List of Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 August 1940</td>
<td>Excerpts from the war diary of the Wehrmacht High Command</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24 March 1941</td>
<td>Wehrmacht Operations Staff/Branch of National Defense</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 August 1940</td>
<td>Excerpts from the notes on the discussions of the situation at the Wehrmacht Operations Staff/Branch of National Defense</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 June 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>25 June 1940</td>
<td>Excerpts from the official diaries of 101 the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Halder</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 June 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>21 May 1940</td>
<td>Excerpts from the notes of the Commander in Chief of the Navy on his conferences with Hitler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 August 1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>29 November 1939</td>
<td>Directive No. 5 of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht: Guid-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ed principles for warfare against the enemy economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Winter 1939/40</td>
<td>Preliminary considerations of the Naval Operations Staff on a landing in England</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25 June 1940 - Letter of Major (GS) Freiherr von
Falkenstein (Wehrmacht High Command/
Office
Wehrmacht Operations Office/L I L)
to Colonel (GS) von Waldau with the
appendix: Basic Requirements for a Land-
ing in England as far as the Luftwaffe
is concerned

30 June 1940 - Memorandum of Generalmajor Jodl (Chief
of the Wehrmacht Operations Office) on
the continuation of the warfare against Eng-
land

2 July 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command
on the preparations for a landing in
England

10 July 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command
on the artillery cover for the transport
operations to England

12 July 1940 - Memorandum of Generalmajor Jodl (Chief of
the Wehrmacht Operations Office) on a landing
in England

16 July 1940 - Directive No. 16 of the Supreme Commander On Pages
of the Wehrmacht on the preparations of
a landing operation in England
12 29 July 1940 - Memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff on the conduct of the operation "Seelowe" (sea lion)

13 30 July 1940 - Teletype message of the Wehrmacht High Command to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe regarding the preparations for the commitment of the Luftwaffe against England

14 30 July 1940 - Notes of the Naval Operations Staff on the progress of the preparations of the operation "Seelowe" (the notes were taken for use in a verbal report). Preliminary notes and a list of the conditions made by the Army General Staff for the conduct of the operation

1 August 1940 - Directive No. 17 of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht for the conduct of the air and sea war against England

15 1 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command for the conduct of the operation "Seelowe"
16 5 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the support of the Luftwaffe operations against England by the Army and the Navy

17 7 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the deception of the enemy

18 9 August 1940 - Notes of the Naval Operations Staff on the conference of the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff and the Chief of the Army General Staff on 7 August 1940

19 10 August 1940 - Letter of the Army High Command to Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command

20 12 August 1940 - Letter of the Wehrmacht High Command to the Army and Navy High Commands regarding the commitment of German forces in North Africa in the case of a postponement of the operation "Seelowe" (This letter was not directed to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe)

21 15 August 1940 - Evaluation of the situation by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 August 1940</td>
<td>Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the preparation of the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 August 1940</td>
<td>Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot;, the Group XI, and the transfer of forces into the Government General</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 August 1940</td>
<td>Directive of the Commander in Chief of the Army for the preparation of the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot;</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1940</td>
<td>Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command on target-dates for the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 September 1940</td>
<td>Order of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe for the commitment of the Luftwaffe during the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot;</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 September 1940</td>
<td>Directives of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding decisions of Hitler on the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot; and on air attacks against London</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 September 1940</td>
<td>Order of the Army Group A for the conduct of the operation &quot;Seelowe&quot;</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14 September 1940 - Operational order of the Naval Commander West for the conduct of the transport activities for the operation "Seelowe"

15 September 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command on planned deception for the operation "Seelowe"

17 September 1940 - Preliminary combat directive of the Second Air Fleet Command for the conduct of the operation "Seelowe"

18 September 1940 - Directive of the Second Air Fleet Command for the commitment of the 7th Air Division in the case of the operation "Seelowe"

19 September 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the operation "Seelowe"

29 September 1940 - Special directives of the Second Air Fleet Command for the time-schedule of the operation "Seelowe" up to and including S-Day

12 October 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command for the postponement of the operation "Seelowe" in the spring of 1941
No. 1

Wehrmacht High Command. War Diary of the Wehrmacht

Operations Staff/National Defense Branch

Copies of Excerpts covering the Period from 1 August 1940
to 24 March 1942.

The War Diary was kept by Ministerialrat (Civil Service Rank
equivalent to the Rank of a Colonel) Helmuth Greiner.

Prefatory Notes:

1) In the following excerpts, only those passages are quoted
which refer to entries relating
directly
a) immediately to the operation "Seelowe" and the "Air
Battle of Britain", and
b) being of general political and military interest in connec-
tion with the topic of the study concerned.

2) Only xxx dates are quoted under which the entries contained
in the excerpts had been made.
1 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch, Generalmajor Warlimont, hands over a report evaluating the overall situation to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office, General der Artillery Jodl, and suggests to the latter that the new directive in preparation for the overall warfare be confined to general guiding principles, since a detailed directive cannot be drawn up until the studies, in particular those of the Army, are available for evaluation. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office accepts this suggestion. Then he reports on the conferences of the Führer with the Commanders in Chief of the Navy and the Army held on 31 July:

The Commander in Chief of the Navy reported that the preparations for the providing of shipping space for the operation “Seelöwe” (sea lion) could be completed by .............. (date not entered in the original copy). The other preparations, especially the mine sweeping and mine laying, could not be completed until 13 September. The mine sweeping and mine laying could be completed by that date only if in the case of favorable weather conditions and friendly air supremacy. At this occasion, the Commander in Chief of the Navy again pointed out urgently the effects which would be brought about by the intended measures on the
German inland navigation which would suffer a reduction of 30 per cent. In addition, all fishing steamers would also have to be employed in this action. In conclusion, he termed the fall as the season generally less favorable than the spring for the conduct of such a landing operation. He did not have a chance to express his opinion on the strategic sea situation.

The Fuehrer decided that the preparations for the landing operation should, for the time being, be based on 15 September as target date.

During the further discussion the Commander in Chief of the Navy pointed out that the views of the Army and the Navy were controversial in respect to a number of essential points, such as:

1. The organization of the chain of command during the crossing operation,
2. The expansion of the landing sector,
3. The time schedule for the consecutive landing of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th waves, and
4. The selection of the hour at which the landing of the 1st wave should be carried out.

Finally, the Fuehrer approved the submarine program also for the year 1942.

As a result of the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of
the Army on the progress of the preparations for the operation "Seelowe" (sea lion) the Fuehrer decided that the planning for
a landing on a broad front were to be continued. Reductions of the
scale of the landing which might become necessary could be ordered
in the course of the operation.

For further statements of the Fuehrer made during the con-
ference with the Commander in Chief of the Army see the notes of
the Chief of the National Defense Branch under the date
of 1 August.

These notes are not attached.

During the verbal report of the Chief of the National De-
fense Branch to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office, the
Chief of the Group I (Luftwaffe), Major Freiherr von Falkenstein,
reported on his communication with the Luftwaffe on 31 July at
"Kurfuerst" (code name for the headquarters of the Luftwaffe Ope-
rations Staff in Wildpark near Potsdam) on the intentions of the
Luftwaffe regarding the time and conduct of the intensified air
warfare against England (see Directive No. 17). He commented on
the reasons for the postponement of the air war against England as
had been for quite a
follows: The Luftwaffe prepared long time for the
intensified air war against England as far as the operational con-
dition of its units and its supply situation was concerned. How-
ever, the controversial suggestions of the air fleet commanders
for a new tactical method to be employed in the operations against
England could not be reconciled to each other so far since the Reichsmarschall had not made any decision on this question. The latter had thought, owing to remarks made by Hitler, that the intensified air war against England would not begin until about 8 days later. After the Reichsmarschall had decided on 21 July that, at first, a large-scale air attack against London was to be simulated during which the British fighter defenses were to be severely hit by the commitment of strong fighter forces, further 5 to 6 days would be needed to familiarize the crews with the new tactics in detailed discussions with the commanders down to group level and in map games.

The following directives were issued as a result of the information released by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office:

1.) The decisions made by the Fuehrer will be summarized in a directive of the Wehrmacht High Command under the date of 1 August.

2.) Directive No. 17 for the intensified sea and air war against England.

3.) Compilation of the controversial points in the views of the Army and the Navy in respect to the operation "Seelowe" (sea lion).

4.) Order for deception measures in connection with the operation "Seelowe" (sea lion). Suggestions on such measures submitted by the Army High Command.

5.) Guiding principles for propaganda activities in connection with the operation "Seelowe" (sea lion).

6.) List of the measures to be taken for the warfare against England.
during the winter months in case the operation "Seelowe" should be carried out this year. In such case, the following measures are planned:

a) According to suggestions submitted by the National Defense Branch and the Commander in Chief of the Army the detachment of armored units for supporting the Italian advance toward Egypt and the support of Italy by the Luftwaffe in the capture of Gibraltar and during operations against Alexandria.

b) Measures in Syria and against the Arabian countries.

c) Use of Japanese support for the sea war.

7.) Order for concealment of the build-up in the East.

8.) Compilation of material for use the outline of an order for preparations conducted on a long-range basis (subject: preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union).

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/ National Defense Branch

2 August 1940

2 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command (General Feldmarschall Keitel) the Directive No. 17 and the compilation of the decisions taken by the Fuehrer as a result of the verbal reports of the Commanders in Chief of the
Navy and the Army. The former is signed by the Fuehrer, the latter by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command the directive on deception measures in connection with the operation "Seelöwe" (sea lion) and the outline of an order for the build-up in the East. The latter is approved on the principle and will be further developed.

(......)

In the afternoon, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command confers with the Chief of the Economic and Armament Office in the presence of the Chief of the National Defense Branch on the preparation of new decisions to be made by the Fuehrer regarding the arms and ammunition program in accordance with the mass production strength of the wartime army and with the other conversions (steering-up of the antiaircraft artillery production, approval of the submarine program for the year 1942).

(......)

For the preparation of the work leave which is to be granted, if possible, on a large scale during the winter of 1941/1942, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command ordered that this leave be granted, on principle, immediately after a negative decision which might be taken by the Fuehrer regarding the operation "Seelöwe" (sea lion). All forces available should be used and the home leave not be used for work should be reduced.
The Chief of the National Defense Branch sends a directive drawn up by himself and regarding the "buildup in the East" to the Chiefs of the Groups IH (Army), II (Navy), and II (Luftwaffe), II, and IV, as well as to the liaison officer of the Economic and Armament Office requesting their opinion and, if under circumstances, their suggestions for complementation.

This outline says that the Fuehrer had decided not to create an independent state in the remaining territory of Poland but to annex the occupied eastern areas to the Greater German Reich. Consequently, the Wehrmacht would have to build up all necessary defenses in this newly gained eastern territory. An additional factor to be considered is in the West that the air threat which would increase in the course of the war will, to an increasing extent, necessitate the military exploitation of the safe eastern territories.

The following guiding principles should be adhered to in this action: (........)

5 August 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office summons, in the absence of the Chief of the National Defense Branch, the group chiefs of Group I for a conference to be held in the Reich's Chancellery in the morning and asks the following statements:

During the conference with the Fuehrer on 31 July (see 1 August) the Commander in Chief of the Navy suggested, as already known, that the
preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion) be based on a plan for a crossing on the small sector Ostend - Deal/Somme Estuary-EastBune. The Commander in Chief who also attended the conference did not contradict this suggestion and the Fuehrer noted it without any comment. From this, the Commander in Chief of the Navy got the impression that the Fuehrer and the Commander in Chief of the Army concurred in his opinion and the Naval Operations Staff continued its work on the basis of this assumption.

The fact was, however, that the Commander in Chief of the Army voiced, after the Commander in Chief of the Navy had left, considerable misgivings to the Fuehrer about the crossing on this small basis upon which the Fuehrer ordered to carry out the preparations on the basis of a plan for a crossing in the broad sector Ostend - Margate/ Cherbourg - Lyme Bay. The crossing was to operation ***must be conducted on the small or the broad basis, however should be reserved.

In the meantime, the Chief of the Naval Staff declared again in letters sent to the Army General Staff and the Luftwaffe Operations Staff that the transportation of the troops could be insured only in and on both sides of the Strait of Dover which was limited by the lines Ostend - North Foreland and Etapes - Beachy Head as long as ports were not yet available and the Channel was not yet cleared of the enemy by naval forces by measures taken by the Luftwaffe and Navy.
In this narrow sector, the crossing will now — in contrast to the crossing in several waves as hitherto planned — be possible in the form of a steady flow of transport units. During this operation, the ports located on the eastern and western sides and the waterways along the continental coast which are covered by coast artillery will also be used. In addition, a more effective protection of the flanks of this narrow crossing sector by mines and other naval action (employment of submarines, motor torpedo boats, artillery cover) seemed to be possible.

To reconcile the controversial views on the expansion of the landing sector which are shown again in this letter, a conference will be held this morning between the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy. He, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office, has not yet been informed on the result of this conference.

A telephone inquiry of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command with the Commander in Chief of the Navy revealed that the latter reached an agreement with the Commander in Chief of the Army to the effect with staff officers that still today the Chief of the Naval Staff specialized in the fields concerned should sent to the headquarters of the Army High Command in Fontainebleau to work out a solution of the controversial problem. At the same time, the Commander in Chief of the Navy assures the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command that the preparations for a crossing on the broad basis are continued for the time being.
As a result of this information, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office issues, to supplement the Directive No.17, some other to be provided by the Army and Luftwaffe for orders for the support and the imminent large-scale commitment of the Luftwaffe against England.

The Army is to commit machine-gun battalions and antiaircraft machine-gun units to provide additional protection for the ground installations of the Luftwaffe in the endangered areas. The suitable Navy is to employ all naval craft to reinforce the sea rescue service in the limited outpost area off the Channel during the large-scale operation to an extent possible in view of the preparations for the landing. Another mission of the Navy is to provide for the possibility that the enemy recognizes the commitment of the Luftwaffe as a preparation for a landing and, consequently, employs stronger naval forces in the Channel area, by committing submarines and by other siege combat action to an extent permitted by the "kitchen" of England which is to be maintained also during this period of time.

