Procurement
of
AIRCREW TRAINEES
The original of this monograph and the documents from which it was written are in the USAF Historical Division, Archives Branch, Bldg. 914, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.
FOREWORD

It is the desire of the President, the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, that a solid record of the experiences of the AAF be compiled. This is one of a series of studies prepared as a "first narrative" in the projected overall history of the Army Air Forces.

The decision to make the information contained herein available for staff and operational use without delay has prevented recourse to some primary sources. Readers familiar with this subject matter are invited to contribute additional facts, interpretations, and constructive suggestions.

This study will be handled in strict compliance with AR 380-5.

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Readers are requested to forward comments and criticisms, and to this end perforated sheets, properly addressed, are appended at the back of this study.
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Procurement of Aircrew Trainees
INTRODUCTION

This study on the procurement of aviation cadets for aircrew duties deals with only one phase of a vast personnel program. The selection of the cadets procured, their classification, and their assignment to training are the subjects of separate studies on the personnel program of the Army Air Forces.

In discussing the procurement of aviation cadets, the emphasis has been placed upon the administration of recruiting, the agencies used, the sources tapped, and the difficulties encountered. Advertising and publicity are discussed, but the topic has by no means been exhausted. Although the procurement of cadets is primarily a personnel problem, it involves a discussion of certain aspects of legislation and training in theAAF. For this reason these have been handled in a limited way since full consideration of the problems involved lies within the province of the history of legislation and training. The major weight of this study has been placed upon the years immediately before and after America's entry into the war, for prior to 1938 procurement was purely routine, a background for the developments of the later period.

From 1920 to 1938 the procurement of personnel for flying training was a comparatively simple matter. The quotas for classes were small and the supply of manpower abundant. Although the qualifications for flying training were high, there was generally more material available than could be used. The procurement problem
during this period was not one of recruiting large number of re-
but of choosing those out of the many applicants those most
suitable for flying training.

Because of the attitude generally prevailing in the United
States during the 1920's and 1930's toward the military establishment,
personnel requirements for pilot training were short. Although
the provisions of the military appropriations act for the fiscal
year 1929 which created the pool of civilian pilots and authorized
the training of 1,700 civilian airmen, 1 of whom raised to
2,500 in 1930, the actual number of applicants received to
training from 1919 to 1930 was far below the initially authorized
figures. In the five years prior to the entry of civilians into
training in 1932, an average of about 300 candidates were
rejected annually into their squadrons.

Since the number of civilian pilots required to fill training
schools was small, the Air Corps was able to set its qualifications
high. They were based primarily on age, education, and medical
standards. The candidate had to be an unmarried, male citizen of
the United States between the ages of 20 and 35, inclusive. He
was required to present documentary evidence of a time assistantly

1. "1 Act. 104.
3. "1 Act. 1223
4. ""1 Act. 104.4, ""1 Act. 1223 (1936).
completed at least two years of college training at an accredited institution. If he did not possess the necessary formal education, he was required to pass a comprehensive "educational examination." This examination, given four times a year, tested the applicant's knowledge of the following subjects: United States history, English grammar and composition, general history, geography, arithmetic, algebra (higher), geometry (plane and solid), trigonometry (plane and spherical), and elementary physics. It was a difficult examination, and very few candidates without some college training were able to pass it. Between 1920 and 1938 only a negligible number of candidates succeeded in entering flying training by qualifying in this manner. Candidates who qualified educationally still had to meet a severe physical examination before they were eligible for appointment as flying cadets.

In spite of these high qualifications the supply of manpower qualified for flying training far exceeded the demand during the period 1920-1938. Consequently, beginning in 1928 candidates were selected for assignment to class on a priority basis.

4. *Flying Cadets of the Army Air Corps* (1937), prepared under direction of Lt. Col. Z.
5. Ibid., 7.
This priority list was established as follows:

a. (1) Graduates of the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Coast Guard Academy who apply for appointment as flying cadets within 1 year from date of graduation, who fail to receive commissions because of lack of vacancies and are recommended for appointment as flying cadets by the respective superintendents of those academies.

(2) Enlisted men of the Air Corps of the Regular Army who at time of appointment have served at least 11 months.

b. Other enlisted men of the Regular Army who at time of appointment have served at least 11 months.

c. Officers and enlisted men of the National Guard who at time of appointment have been assigned to Air Corps units for at least 11 months and who are favorably recommended by their commanding officers.

d. College graduates who are graduates of Air Corps Reserve Officers' Training Corps units.

e. College graduates who are graduates of Reserve Officers' Training Corps units of other arms or services.

f. Graduates of recognized colleges and universities.

g. Other officers and enlisted men of the National Guard who at time of appointment have had at least 11 months service.

h. Students in Air Corps Reserve Officers' Training Corps units who have completed their junior year.

i. Reserve officers and members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps who at time of appointment have served at least 11 months.

j. Students in good standing of recognized universities who have completed their sophomore year.

k. Others.

For a period prior to 1936, the Air Corps, swamped with applications, decided to discourage candidates classified in the low priority groups. These candidates were informed that their enlistment under existing conditions was doubtful. In the 10 years prior to 1938 over half the candidates assigned to training were chosen from groups "a" and "f."

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The operation was for the procurement of flight cadets, in the Office of the Adjutant General, which theoretically conducted all recruiting for the Army. In practice, however, the Office of the Chief of Air Corps (CCA) actually carried on recruiting activities while the Adjutant General merely formalized the procedure. Since the number of candidates were small, little effort was made to "sell" the Air Corps to graduates. Publicity was utilized and chiefly informative. Candidates submitted their applications to the Adjutant General via the local Air Corps station for selection. Once approved there, the candidate was summoned to report before a Flying Cadet Examining Board. These examining boards had been established at each station in the Air Corps throughout the country, and were manned by Air Corps personnel. During the period under consideration, there were approximately 23 stations, including one each in the Services departments, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Field Forces. The smallest were all larger towns incident to the service before the Board.

When the examination was completed, the results were forwarded by the examining board to the CCA, which made a final determination of the candidate's qualifications. Interested for pilot training, the candidates were examined in physical ability category on the eligible list.

12. Conversions with personnel in 4/07.
In 1926, with the onset of the Federal Aviation Act, efforts to flying corps of the Army and Marine Corps better buy the allowance that were given to Army corps, and a successful publicity program was attempted to affect the recruitment of enlisted personnel. On recommendation of the CGC, theAdjutant General sent letters to leading college presidents throughout the country requesting that the Army Air Training Program be brought to the attention of the students. The results were gratifying, but there was a problem: the Army—particularly the Air Corps—felt that effective recruiting machinery was needed to compete with the competition from the Army and to prepare for the planned Air Corps expansion program.

1. Lt. Col., USA, to CG, Air Corps Training Center, Randolph Field, Tex., 18 April 1928, in O/C Prop. Officer, Publicity 101.
Chapter 1

PROCUREMENT UNDER EARLY EXPANSION PROGRAM

From 1938 on, with the first significant increase in the number of cadets assigned to training, the flying cadet picture rapidly changed. The growth of air forces abroad and the threat of Axis air power emphasized the inadequacy of the American air arm. To meet the challenge the Air Corps was forced to grow ever more rapidly, and this necessitated a reconsideration of procurement policies and procedures. This involved a re-examination of existing flying cadet legislation, pilot training qualifications, and the sources utilized for recruitment. After 1938 the main emphasis was upon quantity procurement although every effort was made to maintain the quality of personnel at the highest levels consistent with mounting procurement quotas.

Procurement Quotas

Preliminary increases in the pilot training quotas were authorized before 1 July 1939 when the first large Air Corps expansion program was formally launched. During the fiscal years 1938 and 1939 the number of students sent to flying school was considerably above the yearly average of 350 maintained during the preceding five years. A total of 678 students was assigned to training during the fiscal year 1938, and this number was

raised to 303 in the following year. These increases, however,
were dictated by the pilot training objectives set by the
outlining extension programs of the next few years.

In January 1939 President Roosevelt's annual message ad-
vised Congress of the need for an expanded air arm. In mid-
winter authorization for an appropriation of $700,000,000 was
granted, a much larger sum than had been granted to the air arm
in any year since the end of World War I. With funds subsequently
appropriated the 31 Group Program was inaugurated on 1 July 1939. 3
Under this program an annual training rate of 1,200 pilots was
established. 4 As the spring of 1940 advanced and this schedule
was well on the way to achievement, European developments indicated
the need for a reconsideration of Air Corps plans. Consequently,
in May 1940, before the maximum training rate for the production
of 1,200 pilots a year could be realized, the Air Corps inaugurated
a 41 Group Program. This plan called for producing 7,000 pilots
a year from the flying schools. 5 It was barely under way when
in July 1940 the Secretary of War authorized the 51 Group Program
calling for the training of 12,000 pilots a year. 6 Finally, in

2. Ibid.
3. Address by Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps,
before the graduating class of 1939, Air Corps Tactical School,
4. Interview with Col. Aubrey L. Poore, AC/AS, Program Planning,
5. Ibid.; also for Chief of Staff by Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, 22
6. C/AS to Chief of Staff, 5 Sep. 1940, in AAC 321.581, AF
Organization.

RESTRICTED
SECRET INrORMATION
March 1941 a fourth program, the 84 Group Program, was initiated. This raised the ultimate training rate to 30,000 pilots annually. Thus, one plan was complicated by another before the maximum training rate for the first was secured. As each program took the place of its predecessor, the procurement levels were pushed higher and higher.

Recruiting objectives under these group programs were much greater than the pilot training requirements. Since 40 to 50 percent of the students assigned to pilot training were usually eliminated during the course of instruction, it was necessary to cater almost twice as many students as the training schools expected to graduate. Thus the 84 Group Program called for entering 400 students every six weeks; this figure was raised to 1,200 students every five weeks under the 41 Group Program, and to 2,400 and 3,200 students, respectively, under the 51 and 60 Group Programs. Furthermore, since it was estimated that only one out of every five students who applied for flying training would be able to meet the high physical and mental qualifications, the task of procurement was a great one. The following table illustrates in round figures the rise of procurement objectives.

in relation to the group program of the period.\textsuperscript{10}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Annual Graduation Rate of Pilots</th>
<th>Students to be Entered Annually</th>
<th>Number of Applications Needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 Group</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Group</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Group</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81 Group</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To meet these objectives, a thorough revision of procurement procedures was necessary.

Establishment of Aviation Cadet Status

The opening of a large-scale procurement drive necessitated revision of obsolete statutes relating to flying cadets. Under existing law only 2,500 flying cadets were authorized in any one year,\textsuperscript{11} but Air Corps plans called for training 7,000 pilots a year. The removal of this quota restriction was a simple matter. Early in the summer of 1940 Congress suspended all legal limitations on the number of flying cadets to be trained during the fiscal year 1940\textsuperscript{12} and through subsequent legislation this suspension was to remain in effect for the duration of the war plus six months.\textsuperscript{13}

Legislative approval was also necessary to put Army flying cadets on a par with those of the Navy. The superior advantages

\textsuperscript{10} Address by Erich C. G. Yount, 21 March 1943, in U. S. Air Corps \textit{Historical} Vol. 28 (1943); memo for R. L. Lovett by D. J. [Pleasant Johnson], Chief, Training and Operations Div., and Col. A. E. Duncan, Chief, FPO, 11 July 1941, in A/3 Br. filler, Procurement and Recruiting through 1942.

\textsuperscript{11} 41 Stat. 768.

\textsuperscript{12} 55 Stat. 725.

\textsuperscript{13} 58 Stat. 314.
offered in reward to pay and allowances by the Naval Aviation
Ordin Act proved an obstacle to Army Air Corps procurement.
Until the summer of 1939, however, the supply of qualified can-
didates so far exceeded the demand that the Air Corps was able
to fill its quotas in spite of this discrepancy. During 1939
and 1940 the inequality began to cause difficulty, and in the
summer of 1940, when procurement rights were set at recruiting
nearly 1,300 students monthly, it became important that these
discriminations be eliminated. In a letter of 2 August 1940 the
Personnel Division, OCAO, recommended to the Plans Division that
a bill be prepared for submission to Congress which would close
Army flying cadet on equal terms with their Navy counterparts.
The Chief of the Personnel Division expressed the belief that "Without
equality between the Army and the Navy the Army has little chance
of meeting the flying cadet program in the numbers required."  

In the fall of 1940 a bill was introduced in this end in
view. It was not until 3 June 1941, however, that such a bill
became law. Under the terms of the Aviation Ordin Act, the
grade of aviation cadet, Army Air Corps, was substituted for the
grade of flying cadet. This legislation gave Army aviation
cadets pay and allowances equal to those of the Navy and Marine
Corps, and renewed impetus to cadet procurement at a time when

14. RR, O.I.R., Acting Chief, Personnel Div., to Plans, through
Executive, 8 Aug. 1940, in A/G Br. file, Procurement and
Recruiting through 1942.
such additional encouragement was needed.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Qualifications of Recruits}

As procurement objectives rose, the necessity for expanding
the sources from which the necessary personnel was to be drawn
became increasingly evident. The field was severely limited
by the high physical and mental qualifications required for
appointment to crew training. During the period before Pearl
Harbor the possibility of revising these qualifications to
enlarge the numbers of potential recruits without impairing their
capabilities was given careful consideration. Although there was some
discussion of extending the age limit and altering the rigorous
physical requirements, neither of these plans proved feasible
at this time. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the physical
standards was considerably eased by such devices as granting
waivers. As a result, the percentage of candidates disqualified
for physical reasons steadily declined from 1939 to 1941.\textsuperscript{16}

As the need for more candidates became pressing, it was increasingly
evident that requirements—two years of college or worse; a
difficult examination—were formidable obstacles in the path of
many otherwise qualified men. Consequently, beginning in 1939,

\textsuperscript{15} For a detailed treatment of this measure, consult the study
"Legislation Relating to the Army Air Forces Training Program,
1939-1943," prepared in Administrative History Branch, ATIH-1.

\textsuperscript{16} For a further discussion of the relation of qualifications
for flying training, consult ATIH Historical Studies: V. 2,
Initial Selection of Candidate for Pilot, Torpedo, and
Trainer Training, prepared in ATIH-1B.
additional charge for textbooks. By the end of 1941 there were
17 of these night schools throughout the state with an enrollment
of almost 750.19

A most ambitious promotional campaign was launched by the
American Legion, many of whose members were aviation enthusiasts
interested in cooperating with the Air Corps. The American Legion
Post of Detroit, Mich., sent a form letter to colleges and junior
colleges throughout the country urging them to give support to
the Army Air Corps by inaugurating "prep schools" to prepare
applicants for the educational examination.20 The response to
this request was unusually favorable, and throughout the summer
and fall of 1941 many colleges established "refresher courses."21

These civilian efforts had the enthusiastic support of
corps area commanders from the beginning. In October 1940 the
Second Corps Area Commander advised all district recruiting officers
of the four-month "refresher course" organized by the Board of
Education of Hammonds, N. Y. He urged that the officers present

19. Boston Herald, 4 May 1941; Bulletin of the Department of Ed-
ucation, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, "State University
Extension Director in preparation for Flying Cadet Examination,"
2 Apr. 1941, in A/C Br. records (Col. Witz's notebook).
20. Commander James Corde, Aviation Post No. 237, American Legion,
Detroit, Mich., to Erich D. Petzel, President, Pennsylvania
State College, n.d. [early summer 1941], in A/C Br. files,
Civil Aeronautics Candidates for Aviation Cadet Assignments.
to J. F. Ward, President, Amarillo College, Amarillo, Tex.,
13 Sep. 1941, in A/C Br. files, Air Corps Institutes.
the merits of this plan to their local boards of education.\textsuperscript{22}

This program started from the Second Corps Area, and by February
several of the corps area commanders were conducting such courses
in conjunction with state departments and local boards of edu-
cation.\textsuperscript{23}

The War Department, realizing the widespread demand for
"refresher courses," entertained briefly the idea of sponsoring
such a preparatory course under the supervision of the United
States Office of Education. It was planned that the course would
be three months long, given on a national scale three times
a year. Every youth in the country would be given an opportunity
to prepare himself free of charge for the educational examination.
Although the Federal Security Agency heartily endorsed the plan
and indicated that the project could be accommodated under the
"emergency defense training program," it soon developed that
there were neither the funds nor the authorization for such an
undertaking. Congressional legislation was needed before such
a scheme could be undertaken, and eventually the project was

\textsuperscript{22} L. B. Horrild, Second Corps Area recruiting officer, to all
\textsuperscript{23} Capt. J. T. Durrant, Asst. Chief, Personnel Div., to Col.
The institution of these review courses, coupled with the
modification of the educational examination, increased the manpower
pool from which personnel could be procured for flying training.
Ten times as many applicants took the educational examination
in the fiscal year 1941 as had taken it during the preceding
nine years. 25 From July to December 1941, twice as many can-
didates took the examination as had applied for it during the
preceding year, 26 and in this latter period twice as many passed
it as had in previous years.

There was, however, considerable criticism in certain
sections to eliminate entirely the two-year college requirement
and substitute for it a high school diploma. By such a procedure
the number of men eligible for flying training would grow, and
such less difficulty would be encountered in meeting procurement
custom under existing programs. The Air Corps was accused of
being "high hat" in maintaining the college requirement. 27 On
16 December 1940 the Washington Times-Herald published an
editorial entitled "Fierc, Books and Figures" attacking the
policy of the Air Corps with respect to educational qualifications.

26. Ibid.
in A/O Gr. Riles, Procurement and Recruiting thru 12-43.
The Chief of the Personnel Division felt that this attack was significant enough to merit a published rebuttal over the signature of the Chief of the Air Corps. 23

While conceding that abandonment of the college requirement would widen the field of potential trainees, the Air Corps opposed it on the grounds that flying cadets would eventually become commissioned officers and leaders of men; therefore, certain cultural and educational prerequisites were important. 24 Eventually a temporary solution was found for this difficulty. In order to forestall further pressure to abandon the college requirement and at the same time to widen the supply of manpower available for assignment to flying training, plans were made to give flying training to enlisted men who did not meet the educational requirement.

Sources of Supply

The training of enlisted men was authorized by the Aviation Student Act. At the end of 1940 the Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson wrote to General Arnold: "I submit that the time has come when we should not require two years of college for the Air Corps. It seems to me that this requirement is barring a

large number of capable and eligible young men from becoming pilots.

