PREFACE

1. In consideration of the organization and the chain of command of the German Air Force in World War II, Studies 9 to 11 are presented in two volumes:
   "The Air War in the West" and
   "The German Air Defence"

2. The availability and scope of the necessary source material do not permit the preparation of Studies 9 to 11 as a chronological history. The author was obliged to treat such time periods at first, for which adequate source material was immediately available. Thus, the historical events of the air war, in the course of German Air Defense during the period from 15 September 1943 to D-day (6 June 1944) became the first to be prepared. It embraces three Parts with three Annexes.

Part I
The Air War over Reich Territory, by Day and Night,
15 September 1943 to 31 December 1943

Part II
The Struggle For Air Supremacy over Reich Territory,
1 January 1944 to 31 March 1944
Part III

Air Battles over Reich Territory in Defense of the Vital Resources of the German Air Force

A critical comparison between the Allied and German compilations of historical events of the air war for the selected time period is to follow.

3. In the following Part I of Study 9 to 11, the events of the air war in the course of German Air Defense, not including Anti-aircraft Artillery, are described as seen through German eyes. The sketches belonging to Part I have been combined in Annex I.

4. Source Material for Part I.

The war diary of the I Fighter Corps was utilized as the primary source for the events described. It can be considered a source of authentic documentary reliability. Some supplementary material was taken from the bequest of the former War History Division of the Luftwaffe, which can be evaluated as a semi-authoritative source.

Separate, supplementary remarks concerning the air attacks on Berlin were taken from personal notes of a former Air Defense Commissioner.

The critical comments, incorporated into the monthly reviews, portray the interpretation and opinion of the author. In this
connection, however, opinions of the following individuals were also taken into account:

Brigadier General (ret) Walter Grabaann, former commander of the 3d Fighter Division

Colonel (ret) Guenther Radusch, former commander of the 5th Night Fighter Wing.

Reports written purely from memory and items from wartime or post-war commercial literary writings were not consulted.

5. Evaluation of Part I, Study 9 to 11

The description of the course of events during the air war in Part I is based on documentary sources of the intermediate air command echelons. Operations reports of combat flying elements were not available. Because of the unusual conditions at wars and it seems hardly possible to gain access to documentary material of the lower echelon combat units concerning the course of aerial engagements. Thus, a considerable void exists in connection with historical writing, especially since subjective memoirs of individuals can only be considered of limited significance.

The contents of Part I, Study 9 to 11 will approach historical truth. Minor errors must be taken into account in view of the limited sources and because of human frailties.

It is especially emphasized that all statements concerning commitments of Allied Air Forces portray exclusively the German deductions
at the time of the events as they occurred.

All numerical data, except dates, can only be evaluated in broad terms. The author will have more to say elsewhere regarding the basically limited significance of numerical data, and concerning the peculiarities and incompleteness of reporting.
Chapter 1

EVEN BY DAY DURING THE PERIOD FROM
15 September 1943 TO 1 October 1943

1.) General

For four days enemy Mosquitoes reconnoitered in cloudless skies
at high and medium altitudes. Approximately twenty planes penetrated
German territory to Berlin, to Central Germany, and to Southern Bavaria.
On orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, these enemy re-
connaissance missions were to be met by the commitment of alerted swarms
of fighters, composed of Me 109's and FW 190's, that were strategically
based to protect industrial installations. The inferior capabilities
of these fighters against the Mosquitoes made this a hopeless and un-
economical effort. After approximately 200 alarm take-offs, the German
fighters succeeded in downing only one enemy reconnaissance craft.

Enemy fighter thrusts into the Dutch coastal area, and attacks on
convoys of coastal shipping were carried out at low level. Since loc-
ator equipment picked up these attacks too late no aircraft were co-
mitted in defense.

The enemy carried out a surprise low-level raid on the airfield
The Netherlands

at Woensdrecht, Holland and hit several courier planes.

American bomber fleets based in England conducted only one large-scale attack on objectives within German territory. This occurred on 27 September 1943 against the port installations at Bremen.

Successes and Losses during the period from 15 September to 1 October 1943

Total number of planes committed in the zone of I Fighter Corps:

664 planes

Total number of planes lost in the zone of I Fighter Corps:

11 planes or 1.5% of total commitment

Enemy losses over German territory in the zone of I Fighter Corps:

13 planes not including those downed by AA Artillery

This was about 0.9% of the estimated total of 1,400 planes committed over German territory.
2. Events By Day during the period from 13 September to 19 September 1943

(See Sketch German Air Defense
Appendix I)

The enemy reconnoitered with 14 planes up to the general line
Hamburg - Erfurt - Frankfurt/M. - Salzburg.

Low-level enemy attacks with 35 planes were carried out against two
convoys off the Dutch coast.

In single flights, 74 enemy aircraft penetrated to the vicinity
of the Dutch-Belgian coast.

Total enemy commitment: 122 planes, among which 6 Mosquitoes were
recognized

Commitments of the I Fighter Corps in alarm take-offs: 83 fighters

Enemy Losses were not determined

Own Losses: None
3. Events by day during the period from 19 September to 25 September 1943

(See Sketch German Air Defense Appendix 2)

Weak enemy reconnaissance activity extended to the western shores of the Baltic Sea, to Central Germany, and to Southern Germany. Aircraft plants were suspected to have been the reconnaissance targets. Six enemy reconnaissance craft were identified.

There was intensive enemy activity along the Dutch-Belgian coast. Elements of Marauders and 80 to 100 Boeing Fortresses were identified. Enemy intentions were not recognizable.

- On 19 September about 30 enemy planes carried out a bombing and strafing attack against the airfield at Woensdrecht in Holland.

Total enemy commitment: approximately 675 planes

Committed by I Fighter Corps: Alarm take-offs against reconnaissance planes - 63 fighters
Against enemy coastal sorties - 212 fighters
Total 275 fighters

Enemy Losses: 1 Mosquito shot down near Zwolle, Holland

Own Losses: None
4. Events by Day During the period from 25 September to 1 October 1943

(See Sketch German Air Defense Appendix 3)

Six enemy reconnaissance planes reached the western shores of the Baltic Sea, the area west of Berlin, and the territory between Frankfurt/Main and Stuttgart.

Enemy low-level attacks surprised two convoys off the Dutch coast. The raids were conducted by 37 planes.

Single flights totalling approximately 100 enemy planes penetrated up to the Dutch-Belgian coast.

Total enemy commitment: approximately 141 planes

Disbursed by 1 Fighter Corps: Against enemy reconnaissance - 46 fighters
Against enemy coastal sorties - 95 fighters

Total 141 Fighters

Enemy losses: Were not determined

Own losses: None
5.) American Raid on Baden, 27 September 1943

(See Sketch German Air Defense
Appendix 4)

Enemy Commitment

Taking off from the British Isles and taking an easterly course, three enemy bomber units consisting of between 200 and 250 planes B-17s and Thunderbolts) were located 80 km west of the isles Terschelling at 1020 hours. Two of the bomber units penetrated the areas Baden and Oldenburg via the Frisian Islands. After dropping bombs on Baden, Aurich, and Wilhelmshaven, all three bomber formations began the return flight heading in a northwesterly direction. The last elements were situated 80 km northwest of Terschelling Island at 1150 hours.

Altitudes were: Bombers 7,200 m - 7,500 m
Fighters 4,000 m - 9,000 m

Enemy fighter escorts screened the approaching bombers against attacks from the south. Three enemy fighter units conducted a diversionary thrust into the area around the Scheldt Estuary with deepest penetration reaching the general line Rotterdam - Woensdrecht - Gent.
Commitments of the I Fighter Corps

Committed were: 1st Fighter Division with five fighter squadrons from Holland

2d Fighter Division with two fighter squadrons and the 26th Twin-engine Fighter Wing from bases at Bremen, Muenster, and Paderborn.

The fighter squadrons of the 1st Fighter Division were committed separately. They became primarily involved in dogfights above northern Holland, where they demonstrated inferior effectiveness due to their heavy armament. One squadron failed to make contact with the enemy when its radio equipment failed.

In contrast, the 2d Fighter Division succeeded in committing its elements as a unit. Its formations attacked an enemy bomber force in the area east of Eupen and became involved with its fighter escort.

The enemy approach on Eupen was spotted sufficiently early through radio intercept. That the enemy had fighter escort was disclosed by the following monitored radio message: "Thunderbolts o.k."

Total Commitment: 120 Fighters and 40 Twin-engine Fighters

Enemy Losses: 9 Boeing and 3 Thunderbolt shot down
Own Losses: 10 Fighters and 1 Twin-engine Fighter
Weather: 3/10 to 9/10 overcast in 400 m to 3,000 m.
Visibility: 10 km

Particulars

Measure of the 1 Fighter Corps at the end of September 1943

The 1 Fighter Corps ordered that armament of the 1st Fighter Squadron of the outpost fighter division based in Holland be limited to one cannon (fuselage) and two machine-guns 131 for each FW 190 aircraft. Through the elimination of four machine-guns 151 from each plane and the resulting reduction in weight was calculated to make the fighters more effective in aerial combat with enemy fighters.
Chapter 2

EVENTS BY NIGHT DURING THE PERIOD FROM
15 September 1943 to 1 October 1943

1. General

Two British night attacks with weak Mosquito units were directed against Berlin and the Ruhr area. Both twin and single engine fighters committed against these attacking planes failed to achieve success due to their inferior speeds.

At the same time weak enemy formations engaged in mining operations in the following waters: The Bay of Danzig, The Western Baltic, The Elbe and Weser Estuaries, as well as the Dutch Coastal Waters. The mining operations carried out from low-level could not be successfully combated because the restricted night-fighter tactics known as The Himmelbett * method were employed.

* The Himmelbett method of night-fighter tactics were those wherein the attacks are guided by radio from a ground control within a defined area of operation.

In the course of numerous night penetrations of single enemy aircraft into the Dutch coastal area and Northwest Germany, no bombs were dropped and the enemy intentions could not be recognized.
During the dark nights the enemy conducted large-scale attacks on Hannover, Darmstadt, and Mannheim, as well as Bochum and Recklinghausen. In the course of these raids through the dropping tinfoil strips the enemy interfered considerably with the spotting and recognition service as well as with the **Himmelbett** tactics. The approach route of the bomber stream could generally be determined only after reconnaissance planes were committed. The increasing appearance of enemy long-range nightfighter escorts caused losses among our own twin-engine nightfighters. By committing twin-engine and single-engine nightfighters employing the **Objective** nightfighter method successes were achieved. Because only very few nightfighter units were equipped with on-board radar facilities the hunt or pursuit nightfighter method could only be employed to a limited extent.

**Successes and Losses during the period from 17 September to 1 October 1943**

**Total number of nightfighters committed in the zone of I Fighter Corps:**

931 planes, of which 90 nightfighters defended against Mosquito attacks.

**Total Losses in Nightfighters in the zone of I Fighter Corps:**

21 planes or 2.3% of the total planes committed

**RAF losses over German territory within the zone of I Fighter Corps:**

90 planes, not including those shot down by AA Artillery and single-engine nightfighters.

This was about 4.5% of the estimated total RAF commitment of about 2,000 planes against German territory.
2. Events by night during the period from 15 September to 23 September
1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 5)

The enemy conducted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Planes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courier flights to Sweden</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies for Agents in Poland</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosquito attack on Berlin</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining of waters off the Dutch coastal</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single flights to Northwest Germany</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single flights to the Dutch coastal region</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(mining missions?)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Commitment:</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The I Fighter Corps committed:

1. Fighter Division against single aircraft with
   Himmelbett method                                 10 twin-engine fighters

2. Fighter Division against the courier planes
   to Sweden with radar equipped planes
   against the supply missions to Poland with
   Himmelbett method in Schleswig-Holstein           42 twin-engine fighters

3. Fighter Division in defense of the Mosquitoes
   attacks on Berlin with Himmelbett method in the
   area north of Berlin                               28 twin-engine fighters

Total Commitment: 82 nightfighters

Enemy Losses: 3 planes shot down

Own Losses: 1 single-engine fighter
3.) British Raid on Hannover 22/23 September 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 6)

Enemy Commitment:
The fact that enemy forces had taken off from British bases heading
east was determined through radio direction finding at around 2130 hours.
The penetration situation of the enemy bomber stream composed of from
300 to 400 planes was not clear due to enemy interference with the lo-
cater equipment. Timely commitment of spotter aircraft were able to
determine the enemy approach route and maximize the target. The
return flight of the enemy bomber was conducted in extended formation
from the Hannover, Braunschweig, Stendal areas with a northwesterly
course.

The I Fighter Corps committed:
1. Fighter Division with Himmelbett method over Dutch
territory from 2039 hours to 2054 hours
   in pursuit operations from Holland between
   2132 hours tm and 0037 hours
   6 twin-engine Fighters

2. Fighter Division with Himmelbett method in the
   Schleswig-Holstein area from 2101 hours to
   0110 hours
   7 twin-engine fighters

1., 2., and 3. Fighter Divisions in Objective
   pursuit operations in the Hannover / Braun-
   schweig area from 2039 hours to 0054 hours
   197 twin-engine fighters

Total Commitment: 221 twin-engine fighters
Enemy Losses: 19 four-motored bombers shot down

Gun Losses: 2 twin-engine fighters, of which one was shot down by long-range nightfighter

Weather: 1/10 to 4/10 partial overcast at 1,000 m.

Very dark night
4. British Raid on Mannheim and Darmstadt on 23/24 September 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 7)

**Enemy Commitment:**

The approach route of between 300 and 400 enemy bombers was not completely spotted because of severe enemy interference brought to bear on the radio direction finding equipment. The bomber formation left the British bases at about 2055 hours heading east. The tightly formed bomber stream, after changing course several times, then headed in the general southeasterly direction into the Mannheim -- Darmstadt area. Enemy long-range nightfighters interfered with our own commitments in the Dutch area. At two radar sites the enemy interfered for the first time with our communications. The return flight of the enemy bomber force was in extended formation with a northwesterly course. Only through the timely commitment of spotter planes was it possible to bring our nightfighter forces to bear against the enemy.

**The I Fighter Corps Committed:**

I. Fighter Division with Mannheim method in Mannheim

in the Rhine area from 2125 hours to 0110 hours

28 twin-engine fighters

in pursuit operations from Holland between 2124 hour and 0030 hours

7 twin-engine fighters

II - 2 - 3 and V Fighter Divisions in Objective night-fighter tactics within the Mannheim-Darmstadt area from 2116 hours to 0325 hours

186 twin-engine fighters

**Total Commitment:** 221 twin-engine fighters
Enemy Losses: 30 four-motored Bombers shot down through \textit{Objective} method

Own Losses: 7 twin-engine fighters, of which 3 were shot down by long-range nightfighters; and one was shot down by enemy bomber

Weather: 2/10 to 5/10 overcast, minimum altitude 3,000 m, visibility 10 to 20 km.
5. Events by night during the period from 24 September to 1 October 1943

(Not including British Large-scale Raids on Hannover/Braunschweig on 27/28 September and on Bochum/Recklinghausen on 29/30 September 1943)

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 8)

Enemy Commitment

The RAF conducted:

Mining operations in the following waters: Bay of Danzig, Elbe and Weser estuaries and off the Dutch coast with 41 planes

Three Mosquitoe attacks on the Ruhr area with 40 planes

Courier flights to Sweden with 8 planes

Single flights to northwest Germany and into the Dutch coastal region with 11 planes

Total Commitment: 100 planes

The I Fighter Corps committed:

1. Fighter Division against Mosquitoes with Himmler method in the Rhine area

   1 twin-engine fighter

2. Fighter Division against mining operation with Himmler method in the Schleswig-Holstein area with

   7 twin-engine fighters

   Total Commitment: 8 twin-engine fighters

Enemy Losses: Were not determined

Gun Losses: 1 Fighter
6. British Raid on Hannover and Braunschweig on 27/28 September 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 9)

Enemy Commitment:

The enemy bomber stream left the British Isles in three consecutive waves, in a tight formation, at 2113 hours, and at an altitude of 5,000 m flew a straight course into the Hannover - Braunschweig area. The bomber formations were accompanied by long-range fighters to their target. All radar equipment within the penetration area suffered severe interference created by the enemy. On the return flight the enemy bombers flew in extended formation over northwest Germany. The last of the from 300 to 400 returning bombers were located over the Dutch coast at 0110 hours.

The I Fighter Corps committed:

1. Fighter Division using Himmelbett method in Holland from 2043 hours to 0115 hours in pursuit nightfighter operation from Holland between 2118 hours and 0044 hours 29 twin-engine fighters

10 twin-engine fighters

1.2. and 3. Fighter Divisions using Objective fighter tactics in the Hannover-Braunschweig area from 2118 hours to 0115 hours 175 twin-engine fighters

Total Commitments: 214 twin-engine fighters

Enemy Losses: 32 Bombers shot down, one of which in the course of Himmelbett operations.
Unm Losses: 5 twin-engine fighters shot down, 4 of which by enemy long-range nightfighters.

Weather: 0/10 to 4/10 rain clouds

Minimum: 800 m, Maximum: 3,000 m.

Particulars: On 27 October (should be September) Captain Frank, 5, 6, 9, 12, 21, Commander of 1 Squadron, 1 Nightfighter Wing was killed in action. He had 55 nightfighter victories to his credit and was the holder of the Knights Cross to the Iron Cross.
The Command Staff of I.Fighter Corps directs the nightfighter operations on 27/28 September 1943.
7.) British Raid on Bockum and Recklinghausen on 29/30 September 1943
(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 10)

**Enemy Commitment:**
The assembly of about 400 enemy bombers above the British Isle was recognized early. The point of the British bomber stream reached the Dutch coast near Den Helder at 2022 hours flying at 5,500 m with an easterly course. Enemy interference with the radar equipment distorted the air situation completely. The change of course to the south of the point of the bomber stream was not noted in time. Only after launching spotter planes was the enemy attack target determined.
The enemy masked his turn to the south in the Emden area by dropping dummy flares south of Bremen and near Osnabrueck. On the return run the enemy left the target area flying in extended formation with a westerly course. The last of the departing enemy bombers were over the Dutch coast at 2324 hours. The last of the approaching enemy bomber wave turned over the North Sea before reaching the Dutch coast and headed home. It appeared that due to the deterioration of the weather (fog) at the home bases the enemy executed the raid prematurely.

A British mine laying unit of about 30 planes flew over the western coast of Denmark at 2120 hour and steered a southeasterly course up to the Bay of Danzig, returning via the same route.
The 1st Fighter Corps committed:

I. Fighter Division: Himmeltät method in Holland and the Rhine area from 2055 hours to 0134 hours: 35 twin-engine fighters

II. Fighter Division: Himmeltät method in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark as well as the Baltic Coast from 2054 hours to 0315 hours: 11 twin-engine fighters

I., II., and III. Fighter Divisions in Objective

Nightfighter method in the Bochum/Recklinghausen area from 2055 hours to 0034 hours: 122 twin-engine fighters

Total Commitment: 185 twin-engine fighters

The mass of the fighters committed in Objective operations initially headed for the dummy flares at Braen and Osnabrueck and ultimately were redirected to Bochum by the Fighter Divisions, where they arrived too late. The advent of fog necessitated premature halting of own commitments.

Enemy Losses: 6 bombers shot down (3 Halifax and 3 Lancaster)

Own Losses: 5 twin-engine fighters shot down, of which 1 plane by enemy long-range nightfighters.

Weather: Cloudless, very misty. Visibility 3 to 5 km. From 2230 hours increasing fog.

Particulars: During the night 29/30 October (should be September) Captain Geiger, Squadron Commander, 7. Squadron, 1. Nightfighter Wing was killed in action after 52 nightfighter victories. He was decorated with the Knights Cross to the Iron Cross.
Captain Geiger

killed in action 29/30 September 1943
Chapter 3

EVENTS BY DAY DURING OCTOBER 1943

1.) General

In October 1943 the American daytime bomber offensive on targets within German territory was inaugurated with increased scope. The launched enemy encountered a total of nine large-scale attacks, of which the approach flight of 18 October failed presumably due to adverse weather conditions while over Belgium-Luxembourg territory. Only one raid, against Wiener-Neustadt on 1 October, was launched from Italian air bases. The enemy bomber attacks from British bases were conducted with fighter protection as a matter of principle. These escorts in general penetrated to the approximate line Essen - Dortmund - Cologne - Bremen. In addition to these escort fighters, special retriever fighter units made their appearance to protect the bombers on their return flights. The American raiding units bomb ed primarily the installations of the German aircraft industry. However, these industrial targets did not constitute a definite main effort of the attacks. Most of the bomb drops were carried out from within sight of the ground.

These assembly maneuvers of the American attack formations over British and Italian bases were in all cases recognized early by German radio direction finder installations. Thrusts into the Northsea area of Liberator bomber units did not succeed as diversionary actions for which they were intended.
Enemy reconnaissance activity over German territory during October was comparatively light and limited itself to favorable weather conditions. Reconnaissance presumably served to collect data for attacks, to determine the effectiveness of attacks, to gather weather data, and to watch coastal shipping. Several fighter thrusts into the Belgian-Dutch area, which were not in any way connected with the bomber activity, did not reveal their intention.

The surprise raids on the airfields Schiphol and Woensdrecht were of no consequence.

In connection with defensive operations against enemy daytime bomber attacks, Headquarters of I Fighter Corps received the explicit orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe to firstly destroy the enemy four-motored bombers while avoiding aerial combat with enemy fighters. Furthermore, unescorted bomber formations were to be attacked and destroyed preferably by twin-engine and night fighters. The arming of the heavy fighter wings, the twin-engine fighter units, and the nightfighter planes especially designated for daytime operations, with 21 cm rocket grenades under the wings was stepped up to the utmost.

The average strength of aircraft ready for action within the zone of Headquarters I Fighter Corps were as follows during October 1943:

- Single-engine fighters: 200 - 300
- Twin-engine fighters: 60 - 80
- Nightfighters suitable for daytime operations: 100

The mass of the daytime fighters were based in Holland and Northwestern Germany.
The tactics employed by the German forces was as follows: Enemy four-
motored bomber units were generally attacked by separate fighter wings. 
During the attack, which usually was carried out from the front, some 
elements, normally a squadron, screened against enemy fighters from above. 
The twin-engine fighter wings were combined into a concentrated attack force 
and usually required the protection of from 1 to 2 fighter wings against 
enemy fighters.

The daytime deftive actions in the German Air Defense during 
October were in general carried out successfully. This was especially true 
when enemy bomber units were encountered without fighter escort, and par-
ticularly when twin-engine and night fighters with their heavy armament 
were able to inflict considerable losses on the enemy. In the Dutch and 
Northwestern German areas German fighter units became almost exclusively 
involved in dogfights with enemy fighters. Here the German formations 
proved inferior both numerically and technically. The twin-engine fighter 
units and to some extent the nightfighter units as well suffered considerable 
losses in this area against enemy fighters. As a result, twin-engine fighter 
units and nightfighters were committed only in areas where they would not 
operate within the effective range of enemy fighters.

The numerically inferior German daytime fighter units failed to prevent 
a single American large-scale raid during October 1943. Nevertheless, the 
enemy suffered noticeable losses, especially in bombers.

The air battle of Schweinfurt on 14 October 1943 was a success for 
the daytime fighter units committed in the German Air Defense, in that 
the American air force considered itself forced to select its targets 
within German territory in accordance with the range of its escort fighters 
from that point on.
The alarm take-offs against the enemy Mosquito reconnaissance planes failed to achieve success due to the inferior performance of the German fighter planes. The unyielding determination of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Luftwaffe in holding to their order to frustrate enemy reconnaissance over German territory resulted in useless wear and tear of equipment and also in a loss of confidence in the top-level command.

Total daytime fighter planes committed in the zone of I Fighter Corps during October 1942:
4,551 planes

Total losses of planes in the zone of I Fighter Corps during October 1942:
151 planes or 3.3%

Among these losses the 1. Fighter Division in Holland suffered particularly badly. On 11 October and after suffering considerable damage from hits this division had but 40 serviceable daytime fighters.

Enemy losses in October 1943 in the zone of I Fighter Corps over German Territory:
383 planes, in addition 66 shot down by AA Artillery.

This was about 7% of the estimated total commitment over German Territory of about 5,500 planes.
2.) Events on 1 and 3 October 1943

(Not including air raid on Wiener-Neustadt on 1 October 1943)
(See sketch German Air Defense appendix II)

**Enemy Commitment**

The enemy reconnoitered with small forces over northwestern and southern Germany. Two enemy fighter thrusts were conducted into Belgian territory and into the area of the Scheldt estuary.

The following air fields were attacked on 3 October:

a.) 1140 hours Schiphol near Amsterdam by 75 fourmotored bombers and 80 Marauders.

b.) 1150 hours Woensdrecht in Holland by 50 Boston bombers.

**Total Commitment:** About 257 multi-motored planes and many fighters.

**Commitment of the 1, Fighter Corps:** 64 fighters against attacking forces at airfields and against fighter thrusts

33 fighters against Mosquito Reconnaissance craft

**Enemy Losses:** 3 planes shot down

**Own Losses:** 2 fighter planes
3. Events from 5 to 14 October 1943

(Not including American large-scale raids)

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 12)

**Enemy Commitments:**

Limited enemy reconnaissance activity covered the German coast, west and southwest Germany.

Enemy air activity in the Dutch-Belgian coastal area was drastically curtailed due to unfavorable weather.

**Total Commitment:** About 58 planes and 11 Mosquito Reconnaissance craft

**Commitment of the I, Fighter Corps:** 52 fighters in alert take-offs without success.

**Enemy Losses:** Were not determined

**Own Losses:** None
4. Events from 17 October to 1 November 1943

(Not including American large-scale raids)

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 13)

Enemy reconnaissance activity into the German Bight, to the West German Rhine area, Belgium, and Eastern France was limited. The flight route of the Mosquito reconnaissance planes could not be pursued fully due to limited visibility.

Air activity along the coast was relatively intense.

Among the operations conducted by the American Air Force were:

On 19 October 1943 a bombing attack on the wreck of the steamship "Strassburg" off the Dutch Coast with 25 Fortresses and 15 Spitfires.

On 23 October 1943 an agents mission with 3 planes into the northern area of Poland. These planes were observed circling at high altitudes in the Grodno area. Approach and return route could not be determined.

On 24 October 1943:

a.) A bombing raid on the airfield Schiphol near Amsterdam with a mixed formation of 180 Marauders, Bostons, Thunderbolts, and Spitfires between 1620 hours and 1655 hours. Altitude during approach was 1,500 m to 3,000 m. Minor damage was sustained by the airfield installations.

b.) A divebomber raid on the airfield Woensdrecht in Holland with 10 Typhoons between 1710 hours and 1755 hours. No damage was caused.
A bomber assault with 100 planes from Italian bases was launched into
Austrian-Hungarian area. Approach beginning at 1140 hours via Kaposvar,
Lake Balaton into the Bratislava - Vienna area.
Return flight over Leoben, Zagreb until 1310 hours.
Bombes were dropped in the following areas: Kaposvar, Puenkirchen, Bratislava,
Raab, Oedenburg, Steinamanger, Berndorf, Neukirchen, and the open country
around Wiener-Neustadt.

Weather: 10/10 Overcast in 200 m, partly fog and rain showers.

Fighter Defense by 13 Fighters of the Fighter Command "Ostmark" without
success.

Isolated strafing attacks were conducted against railroad trains and
AA Artillery positions in Southern Holland and in the area around Antwerp.

Total Enemy Commitment: About 420 planes and 10 Mosquito Reconnaissance Craft.

Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps: 124 fighters in alarm take-offs without
success. The enemy divebomber attacks on Schiphol, Woensdrecht, and the
ship wreckage were not discovered in time by the radar facilities. Thus the
fighters were committed too late.

