THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE
1939-1940

PART TWO

THE WAR OF WAITING
CHAPTER ONE

THE PERIOD OF "THE WAR OF WAITING"

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The following part two of the present study on the campaign in Western Europe, 1939-1940 deals with what has been called the period of the "War of Waiting in the West." More precisely, it deals with the period between the German strategic assembly in the West after the end of the Polish campaign (early October 1939) and the opening of the German offensive in the West on 10 May 1940, thus, a period of seven months. During these seven months the belligerent forces faced each other, waiting and probing, without either side seeking any decisive action in the air or on the ground.

This phase of the war in the West might at first glance appear uninteresting. Viewed in the light of the traditional concept of the conduct of a war by an army, this would be a true assumption. In line with its orders, the German Army during the whole period actually endeavored to maintain an attitude of extreme reserve—apart from short skirmishes,patrol activities, or occasional exchange of artillery fire, occasional action to improve positions in the Saar sector of the front, and similar small-scale actions of no significance in the overall situation.

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The situation was different with the German Air Force.
According to the directives received from the Supreme Military Command, the Air Force also was restricted to defensive action in the operational sense. In contrast with the Army, however, there were the following fundamental differences:

1. Although only on a very modest scale, Britain had commenced aggressive operational air warfare immediately after the beginning of the war, and this called for air defense action on the German side. In air warfare, however, the decisive element of defense is the attack. During the whole period of the War of Waiting the German fighter arm was thus uninterrupted in a state of alert and in action. The same applied to the Antiaircraft Artillery Arm.

2. The state of complete uncertainty as to when the definitely expected air warfare between the Western Powers and Germany would begin not only necessitated planning to provide instantaneous effective reiteration by the entire Air Force whenever required and to meet the exigencies of any possible situation, but also required that all aggressive air forces must be constantly ready for immediate action.

As German planning developed during this period, the basic methods of direct and indirect air support for the Army were gradually raised again to the fundamental
principle of air operations, a principle which had already
proved so sound in the Polish campaign. At the same time,
however, the possibility had to be borne in mind that the
Air Force at any time, within a matter of hours, might
have to engage in all-out air warfare, the conduct of which
would, at least in the initial stages, have to be independent
of the intentions and plans of the Army.

3. Planning against such an eventuality necessitated
a continuous watch and continuing scrutiny of the intelligence picture on the air deployment and air action of the
enemy. In other words: air reconnaissance was not at a
standstill during the seven months. After a hesitant start
air reconnaissance developed into a system of planned
patrols over enemy territory, producing good results but
also incurring losses.

4. The final but most important difference between
the inactivity of the Army and the activity of the Air
Force, however, was that elements of the Air Force were
to be committed in attacks during the War of Waiting. De-
velopments will show that combat operations against Brit-
ish naval forces in the North Sea areas became an impor-
tant part of the air mission.

The situation and the mission of the German Air Force
were thus radically different from those of the German Army.
In military history, the Air Force thus merits a study from viewpoints differing considerably from those applied to the Army during the period of the War of Waiting.

In retrospect, the War of Waiting at the turn of the year 1939-1940 appears a single fact of military history, both belligerent sides were practicing more or less the same policy. At the time, however, this fact was naturally only realized at a late stage, and the name for this type of warfare was only coined later. Neither side had anticipated this type of warfare, and while it lasted the feelings of uncertainty, expectation, tension, and nervousness were possibly more intense than those any actual military operation of the later phases could have caused. This applies above all to the German Supreme Command, but in an intensified measure to those responsible for the control of the Air Force, and here particularly to the intermediate and lower field commands.

Whereas the decisions by the Supreme Command (Hitler) were determined largely by factors of the overall political and military concept, but dictated later in a decisive measure by events, the field commands, and thus also the troops, lived in an atmosphere of uncertainty subject to uncounted fluctuations. Added to this uncertainty concerning the daily possibility of combat action, came the continuous
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vacillations in directives and orders from higher headquarters. Added to this uncertainty came the daily worries of the troops themselves to remain assemble in personal and material, anxiety which the higher levels at no time took seriously. Instead, the higher and highest levels of command simply calculated with numerical quantities—with figures, what was behind these figures did not concern them in the least. While the field commands and the troops themselves thus strive continuously to maintain and improve 

train standards, and equipment status, they had at the same time to remain constantly ready for action.

To fully appreciate this state of flux during the War of Waiting, together with all its emotional and psychological implications, it is essential to first obtain a clear picture of the repeated vacillations in the intentions and decisions of the Supreme Command which kept the troops in a constant state of unrest throughout the seven months. A complete insight here is an essential condition for a proper understanding from which to appraise all measures taken by the command and troops during this period.

This insight should have been provided the reader in an introduction to this chapter. However, a thorough treatment of the subject precedes Part 3 of a former edition of this
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study. The reason why this factor, which was the reverberating
target of the whole War of Waiting on the German side, was
given such early treatment, i.e., as stated in the introduction
to Part 3 of the former edition, that time and other consid-
erations made it necessary at the time to treat the MARIAN
1940 German offensive in the west preferentially and post-
poned treatment of the War of Waiting period, which is now
being treated in this present chapter. The author of the
previous study therefore thought it essential to prepare
his work with a broad outline of the development of the
command decisions preceding the offensive.

Reading the introduction to Part 3 of the previous
study before reading this Part Two of the present study,
the fact becomes obvious that commencement of the offensive
in the West, an event which Hitler at no time doubted
would be executed, was postponed no fewer than twenty times.
Field commanders
The manifold varied results for the troops are also
described. For the sake of brevity, the present author has
avoided treating the facts since here, and the reader is
advised to refer back to the previous study quoted before
commencing the present chapter.

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The reasons for the repeated setbacks of the Ger-
man 1940 offensive in the West were all due exclusively to
1. Part 3, Chapter I, "Die Versuche Mann Westfalen," s. 1.
1-2.
weather considerations, in other words, to the requirements of the Air Force. This stresses the remarkable fact that the most modern weapon was subject to factors beyond the influence of strictly military decisions. The fact also evolves that one military branch—in this case the Air Force—determined the deadline for the entire operation, including the operations of the Army forces on the ground. In the final analysis such absolute dependence on weather conditions indicated in practice a return to the methods of Frederick the Great in the conduct of warfare; during the unfavorable seasons of the year, the troops settled down in their winter quarters.

This conclusion, which naturally must be take with a grain of salt, applied during the actual conditions of the War of Waiting only to the Army, the forces of which were more or less "in winter quarters," although they still have to displace from area to area in consequence of changes in operational planning and of training requirements. The Army still measured the time required to prepare for operations by days.

The Air Force, in contrast, was at all times ready for action and at all times had strong fighter, reconnaissance, bomber, and antiaircraft artillery units actually committed in action.
The German Air Force intentionally avoided taking the initiative for any aggressive action on an appreciable scale, leaving this to the enemy, who did so on a modest scale.

This conduct of air warfare on a limited scale will be a part of the subject matter in the following presentation of events. A more important factor, however, will be an examination of the changing plans for attack during the War of Waiting, since, besides the repeatedly changed deadline, this was the factor which determined the activities of the German Air Force.

Planning for airborne operations, a separate segment within the whole complex of planning for the offensive, can only be treated incidentally here in connection with the other planning activities for operations by the operational air arm. This special subject has also received preferential treatment (see footnote 1) in a previous study, where the development of planning for airborne operations, right up to the final plan of operations which was actually executed, is dealt with as a completely separate subject. Development plans up to the execution of the final actually being within the scope of this present chapter, but owing to the conditions under which the present study is being compiled, the present author is restricting himself to information supplementing that given in the previous study.

Another subject which cannot be treated exhaustively enough here is that of antiaircraft artillery operations during the War of Waiting. This refers not so much to the AAA units committed in the Home Air Defense System (coastal areas and the Ruhr region) but to the "operational" AAA forces of the Air Force, namely, the I and II Antiaircraft Artillery Corps deployed together with the Army forces near the border but under command by the two air fleets committed in the Western Theater.

The units of these two AAA corps were also in a constant state of alert throughout the period of the War of Waiting, ready to take instant action to protect the Army assembly, supply and communication lines, traffic centers, and the Air Force ground organization. The real mission for these new type corps was only to develop at the beginning of the offensive on the ground. Their actual operations have already received detailed treatment, and it is necessary to avoid overrating their performances within the scope of this treatment of the period of the War of Waiting.

The background, or the "initial situation" for the following treatment of the War of Waiting has been stated in the final chapter of Part One, above.

The distribution of forces and concentration of available strengths which must serve as a basis for the period immediately after 1 October 1939 have been stated in Chapter IV of Part One, above. 4

The Assembly of the Second Air Fleet has also been stated in Appendix 4 to Chapter IV of Part One, above.

The operational objectives, based on Hitler Directive No. 4 are given on p. 11 of the same chapter.

The organization and distribution of command headquarters, status from October 1939 on, is shown in Chapter V, Part One, above. 5

The reasoning of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force concerning the conduct of operations have also been presented in the same complex of subjects, 6 as well Hitler Directive No. 6, 7 which was the governing factor in all coming events during the War of Waiting.

The presentation which now follows is based on the above. That presentation will cover the end of the strictly defensive attitude of the German Air Force Command during the War of Waiting and during the period of weakness which followed until the redeployment in the West was completed, as well

4. Part One, Chapter IV, above, with Charts 1-3.  
5. Appendix 1 to Part One, Chapter V, above.  
6. Chapter I, Section III, above.  
7. Appendix 1 to Part One, Chapter V, above.
as the beginning of the aggressive attitude and aggressive
planning up to the actual opening of the Offensive in the
West on 10 May 1940.
CHAPTER II/11

CHANGES IN THE PLANS OF OPERATIONS AND ASSEMBLY OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

The initial situation for operational planning during the War of Waiting was created by Directive No. 6 of 9 October 1939.

So far as the missions and the planning of the German Air Force were concerned, the decisively important passage in that directive was as follows:

The Air Force will prevent action by the French-British air forces against the German Army, and, so far as necessary will directly support the Army's advance. The important point here will be to prevent the Anglo-French air forces from gaining a foothold in Belgium and Holland and the landing of British troops there.

The mission for the Air Force was thus clearly stated in broad outline:

1. Action to hold down the enemy air forces, as indirect support for the Army;

2. To give the Army direct air support "insofar as this was necessary."

Some time later, the Army and the Air Force issued their operational orders. \[\text{Foot Note: Chester V (and Appendix 4), above. Also Source 3 to Section I, No. 3a (where the complete text is given).}\]
The Commander in Chief of the Army on 19 and 29 October 1939 issued Assembly Order Gelb (Aufmarschbefehl Gelb). The operational objective was "...to annihilate the enemy forces in the area north of the Somme River and to break through to the Channel coast."\(^1\)

Main emphasis in the attack was to be with the northern army group, Army Group E, which was to advance westwards on both sides of Dieppe. Broadly speaking, Army Group A had the mission of protecting the north flank of this movement.

Apparently the Commander in Chief of the Air Force issued his Directive No. 5, which is not available at writing,\(^1\) on 20 October 1939. However, the lack of the text of this directive does not appear too important, since the text of Directive No. 5 issued by the Second Air Fleet pursuant to the Air Force High Command directive is available. There can be no doubt that the air fleet directive is based on the High Command directive, and it clearly reveals the plans of the air fleet committed in the northern area, the area of main effort.

Directive No. 5, issued by the Second Air Fleet on 7 November 1939,\(^2\) is a relatively late consolidation of a number of previous detailed orders issued by the air fleet since 27 October as advance measures to initiate a new disposition of the air fleet's air units in keeping with the new intentions of higher headquarters.\(^2\)

For footnotes see 7. 126.
Footnote 9, p. 125: For authentic text see Source 5, Section II, Par. 10 and 11. The second directive was the
ruling factor in the following developments.

Footnote 10, p. 125: Par. 2a of the Army Assembly Order
dated 29 October 1939.

Footnote 11, p. 125: The facts and the time can be inferred
from the later Directive No. 5, dated 7 December 1939;
revised the instructions of 20 October 1939 (Ch. 1.
Paharpur, Jatia No. 522/12, Xiln. Chefe) or modifying
them. The text of this later directive was to replace
that of 20 October 1939.

Footnote 12, p. 125: This relatively late issue of basic
orders and directives by the Air Force will become evident
time and again as the story of preparations for the offen-
sive unfolds. In an increasing measure it becomes due
to the necessity for coordination of Air Force instruc-
tions with those of the Army. As indirect and even more
direct support for the Army grew more and more into
prominence the operational intentions and orders of the
Army (Army groups and field army levels) represented the
basis on which Air Force operations could be planned.
For this reason Air Force orders were always issued later
than those of the Army. The time between was taken up
by innumerable conferences, inquiries, and requests by
the Army for modifications, and as forth. Another car-
rying factor in the present case was that the Army
still had to do its operational planning and execute its
assembly movements. From the available War Journal of
Army Group A, for example, it is evident that the Army
Group Commanding General had only assumed command over
Army Group A on 25 October.

Footnote 13, p. 125: Text from Source No. 2.
From this directive the more important features of the operational mission assigned to the Second Air Fleet can be summarized as follows:

1. The VIII (Theseus) Air Corps was to support the advance by the Sixth Army through the frontier fortifications north of Liège; later, it was to support the continued advance by this army, particularly the XVI (Armor) Corps.

2. The IV Air Corps, as its first action was to attack the enemy air forces in the bases within the Ostende-Dunkirk-Calais-Saint-Quentin-Abbeville-Laon-Charleroi-Brussels-Antwerp area, in order to prevent their participation in operations on the ground. Another mission was to attack enemy dumps and concentrations and forward rearmament by the Anglo-French armies westward across the Belgian frontier. In addition, units of the corps were initially to attack British army forces, with particular emphasis on tank and motorized units, in the general area of Calais-

3. The 7th Air Division was to "assemble in accordance with special instructions." It can be assumed with certainty that this was in connection with the first phase for operations against the Belgian "Recluit national."
around Ghent, namely, plans for Operation C. 14

4. The II. Mahdisien. Artillery Corps had the initial mission of providing the assembly and deployment of Army Group B forces. Then, when the German advance commenced, it was to support the Sixth Army in action to capture the Mosel River bridges and reduce the frontier fortifications as well as other enemy lines of resistance.

The directive also contains the following, "orientation on the Third Air Fleet:

This air fleet "...assemble, the bulk of all bomber forces available to the German Air Force, will attack the French air forces in their bases and prevent their participation in operations on the ground. In later action it (the Third Air Fleet) will prevent any generally north-eastward advance by the French armies from their assembly areas in Northern France."

In the northern segment of the Third Air Fleet zone, the II Air Corps was also to support Army Group B. 15

As previously mentioned, orders had already been issued to initiate the redeployment of air forces necessitated by this directive. 16

This redeployment, which entailed considerable changes

14. See also Part Three, Chapter III, and Part Three, Chapter IV.
15. Whether the II. Air Corps was then to be transferred to the Second Air Fleet in Army Group B area of main effort cannot be clarified here.
16. Pursuant to Order: "Initial Instruction 2."
in strength allocations and area assignments when compared
with the previous preliminary assenly,\textsuperscript{17} has been reconstructed
from previously mentioned sources, namely,\textsuperscript{17a \textsuperscript{18a}}
information gathered from Allied and Japanese sources. Furthermore
it was decided to reduce the volume of the Wireless 1st and Wireless
Overseas No. 5 for Inylletta 2 to 7, II, 1939.\textsuperscript{18}

The order of battle and assembly orders just described
were to become effective on 28 October 1939, that is already
ten days prior to issue of the actual Directive No. 5 by the
Second Air Fleet. This meant that, according to orders, the
displacements had to be completed by 5 November, and what is
more, for purposes of concealment, the units moved first to
interim airfields not marked in the chart included in Appendix
2. At these interim airfields, the measures to bring the units
up to full strength in personnel and material were to be com-
pleted. Furthermore, the interim airfields were to remain
available to the units for "rest and resupply purposes."