The Chief of the Group I (Army) of the National Defense Branch suggests that use be made of the large-scale commitment of the Luftwaffe for the adjustment fire of the batteries (K 5 and K 12) which are located at the Channel coast and have a range reaching up to England. However, a limited amount of ammunition only is to be fired in view of the support to be provided for a later landing operation. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office approves this suggestion.
A corresponding directive will be issued on the same day to the high
commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht High Command/

(............)

6 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/
National Defense Branch

(............)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office forwards a letter of
the Army High Command (Commander in Chief of the Army - Army General
Staff - Chief of Supply and Administration G183/40 Restricted Top
Secret of 30 July) which was received by the Chief of the Wehrmacht
High Command on 4 August. This letter contains a request for appro-
val of the intention of the Army High Command to have the administra-
tion of the British territory to be occupied conducted by military authorities available (such as the Commander of the Rear
Army Area, the regional or garrison administration headquarters) for the purpose of the full exploitation of the auxiliary resources of the country to cover the needs of the troops, and to delegate the executive power to the headquarters of the field armies which
pursue a uniform policy laid down by the Army High Command are to (Army General Staff/Chief of Supply and Admin-
istration).
The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command ordered that a brief
directive be issued on this question.

7 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch directs the Chief of the Group
Colonel I H, Lieutenant von Lossberg, in view of the suggestion submitted by the
Commander in Chief of the Army at the occasion of his verbal report to
the Führer on 31 July that the planned Italian offensive against Egypt
be supported by a German expeditionary corps, and in consequence of the
suggestion made by the National Defense Branch in its "Evaluation of
the overall Situation" of 30 July to the effect that a unit an armored corp
should be placed at the disposal of the Italians for this offensive, to
prepare a brief study on the seasonal conditions for such action, the
forces required
and the conditions regarding transportation. This study
has to be
submitted to the Führer together with the other suggestions
for measures to be taken in case the operation "Seelowe" is called off

The Chief of the Group I (Luftwaffe) of the National Defense Branch re-
ports on the intensification of the air war against England. It is in-
tended to crush the British air force by having the Second and Third
Air Fleets commit strong fighter forces in intruding operations and
commit bomber forces in a strength varying according to the development
of the situation. The attacks should be directed against the area of
London without hitting London itself.
By these operations, the enemy should be forced to employ strong fighter forces. An exact plan has been prepared for the first day of subsequent air action, the operations should be conducted according to the situation. The exact date for the beginning of the attacks has not yet been established. The decisive factor for this date is the weather situation which is still unfavorable at the moment.

The prospects for success can be considered as absolutely favorable. The only difficulty which may be expected consists in the possibility that the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe might deem it necessary to friendly discontinue the offensive action prematurely if the losses during the first days should be considerable, as may be expected, and, on the other hand, only inadequate information is obtained on the successes of the attacks and the enemy losses.

The Chief of the Group R (Iraq) of the National Defense Branch reports on the result of the conference with the Operations Officer of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, Colonel Neusinger, on 3 August.

The conference is said to have been a mere exchange of views between him (Lieutenant von Lossberg) and Colonel Neusinger on the controversial opinions of the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy regarding the conduct of the operation "SeaLoewe" which had become evident during the conference with the Fuehrer on 31 July.
At first, Captain Fett informed Colonel Heusinger on the Directive No. 17 issued on 2 August and the directive simultaneously issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command which stipulated that the strategic preparations for the operation "Seelowe" should be continued on the broad basis hitherto planned. Colonel Heusinger had already received the letter dated 2 August and directed by the Naval Operations Staff to the Army General Staff and the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. In this letter it was made clear that the transportation of the forces could be insured only within the sector in and on both sides of the Strait of Dover.

Regarding the date of the landing, Colonel Heusinger said that according to reports by the Navy, the weather conditions in the first half of October were mostly good in the Channel. As regards the time required for the accomplishment of the crossing, a long period was calculated by the Navy as necessary for the crossing operation of infantry, 6 armored, and 3 motorized divisions. Which could be delayed for several days owing to enemy action and bad weather, was sharply rejected by the Army which argued that in such case the overall operation would be unfeasible.

The views of the Army and the Luftwaffe on the commitment of parachute and air landing forces were controversial. The Luftwaffe planned to commit these forces as late as after the establishment of a bridgehead as mobile reserves. According to the statement of Colonel Heusinger, the Army rejected this idea and called for the participation of these forces in the
efforts to establish the bridgehead. If the Luftwaffe had not at
a number of parachute personnel, the Army would be
ready at any time to transfer men to the Luftwaffe for para-
chute training. The ideal case would be the availability of at least
7000 paratroopers. The employment of air landing forces in the estab-
lishment of the bridgehead should not be taken into consideration be-
cause of the considerable preparedness of the British for defensive
action. Utmost importance was attached by the Army High Command to the
consideration of its desire that the command authority regarding the
measures to be taken in the areas near the coast be reserved to the
field commanders. The time schedule of the Army High Command
provided only for the concentration of the first echelon of the first
wave during the period up to 3 August. A warning order about 12 days
prior to the landing would be needed for the conduct of the concentra-
tion of the second echelon of the first wave and of the entire second
wave. The order for the embarkation of the equipment should be issued
2 days prior to the take-off and the embarkation of the troops should be carried out a day before.

A tight control should be exercised by the Wehrmacht High Command
over the measures to be taken for deception purposes.

Finally, the data on England submitted by Major von Necker and the
instruction film on the contours of the British southern coast were
handed over to Colonel Neusinger.

(..................)
In the afternoon, the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on the result of the exchange of views made by the mediation of Captain Fett. The exchange of views had taken place between the Chief of the Group I Army, Lieutenant Colonel von Lomsberg and the Operations Officer of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, Colonel Neusinger (see under 7 August).

The Chief of the National Defense Branch jointly with the Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe then pointed out that, upon orders by the Reichsmarschall, the Luftwaffe has not yet taken any preparatory measures for the landing operation "Seelöwe" planned according to Directive No. 16. For this reason, the Wehrmacht High Command must now tighten its restraints in respect to these preparations.

The controversial views of the Army and Navy on the conduct of the operation on a small or broad basis caused the Luftwaffe to direct again air attacks against ports in West and South England.

The problem of the employment of parachute forces during the operation "Seelöwe" should be clarified, too, since, as the report of Captain Fett revealed, the views of the Army and Luftwaffe on this question were controversial.
The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office declares that he will contact the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff directly on this question.

According to the directive by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office a letter directed to the Army High Command (Chief of Supply and Administration) (Wehrmacht High Command - Wehrmacht Operations Office - National Defense Branch IV 33200/40 Restricted Top Secret, dated 7 August). By this letter it is communicated to the Army High Command that the form of administration planned by the Army High Command for those areas of England to be occupied conforms to the directive expected to be issued by the Fuehrer after the decision on the conduct of the operation "Seeloswe" and that, therefore, the preparatory necessary measures may be taken by the Army High Command on this basis.

Subsequently, the Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch reports verbally to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office on the planned conduct of the intensified air war against England and on the prospects for success of these operations. (See under 7 August).

(..........)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch asks the Chief of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence for information on the present Russian
war potential and for an examination to establish which spots of the British Empire except Gibraltar and Egypt can be attacked with a good prospect for success in case the operation "Seelowe" should be postponed until next spring.

At the present time, the following numbers of aircraft are available to the German Luftwaffe:

- 949 bomber aircraft in operational condition,
- 336 dive-bomber aircraft in operational condition,
- 869 fighter-aircraft in operational condition, and
- 268 twin-engine fighter aircraft in operational condition.

These figures add up to a total number of 2,422 aircraft.

The Wehrmacht Operations Office is renamed Wehrmacht Operations Staff as of this date.

9 August 1940

The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Schniewind, returned from Fontainbleau on 8 August without having reached an agreement with the Chief of the Army General Staff during the conference in the evening of 7 August on the crossing sector to be selected for the operation "Seelowe".

As is revealed by the notes of the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Naval Staff, Admiral Priöke, who attended the conference,
the Chief of the Army General Staff had declared that he could by no means accept the idea of concentrating the landing within the area Folkestone - Bechy Head, since this area would be too small and the terrain too unsuitable for the employment of "wedge tactics" to break through the considerably superior enemy defences. An additional consideration is, according to the opinion of the Naval Staff, that owing to the peculiar character of the transportation of the landing forces any tactical surprise of the enemy cannot be expected.

On the other hand, the Chief of the Naval Staff made it clear again that a landing on a broad front would not be possible for technical as well as military reasons. The same would be true of a simultaneous landing at Deal.

In a conference with the group chiefs of Group I the Chief of the National Defense Branch points out that in view of these controversial views of the Army and the Navy it must be the mission of the Wehrmacht High Command to prepare a decision to be made by the Fuhrer. For this purpose he directs that a memorandum be prepared in which the reasons for the controversial views of both high commands be presented in outlines. Data of the Navy are already on hand for this memorandum while the opinion of the Army cannot be clarified until the Colonel von Witzeleben has arrived from Fontainbleau. On the basis of these data a suggestion for the decision of the Fuhrer is to be prepared which should be largely in conformance with what the Fuhrer had ordered as a result of the verbal reports of the Fuhrer in Chief.
of the Navy and Army on 31 July. The then order of the Fuehrer
provided for the continuation of the preparations for the launching
and the disembarkation of the first echelon of the first wave on the
broad basis hitherto planned. Any reduction of the extension of this
basis which might become necessary should not be effected until later

The results of the consideration of the suggestion of the Army
High Command that the planned Italian move against Egypt be supported
noted down for
by German armored forces are [redacted] the Chief of the Wehrmacht
High Command and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. In this
note the suggestion submitted by the National Defense Branch in
the "Evaluation of the overall Situation", dated 30 July, that armo-
red forces should be offered to the Italians for their offensive action against the Suez-Canal in the case the operation "Sedan" would be called off is renewed and reasons for it are given. The rea-
son given is the fact that armored forces will be dispensable up to
the spring of 1941 and the detachment of an armored corps will be
worth while particularly if at the same time an operation against
Gibraltar is prepared. In such case there would be a good prospect
for crushing the British position in the Mediterranean in the winter
months, (.............).
On the basis of the reconnaissance results provided by the reconnaissance staff of Admiral Canaris in respect to Gibraltar, the National Defense Branch conducts studies in which the operational possibilities for action against Gibraltar and the political prerequisites regarding Spain are examined. The result of these studies is outlined in a note to be used in a verbal report to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. This note suggests that, in case the operation "Seelöwe" will not be carried out during this fall, not only the port be destroyed and the British fleet be routed but that Gibraltar be captured. (..............).

10 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch discusses with the group chiefs of Group I and with the Chief of Group III, Major von Tippelskirch, the problem of organizing the provision and transportation of supplies during the operation "Seelöwe". Particular attention was devoted to the question whether a special organization would have to be established for this purpose.

The following three solutions are taken into consideration:

1.) The entire provision and transportation of the supplies will be directed by a central Wehrmacht transportation and Supply Authority established especially for this purpose. This authority will decide on the urgency of the various supplies and on the order of succession of the supply transports by sea and by air.
2.) The provision and transportation of the supplies for the individual branches of the Wehrmacht will be the responsibility of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht. In this case, the required means of transportation would have to be made available to each branch of the Wehrmacht and special ports would have to be assigned to each branch.

will

3.) The branches of the Wehrmacht report the necessary sea transports to the Navy and the required air transports to the Luftwaffe. The Navy and the Luftwaffe will then decide on the order of succession of the transportation.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch decides that no new organization should be established but that the branches of the Wehrmacht are to regulate their supply activities independently according to the principle of decentralization. The uniform control of the transport operations, however, should be exercised by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Transportation.

During his verbal report in the afternoon, the Chief of the National Defense Branch made a corresponding suggestion to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff approves the principle of decentralization. However, he thinks it necessary that the armies to be committed in the landing operations be assigned the mission of independently providing and transporting the supplies for their own forces as well as for the Luftwaffe elements employed in their sectors.
For this purpose, the sea transport authorities of the Navy should be closely connected with the respective armies and liaison officers of the Army and Luftwaffe should be detailed to these transport authorities.

On the basis of these directives, the Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch contacts the Navy on 12 August and prepares a corresponding order.

(........................)

12 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command

Command/ Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 10 August 1940

(........................)

In the afternoon, the liaison officer of the Army High Command with the Naval Operations Staff, Colonel von Witteleben, calls on the Chief of the National Defense Branch in the train "Atlas" and hands over to him a letter directed by the Commander in Chief of the Army to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. In this letter, the controversial views of the Army and Navy High Commands on the conduct of the operati"Seabees" are again set forth in detail and it is requested that the definite decision of the Wehrmacht High Command be taken soon.

The Army High Command rejects in this letter the view taken by the Navy High Command that a landing operation could be conducted
only within the area limited by the lines Dunkirk - Folkestone and Boulogne - Beachy Head. The following reasons are given for this rejection: The landed troops would encounter considerably superior forces. The marshy terrain of the coastal area which is interspersed with innumerable streams is extremely unfavorable for the employment of the armament of the friendly forces, especially to the mobile forces. For immediate enemy defensive action, however, this type of terrain is ideal. The hills surrounding the entire landing front in a semi-circular form provide favorable positions for the enemy, the long time required for the crossing operation - 6 days for the 4 landing divisions of the first wave including certain GHQ-troops, further 7 days for further 6 divisions with GHQ-troops and antiaircraft artillery units - offers to the enemy the possibility of establishing such a strong defense front that any prospect for any breakthrough would no longer exist, which would mean that an important factor for a quick success in England would be eliminated.

Therefore, the Army High Command demands that simultaneously another landing be carried out at and west of Brighton where the terrain is especially favorable for the employment of mobile units. Furthermore, the Army wants that forces be landed at Deal very early, which is necessary for the rapid occupation of the hills north of Dover and that within 4 days the first waves of a total strength of 10 divisions with the corresponding equipment be landed on the
coast of England between Ramsgate and west of Brighton. A prospect for reaching the first objective of the operations (Thames Estuary - Southampton) in due time, would exist only if forces of adequate strength and provided with a rapid flow of supplies would be employed simultaneously on this broad front.

During the ensuing discussion Colonel von Vitzleben points out that in the conference of the Chief of the Army General Staff with the Chief of the Naval Staff in Fontainebleau on 7 August (See under 9 August) no possibility presented itself for a reconciliation of the conflicting views. Both high commands now considered a decision of the Fuehrer as necessary. No more time should be wasted.