Enemy Losses: 5 Beaufighters and 5 Boston Bombers shot down thru AA Artillery.

Own Losses: 3 Fighters
5. American Raid on Wiener-Neustadt on 1 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 13)

**Enemy Commitment**

**Approaching from Italian Bases without Fighter Protection were:**

a.) 1210 hours 50 - 60 **Liberator** Bombers via Zagreb, Oedenburg into the Wiener-Neustadt area. Return flight was carried out in southerly and southwesterly direction beginning at 1256 hours.

b.) 1314 hours 15 **Liberator** Bombers along the same route to Neusiedlsee.

6 bombers continued on to Wiener-Neustadt and 6 bombers headed for the Bratislava area.

Beginning at 1401 hours the bombers started the return flight in a southwesterly direction.

Altitude during the approach flight of both bomber formations was 3,000 - 5,000 m.

Altitude above the target area: 1,500 - 3,000 m.

Bombs were dropped: Wiener-Neustadt: Air drome, aircraft plants, Rax works

Felixdorf: Army Ammo Dump

c.) 1212 hours 30 - 40 **Four-stored Bombers** via Switzerland into the Oberstdorf - Friedrichshafen area.

The return flight was observed between 1251 hours and 1331 hours between Linzau and Bludenz into Switzerland.

Altitudes were: 2,000 - 5,000 m.

Bomb drops: Feldkirch and Blasenberg in Vorarlberg.
Commitments of the 7. Fighter Corps:

Fighter Command "Catmark" against the Wiener-Neustadt penetration in alarm take-offs from

- Airfield Winer-Neustadt: 8 Me 109
- Airfield Fels on the Wagram: 44 Me 109
- Airfield Hirschberg: 14 Me 410 (twin-engine)

Total: 66 planes

7. Fighter Division (later 7. Fighter Division) against penetration on Feldkirch in alarm take-offs from

- Airfield Neubiberg: 19 Me 109
- Airfield Woerishofen: 29 Me 109
- Airfield Ansbach: 12 Me 110 (Twin-engine)
- Airfield Wettheim: 30 Me 110 (twin-engine)
- Airfield Echterdingen: 6 Me 110 (nightfighter)
- Airfield Memmingen: 8 Me 110 (twin-engine)

Total: 104 planes

Total Commitment: 170 Fighters

Of these planes 68 fighters engaged the enemy. Airial combat occurred primarily above the Vienna basin. The western bomber formation evaded the German attackers in due time by pulling away over neutral Switzerland.

Enemy Losses: 19 fourmotored bombers in the Vienna area
4 fourmotored bombers in the Lake Constance area
4 fourmotored bombers shot down by AA Artillery

The percentage-wise high bomber losses are attributed to the fact that the enemy flew these missions without fighter protection.

Own Losses: 2 Me 109, in addition 11 belly landings.
6. American Raid on Emden on 2 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 14)

**Enemy Commitment**

The points of a strong bomber unit with fighter protection stood about 150 km northwest of the Texel Island at 1614 hours. One of its units flew an easterly course to the north of the Frisian Islands up to the Schiermonnikoog Island and from there with a southeasterly course into the Emden area. A second formation reached Emden along the route Texel Island, Leeuwarden. After dropping bombs on Emden and Norderney the bombers returned to their bases with a norwesterly course between Schiermonnikoog and Langeoog. The location of the last returning element was 80 - 100 km north of Texel Island at 1745 hours.

**Identified aircraft types were:** Boeing at 6,500 m altitude

**Spitfire at 8,000 m altitude**

At 1635 hours numerous planes circled above the Scheldt Estuary.

During the period from 1655 hours to 1735 hours 21 Liberators with fighter protection penetrated into the Gilze - Rijen area via Heyst and flew over the Islands Schouwen and Goeree. This penetration was evaluated by Headquarters I. Fighter Corps as a diversion attempt for the raid on Emden.
Furthermore between 0800 hours and 0900 hours 14 single planes, some at low level appeared before the Dutch coast.

Finally at 1126 hours a Mosquito reconnaissance plane circled the Mainz - Darmstadt - Frankfurt/Main area and left German territory via Luettich and St. Omer.

**Commitments of the I. Fighter Corps:**
Committed were: Against the attack formations on Emden: 216 Fighters
42 twin-engine fighters
5 nightfighters

Against the enemy thrust above the Scheldt Estuary:
16 fighters

Against the Mosquito Reconnaissance plane:
4 fighters

**Total:** 283 planes

**Enemy Losser:** 8 Boeing

**Own Losser:** 1 Thunderbolt

10 fighters
7. American Raid on Frankfurt/Main and Saarbruecken on 5 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 15)

**Enemy Commitment**

At 0909 hours a bomber formation of 60 Liberators appeared about
170 km west of the Island Texel. It flew a northeasterly course up to
120 km northwest of Helgoland and turned to the south. In the area about
40 km west of Helgoland the formation began its return flight at 1000 hours
and thus ended its diversionary thrust.

The enemy approach flight into the Frankfurt basin was executed
via the western Scheldt in two waves:

**First Wave:** At 0940 hours 100 Fortresses with fighter protection steered
a southeasterly course via southern Antwerp, Aachen, Limburg/
Lahn into the Frankfurt/Main - Wiesbaden area. The fighter
escort reversed its course already while over the **Meuse** Maas.
The bombs fell on Frankfurt between 1100 hours and 1116 hours.
The return flight of the attackers began at 1110 hours in
reversed course.

**Second Wave:** From 1005 hours on about 100 Fortresses drove into the
Saarbruecken - Saarlautern area via Gent - Bruxelles - Trier.

Beginning at 1045 hours enemy fighter escort units appeared over the
Scheldt estuary. About 100 fighters flew a southeasterly course to the
German border and then turned joining the returning bomber units along a
northwesterly course.
The departing flights of the enemy *formations* were executed in extended formation between Scheldt Estuary and Valery en Caux.

Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps: 226 Fighters

89 Twin-engine Fighters

5 Nightfighters

Combining the 26th Twin-engine Fighter Wing with its own fighter protection (II. Squadron, 11th Fighter Wing) into one combat unit did not result in success. The twin-engine fighters became involved with enemy fighters and suffered heavy losses.

**Enemy Losses:** 3 Fortresses shot down

**Own Losses:** 10 planes, in addition 26 planes suffered damage.

**Other Enemy Activity on 7 October 1943:**

Beginning at 1110 hours 15 Fortresses coming from Italian bases approached via Parma, Padua, and Trient, and bombed Meran and Bozen. Commitment against these bombers of elements of the Second Air Force are not entered in the War Diary of the I. Fighter Corps.

At 0626 hours a Mosquito navigated over the French channel coast near Berck s. M. and flew into the Bingen area via Arras and Sedan. The suspected weather reconnaissance craft reversed its course at 0715 hours and began the return flight via Sedan and Cap Gris Nez. The operations of 4 fighters committed against this reconnaissance plane were without success.
At 0837 hours another Mosquito flew over Beauvais, Basel, and by-passing Switzerland, into the Bregenz - Munich area. From there this reconnaissance plane started on the return flight at 1012 hours via Karlsruhe and Saarbruecken.

At 1503 hours a third Mosquito reconnaissance plane appeared over Kochem, circled the Wiesbaden - Frankfurt area, presumably to determine the effect of the morning raid, and flew via Amiens and Dieppe back to Great Britain.

Particulars: On 4 October Captain Clausen, Commander of the 1. Squadron, 11th Fighter Wing was killed in action after 128 daytime fighter victories. He was decorated with the Oak Leave Cluster to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross.
8.) American Raid on Bremen on 8 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 16)

Enemy Commitment

Radio Direction Finder installations discovered the assembly of strong enemy attack formations in the area northeast of London begining at 1340 hours. The American operations were conducted with 400 bombers organized into three units.

Approaching were: First bomber unit (Boeing) with fighter escort via the Island Texel and Leeuwarden into the Bremen area.

Second bomber unit (Liberator) with fighter escort along the northern fringes of the Frisian Islands up to the Island Borkum and then in a southeasterly direction into the Bremen area.

Third bomber unit (Liberator) along the northern fringes of the Frisian Islands up to the northern edges of Schiermonnikoog Island, then with southeasterly course up to the Vechta area and from there with a northerly course to Bremen.

The mass of the enemy bombers flew the return run via Holland, while some severed elements headed home with a northwesterly course across the sea.

Strong fighter elements escorted the bombers up to the Oldenburg area. About 50 Thunderbolt fighters met the returning bombers above the sea north of Borkum.
Furthermore the following were observed:

A thrust of 4 Mustang fighters into the sea and coastal area of Bergen a. Z., Terschelling during the period from 0750 hours and 1220 hours.

A reconnaissance plane over Emden. Approach at 1058 hours via Bergen a. Z., Zwolle. Return flight via the Island Borkum until 1149 hours.

A Spitfire reconnaissance plane in the area Walcheren Island - Weensdrecht during the period from 1205 hours to 1227 hours.

A Spitfire reconnaissance plane in the Kiel area. Approach via Husum at 1206 hours. Return flight over Schleswig until 1227 hours.

A coastal approach flight of 2 Mustang fighters near Ijmuiden at 1215 hours.

A pickup fighter escort unit in strength of 80 planes, which during the period from 1535 hours until 1640 hours penetrated into the Zwolle area via Ijmuiden.

**Effect of the Bomb:**

In Emden: The American air attack primarily hit the city area.

Number of bombs dropped: 634 high-explosive bombs, including 24 with delayed-action fuses
3,000 stick-type incendiary bombs
2,045 liquid incendiary bombs

Material Damage:
183 houses destroyed and
700 houses damaged
25 industrial plants damaged
several ships in the harbor damaged
light damage to traffic arteries
a school building in Delmenhorst hit, whereby
45 children were buried.

Personal Damage:
29 Dead
115 Wounded
225 Homeless

Commitment of the 1st Fighter Force:

It was possible to commit all daytime fighter units of the 1st, 2nd,
and 3rd Fighter DIVISIONS and elements of the daytime fighter units
of the 5th Fighter Division at an early time. In the Oldenburg and Bremen
areas violent aerial battles ensued that brought costly losses to both sides.
The attack unit of the 26th Twin-engine Fighter Wing was able to attack
bomber units that were without fighter protection south of Bremen.

The units committed by the Third Air Force did not make contact with
the enemy.

Total Commitment: 453 Fighters and Twin-engine Fighters

Additionally from Third Air Force (Fighter Command West): 56 Fighters

Enemy Losses:
35 fourmotored bombers and 6 Thunderbolts definitely shot down
16 fourmotored bombers probably shot down

Furthermore thru AA Artillery:
1 Mosquito and 2 Marauder Bombers shot down in the Antwerp -
Gent area.
Own Losses: 28 planes destroyed
4 planes damaged

Weather: Cloudless up to 5/10 overcast at 1,500 m, Visibility 20 km.

Particulars: During the aerial engagements on 8 October, Lt Colonel Philipp, Commander of 1st Fighter Wing was killed in action. He was decorated with the Oak Leaf Cluster with Swords to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross and had 206 aerial victories to his credit.
Lt Colonel Philipp
Killed in action on 8 October 1943
9. American Attack on Aircraft Armament Works, Shipyards, and Harbor Installations in Neubrandenburg, Anklam, Danzig, Marienburg and Gotenhafen on 9 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 17)

The approach route of the enemy bomber units for the attack on the Aircraft Armament plants in Eastern Germany led over the North and Baltic Seas. Several hundred American fourmotorred bombers flew in three large formations without fighter protection and negotiated the long distance at from 4,500 to 6,000 m altitudes. The air distance from Great Britain to Marienburg in East Prussia and back totalled about 2,500 km.

Two enemy bomber units composed of 200 planes were spotted at 0909 hours approximately 100 to 150 km northwest of Texel Island and reached the west coast of Jutland between the Islands Sylt and Esbjerg after navigating a northeasterly course. Flying over the Islands Fuenen and Laaland they reached the Neubrandenburg - Anklam area. The return flights with northwesterly course began at 1150 hours, crossing the North Sea coast of Denmark between Esbjerg and the Island Fellworm. The last position bearing at 1346 hours indicated: 80 km north of Island Vlieland.

At 1400 hours, an enemy fighter unit consisting of about 80 fighters picked up the returning bombers north of Texel Island.

A third bomber unit with a total strength of about 300 planes, steared over Jutland, Fuenen, Seeland navigating a southeasterly course until over estuary region of the Vistula and bombed the shipyards, harbor installations, and aircraft plants in Danzig, Marienburg, and Gotenhafen. The return flights began at 1318 hours. After the bombers had passed over Husum and Esbjerg...
their last position was determined at 1550 hours to have been 70 km west of Esbjerg.

Other Events on 2 October 1943:

At 0536 hours a Mosquito reconnaissance plane flew into the western area of the Baltic Sea via Westerland. It was presumably a weather ship. The weather reconnaissance flights in the morning frequently gave the headquarters of I. Fighter Corps the indication of the approach route of subsequent American bombing raids.

During the period from 0700 hours to 1200 hours 22 planes, all single flights, appeared off the Dutch coast.

During the period between 1625 hours and 1648 hours an American fighter unit of from 30 to 40 planes penetrated via Texel Island up to Terschelling Island.

At 1450 hours a mixed enemy unit composed of Marauders, Bostons, and Spitfires, carried out a surprise raid on the Woensdrecht airfield in Holland with a total of 100 aircraft. The altitudes of the attackers ranged between 2,000 m and 4,000 m. The enemy unit executed its return flight via the Scheldt estuary.

From 1140 hours approach flights of from 15 to 20 Mosquito reconnaissance planes began between the Scheldt and Somme estuaries with a southeasterly course. The reconnaissance packet drove into the Frankfurt/Main - Mannheim - Stuttgart region, where it presumably conducted target reconnaissance for future intended raids. They returned to their bases with a northwesterly course. At 1555 hours the last position report indicated the flight to be above Le Trouport.
Weather: Cloudless, good visibility.

Effects of the Raid:

In Arnhem: All the buildings of the Arado aircraft plant were set on fire and several fires were started in the city. Personal Damage:
150 dead and 150 wounded.

In Gotenhafen: 4 ships heavily damaged
1 floating dock damaged
German installations partially destroyed
Torpedo experimental station and arsenal damaged, heavy
damage to buildings in the city
Personal Damage: 100 dead
200 buried, including 100 children
1,500 homeless

In Marienburg: Focke-Wulf aircraft plant heavily damaged
Personal Damage: 70 dead
100 wounded
500 homeless

In Danzig: Light building damage
Personal Damage: 4 dead and
2 missing

Airfield Woensdrecht in Holland: Number of Bombs dropped: 200 high explosive bombs

Heavy damage to the taxi strip

Airfield out of commission for one week
Commitment of the 1. Fighter Corps:

The long detour of the enemy bomber units via the North Sea, Jutland, and the Baltic Sea made the commitment of the daytime fighter units more difficult, since the bulk of them lay in Holland and Northwestern Germany. Nevertheless it was possible to bring all available fighter craft into contact with the bombers and to inflict considerable losses to the American Air Force. Since there were no daytime fighter craft stationed in Eastern German territory, the enemy attack units could not be engaged over the target area.

The commitment of the fighter units developed as follows:

1. Fighter Division took off from Holland and headed into the area above the North Sea. The fighter elements of this division could not make contact with the enemy due to the excessive range and landed on fields in the Hamburg - Schleswig-Holstein area. After refueling the units of the 1. Fighter Division successfully attacked the bombers on their return flights.

The daytime fighter units of the 2. Fighter Division engaged the enemy bombers during the approach and return flights. Fighters and twin-engine fighters entered the fray over the German Bight and over Jutland.

The 2. Fighter Division attacked the approaching bomber formations with weak fighter and industrial defense fighter units over the coastal area on the western edges of the Baltic Sea. For action against the bombers in the Bay of Danzig only a few nightfighters based in Pomerania and East Prussia were available.

Two fighter wings of the 5. Fighter Division from the Frankfurt basin were shifted in low-level flight to fields in the German Bight, where they refueled. These forces too were successfully committed against the American bombers on their return flight.
All nightfighters that could be adapted to daylight operation (between 80 and 100 nightfighters) operated singly and successfully attacked the enemy bombers during their approach and return flights in the area of the western Baltic Sea, over Jutland, and in the North Sea area.

**Total Commitments of the I. Fighter Corps:** 566 planes including second starts and nightfighters.

**Enemy Losses:**
- 53 planes definitely shot down
- 11 planes probably shot down, mostly over the Sea.

Enemy Losses occurred mostly on the return flights.

**Additionally Shot Down by AA Artillery:**
- 1 Mosquito east of Gent
- 1 Mosquito north of Gent
- 1 Mosquito near Antwerp
- Near Schooten 1 Marauder Bomber crashed

**Own Losses:**
(as of evening 11 October 1943)
- 10 planes (5 He 109, 3 FW 190, 2 Ju 88)
- 14 planes suffered hits

Personal Losses: 1 dead, 1 wounded, and 10 missing.

Operations of 9 October 1943 were a considerable defensive victory for the units of I. Fighter Corps, achieved while suffering minor losses. The successes were achieved because of the superior armament of the German planes in their operations against the four-motored bombers. The successes were made possible because the enemy chose to attack during cloudless autumn weather without fighter protection, and also because the deep penetration into German territory gave the defenders a great deal of time to attack the bomber formations.
10. American Raid on Münster on 10 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 18)

Enemy Commitment

German radio intercepts beginning at 1215 hours discovered the assembly
of from 200 to 250 Fortresses in the area between Thames estuary and The Wash.
The American bomber units began their approach flight with fighter protection
at 1350 hours, flying at a 5,000 m altitude in almost cloudless weather
while maintaining an easterly course. At 1418 hours the bomber formations
crossed the Island Goeree and reached the Münster area via Wesel.
The fighter escort dropped off in the Bocholt - Wesel area and turned back.
The return flights of the enemy bomber units commenced beginning at 1505 hours
with a westerly course and in extended formation between Zwolle, Huysewegen,
Bergen, and the Hague. About 150 enemy fighters appeared over the Hague and
IJmuiden beginning at 1445 hours and picked up the returning bombers in the
Arnhem - Deventer area. The altitude of the enemy fighters was recorded at
from 9,000 m to 10,000 m.

Effect of the Raid:

In Münster/Fort-Rally: Number of Bombs dropped:

1,045 High Explosive Bombs
2,000 Stick-type Incendiary Bombs
9,000 Rubber and Naphtha Incendiary Bombs

Minor damage to industrial installations

Heavy damage to buildings, especially through fire:

245 Buildings destroyed
280 Buildings heavily damaged
2,600 Buildings lightly damaged
The following were heavily damaged: Main Railroad Station, 6 Ware Houses, 10 Department Stores, 4 Hospitals, and 4 Churches, including the Cathedral. Personal Damage: 343 Dead, 602 Wounded.

In Eonfeld:

Very heavy building damage

In Enshilde (Holland):

104 Buildings heavily damaged.

Commitments of the I. Fighter Corps:

Committed were: 173 Fighters

70 Twin-engined Fighters

103 Nightfighters

Total Commitment: 346 planes

All of the 

daytime fighter units gained contact with the enemy operating in cloudless weather. The Fighter Wing of the Ist Fighter Division engaged the enemy fighters in the air over Dutch territory. Because of this fact the day and night fighters of the 2d and 2d Fighter Divisions were able to repeatedly attack the unprotected enemy bomber swarms. In the Munster area these units gained a defensive success in that they thwarted several bomber elements in aiming their bomb drops.

Furthermore: 70 daytime fighters were committed by the Third Air Fleet. None of these made contact with the enemy.

Enemy Losses: 47 Boeing and

3 Thunderbolt definitely shot down,

22 Boeing probably shot down

Furthermore: 1 Bomber shot down by AA Artillery near Katwijk
Own Losses: 26 planes (8 Me 109, 9 FW 190, 4 Me 110 and 5 Me 410)

Personnel: 4 dead, 19 missing, 5 wounded.

Other Enemy Activity on 10 October 1943:

At 1200 hours approach flight of two Mosquitoes via Ringkøbing and Bornholm into the central Baltic Sea area. Continuation of this flight could not be plotted. The return flight commenced from the StolpMuende area at 1430 hours. It was suspected that the reconnaissance mission of these craft was to determine the raid effect on aircraft industrial targets in East Germany. The commitment of a fighter from Schwerin failed to achieve success.

At 1430 hours many air targets (Fighters?) appeared 120 km northwest of the Island Texel and drove into the Sea area/about 100 km north of Terschelling, from where they began the return flight at 1539 hours.

During the time between 1420 hours and 1520 hours 10 Typhoons flying at altitudes between 5,000 m and 8,000 m thrust into the Hertogenbusch area via the Island Goeree.
11.) American Raid on Schweinfurt on 14 October 1943
(See sketch German Air Defense Appendix 19 and Aerial Photo of Effect page 53)

**Enemy Commitment**

Radio DF reported the assembly of strong enemy bomber units in the area northeast of London at 1030 hours. Toward 1230 hours about 200 to 300 bombers in large formations launched the attack flight from the Sheerness - Harwich area heading in a southeasterly course. They crossed the Scheldt estuary and navigating a direct course headed into the Frankfurt - Wuerzburg area via Antwerp and Bruxelles. The main attack force hit the Ballbearing plant in Schweinfurt. Some bombs were dropped on Frankfurt/Main. About 200 enemy fighters accompanied the bomber units during the time between 1250 hours and 1410 hours up to the Aachen area. The return flights of the bombers began from the Schweinfurt area at 1445 hours first with a southwesterly course, later changed to a northwesterly one. The departure flight occurred between Berk s.M. and Dieppe, where the last bomber unit left the mainland at 1715 hours. An enemy four-motored bomber unit of from 30 to 40 Liberators hovered above the Northsea at 1445 hours, presumably to divert the German fighter defense away from the main attack wave.

Between 1510 hours and 1525 hours, 4 Mosquitoes Reconnaissance planes drove into the Saarbruecken area via Remagen.

**Raid Effect:**

- In Schweinfurt: Raid Duration: 1435 hours to 1446 hours.
Determined Bomb Quantities: 1,200 High Explosive Bombs
1,500 Liquid Incendiary Bombs

Material Damage:
100 Buildings Destroyed
150 Buildings Heavily Damaged

Personnel Losses:
180 Dead
220 Wounded
10,000 Homeless

Ballbearing production temporarily halted.
Heavy damage within the city limits and at the Main Railroad station.

Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps:
Committed were:

All daytime fighter units and all nightfighters adaptable to daytime operation of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Fighter Divisions. Cloudless weather facilitated the commitment of friendly forces.

Since the enemy fighters returned early, the bombers came under uninterrupted attack from German fighters and Twin-engined Fighters in the Frankfurt/Main - Schweinfurt - Metz area. The units of the German Air Defense gained a great defensive success on 14 October 1943.

Total Commitment: 367 planes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy Losses</th>
<th>Shot Down</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Fighter Division</td>
<td>24 Fortresses &amp; 16 Fortresses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 Thunderbolts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2d Fighter Division  25 Fortresses  8 Fortresses
3d Fighter Division  5 Fortresses  14 Fortresses
4th Fighter Division  20 Fortresses  5 Fortresses

74 Fortresses &  43 Fortresses
5 Thunderbolts

Particulars:  a.) Sergeant Monska of the II. Squadron, 27th Fighter wing shot down 5 planes.
           b.) An American Bomber attempted to escape into Switzerland via Stuttgart - Mammingen. After aerial combat it made an emergency landing near Mittenwald.

Own Losses:  27 planes
            Personnel:  6 Dead
                        9 Missing
                        11 Wounded

Weather:  Holland:  Fog, lifting toward afternoon
            Germany:  Clear

Special Remark:  In contradiction to the entries contained in the War Diary of the I. Fighter Corps, the following is excerpted from the 1st Daily Action Report of the Air Force Command Staff to the Armed Forces High Command, l.c Nr. 45/15.10.43 geh. of 15 October 1943:

Committed for Air Defense were:
From Commander Center (I. Fighter Corps and 7th Fighter Division):

382 Me 109
250 Me 110 (Twin-engined & Night Fighters)
149 FW 190
26 Me 410
21 Ju 88 (Nightfighter)
3 Me 210
2 Do 217 (Nightfighter)

Total: 833 planes

From Third Air Fleet:

15 FW 190
34 Me 109

Total: 49 planes

Enemy Losses:

Thru Air Defense forces of Air Force Command Center shot down:

121 enemy planes, 42 of which thru AA Artillery

Thru Fighters of the Third Air Fleet: 3 bombers

Own Losses: Air Force Command Center: 27 planes missing

14 planes destroyed
2 planes heavily damaged
13 planes lightly damaged

Third Air Fleet: 5 planes missing
Airial Photograph of the Effect of the Daytime Raid on Schweinfurt
on 17 October 1943

The airial photograph was copied from the U. S. Periodical
"Impact".
12. Allied Fighter Assaults in the Dutch Coastal Region

on 13 and 15 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 20)

Enemy Commitment:

On 13 October 1943

At 1440 hours approximately 100 km west of the Scheldt estuary
60 to 100 enemy fighters appeared flying in 3 to 4 units. Of these
20 - 30 fighters thrust into the Rotterdam area and
40 - 60 fighters thrust into the Gent - Antwerp area.
The return flights were conducted via the Scheldt estuary and
were concluded at 1545 hours.

Operating altitudes were: 5,000 m to 8,000 m.

Recognized aircraft types: Mitchell, Lightning, Spitfire, and
Thunderbolt.

On 15 October 1943

Three enemy fighter units with a total of about 200 planes
appeared beginning at 1510 hours 140 km west of Hoek van Holland.

Thrusts were made as follows:

1st unit into the Rotterdam area
2d unit into the Bocholt - Deventer area
3d unit into the area south of Hoek van Holland

Flying a westerly course they headed out to sea with the last elements
leaving at 1637 hours.

Operating altitudes: 5,000 m to 10,300 m.
Commitments of the I. Fighter Corps:

The Headquarters of I. Fighter Corps suspected that bomber units would follow the enemy fighters or that the enemy fighters intended to carry out low-level attacks on occupied airfields within German territory. Therefore on both days daytime fighter units were committed. Since the enemy units turned back at an early moment and failed to indicate any attack intentions the committed/units could be given orders to land in due time.

Committed were:

On 15 October 1943: 24 Fighter Division with
51 fighters and
42 twin-engined fighters from the airfields:
Husum, Marz, Oldenburg, Helgoland, Wunstorf, Lippspringe, and Hespe.

34 Fighter Division with
77 fighters from the airfields: Schiphol, Deelen, Boeninghardt, Elde, and Rheine.

Total Commitment: 170 planes

On 16 October 1943: 24 Fighter Division with
70 Fighters from the airfields: Husum, Marz, Oldenburg, and Helgoland.

Enemy Losses: Were not determined.

Own Losses: None

Weather: On 15 October: Clear
On 16 October: 2/10 to 3/10 overcast at 1,500 m.
13.) **American Large-scale Penetration into Belgium and Luxembourg on 18 October 1943**

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 21)

**Enemy Commitment:**

German radio reconnaissance indicated the assembly of American Attack units in the Norwich area beginning at 1143 hours. At 1250 hours 60 to 100 Liberators took off from the British Isles for the assault flight without fighter protection and navigating a northeasterly course. They penetrated to about 150 km northwest of Island Borkum. Here they turned to a southwesterly course as elements flew over the Islands Vlieland and Texel. The unit turned and with a westerly course headed back to Great Britain. The last position report was at 1443 hours as 100 km west of Texel. It could not be clarified whether the Liberator formation was conducting a diversionary maneuver in the Northsea area or whether it was called back to its bases due to the advent of unfavorable weather.