Second Air Fleet Headquarters had reserved the decision
as to when the units were to displace from their interim to
their final assembly areas in accordance with the chart in
Appendix 2. The movement was not to take place before 6
November 1939 at the earliest.
A comparison with this disposition of forces for the offensive with the previous temporary "defense" disposition of mid-October, as shown in Appendix 4 to Part One, Chapter IV reveals the following:

1. The bomber units had been moved forward from the rear, where they had been stationed for "rehabilitation" to areas in the West so as to be in bases from which their striking range would be adequate for all requirements evolving from their operational missions.

2. The VIII (Close Support) Air Corps had in the meanwhile transferred from Poland to the Western Theater. After rehabilitation at its reactivated home bases, it had moved into its tactical area at the Rhine River. It was ready for action in support of the Sixth Army.

3. The fighter units had been re-raised that they on airfields from where their striking range would be adequate for their mission of tactical support for the air corps and from where they could at the same time support the fighter units of the Home Air Defense System until the offensive commenced.

4. The chains of command had by now been finalized. The order of battle was destined to undergo continuous changes, which applied also to the allocation of airfields.

\[19\] See also Table of Organization in Appendix 1 to Part One, Chapter V.
5. The II A.A. Corps, for which no data of organization is given, was at the same time to assemble in the general area of München/Gladbach-Aachen-Saar-Krefeld, and provide protection for the assembly against air attack besides supporting the units of the A.E.O. Air Defense System. The batteries had orders to be ready for fire as of 5 November.

6. The 7th Air Division was to transfer to the base areas of its transport units (see chart).

The above clarifies the assembly of the Second Air Fleet, plus the I Air Corps of the Third Air Fleet and the V Air Corps controlled directly by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and thus of the bulk of all units of the German Air Force. No such complete and reliable information is available on the assembly of the Third Air Fleet (II and V Air Corps and I A.A. Corps).

The actual air assembly status is thus known as it existed at 7 November, the day on which the Second Air Fleet issued its consolidated directive No. 5 to its various subordinate commands.

To complete the picture of the air assembly, it is stated below in relation to the operational decisions of the Supreme Military Command:
1. According to orders by the Second Air Fleet, the air units were to displace to their ultimate tactical airfields "on 5 November at the earliest."

2. The Second Air Fleet issued its Directive No. 5 on 7 November, and at least a few days passed before the troops could effectuate the instructions it contained.

3. On 5 November, however, Hitler had already given the word that the attack was to commence on 12 November.

4. On 7 November the deadline for attack was postponed by three days.

5. On 9 November the 19 November was stated as the earliest deadline for the attack.\textsuperscript{20}

In spite of these discrepancies in time between what was desired and the actual facts, it is safe to assume that the Air Force was ready for commitment by the first stated deadline for attack, the 12 November; since, as previously stressed, all necessary measures had been initiated in good time by means of detailed orders before these detailed orders appeared in the consolidated form in Directive No. 5 of the Second Air Fleet.

\textsuperscript{20} The dates given in Items 3, 4, and 5, are taken from the table given on page 5 of Part One, Chapter I, Paragraph 1: "Operation Delhi: Deadline Requirements (Die Termine- vorgaben zur Delhi Operation)."
The basic and initial situations for the first aggressive operation planned as well as the first assembly carried out for the planned operation having now been clarified, the further examination of remains alone and measures must remain confined to incisive phase divisions in objectives, planning, and assembly movements. Hence, it is not possible to interpret and use the various documentary evidence available for the period which has followed.

It is self-evident that continuous changes occurred in the basic directives given by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and by the Air Fleet headquarters. These changes involved supplementary orders, corrections, and mission instructions in all fields, only a few of which are mentioned below:

Reconnaissance planning
Interpretation of reconnaissance information
Changes in the crew, case blurs
Terror training measures during the waiting period
Planning and supervision of preparations for airborne operations
Development of the communications networks—Commitment of the Air Signal Corps
Development of the Air Force ground organization
Direction of Home air defense
Definition of the missions of the AAA corps.

In line with the principle adopted in this study to treat only fundamental, operational developments in this Chapter Two,
the next few weeks must be omitted until the next new directives from the Supreme Command entailed new planning, by the Army and the Air Force.

The next phase is thus introduced by Hitler Directive No. 8 of 20 November 1939, the text of which will be found in Appendix 3.

The new directive contained no new intentions affecting the Air Force. The underlying tendency was that esercibility was to be maintained and further improved. This requirement applied particularly to the Army, since the Air Force was at all times ready for instant action.

On the whole the instructions concerning impending Army operations remained unchanged, the only difference of importance in the light of later developments being the statement that the possibility must be taken into account that a shift of emphasis from Army Group B to Army Group A might become necessary under certain conditions.

A point which seems important for the Air Force was the fact that, contrary to formerly, an attack against Holland was now authorized. Of course the directive states: "The missions for the Air Force remain unchanged."

So far as the execution of these missions in detail is concerned, the following idea seems now and at the same time surprising: The 7th Air Division was only to be committed in
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to execute its large-scale airborne operation forming part of the overall plan for Operation Chant "if and when successful of the bridges across the Albert Canal is assured." This planning places the two intended airborne operations in a co-ordinate and time relation one to the other. What appears important here is that the hope of achieving surprise in Operation Chant had apparently been abandoned. 21

The next basic directive for the Air Force is the revised version of Directive No. 5, dated 7 December 1940, from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the text of which will be found in Appendix 4. This directive revokes all former instructions and, as a continuation of former directives, states the principles to be effective in the future.

It is not to be assumed that the new directive was an immediate result of Hitler Directive No. 3, since it will be seen that Air Force Directive No. 5 contains ideas and orders for the future conduct of operations by the Air Forces which differ radically from those hitherto in force.

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Here, a gap is perceptible, so far as time and evolution are concerned, between the old and the new system. The only possible explanation is that conferences must have taken place 21. It is clear from the passage that the last orders "have been amplified by special oral instructions from the Fuehrer for the airborne operations, and by order of the Army in action to seize the Meuse River bridge west of Maasbracht." This explains the clear opposition lack of control resources. Much will be said on this subject in Chapter XIII, which follow.
and agreements must have been reached between the Joint Military, the Army, and the Air Force High Command for which no documentary evidence is available. It can be assumed with some degree of certainty that it was primarily \textit{XXXXX} demands by the Army which led to the changeover from the policy of primarily operational air warfare ordered in the past to the shift of emphasis in Air Force operations to action in support of the Army. This return to the "recipe for victory" of the Polish campaign thus occurred between the date of issue of the first Air Force directive on 20 October and that of the second Air Force directive on 7 December.

The primary mission of the Air Force was now formulated:
".....with the bulk of its units (the Air Force) will support the attack by the Army, concentrating its forces heavily in the areas of main effort."

Continuous air action against the Anglo-French air forces ".....in so far as they could take action against our attacking armies....." was now a secondary mission. This is the new feature, but at the same time it is a repetition of the old "recipe for victory." A logical result was that not only the Second Air Fleet, in the area of main effort, but also the Third Air Fleet in the southern areas, would have to commit stronger forces than hitherto planned to provide direct and indirect support for the Army. Only the southernmost V Air
Corps was to combat the French-British air forces, but here also only "...in no great these could be committed against the (German) attack armies..."

Even the X Air Corps under direct command by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, which was to continue its air warfare against British naval forces and British merchant shipping, was required during the Army operations to attack British troop transports to the Continent and the general service installations of the Royal Air Force in England "...in no great operations occurred from there against the Continent." 22

Briefly stated: the primary mission for the entire German Air Force now was to provide support for the Army.

The distribution of forces according to Directive No. 5 will be seen from Appendix 5 to the present chapter, with explanatory and supplementary information following in Appendix 6.

The new distribution of forces reveals the following basic features:

Main emphasis for the Air Force was now clearly in the South (Third Air Fleet and Army Group A), while main emphasis in the conduct of Army operations was just as clearly in the North (Second Air Fleet and Army Group B). For example, the Third Air Fleet had eight bomber wings, the Third Air Fleet only two. In contrast, the Army area
area of main effort had the large majority of all specifically close air support units in the VIII Air Corps under the Second Air Fleet.

This obvious imbalance between operational planning and distribution of forces was partially balanced by the fact that the I Air Corps, although under the Third Air Fleet supporting Army Group A, was to commit the bulk of its forces on the south of the Army area of main effort from its bases on the north flank of the Third Air Fleet. In addition, the X Air Corps by virtue of its mission to attack targets in the south of England would also provide indirect support for the Army in its area of main effort.

In itself, the distribution of forces available thus given a clear indication of the intensity of the planned Army support operations.

Hitler Directive No. 823 had mentioned the possibility that main emphasis in the overall offensive might be shifted later from north to south, namely, from Army Group B to Army Group A. In his Directive No. 5 the Commander in Chief provided against this contingency by reserving his decision with respect to the XXXX concerning all measures "after breaking through the 27th Army's defenses."

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Mouse River defense line" including the possibility of a
shifting main emphasis for the Air Force from the North to the
center (in which case VIII Air Corps would transfer to south
and V Air Corps to north).

The chain of command as ordered by Directive No. 5 was
KAMAAMIX on 7 December 1939 was to remain unchanged, and ac-
tually was still in effect when the offensive began on 5 May
1940. Only the distribution of forces was to be changed in
some details.25

Finally, a boundary map will be found in Appendix 7
showing the boundary lines between Army Groups A and B and be-	ween the Second and Third Air Fleets. One noticeable fea-
ture here is that the army group and air fleet boundaries do
not coincide, but that the zone of operations of the Third
Air Fleet extended into the southern areas of Army Group B.
The reasons for this arrangement are unknown. The Polish
campaign had already shown that it was essential, in order
to assure uniform command in the conduct of an operation and
to insure adequate Air Force-Army cooperation, to assign identi-
tical zones to the army groups and air fleets required to
cooperate, and to avoid any overlapping. This experience was
disregarded in the Western Theater.26

25. For distribution of forces on 10 May 1940 see Part Four,
Chapter II, Appendix A.
26. See study by same author on the Polish campaign.
The reader is referred to Directive No. 5, Annex 2 for details on the expected or assumed enemy strengths and the enemy action thought probable, at the time.

In view of the actual situation of the Western Powers during the German offensive in May 1940, it appears important in this discussion of German planning to emphasize what the Air Force expected as far back as at the end of 1939; namely,

1. Commitment of the bulk of the Allied air forces against the German advance on the ground.

2. Attacks against German war communications.

3. Attacks against the German Air Force ground organisation.

What actually happened in the offensive reveals to what extent these expectations, which were in every respect justifiable at the time, were vindicated by events.27

The reader is referred to Directive No. 5, Annex 4 for details on the views concerning the conduct of combat operations by the German Air Force.

New and clear-cut principles for the revised planning of air operations now existed.

On the basis of the revised text of Directive No. 5 by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the Second and Third Air Fleets issued their also revised and re-drafted directives 27. See Part Three "Stuka West."
The Second Air Force retained the previous designation of "Directive No. 5", the revised version of which cancelled and replaced the former draft.

The Third Air Fleet issued "Directives for the Conduct of Operations in the Defensive Battle (Weisungen fuer die Hauptfehldruck in der Abwehrkampf)" based on the directive from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

The original text of both of the above operational orders is available, so that it is possible here for the first time to place the plans and measures of the two air fleets side by side, for a comparative study, as they existed at the turn of the year 1938-1940.

1. SECOND AIR FLEET: DIRECTIVE NO. 5 FOR THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE.

In this case the Directive from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, dated 7 December 1939, was followed very soon by the Second Air Fleet Directive of 11 December, a copy of which is attached to this chapter as Appendix 5.23

It is self-understood that the orientation given on the situation and on intentions on the whole corresponded to the information given in the Air Force High Command directive.

Formulation of the target assignment for the Second Air Fleet corresponds in all respects to the new objectives stated by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.
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The Second Air Fleet will commit the bulk of its air units and the 7th Air Division together with the reinforced 22 Infantry Division in action directly supporting the advance of the Sixth Army.

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The attacks against the air forces of the Western Powers and their ground organization provided for in this mission assignment were also designed to support the Army, and altogether the whole course was clearly obvious.

The missions for the IV and VIII Air Corps were also formulated in consonance with the new tendency. There is no need to repeat them here since the original text of the directive is available.

Once again only vague reference is made to the airborne operations planned against the fortress of Eben-Emael and the canal bridges west of Maastricht, as well as against the "Recluit National" area and Ghent (according to special orders).

The mission for the II AAA Corps also is exclusively one of support for the Sixth Army.

Consequent with the primary mission of supporting the Army, the Air Force operational orders included in an annex a demilite Army order of battle in the area of main effort, and a statement of the combat missions for the Sixth and Fourth Armies.

von 11. 11. 1941.
The units which the Second Air Fleet was to entail in the execution of its combat mission are listed in Appendix 9: "Order of Battle for the Units of the Second Air Fleet—December 1939 (Jahrestag der Konrad-Liebenau-Flugblatt Nr. 2—December 1939)" which for the first time presents a complete and fully documented picture of the forces available and of assembly area involved.

Appendix 10: "Explanations to Second Air Fleet Order of Battle (Jahrestag der Konrad-Liebenau-Flugblatt Nr. 2—December 1939)" includes not only the flying units, given in Appendix 9, but also all other tactical forces.

The Second Air Fleet followed us its Directive No. 5 already on the following day, 12 December 1939, with "Special Instructions No. 1 to Directive No. 5 for Combat and Reconnaissance Operations," the text of which will be found in Appendix 11. It is not possible to go into an interpretation of these instructions here.

In closing this review of the orders issued by the Second Air Fleet it is necessary to discuss the concept of "Interdiction Points (Grenzblöcke)" mentioned in the directive.

These interdiction points, sometimes also called interdiction lines, were points which had been determined at an early stage en route on the basis of tactical and traffic.
considerations and with a view to the assumed enemy advance routes, assembly areas, and assembly movements. The main targets here were points at which traffic converged, such as bridges, road intersections, and the entrances to and exits from built-up areas, at or within which the enemy might become involved in congestions, concentrations, or other march difficulties. Such points were ideal targets for attack by dive- and other bomber units. Plans for attacks of this type were worked out far in advance on the basis of careful maps and photo-reconnaissance, which had made it possible to furnish the attack units with photographic data on all targets involved. This method proved very sound in practice.

Appendix II to the present chapter in the text, with outline maps, of an order by the Second Air Fleet which is a good illustration of this type of preparatory work.

III: THIRD AIR FLEET: INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE ENLARGED BATTLE

The Third Air Fleet issued its new instructions later than the Second Air Fleet, namely on 23 December 1939. Although this late issue can be explained by the necessity for coordination with the Army, it is nevertheless to be assumed that another directive was issued previously of which no copy is available at writing. 50

50. This can be assumed from a remark "new version of 23 December 1939 (new-secret, vom 23.12.1939)."
In any case, however, the available text of the "New Version of 27 December 1939, a copy of which is included as Appendix 13 to this chapter, determined the developments which were to follow.31

Unlike the directive issued by the Second Air Fleet, the Order of Battle and Allocation of Airfields which formed part of the Third Air Fleet "Instructions" is not available, so that there is no possibility to give details on the subdivisions of the air force and other large units, although a rough indication is available in the distribution of forces given in the Air Force High Command Directive No. 5.32 Other details have been taken from various orders issued by the Third Air Fleet concerning the allocation of installations of the ground organization and are to be found in Appendix 14 to this chapter. The two tables thus given supplement each other.

Compared with former orders on. directives by the Third Air Fleet, the tone of the Air Fleet's new "Instructions" also reveals a change in line with the tendency evident in the Second Air Fleet directive, in that support for the Army is a far more prominent feature. Because of the whole Army assembly, the basic mission, and the allened Army operations in the south, the change was naturally not quite as ecstatic as.

32. Sep Appendix B to Chapter II.
as in the case of the Second Air Fleet. Nevertheless, the
Third Air Fleet from this juncture on had to base its orders
on the operational plans and force dispositions of the Army,
which are given in detail.

The new tendency is best clearly expressed in the basic
order with which the "Instructions" begin (Part 3, Subd. 4):

With close concentrations of its forces, the Third
Air Fleet will support the attack by the Fourth, Twelfth
and Sixteenth Armies.

This success was served not only by operations directly
supporting the ground forces but also by indirect support ope-
rations, such as continuous attacks against the Anglo-French
air forces and against enemy army forces moving forward from the
deepest rear.

