The documentary sources available for the researcher working in Luftwaffe history are generally spotty since so many air force records were damaged, destroyed, or lost either during the war or in its chaotic aftermath. Nevertheless, considerable materials do remain that shed light on strategy, tactics, supply, losses, and specific campaigns in which the Luftwaffe fought. The most thorough collection of documentary material, now that the British and Americans have returned the records captured at the end of the war, exists in the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, Freiburg, Federal Republic of Germany. This material is well catalogued, and the services provided to the researcher by the staff are very helpful. Most important to this study were the Milch papers, which contain a wide range of material on aspects of the Luftwaffe in which the field marshal was involved, and the records of the Quartermaster General on the Luftwaffe's losses, force strength, maintenance performance, and crew strength. As nearly all the operational records of the Luftwaffe were destroyed, the Quartermaster General's reports on aircraft and crew losses are the only available source that can give a picture of the impact of losses on the Luftwaffe. One must note that these records are based on when aircraft and crews were reported lost rather than when they were actually lost. Thus, there is at least a week's time lag. Nevertheless, the trends that these records indicate are unmistakable.

In the United States, two sources duplicate a portion of the records available in Germany. At Maxwell AFB, Alabama, the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center (AFSHRC) possesses a duplicate set (the other set is in Freiburg) of the historical and documentary material collected for the American Air Force's historical project on the Luftwaffe. This set contains post-war written reports on aspects of the Luftwaffe's history by various senior officers as well as a sizable collection of typed extracts from archival material. It is apparent that some of the historians working on this project had access to the von Rohden collection as well as other material that the British had captured at the end of the war and which in the 1950's was located in the Air Historical Branch, London. The National Archives and Record Service (NARS) in Washington, D.C., possesses a microfilm set of the small section of Luftwaffe archival materials captured by American forces at the end of the war. More importantly, they also possess a full microfilm set of the von Rohden collection, which represents the holdings of the Luftwaffe general staff's historical section. This is an important and useful collection; its holdings are duplicated in Freiburg.

The somewhat spotty documentary material can and should be supplemented with a variety of other materials available to the researcher. The ULTRA decrypts available in the Public Record Office (PRO), London, England, give a useful look at the operational message traffic of the German armed forces. The messages


themselves range from critical pieces of information to reports on venereal disease cases on individual ships. These messages are also of use in evaluating what was available to Allied intelligence sources. In the PRO, the DEFE series contains the messages pertaining to German army and air force matters. It is useful for evaluating the actual German situations as well as establishing when Allied commanders were informed about German strategic moves. Thus, from these records one can establish what was known and when. It is worth noting that only one historical work has examined this material with consistency. Ralph Bennett's Ultra in the West (London, 1980) is an invaluable study of the impact of ULTRA on the western campaign from 1944 forward. The ADM series covers the naval intercepts and is critical for an understanding of the war in the Atlantic. Obviously, it had less importance for this study than the DEFE series. Complementing this source is a valuable history of ULTRA and its impact on American air operations that was written at the conclusion of the war: "Ultra, History of US Strategic Air Force Europe Versus German Air Force," June 1945, SRH-013. It contains many direct quotes from ULTRA decrypts and is available in the NARS. The above material on ULTRA is particularly important for a study of the Luftwaffe, since so much of the operational record was destroyed at the end of the war. Also of use are the 'Y' Service intercepts and reconstruction of the response of the German night fighter force to British night raids. That material is available in the PRO. The records of Bomber Command in the PRO are useful in reconstructing the debates on British bombing policy within the Air Ministry. On the losses suffered by Allied bomber fleets, there are two particularly useful compilations: "War Room Manual of Bomber Command Operations 1939-1945," compiled by the Air Ministry War Room (Statistical Section) and located in the PRO; and "Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17.8.42.-8.5.45.," located in the AFSHRC.

