Request information on the following points:

Erbitte Erklärung folgender Bezeichnungen:

In the German text:

Study 9 to 11, Volumes III and IIIa.

Im deutschen Text:

Seite 100: FF ? *Fuschn Feuer*
Seite 100: Y-Führung ?
Seite 106: FF ? (wie oben)
Seite 119: FN ? *Fernnachtjäger*
Seite 120: FF ? (wie oben)
Seite 130: FN ? (wie oben)
*Hinweis*
Seite 140: Y-Führung? (wie oben)
Seite 210: Y-Führung ? (wie oben)
Seite 296: Duschen ?

*L.G. = Leuchtgranate von Flakartillerie abgeschossen*
Study 9 to 11

The Employment of the German Luftwaffe
Against the Allies in the West
1943 to 1945
Study 9 to 11

The Employment of the German Luftwaffe Against the Allies in the West
1943 to 1945

Volume III (with Supplement III):

Air Battles over the Reich's Territory
in Defense of the Vital Resources of the
German Luftwaffe
From 1 April 1944 to D-Day (6 June 1944)

Prepared from German Material by

Beppe Schmid
Generalleutnant (ret.) and Former Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps

Augsburg, May 1954
Preface

1. On account of the chain of command of the German Luftwaffe in World War II the Study 9 to 11 is subdivided into two books:

"The Air War in the West" and
"The Home Air Defence (HAW)"

2. The procurement and extent of the required source material do not permit the preparation of the Study 9 to 11 in the form of a chronological historical presentation. The author was under the necessity of anticipating in his work these periods for which adequate source material was available in time. For this reason, the historical presentation of the air operations within the framework of the home air defense during the period from 15 September 1943 to D-Day (6 June 1944) was completed first. It contains the following three volumes with three supplements:

I Volume

Air Warfare over the Reich's Territory by Day and by Night from 15 September 1943 to 31 December 1943

II Volume

The Battle for the Air Supremacy over the Reich's Territory from 1 January 1944 to 31 March 1944

III Volume

Air Battles over the Reich's Territory in Defence of the Vital Resources of the German Luftwaffe from 1 April 1944 to D-Day (6 June 1944)
A critical comparison of the Allied and the German presentations of the events of the air warfare during the period selected will be given later.

3. In this third volume of the Study 9 to 11 the air operations in the framework of the home air defense are presented strictly on the basis of German knowledge. So far as required source material was available, detailed data on the employment of the German antiaircraft artillery and the effects of the bombing attacks were included in the presentation too. This, however, distorts an otherwise clear picture. These data, however, serve the formation of an idea of the direct successes in connection with the economy of the German antiaircraft artillery in addition to its indirect deterring effect as well as of the extent the damage inflicted upon personnel and material by bombing attacks.

The sketches pertaining to the third volume are contained in Supplement III.

4. Source Material for the III Volume

The war diary of the I Fighter Corps was used as the main basis for the presentation of the events. It is of documentary value. Complementary data were remaining taken from the AFSF papers of the former Branch of Military Science of the Luftwaffe which are to be regarded as semi-official. The only source for the presentation of the period from 21 May to 6 June 1944 was the documentary material left by the former Branch of Military Science of the Luftwaffe. Therefore, the sketches in Supplement III regarding this period of time are incomplete and offer a graphic presentation of the air operations only.
Individual complementary remarks were based on private notes taken by a former civil air defense official.

A few other sources from which specific data were taken are especially quoted in the text.

Critical comments which are contained in the monthly reviews represent the views of the author. In preparing them the opinions of the following gentlemen were considered:

Generalmajor (ret.) Walter Grabmann, the former Commanding General of the 3rd Fighter Division,

Oberst (ret.) Guenther Radusch, the former Commanding Officer of the 5th Night Fighter Wing.

The following material was not considered:

Reports written from memory and data from bellicistic wartime and post-war literature.

5. Overall Evaluation of the III Volume of the Study 9 to 11

The presentation of the course of events of the air warfare in the third volume is based on material of the air force command of medium level. Combat reports of flying units were not available. Owing to the extraordinary conditions at the end of the war it will hardly be possible to procure documentary material of the operational units relating to the course of combat in the air. Out of this results a considerable deficiency for historiography, all the more so as reports subjectively prepared from memory of individuals are of limited value only.

The statements made in Volume III of the Study 9 to 11 will come close to the historic truth.
Regarding the period from 21 May to 6 June 1944 the presentation is presumably incomplete. In view of the limited source material available and human frailties allowance must be made for minor historical errors.

It should be noted that all the statements regarding the Allied air operations reflect exclusively the German knowledge at the respective point of time.

All figures excluding those relating to time must be evaluated only in respect to relative quantities. The author will later comment on the always limited value of numerical data, moreover on the characteristics and emissions in preparing the preparation of reports.
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    ..............................................................
I have submitted a formal request for a meeting with the intelligence community to discuss the implications of the recent developments. I believe it is crucial that we address these issues immediately to prevent further damage.

The meeting should include representatives from all relevant departments and agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, and the National Security Agency. We need to establish a clear plan of action to mitigate any potential threats.

I am available at any time to discuss further details and to coordinate with the appropriate officials.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.
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Oberfeldwebel Rollwage of 5th Squadron/53th Fighter Wing

The Commanding General of 1 Fighter Corps inspected the Arado Aircraft Plants in Kransow in Brandenburg on the Ravel on 1 May. The American bombing attack on 18 April 1944 did not cause any damage to the plants.

Major Karl Friedrich Mueller (left), Commander of 3rd Fighter Wing (Udet), killed in action in May 1944.

Oberfeldwebel Frank, 2nd Squadron/3rd Night Fighter Wing, killed in action 26-27 April 1944.

Oberst Walter Oesau, killed in action on 11 May 1944.

Hydrogenation plant Bruex prior to the American air attack on 12 May 1944.

Hydrogenation plant Bruex after the American air attack on 12 May 1944.

Armament plant at Krzesinki near Poznan prior to the American air attack on 29 May 1944.

Armament plant at Leipzig-Weiterblick after the American air attack on 29 May 1944.

Armament plant at Krzesinki near Poznan after the American air attack on 29 May 1944.

Armament plant at Oberschleben after the American air attack on 30 May 1944.
Mr. Bliss says:
Somewhere in this text he wrote "medium heavy damages" when he only intended to write "medium damages."

Band III (XXI)
Y-Fuhrung

2 meanings:
ultra high frequency method of directing aircraft and also means of determining location - see Volume (Aerodynamics)
Chapter I

Daytime Activities in April 1944

1.) Survey

a.) American Offensive Operations

The air supremacy of the American air forces over the Reich's territory could be consolidated in April 1944. The former was demonstrated by the fact that the American fighter forces began to carry out strafing attacks against the Luftwaffe on airfields within the Reich's territory. This was done within the framework of large-scale bomber attacks as well as in special fighter operations. Bombing operations against German airfields were conducted only to a limited extent.

By this new American practice of fighting the German Luftwaffe on the ground several hundred aircraft were destroyed and the same number of them was damaged. The striking power of the Luftwaffe, however, was only slightly impaired by these operations. The readiness for action of the flying units of the home air defense was hardly affected. The few bombardments of airfields remained without any influence on the functioning of the home air defense.

The fact that the American fighter forces obtained freedom of operation, however, had grave consequences for the home air defense. While the American fighters were, in performance of their escort duties, hitherto tied to the four-engine bomber formations they had now obtained their full freedom.
of operation in all altitudes and attacked the German fighter aircraft wherever the latter appeared. Thus the American fighter attacks were also directed against the German single- and twin-engine fighter units while the latter were assembling or on their approach flight. Above all, singly flying German fighters which already suffered hits were unable to escape their American pursuers. This also applied to German fighters which were forced to precocious landing because they had run out of fuel. Eventually, the American fighters began to interfere with the landing maneuvers of German fighter and units which thereby scored considerable success. The air supremacy of the over the Reich's Territory. American fighter forces had by now become complete. The American fighters had been released from their rigid mission of escorting bombers and fulfilled their proper mission of free operating. Sometimes this fact proved to be disadvantageous to the American bombers. In cases when American fighters left the bombers they were to escort precociously to fly low-level attacks in free operations the German fighter units succeeded, in surprise attacks, in decimating the unprotected bomber formations or in destroying them completely.

In April 1944 the emphasis of the American bombing attacks was placed on the German air armament industry. The latter suffered heavy damage by attacks carried out on a large scale under favorable weather conditions. In addition, the American air forces stationed in Great Britain started bombing attacks on installations of the transportation system in North-West Germany and strafing raids on trains, especially locomotives.

A synchronization of the American air operations conducted from the air base in Great Britain with those conducted from the Italian base was to assumed be executed on three days only.

The operations of the American air force stationed in Italy extended
to targets in Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. Not including the
attacks on targets in France the amounted to almost one third of the Ameri-
can total effort in April and brought about a dispersal of the fighter defen-
se force within the home air defense.

In spite of the weather conditions favorable for offensive operations
the American air force in Great Britain did not continue their attacks against
the German air armament industry within the Reich's territory on 27 and 28 April.
On both these days these forces operated over the French-Belgian territory.

The intensity of the American air effort against the Reich's territory
in April is demonstrated by the following numbers of offensive missions flown:
- 12 large-scale attacks conducted from the air base in Great Britain,
- 6 large-scale attacks conducted from the air base in Italy,
- 3 independent operations conducted by fighters and fighter-bombers
  against German airfields,
- 11 offensive operations by fighter units against airfields within
  the Reich's territory in conjunction with American large-scale
  bomber operations.

It was only on two days that the American bombers over the Reich's
territory met with such unfavorable weather conditions that they had to drop
their bombs without visual observation of the ground. Nine large-scale attacks
were always concentrated on the respective city, while on all the other days
when attacks were flown several targets were covered. On six days of the month
the American air force conducted only reconnaissance operations over the Reich's
territory and on three days there was no American aircraft over the Reich's
territory at all.
In April 1944 the American air operations had been very successful. They had seriously hit the German air armament industry and thus slowed down the expansion of the German fighter aircraft industry as well as prevented speedy reinforcement of the fighter defense forces of the home air defense.

The order of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe of 24 April 1944 to increase the total strength of the day fighter forces of the home air defense within the shortest possible period of time to the number of 2000 aircraft could not be carried out.

The American attacks on installations of the transportation system and railroad material within the Reich's territory had only limited results in April 1944.

The casualty figures of the American air forces had considerably increased as compared to March 1944. The relative extent of casualties, however, by no means jeopardized future operations.

b) Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

On 1 April 1944 the Corps Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps assumed the mission of protecting the entire Reich's territory including the territories of Austria and Hungary. For this purpose the corps headquarters was assigned the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 7th Fighter Divisions.

The following were the advantages of the new command organization:

responsibility of a single command staff within the home air defense,
uniform interpretations of the air situation for the purpose of conducting fighter operations within the entire Reich's territory,
possibility of concentrating forces in the air for the defense against
provided
American day air attacks as the cruising ranges of the fighter aircraft and the weather conditions permitted such operations.

Despite this new command organization the Corps Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps did not succeed in obtaining from the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe the permission for the concentration of all one
day fighter forces within limited area of the Reich's territory. It was the objective of the corps headquarters to beat the American attacking forces by the employment of all forces available in a limited area. The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, on the other hand, maintained his demand that all parts of the Reich's territory should be protected for economic reasons as well as for reasons of interior politics. Consequently, the day fighter forces were deployed over the Reich's territory as follows:

one single-engine and one twin-engine fighter wing in the area between Hannover and Berlin,

one fighter wing in Western Germany,
two fighter groups in the area of Frankfurt,
two fighter groups in Bavaria,
one single-engine and one twin-engine fighter wing in the area of Vienna.

Owing to this wide dispersion of the day fighter forces it was only to concentrate all forces in respect to time and space seldom possible for command in defensive operations within the framework of the base air defense.
The air defense operations over the Reich's territory in April 1944 continued to be dominated by the American air supremacy. Even so, it had favorable been possible, with the exception of two days, and owing to good weather conditions, to offer resistance to all American large-scale attacks. The result was a balance between the American attacking and the German defense forces which was more favorable in April than it had been in March 1944. This is demonstrated in the following:

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<th>German Total Effort</th>
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<td>(Bomber and Fighter Aircraft)</td>
<td>(Single- and Twin-Engine Fighters)</td>
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<td>March 1944 :</td>
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<td>April 1944 :</td>
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<tr>
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<th>German Total Effort</th>
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<td>(Fighters only)</td>
<td>(Single- and Twin-Engine Fighters)</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1944 :</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1944 :</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1944 :</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1944 :</td>
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The commitment of the day fighter forces was in April 1944 considerably influenced by inadequate interpretation of the air situation in the cases of American large-scale attacks from the air base in Italy and by the American fighter tactics of free operation. The incomplete air route observation and plotting system in the areas of Italy, Dalmatia, and Croatia as well as inadequate signal communications across the Alps to the aircraft reporting stations within the XXII of the Second Air Fleet Command were the reasons why fighter command staffs of the home air defense often received retarded or incomplete reports on bomber aircraft intruding from the South. On these grounds bomber attacks conducted from the American air base in Italy could, in most cases, be fought off only with limited forces or in a precipitated and unsystematic manner. The German fighter forces often did not reach the American attackers at all because they had been sent on their mission too late. Due to the initiative and energy of the Fighter Commander, Adler Ostmark, Oberst Handrick, that conditions ceased by the end of April 1944, which made it possible to establish a well functioning aircraft warning system and a workable ground command organization in the area of Austria and Hungary and its southern foreland.

