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definitely not a three.dollar.zine
stop reading this now. thoroughly boring. not worth your time. a.plague.arisen.
so many birthdays so close together. wassup wit dat? i hate that we only sing
to ourselves.
more serious play along the line of a bakhtinian-parasituationist dialogue
needs to be done rather than following the nihilisticly cynical path of
baudrillard who has conceded to once being 'situationistic' - for him
secrets and repression have been supplanted by 'the obscene,' "the rule
of the game of a world without appearance or depth - a transparent universe."
"dialogue needs to be done?"
so many things i would like to do tonight. i may not be doing what i really
want. this is nothing original, either.
direct volitionalism is the position that one can acquire beliefs directly,
simply by willing to believe certain propositions. indirect volitionalism is
the view some beliefs arise indirectly, from basic acts of the will. some
volitionalists are prescriptive, some are only descriptive. the latter is the
psychological position that the "voliting" of beliefs is possible. the former
goes a step further, and asserts a normative element, holding that it is
permissible or obligatory to take the necessary steps to acquire beliefs
based on nonepistemic considerations.
"necessary steps to acquire beliefs?"
so many possibilities appear from others, too. none of them fit together
to well. i'd like to please you. it doesn't seem possible when i don't
know what to believe. i should have faith in you.
with the time of the bourgeoisie begins that of liberalism. people want
to see what is "rational," "suited to the times," etc., established
everywhere. The following definition of liberalism, which is supposed
to be pronounced in its honour, characterizes it completely: "liberalism
is nothing else than the knowledge of reason, applied to our existing
relations." its aim is a "rational order," a "moral behaviour," a "limited
freedom," not anarchy, lawlessness, selfhood. But, if reason rules, then
the person succumbs. art has for a long time not only acknowledged the ugly,
but considered the ugly as necessary to its existence, and takes it up into
itself; it needs the villain. in the religious domain, too, the extremest
liberals go so far that they want to see the most religious man regarded
as a citizen; that is, the religious villain; they want to see no more of
trials for heresy. but against the "rational law" no one is to rebel,
otherwise he is threatened with the severest penalty. what is wanted is not
free movement and realization of the person or of me, but of reason - a
dominion of reason, a dominion. The liberals are zealots, not exactly for
the faith, for God, but certainly for reason, their master. They brook no
lack of breeding, and therefore no self-development and self-determination;
they play the guardian as effectively as the most absolute rulers.
"supposed to be pronounced in its honour?"
"what is wanted is not realization?"
not wholly analogous motives at odds.
When the aristocratic morality goes astray and commits sacrilege on reality,
this is limited to that particular sphere with which it is not sufficiently
acquainted--a sphere, in fact, from the real knowledge of which it
disdainfully defends itself. It misjudges, in some cases, the sphere which
it despises, the sphere of the common vulgar man and the low people: on the
other hand, due weight should be given to the consideration that in any case
the mood of contempt, of disdain, of superciliousness, even on the supposition
that it falsely portrays the object of its contempt, will always be far removed
from that degree of falsity which will always characterise the attacks--in
effigy, of course--of the vindictive hatred and revengefulness of the weak in
onslaughts on their enemies.
uh, complete barf. quite entertaining. a not wholly analogous apology for
'good' poetry.
i haven't heard any music in hours. 1490 am, she said. i'm gonna go do that
right now. i feel like dancing.
faux 3.2.3