The further examination of this problem conducted by the Chief of the National Defense Branch together with the Chiefs of Groups I Army and I Navy in the presence of Colonel von Vitzleben seems to offer a possibility of a partial fulfillment of the demands raised by the Army. It should be established whether the landing of a combat team of adequate strength and consisting of various types of arms would be feasible in the Bay of Brighton by using only small motor boats or air transportation. Colonel von Vitzleben holds that these forces should contain at least 4 reinforced regimental combat groups. For this purpose, about 500 motor boats with
a capacity of 6 to 20 men with light infantry armament each are available.

At 16:00 hours, the Chief of the National Defense Branch communicates this suggestion by telephone to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and says that corresponding data in writing will be submitted. He points out in particular that a verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer on the attitude taken by the Naval Operations Staff on this suggestion would have no prospect for success until these data have been submitted.

A memorandum prepared by the National Defense Branch which provides a presentation of the conflicting views of the Army and Navy High Commands on the question of the lateral extension of the area in which the landing operation is to take place is submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the same evening for use as a basis for the decision of the Fuehrer (See 13 August).

As regards the problem of the support of the warfare against England to be provided by Italian naval and air forces (See verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer on 25 July), the Fuehrer approved the idea of having Italian submarines participate in the German naval warfare in the Atlantic and of having Italian air forces participate in the air war against the British homeland.
Moreover, the Fuehrer has agreed to the following intentions of
the Commanders in Chief of the Navy and Luftwaffe regarding this ques-
tion:

The uniform planning for combined submarine operations in the
Atlantic is to be insured by a German liaison staff detailed to the
commander of the Italian submarine forces. A port at the Atlantic coast
of South France which is suitable for use as a naval base will be pla-
ced at the disposal of the Italians. Providing supplies for this base
and for the Italian submarines will be the responsibility of the Ita-
lians, while the protection to be provided by antiaircraft artillery
will be the responsibility of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

The Italian units taking part in the air operations against the
British homeland will be organized in a division which should be as
independent as possible also in respect to its ground organization.

Chief of the
A corresponding directive of the Wehrmacht High Command will be

issued to the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht
on 12 August.

Bomber and dive-bomber units of the Third and Second Air Fleets
protected by strong twin-engine and single-engine fighter forces, at-
tacked the harbor installations of Portland and Weymouth as well as
several convoys off the coast of South and East England on 11 August.

During these operations, air combat with enemy fighter aircraft
developed at several occasions in the afternoon during which the enem
suffered heavy losses.
Among other targets, the harbor installations of Bristol, Cardiff and Middlesbrough were attacked in the night of 11 to 12 August. A total force of 230 bomber and 620 twin-engine and single-engine fighter aircraft was committed. The enemy losses amounted to 90 aircraft and 8 barrage balloons while the losses of the friendly forces amounted to 28 aircraft.

Towards 17400 hours, the Luftwaffe Operations Staff serves notice that the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe has decided to launch the intensified air war against England on 13 August, since the prospects for favorable weather conditions during the next days are good.

(The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe reported to the Fuehrer on 11 August that it was his intention to launch the intensified air war against England as soon as there would be a prospect for good weather lasting three days. The Fuehrer agreed to this intention.)

(................)

13 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 13 August 1940

and during the night of 12 to 13

On 12 August, bomber units of the Luftwaffe successfully raided the harbor installations of Portsmouth, Ramsgate, Middlesbrough, Newcastle, and Shields; moreover, they attacked industrial installations, radio stations, airfield and water-borne targets.
A total force of 300 bomber and 1160 twin-engine and single-engine fighter aircraft was committed. The enemy losses amounted to 86, the friendly losses to 25 aircraft.

According to a report of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff the Third Air Fleet carried out an attack against the area north of Portsmouth at 07:00 hours in the morning. The attack of the Second Air Fleet planned to be carried out simultaneously had to be broken off owing to weather conditions. The Reichsmarschall reserved to himself the right to decide on further attacks to be conducted by both these air fleets until 11:00 hours.

At about noon the Fuehrer returns from the Berghof to Berlin. At 17:30 hours, he receives the Commander in Chief of the Navy together with the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff for verbal report and consultation. This conference is also attended by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, and Commander von Puttkamer.

During this conference, the Commander in Chief of the Navy requests an early decision whether the operation "Seeloewe" is to be carried out on the broad or the small basis since otherwise the preparations would suffer delay. He comments on the memorandum of the Commander in Chief of the Army, dated 10 August and submitted by Colonel von Witzleben (See under 12 August), as follows:

The Naval Operations Staff recognizes the necessity of the demands raised by the Army High Command but does not see any possibility
to meet them on the part of the Navy. A simultaneous landing in the Bay of Brighton and at Deal would be unfeasible. The prospects for success in respect to the initial landing and, in particular, to the moving up of reinforcements are so slight that the conduct of such operations would be irresponsible. Further means of transportation in excess of the figures submitted on 2 August can neither be made available nor be accommodated in the launching bases. Consequently, the demand raised by the Army High Command that a total force of 10 divisions with the corresponding equipment be landed on the coast between Ramsgate and west of Brighton would be unfeasible. A rapid transportation of reinforcements and supplies would be impossible on the same grounds. These demands of the Army make it even more difficult to make available additional shipping space for a landing in the Bay of Lyme.

To summarize, it can be said that, in view of the limited naval combat and transport forces, the conduct of the operation "Seelowe" could be only the "ultima ratio" as has been pointed out by the Navy High Command. Such an operation should be conducted only if all the other efforts to make England ready for peace should fail.

The Fuehrer fully shares this opinion. A failure of the landing operation would considerably increase British prestige. The effects of the intensified air war should be waited for. He (the Fuehrer) will make the decision on 14 August after consultation with the Commander in Chief of the Army.
The Fuehrer then broaches the question of the growing tensions between Finland and the Soviet Union. In view of these tensions, he wants a stronger fortification of the area of North Norway, especially of the fjords located in that area. Mainly the road crossing points should be fortified so that Russian attacks in that area would have no prospect for success and a basis for the occupation of Petsamo would be established. In this connection, the appointment of a Navy Commander in this area should be taken into consideration.

/........../

In the evening, the National Defense Branch submits its suggestion on a landing at Brighton to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The latter had been informed on 12 August at 16:00 hours that such a suggestion would be submitted.

While the view taken by the Navy that the wide Channel sector at Brighton cannot be defended against the British Navy and that the surf of the Atlantic would frustrate the approach of loaded barges, is recognized, it is suggested that two regimental combat groups each with a strength of 2100 men (3 battalions, one half of an infantry gun company and one half of an antitank company, and 1 signal, 1 engineer, 1 bicycle platoon each) be shipped to the Bay of Brighton in 500 motor boats with a capacity of 10 men with equipment each. At the same time, two regimental combat groups (with a total strength of about 5000 men) of the 7th Air Division should be dropped with parachutes over the southern part of downs. The latter should be assigned the
mission of covering their northern steep slopes against British
from the shore
reserves and of supporting the landing of the motor boats. Artillery,
further reinforcements, and supplies would have to be moved in by air
large enough as soon as a beachhead would have been established.

It would be the mission of the Luftwaffe during the initial phase
to artillery and to destroy forces approaching across the line Southampton-London. In this connection, a reckless air attack on London if possible on the day preceding landing may be especially ef-
ficte, since such an attack would certainly cause innumerable inhabi-
tants to leave the city all directions which would re-
moreover, result in the blocking of the roads and a demoralization of the popu-
lation.

( ............ )

14 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/
National Defense Branch/, 14 August
1940

The large-scale attack of the Second and Third Air Fleet
scheduled to start on 13 August began according to plan. The Third Air
conducted its operations successfully over the area north of Portsmouth
while the Second Air Fleet had to break off their operations immediate-
ly after take-off owing to bad weather. Only one bomber wing of the Se-
ond Air Fleet which was no more reached by the order for breaking off
the operations attacked the enemy ground organization at Eastchurch, east of London.

At 11:00 hours, the Reichsmarschall ordered again both air fleets to attack the area south-east of London and the area of Bournemouth in the course of the afternoon. However, he reserved to himself the right to decide on the definite conduct of the attacks until 14:00 hours because of the weather situation. The attack which was launched at 17:00 hours had to be broken off prematurely by the Second Air Fleet owing to unfavorable weather conditions.

At 19:12 hours, the following warning order of the Reichsmarschall for the 14 August was issued:

The principal mission will be the further destruction of the enemy fighter forces in the territory of South England. For this purpose, the Second and Third Air Fleets should raid, during their first attack, British fighter units in the air as well as the enemy ground organization east and south of London or in the area at and east of Southampton and north-east of Plymouth. The attempt should be made to carry out the attacks simultaneously flying across the British coast at 09:00 hours. No attacks should be directed against naval ports and warships because of great defensive power during the approach and return flight. If weather conditions would not permit flying across the coast until 10:00 hours, a new time schedule for the attacks would be established by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.
The prepared operation "Lichtermeer" (sea of lights) is to be conducted as the second attack (attack against the area surrounding London).

The order for this operation will be issued by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe by 13:00 hours at the latest.

At 22:10 hours, the Reichsmarschall issued the following directive to the Second, Third, and Fifth Air Fleets:

It is still planned to commit the Second and Third Air Fleets simultaneously for striking a common blow. Only in case the weather situation would not permit the conduct of such an operation, independently the ordered targets of the air fleets would be free to raid the enemy ground organization in their operational sector whenever weather conditions would permit such operations. Extremely strong fighter forces should be committed to cover these attacks. The main objective should be, for the time being, to inflict considerable damage on the enemy fighter arm. In case the weather situation should not permit the commitment of strong units protected by single-engine and twin-engine fighter forces, both air fleets would have to commit extremely small units and single aircraft in their operational sectors for attacks against the targets of the enemy aircraft industry and ground organization. Fighter forces for providing escort cover could not be committed owing to weather conditions.

Narships should be attacked only in cases when the presence of heavy units has been reported and weather conditions permit the
provision of extremely strong fighter protection. The Reichsmarschall
approved the request of the Third Air Fleet to direct its first attack
again against the area north and north-west of Southampton. This
attack is scheduled to be conducted on 14 August.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff sends the Chief
of the National Defense Branch an evaluation of the situation prepared
by the former and based on the views of the Army and Navy High Com-
mands on the feasibility of a landing in England.

In this evaluation of the situation the Chief of the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff makes the following statements:

The planned landing operation should by no means fail, since
such a failure could have political consequences far exceeding the mi-
ilitary ones.

To take all measures humanly possible to prevent a failure,
he, like the Army High Command, thinks it necessary to gain a
foothold permanently on the coast from Folkestone to Brighton simulta-
nously. It would be necessary to land 10 divisions in this sector
within 4 days and to have at least 3 divisions with full equipment
follow up within 4 more days through the Strait of Dover even if the
motion of the sea would not permit the use of barges. The troops lan-
ded further to the West should, in such case, be reinforced by the air
especially in Portmouth's landing forces. Furthermore, the coast of South England should be cleared
of all British military vessels, naval craft and any counteracting
by the British air forces should be almost neutralized or it should
at least be possible to neutralize such counteraction.

He thinks it possible for the Luftwaffe to accomplish
both latter missions. If, however, the Navy would not be able to
meet the first three demands, which must be clarified now, he would
consider the landing a desperate act which must be attempted in a
desperate situation. At present, however, there is no reason for
Germany to conduct such a landing operation at all.

There are other ways to force England down to her knees.
For such purpose, however, a cooperation of the Axis-powers consider-
ably close than hitherto would be required. The objective could
be achieved by the following measures:
1.) The continuation of the air war until the war economy of South
   England is destroyed. For this mission, all Italian air forces
   not in action at the present time would also have to committed.
2.) The intensification of the submarine warfare from the French
   base by employing half of the Italian submarine force.
3.) The capture of
   [Note: This sentence is cut off and not fully visible.]
   [Note: The sentence is cut off and not fully visible.]
4.) The capture of Gibraltar after having reached an agreement with
   Italy and Spain.
5.) The avoidance of operations not necessary for reaching the
   victory over England but which only desirable aim at objec-
   tives which are just desirable and could be easily achieved after
the victory over England (Yugoslavia).

but

The efforts should not be made to achieve objectives to gain the

victory. England's will to resist should be broken by next spring.

Unless this could be achieved by a landing, all other means available

should be employed. During the decisive stage of the warfare against

for

England which is beginning now all forces should be concentrated xx

the decisive point effort which is the air and submarine war against

the British homeland. The Italians have shown a certain readiness to

realized that

cooperate in these efforts since they had xefficiently they could em-

ploy only a part of their forces in their own theater of war. This

right concept should be energetically put to practical use. By discus-

sing this problem with the Duce it will be insured that in the final

stage the operations will not be conducted separately but side by side

During the verbal report of the Chief of the National Defense

study that

Branch of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff

mechanization

xx

in the morning the marshal batons were given to the

xx

field marshals promoted to that rank on 19 July the Fuehrer briefly

talked to the Commander in Chief of the Army about the prepara-

ations

for the operation 'Sealion' and confirmed again that these prepara-

tions should be continued and completed by the established target
date. The Fuehrer reserved to himself the right to decide on the con-
duct of the operation pending the further clarification of the overall

situation.
Moreover the Fuehrer ordered that the preparations for a landing in the Lyme Bay be discontinued on account of the lack of possibilities to provide adequate cover. However, to provide for a launching of the operation from the coastal sector from Ostend to Le Havre to avoid any concentration of shipping space in a few ports near the enemy coast and to conceal the point of main effort of the landing operation. If a crossing of the Channel from this coastal sector on the full scale cannot be protected by the Navy in the form hitherto planned, the possibilities of a single crossing of forces of adequate strength without heavy equipment carried out by utilizing makeshift equipment of the Navy should be examined. In such case, the Luftwaffe might be assigned the additional mission to support the landing by parachute and air landing troops, the main effort of the commitment of the latter should be directed to the western sector of the area of attack (at and west of Brighton).

These directives of the Fuehrer were to be sent to the commanders in chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht to render an opinion.