30. I should be glad to have your views." General Arnold advised

Patterson that a project had been adopted calling for training up
to 20 per cent of the total number of pilots required in an enlisted
grade. Through this device the number of aviation cadets would be
supplemented, and difficulties in meeting anticipated programs would
be removed. Toward the end of February, Patterson was further
advised that the training of enlisted pilots would commence about
1 July 1941, provided that legislative authorization could be secured
32. before that time. On 3 June 1941, simultaneously with the passage
of the aviation cadet bill, the aviation student measure became law.
This authorized the Secretary of war to detail enlisted men in the
Army for training as aviation students in their respective grades.
The requirements for this training differed from those for aviation
cadet training with respect to age, education, and disposition upon
graduation. The age limits were 16-22 as opposed to 20-27.

Educational prerequisites demanded that the candidate be a graduate
of an accredited high school, in the upper half of his class, with
at least 12 credits in mathematics. Upon completion of his pilot

30. Note for Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Deputy Chief of Staff for Air,
by Robert P. Patterson, 27 Dec. 1940, in J/C Br. files, Educational
Requirements 1940-1941.
1941, in J/C Br. files, Educational Requirements 1940-1941.
32. Draft memo for R. P. Patterson, (prepared by C. R. Carter
for signature of Robert A. Lovett), written 27 Feb. 1941, in
J/C 221 B, Enlisted Pilots.
training, the student was to be given the grade of sergeant pilot. The first group of enlisted students entered training on 23 August 1941.

In the summer of 1941 another means of increasing the pool of manpower available for flying training was introduced. This was the provision for the training in grade of officers of the United States. Prior to this time the only officers eligible for training in grade were Regular Army officers. The number applying for such training was very small. Only in September, when members of the West Point graduating class who had elected pilot training entered school, was there an appreciable number in this category. Reserve officers desiring aviation cadet training were allowed to train on an inactive status only. Consequently, many who were on active duty requested relief at some personal inconvenience in order to accept aviation cadet appointment.

In a memo to The Adjutant General on 14 December 1940, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett urged the desirability of allowing Reserve and National Guard officers as well as Regular Army officers to take pilot training in grade. He declared that it would "be necessary to obtain applicants from every available source to meet pilot requirements for the existing emergency." To accomplish this recommendation it was necessary

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33. For a full discussion of the Aviation Student Act, see "Legislation Relating to the Army Air Forces Training Program, 1939-1945."
34. "Aviation Cadets: Examinations and Classes."
35. A/C Br. records (Procurement and Selection of Aviation Cadets, typed-scrip by Eleanor Gessford); conversations with personnel in A/C Br.
to amend Section 3 of Public Law Number 18, of 13 April 1939,
which provided only for detail of regular Army personnel to
civil institutions for aviation training. In view of the fact
that many Reserve and National Guard officers desired flying
training without loss of status, a change in this legislation
was needed. In the spring of 1941 a bill was introduced in
Congress for this purpose, and on 3 July 1941 this bill became
law. 37 In November 1941 the first class of officers training
in grade entered elementary flying school. 38

In addition to the introduction of aviation student training
and officer training in grade, the procurement of personnel from
military ranks was still further augmented by the passage of
the Selective Training and Service Act in September 1940 and
its extension in August 1941. 39 As the Army grew in strength,
the numbers of men applying for pilot training from that source
increased correspondingly. Thus, the military pool became
a progressively more important source from which personnel could
be drawn for pilot training or aviation cadets, aviation students,
or officers training in grade. From the beginning of the 1,200
pilot program in July 1939 until July 1941 the percentage of
men procured from the ranks of the Army varied anywhere from

37. For a detailed treatment of this measure, see "Legislation
Relating to the Army Air Forces Training Program, 1930-1937."
38. "Aviation Cadets, Examinations and Classes"; A/O Br. records,
(Procurement and Selection of Aviation Cadets).
about 2 to 10 per cent of the total number assigned to training. 40

With the introduction of aviation student status in August and
the growing interest of the nation in military training, this
proportion increased steadily. By the time America entered the
war, 25 to 35 per cent of the total number assigned to flying
training were obtained from military sources. The close of 30
December 1941 was composed of aviation trainees in the following
categories and proportions: enlisted men assigned to training as
aviation cadets, 37 per cent; enlisted men assigned as aviation
students, 7 per cent; Regular Army officers and officers of the
Army of the United States assigned to flying training in grade,
3 per cent; and civilians assigned as aviation cadets, 63 per
cent. 41

While the numbers of those assigned to pilot training from
military sources steadily increased, the bulk of recruits
throughout the period from 1933 until Pearl Harbor were procured
from civilian sources. 42 Under the pressure of rising procurement
objectives, assignment to training according to the priority
system was abandoned in April 1940. 43 The relationship of supply
to demand was such that the system was outmoded. Qualified
applicants were assigned almost as rapidly as they could be

40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
procured. Although the proportion of those qualifying by taking the educational examinatin steadily increased, the majority of cadets during these years had at least two years of college. The Personnel Division, OAMC, had consistently maintained that the "most desirable" personnel in terms of health, intelligence, and general background were college students. Accordingly, throughout this pre-PEARL HARBOR period the main emphasis of procurement, the recruiting drivers in particular and publicity in general, was for the most part focused on this group. The innovations and changes in procurement machinery made during these years were largely directed toward promoting increased interest in flying training on the part of the college student.

Administrative Control of Recruitment

In the years prior to the expansion of the Air Corps, the procurement of flying cadets, although established as a function of the Adjutant General, was to a large extent conducted by the Chief of the Air Corps. With the resultant increase in procurement objectives, however, the recruitment of flying cadets was no longer a routine matter, and it became necessary for the Adjutant General to reassume his recruiting responsibilities. The influence of the Chief of the Air Corps still remained of considerable importance, although the main emphasis of

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\[\text{Footnote: }\text{Unidentified note for AC, 23 March 1929, in AG Br. files, Publicity 1927-0; WP No. 5, C.I.U. [other], Chief, Personnel Div. to Executive, 3 Dec. 1928, in AG 211.1, OAMC.}\]
the examination questions were modified to encourage a greater
number of applicants to qualify by passing the educational
examination.17

In addition to these changes, "refresher courses" were in-
curated throughout the country to assist candidates in their
preparation for the examinations. These courses were sponsored
by local and state boards of education. Volunteer civilian
agencies and corps area commanders (with the good will and
approval of the CGAC) actively supported these flying training
"area schools." A large initial role in promoting courses was
played by the junior chambers of commerce throughout the country.18
An example of a very successful "refresher course" program was
done in New England under the auspices of the New England
Flying Cadet Committee, a civilian organization which played
a conspicuous role in assisting the Air Corps to procure candidates
in that region. These courses were established throughout the
New England states under the supervision of state and municipal
departments of education. In Massachusetts the department of
education sponsored the courses, which were given three nights
a week for 12 weeks. The fee for the course was $10 with $3

17. Ibid., 20-21.
18. John P. Fisch, Columbus, Ohio, Junior Chamber of Commerce, to
Air, 21 May 1941, in A/C Br. files, Procurement and Recruiting-
through 1941; Charles A. Wood, Chamber of Commerce, Danville,
Va., to 0/Air, 7 Jan. 1941, in A/C Br. files, Publicity 1941.
procurement activities shifted to the office of The Adjutant General.

A significant step made at this time was the decentralization of procurement from the office of The Adjutant General to corps area headquarters. In February 1938 the War Department ordered that applications for flying cadet examinations, hitherto received in the office of The Adjutant General and forwarded to the OIC/C for recommendations, would be received henceforth by the corps area commanders. Only after the candidate had appeared successfully before an examining board were the results of his examination and accompanying papers to be submitted to the OIC/C for final approval.

Accompanying this change a quota system was established. Every corps area was made responsible for furnishing a minimum number of qualified candidates for each class. The quota for the corps area was determined in accordance with existing training requirements and the character and extent of the population of each corps area. As one program was supplemented by another these quotas rose sharply. Thus from February 1938 the corps areas (later designated as service commands) carried on specific recruiting activities under the general supervision of The

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45. Conversation with personnel in I/C Br.
Adjutant General. The success or failure of any procurement
program depended to a large degree on the interest and energy
displayed by the individual corps area commanders. But since the
Chief of the Air Corps was responsible for the successful develop-
ment and completion of successive expansion programs, he, too,
had a very real interest in procurement problems and policies.
This triangular arrangement was one requiring the continuous
cooperation of all groups concerned.

Publicity Program

A very important part of the procurement programs in which
such continuous cooperation was necessary was that of publicity.
During the early years of Air Corps expansion, from 1928 to 1932,
when comparatively modest goals were set, publicity was conduct
on a simple scale. For Department press releases, an occasional
radio announcement, and limited dissemination of recruiting
service posters and literature, constituted the extent of these
activities. With the rapid acceleration of the training
programs under the 41 Group Program, publicity efforts became
better organized, more intensive, and more sophisticated.

Since publicity was an integral part of procurement, it was
supervised by the Adjutant General with the active cooperation
of the Chief of the Air Corps. While nationwide publicity was
directly handled by the Adjutant General, responsibility for
publicity within the corps areas rested with the corps area
The operations of The Adjutant General’s office were conducted by the Recruiting and Induction Service of that office and by the War Department Bureau of Public Relations. All printed recruiting material was distributed by the Recruiting Publicity Bureau with headquarters at Governors Island, N. Y. Continual efforts were made by the Adjutant General to build an interest in the Air Corps on a national scale through newspaper and magazine advertising, posters, motion pictures, and radio broadcasts. A typical example of the sort of publicity sponsored by The Adjutant General during this period was the promotion of the motion picture, “I Wanted ‘In’.” Representatives of The Adjutant General’s office cooperated with Paramount Pictures to secure maximum publicity for this film which dealt with various phases of flying cadet training. A write-up for local exploitation was issued to corps area recruiting officers. Folders and “tills” publicizing both the motion picture and flying cadet training were distributed by Paramount Pictures. It was planned to secure the cooperation of local mayors in designating the opening day of the picture as Flying Cadet Day.

In the corps area, publicity was handled by the corps area public relations officers and recruiting officers. On a

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lower echelon were the district officers who in turn assisted in and promoted the activities of the local recruiting representatives throughout the corps areas. Although the extent and intensity of publicity varied throughout the corps areas in relation to the intensity of the need for flying cadets and the enthusiasm of the corps area commanders, the pattern was generally the same. Printed recruiting material in the nature of pamphlets and posters were obtained for general distribution from the Recruiting Publicity Bureau at Governor's Island. Newspapers of wide circulation within the corps area carried feature stories, while those of more limited circulation printed articles containing information about the enrollment, appointment, departure, and training activities of local residents. Radio transcriptions of material issued at regular intervals by the War Department were presented for general consumption, while local stations carried announcements of interest to their particular audience.

Films, window displays, and other exhibits designed to stimulate interest in flying training were also utilized. An excellent example of the use of these media was the recruiting publicity drive launched in the Second Corps Area in the winter of 1940-1941, which was inaugurated to meet procurement quotas doubled under the 12,000 pilot program.50

Army Air Corps stations and sub-stations throughout the country were also a part of promoting publicity in behalf of flying cadet recruiting. Although these activities were under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps, their public relations activities were largely financed and directed by corps area commanders.

Regular and Traveling Recruiting Boards

While The Adjutant General, the corps area commanders, and the Chief of the Air Corps were all concerned directly or indirectly with the function of publicity for procurement and recruiting, it was the regular Flying Cadet Examining Boards which came into actual contact with prospective candidates. During the period before Pearl Harbor the number of regular boards increased from 73 to over 80.51 Although these boards were located at Air Corps stations, their administration was under the supervision of the corps area commanders. Additional boards were constituted by the authority of The Adjutant General upon the recommendation of the Chief of the Air Corps who in turn acted on requests submitted from the corps area.52

In the winter of 1937-1938 an effective supplement to these regular boards was introduced. This was the inauguration of the Traveling Flying Cadet Examining Boards. These boards

performed all the functions of the regular boards, but combined
with these activities excellent publicity with aided corps
area commanders materially in securing credits.

The idea for these mobile boards originated in the CGAC.
It had been an established Air Corps policy to recruit the
best available personnel, and it occurred that at this time such
personnel was in the college. As early as December 1936 a
special board was sent to Clarksburg, W. Va., the home of the
Under Secretary of War, to examine a group of young men in-
conveniently located to secure examination through the regular
channels. In the spring of 1937 a campaign was initiated
throughout the colleges of the country to meet the enlarged
demands anticipated for the fiscal year 1938. In connection with
this drive Air Corps officers with passbooks and applications
were sent directly to selected colleges in the First, Second,
and Third Corps Area. At about the same time a special ex-
amining board went with funds furnished by the Adjutant General's
office to the Fourth Corps Area. This board differed from
regular Flying Cadet Examining Boards only in its mobility. It
was equipped both to discriminate information and to examine

53. Unclassified memo for AG, 31 March 1937, in A/C Br. file, Public-

ity 1937-7-6.
54. J. C. Hall, Acting Chief, Personnel Div., to AG,
7 Sept. 1937, in A/C Br. file, Clarksburg F/O Examining Board.
55. Annual Report Dto for the Fiscal Year 1937, 16 July 1937,
The success of the personal contacts established by the Air Corps officers in the spring of 1938 throughout these four corps areas was reflected in the increased number of applicants for flying training and by the inquiries from the colleges visited. Air Corps officials were pleased with the results of these experiments in securing recruits from the colleges, and this satisfaction led to the extension of mobile boards to cover colleges throughout the entire United States.

When the Adjutant General requested that the CGAAC submit a plan for intensifying recruiting during the remainder of 1937-1938, General Arnold recommended that the project be carried to its logical conclusion, and that the Adjutant General authorize the dispatching of five traveling boards to cover the nine corps areas. General Arnold advised the Adjutant General that he appreciated the difficulties connected with conducting numerous physical examinations on the move. He did not, however, consider these difficulties insurmountable, and expressed the opinion that the results would certainly justify the effort involved. Each corps area was because of the distances to be

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
covered by the boards and the number of institutions to be visited, detailed arrangements were to be left to the respective corps area commanders. General Arnold emphasized that only members of the college senior classes should be examined, but he added that future enlistees from the other classes might be diplomatically stimulated by talks, roviers, and Air Corps literature.69 Toward the end of November the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps urged the Adjutant General to adopt this scheme and make it a permanent policy in flying cadet procurement.60 Each of the five boards was to be composed of one Air Corps officer pilot, a flight surgeon, and two residents.61 Two corps areas each were allotted to four of the boards, while the large Ninth Corps Area was the only candidate of the fifth board.

Between 15 and 19 January 1933 specific authority was granted by the Adjutant General to the commanding generals of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Corps Areas to convene boards to visit as many colleges and universities as could be satisfactorily covered within a two-month period.62 The president of each board was instructed to coordinate his plans most carefully with the respective corps area commanders so that no conflict in the recruiting effort would arise.63

69. 0/40 to 10, 15 Oct. 1937, in A/C Br. files, Publicity 1937-40.
60. 0/40 to 10, 23 Nov. 1937, in A/C Br. files, Publicity 1937-40.
61. Note for 10 by 0/40, 8 Jan. 1938, in A/C Br. files, Publicity 1937-40.
62. 00 to 00½, all Corps Areas, 15 Jan. 1938, in A/C Br. files, Publicity 1937-40.
63. 00 to 00½, all Corps Areas, 17 Jan. 1938, in A/C Br. files, Publicity 1937-40.
Big corporations had long realized the advantages of sending

talent scouts to explore the college field. The creation of

the cadet boards was a logical application of this system to

the corps area. Rural districts possessing excellent but

unavailable material could be reached easily. The personal

contact of the Air Corps officers with keen-stimulated enthusi-

asm, and before this enthusiasm could evaporate, they were

accepted for examination and their qualifications reviewed on

the spot. For the college student this procedure was informative,

convenient, inexpensive, and exciting. Furthermore, the arrival

and departure of the boards by plane created a vivid source

of publicity for the Air Corps. The Traveling Flying Cadet

Examining Boards thus proved a highly satisfactory supplement
to routine procedures.

In the spring of 1938 these boards started on tour. They

visited 53 colleges, including such varied institutions as

Fordham, Princeton, and the University of Ohio. The results were

crystallizing. A total of 235 examinations were authorized, and

238 cadets were qualified for flying training. 


61. Lt. Col. Robert E. Alcott, professor of military science and

strategy, University of Maine, to C/Adj, 23 March 1939, in A/C

Ext. Files, Publicity 1937-40.

65. "Division Cadets. Examinations and Classing."

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were period 4,563 applicants were examined by the regular boards, and 878 of these candidates qualified for flying training appointment. Although certain mistakes were made—boards arrived on campus toward the end of the school year when examinations and productions balked large, and in some cases the proper school officers were not consulted sufficiently ahead of time to make the visit profitable—the Air Corps believed that traveling boards were a successful means of testing the best material available for flying training.

Consequently, early in the spring of 1939, in anticipation of the increased numbers necessary to meet the needs for the 1,500 pilot program, recommendations were made to the Adjutant General to send out traveling boards. This recommendation was concurred in, and for a second time five boards were sent throughout the nine corps areas to promote procurement in the larger colleges and universities. From the middle of April until about the first of July, 57 colleges were visited. Profiting from the mistakes of the earlier boards, efforts were made to see that the arrival of these boards was well-timed and had the approval of college authorities. Of the 2,859 examinations authorized, 203 candidates were qualified for assignment.

66. Ibid.
67. A/O Br. records (transcript by Miss Cooper).
69. Unidentified letter to AG, 9 March 1939, in A/O Br. files, Examinations Branch.
to flying training. At the same time regular less-authorized 3,600 examinations of which 571 proved successful. The success of these boards guaranteed their continued existence, and it was not long before they became an established institution.

During the annual training drive of 1940, when the 7,000-pilot program was launched, the number of boards was increased from five to 10, two being assigned to each corps area. This increase in number permitted greater flexibility in the schedule of the boards and a wider coverage of potential candidates. Of the 2,723 candidates examined between April and June of 1940, 753 were qualified by the Traveling Flying Cadet Examination Boards.

