[B-Greek] Questions about NT verbal aspect

LuisCReyes at aol.com LuisCReyes at aol.com
Tue Jan 16 20:10:52 EST 2007


 
Dear Steven, 
Thank you for responding and sharing your thoughts. I  hope that I am not 
drifting too far from the format of this list. I think that I  should expand a 
little more on the differences that I make between: (a)  accidental information 
transmission, (b) covert information  transmission, and (c) overt information 
transmission.   
Under (a) accidental information transmission,  for example, one may consider 
a person’s accent, or his own unique linguistic  expressions (his idiolect) 
to draw a variety of conclusions. The speaker may  unintentionally communicate 
that he or she is from a particular region, or that  he belongs to a 
particular social class, etc. The point is that in accidental  information transmission 
the speaker does not intend for this information to be  noticed. I am also 
inclined to say that under this category one can also include  (perhaps 
partially) unintended  subconscious information by use of a grammar (a code). For 
example, in South  Central Los Angeles, one sometimes hears the use of African 
American Vernacular English (AAVE) (a variety formerly known as  Black English). 
Someone from this area using a particular  linguistic/grammatical expression 
may want to communicate a particular idea by  encoding it in a unique 
linguistic from. A hearer, may understand the speaker’s  intended meaning (despite the “
awkward” or “ungrammatical” English), but upon  hearing the speaker’s 
sub-conscious linguistic grammaticalization of a  particular concept (assuming we 
can even tell whether it was subconscious or  not), the hearer may also draw 
all sorts of additional conclusions from the  speaker’s linguistic expression. 
For example, he may conclude that the speaker  is uneducated pertaining to 
proper modern English usage etc. This information  may never have been intended by 
the speaker, and he may have never intended his  hearers to draw any of these 
conclusions based on the structure of his  linguistic expression, whether 
subconsciously or not.   
In (b) covert information transmission, the  speaker may include a level of 
manipulation or concealment. He may, for example,  appear to be more 
intelligent than he actually is, or tougher than he actually  is etc. He may 
intentionally use certain linguistic/grammatical expressions to  attempt to pass-off such 
notions. However, these things are not meant to be  noticed by the hearers. 
This would fall under covert information transmission.  This involves a speaker’
s intention, but it is not meant to be noticed by the  hearers. I don’t think 
that verbal aspect would fall under this, unless you can  find a text where 
the speaker was deliberately manipulating his encoded meaning  in the sense of 
(b). 
In (c) overt information transmission, as noted  already, a speaker makes a 
genuine attempt at sharing information, and thus  intends to convey a certain 
message or information. Considering your  suggestion of subdividing (c) or 
adding a category of (d), I am trying to think  of a situation where someone would 
intentionally communicate information subconsciously. This almost sounds like 
 a contradiction of ideas (at least on the face of it); for how can one 
intentionally communicate something that  he or she is not aware of? Perhaps by 
constant intentional conscious repetition  of a linguistic structure until it 
becomes grammaticalized? Perhaps after a  point in time the speaker’s intended 
meaning becomes grammaticalized and encoded  in the linguistic form. It is 
conceivable (at least to me) that in this way at  some point a speaker could 
intentionally communicate information subconsciously while uttering a  linguistic 
expression, and perhaps we can categorize this as (d) as you have  suggested. 
This is possible, but I have some concerns about this.   
You mention pragmatics, and  pragmatics is certainly critical here, since 
from my understanding linguistic  communication (based on the code model of 
communication) often falls short of  communicating the speaker’s intended meaning 
(Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, 1986, pps. 1-64). Sperber and  Wilson write, “
there is a gap between the semantic representations of  sentences and the 
thoughts actually communicated by utterances. This gap is  filled not by more 
coding, but by inference” (ibid, p. 9). This  observation is linked to a 
distinction between the linguistic lexico/grammatical  meaning of a sentence 
(semantics), which is recovered by decoding, and a more  general process of utterance 
interpretation (pragmatics). There is a difference between  what the 
linguistic/morphological/grammatical structure means, and what the  actual speaker’s 
intended meaning actually is. A linguist may be interested in  what the encoded 
linguistic/morphological/grammatical structure means, but what  I am interested 
in is to know what the speaker actually meant by using that  particular 
linguistic form, in a particular situation, and for a particular  reason. I am not 
too interested in what his words mean, as much as I am  interested in what he 
meant by using those words. However, the speaker’s words  may provide a clue as 
to what the speaker means, but inference is still needed  nonetheless.  
Since one’s subconscious use of an encoded  
linguistic/morphological/grammatical structure (a code) can fall under (a)  (accidental information transfer, 
transferring subconscious unintended information) or  (d) (transferring 
subconscious intended  information), then how does one determine whether the 
situation is actually  (a) or (d) when considering verbal aspect? I think that this is 
a critical issue  for proponents of verbal aspect theory. My opinion is that 
pragmatics is  unavoidable, and that insights from Relevance Theory can 
actually assist in  making such determinations (this is something that I am  
researching). 
As far as Porter, you  indicated that his view on the matter is that verbal 
aspect is considered to be  a reflection of the original speaker's formulation 
of a particular  conceptualization.  This means that verbal aspect is 
considered as a  constituent of the speaker’s conceptual representation. I also wonder 
how much  the notion of verbal aspect is affected by recent insights, 
research, and  experimentation from lexical pragmatics (Cf. Barsalou, 1982, 1987, 
1989,  Barsalou & Billman, 1989). This is something I am also  researching. From 
this perspective concepts have an ad hoc nature to them, and thus, one’s  
conceptual formation may change each and every time it is situated in a  
particular context. A person’s concept for a particular category may  shift and change 
by utilizing different knowledge from his LTM, including information from his  
episodic memory, which may also be a constituent of conceptualization. I  
think this is very important, especially for notions of verbal aspect because,  “
Episodic memory makes possible the acquisition and retrieval of information  
about specific personal experiences that occur at a particular time and place”  
(The Oxford Handbook of Memory,  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 
633). A speaker’s selection of a  particular conceptual idea (possibly including 
verbal aspect if it is a  constituent of episodic memory) may be different 
each and every time a  particular encoded form is used, despite the fact that it 
is the same  linguistic/grammatical form used. Barsalou writes: 
“Across contexts, a given  person’s concept for the same category may 
change, utilizing different knowledge  from long-term memory, at least to some 
extent. . .Concepts are flexible. Rather  than existing as a stable set of features 
in different people, and in the same  person across contexts, a concept 
varies widely both between and within  individuals” (Barsalou, 1993, 29-30). 
There is a great deal of evidence in the memory  literature that supports the 
notion of flexibility with human concepts. This  flexibility indicates that a 
concept can vary widely across individuals and  occasions. If verbal aspect 
is considered to be a  reflection of the original speaker's formulation of a 
particular  conceptualization, then I am certain that this will have a bearing 
on how  verbal aspect is perceived (at least from a pragmatic perspective). 
This in turn  may have an impact on the interpretation of verbal aspect as it is  
encoded in the use of an utterance. These are things that I am  currently 
researching. I also think that what you mentioned pertaining to  discourse and 
verbal aspect is also important (I am aware that there are about  three new 
books on this, although I have not had the opportunity to read them).  I am always 
interested in any relevant reading you may suggest. Thank you  Steve. 
God bless 
Luis C. Reyes (mailto:b-greek at lists.ibiblio.org) 



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