Regarding the question of the combined German-Italian sea warfare against England the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports that the Italian Air Force has planned the commitment of two bomber and two fighter wings with a total strength of 80 aircraft against the British homeland. As regards the combined sea warfare, the Italian Navy selected Bordeaux as submarine base and served notice that initially 10 submarines would be committed in about two weeks.
The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff then mentions that
the Fuehrer declared himself in favor of the great solution (capture
of Gibraltar, see under 9 August) as a result of the study on possi-
bilities for operations against Gibraltar submitted to him by the Na-
tional Defense Branch on 10 August. The Fuehrer made this decision, since Spain could be interested only in this solution. Accordingly,
the National Defense Branch is to submit now a detailed operational
study which, after being approved by the Fuehrer, should above all
meet with the approval of General Franco.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff relates further that
the Fuehrer summoned the Commander in Chief of the Group XXI, General-
oberst von Falkenhorst, for a conference and discussed with him the
stronger protection to be provided for North Norway (see under 13 Au-
gust). During this conference, Generaloberst von Falkenhorst suggested
to Fuehrer the transfer of the entire mountain corps into
the area Narvik - Kirkenes. This suggestion was approved by the Fuehrer.
The National Defense Branch now is to submit a corresponding
directive, which must make allowance in the desires of the
Fuehrer voiced to the Commander in Chief of the Navy on 13 August,
and a directive to the Luftwaffe for the preparation of a base in
North Norway which the Fuehrer already discussed with the Commander in
Chief of the Luftwaffe.

(.............)
15 August 1940

Owing to bad weather the Second and Third Air Fleets did not carry out their operations scheduled to be conducted in the morning.

The Reichsmarschall decided at 12:00 hours that the air fleets were to commit, according to weather conditions, their units in a concentrated effort protected by strong fighter forces or in missions flown by single aircraft. Therefore, the Second Air Fleet conducted concentrated attacks carried out by units of group strength against the airfields of Dover and Manston in the afternoon, while the Third Air Fleet had committed single aircraft to attack airfields, port, industrial, and radio transmitting installations as well as public utilities and camps in its area of attack. At 19:00 hours, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe issued a directive to the effect that on 15 August attacks should be carried out by single aircraft or by whole units according to weather conditions. The attacking units should be protected by strong fighter forces. The Reichsmarschall will order the simultaneous commitment of both air fleets provided the weather conditions will permit such an operation. The Fifth Air Fleet was given permission to commit its forces operationally.
A total force of 91 bomber and 398 single and twin-engine fighter aircraft was committed on 14 August and during the night of 14/15 August. The enemy losses amounted to 16 aircraft and 7 barrage balloons, while the friendly forces lost 16 aircraft.

The Armistice Commission submits a compilation of information on the aspirations of the French General de Gaulle. The information gives the following picture:

After certain initial success resulting from intensive British propaganda the action of General de Gaulle seemed to have lost a lot of popular appeal. His influence in the French colonies is negligible at the present time. No politicians of high standing have placed themselves at his disposal. He has become and is under the command of weak ground forces (2000 to 3000 men in England and small forces defected from Syria to Palestine according to a report of the German Embassy in Madrid), moreover weak naval forces (consisting of the obsolete battleships "Paris" and "Courbet" and some modern light units the exact number of which is not exactly known) and negligible air forces (the number of aircraft and pilots is not known), but these forces are too weak to be considered as a considerable reinforcement of the British war effort.

The Armistice Commission gives the reasons for the negligible successes achieved by the movement of de Gaulle:

On one hand the great war fatigue and the loss of self-confidence...
of the French armed forces also outside the homeland, on the other hand the prestige of Marshal Pétain and General Weygand. It would be possible that de Gaulle’s popularity might be greater in the nationalist French circles had it not been identified—these French —as treason towards the two military leaders who were so high in public esteem.

( ..................)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff communicates to the Chief of the National Defense Branch the following decision taken by the Fuehrer today:

1.) The orders issued by the Fuehrer yesterday in respect to operation “Seeloewe” should be summarized in an outline for a directive (see 14 August).

2.) As regards the Italian desires in respect to an attack on Yugoslavia, (see under 14 August), the Fuehrer is not interested in such an operation. He wants quietness at the southern frontier of Germany and warns against giving the British any opportunity to establish themselves in Yugoslavia with their air forces. For this reason, German-Italian General Staff conferences would be superfluous. The data on the Yugoslav fortifications at the German frontier which had been submitted by the Army High Command should not be handed over to the Italians.
3.) The air war against England must not be broken off but should be continued utilizing weather conditions.
4.) (................)
5.) (................)

The Chief of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence is informed of the decision of the Führer regarding Yugoslavia (................). The order of the Führer for the continuation of the air war is forwarded by Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

17 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 17 August 1940

At 09:00 hours, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command holds a conference with the Chief of the Economic and Armament Office, the Chief of the Commander of the Staff of the Replacement/Replacement Army, and the Chief of Group II of the National Defense Branch, Lieutenant Colonel Münch, on the adjustment of the armament to the strength of 180 divisions to which the wartime army is to be brought. The results of the conference are contained in the notes of the Chief of Group II of the National Defense Branch, dated 18 August. The most important results are that:

1.) in the field of ammunition production the expenditure is increased.
during the period from 10 May to 20 June plus 10 per cent of that amount to cover production shortcomings that might occur should be established as monthly wartime capacity and that an amount of twelve times the expenditure plus the first issue should be kept as reserve stock,

2.) the production of antiaircraft ammunition for the Luftwaffe is to be increased from 400,000 to 1,000,000 shells per month, scheduled to terminate on 31 December 1940

3.) the submarine program is to be continued without any limitation by a target date.

4.) top priority in the overall program should be given to every branch of production such as submarine construction, torpedo tubes, the construction of aircraft types which suffered most losses, and the construction of Mark III and Mark IV tanks including guns.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command approved the production of arms and military equipment, especially tanks - not including ammunition, however, - in Holland, Belgium, and in the occupied territory of France. However, the production should be limited to the manufacture of individual parts as far as possible.

According to a directive of the Wehrmacht High Command/General Army Office (2763/40g) of 17 August the following classes of personnel will be called up for active duty from 1 October 1940 on, for a term of two years.
1.) The replacement reserves of Class I of the age classes 1919
(last third) and 1920 (about 90,000 plus 417,000 men).

2.) The replacement reserves of Class I of the age classes 1914,
to 1919 (first and second thirds) available on 1 October.

3.) Wartime volunteers and long-term soldiers who had volunteered for
service of the age classes mentioned first and of younger age
classes.

20 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/ Wehrmacht Operations
Staff/National Defense Branch,

20 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of
the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the operational plan drawn up by
the National Defense Branch for the attack on Gibraltar. This plan
is to be used as basic material for

1.) Military agreements with Spain, and for

2.) Use by the German commander who is to command the Gibraltar for-
   ces and is to be committed after a clear basis for action has
   been established by agreement with Spain.

According to the attached note prepared for the verbal report
the Chief of the National Defense Branch places particular empha-
sis on the following facts: During the German-Spanish conferences
conducted sofar the Spanish appeared to favor the idea of being pushed into the war by Germany. The Spanish intended to react on a German air attack against Gibraltar initially with a formal protest which, however, was to be followed by a combined offensive action.

Such a solution would not correspond to the German interests. Germany would thus deliver cheap propaganda material to her enemies including the United States and appear in the role of a peace breaker even in the eyes of wide circles of the Spanish people. On this ground, it should be demanded that Spain would overtly side with Germany from the very outset of the operation.

Moreover, the attempt should be made to have Spain deepen its relations with Portugal, to such an extent that the British would not obtain any naval base in that country after the loss of Gibraltar and that Portugal would, if necessary call for Spanish help.

Material from captured French equipment could be offered to the Spanish as an immediate German compensation.

Italy whose participation in the action cannot be avoided because of her important position in the Mediterranean must already be invited to take part in the preliminary political talks. This is especially so whenever the Spanish war objectives in North Africa are discussed.
Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff a map showing the location of the coastal battery position at the Channel coast. He suggests the participation of these batteries in the action against England whenever the air operations against England have reached a climax and the propagandistic exploitation of the psychological effect which can be expected of such participation. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agrees to this suggestion.

In this connection, the Chief of the National Defense Branch points out that the anti-British propaganda still raises excessive hope in public by mentioning a retaliatory battle over and over again. Instead, the air operations conducted at the present time should be identified as this retaliatory action by the propaganda.

As regards this question, the Chief of the National Defense Branch declares that he will submit a written report containing, in addition, further suggestions in the field of propaganda.

21 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command

Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 21 August 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff communicates to the Chief of the National Defense Branch ideas expressed by the...
Führer on 20 August. These ideas are to be communicated to the
Commander in Chief of the Army who is to give his opinion on them
during his verbal report scheduled to take place next of these
days.

1.) The Führer wants to have a mountain division again be
transferred into the area of Brünheim to take the place of the
2nd Mountain Division. It had been reported to him that trans-
port space for such a transfer would be available only if the
operation “Seelone” would be called off.

2.) The Führer thinks it necessary that, regarding the
German support of an Italian offensive against the provision of
the Suez Canal, a mixed armored brigade (not an armored corps) should be considered. This ar-
mored brigade should be equipped with all modern
armament.

Prior to discussing this question with the Italians, the Com-
mander in Chief of the Army should submit a suggestion regard-
ing the composition, equipment, and supply of such unit.

This suggestion should make allowance for the allocation of
modern types of offensive and antitank armament and specify
give the date by which the armored unit could be detached.

3.) The Führer pointed out that arming the Baltic Sea coast was
urgent already now. The Navy is requested to submit an opinion
on the date and extent of such measure.
A.) For political reasons the Fuehrer is in favor of the transfer of
an armored unit to East Prussia already at the present time.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff points out the necessity
to lift the limitations hitherto imposed on the air and naval operations
against England after the total blockade of the British Isles was announ-
ced on 17 August. He \textit{ーズ} that a corresponding directive be submit-
(..................)

According to \textit{N}'s report of the Military Attache in Rome dated 16 August
(No. 126/40 Top Military Secret) \textit{ишь} forwarded by the Foreign Group/ 
the achieve
Counter Intelligence the primary war objective of Italy is \textit{ыш} with
ment of the mastery of the Mediterranean. Her territorial claims \textit{ыш} to
respect to certain
\textit{ыш}ing France \textit{ыш} to Nice, Corse, Tunisia, a part of Algeria with
at Constantine
its ore deposits) and French Somaliland. In addition, the predominant
position in the Near East is desired. Further Italian war objectives
pertain to the Balkans. In the future, the Adriatic Sea should be ruled
entirely by Italy and the Italian sphere of influence in the Balkans
should be expanded. For this purpose, the destruction of Yugoslavia,
the \textit{ыш} creation of an independent Croatia subjected to Italian in-
fluence, the extension of Albania by annexation of \textit{ыш} South Yugosl-
avian areas inhabited by Albanians as well as of such areas hitherto
belonging to Greece and of Corfu and of perhaps some of the Ionic is-
lands \textit{ыш} considered necessary.
The situation at the Yugoslavian frontier has been so tense for several weeks that border incidents even of a grave nature can occur reproached with at any time. Greece is providing support to British war and merchant ships. Such reproaches are absolutely baseless. Now, terror acts against irredentists are manufactured and Greek consuls are expelled from Italy. In brief, an atmosphere is created which can be brought to an explosion before long. No military preparations directed against Greece have been observed yet. On the other hand, the Duce demanded that preparatory measures for military action against Yugoslavia be rapidly taken, so that he would not have to miss a good political opportunity as had been the case in June at the French front.

22 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense

Branch, 22 August 1940

In the morning, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, Generalmajor von Greiffenberg, calls on the Chief of the National Defense Branch in the train "Atlas" and requests the decision of the Wehrmacht High Command on the transport space to be provided by the Navy during the operation "Seeloewe" for the "green movement" (landing operation in the Bay of Brighton launched from Le Havre).
For this purpose, the Navy has planned to provide 25 Steamers in addition to the 200 motor boats and 100 coastal motor-sailing vessels by means of which the two regimental combat groups were to be transported. However, the Army would need 70 steamers for the transportation of the four divisions (6th, 28th, 6th Mountain Divisions, and 30th Division) stationed in the area west around Le Havre. The Navy bluntly rejected this demand claiming that adequate protection of such a strong transportation movement could not be provided and the loss of the steamships would endanger the overall movement.

On the other hand, it would be impossible for the Army to ship the major part of the divisions stationed in the area around Le Havre to the Dutch ports as planned by the Navy, since such action would involve further major transport movements and it would in such case be impossible to exercise operational control over these divisions on this as well as on the other side of the Channel.

At a conference with the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Luftwaffe General Staff on the participation of the Luftwaffe in the operation resulted in the decision that the Luftwaffe will in the initial stage of the operation play the role of the artillery by raiding the British positions and the British communications in the rear. In addition, the Luftwaffe will commit the parachute forces of the 7th Air Division. Small elements of these forces will be committed on the hills north of Dover while the major part of them will operate in the area of Brighton.
The details of the parachute jumping action still have to be examined. It would be the mission of the parachute forces to facilitate the landing of the ground forces at the previously mentioned points. In the area of Dover, the right flank of the overall operation would have to be protected while in the area of Brighton the forces would have to push forward to the North in coordinated action with the landed Army forces.

After the discussions about the operation "Seelowe" the Chief of the National Defense Branch confers with General von Greiffenberg on the regrouping of the Army forces in Norway and on the desires of the Fuehrer submitted by the Chief of Operations Staff on 21 August. Only those desires regarding the Army were discussed, (see letter of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of 21 August, item 1, 2, and 4). Moreover, he lets him know that the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command has permitted the Army High Command to have the long-range artillery stationed at the Channel coast fire whenever the air operations against England have reached a climax.

Following his conference with General von Greiffenberg the Chief of the National Defense Branch makes a new attempt to mediate between the controversial views of the Army and Navy High Commands on the problem of the transport space to be provided by the Navy for the "green movement".
This mediation attempt is based on the basic idea that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the operation "Seelowe" is to be carried out only if especially favorable conditions right before the beginning of the operation would offer a safe prospect for success. If such conditions exist, the risk run by the Navy during the "green movement" can be considered as reduced. Under such circumstances, the Navy should be able to provide sufficient shipping space at and near Le Havre for the transportation of combat-efficient units from there to the Bay of Brighton. The forward echelons of the four divisions stationed in the area around Le Havre are primarily taken into consideration in this connection. The rear echelons of these divisions and further divisions which might be employed, however, would have to transferred to more suitable jump-off bases either as early as during the period of preparation or after the beginning of the operation as soon as a clear picture can be formed of the situation.

