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Chapter 5 – Progress of the Siege

July

Question of Materials for a Siege

From the first hour of his appearance at Dehli, Baird Smith had begun to examine thoroughly the means and resources at his disposal. He had no great opinion of the power of the place to stand a siege, if the besiegers had adequate material for its prosecution. But never was a besieging army in worse plight for the conduct of great operations than the British Army before Dehli. The Chief Engineer found that his siege ordnance consisted of two 24-pounders, nine 18-pounders, six 8-inch mortars, and two or three 8-inch howitzers. The enemy were much stronger in Artillery. They could bring to any point open to attack from twenty-five to thirty guns, and ten or twelve mortars – all as well served as our own. But there was something even worse than this. If we had possessed more guns we could not have used them, for there was a deplorable want of ammunition. Baird Smith stood aghast at the discovery that the shot in store for the heavy guns was scarcely equal to the requirements of a day’s siege, and there was no immediate prospect of the receipt of further supplies; whilst, on the other hand, the enemy were furnished with the inexhaustible resources of the great Dehli Magazine. It was plain, therefore, that in this helpless state it would have been madness to commence siege operations, which must have been speedily abandoned from the exhaustion of our material supplies.

Question of Assault

But the question still suggested itself: “Might not the place be carried by assault?” It was easier to answer this in the affirmative. “Here,” he argued, “the relative forces are materially changed in value. We have a highly disciplined body under a single head, completely in hand, full of pluck, and anxious to attack, and with

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almost unlimited self-reliance. The enemy is without any head, not in hand at all, so far broken in spirit that he has never met us in battle – with any odds in his favour – without being beaten. It is very true that his numbers much exceed ours, and that in a town, in street-fighting, discipline is of less value than in the open battle-field. It is true, also, that assaults are proverbially precarious. Napoleon said of them, a dog or a goose may decide their issues.’ The results of failure would be as terrible and depressing as those of success would be glorious and inspiriting443.” All these things he deliberately considered; but, weighing the chances on either side., he came to the conclusion that “the probabilities of success were far greater than those of failure, and the reasons justifying an assault stronger than those which justified inaction.” He therefore urged upon the General, in an official letter, the advantages of an assault by escalade, the gates which we desired to force being blown in by powder-bags. “And,” he wrote, four months afterwards, “looking back now with the full advantages of actual experience, and with, I believe, very little disposition to maintain a foregone conclusion. because it was foregone, I think at this moment, if we had assaulted any time between the 4th and 14th of July, we should have carried the place444.”

When the Engineer’s letter reached the Head-Quarters of the Force, Sir Henry Barnard was dead, or dying445. The command was then assumed by General Reed’. General Reed. Since he had been in the Dehli Camp, with no immediate responsibility upon him, his health had improved; and although he still appeared to others, especially to men with the inexhaustible energies of Baird Smith, a feeble invalid, he believed,

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himself to be equal to the work, and wrote that, “with the aid of the Almighty, he trusted to carry it to a successful issue.” To this officer Baird Smith’s plan of assault was submitted. He did not immediately reject it. On the 9th, he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, saying, “We still have the assault in contemplation, the details of which are not yet quite completed by the Engineers’ Department under Baird Smith.” But the delay, whether originating in the Engineers’ Department, or in the councils of the General, was fatal to the scheme; and, as Baird Smith afterwards wrote, “the opportunity passed away, and the question of assault or no assault finally resolved itself into doing nothing by sheer force of circumstances.” “Whatever is,” he added, “being best, I am content with things as they are, and I am very far indeed from attaching the slightest blame to those who differed from me on the question of assaulting. They, doubtless, examined the probabilities as conscientiously as I did, but realised them differently, and came to a contrary conclusion. The difficulties were great enough, and the consequences grave enough, to require every man to form and to hold his own opinion, and yet to promote toleration at differences – at any rate, that was my view of the case, right or wrong.” And, truly, it was very right. For there is nothing, perhaps, which calls for more toleration than the solution of great military questions, when there are antagonistic arrays of difficulties to be considered. It has been said of other places than Dehli, which have stood protracted sieges, that they might have been carried by assault within the first hour of our appearance before them. It was said of Bharatpur; it was said of Sebastopol; but neither Combermere nor Raglan thought that it was his duty to risk the chance of a failure by attempting it.

Action of July 9

The circumstances, the force of which was said by the Chief Engineer to have settled the momentous question of assault or no assault, were these. Whilst in the English Camp our people were considering the best means of attacking the enemy within the walls of Dehli, the enemy were making renewed attacks on the British Camp outside the walls; and every new attack reduced our scanty numbers. On the 9th of July they came out in force against us. Intelligence of their design reached General Reed in the morning, and he was in some measure prepared for them; but he scarcely expected a daring inroad of rebel

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Cavalry into our Camp446. But about ten o’clock447, through a mist of heavy rain, our English officers, on’ the “Mound” discerned their approach. Here, on a piece of elevated ground to the right rear of our Camp, was planted a battery of three heavy guns, with the usual Infantry Picquet. In addition to this a Cavalry Picquet was thrown out, somewhat in advance of the Mound; and this now consisted of a party of Carabineers, two Horse Artillery guns of Tombs’s troop, and a detachment of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, under a Native officer, which occupied the extreme point in advance448. Perplexed by the appearance of the familiar uniform of the Irregular Cavalry of our own picquets, our people at first thought that they had

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been driven in by the advance of the enemy; and so the guns, which might have opened upon them, were pointed harmlessly at the troopers449. But there was something much worse than this. The mistake of the British Artillery was followed by the disgrace of the British Cavalry. As the Irregulars of the 8th from Dehli swept on, the detachment of Carabineers, which formed a part of the picquet, turned and fled. Stillman, who commanded them, remained alone at his post. The first error was soon discovered. Hills, who was in charge of the artillery – two horse-artillery guns – of the picquet, saw presently that it was a hostile attack, and ordered out his guns for action. But the enemy were upon him; he had not time to open fire. In this emergency the dashing Artillery subaltern – a man of light weight and short stature, young in years, but with the coolness of a veteran and the courage of a giant – set spurs to his horse and rushed into the midst of the advancing troopers, cutting right and left at them with good effect, until two of them charged him at the same time, and by the shock of the collision, both horse and rider were thrown violently to the ground. Regaining his feet after his assailants had passed on, he recovered his sword in time to renew the combat with three Sawars, two mounted and one on foot. The two first he cut down450, and then engaged the third, a young, active swordsman

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of good courage, who came fresh to the encounter, whilst Hills, scant of breath and shaken by his fall, had lost all his first strength, but none of his first courage. The heavy cloak, too, which he wore, as a protection against the rain, dragged at his throat, and well-nigh choked him. The chances were now fearfully against him. Twice he fired, but his pistol snapped, and then he cut at his opponent’s shoulder. The blow did not take effect; and the trooper, watching his opportunity, clutched at the English subaltern’s sword and wrested it from him. Hills then closed with his enemy, grappled him so that he could not strike out with his sabre, and smote him with clenched fist again and again on the face, until the Englishman slipped and fell to the ground.

