[B-Greek] 2Cor 3:15-16 hHNIKA ... AN

Brian Abasciano bvabasciano at gmail.com
Mon Feb 8 02:30:44 EST 2010


Hello Donald,

Donald said: "It seems to me that one of the difficulties in our difference over interpretation is partly due to the use of terms."

My Response: That could very well be true. I have not been using the term "conditional" in a grammatical sense, but in a semantic/logical sense, of one thing being dependent in some way on another. However, the point is that the syntax of hHNIKA AN + subjunctive implies this conditional sense.

Donald said: "What is the difference between "whenever" (ἡνίκα, hNIKA) and "if" (εἰ, EI or ἐάν, EAN)? Does it become clearer if we take an example from modern usage? (granted, the overlap may not be total, but I think the use of ἡνίκα hHNIKA in Ex 34:34, the starting point of our analyses, is close enough.) In the sentence, "If I go to the store I will buy some eggs", we understand that the events described are not certain to happen. It is conditional. The thrust of the sentence is that my going to the store is not certain and that, therefore, my buying eggs may or may not happen. I think we can safely say that the way of describing that in Greek would be to say something along the lines of: Ἐὰν δὲ εἰσπορεύηται Μωϋσῆς ἔναντι κυρίου λαλεῖν αὐτῷ περιαιρήσεται τὸ κάλυμμα, or some such.

On the other hand, if I say, "Everytime I go to the store, I buy some eggs", we understand that 1) I am in the habit of going to the store, and 2) when I do that, I habitually buy eggs. The semantic focus is totally different, and it would be a misuse of language to say that this sentence is conditional. It's not. Yes, of course my buying eggs is contingent on my going to the store--*but that is not the focus of the sentence and it is not the content that the grammar of the sentence is communicating.*"

My Response: Ah but the point is that whether or not the contingency is the *focus* of the sentence or the grammar, it is stil legitimately implied by the sentence and grammar. I am not sure how you could infer from the sentence that buying the eggs is contingent on going to the store apart from the "whenever/everytime" construction (for greater precision, let me mention that it is not just that buying the eggs is contingent on going to the store in the sense that going to the store enables you to buy the eggs, but in with this type of construction, if you go to the store, then it is also certainly true that you buy the eggs; as Carl put it, "whenever" = "if at any time"). 

Donald said: "When Exodus 34:34 says ἡνίκα δ᾽ ἂν εἰσεπορεύετο Μωυσῆς ἔναντι κυρίου λαλεῖν αὐτῷ περιῃρεῖτο τὸ κάλυμμα ἕως τοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι, hHNIKA D᾽ AN EISEPOREUETO MWUSHS ENANTI KURIOU LALEIN AUTWi PERIHiREITO TO KALUMMA hEWS TOU EKPOREUESQAI, this is not, grammatically, a conditional sentence, and its content it is not speaking of a conditional event, it is describing a reccurrent one.

My Response: It is not a formal/explicit conditional sentence, but an informal/implicit one. As Wallace notes, conditions can be either formal (marked by formal structural markers such as EI and EAN ["if"]) or informal (without forml structural markers). He does not mention hHNIKA AN + subjunctive as an informal marker of conditionality, but his discussion is not exhaustive, and hHNIKA AN is rare in the NT, indeed only in 2 Cor 3:15-16. He does mention an informal marker of conditionality that is basically parallel to the one we are discussing, use of a relative clause of the type "whoever", which he takes to be equivalent to "if anyone". I think Carl was dead on when he suggested that "whenever" = "if at any time". 

Donald said: "*Logically*, yes, of course, if Moses did not go into the tent, he did not remove the veil, etc. But that does not make the statement a conditional one, and to try to do so is a misuse of categories, IMO.

