the opinion that the JCS will find it most helpful for these pre-
sentations be presented to the President.

CONGENAIR (ARNOLD) TO WARCOS (PERSONAL FOR MARSHALL FROM ARNOLD AT IWO JIMA)
16 June 1945

Eaker personally with Lemay should represent me at the conference to
present the President with factual data available in the Marianas. Lemay is
enroute to Washington now and in view of his intimate knowledge of the local
situation he should personally present the picture of 20th AF capabilities. It
is of utmost importance that USASTAF Hqtrs be established at once and that
full support by everyone be given to that Headquarters for administrative,
operations, supply and top priorities in shipping. Even though the President
indicated that economy of time is comparatively unimportant, I am convinced

- Continued -
COMING AIR TO MARES (PERSONAL FOR MARSHALL FROM ARNOLD) (CONT'D)

16 June 1945

that with energetic and enthusiastic support of the Strategic Air Force, we may expect an early date conditions favorable for the invasion of JAPAN. I have sent this date through you to the JCS as self explanatory a request for consideration of special information on the air offensive against JAPAN whereas I had intended to bring this material back with me. The President's call for a June 18 conference makes my intention timely. Your serious consideration of the data to be presented by the air staff and by General Lemay is earnestly requested.

21 0105 COMFRDLT TO CINCPAC ADV. (HALSEY TO NIMITZ)

Will shortly be prepared to present details of proposed operations for your consideration. If agreeable to you I should like to visit you on Sunday 24 June with Chief of Staff and 3 others returning LEYTE the following day. If approved request you send plane.

22 0845 CINCBB to CINCPAC ADV. (PERSONAL & PRIVATE FROM FRASER TO NIMITZ)

I do not think I can effectively support the British Fleet later in the year unless I can now get on with the facilities asked for at MANUS and the use of Eagle Farm BRISBANE.

From the examinations we have made I do not believe that we should in any way be hampering the American war effort by using these places and I am now in the position of endeavoring to carry out your operational requirements whilst at the same time I do not seem to get the necessary support in my logistic arrangements.

I cannot see what action to take next and would be grateful for your advice and assistance as my operational Commander in Chief.

(JULY) 03 0235 CINCBB to CINCPAC ADV. (PERSONAL FOR ADMIRAL NIMITZ FROM ADMIRAL FRASER)

Changes in availability of ships necessitates my postponing my visit in DUKE OF YORK until about the beginning of August.

I should still like to do this in order to see you and present your decoration on board.

If you desire to see me earlier I can always fly at any time you wish but the postponement might be advantageous until after the forthcoming conferences in EUROPE. Perhaps I could have your views and I will do anything you desire.

03 1300 COMINTCH & CNO TO CINCPAC ADV. (ADMIRAL KING TO ADMIRAL NIMITZ)

Your comment is requested on the following aide memoire from Admiral Somerville to me:

"Item 1. In Admiral King's personal message 092000 addressed to the First Sea Lord he states "such operations as are required by the BP" in areas to the north will be supported by fleet anchorages and shore facilities now established or being established by the US Fleet". The First Sea Lord will be glad to be informed of the bases to which Admiral King refers.

"Item 2. Will it be possible for the BP" to use store houses at the bases referred to in 1. Alternatively can we extend existing resources at these bases with our own construction personnel. (Note: 3000 are available in AUSTRALIA or on passage to AUSTRALIA who could build storehouses, piers, roads, etc. They are not equipped to construct airfields but can repair and maintain airstrips)."