On the basis of this concept, the Navy can, by continual conferences in the course of the day, be made to concede that 50 steamships should be employed at Le Havre. 25 of them are to move directly towards the British coast in the framework of the landing operation of the motor-boats, provided weather conditions permit such action, while the remaining 25 steamers are to move initially off the French coast in north-eastern direction. Later, they are
They are to move to the left wing of the "blue movement" (transport movement from Dunkirk - Boulogne to Folkestone - Beachy Head).

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch, Lieutenant Commander Junge, and the Liaison Officer of the Army High Command with the Naval Operations Staff, Colonel von Witzleben, report jointly, in the afternoon of 22 August, the previously quoted result of their conferences with the Naval Operations Staff as a mutual agreement which, however, is still subject to the approval by the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch thereupon reports

by telephone communication to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on this mediation attempt and at the same time on the agreements arrived at by the Army and the Luftwaffe.

23 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 23 August 1940

In the morning, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Konteradmiral Fricke, reports by telephone to the Chief of the National Defense Branch that the Navy will now continue its preparations for the operation "Seelöwe" on the basis agreed upon by the Liaison Officer of the Army and the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch in the afternoon of 22 August and which was approved by the Commander in Chief of the Navy.
In the course of the day, the Chief of the National Defense Branch repeatedly attempted to find out whether the Commander in Chief of the Army had definitely approved this agreement and the measures to be taken by the Army accordingly. His attempts, however, brought no results, since the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, General von Greiffenberg, had not yet arrived at Fontainebleau again.

24 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch,

23 August 1940

After the main telephone call the Chief of the National Defense Branch made yesterday, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff serves notice by telephone in the afternoon that the new suggestions made by the Commander in Chief of the Navy for the conduct of the "green movement" of the operation "Seeloese" have not met the approval of the Commander in Chief of the Army. On the contrary, the Army High Command demand that the major part of the four divisions concentrated around Le Havre would also have to be shipped across the Channel from this area. For this reason, General von Greiffenberg requests again the decision of the Wehrmacht High Command and serves notice that the Commander in Chief of the Army intends to clarify this question during his verbal report to the Führer on 26 August.
The Chief of the National Defense Branch points out again the general prerequisites for the conduct of the operation "Seelowe" which also the Army has to take into account in its demands. The interference of the British Navy, however, would have to be expected even in the most favorable situation. If the 70 steamships demanded by the Fleet for the transportation of the forces from Le Havre were exposed to this danger, these ships would be missing later during the decisive "Blue movement" and the subsequent supply operations. The overall operation would thus be jeopardized. Therefore, he himself is of the opinion that any further reinforcement of the shipping space to be made available at Le Havre would be absolutely unadvisable. He is going to advise the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command accordingly.

The Chief of the Group I Army of the National Defense Branch submits a study on a landing in the Isle of Wight. In this study, the conclusion is drawn that a single operation with this objective should not be taken into consideration and that the capture of this island preliminary as a first step of the operation "Seelowe" would be unfeasible because such action cannot be included in the time-schedule any more.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice that the Fuehrer has approved the study on the capture of Gibraltar and that General Franco expressed intention in political discussions with the German ambassador in Madrid, Mr. Stohrer, to enter the war provided Germany will give military support and supply fuel as well as grain.
In the morning, the Chief of the Naval Staff communicates by telephone to the Chief of the National Defense Branch that he has also been informed on the disapproval of the latest suggestions of the Navy by the Army High Command. These suggestions were made in relation to the shipping space to be provided for the "green movement". He urgently requests the decision of the Wehrmacht High Command.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch replies that the Navy should continue its preparations on the basis of the agreement arrived at on 22 August and that it can be expected that the Fuehrer will make a decision in this sense at the occasion of the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Army on 26 August. The Navy High Command will be informed on the decision of the Fuehrer immediately.

Following the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Army the Fuehrer takes the following decision:
During the operation "Seelowe", the operations conducted by the
Army will have to be adjusted to the existing facts in respect to the
shipping space available and to the possibilities of providing cover
for the embarkation and the crossing action. Therefore, the Army
forces intended for the crossing including the antiaircraft
artillery units provided by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe
must be regrouped in such a manner that the embarkation can be carrie
out at Rotterdam and Antwerp on a scale planned by the Navy
and that only 25 steamers, in addition to motor-boats and coastal
motor-sailing vessels, would be needed for a single direct
trip from Le Havre to Landing Area B (Bay of Brighton), for which
an especially favorable enemy situation would be the prerequisite.
Further 25 steamships, also loaded at Le Havre, will be directed
along the French coast into the area south of Boulogne and from there
into the Landing Area D (Hastings - Eastbourne). The sea situation
permitting, these 25 steamers should then move along the British
coast also into the Landing Area E.

The Army High Command is to prepare a survey of the planned
disposition of forces on the basis of this decision. This survey is
to present a picture of the course of the movements and the objec-
tives of the landing operation in respect to the different units,
sectors, and to the time-schedule. The Fuehrer will not yet decide
on the time when the operation "Seelowe" is to be launched.
Moreover, the Führer issues the following directives:

1. Since, according to a report of the Commander in Chief of the Army no mountain division is at present available for transfer into the area around Trondheim (see 21 August), the Army High Command is to examine whether, by applying the same method used in activating new units in the zone of the interior, a further division could be organized from the divisions stationed in Norway and could be provided with mountain equipment.

2. The forces stationed at present in the Government General will be further reinforced immediately. For this purpose, about 10 new divisions are to be transferred to the East without considerably impairing the transportation activities necessary for the economy. In addition, about two armored divisions should be transferred to the south-eastern sector of the Government General after their equipment has been reconditioned in the zone of the interior. These new forces to be moved in are to be accommodated in a manner insuring that, if necessary, the forces can rapidly act to protect the oil area of Romania.

These decisions and directives of the Führer will be communicated in writing to the Commanders in Chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht on 27 August.

(..............)
The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command a note to be used for a verbal report. In this note, the differences between the preparations of the Army and the Navy for the operation "Seeloewe" are clearly pointed out and the necessity of early decisions is emphasized. It is suggested that the measures to be taken by the Army be adjusted to the potentialities of the Navy in respect to the crossing operation. In addition, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command documentary material for the planned activation of divisions to bring the Army to a total strength of 160 divisions.

During the subsequent verbal report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to the Führer the latter takes his decision regarding the operation "Seeloewe" according to the suggestion submitted by the Wehrmacht High Command (see Directive of 26 August, Paragraph 1). By and large, the Führer approves the organizational plan of the Army. A written summary of the directives will not be issued until later.

(...............)

29 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 26 August 1940
At noon, the negotiations of the Reich's Foreign Minister and Count Ciano with the Hungarian and Rumanian delegations begin in Vienna.

On 28 August and during the night of 28/29 August the Luftwaffe committed a total strength of 400 bomber and 576 fighter aircraft against England. Among other raids, 722 demolition and 6840 incendiary bombs were dropped on Liverpool and Birkenhead during the night. The score of hits could not be exactly observed owing to bad visibility. The losses of the friendly forces amounted to 12 of those of the enemy to about 43 aircraft. During the night of 28/29 August, British bomber aircraft raided Greater Berlin for the first time.

8 demolition and a number of incendiary bombs were dropped. The major part of these bombs was dropped on residential areas near the Goerlitz-railroad station. 8 civilians were killed, 21 were heavily and 7 were slightly wounded.

As a result of the air raid on Greater Berlin, the Fuehrer decides to return to Berlin immediately.

The train "Atlas" leaves Salzburg at 20:45 hours and arrives at the station of Grünsfeld on 30 August at about 10:00 hours.
30 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff
National Defense Branch/30 August 1940

(........................)

After the conference, the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff that according to information obtained so far the decision on the conduct of the operation "Seelowe" will have to be taken by the Führer about 8 to 10 days prior to the beginning of the operation. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff orders to prepare a time-schedule on this basis. He adds that in view of the present conditions in the air war against England the Führer does not yet feel that the prerequisites for the operation "Seelowe" (obtaining of the air supremacy) have been brought about. He expressed the intention not to decide on the conduct of the operation until about 19 September.

In this connection, Colonel Huminger points out again the view taken by the Chief of the Army General Staff that an operation of the Army on the scale planned originally would not be feasible on the small basis now ordered. The only objective to be reached could be to strike the coup de grâce to an enemy battered down by the air war. Any failure of the operation must be ruled out, since the former would entail an unacceptable setback in respect to the overall success achieved in the war so far.
The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff fully agrees to this view which he has taken himself and calls the attention to the other means which might be used to achieve the same objective, the defeat of England.

(......)

After the conclusion of the conferences with Colonel Neusinger the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff notifies the Chief of the National Defense Branch that he cannot elucidate about the further intentions in respect to the continuation of the air war against England retaliatory attacks that the Führer now wants to have carried out by concentrated against London whenever weather conditions permit such action.

(......)

2 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 2 September 1940

The report of the Army High Command (Operations Branch of the Army General Staff) which was requested by the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command of 27 August arrives at this headquarters. This report covers the intended organization of the forces which are to cross the Channel during the operation "Seelowe" and the probable time-schedule of the crossing operation.

According to this report, 5 corps staffs with 10 divisions
including rear echelons and corps troops could be landed in full strength by the evening of 8-day plus 16 days and about 16 more divisions could be shipped across the Channel in the course of four weeks.

In the afternoon, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the report of the Army High Command (see above) which arrived today. He submits the latter a request of the Army High Command to extend the theater of operations in the West to include the Dutch provinces of Zealand, Zuid-Holland, and Noord-Brabant west and including the railroad line Neerpelt - Geldermalsen. The extension should be effected in view of the operation "Seelöwe".

Moreover, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice that the Führer agrees to the opinion expressed by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch in his note of 26 August on the ratio of strength between the German-Italian and the British fleets and on the possibilities of combined German-Italian naval warfare.

Before this concept can be realised, the planned operations against Gibraltar and Egypt have to be carried out. These operations thus gain in importance.
The economic demands Spain raised as a condition for her entry into the war should be no obstacle to the conduct of the attack on Gibraltar. They would best be fulfilled by a victory.

From 3 September to 4 September 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff suggestions for the instruction of the German military and air attaches in Washington on the air war against and the landing in England to enable them to counteract the American propaganda.

5 September 1940

On 6 September, the Commander in Chief of the Navy informs
the Fuehrer on the progress so far made in the preparation for the
operation "Seelowe" and reports to him that the preparations are
conducted according to plan as far as the Navy is concerned. At
this occasion, he explains again that the Navy will most probably
be able to accomplish the missions assigned to it, provided the air
supremacy will have been gained.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff an outline of a time-sche-
dule which is now forwarded to the high commands of the branches of
the Wehrmacht for consideration and completion. In this connection,
the Chief of the National Defense Branch particularly points out
the necessity of combining the Fuehrer Headquarters and the head-
quarters of the commanders in Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht
as soon as the warning order has been issued. According to a state-
ment of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, "Neufra" (Zie-
genberg) and "Gisela" (Glessen) are to be taken into consideration
for this purpose as it has been planned so far.

Furthermore, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
serves notice that the Fuehrer expressed, in a conference with the
Commander in Chief of the Navy, the intention to restore the situa-
tion in the Mediterranean during the winter in case the operation
"Seelowe" would have to be called off. The Fuehrer mentioned, for
the first time that also the Azores, the Canary, and the Cape Verde
Islands would have to be captured in time by German-Italian forces
to prevent the British and later also the Americans from establishing themselves on these islands. The National Defense Branch is to compile the data necessary for such action.

( ............... )

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff a new outline of a consummate order of the Wehrmacht High Command for the expansion of the wartime Army order was to a strength of 180 divisions. This expansion previously approved by the General Army Office.

6 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff
National Defense Branch, 6 September 1940

( ............... )

reference
With regard to the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command (Wehrmacht Operations Staff, National Defense Branch, Group IIa 2119/40, Secret, dated 24 August) according to which the distribution of the recruits to be drafted and belonging to the age classes 1919 (last third and 1920 among the three branches of the Wehrmacht and the Armed Forces) is to be based on the strength of the wartime Wehrmacht of 1 May 1941, the General Army Office (2883/40, Secret, dated 3 September) submits a note designed for use in a verbal report on the induction of the recruits into the Wehrmacht in the autumn of 1940. This note is to be
forwarded to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

wartime

As of 1 May 1943, the Wehrmacht will have a total strength of
6 763,000 men. The Army will have a strength of 4,900,000 men which
is 72.5 per cent, the Navy 293,000 men which is 4.4 per cent, the
Luftwaffe 1,485,000 men which is 22 per cent, and the Armed SS 83,000
men which is 1.1 percent.

( .................. )

10 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations
Branch
Staff/National Defense Staff

10 September 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff informs the

Chief of the National Defense Branch at the occasion of the latter's

verbal report in the afternoon that, as a result of the verbal report

of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Fuehrer decided in

issue the beginning of the

the morning ملك not to order the operation "Seelowe" unlikely for

at the earliest possible date (11 September), since the results of the

intensified air war against England cannot yet be adequately assessed.

day (21 September)
The most favorable ملك broker rather than the earliest possible

day (21 September) should be taken into consideration for the landing

A postponement of the warning order would not have as grave conse-

quences as the postponement of the final order on 3-day minus 3 days.

Any postponement of the latter would offer the enemy time for clear-

ring
the obstacles laid by the Navy at the flanks in the exits of the
Channel from S-day minus 10 days on. Any postponement of the issuance of the final order would adversely affect the mine-laying operations for in the waters used in the crossing and the Luftwaffe operations, since from S-day minus 10 days on the antiaircraft artillery provided for the operation would have to move out of its present positions and would thus be unable to serve also other purposes.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch hands the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the basic directive prepared for the operation "Gelosse" prepared by the National Defense Branch in cooperation with the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht (No. 18). This directive is to be issued on S-day minus 10 days. Now, however, this directive is merely received by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff because of the postponement of the warning order.

