

MAY 9, 1973 REVISION 5 PARTIAL REVISION

# LAUNCH MISSION RULES INPUT DOCUMENT

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SPACE

FLIGHT

CENTER



MSFC - Form 454-1 (Rev October 1967)

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

REV		ang alata faith of the second seco		CHANGE LOG		•
	CONTROL NUMBER	KSC ITEM	PAGES	DESCRIPTION	REMARKS	LETTER TO KSC
	WP-029	3-2722	I-100A	AM Thermal Control System Primary System Pressure	Added new rule and background data.	MO-MGR (73-10) 3/29/73
	•		I-101	AM Figure 1	Revise AM Figure 1.	MO-MGR (73-10) 3/29/73
6-73			I-102	AM Figure 2	Revise AM Figure 2	MO-MGR (7.3-10) 3-29-73
4 3-2	SP-001	3-8000	1-110	Workshop GSE/ESE GN <sub>2</sub> to ATM Canister	Approved rule moved from Section II.	N/A
REVISION	EP-002 2-907		II-21 II-21.1	Azimuth Laying Theodolite Laying System	Pages deleted.	n/A
<u>т</u>	SP-001	3-8000	II <b>-1</b> 10	Workshop GSE/ESE GN <sub>2</sub> to ATM Canister	Pages deleted.	N/A
	1P-003	3-404	I-3.1	SV Upper Air Winds	Update upper air wind curve for May and June Launch	N/A
C1=6	EP-007	2 <b>-</b> 927A	I-23A	Nose Cone Temperature	Revise upper limit and add alternate measurement	TBS
6-C C NO.	OP-024	P-024 3-218A I-51A OWS AM Ground Power ON I-51A.1 I-51A.2 I-51A.3		OWS AM Ground Power ON	Pages Deleted (see page III - 20)	N/A
NOTETATY	OP-009	3-219 thru 3-222	I <b>-</b> 52	OWS Power Bus 1 & 2	Update Background Data	N/A
ISSK		N CHANGE LOG	STA	GE/SUBSECTION SYST	EM DATE/CHANGE NO MAY 9,1973	P.GE. R5 x1

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# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULES

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# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULES

REV				CHANGE LOG	}			
	CONTROL NUMBER	KSC ITEM	PAGES	DESCRIPTION		REMARKS		LETTER TO KSC
	OP-003 3-400 I-57 I-57.2 I-57.3 I-57.4 I-57.5 I-57.6		I-57.2 I-57.3 I-57.4 I-57.5	OWS Stored Film	>	Revise Redline Maximum and M Notes. Update Background Da		Magnafaxed 5-7-73 <i>SL-EI</i>
	OP-021	3-401	I-58 I-58.3 I-58.4 I-58.5 I-58.6	OWS Refrigeration Primary Circuits		Revise Redline Maximum and M Notes. UP PAte BACKgRound	linimum and pata.	Magnafaxed 5-7-73 SL-EL
	OP-002 3-402 I-59		I <b>-</b> 59	OWS Refrigeration Primary		Change Redline Maximum and M	linimum <i>Limits</i>	Magnafaxed 5-7-73 <i>SL-EI</i>
	WP-014	3 <b>-</b> 2155	I-78.1	AM I&C Coax Switch Position	n .	Update Background Data		N/A
	WP-003	3-2201 thru 3-2208	I-82.1 I-82.2	AM Battery		Update Background Data		N/A
	WP-016	3-2253 thru 3-2268	I-86 I-86.1 I-86.2 I-86.3	AM Battery Power		Revise Redline Maximum and M Update Background Data.	linimum.	LDX SA-E1 5-8-73
	WP-004	3-2706	I-94 I-94.1 I-94.2 I-94.3	Am Mole Sieve		Revise Redline Notes. Update Data.		LDX SL- <b>EL</b> 5-8-73
MISSI SA -5		ON CHANGE LOG	ST	AGE/SUBSECTION	SYSTE	M	DATE/CHANGE NO MAY 9, 1973 R	
MSFC	Form 3173-7	ber 1968)				an an e-subber - Altanapatri al-Altanapatri - an e-subber and a subber al-		

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REV				CHANGE LOG		an a	·
	CONTROL NUMBER	. KSC ITEM	PAGES	DESCRIPTION	REM	ARKS	LETTER TO KSC
	WP-024	3-27.09 3-2709A	I-95 I-95.1 I-95.2	AM Thermal Capacitor	Add Redline Rule for Revise Notes. Updat		LDX <i>to SL-EI</i> 5-8-73
	WP-022	3-2711A	I-96 I-96.1 I-96.2 I-96.3	AM Primary and Secondary Cooland Control	Add Redline Rule for Revise Notes. Updat		LDX to SA <b>-FI</b> 5-8-73
5-9-73	WP-023	3-2712 3-2712A	I-97 I-97.1 I-97.2 I-97.3 I-97.4 I-97.5	AM Primary and Secondary Coolant Control Valves	Add Redline Rule for Revise Notes. Update		LDX <i>40 SL-E<b>I</b></i> 5 <b>-</b> 8-73
REVISION 5	WP-008	3-2715 3-2716	1-98.1	AM Thermal Control System Primary and Secondary Coolan Pumps	Update Background Da	ta	LDX to \$-E <b>I</b> 5-8-73
REV	WP-009	3-2717A	I-99 I-99.1 I-99.2 I-99.3	AM Primary and Secondary Loo Pump Pressure Differential	p Add Redline Rule for Revise Notes. Update		LDX +0 \$-EL 5-8-73
	WP-028	3-2720	I-100 I-100.1 I-100.2 I-100.3 I-100.4	AM Primary and Secondary Loo Bypass Monitor.	p Add Redline Rule for Revise Notes. Updat		LDX to SL-EI 5-8-73
MISS	1	ECTION	ST	AGE/SUBSECTION S	YSTEM	DATE/CHANGE NO	8
Contractor over	513/SL-	CHANGE LOG		n terminen ander ander son ander son af met son af met son af the son at the son at the son at the son at the s		May 9, 1973	R5 xii:
MSFC	- Form 3173-7	(October 1968)					

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULES

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REV					CHANGE LOG	3		
	CONTRO NUMBER		KSC ITEM	PAGES	DESCRIPTION		REMARKS	LETTER TO KSC
				I-104	AM Figure 4	1	Revise AM Figure 4	Trans- mitted to SL-EI 4-17-73
	RP-011	L	3-6101A 3-6101B 3-6101C	I-108A I-108A.1 I-108A.2 I-108A.3			Add New Rule and Background Data.	Trans- mitted to SL-EI 4-5-73
5-9-73					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
REVISION 5	•			đ.,			W <u>A Clarko</u> W. G. Clarke Manager, Operations Engineering Office	
	*****							
MISSI	ON 5 13/SL-1	SECTION	CHANGE LOG		AGE/SUBSECTION	SYSTE	M DATE/CHANGE NO MAY 9, 1973 R.	PAGE 5 xiv
	Form 3173-7		1968)	a an is a subscription			<b>IMI</b> 7, 1773 <b>M</b>	


•								
F	FORM A		MSFC LAUNCH MICON RULE INP	UT				
REV	ITEM		SPACE VEHICLE UPPER AIR WIND RESTR	ICTIONS				
	1-404 PRELAUNCH SIMULATIONS OF THE SPACE VEHICLE RESPONSE TO UPPER AIR WINDS AT TIME OF LAUNCH WILL BE PERFORMED AT MSFC BY AN MSFC/NSC WIND MONITORING TEAM USING WIND DATA PROVIDED BY KSC. A C-BAND RADAR WILL BE UTILIZED TO TRACK JINSPHERE BALLOONS RELEASED FROM THE LAUNCH AREA TO OBTAIN UPPER AIR WIND DATA FROM L-48 HOURS TO T+10 MINUTES ON A SCHEDULE AGREED TO BY KSC, MSFC, AND MSC. RESULTS OF THE WIND SIMULATIONS WILL BE TRANSMITTED VIA DATAFAX TO THE LAUNCH OPERATIONS MANAGER (OR TEST SUPERVISOR IN HIS ABSENCE) AT THE LAUNCH CONTROL CENTER. REPORTS WILL BE AVAILABLE AND PROVIDED AS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE STARTING AT L-24 HOURS WITH A GO/NO-GO RECOMMENDATION TRANSMITTED PRIOR TO START OF CRYGENIC LOADING. IF THE WIND SIMULATIONS INDICATE THAT WIND CONDITIONS ARE MARGINAL FOR LAUNCH, THE WIND MONITORING TEAM WILL REPORT THAT "LAUNCH WINDS ARE MARGINAL FOR LAUNCH, THE WIND MONITORING TEAM WILL REPORT STATES ACCUNTINEENCY PLAN INTO EFFECT WHICH WILL PROVIDE FOR A NEW JIMSPHERE RELEASE EACH HOUR. THE CONTINGENCY PLAN WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL LIFTOFF HAS OCCURRED, THE LAUNCH OF FLASE LACH HOUR. THE CONTINGENCY PLAN WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL LIFTOFF HAS OCCURRED, THE LAUNCH SCRUBBED, OR A SUBSEQUENT REPORT STATES THAT "LAUNCH WINDS ARE NO LONGER MARGINAL FOR LAUNCH." THE WIND MONITORING TEAM WILL PROVIDE A REPORT TO THE LAUNCH OPERATIONS MANAGER FOR EACH JIMSPHERE RELEASE UNDER THE CONTINGENCY PLAN. THE UPPER AIR WIND CHART ON PAGE I-3.1 PROVIDES GENERAL GUIDANCE AS TO WHEN SIMULATIONS ARE REQUIRED. VEHICLE LIMITS ARE NOT EXPLICITLY REFLECTED.							
MISS	ION:	SECTION:	STAGE/SUBSECTION:	SYSTEM:				
SA	-513/SL-	-1 SPACE VEHICLE	WEATHER RESTRICTIONS		4			
programs to deter Tracking of the J provide the wind possible if marging Go/No-Go recomment pft 4/16/13		to determine the effect of the w of the Jimsphere by the real tim he wind monitoring team at MSFC if marginal conditions will or w recommendation to the Launch Ope	e C-Band radar is required to with data to determine as early as ill not exist at launch and make a rations Manager.	REQUIRED BY: CONTROL NUMBER: 51 PAGE .1	AERO 3-1P-003 REVISION REV 5			
		SL-EI PROG. ENG. OFFI	CE: SAT-E MO-MGR: ROB 4-16-73 hure 4/16/73	DATE: MAY 9 1973	PAGE: I-3			

MSFC - Form 3173 (Rev June 1970)

FORM C

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:



NOTE :

- CONTROL SYSTEM FROM MSFC MEMO S&E-ASTR-SD-93-71, DATED 3 SEPTEMBER 1971.
- AERODYNAMICS FROM MSFC MEMO S&E-AERO-71-1, DATED 6 JANUARY 1971.
- TRAJECTORY DATA FROM BOEING MEMO 5-9410-H-433, DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1972.
- $\alpha$ - $\beta$  LIMITS FROM MSFC MEMO S&E-ASTN-ADL (72-41) DATED 12 APRIL 1972.

SKYLAB WIND BIASED WIND SPEED LIMITS AT 12 KILOMETERS ALTITUDE

•	FOR	мв	MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPUT							
DEV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIO	M		CATEGORY		and the second	VALUES	
REV	IICM	MEAS/ IM NO.	DESORIFTIO	FLT CONT	FLT CONT ENG DATA PRE-LAUNCH		H MINIMUM MAXIMUM		TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES	
	2 <b>-</b> 927A	12K20	TEMP NOSE CONE INDICATION	COMPARTMENT		-		60 <sup>0</sup> F	76 <sup>0</sup> F	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL T-24 HOURS
				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			-	_ 65 <sup>0</sup> F	80 <sup>0</sup> F	FROM T-24 HOURS UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTO SEQUENCE
		12K24 (ALTERNATE)	TEMP, NOSECONE COM INDICATION	PARTMENT		-		-		
								с. 		•
					*					
MISS	ON:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECTI	ON:		SY	STEM:	d.	
SA-5	513/SL <b>-</b> 1	LA	UNCH VEHICLE	FAC	ILITY GS	E		R	EDLINES AND	CATEGORIES
and exce	MARKS: Nose cone purge is required to maintain nose cone enclosure cleanliness REQUIRED BY: ad ambient temperature, and provide inerting. Loss of purge could result in ccessive temperatures in PS volume, as well as hazardous gas buildup. At T-24 burs, purge temperature is increased from 63+5°F to 75+5°F to obtain acceptable									
laur	ich tempe	ratures for	the ATM rack electri	cal/mechanic	al equip	ment. ATM	M tele-	CONTROL NUM	IBER:	
metr temp	y data 1 eratures	s not availa must be ass	ble to monitor tempe ured. Loss of the pu	ratures; the rge after T-	refore,t 24 hours	could re	r purge esult in	51	.3-EP-007-R	5
			ch temperatures and			roblems i	in orbit	P	AGE	REVISION
AERO	r to act	ASTR:	he ATM systems, i.e. ASTN: JRL 5/	$\frac{1}{8/13}$	etc.	an a balancina a contra de la conserva a page		.1, .2		REV 4
ATM	eRel 3.12	.73	V							
			SAT-E	PROG DEELO	E: (EI) 3/12/13	MO-MGR:	3-13-73	DATE: MAY	S 1973	PAGE: I-23A

MSFC - Form 3173-2 (Kev June 1970)

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#### FORM C

### MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

Volume enclosed by payload shroud is purged via a nose cone purge in two separate phases. First phase begins with the air purge at roll out from VAB. It is continuous, up to 30 minutes prior to cryogenic loading. At that time purge is switched over to N<sub>2</sub> at 50 lb/min with 1.54 psi umbilical pressure which is then continued till liftoff. Required compartment temperature range is  $75^{\circ} \pm 5^{\circ}$ F.

