ORGANIZATION OF THE
ARMY AIR ARM
1935-1945

USAF Historical Division
Research Studies Institute
Air University

SCANNED BY ISA
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Foreword

The year 1935 marked the establishment of the General Headquarters Air Force, the first official recognition that the development of effective airpower necessitated authority for independent action. The purpose of this monograph is to show the organizational growth of the Army air arm from 1935 to September 1945 and to trace the ideas and influences that affected its development. Most significant of these was the continuous effort to attain an autonomous air force, one with a large degree of control over its own affairs internally and the necessary voice in determining its operational activities. Important internal developments included the establishment and implementation of an Air Staff, the application of management devices, the improvement of programming methods, the consolidation of AAF Headquarters offices, and decentralization of command responsibilities.

This study was prepared by Dr. Chase C. Mooney and revised by Dr. Edward C. Williamson. Like other Historical Division studies, additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
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The Attainment of Autonomy Within the War Department

RAPID DEVELOPMENT of the range, speed, and power of the military airplane necessitated continuous adjustments in the organization of the Army air arm. This arm originated in 1907 as the Aeronautical Division (composed of one officer and two enlisted men) in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. In 1914 the creation of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps by congressional action was a step toward higher status in the Army. The changing concept of employment of the airplane in World War I was instrumental in removing aeronautical matters from the Signal Corps and creating the Air Service in 1918. By 1926 the role of aviation in the field of military science was sufficiently important to warrant the designation of the air arm as the Air Corps. In recognition of its new status the Air Corps was accorded sectional representation on the War Department General Staff. At the same time the office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air was created. Seven years later, however, this office was abolished as a result of economy measures by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Several tests in the 1920's and early 1930's demonstrated that the airplane was potentially a formidable war weapon. Airmen stressed the results of these tests in their efforts to achieve their long-sought goal—the organization of a compact, mobile air arm ready to meet the enemy on M-day. Of the many boards and committees which had studied the question, only the Crowell Board in 1919 and Lampert Committee in 1924 had recommended that airpower be employed other than as an auxiliary of the land and sea forces. Constant pressure by the airmen, increasing recognition of the importance of aerial warfare, and the ominous trend of world events brought about the appointment of the Baker Board in April 1934. This board was, among other matters, to survey the Air Corps as an agency of national defense and to make recommendations for its improvement. Reporting in July after an exhaustive study, the board recommended that the office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air not be reestablished and that the Air Corps remain an integral part of the War Department. It believed, however, that the twofold function of an air corps—(1) fighting, and (2) training and supply—should be performed by different organizations.

It recommended that the Office, Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) should continue to perform the service functions and a General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force should be created as the combat element.

Five months elapsed before definite steps were taken toward carrying out the recommendations of the Baker Board. Then on 31 December 1934, the Adjutant General issued a letter, effective 1 March 1935, establishing the organization which was to develop the now accepted concept of the mobile striking force of air warfare. Headquarters of the GHQ Air Force was to be at Langley Field, Va., and headquarters of the three wings were to be at Langley Field, March Field, Calif., and Barksdale Field, La. The War Department by this action created a new "air army," coordinate with the four ground armies, and organized and commanded so that it could be used effectively either to help the ground services or to strike at distant locations.

*Members were Newton D. Baker, Karl T. Compton, Clarence D. Chamberlain, James H. Doolittle, Edgar S. Gerrell, George W. Lewis, Maj Gen Hugh A. Drum, Maj Gen Benjamin D. Foulois, Maj Gen George S. Smedley, Brig Gen Charles F. E. Lobe, and Brig Gen. John W. Gallich. Of the military personnel only Foulois was as an Air Corps officer.
The Attainment of Autonomy Within the War Department

The existing organization imposed a "dual responsibility" on station commanders and divided control over them. The best solution, the board thought, was to place "all Air Force stations and all personnel and units thereof solely under the Air Force chain of command."

During consideration of the Browning Board proposal, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, Commanding General, GHQ Air Force strongly supported the complete exemption of Air Corps stations from corps area control. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Maj. Gen. John H. Hughes, on the other hand, opposed an exempted status for these stations, and suggested that the GHQ Air Force be placed under the field force army commanders. Also, he thought the confusion existing between the corps area commanders and the GHQ Air Force officials was more apparent than real. The Deputy Chief of Staff, however, supported the recommendations of the Browning Board and General Andrews. On 8 May 1936 Air Corps stations were exempted from corps area control, but court-martial jurisdiction still remained with the corps area commander. In November 1940 corps area control of stations was restored, but was again removed in June 1941. This problem was, of course, inextricably interwoven with the issue of air force autonomy, the War Department's attitude on that issue being partially reflected in the exempted station controversy.

The organization has damaged Air Corps morale and has split the Air Corps into two factions... The Board believes that the present organization is unsound, lacks simplicity and increases the amount of overhead necessary for administration and operation. The Board believes that the new organization should center around the Chief of the Air Corps... There is at present duplication, overlapping, and confusion. A clear determination of duties and responsibilities is first necessary. The Board believes the creation and continued maintenance of the GHQAF to be sound and wise, and that thorough and continuous training for combat operations is vital to it... Further that a consolidation of the Air Corps under one head will permit the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force to devote his maximum effort to training and a minimum to administration.

In April 1936 a board of Air Corps officers, convened to study the recommendations of the Browning Board, agreed that the GHQ Air Force should be preserved as a separate operating command but thought that it should be under the Chief of the Air Corps for administrative purposes. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force would thus report directly to the Chief of the Air Corps and not to any lower echelon of his office. This report was not used, however, as a basis of reorganization because a controversy developed over signing it. Col. Hugh J. Knerr signed the report but later withdrew his signature, arguing that as a representative of General Andrews, who did not agree entirely with the proposals of the board, he had no right to sign. Most of the other members of the board felt, on the other hand, that Colonel Knerr's authority to sign was not affected by the attitude of General Andrews.

While the above controversy was in progress,
The Attainment of Autonomy Within the War Department

The relationship established in 1939 was destined to be short-lived.* The expansion program had begun in that year, and the shortage of planes and trained personnel made it essential to have the best possible coordination of effort. To that end, the necessity of keeping the GHQ Air Force under the Chief of the Air Corps was stressed. But the advice of General Arnold went unheeded, and on 19 November 1940 the GHQ Air Forces was removed from his jurisdiction. The effects of this separation were moderated by the fact that the appointment of Arnold as Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air on 11 November 1940 put him in a position to coordinate the efforts of the two elements of the Air Corps.

The relationship of the air arm to the War Department was also changed by the action on 19 November. The GHQ Air Force as an element of the field forces was placed under the control of the general commanding the field forces, the Chief of Staff. Station complements were made subject to the jurisdiction of the corps area commanders. Much of the independence of action which the air arm had been accorded in 1935 was thus removed, and the concept of the employment of airpower as a separate force received a setback.7

The November reorganization also provided for the creation of four air districts, an action which was deemed essential because the GHQ Air Force had expanded considerably and it was necessary to decentralize tactical control and training. It was expected that the districts would be organized as potential theaters of operations. A few months later, on 17 March 1941, these districts were replaced by the four continental air forces (First to Fourth Air Forces) in the four defense commands—territorial agencies with “appropriate staff designed to coordinate and prepare and to initiate the execution of all plans for the employment of Army Forces and installations against enemy action in that portion of the United States lying within the command boundaries.” The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force was placed under the control of General Headquarters, an agency established the previous July to decentralize activities of the War Department and to assist the Chief of Staff in his capacity as commanding general of the field armies.29

The channels of control of the Air Corps established in November 1940 were viewed with disfavor by those responsible for military aviation. On 26 December the Acting Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, stated that the existing means of control “would be disastrous in the event of war.” He maintained that the “best brains” of the air arm were forced to submit matters to a superior staff which lacked knowledge of air matters. Responsibility and authority were not commensurate, and it was impossible to perform the enormous task ahead as long as the division between the OCAC and the GHQ Air Force existed. As a possible solution to some of the difficulties, he proposed that the Under Secretary of War be given more specific controls over procurement and that three assistant secretaries of war be appointed. These new assistants should be representatives of the ground forces, the air arm, and the services common to the two. On the very day that General Brett made the above suggestions, Robert A. Lovett was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. He was to function primarily as an assistant to the Under Secretary of War in matters of Air Corps procurement. In April 1941 Lovett was designated as Assistant Secretary of War for Air.*

The unsatisfactory relationship between the GHQ Air Force and the OCAC existed until the summer of 1941. However, it was apparent that the division of authority and responsibility was not conducive to the best interests of the expansion program, and in March of that year Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had directed that steps be taken to place our air arm under one responsible head, and that plans be worked out to develop an organization staffed and equipped to provide the ground forces with essential aircraft units for joint operations, while at the same time expanding and decentralizing our staff work to permit Air Force autonomy in the degree needed.40

In regard to the amount of freedom to be allowed the air arm, Secretary Stimson stated that he

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*See Chart 1, p. 6

*This office was in existence earlier. See above, p. 1.
thought "autonomy of the air arm rather than segregated independence" was the best method of "obtaining successful results."

In accordance with Sumner's instructions, steps were taken to bring about the desired results. At length, an agreement was reached, and the terms of the reorganization were set forth in AR 95-5 of 20 June 1941. This regulation created the Army Air Forces to coordinate the activities of the Office, Chief of the Air Corps, the Air Force Combat Command (formerly the GHQ Air Force), and other air units. Direct responsibility for aviation matters was given to the Chief of the Army Air Forces who was to be assisted in policy formulation by the Air Staff. The creation of this staff was in line with the Secretary's policy of decentralizing staff work and giving the Army Air Forces a greater degree of autonomy. The Army Air Forces was intended to have, "so far as possible within the War Department, a complete autonomy similar in character to that exercised by the Marine Corps of the Navy." However, it did not free the Army Air Forces or the Air Staff from subordination to the General Staff.

The Chief of the Army Air Forces was made directly accountable to the Secretary of War and was charged with the establishment of plans and policies for all aviation activities. Under his jurisdiction the Chief of the Air Corps and the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command were given immediate responsibility for service and combat matters, respectively.

The reorganization of June 1941 did not solve the basic problem of unity of effort and delineation of responsibilities between the service and combat elements of the air arm. The legal status of the OCAC was uncertain. The Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command and the Chief of the Air Corps remained on the same echelon. More out of line with military procedure, a lieutenant general, the Commanding General of the Air Force Combat Command, had to be responsible to and function through a major general, the Chief of the Army Air Forces. Because the Chief of the Air Corps and the Chief of the Army Air Forces were charged with the execution of many identical functions, it was inevitable that conflicts would arise.

Nor was the relationship between the air arm and the War Department clearly delimited and defined. The Air Staff, the War Department General Staff, and the "staff" of the OCAC were all involved in service and supply problems. For tactical and combat matters the staff of the Air Force Combat Command, the Air Staff, General Headquarters, and the War Department General Staff had divided responsibility. This parceling of responsibilities and variations in channels of authority tended to increase friction among the several agencies. The reorganization did not give to the Army Air Forces the degree of autonomy thought to be necessary for satisfactory operation. It was generally felt within the AAF that the air arm was so circumscribed by the General Staff that it could do virtually nothing on its own. Furthermore, the conflict between the General Staff and GHQ, which considered itself responsible for strategic plans and viewed the General Staff as an administrative agency, made the position of the air arm weaker than it otherwise would have been. Nevertheless this reorganization was the first significant advance in the movement for autonomy of the air arm since the creation of the GHQ Air Force in 1935.

Because existence of GHQ seemed to complicate the exercise of the over-all authority of the War Department, key officers of War Plans Division (WPB) sided privately with the air arm view that GHQ should be eliminated. In a study reviewed by AAF planners, Lt. Col. William K. Harrison of WPB proposed separate Zone of Interior commands for air, ground, and service forces, plus a command section inside the War Department. On 24 October, Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the Chief of Air Staff, submitted a reorganization plan which incorporated Harrison's ideas. "The routine treatment of this recommendation resulted in 100 percent nonconcurrences."

However, the lack of clear channels of command was producing disturbing failures to follow through on orders given to the defense areas. On 3 November, Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, admitted that he had "the poorest command post in the Army...." With very definite ideas on what should be done, on 14 November General Arnold provided Marshall with a detailed proposal.
The attainment of autonomy within the War Department, the desirability for service and supply coordination on a decentralized basis; and the necessity for the regulation of partial reorganizations.