The “Mound” was a favourite place of gathering in Camp. It commonly happened that many of our officers were to be seen there, watching the progress of events below, or discussing the operations of the siege. But the heavy rain of the 9th of July had driven our people to the shelter of their tents. Among others, Major Tombs was in the Artillery mess-tent – one of the cheeriest places in Camp – when a trooper of the 9th. Irregular Cavalry, in a state of high excitement, rode up and asked the way to the General’s quarters. In reply to a question from Tombs, he said that the enemy were showing in front of our picquets; but the man’s words seemed but scantly to express all that was in him, so Tombs hurried to his own tent, took his sword and revolver, and ordering his horse to be brought after him, walked down to the Mound Picquets. As he approached the post, he saw the Carabineers drawn up in mounted array, and our guns getting ready for action. In a minute there was a tremendous rush of Irregular Horse, the troopers brandishing their swords and vociferating lustily; and then there was to be seen the sad spectacle of our Dragoons broken and flying to the rear, whilst one of our guns went rightabout, some of the horses mounted and some riderless, and galloped towards our Camp. Tombs was now in the midst of the enemy, who were striking at him from all sides, but with no effect. A man of a. noble presence, tall, strong, of robust frame and handsome countenance, dark-haired, dark-bearded, and of swart complexion, he was, in all outward semblance, the model of a Faringhi warrior; and the heroic aspect truly expressed. the heroic qualities of the man. There was no finer soldier in the Camp. Threading his way adroitly through the black horsemen,

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he ascended the Mound, and looking down into the hollow, where his two guns had been posted, he saw the remaining one overturned, the horses on the ground, struggling in their harness or dead, with some slain or wounded gunners beside them. Near the guns he saw the prostrate body of Hills, apparently entangled in his cloak, with a dismounted Sawar standing over him with drawn sword, about to administer the death-stroke. At this time Tombs was some thirty paces from his friend. He could not hope to reach the enemy in time to cut him down with the sabre, so resting his revolver on his left arm, he took steady aim at the trooper, who was turned full-breasted towards him, and shot him through the body. The blood oozed out through the white tunic of the wounded rebel, and, for a while at least, Hills was saved.

But the danger was not yet passed. Tombs helped his fallen subaltern to rise, and together they ascended the slope of the Mound. As they were watching the movements of the enemy, they saw a little way beneath them another dismounted Sawar, who was walking away with Hills’ revolver in his hand. They made at once towards him. He was a young, strong, active trooper, who turned and attacked. them with his sword, as one well skilled in the use of the weapon. His first blow aimed at Hills was parried. Then he struck at Tombs, who with like address guarded the cut. But the third blow, struck with despairing energy, as he sprung upon the younger of his opponents, broke down Hills’ guard, and clove the skull to the brain. In a moment he had turned upon Tombs, who coolly parried the blow and drove his sword right through the trooper’s body451.

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Meanwhile, the Sawars, flushed. with their first success, were sweeping onwards through our picquets, to the main street of our Camp. What could account for the rout of the Carabineers – what could explain the flight of the Horse Artillery452? The utmost confusion prevailed. Our people turned out in excited haste, not knowing what it all portended. The road which the rebel-troopers had taken led to the Artillery Lines. There was a Native troop of Horse Artillery there under Major Benny; and the Sawars called upon them to fraternise with their party, and to march back with them to Dehli. The loyal Natives sternly replied that they obeyed only their own officers. Near them was Henry Olpherts’s European troop, unlimbered and ready for immediate action. The black troop was between them and the enemy; but the Native gunners called upon the white troopers to fire through their bodies. There was no need for this. The whole Camp was now astir. For a little while the Sawars had profited by the uncertainty and perplexity in our Camp. But their triumph was soon turned to defeat, and they fled back to Dehli, leaving many of these audacious rebels behind them, including the originator of the perilous exploit453.

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That so many of them escaped unscathed, returning by the way they had come, is not to be accounted for, except on the ground of surprise and confusion. Acts of individual gallantry are recorded – none more lustrous than those scored up to the honour of the brave artillerymen, Renny and Fagan454. But some dark clouds overshadowed the scene. It is related that in the absence of tangible enemies, some of our soldiery, who turned out on this occasion, butchered a number of unoffending camp-followers, servants, and others, who were huddling together, in vague alarm, near the Christian churchyard. No loyalty, no fidelity, no patient good service, on the part of these poor people, could extinguish for a moment the fierce hatred which possessed our white soldiers against all who wore the dusky livery of the East.

Affairs in the Sabzimandi

This bold incursion of the Irregulars into our Camp did not supply all the day’s fighting. All through the morning a brisk cannonade had been maintained by the enemy, and answered by our guns on the Right. It was soon apparent, however, that the rebel musketeers were as active as their gunners. A body of Sipahis had posted themselves in the suburb of the Sabzimandi, where, screened and aided by houses and walled gardens, and other enclosures, they kept up a galling fire on our picquets. This could not be endured; so a column was formed to attack and dislodge them. It consisted of the Head-Quarters and two companies of the 60th Rifles, detachments of the 8th and 61st Foot, and the 4th Sikh Infantry, with the six guns of Major Scott’s battery; whilst Major Reid was instructed to co-operate with them with such men as could be spared from the Main Picquet. Commanded by General Chamberlain, our column swept through the Sabzimandi, and was soon in close conflict with the insurgents. Posted as they were, and often firing down upon us from some elevated structure, it was not easy to

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dislodge them. The fighting was of the kind most distasteful and most destructive to our British soldiery. But their stubborn courage prevailed at last. The work was done thoroughly455; but such thorough work always was done by us, at heavy’ cost to our ever-decreasing force. We could ill spare at that time a single fighting man; but the cotemporary historians relate that more than two hundred of our people were killed or disabled on the 9th of July456. And so the chances of a successful assault upon the city began to dwindle into a certainty of failure; and. those who had urged it with the greatest confidence, now had their misgivings457. It is true that the carnage among the enemy had been far greater than in our ranks; but they had never been numerically stronger than at that time, and the heaps of dead which they left behind them diminished but little the vital resources of that enormous garrison.