Regular boards, in the meantime, had examined 1,533 applications and ultimately accepted 670. Because of their continued success and as a result of a recommendation of the Chief of the Air Corps, these boards were put on a semi-permanent basis. Traveling boards thus became an integral part of corps procurement machinery although every corps area did not immediately use them.

In the year and a half before Pearl Harbor, under the pressure of rising procurement objectives, the score and activity of these

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70. "Aviation Cadets: Examinations and Classes."
71. Ibid.
borders expanded considerably. They operated continuously throughout the year in the various regions of the corps areas. From July 1940 to January 1941 they visited 141 places, including colleges, cities, and train posts.\(^73\) The primary emphasis of these boards continued to be on colleges and college towns.

Nevertheless, by the spring of 1941 the boards were regularly visiting such cities or were not conveniently located to take advantage of the services of the regular examining boards. Occasionally an Army post was visited to enable men who had been drafted to apply for flying training.

The number of boards throughout the corps areas increased, three being allotted to each corps area by the fall of 1941.\(^76\) Authorization for additional boards was secured from the Adjutant General on the recommendation of the Chief of the Air Corps. The Chief of the Air Corps urged the corps area commanders not to hesitate to request additional boards as needed.\(^75\) Such figures are available indicate that from their inauguration the accomplishments of these traveling boards covered favorably with those of the regular boards. From the spring of 1939 until December 1940, the traveling boards authorized a total of 19,943

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\(^73\) "Aviation Cadets, Examinations and Classes."

\(^74\) H.R. No. 3, Air Surgeon to G/A3, 28 Nov. 1941, in AAG WO 72, Order.

examinations and qualified 3,423 cadets for training. In the
same period regular boards authorized 23,097 examinations and
accepted 10,377 students. 76 It would appear that the effectiveness
of the traveling boards was cumulative, for by the time of
America's entrance into the war they were obtaining the majority
of cadets procured. 77

Civilian Assignments for Recruiters

The regular and traveling flying cadet recruiting boards
during this period were supported not only by official recruiting-
officers, but also by volunteer civilian groups throughout the
United States. National fraternal and patriotic organizations
and local groups of interested civilians concurred generously
with the Army in recruiting flying cadets. The American Legion,
the Veterans of Foreign Wars, junior chambers of commerce, the
Elks, and various other civilian committees were examples of
such groups. The contribution of these organizations was
substantial. Some of the leaders of these groups had been
pilots during the First World War and aviation enthusiasts
were sincerely interested in the development of the Air Corps.
The invaluable and energetic efforts of these volunteers were an
excellent supplement to the routine work conducted by the
Recruiting Service of the Army.

76. Rpt No. 7, Air Service to G/AS, 28 Nov. 1918, in AD 311 E2,
Branch.
77. "Aviation Cadets, Examinations and Classes."
The activities of these organizations were endorsed by the War Department and were carried on in close coordination with the corps area commanders. The publicity sponsored by these private groups was strictly governed by policies determined in the Adjutant General's office. When a new project was launched by a corps area commander, he communicated with these volunteer groups in his area to enlist their cooperation. These procurement drives contributed much from two points of view: through public addresses, radio programs, and feature newspaper articles they promoted public interest in the Air Corps and its needs; and they sought to expand the field of available manpower by encouraging as many potential candidates as they could reach.

The promotional efforts of these organizations were enthusiastic and intensive. The American Legion Aviators' Post of New York City had a particularly sound sense of advertising. At one time it was anxious to sponsor a "Flies over America Bell," similar to the President's Birthday Bell, and thus raise funds for and give publicity to combat procurement. Later it suggested a nation-wide essay contest on the subject of "Air Power in the Present War" or "Why I Want to Be a Flying Cadet."
Cadet "Week" were sponsored throughout the country by junior chambers of commerce and other private groups. One such event, conducted in Boston by the "New England Flying Cadet Committee," was typical. This committee was composed of a group of prominent New England residents. William A. Welch, a World War I flyer interested in aviation progress and later to become Chief of the Aviation Cadet Branch in AM Headquarters, was its chairman.

A week in May 1911 was designated as Boston's "Flying Cadet Week." During that time a mass meeting was staged on Boston Common where model planes were distributed and the public was given an exhibition of anti-aircraft guns and the operations ofinent aeroplanes; a prominent Boston theater featured the production "I Want "Air;" and a large ball in the interest of flying cadets was held at an important hotel. 80 The Veterans of Foreign Wars also put a great deal of initiative and effort into the recruiting of cadets. 81

In addition to this promotional work these organizations achieved results through other recruiting activities. By sponsoring "refresher courses," enlistins the cooperation of draft boards, and, in at least one case, holding to pass the physical examinations, these auxiliary services contributed a great deal toward enabling the Recruiting Service to meet its procurement

81. As to CO's, all Corps Areas, 19 Aug. 1911, in A/G Br. Filer, Procurement and Recruiting, 1911-1912.
program. The New York City Aviators' Post of the American Legion first
sponsored a project which eventually was adopted on a national basis by
the Army Recruiting Service. This post organized a committee to enlist
the aid of local draft boards. These boards furnished the names and
addresses of non-classified I-A and possessing the necessary educational
qualifications for Air Corps training. The committee then advised these
men of the advantages offered by Air Corps training. By the beginning
of 1941 there were 50 committee members working closely with the 280
New York City draft boards.

Eventually this procedure received wide application. On 15
September 1941 the Selective Service System began to cooperate with the
Recruiting Service. Lists of I-A registrants were submitted to state
headquarters 30 days before the mailing of induction notices. In the
interim the Recruiting Service of the Army was free to solicit those
registrants for Air Corps training.

In an additional attempt to secure a maximum number of candidates
for training a useful project was instituted under the sponsorship of
American Flying Services Foundation headquarters in New York. Under
the auspices of this group many men who were rejected for flying train-
ing because of slight physical defects were given an opportunity to
remedy those disabilities through proper medical treatment. In the First
Corps Area the New England Flying Cadet Committee cooperated with the

82. A. Joseph Hoffman, National Chairman, Flying Cadet Recruiting
1941, in I/C Br. Files, Publicity 1941.
83. AG to G-2's, all Corps Areas, 22 Aug. 1941, in I/C Br. files,
Procurement and Recruiting thru 1942.
foundation in rehabilitating for flying service those who had been ruled physically deficient. Furthermore, the General Federation of Women's Clubs, through its Aviation committee, organized an educational program to acquaint mothers with the Army's need for flying cadets and to overcome the fears of those who might have some interest in a flying career.

The contributions of these civilian agencies were thus varied and substantial. As procurement objectives mounted, the contributions made by these volunteer groups were of considerable value to those officially responsible for recruiting flying cadets.

College and City Units

In a further effort to meet the rising procurement goals, a novel publicity scheme was launched in the spring of 1941 by the Adjutant General, with the assistance of the Chief of the Air Corps. This was a project for the training as independent units of young men who had attended the same college or who resided in the same city. Each of these flying cadet units was composed of approximately twenty men. They were assigned in a body to the same elementary pilot training school, and they then continued together insofar as possible through the later stages of training. The virtues of this project were obvious. The

87. 10 to 09s, 41 Corps Area, 22 Aug. 1941, in 1/6 Br. files, Procurement and Recruiting thru 1942.
competition between individual college units, between one college and another, and between neighboring cities promoted the flow of flying cadet candidates and furnished an excellent source of publicity.

Every effort was made to exploit the promotional possibilities inherent in this scheme. Young Air Corps officers were dispatched by Air Corps stations to assist in organizing these units. The activity of these Air Corps officers was supplemented in many cases by the efforts of corps area recruiting officers. In addition to giving talks to fraternities, to college assemblies, and to public gatherings on the opportunities offered in Air Corps training, it was the business of the Air Corps officers to secure the names of prominent campus figures and well-known young men associated with civic enterprises and persuade them to act as organizers and leaders of flying cadet units. The next step was to promote competition between these units, between colleges, and between cities by continually publicizing the activities of the unit leaders. The good-natured rivalry which resulted multiplied the number of applications and brought about the rapid completion of the units. All applications were sent directly to the corps area authorities, each maidenly marked with the name of the college and the number of the unit.

86. AO to COL's, All Corps Areas, 15 May 1941, in A/O Br. Files, College Units, Establishment of.
87. AO to COL's, Air Corps Installations (radio-was), 18 May 1941, in A/O Br. Files, College Units, Establishment of.
88. AO to COL's, All Corps Areas, 25 Nov 1941, in A/O Br. Files, College Units, Establishment of.
to which the cadets belonged.\textsuperscript{39}

Apparently any more college than city units were organized. This is understandable in view of the fact that more efforts were concentrated on colleges, at this time the most productive single source of flying cadet candidates. Then the completion of the first city unit was reported by Pittsburgh, Pa., on 10 June 1941, 23 colleges and universities had already reported the formation of one or more flying cadet college units.\textsuperscript{40} The entire college and city unit program proved, however, popular and rewarding.\textsuperscript{41} Evidence of its success is seen in the fact that the Air Corps soon sought its extension. Early in July it was suggested that various civic and patriotic organizations which were substantially aiding the procurement program be also allowed to sponsor flying cadet units, and this recommendation was accepted.\textsuperscript{42}

While the college and city unit program was well received and produced good results, certain difficulties were encountered in its administration. The Air Corps had planned that every effort would be made to permit members of a unit to complete training together. The whole program had been initiated and

\textsuperscript{39} Air to 2019, Air Corps Installations (radio way), 18 May 1941, in A/G Br. Filer, College Units, Establishment of.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
publicized on this basis. But the Air Corps was often unable to keep this promise. As a result, court publicity boomeranged and the Air Corps found itself in a rather unfortunate position. 93

Difficulties had arisen because the applicants records had been forwarded individually to the Chief of the Air Corps from the corps area headquarters rather than as a group. Sometimes individual applications were delayed; sometimes they arrived incomplete. Frequently upon review several candidates scheduled for a particular unit were found to be disqualified. It did not seem practicable to the court section, COAC, to warrant the retention of an entire group because one or two applications were lacking. Consequently, it was often necessary to solve this deficiency by combining two or more potential units. 94

In an effort to overcome these problems, it was decided in October 1941 to have all applications for training in one unit submitted at the same time. After the application and board proceedings had been finally acted upon in the COAC, the number ultimately qualified for assignment would be sent to the basic training school and the same class recorders of numbers originally accepted by the Aviation Cadet Training Corps. 95

There was no time to see whether this change would

93 Capt. Purdy, Acting District Recruiting Officer, to CCA, 16th Corps Area, 1 Mar. 1942, in A/5 Br. filer, College Unit, Establishment.
94 Lt. William B. Bradley, Acting Chief, A/5 Sec., IPD, to Executive Officer, 16th Angler Recruiting District, 17 Nov. 1941, in A/5 Br. filer, College Unit, Establishment.
95 AD to COAC, all Corps Areas, 5 Oct. 1942, in A/5 Br. filer, College Unit, Establishment.
procedures would iron out the difficulties in the unit program, for with the entrance of the United States into the war the project had to be abandoned. After Pearl Harbor the important factor became the procurement and training of the greatest number of men in the shortest possible time. The great unit program interfered with the achievement of this goal and had to be sacrificed.

Obstacles to Procurement

Though the aid of publicity devices of these Army and civilian agencies, efforts were then made to enable the core area to furnish the required quota under the varying training program. The core area commanders, the Adjutant General, and the OCAC were all involved in the successful completion of these quotas. The position of the OCAC in respect to the core area was summarized by the Chief of the Flying Order Section: "The responsibility rests squarely with the Core Area. The desire of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps is to render them every possible assistance and cooperation." As the core areas were operated under directives issued by the Adjutant General, there was from time to time correspondence between the OCAC and the Adjutant General on the manner in which the core

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areas were fulfilling their responsibilities. Similarly, there was correspondence on other more general matters of procurement policy. It was inevitable, under the triangular arrangement through which the procurement of cadets was thus administered, that certain differences of opinion would arise.

An example of the difficulties inherent in this situation occurred during the summer of 1940. At this time some corps areas were defaulting on the enlarged procurement objectives assigned by the Adjutant General under the 7,000 pilot program. With the prospect of greater procurement schedules in the future, the Chief of the Air Corps was alarmed by this state of affairs. Consequently, in August 1940 Col. George E. Stretey, Chief of Training Division, OGC, and Colonel Duncan, Chief of the Personnel Division, were sent on a tour of inspection through the headquarters of six of the corps areas. The purpose of this visit was threefold: (1) to discover how the OGC could further assist the procurement efforts of the corps areas; (2) to investigate the primary difficulties and find out what remedies could be applied; (3) to make concrete recommendations concerning the functions and procedure of the regular and flying cadet boards.97

This inspection revealed an unsatisfactory state of affairs. A wide discrepancy was found in the amount of effort

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97. Ibid.
and interest exerted by the individual corps area in their recruiting activities. Many of the officers responsible for recruiting were not well informed on the status of procurement even in their own corps areas. Other officers had left for maneuvers, being in charge disinterested or inexperienced substitutes. Although every corps area was entitled to two traveling flying cadet examining boards, three of the corps areas visited had reported only one such board while the others had appointed none at all. Meanwhile, large numbers of candidates were written examination before the regular flying 
cadet boards. At one place two such candidates were being held up. The two most important reasons for this unsatisfactory 
situation were the lack of facilities for examining the large number of candidates and the irregular intervals at which 
board meetings were convened. Thus the procurement situation as it existed in the corps areas needed attention and Colonel 
Ewarc and Stratemeyer so advised the Adjutant General.68

The Adjutant General, however, was unwilling to interfere 
with the functions delegated to the corps area commanders. 
He decided it ill-advised to create hard feeling and infringe on their prerogatives by requiring the less successful corps

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areas to adopt the procurement methods of the more successful. He indicated, however, that he would be willing to stop in if and when the point is reached where such interference would be imperatively needed. Meanwhile, matters for the most part could be left as they stood. According to the Chief of the Personnel Division, CGC, however, "a streamlined, efficient, decentralized system of flying order procurement could be activated by the Air Corps. However, the number of officers and men required to man such a system prohibits its further consideration."

From time to time during this period, concurrent with the steady rise in procurement objectives, the Chief of the Air Corps found it necessary to survey the respective activities of the corps areas and make suitable recommendations. In February 1941 the manner in which the number of qualified candidates had been distributed among the nine corps areas over the preceding 18 months indicated definite differences in recruiting results. It appeared that four of the nine corps areas needed "stimulation" to provide the students who were to be entered at the rate of 2,400 every five weeks under the 12,000 pilot training program. Similarly, in the fall of 1941 on the eve of the activation of the

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100. Ibid.

20,000 pilot program. The Adjutant General was advised by the Military Personnel Division, OCMC, that the continued failure of the corps area commanders to procure the number recommended for enlistment would result in Air Corps failure to meet its quota of trained personnel under the existing scheduled program.

A special point of difficulty which corps area commanders encountered in meeting their quotas was the fact that the regular examining boards which were under their jurisdiction were located at Air Corps stations. The local commanding officers of these stations had no particular interest in the functioning of these boards which lay outside their control, and in some cases even considered them a nuisance. In the fall of 1941 the feeling at Mitchel Field was that the examining board at that station should be abolished since Mitchel Field was a combat station with little time to devote to examining candidates. The lack of active cooperation which existed on the part of many local station commanders was small help to the corps areas in meeting their quotas. It was, however, an understandable product of the corner in which procurement was handled.

In addition to questions arising over the failure of corps area commanders to meet their quotas, other matters pertaining to procurement arose for consideration. One was the question

103. RF 11, L/04/15 to Air Surgeon, 15 Nov. 1941, in AG 2/11 15, 464th.
of publicity; another, the relation of the Chief of the Air Corps to civilian presses. It concerns that the Adjutant General was more conservative in the type of publicity to be used than were the Air Corps. Publicity schemes which the Air Corps felt had possibilities were rejected by the Adjutant General on one ground or another. This situation was not agreeable to the Chief of the Air Corps who felt that all feasible means should be utilized to promote credit procurement. For example, in December 1940 the Adjutant General reduced the services of 'Warner Brothers' and the movie actor Errol Flynn for stimulating credit procurement. The OCA, however, believed that the offer had "lack of merit." There were also the refusal of corps area commanders to release sufficient funds to Air Corps activities for recruiting publicity and

105. The unsigned outlines relating to correspondence concerning procurement of flying credits, about May 1941. This correspondence covers the period from 13 Jan. 1940 to 27 March 1941, in A/C Br. Files, Procurement and "Recruiting thru 1940." On 7 Dec. 1940, the Executive, "FP, revised Personnel (COL. Farwell) to "keep a file on all projects favorably considered by the Air Corps and rejected by the Adjutant General." This file is in the records of the A/C Br. entitled "Projects Relating to the Procurement of Aviation Credit Uniformly Considered by the Adjutant General." The period covered is from 22 Jan., 1940 to the spring of 1941.

the refusal of the Adjutant General's office to furnish funds for publication of flying cadet literature prepared at Brooks Field. 107

A point was raised, too, over the amount of assistance which the Chief of the Air Corps could offer to the civilian organisations which were engaged in procuring cadets. These groups looked to the Air Corps for advice and encouragement, but the Adjutant General felt that all advice and assistance to these groups should come from his office. In at least one instance he disapproved of the help which the CCAC had advanced to a volunteer agency. In May 1930, a civilian organisation offered its services to the CCAC in record to assist procurement. This office thanked the group for its courtesy and promised to render such assistance as was possible in the form of blanks and publicity material. Then the Adjutant General was informed of this, his attitude was reported by the Assistant Chief of the Personnel Division to be as follows:

The Adjutant General expressed his opinion of our reply to this organisation and stated that the problem of recruiting and responsibility therefore was a function solely of the Adjutant General, and that this office under no condition should encourage actions in regard to recruiting which might not coincide with the policy of the Adjutant General on recruiting, and the desires of the recruiting services in the Corps Area concerned. 108

107. See n. 104 above, correspondence relating to procurement of flying cadets.

In spite of these differences, however, it appears that the administration of procurement functioned fairly smoothly during the period from 1938 to 1941 and that procurement rates generally kept pace with training requirements. This is the more remarkable in view of the fact that the Chief of the Air Corps, the official most interested in procurement, was forced to work through the Adjutant General on the one hand and the corps area commanders on the other with the inevitable delays and delays in policy resulting from such an arrangement.
Chapter II
REVISED PROCEDURES AFTER ENTRY INTO WAR

The entrance of the United States into World War II had an immediate effect upon the procurement of aviation cadets. A popular interest in combat aviation soon manifested itself; the need was for more efficient procurement procedures to accommodate and increase this pool of interested applicants. To this end the recruiting program was modified by revising the requirements for cadet selection, simplifying the mechanics of procurement, and creating the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve. By these means an abundant flow of recruits was insured throughout the first year after America's entrance into the war.