At 1342 the points of strong American bomber units (300 - 400 Boeing-Fortresses) were plotted 40 km west of Boulogne and crossed the Channel coast between Boulogne and the mouth of the Soone flying an easterly course. At 1455 the attack formations circled in the area over St. Vith, Luxembourg. Here the situation could not be clearly perceived since the enemy operated above the clouds. The bomber units departed via the Scheldt estuary. Headquarters of I. Fighter Corps had the impression that the attack flight did not go according to the plans of the American command or that it was called off due to weather conditions. No bomb drops were reported.
Three enemy fighter units, presumably escort fighters, coming from the direction of the Schedlt estuary were spotted in the Aachen - Luettich area at 1500 hours, where they turned and headed back.

Furthermore determined were:

Coastal approach flights of individual planes in the Texel - Den Helder area during the period from 0600 hours and 0835 hours.

The thrust of 7 Typhoons into the Tilburg area via the Island Walcheren from 1035 hours to 1120 hours. Return flights were via the Island Schouwen and the Hague. Strafing attacks damaged a minesweeper.

The penetration flight of two units consisting of a total of 50 planes operating at an altitude of 5,000 m via the Island Schouwen into the Venlo area from 1440 hours to 1530 hours. Return flight via the Island Goeree.

The thrust of 40 Lightning fighters via the Island Walcheren up to the Breda area between 1520 hours and 1550 hours. Return flight via the Island Goeree.

The fighter assault of 40 Typhoons in the area of Schouwen Island from 1650 hours to 1655 hours.

**Commitments of the 1. Fighter Corps**

Committed were: **1. and 2. Fighter Divisions** with 141 fighters and twin-engined fighters against the bomber approaches from France. Since the American formations turned back before reaching the German border the German fighter units were called back to their bases before any became involved in combat.
I. Fighter Division with 122 fighters against the Liberator unit. Only a few of the fighters had enemy contact above the Friesian Islands.

**Total Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps:** 263 Fighters and Twin-engined fighters

**Total Commitment of the Third Air Fleet** and the 7. Fighter Division: 244 Fighters

**Enemy Losses:**
- 1 Liberator and
- 1 Spitfire shot down

**Furthermore:** 1 plane shot down by AA Artillery near Texel

**Own Losses:** 9 planes

**Weather:** German Bight: Light overcast to fair.
Northern France, Belgium and Northwestern Germany including the Frankfurt basin: 8/10 to 10/10 overcast; minimum limit 1,000 m to 3,000 m, above that further layers; above 5,000 m clear.
14.) American Large-scale Penetration of the Frankfurt/Main Area on 20-October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 22)

**Enemy Commitment**

The assembly of American bomber units over British air bases was recognized at 1130 hours. German radar equipment registered the first departing flights of bombers from northwest and northeast of London beginning at 1211 hours. Among the formations were also some American training flights. Not until 1316 hour however were 100 to 200 Fortresses reported in the Lille area heading southeastward. The same report indicated the enemy fighters were returning to home bases from the area around Lille. The air situation remained unclear due to the poorly organized enemy approach flight. Some of the enemy bomber formations continued with fighter escort into the area west of Frankfurt/Main, and then headed northward into the Cologne area. Their return flight was picked up over the Scheldt estuary at 1500 hours. Bombs were dropped on Troisdorf, presumably released through openings between clouds.

**Furthermore determined were:**

The reconnaissance flight of 2 planes (presumably weather ships) during the period from 0840 hours to 0925 hours. Approach via Etaples, St. Vith, Wiesbaden into the Marburg area. Return flight via Siegen, Cologne, Welcheren Island.

Coastal flights by a total of 9 Spitfires in the Helder - Hague area during the period from 0940 hours to 1330 1350 hours.
A bomber unit of 60 Fortresses, which had to return prematurely, presumably due to bad weather.
Approach flight with fighter protection at 1400 hours via the Scheldt estuary into the Eindhoven area. Return flight via the same route. Flew over the coast at 1500 hours.

A fighter unit consisting of 55 Lightnings, presumably to pick up returning bombers.
Approach flight at 1415 hours via the Scheldt estuary into the Gilze-Rijen area. Return flight via the same route until 1500 hours.

A thrust of 20 Typhoons at altitudes from 1,500 m. to 3,000 m., with bomb drops in the Woensdrecht area.
Approach flight via the eastern Scheldt at 1550 hours.
Return flight via the Hague until 1610 hours.

**Effects of the attacks**

**In Troisdorf (northeast of Bonn):** 32 HE bombs on the Dynamite Co. with considerable property damage and minor production losses.
Personnel losses:
10 dead and
50 wounded
207 HE bombs on the dummy installations at Troisdorf

**In Dueren:**
20 Incendiary bombs without damage
Commitment of the 1st Fighter Corps

Committed were: 1st Fighter Division with 20 fighters
2d Fighter Division with 119 fighters & twin-engined fighters
3d Fighter Division with 82 Fighters

Total Commitment: 221 planes

Due to poor visibility only the units of the 3d Fighter Division engaged in combat.

Furthermore Committed were:

From the 7th Fighter Division: 91 fighters and twin-engined fighters without enemy contact
From the 3d Air Force: 143 fighters.

Enemy Losses:
Claims of the fighter units:
3 four-motored bombers and 1 Spitfire shot down near Ostende
1 Mosquito crashed in East Friesland

Claims of the Air Defense Command

Holland:
5 crashed four-motored bombers discovered.
1 bomber shot down by AA Artillery

Furthermore determined:
By the Radio Intercept Service:
1533 hours 2 American bombers in distress over the sea above the northern channel
10 planes lost with certainty
Own Losses: 3 planes
Personnel: 1 killed, 2 missing, and 2 wounded.

7th Fighting Division: 2 planes (FW 190)

Weather: In the Belgian-French frontier area: Cloudy to fair
Clouds at 800 m, visibility 10 to 20 km.
In the Meuse area: Closed in up to 6,000 m
In the Rhine area: Rain, visibility below the cloud formations 4 to 6 km
In the Frankfurt basin: Clouds down to 3,000 m
8/10 to 9/10 overcast, humid, visibility 2 to 5 km
In the Schaft area: 3/10 to 6/10 overcast
Chapter 4

EVENTS BY NIGHT DURING OCTOBER 1943

1.) General
   a.) British Raid activities

The British Bomber Command continued the night time bombing offensive with increasing force during the month of October 1943. Despite oftentimes unfavorable weather conditions the British bomber groups conducted nine super raids on cities within German Reich Territory. A real offensive trend, especially one calculated to be co-ordinated with the American air operations to maintain and extend the effects of the day time raids on German aircraft industrial plants, could not be recognized. The British large-scale raids occurred only during dark and moonless nights. Furthermore, six nightly nuisance raids with Mosquitoes were conducted against German cities, and one against the Reich capital. Units of the British Coastal Command flew several missions to mine German coastal waters. The attack activity of the Air Force over and above the night time large-scale missions were comparatively light during October 1943.

b.) British Offensive Tactics

The bomber stream tactics were further improved during this period. The British bomber stream was usually tightly formed during the
approach flight. Since thus the length and width of the stream were reduced the raiding time over the target area was also shortened. The time period of the bomb drops amounted to only from 15 to 20 minutes. By this means and also through changing the flying altitudes of the it was presumed that bombers while over the targets during the raids/efforts were made to minimize the effectiveness of the German Objective night fighter tactic. The following diversionary and screening maneuvers were employed, some with success.

Secondary Mosquito attacks, which occasionally developed out of the main bomber stream.

Secondary attacks by weak four-motored units, which dropped out of the main bomber stream.

Setting of dummy flares (raid marking devices) over targets not attacked.

Repeated changes in course of the bomber stream on the approach route.

Approach of the bomber stream, at times by way of roundabout detours.

To reign the start of a major raid some bombs were dropped on dummy targets. Return flights of some elements from the area of the dummy targets. Persistence of major elements in the general area of the dummy target and ultimately their sudden continued flight to the actual attack targets.

British long-range night fighters escorted the bomber stream to the attack target. They interfered considerably with the take-offs and landings of German night fighters, especially when operating from illuminated airfields. Furthermore they often prevented German in-
instrument target approaches, after the German nightfighters had picked up their bomber targets on their instruments.

c.) **British Radio/Radar Interference**

The large-scale dropping of tinfoil strips by the British bombers during the approach and return flights almost completely neutralized the functioning of the German ground and on board radar instruments (Li BO). The German UHF ground to air radio communication traffic was successfully interfered with for the first time during the night from 8 to 9 October. The enemy jammed the German night fighter frequencies and among other things issued orders in the German language. These, however, could be recognized due to poor pronunciation and foreign accents.

d.) **Own Commitments**

The assembly of British bombers for major missions over the British Isles could almost always be discovered at an early moment. Through British radar interference the penetrations in the air situation were frequently unclear. Only by means of timely commitment of observation planes could the I. Fighter Corps get a true picture in due time as to approach route and attack target.

The commitment of the night fighter units of the I. Fighter Corps during October 1943 suffered primarily from unfavorable weather conditions. The enemy repeatedly took advantage of reversed weather conditions in Great Britain for his night attacks. During such nights the Reich territory was mostly closed in by fog and consequently take-off and landing requirements were limited.
The commitment of night fighters in the restricted night pursuit (Himmelbett method) was utilized therefore by necessity due to weather conditions, since the night fighter craft could only operate a limited distance away from their bases. The successes achieved while utilizing the Himmelbett method were very minor. The reason therefore are:

Enemy interference with ground and on board radar equipment and with radio communications traffic.

Interference by enemy long-range night fighters

Young and inexperienced German crews who were unable to operate while on their radio controlled missions while the enemy interfered with their equipment. /Radio keying traffic.

Since the enemy return flights after the bomb drops and after the Bomber Stream was dissolved generally occurred in an open and extended formation, there were always good possibilities of success for the restricted night fighter tactics of the Himmelbett method.

Since the on board radar set SN 2, which to that time had not been successfully interfered with, was only available in limited numbers for night fighter units, the successful utilization of the night fighter pursuit tactic (Zahme Sau - Tame Sow) on a large scale was not possible.

The mass of the German night fighters were committed in objective fighter tactics. Here the British screening and deceptive maneuvers and the interference caused in radio traffic had a disadventageous effect. Search light activity suffered due to weather conditions and limited target spotting over the attack target areas. Frequently British bombers opened fire on the attacking German night fighters first from their rear gunnery positions. Presumably the bombers were equipped with on board warning equipment.
As a whole the night fighter units of the I. Fighter Corps in October 1943 were not able to successfully combat the British night attacks on German territory. The radar war, insufficient equipment of on board radar devices that could not be interfered with, and make weather conditions all contributed to the night fighter commitment in the German Air Defense critical.

e.) Successes and losses in the month of October 1943.

Average
Number of the planes ready for commitment within the zone of the I. Fighter Corps: 260 twin-engined fighters

Total commitment in the zone of I. Fighter Corps: 1,667 twin and single engined fighters

of which 100 night fighters for defense against Mosquito attacks.

Losses in the zone of I. Fighter Corps: 61 planes or 4% of the committed planes

Of these shot down by enemy long-range night fighters:

8 planes

Shot down by German AA Artillery

4 planes

Crashed due to ice

2 planes

Successes in the zone of I. Fighter Corps:

(Not including AA Artillery) 132 British Bombers shot down

From the total estimated British bomber commitment in October 1943 of approximately 3,800 planes, the Bomber Command suffered about 3.5% losses against twin-engined fighters over Reich territory.
German losses in experienced Wing and Squadron commanders was comparatively high. This fact can be gleaned from the following message from 17 October 1943:

"From the Commanding General of Night Fighters to the U-In-U of the Luftwaffe, Air Forces Personnel Office.

Heavy losses in Wing and Squadron Commanders during night fighter operations in the course of most recent commitments make special measures necessary. Night fighter units will be unable to replace these losses with qualified commanders from within if further losses occur.

It is requested that about 10 night-combat experienced bomber wing or squadron commanders be transferred from bomber units to night fighter units immediately, in an effort to maintain the night fighter force for total commitment before it is too late."

f.) **Particulars**

The bomber stream tactics and the British radio/radar interference operations created such difficulties that the Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps made urgent requests to the Chief of the Air Force Signal Communication Branch (General Martini) and to the Commanding General of Night Fighters (General Kammhuber). They concerned the following:

- Radar Equipment (Ground and on board)
- Radar personnel
- Radio Intercept Service
- Altering of Fighter Command Posts

Appropriate conference notes are to be found in the KTB of the I Fighter Corps of 20, 27, and 28 October 1943. They have been included in Study 9 - 11, German Air Defense, Volume "General"
On 22, 23, and 24 October 1943 the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe 
inspected the night fighter units of the 3d Fighter Division on the 
Declen Airfield in Holland.
Troop Visit by the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe on
22 October 1943
2. Events by Night during the period from 1 to 24 October 1943
   (Not including British Super Raids)

   (See Sketch German Air Defense
    appendix 23)

   During these nights, which due to unfavorable weather conditions,
   appeared to be unsuitable for large scale raids to the British Bomber
   Command, weak Mosquito units conducted nuisance attacks. Four such
   attacks were aimed on targets in the Ruhr area. One nuisance raid was
   directed against Berlin. The number of planes committed to such opera-
   tions ranged between 10 and 30 aircraft. Other than a disquieting effect
   on the civil population these nuisance raids were of little value.
   The bombs frequently fell on open terrain or on dummy installations.

   Of the British courier service to Sweden and return a total of
   18 planes could be spotted. The grand total of the British Courier
   planes was presumably greater.

   During the night from 11 to 12 October 1943 it was presumed
   that three British planes were either dropping agents or resupplying
   agents in the Jutland area.

   During the night from 13 to 14 October 1943, between 1950 hours and
   2005 hours, about 10 nuisance raiders dropped several HE bombs in the
   Cologne -- Neuss area causing minor building damage.

   During the night from 15 to 16 October 1943, three British planes,
   flying at low level, circled over western Poland. Here too it was pre-
   sumed that their mission was the dropping or resupplying of agents.
During the night from 14 to 15 October penetration flights and return flights were spotted over Juetland and the Baltic Sea. It is also possible that these craft came from the east (Russian planes?).

The waters off the Western Frisian Islands were mined by about 30 British planes.

Only a few, single enemy craft appeared before the Dutch coast, over Juetland, and from the Italian bases over the Klagenfurt -- Linz -- Tabpr area.

**Total Enemy Commitment:** 70 planes and about 100 Mosquitoes

**Commitment of the I Fighter Corps**

Using the HimmeHeft method committed were:

1. **Fighter Division** against the Agent Supply craft in Poland -- 12 twin-engined fighters

2. **Fighter Division** against the Agent Supply craft in Juetland and against the courier craft to Sweden -- 18 twin-engined fighters

3. **Fighter Division** against Mosquito nuisance attacks against the Ruhr area -- 4 twin-engined fighters

**TOTAL COMMITMENT:** 34 planes

In addition from the 30. Fighter Division (Fighter Wing 300) in objective pursuit over Berlin ---- 3 single engine fighters

**Enemy Losses** were not determined

**Own Losses:** 1 Me 109
3. Events during the period from 24 October to 1 November 1943
   (Not including British Large-scale raids)
   (See sketch German Air Defense appendix 24)

Enemy Commitment
The Luftwaffe conducted:

During the night from 24 to 25 October 1943 a Mosquito nuisance raid
respectively, on Essen and Diisseldorf with a total of 50 planes as well as a low-level
attack with from 40 to 50 planes against a convoy of ships in the German
Bight. Both of the nuisance raids caused only minor structural damage.

During the night from 25 to 26 October 1943 mining operations in the
Kattegat with about 30 planes.

Mining operations in the Scheldt estuary with two aircraft.

Nuisance flights into the northern Dutch area with 13 planes.

Courier flights to and from Sweden with 9 planes.

Total Commitment: 154 planes and 30 Mosquitoes

Commitments of the I. Fighter Force

Committed were:

1. Fighter Division against the British mining craft in preventive take-
offs for objective pursuit: 38 twin-engined fighters

2. Fighter Division utilizing the Himmelbett method against the mining
operations in the Kattegat: 16 twin-engined fighters

3. Fighter Division against the Mosquito attacks in the Ruhr area:

   8 twin-engined fighters

Total Commitment: 62 planes
The mine-laying aircraft, which had penetrated above the Northsea at low level, could not be clearly spotted by the radar installations on Jutland. When the mining operations in the Kattegat were recognized, the nightfighters which had been launched in preventive take-offs for objective pursuit operations in the zone of the 1. Fighter Division were ordered back to their bases.

Enemy Losses: Were not determined.

Own Losses: 1 plane.
4.) British Raid on Dortmund and Hagen on 1 to 2 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 25)

**Enemy Deployment:**

Several hundred British Four-motorized bombers flew over the Zuidersee at 2050 hours with an easterly course in a tightly formed bomber stream, and after crossing the German frontier turned and headed for the Ruhr area. After scattering their bomb loads over the Dortmund -- Hagen area the attackers departed in extended formation leaving German territory via the Scheldt estuary.

During the period from 2206 hours to 2307 hours two British planes circled over the Zwolle area and The Hague.

At around midnight two courier craft (Sweden) flew across the Skagerrak.

**Commitment of the 1. Fighter Group**

Due to unfavorable weather only elements of the 1. Fighter Division were committed:

- In Himmelbett method: 9 twin-engined fighters
- In objective pursuit: 10 twin-engined fighters

**Total Commitments:** 19 planes

Poor visibility at high altitudes prevented enemy contact.

**Enemy Losses** were not determined.

**Own Losses:** 1 plane due to damaged engine

**Weather:** In the attack area 10/10 overcast from 400 m to 1,800 m.

The take-off airfields were very hazy and partly fogged in, some were not operational.
5.) **British Attack on Munich on 2 to 3 October 1943**

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 26)

**Enemy Disposition**

At 0036 hours the points of a bomber flight consisting of several hundred planes was reported over the Scheldt estuary. The bomber stream moved in a southeasterly direction in the Mannheim -- Karlsruhe -- Stuttgart area. Here the enemy feigned the start of a large-scale raid by dropping flares and single bombs. Actually the mass of the enemy bombers reassembled in the alpine foothills south of Munich. From this concentration they conducted a locally concentrated raid on Munich of relatively short duration. Isolated bombs fell on Sigmaringen, Ueberlingen, and Freising near Munich. Shortly before reaching and while over the main attack target the British bombers changed their flying altitudes considerably, probably in an effort to thwart the German nightfighters. The enemy bombers departed in very extended formation with a northwesterly course until 0328 hours. At that time the last bomber cleared the Dutch coast. The approach flight of the bomber stream was escorted by British long-range nightfighters. Furthermore, long-range nightfighters operated in pursuit over illuminated German airfields.

During the period from 1953 hours to 0035 hours about 70 British planes mined the western portions of the Baltic Sea.

During the period from 2112 hours to 2244 hours a Mosquito nuisance raid conducted by about 10 planes hit the city of Remscheid.

Between 2219 hours and 0138 hours 4 to 5 single flying British planes penetrated to Eindhoven, Giessen, Mainz, and Mannheim.
Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps

Committed were:

Against the bomber penetration to Munich:

1. Fighter Division in night pursuit operations: 9 twin-engined fighters
   The nightfighters joined the bomber stream in southern Holland
2. and elements of 1. Fighter Divisions
   in objective pursuit
   The night fighters assembled in the area between
   Munich and Augsburg.

Against the British mining undertakings in the western Baltic Sea:

2. Fighter Division with Himmelbett method: 66 twin-engined fighters
3. Fighter Division with Himmelbett method: 4 twin-engined fighters

TOTAL COMMITMENT: 193 planes

Due to poor light conditions the German night fighters did not gain a considerable defensive victory. Strong winds at high altitudes created difficulties in the assembly.

Enemy Losses: 3 bombers shot down.

Own Losses: 1 Me 110 missing
   1 Me 110 ran out of fuel and crashed
   1 Do 217 shot down by own AA Artillery

Particulars: During the night from 3 to 4 October Captain Sigmund was killed in action. He was the acting commander of the III. Squadron, 3rd Night Fighter wing, and had 26 victories at night and 2 during daytime to his credit.

Weather: In the German Bight and Jutland: 5/10 to 10/10 overcast at around 1,000 m.
   In East-Jutland and the bordering sea area: Ice formed in rain clouds.
   Visibility: 5 to 10 km.
   In southern Germany: Cloudless, considerable mist, ground visibility 2 to 6 km, fog setting in beginning at mid-night.

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 27)

Enemy Disposition.

A British bomber stream composed of several hundred planes crossed over
the Dutch coast west of the Zuidersee beginning at 2023 hours with an easterly
course. In the Hannover area the bombers turned southward and headed to-
ward Kassel. This change in course around Hannover was not recognized by
our spotters, inasmuch as weak enemy forces, most likely Mosquitoes, drove
deep into the Hannover — Braunschweig area and dropped flares to feign the
beginning of a large-scale raid. The attack on Kassel and some isolated bomb
drops on Paderborn was carried out in four waves. The bombers departed in
a very extended formation flying a westerly course. The last elements were
reported above the Scheldt estuary at 0141 hours.

About 15 Mosquitoes penetrated via Holland at 2108 hours conducted a
nuisance raid on Giessen in an effort to divert attention from the main
attack target of Kassel.

At 0116 hours six British Bombers carried out mine laying operation before
Den Helder.

Five single-flying enemy planes circled over Duisburg and Traben-Trarbach
between 2102 hours and 0440 hours.
Commitment of the 1. Fighter Corps

Commuted were:

1. Fighter Division in the Himmelbett method: 56 twin-engined fighters

Elements of the 1., 2., and 3. Fighter Divisions in objective night pursuit 138 twin-engined fighters

Total Commitment: 194 planes

The night-fighters assembled in the Hannover - Braunschweig area for the objective pursuit. The own aerial observer planes reported the British flares over Kassel at an early time. Thus elements of the night-fighter forces could be diverted from the Hannover-Braunschweig area to intervene in the air over Kassel. Nevertheless the British diversionary maneuver proved to be much of a success. The commitment of forces in the Himmelbett method failed to achieve success due to severe enemy interference with the own radar equipment.

**Enemy Losses:** 16 bombers shot down in the Kassel area

**Own Losses:** 9 planes, including 3 shot down by British long-range night-fighters,
1 shot down by own AA Artillery, and
1 lost in a collision with a British bomber,

**Weather:** In the attack area: Cirrus overcast and light mist up to 6,200 m, no moonlight.
7. British Raid on Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Worms on 8/5

October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 28)

Enemy Commitment:

Several hundred bombers left their bases on the British Isles and flying a straight southeasterly course headed for the central Rhine area and returned home after dropping bombs on Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, and Worms. Some bombs were also dropped on Frankfurt/Main, Offenbach, and Saarlautern. The pints of the bomber stream appeared above the western Scheldt at 1939 hours. The last bomber left Holland at 0101 hours.

Further enemy activity was limited to the following penetrations:
1 plane into the Bocholt area at 2025 hours
4 planes around the Hague at 2039 hours
1 plane around Utrecht from 0036 hours until 0206 hours
2 Swedish couriers through the Skagerrak from 2027 hours until 2339 hours.

Commitment of the 1st Fighter Corps:

Unfavorable weather in Northern Germany permitted only the commitment of elements of the 1st Fighter Division in the Himmelbett method:

Enemy Losses: 5 bombers shot down. Own Losses: None

Weather: In Holland and northern Germany 10/10 overcast from 800 m.

In the attack area mostly fair, misty up to 2,000 m.
8. British raid on Stuttgart, Freiburg, Friedrichshafen, and Munich on 7/8 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 29)

Enemy Commitment

Inconclusive reports led to the suspected conclusion that the points of a British bomber stream were above northern France at 2150 hours heading in a southeasterly direction. About 3,400 bombers reached the southwestern corner of Germany where they carried out bombing raids on Stuttgart, Strasbourg, Freiburg, Friedrichshafen, and Munich. The attackers flew in very extended formation back to Great Britain via Holland and northern France. Rear elements crossed the coast at 0325 hours. The main effort of the British attacks lay in the Stuttgart area.

The RAF further conducted:

A Mosquito nuisance raid on Emden with about 20 planes from 1940 hours to 2143 hours.

A mining undertaking with 6 planes in the waters before Ter- schelling from 1946 hours to 2014 hours.

A nuisance raid on Aachen with 5 Mosquitoes from 1955 hours to 2335 hours.

A mining undertaking in the Kattegat and in the waters around Skagen with about 40 planes from 2244 hours to 2329 hours.

A mining undertaking in the Bay of Helgoland with 10 planes from 2346 hours to 2353 hours.
Flights over the Skagerrak of 5 Sweden Couriers from 2017 hours to 0400 hours. Of these 2 planes to Sweden and 3 planes from Sweden.

Effect of the Raids:
On a total of 19 localities the following bombs were dropped:
22 mine bombs
24.8 high explosive bombs
11,813 incendiary bombs

Of these dropped on Stutthart were: 11 mine bombs
154 high explosive bombs
10,000 stick incendiary bombs
550 phosphorus incendiary bombs

Personnel Losses: Total 97 dead, of which 72 dead in Stuttgart
242 wounded of which 198 wounded in Stuttgart
7,000 Homeless of which 5,000 homeless in Stuttgart

In Stuttgart there was no serious damage to industrial installations.
210 Houses were destroyed and
1,882 Houses were damaged

In Friedrichshafen: In the aircraft plants (airship construction dirigible)
20 planes under construction were heavily damaged
50% of the assembly lines were destroyed
Furthermore 12 houses were destroyed and 115 houses were damaged.
In Munich, Freiburg/Breisach, Ludwigsburg, and Emden: Minor Structure
damage.
In the counties Ludwigsburg, Böblingen, Emmendingen, Esslingen, and
Sigmaringen: 20 Barns burnt down.

Commitment of the 1. Fighter Corps

Foggy weather conditions limited operations.

Committed were:

In defense against the major penetration:
1. Fighter Division in Himmelbett method: 12 twin-engined fighters

Against the mining operations in the Kattegat
2. Fighter Division in Himmelbett method: 28 twin-engined fighters

Total commitment: 40 planes

Enemy losses: 2 Short Stirlings and 1 Wellington shot down

Own losses: 3 planes, of which 1 Ju 88 was shot down
1 Ju 88 crashed after take-off
1 Me 110 crashed due to motor trouble

Weather: In the North Sea coastal area generally fair with from 3/10
to 4/10 overcast at around 1,000 m.

In Jutland fair to bright, average 0/10 to 3/10 overcast
in 500 to 1,000 m altitudes.

In North Germany partly fair and partly cloudy with some
flat cloud layers between 300 m and 2,000 m. In South
Germany from 2200 hours fog which precluded operations.
9. British Raid on Hannover on 5/9 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 30)


either Commitment

A British bomber stream composed of approximately 400 planes, escorted by
numerous long-range night-fighters, was located with its forward elements near
Bremen at 2331 hours and initially steered an easterly course up to and into
the Bremen area. A Mosquito unit dropped out of the Bomber Stream and drove to
Berlin where it conducted a diversionary raid. While some four-motored bomber
elements attacked Bremen, the mass of the bombers headed southeastward and bombed
Hannover. The rear elements of the bombers which headed home steering a westerly
course were reported over the Scheldt estuary at 0321 hours.

Furthermore important were:
Penetration of 5 planes into the Nymwegen area from 1955 hours to 0100 hours.
1 Swedish Courrier flew over the Skagerrak at 2029 hours.
3 British long-range night-fighters in the Soesterberg-Zindhoven-Zwolle area
from 2325 hours to 0010 hours.
A penetration into the Aachen area between 0021 hours and 0124 hours with bomb
drops on Dueren.