Action of July 14

And, a few days afterwards, this question of assault, as Baird Smith wrote, had finally “resolved itself into nothing by sheer force of circumstances;” for there was another hard fight, and another long list of casualties. On the 14th the enemy again came out in force to the attack of our position. on the Right. It was said that they had vowed to carry our batteries, and destroy that formidable picquet at Hindu Rao’s house, which had sent the message of death to so many of their comrades. Becher’s spies had gained intelligence of the movement, and Reid had been warned of the coming onslaught. He was quite ready for them, and said, laughingly, that they had attacked him and been beaten nineteen times, and that he did not expect to be worsted on the twentieth. The attack commenced about eight o’clock in the morning. For some time our people stood on the defensive, keeping the mutineers at bay. Both forces were under cover, and little execution was done. But when the sun was going

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down, Neville Chamberlain saw that the time had come to resort to other measures. So despatching a letter to Reid, desiring him to be prepared to attack the enemy, and act in concert with him, he sent Showers with another column, consisting of detachments of the 1st European, the 75th Queen’s, Coke’s Rifles, and Hodson’s Horse, with six Horse Artillery guns under Turner and Money, to take them in flank. The walled gardens, and other places of shelter, in which the mutineers had posted themselves, were now to be cleared; and it was a fine thing to see our columns sweeping down upon the enemy, Reid’s little Gurkhas setting up a ringing cheer, and every man panting eagerly for the affray. Then two of our great Panjabi warriors were to be seen ever in the thickest of the fight. Where danger threatened most, Chamberlain and Hodson were sure to be seen. The enemy were driven from point to point, in confused flight, clean out of their sheltering walls; and the more impetuous of their assailants pushed on after them along the main road, within. the fire from the walls of Dehli. There was it that Chamberlain, fearlessly exposing-himself, according to his wont, well-nigh met his death-wound. A party of the enemy, covered by a low wall, had made a stand, and were pouring in a destructive fire upon our advancing soldiery, which made them for a moment recoil, when the Adjutant-General, setting spurs to his horse, called upon the men to follow him, and cleared the enclosure. He was gallantly supported; but a musket-ball took effect upon him, and broke his left arm below the shoulder458. Our people were then so near the city walls that the pursuit became disastrous. For the enemy gathered fresh courage, and rallied before their defences, whilst the hot haste with which we had pushed on to chastise the mutineers was throwing confusion into our ranks. The management of the pursuing force was not equal to the gallantry of the pursuit. At one point we had driven the mutineers from their guns, but we were not prepared to take advantage of their desertion. Hodson’s quick eye marked

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the opportunity, and he was eager to charge the battery. But the men, upon whom he called to aid him, were exhausted, and at the moment there was no response. It is always, in such straits, a. question of moments. Seeing that there was hesitation, a Sipahi gunner applied the port-fire to a piece loaded with grape; and before the smoke had cleared away the guns had been limbered up, and the opportunity was lost forever.

Again the old story was repeated. We had gained a profit-less, perhaps, indeed, a dubious, victory, at a loss of two hundred men killed or disabled459. The finest soldier in the Camp, foremost in reputation, foremost ever in action, and all but first in official position, had been carried maimed and helpless to his tent. It was a sorry day’s work that sent Neville Chamberlain, Adjutant-General of the Army, to the Sick List. It was a sorry week’s work that had deprived our little force of the services of twenty-five officers and four hundred men. It had quite settled the question of the assault. With these diminished numbers, how could a sufficient force be left for the protection of our Camp?

July 16

Even the most eager spirits now felt that it must be a hopeless effort. “There will be no assault on Dehli yet,” wrote Hodson on the 16th; “our rulers will now less than ever decide on a bold course, and, truth to tell, the numbers of the enemy have so rapidly increased, and ours have been so little replenished in proportion, and our losses for a small army have been so severe that it becomes a question whether now we have numbers sufficient to risk an assault. Would to Heaven it had been tried when I first pressed it!”

Resignation of General Reed

On the 17th of July General Reed resigned the command of the Dehli Field Force. During his brief season of responsibility his health had broken down under the exertions and anxieties of his position, and it was useless any longer to struggle against his daily-increasing infirmities. So he made over the command of the Force to Brigadier Archdale Wilson, and betook himself to the quietude of the Himalayas460. The selection of

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an officer who had done so well in the actions on the Hindan was the source of general satisfaction in the Camp461. There were few who did not see in the change good promise of increased energy and activity in the prosecution of the siege. But, in truth, we had reached a period of its history at which energy and activity could be displayed only in acts of defensive warfare.

Brigadier Wilson in command

It is certain that when Brigadier-General Wilson took command of the Dehli Field Force, the circumstances which he was called upon to confront were of a most discouraging character. Two Commanders had been struck down by Death, and a third had been driven from Camp by its approaches. The chiefs of the Staff – the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General – lay wounded in their tents. For more than five weeks the British troops before Dehli had been standing upon the defensive. Time after time, assaults upon the City had been projected, and had been deferred; and at last the bold experiment had been I finally abandoned. During those five weeks the enemy had attacked us a score of times, and it had long been acknowledged that the British were the Besieged, not the Besiegers. It was impossible that all this should not have had its effect upon the discipline of the Dehli Field Force. It must be an eternal honour to that force, that the deteriorating effects of such a state of things were so slight; but, nevertheless, they were clearly discernible. The strength of the rebel garrison had been continually increasing; and though their loss was even heavier than our own, our numbers were so inferior, that in proportion to them our sufferings were greater. It was hard to say how much longer the endurance of our people would be proof against a constant succession of vexatious attacks on the part of the enemy, and profitless victories on our own. Our troops had grown weary of beating the enemy, without apparently

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weakening their resources, or diminishing their confidence, or lengthening the intervals between their attacks. It is not strange, therefore, that in the middle of this month of July the British Chief looked the difficulties of our position very gravely in the face, and that there were some doubts as to whether we could hold our own much longer with such fearful odds against us. But no such doubts ought to have been entertained for a moment. Our troops had been much harassed; they were diminished in numbers; they had seen a constant succession of stubborn encounters, which had conduced nothing to the final issue; and they were growing very weary of a state of things of which they could not see the end. But, if they had lost some of their discipline, they had lost none of their heart. They were impatient, but not desponding. They were equal to any demands that could have been made upon them, and would have resented the idea of a retreat.

Question of retirement

But ever since the commencement of the month the thought of a retrograde movement had been fixing itself in the minds even of men who had been at one time eager for the bolder course, which had been described as the “Gamester’s Throw.” Before the death of General Barnard, Hervey Greathed – though he had thrown in the weight of his authority as Chief Civil Officer at Dehli, into the scales on the side of vigorous action – had begun to discern the fact that there might be some advantages to the country generally in liberating the troops now pent up before the walls of the great city, and wasting their energies in the strenuous idleness of a disastrous defence462. They were much needed at other points where our people were girt around with danger, and a great moral effect might be produced by a succession of victories, such as the Dehli Field Force, under happier circumstances, might calculate on achieving. The time for assaulting had passed. Neville Chamberlain and Baird Smith, who were both by official position and native worth the moving principles of the besieging force, had given up all hope of succeeding in such an enterprise. Chamberlain, indeed, had

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begun to apprehend that, in their existing state of discipline, it might be hazardous in the extreme to entangle them in the streets of Dehli. There was nothing left for us, therefore, but to hold on until the arrival of reinforcements; and the question had arisen and had been freely discussed at Head-Quarters, whether, until we could appear before Dehli in greater strength, it would not, both on military and political grounds, be a wiser course to relax our hold, and employ our eager troops in other parts of the country. When Wilson assumed command, he found matters in this state. He did not originate the question of withdrawal.