On the American and British side, I have also made some use of the extensive records available on the development of doctrine and the course of the air campaigns in Europe. These records are available in Britain at the PRO and at the RAF Staff College, Bracknell; and in the United States, at the AFSHRC. At the latter archives, the records and texts of the Air Corps Tactical School are particularly interesting and important for the development of American prewar doctrine.


There are a number of published documentary sources available that have bearing on the study of German military and Luftwaffe history. The published volumes of documents collected for the prosecution of the major war criminals (International Military Tribunal, The Trial of Major War Criminals) contain some useful information on the Luftwaffe and are important sources for German strategy in general. The collections of German diplomatic papers, published both in the original and in translation (Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik and Documents on German Foreign Policy), provide an excellent guide to the evolution of German


diplomacy and include some of the more important military documents. Karl-Heinz Völker, Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der Deutschen Luftwaffe (Stuttgart, 1968), has important documents on the prewar development of the German air force. H. R. Trevor Roper's Blitzkrieg to Defeat, Hitler's War Directives (New York, 1965) is a useful collection of the directives that Hitler issued through the OKW headquarters. The war diary of that headquarters is available in a multivolume set edited by a number of Germany's leading military historians (Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht). This series has important information on the Luftwaffe; but given the emphasis on the conduct of ground operations, its coverage is somewhat uneven on the air war. It is very useful on German strategy. Franz Halder's diary, Kriegstagebuch, edited by Hans Adolf Jacobsen (Stuttgart, 1964), is an important source on German strategy in the first three years of the war. It does touch tangentially on air force matters. There are a number of other diaries that are also of interest but of less immediate concern to the historian of the Luftwaffe. Joseph Goebbels, Diaries, 1942-1943, edited by Louis Lochner (New York, 1948), is interesting and informative on the opinions of one of Germany's most important political leaders. The various volumes of the "strategic" bombing survey carried out by American economists immediately at the end of the Second World War contain much important statistical information as well as useful analyses of the impact of the "strategic" bombing campaign on the German war economy. The final volume of the survey, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy (Washington, 1945), has a particularly important set of summary charts on German armaments production. In this same area, the final volume of Sir Charles Webster's and Nobel Frankland's The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. IV (London, 1961), has an interesting collection of documents on the British side of the "strategic" bombing offensive as well as several useful tables. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges, 1939-1940 (Göttingen, 1956), is useful on the 1940 campaign.


There is, of course, an immense literature of fighter pilot memoirs from the war. This study has relied on a minimum of such works and only on those which shed particular light on aspects of the war's general conduct. Walter Warlimont's Inside Hitler's Headquarters (New York, 1964) provides some insight into the workings of the OKW. Nicholaus von Below's Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937-1945 (Mainz, 1980) has recently appeared and provides an interesting look into Hitler's relationship with his military aides. It also has important information on the air war and air strategy as Below was Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant. Albert Kesselring's A Soldier's Record (New York, 1953) is not particularly informative and leaves many important issues undiscussed. Adolf Galland's The First and the Last (New York, 1954) has much of the flavor of most fighter pilot memoirs but also has interesting material on his relationship with Göring. As for bomber pilots, see Werner


Baumbach's The Life and Death of the Luftwaffe (New York, 1960). Concerning the German economy, there are two important memoirs that one should consult: Albert Speer's Inside the Third Reich (New York, 1970) provides the reader with an important insight into the functioning of the war economy from 1942 on and also a sense of the ambiance of life at the highest levels of the Third Reich; conversely, Georg Thomas' Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft 1918-1943/45 (Boppard am Rhein, 1966) is a valuable source of the prewar and early wartime periods.

The British memoir sources on the air war are extensive and enlightening. Marshal of the Royal Air Forces Lord Tedder's With Prejudice (London, 1966) is observant and perceptive, although perhaps somewhat reticent. Arthur Harris' Bomber Offensive (New York, 1947) is contentious and argumentative but lively and readable. Sir John Slessor's The Central Blue (London, 1956) is a clear, intelligent discussion of the career of one of the more important airmen of the Second World War. Slessor's Air Power and Armies (London, 1936) is one of the most realistic books about airpower written in the prewar period. Two important memoirs on the role of British scientists in the winning of the war have appeared in the last several years: R. V. Jones, The Wizard War (New York, 1978); and Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (London, 1978). Aileen Clayton's The Enemy Is Listening (London, 1980) provides an interesting insight into how the British 'Y' Service established itself in the first years of the war.