Procurement Objectives

Under the impetus of Pearl Harbor the 30,000 pilot program, authorized in March 1941 and initiated in early October, was increased by 27.7 per cent. Shortly thereafter, this revised program was supplemented by further increases. On 11 January 1942 the Air Adjutant General asked that the pilot training program be expanded to provide for an annual graduating rate of 50,000 pilots during 1942 and 70,000 during 1943. Corresponding to the requirements under the 50,000

2. AAG to CG, 11 Jan. 1942, in ibid.
pilot or 115 Crew Program and the 70,000 pilot or 221 Group Program, proportionsate numbers of bombardier and navigators were to be trained. An annual total of 11,018 bombardiers and 6,400 navigators complemented the 50,000 pilot training program; to round out the 70,000 program an annual total of 14,000 bombardiers and 13,000 navigators was required.

Procurement objectives were in direct relation to the vastly increased aircrew requirements. Prior to Pearl Harbor, quotas for bombardier and navigator assignments were based on the prewar rate of men who had been eliminated from pilot training. Because of new procedures inaugurated in January 1942, however, it was necessary to procure candidates in numbers sufficient to cover not only pilot training demands, but those for bombardier and navigator training as well. In the years before Pearl Harbor, the number of candidates to be procured vastly exceeded the training rate. Approximately one of every five applicants was accepted by the training boards, and the existing elimination rate in the training schools was still high. Compared with the earlier period, however, the number to be procured in the years following Pearl Harbor was substantially greater.

Qualifications

At the need for aircrew candidates grew, the tendency toward

5. Ibid.
liberalization of standards for flying training became more

vexed. After December 1911 this trend was carried to its

logical conclusion with the complete revision of the educational

qualifications, the lowering of the minimum age limit, and the

revision of required examination training. The pressure brought

to modify educational prerequisites had produced results in the

former years. On 15 January 1913 the final step in this direction

was taken with the institution of a single qualifying examination
designed to secure flying suitability. The two-year college

requirement for pilot training was completely abandoned, and a

satisfactory score on the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination

became the sole mental requirement. This examination was given

even as often as circumstances warranted, with a minimal score

adjusted to procurement needs. Those who passed this mental

screening test were accepted for aircrew training only. Their

assignment as bombardiers, pilots, or navigators was determined

on the basis of further classification.

In addition to this change, other less radical revisions

were made in qualifications for aviation cadet appointment. In

the middle of December 1911 corps area commanders were notified


full discussion of the changes made in the educational qualifi-
cations at this time, consult the study entitled Initial

Selection of Candidates for Pilot, Bombardier, and Navigator

Training to 1912.


16 Dec. 1911, in AG/AS Files, Procurement and Recruiting
thru 1915. --

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by The Adjutant General that married men could be accepted for aircrew training provided their dependents had other means of support. Shortly thereafter, this proviso was removed and married men became eligible for appointment on the same terms as single men. On 5 January 1942 the available manpower pool was further enlarged when the age limit for cadet training was reduced from 20 to 18 years. This was an important provision, for it made available for flying training an age bracket not liable to the draft. No change, however, was made in the physical standards until August 1943. These revisions in requirements were significant, for they expanded considerably the manpower pool available for flying training. As a result of these changes over 2,000,000 more men were expected to become eligible immediately for aircrew appointment.

Sources of Supply

The number of candidates applying for flying training from the ranks of the Army substantially increased with the rapid induction of great numbers into the armed services. Directly after the outbreak of war, recruitment for aircrew training from military personnel was restricted to those stationed in the

9. AG to G3's, all Corps Areas (radiogram), 17 Dec. 1941, in G/6 Br. files, Instruction—under New System.
10. AG to all Service Commands (radiogram), 18 Sep. 1942, in G/6 Br. files, Dependency Allowances.
11. WD Circular No. 5, 5 Jan. 1942, Sec. I.
United States. Transportation difficulties coupled with other exigencies of war necessitated this limitation. Any enlisted man or officer within the United States, however, was eligible for aircraft training until he was ordered to a point of embarkation under immediate orders for duty overseas.12 But by the summer of 1943 facilities were available for the return of a certain number of officers and enlisted men from overseas for training. On 23 April the Adjutant General informed the commanders of the overseas commands that a limited amount of enlisted men who could qualify for aviation or signal training and a small number of officers suitable for aircraft training in grade might be sent back to the United States if their commanding officers so desired.13 The quotas established for the return were based on the proportions by strength of the respective overseas commands and the capacities of the training centers in the United States.

With the lowering of aircraft training requirements, the need for aviation students no longer appeared to exist. The change in the minimum requirement and mental standards for aircraft training had eliminated the chief differences between the requirements for aviation cadets and aviation students. The only remaining basic distinction between the two,

exclusive of any allowances for aviation students, by in their respective treatment or promotion. The aviation cadets were commissioned as second lieutenants in the Air Corps of the aviation student are given a permanent rating. It was obvious that no criterion could be consistent, contrary considerations aside, would order that idea led to commission.

It was equally obvious that while many were physically and mentally eligible for aviation cadet training under the new provisions, they were lacking in the qualities of leadership and personality expected of a commissioned officer in the Air Corps. This situation led to the passage of the Flight Officer Act on 8 July 1942. Under the terms of this act, all aviation cadets and aviation students were to be made second lieutenants or flight officers depending on the qualities they exhibited during training. Thus, practically all distinction between aviation cadets and aviation students was eliminated. On 5 November 1942, a directive was issued stating that aviation student training leading to the aeronautical rating of second pilot was to be discontinued as of 1 January 1943. Aviation student training in courses other than pilot was to be decentralized from this to time by the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces.  

15. For a more complete treatment of this act, consult study entitled "Legislation Relating to the Army Air Forces Training Program, 1930-1945."  
16. 1/38 Eb Report (transcript by Lieut. T. Groff); 12 Ft., 50-50, 6 April 1942.
Aviation student status had become, however, negligible in the categories of those assigned to aircraft training.

Although the number entering aircraft training from Army ranks steadily increased, the ratio of procurement continued to be civilian. With the reduction in the age limit, however, and the abolition of the two-year college requirement, the number of candidates from other educational levels soon became as important as the number of college students. Any man with intelligence and an aptitude for flying, "so could meet the high physical qualifications, was needed to fulfill the need for combat aircraft production rates."

Change in Administrative Procedure

Concurrent with the revisions in requirements for aviation combat training, important administrative changes were made in procurement procedures. In the period before Pearl Harbor, the preliminary work in connection with procurement had been decentralized, and the corps areas were responsible for processing candidates until they were forwarded to the CGSC for final review. After being approved in the CGSC, candidates were placed on the "cleared candidates" eligibility list. If they were needed, they were enlisted by the Adjutant General and sent to training. This procedure, acceptable in routine, was unsuitable to the exigencies of war. Consequently, complete decentralization was
effected. Corps areas were made responsible not only for processing applications and holding enlistments but for examining, enlistment, and enlisting candidates to training. 17

The new system authorized on 12 December 1912 became effective on 15 January 1913. Final action was taken on all candidates by the examining boards. 18 Applications were sent to the Chief of the Air Corps only in special cases. Examining boards were authorized to enlist or appoint immediately or withdraw cadets, qualified candidates up to the limit of their respective quotas. These quotas were channeled from the Adjutant General to corps area headquarters where they were promulgated to the individual boards. Boards were also authorized to grant furloughs to newly appointed cadets for periods of not more than 30 days when instructions from the corps area commanders made such action necessary. 19 With this directive for the immediate enlistment and assignment to training by examining boards, the practice of maintaining an eligibility list in the CGSC for future enlistment by the Adjutant General was abandoned. 20 This final step in the decentralization of cadet procurement further removed the CGSC from procurement matters.

Under the new system authority to establish all Aviation

18. Ibid.
Cadet Examining Boards rested with corps area commanders or other commanding officers appointed by The Adjutant General. Every effort was made to set up these procurement units wherever they were needed and wherever facilities for their establishment could be made readily available. By the summer of 1942 there were between two and three hundred Aviation Cadet Examining Boards functioning throughout the country.

At about the same time the number of Traveling Aviation Cadet Examining Boards was enlarged, and a novel means for occasional use in transporting them was introduced. In the fall of 1940 the Air Corps had recommended that trailers be used by the traveling boards in order to reach potential candidates in places far from cities where permanent or traveling boards were functioning. At that time the proposal was rejected, but about the first of January 1942 the project was revived, this time by The Adjutant General. Fairly soon, large vans emblazoned with aviation cadet advertising were touring the country. These trailers were equipped to give both the mental screening test and the physical examination. Furthermore, these units were an excellent advertising medium. As they were highly mobile they were to visit remote sections of the country.

The added responsibilities placed on the examining boards as a result of changes in administrative procedures necessitated this increase in their number and scope.

The Air Corps Enlisted Reserve

The complete decentralization of recruiting caused by the lowered aircraft qualifications and the desire of men for combat training produced a large number of recruits in the first part of 1942. Due to the thoroughness of the examining boards and lack of coordination between the Adjutant General and the OMAE in setting the new system under way, the training centers were soon over burdened. It became apparent that some system must be found to handle efficiently the excess number of qualified candidates who could not be immediately accommodated at the training centers. To meet this anticipated increase in requirements, the training facilities were extended, the recruiting program had to push steadily forward in order not to lose the momentum provided by publicity for the recruiting program.

Under the new system, examining boards were authorized to give furloughs to those candidates who could not be sent immediately to school. à Cás on furlough were paid $75 a month and a daily ration allowance of 1. A consequence of the fact

1. "Aviation Orders, Instructions and Orders." For a more detailed discussion of the difficulties encountered at this time consult study onoment of fiers' needs, bin-roduced in 35-AE.

that recruitment was increasing more readily than training facilities could expand, the expenditure of a great deal of money with no immediate return in service. As a result, in March 1918 the Adjutant General revised this furlough system. All aviation cadets who were not immediately required to clause and who did not require temporary duty in the Corps enlisted were placed on furlough or retired. They were not to be re-enlisted aviation cadets until just before they went to training. This reduced the expense considerably but was not an entirely satisfactory arrangement.

Since September 1916 the Chief of the Air Corps had recommended the creation of the grade of Reserve Aviation Cadet in the Air Corps Section of the Enlisted Reserve. This aim permitted the enlistment of partially trained aviation cadets and their placement on an inactive status until called to duty. This seemed to be the most effective way to maintain a ready reservoir of potential student pilots who would not be subject to the draft or lost to the Army or industry. From the beginning of the creation process, one of the perennial procurement problems had been the maintenance of a satisfactory barrel of cadets in order to insure a controlled flow of recruits.

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73. Here for Gen. Arnold by Maj. J. E. March 1917, in AAC 61. 61, 63.
74. A/G Br. records (transcript by J. E. Horsford).
75. In World War I such a system was tried. Before being called to duty, flying cadets were members of the Aviation Section of the Enlisted Reserve Corps. An aviation trade had been successfully created in the naval Reserve.
into training. To the CAS the establishment of an Enlisted Reserve Corps appeared the best way to meet this situation.

Consequently, in the fall of 1940 General Arnold recommended the enlistment of qualified enlistment potential candidates in the Enlisted Reserve Corps.\(^20\) This recommendation was disapproved by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, who felt that an enlisted reservist could be in a position to avoid the draft, and this would create unfavorable publicity for the Air Corps.\(^20\) In a renewed recommendation on 11 October the Chief of the Air Corps denied this charge, asserting that an enlistment enlistment in the Reserve of trained and skilled trained would be immediately ordered to active duty in the enlisted cadre or discharged and his draft board notified of his availability.\(^21\) But the proposal was again unfavorably considered, this time by the Assistant General. His reasons for opposing were that procurement up proceeded at a satisfactory rate and that, therefore, the institution of such a system at that time was unnecessary.\(^33\)

In the spring of 1941, concurrently with the initiation of the 50,000 pilot program, the request was again made.\(^33\) At this time the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 concurred in the

\(^{20}\) Memo for Gen. Arnold by Lt. Col. J.C. Duncan, 13 Sep. 1940, in 1/1 Dr. Files, Procurement and Recruiting files 1940.
\(^{21}\) Memo or NS by Dr. Col. V.E. Skol, 13/S, G-1, 11 Sep. 1940, in IC 111/5, G-1.
\(^{33}\) Memo for Secretary, 27/3 by NS, 11 Oct. 1940, in ibid.
\(^{37}\) Memo for Chief of Staff by Maj. Gen. George V. Brett, 2 March 1941, in ibid.
main corrections of the Chief of the Air Corps but took
exception to two points: (1) the clause which would refuse
discharge to aviation cadets from the Reserve Corps in order to
enlist in the Navy; and (2) the unlimited extension of Reserve
aviation cadets from the draft. We suggested that all such
cadets not remain to train for the end of four months be
discharged from the Reserve. The Adjutant General, however,
was disapproved, stating that it was impossible to comply
with the Staff Directive authorizing aviation cadet Reserve
status without a long period of study within the Air Department
and the establishment of such corps area of proper machinery to
function on this project. On 30 June 1941 the Military
Personnel Division, CGC, reported that the plan had been
disapproved by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air but on the
advice of higher Air Department personnel was re-embodied because
of administrative difficulties involved in denning it in
execution.

During the summer of 1941 a situation existed which made
even more pressing the need for some change in procedure. The
number of applicants qualifying for flight training was steadily
increasing, and the need for those even more imperative.

71. Views for Chief of Staff by Col. Gen. Wade H. Haeckel, 10/3,
0-1, 13 Nov 1941, in ibid.
72. Tap No. 7, Chief, LCD to Executive, 24 June 1941, in ibid.
73. Tap, Chief, LCD to Executive, 26 June 1941, in 10-3 Br. files,
Staff of Chief, Adjutant General.
Nevertheless, because of limited training facilities, we were often obliged to wait many months before we received to training. A steady stream of complaints and queries poured into the various corps area headquarters and were in turn forwarded to Air Corps Headquarters in Washington. The resulting publicity was most unfavorable to the Air Corps. One day of a junior college wrote to the Chief of the Air Corps about the first of September recounting a student who had been appointed for training in the middle of May, and stated that "If he has not been called within the next few days he remains the worst applicant for the Air Corps in this vicinity." 37 Corps area officers found it difficult to explain and reconcile the vast need for pilots with the failure to call all claimable. 38

Meanwhile, the Adjutant General had offered two alternative suggestions to clear up the situation. The first possibility was the immediate enlistment of all qualified candidates, not for the Reserve, but for enrollment in a reception center for ground training until they could be reenlisted at flying schools. 39 The second was to enlist immediately all candidates.
and place them on furlough until space was available for flying training.

Both the Training and Military Personnel divisions of the C&O, however, objected to the former suggestions on the grounds that it would seriously impair the morale of aviation cadets to be assigned to ground training indefinitely. Nor was the furlough system regarded with favor since the cost appeared prohibitive. On 17 September 1941 the Chief of the Military Personnel division estimated that "If the candidates now on the eligible list for aviation cadet appointment (C550) as it now stands were to be enlisted and placed on furlough, it would entail the expenditure of $27,625 a day." Both recommendations were subsequently set aside, for by the fall of 1941 it appeared that innovations in the training program and the enlarged classes under the 30,000 pilot program would for the time eliminate immediate difficulties. But after Pearl Harbor the great number of men who qualified for direct training could not be assimilated, even at the expanded training centers. Consequently, then the request for the enlistment of qualified aviation cadets was made for the third time, it was favorably

40. R&E, Chief, IEO to Executive, 30 June 1941, in C/O Br. files, Loss of Cadet Candidates.
41. R&E, T/O to IEO, 23 June 1941, in C/O 221 E, Cadets; R&E, Chief, IEO to Executive, 30 June 1941, in C/O Br. files, Loss of Cadet Candidates; Memo for Colonel Brev by J. B. Yves, Chief, C/O Sec., 17 Sep. 1941, in C/O Br. files, Procurement and Recruiting thru 1942.
received, and on 1 April 1942 the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve was established. The quota system under which the aviation flight examiner boards had been enlisting recruits for training was abandoned, and from April to December 1942 all civilian applicants enlisted for aviation or aircraft training were enlisted in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve, minus call to active duty. College students who wished to continue their education were enlisted in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve on a deferred basis. Thus three courses lay open to those enlisting for aviation or aircraft training: Men from 18 to 25 in or out of school might take the physical and mental examinations and enlist for active duty or enlist in the Army Air Corps (unarmed), converted for aviation or aircraft training or facilities become available. Or such applicants after examination might enlist in the Air Corps or the Army to be called to active duty and be converted aviation or aircraft training; then such training was possible. Or college men who enlisted in the reserve might be deferred until graduation, subject to call by direction of the Secretary of War in the case of necessity."

The Air Corps Enlisted Reserve program was launched with an intensive recruiting drive in the spring of 1942. The purpose of the drive was not only to secure immediate recruits, but to...
establish solid relations with the educational institutions of
the country which would insure a continuous stream of properly
qualified recruits into the AAF. The manner in which this
campaign was carried out illustrates the way in which the AAF
cooperated with those actually responsible for procurement.

Special aviation cadet boards were dispatched under the auspices
of the AAF. Thirty-two of these special boards were appointed
by the First and Second Air Forces and the three AAF training
centers. Although the project was undertaken by the AAF to
augment the efforts of The Adjutant General and the corps area
commanders, the recruiting activities were coordinated with
the stationary and traveling flying cadet boards and the corps
area headquarters.

