From: Kimmo Huovila (email@example.com)
Date: Tue May 08 2001 - 12:22:46 EDT
> Let's look at the logic of the text.
> Let Z = those who have once been enlightened, tasted of the heavenly
> gift, been made a partaker of the Holy Spirit, tasted of the good word of
> God and the powers of the age to come, and fallen away (4-6a);
> Let Y = the same are renewed to repentance;
> Let X = the Son of God is crucified again and put Him to open shame.
> The argument can then be put together as:
> If Z, then not Y (6:4-6a). This is necessarily a true statement (on the
> assumption of Z), because Y cannot be true. Why not?
> Because, if Y is true, then X is necessarily true, that is, if Y then X
I can see that the rest of your argument follows from this premise. It
is just at this point that I see things differently. If we assume that
there was the thought around that if one is renewed, then the Son is
crucified again, I could see the author using the participle (of manner)
to contradict the whole scenario. But I doubt the "if Y then X" is ever
expressed by having X as the participle and Y as the regent of the
participle. It is normally the other way around (the 'protasis' is the
I have seen your line of exegesis before, and wondered how they take
this participle. Now, even though I cannot (at least now) agree that it
is grammatically possible, I sincerely appreciate that you took time to
explain it to me. Thanks. And I still appreciate any fresh input.
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