The official histories that have come out of the Second World War have been at a consistently higher level than was the case with those of the First World War. The historians of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Federal Republic of Germany, have recently produced the first two volumes of what can best be described as a "semiofficial" history of Germany's role in the war. The first volume, Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich Volkmann, Wolfram Wette, Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. I, Ursachen und Voraussetzung der deutschen Kriegspolitik (Stuttgart, 1979), sets the highest possible standards of scholarship and historical objectivity. It examines both the larger questions of German preparation for the war as well as the specific rearmament issues involved with the three services. The second volume, Klaus Maier, Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegmann, and Hans Umbreit, Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. II, Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem Europäischen Kontinent (Stuttgart, 1979), meets the same standards and contains a groundbreaking discussion of German air doctrine in the prewar period.

One of the most important series of official histories is the Grand Strategy series done by the official historians in Great Britain. Of particular use to this study from that series are the following volumes: J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September 1939-June 1941 (London, 1957); and especially Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV, August 1942-September 1943 (London, 1972). The three-volume set (with one additional volume of appendices) by Sir Charles


Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (London, 1961), is arguably the best work yet done on this aspect of the air war. Basil Collier's The Defense of the United Kingdom (London, 1957) contains important information on the air defense of the United Kingdom. The first volume of a new history on the role of British intelligence in the war, F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, R. C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. I (London, 1979), contains useful information but is disappointing in many respects. Its style is generally undistinguished and its knowledge of what was happening in Germany rather superficial. This study has also consulted a number of other British official histories peripherally: Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London, 1962); L. F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders, 1939-1940 (London, 1955); I. S. O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. I (London, 1974); and L. F. Ellis, The War in the West, Vol. I (London, 1962).

In the United States, the official history of air operations appeared soon after the war was over. Nevertheless, Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1948) still holds up well, although certain issues understandably are not examined in full detail. The Green series, produced in many volumes by the Office of Chief of Military History, are all of high quality but are somewhat tangential to the issues discussed in this work.


One of the most important books on the defeat of the Luftwaffe was written by anonymous authors in the British Air Ministry shortly after the war was over. This work never appeared in general print but can be read in a number of archives including the AFSHRC and the AHB: Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (London, 1948). Perhaps the most provocative and challenging work on the strategic bombing offensive is Anthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (London, 1968). Read with the official histories (American and British), one can gain deep insights into the nature of the problems faced during the bomber campaign. Noble Frankland has produced a readable, incisive summary of the overall bombing offensive for Ballantine Books: Noble Frankland, Bomber Offensive, The Devastation of Europe (New York, 1970). He has also written an excellent summary of British operations, The Bombing Offensive Against Germany (London, 1965). Both works are useful departure points. The multivolume set by Dennis Richards, The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945 (London, 1953), is somewhat dated but still useful. Richard Overy's The Air War, 1939-1945 (London, 1980) represents a new departure; and while it contains several small errors, it puts the air war into a much larger perspective than most historians have been willing to address. The sections dealing with production questions are particularly important. David Irving's The Rise and Fall of the Luftwafe, The Life of Field Marshal Erhard Milch (Boston, 1973) is uneven but contains some interesting observations. Horst Boog's "High Command and Leadership in the German Luftwaffe, 1935-1945," in Air Power and Warfare, Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium,


USAF Academy, edited by Colonel Alfred F. Hurley and Major Robert C. Ehrhart (Washington, 1979), is a valuable piece. B. H. Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War (New York, 1971) has a particularly insightful chapter dealing with the issues involved in the "strategic" bombing offensive. John Killen's History of the Luftwaffe (London, 1966) and Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries (New York, 1968) add little to the subject. Richard Suchenwirth's Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort (USAF Historical Study No. 189, 1968) contains some interesting points as does that author's Command and Leadership in the German Air Force (USAF Historical Study No. 174, 1969).


