THE CONTROL AND EVALUATION OF RECONNAISSANCE
FOR THE GERMAN AIR FORCE HIGH COMMAND

Karlsruhe Study
by
Generalleutnant R.D. (Maj.Gen., Ret.)
Andreas L. Nielsen
Table of Contents

Introduction: Purpose and Objective of Collecting Intelligence 5

Chapter One

I. The Organization of Intelligence Collection and Evaluation 9
   a. The Collecting Agencies (Mission, Organization, and Operations) 9
      1. W&I, and MNZ/Au-Iam (Counterintelligence Office, Armed Force High Command) 9
   2. Radio Intercept Service 16
   3. Air Force Attache 25
   4. The Press Group of the Reich Air Ministry 32
   5. Strategic Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command (Kewehl) 34
   b. The Evaluating and Interpreting Agencies 38
      1. Reich Luftwaffe Ministry, Foreign Affairs Branch -- Target Dossiers 38
      2. The 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff 49
      3. The 8th (Military Science) Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff 51
      4. The Intelligence Officers at Higher Field Headquarters 52

II. The Treatment of Intelligence at the Outbreak of War 52
   a. Volume of Available Intelligence -- General Overview 52
      b. The Most Important Adjacent Countries 56
         1. Czechoslovakia (Prior to Occupation) 57
2. Poland
3. France
4. Great Britain

Chapter IV - Military Intelligence Activities

I. Change in the Intelligence Life-Ten and Organization

a. Change in the Collection Function
   1. Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command
   2. The Intelligence Officers of the Higher Headquarters
   3. Captured Enemy Material Staff at the Luftwaffe Technical Office
   4. The Interrogation Camp at Oberursel
   5. Cooperation with Allied and Friendly Intelligence Services

II. Change in the Processing Organization at the Luftwaffe High Command

a. The Intelligence Division [Z. Abteilung] of the Luftwaffe General Staff

Chapter V - Analysis of the German Intelligence Collection Effort

I. The German Intelligence Operations in Western Europe (Sep 39 - May 40)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. The Norwegian Campaign</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The French Campaign</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Battle of Britain</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Campaign in the Balkans</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. The Russian Campaign</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. The Military Operations in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. United States of America</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. The Cross Channel Invasion in 1944</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Section Four -- Invasion and Occupation**                              | 210  |
Introduction

The Luftwaffe High Command collected information for the purpose of assembling data for air warfare. In so doing, every effort was made to obtain a complete picture of the military capabilities and industrial potential of all countries with whom conflict was within the realms of possibilities. In this manner, the most vulnerable attack objectives could be identified for the German air operations command.

The intelligence process is defined in a study of the 8th (Military Science) Luftwaffe General Staff Division, dated 20 April 1944, as follows:

"One can defeat the enemy only if one knows him. The military commanders must therefore be able to be fully aware of all happenings and circumstances pertaining to their own combat zone. They must make every effort to uncover the weaknesses, strength factors, and plans of the enemy by anticipating developments in the enemy situation that is in constant flux."

"Obtaining intelligence information and evaluating the enemy are therefore important prerequisites for the successful conduct of warfare."

"Luftwaffe intelligence activities extend from the outset over all areas in which the three services conduct operations. The Air Force intelligence covers vast areas"

Karlsruhe Collection.
whose width and depth transcend far beyond the boundaries assigned
to Army and Navy headquarters employed in the same territory."

"Air intelligence must above all provide the data for combating
the enemy air force and for launching air attacks against the
enemy resources in order to destroy them."

"The entire intelligence apparatus subordinates itself to this
guide line, and all means serve this end. In For this purpose,
one must take into account that, because of the rapidly shifting
situations in air warfare, the enemy situation is subject to
constant changes. Quick action is therefore mandatory, if one still
wants to score successes."

"In the case of the Air Force, the principle applies particularly
that the intelligence process serves its purpose only, if it makes
use of every possible source of information and if the intelligence
is properly distributed and arrives in time at the point where it
can be used for operational planning and can be converted into
effective military action."

The recently formed General Staff of the Luftwaffe realised from the
outset that the air force would have a decisive effect on the enemy capabilities
only if all information for strategic air warfare of this type were
already known in peacetime. On the basis of past experience, it was impossible to obtain such data in wartime; they could only be supplemented.

In the German directive on air warfare, entitled *Taktische Luftkriegführung*, Air Force Directive No. 6, reprint of March 1940, Par 79 - 101 (Par. 80) this is stated as follows:

"Wartime reconnaissance is based on peacetime intelligence."

"The information obtained in peacetime is generally decisive for the initial employment of the air force."

"In the further course of operations it often saves new reconnaissance flights that waste time, necessitating only a supplementation or re-evaluation of available intelligence."

"Peacetime intelligence activities produce the basic information that cannot be obtained during hostilities or only at great difficulties."

Par. 144 of the above directive contains the following statements:

"The battle for 

resources and for 

logistical support is essentially a struggle involving fixed installations. Most of these exist already in peacetime and are immobile. The expansion of existing installations and the creation of new facilities confronts the wartime air reconnaissance with important problems. However, the battle for resources is initially conducted primarily on the basis of information obtained in peacetime ..."

\[Karlsruhe Collection.\]
If there was therefore a need for preparing exact data for offensive strategic air operations already in peacetime, the same would be true of defensive missions. An effective defense against enemy penetrations into one’s own zone of interior could be conducted successfully only if the strength and performance of potential adversaries were exactly known immediately before the outbreak of hostilities and if the Air Force High Command had a more or less correct idea of the productive capacity of the same opponents.

The German Armed Forces and Luftwaffe High Commands were fully aware of the significance of these problems. The studies and directives quoted in this study show that they knew the theory; it was their tragedy, however, that the political leadership did not draw the practical conclusions that were essential.
Chapter One

1. The Organization of Intelligence Collection and Evaluation

The Luftwaffe intelligence collection functions were not unified. The collecting agencies were usually not the same as those responsible for evaluation. In peacetime the information collecting functions were primarily assigned to the Foreign Branch, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command (Abt UMW/Abwehr/Inland). The German Air Force High Command addressed its requirements to this agency. Quite apart from this intelligence agency, the Luftwaffe had its own organizations which will be analyzed in the following pages.

In wartime, the emphasis in the collection of information shifted to the organic Luftwaffe agencies since wartime espionage obviously operates under more difficult circumstances.

The following sections will describe the collecting agencies in detail.

a. The Collecting Branches (Mission, Organization, and Operations)

1. UMW, Abt Abwehr/Inland (Foreign Branch, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command)

The most important peacetime collecting agency was the Foreign Branch, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command.

The mission of this agency was to collect intelligence abroad, to prepare sabotage operations for the event of hostilities, and

3 For the organizational structure of this agency, see Appendix I.
to conduct counterintelligence operations.

The following quotation fully describes the mission, organization, and development of this agency:

"In 1934, Canaris, then a captain in the German Navy, was appointed commander of the Swinemünde Fortress with every indication that he was headed for peaceful military retirement. At that time, however, the chief of the then small Counterintelligence Branch in the Reich War Ministry, Captain O. Patzig (Navy) suggested unexpectedly that Canaris be made his successor. Raeder (Chief of the German Navy) approved this choice, and Canaris started his career as chief of the German counterintelligence service on 1 January 1935."

"The modest German counterintelligence service rapidly grew out of all proportions. Since Hitler had taken over, all financial limitations had disappeared. Hitler considered the counterintelligence service as an important instrument of power. And since he had a personal liking for Canaris, the latter was able to draw unlimited funds."

"After Blomberg's departure, the Reich War Ministry was dissolved in 1938 and the Armed Forces High Command was organised under Keitel's command. Canaris and his counterintelligence agency operated directly under Keitel and Hitler in person, being responsible to nobody else. As senior office chief in the Armed Forces High Command, Canaris was Keitel's deputy. This was a considerable concentration of power in the hands of one single man who furthermore had more access to information than anyone excepting very few. Canaris collected everything worth

\footnote{Karl Hartz, Die Tragödie der deutschen Abwehr (The Tragedy of German Counterintelligence), Pilgrim Verlag, Zuerich 1955, pp 13-18.}
knowing, being curious by nature; as a result, few things escaped his attention."

"In 1938 the Counterintelligence Branch was redesignated Foreign Counterintelligence Group. Later, in 1939, the extensive organization was redesignated Foreign Counterintelligence Office. The gigantic agency along the Tirpitz Bank (Ty: Of the Spree River in Berlin) absorbed one private building after another."

"In 1938 the Counterintelligence Group was composed of five major branches that remained in existence until the agency was abolished. These were:

Branch I, an important activity, first directed by Colonel Piespenbrock and later by Colonel Hansen. This branch was the real center of foreign counterintelligence, consisting of overt and covert collection of information. The branch was subdivided into such sections as Section III - Navy (Intelligence Army), Section II - Luft (Intelligence Air), Section II - Navy (Intelligence Navy), Section II - Technik (Technical Intelligence), Section II - Wirtschaft (Economics Intelligence), Section II - Geheimen (Secret Intelligence obtained through photo and press analysis, detection of secret inks, etc.), and Section II - Funk (Radio Interception)."

"Branch I collected information which was passed on for evaluation — often however with a preliminary interpretation — to the appropriate general staff divisions of the service concerned, be it Army, Navy or Air Force. The Armed Forces Operations Staff (General) Jodl also received intelligence through Branch III or the Foreign Branch."

"Branch II was the central agency for sabotage activities. It was
responsible for training representatives of dissatisfied minorities and also Germans abroad for future sabotage missions. The tasks of the agents working for this branch were difficult and very dangerous. They carried out acts of sabotage in enemy countries, destroyed ships, aircraft, manufacturing plants, bridges, etc."

"This branch was also responsible for insurrections and minority control in enemy countries. Part of it was the subsequently organised Brandenburg Division. It was activated in 1939 under the cover designation of Construction Training Company Brandenburg. It soon achieved regimental strength, and by 1942 it was redesignated as a division."

"At the beginning of 1940 one battalion each of this force was stationed at Brandenburg, in the vicinity of Vienna, and at Dueren in the Rhine Province. The personnel were mainly composed of ethnic Germans or of aliens speaking a foreign language, most of whom were convinced National Socialists. Their mission was to parachute into a designated area, dressed in the uniform of the respective country, and to create confusion by carrying out acts of sabotage, such as demolitions. They were the forerunners of the British and American commando raiders."

"Chief of Branch II and its operational forces was Major Grosscouth until 1939, Colonel Lahousse until 1943, and Colonel von Freytag-Loringhoven after the summer of 1943."

"Branch III was responsible for counterespionage. It was subdivided into III A (Army Section of Branch III),
III (Air Force Section of Branch III), III (Navy Section of Branch III),
and F (Economics Section of Branch III). In addition, there was a sub-
section whose integration into Branch III is supposed to have been an organiza-
tional mistake. This subsection III F, whose chief was Captain Protze (Navy),
was responsible for sending agents abroad, where they were to attempt to
infiltrate enemy counterintelligence agencies."

"The counterintelligence personnel collaborated closely with the Reich
Security Office (Fran: Nazi Party agency of the SS), for the police, not the
counterintelligence agencies, were the law enforcing organs in cases of
punishable offenses."

"The German Armed Forces had never been granted jurisdiction over all
means of preventing acts of sabotage and espionage against the military
forces of the Reich. An agreement with the Prussian Ministers of War and
of the Interior, dated 1896, stipulated that the police III were responsible
for combating enemy espionage. The secret police based its jurisdictional
claim on this agreement, and the counterintelligence agencies acquiesced
since many Reserve officers on active counterintelligence duty, who had
returned to the service after many years of civilian life, were able to adjust
because of their practical experience in the secret police service. Covert
intelligence, however, was and remained a counterintelligence function."

"The Economic Branch, which was later elevated to group level, was the
central agency to which the
German military attaches assigned to foreign countries reported. There, all
reports and information originating from these military diplomats were collected;
valuable information was transmitted to the Armed Forces High Command (Keitel),
the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Jodl), and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
This branch was under the direction of Rear Admiral Buerkner who was Cenaris' 
deputy."

"The Central Branch (Abteilung Z — Zentralabteilung) was originally
responsible for administrative matters exclusively. Because of its chief's
aggressiveness, however, this branch developed into the most important agency
of the counterintelligence office. This chief, Colonel — later General —
Oster, was the cause of the eventual downfall of military counterintelligence."

"Before Oster became chief of the Central Branch, he had been in charge of
the ABTEILUNG Z section or desk responsible for counterintelligence
activities in government agencies, which was part of Branch IIIc. In this
capacity he had made many personal contacts with chiefs of government agencies."

"Created as an central administrative agency, the Central Branch was at
first responsible for administering the tremendous counterintelligence
organization. Under its jurisdiction operated the comptroller, the agents'
card index files, the legal section, and the passport agency. But Oster
enlarged his sphere of influence. He maintained contacts with the National
Socialist Party via Count Helldorf and to the Reich Security Office via
the chief of the criminal division, Nebe, who was in charge of Office V
(SEK V — Sekretariat der Hauptamtseinsatz) — the Reich Criminal Police."
"Oster became the sole point of contact with civilian agencies. All data were incoming reports and information channeled through his branch, passed through his message center, and then dispatched to the various other branches. We shall later see the significance of this procedure."

"This agency employing some 400 officers and ten thousands of agents was presided over by Admiral Canaris."

The above explanations pertaining to the mission and organization of the central responsible for collecting intelligence must be amplified by the statement that the intelligence service was organized in a decentralized manner from the outset. Counterintelligence agencies were established at the 7 — later 12 — military district headquarters and naval station headquarters; after the reorganization of the Armed Forces, these agencies were assigned to the corps headquarters.

