SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth - set peer
certificate verification parameters
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode,
int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode,
int (*verify_callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth);
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth);
int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
DESCRIPTION
SSL_CTX_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ctx
to be mode and specifies the verify_callback function to
be used. If no callback function shall be specified, the
NULL pointer can be used for verify_callback.
SSL_set_verify() sets the verification flags for ssl to be
mode and specifies the verify_callback function to be
used. If no callback function shall be specified, the NULL
pointer can be used for verify_callback. In this case last
verify_callback set specifically for this ssl remains. If
no special callback was set before, the default callback
for the underlying ctx is used, that was valid at the the
time ssl was created with SSL_new(3).
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the
certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for
ctx. (See the BUGS section.)
SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum depth for the
certificate chain verification that shall be allowed for
ssl. (See the BUGS section.)
NOTES
The verification of certificates can be controlled by a
set of logically or'ed mode flags:
SSL_VERIFY_NONE
Server mode: the server will not send a client
certificate request to the client, so the client will
not send a certificate.
Client mode: if not using an anonymous cipher (by
default disabled), the server will send a certificate
which will be checked. The result of the certificate
verification process can be checked after the TLS/SSL
The handshake will be continued regardless of the
verification result.
SSL_VERIFY_PEER
Server mode: the server sends a client certificate
request to the client. The certificate returned (if
any) is checked. If the verification process fails as
indicated by verify_callback, the TLS/SSL handshake is
immediately terminated with an alert message
containing the reason for the verification failure.
The behaviour can be controlled by the additional
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT and
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE flags.
Client mode: the server certificate is verified. If
the verification process fails as indicated by
verify_callback, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately
terminated with an alert message containing the reason
for the verification failure. If no server certificate
is sent, because an anonymous cipher is used,
SSL_VERIFY_PEER is ignored.
SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT
Server mode: if the client did not return a
certificate, the TLS/SSL handshake is immediately
terminated with a "handshake failure" alert. This
flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
Client mode: ignored
SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE
Server mode: only request a client certificate on the
initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client
certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This
flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER.
Client mode: ignored
Exactly one of the mode flags SSL_VERIFY_NONE and
SSL_VERIFY_PEER must be set at any time.
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() and SSL_set_verify_depth() set
the limit up to which depth certificates in a chain are
used during the verification procedure. If the certificate
chain is longer than allowed, the certificates above the
limit are ignored. Error messages are generated as if
these certificates would not be present, most likely a
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY will be
issued. The depth count is "level 0:peer certificate",
"level 1: CA certificate", "level 2: higher level CA
certificate", and so on. Setting the maximum depth to 2
allows the levels 0, 1, and 2. The default depth limit is
9, allowing for the peer certificate and additional 9 CA
The verify_callback function is used to control the
behaviour when the SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set. It must be
supplied by the application and receives two arguments:
preverify_ok indicates, whether the verification of the
certificate in question was passed (preverify_ok=1) or not
(preverify_ok=0). x509_ctx is a pointer to the complete
context used for the certificate chain verification.
The certificate chain is checked starting with the deepest
nesting level (the root CA certificate) and worked upward
to the peer's certificate. At each level signatures and
issuer attributes are checked. Whenever a verification
error is found, the error number is stored in x509_ctx and
verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=0. By applying
X509_CTX_store_* functions verify_callback can locate the
certificate in question and perform additional steps (see
EXAMPLES). If no error is found for a certificate,
verify_callback is called with preverify_ok=1 before
advancing to the next level.
The return value of verify_callback controls the strategy
of the further verification process. If verify_callback
returns 0, the verification process is immediately stopped
with "verification failed" state. If SSL_VERIFY_PEER is
set, a verification failure alert is sent to the peer and
the TLS/SSL handshake is terminated. If verify_callback
returns 1, the verification process is continued. If
verify_callback always returns 1, the TLS/SSL handshake
will never be terminated because of this application
experiencing a verification failure. The calling process
can however retrieve the error code of the last
verification error using SSL_get_verify_result(3) or by
maintaining its own error storage managed by
verify_callback.
If no verify_callback is specified, the default callback
will be used. Its return value is identical to
preverify_ok, so that any verification failure will lead
to a termination of the TLS/SSL handshake with an alert
message, if SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set.
BUGS
In client mode, it is not checked whether the
SSL_VERIFY_PEER flag is set, but whether SSL_VERIFY_NONE
is not set. This can lead to unexpected behaviour, if the
SSL_VERIFY_PEER and SSL_VERIFY_NONE are not used as
required (exactly one must be set at any time).
The certificate verification depth set with
SSL[_CTX]_verify_depth() stops the verification at a
certain depth. The error message produced will be that of
an incomplete certificate chain and not
RETURN VALUES
The SSL*_set_verify*() functions do not provide diagnostic
information.
EXAMPLES
The following code sequence realizes an example
verify_callback function that will always continue the
TLS/SSL handshake regardless of verification failure, if
wished. The callback realizes a verification depth limit
with more informational output.
All verification errors are printed, informations about
the certificate chain are printed on request. The example
is realized for a server that does allow but not require
client certificates.
The example makes use of the ex_data technique to store
application data into/retrieve application data from the
SSL structure (see SSL_get_ex_new_index(3),
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3)).
...
typedef struct {
int verbose_mode;
int verify_depth;
int always_continue;
} mydata_t;
int mydata_index;
...
static int verify_callback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
char buf[256];
X509 *err_cert;
int err, depth;
SSL *ssl;
mydata_t *mydata;
err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
/*
* Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
* and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
*/
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index);
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
* Catch a too long certificate chain. The depth limit set using
* SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth() is by purpose set to "limit+1" so
* that whenever the "depth>verify_depth" condition is met, we
* have violated the limit and want to log this error condition.
* We must do it here, because the CHAIN_TOO_LONG error would not
* be found explicitly; only errors introduced by cutting off the
* additional certificates would be logged.
*/
if (depth > mydata->verify_depth) {
preverify_ok = 0;
err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
}
if (!preverify_ok) {
printf("verify error:num=%d:%s:depth=%d:%s\n", err,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(err), depth, buf);
}
else if (mydata->verbose_mode)
{
printf("depth=%d:%s\n", depth, buf);
}
/*
* At this point, err contains the last verification error. We can use
* it for something special
*/
if (!preverify_ok && (err == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT)
{
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
printf("issuer= %s\n", buf);
}
if (mydata->always_continue)
return 1;
else
return preverify_ok;
}
...
mydata_t mydata;
...
mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "mydata index", NULL, NULL, NULL);
...
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER|SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE,
verify_callback);
/*
* Let the verify_callback catch the verify_depth error so that we get
* an appropriate error in the logfile.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(verify_depth + 1);
* Set up the SSL specific data into "mydata" and store it into th SSL
* structure.
*/
mydata.verify_depth = verify_depth; ...
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, mydata_index, &mydata);
...
SSL_accept(ssl); /* check of success left out for clarity */
if (peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))
{
if (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
{
/* The client sent a certificate which verified OK */
}
}
SEE ALSO
ssl(3), SSL_new(3), SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(3),
SSL_get_verify_result(3),
SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(3),
SSL_get_peer_certificate(3),
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(3),
SSL_get_ex_new_index(3)
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