Attack effect:
In Hannover, heavy damage in the center of the city through area conflagration.
16 industrial plants damaged, among them the automobile plant
Hanomag was heavily damaged.
In the area around Hannover: Isolated bomb drops on 15 villages and on 2 dummy
installations. In general medium damage.
In Bremen: Quantity of bombs dropped: 122 high explosive bombs
3,300 stick incendiary bombs
170 phosphorus incendiary bombs
30 liquid incendiary bombs

Material Damage:
103 buildings destroyed
1,399 buildings damaged

Personnel Losses:
18 dead
15 wounded

In Berlin: 1 High Explosive bomb fell on the suckshock Falkensee suburb, while the
mass of the bombs fell on open terrain in the Katzin area.

Commitment of the 1. Fighter Corps

Committed were:
1. Fighter Division against the departing bomber formations
   in the Himmelbett method: 38 twin-engined fighters

Elements of the 1., 2., and 3. Fighter Divisions in objective night
pursuit initially over Bremen and later over Hannover:
   160 twin-engined fighters

From the 30. Fighter Division (Fighter Heng 300) in objective night pursuit:
   52 single engine fighters

Total Commitment: 250 planes

The Himmelbett operations of the 1. Fighter Division had to be discontinued
due to heavy British long-range night-fighter activity in Holland.

The objective night pursuit operations were hampered by initial interference
with the UHF radio traffic and also through poor visibility at high altitudes.
Nevertheless their commitment of night fighters in the Hannover and Bremen areas
were successful.
Enemy losses: 31 bombers shot down

Own losses: 2 planes, of which 1 Ju 88 was shot down,
1 Me 110 shot down by own AA artillery
Furthermore 1 Me 110 made force landing having sustained a hit from a long-range night-fighter,
3 single engine planes of the 30. Fighter Division.

Weather: Isolated loose cloud fields at around 1,000 m, otherwise fair and cloudless. Generally hazy, especially between 800 m and 1,500 m.
Ground visibility 5 km to 10 km, in some instances only 1 km to 3 km.
10. British Raid on Hannover on 18/19 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 31)

Enemy Commitment

The approach of 300 British bombers was discovered as the points of the formations were about 100 km west of the Island Texel at 1826 hours. The bomber stream crossed the Dutch coast between the Island Ameland and Amsterdam and continued on in an easterly course between Osnabrueck and Eremen into the Hannover area. While the four-motored bombers attacked Hannover, small Mosquito elements conducted a diversionary raid on Berlin in an effort to divert the German night-fighters from the main attack target. The return flights began out of the Hannover at 2025 hours and were carried out in extended formation between Borkum and Rotterdam. The last report of departure was at 2217 hours.

In addition the British Air Force conducted:

4 Sweden courier flights via the Skagerrak from 1905 hours to 2145 hours.

Nuisance flights with 10 Mosquitoes into the Cologne-Bonn-Aachen area with penetration occurring between Dunkirk and Somme estuary beginning at 1936 hours. Departed via the Scheldt estuary by 2110 hours.

Nuisance flight with 3 Mosquitoes into the Metz-Luxemburg area between 2004 hours and 2300 hours.

A nuisance raid with about 10 Mosquitoes on Duistburg, penetration effected via the Scheldt estuary beginning at 1945 hours.

Nuisance flight of what was presumed to be a long-range night-fighter over Eindhoven and Gilze-Rijen between 0005 hours and 0354 hours.

Coastal flights with 2 planes in the Den Helder-Enkhuizen area from 2055 hours to 2310 hours.
Nuisance flights with 3 planes via the Island Langeoog into the Wilhelms-
haven area with bomb drops on open terrain during the period from 2145 hours
to 2315 hours. Return flight via Groningen.

A flight to resupply agents with 1 plane.
Approach at 2110 hours via Ringkøbing, southeast of Viburg with easterly
course via Swedish territory. Penetrated German territory again at 2345 hours
southeast of Stolp. Continued flight via Pr. Stargard and Deutsch Eylau into
the Schroetersburg area.
Return flight via Thorn, Konitz, Rügenwalde until 0255 hours.
Approach and return flights at 3,000 m altitudes.
Altitude in the Schroetersburg area: 200 m

ATTACK EFFECT
In Hannover: Time of the attack: 2010 hours to 2050 hours.
Bomb quantities dropped: 100 mine bombs
1,500 High Explosive bombs
12,000 stick incendiary bombs
11,000 Phosphorus incendiary bombs
Material Damage:
212 Buildings destroyed
306 Buildings heavily damaged
258 Buildings lightly damaged
Personnel Losses:
29 Dead
153 wounded
12,000 homeless
Minor damage to industrial installations and transportation fa-
cilities.
Heavy building damage in the outlying districts of the city.
In the Berlin Area: 15 High Explosive bombs dropped on 3 localities and 2 dummy installations. No damage.

In the Hanover area: 36 High Explosive and 120 incendiary bombs dropped on 16 localities. In Duesseldorf steel production in the August Thyssen hut was disrupted considerably.

Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps

Committed were:

In Objective Night Pursuit over Hannover:

1. Fighter Division with 67 Me 110 and 24 Ju 88
2. Fighter Division with 22 Me 110 and 20 Ju 88 and 1 Do 217
3. Fighter Division with 17 Me 110 and 5 Ju 88

In Himmelbett method over Holland:

3. Fighter Division with 29 Me 110 and 7 Ju 88

Total Commitment: 192 planes

Furthermore of the II. Fighter Division:

In Objective Night Pursuit: 64 single engine fighters

Sever haze and the lacking search light spotting reduced the effectiveness of the objective night pursuit operations.

Enemy Losses: Shot down by twin-engined fighters:

In the Hannover Area: 7 Lancasters
3 Halifax
1 four-motored bomber

In the Mienburg/Mesen area: 1 Lancaster

In Himmelbett near Zwolle: 1 four-motored bomber

In the Solingen area:

Total area: 3 four-motored bomber
14 bombers
In addition by AA Artillery: 1 bomber

Own Losses: 1 Me 110 lost when motor burnt out
1 DO 217 crashed when the motors went out
2 planes of the single engine fighters: Completely unserviceable
No personnel losses.

Weather: Breaking overcast between 3,000 m and 5,000 m. Flight visibility limited by haze. In the Skagerrak: Several cloud layers with rain, minimum limits 150 m.
II. British raid on Central Germany on 20/21 October 1942

(See sketch German Air Defense appendix 32)

**Enemy Commitment**

The points of a British bomber stream in strength of about 300 planes stood about 150 km west of the Island Texel at 1822 hours. The bomber units navigated an easterly course in a relatively broad formation initially into the Bremen-Hannover area where they remained for some time. Continuing the flight from there the bomber formations spread extensively heading in an easterly and southeasterly direction until they reached the following line: Western outskirts of Berlin - Frankfurt/Oder-Kottbus-Leipzig-Coburg. It was assumed that the enemy attack had been completely disintergrated due to the weather. Bomb drops were executed but were widely dispersed throughout the central German industrial area, hitting among other targets Halle, Leipzig, Weissenfels, Dessau, Standal, Bremen, and Emden. The returning British bombers also operated in a very widespread area which was bordered in the north by the general line Hamburg-Nesermünde-Borkum, and in the south by the general line Coburg - Scheldt estuary. Return flights were completed along the Dutch coastal area at 0015 hours.

A British bomber unit, which was reported about 60 km northwest of the Island Vlieland at 2012 hours, turned around before it reached the coast and headed home again. It may have been an attempted mining undertaking.

**Furthermore the RAF conducted:**

2 Sweden courier flights through the Skagerrak from 1936 hours to 0523 hours. Nuisance flights with about 20 Mosquitoes into the Trier-Bonn-Cologne area from 1910 hours to 2150 hours.
A flight into Poland with a Liberator bomber via the western Baltic, Pommerania, East Prussia into the Ostrow area south of Warsaw. There the aircraft circled at 200 m altitude. The dropping of agents or of sabotage supplies was suspected. Approach flight 50 km north of Stolp at 2230 hours, return flight near Stolpmuende at 0228 hours.

Coastal flights with 6 planes in the area around the Island Vlieland and Ijmuiden during the period from 1925 hours to 0005 hours.

Nuisance flights with 2 planes into the Krefeld area. Approach via Island Goeree, Venlo at 2250 hours. Return flight at 0120 hours following the same course until 2310 hours.

An agent flight with one plane from Italian bases. Approach flight via Klagenfurt, east of Linz into the Pilsen area. Return flight via Villach until 0230 hours.

**Attack Effect**

Dropped on 47 localities were:
- 12 aerial mines
- 287 High Explosive Bombs
- 2,700 Incendiary bombs
- 37 Phosphorus cannisters

In Leipzig: Material Damage:
- 41 Buildings destroyed
- 712 Buildings damaged, minor damage to communications installations, no industrial damage

Personnel Losses:
- 20 Dead
- 80 Wounded

In the counties Torgau, Borna, Grimma, Doebeln, and Leipzig:
- Minor damage to buildings and farms,
- 21 dead and 8 wounded.
In Emden: 200 rounds of AA ammunition destroyed, 3 dead and 5 wounded.

In Lübeck: 5 High Explosive bombs with no damage.

In Bremen: 2 High Explosive Bombs and 100 Incendiary Bombs without effect.

In Berlin: 2 High Explosive Bombs and 10 Incendiary Bombs with no damage

On 5 Dummy Installations: 5 Mine Bombs, 51 High Explosive Bombs and 300 Incendiary bombs.

Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps

Despite the danger of ice formation the following were committed:

In Objective night pursuits in Central Germany:

1. Fighter Division with 68 Me 110 and 24 Ju 88
2. Fighter Division with 26 Me 110 and 24 Ju 88
3. Fighter Division with 11 Me 110 and 1 Ju 88

In pursuit operations from Holland:

4. Fighter Division with 1 He 219, 23 Me 110, and 1 Ju 88

In HighTaff operations northwest of Berlin and in Holland:

5. Fighter Division with 10 Me 110
6. Fighter Division with 25 Me 110 and 6 Ju 88

Total Commitment: 220 planes

Furthermore committed from the II. Fighter Division: 61 single engine fighters

Enemy Losses: 11 Bombers shot down by twin-engined fighters

Own Losses: 9 planes, including 2 Me 110 crashed due to ice formation

1 Me 110 crashed, cause unknown
1 Me 219 crashed, cause unknown
5 planes missing, probably due to ice formation
Furthermore: 9 single engine fighters

Total: 18 planes

Weather: In Holland bright, to the east increasing overcast up to 10/10, minimum limits 500 m to 1,000 m, maximum limits in parts around 7,500 m with ice forming above 3,000 m. Visibility 4 km to 10 km.
12. British Raid on Kassel on 22/23 October 1943

(See sketch German Air Defense
appendix 33)

Enemy Commitment

The forward elements of an attack unit composed of about 300 bombers reached the channel area approximately 140 km west of the Hague at 1844 hours. Flying a southeasterly course the formations crossed above the Dutch coast between Katwijk and Scheldt estuary, and moved into the Duisburg-Cologne-Bonn area, from where about 60 bombers continued on via Dortmund into the Kassel area. The bomber stream flowed southeasterly, turned southward of Cologne and headed toward Kassel in an easterly course, while small segments steered toward Frankfurt/Main where they carried out a diversionary raid. The turning maneuver south of Cologne was not recognized or reported. However, reconnaissance planes of the 1. Fighter Division were able to determine the start of the raid on Kassel in time so that the 1. Fighter Corps was able to launch the mass of its night fighters in objective pursuit above the city. The British forces departed beginning at 2029 hours from the Kassel area with a northwesterly course moving out between the islands Borkum and Dunkirk to 0001 hours, and from the Frankfurt/Main area beginning at 2036 hours via the Scheldt estuary. The raid on Kassel resulted in heavy damage, while the attack on Frankfurt/Main caused only light losses.

Furthermore the British Air Forces conducted:

A mining undertaking with several aircraft in the waters northwest of the Islands Vlieland, and Terschelling from 1925 hours to 2018 hours.

A coastal flight with about ten planes in the area Den Helder-Bergen-Harlingen from 1938 hours to 2017 hours.

One courier flight each to and from Sweden via the Skagerrak during the period from 2149 hours until 2310 hours.
A flight from the western Baltic over Flensburg, Wilhelmshaven, Den Helder between 2338 hours and 0216 hours.

**Kalt Effect**

In Kassel: Attack time: 2045 hours until 2135 hours.

Determined bomb quantities: about 2,000 mine and high explosive bombs
about 200,000 stick and phosphorus incendiary bombs.

Very heavy destruction throughout the entire municipal area.

Great fire damage to commerce and communication

Personnel Losses: about 2,000 dead and 100,000 homeless.

In Frankfurt/Main: Attack time: 2015 hours until 2055 hours.

Determined bomb quantities: 9 mine bombs
74 high explosive bombs
6,000 stick incendiary bombs
700 phosphorus incendiary bombs

Material Damage: 49 buildings destroyed
385 buildings damaged

Personnel Losses: 9 dead, 40 wounded, 1,000 homeless.

In north near Colonae: 12 high explosive bombs, comparatively heavy damage to water works and Nitrogen plant.

During the approach and return flights of the bombers: On 25 localities
40 high explosive bombs and 2,000 stick incendiary bombs were dropped without any damage worth mentioning.
Commitment of the I. Fighter Corps

Commited were:

In objective night pursuit over Kassel:
1. Fighter Division with 72 Me 110 and 24 Ju 88
2. Fighter Division with 28 Me 110 and 24 Ju 88
2/ Fighter Division with 14 Ju 88

In pursuit operations from Holland:
3. Fighter Division with 29 Me 110 and 2 Ju 88

In Himhütt method in Northern Jutland:
2. Fighter Division: 1 Ju 88

Total Commitment: 194 planes

Furthermore in objective night pursuit over Frankfurt/Main:
From 7. Fighter Division: 44 twin-engined fighters
From 36. Fighter Division (312 Fighter Wing): 53 single-engine fighters

Total commitment in the area of Air Force Command Center: 201 planes

Favorable visibility at high altitudes and good illumination over Kassel made a defensive success possible for the night fighter forces.

Bomber Losses: 39 bombers shot down by twin-engined fighters of the I. Fighter Corps, of which 5 Lancasters near Nienburg, Frankfurt, Veulta, Hofgeismar, and Paderborn,
10 Lancasters, 7 Halifaxes, and 10 four-motored bombers in the Kassel area
4 Halifaxes near Hannover, Nordhausen, Minden, Holzminden
2 four-motored bombers near Holzminden and Enskirchen and 1 plane, a Sweden courrier in the Skagerrak 15 km west of the Swedish coast.
8 bombers were probably shot down

Furthermore shot down by AA Artillery: 1 British plane west of Island Ameland

Own Losses: 5 planes, of which 2 Me 110 shot down

1 Me 110 force landing due to damage
1 Me 110 missing
1 Ju 88 crashed after take-off

Furthermore: 7. Fighter Division: 2 planes (2 Do 17)
30. Fighter Division: 8 planes (6 single-engine fighters)

Total Losses in the area of Air Force Command Center: 15 planes

Weather: In Holland: Increasing overcast of several layers up to 10/10. Minimum limits around 1,000 m, maximum limits around 6,000 m to 7,000 m with ice forming beginning at 3,000 m.

East of the Rhine: Clearing up to from 1/10 to 4/10, thin clouds around 3,000 m, visibility 5 to 10 km.

In northern Jutland: 4/10 to 8/10 overcast around 5,000 m.

Particulars: Colonel (ret) Guenther Raduci, the former commander of the 5.

Nightfighter Wing of the 1. Fighter Division reports as follows about his commitment on 22/23 October 1943:

"The mass of the committed wing and myself were on our way from the Berlin area and approached Frankfurt/Main before it was discovered that it was to be the target for a diversionary attack. When the raid on Kassel began I and elements of my wing were located diagonally close to Kassel. We just had to turn right to be above the objective. There was no need to issue orders to move over the objective since every nightfighter was close enough to discover the raid on Kassel already in progress even through the heavy clouds."
Field Visit by the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe

on 22 October 1943
Study 9 -11, Volume I a

Points to be clarified:

German text:
Page: 154
" 161

English text:
Page: 35
" 41

Y - Fuehrung?
Chapter V

Daytime Events in
November 1943

1. Survey

a. American Offensive Activities

In spite of weather conditions often unfavorable for flying purposes the American air force conducted 8 large-scale attacks against targets in the Reich's territory during November 1943. The depth of penetration, however, was confined to the area of the Heligoland Bight and into North-Western Germany. Presumably as a result of its experiences gained in October 1943, the American Command tried to have its attacking bomber forces escorted by fighter units during their whole flight to and from the target. The escort fighters provided cover up to the general line: Bremen - Bielefeld - Koblenz. The American selection of targets did not reveal any intention in respect to the main effort. Owing to inaccurate bomb aiming without visual observation of the ground the effect of the American bomber attacks decreased as compared to the preceding month. The bomb release without visual observation of the ground but by means of radar equipment represented an innovation in the American offensive tactics.
The American reconnaissance activities over the Reich's territory were relatively limited, probably on account of weather conditions. The main reconnaissance effort was directed to North-Western Germany and to Jutland. The American operations over the coastal areas of Holland and Belgium were also kept within moderate limitations. Only one single large-scale attack by four-engine bombers was directed against targets in Holland.

b.) Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The bad weather conditions in November 1943 confronted the German day fighter forces with difficult problems and caused comparatively heavy losses while the German successes were moderate. The American bomber units made use of the weather conditions in rear of a weather zone in the Island of Britain and appeared in the Reich's territory flying above the clouds. Friendly fighter units were repeatedly not in a position to fly through thick cloud covers to engage in combat above the clouds. Such attempts led to losses due to icing and errors made in controlling the aircraft.

The basic directive of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe to attack in the first place the enemy bomber aircraft was maintained. In addition, new guiding principles were issued by the Luftwaffe Commander Central Sector (German: Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte) for the employment of the day fighter forces. These principles were communicated verbally by Generaloberst Weise to the Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps and to the commanding generals of the fighter divisions during a conference of air force commanders with the Luftwaffe Commander Central Sector on 6 and 7 November 1943 in Berlin.

These guiding principles are contained in an entry in the war diary of the
Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps which reads:

"Generaloberst Weise declared that the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe ordered
had **fixated** to issue, in view of the new American offensive tactics (higher
flying altitudes and stronger fighter cover), basic directive for the con-
duct of day fighter operations. A difference is to be made between operations
over areas within the range of the fighter aircraft and over other territories.
To make it possible for the twin-engine fighter aircraft and the heavy fighter
groups to carry out effective attacks it is necessary **approximately** to engage the
escort beforehand
enemy fighters and to divert them from the bomber units. For such purpose the
light fighters are to be moved in and concentrated against an enemy formation.
The twin-engine fighter aircraft and the heavy fighters then are to be com-
mited against the same enemy formation from which the escort fighters had
been diverted by the friendly fighter aircraft. The single-engine night fight-
er aircraft provide cover for the twin-engine fighters.

The Luftwaffe Commander Central Sector will prepare a directive
to the fighter divisions to the effect that the enemy fighter cover has to
be attacked with forces as strong as possible so that the twin-engine fighter
aircraft can, if possible, be directed **ix** against unprotected bomber units.
Moreover, this directive will determine that, in case the enemy gains a break-
through, i.e. proceeds in eastern direction beyond the area of friendly fight-
er protection, the tactics hitherto **applied** will be **modified** applied.

General Schmid voiced misgivings against this combat method which
provided **maximum** action against enemy fighters as well as against enemy bom-
bers, since the total strength of the day fighter forces available at the time
was too limited."
The deployment of the day fighter forces in the sector of the I Fighter Corps was changed by the following transfers in November 1943:

The airfields located near the coast in Holland were evacuated by the fighter forces. The withdrawn fighter groups were now stationed in Eastern Holland and in the Rhine area. This transfer was to make it possible for the fighter division stationed in the outpost area to assemble in the air up to previously combat altitude without being engaged in combat with enemy fighters.

Two groups of the 26th Twin-Engine Fighter Wing were transferred into the area of Hannover, outside the range of the American fighter aircraft. The 1st Group/26th Twin-Engine Fighter Wing was transferred to the airfield of Grove in Denmark and was to be ready for commitment bomber units unprotected by escort fighters in the area of Jutland and the Western Baltic.

c.) Successes and Losses in November 1943

The average total strength of day fighter aircraft in operational condition in November 1943 was like that of the preceding month.

Total number of day fighter aircraft employed in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in November 1943: 1677 aircraft.

Total losses of aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in November 1943: 124 aircraft which is 7.6 % of the total effort.

Enemy losses over the Reich's territory in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in November 1943: 155 aircraft not including those aircraft shot down by antiaircraft artillery.
This figure represents approximately 3% of the estimated total effort against the Reich's territory amounting to about 5000 aircraft. In addition the American forces had probably sustained a great number of indirect losses, caused by weather conditions.

2.) Daytime Events during the Period from 1 to 5 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 241)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the American air force:

A large-scale attack on Wilhelmshaven on 3 November 1943:
Beginning at 11:37 hours three American bomber units (200 to 300 aircraft) escorted by strong fighter forces intruded in a broad front between the area north of the island of Vlieland and Bergen op Zoom flying in eastern direction into the area between Ems and Hunte from where they proceeded in northern direction to Wilhelmshaven. A fourth bomber unit followed at 13:05 hours flying on the same route. After the bomb loads had been released without visual observation of the ground on Wilhelmshaven and Wesermünde the American bombers returned, from 13:17 hours on, in western direction by way of the West Frisian islands.

On 3 November 1943 between 15:16 and 15:41 hours, 15 to 20 Typhoon Type **Typhoon** aircraft released their bombs between Woensdrecht and Antwerp.

A bomber attack on the airfield of Schiphol on 3 November 1943: Two Marauder units escorted by 80 to 100 fighter aircraft appeared about 150 kilometers west of Den Haag at 15:25 hours and proceeded in northeastern direction into the area of Amsterdam. The aircraft returned in northwestern direction from 15:42 hours on.
About 48 aircraft flying singly, among them 20 Type Typhoon aircraft, approached over the coastal area of Holland.

2 Type Mosquito aircraft flew a reconnaissance mission into the area of Mannheim and Speyer.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

No exact data regarding the operations on 3 November 1943 are available. The German fighter forces sustained heavy losses during this commitment (losses due to weather conditions).

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

3. Daytime Events during the Period from 6 to 16 November 1943

Not including

(Within American large-scale attacks)

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 351)

Enemy Effort

The American total effort was extremely limited. 8 Mosquito-bombers penetrated up to the Bay of Kiel, Holland, North-Western Germany, and Belgium-Luxembourg. Of this force one Mosquito-bomber was shot down by fighter aircraft of the Third Air Fleet Command on 14 November 1943. About 26 Allied aircraft operated over the coastal area of Holland.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The was not operationally employed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.
4. Daytime Events during the Period from 16 to 28 November 1943

(Not including American large-scale attacks)

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 361)

**Enemy Effort**

The following operations were conducted by the American air force:

a.) A bomber attack in the area of Oslo on 18 November 1943:

Three American bomber units with a total strength of about 100 aircraft crossed the Skagerrak flying in north-eastern direction at an altitude of 4400 meters. The position of the approaching aircraft was at 10:15 hours 150 kilometers north-west of Grove. The aircraft were observed returning across the Skagerrak between 12:00 and 13:14 hours.

b.) Two operations conducted by bomber aircraft flying above the clouds to Holland and North-Western Germany on 19 November 1943:

An American bomber unit with fighter escort was intercepted by radar at 11:14 hours as flying about 160 kilometers west of Bergen op Zoom; the radar stations kept track of the flight course of these bombers up to the area of Rheine. The escort fighters changed to counter routes already at the frontier of the Reich. They aircraft returned via Deelen and Katwijk.

At 11:43 hours, a second bomber unit proceeded from the area about 150 kilometers west of Den Haag via Rotterdam into the area west of Duisburg, Dusseldorf and changed to counter routes at 12:43 hours.

In the area of Gilze Rijen this unit was met by a fighter unit which had intruded via Schelde Estuary at 12:33 hours. Bombs were released near Deelen, south-west of Twente, and near Arnheim.
c.) 15 Type Mosquito aircraft low reconnaissance missions over the following areas: Western Baltic, Jutland, North- and North-Western Germany, Holland, Belgium, and the Saar area.

d.) About 56 aircraft approached the coast in Holland and Belgium:

e.) A fighter or mine-laying operation was carried out in the sea area of the Frisian islands.

f.) A courier mission was flown to Sweden.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The corps was not operationally employed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

5.) American Attack on the Ruhr Area on 5 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 371)

Enemy Effort

The German radio intelligence reported the assembly of 450 to 550 American bomber aircraft over the Island of Britain at 10:18 hours and the begin of the approach flight of the bombers at 12:05 hours. According to the reports the approaching bombers used the following flight route:

The first wave, from 12:21 hours on, from the area north of Harwich crossing the coast near Bergen op Zoom, the second wave approached, from 12:38 hours on, from the area of Harwich crossing the coast near Katwijk,
the third wave flew a wide circle over the sea and crossed the coast near Leeuwarden.

Each wave was escorted by strong fighter forces during their approach and return flights. After having crossed the coast, the bomber units proceeded into the area of Muenster, Wesel, and Wuppertal. The different waves did not unite.

Bombs were dispersed all over the industrial area of the Rhineland and Westphalia. The bombers left via Schelde Estuary where they were met by fighter units.

In addition, the enemy air forces conducted the following operations:

From 08:47 to 09:03 hours, 3 Type Typhoon aircraft coming from Bergen flew the coast up to the island of Vlieland.

At 08:50 hours, a single aircraft penetrated into the area of Texel and Leeuwarden.

At 10:40 hours, a reconnaissance mission was flown by a Type Mosquito aircraft over Zwolle, Detmold to Hannover and Braunschweig.

At 15:07 hours, a reconnaissance aircraft flew across the Zuider Sea into the area of Enschede.

Commitment of the Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

The 1st Fighter Division with single-engine fighter aircraft,

the 2nd Fighter Division with 205 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft,

the 3rd Fighter Division with 83 single-engine fighter aircraft
Total effort: 429 aircraft

The German units were engaged in fierce air combat over the area of Rheine and Muenster by strong enemy escort fighter forces.

Enemy Losses: 11 aircraft definitely shot down,
16 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 16 aircraft.
Losses of personnel: 5 missing,
9 wounded,
3 killed.

Weather Conditions: Cloudless, ground visibility from 3 to 8 kilometers.
High-altitude visibility above 1500 meters: from 30 to 50 kilometers.

6.) American Attack on Koeln and Bonn on 7 November 1943
(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 36!)

Enemy Effort

In spite of bad flying weather, 100 to 150 American bomber aircraft flying above the clouds crossed the English Channel and penetrated the coast between Cap Cris Noz and the Westerschelde at 10:05 hours. Initially, they reached the area of Luxemburg, Trier, and Sarrbruecken and, now flying in northern direction, reached the area of Koeln and Aachen. The offense forces were escorted by fighter forces up to the area of Brussels and Luxembourg where the latter changed to counter routes at 10:55 hours. After scattered bomb releases on Koeln, the bombers returned to their take-off bases from 11:15 hours on.
Two enemy fighter units, consisting of 40 to 50 aircraft each, met the returning four-engine bombers over Southern Holland and over Schelde Estuary. The two fighter units which were to meet the bombers approached at 10:15 hours across Schelde Estuary and at 10:27 hours by way of Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Enschede. By 12:00 hours, the last American units had left Dutch territory.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The attempt to employ fighter aircraft in spite of rain and snowfall failed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Weather Conditions: Several strata of clouds from 200 to above 7000 meters. In many areas rain and partially snowfall in the Ruhr area.