In one respect, however, the original plan remained un-
changed, namely, that of commencing air operations with a sur-
prise attack against the enemy air forces.

For this initial airmen's attack, the air fleet specifically
designated the targets. These targets were in the far rear of
the French ground services organization and included air bases
and air supply depots. The I, II, and V Air Corps with a total
strength of twelve bomber groups were designated to carry out
this first surprise attack. The three corps also had authority
35. Paragraph 9 of the "Instructions."

II/32

II/33
to commit another twelve dive- and other bomber crews. However, these also were to be committed in a surprise attack against installations of the French ground service organization with main emphasis against the bases of enemy fighters in the Chambray-Atokens-Chateau-Thierry-Troyes-St. Mié-Bladelnef area.

Only a small number of dive-bomber units were to be committed for direct support of the Army in breaching the frontier fortifications; the rest were at the disposal of the Corps.

All long-range bomber forces were thus to participate in the "great attack" against the enemy air forces.

Presumably, however, the mission assignment changes drastically from that planning:

After execution of the initial powerful surprise attack against the enemy air forces, direct support for the German Army's attack, and combat action against enemy forces moving forward by rail and/or road will take precedence over all other missions.

Direct and indirect air support for the Army came into prominence:

the I Air Corps was to give direct support to the Fourth Army;

the II Air Corps was to give direct support to the Xth Armee
II/34. Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies and the XIX Army Corps.

As a secondary mission besides action to support the Army attack, action was also to be taken against the enemy air forces.

II/35. The Third Air Fleet was to employ the V Air Corps in operational missions, with main emphasis on attacks against enemy reinforcements which it was assumed would be moved forward into the combat areas. Otherwise, the V Air Corps was earmarked for continued operations against the enemy air forces, particularly if the other two air corps could not release units for this secondary mission of theirs.

The boundary lines between the two air corps of the Third Air Fleet for reconnaissance, bombing, and blind navigation operations are shown in Appendix 15.

The zone of the V Air Corps, which extends beyond the area shown on the map, must be projected west and south as follows:

a. Boundary line in southwest from Meret-march of Orleans-Chateau du Loir (24 miles southwest of Le Mans)-Ile d'Yeuau (off the Atlantic coast south of St. Nazaire)

b. The zone extended southwards as far as a line from Monthard (20 miles northwest of Dijen)-the section shown in Appendix 13-Dijen-Pillyy-Sales border west of southern tip of Lake Gauburn, Bass.
One feature in the directives by the Third Air Fleet which appears particularly worthy of note is the great foresight in providing for possible operational developments: at this early stage already, clear-cut missions are stated for the three air corps in the event of Army Group A developing certain operations as soon as the Meuse River would be reached between Dinant and Sedan. This appears particularly interesting, in view of the actual execution of the operations later under the entirely different conditions of plans for the main operation through the center. Within the first few days following the opening of the offensive on 10 May 1940, the Third Air Fleet was actually to place main emphasis in the same area in its Army support operations.

34. Paragraph 12 of the Third Air Fleet "Instructions."
Around the turn of the year 1939/40 the Air Force all along the entire line from the North Sea to the frontier of Switzerland had clear-cut operational orders. These operational orders provided an initial situation for action as soon as the code word to commence operations should arrive, which now as before had to be expected daily.

In the midst of the implementation of the last operational orders, which were to be the final orders for the time being, came a new directive from the supreme command. This directive introduced an entirely new concept, that of the "instant operation (Sofortfall)." The plans here provided against the eventuality of the Western Powers suddenly taking the initiative and rendering all German plans for the "defensive battle," meaning the westward offensive, illusory.

The possibility had to be taken into account that the enemy might stage a drive east before the German offensive commenced; that Anglo-French forces might move into Belgium and Holland in a surprise operation; and that French forces also might attack the Westwall.

Against the eventuality that such instantaneous action might become necessary, the Joint Military High Command (OKW) and the Army High Command issued separate "Precautionary Directives," which necessitated new planning by the Army, in particular to insure immediate readiness for action and
II/38

an accelerated assembly for instantaneous counterattack. The Army was to be ready within the shortest possible time to launch a counterattack.

II/39

No documents are available on this subject from the Army side, so that it is not possible to appraise the results of the actual planning done in the new case.

In the case of the Air Force, it can be assessed with certainty that the results were far less inclusive, since the Air Force in any case at all times had to ready for instantaneous action. The necessity to adjust to the changed situation for the Army nevertheless necessitated certain modifications in planning and in the existing operational orders.

On 31 December 1939 the Second Air Fleet issued a Directive for Instant Action (Heisun, oder den Befehl), pursuant to an order received from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force of which no copy is available.

The text of the new directive will be found in Appendix 16 to the present chapter.35

35. A discussion between the present author and General Halden, Chief of the Army General Staff from 1932 to 1942, produced information which threw some light on the interaction between the "Instant Action" plans for the Army and the Air Force, which is augmented by information from another discussion with General von Salisch, at the time under discussion Chief of Staff Army Group B. According to this information the subject was first raised by Army Group B in December 1939. The concept as such was not new, but obviously it had "... been taken seriously." Army Group B now insisted on views against the eventually stated, apparently without any initial success. The Army opinion was that in the initial stages only the Air Force would be affected by the requirements for instantaneous action. This was due to Goring, who intended to settle the whole matter without the Army.
The cardinal points in this directive were as follows:

On the whole, the plans and missions remained unchanged; even more emphasis was placed on direct and indirect air support for the Army.

The two planned airborne operations were not to be executed.

The air units thus released could be committed for direct support of the Army; both air corps could support the advance by the Sixth Army.

The new objectives thus stated led, in fact, to slight changes in the allocation of the air units which could be released from other missions. Other essential decisions were to be made contingent on information secured through long-range air reconnaissance.

The Third Air Fleet had been able to incorporate the requirements of this new directive in the "instant action" in its "Instructions for the Conduct of Combat Operations in the Defensive Battle," dated 23 December 1939. In the event of execution of the "instant action" plan, all air units of the I and II Air Corps were to be committed immediately, from the very outset, in direct support of the Army.
In such case the V Air Force alone would carry out the planned initial assault against the enemy air forces. Its units were to attack air bases and defended airfields in operation in the Central-Auss-Tilly-St. Mi- area Biedenhofen, with main emphasis on the northern parts of the area.

At the turn of the year the German Air Force in the West was thus ready for action in the case of either of the two contingencies considered possible:

1. It was ready for the execution, according to plan, of its missions in the repeatedly postponed German offensive.

2. It was ready for unscheduled action supporting the Army in the event of a genuine battle of defense which might develop from an Allied offensive, but which was to be a completely aggressive defense on the German side.

In dealing with this series, which was once again extremely critical, it seems wise once again to state the preparations of the Air Force within the scope of the major command decisions.

Footnote 30, p. 192-193—Continued. Force near at the Rhine River in the western side. From January 4th-January 14th, the "instant action" plan of operations was to become the "normal" plan of operations.

This version is offered here with all reservations. It is based on notes prepared by the present author immediately after the discussions with Generals Halder and von Bismarck.

Footnote 6, n. 17, p. 1, Appendix 17, Lines 10, etc.
During December 1939 Hitler had five times postponed his
decision concerning the opening of the offensive.\textsuperscript{37} On 27
December the decision was once again postponed, this time
by a full two weeks, that is to 9 January 1940. On 10 January
Hitler then decided to establish 17 January as D-Day; on 15 January
D-Day was again postponed to 20 January, and then came the long
postponement, until May 1940.

Prior to all of this, however, an event had occurred
which caused a serious check within the German command circles
as well as among the enemy.

On 10 January, the date on which Hitler sanctioned D-Day
to 17 January, two air officers from the Second Air Fleet
flew their bombers and landed at Mechelen, near Maastricht,
in Belgium. These officers had in their possession a copy of
the current German plan of operations, namely Directive No. 5
for the Conduct of Operations in the Defensive Battle, issued
by the Second Air Fleet.\textsuperscript{38}

For quite some time it was not known whether and to what
extent these top-secret documents had been destroyed, and the
German Command had to assume that the German plans were known
to the Allies.

The compilation "Dokumente zur Teil-Ichichte des West-
feldzugs"\textsuperscript{39} gives full details on this matter, generally
\textsuperscript{37} Part Three, Vol. 1, Chapter 1, a. 5.
\textsuperscript{38} Appendix 8 to the present chapter.
\textsuperscript{39} Sources 2, Section VI.
Known as "Fall Reinhard" in German circles and as "Affaire Maelbeek" abroad, and particularly on what parts of the German plan of operations actually fell into Belgian hands, so that the matter needed no further treatment here.

Resignations within the Second Air Fleet came immediately:

1. The Commanding General, General Pauly, and his Chief of
Staff, General Kesselring, were immediately removed from
their posts in a brusque manner, although neither of them
could in any way be held responsible for what had happened.

On the same day General Kesselring was named to succeed
1. General Pauly as Commanding General, and Brigadier General
2. Saidel (the present author had until then served as Chief of Staff of
3. the First Air Fleet) as Chief of Staff, Second Air Fleet. 40

This unfortunate incident seriously damaged the resolu-
tion of the German Air Force, and its general repercussions
on the whole complex of operational planning were not as
direct and decisive as was assumed at the time, or as they
have been portrayed at times in post-war publications. The

40. The present author was attached to the Second Air Fleet
shortly before Christmas 1939 for orientation, and was to
relieve Kesselring as Chief of Staff at an as yet unknown
date. It was his good fortune that the incident occurred
while Kesselring was still in office as the Air Fleet
Chief of Staff.

The present author was also personally present when
Spring, in Berlin, reassigned General Polley, who had
rendered highly meritorious services in preparations for
the Western Campaign, in a most brutal manner and literal-
ly "threw him out." General Polley was never again
even an assignment in the Air Force.
fact is that the Affaire Moucheron was not considered as a reason to immediately cease current planning; otherwise Hitler would not five days later have fixed the 20 January as the deadline for execution of the plans prepared.

Other facts, developments, and considerations in January 1940 had brought about a fundamental change in operational planning by the Joint Military High Command, a detailed discussion of which would exceed the scope of the present study. The following are only a few of the factors, very briefly stated:

Unfavorable weather conditions for air operations in the winter months;

Extension of the war to the Scandinavian territories as a result of Operation "Jegnumina."

The changed concept for operations in the West by shifting the area of main effort from north to the center, where the breakthrough was to be achieved;

The first indications of these new developments became evident in an order from the Joint Military High Command on 17 January calling for intensified measures for naval and air warfare. Excerpts from this order will be found in Appendix 17 to the present chapter.

The actually important outcome of Affaire Moucheron, as far as the Western Theater was concerned, was a complete new
planning for the offensive. The plan for Operation Gelb, as described in Part Three of the present study, represents the connecting link with past developments.40

Very few records are available on the last few months of the War of Waiting, namely, the first few months of 1940. This whole period was relatively quiet, undisturbed by the daily expectation of orders setting or altering the deadline for the western offensive and devoted entirely to the interminable preparations for Operation Gelb. The tension of waiting was also overshadowed by the new and entirely unexpected developments in Scandinavia.

Both the German and the New at last had time and quiet in carrying out the planned preparations. Here the question evolved—whether the preparations made were adequate to ensure success on the scale actually achieved later in the offensive which commenced on 10 May 1940.41

The new "directions," which this time were to be final, first of all formed the basis for a conference between the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commanding Generals of the Second and Third Air Fleets. Records are available on this conference, which took place...

40. Part Three, Chapter II: "Planning and Auftrage fuer den Fall "Gelb."
41. Part Three, Chapter II.
on 29 January. However, the origins of these records are unknown, and the records themselves are not very informative.

On the subject of operational problems they nevertheless reveal that Army Group C Headquarters was to cooperate with the Third Air Fleet in "...attack preparations on a large scale, with large Air Force commitments" in the southern sector of the Army Group's zone of operations. This whole matter can only have been intended as a deceptive maneuver.

At the conference, directives were also given reversing earlier assurances to increase the readiness for action. Main emphasis in training was to be on the subjects of "blind navigation flight, integrated action between aircraft crews and defense units, bombing, and high-altitude evasion." These were the subjects in which serious weaknesses had become evident in the Polish campaign, and which it had not yet been possible to remedy during the past winter.

Following this conference with the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the air fleets and the Army High Command conducted numerous carefully prepared field exercises and maneuvers, with both the Air Force and the Army participating. To clarify all tactical and operational problems involved in the mutual offensive to be launched. One such maneuver organized by the Army High Command on 16–19 March 1940, for example, dealt primarily with air support for mobile ground
Corps operating east and west of the Meuse River. A series of war games, arranged by Intermediate Air and Army command, followed.

Preparations for the airborne operation were particularly intensive, and involved hand-table games with a model of the Rhone Basel fortress, in which all details of the combat action to be taken by the various individual combat teams were played through to an exercise of the whole operation against what was called Fortress Holland. However, preparations did not remain restricted to theoretical activities and training: the newly developed cargo gliders (La Gleu glider) were tried out in an exercise simulating the precise conditions of the coming operation in timing and locality, air transport units exercised with the several forces in the air; and everything was done to promote integrated action by the various commands involved.

By early May 1940 the Air Force could with justification feel convinced that everything sensible had been done to insure success in the coming offensive.
DIRECTIVE NO. 5

1. GENERAL SITUATION. The behaviour of the Western Powers might make it necessary for the German military forces to take the offensive in the West.

2. INTELLIGENCE. After withdrawing to the fortifications along the French northeast frontier, the French-British Army with strong mobile forces is holding the line Dusseldorf-Dunkirk for the advance across the France-Belgian border. According to reports hitherto received, the British Army in this disposition is on the left flank in the area between Deauville and Calais. Back of the whole armament, operational reserves are in the far rear of Northern France.

The Belgian Army with the bulk of its forces is holding the line Liege-Antwerp, with weaker forces further forward at the Meuse-Scheldt Canal and along the frontier.

Of the Dutch Army only small forces are deployed south of the Meuse River for defense purposes.

For air situation and enemy appraisal see "To 1 No. 7218/39, 20 Nov, Thebes, 7, Nov, 1939."
3. The German Army of the West will attack between the Meselle River and the North Sea coast, in order to defeat the enemy retreating the advance in Belgium and Northern France and to reach the Channel coast.

Once this objective is reached the Air Force will conduct short-range air warfare against England.

4. Army Group B (North Wing of the Attack) will breach the Dutch-Belgian frontier fortifications between Veule and the northern tip of Luxembourg and with the bulk of its forces will drive forward initially to a line generally from Brussels to Charleroi and Ghent. The intention is for mobile forces to drive forward as speedily as possible into the plains of Belgium in order by means of all-out attack action to prevent the establishment of an enemy battle front and in order to create favorable conditions for the attack by all other forces.

5. Order of Battle for Army Group B.

- Sixth Army Mission
- Fourth Army Mission

6. Second Air Fleet, committed in Army Group B operations.

VIII Air Corps will support advance by Sixth Army by means of direct close support action.

IV Air Corps as its initial mission will attack the
CHAPTER TWO—Continued

enemy air forces in their assembly areas and prevent their participation in ground operations; later its units will attack troop concentrations as well as the Anglo-French forces moving forward from their assembly areas and, by means of continuous attacks against their rear columns and transportation movement, will prevent or delay their northeastward movement towards Brussels—Charleroi. If necessary, elements of the air corps will neutralize the Dutch air forces.

7. Adjacent: Third Air Fleet, employing the bulk of all bomber units of the “German Air Force,” will attack the French air forces in their assembly areas and prevent their participation in battles on the ground. Later, it will prevent a northeastward movement by the French Army from their assembly areas in Northern France.

With its northeast forces (1 Air Corps) the Third Air Fleet also will support Army Group E.

9. Reconnaissance.

a. Air Force High Command will be responsible for reconnaissance west of the line Le Havre-Orleans-Beurre- Lyons-Genoa.

b. Second Air Fleet, using the 122d Reconnaissance Group, will conduct reconnaissance west of the line Antwerp—Brussels—Charleroi (localities included).