Fairly comprehensive plans were made for conducting this
drive. Specific attention was focused on 150 large colleges
throughout the country. Approximately 1,200 other colleges
and 26,000 high schools were associated with the activities
conducted on the campuses of the major colleges. Each
board was composed of a senior air officer and a lieutenant who
had recently completed his training. Whenevver possible the

45. Memo for A/C Br. by Geyer, Cornell and Swenell [about July
1942], in A/C Br. files, Recruiting.
46. Hq., AAF to CDS, AFCGFC, AFCGFC, Second Air Force,
First Air Force, 1 April 1942, in A/C Br. files, College
Procurement.
47. Memo for A/C Br. by Geyer, Cornell and Swenell [about July
1942], in A/C Br. files, Recruiting.
lieutenant were selected from the locality to which the board was being dispatched. The officers appointed as presidents of the boards were sent to AM headquarters for a short indoctrination course before the program began. Meanwhile letters were addressed to college presidents regarding the most convenient dates for the arrival of their special boards.

At the same time college faculty AM advisors were informed about the details of the program. These advisors served as a link between the representatives of the corps over continents and the AM on the one hand and the student body on the other. Eventually many high schools and preparatory schools throughout the country also established this effective liaison with the AM.

By the end of November 1942, there were about 1,000 faculty advisors distributed throughout 1,700 colleges in the country and an additional 10,000 in 23,000 of the country's high schools. The New York advertising firm of Cramer, Cornell and Frey was authorized by the AM to prepare the advertising for newspapers and college publications and to arrange the portfolio of instructions.

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94. Lt., AM, to OCP, FM 750, FM 760, FM 770, FM 780, 23 April 1942, in A/G Br. File, College Procurement.
96. Revised 23, AM Air Force Aviation Cadet Program Including New Instructed Reserve Plan, effective 6 April 1942.
to be used by the special AE boards. Only promotional activity
was carried on during the first visit. At these meetings held
on the college campuses talks were given and regimental items
were distributed. A feature of these visits devoted to general
Army activities and a special nation-wide training film
were shown. This was followed a week or two later by a second visit during which the actual recruit-
ing took place.52

This first really large-scale procurement drive produced
very excellent results in terms of certain "unfertile" recruits.
There were evidences of lack of organization. Many of the officers
traveling with the boards were not entirely suited for public
relations work. Funds were limited for certain promotional
schemes. There was often not enough time elapsing between the
first visit of a board to a college and the second during which the
recruiting was done. It was estimated that about 85,000
college students attended these meetings. Of these about
10,000 showed an interest in the program. By July 1942,
6,000 college students had actually been enrolled, and many
more candidates were expected to materialize under the program.
Moreover, the experience of handling a nation-wide campaign had

52. Note by Col. G. E. Hawes, Maj. Col. John
H. Evans, 6 April 1942, in /3 BR Jobs, College Recruitment.
been acquired, and valuable lessons had been learned from the
winter war. And excellent relations had been established with
college students and college newspapers throughout the country. 37

In addition to the publicity directed at colleges and high
school students during this spring recruitment drive, general
publicity during this first war of our continued along the lines
previously established. The tone of this publicity, however, was
both more intense and more competitive. An excellent example
of national advertising was the promotion by the AAF Public
Relations Branch of the Warner Brothers short, "Train Your
Son." By the end of 1942, this picture had been presented
at 7,000 theaters, while an additional 1,500 theaters had agreed
to show it. By the time the bookings were closed, it was esti-
inated that this movie could have been shown at 11,000 theaters.
In addition to the theatrical run, the Public Relations Branch
planned to show this picture widely in the non-theatrical field.
It was felt that eventually every section of the country could
be able to see this short film—quite a boost to aviation cadet
recruiting. 38

In the spring efforts were made to maintain strict control
over all advertising so that in the midst of the excited rec-
trition, attention upon the declaration of war, no deviations

33. Aviation Cadet Talented Reserve Report for Col. F. E. Devine,
AAF, by Col. Arthur L. Cook, AAF Public Relations Officer,
15 July 1942, in C/O Dr. Miler, Publicity Branch,

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from established War Department policy would occur. All local advertising aid for or privately sponsored was cleared through the Adjutant General's office on through the various corps area recruiting and induction officers. All advertising released on a national basis by the Adjutant General's Office coordinated with the Directorates of Legislative Planning and the office of the Secretary of War.

While the M3 was building up its Reserve by intensified publicity efforts, other corps and services of the Army as well as the Navy and Marine Corps were adopting similar procedures. With the entry of the United States into the war, competition among the three branches of the service for recruit candidates became increasingly keen. At times, one branch of the service resorted to needle-race methods. Coordination of recruiting activities was needed in order to eliminate friction. Under the auspices of the Joint Army and Navy Board, commands were drawn up which sought to remove the competitive features of the college reserve system. On 1 June 1942 the Joint Army and Navy Personnel Board outlined procedures for the "Enlist in and Commission of College Students in the Reserve of the arm of Service." Inflows greater for reserve enlistment were expected.

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according to specific needs of the individual services. Provision was made for the fact that once a college maintained Army R.O.T.C. units and others only R.O.T.C. units, exclusively. Here a service maintained an exclusive R.O.T.C. unit in a given college, its permanent interest was recognized, but procedure were established for transferring rots from one reserve to another.37

In September 1942 this agreement was modified slightly. While the principle of the original plan remained unchanged, details were altered to clarify the shift from a college Army R.O.T.C. unit to the Naval Reserve, and conversely.38

In the late summer of 1942, plans were made to extend the reserve program of the various services to college students throughout the country. Joint Army-Navy-Marine Corp boards were established to visit the larger institutions and explain to the student bodies the opportunities offered by the individual services.39 The AAF made a special effort to see that it was represented by officers well equipped to get the public, for the Navy consistently offered the best aviation cadet material, and the AAF was the most to direct its own training of student cadets.40

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37. 32 FR 65-600, 37 FR 1978
38. 32 FR 65-600, 16 Oct. 1942, in A/C DR. Miller,
39. 32 FR 65-600, 18 Nov. 1943, in A/C DR. Miller,
40. 32 FR 65-600, 18 Nov. 1943, in A/C DR. Miller,
41. 32 FR 65-600, 18 Nov. 1943, in A/C DR. Miller,
Joint Army-Navy Aviation Code Procurement Considered

In an effort to eliminate this competition between the Army and the Navy, the possibility of selecting a common aviation code procurement was raised and discussed during the first year of the year. On June 13th, a conference was held between the officer in charge of the Reserve Section, Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Chief of the Army Aviation Code Section, Military Personnel Division. At this meeting procurement procedures utilized by each service were considered. It was found that the required qualifications for both Army and Navy training were such that the selection of candidates for aviation code training, however, differed considerably. Since 15 January 1942 the War Department had relied on the Recruiting Service of the Adjutant General's Office not only for the procurement, but also for the selection of candidates for aviation code training. The Navy Department utilized its recruiting service solely for original procurement. The final responsibility for the selection of candidates rested with the Naval Aviation Code Selection Board which were composed of highly-qualified medical examiners and naval aviators.

Continuous contact was maintained between the Naval Bureau of Personnel and the selection boards. This was not true in the Navy. In spite of these differences, however, it appeared possible to secure a mutually satisfactory joint procurement arrangement.

After the preliminary discussion, an A-H committee was appointed to prepare a detailed plan for A-1: a basis for further discussion with the Navy. On 19 June 1942 this committee met in the office of the Air Surgeon. It was composed of representatives of the Aviation Cadet Section, the Adjutant General's office, A-1, the Office of the Air Surgeon, and the Directorate of Legislative Planning. As a result of this conference the following recommendations were made: (1) A Joint Army and Navy board should be composed to supervise all publicity connected with the recruiting of aviation cadets for both the Army and Navy. (2) All enlistment facilities of both the Army and Navy should be made available for the recruiting of cadets for either service. Preliminary physical examinations and mental screening tests similar to those in current use by the Army could be employed in the selection of all candidates. Those who met the requirements should be assigned to a general pool. Final determination of qualifications could be made at classification centers or preflight schools according to the services of the particular service after the candidate had been assigned from the aviation cadet pool. (3) All candidates should be enlisted in a Joint Army and Navy Cadet Reserve Corps. Upon enlistment each cadet should state the branch of the service with which he desired to train, and he should then be received according to his
The project, however, was not executed because certain of the problems involved proved too difficult. The main obstacle lay in the fact that the needs of the two branches differed considerably. The number of men required for flying training by the Army was much greater than that required by the Navy. Furthermore, all naval aviation cadets were naturally pilots and only incidentally bombardiers and navigators. Like the Army, the Navy gave a preliminary examination related to its regular needs. This examination stressed technical aptitude while that of the Army tested for mathematics, intelligence, and comprehension in all. Neither service chose to adopt the screening test of the other, and it did not seem that the two examinations in their existing forms could be reconciled. Thus the recommendation was dropped. Other aspects of the proposed plan, however, such as the joint supervision of publicity and the common utilization of procurement facilities, were revived for further consideration.63

Problem of Common Nomenclature-Fall of 1912

In spite of the competition offered by other services, the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve was swollen to large proportions by

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63. Chaired memo, 1 Aug. 1912, in A/CC 2114, C-6/MC.
64. See 61, p. 112 ff.
the fall of 1942. There were 50,000 Enlisted Reservists of whom one-fifth were on deferred status. There were in addition about 20,000 enlisted men in the Army awaiting call to training. As the quota system had been abandoned when the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve became the medium for recruiting, there was no limitation on the number of men who could be held for aircrew training. Records indicate that 13,000 men were being accepted for appointment as aviation cadets monthly, while only 10,000 were being assigned to training. Consequently, the number of candidates available for training was increasing at the rate of about 3,000 a month. 65

Although it would have been possible to restrict the number of enlistments per month to the number assigned to training in the previous month, this was not desirable. The policy of the AAF was to maintain at least a six-month supply of candidates to avoid the possibility of failing to meet sudden increases in the training rate. 66 It was therefore necessary to hold any man who qualified for training in reserve rather than run the risk of losing him through the draft. But in so doing the AAF was faced with a difficult public relations problem. To meet expected expansion schedules, recruiting efforts had to continue while simultaneously a supply of qualified men was at hand impatiently awaiting assignment.

It had been estimated that the establishment of the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve would eliminate this phase of the procurement problem. But we apparently were no more content to rest on Enlisted Reserves than they had been on a non-reserve status. Corps area headquarters continued to advise Air Force commanders of the importance and direction of those who had left schools and jobs execute immediate call to duty only to find themselves with the training heavily.\footnote{67} This had a bad effect not only on their morale, but on that of their friends and families and rebounded unfavorably to the ACT.

In order to maintain good relations with the public it became imperative in the fall of 1942 to receive all potential trainees of their precise prospects. Public relations officers were instructed to give wide publicity to the fact that men did not be called to training for six months after they were enlisted in the Reserve. Candidates were told not to leave their schools or jobs until they were actually called to duty. At the same time, however, emphasis was laid on the fact that the overall need for all qualified men would be vast.\footnote{68}

The overwhelming numbers of men in the aviation pool in the fall of 1942 had the high point in the number available for service training. Late in 1942


innovations in the training program, coupled with a rapid
tightening up of the national consumer credit, necessitated a
complete reconsideration of the eviction credit procurement
program.
"Ahead of Schedule"
An AAF Report on the Aviation Cadet Program
Chapter III

PROBLEM CREATED BY ELABORATION OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT

The increased intensity of the war and the growing need for enlarged forces had put great demands on the diminishing supply of national manpower. Steps taken in the fall of 1942 to expand this pool and insure to all branches of the service a fair share of the available supply had a significant effect on the procurement of cadets. On 15 November 1942 the draft age was lowered to include men 18 and 19 years old. This amendment to the National Selective Training and Service Act, which made liable to the draft an age bracket heavily relied on for cadet training, was followed by an executive order of 5 December 1942 terminating all voluntary enlistments after 15 December 1942. Henceforth all recruits for flying training who were not in the Army could be reached only through Selective Service procedures. The strict controls applied to the flow of personnel from civilian to military life necessitated a complete reconsideration of the cadet procurement program. Throughout the greater part of 1943 measures were taken to adjust procurement to the emergency manpower situation so that training schedules might be met.

1. 56 Stat. 1018.
2. 48 Circular No. 307, 7 Dec. 1942, Sec. 1.
Procurement Objectives

The requirements for pilot, bombardier, and navigator training continued to rise steadily. On 10 October 1943, directive from the Secretary of War ordered pilot production increased to an annual rate of 100,000 by the end of the calendar year 1944. This order was officially released on 10 April 1945 for an ultimate training goal of 200,000 pilots to be reached by December 1945, an increase of 100,000 over the training goal set early in 1943. In addition, 10,000 bombardiers and 12,000 navigators were to be trained annually. In the summer of 1943, the rate was raised to 90,000 pilots a year with proportionate increases in the number of other aircrew members to be trained annually.

In an earlier year, procurement objectives for pilot, bombardier, and navigator training for exceeded the normal peacetime monthly rates. The attainment of these objectives under the new regulations was much more difficult than it had been in the previous war. Under the new peacetime quotas were established for the various areas of the service. In determining the necessary number of men to be trained, the number allotted to the Air Force, the Secretary of War submitted his requests to The Adjutant General of the Army.
General for presentation to the Joint Army-Navy Personnel Board. On approval by the board, the quotas were broken down by The Adjutant General and forwarded to the service commands.

The original quotas for the greater part of 1945 called for a total of 9,000 recruits in February, 54,000 in March, and 17,000 for the remaining months of the calendar year. It was anticipated that enlisted men in the Army would furnish about 5,000 of the total monthly intake. Apparently these figures were subsequently revised, and the quota was raised to 44,000 for March, and thereafter to 18,702 monthly to meet increased training objectives planned for the summer. This latter figure remained constant for the balance of 1945.

By the first of April, however, it was apparent that these monthly training quotas were not being met. With the call to active duty of Enlisted Reservists and the assignment of the bulk of them to training during January, February, March, and early April, the JAP had to rely upon the number of candidates procured from month to month. The sources of supply, however, were not yielding adequate numbers.

Procurement for the first five months of 1945 declined to such an extent that by the first of June there was an accumulated deficit of 49,517 in the number necessary to meet the current training program. An

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8. Ibid.
10. See below, 82 ff.
even flow of 12,700 a month had to be provided and this shortage had to be made up. Prompt deliveries could result in overwhelming the pilot, bombardier, and navigator production and would be most detrimental to the war effort.

Consequently, throughout the various ranks of the Air Force, steps were taken to promote the flow of personnel into aircrew training from both civilian and military sources. The following aspects of the procurement process were examined in the attempt to meet the deficit in the crew: publicity restrictions, advertising; personnel relations between the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, and the Adjutant General, and the service commands; and the available sources of supply. There were four sources upon which the AAF could draw during 1943. These four were the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve, 17-year-old recruits coming of age, voluntary inductees from civilian life, and men already in the Army—including those who volunteered for flying training at reception centers.

Sources of Supply

Air Corps Enlisted Reserve

The Air Corps Enlisted Reserve was the first source upon which the AAF drew to fill the training needs in the calendar year 1943. In the fall of 1942 the Secretary of War had

17. Memo for Gen. Knox by Lt. Col. S. Pitch, 6 May 1943, in
1/5 Tr. File, "Recruitment and Recruiting thru 1942."
recommended that "it is now proposed that by the end of the college term or semester beginning in December, those student members of the Reserve who have reached active service or drill, or who are called to active duty, and that those remaining that are during subsequent terms will be called." The phrase "for the next year" was inserted for the benefit of the enrollment in order that it might continue to maintain a qualified body of candidates on inactive duty to be called to classes as needed. College students called into the army would not necessarily be called to active duty or the end of the college term, or any other time. Students called in subsequent terms necessarily be called to active duty. "Before college students or not, all list is necessary would not be called to active duty until they were needed to fill active or drill classes. College students and college officials, therefore, proceeded on the assumption that the status and would be continued. Under the intensity of the war, this expectation was not realized. The limitation of voluntary enlistment was the end of the Army in the United States armistice. Many of the army was called through the introduction of a new training service on demand."
This new program was introduced because the AF had for some time recognized the need of qualified officers training to
meet its needs. Since the reduction of educational
standards in January 1942, a large proportion of the men accepted
for basic training were no longer college trained, and the need
for more educational substitute soon became apparent. The
program instituted at this time was intended to give air
cadets some background for the more technical training they
would receive when they entered aircrew training. In order to
put this college program into operation, it was necessary in January
1943 to call to active duty all officers of the Air Corps En-
dlisted Reserve including college students. It was expected
that all Enlisted Reservists could report to the AC basic
training centers for aircrew training on or before 1 April 1943.

This reversal of an earlier policy to offer college students
was not well received by many college bureaucrats and students.
The introduction of a new form of training and the suspension
of voluntary enlistment, however, made this step necessary.

15. Initial Selection of Cadet for Pilot, Bombardier, and
Navigator Training; 2/68.49. records (transcribed by Miss E.
Spencer).
16. Transcripts were made, however, in the case of those students
who had been enrolled in a term that commenced prior to 31
December 1942. They were not to be called up until the
conclusion of the current term. Transmitted, 2/4:49.49, to
college commanders, 27 June 1943, in A/C 49.49.06,
College Procurement.
17. A/C 49.49.06. records, folder entitled Letters to Colleges, contain
correspondence on this subject.
The monthly recruiting for January, February, March, and early April were largely composed of inductees of the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve.

Seventeen-Year-Old Enlisted Reserve

As the pool of the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve was depleted, recruit classes were reorganized to form a larger and important group from which the Air Force could draw for replacement to training. In January 1943 the control of Air Corps Enlisted Reserve had been extended to 17-year-old youths. As a result of the precedent in the National Selective Training and Service Act of 17 October 1940, which reduced the draft age to 18, there was an obvious need for a group which could serve in the Air Force's reserve of the qualified youths arriving at age 17 each month. Since January 1943, the age limit for enlistment in the Enlisted Reserve had been reduced to 18, this younger group, not subject to the draft, had been the civilian reservoir upon which the Air Corps was able to draw heavily. After the middle of 1943 the need for this pool ceased.