7.) American Attack on Luenster on 11 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 391)

Enemy Effort

At 12:00 hours, the assembly of American bomber forces south-east of the British air base was recognized for the first time. It was observed that the bomber units began their approach flight at 13:08 hours in the west of Harwich and Great Yarmouth. Several hundred Type Boeing aircraft escorted by strong fighter forces headed in eastern and south-eastern direction into the area of Luenster. After releasing their bomb loads without visual observation of the ground the offense units returned, from 14:00 hours on, in western direction via Schelde Estuary.
To provide cover for the returning bomber aircraft, American fighter units penetrated, at 14:10 hours, across Schelde Estuary and met the bombers in the area of Ezemich. The last aircraft left the coast at 15:00 hours.

Moreover, 6 Type Mosquito aircraft intruded, flying at a low altitude, at 16:38 hours via the island of Ameland into the area of Northern Holland and where they circled in the air space. Beginning at 17:00 hours, they left by way of Leeuwarden.

Commitment of the 1 Fighter Corps

Owing to bad weather conditions only small elements of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions were operationally employed.

Total Effort: 190 aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 9 aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 10 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 8 missing, 2 wounded.

The losses were due to icing.

Weather Conditions: In Holland: 9/10 to 10/10 cirrus clouds of limited density between 5000 and 7000 meters. Underneath, in the area of the coast and east of the Zuider Sea 3/10 to 6/10 cumulus clouds, lower ceiling 500 meters, upper ceiling of the formation of cumulus clouds up to 2000 meters, flying visibility 20 kilometers.

In the Reich's territory: Variable formation of cumulus clouds, 3/10 to 6/10 with icing above 1800 meters.
Along the general line Breslau - Muenster - Minden
sharp edge of the cloud formation of the bad wea-
ter zone existing in the area adjacent to the South
East with dense stratus clouds for-
ming several layers, lower ceiling in rain 200 me-
ters, upper ceiling between 5500 and 6500 meters.

8.) Large-Scale Operation of American Aircraft into the Heligoland

Right on 13 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 401)

Enemy Effort

According to German radio intelligence reports American bomber air-
craft assembled during the period from 08:20 to 10:00 hours in the area of
Thames Estuary and Norwich. A bomber unit of the strength of 120 Type Liberato-
aircraft left, at 10:00 hours, the Island of Britain about 200 kilometers
above the clouds north of Norwich in eastern direction, crossed the North Sea flying at alti-
tudes from 7000 to 8000 meters and, presumably without visual observation of
the ground, released bombs near Flensburg and Husum. Any escort fighters pro-
tecting the bombers were not observed. The bombers left the target area in
western direction at 11:20 hours and passed the northern part of Heligoland.

elements of
The first two American bomber units total strength of 150 to 200
Type Fortress aircraft were, at 10:30 hours, about 100 kilometers north of
Norwich and, protected by strong fighter forces, proceeded in eastern direction
across the North Sea up to the area of roughly 100 kilometers north of the is-
land of Borkum. There, the offense units changed to south-eastern courses to
reach the area of Oldenburg and Wilhelmshaven.
The release of bombs without visual observation of the ground in the area of Bad Zwischenahn, Quakenbrueck, and Bergen did not seem to have been intended by the American Air Command, but it appeared that the release of these bombs was due to the failure of the Meddo-instruments in locating the targets in the flat terrain. This bomb attack was probably to be directed against Wilhelmshaven again. Flying in a loose formation and in a broad front, the bombers headed in south-western direction, later western direction, for Great Britain. They were met by 5 fighter units with a total strength of about 350 Thunderbolt and Lightning aircraft. These fighter aircraft approached at 11:00 hours from the area south of Norwich and met the bombers over the garge area of Oldenburg, Zwolle, and Arnhem, Amsterdam. The last bombers crossed the Dutch coast in western direction at about 13:00 hours.

Other Enemy Activities

At 08:00 hours, a Liberator-bomber intruded at an altitude of 6700 meters across the Westerschelde into the area of Woensdrecht and Gilze Rijen. The aircraft circled over this area from 09:20 to 09:58 hours and made emergency landing near Dordrecht at 10:07 hours.

During the period from 08:58 to 09:00 hours, 4 Type Mustang aircraft flew at a low altitude along the coast from Hoek van Holland to Den Haag.

At 10:10 hours, 4 Allied fighter aircraft approached, flying at a low altitude, the coast near Bergen op Zoom.

From 11:18 to 11:28 hours, 2 single-engine aircraft flew along the coast from the island of Walcheren to Katwijk.
From 15:57 to 16:18 hours, 16 Type Typhoon aircraft circled at a low altitude over Schelde Estuary.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Total Effort: 314 single-engine and twin-engine fighters

In spite of bad weather conditions the units could score some success. The friendly losses were chiefly due to icing.

Enemy Losses: 8 aircraft definitely shot down,

29 aircraft probably shot down,

1 Liberator - bomber made an emergency landing.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 19 aircraft,

losses of personnel: 2 killed,

7 wounded,

12 missing.

Weather Conditions: On account of the weather conditions, the American bomber units assembled further to the North than usual.

Over the North Sea thick shower clouds, upper ceiling of the cumulus formation above 7000 meters, high-altitude visibility more than 100 kilometers; over the target areas 6/10 to 9/10 shower clouds which sometimes permitted orientation by visual observation of the ground. The employment of friendly forces was very difficult because of thick cumulus formation of rain clouds. On account of frequent showers the aircraft could climb through the clouds only in a few areas.
Flying through the clouds the aircraft were exposed to icing at altitudes above 2000 meters. The upper ceiling of the cumulus formation was between 5500 and 7500 meters.

9.) American Attack on Bremen on 26 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 41)

**Enemy Effort**

At 09:35 hours, American bomber units assembled over the area of London and Norwich. At 10:30 hours, the first attacking unit began its approach flight from the area north-east of Norwich in eastern direction into the Reich's territory. A second unit followed at 10:47 hours. Both bomber units flew along the Frisian coast and changed to south-eastern courses 60 respectively 90 kilometers north of Norderney. The first unit reached Bremen by the direct route while the second unit flew by way of the area of Stade. The bombs hit the sections of the port and the railroad station in Bremen and the airfield of Delmenhorst. The force of about 300 bomber aircraft left in western direction. The units were protected by escort fighters. In addition, they were met over the area of Oldenburg by enemy fighter aircraft which had approached via the Zuider Sea.

**Other Enemy Activities**

2 Type Mosquito aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over the area of Saarbruecken. They had intruded near Blankenberge at 12:48 hours.

From 14:15 to 14:59 hours, a single Allied aircraft circled over the airfield of Grove in Denmark.

**Commitment of the I Fighter Corps**
Total Effort: 294 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Heavy losses due to extraordinarily bad weather, in particular to icing, were sustained by friendly forces.

Enemy Losses: 8 aircraft definitely shot down,

27 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 22 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 13 killed,

5 wounded,

24 missing.

Weather Conditions: The approaching aircraft flew along a route leading through a zone of 5/10 to 9/10 shower clouds in rear of a bad weather zone. Lower ceiling of the cloud around 500 meters, upper ceiling from 5000 to 6000 meters. In the coastal area scattered snow and sleet showers in thunderstorms. Cloudless above 6000 meters. Flying through clouds the aircraft were exposed to icing above 1000 meters. In the area of Bremen at the time of the attack: 8/10 to 10/10 cumulus clouds reaching up into high altitudes with snow and sleet showers extending over large areas. Upper cloud ceiling 6000 meters. The employment of friendly forces was hindered by showers extending over large districts in the area north of the general line: Amsterdam - Rheine - Hannover - Rechlin. Single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft climbing through the clouds were exposed to strong icing.
10. American Attack on Bremen on 29 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 421)

**Enemy Effort**

Several hundred American bomber aircraft protected by fighter forces intruded across the sea area north of the Frisian islands and across northern Holland and attacked Bremen.

The following were the flight routes of the American bomber formations:

At 13:25 hours the first unit approached from the area 140 kilometers west of Bergen op Zoom via Neppen and Vechta to Bremen. At 14:25 hours elements of this unit changed to counter routes over Vechta.

At 13:25 hours the second unit approached from the area 100 kilometers west of the island of Texel flying in eastern direction along the northern side of the Frisian islands.

At 13:40 hours the third unit approached from the area 230 kilometers north of the island of Texel flying in south-eastern direction.

At 13:45 hours the fourth unit approached north-west of the island of Texel flying in eastern direction.

The second, third, and fourth bomber units united in the area over Borkum and proceeded via Emden to release bombs on Bremen. At 14:50 hours the bomber aircraft began their return flights in western direction. The returning aircraft crossed the Dutch coast between the island of Terschelling and Bergen op Zoom flying in a broad front. At 14:17 hours American fighter units penetrated across the Zuider Sea into the area of Assen and covered the returning bombers.

The last leaving aircraft were reported at 15:40 hours.
Other Enemy Activities

A Type Mosquito aircraft, presumably on a weather reconnaissance mission, arrived over the continent at 05:02 hours near Den Helder and proceeded across the area north of Osnabrueck and north of Braunschweig where it changed to a northern course to fly via Lubeck to Kiel. At 06:25 hours radio intelligence intercepted the returning aircraft 30 kilometers north of Norderney.

At 10:31 hours 2 Type Mosquito aircraft circled over the area of Schelde Estuary.

During the period from 10:59 to 11:24 hours two Mosquito-reconnaissance aircraft operated over the area of Rottumeroog and Emden.

At 10:52 hours ten Allied aircraft reached the coast west of Den Haag. The aircraft intruded at altitudes from 400 to 800 meters flying in north-eastern direction into the sea area north of the West Frisian islands where they circled up to 12:55 hours. These aircraft presumably carried out a sea rescue mission.

Commitment of the 1 Fighter Corps

All day fighter units of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fighter Divisions which were in operational condition were committed in the area of Bremen and engaged in combat under inclement weather conditions. There are no data available on the exact number of aircraft employed. The total strength of aircraft employed is estimated at 250 to 300 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft. Enemy fighter forces which possessed the (local) numerical superiority and icing effects caused heavy losses of friendly forces.
Enemy Losses: 14 aircraft definitely shot down,

24 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 33 single- and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 2 killed,

7 wounded,

28 missing.

Weather Conditions: In the target area 10/10 clouds in several strata with

icing; lower ceiling 200 to 500 meters, upper ceiling

5000 to 7000 meters; visibility 2 to 8 kilometers.

11.) American Attack on Ramscheid on 30 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 431)

Enemy Effort

At 10:35 hours a number of American bomber units escorted by

fighter forces appeared about 140 kilometers west of the

Schelde Estuary. They crossed, flying in a broad front, the coast between Hoek van Holland

and Blankenberge and, proceeding in eastern and south-eastern direction,

reached the area of Duesseldorf and Ramscheid. The bomb loads were presumably dropped without visual observation of the ground on Ramscheid and on

the area south of Koeln. The escort fighters changed to counter routes over

the frontier of the Reich. At 12:05 hours the bomber aircraft began to return flying in western direction across Schelde Estuary as well as Ostend,

after a number of enemy fighter units had assumed the task of protecting

the returning bombers over the area of Aachen and Antwerp.

Other Enemy Activities
At 08:53 hours a single Mosquito-reconnaissance aircraft intruded via Den Helder, Meppen, Oldenburg, Wilhelmshaven up to Cuxhaven. The aircraft was last intercepted by radio intelligence when it was flying 70 kilometers west of Heligoland at 09:15 hours.

At 08:31 hours a Mosquito-reconnaissance aircraft intruded via Hoek van Holland and Osnabrueck into the area of Braunschweig and returned by way of Rheine and the Zuider Sea.

At 09:06 hours and at 10:00 hours respectively 4 Allied aircraft flew at a low altitude along the Dutch coast near Den Helder.

From 12:32 to 12:42 hours 10 Type Typhoon aircraft penetrated across the island of Walcheren up to Breda and returned on counter routes.

13:40
At 13:40 hours 20 Type Thunderbolt aircraft appeared over the Westerschelde.

At 14:19 hours 3 Allied aircraft coming from the sea appeared over the Dutch coast at Hoek van Holland.

Commitment of the 1 Fighter Corps

Owing to frequent showers only certain elements of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions could be employed. There are no data available on the exact total strength of the aircraft committed. It can be presumed that 120 to 150 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft were employed.

Enemy Losses: 8 aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 4 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 2 killed, 1 wounded, 4 missing.
Weather Conditions: Over Great Britain and over the sea 3/10 to 8/10 cumulus clouds and scattered in rear of a bad weather zone. The showers and clouds increased over the continent. The clouds amounted, in general, to 10/10 and there were scattered breaks in the cloud formation. The lower ceiling of the clouds in the extensive showers was at 200 to 400 meters. Upper ceiling of the clouds from 5000 to 6000 meters; above the clouds flying visibility of 50 to 100 kilometers.

Weather conditions in the take-off and approach area of friendly fighters:

In general, 10/10 cumulus clouds with extensive showers in rear of a bad weather zone, scattered breaks in the cloud formation, lower ceilings 200 to 400 meters, upper ceilings in showers 5000 to 6000 meters, in showers visibility of 2 to 5 kilometers. Above the clouds good flying visibility. In the clouds icing above 1000 meters.

Weather conditions and possibilities for defensive action over the target:

Defensive action was considerably hindered by bad weather, in particular by icing to which aircraft flying through clouds were exposed and by shower clouds reaching up to very high altitudes. On account of the variable weather situation, no accurate information on alternate flight routes could be given. When the attack took off, generally speaking, there was a thick formation of cumulus clouds reaching up into high altitudes so that the American bomber units could have been able to orient themselves by visual observation of the ground only for a very short period of time.
Chapter VI

Night Time Events in November 1943

1.) Survey

a.) British Offensive Action

The weather conditions which were, on the average, unfavorable for flying purposes during November 1943 did not prevent the British Air Command from continuing on an undiminished scale its offensive night operations conducted by bombers and Type Mosquito aircraft against the Reich's territory. During eight nights, large-scale attacks on German cities were carried out. Mosquito-bombers conducted 27 nuisance raids against the Reich's territory. The striking power and the operational capability of the British night bomber force were emphatically demonstrated by two heavy bomber attacks during two consecutive nights against the Reich's capital coated by November fog. The numerous nuisance raids conducted at night inflicted a considerable harassment on the population and caused interruptions in the production process of the armament industry by the *Feuerwerk* alerts. While the Mosquito-bombers operated regardless of nighttime visibility, the heavy bombers avoided operations during light nights. Six small-scale British mine-laying operations could be observed.

b.) British Offensive Tactics and Radar Interference

During the night of 18/19 November 1943, the British Command
attempted, **for the first time**, to split up the German night fighter defenses by conducting an offensive operation in two bomber streams against different targets. The extensive British radio interference was maintained. An additional jamming of the German reporting and controlling radiotelephone activities was started.

c.) Commitment of the German Night Fighter Forces

The large-scale attacks conducted by the Bomber Command at night when large areas were covered by ground fog confronted the German Night Fighter Command with insoluble problems. Night attacks under such weather conditions often meant a neutralization of the German night fighter defenses, comparatively. Although it had been possible for a great number of well trained night fighter crews to take off under conditions of inadequate ground visibility, landings **were** in ground fog were technically impossible. Sometimes, the Headquarters of the Fighter Corps succeeded in ensuring the commitment of elements of its forces during foggy nights by precautionary transfers of night fighters units in daytime to airfields which favorable weather conditions could be anticipated. However, the limited duration of flight, especially in the case of the Me-110 night fighter units, reduced the operational possibilities of the night fighters considerably. They had to discontinue their mostly night operations precociously to reach airfields near the coast and not covered by fog for a safe landing. Generally speaking, the night fighter operations were in November 1943 not affected by low training standards of the flight crews, by the unsuitability of the aircraft types, enemy radio interference, and the inadequacy of radio equipment, but were dominated by the unsolved problem of landing under bad weather conditions. This increased the crisis of October 1943 in the fighter defenses against British night bomber attacks.
directed against the Reich's territory.

Although progress was made in equipping the twin-engine night fighter aircraft with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus which could not be jammed by the enemy, this equipment was, generally speaking, still absolutely inadequate. The first reports on the experiences gained with the new airborne search apparatus employed in combat operations were available. This apparatus made it possible to locate an airborne target without interference at distances down to 500 meters, but it did not work at shorter distances. The Headquarters of the 1 Fighter Corps intended primarily to equip the 1st and 2nd Night Fighter Wings with which were employed in the outpost area of the home air defense with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus to be able to direct these wings into the British bomber streams so that they could already over Dutch territory engage in night pursuit operations. For the same reason, the 2nd Night Fighter Wing was, in November 1943, transferred with all its groups into the sector of the 3rd Fighter Division and placed under the command of the latter. In operations to provide night fighter protection the Headquarters of the 1 Fighter Corps employed with good success heavy radio beacons as points of destination to direct the night fighter units to the assembly areas and to the respective objective under attack. In tracking the flight course of the British bomber streams the night fighter command was no longer dependent on the bearings of the jammed radio sets. Taking a bearing on the target finding equipment of the British bombers switched on by the latter upon take-off (Type Rotterdam a clear directivity bearings) made it possible to keep track of the enemy flight courses without interference and with a reporting delay of a few minutes. This created the first prerequisite for a systematic employment of the night fighter units by the night fighter command.
d.) Successes and Losses during November 1943

In November 1943, the average total strength of night fighter aircraft in operational condition in the sector of the I Fighter Corps amounted to 294 twin-engine fighters.

In November 1943, the total strength of night fighter aircraft employed in the sector of the I Fighter Corps amounted to 720 twin-engine fighters of which about 50 night fighters were employed to repulse attacks by Type Mosquito aircraft.

The total losses of night fighter aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter Corps during November 1943 amounted to 24 twin-engine fighter aircraft which is 3.4 per cent of the total effort.

Losses of the RAF over the Reich's territory in the sector of the I Fighter Corps during November 1943: 83 aircraft not including the aircraft brought down by single-engine fighter night fighters.

Of this number 17 aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft artillery.

This figure represents about 2.2 per cent of the estimated total effort of the RAF against the Reich's territory amounting to about 3600 aircraft.

e.) Detailed Information

As early as in November 1943 the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps planned to inflict extraordinary losses on the RAF by conducting long-distance night fighter operations to pursue the British bombers returning over
the sea and to interfere with the British landing maneuvers over Great Britain. These planned operations were to be carried out by night fighter aircraft not equipped with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus. This was to be done to prevent the new airborne search apparatus from falling into enemy hands in case friendly aircraft would be shot down over the Island of Britain. The long-distance night fighter operation which planned to be conducted under suitable weather conditions with all night fighter forces available and the twin-engine day fighter wings, was for the first time forbidden by the Luftwaffe Commander Central Sector on 6 November 1943.

The successful operations against the British nuisance raids conducted by Mosquito-bombers had become hopeless by now owing to the technical inferiority of the German night fighter aircraft types available. Therefore, the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps sent the following teletype message to the Luftwaffe High Command and to the Luftwaffe Commander Central Sector on 1 November 1943: "Since the efficiency of the night fighter aircraft of the I Fighter Corps is not sufficient for operations against British nuisance aircraft with a flying speed of more than 500 kilometers per hour and operating at altitudes above 7000 meters and since the RAF continuously intensifies its nuisance activities, it is requested that such night fighter forces be speedily assigned to this command as can be committed against Type Mosquito aircraft with a good prospect for success."

2.) Nighttime Events during the Period from 1 to 11 November 1943

(Not including British large-scale attacks)
(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 441)
Enemy Effort

In spite of unsuitable weather conditions the Bomber Command operations conducted nuisance raids with Mosquito-bombers of which the main effort was directed against the Ruhr area. It was only during the night of 1 to 2 November 1943 that no British aircraft intruded into the sector of the I Fighter Corps. The total number of Type Mosquito aircraft observed operating over the Reich's territory and over Belgium-Holland. Among other objectives, the nuisance raids were directed against the following cities: Duisburg, Bochum, Oberhausen, Muenchen-Gladbach, Koeln, and Venlo.

A total number of 13 aircraft approached the Dutch coastal area and the Heligoland Bight.

During the night of 5 to 6 November 1943, a single British aircraft, presumably delivering supplies to agents, intruded into Northern Denmark where it circled at a low altitude over the area of Aarhus.

5 aircraft serving as couriers to Sweden crossed the Skagerrak.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The corps was not operationally employed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

34) Nighttime Events during the Period from 11 November to 1 December 1943

(Not including British large-scale attacks)

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 451)
Enemy Effort

The British Mosquito-bombers continued their nuisance raids. It was only during the nights of 14 to 15 and 21 to 22 November that no enemy aircraft intruded. The main effort of the British nuisance raids was directed against the industrial area of the Rhineland and Westphalia. Among other objectives, bombs were dropped on the following cities: Bochum, Rheine and Zwolle in Holland. Two nuisance attacks were conducted against Berlin. In addition to 12 aircraft which approached the coast flying singly, a strong air unit circled off the Dutch coast. Two aircraft of the courier service to Sweden were observed crossing the Skagerrak.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The corps was not operationally employed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

4) British Attack on Duesseldorf and Koesn on 2/4 November 1943

Enemy Effort

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 461)

At 18:15 hours, the first elements of a bomber stream several hundred aircraft strong flying in south-eastern direction reached Schelde Estuary. Over the area of Rotterdam a small part of the bomber stream branched off in eastern direction and then headed in southern direction for the Ruhr area. The main part of the bomber stream proceeded in a slowly widening formation into the area of Duesseldorf up to about 50 kilometers south of Koesn. The bombs were dispersed on Duesseldorf and Koesn. The bombers
left flying in a broad front between Amsterdam and Brussels. The flight course of the enemy forces could be accurately recognized by Type Rotterdam directivity bearings.

Other Enemy Activities

From 21:25 to 21:47 hours, a British long-range night fighter aircraft circled over Tilburg and Breda.

From 19:00 to 19:30 hours, a number of British aircraft operated over the sea area of the islands of Vlieland and Terschelling. They presumably carried out a mine-laying operation.

During the period from 19:09 to 00:07 hours, two aircraft of the to Sweden courier service crossed the Skagerrak.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

To provide fighter protection:

1st Fighter Division: 4 Type Ju 88 aircraft
2nd Fighter Division: 18 Type Ju 88 aircraft
3rd Fighter Division: 2 Type Ju 88 aircraft and 9 Type Me 110 aircraft

To conduct pursuit operations:

3rd Fighter Division: 24 Type Me 110 and 1 Type He 219 aircraft

In "Himmelbett"-tactics over Northern Jutland
2nd Fighter Division: 2 Type Ju 88 aircraft

Total Effort: 60 twin-engine fighter aircraft

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Note: * Himmler's night fighter tactics: the designation for the older type of night fighting in which each German aircraft was assigned to a particular "box" outside of which it was not authorized to operate.

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The night fighters of the 3rd Fighter Division employed in pursuit operations were directed into the enemy bomber stream already over Schelde Estuary. Owing to weather conditions, only parts of the total force could, in general, be committed.

Enemy Losses: 17 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 Ju-88 aircraft trying to land in Venlo shot down by British long-range night fighters, as a result of a 1 Me-110 aircraft crashed burning engine.

Weather Conditions: 4/10 to 7/10 clouds forming several thin strata between 1000 and 4000 meters. Take-off and landing generally considerably hindered by ground haze.

5.) British Nuisance Raid on the Ruhr Area and Mine-Laying Operations over the Kattegat and the Belts on 4/5 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 471)
Beginning at 18:19 hours, 50 to 60 Mosquito-bombers, flying at altitudes from 7000 to 9800 meters and using concentric air routes between Cap Cris Ney and Westerschelde, penetrated into the industrial area of Rhineland and Westphalia and released their bomb loads on Koeln, Leverkusen, Dusseldorf, Aachen, and Solingen. The fast bombers left Holland between Schelde Estuary and Ostend during the period from 19:22 to 20:50 hours.

About 20 British aircraft carried out a mine-laying operation over the Kattegat, over the Little and over the Great Belt. The aircraft were recognized approaching over Jutland between Limfjord and north of Esbjerg during the period from 18:02 to 18:40 hours. The aircraft left the mine-laying areas from 19:05 hours via the area of Skagen where the last aircraft left at 21:00 hours. The mine-layer aircraft flew at altitudes of 200, 1000, and 1500 meters.

At 18:19 hours, a British aircraft penetrated by way of Lille and Charleville into the area of Koeln and returned across Schelde Estuary to Great Britain at 20:50 hours.

From 18:15 to 19:59 hours, a British long-range night fighter aircraft operated over the area of Schelde Estuary and Tilburg.

At 22:31 hours, a British aircraft intruded via Bergen op Zoom into the area of Hilversum where it circled from 22:40 to 23:16 hours. The aircraft left 23:47 hours flying in north-western direction at altitudes from 700 to 1500 meters.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Strong high-altitude winds from the East reduced the speed of the intruding Type Mosquito aircraft and gave rise to the presumption that four-
bombers were approaching. After a correct picture of the air situation in
of the 3rd Fighter Division
respect to intruding aircraft had been formed, the few night fighter aircraft
which had taken off to move into their "Himmelbett"-positions were ordered to
land before they had reached their combat altitudes.

in "Himmelbett"-tactics
The following aircraft were employed against the mine-laying
aircraft over Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein:
By the 2nd Fighter Division: 16 Type Ju 88 aircraft

The success of the few night fighters resulted from the fact
that the radio sets at the radar stations must not been jammed by the ene-
my.

Enemy Losses: 7 aircraft

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 6/10 to 10/10 stratus clouds, lower ceiling around 800
meters, upper ceiling around 1,500 meters. Underneath the
clouds a visibility of 5 to 15 kilometers.

6.) British Nuisance Raids on Berlin and on the Ruhr Area on 11/12
November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 481)

Enemy Effort

Between 18:32 and 19:15 hours, a force of approximately 25 Mos-
quito-bombers crossed the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Amsterdam. The aircraft penetrated in eastern direction via the Zuider Sea, Osnabrueck, and
Hannover up to Berlin. A number of aircraft flying singly changed to
counter routes after releasing their bombs in the area of Hannover. The aircraft left the area of Great Berlin flying in a broad front in north-western direction between the islands of Heligoland and Texel. The last aircraft was reported leaving the coast at 21:20 hours. About 30 Mosquito-bombers penetrated into the industrial area of Rhineland and Westphalia and reached the area of Koeln, Muppertal, and Dortmund. The aircraft approached from 18:25 hours on, flying in eastern direction across the coast between Ostend and Calais. They left in north-western direction across the Dutch coast between Amsterdam and Blankenberghe. The last fast bomber aircraft was flying over the Channel coast at 20:40 hours.

At 20:37 hours, 2 Type Mosquito aircraft headed via Den Helder, Zwolle, and Arnhem into the area of Duisburg and left by way of Tilburg and the island of Walcheren. The last aircraft left at 20:40 hours.

Between 19:00 and 21:30 hours, a number of British bomber aircraft circled over Belgian and Dutch territory. They were presumably carrying or supplying agents.

3 aircraft of the courier service to Sweden crossed the Skagar rack during the period from 19:04 to 21:20 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

In "Himmelbett"-tactics against aircraft carrying or supplying agents in Northern Holland:

3rd Fighter Division: 1 Type Be 110 aircraft

Guided by the "Y" Method against courier aircraft flying to or from Sweden:
2nd Fighter Division: 1 Type Ju 88 and 2 Type FW 190 aircraft

Total Effort: 4 aircraft

Enemy Losses: 1 Type Lancaster aircraft (Carrying or supplying agents) shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 Type Fw 190 aircraft crash-landed near Aalborg

Weather Conditions: 3/10 to 7/10 variable formation of cumulus clouds,
lower ceiling 600 meters, upper ceiling 3000 meters.
In the area of Berlin: 10/10 clouds.