2. Probable Cause of (LMR) Violation

Facility GSE failure.

3. <u>Consequence of (LMR) Violation</u>

Skylab launch with cold rack temperatures and corresponding cold equipment problems in orbit prior to ATM systems activation.

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

N/A

5. Operational Tests

Facility air supply units (Nose Cone Purge GSE) are verified prior to hook-up.

6. <u>Reliability/Redundancy Considerations</u>

There are no secondary purges available. Reliability of the system is dependent upon proven, well tested, and checked out facility GSE.

7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Determination

Instrumentation Accuracy (Overall) is  $+ 1.3^{\circ}$  F.

8. Other Information

None





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# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPUT

	17511		DECODIDEION	1		CATEGORY		REDLINE	E VALUES	
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION	1	FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
			THIS PAGE INTENTIO		LANK		PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM		
MISS	ION:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECTI	ON:		SYS	STEM:		
						1970 Proc. And address of the survey				
REM/	ARKS:							REQUIRED BY		
							ł	P	AGE	REVISION
AERO		LAGTE	CONCURRENC	ES	r					112 13101
ALRO	ŧ.	ASTR:	ASTN:			CSE:	ŀ			
									_	
			PROG. ENG. OFFIC	E: PROG. OFFIC	E:	MO-MGR:		DATE:		PAGE: I-51A

- 6	FO	RM B		MSFC LA		and the second se		т	_	
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION		FLT CONT	CATEGORY ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH			TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-219	M7002-440	VOLTAGE - PDCS,OWS BU	S 1			1 of 2			WHILE BUSES ARE ENERGIZED EITHER BY GROUND OR IN- TERNAL POWER UNTIL INITIATION OF
		M7400-440 (ALT, UMB)	VOLTAGE - PDCS, OWS B	US 1			]	_25 VDC	30 VDC	AUTOMATIC SEQUENCE.
	<b>3-</b> 221	M7003 <b>-</b> 440	VOLTAGE - PDCS, OWS B	US 2	с. 1		l of 2 M	*	*	* OWS BUS 1 AND 2 VOLTAGE SHALL BE WITHIN ~1.8/+1.2 VDC
		M7401-440 (ALT, UMB)	VOLTAGE - PDCS, OWS B	US 2						OF THE RESPECTIVE AM REG. BUS.
	3-220	M7004-440	CURRENT - PDCS, OWS B	US 1		-	М	NONE	30 Amps	TRANSIENTS THAT OCCUR DURING LOAD SWITCHING AND
	3-222	M7002-440	CURRENT - PDCS, OWS B	US 2			М	NONE	22 AMPS	POWER TRANSFER ARE NOT CONSIDERED REDLINE VIOLATIONS
						•			. *	
MIS	SSION:	SECTION:	S	TAGE/SUBSECT	ION:		ISYS	TEM:		L
SA	A-513/SL-	-1 WO	RKSHOP	OWS/POWER CONTROL S		JTION ANI		REDLINES A	ND CATEGOR	RIES
REMARKS:       OWS Buses 1 and 2 are the main 28 VDC power buses for the OWS.         They receive power from AM Reg. Bus 1 and 2 and distribute power to most       MDAC-WEST         OWS electrical loads. Monitoring the OWS Bus voltage levels with respect       MDAC-WEST         to the AM Reg. Bus levels will insure that the buses are supplied with       ASTR         power at the required voltage level from the AM and that no excessive       CONTROL NUMBER:							C			
			n the AM/OWS power fee							-009-R5
150.0							]	Р	AGE	REVISION
AERO		AST R.	ASTN:					.1, .2, .	3, .4,	REV. 5
		sw Rwhi 4							.5	REV. 2
-		100110 1	PROG. ENG. OFFICE.	PROG. OFFI		MO-MGR:	-1-1-1-	ATE: MA	Y 9 1973	PAGE: 1-52

#### FORM C

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

1. System Description

OWS Buses 1 and 2 are the main 28 VDC power buses for the OWS. They receive power from Reg. Bus 1 and 2 in the AM and in turn distribute power to most other OWS electrical loads. Main power feeder from AM Reg. buses to OWS buses is divided in two groups, each containing nine parallel power paths. Each bus has twenty-seven conductors from the AM/OWS interface to the OWS Power Distribution Console, nine circuit breakers (one set of nine in OWS; other set of nine in AM), three relays with three power contacts each, and three interface connectors. (Ref. Figure 1)

- 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations
  - a. Open circuit between REG & OWS buses
  - b. Excessive load on REG bus
  - c. Excessive load on OWS bus
  - d. Faulty power feeding REG bus

#### 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

Consequence of violating either upper or lower redline limit for OWS bus voltages is possible loss of subsystem loads necessary for accomplishment of primary objectives. The consequence of violating redline limit for OWS Bus currents is excessive power consumption or possible opening of bus feeder circuit breakers if maximum current capability is exceeded.

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

M0153-513 VOLT - REG BUS 1 M0154-513 VOLT - REG BUS 2 26.9 to 29.7 VDC (Refer to Airlock Module Rule 513-WP-018)

- 5. Operational Tests Not Applicable
- 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

Both OWS buses must be operational at launch to insure refrigeration system redundancy and water tank heater operation. Remote switching capability does not exist to transfer loads from a failed to an operational bus. Liftoff with only one bus active and/or with unacceptable bus voltages or currents could compromise the achievement of mission objectives.

MSTC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS
	LCC-2	4-54	Elect 31-06	1B78543/Circuit Breaker Assy	M7400-M7403	Yes	
	LCC-2	4-57	Data 61.1-31	1B80813/Voltage Sensor		Yes	
	LCC-2	4-51	Elect 31-03	1B83224/Wiring Harness 440A1W1	M7400,M7002,	Yes	
	LCC-2	4-50	Elect 31-02	1B69384/Wiring Harness 436Wl	M7004	Yes	
	LCC-2	4-52	Elect 31-04	1B69383/Wiring Harness 436W2	M7401,M7003,	Yes	
	LCC-2	4-53	Elect 31-05	1B83225/Wiring Harness 440A1W2	м7005	Yes	
· ·	* WILL	FAILURE OF	THIS COMPONEN	I T CAUSE MEASUREMENT TO EXCEED REDLI	NE LIMIT?	I.	

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MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO. 513-0P-009-R5 PAGE

## MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

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7.	Instrumentation Accu	racy and Method o	f Redline Value	e Determination	
	Measurement	CRT	AR	Meter	
	M7400-440	2 	+1.19*	±1.82 VDC	
	M7002-440	±0.74	<del>+</del> 1.26*	+1.89 VDC	
	M7004-440	+3.5	+5.32*	-7.7 AMP	
	M7401-440	-	+-1.19*	+1.82 VDC	
	M7003-440	+0.74	+1.26*	+1.89 VDC	
	M <b>7</b> 005≁440	±3.5	+5.32*	+7.7 AMP	

#### \* PRIME MONITORING DEVICE

All OWS electrical modules have a design upper limit of 30 VDC. Since line drop to many of these modules is negligible, upper redline limit is 30 VDC. Lower limit was determined by operation of RS Pump Inverter which requires between 24 and 30 VDC for proper operation. Allowing for a one volt line drop between OWS bus and the inverter input brings the lower redline limit on the OWS bus to 25 VDC. The requirement that the voltage is within +1.2/-1.8 VDC of the respective AM Reg. Bus reflects a line drop of 0.6 VDC due to maximum loads of 30 AMPS (OWS Bus 1) and 22 AMPS (OWS Bus 2) and system accuracies of +1.2 VDC. The bus current redline values reflect the predicted current loads and system accuracies.

#### 8. Other Information

- a. One volt peak-to-peak noise between 20 and 20K Hertz on steady-state voltage is allowed. Excursions less than 1 sec. duration to 22.0 V minimum and 34 V maximum are allowed.
- b. One half of the water tank heaters are enabled prior to OWS closeout in the VAB and subsequently will operate as required as a function of the water temperature.
- c. The Refrigeration System is turned on in the VAB before perishable food is installed in freezers and remains on through subsequent prelaunch operations until shortly before liftoff. Power will be supplied to the pump inverter from a separate ESE power supply via the RACS/RS bus for the majority of the countdown and the Refrigeration System will be transferred to OWS Bus 1 for a short period prior to the terminal count.
- d. Monitoring the OWS Bus 1 & 2 voltage redlines will insure that both buses are being supplied with power at the required voltage level from the AM and insure that no excessive voltage drop exists in the AM/OWS power feeder circuitry.

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

The prime concern related to bus current-carrying capability is whether or not any of the main power feeder circuit breakers in the AM or in the OWS have been inadvertently tripped open. Each tripped feeder circuit breaker in the AM or in the OWS will cause a loss of 1/9 of the copper in the positive feeder line (the return line is assumed to remain intact since it does not involve any active components). Since there is no direct instrumentation of circuit breaker position, this information must be obtained by analyzing the voltage drop between the AM Regulated Buses and the corresponding OWS Bus as a function of load current. Detection of excessive voltage drop between these two points will serve to indicate an anomalous condition in the prime feeder circuitry, which could be caused by tripped circuit breakers or by other less probable circuit faults.

It will actually be difficult to detect an open circuit breaker(s) since (1) the voltage drops will be small at the levels of OWS bus current drawn during the launch countdown, and (2) the end-to-end measurement system inaccuracies are large enough to mask a change in voltage drop caused by open circuit breakers. Prelaunch checkout procedures will be utilized to reduce the theoretical measurement inaccuracy and by recording data from KSC integrated testing for various states of circuit breakers configuration at several incremental current levels. It will be possible to construct a profile for voltage drop vs load current (see Figure 2).

The following is a summary of the predicted OWS bus loads during launch countdown:

Function	Bus #1	(Amps)	Bus #2	(Amps)
	Min	Max	Min	Max
Refrigeration Regenerator* Heater - 126 Watts	0	4.5	0	0
Refrigeration Logic Unit* - 33.6 Watts	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Refrigeration Pump* Inverter	3.2	3.2	-	-
Metabolic Analyzer Ion Pump - 4 Watts	0.1	0.1	-	-
Water Container Heater 10 @ 95.5 Watts (5 per Bus)	0	17.1	0	17.1
TOTAL	4.5	26.1	1.2	18.3


\*These loads are on the RACS/RS bus until T-20 hours.

#### 9. System Schematic

Ref. Figure 1

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# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND



MSFC	LAUNCH	MISSION	RULE	INPUT

(rototal lines	1.01	MB	MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPU						22.	
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION			CATEGORY		and a local de la	VALUES	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	11.5.0				FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	
						-	h ·	1		
	3-400	C7044-436	TEMP - TCS, FWD COMPT,	NO. 6				( 00 F	( 20 F	FROM START OF LMRD
								42°F	63°F	UNTIL T-12 HOURS
							i.	*55°F	63°F	FROM T-12 HRS. UNTIL T-11 MIN.
							-1 <b>OF</b> 2 M			
		c704 <b>2 -</b> 436 (alternate)	TEMP - TCS, FWD COMPT,	NO. 5				40°F	59°F	FROM START OF LMRD
		(ALTERNATE)								UNTIL T-12 HOURS
						-		51°F	59°F	FROM T-12 HRS. UNTIL T-11 MIN.
										*NOTE: RAMPING OF TEMP SHOULD START AT APPROX T-24 HRS TO ASSURE A MINIMUM OF 55°F AT T-12 HRS.
MISS		SECTION:	L. STA	GE/SUBSECTIC	NI •			STEM:		
	513/SL-1		WORKGHOD	S/GROUND TONING	THERMAL				EDLINES AN	D CATEGORIES
REM/	ARKS: Pre	launch tempe	erature requirements for	the OWS s	stored f	ilm in t	he film	REQUIRED BY		
vaul witł	lt are to 1 allowab	maintain te le excursion	emperature between 40°F as to 65°F. 65°F is the ne refrigeration subsyst	and 50°F a maximum (	as much OWS inte	time as rnal env	possible ironmen-		DAC-WEST	
			cemperature at T-12 hrs					CONTROL NUM		
requirement of 55°F minimum at launch (REF EDCR 2X006))					L3-0P-003	R5				
-	na Brizan da San Tardan Ca		CONCURRENCES					P	AGE	REVISION
AERO		ASTR:	ASTN: the	1				.1		REV.4
		SL-SW (						.2, .3,	.4,.5,.6	REV,5
			PROG. ENG. OFFICE:	PROG. OFFIC # 5-9-7	E: (EI)	MO-MGR:		DATE: MAY	S 1973	PAGE: I-57

SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

The ground thermal conditioning system provides on-pad temperature control to a maximum of 65°F and minimum of 40°F from the time of system activation in the VAB through launch minus 12 hours (55-65°F T-12 hours to launch). Circulation of conditioned dry gaseous nitrogen within the habitation area is effected by operation of one of two fans which force the nitrogen across heat exchangers providing the temperature conditioning. The heat exchangers and the two fans are located in the vehicle wardroom in the entertainment center. At least one circulating fan will be in operation from "Button Up" in the VAB until launch.