The mission of the various counterintelligence agencies depended on their geographical location and the capability derived therefrom. Thus, for instance, Konigsberg and Breslau served primarily as outposts toward the East; Kassel, Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, and Munster toward the West; Hamburg was the center for France and overseas areas, including Great Britain after about 1938; Munich and Vienna served for the Balkans; Nuremberg and Dresden for Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The counterintelligence field agencies were organized on the same principle as the central office.
in Berlin. During the war special field agencies were added to collect information from prisoners of war and to carry out counterespionage activities in the prisoner of war enclosures.

The Luftwaffe headquarters and staffs had no intelligence collecting agencies of their own. As mobile and extremely flexible wartime command agencies, they were not suited for assuming rigid assignments of this type. On the other hand, each senior headquarters of the Luftwaffe had one counterintelligence officer in the intelligence branch or section who was responsible for handling borderline cases and maintaining contact with the intelligence collecting agencies at the corps (military district) level.

The operating procedures of the German intelligence collecting agencies and the central organization — Foreign Branch, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command — were no different from those used by the espionage and intelligence services of other major powers. It is therefore unnecessary to go into details within the framework of this study.

2. Radio Intercept Service

One of the most important sources of information on the military organization and strength of adjacent and — in wartime — enemy nations was the radio intercept service. Both the Army and Navy had their own radio intercept services, which obtained information for their own top-level command staffs as well as for the Luftwaffe High Command and which rendered outstanding services in peace and war. The information produced by
these intercept services was transmitted from the central agency directly
to the Air Force High Command and from the field agencies to interested field
headquarters of the Luftwaffe and thus also through channels to the Air Force
High Command.

The cooperation with the Navy's intercept services was particularly
good. This was of great advantage during joint operations, such as the
breakout of the German Navy across the Channel and the German attacks on
Allied convoys in the Arctic.

The **Luftwaffe Interceptor service** performed as well as its counterpart
organizations of the other two services. It could have been an extremely
valuable source for obtaining or supplementing elements of information,
if the evaluation had been properly organized. But this was never the case,
neither before nor during the war.

The radio intercept service — much like the rest of the Luftwaffe
intelligence service — was almost a private sphere of General Martini,
the Luftwaffe Forces Inspector. The radio intelligence service had been
organised by Martini primarily according to signal communications principles.
The chief of the signal communications system had a Luftwaffe cryptographic
agency which acted as central clearing point for assigning missions,
evaluation, and deciphering operations. The results of the work done by
the field agencies were collected at this center, where they were deciphered
and evaluated, if necessary. The center had no receiver or direction-finding
equipment at its disposal.

The field agencies responsible for radio intercept service proper were the following:

North-Western Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Second Air Force at Telgte near Muenster in Westphalia with Field Station W 12 at Telgte and Field Station W 22 at Hasum-Milstedt in Schleswig Holstein.

These stations covered Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Scandinavia.

South-Western Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Third Air Force at Oberhaching-Deisenhofen near Munich in Bavaria with Field Station W 13 at Oberhaching,

"   W 23 at Baden-Baden, and

"   W 33 at Mainz-Oinheim.

These stations covered France and its North African colonies, the Iberian Peninsula, and Italy.

5 Extracted from a study by Diehr, M.D. (Col., Ret.) Gotteschling. (Karlsruhe Collection).
Multi-Eastern Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Fourth Air Force at

Vienna with

Field Station W 14 at Hirschstetten and a

Special Field Station at Budapest-Katyanfield.

These stations covered the Balkans, Turkey, and were
given special missions concerning Russia and Poland.

Eastern Europe: Radio Monitoring Station of Fifth Air Force at

Pilsnitz in Saxony with

Field Station W 11 at Breslau (at the beginning of the war,

this station was attached to Station W-4 and redesignated W 21),

Field Station 21 at Deutsch-Krone in Pomerania, and

Field Station 16 (at the beginning of the war, this station

was redesignated W 11) at Kobbelbude near Lauenberg.

On principle, this organisation of the radio intercept service appeared
to the onlooker as a very effective and proper solution permitting coverage
of Europe and adjacent areas. The stations and field stations had the best
available technical equipment and elite personnel. However, the deficiencies
of the Luftwaffe intercept service were not based on faulty organisation or
equipment, they were solely caused by the type of missions the service was
given and by the local and central evaluation of the information produced
by the Chief of the Signal Communications System.
The radio monitoring stations received their missions from the Chief of the Signal Communications System and had to report to him the results of their intercept activities. His Luftwaffe cryptographic agency transmitted the radio intercept information to the general staff division responsible for intelligence in the Air Force High Command — the 5th Division — which in turn disseminated this information to the intelligence officers of major field headquarters for whom it was really destined.

It is obvious that this type of organization was faulty insofar as the assignment of missions and the evaluation of information were concerned. The radio intercept service could only supplement or confirm the other sources of information; for this reason, the assignment of missions and the direct evaluation of results should have been the responsibility of the agency in charge of interpreting the over-all intelligence situation. This was not the Chief of the Signal Communications System, but the 5th Division of the Air Force General Staff. The assignment of missions should not have been formulated as requirements; instead, detailed orders should have been issued to the field agencies, and the evaluation should have been carried out in close collaboration with the other branches and sections of the intelligence division. This was the only possible means of producing quick results in evaluating information from radio intercepts.

Furthermore, in order to immediately translate important messages into military operations it would have been necessary to establish close operational contacts between the field agencies and the intelligence officers of the air forces and perhaps also of the air corps. The channels of message transmission
would thus have been doubled or trebled, but without causing any delay. On the contrary, the radio intercept service would have fully accomplished its purpose since the reports would have resulted in immediate military action. Reports referring to enemy units that were taking off or were in the air, for instance, were without value to field headquarters, if they were made available on the next day or even later because of unnecessary detours.

This author remembers that it was not until 1940, when he was appointed chief of staff of an air force headquarters, that he first heard of radio intercept activities. At that time, a book was submitted to him, giving detailed reports on the activities of the radio intercept service during the preceding months. This book had been published by the Chief of Signal Communications; it gave factual data on the radio traffic that had been intercepted, but most of the information was outdated. Also gave an estimate of the situation which naturally was incomplete and partly wrong because of the fact that it was entirely based on radio intercepts that had not been coordinated with information from all other intelligence sources.

Such a situation was untenable, at least for command staffs in the field.

During the war it was not changed by any fundamental organizational modifications or by a switch in the chain of command; instead, whatever changes there were, these were made practically in every theater as the result of the personal initiative of senior field commanders.
and lower echelon commanders of radio intercept units.

The isolation and secrecy of the radio intercept service were so accentuated at the beginning of the war that even senior commanders did not have access to field stations operating in the area under their jurisdiction. The author remembers that in 1941, when he was chief of staff of an air force headquarters, he was to be denied entry to a field station when he intended to take personal interest in the operations of the radio intercept service. General Martini had interdicted access to everybody. This interdiction was subsequently lifted to such an extent that a certain number of personnel were permitted to visit radio monitoring field stations and to establish official contact with the officers in charge of these stations. In other theaters this had been authorized previously upon request of senior field commanders. But there were no clear-cut channels of communication nor were any such channels established during the course of the war. On the other hand, cooperation in the field worked in a relatively satisfactory manner even without official regulations so that the radio intercept reports were transmitted to field headquarters also directly during the later course of the war. This transmission of reports took place either by telephone or by teletype communication.

The Fifth Air Force went farther in making use of the radio intercept service, carrying out the following interesting experiment. After having observed that reconnaissance and operational missions against Scapa Flow and
northern Scotland were no longer feasible because of the tight fighter screen controlled by radar and radio, a monitor was added to the crews of aircraft flying missions in that area after spring 1942. The monitors selected spoke perfect English and were able to monitor the ground-air traffic originating from Scottish airfields. In this manner the Germans succeeded in changing the route of approaching aircraft or turning in a different direction so that the British fighters could not intercept the German attackers.

In 1942 a secondary radio intercept field station was established in northern Norway to monitor the radio traffic of commercial vessels forming convoys and of the naval ships protecting these vessels. This field station was equipped to intercept also the radio traffic of Russian armed forces, above all air force units. Whereas the results of monitoring Russian traffic were good because the Soviet personnel often sent plain text messages, the operations geared toward intercepting naval radio traffic in the North Sea were unsatisfactory. In summer 1942 occurred a mishap that led to the commitment of sizeable German forces. The radio intercept station reported the presence of a strong British naval unit in the immediate vicinity of the northern Norwegian coast. Upon query the station confirmed its report, indicating that the sound volume of the radio traffic gave every assurance of the presence of strong enemy naval forces in the immediate proximity of the coast. The Luftwaffe thereupon committed reconnaissance and combat aircraft, which however were unable to find
any indications of the presence of hostile forces. A number of sorties were flown by these aircraft so that the radio intercept report tied down considerable forces. No enemy forces were located along the entire extensive area of the northern Arctic Ocean. The Luftwaffe High Command thereupon ordered an inquiry as a result of which it was established that the radio traffic that had been intercepted originated from a British naval unit operating in the Mediterranean. The identical traffic had been intercepted by the monitoring services located in Italy.

As concluding statement regarding the radio intercept service one might quote the former chief of the 8th Division (Military Science) of the Luftwaffe General Staff:

"The radio intercept service was controlled by the Chief of the Signal Communications System who used it according to the technical principles of the signal communications system. This type of employment limited the effectiveness of the radio intercept service so that the intelligence value of this service was restricted. The intelligence agencies were authorised to set up requirements, but they had no operational control. On the other hand, the radio intercept service (radio monitoring service) attempted to produce and interpret intelligence, which obviously was inconclusive since it omitted other factors that were outside the sphere of the radio intercept service. Radio intercept reports might have

---

6 Extracted from a study written after the war on the Von Rohden project. (Karlsruhe Collection).
played an important role in the intelligence activities, for the methodology
and facilities had been sufficiently refined for that purpose. That the
organisational structure was not adjusted, is typical for the shortsighted-
ness of the German military leadership and its ignorance of the significance
of intelligence in the conduct of military operations."

3. Air Force Attaches

The primary mission of air force attaches was to observe the air force,
civil aviation, and aircraft industry of the host country and to give current
reports. Up to 1938 they received their instructions from the Secretary of
Aviation via the Attache Group of the Reich Air Ministry, and as of
1 February 1939 from the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff to whom the
Attache Group was subordinated at that time.

The air force attaches could have and should have been an important
source of intelligence information since they were experts who were capable
of obtaining an immediate impression of conditions in their respective
countries. Moreover, they could have been used for checking intelligence
information obtained from other sources and for verifying its accuracy.

But since neither the various chiefs of staff nor the chiefs of the attach
groups considered these spheres of activity as particularly important, the
air force attaches did not produce as much intelligence as would have been
possible, neither in peacetime nor during the war, when they were anyhow
confined to allied or neutral countries.
The entire organization was not yet properly adjusted, the top-level command was not sufficiently interested, and the personnel were not of such a caliber that this lack of interest could have been compensated for by outstanding performances.

The former chief of the 8th Division (Military Science) of the Luftwaffe

General Staff writes on this subject as follows:

"The air force attaches serving with German diplomatic missions abroad produced good results for some time. According to Goering's decision, the attaches were not officers with the best military qualifications, as they should have been. In February 1939 the 'Attache Group' was shifted to the control of the 5th Division. At that time its chief was Major Von Cramon. He considered that his most important task was to represent the Luftwaffe by social contacts with foreign attaches, much less to obtain intelligence information. Lack of time prevented direct contact between intelligence and attache personnel before the outbreak of war."

It is obvious that those responsible for these deficiencies were the respective Luftwaffe Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of the 5th Division. They should have intervened, if they had been interested sufficiently in the attache service. According to the tables of organization for general staff officers, the attache positions should have been filled by general

Extracted from a study written after the war on the Von Rohden project. (Karlsruhe Collection).
staff officers in order that officers be assigned to such positions who were properly equipped to take care of their mission with the greatest of ease. In this manner, the attaches were subordinate to the chief of staff in their capacity of general staff officers, even though the attaché group was not subordinate to him until 1939. However, the shortage of general staff officers — particularly older ones who were suitable for assignment to attaché positions — made it necessary to assign other old officers who often lacked the qualifications and ability to judge that were so essential. This happened mostly in cases when Goering or Milch instructed the Personnel Office to appoint one of their favorites or friends to such a desirable position.

The means available to air force attaches to collect intelligence information were as follows:

To obtain information from the political and above all the military leaders of the host country;

To request information from these persons or the agencies they headed;

To make observations during inspections of troops and by participating in maneuvers;

To study the press and military literature published in the host country;

To gather impression during personal contacts with officers and other

\[\text{For assignments to Luftwaffe attaché positions, see Appendix II of the yearbook of the German Air Force, 1939, pp. 124 - 6.}\]
representatives; and

To exchange intelligence with the attaches of other countries.

In their instructions the German military attaches were forbidden to use agents and to carry out espionage in person. Moreover, they had no funds for such a purpose.

It is obvious that the attaches' means of obtaining intelligence were relatively closely limited, especially if the host country refused to cooperate for political reasons. In many instances, they had to resign themselves to producing general situation reports.

For this reason, the attaché reports varied greatly. Each service attaché reported on his sphere of interest, the Army attaché on Army matters, the naval attaché on Navy, and the Air Force attaché on the Air Force of the host country. Because of the shortage of suitable personnel, the functions of two and sometimes of all three services were accomplished by one person in certain countries (See, Appendix II). For the same reasons, one attaché occasionally took care of several countries. In important countries or nations that were of military-political significance, the attaches were assigned assistants -- the Luftwaffe attaché usually had an assistant who was a technician.

Before dispatching their reports, the attaches of the various services submitted them to the chief of the diplomatic mission who had to certify the accuracy of the information or indicate his dissent in political matters, if such was the
The reports were transmitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also received a copy of all written material having political implications, to the attaché groups of the three services and to the Foreign Branch, Counterintelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command. These agencies were responsible for transmitting the reports to interested personnel, above all those engaged in intelligence activities.