Reconnaissance High.
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX I—Continued

an. Ascertained enemy air forces stationed in the
Northern France-Belgium area.

b. Maintain observation over assembly area of Brit-
ish Army; ascertain as early as possible趋势 and other trans-
formation movements from the area Liége into Belgium in the
direction of Brussels-Charleroi.

c. Detect possible landing operations in Channel
parts.

d. IV and VIII Air Corps, using their headquarters recon-
naissance squadrons, will insure early detection of enemy
trough movements so that these can be taken under immediate
attack.

In operations against the enemy air forces in their bases,
tactical reconnaissance prior to the first attack is exhibited
Special attention is drawn to the use of intruder planes
(Elbeleluzeige).

d. II and III Corps within the scope of its missions will be
assigned the AAA Air Reconnaissance Squadron II, for battle
reconnaissance.

c. Air reconnaissance Headquarters.

Right Boundary: Sixth Army north boundary line
Left Boundary: Sixth Army boundary line to Liége, from
there through Namur-Charleroi-Maubeuge-Charbri-Anciens-
Diopte.

f. Reconnaissance authorized for air aces on D-Day not
before Zero-Hour.

9. VIII Air Corps, in very closely integrated action with the Sixth Army will support the advance by the armored and motorized forces across the fortified defense lines and waterways, particularly in the XVI Army Corps zone of attack.

The VIII Air Corps, using its fighter units, will also provide protection for Army battle reconnaissance units within the zone of the Sixth Army.

10. IV Air Corps, in an initial surprise operation will attack the Belgian-French-British air forces in the area of Ostend-Dunkirk-Calais-Beaulne-Abbeville-Cambrai-Charleroi-Brussels-Antwerp (localities included). The object is to detect and destroy the enemy forces on the ground as early as possible.

Unoccupied ground organization installations and destruction of airfield installations not known to be occupied is prohibited. Emphasis will be on attacks against airfields at which bomber and fighter forces have been detected or are presumed.

Later the IV Air Corps will attack the British Army forces assembled in the general area of Calais-Abbeville-Arras-Lille. Main emphasis to be on action against enemy tank and motorized units, which presumably will be the first to start moving northeast.
aving northeastward. Trees assemblies and tree movements
must be detected and scattered as far west as possible. Still
later, the infantry divisions starting to move out will be
taken under attack along their march routes, if possible while
still within their assembly areas. Attacks against railroads
are authorized only if military rail movements are unmistak-
ably identified. For favorable interdiction points see An-
nex 2.

IV Air Corps will also prepare for a sudden swift attack
against the Dutch air forces if this should become necessary.

In the execution of attacks against moving columns, units
are also authorized to attack built-up areas, barracks, bridges,
and similar targets, if their attack appears favorable in the
effort to destroy the enemy. On the whole, however, all at-
tack motion against such cities and non-military targets are
strictly prohibited. In all, however, industrial and other eco-
nomy targets will not be attacked until further notice.

Casernas, areas training grounds, localities, tent camps,
etc., known to be occupied will be attacked.

A Special Directive will follow concerning cooperation
of IV Air Corps with 7th Air Division (commitment of 24th
Twin-Engine Fighter Wing).

11. 7th Air Division. The 7th Air Division will concen-
trate within the command zone of Second Air Fleet in
accordance with a special directive.

12. Boundary line between Second and Third Air Fleets
for combat operations: South boundary of Sixth Army as far
as Liége, then through Lièvres-Amiens, Péronne.

13. II AAA Corps will have its batteries ready in initial
positions west of the Rhine River within the zone of the
western Army from 1 November 1939 on.

Mission: To protect assembly of Army Group B and the
Air Force ground organization west of the Rhine River imme-
diately adjacent to the forces of Air Defense Command IV.

The units of the II AAA Corps deployed within the zone
of Fourth Army will be placed under command by the I Air Corps.
During the advance the II AAA Corps (minus the units under
the I Air Corps) will support the Sixth Army in action to
capture the Meuse River crossings and in action against bunk-
er positions. In these sectors the II AAA Corps will act
in very close cooperation with the locally assigned commands.

During the continued advance the corps' units will fol-
low as the ground forces advance, particularly the spon-
sored and tank units. The mission here will be to provide pro-
tection against air attack at the various bridges across
waterways, and to participate in ground action to swiftly
break enemy resistance (anti-tank fire).
Furthermore, protection of the road communications and of the ground organization serving the VIII Air Corps west of the German frontier, particularly in the attack zone of the Sixth Army at river and canal lines will become increasingly important. For fighter protection, the II Arm Corps will cooperate very closely with the VIII Air Corps.

14. VI Air District (Germany), will commit the bulk of its forces to protect the Ruhr region and the Air Force ground organization, since this mission is not handled by the II Arm Corps west of the Rhine River.

After the II Arm Corps has crossed the German frontier with the advancing ground forces, VI Air District (Germany) will again deploy adequately strong forces to protect the suspect area forward of Air Defense Area Dusseldorf.

The 26th Fighter Wing will remain assigned for direct defense of the Ruhr region. Its zone of operations will be delimited in the West by the German frontier, even if the fighting front in the ground area farther west in the course of the offensive. This applies also to pursuit operations.

15. VI Air District (Germany) will continue its mission of preventing enemy penetrations from across the North Sea coastline, with special emphasis on North Sea ports, and of protecting airfields in operation.
16. From midday on the day prior to D-Day I shall be at
the command post of the Second Air Fleet in Karat near Nieuw.

Signed: Kelay
General der Flieger

Annexes: 1 (Annex 2 to follow).

Verified
Signed: [Signature]
Colonel [Rank]
ANNEX I

Army Group B Order of Battle

Mission of the Individual Phil. Army

Boundary Lines

1. Order of Battle [Not specified in German text]

2. Mission of Sixth Army. On-day 2-hour Sixth Army will
cross the German frontier. With main concentration in the
Neuwend-Liineusticht sector it will break through the Dutch
and Belgian frontier fortifications and, exploiting all suc-
cess to the fullest, will drive westward against the Meuse-
River-Scheldt River and Albert-Canal fortifications. Main
direction of the drive will be Brussels. After the initial
breakthrough firmly concentrated and uniformly directed
mobile forces will drive on Brussels and then continue in
the direction of Ghent, the mission being to attack and de-
feat Belgian reserves being rushed forward and forward
France-British forces.

The army will move strong forces following up its drive
on the right flank. Early and strong reconnaissance in the
direction of Antwerp is important. The movement will be cov-
ered \textit{en masse} against Holland by forces deployed in the
sector north of Ypres, where German forces will only cross
the border insofar as it is necessary to protect the German
advance.
The continued advance in the north and east segments will isolate Antwerp.

Lille will initially be cut off by forces east of the Meuse River and later in the advance from North and West; these forces will be under unified command. Local attacks and the capture of individual works of the fortress will be required to neutralize and contain the garrison forces.

For the execution of its missions the army during the operations can rely on the receipt of further forces from the General Headquarters reserves.

3. Mission of Fourth Army. On D-Day, R-Hour, the army will break through the Belgian fortifications in the Ardennes mountains and, with the bulk of its forces, will drive forward to and across the Meuse River south of Namur, advancing westward in the general direction of Mainz. After the initial breakthrough the important point is to briskly attack and defeat enemy reinforcements being rushed forward and thus gain freedom of movement for the advance by the army's mobile forces. Bridges across the Meuse River in the Ettich-Namur sector will be captured as speedily as possible to enable the army to advance, as ordered, along both sides of the Meuse River, thus securing the forward crossing south of Namur and insuring coordinated action with
action with the Sixth Army.

Lusitania will be enveloped from southeast, south and
southwest and, as ordered for the Sixth Army, action will be
taken to capture individual fortification works in order to
ensure for the operation to capture the entire fortifications
system. As small forces as possible will be committed to
isolate Namur.

4. VI Deputy Corps Area Command will be responsible for
defense of the German borders within its area. Field-type
fortifications will be constructed. The border will not be
crossed.
Remarks by Author of the Present Study re
Carp. of Second Air Fleet Directive No. 3

1. In copying the original document the precise organization, underwriting, and as forth, have been retained.

2. The index to the directive. Here, only excerpts which have a direct bearing on the present study have been copied. The subdivisions, which extend from corps level have been omitted.

The boundary lines between armies and corps, which were
given on a 1:100,000 scale map, have also been omitted.

The important point appeared to be the missions assigned
to the armies.

3. The distribution has not been included in the copy.
ORDER OF BATTLE

AND TACTICAL BASES OF THE SECOND AIR FLEET AIR UNITS

IN THE ASSEMBLY BASED ON DIRECTIVE No. 5 ISSUED BY

THE SECOND AIR FLEET ON 7 NOVEMBER 1939

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

1. The order of battle and the tactical air bases are
taken from the orders quoted in the text of Greater Two,
Peotota 16, based on corrections, alterations, and supple-
ments, representing what was to be the temporary final ar-
angement for the assembly. A number of obvious errors and
inaccuracies have intentionally been retained.

2. Y Air Corps. This corps has been included since a
large share of its units were based on airfields of Second
Air Fleet's ground organization and because the units of
the corps in their sections were to support Army Group B.

3. X Air Corps has been included because it was still
under the Second Air Fleet when the air fleet issued its first
order, and because its units remained based on airfields of
the air fleet even after it was placed under direct command
by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

4. It has been possible here for the first time to estab-
lish the aircraft types in service in the various units.

5. The abbreviation "蛙蛙 26" indicated 26th Reconnaiss-
ance Squadron.
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<th>Command</th>
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CHAPTER TWO
APENDIX 3

CIN CJoint Military
H/G Command
O/R/RA. 212/33
C/K/JS. JS Def Branch 1

Berlin, 20 November 1939

8 Series
Officer Courier only.

DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

1. For the time being, the state of readiness to continue
the initiated strategic concentration must be maintained. This
is the only possibility to be able to immediately exploit Fav-
orable weather conditions.

The branches of the Armed Forces will make preparations
to insure that the attack can be halted even if the command to
halt it should arrive as late as D-Day minus 1st day 23.00 hours
(A-1. 26. 23.00) at headquarters. At the latest by that
time a code word will be dispatched to the headquarters meaning

Rhein (execute attack) or
Elbe (halt attack).

The Commander in Chief of the Army and the Commander in
Chief of the Air Force are requested, after the date for the
attack has been fixed, to inform Joint Military High Command/
Air Branch, of the time actually agreed upon for the attack
to commence.

2. Contrary to former directives, all measures planned
against Holland are authorized, the moment the general attack
commences, without special orders to this effect.
The behavior of the Dutch Army cannot be predicted. Wherever no resistance is encountered, the invasion will be given the character of a peaceful occupation.

3. Operations on the ground will be conducted in accordance with the basic instructions contained in the Assembly Directive of 28 October, as supplemented by the following:

a. All necessary preparations will be made to make a swift shift of emphasis from Army Group B to Army Group A, sensible if speedier and larger success should be achieved there, which seems probable from the current distribution of forces.

b. Dutch territory will be occupied up to a line from Grobbe to the Heneg River line, including the offshore islands but for the time being excluding Texel.

c. Contrary to former instructions, the Navy is authorized to take blockade action not only against Belgian, but also against Dutch ports and shipping lanes in the night prior to the attack, and with surface and air units from the time of the commencement of the attack by Army forces. However, the time between the commencement of submarine blockade action and commencement of ground operations must be kept as short as possible. Combat action against Dutch naval units is authorized only if they adopt a hostile attitude.

At the coastal areas to be occupied the Navy will assume
responsibility for defense by coastal artillery. Preparations
have already been made for this purpose.

5. The missions of the Air Force remain unchanged. They
have been supplemented by special instructions from the Fuehrer
concerning airframe operations and support for the Army in
action to seize the bridges west of Maestricht. The 7th Air
Division will not be committed in the airframe operation be-
fore the bridges over the Albert Canal have been secured.
Steps will be taken to insure the speediest possible exchange
of reports to this effect between the Commanders in Chief of
the Army and Air Force. Neither in Holland nor in Belgium nor
Luxembourg will large open cities or industries be taken under
attack without compelling military grounds.

6. Missing I Barmera. /Omitted because not of interest
in the present study/.

Distribution: ..... By Order
G/ Keitel
Verified
G/V. To the
Captain.

The above copy corresponds to the text of Directive No. 8
in the Compilation of Sources (Dokumentenauswahl) by Jacob-
see Source No. 5, Section I, No. 2.
DIRECTIVE BY THE CHIEF OF THE AIR FORCE
GOVERNING PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST

CITING THE AIR FORCE
Headquarters, 7 December 1939
Operations Staff In Nr. 5336/39 Top Secret
5th Copy

DIRECTIVE NO. 5

Recalling the instructions contained in "O.H. und O.L. Führungssstab In Nr. 5344/39, "Kriege. Stellung der an 10. 1939" and
saturating these in "O.H. und O.L. Führungssstab In Nr. 5723/39-"Kriege. Stellung der an 20. 10. 1939 M.17:...'
and 17th place, I hereby order execution of the preparatory measures
in accordance with the following instructions:

1. Implementation of Dutch-Belgian neutrality by the
Western powers might compel us to take the offensive in
the Western Theater. The attack in such case will be car-
ried out with all military forces available.

2. a. The purpose of the offensive which would then be
launched with the most powerful air support possible in
the north flank of the western front through the Belgian
and French areas would be to defeat the largest possible
forces of the French Army and their Allies in Belgian and
French soil and, with a simultaneous occupation of Holland
initially as far as the Reet-Waase River line, to gain
as much territory as possible in Belgium, Holland and Nor-

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958
Northern France as base areas for continued conduct of the
war against Britain and France.

For these purposes the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
had ordered as follows:

The objective in the attacks directed by Army Group
B, with Headquarters at Ben Guébriat, and Army Group A,
with Headquarters at Kehl, is to annihilate the Allied
forces in the areas north of the Seine River and drive
through to the Channel coast.

After breaking through the frontier fortifications
north and north of Liége, Army Group B will attack in a
western direction. One attack force (Sixth Army) will ini-
tially be moved forward into the Brussels area, the other
army (Fourth Army) will advance on both sides of Namur
against the Kévelles-Chimay line.

In the zones of the two attack forces mechanized units
will be dispatched towards Ghent and Liége as early as pos-
cible.

The Liévich and Antwerp fortresses will be enveloped.

The intention is, furthermore, to seize the Dutch ter-
ritory in front of Fortress Walloon as an initial measure,
using the smallest possible forces for the purpose. Army
Group A will extend the attack front of Army Group B and
will cover the attack by all Army forces against enemy
action from north and southwest. For this reason it will
assign its Twelfth Army, in the right flank area, as addi-
tively as possible across the Meuse River in the Eupen-
Lennik sector; then through the French fortified frontier zone in
the general direction of Neuen–Nemay–Sierok and will hold
this line to cover the south flank of the overall operation.

Ahead of the bulk of its forces, the army group will dispatch
its mobile forces (the IX Corps) to exploit the open ter-
rain for a HAMMER drive along both sides of Arlen, Ten-
tigny, and Ploumervilliers toward Sedan. The mission of this
force is to defeat enemy mobile forces advancing into south-
ern Belgium and reach the western side of the Meuse River in
a surprise maneuver at and southwest of Sedan, thereby creat-
ing favorable conditions for further progress of the overall
operation. Army Group C, with headquarters at Frankfurt on
Main will defend the territories within its zone, em-
ploying the smallest possible forces for the purpose.

Hammer Drive [Map pages 117, 120, 121].

Between Army Group B and Army Group A Rembec on
Sieg River (Army Gp B)–Weyerbach (Army Gp B)–Neuen (Army
Gp B)–Ahrweiler (Army Gp A)–Ahr River line to south of
Ahrweiler–Hillesheim (Army Gp A)–Truce (Army Gp A)–Pronasfeld
(Army Gp A)–Luetzkanzgen (Army Gp B)–Heidfeld (Army Gp B)–
APPENDIX 4--Continued

St-Hubert (Army C, A)--Hayven, north of Fournay (Army B B).

Between Army Group A and Army Group C Genk--Gemunden--
Memmingen--Bielefeld (localities Army B A).

3. The mission of the Air Force will be:

while continuing combat operations against British
naval forces and their bases, to concentrate the bulk of
its forces for action supporting the Army in the areas of
main effort.