Several important works exist on the Luftwaffe in the period before the war. The best of these in German are Karl-Heinz Völker, "Die Entwicklung der militärischen Luftfahrt in Deutschland, 1920-1933," in Beitrage zur Militär-und Kriegsgeschichte, Vol. III (Stuttgart, 1962), and Karl-Heinz Völker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe, 1933-1939: Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entwicklung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie (Stuttgart, 1967). Both of these are informative on the creation of the Luftwaffe before the war. In English, Edward Homze's Arming the Luftwaffe, The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1939 (Lincoln, 1976) is excellent concerning German armament production and air rearmament issues. It also contains useful and perceptive comments about the German military's role. For the early developments of the Nazi rearmament effort, see Edward W. Bennett's German Rearmament and the West, 1932-1933 (Princeton, 1979). Wilhelm Deist's The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981) is the most important book on German rearmament in English in the last ten years. It has an excellent discussion on the Luftwaffe's place in Germany's preparation for war. On early strategic thinking in the Luftwaffe, see particularly: Bernard Heimann and Joachim Scunke, "Eine geheime Denkschrift zur Luftkriegskonzeption Hitler-Deutschlands vom Mai 1933," Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, Vol. III (1964). Richard Overy's "The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans: November 1936-April 1939," English Historical Review (1975) gives an interesting account of the muddle in prewar production. It draws upon his important dissertation: "German Aircraft Production 1939-1942: A Study in the German War Economy," Cambridge University dissertation, 1977. Richard Suchenwirth's The Development of the German Air Force is dated and somewhat tendentious but does contain useful information. On the Luftwaffe's involvement in the Spanish Civil War, Klaus Maier's Guernica (Freiburg, 1975) is the best work. There are several other works on the Luftwaffe's preparation in the prewar period: Herbert Mason, Jr., The Rise of the Luftwaffe, 1918-1940 (New York, 1973), and Hanfried Schliephake, Birth of the Luftwaffe (Chicago, 1971). The Schliephake work is more careful; the Mason work indicates little research. For an evaluation of the preparedness of air forces to fight in 1938 during the Czech crisis, see my article, "German Air Power and the Munich Crisis," War and Society, Vol. II, edited by Brian Bond and Ian Roy (London, 1975). On German


foreign policy in the 1930's, Gerhard Weinberg's two-volume set (particularly the first volume), The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, Vol. I, 1933-1936, and Vol. II, 1936-1939 (Chicago, 1970, 1981), is a useful point of departure. For the considerable economic constraints on German rearmament, see Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, edited by Friedrich Forstmeier and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Düsseldorf, 1975). For a comparison of the Luftwaffe and RAF, see my article "British and German Air Doctrine Between the Wars," Air University Review (March-April 1980). For a closer look at German air doctrine, see my article "The Luftwaffe Before the Second World War: A Mission, A Strategy?" in the Journal of Strategic Studies (September 1981).

On the development of British doctrine before the Second World War, Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide-Rule, British Air Strategy, 1914-1939 (London, 1976), is an important work. Group Captain R. A. Mason's "The British Dimension," Airpower and Warfare, edited by Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhard (Washington, 1979), gives a new look at the First World War and its air strategy. D. C. Watt's "The Air Force View of History," Quarterly Review (October 1962), is sharp and challenging and an important article. Basil Collier's The Leader of the Few (London, 1957) is a bit too uncritical but an important source on the career of Dowding. For the influence of the Treasury on British rearmament, two useful works have recently appeared: G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury (Edinburgh, 1979), and, to a lesser extent, Robert Paul Shay, Jr., British Rearmament in the Thirties (Princeton, 1977). On the American side, Alfred F. Hurley's Billy Mitchell (New York, 1964) presents a balanced view of the early airpower theorist. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr's. The Air Plan that Defeated Hitler (Atlantic, 1972) is a forthright but uncritical examination of the evolution of American doctrine and plans by one of the individuals at the heart of the Air Corps Tactical School. Robert F. Futrell's Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Montgomery, 1971) is a useful jump-off point for an examination of the development of American air doctrine. Thomas A. Fabyanic, "A Critique of United States Air War Planning, 1941-1944," St. Louis University dissertation (1973), is an interesting critique of the planning and doctrinal developments before and during the war. Thomas H. Greer, "The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941" (unpublished manuscript, Air University Library), is also useful.