The American tactics of free operation forced the friendly fighter forces to assemble to form combat formations outside the areas in which the American fighters were, on account of the general direction of operations, expected to operate; doing so the former were to escape the danger of being attacked already while assembling in the air. By this the periods of time German for which the fighters could engage themselves in combat were shortened. Moreover, the new American fighter tactics meant a new additional moral strain for the single- and twin-engine fighters of the home air defense.
They were admittedly fairly trained in fighting in strong formations especially against four-engine bombers, but lacked experience in combat in detached formation or against individual adversaries. They knew about the technical superiority of the American fighter aircraft and realized that whenever they had to operate singly as a result of bad weather, engine trouble, or fall a damage incurred in combat they could become victim to the American fighters now operating at all altitudes. This was, especially in the cases of young and inexperienced fighter pilots, the cause of the so-called “Fighter Panic” (German: Jaegerschreck). Its result was an increase of the number of German aircraft shot down and lost because the pilot bailed out precociously from fear. Eventually it had become impossible to employ twin-engine or night fighters in areas in which American fighter aircraft could be expected to operate.

The operational strengths of the day fighter units employed in the home air defense decreased towards the end of the month. The reason for this decrease was that the Luftwaffe High Command began, in anticipation of a possible invasion in France, to establish fighter reserves of material and personnel at the cost of replacements for the home air defense.

It could be noticed that, in spite of all the difficulties resultant from the American air supremacy, the inferiority of the friendly forces in respect to technical equipment and training as well as from the
wide dispersion of the fighter forces, the day fighter forces fought bitterly and often successfully. The number of enemy aircraft shot down had increased compared to March 1944. The casualties of the friendly forces, in particular the numbers of damaged aircraft and of formation leaders lost were high. Even so, the fighter forces employed in the home air defense could not prevent an American large-scale attack on the Reich's territory. Their defensive action supplied action for the Luftwaffe juggernaut under the motto of endeavoring primarily to shoot down four-engine bombers. The daytime air warfare over the Reich's territory with its increased American offensive action had brought about a psychological effect on the all command staffs and dominated them. Nowhere, at no command headquarters, neither at the Wehrmacht High Command, nor at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, nor at the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, nor at the staff of the General of the Fighter Force, nor at the Air Fleet Command Reich, nor at the Corps Headquarters of the I Fighter Corps a generous plan for operations to regain the air supremacy by a victorious fighter battle was under consideration. The attention of all responsible commanders was focused on only one danger - the flying fortresses carrying heavy bomb loads. The persistent demand for destroying mainly American bomber aircraft by incessant commitment of fighters doubtless originated with the Supreme Commander of the German Wehrmacht. It had, however, not become public during the war that an experienced airman had contradicted him or had suggested another technique for a successful defense against the dangerous American daytime bombardments together with a plan for regaining the air supremacy over the Reich's territory.

The fact that, as early as on 25 May 1943, the General of the Fighter Forces, Generalmajor Galland suggested to the Inspector General of the
Luftwaffe, Generalfeldmarschall Milch, the employment of all the free armament capacity for the production of the Type Me 262 jet fighter, is not considered here.

c.) Special Information

The unification of the fighter defenses within the Reich's territory was initiated by the following teletype message from the Air Fleet Command Reich of 31 March 1944:

"For the purpose of concentrating the home air defense in the Reich's territory as well as in the occupied western territories, the Reichsmarschall issued the following order:

(1.) The 7th Fighter Division including the Fighter Commander Ostmark will be assigned to the I Fighter Corps as of this date. Thus the I Fighter Corps, subordinate to the Air Fleet Reich assumes command all fighter operations within the Reich's territory, in particular also of the fighter defenses of Southern and South-East Germany against enemy aircraft intruding from the South. Close contact will be maintained with the Second Air Fleet.

(2.) The day fighter forces of the Third Air Fleet will be employed concentrated in the sector of the II Fighter Corps for the defense of the occupied western territories, in particular of the imper-

..............................

tant supply and transportation centers as well as the friendly ground organization. These forces will be committed in the home air defense only against such enemy forces as intruding into the Reich's territory via South-West Belgium and France. Transfers of these forces over longer distances into the Reich's territory will be abstained from in future. The night fighter forces assigned to the Third Air Fleet will be committed as hitherto in the home air defense.

(3.) Particular attention is called to the close cooperation between the I and II Fighter Corps as well as between the Air Fleet Reich and the current and Third Air Fleet by prompt communication of information on the situation and the operational objectives. Special directives will be issued regarding signal communications which may become additionally necessary and improvements of the radar and the fighter control system as transfer well as the possible reorganization of the command post of the I Fighter Corps. The new chain of command will become effective as of 31 March 1944, 21:00 hours*. Air Fleet Reich - Center - number 1921/44, top military secret. (operations officer/j).

d.) Successes and Losses in April 1944

The average total strength of day fighter aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

- 400 single-engine fighters,
- 100 twin-engine fighters.

The total figure of day fighter aircraft employed in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

- 4522 aircraft.
The total losses of aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

395 aircraft - which is 8.8% of the total effort.

The enemy losses over the Reich's territory in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

514 aircraft not including those shot down by antiaircraft artillery.

This was 2.5% of the estimated American total effort against the Reich's territory amounting to 20,337 aircraft of which were 10,000 fighters.

The operations conducted from the American bases in Italy are included in this consideration.

In addition, the incomplete lists in the war diary of the I Fighter Corps show the following data on the American losses over the Reich's territory in April 1944:

42 aircraft shot down for sure by antiaircraft artillery,
10 aircraft crash-landed in Switzerland.

Thus, the American losses in aircraft over the Reich's territory in April 1944 add up to:

566 aircraft.

This was 2.8% of the American total effort against the Reich's territory in April 1944.

2.) The American Attack on Pforzheim on 1 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense in supplement 161)
The Enemy Effort

At 08:35 hours a strong American fighter force intruded via the Belgian Channel coast at Blankenberg in south-eastern direction to cover following bomber forces to the North. Elements of this fighter force penetrated into South-West German territory where they arrived one hour ahead of the bombers. The bombers, flying in south-eastern direction too, appeared over the Channel coast in the sector between Ostend and Stalpes at 08:45 hours. They proceeded via Malines - Charleville, Bingen - Strassbourg into the area of Heilbronn, Stuttgart, Reutlingen, Karlsruhe. In their approach flight they attacked the city of Pforzheim from 10:50 hours to 11:05 hours from the South-East and North-West. The altitude of attack amounted to 6100 to 6700 meters. The target could be located only by observation through openings of the clouds. Strassbourg, too, was hit by a number of bombs. A smaller bomber unit flew over Switzerland by mistake and accidentally dropped its bombs on Schaffhausen on the Rhine. From 10:50 hours on the four-engine bomber units left the area of Pforzheim in north-western direction. Their last elements left the Channel coast between Ostend and the mouth of the Somme River by 12:30 hours. Escort fighter units returning to their bases were observed from 09:07 hours on in the area of Dinant and from 10:16 in the area of Trier. From 10:50 hours on, fighter forces missioned to escort the bomber forces back to their bases flew across the coastal sector between Ostend and Calais into area of Dinant to meet the bomber aircraft.

In the attack against Pforzheim the following forces were committed:
150 bomber aircraft, 200 single-engine fighter aircraft, and 150 twin-engine fighter aircraft. The damages caused by this bombing raid were comparatively little.

In addition, to cover the bombing raid the American air force stationed in Great Britain carried out the following operations:

Two intruding operations with Type Thunderbolt fighters. The aircraft approached at 08:32 hours over the Walchera Island, Hertogenbosch into the area of Muenster and at 08:40 hours over Ijmuiden, Meppel, Meppen into the area of Delmenhorst. They left the area at 09:10 hours via Grenau - Assen. Until 10:35 hours patrol missions were flown along the coast between Den Helder and Zandvoort.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were committed:

Units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Mannheim and Mainz.
Units of the 7th Fighter Division in direction of Heilbronn and Heutlingen.

EMI Information on the air situation available in respect to aircraft approaching over French territory was inadequate. For this reason, only the units of the 3rd and 7th Fighter Divisions were operationally employed. The majority of the fighters employed did not encounter enemy forces.

Total effort: 150 fighter aircraft

Enemy losses: 2 bomber and 1 fighter aircraft definitely sunk; total: 3 aircraft definitely shot down.
Losses of friendly forces:

(as of 1 April 1944, 17:00 hours)

4 aircraft received over
1 aircraft damaged; 60% damage;
losses of personnel: 1 killed,
4 missing.

Weather conditions:

3/10 to 10/10 shallow stratus clouds of 800 up to
1500 meters, above thin medium-high and high clouds.
South of the line Stuttgart - Nuremberg 10/10 clouds
at altitudes of 200 to 300 meters with light snow fall.

Special information:

German intelligence later issued the following state-
ment in respect to the American attack on 1 April:
The attack was intended to hit the chemical plants at
Ludwigshafen and was to be carried out as a coordi-
ated action of the 2nd and 3rd Bomber Divisions. The
units of the 3rd Bomber Division, however, were ordered
back on account of the bad weather conditions in the
area of Dunkirk. It was the first time that the 2nd Bom-
ber Division operated alone over the Reich's territory.
About 180 Type Liberator bombers reached the area above
the target. Each aircraft carried a bomb load of 1,9
tons.

3.) The American Attack on Steyr and Bruck/Mur on 2 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 162 1)

The Enemy Effort

Starting from the American air base in Italy 400 bombers, 200
single-engine and 100 twin-engine fighters reached the areas of Agram and Laibach
at 10:00 hours.
The attacking forces proceeded in northern direction raided armament plants at Bruck on the Mur River and at Steyr. A smaller force released its bombs on Linz on the Danube River. The bombers began their return flight from the target area at 11:20 hours. The last returning unit formation was flying over Klagenfurt in southern direction at 11:37 hours. The American bomber attacks were dispersed by strong German fighter defenses. In the target area under attack medium damage was caused to industrial installations and light damage was inflicted on houses. The emphasis of the attack was placed on the ball-bearing plants and the Daimler motor plants at Steyr.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

- Units of the 3rd Fighter Division from the area of Frankfurt in direction of Wels.
- Units from the 7th Fighter Division from the area of Bavaria in direction of Passau and Salzburg and from the area of Vienna in direction of Graz.

Good visibility at high altitudes and cloudless weather made it possible to engage all forces employed in combat.

Total effort: 225 single- and twin-engine fighters.

Enemy losses: 34 bombers and 3 fighters; that is:
- **37 aircraft definitely shot down.**
- 6 bombers probably shot down.

Moreover:
- 1 bomber shot down by antiaircraft artillery.
Lessees of friendly forces: __________________________
(as of 3 April 1944, 10:00 hours)

13 aircraft received
8 aircraft damaged over 60% damage.

Lessees of personnel: 5 killed,
2 wounded,
15 missing.

Weather conditions: 0/10 to 4/10 shallow stratus clouds of 1000 up to 2000 meters. In the target area cloudless, good visibility.

Special information: German intelligence later issued the following statement in respcet to the American attack on 2 April 1944:
The attack was primarily intended to hit the ball-bearing plants and the motor plants at Steyr. It was flown at altitudes of 6700 to 7000 meters without employing pathfinder forces. Owing to the strong German defenses, the attack was not fully effective. All fighter forces (Types Thunderbalt and Lightning) available at the American American air base were committed for escort purposes. The German fighter defenses which exceeded the expectations of the bomber crews engaged the bomber force for the first time in area of Udine. The climax of the air battle was over the target area. The antiaircraft artillery fire was termed inaccurate by the bomber crews. Three bomber aircraft were lost due to collision in the air and engine trouble.
4.) The American Attack on Budapest on 3 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 163)

Enemy Effort

At 10:15 hours unclear reports were received of American offensive forces approaching over Croatia in northern direction. In the area of Lake Balaton it was observed that 200 bomber aircraft turned into north-eastern direction. Their objective was the aircraft industry in the area of Budapest where heavy damage was inflicted on industrial installations. The bombers left the target area in southern and south-eastern directions. The last report on the position of these aircraft over Southern Hungary was timed 11:15. 150 twin-engine fighters were observed escorting the bombers in the area of Budapest.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Units of the 7th Fighter Division

from the area of Bavaria in direction of Passau and Linz, from the area of Vienna in direction of Lake Balaton and Budapest.

It was not possible to employ the available forces systematically, since information received on the air situation was extremely confusing.
Total effort: 203 single- and twin-engine fighters of which only 58 single-engine fighters were engaged in combat.

Enemy Losses: 2 bomber aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of friendly forces:
(as of 4 April 1944, 10:00 hours) 3 aircraft;

losses of personnel: 3 missing.
5.) American Strafing Raids on Airfields in the Reich's Territory on
5 April 1944

(See sketch: Home air defense, supplement 1641)

Enemy Effort

It was the first time that the American air force stationed in
Great Britain conducted a major fighter operation against airfields in the
Reich's territory. Under weather conditions unfavorable for defensive action
a force of a total strength of 80 single-engine fighters and 70 twin-engine
fighters attacked airfields in the areas of Salzwedel, Hannover, Magdeburg,
Brandenburg, Stuttgart, Memmingen, Munich, and Augsburg. By the
low-level strafing attacks heavy damages were inflicted on all types of
grounded aircraft on nine airfields.

The American fighter raids were conducted as follows:

A total of 70 fighter aircraft approached in two waves from
beginning at
13:10 hours. The first wave approached via Ostend, Trier, Mannheim, and
Karlsruhe from where the aircraft started their return flight. The second
wave proceeded in south-eastern direction to the area of Stuttgart, Augsburg,
and Munich and returned via Heilbronn, Mannheim, Antwerp, Strasbourg, and
Charleville. Patrol missions were flown along the coast between Heyst and
Boulogne till 17:00 hours.