Of main importance in the execution of this mission will
be

a. direct air support for the armies in action to

breach the frontier fortifications and break resistance in
the numerous defense lines; and furthermore, by means of all-
out attack to delay the forward movement of Anglo-French
forces and rear elements of the Belgian Army, and to prevent
any landing operations which might occur.

b. through continuous combat action against Anglo-

French air forces which could operate against our attacking
armies, and through neutralization of the Belgian and, as
far as necessary, Dutch air forces, to prevent any planned
commitment of the Allied air forces over our armies and
against their rear communications; and to prevent antici-
pated enemy efforts of the Anglo-French air forces to gain
ledgment in Belgium and sensibil in Hellami. Operations against the British air forces within Britain remains subject to special orders from me personally.

b. by concentrating strong antiaircraft artillery and fighter forces in the areas of main effort in ground operations to protect the troops, their reserves, and their rear communication lines against air attack.

During the initial stages, attacks by French and British fighter forces are to be expected, as that action against them is of prior importance. Enemy air action will probably be directed primarily against Arm. Group A and the south areas of Army Group B. Only when the enemy enter Belgium are they likely to shift a shiny to the center and north flank of Army Group B.

delay to HEMAY the forward movement of Anglo-French Army forces to Belgian interdiction areas late against rail and road routes in southwest France and in Belgium are necessary. Attacks will be directed primarily against striking areas and moving columns and rail transport movements.

The air fleets will also attack against rail and road routes in agreement with the army groups. Bridges will only be destroyed in agreement with the army groups.

Attacks against any sizable towns, including military targets within them, are subject to express prior approval.
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4

The only exception here is that attacks against these concentrations at the cities to an extent from such terms are authorized.

4. a. Second Air Fleet will give direct support to the attack by Sixth Army in the Groen area, will prevent any movement of enemy reinforcements to the front areas, and will attack any new landing operations detected at the coast of Belgium and Holland; will prevent action by the French-British, Belgium, and as far as necessary the Dutch, air forces against the northern forces of Army Group B; and will deny the French-British air forces the use of airfields in Belgium and Holland.

b. In detail, the following schedule will govern the conduct of operations by Second Air Fleet:

Early and effective action to delay the movement of Anglo-French forces into Belgium is of paramount importance. Under unified direction by the Second Air Fleet, the bulk of the bomber units of that air fleet will therefore at the commencement of the offensive be committed against the assembly and forward movements of enemy forces moving towards the front of Army Group B; for the time being only weak elements will be committed against the enemy air forces in Belgium and laterblue in the Nieuwpoort area.
Combat action against the Dutch antiaircraft artillery
and air forces under their ground organization is authorized
only within the smallest scope absolutely necessary for the
conduct of the overall operation and only if they participate
in combat. However, if French-British air forces are unmis-
takably detected on Dutch territory they will be attacked im-
mediately, regardless of whether they are together with
Dutch air units on one and the same airfield. Destruction
of the lock installations of the Albert Canal will only be
authorized under special orders from me or in response to
urgent requests by Army Group B. The short broadcasting sta-
tion will be destroyed in the first attack.

IV Air Corps (under General der Flieger Keller) on the
first day of attack will support an airborne operation by
the 7th Air Division (more detailed instructions have been
issued separately). The primary mission here is that of di-
rect protection and support of the approach and air landing
against enemy air and ground action. Far far as necessary
for the purpose attacks against the Dutch antiaircraft artill-
ery forces along the approach route of the 7th Air Division
between Waal and the Belgian frontier are also authorized.
Furthermore, even the beginning of the operation on the
corp will hold units in reserve for action against enemy
forces which might approach the Brussels-Genk line from
the Lille area.

VIII Air Corps (under Generalmajor von Richthofen) on
the first day of the offensive will commit elements to sup-
sport an airborne operation by the 7th Air Division (more
detailed instructions have been given separately) and in
other respects will be instructed to give the strongest pos-
sible direct support to the Sixth Army. The main mission of
the air corps is to annihilate the Belgian Army west of the
Yser River. Attacks against built-up areas in these opera-
tions are authorized expressly only then when the localities
unmistakably are occupied by troops.

The fighter units will be committed to protect the
corps and the Sixth Army against enemy surprise air attacks.

The 7th Air Division has special orders. It will sepa-
rare from the rear and under the command of the Second Air
Fleet.

The Second Air Fleet is required to make airfield of
VI Air District Center available for the I Air Corps if
necessary.

(a) It is important to move the VIII Air Corps for-
ward as early as possible. All precautionary measures will
be taken for this purpose.

I reserve to myself the decision as to whether, after
the Moselle River line has been breached, dive-bomber units should be transferred to the I and II Air Corps, whether the V Air Corps should be saved to the north flank, and whether other areas should release fighter units to reinforce those with the VIII and IV Air Corps.

a. **II AAA Corps** (under Generalmajor Dornisch) will assemble initially east of the Meuse River. After assembling, the corps, in a rearward with Army Group B will move forward into its first area of operations in such manner that it will be ready for 5th action the moment Army Group B begins its assembly. The order to move forward will be given in 10th time (had already been given).

The initial mission of the AAA corps is to protect the assembly of the Sixth Army and support the battle for the Rhine Canal and the Moselle River line in the King of advance of the Sixth Army.

Later in the offensive main emphasis will be on ground action supporting the advance by the Sixth Army.

The fighter units currently under command of the AAA Corps will be released. For their assignment see distribution of forces. Their later return to the corps is intended.

The II AAA Corps will also release one AAA regiment to the I Air Corps (has been done).
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX 4—Continued

5. Third Air Fleet will give direct air support to the
left flank forces of Army Group B and to Army Group A, will
effectively delay the forward movement of enemy forces from
France, and will take combat action against the Franco-British
air forces intact as these could be committed effectively against the German
effectively against the German attacking forces.

a. I Air Corps (under General van Kliger Groen) will
give continuous direct support to the Fourth Army (Lusitania
area), and will take early combat action against enemy forces
advancing from the line Valenciennes—Ptocy to the Meuse River.

The AAA regiment received from the II AAA Corps will be
committed in accordance with the Fourth Army to protect the
army's assembly movements, and if the opening of the offens
ive will support operations to break through the frontiers
fortifications.

II Air Corps (under General der Langer Langer) will de
lay the approach of enemy forces from France by means of at
tacks against the rail and road routes in order for the purp
ose across the Franco-Belgian border and, together with a
composite bomber wing from XXII. XXI will give direct sup
port to the XIX Army Corps.

The corps' fighter units and those released from the
I AAA Corps will be consolidated under II Air Corps command.
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX 4--Continued

and moved forward for commitment over the zones of the
Twelfth Army (Mainz area) and the Sixteenth Army (Mainz area).

6. V Air Corps (under Generalmajor von Greim) will
take combat action against the French-British air forces in-
that the crew can be committed against the German attack
areas and primarily these in the Cambrai-Abens-Chateau
Thierry-Chaulnes—Verdun area. It must be the
commit to delay the forward movement of enemy forces to
and across the France-Belgium border.

7. I AAA Corps (under General der Flakartillerie
Weise) will initially assemble east of the line Bad wilden en-
Harburg-Giessen-Friedberg. In agreement with Army Group A
the corps will then move into its initial area of operations
early enough to be ready for fire action when Army Group A
commences its assembly. The initial mission will be to pro-
tect the assembly of Army Group A. After opening of the
offensive emphasis will be on antiaircraft protection over
the foremost units. In addition the corps, in close coor-
dination with the army corps and particularly with IIX Army
Corps, will participate largely in ground combat action to
break through the frontier fortifications and other terror-
lines. The fighter units currently under the II AAA Corps
temporarily
will be released for other assignment. For their new
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX 4—Continued

assignment see forces distribution chart. The possibility exists that they might be returned.

6. a. In direct agreement with the Third Air Fleet, the Second Air Fleet will make airports of VI Air District Command available for operations by the I Air Corps.

6. a. X Air Corps (under Generalleutenant Usáler), under my direct command, will operate against enemy naval forces and merchant shipping in accordance with instructions from me; for the time being its zone of operations remains restricted to the North Sea, the English Channel (including its western exits), and parts of the east and south coast of England. For this purpose, and in accordance with the current overall situation and weather conditions, the corps is authorized to commit small bomber forces in armed reconnaissance missions, and to dispatch reconnaissance units closely followed by bomber forces.

The necessary reconnaissance data on targets outside coastal waters will be furnished primarily by the reconnaissance services of Naval Air Command West. Reconnaissance over the east and south coast of England and reconnaissance preceding the execution of currently assigned combat missions are responsibilities of the X Air Corps.
APPENDIX 4—Continued

b. On the Atlantic and New West-Central US Areas

Assuming that the X Air Forces will increase the intensity of its combat action against Plane, targets and port installations
the ground service installations of the British Air Force in England, insofar as enemy forces are operating from there against the Continent

trom transports from England to France and FRANCE and Holland, both during unloading and while at sea.

Combat action against unloading ports are a responsibility of the Second and Third Air Fleets. Preparations will be made to transfer the X Air Forces to the area northwest of Oldenburg in close coordination with the Second Air Fleet.

7. a. Boundary Lines between Second and Third Air Fleets for reconnaissance and combat operations: Eupen (Second Air Fleet)—Verviers (Third Air Fleet)—Digne (Second)—Laon (Second)—Charleville (Second)—Valenciennes (Second)—Cambrai (Second)—Amiens (Second)—Digne (Second).

b. Movement and Unloading Bases for X Force

In France and the Air Fleets: By Havre—Orleans—Sang—Etam

Lyon-Signed border west of Geneva (facilities to Third Air Fleet).

c. Reconnaissance. It is of particular importance to detect:

d. the whereabouts of all US-French air units, in
particular transfers to northeastern France to the area
between the Oise and Seine Rivers;

b. the appearance of Anglo-French air forces in
Belgium or Holland;

c. the whereabouts of the Belgian and Dutch air
forces;

d. enemy troop transportation movements from the
Reims-Armeau line across the Charleville-Lille line by rail
and/or road;

e. troop disembarkation operations at the coast;

west of the line given above in Paragraph 7, b, recon-
naissance will be conducted exclusively by the Air Force
High Command.

9. For distribution of forces see Annex 1. (On D-Day the
20th Bomber Wing will be assigned for one day under Second
Air Fleet. Operational arrangements will be made directly
between Second Air Fleet and X Air Corps.)

10. Air-Defense. Commitment of the air defense forces
are governed by the instructions given in D.F.O. 7. D.F. 11. 1. 1942. In M. 1566/2. 9. 1942, "Commitment of Air Defense
10. 1939." In addition the instructions given in the fore-
going directive for protection of the attacking armies are
effective. In this connection, particular attention is
directed to protection for the Rhine and Meuse River bridges and newly captured bridges at the various lines reached in the operations.

11. Up to the commencement of the offensive, the directives previously given to the Third and Second Air Fleets concerning the attitude to be maintained towards the enemy remain effective. The air fleets will be informed of the deadline for commencement of the offensive probably three days before D-Day. Preparations will be completed immediately. Reports on this matter to be made to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Operations Staff (\[handwritten remarks\]: Third Air Fleet Completion report by the Air Fleet on 17 January 1940).

12. The assembly of army forces will be completed in area west of the Rhine River in such manner that the concentration for attack can be completed in three night marches.


16. Special Instructions for air signal services: See Annex 5.

For all matters of forces see Annex 1 and Decrees "Or. 1."
17. Maintenance x B aerow. It is essential that all preparations be carried out with the utmost secrecy. Particular attention must be given to the cancellation of all messages. Briefing of subordinate commands, staffs, and crews units must be restricted to the indispensable minimum. Personnel assisting in the preparations will be kept to the smallest possible number and will be sworn in writing to secrecy.

Written material will only be prepared if absolutely essential. The same applies to maps, etc. Their proper handling in accordance with security regulations will be checked continually.

In telegraph communications their use will be made only of secret channels whenever it is possible to deduce certain plans from the message being sent.

Special caution will be observed in the use of telephones.

It is impossible to overstate the importance of the above.


S/ V. Waldau
Letter of 1. L. Rd. Shb. No. 13 December 1939 lists the following corrections to Directive No. 5:

1. Attached allocation of forces, revised edition of 15 December 1939, replaced the former allocation chart; revised version of 11 November 1939, which is to be destroyed.

2. It be inserted as final clause: "As a standard for the concept of "ringle team" can be assumed generally localities with a population exceeding 5,000."
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4--Continued

ALLOCATION OF UNITS

1. Air Force High Command Reserve
   General Headquarters Reconnaissance Group

   V Air Corps
   1st Squadron, 122d Reconnaissance Group
   26th Bomber Wing, minus 7th Squadron
   10th " " " 1st "
   100th " Group
   36th High-Altitude Ju-88 Group (after activation)

2. Second Air Fleet
   Headquarters Staff w/
   2d, 3d, 4th Squadrons, 122d Reconnaissance Group

   IV Air Corps
   1st Squadron, 122d Reconnaissance Group
   5th Bomber Wing
   4th " "
   1st Training Wing, minus IV and V Groups

   28th Twin-Engine Fighter Headquarters Staff
   1st Squadron, 1st Twin Eng. Fighter Wing
   1st " " 76th " " " (temporarily attached)

   VII Corps
   28th Twin Eng. Fighter Wing
   IV " 4th Air Signal Regiment

   VIII Air Corps
   2d Squadron, 132d Reconnaissance Group
   77th Bomber Wing
   1 Greve, 77th Dive-Bomber Wing
   IV " " "
   IV " 1st Training Wing
   2d Dive-Bomber Wing
   1 Greve
   IV " "
   IV " 2d Training Wing--Continued

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CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4—Continued

VIII Air Force—Continued
27th Fighter Wing
I Group
I, 27th Fighter Wing
II, 1st
III, 2d

158th Fighter Group (tactically under IV Corps for initial attack)

Special Purposes Air Signal Battalion

II Antiaircraft Artillery Groups

Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron
201st AAA Regiment
103rd

III (Heavy) Battalion, 3rd AAA Regiment
9th Air Signal Battalion
I Battalion, 11th Air Dist. AAA Regiment

7th Air Division

IX Air District Command Headquarters

1st Fighter Wing, Headquarters w/
2nd Squadron, 19th Tr. Fighter Group
II Group, 27th Fighter Wing

II, 76th Twin-Engine Fighter Wing (temporarily w/IV Air Corps)

101st Fighter Group

10th Squadron, 26th Fighter Wing

VI Air District Command Headquarters

26th Fighter Wing Headquarters Staff w/
I Group
II
III

3. Third Air Fleet

2 Recon Squadrons (1st & 3d of 123rd Group)

I Air Force

5th Squadron, 122d Reconnaissance Group—Continued
III Air Corps--Continued

1st Bomber Wing

76th "

1st Dive-Bomber Wing Headquarters w/ I Group
2d Dive Bomber Wing

I Group, 24th Dive Bomber Wing

III " 3rd "

77th Fighter Wing Headquarters w/ I Group
4th " 36th Twin-Engine Fighter Wing

150th Fighter Group

102d "

IV Battalion, 1st Air Signal Regiment

202d AAA Regiment

II Air Corps Headquarters w/

5th Squadron, 1st Reconnaissance Group
2d Bomber Wing

5th Bomber Wing

I Group 77th Bomber Wing

I " 7th Dive-Bomber Wing

1st Squadron, 136th Tr. St. Group

5th Group, 1st Training Wing

53d Fighter Wing Headquarters w/

3 Groups (I, II, III)

22d Fighter Wing Headquarters w/

I Group

I Group, 77th Fighter Wing

11th Air Signal Battalion

V Air Corps

4th Squadron, 121st Reconnaissance Group

51st Bomber Wing

35th Bomber Wing

27th Bomber Wing
V Air Corps--Continued
175th Fighter Group

I AAA Corps

Headquarters Reconnaissance Squadron
101st AAA Regiment
102d " "
104th " "

III (Heavy) Battalion, 9th AAA Regiment

III " " A. G. C.

101st Air Signal Regiment

XII Air District Command Headquarters w/
52d Fighter Wing Headquarters w/

I Group

II "

I " 51st Fighter Wing
10th Squadron, 72d Fighter Wing

VII Air District Command Headquarters w/

II Group, 51st Fighter Wing;

I " 54th " "

Headquarters Staff, 54th Fighter Wing.
ANNEX 2
INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

A. General Situation:

1. General: (Excerpt from Annex 2, Commander in Chief Army, Army General Staff, Operations Branch, No. 4440/39, 19 October 1939.