Meanwhile, in reply to a memorandum of 9 January from the Chief of Staff, the Air War Plans Division presented its ideas on reorganization of the War Department. It pointed out that the reorganization set forth in AR 95-5 of 20 June 1941 had not brought a satisfactory answer to the problem of unity of command. Many responsibilities were dealt with concurrently by the Air Staff and the General Staff "with resultant conflict, delay and confusion." There was need for adequate air representation in all policy-making and staff agencies, for consolidation of control of the armed services under a single head, and for sufficient liberty for each service to develop its potentialities to the fullest degree. It proposed, therefore, that coordinate ground, air, and naval arms be created with unity of command effected by a coordinator of common services. Under this plan a small staff of ground, air, naval, production and supply, and political and economic warfare representatives would report directly to the President. It felt that this organization would give the desired freedom of action and at the same time ensure the necessary unity of command.\footnote{In the course of the study Colonel Nelson became a member of the McNarney committee and was replaced by Capt. J W Aston}

The McNarney Committee began its deliberations upon the chairman's return from Hawaii and early in February laid down the general outlines of the reorganization. The AAF was instructed to create a policy staff, an operating staff, and a command level. General Arnold delegated the responsibility for the detailed plan to Colonel Gates, who had been studying the air arm structure intensively for several months. Colonel Gates assembled a committee composed of Col. Otto Nelson, Lt. Col. Guido P. Reitera, Capt. Joseph S. Clark, Jr., and Leonard Holscher and Bruce Smith of the Bureau of the Budget. This committee conducted detailed studies to supplement the information on hand, analyzed the functions of the Washington office, and consulted many key men.\footnote{Much of the discussion centered about the functions of the operating staff which came to be known as the "directorates." Also, every effort was made to "push to the front all activities of a staff nature and to delegate to the field all that was not."\footnote{This section was reworded to read: "The plan evolved by the AAF committee was submitted in the latter part of February to General Arnold, and in turn to the War Department, where General McNarney and the reorganization committee made some changes. The primary considerations in this reorganization seemed to have been 1) the securing of unity and clarity of control, 2) the decentralizing of detailed control, 3) an increased recognizing of a new and rapidly developing method of warfare, and 4) the relieving of the air and ground arms from much of the annoyance and effort required for supply, procurement, and general housekeeping.} The final organization was embodied in War Department Circular No. 59, 2 March 1942, which became effective on 9 March. By this reorganization the War Department was consolidated into three coordinate, autonomous forces: the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the Services of Supply (later the Army Service Forces). Each was under a commanding general. The General Staff was reorganized so that approximately 50 percent of its personnel were representatives of the air arm. The Army Air Forces had, at last, achieved theoretical autonomy within the framework of the War Department.

Between the bombing of Pearl Harbor and 9 March the Air Force Combat Command had virtually ceased to exist as a combat agency. The First and Fourth Air Forces had been placed under the Eastern and Western Defense Commands, respectively. The Second and Third Air Forces had been confined primarily to training. In the combat zones the air units were under the control of the theater commanders. The abolishment of the Air Force Combat Command by the reorganization was both in recognition of a fait accompli and in conformity with the newly stated mission of the air arm. This mission was "to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations." Thus, at this stage the Army Air Forces became a supply and training agency, theoretically not concerned with actual combat operations or strategic planning.

During the early days of the war General Arnold—as Chief, AAF and Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air—undoubtedly had played an important
Internal Organization at Headquarters, 1935-1942

Although occasionally the War Department intervened to indicate that it thought there were too many major divisions of the air arm, the Air Corps was left relatively free to determine its own internal structure. This interposition of authority occurred most frequently from 1925 to 1935. From 1935 to 1939 there was a comparatively stable number of main organization units; in the latter year, and after, there was a decided increase, resulting mostly from the expansion program. In March 1942 came a sweeping realignment of duties, as well as the epochal change in the relationship of the air arm to the War Department.

Many of the internal changes were necessitated by the growth and re-emphasis of administrative responsibilities resulting from increased autonomy, technical advances, and the changing concepts of strategy and tactics. After the coming of war those responsible for Air Corps organization sought to keep the administrative structure abreast of military and scientific developments. Their approach was pragmatic because of the urgency of the demands for services. They attempted to keep the air force organization as flexible as the weapon it was designed to serve and adjusted its structure as experience indicated the best methods of meeting the needs of the operating components of the air arm.

In 1935 the Office-Chef of the Air Corps was the service element of the air arm. It consisted of six major divisions: Personnel, Information, War Plans-Training, Supply, Finance, and Reserve. The immediate subordinate of the Chief was an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, who had supervision over the Air Corps Board, the Air Corps Technical Committee, and special boards that were appointed from time to time. In 1938 he was also charged with directing the activities of the Aeronautical Board and the work of the Plans and Inspection Sections. The next year the Chief of the Materiel Division, who had also been designated an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, was brought from Wright Field to Washington.*

The Chief of the Air Corps now began to rely on "special assistants" who rendered "advisory and counselor service on technical, fiscal, and administrative matters." With this development many of the activities formerly performed by the Assistant Chief were transferred to the Executive.

The functions of the Executive in 1935 were quite different from those of an executive by the end of 1943. In 1935 he was primarily a managerial assistant charged with general housekeeping functions and civilian personnel matters. In 1937 the Executive office, after receiving the Reproduction, Plans, and Inspection Sections, was classed as a division.†† Over the Plans and Inspection Sections, however, it exercised no executive authority, and the next year they were removed from its jurisdiction. In 1940 the Executive began to exercise more truly executive functions and became the immediate executor for the Chief of the Air Corps. Office management and civilian employee relationships, formerly the responsibility of the Executive, as well as other service activities,

*See Chart 2
†The GHQ Air Force was the combat or tactical element
††See Chart 3, p 13

This was done so that the officer charged with responsibility for material development would be the immediate adviser of the Chief of the Air Corps on material matters
††Because the number of civilian employees in the Air Corps was very small, it was not considered essential to have a separate division or even section to handle civilian personnel relationships
THE OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

NOVEMBER 1935

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

AIR CORPS BOARD
AIR CORPS TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

ASST. CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

SPECIAL BOARDS

EXECUTIVE

PERSONNEL
DIVISION

INFORMATION
DIVISION

WAR PLANS-
TRAINING
DIVISION

SUPPLY
DIVISION

FINANCE
DIVISION

RESERVE
DIVISION

Chart 3.
THE OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

JANUARY 1937

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

AIR CORPS BOARD
AIR CORPS TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

ASST CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS

EXECUTIVE DIVISION

PLANS SECTION

INSPECTION SECTION

SPECIAL BOARDS

PERSONNEL DIVISION

INFORMATION DIVISION

TRAINING AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

SUPPLY DIVISION

FINANCE DIVISION

RESERVE DIVISION

Chart 4
were no more specifically applicable to one division than to another, and which applied to all in approximately equal degree. The method of dealing with the organization and position of agencies charged with these functions is of especial interest and significance. Generally, the handling of such activities seems to have been based on the sound principle that any activity which concerned all divisions should have independence of action. Planning was, perhaps, the most important of these.

The shift of the planning function to the Executive office in 1936 resulted in greater freedom of action and a position of higher importance, both of which were retained in a change in echelon in 1938 when Plans was placed immediately under the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. In 1939, however, Plans was organized into sections corresponding roughly to those of the War Department General Staff and placed on the division level. With the reorganization of 20 June 1941 the sections of Plans Division became the main components of the Air Staff. A portion of the parent division, however, remained in the OCAC; this residual Plans Section was important in the subsequent development of Management Control.

From 1935 to 1940 inspection activities were confined almost exclusively to the technical phases. Although this function concerned all divisions nearly equally, the inspection agency was located in the Supply Division in 1935. From that date to 1941 the shifts in the inspection agency were identical with those of Plans, and in June 1941 the policy aspects of inspection were separated from the operating phases and placed in the Air Staff.

Although Plans and Inspections were made regular divisions in 1939, four agencies were removed in 1940 from that level and placed in the office of the Executive. These were the Legal, Fiscal, Medical, and Buildings and Grounds Divisions. The Legal and Fiscal Divisions had been in the old Finance Division. The Medical Division had been a section of Personnel, a division in the Training Group, and later, a separate division. Buildings and Grounds had been a part of the Supply Division. The general upward shift indicated some trend toward a staff but was more analogous to what later became known as the Special Staff.

Thus, at the time of the establishment of the Army Air Forces in June 1941 there were eight divisions and four special staff divisions in the Office, Chief of the Air Corps. One month before, a study by the Administrative Research and Statistics Section had indicated the necessity of reorganization and realignment of responsibilities and functions. It was noted that there was "a large amount of duplication of activities" which sometimes made it difficult to establish responsibility for certain duties. This situation not only caused confusion but was "highly wasteful of time and energy."

Under the provisions of the 20 June 1941 reorganization the Chief, Army Air Forces coordinated the work of the combat and service elements of the air arm. In complying with the principles of separating policy and operating activities, the policy functions of the Intelligence, Inspection, and Medical Divisions were placed in the Air Staff. Some operating activities also were removed to the Staff when separate Communications and Public Relations offices were established, a statistics section was created, and the remaining medical activities were transferred.

With the coordination of activities by the Chief, Army Air Forces and the transfer of many functions to the Air Staff, the divisions of the OCAC should have decreased. The reverse was true, however, and by early December 1941 there were 14 divisions. Two of the new divisions—the Ferrying and Air Service Commands—were established for the quick dispatch of aircraft to lend-lease beneficiaries, and for the service and maintenance of aircraft. The third additional office resulted from a splitting of the Training and Operations Division into two units.

The structure of the air arm was in a very unsettled state in the latter part of 1941, and the entry of the United States into the war revealed inadequacies and accelerated changes. On 24 December Maj. Gen. Walter R. Weaver, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, effected a reorganization which reduced the main divisions to seven by combining some of the associated activities under "assistants"—the Materiel Division, the Ferrying...
CHAPTER III

Development of The Air Staff

THE BASIC RESPONSIBILITY of a military organization headquarters is planning for the achievement of the mission of the agency it serves. For a long time over-all planning for Army aviation was the province of the War Department General Staff. The degree of planning that could be done by the air arm was closely interwoven with the movement for autonomy, and it was not until an appreciable degree of autonomy was attained that a true air staff materialized. The Air Staff's gradual emergence, which can be detected in the shifting activities traced in the preceding chapter, constitutes one of the most significant trends in the reorganization of the internal structure of the air arm.

In addition to a planning staff in headquarters, it is necessary to have operating offices which implement and provide for the execution of plans. The question of whether the planning and operating staffs should be lodged in a single set of offices or whether they should be separate long proved to be troublesome. In the June 1941 organization, in theory at least, the Air Staff was the planning agency and the divisions of the OCAC constituted the operating staff. This division of responsibility was consciously adopted in the AAF organization of March 1942. The attempt was made to separate completely the planning from the operating functions by making the A-staff responsible for establishing broad policies and plans and leaving to the directorates the details of their execution. Experience soon indicated, however, that this division was undesirable, and the policy and operating staffs were integrated in March 1943.

The Policy Staff

The War Plans Section in the Training and Operations Division, OCAC concerned itself with strategic estimates for the War Department, general legislative proposals, coordination of regulations concerning fundamental tactical principles and organization, and preparation of specific war plans and legislation for the five-year program. In June 1930 this section was elevated to division status. The Plans Division was charged with making recommendations to the Chief of the Air Corps on all matters of Air Corps policy. Established as a separate planning unit, it was the OCAC's only division that did not have supervisory or operating functions. In that respect, it possessed true staff characteristics. The functions of the Plans Division included war planning, establishing personnel policies, scheduling procurement programs, mobilization planning, approving tables of organization, allocating units, construction planning, coordinating proposed legislation, and harmonizing the materiel and personnel programs with each other and with the budget. Indicative of the importance of the role the Plans Division was expected to play, a brigadier general, one of the two Assistant Chiefs of the Air Corps, was named its chief.

The reaction to the new position of the planning agency was not entirely favorable. Although some individuals complained of a division of responsibility, the Chief of the Personnel Division, Maj. J. C. McDonnell, set forth reasons for the Plans Division as well as the objections to it. He pointed out that before the creation of the division the organization of the OCAC had been along standardized lines, but that there had been insufficient time for the division chiefs to work out detailed studies and plans to insure proper development of the Air Corps. In addition, it had been felt that the "staff" had lacked continuity. The feeling had
staff designations, and in April 1941 they were termed G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4.

The achievements of the Plans Division were not considered to be as high in quality as they should have been. In May 1941 Capt. James M. Farrar of the Administrative Research and Statistics Section reported that the "lack of objective planning in many of the sections and divisions is evident... The need for over-all planning and the establishment of certain general planning policies is likewise apparent." This shortcoming could be partially overcome by the employment of highly trained civilian analysts who would serve as "administrative assistants and divisional planning technicians." In the proposed reorganization, Captain Farrar suggested that the efficiency of the plans agency might be increased by placing it in the office of the Executive, OCAC.

Before any reorganization of the OCAC was carried out, a more significant change took place in the air arm structure. On 20 June 1941 the Army Air Forces was created to coordinate the activities of the OCAC and the Air Force Combat Command. The Air Staff was the main headquarters component of the new agency. This body was formed by removing the major portion of the Plans Division from the OCAC and placing it on a higher echelon. The sections of the Plans Division were designated as A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4, while the war section and a portion of A-3 which had dealt with war plans became the Air War Plans Division. This new staff was to assume the air planning functions formerly performed by the War Department General Staff. It was to prepare "essential overall plans for the Army Air Forces." Its operating functions were "confined primarily to preparing those policies, directives, and instructions essential to directing and coordinating the activities of the major components of the Army Air Forces." This staff was, therefore, a policy agency. The operating functions were performed by the staffs of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command and the Chief of the Air Corps. The charging of the Air War Plans Division specifically with the preparation of "over-all plans for the control of the activities of the Army Air Forces" created the possibility of a conflict of jurisdiction within the Air Staff itself. This grant of authority, however, was possibly intended to place the Air War Plans Division in a position where it could coordinate the work of the other staff components.

The newly created Air Staff was not free from difficulties arising from outside sources. There had been opposition to the creation of such an agency on the ground that the War Department General Staff would no longer be a general staff if its functions relative to air activities were delegated to an air staff. After its creation there was considerable difficulty in delimiting jurisdiction between the two staffs, and not all of the "A's" were satisfied with this division of responsibility.

Although the members of the Air Staff had only recently been in the OCAC and were concerned primarily with the development of the air arm as a whole, their positions as assistant chiefs of air staff were quite different from what they had been in the Plans Division. No longer did they have direct access to the various divisions of the OCAC; the channel of communication was through the Secretary of the Air Staff, the Air Adjutant General, and the Chief of the Air Corps. Thus, the responsibility of the Air Staff was lessened by the authority retained by the Chief of the Air Corps, and the efficiency of the staff decreased because it often did not know to which of the numerous divisions of the OCAC the operating functions had been assigned.