Despite the many personnel and organizational deficiencies, the reports of the service were generally factual. But they often failed to impress the military and political leaders of the Reich and occasionally even appeared unbelievable because too many agencies were engaged in collecting intelligence independently from one another. Particularly harmful in this connection was the so-called **Reichorganisation** (Foreign Organization) which was first under Ribbentrop's jurisdiction and then under Bohle. A Luftwaffe intelligence officer writes on this subject as follows:

"An evil cancerous growth was the part Ribbentrop's and Bohle's Foreign Organization took upon itself in obtaining intelligence. Reports from their agents, who were dilletants lacking completely in know-how and experience, reached civilian governmental agencies — for instance from Turkey. These agencies used the information for their purposes and mainly for political ends, creating unrest and leading of necessity to

---

9 Extracted from a study by [Author], (Col., Ret.) Morell. (Karlsruhe Collection).
wrong political decisions."

How far the political leadership went in its attempts to influence the reports of the attaches can be gathered from the following excerpts from a book written by the former German military attaché in Italy who had held this position for many years:

"... The relative weakness of the Italian Armed Forces was known to the Italian leaders, and it played its part in the political decisions made in 1939."

"Only Hitler and Mussolini refused to acknowledge these facts. Based on my reports and on those written by other officers, the Intelligence Branch of the Army General Staff prepared a secret staff study during the winter 1938-39, in which the strong points and weaknesses of the Italian Army and industrial capacity were established on the basis of factual data. It was not until after the war that I found out that Hitler had ordered this study to be withdrawn and destroyed because he considered it to be wrong that German military agencies be furnished such a clear and unsatisfactory picture regarding the armed forces of a future ally."

"The General Staff's attempt to prevent orally transmission of this study was unsuccessful."

In spring 1939, during a visit to Berlin, I was told to report to the Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. He discussed the German political plans to establish ever closer bonds with Italy, expressing the opinion that under Mussolini's leadership the Italian Armed Forces had become a new factor in power politics. He intimated that I should emphasize this factor more strongly than hitherto. "I replied to the Minister that in Fascist Italy wishful thinking was far stronger than real capability. Also, I refused to deviate from factual reporting. I had hitherto held Von Ribbentrop's statesmanship and diplomatic ability in low esteem, but this conversation convinced me that he lacked common sense and strength of character that were indispensable for his high position. I reported his request immediately to General Halder, the Army Chief of Staff."

"My efforts to keep reports of the Italian military potential outside the sphere of propaganda and to base them on facts were supported by the naval attache, Captain Lange, and the air force attache, General Freiherr von Budlow. But even so, the service attaches did not completely succeed in rectifying the optimistic estimate on the Italian Navy and Air Force given by Von Elsberg after his visit in spring 1937. The Luftwaffe attache, in particular, was faced by preconceived notions held at the Air Force..."
Ministry."

This quotation shows that the reports of air force attachés were received with skepticism by the Luftwaffe High Command, even if they originated from a man of the stature of General von Ressel, who before this assignment held the position of Chief, Air Intelligence Branch — subsequently the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

4. The Press Group of the Reich Air Ministry

The Press Group was another intelligence collecting agency in the Reich Air Ministry. This group was subordinate to the Central Office until spring 1939, thus functioning under the supervision of the secretary of state. It was mainly responsible for evaluating German news media up to this time. It also had the mission of making air force propaganda in the German press and motion picture industry. A systematic exploitation of foreign news media for the purpose of collecting intelligence was initiated at the beginning of 1939, when the group was integrated into the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff and some basic personnel changes were made. The period until the outbreak of hostilities, however, was too short for building up a fully effective target designation service as a result of pre-war interpretation.

Aside from its intelligence functions, the Press Group continued to carry out the censorship mission over the German press, which it had held from the outset. This censorship function extended over matters published pertaining to the Luftwaffe and the release of photographs and reproductions military equipment of belonging to the
Luftwaffe.

In 1933 the Press Group was composed initially of experienced newspapermen who had been recalled to active duty. After its transfer to the General Staff, the change in mission was taken into account and foreign language experts were assigned to the Group, who also had sufficient military background to distinguish between essential and nonessential matters. Because of insufficient time for preparation and a shortage of personnel, this group did not develop into an intelligence agency as it might have done otherwise. A systematic exploitation of Western news media, illustrated journals, industrial catalogues, etc., might have provided extremely valuable information for target indication. Because of the above-mentioned circumstances, the Germans were unable to fully benefit of this source of information:

The procurement of foreign newspapers, journals, and other militarily important writings was the responsibility of the SD (Political Security Service). They were delivered at irregular intervals and selected unsystematically so that precise intelligence exploitation was impossible for this reason, if for no other. The military also tried to obtain desirable materials through diplomatic channels or through the air attaches, but encountered considerable difficulties in obtaining the necessary foreign exchange.

Through this medium the Americans obtained very interesting information on industrial targets in Japan.
In summarizing one may state that this group did not achieve satisfactory results as an intelligence collecting agency throughout the war.

Group 5. **Strategic Reconnaissance Battalion Luftwaffe High Command (Rowehl)**

One of the most important and valuable organizations for collecting information on conducting the air war operations both before and during hostilities was the Strategic Reconnaissance Battalion of the Luftwaffe High Command. General (Col.) Rowehl -- his name was usually used to designate the section -- was its chief. Its official designation was "High-Altitude Flying Test Agency."

Its beginnings date back to 1930, when it was a civilian agency that had one aircraft chartered by the Counterintelligence Branch of the then Reich Defense Ministry from "Luftdienst G.m.b.H." (Air Service Corporation) -- a civilian business firm.

After 1939 the squadron was first subordinate to the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Force High Command; the Luftwaffe High Command had to make requests to this higher headquarters for it to fulfill its requirements. It was not until 1936 that the former squadron that had meanwhile been enlarged to group-size became subordinate to the Luftwaffe High Command.

This is how Group Rowehl developed its activities:

"The construction of fortifications in countries adjacent to the

German Reich was naturally of interest

---

to the Counterintelligence Branch of the Reich Defense Ministry. As an aerial photograph expert I was asked in 1930 to fly along the borders of the Reich above German territory and to take oblique photographs of these fortifications, a great number of which could be photographed with a telescopic lens. After these oblique pictures had been taken, the next step was to take vertical ones, if only to conceal the true intentions. In order to satisfy these requirements and at the same time take maximum precautions, it was necessary to fly as high as possible. In this manner, the photographs covered as much territory as possible while the aircraft flew along the borders and at the same time the adjacent countries did not notice anything. A specially constructed Junkers W 34 model for breaking high altitude records was equipped with Hornet engines originating from America. This aircraft reached 20,000 feet without trouble."

"A small group of 3 men, 1 aircraft, some old photographic equipment dating old from World War I, a few oxygen apparatus, and a little photographic shop formed the nucleus of the Turmfliegerei Fliegerei (High Altitude Test Agency), i.e. the Strategic Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command. The agency operated on a very small scale with maximum secrecy. So far as known, no country adjacent to Germany protested against this type of reconnaissance activity up to
1933. In order to make each individual flight as successful as possible, a \textit{ILFORD} camera for aerial photographs with a 300 by 300 mm picture using different types of lenses was developed in conjunction with the Carl Zeiss \textit{Optical Works} at Jena. This camera was later adopted by the Luftwaffe, and it still produces optimum performances today. Up to 1933, flights were made primarily above the territories that had formerly belonged to Germany and had been ceded to France and Poland after World War I. The Czech-\textit{L} border was also the objective of such flights, and all these areas were constantly surveyed."

"After 1933, when Germany's foreign policy became aggressive, interest for happenings in neighboring countries grew in proportion with the steady increase in\textit{L} fortification construction along the German border. In 1934 the small reconnaissance group moved from Kiel to the Berlin-Staaken airport, increasing its strength to five photographic aircraft; in 1936 it was transferred from the Counterintelligence Branch in the Armed Forces High Commandcess to the Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe Operations Staff in the Reich Ministry of the Luftwaffe. Because of his personal and close contacts with Luftwaffe technicians and industrial technologists, the commander of the group was able to have access to the latest developments in aircraft and apparatus construction. Assisted by good and enthusiastic crews and outstanding technical personnel, he formed a well-integrated group that worked hard and was aggressive, thus achieving a lot with relatively little. There were few
accidents, and the aircraft were usually ready for action."

"In 1934, also, the first photographic missions were flown in the direction of the Bay of Finland, Kronstadt, and Leningrad, in the direction Piskau-
Minsk, and finally also in the direction of the Black Sea coast up to Nikolayev.
Like all missions flown since 1933, these were executed by twin-engine air-
craft at altitudes varying from 25,000 - 30,000 feet, with various types
of photographic equipment installed on the planes. All flights were pre-
pared in great detail and were therefore carried out with success and without
loss. No information was gathered by the German intelligence agencies indicating
that these aircraft had been observed by security agencies of the neighboring
countries concerned, even though the Germans focused their attention on
finding any such indication. The small team, composed exclusively of civilians
except for one military chief initially operated under the designation
Special Air Squadron; by 1937 it had 10 photographic planes and was eventually
redesignated High-Altitude Flying Test Agency. Reconnaissance aircraft of
the unit participated in the annexation of Austria and the Sudeten provinces.
After the annexation of Austria the agency moved to Berlin-Tempelhof airfield.
Until the outbreak of war the photographic planes surveyed regularly the
frontier fortifications of the countries bordering on the Reich, taking
photographs from high altitudes and checking on the construction work
that was under way in the Polish Corridor...."
The following chapters will provide information on the wartime activities of the strategic reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command.

b. The Evaluation and Interpreting Agencies

There was no central military agency for evaluating and interpreting the messages and reports emanating from the collecting agencies. These functions were accomplished by intelligence divisions that each formed part of the general staffs of the three services. Within the Army, it was the Foreign Armies Branch, within the Navy the Foreign Navies Branch, and within the Luftwaffe the Foreign Air Forces Branch.

1. Reich Luftwaffe Ministry—Foreign Air Forces Branch—Target Duties

Until 1938 the evaluation of all information pertaining to foreign air forces and to conducting strategic air warfare was the responsibility of two agencies, both working in close cooperation and belonging to the Luftwaffe General Staff (formerly Air Command Agency).

The first of these two agencies originated from an intelligence agency of the Reichswehr (Former 100,000-man Army) Ministry and had been transferred from that ministry to the Luftwaffe; this was the Foreign Air Forces Branch.

The second was a special section of the Operations Branch, the Target Research Section.

The Foreign Air Forces Branch was responsible for collecting all types of
information from a great variety of sources -- almost above all from written material -- and for evaluating this material. Thus, the Commander to be in Chief of the Luftwaffe and the Chief of Staff were provided with the essential elements of information to estimate the prevailing situation and the strength of foreign air forces.

The branch also produced information for top-level command agencies and finally published the magazine "The Lookout" (The Air Guard).

In 1935, when the Operations Branch formed the Target Research Section, the Foreign Air Forces Branch was given the mission to select material of interest to the new section and to transmit same.

There was no liaison with the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command. Material originating from agents was first requested in 1935 by the Target Research Section and, after this section had been integrated into the Foreign Air Forces Branch, in 1936 such material was asked for by the branch.

The development of the Foreign Air Forces Branch, personnel assignments within the branch, as well as its activities and missions have been described by its first chief as follows:

"In 1927 Major Wilberg, who was then chief of T2 V (Luftwaffe) in the Reichsheer Ministry, instructed me to form an

\[12\]

intelligence agency to determine and research the organizational structure, strength, distribution, and material of foreign air forces. To assist me, he assigned two additional officers to the agency, [Handwritten: stemm] (Lt. Col., Ret.) Frager and Major (Ret.) Morell. Also assigned to my agency was [Handwritten: stemm] (Capt., Ret.) Kirchhner, publisher of the magazine Die Luchtward (The Air Guard) that was financed by the Reich [Handwritten: stemm] Ministry. This magazine printed information on strength figures and organization as well as on technological progress made in the field of aviation in foreign countries. This information provided the Reichswehr with valuable data, and later also the Armed Forces establishment."

"No preparatory work or precedences for accomplishing this mission were available. The only sources were the foreign press, specialized periodicals, and other publications. No service directive was issued for the activation of this intelligence agency nor was any issued subsequently. Obtaining classified information through counterintelligence channels was initially interdicted.

Under these difficult circumstances, it was impossible to attain the objective of obtaining precise information on all foreign military and civilian aviations in order to establish their potential at that time. Initially, the intelligence agency remained therefore a collecting agency for publicized foreign information instead of being an organisation that evaluated and interpreted essential
material on operating procedures, organisational structures, and operational potentials of foreign air forces. The officers assigned to the intelligence agency had all been regular air force officers in World War I, after which they had been retired and later reactivated. Their excellent linguistic ability could not compensate for their lack of recent practical experience in combat and their inability to give a factual interpretation of technological progress in foreign aircraft. Repeated references to these shortcomings were not acknowledged by higher echelons, because the small number of regular air force officers then available did not permit the transfer of individual officers to the intelligence agency."

"The intelligence agency concentrated its efforts on the countries adjacent to Germany, especially France, Great Britain and Russia; also of interest were the U.S.A. and all other countries that were then major air powers, such as Italy and Japan. Gradually, the network of air force collection efforts spread over the entire globe. Thus, by 1930 the intelligence agency employed about 10 officers and several clerical personnel, so that the agency was redesignated an intelligence group."

"Aside from checking on foreign aviation developments, contacts with the German press were intensified upon instruction from the chief of T.A. (L) (Luftwaffe Research and Development). Numerous lectures were held for meetings of officers, military associations, etc., and also on the
radio. The subject was foreign aviation, with particular emphasis being
vivdly
placed on describing the unfavorable air-geographic position of Germany
in the center of Europe. In this manner, the audience was made aware of
the untenable situation and the need for air power was propagated. Moreover,
personnel of the intelligence group wrote articles on foreign aviation,
describing the steady progress in the production of fuselages and engines
as well as in air force organizational matters, that is to say in spheres
that were either interdicted to Germany by the peace treaty or severely
restricted."