"It can be assumed that Belgium is determined to resist invasion of her sovereign territory at least in a line from Meuse River- Albert Canal. The objective of the France-British Command will be to support the Belgians in holding this line, particularly the two corners of Antwerp and Liège. The speed, commitment of mobile forces for this purpose is to be expected. It is to be assumed that this will be followed by a northeasterward advance of a strong French and British force between the Meuse River and the coast. Possibly, a force will attack in a northeasterward drive through the Aisennes Mountains at the same time in order to narrow down the German operational area south of Liège.

"If the German attack should crush Belgian resistance in the frontier zones before the bulk of the Anglo-French forces arrive, it is assumed that those forces will attack frontally west of the Meuse River and that efforts will be made, by pushing forward strong forces on the left flank, to secure contact with Antwerp and turn the German right"
flank. In this case also, a northward attack through the Ardennes Mountains appears possible. For this operation, approximately forty French divisions could be made available now and up to sixty later, in addition to approximately seven British divisions.

2. Attention by Commander in Chief of the Air Force. The early arrival of troop transports from England must be anticipated. For debarkation ports along the French Channel and west coast could be used besides the following: (a) ports.

E. AIR SITUATION.

1. In view of the small size of the air forces of Bel-

gium and Holland, effective action by them against the op-

erations is not to be expected.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that the Belgian air force might have thirty or more Hurricane fighters available.

2. Presumably, the air units serviced to support the

France-British Army will also be in the north French air

base area until operations commence. The following are
assumed in the Cambrai-Compiègne-Chamant-Trayes-Chauvilois-Abbeville area:

a. French.
200 Army tactical reconnaissance planes
70 long-range reconnaissance planes
120 fighter planes
120 twin-engine fighter planes
60 bomber planes

b. British.
80 Army tactical reconnaissance planes
54 fighter planes
160 single-engine bomber planes (Battle)

The majority of the French bomber units totaling approximately 230 bomber units and elements of British bomber units totaling approximately 180 planes are assumed airfields in the area of Paris-Orleans-Chateaudun Blantes
around Tours, Bourges, and around Lyon.

Including all elements remaining in base bases, the British Air Force has a total strength of
350 tactical and strategic reconnaissance planes
700 fighters (approximately)
110 single-engine bombers (approximately)
330 twin-engine bombers (approximately).

It is not assumed that further British air units, particularly fighter units, will be moved to the Continent prior to the opening of the offensive.

3. In order to engage as far as possible the full off-


effect of German air attacks, the enemy forces operating from
airfields in France, besides dispersing the majority of their
air attack units in the far rear areas, will probably have
taken a number of other measures:

a. the preparation of tactical airfields in Northern
France;

b. the subdivision of air forces into small elements
based on a large number of alternate and dispersal fields;

c. the camouflage of aircraft while on the ground
and of the ground service installations;

d. the allocation of fighter units to protect the instal-
lations of the ground organization, particularly in the
northwestern areas.

1. At the beginning of the offensive it is to be assumed
that the majority of the Anglo-French air units deployed in
Northern France, and particularly the fighter units will
oppose the German advance and endeavor to prevent German
denotations on the ground and in the air, particularly in
the south of Belgium and Luxembourg, and in the rear areas
between the Rhine River and the German-Belgium and German-
Luxembourg frontiers.

Provisional operations by the British and French bomber
units integrated with army operations are not expected on
the first day. On the other hand, it is quite likely that elements of these units will attack the German ground organization, particularly in southern Germany if weather conditions permit.

As operations proceed, at the earliest in the second day, the bulk of French and British air power, including the bomber units, will be employed primarily in direct defense against the German attack on the ground. Attacks by the bomber forces will be directed primarily against the most important approaches and supply routes, rail and road, and in particular against the Ruhr river bridges. Later, it is also probable that strong elements of the French air forces will again be committed against German ground service installations in operation in southern Germany. At this stage the British bomber forces will almost certainly attack the German ground organization, particularly in northwestern Germany, attacking the forces units stationed on French airfields and on field in Britain. These operations will include low level attacks by small and very small units.

Later again, it is to be expected that British and French bomber forces will be moved forward to the ground organization in northeastern France and Belgium. It is
CHAPTER TWO
ANNEX 4
Annex 2--Continued

5. Attacks by larger forces against the German armament industries need not be expected until later, namely next probably only then when it will be possible to create the impression that such attacks are being carried out as reprisals.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SUPPLY SERVICES
TO DIRECTIVE No. 5

Ref: "HAPPENED IN 1941. PREPARE 108, 96, 00, 46.34..."

The instructions given with the above order for the supply services and in subsequent directives and orders will be supplemented and corrected as follows:

1. The allocation of medium and light fuel transport columns, in so far as these are not required for the movement of surface vehicle fuels, for the I and II AAA Corps (including the supply branch) are cancelled. The fuel transport columns thus released will be available to Third and Second Air Fleet Headquarters. They will be assigned to the fighter corps area as soon as fighter units are assigned to the AAA corps. Accordingly, these fuel transport columns must be assembled and held available.

Since the I AAA Corps is to release the 107th AAA Regiment to the II AAA Corps, the I AAA Corps will also transfer to the II AAA Corps the following: 1 unit column (with the regiment), 5 unit columns (with Supply Branch), 2 light aviation fuel columns for surface vehicle fuel (with the regiment), 3 light aviation fuel columns for surface vehicle fuel (with Supply Branch). In direct negotiations the Second and Third Air Fleets will arrange the transfer of the AAA ammunition provided for this regiment.
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX 4

Annex 3—Continued


In direct negotiations, the Second and Third Air Fleets will arrange supplies for the AAA regiment to be transferred temporarily from the I to the II Air Corps. The Commander of the III AAA Corps will remain responsible for supplies to the regiment.

The allocation of one mobile (motorized) equipment distribution unit to each of the I and II AAA Corps for Me-109-3 aircraft is cancelled.

All orders hitherto given are cancelled and the allocation of the mobile equipment distribution units will be rearranged by teletype message.

"The other paragraphs of this annex deal with minor details and do not appear important at this juncture."
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATER

The numerous and diversified missions of the Air Force in the Western Theater of Operations make it essential to secure anxious results by means of well-considered endeavors and a carefully thought-out conduct of combat operations.

Whereas in the Polish campaign the necessity existed, was met with the characteristics of the opposing forces and their demands, for massed attacks and for attractions disregarding the defensive situation in order to break the command organization and the morale of the Polish troops, operations in the Western Theater from the outset must be designed to strike the enemy at sensitive points and actually inflict heavy losses by means of an effective but economic use of air power.

The following indications are to emphasize the points of major importance:

A. Bomber Forces, Reconnaissance.

1. General. The effectiveness of the bomber units will be increased if the individual wings are assigned permanent zones of operations. These zones should not be changed too soon without compelling reasons. The familiarity of a unit with the terrain and defense conditions within its zone of
operations facilitates the approach, the direction of combat action, and the attack.

Very close cooperation is essential between the battle reconnaissance units and the attack units. It is particularly important that the reconnaissance units should report as early as possible the results achieved in an attack. This will avert unnecessary overloading of attack operations and an unnecessary expenditure of forces. Experience shows that

a. the actual results achieved by attacks are often not accurately assessed because of the superficial observation over the targets or are overestimated because of chance phenomena, such as smoke or fires, at the target;

b. the troops do not fully appreciate the importance of immediate reports on the results achieved by an attack.

A thorough understanding is essential that accurate reports on attack results are decisively important for the command and avert the unnecessary commitment of forces to wrong points.

A proper selection of the type of bombs appropriate to the target of attack is essential to achieve maximum results. A faulty selection of bomb types and faulty detonator timing alone can necessitate repeat attacks against one and the same target.
B. THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS IN THE ASIAN THEATER will
be governed by the following conditions:

1. the opponent is equipped with modern fighter
aircraft and heavy defense weapons. Their effectiveness
can only be reduced by:

a. taking the enemy by surprise at the target.

For this purpose advantage must be taken of smoke cover
for the approach, and the bombing run must be reduced
to a minimum;

b. the attack must be carried out by small
units, the concentrated fire power of which will be
adequate to neutralize attacking enemy fighter forces.

2. the opponent has a sound service organization,
developed and organized in width and depth, providing extensive
opportunities for dispersal on tactical airfields at
the front and on rear and recuperation airfields in the
rear assembly areas. From this fact evolves

a. the necessity for a speedy circulation of intel-
ligence information, so that reconnaissance reports
can be followed within the shortest possible space of
time by attacks against the reported targets. It is
particularly important for the air corps headquarters
to currently exchange reconnaissance reports with the
tactical airfields are needed to launch attacks within their scope.

d. the necessity for a complete reconnaissance coverage of the entire area of operations by the battle reconnaissance units of the various wings and makes it a sound practice to hold intruder planes ready.

c. the necessity to maintain elements ready for dispatch at very short notice.

d. the necessity to dispatch individual aircraft on urgent missions, attack against the enemy ground organization when weather conditions are favorable. Particularly suitable airfields for this purpose must be prepared for the commitment of heavier aircraft in night missions.

3. Conceptual Till their operational principles, the enemy probably will concentrate initially an attack against the rear elements of our attacking forces and at the start will only commit small elements against these forces of our air force which, invite attack through their clear superiority.

Front area units must be widely dispersed as far as this is possible, must be camouflaged, and must be protected by numerous ground weapons always ready for action as well by the fighter units and by the corps.
Supply operations on the ground must be so arranged that accumulations are avoided. The time loss resulting for disassembly must be accepted as unavoidable to secure increased safety against possible enemy air attack. The effectiveness of enemy attacks can be reduced by the construction of shelter trenches at the airfields and the construction of dummy installations outside of the tactical airfield areas. Individual aircraft not operable for any length of time and units which cannot be committed because of weather conditions must be moved rearwards to rest areas.

4. In combat action against the enemy ground forces it must be borne in mind that in open terrain trucks movements will be largely restricted to nights. Daytime attacks against march routes should be directed against narrow points and carried out by small units and followed up by harassing attacks by individual aircraft at night. Rail interdictions must take the form of surprise operations by small units, in continuous attack and preferably against open sections. More detailed instructions will be issued by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force in agreement with the Chief of Transportation.
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX A
Annex 1--Continued

C. Anti-Aircraft Action. For the same reasons by the AAA

Cores the tactical principles remain unchanged as stated in

the orders given with "P.W.L. and C.O.i.L. Chief Staff, to XXII

LILAC/TE A.E. Chief Staff" and "To 2 Mr. 2536/39 LILAC."

The advance and during attack operations AAA forces will

be concentrated for defense missions consequent with the

terrain phase lines. After each phase line had been gained

by Army forces, elements will be advanced further forward

as soon as possible. For this purpose requests must be

submitted in good time for march routes to be held open.

Ammunition resupply difficulties make it necessary to

authorize fire action only when the chances of hitting tar-

getas are very favorable. Efforts must be made to deliver

sudden concentrated bursts of fire at the most favorable

time. At a rule he fire will be delivered against air-

crraft returning from their missions. Plotted fire and fire

against troops marching. A fact will be an exception. Con-

sidering plotted fire attention it drawn to order "CH.B.

Air. Staff 14 2 Mr. 547/3 Seh. 10 10 1943."

D. Other Units Assigned with Air F.L. F.O. Plan. The fight-

ner units assigned with air and N.A. corps must be stationed

as far forward as possible. It will be necessary to

resupply forward airfields in advance during the advance.
in the ground, so that the units can be moved forward at least by squadrons at an early stage. Very close contact will be maintained with the aeroiced aircraft returning companies and fighter spotting teams will from the headquarters will be moved forward to the front to insure early warning of enemy aircraft which may penetrate. Attention is drawn to vast experience in air operations on the western front.

Particular attention must be paid to the necessity for a systematic effort to give new crew members practical flight experience under front line conditions.

E. Air Defence Zone. The importance of the proclaimed air defense zones for the defense country makes it necessary to confine the operations of fighter forces assigned there to the target areas they are to protect. Crew members will be bound strictly by orders in order to counter the urge to score success at the front in the face of enemy planes daned.

Air Defence Zone Dusseldorf. Authority to fire without warning within the air over the air defense zone is restricted to action against targets at altitudes above 1500 feet.

At altitudes lower than 1500 feet all forces are authorized to fly into or across the zone, and fire action against aircraft in authorized only if they are unmistakably identified as enemy units.
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX C
Section 4—Continued

At altitudes above 1050 feet fire is authorized against any aircraft not clearly identified as friendly.

As a rule friendly bombers, dive-bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft are still not permitted to enter any proclaimed air defense zone. In view of the possibility, however, that weather conditions or enemy action might compel friendly aircraft to enter such zones, the existing orders are here with changed to the effect that fire will not be opened without warning against aircraft flying at altitudes up to 1050 feet if they are noticeably below the cloud ceiling.

To leave no room for doubt, the order is repeated that no special fighter operations areas will be provided within air defense zones. Fighter action will be given precedence in all aircraft artillery action as soon as fighters are in close proximity to the enemy aircraft to be attacked.

The barrage balloon units presently committed in the Ruhr Region Air Defense Zone will be withdrawn immediately and committed in the Northwestern areas of XI Air District Command.

F. SPANISH ORGANIZATION. Units will take all measures for local security. Partisan activities must be expected......
CAROULAGE AND DECEPTION

In addition to the precautions provided in Directive No 5 for camouflage and concealment, the following measures for such purposes are ordered:

1. Units will be moved to their intended tactical air ports, if these are in the near front areas, on the day of the attack at the earliest.

Concealment of the dive-bomber units assigned with the IV, VIII, and I Air Corps is particularly important, since knowledge of their presence would make it possible to draw conclusions concerning the main point of effort in the attack.

2. The following deceptive measures are provided for a few days prior to the opening of the attack:

   a. Increased air and radio traffic by the II and V Air Corps in the zone of the Third Air Fleet;

   b. temporary displacement of elements of the 7th Air Division to forward tactical air ports in the general area of Stuttgart.

Orders to execute the above measures will be given by the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

3. Displacements of air port evacuation companies will take place only in night movements.
4. After moving into their initial areas of operations
the Air Force will carry out entrence work in order to
simulate plans for a lengthy stay in the areas.

5. In order not to reveal the presence of strong anti-
aircraft artillery defenses, only a few duty batteries and
fighter units will engage enemy reconnaissance planes.

6. Intention to attack will be simulated in front of
Army Groups C by means of increased fighter and reconnaissance
activities. The time for such action will be ordered by
the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

7. The Commander in Chief of the Air Force will provide
for the transmission of deceptive messages to foreign coun-
tries.

8. Instructions supplementing the already existing
measures for concealment and deception in the field of
radio, telegraph, and telegraph communications will be given
separately by the Chief of Signal Affairs.
IDENTIFICATION SERVICES

1. Use will only be made of identification ammunition if antiaircraft artillery batteries have commenced firing or if they are expected to open fire because of local weather conditions. A general practice of firing identification signals while crossing the front lines must be avoided in order not to prematurely disclose to the enemy the identification signals used.

At high altitudes identification rounds will be fired diagonally downwards, at low altitudes sideways.

2. Within the Army zone of operations aircraft returning from missions which have not yet reached the ordered safety altitude of between 660 and 1,650 feet will fly very gradual curves at intervals of about two minutes in order to facilitate identification of the aircraft model and the German markings by friendly antiaircraft artillery units.

The descent to the prescribed safety altitude must be so carried out that, seen from the ground, the impression is not given of a climb or dive attack (descent at no more than six meters per second).

The same rules apply to aircraft crossing the zone of interior far from rear or other not at the prescribed
safety altitude.

3. Ant-aircraft artillery units will be offered an opportunity in exercises to familiarize themselves with
   a. the firing of identification signals;
   b. the gradual curve to be flown for identification.

   5 15. 9. 1939."
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 4—Continued
Annex C

EXPLANATORY AND SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
THE DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES ACCORDING TO DI-
Appendix
RECEIVE No. 5 as 7 DECEMBER 1939— ANNEX No. 5, Below.