#### 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations

a. Ground heat exchanger coolant temperature high/low.

b. Fan failure.

#### 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

Launch temperatures greater than 65°F could result in loss of temperature control in food freezers and shortened storage life of food. Temperatures less than 40°F violate the food and film ICD's. Temperature less than 55°F from T-12 hours until T-11 minutes violate the EREP tape to OWS ICD.

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

C7408-436 FILM VAULT INT. C7411-436 FOOD CONTAINER EXT. 47±5°F(until T-12 hours): 59±4°F(after T-12 hours)

5. Operational Tests

Not Applicable.

6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

All critical active functions are redundant.

- a. Two Heat Exchanger Fans,
- b. Two TCUs.
- c. Two Sets of Control Valves,

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)



KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART	PART NUMBER/PART NAME			COMMENTS					
	LCC-2	4-62	Ref 72	1A49958/Disconnect		C7043-C7044	Yes						
			1										
	* WII	LL FAILURE	OF THIS COMPO	I DNENT CAUSE MEASUREMENT	TO EXCEED RE	DLINE LIMIT?	1, 1						
7. <u>In</u>	strumenta	tion Accur	acy and Method	l of Redline Value Detern	<u>ination</u> <u>ACCURACY</u>								
		ME	ASUREMENT	CRT	AR		METER						
			044-436 042-436	+2.5°F* +2.5°F*	+4.3°F +4.3°F -4.3°F		+6.5°F -6.5°F						
*PRIME MONITORING DEVICE													
	Method of redline value determination - Red line is maximum value in ICD 65ICD9541, also maximum refrigeration system can tolerate at lift off without depleting max heat sink capacity. 40°F is minimum value in food and film ICD. 55°F is minimum requirement from T-12 hours until T-11 minutes to pre-condition EREP tapes prior to liftoff.												

The Ground Support Equipment (GSE) can be adjusted to bring the OWS internal temperature within the prescribed tolerance.

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

8. Other Information (Cont'd)

#### Effect of Ground Thermal Conditioning System (GTCS) Unrepaired Failure \* on Launch Day

GTCS LOSS	RESULTING IMPACT	ASSUMPTIONS
Anytime from 6 a.m. (EDT) through the launch window	Film temperature reaches $70^{\circ}$ F. Ambient food temperature specification of 85° F not exceeded. The frozen food will exceed its specification limit of 0° F by 2° F.	<ul> <li>a. GTCS fan de-engerized when failure occurred.</li> <li>b. Controlled walls for 55 to 63° F prior to failure.</li> </ul>
		<ul> <li>c. For May launch.</li> <li>d. Refrigeration system (RS) ground cooling failure has not occurred.</li> </ul>

\* Since the resulting impacts represent some out of specification conditions, all effort should be made to maintain GTCS control. However, in the event that irreparable failures occur, the conditions given could be tolerated.


GTCS down time without recovery is indicated on Chart 1.

GTCS recovery time required is indicated on Chart 2.


GTCS "ON" requirements for various launch times as a function of GTCS failure times is indicated on Chart 3.

9. System Schematic

None




CONTROL NO. 513-0P-003- R5 PAGE 1-57.4



MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO. 513-0P-003-R5 PAGE 1-57

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND



FO	RM	1

# MSFC LAUNCH SION RULE INPUT

-		T			T	CATEGORY		REDLINE	VALUES		
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.		DESCRIPTIO	N	FLT CONT		PRE-LAUNCI	COMPAREMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE OWNER OWNER OF THE OWNER	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-401	C7115-403	TEMP-R	5, PR CKT, T/	C INL, COO	L			-42°F	-24 <sup>°</sup> F	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOOP DISABLE (APPROX. T-5 MIN)
		к7326-403]	EVENT-I MODE	RS, PCR BYP V	LV, RDTR			-1 OF 2	*	*	* SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE WHEN COOLANT FLOW IS DIRECTED THROUGH THE GROUND HEAT EXCHANGERS.
		UC8162	TEMP, (	CCU SUPPLY	-*	(1)		M	-49°F	<b>-2</b> 7°F	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOOP DISABLE (APPROX. T-5 MIN)
		UF8001 PLUS UF8011 _ (ALT)		ATE, WATER/GI ATE, WATER/GI	+ 1		-		- 1.0 GPM	NONE	*(1) FOUR MEASUREMENTS REQUIRED.
MISSI SA-5	on: 13/SL-1	SECTION:	WORKSHOP	2	STAGE/SUBSEC OWA/REFR	IGERATION	SYSTEM	SY	STEM: REDLII	NES AND CA	TEGORIES
REMA	Verify refrige	ration loop	and assu	atus and oper ure that ther L3-OP-002, pa	mal capacit				REQUIRED BY MDAC-W ASTR ASTN		
	NOTE: 1	Measurement	c7115-40	3 is the pri	mary redlin	ne.			CONTROL NUM	IBER: -021- <b>R5</b>	
				CONCURRENC	FS					AGE	REVISION
AERO:		ASTR:		ASTN: Wap 2m 5	1		CSE:		.1, .2	2	REV. 2
		SL-SW	>	8	113				.3, .4	4,.5,.6	REV. 5
				PROG. ENG. OFFIC	E: PROG. OFF	FICE: (EI) <b>9-73</b>	MO-MGR:	19/23	DATE: MAY	£ 197 <b>3</b>	<b>Page:</b> I-58

MSFC - Form 3173-2 (Rev June 1970)

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

## SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

The refrigeration system contains a radiator bypass valve which directs coolant flow either through the radiator or the ground heat exchangers. During prelaunch operations, coolant flow is maintained continuously through the ground heat exchangers which provide proper coolant conditioning to maintain the thermal capacitor in a fully frozen state. The primary measurement indicates coolanol temperature in the primary loop between the ground heat exchangers and the thermal capacitors. Measurements within the redline values indicate the position of the radiator bypass valve in the bypass mode and sufficient cooling capacity from the ground heat exchangers.

#### 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violation

- a. Valve failure
- b. Bypass valve controller malfunction
- c. GSE input command failure
- d. Insufficient cooling from the TCU

#### 3. <u>Consequences of Redline Violations</u>

Consequence of a redline violation is that the thermal capacitor may not be in a fully frozen and chilled down condition at launch. This can result in insufficient cooling during the initial insertion/on-orbit operations and frozen food damage could result due to food temperatures exceeding  $0^{\circ}$ F. Loop switching could occur due to a freezer "HI" condition.

The long term impact is loss of the backup RS loop if the redline violation is due to a bypass valve or bypass valve controller failure.

#### 4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

C7701-A04 RS, CCU COOLANT OUTLET TEMP K7412-436 EVENT-RS, PRIMARY CKT PUMP 1, ON D7002-436 PRESS-RS, PR LOOP, PUMP INLET D7001-436 PRESS-RS, PR LOOP, PUMP DELTA P K7447-403 EVENT-RS, PLR BYP VLV, RDTR MODE

5. Operation Tests

Not Applicable

Nominal Range -21°F to -43°F ON 36 to 44 PSIA 32 to 44 PSID BYPASS MODE

#### MSFE - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)



FORM C

#### 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

A redline violation may indicate an onboard system failure which could ultimately result in loss of one of the two available RS loops, thereby eliminating loop redundancy and reducing RS reliability.

The Critical Items applicable:

		1	1				
KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS
	LCC-2	4-65	Ref 120.01.01	1B82697/Refrigeration Bypass Controller	C7115,K7326	Yes	
	LCC-2	4-67	Ref 120.01.01- 10	1B79878-1/Solenoid Bypass Valve		Yes	A second s
	LCC-2	4-75	Ref 120.01.04- 13	7541626/Quick Disconnect	41626/Quick Disconnect		a se
	* WILL F	AILURE OF	THIS COMPONENT	CAUSE MEASUREMENT TO EXCEED REDLIN	E LIMIT?		

#### 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

a.	Measurement		CRT	AR	Meter
	C7115-403 (	P)	+ 4.4**	<del>+</del> 7.6	±11.3 °F

\* Prime monitoring device

The method of redline value determination is to select temperatures which are sufficiently low to ensure a fully frozen and chilled thermal capacitor. Test data indicate that a coolanol temperature of -24°F, or colder, entering the thermal capacitor for a prolonged period of time will place the capacitor in the required "charged" condition. This upper value for measurement C7115-403 is a soft value and does not contain instrumentation error. The lower limit of -42°F is equal to the lower redline limit of -40°F for thermal capacitor outlet temperature (see reference 513-OP-002) less a 2°F temperature rise due to thermal control panel heat leak. (Page I-59)

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND


b. Instrumentation accuracy for the alternate measurement is not applicable since it is a bilevel measurement. Absence of signal indicates flow through the ground heat exchangers.

#### 8. Other Information

The normal operating procedure for the Ground Temperature Control Unit as specified in TCRSC 1B83429 should preclude measurement C7115-403 from being out of redline limits. Hold times vs. Recovery times are indicated on Charts 1, 2 and 3.

9. System Schematic


Ref. Figures 1 & 2, 513-0P-002, Pages I-59.6 & I-59.7




MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO.513-0P-021-R.5 PAGE 1-58.4

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND





MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO. 513-0P-021-R5 PAGE I-58.6



# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPUT

0.51	1751	ITEM MEAS/TM NO DESCRIPTION CATEGORY						REDUIN	E VALUES		
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTI	ON	FLT CONT		PRE-LAUNCH		MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES	
	3-402	C7279-403 C7402-403 (ALT, UMB)	TEMP - RS, PRI CKT THERMAL CONT VALVE TEMP - RS, PRI CKT THERMAL CONT VALVE	COOLANT OUT			1 OF 2 M	-40°F	-20 <sup>0</sup> F	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOOP DISABLE (APPROX. T-5 MIN.)	
	3-403	C7296-436 C7404-436 (ALT, UMB)	TEMP - RS, PRI CKT CONT VALVE COOLANT TEMP - RS, PRI CKT CONT VALVE COOLANT	OUT CHILL THERM			l of 2 M	+35.3°F		FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LOOP DISABLE (APPROX. T-5 MIN.)	
SA-5	ON: 513/SL-1	SECTION:	WORKSHOP	STAGE/SUBSECT		YSTEM	SYS	RED.	LINES AND C	ATEGORIES	
REMA	REMARKS: Verify proper prelaunch status and operation of primary refrigeration loop. Assure that thermal conditioning of OWS refrigeration system freezer, storage, and chiller compartments is maintained within acceptable limits during prelaunch operations. (Ref. 513-OP-008, Page I-62 CONTROL NUMBER: 513-OP-002-R5										
			CONCURREN	° E S				P	AGE	REVISION	
AERO:	AERO: ASTR: ASTN: Th'				CSE:			, .4, .5, .			
		SL-SW #		78/73				.6		REV 3	
· · · · ·		(Fey June 1070)	PROG. ENG. OFFI	CE: PROG. OFFIC #5-9-	E: (EI)	мо-мдя: 44 С 51	9(7)	DATE: MAY	S 1973	PAGE: I-59	

#### FORM C

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

The Refrigeration System (RS) is a low-temperature thermal control system that utilizes coolanol-15 in a closed loop to provide for freezing of food and urine and for chilling of food, urine, and potable water. Temperature control is provided in the range of +42°F to -20°F. Two coolant loops (primary and secondary) are provided in the RS, with the secondaryloop being a backup in the event of primary loop failure. The two loops are essentially identical and independent of each other except for common utilization of the radiator, ground cooling heat exchanger, and thermal capacitor in the heat rejection portion of the loop. These components have separate primary and secondary coolant paths as do the freezers, chillers, regenerator HX and regenerative heater located in the inner portion of the loop. Each loop of the RS contains automatic failure logic that will switch pumps on receipt of a low pump differential pressure signal, or switch loops due to low pump accumulator level or logic unit power supply voltage out of band. The primary loop also contains logic to switch to the secondary loop for high wardroom freezer inlet temperature, or low chiller inlet temperature.

For on-orbit operation, heat gained in the freezers, chillers and associated plumbing is rejected to space by the radiator with supplemental heat rejection capability provided by the thermal capacitor (charged with undecane wax) located downstream of the radiator. During the LMRD effectivity period, normal operation of the RS will be on the primary loop with the radiator bypass valve in the bypass position. Heat gained will be rejected to a GSE ground cooling cart via the ground cooling heat exchangers.

- 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations
  - a. Causes of high side violations of measurements C7279-403 and C7402-403:
    - 1. Pump failure.
    - 2, Radiator bypass valve failed in radiator mode.
    - 3. Ground cooling heat exchanger TCU coolant temperature high.
    - 4. Insufficient chilldown time,
    - 5. Excessive heat leak.
  - b. Causes of low side violations of measurements C7279-403 and C7402-403:
    - 1. Ground cooling heat exchanger TCU coolant temperature low.
  - c. Causes of high side violations of measurements C7296-436 and C7404-436:
    - 1. Chiller control valve malfunction.