7.) British Attack on Mannheim and Frankfurt on the Main on 17/18

November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 49)

Enemy Effort

Bearings of friendly radio stations indicated assemblies of British bombers in the areas west, south, and south-west of London. First
After having assembled for a long time several hundred British night bombers crossed the English Channel. The first elements of the bomber stream

Note: * "Y" means
reached Somme Estuary at 18:10 hours. From here the bomber stream, flying in tight groups, proceeded in south-eastern direction into the area of Mannheim and Frankfurt. Small elements penetrated into the area of Stuttgart and Wuerzburg. After widely dispersing their bombs on Mannheim, Frankfurt on the Main, Worms, Kaiserslautern, and St. Wendel during the period from 19:22 to 19:55 hours, the bombers left in north-western direction.

A secondary attack timed to coincide with the main operation was conducted by a Mosquito-force of 30 to 40 aircraft against the area of Munster.

The following operations were, in addition, conducted by the RAF:

A nuisance raid/ with 5 Type Mosquito aircraft on Berlin. The fast bombers were observed approaching by way of Amsterdam, Csanabueck, and Hannover at 20:19 hours. Beginning at 21:44 hours, the Type Mosquito aircraft left the area of Berlin flying in north-western direction via Elbe Estuary.

From 00:50 to 01:11 hours, a single aircraft intruded into the Westerschelde.

From 01:33 to 01:57 hours, a single aircraft flew along the coast from Vlieland to Amsterdam.

From 03:25 to 03:41 hours, a single aircraft flew over the sea from Borkum to the island of Texel.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The foggy weather permitted the employment of small elements only.
The following aircraft were employed:

To provide fighter protection over Frankfurt

1st Fighter Division: 27 Type Me 110 and 20 Type Ju 88 aircraft
2nd Fighter Division: 6 Type Me 110 and 4 Type Ju 88 aircraft
3rd Fighter Division: 18 Type Me 110 and 7 Type Ju 88 and 1 Type He 219 aircraft

In "Himmelbett" tactics over Holland

3rd Fighter Division: 2 Type Me 110 aircraft

Total effort: 85 twin-engine fighter aircraft

The following aircraft were assembled to provide fighter protection:

By the 1st Fighter Division at radio beacon 10: The 4th Group/5th Night Fighter Wing from the airfield of Brandis,
at radio beacon 12: The 5th Night Fighter Wing from the airfield Erfurt-Bindelsleben,
the 1st Group/2nd Night Fighter Wing from the airfield Kassel-Rothwesten, and
the 2nd Group/2nd Night Fighter Wing from the airfield of Guetersloh.

By the 2nd Fighter Division at radio beacon Otto: The 1st and 2nd Groups/3rd Night Fighter Wing from the airfield of Wittmundhavan and the 3rd Group/3rd Night Fighter Wing from the airfield of Vechta.
By the 3rd Fighter Division at radio beacon Ida: The 1st Group/1st Night Fighter Wing and the 2nd Group/2nd Night Fighter Wing from the airfield of Venlo and the 2nd Group/1Night Fighter Wing from the airfield of Twente.

of the 1st and 3rd Fighter Divisions
The night fighter aircraft assembled at the radio beacons 10 and Ida were directed to radio beacon Otto. During the period from 19:22 to 19:55 hours, all units arrived over radio beacon Otto. From 19:45 hours on, the observation aircraft of the 3rd Fighter Division operated outside the areas of Frankfurt on the Main, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim which were protected by antiaircraft artillery and recognized the beginning of the attack on Frankfurt and Mannheim. This made it possible for the night fighter command to direct the night fighter aircraft to the objectives under attack in time. A large number of aircraft came in contact with the enemy but no enemy aircraft could be shot down owing to bad visibility.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 6 Type Me 110 aircraft. Three of them were lost by mutual ramming during the landing maneuver at the airfield of Eibiswitz.

Weather Conditions: Variable formation of stratus clouds, lower ceiling 200 meters, upper ceiling up to 3500 meters. Thick haze from the ground up to 1200 meters, above this altitude thin haze. Flying through clouds the aircraft were exposed to icing from an altitude of 200 meters on, no moonlight.
In Jutland: High-altitude fog at 150 meters.
Special Information: Major Walter Ehle, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Group/1st Night Fighter Wing was killed in action during the night of 17/18 November 1943. He had been awarded the knight cross of the iron cross and credited with 31 enemy aircraft shot down in night operations and 3 enemy aircraft shot down in day operations.

Photo of Major Walter Ehle, killed in action on 17/18 November 1943

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8. British Attack on Berlin, Mannheim, and Nuremberg on 18/19 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 501)

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Enemy Effort

The radio reconnaissance recognized in time the assembly of several hundred British bomber aircraft over the coastal area south of The Wash.

At 16:30 hours, the first bomber stream consisting of 200 to 300 aircraft left the assembly area in eastern direction. After crossing the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Bergen op Zoom the aircraft headed directly for Berlin. Small elements branched off in direction of Stettin. The first wave of the attacking force consisted of Type Mosquito pathfinder aircraft. After dropping the bomb loads on Berlin and Stettin the bombers returned in western direction to the British airbase.

A second bomber stream flying straight in south-eastern direction penetrated across Schelde Estuary into the areas of Mannheim and Nuremberg.
The British aircraft returned in north-western direction flying in a large broad front detouring the area in the Ruhr valley protected by antiaircraft artillery.

The British night attacks mainly hit the northern section of Berlin and the city and port areas of Mannheim and Ludwigshafen.

In addition, the following operations were carried out by the RAF:

A nuisance raid with 15 to 20 Mosquito-bombers on the Ruhr area. From 18:41 hours on, the Mosquito-bombers penetrated between Bergen op Zoom and Den Haag into the area of Muenster, Essen, and Munchen-Gladbach. Beginning at 19:38 hours, the aircraft returned on counter routes.

A nuisance raid with 10 Type Mosquito aircraft against the Ruhr area; the aircraft released bombs on Dinslaken, Koeln, Leverkusen, Aachen, and Duisburg. The aircraft had approached via Rotterdam beginning at 21:51 hours.

A nuisance mission carried out by a single Type Mosquito aircraft which intruded at 04:50 hours via the area of Namur and left at 05:49 hours by way of St. Quentin and Somme Estuary.

Two counter missions were flown across the Skagerrak to Sweden during the period from 18:48 to 00:08 hours.

Commitment of the 1st Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

In night fighter pursuit operations:
To operate against the bomber stream attacking Berlin:

By the 1st Fighter Division: 1 Type Ju 88 aircraft
in "Himmelbett"-tactics in the Bight of Heligoland:

By the 2nd Fighter Division: 2 Type Me 110 and 2 Type Ju 88 aircraft,

in "Himmelbett"-tactics over Holland:

By the 3rd Fighter Division: 6 Type Me 110 and 12 Type Ju 88 aircraft,

Total effort: 43 twin-engine fighter aircraft

Owing to extensive ground fog only small elements could be operationally employed. The Ju-88 units of the 1st Fighter Division from Central Germany were directed into the bomber stream over the area of Hannover by the "Y"-method. Since these units were not yet equipped with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus they did not contact enemy forces. The employment in "Himmelbett"-tactics in the \[\text{\textbf{MAXX}}\] sectors of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions had to be changed repeatedly and eventually broken off owing to sudden fog at the airfields.

Enemy Losses: 1 Type Lancaster aircraft shot down 40 kilometers west of Mep-

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: Owing to extensive ground fog, only a small number of airfields in the southern part of the sectors of the 1st and 2nd Fighter Divisions and in the area of the

Note: * "Y" means
Heligoland Bight could be used.

9.) British Attack on the Ruhr Area on 19/20 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, Supplement 51)

Enemy Effort

The radio reconnaissance recognized the assembly of British bomber units in the area north-east of London at an early stage. At 17:45 hours, a bomber stream left the assembly area and, flying in several waves in a close order of succession, proceeded via Scheldt Estuary into the industrial area of Western Germany; its southern flank was covered by a small mosquito-unit. The bombers left, flying in an extremely loose formation, in north-western direction by way of the Zuider Sea.

Other activities of the RAF:

During the period from 18:25 to 20:17 hours, a number of aircraft circled off Bergen op Zoom and over the sea area of the West Frisian islands up to north of Norderney. The low flying altitudes of the aircraft gave rise to the assumption that the latter were conducting a mine-laying operation.

Commitment of the 1st Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed by the 3rd Fighter Division:

in pursuit operations: 3 Type Me 110 aircraft, and
in "Himmelbett"-tactics over Holland and North-Western Germany: 22 Type Me 110 and 7 Type Ju 88 aircraft

Total effort: 32 twin-engine fighter aircraft
Extensive high-altitude fog considerably reduced the scope of the employment of friendly forces. Inadequate visibility and bad conditions for the use of flare equipment over the target area hindered the night fighter operations.

Enemy Losses: 4 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 Type Me 110 aircraft.

Weather Conditions: 9/10 to 10/10 clouds, lower ceiling 200 to 500 meters, upper ceiling 500 to 1200 meters, moderate icing in the clouds, visibility of 1 to 5 kilometers.

10.) British Attack on Berlin on 22/23 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 521)

Enemy Effort

No assembly of British units over Great Britain was observed. At 17:40 hours, the first elements of a strong British bomber stream were flying in tight groups between the island of Texel and Bergen op Zoom. The bomber stream proceeded in five waves flying straight in eastern direction above the clouds in a widening formation into the area of Berlin. The third wave of the bomber stream branched off over the area of Rheine in proceeded in south-eastern direction by way of Goettingen into the area of Halle to attack Berlin from the South. The bombers left in north-western direction flying in a broad front.

Secondary attacks conducted by Mosquito units were directed against Hamburg and the southern part of the Ruhr area. At 18:47 hours, the Type Mosquito aircraft approached by way of Terschelling and the East Frisian islands and were over Hamburg 19:42 hours.
The aircraft returned by way of Elbe Estuary and sea area close north of the East Frisian islands. The last bearing was taken on the aircraft when they were flying north of the island of Schiermonnikoog at 20:39 hours. The aircraft attacking the Ruhr area approached by way of Schelde Estuary from 17:50 hours on and left on counter routes.

The results of the attack on Berlin:

Time of attack: 20:00 to 20:50 hours.

Heavy damages to buildings by incendiary effect in the following sections of the city: Kurfuerstendamm, Potsdamer Platz, Charlottenburg, Tiergarten, Hansaviertel, and Moabit. The population of Berlin did not expect any air raid because of the bad weather.

Other activities of the RAF:

At 04:10 hours, a single British aircraft crossed the territory of Schleswig by way of the island of Fehmarn and penetrated up to the area of Itzehoe. The aircraft returned at 04:45 hours by way of Elbe Estuary in direction of the sea.

Commitment of the Jet Fighter Corps

Owing to weather conditions an employment was impossible. In the morning of 23 November 1943, the Antiaircraft Artillery Group Berlin reported that 17 British bomber aircraft had been shot down by antiaircraft artillery.

Enemy Losses: No enemy aircraft was brought down by night fighters.

Weather Conditions: Close formation of stratus clouds with icing, lower
ceiling from 50 to 3000 meters, at some places the clouds touched the ground. Visibility of 1 to 3 kilometers, frequently fog. Above 3000 meters breaks in the clouds and good visibility.

11.) British Attack on Berlin on 23/24 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 521)

Enemy Effort

At 17:40 hours, the first elements of a British bomber stream crossed the Dutch coast between the island of Terschelling and Den Helder. The bombers flew straight in eastern direction to Berlin in several waves in close succession. After releasing their bomb loads they returned in western and north-western direction. A diversion attack conducted by about 30 Mosquito aircraft which crossed Schelde Estuary at 18:10 hours and proceeded into the area of Kiel and Kiel.

Results of the attack on Berlin:

Time of attack: From 20:00 to 21:00 hours.

Heavy damages in the central section of the city and in the sections of Wending and Gesundbrunnen.

Other activities of the RAF:

Between 18:07 and 18:27 hours, a single British aircraft was observed flying across the island of Goeree to Rosendal.

At 18:10 hours, a British aircraft crossed Amsterdam and circled over Tiel and the Westerschelde.
From 18:48 to 19:58 hours, a number of British aircraft circled at a low altitude between Ijmuiden and the island of Texel and presumably dropped mines.

At 21:52 hours, a British aircraft flying in the area of Lauenburg in Pomerania in south-eastern direction was intercepted by radio intelligence. This aircraft proceeded into the area 20 kilometers north of Warsaw, flying at altitudes from 200 to 1500 meters, and, remarkably it crashed at Gr. 23:45 hours near Spiegel in the county of Dramburg in Pomerania.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

To provide fighter protection over Berlin:

By the 1st Fighter Division: 45 Type Me 110 aircraft,
by the 2nd Fighter Division: 31 Type Me 110 and 23 Type Ju 88 aircraft
by the 3rd Fighter Division: 2 Type Me 110 and 1 Type Ju 88 aircraft.

In night fighter pursuit operations:

By the 2nd Fighter Division: 3 Type Me 110 aircraft,
by the 3rd Fighter Division: 15 Type Me 110 and 6 Type Ju 88 aircraft.

In "Himmelbett"-tactics against the approaching and returning bombers in Holland, North-Western Germany and in the Heligoland Bight:

By the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions: 24 Type Me 110 and 17 Type Ju 88 aircraft

Total effort: 167 twin-engine fighter aircraft
The night fighter aircraft employed in pursuit operations were directed into the bomber stream already over the Dutch coast.

The following aircraft were assembled to provide fighter protection:

Night fighters of the 1st Fighter Division over radio beacon Berta, night fighters of the 2nd Fighter Division over [redacted] beacons Marie and Anton, night fighters of the 3rd Fighter Division over radio beacon Ludwig.

The assembled night fighters were directed:

From radio beacon Anton via radio beacon Marie to radio beacon Berta, from radio beacon Marie to radio beacon Berta, and from radio beacon Ludwig via radio beacon Marie to radio beacon Berta.

All night fighter aircraft arrived over Berlin before the attack began.

In that area, there was thick haze up to an altitude of 7500 meters.

Enemy Losses: 15 bomber aircraft shot down over Berlin.

1 four-engine aircraft crashed in Pomerania.

Losses of Friendly forces: 6 aircraft of which

1 Me 110 as a result of a burning engine,
1 Me 110 as a result of a defective engine,
1 Me 110 as a result of a crash-landing, as a result
1 Ju 88 [redacted] of an unknown cause,
2 Ju 88s as a result of defective engines.

Weather Conditions: In Holland and in the Heligoland Bight: Extremely loose formation of clouds.

In the rest of the Reich's territory: Thick formation of
high-altitude-fog-type clouds, lower ceiling 150 to 400 meters, upper ceiling 1000 to 2300 meters. Visibility reduced by haze.

12.) British Attack on Frankfurt on the Main and Offenbach on 25/26 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 54!)

Enemy Effort

In the evening of 25 November, the radio intelligence recognized British preparations for a bomber attack to be conducted in the second half of the night. The time of the first report on the assembly of bomber aircraft over the Thames Estuary was 00:15 hours. Beginning at 00:10 hours, a bomber stream consisting of several hundred aircraft started its approach flight in south-eastern direction. The aircraft crossed the Channel coast between Schelde and Somme Estuaries and proceeded across the southern part of Belgium into the area of Mannheim and Frankfurt on the Main. It was difficult to form a clear picture of the air situation owing to considerable concealment of the enemy flight course by Mosquito-aircraft and to tail winds. After dropping their bomb loads on Frankfurt on the Main and Offenbach, the bomber aircraft left the area of Frankfurt from 02:00 hours on, in north-western direction; the returning bombers were exposed to headwind and the last aircraft crossed the Channel coast at 05:30 hours.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the RAF:

A mine-laying operation with 6 aircraft over Schelde Estuary from 18:02 to 18:30 hours.
Type Mosquito

Nuisance missions with 10 to 12 aircraft up to the area of Neustrelitz. During the period from 19:21 to 19:46 hours, the aircraft penetrated via Bergen op Zoom, Hannover, Braunschweig up to the area of Neubrandenburg and Neustrelitz and changed to counter routes **from 20:39 hours on.**

From 19:55 to 20:28 hours, a single aircraft crossed the coast in the area of Amsterdam.

From 18:57 to 19:08 hours, a single aircraft operated over the sea 20 kilometers north of Terschelling.

During the period from 00:51 to 02:23 hours, 8 Type Mosquito aircraft flew nuisance missions across Schelde Estuary into the area of Duisburg, Duesseldorf.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

To provide fighter protection over Frankfurt on the Main:

By the 1st Fighter Division: 43 Type Me 110 and 4 Type Ju 88 aircraft,

By the 2nd Fighter Division: 26 Type Me 110 and 27 Type Ju 88 aircraft,

by the 3rd Fighter Division: 21 Type Me 110 and 7 Type Ju 88 aircraft.

In night fighter pursuit operations:

By the 3rd Fighter Division: 16 Type Me 110 and 9 Type Ju 88 aircraft.

In "Himmelbett"-tactics over Holland and Belgium:

By the 3rd Fighter Division: 3 Type Me 110 and 1 Type Ju 88 aircraft
Total effort: 157 twin-engine fighter aircraft

The night fighter aircraft employed in pursuit operations were directed into the bomber stream over Southern Belgium.

The night fighter aircraft which were to provide fighter protection over the target areas assembled as follows:

Northern section: 1st Fighter Division over radio beacon 12, proceeding to radio beacon Otto.

Southern section: 1st Fighter Division over radio beacon Otto,

2nd Fighter Division over radio beacon Philipp, proceeding to radio beacon Otto.

3rd Fighter Division over radio beacon Ida, proceeding to radio beacon Otto.

Owing to headwind, the majority of the night fighters arrived over Frankfurt too late. For this reason, the defensive success could be limited only.

Special Information: The enemy disturbed the German voice-radio communication of the German command and control system by transmitting fake orders.

Some night fighter crews let themselves be deceived by this enemy action and complied with British landing orders.

Enemy Losses: 9 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 4 Type Me 110 and 2 Type Ju 88 aircraft of
which 2 aircraft were missing and 1 He 110 crashed as a result of icing.

Weather Conditions: Between 5/10 and 10/10 fast changing formation of shower clouds, lower ceiling around 500 meters, upper ceiling in rain showers, sometimes snow showers, around 5000 meters. Visibility of more than 10 kilometers.

High-altitude winds at 5000 meters: 270 degrees, 70 to 90 kilometers per hour.

13.) British Attack on Frankfurt on the Main and on Berlin on 26/27 November 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 551)

Enemy Effort

After the assembly had been recognized, a British bomber stream left the area of Thames Estuary to proceed in southern direction to Somme Estuary, where its first elements changed to eastern courses at 17:30 hours. The bomber stream flew in three waves using the direct route into the Rhine-Main plains; a number of bombs was dropped on Frankfurt.

The first wave of the bomber force consisted of Type Mosquito aircraft. This wave penetrated into the areas of Stuttgart and Nuremberg thus concealing the flight course of the proceeding main bomber stream. After the Antiaircraft Group Frankfurt had reported the end of the attack only a small number of enemy aircraft flying singly could be recognized leaving the area of Frankfurt. Only a few reports of Type Rotterdam directivity bearings relating to the area east of Frankfurt and to the area of Kitzingen were available. Additional Rotterdam directivity bearings from the area of
Erfurt-Gotha caused the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps to presume that
the bomber stream proceeded into the industrial area of Saxonia. The pic-
ture of the air situation was not clear until the reports of the bearings
taken by the night fighter stations of the I Fighter Corps in the area
south-west of Berlin were available. In this area the ground direction find-
ing stations took a bearing on the first elements of the bomber stream
proceeding in the area north-west of Leipzig in direction of Berlin.
While the bombers proceeded from Frankfurt to the area of Leipzig, the night
fighter command received only a single sound location report from the air
observation command at Gotha. After releasing their bomb loads on Berlin,
the attacking aircraft left flying in an extremely broad front in north and
north-western direction.

The Results of the Attack on Berlin:

Time of attack: 21:10 to 21:55 hours.
Heavy damages in the sector of Spandau.

Other Activities of the RAF:

During the period from 18:34 to 19:35 hours, about 50 British
aircraft circled over the area of the West and East Frisian islands; they
flew at an altitude of 500 meters and presumably dropped mines.

At 19:30 hours, three British aircraft crossed Schelde Estuary
and proceeded and south-eastern direction into the area of Aachen and Koeln
to join the aircraft returning from the area of Frankfurt.

Beginning at 20:24 hours, 10 Type Mosquito bombers penetrated
across the Zuider Sea in eastern direction into the area of Great Berlin
and, returning to their bases, they joined the four-engine bomber aircraft which had conducted the large-scale attack.

During the period from 19:00 to 22:14 hours, 5 British aircraft appeared over the coastal area of Den Helder.

Evaluation of the British Effort:

In conducting the large-scale attack on Berlin the British air command had attempted, by detouring the bomber stream via Northern France, by carrying out the secondary attack on Frankfurt as well as the Mosquito operations over South-Western Germany and the area of Aachen for concealment purposes, and the simultaneous Mosquito-attack on Berlin, and a mine-laying operation in the Heligoland Bight, to confuse the picture of the air situation over the Reich's territory and to disperse the German night fighter defenses. This attempt failed since the Rotterdam directivity bearings made it possible to keep track of the four-engine aircraft groups; the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps was, consequently, in a position to concentrate all night fighter forces against the four-engine bombers and mine-layer aircraft.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

To provide fighter protection over Berlin:

By the 1st Fighter Division: 74 Type Me 110 and 1 Type Ju 88 aircraft

In night fighter pursuit operations:

By the 2nd Fighter Division: 3 Type Me 110 aircraft
By the 3rd Fighter Division: 1 Type Me 219, 17 Type Me 110, and 8 Type Ju 88 aircraft

In "Himmelbett"-tactics:

In Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland:
By the 2nd Fighter Division: 2 Type Me 110 and 15 Ju 88 aircraft

In "Himmelbett"-tactics:

In North-Western Germany and Holland:
By the 3rd Fighter Division: 41 Type Me 110 and 14 Ju 88 aircraft

Total effort: 156 twin-engine fighter aircraft

When the bomber stream penetrated into France, the 3rd Fighter Division occupied the "Himmelbett"-boxes over the area north-west of Frankfurt and directed the aircraft which were equipped with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus and were to engage in night fighter pursuit operations into the bomber stream over the territory of Southern Belgium. After the British bombers had dropped their bombs on Frankfurt these night fighters proceeded, flying in the same direction as the bomber stream did, to Berlin to provide fighter protection over that city.

To operate against the British mine-layer aircraft, night fighters of the 2nd Fighter Division occupied, from 18:09 hours on, the "Himmelbett"-boxes over Schleswig and Jutland.

Although the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe had, in a personal telephone call with the Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps, recommended
that the night fighter aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division be committed to provide fighter protection over Frankfurt, the latter kept the night fighters back for the protection of Berlin.

The night fighters of the 1st Fighter Division were not assembled over the radio beacons Ponto and Berta and committed to provide fighter protection over Berlin until the British bomber stream proceeded from Frankfurt in north-eastern direction.

To operate the leaving bombers, night fighter aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions occupied "Himmelbett"-boxes over the Heligoland Bight, in North-Western Germany, and in Holland.

Enemy Losses: 28 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 Type Me 110 and 1 Type Ju 88 aircraft

Weather Conditions: The weather situation was extremely variable. Shower clouds reaching up to 6000 meters with icing from 800 on alternated with cloud breaks.

Special Information: 

the Oberst (retired) Guenther Radusch, Former Commanding Officer of the 5th Night Fighter Wing of the 1st Fighter Division gave, from memory, the following report on the events on 26/27 November 1943:

"According to what I observed command post of the 1st Fighter Division in Doeberitz the British feint maneuver can be regarded as a success. The picture of the air situation which could be formed by the 1st
diversion

Fighter Division after the attack on Frankfurt was finished was completely unclear. The intruding aircraft were, after it became known that the attack on Frankfurt on the Main was finished, considered as returning from the area of Frankfurt. For this reason, the hitherto alert of the 5th Night Fighter Wing which had been in readiness for action was reduced. After I had convinced myself that there were no reports on enemy air forces proceeding to Central Germany, I left the command post.

I do not know how many night fighters proceeded from Frankfurt on the Main to Berlin. It could not have been many, in my opinion, since 17 enemy aircraft shot down over Berlin alone were credited to the 5th Night Fighter Wing which was committed too late.

The 5th Night Fighter Wing did by no means assemble over radio The proceeding of beacons Ponto and Berta. The enemy aircraft to Berlin became known to the 1st Fighter Division so late that the crews of the 5th Night Fighter Wing recognized the target area of Berlin already shortly after their take-off and thus had no time to fly a detour via a radio beacon for assembly purposes. In spite of their fast climbing directly to the target, the aircraft reached the combat altitude too late, so that the first enemy aircraft was not shot down until about 10 minutes after the beginning of the attack though, under the best flare conditions from the very beginning, several targets were simultaneously caught by searchlights for several minutes without any appearance of friendly night fighters. I observed all these events from the ground from the very beginning and saw the shooting down of the 17 enemy aircraft with my own eyes. I concluded from what I had observed that practically no night fighter had proceeded from
Attitude of the Former Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps:

The report on the events on 26/27 November 1943 is taken from the war diary of the I Fighter Corps.

The intended British flank maneuver cannot be regarded as a success, since the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps did not commit the units of the 1st Fighter Division to provide fighter protection over Frankfurt but kept them back for the protection of Berlin. The 5th Night Fighter Wing could not be directed to the British bomber stream, since the aircraft of this wing had not yet been equipped with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus.

The picture of the air situation formed by the 1st Fighter Division was justified inasmuch as the impression was established that the British main effort was directed against Frankfurt on the Main. Therefore, the 1st Fighter Division was right in reducing the degree of alert of the 5th Night Fighter Wing, i.e. changed the readiness from the so-called "Sitzbereitschaft", which means crews in the aircraft, to the "10-Minuten Bereitschaft", which means the crews had to stay close to the aircraft. When the Commanding Officer of the 5th Night Fighter Wing left the command post to drive to Berlin, it was surely unknown to the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps as well as to the staff of the 1st Fighter Division that the British bomber stream proceeded from the area of Frankfurt on the Main in direction of Berlin. The 1st Fighter Division and the 5th Night Fighter Wing were not alerted by telephone by the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps until the sound location report from Gotha had arrived.
The 1st Fighter Division doubtless ordered the assembly of the 5th Night Fighter Wing over the radio beacons Ponto and Berta. The failure of the majority of the wing to assemble over these radio beacons resulted from the fact that the British bombers arrived over Berlin earlier than could be expected in view of the air situation. The fighter aircraft of the 5th Night Fighter Wing were over Berlin at combat altitude early enough to be able to operate over the target under attack for 35 minutes and to bring down 17 bombers. The remaining 11 bomber aircraft were shot down while flying from Frankfurt on the Main to Berlin by 29 night fighter aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions employed in pursuit operations. In this context it appears absolutely possible that these night fighter aircraft had broken off their operations already before reaching Berlin owing to fuel shortage, since they had taken off as early as from 17:45 hours on in Western Germany and Holland. The fact that no pursuit fighters of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions was observed over Berlin should not lead to the conclusion that no night fighter from Frankfurt on the Main operated against the bomber stream proceeding to Berlin.