Beginning at 13:40 hours, a total of 80 fighter aircraft approac-
ched over the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Rotterdam. They proceeded
in eastern direction via the lines Muenster - Vechta, south of Hildesheim - Hannover, and Halberstadt - south of Braunschweig. The longest penetration obtained in eastern direction was Luckenwalde - Berlin.

Elements of these units returned from the area Muenster, Osnabrueck. The bulk of the force returned from the area of Berlin in western direction.

Missions were flown across the coast between Den Helder and the Island of Walcheren till 17:00 hours.

The fighter aircraft approached at an altitude of 9000 meters and carried out their low-level attacks at an altitude of 300 meters.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps:

36 fighter aircraft which were in a state of alert were employed by the 1st and 7th Fighter Divisions.

Enemy losses: 3 Type Mustang fighter aircraft were definitely shot down.

Losses of friendly forces: 1 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel: none.
6.) American Attack on Graz on 6 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defence, supplement 1641)

Enemy Effort

Under extremely bad weather conditions the American airforce
conducted in Italy conducted an air raid on Graz employing 120
bombers, 30 single-engine and 30 twin-engine fighters. They took the air
route via Greutia on their approach and return flight. The majority of the
bombs hit open terrain. Only limited damage to buildings was inflicted on
the city of Graz.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps:

107 single- and twin-engine fighters of the 7th Fighter Division
were committed. Owing to the bad weather conditions only a limited number of
fighters encountered the American attackers in the area of Graz.

Enemy Losses: 3 bomber and 2 fighter aircraft;
that is: 5 aircraft definitely shot down.
1 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 single-engine fighter.
1 aircraft received over 60% damage.
Losses of personnel: 1 missing

Special Information: The knight cross of the iron cross was awarded to
Oberfeldwebel Ehrenberger of 6th Squadron/ 53rd Fighter
Wing and to
Oberfeldwebel Hellmagen of 5th Squadron/ 53rd Fighter
Wing on 6 April 1944.
PHOTO OF

Oberfeldwebel Rellwage of 5th Squadron/53rd Fighter Wing
7.) American Reconnaissance Operations on 7 April 1944

Enemy Effort

In spite of weather conditions favorable for offensive action, no large-scale attack was conducted by the American air forces. A number of Type Mesquite aircraft only flew reconnaissance missions over the Reich's territory.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps: Several fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 1 Type Mesquite reconnaissance aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: none.
2.) The American Attack on Braunschweig and on Airfields in the Reich's
Territory on 8 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1651)

Enemy Effort

Beginning at 12:00 hours strong American fighter forces intruded
via Holland over the coastal sector of Den Helder and Nordwijk and
over the mouth of the Schelde River. They proceeded in eastern respectively
in southeastern direction to the area of Hannover, Bremen as well as into the
area of Trier and Koblenz where they carried out strafing attacks on 23 air-
fields. At the same time 500 American bomber aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd
Bomber Divisions escorted by strong fighter forces crossed the Dutch coast
between the island of Texel and Nordwijk. Flying in eastern direction they
reached the area of Magdeburg and Braunschweig. The majority of the four-
engine bomber force bombed, with unobstructed vision of the ground, arma-
ment plants at Braunschweig. Smaller units released their bombs on airfields
in the area of Braunschweig, Bremen, and Rheine as well as on 34 villages in
the area around Braunschweig. The bombing attack on Braunschweig in-
flicted medium damage on buildings and industrial installations. The follow-
ing were the results of the bombing and strafing attacks against the air-
fields:

4 heavily damaged landing fields,
72 destroyed aircraft of all types and
45 damaged aircraft.

Beginning at 14:04 hours the American bomber units left the area of
Braunschweig in western and north-western direction. Patrol flights over
the area between the island of Borkum and the mouth of the Scheldt River
were observed till 15:10 hours. To meet the returning bomber aircraft for
escort purposes, several fighter units had, beginning at 13:30 hours, intruded
via Holland and had partially reached the border of the Reich.
German estimates showed that the total strength of fighter aircraft which
participated in the large-scale attack on Braunschweig amounted to 400 sin-
gle-engine and 250 twin-engine fighters.

On 8 April a force of Type Wellington bombers escorted by Type
Spitfire fighters carried out, for the first time, a daytime attack on tar-
gets in Yugoslavia.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

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The following forces were employed:

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Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Braunschweig,
units of the 2nd Fighter Division in direction of Hildesheim,
units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Diepholz, Bremen,
and Braunschweig,
units of the 7th Fighter Division in direction of Braunschweig.

A bitter air battle developed in the area of Braunschweig and Hannover
during which both sides suffered casualties. The American fighter operations
over German landing fields inflicted additional casualties on the German
forces.

Total Effect: 417 single- and twin-engine fighters

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Enemy Losses:

39 bombers and 11 fighters;
that is: 50 aircraft definitely shot down.
28 bombers and 1 fighter;
that is: 29 aircraft probably shot down.

Lessee of Friendly Forces:

- 36 aircraft,
- 34 aircraft received over 60% damage,
- 9 killed,
- 14 wounded,
- 36 missing.

(as of 9 April 1944, 12:00 hours)

Weather Conditions:

- 6/10 to 9/10 upsloping clouds,
- bottom ceiling: 5000 meters,
- in Southern Germany fogs and high fogs,
- east of the Elbe River cloudless.
### Special Information

**A. Effect of the Attacks on the Airfields in the Reich’s Territory on 8 April 1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airfield</th>
<th>Destroyed Aircraft</th>
<th>Damaged Aircraft</th>
<th>Condition of Airfield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quakenbrück</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>blocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restenburg</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>clear for landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celle</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waggum-Braunschweig</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braunschweig-Breizen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achmer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>blocked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oldenburg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesspe</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hannover-Langenhagen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>clear for landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesendorf</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustedt near Celle</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dadeladerf</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trier-Euren</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limburg</td>
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<td>Mersham sen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niedermündig</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allertchen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:**
- Destroyed Aircraft: 72
- Damaged Aircraft: 45
- 4 blocked airfields
b.) On 8 April 1944 Oberleutnant Zwernemann, Commanding Officer of the 1st Squadron/11th Fighter Wing, after having successfully bailed out with a parachute, died of injuries incurred in fierce air battle. He had 136 downed enemy aircraft to his credit and had been awarded the addition of the oak leaf cluster to the knight cross of the iron cross.

c.) On 8 April 1944

Hauptmann Grislawski, Commanding Officer of the 1st Group/1st Fighter Wing, was awarded the addition of the oak leaf cluster to the knight cross of the iron cross and

Major Specht, 11th Fighter Wing, was awarded the knight cross of the iron cross.
9. American Attack on Aircraft Plants at Peenemunde, Gotenhafen, Marienburg, and Tutew on 9 April 1944

(See sketch: Home Air Defense, Supplement 1661)

Enemy Effort:

Beginning at 09:31 hours strong American air forces were seen intruding about 170 kilometers north-west of the island of Texel flying in eastern direction. 500 bomber aircraft escorted by strong fighter forces crossed the southern North Sea and flew near the west coast of Jutland between Husum and Heide. Continuing their flight these forces divided as follows:

Northern units flying in eastern direction over the island of Lolland into the area of the Bay of Danzig, Konigsberg/East Prussia, and Marienburg to attack the aircraft plants at Gotenhafen and Marienburg.

Southern units flying across the Bay of Luebeck, Rostock the island of Rügen, the Bay of Mecklenburg in south-eastern direction to attack Peenemunde and across the Bay of Luebeck and Rostock to attack Tutew and Warnemünde.

Returning to their bases the aircraft used the following routes:

Beginning at 13:35 hours the aircraft flew from the Bay of Danzig in western direction across the island of Bornholm, the southern corner of Zealand, the island of Rügen and across the Bay of Mecklenburg, the Bay of Luebeck, and Elbe Estuary.

Beginning at 13:35 hours in north-western direction across the Stettiner Haff and the Bay of Mecklenburg.
Beginning at 12:07 hours the aircraft flew from the Pomeranian Bay across the lines Luebeck - Salzwedel, Hannover - Wesermünde, Bocklet - Grünigen - Estuary and the mouth of the Schelde River - island of Texel. The positions of the bomber aircraft which had left last were flying north of the island Ameland. According to German reports the American bomber aircraft were escorted by 400 single-engine and 250 twin-engine fighters. The fighter operations were conducted as follows:

Beginning at 09:35 hours several fighter units approached flying in eastern direction along the West and East Frisian islands to the Bay of Heligoland and Luebeck to cover the bomber force to the South and to carry out low-level attacks on airfields in the area of the Baltic Sea coast.

Beginning at 11:09 hours several fighter units intruded in eastern direction and crossed the lines Assen - Lingen, Kleppenburg - Minden, Seltau - Celle to proceed into the area Lueneburg, Salzwedel, Braunschweig, and Bremen where they were to meet the returning bombers. Simultaneously, strafing attacks were conducted on a number of airfields in this area.

Beginning at 14:00 hours several fighter units intruded via the island of Heligoland, Husum, Kiel, and the island of Fehmarn into the area of Stralsund to meet the returning bombers.

The American bomber attacks inflicted heavy damage on the aircraft plants at Marienburg, Posen, Cotenhafen, Tutew, and Wernemünde.
Medium damage was inflicted on grounded aircraft of all types by the strafing attacks against airfields.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Kiel,
units of the 2nd Fighter Division in direction of Neumünster,
units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Heligoland and Schleswig.

On a second mission elements of all divisions were employed against in direction of Flensburg against returning bomber aircraft.

The combat units of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions were engaged in combat with American fighters already in the area of Hamburg and Elbe Estuary.

Total Effort: 354 single- and twin-engine fighters.

Enemy Losses: 24 bombers and 5 fighters:

that is: 29 aircraft definitely shot down.
7 bombers and 1 fighter;
that is: 8 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 13 aircraft,

12 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel: 3 killed,
7 wounded,
13 missing.
Weather Conditions: Irregular high upsloping clouds.

Dense high-altitude haze.

Special Information: During the attack on April RAF squadrons were, equipped with Type Mustang aircraft, for the first time employed over large areas.
10.) American Fighter-Bomber Attack on Bielefeld on 10 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 167)

Enemy Effort

At 15:05 a total of 80 fighters approaching about 100 kilometers west of Ijmuiden were located by radio direction finding. The fighter-bombers crossed the Dutch coast between Bergen op Zoom and Nordwijk in eastern direction. While 40 Type Thunderbolt aircraft bombed Bielefeld Type Lightning fighters covered the operation in the area Nienburg, Hannover, and Paderborn. From 15:55 hours on all fighter aircraft were on their return flight in western direction. They crossed the coast between Bergen op Zoom and the mouth of the Schelde River till 17:00 hours. They flew at an altitude of 5500 meters. Light damage only was brought about in Bielefeld.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Under weather conditions unfavorable for defensive action 30 fighter aircraft which had been in a state of alert were employed by the 3rd Fighter Division.

Enemy Losses: No enemy losses were observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.
11. American Attacks on Rostock, Stettin, Bernburg, and Oschersleben

on 11 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 168)

Enemy Effort

Employing units of the 1st to 3rd Bomber Divisions the American air force stationed in Great Britain struck a strong blow against the air plants of the German armament industry. These operations were conducted with 600 bombers, 450 single-engine and 250 twin-engine fighters.

Beginning at 09:10 hours strong fighter units flew ahead of the bombers over Holland into the area of Northern Germany. They did not succeed in disturbing the assembly of the German day-fighter units. Instead they inflicted damage on aircraft by strafing attacks against airfields. During their low-level attacks on 25 trains 21 locomotives were damaged and suffered heavy damage.

The American bomber force which was escorted by strong fighter forces approached in two separate groups:

The northern group approached via the southern North Sea to attack Rostock and Stettin. This group approached at 09:09 hours over the sea area about 90 kilometers north-west of the island of Vlieland. The aircraft crossed the coast between Westerland and Rendsburg. They proceeded via Lolland and Rügen into the area of Köslin in Pomerania, Stargard, Poznan, and Stettin, moreover via the island of Fehmarn into the area of Rostock.

The southern group crossed the coast between Bergen op Zoom and Den Haag from 09:55 hours on. The aircraft proceeded in eastern direction across
the Zuider Sea and the lines Kloppegren - Osnabroek, Soltau - Hildesheim, Stendal - Dessau to attack Oschersleben and Bernburg. A smaller bomber unit proceeded from the area of Stendal across the area south of Berlin to Cottbus and via Frankfurt on the Oder, Gruenberg in Silesia, Sagan, and Torgau into the area of Bernburg.

The following were the targets of the attack:

- Stettin, the factories of the "Pommersche Motorenbau GmbH",
- Poznan, the "Focke-Wulf" factories,
- Oschersleben, aircraft plants,
- Bernburg, the factories of the "Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke",
- Schau, the "Focke-Wulf" aircraft plants,
- Cottbus, the factories of the "Pommersche Motorenbau GmbH", and
- Halberstadt, the factories of the "Junkerswerke".

The bomber units returned across the following lines:

Northern group: Eberswalde - Bay of Pomernia, Schwerin - island of Falster, and Elbe Estuary - island of Roem. The last report on the aircraft on their return flight over the western coast of Jutland was timed 14:45.

Southern group: Rotenburg - Paderborn, Muenchen - Gladbach - Groningen, and island of Vlieland - Ostend. The last report on the aircraft on their return flight over Ostend was timed 15:10.

Fighter units escorted the bombers to their target areas. Moreover, several fighter units intruded at 12:38 hours from the sea area 50 kilometers north of the island of Terschelling in eastern direction across the Heligo-
land Eight to the island of Laaland to meet the returning bombers.