Subsequently, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff discusses with the Chief of the National Defense Branch and the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch the question of the commitment and the control of the air reconnaissance units of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. This discussion takes place as a result of a letter of the Naval Staff which was submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch today.
In this letter, the Naval Staff, referring to the preparation and conduct of the operation "Seelowe" and the planned diversion operations "Bipper" and "Herbstreise" (autumn trip), raises the following demands regarding the commitment and the control of the air reconnaissance units of the Commander in Chief of the Navy:

1.) To have the reconnaissance operations over the North Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic up to a line including the Orkney Islands and leading along the east coast of England, at a distance of 60 sea miles from the coast, up to the 53rd latitudinal degree conducted by the Navy Group Command North which is to employ the reconnaissance forces of the Commander of the Air Forces. The 406th Coast Air Group should be reassigned to the latter for this purpose. This group had been assigned to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, subject to recall, at the occasion of the "Weser maneuver."

2.) To have the reconnaissance operations over the sea area south of the line Cape Clear - Land's End, over the Bay of Biscay and the sea area west of the latter conducted by the Navy Group Command West and to reinforce, for this purpose, the 606th Coast Air Group stationed at Brest by the Long-Range Reconnaissance Squadron 2/106 at present committed in sea rescue operations in the Channel area.

3.) To have the reconnaissance operations over the naval bases at the
north and west coast of England, over the 60-sea-mile strip along the east coast as well as over the sea areas of the Saint George's Channel, the Irish Sea, and the North Channel conducted by the reconnaissance forces of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

The reasons given by the Naval Staff for these demands are that the reconnaissance over the previously mentioned sea areas is of particular importance for the conduct of the planned diversion operations and, on the other hand, for the operations conducted against submarines and naval surface forces from bases in West France against the enemy merchant marine and that the conduct and control of these reconnaissance operations must be assigned to those groups responsible for the sea warfare in these areas.

In contrast to this view, the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defence Branch upholds the view of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe who claims that the intensified air war against England necessitates the concentration of all air units available for this purpose under the command of the Luftwaffe High Command to have these units committed according to a uniform plan. In particular the air reconnaissance over England and the surrounding sea areas should be directed by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe to avoid that
the reconnaissance missions overlap each other and efficient reconnaissance forces lay idle.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests that the present system of assigning air reconnaissance units to the Commander in Chief of the Navy be discontinued to on principle. The overall air reconnaissance should not be placed under the control of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe once for all, however the assignment of the units should be governed by the respective circumstances.

(......)

14 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

14 September 1940

Informs

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff informs the Chief of the National Defense Branch during the verbal report given by the latter in the afternoon that the Führer took, during the conference with the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht today, the decision to further postpone the beginning of the operation "Seelöwe". A new decision will be taken on 17 September. The preparations will be continued.

Moreover, the Führer ordered the Luftwaffe to operate against the British long-range batteries firing at the French
These operations of the Luftwaffe should be started as soon as the necessary preparations are complete. The air attacks against London are to be further directed primarily against targets important for the war effort and vital to the large city including the railroad stations. The areas of attack will be extended. Terror attacks against purely residential areas should be reserved as a last means of pressure and not yet be conducted.

Upon the inquiry of the Chief of the National Defense Branch about the probable further development the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares that the Fuehrer seemed to have taken, as early as on 13 September, the decision to call off entirely the operation "Sealion" but then made up his mind to postpone the operation. This means in no way that the Fuehrer intends to force the operation unless the prerequisite for its conduct, the air supremacy, has been achieved. On the contrary any crossing of the Channel should be taken into consideration only to strike the coup de grace at England already heavily battered by air attacks. Apart from this possibility, however, the moral pressure on the British should be further intensified by the continuation of the preparations. On the other hand, the withdrawal even of small elements of the shipping space concentrated in the Channel ports cannot be concealed and would thus reduce the psychological effect of the air war.
A far more important secondary result of the concentration of forces for the operation "Seeloewe" is the fact that the British air forces are attracted by this concentration to the Channel ports and would thus be exposed to attacks by friendly fighter aircraft under conditions favorable for the latter. After all, the commitment of the bomber units against the Channel ports necessarily reduces the enemy night operations over Germany, which will have a favorable effect on the moral of the German population.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff cautions that shipping space that might no longer be needed must soon be placed at the disposal of the Group XXI to reinforce the supply of Norway and that use should be made of the transport space at the ships returning from the Channel ports.

As a result of a suggestion made by the Chief of the National Defense Branch, the stipulation that the measures necessary for counterespionage and deception purposes are to be intensified, is included in the outline of an order which was prepared by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and is to make known the new decisions of the Fuhrer to the branches of the Wehrmacht.

( ................ )

19 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch,

19 September 1940
The Führer has ordered:

1. The concentration movements of the transport fleet which have not yet been completed will be stopped.

2. The concentrations of ships in the launching ports will be dispersed to reduce losses of shipping space due to enemy air attacks to a minimum. This dispersion will be effected in a manner insuring that the period of 3 days minus 10 days will remain sufficient for re-concentrating the shipping space in due time in the launching bases provided weather conditions are favorable for such action.

3. The 10 steamships of the Norway route intended for employment in the operation "Herbstsee" (autumn trip) will be reassigned their usual missions until further orders and 6 further steamships intended for employment in the operation "Seeloewe" will be withdrawn in phases and inconspicuously and will be employed to speed up the supply of the Group XXI until further notice.

4. The anti-aircraft defenses in the launching bases will be strengthened to the utmost possible extent.

The high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht will be informed correspondingly by a directive of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

(............)

23 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff
The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff a report on the trip he took from 18 to 21 September to the Netherlands, Belgium, and North France.

It was the purpose of the trip to get an immediate impression of the progress of the preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" and of the success of the air war. He visited the Wehrmacht Commander Netherlands in Den Hagen, the Sixteenth Army Headquarters in Tourcoing, the command post of the Second Air Fleet near Calais, as well as the Ninth Army Headquarters in Lissey north of Rouen and inspected the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, Calais, Boulogne, and Le Havre.

The preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" have not yet been completed which applies also to those measures not impaired by enemy interference. This is the consequence of belated decisions on numerous open questions encompassing the three branches of the Wehrmacht. The Army High Command has put up with the restrictions imposed on its original plan. The Sixteenth and Ninth Armies conduct intensive training and exercises in preparation for the operation "Seeloewe" in the course of which, however, the training in various landing maneuvers was sometimes still in its initial stage. The staffs of both Armies in the zone of the interior have been established in the planned form.
In the ports, there were heavy concentrations of ships and barges. Sometimes, ships and barges were accommodated in sections of the ports which were not covered against observation and sabotage by the local inhabitants. In nearby warehouses, large quantities of ammunition and other Wehrmacht equipment were often stored. Only parts of this material was actually intended for use in the operation "Seelowë". To avoid further losses it would be necessary to disperse these concentrations which would be possible in most of the ports.

If the conduct of the operation is still actually taken into consideration, the further preparations for the transportation of the material and the troops should be adjusted to the dispersed anchorages, since any re-concentration of the shipping space for embarkation purposes would involve the same danger for the ships as well as for the troops and the equipment. The time-schedule hitherto planned for embarkation, beginning of the movements, and readiness for immediate action should be reconsidered, since in Antwerp, for instance, the beginning of the embarkation had been delayed, because of the small number of tow-boats available as well as of the elusive and navigable water conditions, scheduled to take place as early as 8 days prior to S-day and the embarkation for put out to sea had been set 11 days prior to S-day. The population of the harbor cities suffers from the air raids provoked by the concentrations of shipping space even though the antiaircraft artillery defenses were designated as sufficient by the commands staffs.
It had not been until 19 September, which had been only two
days before the earliest possible target date for the landing, that
the Second Air Fleet had held basic conferences on the commitment of
the VIII Air Corps and on numerous other questions. These conferences
had been held with the Sixteenth Army and the 7th Air Division. The
VIII Air Corps can support only both the corps of the Sixteenth Army
at the front. Owing to the large extension of the front, which amounted
to 30 kilometers, this air support can be provided only on a small scale. The neutralization of the flanks at Dover and Dungeness as well as
the missions deep over enemy territory would have to be accomplished
by other units.

In connection with this question, the Commanding General of the
VIII Air Corps suggested that, if possible, only one army corps be
shipped across the Channel in the initial stage to make it possible
to provide stronger air support for this corps. The Chief of the Luft-
waffe General Staff who attended this conference agreed to this sug-
National Defense Branch
gestion. He (the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff), however, point-
ed out that forces as strong as possible should be shipped with the
first wave in view of the enemy fleet and the motion of the sea which
cannot be foreseen and that the intervals necessarily caused by the
commitment of the Luftwaffe would necessitate the shipping of combat-
from the very outset of the efficient Army elements across the Channel operation.

signatures
After that, the suggestion made by General von Richthofen was not considered any more.

Furthermore, it was decided after a lengthy discussion that the smoke effect produced by air forces should be foregone in favor of an explosive effect. Excluded from this decision should be the reconnaissance squadrons which are to produce smoke screens over the Channel.

The major part of the 7th Air Division is to be committed ahead of the right wing of the Sixteenth Army on 3-day at dawn in order to take the Downs. The remaining elements should be committed in the area of Folkestone on 3-day plus 1 day.

The mission of providing close support to the Ninth Army would be assigned to the I Air Corps.

As regards the intensified air war against England, the airfields in the coastal area are excellently fitted out and camouflaged. The Commander in Chief of the Second Air Fleet and his Chief of Staff complained about the continuously bad weather which again and again necessitated the postponement of the commitment of strong units. Even now, difficulties seem to be encountered in the coordinated action of fighter and bomber units.

The Chief of Staff, Generalleutnant Speidel, made the following comment on the course of the operations had taken:

The outstanding feature of the initial phase was the destruction
of the enemy fighter force the strength and striking power of which was more and more reduced. When the air fleet intended to go over to a large-scale attack on London, such action could at first not be obtained but was given only after repeated urgent requests. Then, however, weather conditions remained good for only one more day so that the attack could not be carried out in the planned form. This respite offered the British and material fighter a chance to draw personnel from all schools and aircraft not yet completely painted from the industry for operational employment. Consequently, the enemy fighter defenses were gradually reinforced again in the course of the following days. During this effort, the British recklessly committed fighter squadrons with poorly trained crews against the German bomber units. During these operations the enemy fighter aircraft repeatedly used the German method of attacking the bomber aircraft as an ultimate means of combat. The German fighter aircraft, however, were mostly attacked only by well-trained British fighters.

This development made it necessary to resume the combat operations against the enemy fighter aircraft a few days ago, so that now, in the third phase of the air war, strong bomber units, even though mostly at night, and strong fighter forces are committed simultaneously. The friendly forces continued to feel considerably superior to the enemy and there was full confidence that the air
war could be further conducted with good success.

The number of enemy fighter aircraft is estimated at about 300.

This number is monthly increased by about 250 coming out of production. Regarding the number of the British bomber aircraft the opinion differ widely. The former air attaché in London, General Henninger, estimates this number at about 800, and it holds that the British have so far limited the scope of their bomber action because they reserve the promised bomber commitment for the expected climax of the air war during a German landing. The Commander in Chief of the Second Air Fleet, however, doubts that such strong bomber forces actually exist.

The conference with the Wehrmacht Commander Netherlands revealed that the cooperation with the Reich’s Commissioner was satisfactory in respect of mutual agreement existed in the Netherlands is unobjectionable, air raid protection for troops and airfields is insured.

The Dutch reconstruction service, under the control of a special engineer staff of the Army is mainly employed for the dismantling of the former fortification lines of the Ijssel and Grabbe Rivers. The new water line will be preserved for the time being. Attempts to use, by employing improvised means, fortresses with their fronts towards the West, have been unsuccessful. The traffic conditions on the canals are well regulated; the road and railway traffic, however,
is still considerably impaired by the fact that, up to the end of
November only one single North-South communication across the bridge
of Moerdijk. The population complies with all orders and no organized
opposition is observed.

Everywhere, the troops are fully occupied with exercises, guard
duties, and other types of work. In conferences with line officers,
the question of the privileges allegedly granted to the Armed SS and the problem of
the grave consequences of the method employed in exempting individuals from military service
are repeatedly broached. The officers of a third-wave division said it was incomprehensible that the SS-troops were equipped like a "wandering armory" while the division of the third wave were still lacking a lot of arms and were, for a great part, provided with old types of weapons. Furthermore, it had been pointed out unmistakably that SS-leaders who had never before served as a soldier and had not engaged in combat even for a single day were insignia of rank of the Wehrmacht and monkish were given titles usually connected with assignments in the latter. The exemption from military service was considered the more urgently alarming the more young men were affected by it and the more the troops desired to be sent home owing to lack of combat action.

For this reason, the suggestion that all young age classes be sent to the front or be engaged in training activities should be repeated.

The replacements for the industry should, on principle, be drawn from the older age classes.
25 September 1940

In the afternoon, **Speer** during his first verbal report after his return from his trip and to the occupied western territories and a subsequent illness the Chief of the National Defense Branch asks the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for a general information on the military situation, particularly regarding the situation in the Mediterranean and in West Africa. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff terms the overall situation unstable.

In particular, the numerous diplomatic talks held last week have not yet brought definite results.

The conferences with the Spanish Minister of the Interior, [Serrano_Suñer] had brought satisfactory results. These conferences, which would result from Spain’s participation in the war. As far as he knew, questions directly related to the combined warfare were not yet discussed. Consequently, the basis for a close military cooperation with Spain and Italy in the Mediterranean does not yet exist.

The conferences of the Reich’s Foreign Minister in Rome were exclusively or, at least, mainly concerned with the imminent conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese military and friendship treaty.
In addition, the questions of the warfare in the Mediterranean must, in view of the recent development, be considered in close connection with the events in West Africa (Dakar). He (the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) has so far availed himself of every opportunity in cooperation with the Chief of the National Defense Branch to convince the Fuehrer of the far-reaching possibilities involved in the exploitation of the common German and French interests regarding the warfare against England which the predominating concern. While the Fuehrer in his decision to release French forces for the repulsion of British attacks against Dakar excluded, following the advice of the Reich’s Foreign Minister, the French naval forces stationed at Toulon thus expressing his lack of faith in the French intentions, he now seems to begin to change his mind. It must be realized, however, that such a change of mind would involve a complete change of the basic concepts on the further conduct and the objectives of the war, above all, the difficulties should not be misjudged which would be caused by Italy and Spain as the allied nations with the greatest interest in the detachment of the French possessions from France.