1. The Forces Distribution Table in Appendix 5 has been
compiled from Annex 1 "Anlage 1 zu Ob. 2 L.-Feldr.-stab
This Annex No. 1 is marked revised version of 17 December
1939 (Heft Ausgabe vom 17. 12. 1939). It has not been possible
to check whether the Annex No. 1, which is only available in
a typed form, is absolutely correct.

2. All bomber units available at the time, early Decem-
ber, are included in the survey. However, not all bomber
wings had as yet received their third group. An actual over-
all strength evolves of 13 wings (wing headquarters staffs)
contain 31 bomber groups, since the 3rd, 16th, 26th, 30th,
1st, 94th, 70th Wings and 1 December 1939 had only two groups
each (See Part one; Chapter Four; Appendix 1, above).

3. The Fighter wings had three groups each. Exceptions
either way are noted by mention of the actual number of
groups controlled in parentheses, for example, 27th Fighter
Wing (5).

4. The origin of the 7th Division at the time is
not given in Annex 1 and it has not been possible to reconstruct it. It will follow later.

5. The AAA cases were organized as follows:

**I AAA Cases**
101st AAA Regiment
102d " "
104th " "
20th Battery, III Heavy Battalion, MARIAM/AMERICAN
III Battalion, Scoring Regiment

**II AAA Cases**
201st AAA Regiment
103d " "
33d Battery, III Heavy Battalion

(The ultimate organization of the II AAA Cases can be seen in (1) Part One, Chapter Five, Appendix 3, above and (2) Part Three, Chapter Ten, Appendix, below.)

6. The Air District Commands had the following fighter strengths:

**Third Air Fleet Zone.**
VII Air District Command: 54th Fighter Wing (2 groups)
XII " " " 52d " " (3.5 " )

**Second Air Fleet Zone.**
VI Air District Command: 45th Fighter Wing
XI " " " 1st " " (3 1/3 groups)
(Explanations concerning figures in parentheses as in Item 2).
7. The names given, without ranks, are those of the commanding generals. These assignments remained unchanged until the ending of the campaign and to its end.

Appendix 5 contains one error, insofar as General der Flieger at that time was still in command of the Second Air Fleet, while General der Flieger Hessling was only appointed to that post in January, 1940.
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX E (Continued)

PAGE 9

CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX E (Continued)

Copy

224.

Der Chef der Luftflotte 2
und Bevollmächtiger Nord
Fuessingstr., In Nr. 7300/39

Headquarters,
11 December 1939
10th of 21 Series

Officer Courier Only!

DIRECTIVE No. 5 FOR THE BATTLE OF DEFENSE

1. General Situation. Violation of Belgian and Dutch neutrality XYZ by the Western Powers might make it compulsory to assume the offensive in the West.

2. Intelligence. After retiring to the fortifications of the French northeast front, the allied France-British Army with strong mobile forces in holding the line Maastricht -Dunkirk ready for the advance across the France-Belgian frontier. According to reports Witek received the British Army in this disposition in on the left flank in the area between Tournai and Calais. Back of this entire area strong operational reserves are in the rear rear of the northern territories of France.

The bulk of the Belgian Army forces are holding the Liége-Charleroi line, with lesser forces at the Meuse-Scheldt Canal in the frontier.

Of the Dutch Army only relatively small forces are south of the Maas River involved in security missions.

For air situation and estimate of enemy potential see
in detail see "75th Ir. 74th Br., Kast. Chasseurs von 5. 11. 1940."

3. The German Army of the West, with very strong air support, will launch its offensive on a front between the North Sea and the Meuse River, driving through the Belgium-Luxembourg area to defeat or large parts of the French Army and its allies on Belgian and northern France, at the same time securing Holland, primarily as far as XXXXVIII the Meuse-Meuse River line and as much ground as possible in Belgium and Northern France as a base area for the continued conduct of the war against Britain and France.

4. Army Group B (in the north of the attack) has the mission to destroy the enemy forces north of the Seine River and drive through to the North coast. After breaking through the frontier fortifications, it will attack in a westward drive, passing Liege on both sides.

The northern group, Sixth Army, initially will be dispatched in a drive to the Brussels area, the southern attack group, the Fourth Army, will advance on both sides of Noyon against the XXXVII Arleux-Champa line. In the sense of both attack groups, mobile forces will be sent forward as early as possible in the direction of Saint-Quentin.

The fortresses of Liège and Antwerp are to be invaded.
CHAPTER TWO

**APPENDIX A**

**Annex B—Continued**

Thence also provide for a smaller force (X Army Corps with the assigned 1st Cavalry Division), to occupy the rest of Holland with the exception of the part known as the fortress of Holland (Amsterdarn Holland). 

5. For Area Group B Order of Battle see Annex C.

6. Adjacent Forces.

a. Third Air Fleet will attack the bulk of its bomber units to attack the French air forces in their assembly bases and prevent their participation in ground operations. As the attack develops the air fleet will prevent movement of the French armies from their assembly areas toward areas generally northwest.

b. The Third Air Fleet will also employ its northern forces (1 Air Force) in action coordinated with Army Group B.

c. X Air Force, directly under the Air Force High Command, will cooperate closely with the Navy and the Naval Air Command in action primarily against British naval forces at sea, in ports and in bases. It is likely that action will have to be taken against the south coast of England and in the Channel, from bases in the area northwest of Oldenburg, to combat troops, transports, ships. Accordingly, the X Air Force will conduct air reconnaissance over the
CHAPTER XXXI

Annex 4—Continued

4. The North Sea and the English Channel coasts will be the area of main attack

7. The Second Air Fleet will cover the bulk of its air forces and the 7th Air Division (less the assigned 23d Infantry Division) to support the attack by the Sixth Army. In particular, the air fleet will prevent the approach of enemy reinforcements to the front by attacks against troop concentrations, harbors, railheads, and possible troop landing operations at the Belgian-Holland coast. It will prevent action by the French-British, Belgian, and so far as the situation requires, Dutch air forces against the northern flank of Army Group B. By means of all-out attacks it will prevent the Anglo-French air forces from gaining a foothold in the areas of Belgium and Holland.

With air and concentrations of fighter and antiaircraft artillery forces the air fleet will protect the troops in combat in the areas of main effort on the ground, as well as their reserves and rear communications, against air attack.

In Rear Air Defense, main emphasis is on protection for the Air Force ground organization and vital industries.

9. For details on the forces allocated, their distribution and their first general commitment see Annex 1.
9. Reconnaissance.

a. The Air Force High Command will conduct reconnaissance west of a line through Le Havre-Orléans, Beuze, Lyons-Geneva.

b. Second Air Fleet, employing the IIda Reconnaissance Group, will be responsible for reconnaissance northwest and west of the line through the west Provis island-Antwerp, Brussel-Nivelles (islands and localities included).

Pre-Arrival Reconnaissance:

aa. To ascertain the disposition of the enemy air forces in the Northern France-Belgium area.

bb. To maintain observation over the assembly areas of the British Army, and to detect as early as possible any troops and transportation movements from these areas into Belgium in the direction of Brussels-Charleroi.

c. To detect possible landing operations at the coast.

d. The IV and VIII Air Corps will employ their headquarters reconnaissance squadrons for the early detection of enemy troops movements to insure immediate combat action against such movements.

In the combat action against the enemy air forces on the ground, tactical reconnaissance prior to the initial attack is prohibited.
Particular attention is drawn to the use of intruder planes.

d. The II AAF Corps will have the II Reconnaissance Squadron available for the battle reconnaissance necessary in the execution of its assigned missions.

e. Air Reconnaissance Reconnaissance.

On Right: North-South Central Line
On Left: Southeastern corner of the Maestricht corner—Liege—Charleroi—Valenciennes—Amiens—Djappe (Localities included).

f. Border crossing by reconnaissance units on D-Day authorized only from 6-Hour plus five minutes on.

10. Mission of VIII Air Corps. On the first day of attack, the VIII Corps will commit units to support an airborne operation by the 7th Air Division (see Special Orders).

In action closely coordinated with the Sixth Army (area of main effort at and west of Maestricht) the corps will support the ground forces in the advance across the fortified western lines and will pounce on the garrison area of the Meuse River and will annihilate the Belgian Army west of that area. In those operations an order to be strictly observed is that attacks against localities are only authorized if it is definitely established that they
are occupied by troops.

The corps will commit its fighter forces in action to establish air superiority over the attack zone of the Sixth Army.

II. IV Air Corps: On the first day of attack will support Air the airborne operation by the 7th Division by annihilating the Dutch and Belgian air forces and attacking the ground defenses within the area in which the 7th Air Division will operate. Adequately strong forces will be dispatched in concentrated surprise attack against the air bases probably used by fighter forces, for example at Ghent, Ypres, Deurle, Ypres, Divi, and Vilseghen. With the bulk of its bomber forces the corps in continuous day and night operations will attack enemy troop concentrations and the troop transports and personnel movements expected in the area around Lille-Mons-Beauvechain-Haelen-Valenciennes and/or towards the Brussels-Charleroi line from midday on D-Day on.

As alternate targets the units will select interdiction points, e.g., supply centers, entrances to and exits from building areas, and important road-transport lines.

For combat action against the Dutch air forces and their ground service installations, as well as against possible landing areas in Holland, the 26th Bomb Group will be tactically assigned to the IV Air Corps for the first day.
of the attack.

12. The 7th Air Division, reinforced by the 23rd Infantry Division or parts of the division, will be used to execute an airborne operation according to a special order.

13. The VI Air Corps (two regiments) initially will protect the concentration areas of the Sixth Army. With this army it will open the attack and support the army forces in crossing the Juliana Canal and the Maas River line, as well as in battle for the bunkers. As the attack progresses, the corps units will keep pace with the advance and will be committed simultaneously with motorized and tank divisions in the foremost line of action in support of the Sixth Army. Air operations exploiting the great mobility and flexibility and high fire power of its units enable the AAA sector to make a major contribution to the success of the drive to the Belgian and north French coastline.

14. The VI Air District Command with the bulk of its forces will protect the Ruhr region, the Air Force ground organization, and the rear communication lines of the Army (main emphasis on Ruhr River bridges).

After occupation of Belgian and Dutch territories, the
CHAPTER TWO

VI Air District Command will assume responsibility for protection of the ground installations in use and of the rear communication lines of the Army. For these purposes it will

in the Dutch territories: the 3rd Training Regiment (6th Battalion), and the 5th Fighter Wing (two fighter groups).

in Belgian territories: The VI AAA Brigade.

Linking with the VI Air District Command approximately on a line through Maas-Aderschurn-Vinktoven, the VI Air District Command will develop an air defense sector area.

The 26th Fighter Wing will remain committed with the mission of direct defense of the Ruhr region. Its zone of operations is bounded on the east by the German frontier, even if the front advances further westwards. This region also to pursuit operations. On 1-Day the 26th Fighter Division will count on having to release two of its groups for one day to the IV Air Corps.

15. The XI Air District Command will prevent enemy penetrations over the North Sea coastline and, with main emphasis on the North Sea ports and the service installations of the ground emplacements in use at occupied airfields will protect its areas against air attack.

With occupation of Holland, the air district command will assume responsibility within the occupied territories.
for protection of the Air Force ground organization and of the rear communication lines of the Army and, linking with the VI Air District Command at a line approximately through Aachen-a-Pessel-Bremingen will develop an air defense support area. It will commit elements to support army forces in occupying the West Flanders area, mainly fighters and light AAA units for protection against air attack. An early aircraft warning line will be established by placing air observers on the islands.

16. Boundary Lines:

5. Between Second and Third Air Fleets for combat operations: southeast tip of the Maastricht corner-Liège-
   Nivelles-Valenciennes-Antwerp (localities to Second Air Fleet).

5. Between IV and VIII Air Corps: on 7-Day: Valken-
   Weert-Elst-Pelmant-Maan (localities to VIII Air Corps).

For 9-Day plus one until further notice: Valken-Antwerp-
   Brussels-Chaarleroi (Severe and severe air bases to IV Air
   Corps).

As the attack by the Sixth Army gains ground the bound-
ary will be advanced westwards.

5. Between VI and XII Air District Command: swing op-
   erations against Holland: Quakenbruck (including air base to
   VI Air District Command)-Mesen-Severden-Southern tip of
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 8--Continued

Yasal Lee.

17. From 1200 midday on the day prior to the attack I shall be at Second Air Fleet General Post in Khorat near

Soma.

S/ Delay
General der Flieger

Distribution: .......

234
EXPLANATORY MATERIAL TO THE SECOND AIR FLEET
ORDERS OF BATTLE
(Appendix 9)

1. Appendix 8: "Second Air Fleet Order of Battle (Truppenrichtungsabgabe der Verbände der Luftflotte 2)," has been compiled from the appropriate annex to Directive No. 5 for the Battle of Defense, Appendix 9 to the present chapter.

2. Only the flying units of the Second Air Fleet have been included, together with the fighter units of the air district commands under the Second Air Fleet.

The flying forces of the X Air Corps are not included, since they were not tactically assigned to the Second Air Fleet, with the exception of the 26th Bomber Wing, assigned only for one day, on D-Day.

3. The tactical symbols for the individual arms and services are those in use at the time.

4. In the case of the air- and ground forces of the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Infantry Division, all units smaller than battalion size, for example the antitank, reconnaissance, and medical units, have been omitted to avoid confusion.

For security reasons the localities for action were omitted in the original and also do not appear here.
5. The tables of organization for the antiaircraft artillery have not been included. The strengths were as follows: The II AAA Corps, with headquarters at Muenchen-Gladbach, according to the original order of battle, had the 105th, 201st, 203rd AAA Regiments, each with four battalions of each three heavy and one light battery; corps troops were approximately as given in Part One, Chapter Five of the present study.

The antiaircraft artillery units allocated for home defense in the VI and XI Air District Command zones also are not included.

In the case of the II AAA Corps the fact must also be noted that the 202nd AAA Regiment was tactically assigned to the II Air Corps (Third Air Fleet).

6. Within the zone of the VI Air District Command, the 12th, 14th, and 16th Special Air District Commands had been organized for defense in the German advance.

7. Within the zone of the VI Air District Command antiaircraft units were also concentrated (51st Fighter Wing Headquarters with two groups) which, together with the AAA Training Regiment also held available for the airzone, were to assume responsibility for protection of the ground installations used by the German Air Force in Holland and Belgium after the
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 10—Continued

Belgian and Holland
alter XXRA countries and been recalled and to protect the
near communications of the Army.

The VI AAA Brigade was to take over the same responsi-

bilities in Belgium.

All of these units were under command by the VI Air
District Command.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS No 1 to
Directive No. 5 for Combat and Reconnaissance
(Revised)

A. Enemy Units:

1. Each corps and the 7th Air Division will receive
special orders concerning the possible form of the initial
action.

From these special orders any changes which might become
necessary in the general assignments of the various units
for tactical purposes will evolve.

2. Principles for the Conduct of Combat Operations:

a. Attitude towards Belgium and Holland:

It must be assumed that the Government and the popu-
lation in Belgium will resist invasion as energetically
and with the use of all means available as was the case in
1914. In Holland this is not quite as definitely the case.
The attitude of the Dutch Army cannot be predicted.

The evacuation of these countries rendered necessary
by the attitude of the Western powers initially necessitates
that the greatest possible consid action be shown for the
countries and the regulations for military requirements permit. These must be implemented with all urgency, and all measures allowed by international law must be used to break
resistance. Where no resistance is encountered the XAM
XAM is to be given the characteristics of a peaceful oc-
cupation.

b. In attacks against moving columns and troop concen-
trations the following points must be borne in mind:

Attacks against permanent type targets, such as rail-
roads, roads, bridges, and built-up areas, produce only in-
direct and delaying results but no annihilating effect,
unless they strike enemy troops at much narrow points.

c. Attacks to destroy bridges in Holtzendorf will be exe-
only in agreement with the Sixth Army.