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)



FORM B				MSFC LAU	UNCH MIS	SION RU	LE INPU	Г	$d^2 = \frac{1}{2}$	
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIO	N		CATEGORY			VALUES	TIME PERIOD ACTION NOTES
KEV	3-2155	MEAS/1M NO. K374-512	POSITION - COAX SWI 10W		FLT CONT	ENG DATA	M M	MINIMUM *	MAX1MUM *	COMMIT AT END OF FINAL TRANSMITTER TEST (APPROX. T-19 HRS.) SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE IF 2 WATT XMTR SELECTED. DISREGARD WHEN 10 WATT XMTR IS BEING TESTED
MISS	ON:	SECTION:	<b>.</b>	STAGE/SUBSECT1	ION:		SYS	STEM:		
٨S·	-513/SL-1	Б	VORKSHOP	AM/I&C	SYSTEM			REDLINE	S AND CATE	GORIES
REMA	Should		transmitter be sele be impaired at certai			emetry		REQUIRED BY MDAC-EAS ASTN CONTROL NU	ST MBER:	
								513-WP-0	TOTAL CONTRACTOR OF THE OWNER	DEVISION
CONCURRENCES								PAGE	REVISION	
AERO	and all the state of the state	Brillen	4-19-73 ASTN:					.2		PRELIM.
			2 Bled 123,	173				.1		REV. 5
			PROG. ENG. OFFL	PROG. OFFI	-73 (EI)	MO-MGR:		DATE: MAY	S 1973	PAGE: I-78

MSFC - Form 3173-2 (Kev June 1970)

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#### FORMC

## MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

AM Data Transmission and Antenna Subsystem provides RF transmission capability to STDN during prelaunch, launch and orbit for real time and delayed time data and delayed time voice, in both stabilized and unstabilized vehicle attitudes. Airlock telemetry data is transmitted to STDN by means of four telemetry transmitters consisting of three 10-watt units and one 2-watt unit. 2-watt transmitter is used during launch phase of SL-1. 10-watt transmitters are used during orbit phases of mission. See Figure 1 for system diagram.

#### 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations

a. Relay malfunction

b. Human error

#### 3. Consequence of a Redline Violation

When used with the 10-watt transmitter the quadriplexer is subject to a corona discharge at certain ambient pressures down to .07 MMHg, which will reflect the transmitter output power. Although no permanent damage would be sustained by either the transmitter or quadriplexer, telemetry transmission would be impaired until the corona was extinguished.

- 4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Valves See Paragraph 5
- 5. <u>Operational Tests</u> During the final transmitter test the DCS command S195 will be sent for the last time selecting the 2-watt transmitter for operation for the remainder of the countdown and for launch. When the command is sent, observe that received signal strength decreases to insure 2-watt transmitter was actually selected. The above assumes sufficient attenuation is inserted in RF link to take receiver out of saturation.
- 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations None.
- 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination The discrete measurement verifying coax switch position in combination with change in signal strength is used rather than a continuous signal strength indication. Atmospheric conditions, antenna orientation/location, etc., make continuous signal strength monitoring an unrealiable method for determining whether the 2-watt or 10-watt is transmitting at a given time. With the above method, there is no accuracy problem.
- 8. Other Information None

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPUT FORM B **REDLINE VALUES** CATEGORY REV MEAS/TM NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION TIME PERIOD ACTION/NOTES FLT CONT ENG DATA PRE-LAUNCH MAXIMUM MINIMUM  $26^{\circ}F$ 100°F TEMP, BATTERY 1 INTERNAL 3-2201 C101-524 Μ 26°F 26°F 26°F 26°F 26°F 100°F 100°F 100°F 100°F TEMP, BATTERY 2 INTERNAL 3-2202 C102-524 M М C103-524 TEMP, BATTERY 3 INTERNAL 3-2203 FROM START OF LMRD TEMP, BATTERY 4 INTERNAL Μ C104-524 3 - 2204UNTIL INITIATION OF TEMP, BATTERY 5 INTERNAL Μ C105-525 3-2205 100°F 100°F AUTOMATIC SEQUENCE TEMP, BATTERY 6 INTERNAL М C106-525 3-2206 26°F 26°F C107-525 TEMP, BATTERY 7 INTERNAL Μ 3-2207 100°F TEMP, BATTERY 8 INTERNAL Μ C108-525 3-2208 SEE AM FIG. 3 (PG. 1-103) MISSION: SECTION: STAGE/SUBSECTION: SYSTEM: SA-513/SL-1 WORKSHOP AM/ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM REDLINES AND CATEGORIES REQUIRED BY: REMARKS: AM battery temperatures are controlled by active TCS during prelaunch MDAC-EAST operations to assure battery electrical performance within acceptable limits. ASTR Battery degradation and/or loss occurs at high operating temperatures. CONTROL NUMBER: (Ref. 513-WP-016, Page I-86) 513-WP-003 - R 2 PAGE REVISION CONCURRENCES AERO: ASTR: CSE: .1, .2 ASTNIJUL REV. 5 REV. 3 .3 MDA DATE: P 4.5 E PROG. ENG. OFFICE: PROG. OFFICE: (EI) MO-MGR: I-82 MAY 9 1973 WAR 5/9/73 73

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MSFC - Form 3173-2 (Kev June 1970)

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

- a. Ref. 513-WP-016, Page I-86, Para. 1a.
- b. OWS solar array is divided into eight electrically identical parts called solar array groups, each of which feeds a power conditioning group (PCG) composed of battery charger, battery, and voltage regulator. The function of each PCG is to provide conditioned power to using equipment and to recharge nickel-cadmium batteries during orbital daylight period. Battery charger output voltage is limited as a function of battery temperature and available power. Temperature compensation of charger voltage is provided to prevent hydrogen generation within battery and to restrict oxygen generation rate to that level which can be recombined within battery without venting. Two thermistors installed within each battery provide temperature sensing to the battery charger for this function. An additional thermistor within each battery provides battery temperature for telemetry purposes. Each battery is mounted with base of the case in contact with a cold-plate, through which coolant is circulated to remove battery generated heat. For diagram ref. Fig. 1, 513-WP-016 and Fig. 1, 513-WP-023 on Pages I-86 and I-97 respectively.

During the LMRD effectivity period, each battery will be charged and discharged, with resulting heat removed by active coolant system to maintain control of battery temperature.

## 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations

- a. Excessive battery charge/overcharge due to battery charger malfunction (maximum limit violation).
- b. Malfunction of ground cooling system (maximum limit violation all batteries). Refer to 513-WP-022, Page 196.
- c. Malfunction of active coolant system (maximum or minimum limit violation all batteries). Refer to 513-WP-022, Page I-96.

# 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

An overtemperature condition will reduce battery cycle life; therefore, depending on the extent of degradation, energy storage capability of the affected battery or batteries in the latter portions of the mission may be reduced. If the violation is the result of a charger malfunction, the charger and affected battery may be unusable, reducing system energy storage capability as long as the malfunction persists. An undertemperature condition will result in lower than normal battery charge rates, however, no adverse effect on the batteries will result.

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

Primary Coolant Loop: C233-505 TEMP, PRI LOOP - BAT MOD 1 OUTLET C235-505 TEMP, PRI LOOP - BAT MOD 2 OUTLET

Nominal Values: 37 to 90<sup>0</sup>F. Comparative temperatures of coolant in the active loop entering and leaving battery module coldplates provide battery coolant status.

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)



FORM C

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

4.	Backup Measurements and Nominal Values (Contd)		
	C273-534 TEMP, PRI CLNT CTL VLV - CVPC OUT 1	Norden 1 Welling	Do 6. 512 UD 022
	C275-534 TEMP, PRI CLNT CTL VLV - CVPC OUT 2	Nominal Values: 34 to 70 <sup>0</sup> F	Ref: 513-WP-022
	M133-524 thru M136-524 VOLT, BATTERY 1 THRU 8 and VOLTAGE M137-525 thru M140-525	Nominal Values: 37.3 to 46.9 VDC	Battery voltage level is an indication of the battery temperature when the battery is maintained in the voltage limited charge mode. If the voltage is fairly steady and is between the stated limits, then the battery temperature is in the acceptable range.
	Secondary Coolant Loop:		
	C234-505 TEMP, SEC LOOP - BAT MOD 1 OUTLET C236-505 TEMP, SEC LOOP - BAT MOD 2 OUTLET	Nominal Values: : 37 to 90 <sup>0</sup> F.	Comparative temperatures of coolant in in the active loop entering and leaving battery module coldplates provide battery coolant status.
5.	C274-534 TEMP, SEC CLNT CTL VLV - CVSC OUT 1 C276-534 TEMP, SEC CLNT CTL VLV - CVSC OUT 2 Operational Tests	Nominal Values: 34 to 70°F	Ref: 513-WP-022
	News		

None

### 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

Eight (8) nickel-cadmium batteries are provided in the AM EPS. Battery overtemperature conditions could result in a reduction of cycle life capability of the affected batteries which could ultimately result in loss of the affected batteries and a reduction of available power.

The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEA SUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS				
LCC-II pg 29 EPS 1.1.17		61B769006/Battery Charger C101-C108		Yes							
*Wi1:	*Will failure of this component cause measurement to exceed redline limit?										

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO. 513-WP-003-R5 PAGE 1-82.2

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

Instrumentation Accuracy: +2.9, -5.3 (Range 26 to 100°F) (CRT)

Method of Redline Value Determination: Analysis of previous AM battery subcontractor testing has indicated desirability of maintaining nickel-cadmium battery temperature and at absolute levels of approximately room temperature (75°F). Maximum limit is beyond normal operating range using ground coolant system, but below automatic cut-off point setting of battery chargers. Minimum limit is well below normal operating range and was widened by the amount of instrumentation accuracy.

### 8. Other Information

Each battery charger contains control circuitry to limit battery charge current to 0.5 AMP max. in the event battery temperature reaches 120 + 0, -  $12^{\circ}F$ .

#### 9. System Schematic

Ref. Fig. 1, 513-WP-023 & Fig. 1, 513-WP-016 on Pages I-97 and I-71 respectively.

FORM B

	FUF	M B	məl	C LAUNCH MIS						
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION	FLT CONT	CATEGORY	PRE-LAUNCH	and the second		TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES	
	3-2253 3-2254 3-2255 3-2256 3-2257 3-2258 3-2258 3-2259	M133-524 M134-524 M135-524 M136-524 M136-525 M138-525 M139-525	VOLT, BATTERY 1 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 2 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 3 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 4 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 5 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 6 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 7 VOLTAGE			M M M M M M M M	SEE AM FIG 3&4	SEE AM FIG 3	SEE AM FIG. 3 & 4 (PGS. 1-103, 104)	
•	3-2260 3-2261 3-2262 3-2263 3-2264 3-2265 3-2266 3-2267 3-2268	M140-525 M141-524 M142-524 M143-524 M144-524 M145-525 M145-525 M146-525 M148-525	VOLT, BATTERY 8 VOLTAGE VOLT, BATTERY 1 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 2 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 3 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 4 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 5 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 6 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 7 CURRENT VOLT, BATTERY 8 CURRENT			M M M M M M M M	NONE	SEE AM FIG 4	SEE AM FIG 4, (PG. I-104)	
	ON: A-513/SL-	-1 SECTION:		SUBSECTION: LECTRICAL POWE	R SYSTEM	SYS	item: REDI	LINES AND	CATEGORIES	
to ne ba ac	o interna arly ful attery en ctivation	1 power (pre 1 SOC during ergy for init command tim	are required to power AM/M elaunch) through launch. He g final prelaunch periods t tial OWS SAS activation, p me, and during orbital nigh 2 and I-85 respectively.)	Cach AM battery to provide maxi plus contingenc	must be mum tota y backup	at 1	REQUIRED BY	MDAC ASTE		
			17				p	AGE	REVISION	
RO		ASTR: W	CONCURRENCES				1	.4,.5	REV.3	
		ASTR: H	AT /MDA				.1, .2,		REV.5	
		(Key June 1970)	PROG. ENG. OFELCE. PR	OG. OFFICE: (EI)	MO-MGR:	1	DATE MA	<b>f 9</b> 1973	AGE: I-86	

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

- a. AM EPS is designed to accept power from a solar array mounted on OWS (during flight) or from external power (during prelaunch operations) and to condition this power for application to AM EPS buses and nickel-dadmium batteries. Nickel-cadmium batteries are utilized to provide power to leads during the orbital night period, launch period, and during prelaunch periods when external power is not applied.
- b. OWS solar array is divided into eight electrically identical parts called solar array groups, each of which feeds a power conditioning group (PCG), composed of battery charger, battery, and voltage regulator. Function of each PGG is to provide conditioned power to loads and to recharge the nickel-cadmium batteries during orbital daylight periods. Each battery charger contains two ampere-hour integrator circuits, (primary and seconday), each of which computes an approximate value for battery state of charge, with the selected circuit providing a control signal to reduce charging to low levels upon reaching full charge conditions. The state of charge measurement of each ampere-hour integrator circuit is continuously provided to the AM telemetry subsystem. Temperature compensation is provided for each ampere-hour integrator circuit to account for variation in battery charging efficiency as temperature of the battery changes. Each battery contains 30 series connected cells. During LMRD effectivity period, each battery will be charged and discharged, with apparent SOC monitored and charging controlled (in part) by ampere-hour integrator circuits. Battery voltage will also be monitored to provide an indication of battery performance under both charge and discharge conditions. For diagram, refer to Figure 1.