The engagement of France in the warfare against England, however, would doubtless involve new possibilities of considerable extent. At the same time, such an engagement would be the best countermeasure against the extension of the British influence to North Africa.
Consequently, he (the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) further
seems it extremely important to influence the Führer in this sense.

Mention was already made of the Führer's intention to confer with the
former French ambassador in Berlin, François Ponsot, and to hold a
meeting with Marshal Pétain. Such a change of splendid mess, however,
would doubtless be preceded by a conference with the Duce.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch declares that it is now
no longer necessary for him to submit concepts and suggestions regard-
ing the same objective. He already ordered to prepare a survey of
the current disposition of the French forces and of the communication
routes between North and West Africa to be used as first basic mate-
rial. In addition, the study on the Atlantic Islands prepared by the
Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch and submitted a
few days ago will have to be supplemented from the angle of a coopera-
tion with France.

( ............. )

1 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff:
National Defense Branch, 1 October
1940

In the afternoon, the Chief of Group I Navy of the Na-
tional Defense Branch reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff in the presence of the Chief of the National Defense Branch.
that the Naval Operations Staff does not agree to the suggestion made by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff on 28 September that the Squadron 1/106 (He-115) assigned to the Commander of the Air Forces Wilhelmshaven be exchanged, because of its longer range mission, greater speed, and bomb-carrying capacity, for the Squadron 5/106 (Do-18) assigned to the 9th Air Division.

The naval air forces which have been weakened by transfers of composition elements to the Luftwaffe are fully needed in their present strength. In particular, a further reduction of their He-115 strength would not be acceptable, since this type of aircraft is mainly used for the providing important mission of the "close escort cover" for ships putting out to sea or moving into coastal waters endangered by enemy submarines. The type "Do-18" cannot be employed in such missions, since its bomb-carrying capacity is very limited and it is unable to carry water bombs.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch adds that since the Führer's decision of 13 September the conditions in this field have not changed so that no further intervention of the Luftwaffe would be justified. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff shares this view. The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command has not yet decided on this question.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch explains
to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operation Staff the reasons for
which the Naval Operations Staff attaches great importance to
serial-delivered
amphibious possible use of magnetic
having developed a means for sweeping
British The British magnetic
mines, a new type of ignition will be employed from now on which
holds out a prospect a prospect for a great effect. For this rea-
son serial-delivered mines are to be employed on a large-scale
before the enemy finds a new sweeping means for this new type
of ignition.

The Naval Operations Branch considers steadily intensified
mine-laying operations an effective supplementation of the air war
against the enemy ports and of the submarine warfare. For this rea-
son, the Naval Operations Staff thinks it advisable to commit the
comparatively small number of aircraft suitable for mine-laying &
operations with their specialist personnel (9th Air Division)
only for this purpose and to assign the bombing missions to the
major part of the bomber units. The Naval Operations Staff main-
tains its right to participate in the serial-mining operations
by advocating this type of commitment.

The effects produced by the serial-delivered mines when used
by bombs are impaired by the fact that the mines can be dropped
only with parachutes. The latter is easily caught whenever the mi-
ne is dropped on build-up areas thus preventing the mine from deto-
nating. The mine is thus found by the enemy; this happened already
and is absolutely undesirable.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice that the

Führer has hitherto planned to employ aerial-delivered mines at

a later date. Now, however, he ordered the immediate employment

of such mines, since aerial-delivered mines with the new type of

fuse (Fab) were already dropped. It is to be ascertained whether

they were already dropped on London (the Naval Operations Staff

had urgently requested that they not be dropped on that city; the

Luftwaffe reports upon inquiry of the Chief of the Group I Navy of

the National Defense Branch that no such mines were dropped on

London).

( .......... )

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits a survey

of the progress made in moving up transport space for the operation

"Seelowes" prepared by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National

Defense Branch. At this occasion, he points out that the order for

the beginning of the operation could no more be issued on 3-day

minus 10 days, as provided for in the time-schedule but that the

readiness of the branches of the Wehrmacht for action has to be

restored first.

( .......... )
In addition, the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff requested to counteract energetically the rumors circulating in Berlin. These rumors indicated that the British would intensify their air warfare and extend the latter by the use of chemical warfare agents and that American heavy aircraft types would be employed before long.

( ............ )

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch mentions the British air raids against the Channel ports which had grave consequences. The effects of these attacks were considerably increased by hits in ammunition dumps and trains some of which contained captured enemy ammunition. The air raid protection at these places seems to be fully inadequate. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff orders the submission of a directive to be issued by the Führer. According to this directive, the branches of the Wehrmacht will have to take immediate measures to obviate such grave consequences of enemy air raids.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch then broaches again the question of the information of the American military attachés in Berlin. The decision just made by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in conformance with the views of the Army and Luftwaffe High Commands that these attachés should be occasionally informed on the military situation by qualified officers similar to the
information of the German military attaché in Washington but
should not be permitted to visit the front would, in his (Chief
of the National Defense Branch) not be sufficient if any counter-
propaganda conducted should be against the reports sent to Washington by the
American military attachés in London. Therefore, the Chief of the
National Defense Branch suggests again that the attachés be given,
by corresponding measures to be taken by the Luftwaffe, a chance to
get an immediate impression of the air war at the Channel coast.

( ........... )

2 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-
tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 2 October 1940

In a letter to the Wehrmacht High Command/National Defense
Branch of 30 September (Operations Officer 562/40 Restricted Top
Secret) the Army High Command (Army General Staff/Operations Branch)
points out the consequences the maintenance of the present degree
of readiness for action in the operation "Seelöwe" over an extended
period of time would have for the Army.

1.) The necessity to begin with the embarkation of the equipment-
immediately upon issuance of the code-word order after having
received a warning order 10 days ago before requires the availab-
ility of considerable forces and equipment in the immediate vicini-
ty of the ports.
This leads to steady losses of personnel and matériel due to the continual British air raids against the coastal areas. Even though these losses do not, at present, exceed an acceptable extent they would in the long run inflict a tangible damage upon the troops.

2.) The organizational measures to be taken by the Army High Command in the course of the winter could not be carried out if the present degree of readiness for action in the operation "Seelow" should be maintained by the units intended for commitment in this operation.

In the course of November, these units would have to detach one third of their strength for the activation of new units and receive recruits instead. Their readiness for action would thus be impaired from November to February. If the detachment of these cadres would not be possible because the degree of readiness for action should be maintained for the operation "Seelow" the activation of the divisions of the 12th, 13th, and 14th waves would not be feasible in the planned way.

Difficulties are encountered in the training of the troops made available for the operation "Seelow" is done with difficulty, since these troops must be ready for action at a short notice.

4.) Among those forces made available for commitment in the operation "Seelow" there are troops (engineers etc.) which belong to
those divisions transferred to the East and are urgently needed by these divisions. Owing to the present degree of readiness, however, their withdrawal from the planned commitment in the operation "Seeloewe" and their replacement by other units would be impossible.

If it is intended to maintain the degree of readiness for action in the operation "Seeloewe" during the winter so that the attack can be carried out can begin at any time after a previous warning order as a coup de grace for England as a nation in process of breaking down, the Army High Command would request that the maximum warning order be issued three weeks before the beginning of the attack to provide the possibility of dispersing the troops, exchanging the units, and facilitating the training activities.

If, however, it is intended to maintain the readiness for action in the operation "Seeloewe" during the winter as a means of military and political pressure on England without actually carrying out the operation, the Army High Command would take appropriate measures to insure the military pressure on England. At the same time the units could be dispersed and exchanged, the possibilities for training improved, and the necessary organisational measures be taken to the full extent.

The Army High Command requests a decision to be made at the latest by the middle of October to be able to take the necessary measures in time.
At 17:30 hours, the Chief of the National Defense Branch reported to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on the letter XX of the Army High Command on October 8, 1940. An excerpt of which was quoted above and suggests to abolish the 10-day period for the issuance of the warning order and to inform the Seelow Heights Army High Command that perhaps, should the operation "Seelow Heights" be carried out in the near future, he should be consulted early enough about the period required for the initial phase of the operation (about 15 days).

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agrees to this suggestion and declares that the decision on the degree of readiness of the units for action during the winter would be made by the middle of October.

The Army High Command (Army General Staff/Operations Branch) will be correspondingly informed by teletype message.

( ................ )

8 October 1940

In connection with the conferences with the Fuehrer, the Duce at the Brenner pass the Chief of the National Defense Branch makes the following suggestion on the attitude to adopt towards France:

( ................ )

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 8 October
2. The high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht, in particular, that of the Army, which consider themselves as inadequately informed on the next intentions affecting the conduct of the war, should be provided with the necessary guiding principles.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agrees to these suggestions and thinks it advisable to connect a directive for the relaxation of the measures for the operation "Seeloewe" with the information of the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht on the next intentions for the warfare, provided the Führer would have taken a decision to that effect upon his return from the Obersalzberg on 9 October.

( ........... )

10 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht
High Command/Wehrmacht
Operations Staff/National
Defense Branch, 10 October

The Chief of the German Liaison Staff with the Italian Air

Force, Generalleutnant Ritter von Fohl, reports by a teletype

message dated 9 October, on his conference with Marshal Badoglio held on the same day as follows:

Marshal Badoglio stressed the necessity of a conference
with Generalfeldmarschall Keitel at the earliest possible date to draw up the plans for the operations to be conducted in winter.

He still considers a landing in England as necessary to bring the war quickly to an end. However, he does not think that such a landing operation can be carried out still in this fall. During the winter, the main effort of the warfare will have to be shifted to the Mediterranean in addition to the continuation of the air and submarine operations against England. This should be done to curtail the British from Egypt and Gibraltar.

Moreover, Marshal Badoglio declared that he would not have approved the dispatch of the Italian air corps to Belgium if he had been asked before, because this corps was not used to the bad weather conditions in that country and would therefore be doomed to inactivity during the winter months. On the other hand, however, the best possibilities for commitment would exist in the Mediterranean during this season. For this reason, he would welcome the participation of the German Luftwaffe in the operations against Egypt and then, in spring, make half of the Italian air forces available for participation in the operations against England.

( ............. )

Furthermore, Marshal Badoglio mentioned the inadequate use made of the 30 Italian submarines committed in the Atlantic. These submarines could not be effective due to lack of shipping traffic in
the operational areas assigned to them.

14 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht
High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense
Branch, 14 October 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command directs the German General assigned to the Supreme Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces, Generalmajor von Rintelen, to inform Marshal Badoglio that he fully agrees to the suggestion of the latter that the operational plans for the winter be drawn up at a common conference to be held at the earliest possible date and that a suggestion for the place and time of this conference will be made at the latest when the political talks will have brought about a basis for the future warfare.

22 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht
High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense
Branch, 22 October 1940

According to a teletype message of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff dated 21 October 1940 a Lieutenant colonel of the Italian General Staff confidentially told the Chief of the German Liaison Staff with the Italian Air Force that the target date for the Italian offensive against Greece was set for 15th or
26 October. The first objectives were to be the islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, and Xanthina. The second objective was to be Saloniki and the third objective was to be Athens which was to be reached by two columns. Bulgaria was allegedly supposed to occupy at the same time the coastal strip east of the peninsula of Halkidike.

( .................. )

26 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 28 October 1940

Discussion of the Situation

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch reports that 227 bomber and reconnaissance aircraft and 136 fighter aircraft were committed against England and that 225 bomber aircraft were committed against England during the night of 27/28 October and dropped 52,8 tons of bombs on London in daytime and 126,7 tons of bombs and 40 BSK * during the night. Moreover, the British night airfields were raided, apparently with good success.

On 27 October, the losses of the friendly forces amounted to 9, those of the enemy to 29 aircraft. The IX Air Corps conducted mine-laying

..............................

Note: * BSK:
operations along the coast of West and South England. Two enemy aircraft intruded into the Luftgau Holland on 27 October and raided the airfield of Den Helder. 67 enemy aircraft intruded into the Luftgau Holland during the night of 27/28 October. 12 enemy aircraft intruded into Belgium/North France and 25 aircraft intruded into West France during the same night.

They dropped bombs on 14 places. 85 aircraft intruded the Reich's territory. 114 demolition bombs and more than 140 incendiary bombs were dropped mainly on the Luftgau VI, IV, and IX.

( ............ )

In conclusion, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff points out that in view of the intensified reconnaissance and nuisance activities of the British against the shipping traffic in Norwegian waters the execution of the directives issued on 22 October for the deception of the enemy might endanger the transportation activities in these waters.

29 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations /Staff/National Defense Branch,

29 October 1940

Discussion of the Situation

( .............. )
The Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch then gives a survey of the German air attacks against England during the month of September. A total of 741 attacks were carried out of which 268 were directed against London. During these attacks, 6223.92 tons of demolition bombs and 854.6 RZ were dropped on London and 1096.55 tons of demolition bombs and 1733 ESX were dropped on the rest of England.

30 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch reports that the British give their losses of shipping space during the week from 20 to 27 October as 196,000 gross register tons. 8 to 10 German submarines are always engaged in combat operations.

Notes: * ESX:
** ESX:
As a result of the apprehension voiced by the Chief of the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff on 26 October and of the telephone con-
versation with the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander Norway
which took place on the same day the Foreign Group/Counter Intelli-
gence/III is directed to exploit, for the time being, the troop trans-
portation movements still running
for deception purposes according to the new guiding principles
issued on 22 October. This di
er these transportation movements. Information on the reinforcement
of the troops stationed in Norway should not be made leak through
to the enemy intelligence service before these movements will
have been completed. Such information should be made leak through
to the enemy to make the latter believe that the Island of Britain
is threatened from the area of Norway and to relieve the offensive
action of the Navy in the Atlantic.

31 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht
High Command/Wehrmacht Oper-
adions Staff/National Defense
Branch, 31 October 1940

Discussion of the Situation

The Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense
Branch: (...)

(......) Subsequently it was reported that bomber aircraft of the Italian air corps dropped 92 bombs (11 tons) on the harbor installations of Ramsgate in the afternoon of 29 October. (......)

According to a report of the Economic and Armament Office the USA is said to have delivered 743 aircraft to England during the first year of the war. About 250 of this figure are said to have been delivered in August and more than 100 in July.