My Response: Again, I have not claimed that the sentence is grammatically a formal conditional, but that it is an implicit one. This is not a misuse of categories. Moreover, grmmatical or syntactical constructions can imply certain logical or semantic senses, and that can be very important for meaning. In this case, you draw the conclusion that logically, "Moses took of the veil because of his entering into the tent and, of course, if he did not enter into the tent, he did not take it off." This conclusion is based largely on the use of hHNIKA AN ! If the temporal phrase implies a condition, then it is hard to see how you could object to my saying this very thing. And if one looks at other uses of the phrase in the OT, it happens to be true in every instance.

Donald said: "The sentence is making another point. Especially when it is describing a past factual event, the idea of conditionality becomes very strained, and it is preferable to speak of a reference to habitual concomitant events. I do believe that the same can be said for the use of hHNIKA in the OT generally. Since, as we are both agreed, Ex 34:34 provides the starting point for Paul's inhabitual use of hHNIKA in 2 Cor 3:15-16, I think it is safe to say that we can also say the same for these two verses."

My response: The sentence is making more than one point. It implies conditionality, and it also speaks explicitly of concomitance (indeed, the specific type of concomitance indicated is also what implies conditionality). Your suggestion that conditionality is somwehow ruled out by description of a past factual event strikes me as completely arbitrary and without basis. It is easy to think of past factual events that were conditional. One could say, "If Moses went into the tent, then he took off his veil." I don't see how that is invalid. Moreover, as I mentioned, we are not talking about a grammatically formal conditional, but syntactical structure that implies conditionality.

I said: "I remain in complete agreement with Carl's assessment: "Temporal but generalizing; but I think I'd have to say that it is implicitly conditional, that "whenever" = "if at any time."

Donald said: "I could be wrong, but don't think Carl's definition took into consideration the reference to Ex 34 (that element of this thread came into the discussion later), and, at any rate, I repeat that conditionality is not mentioned in the LS or BDAG entries; what is mentioned is the notion of habitual action (cf. my previous post)."

My Response: IMO, Ex 34:34 strongly supports Carl's statement, and as I have pointed out, your own reasoning seems to prove the point. You infer based on the use of the hHNIKA AN phrase that Moses' removal of the veil was contingent on his going into the tent. I am not sure how there could be stronger evidence that the phrase does imply conditionality there. As for LS and BDAG, they seek to give the lexical meaning of the words, not necessarily their logical implications. They might sometimes do this, but they cannot be counted on to provide such information. 

God bless,

Brian Abasciano
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Donald Cobb 
  To: Brian Abasciano ; B-Greek 
  Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 12:44 AM
  Subject: Re: [B-Greek] 2Cor 3:15-16 hHNIKA ... AN


  Hello Brian,

  It seems to me that one of the difficulties in our difference over interpretation is partly due to the use of terms.

  What is the difference between "whenever" (ἡνίκα, hNIKA) and "if" (εἰ, EI or ἐάν, EAN)? Does it become clearer if we take an example from modern usage? (granted, the overlap may not be total, but I think the use of ἡνίκα hHNIKA in Ex 34:34, the starting point of our analyses, is close enough.) In the sentence, "If I go to the store I will buy some eggs", we understand that the events described are not certain to happen. It is conditional. The thrust of the sentence is that my going to the store is not certain and that, therefore, my buying eggs may or may not happen. I think we can safely say that the way of describing that in Greek would be to say something along the lines of: Ἐὰν δὲ εἰσπορεύηται Μωϋσῆς ἔναντι κυρίου λαλεῖν αὐτῷ περιαιρήσεται τὸ κάλυμμα, or some such.

  On the other hand, if I say, "Everytime I go to the store, I buy some eggs", we understand that 1) I am in the habit of going to the store, and 2) when I do that, I habitually buy eggs. The semantic focus is totally different, and it would be a misuse of language to say that this sentence is conditional. It's not. Yes, of course my buying eggs is contingent on my going to the store--*but that is not the focus of the sentence and it is not the content that the grammar of the sentence is communicating.*