Therefore, two days before the passage of the Selective Service Act, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff advised the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, that the age limit for enlistment in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve be reduced to 17 years, such recruits to be
called to active duty when they reached their sixteenth birthday. On 10 December 1941 the Assistant Chief of Staff, O-2, forwarded this proposal to the Chief of Staff. He emphasized the fact that of 50,000 men who turned 18 each month, a definite proportion had to be reserved for Army Air Corps training. Since the executive order of 6 December 1940 did not prohibit the voluntary enlistment of men under 18 years of age, by authorizing the enlistment in the Flyer Corps Reserve for men in the 17-year-old bracket, a partial solution to the difficulties involved in this restriction would be found. Within six months after the enlisted reservist had reached 18 he could be ordered to active duty.

On 17 January 1941 the Military Personnel Division of the Services of Supply received a staff directive authorizing the voluntary enlistment in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve of all 17-year-old provided they were otherwise qualified for military service and parental consent had been secured. Reservists were to be called to training within six months after they had reached their sixteenth birthday.

Once this proposal was authorized, the 17-year-old reservists were called to training within six months after they had reached their sixteenth birthday.

turning 17 every month. There was little variation in terms of ability that the younger group furnished excellent material for aviation craft training. Figures assembled from a routine of several service commands toward the end of April indicated that the percentage of candidates 17 to 18 years old qualifying for aviation craft training was far greater than the percentage found earlier in the 18 to 19-year bracket. It was established that the records of distinction at training schools were much lower among the younger candidate.\(^1\)

Moreover, the physical stamina of a combat fighter known to decrease sharply in his early older.\(^2\) In terms of numbers, also, the 17-year-old group was a very necessary source of recruits.

Therefore considerable anxiety was occasioned in the AF

then toward the first of May the War Air Force Command decided this necessity for the continued recruit of 17-year-olds for the Air Force manned force. On 7 May the command informed the Office of War Information (OWI) that "until further notice, the recruitment of seventeen-year-olds is definitely disapproved and should not be allowed in any case."\(^2\)

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On 11 June the Commandant General of the US addressed a letter to Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Munitions Commission, expressing the need for 17-year-old reservists. General Arnold stated that only volunteers were trained for service, and of these candidates, unless willing, apt, met with physical and mental standards, the field for such recruits was limited. Since only a few of the aged reserve could not furnish more than half of the required number and in the reality of 12 to 13-year-old civilians capable of the physical work, 17-year-olds were urgently needed. The caliber and size of the pool of 17-year-olds was emphasized, and the letter concluded: "It is important that you instrumental in the seventeen year old age group be thoroughly indoctrinated with the desire to serve their nation on combat lines." Eventually this letter together with other controversial policies of the War Munitions Commission was turned over for settlement to James F. Byrnes, the Director of War Mobilization.

Byrnes directed that the Army and Navy continue to enlist men under 18 on enlistment orders. These young men were to be sent to active service immediately upon completion of their school term. In no case were they to be called to duty.

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later than six months after their eighteenth birthday. Furthermore, each month the Adjutant General was to furnish the "for
"on-radar correlation with the number of 17-year-olds enlisted in
the Air Force Volunteer Reserve, the number in that category
already called to active duty, and the number expected to be
called to active duty in the following month."

Of more than 10,000 boys who reached 17 years of age each
month, it was estimated that 10,000 could be expected to enlist
for aviation cadet training if they were convinced of its advan-
tage. The rate of enrollment, however, did not come up to
expectations. By the first of July 1947 the number enrolled
in the Volunteer Reserve was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>3,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>2,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>3,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>3,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>3,181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appeared that the "boy-conducting more effective
protest to interest 17-year-olds in military aviation. The
Army ordered local buttons to be given to the boys who were enlisted in the
reserve, and the Air Force advised that as much contact was possible
be made from these sources in order to secure the maximum publicity for
17-year-old enlisted "recruits." The Adjutant General and

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24. See also 10/13, Personnel by Col. Perry E. Coile, 10 July
1947, in "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets and 17
Year Olds," study 19, prepared in Plans and Operations Division,
10/113, Personnel.
The service cadets were informed of this policy. A typical orientation ceremony was conducted under the direction of the 1st Later Command at Mitchel Field, L.I., N.Y. All the cadets of the Greater New York area schools were invited to the field to inspect the equipment, to listen to short talks by pilots and bombardiers, and to witness, on the feature event, the presentation of an aviation cadet level button to one idle school boy enrolled in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve. On the Fourth of July ceremonies of a similar nature were held at many of the Air Corps stations and in many cities throughout the country.

The Air Force, however, was able to offer to the young men who enlisted in the Enlisted Reserve such more tangible aid of action in its W1-2 program than the mere issue of a level button during a year of inactivity.

The Air Force acted immediately on the realization that this enlistment recruit, called him to active duty on an imaginative scene, put him in uniform, and sent him to college. The Air Force, furthermore, had conducted a vigorous campaign to sell the idea secondary school students with the advantages of the program. It had established contacts with practically every high school in the country and maintained, in cooperation with school authorities, honor or honor roll-
for the men of those enlisted in the Naval Reserve. While the
Navy did not actually recruit cadets in such numbers as to
offset seriously AT procurement, it did offer such an excellent
immediate program that the return of the crew was diverted to
real aviation cadet training. Under the law, rollout the boy
to on his twentieth birthday enlisted in the reserve could
not be called to duty until his sixteenth birthday. Consequently,
for 16 months the youth remained in a state of suspended activity
waiting his call to the Air Corps. The Navy had a much more
constructive course of action for the alert and intelligent young
men the desired flying training.

In the summer of the spring of 1927, the Chief of the
Aviation Bureau strongly desired the assistance of the
Army program to counteract the Navy. He urged
that the Army offer the same advantages to those extended by
the Navy for the training of 17-year-olds and recommended that
a pre-entrance aviation cadet program be immediately established
to catch the boy young for seventeen year olds.

In the early part of June the Chief of the Special Projects
Office requested information from the Air Force Cadet recordin-

the possibility of training 17-year-old recruits on an active or
an inactive status.\textsuperscript{72} It was decided in reply that although
the 17-year-old Enlisted Reserve unit locally be called to
active or inactive before reaching 18, such a unit could not
readily be resubmitted without congressional action or a
revision of the Department policy. An interpretation placed upon
the amendment of 19 May 1940 of the National Defense Act permitted
the enlistment of men under 18 years of age only if they were
enlisted on an inactive status. To meet legislative restriction
as to age, 16 and under the enlistment of men was barred. Hence,
the unit could not readily resubmit under 18 for active duty
and training.\textsuperscript{73}

While it was possible to train 17-year-olds on an inactive
status, it could involve some conflicts with the existing
military policy. Persons so trained could not be entitled to any
allowances or subject to military discipline or control. If
from Army instruction, they could not be allowed the protection

\textsuperscript{72} 35 W. 117th St., Col. T. L. F. D. 1st, Special Service
Office, to L. T. F. D. 1st, 25 June 1942, in
"Procurement and Training of Enlisted C's 17 Year Olds."

\textsuperscript{73} The Senate 1940, supra note 1, at p. 1771, states that locally
enlisted men on an inactive status pursuant to the 19
May 1940 amendment to the National Defense Act, could then
be called to active duty. However, in view of the definite
restrictions imposed due to manpower, and their recent prior
enlistment to the effect that they would not be called to
active training before reaching 18, they could not be called
in and forthcoming, to call up the recruits would
be a breach of congressional policy as expressed in the amend-
ment of 19 May 1940. Memo for JAG by Col. Charles J. West,
in April 1942, in file.
of insurance at government expense authorized for aviation cadets and aviation students. In order to train these individuals in an inactive status, legislative action would again have to be taken.

However, on 22 June 1943 the Director of War Mobilization, James F. Byrnes, in arbitrating the differences between the Army and the Navy on the one hand, and the War Manpower Commission and the Office of War Information on the other, stated that the Army and Navy could call up the 17-year-old reservists immediately on enlistment. This seemed to give the AAF the authority it needed. The terms of this authority were confusing, however, and the Chief of the Aviation Cadet Branch proceeded to investigate its meaning. He was informed by G-1 that it had not been the intention of the Byrnes memorandum to permit the call to active duty of boys before they reached their eighteenth birthday. G-1 emphasized the fact that the provisions of the July 1941 amendment to the National Defense Act did not permit the War Department to make such a regulation. Thus, despite the statement made by the Director of War Mobilization and despite the fact that 17-year-olds qualifying for cadet training could be called

35. James F. Byrnes to H. L. Stimson, etc., 22 June 1943, in A/C Br. files, Publicity.
36. Chronology of Action, introduction to "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds."
to active duty locally. Our present policy is opposed to such a concept.

In the meantime, the Special Projects Office continued its investigation of the problem and reached the conclusion that the present authority to induct seventeen-year-olds and send them to the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve until call to active duty at age 18 is not an adequate solution to reach the number required to be conscripted for training. The civilian and military service in the 18 to 21 age bracket had been consistently reduced and could no longer furnish candidates of the right caliber or could a source which was being prepared every month.

Furthermore, if the authority were extended to call 17-year-olds to active duty, it could stabilize the flow of recruits to training. While a statutory enrollment of the 17-year-olds necessary under current events, it was not as effective in view of an anticipated increase in the quota allotted to aviation after training. Consequently, it was proposed that a staff study be prepared for the Deputy Chief of Staff recommending:

1. That the age of 17 and 18 be called to active duty.  
2. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, indicate, however,

that the recommendation was too revolutionary and that such an authorization could only be justified by an extreme emergency. 9

By 1917-18, the program for the organized emergency training of 17-year-old Air Corps Selective Reserve was still under consideration. 10 The problem was ultimately solved by the introduction of a new factor. In the fall of 1917 the Civilian Institute, which had been an auxiliary of the Air, was to give pre-induction courses to such recruits as desired them.

System of Voluntary Induction

The third course of action for selection of men in

the ranks of voluntary enlistments was towards the voluntary induction of civilians. Under the provisions of the Selective Service System, it was possible for a man to apply for voluntary induction into one branch of the service. There was no guarantee under this system but the recruit could be ordered to the service of his choice, but his chance for such an induction was much better than if he enlisted until he was drafted.

Selective Service together with the Joint Army-Navy Personnel Board worked out a procedure to facilitate the procurement of specialized personnel including aviation cadets under this system. 11 According to these procedures, registrants who


10. Ibid., "Civilian Institute, Civilian, C/O 3rd, to SS, 1st Service Command, 20th June 1917, in C/O 3rd, civilian, Procurement—17 year olds.

desired to apply for aviation cadet training and do so at their local Aviation Cadet Training Board. If the applicant passed the mental screening test, the physical examination, and the exhibition as a cadet for training as pilot, navigator, or to be breacher, he was furnished with a letter to use commanding officer of the coast forces induction station. The registrat
then required for voluntary induction at his local selective
service board. He was ordered to report for induction in exactly
the same manner as any other volunteer. Then induced in
accordance to the Act and sent to training. The letter cutting
forth the pertinent facts concerning the voluntary induction was
valid for a period of 60 days.

On 7 February 1943 the Assistat of Chief of Staff, G-1
directed a memo to the Adjutant General in which this new
procedure we outlined. The next day, the Adjutant General
issued the commanding generals of the service commands the
provision for establishing the voluntary cadet out of aviation
service. During the remainder of February the details of the
plan were worked out. Then the word went out rapidly, about
the first of March, 1943, in appropriate commands were run in the

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\[ \text{(Footnotes and references omitted for brevity)} \]

\[ \text{(Text continues on the next page)} \]
nelemers and exanner calling attention to the fact that
civilian enlisted personnel should be accepted for aviation training.

Shortly after voluntary induction was initiated in March 1942, it became evident that certain changes were necessary in order to get the system to function at suicide efficiency. One of these was the reduction from 90 to 70 days of the time allowed for the validation of the enlistment orPlot qualification letter issued by the forwarding board. The other was the elimination of the difficult maintenance training phase of physical examination. Because of the rapid increase in the number of aviation career training boards after American entry into the war, there was not an enough number of flight surgeons available to examine all these boards. It was therefore necessary to refer most candidates to the nearest medical center for the physical examination. In order to reach the nearest medical center, the candidate had to travel at least 100 miles. Obviously, this proved onerous, particularly to the younger men.

On 13 March 1942 a staff study was ordered in which this problem was pointed out. Also indicated was the fact that

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**SECRET INFORMATION**
the Army as a part of its aviation order recruiting women had for some time yielded excesses incident to the misjudgment of
those candidates who were qualified for civil aviation training.
This included not only travel costs, but charges for food and
lodging. It was believed that this gave the Army decided
advantages over the Army and that it might in the long run cost the Army
of a consider the curability of manpower. Therefore the
recommendation was made that the Army adopt similar procedures.
In order to encourage the voluntary induction for aviation order
training of qualified civilians, the Army was then provided with the
“or” or “provided for in the joint military order of current procedure, and to obviate criticism.” This was
accomplished, and on 7 April 1943 the mortality of the
situation (cited 1942, p. 356) was revealed so that all civilian applicants
between the ages of 17 and 21 who was qualified for aviation training could be transferred to receive the physical examination at
“without expense.”

The second revision in the voluntary induction system, directed at reducing the interval between the candidate’s qualification by the 30 days, was introduced for training. This establishing the voluntary enlistment for specialized personnel, the
Porter required that the candidate should be allowed s

56. Ibid.
57. Ex. 22-450, e.g., 3 April 1943.
maximum of 30 days to be used at his discretion before offering
himself for induction after he had been examined. This notice
and the fact that draft boards accepted qualified individuals
only when they fell within their monthly quota considerably
slow down the flow of recruits to training. 28 The Aviation
Draft Branch in the early period of 1943 provided to Selective
Service boards that qualified recruits could be immedi-
ately accepted by local draft boards without waiting for the
monthly quota. If the draft board exceeded its monthly quota,
the excess could be credited against the next unfilled quota
of the week. 29 Currently this recommendation is not noted
now. In May 1943 the Chief of the Aviation Draft Branch
revised the recommendation and further proposed that the applicant
be allowed not 90 but 80 days before being induced. 30 By the
early fall of 1943 certain weaknesses in the process had been
found. The validity of the letter was reduced to 30 days and
Selective Service Board chairmen were told to cooperate in encouraging
local boards to send the highest rate of inductees to training. 31

In the Army

The men recruited from the ranks of the Army were an
important supplement during this period to the numbers procured

29. Ibid.
31. Conversation with General in L/C Sr.
...from civil life through voluntary induction and the Air Corps.

Enlisted reserve, military service were, essentially consisting, of three types: the Army Air Forces, the other branches, and eventually their selection centers. While the Air Force had priority over any other or other service, there is considerable evidence to indicate that certain problems had consistently attended recruitment efforts within the Army. One of the most significant obstacles was the understandable reluctance of commanding officers and their subordinates to forward the application of non-air service to aviation career training.

As early as 10 May 1941, the Adjutant General had dispatched the followingtelegram for the attention of all commanding commanders:

"Very early in the training process, all enlistees were qualified for aviation service and should be encouraged to apply for aviation training. Candidates from various sections of the country indicated that applications of enlistees, and trainees have been returned or not continued to the Central Office by the commanding commanders. The next to receive an application for aviation training must not be delayed."

The fact that the instructions in this telegram are not being properly carried out, both by district commanders and officers in higher echelons, indicates that difficulties were encountered in their enforcement.


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Coincident with the reluctance of unit commanders to release en-colle in one branch of the service in another was the fact that large numbers of enlisted personnel were not well informed about the possibility of aviation assignment. They did not know how to determine their eligibility nor how to apply for such instruction. This lack of motivation affected substantially the number of prospective aviation candidates.

A third very real restraint to the volunteering of enlisted men for aviation training was the fact that in so doing they were deprived of dependency allowance and, in certain cases, military training. When CPU 193 the number of volunteers indicated into the aviation career was considerably lower than the number in previous years. Consequently, aviation cadet training became progressively less attractive to enlisted men.

In view of the urgent need for recruits from military sources, this obvious difficulty was recognized and measures were taken to improve the situation. On 31 July 1943 aviation cadet training was revised so that enlisted men in aviation training could be modified to train in order and remain eligible for dependency allowance. On 5 October 1943 dependency allowance legislation was amended to give aviation cadets the same

57. Ibid., p. 40, 90 Sep 18-19-43, 10 July 1947, in "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds."
58. Ibid., p. 11.
dependency allotments granted to enlisted men of the Army.

Since enlisted men had previously elected aviation student status in order to be eligible for dependency allotments were restored to re-elect aviation student status if they so desired.\(^\text{53}\)

Such worker difficulties were involved in correcting the soldier's ignorance of matters concerning aircrew training and the resistance of his superior officers to the release for such training. Although this resistance prevailed to some extent within the AAF, it existed to a much greater degree in the Service and Ground Forces. At the beginning of 1943 the enlistment quotas of the three branches of the Army were restricted; the quotas allotted for the Army Air Forces being more centrally-controlled than that for the Ground and Service Forces.\(^\text{54}\)

As a consequence, it became necessary to rely rather more heavily on recruiting enlisted men from the other two branches for aviation cadet training. A situation already critical was thus intensified.\(^\text{53}\)

In April a corollary was in turn led to secure more recruits from the three branches of the Army.\(^\text{55}\) Within the AAF it was possible for the commanders to be told to turn to ground forces.

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53. Daily Diary, 1/C Br., 3 Nov. 1942, in 1/12 File.
54. Memo for 10/A3, Personnel by Col. F., 10 Jan. 1943, No. 141, "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 year Olds."
55. Ibid.
to promote their careers. On 1 April 1917 orders were sent to
the commanding officer of each air force and air corps within
the United States. The orders were worded that steps be initiated
to examine all officers and enlisted men who volunteered for flying
training, and concluded: "It is desired that you bring this
opportunity to the attention of every potential candidate
and see that his immediate superior officer does not discourage
the application and subsequent transfer." It is significant that
this directive was followed by a second one on 23 May 1917 which
again stated explicitly the necessity for securing the cooperation
of all officers in encouraging applications for flying training
in view of the need for greater numbers of aviation cadets.