(......)

1 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations
Staff/National Defense Branch,

(......)

Discussion of the Situation

(......)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch reports on a conference of the Military Attaché in Rome with Marshal Badoglio in the afternoon of 30 October. (......)

At that occasion, Marshal Badoglio expressed his satisfaction at the great successes achieved by the submarines during the last days and declared that the best way to force England to surrender would be to cut off her supplies. (......)

(......)
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (........) He then gave
the following information:
The Fuehrer does not at all approve of the Italian action against
Greece and considers the prospect of this action for success as
negative in every respect. Consequently, he has lost any inclina-
tion for a close military cooperation with Italy. It is, therefore
questionable whether the planned commitment of German troops in
Libia will actually be realized. A decision on this question, how-
ever, will not be taken until after the Commander in Chief of the
Army together with Generalmajor Ritter von Thoma reported to the
Fuehrer on 2 November and after the planned conference between the
Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and Marshal Badoglio has taken
place. If it should be decided to desist from a commitment of Ger-
man troops in Libia, this could, though only to a small extent,
be compensated by launching a thrust from Bulgaria to the Aegean
Sea. In addition, the Fuehrer now wants to carry out the attack
against Gibraltar in coordinated action with Spain but, if possi-
ble, without participation of Italy. Furthermore, he contemplates
the occupation of the Atlantic Islands and, if necessary, also
that of Portugal.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch comments on these
plans as follows:

The intentions for the continuation of the war during the
winter are not satisfactory. The intensified air war against England is considerably impaired by the unfavorable weather conditions which are expected to last through the winter. In case it will be decided not to commit German troops in Libya, the Italian offensive against Egypt will hardly lead to a decisive success nor will the much desired restoration of the situation in the Mediterranean be achieved. Thus, the Italian battle fleet will continue to be tied up in the Mediterranean and its commitment in the Atlantic jointly with the German heavy naval forces against the British battleships will not be possible.

On the other hand, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command declares that German air forces should be committed against Egypt as planned. In addition, the employment of aerial-delivered mines against Alexandria and the Suez Canal is planned and the commitment of dive-bomber aircraft from Syria against the British Alexandria under consideration. Squadron is expected. It is also expected that the fall of Gibraltar will have repercussions on the Eastern Mediterranean. The military cooperation with France was discussed only in broad outlines during the negotiations of the Fuehrer with Marshal Pétain and Foreign Minister Laval.

The further discussion of this question with the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command who just arrived reveals that in the future France will,
towards Germany, adopt the attitude of a friendly neutral power but that she will not declare war on England. France will tolerate on the territory under her jurisdiction measures taken by the German military command against England and will, so far as necessary, support such measures by making use of her own means of defense. France fully realizes that this attitude for a number of French colonies or even for the whole French colonial empire, develop into some sort of a state of war with England.

( .......... )

Referring to the apprehension voiced by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on 28 October the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports to the latter that the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander Norway had asked him for a strong protection to be provided by the Navy and Luftwaffe for the troop transportation movements running at present to Norway. To prevent these transportation movements from being endangered he (the Chief of the National Defense Branch) then directed the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence/III on 30 October not to exploit these transportation movements for deception purposes according to the new guiding principles issued on 22 October and to desist from having information on the reinforcement of the forces in Norway leak through to the enemy intelligence.
service until these transportation movements are completed. (See under
28 and 30 October.)

( .................. )

3 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht
High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense
Branch, 3 November 1940

Report on the Situation (No discussion of the situation)

( .................. ) The report of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff on the
situation, dated 3 November, reveals that 4 of the
bomber aircraft which operated against London at night
and were partially iced while flying through storms,
gusts, and rain showers have not returned to their
bases ............ )

( .................. ) According to press reports, the British Food Ministry
now stores food supplies all over London in churches, movie halls,
and other buildings to prevent famine in those districts cut off from
traffic as a result of the German air attacks.

( .................. )

4 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff
National Defense Branch, 4 November 1940
At a result of today's conference of the Fuehrer with the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff issues the following order for the directive to be prepared by the National Defense Branch for the conduct of the war:

The preparations for the operation "Seelowe" will be continued energetically, since it is possible or even necessary that this operation will be carried out in springtime.

Moreover, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff orders that a list be made of the questions to be discussed in the imminent conference of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command with Marshal Badoglio.

The Italian air units committed at the Channel coast should be withdrawn to Italy for the winter.

5 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 5 November 1940

The National Defense Branch submits the outline for Directive No. 18 prepared according to the guiding principles of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the latter.
The first point treated in this outline is the operation "Beelowe". This first passage reads: I adhere to the intention to carry out the landing during the first half of the year 1941 as soon as a situation favorable for such action develops. The three high commands will make efforts to improve the basis for the conduct of such an operation in every respect. Guiding principles for these efforts will be issued."

6 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff
National Defense Branch, 6 November 1940

Discussion of the Situation

( ........................... )

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch reports that it is estimated that the number of divisions stationed in Great Britain amounts to 34 and a half compared to 39 divisions in August 1940. The lacking 4 and a half divisions have presumably been transferred to abroad, mainly to the Near East. 12 of these 34 and a half divisions probably belong to the Coastal Defense Force 12 and a half of these may belong to the Mobile Defense Force, 1 of them is thought probably stationed in North Ireland; and 2 of them are reported in the process of being activated. The whereabouts of 1 of these divisions is unknown.
When asked by the Chief of the National Defense Branch whether decision has been taken already on the outline submitted yesterday, for a new directive on the conduct of the war, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares that a considerable modification must be effected only in respect to the operation "Seeloewe", since the priority given to this operation by the National Defense Branch conforms to the opinion of the Army but does not meet with the approval of the Führer.

Upon the remark of the Chief of the National Defense Branch that the operation "Seeloewe" should still be regarded as being of decisive importance for the overall war effort the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff admits this fact but emphasizes that the maximum effort must be created before the actual conduct of the operation can be taken into consideration.

This opinion has led to the formulation used by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for the passage covering the operation "Seeloewe" and ranking last in the directive. This passage now reads: "Since, owing to changes in the overall situation, it may become possible or even necessary that in spring 1941 the operation "Seeloewe" will be actually carried out, the three branches of the Wehrmacht should make
serious efforts to improve the preconditions for such operation in
every respect" (see the formulation of the National Defense Branch
in the outline submitted on 5 November). The Chief of the Wehrmacht
High Command approved this formulation.

7 November 1940
War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff
National Defense Branch, 7 Novem-
ber 1940

( ............ )

A new outline for the Directive No. 18 is submitted to the
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. In this new outline, the
changes effected by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in
the old outline are taken into account. (See under 6 November).

The outline is approved by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Op-

rations Staff and by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and for-
warded to the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht even
before it is being signed by the Fuehrer. The outline is to be used,
for the time being, as a basis for the planning of the Army and Luft-
waffe General Staffs and of the Naval Operations Staff.

( ............ )

The Reich's Minister for Arms and Ammunition, Dr. Todt, is notified

by a letter of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command that the Fuehrer
desires that bomb-proof shelters for submarines be built by the
Organization Todt in the submarine bases in the occupied western
areas.
Discussion of the Situation

In the afternoon of 7 November, a dive-bomber unit of 20 aircraft escorted by strong fighter forces attacked a ships and 1 convoy of 14 <<>>> cruiser <<>>> in Thames Estuary. 1 steamer of 4 to 5000 gross register tons was sunk and 2 further steamers and the <<>> were damaged.

In the Atlantic 23 Italian submarines are operating at present. Some of them are stationed at Bordeaux. Two submarines on their way to this port were attacked by British destroyers with water bombs in the Strait of Gibraltar. They had to touch at the port of Tangiers to repair the damages incurred during this attack. The armoured cruiser "Admiral Scheer" unexpectedly encountered a British convoy in the North Atlantic and sank a number of steamships with a total <<>> of 85 000 gross register tons.
According to the data on losses and expenditures compiled by the Group I M 2 of the National Defense Branch for the period from 10 May to 31 October 1940, the personal losses of the flying units of the Luftwaffe committed at the front amounted, in October, to 36 officers and 111 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 94 enlisted men wounded, and 93 officers and 293 enlisted men missing.

Operational losses of aircraft including those employed in the zone of the interior amounted to 576 aircraft of which 371 were completely lost. 984 new aircraft were put into service. The situation concerning personal replacements is satisfactory. A shortage exists in respect to Ju-88 and twin-engine fighter crews.

As a result of the attitude adopted by the Army High Command on the outline for the Directive No. 18 and of the time-schedule for the operation "Felix" submitted simultaneously with the letter of the Army High Command to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations, it is suggested to Staff that the Directive No. 18 be modified. The suggested modifications are approved by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

11 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations
Discussion of the Situation

( ................ )

( ................ ) A total of 789 air attacks were carried out against England in October; 333 of these attacks were directed against London.

The torpedo boat "T 6" was lost due to being hit by a mine during an operation against the coast of East Greenland.

( ................ )

12 November 1940

( ................ ) The Directive No. 18 is issued to the high commands of the Wehrmacht after being signed by the Fuehrer. (See under 9 November/5)

( ................ )

13 November 1940 War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 13 November 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff submits the evaluation of the situation prepared by him for the imminent conference between the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and Marshal Badoglio in Innsbruck and approved by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

This evaluation of the situation begins as follows: "The war
has been won, it cannot be lost any more. It just has to be brought to an end. For this purpose it is necessary to convince England by force that she has lost the war”. The directive continues with the statement that at the beginning of 1941 Germany will, in all fields, be stronger than she was at the beginning of the war or at the beginning of the operations in the West. The German Army will not be confronted with any problem in Europe owing to its strength of about 230 divisions of first-wave divisions, which 165 are, of the latter are armored divisions. Furthermore, the Army has a armoured units with captured enemy equipment, 12 motorized divisions and stocks of ammunition sufficient for to meet the requirements of large-scale combat action lasting 2 to 3 years. By the beginning of the new year, the Army will have recovered from the damages incurred and replaced the major part of its losses.

The Navy will be able to commit a steadily increasing number of sub-
against the enemy and to up marines. The production of submarines to 25 submarines by the end of the year. The Luftwaffe, too, will, by springtime, be stronger in respect to quantity and quality than it was at the beginning of the battle against England.

After a brief discussion of the effects of the air and sea war against England and some remarks on the attitude of Russia and the USA as the only powers from which England still hopes for support, the situation in the Mediterranean is treated in detail. During the treatment of this question it is stated that according to German opinion it is desirable for military
Reasons for the conclusion that the warfare in the Balkans should be confined to Greece. British attacks against the oil production area of Rumania only could justify the commitment of German troops in the South East. To support the Italian offensive against Egypt primarily the commitment of German air forces against Alexandria and the Suez Canal should be taken into consideration after the capture of Marsa Matruh for which German troops would not be needed according to the opinion of both parties. Gibraltar could be taken without difficulties by especially trained German troops provided Spain should decide to enter the war rather soon. As regards the cooperation with France, Germany should, in view of the great importance of the French colonial empire in Africa for the continuation of the war against England, endeavor to tighten this cooperation as closely as possible.

It is desirable that this necessity be fully recognised also by all military authorities in Italy.

Regarding the immediate cooperation of Italian air and naval units with the corresponding German branches of the armed forces, the view taken by Badehöfer is shared. Badehöfer is of the opinion that it would be more economical and better strategy to employ the Italian air units stationed in Belgium in the Mediterranean during the winter. On the other hand, however, it is requested that the Italian submarines employed in the Atlantic be left in this area as a valuable support for the siege of England.

(..........)
14 November 1940

Finally, the Chief of the National Defense Branch inquires what political guiding principles are envisaged in case Ireland, attacked by England, calls for German support. Ambassador Ritter wants to know what contribution the Wehrmacht could do in such a case. The Chief of the National Defense Branch declares that any effective support could not be provided; airborne troops could not be committed. The conduct of Luftwaffe and Navy operations only could be taken into consideration. Ambassador Ritter thinks that in such case the utmost effort on the part of the Wehrmacht would be demanded by the Fuehrer.

19 November 1940

Upon the question of the Chief of the National Defense Branch whether the Fuehrer has ever voiced his opinion about what should be done in case Ireland, attacked by England, would call for German support, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff replies that the Fuehrer has not yet given this problem any thought.
Eventually, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares
that now the Fuehrer again gives considerable thought to the operation
"Geeloewen".
( ............... )

Notes on the period from 1 to 4 December

The Chief of the National Defense Branch calls on the Fuehrer
for verbal report and consultation on the afternoon of 3 December.
( ............... )

At this occasion, the Chief of the National Defense Branch
submits the note on Ireland in addition to a survey of the stocks of
captured English arms.
( ............... )

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ( ............... )

As regards the airborne corps, the Fuehrer has ordered that the
22nd Division be placed under the command of the 7th Air Division.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch no longer upholds his
intention to have the operational principles of the 22nd Division exa-
mined because of this new assignment of this division, since the Fuehrer
pointed out emphatically that this assignment would be only temporary
in nature.
( ............... )

3 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
Command/Wehrmacht Operations
Staff/National Defense Branch
3 December 1940

reports to

At 16:30 hours, the Commander in Chief of the Navy reports to the Fuehrer on the situation while the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, and Commander von Puttkamer are present. He gives the following report:

It has become more and more clear that the utmost harm is inflicted upon the British by the destruction of their industrial and harbor installations by the Luftwaffe in connection with the disruption of the sea supply service by submarines in coordinated action with the Luftwaffe. For this reason, these operations should be continued in a concentrated manner and interruption or impairment of this action should be tolerated. These operations might, in the long run — maybe as early as this winter — have a fatal effect on the enemy. Any loss of prestige resulting from an operation involving an excessive risk must be carefully avoided. Such loss of prestige could prolong the war and, above all, influence the attitude of the USA in a manner detrimental to Germany. Further operations should be carried out against England with the objective to relieve the pressure on Italy and to capture Gibraltar for the purpose of clearing the Mediterranean of enemy forces.

Regarding the problem of the support of Ireland against Britain, the dispatch of an expeditionary corps and the occupation of the Island of Ireland would not be possible owing to the superior enemy sea power, the unfavorable geographical conditions, and the impossibility to move in supplies.