THE EARLY WAR, 1939-41

Robert M. Kennedy's The German Campaign in Poland, 1939 (Washington, 1956) is an excellent study of the first battles in that war. For the study of the "phony war," two articles are noteworthy: The first one is mine, "The German Response to Victory in Poland: A Case Study in Professionalism," Armed Forces and Society (Winter, 1981); the second is Peter Ludlow's outstanding article, "The Unwinding of Appeasement," in Das 'Andere Deutschland' im Zweiten Weltkrieg, edited by L. Kettenacker (Stuttgart, 1977). For difficulties within the German high command, see Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy Against Hitler in the Twilight


War (Minneapolis, 1968). A number of important works exist on the defeat of France in 1940. Among those worth consulting are Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest (New York, 1958); Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle, France 1940 (London, 1969); and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1940 (Wiesbaden, 1957). For obvious reasons, these works do not concentrate on the air battle and its significant losses but rather on the course of the decisive land conflict. Patrice Buffotot and Jacques Ogier, "L'armée de l'air francaise dans la campagne de France (10 Mai-25 Juin 1940)," Revue historique des Armées, Vol. II, No. 3, pp. 88-117, offers a unique look at the problems that the French air force faced in 1940 as well as its contributions.

On the first developments in the intelligence war, see Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (New York, 1978). Brian Johnson's The Secret War (London, 1978) looks at the development of the scientific war as well as intelligence. For the best book on the Battle of Britain, see Francis K. Mason, Battle Over Britain (New York, 1968). Telford Taylor's The Breaking Wave (New York, 1967) is also good on the wider strategic questions as well as the air battles. Basil Collier's The Battle of Britain (New York, 1962) is also useful.

Adam Ulman's brilliant work, Expansion and Coexistence: History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York, 1974), has much to say on the diplomatic background to the Russo-German War. Gerhard Weinberg's Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941 (Leiden, 1954) still is useful but flawed.

There are a number of important works that treat particular aspects of the 1941 campaigns. Martin van Creveld's Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941, The Balkan Clue (Cambridge, 1973) is interesting but perhaps overstated. For the spring battles, George Blau's The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring, 1941)" (Washington, 1953) is an excellent piece of work. Hans-Otto Mühleisen, Kreta 1941, Das Unternehmen 'Merkur' (Freiburg, 1968), is a thorough battle study. For the German invasion of Russia, a number of outstanding works exist. For the intelligence background to the invasion, see Barton Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa (Cambridge, 1973). The best work on German strategy in the first years of the war is Andreas Hillgruber's monumental Hitlers Strategie (Frankfurt, 1965). George E. Blau's The German Campaign in Russia--Planning and Operations (1940-1942) (Washington, 1955) is an excellent summary for the time when it was written. The best account on Barbarossa's failure, though somewhat limited in its span of time, is Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau, Das Scheitern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/42 (Stuttgart, 1972). Herman Plocher's study, The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1941 (USAF Historical Study No. 154, 1967) has much interesting information but is narrow in scope. Richard Overy's "The Luftwaffe and the German Economy 1939-1945," Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 2/79, is a brillant account of why the Germans made such a hash of aircraft production in the war years. On why the campaign turned into such a terrible war of atrocity, see: Jurgen Förster's "Hitler's War Aims Against the Soviet Union and German Military Leaders," Militärhistorisk Tidskrift (Stockholm, 1979). For the most