While these directives had one to all AF commands, corps,
and stations, similar efforts appeared to have been made at
this time by stations and corps under the AM and Ground Forces
and Army Service Forces. The Commanding General of the Army
Air Forces was in no position to secure that such steps could
be taken by the Service Forces and the Ground Forces except
through channels. It seemed to the Aviation Cadet Branch,
however, that the Assistant General and the commanding generals

80. 03, AAF to all Air Forces and Commands (s 416 mem), 1 April
1917, in 1/59, file. 81. 02, AAF to all Air Forces and Commands, 23 May 1917, in 1/59
file. 82. "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds."
of the service career were not being enough to procure men from
those two branches of the Army. At the beginning of May the ATT
was contributing more than half of the calibres enroled for aviation effect training.63 It was the opinion of the Aviation
Chief that efforts similar to these undertaken by the
ATT were instituted by other branches of the service and obstacles
were removed or processing and transfer of enlisted men to
aviation training better results could ensue.

On 13 June 1922 the Secretary of War directed
the full cooperation of all Army organizations in existing
in the procurement of aviation effects. It stated:

Information has reached the Secretary that
enlisted men are increasingly able to obtain
accurate information from the recruiting
officer about the opportunities for aviation
effect (air crew) training, and on occasion
have been informed that in order to qualify it
would be necessary for them to proceed to the
location of the nearest aviation effect unit
in their area and at their own expense in order to
have their qualifications noted upon. ... It is the intent of the
regulations that every recruit for the service to fly and meet the eligibility requirements ... will be given the opportunity to qualify for
flying training. Commanders of units of all
enlisted should be familiar with the procedure
to be followed in procuring an aviation effect
qualification and in arranging for him to take the
appropriate examination.

As indicated, this was not the first time that commanding

63. Note for 6/C/8, C-1 or 17th Aviation, 12 Oct 22, in NARA.
FILE: Procurement and Recruiting: Unit 1177
G. 35/465, No. 112-463, 13 June 1923.
collected on army units, have been ordered to do full cooperation to the recruitment of aviation cadets from army units. Follow-on
requests were necessary.

One of the results of the study on aviation cadet procurement undertaken by the Airman and Aviation Division of Military
Personnel was the recommendation that air liaison officers in
service command headquarters be authorized to inspect all installations including control stations within their respective
codes to ascertain that there was full compliance with the
directives concerning to aviation cadet procurement. 53 This
study further showed that it is easier to achieve uniform
for pilots career without having them from the rank of 2nd Lt.
and 3rdLt. to be selected for the Air Force Reserve. The Airman
Chief of Staff, 63 to allow aircrews required to submit their
applications directly to the Secretary General, 64 in order of processing the through existing channels. The
third alternative and in this report was that suitable
male cadet's should be sent to the ground and service forces for
recruitment and recruitment from that in order to ensure their leaving
army units either in quality or quantity. 63

In making these recommendations the Airman at Chief
of Air Staff, Personnel was influenced by the fact that recrui-
tment for June and July 1943 had improved considerably over that

53 Time and Space, Personnel by Maj. Henry G. Tilton, 18 July
1943, in Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets at 17 Year Olds.
63 Ibid.
of March, April, and May, the first three months of the new
activation of our procurement structure. This meant, therefore,
that procured education which depended on local centers in
the Department of the Army would not be on hand until such time as
overseas centers were not known.

The third recommendation, which dealt with
providing the Ground and Service Forces with new recruits for
all on transferred from their branches to aviation cadre training,
was favorably received. General Pershing reported to the
Plane and Liaison Division together with the Enlisted Cheer
and the Aviation Cadet Cheer of the Military Personnel Division
work out a suitable plan. In so doing, however, they had to
bear into consideration the manner in which a new system for
procurement enlisted men directly from the reception centers
would affect the entire situation, for the latter must furnish
authorization for filling the cadre of all enlisted men at
reception centers for aviation cadre training.

67. Gen. Pershing to Plane and Liaison Div., 15 July 1917, in
"Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets 1917-1918.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.

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Volunteers for "Trainee" at Reception Centers

The introduction of this new procedure and terminology is a logical step. There was no doubt that men were trained and released from the service through the system of "trainee" and "vocational trainee." It was believed that this procedure would alleviate some of the difficulties encountered in transferring men from the service to the civilian environment. The system was introduced initially on 15 April 1967, when the Assistant Director of the Vocational Training System proposed that personnel for civilian training be transferred to the Army Reception Centers directly from the trainee centers. This recommendation was formalized on 21 June 1967, when the Assistant Director of the Vocational Training System issued instructions to all personnel on the proper procedures for the transfer of personnel. Subsequently, all personnel at the Army Reception Centers were required to follow these instructions for the transfer of personnel. The system was initially introduced to Army Reserve training centers as part of the Civilian Vocational Training (CVT) program. This included personnel who had volunteered for "trainee" status, 18-25 years old,
no attained a score of 100 or better on the Army General Classification Test and who passed a brief form "A" physical examination, the final determination of chemical qualification to be made at the JTP basic training centers. Each soldier who was selected was informed that his selection was only tentative.

Before assignment to reservist, pilot, or other professional, he was required to pass further physical, mental, and psychological tests. Moreover, his selection also depended on passing under aviation tests.

Shortly after this system was begun, a fundamental problem in the selection process became evident. Under the procedure all volunteers for flying training sent to the basic training centers were assigned to the Aviation Enlisted Training Center. Because of the length of screening tests administered at the reception centers, however, the bulk of the volunteers were ultimately disqualified for flying training. From did not take aviation tests the Aviation Enlisted Training Center; others were eliminated through the physical examination. Of more than 10,000 potential trainees, only 1,500 were selected for this course by 1 October 1953, only 77 for com, or 5,000 of those selected, ultimately met the qualifications for aviation enlist training. The result was that the monthly requirement for fully qualified men could not be met because the total number of volunteers for
FLYING TRAINING received at the reception centers, including
those later eliminated, are charged to aviation cost incurred
there.\textsuperscript{77}

This situation, however, warrants, and urgently, in Seattle
the Assistant Chief of Staff, as a solution to the difficulty. He suggested that men who volunteered during the
weeks for flying training at reception centers or reactivated
against Aviation cost allotment be proportioned to the
number who had successfully passed the final tests at the basic
training center in the previous months. To receiving centers
this could be included in the number of tests of enlisted men,
only the number actually available to basic training centers
should be actually charged against the aviation cost per month.\textsuperscript{78} The computation was not accepted, however, on the
grounds that the costs which allocated to the IAW were allowed
for certain categories of aircrew to meet current requirements;
that these centers were correlated with total monthly induction;
and that this solution offered a step toward current allocation
while for all induction areas alike.\textsuperscript{79}

An alternate suggestion was advanced by Maj. Gen. B. P.
Commander of the "Military Personnel Division of the Army Service

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid. for Oct. 3, 1937, for Air by Gen. Parsons, 20 Oct.
1937; Allocation of Men, Feb. 15, 1937, in "Personnel and Training of Aviation Pilots - 18 Year
Olds."


\textsuperscript{79} Ibid. twice. Gen. Forrester, 20 Apr. 1937, to Chief of Staff,
20 Apr. 1937, in ibid., \textsuperscript{5} NOTICES OF INFORMATION

\textsuperscript{5} THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
Forces. The solution to this difficulty was the redefinition of the reserve center test at the reception centers. Closer correlation between the Army General Classification Test and the aviation's General Classification Examinations resulted with more accurate classification of the pilot candidates could reduce the number of those directed to the Air Force training centers. The opinion was occurred in the 6-1 and 6-2. On 6 October 1942, directives were issued by the Adjutant General to the commanding generals of all service commands to the effect that as of 15 October 1942 the Aviation O-54 C-3

Classification Examinations were to be continued at the reception centers to all enlisted or otherwise qualified, not volunteers for flying training who make standard scores of 60 or better on either the Army General Classification Test or the 'Technical Aptitude Tests'. The revised physically qualified for flight training additional credit after a thorough physical examination on the scale of 'Flig Test' was now constituent of the Air Surgeon.

The claim brought to its logical conclusion it was not necessary, as had been decided to establish special medical/aviation centers for the reception centers to be used volunteers for flying training and ship them on a priority of qualification with those being.
obtained from other sources of procurement. On 13 October the
Division was notified to proceed to Spain for the direction of
the establishment of Special Division Craft Training Orders at
the reception centres.76

Thus, the source upon which "F-171" could draw for recruits
for training during 1947 was secured. To a certain
extent the Air Force Technical Training, such as it had been originally
constituted, was effectively enlarged on the first of April 1947.
In effect, all of the sources of voluntary induction went into
operation. In April an intensive educational campaign was
instituted to procure recruits from within the force. To meet
recruitment at reception centres. Throughout the year
efforts to secure 17-year-olds "F-171" continued with
increased intensity until by the fall of 1947 the bulk of publicity
was directed toward that group. The educational effort was
continued through the entire period from 1 January 1947 to 1
September 1947. Through the combined sources of supply, the
official estimates indicated in the spring of 1947 that,
recruits by the fall of 1947

Importance of Selective Service is reflected in the number of
those sources available for available during this period that
the following table shows the proportion of the total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Number of Recruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-171</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-172</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-173</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76. Historical Report, T/3 Tn, dated 13 Oct. 1947, in
ARMY files.
Commission restrictions on AIR publicity: the retaining of non-advertising space; the contributions of the Civil Air Patrol; and the relationship of the A&P to the Joint Air Council in the matter of procurement.

Publicity of December 1943

Joint Aviation Board and Administrator Commission Restrictions on AIR Publicity

Jointamed as the joint program for the use of available space, the restrictions on publicity were ordered by the Joint Commission Board on the basis of the Joint Air Council's consensus on the other. The order of the Air Force in the matter of this, the operating agency, could not be given a free hand. The limitations established by the Joint Air Council were to avoid the competitive condition between the branches of the armed forces. The use of this for competitive condition was to be avoided by the need to maintain that existing interest throughout the nation and particularly in the area of public concurrence for industry.

To avoid the competitive use of non-advertising media by the armed services, it was decided early in 1943 that all recruiting-advertising would be submitted for approval through the office of the Assistant General to the Joint Air Council.


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Restrict

Security Information

Dr. Gen. V. H. White, Assistant Chief of Staff, C-1, ... The conference on 2 April and another one held on the next weekSelector Service Headquarters, little satisfaction ... The subsequent action of the Joint Service Personnel Board on 18 April for action ... was reviewed, and C. E. Harr, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, volunteered to bring the letter to the battle office ... 

As the result of work the General mentioned was taken, the situation had changed by the time of the conference. The situation was now an increasingly serious one. The result of a survey made by ... have to do, the short-time enemy opponent was ready with new recruiting, indicated that 40 per cent of the people in the United States did not know that it was possible to obtain for service training by means of volunteer induction. 

This situation obtained while extensive service announcements were made. The Chief of the induction Service Branch had stated the fact that one of the principal sources for the early decision was the Joint Service Personnel Board on the use of radio, 10 and he noted: "It is vitally important that all appropriate organizations be used to try to remove this restriction on radio publicity."

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10. This.
Because of the stringent manpower situation, the War Manpower Commission had not only banned the use of radio, but in early spring of 1943 had also indicated that in certain labor shortage areas all recruiting must be limited to the answering of questions. This was a severe impediment to the procurement of cadets as was pointed out in April by the assistant recruiting and induction officer in the First Service Command. He stated:

Our drive up in Burlington, and Rutland, Vermont this week and next is proving some results, but the difficulty is that there are so many industries that we cannot interfere with such as manufacturing, farming, etc. I sometimes wonder where the applicants come from and why they haven't been drafted before. However, they seem to appear from somewhere. It seems to me that the manpower board is making quite an unnecessary fuss about our going after aviation cadets inasmuch as the draft board has the final say whether or not a man is in a vital industry or in a key position, and they have the authority to refuse to release him.

As has been indicated, the War Manpower Commission also challenged the necessity for continuing the recruiting of 17-year-olds for the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve.

Eventually the controversy concerning war manpower policies was turned over for settlement to the Director of War Mobilization. He decided that the AF could continue recruiting 17-year-olds.

86. E. M. Helterman, 1st Service Command, Recruiting and Induction Officer, to Maj. M. C. Mitch, Chief, A/C Br., 9 April 1943, in MG 541.01, Publicity and Advertising etc.
provided a full report of the number of reservists procured and the number to be assigned to training was reported monthly by states. In regard to the controversy over the radio ban it was ruled that the Army and Navy could use the radio, as well as newspapers, motion pictures, and other media as were necessary to "insulate in young men in and out of the Army and Navy a strong desire to fly and to inform men not in the service how they may make known their desire for flying training and determine their qualifications prior to entry upon active duty."

All programs were to be coordinated with the War Manpower Commission and the O.T.

General White placed the following interpretation on the decision reached by the Director of War Mobilization. In the first place all future recruitment material was to be presented from an educational point of view. It was not to be based on or emphasize the Army's need for aviation cadets. No mention was to be made of the words "voluntary induction" for men over 18 years old in the procurement advertising. Finally, all printed or stated announcements were to include the statement, "If you are an essential worker and employed in a war industry—do not apply."

87. James F. Byrnes to H. L. Stimson, etc., 22 June 1943, in A/G Br. files.
The morale of the Director of Mobilization conformed with the general policy of mobilization. The problem of recruiting in areas was handled by critical defense industries. The Division of Training and The Adjutant General were informed by the General Staff that essential civilian personnel could not be spared in such a manner. The result, however, could be all recruiting activity for such a task as "Your country needs you" would still have been viewed in essential industries not to vary for training.

There was considerable duty in still further authorization for publicity given by the Director of Mobilization. Although the mobilization had received general public acceptance by July 1, the press had not been fully carried by the radio. The manner for the...but the COT

A letter should be written to inform its Oil for consumption of the change in policy. By fall, however, the COT was covered in full with the Adjutant General of the Division of Training Branch. A substantial change of the radio time allocated for public..."Your country needs you" would still have been viewed in essential industries not to vary for training.

- Federal (Col. W. E. Field, Col. J. A. Stetson, CO, Dec. 12, 1941), IT, Col. W. S. Patten, to FT, Mar. 15, 1942, in WC Cr. (Patt), Publicity 1942.
- IT, 1st Service Command, 22 Oct. 1942, in WC Cr. (Patt), Publicity 1942.
- WC Cr. (Patt), PA, 1st Service Command, 22 Oct. 1942, in WC Cr. (Patt), Publicity 1942.
- WC Cr. (Patt), PA, 1st Service Command, 22 Oct. 1942, in WC Cr. (Patt), Publicity 1942.
- WC Cr. (Patt), PA, 1st Service Command, 22 Oct. 1942, in WC Cr. (Patt), Publicity 1942.
The procurement study and report by the Plans and Munitions Division of the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, dealt with the presentation of the recruiting restrictions or recruiting. One of the recommendations made out of this report was that efforts be made to revise and circulate the C-1 intermediation of the recruiting code by the Director of Mobilization. Several of the restrictions for aiding the creation of "voluntary induction" would allow the advertising agency freedom of action which is indispensable in publicizing the need for volunteers. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, did not favor this suggestion. In his opinion, the present advertising agency would handle the C-1 intermediation in such a fashion as not to be integrated in its activities. The important factor, he felt, was the well-trained selection of a skilled advertising agency and the close supervision of its work.

Use of Advertising Agencies

The search for a competent advertising agency which could handle the recruiting project in the most effective manner has long been a matter of concern to the AAF. In the spring of 1937 the Air Corps had requested the War Department retain an agency to handle aviation recruiting advertising exclusively.

Crew, Cornell and Well, the company had organized the nation-wide college drive in the spring of 1942, ... the firm had closed the drive by the fall of 1942. Apparently that proposal was not altered. 25 Z. V. Agency and Sons, Inc., also handled all recruiting publicity for the distant General since 1941, continued to handle solicitation or set advertising.

In 1945, however, when orders were not being met and the prices for the cadres were being lowered, plans were made to include all possible orders for the full orders by utilizing new orders and orders for new sales. An evaluation report submitted by Z. V. Agency and Sons, Inc., during March 1947 for the forthcoming international advertising campaign, the Agency and Sons, Inc. would not be involved. 26 It was felt that the introduction of the psychological concept, necessary to the solicitation of people interested in aviation, it offered no plan of operation for men's and women's under 18; the basis it presented to the men of all ages variety. The most important factor, however, was the simple fact that we understood the needs and problems of the independent agents by its failure to maintain close contact with aviation and commercial societies. Therefore, in May 1947 the Chief of the Aviation Office of the company's interest in securing
from the Assistant General to contract with a specific advertising agency whose services could be in line with the Assistant General and the Assistant General's needs for aviation aircraft procurement.\footnote{Procurement of Airplanes by the Assistant General, 1917, in NA.}

Then by contract \footnote{1917, in NA.}, A. A. B. Inc. arrived at the end of June 1917, bids for future aviation aircraft procurement advertising were accepted. The criterion for the choice was a well-rounded combination of the possible involved, which consisted in one field, the G. M. C. & Co. that was selected, and the caliber of the company to suit the selling objectives.\footnote{1917, in NA.} On 11 August 1917 the contract was awarded to G. M. C. & Co., Connell and \footnote{1917, in NA.}, Ill.

In the fall of 1917 this company turned out excellent advertisements. The headlines were a model of interest, and ran directly to the point. The campaign had two parts, the first part, the 31st of October, and Second, 1917, in line with the M. During the first of October advertisements were published in various cities with a collection of more than 20,000 copies in the different articles until the 1st of December. The second advertisement, "The New-England 400" and "And P-1400," appeared in newspapers throughout the country in the months of \footnote{1917, in NA.}.

\footnote{Procurement of Airplanes by the Assistant General, 1917, in NA.}
October. The excellent service rendered was not only a mark of the Civil Air Patrol, but also a mark of the Air Force and the U.S. Navy. The contributions made by the Civil Air Patrol in the fall of 1942 were undoubtedly an important part of the preparation of the nation for war.