Oberst (retired) Radusch formed his opinion from the point of view of the 1st Fighter Division at a time when it could not have been known that the British bomber stream proceeded to Berlin. He left the command post of the 1st Fighter Division and his wing which was still under orders to stay in "10-Minuten Bereitschaft" (See page 57) and erroneously assumed that the British night operation was finished with the attack on Frankfurt on the Main.

The example of the night fighter operations on 26/27 November
1943 shows the decisive importance of a centralized command in air defense operations to protect a large area.

Detailed Information:

On 27 November 1943 at 17:15 hours, a conference at which the Commanding General presided took place in the headquarters of the I Fighter Corps. The subject under discussion was the conduct of a long-distance night fighter operation to interfere with the landing maneuvers British over Great Britain of bomber aircraft returning from a night operation. The operation was to be carried out under the code name "Sternflug" (Star flight). See Chapter VII, 1.e.

Chapter VII

Daytime Events in
December 1943

1.) Survey

a.) American Offensive Activities

In December 1943, the American bomber force in Great Britain took, for its offensive operations against the Reich's territory, only advantage of those days which offered favorable weather conditions favorable for take-off and landing of the bomber units at the British air base. For this reason, the total number of the American aircraft committed
against the Reich's territory in December 1943 was smaller than \textbf{xx} in the preceding month. A total of 7 large-scale attacks were conducted against the Reich's territory; these attacks were directed against targets in the Heligoland Bight, North-Western Germany, and targets in the Rhine-Main area. Long-distance operations were avoided. Regarding the selection of targets a main emphasis on attacks against establishments of the German Navy could be observed. All attacking bombers were escorted by Allied fighter forces of which the only mission it was to protect the bomber aircraft against German fighter attacks. The German fighter command had the impression that the total strength of the American fighter forces employed for escort purposes in December 1943 had been increased. The American units dropped bombs, presumably without visual observation of the ground, on four days of attack. American reconnaissance activities over the Reich's territory were comparatively limited. The main effort of the reconnaissance operations was directed to North-Western Germany.

b.) Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

\textbf{xx} more favorable flying weather rendered the employment of the German day fighter forces more economical than it had been in the preceding month. In addition, the German fighter command used restraint in the employment of forces under conditions of fog or high-altitude fog. The German day fighter forces of numerical inferiority had succeeded neither in preventing an American large-scale attack nor in inflicting decisive losses on the enemy. The approximate German numerical inferiority is, on the basis of the average daily effort, \textbf{xx} demonstrated by the following figures:
American total offensive effort: German single-engine and twin-engine fighter strength

3 : 1

American escort fighter strength: German single-engine and twin-engine fighter strength

1,4 : 1

In view of the German inferiority, the Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps rejected the idea of the employment of the day fighter forces by groups and the tactics of simultaneously attacking American fighter and bomber aircraft at different spots of the bomber stream. At the occasion of a map game on 11 December 1943 in the presence of the General of the Fighter Forces and of all wing commanders he tried to explain the motives of his rejection.

On 29 December 1943, the Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps gave, at his headquarters in Driebergen near Zeist in Holland, the following verbal directive to the commanding generals of the fighter divisions regarding the methods to be applied in offensive action:

"In view of our numerical inferiority it is necessary in our operations against the American attacks to concentrate our units for the attack in respect to time and space. The fighter attacks have to be conducted in such a manner that coherent units of the strength of at least one wing attack the bomber stream at a specific spot. By applying this method it must be possible to destroy an American bomber unit completely."
On the same day, a closer concentration of the day fighter units within the divisional sectors, the technique of assembling the fighter wings in the air, and the method of attacking from the front were discussed with the commanding generals of the fighter divisions. The closer concentration of the units was to be materialized in January 1944.

c.) Successes and Losses in December 1943

The average total strength of day fighters in operational condition in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943 amounted to:

- 300 fighter aircraft (single-engine),
- 80 twin-engine fighter aircraft, and
- 100 night fighter aircraft suited for daytime employment.

Total number of day fighter aircraft employed in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943: 1209 aircraft

Total losses of aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943: 41 aircraft which is 3.4 per cent of the total effort

Enemy losses over the Reich's territory in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943: 155 aircraft not including those shot down by antiaircraft artillery.

This figure represents about 4.4 per cent of the estimated total effort against the Reich's territory which amounted to about 3500 aircraft.
d. Special Information:

On 11 December 1943, a map exercise was held under the personal supervision of the commanding general at the headquarters of the I Fighter Corps in Driesbergen near Zeist.

This map exercise was attended by the following persons:

The General of the Fighter Forces with members of his staff,
the commanding generals of the fighter divisions stationed in the home air defense area,
a number of group commanders of the day and night fighter wings employed in the home air defense area,
members of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe High Command,
members of the operations staff of the Luftwaffe Commander Central Sector,
members of the staff of the Inspector General of the Antiaircraft Artillery in the Luftwaffe High Command,
members of the staffs of the Luftwaffe administrative commands within the Reich's territory.

The map exercise had the following objective:

The information of the commanders on principles of command and operational techniques to be applied in day and night fighter operations within the framework of the home air defense with special regard to the cooperation with the antiaircraft artillery.
The necessity of the following measures was to be proved:

- The uniform interpretation of the air situation at a central post of the home air defense system,
- the subordination of the radio intelligence system to the fighter command,
- the establishment of a centralized command for the conduct of the fighter and antiaircraft artillery operations in the home air defense; in particular the placing of the single-engine night fighter forces under the operational responsibility of the I Fighter Corps,
- the conduct of a long-distance night fighter operation over the Island of Britain with all available night fighter and twin-engine fighter forces of the home air defense to interfere with a British landing maneuver.

The good prospects for success involved in such operation in case a surprise could be obtained was pointed out.

Photo of the General of the Fighter Forces, General-Major Galland, at the Map Exercise at the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps on 11 December 1943

2. Daytime Events during the Period from 1 December 1943 to 1 January 1944

(Not including American large-scale attacks)

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 561)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the American air forces in Great Britain:
Reconnaissance missions flown by 22 Type Mosquito aircraft.

The main effort of the reconnaissance operations was directed to North-Western Germany. Only a few reconnaissance missions extended to Denmark the Western Baltic, the Bay of Kiel, the Heligoland Bight, the area of Hannover, and the area west of Berlin. Owing to bad visibility over the Reich's territory, it was no longer possible to keep track of the flight course of 8 Type Mosquito aircraft on a reconnaissance mission. The total area covered by the enemy air reconnaissance was about the same in which the targets of the American attacks were located.

35 aircraft flying singly approached the coast.

On 23 December 1943, about 150 Thunderbolt-fighter aircraft intruded across Schelde Estuary up to the frontier of the Reich.

On 12 December, enemy fighter aircraft presumably intruded into the North Sea area.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

For want of a suitable fighter aircraft type, the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps no longer committed any forces against Type Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft. A Type Mosquito aircraft operating at a low altitude was shot down by a Type Me 109 fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 1 Type Mosquito aircraft.

3.) American Attack on Gummersbach on 1 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 57)
Enemy Effort

Beginning at 10:40 hours, American bomber forces covered by strong fighter units penetrated across Scheldt Estuary in south-eastern direction into the area of Koln, Siegen, and Mainz and dispersed their bomb loads over a large area. The main effort of the bombing was directed against the near area at Grummersbach. At 11:40 hours, some elements of the escort fighter forces returned in western direction via Aachen to their take-off base. The bombers left the target area flying in a widely dispersed formation in western direction. The last unit crossed the Channel coast between Scheldt Estuary and Calais at 13:35 hours. An American fighter unit which approached across Scheldt Estuary at 11:20 hours met the returning bombers over the area of Liège and Aachen.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the American air forces:

A reconnaissance mission flown by Type Mosquito aircraft over the area of Duisburg and Dortmund. The Type Mosquito aircraft intruded at 08:25 hours via Antwerp and left by way of Muenster and Arnhem at 09:30 hours.

During the period from 09:09 to 09:15 hours, two aircraft approached the coast at Den Helder flying at altitudes from 50 to 200 meters.

During the period from 09:11 to 09:13 hours, two aircraft approached the coast at Hoek van Holland flying at altitudes from 50 to 200 meters.

A reconnaissance mission was flown up to the area north-west of Berlin. The aircraft intruded at 10:30 hours via Leiden, Canabrueck, and Stendal to Neuruppin and left by way of Hamburg and the island of Heligoland at 13:12 hours.

The units of the 3rd and 2nd Fighter Divisions repeatedly attacked a number of American bomber units over the area east of Koblenz. They scored successes sustaining moderate losses. The fighters of the 1st Fighter Division engaged in combat over the area east of Gummersbach without scoring any success.

Enemy Losses: 17 bomber and 15 fighter aircraft definitely shot down,

4 bomber and 4 fighter aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 4 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 2 killed,

3 wounded,

5 missing.

Weather Conditions: Over Great Britain: Bright, 1/10 to 3/10 cumulus clouds at about 1000 meters with good visibility. Over the continent increasing cloud formation at first of 3/10 to 6/10 and closer to the target area of 8/10 to 10/10.

North of the Mittelgebirge and over Dutch territory: 5/10 to 9/10 cumulus clouds, lower ceiling 500 meters, upper ceiling partially above 4000 meters, scattered showers, visibility outside the shower zone more than 10 kilometers. Accumulation of air on the north-west side of the mountains, at and over the mountains 10/10 clouds with icing. Aircraft could land only North-Western Germany and in Holland.
There were from 8/10 to 10/10 clouds in the target area so that the enemy forces could have been able to orient themselves by visual observation of the ground only during short periods of time.

4.) Penetration of American Fighter Forces into Holland on 4 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 581)

Beginning at 14:20 hours, two American fighter units penetrated, flying at altitudes between 5000 and 8000 meters, across Schelde Estuary into the areas of Arnheim and Muenchen-Gladbach. Both units left in western direction.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the American air forces:

At 8:35 hours, enemy aircraft approached the coast at the island of Terschelling.

Two Type Mosquito aircraft flew a reconnaissance mission across Hoek van Holland, Gilze Rijen to the island of Schouwen during the period from 09:24 to 09:52 hours.

A single aircraft passed over the island of Texel at 09:40 hours.

Enemy aircraft approached the coast at Hoek van Holland at 10:56 hours.

A reconnaissance mission with a single aircraft over Hoek van Holland, Appeldorn, and the Zuider Sea from 11:28 to 11:55 hours.

A reconnaissance flown by a single Type Mosquito aircraft across Amsterdam, Hannover into the area of Magdeburg at 13:03 hours.
The aircraft was over Braunschweig at 14:47 hours; from that time on it was no longer possible to keep track of its flight course.

During the period from 13:20 to 13:49 hours, a reconnaissance mission was flown into the area of Emden.

From 13:07 to 13:15 hours, an enemy aircraft passed over the island of Walcheren.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Although the units of the 3rd Fighter Division were scrambled, they did not succeed in reaching combat altitude in time. Some of these aircraft were attacked from top by American fighters.

Total Effort: 55 fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 3 Type 109 aircraft of the 2nd Group/3rd Fighter Wing.

Special Information: On 4 December, Hauptmann Lemke, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Group/3rd Night Fighter Wing, was killed in action. He was credited with shooting down 131 enemy aircraft in day fighter operations and was awarded the addition of the oakleaf cluster to the iron cross of the knight cross.

Over the Channel and the coastal area: Mostly cloudless. Local formation of high-altitude fog up to 300 meters. Very good flying visibility.

Over the Reich's territory: Extensive formation of high-altitude fog.

In Holland and Western Germany: Cloud breaks. Aircraft could take off at some airfields.

5.) American Attack on Emden on 11 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 59!)

Enemy Effort

From 08:08 hours on, the German radio reconnaissance observed the assembly of American bomber units over the Island of Britain in the area of Norwich. At about 10:35 hours, 250 to 300 bomber aircraft began to fly their offensive mission across the North Sea in north-eastern direction. Over the area about 60 to 100 kilometers north of the island of Norderney they changed to southern courses and bombed Emden attacking in three waves. The left flying in a broad front across Northern Holland. From 12:40 hours on, a strong American fighter force penetrated via Leeuwarden to meet the bombers over Emden. A second fighter force succeeded in uniting with the last wave of the American bomber force so that the latter had to leave Emden without fighter cover.

In addition, the following four Mosquito reconnaissance missions were conducted by the American air forces:

1st flight course: At 09:47 hours via Utrecht, Rheine, Nienburg, and Salzwedel. From 11:05 hours on, it was no longer possible to keep track of the further flight course.
2nd flight course: At 11:24 hours, via the island of Goeree, Rotterdam, Arnheim, Duisburg, Duesseldorf, Muenchen-Gladbach, Antwerp, and Schelde Estuary. The aircraft left at 12:14 hours.

At 3rd flight course: 11:37 hours via Amsterdam, Rhenine, Csmabrucek, Braunschweig, Gardelegen, Uelsen, and Bremen.

The aircraft left at 13:00 hours.

4th flight course: At 13:19 hours, via Randers, south of the island of Samoe, and the island of Zealand. The aircraft were last reported flying south of Kopenhagen at 13:53 hours. They presumably proceeded to Sweden.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Total Effort: 307 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft

at the Elbe River

Owing to bad weather conditions, the units of the 1st Fighter Division did not contact the enemy. 147 aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions engaged in successful air combat over the area of Emden.

Enemy Losses: 19 bomber and 5 fighter aircraft definitely shot down.

10 bomber and 1 fighter aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 8 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 7 killed,

5 wounded,

11 missing.

Weather Conditions: Great Britain: 5/10 to 8/10 stratus clouds, lower ceiling around 500 meters, upper ceiling around 1500 meters.
Holland and North-Western Germany: Extensive high-altitude-fog-type stratus clouds between 5/10 and 10/10. Lower ceiling 500 to 1000 meters.
Coastal area of the North Sea: Frequently bright.
From the area of the Elbe River to the East:
Generally 10/10 clouds with lower ceiling at 100 meters, visibility of 1 to 3 kilometers.
In Southern Germany: 10/10 clouds with lower ceilings from 300 to 500 meters. Mountains covered by clouds. Moderate icing in the stratus clouds.
Target Area: Bright to cloudless.

6.) American Attack on Kiel, Hamburg, and Bremen on 13 December 1943

(See sketch: Home air defense, supplement 601)

Enemy Effort

The assembly of American bomber units over the area of Ipswich, Cambridge, and The Wash was observed from 06:30 hours on. Beginning at 10:00 hours, the attacking force grouped and proceeded from the area of The Wash under fighter escort in eastern direction across the North Sea. Without visual observation of the ground the American bombers attacked ENGLAND, flying in five waves, targets in Kiel, Hamburg, and Bremen. The waves used the following flight courses:
First wave: Friedrichskoog, Hamburg, Bremen; the aircraft returned in western direction.

Second wave: North of Wesermünde, Bremen; the aircraft returned in western direction.

Third wave: West of Cuxhaven, Hamburg, Kiel; the aircraft returned in western direction.

Fourth wave: South-west of Cuxhaven, Bremen; the aircraft returned in western direction.

Fifth wave: Spinnekopf Spiekeroog, north of Wesermünde, Hamburg, Kiel; the aircraft left via Hettstedt.

During the period from 10:48 hours to 11:27 hours, 4 American fighter units were employed to meet the returning bombers. 3 of these units penetrated into the area of Groningen and 1 unit penetrated up to Bremen.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the American air forces:

From 08:37 to 08:56 hours, two aircraft flew along the coast at Den Haag.

From 09:51 to 10:41 hours, a force of 20 to 30 enemy fighter aircraft penetrated across Schelde Estuary into the area of Venlo.

From 09:52 to 10:39 hours, 20 enemy fighter aircraft penetrated across Katwijk into the area north of Deelen.

From 10:50 to 12:08 hours, a force of about 100 enemy fighter aircraft penetrated into the area of Muenster.
From 14:13 to 15:17 hours, a bomber attack was conducted in several waves against the airfield of Schiphol. The attacking aircraft flew at an altitude of 5000 meters.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Fog, occasionally at high altitudes, permitted only the employ-
day and night of only a limited number of fighter aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions.

Total Effort: 47 aircraft

Enemy Losses: 3 Type Boeing aircraft

Losses of Friendly Forces: 2 night fighter aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 5 missing,

6 wounded.

Weather Conditions: Great Britain and North Sea: 5/10 to 10/10 stratus clouds,

lower ceiling from 500 to 800 meters, upper ceiling around 1000 meters.

In the target areas: 10/10 clouds, lower ceiling from 50

to 100 meters, sometimes touching the ground. Owing to

Fog, also at high altitudes, day fighter aircraft could not take off before noon in the area of Volkel and Schi-

pol and night had to take off blind-flying.

7.1) American Attack on Bremen on 16 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 611)
Enemy Effort

At 10:53 hours, 7 American bomber units were recognized approaching 200 kilometers west of Den Helder. The bombers proceeded over the sea area north of the West and East Frisian Islands in eastern and north-eastern direction into the area of Flensburg, Kiel, Hamburg, and Bremen. Bombs were dropped on Bremen without visual observation of the ground. Beginning at 12:30 hours, 5 American fighter units intruded between Katwijk and De Kooy across the Zuider Zee into the areas of Emden, Oldenburg, and Rheine. They provided cover for the returning bombers. The bombers left flying in a broad front between north of Bergen op Zoom, Heide, and Heligoland. The bomber aircraft left the Dutch coast at 14:10 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Total Effort: 91 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft

The operational employment of the aircraft was hindered by fog.

Enemy Losses: 13 bomber aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly forces: 2 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 6 missing,

2 wounded.

Weather Conditions: Over Great Britain and the North Sea: Total, thin cover of stratus clouds, lower ceilings from 400 to 800 meters, upper ceiling 1000 meter.

In the central sector of the Heligoland Bight and over the coastal areas: Fog or high-altitude fog. Above 1000 meters extremely light good visibility with Cirrus clouds. There were only
a few large breaks in the extensive fog and high-altitude cover over the Reich's territory in the area of Muenster, in the area of Koeln, and in Holland. The effectiveness of the fighter defenses was strongly impared by the extensive fog cover. At some airfields the aircraft took off with a visibility of 1 to 2 kilometers.

6. American Attack on Bremen on 20 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 621)

Enemy Effort

From 0830 hours on, American bombers assembled in the area north-east of London. At about 1030 hours, they left the Island of Britain in eastern direction and, covered by strong fighter forces, flew in three waves across the Dutch coast between the island of Vlieland and Amsterdam. They aircraft proceeded across the Zuider Sea to Bremen. The bombs were dropped on that city between 1143 and 1215 hours. At 1020 hours, American fighter units crossed the Schelde Estuary to meet the bombers over the Schelde Estuary at 1245 hours.

From 1315 to 1337 hours, a Type Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft circled over the Stettiner Haff. This aircraft had intruded at 1207 hours via Esbjerg in south-eastern direction and returned by way of Odense and Kolding. The last intercepted position of the aircraft was 80 kilometers north-west of Esbjerg at 1446 hours.
In addition, documents of the former Military Science Branch of the Luftwaffe show that, on 20 December 1943, American bomber units from the air base in Italy attacked targets in Augsburg and Innsbruck.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Under good weather conditions the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fighter Divisions succeeded in committing the majority of their day fighter forces in the area of Bremen and Oldenburg where fierce air combat developed.

Total Effort: 202 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft

Enemy Losses: 35 bomber and 3 fighter aircraft definitely shot down.

9 bomber and 2 fighter aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 10 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 3 killed,

2 wounded,

15 missing.

Weather Conditions: Under the conditions of cold air with a good visibility and with thin formation of cumulus clouds the American units could operate unhindered and locate the target. The time of approach was reduced by tail wind.

The weather conditions at all airfields north of the Main River were favorable for air operations. The approach flight of friendly units was hindered by wind shifts. Light cumulus clouds drifting from the North Sea into over the target area. Lower ceiling 600 meters, upper ceiling up to 2500 meters. A haze layer and cirrus clouds between 6000 and 7000 meters.
9.) American Attack on North-Western Germany on 22 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplements 631)

Enemy Effort

At 12:30 hours, a strong Lightning-fighter force was flying 120 kilometers west of Katwijk and proceeded in eastern direction by way of Appeldoorn into the area of Rheine. Over this area the force changed to counter routes. At 12:55 hours, strong American bomber units escorted by and fighter forces approaching over the British air base were intercepted by radio intelligence. The bomber aircraft crossed the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Rotterdam and proceeded, flying above or in the clouds, to the area of Rheine, Muenster, Osnabrueck, Vechta, Bremen, and south of Oldenburg. Over this area the bombs were widely dispersed without visual observation of the ground, among other targets on the area near Muenster, Achmer, Rheine, Groningen, north and west of Meppen and on a great number of rural communities around Osnabrueck. The American attack had been widely split up. The bombers returning in western direction were met over the area of Duisburg and Muenster by American fighter aircraft which had intruded at 13:30 hours by way of Schelde Estuary as usual.

The other activities of the American air forces were limited in scope. The following missions by flown by three aircraft of the American air forces:

At 09:45 hours over Hoek van Holland,

hours at 09:43 over the island of Schouwen, and

at 10:00 hours over Bergen op Zoom.

Commitment of the 1 Fighter Corps
In spite of inclement flying weather the friendly fighter units succeeded by chance in reaching combat altitude over the area between the Ems and Weser Rivers by flying through cloud breaks. These units attacked the American offense forces above the clouds. The losses sustained by friendly forces were due to icing to which the aircraft were exposed when flying through the clouds.

**Total Effort:** 194 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

**Enemy Losses:** 19 bomber and 6 fighter aircraft definitely shot down, 5 bomber and 2 fighter aircraft probably shot down.

**Losses of Friendly Forces:** 12 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 1 killed, 7 wounded, 17 missing.

**Weather Conditions:** The flight formation of clouds in the rear of the bad weather zone offered good visibility so that the American units could assemble over the Island of Britain. In the coastal area of Northern Germany and the foothill area of the Harz Mountains: Thick formation of several strata of clouds which permitted air operations but did not permit climbing through the clouds over these areas. Another bad weather zone was moving from the Dutch coastal area to the East. Ahead of this bad weather zone the cloud cover became thinner so that over the industrial area of Rhineland-Westphalia between Ems and Weser the aircraft could climb to adequate altitudes.
Over the target area: 7/10 to 10/10 variable formation of cumulus clouds, upper ceiling up to 5000 meters, above this altitude up 10k to 7000 meters light stratus cloud fields of which the thickness aircraft sometimes permitted the American bomber to disappear in the clouds.

10. American Attack on Frankfurt on the Main on 30 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 641)

**Enemy Effort**

From 09:10 hours on, the assembly of American bomber units over the southern sector of the British air base was recognized by the German radio intelligence. Beginning at 09:51 hours, the American bombers crossed the Channel coast between Somme Estuary and Dieppe. The aircraft then proceeded by way of the area of St Quentin, Reims, and Luxembourg into the area of Frankfurt, Mannheim, and Karlsruhe. Since optical target finding was not possible, the bombs were dispersed among other targets on Mainz, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Oppau, and Mannheim. From 12:10 hours on, the bomber aircraft returned in north-western direction by way of Schelde and Somme Estuaries, where the last bombers' units were reported at 15:00 hours. A number of American fighter units met the returning bombers over the area of Brussels, Namur, Malmedy, and Trier. These fighters had intruded between Schelde Estuary and Calais from 11:38 hours on.

In addition, the American air forces conducted the following operations:

At 09:50 hours, a single aircraft flew along the
coast near Den Helder.

A force of 20 to 30 Mosquito-fighters intruded via Den Helder into Schelde Estuary during the period from 10:20 to 10:45 hours.

From 10:47 to 10:52 hours, two aircraft crossed the island of Walcheren.

From 10:54 to 11:10 hours, a single aircraft appeared over the coast at Rotterdam.

From 11:15 to 11:45 hours, 1 Type Mosquito aircraft flew a reconnaissance mission over the area of Duisburg and Muenchen-Gladbach.

From 11:53 to 11:58 hours, a single aircraft crossed the island of Walcheren.

From 12:31 hours on, a single Type Mosquito aircraft flew a reconnaissance mission across Esbjerg and Alsen into the area of Rostock. When the aircraft had reached Rostock, it was no longer possible to keep track of its flight course.

From 13:23 to 14:03 hours, a single aircraft appeared over the coast at Dortrecht.

From 14:35 to 15:06 hours, two aircraft flying at a low altitude penetrated into the area of Herzogenbosch.

From 15:12 to 15:17 hours, two Type Mustang aircraft flying at low altitude intruded across the island of Walcheren.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps
Total Effort: 128 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

The majority of the fighter aircraft employed by the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions did not succeed in climbing through the clouds. All aircraft were precociously recalled to airfields in the coastal areas at which safe landing was possible.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: No losses of aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 3 killed in crash landings.

Weather Conditions: Good visibility in rear of a bad weather zone permitted the American units to assemble over Great Britain. Approaching over Northern France and Belgium they were able to orient themselves by visual observation of the ground. Over the Ardennes they met with a cloudy bad weather zone with an upper ceiling \( \text{max} \) between 2500 and 3000 meters.

Reich’s territory: South of the line Ruhr area - Harz

friendly fighter aircraft could not be operationally employed owing to \( \text{max} \) the extremely low cloud ceilings. Lower ceilings from 50 to 150 meters, visibility from 300 to 1500 meters. There were heavy showery's in Northern Germany which \( \text{prevented} \), on account of icing, permitted the fighters to climb through the clouds only in the cases of \( \text{single} \) scattered cloud breaks.
In the target area: Thick formation of clouds with rain-fall. Lower ceiling 150 to 4000 meters, upper ceiling 2500 to 3000 meters.

Chapter VIII

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Nighttime Events in

December 1943

1.) Survey

a,) British Offensive Activities

In December 1943, the weather conditions in Great Britain assumed such proportions that the offensive nighttime activities of the RAF against the Reich’s territory were more limited than they had been during November 1943. During nine nights (5/6, 6/7, 7/8, 8/9, 9/10, 14/15, 25/26, and 27/28 December 1943), no British aircraft appeared over the sector of the 1 Fighter Corps except a small number of British courier aircraft flying to Sweden. During nights with weather conditions suitable for take-off, a total of 6 large-scale attacks were directed against cities in the Reich’s territory. 4 of these attacks were directed against the Reich’s capital. The number of Mosquito-bombers employed in nuisance raids had decreased in December. About 17 nuisance raids were conducted by small Mosquito-units were recognized. The destructive effect of these raids was negligible. The Coastal Command continued its mine-laying activities in the form of 7 recognized operations,
b.) British Offensive Tactics and Radio Interference

The Bomber Command adhered to its tactics of concealing the large-scale attacks by conducting secondary attacks with Mosquito- and four-engine bombers. A deception of the German night fighter command by a British secondary attack during the night of 3/4 December was successful. A repetition of the detour maneuver by way of Frankfurt on the main route to the attack on Berlin during the night of 23/24 December after the pattern of the night attack on 26/27, however, did not catch the German night fighter defenses by surprise. The British long-distance night fighter operations extended to the area of Berlin and Central Germany. In this area low-level strafing attacks on German night fighter airfields produced nuisance effects.

The British radio interference with the activities of the German radar stations by dropping tinfoil strips made itself felt to an increasing extent also during Mosquito-nuisance raids.