2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations

Minimum SOC Limit Violations (SOC, CN 513-WP-017 on Page I-85) (Note: Maximum SOC Limit Violations - N/A)

a. Excessive battery discharge due to loss of external power (all eight batteries).

- b. Excessive battery discharge due to battery discharge due to battery charger malfunction (one battery).
- c. Malfunction of ampere-hour integrator circuit selected to control battery charging (one battery).

Maximum Voltage Limit Violations (Charge Cycle, AM Fig. 3) (Note: Minimum Limit Violations during charge cycle - N/A) a. Excessive charging voltage resulting from a charger malfunction.


Minimum Voltage Limit Violations (Discharge Cycle, AM Fig. 4) (Note: Maximum Limit Violations during discharge cycles N/A)

- a. Excessive load impressed on the battery.
- b. Loss of individual cell outputs.
- c. Low battery state of charge.

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)

FORM C

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)



a. Although there is no redline value for maximum battery current, an unexpected increase may be caused by a malfunction in the EPS or load equipment and therefore should be investigated.

### 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

Violation of the minimum limit for state-of-charge would reduce the stored energy available for initial OWS SAS activation, plus contingency backup activation command time, and during orbital night periods. Violations of the maximum voltage limit of AM Figure 3 would require bypass of the affected battery and charger combination, which would reduce energy storage capacity by one-eighth. Violation of the minimum voltage limit of AM Figure 4 may also result in loss of one-eight of AM energy storage capacity.

#### 4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values


For primary and secondary state-of-change:

M141-524 thru M144-524	VOLT, BATTERY		A gross indication of battery SOC during discharge can be obtained by integration of the current time plot:
and	- 1 thru 8	- Nominal Values:	Iah = Integrated current in amp-hrs
M145-525 thru M148-525	CURRENT	0 to 15A	$SOC = (1 - \frac{Iah}{33}) 100\%$
For battery	voltage:		n na seu a seu a seu a seu anna seu a s
M117-524 thru M120-524 and M121-525 thru M124-525	VOLT, BATTERY - 1 thru 8 PRI SOC	- Nominal Values:	To substantiate reason for low voltage indication.
M125-524 thru M128-524 and M129-525 thru M132-525	VOLT, BATTERY - 1 thru 8 SEC SOC	95 to 100%	

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

201

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)



VOLT, SAS ARRAY GROUP 1 THRU 8 Nominal Values: Array voltage will be approximately one volt less than battery voltage (discharge cycle only).

#### 5. Operational Tests

None

### 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

The AM EPS is designed to operate as essentially eight paralleled subsystems, each of which uses one battery for energy storage. Loss of battery or battery charger before launch would reduce system capability to sustain launch electrical loads as well as orbital loads thereafter.

### The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR CIL ITEM GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS
LCC-II LCC-II LCC-II	pg 29 pg 29 pg 29 pg 29	EPS 1.1.17	61B769005/Regulator	M117-M140 M141-M148 M117-M140	Yes No Yes	

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPUT FORM B **REDLINE VALUES** CATEGORY REV ITEM MEAS/TM NO. DESCRIPTION TIME PERIOD ACTION NOTES FLT CONT ENG DATA PRE-LAUNCH MAXIMUM MINIMUM FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION 3-2706 C217-541 TEMP, MOLE SIEVE B - CHX PRI AND TEMPERATURE STABI-INLET -1 of 2 LIZATION UNTIL 43°F 51°F C209-542 TEMP, MOLE SIEVE A - CHX PRI INITIATION OF AUTOMATIC Μ \* (ALT) SEQUENCE. INLET 3-2706A C218-541 TEMP, MOLE SIEVE B - CHX SEC FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND TEMPERATURE STABI-INLET 51°F 43°F -1 of 2 LIZATION UNTIL TERMI-\* \* М C210-542 TEMP. MOLE SIEVE A - CHX SEC NATION OF SECONDARY (ALT) INLET COOLANT LOOP FLOW. (APPROX. T-5 HOURS) **\*MOMENTARY DEVIATIONS** WHEN HEAT LOAD OR TEMPERATURE OF COOLING SOURCE VARIES RAPIDLY ARE NOT CONSIDERED VIOLATIONS. MISSION: SECTION: STAGE/SUBSECTION: SYSTEM: SA-513/SL-1 WORKSHOP AM/THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM REDLINES AND CATEGORIES REMARKS: **REQUIRED BY:** Temperatures are monitored to assure that coolant is supplied to the condensing heat exchanger at the desired temperature. MDAC-EAST (Ref. 513-WP-008,-009, -022, and -023, pages I-98, I-99, I-96 and I-97 respectively. CONTROL NUMBER: 513-WP-004-R5 PAGE REVISION CONCURRENCES AERO: ASTR: CSE: .1.2, .3 REV. 5 wins PROG. ENG. OFFICE PROG. OFFICE: (EI) MO-MGR: DATE: PAGE: MAY 9 1973 - 75 I-94 4910 5/9/72

MSFC - Form 3173-2 (Kev June 1970)

FORM C

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

1. System Description

Ref. 513-WP-023, page I-97.

2. Probable Causes of Redline Violations

Maximum limit violations:

- a. Coolant temperature control valve malfunction.
- b. Premature switching of radiator bypass selector valve should be detectable by discrete measurement
   K209-515 for the primary coolant loop and K210-515 for the secondary coolant loop. (Ref. 513-WP-028, page I-100)
- c. Malfunction of ground cooling system.
- d. Motor/pump unit malfunction Should be detected by the observer monitoring pump ▲P and coolant flow (Ref. 513-WP-009, page I-99.)

#### Minimum limit violations:

- a. Coolant temperature control valve CVPB or CVSB malfunction.
- b. Failure of control valve CVPA or CVSA to hold minimum temperature limit. (Ref. 513-WP-023, I-97)

3. Consequences of Redline Violations

A violation of minimum limit could result in excessive cooling or equipment in modules downstream of coolant control, valve. Violation of maximum limit would lead to possible overheating of equipment downstream of coolant control valve CVPB or CVSB. Violation of either limit would alter moisture removal capability of CHX and thus, prevent maintenance of desired dew point with present operational plans. Extreme violations could cause equipment damage. CHX does not remove moisture until system activation in orbit, however.

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

Primary Coolant Loop: C244-515 TEMP - THERMAL CAPACITOR - PRIMARY OUTLET C265-517 TEMP - THERMAL CAPACITOR 2 PRIMARY INLET

A temperature higher than +40°F prior to T-30 minutes or +18°F after T-30 minutes would indicate a failure of the ground cooling system or premature switching of the radiator bypass selector valve.

C283-534 TEMP - PRIMARY COOLANT CONTROL VALVE CVPA OUTLET 1 (Ref. 513-WP-023, page 1-97)

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)

### MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values (Contd) Primary Coolant Loop: K209-515 EVENT, PRI RAD BYPASS MONITOR - ONE = BYPASS Value of ONE until Bypass Mode is switched at T-9:25 min. Secondary Coolant Loop: C245-515 TEMP - THERMAL CAPACITOR - SECONDARY OUTLET A temperature higher than +40°F prior to T-5 hours would indicate a failure of the ground cooling system or premature switching of the radiator bypass selector valve. C284-534 TEMP - SECONDARY COOLANT CONTROL VALVE CVSA OUTLET 1 (Ref. 513-WP-023, page I-97) Value of ONE until valve switching during sec. loop K210-515 EVENT, SEC RAD BYPASS MONITOR - ONE = BYPASS deactivation at approximately T-5 hrs. LMRs 513-WP-008 and 513-WP-009 covering pump inlet pressure, pump differential pressure and coolant flow may provide additional information. (See pages I-98 and I-99 respectively) 5. Operational Tests Not Applicable

6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

Exceeding redline limits can be an indication that any one of several failures may have occurred which could ultimately result in complete operational loss of one of the two coolant loops thereby eliminating loop redundancy. Such an event would decrease the coolant system reliability.

The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS				
	LCC-II	pg 21	ECS 4.1.37	61C830096-9/Temperature Control Valve -47°F	*(1) C217, C218 C210, C209	Yes	*(1) Item to be included in Rev C of CIL (ECP 971)				
	* WILL FAILURE OF THIS COMPONENT CAUSE MEASUREMENT TO EXCEED REDLINE LIMIT?										

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO.513-WP-004-R5 PAGE 1-94.2

## MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

Instrumentation accuracy: +1.0, -1.9 (Range 42 to 52)°F (CRT)

Method of redline value determination: The coolant temperature control values CVPB and CVSB are adjusted prior to installation to maintain value outlet coolant temperature between 45°F and 49°F. The correct outlet temperature is obtained by proportional mixing of hot and cold incoming coolant. In a normally operating value, the flow of hot coolant into the value will be completely blocked (except for allowable internal leakage) if the outlet temperature rises to 49°F and the flow of cold coolant completely blocked if the outlet temperature drops to 45°F. The given redline limits were based on these value characteristics for the expected coolant temperature distribution, instrumentation accuracy noted above and an allowance for heat leak into coolant lines between the value and the sensors.

- 8. Other Information None
- 9. System Schematic Ref. Fig. 1, 513-WP-023, page I-97.4.

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FORM	в

-	r Or	RM B	r	MOFC LAU						
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIC	N	ELT COUT	CATEGORY	OPE ( AUDICI		EVALUES	TIME PERIOD ACTION NOTES
					FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	
	3-2709	C262-517 C263-517	TEMP, THERMAL CAP. TEMP, THERMAL CAP.							FROM SYSTEM TEMPERATURE STABILIZATION UNTIL TERMINATION OF GROUND COOLING (APPROX. T-10 MINUTES)
	ана 19	C264-517	TEMP, THERMAL CAP.	SKIN 3			-1 of 2 M	-NONE	18°F *(3)	*ALL THREE MEASUREMENTS REQUIRED
		C265-517	TEMP, THERMAL CAP. INLET	2 PRI _*(1)			М			
		C244-515 (ALT)	TEMP, THERMAL CAP. OUTLET							*(1) BOTH MEASUREMENTS REQUIRED WHILE PRI LOOP IS ACTIVE *(2) PRIOR TO T-30 MIN. *(3) AFTER T-30 MIN.
		C245-515	TEMP, THERMAL CAP, OUTLET				М	NONE	40°F	FROM SYSTEM TEMPERATURE STABILIZATION UNTIL TERMINATION OF SEC. COOLANT LOOP FLOW (APPROX. T - 5 HOURS)
MISSI SA-	on: -513/SL-1	SECTION:	RKSHOP	STAGE/SUBSECTION AM/THERMAL C			SY	REDLINES	AND CATEG	
REMA	RKS:		4) and bottles of the Scholar starts Constant and the same share the start the second start provides the second start p		in fulfille de la constance de la constance de la constance	an Malanda an Internet an Internet Malan (an Internet Alban) I		REQUIRED BY		na an a
	ass	surance that	MRID until T-30 min coldplated AM equip peratures. From T-3	ment will be	maintain	ed at		_	MDAC-EAST	
		le provides a arged prior t	assurance that the A to launch.		CONTROL NUMBER: 513-WP-024-R5					
			CONCURREN	CES				Р	AGE	REVISION
AERO:		ASTR:	ASTN: Jul			CSE:			.1, .2	REV. 5
			(AL/MDA ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	3						
	_	(Rev June 1970)	PROG. ENG. OFFI	PROG. OFFIC	<sup>E:</sup> (EI) <b>/3</b>	MO-MGR:		DATE: MA	Y 9 1973	PAGE: 1-95

EOPM C

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

1. System Description

Ref. 513-WP-023, page I-97.

Probable Causes of Redline Violations 2

#### Maximum limit violations:

- a. Malfunction of ground cooling system.
- b. Motor/pump unit malfunction in primary loop or secondary loop.
- c. Premature switching of primary or secondary radiator bypass selector valve.
- d. Excessive heat leak into capacitor module or coolant primary or secondary inlet/outlet line due to damaged insulation.

Minimum limit violations:

a. Ground coolant supply temperature too low.

3. Consequences of Redline Violations

> A violation of the maximum limit of 40°F (prior to T-30 minutes) may result in overheating of AM coldplated equipment.

Violation of maximum limit of +18°F after T-30 minutes would decrease the coldplated equipment cooling available prior to radiator activation/cool-down due to a less than fully charged capacitor module.

Backup Measurements and Nominal Values 4.

None

5. **Operational** Tests

Not applicable

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)



line

#### CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

### 6. <u>Reliability/Redundancy Considerations</u>

Exceeding redline limits may indicate that any one of several failures has occurred. The failure could result in ineffective operation of the coolant system and overheating of equipment and could ultimately result in complete operations loss of one of the two coolant loops thereby eliminating loop redundancy.