Contributions of the Civil Air Patrol

Another factor which effectively stimulated aviation and contributed to the contribution made by the Civil Air Patrol was the influence of the Office of Civilian Defense and the Air Force in the recruitment of aviation cadets. The recruitment of aviation cadets was not only a matter of national concern, but also a matter of local concern. The Civil Air Patrol in the early days of the war contributed to the recruitment of aviation cadets. The local Civil Air Patrol units were organized and trained to operate in the early days of the war. In the first few months of the war, the Civil Air Patrol was responsible for the recruitment of aviation cadets. The Civil Air Patrol contributed to the recruitment of aviation cadets by providing information and encouragement to potential cadets.
The first step of the JPD recruiting effort was
marked by a variety of operational venues. The special
activities were particularly needed in the operation, where
they provided an essential element for key areas. The
activities included publicity, radio programs, citizen
meetings, special events, and word of mouth
activities were conducted by the JPD in the interest of
recruitment. Among the most successful activities were
those conducted by the Civic Action Team, where
special events, such as citywide rallies, followed
by rallies, news in the media, and word of mouth
activities were highly effective. In addition, the
activities of the Civic Action Team were followed
by similar events in city after city, with great
success in the field of community. In two
months, the
activities showed a great increase in the number of
people involved. The Civic Action Team conducted
publicity and special events to attract new
participants. The activities were highly effective in bringing in new
members.
Col. Gen. John H. Filer, Commanding General of the First Service Command, reported: "The widespread favorable publicity and actual achievement of the recruiting activities are most creditable and have given impetus to the aviation effort at large, in general." 105

"Recruiting on this intensive level could not be indefinitely maintained without creating their own reserves.

With the opening of the schools in the fall, plans were made for a similar approach. CIP representatives conferred with local educators to secure their cooperation in keeping the aviation effort uppermost. 106 Recruiting literature was supplied to school officials, and wherever possible school leaders were asked to forward it. Notices of student bodies in high schools throughout the country were ordered by CIP officers.

In July 1943 the Adjutant General gave CIP authority to conduct aviation effort screening examination in the Fifth and Seventh Service Commands. 108 In success of this excellent result resulted in the extension of the authority to other service commands to be used at the discretion of the local commanders. 109 This innovation increased the intake of boys with aviation potential.

108. George W. Johnson, National Commander, CIP (in CIP, 7 Nov. 1943), to Mr. H. V. T. C., 1 Oct. 1943, in CIP, Civil Air Patrol, Recruiting and Advertising files.
109. CIP to Service Command, 1 Oct. 1943, in CIP files, Civil Air Patrol.
event occurred and reduced the chances which indicate creen
required to travel to resident mental difficulties conditioning.

A third and final lesson was that, in the collective effort of the Civil Air Patrol in recruiting and
enlistment, the CAP officers worked to write an essay in the
Bible of the Aldridge, the CAP cadet's attendance
time of 19 and 17 in the last two years of high school. They
were the uniform of an enlistee, the CAP uniform and were
sent military and aviation training by member staff of the
CAP. It was inevitable that this would have to be
done, since the best recruits will not move until they
will not have the potential to continue training, the
re-enlistment in a CAP or enlist uniform, is a
re-enlistment for aviation training. Furthermore, it was
evident that 17 years old CAP cadet training in any of the Air Corps, Tullahoma, while
continuing CAP training for their respective state being called to
active duty at 18. These boys were in uniform, and uniform
with the silver insignia of the Air Corps Reserve.

Another critical component was the continuation of CAP
enlistment training to all 17-year-old boys of the Air Corps
Enlistment Reserve. CAP cadet in the 1954-55 CAP Test at tional

110. history of the Civil Air Patrol from 1947 until 1955 to 19
It was decided to develop a new program to meet the needs of the expanding CAP. The program was designed to train 17-year-olds who were not eligible for enlistment in the Air Corps. The program was structured to provide training for these young men, who were called to active duty at the age of 17. They were divided into units based on their rank in order to ensure that they were called to active duty at the appropriate age. This system was designed to ensure the maximum utilization of the cadre and pilot training. It was anticipated that 10,000 men between 15 and 17 years old would be trained annually by the CAP. By the end of 1936, the CAP had planned to increase the number of men trained to 25,000 per year. In 1937, a definite plan for the establishment of new training camps was established for enrollment in the CAP cadre. These requirements differed from those for enlisted personnel only in the matter of age; that is, CAP cadets over or under the age of 17 continued to serve in the same capacity.

111. Historical Report, CAP, February 1936, in AAFI files.
112. Interview with Capt. F. A. Trimble, CAP, 30 Oct 36, OSR.
pro-training course given to CIP cadets was more closely coordinated with the AAF Training Command so that it would be of most value to the prospective civilian. Evidence that the CIP contributed a substantial amount to aviation cadet recruiting is seen in the secondary letters received by AAF headquarters from AIP representatives. A more tangible illustration of the confidence of AAF officers in CIP procurement activities was demonstrated by the fact that 233 CIP aircraft were assigned among the 45 wings of the CAF for AIP recruiting.

Fundamental Problem of Procurement: Lack of AAF Control

Throughout this period many serious problems of procurement continued to arise from the fact that the AAF had no direct control over the procurement of its men. That control rested with the Adjutant General and the service commanders. Among the important reasons for the various deficiencies appeared to be the fact that the office most vitally concerned was not authorized to perform the actual function of procurement.

For some time the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel had sought to obtain a greater share in developing the policies, plans, and operating procedures for the procurement of aviation cadets. It was believed that more satisfaction and good feeling on all sides would result if the AIP

114. Ibid.
In a direct line to procurement agents. If the procurement
interests in the success of the program, an actively articulate
in it, the chances for our success would be increased.
We can hardly understand how the need for training
training that there "In the olden days" and were heavily interested
in all phases of aviation. There are no recruitment officers
in the procurement and in the field itself this lack of utilization
for others. Furthermore, the procurement officers of the
Assistant Chief and the Service are involved in many outlets
outside that of aviation officer procurement, and of this the
office of the Assistant Chief of Air Force Personnel will
also be.
It is felt that if the all force, more authority over procurement, the results could be more
satisfactory. In the first place, our "glass" would go into the
forces; in the second place, more stringent control could be
executed over service control activities; and finally, the
practices involved in the selection between the offices of
the Assistant Chief of Air Force Personnel and the Assistant
Chief of the office could be discriminated.

In the opinion of 1942-43, if there were to be such a move, the training
centers from College for Rejects, the difficulties inherent

115. Page 9 of 1/3, Personnel by Col. J. R. R. Bailey, 10 July
1947, in "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds."
116. Page 1 of 1, Personnel by Col. J. R. R. Bailey, 10 July
1947, in "Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds."
117. This.
in this previous situation or receive clear. During the
initiation of the erection of a permanent office for the Recruiting
and Induction Section of the Adjutant General's office and the
service consideration added to our major effort
to the erection of "41A" officers. The Adjutant Division of
effect, both in "41A" officers in the U.S. were added to
the recruitment of aviation officers. The representation
of the Air Force Division to the joint tri-service representa-
tive of the Adjutant General's office through the service
was to establish a record, his report was not
accepted. The second call in the Adjutant General's office
resulted in an error procurement for the Secretary of the
service to which the temporary authority which would
have been created of "41A" officers. Consequently, it was
decided that the Chief of the Aviation Corps might recommend that
the Air Force officer be assigned to the Adjutant General's
office, and that it, in order that he consider necessary
to report to the Secretary of the Department of War in the field,
be given full responsibility for aviation officer procurement.

110. "True for Air Force by M.R. E. C. Richey, on May 1942, in
A/G PR, filing."
111. "True for Air Force by M.R. E. C. Richey, on May 1942, in
A/G PR, filing."
112. "True for Air Force by M.R. E. C. Richey, on May 1942, in
A/G PR, filing."
113. "True for Air Force by M.R. E. C. Richey, on May 1942, in
A/G PR, filing."
114. "True for Air Force by M.R. E. C. Richey, on May 1942, in
A/G PR, filing."
115. "True for Air Force by M.R. E. C. Richey, on May 1942, in
A/G PR, filing."
After having the effectiveness of the existing court program improved by the
First and Second Division, the First and Second
Division received the following recommendations to improve
in order to improve the relations in promotion and in the
command of the service. The Assistant Commanding officer, an
officer would be detailed from the office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff of the First, Second, and Third, or the
Assistant Commanding officer with the office of the Assistant
General, to be selected from the important part of
stressed in order to
strength in the service, and this is not only in the
force, but also in the service. The
Chief of Staff of the service, and the needs to be
commanding the First and Second
Division, an officer would be the
Division commander. The Second
Division, called for the creation of
recruiting forces in each service to provide
intensive coverage of the service and
reinforcement of enlisted personnel. These forces would be
made up of
the recruiting forces, and the
forces, so that the
could be at least one pilot, controller, or
chief returned
from services. Both of these services would use the same control in connection activities.

These proposals received a mixed reception. The risk of having a single liaison officer between the Aviation Order Branch and the Procurement and Training Division of the Assistant Chief of the Air Force, Personnel, and Logistic Division was then to direct results. The difficulty of directing the most competent liaison officer between the two services was pointed out. The other most capable unit was widely less success. Indeed, of the division's measures, none was accepted.

In view of the fact that the current situation placed the responsibility for the procurement of aviation officers directly upon the Commanding General, Service Command, it is considered impossible to describe in detail the services of the Air Liaison Officer attached to Service Command in the best interest. Therefore, the following outline of the situation:

1st. Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds.
2nd. Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds.
3rd. Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds.
4th. Procurement and Training of Aviation Cadets & 17 Year Olds.
better results can be accomplished by informal reports and verbal communication between the Command General, Army Air Forces, and the Commanding Generals of the Service Command; without direction from higher authority...

The views of the Service Command are the result of conversations with the Commanding Generals of the Service Commands. The views of the Command General, Army Air Forces, are the result of discussions with Department of War officials...

1. The Service Command views the aircrew training problem in the light of the 1942 order of the Secretary of War, which has not been revised in the light of the service accomplishments. The order is not sufficient and should be revised...

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1. See Cso. 626, 10 July 1942, General, Army Air Forces, for reference.
CONCLUSION

By the middle of October 1944, it was clear that the evacuation crisis of the evacuated elements in the U.S. had accelerated to the point where evacuation to the United States became impossible. The flow of evacuation continued to increase, and the overall evacuation situation continued to worsen. The result was a situation where the evacuation of the remaining refugees and family members was virtually impossible. With the continued evacuation of the remaining refugees and family members, it became clear that the flow of refugees and family members to the United States would continue to increase. In order to facilitate the evacuation of the remaining refugees and family members, the flow of refugees and family members would have to be increased.

To meet the demand for the U.S. evacuation of the remaining refugees and family members, an additional 20,000 to 30,000 refugees and family members were to be evacuated by December 1944. A corresponding increase in the number of refugees and family members to be evacuated was also planned. By December 1944, the number of refugees and family members to be evacuated had been increased to about 10,000 to 15,000.

1. Memo for T. A. Foster, from J. D. Jones, 10 Oct. 1944, in AEO.
commencing with the first of the year. These reduced quotes coupled with the backlog of applications necessitated a review of existing procurement policies and procedures.

As physical and mental qualifications had earlier been revised to enlarge the available field of manpower, it logically followed that these qualifications should be re-examined in order to limit the number eligible for flying training. As a result of a conference between representatives of the Psychological Branch of the office of the Air Surgeon, the Training Command, and the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, held in the middle of November, the passing mark on the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination was raised. This change became effective on 10 February 1944. Toward the end of December it was further decided that after 1 March 1944 only those candidates were to be accepted who met the physical standards as they existed prior to August 1943. It was believed that the reduced flow resulting from these changes would assist in adjusting the supply to the demand.

Where the early emphasis had been on the expansion of sources available for flying training, in the fall and winter of 1943-1944 this emphasis shifted to the other extreme. The

4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
group first affected was that recruited from military ranks. Because of the oversupply of aircrew candidates, it was necessary to limit drastically the number of officers assigned monthly to aircrew training in grade. Plans were laid to reduce the monthly quotas of trainees so assigned to 200 by March 1944. In view of this and the large backlog of applicants in this category (8,500 on 1 December 1943 and 9,000 on 1 January 1944), it was necessary to apply a highly selective procedure to determine the number of officers to be assigned to training. To this end all the applicants on the list for aircrew training in officer grade were for the first time required to take the Aviation Cadet Qualifying Examination. The passing score on this test was adjusted to secure the desired reduction in numbers.

On 22 February 1944 procurement of aviation cadets from the Army Ground and Service Forces was suspended. Under authorization of Air Department 6-1, the Adjutant General issued a directive to all service commands terminating the acceptance of further applications from officers and enlisted men in the Ground and Service Forces for transfer to the Army Air Forces for aircrew training. On 20 February 1944 this ruling was extended to the Army Air Forces.

The logical conclusion of these developments was reached shortly thereafter when procurement from civilian sources was suspended. For according to the Requirements and Resources

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11. Ibid.
Branch of the Air Force Personnel Division, the Air Force was in training at the time of the order so that personnel could be immediately released and would not need to be in training until the [1924].

Consequently, toward the end of March 1942, further recruiting from civilian life for aircraft training was terminated, and further enrollment of the men in the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve and Reserve Officers' Reserve was brought to a halt. Aircraft training was limited only to those volunteers categorized as personnel:

1. All officers and enlisted men who are capable and have the ability to serve.
2. All colored enlisted men and 19- to 35-year-old colored civilians (volunteer induction).
3. Former Civil Defense volunteers for training as aircraft instructors and as infantrymen in active duty with the Air Force Reserve in the Reserve with previous service as infantrymen.

In a public letter by General Arnold to the country, he informed the public that in recognition of the overwhelming public support given to the Air Force, it would continue to work closely so that it could invite further active enrollment. The letter stated, "The nation will return to its activism and to full return of our forces."

The procurement of aviation cadets was full scale in the spring of 1942. In many respects to the detriment of

1. Daily Diary, Air Intelligence and Operations Branch, 23 Feb. 1942, in AAF files.
2. Historical Report, 1/2 Tr., 1942 and 1943, in AAF files.
3. Ibid.
the Air Force now has available for pilot training those could be recognized with the remaining months of the Air Force's 1976 to 1977 record on most recent recruits.

The overall trend indicates the late fall and winter of 1976-77 as when minimum criteria training was offered to candidates for pilot service. This is not negligible, if any, with considerable difficulty and it is to wit in the middle of the winter, this

statement is concerned.

The order of difficulty would be second to none in acquiring another motor training of national service which

increased demand. The attitude training programs

took from 1,000 to 2,000 and then on average entered into the

year 1976-1977 to see 20,000, the anticipated population
of training and in order that for creative all available

on the 1977-1978 year of available for pilot training,

Congress early in 1976 in some part of the more than 20,000

motor training into the possible. On or outside certain situations

for selection, the number needed for training to train on the

will be considerably lower with no reduction in the quality of

otherwise, the shortage of those needed for training to train on the

In direct proportion to the flow of candidates to the service, a

R. J. N. V. T. I. (Civilian to Military)
course. In the words of the author, the machinery of recruitment is increasingly controlled until responsibility for recruitments can amount to an interference with the Aviation Combat Command.

The initial problem was that of obtaining qualified candidates for the Aviation Combat Command. The ideal procurement was a situation where a steady flow of applicants to training would occur.

The initial problem was that of obtaining qualified candidates. It was realized that the current state of affairs was impossible. It was necessary to control the admission of all those 10,000 current candidates to ensure that each birth of candidates was a future command.

In establishing the Air Corps Enlisted Force, it was felt that the only satisfactory means of solving the difficulty was sound. Unfortunately, the lack of leadership, which created financial and personnel problems, resulted in a variety of personnel problems. This led to the birth of new commands to replace command of retired officers by young to replace command.
With the activation of the Reserve and the re-establishment of the quota system there was again the strain of meeting quotas every month. This, coupled with the difficult manpower situation, brought into full relief the problem basic to the procurement of cadets. This was the fact that the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces was dependent on the Adjutant General and the service commands to recruit the required number of cadets. When the numbers were not produced, strained relations inevitably resulted. In late 1943 and early 1944 the abundant supply of cadets removed this tension. The fundamental problem, however, remained unsolved.
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.T.  Army Air Forces
A.G  Air Adjutant General
A.C  Air Corps
A/C  Cadet Branch
A.G./A.C.  Assistant Chief of the Air Corps
A.G./A.S.  Assistant Chief of Air Staff
A.C./A.S.  Assistant Chief of Staff
A.S.A.  Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1
A.P.D.  Director of Personnel
A.S.A.II  Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division
A.F.M.D.  Military Personnel Division
A.F.I.C  Training Command
A.G  The Adjutant General
A.S.T  Army Ground Forces
A.J.A  Air Judge Advocate
A.S  Army Service Forces
A.S.  Assistant
A.P.R  Bureau of Public Relations
C.O.  Chief of Air Corps
C.A  Civil Air Patrol
C.S  Chief of Air Staff
C.I.  Commanding General
C.O.  Commanding Officer
D/F  Disposition Form
F/C  Flying Cadet
G.S.C/O  Gulf Coast Air Corps Training Center
G.C.A.F.T.C  Gulf Coast Air Force Training Center
G.H.Q.  General Headquarters
H.Q.  The area or the area place
I.A  Inspection
I.D.  Military Aeronaut Division
I.D.  Inspect...date
O.C.O.  Office, Chief of Air Corps
O.D.R  Operations, Commands, and Requirements
O.D.O  Operations Division
O.I.  Office of the Information
O.P.O  Public Relations Officer
R.R.  Routine and Record Sheet
S.C.G.T.C  South Central Air Corps Training Center
S.W.A.F.T.C  South West Air Force Training Center
S.S.  Services of Supply
T.O  Training and Operations
T.O.A.C.T.C  East Coast Air Corps Training Center
T.O.A.F.T.  East Coast Air Force Training Center
S.O.  Staff
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Lt. Col. Willis S. Fitch, Chief, Aviation Cadet Branch
Miss Eleanor Gessford, Aviation Cadet Branch
Miss Gessford who has been in the aviation cadet field for over twenty-five years was a most important and cooperative source in the preparation of this study.
Capt. H. W. Hawgood, Civil Air Patrol, Operations, Commitments and Requirements
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1920 to 1938

APPLICANT
1. My application
2. Prove our selection
3. Accept the result in writing

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
1. See if literature is published
2. Refer to examiners
3. It is necessary to

EXAMINING BOARD
1. Instruct applicant to remain in control
2. Conducts examination

OFFICE CHIEF OF AIR CORPS
1. Receive results of the examination and issue an applicant
2. Maintain relations and keep records of the applicant until the training

*Note: All activities listed are assumed to be conducted by the Oasis.
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