"In 1933 the intelligence group was again assigned additional personnel
in the course of the creation of the Reich Air Force Ministry and was re-
designated Foreign Air Forces Branch. More and more emphasis was placed on
military matters. A Target Section was attached to the branch, and contact was
established with Army counterintelligence, which meant the beginning of a
shift in functions until the branch was integrated into the Luftwaffe General
Staff at the beginning of 1938 and redesignated 5th Division (Intelligence). "

"The preparatory work done during the 10 years' existence as intelligence
agency, intelligence group, and finally as Foreign Air Forces Branch
was instrumental in

15
Author's Note: Von Buelow means the Counterintelligence Branch, Armed
Forces High Command.
creating the prerequisites for carrying out the intelligence mission
given on 1 January 1938. This mission was to produce target data for
strategic air warfare and for all other operations connected with air
attack or air defense in any future war."

The organization and performance of the Foreign Air Forces Branch
that had been organized in 1933 were not in compliance with the require-
ments of an intelligence branch of a supreme air force command. The pre-
requisites for accomplishing such a mission were initially nonexistent,
neither person nor prestige-wise. The development of the
branch could therefore not be rapid, all the more so because the primary
interest of the top-level command was concentrated on the organizational
sphere and progress in training. In 1935, however, it became necessary to
expand the intelligence functions. But it was not the Foreign Air Forces
Branch that benefited from this expansion: the new missions were given to a special
section of the Operations Branch, the Intelligence Section (Target
Designation).

Whereas the Foreign Air Forces Branch continued to be responsible for
collecting material, evaluating the development of foreign air forces, and
making this information available to the Luftwaffe command agencies, the
Intelligence Section of the Operations Branch compiled the practical data
for the conduct of air operations by establishing Target Determination. The basic
information for compiling these data was received from or
via the Foreign Air Forces Branch and partly also directly from the Counter-
intelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command.

The tasks and operating procedures of the Intelligence Section of the
Operations Branch are described by the then chief of the branch as follows:

"The target dossiers prepared by the general staff and their interpre-
tation were among the most important media of conducting air operations
available to the Luftwaffe for the case of war."

"The preparation of target dossiers was started around 1935 by the
Intelligence Section of the then 1st Branch of the General Staff. The
section chief was Major von Flotow, later Major Stein. The section was
integrated into the 5th General Staff Division "Foreign Air Forces" on
7 January 1938."

**The Target Dossiers**

"The files were divided into different groups according to types of
objectives; there were military objectives, industrial objectives,
communications and transportation facilities, etc."

"The groups of objectives were subdivided into objective cards. Each
objective was designated by a number. The first two digits of this number
indicated the type of objective in which the card was grouped.

---

"A target dossier was created for each individual objective. The dossier contained the following documents:

One small-scale map on which the position of the objective and the approach route had been marked. Also indicated on this map were such enemy defenses as fighter airfields, gun positions, etc., as well as magnetic declinations, outstanding points of orientation along the approach, distinctive forest areas, and major railroad and highway crossings.

One large-scale map of the objective, showing defensive installations, such as battery positions, etc.; ground plans; aerial photomaps; sketches of the objective; descriptions of the target, indicating its political, military or economic significance, such as for instance information on percentages of production in relation to total production of the respective country, number of workmen, work hours, times at which shifts change; vulnerability of the target to aerial attacks indicating the possibility of producing major explosions or fires; indications on particularly important parts of the objective, the destruction of which would paralyze the target (such as for instance boiler plants, electricity or water supply installations)."

"Relief maps or reliefs were produced for especially important targets."

**Evaluation of the Target Dossiers**

"The current evaluation and interpretation of the target dossiers were important means of conducting strategic air warfare. In one instance, it was
established that a country adjacent to Germany had some 40,000 large
and medium factories. It was therefore impossible to conduct strategic
air warfare against the military production capacity of this country by
attacking all its factories. On the contrary, it was essential to find out
in which spheres that country was vulnerable and which types of objective
were the best suited for strategic air warfare."

"For this reason, the following considerations were of decisive im-
portance with regard to military-economic targets:

A. What were the respective country's needs of a particular type of
product, such as for instance oil, in case of war?
B. What were that country's capabilities of covering its requirements in
case of war?

I. How high is the peace- and wartime production? Where is that pro-
duction concentrated? What percentage of the production originates
from each such production center?

II. To what extent can the German Air Force eliminate each individual
production center? Can it be completely or only partly eradicated?
What forces and how much time would be needed for this purpose?

III. Has the respective country a possibility of replacing the loss of
production in any of the following ways:

a. By stored supplies;
b. By switching to other production facilities and plants; and
c. By imports from overseas or by railroad.

IV. Is it possible to interdict this resupply from outside sources by
air force attacks or by other means, such as the preventive buying
of such items in other countries, where they are available; or by
exerting diplomatic pressure; or by air attacks on line of communications
installations such as railroads and ports."

Final conclusions

"Under what circumstances will attacks on targets of this type achieve
decisive results?"

Special Technical Summary

"In addition, studies were prepared on air attack methods against certain
types of targets, such as mines, oil refineries, dams, railroad installations,
etc., for which purpose technical experts were consulted. These studies in-
dicated, how such targets could be attacked and destroyed most effectively,
specifying certain particularly vulnerable parts as ideal target areas, listing
the types of bombs to be used for different purposes, etc."

Analysis of the Evaluation Results

"Based on the evaluation of these data, the Luftwaffe General Staff
arrived at the conclusion — even before the war — that

Great Britain was most vulnerable to attacks on
its part installations and naval supply lines, while

Rommel's weakness was its communications facilities."

The mission of the two agencies was during the first years extremely complicated because of the lack of clear-cut political and military instructions emanating from the political leadership. In a study on Project Von Rohden, written after the war, this matter is dealt with as follows:

"The Target Group Branch, responsible for collecting data on objectives in foreign countries which were to be attacked, was until 1937 part of the 1st Branch of the Luftwaffe General Staff. Since no definite political trend had developed by that time and since it was not clearly known which countries would fight with or against Germany, this branch collected material of interest without applying standards of selectivity..."

Even later -- until spring 1939 -- the Luftwaffe top-level command agencies, like all other military key command authorities of the Armed Forces, remained ignorant of definite political plans. This made the task of the intelligence collecting and evaluating agencies extremely difficult. Information regarding

17 For further details, see Luengraaf, Plan B, Lt. Gen., Ret.) Deichmann, Der deutsche System der Evaluation und Interpretation (The German Target Evaluation and Interpretation System).

18 The Target Group Branch (nicht Zielgruppen) , extracted from a study on Project Von Rohden, Karlsruhe Collection. (The designation "branch" is misleading; the Target Research Section was not a separate branch, since it was a section subordinate to the Operations Branch -- Author's Note.)
political "Blitz actions" intended by Hitler was passed on to these agencies at the very last moment, if at all. Insofar as these political actions entailed military measures, such as the occupation of the Rhine **land**, the entry into Austria and the Sudeten **land** (province), the local military command agencies received direct orders. Most of the military leaders in the High Command were bypassed on these occasions and were informed shortly before the event.

For all practical purposes, the Foreign Air Forces Branch and the Target Research Section of the Operations Branch had to be prepared for all possible contingencies. Such preparations made disproportionate demands on the responsible staffs, and they also meant a dissipation of effort.

2. The 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff

When the Reich Air Ministry was reorganized in 1937 and the most important military branches were consolidated in the Luftwaffe General Staff on 1 January 1938, the Foreign Air Forces Branch was redesignated 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

The first **Hauptmann** chief -- **Hauptmann** (Col.) Freiherr von Buslow -- had been replaced by **Hauptmann** (Lt.Col., General Staff) Schmid as early as mid-1937. Up to the time the 5th Division was transferred, the latter had been assigned to the Operations Division.

19 Personal recollections of the author who at that time was chief of the policy section of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

20 See Appendix III.
He was thus well equipped for appreciating the requirements of the
Operations Division insofar as top-level intelligence was concerned.
The division was appropriately reorganized and reoriented toward accomplishing
solely intelligence missions. The Target Research Section was integrated
into the 5th Division.

From this time onward the adjacent countries were systematically
researched for the purpose of conducting effective strategic air warfare
and of equipping the field headquarters with better target data for their
future sphere of operations. Air topographical descriptions and orientation
pamphlets concerning each individual country were prepared and issued to all
field headquarters and staffs.

This intensification of intelligence work necessitated a far closer
cooperation with the information collecting agencies, and above all with
the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command. The Strategic
Reconnaissance Group Rowehl, since 1936 subordinate to the Chief of the Luft-
waffe General Staff, was employed to collect systematically photographic
data on all adjacent countries.

Despite the still existing gaps in the material it had assembled, the
5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff performed outstandingly well
during the short time that had been available up to the outbreak of war.
When the war started, there was not a single field headquarters or staff
that was not in possession of all the
orientation material and target data for every possible type of operation.

3. The 8th (Military Science) Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff

Another evaluating and above all interpreting agency was the 8th (Military Science) Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

All files that were of historical and statistical significance were transmitted to this division. Copies of all orders and instructions issued as well as wartime reports concerning the outcome of missions and the day-by-day situation of all service agencies were sent to the division. The same was true of war diaries of all agencies and units. The division thus had complete records to use as source material for its principal task — writing the History of the German Air Force.

The 8th Division also had the secondary mission of writing special studies and monographs that could be used by the combat forces and which were based on the collected experiences of the great variety of units and staffs in such specialized fields as buildup, organization, training, and military operations in the various theaters.

Upon special request of the Chief of Luftwaffe General Staff, the division also wrote special studies that supplemented or paralleled similar work of the 5th Division. These studies had such subjects as comparative estimates of the military potential of belligerents or evaluations of future operations plans and others.

For the organizational structure of the 5th Division at the beginning of hostilities in 1939, see Appendix IV.
Whereas the 5th Division was primarily interested in immediately interpreting incoming information, the 8th Division was responsible for summarizing [after their conclusion] the experiences of past combat actions and making them useful for the future conduct of military operations.

Like almost every agency of the infant Luftwaffe, this division suffered from a shortage of suitable personnel. This shortage reflected on its performance; the buildup had been too fast.

4. The Intelligence Officers at Higher Field Headquarters

The intelligence officers at higher fields headquarters, such as the Air Force Military District Headquarters, later the Air Force Headquarters, also evaluated and interpreted intelligence information. In peacetime this function was of little significance, since these staffs received finished intelligence from the Reich Air Ministry.

Their wartime activities were extremely valuable and useful.

II. The Procurement of Intelligence at the Outbreak of War

a. Nature of Pre-War Intelligence - General Situation

After Lt.Col. Schmidt had become chief of the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff, collection, evaluation, and interpretation procedures were properly systematized. During 1938-39 all efforts were concentrated on collecting as much

22 For further details, see Chapter Two, Section 1, par a, subpar 2.
information as possible in order to provide the field headquarters and
field forces with the data they might need for operations across the German
borders. The technical staff officers of the 5th Division were granted ex-
tended leaves in 1938 to travel in these countries for which they were
responsible. On this occasion they were to get well acquainted with conditions
in the countries that were their specific fields of interest and were to
observe as many militarily important objectives as possible. This orientation
leave proved to be of great value for subsequent intelligence operations.

Since it was not feasible to distribute to every staff and headquarters
all the intelligence that would have been needed to conduct flexible military
operations in any direction at any time, record centers were established at
all peacetime airfields, where the necessary information was readily available
at all times. In the archives of the principal airport of the airfield area
command, so many copies were stored that the advance airfields that were not
to be occupied until the outbreak of hostilities could also be given adequate
distribution. In this manner, it had been ascertained that every unit at
every airfield would receive the elements of information essential to its
operations. As early as 1938, the necessary steps were taken to reproduce
extensively the intelligence, and by 1939 the distribution to airfield
archives was accomplished.
Among the distributed data were orientation maps and

orientation maps for every country with which Germany might have to
fight. Moreover, target maps were prepared for every objective that was of
interest in the respective countries. Aside from the maps contained in the
target dossiers, every airfield had a map depot to service the troops
stationed there. At this map depot, all maps were available, which any unit
employed in any direction from that airfield might require.

The intelligence furnished to command staffs, headquarters, and airfields
corresponded to the information available to the 5th Division, and the target
data to the dossiers in the central target files.

The intelligence available at the beginning of the war was very compre-
prehensive owing to the personal initiative taken by the Chief of the 5th
Division. Nevertheless, the volume of intelligence and its refinement did
not reach and really could not reach the level desired by the Luftwaffe
Operations Staff, mainly because of lack of time. For example, orientation
pamphlets and air topographical descriptions were not always completely
up to date, the target data contained only a selection of the most
important objectives,
and the individual target dossiers still showed gaps, the bridging of which would have required a lot more time.

Nevertheless, the intelligence produced by the beginning of the war was truly imposing. During a conference Goering called during the Battle of Britain, he told the assembled air force, air corps, wing, and group commanders the following:

"The target data that the General Staff had prepared in an exemplary and altogether unique manner are not being exploited by the combat forces. Photomaps and individual target diagrams offer the most plastic information."

Goering thus touched upon a weakness of the system, for the combat forces had not been sufficiently trained in the use of carefully and painstakingly prepared intelligence. The reasons for this deficiency were obvious. Because of constant expansion of the organization, because of the frequent changes in command and personnel that were thus generated, because of changes of station, and because of other important duties the units had no time to practice systematically the use of intelligence data. Target data, however, are of practical value only if the troops are trained to use them; both theoretical and practical training at sample installations are essential for that purpose.