Protests of Baird Smith

What might have been his resolution, if left to his own unaided counsels, History can never declare. But the eager protests of Baird Smith soon swept away any doubts that the General might have entertained463. As soon as the Chief Engineer learnt that the proposal was likely to be laid before him, he resolved to anticipate the formal reference. On the first occasion of Wilson consulting him professionally, he threw all the earnestness of his nature into a great remonstrance against the project of withdrawal. He told the General that to raise the siege would be fatal to our national interests. “It is our duty,” he said, “to retain the grip which we now have upon Dehli, and to hold on like grim Death until the place is our own.” He dwelt upon the many circumstances in our favour. Our communications with the Panjab were open. There was still there a considerable amount of available strength, which the increasing security of that great province would soon place at the disposal of the Dehli leader. The army was in good health, and it was well supplied. It was true that little had been

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done to strengthen the position of our besieging army, or to bring our guns to bear with more fatal effect upon the enemy’s works. But he pledged himself to do what as yet had been undone. And then he urged the General to consider what would be the result of withdrawal of the Force. “All India,” he said, “would at once believe that we retreated because we were beaten, and in such circumstances an adverse impression of this kind was as disastrous as the severest defeat we could sustain. We must abandon, in such a case, our communications with the Panjab, and cease to act as a covering force to that province, from which all the reinforcements we could hope for must be drawn; we must again fight our way to Dehli against reinvigorated enemies, increased in numbers and spirits, and we must cease to perform the incalculably important function of check-mating the entire strength of the revolt, by drawing towards Dehli, as a great focus, all the mutinous regiments of all arms, and so preventing them from dispersing themselves over the country, and attacking and overpowering. our defenceless posts.” These arguments prevailed. Wilson listened, and was convinced. He thanked Baird Smith for his frank statement of his views, said that he would hold on, and then called upon him, as Chief Engineer, to state what could be done to maintain our position before Dehli with the least possible loss, until such time as the Dehli Field Force could be so strengthened as to render the final assault upon Dehli secure in its results. Then Baird Smith stated what Wilson, as an experienced Artilleryman, had long felt, that our great want was a want of far-reaching guns, that we had been always beaten by the heavy metal and wide range of the enemy’s Artillery; but that as soon as we could bring down a siege-train of sufficient magnitude and sufficient weight to silence the guns on the walls of Dehli, success would be certain. To all of this Wilson readily assented. He asked for a statement of the strength of ordnance which would be required for siege operations, which in due course was given; and at the same time the Chief Engineer undertook to have the work of his own department in a sufficient state of forwardness to give every possible advantage to the operations of the Artillery. “And from that time forward,” said Baird Smith, in a letter written at a later period, “we were guided by these plans, and prepared busily for the resumption of active work on the arrival of the siege-train.”

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Further attacks on our position

The first week of Wilson’s command was enlivened by two more attempts on the part of the enemy to drive i us from our advanced position; firstly, on the Right, and then on the Left. Our scouts in the city had obtained intelligence that the enemy purposed to proceed in force to the neighbourhood of Alipur464,” in our rear, to intercept an expected convoy on its way to our camp, and when they had thus drawn out a considerable part of our strength, to make a vehement attack upon our right.

July 18

The movement to Alipur was never made, but, on the 18th of July, the enemy again betook themselves to the old work of harassing us from the shelter of the suburbs; so a detachment of Infantry and Artillery was sent out, under Colonel Jones of the 60th Rifles, with the old result. What had come to be called “rat-hunting” went on for a while, and a number of British officers and men fell beneath the fire of the enemy465. But there was this time no attempt of pursuit. Colonel Jones, having driven the mutineers from their shelter, withdrew his own men carefully and skilfully, covering their retirement with his guns. It was the last of our many conflicts in the Sabzimandi suburb. Our Engineer officers were already at work clearing away the cover – the garden-walls, the ruined houses, and the old serais, of which the enemy had made such good use from the commencement of the siege, and were connecting our advanced posts in that direction with the Main Picquet on the Ridge.

July 23

Perhaps it was in despair of making any impression upon our Right, that a few days afterwards, July 23rd, the enemy in considerable force streamed out of the Kashmir Gate, and endeavoured to establish themselves at Ludlow Castle, whence they opened a fire both on the Metcalfe Picquet and the Ridge. A column of British and Sikh Infantry, with guns from Turner’s and Money’s troops, was, therefore, sent out, under Brigadier Showers, to dislodge them. The work was soon accomplished. The enemy were in retreat to 1 the city walls, but again the fatal inclination to press on in 1 pursuit was irresistible, and our column was drawn on towards

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the city walls, and. many of our best officers were carried wounded to the rear. Colonel Seaton, who had been appointed to officiate as Adjutant-General, was shot through the body. Turner and Money of the Artillery, and others were wounded466; and Captain Law, who was serving with Coke’s Rifles, was killed. ‘The loss of the enemy was not heavy, and they carried off all their guns. After this, orders went forth prohibiting the forward movements, which had always been attended with so much disaster. Our main losses had commonly been incurred after we had driven back the enemy towards the walls of their stronghold. This system of warfare had been too long permitted. Had the enemy’s numbers been more limited, it would have been less necessary to restrain the natural impetuosity of our people to push on and to punish in pursuit; but scarcely any amount of carnage that we could inflict upon the mutineers was any substantive gain to ourselves.

And so the month of July came to an end and left Wilson in good spirits; for Sir John Lawrence, never slackening in his great work, had responded to the General’s appeal by fresh promises of help, and he had cast away all thought of raising the siege. Writing on the 30th of July to Mr. Colvin, who had earnestly protested against the thought of withdrawing from Dehli, he said: “It is my firm determination to hold my present position and to resist every attack to the last. The enemy are very numerous, and may possibly break through our intrenchments and overwhelm us. But this force will die at its post. Luckily, the enemy have no head and no method, and we hear dissensions are breaking out among them. Reinforcements are coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold on till they arrive, we shall be secure. I am making every possible arrangement to secure the safe defence of our position.”