The attacked air armament plants showed heavy damages.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

- Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Schwerin and the island of Fehmarn,
- units of the 2nd Fighter Division in directio of Kiel,
- units of the 3rd Fighter Division in directio of Stade, Flensburg,

and in direction of the Brocken in the harz.

Total Effort: 432 single- and twin-engine fighters.

Combat units of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fighter Divisions attacked American bomber formations in the area of kiel, Rostock, and Luebeck.

Fierce air battles developed. The single- and twin-engine fighters of the 1st Fighter Division distinguished themselves especially. Owing to bad visibility in the area of Central Germany the units of the 3rd and 7th Fighter Divisions scored limited success only.

Fighting against American air forces three times superior the day-fighter units of the home air defense shot down a considerable number of enemy aircraft. However, they did not succeed in preventing the air attacks of the German armament plants which were of utmost consequence.

**Enemy Losses:**

- 81 bomber and 11 fighter aircraft;
- that is: 92 aircraft definitely shot down.
- 20 bomber and 3 fighter aircraft;
that is: 23 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces:

(19 aircraft,
17 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel:
13 killed,
17 wounded,
24 missing.

Of these losses the units of the 1st Fighter Division sustained:

11 aircraft completely lost,
12 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel:
10 killed,
11 wounded,
16 missing.

Weather Conditions: Frequently changing clouds, ground haze.

Special Information:

It was observed that the bombers intruding into the Reich's territory used a new type of flying formation. The three groups of a wing flew in a broad front one beside the other without being echeloned vertically. Within the individual groups the vertical echelonment by leading, high- and low-altitude flight was omitted. Units of the 2nd Bomber Division were up to 34 minutes late.
The escort fighter forces for the 3rd Bomber Division were subdivided into 16 waves.

12.) American Attacks on Wiener-Neustadt and on Airfields in Central Germany on 12 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 169)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the American air forces:

a.) A large-scale attack from the air base in Italy 500 bombers, 400 single-engine and 250 twin-engine fighters on the aircraft factories at Wiener-Neustadt. The bombing raid brought about heavy damages.

b.) Strafing attacks with a strong fighter unit from the air base in Great Britain on airfields in Central Germany. The attacks were almost completely ineffective owing to the strong German fighter defenses.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

All units of the 7th Fighter Division in the area of Vienna.
During these operations superior American fighter forces inflicted serious losses on the German defense forces, in particular on the twin-engine fighter units.
Almost all fighter units of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Fighter Divisions which had been in a state of alert; they were to fight off the low-level attacks in Central Germany. They prevented the systematic conduct of the American attacks on the airfields.
Total Effort: 421 single-engine and twin-engine fighters.

Enemy Losses:

In the area of Vienna:

21 bombers and 2 fighters;
that is: 23 aircraft definitely shot down.
1 bomber and 1 fighter;
that is: 2 aircraft probably shot down.

In the area of Central Germany:

1 fighter definitely shot down,
2 fighters probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces:

12 aircraft,
13 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel:
7 killed,
11 wounded,
15 missing.

13.) American Attacks on Augsburg, Schweinfurt, and Budapest 13 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 170)

Enemy Effort

At 08:29 hours three units equipped with Type Marauder aircraft
crossed the Channel coast between Calais and Ostend and proceeded in south-eastern direction into the area of Brussels, Liège, and Sedan. Presumably they bombed airfield on Belgian territory. Beginning at 08:50 hours the medium bombers returned on their former flying routes. They were met in the end at an altitude of 3300 meters by a fighter unit which had intruded at 08:50 hours over Etaples.

The heavy bomber forces continued their attacks on aircraft factories in the Reich's territory. 500 four-engine aircraft, escorted by 300 single-engine and 150 twin-engine fighters, attacked armament plants in Schweinfurt and Augsburg as well as a number of airfields in Southern Germany. The bombers used the air route across the Channel coast between Schelde Estuary and Calais where they appeared at 12:00 hours. They proceeded across the lines Antwerp - Dinant, south of Koeln - Bingen, Giessen - Darmstadt into the areas of Schweinfurt and Augsburg, Kuenchen. The escort fighter units flew ahead of the bombers in northern direction. Beginning at 13:40 hours elements of them flying over the area of Frankfurt on the Main began turning home. Other elements penetrated into the area of Southern Germany where they conducted strafing attacks on a number of airfields. The bomber aircraft commenced their return flight and at 14:08 hours over the area of Schweinfurt at 15:00 hours over the area of Augsburg flying in north-western direction. Over the Channel coast in the sector between Schelde Estuary and Boulogne the return flights lasted until 17:45 hours.

Several fighter units met the attacking forces over the Rhine River as well as over the areas of Mainz and Mannheim. They had been intruding
from 15:22 hours between Schelde Estuary and Boulogne in south-eastern direction.

by bombing

The damages inflicted on the aircraft plants at Schweinfurt and Augsburg were heavy. Heavy damages were also caused to aircraft grounded on the airfields in Southern Germany.

The American air force stationed in Italy attacked industrial installations at Budapest and other Hungarian cities successfully with 300 bombers, 100 single-engine and 50 twin-engine fighters.

Commitment of the 1st Fighter Corps

Under weather conditions favorable for defensive action the following forces were employed:

To repulse a large-scale attack on Southern Germany:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Frankfurt on the Main,
unites of the 2nd Fighter Division in direction of Frankfurt on the Main,
units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Koblenz and Eifel from the Bavarian Woods
units of the 7th Fighter Division in direction of Mannheim.

To repulse the attack on Budapest:

Units of the Fighter Commander Ostmark in the area of Lake Balaton.

In the area of Frankfurt on the Main and Schweinfurt fierce air battles
developed between German and American fighter forces. The American escort forces often succeeded in preventing the German attacks on the bombers. They inflicted considerable losses on the German fighter units.

Since the air situation in Croatia and Hungary was obscure the commitment of the forces of the Fighter Commander Ostmark was difficult.

Total Effort: 412 single-engine and twin-engine fighters.

Enemy Losses: 31 bombers and 4 fighters;
that is: 35 aircraft definitely shot down.
11 bombers and 2 fighters;
that is: 13 aircraft probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces:

(as of 14 April 1944, 10:00 hours)

28 aircraft,
15 aircraft received over 60% damage.
Losses of personnel:
1 killed,
4 wounded,
32 missing.

Weather Conditions: 5/10 to 10/10 clouds. Visibility of 5 to 10 kilometers.

14.) American Fighter-Bomber Attack on the Airfield of Diedenhofen on

14 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 171)
Enemy Effort

80 American fighter-bombers attacked the airfield of Diedenhofen. They had approached via Ostend in south-eastern direction and returned on counter routes via Dunkirk to Great Britain. The damages caused at Diedenhofen were negligible.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Several fighters of the 3rd Fighter Division which had been in a state of alert were employed from the area of Frankfurt. They did not reach the attackers any more.

Enemy Losses: No enemy losses were observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

15. American Strafing Attacks on Airfields in the Reich's Territory and in Jutland on 15 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 171)

Enemy Effort

The American fighter forces conducted strafing attacks on 28 airfields in the Reich's territory and in Jutland with a total strength of 400 single-engine (Type Mustang and Thunderbolt) and 200 Type Lightning fighters; they scored little success.
The operations were conducted as follows:

a.) From 12:14 hours to 13:07 hours a great number of fighter units penetrated across the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Hoek van Holland in eastern direction into the areas of Northern and Central Germany. A portion of these units conducted low-level strafing attacks on airfields while providing cover against German fighters at high altitudes.

The area in which the American fighters operated was bordered by the following general lines:
In the North: Assen - Kloppenburg - Bremen - Lueneburg - Parchim.
In the South: Hertogenbosch - Duisburg - Kassel.
In the East: Wittstock - Neuruppin - west of Potsdam - Dessau - Halle - Nordhausen - Langensalza.

Elements of the American fighter forces began their return flights in western direction already in the area of Osnabrueck and Hannover. The majority of the fighters left the area of attack split up into a great number of small units which flew in a broad front in western and north-western direction. They were observed flying over the coast between the Heligoland Bight and Schelde Estuary until 15:15 hours.

b.) Beginning at 12:32 hours a number of American fighter units penetrated between the island of Terschelling and Den Helder across the West and East Frisian islands in eastern respectively north-eastern direction into the area of Schleswig-Holstein and the Bay of Kiel and of the islands of Falster, Lolland, Zealand, and Fyn. In this area they carried out strafing attacks against airfields. Beginning at 14:00 hours they returned in western direction flying in a broad front and had left the western coast of
Jutland by 15:05 hours.

Strong offensive forces from the American air base in Italy bombed targets within the urban areas of Bukarest, Ploesti, and Nisch.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

To repulse the low-level attacks in Northern and Central Germany a total of 133 fighter aircraft were employed by the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions. These fighters succeeded in preventing systematic offensive action of the American fighters and major damage to the airfields.

Enemy Losses: 4 fighter aircraft definitely shot down.

In addition, 20 fighters were destroyed by antiaircraft artillery.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 11 aircraft.

Losses of personnel: 6 killed,
2 missing.

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 172)

**Enemy Effort**

Beginning at 10:30 hours an American offense force consisting of 500 bombers, 400 single-engine and 200 twin-engine fighters flew across the Zuider Sea and proceeded in eastern and south-eastern direction towards Berlin. Under weather conditions moderately suitable for offensive action the bombers attacked industrial targets in the area of Berlin approaching from western and southern direction. Some bomber formations bombed Rathenow and the airfield of Ferleberg. Berlin suffered medium damages to industrial installations. The damages caused to Rathenow and the airfield of Ferleberg, however, were heavy. The bombers returned from the area of Berlin in north-western direction via Elbe Estuary as well as in western direction via Northern Germany, Holland, and Schelde Estuary.

The targets of the attack in the area of Berlin were:

- Oranienburg, the factories of the "Heinkelwerke",
- Klein-Wiecknow, the factories of the "Boschwerke", and
- Brandenburg, the factories of the "Arado Werke".

**Commitment of the I Fighter Corps**

The following forces were employed:

- Units of the 1st Fighter Division after being assembled in the area of Schwerin.
Units of the 2nd Fighter Division were, after assembly in the area of Hannover and Nienburg, engaged in fierce air combat with American fighter forces. The units of the 3rd and 7th Fighter Divisions could not be employed owing to bad weather conditions in Western and Southern Germany.

Total Effort: 144 single-engine and twin-engine fighters.

Enemy Losses: 31 bombers and 3 fighters; that is: 24 aircraft definitely shot down, 1 bomber probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 6 aircraft, 2 aircraft received over 60% damage.

(as of 19 April 1944, 12:00 hours) Losses of personnel: 2 killed, 6 missing.

Special Information:

a.) A bomber force attacked from the front by German fighters fired rocket-type projectiles after the German combat unit which exploded with black or grey bursts at a distance of roughly 600 meters behind the combat unit.

b.) On 18 April 1944 the 3rd Fighter Wing (Udet) under the command of Major Karl Friedrich Mueller succeeded in destroying completely a bomber force flying in close formation.
The Commanding General of the I Fighter Corps inspected the factories of the "Arado-Flugzeugwerke" at Brandenburg on the Havel on 1 May 1944. The American bombing attack on 18 April 1944 did not cause any damage to the factories.
PHOTO

Major Karl Friedrich Mueller (left), Commanding Officer of the (Udet)
3rd Fighter Wing, killed in action in May 1944.
17.) American Attacks on Koblenz and Kassel on 19 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1731)

Enemy Effort

The American air force stationed in Great Britain conducted
large-scale attacks on Kassel and Koblenz as well as against a number of
airfields employing a total strength of 600 bombers, 450 single-engine
and 350 twin-engine fighters. The aircraft factories at Kassel as well as
three airfields sustained heavy and the installations of the transporta-
tion system at Koblenz sustained medium damage.

Beginning at 09:00 hours bomber units escorted by strong figh-
ter forces crossed the Dutch coast between Bergen op Zoom and Hook van
Holland. Proceeding across the lines Meppen - Muenster, Hannover - Biele-
feld in eastern and south-eastern direction they reached the area of Nord-
hausen, Eisenach, and Kassel. From here a number of units proceeded in
south-western direction to Koblenz. From 10:40 hours on the bombers re-
turned in western direction via Schelde Estuary to Great Britain. The
last units left the continent at 12:19 hours. Beginning at 10:20 hours
several American fighter units had intruded via Schelde Estuary in south-
eastern direction to protect the returning bombers.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Under variable weather conditions the following forces were employed:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Hameln,
units of the 2nd Fighter Division in direction of Osnabrueck; they
were, while assembling, attacked and dispersed by American
fighters.
Units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Munster and
Paderborn.
The units of the 7th Fighter Division could not be moved in owing
to weather conditions.

Total Effort: 220 single-engine and twin-engine fighters; only 96
of them engaged in combat.

Enemy Losses: 15 bombers and 7 fighters;
that is: 22 aircraft definitely shot down.
2 bombers probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 10 aircraft.
(as of 20 April 1944, 10:00 hours)
7 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel:
6 wounded,
10 missing.

Special Information:
On 19 April 1944 Oberleutnant Otto Kesaling, Commanding Officer of the 11th Squadron/3rd Fighter Wing was killed in action. He was credited with 83 downed enemy aircraft and was decorated with the knight cross of the iron cross.
18.) American Reconnaissance Operations over the Reich's Territory

on 20 and 21 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1731)

Enemy Effort

On 20 April the following reconnaissance missions were flown:

1 Type Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft intruded &quadrant into the via
area of Kassel. This aircraft approached at 09:00 hours &over Brussels,
Koblenz, and Kassel. It returned in north-western direction via Paderborn
and left the air space over Den Helder at 12:00 hours.