23 The Most Important Adjacent Countries

Extracted from Karlsruhe Collection.
1. **Czechoslovakia (Filer To Perspiration)**

As one of the politically crucial countries along the German border, Czechoslovakia had been an important intelligence collection target as early as the time when the **Hausherr** was still in existence. After 1933, the intensive exploration of that country was intensified in relation to the increase in available funds for intelligence purposes. The collection of information was facilitated by the existence of data that were still available from the days of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and above all by the fact that major elements of the population of that country were German and felt German. Since these population segments resided in the border areas -- the Sudeten province -- and were precisely **HAUSHERR** informed on Czechoslovak military matters because of their military service obligations, the German intelligence agencies had no difficulty in keeping fully informed on all military matters that were worth knowing.

Until 1938, when the Sudeten province was occupied by German troops, the German Armed Forces penetrated every secret of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, its armament, communications system, and everything else. The Strategic Reconnaissance Group of the Luftwaffe High Command under Rowohl had photographed all border areas and other militarily significant points of the country. The corresponding photomaps were included in the target data distributed to the combat.
forces.

Before the territory of what subsequently was designated the protectorate was occupied, the unit commanders, who might have been committed in aerial operations, were XXX initiated accurately on the basis of available intelligence. As DHLoman (Fr.: commercial air line) passengers they were furthermore given opportunities of getting acquainted with the terrain over which they would have to fly.

As a result of the evaluation and interpretation of available information, the Luftwaffe High Command arrived at the conclusion that strategic air warfare against that country was unnecessary for the purpose of overcoming possible military resistance. A surprise air attack would suffice to eliminate the Czech Air Force and to prevent the assembly of Czechoslovak ground forces.
2. Poland

The circumstances pertaining to the collection of intelligence in Poland during the pre-war period were similar to those in Czechoslovakia. This country, also, had become a center of attention for the German military counterintelligence services even before 1939, mainly because of its political attitude toward Germany. Thus, by the outbreak of hostilities the Germans had a complete picture of the strength, distribution, and assembly plans of the Polish Armed Forces as well as exact data on Polish armament production and internal communications. Here, too, the collection of information was greatly facilitated by the presence of a strong German ethnic minority. An additional factor was that precisely the border areas had been almost exclusively former German territory so that the Germans obviously had still all the data to facilitate the operations of the military counterintelligence services.

The Strategic Reconnaissance Group Nowaki had taken photographs of the border areas, of the so-called Polish Corridor, and of all military and armament production targets of importance. These photographs, together with the target data, had been distributed to the field commanders.

The strength and ground organization of the Polish Air Force were exactly known to the Germans, with the exception of a few airfields in the easternmost part of the country.
3. France

At the outbreak of war, data on France were unsatisfactory and far from complete. The counterintelligence sources had provided much doubtful information, most of which however was of dubious origin and value.

The air attaché had not furnished any significant information up to that time. Nor had the French press provided the volume of military and military-economic information that was customary among the other Western powers, such as the United States and Great Britain. The only available photographs covered airfields and industrial installations in Alsace-Lorraine.

In peacetime, the radio intercept service had not provided any important clues.

In general, the German air force intelligence agencies were not prepared for a war against France on 1 September 1939. The main reason for this unpreparedness was the fact that the political leaders had not included France among the potential adversaries.
4. Great Britain

There were far better data available about Great Britain, when the war started. That these data for the conduct of air warfare had been assembled, was to be attributed to an order issued by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe at the end of 1938. Up to that time the intelligence covering Great Britain had been totally inadequate, just like that pertaining to France. Since the political leadership had not taken a war with the Western powers into account, the collection of information in those countries had not been considered as particularly important. It was therefore not altogether surprising that the information provided by the military counterintelligence agencies was not only scarce but also totally inadequate in value.

At the end of November 1938 Goering therefore ordered that a study be prepared on the air vulnerability of Great Britain. The then Chief of the 5th Division commented on this study as follows:

"General Jodl, who was then Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, was of the opinion that an exact intelligence estimate and comprehensive preparations based on target data were of decisive importance for the success of an aerial operation. He also thought, that this was particularly the case with a possible air warfare against Great Britain. For this reason, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe ordered that a special study be prepared to establish the air vulnerability factors pertaining to Great Britain."

— Excerpt from a report of General von Schmid, who was then Intelligence Officer at the Luftwaffe High Command. This report was written from memory in 1953, with personal notes also being used for this purpose. Karlsruhe Collection.
Britain; this study was given the code designation "BLAU". In 1939 the study, classified secret, was available in copies. It was submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe at Lütticken on the island of Sylt, and the Chief of Intelligence, who submitted it, was given the approval of the Commander in Chief and the Chief of Staff.

**Study Staff**

The study was prepared during the period January to June 1939 under the direction of the Chief of Intelligence.

Once or twice a week, conferences, verbal reports, discussions, and question-and-answer periods lasting 4 - 5 hours were held. The participants were:

(a) The foreign specialist of the 5th Division of the Luftwaffe High Command;

(b) The economics expert of the Counterintelligence Branch of the Armed Forces High Command;

(c) Technical experts from the Air Material Command;

(d) Representatives of private industry;

(e) Professors of geopolitics; and

(f) The Air Attaché from London with his assistants.

The study analyzed all aspects of British statehood: the structure of the British Empire, the armed forces, people, government, constitution, administration, economy, industry, trade, imports, exports, agricultural production in peace and wartime, electricity supplies, air vulnerability,
shadow factories, natural resources, railroad communications, inland
waterways, naval and commercial port installations, stock piles, naval
lines of communication, etc.

There was an abundance of source material in libraries, in the British
minutes of
press and literature, in foreign writings, parliamentary debates, and
particularly in papers and documents dating from the First World War.
A number of officials who had lived for some time in Great Britain were
of great assistance.

The study resulted in a multitude of suggestions and requirements
for obtaining information.

In 1939 the thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the study
was completed. The result was available by mid-July: it was voluminous
and included many statistics and maps. It may be summarized somewhat as
follows:

"Great Britain is an extremely solid state of considerable national
and economic strength. Its military power is based essentially on the
Navy, which is far superior to its German counterpart. The mobilisation
of the British Navy had been underway since spring 1939. The British
Air Force is the second strongest service. It is now being modernised and
brought up to date. With the buildup planned for the future, it might
become equal to the Luftwaffe by
1940. The defense against air attacks are well prepared and are constantly being perfected in the British Isles. The small British Army is being modernised and makes progress. But the Army can assume significance only in conjunction with French ground forces. Stock piling has begun in all spheres of the British industry and economy. The weakest points in the over-all economic picture are the British dependence on imports and the overseas communications. Because of these factors, its general geographic position and its numerous naval and commercial harbor facilities — XXXX the latter are the breathing organs of the economy — the air vulnerability of the British Isles assumes particular significance. In any air warfare with Britain, the defeat of the British Air Force, including the elimination of the aircraft industry that is a bottleneck at any time, and the neutralisation of the British Navy are prerequisites for success. The primary mission of the German Air Force is therefore to neutralise all naval and commercial port facilities on the islands and to destroy shipping capacity. To carry out this mission, the Luftwaffe will need very strong forces. No time limit can be set for achieving this objective. Because of the British government's capability to improvise and because of the spiritual strength of the British people, it might be possible that the surrender of the British Isles cannot be solely obtained through
Field Marshal Kesselring has the following comments to this study as a preparatory step and basic document for conducting air warfare against Great Britain:

"The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe had in this instance (Great Britain) been ahead of the other services. As early as June 1939, after 6 months of preparatory work done with the assistance of scientists and economists, he had produced an integrated plan that constituted a really useful basis for the "air battle against Britain" and might have also been used as basic planning document for an invasion of the British Isles."

According to all these indications, the collection of intelligence concerning Great Britain seems to have been well advanced by the outbreak of war. The above-mentioned study BLAU led to a collection effort to fill existing intelligence gaps; furthermore, the available information was evaluated and interpreted.

The military collection agencies of Canaris contributed relatively little to this effort. On the other hand, the German air attache in London and -- last but not least -- the British press provided excellent material. The following photographic material was available at the outbreak of hostilities: The ports of London, the southeast coast ports, parts of the south coast, ground organisation and aircraft industry in the southeastern part of the country, and the airfields in the Midlands.

Albert Kesselring, *Geheimen war zwei Teilnehmer* (Secrets to World War #2), Bonn, 1955, p. 67.
Radio intercepts provided valuable information on armament production figures, organization and distribution of the British Air Force, etc., which was

used by the intelligence collection agencies.

The creation and buildup of an extensive shadow industry was known to the Germans. The German High Command was also aware of the existence of a British radar screen. Shortly before the outbreak of war, the airship “Graf Zeppelin” flew several aerial survey missions over the North Sea, which produced additional information in this field.
Wartime Intelligence Activities

1. Changes in the Intelligence Mission and Organization

a. Changes in the Collecting Agencies

During wartime the organisational structure of the intelligence collecting agencies had to be changed by necessity, even though all responsible personnel made every effort to adjust the peacetime to the wartime organisation in order to safeguard a smooth transition. However, sources that were open to collecting agencies in peacetime became blocked or were far more difficult to accede to as time went on. Other, new contacts and sources had to be established and brought into action and then adjusted to wartime conditions.

The changes in the organization and mission of each individual collecting agency will hereby be discussed as follows:

1. Combat Intelligence Office, Armed Forces High Command

There was no immediate change in the mission of this office at the outset of the war. Except for a few additions and changes, the existing organization was to serve both in peace and war. In the course of the war, however, some changes were made in the organization of the office; these
changes resulted from the immediate experiences made in wartime or from
the domestic political events after 20 July 1944 (The Attempt on Hitler's
life).

Whereas Branches I, II, and III of the Counterintelligence Office,
Armed Forces High Command remained substantially unchanged until 1944,
the Foreign Branch was consolidated with the Central Branch at the outbreak
of war, being redesignated "Foreign Office Group." The chief of the new
group was General Oster, who had been chief of the Central Branch until
then. Oster thus expanded his sphere of influence considerably, since he
assumed personal control of the activities by which
all reports gathered by Branch I and attache reports from allied and neutral
countries were collated and summarized.

This concentration of power probably also resulted in the attempt to
develop the office group into a kind of official intelligence agency of
the Armed Forces High Command. This was certainly not an advisable solution,
since it is inappropriate to make the collecting agency simultaneously
responsible for the evaluation and interpretation of all information.
For this purpose, the collecting agency lacked unbiased objectivity and
access to the numerous other sources of information that developed during
the course of the war, such as photographic reconnaissance, radio
intelligence,

The ranking service attaché was usually appointed simultaneously
Armed Forces Attaché with the duty of reporting both to his service
and to the Armed Forces High Command.
press analysis, prisoner-of-war interrogation, combat reconnaissance
reports, etc. It was not until toward the end of the war that the Armed
Forces Operations Staff decided to create its own intelligence division,
but this measure did not produce any major effect.

As previously mentioned, the organization of the Counterintelligence
Office, Armed Forces High Command was not changed. The office consisted
of the following three branches until the end of the war:

Branch I — Collection of Information;
Branch II — Sabotage; and
Branch III — Espionage and Antisabotage Activities.

The counterintelligence agencies attached to the corps and military
district headquarters were subordinate to the office in technical and
operational matters. In addition, the office employed special combat
reconnaissance teams in wartime. For its activities abroad, the Counter-
intelligence Office used the Armed Forces Stations in allied and neutral
countries and the KB — Kalamorganisation (Kalmorganisation) that was
integrated in the diplomatic missions.

The counterintelligence agencies attached to the corps and military
district headquarters — the latter remained in the zone of interior —
continued their peacetime operations also throughout the war. They proved
to be effective. When the corps headquarters moved into combat, the
military district headquarters assumed their counterintelligence responsibility in the zone of interior. The counterintelligence agencies of the corps headquarters in the field were assigned missions that corresponded to the military plans pertaining to the operations in which the respective corps was involved.

The counterintelligence agencies of the military district headquarters assumed the responsibilities assigned to the peacetime agencies operating in the respective areas insofar as the collection of information was concerned, emphasizing the XXX points of main effort as instructed. They subsequently worked on any lead and contact with abroad that seemed worth while to them or the Counterintelligence Branch and later Office. In theory, such operations were to be coordinated with the respective K0 operating in that country, which was supposed to establish and maintain the contact.

The K0 was an organization that was employed in neutral countries in addition to the military attaches. Operating from neutral bases, the K0's directed their activities at Germany's adversaries, whereas the military attaches reported on matters pertaining to the host countries.

The combat reconnaissance teams, occasionally also organized as squads or similar units, operated near the MLR. Aside from carrying out special tasks that corresponded to the course of combat events, they had principal mission of interrogating prisoners of war. They coordinated their operations with and received their instructions from the local intelligence officers of
the army groups or air forces to which they were attached.

Until 1944 Branch I of the Counterintelligence Office was subdivided

according to the special collection fields dealt with, such as Army,

Navy, Air Force, etc. Each section was in turn subdivided according

to countries or groups of countries, is to say according to the areas

in which the information was collected. The country with which the in-

formation was concerned, was considered of secondary importance. Since the

above-mentioned sections were not only concerned with collecting information

but also adhered to certain premises — not to say prejudices — there were

required difficulties and one major problem that an unprecedented solution.

The last chief of the Air Force Section, (Col., Ret.) Klayanstueber, writes on this subject as follows:

"The divergence permeates the entire organizational structure of the

secret service. To prevent overlapping, mutual interference, etc., the

collection effort must be organized according to friendly or neutral areas

from which or through which the enemy's security screen is penetrated. The

evaluation and interpretation must be organized according to fields of interest

or areas with which the information is concerned. Moreover, the retroactive

appraisal of the value of a source should not be left to the collecting

agencies but rather to the evaluation or interpretation organizations.