Unrecorded heroism

And here I may fitly pause in this recital of military events – of engagement after engagement with the enemy, following each other in quick succession, all of the same type and all leading to the same results. The true story of the siege of Dehli is not to be found

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in the bare record of these exploits. Many as were those gallant soldiers, whose active heroism it has been my privilege to illustrate in these pages, there were many more in the British Camp whose names have been unwritten, but whose gallantry, in doing and in suffering, was not less conspicuous. It was the fortune of some to be continually called to the front, to be specially thanked by commanding officers and named in official despatches, whilst others, day after day, week after week, month after month, laboured on, exposed to the fire of the enemy and to all the evil influences of camp-life in the worst season of the year, without praise, without encouragement, almost without notice. A signal instance of this presents itself in the circumstances of the two branches of the Artillery. The Light Batteries were always to the front, and the names of Scott, Turner, Money, Tombs, and others of the Horse Artillery or Horse Batteries have repeatedly claimed admiring recognition; but of the Heavy Batteries, which, in their own way, were equally well served, scant mention has yet been made in this narrative of the siege467. The time for breaching operations had not yet come, and it was a dull and weary season for the Siege Artillery thus expending themselves in defensive efforts, outmatched in numbers, outmatched in

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weight of metal, outmatched in profuseness of ammunition. There was a scarcity of officers for duty in the batteries; there was a scarcity of gunners. Both had to be improvised and supplemented as best we could, so that men found themselves working at the guns who, a little while before, did not know a portfire from a sponge-staff. Stray Lancers, for whom there was not much cavalry-work in camp, were caught up and set to learn the gun-drill, and right good gunners they often made; whilst old Sikhs, who had learnt artillery practice under Ranjit Singh’s French officers, and had served the guns of the Khalsa, at Sobraon and Chilianwala, were recruited by John Lawrence, who never missed a chance of aiding the Dehli warriors, and sent down to man Wilson’s batteries. But the time was now approaching when the real business of the Siege would commence in earnest, and the officers of the heavy batteries would contribute their share of good work towards the capture of the great city.

Incidents of the Siege

Over and above the excitement of the frequent actions with the enemy, which always added the names of many brave men to the list of killed and wounded, there were sometimes lesser sensations to stir the heart of the Camp. On one occasion, an officer of good repute, whilst reconnoitring as a field-engineer, failed to give the parole with sufficient promptitude when challenged by one of our sentries, and was shot dead in the darkness of the night468. It often happened that officers on the look-out from exposed positions, or passing from post to post, or showing their heads above the breastworks of our batteries, became special marks for the rebel artillery-men, and narrowly escaped, if at all, with their lives469. Among the current Camp jokes was one to the effect that a soldier hal made it a matter of complaint that,

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since the Engineers had built up the parapets so high, a fellow at work in the batteries behind them could only get shot in the head. One officer is stated by the contemporary chroniclers of the Siege to have had such a fancy for exposing himself in the embrasures, that, in spite of repeated warnings from his comrades, he was killed one day at his dangerous post.

Cheerfulness of the Camp

The general cheerfulness of our People, in spite of all dispiriting circumstances, was something upon which it is a pleasure to comment. Day after day our officers met each other with bright faces, laughed and joked, reciprocated kindly offices, and exchanged the news of the Camp or the tidings brought from a distance. There was ever alive amongst them a warmth of good-fellowship, which nothing could weaken or cool. To make a friendly visit to the tent of a wounded or sick officer was a part of every sound man’s duty, which he was sure not to neglect. Such was the overflowing kindness shown to every man who was down, that if it had not been for the eager desire to be at work again that animated all, it would have been a privilege to be upon the sick-list. On fine evenings when the sun was going down, the sick and wounded were brought out from their tents on their beds and litters, thus to taste the fresh air, to be exhilarated by the liveliness of the Camp, and to commune with their comrades. Officers and men alike enjoyed this change. There was one, however, the noblest sufferer of all, who would not permit himself to be thus brought out of the privacy of his tent, lest it should appear that he was parading his wounds.

Meanwhile, those who were well, found great delight in the comradeship of their several Messes, and seemed to enjoy the rough Bohemianism which necessity had substituted for the polite amenities of the peaceful Cantonment. The rougher the ménage, the better the cheer. It has been recorded that in one notable instance, when tablecloths came into use, a good deal of the special jollity of the gathering was scared away by their introduction. It does not appear that at any time there was a scarcity of provisions. But many things, which had become almost necessities with our officers, fell short from time to time, and were painfully missed. Some were more fortunate, or had more forethought, than others; but what one Mess, or one man, missed, another was able to lend him. Sometimes the supplies of beer or wine were drunk out to the last bottle, and commonly each member of a Mess was put upon an allowance of

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drink470; sometimes the last cigar was smoked, and the generosity of a neighbour supplied the inconvenient want. There were no Sybarites among them, and even those who had been wont to fare sumptuously every day, were thankful for what they got, and laughed at the privations they were compelled to endure. Good clothes, too, after a while, became scarce in Camp. There was little regard for proprieties of costume, and men who had delighted to walk daintily in fine Linen, went about in strange costumes of flannel, half civil half military in their attire, and were fain to possess themselves of the second-hand garments of their departed brethren. Even the chief civil officer in Camp, Hervey Greathed, was glad to get a pair of boots from his brother in the Engineers, and to buy the leavings of young Barnard’s toilet when he quitted Camp after his father’s death. And the Chaplain of the Force has told us how he was compelled to abandon all thought of ministering in appropriate clerical vestments, and to go about clothed like a brigand.

And whilst our officers thus met each other with cheerful, sometimes radiant faces, the English soldier was quite jubilant. “I have been pleased,” wrote one of the bravest and best of the Dehli warriors, “to observe the cheerful tone displayed at all times by our troops. I never saw British soldiers in camp so joyous. They walk and run about, in the afternoon and evening, when the rain and Pandi are at rest, as though they had nothing serious to do. Nor has it ever occurred to them that there was anything doubtful in the conflict.” When off duty, the men amused themselves as in the most peaceful times, playing cricket and quoits, getting up pony races, and invigorating themselves with gymnastics. There was some talk of getting up rackets; but the old cantonment racket-court was in so exposed a situation that it was thought by no means an improbable contingency that the Enemy would take part in the sport, and with balls of a larger diameter than those proper to the game.

Drunkenness among the soldiery

That the excitement of strong drink was much coveted by the soldiery in the English Camp need scarcely be set down in the narrative; but, on the whole, it may be recorded in their honour that few outrages were committed under its influence. The wet season

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had set in. The lowering skies, the drenching downfalls of rain, the constant damps, and all the wonted accompaniments of such weather, at a time when the activities of service rendered shelter impossible, not only had a depressing influence upon men’s spirits, which rendered stimulants ever welcome to them, but had external results, in saturated clothes and boots oozing with water, that justified, if they did not demand, a resort to such supposed correctives. There were some wise officers in Camp, who thought that still better precautions might be taken; and when fever and ague were prevalent among our people, bethought themselves of the value of quinine, as a prophylactic, and were minded to serve out a dose of it every morning to their men. An Artillery officer, of whom frequent mention has been made in this story of the Siege, when he found that his gunners demurred to imbibing the bitter draught, as no part of their military duty, told them that no one who refused to take it should ever have an extra dram; and so they swallowed the quinine for the sake of the rum which followed in the course of the day. And the result was, that scarcely a man of this Company was knocked over by the fever of the season.