1 Type Mosquito reconnaissance aircraft intruded into the area of
the Baltic coast. This aircraft approached at 09:35 hours via Heligoland,
Schleswig, north of Kiel into the area of Greifswald.
return flight
Its #back on counter route lasted until 11:20 hours.

On 21 April several Type Mosquito aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over
the Reich's territory.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps: The corps was not operationally committed

Enemy Losses: No enemy losses were observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.
19.) American Attacks on Hamm and Koblenz on 22 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 174)

Enemy Effort

The American large-scale attack carried out by 600 bombers, 400 single-engine and 200 twin-engine fighters was directed against the installations of the transportation system at Hamm and Koblenz. While the marshalling yard at Hamm was heavily damaged, the city of Koblenz sustained medium damage inflicted on industrial installations and buildings.

At 17:20 hours 6 American fighter units began intruding in a broad front across the Dutch as well as French-Belgian coasts. They penetrated between Texel and Schelde Estuary in eastern direction into the area of Hamburg, Uelzen, east of Braunschweig, Hildesheim, west of Kassel. They conducted strafing attacks in this area. Other fighter forces intruded between Ostend and Dieppe in south-easteren direction into the areas of Mainz, Darmstadt, Mannheim, as well as Soissons, Metz, and Luxembourg. At 18:25 hours the bombers appeared, escorted by strong fighter forces, over the Dutch coast between Amsterdam and Den Haag. They crossed the line Deventer - Wesel in east-south-eastern direction and attacked Hamm; elements of them proceeded via Muenster. Other elements proceeded in south-eastern direction into the area of Harburg where they turned to attack Koblenz. Returning from the Ruhr area and from the area of Koblenz the bombers and escort fighters flew in western direction and left the Channel coast between Dunkirk and Boulogne at 20:30 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps
The following forces were employed:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Koblenz,
units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Munster and Siegen.
The units of the 2nd Fighter Division could not be employed owing to weather conditions.

The majority of the fighters of the 1st Fighter Division did not reach the American attacking forces any more. Superior American fighter forces inflicted heavy losses on the fighter units of the 3rd Fighter Division.

Total Effort: 193 single-engine and twin-engine fighters of which 140 aircraft engaged in combat.

Enemy Losses: 9 bombers and 10 fighters;
that is: 19 aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 17 aircraft,
10 aircraft received over 60% damage.
(as of 23 April 1944, 03:00 hours)
Losses of personnel:
1 killed,
5 wounded,
17 missing.

Weather Conditions: 4/10 to 7/10 cumulus clouds with scattered showers.
High-altitude wind: 300 degrees, 100 kilometers per hour.

20. American Attacks on Wiener-Neustadt and on Airfields in the Reich's territory on 23 April 1944.
(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 175)
Enemy Effort

In the morning 600 four-engine aircraft, escorted by 200 single-engine and 100 twin-engine fighters, bombed the aircraft plants at Wiener-Neustadt. This large-scale attack which was conducted from the American air base in Italy caused medium damage to buildings and industrial installations.

In the afternoon a total strength of 100 American fighters conducted strafing attacks against airfields in North-Western Germany and in the area of Stuttgart. The airfield of Soesterberg in Holland was bombed.

The offensive operations were conducted as follows:

At 14:05 hours 30 fighter aircraft intruded over Bergen op Zoom in eastern direction into the area of Emden, Bremen, and Osnabrueck. They returned in western direction and marked the air space over the island of Terschelling up to 15:30 hours.

At 14:26 hours 20 fighter aircraft approached flying in south-eastern direction via Ostend, Longwy into the area of Stuttgart. They returned on counter routes and were observed leaving the air space over Schelde Estuary up to 16:25 hours.

Beginning at 14:48 hours 50 fighter aircraft intruded flying in small formations across Den Haag in eastern direction into the areas of Paderborn, Hannover, Bremen, Halberstadt, and Kassel. A small unit bombed the airfield of Soesterberg. They aircraft returned flying
in a broad front in western direction across the coastal sector Den Helder - Schelde Estuary up to 19:25 hours.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

To repulse the attack on Wiener-Neustadt the units of the 7th Fighter Division were employed. On account of the weather conditions no mission was flown against the attacking aircraft attacking the airfield.

Total Effort: 174 single-engine and twin-engine fighters of which 169 engaged in combat.

Enemy Losses: 12 bombers and 9 fighters;

that is: 21 aircraft definitely shot down.

2 bombers were probably shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces:

(as of 24 April 1944, 19:30 hours)

11 aircraft,

8 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personnel:

1 killed,

4 wounded,

15 missing.

Weather Conditions: 3/10 to 7/10 light clouds at altitudes of 100 to 1500 meters, around 2500 and above 7000 meters.
21.) American Attack on Munich, Friedrichshafen, and on Airfields in Southern Germany on 24 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 176.)

Enemy Effort

From 09:00 hours on 10 to 11 American combat wings were located assembling over the area of Norwich and over Thames Estuary by the German radio intercept service. Beginning at 11:10 hours 600 bombers escorted by strong fighter forces left the Estuary Island of Britain between Brighton and Dover flying in south-eastern direction. Having crossed the coast between Boulogne and Trouport they reached the area east of Paris. From here they proceeded via Nancy, Strasbourg, and via Neufchateau, Colmar into the area of Munich. Individual units branched off into the area of Friedrichshafen. Strong fighter forces intruded across Scheldt Estuary, Liege, and Frankfurt on the Main into the area of Munich and covered the bombers to the North. In addition, they conducted strafing attacks against a total of 15 airfields in the area of Nuremberg, Stuttgart, and Munich. The bulk of the bombers returned via Mannheim and Darmstadt in north-western direction. A number of units left the area of Southern Germany in western direction. To protect the returning offensive forces additional fighter units had penetrated via Scheldt Estuary into the area of the Mosel River. The bomber operations were protected by a total force of 600 single-engine and 300 twin-engine fighters.

The American attacks had brought about the following results:

At Munich and in the aircraft factory of Oberpfaffenhofen:
Medium damage to buildings and to the transportation system.

At Friedrichshafen:
Heavy damage to the aircraft factories.

On the airfields in Southern Germany:
Heavy damage inflicted on grounded aircraft by strafing and bombing raids.

A secondary attack was directed against the piston manufacturing plants at Neckarsulm.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division in direction of Eisenach, Wuerzburg,
units of the 2nd Fighter Division in direction of Frankfurt, Stuttgart,
units of the 3rd Fighter Division in direction of Mainz, Strasbourg,
from the area of Bavaria
units of the 7th Fighter Division in direction of Stuttgart, Sigmaringen;
from the area of Vienna in direction of Munich.

Total Effort: 350 single-engine and twin-engine fighters of which 301 engaged
in combat.

The units of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions engaged in fierce air battles with the American fighter forces protecting the bombers to the North. The units of the 1st and 7th Fighter Divisions scored good successes in bringing down enemy aircraft. The losses sustained by friendly forces were extremely high.

Enemy Losses: 48 bombers and 14 fighters;
that is: 62 aircraft definitely shot down.
6 bombers and 6 fighters;
that is: 12 aircraft probably shot down.

Additional losses:

- 12 aircraft shot down by antiaircraft artillery,
- 10 aircraft made emergency landings in Switzerland.

Total losses: 84 aircraft.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 32 aircraft,

- 22 aircraft received over 60% damage.

Losses of personal:
- 10 killed,
- 8 wounded,
- 35 wounded.

Weather Conditions:

- In Northern Germany: Low clouds.
- In Southern Germany: Bright, good visibility at high altitudes.

Special Information: On 24 April 1944, Leutnant Schwaiger, Commanding Officer of the 1st Squadron/3rd Fighter Wing, was killed in action. He was credited with 58 downed enemy aircraft and decorated with the knight cross of the iron cross.
22. American Attacks on Southern Germany on 25 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 177!)

Enemy Effort

Beginning at 08:20 hours 600 bombers escorted by strong fighter forces crossed the French Channel coast between Valery en Caux and Berck sur Mer in south-eastern direction. While proceeding they crossed the areas of St. Quentin, Meaux, Sedan, St. Dizier, Diedenhofen, Spinal and reached the area of Mannheim, Stuttgart, Ulm, Konstanz, and Freiburg in the Breisgau. High-altitude clouds hindered in the area of Ulm presumably hindered the continuation of their flight. They dropped their bombs unsystematically on small towns, airfields, and open terrain. The damage thus caused was negligible. Starting at 10:10 hours the bomber units turned back in north-eastern direction flying over Belgium and Northern France. They were observed leaving the coastal sector Ostend - Somme Estuary up to 12:00 hours. 400 single-engine and 200 twin-engine fighters took part in this unsuccessful offensive operation.

Beginning at 08:25 hours the majority of these fighters crossed Schelde Estuary in south-eastern direction flying in subsequent unit formation into the area of Ingolstadt, Schleisheim near Munich. A portion of these units began turning back on counter routes as early as at 09:10 hours over the area of Schwaebisch-Gmuend.

Commitment of I Fighter Corps

The corps was not operationally employed owing
to bad weather conditions.

Enemy Losses: No enemy losses were observed.

Weather Conditions: 4/10 to 7/10 clouds. Lower ceiling was 150 to 200 meters in rainy weather. Upper ceiling was 3500 to 4000 meters.
23. American Attack on Braunschweig on 26 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1781)

Enemy Effort

At 07:49 hours 700 bombers escorted by 400 single-engine and 200 twin-engine fighters reached the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Den Haag flying in eastern direction. They proceeded in four waves across the lines Zwolle - south of Groningen, Münster - Verden and Hildesheim - Uelzen to attack Braunschweig where the bombs were dropped without visual observation of the ground. The third wave struck at Braunschweig flying by way of Detmold and Holzminden. From 09:55 hours the bomber units left the area of Braunschweig in western direction. Their return lane was bordered by the following lines:

In the North: Celle - Vechta - Assen - Den Helder.

In the South: Paderborn - Bielefeld - Apeldoorn - Haarlem.

The last bombers crossed the coast at 11:30 hours in western direction. In addition to the fighters immediately escorting the bombers a fighter unit was observed which penetrated at 08:50 hours across the island of Goeree, Emmerich, Muenster, and Detmold into the area southwest of Hannover. Braunschweig reported medium damage caused to buildings and slight damage inflicted on industrial installations.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The commitment of the corps was not possible owing to bad weather conditions. The 3rd Fighter Wing was readied for a possible operational employment over Berlin.
Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: Dense stratus clouds; lower ceiling from 300 to 500 meters, upper ceiling 1500 meters. East of the Elbe River high-altitude fog. Strong icing in cases of flights through the clouds in the extremely moist air at altitudes of 5000 to 7000 meters high-altitude winds of 350 degrees, 60 kilometers per hour.

24. American Reconnaissance Operations over the Reich's Territory
    on 27 and 28 April 1944

Enemy Effort

On both days a number of Type Mosquito aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over the Reich's territory.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

On 27 April 19 fighter aircraft.
On 28 April 10 fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 2 aircraft were definitely shot down on 28 April.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.
25. American Attack on Berlin on 29 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1791)

**Enemy Effort**

From 07:25 hours on the German radio intercept service was able to locate the assemblies of 11 combat wings. Beginning at 09:15 hours 800 bombers, 400 single-engine and 200 twin-engine fighters took off from the area of Great Yarmouth on an offensive mission in eastern direction towards Berlin. They crossed the Zuider Sea, the area of Hannover and Soltau and struck at Berlin flying by way of Stendal and Fritzwalk.

Elements of the offense force bombed Braunschweig. The bulk of the bombers left the area of Berlin in southern direction. The aircraft returned by way of the area of Magdeburg from where they proceeded in a broad front to the Dutch coast which they crossed over the sector between the island of Texel and Schelde Estuary. Elements of the American escort fighter forces flew about 100 kilometers ahead of the intruding bombers forming a broad cover. A number of fighters conducted low-level strafing attacks against the airfield of Burg near Magdeburg. To provide cover for the returning bombers several fighter units penetrated across Schelde Estuary into the area of Bielefeld and Nienburg, proceeding in south-eastern direction elements of these forces carried out strafing attacks against the air bases of Gotha and Nordhausen.

In spite of good visibility and high numerical strength of its operational units the large-scale attack on Berlin was, for the American air force, no success of great importance in respect to the over-all war effort.
The industry of Berlin sustained slight damage only. The damages caused to buildings and the losses of personnel were heavy. The strafing attacks against air bases showed no results.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division: Assembly over Magdeburg and operational employment in direction of Braun-26th schweig. The Twin-Engine Fighter Wing was kept in readiness over Kustrin for commitment against bombers breaking through to the North.

Units of the 2nd Fighter Division: Assembly over Hamburg. Employment in direction of Hannover. Kassel

Units of the 3rd Fighter Division: Assembly of all elements over Braunschweig. Employment in direction of Kassel.

Elements of all fighter divisions could be employed on a second mission from the sectors of the 1st and 2nd Fighter Divisions against returning bombers. It was not possible to move in units of the 7th Fighter Division owing to weather conditions.


2nd mission: 75 single-engine fighters.

Total: 350 single-engine and twin-engine fighters.

By assembling the combat units outside the approach lanes of the American bombers the German fighter units could be launched into a
concentrated attack against the bomber units. During these operations the
day-fighter units of the I Fighter Corps scored a considerable defensive
success by **inflating** destroying 10% of the American bombers committed.