The division of responsibilities created friction between the Air Staff and the OCAC. The Air Staff tended to by-pass the Chief of the Air Corps by issuing orders directly to the divisions and, even more disastrous to the development of a true policy staff, to assume operating functions. Another complicating factor was the retention in the OCAC of a Plans Section, a portion of the former Plans Division. The possibility was always present that this remaining group would resume the performance of the functions formerly charged to the entire division. As a matter of fact, this remnant was charged by the OCAC on 29 August with many of the same functions performed by the Air Staff. The unsatisfactory relationship between the Air Staff and the OCAC became more acute in December 1941 when General Brett was assigned to duty in the Pacific and an Acting Chief of the Air Corps was appointed. The OCAC was reorganized and informal communication between its divisions and the Air Staff was forbidden.* The most immediately noticeable result of this

*See Chart 9, p. 27.
ARMY AIR FORCES ORGANIZATION
24 DECEMBER 1941

Chart 9.
Development of the Air Staff

The problem of complete reorganization had been undertaken by the consultant committee. During the course of this reorganization study the possibility of abolition of the policy staff was considered, but the War Department directive left no alternative but to retain it and also to create an operating staff. The Bureau of the Budget members of the reorganization committee wished to establish the policy staff as a consolidated group attached to the Chief of the Air Staff rather than as a coordinate group. This concept by the Bureau of the Budget was based on the conviction that the staff would function in the unified manner required if it were small and attached directly to the office of the Chief of the Air Staff.

The traditional military concept prevailed in the March 1942 reorganization, however, and the policy staff was established as a group of coordinate offices. The function of planning, and establishing policies, was lodged in A-1 (Personnel), A-2 (Intelligence), A-3 (Training and Operations), A-4 (Supply), and Plans. The Plans office was viewed as the coordinating agency for the other four, since in theory it should not concern itself primarily with war plans. Once again, however, the regulations were not specific enough in delimiting function and responsibilities. The five units were to participate in the planning, scheduling, and control of programs for the attainment of the mission of the Army Air Forces and the translation of approved programs into requirements peculiar to each division. Each “A” was to formulate policies governing its own activities, and the necessary synchronization was to be furnished by Plans. After the policies, plans, and programs had been established by the policy staff, they were to pass to the operating staff or directorates for implementation.

The Operating Staff

Although there was no clear delineation of responsibilities between policy and operating agencies in the June 1941 reorganization, it was intended that the Air Staff should determine policy and that the OCAC should do the operating, or take the necessary action to implement and effect the policies established by that staff. The OCAC, however, continued to plan, and the Air Staff assumed many of the operating details which supposedly were the activity of the OCAC. In March 1942, however, an operating staff (the directorates) was established as a result of the recommendations of the McNarney Committee.

The War Department Special Staff—Chief of Infantry, Field Artillery, etc.—serving in the capacity of functional specialists for the General Staff—presented some parallels for parceling headquarters responsibilities. However, several Air Corps officials had visited England and appear to have been favorably impressed with the directorates in the Royal Air Force. As a result, at least two months before the major reorganization, some “test” directorates were established and the concept of the functions of such officials began to become more clearly defined. The rapidity of technological advances, the necessity for highly specialized information in the many aspects of aerial warfare, as well as the functional inadequacies of the staff as then constituted, caused careful scrutiny to be given to the problem of distributing functions among the staff offices.

The officers responsible for planning the basic feature of the reorganization found one serious defect in this traditional type of staff breakdown. A-4, as the supply division, was concerned with the characteristics of all kinds of aircraft—heavy and light bombers, dive bombers, pursuit and observation planes alike. Similarly, A-3 was concerned with policies for training bombardment crews and fighter crews and for training for independent air operations and for air support of ground troops. Nobody was responsible for the development of bombardment squadrons as such—with all the elements of materiel design and personnel training that go into making an effective combat unit—nor fighter or liaison groups as such. What was lacking were specialists in the functional phases of aerial combat.

Several concepts of the directorate's role may have been involved in the reorganization activity, but the one stressed most for the Directorate of Military Requirements—the most discussed of the new offices—was that of functional specialists engaged in “military research.” Nearly one year later it was noted that the operating echelon was charged with the performance of the typical functions found in an air task force and that the personnel selected to discharge these functional responsibilities should be delegated broad discretion to act on behalf of the Commanding General on those...
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matters peculiar to the respective type functions. The obvious necessity for a logical grouping of activities seems to have been the motivating force in the formulation of some of the other directorates. 

As finally established, there were three main directorates: Military Requirements, Technical Services, and Management Control.* The Directorate of Military Requirements was intended as the medium through which the lessons of combat would be transmitted and reflected in modifying training and procurement programs. It was to coordinate the work of the Directorates of Air Defense, Bombardment, Ground Support—the type directorates—War Organization and Movement, Base Services, and Individual Training. The chiefs of the type directorates were to be experts on all phases of bombardment, fighter, and air-ground support warfare and were to develop tactics and techniques and determine requirements of aircraft, equipment, and personnel for their respective activities. War Organization and Movement, originally intended as a separate directorate, was to perform the functions relating to the organization of units, the preparation of troop-movement orders, the assembly of task forces, correlation of the "allocation of aircraft and personnel to insure distribution in accordance with approved policies," and most G-3 functions of the disbanded Air Force Combat Command. The supply function, formerly in A-4, was not placed with the aircraft and troop allocation function which was moved from A-3. It was given to the Directorate of Base Services along with the G-4 functions that had been performed by the Air Force Combat Command and the Buildings and Grounds Division, OCAC. In addition, the Directorate of Base Services was to review training programs and recommend changes that would improve the ability of that directorate to meet military requirements, and, among other things, to coordinate the planning and construction necessary for the establishment of new military air routes. The special staff of representatives of the other branches of the Army was placed in Base Services. The Directorate of Individual Training was the sixth component of the Directorate of Military Requirements. This directorate was to maintain liaison with the Technical and Flying Training Commands; coordinate training standards (rela-

*See below, Chapter VI, for a discussion of Management Control

tive to individual training) established by the type directorates and Base Services; and coordinate for the several commands the primary, basic, and advanced technical and flying training activities which applied to individual training.

Although the above grouping of functions within the various subdirectorates appears generally logical, it is difficult to see how a number of these activities fit the concept of military research which had been stressed as the chief aim of the Directorate of Military Requirements. Most noticeably, all functions of War Organization and Movements, the supply functions of A-4, the G-4 activities of the disbanded Air Force Combat Command, and the activities of the Buildings and Grounds Division scarcely conformed to the military research specification. The Directorate of Technical Services contained the next largest divisional grouping. Its major components, formerly parts of the Training and Operations Division and more recently the Army Air Traffic Services, were Communications; Weather; Photography, Maps and Charts, Traffic Control and Regulations; and Technical Inspection.* The first three of these can justifiably be included in the military research category; it would be more difficult to attribute such aspects to the other two. Many of these functions had been previously performed by the OCAC; others were formerly the responsibility of civilian agencies. The unprecedented expansion of military aviation and the entry of the United States into the war required that additional attention be given to these matters and that they be brought wholly under military control. The operating functions of the Directorate of Technical Services seem to have been a more important consideration than the functional specialist idea, and no fundamental realignment of duties similar to that of the Directorate of Military Requirements was evolved.

The Directorate of Personnel was a smaller unit formed by the combination of the military and civilian personnel functions of the OCAC, some functions of A-1, and some from the Air Adjutant General. Civilian and military personnel functions had been separate except for a short period in 1941, and even though "military and civilian personnel might involve totally different practices, there remained instances where coordination was necessary—particularly, decisions needed to be

*The War Department had provided for communications and weather commands but neither was ever activated.
CHAPTER IV

Application of The Command and Bureau Principles

The war department directive effecting the reorganization of 9 March 1942 stipulated that there should be a threefold division of activities among the policy staff, the operating staff, and the commands. But as indicated in the preceding chapter, the delimitation of responsibilities between the two staffs in AAF Headquarters was not clearly defined. Also, many of the functions assigned to the operating staff were delegated to the field when division of functions between the policy and operating staffs came to an end in Headquarters in March 1943. After that date, however, the command principle became more firmly established as a feature of AAF organization.

The adoption of the command basis—though with some reservations—for the organization of field activities represented the culmination of a trend in AAF structure. Although in March 1942 the Air Service, the Ferrying, and the Technical and Flying Training Commands, were in existence, many field activities were organized on the bureau basis. From the functional standpoint it seemed to matter little which of these principles was adopted. The entire problem of Headquarters-field relationships, however, was involved in the choice, and in that respect the adoption of one or the other was of significance.

The differences between the command and bureau structures are fundamentally the differences between military and civilian types of organization. The command structure is characterized by a hierarchical or pyramidal structure with the chain of authority direct from the commanding officer of one echelon to the commanding officer of the next. This authority may be delegated to staff officers, but final responsibility is retained by the commanding officer. On the other hand, the bureau principle is most frequently applied to governmental agencies of a nonmilitary character and, on occasion, to military supply agencies within the Zone of the Interior. The hierarchy of officialdom is analogous to that of the command structure, but in the bureau structure there is no attempt to make a division between the operating and policy functions of a headquarters. Authority and responsibility are delegated to the bureau head, who performs dual functions as head of an operating agency and as an administrative or technical adviser.

The command and bureau principles have found concurrent usage in the organization of the air arm. The GHQ Air Force, created in 1935, was intended as a combat arm and was organized, therefore, strictly on a command basis. Authority was direct from the commanding general to the commanders of the wings, and thence to the commanders of the subordinate units. The OCAC was the training and supply element and did not follow the command pattern exactly. Fundamentally, the OCAC consisted of divisions—not staffs—which frequently did not correspond closely to the usual staff designations. The controlling agency was not a headquarters but an office, and the highest officer was a chief, not a commanding general. The chief functioned through an executive instead of an adjutant general, while the routine of mails, files and other services was under the supervision of a miscellaneous or administrative division. Thus, this agency conformed rather closely to the bureau organization.

Although the command pattern was not applied to the highest echelon of the OCAC, it had been
paper was circulated through AAF Headquarters and received no particular criticism from the Supply Division, which thought that it contained no violations of the War Department directive of 1936. The Plans Division, however, was of the opinion that many of the statements on policy constituted an “attempt to evade” the spirit, if not the letter, of that directive.

Appointed to settle this issue a board of officers presented a revised directive which conceded most of General Brett’s points. The Chief of the Materiel Division was made the “immediate” adviser on materiel and supply matters, and, under the direct supervision and control of the Chief of the Air Corps, had jurisdiction over all “materiel matters delegated to him.” This action re-established most of the features of the bureau structure for the supply agency. The Supply Division was removed from its advisory position and was charged with coordinating plans and policies which were prepared by the Materiel Division. It was also to serve as liaison agency with the Assistant Secretary of War, the War Department General Staff, and other agencies.

In an effort to centralize Air Corps materiel matters, the Chief of the Materiel Division and the Industrial Planning Section of that division were moved to Washington in September 1939. The Supply Division was officially dissolved in November 1940, and the Materiel Division office in Washington was greatly expanded. Planning sections corresponding to the operating activities at Wright Field were created. The chief of the division was also charged with all materiel liaison matters. Activities in the materiel field had thus reverted to an orthodox bureau structure and remained on that basis until March 1942.

Although supply activities were organized on the command basis for only a few years, the training structure conformed to this pattern during most of the pre-1942 period. The evidence is not always clear, but the organization at Randolph Field seems usually to have been a lower echelon of command directly responsible to the Chief of the Air Corps in Washington. This appears to be substantiated by the fact that the training organization was not ordinarily considered an integral part of the Washington office of the Chief of the Air Corps as was the Materiel Division.

In 1930 the head of the Training and Operations Division in the OCAC was a brigadier general located in Washington and serving as an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. This suggests that this officer may have had authority over field operations corresponding to the authority exercised by the Chief of the Materiel Division. If such was the case, the bureau structure was in effect. Between 1932 and 1938, however, the head of the Training and Operations Division was either a major or lieutenant colonel, while the brigadier general located at the training center was in the chain of command and directly under the Chief of the Air Corps. There was nothing to indicate that the Training and Operations Division, or the Training Section of it, was considered as a liaison section responsible to the general in the field as was the Materiel Liaison Section. Early in 1937 it corresponded rather to the Supply Division at its height—a policy-making unit charged with the direction of training methods, programs, curricula, and facilities at the Air Corps Training Center, the Air Corps Tactical School, and the Air Corps Technical School. Apparently, then, the command structure was in effect during those years.

The Headquarters-field relationships in training do not appear to have been of the volatile character found in the materiel activities. However, Brig. Gen. B. K. Yount, in command at the Training Center, in January 1939 was brought to Washington to head the so-called Training Group, which included activities from the Training Operations, Personnel, and Reserve Divisions. This organization lasted only until October 1939 when the Training and Operations Division was re-established and the Training Section was once again given broad responsibilities. In November 1941 the Training and Operations Division was divided into separate Training, Operations, and Communications Divisions and the Training Division was given authority to “organize and administer all Air Corps Special Service schools, except the Air Corps Engineering School and School of Aviation Medicine.”

The great expansion of activities after 1939 brought about several changes in materiel and training activities. Late in 1940 General Brett proposed the creation of an agency “to meet the increasing requirements for the technical supply

*The predecessor of the Air Service Command, however, was created in March 1941

*All operational training was under control of the GHQ Air Force
in very close contact with Headquarters, AAF during the initial period of the new organization and the days of greatest expansion. Before the end of 1942, the headquarters of all the commands except Air Transport (formerly Ferrying) had been removed from Washington and definite channels of liaison established.

In the subordination of the Air Adjutant General the reorganization departed sharply from the command principle. That officer was shown on organization charts as an operating staff officer—not in the chain of command—and his duties were so restricted as to make him a chief of central administrative services. The various directors performed one of his customarily major functions, the issuance of unpublished directives in the name of the Commanding General, AAF.

This compromise of the command structure was strongly challenged by Col. W. W. Dick, the Air Adjutant General, in his June 1942 comments on the working efficiency of the new organization. He felt that there should be a clear-cut distinction between a bureau such as the War Department and a command such as the Army Air Forces or Army Ground Forces. The principles, he maintained, had been confused, and prerogatives of command had been lodged in bureau-functioning directorates. Such a reassignment of prerogatives, however, did not and could not relieve a commanding general of his personal command responsibilities. Colonel Dick asserted that the directorates, although designed to be operating agencies, had overreached themselves and become administrative. He recommended that the three-fold division of activities be made effective in AAF Headquarters by assigning 1) planning and policy-making to the A-staff, 2) operating functions to the directorates, and 3) strictly administrative functions to the Air Adjutant General. He viewed the Air Adjutant General as the Commanding General’s “outer office,” and as a neutral agency needed to coordinate the directives issued freely by the various directorates. A proposal was made the next month to redefine the duties of this officer in order to make them conform to the conventional duties of the adjutant of any command, but the suggestion seems to have been dependent on so many other factors that it was not carried out.

Headquarters, AAF had definitely departed from the command principle in another respect: the staff had begun to exercise command authority instead of its legitimate advisory and planning functions. Also, the staff sections, especially the directorates, began to break down according to the type of activities in the field that fell under their jurisdiction. The Headquarters units were exercising policy-making authority in particular fields without any of the responsibility for actually getting the job done. The ultimate in this aggrandizement would have been the adoption of the proposal in the comments of the Director of Military Requirements on 7 June that the Flying Training Command be eliminated and that the Director of Individual Training “through his [I] three well-organized training center commands ... administer the flying training program ... without the interposition of the Headquarters, Flying Training Command. This suggestion was made despite the fact that the director involved was a colonel and the commanding officer of each training center was a major general. However, contrary opinions of the Commanding General, Flying Training Command and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-3 were upheld, and the command remained. Its headquarters was moved from Washington to Fort Worth on 1 July 1942, and during the succeeding months more command headquarters were moved to the field and liaison offices established in Washington.

From 9 March 1942 to the end of 1943 several changes in commands occurred. On 30 April 1942 the Air Transport Command was formed to supervise and conduct the organization of “air transport units . . . with special emphasis on . . . such units for the movement of air landing troops and equipment including glider-borne troops, and parachute troops and equipment.” Less than two months later this command was redesignated the Troop Carrier Command, and the Ferrying Command became the Air Transport Command, each performing the same function it had under its former name. Shortly thereafter the Air Transport Command absorbed many of the domestic transportation functions of the Air Service Command and, later, many of the duties that had been

*On 9 May the Director of Management Control had already proposed that the Flying Training Command be dissolved and its functions placed as mentioned
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safety, communications, and weather was of vital concern and at the end of 1943 was still being seriously studied.

The history of the field activities of the air arm indicates that there was a shifting between the command and bureau principles, but as the personnel of the AAF grew into the millions and its activities spread around the world, the command principle was favored. One analyst of AAF organization held that if either principle should be adopted, "it would appear desirable that it be adopted consciously and that any compromise in the basic structure be well-considered." If the command structure at the end of 1943 was to be maintained, the necessity of a closely knit, well-manned staff to integrate the activities and to exert strong policy leadership seemed quite evident. A favorably located and well-staffed program planning and control unit would have contributed materially toward this end.

The ever-recurring rivalry between the field and Headquarters for primacy in policy determination was a definite obstacle to the smooth working of the command structure. This was also one of the main difficulties in the bureau structure. In fact, it seemed to lie at the root of Headquarters-field relationships. The whole problem at the close of 1943 was under constant survey by Management Control, and the solution adopted for each case was the one that lent itself to the most efficient operation of the particular activity involved.
planned that the lack of adequate planning along the A-level had caused much confusion on the operating level. He felt that most of the "serious criticisms" of the organization could be "traced primarily to administrative rather than organizational deficiencies." Since the A-staff had been reluctant to accept its real responsibility, the directorates had been forced to establish their own policies, in many instances "wholly based on their individual ideas." The Chief of Management Control stated later that the A-staff had done little between March 1942 and March 1943 toward setting policy. The exigencies of war necessitated rapid action; decisions were frequently rendered in the highest possible AAF echelon and then carried out by the directorates before the A-staff knew that a policy had been changed.

Because of the many closely interdependent functions and responsibilities of AAF offices, thorough and complete coordination was of utmost importance. This coordination was not forthcoming, however, under the 9 March organization. The Materiel Command procured anything that was asked by the A-sections, the Military Requirements and Technical Services Directorates, and the Technical Training, Flying Training, Ferrying, and Air Service Commands, with no one charged with coordination. Not only was there overlapping of staff and directorate functions, but it was difficult to determine the division of responsibility among the directorates. The directorates not only became planning agencies as well as operating agencies, but they frequently dealt with munitions which should not have been within their province.

Conflicts from the field evidenced that the AAF Headquarters organization was not functioning as it should—as a planning and policy-making agency. Headquarters of the First Air Force attributed 25 instances of misinformation, conflicts of orders, and confusing action to Headquarters, AAF. The commanding general of the Technical Training Command complained that the creation of the directorates served to defeat the decentralization policy, because the directorates attempted to operate the field activities too much in detail and originated too many field inspections. He also noted the "everlasting desire grown up through long years of peacetime operations, for any organization in Washington to take unto itself all the executive and operating powers possible."

The Inspector General's Department had a slightly different approach to the problem. On 2 July 1942 Col. B. M. McFayden submitted a report on the working of the 9 March organization. He suggested first of all that by confining itself rigorously to broad policy and planning the staff had "over-delimited itself, thereby relinquishing in some degree the functions of rendering staff decisions and supervision to insure coordination among the operating directorates." As a result, coordination had been established among the directorates in lateral operation, thus weakening vertical control. This could be alleviated by emphasizing that the functions of the staff included the "active enunciation of policies and objectives to the appropriate operative directorates."

Colonel McFayden then stated what he considered to be the major duplications and suggested remedial action. He noted that there were three planning agencies: Plans Division of the A-staff, Program Planning and Control, and Organizational Planning. The second of these appeared to overlap the functions of several of the A-staff divisions. The title "Directorate of Military Requirements" was a misnomer since Program Planning had been removed from its jurisdiction. The directorates of Individual Training, Air Defense, Ground-Air Support, Bombardment, and War Organization and Movement should all be viewed as operating agencies for A-3. The Directorate of Base Services should be the operating agency to execute plans formulated by A-4.

Communications, Weather, and Photography appeared to be suitably grouped in the Directorate of Technical Services. However, Flying Safety and Technical Inspection Colonel McFayden viewed as more closely associated with the Air Inspector, and he thought that their correlation with that office might be "advantageous in the conduct of field inspection." Also, he felt that the Directorate of Legislative Planning should be combined with the Air Judge Advocate's office, the Budget with the Fiscal office, and the Directorate of Organizational Planning with Management Control. The exact needs of the staff in statistical matters should be determined, and these needs should then be met by Statistical Control, not by some other agency. He recommended that the number of Headquarters offices authorized to issue orders and instructions in the name of the commanding general be reduced from the "more than thirty." The chart
posed by the Inspector General's Department and some of the comments of June 1942. One plan had already been approved by the Chief of Air Staff, when General Arnold, returning from his world tour, brought back additional organizational ideas. The result was an adjustment and reconciliation of the various plans and ideas that had been or were soon to be presented.

The streamlining which became effective on 29 March 1943 telescoped into the offices of the assistant chiefs of staff and special staff many offices devoted to the planning or execution of specific functions, abolished much of the overlapping of functions, and reassigned other offices. The assistant chiefs of staff were reduced to six. Personnel, Intelligence, Training, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D), Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); and Plans Program Planning became a part of OC&R. Management Control was attached directly to the Office of the Chief of Air Staff. To give adequate consideration to manpower problems, a Manpower Division was established in Management Control, and Legislative Planning was removed to the jurisdiction of the Air Judge Advocate. The Special Staff was increased to five by the creation of the Special Projects office. The deputy chiefs of air staff were increased to three.

The directorates were abolished because they were considered an unnecessary link in the chain of command and authority, and their functions were absorbed by the various assistant chiefs of air staff and the commands. Base Services (minus the Air Chaplain) went to MM&D; Individual Training, to Training, Flight Control, Flying Safety, and Safety Education formed the newly organized Flight Control Command. The Directorate of Personnel and the Air Chaplain became part of Personnel. The directorates of Weather and Communications were split among the Flight Control Command, Training, OC&R, and MM&D; and Photography was divided among Training, OC&R, and MM&D. Two sections of Counter-Intelligence, Safeguarding of Military Information and Training Clearance, were transferred to the Facilities Security and Personnel Security Branches of the newly created Air Provost Marshal in MM&D. The Message and Cable Division was relegated from a major component of Management Control to a branch of the Air Adjutant General's office.

The training functions of the various directorates, except those which went to MM&D from Base Services, were taken over by Training; similarly, procurement functions were absorbed by MM&D. "Primary interest, supervision, and administrative channels of communication" between the field arms and Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff were established as follows: Flying Training, Technical Training, and Troop Carrier Commands, and First, Second, Third, and Fourth Air Force to Training; Air Transport, Air Service, and Material Commands to MM&D; Proving Ground, Anti-submarine, and Flight Control Commands, School of Applied Tactics, and the other 10 air forces to OC&R.

This group has definitely reduced the span of control in AAF Headquarters and built an organization along functional lines. Under this structure Headquarters was to determine the programs and policies that would be executed but would not tell the field how to carry them out. General Arnold stated that decentralization must occur, that the staff "must stop operating" and spend its time thinking "in order that we can correctly tell our commanders what to do and maybe sometimes when to do it," but never how to do it. Although this view was applicable to Plans, it seems evident that the transfer of the operating directorates to the new staff offices precluded the possibility of the staff confining itself to policy alone.

The attempt to separate policy and operations at the staff level had not been successful. The concept had merits, not the least of which was rapidity of functioning, but it was abandoned because the disadvantages seemed to outweigh the advantages. Should an agency be established to supplement and coordinate the planning of this A-staff, then the effect of operating being done in this staff might be partially offset.

From March 1943 to the end of the year no internal changes of major significance occurred. Minor shifts included the transfer of the Message and Cable and Administrative Divisions of the Air Adjutant General's office to the newly created Administrative Services Division of Management Control, the shifting to Training of Headquarters jurisdiction over training of arms and services units previously delegated to MM&D, the creation for
gilder activities of a Special Staff office which was subsequently discontinued and its duties lodged in O&C&K, the creation of the Weather Division in O&C&K to combine the personnel and activities of the Weather Branch, the Weather Information Branch, and the Air Weather officer; and the elevation of Operations Analysis to division status in Management Control.

Three new Special Staff offices, Flying Safety, Communications, and Antiaircraft, appeared on the October 1943 master organization chart. The first office had been elevated to a comparable position for a short time in the summer of 1942, but under the new organization it was the Headquarters agency for the Office of Flying Safety, which was located at Winston-Salem, N.C. The Communications Officer was given many of the functions formerly performed by the Director of Communications and more recently by sections in the Flight Control Command, O&C&K, and MM&D. The Antiaircraft Officer was to be a special assistant to the Commanding General, AAF, and was to represent the official on all antiaircraft matters affecting the AAF. In December 1943 the Office of Legislative Services was established on the Special Staff to perform the legislative activities previously lodged in the office of the Air Judge Advocate and to serve as a liaison agency with Congress.

A noticeable trend in AAF organization during 1943 was toward the great increase in Special Staff offices in AAF Headquarters. Some activities, such as communications, safety, and weather were still the subject of discussion, and it was obvious that functions would continue to shift. But, on the whole, by the end of the year the principle of consolidating policy and of monitoring operations in a single set of offices and dispersing operating functions to the field was fairly well established and working in a satisfactory manner.
The imminence of war accentuated the imperative need for accurate and up-to-date information on the combat readiness of tactical units, including the number of personnel and the status of training, aircraft, and equipment. In an effort to supply this need a Statistics Section—a part of the former Plans Division—was established in the office of the Chief of Air Staff after the 20 June 1941 reorganization. The Administrative Research and Statistics Section remained in existence; its chief had reported one month before that there was need for a study of all reporting systems and reporting forms and of the statistical needs and requirements of the Air Corps as a whole, and for the development of a standard practice or procedural manual. The creation of the Air Staff Statistics Section did not, however, solve the problem. Instead, it made it more acute. There was also such a unit in the Air Force Combat Command with the result that there were three sets of statistics on vital items, and no two were in agreement. Each of the agencies felt that its own figures were the ones that should receive official sanction.

A portion of the Plans Division was retained as the Plans Section in the OCAC in June 1941. The line of descent from this section to Management Control was direct. When the OCAC was reorganized in December 1941, the Plans Section was divided into two branches under assistant executives, one for technical and one for administrative planning and coordination. The former office never developed very clear functions. The latter, however, included the Administrative Research and Statistics Section and was to "plan and coordinate all administrative functions of the Office, Chief of the Air Corps." The Col. E. B. Gates, former head of the Plans Section, served as Assistant Executive for Administrative Planning and Coordination. Stating its role clearly for the first time, he placed strong emphasis on organizational and procedural planning. He stressed the importance of the investigation of administrative methods, the instigation of improved procedures, and the supervision of the preparation of administrative manuals. To assist him in the new activities, Colonel Gates acquired a group of civilian administrative analysts. This broad interpretation of responsibilities did not go unchallenged; the Adjutant General, OCAC protested that his functions were being usurped.

The Wallace Clark study of October and November 1941 had pointed out the need for better statistical reporting, the need of civilian administrators, the desirability of adopting business methods, the necessity of standardizing procedures, and the desirability of time objectives and time-quantity reports. Somewhat earlier in 1941 General Dargue had proposed a Management Engineering Staff for the Army Air Forces, and the head of the Administrative Research and Statistics Section expressed approval of most of the proposal.

One other step of importance that occurred prior to 9 March 1942 was the placing of the responsibility for coordinating and issuing directives concerning Air Corps organization and procedures in a Procedural Section under the Assistant Executive. Formerly such coordination had been accomplished by circulating these directives among the interested divisions, with the originating division bearing the responsibility for coordination. This action was protested by the Adjutant General, OCAC, but the authority of that officer was even more uncertain than the powers of the OCAC as a whole.

In the course of the study of the reorganization, the consultant staff pointed out two major problem areas in the sphere of management control. These were the need for civilian administrators and the need for regulating partial reorganizations. The first recommendation perhaps was not considered per se but by the nature of circumstances received considerable corollary attention. The control for regulating partial and ill-considered reorganizations was provided by the creation of the Director of Organizational Planning in the March 1942 reorganization.

At the same time the activities performed by Colonel Gates and his consultant group, as well as other functions, were consolidated in the Directorate of Management Control. The director was charged with the supervision and coordination of the work of the directorates of Organizational Planning, Statistical Control, and Legislative Planning, and the work of the Air Adjutant General. From the control standpoint the most important of these were Organizational Planning and Statistical Control. The former was, among other things, to conduct studies and surveys of "administrative problems relating to the organization, flow of work, procedure, and management practices in the Army Air Forces; develop improved plans.
trative planning, statistical control, program control, manpower, operations analysis, and administrative services. In opposing dissolution of the management agency, Gates called attention to the fact that the Bureau of the Budget had played a significant role in setting it up in March 1942.\textsuperscript{23}

On 25 November Gates wrote that the principle of the reorganization should be approved and that the wisdom of combining the training, organization, and requirements functions in the Air Staff was unquestionable. He felt, however, that such a realignment should be postponed until the delineation of responsibilities between Headquarters, AAF and the proposed Continental Air Forces had been clearly drawn.\textsuperscript{24}

The reorganization proposed in late 1944 failed to materialize, and Management Control continued to function intact until after the capitulation of Germany. Attention then began to focus on the realignment of Headquarters, AAF for the postwar period. In the latter part of June 1945 the realignment of the components of Management Control to other offices began. On 27 June the Statistical Control Division was transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Air Staff, and the following day the Administrative Services Division (less the supply function) and the Publications Branch were transferred to the Air Adjutant General's Office.\textsuperscript{25} The Manpower Division was transferred to AC/AS, Personnel on 1 July; Organizational Planning personnel were distributed to various Headquarters offices in July when the functions formerly charged to Organizational Planning were made the responsibility of each major office of Headquarters AAF in its own sphere of operations,\textsuperscript{26} and Operations Analysis was transferred to AC/AS-3 on 25 August. With this last action, Management Control—left with neither functions nor personnel—ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{27}

Thus after almost three and one-half years, the central agency for the supervision of the administrative guides and managerial aids affecting all staff agencies was dissolved. The office had grown gradually in the few years prior to 1942, but, with the support of the Bureau of the Budget, had flowered in the March 1942 reorganization.\textsuperscript{28} Considerable difference of opinion seemed to exist as to the merits of having such an office, but that it made worthwhile contributions appears to be unquestionable. In its growth from March 1942 to the end of 1943, the accretion of functions pulled it away from the original purpose and intent of providing better administrative management for the AAF. The provision of administrative services for Headquarters, AAF, to mention one example, seems not to have been within the proper sphere and purview of the office. Such an arrangement gave to one division of the office a major responsibility of surveying the functions of another division of the same office. Had the office been confined more closely to survey and planning and less concerned with actual operations, it might better have achieved its aim and longer survived the accumulative disapprobation. As General Gates intimated in the fall of 1944, perhaps both “management” and “control” were unfortunate terms to be applied to such an agency in the military sphere.\textsuperscript{29}

Thus, a partial explanation for the termination of Management Control may be found in misconceptions of the agency’s proper functions caused by failure to modify a terminology unsuited to a military organization. In retrospect, objections to the office seem minor when compared to the advantages derived from its activities.

**Program Planning and Control**

One of the most vital components of adequate planning in any structure is the program planning and control function. This activity in the Army Air Forces included the establishment of a schedule of all requirements—airplanes, engines, personnel, training, quartermaster, communications, medical, etc.—and a synchronization of the flow of the various components. It apparently received no real consideration, however, until the Wallace Clark study late in 1941.

The Clark study noted that there was much to be desired in planning and that the various programs were not coordinated one with the other. Maj. Gen. W. R. Weaver, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, recognized late in 1941 the necessity of collecting in one location all possible information pertaining to programming and directed that such data in graph or chart form be placed on the walls of his office.\textsuperscript{30} Already, however, some of the administrative consultants of the Bureau of the Budget were working on the coordination of programming activities. Various offices were visited and their programs requested, some were able to produce

\textsuperscript{23} See above, p 48
September, when he became Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Program Planning. In spite of the importance of the programming activity, full cooperation of the other Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff was never secured, and Program Planning never got far beyond the unit’s program. This absorption in minor details might have been avoided if the manifold operating activities previously performed by the Air Force Combat Command had been lodged with an operational training command rather than with the Director General of Military Requirements.  

On 9 July 1942 and again on 5 February 1943 Management Control proposed that the programming functions be placed with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, but when the major regrouping of functions occurred on 29 March 1943, Program Planning was reduced to branch status in the Allocations and Programs Division of OC&R. This reduction in echelon obviously did not contribute to the effectiveness of the unit. After March 1943 several proposals were made regarding the organizational position of the program agency. One suggestion was to make the program function the responsibility of a programs branch of Management Control. Management Control proposed placing the program responsibilities on a Deputy Chief of Air Staff, while the Bureau of the Budget wanted to establish a program coordinator in the office of the Chief of Air Staff. Several similar proposals failed of adoption.

In the summer of 1943 General Arnold delegated to Brig. Gen. L. S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, the controlling influence over program planning. Several meetings were held in an attempt to implement General Kuter’s assumption of this control. The proposed solution of Management Control was to incorporate the program function into the Plans office and to make the head of that office a Deputy Chief of Air Staff, giving to the Program Control Division responsibilities similar to those first allocated in June 1942. No proposal to redevote the programming control functions to a sufficiently high echelon had been successful by the close of the year. With the October 1943 reorganization, however, the chief of this activity had been raised from a division-head status to Deputy for Program Control in OC&R.

Two months later, Edmund P. Learned, who had been serving as Deputy for Program Control, was appointed Special Consultant to the Commanding General, AAF. He reported through the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, OC&R, where he was assigned as Advisor for Program Control. In this position he was continuously to review and to recommend action necessary for over-all control of the program and to ensure a coordinated flow of aircraft, equipment, and trained personnel to meet commitments. Among other means of accomplishing these ends, he was to ascertain relative priorities, make recommendations for the reconciliation of conflicts, and maintain records and prepare reports reflecting the program status. By the end of 1943 many conflicts in the AAF program had been resolved, and the information and devices of Statistical Control proved very beneficial in making modifications of the program.

However, serious difficulties remained. In May 1944 Learned expressed dissatisfaction with the personnel program planning, and pointed out that Training and Personnel were not operating as smoothly as they should in planning the training program. This expression of dissatisfaction led to a suggestion that Management Control examine the AAF Headquarters organization with respect to program planning and recommend an organization or method of procedure which would require a “central program planning agency to coordinate and recommend action on all basic production programs, both personnel and materiel.” The several divisions would remain responsible for devising their own programs to provide necessary auxiliaries or components.

Maj. Gen. H. A. Craig, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, OC&R maintained that a strong, centralized program agency already existed and recommended that Organizational Planning and the Advisor for Program Control review pertinent regulations and memorandums and recommend revisions necessary to ensure the proper coordination. The Chief of Air Staff, Maj. Gen. B. M. Giles, approved this proposal.

Only slight modifications resulted, and the office continued under the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, OC&R until the 23 August 1945 reorganization. At that time program control activities were removed from the assistant-chief-of-air-staff level and placed in the Office of Program Monitoring. The latter office reported directly to the Chief of Air Staff, although it was attached to the office of the Secretary of Air Staff for administration and
Acquisition of New Functions

EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONALIZATION of the AAF agencies was a major effort of Management Control. This functionalization embraced not only the assignment of duties to the organization best able to accomplish a given mission, but also involved the acquisition and appropriate reassignment of new services that would make the AAF as nearly as practicable a self-impelled, self-sufficient agency. Significant responsibilities with which the AAF was charged in the closing period of the war were in the fields of communications and aircraft crash rescue and fire fighting. The AAF’s quest for control of functions relating to weather equipment had been practically successful by the end of the conflict, but the responsibility for antiaircraft artillery remained an open question.

The transfer from the Army Service Forces (ASF) to the AAF of responsibility for research, development, maintenance, issue, and storage of communications equipment peculiar to the AAF was an important step in the absorption of duties which would make the AAF a self-contained unit. The move indicated that electronic equipment was now recognized as an integral part of aerial operations, thus, supervision of such equipment logically belonged to air personnel.

The impulse for the AAF to acquire these duties seems to have had its origin in storage problems and the difficulties attendant upon getting surplus equipment back into ASF channels from the AAF. The storage problems were made apparent by a strong complaint of the Air Communications Office on 26 June 1944. Almost a month later an AC/AS, OC&R memo pointed out the causes of some of the difficulties. It asserted that OC&R desired to be in a position to state the requirement for necessary items and to have one agency coordinate the procurement, receipt, storage, and delivery of the equipment. "This Office," it declared, "cannot act as a coordinating agency between two or more procurement offices." The Air Communications Office pointed out on 9 August that changes in Air Staff procedures would be only temporary palliatives; the more fundamental difficulties lay in the division between the AAF and ASF of basic responsibility for the development and procurement of technical equipment. Because the decision to change the basic responsibility had been made, it suggested that the AAF procedures be retained for the time being.

This decision had been set forth by General Marshall on 26 July in a memorandum addressed jointly to Generals Arnold and Somervell. He stated that after discussing the problem with Dr. Edward L. Bowles, expert consultant to the Secretary of War and communications consultant to the Commanding General, AAF, he believed airborne radar and radio equipment, guided missiles, and ground radar and radio navigational aids should be considered items of equipment peculiar to the AAF and should be treated as a part of the main problems of aircraft design and operation rather than as accessories. General Marshall felt, however, the time was not propitious to transfer all production activities of these items to the AAF but that the AAF should assume responsibility for research, development, and development procurement. A survey by Bowles indicated such a transfer would involve about 195 officers, 170 enlisted men, 1,470 civilians, and approximately $50,000,000 in facilities. The Deputy Chief of Staff would take the necessary staff action.
Acquisition of New Functions

Department for the AAF. Furthermore, when the Air Corps acquired its weather functions in 1937, the Chief Signal Officer had recommended that the Air Corps assume within a reasonable length of time the responsibility for development, procurement, storage, and issue of meteorological equipment and supplies. The AAF maintained that the assumption of these responsibilities (plus maintenance) would be justified on the following grounds: 1) it would unify, simplify, and expedite all weather activities, 2) it would be consistent with recent precedents established in assigning to the Commanding General, AAF complete responsibility for aircraft communications, aircraft crash rescue, and other equipment used predominantly by the AAF, and 3) it would utilize the present channels and procedures used in fulfilling the same functions concerning other aircraft supplies and equipment. 10 Although the lines of logical responsibility seem fairly clear in regard to these functions, the staff study was still in G-4 on 15 November.

The most inclusive transfers of functions to the AAF were those concerning aircraft crash rescue and fire fighting. In the fields of communications and weather the AAF already had operating responsibility, with the result that it acquired—or was attempting to acquire—the responsibilities that lay behind operations. In crash rescue and fire fighting, however, all functions belonged to the Engineers before the functions were transferred in toto to the AAF.

The acquisition of these functions was a natural outgrowth of the integration of the arms and services with the AAF (ASWAAF) into the AAF and more particularly of the transfer of most ASF responsibilities at Class III (AAF) installations to the AAF. 17 An arms and services integration subcommittee on crash rescue and fire fighting, charged with drafting regulations assigning responsibilities for structural fire protection and aircraft crash rescue and fire activities, held its first meeting on 13 October 1944. Four days later proposals had been drafted, and by 14 December a recommendation concurred in by the Commanding General, ASF was made to transfer all responsibilities pertaining to aircraft crash rescue and fire fighting to the AAF. 15

The major problem encountered was the separation of structural fire-fighting activities from those involved in air operations. This difficulty was resolved, and on 30 January 1945 provision was made that all functions and responsibilities for activities pertaining to aircraft crash rescue on land and water and to aircraft fire fighting be transferred from the ASF to the AAF on 15 February. 18

The Chief of Engineers was not relieved of his Army-wide responsibility for fire prevention and protection “except for aircraft crash rescue and aircraft fire fighting.” 19 On 9 March the ASF directed the immediate transfer to the AAF of all personnel engaged primarily in the functions newly assigned to the AAF and two months later ASF Service Commands ceased activities in the aircraft crash-rescue and fire-fighting fields. Technical inspection of structural fire-protection activities and equipment of Army-wide application required by Circular No. 388 was continued as a repairs and utilities function of the Engineers. 20

As was the case with the communications transfer, the process of implementing a shift of functions was enormous. Although many details remained unsettled by the fall of 1945, the functions had been legally acquired, the task of “taking over” required only time.

In order to assure unified command of activities closely associated with the defensive operations of the Air Forces, the AAF initiated a campaign in early 1945 to integrate antiaircraft artillery into its organization. In response to the desires of the Commanding General, AAF, the Special Assistant for Antiaircraft prepared a brief study showing the advantages and disadvantages of integration. On the credit side he concluded that integration would: 1) centralize responsibility for planning and conducting air defense, and would ensure a unity of effort not then existing, 2) give to the same man control of all units used in the conduct of air warfare, 3) ensure evolution and eliminate duplication, 4) resolve the existing awkward maintenance and supply situations confronting AAA units controlled tactically by the AAF and administratively by the AGF, and 5) add to the AAF a large complement of Regular Army officers. Disadvantages were seen in: 1) the larger and more complex organization of the AAF, 2) the vexing problems of personnel, supply, and administration, 3) the legal inability of the transferred officers to command the combined units, and 4) jurisdictional controversy certain to result.
CHAPTER VIII

Consolidation

DURING THE COURSE of expansion and rapid growth of the AAF there was a tendency to multiply both the AAF Headquarters offices and field agencies and to increase the number of operating functions performed in Headquarters. This trend was partially justified by the necessity for quick action and the impossibility of separating satisfactorily policy and nonpolicy functions while meeting urgent day-to-day demands. However, as the AAF reached its peak strength and policy became more stabilized, 1) many non-policy functions were removed from Headquarters, 2) certain Headquarters offices were consolidated or reduced, and 3) a diminishing of field agencies reporting to Headquarters occurred. This last achievement was made either by merging commands or by creating intermediate coordinating echelons. Thus details of operations that had previously burdened Headquarters were handled at appropriate lower echelons.

The most important single development in the removal of operating functions from Headquarters, AAF and the reduction of commands reporting directly to it came in the creation of the Continental Air Forces (CAF). In proposing this new agency, General Arnold pointed out that the staff in Washington was larger than desirable and that redeployment from the European to the Pacific theater would augment the problems and increase the burdens of the Air Staff. The creation of a Headquarters, Continental Air Forces with jurisdiction over the four domestic air forces and the I Troop Carrier Command would assist the AAF materially in meeting its over-all, world-wide responsibility. Such a reorganization would permit more attention to be given to planning, improve redeployment, and bring the desired reduction of personnel in the AAF. The new command would be charged with 1) the organization or reorganization and training of combat and service units and crews (except air depot groups) for deployment or redeployment to overseas theaters, 2) the formation and command of the continental strategic air reserve, 3) joint air-ground training, and 4) air defense of the continental United States.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. T. T. Handy, expressed approval of the new command. He believed that the AAF should determine its own organization, and he agreed with the principle of decentralization. He suggested for consideration, however, placing the Training Command under CAF because the primary mission of the AAF in Headquarters was training. Further, he cautioned, careful consideration should be given to relations of the new CAF Headquarters to Headquarters, AAF and of the latter to the subordinate units of the CAF. However, General Arnold felt that the difference in the jobs to be performed was sufficient justification for continuing the Training Command as it was. The new organization as originally proposed received approval on 17 November 1944.

The division of responsibilities and delimitation of functions between Headquarters, AAF and the projected Headquarters, CAF were primarily the tasks of AC/AS, OC&R and of Management Control. The activation of Headquarters, CAF was authorized for 15 December 1944 with the functions as stated by the Commanding General, AAF in his initial memo to the General Staff. The originally planned date for assumption of full responsibility by the CAF was 1 September 1945, but in January this was moved up to 1 April. Although the CAF assumed jurisdiction over the
began exercising command jurisdiction over the
AAF Board, School, and Proving Ground Com-
mand, the commanding officers of which he ap-
pointed.

The AAF Board, composed of its president, the
Commanding General, AAF Center, the Com-
manding General, Proving Ground Command, and
a recorder without vote, was made responsible
for the development of tactics, techniques, doc-
tines, and other military requirements of the AAF
and for appropriate recommendations to higher
authorities concerning these activities. The School
was to give advanced academic instruction in the
major requirements. The testing facilities were
concentrated at Eglin Field. The Commanding
General, Proving Ground Command was charged
with conducting tests to improve operational tech-
niques; with determining operational suitability,
new and different tactics, and techniques of aerial
warfare under simulated combat conditions; and
with testing under simulated combat conditions
the tactical suitability of materiel and equipment
used or proposed for use by the AAF.

This shifting and reassignment of responsibilities
brought the equipment and operational testing
under one authority, established the school on a
firmer academic basis by reducing the time devoted
to purely military matters, redefined the author-
ity of the AAF Board, drew sharper lines of
responsibilities for the several agencies, and cre-
ated a coordinating authority that resulted in
greater efficiency and cooperation, as well as re-
lieving Headquarters, AAF of many of the details
attendant upon actual operations.

Another reduction in the number of officials
reporting directly to Headquarters, AAF was
brought about by the consolidation of the Materiel
and Air Service Commands into the Air Technical
Service Command. Although this reorganization,
which combined closely related activities in the
supply and service fields under one command, was
actually accomplished prior to the creation of the
CAF, and similar problems were faced and re-
solved, there was not a noticeable interrelationship
in the action on the two. In solving the problem
related to the Materiel and Air Service Commands
the officials concerned were apparently attempting
to eliminate inefficient operations rather than to
follow a principle of decentralization and consoli-
dation of command.

As early as the fall of 1942 a proposal was made
to consolidate the control of the Air Service, Mat-
eriel, and Air Transport Commands under a com-
manding general of an air logistics command. The
purpose behind this suggestion appeared to have
been the creation of a supply force for the air
arm. Although the proposal was twice repeated
during 1943, not much interest was aroused until
April 1944 when the Chief of Organizational Plan-
ing pointed out that over two years of experience
with the development of the field organization for
supply matters had brought certain basic problems
into relief. Among these were 1) lack of harmony
between AAF Headquarters, the Materiel Com-
mand, and the Air Service Command, 2) an un-
natural division of responsibilities and overlapping
and conflicting geographical boundaries relative to
the procurement, distribution, and using agencies
in the AAF, 3) lack of harmony between the sup-
ply and other major AAF agencies, and 4) lack of
clearly defined policies, exercise of broad controls,
and adequately qualified personnel. Either a shift-
ing of personnel or an organizational change would
bring a solution to these problems. The latter was
thought to be preferable, and it was suggested that
a deputy chief of air staff for materiel and supply
be created and the Materiel and Air Service Com-
mands be combined.

Before any definite action had been taken on
this proposal, the Commanding General, Air Ser-
vice Command presented a plan to split AAF
Headquarters responsibilities in a manner similar
to the functional divisions between the Air Ser-
vice and Materiel Commands. Such a solution,
Organizational Planning objected, would not
strengthen the supply and maintenance agency in
Headquarters but would deprive it of unified lead-
ership and blur further confusion in the com-
mands. The redesignation of AC/AS, Materiel,
Maintenance and Distribution (MM&D) as
AC/AS, Materiel and Services (M&S) and the
amalgamation of the commands would bring a
uniformity of organization, a logical succession of
activities (for it was felt that planning and action
on supply matters should not be split), a stream-
lining of procedures, and a clean-cut authority in
Headquarters and command. After some maneu-
vering in the AAF, the Assistant Secretary of War
for Air expressed approval of the consolidation
principle, but he cautioned that unless the correct
man were found to head the new command the
CHAPTER IX

Post-Hostilities Organization

The fundamental framework of the organization established on 29 March 1943 existed until after the cessation of hostilities with Japan. During the period from December 1943 until 23 August 1945 some realignments and shifts occurred but the basic structure was unaltered.

In AAF Headquarters there were some transfers and retransfers and an increase in the number of special assistants to the Commanding General. The additions included a scientific advisory group and special assistants for Latin American activities and for program control. Together with special consultants in communications, supply and procurement, and weather these advisors were responsible for the planning and execution of important phases of AAF activity.¹

For some time the possibility of the reassignment of the Air Provost Marshal and Air Finance Officer was also considered. When action was taken, the merits of having these officers function under some agency other than Material and Services seems to have had little if any influence. On 29 August 1944 the AC/AS, M&S reminded the Chief, Management Control that the personnel of M&S had to be reduced to 436 by 1 September.²

In this reduction, he understood that Management Control [AFDMC] was acting to transfer the Air Provost Marshal (22 officers) and the Air Finance Office (5 officers) out of M&S. Subsequently, the Air Finance Officer was transferred to the Budget and Fiscal Office, and the Air Provost Marshal was shifted to AC/AS, Intelligence. Two weeks later the Air Provost Marshal was shifted to AC/AS, Personnel, and on 10 July 1945 the Air Finance Officer was returned to the jurisdiction of M&S.³

The AAF public relations office, which had officially been discontinued in 1942 but had functioned in the form of the Technical Information Division of AC/AS, Intelligence, was set up as a special staff in the spring of 1944. Its powers were redefined and expanded in June of that year, and in November it was redesignated the Office of Information Services and attached to the Chief of Air Staff.⁴

The establishment of the Flight Operations Division in AC/AS, Training in July 1944 was perhaps the first indication of the movement toward a postwar AAF Headquarters organization and the recombination of the training and operations functions into one office. The division initially was concerned principally with civilian traffic, but its purpose was to establish uniform methods of clearance and flight briefing of military aircraft and to coordinate aircraft and airway traffic-control services with military and civilian agencies.⁵

In late October 1944 some rather significant changes were instigated; on 30 October General Arnold directed the Chief of Air Staff as follows: 1) to transfer the Commitments Division, OC&R to Operational Plans of AC/AS, Plans; 2) to redesignate OC&R as Organization, Training, and Requirements (OT&R); 3) to make AC/AS, Training the Training Division of OT&R; 4) to transfer Organizational Planning (AFMOP), less a few functions, to OT&R; 5) to reassign Manpower to AC/AS, Personnel; and 6) to eliminate AFDMC and establish a secretariat. The changes were to be made in two months with a minimum disruption of work and movement of personnel and offices and a maximum preservation of integrity of divisions and branches. The Chief of Air Staff was authorized to make any necessary adjustments to achieve an efficient and smooth-working organization.⁶
"primarily monitors and coordinators of the groups of allied interests under their cognizance."

This statement of authority to be vested in the assistant chiefs was probably prompted by the fact that the organization was conceived before the capitulation of the Japanese and by a fear that the sudden curtailment of authority of the Special Staff might result in unnecessary and undesirable complications.

The day after the changes became official Maj Gen. Charles C. Chauncey, Acting Chief of Air Staff, informed staff officers that the 23 August framework had been based upon the assumption that the Japanese war would continue for some time "It is obvious," he stated, "that the size of the organization as now published is unnecessary for posthostilities purposes. There are many agencies and functions that can be consolidated and many can be eliminated entirely." The officers were instructed to prepare a new chart based on actual post-hostilities requirements. The principles set forth in Hq O.I. 20-1 of 23 August were to serve as a guide.¹⁶ Three days later a draft AAF Reg 20-1 was sent to the various offices with the request that the functions of each office and of commands for which the office might be responsible be reviewed. Comments were to be confined to broad statements of functions and were not to consist of elaborations or breakdowns of functions set forth in the regulation. Functions were to be eliminated, curtailed, or consolidated wherever possible.¹⁷

The comments received did not propose a drastic reshuffling of offices. There was some doubt, however, that a new directive should be published at that time and a rather general feeling that more authority should be given to the assistant chiefs of air staff Maj Gen. F L. Anderson, AC/AS-1, emphasized that the "positive organizational requirements" of the post-hostilities period had been included in the 23 August organization of AC/AS-1, but that some inconsequential shifting could be done in the offices of the Air Judge Advocate and Air Provost Marshal. More significant was the attached draft Hq O.I. 20- which stated that AC/AS-1 "plans, directs and supervises the activities of the office."¹⁸

On 31 August Lt. Gen. Hoyt S Vandenberg, AC/AS-3, placed all subordinate units in his office on the division level and reported that the intermediate Training and Operations office had been eliminated. Five days later he expressed the conviction that the assistant chiefs of air staff should supervise and direct" rather than "monitor and coordinate" the activities of their offices. His main reason was that since Headquarters, AAF had been reduced and a more compact and streamlined organization achieved, there was less justification for coordinators.¹⁹

The comments of Maj. Gen. E. M. Powers, AC/AS-4 (Acting), paralleled closely those of AC/AS-3. He pointed out that his divisions had been reduced from 17 to 12 since 1 July. The office of Materiel and Services, as shown on the 23 August organization chart, he considered unnecessary since the divisions had always worked with highest intraoffice authority on problems involving personnel, administration, and organization. He thought that his office should have "directing and supervisory" authority over the subordinate units; only since the 23 August shifting had the assistant chiefs of air staff been confined to coordinating and monitoring responsibilities.²⁰

Maj Gen. L. S. Norsedt, AC/AS-5, felt that the thinking on many activities had not progressed to a point where publication of a new regulation could be "anything but an unsatisfactory interim measure." For this reason he considered it wise to issue a statement of functions which might lead to faulty internal organization, but he suggested that he initiate and guide staff action concerning "broad policy on all matters pertaining to relations and responsibilities of the AAF with external organizations and with internal agencies of the AAF."²¹