  When Exodus 34:34 says ἡνίκα δ᾽ ἂν εἰσεπορεύετο Μωυσῆς ἔναντι κυρίου λαλεῖν αὐτῷ περιῃρεῖτο τὸ κάλυμμα ἕως τοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι, hHNIKA D᾽ AN EISEPOREUETO MWUSHS ENANTI KURIOU LALEIN AUTWi PERIHiREITO TO KALUMMA hEWS TOU EKPOREUESQAI, this is not, grammatically, a conditional sentence, and its content it is not speaking of a conditional event, it is describing a reccurrent one. *Logically*, yes, of course, if Moses did not go into the tent, he did not remove the veil, etc. But that does not make the statement a conditional one, and to try to do so is a misuse of categories, IMO. The sentence is making another point. Especially when it is describing a past factual event, the idea of conditionality becomes very strained, and it is preferable to speak of a reference to habitual concomitant events. I do believe that the same can be said for the use of hHNIKA in the OT generally. Since, as we are both agreed, Ex 34:34 provides the starting point for Paul's inhabitual use of hHNIKA in 2 Cor 3:15-16, I think it is safe to say that we can also say the same for these two verses.

  < I remain in complete agreement with Carl's assessment: "Temporal but generalizing; but I think I'd have to say that it is implicitly conditional, that "whenever" = "if at any time. >

  I could be wrong, but don't think Carl's definition took into consideration the reference to Ex 34 (that element of this thread came into the discussion later), and, at any rate, I repeat that conditionality is not mentioned in the LS or BDAG entries; what is mentioned is the notion of habitual action (cf. my previous post).

  In summary, I don't think we can legitimately say that Paul is trying to convey a notion of conditionality in these two verses. I think his thoughts go in another direction, that of "what is happening" 1) in the context of Ist century Judaism that does not understand the disappearing glory of the old covenant due to Christ's coming, and 2) in the context of the new covenant, where the factual experience is the removal of the veil (cf. v. 18).

  Blessings,

  Donald Cobb
  Aix-en-Provence, France



  Brian Abasciano a écrit : 
(I am sorry, I sent this message with the wrong subject line, so I am 
sending it with the correct one.)

I said: "Apart from the reading, there would be no experience of the veil"

Elizabeth said: "How about "apart from Moses there is no experience of the
veil" so reading the prophets they understood them clearly but when they
read Moses and just didn't get it. Is this valid?"

My respone: No, it would not be valid, but that is because it is a matter of
common and exegetical sense. Moses and the prophets amount to the same thing
conceptually for Paul--the word of God. You could add the Writings in there
too and it would not change the matter. My point was that experience of the
veil Paul refers to is contingent on the reading of Moses (or any portion of
what Paul considered to be the word of God). Let me give you an example
(this is in English, but it is my contention that English and Greek usage
are the same here). Say there were a picture hanging in the living room of a
friend's house that I frequent, a painting which I hate because it makes me
feel really uncomfortable because of the way it looks, and I said something
like: "Whenever I go into his living room, that painting is there making me
feel uncomfortable." I would not mean that my going into the living room
brings the painting to be there and to make me feel uncomfortable. Of course
the painting is there when I am not in the room. But the "whenever" clause
subordinates the painting's presence in the room to my entering due to the
fact that it is my entering the room that brings the experience of the
presence of the painting and its discomforting effects. I would not mean
that my entrance into the room and the painting's presence and discomforting
effects on me are merely coincidental with no particuluar logical
connection.

Elizabeth said: "It seems to me that Paul's though on spiritual blindness of
both Jews and Gentiles in his other letters is a valid cognitive framework
to be applied to the veil metaphor in this passage. You are making the
metaphor "walk on all four". You are claiming that Paul is affirming a
negative proposition "no spiritual blindness except when they read Torah".
Paul isn't affirming that. He wouldn't affirm that."

My Response: I didn't say that at all. I am saying that the construction he
uses to connect the reading of Moses with the veil on their heart, a
construction which everywhere else in the Bible presents the action as in
some way determinative for a subordinate contingent action, highlights the
fact that the reading of Moses brings about experience of the veil on their
heart. So I am expressly NOT claiming that Paul is affirming a negative
proposition "no spiritual blindness except when they read Torah". I am
saying that Paul is affimring a positive proposition: "whenever they read
Torah, the veil on their heart is actively experienced."