**Enemy Losses:** 84 bombers and 7 fighters;
that is: 91 aircraft definitely shot down.
9 bombers and 2 fighters;
that is: 11 aircraft probably shot down.

**Losses of Friendly Forces:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10 aircraft received over 60% damage.</td>
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**Losses of personnel:**
3 killed,
2 wounded,
11 missing.

**Weather Conditions:**

- Sector of the 1st Fighter Division: 4/10 to 6/10 cumulus clouds.
- Sectors of the 2nd and 3rd Fighter Divisions:
  - 6/10 to 10/10 **shower** clouds,
  - lower ceiling 400 to 600 meters; snow and rain showers;
  - icing in case of flights through clouds.
Special Information:

Effects of the attack on Berlin: During the period from 10:41 hours to
11:30 hours about 1000 demolition bombs were dropped on Berlin.
The sectors hit were: The center of the city, the southern sector
of the city, Zehlendorf, and Steglitz.

DAMAGE infliction on material and personnel:
294 buildings completely destroyed,
1608 buildings damaged,
375 killed,
470 wounded, and
13,700 lost their homes.

26.) American Reconnaissance Operations over the Reich's Territory
on 30 April 1944

Enemy Effort

A number of Type Mosquito aircraft flew reconnaissance missions
over Northern Germany. In addition, several American fighter aircraft con-
ducted strafing attacks against airfields without scoring any success.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The corps was not operationally committed.

Enemy Losses:

Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.
Chapter II

Night Activities in April 1944

1.) Survey

a.) British Offensive Action

In spite of the high losses in heavy bomber aircraft which the RAF had sustained at the end of March the British air command maintained its concept of night attacks. In April 1944 the night bombing operations against the Reich's territory were continued with undiminished intensity. In the first half of the month the RAF admittedly limited the ranges of penetration as well as the total strengths of its bomber forces the committed and temporarily placed emphasis of its attacks on the western areas occupied by Germany. In the last third of the month, however, the striking power of the RAF reached a climax in respect to the momentum of its attacks. The British air armament industry had proved to be in a position to cover the material losses of the RAF without difficulty and the RAF had surprisingly proved able to quickly to replace losses in personnel. The British nuisance raids were continued regardless of weather conditions and visibility at night. The British Mosquito force exercised the unqualified air supremacy over the Reich's territory at night. By now, the continual effect of the night attacks had developed into a "Mosquito-plague" for Germany. The employment of British nuisance bombers
and aircraft carrying agents from the air base in Italy had been increased in
April. The alarming effects of this employment extended to Austria, Hungary, and to the areas of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland.

The British large-scale attacks did not reveal a special tendency in respect to the selection of targets. However, the British Bomber Command as well as the American air force stationed in Great Britain began to attack installations of the transportation system in the Reich's territory, especially in the area of the Rhine River. These attacks caused heavy damage to railroad stations, however, did not materially impair the German transportation activities to the western areas occupied by Germany.

It could be assumed that it was only during the day and night attacks on Munich on 24 April that the RAF and the American air force stationed in Great Britain directly coordinated their operations.

The total operations of the RAF against the Reich's territory and the eastern areas covered by the home air defense in April 1944 consisted of:

6 large-scale attacks on targets in the Reich's territory,
1 large-scale attack on Budapest,
18 nuisance raids against targets in the Reich's territory conducted from the air base in Great Britain,
2 missions to drop agents flown from the British air base in Italy, and
11 mining operations with emphasis on the Baltic Sea, often conducted with strong forces.
It was only during one night of the month that not a single British aircraft appeared over the Reich's territory.

b. British Offense Tactics and Radio Interference

During the winter of 1943/44 the RAF placed great emphasis on ample and varied radio interference activities in line with its night bomber operations to disturb the commitment of the German night fighter units. This period of radio interference had been successfully overcome by the Germans by the end of March. However, already since the beginning of 1944 the British air command attempted to counter by variable tactical measures the defensive action of the German night fighter force in the home air defense. British air command, which scored increasing success. By action of all types the HAF endeavored to conceal the approach routes and the targets of the bomber units. Even so, it was not able to prevent the failure on 30/31 March 1944.

The April 1944, however, brought a change in the British night bomber warfare. This could, above all, be ascribed to the great flexibility and tenacity of the British command as well as to the considerable striking power of the British night bomber forces. The latter was demonstrated by numerical superiority, varied command facilities, and high training standards of the flight crews. In spite of the loss of at least 500 men of high-class flight personnel solely during the night of 30/31 March, the fighting spirit of the bomber groups was unbroken.

In April 1944 the RAF, applying new tactical methods, started night operations against the Reich's territory and with comparatively little losses it succeeded in maintaining the night air operations which were to have so grave consequences for Germany. The new tactics applied
by the RAF consisted in employing several bomber streams if possible simultaneously against different targets in the Reich's territory instead of operating with a single bomber stream in these night attacks. The evaluation of these British intruding operations by the German command was, in addition, rendered difficult by the fact that often British nuisance force and mining forces left the air base Great Britain simultaneously with the four-engine bomber streams. Thus, it had become extremely difficult and often impossible for the German radio intelligence to locate the main bomber stream(s) accurately and in time. It had to acquire new knowledge to be able to compute on the bearings of the British radar stations the main effort of the four-engine bomber streams.

c.) Commitment of the German Night Fighter Forces

On 1 April the headquarters of the I Fighter Corps assumed the responsibility for the night fighter defenses within the entire Reich's territory. (See Chapter I, 1c) By this arrangement a demand raised by the corps headquarters in autumn 1943 was met. The command organization of 1 April 1944 created the basis for a unified interpretation of the air situation in the Reich's territory and made it possible to concentrate forces for the repulsion of British night attacks. In spite of this basis the efficiency of the night fighter defenses had decreased in April 1944. The reason for this decrease was primarily the British tactics of employing several bomber streams in conjunction with ample camouflage measures. The headquarters of the I Fighter Corps did not succeed in concentrating a maximum strength of defense forces on the respective bomber stream.
Short-range intrusions with attacks against targets in the western part of the Reich's territory or in the western outpost area and time-consuming efforts to find out the main bomber stream were the reasons why the night fighter forces were often employed too late or in an precipitated manner. Moreover, the British FIGHTER several-bomber stream and concealment tactics brought about a dispersion of the night fighter operations as well as mixed the misdirected commitment of forces. Finally, bad weather conditions and, above all, bad visibility at high altitudes sometimes impaired the efficiency of the German night fighter defenses.

In the endeavor to repulse the British intrusions from the South the inadequacy of matériel and personnel of the radar and ground control organization in the areas of Austria and Hungary made itself unfavorably felt. The network of radar stations in these areas was widely dispersed, the construction of the stations was, in part, not yet completed and the personnel manning the stations lacked experience. The night fighter training units employed in the sector of the Fighter Commander Ostmark lacked operational experience. A strange development occurred that over the areas of Austria and Hungary, the obsolete Type Do 217 night fighter without the Type SN 2 airborne search apparatus was committed against the obsolete Type Wellington bomber. It was not until 5 April 1944 that the headquarters of the 1 Fighter Corps transferred the experienced 2nd Group/5th Night Fighter Wing from the sector of the 1st Fighter Division on the airfield of Farndorf into the sector of the Fighter Commander Ostmark.

Among other statements, post-war literature disclosed that British interference impaired the efficiency of the German
Type SW 2 airborne search apparatus already in April 1944 and thereby
reduced the successes of the night fighters in bringing down enemy aircraft.
The war diary of the I Fighter Corps contains no statement to this effect.

Towards the end of April 1944 German radio intelligence had succeeded in differentiating the bomber groups in British large-scale operations and evaluate the different bomber streams. Consequently, the operations of the night fighter units in the home defense had 'justified' prospects for decisive successes in the future. This was especially so since the British several-bomber stream tactics had not reduced the effectiveness of the German night fighter combat methods but, above all, the efficiency of the German radar system which was the basis of a systematic night fighter commitment. This abuse was remedied.

The problem of repulsing the Type Mosquito bombers remained completely unsolved also in April 1944.

1. Successes and Losses in April 1944

In April 1944 the average total strength of operational night fighter aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter Corps amounted to:

- 270 twin-engine night fighter aircraft
- 110 single-engine night fighter aircraft.

The total number of night fighter aircraft committed in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

- 188 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

The total losses in night fighter aircraft in the sector of the I Fighter
Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

76 aircraft which is 4% of the total effort.

The losses of the RAF over the Reich's territory in the sector of the I Fighter Corps in April 1944 amounted to:

143 aircraft not including aircraft
brought down by antiaircraft artillery.

This figure was about 2.6% of the estimated total effort of the RAF against the Reich's territory amounting to 5400 aircraft in April 1944 and about 3% of the heavy bomber aircraft employed.
2.) British Nuisance Raid on Essen during the Night of 31 March to 1 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1801)

Enemy Effort

Essen was attacked by 10 Type Mosquito bombers without special success. At 21:02 hours 12 aircraft approached across the Zuider Sea. One Type Mosquito aircraft of them cruised over the area east of Neppel and turned back on counter route. An other Mosquito penetrated into the area of Leppen. The majority of the aircraft proceeded in south-eastern direction into the area of Essen, Duisburg. They returned via Schelde Estuary up to 22:05 hours.

Other Enemy Activities

During the period from 21:23 hours to 21:40 hours a number of aircraft cruised in the sea area north of the island of Ter- schelling and presumably dropped mines.

An aircraft (PN) penetrated across the Zuider Sea, and flying at a low altitude, into the area of Hannover, Kassel, Magdeburg, Stm and Stendal and returned by way of Bremen, Emden, and Frankfurt on the Main. A Mosquito, flying over France in eastern direction, reached the area of Wuerzburg and Bamberg and returned on counter route.

Southern Norway was crossed by two British courier aircraft flying in direction of Sweden. A British courier aircraft passed by Northern Jutland flying to Sweden.
Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

The 1st and the 3rd Fighter Divisions employed single-engine fighters each.

Total Effort: 6 aircraft

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions:

In the southern part of the sector of the 3rd Fighter Division and in the Ruhr area: Bright.

Otherwise: 3/10 to 8/10 clouds between 800 and 4000 meters. Visibility: 10 to 20 kilometers. In the coastal area scattered snow showers with clouds at altitudes of 200 to 400 meters.
3. British Nuisance Raids on Krefeld, Aachen, and Hameln on

1/2 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 180)

Enemy Effort

A total of 30 Type Mosquito bombers attacked Krefeld, Aachen, and Hameln. Beginning at 20:39 hours the bombers approached via the island of Terschelling and Northern Holland. They proceeded in eastern direction into the area of Celle, Braunschweig, and Hannover and in southern direction into the area of Duisburg and Aachen. They returned from the area of Hameln from 21:30 hours and from the Ruhr area from 21:05 hours on. The aircraft left the air space over the island of Ameland and over the Westerschelde up to 22:50 hours.

In addition, the following operations were observed:

Several aircraft intruded over sea to the West Frisian islands. After dropping tinfoils they turned back on counter routes.

A British aircraft was observed flying over Northern Jutland, presumably carrying supplies for agents.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were committed:

By the 3rd Fighter Division 3 single-engine fighters were employed to repulse attacking Type Mosquito aircraft, and 4 twin-engine fighters were employed which were to apply the "Himmelbett" night fighter aircraft tactics to repulse intruding to the West Frisian islands.
By the 2nd Fighter Division 1 twin-engine fighter was employed to apply the "Himmelbett" night fighter tactics in order to repulse aircraft intruding to the West Frisian islands.

Total Effort: 8 aircraft

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 0/10 to 4/10 clouds, lower ceiling 1000 meters, upper ceiling 1500 to 2000 meters. Above 6000 meters thin cloud formations.

4.) British Attack on Budapest on 3/4 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1801)

Enemy Effort

In the first half of the night about 30 Type Wellington bombers approached from the British air base in Italy via Croatia and Western Hungary in northern direction and bombed Budapest. A number of aircraft, presumably carrying supplies for agents, penetrated by way of Slovakia into the area of Lodz and Warsaw. All these aircraft returned on counter routes. Slight damage was caused at Budapest.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed in night fighter pursuit

Note: "Himmelbett" is the designation for the older type of night fighting in which each German aircraft was assigned to a particular "box" outside of which it was not authorized to operate.
operations:

By the 7th Fighter Division (Fighter Commander Ostmark): 6 twin-engine fighter aircraft. They assembled over the airfield of Farnhof and proceeded across the Lake Balaton to Budapest.

Enemy Losses: 3 bomber aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 Type Do 217 aircraft slightly damaged.

Weather Conditions: In Austria and Hungary thin cloud formations at about 5000 meters. Visibility from 5 to 15 kilometers.

Special Information: On 3 April 1944 Major Hans Joachim Jabs was awarded the addition **maximum** of the oakleaf cluster to the knight cross of the iron cross.

5.) British Nuisance Raids on Essen and Koeln on 4/5 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 180!)

**Enemy Effort**

In the first half of the night a force of about 40 Type Mosquito bombers penetrated via Northern Belgium in eastern direction and attacked Essen and Koeln. They returned via Holland.

**Commitment of the I Fighter Corps**

Operations against the nuisance aircraft were not conducted, since the night fighters of the 3rd Fighter Division which were to be employed against the Type Mosquito aircraft were not in operational condition.

**Enemy Losses**: Enemy losses were not observed.

**Losses of Friendly Forces**: None
Weather Conditions: 3/10 to 6/10 light clouds at about 800 meters; cloud-
less in the target area.

6.) British Nuisance operations on 5/6 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 180)

Enemy Effort

2 British nuisance aircraft flying via Schelde Estuary and St.
1rong reached the area of Ketz. They returned on counter routes.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The corps was not operationally employed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 10/10 stratus clouds. Tower ceiling from 200 to 400 me-
ters, rain.