27 Extracted from a study written by (Col., Ret.) Klayan-
stueber in 1955, which dealt with the organisation of the military

secret service (counterintelligence service). Karlsruhe Collection."
Just like a mother usually closes her eyes to the faults of her own child, whom she considers the best and most beautiful of all, a military or civilian official of a clandestine collecting agency will rarely notice a fault in the contact he has established or maintained. He will be the last one to detect that there is something wrong, even if his source has been operating for the enemy for quite some time. This was one of the organizational deficiencies from which the Counterintelligence Office suffered in 1944.

The retrospective evaluation and analysis of reports from a source was usually neglected because of the voluminous daily workload. This type of analysis is actually very simple and produces an unequivocal verdict on the value and contents of information. Apart from individual "major" contacts, such an analysis should not be limited to the General Staff's evaluation accomplished by the three services. Another factor to be considered is that the evaluation personnel are not acquainted with the collection methods and techniques. For this reason, the above-mentioned sections formed subsections or similar organizational units for pre-evaluation purposes, but without finding a truly satisfactory solution to the problem. These were the intellectual premises on which the subsequent reorganization was based.

The subsequent reorganization of Branch I, which took place in 1944, led to the following organizational structure:

Western Section: collection in or above the West, and
Eastern Section: collection in or above the East.
In addition, pre-evaluation agencies were created that were subdivided according to Army, Navy, Air Force, and industry. These pre-evaluation sections were in turn subdivided according to countries, assembly areas, etc., by the various categories of information.

The collection sections were responsible for maintaining existing contacts and -- insofar as possible -- for establishing new ones. They were to guide and control the collection of information through these sources.

The pre-evaluation sections, having equal rank with the collection sections, assigned missions and requested information on the basis of requirements transmitted by the intelligence officers of the three services. They evaluated individual contacts and sources by retroactive evaluation of the information produced; in this capacity they cooperated closely with the intelligence officers of the three services. They thus acted as advance filters -- at least in judging the value of information -- in transmitting newly arrived items of information.

This organization was no doubt more effective than the previous. The change in the organizational structure should not be attributed to the fact that the counterintelligence agencies had meanwhile been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA -- Reichssicherheitshauptamt).
since it had previously been planned on the basis of past experience.

A drastic change in the collecting methods occurred at the beginning of 1944. The numerous other government and Party officials who were engaged in the collection of information in some capacity or another — especially the two dominant personalities Himmler and, until his death, Heydrich — succeeded in influencing Hitler to dismiss Admiral Canaris who had hitherto been considered indispensable. The reasons given during secret conferences will probably never be determined. The Chief of Branch I, Colonel Hansen, succeeded Canaris. At the same time, the Counterintelligence Office was transferred from the Armed Forces High Command to Reich Security Main Office and redesignated Abt. XI. (Military Office). It thus became subordinate to the Chief of the State Security Service (SD — Secret Police — Higher Ranks), Kaltenbrunner. This transfer did not change the military status of the personnel assigned to the office, since they continued to serve in a military capacity and were administered by the respective personnel agencies of the three services.

After the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, in the preparation of which the Chief of the Military Office had a certain part, Schellenberg, who was Chief of Office VI (Collection of Political News from Abroad) of the Reich Security Main Office, assumed the additional duties of directing the Military Office. This organisation remained unchanged until the end of the war. As a result, a major part of the information collection effort
of the Luftwaffe and the other services was controlled by the National
Socialist Party security service after 1944.

2. The Intelligence Office of the Higher Headquarters

Whereas before the war the collection of information was primarily
the task of the counterintelligence agencies, radio intercept services, and
other units of the Luftwaffe High Command under the control of the latter,
this function was transferred to a large extent to the higher headquarters
subordinate to the High Command. There, the information resulting from
air and ground reconnaissance first became available, and to a certain
degree also the statements of prisoners of war. The monitoring agency within
the higher headquarters was the intelligence officer.

The intelligence officer was responsible for preparing the

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

and as secondary missions, he \textbf{took charge of}

(g) 

\textbf{Counterintelligence activities} (antisabotage and countermesionage),

but only in coordination with the Armed Forces counterintelligence
agencies; and

(h) 

The chiefs of the intelligence branches of these headquarters were usually general staff officers.

The higher Luftwaffe headquarters participating in the collection of information with their sphere of jurisdiction were the following:

(a) The air force headquarters;

(b) The air corps headquarters;

(c) The air division headquarters;

(d) The air force commanders;

(e) The Luftwaffe liaison missions attached to army group and army headquarters; and

(f) The air force administrative command headquarters.

The means for collecting information, which were available to the intelligence officers according to the level of the headquarters they served, were the following:

(a) Strategic and close air reconnaissance units;

(b) Enemy observations made by bomber, fighter-bomber, fighter, and air transport units;

(c) Ground and air observations by friendly flak and signal units;

(d) Statements by prisoners of war and deserters;

(e) Captured enemy property;

(f) Information concerning the enemy, made available by the Army and Navy;

(g) Reports from agents (of the counterintelligence service or occasionally of the Luftwaffe proper); and

(h) Analysis of the enemy press and radio.
In addition, each intelligence officer received information from the Luftwaffe High Command and the higher headquarters. By listing the sources of information available to intelligence officers in wartime one arrives at the conclusion that the bulk of the information on the ground and air situation was gathered by the headquarters in the field. The intelligence personnel at the Luftwaffe High Command produced the air estimate of the situation from the sum total of information collected by the field head-
the information quarters; which passed through the intermediate commands which also made use of it.

The most important and most reliable intelligence collection forum to obtain intelligence on the enemy in the field were the reconnaissance units. The tactical reconnaissance units brought information and photographs from combat zones, whereas the strategic reconnaissance units obtained information — above all photographs — of enemy territory situated far to the rear. The higher the headquarters, the farther its strategic reconnaissance aircraft generally penetrated over enemy rear areas.

To develop and evaluate incoming photographs, the units responsible for photoreconnaissance as well as every higher headquarters had one photographic shop. The staff photo agency at higher headquarters was under the operational control of the photographic interpretation officer assigned to the intelligence staff. It was his duty to screen the photogra- phes and evaluate them as to their usefulness to the operational command. He was also responsible for transmitting with a minimum of
delay XX interpreted prints to all agencies interested in their contents.

The German INTERESSANTE Air Force Directive No. 16, Interessante Luftwaffe
(Air Warfare), reprint of March 1940, par. 79 - 101, defines in great
detail the purpose and methods of collecting information by higher head-
quarters:

Par. 79: Reconnaissance should produce a reliable and complete picture
of the situation as rapidly as possible. The reconnaissance
results form the basis for the decisions taken by the command and
the operations conducted by the troops.

Par. 80: Wartime reconnaissance is based on peacetime intelligence.

The information obtained in peacetime is generally decisive for
the initial employment of the air force.

In the further course of operations it often saves new reconnaissance
flights that waste time, necessitating only a supplementation or
reevaluation of available intelligence.

Peacetime intelligence activities produce the basic information
that cannot be obtained during hostilities or only at great
difficulties.

Par. 81: Wartime information media are as follows:

Air reconnaissance, aircraft-warning service, intercept service,

28 Karlsruhe Collection.
exchange of information, press and radio scrutiny, reports from agents, 
prisoner-of-war statements, and evaluation of captured documents. 

Par. 82: Every one of these means of information has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. And each medium has its limitations. The 
important thing is to use the right one at the right time and 
to coordinate their use in such a manner that the results com-
plement one another instead of overlapping.

A SYNTHESIS OF

The reconnaissance information (air reconnaissance, intercept, 
aircraft-warning service, and reports from adjacent headquarters) 
collected and evaluated by the air report gathering station at the 
command post of the air force headquarters in the field produces 
the estimate of the situation. Every staff must transmit significant 
information to its own units and other staffs without delay.

AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Par. 83: Under favorable circumstances, air reconnaissance rapidly and 
comprehensively an over-all estimate of the situation as well as 
numerous details.

But air reconnaissance can only determine whatever is visible to the 
eye or can be photographed. It fails in
establishing details to which it has no access.

Moreover, air reconnaissance is hampered by the adversary, XXX by unfavorable weather, and by restrictions to certain hours of the day when there is sufficient light. This type of reconnaissance can therefore produce only extracts of the situation. And even these are based on momentary observations.

On the other hand, the range of air reconnaissance is so extensive that the over-all results can compensate for the fact that the information has gaps and covers a limited period.

Par. 84: The air reconnaissance of the Air Force, Army, and Navy serves the purposes of mutual service and security also the over-all conduct of warfare. The Armed Forces High Command must therefore maximize the territorial and functional reconnaissance responsibilities of each service and define its own reconnaissance requirements.

Par. 85: The reconnaissance area of the Air Force is usually beyond the reconnaissance area of the Army and Navy. If possible, the delimitation should follow geographical lines.

At the beginning of war, air force reconnaissance on land usually starts beyond the assumed assembly and staging areas of the enemy ground forces. Exceptional situations require different reconnaissance missions.
Par. 86: During the course of operations the reconnaissance areas and missions will shift frequently. The activities of the reconnaissance units, however, will be facilitated by maximum consistency.

Par. 87: To economize forces, it may be indicated to delegate some of the reconnaissance missions of one unit to another. Care must be taken that one's own mission is not impaired.

Par. 88: Occasionally, it will be impossible to prevent maximum in reconnaissance. The use of air combat forces in the reconnaissance or combat area of the ground forces will often make air reconnaissance necessary. In combating mobile targets in the battle area, it will be particularly necessary to commit air reconnaissance units.

Par. 89: The procedure for flying reconnaissance missions prior to an attack of friendly forces and the selection of units for such a purpose will depend on the type and comprehensiveness of the over-all missions, on the enemy situation, on the weather, on the time of day, and on the terrain.

Directives from higher headquarters will guarantee coherence in the execution of the reconnaissance mission and effective employment of forces.

The air reconnaissance units of bombardment planes will limit the scope of their mission to establishing the enemy and weather situations along their
approach routes and above their targets as well as to collecting detailed
information on the objective and the effect of bombings.

Even so, these units will observe anything that might be of interest
to the conduct of air operations during the execution of their
assigned missions.

Par. 90: The reconnaissance process consists usually of taking aerial photo-
graphs. Since this takes time, the flights must be so prepared that
the reconnaissance results can be fully exploited.

In urgent cases, photographic reconnaissance will have to be replaced
by visual reconnaissance and radio reports to higher headquarters
or by direct reports to assembled combat forces.

Entirely new vistas that cannot yet be fully gauged have been
opened by the advances made in the field of television.

Par. 91: Economy of reconnaissance forces for individual mission is indicated.

These forces should avoid becoming involved in combat. If proper
equipment is available, they should fly singly, taking full advantage
of their range.

Employment of units flying in close order might be necessary, if
the reconnaissance mission is directed against strongly defended
areas or targets and powerful protection is needed.

If the mission requires simultaneous reconnaissance or of
large areas, the total requirement of forces will be calculated
on the basis of the width of territory.
covered by each aircraft.

Para. 92: The mission given to the reconnaissance forces must clearly indicate what is important to the command agency as well as how and to whom the results should be transmitted.

It may be expedient to inform the reconnaissance units about the simultaneous commitment of combat forces to whom they can transmit important observations directly by radio.

Para. 93: Reconnaissance missions flown against fixed targets vary according to the situation, extension, course, and significance of certain parts of the target. The timing and the frequency of the reconnaissance missions depend on their purpose.

Reconnaissance missions flown against mobile targets, such as aircraft, transport movements, motorized troop units, etc., must take into account the probable reaction of the opponent. On the basis of the overall situation, the intelligence available, the weather reports, and the terrain conditions as they affect the adversary, reconnaissance effort will be intensified either by covering a wider area or by flying more missions.

Para. 94: To supplement the reconnaissance effort over enemy territory on the flanks and to supplement the aircraft-warning service on the front, it might be necessary to observe the sky above one's own territory.
by air force units.

Par.95: Night reconnaissance may be necessary to determine enemy movements at night, to reconnoiter objectives, and to establish the effectiveness of bombardments.

Night reconnaissance presumes precise knowledge of the terrain and targets as well as the ability of utilizing this knowledge by night even in comparative darkness. However, night reconnaissance cannot as possibly achieve the same results or replace daytime reconnaissance.

Par.96: The results of air reconnaissance operations can be effective only, if they reach in time those agencies which have to take appropriate action.

Aircraft-Warning Function

Par.97: The aircraft-warning function lays the groundwork for the operations of defensive forces. It observes the air space, detects enemy aircraft, traces their routes, and determines their whereabouts.

The aircraft-warning service command screens the individual reports and transmits them according to importance and urgency immediately to the defensive command agencies and to the air raid warning service.

It reports to the defensive command agencies the landing of enemy aircraft, the release of propaganda.
by the enemy, and the airdropping of individuals or bodies of troops.

Par. 98: The aircraft-warning service does not lose any of its basic importance, even if special air reconnaissance units are committed for defensive purposes. The aircraft-warning service operates in any weather, even though it is affected by low clouds, rain, fog, and bad visibility. It is capable of observing the air space without interruption. Herein resides its special forte.

The simultaneous appearance of flying units at different points, the difficulty of identifying them as enemy aircraft, their speed and altitude, rapid change of direction and use of cloud formations complicate the aircraft-warning service.

These difficulties must be overcome by effective organisation, thorough training, and constant improvements in transmitting information.

Par. 99: The loss of elements of the aircraft-warning service must not lead to an interruption of service at any time. Rapid relief must be sought by accelerating the replacement of such elements, if necessary by improvising detours.

Par. 100: Air reconnaissance and aircraft-warning service are supplemented by other means of collection of information to a considerable extent. These supplementary means often give hints for appropriate action to
the air reconnaissance units.

Radio Interception provide data on billeting areas, distribution of forces, approach and advance route of enemy forces, and the success of friendly offensive operations, which are obtained by monitoring enemy radio traffic.

The value of reliable reports from sources can be considerable. They usually inform more accurately on the morale of the enemy home front than the enemy or neutral press. They might be the only means of obtaining target data for bomber attacks, such information on as for instance the key installations of industrial plants and power stations.