## 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Determination

Instrumentation accuracy: C244-515, +1, -2.2 (Range -20 to +20)°F (CFT), -2.53°F C262-517 thru C265-517 +.9, -1.3 (Range -20 to +20)°F; C245-515, +1, -2.2 (Range -20 to +20)°F

The maximum redline limit of +40°F (Prior to T-30 minutes) was based on assuring adequate cooling of the AM battery modules while allowing some margin should the ambient FTC temperature be abnormally high. The maximum limit of +18°F for the primary loop after T-30 minutes is based on a requirement to freeze the capacitors for launch. Should the ambient KSC temperature be abnormally high, supplemental cooling will be introduced at a point in the count such that at T-30 minutes the capacitors will be frozen. Although the capacitors freeze at approximately +22°F, the redline limit was set at +18°F to allow for instrumentation inaccuracy and the location of temperature sensors attached to the capacitor skin.

### 8. Other Information

No problem with violations of the minimum temperature limit (-120°F) is anticipated based on the present ground cooling system capabilities.

#### 9. System Schematic

Ref. Figure 1, 513-WP-023, page I-97.4.

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

	FOF	RMB		MSFC LA	UNCH MI	SSION RU	ILE INPU	T		•
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION	1	L	CATEGORY			VALUES	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
		C273-534	TEMP - PRIMARY COO VALVE CVPC OUTLET	LANT CONTROL	FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	* 34°F	* 70°F	FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND TEMPERATURE STABI- LIZATION UNTIL T -30 MIN
		C275-534 (ALT)	TEMP - PRIMARY COON VALVE CVPC OUTLET					* 34°F	* 44°F	FROM T -30 MIN UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTO
	3-2711A	C274-534 C276-534 (ALT)	TEMP - SECONDARY CO TROL VALVE CVSC OUT TEMP - SECONDARY CO TROL VALVE CVSC OUT	ILET 1 DOLANT CON-		gan second da	-1 of 2 M	* 34°F	* 70°F	SEQUENCE. FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND TEMPERATURE STABI- LIZATION UNTIL TERMI- NATION OF SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP FLOW. (APPROX. T-5 HOURS)
MISS	ION:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECTI	ON:		[SY	STEM:		*MOMENTARY DEVIATIONS WHEN HEAT LOAD OR TEMPERATURE OF COOLING SOURCE VARIES RAPIDLY ARE NOT CONSIDERED VIOLATIONS.
SA	-513/SL-1	L	WORKSHOP	AM/THERMAI	L CONTROL	L SYSTEM		REDLIN	ES AND CAT	TEGORIES
The ter	mperature e Primary	e is adequate y loop will 1	et temperatures are m e for cooling of batt be active for launch.	ery and elec	tronics	modules	coolant Only	REQUIRED BY	: MDAC-	-EAST
		••	tely T-5 hours. 8, -009, and -023, pa	ges I-94, I-	98, I-99	and I-9		CONTROL NUM		₽-022-R5
· · · · · · ·			CONCURRENC					P	AGE	REVISION
AERO		ASTR:	ASTNI STOCK			CSE:		.1,	.2,.3	REV. 5
			PROG. ENG. OFFIC	The second se	E:	MO-MGR:		DATE: COV	C (070	PAGE:
140.0.5	P	2 (Kev June 1970)		# 5-9-			5/9/23	DATE: LIAY	0 1973	I-96

FORM C

### SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

1. System Description and Diagram

Ref. 513-WP-023, page I-97.

2. Probable Causes of Redline Violations

Maximum limit violations:

- a. Coolant temperature control valve malfunction.
- b. Premature switching of radiator bypass selector valve should be detectable by discrete measurement K209-515, for the primary coolant loop and K210-515 for the secondary coolant loop. (Ref. 513-WP-028, page I-100).
- c. Malfunction of ground cooling system.
- d. Motor/pump unit malfunction Should be detected by the observer monitoring pump  $\triangle P$  and coolant flow (Ref. 513-WP-009, page I-99).

#### Minimum limit violations:

- a. Coolant temperature control valve malfunction.
- b. Failure of control valve CVPB (CVSB) and CVPA (CVSA) or CVPB (CVSB) alone to hold minimum primary (secondary) temperature limits. Failure of control valve CVPB (CVSB) and CVPA (CVSA) should be detected by the observer monitoring redlines in 513-WP-004 and 513-WP-023, respectively.
- 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

A violation of maximum limit could have a detrimental effect upon electrical equipment downstream by not providing adequate cooling. (Ref: 513-WP-003, page I-82)

A violation of the minimum limit could result in excessive cooling of equipment in modules downstream of coolant control valve. (Ref: 513-WP-003, page I-82)

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

Primary Coolant Loop: TEMP, THERMAL CAPACITOR C244-515 PRIMARY OUTLET

Nominal Values: A temperature higher than  $+40^{\circ}$ F prior to T -30 minute or +18°F after T-30 minutes would indicate a failure of the ground cooling system, or premature switching of the radiator bypass selector valve.

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)



# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

### 4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values (contd)

C279-534 C277-534	TEMP, PRI ATM COOLANT MODULE OUTLET >45°F Nominal Values: VALVE CVPC INLET <42°F	Indication that coolant temperatures entering the control valve are in the correct range following completion of thermal capacitor charging (no later than T-30 minutes).
K209-515	EVENT, PRI RAD BYPASS MONITOR, ONE = BYPASS	Value of ONE until Bypass Mode is switched at T-9:25 minutes.
Secondary Coola	ant Loop:	
C245-515	TEMP, THERMAL CAPACITOR SECONDARY OUTLET	A temperature higher than +40 °F prior to T-5 hours would indicate a failure of the ground cooling system, or premature switching of the secondary radiator bypass valve.
К210-515	EVENT, SEC RAD BYPASS MONITOR, ONE = BYPASS	Value of ONE until secondary loop is turned off (approx. T-5 hours).
Operational Tec		

5. Operational Tests

Not Applicable.

### 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

Exceeding redline limits can be an indication that any one of several failures may have occurred which could ultimately result in complete operational loss of one of the two coolant loops thereby eliminating loop redundancy. Such an event would decrease the coolant system reliability.

### MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT · NUMBER	*	COMMENTS
	LCC-II	pg 32		52-83700-491/40°F Temp Control Valve	C273, C275 C274, C276	Yes	

\* WILL FAILURE OF THIS COMPONENT CAUSE MEASUREMENT TO EXCEED REDLINE LIMIT?

#### 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

Instrumentation accuracy: +1.3, -1.7 (Range 33°F to 45°F)(CRT)

Method of redline value determination: The coolant temperature control valves CVPC and CVSC are adjusted prior to installation to maintain valve outlet coolant temperature between 36°F and 42°F. The correct outlet temperature is obtained by proportional mixing of hot and cold incoming coolant. In a normal operating valve, the flow of hot coolant into the valve will be completely blocked (except for allowable internal leakage) if the outlet temperature rises to 42°F and the flow of cold coolant completely blocked if the outlet temperature drops to 36°F. The given redline limits for the period from T-30 minutes until launch were based on these valve characteristics together with noted instrumentation accuracy and an allowance for heat leak into coolant lines between the valve and the sensors. During the period prior to T-30 minutes, the valve cold inlet ports may be supplied with coolant higher than 42°F and thus be unable to maintain the 36°F to 42°F range. The higher temperature is acceptable as long as it remains below 70°F, a limit based on maintaining the downstream battery modules at acceptable temperatures.

#### 8. Other Information

None.

9. System Schematic Ref. Fig. 1, 513-WP-023, Page I-97.4



FORM B

		мв			and the second	ATEGORY		REDLINE	VALUES	
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION	FLT			PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-2712	C283-534 C285-534 (ALTERNATE)	TEMP - PRIMARY COOLANT VALVE CVPA OUTLET 1 TEMP - PRI RGN HX IN-S MOD	CONTROL			-1 of 2 M		51°F	FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND TEMPERATURE STABILI- ZATION UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTO SEQUENCE (T-3 MIN 7 SEC) *IN THE CASE OF A VIO- LATION OF THE MINIMUM REDLINE LIMIT, CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT FREEZING OF THE EVA/IVA SUIT COOLANT. THE PRIMARY LOOP SHOULD BE DEACTIVATED, AND THE SECONDARY LOOP ACTIVATED, IF NECESSARY. *(1)MOMENTARY DEVIA- TIONS WHEN HEAT LOAD OR TEMPERATURE OF COOLING SOURCE VARIES RAPIDLY ARE NOT CONSIDERED VIOLATIONS. *(2)MAXIMUM REDLINE APPLICABLE ONLY AFTER
				20 A						T-30 MIN.
MISSI	ON:	SECTION:	STA	GE/SUBSECTION:			SY	STEM:		
SA	-513/SL-	1 WO	RKSHOP A	M/THERMAL CON	TROL S	SYSTEM		REDLINE	S AND CAT	EGORIES
REMA	RKS:							REQUIRED BY		
Th of in	e CVPA a battery the con	modules and densing heat	et temperatures are mon satisfactory temperatu exchanger. For relate	re control fo d data see CN	r mois	sture re	cooling moval			C-EAST
-0	09, and	-022, Pages	I-94, I-98, I-99, I-96)	•				CONTROL NUM	IBER: 513-WP-0	023-R5
			CONCURRENCES					P	AGE	REVISION
AERO:		ASTR:	ASTN: JWL		CS	SE:		1.,2.,3	.,4.,5.	REV. 5
			AL/MDA							1997 - Contract - Cont
	P	(Key June 1970)	PROG. ENG. OFFICE:	PROG. OFFICE: (E	I) MC 4/	0-MGR:	19/23	DATE: MAY	9 1973	PAGE: 1-97

	Contractor and the second s	Contraction of the second s									
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION		FLT CONT	CATEGORY	PRE-LAUNCH	and the second se	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES	
-	-	C284-534 C286-534 (ALT)	TEMP - SECONDARY COO TROL VALVE CVSA OUTI TEMP - SEC RGN HX IN MOD	LET 1			-1 of 2 M	43°F *,* (1)	NONE	FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION AND TEMPERATURE STABILI- ZATION UNTIL SECONDARY LOOP TURN OFF (APPROX. T-5 HOURS)	
										*IN THE CASE OF A VIO- LATION OF THE MINIMUM REDLINE LIMIT, CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED TO PREVENT FREEZING OF THE EVA/IVA SUIT COOLANT. THE PRIMARY LOOP SHOULD BE DEACTIVATED, AND THE SECONDARY LOOP ACTIVATED, IF NECESSARY. *(1) MOMENTARY DEVIA- TIONS WHEN HEAT LOAD OR TEMPERATURE OF COOLING SOURCE VARIES RAPIDLY ARE NOT CONSIDERED VIOLATIONS.	
MISS		SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECTI			5	STEM:			
SA	-513/SL-	1 WORKSH	OP	AM/THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM					REDLINES AND CATEGORIES		
MSFC	- Form 3173-	3 (Rev June 1970)					C	ONTROL NO. 5	513-WP-023-	-R5 PAGE I. 1	

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. System Description

Two independent, redundant coolant loops (primary and secondary) are provided. There are two pump packages, one for each loop containing three coolant pump/motor units. Three power supplies are provided for the three pump/ motor units of each loop to convert spacecraft supplied DC power to the AC power required by the pump motors. During normal operation, one pump is operated in each loop, with each pump powered by a separate inverter. For a contingency mode after loss of one coolant loop, two pumps are operated in the remaining loop, with both pumps powered by a single inverter. Pump and inverter selection is provided by onboard switches and also DCS command. Inverter No. 1 powers pumps A and/or B, inverter No. 2 powers pumps B and/or C, and inverter No. 3 powers pumps C and/or A. Reservoirs are provided to maintain pump inlet pressure.

The coolant loops provide temperature control for ECS equipment, coldplated electrical/electronic equipment, and the ATM C&D panel/EREP heat exchanger. ECS equipment consists of suit cooling heat exchangers, condensing heat exchangers, cabin heat exchangers for OWS and AM/MDA, and an oxygen heat exchanger. The coldplated equipment includes three tape recorders, two battery modules, six electronic modules and two coolant pump inverter coldplates. All coldplated equipment except the pump inverters contain parallel coolant passages to permit passage of both primary and secondary coolant. Figure 1 is a system diagram illustrating measurement sensor locations.

During the LMRD effectivity period one or both loops may be activated and heat is dissipated to a ground coolant cart through a ground cooling heat exchanger installed in a bypass line around the radiator. Flow through the ground cooling heat exchanger is controlled by the radiator bypass selector valves which are in the bypass position until approximately T -5 hours, at which time the secondary loop is switched to the normal position and deactivated via DCS command. At T -9:25 minutes, the primary loop is switched to the normal position via DCS command. In orbit, heat is rejected to space by a radiator. Radiator performance is supplemented by a thermal capacitor (charged with tridecane wax) located downstream of the radiator. The capacitor stores heat while the vehicle is on the hot side of the orbit and rejects the heat on the cold side.

FORM C

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

#### 2. Probable Causes of Redline Violations

#### Maximum limit violations:

- a. Coolant temperature control valve malfunction.
- b. Premature activation of radiator bypass selector valve Should be detected by discrete measurement K209-515 for the primary coolant loop and K210-515 for the secondary coolant loop. (Ref 513-WP-028, Page I-100)
- c. Malfunction of ground cooling system.
- d. Motor/pump unit malfunction Should be detected by the observer monitoring pump △P and coolant flow. (Ref. 513-WP-009, Page I-99)

#### Minimum limit violations:

Coolant temperature control valve malfunction.