thorough study of this subject, see Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden, Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945 (Stuttgart, 1978). Robert Conquest's The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (London, 1968) gives the political background and results of Stalin's savaging of his military services. The results, the catastrophic collapse of 1941-42, are graphically described by John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (New York, 1975). For the suffering of Russia's civilians, see Harrison Salisbury's The 900 Days, The Siege of Leningrad (New York, 1969). Seweryn Bialer's collection of translated Russian memoirs, Stalin and His Generals (New York, 1969), contains many interesting accounts. Albert Seaton's The Russo German War, 1941-43 (New York, 1971) covers both sides of the war and is interesting in parts but has some major weaknesses. For the Soviet summary in English of their great military history effort on the war, see: The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, A General Outline (Moscow, 1974). On the Russian air force, one can consult Walter Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders (USAF Historical Study No. 175, 1960), and Klaus Uebe, Russian Reaction to German Airpower in World War II (USAF Historical Study No. 176, 1964). From the Russian point of view, one can consult the translation of the Soviet official history by Leland Fetzer and edited by Ray Wagner, The Soviet Air Force in World War II (New York, 1973).


On the air war in Russia, Herman Plocher's The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1943 (USAF Historical Study No. 155, 1967) has the same weaknesses of his volumes on 1941 and 1942. There are a number of important works on the German defeats in Russia in the last years of the Second World War. The best work in English is Earl F. Ziemke's excellent Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, 1968). Not surprisingly, there are a number of works in German. Manfred Kehrig's Stalingrad, Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht (Stuttgart, 1974) is as thorough a study of that battle as one could expect. The Battle of Kursk has also received the same sort of attention: see, in particular, E. Klink, Das Gesetz desHandelns, 'Zitadelle' 1943 (Stuttgart, 1966).

A number of worthwhile pieces have appeared on various aspects of the air war in 1943-44. Martin Middlebrook has written two excellent studies that cover major incidents in those years. The first of those is The Nuremberg Raid (New York, 1974). The coverage on Bomber Command's operations was excellent; that of German operations adequate. His more recent work, The Battle of Hamburg, Allied Bomber Forces Against a German City in 1943 (London, 1980), has the same strengths and weaknesses. From the German viewpoint, Friedhelm Golücke's Schweinfurt und der strategische Luftkrieg, 1943 (Paderborn, 1980) is thorough on all aspects of the German side but leaves many aspects of the American air offensive untouched. It is an important work. David Irving's The Mare's Nest (London, 1964) is arguably his best work and covers the development of German rocket technology and the British response. While Hans Rumpf's The Bombing of


Germany (New York, 1961) is much weaker than the above works, it does contain some useful statistics. Thomas M. Coffey's Decision Over Schweinfurt (New York, 1977) does not compare with Middlebrook's or Golücke's works. Max Hasting's Bomber Command (New York, 1979) is a unique mixture of squadron histories and an operational account of the course of the British campaign. It is one of the more interesting books on the air war that have recently appeared. Gordon Musgrove's Pathfinder Force, A History of 8 Group (London, 1976) gives a close look at the development and effectiveness of Bennett's force. Werner Girbig's . . . mit Kurs auf Leuna (Stuttgart, 1980) is an important account of the "strategic" bombing attacks on Germany's oil industry and the efforts of the Luftwaffe to defend its life blood. On German aircraft production during the war, see the outstanding article by R. J. Overy, "The Luftwaffe and the European Economy, 1939-1945," in Militärgeschichtliche Mittedungen, 2/79. Olaf Groehler's "Starke, Verteilung und Verluste der deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militärgeschichte, Vol. 17 (1978) presents some interesting tables based on the loss reports of the Quartermaster General. His interpretation, colored by the political atmosphere of the GDR, leaves much to be desired. On the Normandy campaign, Ralph Bennett's Ultra in the West, The Normandy Campaign, 1944-1945 is the first work to integrate the impact of ULTRA with supporting evidence directly into an account of ground and air operations.


Table of Contents ** Previous Appendix (4) * Next Appendix (Index)

Transcribed and formatted by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation