Distribution of AIR MATERIEL to the Allies 1939-1944
Controls, Procedures, and Policies

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DISTRIBUTION OF AIR MATERIAL TO THE ALLIES,

1939-1944:

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Distribution of Air Materiel to the Allies,
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INTRODUCTION

Air matériel has been the largest single category in America's "arsenal of democracy" from which our Allies and potential Allies have been supplied during this war. Out of a total of 12.9 billions of dollars in material aid of all kinds distributed as "Defense Aid" to beneficiary governments by the United States Government since March 1941, about 1.8 billions have gone for aircraft and aeronautical equipment. The airplanes exported have comprised almost a third of the entire output of the aircraft plants under the jurisdiction of the Army Air Forces.

The transfers of air matériel to the Allies have been handled chiefly in three ways, of which "Defense Aid" was the last to be used: (1) the sale of Air Corps-designed aircraft to foreign purchasing agents in the United States by Air Corps contractors; (2) the release to Britain and other Allies of production capacity that was already committed to the United States under Air Corps contracts, beginning in July 1940; and (3) the outright transfer of matériel to foreign beneficiaries under Lend-Lease authorization, after March 1941. All of these devices were "peacetime," "defense-period" measures in active use by the AAF before the attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. Shortly after the United States became an active

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Participant in the war, the munitions resources of the AAF were pooled with those of the British Empire and distributed under various inter-Allied controls to Allied commands and countries in accordance with strategic policies of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The controls, procedures, and policies in each of these phases will be discussed below.

This study is limited to the airplanes and other items of manufactured air matériel that were made available to the Allies. It does not cover the various technical services related to matériel which were rendered to the British and other foreign governments, such as the exchange of technical information, the construction of overseas bases, and the operation of supply and maintenance depots. Nor does it include the transfer of matériel and other resources such as machine tools, which will be taken up in later historical studies on the control and allocation of aircraft resources.

2. The chronological scope of this study, 1939 to 1944, covers events through February 1944, when the final draft of the study was prepared.
Chapter I

DISTRIBUTION DURING THE "DEFENSE PERIOD," SEPTEMBER 1939 TO DECEMBER 1941

Export of Military Aircraft by Air Corps Contractors, 1931-1939

The outbreak of the European war in September 1939 ushered in the "Defense Period" of American military and diplomatic policy, a period that lasted until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. World War II was, however, well under way before the German invasion of the Low Countries in September 1939. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, the German-Italian support of the Franco regime in the Spanish Civil War in 1937, and the unopposed German moves into the Rhineland and the Sudetenland between 1938 and 1939 were all "unofficial" and preliminary skirmishes of the second World War. A brief statement on Air Corps "foreign policy" toward the distribution of military aircraft to potential Allies and other foreign governments during those early years is necessary as an introduction to the story on the later "Defense Period" and "War Period" of American participation in the war.

The story of major U. S. diplomatic and military policies during the period 1931-1939 is outside the scope of this study, except for those phases of War Department and Air Corps policy that were concerned with the question of supplying aircraft to one or more of the belligerents. The export of arms to foreign powers had been permitted under certain conditions, under a series of old statutes that were still on
the books since the first World War. However, any substantial aid to the belligerents, either by private exporters or through government channels, came to be more and more discouraged by a growing public sentiment in the 1920's against the export of arms to belligerents, even to victims of Nazi and Fascist aggression. Although the underlying "isolationist" and other factors of this attitude cannot be analyzed here, it was reflected in the Johnson Act of 1932, which forbade loans by Americans to belligerent governments, and by the successive "neutrality" resolutions of Congress in August 1935, February 1936, and May 1937, which curtailed the export of war material to foreign governments. Whether these measures did, in effect, assist impotent countries like Ethiopia or injure stronger governments like the Chinese Republic or the Spanish Republic, at any rate they were the basic policy by which the War Department and the Air Corps were controlled until 4 November 1939, when the "cash and carry" act was passed by Congress and signed by the President.

The interests of the Air Corps in the export of war material lay less in the diplomatic and political factors behind the "neutrality" policy than in the various military factors to be considered in the export of aircraft by American manufacturers to foreign air forces. The Air Corps since the Armistice of 1918 had generally favored the export of aircraft by American manufacturers as a device for keeping the aircraft industry alive. This production factor became increas-

ingly important as military preparations were continued by the foreign
air forces. When the neutrality resolutions of 1935-1937 sought to
curtail the export of munitions, the Air Corps attempted—within that
framework—to liberalize War Department policy so that such Air Corps
models as were cleared for security reasons could be manufactured by
Air Corps contractors for foreign sale. The hope for expanded plant
capacity is the recurring theme of the correspondence and conferences
on "foreign releases" in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, es-
pecially between 1935 and 1940. In addition to insuring sufficient
productive capacity for future Air Corps needs, the successive "release
policies" were intended also to result in other advantages to the Air
Corps: the cost of developing new articles of aircraft and air equip-
ment would be partially absorbed by selling them abroad; foreign air
forces, if they came to depend upon American industry, would be
"controlled" by the United States, because the Air Corps would have
accurate performance data on their planes and would be able to cut off
their source of supply in case of war; and, in connection with the
importance of Latin America to hemisphere defense, foreign sales would
permit the United States "to compete on equal terms with foreign

2. See especially AAC 452.1 Sales ... Abroad, c. c., Brig. Gen.
H. C. Pratt, Chief, Material Division, to Boeing Aircraft Co.,
2 Dec. 1932; memo for C/S by C/AC, 28 April 1933 (draft); C/AC
"for all concerned" by C/AC, 1 Sept. 1939; and minutes of OCAF
meeting with C/S, 19 March 1940. 2. See also OCAF "Policy No.
147," 10 Feb. 1930, regarding sale of surplus matériel to foreign
governments (copy not found).
4. Ibid.
nations in the sale of aeronautical equipment in South American countries."

Having embarked on a general course of encouraging exports of military aircraft, the Air Corps was faced with several important problems, such as the following: (1) Should all countries be treated alike, or should "universality" be abandoned in favor of releasing specific models to specific countries? (2) How soon after development should an Air Corps airplane be released to a foreign government? (3) How should release dates vary for experimental types of military airplanes, standard military types, commercial adaptations of military airplanes, and strictly commercial types? (4) Should single articles of latest types be sold for production abroad, or should the Air Corps insist that all production be confined to the United States? (5) Should quantity production of standard types abroad be permitted?"}

Universality was the first and most pressing issue, judging from the controversy that was engendered. The Department of State, which was charged with controlling exports of munitions, had a policy dating from November 1934 that once an item was released, it was released to all countries universally. The G-4 Section of the War Department General Staff, supporting this view in September 1935, ruled that it was "no function of the military to release items of equipment to, say,

5. Memo for AS/U by G/AG, 7 Aug. 1939, in AAS 452.1, Sales Abroad. See also minutes of meeting between G/AG and G/AG, 13 March 1940, on "Policy on Foreign Sale of Aircraft," 2, in ibid.
7. Agreements between State Department and War and Navy departments, 19 and 30 Nov. 1934 and 6 Dec. 1934, mentioned in letter from Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy (copy), 13 Sep. 1935, in ibid (filed under 31 Oct. 1935).
France, and not to Great Britain; such a decision must be based on
treaties or statutes and would seem to be the sole province of the State
Department.\[^8\] On the other hand, the Air Corps, directly and through
the joint Army-Navy Aeronautical Board, sought to change this policy,
urging that each country's request for a release should be considered
individually, "regardless of whether the particular item [had] already
been released."\[^9\] The Aeronautical Board maintained that even though
"military secrets" released by the War Department to one country were
theoretically open to the whole world, nevertheless more-than-secrecy
was involved in a realistic release policy. Specific releases, con-
trolled by the War Department, were necessary in order to carry out
the "responsibility of the Secretary of War relative to National
Defence,"\[^10\] that is, his responsibility (1) to guard against "possible
interference of foreign orders with the completion of contracts in
force or contemplated by the United States Government," and (2) to
obtain "valuable information as to the activities of foreign powers in
regard to the development and equipment of their air forces," obtainable

\[^8\] O-4 study addressed to O/S, 18 Sep, 1935 (copy erroneously dated 18
Sep, 1935), in ibid. Earlier, 3 Sep, 1935, an AG directive to the
various services promulgated the "universality" policy. (Copy of
directive in ibid.) This policy was subsequently upheld by Judge
Advocate General. (Copy of JAQ opinion, 26 Oct, 1935, in ibid.)


\[^10\] Quoted in ibid.; see also memo for S/N by Aeronautical Board, 21
Oct. 1935, in ibid. In denying the right of the State Department
to control releases, the Aeronautical Board stated that the former
was "merely regulatory in re munitions control and a channel of
communication and record." Quoted in memo for DO/S by O/AC, 31 Oct.
1936, in ibid. The Secretary of State had opposed specific releases
because they would "unnecessarily complicate the administration of
the restrictions . . . and . . . export licenses." (Secretary of
State to Secretary of the Navy, 13 Sep. 1936, in ibid.)
only by writing into each release a guarantee for the exchange of technical information. This view ultimately prevailed over the policy of "universal" releases to all foreign countries, and became a fundamental policy throughout the entire history of distribution of Army aircraft to the Allies, from 1935 to 1944.

As to the timing of foreign releases with respect to the deliveries of similar aircraft to the Air Corps, the policy became more and more liberal between 1935 and 1940. In September 1935 a 12-month policy was recommended by the Aeronautical Board and approved by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, by which releases were permitted one year "after acceptance by the Air Corps of the second article on the first Air Corps production contract." Certain exceptions were to be made, to withhold "indefinitely" any air equipment "containing features so novel as to constitute new inventions of purely military use"; but--on the other hand--to release "at an early date" before the lapse of 12 months such standard types of airplanes or equipment as had "no strikingly novel feature."  

A year later, in October 1936, the 12-month policy was "liberalized" to six months. The Material Division had recommended foreign releases six months "after giving the 'go-ahead' on the fourth article," provided that exports would actually not be made until 12 months after the fourth article had been delivered to the Air Corps and with the proviso that existing Air Corps contracts would not be disturbed. The Chief of the

Air Corps, in routing the recommendation to the Chief of Staff, went
even further to permit release 12 months after the first article. The
"first production article," as defined, was to be "not the article pre-
pared for the purpose of evaluation, but the first article delivered on
a contract as the result of such competition." Such close timing
would not prejudice the national defense, it was argued:

By the time a foreign factory could get into production
on the type of plane released, we should have a more
advanced type developed if not under production. This is a case of balance. An earlier release would be prejudicial
to the National Defense, and a restriction for a greater
length of time would probably prevent the American manu-
facturer from making the sale . . . abroad.

The policy actually adopted was a midway compromise—foreign release
six months after the delivery to the Air Corps of the second produc-
tion article of "the first service test or production contract." In
addition, negotiations between the Air Corps contractor and the foreign
representatives could be begun even earlier, in order to permit actual
export deliveries to be made as soon as the six-month period had elapsed.
In September 1939 the period was further shortened to eliminate entirely
the six-month delay.

Behind the issues of releasing specific types of airplanes to
specific countries within specific periods of time was this basic

15. Ibid.
16. "Notes for General Arnold for use at Conference with Representatives
    of Canadian Government," no date, about Sep. 1938, in ibid. (Filed
    under 25 Sep. 1938.) The policy was probably issued by the Aeronau-
    tical Board on 33 Dec. 1938 (copy not found).
17. Minutes of meeting between G/AC and G/S, 19 Mar. 1940, on "Policy
    on Foreign Sale of Aircraft," 1, in ibid. See also "Outline of Policy
    of the War and Navy Departments for the Release of Aircraft,
    etc.," 28 Aug. 1938 (copy not found).
consideration: to improve America's aircraft production capacity
without sacrificing Air Corps military secrets or interfering with Air
Corps production plans. Thus, in 1936 the Air Corps objected to ex-
porting single items of a given airplane type for use merely as a
prototype by foreign manufacturers. Such a policy, it was argued,
would only tend "to make ... American industry a development lab-
oratory, with foreign nations and manufacturers securing the benefits
of such development"; and while development costs would thus be ab-
sorbed, the American manufacturer "would be denied the profit which he
should normally expect from a production order for such aircraft." 18

When in April 1938 the Air Corps learned that British agents were about
to let heavy aircraft contracts in the United States, it was feared that
the manufacturers (who were also Air Corps contractors), instead of
expanding their plants, would merely delay deliveries on their Air
Corps contracts. Accordingly, the Air Corps proposed that only short
delays on its contracts be permitted, so that the manufacturers would
be "forced to expand their production facilities at the expense of the
foreign purchaser." 19

Between January 1939 and the outbreak of war in September 1939,
the following airplane types—chiefly obsolescent—were released to

cert ... not entirely in accord with C. A. C. policies."
Whether a similar, modified proposal was made is not known.
foreign governments, chiefly to the British and French.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manufacturer and type</th>
<th>Equivalent Army type</th>
<th>Release Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Curtiss 75A</td>
<td>F-26A</td>
<td>18 March 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin 139-7</td>
<td>B-10E</td>
<td>14 April 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic (Seversky) 4P-1</td>
<td>F-25</td>
<td>8 May 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American NA-16-1B</td>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>16 Sept. 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtiss 76D</td>
<td>YA-18</td>
<td>9 Nov. 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kellett XE-1A</td>
<td>YL-12</td>
<td>16 Jan. 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lockheed 212</td>
<td>C-37</td>
<td>27 Feb. 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American NA-57</td>
<td>BT-3B</td>
<td>11 April 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas 8A-3N</td>
<td>A-17A</td>
<td>23 May 1939</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No fundamental change in Air Corps policy occurred in September 1939 when war officially began in Europe. The existing policy of releasing airplane types for foreign sale was reiterated on 1 September 1939. During the remaining months of 1939 the manufacturers were permitted to export the B-28A (Douglas DE-280), the A-20 (Douglas DE-7A), the PT-19 (Fairchild 1-52), and the P-40 (Curtiss 31A), the latter without the closely guarded supercharger.

Some minor reorganizations also occurred late in 1939. The Plane Section of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps was given charge of the "coordination of all foreign orders," and the work was delegated.

20. Abstracted from tabulation prepared by Material Planning Section on "Aircraft Released to Foreign Purchasers, Jan. 1, 1938 to Feb. 29, 1940 incl.," 25 Mar. 1940, in AAC 452.1, Sales Abroad. See also similar tabulation covering aircraft engines. Ibid.


22. Material Planning Section tabulation on "Aircraft Released to Foreign Purchasers, Jan. 1, 1933 to Feb. 29, 1940," 25 Mar. 1940, in AAC 452.1, Sales Abroad. See also similar tabulation covering aircraft engines. Ibid.
to Lt. Col. G. S. Warren. The Air Corps two new agencies dealing with foreign sales of munitions had meanwhile been superimposed on the existing administrative controls: the Clearance Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, established in July 1939, and the President’s Liaison Committee, established in December 1939 shortly after the passage of the "cash-and-carry" act of 4 November 1939. The Clearance Committee was organized by the Assistant Secretaries of War and of the Navy as a central office to approve all foreign military contracts in the United States, in order to integrate them with Army-Navy industrial mobilization plans. The Air Corps, however, was not represented. The President’s Liaison Committee, consisting of the Treasury Director of Procurement, the Army Quartermaster General, and the Navy Paymaster General, likewise was organized to coordinate exports, both of military and other items, to foreign governments, chiefly from the viewpoint of foreign political, fiscal, and economic policy. The Air Corps, however, resumed its former procedures by which releases of aircraft were approved by the Aeronautical Board and War Department, with its exports licensed by the State Department. Subsequently, when the Chief of Staff asked with some concern whether the President’s Liaison Committee had taken over the "responsibility for air defense" through its clearance of foreign aircraft sales, the Chief of the Air Corps

25. The State Department’s control over the export of munitions was modified, however, by the establishment of an interdepartmental National Munitions Control Board, on which the War Department and other agencies were represented. (Act of 4 Nov. 1939; 54 Stat. 10.)
denied that the committee had in effect any control or influence over
the War Department's "approved policy . . . [to] control [the] release
of military equipment." 26 For example, it was cited, whenever an Allied
purchasing agent had attempted to appeal an adverse War Depart-
ment decision on a given request, that committee had merely "forwarded such
requests for action by the proper authorities of the War Department." 27

Foreign Release Policy of 25 March 1940

In March 1940 the policy of releasing relatively obsolete airc-
raft types was replaced by a "liberalized release policy" which permitted
the Air Corps contractor to export more advanced types, again, of course,
under proper clearances from the Air Corps and the Aeronautical Board.
The Air Corps, after a "careful analysis" of the effect of foreign
releases on its own expansion program, concluded on 25 March 1940 that
certain "late military types" of airplanes might be made available for
release to foreign purchasers through the appropriate Air Corps con-
tractor, as follows: 2-17, 2-24, 2-26, 2-26, A-20A, P-10, C-52, FT-12B,
FT-17, FT-18, FT-19, BT-13, and BT-14. 28 Each type was to be individually
released, to individual countries, and

only after definite assurances that the superior or improved
types we require to complete our contracts can and will be

26. Minutes of meeting between O/AO and O/S, 19 Mar. 1940, on "Policy
on Foreign Sales of Aircraft," 7, in AG 452.1, Sales . . . Abroad.
See also ibid., 3, 13.
27. Ibid., 12.
28. Ibid. 15.

furnished by the manufacturers without additional cost to the United States Government. To accomplish this, a signed change order [that is, an order from the Air Corps to the manufacturer, modifying a given detail of a contract] must be in our hands before a release is recommended for approval.

In addition to the Air Corps agreement with the contractor, the contractor's agreement with the foreign purchasing agent (which required approval of the Aeronautical Board, the War Department, and the Air Corps) was to contain appropriate guarantees that the "detailed assembly" of the airplane would be accomplished in the United States and not by a foreign manufacturer, and that combat performance data on the given airplane type would be supplied to the Air Corps.

The overwhelming advantages that would result from this policy were summarized as follows by the Chief of the Air Corps, in a meeting with the Chief of Staff a few days earlier:

1. The development of improved methods of quantity production with corresponding reduction in production costs.
2. The building up of an aircraft industry, including a large force of skilled workmen, that can compete with foreign competition for airplanes in normal times.
3. Expansion of the normal aircraft industry by foreign capital to meet the requirements of the Government in an emergency.
4. The training of key personnel in production and the development of improved designs through an acceleration of

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31. Minutes of said meeting, 19 Nov. 1940, on "Policy on Foreign Sale of Aircraft," 5-6, in ibid.
the applied research conducted by the staffs of the engineering manufacturers, i.e., the more orless, the larger the experimental engineering staff that can be maintained by manufacturers.

5. The introduction of American practices and standards abroad with the resultant advantages of the adoption of American practices as international standards.

The relatively few disadvantages, on the other hand, were regarded merely as possible future problems that had to be solved: a possible overexpansion of the aircraft industry; a possible adverse effect on deliveries on Air Corps production contracts and experimental contracts; and a possible adverse effect on aeronautical resources, that is, "the opportunity for jobbers and promoters to gain control of critical raw materials such as aluminum, special steel, and certain of the airplane components."

Anglo-American Combined Control, September 1940

After the fall of France in June 1940, the British took over French aircraft contracts in the United States, and, together with their own contracts negotiated under the War Department's "foreign release policy" described above, developed a program for about 14,000 airplanes. This production program, added to the non-expanded Air Corps program totalling over 21,000 airplanes, made an unprecedented demand on American industry. Together with the early delivery dates that both parties wanted, these requirements now threatened to exceed.

32. Ibid.
the current production capacity of the American aircraft industry, which was still geared to a "scarcity economy" in aircraft as in other munitions. The situation called for adjustments in delivery schedules in deference to the British, confronted as they were with a more acute military need than was the Air Corps. A combined Anglo-American conference was held, resulting in an agreement with the British on 23 July 1940. Under the terms of the agreement, the Air Corps reduced its scheduled deliveries (for the period 30 June 1940 to 1 April 1942) from 21,470 to 13,884 airplanes. The 8,586 airplanes thus deferred in favor of the British until after April 1942 were expected to "incorporate improvements in design and equipment that would assure that they would be comparable to airplanes in use by foreign armies upon delivery."

The July agreement did give British contracts substantial priorities over the original Air Corps program, but did not prevent the British from letting any number of additional contracts for airplanes, engines, and propellers which might in the future upset even the modified Air Corps program of deliveries. The British contracts, unlike Air Corps and Navy contracts, did not as yet require the approval of the National Defense Advisory Commission, established in May 1940. War Department and Air Corps officials feared that such uncontrolled contracts might "have a far reaching and detrimental effect upon pro-

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34. Details of the agreement, which included also 6,298 airplanes for the Navy, are given in memo for C/AC by Chief of Materiel Division, 17 July 1940, in JAC file on "Conferences . . . .", July-Nov, 1940, doc. 3.

duction of airplanes for the War Department. In fact," warned Maj. Gen. G. F. Brett, Chief of the Material Division, "the placing of additional ... British orders with airplane manufacturers will, in my opinion, result in the failure of the War Department to meet the time schedule provided in the Munitions Program approved with revisions July 2, 1940. The anarchy and lack of unified control extended also to other phases of the production situation.

At present, requests are being made by manufacturers for release of productive capacity for particular types and models of airplanes for export; by representatives of the British Purchasing Commission for release of aircraft for export; and ... the British Purchasing Commission is understood to be negotiating with the Aluminum Company of America for delivery of critical materials needed by the aircraft industry. This continued piecemeal procedure will result in the failure of the Air Corps to meet its minimum objectives.

Furthermore, with respect to aircraft engine contracts, the British had tied up 80 per cent of engine production capacity in the United States, including orders for 18,000 engines for which they had no airframes to match. The Air Corps was unable to obtain "definite information from the British Purchasing Commission on their requirements for these unallocated engines" and was being seriously delayed in "the establishment of firm delivery schedules for airframes."

In effect, General Arnold concluded, "the Army aircraft program is


38. Memo for Chief of Staff by C/AC, 18 Aug. 1940, written by Maj. A. J. Lyon, Material Division, in ibid., docs. 9 and 14.
practically controlled by the British.  

The solution for this problem of anarchical competition was the establishment in September 1940 of combined United States-British machinery for the continuous review of the aircraft production situation and the allocation of future deliveries to the three chief customers—the Air Corps, the British Purchasing Commission, and the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. A "joint commission" representing the two countries had been proposed by General Brett on the eve of the 23 July conference with the British, as a device "to insure an equitable allocation" of aircraft engines and to assure that the airplanes produced on additional orders placed by the three customers would be "allocated on the basis of tactical requirements." Shortly after the agreement of 23 July, the Air Corps again proposed that a combined committee be set up; that the members be given authority "to act for and obligate the agencies they represent"; and that a "firm" delivery schedule for all airplanes ordered by the three agencies be prepared immediately by the committee in order to provide "a composite, definite, and positive delivery schedule for all airplanes and engines." Such a schedule, General Arnold urged, was "absolutely essential in order to determine a breakdown of the Army's portion of the total airplanes allocated and to permit the minimum delivery objective tentatively agreed upon /on/ ... July 23, 1940."
The proposal was placed before the Secretary of War by the Air Corps on 13 August 1940 and in turn transmitted to the Navy, the National Defense Advisory Commission, the British Purchasing Commission, and the Treasury Department, the latter an additional interested party because it held the chairmanship of the President's Liaison Committee. On 13 September 1940 the organization was set up, with the cumbersome title of Army-Navy-British Purchasing Commission Joint Committee, later renamed the Joint Aircraft Committee (JAC).!

The Air Corps assumed the leadership in the Joint Committee. The idea of the committee was largely an Air Corps development, and had apparently been worked out in the Materiel Division. After the concurrence of the Navy and the British was obtained, the Air Corps supplied the Recorder and the office space. The Chief of the Air Corps, who soon became the senior Army member of the committee, became its chairman as well. Finally, when the Aircraft Scheduling Unit was

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44. Even with the change in name in March 1941, the term "Joint" was still erroneous because the JAC was broader in membership than a joint Army-Navy organization.


46. S/7 to Chairman, British Supply Council, 18 Mar. 1941, in AAG 334.8-2 "JAC."

47. Maj. Frederick H. Hopkins, Jr., served originally as Recorder (during September and October 1940) and was replaced by Maj. Patrick W. Timberlake, who served from November 1940 to June 1942. Col. John W. Sessaum Jr. is the present Recorder (as of February 1944).

set up at Fort Worth Field in March 1941 to carry out JAC schedules.\textsuperscript{49} The Air Corps supplied the Chief, the facilities, and administrative personnel.

The Joint Aircraft Committee, which started out as a means for implementing the July 1940 agreement and for adjusting Anglo-American competition for aircraft production capacity, eventually came to coordinate all foreign aircraft contracts in the United States. The committee discovered in November 1940 that "certain priorities and allocations of deliveries to foreign governments other than the United Kingdom were being made by other agencies of this government,"\textsuperscript{50} presumably by the Army and Navy Munitions Board and by the President's Liaison Committee. In January 1941 the committee's authority was confirmed over all foreign contracts, British and otherwise.\textsuperscript{51} All production plans were now integrated into a single production schedule.

All subsequent revisions of these schedules or "targets" prepared by


\textsuperscript{50} Minutes of special meeting of Army and Navy members of the Joint Committee, 4 Nov. 1940, in JAC "Report of Meetings," in JAC files.

\textsuperscript{51} Memo on "Case 307" by the Joint Committee, 6 Feb. 1941, in AAG 334.8-2, JAC. The authority of the Joint Committee was further extended in March 1941 to all users of U. S.-manufactured aircraft, including miscellaneous "customers" such as the domestic airlines. The JAC and its Working Committee on Delivery Schedules thus became the single agency "to operate as a liaison agency between the Committee itself and the other agencies dealing with priorities." Undated draft of proposed reorganization of JAC, ca. 19 Feb. 1941, transmitted in letter from S/W to Chairman of British Supply Council, 18 Mar. 1941, in ibid.
the National Defense Advisory Commission, beginning with Report "8-A" on aircraft and Report "9-A" on engines, henceforth required the clearance and approval of the Joint Aircraft Committee. According to the procedure established, all proposed deviations from the schedule were to be prepared in case form by the JAC Working Committee on Delivery Schedules, cleared through the Aeronautical Board for questions of military secrecy, presented to the British for study, and acted upon by the full committee.

The Joint Aircraft Committee became the top authority for the approval and integration of all aircraft contracts being negotiated by foreign governments, by the Air Corps, and by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Its authority thus transcended that not only of the service arms but of the civilian National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) as well. Although the NDAC's Aircraft and Engine Division did sit in the meetings of the JAC from the beginning, not until after the NDAC was expanded into the Office of Production Management in January 1941 was it given voting membership on the JAC. Although the NDAC had antedated the Joint Committee by several months in coordinating British aircraft requirements with those of the Army and the Navy, it was necessary to superimpose on it a committee like the JAC "with authority to obligate the respective services." With allocations thus determined by the interested parties, the NDAC was provided "with a basis from which to work," in its further task of managing the aircraft industry to meet

52. Later reorganized into the Office of Production Management (Jan. 1941) and the War Production Board (Jan. 1942).
53. "Plan of Procedure" of the Joint Committee, no date (about 20 Sep. 1940), in JAC "Report of Meetings", in JAC files.
these production targets.\footnote{54} Some streamlining of procedures was accomplished as the work of the committee progressed. The JAC, concerned both with allocation and with standardization\footnote{55} of aircraft, decentralized its allocation work into one of its major subcommittees—the Working Committee on Delivery Schedules. This subcommittee prepared cases for the JAC and was given independent authority in December 1940 to allocate parts, accessories, and components "other than complete airplanes, complete engines, and complete propellers," provided that its recommendations had the unanimous approval of all subcommittee members present.\footnote{56} Any dissents were, of course, to be referred to the full committee. In February 1941 the clearance of foreign contracts for political and secrecy factors was simplified by adding the Army member of the Aeronautical Board (Maj. D. G. Lingle) to the committee, "to assure that aeronautical equipment \(\text{\cancel{\text{eligible}}}\) for release \(\text{\cancel{\text{to foreign governments}}}\) on grounds of military secrecy or has been officially released \(\text{\cancel{\text{politically}}}\) by the State Department.\footnote{57}

\footnote{54} JAC "Report of Meetings," 20 Sep. 1940 (in JAC files).
\footnote{55} Standardization was an important factor in American aid to the Allies. Secretary Stimson told Congress in October 1941 that "the emphasis on standardization of the production of weapons so that they could in an emergency be used by our own forces has been maintained." (Senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on E.R. 5738 . . . ; part 1, Defense Aid—Lend-Lease, 29.)
\footnote{56} JAC "Report of Meetings," 13 Dec. 1940, in JAC files.
\footnote{57} Ibid., 13 Feb. 1941.
Transfer of Air Material under "Defense Aid" Authorizations, March-December 1941

Although sales of Air Corps equipment and the release of production capacity to potential Allies prevailed during the first eighteen months of the war, the pressure increased for a type of material aid that would not be geared to the financial limitations of the Allies in their purchases from American industry. British procurement officers in England and the United States had kept the Air Corps informed of their dwindling money resources. Thus, in February 1940 the American air attaché in London was warned by a "high ranking" RAF officer that British finance "in terms of dollars" was limited, that "the end [of direct purchases] was in sight," and that after the arrival of this crisis, the United States must decide "whether to actively enter the war on the side of the Allies or to make available extended credits . . ., preferably quantities of modern military aircraft constructed in accordance with the known British lessons from the war to date." 53

The policy of "extended credits" to the Allies for materiel, recommended not only by British but also by American officials and based on the practice during the first World War, was not followed, in part because it was forbidden by the Johnson Act of 1932 and the Neutrality Act of 4 November 1939. Instead, a new, more comprehensive, and more forthright and realistic policy was adopted in March 1941. This permitted outright transfers of materiel to those potential Allies who were contending with the common enemy rather than the "sale" of items to a foreign "customer" regardless of their ultimate military use or strategic

importance to the United States. The new policy was called "Defense Aid" and it was approved in the Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941, and in subsequent Defense Aid appropriation acts.

The so-called "lend-lease" policy, which actually provided for outright transfers and "cash-reimbursement" deliveries rather than "loans" or "leases" of material, permitted American air power to be diverted to potential Allies against the day when the American combat air forces would be adequately equipped and trained for active participation against the Axis. The Lend-Lease Act empowered the President to designate countries to which Defense Aid might be rendered; to authorize and direct the Secretary of War (and, in turn, the Chief of the Air Corps) to transfer "defense articles" from stocks at hand if they would be spared and if such transfer were judged to be in the "national interest"; and to issue subsequent "transfer directives." The Defense Aid appropriations of 11 March 1941 and of subsequent dates required the President to make all allocations of funds or Defense Aid Allocations for the production of

59. An act further to promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes (H. R. 1776), 55 Stat. 31-33.
60. The various DA appropriation acts are tabulated in the Lend-Lease Administration's Report to Congress, ... for the period March 11, 1941, to December 31, 1942, 61-63. After 7 Dec. 1941, aircraft destined for foreign beneficiaries were included in the regular Army appropriations. Ibid., 15.
61. A list of the beneficiary governments, with the dates of their clearance, is given below in Appendix 2.
62. Many if not all of the original transfer directives issued by the President to the Secretary of War are in AG 400.3295, passim.
aircraft for beneficiary governments. An interdepartmental board to handle Defense Aid under the President was recommended to him in February 1941, on the eve of the passage of the bill. The proposal, drafted by the Army and the Navy and concurred in by the Treasury and State departments, suggested that this board review all foreign requirements for munitions in accordance with "changing political and strategic conditions," and make the "final recommendations" to the President as to the types of materiel, the quantities, and the beneficiary governments; that the British (and presumably other countries) be called in for "consultation and advice" whenever their needs were being considered; and that any additional British and other foreign contracts direct with industry be merged with Army and Navy supply programs and placed with the industry through the regular Army, Navy, and Office of Production Management procurement channels.

The machinery as actually set up on 2 May 1941 followed this proposal in substance. Instead of a single board, however, separate

63. The originals of many of the President's DAD's are in AG 463.8 (4-11-41). passim.
64. Letter from S/F to President Roosevelt, 13 Feb, 1941, and enclosure in AG 400.3295 (2-13-41).
65. Existing foreign contracts with the American aircraft industry were not disturbed. British contracts for aircraft, totalling about 1.5 billions of dollars as of 1 January 1941, and representing almost half of the dollar-volume of British munitions contracts in the United States, did not begin to run out until late 1943. As of 31 Jan, 1944, only 286 airplanes, mostly one-engine light bombers, remained undelivered to the British. (Message of the President to Congress, 23 Dec, 1940; conversation with Col. H. R. Paige, IIA&D International Section, 19 Jan, 1944 and US-301, monthly report on "... Foreign Airplane Procurements in the United States ...," 31 Jan, 1944, 47, copy in Material Command Historical Office files.)
"Defense Aid Supply Committees" were organized for each Army supply service, including the Air Corps, which was regarded as one of the "supply" services for purposes of procurement and distribution. All these committees were to be coordinated through a Defense Aid Division controlled by the Under Secretary of War.

In the White House, Harry L. Hopkins was deputized by the President to receive and solicit all foreign aid requests, to appraise them for over-all strategic and diplomatic policy, and to get them to the proper procuring agency—Army, Navy, or Maritime Commission. Hopkins and the President were assisted by an executive officer who came from the Army—Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, who was in turn deputized to handle all Defense Aid transactions in their absence.66 This relationship was formally confirmed in May 1941, when a Defense Aid Control Office was set up in the White House as the central recording, control, and reporting office for all Defense Aid matters throughout the government.67 In October the office was renamed the Office of Lend-Lease Administration,68 and although it was assigned to the Office for Emergency Management, the President's

66. Memo for S/D by Burns, 26 Nov. 1941, in AG 400,3295 (3-11-41). Burns had earlier been prominent on the President’s Liaison Committee.

67. Executive Order No. 8751, 2 May 1941, in Federal Register, 7 May 1941. Burns was formally appointed Executive Officer on 6 May 1941, by "military order" of the President. (See memo for AEO by Burns, 14 Nov. 1941, in AG 240[30-33-41]. "... Lend-Lease.") Regarding controversy over Hopkins' exact position in the Division, see House Committee on Appropriations, Hearings... on Second Supplemental National Defense Bill, 16, 30-33, 46.

control over final approval remained unchanged. 69

The Defense Aid Supply Committee in each of the procurement
branches was directed to determine foreign-government requirements as
to types, quantities, and destination; to establish supply programs;
to allocate production capacity; to plan future diversions from supply
programs; and to recommend standardization of types and models of
material which would facilitate the procurement, assignment, and use
of material. The Air Corps, unlike most of the rest of the Army,
already possessed machinery capable of handling foreign requests,
through its Joint Aircraft Committee. The JAC for several months had
developed procedures for integrating British contracts with Air Corps
contracts, allocating production capacity, and encouraging standardiza-
tion. These earlier problems differed little procedurally from Defense
Aid problems, and so the JAC was designated on 10 April 1941 to serve
as the Defense Aid Supply Committee for air materiel, both for Air Corps
items and for those procured by the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics. 70

The top policy-making authority, however, was not delegated to the
JAC. It remained in the hands of the Chief of Staff 71 and the President
and in their combined ad hoc conferences with the British Prime Minister
and his military staff and with the army or air force heads of other

69. For example, a transfer request addressed to the Secretary of
War by the Lend-Lease Administrator on 7 Nov. 1941 carried the
familiar "OK-JDR," AG 400.35295.

70. JAC "Report of Meetings," 2 May 1941, in JAC files; ltr., AG
020.1 (3-29-41) H-1, 10 Apr. 1941, on "Procedure under the Lend-
Lease Act," including exhibit no. 4, in AAG 351.3 "Lend-Lease";
and AG 020.1 (3-29-41).

71. Ibid.
governments. General Arnold had assured the British that the JAC was to become not the "policy making body" but "merely the machinery to put into operation policies laid down by higher authority"; after the directive of 10 April 1941 was issued, the British Supply Council in Washington reserved the right to "present the British view on aircraft matters to higher authority on any matter of real importance where our British representatives feel we cannot agree with the other members of that Committee," since in such "rare cases the opportunity of appeal may be of considerable moment to us." 75

The Joint Aircraft Committee remained independent of the Defense Aid Supply Committees of the other Army supply services. In fact, in July 1941, when a single Defense Aid Supply Committee consolidated the separate "cumbersome and confusing" committees for each branch, the JAC was specifically exempted, and its control was reaffirmed not only over aircraft requisitions, but also over requests for related air equipment. 76

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72. Memo for the S/W by Arnold on "Conference . . . on the reorganization of the Joint Aircraft Committee," 17 Mar. 1941, in AG 334,8-2 "JAC."

73. Memo for all WD divisions and chiefs of arms and services by S/W, 8 Apr. 1941, on " . . . Lend-Lease Act . . .," in AG 020.1 (3-28-41).

74. Successor to the British Purchasing Commission, A. B. Purvis was Chairman. See "History of the British Supply Council in North America," 16 pp., micrographed, in ATIH files.

75. Purvis to S/W, 11 Apr. 1941 (excerpt), in AG 020.1 (3-29-41) " . . . Lend-Lease . . . ."

76. Ltr., AG 020.1 (7-9-41) HC-H, 10 Jul. 1941, on "Change in procedure . . . ," in AG 020.1 (7-28-41). This consolidation of all branch committees except the aircraft committee apparently constitutes a significant organizational development that anticipated by over eight months the consolidation of all the Army supply branches except air matériel into the "Services of Supply" on 9 Mar. 1942.
Also, in December 1941 "ammunition, ammunition, and other accessories" peculiar to but not procured by the Army Air Forces were added to the Defence Aid jurisdiction of the JAC upon the recommendation of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. 77

Items other than "major items" of air materiel were not cleared by the JAC unless they involved a potential production problem. The sum of $250,000 was transferred by the Secretary of War to the Chief of the Air Corps in April 1941 as a "block requisition" on the Air Corps to cover "sub requisitions" for miscellaneous items obtainable directly from Air Corps stocks, such as subassemblies, spare parts, and spares other than complete airframes, engines, and propellers. 78 However, if any "block" items were "unusual" either as to type or quantity and likely seriously to affect the air production programs, they were to be forwarded to the JAC. However, no dollar limit on subrequisitions was established. 79

The Defence Aid Division established in the office of the Under Secretary of War was another link in the chain of command between the White House and the Air Corps. It was intended to be a "coordinating" agency among the separate supply services of the Army and to serve as the central office of record for the War Department on Defence Aid.

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77. WPD memo 4418-17 to DO/S, 3 Dec. 1941, on "DA Allocation Tables," in AG 400.325 (11-17-41) "Distribution . . . ."

78. Memo for O/AO by 3/V, 6 May 1941, on "Block Requisition Procedure . . . ." in AG 381.3 "Lend-Lease." The fund was increased later to 1,5 millions.

matters. Apparently its director, Col. H. S. Aurnand, had less
control over the Air Corps than over other supply branches. In October
1941 he was added to the membership of the Joint Aircraft Committee, and a subsequent directive "enjoined" the committee "to keep the Defense Aid Director informed of the recommendations of that Committee concerning Defense Aid matters which come before it and to consult with him about all Defense Aid matters before presentation to that Committee."

Within the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps the Material Division was the point of contact on Defense Aid matters. The Army members of the Joint Aircraft Committee were on its personnel roster, and within the division there was appointed a Defense Aid Officer (Col. B. E.
McNary), with a Defense Aid Section headed by Lt. Col. H. Ray Paige in July 1941. A counterpart at Wright Field was known as the Defense Aid Organization. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, over 400 Air Corps officers, 52 of them Regular officers, were on "Lend-Lease duty" in the Material Division and elsewhere.

81. Memo for AS/U by Arnold, Chairman of JAC, 16 Oct. 1941, on "Change in Procedure under Lend-Lease Act," in AG 391.3 "Lend-
Lease."
82. Ltr., AG 020.1 (10-16-41) HQ-F-11, 3 Nov. 1941, on "Change in Procedure under Lend-Lease Act," in AG 020.1 (3-29-41).
85. Memo for AGO by Lt. Col. D. R. Goodrich, Executive, Military Personnel Branch, 00AC, 15 Nov. 1941, in AG 240 (10-23-41). By June 1942 the roster had grown to 573 officers, including 110 Regular officers. Ibid.
While the Defence Aid program expanded the administrative machinery in Washington and Wright Field, it also resulted in the sending of missions to the chief Allied governments abroad, not only to attempt to expedite the requisitioning of materiel but to improve the exchange of technical information on air materiel. The system of military attaches and "Assistant Military Attachés for Air," which had been handled by the Intelligence divisions of the General Staff and the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, respectively, was expanded to provide special "Defence Aid Missions" to certain of the Allied governments involved—chiefly the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Republic.

A Defence Aid mission to the United Kingdom was proposed in August 1941 and authorized in September 1941 by the Operations Division of the General Staff. This was to be concerned with various problems, including the preparation of requirements as to "type, quality, quantity, and delivery dates" of materiel. The Special Observers Group in London, which had already been on the job for a year, exchanging materiel information with the British, was opposed to the new mission as a separate agency and counterproposed that a "technical bureau," including an air section, be added to its own group. General Arnold opposed such a bureau, how-

ever, because it would duplicate the functions of the Joint Aircraft Committee, already engaged in receiving requirements from British representatives in Washington. Furthermore, he objected to "setting up a small material division in England" on a permanent basis. He preferred temporary technical missions (which would operate, he said, without "cabled and written reports") in lieu of officers who, if permanently stationed abroad, would get out of touch with developments in the United States. 90

The basic agreements for transferring aircraft and air equipment to the British did not, however, spring from the Defense Aid missions to the United Kingdom. It was in the Materiel and Plans divisions of the Air Corps, and in subsequent special conferences with the British, where the basic agreements for transfers to the United Kingdom and the other potential Allies were worked out. A Plans Division study entitled "ANFD/2," released on 9 September 1941 and revised on 26 September 1941, proposed an over-all plan for "Release of Airplanes and Related Equipment for Defence Aid." 91 This proposed the establishment of an "Anti-Axis Pool" of air materiel between 1 October 1941 and 20 June 1942, to consist of: (1) all airplanes being produced under British and other

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89. AG (for Arnold) to Brett, message, 31 Oct. 1941, in AHI files.
90. Memo for Brett by Arnold, 3 Oct. 1941, on "Recommendations...Carrier mission...", in AG 574.8 "Commissions." Regarding the conflict of authority among the missions to England, see also memo for G/AS by Brig. Gen. Hurl S. Fairchild, 10 Oct. 1941, in AG 210.68.
91. ANFD/2, dated 9 and 26 Sep. 1941, in AG 457.1 "Bulk."
foreign contractors; basically the idea of sharing aircraft production capacity with the Allies, as worked out by the Joint Aircraft Committee after September 1940; (2) all airplanes and equipment being produced under Defense Aid Appropriations since March 1941; the policy of direct transfers under Lend-Lease authorizations; and (3) a diversion of 15 per cent of the Air Corps' own expected deliveries of combat airplanes, to be reallocated to a 30 per cent diversion after the "minimum Army Air Forces" of 27 bomber groups and 33 fighter groups were equipped.

The Anti-Axis Pool was planned not only for distribution to Britain but for the entire anti-Axis world, according to the following tentative proportions: United Kingdom and British Dominions, 50 per cent; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 30 per cent; Chinese Republic, 10 per cent; and "Others," including Latin American republics, 10 per cent.

Meanwhile, a more drastic diversion of the Air Corps program was proposed in the so-called "Slesser Agreement" (formally entitled "United States-British Staff Conversations--Air Policy"), arrived at about 30 September 1941 by Air Vice Marshal J. C. Slesser, Col. J. T. McNairney, Air Corps, and Capt. D. C. Henney, United States Navy. This policy proposed to modify downward even the aircraft requirements of the 54 Group Program in favor of increased deliveries of aircraft to the British. The proposal was denounced by the Plans Division, not only because it had not been approved by the War Department, but--more

fundamentally—because it would destroy the United States' plan for "hemisphere defense" and the defense of America's overseas possessions, not to mention the President's larger plan for a force adequate for the "defeat of our potential enemies." 93 A more workable alternate policy, according to Planck, was to return to the basic policy in AFD/3, subject to its being scrapped or drastically revised when and if the United States actually entered the war. 94 In January 1942 the allocation phase of this plan was superseded by the Arnold-Portal agreement.

The basic aircraft agreement with the Soviet Union originated a month after the German invasion of Russia, with conferences at the White House and the Soviet Embassy in Washington between 31 July and 11 August 1941. Forty P-40's and five B-25's were promised to the Soviet representatives by this agreement. 95 The following month a Special Mission for War Supplies to the U. S. S. R. was sent from Washington, headed by W. Averell Harriman, "Lend-Lease Expediter" abroad, and including Col. A. J. Lyon from the Air Corps. 96 On 9 October 1941 the Harriman mission, and a British counterpart headed by Lord Beaverbrook, conferred with Marshal

93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Minutes of meetings, 1–11 Aug. 1941, and related memoranda, in AFD "Russia 000–900 [Misc.]; and S/1 to Constantin Cumancky, Soviet Ambassador, 4 Aug. 1941, summarizing White House conference of 31 July, in AFD 326. Other copies of some of the documents are also filed in AFD 331.3 "Lend-Lease."
96. UD to H/A London, message, 10 Sep. 1941, in AFD 201 "A. J. Lyon."
Josef Stalin and his staff. The conference resulted in the first "Soviet Protocol," whereby the United States and Britain each pledged about 1,800 airplanes (pursuit and medium bombers from the United States) during the remainder of the fiscal year 1942. The air sections of the Protocol were developed in Washington later in the month by General Arnold and Capt. E. H. Balfour, British Under Secretary of State for Air, and their respective staffs. Agreements for subsequent years were prepared under the supervision of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee and at the Roosevelt-Churchill conference at Casablanca in January 1943.

These conferences with the Soviet Union were of greater significance to the AAF than the regular Lend-Lease missions sent by the War Depart-

97. Harriman to AG (for President Roosevelt and Henry L. Hopkins), message from London, 9 Oct. 1941, in AFIHI files.
98. Ibid.
ment to the Soviet Government. The mission headed by Col. Philip R. Faymonville included no Air Corps officers, and a later mission, led by Maj. Gen. John H. Greely, was never accredited. The Soviet Government made no use of either of them, so the American ambassador reported in April 1943. In view of the separate negotiations through Harriman and Deweybrook, however, the "fruitless" character of these missions was probably no loss to the Army Air Forces.

By December 1941 agreements were in effect with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and lesser commitments had been made to the Chinese Republic and to various Latin American nations. Foreign contracts were in effect and were beginning to result in deliveries, and some transfers were being made directly from Air Corps stocks. The greatest expectations for the Allies, however, lay in the Defense Aid contracts that had been authorized by congressional appropriations during 1941. A general strategic guide for distributing this Defense Aid matériel, both air matériel and ground munitions, was established by the General Staff on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This "general guide based on strategic considerations," stated the following general policies on commitments and allocations for the future:

1. Adherence to the minimum requirements of the Russian Protocol agreements.
2. Earlier and increased aid to Russia when possible.

102. Nov. 1941 to May 1942.
103. See correspondence between S/4 and Secretary of State and related memoranda and dispatches, Mar.-Apr. 1942, in RG 110.32 (3-14-41), "... U. S. S. R. ..." sec. 1.
104. Ibid.
3. In the absence of other factors, a distribution of 40\% of Defense Aid procured material to the United Kingdom, 40\% to Russia, 10\% to China, and 10\% for others (such as the Latin American republics); or 50\% to the United Kingdom and 50\% to Russia, where there is no requirement for other countries.

106. WPD memo 4418-17 to DG/S, 3 Dec. 1941, on "Defense Aid Allocation Table . . .," in AG 490.2295 (11-17-41).
Chapter II

ASSIGNMENTS FROM THE COMBINED INTER-ALLIED POOL:
DECember 1941 to FEBRUARY 1944

The attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into
the war formally on the side of the Allies led shortly after 7 De-
cember 1941 to American-British conversations in Washington for the
purpose of coordinating the material resources and the strategic plans
of the two nations into an inter-Allied pool for a combined assault
upon the Axis. The conferences, held in Washington and directed by
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, resulted in the
establishment in January 1942 of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the
ultimate authority for carrying out these inter-Allied controls.¹

Munitions Assignments Board and its Subcommittees

On the problem of distribution of matériel among the Allies, it
was agreed that "the entire munitions resources" of both governments
would become "a common pool" and that a combined Munitions Assign-
ments Board would be established as a satellite of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff to carry out this objective.² The mission of the Board, as

1. Copy of announcement and directive in Lend-Lease Administration's
   Report of • • Operations • • March 11, 1942 to December 31,

2. CCS Directive 19/1, 4 Feb. 1942; and Harry L. Hopkins, Chairman of
   MAB, to S/W, letter and inclosures, 9 Feb. 1942, in AG 334 (2-9-42)
   "MAB." See also AAG 334 "MAB."
stated in the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of 4 February 1942, was to prepare estimates of American and British munitions resources in terms of combat forces and materiel reserves and in accordance with varying production achievements, shifts in strategic policies, and changes in operational conditions; to "advise" the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the assignments to the United States, to the United Kingdom, and to "others of the United Nations" from the combined pool; and to issue "transfer directives" on the basis of which "transfer schedules" would be issued by its subcommittees. 3

The idea of inter-Allied control was not a new development after Pearl Harbor as far as aviation was concerned, but had already been used for allocating aircraft production resources ever since the Anglo-American agreement of July 1940 and the subsequent establishment of the Joint Aircraft Committee. What was new in the procedure established in February 1942 was the extension of combined control over British production as well as United States materiel, whether or not originally procured for "Defense Aid" export to other governments. The Munitions Assignments Board in Washington was intended to handle assignments of American-produced materiel, while a corresponding Board in London handled assignments of materiel pro-

3. Ibid.
duced in the United Kingdom. Harry L. Hopkins, the former Defense Aid coordinator for the President, was appointed civilian chairman of the Washington board, and Oliver Lyttleton, the British Minister of production, was placed in command of the London equivalent.\footnote{5}

Air material was recognized as co-equal with ground and naval equipment. The Washington and London plenary boards each had an AAF representative (Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon and Brig. Gen. A. J. Lyon, respectively) as well as Royal Air Force representatives.\footnote{6}

The secretariat of each board had an Air Section along with ground,

\footnote{4. Eventually, the MAB procedure was extended also to matériel produced in Canada and India. The "Munitions Assignment Board—India," set up about May 1943, was regarded as a branch of the London MAB, because of British economic and military control of the government of India. The need for this agency arose from increased Indian production and the declining demands of India on the U. S. and the U. K. American membership established "the principle of U. S. participation in the distribution of India's resources" and enabled the U. S. to make "reverse lend lease requests upon India." (Lt. Gen. E. B. Somervell to Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, SOS in China-Burma-India theater, message, 6 Jan. 1943, in AG 400.3295 (1-1-43), sec. 1.)}

\footnote{5. Lend-Lease Administration, Report of Operations, March 11, 1942 to December 31, 1942, 61.}

\footnote{6. The RAF representatives were Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher L. Courtney (London) and Air Marshal D. S. C. Erill (Washington).}

\footnote{7. By February, 1944, the secretariat of the Washington board included two AAF representatives—Brig. Gen. J. Y. York, Jr., and Lt. Col. L. W. Donoghue, although they were no longer called an air "section." (See MAC-Air organization chart, 21 Dec. 1943 [copy in AFIHI files]).}
nal, and statistical sections; and each board had a major Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), with the Washington committee headed by General Harmon.9

The Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) was given jurisdic-
tion not only over aircraft but also over related material peculiar
to air, whether procured by the Army Air Forces, the Navy Bureau of
Aeronautics, or the other supply branches of the Army and the Navy.10
Subcommittees were set up for Aircraft, including complete airplanes,
extra spare engines and propellers, and extras of other component
spares (other than normal spares that accompanied the plane);11 Air-
craft Ammunition and Bombs, including machine guns (other than those
initially installed), 20- and 37-mm. aircraft ammunition, incendiary
.30- and .50-caliber ammunition, and aircraft bombs; and Aviation

8. The Statistical Section (later Statistical Analysis Branch),
headed by Dr. Isador Lubin, was set up to prepare and main-
tain the "Anglo-American balance sheet" on combat and reserve ma-
terial. (COS directive 19/1, 4 Feb. 1942, in AG 334 (2-9-42)
"MAB,")
9. See Appendix 2, table showing MAB and MAC-Air membership.
10. For a statement of the functions of the Committee, see AAF
no. 2-Bb, in AFIHT files, and MAC-Air, "Organization and Func-
tions . . . " ("Brown Book"), no date, about Aug. 1943, in MAC-
Air files.
11. The Joint Aircraft Committee retained its control over the al-
location of components of airplanes to the assembly lines, as
an inextricable part of its scheduling of aircraft production.
Petroleum Products, chiefly gasoline with an octane rating higher than 87.\footnote{12} In October 1942 another subcommittee, Air Forces Equipment, was established to assign accessories and other equipment peculiar to the ground or air operations of the air services;\footnote{13} and in January 1944 a Radio Requirements subcommittee and a Helicopter subcommittee\footnote{14} were established for air communications equipment and rotary-wing airplanes, respectively.

The ultimate policy decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and its satellite Munitions Assignment Board, issued from their headquarters on Constitution Avenue opposite the Munitions Building came to be spoken of within the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) and the War Department as directives from "across the street."\footnote{15} The MAC-Air, in fact, was conservative in deferring to the authority of the Munitions Assignments Board and the Combined Chiefs of Staff to formulate the basic strategic and logistical policies of the war.

In one of its first cases, one involving requests from China, the Netherlands East Indies, and Brazil, the committee declined to take action "because of lack of information available to the Air Committee on strategic plans and policies"; and recommended that "for its

\footnote{12} Memo for United Nations Branch, Air Service Command, by Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers, 21 Nov. 1942, in AAG 334-A "Boards ... ."
\footnote{14} MACD Materiel Division, diary, 20 Jan. 1944, in AFIHI files.
\footnote{15} For example, see minutes of 25th meeting of MAC-Air, 21 July 1942, in MAC-Air files.
guidance ... a statement of general policy as to the treatment to be accorded the requests of those countries" be prepared by the Munitions Assignments Board. While Munitions Assignments Board decisions were regarded as final by the MAC-Air, their controls were not immediately and automatically accepted elsewhere in the War Department, not even by the Army Air Forces. Thus, when the Munitions Assignments Board approved the sending of 29 transports to the Soviet Union in April 1942, the Secretary of War, at the suggestion of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, "protested" and actually held up the transfer; and the MAC-Air heard the complaint that "The only way to get around such things happening is to have the heads of the Naval and Military Air Forces sitting on this Committee and making the decisions."\(^{17}\)

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16. Col. E. C. Langmead, Secretary of MAC-Air to Executive, MAB, 6 Mar. 1942, in file on case no. 3. The MAB, although set up as the ultimate authority on Lend-Lease transfers of war material, was not entirely familiar to all War Department officials concerned with Lend-Lease matters. Thus, a high ranking officer in the Air Service Command, having received a transfer directive from one of the MAC-Air subcommittees about a year after the MAB was established, asked whether that board and its committees were the proper and final authorities and whether they might not be overruled or sidestepped by someone like Harry Hopkins. "Harry Hopkins is the MAB!" was the reply. Conversation with Maj. G. E. Diethelm, Secretary of the MAC-Air Subcommittee on Air Forces Equipment, 27 Jan. 1944.

17. Statement by Col. E. C. Langmead, Secretary of MAC-Air, in minutes of tenth meeting of that committee, 17 April 1942, in MAC-Air file. This "protest" by the Secretary of War was actually initiated by the AAF. See memo for S/W by General Arnold, 11 April 1942 (in AAG 400 "Misc.--Russia,")", "protest/In" most emphatically this allocation of transport airplanes."
That committee was, of course, realistic in considering the views not only of the Combined Chiefs of Staff but also those of the Commander in Chief. Presidential policies—both recorded and verbal—did weigh in the councils of the committee. Thus, on a Latin American request for airplanes, the committee chairman asked the leading question, "What will happen if we turn it down?" and was answered by a member with: "If you keep turning them down you are open for a directive from the White House stating that you give 50 or 100 planes to South America"; whereupon the case was approved.\textsuperscript{18} In another case, involving 10 C-47 transports that had been "loaned" by the Army Air Forces to the Soviet Union for use in returning U. S. S. R. ferry crews to Fairbanks, Alaska, the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) decided not to charge them against the Soviet Protocol because such action would "harass" the President's commitment. Later, however, the U. S. S. R. permitted the 10 planes to be charged against their commitment.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} MAC-Air minutes of 43th meeting, 5 Feb. 1943, in MAC-Air files. On 6 May 1943 the U. S. S. R. approved a reduction of 10 airplanes from the commitment of 200 made to it. Minutes on 61st meeting, 7 May 1943, in MAC-Air files.
The Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) and its five subcommittees were from the beginning dominated by the Army Air Forces. While the Committee was actually not a "division" of the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff, nevertheless the chairman was the Chief of the Air Staff. His alternate on the Committee came from the Plans division of the Air Staff, and four of the five subcommittee chairmen (and their alternates) were Air Corps officers. All the senior secretaries, except the one for the petroleum subcommittee, came from the Army Air Forces, in most cases with assistant secretaries representing the Navy air arm. In addition to the chairmanships and the secretaries, the Army Air Forces possessed additional members on the plenary committee (Maj. Gen. C. P. Echols and his alternate, Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers, Assistant Chief of Air Staff and Deputy Assistant Chief, respectively, for Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution) and on three of the five subcommittees. The members were about evenly divided between operational and supply officers, unlike the corresponding Board in London, the dominating British members of which were almost entirely operational men from the British general staff.\(^{21}\) The United States Navy, the Royal Air

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20. The AAF "Organization and Functions Charts," 25 Jan. 1943 ed., chart no. 2-Bb, labels the Committee as a "division" of the office of the O/AS.

Force, and the Royal Navy (Fleet Air Arm) representatives were also largely operational officers, but of course the Army Service Forces members were primarily supply men. No other agencies were represented on the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), except one civilian organization, the Petroleum Administration for War, represented on the petroleum subcommittee. Nor did any other foreign governments besides the United Kingdom have voting membership, not even other members of the British Commonwealth, although it was the common practice of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) to invite interested officers of foreign missions both to consult with the secretariats and to sit in on the early portions of the committee deliberations before the voting began.  

Special Geographic Controls

The relatively simple channels—Combined Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Assignments Board, Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), and the Army Air Forces—followed in the assignment of air materiel to the Allies involved certain exceptions in the regular procedures and controls when particular countries or special-interest areas were being considered. The theater commander, for example, has tra-

22. Ibid.
23. Conversations with members of the MAC-Air secretariat, Jan. 1944. A detailed analysis of the AAF staff offices and other agencies represented on the MAC-Air, together with the names of officer members since February 1942, appears as Appendix 2.
ditionally had control over all matters involving his overseas area of operations. When applied to allocations of materiel within his theater, the assumption might be that the theater commander was the controlling authority; and if other Allied air forces besides the United States Army Air Forces were operating in that theater, the allocations to such Allies would seem to have been a phase of his prerogative. This simple formula was not accepted automatically at the beginning of the war, even with the development of the idea of combined inter-Allied command. Thus, requests for aircraft made by the Australian Government in behalf of the Royal Australian Air Force were at first sent directly to Washington (or to London), independently of the Allied commander in the Southwest Pacific Area. It was necessary for the Southwest Pacific Area headquarters to negotiate various procedural agreements with the Australian Government in 1942, whereby Australian requests for air materiel and other munitions required the prior approval of the Allied Commander, as well as a priority rating which took into account the entire requirements situation of the Allied command in that area. Nor was the

24. Southwest Pacific Area Hq. (SWPA) to SOS Hq., #G-423, 4 Sep. 1942, CM-IN-1619; SWPA to War Dept., #C-1242, 17 Dec. 1942, CM-IN-7310.
25. SWPA to SOS Hq., #G-423, 4 Sep. 1942, CM-IN-1619.
procedure automatic after the accomplishment of agreements. Apparently
the Australian mission in Washington continued to submit RAAF req-
quissions directly to the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington,
at least as late as October 1942, when the authority of the South-
west Pacific Area headquarters was once again reiterated. In
clarifying the authority of the theater commander, the directives
permitted shipments of aircraft to the Southwest Pacific Area to be
diverted or re-allocated by the commander from the RAAF to other
elements of the command. General MacArthur's staff guarded these
controls and procedures carefully, and when a Washington message on
an Australian request for material was erroneously addressed to Maj.
Gen. George C. Kenney, commander of the United States Army Air Force
in that area, a complaint was promptly registered by Southwest
Pacific Area headquarters with the request that the War Department
not accept and act on "requests that circumvent this channel." In
effect, this theater control, with respect to the Southwest Pacific
Area, came to mean that the handling of Australian requirements had

26. SWPA to WD, #C-722, 16 Oct. 1942, CM-IN-07028. Again in December,
1942 the RAAF representative in Washington was asked by the AAF
to "re-route" a request (for 20 transports) "through the agreed
channel," instead of going directly to Hq., AAF in Washington.
Dec. 1942, in AAG 452.01, "Allocation."
27. WD (for OPD) to SWPA, #3954, 21 Nov. 1942, in AG 400 (8-10-42),
sec. 5, "... SWPA."
28. SWPA to WD, #C-1248, 17 Dec. 1942, CM-IN-7310.
come to be more and more dominated by the United States. This was
confirmed in the Arnold-Towers-Slessor agreement of July 1942,
which "recognized the responsibility of the United States to define
the strategic requirements of Australia and to make appropriate al-
locations to meet them." 29

Assignments to the Royal New Zealand Air Force and other agencies
of New Zealand likewise were cleared through the Commanding Admiral
of the corresponding theater, the South Pacific. The Joint Army and
Navy Purchasing Board, established in May 1942 as a division of the
Admiral's staff, 30 was authorized in October by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff to "screen all Lend-Lease requisitions originating in [that] area, including those for Allied armed forces." 31 By a subsequent
directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was established that all
New Zealand requisitions required the approval of the South Pacific
commander "or his authorized representative" and that subsequent ship-
ments of supplies would be "subject to [his] reallocation," if "oper-
ational circumstances justify such action." 32

The procedure for handling United Kingdom requests varied from
other theaters. Since there was no combined inter-Allied command in

29. MAC-Air case no. 25, no date, about Sep. 1942, in MAC-Air file on
30th meeting, 11 Sep. 1942. See also CCS 91/1, 21 Aug. 1942
(not found).
30. Ltr., AG 400 (5-6-42), in AG 400 (12-28-41) "... SWPA ... NZ."
31. CCS directive, 2 Oct. 1942, quoted in memo from AG/S, Personnel,
SOS, to G-1 (of SOS?), 12 Oct. 1942, in AG 320.2 (7-17-42); see
also Brig. Gen. Lett. Lutes to C/S (of SOS?), 18 Sep. 1942, in
AG 400 (8-10-42), sec. 5, "... SWPA."
32. MAB directive M.B.W. 31, 22 Sep. 1942 and M.B.W. 31/1, 3 Oct. 1942,
in MAC-Air file on "Memo No. 19."
the European Theater of Operations until later, there was no control comparable to that exercised by the Allied commander in the Southwest or the South Pacific areas. Nevertheless, on materiel assignment matters, an inter-Allied control did in effect exist, through the London Munitions Assignments Board, which screened all United Kingdom bids on the United States before they were transmitted to Washington.

Other geographic areas were regarded as special spheres of influence, such as Turkey, allocations to which were dominated by Britain, and Latin America, dominated by the United States. The screening of Turkish demands, both military and civilian, was placed under the control of the Anglo-American Coordinating Committee in Ankara in October 1942. Although this committee continued to make recommendations to the London or the Washington Munitions Assignments Boards, depending on where the items were to be procured, nevertheless Britain served as the middleman between the United States and Turkey for the consignment of shipments from the United States. Commenting on this arrangement, which was agreed upon at the Casablanca conference in January 1943, the Commander of

33. December 1943.
the Army Service Forces stated that

the President surrendered to Mr. Churchill full
powers to make any arrangements with Turkey which
he saw fit. . . . This question was decided on a
higher level and there was nothing to do about it.
I fear, however, that the Turks, like the Russians,
and others will suffer by the diversion of this
material to the use of the British Army whenever
the British see fit. The arrangements were, how-
ever, that we were to be notified in case this was
done."

The assignment of aircraft to the American republics was based
not only on the military requirements of the "hemisphere defense"
policy but also on political factors involving the State Department
and other agencies; and while the British sat on the Munitions As-
signments Board and the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) when
Latin American requests were being considered, the actions taken
were based largely on American military and political policies.

These policies went back to the Pan-American conferences of
1938-1940 and the "National policy re supply of arms to American
republics" of July 1940, which was agreed to by the War, Navy and
State departments and approved, on 1 August 1940, by the President.37
According to this policy, the air forces and other military branches
of the Latin American governments were to be built up as an integral

35. Memo for Brig. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, SOS Director of Material, by
Lt. Gen. B. B. Somervell, 22 Feb. 1943, in AG 400.3295 (1-1-43),
sec. 1.
at the Lima, Panama, and Havana (1940) Pan-American Conferences
[1938-40]," in AAG 360.01 "Bulk."
37. Copy of this document is filed in AAG 334.8 "Committees," under
15 Dec. 1941.
part of hemisphere defense; each country was to be supplied under
a custom-made objective, "as determined in each case by our es-
timate of their requirements"; and the financial terms, which had
as yet not been waived by Congress, were to be such that the re-
publics could meet them, with the United States "accepting any
loss as a proper charge against our national defense." The
various country objectives were prepared in January 1941 by a
newly established Joint Advisory Board on American Republics.
Although the Air Corps was not represented on the Board, it was
influential through its membership on the Joint Aircraft Committee,
which was made responsible for the allocation, timing, and sched-
uling of deliveries to the Latin Americas. This control of pro-
duction led to the Committee's policy in February 1941 whereby 5
per cent of United States capacity would be allocated to Latin
America after the aircraft requirements of the 54 Group Program

38. Ibid.
39. "Tentative priorities to govern the allocation of munitions to
American Republics," about Jan. 1941 (copy), in ibid.
40. Established by agreement between Secretary Stimson and Navy
Secretary Frank Knox, 17-23 Dec. 1940, the original of which
and the background correspondence are in AG 334.3 (11-14-40)
"Joint Advisory Board on American Republics."
41. Memo for Chairman of JAC by S/W, 30 Jan., 1941, in JAC "Pro-
ceedings . . . . ," no date, in AFIHI files. When the War
Plans Division of the WD General Staff proposed the new board
on American Republics, the acting Secretary of the Navy, James
W. Forrestal, objected that it would duplicate the "basic
studies" already made by the Joint Aircraft Committee. Under
Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson concurred in his objec-
tions, and when the new board was established, it was under-
stood that the JAC would continue to establish the allocations
to meet the requirements. Forrestal to S/W, 21 (177) Dec.
1940, and Patterson to Forrestal, 26 Dec. 1940, in AG 452
(8-13-40) "Aircraft Standardization."
and "additional British commitments" had been met; and 50 per cent of capacity, after the requirements for 100 groups (or modifications) and "additional British commitments" had been met. The Joint Aircraft Committee was furthermore insistent that the Latin American republics be planned for together. When in July 1941 the Board on American Republics allotted, under the Lend-Lease Act, funds for aircraft for Argentina and Mexico, the JAC declined to act until the totals for the entire hemisphere were known; and the State Department supported the Committee with a plea for "the development of a proper ratio between aviation and other types of armament and a proper balance . . . [among] the various countries." Lump-sum totals for each country were prepared and submitted in the estimates for the Defense Aid appropriations in 1941, and, unlike Defense Aid for other countries, the Lend-Lease Administration was given authority to screen all Latin American requests to see that they complied with these negotiated sums committed to the various countries.

By January 1943 the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that aircraft allocations to Latin America be made chiefly "on grounds of

42. JAC memo on case 307, 6 Feb. 1941, in AAG 334.8-2 "JAC."
43. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State, to S/N, 2 Aug. 1941, in AG 112.05 (S-2-41).
political necessity" rather than upon "military considerations," particularly since the Western Hemisphere military situation was "less critical than formerly." Each American republic's demands were to be weighed carefully, and no single country's allocation or "target" was to be permitted an increase unless it could be definitely shown that a corresponding reduction could be effected for another country.  

This increasingly restricted policy led to an overhauling of the old 1940-1941 policy by the War, Navy, and State departments and resulted in the following restatement of objectives by the three agencies in August 1943: to "curtail" the future supplies and aid to Latin America because of the "improved strategic situation"; to integrate the Latin American forces as combat auxiliaries in this hemisphere as well as overseas; and to develop "an interest in American munitions . . . to the exclusion of foreign materials and influence, insofar as may be practicable."  

Procedurally, the control was to be streamlined so that (1) the Lend-Lease Administration would be removed from control (except reporting); (2) requirements would be determined by the Operations Division of the General Staff, by the Joint Brazil-U.S. Defense Commission, and by the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission; (3) availability would be determined by the AAF (for air materiel items), from the view-

point of resources available, production limitations, and the tactical needs of the AAF and the other Allies; and (4) assignments would continue to be made by the Munitions Assignments Board. 46

Airplane Assignments

The assignment of Army and other American-produced airplanes to the United Kingdom, to the Soviet Union, and to the other Allied or friendly governments was controlled after Pearl Harbor by a series of basic Anglo-American air agreements which in each case were prepared primarily within the AAF and adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and passed on as "CCS papers" to the Munitions Assignments Board, to the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), and to the latter's Subcommittee on Aircraft Distribution, as guides for the assignment of airplanes after they had been delivered by the contractors. The first of these agreements, the Arnold-Portal agreement of 13 January 1942, was actually concluded by the Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force prior to the establishment of the Munitions Assignments Board. 47 It was accepted, however, by the Board in March 1942 for "production planning purposes" for the period through January 1943, although Harry L. Hopkins, chairman


47. The schedule of allocations by country, incorporated in this agreement, is in MAC-Air files.
of the Board, objected to commitments made for an entire year in advance which might become inflexible enough to prevent increased commitments to meet particular emergencies, such as, for example, the need for increased deliveries to the Soviet Union.\footnote{48} These objections, which were also equally apparent to the AAF planners, were in effect overcome by (1) the periodic revision of the Arnold-Portal agreement through subsequent agreements and (2) the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Munitions Assignments Board policy of regarding any such agreements as "tentative" commitments rather than as "firm" assignments.

The chief revisions of the Arnold-Portal agreement were as follows:\footnote{49} Arnold-Towers-Portal agreement, June 1942 (covering the period June 1942 to March 1943); Arnold-Towers-Slessor agreement, about July 1942; Arnold-Portal-McCain-Patterson agreement, fall 1942 (covering period March to December 1943); Lytllenton agreement, November 1942 (covering calendar year 1943); Arnold-Ewills-McCain agreement, about February 1943; Arnold-Courtenay-McCain-Portal agreement, June 1943 (covering period July 1943-June 1944); Arnold-Courtenay agreement, January 1944 (covering calendar year 1944). These agreements became basically a series

\footnote{48} MAB "resume," 11 March 1942, in MAC-Air file on 5th meeting, 13 March 1942; memo for Defense Aid Section, Materiel Command, by MAC-Air, 13 March 1942, in AAG 336 "Conferences."
\footnote{49} Conversation with Maj. D. S. Blossom, Secretary of MAC-Air, 22 Jan. 1944.
of forecasts of the combat availability of all American-produced tactical airplanes,\textsuperscript{50} together with plans for their distribution to the Army Air Forces, the United States Navy, the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, the U. S. S. R.,\textsuperscript{51} the Chinese Republic, and miscellaneous other beneficiaries. While they are the basic allocation guide, these agreements came to be regarded only as tentative commitments. They represent a delivery schedule for planning purposes. Since they may extend over a period of several months, they are subject to adjustment in the light of changes in the strategic situation and military plans. They should therefore be considered neither as a commitment nor as a promise. Assignments, on the other hand, represent firm commitments and are made monthly by the Munitions Assignments Board for the purpose of meeting the most urgent requirements.\textsuperscript{52}

The need for flexible allocations and for inter-Allied planning of total Allied aircraft resources was emphasized by President Roosevelt in a letter to Prime Minister Churchill after the completion of the Lyttleton agreement in November 1942:

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\textsuperscript{50} The assignment of trainer airplanes was based on separate agreements and was handled, at least up to July 1942, by the Joint Aircraft Committee. See memo for Executive of MAB, by Secretary of MAC-Air, 15 July 1942, in MAC-Air file on 22d meeting, 17 July 1942.

\textsuperscript{51} Commitments to the Soviet Union, while they were incorporated in the above allocation agreements, appeared in their original form as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Soviet Protocols.

One thing is sure, that the aircraft must be brought to bear on the enemy at the earliest moment and, if there are competent British and Russian crews to fight [with] these planes and you can get at the enemy quicker and just as effectively as we can, then I have no hesitancy in saying that you and the Russians should have all the planes you need.

We have heavy commitments in the Southwest Pacific. We are rapidly assuming similar commitments in North Africa, and the bombing of Germany and Italy, whether from England or Russia, must be an unrelenting and constant business.

There have been many conferences taking place here between our respective representatives regarding the distribution of aircraft. I am in accord with the [Lyttleton] agreement that has been reached. . . . Oliver [Lyttleton] has impressed on me the necessity of making an early decision regarding the distribution of our combined aircraft production. I think that the decisions that we have come to regarding aircraft are of the highest importance.53

One procedural change early in 1942 was to abandon the idea of "fixed" allocations. Under the Arnold-Portal agreement, a working policy had been set down providing that "fixed" quantities of aircraft would be allocated to the United Kingdom and other countries for each month and that the United States would suffer or enjoy the shortages or overages in production in relation to the estimates used as a basis for allocation. Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers of the Materiel Command objected that such a procedure was "not practicable" even if it were equitable, because if actual production should tend, over a period of months, to exceed total estimates,

53. Roosevelt to Churchill, 30 Nov. 1942 (copy, referred to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 8 Jan. 1943), in AG 336 (1-11-43).
"A position would develop towards the end of [a given\(^\) contract where there would not be [any remaining\(^\) airplanes to satisfy the foreign allocations.\) His alternative, which was adopted, was "to earmark production in the quantity and in the order of the approved allocation [agreement\(^\) ; for example, with respect to B-24's, the first 9 to be earmarked for the United States, the next 32 for the United Kingdom, the next 30 for the United States, and so on. This procedure, he concluded, would be "sound and beneficial to all concerned, including the factories that are producing the airplanes."\(^5\)

After using the block system for a year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that it be continued:

Experience during 1942 in making allocations and assignments indicates that the only practical method of distributing aircraft is to split the monthly quotas of each recipient (except the U. S. S. R.) into small blocks (about 20 each) and let the aircraft industry turn out the rotating blocks without regard for month-end audits. There is no such thing as a standardized airplane [applicable to all recipients\(^.\) All recipients require modifications essential to the problems of their particular theater and operative conditions. These modifications involve installations that must be made in the production line from thirty to sixty days before acceptance. This fact is the basic factor in establishing the "repeating block system" as the only practical system for the distribution of airplanes. . . .\(^5\)

In the basic agreements in 1943, the AAF planners"proceeded on the assumption that [they\(^\) must meet every bid made by the

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Allies except where such action would:

a. Require a modification in our own [AAF] production program.
b. Encroach upon our own [AAF] deployment and training program.
c. Result in an obvious wastage of airplane resources. 56

Thus, with respect to the third danger of "wastage," B-24's were refused to Canada and New Zealand because "the dispersal of our heavy bomber resources [was] not justified"; and, similarly, B-24's were refused to Australia because their "dispersal . . . for the coastal defense of Australia and the islands in the rear areas [was] not justifiable." On the other hand, B-26's were refused to the French because the "French Army's ability to employ [that] aircraft . . . must be established before assignment action can be taken." 57

Toward the end of 1943, as the moment approached for another revision of the basic allocation agreement, the AAF proposed to be guided by the following "three fundamental rules . . . as basic guides in their discussions with other United Nations representatives": 58

56. Memo for the President by Gen. Arnold, 30 June 1943 (written by Col. E. C. Langmead), in AAG 452.01 "Allocations."
57. Ibid.
1. ... to establish as first priority from United States production the aircraft required to support the U. S. Army Air Forces 273 Group Program;  

2. to determine allocations to other nations "in proportion to the ability of each nation to bring those aircraft to bear against the enemy in accordance with planned strategical uses of the various air forces"; and  

3. to prorate any production losses among all foreign and United States customers, with "all participants, including the U. S. S. R., sharing proportionately in any reduction of aircraft availability due to production slippages." This was a distinct departure from the old commitment policy followed in the agreements of 1943 as well as previous years, whereby the Soviet Union received her entire allocation regardless of any production losses, the United Kingdom and the Dominions received all their commitments if 80 per cent or more of the production schedule was being met, and the Army Air Forces and the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics alone shared proportionately any deficiencies from the above. About 1,555

59. Ibid.  
60. For example, the Lyttleton agreement on 1943 production covered only 80 per cent of the 82,000 airplane (73,000 combat airplanes) program of the President, "in order to give the British some assurance as to their assignments in the event the United States did not achieve production at the full 82,000 ... rate ... . Failures below 80%, [however, were] to be borne proportionately." B&R, Gen. H. H. Arnold to Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hanley, Jr., 1 Jan. 1943 and memo for ODP by Maj. Gen. G. E. Stratemeyer, 17 Dec. 1942, both in AAG 452.01 "allocations."
airplanes had been lost by the Army and Navy air forces in 1943 as a result of this policy, it was estimated.

Such were the basic policies pursued by the AAF planners in 1943 in allocating American aircraft resources to the combined inter-Allied pool. If the policies involved controversial issues, the procedure for conducting the negotiations did not. In fact, the conference procedures had become quite routine. The pattern was something like the following, which was suggested by Air Chief Marshal Portal for conducting the negotiations on the 1944 agreement:

1. The United Kingdom (the Air Section of the British Joint Staff Mission together with two representatives from the Air Ministry), to "submit our bids with full supporting reasons";

2. The AAF (chiefly the Plans Division) "to give us their reactions to our bids and their supporting reasons";

3. The combined air staffs to prepare "an agreed paper setting out the differences"; and

4. General Arnold and Sir Christopher L. Courtney to undertake the "reconciliation of the differences."

61. Memo for the President by Gen. H. H. Arnold, 5 Nov. 1943, in AAG 432.01 "Production."
Aviation Gasoline and Lubricants

Aviation gasoline, unlike radio and air accessories, had been brought immediately under the central allocation authority of the Munitions Assigments Board. The Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee of the MAC-Air, established in February 1942, was given the mission to recommend allocations from U. S. stocks of 100-octane gasoline (later extended to 87- and 91-octane fuel) and aviation oils, and (together with its counterpart in the Petroleum Department in London) to avoid duplication of shipments from British and American stocks. Unlike the other subcommittees of the MAC-Air, a civilian organization (the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator) was represented, in addition to the Army Air Forces,

63. Prior to the establishment of the MAB, allocations of aviation gasoline and oil to foreign beneficiaries were handled by the Lend-Lease Administration. See MAC-Air minutes on 2nd meeting, 24 Feb. 1942, in MAC-Air files.

64. Minutes of 2nd meeting of MAC-Air, 24 Feb. 1942, in MAC-Air files.

65. The Petroleum subcommittee (APPAC), unlike the other subcommittees of the MAC-Air, "recommended" allocations to the MAC-Air, which in turn recommended to the MAB. The APPAC, however, did take direct action in supplying the numerous miscellaneous domestic customers in the United States, such as engine builders, aircraft manufacturers, airlines, Army contract flying schools, civilian pilot training projects, and municipal airports; and it submitted reports subsequently to the MAB. MAC-Air to MAB, minutes on case no. 5009, 17 March 1942, in MAC-Air file on 6th meeting, 20 Mar. 1942.


67. Later known as the Petroleum Administration for War.
the Navy, the Army Service Forces, and the British authorities. In fact, the Petroleum Coordinator controlled the secretariat, while the AAF held the chairmanship as well as several other memberships. In addition, the organization included "area committees" in each of the theaters of operations or other areas throughout the Allied world. Each committee coordinated all the requirements for that area—whether for a U. S. air force, an Allied air force, or a contract airline—and effected the actual transfers out of the "common-user" stocks accumulated in the area, after the assignments had been approved by the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington or the Petroleum Department in London.

The Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee was relatively free from jurisdictional conflicts with other agencies, although a controversy arose in August 1942, when the Army-Navy Petroleum Board charged that the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) was violating the former's Circular no. 51 in making allocations of petroleum to the Army and Navy. Some of the members of the MAC-Air were

68. Petroleum coordinating committees were originally authorized only for the Middle East, Australia and New Zealand, India and Ceylon, and the United Kingdom. A separate area committee for Newfoundland was established in July 1943. MAC-Air memo no. 506 to Executive of MAB, 5 March 1942, in MAC-Air file on fifth meeting, 13 March 1942; WD to USAFAA, message no. 819, 23 Mar. 1942, and similar messages to other theaters of about the same date, in AAF Message Center; and MMSD Supply and Services Division, diary, 9 July 1943, in AFTIH files.

ready to "make peace" with the Petroleum Board, especially since the Army and the Navy each had an air representative on the latter; but General Statemeyer, the chairman, insisted that petroleum be retained as one of the munitions of war covered by the Munitions Assignments Board. Later, Lt. Col. David G. Lingle, the chairman of the Petroleum subcommittee, noted that since the Petroleum Board's secretary was also a member of the former, it was probable that "we can work it out between ourselves" without taking the problem to higher authority within the Munitions Assignments Board.

The assignment procedures as developed involved chiefly a series of statistical controls. The local coordinating committees submitted regular semi-monthly (later changed to monthly\textsuperscript{71}) combined reports on stocks on hand, cargoes in transit, consumption during the past month, and "forward" requirements for all services that were using aviation petroleum products.\textsuperscript{72} The petroleum subcommittee used these figures as the basis for a monthly "aviation fuel stock analysis" of each grade of critical aviation fuel, taking into account also the replacement time needed for each area, the "minimum target" or strategic needs of that area, and the "target position" (whether the stock was "short" or "over" with respect to the target). The latter figure was the basic

\textsuperscript{70} Minutes of 26th MAC-Air meeting, 14 Aug. 1942, and minutes on MAC-Air case no. 5018, 13 Aug. 1942, in MAC-Air files. Apparently there was also a threatened jurisdictional dispute with the Board of Economic Warfare in February 1942. Minutes of 3rd meeting of MAC-Air, 27 Feb. 1942, in MAC-Air files.


\textsuperscript{72} For example, with respect to the Southwest Pacific Area, see USAFIA to AGO, message no. U-312, 19 July 1942, CM-IN-6729.
guide which governed the allocations to that area for the following month.

In addition to the monthly stock analysis, the "paper controls" included also a weekly compilation of available supplies versus requirements; a quarterly report on world-wide production versus long-range demands; a running monthly inventory of stocks on hand in all theaters; and daily coordination with all the production authorities and using services, including the British Petroleum Representative in Washington, the Canadian Oil Controller, the War Production Board, the RCAF, the RCAF, the AAF, the Army Ground Forces, and the Navy Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

**Miscellaneous Air Material**

The Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), as shown in the gradual evolution noted earlier, did not assume jurisdiction immediately over all categories of air material in February 1942. This delay arose because of (1) the uncertainty in defining "finished" munitions (the province of the MAC-Air) as against "unfinished" war materials, that is, aircraft components (handled by the Joint Aircraft Committee); and because (2) the small secretariat of the MAC-Air, set up primarily to handle the major job of

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73. Copies of the monthly "aviation fuel stock analysis" are filed in the MAC-Air secretariat with the appropriate minutes of the MAC-Air meetings.

allocating airplanes, was unable to handle the multitude of items of miscellaneous equipment that soon outnumbered airplane cases. 75

Accessories and miscellaneous air equipment, before the establishment of the Munitions Assignments Board, had properly been a function of the Joint Aircraft Committee, which operated not only as a production scheduling agency but also as the "Defense Aid Supply Committee" for the Air Corps after the Lend-Lease bill became law in March 1941. When these Defense Aid activities were transferred to the Munitions Board by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in February 1942, the JAC continued to make assignments of miscellaneous items. This practice had the tacit approval of the secretariat of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), which agreed that many of the items "liberally" interpreted were "unfinished" items that were useless unless installed in an airplane. The actual case work on most of these items was done not in the JAC, however, but in the International Section of the Material Command, 76 which informally approved or denied the numerous requisitions. Many of the requisitions were time-consuming in the problems that were involved, such as "leg work" and consultation with the Air Service Command at Patterson Field on the stock position of a particular item, or even, in some cases, to obtain an elementary identification of the nomenclature and nature of the item that was being requisitioned.

75. These problems are illustrated in the origin and growth of the Subcommittee on Air Forces Equipment in October 1942 and the Subcommittee on Radio Requirements in January 1944.

76. After March 1943, called the International Section of AG/AS, M&X. Conversation with Col. H. R. Paige, Chief of that section, 19 Jan. 1944.
The problem was further complicated because some of the items were procured for the air services by the Army Services of Supply and its counterparts in the Navy's supply branches. These items—Quartermaster, medical, chemical, photographic—while they were peculiar to air operations, were nevertheless procured by the general supply services. The secretariat of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air), understaffed for handling numerous minor requests, proposed on at least two occasions to turn that part of the job over to the Defense Aid Organization of the Services of Supply, together with the discretion for interpreting the term "minor item," and to work with the International Section of the Material Command. But the Committee tabled the proposals and later arrived at an agreement with the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) that the former would handle SOS-procured material "peculiar to the requirements of the Air Forces," and that the secretariats would between them decide on the "cognizance" or jurisdiction whenever any question arose.

Both AAF-procured "aircraft general stores" and SOS-procured "aircraft ground equipment," as well as their Navy counterparts,

77. Later called the International Aid Division of the Army Service Forces.
78. Proposal of 13 Mar. 1942, in draft of MAC-Air memo no. 529, same date, in MAC-Air file on 5th meeting, 13 Mar. 1942; and proposal of 9 July 1942, in memo no. 529 from Secretary of MAC-Air to the Committee, same date, in MAC-Air file on 21st meeting, 9 July 1942.
79. 24 July 1942. See MAC-Air minutes no. 20, on memo no. 529, 24 July 1942, in MAC-Air file on 23rd meeting, 24 July 1942.
were shortly thereafter, in October 1942, placed under the control
of a new Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) Subcommittee on
Air Forces Equipment,\textsuperscript{80} under the direction of Lt. Col. H. R.
Paige, chairman, and Lt. G. E. Dithelm, secretary, both from the
same MMD International Section that had been handling miscellane-
cous AAF equipment informally for the Joint Aircraft Committee in
the past. The new committee included representatives from the ASF
International Aid Division and through it from the MAC-Ground. The
Air Service Command and its counterpart in Washington were also given
representation, and the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics and the British
supply authorities had their normal complement of members.

The Joint Aircraft Committee withdrew in December 1942 from de-
cisions on "finished" miscellaneous items,\textsuperscript{82} but still passed on

\textsuperscript{80} For a statement of functions, see memo for ASC United Nations
Branch by Lt. Col. H. R. Paige, 21 Nov. 1942, in AAG 334 A
"Boards, etc." Another proposal, as a substitute for the new
Air Forces Equipment subcommittee, was to consolidate the Joint
Aircraft Committee and the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air)
into a new organization called the "Combined Aircraft Board";
to retain both of the above committees under the new board,
with identical membership; and to have the new board assign both
components and finished items, in order to bring related de-
cisions better "in accord" and "to more closely coordinate pro-
duction problems with the assignment of finished war materials
to the U.S., Great Britain, and others of the United Nations."
Maj. J. A. Saalfeld, Asst. Sec. of MAC-Air, to Chairman of
MAC-Air, memo no. 539, 1 Oct. 1942, and accompanying chart, in
MAC-Air file on that memo.

\textsuperscript{81} Directorate of Base Services; after Mar. 1943, called the Sup-
ply and Services Division of AC/AS, MM&D; after September 1943,
the Air Services Division.

\textsuperscript{82} Memo for Chairman of JAC by Maj. J. A. Saalfeld, Asst. Sec. of
MAC-Air, 9 Dec. 1942, in AAG 337 "Conferences."
what it regarded as "unfinished" items or components of aircraft, which were allocated to the aircraft manufacturers in accordance with regular scheduling procedures. The yardstick for defining the limits between "finished" and "unfinished" items was that "anything that flies with the airplane" was a component or part of an airplane and therefore under the cognizance of the JAC, while "all other air forces items," whether they are used on the ground or interchangeably in the air or on the ground, were finished items assignable by the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air). The two committees, in their agreement on their respective jurisdictions in February 1943, agreed on a tentative list of items falling in each of the categories. Thus, unfinished items included obvious basic components of aircraft such as airframes, engines, propellers, and armament, as well as items like bombsights, flight instruments, and tool kits. Finished items included the following:

- Field lighting equipment
- Servicing trucks
- Bomb trailers
- Crash trucks
- All other special air force vehicles
- Oxygen charging apparatus
- Portable engine heaters
- Airdrome tractors

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83. JAC case 3400, 25 Feb. 1943 (copy in MM&D International Section files). Col. E. C. Langmead, commenting on this case in a MAC-Air meeting, stated, "We have given up the idea of writing a principle and have gone down to listing items to be handled by the MAC (A) and J.A.C. Working along these lines I believe we can reach an understanding." Minutes of 18th meeting of MAC-Air, 5 Feb. 1943, in MAC-Air files.
Signal pistols
Moorings for flying boats
Parachutes
Oxygen masks
Flying clothing
Flying goggles
Jungle kits
Octants
Navigation computers
Navigation watches
Cameras and photographic equipment
Respirators
Wind cones
Wheel blocks
Wing, nose, axle, and tail jacks
Mooring kits
Power plants (except aircraft engines)
Flight bags
Container assemblies, including cargo parachutes
Chemical spray tanks

Jurisdictional problems were henceforth worked out informally between the Recorder's office of the JAC and the secretariat of the MAC-Air Subcommittee on Air Forces Equipment, whose offices in the Pentagon building were almost adjacent; and a revised guide on their respective jurisdictions was in process of preparation in February 1944. Occasionally a decision was whimsical. One request involved items for the repair of airplanes for the French North African Air Force, and resulted in the paint being handled by the JAC and the paint brushes by the MAC-Air.

Assignments to foreign governments of miscellaneous air-force equipment did not normally require action either by the plenary Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) or by the combined Munitions Assignments Board. The decision of the MAC-Air Subcommittee on Air Forces Equipment, if its combined membership (Army, Navy, and British) unanimously agreed on a given case, was final and remained
unreviewed by higher authority.\textsuperscript{34} However, any dissents were to be "bucked upstairs" to the full MAC-Air, and if the MAC-Air in turn failed to give unanimous approval, they were in turn sent on to the Board. In practice, very few such dissents occurred, because of the policy of the Subcommittee secretariat, together with the MACD International Section, to work carefully with the foreign representatives in defining and clarifying their requests, and to appraise them accurately in terms of the supply and production situations. Of the occasional dissents that did occur, none had ever been upheld by either of the higher authorities, as of February 1944.\textsuperscript{35}

In other respects, the procedure for assigning miscellaneous equipment was similar to that for the other categories of air material. The request from a foreign government, whether it came from the latter's Washington mission or through the theater of operations or elsewhere, was received by the International Section; then translated, if not already accomplished, into a "firm" requisition signed by the foreign representative; next recorded by the MAC-Air secretariat; and finally sent to the secretariat of the Equipment subcommittee for processing. Here the case was prepared and placed

\textsuperscript{34} The reports of action taken, however, were filed with the MAC-Air and, in turn, the MAB, for recording and accounting purposes; but they were not reviewed if agreement was unanimous.

\textsuperscript{35} Conversation with Col. H. R. Paige, Chairman of the Subcommittee, 27 Jan. 1944.
on the subcommittee's "agenda," which contained not only the listing and description of the cases for the forthcoming subcommittee meeting, but also the details of any issues, controversies, and related factors involved, together with any recommendations from the secretariat. After action by the subcommittee, its "minutes," which contained not full minutes but only the basic recommendations on each case, were reproduced and sent on to the MAC-Air as a report of action taken, and were also sent as a "transfer directive" to the Air Service Command's United Nations Branch, either for transfer from stock or for procurement through the Materiel Command; to the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics; or to the ASF International Aid Division, depending on where the stock was controlled or where procurement was to be initiated.

The Army Air Forces, as one of the three major combat commands, was also given representation in March 1943 on the so-called Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), which made assignments not only of ground-force items but also of all common-use items common to the three commands—air, ground, and naval—that were procured by the Army Service Forces and the equivalent supply bureaus of the Navy Department. Prior to March 1943, requests for such items on behalf of foreign air forces were handled entirely outside the Army Air Forces, although

86. Of course, if a dissent had occurred, a full statement on the issues involved accompanied the minutes.
87. Col. Richard C. Coupland, AAF Air Ordnance Officer, and Maj. Chandler G. Lewis, alternate, same office, were assigned in Mar. 1943 to represent the AAF. Ltr., AG 334.8 "MAB" (3-17-43), 20 Mar. 1943, in AG 334.8 "MAB."
comments were occasionally invited from AAF offices, especially the Air Quartermaster's Office, the Air Ordnance Office, and the Air Engineer's Office, as well as the International Section, all in the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution.

Air Communications Equipment

Airborne radar and other communications "equipment," like miscellaneous equipment, were originally ignored by the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air). At one of its first meetings, on 27 February 1942, Col. J. Y. York, Jr. directed that "signal equipment shall come under the Bomb and Ammunition Subcommittee," but that committee, preoccupied with ordnance, apparently ignored the directive. A few months later the proposal for a separate radar subcommittee came up, and J. L. Airey, a British representative, suggested that "other signal equipment" be handled as well. Nothing apparently came of these suggestions, however, and in August 1942 the Joint Aircraft Committee set up a Special Subcommittee on Radio Requirements to handle the allocation of all airborne radio and radar equipments as "components" of airplanes. The MAC-Air agreed to

89. Minutes of 20th meeting, 3 July 1942, in MAC-Air files.
90. JAC, "Report of meetings," 14 Aug. 1942, in JAC files. The JAC directed that the Subcommittee coordinate with the Munitions Assignments Board as well as the Combined Communications Board and the International Supply Committee. Ibid.
give up its responsibility for air communications equipment, ac-
cepting the view that the JAC was the proper authority because "as-
signment of aircraft radio [was] so closely tied in with the produc-
tion of the airplanes for which they [were] needed." At the same
time a Communications and Radar Coordinating Committee was established
as a subcommittee of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground),
to handle all communications equipment as "finished" items of muni-
tions; and it contained a separate Air Section to handle all communi-
cations equipment peculiar to air operations, whether airborne or other-
wise. The members of the Air Section were the same officers who sat
on the JAC's Radio Requirements subcommittee—the former dealing in
"finished" items, the latter allocating radar as a component of air-
planes.

In January 1944 the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air) at-
ttempted to reestablish its authority over air communications equipment
and virtually came to an agreement with the Joint Aircraft Committee
whereby the latter's Subcommittee on Radio Requirements would act as
a MAC-Air subcommittee when recommending assignments to the using

91. The function was transferred to the JAC on 1 Oct. 1942. Memo for
Chairman of JAC by Lt. G. E. Bennett, USN, and Lt. E. S. Stewart,
AAF, 7 Jan. 1944, in MAC-Air file on 96th meeting, 7 Jan. 1944;
Maj. J. A. Saalfeld, Asst. Sec. of MAC-Air, to Recorder of JAC,
memorandum, 19 Sep. 1942, in ibid.
92. Memo for various interested committees by Maj. Gen. J. H. Burns,
Executive of MAC, 2 Nov. 1942, in JAC file on "Formation of Radio
Subcommittee." The establishment of the committee was agreed to
at a conference on 7 Oct. 1942 in the office of Col. A. W. Marriner,
Director of Communications, AAF. Ibid.
services (Army, Navy, and foreign governments), and as a JAC sub-committee when recommending allocations to the airplane assembly lines and modification centers. This solution, it was argued, was not only economical of officer personnel but also recognized the close relationship between production and distribution. In effect, the chief change that was expected was the substitution of the MAC-Air for the MAC-Ground in the channel of authorities.

**Procedures Within the AAF**

Within the AAF, the processing of requests from foreign beneficiary governments eventually followed a general pattern. Requests would come directly from the Washington military or diplomatic mission of the beneficiary government; indirectly through discussions with President Roosevelt, General Arnold, or (in the case of the U. S. S. R.) the President's Soviet Protocol Committee, of which Harry L. Hopkins was chairman. Regardless of these diverse origins, the requests were received by the MM&D International Section and translated into "firm requisitions" signed by the appropriate foreign representative. If the requisitions were not covered by commitments made by higher authority, such as the Arnold-Courtney agreement, the International Section obtained "to the extent available, justification for

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the request," and forwarded it to the MAC-Air (or to the JAC, if the request was for an aircraft component), which in turn registered the case and forwarded it to the proper subcommittee, each of whose special procedures have been discussed earlier. Cash reimbursement, furthermore, was involved if the request came from Canada and Brazil, or, in certain cases, from Turkey or the exile governments of Norway or the Netherlands.95 For other countries the question of payment was left open. Special screening with respect to particular geographic areas was also to be undertaken, as discussed earlier.

Subsequent to Munitions Board approval—or MAC-Air subcommittee approval, in cases where higher approval was waived—the transfer schedules or directives were incorporated into instructions sent to the United Nations Branch of the Air Service Command.96 These delivery instructions, originally called the CTI-300's (Confidential Technical Instructions) and Addenda, were replaced in April 1943 by LLI's (Lend-Lease Instructions),97 which in effect became mere letters of transmittal referring by reference number to the attached mimeographed copies of cases acted on by the various MAC-Air subcommittees. The United Nations Branch authorized the transfer of the items of materiel, if they were to come from stocks on hand; or issued, through the Air-

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96. Before April 1942, called the Defense Aid Organization at Wright Field. Memo for Col. Ray A. Dunn, ASC Overseas Division, by Director of Military Requirements, 5 April 1942, in AAG 381.3 "Lend-Lease."
97. LLI no. 1, 5 April 1943 (in MA 1932 International Section "Lend-Lease Procedure File") describes revised procedure for Lend-Lease requests, requisitions, and programs.
craf Supply Section, an Authority for Purchase (AFP) to the Material Command, if the item was to be procured. The actual deliveries were then made from aircraft modification centers or from regular Air Service Command depots. Prior to October 1945, special United Nations depots handled Lend-Lease shipments. Statistical summaries were prepared by the United Nations Branch at Patterson Field and by the Aircraft Distribution Control Office in MMAD. Outside the AAF, additional statistical records were also kept by the MAB Statistical Analysis Branch, by the Lend-Lease Administration.


100. Since the fall of 1943, the Foreign Economic Administration.
and by the ASF International Aid Division. 101

In October 1943 procedures within the AAF were streamlined
to consolidate the allocation functions in the Aircraft Distribution
Control Branch in the office of AC/AS, MM&ED. 102 This branch had
come to be the "administrative agent" in the AAF for the Munitions
Assignments Committee (Air) and was represented on the latter's
Aircraft Subcommittee as technical adviser on all Army-procured air-
craft. As such it aided in preparing the block allocations and in
monitoring the execution of the allocations through its Aircraft
Distribution Office located at Dayton, Ohio. In Dayton, detailed
instructions were issued and follow-up maintained with respect to
the Materiel Command (for aircraft leaving the aircraft plants and
modification centers), to the Air Service Command (for aircraft in
air depots), and to the Air Transport Command's Ferrying Division
at Cincinnati (for aircraft to be ferried overseas). 103

101. The ASF International Aid Division came to regard itself as the
Lend-Lease office for the entire Army, including the AAF. When
it was transferred from the Under Secretary's office to the newly
created Services of Supply in March-April 1942, Brig. Gen. H. S.
Aurand, its director, stated to Lt. Col. H. R. Paige, deputy
AAF International Aid Officer and Chief of the AAF International
Section, that even though the AAF was autonomous, "I'm still be-
ing held by the Secretary and McCloy [Assistant Secretary of War]
for all of the reports and all of the follow-up and so on, on all
Lend-Lease activities within the War Department." Transcript of
telephone conversation between Aurand and Paige, 9 Apr. 1942, in
MM&ED International Section, "Lend Lease Procedure File."
102. RR, AC/AS, MM&ED to Historical Division, 30 May 1944, in AFIHI
files.
103. Collection of directives on Aircraft Distribution system, July
1943-Jan. 1944, in AFIHI files.
SUMMARY

During the pre-war years, while the nation debated whether it was a "neutral" activity to export munitions to potential Allies or politically expedient to assist them, the Air Corps appraised airplane exports not legally or politically but in terms of their military value to the Air Corps and its mobilization needs. The Air Corps found that exports of military aircraft—under proper security safeguards—would serve to keep the American aircraft industry alive, amortize the rising costs of aircraft development, provide combat performance data on foreign air forces, and expedite industrial mobilization. At first only obsolescent Air Corps types were released for export (via the manufacturer), but after the "liberalized release policy" of 25 March 1940, more modern types were included.

From March 1940 to March 1941, when the Lend-Lease Act was passed, Air Corps policy was directed chiefly to sharing with the British—within the limits of the cash-and-carry act of November 1939—the production capacity of the nation, which was now expanding as a result both of foreign orders and of the War Department's facility expansion program. The Lend-Lease Act and subsequent Defense Aid appropriations opened the way to increasing the flow of air materiel to the Allies under a flexible accounting system that was not geared to the financial limitations of the Allies. After Pearl Harbor, the policy of Defense Aid was extended to embrace the

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growing list of United Nations and became the fundamental factor in the air logistics of the Allied air forces.

The controls and procedures for the distribution of air material to the Allies centered around the idea of international organization and international technical cooperation, with the Air Corps playing a dominant role. The combined Army-Navy-British aircraft committee (later called the Joint Aircraft Committee), established in September 1940 to harmonize American and British competition for aircraft contracts and aircraft deliveries, became the effective vehicle for close technical cooperation on production and distribution problems between the Army Air Forces, the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, and the British Ministry of Aircraft Production. The establishment of the JAC occurred long before Pearl Harbor. It preceded by 16 months the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff and their satellite boards and committees, and preceded by six months the establishment of similar technical committees in the other supply arms of the Army.

After Pearl Harbor, when American munitions were merged with the production of the British Commonwealth into a single inter-Allied pool under the control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Assignments Board, a separate subcommittee was organized for air material—the Munitions Assignments Committee (Air)—thus recognizing that the logistical needs of air operations were co-equal with ground and naval requirements. The MAC-Air took over the function of distributing airplanes and other "finished" items...
of air equipment, leaving to the Joint Aircraft Committee its original function of controlling the distribution of "unfinished" components of aircraft as a phase of the whole job of production control. These international organisations, and the unspectacular day-to-day operating procedures that they evolved on the logistical phases of the war, provide a basic idea for close inter-Allied military collaboration in the post-war period.
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAGC</td>
<td>Anglo-American Coordinating Committee for Lend-Lease assignments of material to Turkey</td>
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<td>AAG</td>
<td>Central Files of Headquarters, AAF, formerly under control of the Adjutant General</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG/AS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of the Air Staff</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>AP/AB</td>
<td>AG/AS, Intelligence</td>
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<td>AFTIH</td>
<td>Historical Division, AG/AS, Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Classified Files of the Adjutant General's Office, War Department</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>Adjutant General's Office, War Department</td>
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<td>ANRB</td>
<td>Army and Navy Munitions Board</td>
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<td>ANPB</td>
<td>Army-Navy Petroleum Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPAC</td>
<td>Aviation Petroleum Products Allocation Committee</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Air Service Command</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>Army Service Forces</td>
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<td>ASU</td>
<td>Aircraft Scheduling Unit, Wright Field</td>
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<td>AS/W</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of War</td>
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<td>C/OAG</td>
<td>Chief of the Air Corps</td>
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<td>C/AS</td>
<td>Chief of the Air Staff</td>
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<td>COS</td>
<td>Combined Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>C/S</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>CTI</td>
<td>Confidential Technical Instruction</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Defense Aid (DA appropriations, DA contracts, DA transfers, etc., covering material authorized for transfer under the Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941 and subsequent legislation)</td>
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<td>DAA</td>
<td>Defense Aid Allocations</td>
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<td>DC/S</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>FFA</td>
<td>Fleet Air Arm, Royal Navy</td>
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<td>GC</td>
<td>Group Captain</td>
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<td>JAC</td>
<td>Joint Aircraft Committee</td>
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<td>LLI</td>
<td>Lend-Lease Instruction</td>
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<td>LMA/B</td>
<td>London Munitions Assignments Board</td>
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<td>Military Attache</td>
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<td>Munitions Assignments Board</td>
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<td>MAC-Air</td>
<td>Munitions Assignments Committee (Air)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC-Ground</td>
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MWB  Munitions Assignments Board, Washington

MAD  AO/AS, Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution

OGC  Office of the Chief of the Air Corps

OLLA  Office of Lend-Lease Administration

OPC  Office of the Petroleum Coordinator

OPD  Operations Division, War Department General Staff

PAW  Petroleum Administration for War

RAAF  Royal Australian Air Force

RAF  Royal Air Force

RCAF  Royal Canadian Air Force

RN  Royal Navy

RNZAF  Royal New Zealand Air Force

SOPAC  South Pacific theater of operations

SOS  Services of Supply

S/W  Secretary of War

SWPA  Southwest Pacific Area

TI  Technical Instruction

UK  United Kingdom

USAFIA  United States Army Forces in Australia

US/W  Under Secretary of War

WD  War Department

WMAB  Washington Munitions Assignments Board

WPD  War Plans Division, WD General Staff
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Lt. (j. g.) S. E. Zinnott, USH, Asst. Sec., MAC-Air, 23 Jan. 1944.

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Appendix 1

LIST OF ALLIED AND OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE A.I.F. MATERIAL, 1941—1944

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<th>Lend-Lease Aid Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement Signed</th>
<th>United Nations Declaration Signed</th>
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1. Adapted from chart on "Status of Nations: Lend-Lease Countries and United Nations," in Lend-Lease Administration, Eleventh Report to Congress, ... , for the Period ending July 31, 1942, 41-42.
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