3. Consequences of Redline Violations

A violation of the minimum limit in the primary (secondary) loop may prevent coolant temperature control valve CVPB (CVSB) from maintaining satisfactory temperature control for moisture removal in the condensing heat exchanger and thus prevent maintenance of the desired dew point with present operational plans. A gross violation of minimum limit could result in freezing of the EVA/IVA suit coolant. A violation of the maximum limit could reduce cooling of battery modules to an unacceptably low level.

4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

Primary Coolant Loop:

C244-515	TEMP, THERMAL CAPACITOR,	- Nominal Values:	≤+18°F	A value higher than 40°F prior to T-30 minutes or a value higher than 18°F after
	PRI OUTLET			T-30 minutes would indicate a failure of the ground cooling system or premature
C265-517	TEMP-THERMAL CAP 2 PRI INLET			switching of the radiator bypass selector valve.
K209–515	EVENT, PRI RAD BYPASS MONITOR. ONE = BYPASS			Value of ONE until Bypass Mode is switched at T -5 minutes.

7.3

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

Secondary Coolant Loop:

C245-515 TEMP, THERMAL CAPACITOR,

Nominal Values: ≤+40°F

SEC OUTLET

A value higher than 40°F prior to secondary loop deactivation would indicate a failure of the ground cooling system or premature switching of the radiator bypass selector value.

K210-515 EVENT, SEC RAD BYPASS MONITOR. ONE = BYPASS Value of ONE until secondary loop turned off at approximately T -5 hours.

### 4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values (Continued)

LMRs 513-WP-008 and 513-WP-009 covering pump inlet pressure, pump differential pressure and coolant flow provide additional information.

5. Not Applicable

#### 6. Reliability/Redundancy Consideration

Exceeding redline limits can be an indication that any one of several failures may have occurred which could ultimately result in complete operational loss of one of the two coolant loops thereby eliminating loop redundancy. Such an event would decrease the coolant system reliability.

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR ITEM	CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS :
•.	LCC-II	pg 24	ECS 4.1.37	61C830096-11/Temp Control Valve -47°F	C283,C285 C284, C286	Yes	

\* WILL FAILURE OF THIS COMPONENT CAUSE MEASUREMENT TO EXCEED REDLINE LIMIT?

# 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

- a. Instrumentation accuracy: +0.3, -1.0 (Range 42 to 52)° F (CRT)
- b. Method of redline value determination: The coolant temperature control values CVPA and CVSA adjusted prior to installation to maintain value outlet coolant temperature between 45°F and 49°F. The correct outlet temperature is obtained by proportional mixing of hot and cold incoming coolant. In a normally operating value, the flow of hot coolant into the value will be completely blocked (except for allowable internal leakage) if the outlet temperature rises to 49°F and the flow of cold coolant completely blocked if the outlet temperature drops to 45°F. The given redline limits were based on these value characteristics together with noted instrumentation accuracy and an allowance for heat leak into coolant lines between the value and the sensors.

### 8. Other Information


None.

9. System Schematic

See Fig. 1.

• MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND



MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTROL NO.513-WP-023-R5 PAGE 1-97.6

FORM	в

# MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE INPUT

REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIO	N	CATEGORY			REDLINE	VALUES	THE DEDIOD ACTION NOTES
REV	TIEW	MEAS/ IW NO.	DESURIFIIO	14	FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD ACTION NOTES
	3-2715	D222-515	PRESSURE - PRI COOI INLET	LANT PUMP			М	25 PSIA	NONE	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL INITIATION OF
	3-2716	D223-515	PRESSURE - SEC COOL INLET	LANT PUMP			М	25 PSIA	NONE	AUTOMATIC SEQUENCE.
										P <b>P</b>
		Υ.								
							-			а А
ŝ.										
			•							
		(r								
8		ц.								
				2						
		9			24					
1155	ION:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECTI	ON:		Isv	STEM:		
				AM/THERMAL		OVOTEM				
	A-513/SL-	-1 V	VORK SHOP	AM/ IHERMAL		SISIEM				CATEGORIES
			1					REQUIRED BY		
	-	-	adequate coolant is -022, and -023)	s available 1	n the re	servoir.		M	DAC-EAST	
(Re	er. 515-w	2-004, -009,	-022, and -023)				ļ			
								CONTROL NU		
									.3-WP-008-	
			CONCURRENC	CES					AGE	REVISION
AERO		ASTR:	ASTN: W			CSE:	ŀ		.2	REV.3
AL/MDA - 100								.1		REV. 5
			PROG. ENG. OFFIC		E. (ET)	MO-MGR:		DAT	0 0070	PAGE:
			PROG. ENG. UPPIN	#5-9-		WHE 5		DAT MAY	9 1973	PAGE: 1-98

MSFC - Form 3173-2 (Rev June 1970)

FORM C

SY	TEM BACKGROUND DATA:	
1.	System Description	
	Ref. 513-WP-023.	
2.	Probable Causes of Redline Violations	
	Maximum limit violations	
	a. Excessive coolant in system. b. Excessive coolant temperature resulting in excessive coolant expansion (See 513-WP-022).	
	Minimum limit violations	
	<ul> <li>a. Coolant leakage.</li> <li>b. Leak of Freon pressurant in reservoir.</li> <li>c. Malfunction of coolant control valve CVPC or CVSC causing coolant temperature to be lower than specified resulting in excessive coolant contraction (See 513-WP-022).</li> </ul>	
3.	Consequences of Redline Violations	
	Minimum redline limit violation would render the affected loop unusable and, if undetected, operating electron equipment could be overheated and damaged. An upper limit violation caused by a coolant overfill could result in sufficiently high pressures to rupture a cooling system component.	ic
4.	Backup Measurements and Nominal Values	
	K222-515       EVENT, PRI COOLANT RESERVOIR LOW       ON indicates almost total loss of reserve coolant. Pump △P will not be affected until coolant loss	8
	K223-515 EVENT, SEC COOLANT RESERVOIR LOW Nominal Value: OFF is greater than that indicated by these measurement	
5.	Operational Tests	
	Not Applicable.	
MSFC	CONTROL NO. 513-WP-008-R-PAGE	8.1

•										
٠	FO	RM B		<b>MSFC LA</b>	UNCH MI	SSION RU	LE INPL	Л		
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIO	N	FLT CONT	CATEGORY	PRE-LAUNC			TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-2717 D224-515 F214-534		PRESS, PRI COOLANT FLOW, PRI COOLANT C			-1 of 2	20 PSID	70 PSID *	FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTOMATIC SEQUENCE.	
		(ALT)	VALVE CVPB OUT	JONIKOL			l I			*ONE PUMP OPERATION.
										TRANSIENTS WILL OCCUR DURING VALVE SWITCHING
			• • •							
					-		×			
	a.									
11551	ON:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECTI	I ION:		SY	STEM:		
5 <b>A</b> -	513/SL-1	WORK	SHOP	AM/THERMAL	CONTROL	SYSTEM		REDLINI	ES AND CAT	EGORIES
P			f primary and second and secondary pump p		loop flo	w and ver		REQUIRED BY: MDAC-EAST ASTN		
(1	Ref. 513	-WP-004, -00	8, -022, and -023 on	Pages I-94,	I-98, I-9	96, and 1	[-97.)	CONTROL NU	MBER:	
								5	513-WP-009-	<b>-</b> R3
			CONCURRENC		P	AGE	REVISION			
ERO:		ASTR:	ASTN: Jak Sturn AL/MDA The S/B/	1		CSE:		.1,	.2, .3	REV. 5
			PROG. ENG. OFFIC	19/23	DATE: MAY	9 <b>1973</b>	PAGE: I-99			

DEV		MEAS/TH NO	DECODIOTIO	18		CATEGORY		REDLINE	VALUES	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIO	V	FLT CONT		PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME FERIOD/ACTION/NUTES
	3-2717A	D225-515 F215-534 (ALT)	PRESS, SEC COOLANT FLOW, SEC COOLANT C VALVE CVSB OUT				-1 of 2		70 PSID	FROM SYSTEM ACTIVATION UNTIL TERMINATION OF SECONDARY COOLANT LOOP
		(ALI)	VALVE CVSB OUT				јм	238 LB/HR	NONE	FLOW (APPROX. T -5 HOUR
										*ONE PUMP OPERATION.
										TRANSIENTS WILL OCCUR DURING VALVE SWITCHING
		÷				*				
	ă.	- 								
								2		
	2			-			*			
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	2 2 3				-					
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	2						1	-		
				* 			- - -	a	а. Фр	
							-			
	ION:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECT			SY	STEM:		ECODIES
SA-	513/SL-1		WORKSHOP	AM/THERMAL	CONTROL	SISTEM		KEDLINI	ES AND CAT	EGOR1E2

# SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

FORM C

- 1. System Description and Diagram
  - Ref. 513-WP-023, Page I-97.
- 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations

Maximum limit violations

- a. Pump inverter malfunction
- b. Operation of more than one pump in a coolant loop.

Minimum limit violations

- a. Pump malfunction.
- b. Pump inverter malfunction.

c. Excessive coolant leak (should be detected first by observing redline measurements in 513-WP-008, Page I-98).d. Pump off.

### 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

Over-stress conditions that could follow a maximum limit violation may weaken or damage system. Reduced heat removal capability that would follow a minimum limit violation of either the primary or alternate redlines would eventually result in damage to dependent equipment. The given probable causes can result in partial or total loss of affected loop capability or reduction in loop reliability.

- 4. Backup Measurements None.
- 5. Operational Tests

Not Applicable.

6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

A redline violation introduces the possibility of subsequent total loss of the affected primary coolant loop thereby eliminating loop redundancy. Loss of one pump will reduce the affected coolant loop reliability.

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

The Critical Items applicable:

KSC LMR ITEM				PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEA SUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS
	LCC-II	pg 32	ECS 4.1.03	61B85009/Pwr Inv, Cool Pump	D224, D225	Yes	
	LCC-II	pg 32	ECS 4.1.01	52-83700-833/Cool Pump, Dual	D224, D225 F214, F215	Yes	

\* WILL FAILURE OF THIS COMPONENT CAUSE MEASUREMENT TO EXCEED REDLINE LIMIT?

#### 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

Instrumentation accuracy: D224-515, (D225-515),  $\pm$ 7 PSI F214-534, (F215-534)  $\pm$ 7.2 lb/hr. (Based on 20-100% F.S. Range) Method of redline value determination: The given redline limits were estimated from pump performance curves and were verified during spacecraft systems tests. The maximum redline of 70 PSID considers a maximum pump differential pressure of 63 PSID for stabilized one-pump operation with the radiator bypass valve in the NORMAL position and allows for +7 PSI instrumentation inaccuracy. The minimum redline of 20 PSID is based on a mimimum differential pressure of 27 PSID for stabilized one-pump operation with the radiator bypass valve in the BYPASS position and allows for -7 PSI instrumentation inaccuracy. For the alternate measurement, the minimum redline of 238 lb/hr considers a minimum design flow rate of 230 lb/hr for one-pump operation and allows for +7.2 lb/hr instrumentation inaccuracy.

8. Other Information

None.

9. System Schematic

Ref. Fig. 1, 513-WP-023, Page I-97.4



	ITTN	HEAD THAN	DECODIDITION			CATEGORY		REDLINE	VALUES	TIME DEDUCE A OTION ANOTES
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTION		FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-2720	к209-515	PRIMARY RADIATOR BY MONITOR.	PASS			м	* *(1)	* *(1)	FROM START OF LMRD UNTI T-10 MIN
										SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE WHEN BYPASS MONITOR IS DIRECTED TO GSE
										(1) FROM T-10 MIN, UNTI INITIATION OF AUTO SEQ. (T-3 MIN 7 SEC)
										SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE WHEN BYPASS MONITOR IS DIRECTED TO RADIATOR. AT LEAST A 4 PSID IN- CREASE IN D224 IS REQUIRED COINCIDENT WIT THE BYPASS VALVE CYCLIN TO INSURE THE BYPASS VALVE HAS MOVED TO RADI ATOR POSITION.
1										
ISSI SA-	on: -513/SL-1	SECTION: WORI	KSHOP	STAGE/SUBSECTION		in y N N N	SYS	tem: RED	LINES AND	CATEGORIES
EMA		ide verifica he proper po	ation that coolant sy osition.	stem radiato	or bypass	s valves	are	REQUIRED BY	: AC-East	•
							C	ONTROL NUM 51	ABER: 3WP-028-R	5
	<del>.</del>		CONCURRENC	F S				Р	AGE	REVISION
RO:		ASTR:	ASTN: AND					.1, .2,	.3	REV. 5
			AL/MDA 2012 5/8/73							
			PROG. ENG. OFFICE			and the strength of the strength os strength of the strength os strength of the strength os strength o	19/23	ATE: BEAN		PAGE:

[	1.00				1	CATEGORY		REDLINE	VALUES	
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIC	)N	FLT CONT		PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-2721	K210-515	SECONDARY RADIATOR D MONITOR	BYPASS			М	*	*	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL SECONDARY LOOP TURN-OFF (APPKOX. T-5 HRS)
										SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE WHEN BYPASS MONITOR IS DIRECTED TO BYPASS
			- 5.					*(1)	*(1)	*(1)FROM SECONDARY LOOP TURN-OFF (APPROX. T-5 HRS) UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTO SEQUENCE (T-3 MIN 7 SEC)
										SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE WHEN BYPASS MONITOR IS DIRECTED TO RADIATOR. AT LEAST A 4 PSID INCREASE IN D225 IS REQUIRED COIN- CIDENT WITH THE BYPASS VALVE CYCLING TO INSURE THE BYPASS VALVE HAS MOVED TO RADIATOR POSITION.
										IE
MISS		SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECT			SY	STEM:		
SA-	513/SL-1		WORKSHOP	AM	/TCS			REDI	LINES AND	CATEGORIES
MSFC	- Form 3173-	-3 (Rev June 1970)		-			C(	ONTROL NO.	513-WP-02	28-R5 PAGE I 0.1



## SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

#### 1. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

FORM C

Ref. 513-WP-023, Page I-97.