Statements of prisoners of war usually produce an idea of the enemy's distribution of forces, the billeting areas, equipment, and morale of enemy air forces.

For more details, see the manual on the conduct of operations, par. 184 ff.

Weather Service

Par. 101: The weather service is extremely important in wartime. It operates under far more difficult circumstances than in peacetime because no direct information from enemy territory becomes available.

The gaps that are thus created on the weathermap should be closed,
if at all possible, by using every available expedient to obtain
weather reports via allied or neutral countries or by intercepting
information from enemy weather stations through monitoring.

In wartime, air reconnaissance can assume considerable importance
for air reconnaissance. Every penetration into enemy
territory should be used for weather reconnaissance."

3. Captured Enemy Material Staff at the Luftwaffe Technical Office

A so-called Captured Enemy Material Staff was formed to research
enemy air technology; this staff was attached to the German test center
of the Luftwaffe at Rechlin in Mecklenburg at the beginning of the war.

It was composed of a great number of technicians and specialists, whose
specialized knowledge enabled them to draw conclusions from examining
captured enemy air material.

Whenever material was captured in any theater, including aircraft that
had been shot down, the Captured Enemy Material Staff was notified by the
chief engineer or maintenance engineer of the respective headquarters. If
there was any reason for assuming that new or unknown material had been
captured, an investigation committee traveled to the point where it was
located and investigated the item.

Especially important captured material was moved to Berlin and was
examined according to scientific principles either from the point of
view of counterintelligence or for
the evaluation of its usefulness to German armament industry.

The analysis reports of the Captured Enemy Material Staff were transmitted to the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command, to the Technical Office of the Air Material Command, and to the Armed Forces Economics Staff. These reports were a major contribution to intelligence coverage of the enemy armament industry, and they closed many gaps in the available information.

When Goering was questioned about the activities of the Captured Enemy Material Staff during a session of the International Tribunal at Nuremberg and was asked whether patent rights were considered before the Luftwaffe released items for industrial production, he answered:

"They would have gone to hell three times, if they had done this thing different. Patents never bothered me, whether they were German or foreign."

4. The Interrogation Camp at Oberursel

At the end of 1939 a transit camp for enemy airmen was opened at Oberursel in the Taunus Mountains under request of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command. This transit camp had the single mission of interrogating enemy flying crew personnel before they were transferred to permanent camps. The reason for establishing such a special camp was that according to past experience no useful information was obtained during the first interview of such prisoners at field headquarters or at the command posts of combat troop elements. The Intelligence officers assigned to
such headquarters, who had been trained to conduct such interrogations, were lacking
neither the necessary experience nor were they sufficiently acquainted with
the over-all situation. For these reasons, they were unable to ask those
salient questions that would have produced information of interest to the top-
level command. Occasionally, when prisoners were captured by a forward
combat element, such an "interrogation" degenerated into a social
conversation that was spiced by intoxicating beverages, so that the prisoners
were often completely spoiled by the time they reached the proper inter-
rogation authorities.

In 1941 a general order was therefore issued by the Armed Forces High
Command, specifying that all aviators flying enemy planes who had been shot
down were to be brought immediately to Cherbourg without any prior inter-
rogation. There, the interrogation was then undertaken according to uniform
guidelines that were appropriate for the purpose; furthermore, experienced
experts conducted the interrogations in conformance with the intelligence
requirements of the Luftwaffe High Command.

In general, it is no exaggeration to state that this type of prisoner
interrogation produced valuable information. The fact that the British
prisoners maintained a remarkable interrogation discipline does not change
any of these facts.

During the early period of their intervention in the European theater,
the American crews were more communicative. They answered all questions in
a harmless, and uninhibited manner. This condition, which was so convenient
for the intelligence collection personnel changed with the course of time.

In fact, during the last years of the war, the Americans also maintained an interrogation discipline that was similar to that of the British.

The author has some personal experiences regarding the interrogation discipline of the British. In August 1941 two British aircraft carriers attempted to attack the ports of Petaamo and Kirkenes. About 25 young British fliers were pulled out of the water and rescued from the many aircraft the Germans shot down. Despite excellent care and very sociable treatment, not a single Britisher gave more than his name, rank, and serial number during the first interrogation. The interrogation turned out to be very interesting, nevertheless: while the men were being served at the officers' mess, their clothes had been hung up to dry in the sun.

The Germans had taken the opportunity to search the pockets for interesting documents. In so doing, they found among other items the complete operations order of the group, containing all the information on the scope of the operation, the number of aircraft employed and available, the names of the superior officers and the flying crews, and many details on routine matters concerning aircraft carriers, and the service aboard such ships. The interrogation officer was thus able to tell the prisoners all that and even more things that he really wanted to find out from them. Since several of the young men had two movie tickets of a Reykjavik theater in their pockets, it was also not
too difficult to confront them with the information that they had been
to a movie HELP with a girl at Reykjavik only four days ago.

This extensive knowledge of the German officers produced not only
enormous surprise but also repeated loud laughter on the part of the young
when he prisoners. The only one who did not smile was the captain, found out
that his pockets had been searched meanwhile and that he had forgotten to
rid himself of the important documents before starting on his mission.

An amusing incident, but also a serious one, which indicates that the
best interrogation discipline is of no use, if all items that might provide
the enemy with clues are not put aside before starting on a sortie. —

The prisoners mentioned above were sent by air to Oehrusel on the next day.

The interrogation of French fliers was of no intelligence significance
because of the short duration of the combat operations against France.

Of all enemy prisoners the Soviet crews were the most willing to answer
questions that were put to them in a special camp at Brest Litovsk and later
at another inclosure near Lietzen in East Prussia. This willingness to reveal
secrets should probably be attributed to the fear spread by Soviet propaganda
the concerning bad treatment meted out by the Germans.

The method of interrogation employed naturally took into account the

29 (Maj. Gen., Ret.) Nielsen, 10/41 FLIGHT COMMANDER, KIRKENES
(Air Force Commander at Kirkenes in 1941).
national characteristics of the prisoners and their individual personalities, since this was the only way of obtaining useful information. In many instances the prisoners made statements to secure optimum treatment. This slanting of information was particularly prevalent among prisoners who had been subjected to some of the atrocity propaganda that had been spread in some countries during the war and who believed that they would be badly treated. With prisoners from west European countries friendly words, generous treatment, and apparent disinterestedness regarding the statements made were more successful than rough tactics, which usually induced the prisoner to become stubborn.

The first commander of the Oberursel transit camp was Major Rumpel, an old wartime buddy of Goering. He was a very capable and versatile officer who was particularly suited for assuming this psychologically difficult task. Despite the primitive amenities, he always treated prisoners in a humane manner, and the interrogation methods were therefore extremely successful. When these facts became known to him, Hitler grew suspicious, feeling that this capable officer and some of his interrogation officers were too anglophile. He therefore ordered that they be released from their assignment. Rumpel was succeeded by Lt. Col. Killinger who did not make any major changes in the methods employed at Oberursel.

The procedure by which a certain category of prisoners were sent to a
specially established interrogation camp has proved fully effective. The interrogation team that had been specially trained in its field had many years of experience and therefore knew exactly how the enemy conducted air force operations and what his items of equipment were. In asking questions, they could limit the field of interrogation to the areas in which there were gaps that needed filling. Because of their background they were able to recognize interrelationships that had hitherto been unknown from minor indications or unintended remarks. Thus, they were able to add piece by piece in an effort of uncovering the well-camouflaged edifice of enemy air armament and operations methods and planning.

...together with Oberursel, the transit camp at Loetzen established for the Russian crew, became of the most important sources of information for the German Air Force and also for the Armed Force High Command.

5. Cooperation with Allied and Friendly Intelligence Services

Before the outbreak of war, there had been no organized cooperation between the German intelligence service and those of allied and friendly countries. The military staffs of the allied Axis Powers only exchanged official visits, and occasionally leading personalities met at conferences. Occasional confidential contacts between
different intelligence services did not result in any exchange of general
information, but in reports on details, if anything.

Even **during the war** the Axis Powers did not cooperate to the degree
that would have been essential for achieving one common objective. On the
other hand, the allied countries mutually informed the attaches in a very
proper and exhaustive manner. Perhaps the sole exception was the representative
of the Soviet Union, if that country can be counted as one of the allied
powers after the agreement of 1939. One author **WII** wrote on this
subject in 1945 as follows:

"During the Polish Campaign the agreement with the Soviet Union was
arrived at, as known (sic). Upon Goering's request, a Russian air attaché,
Colonel Skornyakov, soon arrived at the headquarters. The unassuming, tacit,
and completely uneducated Russian officer was attached to the intelligence
section. Although he was assigned his own room at headquarters, Skornyakov
made little use of it and could not be seen for weeks. His principal
occupation was to travel. Accompanied by a German officer, he visited all
major German cities, showing particular interest for churches and cathedrals.
The Intelligence Division could not obtain any information on Russian aviation
from this source. Skornyakov, in turn,
was not particularly interested in us (i.e., the Germans). He only stated that everything was better in the Russian Air Force than in the German. He furnished a sumptuous apartment in Berlin, brought his wife from Russian in spring 1940, and shortly afterward left Germany without returning. He was not replaced by another officer."

It is probably in the nature of intelligence work that the information obtained is carefully kept secret and that the personnel engaged in this activity do not trust their best friends. Nevertheless, the German intelligence personnel succeeded during the war in carefully establishing contacts with the intelligence services of some friendly countries. Dr. Paul Leverkuehn, presently a member of the Deutsche Bundestag (German parliament, lower house) and formerly associated with the Counterintelligence Office of the Armed Forces High Command, writes on this subject as follows:

"During the military operations in the Balkans the German forces benefited from the information obtained by the German counterintelligence agencies that had been active in those areas. In addition, they also profited from the carefully established and maintained cooperation with Hungarian, Bulgarian, and partly also Romanian intelligence services."

"Other sources of information were the reports from the military attaches and the exchange of data with friendly intelligence services."

For this purpose, the Counterintelligence

---

Dr. Paul Leverkuehn, *Der militärische Nachrichtendienst* (The Military Intelligence), (The Balance Sheet of World War II) p. 204.
Office of the Armed Forces High Command acted as intermediary."

Another statement made by the same author indicates that friendly relations were also maintained with the Spanish intelligence service. He writes on this subject as follows:

"The counterintelligence staff has submitted information on the imminent Allied landings in North Africa. Moreover, Hitler and the political and military authorities must have known that the Spanish intelligence service had received similar information."

Another proof of the German cooperation with Spanish intelligence personnel was the so-called Case XXXX Martin. It indicates that at least the British were oriented on the connection between the German and Spanish intelligence services. The Case Martin was an English attempt to play secret documents into German hands. For this purpose, a British submarine abandoned a corpse near the Spanish coast, which was dressed in a British major's uniform. The "Major Martin" carried documents indicating that landings were intended on Sardinia, not in Sicily. The British plan succeeded completely; the German Armed Forces High Command was immediately informed. However, no decisive changes in the defensive dispositions in the Mediterranean area were made, not because the documents did not seem true but because their contents seemed too unrealistic from a military point of view.

31a

(TOP, p. 206.)

31 b

(TOP, p. 207.)
With regard to German contacts with the Romanian intelligence service dating back to pre-World War II days, Dr. Paul Levenkuehn writes:

"At that time Romania was politically neutral, inclining to the Allies rather than toward Germany. Canaris succeeded in convincing the chief of the Romanian intelligence service that the Romanian economic interests would suffer greatly, if the Danube was blocked as a navigational route. From then on the barge columns on the Danube carried small guard details, composed of counterintelligence personnel."

There are no further details on cooperation with allied and friendly countries in the field of intelligence. It will not be possible to obtain such details because the responsible personalities who could have provided information, are no longer alive. Both Admiral Canaris and his successor Colonel Hansen were executed in connection with the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944.

Direct cooperation among intelligence officers of allied combat forces naturally existed on a routine basis in all theaters, where combined operations were conducted.

Thus, for instance, in May 1943, an Italian Air Force liaison staff was attached to the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe General Staff.

As a reciprocal measure, the German Air Force general

32

Otmar von Remler, Weltkrieg, p. 209.
von Pohl was attached to the Italian Air Force High Command with a staff of his own. The meanwhile deceased Generalmajor u.N. (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Schmid writes as follows on the subject of the value and activities of the Italian liaison staff:

"The general relationship to Italy was good despite its neutrality and despite the alliance (sic). The Italian air attaché Colonel Teucci made every effort to stay away as much as possible. The mutual exchange of information was minor in volume and rather unilateral. Curiously enough, the Italians showed a particular interest for the British Isles. They, however, had little information on the enemy air bases in the Mediterranean and in the south of France. They had only scanty information even on Malta."

"As early as May 1940 a liaison staff of the Italian Air Force under the command of Colonel Teucci was attached to the Intelligence Division. This liaison staff never provided anything; on the contrary, the Italians always asked for information. The less the Italians took part in the air battle, the more the staff was reduced. Without being able to produce any proof, I am firmly convinced that information was passed on to enemy countries via this liaison staff and Italy."

Another type of liaison staff were the Luftwaffe commissions established in unoccupied France and in North Africa after the surrender of France.

---

Schmid writes in the same book on the intelligence collecting activities of these commissions as follows:

"The Luftwaffe commissions in unoccupied France were effective in collecting intelligence information, whereas those in North Africa did not produce. They had adjusted so well to French colonial life that they were unable to predict the landings of Allied forces in the autumn of 1942. They had trouble in hastily leaving French territory and crossing over to Spain in order to avoid capture by Allied troops."

- 98 -
II. ORGANIZATION IN THE EVALUATION OF INFORMATION AT THE JUNIOR'S HIGH COMMAND

a. The Intelligence Division [Z. Intelligenz] of the Luftwaffe General Staff

Whereas in peacetime the functions of the Intelligence Division were restricted to collecting all incoming information and evaluating it for the use of the top-level command, in wartime the division was assigned a very important additional mission, that of preparing the daily estimate of the situation. This estimate was a synthesis of the daily situation reports of subordinate Air Force headquarters, Army and Navy agencies, as well as of the reports and messages originating from the other previously mentioned intelligence sources, above all from radio intercepts.