Special Information: On 6 April 1944 Oberstleutnant Guenther Radusch, Com-
manding Officer of the 2nd Night Fighter Wing was awar-
ded the addition of the oakleaf to the knight cross of
the iron cross.

b.) On 6 April 1944 Oberfeldwebel Frank, 2nd Squadron/3rd
Night Fighter Wing, was awarded the knight cross of the
iron cross.

7.) British Nuisance Raids on Hagen, Duisburg, Koeln, and Hamburg on 6/7
April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 181)

Enemy Effort
The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

Nuisance raids on Hagen, Duisburg, and Koeln.

Beginning at 21:25 hours 30 Type Mosquito aircraft approached via Holland in south-eastern direction and flew into the area of Dortmund, Wuppertal, Koeln, and Bonn. Some aircraft returned extremely early across the area of Holland. The majority of the aircraft returned from the Ruhr area via Scheldel Estuary up to 23:27 hours. Individual aircraft dropped their bombs also on Krefeld and Aachen.

A nuisance raid on Hamburg.

Beginning at 22:02 hours 30 Type Mosquito bomber aircraft intruded across the North Frisian islands, Husum, and Neumuenster into the area of Hamburg. They returned via Elbe Estuary up to 22:50 hours.

A courier aircraft flew to Switzerland. The aircraft approached by way of Dunkirk in south-eastern direction to the Lake of Constance and proceeded to Switzerland.

Two courier aircraft flew from Sweden across the Skagerrak and another courier aircraft flew to Sweden.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The British aircraft approaching across the North Sea were, at first presumed to be four-engine bomber stream. For this reason, 11 twin-engine fighter aircraft of the 2nd Fighter Division assembled for commitment. They were later committed over the coastal areas of the Heligoland Bight by "Himmelbett" tactics.
Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: In the sector of the 3rd Fighter Division 10/10 clouds, lower ceiling 150 meters, upper ceiling from 1500 to 2000 meters. In the Heligoland Bight 0/10 to 5/10 clouds, lower ceiling 800 meters.

8.) British Mine-laying Operations off the Dutch Coast on 7/8 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1811)

Enemy Effort

During the period from 22:34 hours to 23:09 hours 40 British mine-laying aircraft cruised over the sea and coastal area from the island of Vlieland to Bergen op Zoom at an altitude of 150 meters. They were observed returning in western direction from 22:58 hours on.

Individual aircraft, presumably "FN", penetrated via Northern Belgium in south-eastern direction into the area of St. Trond and returned by way of Txxx Schelde Estuary.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

By "Himmelbett" tactics 2 twin-engine fighters were employed by the 3rd Fighter Division over the coastal area of Northern Holland.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None

Weather Conditions: 5/10 thin layer of stratus clouds at altitudes from 500 to 1000 meters; at higher altitudes cloudless.
Special Information: The following officers were decorated on 8 April:

Hauptmann Schoenert, Commanding Officer of the 10th Night Fighter Group was awarded the addition of the oakleaf cluster to the knight cross of the iron cross, and

Hauptmann Fellerer, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Group, 5th Night Fighter Wing, and Oberfeldwebel Scherfling, 4th Group/1st Night Fighter Wing, were awarded the knight cross of the iron cross.

9.) British Nuisance Raids on Duisburg and Essen on 8/9 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1811)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

A nuisance raid against Essen with 50 Type Mosquito bombers. Beginning at 21:42 hours the aircraft intruded between Bergen op Zoom and Noordwijk by way of Nordhorn, Rheine, Lueneburg into the Ruhr area. From 22:16 hours they returned in western direction. The aircraft left the air space between Schelde Estuary and Bergen op Zoom up to 23:10 hours. A few aircraft dropped bombs also on Bocholt and Oberhausen.

A nuisance raid on Duisburg with 50 Type Mosquito bombers. Beginning at 22:18 hours the aircraft intruded via Northern Holland, Groningen and Osnabrueck into the Ruhr area. They returned across the Dutch coast between Den Helder and Zandvoort up to 23:37 hours.

Nuisance operations conducted by individual aircraft from the British air base in Italy over Croatia into the area of Budapest. The aircraft returned in southern direction.
Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

To repulse nuisance raids against the Ruhr area:

By the 3rd Fighter Division in "Himmelbett"-tactics: 4 twin-engine fighters (Types He 219 and Me 410).

To repulse nuisance vexatious operations in Hungary:

By the 7th Fighter Division in pursuit operations; 16 twin-engine fighters (Types He 110 and Do 217). The aircraft assembled over the airfield of Parndorf and proceeded by way of Lake Balaton to Budapest.

Total Effort: 20 twin-engine fighters.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 8/10 to 10/10 up-sloping clouds above 3000 meters.

10.) British Nuisance Raids on Cities in the Reich's Territory and Mining Operations in the Bay of Danzig on 9/10 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 182.)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

Nuisance raids on Duisburg and Osnabrueck with a total force of 30 Type Mosquito bombers. Beginning at 21:40 hours the aircraft approached
between IJmuiden and the island of Texel. They proceeded by way of Muenster, 
Osnabrueck, and in south-eastern direction into the Ruhr area. From 22:17 
hours on the aircraft returned in western and north-western direction. They 
left the coast by way of the island of Vlieland and Schelde Estuary up to 
23:00 hours.

Nuisance raids on Koeln and Mannheim with a total of 30 Type Mosquito bombers. 
Beginning at 22:06 the aircraft approached across the Channel coast between 
Dunkerk and Calais flying in eastern direction into the area of Koeln and in 
south-eastern direction into the area of the Rhine and Main Rivers. From 22:30 
hours on the aircraft returned in western and north-western direction. They 
crossed the coast between Ostend and Calais up to 24:00 hours.

A nuisance raid on Hamburg with 20 Type Mosquito bombers. Beginning at 22:18 
hours the aircraft approached roughly 50 kilometers north of the island of 
Terschelling flying in eastern direction north of the West and East Frisian 
islands into Heligoland Bight from where they proceeded in south-eastern 
direction into the area of Hamburg. Beginning at 23:05 hours they returned in 
north-western direction into Heligoland Bight. The last aircraft left at 23:30 
hours.

A mining operation in the Bay of Danzig with 80 aircraft. The aircraft approa-
ched across the North Sea about 150 kilometers west of Esburg at 22:58 hours. 
They crossed the coast between the island of Roen and Ringkoebing. From there 
they proceeded by way of the Kattegat and the Central Baltic into the Bay of 
Danzig. Beginning at 01:55 hours the aircraft returned on counter routes by 
way of Northern Jutland up to 04:45 hours.

Missions to drop agents were flown by a number of aircraft from the British
air base in Italy into the areas of Southern Poland and Upper Silesia. The aircraft approached by way of Croatia, Western Hungary, and Slovakia and returned on counter routes.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Against intruding Type Mosquito aircraft in the Ruhr area:

By the 3rd Fighter Division: 5 twin-engine fighter aircraft in "Himmelbett" tactics over Holland.

Against mine-laying operations:

By the 2nd Fighter Division: A number of twin-engine fighter aircraft in "Himmelbett" tactics at the western coast of Jutland. They turned to the pursuit of the enemy aircraft in direction of the Kattegat. The Night Fighter Group "Stade" was committed for the pursuit. The pursuit operation was initiated by the radar station "Seehund" (English: seal). The pursuit operation was stopped when Swedish territory was reached.

Units of the 1st Fighter Division: The aircraft assembled over EF. After friendly the mine-laying aircraft had proceeded into the Central Baltic the aircraft landed on the airfield of Kolberg.

In night fighter operations to pursue returning mine-laying aircraft:

Units of the 1st Fighter Division: The aircraft started from the airfield of

Note: ** EF means
Kolberg and assembled over F.F. "Seehund" (English: seal) and turned to the pursuit of the enemy aircraft north-west of the radar station "Seehund". Units of the 2nd Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft which had made a stop at stade assembled over the radar station "Seehund" and turned to the pursuit of the enemy aircraft north-west of the radar station "Seehund". Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Vechta: Y-guidance * to Jutland and turning to the pursuit of the enemy aircraft. Units of the 3rd Fighter Division: The Ju 88 Groups "Twente" and "Langensalza" started in direction of the radar station "Seehund" and turned to the pursuit of the enemy aircraft in the area of Kattagat.

Against aircraft carrying agents in Hungary:

By the 7th Fighter Division: A number of twin-engine fighter aircraft of the Fighter Commander Ostmark. The aircraft started from the airfield of Parrdorf xxx in direction of Budapest and turned into the area of Lake Balaton.

Total Effort: 77 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 14 mine-laying aircraft were definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 3 aircraft were slightly damaged.

Losses of personnel: 5 wounded.

Note: * Y-guidance means
Weather Conditions:

Holland and North-Western Germany: 10/10 clouds at altitude 3000 meters up in several strata, partially rain. From 01:00 hours sudden approach of high-altitude fog.

Jutland and Baltic Sea area: 3/10 to 6/10 high clouds above 6000 meters.

Hungary: 10/10 clouds from the altitude of 1200 meters up; several thin strata up to the altitude of 2000 meters.

11. British Nuisance Raids on Duisburg, Dusseldorf, and Hannover on

10/11 April 1944

(See sketch: Home Air Defense, supplement 1831)

Enemy Effort

From 21: 50 hours on 30 Type Mosquito bombers penetrated across the Dutch coast between Bergen op Zoom and Zandvoort. Over the Zuider Sea they split up to proceed in eastern direction into the area of Hannover and in south-eastern direction into the Ruhr area. After having bombed Hannover, Duisburg, and Dusseldorf the Type Mosquito bombers left, from 23:05 hours respectively 22:31 hours on, the Ruhr area in western and north-western direction. Their return flights over the continent were terminated at 23:15 hours over Schelde and Estuary at the Dutch coast west between the island of Terschelling and Den Haag at 24:00 hours.

Simultaneously with the appearance of the Mosquito bombers off the Dutch coast a bomber stream from the area of Norwich approached the Channel coast between flying Westerschelde and Ostend in south-eastern direction. The bombers attacked the installations of railroad station in Gent and began their return flight.
At midnight a Type Mosquito aircraft flew across Schelde Estuary in southeastern direction and reached the area of Kassel. From there the aircraft proceeded in northern direction into the area of Braunschweig from where it flew into the Heligoland Bight by way of Cuxhaven.

A British courier aircraft flew over the Skagerrak in direction of Sweden.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Against the Mosquito-bombers: A number of twin-engine fighters of the 3rd Fighter Division in "Himmelbett"-tactics over the Ruhr area.

To repulse bomber aircraft intruding across the Channel coast:

Precautionary start of twin-engine fighter aircraft of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th Fighter Divisions. After the attack on Gent has been recognized the units which had started were ordered to land.

Total Effort: 112 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 Type Me 110 aircraft was damaged.


12.) British Attacks on Aachen and Hannover as well as Mine-Laying Operations over the Western Baltic on 11/12 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1841)
Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

A mine-laying operations north of the island of Laaland and south-east of the island of Zealand with a total strength of 100 aircraft.

Beginning at 21:06 hours the aircraft approached about 120 kilometres west of Jutland in eastern direction. They crossed the coast between Esbjerg and Ringkoebing. They aircraft proceeded by way of Zealand and Fyn into the area north of Laaland and south-east of Zealand. From 22:45 hours on the aircraft returned in western direction. They left the coast between Ringkoebing and the island of Fano up to 00:25 hours.

Nuisance raids against Hannover as well as against the night fighter airfields of Venlo, St. Trond, and Deelen with a total force of 80 Type Mosquito bombers. Beginning at 21:19 hours the aircraft intruded across the Dutch coast between Bergen op Zoom and Noordwijk in eastern direction into the area of Hannover. Individual aircraft circled over the night fighter airfields in Holland and Belgium. In addition, several aircraft penetrated into the area of Magdeburg, Nordhausen, Eisenach. They returned from the area of Hannover in western direction from 23:00 hours on crossed the coast between Den Helder and Den Haag up to 00:05 hours.

A large-scale attack on Aachen with 250 four-engine bomber aircraft. Beginning at 21:44 hours the bomber stream approached across Schelde Estuary flying in south-eastern direction into the area to Aachen. They returned by way of Schelde Estuary up to 23:50 hours. Except some erroneous bomb releases on the area around Dueren, Erkelenz, and Duisburg the at-
was concentrated Aachen. The attack inflicted heavy damage on buildings and slight damage on industrial installations.

A nuisance mission flown by one Type Mosquito aircraft in the morning over Northern Belgium, Koblenz, and Kuenstorf. The aircraft returned by way of Oldenburg in north-western direction.

Missions flown by a number of aircraft to deliver supplies to guerilla forces on Bosnian territory. The aircraft approached from the British air base in Italy.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps
__________________________________________
The following forces were employed:
__________________________________________

Against the mine-laying aircraft:
__________________________________________

By the 2nd Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Westerland in pursuit operations.

Against Type Mosquito bombers:
__________________________________________

By the 1st Fighter Division: Several twin-engine fighter aircraft in "Himbelbett"-tactics in the area of Magdeburg and Halberstadt.

By the 3rd Fighter Division: Several twin-engine fighter aircraft in "Himmelbett"-tactics over Northern Holland.

To repulse an attack on Aachen
__________________________________________

In night fighter pursuit operations:
__________________________________________

By the 3rd Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Oelsen and

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________
St. Trond. The aircraft assembled over the airfields and were directed into the bomber stream over the radar stations in Northern Belgium.