Tidings from a distance

During seasons of comparative quietude in Camp, news from the outer world was greedily sought and eagerly discussed. There was little or no communication with the country below, and so far as the present safety or future success of the Dehli Force was affected by operations in the lower country, there was little reason to concern themselves about those distant events, tidings of which commonly reached them crusted over with error, if not in the shape of substantial lies. Of the doings of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief they knew, and indeed cared, little or nothing471. Sir John Lawrence was their Governor-General – their Commander-in-Chief. They looked to the great Panjab Commissioner for the means of taking Dehli, and with these means he was furnishing them with an energy of self-denial beyond all praise. But the great work which lay before our people on the Ridge, with all its toil and

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anxieties, its dangers and sufferings, did not so engross men’s minds as to leave them no thought, no sympathy for their brethren who were girt with peril elsewhere. Most of all they sought news from Kanhpur and Lakhnao, where Wheeler and Henry Lawrence, threatened by an overwhelming enemy, were looking anxiously for succours from below. False tidings of the relief of Lakhnao were continually coming into Camp. It was said, time after time, that Wheeler was safe, sometimes with the addition that he was marching upon Dehli, and at others that the Sipahi regiments that had besieged him were bound for that place. At a later period it was reported (long before the first relief of Lakhnao) that Havelock had fought a great battle with Man Singh and defeated him, had entered the Oudh capital, and that for three days the city had been given up to plunder and slaughter. From Calcutta, through some circuitous channel, there came a report that the French troops, forming part of the China expedition, were coming to help us; and it was rumoured in Camp that so great had been the excitement in London on the arrival there of the news of the revolt, that the populace had burnt the India House, and hung the Directors up to the lamp-posts.

But tidings came at last, only too fatally true, that the garrison of Kanhpur, with all our women and children, had been foully massacred, and that Sir Henry Lawrence was dead. It is hard to say whether the indignation excited by the one event or the sorrow born of the other were the stronger and more abiding feeling. There was not a man in Camp who did not grieve for the great and good commander of the Lakhnao garrison; and there were many who, loving him as a father or a brother, shed such tears for him as they would have shed for the nearest and dearest of their kin472. All felt that one of the Pillars of the State had fallen – perhaps the stoutest and the

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grandest of all – and that such a master in Israel was little likely to be seen again. In strong contrast to the tender feelings and pathetic utterances which this calamity called forth throughout the general camp, was the vehement exasperation which the news of the Kanhpur massacre elicited – the bitter hatred, the intense thirst of revenge. It was natural – it was commendable. Those stern soldiers “did well to be angry.” No such foul act as this had ever stained the annals of British , connexion with the East. The foul tragedy of the “Black Hole,” which for a hundred years had been cited as the great horror of horrors, now paled beside the massacre of Kanhpur: for the victims of Siraju’d daulah’s cruelty had been strong men. And ever as the atrocity was discussed in Camp, our people longed for tidings of the onward march of Havelock and Neill; and yearned for the coming of the day when the order would be given to them to set the mark of the avenger on the guilty city which had so long resisted and defied them.

Treatment of the Natives

It was not strange that, after this, the feeling of hatred against the coloured races, already strong in the British Camp, should have become more vehement and outspoken. It showed itself in many ways. We were everywhere surrounded by Natives. The typical Pandi, whose name was in every man’s mouth, was the representative only of one of many phases of Native humanity, which were then ever present to us. It was one of the most curious characteristics of this Mutiny-war, that although the English were supposed to be fighting against the Native races, they were in reality sustained and supported by the Natives of the country, and could not have held their own for a day without the aid of those whom we hated as our national enemies. Not only were the coloured races fighting stoutly upon our side473, but thousands of non-combatants were sharing the dangers, without the glories, of the siege, and doing their appointed work with fidelity and alacrity, as though there had never been any rupture – any division of interests – any departure from the normal state of things, as it existed in quiet times. How utterly dependent upon Native Agency is the exotic European,

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though sprung from the working classes, and in his own country accustomed to the performance of the most menial and laborious duties, is known to all who have dwelt in India for a week. If the labour of the people had been utterly lost to us, our power must have suddenly collapsed. The last drop in the cup of domestic bitterness was the desertion of our Native household servants. But a Family could do better without this aid than a company of Infantry, a troop of Horse, or a battery of Artillery474. Without these Native attendants of various kinds, our people would have had no food and no drink. They could not have fed their horses, or served their guns, or removed their sick. Both public and private servants, with but few exceptions, remained true to their employers throughout the siege, and some displayed instances of rare personal devotion475. It little matters what was the source of this fidelity. It may have been that these people, accustomed to the domination of the English, satisfied to move in the old groove, and sure of their accustomed pay from month to month, never troubled them-selves to regard the national aspects of the struggle, and, with characteristic hatred of change, clung, therefore, to their old employments. But, of whatsoever it was the growth, the fact was there; and I am afraid that it was not sufficiently appreciated by those who profited so largely by it. It has been shown how the cook-boys, carrying the coveted dinners to our picquets, were exposed to the merciless fire of the enemy, and how lightly their danger was regarded. This was but one of many signs of the little gratitude that was felt towards these

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serviceable auxiliaries. But there w as more than this negative unkindliness. For many of our people in Camp, in return for the good services of the Natives, gave back only the words and blows of contumely and insult more readily even than in quiet times. Those times were changed, but we were not changed with them. The sturdy iron of the national character was so inflexible that the heat of the furnace through which we were passing had not yet inclined it to bend. As arrogant, as in-tolerant, and as fearless as ever, we still closed our eyes to the fact that our lives lay in the hollow of the hand which we so despised. Even in the midst of disasters and humiliations, which would have softened and enfeebled others, our pride of race still upheld us, stern, hard, and immovable. And in spite of all human calculations, and in defiance of all reason, the very obduracy and intolerance, which might have destroyed us in this conjuncture, were in effect the safeguard of the nation. That stubborn, unyielding self-reliance, that caused the noblest of our enemies to say that the English never knew when they were beaten, had caused the Indian races to believe that if a single white man were left in the country, he would regain the Empire for his race. And though it is impossible for those who sit deliberately in judgment upon such conduct towards a, subject people not to condemn it, the fact remains that this assertion, this appearance of strength, was strength in the midst of our weakness.

Within the City

Meanwhile, within the walls of Dehli the national character was shaping events with equal force and distinctness. There were feebleness and irresolution and divided councils in high places, and elsewhere a great antagonism of interests, internecine strife, oppression, and misery not to be counted. Whilst the English were clinging together and moving as one man, the inmates of Dehli were dislocated and distracted. The Court, the Soldiery, the industrial inhabitants were in deadly feud the one with the other, and as the numbers of our enemies increased, their difficulties also increased. A state of things had indeed. arisen very fatal to the continued supremacy of the King, the circumstances of which will be detailed in another chapter of this history.

Footnotes

443. MS. correspondence of Colonel Baird Smith.

444. Ibid.

445. I have here again to notice the confusion of dates, of which I have spoken in a former note. Baird Smith, in a letter before me, says, “My letter recommending the measure went in on the 6th. I doubt if Sir Henry Barnard ever saw it, as he died a day or two afterwards.” But Mr. Greathed, in a letter dated July 6, says that the remains of the General were buried at ten o’clock on that day; and Mr. Rotten (Chaplain’s Narrative), who performed the funeral service, says most distinctly that Barnard died at three o’clock on Sunday afternoon, July 5. There is not the least doubt of the fact Baird Smith’s letter, therefore, was not sent in until after Barnard’s death, unless he is wrong about the date of its despatch.