This latter assignment assumed very considerable proportions since the daily situation estimate was composed of an endless number of individual reports and messages, which had to be screened and properly integrated into the over-all situation. The preparation of the estimate of the situation was a heavy responsibility because it provided the basis for the top-level command decisions. It is therefore not surprising, if the activities of the Intelligence Division, and especially the actions of its chief, are severely criticized in all kinds of publications concerning the German Air Force, these criticisms may be more or less justified, but one thing is certain: the severest critics are mostly writers who never had any insight into higher level interrelationships and who did not always get the right
slant.

At the beginning of the war the Intelligence Division moved with the Luftwaffe High Command to Wildpark-Werder near Potsdam. There the Luftwaffe High Command remained throughout the entire war.

Since it was not possible to move the large high command organization to the command posts established for each campaign, especially since a command train with limited space had been prepared for this purpose, the Luftwaffe High Command — and thus also the Intelligence Division — was subdivided into a first and a second echelon. The second echelon, comprising the major elements of the Intelligence Division, stayed at Wildpark-Werder. The first echelon, forming the intelligence staff of the Luftwaffe High Command, moved to the various command posts as an integral part of the command. The division chief's basic function was to stay with the chief of the general staff, that is to say with the first echelon.

The second echelon of the Intelligence Division thus operated more or less as the preparatory agency supporting the intelligence staff at the Luftwaffe High Command in all matters that did not require immediate evaluation. At the same time, the principal function of the intelligence staff forming part of the first echelon was to prepare the daily estimate of the situation. The second echelon received its operational instructions as previously from the division chief.

The effectiveness of the Intelligence Division was greatly impaired in mid-1942, when the division chief was replaced because one of his office associates was involved in an espionage case. The new division chief was
a young, inexperienced officer.

The former division chief, Generalleutnant (Maj.Gen., Ret.) Josef Schmid, writes on the subject of his relief from this assignment as follows:

"In August 1942, on the same day Goering ordered me to include the SS (Schutzstaffel - Nazi Party elite troops) in my intelligence agents' network, an officer of the Intelligence Division by the name of Schulze-Boysen was arrested by the Gestapo (Nazi Party Secret Police) with Goering's approval. He and his wife were accused of espionage for Russia's account. He was supposed to have transmitted information from Berlin via Belgium by radio. Throughout the entire month of September I had no more news on this subject. Meanwhile, a number of Intelligence Division personnel were interrogated by a Military court-martial official without my knowledge.

It finally developed that First Lieutenant Schulze-Boysen had not received any secret information from the Luftwaffe Intelligence Division, but that his sources of information were the Technical Office of the Luftwaffe, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Forces High Command. The case against Schulze-Boysen was know as the Kino Erlebnis Case (Red Chapel); during the course of the investigation at least 100 persons were arrested in Berlin. The Chief of the Intelligence Division was not involved. But, the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff of the Luftwaffe made him the reproach of not having suspected Schulze-Boysen at an earlier stage and of having rejected earlier accusations of Schulze-Boysen by the Gestapo in 1938 and at the beginning of the war. At the beginning of October 1942, Schmid, op. cit., no page number indicated.
I found among the morning mail on my desk a directive, according to which the new division chief was *thereafter*. (Lt. Col.) Kogl. This happened after Goering had made some loud criticisms about me in front of a great number of people. I left my assignment with mixed feelings. Predominant among them was my great worry about the further course of the war and its final issue as well as bitterness about the manner in which I had been dismissed. To leave a division that I had built up and whose work and people I liked, was very difficult for me."

The above-mentioned *Kalte Kompagnie* espionage case was a heavy psychological burden for the Luftwaffe because the key personality involved was a Luftwaffe officer.

The author Hans Grimm writes on the subject of *Kalte Kompagnie* activities as follows:

"Friedrich Lens states in his publication *Der eKKe Warn Kar Gesieran* (The Disgusting Worm of German Dissension), Heidelberg 1953, that a number of specific betrayals can be traced back to adherents of the *Kalte Kompagnie*. The following items of information are listed as having been turned over to the Russians by them: the strength of the German Air Force at the beginning of the German campaign against Russia; the monthly production figures of the German aircraft industry; Germany's POL stockage figures; the German preparations for the attack on the Haikop oilfields; the transfer of German parachute units from Crete to the Russian theater; German bottlenecks in the manufacture of

---

locomotives and special valves; the monthly aircraft production figures
of the Charleroi plant; details on the layout of the repair docks at
Amsterdam; military production and armament industries at Amsterdam and
Rotterdam; troop movements along the Belgian and French coast; the blue-
prints of an aircraft factory along the Berlin-Dresden line; the iron and
steel production figures of Belgium; details concerning the development
of a rifle grenade; the distribution of XXX German XXXX naval units;
statistics covering the monthly armament production; bomb damages and
losses in the Russian theater. Finally, a shrewd radio play informed the
Americans that Germany had deciphered the Cairo code. The consequences of
the latter betrayal were decisive for the collapse of Rommel's forces
in North Africa."

The listing of the betrayals that were revealed indicates clearly
what a heavy blow had thus been dealt to the German war effort. Without
having had any part in it, the chief of the Intelligence Division was
one of the victims of the subsequent house-cleaning operation. However,
Goering penalized only himself by the action he had taken, since he replaced
an experienced man with a young inexperienced officer.
2. Professor Steimann's Agency

An interesting organisation, responsible for evaluating information, was Professor Steimann's agency, which was developed during the war.

Professor Dr. Steimann, who was employed by the Administrative Office where he was in charge of electricity, water, gas, and other XXX utilities for Luftwaffe installations as a subordinate of the Construction Branch, had already before the war advocated the idea that air warfare against the enemy economic potential and war industries should be conducted by attacks on power stations and long-distance transmission lines. As an expert in this field, he was of the opinion that a lasting disruption of the long-distance transmission lines and the additional destruction of the main power plants would paralyze the entire economy and thus also the armament production of a country.

He had developed a so-called cable bomb to carry out his plans. When this bomb was dropped, a steel cable would unfurl and burn through HT wires upon contact, and collapse some of the poles. A prerequisite for the latter, however, was that the wires were not simply strung along the poles, but that they were firmly attached, as had hitherto been the case everywhere.
Professor Dr. Steinmann had participated in the preparation of Study 36 HAU, but had been unable to prevail because the ground defenses, Great Britain would put up, made a decisive ANV victory seem unlikely. Conditions in Russia were different. There, the long-distance transmission lines traversed extensive unprotected areas. A carefully planned operation against the power plants and major long-distance transmission lines would certainly paralyse important segments of the Soviet armament production potential.

This plan was not prepared during Generalluftkampf (General) Jeschonnek's tenure of office as chief of Luftwaffe General Staff. After the victories in Poland, France, and in the other theaters of war, he believed that major successes would be obtained also in Soviet Russia by employing the Luftwaffe, for tactical KAMPF operations exclusively.

After Jeschonnek's suicide, the Luftwaffe General Staff explored new possibilities of committing KAMPF at least some Luftwaffe elements for strategic missions. In so doing, Professor Steinmann's ideas were being reconsidered. In 1943 he therefore formed a special staff which was given the assignment of researching all Russian territory within the range of German aircraft for operations that could be conducted against power plants and long-distance transmission lines.

The staff was composed of 37 persons; for reasons of concealment, it remained within the Administrative Office, but received its instructions 36

The study concerned Great Britain; for more details, see p. 60 ff.
from the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, directly.

During the preparatory steps, all photographs taken in Russia up to that time were screened for long-distance transmission lines. Extensive new surveys completed the over-all picture so that a complete information on Russian power supply was available at the completion of this project. Models were built of the most important power plants to provide more detailed information for the attack units. Based on these data, the IV Air Corps was to fly special missions against the Soviet power plants and supplies after the conclusion of the preparatory work. This corps was being specially trained for flying strategic bombing missions.

However, this plan was never executed. When the preparatory steps came to a conclusion at the beginning of 1944, the situation had changed so drastically because of the German withdrawal in the Russian theater, that the military leaders no longer expected a decisive success from carrying out such an operation.

After the surrender of the German Armed Forces, Professor Steinmann turned over to the Western Powers the data, models, etc., he had prepared. For the material located in the Soviet-Occupied Zone, he indicated the secret hiding places to the Western Powers.
Chapter Three

Analysis of the Wartime Intelligence Collection Effort

1. The German Intelligence Operations in Western Europe (Sep 39 - Dec 39)

As XXX previously mentioned in Chapter One, the intelligence operations covering western European countries were inadequate until the outbreak of war. The data for conducting strategic air warfare were insufficient, which is not surprising since no political directive for collecting such information had been issued. Great Britain was somewhat of an exception because it had been the subject of an intensive intelligence effort after the beginning of 1939 when Goering had ordered the preparation of the previously mentioned Study BLAU.

After France and Great Britain had declared war, this situation changed radically. The intelligence effort was increased to a maximum upon request of the three services. With the outbreak of hostilities direct operations in enemy countries were greatly reduced so that the main emphasis in the operations against these two countries was placed on the T.N. (N:rux-rum- nition - Wartime Organization), whose agents were active in the neutral countries of Western Europe with Belgium and Holland being given preference.

It is obvious that the proper functioning of such a new organization created certain
difficulties and required a lot of time. An sizeable increase in the flow of information from these two countries was therefore not registered during the short time available. It was primarily attempted to direct the agents toward obtaining certain definite types of information needed to fill existing gaps in the over-all intelligence picture. (Among such intelligence targets were high-level military headquarters and staffs, troop transfers, etc.)

Despite the absence of combat actions, the main intelligence collection effort at the outbreak of hostilities was shifted to air reconnaissance. The air reconnaissance operations by the reconnaissance group of the Luftwaffe High Command and by the strategic reconnaissance units of the air forces produced good results. Among the information obtained were almost all the missing data on targets on the British Isles and in east France; in addition, shifts of enemy air units were observed as well as the status of enemy ground craft organization and air production.

The British naval ports, above all Scapa Flow (Home Fleet), were kept under constant surveillance for the German Navy. This observation was as useful for air warfare preparations as for naval planning and operations. Without the photographic data of Scapa Flow the famous attack by Blackburne (Commander) Piers and his submarine could not have taken place.
For the Army, the strategic air reconnaissance produced photos maps of the border area fortifications and of the enemy assembly areas. After the German operations plans had been determined for the campaign in Western Europe, the crucial areas of operations were covered by photos maps as far as possible. Photos maps on various scales were thus, for instance, established for advance in the direction of Sedan and to the west of that area as far as the Channel.

The intelligence collection activities of all types were under the same pressure for time as the evaluating agency — the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command. A particular obstacle was the fact that nobody was exactly informed on the time at which the operation against France was to start so that the proper planning of intelligence preparations was extremely difficult.

General Hauptmann (Maj. Gen., Ret.) Josef Schmid wrote as the then Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Luftwaffe High Command with regard to the course and status of intelligence collection and of target intelligence up to 10 May 1940, as follows:

"In the six months of the winter 1939-40 the Intelligence Division produced a tremendous amount of work and was always pressed for time. Actually, it was not known when the operations against France were to begin. The Army General Staff was opposed to a start in the late autumn 1939, mainly because it did not yet have sufficient armor. The unusually long winter, bad weather initially not conditions, and the scheduled campaign against Norway brought about the delay until 10 May."

Schmid, pp. 8-9 (no page number indicated).
"The information on air bases, naval ports, fortifications -- such as Eben-Emael -- and parachute drop zones had been prepared by the end of March 1940. The data were almost exclusively based on attacks and aerial photo reconnaissance. At the same time the target intelligence concerning France and Britain had reached a more conclusive stage. The data pertaining to air bases, naval and commercial ports, and the armament industry of both countries had been compiled in comprehensive surveys, consisting of descriptions, aerial photographs, geographic charts, etc. The air objective materials were made accessible to the field forces via the record offices of all the airfields in western Germany."

"The assembly of the Allied air forces were kept under constant observation. Strong fighter defense forces hampered German access to the British air base in northern France. There were therefore still gaps in the information concerning the British air force assembly by 10 May 1940."

"The progress in British armament was observed very closely. The improved Spitfire models were committed in small numbers only at the time the campaign in the West began. Modern bombers were still not available to the Royal Air Force. The combined British and French Air Forces were considered as numerically and qualitatively inferior to the Luftwaffe in Western Europe. The German air forces"
were reorganized, reequipped, and given additional training during the early months of 1940. They camouflaged their concentration of forces by frequent mobilization exercises and unit shifts. The lack of enemy air activity was noticeable."

Goering was not satisfied with the intelligence collection and evaluation methods used by the Luftwaffe General Staff. In order to exploit every avenue of military triumph, he explored extraordinary approaches in this field. General Josef Schmid writes in the same study on this subject:

"In the winter 1939-40, the Chief of the Intelligence Division was assigned a special mission. In Kassel lived a doctor of medicine who was more than 70 years old and whose name was Herrmann. This doctor was a fortune teller who used a pendulum for this purpose. He assumed various tasks which he believed to be able to accomplish without fail. These tasks covered diversified fields as finding gold deposits, bringing down aircraft by electric rays, killing people with electric rays, and many others. Goering trusted this miracle man implicitly. With the expenditure of large included sums of money a major operating staff was formed which a number of deferred personnel. Above all, this group was to produce predictions of matters important to the intelligence field. After several months of activity, Dr. Herrmann and his associates were proved incapable of producing any intelligence."
I was able to effect the dissolution of the miracle staff, thus saving the German Government a lot of money. Apparently, the great savant reentered the scene during the later war years, when the events took an unfavorable turn."