Elizabeth said: "Your are correct that the text under discussion does not
address  spiritual blindness in general, but focuses only on the the reading
of Moses. But if we used your logic, we might state that this metaphor
implies that while reading the Prophets the veil was lifted because it is
only stated in this text that they were under veil while reading Moses."

My Response: I addressed this above. That would simply be an overly literal
and rigid reading of the text. Moses and the Prophets are conceptually
equivalent for Paul. My point was that the text does not make any assertions
about the veil apart from the reading of Moses (or any part of the Bible)
and so this text cannot be used to make assertions about the veil apart from
the reading of Moses (and anything conceptually equivalent to it for Paul,
i.e., the word of God).

Elizabeth said: "Once again,  I agree with Donald Cobb's analysis, point by
point."

My Response: Ok, but one of Donald's main points is that Ex 34:34 stands in
back of Paul's usage and is determinative for it here. I agree. But Donald
also agrees that it is obvious that Moses's entrance into the tent was the
cause/reason/condition of him removing the veil, and thinks so *based on the
temporal expression given*, but then for some reason denies that the
temporal expression implies conditionality. This seems untrenable to me.

I remain in complete agreement with Carl's assessment: "Temporal but
generalizing; but I think I'd have to say that it is implicitly conditional,
that "whenever" = "if at any time." "

God bless,

Brian Abasciano

**********************

From: Elizabeth Kline <kline_dekooning at earthlink.net>
Subject: Re: [B-Greek] 2Cor 3:15-16 hHNIKA ... AN
To: greek B-Greek <b-greek at lists.ibiblio.org>
Message-ID: <833D2A22-291F-49F7-88B4-5E5973A04CEE at earthlink.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii

Brian,


On Feb 5, 2010, at 6:28 AM, Brian Abasciano wrote:

  As for my statement that "Apart from the reading, there would be no 
experience of the veil", I think that is one sound way of expressing what 
the text itself says. It only links the veil with the reading of Moses: 
"Until today, whenever Moses is read, a veil lies over their heart" (2 Cor 
3:15). The text itself only gives us information about the veil in 
connection with the reading of Moses/the Old Covenant. The same is true of 
3:14 as well. If anything is "going beyond the text", it would be to make 
conclusions about the veil that concern it apart from the reading of Moses 
(or tunring to the Lord). I am not saying it is invalid to do so, but it 
is more of a theological exercise than is stating that that the text only 
presents the veil as active in connection with the reading of Moses. This 
latter point seems undeniable based on the wording of the text itself, 
*precisely due to the **temporal** expression we are discussing.* The text 
does not concern itself with the veil oth
     er than its relationship to the reading of Moses (and of course, its
removal upon turning to the Lord). There might be other things to discern
validly about it theologically etc., but that is not specifically mentioned
by the text as is the veil's relationship to the reading of Moses.



  "Apart from the reading, there would be no experience of the veil"
    

How about "apart from Moses there is no experience of the veil" so reading
the prophets they understood them clearly but when they read Moses and just
didn't get it. Is this valid?

It seems to me that Paul's though on spiritual blindness of both Jews and
Gentiles in his other letters is a valid cognitive framework to be applied
to the veil metaphor in this passage. You are making the metaphor "walk on
all four". You are claiming that Paul is affirming a negative proposition
"no spiritual blindness except when they read Torah". Paul isn't affirming
that. He wouldn't affirm that.

Your are correct that the text under discussion does not address  spiritual
blindness in general, but focuses only on the the reading of Moses. But if
we used your logic, we might state that this metaphor implies that while
reading the Prophets the veil was lifted because it is only stated in this
text that they were under veil while reading Moses.

Once again,  I agree with Donald Cobb's analysis, point by point.

I think we have pretty well exhausted this question. Once again, thanks to
everyone who participated.

Elizabeth Kline

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