In fighter operations to protect the target area:

By the 3rd Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Venlo. The aircraft assembled over F.F* "Ida" fighter
Twin-engine aircraft from Twente. They were directed from their operations in "Himmelbett" tactics to Aachen.
Single-engine fighter aircraft from Rheine, Bonn, and Wiesbaden-Erbenheim.

Total Effort: 101 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 9 bombers definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 2 aircraft of which one He 219 was shot down by F.N** at 23:08 hours near Weert and one He 109 of the 3rd Group/5th Night Fighter Wing was shot down by F.N** over the airfield of Mainz-Finthen at an altitude of 300 meters.
3 aircraft damaged.

Losses of personnel: 4 wounded; 1 missing.

Weather Conditions: 5/10 to 8/10 thin formation of stratus clouds between the altitudes of 1000 and 3000 meters. Flying visibility of 10 kilometers.

Notes: * F.F. means
** F.N means
13.) British Attacks on Osnabrueck and Budapest as well as Mine-Laying

Operation in the Heligoland Bight on 12/13 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1851)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

a.) From the air base in Great Britain:

Mining operations in the sea area of the West and East Frisian islands up to the Heligoland Bight with 50 aircraft during the period from 22:40 hour to 23:50 hours.

A nuisance raid against Osnabrueck with 120 Type Mosquito bombers. The aircraft penetrated from 22:05 hours on across the Dutch coast in a broad front between the island of Texel and Den Haag flying in eastern and south-eastern direction into the area of Osnabrueck. They returned on counter routes up to 23:25 hours.

Patrol missions with several FW were flown across the Zuider Sea into the area of Berlin, Stettin and across the Westerschelde, Brussels, and Kaiserslautern into the area of Munich and with a single Mosquito- aircraft via Northern France into the area of Saarbruecken and Strassbourg.

b.) From the air base on Italy:

An attack of medium intensity on Budapest with presumably 300 bomber aircraft. The aircraft approached by way of Croatia to Lake Balaton. There the bomber force split up to proceed in north-western direction towards the
area of Budapest and in northern direction to the Neusiedler See. It was not
turned recognized in time that the bombers over the Neusied-
er See to fly towards the area of Budapest. They aircraft returned in sou-
thern direction. Budapest sustained heavy damage to transportation facili-
ties and slight damage to industrial installations.

Missions were flown by a number of aircraft to deliver supplies to
agents in the area of Warsaw. The aircraft approached and returned by way of
Croatia, Western Hungary, Slovakia, and Southern Poland.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

Against Mosquito-bombers: By the 3rd Fighter Division: 1 Type Me 410 aircraft

Against mine-laying aircraft: By the 2nd Fighter Division: 6 twin-engine
fighter aircraft in "Himmelbett" tactics in the Heligoland Bight.

Against British "FN":

By the 7th Fighter Division: 2 single-engine
fighter aircraft in the area of Stuttgart.

To repulse the attack on Budapest: By the 7th Fighter Division (Fighter Com-
mander Ostmark):

To provide protection over Vienna: Single-engine fighter aircraft from Sey-
ring and twin-engine training fighter aircraft of the 2nd Group/101st Night Fighter Wing.
First commitment.

To provide protection over Budapest: Twin-engine fighter aircraft of the 2nd
Group/101st Night Fighter Wing from Parndorf.
at first over Budapest, later they were sent to Lake Balaton. Single-engine fighter aircraft from Seyring. Second commitment. Total Effort: 36 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

In spite of weather conditions favorable for defensive action the commitment of the night fighter forces on 12/13 April was unsuccessful. In the whole sector of the I Fighter Corps there was only one single aircraft (Type Me 410) suitable for action against Mosquito aircraft in operational condition. This demonstrated our weakness compared to the efficiency of the British nuisance raids. "Himmelbett"-tactics proved to be unsuitable for application against mine-laying aircraft because the British aircraft flew at low altitudes. The inadequate radar and aircraft warning system in Croatia and Hungary failed to provide a clear picture of the air situation when the British bombers approached towards Budapest. The committed night fighters of the 7th Fighter Division did not encounter British aircraft over Vienna and arrived too late to provide protection over Budapest.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 3/10 thin formation of stratus clouds around 1500 meters, above this altitude cloudless. In the area of Berlin 5/10 to 10/10 clouds with scattered showers. Flying visibility from 10 to 20 kilometers.

British Nuisance Raids on Berlin, Dortmund, and Aachen on 13/14 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1261)
Enemy Effort

The following targets were attacked:

- Berlin by 20 Type Mosquito bombers. The aircraft approached from 22:20 hours on flying across the Zuider Sea in eastern direction. They returned on counter routes.

- Dortmund and Aachen by a total strength of 20 Type Mosquito bombers. The aircraft intruded from 22:04 hours on between Dunkerk and Calais as well as from 22:22 hours on by way of Schelde Estuary flying in eastern direction. They returned in north-western direction.

In addition, 2 British courier aircraft coming from Sweden and 1 courier aircraft flying to Sweden passed the Skagerrak.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

To provide protection over Berlin: 6 single-engine fighter aircraft of the 1st Fighter Division.

Renewed attempts to operate against Mosquito-aircraft with Type Me 109 single-engine fighter aircraft without equipping the latter with an engine of higher efficiency failed again.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: In Holland and in the Ruhr area 8/10 to 10/10 rain clouds at altitudes from 500 to 6000 meters, partially
with thunder storms. In the rest of the Reich's territory: 3/10 ice clouds above 7000 meters. Flying visibility from 10 to 20 kilometers.

15.) British Air Operation on 14/15 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 187.)

Enemy Effort

30 aircraft intruding from the British air base in Italy by way of Croatia and Hungary reached the area of Budapest; a few of them also reached the area of Southern Poland. The operation presumably served to deliver supplies to agents. The aircraft returned on counter routes.

During the period from 22:40 hours to 23:12 hours a British courier aircraft crossed the Skagerrak in direction of Sweden.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed to provide protection over Budapest:

By the 7th Fighter Division (Fighter Commander Ostmark): 14 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 1 aircraft.

2 aircraft damaged.

Weather Conditions: Croatia and Hungary: 0/10 to 3/10 clouds above 3000 meters. High-altitude visibility from 20 to 50 kilometers.
16.) British Air Operation on 15/16 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1871)

Enemy Effort

40 aircraft from the British air base in Italy penetrated by way of Croatia, Hungary, and Slovakia into the area of Warsaw to deliver supplies to agents. A number of aircraft circled singly over the area of Budapest.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed to provide protection over Budapest:

By the 7th Fighter Division (Fighter Commander Ostmark): 7 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 3/10 thin formation of stratus clouds above 1000 meters; 5/10 to 8/10 upaloping clouds above 5000 meters.

High-altitude visibility: 20 kilometers.

17.) British Nuisance Raid on Budapest on 16/17 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1871)

Enemy Effort

Budapest was attacked by 30 aircraft. The aircraft approached and returned by way of Croatia and the area of the Danube River in Southern Hungary. Returning to their bases, individual aircraft crossed Lake Balaton flying in southern direction.
Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

By the 7th Fighter Division (Fighter Commander Ostmark)
to provide protection over Vienna: 4 single-engine fighter aircraft,
to provide protection over Budapest: 4 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Total Effort: 8 aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 1 aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 10/10 stratus clouds at altitudes from 4500 to 7000
meters; underneath 3/10 thin formation of clouds at
an altitude of around 1000 meters.

18.) British Nuisance Raid on Koeln and Mine-laying operations in the Bay
of Kiel on 17/18 April 1944

(See sketch; home air defense, supplement 1871)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

A nuisance raid on Koeln with 20 Type Mosquito bombers. The
aircraft approached by way of Schelde Estuary and left via Den Haag.

A mine-laying operation in the Bay of Kiel with 40 aircraft.
The aircraft approached by way of the North Sea and the island of Fyn.
They returned in western direction.
2 aircraft coming from Sweden crossed the Skagerrak on courier missions.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

Owing to weather conditions the corps was not employed.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None

Weather Conditions: 7/10 to 10/10 stratus clouds at altitudes from 500 to 1500 meters. Above these altitudes formation of light clouds.

19.) British Nuisance Raids on Berlin and Osnabrueck as well as Mine-Laying in the Stettiner Haff on 18/19 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1871)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

Nuisance raids on Berlin and Osnabrueck with a total strength of 40 Mosquito-bombers. The aircraft penetrated by way of the Zuider Sea in eastern direction into the area of Berlin and in south-eastern direction into the area of Osnabrueck. They returned on counter routes.

A mine-laying operation in the Stettiner Haff with 100 aircraft. The aircraft approached via the North Sea, Westerland, Bay of Kiel, Bay of Luebeck, and Bay of Swinemünde. They returned in north-western direction, later in western direction by way of the island of Fyn.

a single aircraft

On 19/20 April flew along the coast in the area of Schelde Estuary.
Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following forces were employed:

By the 2nd Fighter Division: The Twin-Engine Fighter Group Westerland in "Himmelbett"-tactics along the western coast of Jutland. The group was later diverted to pursuit missions.

Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Stade, Nordholz, and Vechta to pursue returning mine-layer aircraft. They were directed into the enemy flying formation in the area of Fehmarn.

Total Effort: 61 twin-engine fighter aircraft.

Enemy Losses: 2 aircraft definitely shot down.

Losses of Friendly Forces: None.

Weather Conditions: 0/10 to 3/10 clouds above 500 meters. High-altitude visibility from 10 to 20 kilometers.

20.) British Attacks on Köln, Berlin, and Osnabrueck on 20/21 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 188)

Enemy Effort

The following operations were conducted by the RAF:

In the first half of the night:

An attack on Brussels. A bomber stream of medium strength intruded across the Westerschelde flying in south-eastern direction into the area of Brussels. The aircraft returned in north-western direction via Ostend.
A number of Type Mosquito aircraft left the bomber stream and proceeded into the area of Koeln.

Nuisance raids on Berlin and Osnabrueck with a total strength of 45 Mosquito-bombers. The aircraft intruded across the Zuider Sea in eastern direction into the area of Berlin and in south-eastern direction into the area of Osnabrueck. They returned in western direction.

A nuisance mission flown by a single aircraft over the North Sea into the area of Heligoland. The aircraft may have been a weather reconnaissance plane.

In the second half of the month:

A heavy attack on Koeln with 300 four-engine bomber aircraft. The approaching bomber stream was not located by the radar stations until it had reached the air space 40 to 50 kilometers north-west of Schelde Estuary.

There were no previous reports of the German radio intercept service available in the area of Koeln. German bomber aircraft simultaneously returning from the Island of Britain made it difficult to keep track of the course of flight.

The British bombers flew in south-eastern direction across the southern section of Schelde Estuary into the area east of Namur where they turned to the North for the attack on Koeln. They returned in north-western direction via Southern Holland.

The effects of the attack on Koeln: Heavy damage caused to buildings and transportation facilities; slight damage inflicted on industrial installations.
Nuisance raids with a few Mosquito-bombers against the night fighter airfields of Twente and Vechta. The aircraft approached simultaneously with the bomber stream via Northern Holland.

Several "FN"*-aircraft carried out patrol flights over Dutch territory. They approached at the same time when the bombers returned to their bases.

Commitment of the I Fighter Corps

The following aircraft were employed:

In the first half of the night:

By the 1st Fighter Division: a number of single-engine fighter aircraft to operate against Type Mosquito aircraft over Berlin.

By the 3rd Fighter Division: The Ju-88 units assembled over the airfields. When the beginning of the attack on Brussels was recognized the night fighters were ordered to land.

In the second half of the night:

By the 1st Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Stendal, Brandis, and Werneuchen. The aircraft assembled over F.F.** 12. Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Erfurt. They started in direction of F.F.** Ida.

Notes: * FN means
** F.F. means
After the attack on Kœln was over all night fighters were ordered to land; they did not reach the British bombers.

By the 2nd Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Westerland, Staade and Vechta. They started in direction of F.F. Ludwig. When the British bombers left the area of Kœln all units were ordered to land; they had not been engaged in combat.

By the 3rd Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Mainz-Finthen and Langendiebach. They started in direction of F.F. Ida. The aircraft were then directed to provide protection over Kœln. These were the only night fighters which could contact the enemy. Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Venlo. The were employed in "Himmelbett"-tactics over the area of the German-Dutch border. Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Leeuwarden. They started in direction of F.F. Kurfuerst and pursued returning bombers. Ju-88 groups from Twente, Kassel, and Langensalza. They started in direction of F.F. Kurfuerst too late, since the aircraft were not yet ready to start after they had flown their first mission.

By the 7th Fighter Division: Twin-engine fighter aircraft from Eckertingen, Leipheim, and Illasheim. They started in direction of F.F. Otto. After the attack on Kœln had started the units were ordered to land; they had not been engaged in combat.
Total Effort: 165 single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft.

The night fighter operation on 20/21 April failed for the following reasons:
Failure of the German radio interception service in the second half of the night.
Confusion of the picture of the air situation by returning German bombers.
British multi-bomber stream tactics.
Bad visibility over Koeln.

Almost all of the night fighter aircraft were committed too late.
Consequently, it was impossible to reach the British bomber stream over Koeln.
The German losses were brought about mainly by the precipitated commitment.

Enemy Losses: Enemy losses were not observed.

Losses of Friendly Forces: 6 aircraft.

- Losses of personnel: 4 killed,
  4 wounded,
  5 missing.

Weather Conditions: Holland: 2/10 to 5/10 thin formation of stratus clouds.
North-Western Germany and the plains of Frankfurt:
7/10 to 10/10 stratus clouds between the altitudes of 500 and 3000 meters. Area of Berlin: Bright.

21) British Nuisance Raid on Koeln on 21/22 April 1944

(See sketch: home air defense, supplement 1891)