446. “We had a sharp affair with the enemy yesterday. I had received a report in the morning that they were coining out in force on the right, and Major Reid applied for their usual reinforcement at Hindu Rao’s house, which was sent, and the rest of the troops held in readiness to turn out. About ten A.M. ‘ a party of insurgent Sawars made a most daring inroad to the rear of our right by a road leading to the Grand Trunk. These men were dressed exactly like the 9th Irregulars, which led to the supposition that part of that regiment which was on picquet on that flank, had mutinied; but it turned out that the greater part of them, at least, belonged to the 8th Irregulars from Banal. About a hundred men of their people actually swept through the right of our camp, by the rear, by the bridge adjoining the burial-ground.” – General Reed to Sir John Lawrence, July 10, 1857. MS.

447. It will have been seen that, in the preceding note, General Reed says that the enemy appeared about ten o’clock. Major Reid says, “the action commenced about seven o’clock.” The latter may refer to the opening of the enemy’s guns. Major Tombs says that, to the best of his recollection, it was about three P.M. when he first learnt that the troopers were entering our Camp. Cotemporary accounts often differ greatly with respect to the time of day.

448. “The Mound was about half-way between the Ridge and the Canal; which protected the British rear. It was on the right rear flank of Camp, and overlooked the Sabzimandi. Between the Mound and the Canal there were several clumps of trees, and the Canal-bank being also fringed with them, the view in that direction was confused and interrupted, and for this reason a Cavalry picquet was thrown out on the Canal bank, somewhat in advance of the Mound, from which, however, the videttes of the Cavalry picquet were visible. ... The guns and the Carabineers were not stationed on the Mound, but at the foot of and on the right flank of it, so that facing to their proper front – the Sabzimandi – the Mound was on their left hand and the Canal on their right. The ground on the right of the picquet was somewhat elevated, and on this the tents of the men were pitched and the Cavalry horses picqueted. The guns were, as it were, in a hollow, with the Mound on their left and the elevated ground on the right. To their front was a small breastwork, to which it was ordered that the guns should be run up and fought behind in case of an attack, and until the picquet could be reinforced.” – MS. Memorandum.

449. The actual assailants were troopers of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, who had mutinied at Bareli; but it was more than suspected that the men of the 9th were cognisant of and favoured the attack. It has been seen (Note, ante, page 425) that General Barnard had been very doubtful of their fidelity. There had been many desertions from their ranks, but no signs of open mutiny. It may be stated here that after this affair of the 9th of July, the regiment was quietly moved out of Camp, apparently on duty. “On the 11th of July the Head-Quarters of the Regiment proceeded to for the purpose of keeping open the communication with the rear. Large detachments were sent into the divisions of Saharanpur, Sonpat, and Panipat. On the 21st of July, in consequence of a large desertion from the Sonpat detachment, it was deemed advisable to march the regiment back towards the Panjab.” – Parliamentary Return of Regiments that have mutinied. A wing of the 9th Irregular had accompanied the first siege-train to Dehli (ante, page 141), and the other (Head-Quarters) wing had joined our Camp on the 2nd of July.

450. “The first I wounded and dropped him from his horse; the second charged me with a lance. I put it aside and caught him on awful gash on the head and face. I thought I had killed him; apparently he must have clung to his horse, for he disappeared. The wounded man then came up, but got his skull split.” – Hills’ Narrative.

451. This narrative differs from some of the published versions of this incident, and, in one respect at least, from the account (quoted above) written by Hills himself, and printed at the time in the English journals. Hills says that the Sawar with whom he and Tombs had the second encounter was the very man who had attacked him in the first instance, and from whom his friend had saved him “When we got down,” he says, “I saw the very man Tombs had saved me from moving off with my pistol (he had only been wounded, and shammed dead). I told Tombs, and we went at him.” But it is the assured belief of Tombs, who saw the first trooper fall, and the blood streaming from the man’s chest over his white tunic, that their second antagonist was “another dismounted Sawar.” Caeteris paribus, there would seem to be more reason to accept Tombs’s version than that of his subaltern, as the circumstances of the former were more favourable to cool and accurate observation. And I would rather believe this version, as the one that best illustrates the splendour of the achievement. If the same Sawar were the. hero of both combats, he assuredly well earned by that morning’s fighting the Bahadur-Shah Cross for personal bravery. I should not omit to add that it has been recorded that “Tombs’s account of the affair of the 9th, when the enemy’s Horse rode through our Camp, was torn up by Colonel Mackenzie. He had omitted to say a word about himself, so Mackenzie gave the General the true version.” – Greathed’s Letters. Both Tombs and Hills were deservedly rewarded with the Victoria Cross.

452. It seems to have been a question among earlier writers whether the artillery or picquet duty did run away; but there can be no doubt of the fact. In a letter written from Camp on the same day, an artillery officer, describing what he saw, says: “A gun of the Horse Artillery, that had been on picquet on our right, had just retreated into Camp, into our main street, close to my tent.” The statement of Major (Sir Henry) Tombs, as embodied in the text, is quite conclusive on the subject. With respect to the flight of the Carabineers, General Reed writes: “In the confusion, I am sorry to say a detachment of the Carabineers, who were escorting the guns, gave way, in spite of the endeavours of their officers to stop them. These men I propose to dismount as a disgrace to them. It would appear that they are composed mostly of recruits, and, being mounted on half-broken horses, do not know how to manage them.” – MS. Correspondence.

453. “They were at first supposed to be the 9th, but, being discovered, were charged by Brigadier Grant with his Lancers, and Captain Hodson with the Guides, who drove them out of Cantonments.” – General Reed to Sir John Lawrence. MS. Correspondence. This, however, as regards Hodson’s part in the expulsion of the enemy, is erroneous. Hodson started in pursuit with the Guides, mistook the enemy for our own people, and rode some three miles parallel to them, until they suddenly crossed a bridge and “galloped off to Dehli.” – See Greathed’s and Hodson’s Letters.

454. Renny is said to have shot several of the rebel troopers with his revolver. Fagan rushed out of his tent with only a pen in his hand, got together a few men, killed fifteen of the enemy, and returned with a sword and Minié rifle, of which he had “eased” a Rasaldar of the Irregulars. – Norman’s Narrative. – Greathed’s Letters. – History of the Siege of Dehli.

455. “Eventually everything was effected that was desired, our success being greatly aided by the admirable and steady practice of Major Scott’s battery under a heavy fire – eleven men being put ‘hors de combat’ out of its small complement.” – Norman.

456. The number stated is two hundred and twenty-three, including one officer killed and eight wounded. The officer killed was Captain Mountsteven, of the 8th. There was heavy carnage in the enemy’s ranks.

457. See letters of Harvey Greathed. Writing on the 10th, he says: “It may now be prudent to defer the attack for a short time, for at this moment they (the enemy) may be considered in the plentitude of their force,” &c. &c.