#### 2. PROBABLE CAUSES OF REDLINE VIOLATIONS

- a. Premature switching of radiator bypass valve.
- b. Failure of command system to properly position the valve.
- c. Valve malfunction.

#### 3. CONSEQUENCES OF REDLINE VIOLATIONS

Violation of the redline limit for K210-515 prior to primary loop turn on will prematurely terminate ground cooling of the AM coolant system. Violation of the redline limit for K209-515 after secondary loop turn off and prior to T-10 minutes will prematurely terminate ground cooling of the AM coolant system. If ground cooling is prematurely terminated, excessive coolant temperatures could be obtained with possible overheating of coldplate mounted equipment or lift-off could occur with thermal capacitors which are partially or completely discharged (Ref. 513-WP-024). A violation after T-10 minutes will result in loss of heat rejection capability of the primary coolant loop via the radiator during orbital operation unless the valve can be manually positioned by the crew during cluster activation. (See Page I-95.)

Violation of the redline limit for K210-515 will result in loss of heat rejection capability of the secondary coolant loop via the radiator during orbital operation.

Failure of pump differential pressure to increase at least 4 PSID in either loop after switching command is sent is a positive indication that the related value did not operate to the radiator position even though the appropriate discrete (K209 or K210) may be indicating that it has. (Note: In the case of one of the discretes indicating a value has assumed the radiator position without the occurrence of a corresponding increase of differential pressure, crew operation of the onboard switch is not likely to cause value operation.)

#### 4. BACKUP MEASUREMENTS AND NOMINAL VALUES

Primary and Secondary Loop: C262-517 TEMP, THERMAL CAP. 1 SKIN 1 A temperature increase will occur following pre-C263-517 TEMP, THERMAL CAP. 1 SKIN 2 mature switching of primary radiator bypass valve.

#### 5. OPERATIONAL TESTS

None

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

#### 6. RELIABILITY/REDUNDANCY CONSIDERATIONS

Exceeding redline limits may indicate that any one of several failures has occurred. The failure could result in ineffective operation of the coolant system and overheating of equipment and could ultimately result in complete operational loss of one of the two coolant loops thereby eliminating loop redundancy.

#### 7. INSTRUMENTATION ACCURACY AND METHOD OF REDLINE DETERMINATION

Not applicable to the discrete measurements.


The requirement given for the increase in pump differential pressure when the bypass value is switched is based on CDDT and spacecraft tests and analyses. The D224 and D225 instrumentation inaccuracy of  $\pm$  7 PSID is not considered applicable since the requirement is expressed in terms of a delta rather than an absolute measurement. Test experience indicates that an increase in stabilized differential pressure greater than 4 PSI will be obtained as a result of switching the radiator bypass value to the normal (radiator) position.

#### 8. OTHER INFORMATION

None

#### 9. SYSTEM SCHEMATIC

Ref. Figure 1, 513-WP-023, Page I-97.4



MSFC - Form 3173-7 (October 1968)

•	FOR				MSFC LAU	UNCH M	JON RU	LE INP	UT		•		
Dr.	ITCH	NEAS /TH NO	-	DECODIDITIO	1		CATEGORY		REDLINE	VALUES			
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.		DESCRIPTIO	V	FLT CONT	ENG DATA			MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES		
	3-6101A	DP7033 (ACE)	POSITION, CMG 1	EVACUATIO	N VALVE OPEN			М	*	*	FROM START OF LMRD UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTO SEQUENCE		
	3-6101B	DP7034 (ACE)	POSITION, CMG 2	EVACUATIO	N VALVE OPEN			М	*	*	*SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE IF INDICATION IS OFF		
	3-6101C	DP7035 (ACE)	POSITION, CMG 3	EVACUATIO	N VALVE OPEN			М	*	*			
						- - -	5						
										-			
MISSI	DN:	SECTION:			STAGE/SUBSECTIO	SN:		s	YSTEM:				
SA-	513/SL-1		WORKSHOP		A	rm/apcs			· ·	REDLINES A	ND CATEGORY		
REMA	REMARKS: Insure energy is not applied to ATM APCS Buses +7D12 & +7D22. The evacuation valve positions will indicate OPEN if either of the subject busses have been inadvertently powered. Assessment of the cause will have to be performed and corrective action taken									REQUIRED BYUAL-PF ASTR-S ATM (APCS) Mr. Igou			
and the second second										105	DEVICION		
AERO:				CONCURRENC					AGE	REVISION			
ALKO		ASTR: 4/ E.F. M	3/73 AS		QUAL /	3-4-73			.1, .2,	.3,	REV 5		
ATM									1	1)			
01710 <b>7</b> 1-1 (140)		(Fey June 1970)	PR	DG. ENG. OFFIC	E: PROG. OFFIC		мо-мда: 1992 4	1/5/73	DATE: MAY	9 1973	PAGE: I-108A		

#### FORM C

## SYSTEM BACKGROUND DATA:

### 1. System Description

The ATM/APCS sub-buses \*\*7D12 and +7D22 are the sources of input DC power to the Attitude and Pointing Control System components. The on/off status of these sub-buses can be controlled from the IU through the SWS switch selector, from the AMDCS, and from ATM switch selector number one. The APQS sub-buses can be energized from these control sources anytime the ATM +7D11 and +7D21 main buses are energized; these buses are energized for approximately 70 hours during the countdown and are still on at liftoff. Electrical closeout of the APCS in the VAB latches (sets) the power input relays for the primary ATMDC, the Acq. S.S., and the 3 CMG's so that these components are powered up in flight by the "APCS\_ on" commands from the IU. The 9 rack rate gyros are configured in a similar manner during countdown. Any command to the APCS sub-buses during countdown will prematurely power up the APCS components that are latched to +7D12 and +7D22. The status of these buses can be monitored by observing the status of the three CMG evacuation valve open indications since electrical closeout provides a path from the sub-buses through the CMGIA and CMG to the umbilical measuring system. An additional monitor point is available until T-9 minutes when the deadface relays open; this monitor point is a direct readout of the sub-buses?

#### 2. Probable Cause of Redline Violations

- a. Inadvertent ATM switch selector number one command.
- b. Inadvertent IU command.
- c. Inadvertent AM DCS command, local or from MCC Houston.
- d. Failure in control networks.

#### 3. Consequences of Redline Violations

- a. If the APCS sub-buses are powered up during the countdown, this would indicate that an erroneous command has been issued by one of the control sources or that a failure has occurred in the control networks. The results of such a premature command would be:
  - The ATM Batteries would be loaded with approximately 40 amperes from T-71 Hours until T-7 Minutes. After T-7 Minutes the ATM Batteries would be loaded with approximately 50 amperes. On orbit battery reserve could be reduced below an acceptable level, depending upon the time of malfunction.
  - 2) The ATM DC, WCIU, CMG, CMG Inverter Assemblies, Acquisition Sun Sensors, and Rack Rate Gyros would be operated with no method of monitoring their performance or temperature. These components and the ATM batteries could operate above their specified ranges and be damaged.

MSFC - Form 3173-5 (August 1968)



MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

#### 4. Backup Measurements and Nominal Values

Measurements:		Nominal Value:	Remarks:
*BP7033, Voltage,	Bus +7D12	0.0 to 2.0 VDC	*Inactive
*BP7034, Voltage,	Bus +7D22	0.0 to 2.0 VDC	open at T

\*Inactive after deadface relays open at T-9 minutes.

5. Operational Test (Other Method of System Validation)

#### None

#### 6. Reliability/Redundancy Considerations

The APCS sub-buses can be turned on from three sources. Any of the commands will power up both +7D12 and +7D22; separate command is available from ATM switch selector number one and to turn the buses off one at a time.

The Critical Items applicable: TBD

CIL GP/CAT	CIL IDENT	FMEA IDENT	PART NUMBER/PART NAME	MEASUREMENT NUMBER	*	COMMENTS

#### 7. Instrumentation Accuracy and Method of Redline Value Determination

These measurements are discrete indications.

The position of latching relays and CMG valve switches after electrical closeout in the VAB is such that the +7D12 and +7D22 bus voltages are available on the above measurements until plug eject. These three measurements are on red event lights in the ATM control room.


8. Other Information

None.

MSFC - Form 3173-6 (August 1968)

CONTINUATION SHEET (FORM C)

MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULE BACKGROUND




		INDEX	
	SECTION III	DISAPPROVED LAUNCH MISSION RULES	
KSC Item Number(s)	Control Number	Rule Description	Page Number
	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		
	RP-010 *(4) *	VOLTAGE, BUS 7D11 ATM FIGURE 1	
	*(1) *(2)	ATM FIGURE 2 ATM FIGURE 3	THESE DISAPPROVED
	*(3) *(4)	ATM FIGURE 4 ATM FIGURE 5	RULES ARE RETAINED
2-431	OP-011 BP-004 OP-012	TEMP - GTCS, FOOD CONTAINER EXT. S-II LOX DEPLETION SENSORS 1-5 OPEN EVENT, RS, PRI LOOP RAD BYPASS VLV, BYP MODE	IN THE MO-E FILES
	OP-018	EVENT, MS, TENS STRAPS SECURED	
3-2106 thru 3-2109	WP-007	VOLT, INSTR BUSES A	III-18
3-611 thru 3-616	<b>OP-</b> 015	EVENT, TACS THRUSTERS	III <b>-</b> 19
3-218A	<b>OP-0</b> 24	EVENT - AM GND PWR ENABLE ON	<b>III-20</b>
2 - - -	OP-025	EVENT - RS, RADIATOR PROTECTIVE SHIELD JETTISON AND RTN SW RLYS IF MODE ON	<b>III-</b> 21
	OP-026	EVENT - OWS, ATM SAW PRI AND SEC AND A & B	III-22
	OP-027	EVENT - OWS SAW SECTION AND FAIRING DEPL RLY RST	III-23
	OP-028	EVENT - OWS MS RLY RST ON & H/A SOL VNT CLOSE OFF	VLV III-24
N SECTION 3/SL- III	STAGE/SUBSECTION	SYSTEM	DATE/CHANGE NO PAGE MAY 9 1973 R5 III-

# **MSFC LAUNCH MISSION RULES**


		an a	INDEX			
		SECTION III DIS	SAPPROVED LAUNCH MISSION RULES	) LAUNCH MISSION RULES		
KSC Item Number(s)		Control Number	Rule Description	Rule Description		
		OP-029	EVENT, ATM DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY RELAYS RST ON		111-25	
		OP-030	EVENT - PAYLOAD SHROUD RELAYS R	ST ON	<b>III-26</b>	
-						
ON 513/ SL-1	SECTION	STAGE SUBSECTION	SYSTEM		DATE/CHANGE NO MAY 9 1973 R5	PAGE


	FOI	RM B		MSFC LA		SION RU	LE INPU	г		
-	1754	115 40 / 714 110	DECODIOTION		CATEGORY			REDLINE VALUES		
REV	ITEM	MEAS/TM NO.	DESCRIPTIC	JN	FLT CONT	ENG DATA	PRE-LAUNCH	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM	TIME PERIOD/ACTION/NOTES
	3-218A	K7428-411 (UMB)	EVENT-AM GND PWR E	NABLE ON		1	M	*	*	FROM TRANSFER TO INTERNAL POWER (APPROX. T-15 MIN.) UNTIL INITIATION OF AUTO- MATIC SEQUENCE. *SYSTEM IN TOLERANCE IF ENABLE INDICATION OFF.
						z sz to Rev s	his rule -EI. The be a mand	DISAPPRO has been di rule is no atory requi	VED RULE (sapproved trement: 9 1973	
MISSI	ON:	SECTION:		STAGE/SUBSECT			SYS	ТЕМ:		$\checkmark$ ———
S	A-513/SI	-1 W	ORKSHOP	CONTROL	ER DISTRI SYSTEM	BUTION A	ND	REDLIN	ES AND CAT	EGORIES
REMA							I	REQUIRED BY		
T 1 0 m	his meas ated fro VDC at inus <b>15</b> 1	m the OWS um execution of	fies that the OWS SA bilical. A change : Airlock Module Grou cates that the OWS u	in output of und Power En	K7428 fr able Off	om +28 V command	ly iso- DC to (launch	MDAC-We	est	
			CONCURREN	050				P	AGE	REVISION
AERO:		ASTR:	13-73 ASTN:	SW	3/13/73			.1, .2,	.3	REV 4
			0							
		(Rev June 1970)	PROG. ENG. OFFIC	CE: PROG. OFF		MO-MGR:		ATE: MAY	9 1973	PAGE: - III-20

4




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



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