The new organization became effective on 15 September 1945.²² The major units of the several offices were designated as divisions immediately subordinate to an assistant chief of air staff, his deputy, and his executive.²³ The nonexistent offices were eliminated from the chart, the six divisions of AC/AS-2 were reduced to three, and the major subordinate units of AC/AS-5 were limited to the same number. More important from the standpoint of administration and the execution of delegated functions was the change in authority of the assistant chiefs of air staff. All were given supervisory control "except that the Assistant Chief of Air Staff-1 will have coordinating and monitoring responsibility only for the activities and functions of the office of the Air Surgeon."²⁴

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¹⁶See Chart 13, p 64
¹⁷See Chart 14, p 65
AIR STAFF DIVISIONS
15 SEPTEMBER 1945

CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
DEPUTY CHIEF
OF AIR STAFF

AIR STAFF

AC/AS 1
EXECUTIVES

AIR SURGEON
MILITARY PERSONNEL
MEDICAL PERSONNEL

AIR PROTEST DIVISION
MEDICAL PLANS & SERVICES
MEDICAL RESEARCH

AC/AS 2
EXECUTIVE

AIR INFORMATION
AIR INTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE

AC/AS 3
EXECUTIVES

AIR COMMUNICATIONS
REQUIREMENTS
GUIDED MISSILES

ADJUTANT
ORGANIZATION
TRAINING
FLIGHT OPERATIONS
COMMITMENTS

AC/AS 4
EXECUTIVE

AIR ORDNANCE
AIR CHEMICAL
PRODUCTION
AIR INSTALLATIONS
AIR ENGINEER
HEADQUARTERS
CONTRACTS
AIR FINANCE

AC/AS 5
EXECUTIVES

STRATEGY & PERS
POST-WAR
THEATER

Chart 14.
“substantial changes” in Headquarters, AAF. The problem of “unionization” of personnel was also considered and it was contended that ASWAAF personnel should be air force personnel either in a single department or a separate air force. The possibility of organizing the personnel into a technical branch, an administrative branch, and a line branch, with provisions for transfer or reassignment, was broached as a solution to the categorizing of personnel.25
activities of the directorates, and vice versa, was a
development to be expected in the light of back-
ground and prevailing conditions. The nature, ex-
erience, and traditional prerogatives of military
activity will probably long prevent a clear-cut
delimitation between the policy and operating
functions of a staff nature.
The relationship of AAF, Headquarters and
field, whether expressed in the command or the
bureau principle, was a cause of considerable dis-
sension and dissatisfaction. In many instances the
exact degree of control to be exercised by each was
not determined, and consequently causes for alter-
cation remained. Furthermore, there was an over-
lapping of functions among some of the field
agencies, especially in the supply line. Fortunately,
the work of Management Control, and more spe-
cifically Organizational Planning, was of great
value in preventing overlapping in Headquarters
and field agencies and in contributing toward a
smoother working relationship between Headquar-
ters and field units.
The establishment of Management Control with
its subsidiary divisions represented one of the most
significant steps in the AAF organization. This
agency did much toward clarifying responsibilities,
increasing administrative efficiency, testing the
accuracy of staff planning factors by means of sta-
tistical analyses, and increasing the utilization of
manpower, as well as performing many other sig-
nificant services. Much remained to be done along
these lines when Management Control was dis-
solved. It is of consequence, however, that even
for three and one-half years the principle of cen-
tralized management and control was recognized.
Through constant study and monitoring the office
contributed to the smoothness of operation by
building a more efficient organization and institut-
ing and maintaining uniform practices and pro-
cedures, although, of course, it did not bring about
all needed reforms nor were some of its activities
above criticism.

As the war moved toward its close, the AAF ac-
quired significant responsibilities in the communi-
cations and aircraft crash rescue and fire fighting
fields and was about to acquire important func-
tions in regard to weather equipment. The ac-
quisition of these new responsibilities helped to
eliminate conflicts between the AAF and the ASF,
as well as to move the AAF closer to its goal of
becoming a self-impelled, self-contained agency.

Also, the AAF had, by September 1945, taken
steps to reduce the number of field agencies re-
porting to Headquarters and to decentralize oper-
ating functions from Headquarters to the field. The
reduction of the number of offices in Head-
quarters, either by elimination or consolidation,
was a retrenchment trend exemplified in the re-
organizations of 23 August and 15 September
1945. Although much pruning was still necessary
to bring the AAF Headquarters structure to a
peacetime basis, a beginning had definitely been
made within one month after V-J Day.

One other development deserves especial men-
tion. Program planning, which had received vir-
tually no consideration prior to America's entry
into the war, became recognized as one of the most
inclusive and difficult activities in the Army Air
Forces. For some time program planning was
hampered by an inadequate staff, the failure of
some offices to accept their responsibilities in this
field, the assumption by the program planning
staff of tasks involving too many minute, lack of
appreciation and understanding of the necessity
for controlled program scheduling in many Head-
quarters offices, and the low organizational
position of the program planning unit. Only at the
beginning of its existence and after the termina-
tion of hostilities was the agency placed on a suffi-
ciently high echelon to ensure proper control of
this function. As a part of the office of the OC/AS,
OCSR its authority was not commensurate with its
responsibility, and though it accomplished much,
was not able to ensure the desired synchroniza-
tion of the various factors in the programs.


35. Conversation by author with Lt Col J. S. Clark, Jr., Dir of Organizational Planning, 27 Jul 43, typescript in AFSHO files.


37. Notes used by Brig Gen L. S. Kuter in conference with AAF commanders, 6 Apr 42, in AFSHO files.

38. The General Staff then had only two Air Corps men on it.


41. Memo for AG by Lt Gen H. H. Arnold, 19 Jan 42, in AG 381 (1-19-42), pt. 2. General Arnold, in his capacity as Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, directed that no action be taken on this statement but that it be held for consideration by General McNarney as evidence of flaws in the current organization. Memo for Col [Walter B. (**) Smith by Lt Col L. S. Kuter, 24 Jan 42, in same file.

42. Interview by author and Lt H. S. Bingham with L. W. Hoelscher of the Bureau of the Budget, 27 Jul 43, in USAF HD 105 5-6.

43. Ibid.

44. Memo for C/S by Air War Plans Div, 9 Jan 42, in AAG 321.9, Orgn AAF. The proposed organization differed in slight detail from the frequently advocated Department of National Defense.

45. Hoelscher interview, interview by author and Miss Jackson with Lt Col J. S. Clark, Jr., 15 Apr 43, in USAF HD 105 5-6. In addition to the committee members, several other Bureau of the Budget people attended the meetings. Among them was James Sundquist.

46. Interview by author, Dr. L. B. Howard and Lt H. S. Bingham with Brig Gen B. E. Gates and Maj A. W. Wood, 14 Jan 44, in USAF HD 105 5-6.

47. The Second and Third Air Forces reported independently to Headquarters, AAF. On 10 September 1943 the First and Fourth Air Forces were removed from defense command jurisdiction and returned to the authority of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. In case of an “invasion” emergency, they were to revert to command control. (AG 381 (6-24-43) OB-S-E-M, 10 Sep 43.)


49. That key air officers never took seriously the restricting of their mission to supply and training is indicated by the statement of the Chief of Air Staff on 10 June 1942 that the “main objective of the Army Air Forces is to operate effectively against the enemy the maximum number of organized units and airplanes possible.” (Memo for all AAF units by Maj Gen M. F. Harmon, 10 Jun 42, in AAG 381, War Plans. Sundquist, “Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces,” p. 36.)

50. FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 21 Jul 43. Another step of significance in the increased freedom of the AAF was the approval, in November 1943, of the elimination of all arms and services branch distinctions with the AAF and the creation of new functionalized organizations. A rather full discussion of the significance of the elimination of arms and services designations is given in USAF Historical Study 28 (Rev.), Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF.

51. For a discussion of these steps, see USAF Historical Study 46, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1935-1945. Executive, Congressional, and War Department Action.

**CHAPTER II**

1. Unless otherwise indicated the discussion of internal organization has been based on James Sundquist, “Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces” (3 August 1942), in USAF HD 168.1-4.

2. See HQ OI 20-6, 6 May 43. The Chief of the Air Corps did not have an adjutant, his outer office was an “Executive.”


4. This memo was drafted by Col Otto Nelson and is in the files of L. W. Hoelscher of the Bureau of the Budget. It is fully summarized in Sundquist, “Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces,” pp. 22-23.

**CHAPTER III**


3. Ibid.

4. Memo of chiefs of all divisions by Brig Gen H. H.
31. AG 320 2 (10-9-42) OB-1-AF-M, 13 Oct 42
32. AG 320 2 (3-31-43) OB-1-AFDPU-M, 1 Apr 43.
34. AG 322 (9-27-43) OB-1-AFRPG-M, 29 Sep 43
35. AAF Reg 20-26, 1 Oct 43. The Office of the Chief, Flying Safety and a Deputy Chief, Flying Safety, together with a major portion of the Flying Safety organization, operated from Winston-Salem
36. AAF Reg 20-23A, 11 Dec 43
37. Teletype from C/AS to CG Flying Training Comd, 13 Mar 43, in AFDMC files
38. R&R, Maj Gen G E Stratemeyer to Brig Gen B.E. Gates, 3 Jul 43, in AFDMC files
39. AG Memo W95-18-43, 7 Jul 43; AG 322 (7-7-43) OB-1-AFDMC-MP-H, AAF Memo 20-5, 7 Jul 43
40. James Sundquist, "War-time Organization of the Army Air Forces" (3 August 1942), p 44 in USAF HD 168 1-4

CHAPTER V
1. AAF Reg 20-5, 24 Apr 42.
2. AAF Reg 20-1, 19 Jul 42
3. WD Circular No. 59 provided for the submission of recommendations to the Deputy Chief of Staff, WDGS, at the end of three months. It was in pursuance of this provision that the comments were channeled through the Deputy Chief of Air Staff.
5. Memo for DC/AS by Col H S Vandenberg, AC/AS, A-3, 6 Jun 42
6. Memo for C/AS by Col H A Craig, AC/AS, Plans and An almost identical memo was written by Col H S Vandenberg on 25 Jun 42
7. Memo for CG AAF by CG AFTTC, 7 Jul 42. The Commanding General, AFTTC thought a first principle of sound organization should be the delegation of the greatest possible amount of responsibility to the lower echelons of command. The remaining duties should be given to the higher echelons. Instead, the process had always been the opposite "It is this failure to surrender power by decentralization and to confine the efforts of each headquarters to a definite bracket of responsibility that prevents proper planning and sound directives being issued by subordinate headquarters. Also, it was felt that the methods and practices of Headquarters, AAF were too similar to those employed when the air force consisted of "only a few thousand men and officers."
8. Brig Gen Carlyle Wash quoted in R&R, C/AS to AFDMC, 7 Jul 42
11. Memo for DC/AS by Lt Col H W Bowman (for Brig Gen M S Fairchild), AFDMR, 7 Jun 42.
12. Interview by author, Dr L V. Howard, and Lt H S Brigham with Brig Gen B E Gates and Maj A.W. Wood, 14 Jan 44 in USAF HD 105 5-6. General Gates pointed out that changes were so rapid that some decisions had to be reversed almost before they were made
13. Memo for DC/AS by Lt Col H W Bowman (for Brig Gen M S Fairchild), AFDMR, 7 Jun 42.
15. R&R, Dur of Bombardment to AFDMR, 6 Jun 42, Brig Gen Carlyle Wash quoted in R&R, C/AS to AFDMC, 7 Jul 42.
16. Brief (by Organizational Planning) of comments from various activities on the organization of the AAF, 21 Jul 41. The Gulf Coast Training Center, in telegram of 7 Jul 42, wanted to know who was responsible for certain activities
17. Memo for CG AAF by CG AFTTC, 7 Jul 42
18. The primary purpose of this study had been the discovery of "duplication of effort and the causes of the issuance of conflicting orders or instructions which at times have been received in the field."
19. The proposal to combine the Directorate of Organizational Planning with Management Control is not quite clear. Perhaps it was intended that the personnel of the operating directorate (Organizational Planning) should become an integral rather than a subsidiary part of the administrative directorate (Management Control). Report of Col B M McFayden, IGD, to the Inspector General, 2 Jul 42, in AFSHO files
20. Memo for DC/AC by Col B E Gates, 9 Jul 42, in AFSHO files
21. Brief of comments of officers in conference called by C/AS for purpose of discussing the organization of Headquarters, AAF, in AFSHO files. In this last comment probably lies much of the difficulty of bringing about more efficiency through more effective reorganization
22. Colonel Aston stated that it was not possible to abolish the directorates in July 1942 because it took time to "persuade the 'powers' that this was not the best organization to carry on with the fulfillment of the mission of the AAF." Interview with Col J W Aston, 18 Jan 44, in AFSHO files
23. Flying Safety was soon returned to its former status of a directorate
24. AAF Reg 20-1, 1 Jan 43
25. Interview by author and Mrs Jackson with Lt Col J S Clark, Organizational Planning, 15 Apr 43, in USAF HD 105 5-6.
25. Donald C. Stone, Assistant Director for Administrative Management, Bureau of the Budget, wrote on 10 Mar 42: "We commend most heartily the provision within the new organization plan for facilities under the Director of Management Control which, acting by your direction and within the guidance of the Chief of Air Staff, can give sustained attention to installing the plan." (Memo for Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, in AAO 310,1, Budget and Fiscal Office.)


27. Interview by author with John S. Canterbury and Arnold Miles, 18 Oct 43, in USAF HD 10554.

28. Memo for Donald Stone by staff on status reporting and program planning and scheduling, 10 Feb 42, in Bureau of the Budget files.

29. Summary examples of existing lacks pertaining to over-all programming and scheduling, J. L. Jacobs, 27 Apr 42, in Bureau of the Budget files.