The interference with the radio communication of the German command and control system was intensified considerably. This interference hindered, in particular, the night fighter operations during the night of 16/17 December.

c.) Commitment of the German Night Fighter Forces

The employment of the night fighter forces was also in December 1943 often hindered by fog which was encountered also at high altitudes. However, considerable proportion due to weather conditions could be avoided.
Although heavier losses, as compared to the preceding month, could be inflicted on the British bomber force, the night fighter generally speaking, by no means produce satisfactory results. Above all, the inadequate supply of the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus which was immune to any interference made it impossible to improve considerably the successes obtained in night fighter pursuit operations. The development of this method of commitment, however, made some progress owing to the employment of radio beacons as auxiliary means of the command and control system. Thus the confidence of the night fighter forces in their own successes which the latter had lost as a result of the failure of the "Himmelbett"-night fighter operations. Operations against the British Mosquito-bombers were almost completely discontinued because no suitable night fighter aircraft type. Technical improvisation to improve the efficiency of available night fighter types did not bring about a solution of the problem of counter-Mosquito operations.

During December 1943, it occurred several times that the assembly of British bomber forces over the British air base was not recognized at all or was recognized too late. It has never been definitely recognized had been ascertained whether such prevented by British concealment or whether the German radio intelligence had failed. In conclusion, it should be noted that the German fighter defenses, in December 1943, did not succeed in causing such losses to the units of the RAF that a continuation of the night bomber operations against Germany in 1944 would have to be considered as a risk.

d.) Successes and Losses during December 1943

The average total strength of night fighter aircraft in operational
condition in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943 amounted to: 245 twin-engine fighter aircraft

Total strength of night fighter aircraft committed in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943: 775\# twin-engine fighter aircraft of which about 60 night fighters were employed to Mosquito-attacks.

\# Number of night fighter aircraft completely lost in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943: 24 twin-engine fighter aircraft which is 3 per cent of the total effort.

Losses of the RAF over the Reich's territory in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in December 1943: 138 aircraft not including those aircraft brought down by antiaircraft artillery and by single-engine night fighters.

This figure represented about 5.3 per cent of the estimated total effort of the RAF against the Reich's territory which amounted to about 2,600 aircraft.

e.) Detailed Information

it was the first time that On 12 December at 19:00 hours, a Mosquito-bomber was shot down over the radar station Badn in a "Himmelbett"-operation. The Mosquito-aircraft hit the ground near Zaltbommel in Holland. The successful crew consisted of Hauptmann Heurer, Oberleutnant Haasdorf, and Oberfeldwebel Schelbe and flew a Type Ju 88 K model Series R2 aircraft equipped with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus as well as with Type GM1 and SM2 units. The latter are devices reinforcing the engines to improve the climbing and acceleration performance.
The Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps ordered the following measures:

On 12 December 1943 the formation of the aircraft reporting and ranging company of the 222nd Air Signal Regiment as crew of the night fighter control ship "Togo" at the anchorage of Kiel. The "Togo" was to be employed as water-borne radar station in the Baltic Sea as well as in the Skagerrak.

On 28 December 1943 the establishment of the position of the Sectional Fighter Commander Grove in Holland. Inadequate wire communications from Denmark to the command post of the 2nd Fighter Division necessitated the possibility of conducting night fighter operations independently in Jutland.

On 29 December 1943 the re-equipment of the night fighter respective wings with only one aircraft type **Heinkel 110**. The wings were to be equipped with the following types:

1st Night Fighter Wing with the Type 219 aircraft for employment in "Himmelbett"-tactics and in night fighter pursuit operations,

2nd Night Fighter Wing with the Type Ju 88 R aircraft for employment in night fighter pursuit operations,

3rd Night Fighter Wing with the Type Me 110 aircraft for employment in "Himmelbett"-tactics,

5th Night Fighter Wing with the Type Ju 88 and Type Me 110 aircraft for employment in "Himmelbett"-tactics and in night fighter pursuit operations.

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Photo of Oberfeldwebel Scheibe, the aircraft radio operator of Hauptmann Meurer, shot down the first Mosquito-bomber in a night operation on 12 December 1943. He was killed in action on...
21/22 January 1944

2. Night Events during the Period from 1 to 16 December 1943

(Not including British large-scale attacks)

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 651)

The Ruhr area was the target area for 6 nuisance raids conducted by Type Mosquito aircraft. The bombs were widely dispersed, among other targets on Essen, Oberhausen, and Venlo. A small number of nuisance aircraft flying singly penetrated into the area north-west of Berlin and into the area of Frankfurt and Mannheim. British small-scale mine-laying operations were conducted in the sea area north of the Nortik East Frisian Islands. 2 Courier aircraft were observed flying across the Skagerrak to Sweden.

Total Effort of the RAF: About 83 Type Mosquito aircraft as well as 10 aircraft of unrecognized types and a great number of mine-layer aircraft.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

In "Himmelbett"-tactics over Northern Jutland: 1 twin-engine fighter aircraft;
in "Himmelbett"-tactics in Holland: 2 twin-engine fighter aircraft

Total effort: 3 aircraft

Enemy Losses: 1 Mosquito-bomber on 12 December 1943.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None
3. Nighttime Events during the Period from 16 December 1943 to 1 January 1944

(Not including British large-scale attacks)

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 66!)

**Enemy Effort**

In the second half of December, the nuisance raids conducted by Type Mosquito aircraft at night were again concentrated against the industrial area of Western Germany. A small number of bombs was released on Kiel, Dusseldorf, Bonn, Frankfurt on the Main, Hanau, and other targets. A few aircraft flying singly appeared over North-Western Germany and the coastal area of Holland. British mine-layer aircraft operated in the sea area north of the West Frisian Islands. 

Total Effort of the RAF: About 100 Type Mosquito aircraft and 1 mine-layer unit of unknown strength.

**Commitment of the I Fighter Corps**

In "Himmelbett" tactics over Northern Jutland: 2 twin-engine fighter aircraft,

in "Himmelbett" tactics over Holland: 11 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Total effort: 13 aircraft

**Enemy Losses:** Enemy losses were not observed.

**Losses of Friendly Forces:** None
4) Mine-Laying Operations Conducted by the RAF over the Kattegat and the
Sea Area north of the West Frisian Islands on 1/2 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 671)

Enemy Effort

During the period from 17:20 to 18:00 hours, 40 to 50 British
aircraft flying at an altitude of about 4000 meters crossed the coast of
Jutland between Ringkøbing and Esbjerg. Flying in eastern direction they
headed into the Kattegat where they dropped mines from an altitude of about
200 meters. They returned by way of the Skagerrak. The last returning air-
craft passed Skagen at 20:02 hours.

From 18:08 to 18:51 hours, a second mine-layer unit from 15 to
20 aircraft strong circled over the sea area north of the islands of Vlieland and Terschelling.

A British courier aircraft was observed from 20:41 to 21:17
hours when it crossed the Skagerrak flying to Sweden,

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

By the 2nd Fighter Division in "Himmelbett"-tactics over Jutland and Schles-

wig-Holstein: 23 twinengine fighter aircraft,

By the 3rd Fighter Division in "Himmelbett"-tactics in Holland:

13 twin-engine fighter aircraft

Total effort: 36 aircraft
Enemy Losses: 1 aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: In Jutland: 5/10 thin cloud cover at altitudes from 800 to 1500 meters.
In the coastal area of Holland: 5/10 to 8/10 cumulus clouds at altitudes from 600 to 3000 meters with scattered showers and icing above 1000 meters.

5.) British Attack on Berlin on 2/3 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 68)

Enemy Effort

Having left the area west and north-west of Norwich, strong British bomber units assembled over the sea area of The Wash. Proceeding from here the aircraft formed a bomber stream from 17:50 hours on which flew in south-eastern direction with Mosquito-aircraft forming the one point. Flying in 8 waves closely following each other the aircraft crossed the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Amsterdam.

Flying in tight groups, the bomber stream proceeded to the area of Hannoever from where it headed in widening formation into the extended area of Berlin and Leipzig. About 10 bomber aircraft changed to counter routes already over the northern sector of the Ruhr area. After releasing their bomb loads on Berlin, the bombers returned flying in a very broad front in north-western, western, and south-western direction. The aircraft crossed the coast over the sector extending from the island of Terschelling and...
to Boulogne sur Mer. The last aircraft left the continent at 23:50 hours.

**Results of the Attack on Berlin:**

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Time to attack: 19:50 to 21:20 hours.

Heavy damages in the central sector of the city.

Slight damages in the outlying districts of the city.

**Other British Air Activities**

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At 17:40 hours, 5 Type Mosquito aircraft penetrated via Brugge, Brussels into the area of Koeln, Duesseldorf, and Duisburg and left in western direction. The last fast bomber crossed the Dutch coast at 19:40 hours.

From 19:32 hours on, about 15 Mosquito-bombers penetrated via the coastal sector of Den Helder and Amsterdam into the area of Hannover, Braunschweig, and Kassel.

**Commitment of the 1 Fighter Corps**

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The following aircraft were employed:

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To provide fighter protection over Berlin and in "Kimmelbett"-tactics in the sector of the 2nd Fighter Division against the approaching and leaving bombers by the 1st and 2nd Fighter Divisions: a total of 139 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

The night fighter aircraft of the 3rd Fighter Division could not be operationally employed owing to foggy weather.
The following units assembled to provide night fighter protection:

Units of the 2nd Fighter Division:

Northern sector: Over radio beacon Quelle,
Southern sector: over radio beacon Marie and radio beacon Philipp.

Units of the 1st Fighter Division: Over radio beacon Gertrud.

The following aircraft were directed to proceed on the following routes:

Night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division from radio beacon Quelle by way of radio beacon Marie, radio beacon Gertrud, and radio beacon Ponto to Berlin and from radio beacon Philipp by way of radio beacons Gertrud and Ponto to Berlin.

Night fighter aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division from radio beacon Gertrud by way of radio beacon Berta to Berlin.

A number of night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division were operating singly, directed into the bomber stream over radio beacon Marie to pursue the enemy aircraft contacted the enemy forces over the area of Hannover.

The reports of friendly observation aircraft which operated over Gnambruckeck, Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Berlin considerably contributed to the success of the operation.

Enemy Losses: 43 bomber aircraft definitely shot down,
4 bomber aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 3 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 2 wounded and 4 missing.
Weather Conditions: From the Channel coast to the Weser River:

For also at high altitudes with rain.
East of the Weser River: Light stratus cloud banks,
lower ceiling 1000 meters, upper ceiling 1500 meters.

6.) British Attack on Leipzig on 3/4 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 69!)

Enemy Effort

No assembly of British bomber forces over the Island of Britain was observed. At 01:02 hours, the first elements of a bomber stream consisting of several hundred four-engine bomber aircraft were flying about 150 kilometers west of Bergen op Zoom. After crossing the coast between Den Helder and Katwijk, the British bombers headed straight in eastern direction into the area of Berlin and Perleberg. British aircraft which left again at 03:41 hours dropped only limited number of bombs on the area of Berlin (Oranienburg and Brandenburg on the Havel). The majority of the bombers changed to southern direction before reaching Berlin to attack Leipzig.

The air observation system failed to recognize this change of the flight course of the British aircraft. The Corps Headquarters was informed on the beginning attack on Leipzig by a phone call from the antiaircraft artillery commander in Leipzig. Beginning at 04:30 hours, the attacking aircraft left the area of Leipzig via Southern Germany, Belgium, and Northern France. The Channel coast was crossed between Schelde Estuary and Caen where the last bomber left the coast at 06:28 hours.

Other British Air Operations
At 16:58 hours, 2 Type Mosquito aircraft coming from Heligoland Bight appeared over Cuxhaven and proceeded in south-eastern direction into the area of Legeburg, Stendal, and Perleberg. The aircraft returned by way of Salzwedel, Luensburg, and Leeuwarden. The last position of the aircraft reported was over the island of Texel at 18:36 hours. They presumably were weather reconnaissance aircraft.

At 16:21 hours, 2 Type Mosquito aircraft penetrated via Ostend, Charleville, Frankfurt on the Maine into area of Rothenburg ob der Tauber and Crailsheim. They left this area by way of Heidelberg, Saarbruecken, and Arras. At 18:35 hours, their position was over Dieppe.

From 20:34 to 21:20 hours, a number of aircraft circled in the British sea area north-west of the islands of Terschelling and Vlieland. British might have been a mine-laying mission.

At 02:40 hours, 2 Type Mosquito aircraft crossed Somme Estuary and penetrated via Cambrai into the area of Trier where one of them changed to a counter course, while the other aircraft proceeded to the area of Giessen. On its way back this aircraft joined the returning bombers at 04:13 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

High-altitude fog permitted the employment of small elements only.

The following aircraft were employed:

In "Himmelbett"-tactics in Holland and in the sector of the 2nd Fighter Division, in night fighter pursuit operations, and to provide fighter protection over Berlin a total of 70 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

To conduct night fighter pursuit operations, the following aircraft were
directed into the bomber stream:

* Night fighter aircraft of the 3rd Fighter Division from the airfield of Gustersloch over the area of Twente in Holland and
* Night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division over the area south of Bremen.

The following aircraft were assembled to provide fighter protection:

Night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division over radio beacon Qualle. They were directed to proceed via radio beacons Gertrud and Bert to Berlin.

Night fighter aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division over radio beacon Gertrud. They were directed to proceed via radio beacon Berta to Berlin.

Elements of the night fighter forces assembled over Berlin could be directed to Leipzig to provide fighter protection over that city. The operations of these aircraft over Leipzig were successful.

Enemy Losses: 21 bomber aircraft definitely shot down.

3 bomber aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 3 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 2 wounded and 3 missing.

Note: *) Only those aircraft equipped with the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus could be employed in night fighter pursuit operations.
Weather Conditions: Fog, sometime at high altitudes with a lower
celling of 200 to 400 meters. Visibility underneath
the high-altitude fog from 1 to 4 kilometers.
In the northern and central areas of the sector of
the 1st Fighter Division bright, in the southern area
sometimes of that sector cloudy. Visibility of 4 to 10
kilometers. From 24:00 hours on, formation of fog al-
so at high altitudes also in the northern area of the
sector of the 1st Fighter Division.

7.) British Mosquito-Attack on the Ruhr Area on 10/11 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 70!)

Enemy Effort:

The following operations were conducted by the R.A.F:

A nuisance raid carried ot by 50 to 60 Type Mosquito aircraft
on the Ruhr area. The aircraft intruded in two waves which crossed the z
cost from 17:50 to 19:00 hours as follows:

1st wave between Calais and Westerschelde,

2nd wave between Schelde Estuary and Zandvoort.

A small number of bombs was dropped on Koeln, the area near Siegburg, near
Leverkusen, near Solingen, south of Krefeld, and on other targets. The
Mosquito-aircraft returned from 18:46 hours. The last returning nuisance
bomber was reported flying over Schelde Estuary at 20:05 hours.

A number of aircraft conducted a mine-laying operation over
the sea area of the East and West Frisian islands from 17:54 to 18:41
hours. The aircraft achieved the deepest penetration.
north of Norderney flying at altitudes from 50 to 200 meters.

From 17:50 to 20:31 hours, 3 aircraft flew courier missions to Sweden.

During the period from 22:17 to 23:24 hours, a single aircraft carrying or supplying agents intruded into the area of Arhus in Denmark. The aircraft approached via Ringkøbing, Limfjord, Island of Samsø; it flew at altitudes from 50 to 200 meters.

A single aircraft carrying or supplying agents intruded into the area of Rinstedt in Denmark. The aircraft intruded at 00:44 hours 30 Fm kilometers north of Ringkøbing up to the island of Fyn and was shot down at 01:54 hours north of Rinstedt. The aircraft flew at altitudes of 200 to 500 meters.

A single Type Mosquito aircraft penetrated into the area of Bremen. The aircraft approached at 04:37 hours via Bergen op Zoom and Heppen. It left by way of the island of Texel at 05:46 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

In "Himmelbett"-tactics in the coastal areas of the Heligoland Bight, in Holland, and in Denmark a total of 13 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 1 aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None

Weather Conditions: In the coastal area of the Heligoland Bight mostly
bright with 2/10 cloud cover at about 1000 meters. In
the inland areas cloud formation increasing to 10/10
at altitudes from 500 to 1200 meters; above that alti-
tude cloudless. In the coastal areas of Northern Jutland
cloudless and good visibility.

Photo of the Commanding Officers of the Fighter
Units in the Sector of the 2nd Fighter Division
at a Map Exercise Held by the Headquarters of the I
Fighter Corps on 11 December 1943

8.) British attack on Berlin on 16/17 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 71 and photo-
stat: home air defense, supplement 721)
Situation map of the Headquarters of the I Fighter
Corps of 16/17 December 1943

Effort

The British bomber forces assembled over the area north of
London. From 17:25 hours on, a bomber stream, flying in several waves
on the whole
each closely following the other and consisting of several hundred aircraft
headed across the Zuider Sea straight for Berlin. Mosquito-bombers flew
ahead of the main force. After dropping their bomb loads on Berlin the Brit-
tish bombers returned in western and north-western direction to their bases.
The majority of the returning aircraft used the air route via the North
Frisian islands which were crossed by the last aircraft between 21:22
and 21:44 hours.
In addition, the RAF conducted a nuisance raid with 5 to 6 Mosquito aircraft against Duisburg-Hamborn. The Mosquito-aircraft crossed the Dutch coast from 19:26 to 20:22 hours between Ijmuiden and Katwijk in south-eastern direction and returned by way of Schelde Estuary. At 21:35 hours, a bearing was taken on the last aircraft passing over this area.

Results of the Attack on Berlin:

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Time of attack: 20:00 to 20:45 hours.

Further heavy damages in Spandau and Spandau-Siemensstadt, medium damages in Tempelhof, Berlin-Grätz, Wilmersdorf, and Stadtmitte.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

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Extensive fog also at high altitudes considerably restricted the scale of the friendly effort.

The following aircraft were employed:

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In "Himmelbett"-tactics over the coastal area of Holland: 30 twin-engine fighter aircraft,

in "Himmelbett"-tactics in the southern part of the sector of the 2nd Fighter Division: 4 twin-engine fighter aircraft,

in night fighter pursuit operations: 26 twin-engine fighter aircraft,

to provide fighter cover over Berlin at night: 30 twin-engine fighter aircraft

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Total effort: 92 aircraft

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To conduct night fighter pursuit operations, the following aircraft were
directed into the bomber stream:

Night fighter aircraft of the 3rd Fighter Division over the Zuider Sea and the 1st Group/2nd Night Fighter Wing from Kassel over radio beacon Philipp and radio beacon Zebra.

Night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division over radio beacon Ludwig in the area east of Zwolle, at night.

To provide fighter cover over Berlin, the best crews of the 1st Fighter Division were employed:

- of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions

The Type Ju 88 aircraft employed in night fighter pursuit operations could extend their operations up to Berlin, while 15 Type Me 110 aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions were forced by fuel shortage and lack of landing possibilities in the area of Berlin (weather) to break off their pursuit operations for landing at their take-off bases. The aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division employed to provide night fighter cover over Berlin had to land on airfields in Southern Germany when the attack was over. Night fighter cover over Berlin was provided by a total force of 69 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy losses: 13 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of friendly forces: 3 Type Me 110 aircraft of which 1 aircraft crashed immediately after take-off.

Losses of personnel: 3 killed,

1 wounded,

3 missing.

Weather conditions: In the plains of Northern Germany extensive fog and high-altitude fog banks at 50 to 100 meters, upper
ceiling 500 meters. Considerably busy in the Bay of Muensterland and in sections of Central Holland.

Special Information on Radio Warfare

The control of the night fighter operations was marred with
was adversely affected by the British interference of the corps and divisional command frequency. The short-frequency radio voice and keying communication was obstructed by counter-transmission of signals from speaches delivered by the Fueshrer or by the telegraph jamming and thus almost unfeasible. Bell sounds disturbed the ultra short wave communication. The radio voice communication on the frequency of the Reich's transmitting station Stuttgart (Armed forces radio network station "Annemarie") which had been used by the Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps for fighter control purposes since the end of November 1943, was all of a sudden jammed by a strong British jamming station.

9.) British Attack on Frankfurt on the Main and Mannheim on 20/21

December 1943

Enemy Effort

At 18:00 hours, the first elements of a British bomber stream appeared over Schelde Estuary proceeding in south-eastern direction. Type Mosquito aircraft which flew ahead of the main force penetrated into the Ruhr area and left by way of the Zuider Sea. The tried to conceal the flight route of the heavy bombers proceeding to the Rhine-Main plains. The bomber stream proceeded up to the area of Frankfurt on the Main and Mannheim where the aircraft scattered. After dropping their bomb loads on Frankfurt, Offenbach, and Mannheim the four-engine bomber aircraft left.
the Reich's territory flying in an extremely broad front from western and 
north-western direction.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the RAF:

Between 18:08 and 18:23 hours, a single aircraft crossed 
the sea area north of Skagen flying to Sweden.

A single aircraft intruded into the area of Bocholt. The 
aircraft approached at 20:04 hours via Katwijk and Deelen and left via 
Schelde Estuary at 21:20 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

In "Himmelbett" tactics in Holland, 
in night fighter pursuit operations beginning at Schelde Estuary, and 
to provide night fighter cover over Frankfurt and Mannheim and, as a pre-
cautionary measure, over Berlin

a total force of 177 twin-engine fighter

aircraft

Elements of the night fighter units of the 3rd Fighter Division 
took off as soon as the aircraft approaching from the British air base 
were recognized and proceeded in direction of XX Schelde Estuary where 
they were directed into the bomber stream.

The following aircraft were assembled to provide fighter cover:

Night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division:

Northern sector: Over radio beacon Ouelle. The aircraft were directed to
proceed by way of radio beacon Philipp to radio beacon Otto and Frankfurt.

Southern sector: Over radio beacon Zebra. The aircraft were directed to
proceed by way XXX of radio beacon Philipp to radio beacon Otto,
Frankfurt, and Mannheim.

Night fighter aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division: Over radio beacon 12
and radio beacon Philipp. Since an attack on
had to
Berlin XXX be anticipated, these forces XXX
were not directed to radio beacon Otto and to
Frankfurt.

Enemy Losses: 23 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 6 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 3 killed,
1 wounded, and
5 missing.

Weather Conditions: 3/10 to 10/10 thin and rapidly changing formation
of clouds at about 600 meters. Visibility of 5 to
10 kilometers.


(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 741)

Enemy Effort

At 02:45 hours, a bomber stream consisting of small four-en-
gine aircraft units left the Island of Britain in south-eastern direction
The bomber stream crossed Scheldt Estuary in south-eastern direction and
proceeded into the area of Frankfurt on the Main where the aircraft circled. They proceeded initially in eastern direction into the area south of Erfurt and then in north-eastern direction into the area east of Leipzig, and finally in northern direction for the attack on Berlin at 04:40 hours. The Western bomber aircraft returned in western direction by way of North Germany.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the RAF:

A nuisance raid conducted by Type Mosquito aircraft on Berlin.

15 to 20 Type Mosquito aircraft approached from 02:50 hours on across the Zuider Sea and via Hannover and Braunschweig. On their way back the Mosquito-aircraft joined the returning heavy bombers.

At 03:36 hours, a long-range night fighter aircraft penetrated into the area of Minden. The aircraft left Schelde Estuary at 05:41 hours.

Results of the Attack on Berlin:

Time of attack: 03:40 to 04:40 hours.
Heavy damages in the eastern sectors of the city.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps:

The following aircraft were employed:

In "Himmelbett"-tactics in Southern Holland, Belgium, and in the sector of the 2nd Fighter Division,
in night fighter pursuit operations from Schelde Estuary on, and to provide night fighter cover over Berlin

d a total force of 166 twin-engine fighter aircraft.
When the British bombers appeared over the northern Channel area the
night fighter aircraft of the 3rd Fighter Division took off from the air-
fields St. Trond and Deelen to proceed into the area of Schelde Estuary where
they were directed into the bomber stream.

To provide night fighter cover the following aircraft assembled as follows:

Night fighter aircraft of the 3rd Fighter Division: Over radio beacons Kur-
fuerst and Ida. They were directed to radio beacon Otto from where they operated in the bomber
stream up to Berlin.

Night fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division: Over radio beacons Zebra,
Philipp, and Ludwig. They were directed from radio beacon Philipp via radio beacon Ludwig to
radio beacon Otto from where they operated in the bomber stream up to Berlin.

Night fighter aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division:

Northern sector: Over radio beacon 12. They were
directed via radio beacon Ponto to Berlin to pro-
vide fighter cover.

Southern sector: Over radio beacon Ponto from
where the aircraft were directed to Berlin to pro-
vide fighter cover.

British long-range night fighter aircraft interfered with the
landing maneuvers of friendly night fighters in the area of Great Berlin.
In addition, antiaircraft artillery fired at a number of night fighter air-
craft when they were landing on airfields in Berlin.
Enemy Losses: 12 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 6 aircraft of which 1 was shot down by a friendly single-engine night fighter over Berlin.

Losses of personnel: 4 killed,

2 wounded, and

5 missing.

Weather Conditions: In Holland: Very thick haze, fog, or high-altitude fog at 100 to 300 meters.

In Northern Germany up to the Elbe River: 8/10 to 10/10 cloud cover, lower ceiling 200 to 600 meters.

In the area of Berlin: 5/10 to 9/10 light clouds.

In the area of Leipzig: Cloudless

In Southern Germany: Extensive misted covers.

11.) British Attack on Berlin on 29/30 December 1943

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 751)

Enemy Effort

At 18:20 hours, the first elements of a British bomber stream were recognized flying over Great Yarmouth and Lowestoft. The bomber aircraft proceeded in eastern direction across the Zuider Sea into the area of Osnabrueck and, flying now in south-eastern direction, reached the area of Dessau and Leipzig.
From here one bomber wave headed directly for Berlin, while the majority of the bombers flew a wide circle via the area south and southwest of Berlin to attack the Reich's capital approaching from the East, widely dispersed. The British attacking aircraft left in a wide formation in western and north-western direction.

In addition, the following operations were conducted by the RAF:

A nuisance operation conducted by Type Mosquito aircraft dropping tinfoil strips in coordinated action with four-engine aircraft penetrating into the Ruhr area. From 18:22 hours on, 15 to 20 Type Mosquito aircraft crossed the Channel coast between Dunkirk and Boulogne, up to 20:30 hours, sur Mer in eastern direction. They returned from the Ruhr area in north-western direction via Schelde Estuary to Great Britain.

A mine-laying operation over the sea area north of the East Frisian and west of the North Frisian Islands where a great number of aircraft circled between 19:03 and 19:24 hours.

A nuisance mission flown by 2 Type Mosquito aircraft into the area of Wertheim on the Main. The aircraft approached at 03:00 hours via Katwijk, munchen-Gladbach, Koblenz, and Frankfurt on the Main and left by way of Schwanheim, Stuttgart and Metz. The last aircraft was intercepted by radar when it was flying over Reims at 04:50 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

When the British bomber aircraft intruded the night fighter aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions could not be committed owing to weather conditions.
The following aircraft were employed:

In "Himmelbett"-tactics in the sector of the 1 Fighter Division when the bombers intruded and left,
in "Himmelbett"-tactics when the bombers left in the sector of the 2nd Fighter Division,
in "Himmelbett"-tactics against the mine-layer aircraft in the area of the Heligoland Bight and in Jutland,
in "Himmelbett"-tactics when the bombers left over Dutch territory, and
in night fighter pursuit operations a small number of aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division when the bombers approached over the area south of Berlin,
as well as of the 3rd Fighter Division when the bombers left over Holland.

Total effort: 66 twin-engine fighter aircraft

Enemy Losses: 12 bomber aircraft shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 3 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 9 killed.

Weather Conditions: When the enemy aircraft intruded into Belgium, Holland, and into the Reich's territory 10/10 stratus clouds, lower ceiling 75 to 200 meters, upper ceiling 1,500 meters. Above these, thin stratus of light clouds. Visibility of 1 to 2 kilometers, at certain places even less.

When the aircraft returned, breaks in cloud formation came from Jutland. In the coastal area lower cloud ceilings at 200 to 300 meters. Visibility of 1 to 3 kilometers.