458. It was thought at first to be a gun-shot wound. A contemporary letter says: “Chamberlain was brought in with a sorely shattered arm. His impression was that he had been struck by grape, which was being showered on them from the city walls. He bore his wound and his pain nobly, with a high cheerful courage, but getting out of the narrow dooley was too much for him, and as he leant on two or three people he stumbled forward and fell, almost on the shattered limb.”

459. The author of the “History of the Siege of Dehli” says: “Seventeen men killed, and sixteen officers and a hundred and seventy-seven men wounded.”

460. Hodson says that Wilson succeeded by virtue of seniority. The author of the “History of the Siege of Dehli” says, “he was not the senior General in Camp.” The senior officer in Camp, according to substantive rank, was Colonel Congreve, of H.M.’s 29th, Quartermaster-General of Queen’s troops. It is stated that he sent in a protest against his supersession and retired to Simlah. General Reed had anticipated the difficulty on the score of rank by making Wilson a Brigadier-General – an appointment afterwards confirmed by Government.

461. See Greathed’s Letters and the “History of the Siege of Dehli.”

462. “The determination to take Dehli by assault has been twice on the eve of execution, and I no longer feel confident that it will again be so far matured. And supposing I am right, the question will arise whether we should maintain our position, or raise the siege, and dispose our forces as may hest serve the public interests, until a second campaign be opened.” Greathed to Lawrence, July 4, MS. Correspondence.

463. It was on the 17th of July, the first day of Wilson’s command, that Baird Smith pressed upon him the duty of not relaxing his hold on Dehli. On the 18th the Brigadier-General wrote to Sir John Lawrence urging him to send reinforcements immediately. The letter was in French, and it contained these words: ‘Je retiendrai cette position jusqu’à la fin. Car il est de la plus grande importance que l’ennemi soit empéché de quitter Dehli pour ravager le pays. Pour faire ceci il est absolument necessaire que je sois renforcé de la plus graude force et aussi vite qu’il est possible. J’entends que ce renforcement ne peut venir du sud, et en conséquence je prie que vous m’enverrez du Panjab un Regiment Anglais complet et deux de Sikhs ou Panjabis. Si je ne suis pas bien vite renforcé je serai forcé de retirer à Karnal. Les consequences de ce mouvement seraient desastreuses.’ – MS. Corres.

464. Reinforcements had entered Dehli – mutineers from Jhansi, who, according to custom, were to try their luck on first arrival against the Faringhis.

465. Our loss was one officer and twelve men killed, and three officers (one mortally) and sixty-six men wounded.

466. Mr. Cave-Browne says that Brigadier Showers was wounded, and compelled to give over the command to Colonel Jones. His name is not in the list given by Norman, and, therefore, it would seem that it was not officially returned. The wound must have been a very slight one, if any, for Showers was in action again on the 12th of August.

467. The principal officers with the siege batteries were Colonel Corbett, Major James Brind, Major Murray Mackenzie, and Major Kaye. The last-named had come down to Dehli with the first siege-train. Major Brind joined soon afterwards, and took a leading part in the siege operations up to the hour of final success. Colonel Garbett, who arrived at a later period, was appointed Brigadier of Artillery, on Wilson’s nomination to the chief command; but he was wounded on his way from one battery to another, and though the wound was little more than a graze, of which he took no notice at first, it became afterwards a most virulent sore, which compelled him to take to his bed, and subsequently to leave the camp. He ultimately died of fever. Major Mackenzie was struck by the splinter of a shell on the 30th of June, and though in this case, also, the wound did not appear to be a severe one, he was driven also to Simlah, where he died. [Mackenzie and Kaye had served together with the Native troop of Horse Artillery which attended the Hindu Kush, and was engaged in the battle of Bamian]. Major Gaiskill, who joined at a latter period of the siege, succeeded Colonel Garbett in command of the Artillery. Among the younger officers distinguished during the siege were Captain Johnson, Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery, who came down with Wilson from Mirath, and as chief staff-officer did excellent service, and Lieutenant Light, an active and energetic officer, always eager to go to the front, who was incapacitated by sickness about the middle of July, and unable to return to his duties. Griffith, Commissary of Ordnance, was driven from camp by cholera, and was succeeded by Captain Young.

468. Captain Greensill, Her Majesty’s 24th Regiment.

469. See following account of the bursting of a shell, which nearly deprived the Force of one of the best officers in it – Major Scott of the Artillery: “Major Scott had a very narrow escape from a shell yesterday; he was standing by his horse on the Ridge, looking through his glass, when a shell fell close by him and burst as it touched the ground. I saw his horse running off, and saw him on the ground, but he got up and walked on, and I saw him riding by just now, so I suppose he is not hurt. I was on the General’s Mound at the time, and the explosion drew my attention, and we heard afterwards who it was, and that a man of the Fusiliers had been wounded by a piece of the shell.” – Letters of Hervey Greathed.

470. The greatest inconvenience of all was that no allowance was made for guests, and this limited hospitality. Stray arrivals in Camp were sometimes sore pressed for dinner, and compelled to fall back on Commissariat beef.

471. I have a letter before me, written by the Military Secretary to Government, from Council Chamber, Calcutta, from which it is plain that on the ??th of July, three weeks after General Barnard’s death, Government were ignorant of that event.

472. One officer touchingly records in his journal now before me: “I do indeed feel that I have lost a prop in the world.” The same writer, a day or two afterwards says: “In these days of battle and death there is so much to excite the mind, that one is not long, by any possibility, in the same vein of thought, but I felt beaten down when this sad tale reached me. Reflection brings home to one the sad public loss which his death occasions. At any time India would mourn his fall, but now, when she so much needs his guidance and his wisdom, the death of the soldier-statesman fills all with grief, and this to the putting aside of personal feeling. He was a rare specimen of God’s handiwork.” – MS. Journal.

473. “In camp,” wrote Wilberforce Greathed to Mr. Colvin (August 23, 1857), there is a feeling of confidence in our native troops. Guides, Gurkhas, Cokey’s (Coke’s Rifles), and Sikhs, are all popular, and, I think, all smart and useful.”

474. The author of the “History of the Siege of Dehli,” says: “There were ten Natives for every European in camp. In every troop of Artillery there were four times as many Natives as Europeans; in the Cavalry two men for every horse; without them the work could not go on.”

475. Take, for example, the following, illustrative of the good and gallant conduct of some of our Native Artillery drivers. It is from a letter addressed to the author: “When returning from this day’s work, my guns brought up the rear, and I had to hold the mutineers in check, picking up any of our wounded and placing them on my limbers until they could be provided for. One of my Native drivers was shot through the leg and the bone broken below the knee. He was riding one of the leaders of the gun-team. I rode up and told him to stop the gun until I could dismount him; but he said, ‘Kuchh-parwa-nahin (never mind), Sahib. I would sooner remain on my horse with my gun.’ And he would have remained had I not insisted on dismounting him and placing him in a dooly. This was the sort of spirit many of my Natives showed throughout.” – MS. Correspondence.

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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