30. Sundquist, "Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces," p. 34.

31. Interview with Canterbury and Miles.


33. AAF Reg 20-10, 8 Jun 42.

34. Memo for L. W. Hoeltcher by Arnold Miles and J. L. Sundquist, 16 Jan 42, in Bureau of the Budget files.

35. Memo for DC/AS by Col B. E. Gates, 9 Jul 42; memo for CG AAF by Col B. E. Gates, 5 Feb 43, in AFSHO files.

36. Memo for Col B. E. Gates by Lt Col J. S. Clark, Jr., 8 Jun 43, in AFSHO files.

37. In Bureau of the Budget files.

38. Organization chart for DC/AS, Plans and Programs [about 1 Aug 43], in AFMOP files.

39. Ashton interview.

40. HQ OI 20-29, 13 Dec 43.


43. HQ OI 20-1, 23 Aug 45. Learned continued to head the office until 1 Sep 45 when he was reassigned on a part-time basis as a special consultant to the Commanding General, AAF. (HQ OI 20-29, 1 Sep 45.)

44. HQ OI 20-110.

CHAPTER VII


2. Comment 2 (R&R in n. 1), ACO to AC/AS, M&S, 9 Aug 44.


5. WDCSA 41344 (10 Aug 44), 26 Aug 44.

6. AG PO-A 334 (31 Aug 44).

7. OS&A to CO Dayton Signal Corps Publishing Agency, 2 Oct 44, and memo for C/S by Brt Gen P. W. Timberlake, 16 Dec 44, in AFMOP files. See also AAF Reg 20-46, 2 Oct 44, WD Circular 429, 3 Nov 44; HQ OI 20-75 and 100-1, 4 Dec and 17 Mar 44; AG 41344 (21 Oct 44) OB-8-WGD6S For the final details of transfer, see Signal Transfer in ACO files.

8. AR 95-150, 24 Apr 43. In the theaters of operations, however, the theater commander (with technical instruction from the Commanding General, AAF) was charged with the administration, operation, and maintenance of an adequate weather service for the AAF units under his command.

9. AR 95-150, 15 May 45. The making of upper air observations for the specific purpose of determining ballistics for artillery fire was reserved as a function of the artillery.


11. R&R, AFOCR to AFAMS (thru AFMOP), 14 May 45, and teleg. AFAMS to ATSC, 6 Jun 45, in AFDCO files.


13. Memo for Maj Gen E. M. Powers (thru Col C. H. Dyson) by Lt Col S. S. Mullin, 15 Jun 45, in AFDCO files. Mullin noted that the Ground Forces appeared to object to the AAF taking over responsibility for any other than equipment peculiar to the AAF.


15. Memo for C/S (ats 0-4) by AC/AS-4, 17 Sep 45, in AFDCO files.

16. Ibid.
at Orlando but was to move to Eglin when facilities were made available.

16 See AAF Regs 20-1, -14, -15, -16, and -17 of 1 Jun 45.

17 The AAF Center Liaison Office was established in the OAC/AS-3 by Hq OI of 20-51 of 25 Aug 45.

18 For a fuller discussion of the consolidation of these commands, see USAF Historical Study 28 (Rev.), Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF.

19 Memo for C/AS by AFDM/C, 16 Sep 42, in AFSHO files.

20 Memo for Brig Gen E. S. Perrin by Lt Col R. E. Decker, 4 Apr 44, in AFMOP files.

21 Memo for CG AAF by Maj Gen W. H. Frank, 19 May 44, in AFMOP files. The approval of this proposal would have added another assistant chief of air staff, would have violated the principle of functional consolidation, and would have been moving in a direction contrary to the three-deputy plan extending from the bases through Headquarters, which had been approved by General Arnold for the postwar air force.

22 Charts 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 in AFMOP files. These charts are in a series of about 30 prepared by Organizational Planning to promote its ideas on the consolidation of the two commands.

23 Memo for Brig Gen B. E. Lovett, 1 Jun 44, in AFMOP files.

24 Memo for Gen H. H. Arnold, 3 Jul 44, in AFMOP files.

25 R&R, CG AAF to Lt Gen B. M. Glines, 7 Jul 44, in AFMOP files. General Knudsen was to be assisted by a deputy, Maj Gen B. E. Myers, and by Brig Gen K. B. Wolfe and Maj Gen Delmar Dunton, who were to head the Materiel and Air Service Commands, respectively.


27 AG 322 3 (8-30-44) OB-I-AFRPG-M, 31 Aug 44; AAF Reg 20-43, 31 Aug 44; Hq AAF, GO 12, 31 Aug 44.

CHAPTER IX

1. AAF Memo 20-11, 20-13, and 20-16, 2 Sep, 1 Oct, and 3 Nov 43; Hq OI 20-19, 20-76, and 20-78, 13 Dec 42, 1 Dec 44, and 19 Dec 44.


3. Hq OI 20-3 and 20-4, 31 Aug 44; 20-3, 14 Sep 44; 20-68, 9 Jul 45. M&I Sec had been redesignated M&I by AAF Reg 20-43, 17 Jul 1944.

4. Hq OI 20-5 and 20-66, 6 Jun and 1 Nov 44. A Radio Division was added in January 1945. (Hq OI 20-82 and 20-66, 23 and 26 Jun 45.) The Motion Picture Office was moved from AC/AS, OC&I to AC/AS, Intelligence and redesignated the Motion Picture Services Division by Hq OI 20-10 of 14 Aug 44. In the summer of 1945 it was attached to the OC/AS.

5. Hq OI 20-17, 26 Jun 44. There were some other new offices in Headquarters during 1944—such as the Air Installations Division—which caused difficulty in the delimitation of functions, but they had little effect on the total organization picture. (Hq OI 20-54, 12 Jun 44, 20-24, 24 Oct 44, 20-51, 20 Feb 45.) The superimposition of Headquarters, Twentieth Air Force on AAF Headquarters in April 1944 added to the burden of staff members and perhaps created a tendency to neglect the more pressing responsibilities of the AAF as a whole in order to devote energies to the activities of the B-29's. (AG 322 (4-4-44) OB-I-AFRPG-M.)


7. R&R, DC/AS, to AC/AS, OC&I, 6 Nov 44, in AAG 321, AAF. A fourth deputy chief had been added in June 1944.


10. Memo for all offices of Air Staff by C/AS, 4 Dec 44, in Postwar Plans Div files.

11. AAF Reg 20-58, 1 Jul 45. In May 44 the Army Airways Communications System had been reorganized on a command basis, and on 1 Jun 44 the AAF Redistribution Center had become the AAF Personnel Distribution Command. (See AACS History, III, pp. 947-51; AAG Reg 20-40, 1 Jun 44, chart, Organization of AAF, 1 Jun 45.)

12. Chart, Organization of AAF, 23 Aug 45, attached to Hq OI 20-1. same date; statement of Lt Col J. O. Wright, Exec Asst, OC/AS, 24 Sep 45, in AFSHO files. The Office of Special Projects ceased to exist on 15 Sep 45 when its functions were distributed to AC/AS/1, -4, and -5. (Hq OI 30-109, 5 Sep 45.) By the 15 Sep chart, the former Historical Division was called the AAF Historical Office, under the Secretary of Air Staff.


14. Statement of Lt Col J. O. Wright, in AFSHO files.

15. Hq OI 20-1, 23 Aug 45.

16. Directive, Acting C/AS to Asst Chiefs of Air Staff, 24 Aug 45, in OC&I files; Sources in notes 17-21 in same files.

17. R&R, C/AS to various Hq封锁, 27 Aug 45.

18. Memo for C/AS by AC/AS-1, n.e.
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Appendix

Roster of Key Personnel
To September 1955

COMMANDING GENERAL, GHQ AIR
FORCE (Air Force Combat
Command after 20 Jun 41)
Maj Gen F.M. Andrews
1 Mar 35—1 Mar 39
Lt Gen D.C. Emmons
1 March 39—17 Dec 41
Maj Gen M.F. Harmon (acting)
17 Dec 41—26 Jan 42
Maj Gen C. Spaatz
27 Jan 42—8 Mar 42

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
Maj Gen B.D. Foulkes
19 Dec 31—22 Dec 35
Maj Gen O. Westover
22 Dec 35—21 Sep 38
Maj Gen H.H. Arnold
22 Sep 38—30 May 41
Maj Gen G.H. Brett
30 May 41—8 Dec 41
(Served as Acting Chief
from 25 Oct 40—30 May 41)
Maj Gen W.R. Weaver (acting)
8 Dec 41—9 Mar 42

ASST. CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS
Brig Gen O. Westover
22 Dec 31—22 Dec 35
Brig Gen H.H. Arnold
24 Dec 35—22 Sep 38
Brig Gen W.G. Kilner
22 Sep 38—6 Aug 39
Brig Gen J.E. Fickel
1 Dec 39—2 Oct 40
Brig Gen D. Johnson
2 Oct 40—8 Aug 41
Brig Gen M.S. Fairchild
8 Aug 41—9 Mar 42

CHIEF, ARMY AIR FORCES
Maj-Lt Gen H.H. Arnold
20 Jun 41—9 Mar 42

COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR
FORCES
Lt Gen-General of the
Army H.H. Arnold
9 Mar 42—

CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
Brig Gen C. Spaatz
20 Jun 41—26 Jan 42
Maj Gen M.F. Harmon
27 Jan 42—6 Jul 42
Maj Gen G.E. Stratemeyer
6 Jul 42—26 Jul 43
Maj Gen B.M. Giles
26 Jul 43—30 Apr 45
(also Deputy Commander, AAF)
Lt Gen I.C. Eaker
30 Apr 45—2 Jun 45
(Deputy Commander only after
latter date)
Maj Gen C.C. Chauncey (acting)
2 Jun 45—

DEPUTY CHIEFS OF AIR STAFF*
Brig Gen L.S. Kuter
9 Mar 42—17 Oct 42
Brig Gen T.J. Hanley, Jr.
17 Oct 42—25 Jun 43
Brig Gen E.S. Perrin
25 Jun 43—29 Apr 44
Brig Gen W.E. Hall
29 Mar 43—4 Sep 44
Brig Gen L.G. Saunders
29 Mar 43—25 Aug 43
Brig Gen H.S. Vandenberg
25 Aug 43—15 Mar 44
Brig Gen P.W. Timberlake
15 Mar 44—3 Jul 45
Brig Gen D. Wilson
10 May 44—2 Sep 44
Brig Gen R.O. Owens
3 Jul 44—15 May 45

*From 29 Mar 43 to 1 Jun 44 there were three deputy chiefs.
for a short while after Jun 44 there were four deputy chiefs, and
after the Aug 45 reorganization there was only one
AIR INSPECTOR
Brig Gen H.A. Dargue
20 Jun 41—24 Jul 41
Col E.W. Hill
24 Jul 41—13 Jul 42
Col J.W. Whiteley
18 Jul 42—28 Mar 43
Maj Gen F. Bradley
28 Mar 43—13 Jul 43
Brig Gen J.W. Jones
13 Jul 43—

CHIEF, LEGAL DIV, OCAC; AIR JUDGE ADVOCATE
Col E.H. Snoadgrass—head of
Legal Division, OCAC, and
Air Judge Advocate
20 Jun 41—3 Jul 43
Brig Gen L.H. Hedrick
3 Jul 43—11 Oct 45
(General Hedrick did not
assume office as of this
date, but this is the date
of his order. He actually
assumed office about one
week later.)
Col D. O'Keefe
11 Oct 45—

AIR ADJUTANT GENERAL
Col W.W. Dick
20 Jun 41—19 Sep 42
Col F.C. Milner
19 Sep 42—28 Sep 43
Col J.B. Cooley
29 Oct 43—15 Dec 43
(acting from 28 Sep 43—29 Oct 43)
Lt Col H.H. Hewitt (acting)
15 Dec 43—27 Dec 43
Col T.A. FitzPatrick
27 Dec 43—8 May 44
(There was no Air Adjutant
General between 8 May
44 and 8 Jun 45)
Col H.G. Culton
8 Jun 45—

SPECIAL PROJECTS
Col F.T. Davison
29 Mar 43—

BUDGET AND FISCAL
Lt Col L.W. Miller
(Chief of Fiscal Division,
OCAC as early as 20 Aug 41)
Lt Col A.W. Martenstein
(Asst Chief of Fiscal Division,
OCAC as early as 20 Aug 41)
Col L.W. Miller (Budget Officer)
9 Mar 42—29 Mar 43
Col A.W. Martenstein (Fiscal Officer)
9 Mar 42—29 Mar 43
Brig Gen L.W. Miller (Budget and
Fiscal)
29 Mar 43—

AIR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER
Brig Gen H.M. McClelland
26 Sep 43—

AIR SURGEON
Col-Maj Gen N.W. Grant (assigned
from Medical Division, OCAC to Hq.,
AAF and appointed Air Surgeon)
30 Oct 41—

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR GLIDER
PROGRAM
R. DuPont
19 Apr 43—13 Sep 43

FLYING SAFETY (Office of. See also
Directorate of )
Col G.C. Price
1 Oct 43—
(Moved to Winston-Salem, N.C.,
8 Feb 44)
Lt Col M. Estes (Deputy Chief and
head of Washington office)
8 Feb 44—

SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR ANTIAR CRAFT
Maj Gen H.R. Oldfield
26 Oct 43—

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES
Col W.S. Ege
11 Dec 43—

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
Brig Gen M.S. Farnchild
9 Mar 42—25 Nov 42
Maj Gen D. Johnson
25 Nov 42—24 Feb 43
Col M.E. Goss (acting)
25 Feb 43—14 Mar 43
### Glossary

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<td>AAFSAT</td>
<td>AAF School of Applied Tactics</td>
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