Attacks against sizable targets, including military units
they might contain, are subject to express approval by the
Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Exempted are attacks
against troop concentrations at the entrances and exits
from each town. A list of "sizable target" will follow.

d. Attacks to destroy the lock installations of the
Albert Canal will only be undertaken on orders from the
Second Air Fleet. Requests from Army commanders for such
attacks will be forwarded to Second Air Fleet Headquarters.
CHAPTER II—Continued

3. Attacks against Dutch antiaircraft artillery
forces, and air forces—particularly fighters, and their
ground service installations will be restricted to the absolu-
tute minimum necessitated in the execution of assigned mis-
sions. Attacks are authorized only if they participate in
combat operations or if French, British, or Belgian air
units are unmistakably identified on the airfields. In com-
bat action against such French, British, or Belgian units,
no consideration can be shown for Dutch units.

4. Concerning the weapons to be used in the battle of
defense attention is drawn to letter "M. Kav. F. Fechmuz-
abt. In ex 1 Bz. 331/39 vom 6. II. 1939."

Selection of the appropriate weapons for attack must
be considered as of incisive importance, and must go hand
in hand with a successful and economic use.

5. The initial border crossing by air units at N-Hour
will take place above the cloud level; if there are no clouds
the units will fly at maximum altitudes and with throttled
engines.

6. Attention is drawn to the airfields specially
equipped for night landing operations, namely:
Kassel-Bassum, Kassel-Othaum, Dusseldorf;
Dortmund, Flensburg, Muenster;
Hamburg, Rendsburg, Solingen.
Under special circumstances one can also be made of
Third Air Fleet air bases and tactical airfields. There, the
following airfields in the border areas are specially equip-
"ed for night landings: Bremen-Hangeler, Wurz, and Gelsen.

6. Code Words:

a. The following code words will be given to initiate
the assembly and the commencement of combat operations:

"Displacement Exercise (with date)" (acronym).

This will mean that the air units in accordance with
Directive No. 5, Annex 1, must complete their displacement
by thirty minutes before dark on the date specified.

b. "Freedom ...(Date) ...(Time) (code) ...(code) ...
(Urnerit)!" The date given will be D-Day and the time given
will be H Hour. At the time given, border, fighter, and
reconnaissance units are authorized to cross the borders
in accordance with the requirements of Directive No. 5.

Existing instructions are supplemented as follows:

The air corps, the II A.A. Corps, and the Air District
commands will insure that the operations planned for the
remain of D-Day can still be halted if orders to halt then
reach the corps and Air District command headquarters by
0500 hours on D-Day.
By that time all latent ones of the following five words will be transmitted by secret teletype channels:

Rhein—meaning that the attack is to commence.
Elbe—meaning that the attack will not commence.

By 20 December 1939 the above words and air district demand headquarters will report to headquarters, Second Air Fleet, Operation Branch, that measures have been taken insuring that the code words will be received in time by all agencies concerned.

7. Key Times. To avoid misunderstandings, the various key times for the Battle of Defense are stated as follows:

First day of the Battle of Defense—D-Day (in German A-Tag)
Deadline for first border crossing by air units and commencement of the attack by Army forces —H-Heur (in German X-Zeit)
Deadline for takeoff by first echelon of 7th Air Division —a-Heur
Deadline for takeoff by first echelons of 2nd Infantry Division —f-Heur
Deadline for commencement of radio deception by 7th Air Division —t-Heur

Only independently acting unit commanders down to wing or regiment level will be oriented on the meaning of these codewords, and they only as far as necessary.

8. The date and time will be transmitted in code according to Annex 1.

9. The airfield immediately south of the boundary...
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX I: Continued

with Third Air Fleet near Athens (targets 1054 and 1052) will be attacked by units of the Third Air Fleet.

3. Reconnaissance.

1. In view of the way in which the reconnaissance bases of the Operational Air Arm and those of the Army overlap, a speedy exchange of reconnaissance results and a mutual orientation on reconnaissance plans is of especial importance.

The VIII Air Corps and the Sixth Army will make appropriate mutual arrangements. Second Air Fleet (with command post Falke—Intelligence Section) will exchange reports and information with Army Group B and the Third Air Fleet.

2. For the same reasons as given above, the air corps will plan their reconnaissance in close coordination with the Intelligence Section of the Second Air Fleet (Command Post Falke).

3. A forward photo section is stationed at the Dusseldorf air base to handle simple and urgent photo traffic work for Second Air Fleet Command Post Falke, and to process weekly all important reconnaissance reports from the 1220 Reconnaissance Group. The section is assigned tactically to the Intelligence Section Command Post Falke.

4. Trained Aircraft. Insofar as they have the necessary personnel available and time warrants, the air corps will
issue appropriate instructions to insure immediate combat action against any enemy air units detected by intruder aircraft within the Second Air Fleet zone.

In reporting, intruder aircraft will use their wing frequency or the frequency used by the reconnaissance group. Speedy transmission of reported reconnaissance results through intelligence channels is essential, particularly the station reports sent by intruder aircraft.

C. Special Instructions for Reconnaissance Operations by the 1224 Reconnaissance Group. Starting on D-Day, the 1224 Reconnaissance Group will conduct reconnaissance in the areas of Northern France, Belgium, and Holland west of a line through the West French–Yanks–Amsterdam–Antwerp–Brussels–Utrecht.

To supplement intelligence information already available by that time the important point will be to ascertain:

1. the movements of the Anglo-British air forces (this is of primary importance) particularly in the Marseilles and Arras areas and the canal areas of Northern France.

2. the enemy assembly areas opposite the Belgian frontier in the assumed assembly area of Dunkirk–Ghent–Cambrai–Valenciennes.

3. the movements of additional enemy forces to Belgium.
CHAPTER TWO

APPENDIX II

a. From the Calais-Dieppe-Antwerp-Central area;
b. by means of troops landing operations in French, Belgian, and Dutch ports north of Dieppe. (Are any lateral troop movements noticeable?) More aid emphasis will be on Boulogne and ports further south. Smaller landing night ship occur between Hook van Holland and Calais.

c. The Dutch air forces and their ground service organization as well as the West Russian Islands must be kept under observation (and emphasis in the area known as Fortress of Holland—Western Holland).

For The Air Fleet Command
Chief of Staff
S/ Knaakubr

Distribution: .......

Annex 1: Key Times Chart (not copied here).
The Chef der Luftflotte 2
und Behandlung der
Nr. 7220/39 v. Ktn. Chefsache
VIII, Aug
with Annex 2 and Overlays A & B

Supplementary to the above order, Annex 2 and Overlays A and B herewith.

For Second Air Fleet
Chief of Staff
By Order B/Blackhead
Lieutenant Colonel, GSC

Distribution:
IV Air Corps 1st Copy
VIII " 2d "
VI Air Div. 3d "
Lu " 4th "
II AAA Corps 5th "
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(Reserves for AF
Loss of w/Army G's
& The Air Div. Staff)
Total: 22 copies.

FAVORABLE INTERDICTION POINTS FOR ATTACKS AGAINST ROAD AND RAIL TRANSPORTATION MOVEMENTS

A. Rail Routes (1:100 000 000)

The road targets favorable for rail interdiction are

consolidated under a western and an eastern zone (see Overlays A and B of Annex 2).

In the western zone the following points, among others, are favorable for railroad destruction:
1. the Mons-en-Puisieux section
2. east of Arras
3. the Delville-7 Quareaux section
4. the St. 1,1 wall depot
5. Target Authuille No. 4469 north of Albert near Mi-
   ramicourt
6. Target Halley No. 4263 northwest of Deuillons near
   Hamelcourt
7. Barisis, Target (16), 5 miles southwest of Cambrai

In the Eastern Area:
8. the open way half way between Bruges and FINE
9. south of Easting
10. rail intersection at exit from Central
11. Wavreco, 3 miles southwest of Loria
12. open way halfway between Hamanx and Avalanches, east
    of Bettiaries
13. west of Tarund before reaching a crossing in Lille and
    Cuurne
14. half way from Lened to Ath
15. at quiet area between Vanciaenes and Xoox.

3. Road Routes (Map 1:500,000) (see Overlay B, Annex 2)

If possible, transportation movements on road routes should
be attacked at the following favorable interdiction points:

Road Route                Interdiction Point
----------                -------------------
1. Dunkirk-Duilleul-Lille   a. Rail and road bridge over can-
                               nel at northwest exit from
                               Bruges
1a. Dunkirk-Ypres-Menin-
       Courtrai-Audenoises-
       Fimeys-Brussels       b. Road intersection at Cassel,
                               13 miles south of Dunkirk
XIV REHIBIN, STADY

15.
2. Calais, St Omer, Bethune, Lille
   a. Railroad-river bridge north of Arbray; 6 miles southeast of Calais
   b. Railroad-river bridge in Lens

3. Boulogne, St Omer, Arbray, Caubraf
   a. Railroad crossing Marchairol; 15 miles southeast of Boulogne
   b. Railroad crossing Bellacourt, SE of St Pol
   c. Railroad bridge 5 miles northwest of Caubraf

5. Abbeville, Doullens, a. Road intersection 1.75 miles NW of Doullens
   b. Road bridge over Scarpe River 2 miles NE of Beaulieu
5. Arras, Chabrais, Valenciennes, Noye, Framac,
   a. Road intersection Fargue
   b. Road bridge 600 yards east of Denain
   c. Drain la cote, 16 miles SW of Arras

7. Valenciennes, Gent
   a. Road bridge north exit from Peronne
   b. Audenarde

8. Chishanghion, Gent
   a. Lesmee, narrow gauge rail-
      road-river intersection

9. Ostend, Thieve, Lichtervelde, Tielt, Gents,
   a. Lichtervelde
   b. Road intersection Tielt

10. Lille, Gents
    a. Road intersection 10 miles NE of Centraal
    b. Road intersection Faymonville

11. Bruges, Gents
    a. Road-river 15 miles north of Bruges
    b. Road intersection Ghislenghe
    c. Road intersection Orchies

Lille, Five-Arms, Lille, Leusden-Breskens, Molenbeke
CHAPTER TWO
APPENDIX 19

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Der Chef der Luftflotte 3
und Heer-Ebene Nord
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DIRECTIVES FOR THE CONDUCT OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
IN THE BATTLE OF BELGIUM
(Removed 23 December 1939)

1. A Franco-British attack through Belgium-Luxembourg
the German Army would resist with support from the Air Force
by means of a counterattack.

Army Group B, advancing along a line on both sides of
Liege-Maasland, will drive the enemy back to the Channel
coast. On the army group's left flank, elements of the
Fourth Army will invest the Liege fortress from south and
west and with the bulk of its forces, spearheaded by armored
forces, the army group will initially fight its way across
the Meuse River at Huy and Dinant.

Left of the Fourth Army, Army Group A forces will attack
in a drive aimed generally towards Lienz.

The Twelfth Army, supported by forward materialized units
(XIX Army Corps), will advance to and across the Meuse River
between Fussay and Meuse.

The Sixteenth Army will advance to the line Neuren-
Siervel and cover the left flank of the entire Army operation.
CHAPTER 120
APPENDIX 11—Continued

Should the enemy advance in a surprise offensive during
the German assembly, the German armies will immediately go
into action in the current order of battle in a counterattack.

Army Group C will defend the Westwall fortifications from
the Meuse River to the Swiss border.

2. For enemy units see Order "Verfügung OKW, Kriegs. 1
XII. 1950."

3. Army Headquarters around the Joren of the 23rd Air
Front.

Army Group B
Fourth Army

Army Group A
Twelfth Army
XX Army Corps
Sixteenth Army

Army Group C
Fifth Army
Seventh Army

Frontlines: (May 1 to 300,000)

Between Sixth and Fourth Armies: Kevelaer (Sixth Army)—
Kerpenerhöhe (Sixth)—3000 yards northwest of Dieren (Fourth
Army)—Hoegen (Fourth)—Mun (Sixth)—Liege (Sixth)—Monseliefel
(Fourth).

Between Fourth and Twelfth Armies: Neumünster (Fourth)—Amrathuer
(Twelfth)—Am River line as far as south of Antwerpen-Milken-
heim (Twelfth)—Fremnols (Twelfth)—Fransefield (Twelfth).
Inchakragon (Fourth)-Menifalize (Fourth)-St. Hubert (Twelfth)-
Haynes, north of Nancy (Fourth).

Between Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies: Barneveld (Sixteenth)-
Gentenray (Sixteenth)-Molhorn (Sixteenth)-Elbeur (Twelfth)-
Pallenberg (Sixteenth)-Stavelruoc (Twelfth)-
Martelange (Twelfth)-Saufchateau (Twelfth)-Cainy (Sixteenth)-
Corigan (Sixteenth).

Twelfth and First Armies: Lorch (Sixteenth)-
Gemunden (Sixteenth)-Wemdeile (Sixteenth)-Diesdorf (Six-
teenth).

between First and Seventh Armies: Kinsalea (Seventh)-
Phillipsburg (First)-Somersell (First)-Rhine River line
east of Lauterburg.

A. Div. Art. Plan will support the attack by the
Fourth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Armies, concentrating its
forces lightly in the areas of main effort. The main require-
ments in the performance of this mission are:

a. continue combat action against the Anglo-French
air forces, initially in the area of Cambrai-Arines-Chateau
Trierry-aero-st Mihi-Dieu-en-Go, to prevent planned
operations by the Allied air forces over our attacking armies.

b. direct air support for the armies in action to
break the fortification belts and numerous river lines of
defense, and action to delay the advance of Anglo-French
forces and rearward elements of the Belgie Army.

c. to concentrate strong antiaircraft artillery and
fighter forces at the points of main effort in ground.
operations to protect the attack units of the Army and Air
Force against air attack, together with their rear communi-
cation lines.

5. Covering Line for Reconnaissance, Bombing, and
blind navigation exercises (Outline Map, Scale 1: 1,000,000,
Sheet Southeast):

a. Between Second and Third Air Fleets (localities
to Second Air Fleet): Southeast tip of Monticourt Corner-
Liège-Huy-Bas-Rihain—Dinant—Lille-

b. Between I and II Air Corps (locality to I Air
Corps): Logis-la-Grande (III Air Corps)—Domfront (II Air Corps)
—Roye (II)—Atom (II)—Villeneuve,
12 miles south of Somme (II)—North 6 miles SE of Fismes—
Yvelines (II)—Chantilly, 24 miles SSE of Leمدن (II)—
Lille (I) (II) (I).

6. Air Force boundaries for mapping and reconnaissance
exercises (localities included): Arras—Valenciennes-
Ons—Douvres, 39 km of Château Thierry—Segent s.d. (II of
Reims, S.I.)—Vermand (24 miles N. of Bigny)—Bigny—
Saxony border west 12 miles north of Lake Neuchâtel—See.

7. Boundary between Air Force Second and Third
Air Fleets for reconnaissance exercises (localities to Third
Air Fleet): Le Havre—Orléans—Bourges—Lyon—Swiss border west
of Geneva.
6. Air units still in their base air ports will displace forward to the assembly air ports on D-Day minus 1 on receipt of the code message

"Verkehrseinschnitt... (Date)," in which the date will be sent in the code attached as Annex 2.

The various corps headquarters will assign those units which cannot displace forward in time because of weather conditions, alternate near front targets for their first mission.

9. The battle will commence with a sudden, concentrated blow against the enemy air forces. This initial action will take the form either

a. of a uniformly directed attack all along the line on receipt of the code message "Verkehrseinschnitt... (Date and hour)," with the hour given signifying the time at which the air units will cross the borders (time given in code attached as Annex 2), or

b. of attacks carried out on orders given separately immediately by the various unit commanders upon receipt of the code message "Grannscheidung West frei (border crossing West authorized)."

In either case the execution and scope of missions will depend on weather conditions at the take-off airfield and over the target area, and the training status of the various
CHAPTER XIV

A.T.D. IX B3—Continued

Aircraft crews. The various air corps headquarters will take measures to insure that the attack can be halted if an order to do so should reach their headquarters by D-Day 0200 hours.

By that time at the latest, the air fleet headquarters will forward by secret teletype channels to the various air corps headquarters (and for orientation to the I A.A. Corps, the 12th Reconnaissance Group, and the XII, VII, and XIII Air District Commands, one or the other of the two following coded messages:

Klein—meaning that the attack is to be executed

Elbo—meaning that the attack is to be halted.

In accordance with Third Air Fleet C. R. A. R. S. Study 39, page 102, measures will be taken to insure that the message is passed on.